MULTINATIONAL DESIGNEVALUATION PROGRAMME
Annual Report
April 2018-April 2019

Multinational Design Evaluation
Programme
Annual Report
April 2018 – April 2019

2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

Foreword from the Policy Group Chair
Since May 2018 it has been my privilege to serve as Chairman of the Multinational Design Evaluation
Programme (MDEP) Policy Group. This initiative serves a crucial function in helping regulatory bodies from allover the world to co-operate across a range of international activities related to assessing new reactor designs.
Our collective accomplishments this past year underline the fact that MDEP is a unique and timely enterprisethat allows us to critically examine projects and prepare for future challenges.
This Annual Report provides an accessible summary of these accomplishments and will help readers reflect
on the future of the programme. I am pleased to note that two reactor designs evaluated by MDEP havesuccessfully come into operation in the People’s Republic of China in recent months: AP1000s in Haiyang andSanmen and an EPR unit in Taishan. Other designs currently undergoing safety evaluation are projected to
become operational in numerous other locations in the coming years. Now more than ever, MDEP’s
input promises to be a vital tool for identifying and diffusing best practice for the licensing,construction, commissioning and initial operation of new reactors across the globe.
I would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to my predecessor as chairman, Petteri Tiippana. MDEP
went from strength to strength under his guidance, with the number of member states rising to 16 and theportfolio of reactor designs under evaluation reaching six in 2018. I am sure I speak for all of us when I express
profound gratitude to Petteri for his tireless work in facilitating these and other successes, and for his
invaluable contribution in strengthening MDEP’s reputation as an effective organisation for leveraging theexpertise and experiences of regulators from around the world.
This year, the MDEP has continued to build links with regulators, industry, and standards development
organisations through regular meetings and conferences. Notably, November 2018 saw the staging of the
Nuclear Supply Chain Management Workshop, an event co-organised by MDEP and the Committee on Nuclear
Regulatory Activities (CNRA). Throughout this two-day event, representatives from a variety of stakeholders
analysed key supply chain issues pertinent to an increasingly globalised nuclear industry. The workshop wasa reminder of MDEP’s important role in facilitating co-operation and ensuring that multiple perspectives aretaken into account. I greatly look forward to continuing this at the fifth MDEP Conference.
Clearly, MDEP is in a period of transition. Some Design-Specific Working Groups (DSWGs) are reaching theend of their time within the MDEP framework; some Issue-Specific Working Groups (ISWGs) are beingtransferred to the CNRA in order to expand their membership and scope of work; meanwhile, the new HPR1000
Working Group has recently been established, and Argentina’s Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear (ARN) has joined
the programme. This should lead to interesting discussions on the future of MDEP and the role it might playfor other activities.
I am confident that over the next year we will build upon our excellent track record of enhancing nuclear
safety by pursuing information exchanges, building institutional links, and realising cross-border collaborations.
The support of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), which operates as the MDEP Technical Secretariat, hasbeen and will continue to be instrumental to MDEP’s success; for this reason, I would like to thank our colleagues
at the NEA for all their work in ensuring the smooth functioning of the initiative. In particular, I must express
my gratitude to Luc Chanial for his tireless commitment to marshalling knowledge and resources in support of
all MDEP members. Many thanks to him for his support throughout my chairmanship so far.

Mark Foy,
MDEP Policy Group Chair3

2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

Table of contents

Executive summary............................................................................................................................... 7
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 9
2. Programme goals and outcomes .................................................................................................... 9
3. Programme implementation ......................................................................................................... 10
3.1. Membership ............................................................................................................................. 10
3.2. Organisational structure ........................................................................................................ 10
3.3. MDEP Library............................................................................................................................ 11
3.4. Common Positions .................................................................................................................. 12
4. Interactions with other organisations ......................................................................................... 124.1. CNRA WGRNR .......................................................................................................................... 124.2. IAEA ........................................................................................................................................... 13
4.3. Advanced Reactor Forums ..................................................................................................... 13
4.4. WENRA ..................................................................................................................................... 13
4.5. Industry .................................................................................................................................... 13
4.6. World Nuclear Association .................................................................................................... 14
5. Current activities ............................................................................................................................. 14
5.1. EPR Working Group (EPRWG) ................................................................................................ 15
5.2. AP1000 Working Group (AP1000WG) .................................................................................... 16
5.3. APR1400 Working Group (APR1400WG) ............................................................................... 175.4. VVER Working Group (VVERWG) .......................................................................................... 18
5.5. HPR1000 Working Group (HPR1000WG) ............................................................................... 19
5.6. Vendor Inspection Co-operation Working Group (VICWG) .............................................. 19
5.7. Codes and Standards Working Group (CSWG) ................................................................... 21
6. Interim results ................................................................................................................................. 23
7. Next Steps – Future of the programme ....................................................................................... 24
Appendix 1: List of abbreviations and acronyms.......................................................................... 25
Appendix 2: Revised or new documents and publications ......................................................... 27

5

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2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

Executive summary
The Multinational Design Evaluation Programme(MDEP) is an initiative that seeks to leverage theresources and knowledge of national regulatory
authorities that are currently, or will shortly be,
undertaking the review of new reactor power plantdesigns. MDEP members are the regulatory
authorities of Argentina (ARN), Canada (CNSC),
China (NNSA), Finland (STUK), France (ASN),
Hungary (HAEA), India (AERB), Japan (NRA), Korea(NSSC), the Russian Federation (Rostechnadzor),
South Africa (NNR), Sweden (SSM), Turkey (TAEK),
the United Arab Emirates (FANR), the United
Kingdom (ONR) and the United States (NRC). The
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) performs theTechnical Secretariat function in support of MDEP.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also
takes part in the work of MDEP. This programme
incorporates a broad range of activities including
enhancing
multilateral
co-operation
withinexisting regulatory frameworks and increasing
multinational convergence of codes, standards,
guides and safety goals. A key concept throughout
the work of MDEP is that national regulators retain
sovereign authority for all licensing and regulatory
decisions.
Working groups are implementing theactivities in accordance with programme plans
with specific activities and goals, and haveestablished the necessary interfaces both within
and outside of MDEP. This report provides a statusof the programme after more than a decade of
implementation.

of Korea, the United Arab Emirates and the UnitedStates. The VVER Working Group (VVERWG)
includes the regulatory authorities of China,
Finland, Hungary, India, Russia and Turkey. The
HPR1000 Working Group (HPR1000WG) includes
the regulatory authorities of Argentina, China,
South Africa and the United Kingdom. The DSWGs
continued to share information and experience on
the safety design reviews with the purpose ofenhancing the safety of the design and enabling
regulators to make timely licensing decisions.
International co-operation also makes it possible
to promote safety and the standardisation of MDEP
designs.
The accomplishments witnessed to date provide
confidence that the MDEP membership, structure
and processes offer an efficient method of achieving
effective co-operation in regulatory reviews for new
designs. At the level of the working groups, the key
accomplishments for 2018-2019 include:•

The EPRWG published a Technical Report (TREPRWG-04) identifying the main differences in
the modelling of a number of reactor faults inthe various EPR designs. It also completed adraft Common Position on boron dilution faults
and 2A loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).
Additionally, it is revising the Common
Position on EPR Instrumentation & Control
designs and is developing reports on hydrogen
management, extended station blackout.

•

The APR1400WG continued to exchange
information on country-specific design issues
in South Korea, the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
and the United States. In October 2018 it
published a Common Position (CP-APR1400-03)
on fuel thermal conductivity degradation (TCD),
following approval with comments by theSteering Technical Committee (STC). The
working group continues to develop Technical
Reports on Equipment Survivability. It is also
developing a Common Position paper on theseismic performance of fuel.

•

The AP1000WG continued to exchange
information about important design changes,
construction issues and vendor issues
associated with the AP1000 design. In 2018 it
published a Common Position (CP-AP1000WG03) on AP1000 In-containment Refuelling
Water Storage Tank (IRWST) Condensate
Return Modelling, and Technical Reports on
Lessons Learnt with AP1000 Reactor Coolant
Pumps (TR-AP1000WG-01) and AP1000 Squib

Significant progress is being made on the overall
MDEP goals of increased co-operation and enhanced
convergence of requirements and practices. In
addition, the lessons learnt from the 11 March 2011accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power
plant have appropriately been addressed by all
designs under MDEP and incorporated into MDEP
activities in the Design-Specific Working Group(DSWG) programme plans.
Five DSWGs are facilitating the MDEP goal ofenhanced co-operation. The EPR Working Group(EPRWG) consists of the regulatory authorities ofChina, Finland, France, India, Sweden, and theUnited Kingdom. The AP1000 Working Group(AP1000WG) consists of the regulatory authorities
of China, India, and the United States; theregulatory authorities of the United Kingdom andCanada also belong to this working group as nonactive members. The APR1400 Working Group(APR1400WG) includes the regulatory authorities7

2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

Valves Design, Construction, Qualification,
and Testing Experience (TR-AP1000WG-02). It
is now developing a Common Position on
Design Approach to Post Loss-of-coolant
Accident (LOCA) Strainer Performance andDebris In-Vessel Downstream Effects, as wellas Technical Reports on Lessons Learnt from
Implementation of the CP addressing FPOTs,
AP1000 Hydrogen Management, and AP1000
Hot Functional Testing Lessons Learnt.
••

8

The VVERWG continues to develop a Common
Positions and Technical Reports on a variety of
topics: regulatory approaches related toaccidents and transients analyses; ex-vessel
melt retention in core catcher; Reactor Pressure
Vessel and Primary Components Reliability for
AES-2006 designs; similarities and differencesamong VVER designs; regulatory safety review
approaches and resulting evaluations. It is also
developing a Technical Report on hydrogen
management at the STC’s request.
The Vendor Inspection Co-operation Working
Group (VICWG) continued to exchange
experience on vendor inspection processes inorder to understand differences in regulatory
approaches and to identify trends andvulnerabilities in international supply chains.
In May 2018 the working group published a
Common Position on the Preparation and
Performance of Vendor Inspections. In Octoberit published a Common Position on Counterfeit,
Suspect
andFraudulent
Items(CSFI)
Procedures and Policies, drawing in particular
on detection and mitigation approach surveys
conducted by France’s ASN. During 2019 and2020 it intends to build on this work bycompiling an Inspection Planning and Tracking
Table that clearly communicates opportunities
for MDEP VICWG regulators to participate andwitness inspections.

