Special Interview
Interview with the Hon. Akira Amari, former minister in charge of TPP negotiations

Late Prime Minister Abe’s Legacy in Trade
Policy in JapanBy Japan SPOTLIGHT
Former Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe, who was assassinated on July 8, 2022, led the nation for
more than eight years and played a significant role in redirecting Japan’s economic and foreign policies.
His forward-leaning fiscal and monetary policies aiming to overcome deflation, his “Abenomics” and his
unique foreign policy approaches such as his Asia-Pacific strategy are some examples.
In particular, his administration was successful in concluding negotiations on the Trans-PacificPartnership (TPP), a large regional trade agreement in which the United States and Asia-Pacific countries
were members in 2016. Furthermore, even after the US withdrawal from the TPP with the establishment of
the Trump administration, in spite of the US having promoted it until then, many recall that Japan took the
initiative in concluding the CPTPP without the US. This is remembered by many as Japan’s outstanding
contribution to rule-making in international trade.
In this article, Ken Karube, professor of Teikyo University and a former commentator with Jiji Press, aswell as one of the members of the Japan Economic Foundation’s Editorial Committee, interviewed Hon.
Akira Amari, member of the House of Representatives, who was responsible for the TPP negotiations as
minister in charge of economic and fiscal policy in the Abe administration.
(Interviewed on Sept. 8, 2022 at Amari’s office)Japan’s Bargaining Power in
the TPP Negotiations

for the entire process was for the first time
unified. However, to tell you the truth, it did
not work well at the beginning. Regardless of
Karube: With geopolitical changes,
what I was saying, our trading partners, in
we have also seen changes inparticular the US, would go talk to Yoshimasa
globalization. Trade policy also
Hayashi, then minister of agriculture, forestry
seems to have been changing
and fisheries on issues related to agricultural
significantly. In the Abe
products. If the METI minister was convinced
administration, I recall that TPP
that negotiations for manufacturing products
negotiations were left to you alone.
like automobiles had to be done by himself,
I witnessed a number of trade
then the overall negotiation process would
negotiations as a journalist with Jiji
become fragmented.
and normally from Japan three
Such fragmentation would result in weakministers – of agriculture, forestry
bargaining power for Japan, sinceand fisheries, of economy, tradenegotiations would not be approached withand industry, and of foreign affairs
one voice. We had to create a negotiation– have joined in the negotiations. In
system in which what I say as the minister in
Hon. Akira Amari
this regard, what would be thecharge of TPP would be understood to be theimplications of having only one minister in charge ofsame as the words of the prime minister himself.
trade negotiations and how come it was possible?
A trading partner could also try to take advantage of the network
they have among the staff of the Prime Minister’s Office. Regardless
Amari: Japan’s trade negotiations until then had been doneof what I was saying as the minister in charge of TPP negotiations,according to product which tended to divide and weaken our
they could ask the PM’s staff directly if the premier was in a position
bargaining power. We were unable to take account of reciprocal
to make further concessions. Once the PM’s staff tried to step in,
relations across the different product areas and negotiate by asking a
Japan’s bargaining power would immediately decline, since whatever
trading partner for concessions in a certain area in return for our
I was saying would no longer be perceived to be the true intention ofconcessions in another area.
the Japanese government.
When I was in charge of the TPP negotiations, the responsibility
As I experienced such cases a number of times, at a certain pointhttps://www.jef.or.jp/journal/

Japan SPOTLIGHT • January / February 2023

57

during the TPP negotiations I asked Yoshihide Suga, then the chiefcabinet secretary, to confidentially summon the ministers with closeinterests in the TPP negotiations to a meeting room at the Diet
members’ official residence in Akasaka to deliver my message tothem. In his presence, I told the ministers that were in charge of
foreign affairs, trade and agriculture that “We can’t negotiate unless
we speak in one voice. Once any of you says there is anothersolution different from what I say, our bargaining power will be lost.
I will resign as minister at any time if any of you dares to do such athing. I want that person to take over my responsibility and settle thenegotiations after my resignation.” I told them, “I will make thedecisions as I am given full responsibility over the negotiations. If
any of you have any objection to this, I am ready to be replaced byany of you at any time, so tell me now.” Then I asked Suga, “Would
this be OK?” and he said it would be fine. That is how we became
able to speak in one voice in the TPP negotiations.
Karube: The other ministers agreed?
Amari: Yes, they did.
Karube: Did you lay the groundwork in advance to get

