A History of Hundred Years of
Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd. (TEXT/PDF)⇨ CONTENTS

⇨ CONTENTS
Concerning Publication of this English Edition

Norio Hosomi

On the Publication of A History of Hundred Years of Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd. Naoya Kakizoe

Section I
Chapter 1

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries
The Dawn of Japanese Fisheries Up to around 1905
Part 1 Prehistory: The Ancient, Medieval, Premodern and Modern Eras
Part 2 Fisheries Administration and the Growth of FisheriesPart 3 Introduction of Modern-Style Whaling
Part 4 Emergence of TrawlingPart 5 The Start of North-Sea Fisheries

Chapter 2

The Rise of Modern-Style Fisheries 1905–1917— Creation of the Tamura Steamship Fishery Company —Part 1 Early Days of TrawlingPart 2 Founding of the Tamura Steamship Fishery Company
Part 3 North-Sea Fisheries and Management of the Ship Business

Chapter 3

Industrial Expansion and Technological Innovation 1918–1933— Growth of “Kyodo Gyogyo” —Part 1 Establishment of “Kyodo Gyogyo”
Part 2 Establishment of Tobata Reizo and Relocation to Tobata Fishing Port
Part 3 Development of Overseas Fishing Grounds and Growth of the BusinessPart 4 Amalgamation of Mother Ship-Type Crab FisheriesPart 5 Innovations in Trawlers
Part 6 Efforts to Develop Fishery Science —Establishment of the Hayatomo Fishery InstitutePart 7 Modern Labor Relations in Trawling

Chapter 4

Emerging Zaibatsu and Fisheries 1931–1940— Nippon Sangyo and Nippon Suisan —Part 1 Kyodo Gyogyo’s Expanding Business Sectors
Part 2 The Challenge of Antarctic Whaling
Part 3 Participation in Nissan Konzerne
Part 4 Evolution into Japan’s Largest Fisheries Company

Section II
Chapter 1

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction
The Controlled Economy and Fisheries in Wartime 1940–1944
Part 1 Conversion to a Planned Economy and Changes to Industry
Part 2 The Choice of Nippon Suisan

Chapter 2

CONTENTS

Fisheries in Occupied Japan 1945–1950

2

Part 1 War Damage and Food Crisis
Part 2 The GHQ Occupation Policy and FisheriesPart 3 Resumption of Fisheries

Chapter 3

Reconstruction of Fishery Companies 1945–1950
Part 1 Relaunch of Nippon Suisan and Company Reconstruction After the War
Part 2 Resumption of Fishing Operations by Nippon Suisan
Part 3 The Road to Management Reconstruction

Section III
Chapter 1

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid
Economic Growth
Laying the Groundwork for Growth 1950–1955
Part 1 The Korean War and Special Procurements
Part 2 Establishing Postwar Maritime Order
Part 3 Fishery Negotiations and the Resumption of Fishing Operations
Part 4 Development of Nippon Suisan’s Marine Products BusinessPart 5 Full-Scale Shipping BusinessPart 6 Development of the Processed Foods BusinessPart 7 Management Status of Nippon Suisan

Chapter 2

Strong Strides Forward during Japan’s Period of Rapid Economic Growth 1955–1964
Part 1 Japan’s Period of Rapid Economic Growth and Changing Dietary Habits
Part 2 Rising International Concern about Fisheries Resources
Part 3 Nippon Suisan’s Five-Year Reformation Plan
Part 4 Tightening Fishery Regulations and Nippon Suisan
Part 5 The Evolving Processed Food Industry and Nippon Suisan

Chapter 3

New Developments in the Fishing Industry 1965–1970
Part 1 Development and Commercialization of Frozen SurimiPart 2 The Arrival of a New Generation
Part 3 Nippon Suisan’s Food Products BusinessPart 4 Nippon Suisan’s Overseas BusinessPart 5 Development of Nippon Suisan’s Shipping BusinessPart 6 Successes in the Last Half of the Era of Rapid Economic Growth

Chapter 4

End of the Era of Rapid Economic Growth: 1971–1977
Part 1 Rapidly Changing Economic and Industrial Environments
Part 2 International Fishery amid Tightening Regulations
Part 3 Nippon Suisan during the Era of Slow Growth

CONTENTS

3

Section IV
Chapter 1

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth
Changes in the Economy and Fishery Environment 1977–1985
Part 1 Trade Friction between the U.S. and Japan
Part 2 Changing Consumption and Distribution of Food Products
Part 3 Arrival of the Era of 200-Nautical-Mile Zones

Chapter 2

Nippon Suisan Phases Out its Fishing Business 1977–1985
Part 1 Shrinking Deep-Sea Fishery by Japan and Nippon Suisan
Part 2 Efforts to Create a New “Nippon Suisan”
Part 3 Nippon Suisan’s Shrinking Fishing and Shipping Businesses
Part 4 Sluggish Growth in the Food Products Business

Chapter 3

Nippon Suisan Struggles to Change its Business Structure 1985–1995
Part 1 A Frustrated Expansion Strategy and Sluggish BusinessPart 2 Diversification in the Fisheries BusinessPart 3 Advancement of the Food Products BusinessPart 4 Formation and Growth of New Business Fields

Section V

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

Chapter 1

Management Reforms Based on Selection & Concentration 1996–2000
Part 1 Business Environment during the Second Half of the 20th Century
Part 2 Conversion to a Profitable Company Structure—NCR Management

Chapter 2

Aiming for True Globalization TGL Plan and New TGL Plan 2001–2010
Part 1 Environment Surrounding Nippon Suisan
Part 2 Creating “Global Links” —The “TGL Plan” for Fiscal 2001 to 2005
Part 3 “New TGL Plan” as Management Strategy for Nippon Suisan’s Next 100 Years for Fiscal 2006 to 2010
Part 4 Passing on the Aspirations of our Pioneers
Postscript
Bibliography of major sources

Basic Data
Company History at a Glance
Trends in the Company’s Business Performance
Nippon Suisan Executives’ Terms of Office
List of Group Companies
List of Group Vessels

CONTENTS

4

Japan and the World
Global Population/Japanese Population
Global Food Staple Production Trends/Japan Food Staple Production Trends
Global Meat Production Trends/Japan Meat Production Trends
Global Fish Hauls and Aquaculture Trends/Japanese Fish Hauls and Aquaculture Trends
Japanese Fish Hauls and Aquaculture Trends by Sector/Japanese and Global Marine Products Import Trends

Chronology
Index

CONTENTS

5

Concerning Publication of this English Edition

Norio Hosomi
President and CEO
Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.

On May 31, 2011, Nissui celebrated the 100th anniversary of the founding of its predecessor, the Tamura
Steamship Fishery Company. Looking back, these 100 years were marked by a continuing series of hardships. Yet Nissui survived to the present by overcoming each challenge that confronted it with the supportof business partners in all fields and enduring purchaser loyalty for its products.
Just prior to this 100th anniversary, at 2:46 P.M. on Friday, March 11, 2011, the Great East Japan
Earthquake struck an area off the coast of Japan’s Tohoku region. The earthquake combined with amassive tsunami and an accident at Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Plant claimed a great number of lives and caused enormous damage along Japan’s Pacific coast. The
Nissui Group was no exception, as it suffered extensive damage to its business facilities along the Tohoku
and Kanto coasts and lost the precious lives of employees and their loved ones.
Nissui responded by placing the highest priority on confirming the safety of and providing relief toits employees and their families in the devastated areas, while also extending assistance to communities.
Moreover, the entire Group endeavored to shift control of manufacturing lines in damaged plants tomeet the needs of customers and business partners, while at the same time providing fish sausages, canned
goods, and other Nissui products as relief supplies to affected areas.
It was amid such traumatic circumstances that Nissui published Nippon Suisan Hyakunen-shi to present Nissui’s story since its founding. Rather than simply presenting an account of the company, Nippon
Suisan Hyakunen-shi is intended as a true history of its industry by examining advancements in Japan’ssociety and fisheries industry and bringing in the views of outside experts.
After holding joint memorial services for employees and their loved ones lost in the Great East Japan
Earthquake in June 2011, Nissui began presenting Nippon Suisan Hyakunen-shi to domestic clients, public
libraries in Japan’s prefectures, fisheries researchers, and others the following month. Given the strong
positive response it received from readers in Japan, Nissui decided to translate Nippon Suisan Hyakunenshi into English under the title A History of Hundred Years of Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd. for presentation10

to concerned interests, research institutions, and researchers overseas.
In 2012, Nissui embarked on its next 100 years. Amid radical changes in people’s lifestyles and consumption patterns in today’s world, Nissui took its first step by putting forth a vision of the Nissui Group
as a “manufacturer that delivers deliciousness, enjoyment, health, and beauty from the Earth and thesea” in its “Medium-Term Management Plan MVIP 2014”, which was formulated in April 2012. (MVIP
simultaneously stands for “Make Value through Innovative Plan” and “Most Valuable Impressive Player”.)
In executing the Medium-Term Management Plan MVIP 2014, Nissui is returning to the founding
philosophies that were espoused by Kosuke Kunishi, a preeminent figure of the company’s earliest days.
As a basic policy, this plan establishes that Nissui will “give consideration to the sustainable utilizationof marine resources and the preservation of the earth environment, continue to create diverse values
from resources, including marine resources, and contribute to the active lives and a future full of hopefor the people around the world”.
It is our most earnest desire to utilize the support of business partners, loyalty of Nissui productcustomers, and labors of our forebears that are described in A History of Hundred Years of Nippon Suisan
Kaisha, Ltd. as a source of invaluable wisdom when setting the future course of the Nissui Group.
In this endeavor, we respectfully request the reader’s encouragement and support.
November 201211

On the Publication of
A History of Hundred Years of Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.

Naoya Kakizoe
President and CEO from 1999 to 2012
(currently Board Adviser)
Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.

In May 2011, NISSUI celebrated the 100th anniversary of its establishment by Ichiro Tamura back in
1911. As one of the projects to celebrate the company’s centenary, we decided to publish a “100-Year
History” in which we would re-examine the company’s evolution through the eyes of external experts,
placing it in the context of developments in Japanese society and fisheries.
Of all Japanese industries, these last 100 years have been particularly turbulent for fisheries, tossed
about on a sea of global upheaval. Our aim has been to verify this history as historical fact and create anarrative that could pass muster not only as a corporate history but also as the authentic history of awhole industry. This has certainly not been easy. NISSUI’s bases both in Japan and abroad were utterly
destroyed in the war, and historical documents were scattered or lost, making it particularly difficult tocompile the prewar and wartime sections. That we have been able to publish this history is thanks in nosmall part to the cooperation received from so many—most notably the family and estate of our founder
Ichiro Tamura. It also owes much to the efforts of corporate history researchers and their staff, who haveverified the details of our history. As well as reporting on this achievement, I would like to express mysincere and heartfelt gratitude to all of these.
NISSUI started life when its founder Ichiro Tamura instructed Kosuke Kunishi, who had only justreturned from studying in England, to go back and learn about trawl fisheries and how to build a trawler.
Tamura had set his sights on the future potential of fisheries, and wanted to introduce the very latest
technology. He named the new trawler Minato Maru and founded the “Tamura Steamship FisheryCompany”—the forerunner of NISSUI—on 31st May 1911, which became the company’s official founding date. In this History, I hope you will join us in retracing the footsteps of a small venture company
which, though only possessing one fishing boat at first, eventually managed to catch up with and overtakethe rest of the world.
While it undoubtedly took tremendous persistence for a Japanese person in Meiji times to catch up
with the west, the History vividly depicts the way in which his actions were shaped by the strength of
his determination to industrialize fisheries. Improving dietary habits was an essential element in making
the Japanese nation more affluent. As the business eventually expanded into other countries of the world,
Tamura’s sense of mission in delivering fresh marine products to the Japanese people with minimum
wastage was transformed into a service for people all over the world. In the process, he created a mission

12

that runs through the whole history of NISSUI.
Even when times change, there are some genes that we always pass on. In our case, those “genes” are“to develop a global supply chain for marine products”, “to give importance to quality, cost, R&D andmarketing”, “to challenge and explore the advanced fields of our business”, “to effectively utilize global
and marine resources in a sustainable manner and take good care of the environment”, and “to behavewith integrity both as a company and as individuals”. These five form the philosophy at the heart of
NISSUI. While continuing to reform and evolve our own business, we pledge that we will “contributing
to a healthier and richer life for the people of the world by creating diverse values from marine resourcesand delivering them to customers”.
Together with global partners who share NISSUI’s aspirations and values, we are currently in theprocess of building a network for worldwide collaboration in the various functions of fisheries, aquaculture, processing, distribution and sales, R&D, and quality management. We call this network NISSUI
Global Links. The various participants in NISSUI Global Links will continue to improve themselves,
as carriers of fisheries for the new age who will be able to link “marine resources and people’s lives”
through these functions. In doing so, they will meet the expectations of society and the public.
I am sincerely thankful for all those customers who have favored and chosen NISSUI products overthe many years since we were first founded. I also feel a deep gratitude for the support of so many people
in so many areas of our business. I would finally like to express my most profound respect for all the
successive officers and employees of the company who have devoted themselves to their work with great
dedication over the years.
As well as presenting this publication A History of Hundred Years of Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd. to all
our associates, we have also decided to archive the historical materials and other data for public perusal
in a historical museum (Nissui Pioneer Exhibition) remodeled from the Tobata Building, which was thecompany’s base in 1936. I would be more than happy if this could contribute to the advancement ofsociety, fisheries and communities in future.
May 2011

13

Explanatory notes
1. A History of Hundred Years of Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd. (hereafter “the book”) is comprisedof a main body of text, a chronological table, basic data, and an index. Its content describes
events taking place up to the end of December 2010.
2. The book is an English translation of the original Japanese Nippon Suisan Hyakunen-shi, which
was published in 2011 in two parts: a “main volume” and a “compilation of historical data”.
However, the English version is prepared as a single volume that contains a full translation of
the main volume (with a new chronological table added to the end) together with photographs,
figures, and tables relevant to the text that were taken from the compilation of historical data.
The English version also adds a message by President Hosomi titled “Concerning Publicationof this English Edition”.
3. The book not only describes the history of “Nippon Suisan” (hereafter “Nissui”) but also
discusses the fisheries industry, food products industry, and maritime shipping industry froma broad industrial-historical perspective.
4. Tamura Steamship Fishery Company, Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., and Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo
Tosei K.K. were direct predecessors of the present Nissui.
5. As a rule, Japanese personal names are provided in the order of given name first followed byfamily name. However, for people born in or prior to 1868 (the year of the Meiji Restoration),names are provided in the order of family name followed given name. An exception is madefor paragraphs in which the names of people born before and after 1868 appear together; insuch cases, all names are provided in the order of given name followed by family name.
6. Personal names are presented without honorifics (e.g., Mr., Mrs., etc.). Managerial titles forindividuals are those that applied at the time of the relevant discussion. As a rule, corporate
names are presented in their full form with appropriate prefixes or suffixes (e.g., K.K. [stockcompany], Co., Ltd. [limited company], etc.) when they first appear in the book; such prefixes
and suffixes are omitted in later appearances.
7. Notation of years is based on the Western calendar.
8. As a rule, the names of countries, places, and regions appearing in the book are those in use at
the present time. However, some country, place, and region names that were in use prior toWorld War II and remain in common usage today are noted together with their current officialnames when they first appear in the book.
9. With some exceptions, the tonnages of vessels appearing in the book are omitted. For details
on vessels belonging to Nippon Suisan, please see the List of Group Vessels found in the Basic
Data.

14

A History ofHundred Years of
Nippon Suisan
Kaisha, Ltd.

Section I
The Modernization ofJapan and Japanese Fisheries
Chapter 1: The Dawn of Japanese Fisheries
Up to around 1905

Part 1 Prehistory: The Ancient, Medieval, Premodern and Modern Eras
1. From Fishing to Fisheries
The Early Days of Fisheries
Since our earliest beginnings, humans have enjoyed ahighly varied diet. Marine products, particularly fishand shellfish, were consumed as food even before the
Paleolithic (Old Stone Age). In fact, the acts of catching or harvesting fish, shellfish and seaweeds — inother words, fishing — have been regarded as important means of sustaining human life.
The history of fishing by inhabitants of the Japanesearchipelago has been traced back to the Late Paleolithic(30,000–10,000 years before present). The Early
Jomon period, when habitation started to become
settled, saw a peak in climate warming, with an accompanying rise in sea levels and increased activity in ocean
currents. These had the effect of enriching marine
resources. Shell mounds on prehistoric village sites
formed in coastal areas have yielded more than 200
types of shellfish including clams and oysters, mixed
with the bones of fish (perch, black sea bream, red sea
bream, tuna, shark), dolphins and sea lions, together
with bows and arrows, harpoons, fish-hooks, nets andother fishing implements. These give us an idea of
how people fished in those days, and chart the birth andprogress of technology for processing and storing fish.

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

In the Yayoi period (around 300 BC-200 AD),
plant-based foods came to occupy a greater proportionof the diet with the spread of rice farming, but fishingcontinued to flourish. Livestock farming alreadyexisted in this era, but the abundance of marine produce in the natural environment surrounding theislands meant that this never gained particular importance in Japan.
In around the 3rd century, there was a progressive
shift towards the use of iron implements in Japan.
With the spread of Iron Age culture, the material
chosen for harpoons and fishing tackle changed fromwood and animal bone or horn to iron; the shapes
also became more diverse. From the Yayoi period
onwards, people used fishing nets made of straw rope,
while dip nets, drag nets and others were used to scoop
fish out of the water. Fishing boats had by now evolved
from simple hollowed-out log canoes into structured
vessels capable of carrying several people, and took
various forms depending on the purpose. The fishinggrounds were coasts, rivers and lakes. Various fishingmethods were devised and stood the test of time; theseinclude diving, fish traps (bottle-shaped baskets withreversed prongs at the entrance, preventing fish fromescaping once they had entered), kaibori draining (a16method of damming part of a river or lake, then scooping the water out to expose the fish), and fishing withthe aid of cormorants. Historical documents also
reveal that fishing at night with flares was alreadybeing practiced in those remote times.
In the Taika Reforms of 645, laws and institutions
were reformed and reorganized under a system ofcentralized government. A kind of corvée taxation was
introduced as part of this. Local speciality produce
was now used for payments of tax in kind, and thisincluded a variety of fish and shellfish. Also createdat this time was the system of mikuriya, special fishingvillages that would provide tribute to the court andshrines in the form of fish and shellfish. In other words,
tributes took the form of foods presented to the rulingclan as a kind of tax. Fish and shellfish were not merely
a food for the masses, but were regarded as important
produce representing the wealth of the nation and theimperial family.
From the Nara period onwards, markets for theexchange or barter of marine produce appeared in thecapital. With the formation of ancient Japanese society, there was a gradual shift from self-sufficient fishing
to fisheries as a social division of labor. Owing toconstraints on distribution, however, fishing grounds
were limited to the Kinki region and part of the Seto
Inland Sea. This caused an increasing tendency tooverfish, and the imperial court occasionally placed
restrictions on fishing. Under the influence of Buddhist
doctrine, meanwhile, edicts were issued to prohibit
the taking of life; this extended not only to animal
meat but sometimes also included fish, causing hardship for fishing people.

Fisheries in the Medieval Period
With the growth of commerce and transportation in
the Medieval period, demand and distribution channels for marine produce steadily increased. And as themonetary economy developed, small markets started
to spring up all over the country. Fish and shellfish
were widely handled by these markets, and organizedfisheries came to be established against a backgroundof expanding distribution. As the lives of the samurai
class improved and trade with other countries became
more active, the commercialization of fisheries grewincreasingly pronounced. A wholesale market district
was established in Kyoto in the mid-15th century anda fish market in Osaka at the end of the 16th century,with resultant booms in each case.
The growth of distribution via markets helped
fisheries to thrive, particularly in the Kinki region, theSeto Inland Sea, and Tango on the Japan Sea side.
Various styles of fishing with nets were practiced, withdragnets being used particularly extensively. In someregions, set nets were used. Nets were made of materials
such as arrowroot vine, wisteria and straw rope. Somenet fisheries took the form of cooperatives involving
tens of fishermen working together, and this gave rise
to a hierarchy led by head boatmen or team leaders.
Fishing boats gradually grew larger, and coastal fishinggrounds were also opened up. On the other hand,
there were occasionally disputes between fisheryoperators over fishing grounds. Disputes were often
resolved through third-party mediators, and fisheryoperators started to seek ties with landlords, estate
stewards, or other figures of political authority in an
attempt to secure powerful backing.

2. The Development of Fisheries Technology in the Premodern Period
Expansion of Fishing Grounds
The Edo period brought rapid growth to fisheries.
This was because new fishing techniques were devised
through the ingenuity of local fishermen around the

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

country.
Firstly, the establishment of the Tokugawa shogunate in Edo triggered the development of Edo Bay byfishermen from Osaka, while Kishu fishermen went
to settle in Kujukuri on the Pacific coast. In the 17th17

and 18th centuries, pioneering methods of fishingspread throughout the country when fishermen fromwestern Japan went traveling in search of new fishinggrounds. In the Kanto region, meanwhile, the so-called“Kanto fisheries” rose to prominence; these included
four-boat lift net and mullet lift-net fisheries in Edo
Bay, sardine drag nets in fisheries Kujukuri, and makase
and yahira net fisheries in Boso. In Shikoku andKyushu, there were similar resettlements of fishermenfollowed by the spread of fishing methods: eight-angle
lift nets in Hizen, arrowroot nets in Nagato Toyoura,and bonito line fishing and whaling in Tosa, among
others. Whaling was already an organized enterprisein the 17th century.
Advances in fishing methods not only compromised the local specialty of sardines and other pelagic
fish, but also caused disputes over fishing grounds
between fishing villages and between fishery operators.
At first, the shogunate allowed each regional clan totake its own measures, but in 1742 it issued the “Kampo
Edict”. This established the basic rule on fishinggrounds that “shoreline fishing is a local matter, open
seas are for association”. By this, it meant that shoreline
fisheries were the collective property of local fishermen
while offshore fishing grounds should belong to thefishery associations of each village. The latter weremainly fishing grounds that could be fished in small
sailing boats, but because a number of villages would
go out to fish in the same area, association fishinggrounds were established and regulations were established by the villages or clans. After the issue of this“Kampo Edict”, fishing in open seas became free inprinciple, causing an expansion into new fishinggrounds. Although this failed to stop the disputes, theprinciple involved seems to foreshadow the exclusive
fishing rights prescribed in the Fisheries Law in thelater Meiji era.
Meanwhile, as agriculture developed, dried sardines, dried herrings and other fish came to be usedas fertilizer, giving rise to demand for fish-based fertilizers (fish fertilizers). This led to the design of nets
specifically to catch fish used in fish fertilizers. Nets

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

adapted to the traits of individual fish species were
now successively devised in various parts of the country. They included seine nets, lift nets, gillnets andpurse seine nets. As for the material used, finer but
more robust hemp yarn started to be used instead ofstraw rope and others from the Middle Edo period
onwards, enhancing the precision of fishing catches.
Line fishing also expanded from handline and rod
fishing to include the new longline fishing.
Establishment of a Distribution Chain
In the “four category” hierarchy of social status (samurai, farmers, artisans, merchants), fishermen belonged
to the class of “farmers”; they were called hyakusho(“peasants”), or sometimes ura-byakusho (“bay farmers”). Compared to agriculture, fisheries were low in
self-sufficiency, the majority of their produce being
destined for sale. Fish wholesalers sprang up in various
cities at the beginning of the 17th century, when largescale major fish markets were established in Kyoto,
Osaka and Edo (in that order). As the impact of theearlier Buddhist prohibition on taking life started towane, fish-based diets spread and demand for fish andshellfish increased markedly throughout the country.
The growth of commerce and distribution then caused
the distribution range of fish and shellfish to expand
still further.
The establishment of a fish and shellfish distribution chain had its beginnings in the payment of taxes
in kind to the shogunate and clans. Since deliveringfish depended on special technology to preserve freshness, etc., fish wholesalers who took care of thesefunctions were granted land for canals by the shogunate and clans, and enjoyed their exclusive protection.
Armed with such privileges, fish wholesalers madeadvance payments to fishery operators, to fund theiroperations and guarantee the collection of consignments. In other words, this was a case of control andhierarchical affiliation through finance. While thisformat made fishery operators subordinate to fish
wholesalers, it also made them try even harder to18

improve fish catches. Meanwhile, the fish wholesalers
also took a ten percent commission from the retailers,and are said to have garnered massive profits frominterest on advances and by setting wholesale prices.
As the consignment volumes and types of fish
increased, middlemen naturally started to mediate
between wholesalers and retailers, while operators ofships called “haya-mawari-bune” (shorter distances),“oshi-okuri-bune” (longer distances) and others collected fish from the fishing grounds and transported
them to the markets. Besides these, production source
middlemen called “isabaya” mediated between fisheryoperators and wholesalers. Thus, a distribution chain
consisting of fishery operators—production source
middlemen—wholesalers—middlemen—retailers—
consumers was formed. Fish and shellfish now cameto be traded broadly, and this helped to stimulate
fisheries in various parts of the country.
Meanwhile, a marine produce processing industry
was also developing. The clans used to deliver local

specialty produce to the shogunate as “seasonal tribute”, and in many cases these were processed productsthat would keep fresh for a long time. Distribution by
sea also became established on eastward and westward
routes, eliminating differences in the consumption ofmarine produce between east and west.
In this way, fisheries underwent remarkable growththroughout the Premodern era, but they still retained
elements that hindered the development of fisherytechnology and the freedom of fishery operators. For
example, the feudal, closed organization of fishingvillages that had continued since Medieval times; thecartel-like relationships between fishermen’s bosses
and fishery business owners; and the collusion between
these organizations and local powerholders, to mention but a few. Moreover, the isolationist policy pursued by the shogunate restricted fishing grounds tocoastal regions, gradually causing Japan to fall further
behind advanced fishery nations in matters
technological.

3. Delays in the Modernization of Fisheries
The Meiji Reformation and the Stagnation ofFisheries
The Meiji Reformation of 1868 ushered in a new
government with the urgent mission of transforming
Japan into a modern nation state. It began this processwith a rapid succession of reforms to systems andinstitutions, including the abolition of feudal domains,
the return of their lands to the government and theestablishment of today’s prefectures in their place, theabolition of hereditary stipends, and land tax reform.
The new government set out to absorb western culture
across the board. It encouraged westernization in all
aspects of life including diet, clothing and housing,and attempted to break the mold of conservatism. In
terms of the economy, it implemented a series of measures aimed at modernizing industry under the banners of “Enrich the nation, strengthen the military”
and “Encourage industry”. Here, particular focus was

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

placed on developing socio-economic infrastructuresuch as railways, shipping, communications, postal
affairs and finance. These government measuresresulted in a succession of powerful companies being
established in the private sector, leading to a boom in
corporate activity in the 1880s. In particular, lightindustries centered around silk making and spinning
acted as a driving force for industry as a whole. Theseembodied Japan’s first industrial revolution and provided the nation’s flagship exports, underpinning ahealthy economy that continued until the depression
following the Russo–Japanese War (1904–05).
Technology amassed through mechanized production
in light industries in this period would result in thegrowth of heavy industries in later times.
Although Japanese industry in general enjoyedrapid growth, fisheries had not changed greatly since
the Edo period and continued to stagnate. Despite an
anticipated increase in fish and shellfish demand with

19

Trends in fish catches around Japan in the late Meiji era (1894 –1912)(10,000 tons)

120
110
100

Establishment of the “Tamura
Steamship Fishery Company”,
start of operations by the trawler
Minato Maru

90
80
70

Start of operations by the trawler
Fukae Maru (Tomisaburo Glover)Start of operations by the trawler
Dai-Ichi Maru (Ichiro Tamura)

60
First expedition by the whaler
Dai-Ichi Choshu Maru

50
40
30

Start of operations by the trawler
Hokusui Maru (Tsunezo Takio)

Promulgation of the Deep Sea
Fisheries Promotion Act

Start of operations by the trawler
Kaiko Maru (Kamezo Okuda)

20
10
0

1894

95

96

97

98

99

1900

01

02

03

04

05

06

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries

population growth, as well as the development oftransport, improved diets, and so on, gross fisheryoutput fell from 1,618,000 tons in 1894 to a mere
1,353,000 tons in 1905. Compared to 1894 figures,
rice production in 1905 had risen to 138%, that ofcotton to 309%, shipbuilding to 854%, and steel to273%. But fisheries had slipped to 84%, showing justhow poorly the sector was performing in comparison.
One problem that dogged fisheries at the time wastheir piecemeal nature. As of 1891, the population
engaged in fisheries was 3,338,000 (887,000 households), but 70% of these (73% of households) combined fisheries with agriculture. Rights of occupancy
and use of fishing grounds remained basicallyunchanged since the Edo period; they were the sharedproperty of village cooperatives and farmers’ collectives (including full-time fishermen). Nor was any
great progress seen in fishing methods; operations
barely strayed from the coastal waters, and more than
80% of catches consisted of herring and sardine for

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

07

08

09

10

11

12
(year)

use in fish fertilizers. Fishery operators risked exhausting resources by repeatedly overfishing too close to
the coasts. Other indirect factors behind the regressionof fisheries were the pollution of seawater due to thegrowth of industrial activity, and increasingly aggressive land reclamation projects. Norio Ninohei, while
asserting that “not all fishery production was in a stateof stagnation”, highlights two causes behind the downturn of Japanese fisheries in the Meiji era—namely,(1) localized fisheries in narrow coastal fishing grounds,and (2) inefficient fishery technology. Ninohei
describes the period of stagnant fishery production
until the end of the Meiji era as “a time of repeatedsearches for modern fishery technology”, in which
desperate attempts were made to expand fishinggrounds and increase the efficiency of fishery technology (Nihon Gyogyo Kindaishi, “Modern History ofJapanese Fisheries”).
Although Japanese fisheries had achieved significant growth in the Edo era, the pace of change was20leisurely compared to western countries following theIndustrial Revolution. And at first, even the modernization policies of the new Meiji government had
nothing worthy of the name when it came tofisheries.
Repercussions of State Ownership
The abolition of feudal domains and creation of prefectures in 1871 also signaled a collapse in the orderof fisheries, controlled until then by each clan. This
caused considerable confusion, as fishery operatorsthen tried to protect their customary fishing rights
independently. In February 1875, a Proclamation of
the Grand Council of State abolished many petty taxes
from the feudal era (including those on fishing), withthe aim of standardizing taxation on a national scale.
Then, in December of the same year, the GrandCouncil proclaimed and issued the Declaration on
State Ownership of Seas and the System of Sea Area
Lease Rights. These brought the seas around Japan
under state control and introduced a system of permits

for fisheries. Now, the government would issue licenses
to operators applying for special permission, in
exchange for the payment of rental charges. This was
based on the principle that the central government
should manage marine resources through levies raisedon licenses.
The result, however, was a flood of applicants forfishing grounds, including new participants, causingfishing ground disputes all over the country—whether
between different villages, or between existing operators and newly participating merchants or former
samurai, or even among the former peasant classes
within villages. Overfishing intensified, and fish
catches increased rapidly for a while before falling
sharply. As a result, the system of state ownership andlease rights was abolished the following year, andformer practices from the feudal era were permitted
once more. In 1878, a Fisheries Tax was introduced.
But a radical solution to the escalating disputes overfishing grounds would not come until 1901, when the
Fisheries Law was enacted.

Part 2 Fisheries Administration and the Growth of Fisheries
1. Developing the Fisheries Environment
Early Days of Fisheries Administration
The official administration of Japanese fisheries beganwith the creation of a Fisheries Section in the
Agriculture Promotion Bureau of the Home Ministryin 1877. It all started when Sekizawa Akikiyo was sent
as a government representative to both the Vienna
World Exposition in 1873 and the Centennial
International Exposition (Philadelphia, U.S.A.) in
1876. There, he was made painfully aware of the gulf
between Japan and western nations in their development of fisheries. After his return home, he urged
Okubo Toshimichi, Lord of the Interior, to develop
fisheries as a matter of utmost urgency.

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese FisheriesWith the creation of the Fisheries Section, theimportance of fisheries came to be recognized within
the government. In 1880, the Fisheries Section was
upgraded to a Fisheries Division consisting of four
sections (Coordination, Fishing, Seaweed Farming,and Propagation). When the new Ministry ofAgriculture and Commerce was established the following year, the Division was transferred to the new
Ministry, and a new Trial Manufacture Section wasadded. Then, with the launch of the inaugural Cabinet
under Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi in 1885, theDivision was again upgraded to the status of a Bureau.
Now, under Agriculture and Commerce Minister Tani
Tateki, Oku Seisuke was appointed Director-General21

of the Fisheries Bureau and Somejima Sai as his
Deputy, with Sekizawa as Senior Engineer and a staff
just over 30 strong. The Bureau was divided into threedivisions (Fishing Division, Trial Division, andGeneral Affairs Division) together with a Fisheries
Exhibition Center. With this, the organization of the
Bureau as an authority for fisheries administration
was complete.
As a consequence of the depression that started in
1890, however, the Fisheries Bureau was again downgraded to a Division as part of the government’s policyof fiscal austerity. The Division now only had a few
employees and came under the jurisdiction of theAgricultural Affairs Bureau as its 4th Division.
Nevertheless, partly due to appeals by the Japan
Fisheries Association (to be discussed later), theFisheries Bureau was revived in 1897. And from thistime on, the Bureau came to play a major role as fisheries increased in importance. In particular, Maki
Naomasa, who served as the Bureau’s Director-Generalfor eight years from 1898, built the foundations offishery policy from the end of the Meiji era into thefollowing Taisho era. This included the implementation of the “Distant Water Fisheries Promotion Act”
and the enactment of the “Fisheries Law” and “Foreign
Territorial Waters Fishery Cooperatives Act”, among
others.
While organizing the structure of fisheries administration at home, the government sent officials andfishery representatives to world expositions and fisheries expositions held in Europe and America. There,
they learnt fishing methods, manufacturing, aquaculture and other techniques, and eventually introduced
them in Japan. Expositions provided an opportunity
for each country not only to advertise its own industrial technology but also to acquire knowledge fromother countries. Japan first exhibited marine products
at the Berlin Fisheries Exposition of 1880. At the
London Fisheries Exposition in 1883, Japanese representatives reported on the current status of Japanesefisheries and displayed marine products destined forexport.

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Within Japan, too, the government held the 1st
Fisheries Exposition (Tokyo) in 1883 and the 2nd
Fisheries Exposition (Kobe) in 1897. Here, the aim
was to absorb knowledge from fishermen as well as
giving guidance on new knowledge and technology.
Meanwhile, a section on fisheries was added to the
National Industrial Exhibition, aimed at industry ingeneral, from the 3rd Exhibition in 1890 (Tokyo).
The aquarium created for the 5th Exhibition in 1903
(Osaka) attracted large crowds of visitors every day.
Creation of the Japan Fisheries Association
In parallel with these government activities to promoteawareness of fisheries, similar moves also started toappear in the private sector. A pioneer in this field was
Suisansha, a company formed by a group of likeminded individuals (Nagai Yoshinosuke, Nakao
Naoharu, Yamamoto Yoshikata, Hachiya Masakatsu,
Shishido Hayata and Kawamura Yukio) in Hongo
Haruki-cho, Tokyo, in 1881. Suisansha publishedJapan’s very first fisheries journal Naigai Suisan Zasshi(“Domestic and Overseas Fisheries Magazine”), held
meetings throughout Japan and gave guidance aimed
at spreading knowledge and technology related tofisheries. The strength of their mettle can be seen in
their publishing statement: “By publishing this magazine, we aim to enhance the accuracy of fishing methods, improve fishing gear and increase fish populations,and moreover announce new techniques and good
methods to the world at large, and thereby help thisindustry to flourish and thrive…” (“Hundred-Year
History of the Japan Fisheries Association Part I”)
Besides this, Nagai and the others planned to organize private-sector core institutions (fishery-relatedbodies) all over the country. To do this, they went tofishery meetings in various parts of Japan to gather
members, and even sought the participation of government officials. The creation of fishery-related bodies
was modeled on similar efforts in America, Franceand Germany. This was based on the principle thatJapan urgently needed to consolidate private-sector

22knowledge and capital in promoting research on fisheries, and to make people aware of its importance. The
Japan Fisheries Association, Japan’s first central bodyof this sort, was founded in February 1882. SeniorVice Agriculture and Commerce Minister Shinagawa
Yajiro was appointed its inaugural President, with
Sekizawa, Masuda Takashi, Matsubara Shinnosuke
and others from the Fisheries Bureau as Directors.
Nagai and five others took care of practical matters,
and Suisan Zasshi was continued as “Transactions of
the Japan Fisheries Association”. This was the forerunner of the monthly magazine Suisankai (“Fisheries
World”) that is still published to this day.
The Japan Fisheries Association linked up with theFisheries Bureau to make proposals for the planningand content of fisheries expositions and the National
Industrial Exhibition. It also played an important rolein promoting fisheries by implementing various fishery-related measures, such as encouraging fisherystakeholders all over the country to collect exhibits.