•

In November 2018 the VICWG sponsored the
Nuclear Supply Chain Management Workshop
in collaboration with the Committee on Nuclear
Regulatory Activities (CNRA). Throughout thetwo-day workshop, participants discussed theprimary supply chain oversight challenges in an
increasingly globalised nuclear industry,
identifying emerging risks and providing
recommendations to further improve supply
chain management and oversight arrangements.
The VICWG will formally publish theproceedings from the joint workshop; keytakeaways will be considered and integrated
into its future work.

•

The CSWG transferred from MDEP to the
CNRA in June 2018, having achieved the goals
initially established by the STC to improve
design reviews through harmonisation ofcode requirements for pressure-retaining
components. Initially, the transitioned CSWG
will focus on three broad themes: carbon
macro-segregation; in-service inspection andenvironmentally assisted fatigue; and nonwater cooled reactors. These topics wereidentified as consistent with MDEP CSWG
members’ interest and
CNRA survey
responses. It will work with CORDEL and the
SDOs to harmonise code requirements to
reduce economic, technical and regulatory
barriers.

•

The HPR1000WG established two new TESGs:
the Severe Accidents (SA) TESG and theInternal and External Hazards TESG. It willdevelop three Common Positions on thefollowing topics: the Vienna Declaration;
Fukushima lessons learnt; and the Post Lossof-coolant
Accident(LOCA)
Strainer
Performance and Debris in-Vessel Effects. It
also intends to complete a survey on hydrogen
management and will draft a Technical Reportdrawing on the results.

2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

1. Introduction
The Multinational Design Evaluation Programme(MDEP) is an initiative that develops innovative
approaches to leverage the resources and knowledgeof national regulatory authorities who are, or will
shortly be, undertaking the review of new reactor
power plant designs. MDEP is primarily focused on
design evaluation, but also includes inspection
activities and generic issues. A key aim is to better
inform the decisions of regulatory authorities
through multinational co-operation, even as eachregulator retains the sovereign authority to makelicensing and regulatory decisions.
Working groups are implementing the activities
in accordance with their programme plans withspecific activities and goals, and the working groups
have established the necessary interfaces bothwithin and outside MDEP members. Significant
progress has been made over the past year on theoverall MDEP goals of increased co-operation andenhanced convergence of requirements andpractices. Accomplishments to date provide

confidence that the MDEP membership, structure
and processes provide an effective method of
increasing co-operation in regulatory design reviewsfor new reactors.
MDEP was established in 2006 as a multinational
initiative for a five-year period. It was extended foranother five-year period in 2012 by the Policy Group
based on the value gained by the members. In 2015,
the Policy Group determined that MDEP should
continue in its current form, for at least five more
years following 2017. Since MDEP is a temporaryorganisation, the Policy Group has implemented thetransfer of two of the issue-specific working groups(the Codes and Standard Working Group and theDigital Instrumentation and Control [DI&C]
Working Group) and one design-specific working
group (the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor
Working Group) to the NEA Committee on Nuclear
Regulatory Activities (CNRA). This report provides a
status of the programme after more than 10 yearsof implementation.

2. Programme goals and outcomes
The main objectives of the MDEP effort are toenable increased co-operation within existing
regulatory frameworks and establish mutuallyagreed upon practices to enhance the safety of
new reactor designs. The enhanced co­operation
among regulators will improve the effectivenessand efficiency of the regulatory design reviews,
which are part of each country’s licensing process.
The programme focuses on co-operation on
regulatory practices that aim at harmonising
regulatory requirements. The IAEA safety
standards, which provide a general level ofharmonisation, provide input to the work and canbenefit from the final results.
MDEP is meeting its goal of enabling increased
co-operation through the activities of the working
groups. MDEP has been successful in providing aforum for regulatory bodies to co-operate on design
evaluations and inspections. In addition toorganising working groups, MDEP has provided
each regulator with peer contacts who share
information, discuss issues informally, anddisseminate information rapidly. For example, thedesign-specific working group members havebenefitted significantly from the sharing ofquestions among the regulators, resulting in more
informed and harmonised regulatory decisions.
MDEP members have also been highly successful inco-ordinating vendor inspections in which theregulators share observations and insights. MDEP
has made improvements in communicating
information regarding the members’ regulatory
practices through development of an MDEP librarywhich serves as a central repository for all
documents associated with the programme.

92018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

3. Programme implementation
3.1. Membership

Two lines of activities have been established tocarry out the work of MDEP:

Participation in the Policy Group and Steering
Technical Committee is intended for nationalsafety authorities of interested countries that
already have commitments for new build or firmplans to have commitments in the near future for
new reactor designs. The MDEP members are:Argentina, Canada, China, Finland, France, Hungary,
India, Japan, Korea, Russia, South Africa, Sweden,
Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United
Kingdom and the United States. The IAEA also takes
part in the work of MDEP.

•

Design-specific activities. Design-specificworking groups share information on a timely
basis and co­operate in the areas of specificreactor design evaluations, construction
oversight and the commissioning and earlyphase operation of new reactors. Participantsin these working groups are the regulatory
authorities that are actively reviewing,
preparing to review, or regulating theconstruction of the specific new reactor
designs. A design-specific working group isformed when three or more MDEP member
countries express interest in working together.
Under the design-specific working groups,
expert subgroups have been formed toaddress specific technical issues. Non-MDEP
regulators could request MDEP membership inorder to join a design-specific working group.

•

Issue-specific activities. Working groups may
also address specific technical and regulatory
process areas within the programme of work.
Today, MDEP has one issue-specific working
group addressing vendor inspection issues(VICWG); it previously incorporated working
groups on codes and standards (CSWG) anddigital instrumentation and controls (DICWG).
Membership in issue-specific working groups isopen to all MDEP participating countries and the
IAEA representatives. These topics were chosenbecause the activities are of generic interest andof safety significance to the licensing of newreactors in MDEP member countries. The
approaches followed by the MDEP regulators are
not completely alike, and successful completionof the activities related to the issue-specificworking groups will likely result in increased
harmonisation and convergence in regulatory
practices or increased co-operation. In June 2015,
the MDEP Policy Group determined that the
programme should focus on design-specificactivities going forward and the issue-specificworking groups should be closed or transferred
to another organisation over the next few years.
The Digital I&C and Codes and Standards
working groups were transferred to the CNRA in2017 and 2018, respectively. The VICWG has
been approved by the PG to remain in MDEP
until 2022. The following chart illustrates how
the programme is currently organised.

3.2. Organisational structure
The programme is governed by a Policy Group (PG),
made up of the heads of the participatingorganisations, and implemented by a Steering
Technical Committee (STC) and its working groups.
The Steering Technical Committee consists ofsenior staff representatives from each of theparticipating national safety authorities in addition
to a representative from the IAEA.
The Policy Group provides guidance to theSteering Technical Committee on the overall focus
of MDEP; monitors the progress of the programme;
and determines participation in the programme.
The Steering Technical Committee manages andapproves the detailed programme of work including:defining topics and working methods; establishingtechnical working groups and nomination ofexperts; approving procedures and technical papers
developed by the working groups; establishinginterfaces with other international efforts to benefit
from available work and avoid duplication;
developing procedures for the handling of
information to be shared in the project; reporting to
the Policy Group; identifying new topics for the
programmetoaddress;andestablishingsubcommittees of the STC to study specific topics.
The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
performs the Technical Secretariat function in
support of MDEP.

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2016-2017 MDEP Annual Report

MDEP organisational structure as of April 2019

3.3. MDEP library
In part, MDEP information is communicated among
the members through the MDEP library, which
serves as a central repository for all documents
associated with the programme. The NEA provides
the technical support for development andmaintenance of the MDEP library on a secured
password-protected website. The website provides
two levels of access which are: 1) general access
open to every member, and 2) restricted area accessfor each MDEP working groups’ member regulators.
Publicly available documents related to MDEP areavailable on the MDEP page of the NEA website(www.oecd-nea.org/mdep). The STC, through theSecretariat, manages the maintenance of the libraryand makes enhancements to improve theeffectiveness of the library.

In order for MDEP to be successful in fulfilling its
goal of leveraging the work of peer regulators in theevaluation of new nuclear power plant designs, aframework was developed to facilitate the sharingof technical information among MDEP participantsthat at times may include proprietary and othertypes of sensitive information. As a general rule, theinformation exchanged as part of the MDEP in
meetings and the MDEP library is for the sole use of
the participating national regulatory authorities.
The members of the working groups also follow thecommunications protocol to share new information
related to new reactors with other members inadvance of its release to the public. A large portionof the information shared may not be proprietary or
sensitive; however, all participating members must
protect and properly handle the information that an
originator claims to be proprietary or sensitive.