was the agriculture minister. For a negotiator from METI, his boss
was the METI minister. I united them under a consensus thatregardless of whether they were from the agriculture ministry or
METI or the foreign ministry, as long as they were members of the
TPP team, I was their boss.
I recall some events that convinced me that the team had now
become truly unified as “team-Amari.” One example was somethingthat Deputy Chief Negotiator Hiroshi Oe told me. In his words, Oe“saw Makoto Osawa, head of the International Affairs Department of
the Agriculture Ministry shouting into the phone and wondered what
it was all about. It turned out that Osawa was shouting ‘Do you
seriously think that we can agree at the numbers you aresuggesting?’ to someone from his own ministry.” That is when I
thought that the unity of our team had to be real. This person was
acting under my command to give me a card in the negotiations. And
he was not creating the card based on instructions coming from his
own ministry. On the contrary, he was shouting “What are you
thinking? Do you seriously think that we can agree at the numbers
you are suggesting?” at his own ministry. This was unheard of. Until
then, members of a negotiating team were mere messengers acting
based on instructions coming from the respective ministries.

agreement among them?

Karube: Why did you believe that without this “oneAmari: No, nothing. Those ministers happened to all be in the sameteam for drafting legislation with me as the leader since many years
ago. The minister for foreign affairs then was Kishida (now prime
minister), the minister for agriculture was Hayashi and the METI
minister was Motegi. They were all members of my team. That is
why they all agreed with me even though I might have sounded a bit
harsh.
With Suga’s approval, TPP negotiations were now to be carriedout with one voice. The ultimate responsibility for the entire
negotiations was given to me. Whatever other people might say, it
did not reflect the position of the Japanese government. This was
confirmed in Japan and this was made known to our trading partners
as well.
At the Prime Minister’s Office, I said to prime minister Abe, “Do
you agree that what I say in the negotiations should be regarded as
being your own words? Nothing more, nothing less. Your staff at the
PM’s Office must remain silent about it. Would this be OK with you?”
He said, “that would be fine, you please decide everything,” and thatis how we got to speak in one voice.
Since then, our negotiating team got together frequently, including
a bonding ceremony for going into battle (the negotiations) as wellas other social gatherings to consolidate our unity. I believe Japan’s
negotiating power was weak as the negotiating team consisted of
officials from different ministries who ultimately answered to theirown ministries. I had to reverse this tendency where team members
were reporting to the respective ministries. Until then, for anegotiator coming from the agriculture ministry, his highest boss

Amari: I thought the TPP would be the largest trade negotiations
ever in history. Also, Japan entered into the negotiations at a laterstage. And it was Abe that made the decision to enter into
negotiations when anti-TPP demonstrations were happening all overthe country.
So I got goosebumps when Abe asked me to do it.
When I accepted his offer, I was telling myself that I would never
flinch in the face of the US. Never. After returning to my residence
alone, I told myself that if and when I started to feel I was no longer
able to face up to the Americans, that was the time for me to resign.
And I wanted this resolve to be shared by all the members of theteam.
For that purpose, we organized a get-together camp for the entire
team. Also, during the negotiations, I called each group leader to myroom and asked them to “fight with me till the end.” In return, I told
them that I would ensure their preferred postings for promotions if
the negotiations worked well. “Let me know what you want to do
next,” I told them. Then I called the chief cabinet secretary. I told himthat in the event that the negotiations were successful, it was my

58 Japan SPOTLIGHT • January / February 2023

voice” the TPP negotiations would not be
successful? As you just said, if Japan had taken asimilar approach as past negotiations, the teamwould become fragmented with a bunch of
messengers coming from the various ministries. But
what made you believe so strongly that you would
not be able to succeed unless you forced everyone tospeak in “one voice?”intention to recommend the leaders to certain posts. I then asked
him to respect my recommendations. And he said that he would do
as I recommend.
Karube: At what stage did the US side realize that theand such. We will never be able to accept this proposal.” That is how
the proposal was deferred. And by the way, I received many thanksfrom other countries afterwards.
That was when I realized how powerful the US was.

Japanese negotiating style had changed?

