NE/NEF
FW/2011O
ORIGINAL:: English
15..11.2011

Final
F
R
Report of thee

Interrnationnal Missio
M
n on
Rem
mediaation of
o La
arge
Co
ontam
minateed Arreas Off-si
O ite
thee Fukkushimma Dai-ich
D
hi NP
PP
7–15
5 Octobber 20011, Ja
apan

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 1
1.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 6

2.

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS .......................................................................... 7

3.

STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT ............................................................................ 12

4.

RADIATION PROTECTION ........................................................................................ 17

5.

REMEDIATION STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION .................................................. 24
5.1.
5.2.
5.3.
5.4.
5.5.
5.6.
5.7.

6.

Monitoring and mapping .................................................................................. 28
Data management ............................................................................................. 32
Agricultural areas ............................................................................................. 34
Urban decontamination..................................................................................... 44
Forest areas ....................................................................................................... 49
Aquatic areas .................................................................................................... 51
Waste Management .......................................................................................... 51

TECHNICAL MEETINGS AND VISITS ..................................................................... 73

Annexes•

List of Team Members and Japanese participants•Mission programme

The Mission Team uses the term ‘remediation’ in accordance with the IAEA Safety Glossary.
The Team understands that in the Japanese language there is only one word for both
remediation and decontamination.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In response to a request made by the Government of Japan, the IAEA organized a fact-finding
Mission to support the remediation of large contaminated areas off-site of the Fukushima
Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). The Mission Team included 12 international experts.
The Mission had three objectives:
1. Provide assistance related to Japan’s plans to remediate large areas contaminated by
the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP;
2. Review Japan’s ongoing remediation related strategies, plans and activities, including
contamination mapping; and3. Share its findings with the international community as part of the joint effort tobroadly disseminate lessons learned from the accident.
The Mission included an assessment of information provided to the Team, open discussions
with relevant institutions in Japan, and visits to the affected areas, including several
demonstration sites. The Team also visited the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP. The authorities ofJapan provided comprehensive information on their remediation programme.

Overview
Remedial actions are based on how the affected areas are characterized. The isotopic
composition of the fallout included mainly volatile radionuclides (e.g. I, Te and Cs), but
Cs-134 and Cs-137 are currently the dominant contaminants and are mainly contained in the
topsoil layer. Shorter-lived isotopes have already decayed. The remediation programme
covers about 500 km2 where radiation dose levels are above 20 mSv/a and about 1300 km2
where radiation dose levels are between 5 mSv/a and 20 mSv/a.
Based on the current schedule of activities, the Team focused on the remediation of affectedareas outside the 20 km restricted area (see Figure 1). The Team agrees with the prioritizationand general strategy being implemented and is of the opinion that additional missions could
be beneficial at the appropriate time to (a) confirm the progress made and (b) address theremediation challenges within the 20 km zone.

1

Figure 1:: Overview off the different designateddarereas around th
he Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP
P. The Govern
nment’s
instructioons for the “E
Evacuation-Preepared Area iin case of Emeergency” weree lifted on 30 SSeptember 20011.

2

Main findings
This report presents the main conclusions of the Mission. It highlights nine areas of important
progress to date and offers advice on twelve points where the Mission Team felt that current
practices could be improved. The advice covers improvements in strategy, plans and specificremediation techniques, taking into account both international standards and experience fromremediation programmes in other countries. Japan is encouraged to continue its current
remediation efforts and to take into consideration the Mission’s advice for future remediation
activities.
Highlights of important progress
Highlight 1: The Mission Team appreciates that Japan has gone forward very quickly andallocated the necessary legal, economic and technological resources to develop an efficient
remediation programme to bring relief to the people affected by the Fukushima Dai-ichi
nuclear accident. Priority has been given to children and the areas that they typicallyfrequent.
Highlight 2: The Fukushima Decontamination Promotion Team, which consists of resident
staff in Fukushima from the Ministry of the Environment (MOE), the Local Emergency
Response Headquarters and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), coordinates andshares information with relevant ministries and agencies, and communicates with andprovides technical support to the Fukushima prefecture and relevant municipalities. The
Mission Team welcomes Japan’s efforts to establish a practical catalogue of remediation
techniques.
Highlight 3: The Team acknowledges that the Act on Special Measures explicitly stipulates
stakeholder involvement. The Team appreciates that the Government is not waiting for the
new Act to come into force, but has already started implementing this aspect of theremediation plan.
Highlight 4: The Team appreciates the strong commitment to remediation demonstrated at
the Fukushima prefecture and at local levels. The Team benefitted from visiting school sites,from which the contamination had been removed to a large extent by volunteers, mostly
parents of the pupils. The Team in particular acknowledges the efforts of the municipal
administrations and the large number of volunteers as an important and effective self-help
method.
Highlight 5: The Team acknowledges the practical measures taken by the JAEA in public
information and its involvement in the programme based on the needs of the local residents.
Highlight 6: The Team considers the use of demonstration sites to test and assess various
remediation methods to be a very helpful way to support the decision-making process.
Highlight 7: The Team acknowledges the impressive monitoring and mapping effort by theJapanese authorities as a good basis for a successful remediation programme. The extensive,
real-time monitoring system that is currently being set up and the transparent online

3

availability of the resulting data are important measures to reassure the public and theinternational community.
Highlight 8: The Team recognizes that, in the early phase of the accident, conservatism was agood way to manage uncertainties and public concerns related to reference levels related tofood and agriculture.
Highlight 9: The Team appreciates the fact that some school sites were remediated mostly by
volunteers with the technical support and guidance of the JAEA. The Team was informedthat 400 school playgrounds had already been appropriately remediated (as of 30 September2011).
AdvicePoint 1: The Japanese authorities involved in the remediation strategy are encouraged tocautiously balance the different factors that influence the net benefit of the remediation
measures to ensure dose reduction. They are encouraged to avoid over-conservatism which
could not effectively contribute to the reduction of exposure doses. This goal could beachieved through the practical implementation of the Justification and Optimization
principles1 under the prevailing circumstances. Involving more radiation protection experts(and the Regulatory Body) in the organizational structures that assist the decision makers
might be beneficial in the fulfillment of this objective. The IAEA is ready to support Japan inconsidering new and appropriate criteria.
Point 2: It is appropriate to consider further strengthening coordination among the main
actors, through the establishment of a more permanent liaison between the organizational
structures of the Government of Japan and the prefectural and municipal authorities.
Point 3: The central and local governments are encouraged to continue strengthening the
involvement of and cooperation between various stakeholders. The authorities might wish tostrengthen the engagement of appropriate universities and/or academia in the process offurther developing a stakeholder involvement strategy and implementation methods, which
would be based on stakeholder needs and domestic cultural settings.
Point 4: Access to the “Deliberate Evacuation Area” is free and unmarked. The Team
encourages considering the use of appropriate indications/markings of the routes and simple
instructions for the public when entering or leaving these areas. These indications/markings
are considered important tools for informing the public and avoiding unnecessary radiation
exposures to individuals.
Point 5: It is important to avoid classifying as “radioactive waste” waste materials that do notcause exposures that would warrant special radiation protection measures. The Team
encourages the relevant authorities to revisit the issue of establishing realistic and credible
limits (clearance levels) regarding associated exposures. Residues that satisfy the clearance

1

IAEA Safety Glossary 2007 STI/PUB/1355 (ISBN:978-9290-058908-9).

4

level can be recycled and reused in various ways, such as the construction of structures,banks and roads. The IAEA is ready to support Japan in considering new and appropriate
criteria.
Point 6: The Team draws the authorities’ attention to the potential risk of misunderstandingsthat could arise if the population is only or mainly concerned with contamination
concentrations [surface contamination levels (Bq/m2) or volume concentrations (Bq/m3)]
rather than dose levels. The investment of time and effort in removing contamination beyond
certain levels (the so-called optimized levels) from everywhere, such as all forest areas andareas where the additional exposure is relatively low, does not automatically lead to a
reduction of doses for the public. It also involves a risk of generating unnecessarily hugeamounts of residual material. The Team encourages authorities to maintain their focus on
remediation activities that bring the best results in reducing the doses to the public.
Point 7: The management of the collected data should be formally described in a data
management plan.
Point 8: With respect to the remediation of agricultural areas, the Team considers that for the
next cropping season there is room for reducing some of the conservatism (such as that in thefactors determining the transfer of radioactive caesium from soil to crops) by taking into
account data and factors published by the IAEA and the results obtained from thedemonstration sites. The IAEA is ready to support Japan in considering new and more
appropriate criteria.
Point 9: With respect to waste in urban areas, the Team is of the opinion that it is obviousthat most of the material contains very low levels of radioactivity. Taking into account the
IAEA safety standards, and subject to safety assessments, this material might be remediatedwithout temporary and/or interim storage. It is effective to utilize the existing municipal
infrastructure for industrial waste. The IAEA is ready to support Japan in considering new
and appropriate criteria.
Point 10: Before investing substantial time and efforts in remediating forest areas, a safetyassessment should be carried out to indicate if such action leads to a reduction of doses forthe public. If not, efforts should be concentrated in areas that bring greater benefits. Thissafety assessment should make use of the results of the demonstration tests.
Point 11: The Mission Team encourages the Japanese authorities to continue the usefulmonitoring of freshwater and marine systems.
Point 12: The Mission Team encourages the Japanese authorities to actively pursue
appropriate end-points for the waste in close cooperation with stakeholders. The national andlocal governments should cooperate in order to ensure the provision of these facilities. A lackof availability of such an infrastructure would unduly limit and hamper successful
remediation activities, thus potentially jeopardizing public health and safety.

5

1. INTRODUCTION
The accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP led to the radioactive contamination of large
areas. The Government of Japan has formulated a programme for the recovery of these areas.
As a major part of this recovery programme in off-site areas near the Fukushima Dai-ichi
NPP, Japan is launching remediation efforts. The final aim of the recovery strategy, andtherefore of the remediation programme, is to improve the living conditions of the people
affected by the accident.
The IAEA organized the “IAEA International Fact Finding Expert Mission of the Fukushima
Dai-ichi NPP Accident Following the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami”, held on 24
May – 2 June 2011. The conclusions of this mission were presented in the International
Ministerial Conference held in Vienna from 20 to 24 June 2011.
In response to the request made by the Government of Japan, the IAEA organized this second
fact finding mission to support the remediation of contaminated off-site areas. For this second
mission an Expert Team of 12 international experts was assembled (the Mission Team
members are listed in Annex 1).
This Mission is in line with the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety that was approved by the
Board of Governors on 19 September 2011 and endorsed by the 151 Member States of the
IAEA. In particular, the Mission is in connection with actions to strengthen the emergency
response to nuclear accidents and the protection of people and the environment from ionizing
radiation.

6

2. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Basis for review
In the Japanese administrative system, the national government, the prefectures and themunicipalities play specific roles in disaster management and environmental protection. Inline with this general institutional framework, the remediation programme is being conductedwith the following basic approach:•The national government provides policies and standards, conducts remediation inareas which are in “emergency exposure situation” and promotes the efforts of local
governments by taking technical and financial measures.

•

Local governments (prefecture and municipalities) formulate and implement
remediation plans in areas which are in “existing exposure situation”.

The information on the relevant legal and regulatory framework was reviewed in light of the
IAEA safety standards. The applicable IAEA safety standards and supporting publications
were:•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Fundamental Safety Principles,
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1 (2006)•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, International Basic Safety
Standards for Protection Against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation
Sources, International Basic Safety Standards; IAEA SAFETY STANDARDSSERIES No. GSR Part 3 (Interim) (2011)•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Governmental, Legal andRegulatory Framework for Safety, General Safety Requirements Part 1, IAEA Safety
Standards Series No. GSR Part 1 (2010)•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Predisposal Management ofRadioactive Waste, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 5 (2009)•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Release of Sites from
Regulatory Control on Termination of Practices, IAEA Safety Standards Series No.
WS-G-5.1 (2006)•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Environmental and Source
Monitoring for Purposes of Radiation Protection, IAEA Safety Standards Series No.
RS-G-1.8 (2005)•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Non-technical Factors Impacting
on the Decision Making Processes in Environmental Remediation, IAEA-TECDOC1279, IAEA, Vienna (2002)

7

•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Technologies for Remediation ofRadioactively Contaminated Sites, IAEA-TECDOC-1086, IAEA, Vienna (1999)•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Characterization ofRadioactively Contaminated Sites for Remediation Purposes, IAEA-TECDOC-1017,
IAEA, Vienna (1998)•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Remediation of Sites with
Dispersed Radioactive Contamination, Technical Reports Series No. 424, IAEA,
Vienna (2004)•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Management of Long Term
Radiological Liabilities: Stewardship Challenges, Technical Reports Series No. 450,
IAEA, Vienna (2006)•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Environmental Consequences of
the Chernobyl Accident and their Remediation: Twenty Years of Experience Reportof the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group "Environment" (EGE) Radiological
Assessment Reports Series 8•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Remediation Process for Areas
Affected by Past Activities and Accidents Safety Guide IAEA Safety Standards Series
4301(2007)•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Remediation of Areas
Contaminated by Past Activities and Accidents Safety Requirements, IAEA Safety
Standards Series 4300 (2003)•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Guide on Decontamination of
Rural Settlements in the Late Period After Contamination with Long-Lived
Radionuclides- Working material TC Project RER-9059 (2001)•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Planning for Cleanup of Large
Areas Contaminated as A Result of A Nuclear Accident, Technical Reports Series
327 (1991)•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Cleanup of Large Areas
Contaminated as A Result of A Nuclear Accident, Technical Reports Series 300(1989)•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Disposal of Waste from the
Cleanup of Large Areas Contaminated as A Result of A Nuclear Accident, Technical
Reports Series 330 (1992)•

ICRP 109. Application of the Commission’s Recommendations for the Protection of
People in Emergency Exposure Situations (2008)

8•

ICRP 111. Application of the Commission’s Recommendations for the Protection of
People Living in Long-Term contaminated Areas after a Nuclear Accident or a
Radiation emergency (2009)

Findings
Legal framework for remediation
On 26 August 2011, The Parliament (Diet) of Japan approved the “Act on Special Measuresconcerning the Handling of Environment Pollution by Radioactive Materials Discharged by
the Nuclear Power Station Accident Associated with the Tohoku District – Off the Pacific
Ocean Earthquake that Occurred on March 11, 2011”. This Act is the main instrument
adopted to deal with the remediation programme for the areas affected by radioactive
pollution, and will enter into force on 1 January 2012. The Government plans to develop
activities under this Act through specific policy documents including the basic principles andstandards.
The Act establishes, among others things, the main purposes of the remediation programme;
the distribution of roles and responsibilities among the involved institutions, namely thecentral government and prefectural and municipal governments; the role of stakeholders;
basic lines for monitoring, decontamination and waste management; and the provision offinancial resources.
Decision making process
To properly implement the remediation activities under the Act, the Ministry of theEnvironment, in consultation with the relevant administrative bodies and stakeholders, is incharge of developing the basic principles regarding the handling of environmental radioactive
pollution.
These principles were formally approved by the Cabinet. In the meantime, the Nuclear
Emergency Response Headquarters on 26 August 2011 established the “Basic Policy for
Emergency Response on Decontamination Work”, which is in line with the Act and permits
the start of activities for remediation in advance.
The “Policy and Guidelines for Environmental Remediation” and guidelines for the decisionmaking process on decontamination to be conducted by local authorities have been preparedreflecting comments from relevant ministries and agencies as well as from the local
authorities, so those comments were reflected in the decision-making process.
The Emergency Evacuation Preparation Zone was lifted on 30 September 2011, taking into
account technical advice from the relevant body, namely the Nuclear Safety Commission(NSC), the conditions of the NPP and the results of the radiological monitoring in the area.

9This is one example of shifting from an emergency exposure situation to an existing exposure
situation.
Roles and responsibilities
Under the Act on Special Measures, the Ministry of the Environment is the leading Ministry
for implementing the decontamination activities in cooperation with other relevantorganizations. The roles and responsibilities of the relevant organizations are as follows:•

The Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (GNER-HQs), headedby the Prime Minister and consisting of all the Cabinet members, decides the basic
policy to respond to the emergency (including the remediation policy). The Support
Team for Residents Affected by Nuclear Incidents, under the GNER-HQs, headed by
the Minister of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Ministerfor the Restoration and Prevention of Nuclear Accidents, implements the model
remediation programmes according to the “Urgent Decontamination Implementation
Policy”;•

MOE is responsible for formulating an implementation policy for the decontamination
activities. It also has a responsibility for the treatment of contaminated solid waste,
including disaster debris and contaminated soil;•

The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) is
responsible for implementing monitoring and coordination of activities for monitoringby relevant ministries and other organizations;•

The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) is responsible for theformulation of an implementation policy for the decontamination of farmlands andforests;•

The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) is responsible for occupational(including radiation) safety of workers implementing decontamination activities;•

The Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) gives necessary advice to the government ontechnical standards on remediation; and•The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) provides technical support for model
decontamination programmes and monitoring and communicates with local authorities
and residents about technical issues.

Local governments shall, through cooperation with the national government, carry out theirrole in accordance with the natural and social conditions of their respective areas in handlingthe environmental pollution from radioactive materials discharged by the accident.
The relevant nuclear power operator shall implement the necessary measures to deal with theenvironmental pollution from radioactive materials discharged by the accident and cooperate10with the measures taken by national or local governments to deal with the radioactive
environmental pollution.
The Fukushima Decontamination Promotion Team was established last August to promote
decontamination activities. The team, consisting of government officials and JAEA
representatives, communicates and coordinates with the local authorities. The team conducts
and coordinates the so called demonstration projects.