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2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

3.4. Common Positions
MDEP has developed a process for identifying anddocumenting Common Positions on specific issues
among the member regulators based on existing
standards, national regulatory guidance, bestpractices and group member inputs. Designspecific Common Positions document common
conclusions that each of the working groupmembers have reached during design reviews.
Discussions among the members and sharing
information in these areas help to strengthen theindividual conclusions reached.
Generic Common Positions apply genericallyrather than only to one specific design. GenericCommon Positions document practices andpositions that each of the working group members
find acceptable. The Common Positions are intended

to provide guidance to the regulators in reviewing
new or unique areas, and will be shared with the
IAEA, and other standards organisations, forconsideration
instandards
development
programmes. After a Common Position is agreed toby a working group, it is presented to the STC for
endorsement. Upon endorsement by the STC, theproposed Common Positions are made publicly
available on the NEA MDEP website in order to keep
external stakeholders informed of the work
completed within MDEP. Those Common Positions
will become commendable practices, recommended
by MDEP. There is no obligation on the part of any
regulatory body to follow them. A key concept
throughout the work of MDEP is that national
regulators retain sovereign authority for all licensing
and regulatory decisions. If a regulatory bodychooses to formally adopt a Common Position, it
would be through that country’s regular processes.

4. Interactions with other organisations
MDEP strives to maintain an awareness of, andinteractions with, other organisations that are
implementing
programmestofacilitate
international co-operation on new reactors.
Interactions focus on ensuring that MDEP does not
duplicate efforts and benefits from the outputs ofthese organisations.
A key outcome of MDEP’s co-operation withexternal organisations was the 2018 Supply Chain
Management Workshop. The CNRA, CORDEL,WENRA, the IAEA and industry actors all madesignificant contributions to the planning andexecution of this two-day event, which focused on
the primary supply chain oversight challenges.
Participants worked to identify emerging risks andprovided recommendations to further improve
supply chain management and oversightarrangements.

4.1. CNRA WGRNRThe CNRA Working Group on the Regulation of New
Reactors (WGRNR) examines the regulatory issues ofsiting, licensing, and regulatory oversight ofgeneration III+ and generation IV nuclear reactors.
The current focus areas of the WGRNR are
construction experience and construction inspection
issues. The WGRNR co-ordinates its work with thework performed by MDEP such that it utilises its
outputs, does not duplicate its efforts, and extends
the results of MDEP to other CNRA members. To

12

avoid overlap of activities between the groups,
WGRNR focuses on procedures and guidance, while
MDEP focuses on design-specific issues.
MDEP interacts with the CNRA WGRNR and theWorking Group on Inspection Practices (WGIP)
through the NEA, which also serves as the Technical
Secretariat for the CNRA. WGRNR is the focal point ofinteractions between MDEP and the CNRA and its
working groups, and will assist in co-ordinating
communications and requests between the two
activities in order to ensure that the MDEP's efforts
take full advantage of the work already being doneby the CNRA.
Since 2014, MDEP and CNRA have worked
together to address commissioning activities (hotfunctional and start-up testing) specific to particular
MDEP designs; meanwhile, WGRNR continues tofocus on generic commissioning activities. Lessons
learnt from MDEP commissioning activities continue
to be transferred to WGRNR for it to pursue the workon a generic basis with participation open to a wider
range of regulators.
In accordance with the Policy Group direction totransfer the MDEP issue-specific working group
activities to the NEA, MDEP has co-operated with
CNRA leadership to undertake the transfer of
additional activities to CNRA. The benefits ofcontinuing co-ordination among regulators onthese topics have been recognised both within andoutside of MDEP.

2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

In June 2018, the CSWG was transferred to the
CNRA. The decision to do so was reached following
the CSWG members’ success in their mission topromote and facilitate harmonisation andconvergence of international Codes and Standards.
Several ongoing efforts attest to this, and aframework for future work has been built. At aworkshop held in April 2018, the members
identified considerable further potential forfurther work, though they believed this would
likely fall outside the purview of MDEP.

4.5. Industry

Having surveyed the memberships of the CNRA,
the members of the CSWG believe that there is agreat deal of profitable and mutually beneficial work
left to be done in a forum of similar composition to
the CSWG. The proposed new working group would
be a valuable support in maintaining a safe andefficient nuclear industry worldwide.

•

The Codes and Standards Working Group
interacted with a committee of standards
development organisations (SDOs) (ASME, JSME,KEPIC, AFCEN, NIKIET and CSA) in a code
comparison project. After issuing the code
comparison report, the SDOs formed a Code
Convergence Board to achieve convergence on
individual requirements, where realistic andpractical. Members of the MDEP CSWG
participate in meetings of the Code Convergence
Board. Within the framework of the CNRA, thenewly created WGCS is planning to pursue
co-operation with industry to achieve its goals.

•

The EPR Working Group meets regularly withrepresentatives of Framatome, EDF and other
EPR licensees, applicants and potential
applicants to discuss similarities anddifferences among the EPR designs being
licensed in each country.

•

The AP1000 Working Group meets with
Westinghouse and the AP1000 applicants andlicensees.

•

The APR1400 Working Group meets with KHNP
and representatives of the licensee for the
Barakah nuclear power plant, an APR1400 in
the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

•

The VVER Working Group continues tointeract with the Russian nuclear industry, as
well as invited representatives of Rosatom,
Rosenergoatom and design organisations(such as Atomenergoproekt, Atomproekt andGidropress) to take part in the meetings of theVVERWG and its subgroups to acquire
additional
informationabout
safetysignificant design solutions.

•

The Vendor Inspection Co-operation Working
Group (VICWG) meets with SDO and World
Nuclear Association (WNA) representatives todiscuss Quality Assurance and Quality
Management(QA/QM)
standardsformanufacturing nuclear components. Many
industry representatives attended the Supply
Chain Management workshop held in
November 2018.

The MDEP working groups are very interested inunderstanding the perspectives of the design
vendors, codes and standards organisations, andcomponent manufacturers, as well as thechallenges they face in dealing with numerous
regulators and regulatory systems. The MDEP
working groups interact with industry groups, andinvite them to participate in selective portions ofmeetings and other activities. For example:

4.2. IAEA
The IAEA takes part in the work of MDEP throughparticipation in the Policy Group meetings, STC
meetings and issue-specific working groups. In
addition, the generic Common Positions developedin MDEP are shared with the IAEA for considerationin the IAEA standards development programme.

4.3. Advanced reactor forums
Although MDEP is not currently considering thedesigns of advanced reactors, MDEP interacts with
the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) to stay
informed of multinational co­operative activities in
the area of advanced reactors. MDEP also receives
updates, through the NEA, of the work of the Joint
CNRA/CSNI Ad hoc Group on the Safety of
Advanced Reactors (GSAR), and maintains anawareness of the efforts of the IAEA Small Modular
Reactor Forum. While these groups co-operate on
the generic issues related to advanced and small
modular reactors (SMR), there is an understandingthat MDEP may form a design-specific working
group if three MDEP member countries begin toconsider a specific advanced or SMR design.

4.4. WENRAThe MDEP Steering Technical Committee meets
periodically with a representative of the Western
Europe Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) todiscuss the development of WENRA safety
objectives and reports. The WENRA Reactor Safety
Working Group has welcomed MDEP input whendeveloping its documents.

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2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

4.6. World Nuclear Association
The World Nuclear Association CORDEL group acts
as the industry counterpart to MDEP.
Since both MDEP and CORDEL have expressedinterest in and have established a goal of furthering
harmonisation of reactor designs, regulatory
practices, and industry and international standards,
the MDEP Policy Group has agreed thatco-ordination of efforts with CORDEL is appropriate
in some cases. While co-ordinating efforts in areasof mutual interest, MDEP members will always
retain their individual and independent regulatory
roles and positions. CORDEL task forces address
many issues, including those currently being
worked on by the MDEP issue-specific working
groups. Members of the MDEP STC meet with
CORDEL periodically, and CORDEL has participatedin meetings of the MDEP Vendor Inspections andCodes and Standards Working Groups. CORDEL
plays an important role in code harmonisation. The
CSWG interfaced with CORDEL’s Codes andStandards Task Force (CSTF) to advance code
convergence in partnership with technical experts
from companies worldwide.
While MDEP is a regulatory forum and CORDEL
is an industry organisation, both parties agree they
can benefit from communications and co­operation
where the organisations share common goals. Twoareas in which CORDEL and MDEP both haveprogrammes of work to increase harmonisation are
digital instrumentation and controls and codes andstandards. This co-operation remains strong
following the working groups’ transition to CNRA.
Both MDEP and CORDEL maintain strong
interests in the harmonisation of new reactor
designs and design reviews, regulatory safety
standards and practices, and related industry and
IAEA standards. MDEP values continued interaction
to assist in achieving these goals while eachorganisation functions in a manner consistent with
its appropriate roles and responsibilities.

5. Current activities
The 2018 activities of MDEP are being implemented
through design-specific and issue-specific working
groups. The members of the design-specificworking groups share information and co-operateon specific reactor design evaluations andconstruction oversight. MDEP also maintains one
issue-specific working group that scrutinises
technical and regulatory process areas within the
programme of work. Each working group has a leadand co-lead regulator designated as chair and vicechair, and has developed a programme plan which
identifies specific activities, schedules and contacts.
The design-specific working groups leveragenational regulatory resources by sharing informationand experience on the regulatory safety design
reviews with the purposes of enhancing the safety ofthe design and enabling regulators to make timely
licensing decisions. Design-specific working groups
achieve this goal through:•Exchanging experiences and lessons learnt on
licensing process implementation, design
reviews, and design-related construction andcommissioning activities;•

Working to understand the differences inregulatory safety review approaches in eachcountry to support potential use of otherregulators safety design evaluations, whereappropriate;

14•

Identifying and understanding key design
differences including those originating from
regulatory requirements and then documenting
the reasons for differences in regulatory
requirements;•

Looking for opportunities to provide input toissue-specific working groups on potential
topics of significant interest;•

Documenting common MDEP positions on
aspects of a review;•

Documenting the group’s activities in Technical
Reports to ensure knowledge transfer;•

Communicating
andco-ordinating
communications on MDEP views and Common
Positions to vendors and operators regarding thebasis of safety evaluations and standardisation.