Karube: That means everybody was afraid of the US.

Amari: We said “No” to the Americans many times.
The point is that we did not give in and made our views clearly
known. We had to give them the impression that Japan cannot be
persuaded easily. At the same time, it was important to make it
known to them that we were saying what we had to say because we
wanted to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion. I said to
my counterpart, Michael Froman, then USTR, “You know what? You
and I are the only people in the world that truly want thesenegotiations to be successful. So to make that a reality, I will saywhat I have to say.”We also need to understand the mentality of countries from Asiaand other regions. The Americans were always irritated by the way
these countries were acting, so I told them that “These countries will
not speak against the US but this does not mean that they agree” totry to make them understand.
These countries will not say “No” to the US. Their ministers might
be wanting to say “No,” but they can’t. However, Japan was always
talking straight. I think it is rare to see a Japanese minister that talks
straight like this. But I always told them “No” when it came tosomething that could not be done. And I clearly explained what thereason was.
One day, Tsuruoka, the chief negotiator, told me that there would
be strong objections from many countries in the ministerial meeting
to follow that day. “Therefore, you please refrain from speaking
initially. Several ministers from other countries will say ‘Out of thequestion’ to the US proposal. Let them speak first. You can come inright after them,” he said. “There were many objections voiced in the
preparatory meeting of chief negotiators saying that the US proposal
was outrageous. So we all decided to report back to the ministers.
The next ministerial meeting will be a mess. Therefore, minister
Amari, please refrain from speaking initially. Let others criticize the
US first. Then, you can step in and wrap things up,” he said.
Well, the ministerial meeting started. The US side made theproposal. That proposal was not supposed to be acceptable to theothers. However, when the Americans asked “Will this be OK?” andwhen I was so sure that people would start voicing their objections,
everyone was looking down in complete silence. The Americans
asked for the second time. “Will this proposal be acceptable?” Andagain, complete silence. I turned to Tsuruoka. “This is turning out tobe quite different from what you said.” Tsuruoka was also puzzled.
“Strange. They were all so outraged, but no one is talking about itnow.” So I asked him. “If we let it be, the American proposal will be
accepted. Is that OK?” And because his response was a very clear“No,” I stepped in. “Wait a minute. I say no. And the reason is such

Amari: I stepped in and stopped it, and the proposal was deferred.
Everyone looked very much relieved. I was surprised to see thateveryone was so afraid of the US at the time.
Karube: Negotiating in one-voice coming from a single

minister is certainly a good idea, but the flip side of
the coin is that you alone had to make judgements on
all kinds of things that had to do with Japan’snational interests. What kind of criteria did you use to
make those judgements?

Amari: In my office, the key officials from the ministries of foreign
affairs, trade and agriculture always got together and discussed
issues with me. And it was not a matter of sacrificing the agriculture
ministry in the interest of the trade ministry. All the ministers
involved in the TPP negotiations were members of “Team Amari,”and they were discussing how to proceed in the negotiations basedon national interests rather than the interests of the respective
ministries. All the members present in the discussions saw the TPP
minister – not the agriculture minister nor the trade minister – as theultimate boss.
On agriculture, as there were many who supported protection ofagricultural products in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), it
was very important to find ways to come to an acceptable deal.
I asked key members of Parliament that were influential in the areaof agriculture what would be the minimum for the deal to be
acceptable to the LDP. Beef, pork and rice were of particularimportance. And above all, rice was critical. To my question “what isthe bottom line that you need me to defend for you to be able to sell
the deal to the Party,” they gave me some border lines and said that
if I defended them, they would take responsibility in controlling theParty.
Deputy chief negotiator Oe also instructed the officials of the
agriculture ministry to create absolute bottom line cards for me touse in the negotiations. “Otherwise, how can the minister know
where the ultimate line of defense is? So create cards that can only
be used at the very end of the negotiations and give them to minister
Amari.” He then brought the cards to me and said, “Minister, keepthese cards in your pocket. These are the cards that you can use at
the very end. The agriculture ministry is saying that they will control
the various agriculture organizations if everything is kept within thelimits indicated on these cards.”
I told the negotiating officials never to use the concessions
indicated on these ultimate cards. “I am confident that I can wrap
Japan SPOTLIGHT • January / February 2023