Establishment of Fisheries Educational
Institutions
A major legacy of the Japan Fisheries Association lies
in its proposal that the government establish theSuisan Denshujo (Fisheries Institute, later to become
the Fisheries Training Institute) in 1889. If fisheries
were to move ahead, developing technology and training engineers were tasks of utmost urgency.
The first attempt to establish an educational institution came in 1887, when Fujikawa Sankei founded the
Dai-Nippon School of Fisheries in Tokyo. However,a failure to attract willing investors and a resultant
lack of funds forced the school to close after only ayear. Then, in 1888, a three-year Fisheries course was
set up in the General Course of Tokyo School of
Agriculture and Forestry (now the Faculty ofAgriculture, University of Tokyo). This also closed
down after only one attempt to recruit students.
Finally, after lobbying by the Japan Fisheries
Association, the Fisheries Institute emerged out of

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

these failures. A schoolhouse was built in Mita
Shikoku-cho, Tokyo, and Sekizawa was appointed
schoolmaster. Most of the teachers were Fisheries
Bureau employees, who received no extra remuneration for their services.
When the Fisheries Bureau was downgraded to theFisheries Division in 1890, however, Sekizawa resigned
and the Bureau staff employed as teachers were dismissed. The management of the Institute was now indisarray, and at one point closure was considered. But
a crisis was averted through the efforts of Sekizawa’s
successor Murata Tamotsu, a member of the Houseof Peers. In 1893 Murata successfully negotiated anannual subsidy of 6,500 yen from the Ministry ofAgriculture and Commerce, and expanded theInstitute to an educational establishment offering
three-year courses in the departments of Fishing,
Manufacture and Aquaculture. In March 1897 theInstitute was reorganized as a state-funded Fisheries
Training Institute, subsequently moving to Fukagawa
Etchujima, Tokyo in 1902. The move coincided withthe establishment of manufacturing and research facilities, a laboratory and other buildings, while practicaltraining in distant water fisheries was started using a
training ship. The Institute not only trained large
numbers of personnel engaged in fisheries, but also
contributed to advances in technology with its researchin various areas of fisheries. It later evolved into theTokyo University of Fisheries, eventually becoming
today’s Tokyo University of Marine Science andTechnology.
Meanwhile, back in 1907, a Fisheries Department
was also created in Sapporo Agricultural College. Laterto become the Faculty of Fisheries Sciences of
Hokkaido University, the Department ranked alongside the Fisheries Training Institute as “the twin jewels
of fisheries education”, producing numerous instructors and technicians in the field. Again, in 1910 a
Fisheries Department was created in the College ofAgriculture of Imperial University (now the Facultyof Agriculture, University of Tokyo). With its focus
primarily on biology, the new department pursued

23

studies in ichthyology, resource sciences and reproductive science, and produced many graduates.
Now Fisheries Training Institutes started to appear
all over the country, starting with the Kyoto Prefecture
Fisheries Training Institute in 1899, followed by othersin Toyama and Miyagi Prefectures in 1900, Hokkaido(Otaru) in 1903, Okinawa (Naha) and Niigata
Prefectures in 1905, Mie Prefecture in 1907, andKagoshima and Nagasaki Prefectures in 1908. In the
Taisho era, more were set up in Shizuoka, Chiba,
Aomori Prefecture, Shimane and other prefectures,
each having its own training ship and committed totraining not only crews but also field technicians.
Besides these, fisheries schools (forerunners of today’s
fisheries high schools) also came to be set up all overthe country, starting with Obama, Fukui Prefectureand Miyako, Iwate Prefecture in 1895. Much later, in
1946, the Shimonoseki Branch of the Ministry ofAgriculture and Forestry Fisheries Training Institute(the forerunner of the National Fisheries University)
was established in Shimonoseki, Yamaguchi
Prefecture.
In parallel with these institutions for training fisheries-related technicians, other bodies for experimental
research and instruction in fisheries also came to beestablished. There were two types of experimental
body—the state-run Central Fisheries Experimental
Stations and the Prefectural Fisheries Experimental
Stations. Central Fisheries Experimental Stations werecreated inside Fisheries Training Institutes. The prefectural institutes, on the other hand, were establishedat the rate of one per prefecture, based on the“Regulations on Prefectural Fisheries Experimental
Stations” issued in 1899, and at the cost of the local
prefecture. There was a particular rush to establish
Fisheries Experimental Stations between 1899 and
1903, and by the final years of the Meiji era, they
existed in nearly every prefecture.

2. Enactment of the “Fisheries Law” and the “Distant Water Fisheries
Promotion Act”
Enactment of the “Fisheries Law”
The Fisheries Bureau had the task of devising measures
not only to promote fisheries but also to eliminate
disputes over fishing grounds and maintain order. In
May 1886, therefore, it decided to issue “Rules forFishery Cooperatives”. Under these, fishery cooperatives would be established in each fishing village andmade responsible for maintaining order in their own
fishing areas based on their own autonomous rules.
Cooperatives varied in size; some covered whole counties, while others only answered to a single village.
Nevertheless, by the end of 1889 there were 329 ofthem, this increasing to 545 by 1892.
Unfortunately, the “Rules for Fishery Cooperatives”
failed to function as the Fisheries Bureau had originallyintended. Each cooperative merely attempted toextend its own sphere of influence, so that eventually
there were even more disputes over fishing grounds
and catches than there had been before. Such disputes

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

were particularly frequent in 1892 and 1893, someeven resulting in bodily injury.
Murata Tamotsu had already submitted the firstdraft of a Fisheries Law to the 5th Session of theImperial Diet in November 1893, starting a processof repeated debate and revision. But now, there wasan increased desire to enact uniform legislation on
fisheries as a radical solution to this state of affairs.
Thus it was that, in April 1901, Japan’s first legislation
on fisheries was promulgated in the form of the“Fisheries Law” (now generally known as the “Former
Fisheries Law”), which came into force the following
July.
The Fisheries Law organized fisheries into four
categories of rights (fixed-net fishery rights, demarcated fishery rights, special fishery rights and exclusive
fishery rights). Exclusive fishery rights were subdivided
into those based on traditional practices and those in
nearby coastal waters permitted only to fishery cooperatives. Fishery operators were granted special licenses

24

to fish in accordance with traditional practice. The
Minister and provincial governors were given powersof enforcement over fisheries. Fishery operators withaddresses inside specific areas were permitted to establish fishery cooperatives, with the approval of thecompetent authorities, based on units of individual
beaches and villages, i.e. areas smaller in scope thanthose recognized under the Rules for Fishery
Cooperatives. These cooperatives would be the bearersof rights and obligations connected with the possession and exercise of fishing rights.
The basic thrust of the Fisheries Law, then, was tomaintain existing practice. But this approach was notwithout its detractors. Among the deficiencies highlighted were that the Act lacked an element of physicalcollateral for fishing rights, and that the legal relationship with rights of association in fisheries was notclear. Besides, there was an emerging need to coordinate trawl and coastal fisheries due to the rapid development of offshore and distant water fisheries
following the enactment of the “Distant Water
Fisheries Promotion Act”. As a result, the Fisheries
Law was thoroughly revised in 1910. Among otheramendments, an element of modernity was added
though maintaining traditional practices, while theaims of fishery cooperatives were expanded inscope.

Enforcement of the “Distant Water Fisheries
Promotion Act”
Actually, the Fisheries Law had already been preceded,in April 1898, by the enforcement of the “Distant
Water Fisheries Promotion Act”. While the purposeof the Fisheries Law was to manage and coordinate
Fisheries Lawivity, the Distant Water Fisheries
Promotion Act was aimed at technical innovation andskill enhancement to promote distant water fisheries,
as the name suggests. Behind this lay a boom in whaling and hunting for otters and fur seals by western
fishing boats in Japanese waters. As a result, theJapanese government needed to devise protective

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

measures for Japanese fisheries, fragile as they were,to drive out foreign ships as quickly as possible.
The Distant water fisheries Promotion Act consisted of 66 articles, the principal content being asfollows.
•To promote distant water fisheries, the Treasury
would disburse 150,000 yen every fiscal year.
•Subsidies were only available for operations in designated fishing grounds, using Japanese-registered
vessels owned by Japanese nationals or by trading
companies whose employees or shareholders were
exclusively Japanese.
•The minimum weight of vessels eligible for subsidies
was 50 tons for steamships (whether wooden or iron)and 30 tons for sailing ships; the maximum subsidy
was 15 yen per ton per year for steamships, 10 yen
per ton for sailing ships, and 10 yen per crew
member.
•Fishing or hunting activity was restricted to whales,otters, fur seals, shark, tuna, bonito, cod, mackerel,
yellowtail, squid and halibut.
•Locations for fishing or hunting were the China Seas,
the Taiwan Strait, the East Sea, the Yellow Sea, theKorea Strait, the Japan Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk and
the Pacific Ocean.
Thus, in line with its premise of stimulating public
interest in distant water fisheries, the Distant Water
fisheries Promotion Act encouraged the enlargementof fishing boats by issuing subsidies based on minimum
tonnage. This meant that any Japanese national who
had a fishing boat, regardless of qualifications or experience, was free to start distant water fishing. However,in fiscal 1898, the first year of the scheme, subsidies
were only disbursed to 14 fishing boats engaged in
hunting fur seals and otters, with a gross tonnage of
only 876 tons. Moreover, of the 150,000 yen earmarked for subsidies, only 8,000 yen were actually
allocated. This speaks volumes about the fragile capital
status of fishery operators and the small size of fishingboats at that time.
From then on, recipients of subsidies gradually
increased, expanding to 30 ships and 2,115 tons in25

1904. However, the poor performance of unsubsidized
fisheries led to an amendment to the Act in 1905;
now, subsidy ratios were increased and the scope ofsubsidies widened to include fish processing and transportation businesses, among others. Further amendments were made in 1909 and 1910, and the scope
further widened to include installation of refrigeration
machinery. At the same time, operations that were
thought to have benefited from subsidies already (otter
and fur seal hunting, steamship whaling, steam trawler
fisheries) were removed from consideration.
The Distant Water fisheries Promotion Act also
provided that 10% of budgets should be allocated tosupervising distant water fisheries and improving technology; support was also given for overseas secondment of young technical staff from the Fisheries
Bureau. Furthermore, “Regulations for Trainees inDistant Water Fisheries” were set out, and aspiring
graduates from the Fishing course of the Fisheries
Training Institute as well as private-sector technicians
were also accepted. With this, many young technicians
came to receive grants and pursue energetic research
activities.
After this, amid a changing environment withadvances in the motorization of fishing boats andincreasing corporate ventures into fisheries, the Distant
Water Fisheries Promotion Act was again amended
in 1914, 1918 and 1923. The subsidy pot also increased
year by year, until in the mid-1920s it contained morethan 300,000 yen. This law was of immense significance not only in promoting fisheries but also in creating a climate for encouraging the introduction oftechnology and the modernization of fisheries.

3. Progressive Modernization of Fisheries
Motorization of Fishing Boats
The end of the Meiji era was a period of progressive
development, both in fisheries administration and in
the modernization of fisheries. Innovations were introduced across the board of fishery technology, including the motorization of fishing boats, mass productionof fishing nets and introduction of trawl fisheries.
The motorization of fishing boats started in the
Shizuoka area, where bonito fishing was well established. The experimental ship Fuji Maru, completed
by the Shizuoka Prefecture Fisheries Experimental
Station in March 1906 with the aid of a “distant water
fishery subsidy”, was Japan’s first motorized fishingboat. Fuji Maru was a 25-ton ketch-type motorizedsailing ship, fitted with a 20-horsepower union gas
engine imported directly from the Union Gas Engine
Aion Company in San Francisco. In June that year, it
set off from Izu to conduct experimental bonito line
fishing operations in the Ogasawara area.
At that time, Shichibei Katayama, a fishery operator
from Yaizu, allowed a boatman from one of his own

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

ships to travel with the Fuji Maru as an apprentice.
The boatman reported to Katayama that “Though
the violent pitching of the ship makes the work difficult, fishing would be easy if a larger ship were built”.
He was subsequently sent on other ships fitted withengines, but the reports were the same. So thenKatayama hit upon the idea of fitting a Japanesewestern hybrid vessel with an engine to prevent rolling(which causes pitching). In October 1907 he established the Tokai Enyo Gyogyo K.K. (“Tokai Distant
Water Fisheries Co., Ltd.”) (capital 30,000 yen), a
collective venture with other Yaizu shipowners, topromote the motorization of fishing boats. Meanwhile,
the Yaizu Production Cooperative was established in
Yaizu in June 1908 in line with the Industrial
Cooperative Act, and shipowners in the area came tobelong to one or other of these organizations.
Encouraged by the success in Yaizu, moves towards
motorized fishing boats rapidly gathered momentumin Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki, Chiba, Wakayama,
Kochi, Kagoshima and elsewhere, and a series ofexperimental ships fitted with engines were built. This26

was just when heavy industries were rising to prominence in an attempt to beat the recession after the
Russo-Japanese War. Now, ironworks across the country started to produce engines for fishing boats. Mostof the Yaizu fishing boats had installed union-type
engines produced by ironworks in Osaka, but engines
made by other Japanese companies were still technically imperfect. As a result, attempts to motorize fishing boats turned into a repeated process of trial anderror.
Mass Production of Materials
The material used for fishing nets had changed fromstraw rope to hemp yarn in the Middle Edo period,
but from the mid-Meiji era onwards, cotton also cameto be used. Cotton had less tensile strength than hemp
yarn, but lasted longer as it resisted friction and decomposition. Above all, though, its major characteristic
was that it was cheaper. The transition to cotton
became decisive from around the turn of the century,
when cotton came to be supplied in bulk and at reasonable cost with the growth of Japan’s spinning industry. By around 1912, all nets had been switched tocotton.
The work of weaving nets, meanwhile, had previously been undertaken by the fishery operators themselves or by farmers as a side job, although it was
sometimes handled by cottage industry businesses
called “amiya” or net weavers. But now, mass

production of raw yarn and the expansion of fisheries
led to the development of net making machines. Netmaking specialists who used these machines to massproduce fishing nets now sprang up all over thecountry. As with engines, the rise of machine industries
lay behind the appearance of net-making machines,
and various different net-making machines were produced in this era. In particular, the Mie-style manual
reef-knot net-making machine devised by Rihei
Nishiguchi of Mie Steelworks became the mainstreamof fishing net production. Using this machine, Ishikawa
Prefecture became the principal source of thickmeshed nets, Shizuoka Prefecture of medium-meshednets, and Aichi Prefecture of fine-meshed nets. Then,at the end of the Meiji era, kaeru-mata-ami nets
(trawler-knot nets), which suffered less mesh slip thanreef-knot nets, came to be mass-produced instead.
Meanwhile, in parallel with the transformation offishing nets, Manila rope (rope made from Manila
hemp grown in the Philippines) also came to be massproduced domestically. Manila rope would soon beindispensable for trawling and seine fishing with dragnets, as well as fixed lift nets.
Thus, by the end of the Meiji era, a mechanism for
supplying fishing nets and ropes as basic materials had
been established in the major fishery bases all overJapan. Along with the motorization of fishing boats,
this formed a major element of the infrastructure
supporting the growth of fisheries in Japan.

Part 3 Introduction of Modern-Style Whaling
1. Japanese Whaling before Modernization
Establishment of Net Whaling
Whales have a very wide habitat range, and the Japanesearchipelago is surrounded by their migration routes.
Archeological finds in Jomon sites throughout Japan
prove that people used to eat whale meat in prehistoric

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

times.
Whaling would have started when “drifting whales”(dead whales drifting on the sea) or “beached whales”(whales stranded on beaches at low tide) were pulled
up to dry land. The carcasses would be cut up on the
shore and the whale meat distributed, the fat and oil

27extracted and used as fuel. Whales were seen as a“bounty of the sea” sent down from above. The
Emperor Tenji (626–672) issued a decree forbidding
the consumption of animal meat as an element of
Buddhist belief, but whales were excluded from this,as they swam in the sea and were therefore considered
to be fish.
It was not until the 17th century that full-time
whaling operators started to appear. As the foundations of the Tokugawa shogunate solidified, somesamurai warriors deprived of their stipends took up
full-time whaling as an occupation that allowed themto manifest their martial prowess and courageous
spirit. They forming whaling groups called “kujira­gumi” all over the country. These were particularly
active in Kii, Tosa, Nagato, Hizen, Iki, Tsushima and
Awa. Whaling operations mainly targeted the rightwhale (Eubalaena glacialis), which is relatively lethargic and swims slowly, although humpback whales werealso hunted secondarily. The fishing method at thetime involved approaching a whale and spearing itwith harpoons (harpoon whaling). This is thought
to have started in around the mid-15th century. The
harpoon method often ended in failure, with the whale
unable to be caught even when speared with harpoons.
Or it would be killed by the harpoons and sink to thebottom of the sea. Sometimes, the whale would escapeanyway, it was simply too fast for the whaling boats.
Japanese whaling technology took a great leap forward in 1675, when Wada Kakuemon of Taiji in Kishu
devised the “net whaling method” combining harpoons with straw nets. This method led to a dramaticfall in the failure rate. It immediately spread to otherwhaling bases throughout the country, and remained
the principal whaling method for the next two centuries or more. During that time, whaling continued
to thrive everywhere in Japan; at one point there weremore than thirty regional bases for whaling groups.
Net whaling was a large-scale and complex activity
that required a heavy concentration of ships and manpower. Whaling groups are said to have employed atleast 500 workers (including day laborers), sometimes

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheriesrising to as many as 800. Systems of horizontal segmentation were built up using specialists in various
fields. The head of the group required not only strong
leadership but also the business acumen to manage
and invest huge amounts of capital.
The Rise and Fall of American Whaling
In America, meanwhile, whaling had developed intoa thriving industry. This was because sperm oil wasused to make candles, an important export commodity. Whaling ships started to increase in size from thesecond half of the 1720s, and by the 1760s the 100-tonclass was the norm. These ships would remain at sea
for long periods while hunting mainly for sperm
whales, gradually increasing their range of activity as
they did. A major difference with Japanese whalers at
the time was that the whales were cut up and processedon the broadside of the whaling ships. The main target
was the whale oil; the whale meat was thrown overboard. In 1842, American whaling ships accounted
for 652 of the worldwide total of 882 ships. This
number peaking in 1846 at 735 ships with a gross
tonnage of 233,000 tons and an average annual catchof 10,000 whales. In that same year, an explosive harpoon called the bomb lance, which used explosives tofire a killer harpoon into a speared whale, was invented
in the U.S.A.
In the Pacific, whaling became particularly activefrom around 1820. When the U.S.A. sent Commodore
Perry to forcibly end Japan’s self-imposed isolation in
1853, a major objective was to acquire material supply
bases for American whaling ships operating in Japanesewaters.
Having gained free and convenient access toJapanese ports with the opening of Japan, however,American whaling suddenly went into decline fromaround 1860. Following the discovery of crude oil inwestern Pennsylvania in the 1850s, whale oil had been
replaced by kerosene as fuel for lamps. With the lossof demand, the price of whale oil collapsed, making
whaling operations hard to maintain. Another major

28

factor was that whale populations had been dramatically reduced by excessive catches over many years.
Decline of Japanese Whaling
Japanese net whaling had enjoyed a long period ofprosperity, but failed catches were increasingly frequent from the end of the 18th century, and the industry went into rapid decline from around the start of
the Meiji era. The biggest reason for this was the floodof American whaling ships entering Japanese waters,
as mentioned above. These caught not only sperm
whales but also right whales, the principal target ofJapanese whalers at the time.
Japan’s whaling ships were not strong enough toresist the American whalers. Firstly, owing to Japan’s
self-imposed isolation from 1639 to 1854, there had
been no source of information on overseas whaling.
Added to this was a ban on the construction of ships
carrying over 500 koku (equivalent to 75 tons); thetechnology for building large ships had not been accumulated. American whalers operating in Japanesewaters were 300–500-ton sailing ships, but Japan’s
fishing boats, even in the Meiji era, weighed only about
20 tons at most.

Attempts by Nakahama Manjiro andSekizawa Akikiyo
Against this backdrop, attempts were being made to
adopt foreign whaling and search for new methods.
Nakahama Manjiro was a fisherman’s son from
Nakanohama in Hata-gun, Tosa Province (now Tosa
Shimizu City in Kochi Prefecture). In January 1841,
at the age of 15, he got caught in a storm while fishing
and was rescued by an American whaling ship. The
captain took a liking to him and adopted him as hisson. Manjiro was taken to America, where he received
an education in English, mathematics, surveying, navigation, shipbuilding and other subjects. He was evenlucky enough to be taken round the world on a whaling expedition. After his return home in October

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

1852, he worked as a teacher at the Tosa clan school(Kyojukan) for a while. But when Perry’s “black ships”
arrived the following year, he was hired by the shogunate as an interpreter.
For some time after that, Manjiro gave guidanceon navigation, surveying and shipbuilding at therequest of the shogunate. He proposed that Americanstyle whaling be operated directly by the shogunate,arguing that this would be advantageous in terms ofnational policy. Then in October 1857, he received anorder to learn whaling methods. He repaired a shippresented to Japan by Russia, modified it into a whaling ship, and set sail from Shinagawa bound for
Ogasawara. Unfortunately, he encountered a stormthat not only damaged the ship but also washed thewhaling equipment overboard. At the end of 1862,
Manjiro purchased an American-style whaling ship,made himself captain, and once again took up thechallenge of whaling in seas near Ogasawara. He is
said to have caught two whales at this time. But because
this came after the demise of American whaling andthe foreign threat had diminished, his feat received
little acclaim. Finally, partly due to the British bombardment of Kagoshima that year, the shogunate
ordered him to return. Manjiro had no choice but toabandon his attempts at whaling.
As mentioned in Part 2 of this Chapter, Sekizawa
Akikiyo was heavily involved in guiding Japan’s embryonic fisheries administration. On an inspection tourof the Izu Islands in 1887, he discovered that whales
migrated through nearby waters. He therefore carriedout a trial operation using a whaling method he hadlearnt in America (using harpoons fired from a Pierce’sgun). He also gave guidance in American-style whaling
to Daigo Shinbei of Katsuyama in Boshu Province(the Daigo whaling group), who was already turning
his attention to gun whaling. Sekizawa then established the Nippon Suisan company in Katsuyama,
with the aim of fishing for whales and refining fish oil
wax.
When Sekizawa retired from the Ministry ofAgriculture and Commerce in 1893, the Nippon

29

Suisan company was experiencing managerial difficulties. So he took over the company and decided to go
into whaling himself. The following year, when the
Fisheries Research Department of the Ministry ofAgriculture and Commerce decided to carry out trial

whaling for sperm whales near Kinkasan in Miyagi
Prefecture, Sekizawa was commissioned to conduct
the trials. He succeeded in catching two sperm whales
with his own ship Choju Maru, thus achieving somenotoriety as a whaleman.

2. Modernization and the Establishment of Nippon Enyo Gyogyo
The Threat from Norwegian-Style whaling
When Crown Prince Nicholas of Russia visited Japanas a goodwill envoy in 1891, he was accompanied(among others) by General Aleksei Kuropatkin, laterto command Russia’s armed forces during the Russo–
Japanese War. On his way home, Kuropatkin spotteda large number of whales in the Korea Strait. This led
to the establishment of the Russian Pacific Whaling
Company in St Petersburg in the very same year, its
purpose being to conduct whaling operations in seasaround the Korean Peninsula. The company adopted
Norwegian-style whaling, the latest method of theday. Using Vladivostok as an operational base, it leased
berths in the three Korean ports of Ulsan, Changjon
and Sinpo, and started operations across the whole of
the Japan Sea from the coast of Karafuto (nowSakhalin) to the Korea Strait.
Norwegian-style gun whaling was invented in 1864
by Svend Foyn, captain of a Norwegian otter hunting
ship, and commercialized in 1868. Though both methods used whaling guns, the American bomb lancemethod used the gun to launch an explosive harpoon
that would kill off a harpooned whale. With theNorwegian method, the gun was used to release a
harpoon on the end of a long rope. The company usediron steamships weighing around 100 tons, fast andhighly maneuverable, to hunt for whales. Until then,whaling had targeted arctic whales, right whales andsperm whales, which were lethargic in their movement;these had diminished dramatically due to overfishing.
On the other hand, the more agile blue whales andfinback whales were difficult to catch. This problem
was solved with the introduction of Norwegian-style

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

whaling. The method rapidly spread to whaling countries all over the world, and was the single most important innovation in whaling. In a word, it marked thebirth of modern whaling.
The start of operations by Russian Pacific Whaling
was a major threat. A drastic fall in the number ofwhales in Japanese waters was anticipated, and it was
clear that Japanese whaling, which still relied on oldstyle net whaling, would decline even further.
Another threat appeared when whale meat fromthese Russian catches was brought in to Nagasaki Portand put on sale inside Japan. Between November 1898
and the following March, Russian Pacific Whalingcaught 120 whales and landed 1,000 tons of whale
meat at Nagasaki. By contrast, catches by Japanesewhaling in the same period consisted of around 15
whales, and the volume of whale meat sold was no
more than tens of tons. To make matters worse, thetrading company Holme Ringer & Co., formed as a
joint venture by English and Russian residents ofNagasaki, also started whaling in its own ships andselling whale meat in Japan. The sale of whale meatby foreign companies meant that enormous amountsof Japanese currency were flowing out of thecountry.
Russian Pacific Whaling also undertook surveys of
the Japanese archipelago and the Korean Peninsulawith the assistance of the Russian navy, presenting afurther threat – this time military. Japanese experts
now tried to explain the merits of Norwegian-stylewhaling to the old whaling groups, government
authorities and others, and lobbied for the method to
be introduced. However, colossal amounts of capitalwere required to obtain whaling ships, and as a result,30

traditional whaling businesses were reluctant to introduce the new method.

Juro Oka

Establishment of Nippon Enyo Gyogyo
It fell to a man called Juro Oka to open the way forthe modernization of Japanese whaling.
Juro Oka was born in 1870 as the 5th son of Riemon
Nishimura, owner of a saké brewing business in
Nagoura, Abu County, Choshu Province (now in theoutskirts of Hagi City, Yamaguchi Prefecture). In 1889
Juro entered Keio University, where he studied under
Yukichi Fukuzawa. Although his studies only lasted
one year, on his return home Fukuzawa told him “Yourhomeland of Nagato (Choshu) is only separated from
Korea by a narrow strait of water; you should pay
particular attention to fisheries in Korean seas, as thepromotion of fisheries in Korea will be most criticaland significant in future”. At the age of 21 he became
the adopted son of Yoshisuke Oka, another saké
brewer in a nearby village, and took the surname Oka.
In 1896 he became a member of the local County
assembly, then in 1897 was elected to the Yamaguchi
Prefectural Assembly. When the Yamaguchi Prefecture
Fishery Union was established in 1898, he wasappointed its inaugural Chairman, and in that role
strove to support local industries.
Masamori Fujita, Head of Industrial Promotion in
the Yamaguchi Prefectural Offices, was in charge of
researching Korean sea fisheries. When he reported
to Oka about whales in the vicinity of Korea andoperations by Russian whaling companies, Oka
resolved to move into whaling himself. After resigningfrom the Prefectural Assembly in February 1899, heteamed up with Tosaku Yamada, another member of
the Prefectural Assembly who was keenly concerned
about the problems of whaling, Kanshichi Kawakita,a Dietmember with a similar interest in whaling, andothers. Together, they would launch a new company
engaged in Norwegian-style whaling.
The Inaugural General Meeting of the new company was held on July 20th, 1899. The company was

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

called Nippon Enyo Gyogyo K.K. (“Japan Distant
Water Fisheries Co., Ltd.”), Yamada was appointed its
President and Oka its Managing Director, and it wascapitalized at 100,000 yen. The Head Office wasestablished at Senzaki-Ura (now Senzaki Imaura-cho
in Nagato City, Yamaguchi Prefecture), with a Branch
Office in Shimonoseki. Nippon Enyo Gyogyo,
together with its successor Toyo Gyogyo K.K. (ToyoFisheries Co., Ltd.), is affectionately known as“Ichimaru Company”. “Ichimaru”, literally meaning“One-Circle”, is a reference to the family crest of the
Mouri clan in the original Choshu Domain, consistingof the kanji letter for “one” with three circles beneathit.
Oka did not attend the Inaugural General Meeting,as he had already left for Norway when the company’s
establishment had become certain in May 1899. In
Norway, he studied Norwegian-style whaling andpurchased whaling guns, harpoons and other whaling
equipment in Kristiania (now Oslo). Then he traveled
to whaling grounds in the Azores and a whaling baseon the Massachusetts coast of northeastern America,
before finally returning to Japan in December that year.
Opinions were divided as to whether a whaling shipshould be sourced from a domestic or a Norwegian
supplier, but in the end the contract was awarded toTokyo Ishikawajima Shipbuilding & Engineering Co.,
Ltd. The new ship was launched on October 5th,
1899, with a gross tonnage of 122 tons and a speed of
11 knots. It was named Dai-Ichi Choshu Maru by Yajiro
Shinagawa, Chief Secretary of the Japan Fisheries
Association. It had a whaling gun with a bore of 3
inches (about 7.6 cm) and a barrel length of 6 feet(about 183 cm) installed on its bow, and was Japan’s
first western-style whaling ship.
On January 28th, 1900, Dai-Ichi Choshu Maru set

31

Dai-Ichi Choshu Maru, built in 1899
The first iron-hulled whaler built in Japansail from Senzaki Port bound for Busan, accompaniedby the factory ship Chiyo Maru and the transport ship
Bocho Maru. By February 4th it had already succeededin making its first catch, a huge finback whale, in the
Korea Strait. Nippon Enyo Gyogyo could hardly have
got off to a better start.
Dai-Ichi Choshu Maru Runs AgroundBut just then, Nippon Enyo Gyogyo ran into unforeseen difficulties. Soon after leaving port in February
1900, the Dai-Ichi Choshu Maru started to have engine
problems of one sort and another. In March, the Bocho
Maru, loaded with the meat from four finback whales,
ran aground inside Ulsan Bay; and in the following
month, a fire broke out on board while the ship wasanchored in Shimonoseki Harbor. The fire destroyedpart of her hull and the entire consignment of whale

meat—the company’s very first cargo. By comparison,
the subsequent haul of 15 whales was reasonable
enough; it meant that a shareholder dividend of 8%
could be paid in the first business year (1st Term: July
1899–May 1900), to the relief of the shareholders. In
December 1901, however, the Dai-Ichi Choshu Maru
sailed into a storm off the coast of Korea and ran
aground at Shiokushi-hama in Tongchon (now inNorth Korea). Oka himself supervised several attempts
to refloat the vessel, but without success; in the end,
the hull had to be abandoned. It was a major blowthat threatened the very existence of the company.
Oka now took the decision to sell the Bocho Maruright away, and with the proceeds from this and a
subsidy received from the Ministry of Agriculture andCommerce under the Distant Water Fisheries
Promotion Act, met the cost of salvaging the ship andother expenses. He then converted the Chiyo Maru
to a whaling ship, and also chartered another whaling
ship (the Olga) from Holme Ringer in Nagasaki.
Fortunately, the 4th term ( June 1902–May 1903) was
more fruitful in catches, with 89 whales caught in all.
This offset the previous year’s losses and allowed fora small dividend. In the 5th term ( June 1903–May
1904), two more whaling ships were chartered from
Norway and the results were good, with catches of
101 whales.

3. Establishment of Toyo Hogei and Amalgamation
Establishment of Toyo Gyogyo
When the Russo–Japanese War broke out in February
1904, three ships (including whalers) belonging to
Russian Pacific Whaling were anchored at Nagasaki
in Japan and Changjon in Korea. These were seizedby the Japanese army and moored in Sasebo Harbor.
The disposal of the three ships then turned into a
catfight between Oka’s Nippon Enyo Gyogyo and thefounders of a company called Nikkan Hogei Goshi
K.K., only recently formed by 14 Diet members.
The government decided that the disposal of the

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

ships would be conditional upon an amalgamation
between Nippon Enyo Gyogyo and the founders of
Nikkan Hogei. The two companies then reached acompromise on this basis, and a joint agreement was
drawn up. In September 1904, Nippon Enyo Gyogyo
was constructively dissolved and Toyo Gyogyo newly
established with capital of 500,000 yen. The Inaugural
General Meeting was held in Shimonoseki City, theShimonoseki Branch Office of Nippon Enyo Gyogyo
was made its Head Office, and Oka was appointed its
President.
With the outbreak of the Russo–Japanese War,32

Russian Pacific Whaling had forfeited its fishery concessions in Korea. In its place, Toyo Gyogyo obtained
long-term concessions in the three ports of Ulsan,
Changjon and Sinpo from the Korean government.
As a result, whaling in Korean waters came to bemonopolized by a single company.
Having consolidated its operational base in Koreanwaters, Toyo Gyogyo caught 245 whales and paid ashareholder dividend of 18% in its first business year
(June 1904–July 1905) —a splendid result considering
the context of the Russo–Japanese War. Now Oka
and the others wanted to expand the fishing grounds,
and conducted trial operations using Norwegian-stylewhaling along the Japanese coast. In particular, theysucceeded in catching 111 whales in seas off Kinkasan,
Inubo, Kii and Tosa on the Pacific side. Plants were
therefore established in Ayukawa and Choshi, with aBranch Office in Tateyama, whereupon operations
could start in earnest. Thanks to the expansion offishing grounds, 403 whales were caught in the 2nd
term. The company’s capital was increased to 2 million
yen, and further expansion of business on the Pacificside was planned. Now, plants were opened in Kishu
Oshima, Awa Shishikui, Tosa Shimizu and Tosa
Kannoura. At the same time, steps were also taken to
expand the company’s fleet; among others, the construction of two new whaling ships was ordered from

Norway while another whaling ship was bought. The
3rd term yielded catches of 633 whales; so many, infact, that the flensing and processing operations could
not keep pace and whale carcasses were reportedly
sold at a loss without being cut up.

Proliferation and Amalgamation of
Whaling Companies
The success of Toyo Gyogyo sparked a succession of
new whaling startups in various parts of Japan. By
1908 there were twelve companies, possessing a totalof 28 whaling ships, all using the Norwegian-stylemethod of whaling.
However, as Japanese whaling began to boom,
whales became overfished, gunners and crew members
started to be headhunted, and disputes arose over theestablishment of bases. Toyo Gyogyo itself was not
unaffected by these developments; catches had plummeted from 547 whales in the 4th term to 187 in the
5th.
Anxious over the future of the whaling industry,Oka now set out to establish a Japanese Whaling
Fisheries Association, and proposed that all whaling
operators should be amalgamated in order to bring
the situation under control. This idea found agreement with Naomasa Maki, the previous Director-

Map of whaling stations in the Far East (1910)

Source: Meiji-ki Nihon Hogeishi (“Journal of Japanese Whaling in the Meiji Era”)

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

33General of the Fisheries Bureau who now served as
Chairman of the Japan Fisheries Association. At first,
the other whaling operators showed little inclination
to amalgamate, but with the solid backing of Maki,
Oka did his best to bring them round. In June 1908,he held informal talks with all whaling operators in
Miyajima. As a result, although not all were in agreement, the opinions of four companies (Toyo Gyogyo,
Nagasaki Hogei Goshi K.K., Dai-Nippon Hogei K.K.
and Teikoku Suisan K.K.) converged in favor of
amalgamation.
In May 1909, the new company Toyo Hogei K.K.
was established with capital of 7 million yen as anamalgamation of these four companies. Oka was
appointed its President, while Maki was to assist in a
consultancy role. The Head Office was in Osaka, with
branches in Tokyo and Shimonoseki and a sub-officein Hakata.

Even after the launch of the new company, Oka
continued his attempts to persuade the other whaling
companies. By the end of 1909 he had succeeded inabsorbing Tokai Gyogyo K.K. and Taiheiyo Gyogyo(the whaling division of Iwatani Shokai). These were
followed in 1916 by Naigai Suisan K.K., Nagato Hogei
K.K., Kii Suisan K.K. and others. With this, a conglomerate possessing 26 ships, with premises in 34
locations around Japan as well as on the coast of Korea,
and making catches of more than 1,000 whales a year
was formed to monopolize whaling in coastal waters.
Meanwhile, a system of marketing was establishedwhen Isana Shokai (President Tosaku Yamada), a company with responsibility for sales of whale meat, wasset up in Osaka. This ensured a virtual monopoly ofmarkets all over Japan, making Toyo Hogei, quite literally, the No.1 whaling company in the far east.

Part 4 Emergence of Trawling
The Early Days of Trawling in Japan
Steam trawlers were first used by British fisheries inthe early 1700s. Much later, in the late 1800s, otter
boards were installed on each side of the net mouth,
enabling the mouth to be expanded laterally. At thetime, trawling was the most advanced method of fishing. The advance of the Industrial Revolution led tothe motorization and enlargement of fishing boats,
improved fishing nets and the development of icemaking technology. With all these features combined,
the trawling method enabled operators to venture into
distant waters and bring in much larger catches. As
An early trawling method

such, it quickly spread through the countries ofEurope.
Trawling in Japan was no exception to this trend.
Unlike in Europe, however, it had not developed as anatural extension of traditional Japanese fisheries, but
was imported as completely new technology fromabroad (Great Britain). As a result, Japan skipped thesailing trawler stage previously experienced in Europe,and launched straight into trawling by steam.
In 1904, Kamezo Okuda, owner of Kakuyu Gyogyo
Shukusei Shokai in Tottori Prefecture, decided toattempt trawling when he read of a tour by Mokuichi
Shimoda of European and American fisheries. Shimoda

18th-century beam trawling

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Otter trawling34

was an engineer in agriculture and forestry whosename is etched in Japanese fishery history as the man
who developed distant water tuna fisheries. First,
Okuda built a wooden steam trawler (152 tons) at the
Ominato Shipyard in Mie Prefecture (engine supplied
by Ishii Ironworks). The ship, named Kaiko Maru by
Okuda, is thought to have been the first trawler everbuilt in Japan. The Kaiko Maru was formally launchedat Ominato in September that year, and underwent
trials in December. Then in June of the following year
(1905), trial fishing was carried out near Hinomisaki
and Tanabe in Wakayama Prefecture. However, defects
were discovered in the design and structure of the ship
and fishing tackle (for example, the net mouth would

not widen properly). The project was abandoned
half-way, owing to a lack of operational experienceand opposition from coastal fishermen.
Again, in 1905, Tsunezo Takio of Muroran in
Hokkaido built the small wooden steam trawler
Hokusui Maru (159 tons) with a distant water fisherysubsidy and a grant from Hokkaido Prefecture. He
used it to operate inside Uchiura Bay using Muroranas a base, achieving a modicum of success. After this,a succession of new small wooden steamships werebuilt, or existing wooden ships converted for trawling.
In the end, however, nearly all of them ended in failure(including the Hokusui Maru) owing to deficiencies
in both ships and equipment.

Part 5 The Start of North-Sea Fisheries
1. Japan’s Fisheries Move North
The Advance to Sakhalin and Collision with Russia
The Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea, framed by
the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin, the Kamchatka Peninsula
and Alaska, are known as some of the world’s finest
fishing grounds. These are what we call the north-sea(“Hokuyo”) fishing grounds.
It was in the 18th century that Japanese fisheryoperators first ventured into these waters. In 1751, theMatsumae clan, rulers of Ezo (Hokkaido) at the time,
sent clansmen to Sakhalin to develop the fishinggrounds there. The following year, two clan-operated
fishing grounds were opened in Kushunkotan (latercalled Otomari) and elsewhere. As for private enterprise, Date Rin-emon and Suhara Koemon obtained
licenses from the Matsumae clan as fishing groundsubcontractors, and it was they who first opened thefishing grounds in Tobutsu (on the west coast). Levies
from these fishing grounds were more than 60,000
ryo at their peak, providing a generous income for the
Matsumae clan.
Meanwhile, Russia had continued to push

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

eastwards from the end of the 16th century. Initially,
the main focus was on hunting and there was no interest in fisheries. It was from around the middle of the
18th century that Russians started fishing in seas northof Japan. They clashed with northward-bound Japanese
operators at Kamchatka, a treasure store of salmon
and trout, and this developed into a scramble forresources. By the beginning of the 19th century, Russia
had sent warships to threaten the island of Iturup,
taking fishing grounds from Japanese interests in
Kushunkotan, Sakhalin. The weakened shogunate
could do nothing about it, and the problems of fishingrights and territory in Sakhalin were carried forward
to the Meiji government.
In 1870, the new Meiji government created a
Sakhalin Development Commission and establishedstate-operated fishing grounds in four locations. At
the same time, private fishery operators moved into
the area, and 311 fishing boats made the journey to
Sakhalin in 1874. But then, as a measure to stabilize
Russo–Japanese relations, the Meiji government withdrew its earlier proposal to create a north-south

35

division at 50° north latitude. In 1875, the government
agreed to a Russian proposal for a Sakhalin-Kuril
Exchange Treaty. With this, Sakhalin became Russian
territory.
Under the Treaty, Japanese operators were permitted to continue fishing in the area for another sevenyears. As a result, some who had previously left
Sakhalin returned there, and by 1882 there were 30
fishing grounds, 22 fishery bosses and 1,500 fishermen,
with catches weighing 35,000 koku (5,250 tons).
When the seven years were over, however, Russia
imposed heavy taxes on fish catches leaving the area,changed its fishery regulations many times over, took
control of the best fishing grounds and leased themto Russians. It was a deliberate policy of alienation.
From 1902 onwards, fishing permits were granted
exclusively to Russians, and the Japanese were left with
only the traditionally permitted fishing grounds insouthern Sakhalin.
Even so, the fishermen and general laborers
employed by the Russians were all Japanese; theJapanese still had a hand in the control of fisheries.

nets, food and other provisions to Nikolayevsk, would
loan these materials to Russians and have them engage
in fisheries, then would buy up their catches and takethem back to Japan. In other words, the whole operation was being managed by the Japanese side. Saké,sundry goods and other merchandise would also be
loaded onto the ships for sale in Russia, and sometimes
the fish catches were purchased with the profits fromthis activity.
The Russian government tacitly allowed this system
to continue, because Russians at the time had low
levels of management skill and technology related tofisheries; the region would have been impossible todevelop if the Japanese had been squeezed out altogether. These operations increased from the second
half of the 1890s, when Japanese fisheries in Sakhalin
became difficult, and prospered until just before theoutbreak of the Russo–Japanese War in 1904.
In the meantime, Japanese activity had been
restricted in 1900, when the Russian government
banned the employment of Japanese fishermen in the
Nikolayevsk region in order to protect its own
fishermen.