While the design-specific working groups
typically address issues that the members findchallenging, specific to each design, some topics are
addressed by several working groups. Two such
topics are commissioning activities and Fukushima
Daiichi lessons learnt.

Commissioning activities
Members of design-specific working groups,
especially EPRWG and AP1000WG, are presently

2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

devoting resources to co-operate on thecommissioning of first-of-a-kind (FOAK) reactor
testing. Lessons learnt by MDEP will be transferred to
WGRNR for it to pursue the work on a generic basis,
with participation open to a wider range of regulators.
The MDEP generic Common Position addressing
first plant only tests (FPOTs) provides high-levelguidance to applicants and licensees that wish totake credit for a FPOT performed during thecommissioning of the first unit of a similar type, if
accepted by the applicants, licensees and regulators.
An FPOT allows a test performed on the very firstreactor of a specific design to be credited for thesubsequent units of similar design.
As China AP1000s have moved into thecommissioning phase, the Commissioning Activities
Technical
ExpertSubgroup(TESG)
sharedinformation on commissioning tests, significant
issues related to the testing, and lessons learnt on
pre-operational testing. The TESG future activities
include drafting a Technical Report on AP1000 hot
functional testing lessons learnt from the Sanmen,
Haiyang, and Vogtle sites, and increasingco­operation on pre-operational and start-up testing
as more reactors start going through these phases.

MDEP co-operation in operational phases
MDEP was established primarily as a forum toco-operate on design reviews. The Policy Group andSteering Technical Committee have discussed thebenefits and challenges of continuing co-operation
after construction is complete and into theoperational stages. MDEP recognises the benefits ofcontinuing the co-operative relationships formed
during the design review stage, as well as the benefit
to the members of the Design-specific Working
Groups (DSWG) who are still in the licensing phase.
The Policy Group has determined that theoperational stage should not be included in the scopeof MDEP. However, they stated there should be ameans to ensure that operating experience related todesign issues is addressed by DSWGs. With this inmind, MDEP will continue to share information on
construction and commissioning of new reactors,
and incorporate feedback from operating experience
as it pertains to design.
MDEP members agree that operating experience,
when it has an impact on designs, should beconsidered. In particular, information from the firsttwo years of operation may be directly related tocommissioning. MDEP members are encouraged tostay and participate in a group after the considered
reactor begins to operate in their country to shareoperating experience.
This issue was raised once more at the STC
meeting in June 2017. After an extensive discussion,
it was clear that the members value the forum that

MDEP provides. The discussion revolved mostly
around the transition of a DSWG from MDEP toanother area because there is a real value in the
structured co­operation and dialogue that MDEP
promotes. The STC discussed this challenge
extensively and it is considering the Policy Group’s
guidance following their September 2017 meeting.
The ABWRWG was the first design in MDEP tocomplete its programme of work and ceased its
activities under MDEP in June 2018.

Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant
accident lessons learnt
All of the DSWGs have discussed the lessons learnt
from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant
accident and each working group has developed aCommon Position that identifies common
approachestoaddress
potential
safetyimprovements, as well as common general
expectations for new nuclear power plants. As
directed by the MDEP Policy Group, the STC andworking groups developed an integrated MDEP
Common Position on the lessons learnt from the
Fukushima Daiichi accident. The STC finalised thisdocument in 2016 and placed it on the MDEP public
webpage. MDEP recognises that other related
international initiatives have been implemented
that are focused on operating plants. Therefore, it
is important for new MDEP designs, such as the
HPR1000, to address the Fukushima Daiichi
lessons learnt.

5.1. EPR Working Group (EPRWG)
The EPR design-specific Working Group (EPRWG)
includes the regulatory authorities of China (NNSA),
Finland (STUK), France (ASN), India (AERB), Sweden(SSM) and the United Kingdom (ONR). Numerous
meetings and technical exchanges have taken place
to share information on the reviews being conductedin each country. Several major construction
activities were ongoing at the time of this report:
Olkiluoto 3 in Finland, Flamanville 3 in France andthe twin unit plant at Taishan in China were all in
the final stages of construction, one of which started
commercial operation at the end of 2018; the twin
unit plant at Hinkley Point C in the United Kingdom
was in the early construction phase.
The working group currently includes fivetechnical expert subgroups that are addressing
information on specific technical issues: Accidents
and Transients, Digital Instrumentation and Control,
Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Severe Accidents
and Commissioning Activities. Each of thesesubgroups meet regularly to exchange information
on relevant aspects of the design review andcommissioning status, share relevant evaluations
when they become available, and produce Technical15

2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

Reports to identify and document similarities anddifferences among designs, regulatory safety review
approaches and resulting evaluations.
The
EPRWG
meets
occasionallywithrepresentatives of Framatome and of EPR licensees,
applicants, and potential applicants to discuss
similarities and differences among the EPR designs
being reviewed and licensed in each country. In
June 2018, the EPRWG held a meeting in Bristol,
United Kingdom, which included a visit to Hinkley
Point C. In November 2018, the EPRWG met in
Zhuhai, China before visiting the Taishan plant

Accomplishments and plan of work
In 2018, the EPRWG completed and published a
Common Position stating how the EPR design
addresses the objectives of the Vienna Declaration,
especially with regards to avoiding large and early
releases and long-term contamination. This
Common Position addresses design basis, design
extension and severe accidents.
Given the move of most of the current EPR
projects towards final commissioning and operation,a review of the plan of work and TESGs wasundertaken, with most TESGs (as outlined below)
anticipated to complete their programme of workand close in 2019.
The Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) TESG
published a Technical Report identifying the maindifferences in the modelling of a number of reactor
faults in the various EPR designs. It will close
following a final meeting to compare the latest EPR
PSA models.
The Accidents and Transients (A&T) TESG has
been discussing reactor physics data obtained fromthe post fuel load commissioning tests at Taishan
and various aspects of the EPR design, including theeffectiveness of the pump filtration in design basis
and severe accidents, and Heating, Ventilation and
Air Conditioning (HVAC) designs. They havedeveloped a Common Position on boron dilution
issues. In addition, the subgroup has completed adraft paper on double-ended guillotine break lossof-coolant accident (2A LOCA). The A&T TESG willclose once the Technical Report on 2A LOCA isissued and discussions on the reactor physics dataobtained from the post fuel load commissioning
tests at Taishan have been completed.
The Digital Instrumentation and Controls (DI&C)
TESG has developed a draft Common Position in
EPR I&C designs and is finalising a Technical Reporton EPR I&C designs. The subgroup will close
following completion of these tasks.
The Severe Accidents (SA) TESG has developed adraft Technical Report on hydrogen management
and is now focused on the different approaches

16

across the EPRs to operating strategies for severe
accidents. The SA TESG will close once thehydrogen management report has been issued, anddiscussions on EPR operating strategies for severe
accidents reviews have taken place and any followon work completed.
The Commissioning Activities (CA) TESG met
twice in 2018 to share experiences on a variety ofcommissioning-related issues. They also revised theTechnical Report on First Plant Only Tests (FPOT) to
address learning from observing an EPR FPOT. They
intend to continue their activities as long as
members continue to show interest in exchanging
information regarding commissioning-related issues.

5.2. AP1000 Working Group (AP1000WG)
The AP1000 design-specific Working Group(AP1000WG) includes the regulatory authorities ofChina (NNSA), India (AERB) and the United States(NRC). The UK regulatory authority (ONR) has ceased
regulatory review activities for the AP1000 design inthe United Kingdom following NuGen’s decision to
pursue a different reactor design for the Moorside
project in Cumbria. In Canada, since CNSC
completed a pre-licensing assessment of the AP1000
in June 2013 as part of its Phase 2 evaluation, there
has been no activity with Westinghouse ElectricCompany (Westinghouse) on further AP1000 review
efforts. The Phase 2 vendor design review is now
complete. In light of these developments, theregulatory authorities of the United Kingdom (ONR)
and Canada (CNSC) remain in the AP1000 Working
Group as inactive members.
During this reporting period, four AP1000 units
reached commercial operation in China at theSanmen and Haiyang sites. Construction work
remains underway on two units at the Vogtle site in
the United States. India is considering building six
AP1000 units at the Kovvada site.
On 14 February 2018, the NRC granted
Westinghouse an exemption from Title 10 of theCode of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 52.57(a) to deferby five years the time period during which
Westinghouse could submit and the staff could
accept a renewal application for the AP1000 Design
Certification (DC). The renewal can now be requested
between 27 February 2023 and 27 February 2025.
Westinghouse had requested the exemption to allow
for the completion and initial operation of AP1000
units in the United States, and the subsequent
incorporation of lessons learnt from those activities
into the DC renewal application.