Highlights of important progress
Highlight 1: The team appreciates that Japan has been going forward very quickly and withthe allocation of the necessary resources (legal, economic and technological) to develop an
efficient programme for remediation to bring relief to the people affected by the Fukushima
Dai-ichi nuclear accident. Priority has been given to children and to those areas where they
typically spend most of their time.
Highlight 2: The Fukushima Decontamination Promotion Team, consisting of resident staff
in Fukushima from the Ministry of the Environment (MOE), the Local Emergency Response
HQs and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), shares information and coordinates withthe relevant ministries and agencies, communicating with and providing technical support to
the Fukushima prefecture and relevant municipalities. The Team welcomes the Japaneseefforts to establish a practical catalogue of remediation techniques.

AdvicePoint 1: The Japanese authorities involved in the remediation strategy are encouraged tocautiously balance the different factors that influence the net benefit of the remediation
measures to ensure dose reduction. They are encouraged to avoid over-conservatism which
could not effectively contribute to the reduction of exposure doses. This goal could beachieved through the practical implementation of the Justification and Optimization
principles2 under the prevailing circumstances. Involving more radiation protection experts(and the Regulatory Body) in the organizational structures that assist the decision makers
might be beneficial in the fulfillment of this objective. The IAEA is ready to support Japan inconsidering revised, new and appropriate criteria.
Point 2: It is appropriate to consider further strengthening coordination among the main
actors through the establishment of a more permanent liaison between the organizational
structures of the Government of Japan and the prefectural and municipal authorities.

2

IAEA Safety Glossary 2007 STI/PUB/1355 (ISBN:978-9290-058908-9).

11

3. STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT
Basis for review
As stated in the IAEA safety standard “the decision making process shall provide for the
involvement of a wide range of interested parties in the definition, implementation andverification of remediation programmes and for regular public information exchange on theimplementation of these programmes.” (WS-R-3).
There are many definitions for the word “Stakeholder”. The IAEA Handbook on Nuclear Law
states that:“Owing to the differing views on who has a genuine interest in a particular nuclear related
activity, no authoritative definition of stakeholder has yet been offered, and no definition is
likely to be accepted by all parties. However, stakeholders have typically included thefollowing: the regulated industry or professionals; scientific bodies; governmental agencies(local, regional and national) whose responsibilities arguably cover nuclear energy; themedia; the public (individuals, community groups and interest groups); and other States(especially neighbouring States that have entered into agreements providing for an exchange
of information concerning possible trans-boundary impacts, or States involved in the export
or import of certain technologies or material).”The Team recognizes that stakeholders are not necessarily those living in areas to be
remediated, but could be physically situated also much further away.
The objective is to seek and promulgate safety through technically and economically optimal
solutions of remediation processes that are, at the same time, acceptable to the stakeholders.
Since remediation involves many steps, careful consideration must be given to understanding
and ensuring that each step is an integral part of a well-functioning remediation system. Thismeans that the output of a step has to be a compatible input to the following step.
For example, what appears to be a seemingly good step if viewed in isolation (e.g. cleaningsoil more than radiation protection considerations would suggest) will complicate the next
step (in this case by creating much more waste than necessary, leading to an increasing
anxiety among the public in the next remediation steps, i.e. how to find storage and disposal
locations for the waste). Optimum consideration of the system as a whole is the key for all
stakeholders in their involvement and for their information.
Taking into account that remediation of this scale is a complicated and long term process,stakeholders have an important, sometimes governing, influence on it.
Decisions regarding particular remediation issues like the recycling and reuse of material
should be given considerable attention by stakeholders.
In light of international experience, the Team emphasizes the balance between “rights” and“responsibilities” of stakeholders. Namely, all stakeholders with an interest in remediation

12

should be provided with an opportunity for full and effective participation. With this right,
however, come certain obligations on all sides for openness, cooperation and goodwill.
Wide possibilities for stakeholders to be involved and informed ensure that as remediation
planning and implementation proceed, stakeholder needs and concerns are properly
addressed. Based on international experience this has many benefits, such as:•

Timely stakeholder involvement increases the credibility of the whole remediation
process and the probability of success;•Public confidence is improved if issues that are raised by the public are taken seriously
and are carefully and openly discussed and evaluated;•

Stakeholder involvement may result in attention to issues that otherwise might not be
identified and addressed;•

Timely stakeholder involvement provides improved opportunities for innovation andan influx of ideas. This may not happen if the stakeholders are not engaged earlyenough or are not convinced about technology demonstrations, related R&D or debate;•

Stakeholder involvement enhances the possibility of delivering a project on time,within cost estimates and through good performance by providing a unified vision ofrisks, plans and developments. It reduces costly delays to projects by avoiding andeffectively resolving conflicts among interested parties;•

Remediation of this scale requires particular project management skills and attention.
Early stakeholder involvement provides better identification and mitigation of projectrisks which enables an improved risk management process to be implemented in orderto ensure the success of the entire remediation operation (including disposal of
remediation wastes); and•Experience in many countries has shown that transparency can be an effective tool toenhance safety performance.

Managing expectations is essential from the onset of stakeholder engagement. It is important
to clearly identify the objectives so that stakeholders can understand the extent of theirinvolvement and responsibility.
Relevant international experience
The Team considered it to be important that all parties involved in remediation projects
understand the issues that may affect decisions and are able to benefit from the experiencethat has already been acquired in other countries. It is recognized, however, that different
experiences may not be universally relevant and that some issues have a particular national
character.
The Team noted that the IAEA, UNSCEAR, WHO and others devoted significant efforts tolearn lessons about involving and informing stakeholders, in particular the public, after the13

Chernobyl accident. The Team is of the opinion that many of these important lessons are also
applicable to the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP off-site remediation strategies, plans and activities.
In the Team’s view, important and relevant lessons learned from the Chernobyl accident
include the following:•

Psychological consequences were clearly observed and documented;•

Many people were traumatized by their evacuation and relocation, the subsequent
breakdown of their social contacts, their fear and anxiety about health effects theymight ultimately suffer from;•

Elevated levels of anxiety and unexplained physical symptoms among affected people
were reported;•

Self-perception as “Chernobyl Victims or Invalids” and not as “Chernobyl survivors”
was observed;•

Over the years, the most significant problems have become the severe social andeconomic depression of the affected Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian regions andthe associated serious psychological problems of the general public and emergency
workers; and•Recent research shows that social and economic restoration of the affected regions
must be a priority.

Findings
Concerning the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP’s accident, the Team noted that there were issues
that raised concerns among the stakeholders, which would benefit from lessons learned fromthe Chernobyl accident. For example, there is a rising concern about how the contaminationfrom the accident will affect children’s health, including thyroid abnormalities. It might bebeneficial for the stakeholders to know that in the case of the Chernobyl accident children andadolescents received substantial thyroid doses in the spring of 1986 due to the consumption ofmilk contaminated with radioiodine. Many thyroid cancer cases that were detected were likely
to be associated with this type of radiation exposure. With regard to milk and other food inJapan, the Team appreciates that the country’s food control system appears to be in very goodorder.
Relevant structures and processes
In the Japanese administrative system, municipalities and prefectures have strong autonomy
and play significant roles in disaster management and environmental protection, including theremediation process. The national government provides the legal framework, policies,
standards, and financial and technical support, and conducts remediation for areas which are
in “emergency exposure situations” - in this case areas where citizens could be exposed to anannual dose above 20 mSv.

14

Local governments implement remediation plans for areas which are in “existing exposure
situations”, i.e. areas below 20 mSv/year. In these areas the ultimate decision whether toremediate or not rests with the landowner.
The “Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution”, which willenter into force 1 January 2012 but which the Government already implements to a large
extent, explicitly recognizes stakeholder involvement. The purpose of the Act is to promptly
reduce the impacts of environmental pollution by instituting measures taken by stakeholders,
especially the national and local governments, as well as the relevant nuclear power producer.
Under the ‘Basic Policy for Emergency Decontamination Work’ established on 26 August
2011, several important policy, guidelines and documents have been issued. These include
stipulations of how stakeholders are to be involved in the process.
Practical involvement of stakeholders
There is understandable anxiety in the society about the current radiation situation. The Teamnoted that in the early phases of the accident many doubts were expressed about the accuracy
and timeliness of the information provided by the central authorities.
The Team observed that revised ways and new efforts to inform and involve stakeholders, inparticular the public, are being implemented by the central authorities. At a local level, theTeam was impressed by the strong commitment to the remediation efforts shown by the
Fukushima prefecture and the municipalities.
The Mission Team recognized the following important players in the practical stakeholder
involvement:•••

The Fukushima Decontamination Promotion Team under the Ministry of theEnvironment is tasked to communicate and coordinate activities with local
municipalities, assisting them in their preparation of remediation plans, by dispatchingexperts and promoting model remediation projects in 12 municipalities affected byelevated radiation levels. JAEA, being a member of the Promotion Team plays animportant role in interacting with the public and other stakeholders.
Having established a “Fukushima office”, the JAEA interfaces with relevant
Fukushima prefecture organizations and citizens. With regard to technical issues, theMission Team appreciated that JAEA provided a telephone hot-line for healthconsultations, dispatched experts to stakeholders (ministries, local governments, cityadministration, etc.), sent researchers to Fukushima prefecture schools fromkindergartens to junior high schools at their request, held briefings on radiation inschools, took time and effort to answer questions from parents and teachers, andprepared written material for the benefit of the local people. In the demonstration testsites described elsewhere in this report, the JAEA works in close cooperation with theresidents and landowners, and carries out activities subject to their consent.
Cities, villages and their citizens: the Team benefitted from visiting some school sites,from which the contamination to a large extent had been removed in a well-organizedmanner by volunteers, mostly parents of the pupils. The Mission Team acknowledged

15

the effort of the city administration and the large number of volunteers as an importantand effective clean-up and self-help method.

Highlights of important progress
Highlight 3: The Mission Team acknowledges that the Act on Special Measures explicitly
stipulates stakeholder involvement. The Mission Team appreciates that the Government is not
waiting for the new Act to come into force, but has already started implementing this aspectof the remediation plan.
Highlight 4: The Team appreciates the strong commitment to remediation demonstrated at the
Fukushima prefecture and at local levels. The Team benefitted from visiting school sites, fromwhich the contamination had been removed to a large extent by volunteers, mostly parents ofthe pupils. The Team in particular acknowledges the efforts of the municipal administrations
and the large number of volunteers as an important and effective self-help method.
Highlight 5: The Team acknowledges the practical measures taken by the JAEA in public
information and its involvement in the programme based on the needs of the local residents.

AdvicePoint 3: The central and local governments are encouraged to continue strengthening the
involvement of and cooperation between various stakeholders. The authorities might wish tostrengthen the engagement of appropriate universities and/or academia in the process offurther developing a stakeholder involvement strategy and implementation methods, which
would be based on stakeholder needs and domestic cultural settings.

16

4. RADIATION PROTECTION
Basis for review
The information on the relevant legal and regulatory framework was reviewed in light of the
IAEA safety standards. The applicable IAEA safety standards and supporting publications
were
•
•

•

•

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Fundamental Safety
Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1 (2006)
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, International Basic Safety
Standards for Protection Against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation
Sources, International Basic Safety Standards; IAEA SAFETY STANDARDSSERIES No. GSR Part 3 (Interim) (2011)
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Governmental, Legal andRegulatory Framework for Safety, General Safety Requirements Part 1, IAEA
Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 1 (2010)
Classification of Radioactive Waste. General Safety Guide GSG-1, IAEA, (2009)

The Basic Safety Standards (BSS) define the requirements on protection of people and theenvironment. These requirements reflect a broad international consensus on the requirements
for safety.
For post-accidental conditions, the BSS recommend a reference level in the range of 1-20
mSv/year. It is an international consensus that the reference levels have to be defined taking
into account the specific circumstances of an exposure situation. This includes the level ofactivity in the environment, environmental conditions and people’s life style.
The BSS require that any measure taken is justified to ensure that it does more good thanharm and that it is commensurate with the risk.
Usually, remediation actions also have social and economic implications and decisions haveto take into account all aspects of a specific situation. The optimization of protection andsafety – as required by the BSS - is a process for ensuring that exposures and the number of
exposed individuals are as low as reasonably achievable, with economic, societal andenvironmental factors taken into account to ensure that the level of protection will be the best
possible under the prevailing circumstances. It requires both qualitative and quantitative
judgments to be made.
Any reasonable steps shall be taken to prevent doses remaining above the reference level. The
exposure has to be assessed for the more highly exposed individuals in the population.
The optimization of protection and safety, when applied to the exposure of workers and ofmembers of the public is an iterative and prospective process for ensuring that the magnitude
and likelihood of exposures and the number of individuals exposed are as low as reasonably
achievable. It requires both qualitative and quantitative judgements to be made.

17

According to IAEA Safety Standards3, remedial work should not be carried out by persons
younger than 18 or by women who have notified their employer of a pregnancy or breast
feeding. The dose limits for remediation workers should be established according to
occupational exposure requirements as follows:•••An effective dose of 20 mSv per year averaged over five consecutive years (100 mSv
in 5 years), and of 50 mSv in any single year;
An equivalent dose to the lens of the eye of 20 mSv per year averaged over fiveconsecutive years (100 mSv in 5 years), and of 50 mSv in any single year;
An equivalent dose to the extremities (hands and feet) or the skin of 500 mSv in ayear.

Remediation work may generate residues that contain enhanced levels of activity.
Accordingly, waste arising from remediation operations will have to be managed asradioactive waste and be either stabilized in situ or disposed of in appropriate disposal
facilities.
According to the BSS, for legal and regulatory purposes radioactive waste is defined asmaterial for which no further use is foreseen and that contains, or is contaminated with,radionuclides at activity concentrations or activities greater than the clearance levels
established by the regulatory body. In the GSG-1 referred to above, radioactive waste withactivity concentrations that are about 100 times higher than the clearance levels is classified
as Very Low Level Waste (VLLW). Such waste does not meet the criteria for clearance, but it
does not need a high level of containment and isolation and, therefore, is suitable for disposal
in near surface landfill type facilities with limited regulatory control. Such landfill typefacilities may also contain other hazardous waste. Typical waste in this class includes soil andrubble with low levels of activity. Concentrations of longer lived radionuclides in VLLW aregenerally very limited.
Such waste, arising from remediation operations, should be accommodated within an existing
waste management system established for normal practices, particularly if the amounts ofwaste expected are small.
If the existing waste management system is not capable of dealing with the types andquantities of waste that will be generated during the remediation activities, the system should
be adapted or supplemented accordingly.
Clearance levels for radionuclides are given in the BSS for material which is intended to be
used without any restrictions. Clearance levels for material that is going to be disposed of in
landfills may be derived by national governments taking into account the specificcircumstances, the radionuclides involved and the specification of the landfill.
It is the responsibility of the government to set reference levels for the disposal of residues inmunicipal landfills or for landfills to be especially designed for the disposal of those residues.

3

See details in: IAEA Basic Safety Standards, GOV2011/42, 15 August 201118

In view of the strong absorption of caesium by the soil, the definition of the reference levelshould in particular focus on Cs-137 rather than on the relatively short-lived Cs-134.

Findings
The Japanese government has defined a set of reference levels to control the exposure of the
public. In areas where the annual effective dose is estimated to be above 20 mSv, the national
government aims to reduce the estimated annual exposure dose to less than 20 mSv; in areas
where an estimated annual exposure dose is less than 20 mSv, the national government will
work with municipalities and local residents to conduct effective remediation work, with along term target of keeping the estimated annual exposure dose below 1 mSv.
Specific attention is being given to the exposure of children. Therefore, initial efforts focus on
measures to reduce exposures in schools and kindergartens, with the aim to reduce theexposure to children to an effective dose of 1 mSv per year during the time children are atschool.
This approach is in accordance with the recommendations of the International Commission on
Radiation Protection and the BSS.
Exposure of remediation workers
The “Basic Principles Based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling ofRadioactive Pollution” developed by the Japanese national authorities include the following
requirement: “Full attention shall be paid to occupational safety and the health of those who
engage in the handling of the environment pollution such as radiation protection and theamount of radiation that the relevant workers receive shall be controlled”.
According to information obtained from Japanese counterparts, the application of personal
protection equipment is required for remediation workers, including protective clothes andface masks, to prevent the surface contamination of workers and incorporation ofradionuclides.
Currently, the JAEA programme of whole body counter measurements is in place forresidents of ten towns (Namie, Iitate, Kawamata, Hirono, Naraha, Futaba, Okuma, Tomioka,
Kawauchi and Katsurao) within the deliberate evacuation area and restricted area. The
expansion of this programme to remediation workers could be considered.
When visiting the decontamination demonstration sites, it was found that the radiation
monitoring equipment is in place during the remedial work and the measured levels of gamma
radiation dose rates are properly recorded. Measurements of beta contamination were notsystematically included during remedial operations in visited demonstration sites. In any case,the monitoring of the contamination of remedial workers should be carried out after thecompletion of their daily work.