Fisheries on the Coast of Mainland Russia
Like Sakhalin, the Nikolayevsk region on the continental side of the Sea of Okhotsk, and particularly theLower Basin of the Amur River, was rich with resourcesof salmon and trout. Ventures into this region by
Japanese fishery operators started in around 1870,
increasing yearly thereafter.
The Russian government, sensing a threat in thegathering momentum, attempted to repel the Japaneseby establishing provisional fishery regulations in 1879.
The regulations prohibited fishing by Japanese, butsince the majority of catches depended on the Japanesemarket, processing and exports by Japanese operators
were tacitly accepted.
So now Japanese fishery operators leased fishingzones in the name of Russians, or continued to fishunder the pretext of buying fish. Japanese fishing boats
would carry fishermen, salt for preserving, fishing

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Fisheries on the Kamchatka Peninsula
In the Kamchatka region, meanwhile, the indigenous
peoples had a long tradition of preserving salmon for
their own consumption, whether by salt-drying or byfermenting fish in the ground. In the second half ofthe 1890s, however, entrepreneurs from mainland
Russia started operating industrial-scale fisheries there.
The main operators included Zubkov (14 fishinggrounds), Kotik (26 fishing grounds) and Brunel (8fishing grounds).
The leading company, Kotik, originally set out in
1891 with the aim of fur seal hunting, but when culls
decreased in quality, turned its attention to fisheries.
It then joined forces with Semenov-Denby, a company
engaged in fisheries in Sakhalin, and expanded its
salmon and trout business. Its first operation was in
1896, when it hired 46 Japanese fishermen to produce

36Japanese-style salt-dried fish. From this operation,
Kotik sent 7,000 salmon to Mitsui & Co. in Hakodate.
Realizing the advantages of hiring Japanese workers,
the company now did so in much larger numbers.
Other Russian companies followed suit, and partly
because the majority of catches were exported to Japan,
the business model became hard to maintain without
employing Japanese technicians or operating jointlywith Japanese businesses. With the Russian government’s ban on employing Japanese fishermen in 1900,
however, Japanese-style salt-dried fish produced
mainly by Russian companies came to an end thatyear.
In Japan, meanwhile, a survey report in 1894 suggested that the coast of the Kamchatka Peninsulaoffered superb salmon and trout fishing grounds. And
when information came in from fishermen employed
by Russian companies, followed by actual shipmentsof salt-dried fish in 1896, awareness of the Kamchatka
Peninsula rapidly increased.

In 1899, Tokishiro Yoshimasu was the first to venture to Oloskoi, while Yujikeisaburo Saito sent two
ships in collaboration with a Russian trader from
Vladivostok. They returned to Japan carrying 500
koku in weight after only six months of operations.
And the following year, fishery operators sent ships
there in droves, having diverted them from Sakhalin
and the Nikolayevsk area. Many of these had obtained
fishing permits from the Russian government, butsome were poachers.
Taken aback by these mass incursions of Japanesenationals, in 1901 the Russian government establisheda rule that both business owners and fishermen musthave Russian nationality. Japanese owners got aroundthis by replicating the tactics employed in Nikolayevsk(entering fish sale agreements with Russian entrepreneurs, employing Japanese fishermen but calling themseamen, etc.), and merely increased their presence inthe area.

2. Establishment of a Russo–Japanese Fisheries Agreement
The Russo–Japanese War broke out in 1904, but peacetalks were already underway in September of the following year. Japan’s conditions included demands thatJapanese fishing rights in the Japan Sea, the Sea of
Okhotsk and the Bering Sea coasts be recognized; thePeace Treaty included a requirement that a Fisheries
Agreement be signed.
The Russo–Japanese Fisheries Agreement was duly
signed in 1907. It included provisions to the effectthat, when undertaking fisheries and manufacturing
in fishing zones leased through auction, both Russians
and Japanese would receive equal treatment, and that

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

when exporting to Japan no export tax would be levied.
The period of validity was 12 years.
Because Japanese fishery technology was moreadvanced in this period, the condition of equality even
within Russian territory could be seen as advantageous
to Japan. Under the Treaty, salmon and trout fisheries
were officially permitted in coastal areas of theKamchatka Peninsula and the Sea of Okhotsk, leading
to a succession of new businesses moving into fisheries.
This was the beginning of Japan’s north-sea
fisheries.

37

Chapter 2: The Rise of Modern-Style Fisheries — Creation of
the Tamura Steamship Fishery Company 1905–1917
Part 1 Early Days of Trawling
1. The Start of TrawlingThomas Albert Glover and the Fukae Maru
It was a man named Thomas Albert Glover who first
introduced full-scale trawling to Japan. In 1908 hepurchased an iron-hulled trawler from Aberdeen in
Scotland and renamed it Fukae Maru, hired a Captain
Ford and two other fishing experts and started operations in waters off the Goto Islands in May that year.
Trawling gathered attention from that time on, quickly
spreading throughout Japan.
Thomas Albert Glover was the son of Thomas
Glover, a Scottish merchant and entrepreneur activein the late Edo and early Meiji eras. After studying
biology (particularly in connection with fish) at the
University of Pennsylvania, Glover returned to Japan
in 1893 to take up employment with Holme Ringer& Co. The company, based in Nagasaki, was engaged
in a wide range of fields, including tea, whaling andother fisheries, and trading. Then, in October 1907,
Glover became director of the newly established
Nagasaki Steamship Fishery Co., and by 1912 was inpossession of six trawlers.
The success of Glover’s Fukae Maru sparked a “trawlboom” in which a succession of trawlers were built orpurchased. The government’s view was that building
trawlers would contribute greatly to the developmentof Japan’s fisheries. As such, it initially issued subsidies
under the Distant Water Fisheries Promotion Act,and placed no restrictions of any kind on operations.
The result was that the number of trawlers increased

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

dramatically from two in 1908 to nine in 1909, seventeen in 1910, sixty-seven in 1911, and 139 (79 owned
by companies and 60 by individuals) in 1912.
Moreover, the lack of any restrictions on operations
meant that any business venturing into trawling could
succeed in making a profit. In August 1910, the Japan
Steam Trawler Fisheries Association was formed in
Shimonoseki. Its purpose was to improve or develop
steam trawler fisheries and promote the common
interests of participating operators. Glover was persuaded to act as its Chairman.

Both Equipment and Knowledge
Needed for Trawling
Trawling is a method of fishing that involves dragging
a large bottom trawl net across the sea bottom. It
promised large gains and was a coveted method forfishery operators. But trawlers depended on engines
and equipment that could withstand the pressures ofdragging nets through extensive areas of sea.
The method of trawling introduced from Britain
involved dragging bottom trawl nets behind ships.
However, greater efficiency in driving shoals into thenets could be achieved by fitting otter boards on theends of ropes (warps) fed out from the bow and sternwith the movement of the trawler, thus widening thenet mouth laterally. The warps required a variety ofequipment, including strong wire rope, a high-horsepower winch with which to reel it out and wind it

38

back in again, guiding rollers to lead the warps to bothsides of the net and guide them in and out on the bow
and stern, and a device for attaching and removing
the otter boards. And on top of this advanced equipment, a wealth of knowledge and highly-trained fishing skills were needed in order to make use of it. A
single trawler was said to cost as much as 100 longline
ships, and therefore required a certain level of capitalbacking.
The wooden trawler Kaiko Maru had been built
in 1904, but ended in failure owing to defects in the
ship’s body and equipment. In around 1907, Hokusui

Maru fished with some success in Uchiura Bay,
Muroran. On board was Kosuke Kunishi, later tomanage the Tamura Steamship Fishery Company,
who at the time was on practical training with theFisheries Training Institute. Kunishi later wrote of theattempts by Kaiko Maru and Hokusui Maru: “Early
trawlers were structurally weak and poorly designed.
They were incomplete as trawlers, and their fishinggear was also incomplete, while the fishing methods
were nothing more than imitations” (Anthology of
Writings and Speeches of Mr. Kosuke Kunishi).

2. Opposition to Trawling and Codification in Law
Anti-Trawling Movements
While the introduction of trawling was a major spurto the modernization of Japanese fisheries, it also dealt
a serious blow to coastal and offshore fisheries. Thiswas because there were no exclusion zones for trawling
and trawlers operated close to the coasts. In Kansai
and Chugoku, where bream longline fishing was particularly prominent, trawlers venturing into the fishinggrounds would come alongside the longline fishingboats, sweep up the whole catch of bream in a single
net, go to unload them at a fishing port and then returnto the fishing grounds to continue fishing. This kindof activity was repeated continuously.
The livelihoods of coastal fishermen were severely
threatened by this, and anti-trawling movements anddisputes now started breaking out all over the country.
In January 1908, Kaiko Maru, operating in seas off
Choshi in Chiba Prefecture, was set on fire by Choshi
fishermen while anchored at Hasaki, Ibaraki
Prefecture.
Opposition movements by coastal fishermen gradually grew in scale, until a resolution was passed at a
National Convention of Fishery Operators, to theeffect that a “Petition on the Prohibition of Steam
Trawler Fisheries” would be submitted to the government. The “Hundred-Year History of the JapanThe Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Fisheries Association Part I” outlines the content of
the petition as follows:•Trawlers use steam power, extensively disturb theseabed, and operate unscrupulously in small reefs
and the like, thereby ruining fishing grounds andinterrupting fish breeding activity.
•Trawlers operate at depths of 20 to 70 fathoms, thetraditional range of activity by coastal fishery operators, and this threatens the livelihoods of coastal
fishery operators.
•This should be a time to find ways of protecting fish
breeding, but activity such as trawling is designed
merely for the profit of two or three capitalists. On
what grounds, therefore, do the government authorities encourage fisheries such as these that will clearlylead to a decline in fish stocks?
•As seen in the recent ship-burning case in Chiba,
fishermen in each prefecture are planning to form
alliances and take extreme measures to eradicate
trawlers. We therefore petition the government toban steam trawler fisheries that rob fishermen of theirlivelihoods.
Conversely, a “Japan Fisheries Association
Newsletter” dated April 10th, 1908, argues against
the resolution by the National Convention of FisheryOperators:“It stands to reason that large-scale fisheries will be

39more profitable than small-scale fisheries, and it would
not be appropriate for the government to ban largescale fisheries that are finally in the process of growthand halt progress in the improvement of fishing tackle
and fishing methods, just to protect certain small-scale
fisheries. The impact of this should rather encourage
research among coastal fishermen and bring improvements in their trading, storage, transportation andother aspects; calls to ban trawling are the narrowminded ranting of those who do not understand thegeneral trends of fisheries. However, trawling should
not be unrestricted. It should be banned in inlandseas, in bays, and along coasts. Even in open seas,
exclusion zones should be established in fishinggrounds where there are special circumstances. Before
that, it is to be hoped that trawl fishery operators, after
amassing sufficient experience in inland waters, should
all move out to Korean Seas, China Seas and the Seaof Okhotsk…”

Enforcement of the “Regulations for the Controlof Steam Trawler Fisheries”
The government, which had wanted to build up trawling as part of the modernization of fisheries, was now
caught between the two stools of maintaining coastal
fisheries and supporting trawling. By 1909, all major
newspapers were reporting on this issue. Arguments
both for and against trawling were published in the“Japan Fisheries Association Newsletter” and elsewhere. On April 4th, 1909, therefore, the government
issued “Regulations for the Control of Steam Trawler
Fisheries”, which came into force on June 1st thatyear.
The Regulations consisted of 12 articles, stipulating, among others, that the permission of the Ministerof Agriculture and Commerce would be required foreach vessel, applications would have to specify theoperating area and be accompanied by copies of boththe ship’s certificate of registration and its inspection
certificate, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce
would establish coastal exclusion zones, operators with

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

permits would have to submit business reports to the
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce each business
year, and violators would be fined.
However, the very fact that the Control Regulations
were established also meant that trawling had beenlegally recognized. Even the exclusion zones weremainly within bays and in the space between promontories, and there was no mitigation of the threat to
trawlers by coastal fishermen. The penalties were also
mild—up to 50 yen for violations and up to 100 yen
for using unlicensed boats—and the method of policing in order to uncover violations was not specified.
Behind these shortcomings lay the fact that manymembers of the government were advocates of trawlingas a revolutionary new method of fishing.
This served to bolster the succession of businesses
making startups in trawling. The enactment of the“Regulations for the Control of Steam Trawler
Fisheries” had succeeded merely in fanning the anxiety
of coastal fishermen, and led to a continuing spate ofdisputes all over the country. At the National
Convention of Fishery Operators held in February
1910, a resolution was passed on expanding exclusion
zones, limiting the number of ships, halting subsidies
for coastal trawling, enacting specific methods ofpolicing, and withdrawing permits from violators,
among others; the government would be petitioned
to amend the Regulations to incorporate these changes.
This was just one of a number of organized opposition
movements that sprang up around the country.
Trawling is a non-selective fishing method. As such,fishing grounds were rapidly ruined by overfishing.
Infringements of exclusion zones, overfishing andother ills became rife, and the problem of pressure oncoastal fisheries was re-ignited. Another problem thatemerged was that seabed power cables linking Japan
with China (mainly around Nagasaki) were frequently
being cut by steam trawlers.
In view of these problems, the government decided
to take up the demands of coastal fishermen andembark on sweeping limitation measures. Firstly, in
October 1910 it removed trawling from eligibility for40subsidies under the Distant Water Fisheries Promotion
Act. Then in January 1911 it removed steamships of
180 tons or less from eligibility for permits under the
Regulations for the Control of Steam Trawler Fisheries.
It also clarified the definition of trawling as referring
to “fisheries undertaken by navigating in ships propelled by a screw propeller, using ‘otter trawls’ or ‘beam
trawls’”, and limited the operating zones of newly
licensed trawlers to waters west of 130° east longitude.
In August that year, moreover, it expanded trawling
exclusion zones. Exclusion zones were also establishednear seabed power cables linking Japan with China,
mainly around Nagasaki. These exclusion zones were
inside good fishing grounds in the East China Sea,
the Yellow Sea and elsewhere, and when the fisheries
patrol ship Hisokucho Maru was deployed and policing
was strengthened in 1913, it came as a major blow to
trawling.
Another issue was the depletion of resources. Most
catches made by trawling at the time consisted of red
sea bream, in particular. Because these fish grow slowly
and live on the sea bottom, stocks rapidly diminished
as a result of trawling. This in turn reduced the sizeof catches, so that fishing boats had to move further
out to distant water areas in search of new fishinggrounds. The capacity of refrigeration equipment
could not keep pace with this, however, impairing the
freshness of catches and reducing their prices.
The Trawl Boom and its Demise
Given the inherent nature of trawl fisheries, it wasinevitable that they would eventually gravitate towards
distant water. In fact, trawl operators lost no time indeveloping new fishing grounds in Korean waters.
In spite of the far-reaching government restrictions
on trawling, there was no sign of abatement in the

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

vigor of the trawl boom. At the peak of Japanese trawling in 1912, there were 139 steamships in operation,
making this a truly golden age for the industry. At thetime, the cost of building a single steam trawler is said
to have been 50–60,000 yen. But even with such a
massive investment of capital, huge catches of highquality fish that would quickly fill a ship to overflowing could be made by merely going out to new fishinggrounds where nets had never been used and trawling
the sea bed. The promise of immediate financial
returns made trawling subject to expectations of highprofit. And the attraction of this high profit sparked
an almost abnormal trawl boom as soon as the method
was introduced to Japan.
Amid this frenzied trawl boom, many who started
up businesses had not previously worked in fisheries
management, but were lured from other sectors by
the high profitability of trawling in the early days.
Trawling at the time was often undertaken by fish
wholesalers or businesses that had previously had little
to do with fish. In fact, it was not unusual to find ricewholesalers, doctors and others from Osaka and Kobe
as trawler owners.
As a result, trawl operators were not always sufficiently prepared or equipped with sufficient knowledge for this type of business; they often had only
poorly formed business plans for the future.
In many minds, this led to grave misgivings overthe future of the newly emerging trawl fisheries. And
it was not long before these misgivings became hardreality; the trawling industry, still heady with its initial
success, suddenly turned to a downward slide, enteringa period of severe crisis in which it was forced to reduce
scale and reorganize.

41

Part 2 Founding of the Tamura Steamship Fishery Company
1. Ichiro Tamura and Kosuke Kunishi
Ichiro Tamura
Ichiro Tamura was born in Hagi, Abu-gun, Choshu
Province (now Hagi City, Yamaguchi Prefecture) in
January 1866 as the third son of Shozaburo Kuhara.
His father Shozaburo was the elder brother ofDenzaburo Fujita, founder of the Fujita Gumi company. Together with their eldest brother Shikataro
Fujita, he was involved in running the Fujita Gumi
business together with Denzaburo from February 1873
onwards. After the Meiji Restoration, Denzaburo
Fujita made a fortune out of military procurement.
Fujita Gumi later rose to prominence in the Kansai
business community through a variety of interests,
including mining, agriculture and forestry, as well as
land reclamation in Kojima Bay.
Three of Shozaburo Kuhara’s sons — Ikuta, Ichiro
and Fusanosuke—survived into adulthood (his second
son Asazuchi died on April 10th, 1864). Ikuta andIchiro were adopted into the houses of Saito andTamura, respectively, while Fusanosuke continued theKuhara line, according to the custom of inheritanceby the last-born son. Fusanosuke initially worked at
the Kosaka Mine, the center of Fujita Gumi’s business
operations. He left the company in 1905, but only
after reviving the mine by updating the smelting process when it had been in danger of closure. In Decemberthat year, Fusanosuke purchased the Akasawa Mine

Founder Ichiro Tamura

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

from Ibaraki Prefecture, changed the name to Kuhara
Kogyosho Hitachi Kozan (Hitachi Mine of Kuhara
Mining) and took his first step as an independent
entrepreneur. The business grew from that point,
becoming the Kuhara Mining Company with capitalof 10 million yen in September 1912. Some years later,in December 1928, it would be reorganized as the
public listed company Nippon Sangyo Co., Ltd.
Back in 1880, Fusanosuke’s eldest brother Ikuta wasadopted into the family of Goichi Nakano, who
included the governorship of Yamaguchi Prefecture
among his previous appointments. Ikuta revived
Goichi’s former family name of Saito and became amajor landowner in Kobe. Fusanosuke’s second
brother Ichiro, in turn, was adopted by his motherFumi’s family (Tamura) in 1895. The Tamura family
had lived in Hagi for generations, and had been
appointed kawase goyokiki (money exchange tradesmen) by the Choshu Clan in 1803. Their high social
standing is illustrated by the fact that they donated80 pieces of silver when the Hagi area suffered disastrous damage due to torrential rains in 1850.
As time went on, Ichiro s spirit of independent
enterprise merely intensified. He even tried his handat papermaking, sericulture and other fields, but was
unsuccessful. His bitter experiences during this period
served to hone his disposition as an entrepreneur, andlater led to the emergence of a highly talented
individual.
For some time, Ichiro had been interested in the
future potential of fisheries, and on inheriting a shareof his father Shozaburo’s fortune, he discussed the ideaof investing capital in the industry with his younger
brother Fusanosuke. As a result, they resolved thatthe elder would take to the sea, the younger to theland — in other words, Ichiro would venture into fisheries, which were not even established as an industry

42

“Tamura Kan” lecture hall the elementary school in Katagiri, Nara Prefecture

at the time. From that time on, he and Fusanosuke
were to help each throughout their lives, firstly as
business advisors, and later, when Fusanosuke entered
the political world, as supporters.
Ichiro was certainly not without his philanthropic
side, and made numerous donations and contributions
to worthy causes. He donated a lecture hall to theelementary school of Katagiri in Nara Prefecture,
where he lived; he also contributed to the cost ofbuilding a lighthouse in Ako, Hyogo Prefecture, where
shipping accidents were commonplace. He donated5,000 tsubo of land (about 4 acres) in Fushimi, Kyoto,site of the birth of Dogen (founder of the Soto Sectof Buddhism), and contributed to the constructionof Tanjoji (“Birth”) Temple there.
Of the 1 million yen inherited from his father in
1907, Ichiro made investments in three sectors:
500,000 yen in a Korean seafood trading and pollack
liver oil manufacturing business, and in north-sea
herring, salmon and trout fisheries; and 300,000 yen
in trawl fisheries. For the Korean business, he established a branch (Tamura Shoten) in Busan, and sent
Kenkichi Ueki, who had only just joined the company,
to do business through the agency of the Korean
Fisheries Association, among others. Success was
unforthcoming, however, and so in 1912 he sent Ueki
to Nikolayevsk in Russia, there to gain a foothold in
north-sea fisheries.
After the Meiji Reformation, fisheries along thecoasts of the Korean Peninsula were undeveloped,
very much like coastal fisheries in Japan. For thoseengaged in fisheries mainly in western Japan, these

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

The lighthouse at Ako in
Hyogo Prefecture

waters could be accessed via the Goto islands, Iki,
Tsushima and other intermediate islands. These were
extremely effective as bases for fishing operations.
Consequently, operators in western Japan had been
actively venturing out to those parts since the beginning of the Meiji era.
The rights situation became clearer with the signingof the Japan–Korea Treaty of Amity in 1876 and theJapan–Korea Trade Regulations in 1883, followed by
the issue of detailed provisions under the Japan–Korea
Fishing Regulations of 1889. In 1900, Korean Fishing
Cooperatives were established in each prefecture, anda Federation of Korean Fishing Cooperatives wasformed as a collective body for these. These examples
merely illustrate the height of interest in coastal areasof the Korean Peninsula at the time.
In 1890 there had been 718 fishing boats venturing
into Korean waters, but this number continued toincrease thereafter. According to estimates for 1911,
they had burgeoned to 5,000 fishing boats sent by 171
fishery organizations in 27 prefectures, employing
42,000 people.
Ichiro Tamura’s motivation to enter fisheries andhis initial attempt to establish a business presence on
the Korean Peninsula should be seen in the context
of this trend.
In November 1908, six months after the Fukae
Maru and at the urging of his relative Juro Oka, Ichiro
Tamura built a 199-ton iron-hulled steam trawler at
the Sakurajima Works of the Osaka Iron Works company (later to become Hitachi Zosen Corporation).
He named the ship Dai-Ichi Maru.

43

Dai-Ichi Maru, Japan’s first iron-hulled trawler

This was not only the first iron-hulled trawler tobe built in Japan, but also the first steamship to obtaina license under the “Regulations for the Control of
Steam Trawler Fisheries”. However, despite carryingout trial operations in the Seto Inland Sea, the outcome from Dai-Ichi Maru left much to be desired.
Conversely, the Fukae Maru, the ship purchased byThomas Albert Glover in Scotland six months earlier,
was already operating with significant success. Ichiro
Tamura came to the conclusion that the difference
between the Dai-Ichi Maru and the Fukae Maru wasinexperience in design and fishing methods. In July
1910, therefore, he sent Kosuke Kunishi to Great Britain,
an advanced trawling nation, to build a trawler there.
Kosuke Kunishi
Kosuke Kunishi was born in Kobe, Hyogo Prefecture
on February 10th, 1887, as the third son of Heita Nomi,a samurai from Yamaguchi Prefecture. He was adopted
by Sukeju Kunishi , another samurai from Yamaguchi
Prefecture, in August 1893. His adoptive father Sukeju
was the elder brother of his natural mother Ume, andwas the son of the younger sister of Yahachi Aikawa,

father of Yoshisuke Aikawa (later to achieve fame as
founder of the Nissan Konzerne conglomerate). When
Sukeju passed away suddenly in March 1896, theremaining Kunishi family became dependent on the
Aikawa family.
When Kunishi graduated from Yamaguchi Middle
School in March 1904, he confided to Yoshisuke
Aikawa, who had graduated from Tokyo Imperial
University the previous year, his wish to go into fisheries in future. Aikawa then met with Shinnosuke
Matsubara, Director of the Ministry of Agriculture
and Commerce Fisheries Training Institute, andNaomasa Maki, Director-General of the Ministry’s
Fisheries Bureau. On confirming the future potentialof fisheries, he recommended that Kunishi enter the
Fisheries Training Institute.
Cautious by nature, Kunishi also consulted his
relative Kaoru Inoue (a Meiji and Taisho era politician)and Kusuyata Kimura of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu(President of Mitsubishi Joint Stock Company from1920 to 1935), who had married Aikawa’s elder sister.
Only then did he enroll in the Fisheries Course(Regular Course) of the Ministry of Agriculture andCommerce Fisheries Training Institute. On graduatingfrom the Course in July 1907, the Ministry arranged
for him to become a trainee in distant water fisheriesin August. He then enrolled in the Distant Water
fisheries Course from the Fisheries Training Institute.
In February of the following year, the Ministry sent
him to Europe for practical training in distant water
fisheries, whereupon he received training in steam
trawler fisheries in both Britain and Germany.
Returning to Japan after studying overseas for 18
months, Kunishi graduated from the Distant Water
fisheries Course and took up employment in yellowtail
large lift-net fisheries operated by Ichiro Tamura in
Tsutsu, Tsushima. Finally, he was sent back to Britain
in July 1910 to oversee the construction of a trawler
commissioned there and to bring it back to Japan.

Kosuke Kunishi during his stay in
Britain

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

44

2. Establishment of the Tamura Steamship Fishery Company
Construction of Minato Maru
On his return to Britain, Kosuke Kunishi ordered a
trawler from the Smiths Dock shipyard in Mid­
dlesbrough, Yorkshire.
The trawler was completed in March 1911. The
main specifications were as follows:
Gross tonnage: 188.84 tons
Length: 33.53 m
Beam: 6.4 m
Height: 3.58 m
Max. speed: 9.96 knots (ca. 18 kph)
Range: 2,500 nautical miles (4,630 km)
Horsepower: 410 hp
The trawler, named Minato Maru, took just overtwo months to complete the journey to Japan, with
Kosuke Kunishi himself on board.
Also on board was the fishing master Hardisty, acaptain hired by Kunishi in England. Levels of shiphandling and fishing methods by Japanese operators
at the time were still quite low; Kunishi aimed toincrease these levels through Hardisty’s guidance.
Kunishi would later explain his rationale at the time
as follows:“I thought I should stop immersing myself vainly
in various pointless surveys and research without testing my actual abilities. Before all else, I should go to
England and have the most advanced trawler built
there. To operate it, I would recruit a captain with themost experience in his country, make him a leader,
and thereby train superior new people. Then withthat ship and those people, I would first produce
something on a par with England, then make further
improvements and advances to adapt to circumstances
in Japan. As well as being the safest and most reliablemeasure, this would also be the way to make best useof the characteristics of Japanese people” (Anthologyof Writings and Speeches of Mr. Kosuke Kunishi).
Then, with the arrival of Minato Maru in May 1911,
Ichiro Tamura established the Tamura Steamship

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Fishery Company in Shimonoseki City, Yamaguchi
Prefecture, making Kunishi responsible for full-scale
trawling operations. Later, Aikawa described the situation at the time thus: “To support his (Kunishi’s)
work from the very beginning, I introduced him to
Kuhara as a potential source of capital. Kuhara thenused his elder brother Tamura’s capital to establish the
Tamura Fishery Company, which he then developed
as a business” (ibid.).
Ken-ichi Katsuno, an employee at the time, recalls
the newly-launched Tamura Steamship FisheryCompany:“When the Tamura Steamship Fishery Company
was first created, we rented a two-story house measuring about 12 tsubo (ca. 48 square meters), with a fairly
spacious rented storehouse. The house had been built
near the coast as a retreat for the family of a man named
Kokichi Hirotaki, a goods wholesaler of 18
Kannonzaki-cho, Shimonoseki City. To enter thepremises from the street, you had to cross over fromthe earth floor of the shop to the kitchen and pass infront of the gloomy storehouse. On the other hand,
you could see the sea right outside the window andthe view was wonderful. It was also very convenient
for communicating with berthed ships. The office andkitchen were downstairs, with a single room upstairs.
It had cupboards and an alcove, and there was noinconvenience to those of us who lived there (Kunishi,
Katsuno)” (Conversation with Ken-ichi Katsuno).
It was from this two-story rented house that

The Minato Maru, built at the Smiths Dock shipyard in England(completed in March 1911)

45

The Kannonzaki Office at the time of thecompany’s founding in 1911

The company moved to the Hanano-cho
Office in 1917, and was based here until
1929.

“Nippon Suisan” would be conceived.
Katsuno describes Kosuke Kunishi’s work ethic at
the time with the following anecdote: “One day wemade a huge catch of gurnard. Usually the ship would
return to port with the fish packed in cases on board,but because this would have taken too long, Minato
Maru docked at 8 o’clock that night with the catchloose on deck. When he saw that, Kunishi said “Let’spack it through the night”. The captain agreed, saying“Other companies also had ships out there, and they
have all made big catches. They’ll be back here bytomorrow morning”. Kunishi changed into working
overalls, and mucked in together with the crew tospend all night packing the fish into crates, thenshipped them to market early the next morning andsold them off at high prices. The gurnard brought into
port later by the other ships went for half the price”.
Again, on Kunishi’s earnest attitude to his work,
Keizo Tamura, adopted son of Ichiro Tamura and 2nd
President of Nippon Suisan, recalls: “He would board
the trawler himself and go to the fishing grounds, catchthe fish, bring it back and unload it, then take it himself
to the market and sell it. And once he had finishedthat work, he would board the trawler again and go
back out to the fishing grounds. That was how enthusiastic he was about working in the trawling business.
(part omitted) The other trawl operators all said he
was uncooperative, but the way Kunishi worked—
well, at the time it was called it the Tamura Steamship
Fishery Company, but I think the fact that it could
always make a profit was solely because Kunishi would
take it upon himself to do everything from catching

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

The street side of the Hanano-cho Office
was a fish market.

the fish to selling them” (ibid.).
The Tamura Policy of Not Selling Ships
The trawling boom in Korean waters and elsewhere
now entered a period of crisis. This was due partly tothe devastation of fishing grounds caused by the proliferation of fishery operators and overfishing, andpartly to the strengthening of government regulations.
Of 139 ships at the peak in 1912, four were scrappedin 1913; only 40 out of 131 licensed ships were actuallyengaged in operations in 1914, illustrating the sheer
speed with which the industry declined.
Operators in the industry now tried to overcome
this crisis with one of two quite different measures.
One was that “If vessel tonnage could be increasedslightly, and superior ships with sufficient speed andcruising range could be achieved, I recognize no needfor pessimism over the future of this industry…”(Anthology of Writings and Speeches of Mr. Kosuke
Kunishi). In other words, this was a positive response.
The Tamura Steamship Fishery Company managed
by Kosuke Kunishi was at the forefront of thisapproach, and in fact, continued to make steady profitsand maintain solid business.
The other measure was designed to strengthenbusiness through corporate amalgamation. The idea
here was that “the only thing is to rally together likeminded trawler owners, to add new personnel andcapital to form a large organization, to reform business
management and coordinate ship movements, thus
making sales of fish catches more profitable and46

reducing costs” (ibid.). In fact, a corporate amalgamation was planned in line with this principle; inNovember 1914, eleven businesses merged to form
Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd. (capital 2 million yen),
the largest single business in the industry with a totalof 18 steam trawlers.
But then, just as the search for ways of beating thecrisis continued, World War I broke out—a doubleedged sword for trawl operators. For the war heralded
a hitherto unknown boom in the marine shippingworld, cargo space became scarce and ship prices
soared. Steam trawlers could easily be converted tocargo ships, while their excellent mobility made them
ideally suited as minesweepers and lookout ships forsubmersibles. This led to a surge in demand for steam
trawlers among（隻）shipping companies, as well as in
150
Britain, France and other allied nations; now, steamships that cost 50–60,000 yen to build were being
120
sold for 250–260,000
yen. Some operators, suffering
under financial difficulties and feeling anxiety over90
the future, gave up
on fisheries. Instead, they now
competed to sell the steamships they had competed
to build during the60boom years. The buyers were shipping companies and allied nations. It was “an odd
30
phenomenon whereby
the fallen giants of yesterday
become the upstart rich of today” (Takashi Katsuta,
0 Shi, “Twenty-Year History ofed. Suisan Nijunen
1908 09

10

11

12

13

14

15

Fisheries”, 1932). As a result, the number of steam
trawlers, standing at 139 ships at their peak, had fallen
to 56 or less than half by 1916.
That year, however, fish prices were suddenly
inflated due to the booming wartime economy. For
trawl operators, this was a once-only opportunity forrecovery. But by that time many operators had alreadychosen the path of selling their ships rather thanrebuilding their business, and had withdrawn fromthe industry. Many of these had not originally been
based in fisheries, but were speculative operators that had
merely jumped onto the bandwagon of the trawl boom.
Amid these changes, the Tamura Steamship FisheryCompany alone chose a business path that differedfrom the others. Rather than following other operators
in selling their ships during the war, it adopted a consistent policy of not selling ships. Quite the contrary,
全国in fact, as it actually attempted
to strengthen its fleet.
田村汽船漁業部
As a result, the Tamura および共同漁業
Steamship Fishery Company
owned four out of only six trawlers remaining in Japanby the war s end in 1918. And so, in the period ofgreatest prosperity for trawl operators between the
final stages of the war and the period immediately
following it, the four ships owned by the Tamura
Steamship Fishery Company were operating freely inseas that were already emptied of competitors; theseas were theirs and theirs alone.
16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23
（年）

Trends in numbers of steam trawlers (1908 –1923)(vessels)
150“Tamura Steamship Fishery Company”
and “Kyodo Gyogyo”

120

Others

90

60

30

0

1908

09

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23
(year)

Source: Fisheries Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Present Status of Steam Trawl Fisheries (1936), others

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

47Part 3 North-Sea Fisheries and Management of the Ship Business
1. Ichiro Tamura and North-Sea Fisheries
The Start of North-Sea Fisheries and Foundingof “Ichi-I Gumi”
In the early days of the Meiji era, north-sea fishinggrounds centering on Sakhalin were rich in a variety
of fish; besides salmon and trout, crab, herrings andcod, they offered other important produce such as
whales and kelp. Japan and Russia were continually indispute over territorial rights to Sakhalin, and had
continued to cohabit the area with no clear boundary
markers.
In 1875, a degree of settlement was achieved under
the Treaty for the Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kuril
Islands. However, this brought considerable anguishto the many private capitalists who had invested in
Sakhalin and undertaken fishery activity there.
Although some vested interests were retained, theirdissatisfaction under the rule of the Russian government was to continue for a long time to come.
A major turning point in the situation regarding
north-sea fisheries came with victory in the Russo–
Japanese War. This was because Japan thereby acquired
territorial rights to the southern half of Sakhalin. On
the subject of fishing rights, however, the only provision was made in Article 11 of the Treaty ofPortsmouth:“Russia engages to arrange with Japan for granting
to Japanese subjects rights of fishery along the coastsof the Russian possession in the Japan, Okhotsk andBering Seas”.
A Russo–Japanese Fisheries Agreement was concluded on this basis in 1907. It consisted of 14 articles
and a supplementary protocol, providing for the definition of Russian and Japanese fishing rights, fishingareas, fishing methods, traffic, transportation, taxation, nationality of workers, and equal treatment of
Russians and Japanese, among others.

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Full-scale north-sea fisheries were to commence
against this international and social backdrop.
It was around 1907 that Ichiro Tamura himself
ventured into north-sea fisheries. Hearing that Isaburo
Yonebayashi was having trouble with his herring fishery business in Sakhalin, Ichiro approached him witha proposal for joint operations.
The proposal bore fruit, and the joint venture wasto be called “Ichi-I Gumi (The Ichi-I Group)”. “IchiI” was made up of the “Ichi” of Ichiro Tamura and the“I” of Isaburo Yonebayashi. Tamura did not manage
the business in person, but appointed Setsutaro
Nakayama to do so in his stead.
Nakayama was born in 1873 as the son of a samurai
from Okayama Prefecture. He barely managed tograduate from Osaka Commercial School and spent
a time in coal trading and other pursuits before establishing the Osaka Woolen Mill Company in 1903.
The company made a huge success out of militarydemand arising from the ensuing Russo–Japanese War.
Having secured his own business capital, Nakayama
then visited Sakhalin and realized the potential ofnorth-sea fisheries. At the time, Nakayama was amember of the Kuhara Mining management team,but on finishing his work in mining for the company,
was recommended to join Ichi-I Gumi.
Tamura decided to engage Nakayama in Sakhalin
herring fisheries, and at the same time appointed him
to oversee the management of Ichi-I Gumi. The business then grew rapidly. The reason for this was thatthe management method differed significantly fromthat of other businesses.
At the time, most north-sea fisheries adopted asystem of “advance purchase”. Here, the norm was thatthe supply of all fish catches would be promised tomarine produce traders in Hakodate, which would
furnish the purchasing capital, fishing tackle and nets48

needed for operations. With this system, most of the
profit went into the pockets of the traders, while theactual fishery operators could not accumulate
capital.
In contrast, Ichi-I Gumi insisted on using its own
capital, and was therefore free of this yoke.
At first, Ichi-I Gumi’s main interest lay in Sakhalin
herring fisheries its, but as little success was forthcoming, it immediately switched to salmon purchasing in
Nikolayevsk, Russia. In 1912, Kenkichi Ueki was sent
to take charge of the work. Ueki was a graduate of theFisheries Training Institute, and had worked as an
instructor at the Fisheries Training Institute of Toyama
Prefecture. He would later become the 3rd Presidentof Nippon Suisan. Also in 1912, Ichi-I Gumi won acontract for estuarine fishing grounds in Kamchatka,
and now ranked alongside Tsutsumi Shokai and
Yushutsu Shokuhin K.K. (Exported Foods Co.) in
importance.
In the following year, 1913, there were 231 fishingzones in Russian territory fisheries. Ichi-I Gumi operated 13 of these, more than Tsutsumi Shokai, making
it a leading operator in the north-sea region. In thesame year, it set up two canneries in Nikolayevsk.
Products from these factories were exported via
Mitsubishi Corporation.
As Ichi-I Gumi’s business had shifted to salmon
fisheries soon after its establishment, the connection
with Yonebayashi’s herring business became diluted
and Yonebayashi left the company. In 1914, Tamurachanged the name from Ichi-I Gumi to Nichiro
Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., capitalized at 2 million yen.
Ichiro Tamura owned 15,000 shares and Fusanosuke
Kuhara 10,000. The President was Ichiro Tamura, theExecutive Director Setsutaro Nakayama, the Director
Hideo Nishimura and the Auditor Eikichi Sasano.
Nichiro Gyogyo’s business went smoothly from thevery first year. World events conspired in the company’s success; for in this year, World War I broke out,
stimulating demand. Exports of canned products werebrisk and a profit of 300,000 yen was posted in thefirst business year, producing a 10% dividend. In the

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

2nd term, despite a decrease in catches, a dividend of
12% was secured. However, this profit was mainly
from the construction and sale of new ships, as wellas subleasing to shipping companies of chartered ships
under long-term agreements for transportation to the
Kamchatka fishing grounds.
In terms of equipment, canning machinery was
imported from America, while the company had 25
fishing zones in Kamchatka and 41 in total, if thosein Sakhalin and Iturup are included.
In the 3rd term, despite an expansion of fishingzones, catches of Sakhalin herrings were poor whiletransport and material costs became inflated. As aresult of these and other factors, profits from fisheries
were lower at 215,000 yen. The company s results were
further affected by the transfer of the highly profitable
ship business to the newly established Nippon Kisen
K.K. ( Japan Steamship Co.).