Accomplishments and plan of work
The working group members have continued toshare design, construction and commissioning2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

information, application documents, evaluations
and preliminary findings. They have also continued
to identify the most significant design review issues,
as well as construction and vendor challenges. In
November 2018, members began to consider the
initial operational experience of the AP1000 units in
China, and discussed changes to the technicalspecifications as construction was completed andthe units entered commercial operation.
Throughout the existence of the working group,
members have exchanged information related tolicensing, construction, commissioning, and initial
operation issues in various countries. The
documents have been shared through the MDEP
library. Discussion topics have included incontainment condensate return, main control
room dose and habitability, reactor coolant pumps,
squib valves and equipment qualification, as well
as discussions on lessons learnt from the
Fukushima Daiichi accident and the prevention
and mitigation of severe accidents. In October 2018,
these efforts culminated with the publication ofTechnical Reports on Squib Valves (TR-AP1000WG02) and Reactor Coolant Pumps (TR-AP1000WG-01)
and a Common Position (CP-AP1000WG-03) on Incontainment Refuelling Water Storage Tank
(IRWST) Condensate Return Modelling.
As the AP1000s in China moved closer tooperation and completed hot and cold functional
testing, the working group discussed the results andthe lessons learnt from these tests. The working
group also collected information on how thedifferent member countries are addressing hydrogen
management. The working group is currently
finalising Technical Reports documenting lessons
learnt during the initial test program, hydrogen
management and on international co-operation
during the design, construction and commissioningof AP1000 reactors. These will be the next three
Technical Reports completed by the working group.
In its latest Programme Plan, the AP1000WG has
established a number of objectives to be completed
during the 2020-2021 period. In response to arequest by the STC, the group has begun to plan a
Common Position regarding Post Loss-of-coolant
Accident (LOCA) Strainer Performance and Debris
In-Vessel Downstream Effects. Additionally, theworking group is developing a Technical Report on
lessons learnt from implementation of the CP
addressing FPOTs.
More broadly, it will continue to share AP1000
regulatory evaluations and inspection reports andwill conduct discussions on technical issues
including commissioning and initial test programs,
design changes, construction and vendor issues,and operational challenges.

5.3. APR1400 Working Group (APR1400WG)
The APR1400 design-specific Working Group(APR1400WG) was established in August 2012 withfour countries, though Finland later opted to leavefollowing the cancellation of the Olkiluto 4 projectin 2015. The current participants are the regulatory
authorities of Korea, the United Arab Emirates(UAE), and the United States. The United ArabEmirates leads the working group.
The first APR1400, Shin-Kori Unit 3 in Korea, hasbeen in commercial operation since December 2016.
Shin-Kori 4 was connected to the grid in April 2019
and was expected to enter commercial operation in
the summer of 2019. Four additional units – ShinHanul 1&2 and Shin-Kori 5&6 – were underconstruction. Four APR1400 units were also underconstruction at the Barakah site in the UAE. The
construction licenses for Barakah Units 1&2 andBarakah Units 3&4 were granted in July 2012 andSeptember 2014, respectively. The operating license
application for Barakah nuclear power plant Unit 1
was submitted in March 2015 and was under review
by the UAE Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation.
Furthermore, licenses for new fuel import, fresh
fuel transportation, and fresh fuel storage inBarakah Unit 1 were granted to the future operatorof the UAE nuclear power plants in 2016.
The US NRC certified the APR1400 for the US
market in May 2019, following a 42-month design
certification review process. The application for
design certification was submitted in December
2014 by KHNP and KEPCO and docketed in March2015. The contents of the application included
design control documents, the environmental
report, Technical Reports, Inspection, Tests,
Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) andtopical reports. The Phase 1 safety evaluation wascompleted in February 2016 and Phase 2 review wascompleted in May 2017. The NRC’s Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards completed its
review in July 2017. The Phase 4 review wascompleted in May 2018. Phase 5 and phase 6 werecompleted in July and September 2018, respectively.
In May 2019, the US NRC published the APR1400
Design Certification rule for public comments.

Accomplishments and plan of work
Throughout 2018 and 2019, the nuclear regulatory
agencies of Korea, the United Arab Emirates, andthe United States continued to exchange
information related to several significant APR1400
issues. In October 2018 the working group met atthe NEA in Paris, with the Accident and Transient(A&T) TESG and the Severe Accident (SA) TESG also
holding their own separate meetings.
At the October 2018 meeting, the A&T TESG
focused on country-specific issues related to new17

2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

APR1400 reactors in South Korea, the UAE and theUnited States. They also held discussions on Fuel
Seismic Issues and their impact on different designs.
Meanwhile, the SA TESG discussed Equipment
Survivability, particularly with regards to the testingof containment penetration seals and gaskets.
Subsequently, the subgroup intends to develop a
draft Technical Report on this topic. It will also
develop a draft Technical Report on Severe AccidentManagement Programmes.
In 2018 the working group completed a Common
Position (CP-APR1400-03) on fuel pellet thermal
conductivity degradation (TCD), which was approved
with comments by the STC in October. The
APR1400WG is also in the process of developing a
Common Position paper on the seismic performanceof fuel.
Given the completion of both the NRC’s APR1400
licensing process and the 2018 safety review report,
the United States will reduce its participation in theactivities of the APR1400WG, remaining part of theworking group as an inactive member. In light ofthese circumstances, the working group has
decided to focus on completing the Technical
Reports and Common Position papers that are
currently under development.

5.4. VVER Working Group (VVERWG)
The VVER Working Group (VVERWG) includes theregulatory authorities of China, Finland, Hungary,
India, Russia and Turkey. The working groupmembers are reviewing plants at various stages ofdesign and construction. In Russia, the Rostov
nuclear power plant’s Unit 4 entered commercial
operation in September 2018. The Leningrad-II
nuclear power plant Unit 1 entered commercial
operation in October 2018; Unit 2 is underconstruction and siting licenses have been issues for
Units 3 and 4. The Novovoronezh-II nuclear power
plant Unit 1 is in operation; Unit 2 has received its
operating license and was connected to the grid in
May 2019. The Kursk-II nuclear power plant Units 1
and 2 were under construction. The Smolensk-II
nuclear power plant siting licenses have been issued
for Units 1 and 2. In Finland, one unit is under review
for a construction license at Hanhikivi nuclear power
plant. At the Kudankulam plant in India, two units
are in operation, two units are construction, and two
more have received siting licenses. At Akkyuy inTurkey, Units 1 and 2 are under construction with
two additional units being considered forconstruction licenses. In China, four VVER units arein operation at the Tianwan nuclear power plant. In
June 2018, the Chinese and Russian governments
signed an agreement to construct two more VVER
units in Tianwan. Hungary has granted siting

18

licenses based on generic design information for two
VVER units at the Paks-II nuclear power plant.

Accomplishments and plan of work
The VVERWG currently includes four technicalexpert subgroups that are addressing specifictechnical issues: Severe Accidents (SA TESG),
Fukushima accident Lessons Learnt (FUKU TESG),
Reactor Pressure Vessel and Primary Circuit
Components (RPV&PC TESG) and Accidents andTransients (T&A TESG). The members meet
regularly to exchange information and experiencein their countries’ regulatory activities, approaches
and legal framework related to new designs.
In 2018 the VVERWG published its Technical
Report (TR-VVERWG-01) on regulatory approaches
and criteria used in severe accident analyses andsevere accident management after obtaining
approval from the STC.
The T&A TESG has drafted a Technical Report on
regulatory approaches related to accidents andtransients analyses. The report covers the following
four topics: regulatory requirements for accident andtransient analyses; computer codes used formodelling of accidents and transients; issues
concerning safety demonstration of passive systems;
and approaches for regulatory review of safety
analyses. The VVERWG is currently reviewing thisreport before it is submitted to the STC.
The SA TESG continues to develop a Technical
Report and a Common Position addressing exvessel melt retention in core catcher, and will
incorporate the answers to questionnaires on
passive autocatalytic recombiners and on extended
station blackout as it discussed at its meeting in
February 2018 in Paris. The Technical Report is
expected in December 2019 and the draft Common
Position in June 2020.
The Fukushima TESG continues to develop a
draft Common Position addressing the Vienna
Declaration on Nuclear Safety. At the 10th VVERWG
meeting in May 2018, the members decided topostpone the development of this Common
Position until receiving the licensing documentsfrom STUK and HAEA.
The RPV&PC TESG continues to discuss theregulatory approaches and oversight practices
related to reactor pressure vessel and primary
components. Since its meeting in September 2017,its discussions have also covered the evaluation ofsurveillance programmes for justification of RPV
integrity, the qualification of FOAK components
and the qualification of non-destructive testing(NDT) and welding personnel and special processes.
The subgroup has drafted a CP on Reactor Pressure
Vessel and Primary Components Reliability for AES2006 designs; this is under review by the members

2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

before submission to the STC. It also intends todevelop a Technical Report on the same topic.
Furthermore, the VVERWG intends to draft
Technical Reports identifying and documenting
similarities and differences among designs,
regulatory safety review approaches and resulting
evaluations. It will also continue to document
lessons learnt from design reviews and design issues
faced during construction and commissioning andearly phases of operation. Additionally, it willdevelop a Technical Report on hydrogen
management following a request from the STC.