19

It was especially noted that all persons involved in remedial work were provided withadvance training and information on the remedial operations including radiation protection
measures. According to IAEA standards for an existing exposure situation and for the
remediation of areas with residual radioactive material, the exposure of workers undertaking
remedial actions should be controlled in accordance with the relevant requirements foroccupational exposure in planned exposure situations. The responsibility for such control
shall be assigned to remediation worker employers.
The national government requirements regarding remediation worker safety are the basis formunicipal requirements as established by the above mentioned basic principles document.
The Team noted that remediation activities include the voluntary involvement of local
residents. For instance, 500 volunteers were involved in clean-up operations for a school
environment in the Fukushima prefecture (Tominari Elementary School) visited by theMission Team. In this case, the radiation protection advice was given by a competent
governmental and municipal body. The advice was specific to the remediation option andtechnology applied.
With regards to the available information on dose rates and radioactivity concentration levels
present in the areas of decontamination operations, the above requirements for occupational
exposure of remediation workers are feasible.
The Team points out that the responsibility for the control of the exposure of workers
undertaking remedial actions should be assigned to remediation worker employers (which are
the national government institutions or municipalities depending, on the value of the expectedannual dose (above or below 20 mSv/year, respectively).
The Team also considered that it would be useful to apply the monitoring of contamination ofremedial workers’ bodies after the completion of daily work. The JAEA programme of wholebody counter measurements should be extended to remediation workers.
Use of clearance levels
As reflected in the advice in Points 1 and 5, the Team considers the introduction andimplementation of specific clearance levels for disposal in landfills or other specific purposes
taking into account clearly defined designated purposes as very useful. A number of countries
have set activity levels for the particular disposal of material in landfills. For example, in
Sweden, material with Cs-137 activities of 5 Bq/g may be disposed of in landfills formunicipal waste. In Germany, activities up to levels of 8 Bq/g may be disposed of in landfills.
All these values were derived to comply with a de-minimis dose to members of the public in
the order of 10 µSv/y, giving specific consideration to the pathway of exposure duringtransport and management of the waste. Long-term issues such as the possible impact on the
groundwater and its subsequent use by humans were also considered.

20Any specific levels defined for conditional reuse, recycling or waste disposal in a landfill are
subject to a safety assessment of the specific site and practice, and any effort should becommensurate with the associated risks.
Key elements for the successful continuation of remediation measures include unconditionaland conditional reuse and recycling of residues as well as planning, construction andoperation of landfills for the residues.
Assessment of exposures
The decision on measures to be taken is currently based on the external exposure; otherpathways such as the intake of food are not explicitly taken into consideration. While theintake of food is very likely not an important pathway, due to the strict activity limits forfoodstuffs, its contribution to the dose should be explicitly assessed. This is to achieve acomprehensive and transparent overview of the radiation sources and their magnitude. This isalso an important input for the optimization of any remediation measures.
The exposure of the public is the determining criterion for remediation actions. Due to thestrict control of activity levels in food, the external exposure from radionuclides deposited on
the ground is the most important pathway. Currently, Cs-134 and Cs-137 are present in about
equal activities, but due to the decay characteristics, the contribution of Cs-134 is muchhigher than that of Cs-137. However, since Cs-134 decays faster than Cs-137, the external
dose rate will decrease significantly during the coming years. This relationship is illustrated in
Figure 2, where the decline of the gamma dose rate due to radioactive decay is shown for
C s-134, Cs-137 and the sum of both radionuclides respectively.

21

Figure 22: Reductionn of the relatiive external eexposure ratte subsequent to depositioon of Cs-134
4 and Cs13
37 (ratio = 11) due to radioactive decaay.

Usuallyy, the reducttion of the externaledosse rate is morempronounnced due too weatheringg effects
and onggoing attenuuation effects arising frrom the mig
gration of caesium intoo deeper soiil layers.
Migratioon of caesium in soil is in generral very slow
w, but evenn thin layerrs of soil co
ontributesignificaantly to the attenuationn of the radiiation.
The connsiderable reductionr
off the gammaa dose ratess during thee coming yeears suggestts that inareas with exposurres that are relativelyrcllose to the lower
lband of referencee levels for existing
exposurre situationn (1-20 mS
Sv per yearr), decisionns on drastic remediat
ation action
n requirethorouggh considerration of alll factors iinvolved, su
uch as thee dose reduuction (beyyond theradioacttive decay),, costs, geneeration of w
waste and so
ocial implicaations.
As discussed in Seection 3 of this report (stakeholdeer involvem
ment), providding inform
mation to
the publlic is a key issue for th
he involvem
ment of the populationpin the remeddiation proccess. The
Team nnoted that accessato thhe ‘Deliberaate Evacuattion Area’ is free. Hoowever, app
propriate
indicatioons when enteringeor leavinglthesse areas maay be consid
dered as an important issueiforthe infoormation of the public.
The Teaam encouraages the resspective autthorities to optimize alll remediatiion measurees to theextent ppossible in thet context of ensuringg that all thee steps are integrated inn the optimu
um way,as is meentioned in PointP
1 of thhe Team’s aadvice.

22

Advice
Point 4: Access to the “Deliberate Evacuation Area” is free and unmarked. The teamencourages considering the use of appropriate indications/markings of the routes and simple
instructions for the public when entering or leaving these areas. These indications/markings
are considered important tools for informing the public and avoiding unnecessary radiation
exposures to individuals.

23

5. REMEDIATION STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION
Basis for review
This section of the report (sub-sections 5.1-5.7) discusses the Japanese remediation strategy
and its practical implementation.
The Team notes that remediation of this scale is a multidimensional challenge. In order tomake good and well-informed decisions on what to clean-up, when and by whom, a strategy
is needed.
In the Team’s experience, a successful remediation strategy includes such main elements as:•

Requirements and classification as to what constitutes such contamination that
requires remediation, which materials can be reused and recycled and what are thecondition to do that. Commonly these limits are referred to as ‘clearance levels’;•

Objective of each technology option available for remediation. The Team is aware ofabout 60 technology options available;•

Constraints on implementation for each technology;•

Effectiveness of technology options, including such factors as quantities andcharacteristics of wastes generated;•

Wastes generated in each step of remediation, their respective waste management
options and their availability;•

Doses received during implementation;•

Side-effects each technology might have;•Experience gained elsewhere and lessons learned in using the remediation technology;
and•Cost/benefit considerations.

The Mission Team recognized that there is quite some experience and lessons learned indifferent countries in implementing various remediation approaches and technologies. One
important lesson learned is that what works in one country under certain conditions does not
automatically work well in another country under the same or different conditions.
The Team emphasizes that remediation should always be considered as a system of many
sequential and sometime parallel steps and processes. These steps and processes should not beviewed in isolation but integrally linked to each other. Namely, successful remediation withacceptable end results to all stakeholders requires that the output of one step is fullycompatible as an input to the next remediation step.
For example, from the very beginning of planning remediation activities, one should keep inmind that the generation of radioactive wastes (quantities and types) from any remediation

24

step should be kept to the minimum. Also, such remediation techniques that produce no, orvery little radioactive waste, should be favoured.
The justification principle as expressed in the international standards stipulates that the
introduction of a remediation strategy needs to produce more good than harm. In other words,
the benefits need to exceed the associated burden and costs. The reduction of exposures to the
public also needs to be optimized, i.e. the residual levels of radiation in the environment
should be as low as reasonably achievable with social and economic aspects factored in. The
simple reduction of existing doses by the application of any clean-up strategy per se may not
produce the desired benefits, especially if they create additional problems (such as waste andnegative social impact) and excessive cost. In other words, the burden may be disproportional
to the benefits the remediation will bring.
Another factor that is very important in the context of environmental remediation is thatsolutions are also site-specific. Lessons learned with other events shall always be taken into
account in the decision making process but they may not be readily transferable from one
situation to another.
Last but not least, decisions in these circumstances are not based only on technical mattersand evidence. Several socio-psychological elements play an important role in the decision
making process. Therefore, the key issues include stakeholder involvement, which is
discussed in Section 2 of this report.
Gathering international experience and learning from lessons, careful system-approachplanning as well as testing and demonstrating feasibilities and the effectiveness of various
remediation approaches and technologies are therefore important before large scale
remediation implementation starts.

Findings
In the following, only generic findings are presented. More detailed findings are presented inconnection with each sub-section 5.1–5.7.
Overview of the on-going remediation activities
The Team appreciates that Japan has been going forward very quickly and with the allocationof the necessary resources (legal, economic and technological) to develop an efficient
programme for remediation. There are various on-going remediation activities related tomonitoring and mapping, data management, agricultural areas, urban decontamination, forest
areas, aquatic areas and waste management. These are discussed in more detail in thesubsequent sections of this report.
On a general level, the Team wishes to note the following two remarks:•

The Team notes that the main strategy adopted by the Japanese authorities relates tothe concept of decontamination. At this stage, it is important to stress that
decontamination is only one of the many available options to be used to achieve thereduction of doses in the case of radioactivity concentrations in the environment

25

caused by an accidental release. Other options need to be considered and the one (orones) to be selected need to derive from a process of optimization of the protection,
which the Team wishes to identify more in the decision making process.
In the decontamination efforts perpetrated by the Japanese counterparts, the Teamobserved that the major strategy being considered is the removal of top soil (up to 5
cm of the soil layer) due to the well-known behaviour that radiocaesium accumulates
in this part of the soil. While this strategy has the benefit of reducing radionuclide
concentrations in the upper layer of soils and consequently the dose, it also involves arisk of generating unnecessarily huge amounts of residual materials, some of which
can be classified as ‘radioactive waste’.
If removal of the top layers of the soil is one of the selected options for wider use, asimilar system would be useful that is in place for naturally occurring radioactive
material residues (so-called NORM residues) in many countries and is based on safetyassessments. This would allow the removed material to be used in selected
applications, e.g. together with clean material in the construction of structures, banks
or roads that will not pose undue risks to members of the public. This system is known
as clearance and specifically in the present situation conditional clearance could beconsidered. This is recognized as an applicable strategy also in the IAEA Safety
Standards. The classification of the material resulting from the remediation operations
as radioactive waste should not be automatic. In fact, the Team finds that doing so
could create unnecessary major challenges for the Japanese authorities without
providing any benefit in terms of reducing doses to the public.
•

The team recognizes and values the strategy of involving local people to help
themselves with the decontamination of their properties. However, it has been noticed
that for more complex work specialized services will be required and this will
obviously add costs to the remedial actions. Whenever local residents become
involved in the clean-up of their properties it is important to observe that appropriate
training, supervision and technical assistance are given. Radiation protection measuresand monitoring should also be in place, when integrating local people in remediation
work.

The logical sequence of the remediation efforts involved can be summarized as shown next
page.

26

Highliights of immportant progress
Highlight 6: In the Team’s vieew, the apprroach for using demon
nstration sitees to test an
nd assessi a very hellpful way too support th
he decision-m
making pro
ocess.
various remediationn methods is

Advicee
Point 1 is also appllicable here.
Point 5:: It is imporrtant to avoiid classifyinng as “radio
oactive waste” waste mmaterials thaat do notcause eexposures thatt
would
d warrant sspecial rad
diation prottection meeasures. Th
he Teamencouraages the rellevant autho
orities to reevisit the isssue of estaablishing reealistic and credible
limits (cclearance leevels) regarrding assocciated expossures. Resid
dues that saatisfy the clearanceclevel caan be used inn various ways,
wsuch as the constrruction of sttructures, baanks and roads. The
IAEA iss ready to suupport Japaan in considdering reviseed, new andd appropriatee criteria.
Point 66: The Teamm draws thee authoritiess’ attention to the poten
ntial risk off misunderstandingsthat coould arise if the po
opulation iss only or mainly cooncerned w
with contam
mination3
concenntrations [suurface conttamination levels (Bq//m2) or volume conceentrations (Bq/m()]
rather tthan dose leevels. The innvestment oof time and effort in reemoving conntaminationn beyond
certain levels (thee so-called optimizedoleevels) fromm everywherre, such as all forest areasaandareas wwhere the additional exposure iss relatively
y low, doess not autom
matically leead to a
reduction of doses for the pu
ublic. It alsso involvess a risk of generatingg
unnecessarrily hugeamountts of residuual materiall. The Teamm encourag
ges authorities to mainntain their focus
fon
remediation activities that bring the best results in reeducing the doses to thhe public.

27

5.1. Monitoring and mapping
Basis for review
The monitoring of radiation levels and the mapping of the distribution and level of radioactive
contamination are necessary tools for both the preparation and the verification of a successful
remediation effort.
Radiological monitoring is a well-established subject and consequently there are a series of
IAEA reports and guides that the review is based on. These are in particular:‐ IAEA Safety Guide No RS-G-1.8 ‘Environmental and Source Monitoring for the
Purposes of Radiation Protection’ (2005)‐ IAEA TECDOC 1017 ‘Characterization of radioactively contaminated sites for
remediation purposes’ (1998)‐ IAEA Technical Reports Series No. 450 ‘Management of Long Term Radiological
Liabilities: Stewartship Challenges’ (2006)
Technological progress in environmental mapping, e.g. in geo-information systems and GPS,is so recent and has been so rapid that a complete set of standards has not yet been establishedby the IAEA. However, most of the basics are included in an IAEA TECDOC:‐

IAEA TECDOC 1363 ‘Guidelines for radioelement mapping using gamma ray
spectrometry data’, 2003

It can be expected that updated guidelines on environmental mapping will be one of theoutcomes of the environmental mapping efforts in Japan over the coming years.

Findings
National monitoring and mapping efforts
The Japanese government has outlined the responsibilities of the different government
agencies regarding radiation monitoring and mapping in the Comprehensive Monitoring Planfrom 2 August 2011. The overall responsibility and coordination falls to MEXT, but MOE,
MHLW, MAFF and MLIT, as well as a number of other agencies and organisations, are also
involved. JAEA is playing a key role as keeper of the data base, technology provider andliaison to the universities.
Radiation levels are monitored at different geographic scales using the appropriate technology
for each case: airborne and vehicle based surveys for the large scale overview (up to 160 km
from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP), soil samples (2,200 locations, within 100 km of the NPP

28

and surrounding areas within the Fukushima prefecture), sea water and soil samples off thecoast, and hand-held dosimeters and spectrometers for local radiation maps anddecontamination test sites. Typically, the data are given as aerial dose rate 1 m above ground,but often the surface dose rate and the concentration in Bq/kg or Bq/m2 are also used.
Three airborne surveys around the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP were carried out in April, May
and June 2011 by MEXT in cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DoE). Thesesurveys use high sensitivity gamma detectors (NaI scintillators) carried by helicopters flown
at an altitude between 150 and 300 m. The results are given as dose rates at 1m above groundby taking the altitude appropriately into account. The range of the surveys has been expanded
step by step to cover further prefectures. The next airborne survey planned for November
2011 will cover the entire Eastern part of Japan, from the Aichi to Aomori prefectures, using
four helicopter teams in parallel. Further airborne surveys are planned in the future, with thenext one after November expected to take place in the spring of 2012. The importance of thismapping effort is perhaps best illustrated by the creation of the deliberate evacuation area
North-West of the 20 km exclusion zone, which was based on these results.
MEXT is currently in the process of setting up a real-time monitoring system that will
eventually cover the Fukushima prefecture with about 2700 monitoring stations. Twenty
monitoring stations have already been deployed in the Fukushima prefecture. This
information is available online at www.r-monitor.jp. The system is similar to other national
monitoring networks, e.g. the one maintained in Germany by the Bundesamt fürStrahlenschutz, which has 2150 monitoring stations4. However, the new Japanese system uses
more advanced, contemporary technology, e.g. where the German system uses phone lines forthe data transmission, the Japanese system uses satellite links. The monitoring station, which
was under construction and which the Team could inspect, was located next to the entrance ofan elementary school and it featured a solar panel and a display. 2700 monitoring stations areunder an on-going open bidding process. Almost every school, from nursery to university,
will eventually be equipped with an online monitoring station. For the citizens of Japan thissystem represents an unprecedented amount of readily available, real-time information. The
transparent online availability of the resulting data is an important measure to reassure theJapanese public as well as the international community.
MAFF has conducted investigations on the concentration of radioactive material in
agricultural soil, in cooperation with MEXT. Samples have been taken at 360 points in the
Fukushima prefecture and at about 220 points in the five surrounding prefectures (Miyagi,
Tochigi, Gunma, Ibaraki and Chiba). The results were compiled into a map that was publishedon 30 August 2011.
In addition to the monitoring and mapping of the radioactive contamination on land, MEXT isalso carrying out a monitoring programme of the ocean offshore of the Miyagi, Fukushima
and Ibaraki prefectures. The monitoring plan includes sea water and marine soil samples.
Most measurements concern I-131, Cs-134 and Cs-137, but some measurements on Sr and Pu

4available online at odlinfo.bfs.de29

isotopes were taken as well. The results of the measurements from March to May have beenused as input values for a simulation of radioactivity concentrations in the Pacific Ocean in
the coming years.
Japan is carrying out a very comprehensive national monitoring and mapping effort of theradioactive contamination following the Fukushima accident. The Team did not find anythingthat obviously would have to be added to this effort.
Local monitoring efforts
In addition to the large national programmes, the aerial surveys and the R&D efforts by JAEA
and by universities and research institutes, there are additional examples of monitoring efforts
at the local level, e.g. by municipalities. In one municipality visited by the Team it was foundthat copies of local radiation dose maps of the area with a 1 km grid were available at the city
hall. They were apparently the result of a municipal initiative and had a resolution that made it
possible to identify individual buildings.
Another example that the Team noticed between site visits was a solar powered LED dose
rate display visible from the car. The display was similar to those that show temperature andhumidity that were used in other locations or those that indicate your speed. These activities
do not yet all appear to be coordinated and their data are not yet collected centrally anywhere.
MEXT only collects the data down to the prefecture level. More and closer coordination of
the monitoring and mapping initiatives below the prefecture level would enable the spreading
and application of the best ideas and practices and the collection of locally generated data.