59

things up well within the limits indicated on these cards. So do not
use any of these cards. Don’t even hint in negotiations at your levelthat we have these cards as I intend to conclude things far within theline of defense,” I said to them. And in deed, I did succeed inconcluding the negotiations without using any of the ultimate cards
that were provided to me. Of course, the agriculture ministry wasvery happy.
One time, the US told me on a certain issue that a Japanese official
confidentially gave them a certain concession proposal (a number),and said to me that this must be indication of the fact that Japan canlive with such a number. So I said to them, “Oh really? Who gave
you that number?” and the Americans gave me a name of a certain
official from the agriculture ministry. So I said, “That number is
hereby invalid. I am the responsible minister, and anything different
from what I say is not the position of the Japanese government.”
This got the US side ticked off. “That can’t be right. At a minimum
we have to start negotiating from this number,” they said. I refusedby telling them again that anything different from what I say is not
the position of the Japanese government. “If you don’t believe me,
you should call the prime minister and ask.” And in deed, I was able
to reach a deal well within the number that was indicated.
Karube: When did this happen?
Amari: It was a long time ago. I succeeded in wrapping up thenegotiations without using any of the ultimate cards that theagriculture ministry believed they might have to accept. That is why
their vice minister came to my office to express special gratitudeafter we reached agreement in principle.
Karube: After the TPP, minister Motegi worked on the

US-Japan FTA. At that time also, the responsibility fornegotiations rested only with him. I am not sure what
is to come in the future, but the ability for one
minister to be able to coordinate the diverse interestsof the different ministries may ultimately rest on who
is there at the time. In your case, there was Abe, there
was you, and there was Suga.

Amari: Yes, that’s true. It would be difficult to do so without a senior
minister as the leader in charge of negotiations. Even if we were to
put one minister in charge of negotiations, it would be unrealistic,
really, for him to coordinate the interests among the relevant
ministries if their ministers were senior to the coordinating minister.
In my case, I could do it because I was the most senior minister.
Team Amari was made up of companions who had fun doing various
things together since the old days. The minister for foreign affairs,
the METI minister and the agriculture minister were all members ofTeam Amari. And I was much senior to them. This was the reason I
could do it. According to customs, it would be impossible for ajunior minister to keep senior ministers under his line of command
60 Japan SPOTLIGHT • January / February 2023

and keep them under control.

On the Current Status of the US-Japan FTA
Karube: On the question of the US-Japan FTA under the

Trump administration, it was agreed by both parties
that negotiations on elimination of tariffs on
automobiles and auto parts on the US side would
begin at a later stage. But these talks remainsuspended. I have a strong impression that we arebeing kept waiting in a gray-zone where this FTA
does not fit well with the definition of FTAs in Article
24 of GATT that requires that “duties and otherrestrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated on
substantially all the trade.” Could you tell us what
you think about this situation?

Amari: With President Trump, in my view, nobody could haveachieved further concessions from the US and succeeded ineliminating US tariffs on automobiles.
When prime minister Abe said in a US-Japan Summit meeting that
it was good for the US as well to come back to the TPP, President
Trump said something like “Trade agreements are wrong to startwith. Once you get in, you can never leave.” Of course, this piece ofmemory of his is not correct.
To this, Motegi, then METI minister, said, “Mr. President, you arewrong. You CAN leave a trade agreement.” This made Trump go madand he shouted “That is fake!” Everybody froze.
Minister Motegi had told the truth. It was only that Trump’sknowledge was mistaken. But this made Trump go mad andeverybody froze. However, the moment all the attendees thought that
this would be the end of the meeting, Abe said as if nothing had
happened, “By the way, Donald, on a different issue...” and changed
the subject.
People told me later that everybody there thought Abe must be a
genius. He changed the subject just like that, and even theatmosphere of the meeting was friendly again. Everyone thought that
this man was great. Trump too, immediately came back to himself.
“Shinizo, on that issue...” And the meeting continued like that on theissue that Abe brought up.
Karube: Speaking of Trump, I do think that his

emergence has had a big impact. Republicans who
used to be pro-trade in the US have completely
completely changed. In such circumstances, how doyou think Japan should deal with the US ininternational trade?