5.5. HPR1000 Working Group (HPR1000WG)
The MDEP HPR1000 Working Group (HPR1000WG)
was approved by the MDEP Policy Group in
September 2017. The group is focused on safety
design reviews of the Hualong Pressurized Water
Reactor Technology Co. LTD HPR1000 design. The
HPR1000WG includes the regulatory authorities ofArgentina (ARN), China (NNSA), South Africa (NNR),
and the United Kingdom (ONR).
The first meeting of the HPR1000WG was held inMarch 2018 in Beijing, China. Members met in Paris,
France, in September 2018 and in Liverpool, United
Kingdom, in March 2019. A total of four HPR1000
units are currently under construction in China at
the Fuqing and Fangchenggang sites.
In the United Kingdom, the HPR1000 design
passed Step 2 of the ONR’s Generic Design
Assessment (GDA) process in November 2018. Step 3of the 4-step process began in November 2018 and isscheduled to last one year. The Bradwell B HPR1000
nuclear power plant project is in the early stages,
with initial site investigations currently underway.
The ARN has signed a Memorandum ofUnderstanding
(MOU)
with
the
licensee,
Nucleoeléctrica Argentina S.A. (NA-SA). A similar
MOU is expected to be signed between NA-SA andthe China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) in
the near future.

Accomplishments and plan of work
In light of its discussions on Fukushima and severe
accidents, FPOTs, unique design features affecting
safety, and the treatment of external and internal
events, the HPR1000WG has opted to establish two
new TESGs to further scrutinise the issues: theSevere Accidents (SA) TESG and the Internal andExternal Hazards TESG. These TESGs will be
required to provide a work plan describing thescope of the issues they will address and will also
report on the status of their work at each
HPR1000WG meeting.

The HPR1000WG will complete a survey onhydrogen management and will draft a Technical
Report on this issue drawing on the results.
It will develop three Common Positions on thefollowing topics:•

Fukushima Lessons Learnt, incorporating the
STC statement on the Vienna Declaration.

•

Post Loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) Strainer
Performance and Debris in-Vessel Effects.

•

The Vienna Declaration.

The STC approved the HPR1000WG’s ProgrammePlan for 2019-2020 at its meeting in April 2019.

5.6. Vendor Inspection Co-operation
Working Group (VICWG)
The goals of the VICWG are to:•Support MDEP design-specific working groups;•

Maximise the use of the results obtained fromother regulators’ efforts in inspecting vendors;•

Understand the similarities and differences
between MDEP national regulators’ Quality
Assurance and Quality Management (QA/QM)
Requirements in order to utilise the information
to improve regulators own requirements;•

Facilitate the adoption of good vendor
oversight practices by national regulators;•

Harmonise the vendor inspection practices
among MDEP regulators for inspections under
the MDEP protocol;•

Continue joint and witnessed inspections andperform multinational inspections of vendors
according to the common QA/QM requirements;•

Focus vendor attention on areas of emerging
risks;•

Focus licensee and vendor oversighteffective supply chain performance;•

Focus licensee and vendor attention on
positive nuclear safety culture expected within
the supply chain;•

Continue to engage with CNRA to consider how
to maximise the use of information gathered
through VICWG activities;•

Consider the establishment of an NEA working
group for vendor oversight, as part of thetransfer of ISWGs to the NEA.

on

The working group enhances the understandingof each regulator’s inspection procedures andpracticesbyco­ordinating
witnessedand192018-2019 MDEP Annual Reportmultinational inspections of quality assurance
arrangements and safety-related components.
Witnessed inspections consist of one regulator
performing an inspection to its criteria, observed byrepresentatives of other MDEP countries. The
benefits to the observing countries include
additional information and added confidence in theinspection results.
Multinational inspections consist of one
regulator conducting an inspection according to its
own regulatory framework with the active
participation of one or more regulators. This allows
the participating members to use the results of theinspection that are applicable to their regulations.
Multinational inspections are a tool to gain vendor
performance insights with minimal inspection
resources from the participating regulators.
The working group maintains an annual list ofplanned inspections providing the opportunity toco­operate and fully maximise the results fromvendor inspection activity. The inspection results areshared through the MDEP library. The library
includes not only the reports of witnessed andmultinational inspections, but other inspection
reports that may be of interest to the MDEP members.
The VICWG routinely engages with standard
development organisations (SDOs) to exchange
regulatory experience, encourage co­operation andinfluence the future activities of the SDOs. It
continues to co-operate with important external
stakeholders such as the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), CORDEL and the World
Nuclear Association (WNA) Supply Chain Taskforce.
Furthermore, the VICWG engages with the CNRA
Working Group on Inspection Practices (WGIP) to
provide opportunities to WGIP members to observe
vendor inspections and to share VICWG Common
Positions.

Accomplishments and plan of work
During the 2018-2019 period, the VICWG continued
to exchange experience on vendor inspection
processes in order to understand differences inregulatory approaches and to identify trends andvulnerabilities in the international supply chain
encountered in vendor inspections. It also
continued to work with standard development
organisations (SDOs) of applicable standards to
explore harmonisation of QA/QM requirements.
During the 2017-2018 reporting period, fivewitnessed inspections were completed involving
regulators from the United States, Korea, France,
United Kingdom, Russia, Japan and Finland. The
French and US regulators also collaborated on
inspection results from separately conducted
vendor inspections. In total, 15 opportunities wereidentified to co­operate on vendor inspection-

20

related information. Based on the collaboration andopportunities to witness inspections, the VICWG
published its Common Position CP-VICWG-03:
Preparation and Performance of Vendor Inspectionsin May 2018.
The VICWG has continually enhanced its
co­operation on areas of emerging risk in supply
chain management and vendor activity, notably in
relation to Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect
Items (CFSIs). In 2017, the group co-operated
effectively in dealing with fraudulent material
certificates supplied from a Japanese material
manufacturer. This approach continued into 2018as the scope of falsification continued to grow.
Ongoing co­operation has enabled regulators toevaluate their measures for addressing the risks of
CFSIs entering licensee facilities through vendors.
In October 2018, this culminated in the publicationof a Common Position (CP-VICWG-04) on CSFI
Procedures and Policies. Forward activities willcontinue to consider co­operation on areas of
emerging risk such as reverse engineering.
In further developing its approach to these issues,
the VICWG will also draw on the Nuclear Supply
Chain Management Workshop which it sponsored incollaboration with the Committee on Nuclear
Regulatory Activities (CNRA) in November 2018. This
event brought together representatives fromindustry,
regulatoryorganisations,standarddevelopment organisations, technical support
organisations, and other international organisations
from over 15 countries. Throughout the two-day
workshop, participants discussed the primary
supply chain oversight challenges in an increasingly
globalised nuclear industry. Covering topics such as
CFSI lessons learnt, advancing early integration of
Safety Culture into the supply chain, and regulatory
approaches and international co-operation toprepare for new technologies, participants identified
emerging risks and provided recommendations tofurther improve supply chain management andoversight arrangements. The VICWG will formally
publish the proceedings from the joint workshop;
key takeaways will be considered and integrated into
its future work.
The VICWG continues to ensure that its
programme documents and inspection protocols are
effectively maintained. In October 2018, it publisheda Technical Report (TR-VICWG-05) summarising its
2016 inspection of the Creusot Forge facility. The
report also offers insights into the planning andorganisation of future multinational inspections.

Next steps
As the VICWG has matured and national vendor
inspection programmes have developed, theopportunities from VICWG participation haveincreased from co­operation on vendor inspection

2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

activities to sharing the outcomes of national vendor
inspection programmes. The Programme Plan
continues to emphasise this additional objective of
the VICWG.
The VICWG will continue to organise and conduct
witnessed or joint inspections in future. In 2019 and2020 it intends to compile an Inspection Planning
and Tracking Table that clearly communicates
opportunities for MDEP VICWG regulators toparticipate and witness inspections. Following this,it will target at least two inspections to be conductedeach year and will discuss lessons learnt from their
execution. The frequency of inspections isdetermined in relation to the activities of theidentified vendors; however, it is anticipated that atleast one multinational vendor inspection will becompleted every two years. The VICWG will also
consider any public communication needs
associated with the outcome of MDEP multinational
vendor inspections and, if necessary, prepare
joint/co-ordinated press releases and statements to
be issued by the PG.
The VICWG will continue to co­operate on areasof emerging risk and share inspection programmeoutcomes among regulators and with SDOs toinfluence appropriate mitigating methods including
the development of associated international
standards and guidance.
To ensure continued alignment with MDEP goals,
the VICWG will continue to engage with the Designspecific Working Groups (DSWG) to assess whether
it continues to provide effective support for DSWG
issues and identify any opportunities forenhancement. The VICWG is currently collaboratingwith the CNRA Working Group on Safety Culture(WGSC) to develop a Common Position on Safety
Culture in the Supply Chain; it intends to conduct asurvey on safety culture to support this work.
The VICWG has been supporting the Working
Group on Digital Instrumentation & Controls(WGDIC) in considering how existing vendor
inspection processes could be applied to support
Digital Instrumentation and Control (DI&C) Vendor
Inspections. During the 2019-2020 period, VICWG
will contribute to the development of a Technical
Report on DI&C inspections.