Sale of Nichiro Gyogyo and Withdrawal from
North-Sea Fisheries
Tamura decided to withdraw from Nichiro Gyogyo
as early as 1916. Two major factors can be seen behind
this decision.
The first was that north-sea fisheries had a strong
element of speculative enterprise, and stable catches
were difficult to achieve. In 1916, the 3rd business
term, catches in fishing grounds on the east coast of
the Kamchatka Peninsula fell by half. At the sametime, productivity in canned foods held the key toprofits in north-sea fisheries, but the fact that thecompany started this later than other companies also
became a problem. To achieve long-term, stable profits,
massive investments of capital would be needed, butthere was little prospect of the political stability
required to achieve this.
The second major factor was the soaring inflationof ship prices caused by World War I. Setsutaro
Nakayama had chosen the path of investing capital in
shipbuilding and dealing in ships rather than continuing north-sea fisheries as they were.

49

At an Extraordinary General Meeting of Share­
holders held in November 1916, a business diversification plan was laid out. The company’s capital would
be increased from 2 million yen to 5 million yen, while
the business objective would be changed from“Fisheries, and manufacture and marketing of marine
products” to “Fisheries, and manufacture and marketing of marine, agricultural and forestry products”, thiseven extending to “livestock farming”.

But the plan was never fully pursued. For when
Osaka stockbroker Tokuzo Shima offered by buy out
Nichiro Gyogyo in December that year, the offer was
readily accepted. A shareholder dividend of 486,000
yen was paid out, representing the whole amount left
after deducting fishing ground amortization costs andstatutory reserves from the total of 561,000 yen profit
for that business year, added to profits carried overfrom the previous term.

2. Ichiro Tamura and the Ship Business
Establishment of Nippon Kisen and
the Ship Business
Ichiro Tamura’s decision to withdraw from north-sea
fisheries was based on the advice of Setsutaro Nakayama
and Kenkichi Ueki, whom he had entrusted withmanaging the business. It was their judgment that,rather than investing in north-sea fisheries, there
would be greater profit in concentrating capital in the
shipping business and buying (or building) and sellingships.
Capital had been earmarked for purchasing rights
to yellowtail fixed net fisheries, planned for the wintermonths when north-sea fisheries were in low season.
Nakayama persuaded Tamura and Kuhara to purchasea secondhand ship with this capital and charter it toshipping companies. In the process, he succeeded inbuying a ship for 750,000 yen and selling it for 2 million yen, and with the proceeds established Nippon
Kisen in 1915. Besides President Tamura and Executive
Director Nakayama, the company only had five
employees, and was more like a ship broker than ashipping business. To make the business run even moresmoothly, they would need to engage in building andselling ships. This was how the plan to purchase Osaka
Iron Works materialized.
Founded in 1881 by Irishman Edward Hazlett
Hunter, Osaka Iron Works was a western-style shipyard that started shipbuilding operations at Sakurajima,
Nishi-ku, Osaka in 1890. Dai-Ichi Maru, the first

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

trawler built by Tamura, was one of its products.
Along with a capital expansion plan for Osaka Iron
Works, Nippon Kisen had a majority shareholding in
the company by 1918, and thus succeeded in bringing
it under its wing. Osaka Iron Works built 16 ships
weighing a total of 79,828 tons over the three years
from 1916, gaining enormous profits amid the wartime
scenario.
As Kenkichi Ueki recalled: “Our plan to build
60,000 tons a year and 300,000 tons in 5 years did
not proceed completely as we had wanted. Osaka Iron
Works was busy with other orders too, and could not
produce on time. This made us think that our work
would not go according to plan, and so to free up the
shipyard, we bought a majority share in Osaka Iron
Works and made it a subsidiary of Nippon Kisen.
(part omitted) When we could produce 300,000 tons,
Nippon Kisen’s business was at its peak. We would
build ships and sell them, or buy ships and sell them,and things just got better and better. (part omitted)
When things were at the peak, we earned as much as
200 million yen in the old money” (Ueki Memoirs).
However, after the end of World War I, the Kuhara
Shoji trading company run by Fusanosuke Kuhara ran
into difficulties, and Tamura injected a large part ofthe profit gained from Nippon Kisen in an attempt
to save it. As a result, Nippon Kisen had to be dissolvedin 1921.
Ichiro Tamura had invested a fortune in fisheries,
but was not directly involved in running the business,50

leaving everything to managers he could trust — northsea fisheries to Setsutaro Nakayama, trawling to
Kosuke Kunishi.
Once fishing rights in Russian coastal territories
had been secured following the Russo–Japanese War,Nakayama persuaded Tamura to move into north-sea
fishing grounds. But the outcome fell short of expectations, and when he noticed the boom in the shippingand shipbuilding sector on the outbreak of World War
I, he quickly withdrew from fisheries and switchedindustries.

Kosuke Kunishi’s attitude towards business management differed from that of Nakayama. Kunishi
was earnestness personified: he immersed himself
solely in trawling, and did not drink, smoke or attend
parties. Sometimes known as “steel-reinforced concrete”, he was a methodical, plain entrepreneur, a manof few words, driven by a strong spirit of study.
Tamura’s business was later to converge around
Kunishi, who was to become the driving force behindthe largest fisheries corporation in Japan before WorldWar II—Nippon Suisan.

Chapter 3: Industrial Expansion and Technological Innovation— Growth of “Kyodo Gyogyo”
1918–1933
Part 1 Establishment of “Kyodo Gyogyo”
1. The Postwar Depression and Fisheries
Postwar Depression, Corporate Integration andMergers
The end of World War I in November 1918 also spelt
the end of the wartime boom economy. Industries
instantly turned to recession, but bottomed out after
less than six months, returning to positive growthfrom around April 1919. This was due to a number offactors: the terrible devastation suffered by European
countries in the war meant that there was no immediate obstruction to imports from Japan, and this helped
the shipping industry to recover quickly. Again, theraw silk market rediscovered its vitality due to an
upturn in America, the only nation to profit from theGreat War.
But the improvement in fortunes could not last forever. Stockmarket collapses in both Tokyo and Osakain the spring of 1920 triggered the arrival of a fully
fledged postwar depression. Various commodity prices

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheriesalso plummeted. The slump, called “gara” (a crash) at
the time, brought many companies to bankruptcy,
including the raw silk export giant Mogi Sobei Shoten
and 74 affiliated banks. The tumble in the price ofraw silk, in particular, not only delivered a direct blow
to the sericulture industry, which had been one ofJapan’s leading industries since the Meiji era, but alsorobbed impoverished farming villages of their biggest
side income.
Businesses tried to weather the storm by withdrawing from many commodity markets and creating syndicates, among other moves. The government andBank of Japan issued coordinated statements, andembarked on bail-out loans by releasing large amountsof capital. Although the government’s relief measures
were inflationary in nature, the postwar depression
nevertheless subsided after only six months. However,the Japanese economy thereafter was not to experience
another proper economic boom, even as times moved51

on to the Showa era.
Between the end of the Great War and the beginning of the Showa era, there was a progressive climateof corporate integration and mergers amid the recession. Zaibatsu-related companies suddenly increasedin power and swallowed up weaker companies. The“bubble businesses” that had appeared during thewartime boom nearly all vanished. In that sense, thepostwar depression actually helped to reorganize
industry. In various sectors, there were increasingly
active moves to form cartels with which to regulate
production, sales routes, prices and so on, in a bid tosurvive the recession.
As this situation continued, the magnitude 7.9
Great Kanto Earthquake struck on September 1st,1923. It dealt a devastating blow to Tokyo and
Yokohama, the beating heart of the nation, withdamage extending to and around the Kanto region.
The ensuing fires and aftermath left around 133,000
people dead or missing.
The government announced a 30-day moratoriumon all payments, and took other steps including arranging for the Bank of Japan to issue special loans in theform of “earthquake bonds”. Even so, the losses suffered
as a result of the earthquake further aggravated thebusiness of private companies. But the government
and Bank of Japan, fearing corporate bankruptcies,
continued bailout loans even while knowing that thecompanies were insolvent. As a result, the earthquakebonds turned into bad debts.

From Financial Depression
to the Great Depression
The Emperor Taisho passed away as 1926 neared its
end, and on December 25th the Showa era was born.
But in practical terms, Showa started in the following
year (1927).
The Showa era started during a time of financial
depression. A slip of the tongue by Finance Minister
Naoharu Kataoka in March 1927, to the effect that
the Tokyo Watanabe Bank had folded, triggered a run

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

on the bank followed by closures and bankruptcies ofsmall banks all over Japan. The Suzuki Shoten company in Kobe, which had enjoyed sudden growth in
the Great War boom, collapsed as a result of withdrawn earthquake bonds. Suzuki Shoten’s main bank
was the Bank of Taiwan, which owned more bad debts
than any other. The government tried to issue an
emergency order to bail out the Bank of Taiwan, which
was now in a state of financial crisis. But the request
was rejected by the Privy Council and Prime Minister
Reijiro Wakatsuki was forced to resign, along with hisentire Cabinet.
A new Cabinet was now formed under Giichi
Tanaka, and the new Finance Minister Korekiyo
Takahashi decided to impose a three-week moratorium by government order. He also instructed the
Bank of Japan to issue special loans with losses of 500
million yen guaranteed by the government. The moratorium was very effective, bank runs subsided, and thesituation eased. With this, a crisis of confidence inbanks was averted.
Many banks went under in this financial depression,
while deposits became progressively concentrated in
the five big banks of Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo,
Dai-Ichi and Yasuda. Both the banks, in their wish
for overseas exports of excess capital, and industry,
which sought an economic recovery, next hoped forthe gold embargo to be lifted. The global trend wasfor a return to the gold standard, which had beenabandoned during World War I. America had achieved
this in 1920, Germany in 1924, Britain in 1925 andFrance in 1928. Japan, however, had missed its chance
as a result of the repeated depressions and otherproblems.
The Cabinet of Osachi Hamaguchi, formed in July
1929, made returning to the gold standard a central
pillar of its policy. Despite opposition from some parts,
this was achieved in January 1930. But the timing was
not good. In America, a depression had been triggeredby a devastating stockmarket crash the previous
October. At the time, hardly anyone predicted that
this would be the start of a Great Depression that52

would sweep the world. Japan was not spared its
impact; under the weight of a gradually worsening
global economy, Japan fell into an unprecedented
depression of her own (the Showa Depression).
The first thing to happen was a sharp outflow ofgold and a stockmarket crash. Raw silk, which wasdependent on America, also collapsed and exports
failed. The economy was plagued by a vicious deflationary spiral of falling commodity prices and receding
demand, while mining and manufacturing output fell
dramatically and unemployment rose. There were nojobs for university graduates, prompting the common

saying “But I went to university!”. In medium, small
and micro capital, cases abounded of factory owners
disappearing overnight and wages not being paid.
The Great Depression also had a direct impact onrural areas. In 1930, raw silk prices were continuing
to hit new lows, and rice prices also collapsed. And in1931 harvests failed in Tohoku and Hokkaido.
This era of recession and depression started to
improve with the Manchurian Incident of 1931 andthe rise of industries catering to military demand. But
this was also the start of a period of war.

2. From the Tamura Steamship Fishery Company to Kyodo Gyogyo
Purchase of Kyodo Gyogyo Shares andCorporate Merger
Due to a dramatic decline in the number of steamships,
the government now amended the “Regulations for
the Control of Steam Trawler Fisheries” in January
1917 with a view to reviving trawl fisheries and consolidating growth. The amendment restricted thenumber of steam trawlers to 70 ships, and limited new
shipbuilding to superior vessels with at least 200 tons
in weight, a speed of at least 11 knots, and a cruising
range of at least 2,000 nautical miles. Moreover, inview of European experiences in World War I, it also
included additional provisions for reinforced structures that could be of use for military purposes as
reserve vessels in the event of an emergency.
Among the permitted number of 70 ships for trawling, there were some companies that did not actually
have ships in operation, despite holding rights. Oneof those was Kyodo Gyogyo, which possessed 18 ships
and the largest share of existing rights.
Kyodo Gyogyo had been established in 1914 as anamalgamation of five companies concerned over the
possibility of a future crisis in trawling (Naigai Suisan,
Kasuga Gyogyo, Daiwa Gyogyo, Shimonoseki Suisan
and Mitsuuroko) and six individual operators (Eima
Takatsu, Shozo Tanaka, Tokichi Okazaki, Shin

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Machida, Yoshiharu Fukuhara and Senjiro Itakura).
With its Head Office in Tokyo and branches in
Osaka, Shimonoseki and Nagasaki, Kyodo Gyogyo
was the leading business in the industry with 25 trawlers in its possession. But although the company’s capital was 2 million yen, the paid-up capital of 500,000
yen only included 50,000 yen in cash; the remaining
450,000 yen had been converted to shares as payment
for ships owned by each of the participants.
Serving as the company’s President was a man
named Shaku Hoshino. His business interests lay inprinting and publishing; he was a President in nameonly. Instead, it was Managing Director Eima Takatsu
who held the real power.
Takatsu had graduated from Tokyo Imperial
University before working for an oil company. Thenhe was adopted as a son-in-law by the head of Takatsu
Shoten, a Kobe firm with a wide range of interests incivil engineering, construction and trade. Takatsu
eventually inherited the business. After the RussoJapanese War, he was appointed President of Kobe
Kisen K.K., of which the Takatsu family was the major
shareholder.
The shipping industry was in dire straits at the time,and so Takatsu pulled out of that business and soldthe company’s ships. With the proceeds, he purchased
a foreign trawler and moved into trawling. Now he53invited Jinpachi Hayashida and Chiyoma Iwamoto,who had learnt trawl fishing methods in Britain after
graduating from the Ministry of Agriculture andCommerce Fisheries Training Institute. With them,
he created a new Takatsu Shoten Fisheries Department
and launched the business.
Like other trawl operators, the Takatsu Shoten
Fisheries Department also built a factory where thefishing nets used by the company’s own ships weremade and repaired. The nets dyed and prepared at thefactory were Japan’s very first “Manila nets”, using
technology learnt by Iwamoto in the UK. This would
lead to Takatsu Shoten’s core business.
When Kyodo Gyogyo was founded in November
1914, the four ships owned by the Takatsu Shoten
Fisheries Department were transferred to Kyodo
Gyogyo, while Hayashida, a central player in founding
the company, was made a Department Manager. With
this, the Takatsu Shoten Fisheries Department wasdissolved, and the net-making division led by Iwamoto
became an independent entity in the manufacture andsale of fishing nets and fishing tackle. For this, it started
life anew under the name of Takatsu Shoten NetMaking Department.
At the time, around 60 trawlers weighing less than
300 tons (mainly those of Kyodo Gyogyo) were based
at Shimonoseki, and nearly all the fishing nets andfishing tackle for these were supplied by the Takatsu
Shoten Net-Making Department. Although mosttrawl operators supplied their own fishing nets, as
more and more trawlers became integrated under
Kyodo Gyogyo, their supplies of fishing nets were also
taken over by the Takatsu Shoten Net-Making
Department.
Under the guidance of Takatsu and Hayashida,
Kyodo Gyogyo made a profit in its first business year,
but was forced into tight financial straits owing to alack of startup capital. Despite the healthy situationof Takatsu Shoten, the company had its hands tied byloan repayments and other pressures.
Thus, at the beginning of fiscal 1916, two years after
the company’s establishment, it started to implement

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

radical reforms. As part of this, a proposal to sell thecompany’s ships was included in the business plan for
the following fiscal year. The initial aim was only tosell ships that were “relatively unsuited to fisheries”,
but a sudden change of direction saw eight of thecompany’s ships sold to the French government anda resolution to liquidate the company.
The reason for the change was the inflation of ship
prices due to World War I. Added to this, Takatsu,
who had advocated a policy of not selling ships, diedat the age of 44 in September 1916. His death had amajor bearing on the change to a policy of selling the
majority of Kyodo Gyogyo’s fleet.
The Managing Director Jinpachi Hayashida, a close
confidant of Takatsu, was vehemently opposed to theidea of liquidating the company. Ultimately, to reflect
Hayashida’s opinion, it was decided that Kyodo Gyogyo
would survive as a company, but the sale of the eightships went ahead leaving only one ship remaining,
and the directors in favor of the sale all resigned.
With Kyodo Gyogyo now in this situation, theTamura Steamship Fishery Company set out to acquire
the company in 1917, and had bought up more thanhalf of its shares in the space of less than a year. The
Tamura Steamship Fishery Company initially reorganized and renamed itself “Nippon Trawl K.K.”, thenin this guise planned an absorption-style merger with
Kyodo Gyogyo. Having achieved this, it would go on
to construct new steam trawlers based on Kyodo
Gyogyo’s authorization to apply for a business startup
license.
To do this, however, it had to prepare documents
certifying the merger for each of Kyodo Gyogyo’s 18
ships. Furthermore, it was discovered that the issue of
licenses was conditional upon evaluation of the applicant’s business record and experience. Nippon Trawl
had no business record, but Kyodo Gyogyo was alreadyrecognized by the Ministry of Agriculture andCommerce and other related bodies. In that case, it
was clear that Kyodo Gyogyo would have the advantage over Nippon Trawl. Therefore, the plan waschanged so that Nippon Trawl would be merged into

54

Kyodo Gyogyo, which continued to be used as thecompany name.
Growth to Japan’s Biggest Trawling Operator
In May 1919, the Tamura Steamship Fishery Company
changed its organization to a public limited company
and renamed itself “Nippon Trawl K.K.” (capital
700,000 yen, all paid-up). In September that year,“Nippon Trawl” was merged into Kyodo Gyogyo,
which had previously been acquired by the company
and its capital reduced to 300,000 yen in 1918. Now
the capital was again increased by 4 million yen to 5
million yen. Hisazo Matsuzaki, former DirectorGeneral of the Fisheries Bureau in the Ministry ofAgriculture and Commerce, was welcomed as thecompany’s President, while the Managing Directors
were Kosuke Kunishi and, from the old Kyodo Gyogyo,
Jinpachi Hayashida. The Head Office would belocated in Kobe and a Sales Office in Shimonoseki.
With this, the new Kyodo Gyogyo held the rights
for 25 ships—7 from the Tamura Steamship FisheryCompany and 18 from the old Kyodo Gyogyo. Now

it embarked on building new ships in a determined
drive to reinforce its fleet. The Rokko Maru in 1919
was the first of a series of new ships to be built. By theend of 1920, the company possessed 28 ships, accounting for 60% of all 48 ships licensed at the time.
Most the new shipbuilding contracts were awarded
to Osaka Iron Works, an affiliate of Nippon Kisen.
This was very soon after the end of World War I, when
shipyards were finding themselves out of work. In justover two years, the company built 25 ships, at a costof 200,000 yen per ship totaling 5 million yen in all.
The cost was financed with 20,000 of Kyodo Gyogyo’s
shares.
“At the time, new ships were being completed at a
rate of about one per month. One after another, newships covered with bunting would sail around thewaters outside the Shimonoseki Office; times werereally good. Nor did we have any trouble manning theships with crews, as people who had previously worked
for the company and had plenty of experience applied
for the jobs” (Conversations with Ken-ichi Katsuno).
With this, Kyodo Gyogyo became Japan’s biggest
trawling operator, in both name and substance.

The 25 trawlers built by Kyodo Gyogyo
Name
Ibuki Maru
Rokko Maru
Hayama Maru
Niitaka Maru
Hoei Maru
Benten Maru
Tokiwa Maru
Chihaya Maru
Rikuzen Maru
Nunobiki Maru
Rumoi Maru
Otowa Maru
Wakakusa Maru
Kasuga Maru
Yoshino Maru
Takao Maru
Reisui Maru
Sonobe Maru
Tsukushi Maru
Nemuro Maru
Naruo Maru
Arashiyama Maru
Musashi Maru
Ujina Maru
Noshiro Maru

Gross tonnage
225.79225.79219.58221.38219.47221.38221.82219.97221.82219.90220.49220.49220.15219.46220.42220.00219.15220.25220.32220.15216.24219.11227.02227.02216.55

Year built
Nov. 1919
Nov. 1919
Nov. 1919
Nov. 1919
Dec. 1919
Dec. 1919
Jan. 1920
Feb. 1920
March 1920
Feb. 1920
March 1920
March 1920
April 1920
April 1920
April 1920
April 1920
April 1920
April 1920
Aug. 1920
Sept. 1920
Dec. 1923
Oct. 1920
Sept. 1920
Sept. 1920
Oct. 1923

Location
Kobe
Kobe
Habu-cho, Hiroshima Pref.
Mitsunosho-cho, Hiroshima Pref.
Habu-cho, Hiroshima Pref.
Mitsunosho-cho, Hiroshima Pref.
Mitsunosho-cho, Hiroshima Pref.
Habu-cho, Hiroshima Pref.
Mitsunosho-cho, Hiroshima Pref.
Osaka
Osaka
Osaka
Osaka
Habu-cho, Hiroshima Pref.
Osaka
Habu-cho, Hiroshima Pref.
Mitsunosho-cho, Hiroshima Pref.
Habu-cho, Hiroshima Pref.
Habu-cho, Hiroshima Pref.
Habu-cho, Hiroshima Pref.
Habu-cho, Hiroshima Pref.
Mitsunosho-cho, Hiroshima Pref.
Yokohama
Yokohama
Habu-cho, Hiroshima Pref.

Shipyard
Mitsubishi Zosen
Mitsubishi Zosen
Innoshima Works, Osaka Iron Works
Bingo Works, Osaka Iron Works
Innoshima Works, Osaka Iron Works
Bingo Works, Osaka Iron Works
Bingo Works, Osaka Iron Works
Innoshima Works, Osaka Iron Works
Bingo Works, Osaka Iron Works
Sakurajima Works, Osaka Iron Works
Sakurajima Works, Osaka Iron Works
Sakurajima Works, Osaka Iron Works
Sakurajima Works, Osaka Iron Works
Innoshima Works, Osaka Iron Works
Sakurajima Works, Osaka Iron Works
Innoshima Works, Osaka Iron Works
Bingo Works, Osaka Iron Works
Innoshima Works, Osaka Iron Works
Innoshima Works, Osaka Iron Works
Innoshima Works, Osaka Iron Works
Innoshima Works, Osaka Iron Works
Bingo Works, Osaka Iron Works
Uchida Shipyard
Uchida Shipyard
Innoshima Works, Osaka Iron Works

Source: Kyodo Gyogyo Sales Reports

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

55Moves into the Distribution and Marketing
Sectors
The system of trading on fish markets in the Taisho
era took a form that favored fish wholesalers. Fishprices in consumption areas were decided between
wholesalers and middlemen, and the fishery operatorsthemselves basically had no choice but to “let matterstake their course”.
“In all kinds of marketing organizations, it is trueof any product and any industry that there are too
many “middlemen traders” mediating between the
producers and the end consumer. This causes toomuch wastage, as well as resentment that the retailprice is unreasonably high compared to the wholesale
price. However, there is no product in which this is
more extreme in degree, or in which there is morewastage and siphoning off between the stages of production and consumption, than fresh fish” (Anthologyof Writings and Speeches of Mr. Kosuke Kunishi).
Kosuke Kunishi was later to point out the evils andwastage in the traditional trading system, but his firststep was to physically experience and observe tradingin fish markets for himself.
The Tamura Steamship Fishery Company, while
promoting steps to develop and enhance trawling, wasalso searching for inroads into the marine produce
distribution and marketing sectors. The first step inthis direction came in 1917, with the capitalizationand purchase of a majority share in Yamagami Gumi
K.K., which together with Hayashikane Shoten K.K.
had formed a powerful presence in fish purchasing on
the coasts of the Korean Peninsula.
Hayashikane Shoten, the first of the two to be
Business scale of the former Yamagami Gumi as of1918 (according to the Financial Report)
Ships (transporters):
6 steamships, 48 motorized ships, 39 sailing ships,
total 93 ships
Real estate & buildings:
4 locations in Shimonoseki, 37 in Korea, 2 others
Sales outlets:
Tokyo, Nagoya, Kyoto, Tenma, Kizu, Kobe, Shimonoseki,
HakataThe Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

established in Korea, was founded in 1880. The
Nakabe family, into which the founder Ikujiro Nakabe
was born, were originally fishermen from Hayashi
Village in Akashi-gun, Harima Province. Four generations before Ikujiro, the head of family had resettled
to Akashi castle town. There, he had started a fresh
fish trading business under the name “Hayashiya”,
based on the name of the family’s original village. The
head of family had been named “Rihei” for generations, but Ikujiro’s grandfather was called Kanematsu,
and with him the business name also changed to
Hayashikane. When it was first established,
Hayashikane was engaged as a fish brokerage in
Zakoba, Osaka, but also undertook the business oftransporting fresh fish to market from seas near Akashi,
bonito from Tosa and other marine produce.
The opportunity for Hayashikane to take a leap
forward came in 1905, when it bought the light steamship Awaji Maru. This ship was used as a tugboat for
the traditional oshi-okuribune craft that relied on oars
and sails. It vastly shortened the journey between
Akashi and Osaka from the 10–15 hours needed until
then. This made it possible to purchase fish cheaply,
after the other oshi-okuribune had sailed from Akashi
in time for the start of auctions at market, then totransport it to market in Osaka and sell it for the same
prices as the competitors, thereby securing wide profit
margins.
Following this success, the construction of the
motor-powered fresh fish transport ship Shinsei Marulater that year produced another boost in the company’s fortunes. The 12-ton, 8-horsepower Shinsei
Maru also had a fish preserve, and was therefore well
suited to transporting live fish. It could carry twice asmuch cargo as existing ships and took half the time
to arrive; its range of activity even extended to theJapan Sea.
Armed with this Shinsei Maru, in 1907 Hayashikane
ventured out to the Korean Peninsula. Its main business involved providing capital to fishermen goingout to seas around the Korean Peninsula and buying
their fish catches. Until then, it had taken three days

56and nights to transport fish back to Japan, but by using
this high-performance fresh fish transport ship, thecompany succeeded in cutting the transportation time
to one-third. Now, fish purchasing on the Korean
Peninsula grew into Hayashikane’s main business. In
1919, it had as many as 300 transport ships plying theseas, including new state-of-the-art ships in the 50–60
ton class.
Hayashikane’s success spawned followers, one ofwhich was Yamagami Gumi.
Yamagami Gumi was a joint venture founded inaround 1907. Its capital was provided by Osaka fish
wholesaler Heikuro Sagiike of Kanpei Shoten, and its
transport ships by fish merchants and fishery operatorsfrom Nushima in Hyogo Prefecture (including the
Nushima cargo boat wholesaler Tsurumatsu Yamano).
Together, these formed the “anonymous association”
Yamagami Gumi in 1912, with its Head Office inShimonoseki.
It also opened a Branch Office on the Korean
Peninsula, stepped up fish purchasing business in thesewaters, and at one point had five 200 to 300-ton classtransporter steamships and at least 40 motorized ships
in service. Even then, business was so brisk that the
number of vessels seemed a little short. The company’s
range of fish collection extended from the whole ofthe Korean Peninsula to Bohai Bay. Not only that, but
it endeavored to transport mainly high-grade fish, andcame to rank alongside Hayashikane in importance.
Besides fish purchasing, meanwhile, it was also engaged
in coastal fixed-net fisheries and purse seine
fisheries.
In 1916, the business was reorganized as a public
limited company with capital of 500,000 yen (400,000
yen paid-up), with the aim of expanding its business.
And in the following March, a capital injection of
800,000 yen was made to take the capital to 1.3 million yen. At this time, since Kosuke Kunishi was an
acquaintance of Yamagami Gumi Director Yojiro
Shiraishi, Ichiro Tamura provided an investment of
900,000 yen in all (the capital increase of 800,000
yen and a shortfall of 100,000 yen from the 1916

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

capital increase). This was funded by profits from thesale of ships when Tamura withdrew from north-sea
fisheries. In June 1917, the company name was changed
to Nippon Suisan K.K., and a company emblem wascreated from a stylized image of “日”, the first characterof “Nippon Suisan”. This emblem was registered as atrademark, and these would be handed down as thecompany emblem and trademark of Nippon Suisan.
Since the company has a different genealogy fromtoday’s Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd., in this book itwill go under the name “former Yamagami Gumi” toavoid confusion.
The former Yamagami Gumi appointed Hisazo
Matsuzaki as its President, Tsurumatsu Yamano, Yojiro
Shiraishi and Kosuke Kunishi as Directors, and Ichiro
Tamura as an Advisor. According to the Financial
Report of July 1918, the business scale was asfollows.
•Ships (transport ships): 6 steamships, 48 motorizedships, 39 sailing ships, total 93 ships•Premises and buildings: Shimonoseki 4 locations,Korea 37 locations, 2 other locations•Sales outlets: Tokyo, Nagoya, Kyoto, Tenma, Kizu,
Kobe, Shimonoseki, Hakata
After the capital increase, a disagreement over thebusiness aims arose between one of Yamagami Gumi’sfounders, Tsurumatsu Yamano, and the Tamura
Steamship Fishery Company. Yamano asserted thatthe company’s business should always center on providing capital and purchasing fish. He resigned in
January 1918, going on to start his own independent
fish transport business.

Company emblem of Nippon Suisan(formerly Yamagami Gumi) created in
1917

57

Reorganization of Yamagami Gumi andEstablishment of Nippon Gyomo Sengu
In September 1919, Hisazo Matsuzaki resigned as
President of the former Yamagami Gumi in order tobe appointed President of Kyodo Gyogyo. In his place,
Soji Yamawaki, already President of Takatsu Shokai
K.K., took the presidency as a concurrent post.
Yamawaki immediately set to work on reorganizing
the former Yamagami Gumi, selling off many of its
ships as well as simplifying its business content. He
separated off the various business divisions as independent companies, and reorganized the former
Yamagami Gumi itself into a public limited company
that would oversee all of these. Later, in November
1926, it was to merge with Kyodo Gyogyo, becoming
the latter’s Investment Department. The companies
under Yamagami’s management were as follows.
[Sales Sector]
August 1920 Establishment of Chuo Suisan
Hanbaisho K.K.: Sales division of former Yamagami
Gumi made independent. Mainly sales of fresh fishin Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe.
May 1921 Establishment of Kyodo Suisan Hanbaisho
K.K.: Sales division of former Yamagami Gumi
made independent. Wholesale and retail sales offresh fish in the Tokyo area.
[Transport Sector]
March 1920 Establishment of Marushin Unsoten
K.K. (later Marushin Unyu K.K.): Sales divisionof former Yamagami Gumi made independent.
Land haulage of fresh fish and others. Head Officein Osaka, branches in Tokyo, Kyoto, Kobe,
Okayama, Shimonoseki, etc. At the time, fresh fish

Chiyoma Iwamoto, inventor of
the “Iwamoto on-board rapid
freezer”

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

dispatched from Shimonoseki amounted to 130,000
tons per year, but in a sector crowded with 11 transport companies, Marushin Unsoten accounted fora quarter of that total.
March 1921 Establishment of Nissen Gumi K.K.:
Marine transport of fresh fish from the Korean
Peninsula and the north-sea region.
[Processing Sector]
June 1921 Establishment of Nippon Chikuwa
Seizosho K.K. (later Nippon Gyoryo K.K.): Jointly
capitalized by Kyodo Gyogyo and former Yamagami
Gumi. Manufacture of kamaboko, chikuwa andfish meal.
[Fishery Sector]
June 1922 Establishment of Asahi Suisan K.K.: Large
lift-net (fixed net) fisheries division of former
Yamagami Gumi separated and made independent.
Operation of fixed net fisheries on the Korean
Peninsula (North Hamgyong Province) (4 locations), Kochi Prefecture (3 locations) and Wakayama
Prefecture (1 location).
Conversely, when the new Kyodo Gyogyo started
business in August 1919, the Takatsu Shoten NetMaking Department was incorporated in the Kyodo
Gyogyo Group and reorganized as Takatsu Shokai
K.K. (now Nichimo Co., Ltd.). Its capital was 150,000
yen, its President Soji Yamawaki, and its Executive
Director Chiyoma Iwamoto. Of a total of 3,000 shares,
the main shareholders were Takatsu Ryutaro (600
shares), the former Kyodo Gyogyo (400 shares), andKosuke Kunishi (300 shares).
Again, in June 1920, the company name waschanged to Nippon Gyomo Sengu Kaisha, Ltd., andKosuke Kunishi became the majority shareholder.
The aim in doing so was to move away from dependence on the new Kyodo Gyogyo and develop businessbroadly towards Japanese fisheries as a whole. This
company has played an important role in the development not only of Nippon Suisan but also of Japanesefisheries in general.
The company also endeavored to integrate theformer Kyodo Gyogyo and the Tamura Steamship58

Fishery Company, and laid the foundations for thegrowth of trawling. It also produced numerous talented individuals, including Soji Yamawaki, who succeeded in a north-sea venture using crab processing
ships; Jinpachi Hayashida, instrumental in establishing the former Kyodo Gyogyo in a bid to rescue trawl
fishery operators; Chiyoma Iwamoto, who developed
the flat-tank on-board rapid freezer; and Shizuo
Minoda, later to become Nippon Suisan’s Executive
Director, among others.
Kyodo Gyogyo succeeded in moving into the firstcrab processing ship business through Hokuyo Suisan
K.K., which it established in January 1926. Then in
November that year it absorbed both Hokuyo Suisan
and the former Yamagami Gumi, including capitalincreases. Now, Chuo Suisan Hanbaisho took overthe company name “Nippon Suisan” which had beenused by the former Yamagami Gumi until then.
However, this company also has a different genealogy
from the present Nippon Suisan proper, and will therefore be called “the former Chuo Suisan Hanbaisho”
to avoid confusion.

Towards the Creation of a General FisheriesCompany
Kyodo Suisan Hanbaisho, a major intermediary
responsible for sales by Kyodo Gyogyo in the Tokyo
area, was located in Tsukiji Market. It handled 12,000
tons of marine produce in 1926, accounting for 6.2%of a total of 194,000 tons coming into the market thatyear. The average volume handled by a single wholesaler at the time was 250 tons. Another sales intermediary, Chuo Suisan Hanbaisho, had its Head Officein Osaka, with outlets in the ten cities of Shimonoseki,
Hiroshima, Okayama, Kobe, Osaka, Kyoto, Kishiwada,
Otsu, Nagoya and Shizuoka. It also had branch officesin the four cities of Fukuoka, Omuta, Kure andToyohashi. In this way, fish caught by Kyodo Gyogyo
were brought to market through single channels inboth east and west Japan. In 1926, Chuo Suisan
Hanbaisho handled 1.4 million cases of fishery

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

products. Both of these companies were capitalized
at 1 million yen. A sales structure of this kind was vitalin order to provide markets with dependable suppliesof fresh fish caught in bulk by trawlers.
As well as increasing its capital to 15 million yen in
1928, Kyodo Gyogyo had in the meantime rapidly
expanded its organization across all sectors of fisheries
production, processing, transportation and sales, andwas to become Japan’s biggest general fisheries company as the Showa era moved on.
The main companies established by Kyodo Gyogyo
between the end of the Taisho era and the early Showa
era were as follows.
December 1923 Nippon Gyoryo: Name changed
from Nippon Chikuwa Seizosho.
November 1925 Nippon Trawl: Subsidiary of Tokyo
Ishikawajima Shipbuilding & Engineering, became
an affiliate through share acquisition (distinct frompreviously mentioned company of the samename).
November 1925 Hoyo Gyogyo K.K.: Successor to
the anonymous association Shichida Gyogyo-bu
of Shimonoseki. With the addition of 2 fishingboats owned by Nissen Gumi and 4 newly built
vessels, it started paired steamship bottom trawl
net fisheries with 14 ships divided into seven pairs.
Bottom trawl net fisheries were also known as“oki-teguri” (offshore hand trawling), a fishingmethod traditionally practiced in Japan. Kyodo
Gyogyo also ventured into set net fisheries as wellas trawling.
November 1926 Nippon Suisan K.K. (formerly Chuo
Suisan Hanbaisho): Company name changed from
Chuo Suisan Hanbaisho.
June 1927 Chuo Reizo K.K.: Chuo Reizoko (takenover by Obayashi Gumi from Himuro Gumi) split
off and established independently. The company
had refrigerating equipment on the coast near the
Kizu estuary in Osaka, with refrigerating capacityof 25 tons and ice-making capacity of 40 tons.
July 1927 Horai Suisan K.K.: Established to expand

59

into steamship bottom trawl net fisheries based in
Taiwan. Built 4 ships in the Horai Maru class andoperated in the South China Sea.
November 1927 Nippon Kosen Gyogyo K.K.:
Mother ship-type crab fishery. Launched via thefirst amalgamation of crab fisheries.
These affiliates were managed by Kyodo Gyogyo’s
Investment Department, and can be divided by business sector as follows.
•Fisheries: Nippon Trawl (trawl fishey), Hoyo Gyogyo(west-water two boats trawling), Asahi Suisan (fixed
net fisheries), Nippon Kosen Gyogyo (mother shiptype crab fisheriy)•Processing: Nippon Gyoryo (chikuwa, kamaboko
and meal production)•Transportation: Nissen Gumi (shipping), Marushin
Unsoten (land haulage)•Sales: Former Chuo Suisan Hanbaisho (sales in
Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe areas), Kyodo Suisan
Hanbaisho (sales in Tokyo area)
To a certain extent, then, the foundation for the
Kyodo Gyogyo Group to be transformed into a “general fisheries company”, covering everything fromfishing to processing, distribution and sales, had been

established by the beginning of the Showa era. Kyodo
Gyogyo was at the core of this, and the growth of the
trawl business now held the key to the success of thewhole venture.