Applications of modern technology
In the 25 years since the Chernobyl accident there have been a large number of technologicaldevelopments that directly or indirectly affect radiation monitoring and environmental
mapping.
It is possible to access the information of the Japanese radiation monitoring stations online at
any time5, from anywhere and in real time, based on the combination of technologies andinformation (GPS, GIS, WWW, satellite uplinks).
The Team appreciates the technological development. As a liaison with universities, JAEA
can play an important role in this and Japanese companies are world-leading in several
relevant technologies.
JAEA is making efforts to fill the gap between large area airborne monitoring and hand-held
dosimeters through the introduction of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system, which can

5available online at www.r-monitor.jp

30

be used in areas that are impossible to reach by car. Also UAVs are a technology that has only
really taken off in the last few years, and that only now is being developed for environmental
monitoring applications. JAEA is using a UAV helicopter that carries a detector systemcomprised of NaI and plastic scintillators as well as a dust sampler. The helicopter is radio- aswell as GPS-controlled and scans are performed from a height of 20-80 m. It can stay in the
air for about 90 min at a time. The data are transmitted to a vehicle on the ground in real time,
where they can be used to assemble a radiation map.
JAEA is also developing and improving detector technology for local applications. One
example is the scintillating fibre detector that JAEA demonstrated to work as well or better
than more conventional detectors. It allows the rapid measurement of radiation profiles ande.g. makes it possible to quickly see the difference between an area that has gone through aremediation effort already and a neighbouring area that has not.
Mapping of private properties
It is foreseen that the remediation of private properties outside of the 20 km exclusion zone
and the deliberate evacuation area will be carried out by the municipalities, local companies
and/or by the residents themselves. It is known from the decommissioning test sites that small
scale hot spots can be expected to occur on private properties, e.g. at the drain pipes from theroof. This leads to the question of how best to assess if and where these small scale hot spots
exist on a given property and to confirm that they have been successfully removed after
remediation. Monitoring data are typically only available with a resolution of the order of 100
metres at best. This of course does not show which area at a drain pipe or at the foot of a tree
might require special attention, while this is exactly what local residents would be interested
in. An exacerbating circumstance in this case is the low level of trust that many residents
appear to have in their government.
One possible way to address this issue would be the provision of mobile gamma
spectrometers and a corresponding mapping service. Technologically, it would bestraightforward to provide compact and light mobile gamma spectrometers in a backpack
configuration. These kinds of backpack detectors are available from a number of suppliers
already. They can be provided in a configuration that requires no expert knowledge from theuser and also gives the user no opportunity to interfere with the equipment. In simple words,
the detector would only have an on/off switch.
These detectors can be calibrated and maintained by service staff and given out to local
residents with instructions about how to collect the data. The data are extracted from thereturned detectors and sent to a mapping service, which in turn returns a local radiation map
to the residents. This can be done first before the remediation effort and then be repeatedafterwards, to clearly either demonstrate the success of the remediation or to illustrate that theremediation is not yet complete. The residents collect the data themselves, the backpack
detectors can be provided by local government and the mapping service could be certified byan outside organisation, e.g. by the IAEA. This automatically also would address the issue of31

trust of the residents in information from their government – because they themselves would
be generating the information.

Highlights of important progress
Highlight 7. The Team acknowledges the impressive monitoring and mapping effort of theJapanese Authorities as a basis for a successful remediation programme. The extensive, realtime monitoring system that is currently being set up and the transparent online availability of
the resulting data are important measures to reassure the public and the international
community.

5.2. Data management
Basis for review
Data management is a rather recent topic that has emerged due to the Freedom of Information
legislation enacted by many countries in combination with the realisation that data arevaluable and cannot always be easily reproduced.
Guidelines on data management have been drafted by funding agencies in a number ofcountries, but there are no accepted international standards yet. In some countries theseguidelines are under discussion right now.
A very basic coverage of the subject is included in‐

IAEA Technical Reports Series No. 450 ‘Management of Long Term Radiological
Liabilities: Stewartship Challenges’ (2006)

The more detailed requirements for a data management plan of the US National Science
Foundation have been used as guidelines in this case. They can be found at
http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/policydocs/pappguide/nsf11001/gpg_2.jsp#dmp.

Findings
The idea that data require management is based on the one hand on the legal requirement tobe able to make publicly held data accessible and on the other hand on the recognition thatdata, especially scientific data, are a valuable resource that often represents a considerable
investment. The legal requirements arise from the applicable freedom of information laws thatmany countries have nowadays - in Japan the corresponding law is the “Law Concerning
Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs” which has been in force since 2001.
The environmental monitoring data from Japan after the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident are not
only a crucial input for any remediation activity, but they also represent an immensely

32valuable scientific resource for future analysis. The collected data will be more complex anddetailed then those collected following the Chernobyl accident 25 years ago, due to thetechnological progress in the intervening time. The volume of data will also simply be muchlarger.
The management of the collected data should be formally described in a data management
plan. In a scientific experiment such a plan would be drawn up in advance. In this case,however the time for action is now, at the transition from emergency measures to long-termmonitoring.
Elements of a data management plan
While the general idea of a data management plan is the same in different countries andcircumstances, there is some variety in the type of information required. For example, theNational Science Foundation (NSF) in the USA requires a short two-page data management
plan as part of all grant applications. Such a plan is expected to address the following points6:• the types of data, samples, physical collections, software, curriculum materials, andother materials to be produced in the course of the project;• the standards to be used for data and metadata format and content (where existing
standards are absent or deemed inadequate, this should be documented along with any
proposed solutions or remedies);• policies for access and sharing including provisions for appropriate protection ofprivacy, confidentiality, security, intellectual property, or other rights or requirements;• policies and provisions for re-use, re-distribution, and the production of derivatives; and• plans for archiving data, samples, and other research products, and for preservation ofaccess to them.
A very useful practical resource for the preparation of a data management plan is the online
data management planning tool of the UK Digital Curation Centre7. The UK Digital Curation
Centre was launched in 2004, by a consortium comprising the Universities of Edinburgh andGlasgow (which together host the National e-Science Centre), UKOLN at the University ofBath, and STFC, which manages the Rutherford Appleton and Daresbury Laboratories.
Data management plans are not limited to data from natural sciences or engineering; they arealso found in the social sciences. A comprehensive example, that in turn is also applicable fornatural science and/or engineering data, is the list of the elements of a data management plan
provided by ICPSR at the University of Michigan8.
A data management plan for radiation monitoring data6

http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/policydocs/pappguide/nsf11001/gpg_2.jsp#dmp
available online at https://dmponline.dcc.ac.uk
8
Inter-University Consortium on Political and Social Research, University of Michigan,
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/content/ICPSR/dmp/framework.html
733

Several Individual pieces of a data management plan already exist or are emerging: quality
assurance was discussed at the Conference for the Preparation of the Distribution Map ofRadiation organised by MEXT in August 2011 and the real-time access to monitoring data
since September 2011 constitutes a de-facto policy of transparency. However, a formal andcomprehensive data management plan does not yet exist.

AdvicePoint 7: The management of the collected data should be formally described in a data
management plan.

5.3. Agricultural areas
Basis for review
The applicable IAEA safety standards and supporting publications were:
1) INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Fundamental Safety Principles,
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1 (2006)
2) INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, International Basic Safety Standards
for Protection Against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources, IAEA
Safety Series No. 115 (1996)
3) INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Non-technical Factors Impacting on
the Decision Making Processes in Environmental Remediation, IAEA-TECDOC-1279,
IAEA, Vienna (2002)
4) INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Technologies for Remediation ofRadioactively Contaminated Sites, IAEA-TECDOC-1086, IAEA, Vienna (1999)
5) INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Characterization of Radioactively
Contaminated Sites for Remediation Purposes, IAEA-TECDOC-1017, IAEA, Vienna(1998)
6) INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Environmental Consequences of theChernobyl Accident and their Remediation: Twenty Years of Experience Report of the
UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group "Environment" (EGE) Radiological Assessment
Reports Series 8
7) INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Planning for Cleanup of Large
Areas Contaminated as A Result of A Nuclear Accident, Technical Reports Series 327(1991)
8) INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
Cleanup of Large Areas
Contaminated as A Result of A Nuclear Accident, Technical Reports Series 300 (1989)
9) INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Quantification of Radionuclide
Transfer in Terrestrial and Freshwater Environments for Radiological Assessments
Technical Reports Series 1616 (2009)34

Findings
The Team was informed that the target for remediation of farm land is the reduction of thetotal annual dose to the public by 50% in the next two years. This refers only to the areas
where the current dose is between 1 and 20 mSv/year. In the long term the total dose should
be reduced to under 1mSv/year.
A threshold as basis for the selection of remedial actions
The selection of remedial actions for agricultural land is linked strongly to the thresholdconcentration of 5000 Bq/kg of radioactive caesium (Cs-134 and Cs-137) in the soil. For aradioactivity concentration in the soil of up to 5000 Bq/kg, reduction of the air dose rate anduptake of radioactive caesium by crops will be envisaged by deep ploughing or appropriate
agrochemical and agronomic practices. Above this concentration, topsoil removal will beconsidered in addition to other practices.
Japanese authorities calculated that 6300 hectares of paddy fields and 2000 hectares of uplandfields are characterized by a caesium concentration in soil above the threshold of 5000 Bq/kg.
Since the provisional regulation value for radioactivity in rice, set by the Japanese authorities,
is 500 Bq/kg, a conservative transfer factor of 0.1 implies that the temporary permissible
concentration for cultivation of rice paddy soil is 5000 Bq/kg.
The transfer factor of 0.1 was derived by the MAFF using data (564 data records) from 43
years of research on the transfer of caesium from paddy soil to brown rice collected by the
National Institute for Agro Environmental Sciences. The observed transfer rates for 17
locations from all over Japan and a wide range of soil types varied between 0.00035 and 0.64,
which averaged out at 0.012 (geometric mean). The ministry adopted the conservative valueof 0.1 (90th percentile of the observed transfer factors), nearly 10 times the average rate9. Thisrate was a good measure to reduce uncertainty in the Japanese population about the quality of
the food produced.
However, the first preliminary results from the demonstration sites established by theJapanese authorities in the affected areas indicate that the actual transfer factor is likely
significantly lower than 0.1, as anticipated. For instance, on the demonstration site in Iitoi(Iitate village) 30 km from the nuclear power plant, a transfer rate of 0.0065 was reported, 15
times lower than the established conservative rate of 0.1. This would also be consistent with

9

The reference index (0.1) of the transition of radioactive caesium from soil into brown rice was published on 8 April as areference for consideration whether the planting of rice was suitable or not.
On 22 April, the Director-General of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters instructed the government ofFukushima prefecture to restrict rice farming in the evacuation area, planned evacuation area and emergency evacuation
preparation area, based on the result of soil surveys and consultation with the government of Fukushima prefecture.
Although the Director-General of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters ordered the Fukushima prefecture not toplant the rice on 22 April, a Q&A regarding the production of vegetables “mentioned that the planting of agricultural
products other than rice w[ould] not be restricted”.

35the transfer factors in IAEA TECDOC 1616 from 2009 10 , observed for clay-rich lowland
paddy soils, similar to those soils found in the affected area of the Fukushima prefecture. In
TECDOC 1616 transfer rates for brown rice grown on clay-rich soils are reported to range
between 0.0014 and 0.15, with an average of 0.017 (geometric mean).
The Team was informed that the local governments are measuring radioactive caesium
concentrations in rice planted and harvested after the accident during the current cropping
season of 2011. Based on the data thus obtained, MAFF will calculate transfer factors ofradioactive caesium from soil to brown rice and determine the transfer factor as an aid toreaching a decision on the feasibility of rice planting in the 2012 cropping season.
The Team is of the opinion that the conservatism in the transfer factor can be reduced when
the tests in the affected area are completed and realistic factors have been firmly established.
It is expected that availability of caesium for the crops will further decline, due to increased
fixation of caesium in the clay-rich soils. The Team, therefore, also advises that continuous
testing is needed to fine-tune the reference level for the coming cropping seasons, and this fora wide range of soils and crops in the affected area.
Such testing results will be useful for planning appropriate and effective remedial actions.
Remedial options tested and implemented
Over the past months, the Japanese authorities have been testing options of how to remediate
agricultural land affected by the Fukushima nuclear accident, with a focus on those techniquesthat are known to be the most efficient, such as topsoil removal and deep ploughing. Since 16
June, in nineteen sites, at a distance ranging between 30 and 160 km from the nuclear power
plant, efficiency assessments have been carried out and estimations made of the amounts ofwaste generated (topsoil with elevated radioactivity levels), time needed and costs involved incarrying out the remediation.
a) Removal of topsoil: In the demonstration sites the following options for removal of topsoil
were tested:•••

Removal of the first 4 cm of topsoil;
Removal of topsoil using soil hardener (3 cm); or
For meadows, removal of grass and upper root-top soil layer (3 cm).

Measurements showed that removal of topsoil (a layer between 2 and 4 cm) is the mostefficient countermeasure to drastically and rapidly reduce radioactive caesium in the soil
(Figure 3). Reported efficiencies of this method varied between 75 and 97%.
Despite the high efficiency, the disadvantage is the volume of the disposed soil, with up to
400 ton/hectare (for 4 cm removal of topsoil) (Figure 4). An additional disadvantage is the10
http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/iaeabooks/8103/quantification-of-radionuclide-transfer-in-terrestrial-and-freshwaterenvironments-for-radiological-assessments

36

time neeeded to caarry out thee remediatioon, ranging
g between one and tenen days perr hectare(includiing time to letl the topso
oil harden aafter having applied thee hardener s olution).
Althouggh the efficciency in raadioactivity reduction isi high, thee radiation aair dose ratte is notalways reduced in the same proportion.
p
The reason
n is found ini the smalll size of th
he paddy
fields, ssurrounded byb forests, withw higherr radiation levels. Thereefore the Teeam advisess the useof an inntegrated laandscape ap
pproach in remediatio
on, taking in
nto accountnt the field margins
around agriculturall land as weell, which arre often cov
vered by forest.

F
Figure 3: Testing top soil removalrafter uusing soil harrdener (Courteesy of MAFF-J-JAEA-NARO)).

37

Figure 4: Temporaryy storage of reemoved topsoiil from a padd
dy field at the demonstrationn site in Iitatee village.
(Giovannni Verlini, MT
TPI, IAEA)b) Deepp ploughingg: A promising and lless expenssive option for deconttaminating soils, inparticular for lowerr soil radioaactivity conncentrations,, is deep plo
oughing to bbury the raddioactive
ng depths havehbeen teested, rangiing fromtopsoil into the subbsoil (Figurre 5). Severral ploughindrates onn the surfacce of plough
hed land were reducedd by a facto
or of 2.3,
30 to 600 cm. Air dose
while wwith normal ploughing (rotary culttivation) these were reeduced by oonly a facto
or of 1.8.
The bigggest advanntage of deeep ploughiing is that it is less timetconsumming and doesdnotgeneratee soil that needsnto be disposeddof.
f.
Howeveer, only plooughing dep
pths of up to 45 cm canc be carriied out by normal agrricultural
machineery. In addiition, assesssment of soiil condition
ns or grounddwater levells is requireed before
carryingg out this tyype of remediation actiion. Fixationn of caesium
m in permannently flood
ded soils(i.e. undder the grouundwater tabble) may bee lower thann in soils thaat are not peermanently flooded.
As caessium fixatioon determin
nes the avaailability off radioactive caesium for the plaants, this
aspect is crucial.

38

Figurre 5: Samplingg soil for the assessmentaoff efficiency in reducing soil radioactivity by deep ploug
ghing.
(Courtesy of MAFF-JAE
EA-NARO)c) Drainning suspennded soil fro
om paddies:: A third tessted methodd was a methhod specificcallytargetinng flooded soils (i.e. ricce paddies), focussing ono the reducction of radiioactivity leevels inthe soil by puddlingg the thin laayer of tops oil under flooded condditions, drainning the susspended
soil (claay to light siilt fraction), separatingg the sedimeents from water, and finnally dispossing
only thee sediments (Figure 6).
nique in reeducing thee radioactiv
ve caesium concentrattion and
The effficiency off this technexternall dose rate, at the test site,s
was 366% and 15%% respectiveely. Howevver, it was estimatedby the authorities that the efficiencyeoof this kin
nd of remedial actionn (reductionn of theradioacttive caesium
m concentraation) can ggo up to 71%, dependiing on soil properties, i.e. clay
and hummus contentts .
An important advaantage of thiis techniquee was the loower amoun
nt of waste that was geenerated,
up to 333 times leess, as com
mpared to thhe techniquue based on
n topsoil rremoval (off 4 cm).
Therefoore, this metthod can minimizemthee deterioratiion of soil fertility.
f
Hoowever, it has
h to be39

taken innto account that the effficiency of this method
d is relativeely low for soils whichh containhigh ammounts of sooil organic matter,m
provviding aggreegation of th
he soil partiicles and preventing
the disppersion of sooils.

Figgure 6: Draining suspendedd soil from pa
addies as a rem
mediation optiion.
(Courteesy of MAFF--NARO).

ng for instaance sunflo
owers tod) Phyttoremediatioon: Phytoreemediation was also tested, usin
extract ccaesium froom the soil. However, aas expectedd from lesso
ons learnt frrom the rem
mediationof soils affected byy the nuclear accident in Chernob
byl, results were not s atisfactory, with anabsorptiion of caesiium concenttrations perr unit area by sunflowerrs of only 00.05% of caesium inthe soil at plantingg date. The disposal off the crop residuesris ana additionaal challengee, whichneeds sspecial incinneration faccilities, succh as those tested at thet demonsstration sitees in theaffectedd area of thee Fukushimaa prefecturee (Figure 7).