5.7. Codes and Standards Working Group(CSWG)The goal of the Codes and Standards issue-specific
WorkingGroup(CSWG)
wastoachieveharmonisation of code requirements for design andconstruction of pressure-retaining (pressure
boundary) components in order to improve theeffectiveness and efficiency of the regulatory design
reviews, increase quality of safety assessments,

and to make each regulator stronger in its ability tomake safety decisions.
The CSWG recognised early on that the first stepto achieving harmonisation is to understand theextent of similarities and differences among thepressure boundary codes and standards used invarious countries. The CSWG encouraged standards
development organisations (SDOs) to compare therequirements in JSME’s S-NC1 Code (Japan),
AFCEN’s RCC-M Code (France), KEA’s KEPIC Code(Korea), CSA’s N285.0 standard (Canada), and
NIKIET’s PNAE G-7 Code (Russia) against therequirements in Section III of the ASME Boiler andPressure Vessel Code (United States) for Class 1
vessels, piping, pumps and valves. The results
identified similarities and differences among thenational codes, provided insight into thebackground, history, and philosophy of each code,and provided a basis for developing a generalapproach to code harmonisation. The report oncode comparison was published in December 2012.
Based on the CSWG findings and the code
comparison results, the CSWG established a global
framework of a hierarchical structure for achieving
code harmonisation. At the top of the hierarchy, theFundamental Attributes provides overarchingrequirements for nuclear power plant design andconstruction. At the middle level, the Essential
Performance Guidelines recommends basic designand construction rules to be included in codes, andprovides guidance for code harmonisation. At thebottom level, code harmonisation was performed, aprocess that includes convergence and reconciliationof code differences as well as the minimisation offurther code divergence. The CSWG proposed a
stepwise approach for code convergence andestablished a regular communication process for
information exchange and discussion among
regulators, industry, and SDOs.
The CSWG played an important role as aninterface between the regulators and industry efforts
to harmonise codes and standards. CSWG interactedwith the WNA CORDEL group Codes and Standards
Task Force (CSTF), consisting of technical experts
from various companies worldwide (Framatome,
Bentley, Rolls-Royce, EDF, EPRI, Westinghouse, TVO,etc.) working to converge code requirements. They
proposed a pilot project plan, which was consistent
with CSWG stepwise approach, to harmonise code
requirements. The CORDEL CSTF has achieved
significant accomplishments in the areas of nondestructive
examination(NDE)
personnel
certification and non-linear analysis. They havecompared requirements in the major nuclear designcodes, compared the current international industrial
certification practices, and recommended aharmonised international alternative for thecertification of NDE personnel. They have also

21

2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

thoroughly reviewed the existing non-linear rules indifferent codes, and compared the scope, methods
and availability of material data needed to perform
analysis in very technical detail; they are developing
universal new rules for non-linear analysis.
After issuing the code comparison report, theSDOs formed a Code Convergence Board to limit
divergence on code requirements, and achieve
convergence on individual requirements where
realistic and practical. The SDOs and CORDEL areworking jointly on code convergence of weld
qualification. They extensively reviewed worldwide
practices in performance qualification, procedure
qualification, and quality assurance of welding, andare exploring strategy to harmonise code
requirements on weld qualification. The SDOs arealso considering including other significant technicalissues with international interest that are notcurrently addressed in codes, and jointly developing
universal code requirements. These include
corrosion fatigue, RPV indications, flow-induced
vibration in steam generators, small modular
reactors, margin under high-seismic loadings, andthe use of high-density polyethylene piping.
In parallel to the CORDEL CSTF and the SDOs, the
CSWG worked independently on code reconciliation.
The code differences with international interests andurgent needs were reconciled through four
approaches: 1) demonstrating that different
requirements provide an equivalent level of quality
and safety; 2) demonstrating that a comparatively
less restrictive provision in one code is compensatedby other more stringent provisions of this code, andfull implementation of the code still results in an
equivalent degree of quality and safety; 3) specifying
supplementary requirements to conditionally accept
code differences; 4) identifying applicable conditions
for specific code requirements of difference.

Accomplishments
The CSWG has successfully completed its goal andmandate to achieve some level of harmonisationand has identified the challenges in harmonisingcodes and standards. The group has established aregular communication process for informationexchange and discussion, and has encouraged theindustry and the SDOs to move forward and work
co-operatively.
The working group has published six key
technical documents. The Fundamental Attributes
document and Essential Performance Guidelines
document provide high-level and middle-levelguidance for code harmonisation, respectively. The
Regulatory Frameworks for Use of Codes document
describes the regulatory practices in each country inusing codes and provides insight on the flexibility of
the regulatory framework of MDEP countries in using
foreign codes. The Lessons Learnt document

22

provides CSWG’s preliminary findings on achieving
code harmonisation and provides general guidanceon using foreign codes. The Common Position
document proposes a hierarchy structure as a global
framework for harmonisation and documents the
CSWG Common Positions on code harmonisation.
The CSWG Past, Current, and Future Activities
document summarises the CSWG activities andachievements, develops a work plan, and collects alist of potential topics of interest for future code
harmonisation.
Despite the challenges of code harmonisation,with dedicated work and close co-operation
among the CSWG, CORDEL CSTF and SDOs, code
harmonisation is happening in several technicalareas. For example, one SDO is developing its code
based on the SDOs’ Code Comparison Report, andintroducing new code areas. A regulatory authority
is using the CORDEL/SDO Weld Qualification
report to draft proposals for modifying regulatory
requirements. An SDO that requires companybased certification has started to modify its codeand to accept the international alternative
proposed in the NDE personnel certification report.

Next steps
The CSWG has fulfilled the original goals laid out by
the STC and further work will lie outside thepurview of MDEP. Consequently, the CSWG’s
mandate has been transferred to the NEA’s
Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA).
This effort encompassed presentations to CNRA
representatives, the completion of a draft mandate,
and a one-day workshop held in April 2018. The
workshop included code experts and stakeholders
presenting on the CSWG’s accomplishments, thebenefits of CSWG work products, the stakeholderinterest in a regulator body such as the CSWG, andregulators’ expectations on code harmonisation
work. The audience of the workshop consisted of
MDEP, CNRA, and stakeholder code expert
representatives. A survey was sent to CNRA
members in preparation for the workshop; theresults indicated broad support for the continuationof the CSWG work.
At the April 2018 CSWG meeting, it was
proposed that an initial scope of work for atransitioned CSWG entity would focus on threebroad themes: carbon macro-segregation, inservice inspection and environmentally assisted
fatigue, and non-water cooled reactors. These
topics were identified as consistent with MDEPCSWG members’ interest and CNRA survey
responses. The group’s mandate to operate under
the CNRA was formally established in June 2018.
The Working Group on Codes and Standards(WGCS) will continue, with an extended membership
under the CNRA, to encourage CORDEL and the SDOs

2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

to make progress in harmonising code requirements
in order to improve operations and reduce technicaland regulatory barriers. Some countries are
considering developing their own codes. The WGCS
will encourage these countries to study the existingcodes carefully and minimise the potential

differences between new codes and the existingcodes.
The transfer of the CSWG from MDEP to the
CNRA is now completed.

6. Interim results
MDEP is considered a long-term programme withinterim results. Interim results are those productsthat document agreement by the MDEP members
and are necessary steps in working towards
increased co-operation and convergence. Theinterim results for this reporting period include:••

The EPRWG published a Technical Report (TREPRWG-04) identifying the main differences in
the modelling of a number of reactor faults inthe various EPR designs. It has also completed adraft Common Position on boron dilution faults
and 2A LOCA. Additionally, it is revising theCommon Position on EPR I&C designs and isdeveloping reports on hydrogen management
and extended station blackout.
The AP1000WG published a Common Position(CP-AP1000WG-03) on IRWST Condensate
Return Modelling, and Technical Reports on
Lessons Learnt with AP1000 Reactor Coolant
Pumps (TR-AP1000WG-01) and AP1000 Squib
Valves Design, Construction, Qualification, andTesting Experience (TR-AP1000WG-02). It isdeveloping a Common Position on Design
Approach to Post LOCA Strainer Performanceand Debris In-Vessel Downstream Effects, aswell as Technical Reports on Lessons Learnt
from Implementation of the CP addressing
FPOTs, AP1000 Hydrogen Management, andAP1000 Hot Functional Testing Lessons Learnt.

•

The APR1400WG published a Common Position(CP-APR1400-03) on fuel thermal conductivity
degradation (TCD). It continues to develop a
Technical Report on Equipment Survivability
and a Common Position paper on the seismic
performance of fuel.

•

The VVERWG continues to develop a Common
Positions and Technical Reports on a variety of

topics: regulatory approaches related toaccidents and transients analyses; ex-vessel
melt retention in core catcher; Reactor Pressure
Vessel and Primary Components Reliability for
AES-2006 designs; similarities and differencesamong VVER designs; regulatory safety review
approaches and resulting evaluations; andhydrogen management.
•

The HPR1000WG established two new TESGs:
the Severe Accidents (SA) TESG and theInternal and External Hazards TESG. It willdevelop three Common Positions on thefollowing topics: the Vienna Declaration;
Fukushima lessons learnt; and Post Loss-ofcoolant Accident (LOCA) Strainer Performanceand Debris in-Vessel Effects. It plans to conduct
a survey on hydrogen management and willdraft a Technical Report drawing on the results.

•

The VICWG published Common Positions on
the Preparation and Performance of Vendor
Inspections and CSFI Procedures and Policies.
During 2019 and 2020 it intends to build on
this work by compiling an Inspection Planning
and Tracking Table that clearly communicates
opportunities for MDEP VICWG regulators toparticipate
andwitness
inspections.
Additionally, the VICWG sponsored the
Nuclear Supply Chain Management Workshop
in collaboration with the Committee on
Nuclear
Regulatory
Activities(CNRA).
Participants discussed supply chain oversightchallenges, identifying emerging risks, andprovidingrecommendations
to further
improve supply chain management andoversight arrangements. The VICWG will
formally publish the proceedings from thejoint workshop; key takeaways will beconsidered and integrated into its future work.