Slumping Fish Prices and Measures Aimed at
Progression
A series of financial crises—the recession after WorldWar I, the confusion following the Great Kanto
Earthquake, the Showa Depression, and the worldwide
Great Depression—had drawn the Japanese economy
into a protracted scenario of negative growth. The
result was that, in Japanese society throughout the
1920s, unemployment was prevalent in both urban
and rural areas.
These recessions and depressions also had an impact
on trawling, with fish prices continuing to fall at a rateof around 10% every year. As of 1922, the price was
14.98 yen per case, but by 1926 it was less than 10 yen,
and by 1930 it had fallen to 5.92 yen, a decline of morethan 60%. It continued to fall thereafter, until in 1932
it was 4.29 yen, less than 30% of the 1922 level.
Operators now tried to cope with tumbling prices

Comparative statistics for average fish prices and the consumer price index by month and by year (1919 –1930)

Source: Anthology of Writings and Speeches of Mr. Kosuke Kunishi

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Top: Consumer price index Bottom: Fish prices

60through cost-cutting measures (such as reducing
anchorage time), while making every effort to introduce the latest technology and thus expand catchefficiency. In 1922, the total catch was 380,000 cases,
but by 1926 this had grown to 430,000 cases and by1930 to 770,000 cases, more than twice the 1922
figure. The increase in catches between 1924 and 1925
resulted from the introduction of the V-D fishingmethod, more efficient than the otter trawl systemused until then. After 1928, the increase was due tothe modernization of fishing boats.
Falling fish prices hit coastal fisheries particularly
hard. Coastal fishery operators contracted by fish
wholesalers had no power to control the market, leading to a widening disparity in fortunes. As the leading
power in trawling, Kyodo Gyogyo had the ability to

influence markets, for example by securing sales channels for the former Chuo Suisan Hanbaisho andadjusting prices. This was why its business had continued to grow even in lean times.
From this point, however, a number of processes
would still be required before the target set by Kosuke
Kunishi could be met—namely, that “Fisheries in the
new age will require us to seek unexploited fishinggrounds all over the world, and to supply their produce
to the world. To this end, I believe that developing
fisheries on an industrial scale will be more important
than anything else” (Anthology of Writings and Speechesof Mr. Kosuke Kunishi).
The relocation to Tobata Fishing Port became a
reality at just this point in time.

Part 2 Establishment of Tobata Reizo and Relocation to Tobata Fishing Port
1. Reclamation of Dokai Bay and Tobata Reizo
Shimonoseki as a Base for Fisheries
The city of Shimonoseki, the location of Kyodo
Gyogyo’s fisheries base, had proposed a plan to refurbish its fishing port. In 1919, however, a conflict of
opinion arose on this matter between the city authorities and fishery operators.
The plan was to allocate a budget of 7 million yen
over 17 years from 1929, half of the cost being fundedby the national treasury and half by prefectural bonds.
The bonds would be redeemed by charges on fishingport users over a period of 20–25 years. During therefurbishment works, moreover, the West Port areaof Shimonoseki was designated as a cargo landing site
for fishery operators. The problem was that the tidal
currents there were fast, leading to concerns that it
would be too dangerous for ship maneuvers or port
access by trawlers.
In May 1923, Kosuke Kunishi sent a letter to Rintaro
Yamazaki, Mayor of Shimonoseki, pointing out that,

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

as hardly anyone involved in the city administration
had any experience of fisheries, they were unlikely tounderstand the essence of the fishing port problem;
they had been too hasty in securing funding for thefishing port, and as a result, the users’ burdens would
be too heavy. He also conveyed his opposition to a
construction plan that disregarded the interests offishery operators.
Nevertheless, the fishing port refurbishment plan
would eventually go ahead, despite the opposition
from Kunishi and other fishery operators.
Kyodo Gyogyo now started preparations with aneye on Tobata as a base to replace Shimonoseki. A
man who had a decisive impact on this was Yoshisuke
Aikawa, later to serve as President of Nippon Sangyo
Co., Ltd.
Yoshisuke Aikawa and Tobata City
Granted its municipal charter in 1924, the city of61

From the right: Machine room, office, pump room and landing
yard. In the foreground, the site scheduled for construction of
Tobata Seikan.

Work in progress in the rapid freezing room

Tobata had pursued a policy of attracting big businesswith infrastructure development since its days as atown (Tobata-cho). Once a station had been opened
here in 1902, the Railways Ministry built a quay exclusively for cargoes of coal, followed by exclusive piersfor Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. and Toyo Iron Works Co.,Ltd.
Tobata was a place with meaningful connections
for Yoshisuke Aikawa. After founding the Tobata
Foundry Co. in 1910, he drew up a plan to build anironworks here in 1915. For this, he acquired a totalof about 627,000 tsubo (about 500 acres) of land from
Tobata-cho, and the reclamation rights to about
620,000 tsubo at sea. In 1916, he established the Tobata
Iron Works Co., Ltd., and started work on building afactory. In 1918, however, the company merged with
Toyo Iron Works, which was keen to acquire land.
In 1920, Tobata-cho proposed a plan for port terminal facilities to accompany the reclamation of the
Ichimonji coast in Dokai Bay, and applied for permission for the reclamation work in October that year.
The original proposal was for a quay-front water depthof 12 shaku (about 3.6 m), but this was later changed
to 20 shaku, with 600,000 yen invested to create 7,300

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

tsubo (about 24,000 m2) of reclaimed land. A water
depth of 20 shaku was an important condition if it
was to be used as a base for trawlers.
The reclamation work was started 1921 and completed in March 1926.
Eighteen months later in December 1927, Tobata
Reizo K.K. was established with Aikawa as President
and capital of 1 million yen. It was decided that all of
the reclaimed land would be used as the company’s
premises.
As he shuttled back and forth between Tobata andthe Tokyo Head Office of the Tobata Foundry Co.,
Aikawa occasionally dropped in to Shimonoseki totalk things over with Kunishi. They both shared theconviction that Tobata was in an excellent natural
location at the entrance to Dokai Bay, and that an
ideal fishing port could be established there, given theright facilities. They felt that a fishing port depended
not only on sufficient water depth to calm wave
motion, but also on good links between sea and land.
If they were to operate distant water fisheries rationallyas a corporate concern, they would need centralized
freezing, refrigeration and processing facilities to regulate supply and demand at low cost, not to mention
sufficient terminal facilities to ensure the smoothlanding and transportation of catches. Moreover, thefacilities would have to function as a convenient basefor loading fishing nets, ships’ gear, crushed ice, fuel,food provisions and others needed for distant water
fisheries.
With the completion of the reclamation work andthe establishment of Tobata Reizo, the conditions
were all in place for Tobata to become a new, modern
fisheries base for Kyodo Gyogyo. Until then, DaiNippon Seihyo K.K. had been relied upon to provide
all the ice needed for ice storage, essential for storingfish catches. The completion of Tobata Reizo’s ice
making factory and cold store now offered prospects
for a leap to new horizons.

62Promotion of Refrigeration,
Freezing and Ice-Making Business
Refrigeration and freezing technology had been introduced by Hayashikane Shoten from the early 1920s,
but not by Kyodo Gyogyo or Nichiro Gyogyo until
after 1926.
Between 1920 and 1924, Hayashikane Shoten
installed a large refrigeration and ice making factoryon Hikoshima Island in Shimonoseki City, using it asa base for fisheries and marine product processing.
Over the following several years it then built cold
stores in five locations including Hikoshima, Aomori
and Korea, and also constructed a series of refrigerated
transport ships for movements of fish catches from
1922 onwards. The introduction of cold stores andrefrigerated transport ships helped to improve
Hayashikane Shoten’s volume of fresh fish shipments.
Nichiro Gyogyo’s introduction of refrigeration technology from 1926 also contributed to an upturn inbusiness performance.
Kyodo Gyogyo started directly operating its own
cold store in November 1926, when it absorbed theformer Yamagami Gumi. In 1927, Kyodo Gyogyoacquired Chuo Reizoko in Osaka, which Himuro
Gumi was in the process of building. Himuro Gumi
was a refrigeration company set up by Setsutaro
Nakayama in 1920, but soon found itself in fierce
competition with Kuzuhara Refrigeration Co. (thefirst company in the sector to attempt the production,
storage and distribution of frozen fish on land), leading to the collapse of both companies in 1926. Chuo
Reizoko had a quay where trawlers and refrigerator
ships could berth directly alongside, as well as freezing,
refrigeration and ice making facilities. It was used asa base for processing and unloading frozen fish andprocessed marine products. Chuo Reizoko was reorganized in June 1927 to become Chuo Reizo K.K.
The completion of Tobata Fishing Port meant thatthe company had general bases in both major consumer bases and production source areas, greatly
expanding the options for methods of processing and

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheriestransportation.
From around this time Kyodo Gyogyo started torealize that innovations in refrigeration technology
were vital as a means of raising the value of fish catches.
The greatest factors behind rising costs accompanying
the expansion of fish catches were the costs of transportation and crushed ice for refrigeration. On theother hand, cutting transportation costs depended
largely on introducing refrigeration technology, while
efficiently combining haulage and refrigeration
depended largely on the location and equipment
capacity of the fisheries base. In this way, innovationin refrigeration technology became necessary.
Tobata Reizo now planned to build a 150-ton icemaking factory and a cold store with the equivalentof a 100-ton ice-making capacity. Work on these wasstarted in December 1927 and finished in April 1929.
And from that May onwards, Kyodo Gyogyo’s trawlers
docked at Tobata to load coal and crushed ice forrefrigeration, before setting off on fishing expeditions.
From its first year of operation, Tobata Reizo supplied
the crushed ice used by Kyodo Gyogyo at cheaper
prices that when procured from outside the Group.
The work of loading crushed ice onto fishing boats
was also made considerably more efficient by using
ice chutes, among other equipment.
Kyodo Gyogyo used 70,000 tons of crushed ice
every year, all supplied by Tobata Reizo. Until then,
Kyodo Gyogyo had purchased ice from Dai-Nippon
Seihyo, the largest ice-making company at the time,
at a price of 7.5 yen per ton; but the price from Tobata
Reizo was only 6 yen. Tobata Reizo then started sellingits excess output to external buyers, and its price competitiveness triggered demands by fishery operatorsthat other companies reduce their prices. This cameas a serious blow to Dai-Nippon Seihyo; the company’s
profits plummeted and it was unable to pay a dividendin the second half of 1930.
Tobata Reizo’s operations would also bring Kyodo
Gyogyo’s problem of fishing port relocation to thefore.
In April 1929, Tobata Reizo installed a rapid

63

Kosuke Kunishi

freezing device called the UM-type. The device had
been developed jointly by an engineer called Takeshi
Murayama, from Kyodo Gyogyo’s Hayatomo Fishery
Institute, and L.N. Udell, an engineer with the US
company Frick. It used calcium chloride as a coolant
for the first time in Japan. Fish frozen using thismethod, together those frozen at sea, completely
dominated the markets.
Incidentally, the “strawberry freezing method”
developed by Shunro Kato at Tobata Reizo was patented in 1930.

2. Kyodo Gyogyo Relocates to Tobata
Once Tobata Reizo had started operations, Tobata
City hurriedly built a port railway between November
and December 1929 as an exclusive line connectingwith Tobata Station. On the day the port railway wascompleted, Kyodo Gyogyo announced that it would
relocate its fisheries base from Shimonoseki to Tobata.
On the relocation, Kosuke Kunishi gave the following
instructions to his staff.
“The key to success in business lies in adapting to
the times and being the right people for the industry”;“The company could be destined for bankruptcy
unless we finalize the relocation to Tobata” (Anthologyof Writings and Speeches of Mr. Kosuke Kunishi).
“Taking this relocation to Tobata as a turning point,

I look forward to the completion of fishing port facilities in this area. I hope that we will all cooperate
together in striving to rationalize the sundry aspectsof fisheries, clearly show that the group of people wehave formed is conducting business in a way that ismost adapted to the times, not only in Japanese fisheries but also in industry in general. And with spirits
full of optimism, I hope that we will form and settle
in a micro-society that is pleasant to live in, withpermanent harmony in labor relations and stabilityof business, and with each individual helping andencouraging the other; and I would like to make thecompletion of this tangibly and intangibly significant
project our hope and our goal, and even if said fishing

Tobata Fishing Port as initially planned

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

64port facilities are not the largest in scale, to make themsomething of which we can be proud both inside andoutside the company, as being most advanced in content and substance, and share the resultant benefits
and pride among all of us” (ibid.).
This was not Kosuke Kunishi’s only view on therelocation to Tobata. For he also felt that establishinga fishing port close to the consumer base and supplying
fresh and cheap seafood products to the masses working in the Kitakyushu industrial belt and Chikuho
mines would stimulate the active energy of thesepeople and would in one sense foster the growth ofstate industries, and therefore, that landing all catchesat Tobata rather than going via Shimonoseki would
be the best measure.
Tobata Fishing Port thus became the new base for
Kyodo Gyogyo trawlers. It was equipped with functions for fishing, ice making, refrigeration and freezing, processing, distribution and sales in the fisheries
industry, and served as a base for supplying marine
products to Kitakyushu and other consumer bases.
Kyodo Gyogyo’s relocation started with the Trawl
Department in December 1929 and was complete in
May 1930. In February 1929, meanwhile, as well as
Tobata Seikan K.K., Tobata Uoichiba K.K. and othercompanies newly brought under the company’s wing,
affiliated companies managed by the Investment
Pump room

1st floor Landing yard
2nd floor
2nd floor Chikuwa factory Crushed
Over-bridge conveyor ice room

Barber
baths

ce

Trade
entrance
WC
Goods sewarehouffi

Ice plant tank 1
2nd floor Hayatomo FisheryResearch Center.oMachineroom
1st floor Staff canteen Restaurant
2nd floor Changing rooms

.K

Road

Platform

K
yo

Road

og

Wall

Gy

Repair workshop

Ice store

Mezzanine floor
Ice plant tank 3

8 condensors

Sea

Ro

Tobata Seikan office

Cold store

Ice chute
Tower
Ice store
corridor
Fish wholesalers’ stalls

2n

Platform
Office Freezer
room
WC
Main
Kitchenentrance
Brine tankTobata Seikan K.K.

1st floor Kyoshinkai shop
2nd floor Fuso Gyogyo officeHoyo Gyogyo office
Water police

o
t
ke od
ar r Kyh m ooFis d flad

Platform

Research lab incold store

Department and other partner companies had also
completed their relocation to Tobata by May thatyear.
This meant that, of Shimonoseki’s population of
100,000 at the time, about 10,000 people connectedwith Kyodo Gyogyo (including their families) would
resettle in Tobata.
First of all, Tobata Fishing Port was in an excellent
location. It was within reach of the East China Sea,
the Yellow Sea and other fishing grounds, and, alongwith Wakamatsu on the opposite shore, was a shipping
port for Chikuho coal. This made it convenient for
stocking up on coal, the main fuel of trawlers at thetime. What’s more, both the largest consumer market
of Kitakyushu and the Chikuho coal mining belt were
lined up behind the port. And finally, the calm watersof Dokai Bay were safe for both ship maneuvering andanchorage.
The quay, suitable for both small and large fishingboats, was about 230 m in length and 6 m deep, witha water surface area of 50,000 m2.
On a total site covering 4,500 tsubo (15,000 m2),
onshore facilities consisted of an ice-making and cold
store measuring 1,500 tsubo, a cargo landing yard of
500 tsubo, a fish market of 300 tsubo, company officesof 400 tsubo, a fish meal factory of 300 tsubo, a box
making factory of 300 tsubo, and research facilities ofTradeentrance

Wall

Tobata Fishing Port Construction Drawing

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries65120 tsubo arranged in integrated fashion. Besides these,
the No. 1 shed covering 400 tsubo was a trawler cargolanding yard and the No. 2 shed with 100 tsubo was ahand trawler cargo landing yard.
Other facilities included an 18-meter floating pier,six berthing buoys, three unloaders with an hourly
capacity of 1,000 large cases, one over-bridge conveyor
with the same capacity, three wagon loaders with anhourly capacity of 300 large cases, one electric truck,

five electric hoists, four electric capstans, one wagon
shunter and one cable transporter. Also, the privatelyestablished Tobata wireless telegraph station for fisheries was equipped with a tall antenna as well as powerfultransmitters and receivers. These facilitated communications not only with trawlers and hand trawlers in
the East China Sea, Yellow Sea and South China Sea,
but also with ships operating far away in South America,
thus supporting efficient business operations.

Part 3 Development of Overseas Fishing Grounds and
Growth of the Business
Expansion into Overseas Fisheries
Kyodo Gyogyo now decided to make a positive movein search of new fishing grounds overseas. The decision was backed by new technological realities: theintroduction of wireless telegraph equipment had
improved operational efficiency, the use of diesel
engines had extended the range of operations, and theinstallation of on-board rapid freezing equipment had
made it possible to keep fish catches fresh.
Moves to develop overseas trawling grounds were
triggered when the Karumo Maru fished near Tonkin
in the South China Sea in 1928. In the following year,
1929, the Kushiro Maru discovered superior fishinggrounds in the Bering Sea, whereupon fleets were sent
there in quick succession. Then in 1930 the Taihoku
Maru fleet went out to fish in the north sea, producing
canned king crab as well as fish meal from Alaska
pollack, flounder and other demersal fish. Fish meal,
made by heat-processing fish, removing the oil content

Karumo Maru

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

and adjusting moisture, was used as animal feed andfertilizer.
The basic rationale was outlined by Kosuke Kunishi:“We Japanese, in the current chaotic state of international affairs, need to fully manifest the fishery technology that is our forte, endeavor to go out and develop
fishing grounds all over the world, acquire theirresources using the actual capacity we now have or anenhanced capacity, and not only in international
waters, but even in territorial waters, to collaborate
with people in the countries to which those territorial
waters belong and strive to engage in fisheries in a
spirit of co-existence and co-prosperity” (Anthologyof Writings and Speeches of Mr. Kosuke Kunishi).
As international tension mounted in the build-up
to World War II, Kyodo Gyogyo embarked for theworld’s fishing grounds with this kind of belief ininternational harmony.
In July 1932, Kyodo Gyogyo established Nanbei

Kushiro Maru

66

Suisan K.K. with capital of 1 million yen. In November,
Executive Director Naoki Imai and some employees
traveled to Argentina, where they would ask theArgentine government for permission to conduct
fisheries and seek the government’s cooperation infishing operations there. Kyodo Gyogyo was thenasked to export frozen fish and shellfish to Argentina
and to conduct sales trials in the country, and this led
to a fishing license being granted in 1933.
To conduct business in Argentina, Kyodo Gyogyopressed ahead on the premise of tying up with two
local trawling firms that shared the same businessterritory, and negotiations with the two companies
started. After more than two years of talks, theCompaña Argentina Commercial e Industrial dePescheria (CACIP) was established as a joint venture
between Nanbei Suisan and Argentina in July 1936,
with capital of 100,000 peso. In the same year, thetrawler Himeji Maru was sent to Argentina, where it
operated from a base in Buenos Aires. Later, theKushiro Maru would also operate in Argentina.
However, owing to a worsening economic situation
there as well as opposition from local fishery operators,
operations were discontinued shortly before the PacificWar, after three years of activity starting in 1938.
The liquidation of Nanbei Suisan was decided bya resolution of the General Meeting of Shareholders
on June 1st, 1939, whereupon all of its assets were to
be taken over by Nippon Suisan.

Minato Marufishing grounds. At the peak, the Suruga Maru wasfishing there together with 3 trawlers and 9 west-water
trawling boats. As west-water trawling boats had nofreezing equipment, the caught shrimp were frozen
on board the Suruga Maru. In about a year’s operations
from 1939, some 2,200 tons were produced for US
and Japanese markets. Shrimp produced by the Minato
Maru were called “Minato shrimp”, and were highly
prized along with the “Taisho shrimp” (oriental
shrimp) caught in the East China Sea.
As Japan–US relations worsened year by year, avariety of problems arose in foreign money transfers,
friction with trading companies (Mitsui & Co.,
Mitsubishi Corporation) over US domestic sales ofshrimp, etc., intensified competition with the entryof Hayashikane Shoten, and so on. In the end, theMinistry of the Navy recommended a discontinuationof fishing operations in August 1940, and the company
withdrew from the business.

In 1935, the state-of-the-art trawler Minato Maru
set out on an expedition to Baja California on thewest coast of Mexico, where it opened up shrimp“Since opening up sales routes overseas is a matterof extreme urgency in view of Japan’s present situation,
we will now establish a company under the nameSankyo Suisan Co., Ltd. as a joint venture capitalized

Himeji Maru

Suruga Maru

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

67

Sphere of trade in 1937

half and half between Mitsubishi Corporation andKyodo Gyogyo with Kyodo Suisan K.K. As the situation gradually becomes clearer in future thanks toresearch on overseas markets, the state of sales channels, etc., I think we can expect considerable activity
with a view to a major leap forward in future”(Anthology of Writings and Speeches of Mr. Kosuke
Kunishi).
As a Kyodo Gyogyo affiliate specializing in theexport of marine products to European and American
markets, Sankyo Suisan was established in 1931 in a
50:50 deal with Mitsubishi Corporation. The original
purpose was to export frozen fish to overseas markets
amid depressed domestic prices. After its establishment, Sankyo Suisan exported fish liver, frozen tuna,
edible frogs and other frozen products, but eventually
all of Kyodo Gyogyo’s whale oil, canned king crab andothers were exported via Sankyo Suisan. Sankyo Suisan

Shinkyo Maru

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

subsequently merged with Nippon Suisan and became
the forerunner of the Trade Department.
In November 1934, Kyodo Gyogyo established
Nanyo Suisan K.K., based in Zamboanga in thePhilippines (at the southwestern end of Mindanao
Island). Nanyo Suisan developed bonito and tuna
fisheries, subcontracting the local company Seafood
Corporation to make the fish catches, which it thenprocessed and canned. The company was seized by
the Americans in December 1941.
In 1935 the trawler Shinkyo Maru made an expedition to seas northwest of Australia. Based in Singapore,
five trawlers were sent out to fish, part of their catches
being landed at Singapore and sold in surrounding
regions, the rest being sold in Japan.
Shinkyo Maru further expanded the scope of fisheries research, and from 1936 started business in
Singapore through a tie-up with Tai Cheung Ltd. Tai
Cheung was a Singapore company mainly engaged intuck-net fisheries by Okinawan fishermen. The tie-up
with Kyodo Gyogyo enabled it to start full-scale fishing in the Gulf of Siam, the Bay of Bengal, Australianwaters and elsewhere, while also conducting trial
operations off Karachi and in the Persian Gulf.
However, the business in Singapore had to be shelved

68after only just over two years, as a boycott by ethnic
Chinese made landings and sales impossible. There
were still hopes of a new business based in Colombo,
but this too was scrapped in 1937 due to mounting
international tension amid developments in the SinoJapanese War.
In 1927, Kyodo Gyogyo established Horai Suisan
for west-water two boats trawling in Keelung, Taiwan.
Horai Suisan possessed four Horai Maru-class westwater trawling boats equipped with 150-horsepower
diesel engines. It also set up cold stores in Keelung and
Kaohsiung, where, as well as producing ice for its own
use, it also kept fresh fish in chilled storage and supplied it around the island, shipping the surplus toJapan. Then in 1929, the four companies of Horai
Suisan, Kyodo Gyogyo, Hoyo Gyogyo and Nippon
Trawl, in partnership with Mitsui & Co., established
Horai Gyogyo K.K. to conduct fisheries with a basein Hong Kong, and started fishing in the East China
Sea. In 1934, Kyodo Gyogyo absorbed Horai Suisan,while in 1936 it took over all business interests of
Horai Gyogyo.
Introduction of Foreign Sales Techniques
The driving force behind the expansion of the Kyodo
Gyogyo Group’s sales network lay in sales techniques
introduced from America by Kosuke Kunishi inaround 1928. Promotional activity that informed
consumers of the meaning and characteristics of products had not existed until then, but was vital to stimulating demand. Kosuke Kunishi quickly realized theimportance of these techniques, which were in theirinfancy even in America at the time. Japanese consumers were still not familiar with marine products rapidly
frozen and brought back by diesel trawlers from distantwater fisheries, and Kunishi realized that promotion
was the first necessity. Kunishi himself described thesituation as follows.
“We who are engaged in fisheries must of course
strive to reap a rich harvest of foods from the oceans

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

and supply them liberally. At the same time, however,owing to past customs and convention, or public ignorance, the true value of those foods so painstakingly
assembled and manufactured by the producers is notrecognized, the purpose of their use is not understoodand they are carelessly discarded. In this case, what weneed most of all is to devise appropriate ways of promoting them and ensuring that their true value is fully
understood; we must strive to have these richly tasteful
foods provided for the sake of people, in particular,
who have not enjoyed this type of food in the past – inother words, the so-called working classes and nonproductive classes that are most numerous in ourcontemporary society. And as well as enriching our
supply, this must also be promoted as the shared mission of all of us who are engaged in fisheries. Moreover,there should not be the slightest difference between
this mission and the proselytizers who explain theways of Shintoism or Buddhism to people who do notreceive the provisions necessary for spiritual comfort.
In other words, it is an extremely significant act that
could be likened to a kind of missionary work…”(Anthology of Writings and Speeches of Mr. Kosuke
Kunishi).
“When selling fresh or normal ice-stored refrigerated fish and shellfish, trademarks are too difficult to
attach, and as a result, there is no way of applying thepower of advertising to them. Consequently, there isno means of stimulating and increasing demand forsales of live and fresh fish, ice-stored or refrigerated
fish and shellfish; sales are invariably a question of
supplying varieties that consumers are habitually accustomed to eating, based on the consumers’ spontaneous
demand alone. However, once packaged fish appear,
the suppliers are able to display their own trademark
on the packaging or container in question, and as aresult, promotional material can be aimed directly at
the consumer for the first time, using the power ofadvertising. This enables us not only to plan proactive
increases in consumption but also, from the consumers’ point of view, to obtain quality guarantees from69

Nissui Food Store (a shop opened in 1928 at the corner of SakaisujiStreet and Imabashi in Osaka)

Developing direct sales channels to the retail trade “Nippon Food
Industries Company News” Issue No. 10 (Oct. 15, 1935)

each producer based on the trademark. And once theconsumer is satisfied, the inconvenience currently
experienced in having to examine the quality eachtime when purchasing fresh or refrigerated fish nolonger exists; moreover, products can be bought atfixed, standard prices, and this has brought fish into
the ranks of contemporary goods for the first time”(ibid.).

fish, new products that had not existed until now. The
employees tasted their companies’ processed marine
products in the staff canteens, thereby not only gaining
knowledge of fish but also deepening their understanding of their companies’ products. In the employees’ homes, meanwhile, Friday was known as “FishDay”, and frozen fish from the trawlers would be delivered to them. After repeated efforts such as these, thefrozen fish delivered to the navy, a major buyer, hadgrown to nearly five times the 1930 total of 90 tons
by June 1931.
Full-scale development of domestic retail markets
started in 1932. The former Chuo Suisan Hanbaisho
altered its previous business policy of mainly targetingfish markets in major cities; now it opened sales basesin provincial cities and embarked on building direct
sales routes in major consumer bases. At the same time,it held advertising campaigns, tasting sessions, cookery
classes, and other publicity activities designed tospread awareness of frozen fish, mainly in fish markets
and among other people connected with markets.
As a result of these efforts to expand sales routes
and develop markets, market prices for frozen fish
started to rise, while both demand and consumption
increased. In some places, frozen fish even commanded
higher prices than fresh fish.

“We should broadly research markets and costs,
and move into areas where there is any potential for
gain, but with all due care and diligence. As for
products, on the other hand, we should carry out
planned advertising within a given budget range forany product for which advertising is effective. Then,
when this produces effects, we should use it for further
publicity, and in the process come closer to the consuming masses, step by step. We should also, moreover,acquire sales channels in overseas markets” (ibid.).
Frozen fish sales activity started with employee
education, triggered by Kyodo Gyogyo’s relocation to
Tobata. First of all, Kyodo Gyogyo and its affiliates
opened seafood canteens for their staff. These not
only served as social facilities for the employees, butwere also the first step in gaining awareness of frozen

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

70Part 4 Amalgamation of Mother Ship-Type Crab Fisheries
1. The Rise of Mother Ship-Type Crab Fisheries
Crab Fisheries Start in Earnest
Ten years after Ichiro Tamura withdrew from northsea fisheries in 1916, Kyodo Gyogyo, having acquired
capital power and leadership in the industry, again
turned its attention to the north sea in 1926. Thistime, the focus of that attention was the mother shiptype crab fisheries industry.
Crab fisheries had boomed thanks to increased
demand for canned king crab in western countries.
Canned king crab was specialty produce of Japan, andwas first exported in around 1907. From then on,
coastal crab fisheries in Hokkaido and Sakhalin
thrived. In those days, canned king crab was producedby coastal fishermen mainly using gill nets to catch
crabs, the catches then being bought up by cannery
operators who would process the crabs in factories onland.
In 1920, the Kureha Maru, a training sailship of
the Toyama Prefecture Fisheries Training Institute,succeeded in producing 287 cases of canned king crab
at sea off the west coast of the Kamchatka Peninsula.
In so doing, it overturned the standard theory thatcrab meat should be washed in freshwater and succeeded in using seawater instead, thus paving the way
for the later commercialization of crab factory ships.
In the following year, Teiji Wajima, who had beenrunning a king crab cannery in northern Kuril, started
mother ship-type crab fishery with the 300-ton+sailing ship Kiku Maru and the 389-ton steamship
Kita Maru. With these two vessels, he succeeded in
producing 2,759 cases in seas off Primoriye. This triggered a boom in mother ship-type crab fishery; in
1922, three mother ships were operating off the west
coast of the Kamchatka Peninsula, but in 1923 thenumber had risen to fifteen, with early signs of excessive competition.

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

The production output also showed an abnormallylarge increase from 33,000 cases in 1923 to 40,000
cases in 1924, 105,000 cases in 1925 and 219,000 casesin 1926 (at the time, each case contained eight dozen
half-pound cans).
Resources of crab are prone to depletion, owing to
the crabs’ narrow range of mobility. Sudden increases
in production also caused market confusion. In 1923,
the “Regulations for the Management of Factory-Ship
Crab Fisheries” were enacted (amended in 1934 to“Regulations for the Management of Mother Shiptype Crab Fisheries”), bringing these fisheries under
the license of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.
Meanwhile, the Factory-Ship Crab Fisheries Association
was launched to start regulating production and sales.
And in 1925, Kani Kanzume Kyodo Hanbai K.K. wasestablished to regulate prices for canning.
Kenkichi Ueki and Crab Fisheries
Kenkichi Ueki joined Tamura Shoten (a company set
up by Ichiro Tamura in Busan, Korea) in 1910. In the
two years before that from 1908, he had worked as an
instructor at the Toyama Prefecture Fisheries Training
Institute. The Takashi Maru, built at the Institute in1909 with Ueki’s involvement, was later involved inking crab cannery. The Director of the Toyama
Prefecture Fisheries Training Institute had strongly
recommended the crab business to Ueki, as it had

3rd President Kenkichi Ueki

71

Jingu Maru

future potential, and Ueki was now waiting for achance to set up a business.
In January 1926, Kyodo Gyogyo established Hokuyo
Suisan K.K. using the rights to two crab mother ships
owned by former Yamagami Gumi President Soji
Yamawaki. With this, two large mother ships(Itsukushima Maru and Jingu Maru) were sent to fishat Sopochinui on the west coast of the Kamchatka
Peninsula from April to August. As a result, the two
ships produced 21,000 cases and 19,000 cases ofcanned crab, respectively, and succeeded in bringing
back a profit of 600,000 yen.
In November 1926, Kyodo Gyogyo absorbed
Hokuyo Suisan, adding two more crab mother ships(Moji Maru and Toyokuni Maru) to its fleet. In 1927,
it fished with these four ships, producing 86,000 cases.
The company had a total of 16 licensed ships in thatyear.
Meanwhile, Hayashikane Shoten had fished atMororokke off the west coast of the Kamchatka
Peninsula using the recently purchased Hakuai Maru
in 1927, producing a good yield of 23,000 cases. With
the entry of Hayashikane Shoten and Kyodo Gyogyo,
the industry had 17 factory ships and an output of
330,000 cases that year, rising to 520,000 cases including those produced on land. What was more worrying,
however, was that 70,000 of these cases were excess torequirements.
This made it clear that, if free competition wereallowed to run its course, it would inevitably lead tothe devastation of fishing grounds and market confusion due to oversupply, and that, in order to prevent
this, there was no option but to integrate. Some operators recommended this course of action, and the government was also resolved to give guidance in that
direction.

2. The Integration of Crab Fisheries
1st Integration—Two Companies: Nippon Kosen
Gyogyo and Showa Kosen Gyogyo
At the end of the Taisho era (1925), the Kitami andRishiri districts had played a pioneering role in landbased king crab canneries. Owing to excessive fishingover a protracted period, however, resources had
become exhausted and the Hokkaido prefectural
authorities had imposed a five-year ban on crab fisheries from 1927. Even the Sakhalin coastal fisheries,
which had once produced 110,000 cases a year, were
now in apparent decline with only 4,000 cases. If
unregulated operations were to continue unabated in
crab fishing grounds off the west coast of the Kamchatka
Peninsula, it was thought inevitable that those fishinggrounds would sooner or later suffer the same fate as

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

the coastal fishing grounds.
To prevent market confusion caused by pointlesscompetition, all companies engaged in crab fisheries
were now integrated into two conglomerates—the
Nippon Kosen Gyogyo group affiliated to Kyodo
Gyogyo, and the Showa Kosen Gyogyo group affiliated to Hayashikane Shoten—following a government
recommendation in November 1927.
The companies and mother ships included in eachgroup were as follows.
Nippon Kosen Gyogyo (President: Kenkichi Ueki):
Capital 3 million yen, 6 companies, 11 factory ships,
licensed output 194,600 cases)—Kyodo Gyogyo(Itsukushima Maru, Jingu Maru, Moji Maru andWakaura Maru), Matsuda Gyogyo (Fukuichi Maru
and Ryoto Maru), Karafuto Sangyo (Kanton Maru),

72

[Off Kamchatka west coast]
Kyodo Gyogyo(Itsukushima Maru,
Moji Maru, Jingu Maru,
Wakaura Maru)

Matsuda Gyogyo(Fukuichi Maru, Ryoto Maru)
Integrated Nov. 1927

Karafuto Sangyo

1932

Nippon Kosen Gyogyo(Kanton Maru)

Hokkai Kosen

Full tie-up in 1928

Nippon Godo Kosen(Pusan Maru)

Hokuho Shokai(Eitoku Maru, Pusan Maru)

Nichiro Gyogyo(Buzen Maru)

Taisei Gyogyo(Ryuyu Maru)

Sanemichi Yagi
(Karafuto Maru,
Mifuku Maru)

Integrated Nov. 1927

Hayashikane Shoten

Showa Kosen Gyogyo(Hakuai Maru)

Mifune Kanzume(Higo Maru)

Imai Sakuji(Shunkai Maru)[0ff Kamchatka east coast]
Nippon Kosen Gyogyo, Showa Kosen
Gyogyo , Toyama Kosen, Yagi Shoten
4 companies, 5 ships(management entrusted to
Nippon Kosen Gyogyo)

Integrated in 1931

Higashi Kosen

Hayashikane Shoten(Nagato Maru)

Source: Nobuo Okamoto, Kindai Gyogyo Hattatsu Shi “History of the Development of Modern Fisheries”, 1984

Hokkai Kosen (Pusan Maru), Hokuho Shokai (Eitoku
Maru and Pusan Maru) and Nichiro Gyogyo (Buzen
Maru).
Showa Kosen Gyogyo K.K. (Presidents: Michitomo
Iwakura and Sanemichi Yagi): Capital 2 million yen,
5 companies, 6 factory ships, licensed output 112,326
cases)—Hayashikane Shoten (Hakuai Maru), Imai
Sakuji (Shunkai Maru), Mifune Kanzume (HigoMaru), Taisei Gyogyo (Ryuyu Maru) and Sanemichi
Yagi (Karafuto Maru and Bifuku Maru).
It was decided that fishing operations in 1928, after
the companies were integrated, would be 10% lower
in output than the year before. Nippon Kosen Gyogyo
sent 9 ships and Showa Kosen Gyogyo 5 ships, thistotal of 14 ships producing 310,000 cases.

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

2nd Integration— Alienation of Hayashikane
ShotenAfter the integration into two groups, many of themother ships added to Showa Kosen Gyogyo performed poorly. This prompted a full tie-up between
the two groups in the second half of 1928, centeringon Kyodo Gyogyo, which had received a significant
number of Showa Kosen Gyogyo shares. With this,the number of mother ships, 17 in 1927, was downsized
to 14 the following year. Keizo Tamura was appointed
Chairman of Showa Kosen Gyogyo. The downsizing
only involved the two companies operating in fishinggrounds off the west coast of the Kamchatka Peninsula;i.e. Nippon Kosen Gyogyo and Showa Kosen
Gyogyo.
However, no sooner had the crab factory ship industry off the west coast of Kamchatka at last achieved73

its long awaited amalgamation and entered a periodof relative calm, than a movement that threatened tospark a renewed flurry of activity started off the east
coast. That was in 1929, when the Sanemichi Yagi
factory ship Hachiro Maru started fishing off there.
Though at a disadvantage compared to the west coast,
the ship produced a respectable haul of 21,000 cases,
triggering a spate of license applications in the following year (1930). Six ships from five companies started
fishing there, but with the exception of one ship thatchanged course to seas near Alaska in mid-operation,
all of them suffered losses due to poor catches. But
the one that changed course to seas near Alaska—
Nippon Kosen Gyogyo’s Taihoku Maru—produced
a good yield of 29,000 cases.
Meanwhile, 13 ships fished off the west coast thatyear, so that a total of 19 ships were operating off theeast and west coasts of the Kamchatka Peninsula.
Between them, they achieved the phenomenal output
of 405,000 cases, including those produced on land.
This created huge inventories, dealing a serious blow
to the industry.
In March 1931, four of the five companies operating
off the east coast—Nippon Kosen Gyogyo, Showa
Kosen Gyogyo, Toyama Kosen and Yagi Shoten (thefifth was Hayashikane Shoten, which opposed
amalgamation)—were integrated with the establishment of Higashi Kosen K.K. (capital 1,900,000 yen).
Nippon Kosen Gyogyo was responsible for its management. Virtually all crab fisheries now came within
Kyodo Gyogyo’s sphere of influence, and the latter’sde facto business control was complete. Now Nippon
Kosen Gyogyo voluntarily restricted its operations,aiming to sustain resources, regulate product supply
and demand, and recover international trust. As aresult, fishing operations by Higashi Kosen in 1931
were suspended, owing to the need to restrict production of canned crab, as well as the extremely poor
profitability of fishing off the east coast of theKamchatka Peninsula and in seas near Alaska.
In 1931, Hayashikane Shoten, which had not taken
part in the amalgamation, sent Nagato Maru to fish

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheriesin Bristol Bay, Alaska, producing 33,000 cases.
However, since the licensed output there was only
23,000 cases, the surplus of 10,000 cases became subject to administrative disposal, resulting in a reductionof future licensed output.