40

Figure 7: Incineratioon facilities forr crop residuees tested at a demonstrationdn site in the affffected area (GGiovanni
Verrlini, MTPI, IA
AEA)e) Agrochemical annd agronom
mic options:: Besides sooil-based rem
medial optiions, such asa topsoilpwhich are ccurrently thee most impo
ortant focuss of the rem
mediation
removall and deep ploughing,of affeccted agriculltural land in Japan, tthe applicaation of pottassium (K)K) and nitroogen (N)fertilizaation technniques, andd adaptedd land use/managem
ment and agricultural water
manageement practiices may bee agrochem
mical and ag
gronomic op
ptions to m
minimize raddioactive
caesiumm in the locaal foodchainn.
Assessm
ment of thee use of pottassium ferrtilizer has been started to furtheer minimizee Cs-137
transferr into the loocal foodchain. Potassiium is know
wn to behave similarlyy to caesium
m in thesoil. Byy adding pottassium, caesium will be taken up
p less by the crops. Ass the tested physicalremediaation techniiques may influence ssoil quality (the most fertile part of the soil can befound inn the topsoiil), agrochemical optioons are a cru
ucial compllement to thhe above meentioned
soil-bassed remediaation measurres, such ass topsoil rem
moval and deepdploughhing. Curren
ntly, 80100 kg pper hectare of potassium is recomm
mended.
To idenntify the besst agronomiic options tto remediatee affected agriculturalaland, it is advisibleato link radioactiviity levels ofo soil withh soil prop
perties. In particular,piinformationn on thepotassiuum status of the soil will
w be essenntial to preedict the effficiency of ppotassium fertilizer
applicattion in reducing the transfer of caeesium from soil to cropp.

41

Holisticc and area-w
wide approaachPlanninng agriculturral counterm
measures too remediate affected faarmland is a task that needs totake intto account radiologicaal, food saffety, ecolog
gical, socio--economic and culturaal issues
within a holistic annd interdisciiplinary framme.
The Teeam agrees with conttinuing in the same intensiveiandasuccesssful way too screenradioacttivity conceentrations in
i foodstufff samples. However, foodstuff analysis shhould beintegratted in all test sites ass a parameeter to asseess the efficciency of tthe remediaation. In
additionn, it will encourage peo
ople to starrt farming thheir lands again,aand w
will further increase
the conffidence of loocal, nation
nal and interrnational coonsumers (Figure 8).

Figuree 8: Samplingg a rice crop to measure radioactivityy concentratiion in grainss at a demonsstrationsite afterr remediationn (Giovanni Verlini, MTPPI, IAEA).

To commplement thhe data fromm the asses sment of thhe efficienccy of remeddiation strattegies tomitigatee the consequences off the Fukushhima accideent for agriiculture, thee Team adv
vises theestablishhment of coost-benefit analyses att the differeent levels off the decisioon-making process.
These sshould conssider the reelationship between doose reduction and cossts, includin
ng thosecosts related with temporarytanda final dissposal of rem
moved soil and crop reesidues.

42

The Jappanese counnterpart has developed a preliminaary, but alreeady compre
rehensive, catalogueof all poossible remeedial action
ns. The counnterpart is encouragedeto also devevelop a decission-tree
to assisst communiities with th
he selectionn of the mostmefficien
nt and costt-effective remedialractions, taking intoo account th
he reductionn of radiatio
on doses annd the activiity concentrration offaand the amo
ount of gen
nerated wastte (soil/cropps) to beradionuuclides in thhe soil and foodstuffs,
disposedd of.
An area-wide lanndscape app
proach is aalso cruciaal as soil redistributior
on in mountainous
catchmeents, such as in speecific areass of the FukushimaFprefecture,, can leadd to theredistribbution of radionuclidees from thee uplands tot rice padd
dies and riiver system
ms in thelowlandds through erosioneof so
oil from steeep uncoverred hillslopees or forest tracks, in particularpafter exttreme rainfa
fall (Figure 9).
9

Figuure 9: Small--holder farming systems iin the Fukushima prefectture: An areaa-wide landsscapeapproaach is cruciaal (Gerd Derrcon, NAFA, IAEA).

mportant progress
Highliights of im
Highlights 5 and 6 are also app
plicable herre.
Highlight 8. The TeamT
recognnizes that inn the early phasepof thee accident, conservatissm was agood w
way to mannage uncertaainties and public con
ncerns relatted to referrence levells in thecontext of food andd agriculturee.

43

Advice
Point 8. With respect to the remediation of agricultural areas, the Team considers that for the
next cropping season there is room for reducing some of the conservatism (such as that intransfer factors quantifying the transfer of radioactive caesium from soil to crops) by taking
into account data and factors published by the IAEA and the results obtained from thedemonstration sites and current surveys. The IAEA is ready to support Japan in considering
new and more appropriate criteria.

5.4. Urban decontamination
Basis for Review
The review of countermeasures for urban decontamination was based on the requirements set
out in the technical recommendations contained in safety standards and IAEA Nuclear Energy
Series, Technical Report Series and Technical Documents listed below:
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Planning for Clean-up of Large Areas
Contaminated as A Result of A Nuclear Accident, Technical Reports Series 327 (1991)
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Clean-up of Large Areas Contaminatedas A Result of A Nuclear Accident, Technical Reports Series 300 (1989)
EURANOS: Generic Handbook for Assisting in the Management of Contaminated Inhabited
Areas in Europe Following a Radiological Emergency (2007)
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Guide on Decontamination of Rural
Settlements in the Late Period After Contamination with Long-Lived Radionuclides, work
material from TC Regional Project (2004)
ICRP
Annals of the ICRP Publication 111 – Application of the Commission’s
Recommendations to the Protection of People Living in Long-Term Contaminated Areas
After a Nuclear Accident or a Radiation Emergency (2009)
The following documents and presentations were provided by the representatives of theJapanese Government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of the Environment(MOE), Support Team for Residents Affected by Nuclear Incidents in Cabinet Office,National Emergency Response Headquarters (NER HQ), Japan Atomic Energy Agency(JAEA), and Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ)) for discussions with the IAEA Team
related to urban decontamination.
1.
Outlines of the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environment
Pollution by Radioactive Materials Discharged by the NPS Accident Associated with the
Tohoku District - Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake that Occurred on March 11, 2011

44

2.
Basic Principles Based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling ofRadioactive Pollution [Draft Outline]
3.
Responses on the proposed topics for discussions with regard to the Act on Special
Measures concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution and attachments prepared by
Ministry of the Environment
4.
Additional Report of the Japanese Government to the IAEA, September 2011 – Chapter
IV Immediate Actions to Assist Residents Affected by the Nuclear Accident (Actions in OffSite) with the following attachments:••

Attachment IV-10
Decontamination Measures in Date City
Attachment IV-11
The Basic Approach to Clean-up Work (Decontamination)
in Residential Areas (Except Restricted Area and Deliberate Evacuation Area) in
Fukushima Prefecture5.
Remediation Effort in Japan, presentation by Support Team for Residents Affected by
Nuclear Incidents in Cabinet Office
6.

JAEA Remediation Activities, presentation by JAEA

7.
JAEA Activities towards Environmental Restoration of Fukushima, presentation by
JAEA
8.

JAEA Remediation Activities- Demonstration Projects, presentation by JAEA

9.
Environment Remediation Techniques for Briefing (Provisional version Ver. 2 ）presentation, prepared by Clean-up Subcommittee Committee for Investigation of Nuclear
Safety Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ).

Findings
Decontamination of settlements is one of the main countermeasures to be applied to reduce
external exposure of the public and clean-up workers during the initial stage of the response toa severe nuclear emergency. The immediate purpose of settlement decontamination is usually
the removal of radiation sources distributed in urban environments inhabited by humans or
isolation of the sources from the inhabited environment.
The contributions of different urban surfaces to human external doses and the associatedopportunities for dose reduction are determined by settlement and house design, theconstruction materials, the habits of the population, the mode of radionuclide deposition (dryor wet), the radionuclide and physicochemical composition of the fallout, the season and thetime since the fallout. Surfaces such as trees, bushes, lawns and roofs become relatively morecontaminated under dry conditions than when there is precipitation. Under wet conditions,horizontal surfaces receive the highest levels of contamination, including soil plots and lawns.

45

Due to natural weathering processes and to human activities, radionuclides become detachedfrom the surfaces on which they were deposited and transported within settlements.
Contaminated leaves and needles from trees and bushes are removed from settlements after
seasonal defoliation and radionuclides deposited on asphalt and concrete pavements are
eroded or washed off via sewage systems. Particularly high Cs-137 activity concentrations
have been found around houses, where rain has transported radioactive materials from roofs
to the ground.
Analysis of the sources of external exposure in different population groups living in areas
contaminated with air-borne radionuclides revealed that a significant fraction of the dose isusually received by people from sources located in soil, on coated surfaces like asphalt andconcrete and to a smaller extent on building walls and roofs. In order to ensure highdecontamination effectiveness and to keep the associated costs low, validated models of urban
decontamination were developed by Japanese demonstration projects and provided with setsof model parameters and practical recommendations for clean-up. In this demonstration
framework, a preliminary remediation assessment based on well-developed cost-benefit
techniques has been performed in order to justify decontamination and to optimize its
implementation.
The Team noted that when moving from demonstration tests into large scale remediation, in
accordance with present radiation protection methodology, a decision on intervention(decontamination) and selection of optimal decontamination technologies should be madegiving consideration to the costs of all actions and social factors. The calculated cost should
address the various decontamination technologies for which an assessment of the averted dose
has been made.
The Team’s visits to sites have shown that decontamination of urban areas is actively pursued
in contamination affected areas. In the Team’s view, the priorities are clearly establishedstarting with the deliberate evacuation area and so called “hot spot” areas, kindergartens andschools, then community centres followed by individual settlements.
Also, based on visits to the sites, the Team noted the utilization of proven technologies for thedecontamination of roofs, building walls, playgrounds, swimming pools, parking lots, andasphalt covered areas. Thorough measurements and mapping of the contamination are carriedout to ensure the most effective results and the elimination of hot spots. The most effective
decontamination methods that are pursued involve the removal of the upper soil layer. The
tests performed indicate the use of different methods to achieve a significant reduction of dose
rates.
The contaminated material that is removed and collected was temporally stored at sites
because of the removal option used and the absence of interim storage facilities. The current
practice is either to bury the material in near surface trenches and cover it with a layer ofclean topsoil or to collect it in a pile on the ground and to cover it with plastic sheets and sandbags to provide additional shielding. Both measures were considered as temporary measures
before transport to interim storage.

46

The meeasurementss indicate thatta largee part of th
he contaminnated mateerial collectted fromclean-upp actions at urban demonstratiodon sites iss only slig
ghtly contam
minated. AdequateA
pathwayys for such material cou
uld be founnd outside of the catego
ory of radioaactive wastee.
The porrtion of the removed materialmthatt qualifies asa radioactiv
ve waste geenerated fro
om urbandecontaamination should be disposed of in acccordance with estab
ablished reegulatory
requiremments.
Model demonstrattion tests havehbeen conducted
d by JAEA
A in severaal schools for thedecontaamination of swimmingg pools usinng a floccullation-preciipitation proocess developed forthis purrpose. Locaally availab
ble natural zeolite poowder has beenbused for the capture ofradiocaeesium. In demonstratiodon tests, poool water was
w pumped into a seriees of 1 tonne tanks
and treaated. The purifiedpwaater was diischarged anda the raddioactive reesidue colleected forstorage.. The processs scheme iss illustratedd in Figure 10.
1

Figuree 10: Decontaamination of swimming pool water

Removaal of radioccaesium fro
om swimm
ming pool waterw
was alsoasuccesssfully testeed usinggrafted adsorbent columns.
cTh
he column mmethod requuires carefu
ul removal oof suspendeed matterto preveent cloggingg so it can beb used morre effectiveely for decon
ntaminationn of relativeely cleanwater.
The vissit to Date city provid
ded an oppoortunity to witness larrger scale ddecontaminnation ofresidenttial and surrrounding arreas, wheree various tecchniques were tested ffor decontam
mination(Figure 11).

47

F
Figure 11: Exxample of thee demonstrattion of decon
ntamination ofo various ressidential areeas

In anothher examplee of a demo
onstration triial, contamiinated topso
oil (5 cm) w
was removed from aschoolyyard resultinng in a redu
uction of uup to 95 % in the dosse rate. Thee removed soil was
emplaceed in a 1.5 m deep trennch that waas dug out at
a one side of the schooolyard and covered
with a m
mixture of soil removed
d from the ttrench and cleancsoil (FFigure 12).

Fiigure 12: Exam
mple of demonnstration of deecontaminatio
on of school yaard

The Cleean-up Subccommittee Committee for Investiigation of Nuclear
N
Safe
fety, Atomicc Energy
Society of Japan (AESJ) has prepared a catalogue of environm
mental rem
mediation tecchniquesthat is iintended for use in sellecting suitaable option
ns for impleementation aas appropriiate. The
basis foor the cataloogue’s devellopment is E
EURANOSS reports an
nd other matterials summ
marizing
lessons learned. BasedB
on a review off existing in
nformation on availabble techniquues, thiscataloguue summariizes the key
y features oof a selectio
on of techniques that ar
are applicable to thesituationn in Japan. The techniiques includde those thaat are suitab
ble for builldings (exteernal andinternal) and publlic facilitiees like parkks, athleticc fields andd roads, e..g. water spraying,s
scrubbinng, wipingg, containm
ment, roof replacemen
nt, strippab
ble paints, grinding, vacuum
cleaningg, soil rem
moval, mowiing, etc. Coontaminatio
on removal efficiency,, worker doose, and48

generation of secondary waste are amongst the important factors suggested for considerationin selecting appropriate techniques for particular applications.
The material in the catalogue is presented in such a way that non-technical readers will beable to understand the advantages and disadvantages of particular decontamination
technologies, the optimal use of each and how it is to be utilized. The results of all
demonstration tests performed in various areas to be decontaminated will be used to validate
technical options listed in the catalogue and their performance. Besides urban areas thecatalogue also includes information on decontamination techniques applicable to other areas
such as agriculture land and forest and even processes for treatment of material coming out of
the tsunami disaster.
The Team appreciated that the development of the catalogue is a commendable effort by the
Clean-up Subcommittee Committee for Investigation of Nuclear Safety, Atomic Energy
Society of Japan (AESJ). The catalogue is a very valuable tool since it simplifies the decision
making process and provides a basis for stakeholder participation in decision making.

Highlights of important progress
Highlights 4, 5 and 6 are also applicable here.
Highlight 9: The Team appreciates the fact that some school sites were remediated mostly by
volunteers with the technical support and guidance of the JAEA. The Team was informed that
400 school playgrounds have already been appropriately remediated (as of 30 September2011).

AdvicePoint 9: With respect to waste in urban areas, the Team is of the opinion that it is obvious thatmost of the material contains very low levels of radioactivity. Taking into account the IAEA
safety standards, and subject to safety assessments, this material might be remediated without
temporary and/or interim storage. It is effective to utilize the existing municipal infrastructure
for industrial waste. The IAEA is ready to support Japan in considering new and appropriate
criteria.

5.5. Forest areas
Basis for Review
Countermeasures for forested areas contaminated with radionuclides are only likely to be
implemented if they can be accepted by foresters or landowners on a practical basis and also
be accepted by the general public. Based on lessons learned from the Chernobyl accident,
forest countermeasures are labour-intensive and expensive, cannot be implemented quickly

49and have to be planned carefully. They are likely to be long-term activities and theirbeneficial effects take time to be realized.
The known forest countermeasures can be broadly categorized into: (a) management; and (b)technological countermeasures.
Among management-based countermeasures, restrictions of various activities normally
carried out in forests have been successfully implemented:••••

Restricted access, including restrictions on public and forest-worker access;Restricted harvesting of food products by the public. The most commonly obtained
food products include berries and mushrooms;
Restricted collection of firewood by the public; andAlteration of hunting practices.

Fire prevention is particularly important in order to avoid secondary contamination of theenvironment.
The technologically-based countermeasures include the use of machinery and/or chemicaltreatments to alter the distribution or transfer of caesium in the forest. However, the costeffectiveness of many technological countermeasures is questionable, especially when applied
on a large scale. Thus, it is to be expected that such countermeasures will be restricted tosmall-scale cases only, if they are feasible at all. Such cases might include small areas ofurban woodland, such as parkland, which is likely to be visited frequently by large numbersof people, rather than extensive and remote forest areas.
Technological countermeasures might include the mechanical removal of leaf litter or
scraping of soil layers, clear cutting and ploughing, and the application of calcium andpotassium containing fertilizers. However, any of these methods can damage the ecological
functioning of the forest when applied outside of the normal schedule of forestry operations.
These factors and the high economic costs of such operations, means that the practical use ofsuch techniques as countermeasures remains largely speculative. Therefore, such measures
have not been applied after the Chernobyl accident other than in small-scale experiments.
The results of cost-benefit calculations indicate that the management options likely to result inthe least overall detriment are those which limit access and consumption of forest foods.
Options which involve technological intervention, application of chemicals, or altering theharvesting patterns in forests are unlikely to be used in practice.

Findings
The Mission Team understands that authorities in Japan are considering three possible options
for remediation of the forest areas. The option that is considering remediation of the forest in
the neighbourhood of urban settlements and agricultural lands looks most realistic for
implementation.

50

Advice
Point 10. Before investing substantial time and efforts in remediating forest areas, a safetyassessment should be carried out to indicate if such action leads to a reduction of doses for the
public. If not, efforts should be concentrated in areas that bring greater benefits. This safety
analysis should make use of the results of the demonstration tests.