23

2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

7. Next steps – future of the programme
The MDEP was established in 2006 as a multinational
initiative for a five-year period. It was extended foranother five-year period in 2012 by the Policy Group
based on the value gained by the members. At its
May 2014 meeting, the MDEP Policy Group requested
a data collection to be conducted among themembers to prepare for a discussion on MDEP’s midand long-term strategy. The questions focused on
MDEP’s mission and expected deliverables, the use of
MDEP products, and the future of MDEP. The resultsof the data collection indicated that the members
continue to receive significant benefits fromparticipation in MDEP and it should continue beyond
2017. The members confirmed that the core activity
should be the design-specific working groups andidentified some recommended improvements in thedevelopment of the programmes of work, defining
the products and ensuring knowledge transfer asreactors begin the operational phase. These findings
were shared with the Policy Group at its June 2015
meeting. At this meeting, the Policy Group
determined that MDEP should continue in its current
form for an additional five-year period after 2017
until the end of 2022. However, the PG stressed that,going forward, MDEP should focus on design-specificactivities.
As new cross-cutting issues are identified in the
future, the STC will consider setting up specificarrangements, such as ad hoc groups, subcommittees or arrangements with other working
groups (e.g. the NEA’s CNRA WGDIC, WGRNR and
WGIP) to address the issues without duplication
rather than creating new issue-specific working
groups. The design-specific working groups will24

continue to co-operate and exchange feedback on
design issues through the construction phase andthe first two years of initial operations. The PolicyGroup has determined that the operational stage
should not be included in the scope of MDEP.
However, there should be a means to ensure that
operating experience related to design issues isaddressed by DSWGs. With this in mind, MDEP willcontinue to share information on construction andcommissioning of new reactors, and incorporate
feedback from operating experience as it pertains todesign.
As the current issue-specific working groups arecompleting the goals and activities originallyassigned to them, the STC and Policy Group haveapproved the transferring of the generic activities toother organisations. As of April 2019, the working
groups on Digital Instrumentation & Control andCodes and Standards had both been transferred to
the CNRA.
MDEP member countries have also expressed
the need and benefits of continuing co­operation
among members even after a specific design review
has concluded. To that end, the STC has begun to
explore different options that can be utilised totransition existing co­operation within a designspecific working group outside of the MDEP once
the working group has achieved its mandate under
MDEP. For instance, the ABWRWG has identified
topics that include BWR-specific concerns andrecommendations for ensuring the continuation of
the interactions within the Working Party on
Boiling Water Reactors within the CNRA.

2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

Appendix 1: List of abbreviations and acronyms
ABWR
ABWRWG
AERB
AFCEN
ARN
ASME
ASN
BWR
CATESG
CCF
CFSI
CNRA
CNSC
CORDEL
CP
CSA
CSTF
CSWG
DICWG
DSWG
EDF
ENEC
EPRWG
FANR
FOAK
FPGA
FPOT
GDA
GIF
GSAR
HVAC
HAEA
HDL
I&C
IAEA
IEC
IEEE
IRWST
ISWG
ITAAC
JSC
JSME

Advanced boiling water reactor
Advanced Boiling Water Reactor Working Group
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (India)
Association française pour les règles de conception, de construction et de surveillanceen exploitation des matériels des chaudières électronucléaires (French SDO)
Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear (Argentina)
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (Nuclear Safety Authority of France)
Boiling water reactor
Commissioning Activities Technical Experts Subgroup
Common cause failure
Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Item
Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (NEA)
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
Co-Operation in Reactor Design Evaluation and Licensing
Common Position
Canadian Standards Association
Codes and Standards Task Force
Codes and Standards Working Group
Digital Instrumentation and Controls Working Group
Design-specific Working GroupElectricité de France
Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation
EPR Working Group
Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (United Arab Emirates)
First-of-a-kind
Field-programmable gate arrays
First plant only tests
Generic design assessment
Generation IV International Forum
Group on the Safety of Advanced Reactors
Heating, ventilation and air conditioning
Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority
Hardware description language
Instrumentation and controls
International Atomic Energy Agency
International Electro Technical Commission
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
In-containment refuelling water storage tank
Issue-specific Working Group
Inspection, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Joint Stock Company (AtomStroyExport, Russia)
Japanese Society of Mechanical Engineers

25

2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

KEPCO
KEPIC
KHNP
KINS
LOCA
MCCI
MDEP
MHI
NDE
NDT
NEA
NIKIET
NNR
NNSA
NPP
NRA
NRC
NRO
NSSC
OECD
ONR
OOG
PC
PG
PSA
QA
QM
RI
RO
RPV
SBLOCA
SDO
SMR
SSM
STC
STUK
TAEK
TESG
TR
TVO
UAE
VICWG
VVER
VVERWG
WENRA
WGIP
WGRNR
WNA

26

Korea Electric Power Corporation
Korean Electric Power Industry Code
Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power
Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety
Loss-of-coolant accident
Molten core concrete interaction
Multinational Design Evaluation Programme
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
Non-destructive examination
Non-destructive testing
Nuclear Energy Agency
Scientific Research and Design Institute of Energy Technologies (Russian SDO)
National Nuclear Regulator (South Africa)
National Nuclear Safety Administration (China)
Nuclear power plant
Nuclear Regulation Authority (Japan)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (United States)
Nuclear regulatory organisation
Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (Korea)
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Office for Nuclear Regulation (United Kingdom)
Owners and Operators Group
Primary circuit components
Policy Group
Probabilistic safety assessment
Quality Assurance
Quality Management
Regulatory issue
Regulatory observation
Reactor pressure vessel
Small-break loss-of-coolant accident
Standard development organisation
Small modular reactorStrålsäkerhetsmyndigheten (Swedish Radiation Safety Authority)
Steering Technical Committee
Säteilyturvakeskus (Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland)
Türkiye Atom Enerjisi Kurumu (Turkish Atomic Energy Authority)
Technical Experts Subgroup
Technical Report
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (Finnish Nuclear Power Company)
United Arab Emirates
Vendor Inspection Co-operation Working Group
Water-water energetic reactor
VVER Working Group
Western Europe Nuclear Regulators Association
Working Group on Inspection Practices (NEA/CNRA)
Working Group on the Regulation of New Reactors (NEA/CNRA)World Nuclear Association

2018-2019 MDEP Annual Report

Appendix 2: Revised or new documents and publications•

Working group programme plans: www.oecd-nea.org/mdep.

•

TR-EPRWG-04 Limited Comparison of EPR Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) 2017, oe.cd/4au.

•

CP-EPRWG-07 Common Position Addressing the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety 23 April 2018,oe.cd/4av.

•

CP-EPRWG-06 Common Position on EPR Boron Dilution During a Small-Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident(SBLOCA) CP-EPRWG-06 – 16 April 2018, www.oecd-nea.org/mdep/documents/CP-EPRWG-06_Boron_
dilution.pdf.

•

TR-AP1000WG-02 Technical Report on AP1000 Squib Valves Design, Construction, Qualification, andTesting Experience, 23 October 2018, www.oecd-nea.org/mdep/common-positions/tr-ap1000wg-02.pdf.

•

TR-AP1000WG-01 Technical Report on Lessons Learnt with AP1000 Reactor Coolant Pumps, 23 October
2018, www.oecd-nea.org/mdep/common-positions/tr-ap1000wg-01.pdf.

•

CP-AP1000WG-03 Common Position on AP1000 In-containment Refuelling Water Storage Tank (IRWST)
Condensate Return Modelling, 23 October 2018, www.oecd-nea.org/mdep/common-positions/cp-ap1000wg03.pdf.

•

CP-APR1400-03 Common Position on the Fuel Thermal Conductivity Degradation 11/01/2018, www.oecdnea.org/mdep/documents/DCP-APR1400-Fuel_Thermal_Conductivity_Degradation.pdf.

•

CP-VICWG-04 Common Position: Counterfeit, Fraudulent, and Suspect Items Procedures and Policies,
23 October 2018, www.oecd-nea.org/mdep/working-groups/vicwg.html.

•

TR-VICWG-05 Technical Report on Assessment of Multinational Vendor Inspection of AREVA NP Creusot
Forge (ACF), 23 October 2018 (not publicly available).

•

CP-VICWG-03: Common Position on Preparation and Performance of Vendor Inspections, May 2018,www.oecd-nea.org/mdep/common-positions/cp-vicwg-03.pdf.

27

MULTINATIONAL DESIGN EVALUATION PROGRAMMEThe Multinational Design Evaluation Programme (MDEP) was established in 2006 as a multinational initiative
to develop innovative approaches to leverage the resources and knowledge of the national regulatory
authorities that are currently or will be tasked with the review of new nuclear power reactor designs. MDEP
members are the regulatory authorities of Argentina, Canada, China, Finland, France, Hungary, India, Japan,
Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom
and the United States. The Nuclear Energy Agency serves as technical secretariat for MDEP. The International
Atomic Energy Agency also takes part in the work of MDEP.

NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCYThe OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) was established on 1 February 1958. Current NEA membershipconsists of 34 countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, theNetherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Korea, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The European Commission and theInternational Atomic Energy Agency also take part in the work of the Agency.
The mission of the NEA is:-

to assist its member countries in maintaining and further developing, through international
cooperation, the scientific, technological and legal bases required for a safe, environmentally soundand economical use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;-

to provide authoritative assessments and to forge common understandings on key issues as input togovernment decisions on nuclear energy policy and to broader OECD analyses in areas such as energy
and the sustainable development of low-carbon economies.

Specific areas of competence of the NEA include the safety and regulation of nuclear activities, radioactive
waste management and decommissioning, radiological protection, nuclear science, economic and technicalanalyses of the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear law and liability, and public information. The NEA Data Bank
provides nuclear data and computer program services for participating countries.
.

Cover page photo credits: Panoramic view of units 5 and 6 of Fuqing Nuclear Power Plant(Guo Donghai, CNNC Fujian Fuqing Nuclear Power Co., Ltd.).

www.oecd-nea.org/mdep

Printed by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency for the Multinational Design Evaluation Programme