Integration Complete, Establishment of Godo
Kosen
In April 1932, Nippon Kosen Gyogyo integrated
Showa Kosen Gyogyo, Higashi Kosen and all mothership-type fisheries of Hayashikane Shoten, forming a
new company named Nippon Godo Kosen K.K. Now
the number of ships sent out on fishing operations
could at last be reduced, and comprehensive production adjustments could be made.
In fact, Nippon Godo Kosen had already reduced
its factory ships to seven to protect resources in 1932,and its output was only 173,500 cases.
Kosuke Kunishi’s rationale on crab resources was
the same as that of protecting coastal fishery resourcesby trawling in deeper seas. In the case of crab resources,
he felt that “This company is voluntarily and appropriately reducing its output, both with a view to protecting crab breeding and in deference to sales policies”(Anthology of Writings and Speeches of Mr. Kosuke
Kunishi). As this shows, Kyodo Gyogyo voluntarily
engaged in conserving resources using the method of“voluntarily reducing production”.
Most sales of canned king crab were for export,
those to America accounting for 50–60% and thoseto the UK for about 30%, the remaining 10% or sogoing to countries like Australia, France and Denmark.
Nippon Godo Kosen was merged into Kyodo
Gyogyo in 1936, and in the following year Kyodo
Gyogyo was renamed Nippon Suisan. From then on,
it continued crab fisheries as the company’s north-sea
division. In the meantime, it continued planned fishing operations while striving to rationalize business,
improve quality and expand sales channels, achieving
good results in the process. As the wartime regime
took hold, however, Japan–US relations worsened,74

and in 1939 output was restricted owing to poor
exports. In 1941 fishing operations were suspended,

and in 1942 only two fleets were dispatched, after
which operations had to be stopped altogether.

Part 5 Innovations in Trawlers
1. Adoption of New Fishing Methods
The V-D Method
Trawling technology and fishing boat equipment
made remarkable advances from the Taisho to earlyShowa eras (1912 to 1920s). The innovation and development of technology were major factors behind the
expansion of trawl operations from coastal areas tothe East China Sea, the South China Sea, and further
to the “world’s seas” beyond the equator and the international dateline.
Although trawling in itself, as a fishing method
using bottom trawl nets, was developed in Britain, it
is very similar to the “utase-ami” (small sailing trawl)
method traditionally practiced in Japan.
At the beginning of the 18th century, the “beamtrawl” method using a crossbeam to widen the mouthof a towing net had first appeared in Britain, but thecrossbeam was only 15 meters wide at most. From theend of the 19th century, otter boards came to be used
to expand the mouth of the net. The trawling method
first introduced to Japan (otter trawl) used these otter
boards. Later, the otter boards were separated fromthe net mouth, and “ground cables” about 100 meters
long were used to connect them to the mouth. Theseground cables, together with the otter boards, maintained contact with the sea bed while the trawler
moved along. This new method came to be adopted
in Japan from around 1925. It was known as the V-D
method, so named because the patent was owned by
V.D. Co. Ltd. of Britain.
With this method, the otter boards and groundcables would rake along the sea bed, stirring up a cloudof sediments to drive the fish back into the net. In
other words, with the V-D method, the net mouth

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

was effectively widened to the distance between theotter boards.
With conventional otter trawl, the net mouth measured 24 meters and the height in the center was 1.2
meters. But with the V-D method, the distance
between the otter boards was 69 meters and the heightwas 7.8 meters, thereby increasing fish catches. In thefirst half of 1925, for example, Kyodo Gyogyo produced 190,000 cases, but in the second half, when it
adopted the V-D method, this increased to 200,000
cases. By the second half of 1926, it had increased
again to 220,000 cases. Thereafter, improved versions
were developed to replace this V-D method.
Single Quarter Rope
In around 1931–32, Kyodo Gyogyo devised a methodof operating with a single quarter rope, which it commercialized from around 1934.
The method of hauling nets in use until theninvolved pulling nets to the side of the ship and hauling the main net up by hand. This meant that, because
the mouth of the main net had to be closed first before
operating the winch, two quarter ropes had to be
used.
The single quarter rope method used only one rope,
V-D method otter trawling

A Trawler
B WarpsC Otter boards (net opening boards)
D Ground cables
E Net opening
F Cod end75

as the name suggests. When the fishing nets were
pulled close to the side of the ship, the main net mouth
was closed and the quarter rope was immediately
engaged with the winch to haul up the net. Thiseliminated manual hauling of nets, thus economizing
on labor and vastly reducing the time needed to haul
up nets. The single quarter rope method was used by
all Kyodo Gyogyo ships up to around 1939.

2. Technical Innovations in Fishing Boat Equipment
Wireless Telegraph Equipment
Three technical innovations in trawler equipment
opened the way for operations in distant water fishinggrounds: the installation of wireless telegraph equipment, the conversion of the Kushiro Maru’s engines
to diesel in 1927, and the adoption of on-board rapid
freezing equipment in 1930. This was the start of a
new era for trawling. Much of the basic and appliedresearch in this connection was carried out by the
Hayatomo Fishery Institute, Japan’s first private-sector
fisheries research institute, and the resultant equipment was subsequently fitted in Kyodo Gyogyo’s trawlers in stages.
In 1921, wireless telegraph equipment was fitted in
the Ujina Maru and Musashi Maru (both built in1920), the first time this had happened to private
trawlers in Japan. This made it possible to transmit
two types of radio wave (1,364 and 500 kilocycles)from both main and auxiliary equipment, using sparkgap transmitters with antenna power of 0.3 kilowatts.
Later, the equipment was fitted on all ships in very
quick order, while a private wireless telegraph station

was set up in Tobata Fishing Port, site of Kyodo
Gyogyo’s relocation.
The impact of wireless communication spurred
remarkable development in the rational managementof fisheries. Ships could now maintain uninterrupted
communication even in mid-operation. This not only
helped to prevent shipping accidents thanks to relaysof information such as weather and sea conditions
between sea and land, but also made it possible toregulate output and prices by relaying the state of fish
catches from sea, or fish prices in various locations
from land bases.
The adoption of wireless communication also madeit possible to establish a cargo allocation center inOsaka and inform it of the going prices by telephone,then, the next morning, compare this with the types
and volumes of fish catches to be brought back to port,
and finally determine how much of which fish should
be sent to which market. Ships could also use secretcodes to notify reach other of fishing grounds, enablingthem to operate in fishing grounds where the value
was highest, thus increasing output.
Diesel Trawlers

Wireless room on a trawler of the day

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

The Fisheries Bureau vessel Hokusui Maru was thefirst fishing boat to be fitted with a diesel engine in
1918, but the first fully commercialized diesel trawler
was Kyodo Gyogyo’s Kushiro Maru.
At the time, west-water trawling was approaching
the peak of its development, and the Kushiro Maru
was built at the Mitsubishi Zosen Nagasaki Shipyardin 1927, based on a plan to expand fishing grounds
south of the Taiwan Strait. With a speed of 11.8 knots,
a 750 horsepower engine and a cruising range of 4076

In conventional trawling, fish catches could be refrigerated with ice alone. Given the increased days ofoperation, however, this was no longer enough to keep

catches fresh when using diesel trawlers. Trawlers could
not have fished in the “seven seas” of the world withwireless communication and diesel engines alone; thetechnology would not have been complete without
the commercialization of on-board rapid freezing
equipment.
Built in 1927, the Kushiro Maru was fitted with thevery latest American-style refrigeration equipment of
the day, but it failed to deliver the expected results.
Therefore, superior on-board rapid freezing equipment was developed following further research by the
Hayatomo Fishery Institute.
This equipment was first fitted on the YatsushiroMaru, as well as on five diesel trawlers in the sameclass, between May and October 1930. As Kosuke
Kunishi recalls: “We Japanese trawl fishery operators
had, for the previous 20 or so years, restricted ourselves
to fishing grounds in the East China Sea and the
Yellow Sea, and had primarily focused on internalmarkets as sales routes for these catches. However, we
felt confined by these fishing grounds as a result ofvarious circumstances, and attempted to venture out
to the north sea or the South China Sea. To meet ourobjectives, we led the world in striving to complete
diesel trawlers and on-board rapid freezing equipment,
and succeeded in doing so” (Anthology of Writings andSpeeches of Mr. Kosuke Kunishi).
Kunishi goes on to state: “As a result of research on
freezing, it was discovered that, if we used a methodof rapid freezing, the tissues of fish and shellfish would
not be destroyed, and it would be possible to freeze
them in fresh condition. When we learnt this, we were

The first private diesel trawler Kushiro Maru (completed in
1927)

The diesel trawler Yatsushiro Maru fitted with the Iwamoto onboard rapid freezer

days, it could carry out trawl operations in water
depths of up to 360 meters. It also had a valve-type
wireless telegraph system with a communication range
of 1,600 kilometers, a radio telephone with a range of
80 kilometers, an electric-powered trawl winch, andother state-of-the-art equipment.
The method of lighting was also improved.
Conventionally, internal lights and working lights on
deck were mostly oil or gas lamps. After the construction of the Kushiro Maru, however, lighting was gradually converted to electricity, which reduced the hazardsof night work and improved efficiency. One crewmember has the following recollection from thosedays: “The glass chimneys of the oil lamps had to becleaned, so we had no time to rest even during ourtime off. But once the lamps were changed to electricity, things became much more convenient”.
Diesel trawlers were economically superior for thevery fact that they aimed for distant water fishinggrounds. Compared to steamships, not only was thecruising range more than doubled, but they could also
carry twice as many cases of fish while achieving a fuelconsumption saving of 20%.
In 1929, the Kushiro Maru went north to fish in
the Bering Sea, and south to the seas off Annam, reaping as much success as had been expected.
On-Board Rapid Freezing Equipment

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

77motivated to conduct further research at Kyodo
Gyogyo on using these results in actual fisheries. And
before long, we had completed a design for on-board
rapid freezing equipment that no country in the world
had yet succeeded in developing. As a result, by using
diesel trawlers fitted with this freezing equipment,
not only could we fish in fishing grounds anywherein the world, but we could also freeze the fish andshellfish in live condition straight after catching them”(ibid.).
The adoption of on-board rapid freezing equipment dramatically improved the ability to keep fish
catches fresh, and at the same time made it possible
for fish to be standardized as products and systematically supplied to markets.

Part 6 Efforts to Develop Fishery Science — Establishment of the
Hayatomo Fishery Institute
1. The First Private Sector Fisheries Research InstituteAs a Research Arm of Kyodo Gyogyo
In February 1920, the Hayatomo Fishery Institute wasestablished as a research arm of Kyodo Gyogyo andassociated companies—and as Japan’s first ever privatesector fisheries research institute—in Hanano-cho,
Shimonoseki, following a proposal by Kosuke
Kunishi.
Kyodo Gyogyo President Hisazo Matsuzaki served
concurrently as the Institute’s Chairman, Kosuke
Kunishi and Jinpachi Hayashida as the two Executive
Directors, and Soji Yamawaki as the Auditor, while
Chiyoma Iwamoto and others were responsible forplanning and promotion. In reality, the Institute itself
had the strong character of a research and advisory
body for Kunishi. The name “Hayatomo” was derived
from “Hayatomo no Seto”, the narrowest stretch of

The Hayatomo Fishery Institute as of 1930

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

the Kanmon Straits.
The following outline was drawn up to define thesurveys and research targeted by the Institute.
(1) Surveys of fishing grounds together withresearch on fish species(2) Research on marine product manufacture andrefrigeration methods(3) Research on fishing nets, tackle and methods(4) Shipbuilding and design of machinery andequipment(5) Surveys on domestic and overseas fisheries(6) Surveys and research on other business ancillary
to fisheries
Members of the research team at the time of establishment included Toshio Kumada (marine biology,
fishing ground surveys), Tahei Iiyama (fish catch processing and treatment), Tatsunosuke Tajima (fishing

The specimen room at that time78

boat machinery) and Takeo Horie (shipbuilding).
They were soon joined by Shu Suzuki, designer of
ship’s machinery, and fishing boat designer Eijiro
Kaneko.
In 1921, Keizo Tamura (Kyodo Gyogyo’s 2nd
President) became Chairman, and more up-andcoming researchers joined the Institute’s lineup.
Ichiemon Yoshida (from the freezing and refrigerationequipment field) joined in 1923, Zenpei Ogura (fisheries chemistry) in 1924, and Hisatoshi Marukawa(marine biology) in 1926.
At the time of its establishment, the Institute consisted only of a research lab (15 tsubo or 50 m2) and a
specimen room (15 tsubo); the research was mainly
carried out within the various divisions of associatedcompanies.
This Hayatomo Fishery Institute was run withfunding and equipment donated by Ichiro Tamura,
as well as Kyodo Gyogyo and associated companies
that benefited from the research.

Research Results Contributing Greatly to the
Growth of Fisheries
When the Hayatomo Fishery Institute was firstlaunched, Japanese fisheries were in the process ofmodernization; the motorization of fishing boats andmass production of fishing nets were in progress, andit was becoming increasingly possible to venture into
offshore waters, and further, to distant water fishinggrounds. In tandem with this, there was an increasingneed to incorporate rational, scientific methods into
surveys on fishing grounds and fish species, improvements to fishing methods and fishing tackle, freezing
and preservation technology, and so on.

The Hayatomo Fishery Institute played a majorpart in some aspects of this—for example, promoting
the introduction of diesel trawlers when trawling wasin its developmental stage, or developing on-board
rapid freezing equipment.
In 1930, Kyodo Gyogyo completed its relocationfrom Shimonoseki City to Tobata City in the expectation of further development. At the same time, theHayatomo Fishery Institute also relocated to Shioizaki
in Tobata City, and started activity as a fully-fledged
research institution consisting of three departments(Fishing Boats, Chemistry and Biology). In April 1932,
it changed its name to Hayatomo Fishery ResearchCenter, and the former Group’s Chairman Keizo
Tamura continued to serve as the Center’s Director.
The Center’s facilities consisted of a biology labmeasuring 16 tsubo (53 m2), a specimen room of 10
tsubo, a chemistry lab of 16 tsubo, a freezing equipment
lab of 16 tsubo, a combustion chamber of 4 tsubo, abalance room of 4 tsubo, a machine design room of 7
tsubo, a library of 10 tsubo, and an office of 7 tsubo.
Besides this, the Senzokujima Laboratory was set
up in Senzokujima, Amakusa-gun, Kumamoto
Prefecture. Here, research on kuruma prawn aquaculture was carried out under Motosaku Fujinaga fromMay 1933. The facilities in this case consisted of ashrimp production lab of 4 tsubo, a seawater analysis
lab of 2 tsubo, and a seed shrimp farming pond of 150
tsubo, among others.
The Hayatomo Fishery Research Center was takenover by the Nissan Fishery Institute Co., Ltd. in 1935,
and would later evolve into the Nippon Suisan Central
Research Laboratory and Nissui Pharmaceutical Co.,Ltd.

2. Outline of Research
Fishing Boat Department
The first requirement for fishing in distant waters wasto have fishing boats with a large cruising range. The

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Kushiro Maru, Japan’s first commercial diesel trawler
operated by a private company, had more than twice
the cruising range of a steamship; with the development and commercialization of on-board rapid

79

freezing equipment, it could supply fresh fish catchesfrom fishing grounds in distant foreign oceans, in bulk
and at reasonable prices.
The two trawling innovations of diesel engines andon-board rapid freezing equipment had originallybeen conceived and planned by Kosuke Kunishi.
Diesel trawlers were designed by the two engineers
Shu Suzuki and Eijiro Kaneko. By fitting trawlers withdiesel engines, they ushered in a new era for Japanese
trawling and laid the foundations for broad expansion
into overseas fishing grounds.
These two engineers handled the design or modification of numerous fishing boats under commission,
not only from associated companies but also fromother fishery companies, thus contributing greatly tothe improvement of vessel formats and improved performance of engines.
Chemistry Department(1) Research on refrigeration and freezing methods
On-board rapid freezing equipment was developedin 1930, three years after the Kushiro Maru was built.
The hold of the Kushiro Maru was fitted with refrigeration equipment imported from America, but theresultant loss of moisture from the fish had a negative
impact on product value; conventional ice storage
could actually do a better job. Storing unfrozen fish
inside a hold cooled by a freezer was not a good wayof maintaining freshness. Because the fish were frozen
gradually, the moisture inside their body cells would

Iwamoto on-board rapid freezer
Each tank could be raised or lowered individually

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

form large crystals during the freezing process; thesewould then break through the cell walls, destroying
the firmness of the flesh. On thawing, this moisturewould be released, ruining the taste. This problem
was solved by rapid freezing. The failures describedabove were necessary steps in the development of
on-board rapid freezing equipment. Kunishi himself
suspected as much, writing: “When refrigerating, thehold should be cooled to around 1 or 2 degrees centigrade, so that crushed ice gradually starts to thaw”(Anthology of Writings and Speeches of Mr. Kosuke
Kunishi).
The Hayatomo Fishery Institute had started
research on refrigeration and freezing equipment for
general use and for fishing boats in around 1927. But
Kosuke Kunishi strongly urged the Institute to promote development, as he saw rapid freezing at sea asa vital element in developing remote fishing grounds
and expanding operations,.
The Institute now oversaw the installation of theKaohsiung and Keelung cold stores of Horai Suisan,established in Taiwan in 1927, as well as refrigerationand freezing equipment installed on the bottom trawlers Horai Maru, Takasago Maru, Takao Maru andKoshun Maru. These were also the first fishing boats
to use 150-horsepower diesel engines.
On-board rapid freezing equipment was developed
after this. The brine-drip freezing equipment used foron-board rapid freezing was an invention of the engineer Zenpei Ogura. His invention was patented not
only in Japan but also in Britain, America and France.

Scene at a chikuwa factory80

A total of twelve patents and utility model rights wereobtained in connection with freezing technology atthis time, including brine-drip freezing equipment.
Subsequently, on-board rapid freezing equipment
was installed in all ships between the end of 1933 andthe beginning of 1934 under the name of the “Iwamoto
on-board rapid freezer”. This device developed by
Chiyoma Iwamoto consisted of a stack of flat tanks
containing brine as a coolant (calcium chloride solution). The device occupied minimal space as the individual tanks could be moved up or down, and thepitching of the vessel could not interfere with the workas the brine was sealed inside the tanks. This offereda level of perfection that could be seen as the prototype
of today’s flat tanks.
On-board rapid freezing equipment could freeze
fish in a short time inside trawlers, and made it possible
to keep fish fresh longer. It was a major step towards“From the oceans to the dinner table” (Anthology of
Writings and Speeches of Mr. Kosuke Kunishi), the idealof fisheries targeted by Kyodo Gyogyo.
(2) Research on chikuwa and fish meal
“Processing fish into forms such as chikuwa,
kamaboko or tempura like satsuma-age, and thereby
expanding sales of fish catches, must be one methodthat we fishery producers should use, bearing in mind
the present state of collapsing fish prices” (ibid.).
Kosuke Kunishi targeted industrial production of
chikuwa (a kind of white fish sausage made of surimi
or ground fish meat), which until then had remained

The Nippon Gyoryo fishmeal factory(Odo, Hikoshima Island, Shimonoseki City)

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

within the domain of the home, as a step towards
adding value to marine resources.
The man appointed to research and commercialize
this was Tahei Iiyama, who was invited to join Kyodo
Gyogyo from the Ministry of Agriculture andCommerce in 1920. At the time, the raw material forsurimi products west of Kansai consisted of firmbodied white-meat fish such as lizardfish, caught in
the Seto Inland Sea and the East China Sea. But inorder to make surimi products from fresh west water
fish such as croaker, gurnard and shark that were notsuited to the dinner table, Iiyama introduced manufacturing machinery modeled on factories in the
Sanriku region. Sanriku had a long history of making
chikuwa from fish including Kamchatka flounder,
Alaska pollack and shark. Iiyama also invited the“Association of Chikuwa Craftsmen” (led by Kouemon
Doi) from Watanoha in Miyagi Prefecture to participate in this venture. Kyodo Gyogyo then establishedthe Nippon Chikuwa Seizosho in 1921, thereby marking its full-scale entry into the manufacture and saleof chikuwa.
But now a problem arose. “It was how to deal withresidues of the bone known as the ilium... Proper
chikuwa cannot be made without somehow processingthese residues. I decided to consult Mr. Kunishi”(Tahei Iiyama, Suisan ni Ikiru “Living in Fisheries”).
As a result, Iiyama decided to make fish meal out
of inedible fish parts arising from the manufacture ofchikuwa. To this end, he introduced a Meakin fishmeal machine made by the U.S. company California

Meakin fish meal machine81

The factory ship Taihoku Maru sets out with its two meal-making
machines

Press, and started producing fish meal in 1922.
Kunishi commented on these developments asfollows:“Of fish that are particularly cheap in price, we shallmake chikuwa and use all the residues to make fishmeal... By so doing, every single part of cheaply priced
fish including their residues will become useful commodities, nothing will be thrown away, and we shalluse up the precious resources of the sea without any
waste” (Anthology of Writings and Speeches of Mr.
Kosuke Kunishi).
Kunishi also states that, if the rationale on making
full use of these marine products could be applied tofactory ship fisheries, “All fish catches could be completely processed as products, and factory ship fisheries
could thereby be perfected” (ibid.). Later, he installeda Meakin fish meal plant on the crab factory ship
Taihoku Maru, and started producing meal fromflounder and Alaska pollack.
Iiyama also started work on developing fish sausages
in 1931. After the war, he was made the inaugural
Director-General of the Fisheries Agency. Even after
his retirement, he spent many long years contributing
to the fisheries industry, earning the moniker Suisan
O (“Wise Man of Fisheries”).
(3) Research on other fishery products
Research on various fishery products was started
by the Chemistry Department, newly created in 1930.
Attention was particularly focused on inventions for
extracting seasonings from fish meat, with patents

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

obtained in Britain, France, Canada and other countries. Besides these, research was also carried out onfish meat extracts, compressed dried fish, hardenedoil, margarine and others.
Meanwhile, food processing through the use of
freezing technology was another important subjectof research. This was because researchers sent to
America in 1928 reported on a growing industry inthe manufacture and sale of fresh frozen fish meat
blocks. Other important research topics included
reforms to methods of processing trawl catches andthe use of by-products. Finally, studies were started
on freezing various foods besides frozen fish, including
fruits, vegetables and livestock products, and the possibility of their commercialization.
(4) Research on fish oil“The future rationalization of fisheries will dependon the results of scientific research. It is hard to predictwhether the substances we now discard as waste will
become precious drugs or industrial raw materials asa result of research” (Anthology of Writings and Speechesof Mr. Kosuke Kunishi).
As if to reflect these thoughts, research aimed atprocessing and using fish oil was started in 1934. This
would later blossom as research on EPA (eicosapentaenoic acid) and the fine chemicals industry, forwhich this research provided a springboard.
Research on fish oil at the time was basic research
aimed at using the oil as a paint material. The results
were reported in the Journal of the Society of Chemical
Industry No. 444 as “The Impact of Refinement
Methods on the Properties of Oil Polymerization”.
Biology Department
The Biology Department conducted surveys on fishing grounds and research on fish species. It also produced fish charts that would later be compiled into
an Encyclopedia of Fish.
(1) Surveys on trawling82

Precise scientific surveys were made from the anglesof oceanography and fish ecology, with the aim of
expanding fish catches and discovering unexploited
fishing grounds.
•Surveys in Bohai Bay and the northern Yellow Sea
These sea areas were important fishing grounds,
with abundant populations of bream, croaker, olive
flounder, drumfish, gurnard and other demersal fish,
as well as shrimp. Surveys were continued annually,
but particularly large-scale surveys were conducted in
1931, in collaboration with testing laboratories in
relevant locations. Based on the results of these surveys, trial operations were actually carried out by six
trawlers. The catches were good, bringing recognition
for the outcome of the surveys and research. Thesesurveys played a significant role in establishing fisheries in these sea areas.

•Surveys in the East China Sea and the southern
Yellow Sea
At the time, these sea areas were the main fishingzones licensed as trawling grounds. The principal fish
catches consisted of red sea bream, crimson sea bream,
yellow sea bream, flounder, olive flounder, croaker,
drumfish, mackerel, butterfish, conger and stingray,among others. The different types of bream had particularly high market value and were important fish.
When surveys were therefore carried out with emphasis on bream varieties, it was discovered that they
spawned north of a line running between Shanghai
and Jeju Island, and that they migrated in shoals
between there and the growth habitats. This finding
made a great contribution to the trawling industry.
•Surveys in the Gulf of Siam, the Java Sea andelsewhere

M. Fujinaga’s research thesis reproduced in “Report of the Hayatomo Fishery Institute”(Feb. 1935) and “Japanese Journal of Zoology” (1942)

Illustrations from the thesis

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries83

In the summers of 1932 and 1933, surveys wereconducted aboard the Shonan Maru, a survey vesselof the Governor-General of Taiwan. The possibilityof coastal fisheries was recognized, although the South
China Sea, the Gulf of Siam, the Strait of Malacca,
the Java Sea and others were deemed unsuitable as
trawling grounds.
(2) Surveys on Taisho shrimp (oriental shrimp) fishinggrounds
Taisho shrimp resembled kuruma prawns in various
aspects, including their shape and taste; they also hada high market value, and were attractive as targets for
trawling. In 1922–1923, Taisho shrimp were firstmixed with trawler landings, whereupon surveys wereconducted to gauge their potential as fish catches. In
the 1924 survey, Taisho shrimp were found to residealong coasts for very short periods in all four seasons.
From 1925 onwards, wide-ranging surveys were madeby vessels from both private and public sectors. Thesesurveys culminated in successful trawling for Taisho
shrimp in Bohai Bay in spring and autumn.
(3) Research on kuruma prawn production
Although Taisho shrimp trawling was successful,there was one researcher who realized the limits tonaturally growing marine resources, and opened theway for active aquaculture of kuruma prawn. His namewas Motosaku Fujinaga.
In April 1933, the Senzokujima Laboratory was
opened in Senzokujima, Amakusa-gun, Kumamoto

A Gyofu fish drawing

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Prefecture. Here, Fujinaga started research on kuruma
prawn production from May that year. In July, artificial
spawning was achieved for the first time in the world,
and in 1939 complete aquaculture was successfully
carried out.
Thereafter, research on kuruma prawn would becontinued by the Nissan Fishery Institute, but in 1941,
Fujinaga’s degree thesis “Reproduction Development
and Rearing of Penaeus japonicus Bate” won the Japan
Prize of Agricultural Science.
Fujinaga worked for Nippon Suisan until the endof the war. Then, when the Fisheries Agency was created after the war, he became the Director of its
Research Institute following a request by Tahei Iiyama,
inaugural Director-General of the Agency and also
originally from Nippon Suisan.
(4)Collection of fish and marine biological specimens
From among the fish and other marine species
obtained during fishing operations, those that wereof particular value both scientifically and industriallywere collected as specimens. These included fish fromwaters off Europe and America and crustaceans fromsouthern oceans, and were permanently available forpublic perusal.
A particularly noteworthy endeavor was that of
Kumada. As the person responsible for marine species
and fishing ground surveys, he took the initiative intraveling on trawlers to make detailed sketches of thecoloring and shapes of various fish in situ, thus recording their appearance in their natural condition. The
original drawings of these fish and marine species,
titled Gyofu, numbered more than a thousand. They
were published before the war as Nanyo Shokuyo
Suisan Zusetsu or “Illustrated Guide to Edible Marine
Produce of the Southern Oceans” (Gyofu 149pp, publ.
1941) and Nanyo Yudoku Gyoshu Chosa Hokoku or“Survey Report on Poisonous Fish in the Southern
Oceans” (Gyofu 77pp, publ. 1942), among others.
After the war, Nippon Suisan Gyofu or “Guide to
Japan’s Marine Produce” (Gyofu 394pp) was publishedin 1961. The Gyofu created by Kumada later became84one of Japan’s four great fish guides. They would be
discovered by Keizo Shibusawa (grandson of Eiichi
Shibusawa), who, at the same time as serving as
Governor of the Bank of Japan and Minister ofFinance, had tremendous enthusiasm for researching

the folklore of the marine produce and fisheries
industries.
Another major achievement of Kumada is that hestandardized the names of fish, which tended to varyfrom region to region.

Part 7 Modern Labor Relations in Trawling
1. Kosuke Kunishi’s Management of Fisheries Business
Management of Trawling Business
The trawling industry as it stood in the late Meiji era
was created by 26 corporate organizations and 35
individual businesses. The largest of the former wereHakata Kisen K.K. with 10 ships, Fukuhaku EnyoGyogyo K.K. with 7 ships, and the Nagasaki Steamship
Fishery Co. with 6 ships. As for individual operators,
Shin-ichi Hara was the largest with 6 ships. The
Tamura Steamship Fishery Company had only 3 ships
under the name of Kosuke Kunishi, and at the time
was merely a medium-scale concern. Two major factors
caused this to transform into the largest trawling concern at the beginning of the Showa era. One was that
the Tamura Steamship Fishery Company acquired
the outstanding talent that was Kosuke Kunishi; theother was that labor relations were founded on
Kunishi’s concept of the industrialization of fisheries.
This was the difference between management by ordinary shipowners of the time and the Tamura Steamship
Fishery Company, and this is what provided a major
foundation for growth.
During its rise to prominence, trawling was often
managed by fish wholesalers as owners of fishing boats
and fishing tackle, or by wealthy industrialists with

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

no connection to fisheries. It was not unusual, in fact,
for rice wholesalers, doctors and others in Osaka andKobe to be shipowners.
They would directly hire boatmen, who would thenhire fishermen in turn; the shipowners would merely
remain on land and collect their shipowners’ dividends. For this reason, if the business was going poorly
they would immediately withdraw their capital. Or
when ship prices rose during the Great War, theywould simply cash in on their assets.
Trawling operations by the Tamura Steamship
Fishery Company were completely different in theirstyle of management. Rather than taking the easy routeof using the old system of master and apprentice boatman, the company took determined steps to establish
a modern system of labor relations. This was the big
difference between ordinary shipowners of the day
and the Tamura Steamship Fishery Company, and it
was this that formed a major foundation for the growthof the company. Fishermen were mainly recruitedfrom the Shimane area, but they were directly employedby the Tamura Steamship Fishery Company, and did
not have an employment relationship with theboatmen.

85

2. Kyodo Gyogyo’s Labor Environment
Employees’ Motivation Spurred by
Mutual Aid System
Particularly worthy of mention are the company’slabor-related measures. In July 1920, the year after
Kyodo Gyogyo was launched, a mutual aid society for
employee recreation and welfare called the “Kyodo
Gyogyo Kyoshinkai” was formed. Its purpose was to“promote the common welfare of the society’s members, to provide mutual aid for the members and theirfamilies in the event of injury or illness, and to provide
felicitations or condolences in times of good or bad
fortune”, and at the same time “to encourage employees
to express their hopes to Head Office freely, and to
facilitate the communication of wishes between Head
Office and the employees”. The Chairman would be
the President of Kyodo Gyogyo, assisted by six officers,
and the membership reached around 1,000 (1927). A
membership fee of 1.5% of the annual bonus (forland-based workers) or of the performance-based commission (for sea-based workers) would be charged,
and the company would match these amounts withequal contributions to operate the society.
The society undertook a number of secondary
activities, including an agency for life and non-life
insurance, a tax payment cooperative, a land cooperative and a housing cooperative. It engaged in a rangeof highly specific services including arranging members’ weddings, funerals and other formal occasions,insurance work, assistance with savings, advice on land
and housing, administrative work on further education, moving house, etc., arranging doctors and hospitals, and so on.
Meanwhile, as well as launching a system of mutual
aid in 1927, the society also oversaw the constructionof compact housing and seaman’s homes, opened seafood canteens, and so on. These amply express thespirit of “creating a micro-society that is easy to livein” and “sharing both the benefits and pride between
all of us” in the “Declaration” set out upon the reloca-

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

tion to Tobata.
This bore fruit in raising employee morale, creating
a sense of responsibility and solidarity, improving
production efficiency, and motivating technical innovation. Even in times of recession, Kyodo Gyogyo
could gradually enhance its corporate standing; behind
this could be said to lie the fact that the employees’
willingness to participate was centered on the guidanceof a leader with the philosophy and driving force of
Kosuke Kunishi.

Re-employment of Retired Seamen and
Improved Conditions for Active Seamen
On average, trawlers in 1927 operated for 14 days pertrip, fishing for about 10 days, with a round-trip of
4-7 days to and from the fishing grounds. They towed
nets for about 5 hours per session, completed between
35 and 40 towing sessions per trip, and caught 500 to
800 large cases each containing 60 kg of fish. Given
that there were 23 or 24 trips every year, the crewmembers spent virtually every day of the year at sea.
Ships were anchored at port for 27 or 28 hours.
During this time, fish catches would be unloaded,then food provisions, drinking water, crushed ice, coaland other requisites would be loaded in preparation
for the next trip. The engines would also have to beserviced. Conventionally, unloading and loading
operations were the work of the crew members. This
made it hard for them to recuperate sufficiently onland while the ship was docked, and was therefore anarea that required improvement.
In May 1927, the mutual aid system was establishedwith a view to hiring sea-based workers who hadreached retirement age, workers who had been injured
or fallen ill at work, and retired workers deemed particularly suitable by the company, among others. These
would be engaged in work necessary for the company,
while also promoting welfare, including relief fromunemployment. After the relocation to Tobata,86

positive moves were made to subcontract port entry
and departure operations by trawlers.
As a trawler entered port, mutual aid workers would
be mobilized to undertake all operations includingship handling and mooring, unloading of fish catches,loading of food, crushed ice and coal, etc., and tidying
the ship interiors. As well as giving the crew members
ample rest for 24 hours while the ship was docked,
this also had the effect of providing an income for themutual aid workers.
These improvements by no means reduced theseverity of the work at sea, however. As one crew
member recalled, “Once, in around 1932, we towed
nets 28 times during an eight-day trip, until the ship
was full of ribbonfish. Day after day, we made hugecatches with no time to sleep, and I was in bed for
only 3 hours 58 minutes during the whole eight days.
Of course, this does not include the number of times
I fell asleep while working. But then, no sooner had
we returned to port than we were off again only 24hours later”.
When the first towing was finished, the fish piled
up on deck would be sorted into cases while the second
towing was in progress. Then, as soon as the sortingwas complete, nets would be hauled up for the second
time. The nets would be emptied on deck then immediately cast again, followed by sorting, and this work
was repeated continuously around the clock. During
this time, the crew would never sleep for two consecutive hours. This may have been acceptable during theday, but working at night, before the lighting systemchanged to electric lamps, meant working in the dim
light of oil lamps, with many associated dangers. It
was not until around 1934 that all ships’ lighting waschanged to electricity.
In this way, the sweat of the trawler workers’ brow
was an important driving force that launched Kyodo
Gyogyo through the world of trawling.
Training Fisheries Workers“The success of fisheries in the new era of reorganization

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

will depend on workers who can adapt to it. To that
end, therefore, we will need to select those with theright qualities, and give them the knowledge andtraining essential for their work” (Anthology of Writingsand Speeches of Mr. Kosuke Kunishi).
Kosuke Kunishi identified the training of humanresources, irrespective of their qualities, as an important means of rationalizing fisheries. In particular, he
actively recommended that the sons of coastal fishermen should aim to become crew members in distantwater fisheries, thus adapting to the new age.
In April 1927, the Shimonoseki Fisheries Employee
Training Center was established with the aim of training superior seamen. The Center consisted of a Deck
Department and an Engines Department, each offering a Preparatory Course and a Main Course.
The Preparatory Courses accepted 20 higher elementary school graduates every year and gave practicaltraining for one year, including three months ofcoursework. The Main Courses, meanwhile, accepted
trainees who had completed the Preparatory Course
or had equivalent academic ability and on-board experience. It gave practical training for three years, including six months of coursework. The aim was to train
the managerial seamen of the future.
Incidentally, when trawling was first introduced toJapan, some ship’s captains had no knowledge of fisheries, and would therefore be accompanied by chief
fishermen. But now that ship’s captains had become
proficient in fisheries, Kyodo Gyogyo quickly abolished the system of chief fishermen. This was one of
the characteristics of Kyodo Gyogyo’s on-board labororganization.
In the steamship era, trawlers generally had crewsof 16–17, consisting of 4 senior seamen and 12–13
ordinary seamen. With the change to diesel engines,
however, trips became longer and equipment more
complex. To reflect this, crews increased to 20-21 men,with 6 senior seamen and 14-15 ordinary seamen,
including the addition of 2 freezer operators.
Soon, graduates of the Shimonoseki Fisheries
Employee Training Center came to account for the87majority of crew members—ordinary seamen as well
as senior seamen. This was another characteristic of
Kyodo Gyogyo.
Upon the company’s relocation to Tobata in 1930,

the Shimonoseki Fisheries Employee Training Center
was renamed the Tobata Fishing Boat Staff Training
Center.