5.6. Aquatic areas
Basis for review
Aquatic environments include rivers, irrigation reservoirs, fish ponds, lakes and coastal areas.
The last are being directly affected by the release of radionuclides from the affected NPP.
Freshwater environments receive radionuclides from erosion and runoff of the soils in thewatersheds. This contribution has a long term source of activity; the accumulation of therelevant radionuclides will preferentially take place in sediments. Organisms feeding on them
may incorporate caesium to different degrees depending on the individual species andenvironmental conditions.

Findings
The monitoring of river water, sediments and fish is being conducted by different
organizations; a limit for fish of 500 Bq/kg is applied. Remediation of these areas was notaddressed in detail by the Japanese counterparts during the meeting with the Mission Team.
However, the exposure to members of the public through this pathway generally is of minor
importance.

AdvicePoint 11. The Mission Team encourages the Japanese authorities to continue the usefulmonitoring of freshwater and marine systems.

5.7. Waste Management
The Team recognised that managing contaminated disaster waste, in particular identifying
appropriate end-points, is currently a key issue for successful remediation activities in Japan.
Challenges in waste management also emphasize the benefits from identifying such
remediation approaches that produce no or limited amounts of waste as reflected in the advice
in Points 1, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10.
Since in Japan, the waste issues are one of the key issues under discussion and consideration,
the Team wishes to express its deliberations in more detail in the following.

51

Basis for the review
The IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles, Safety Fundamentals No.SF-1 state that
“Radioactive waste must be managed in such a way as to avoid imposing an undue burden on
future generations; that is, the generations that produce the waste have to seek and apply safe,
practicable and environmentally acceptable solutions for its long term management. The
generation of radioactive waste must be kept to the minimum practicable level by means ofappropriate design measures and procedures, such as the recycling and reuse of material.”
This principle is further elaborated in “Predisposal of Radioactive Waste, General Safety
Requirements Part 5, No. GSR Part 5”. For example, measures to control the generation ofradioactive waste, in terms of both volume and radioactivity content, have to be considered.
The control measures are generally applied in the following order: reduce waste generation,
reuse items as originally intended, recycle materials and, finally, consider disposal as waste.
The review of management of contaminated material from remediation was based primarilyon the requirements set out in IAEA Safety Standards Series and the technicalrecommendations contained in IAEA Nuclear Energy Series, Technical Report Series andTechnical Documents listed below:
1. Policies and Strategies for Radioactive Waste Management, NES NW-G-1.1 (2009)
2. Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste, IAEA Safety Standards Series No.
GSR Part 5 (2009)
3. Review of the Factors Affecting the Selection and Implementation of Waste
Management Technologies; IAEA TECDOC-1096, IAEA, Vienna (1999)
4. Strategy and methodology for radioactive waste characterization, TECDOC-1537(2007)
5. Development of specifications for radioactive waste packages, TECDOC-1515 (2006)
6. Methods for maintaining a record of waste packages during waste processing andstorage, TRS-434 (2005)
7. Inspection and testing in conditioning of radioactive waste, TECDOC-959 (1997)
8. Characterization of radioactive waste forms and packages, TRS-383 (1997)
9. Requirements and methods for low and intermediate level waste package
acceptability, TRS-864 (1996)
10. Quality assurance for radioactive waste packages, TRS-376 (1995)
11. Application of the Concepts of Exclusion, Exemption and Clearance, IAEA Safety
Guide, Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.7 (2004)
12. New developments and improvements in processing of ‘problematic radioactive
waste, TECDOC-1579 (2007)52

13. Retrieval and conditioning of solid radioactive waste from old facilities, TRS-456(2007)
14. Predisposal management of organic radioactive waste, TRS- 427 (2004)
15. Application of ion exchange processes for the treatment of radioactive waste andmanagement of spent ion exchangers, TRS-408 (2002)
16. Technologies for in situ immobilization and isolation of radioactive wastes at disposal
and contaminated sites, TECDOC-972 (1997)
17. Containers for packaging of solid low and intermediate level radioactive wastes, TRS355 (1993)
18. Improved cement solidification of low and intermediate level radioactive wastes, TRS350 (1993)
19. The volume reduction of low-activity solid wastes, TRS-302 (1989)
20. Application of Thermal Technologies for Processing of Radioactive Waste, TECDOC1527 (2006)
21. Status of technology for volume reduction and treatment of low and intermediate levelsolid radioactive waste, TRS-360 (1994)
22. Treatment and conditioning of radioactive solid wastes, TECDOC 655 (1992)
23. Combined methods for liquid radioactive waste treatment, TECDOC-1336 (2003)
24. Management of low and intermediate level radioactive wastes with regard to theirchemical toxicity, TECDOC-1325 (2003)
25. Interim storage of radioactive waste packages, TRS-390 (1998)
26. Storage of radioactive wastes, TECDOC-653 (1992)
27. Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2009 Edition, No. TS-R-1
28. Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive
Material, No. TS-G-1.1 (Rev. 1) [2008 Edition]
29. Disposal of Radioactive Waste, IAEA Specific Safety Requirements No. SSR-5(2011)
30. Low and Intermediate Level Waste Repositories: Socio-economic Aspects and Public
Involvement, IAEA-TECDOC-1553 (2007)
31. Considerations in the Development of Near Surface Repositories for Radioactive
Waste, TRS-417 (2003)

53

32. Scientific and Technical Basis for the Near Surface Disposal of Low and Intermediate
Level Radioactive Waste, TRS No. 412 (2002)
33. Technical Considerations in the Design of Near Surface Disposal Facilities forRadioactive Waste, TECDOC-1256 (2001)
The following documents and presentations were provided by the representatives of theJapanese Government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of the Environment(MOE), Support Team for Residents Affected by Nuclear Incidents in Cabinet Office,National Emergency Response Headquarters (NER HQ), Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries (MAFF), Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), and Atomic Energy Society ofJapan (AESJ)) for discussions with the IAEA team related to the management ofcontaminated material from remediation.
1. Outlines of the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environment
Pollution by Radioactive Materials Discharged by the NPS Accident Associated with
the Tohoku District - Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake That Occurred on March 11,
2011
2. Basic Principles Based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling ofRadioactive Pollution [Draft Outline]
3. Guidelines on Disposal Methods for Incinerated Ash and Other Waste with Radiation
Levels higher than 8,000 Bq/kg up to less than 100,000 Bq/kg (Outline)- prepared by
MOE
4. Responses on the proposed topics for discussions with regard to Act on Special
Measures concerning the Handling of Radioactive Pollution and attachments preparedby Ministry of Environment
5. Additional Report of the Japanese Government to the IAEA, September 2011 –Chapter IV Immediate Actions to Assist Residents Affected by the Nuclear Accident(Actions in Off-Site) with the following attachments:a. Attachment IV-11 The Basic Approach to Clean-up Work (Decontamination)
in Residential Areas (Except Restricted Area and Deliberate Evacuation Area)
in Fukushima Prefectureb. Attachment IV-12
Prefecture

Guideline on Disaster Waste Processing in Fukushimac. Attachment IV-13 Interim Storage for the Disposal of Disaster Waste in
Fukushima Prefectured. Attachment IV-14
Incineration Facilities and Monitoring of Disaster Waste
Disposal in Fukushima Prefecturee. Attachment IV-15
Measurement of Incineration Ash and Interim Handling
Thereof at Incineration Facilities for General Waste

54

f. Attachment IV-16

Promotion of Regional Disposal of Disaster Waste

g. Attachment IV-17
Regarding "The Approach to Immediate Handling ofSecondary By-products of Water and Sewage Treatment in which Radioactive
Materials were Detected"
h. Attachment IV-18
material

Temporary treatment of waste detected radioactive

i. Attachment IV-19
Measurement Results for the Concentration ofRadioactive Cesium in Incinerated Ash at General Waste Treatment Facilities
j. Attachment IV-20
Treatment Facilities

Monitoring of Radioactive Materials at General Wastek. Attachment IV-21 Handling of General Waste Possibly Contaminated byRadioactivity at General Waste Treatment Facilities
l. Attachment IV-22
Basic Policy for Emergency Response on
Decontamination Work
6. Estimation on the Amount of Soil etc. Generated by Decontamination Work
7. Remediation Effort in Japan, presentation by Support Team for Residents Affected by
Nuclear Incidents in Cabinet Office
8. JAEA Remediation Activities, presentation by JAEA
9. JAEA Activities towards Environmental Restoration of Fukushima, presentation by
JAEA
10. Treatment of “Disaster Waste” that May be Contaminated with Radioactive Materials,
presentations by JAEA
11. JAEA Remediation Activities- Demonstration Projects, presentation by JAEA
12. Development of Technologies for Removal of Radioactive Material from Agricultural
Soil in Japan, presentation by MAFF
13. Environment Remediation Techniques For Briefing (Provisional version Ver. 2
presentation, prepared by Clean-up Subcommittee Committee for Investigation of
Nuclear Safety Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ)

Findings
Waste types, quantities and characteristics
Large volumes of contaminated material will be generated from massive clean-up/remediation
activities in urban, agriculture, forest and aquatic areas that are affected mostly by radioactive

55

caesiumm releases. The
T material would innclude soil,, organic material,mvehhicles, build
ding androad maaterial, aqueeous liquidss, trees andd stumps con
ntaminated with Cs-1334 and Cs-1
137. The
radioacttivity conteent of the contaminatted material ranges frrom a few to several tens of
thousannds of Bq/kgg.
The quaantity of contaminated material thhat would beb collected from cleann-up depend
ds on theextent aand depth of the contam
mination, thhe characterristics of thee affected eenvironmentt (urban,
forest, aagriculture, etc.) clean-up criteria, and the tim
ming when th
he remediattion is donee.
The autthorities in Japan are consideringcnine refereence decontaamination ccases that area basedon annuual effectivee dose and the type off area. The initialiestimmate of the aamount of soil, etc.
that wouuld be geneerated from the differennt reference cases is giv
ven in Tablee 1.

T
Table 1. Estimaated results off the amount oof soil, etc. pro
oduced by difffferent decontaamination cases

As can be seen froom the Tabble, the vollume of con
ntaminated material frrom the cleean-up isestimateed to be annywhere bettween 5 andd 29 millio
on m3, depeending on thhe annual exposureedose in targeted areeas and the extent of foorest and agriculture lannd decontam
mination.
It should be noted that the estiimate appeaars to be baased on thorough removval of contaaminatedd areas and it does not take into acccount eitheer segregatio
on at themateriall from all coontaminated56

source or the application of clean-up techniques that would not require removal (e.g.
ploughing in) or timing (for example allowing natural decay of Cs-134 to the radioactive
content of the soil).
Another point worth noting is that the volume of excavated soil is considerably higher than
the geometric excavation volume due to a reduction in its density. For example, the volume
corresponding to the removal of 5 cm layer from land surface is 50 000 m3 per km2 but thevolume of removed soil to be handled will be considerably higher.
The contaminated debris (wood, concrete, and metal) from the destruction caused by thetsunami, so called “disaster waste”, amounts to 2.3 million tonnes just in the Fukushima
prefecture which needs to be added to this volume. More than half of the disaster waste has
already been collected in temporary storage sites in the municipalities of the Fukushima
prefecture. It is estimated that up to 50% of such waste is combustible. It should be also notedthat collected material is piled up by type (e.g. wood, rubble and metal) but not further
segregated by the activity content. This means that further management of all material fromdesignated piles is already determined, since now further segregation by the activity is notpractical.
In the Team’s view, it is however clear that, irrespective of which reference case is adopted inpractice, clean-up efforts will lead to the generation of huge volumes of contaminatedmaterial running into millions of m3.
All of this generated contaminated material is to be collected, characterized for clearance ortreatment and conditioning as required, stored and finally disposed of.
The Mission Team’s considerations related to waste management were trying to address theconsequences of full implementation of the clean-up and the maximal volume ofcontaminated material that could be generated.
In order to put these quantities into perspective it is to be understood that a typical nuclear
power plant with a 1000 MW(e) reactor generates 250-400 m3/y of operational waste, which
will result in a total of 15 000 - 25 000 m3 of raw low level waste (LLW) for 60 years ofoperation. The decommissioning will add 5000 - 10 000 m3 of generated waste. The
disposable volume of the radioactive waste generated would be still much less after
processing for volume reduction and final conditioning prior to disposal and classified mostly
as LLW or VLLW. Therefore waste management strategies for NPPs are addressing volumes
expressed in thousands of m3 and management of contaminated material as result of accident
needs to address millions of m3. Moreover waste management strategies for NPPs are dealing
with radioactive waste issues in long time frames (e.g. 60 - 100 years) whereas managementof the bulk of accident generated contaminated material is planned to be implemented in amuch shorter time frame.

57

In the Team’s view, it can be easily concluded that a relative comparison of the volumes ofradioactive waste generated from nuclear power plants and the volumes of “contaminatedmaterial” from post-accident remediation is meaningless since the difference amounts toseveral orders of magnitude, even if one tries to compare it with all VLLW and LLW from thelife cycle of the existing NPPs in Japan. It is then also possible to conclude that pathways for
management of these “materials” should have different considerations and end-points.
Clearance and waste classification issues
A major proportion of the very large volumes of generated material that is to be collected will
likely be only slightly contaminated. At the outset, it is imperative to have clear criteria forwhat constitutes radioactive waste and which kind of material can be cleared (either
conditionally or unconditionally) from the regulatory control as elaborated in Section 4 of thereport.
As already noted contamination of areas affected by the deposition of radioactive Cs is the
major focus of the clean-up. It is important to note that deposition of radioactive Cs in
affected areas is not uniform. Since radio Cs is a gamma emitter it is possible to measure thedose rate with readily available instruments and to further characterize and map areas where
clean-up is to be performed. Detailed mapping of areas prior to clean-up has been performed
prior to implementation of demonstration projects. Therefore it is worthwhile to pursue
segregation of material collected from the clean-up based on its radioactivity content at the
point of collection.
The Team noted that segregation of the material based on activity at the point of collection
from clean-up and prior to mixing all collected material in “temporary storage” would help
simplify the determination of the further steps required to manage the volume of collectedmaterial. Such an effort may also contribute to better understanding for decisions on theestablishment of criteria for unconditional clearance, conditional clearance, or classification
as residues (not classified as radioactive waste), VLLW and LLW.
The unconditionally cleared material can be considered for recycling and reuse orconveniently managed as municipal solid waste utilizing existing infrastructure fortransportation, handling, treatment for volume reduction and disposal in municipal solid waste
landfills.
The management of conditionally cleared material could require particular arrangements fortransportation, treatment, eventual recycling and disposal in designated landfills equippedwith systems for leachate collection, control of gases and adequate monitoring.
Only the fraction designated as VLLW or LLW radioactive waste would be required to meetthe corresponding requirements for transportation, adequate processing, packaging, andfacilities for interim storage and disposal in licensed near surface facilities.

58

At present, it is not possible to estimate the relative proportions of these three categories that
could come out of the segregation of contaminated material and the future consequences of
the adoption of the proposed management options. The large volume is still the major
concern. For example, it is not clear to what extent municipal solid waste landfills canaccommodate additional quantities of unconditionally cleared material from clean-up
campaigns, or how many existing landfills could be designated to receive conditionally
cleared material, or to what extent the municipal solid waste management infrastructure isavailable for management of these additional volumes.
In the Team’s view, the following aspects could contribute to the success of envisaged cleanup campaigns:•••

Establishment of clearance levels to handle these massive volumes,
establishment of criteria and a management system for conditional clearance on a caseby case basis andpossible revision of regulatory requirements related to the management of Municipal
Solid Waste (MSW) to utilize existing infrastructure and to allow the acceptance ofbulk quantities of unconditionally cleared and conditionally cleared material.