Amari: If you talk to well-informed persons in the US, they all believethat the US should return to TPP. However, under the current
political circumstances, nobody can initiate a discussion by saying

so. In a nutshell, TPP means the US market and US jobs being
snatched away by foreign capital. This kind of brainwashing has
unfortunately sunk in. I think we must preserve the TPP until the US
returns to being a model country for free trade as it was in the olddays.
In this light, it would be good to allow the United Kingdom to join
TPP. Australia is in, New Zealand is in, Canada is in. And with UK
accession, four of the Five Eyes would be members of the TPP
making it a sort of alliance to balance China. That would help create
an environment where the US could be persuaded to come back.
However, Liz Cheney, the daughter of former Vice President Dick
Cheney and a Republican member of the House of Representatives,
was defeated by a wide margin in a primary after she criticized
Trump. This shows there are still many devoted Trump supporters.
Some of the not-so-well-to-do white Americans are trapped in a stateof paranoia that they have been victimized by the system. And I think
there will need to be some time before these people can come backto their original senses. Nevertheless, TPP is absolutely necessary
for the US, and every informed person in the US believes that the US
must return to the TPP someday.

Rebuilding a Rules-Oriented World Trade
SystemKarube: Since the beginning of 2022, I think the worldorder has been drastically changing with Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine. As chairman of the JapaneseDiet’s parliamentary group on strategy for rulemaking, what do you think about the relations
between trade-restricting movements and free trade?

Amari: President Biden proposed an economic framework called theIndo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Previously, Abe had
proposed an Indo-Pacific Vision to include ASEAN and theirneighbors into a cooperation framework among allied and likeminded countries. For this, ideally the US would have joined TPP and
opened its market, However, as this was not possible, Biden
proposed IPEF instead. Biden made this proposal intending to show
some economic merit that can be a substitute for TPP. While the US
cannot come back to TPP, he proposed to have some sort ofeconomic linkages within the context of the Indo-Pacific Vision.
However, IPEF does not commit to opening the US market. ASEAN
and others will misunderstand it to be a framework for the US tokeep an eye on them to prevent any violation of human rights or
infringement of rights at production sites. Therefore, I told key
persons I met during my recent visit to the US that without US
commitment on access to the US market, this attempt to add
economic merit to the Indo-Pacific Vision would not be attractive for
the ASEAN countries. They would regard it as a framework where an
American instructor tells them how to behave without giving themaccess to the US market.

If you include some level of access to the US market in a supply
chain cooperation agreement, then ASEAN and the Asian region
would see merit in joining such an agreement. Otherwise, they would
not feel very much attracted to it.
I think Japan should give advice so that IPEF can become
something that Asian countries can see some economic benefit in.
Karube: Would this be something like tariff

negotiations?

Amari: In order for the member countries to gain the merit of accessto the US market.
Karube: Another big issue is the WTO where theAppellate Body has ceased to function triggered by
US claims. The point is that some 20-30 years havepassed since the WTO was founded in 1995. How can
the WTO be restored? Or should the WTO continue toplay a centerpiece role in international trade? What isyour view on this issue?

Amari: There is distrust in international organizations now. The
United Nations itself is not functioning at all. It is helpless. It can’t
say anything about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, nor is it
functioning. This is leading to a lack of trust in internationalorganizations. In addition, China has started to hold the leadership
position of many international organizations shifting things in its
favor. China is going to integrate international organizations into its
tools of foreign policy strategy.
In the WTO Doha Round, although negotiations were close toconclusion, the US unexpectedly raised the hurdle for acceptanceand India could not agree. People tried to convince India, but thiswas not possible. The WTO has ceased to function since then.
That is why I believe that TPP is playing a key role as an alternative
framework of economic partnership among like-minded countries. It
has become a template for new international frameworks. The JapanEU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) was concluded based onit. Many other countries are now interested in joining the TPP, suchas the UK and Ecuador. China wants to join it too. China regards TPP
as a functioning international organization, and that is why it wants
to join it.
Karube: What do you think about the view that Japan

should invite China to join the TPP to show the restof the world that the TPP is an internationalorganization and not an economic bloc?