Chapter 4: Emerging Zaibatsu and Fisheries— Nippon Sangyo and Nippon Suisan 1931–1940
Part 1 Kyodo Gyogyo’s Expanding Business Sectors
1. Kyodo Gyogyo and Market Distribution
Affiliated Businesses Stand Side by Side
After the relocation to Tobata in 1930, the Kyodo
Gyogyo Group had business interests in three main
sectors: (1) trawl fishery, west-water trawling, mothership-type crab and other fisheries, (2) ice making,refrigeration, freezing and marine product processing,and (3) sales of marine products. The company wasjoined by associated companies and affiliates standing
side by side.
Kyodo Gyogyo’s fisheries division absorbed thewhole business of Nippon Trawl in January 1931,
having acquired shares in that company in 1925. Thenin December that year, the herring fixed-net fisherycompany Godo Gyogyo K.K. was established. At
Tobata, mainly Kyodo Gyogyo but also others including the west-water two boats trawling company Hoyo
Gyogyo and Fuso Gyogyo K.K. were engaged in fisheries. In 1934, the Kyodo Gyogyo Group reached ascale whereby it owned 53 ships or 72% of Japan’s totalof 74 trawlers.
The necessary fishing nets, fishing tackle and ship’s
gear were supplied by Nippon Gyomo Sengu, fishcases by Nippon Gyokan K.K. (formerly Kagotora
Seikan K.K.) and crushed ice by Tobata Reizo.
Fish catches unloaded by conveyor were transported

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

and distributed by Marushin Unsoten and Kosoku
Reizo Kisen K.K. And the fish were delivered to theconsumers through a sales network including the 30
sales outlets of the former Chuo Suisan Hanbaisho,
as well as companies like Kyodo Suisan Hanbaisho inTokyo.
Meanwhile, parts of the fish catches were processed
into chikuwa, kamaboko and paste (canned fish) at the
Nippon Gyoryo factory, while other residues weremade into meal. Other parts were frozen by the company’s freezing equipment and delivered to consumers
in that form. Fish rapidly frozen at sea by deep-sea
fishery ships were similarly delivered to consumers via
Tobata Reizo’s freezing and refrigeration facilities.
Sankyo Suisan exported frozen and canned fish,
and later, whale oil too.
Canned king crab already enjoyed a good reputation
on overseas markets as specialty Japanese produce. It
was produced by Nippon Godo Kosen, which operated crab factory ships in the Sea of Okhotsk and theBering Sea. The empty cans used for this were madeby Tobata Seikan.
In fiscal 1931, Japan’s national railways handledsome 597,000 tons of fresh fish inside Japan, of whicharound 65,000 tons or 11% were dispatched from
Tobata Station; the Kyodo Gyogyo Group accounted

88for the majority of these catches.
Expanding Sales of Frozen Fish
Behind the dramatic expansion of Kyodo Gyogyo’s
frozen fish production lay technical innovations suchas the commercialization of diesel trawlers fitted with
rapid freezing equipment, and the practice of reducing
costs in the fishery business. Tobata Reizo, in chargeof processing, also installed UM-type rapid freezing
equipment, and from 1929 started trial manufacture
and production of frozen marine products, frozen
fruit, frozen vegetables and livestock products.
On the back of these developments, Kyodo Gyogyo
set up direct sales organs (Kaiko Shokai K.K.) in
Tokyo, Osaka and other major consumer bases, providing direct sales access to major consumers.
In response to this, the former Chuo Suisan
Hanbaisho also switched to a policy of direct sales to
consumers from 1931 onwards. In large cities, sales
routes for direct marketing of fish frozen at sea, processed marine products and others were developedwith a main focus on the army, restaurants and othermajor consumers. In the regions, meanwhile, sales
networks were rapidly expanded by setting up sales
outlets and branch offices.
Kosuke Kunishi had acutely felt the need to reformfish market distribution from the days of the Tamura
Steamship Fishery Company. In August 1921, basedon experience of over-the-counter selling and otherformats until then, he declared the view that “a fundamental policy needs to be established with regard
to fish markets”.
The gist of this was that the root cause of spiraling
fish prices lay in the lack of a government policy on
regulating fish prices. Having pointed this out, Kunishicited four possible solutions: “economic fishing port
development”, “building more refrigerated freightwagons, boosting the transportation capacity of railways, and reducing railway transportation costs for
fresh fish”, “improving the system and facilities of fish
markets”, and “improving the retail system”.

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Of these, he submitted his “Views on a Guideline
for Creating Central Markets” in June 1922, when an
Outline on the Creation of Central Markets as a measure to improve the system of fish markets was being
deliberated by the Home Ministry’s Advisory
Committee for Social Services. As a representative offisheries producers, Kunishi also appealed that promoting cost reductions and aiming to develop fisheries
should be urgently addressed, while taking steps tostabilize the national lifestyle by keeping prices of
essential foods at appropriate levels. Based on thisopinion from Kosuke Kunishi, the Japan Fisheries
Association submitted “Opinions on Central
Wholesale Markets” to the Home Ministry.
In outline, it asserted that, if the national government and local authorities were to construct central
markets at the rate of one per district in principle,
create independent inspection bodies, restrict numbersof middlemen and retailers through a system of qualifications and public authorization, and organize
autonomous unions by authorized middlemen andretailers, among other measures, not only would thecurrent proliferation of wholesale operators be corrected, but also monopolies by single operators would
be abolished, achieving fair distribution and smoothertrading.
In March 1923, the Central Wholesale Market Law
was enacted and promulgated. However, the Central
Wholesale Market created by the city of Kyoto aheadof the rest of the country in 1927 was, partly due tothe city’s fiscal constraints, far removed from that
hoped for by Kunishi and other fisheries producers.
The city’s policy on accommodating operators had
been changed from one of selecting operators to oneof accommodating all of them, and from a multiple
system of wholesalers to a single system. The policyof accommodating all operators had arisen from thecity’s wish to avoid compensating existing operators.
But this was later interpreted as a preferential rightfor existing wholesale operators, and merely resulted
in alienating fisheries producers.
Hereafter, central wholesale markets were89

successively created in 1930 (Kochi City), 1931 (Osaka
City and Yokohama City), 1932 (Kobe City), and1935 (Tokyo City). Central wholesale markets in aform consistent with Kunishi’s proposal would not
be introduced until after the war.

2. Creation of a Refrigerator Network
The relocation to Tobata, completed in 1930, was animportant starting point for Kyodo Gyogyo’s businessexpansion. For the necessary conditions were now allin place, with the associated companies handling fisheries development, processing and distribution allconcentrated in a single fisheries base. Previously, theperipheral businesses had been run by subsidiaries
around the core of Kyodo Gyogyo, but now Kyodo
Gyogyo embarked on a strategy of reorganizing andintegrating same or similar businesses in order to promote the industrialization of fisheries. By doing so,
Kyodo Gyogyo aimed to become a general fisheries
company handling large-scale production, processing,storage and distribution.
In the marine product processing sector, firstly,
Tobata Reizo changed its name to Godo Suisan Kogyo

K.K. in May 1932. In August that year, it absorbed
the two companies of Chuo Reizo and Nippon Gyoryo
by merger, adding ice making, refrigeration and freezing business to their existing marine product processing. In addition, Horai Suisan’s Takao cold stores andAsahi Suisan’s facilities on the Korean Peninsula were
all absorbed, and the Head Office was moved from
Tobata to Osaka. Land-based businesses previously
operated individually by individual companies were
now concentrated in Godo Suisan Kogyo.
“In both the past and the present, Japanese fisheries
have been unable to pull away from the realm of instability. Almost the only measure to turn this into astable business without sharp fluctuations in fish
prices, and to correct the present situation in which
we cannot preclude misgivings of immense instability

Head Office and emblem of Nippon Food Industries

Hachinohe Refrigeration Plant

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Tsuruga Refrigeration Plant

90

in that area, is to create a large-scale, controlled network of refrigerator facilities in principal locations
throughout Japan. When there are big fish catches
and a risk of falling into oversupply, this network
should be used to buy up appropriate volumes at fixedprices, thereby preventing a collapse in fish prices; andwhen there are reports of a supply shortage, theseshould be released and distributed to the public as
inexpensively as possible” (Anthology of Writings andSpeeches of Mr. Kosuke Kunishi).
However, a large investment of time and money
would be needed to form this with the company’s own
capital equipment. Therefore, it was considered ideal
to make corporate acquisitions the basic strategy.
Godo Suisan Kogyo had already become the core ofland-based business, and by adding and enhancing a

refrigerated warehouse network to it, a greater leap
forward could be expected. Kosuke Kunishi had conceived the idea of creating a refrigerated warehousenetwork.
In July 1933, Godo Suisan Kogyo negotiated amerger with Dai-Nippon Seihyo, which, despite being
the largest force in the ice-making industry, wasbecoming structurally weak. The talks fell through,however. So then Godo Suisan Kogyo, on completionof the Tokyo factory in December that year, decided
to build another new factory in Osaka.
In May 1934, Godo Suisan Kogyo renegotiated anabsorption merger with Dai-Nippon Seihyo, changing
its name to Nippon Food Industries K.K. (capital 15
million yen).

Part 2 The Challenge of Antarctic Whaling
1. Moves into Antarctic Whaling
Signing of the First International Whaling
Convention
Mother ship-type whaling in the Antarctic was quickly
developed by Norway. This sparked moves by whaling
ships from all over the world, vying with each otherfor the Antarctic’s abundant store of whales. With the
Antarctic now transformed into an international fishing ground, biologists started to warn of the threat ofextinction due to overfishing. Some politicians, meanwhile, were concerned over a decline of whaling, and“Developing sources of marine wealth” was adopted
as a theme for the Economic Expert Committee set
up within the League of Nations in 1924. Triggeredby talk in the Committee on the danger of baleen
whale extinction, the need to propose internationalrules for the protection of whales was confirmed in
1929.
The League of Nations Expert Committee thendrew up a “Draft International Convention to Regulate

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Whaling”, modeled on a Whaling Act passed independently by Norway. The Agreement was signed at
an international conference held in Geneva in
September 1931. Although it was signed by 25 countries, the Agreement could only come into force once
it had been ratified by at least 8 countries including
Norway and Britain. As a result, it did not actuallytake effect until 1935. Japan had attended the conference in Geneva as an observer, but did not sign theAgreement.
At just that time, the European whale oil market
fell into disarray owing to oversupply and the impactof the global Great Depression. Now Norwegian andBritish companies voluntarily imposed restrictions on
operating seasons and production. In response to thesetrends, the inaugural International Whaling Con­
ference was held in London in June 1937, resulting in
the adoption of a Whaling Agreement. Although it
was signed and ratified by western states, Japan refused
to sign, calling it premature. It was not until 1939 that91

Japan formally signed the International Whaling
Agreement. Before long, however, the war situation
had deteriorated, and the International Whaling
Agreement came aground while ratification procedures were still in progress.
In connection with the International Agreement,
Kosuke Kunishi was concerned that European countries would try to shut out Japanese interests in orderto maintain whale oil prices. In his own words, “Mostwhale oil is transported to European markets, where
it is used to make margarine, while the oil and fat
industry that uses this whale oil consists of so-calledworld-beating companies in this industry, like Unileverof Great Britain. If the Japanese were to venture further
into the industry and rival these companies in future,they would probably find some way of imposing aboycott on Japanese whale oil”. Furthermore, “Should
we eventually be compelled to sign the Agreement,
we would have to accept extremely disadvantageous
terms unless we had significantly built up our existing
capability by that point. For this reason, it is deemednecessary, more than anything else, to expand ourexisting capability as soon as possible” (Anthology of
Writings and Speeches of Mr. Kosuke Kunishi). Once
Nippon Suisan had moved into Antarctic whaling,
the business was promoted and expanded at a rapid
pace. This was because, at the same time as being forthe company’s own business expansion, Kunishi saw
it as his mission to elevate Japanese fisheries to a levelof international superiority.
Toyo Hogei Purchases the Beltana
The Japanese boom in coastal whaling from the endof the Taisho era to the beginning of the Showa era(early to mid-1920s) caused whales to migrate awayfrom coastal waters and swim offshore. As they did,the limits of coastal whaling started to become apparent, and there was a growing groundswell of opinion
in favor of sending large mother ships out for Antarctic
whaling. Besides, information was coming in to theeffect that Norway and Britain had already built up

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

impressive track records in the Antarctic. In response,
Toyo Hogei sent a survey team led by its Director
Tatsusaburo Shibuya and others to Europe. Tatsusaburo
Shibuya had been involved in whaling since aroundthe middle of the Meiji era, when Norwegian-stylewhaling was first introduced to Japan. He was one ofthe pioneers who promoted Antarctic and north-sea
whaling, and continued to devote himself to whaling
thereafter as well.
The team’s mission was to survey the state ofEuropean whaling and new fishing grounds, as well
as searching for a vessel that would be suitable as awhaling mother ship. This was in 1929, five years after
Norway had started its experiments with Antarctic
whaling. That year, 26 whaling mother ships were sent
to the Antarctic. Of these, Norway sent 18, Britain 5,
and Argentina and others sent 3, these numbers
increasing annually. This is thought to have reinforced
Toyo Hogei’s feeling that there was no more time tobe lost in catching up.
The team came across a ship called the Beltana at
the P&O Steam Navigation Company in London.
The Beltana had a gross tonnage of 11,220 tons, wasfitted with 220,000 cubic feet (1 cubic feet = 28.4
liters) of refrigeration equipment, and was built withgreat precision. It was well-suited to refurbishment asa whaling mother ship, and was also reasonably
priced.
Reasonable as it was, this was still a huge investment
for Toyo Hogei in those days, and there was a heateddebate about whether to buy or not. But after muchdeliberation, it was decided that the purchase would
go ahead, for a number of reasons: Norway, a leading
whaling nation, had already found considerable successin the Antarctic; the Antarctic had some excellent
fishing grounds; and being in a monopolistic positionin terms of whaling, Toyo Hogei had the national dutyof embarking on Antarctic whaling.
The handover was successfully completed in May
1930, and work started on designing the refurbishment. But just at that moment, the worldwide Great
Depression struck. To make matters worse, 1931–1932

92

were years of bumper catches and surplus production
by Norwegian whaling, causing a dramatic collapse
in whale oil prices. Most Norwegian fleets were forced
to remain idle in the following year, 1933. To meetthis situation, Toyo Hogei decided to temporarily
postpone the refurbishment of the Beltana. The ship
was moored off Ashiya in Kobe in the hope of a market

recovery, but prospects of an upturn failed to appear.
After remaining moored for about two years, the ship
was sold for scrap for 330,000 yen, nearly the same as
the original purchase price. This was the stroke of badluck that preceded Japan’s first success in Antarctic
whaling.

2. Establishment of Nippon Hogei
From Toyo Hogei to Nippon Hogei
Having gained momentum with its success in mothership-type crab fisheries, Kyodo Gyogyo now turned
the spotlight on Antarctic whaling as its next businessventure. Feeling it prudent to invest the capital earnt
from crab fisheries in the promising Antarctic whaling
business, Kenkichi Ueki asked Komao Baba, a formerclassmate and now a factory supervisor at Nippon
Godo Kosen, to investigate. Komao Baba would later
board the whaling mother ship the Antarctic, renamed
the Tonan Maru, as captain of a fleet bound for the
Antarctic.
Kosuke Kunishi had already felt the need to moveinto Antarctic whaling at the earliest possible juncture.
As mentioned above, Norway and Britain were alreadyoperating in the Antarctic at the time, and other countries were also waiting for an opportunity to do thesame. Kunishi was concerned that, if these countries
were to exercise their vested rights, Japan could findherself shut out of the Antarctic.
Around the time that Toyo Hogei purchased theBeltana, Kosuke Kunishi had once discussed with thatcompany the possibility of jointly operating mothership-type Antarctic whaling. By 1933, he was convinced of the need for Japanese whaling to shift tomother ship-type Antarctic whaling, and talks between
the two resumed. As a result, their views concurredon forming a collaborative relationship, but the question remained as to whether they should continue tooperate as separate companies or whether they should
merge their businesses. With mediation by Tatsunosuke

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Takasaki, Managing Director of Toyo Seikan, negotiations between Keizo Tamura of Kyodo Gyogyo andToichi Kuwata of Toyo Hogei led to a decision that
Kyodo Gyogyo would absorb Toyo Hogei and set up
a new company. Toyo Hogei initially resisted the lossof a company name steeped in tradition, but placed
greater priority on aiding the growth of Japanese fisheries through whaling, and embarked on the merger
from a national interest point of view.
Just before this, talks on a merger between Kyodo
Gyogyo and Nippon Sangyo were concluded, andToyo Hogei was also to be taken under the wing of
Nippon Sangyo. In May 1934, Nippon Sangyo established Nippon Hogei K.K. with capital of 20 million
yen for the purpose of Antarctic whaling. The
Chairman was to be Yoshisuke Aikawa, the President
Man-ichiro Hara, and the Directors Toichi Kuwata,
Tatsusaburo Shibuya and Kosuke Kunishi. Nippon
Hogei thus set out on the path of developing mothership-type whaling in Japan, based on a philosophy ofcombining the personnel, experience and technicalcapability of Toyo Hogei with the capital power of
Nippon Sangyo and Kyodo Gyogyo’s capacity forsupplying a wealth of marine resources to Japanesedinner tables.
Purchase of the Antarctic
Nippon Hogei started to prepare for Antarctic operations right away, but faced a number of hurdles in its
attempt to move into the new territory of Japan’s first
Antarctic whaling. The biggest problem was93

a fundamental one: Should the company really beventuring into Antarctic whaling when the prospectsof financial success were so uncertain? And if deciding
to go ahead, another major issue for consideration waswhether to build a new mother ship or just modify
an existing ship, or whether to purchase a new mothership. This was just at a time when the internationalsituation was growing increasingly precarious. The
business environment could hardly have been describedas favorable, with a ban on imports of secondhand
ships by the Japanese government, difficulties in business deals and negotiations due to worsening market
conditions in Europe, and so on. Although snags were
inevitable whichever option was chosen, a decision
was made to purchase a mother ship and immediately
embark on Antarctic whaling. Behind this lay
Yoshisuke Aikawa’s determination that “being newly
established as a national enterprise, Nissan should not
be overly concerned with profit but should engage inbusiness that no one else could fulfil” (Nobuo
Okamoto, Kindai Gyogyo Hattatsu Shi “History of
the Development of Modern Fisheries”).
At around that time, a Norwegian mother ship, theAntarctic, was put up for sale. Nippon Hogei decided
to purchase the ship and five auxiliary whaling ships
in a single lot. The government had imposed a ban on
secondhand ships, but the purchase in this case was
exceptionally permitted due to the special circumstances as a whaling mother ship. A purchase contract
was drawn up through the Kobe firm All Shokai
Guenner Gran for a total price of 56,000 pounds

sterling (about 900,000 yen), and the import permit
from the Japanese government was obtained without
problem. But then Norway suddenly passed a law
prohibiting the overseas sale of whaling mother ships,
and the deal seemed to have run aground. However,when it was pointed out that the contract had beenconcluded some days before the law was promulgated,
the Norwegian government narrowly approved the sale
after diplomatic lobbying by the Japanese government.

The Antarctic (later Tonan Maru)

The whaler Showa Maru No.5 (formerly the Galicia), a member of
the Tonan Maru fleet
Purchased together with the Antarctic

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Japan’s First Antarctic Whaling Goes Ahead
The next question was which whaling grounds to aim
for—the Antarctic or the north sea. Norway and othercountries had already achieved success in Antarctic
whaling, but for Japan, the Antarctic was unknown
territory when it came to fisheries. As with previous
plans, therefore, the aim was to gain experience of
whaling in the north sea, and only when a complete
system was in place, to venture into the Antarctic. At
the time, the Antarctic was regarded by some as “anocean of intense cold, dotted with icebergs, beyond astretch of rough and stormy seas”; many thought it
too reckless to go straight into Antarctic whaling. But
the opportunity to take up the challenge of Antarctic
whaling was to arrive with unexpected speed.
The Antarctic was moored at Tonsberg in Norway,
and the five whaling ships in a southwest African
fishing village called Walvis Bay. The proposed plan
was for the Antarctic to sail southwards down the west
coast of Africa, where it would join up with the94whaling ships, then round the Cape of Good Hopeand cross the Indian Ocean before navigating to Japan.
In the process, the idea was mooted that, since sailingdue south from the Cape of Good Hope would takethem within touching distance of the Antarctic, going
there to inspect conditions in situ before returning toJapan would be useful when planning future whaling
operations. A decision was therefore made to conduct
trial whaling in the Antarctic, as this could contributeto the cost of the voyage. This was a bold decision
driven by a strong awareness that it was important tostart Antarctic whaling as soon as possible, despite thepotential risks. Behind this decision is thought to havelain a firm confidence in operating fleets, from theexperience of crab mother ship operations in the northsea.
Having made this sharp about-turn and decided tofish in the Antarctic, Nippon Hogei urgently set about
recruiting crew members. The mother ship (theAntarctic) was to be captained by Shozo Kobayashi,with Yasushi Nagayama as Chief Engineer. These two,accompanied by Tatsusaburo Shibuya, went to Norway
via America, followed by a team of mother ship crew
members traveling via India. Another group made its
way to Walvis Bay, where it would take over the whaling ships and carry out repairs. Finally, whaling shipcrew members and flensing workers also set off for
Africa on the Hakuai Maru, taking food provisions,fishing tackle, cold weather gear and other requisites
with them.
Both the mother ship and the whaling ships were
all repaired and preparations for fishing completed at
a rapid pace, whereupon the Antarctic was transferred
to Japanese registration and renamed the Antakuchikku
Maru. Although it was exceptional for a vessel that
had so quickly been readied for fishing operations to
be given a certificate of Japanese registration, theMinistry of Communications and Transportation
provided full cooperation, having judged it to be amatter of national importance. Once the necessary
inspections had been carried out during the repair
period, the reg istration certificate was

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

obtained without problem. In addition, several highly
experienced Norwegian engineers were hired andtaken on board, and a system of education for crew
members was put in place. With preparations completed at this quick pace, the Antakuchikku Maru
departed from Cape Town bound for the Antarctic
Ocean, accompanied by three of the five whaling ships,
as the other two were too dilapidated.
The fleet arrived in the Antarctic fishing grounds
ten days later on December 23rd, 1934, and carriedout a whaling survey until early in the New Year. The
record of Antakuchikku Maru in this period was asfollows.
•213 whales caught (125 blue whales, 83 finback
whales, 4 humpback whales, 1 sperm whale)•2,159 tons of whale oil extracted
This record was significantly inferior compared tothe subsequent full-scale operations. Nevertheless,bearing in mind that the work had started in midvoyage after a sudden change of plan, and that the firstwhaling trial had still been achieved without hindrance, there could have been few complaints withthis opening performance. The fishing ground surveys
carried out in situ brought valuable information for
subsequent Antarctic whaling. Moreover, the crew
members had gained confidence in the success of
Antarctic whaling, and that was the best outcome of all.
The collected whale oil was exported from Kobe
Port for the Netherlands. As luck would have it, thewhale oil market was depressed and the price received
was not exactly favorable, but the quality was tradedat the highest standard available.
From the establishment of Nippon Enyo Gyogyo
in 1899 until that of Toyo Hogei, Nippon Hogei had
gathered ample experience in the technology of themodern Norwegian whaling method. It had moreover
experienced mother ship operations by Nippon Godo
Kosen, and had succeeded in trial operation of
Antarctic whaling with the Antakuchikku Maru.
Although Norwegian engineers had given guidance
during this voyage, subsequent operations were to relyon all-Japanese crews.

95

The Second Expedition by the Tonan Maru
Buoyed by its first whaling expedition, Nippon Hogei
immediately started preparing full-scale operations
for the next year, 1935. Because it was a factory ship
originally fitted in Norway, the Antakuchikku Maru
had no equipment for producing anything other thanwhale oil, and only produced 30.6 tons of salt-cured
whale meat. Antakuchikku Maru returned to port at
Kobe on March 21st, but prior to that, on the 12th,
had been renamed the “Tonan Maru”. After its return,the ship was repaired and refurbished, including new
facilities for storing edible whale meat.
On September 30th, 1935, the Tonan Maru
departed from Osaka with Komao Baba as captain of
the fleet, hunted whale until the following March andreturned on April 8th. In this second expedition, there
were no Norwegians on board, the crew being exclusively Japanese. The outcome was a catch of 639
whales, producing 7,358 tons of whale oil. Of the latter,some 5,000 tons were not taken back to Japan but
exported directly from the Antarctic to Europe.

In response to the Tonan Maru’s success in the
Antarctic, Nippon Hogei’s long-time rival Hayashikane
Shoten immediately decided to embark on Antarctic
whaling. Loth to fall any further behind Nippon
Hogei, it commissioned a rush construction job from
Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation, and in the shortspace of five months, the Nisshin Maru was completed
on September 28th, 1936. As a result, the third whaling expedition in fiscal 1936 saw two fleets operatingin the Antarctic; the Tonan Maru was joined by a
Hayashikane Shoten fleet led by the new whaling
factory ship Nisshin Maru.
For its part, Nippon Hogei now hurried to build asecond and a third Tonan Maru. It had decided toboost its fleets in view of the first Tonan Maru’s operating record, hampered by its limited capacity andequipment mainly designed for whale oil. The rapid
catch-up strategy by Hayashikane Shoten certainly
provided a stimulus. In fact, Japan’s Antarctic whaling
acted as a positive spur that energized these two, andalso led to improvements in technology.

3. Antarctic Whaling Evolves into a National EnterpriseFirst Expeditions by the Tonan Maru II and
Tonan Maru III
In August 1936, two months before Hayashikane
Shoten’s Nisshin Maru expedition, Nippon Hogei
started building the Tonan Maru II. On completion,it had a gross tonnage of 19,262 tons, making it thelargest steamship in Japan at the time. For the shipbuilder, Osaka Iron Works, this was a major projectof unprecedented scale, even causing the company toexpand its slipway on starting the construction. In
September that year, Nippon Hogei and Nippon
Godo Kosen were both merged into Kyodo Gyogyo,
which changed its name to Nippon Suisan the following March.
In advance of the construction of the Tonan Maru
II, Kyuhei Suzuki (later to become the company’s 4th

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

President) met with Norwegian engineers in Europe
to discuss the ship’s design. A problem with previously
attempted whaling mother ships was that the righting
moment was too strong, causing violent rolling andresultant interference with the work. To overcome
this, it was found that a 1.9-meter tween deck should
be installed between the tank top and the factory deck.
Although this would reduce the righting moment, it
would also reduce rolling and improve the ship’s safety,
thus increasing the efficiency of work on board. It wasalso found that a capacity of about 2,000 tons would
facilitate the production of salt-cured whale meat.
This was a valuable piece of information for starting
full-scale production of whale meat along with whaleoil. The adoption of such advanced technology andequipment enabled the company to build a massive
vessel in excess of 19,000 tons. The Tonan Maru II

96

Tonan Maru II and the whaler Takunan Maru in the Antarctic
Ocean

Tonan Maru III transferring whale oil to the tanker Itsukushima
Maru in the Antarctic Ocean

was successfully launched in May 1937.
Hardly pausing for breath, Nippon Suisan then set
to work on building the Tonan Maru III. This wasanother giant whaling mother ship with a gross tonnage of 19,209 tons, on the same scale as the Tonan
Maru II. The Tonan Maru III was completed in
September 1938.
Hayashikane Shoten, meanwhile, had completed
the Nisshin Maru No.2 in 1937, sending two fleetsfrom that year’s Antarctic expedition onwards. Then
Kyokuyo Co., Ltd. was established in September andits ship the Kyokuyo Maru was completed in October
1938, starting Antarctic whaling in the same year.
Kyokuyo had been founded by Tosataro Yamaji in
1937. In 1919, he had established Sumatera Rubber
Development, running a business for the productionof natural rubber, a scarce commodity in Japan, andresearching the development of fat and oil resources.
While doing so, he turned his attention to Antarctic
whaling. In October 1936, he applied for a businesslicense as the Sumatera Development Whaling
Department, which was granted in February 1937.
These developments at the time were colorfully
reported in the newspapers and other media as competition to build giant ships, making it a big topic ofdiscussion all over Japan. In particular, the construction of the Tonan Maru II and III was seen as anepoch-making venture in the shipbuilding industry.
A 75-Year History of the Hitachi Zosen Corporation
states that “Together with the Nisshin Maru, underconstruction by Kawasaki Shipbuilding at the time,these were the largest steamships in Japan, with thespecial structure of whaling factory ships, moreover
being built in Japan for the first time; for Hitachi
Zosen, this was truly an epoch-making project”. The
Tonan Maru II was actually 2,000 tons heavier thanthe Chichibu Maru, lauded as the “Queen of the
Pacific” at the time. Its displacement of 35,000 tons
was also fully 2,000 tons larger than the super-dreadnoughts Mutsu and Nagato, while the launch weightof 9,800 tons more or less rivaled the gross weight of
the iron framework used to build the National Diet
Building in Tokyo.
The fact that such an impressive system had been
put in place only four years after the Tonan Maru
ventured out on Japan’s first Antarctic whaling expedition reveals the strength of Nippon Suisan’s resolve
for Antarctic whaling. It provides evidence of theimportance placed on Antarctic whaling, as a business
imbued with Nippon Suisan’s ideal of acquiring marine
resources from the world’s oceans and providing richly
nutritious food for Japan’s dinner tables.
In September 1937, the Tonan Maru II set off for
the Antarctic. The recorded outcome was a catch of
1,833 whales and production of more than 20,000
tons of whale oil. Such a large output of whale oil was
made possible by the power of 12 steam-type oil extraction devices called quaner boilers. In the year after the
first expedition by the Tonan Maru II, the Tonan Maru
III set off on its first expedition to the Antarctic. The
Tonan Maru III caught 1,378 whales and produced
15,713 tons of whale oil.

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

97Full-Scale Production of Red Whale Meat andthe Start of the Tanker Business
Up to this point, whaling mother ships had mainly
produced whale oil and brought back a limited supplyof salt-cured whale meat. But the ultimate goal of
Antarctic whaling by Nippon Suisan was to massproduce frozen whale meat and deliver it to Japanesedinner tables.
Producing frozen whale meat depended on theexistence of freezing factory ships. A decision was
therefore made to purchase the secondhand refrigerator ship “Narenta” from Britain. After docking at
Osaka in March 1939, the Narenta was refurbished at
the Sakurajima Works of Osaka Iron Works andrenamed the “Kosei Maru”. The Kosei Maru was thenintroduced for Antarctic whaling in 1939. Particularly
noteworthy in its refurbishment was the addition ofan Iwamoto on-board rapid freezer (freezing capacity
about 100 tons per day), and the installation of afreezing hatch that could store 5,000 tons of whale
meat. Executive Director Chiyoma Iwamoto, thedesigner of this rapid freezing equipment, traveled to
the Antarctic on the ship and oversaw the productionof frozen whale meat in a faultless system. Incidentally,
this ship, assigned to the fleet of the Tonan Maru II,
produced 4,923.9 tons of edible whale meat.
Nippon Suisan sent the tanker Itsukushima Maru
for her maiden voyage to the Antarctic in January
1938. With the production of sperm oil added to theexisting finwhale oil, whale oil output had been
increasing briskly, and the need for bulk transportation

The freezer mother ship Kosei Maru (formerly the Narenta)

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

by dedicated tankers had become a pressing issue.
Tanker ships were introduced so that the large volumesof whale oil produced in the Antarctic could be loaded
onto the Itsukushima Maru and exported to Europe
more efficiently.
While the Itsukushima Maru played a great part inexporting whale oil, once the whale oil was offloadedin Europe the ship would return to Japan empty.
Effective measures to make use of this were then studied. As a result, it was decided that crude oil would
be loaded at Panama on the return journey, and thiswould then be brought to Japan. The Itsukushima
Maru had originally been introduced with the aim of
efficiently exporting large quantities of whale oil. At
the same time, however, it led to the company’s involvement in the crude oil and heavy oil loading and transportation business. It was a pioneer of the tanker
business in Japan.

Expansion of Japanese Influence in the
Antarctic and Interruption of Antarctic Whaling
With a succession of whaling mother ships constructedby Nippon Suisan and Hayashikane Shoten, Japansent six fleets for Antarctic whaling in the years
1938–1939.
In the previous year, 1937, Norway possessed 9
mother ships, Britain 10, Germany 6, Japan 4, America
1 and Panama 1. In other words, Japan had alreadyestablished a significant presence in Antarctic whaling.
And Japan’s increase from four to six fleets in operationfrom 1938 drew attention not only from inside Japanbut also from the rest of the world. Nippon Suisan
owned half of these with three fleets; moreover, thescale and equipment of the Tonan Maru II and III
were overwhelming.
So now Japan’s long-awaited challenge on Antarctic
whaling with six fleets could start, but the growth inyield that year fell short of expectations. Given thatsome fleets were hunting for the first time, this isthought to have been because more emphasis was
being placed on safe operations.

98

Operations in 1939–1940 finally produced moresatisfying results, partly due to the development of
new fishing grounds; good yields were obtained fromthe Balleny Islands and the Ross Sea east of 140° east
longitude. Another major factor was that the output
of both whale oil and whale meat had risen dramatically thanks to Nippon Suisan’s introduction of thetanker Itsukushima Maru and the freezer mother ship
Kosei Maru.
Even better results were to be achieved in the 1940–
1941 operations. World War II broke out in September
1939, triggered by Germany’s invasion of Poland.
When Germany formed the Triple Axis with Italy andJapan the following September, America hardened its

stance towards Japan. Operations continued amid
mounting international tension. With the onset of
the wartime regime, moreover, controls became more
intense, hindering the procurement of human resources
and materials. Nevertheless, the six fleets still went
through with Antarctic whaling. As it transpired, thisyear’s expedition was to be the last before the war.
With the outbreak of the Pacific War, Japan’s six
Antarctic whaling mother ships, including the threeowned by Nippon Suisan, were requisitioned one after
the other in 1941-1942 for use as navy tankers. Theirfate was to be sunk in allied attacks. Of the otherwhaling ships, 67 were either sunk or went missing.

4. Expeditions to the North Sea
Establishment of Hokuyo Hogei andInterrupted Operations
All companies had applied for whaling in the North
Pacific, as the whaling grounds were relatively nearand the whaling season was in summer, thus not overlapping with Antarctic whaling. Considering the stateof resources, however, the government limited its issueof licenses, and in 1936 decided to permit operations
by only one mother ship.
In response to this, Hokuyo Hogei K.K. (capital
300,000 yen, increased to 1.5 million yen in 1940)
was established that March with joint capitalization
by Nippon Suisan, Taiyo Hogei K.K. and Kyokuyo.
Before starting operations, Hokuyo Hogei sent the
trawler Yuki Maru to the north sea for a fishing groundsurvey in July 1937. Sailing northwards through theBering Sea along Kamchatka to reach the Arctic
Ocean, the ship followed a course along Alaska to thenorth of the Aleutian Islands on the return journey,
conducting thorough surveys along the way. In theprocess, a total of 547 whales were spotted, leading to
the conclusion that the north sea provided excellent
whaling grounds.
It was not until June 1940 that an actual whaling

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

expedition was sent to the north sea, the Nippon
Suisan mother ship Tonan Maru leaving port in thecompany of four whaling ships. It had taken nearly
three years from the end of the survey to the actual
expedition. One reason for this is thought to havebeen that international whale oil prices hadcollapsed.
This first whaling operation lasting 80 days in thenorth sea produced catches of 673 whales, 4,577 tonsof whale oil and 1,486 tons of whale meat, among
others. In the following year, the Tonan Maru andseven whaling ships operated for 60 days, during whichtime 579 whales were caught, and 4,000 tons of whale
oil and 3,655 tons of whale meat and others were
produced. Like Antarctic whaling, however, operations were interrupted by the deterioration of the war
situation.
Coastal Whaling by Nippon Hogei
While putting energy into Antarctic whaling, Nippon
Hogei still continued its traditional coastal whaling
operations. Overexploitation and exhaustion of
resources had caused the Regulations for theManagement of Whaling to be enacted in 1909,

99

limiting licenses for coastal whaling to no more than
30 ships. In 1934, an amendment to the Regulations
brought this number down further to 25 ships. Of
these, 19 were owned by Nippon Hogei, 4 by Tosa
Hogei K.K. (a Hayashikane Shoten affiliate), 1 by

Enyo Hogei K.K. (ditto), and 1 by Ayukawa Hogei
K.K. (Kyokuyo). In other words, 76% of licensed ships
were concentrated in Nippon Hogei, and this licensing
ratio would not change until after the war in 1947.

Part 3 Participation in Nissan Konzerne
1. Birth of the Newly Emerging Zaibatsu
Emerging from the Wartime Boom andthe Great Depression
The outbreak of World War I in 1914 sparked an
economic boom in Japan. Both domestic and overseas
demand suddenly increased, and private companies
embarked on massive business expansion. This was
especially true of the newly emerging companies, andparticularly the new zaibatsu conglomerates whosebusiness had blossomed somewhat later than the oldzaibatsu. These new zaibatsu included Suzuki, Kuhara,
Kawasaki (Shozo) = Matsukata, Shibusawa, Iwai,
Nomura and Murai. The older conglomerates ofMitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo had developed theirbusiness in diverse sectors as general zaibatsu, and had
mainly moved into heavy chemical industries during
the World War I boom. By contrast, the new zaibatsu
focused on ventures and expansion in the sectors ofoverseas trade, shipping, shipbuilding, steelmaking
and banking, with a force to rival that of the oldzaibatsu.
But everything changed after the war, when the
postwar “rebound depression” plunged the Japanese
economy into new lows with astonishing rapidity.
This was followed by the Great Kanto Earthquake on
September 1st, 1923, the ensuing Showa Depression,and finally the global Great Depression triggered by
the catastrophic Wall Street crash of 1929. As a resultof these events, the Japanese economy was in a stateof chaos.

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Characteristics of the New Zaibatsu
Amid the economic turbulence between World War
I and the Showa Depression, the three great zaibatsu
of Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo and the fiveother zaibatsu of Yasuda, Asano, Okura, Furukawa
and Kawasaki (Hachiemon) had continued to expand
their business foundations without any negative
impact on their status. Comparing the business scaleof the various zaibatsu in terms of paid-up capital, asof 1928 Mitsui and Mitsubishi were overwhelmingly
the largest, followed by Yasuda and Sumitomo, with
Asano, Okura, Kawasaki and Furukawa lagging considerably behind (Nihon Keieishi, “Japanese BusinessHistory/New Edition—From the Edo Period to the
21st Century”, Yuhikaku). Although the old zaibatsu
were equally affected by the postwar depression, theyeffectively invested the capital gains made during theGreat War boom in their principal business sectors,
or quickly liquidated loss-making divisions, andthereby succeeded in strengthening their economic
muscle. On the other hand, Suzuki, Kuhara, Murai
and others were to taste the bitter pill of bankruptcy.
Factors separating winners from losers included failures in banking business, speculation and diversification strategies.
The decline was particularly severe for the Suzuki
zaibatsu (Suzuki Shoten), which came to its demisewith the Showa Depression. Suzuki Shoten had beenfounded back in 1874. After obtaining sales rights to
Taiwanese camphor oil, it had consolidated its power100through the Taisho era with a succession of corporate
acquisitions. It had continued to make speculative
buyouts during World War I, reaping massive profits,
but had been hit hard by the “rebound depression”. It
was then quickly driven to bankruptcy following thefamous “Watanabe Bank collapse” gaffe by the Finance
Minister of the day. Similarly, Kuhara Mining (discussed in more detail later) also trod the path of
decline, influenced by an unstable economy.
Little affected by these violent ups and downs of
the Taisho zaibatsu, organizations called “newzaibatsu” or “new Konzerne” now started to build asolid status for themselves. These had first appeared
between the final year of Meiji and the Taisho era,and had formed groups of companies between thetime of the Mukden Incident and the first half of theSino–Japanese War. Specifically, the new zaibatsu
included Nippon Sangyo (Nissan), of which Nippon
Suisan would become an affiliate, as well as Nitchitsu,
Mori, Nisso and Riken. The new zaibatsu were to rival
the existing zaibatsu around the time of the Sino–
Japanese War, but their management methods andcorporate activity were very different from those of
the existing zaibatsu.
While the existing zaibatsu mainly revolved aroundfamily-owned capital, the new zaibatsu took the formof public stock companies, and the ratio of family
share ownership was generally not so high. Anotherbig difference compared to the old zaibatsu was thatthey did not include financial institutions among theiraffiliates. This made them dependent on other waysof raising funds from the public, and this, in turn, was
one reason why they took the form of public stockcompanies.
Again, while the existing zaibatsu were general
corporate conglomerates, the new zaibatsu were corporate groups with a main focus on heavy chemicalindustries. The new zaibatsu made bold challenges innew business areas that had not previously existed inJapanese industry. Many of their founders were menfrom technological backgrounds, who provided personal leadership in actively developing innovative
business.
Because the new zaibatsu developed their businessin heavy chemical industries, they became strongly
linked to military supply industries. Their ties withthe military and reformist bureaucrats inevitably grewstronger; later, Nissan would achieve huge businessexpansion in Manchuria and Nitchitsu in Korea. The
new zaibatsu promoted the public offering and deconcentration of stock, and by conducting business inpreviously unknown sectors, aimed to contribute to
the national interest. As their businesses continued to
expand, they stoked a burning a sense of rivalry vis-àvis the conservative existing zaibatsu.