Waste management strategy
The key elements of the current waste management strategy have been formulated by theGovernment of Japan and they are already considering the three above mentioned pathways
for contaminated material management options. These key elements include:•

collection of contaminated material in dispersed temporary storage facilities at or near theclean-up location•transfer of contaminated material from temporary storage facilities into a smaller numberof interim storage facilities•

volume reduction of combustible material by incineration in available municipal solid
waste incinerators equipped with off-gas cleaning systems for retention of caesium•

volume reduction of soil using soil washing techniques to separate caesium or caesiumrich soil constituents•

final disposal, depending on radioactivity content, in commonly used or speciallydesignated municipal landfills or near surface disposal facilities•

establishment of an inventory of collected material to keep track of the activity and theamounts actually generated

The Team is of the opinion that the national strategy for dealing with disaster and clean-up
waste is properly established and it is sound. The main technical challenges in waste
management strategy implementation and consequently in the implementation and success ofclean-up campaigns are:59

− existence of the infrastructure that is required for management of such very large volumesof generated material (including collection and segregation at the source by the activity
level);− establishment of numerous temporary storage facilities, transportation, capacity fortreatment for volume reduction and the needed capacity of municipal landfills for disposalof unconditionally or conditionally cleared material;− determination of site locations for interim storage facilities for such volumes and the timeframe for storage;− establishment of designated final disposal locations for different types of wastes.
Utilization of existing infrastructure for management of municipal solid and industrial waste
It can be assumed that the existing infrastructure for the management of municipal solid andindustrial waste is the only infrastructure that is presently available for management ofdisaster waste (from areas affected by the tsunami) and for the management of contaminatedmaterial from clean-up campaigns. The utilization of the existing infrastructure for municipal
solid and industrial waste would require a better understanding of its ability to: (i) handle
these unplanned additional quantities as well as (ii) handle contaminated material. In the textthat follows these two issues are discussed assuming maximum volumes of material fromclean-up campaigns and the management of disaster waste in the implementation period of 25 years.
In Japan, waste is divided into two major categories, “industrial waste” and “municipal
waste”, and managed in accordance with the Waste Management and Public Cleaning Law
established in 1970. The disposal of municipal wastes is the responsibility of themunicipalities. The disposal of industrial wastes is the responsibility of the entities thatgenerate the wastes.
For the purpose of this discussion it is assumed that the existing infrastructure for thecollection, transportation, treatment, conditioning and disposal of MSW is optimised torespond to the needs of the total population, and it is based on the average density anddistribution of inhabitants in all municipalities. In Japan annual generation of MSW by 127
million inhabitants is approximately 44 million tonnes (1.0 kg/capita/day), of which onlyaround 5 million tonnes go for final disposal in municipal landfills (less than 12%). Nearly 32
million tonnes is incinerated to reduce volume and 10 million tonnes is recycled. The balanceof the total (non-processable waste), together with residues from recycling and incineration
comprise 5 million tonnes that are disposed of. The complete infrastructure for managementof MSW is the responsibility of local governments, prefectures and it is optimized to thesequoted quantities.
The amount of generated industrial waste is about 400 million tons, divided by volume in 20
separate categories. The disposal rate for the industrial waste is much smaller than for MSW,
since only 5% or less than 17 million tonnes are disposed of in landfills. The collection of60

industrial waste and facilities for treatment are the responsibility of the waste generators.
Although the disposal of the certain categories of industrial waste can be combined withdisposal of municipal waste it is still the responsibility of the generator. The distribution offacilities for the treatment of industrial waste, as well as for its disposal is not uniform acrossthe country, since it depends on concentrations of the various industries and commercial
arrangements for eventual treatment and disposal.
These numbers point to the special features of waste management in Japan, namely highvolume reduction and very low volumes that go for final disposal. Most waste is treated inincineration, dehydration, or milling plants. The major reason for this is limited space for
landfills.
The Team understood that the total quantity of disaster waste is estimated at 25 million
tonnes, but the ratio of contaminated disaster waste to clean is at the moment unknown to the
IAEA team, except in the Fukushima prefecture where 2.3 million tonnes is reported to becontaminated. The maximum volume of contaminated material from the clean-up campaign isestimated at 29 million m3. Assuming the bulk density of 1 tonne/m3 the mass ofcontaminated material is 29 million tonnes. If such assumptions are correct then it is obviousthat total the quantity of disaster waste and contaminated material from the clean-up is nearly
equal to the annual generation of MSW for the whole of Japan.
However it is not possible to utilize the infrastructure for MSW in the whole of Japan for
management of this additional load of waste. Most likely the infrastructure available inaffected and neighbourhood prefectures will be the one to be predominantly utilized. It is
worthwhile to note that the infrastructure for MSW in the prefectures of Fukushima, Miyagi
and Iwate that are most affected by the tsunami and in Chiba and Ibaraki that are also affectedby the tsunami and contamination to a lesser extent corresponds to the needs of only 4.4 to
11.6% of the total population in Japan. The Team considered it important to estimate to what
extent the available infrastructure in these prefectures will be saturated if it is used for routine
MSW streams as well as for these additional volumes of material from disaster waste andclean up.
Since both the number of incinerators for MSW and their possible throughput (186 000
tonne/day for all of Japan) are high, it could be assumed that the mass and volume of theadditional load of combustible material coming out of the treatment of disaster waste andclean-up would not fully saturate available capacities especially if some industrial incinerators
can be used to add capacity. However, this assumption requires a better understanding ofavailable capacities in the directly affected region and the ability to use incinerators from theother prefectures. In any case treatment capacities can be gainfully utilized with eventual
capacity additions. However, the criteria to use these incinerators to burn contaminatedcombustible material, related to worker protection, public exposure due to discharge limits forgaseous effluents, and management of radioactive ash, may present a challenge because of
specific features of these incinerators such as their locations, design details and operating
licences.

61

The situation regarding utilization of municipal landfills for disposal of treated and nonprocessed contaminated material appears to be a much bigger challenge. Landfills areclassified into three types: isolated, leachate-controlled, and non-leachate-controlled. Isolated
landfills are used for the disposal of hazardous industrial wastes. Leachate-controlled landfills
are used for the disposal of both municipal and industrial wastes other than hazardous andstable wastes. Non-leachate-controlled landfills are used for the disposal of stable wastes,
namely, waste plastics, rubber scrap, metal scrap, waste glass, ceramics, and demolition
waste. The standards for landfill site structure and those for landfill site operation andmaintenance have been established in accordance with landfill type. It can be concluded that
adequate controls exists on most of these landfills and that their utilization for contaminatedmaterial is possible after a safety assessment to establish limits due to the radioactivity ofmaterial to be disposed of. However the available capacities in the existing landfills seemfairly limited. The data for all of Japan point to an available capacity for the next 19 years for
MSW and only several years for industrial waste. The capacity limits should first be checked
for the affected prefectures to come to a better estimate of the magnitude of the problem.
Careful consideration should also be given to the establishment of limits for the recycle andreuse of material starting from segregation at collection points as well as from different
treatment methods to resolve capacity limitation problems for utilization of municipal
landfills.
The Team is of the opinion that the National Strategy rightly includes the use of existing
infrastructure for municipal solid and industrial waste. This infrastructure exists and it would
be able to handle contaminated material to a significant extent, especially if the following
criteria are established to assist in the management of the post-tsunami and post-accident
situation:
−
−
−

−

occupational exposure limits for the collection of material for temporary storage andsegregation at the point of collection to different streams related to activity;
establishment of limits for direct recycle and reuse of slightly contaminated material (e.g.
rubble, metal, soil, etc.);transportation of contaminated material to treatment facilities, non-processable
contaminated material directly to disposal facilities and soil to either treatment or
disposal facilities;
acceptance requirements for contaminated material for incineration, radiation protectionof workers, effluent release limits, and the transport of radioactive ash to disposal
facilities.

On the other hand additional capacity for contaminated material treatment by incineration andsoil treatment facilities will be needed probably on the contaminated territory. However the
major capacity additions to the existing infrastructure are going to be facilities for interim
storage, disposal of radioactive waste and landfills for disposal of slightly contaminatedmaterial.

62Temporaary storagee
The misssion team visitedv
somee sites wherre contaminnated materiial generateed from the clean-upof land, buildings,, agriculturral fields, sswimming pools,pforessts, etc. haas been tem
mporarily
stored. Examples ofo temporarry storage o f contaminaated materiaal are illustrrated in Figu
ure 13.

Figuure 13: Tempoorary storage of contaminatted material – examples fro
om clean-up ddemonstration tests

Accordiing to the practicepbein
ng followedd, the contam
minated maaterial (e.g. soil, zeolitee, etc.) ispacked in plastic oro jute bags and then ppiled up on a plastic shheet placed on the grouund. The
heap is then covered with a plasticp
sheett and sand bags are placed over tthe plastic sheetsforshieldinng the radiattion.
i a school playgroundd visitedSub-surrface tempoorary storage is also prracticed, as was done inby the M
Mission Teaam. In this case, the uppper layer ofo soil remo
oved from tthe playground wasplaced iin a pit dugg in the grou
und and theen covered with uncon
ntaminated ssoil. The Teeam wasinformeed about moore elaboratee plans for ssub-surfacee storage, as can be seenn in Figure 14.

63Figgure 14: Temp
porary storagee trench for reemoved contam
minated materrial

Consideering that easy retrievaal of waste is a key feature of tem
mporary stoorage, there is room
for simpplification ofo above arrrangement.
g tested andd consideredd is a concreete box, 15 cm thick, 1.6
1 m3 inAnotherr storage strrategy being
volume,, and with a weight of 4.2 tonnnnes (Figuree 15). In a test case,, contaminaated soil
removedd from a paddy field and put in flexible baags was paccked in suchh boxes an
nd it wasdemonsstrated that the dose raate can be rreduced by more than 90%. The boxes are provided
pwith liftting hooks.

64

Figgure 15: Conccrete box for ttemporary storage of contam
minated materrial

These bboxes have to be placed on adequuate foundattions and neeed a suitabble sling atttachment
for liftinng with a crrane. It is esstimated thaat 400 suchh containers are neededd per hectaree of land
from whhich 5 cm ofo top soil iss removed. Considering the very largelareas tthat may haave to be
decontaaminated byy removal of topsoil, itt is envisageed that suchh concrete sshielding bo
oxes canbe usedd for the tem
mporary sto
orage of onnly limited quantitiesqofo removed soil with relatively
high raddioactivity content.
c
The Teeam considdered that thetdemonsstration proojects havee demonstrrated their primary
purposee which is thhe successfu
ful applicatiion of the seelected cleaan-up technoologies. Hoowever itneeds too be notedd that no fu
urther segreegation of collected materialmwaas performeed at thedemonsstration sitess. All collected materiial was equually placed as bulk in temporary storage,
which aactually mayy add to the volume thaat needs to beb further managed.
m
u
to co
onsider perfforming meeasurementss of the do se on every
y bag of
It wouldd be very usefulcollecteed material anda segregaation at the source baseed on the acctivity in eacch particulaar bag. It
is recoggnized that highhbackgrround field conditions may requirre special arrrangementts for themeasureement of veery low activities. How
wever it sho
ould be posssible to ideentify bags that are
possiblee candidatess for furtheer screeningg and design
nation as clleared mateerial. This approachacould siignificantly decrease th
he volume oof material thatt will req
quire furtheer managem
ment. The65

segregation at the point of collection is the only way that can help simplify the determinationof further steps required to manage the volume of collected material.
The lessons learned from the Chernobyl accident indicate that the largest volumes ofradioactive waste generated are located in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone (CEZ). Sites for
temporary storage of radioactive waste, of the trench and landfill type, were constructedshortly after the accident at distances of 0.5–15 km from the nuclear power plant site. They
were created from 1986 to 1987 and intended for radioactive waste generated after theaccident as a result of the clean-up of contaminated areas to avoid dust spread, reduceradiation levels and provide better working conditions. These facilities were establishedwithout design documentation, engineered barriers or hydrogeological investigations.
The majority of the temporary radioactive waste facilities consist of trenches in various typesof geological settings, in which waste was stacked and covered with a layer of soil from the
nearby environment.
These facilities are very variable with regard to their potential for release, which depends on
the total radioactivity stored, the waste form (in particular timber), the retention capacity ofthe substratum along migration pathways and the location of the sites in hydrogeologicalsettings.
Some of these temporary radioactive waste storage facilities, estimated to comprise about 800
trench facilities each with waste disposal volumes in the range of 8 × 102 to 2 × 106 m3 are outof regulatory control because it is impossible to establish effective controls when only 50 %of the inventories of these facilities are known 25 years after the accident.
The Team wishes to point out the lessons learned from clean-up campaigns after the
Chernobyl accident point out the risk of having many sub-surface temporary storage facilities.
Treatment and conditioning
With respect to the management of combustible contaminated material, the Japanese
authorities are already coping with the management of contaminated ash from the incinerationof municipal waste and contaminated sludge from municipal sewage treatment plants.
Incineration normally achieves the highest volume reduction and converts the waste to a form
which is suitable for subsequent immobilization and disposal. Guidelines have been issued forthe management of incinerator ash and sewage sludge depending on their activity level. For
example, incinerator ash having activity levels of 8000 Bq/kg or less is to be disposed of atconventional controlled type landfills without any further conditioning. The Team finds thisapproach to be fully aligned with established international practices.
For higher activity content of incinerator ash up to 100 000 Bq/kg, the proposed disposal
pathway is in designated municipal landfills equipped with leachate control systems that canbe further monitored. In the Team’s view, this proposal is also very much aligned withestablished practices in a variety of Member States e.g. UK, Brazil, etc.), based on safety66assessments performed for particular landfills before such material is disposed of. Ash isgoing to be fully immobilized by for example conditioning in cement or other suitable matrix
prior to disposal.
The strategy for the management of disaster and clean-up waste aims to utilize municipal
incinerators subject to the provision of adequate off-gas cleaning systems for the retention of
caesium. The extent to which this can be done will depend on acceptance criteria for waste
feed, effluent release limits and available excess capacity over and above the capacity forroutine waste.
In the case of radioactive waste incinerators it is usually required to limit the content ofradionuclides in material that is to be treated. Usually limits are set for beta/gamma activity at
about 3.7 × 106 Bq/kg and alpha activity at about 3.7 × 105 Bq/kg. The stack release(discharge) limits for radionuclides are also set up. At the present moment such limits do notexist for the municipal or industrial waste incinerators that are planned to be used in thetreatment of contaminated material. These limits by and large depend on the location of the
facility, its design features especially related to the off gas system and the control ofdischarges. In the Team’s view, this implies that although general guidance for incineration
can be established by MOE, it would be prudent to perform safety assessments for all
incinerators that are being considered for possible use in treating contaminated material.
That also implies that the characterization of material needs to be done before and after thetreatment. Characterization before treatment is to ensure acceptance of contaminated material
by the treatment facility and characterization after is to ensure either the need for conditioning(immobilization step) to be performed or to determine direct storage/disposal options.
One of the major disadvantages of incinerators is a low tolerance for non-combustible
material that can be present in the inflowing material mix. This is usually resolved througheither sorting material before it is sent to the facility or by fragmentation at the facility. Bothmethods are even more disadvantageous in the case of contaminated material, since sorting
could increase workers’ doses and fragmentation would require full control of dust that might
be generated. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to consider the use of advanced incineratorsin addition to the available capacity because these are less sensitive to the properties of
inflowing material.
Advanced incineration systems apply plasma treatment of waste, enabling the melting of ash
residues into a mineral-like or glass composite material. Particularly efficient are shaft
furnaces supplied by plasma burners. These incinerators treat both organic and inorganic
wastes such as glass, ceramics, construction materials, refuse, metal reinforcement, etc.
practically without pre-treatment. Temperatures achieved in shaft furnaces with plasma
burners (plasmatrons) are as high as 1400 – 1600 oC enabling melting (e.g. slagging) of theash residue. Liquid slagging is the most significant advantage because the final product is asolid, chemically durable material suitable for long-term storage or final disposal. Suchincinerators are used for radioactive material as well as for MSW and industrial waste.

67

Regarding the management of contaminated soil, the Japanese authorities are actively
pursuing technologies and processes for volume reduction of contaminated soil. This isunderstandable considering that huge volumes of contaminated soil are estimated to begenerated from clean-up efforts and direct disposal of soil in municipal landfills would
saturate their capacities. The techniques being tested for volume reduction include separationof caesium rich soil constituents using soil washing methods or extraction of caesium fromthe soil using chemical agents. In the latter case, in trial experiments, soil containing inactive
caesium was used to demonstrate the full release of caesium from the soil by treating it withdilute nitric acid at 200 ºC. Caesium was then separated from the acid using a small quantityof ferrocyanide sorbent. The results are encouraging and radioactive tests are planned.
However, the challenges of large scale deployment of such a process deserve carefulconsideration.
There is significant experience with soil washing processes. These typically consist of several
unit operations tied together in an integrated process to separate soil components fromcontaminating materials, and separate the contaminants from each other. Much of the system
is based on commonly available mineral treatment technologies widely used in the mining
industry, and has well known scale up parameters. Soil washing systems can be designed toaccommodate a wide variety of soil types, including those with moderately high clay content.
The Team noted that the development of volume reduction technologies for contaminated soil
should be pursued for industrial deployment, since the availability of interim storage facilities
or disposal sites for soil could be considered as the most critical factor for successful
implementation of the clean-up campaign.
With respect to the management of other non-combustible material, the Team encourages thedevelopment of criteria for the recycling and reuse of slightly contaminated metal and rubble
to allow effective management of these types of waste.
Transportation
The existing transportation for MSW is planned to be used for the distribution of collectedcontaminated material. Only material that is not declared as VLLW and LLW radioactive
waste would not be required to meet special transportation requirements. In the case that theexisting transportation fleet is to be used for radioactive material special precautions to protect
drivers and other workers as well as special features for the decontamination of vehicles
should be used. The IAEA reference material related to the clean-up campaign after the
Chernobyl accident provides experiences and lessons learned, for example as presented in the
IAEA document ‘Clean-up of large areas contaminated as a result of a nuclear accident’,
IAEA Technical Report Series No. 300, 1989.
The Team considers it worthwhile to point out the need to develop:•

A data handling system to control loading, transport and disposal;

68

•
•
•

Transportation routes and truck control points to ensure compliance with the routing
plan;
Truck clean-up areas and monitoring points either at interim storage sites or disposalsites or between the contaminated and clean zones;
An emergency response plan for the event of a transportation accident.

Interim storage
Storage in numerous dispersed locations as discussed above is envisaged as a temporary
measure that has to be followed by relocation of the material in a smaller number of interim
storage sites. Therefore identification of sites for the location of interim storage facilities is ofhigh priority and this is recognized by the authorities in Japan. At the time of the Mission, thenational government continued to discuss this matter with the prefectural authorities to find an
agreeable solution and it is hoped that these efforts will be fruitful.
The Team noted that the technical approach would be to locate temporary storage facilities for
combustible material at a reasonable distance from the treatment facilities, to locate treatablesoil close to soil washing facilities and to locate storage facilities for waste that needs to bedisposed of without any further processing close to locations of existing or purposely
designed new disposal facilities.
The design of interim storage facilities should take into consideration key functional
requirements, namely, to provide for the safe retrieval from storage pending transfer to a final
disposal facility, to ensure water ingress and egress control, to provide an environment suchthat the waste packages do not degrade during the period of storage and are safe to retrieve
and transfer to the final repository, to prevent inadvertent or malicious entry to the store, etc.
Safety includes the operators who will access the store for operational duties and the public.
Existing caves, mines or tunnels, locations with limited or no human access, etc. could also
provide suitable sites for storage facilities, as well as purposely designed in-ground trenches,storage surface mounds, etc.
The establishment of new interim storage facilities for contaminated material from the cleanup should be pursued either as fully dispersed or for 1-10 km2 of the clean-up area, or by alimited number of sites or fully centralized.
Final disposal
The Team understands that the national government is responsible for the final disposal ofwaste from clean-up operations. Material that cannot be disposed of in conventional or special
landfills will require establishing new disposal facilities.