Amari: I don’t think that it is a good idea. There is no way we could
keep China under control if China joins when the US has not joined.
The reason we do not lower the hurdle for the UK to join is that if we
do so, it would make it easier for China to join. So Japan is saying toJapan SPOTLIGHT • January / February 2023

61the UK that “We will keep the hurdles up high because we want tokeep the original format. The UK should overcome them to join TPP.”
This is also a signal to the US. The US would become the only Five
Eyes member that is not a TPP member. We should keep the TPP asa basis for trade and investment rules and make it a newinternational organization sharing basic values of freedom,democracy and human rights. If the US joins, this vision will becompleted.

Achieving Economic Security
Karube: You have mentioned the need to establish a

National Economic Council in Japan, an advisoryboard to the government on a broader range of policy
issues including economic policy, national security
policy, etc. With a new ministerial post for economic
security, has this need been fulfilled?

Amari: Our economic security policy is still under development.
Before the end of 2022, three documents related to our national
security strategy will be completed – the National Security Strategy,
the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense
Buildup Plan. In the National Security Strategy, in addition toconventional national security policies such as foreign policy anddefense policy, economic security policy will be included. Thismeans that before the end of this year, we will have a combined
national security strategy that covers economic security for the firsttime.
There is something that was definitely lacking in Japan’s security
strategy. This is intelligence. Indeed, we need both conventional
intelligence and economic intelligence. For instance, in cyber, there
is cybersecurity in the national security context, but there also needs
to be cybersecurity to deal with threats on the economic intelligenceside such as malware and backdoor attacks. There needs to be aseamless link between these two aspects of conventional andeconomic security.
Dennis Blair, former US Director of National Intelligence, visited
Japan and told us that if he were to put a score on the Japanesecybersecurity system, it would be zero. As I have now become the
Director of Economic Security Policy Promotion in the LDP, my job
now is to do something about this. I think we must include a clear
reference to cybersecurity in our National Security Strategy
document as an area that spans both conventional national security
as well as economic security.

Abe’s ForesightAmari: Let me add one thought on prime minister Abe and TPP. I
really think it was phenomenal that PM Abe was able to instinctively
understand that TPP would become critical for Japan even at a time
when staunch objections to it surrounded the Diet. Because if we
62 Japan SPOTLIGHT • January / February 2023

promoted TPP, it would result in the loss of support fromagriculture-related organizations and loss of seats in the Diet. Even I
was told by core supporters in my constituency that they would notrecommend me for re-election anymore.
Even under such circumstances, he instinctively knew what had tobe done. Instead of saying that complete tariff elimination had to berealized, he gradually persuaded those agricultural support groups
by saying that he would not promote free trade without any
exceptions. He persuaded them by implying that he would makeexceptions for trade liberalization.
In the domain of US-Japan security cooperation as well, if Japan
became a bystander and were just sitting in the audience seat undera Taiwan contingency situation, saying “Good luck! Let’s see how
you do!” to the Americans, there is no way that the US would help
Japan in time of need. Prime Minister Abe instinctively knew this.
This is why even amidst growing objections, he stepped into theextreme limit of the interpretation of the Constitution in Japan’s
Legislation for Peace and Security that enabled the limited executionof the right of collective self-defense.
By clarifying Japan’s stance in a seamless way for all situations
ranging from peacetime to contingencies, that Japan would join thefight with the US even before the mainland of Japan came underattack if the situation threatened Japan’s survival, the US did not fall
into distrust towards Japan.
An average politician would not have the courage to go that far.
Even the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets wasachieved by his administration. Without it we would have no accessto sensitive information on issues like terrorist attacks from all over
the world. Countries would not cooperate to provide suchinformation. With this legislation, Japan was now able to obtain suchsensitive and confidential information. Politicians usually want toavoid such risky business. But that man, if he deemed it necessary,
never hesitated to take action. Future historians will look back andpraise him for what he did.
His foresight was truly outstanding and his courage in risking his
reputation as a politician in the cause of national interests wasadmirable.

Interviewer: Kensuke Karube is a journalist and professor at Teikyo
University. He was a former executive writer for Jiji Press, which he joined in1979 after graduating from Waseda University. From 1992 to 1996 he was acorrespondent in Washington DC and from 2004 to 2009 he was chief of the
Washington and New York bureaus. Before taking the executive writer’s post,
he was deputy managing editor at the Tokyo head office (2010-2013). Among
his books are Failure of Economic Policy Management (1999), The Bubble
Economy (2015) and Japanese Bureaucrats with their Abenomics (2018).