69

The Teaam notes thee importancce of findingg suitable loocations as soon as posssible for ad
dditional
near surrface disposal facilities and consttructing succh facilitiess with adeqquate capaciities thatwould sserve as finaal destinatio
ons for the l arge volummes of clean--up waste.
Three sccenarios forr disposal area usually cconsidered in the clean
n-up of largge areas. Th
he first is
fully diispersed diisposal of contaminateed materiaal that is collectedcfrrom 1-10 km
k 2 andconcenttrated in large piles or naturall depressio
ons close to the poiint of the highest
contamiination. Thee second op
ption is the establishmeent of a lim
mited numbeer of larger disposalsites, annd the third option is centralizedcddisposal. Uttilization off these scennarios in thee case of
the cleaan-up campaign in Jap
pan very muuch depend
ds on the fin
nal decisionn of the cenntral and
local goovernments on areas too be cleaneed-up, volummes of waste that needd to be disp
posed ofoutside of municippal landfillss, the availaability of lo
ocations forr disposal ssites and the resultsfrom staakeholder innvolvementt.
A varieety of geneeric designss are availaable for thee disposal of the veryy large volumes ofcontamiinated soil and other bulk mateerials arisinng from th
he clean-up operationss. Thesedesigns include natural deepressions, excavatedd trenches, surface mounds, existing
excavattions, abanddoned miness, caverns oor rock caviities and abbove or beloow ground concrete
vaults. These dessigns incorp
porate enggineered features like covers, liiners and leachatecollectioon systems as requiredd. The selecttion of disposal sites will
w depend oon the resullts of the
stakeholder involveement, the naturenand quantity off waste, site characterisstics and eng
gineeredpport servicces, operatio
onal monito
oring and innstitutional control,featuress, requiremeents for supincludinng post-operrational monitoring.
The Teaam noted thhat the land
dfill facilitiies being co
onsidered byb Japanesee authoritiess for the
disposall of contam
minated maaterial (Figuures 16 and 17) are provided
pw
with the eng
gineeredfeaturess mentionedd above.

FigureF
16: Coontrolled type of landfill site

70

Figu
ure 17: Strictlly controlled typety of landfilll site

The seleection of neew disposal site(s) willl have to tak
ke into accoount short aand long termm safetyof publlic, workerss, environm
ment, availaability of suitablesdissposal sitess, time req
quired tocharacteerize site annd construcct facility, aavailability of equipm
ment, to connstruct and operate,
long terrm predictaability of peerformance,, establishm
ment of insttitutional coontrol after closure,consequuence of faiilure, land area,acost annd public acceptance,aand last buut certainly notn leastthe resuults of stakehholder involvement.
The Teaam encouragges the estaablishment oof new nearr surface faccilities for tthe final dissposal ofmateriall consideredd as radioaactive wastee that needss to be stabbilized and properly paackaged.
The cappacity of thee existing in
nfrastructurre including
g human ressources to ccollect, charracterize,
handle, transport, treat, conddition, storee and dispo
ose of contaminated mmaterial shhould bemented as necessary.
assessedd and augm

Highliights of immportant progress
Highlight 6 is also applicable here.
hAdvicee
Points 5 and 6 are alsoa applicaable here.

71

Point 12. The IAEA Mission team encourages the Japanese authorities to actively pursue
appropriate end-points for the waste in close cooperation with stakeholders. The national andlocal governments should cooperate in order to ensure the provision of these facilities. A lackof availability of such infrastructure would unduly limit and hamper successful remediation
activities, thus potentially jeopardizing public health and safety.

72

6. TECHNICAL MEETINGS AND VISITS
On 7 October 2011, the IAEA Mission Team held a preliminary meeting with all of Japan’s
relevant Government Offices, Ministries and Agencies involved in the effort to develop
strategy and plans to implement countermeasures to remediate the off-site areas affected by
the consequences of the nuclear accident in the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. The
meeting was held in the Ministry Office of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) building.
On 8 October 2011, the IAEA Mission Team held a day-long meeting with the Ministry of theEnvironment and the Japanese counterparts in charge of supporting residents affected by
nuclear incidents. This meeting was also held in the MOFA building.
On 9 October 2011, the IAEA Mission Team travelled to Fukushima to get first-handexperience of the work carried out in the area, as well as to meet local government officials.
On their arrival in Fukushima, the IAEA Mission Team met members of the Fukushima
Decontamination Team as well as staff from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency’s (JAEA)
Fukushima office and representatives from the Fukushima prefecture for a briefing on theenvironmental remediation efforts underway in the area.
In the afternoon of the same day, the IAEA Mission Team visited the area surrounding theHaramachi thermal power plant in the city of Minami-Soma. The city, once a renowned
holiday destination, was badly affected by the tsunami that hit Japan's east coast on 11 March
2011. The IAEA Mission Team then visited a remediation model site located in the hills
inland from the city of Minami-Soma, where methods and technologies for the remediation offorestry areas are being tested.
On 10 October 2011, the IAEA Mission Team visited four locations where model remediation
projects are being carried out by the Fukushima Decontamination Team and JAEA. These
include the Tominari Elementary school and the Shimooguni Central Assembly Hall, both
located in the city of Date.
On the same day, the IAEA Mission Team also visited two sites where verification studies forthe application of remediation technologies in agriculture are being conducted. Both sites arelocated in the territory of the village of Iitate. In one agricultural site, rice has been planted ina paddy where a layer of earth with elevated levels of radiocaesium was removed from the top
soil. In a near-by site known as Iitate village clear centre, the IAEA Mission Team received abriefing on a series of tests that are being carried out on the combustion of crops and soil withelevated levels of radioactivity. In all of these demonstration sites, experts are evaluating theefficiency of a number of methods and technologies that can be used in environmental
remediation strategies.
In the morning of 11 October 2011, the IAEA Mission Team paid a courtesy visit to Mr.
Yuhei Sato, Governor of the Fukushima prefecture. In the afternoon of the same day, the
IAEA Mission Team visited the accident site at TEPCO’s Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power73

plant. Following the conclusion of the visit to the Fukushima prefecture, the IAEA Mission
Team returned to Tokyo where it continued to meet with Japanese officials and draft its
preliminary report.
On 12 October 2011, the IAEA Mission Team met with officials from the Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), the Atomic Energy
Commission of Japan and the Nuclear Safety Commission, etc.
On 13 October 2011, the IAEA Mission Team had a day-long meeting with all of Japan’s
relevant Government Offices, Ministries and Agencies for a final exchange of views andinformation on the situation in the off-site areas affected by the consequences of the nuclear
accident in the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. The meeting was held in the Ministry
Office of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) building. The IAEA also had a meeting with the membersof a committee in JAEA which is considering a practical catalogue of remediation techniques.
On 14 October 2011, the IAEA Mission Team officially presented a final copy of the“Summary Report of the Preliminary Findings of the IAEA Mission on Remediation of Large
Contaminated Areas Off-site the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP” to the Government of Japan. Mr.
Goshi Hosono, the country’s Minister of Environment, received the report on behalf of theGovernment.
Following the handover ceremony, Messrs Juan Carlos Lentijo and Tero Varjoranta held aconcluding press conference at the Foreign Press Center/Japan, Tokyo.

74

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Mission TeamMISSION TEAM MEMBERS
Juan Carlos Lentijo
Team Leader

Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear, Spain

Tero Varjoranta
Deputy Team Leader

Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology

Mikhail Balonov

Institute of Radiation Hygiene, St. Petersburg, Russian Federation

Gerd Dercon

Soil and Water Management and Crop Nutrition Section
Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques

Zoran Drace

Waste Technology Section
Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology

Igor Gusev

Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security

Ralf Kaiser

Division of Physical and Chemical Sciences
Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications

Horst Monken Fernandes

Waste Technology Section
Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology

Gerhard Proehl

Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security

Shoichiro Sakaguchi

Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Materials Section
Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology

Susanta Samanta

Waste Technology Section
Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology

Giovanni Verlini

Division of Public Information
Department of Management (MTPI)

Special support from IAEA Headquarters:
Irena Mele, Waste Technology Section, Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology
Hiroko Ratcliffe, Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology
Celine Philip Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology

75

List of people the Team met during the Mission
NAME

MINISTRY/INSTITUTE/COMPANY

Ministry of the Environment
Goshi Hosono

Soichiro Seki
Yoshimi Okunushi
Tsutomu Sakagawa
Mimi Nameki
Hirotoshi Murayama
Masaru Moriya

Minister of the Environment(Minister for the Restoration from and Prevention of Nuclear Accident
and Minister of State for the Nuclear Power Policy and Administration)
Director General for Water Environment
Director, Secretariat Division
Director, Policy Planning Division
Waste Management and Recycling Department
Deputy Director, Policy and Coordination Division, Environmental
Management Bureau
Deputy Director, Waste Management Division, Waste Management andRecycling Department
Leader, Fukushima Decontamination Promotion Team LNER
Headquarters

Cabinet Office
Junya Nishimoto
Hidekazu Chayama
Motoharu Shirai
Hiroshi Nunota

Deputy Director-General for Coordination
Head, Radiation Section, Support Team for Residents Affected by Nuclear
Incident, Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
Director, Radiation Section, Support Team for Residents Affected by
Nuclear Incident, Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
Senior Specialist, Radiation Section, Support Team for Residents Affectedby Nuclear Incident, Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters

Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
Fumiyasu Hirashita
Naoaki Akasaka
Toshimitsu Ishii

Toru Kuga

Director, School Health Education Division, Sports and Youth Bureau
Director, Office of International Relations, Nuclear Safety Division,
Science and Technology Policy Bureau
Senior Specialist for Radioactive Waste Management, Office of Radiation
Regulations, Nuclear Safety Division, Science and Technology Policy
BureauResearcher, Office of International Relations, Nuclear Safety Division
Science and Technology Policy Bureau

Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
Noritaka Akiyama
Tsutomu Tamura
Kenji Ohara
Ayako Takada
Hiroyuki Nishiura
Makoto Nakatani

Deputy Director, Food Security Division, Minister’s Secretariat
Deputy Director, Plant Products Safety Division, Food Safety andConsumer Affairs Bureau
Deputy Director, Animal Products Safety Division, Food Safety andConsumer Affairs Bureau
Deputy Director, Administration Division, Agricultural Production
BureauDirector for International Affairs on Staple Food, Policy Planning
Division, Crop Production Department, Agricultural Production Bureau
Director, Research and Development, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries

76

Ikuo Ando
Seiji Tazo
Yutaka Maruyama
Takanori Shimizu
Hisashi Endo
Toshiaki Ookura

Research Council Secretariat
Manager, Research Cooperation, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
Research Council Secretariat
Deputy Director, Research Policy Planning Division, Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries Research Council Secretariat
Principal Research Coordinator, Search, Extension, and Environment
Policy Division, Forestry Agency
Deputy Director, Forestry Management Improvement Division, Forestry
AgencyDirector, Ecosystem Conservation Office, Resources and Environment
Research Division, Fisheries Agency
Research Coordinator, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries ResearchCouncil Secretariat

Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
Shoujirou Yasui

Occupational Health Specialist, Industrial Health Division, Industrial
Safety and Health Department

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ichiro Ogasawara
Takashi Hatori
Daisuke Kiryu
Yasunori Sota

Deputy Director-General, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science
Department
Director, International Nuclear Energy Cooperation Division,
Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science Department
Official, International Nuclear Energy Cooperation Division
Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science Department
Researcher, International Nuclear Energy Cooperation Division
Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science Department

Nuclear and Industry Safety Agency
Taku Ujihara

Deputy Director, Nuclear Power Licensing Division

Kazuo Todani

Executive Director, Deputy Senior Director General, Headquarters of
Fukushima Partnership Operations
Director, Office of Fukushima Partnership Operations for Environmental
Remediation, Headquarters of Fukushima Partnership Operations
Deputy Director, Office of Fukushima Partnership Operations forEnvironmental Remediation, Headquarters of Fukushima Partnership
Operations
Senior Principal Researcher, Office of Fukushima Partnership Operations
for Environmental Remediation, Headquarters of Fukushima Partnership
Operations
Senior Principal Engineer, Office of Fukushima Partnership Operations
for Environmental Remediation, Headquarters of Fukushima Partnership
Operations

Japan Atomic Energy Agency

Junichiro Ishida
Shinichi Nakayama

Kaname Miyahara

Toshiro Nakai,

University of Tokyo
Kenkichi Ishigure
Satoru Tanaka

Professor Emeritus
Professor, School of Engineering

Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry

77

Masashi Inoue

Research Adviser

Tokyo Electric Power Company
Ken Shimizu

Atsufumi Yoshizawa
Akira Kawano
Shin Takizawa

Group Manager, Environmental Impact Assessment Group, Radiation
Protection & Environment Department, Fukushima Daiichi Stabilization
CentreUnit Superintendent (No.5, 6), Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
General Manager, Nuclear Power & Plant Siting Administrative
Department, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
Manager, Nuclear Power & Plant Siting Administrative Department,
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

Fukushima Prefecture
Yuhei Sato
Masao Uchibori
Kazuhiko Ono
Katsumasa Suzuki
Syunji Miura
Hiroyuki Sakai

GovernorVice Governor
Senior Policy Administrator of the Social Affairs & Environment
Department
Director of the Decontamination Countermeasure Division, the Social
Affairs & Environment Department
Desk Chief of the Decontamination Countermeasure Division of theSocial Affairs & Environment Department
Assistant Director & Desk Chief of the Decontamination Countermeasure
Division, the Social Affairs & Environment Department

Minamisoma City
Toshikazu Owada

Assistant Director, Citizen Affairs Department

Shoji Nishida
Takayuki Sato
Hiroshi Ono
Takahiro Hanzawa
Yuitsu Horie
Yasuo Miyajima
Yoshiyuki Umetsu
Makoto Sato

Mayor
General Manager, Radioactivity Measures Division
General Manager, Education Division, the Board of Education
Deputy General Manager, Radioactivity Measures Division
Manager, Radioactivity Measures Section
Manager, a Public Institution Section, the Board of Education
Chief, Remove Radioactivity Charge, Radioactivity Measures Section
Chief, a Public Institution Management Charge, Public Institution Section,
the Board of Education
Chief, Secretary Charge, General Affairs Section, General Affairs andPlanning DivisionPrincipal, Date Elementary school
Former Principal, Date Elementary school

Date City

Hiroshige Yagome
Yuriko Naito
Satsuki Katsumi

78

MISSION PROGRAMME
Day
1

2

3

4

5

Date
7.10.2011(Friday）

8.10.2011(Saturday）

9.10.2011(Sunday）

10.10.2011(Monday)

11.10.2011(Tuesday）

AgendaArr. Narita Airport
1100-1200:

Visit to IAEA Tokyo Office (TRO: Tokyo Regional Office)1400-1700:

Meeting with all relevant Government Offices, Ministries and Agencies (MOFA)

1000-1200:

Meeting with MOE、"Support Team for Residents Affected by Nuclear Incidents" in Cabinet
Office, etc （MOFA）

1330-1700:

Meeting with "Support Team for Residents Affected by Nuclear Incidents" in Cabinet Office, etc(MOFA)

1100-1230:

Meeting with Fukushima Decontamination Team and JAEA Fukushima Office

1500-1600:

Visit to the surrounding areas of the Haramachi Thermal Power Plant （Minamisouma City）

1615-1700:

Visit to Heart Land Haramachi (Minamisouma City)

0900-1000:

Visit to a decontaminated site in Date City（Tominari Elementary School)

1020-1100:

Visit to Shimooguni Central Assembly Hall, Date City

1400-1600:

Visit to the site of a verification study on the development of decontamination technology ofagricultural soils (Iitate Village)

900-925:

Courtesy visit to the Governor of Fukushima Prefecture

12:30

Arr. J Village

1300-1500:

Visit to Fukushima Daiichi NPP

To Tokyo
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7

8

9

12.10.2011(Wednesday)

13.10.2011(Thursday）

14.10.2011（Friday）

15.10.2011（Saturday）

1000-1200:

Meeting with MEXT, "Support Team for Residents Affected by Nuclear Incidents" in Cabinet
Office and JAEA (MOFA)

1330-1700:

Meeting with MEXT, "Team in Charge of Assisting the Lives of Victims around the Nuclear
Power Plant" in Cabinet Office and JAEA, and Preparation of a report (MOFA)

1600-1630:

Courtesy visit to Dr. Kondo, Chairman of Japan Atomic Energy Commission

1630-1700:

Courtesy visit to the commissioners of the Nuclear Safety Commission

1000-1200:

Meeting with "Support Team for Residents Affected by Nuclear Incidents" in Cabinet Office and
JAEA (MOFA)

1330-1700:

Meeting with MAFF, MOE , "Support Team for Residents Affected by Nuclear Incidents " inCabinet Office and MHLW, and Preparation of a report (MOFA)

1000-1200:

Meeting with Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) and MOE (MOFA)

1330-1630:

Meeting with all relevant Government Offices, Ministries and Agencies (MOFA)

1700-1730

Courtesy Visit to Minister Hosono* (MOE)

1800-1900:

IAEA Press Conference (FPC)

Dep. Narita Airport

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