2. Background to the Founding of Nippon Sangyo
The Rise of Fujita Gumi
Fujita Gumi can trace its beginnings back to 1869,
when Denzaburo Fujita, thought to have worked inlogistics for the kiheitai irregular militia in the Choshu
Clan (now Yamaguchi Prefecture), started manufacturing army boots. Denzaburo Fujita was the uncle of
Nippon Suisan’s founder Ichiro Tamura. Denzaburo
persuaded his eldest brother Shikataro Fujita and hiselder brother Shozaburo Kuhara to join him in setting
up Fujita Gumi in 1881. In 1884, when the Matsukata

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

policy of austerity was in full swing, Fujita Gumi
bought up the Kosaka Mine from the government.
With moral support from his clansman, the Meiji
elder statesman Kaoru Inoue, Denzaburo Fujita succeeded in obtaining a loan from the Mouri family,
rulers of the Choshu Domain, thereby acquiring business capital. At the same time as operating the Kosaka
Mine, Fujita Gumi also put energy into the Kojima
Bay land reclamation project, and created the vast
Fujita Farm. Fujita Gumi then promoted its businessexpansion on the twin axes of mining and farming.

101

The former fell into difficulties, however, as output
from the Kosaka Mine left something to be desired,and moreover, silver prices were in a downward trend.
Fujita Gumi decided to close the Kosaka Mine, entrusting the administrative procedures to Fusanosuke
Kuhara, Denzaburo Fujita’s nephew and Ichiro
Tamura’s younger brother. Kuhara had graduated from
Keio University before joining the Morimura Gumi
group, but was transferred to Fujita Gumi on theorders of Kaoru Inoue. Though entrusted with theclosure of the Kosaka Mine, Kuhara found future
potential in the mine’s black ore deposits, and appealed
directly to Kaoru Inoue that the mine should remain
active. The Kosaka Mine was consequently broughtback from the brink in line with Fusanosuke Kuhara’s
designs. This not only averted a management crisis in
Fujita Gumi, but also served to make it independent
from the Mouri family, which had provided its startup
capital.
Establishment of Kuhara Mining
While Fusanosuke Kuhara was devoting his energies
to reconstructing the Kosaka Mine, a dispute over the
succession of Fujita Gumi’s business had arisen following the death of Shikataro Fujita and the retirementof Shozaburo Kuhara. Fusanosuke Kuhara decided toresign from Fujita Gumi, and used the capital allowance paid by Denzaburo Fujita to purchase the
Akasawa Copper Mine. He then named it the Kuhara
Kogyosho Hitachi Kozan (Hitachi Mine of Kuhara
Mining) and opened it for mining operations. Thiswas in 1905. Kuhara introduced the latest technology
into the Hitachi Mine and increased its output ofcopper, then went on to purchase mines all over thecountry. As a result, copper output by Kuhara
Kogyosho (Kuhara Mining) in 1912 rose to become
the third highest in Japan. That year, the Kuhara
Mining Co. was established with capital of 10 million
yen.

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

During World War I, which broke out two years
later, Kuhara Mining acquired a succession of nonferrous metal mines all over Japan and in Korea,
achieving remarkable growth. Equipped with the vast
sums earned in this way, together with the massive
amount of capital obtained through capital increases,
Kuhara now embarked on business diversification.
The business scope of Kuhara Mining extended tomaritime shipping, shipbuilding, steelmaking andtrade. As major shareholders, the Kuhara family had
brought other companies under its wing besides
Kuhara Mining—notably Hitachi, Ltd., Kuhara Shoji,
Nippon Kisen, Osaka Iron Works, Godo Hiryo andKyoho Life Insurance—and now formed a massive
conglomerate, one of the biggest Taisho zaibatsu.
It could not maintain this momentum, however,and its fortunes suddenly turned downwards in therebound depression after World War I. The main
reason for its poor business performance was a downturn in the performance of Kuhara Mining. On top
of falling copper prices and increased manufacturingcosts, an increase in imports of American copper,
backed by that country’s superior technology, caused
grave damage not only to Kuhara Mining but also to
the Japanese copper mining industry in general.
Another reason was the poor performance of Kuhara
Shoji. Kuhara Shoji had failed in speculative tradingof sundries amid the maelstrom of the rebound depression, and had recorded enormous losses. And although
Kuhara Shoji’s debts were resolved through personal
guarantees from Fusanosuke Kuhara, the various affiliates of the Kuhara family, which owed much to thereputation of Fusanosuke Kuhara, fell into a serious
financial crisis.
Taking personal responsibility for the critical situation of Kuhara Mining, Fusanosuke Kuhara now
withdrew from its management, entrusting its reconstruction to his brother-in-law, Yoshisuke Aikawa.

102

3. The Birth of Nissan Konzerne
Yoshisuke Aikawa Reconstructs
Kuhara Mining
Yoshisuke Aikawa was born into a samurai family inthe village of Ouchi, Choshu Province, in 1880. As
his mother was a niece of Kaoru Inoue, he was brought
up in the Inoue household, where he benefited greatly
from the tutelage of Kaoru Inoue. Aikawa had fivesisters and one younger brother. The sisters married,variously, Mitsubishi Chairman Kusuyata Kimura;
Fusanosuke Kuhara; Taichi Kaijima (the Kaijima
family ran the Chuo Kasai Shogai Hoken insurancecompany, which would later become an affiliate of
Nissan Konzerne); Tatsugoro Inoue, younger brotherof Dr. Tatsuji Inoue, Director of the Inoue Eye Hospitalin Kanda Surugadai, Tokyo; and Shin-ichi Kondo,
son of Rikusaburo Kondo, President of Furukawa
Gomei Kaisha. Yoshisuke’s younger brother Masasuke
married the eldest daughter of Kotaro Fujita, eldest
son of Shikataro Fujita, and succeeded to the Fujita
family (Fujita of Tokyo). Yoshisuke Aikawa himself
married the eldest daughter of Tojiro Iida, owner ofTakashimaya Iida Gomei Kaisha. Yoshisuke Aikawa
thus built relations of kinship with some of the mosteminent entrepreneurs and families of the day, andthe majority of these alliances were mediated by Kaoru
Inoue.
On graduating from the Mechanical Engineering
Department in the Faculty of Engineering at Tokyo
Imperial University, Yoshisuke Aikawa went incognito
to join Shibaura Engineering Works (the forerunnerof Toshiba Corporation) as a mechanic. His aim in
doing so was to gain factory floor experience withwhich to become independent and pursue his own
business in the future. While working at Shibaura
Engineering Works, he went to visit other factories in
the Tokyo area on his days off. After visiting nearly
200 factories, he came to the conclusion that the latest
technology in mechanical engineering could not befound in Japan, and so decided to travel to America.

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Having crossed the Pacific in 1905, Yoshisuke Aikawa
worked in America as an apprentice for a metal casting
company. Through his experience there, he discovereda means of successfully domesticating the productionof malleable cast iron. He became convinced that, by
combining the latest American technology with theinnate manual dexterity and locomotive agility of theJapanese, he could make internationally competitive
products that were superior to those of Americancompanies.
On his return to Japan, Yoshisuke Aikawa, with thebacking of Kaoru Inoue, established the Tobata
Foundry Co. (the forerunner of Hitachi Metals, Ltd.)in Tobata, Kitakyushu, in 1910. Tobata Foundry successfully emerged from the teething troubles of its
startup period, thanks to the support of related families, and became established in domestic productionand exports of malleable cast iron. The business proceeded smoothly, and achieved management independence via World War I. As Yoshisuke Aikawa’s businessinvolvement increased, however, he started to feel that
there were limits to his method of centralized management, whereby he himself would manage and control
every aspect of the business. This, he felt, needed tobe corrected both in terms of personnel and with aview to developing diversified strategies in future. In
1922, therefore, he established Kyoritsu Kigyo K.K.
as a shareholding management body through which
to introduce a method of decentralized management,
and placed Tobata Foundry and other acquisitions
under its umbrella as affiliates. However, Kyoritsu
Kigyo was unable to serve fully as a management body,owing to a lack of capital power. There was no option
but to take capital from affiliates that had surplus
funds and divert it to the other companies. As a result,the Tobata Foundry, which had capital power, strengthened its influence. The Konzerne-type managementwith Kyoritsu Kigyo at its center, as envisaged by
Yoshisuke Aikawa, could not be materialized.
It was amid this situation that Yoshisuke Aikawa

103was appointed to reconstruct Kuhara Mining in placeof Fusanosuke Kuhara. After examining the company
down to the minutest detail, Aikawa realized that the
only possible solution was to settle its debts internallyamong the related families and owners, and thus
requested assistance from each related family. The
Kaijima, Fujita of Tokyo, Tamura, Aikawa, Saito(Fusanosuke Kuhara’s eldest brother Ikuta Saito wasa Director of Kuhara Mining) and other related families all rallied to the call, approving appropriate levelsof financing.
The Birth of Nissan Konzerne
Once the debts of Kuhara Mining had been consolidated, Yoshisuke Aikawa was appointed the company’s
President in 1928. Having learnt his lesson from thefailure of Kyoritsu Kigyo, Aikawa now established theconcept of a public holding company. By listing thecompany’s shares, he planned to increase shareholders
among the general public, obtain capital broadly fromthe stockmarket and thus ease financing problems.
He also planned to enhance management and supervisory functions to ensure the success of the diversification strategy. In this way, Aikawa aimed to develop
a multi-sector, compound corporate business strategy.
He announced this business management format
under the name of a public holding company, as a“holding company that has its foundations in themasses” (Ginko Sosho Vol. 21, “New Capitalism andHolding Companies”, Tokyo Ginko Shukaisho, 1934).
To bring this to reality, he presented a proposal to theGeneral Meeting of Shareholders. The proposal,
which was approved in December 1928, outlined thefollowing three points.
•Kuhara Mining will be reorganized as a holding
company.
•The company’s shares will be made publicly available.
•The company name will be changed to Nippon
Sangyo Co., Ltd.
As a result, the Nippon Sangyo holding company
would later reign supreme as the core company of

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Nissan Konzerne.
At first, however, Nippon Sangyo had considerable
hurdles to overcome. Because around 70% of the total
investment was diverted to Nippon Mining Co. (theforerunner of JX Holdings, Inc.), which had been split
off and made independent as a successor to Kuhara
Mining’s business, the company was heavily influenced
by Nippon Mining’s business performance. The Showa
Depression hit Nippon Mining directly, and this consequently led to a deterioration of Nippon Sangyo’s
business performance.
Nippon Sangyo failed to pay a dividend for fiveconsecutive terms from the first half of 1930 onwards,
but the company’s business recovered dramatically asa result of the renewed ban on gold exports in 1931
and government measures to raise the sale price ofmined gold from the following year onwards. This
upturn in the external environment provided a powerful stimulus for Nippon Mining, which, as Japan’s
biggest gold mining company, accounted for around
30% of the value of Japan’s mined gold. Nippon
Mining’s share price, which at one point had fallen to
11.9 yen, rose to 130.5 yen in the first half of 1933.
Yoshisuke Aikawa capitalized on this to start a withdrawal from the structure of dependence on Nippon
Mining and to spread risk through a strategy ofdiversification.
Nippon Sangyo immediately put shares in its twocompanies Nippon Mining and Hitachi, Ltd. up forsale. Having thus acquired numerous shareholders,
the two companies then made capital increases throughrights issues, and succeeded in expanding their business capital. Nippon Sangyo allocated the capitalobtained through share sale profits to new businesses
and proceeded with diversification. It embarked on
aggressive corporate absorption mergers based on
exchanges with its own soaring shares, then successively separated the companies off as subsidiaries.
As a result, Nippon Sangyo was able to expand its
business into diverse sectors besides its existing mining(Nippon Mining) and engineering businesses (Hitachi,Ltd. and Hitachi Denryoku), including chemical

104

industries (Nippon Kagaku Kogyo and Nippon Oil& Fats), automotive engineering (Nissan Motor),audio industries (Nipponophone and Victor Talking
Machine Company of Japan) and fisheries (Nippon
Suisan).
Now developed into a major business conglomerate,
Nippon Sangyo succeeded in increasing its numberof shareholders as planned. The number grew fromabout 20,000 in the second half of 1934 to about
30,000 one year later, passing 50,000 in the first halfof 1937. Of these, some 98% were ordinary shareholders with holdings of less than 500 shares; the shareholding ratio of these ordinary shareholders was
actually more than 50%. The shareholding ratio of
those connected with the Kuhara and Aikawa families
decreased in inverse proportion to this, falling fromaround 40% at the time of Nippon Sangyo’s establishment to around 5% at the end of the first half of 1937.
Nippon Sangyo had succeeded in transforming itself
into a public stock company.

4. Nippon Suisan Becomes an Affiliate of Nissan Konzerne
Establishment of the Nippon Sangyo Fisheries
Department and the Birth of Nippon Suisan
One of the main reasons for Nippon Sangyo’s diversification was to avoid the risk of structural dependence on mining (Nippon Mining). To pay dividends
to large numbers of shareholders, it was vital that theshare price be kept stable and high. To achieve this,the time lag between investment and returns had to
be made as short as possible, and the format of a generalbusiness group needed to be perfected quickly. In
other words, the most pressing task was to produce
immediate profit, and to acquire companies engaged
in business sectors not linked to the market risks ofmining. The company that came to the fore amid thisprocess was one that boasted a monopolistic scale in
the fisheries industry — Kyodo Gyogyo.
The reasons why Yoshisuke Aikawa turned his
attention to fisheries have been described as follows:“Since Nippon Mining was a mainstay for Nippon
Sangyo as a public holding company, another company
that could substantially match Nippon Mining was
also needed, from the perspective of diversification.
While the search for that company continued, theidea of fisheries is said to have been mooted. Specifically,a food industry furnished by marine products. Rice
could not be industrialized, and livestock products
would also have been difficult to industrialize, given
Japan’s shortage of open land. The seas, on the other

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

hand, were a wellspring of food for human consumption, and proud industries still remained there.
Moreover, fisheries and related food industries could
provide another mainstay for Nissan, from the opposite end of the business spectrum to mining” (Hideyoshi
Wada, “Nihon Konzerne Zensho (VI), Nissan Konzerne
Dokuhon”, 1937).
In July 1933, Yoshisuke Aikawa was appointed
Chairman of Kyodo Gyogyo. At the same time,
President Hisazo Matsuzaki bowed out, his place being
taken by Keizo Tamura, the adopted heir of Ichiro
Tamura. In the second half of that year, Nippon
Sangyo owned 89,660 shares in Kyodo Gyogyo,
36,300 shares in Nippon Godo Kosen and 33,800
shares in Godo Suisan Kogyo. Nippon Godo Kosen
was a company mainly engaged in mother ship-type
crab fishery, while Godo Suisan Kogyo, the forerunnerof Nippon Food Industries, was engaged in ice making,freezing, refrigeration and marine product processing,

Kyodo Gyogyo Chairman Yoshisuke Aikawa (right) and President
Keizo Tamura

105

among others.
In June 1934, Nippon Sangyo created a Fisheries
Department with the aim of overseeing its fisheriesrelated business. Kosuke Kunishi was appointed
Managing Director and was made Manager of theFisheries Department.
The Nippon Sangyo Fisheries Department energetically set about expanding and integrating the companies under its umbrella. First, it increased the capitalof the west water two boats trawling company Hoyo
Gyogyo from 2 million yen to 10 million yen, allowing
it to take over Kyodo Gyogyo’s trawling division. The
following July, it absorbed Kyodo Gyogyo, Toyo Hogei
and Dai-Nippon Seihyo into Hoyo Gyogyo, Nippon
Hogei, Nippon Food Industries, respectively, and thenchanged the name Hoyo Gyogyo to “Kyodo Gyogyo”.
With the aim of centralizing business and rationalizing management, Nippon Godo Kosen and Nippon
Hogei were merged with Kyodo Gyogyo in September,while at the same time all Nippon Food Industries
shares were transferred to Kyodo Gyogyo and steps
taken to integrate its business. Then in January 1937,
Kyodo Gyogyo took over all operations of the former
Chuo Suisan Hanbaisho. This meant that Kyodo
Gyogyo now controlled the ice-making, freezing,
refrigeration, canning and chikuwa manufacturingbusinesses of Nippon Food Industries, together withthe fish and processed marine product sales of theformer Chuo Suisan Hanbaisho. Two months later
in March 1937, Kyodo Gyogyo absorbed Nippon Food
Industries, increased its capital to 91.5 million yen,
and changed the company name to “Nippon Suisan

The Nissan Building
Nippon Suisan moved its Head Office here from the Maru Buildingin August 1937.

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Kaisha, Ltd.”.
And now, Nippon Suisan was to start life anew as
an affiliate of Nissan Konzerne. That August, Nippon
Sangyo relocated to the “Nissan Building” in Shiba
Ward, completed at a total cost of about 5 million
yen. The Nissan Building was an 8-story building witha single basement, and was home to Nippon Sangyo
and other affiliates of Nippon Suisan. Nippon Suisan
itself had its Head Office on the 6th floor of thebuilding.
Nippon Suisan was by that time Japan’s largest
fishery company. In September 1938, moreover, it
absorbed Shinko Suisan K.K., a company engaged in
the mother ship-type fishmeal business, increasing its
capital to 93 million yen. In December, it established
Kyodo Gyogyo K.K. to conduct buying, selling andleasing of ships as well as other aspects of maritime
shipping business, and transferred ships owned by
Nippon Suisan (Tonan Maru II and III, Itsukushima
Maru and others) to the company.
Nippon Suisan also invested actively in companies
that had a close connection with Nippon Sangyo’s
business. By around 1940, the targets of its investment
included fisheries companies with business expansion
strategies overseas—notably, the west-water two boats
trawling company Nitto Gyogyo K.K., the mainly
trawl-based company Hinode Gyogyo K.K., andNichiman Gyogyo K.K., which engaged in west-watertwo boats trawling in Dalian, China, and also had amarine product sales network in northern and northeastern China. They even included the sister company
Nippon Gyomo Sengu, which was engaged in the
manufacture and sale of fishing nets and ship’s gear,
supplies of fuel oil for fisheries, etc.
In this way, Nippon Suisan became a general fisheries company with four divisions—the fisheries division(trawl fishery, west-water trawling, mother ship-type
crab fishery, mother ship-type whaling, coastal whaling, etc.), the processing division (ice-making, freezing
and refrigeration together with marine product processing ), the sales division, and the investment
division.

106

An Important Wing of Nissan Konzerne
As a result of Nippon Suisan’s business expansion in
its aim to become a general fisheries company, it cameto have 46 subsidiaries. Besides Nippon Suisan,
Nippon Sangyo also included Nanbei Suisan and the
Nissan Fishery Institute as fishery-related subsidiaries
directly under its wing. Nanbei Suisan was engaged
in fisheries and associated business, as well as tradingin marine products and others in South America, as
the company name suggests (“Nanbei” = SouthAmerica). The Nissan Fishery Institute, previously
called the Hayatomo Fishery Research Center, was asurvey and research body dedicated to fisheries. It wasestablished in 1935 following Yoshisuke Aikawa’s
appeal for the industrialization of research labs.
With this, the number of fishery-related affiliates
in Nippon Sangyo came to 60 in all, consisting of 3
parent companies (including Nippon Suisan) and 57
subsidiaries. Collectively, their capital amounted to118.23 million yen.
The ratio of Nippon Mining’s dividend income tothat of Nippon Sangyo as a whole was 84.6% in theSecond half of 1932, but fell by more than half to41.7% in the first half of 1937. In terms of Nippon
Suisan alone, this rose from 10.6% (the total of Kyodo
Gyogyo, Godo Kosen and Nippon Food Industries)
in the second half of 1934 to 26.7% in the first half of1937. This reveals that fisheries centering on Nippon
Suisan contributed greatly to the withdrawal fromstructural dependence on Nippon Mining, as targetedat the time of Nissan Konzerne’s establishment.

companies and others to establish Nippon Oil & Fats
Co., Ltd. When Dai Nippon Artificial Fertilizer Co.
came under the wing of Nippon Sangyo two months
later, its subsidiary, the oil and fats major Godo Yushi
K.K., was merged and the company name changed toGodo Yushi on June 1st, 1937. But soon afterwards,
on June 25th, it was renamed Nippon Oil & Fats Co.,
Ltd.
Nippon Oil & Fats carried out aggressive diversification and business expansion, adding explosives
and textile divisions to the existing four divisions ofoil and fats, paint, fisheries and soybeans. Under thewartime regime, the company was designated underprocurement for military demand, taking it further
into the manufacture of oil and fat products, explosives
and others. And as the wartime regime intensified,
the textile, soybean processing, marine product processing and other productive divisions were separated
off in order to boost priority production in the oil andfats industry. Meanwhile, the chemical division of
Nippon Mining was taken over before the end of thewar, the new company being named Nissan Chemical
Industries, Ltd. After the war, the company was designated as subject to measures under the Economic
Deconcentration Law, but filed an objection, which
was accepted. The company was now allowed to draw
up its own reorganization plans independently. As aresult, the chemical division remained in Nissan
Chemical Industries, while the oil and fats, paint,
explosives and welding divisions in combination wereconsolidated as Nippon Oil & Fats. From that timeon, Nippon Oil & Fats expanded its business by venturing into petrochemicals, chemical agents, foods,

Establishment of Nippon Oil & Fats Co., Ltd.
Nippon Suisan also played a major role in Nippon
Sangyo’s expansion into the chemical sector. Nippon
Food Industries had taken over the business of companies including Velvet Soap K.K., seen as a longstanding presence in the soap industry, in order tomake effective use of fish oil as a by-product of fishmeal
processing. In March 1937, it absorbed fishmeal

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Nippon Food Industries, fish food factory in Shimpo

107

anti-corrosives and other businesses, and promoted
globalization. On its 70th anniversary in 2007, thecompany changed its name to Nichiyu K.K. (NOF
Corporation). It is now engaged in a wide range ofbusiness from biotechnology to space development.

The Centralized Management System of
Nissan Konzerne
With such a large number of companies acquired asa result of its diversification strategy, centralized management of subsidiaries now became a major challenge
for Nippon Sangyo. Although Nippon Sangyo was
the controlling body for its subsidiaries, it had adopted
the principle of encouraging their independence.
Nevertheless, a certain degree of centralized management was unavoidable, bearing in mind that so manydifferent companies had been acquired in such a shortspace of time. The company therefore set up a
Supervision Department for centralized managementof subsidiaries, and imposed vertical control throughthis. Although several subsidiaries were unhappy withthis control, it seems that Nippon Suisan was notnecessarily one of them. Nippon Suisan’s 2nd President
Keizo Tamura states that he took a positive approachto the inspection of the company’s settled accounts
by the Auditing Section of Nippon Sang yo’s
Supervision Department, as a marker of business
improvement.
In around 1936–1937, Nippon Sangyo carried out
a structural reorganization in its management of subsidiaries. First, it abolished the system of block-based
control by the Mining, Engineering and Fisheries
Departments. Instead, it appointed the Presidents ofthe main subsidiaries as Nippon Sangyo directors,
then created Senior Boards of Directors at Executive
Director level or higher within its subsidiaries, to beattended by Nippon Sangyo directors wheneverappropriate. This was a method adopted by Nippon
Suisan in the past, and had spread throughout theKonzerne because it produced good results. The creation of these Senior Boards of Directors meant that

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

managerial authority was significantly delegated tothe subsidiaries.
Meanwhile, in a bid to strengthen horizontal links
between the subsidiaries, the Nissan Thursday Groupwas formed in September 1934. This was an informal
discussion group for full-time directors of the subsidiaries, its purpose being to promote friendly relations
and exchanges of information between them andthereby to help build a cooperative structure. Later,
eligibility for membership was extended to include
personnel in the department manager and section
manager class.
By carrying out this vertical management via theSupervision Department (upgraded from a Supervision
Section at the time of the structural reorganization)and Senior Boards of Directors, combined with horizontal management by the Nissan Thursday Group,
Nippon Sangyo increased the solidarity of theKonzerne. Nippon Suisan made use of horizontal
management by Nippon Sangyo to gain tremendous
cooperation from the latter in terms of both capitaland business management. Moreover, by engaging inmeaningful exchanges with some of Japan’s mostrenowned subsidiary companies, it took steps towards
promoting public welfare through fisheries.
Kosuke Kunishi and Yoshisuke Aikawa
Kosuke Kunishi, the man at the helm of Kyodo
Gyogyo, was related to Yoshisuke Aikawa; Kunishi
had lodged with the Aikawa family while at Middle
School. Kunishi was earnest in nature and worked
hard at his studies, and Aikawa looked out for him as
he would a younger brother. When Kunishi left
Middle School, he thought of going on to study at the
Fisheries Training Institute, and sought Aikawa’s
advice. Aikawa went to the Institute in person andspoke to its Principal, as well as listening to the viewsof fishery experts. In the process, he came to haveconfidence in the importance and future potential offisheries, and urged Kunishi to do all he could todevelop the industry in Japan. Kunishi duly attended

108the Fisheries Training Institute, and on graduating,expressed a desire to travel abroad as a practical business trainee of the Ministry of Agriculture andCommerce. Here, he sought the help of Kaoru Inoue,
who supported him in achieving his goal. And when,on returning to Japan, he mentioned that he wanted
to buy a trawler, it was Aikawa who introduced him
to Ichiro Tamura. The meeting between the two would
culminate in the establishment of the Tamura
Steamship Fishery Company.
Again, around the time when Aikawa launched
Nippon Sangyo, it was none other than Kunishi who
introduced him to three important figures—Hiroya
Ino, later to become Executive Director of Nippon
Suisan and after that Minister of Agriculture andForestry; Jiro Shirasu, who made his name as a close
associate of Shigeru Yoshida after the war; andTatsunosuke Takasaki, Toyo Seikan founder and inaugural Director-General of the Economic Planning
Agency.
Kunishi had an insight that these three would beof assistance to Aikawa. And in fact, they all went on
to make huge contributions to Aikawa’s businessdevelopment.

The Mutually Cooperative Relationship Between
Nippon Sangyo and Nippon Suisan
Kosuke Kunishi decided to take Kyodo Gyogyo under
the wing of Nippon Sangyo because he fully endorsed
Yoshisuke Aikawa’s idea of a “public holding company”.

He saw significance in a public holding company interms of receiving a supply of funds from the generalpublic, gaining public support by paying dividends,
and thus sharing its fate with ordinary people.
Transferring shares to Nippon Sangyo in its aim tocreate a public holding company, and moving forward
as a member of Nippon Sangyo, would bring Kyodo
Gyogyo many new shareholders and give the publicmore opportunities to have a say in running the company. That was an ideal scenario for Kunishi, who saw
fisheries as an enterprise of national and social significance in connection with food. Furthermore, capital
power was a vital tool for gaining international competitiveness and thereby standing on a par withadvanced fishery nations; in that sense, too, operating
under the massive conglomerate of Nippon Sangyo
was the way forward.
Again, Aikawa’s understanding and passion forJapanese fisheries worked perfectly for the businessexpansion of Nippon Suisan. With the absolute support and capital backing of Aikawa as a “commanderin-chief ”, Nippon Suisan greatly enhanced thefeasibility of promoting public welfare, as targeted by
Kunishi.
It was partly thanks to the strong relationship ofmutual trust between Aikawa and Kunishi that
Nippon Suisan entered the fold of Nissan Konzerne.
And because Nippon Suisan was now a subsidiary of
Nippon Sangyo, not only did it become Japan’s foremost general fisheries company, but it also played afull part as a member of Nissan Konzerne.

5. Expansion into Manchuria and Subsequent Withdrawal
Nippon Sangyo Moves into Manchuria
When the Sino–Japanese War broke out in July 1937,
Japan’s wartime regime was further intensified. The
government of Manchukuo (a puppet state createdby Japan in northeastern China) and the Kwantung
Army (a unit of the Imperial Japanese Army stationed
in Manchukuo, forming the nucleus of Japanese rule

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

there) wanted to build a supply base. To this end, they
were hurriedly developing projects mainly in themining sector and the construction of railway lines
by the South Manchuria Railway Company (a national
enterprise formed after the Russo–Japanese War in
1906, and dissolved on the conclusion of World War
II). With a view to expanding the project scale andfurther reducing construction times, Nippon Sangyo

109was chosen as the project implementer. Nippon
Sangyo was chosen because it had a mining division,and an automotive engineering division in particular.
The fact that Nippon Sangyo was a public stock company also found favor with the Kwantung Army, which
was hostile to the zaibatsu. And of course, Yoshisuke
Aikawa’s business acumen and the consummate perfection of his project plans in Manchukuo were highly
valued at the time.
A number of circumstances lay behind Nippon
Sangyo’s acceptance of the request from the military.
One was that, as the clouds of war darkened, it had
become difficult to raise capital from the domestic
stockmarket, while tax was now payable on dividends
received and capital gains on share trading. With its
functions as a public stock company restricted, andanxious over the prospects of business expansion in
Japan, Nippon Sangyo found a lifeline in developing
its business in Manchuria.
In November 1937, Nippon Sangyo relocated to
Hsinking in Manchukuo (now Changchun, Jilin
Province, China). It changed its company name to“Manchurian Industrial Development Company” andreceived funding from the Manchukuo government,
making it a semi-private, semi-public national enterprise. As his condition for relocation, Aikawa succeeded in being granted six privileges, including
guarantees of principal and an annual dividend of 6%
for new investment in Manchukuo, exemption fromdual tax, and freedom in its dividend policy. For
Nippon Sangyo, which could relocate to Manchukuo
without losing its rights to control of subsidiaries, themove to Manchukuo seemed like the start of a bright
future.
Once Nippon Sangyo’s relocation to Manchukuo
was decided, Nippon Suisan and other subsidiaries inJapan renamed the Nissan Thursday Group the“Nissan Informal Discussion Group”. Then in
September 1938, shares in Godo Tochi K.K., a subsidiary of the Manchurian Industrial Development
Company, were taken over from the Company, andits company name was changed to “Nissan K.K.”, as a

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

parent-like body with subsidiaries.
Even after Nippon Sangyo’s move to Manchuria,
the various subsidiaries in Japan intensified efforts
aimed at solidarity. One of these was the opening of
the Tokyo Nissan Kosei En (Welfare Park), a recreation and welfare center that could be used by allcompanies related to Nippon Sangyo. Aikawa, as
President of the Manchurian Industrial Development
Company, a national enterprise, was prohibited fromconcurrently being an officer of Nissan Konzerne. But
he had continued to serve as an unpaid officer, inreward for which he was to be paid an allowance of 1
million yen on retirement. Aikawa donated this allowance to fund a facility to be shared jointly by theemployees of Nippon Sangyo’s associated companies
and their families, something he had long envisioned.
Part of this capital was used to create the Tokyo Nissan
Kosei En in 1940, and Nissan took responsibility forrunning it. As the war situation advanced, however,it became difficult to operate public benefit and social
projects. In 1942, therefore, the Nissankai corporate
juridical person was established with Aikawa as its
Chairman, and it was entrusted with running theTokyo Nissan Kosei En. When first launched,
Nissankai had 17 corporate members, including
Nippon Suisan as well as Nissan, Hitachi, Ltd., Nippon
Mining and others, revealing the strength of solidarity
in the Konzerne. Around the time when Nippon
Sangyo was attempting to develop its business in
Manchukuo, the various subsidiaries remaining inJapan maintained a cooperative structure amid theharsh climate of war, and took measures forsurvival.
Withdrawal from Manchukuo
Yoshisuke Aikawa crossed to Manchuria with ambitions of building a massive business conglomerate
straddling both Japan and Manchukuo, improving
Japan-US relations and bringing the Sino–Japanese
War to a conclusion. From the outset, however, hefound himself in a harsh business environment.

110

Resources in Manchukuo were scarcer than he had
been led to believe, and he faced undue interference
from special corporations already established there.
For these and other reasons, the progression of business in Manchukuo was hampered from the start. It
was almost as if the Kwantung Army had sweet-talked
Nippon Sangyo into its Manchurian venture.
Yoshisuke Aikawa foresaw difficulties in building
heavy industries in the country, and drew up a newplan to develop Manchukuo as an agricultural nation
instead. But this was immediately rejected by the
Kwantung Army. Aikawa’s idea for industrial-scale
farming ran counter to the fundamental aim of the
Kwantung Army — to divide up arable land so that as
many Japanese people as possible could resettle in
Manchuria in coming times.
The business environment in Manchuria grew
harsher still. Nippon Sangyo had drawn up plans to
introduce foreign (particularly American) capital in
Manchukuo, but this could not be achieved owing toworsening relations between Japan and the UnitedStates. Another plan was to introduce machinery from
Germany, an ally, but this also ended inconclusively.
Moreover, intervention by the Kwantung Army grewstronger by the day, until it was no longer possible toconduct business independently. Before long, theoriginal plan to build heavy chemical industries inManchukuo had been shifted to one of creating a
supply base for raw materials and resources. Whenthe Important Industrial Organization Ordinance
was issued in August 1941 and it was clear that management authority would be severely restricted,
Nippon Sang yo (the Manchurian Industrial
Development Company) decided to withdraw from
Manchukuo.
In making the decision to withdraw, Yoshisuke
Aikawa is thought to have been greatly influenced by
the advice of Jiro Shirasu. Shirasu had been involvedin the management of Nippon Suisan since his
appointment as a Director on March 31st, 1937; hewas also to serve as a Director of Teikoku Suisan Tosei
K.K. (Teikoku Marine Products Control Company),

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

Jiro Shirasu

to be established later. Jiro Shirasu had plenty of overseas experience, notably through a period of study in
Britain, and foresaw a quick defeat for Japan if it wereto start a Pacific War. No one wanted to believe him,
but Yoshisuke Aikawa paid serious attention to
Shirasu’s theories.
In June 1941, Aikawa established Manchuria
Investment and Securities Ltd. with joint capital from18 leading Japanese life insurance companies. His aim
in doing so was to regain management authority overthe group of Japanese affiliates from the control company. Stock in Manchuria Investment Securities consisted of 355,000 shares without voting rights at 1,000
yen each, and 5,000 shares with voting rights. The
Manchukuo government imposed conditions of anannual guaranteed dividend of 5% and repayment ofprincipal after 10 years on the former; these were to
be underwritten by life insurance companies seeking
to invest in strong-performing military supply companies. The 5,000 shares with voting rights were to
be owned by Nissan. Yoshisuke Aikawa succeeded in
retrieving controlling rights in Nissan Konzerne (i.e.
the subsidiaries in Japan), appointed Tatsunosuke
Takasaki as his successor in the Manchurian Industrial
Development Company, and entrusted all subsequentadministration to him.
Thus, Nippon Suisan and the other subsidiaries inJapan were liberated from the grip of the Manchurian
control company, but would later be at the mercy of
the government and the military as the wartime regime
intensified.

111

Part 4 Evolution into Japan’s Largest Fisheries Company
1. The Establishment of Nichiman Gyogyo and the Start of Controls on Marine
Products
Establishment of Nichiman Gyogyo
In 1935, Kyodo Gyogyo took over the business of
Hazuki Shoten K.K., which had previously been
engaged in west-water trawling based at Dalian (nowDalian City in Liaoning Province, China), and established Nichiman Gyogyo. In October that year, theDalian Sales Office together with all northern andnortheastern China business under its jurisdiction
were transferred to Nichiman Gyogyo.
From its base at Dalian, Nichiman Gyogyo engaged
in shrimp purchasing business using 20 bottom trawlers mainly in the Bohai and Yellow Seas. It also undertook manufacturing and sales in Manchuria andnorthern China.
Since Manchuria was geographically less endowedwith marine resources than Japan, freezing and refrigeration facilities needed to be enhanced to meet thedemand for marine products, mainly from Japanesenationals resident there. Including Nichiman Gyogyo,
there were only two companies in Manchuria engaged
in the freezing business, and frozen fish sales becamea major mainstay of the company’s operations.
Nichiman Gyogyo’s frozen fish sales in Manchukuo
started with deliveries to the military after the Mukden
Incident, but it also made sales to ordinary consumers.
The company set up branch offices in six main
Manchurian cities, and set out a system whereby it
could distribute fresh marine products with reliable
quality anywhere. The frozen fish sales business in
Manchuria was indeed one that embodied Nippon
Suisan’s ideal of “producing and supplying marine
products as daily life necessities, just like supplying
water through a tap”.
In April 1942, Nippon Suisan transferred its
Manchuria branches and the business under theirjurisdiction to Nichiman Gyogyo, in a measure to

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

centralize its business in Manchuria. With the onsetof the controlled economy, however, Nichiman
Gyogyo was to transfer the ships in its possession alongwith onshore facilities and other assets to the Minami
Manshu Kaiyo Gyogyo K.K. in October 1944, andin the following January, was merged into “Nippon
Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei K.K.”.

Outbreak of the Sino – Japanese War andBusiness Strengthening in Manchuria and China
When the Sino–Japanese War broke out after the
Marco Polo Bridge incident in 1937, productivity cameto be concentrated in military supply industries. With
the creation of Manchukuo as a state, Japan was alreadypromoting the establishment of a Japan–Manchukuo
economic bloc. Now, the Sino–Japanese War provided
a premise for proposing an economic bloc policy inChina, with a view to addressing the further expansionof war costs and enhancing the provision of materials.
In response to this, Nippon Suisan would promote astrengthening of its operations on the mainland.
As part of the company’s measures to strengthenbusiness in Manchuria, a Manchuria Sales Office was
newly created in August 1939. The Manchuria Sales
Office split off the sales operations of the recently
established Nichiman Gyogyo and took over all of its
business except fisheries, and set out to strengthen thesales network in Manchuria. Then, to promote its
business in China, the company set up Sales Offices
in northern and central China. As a base for the southern China area, it created a Guangdong Branch Officeand placed it under the jurisdiction of the Taiwan
Sales Office.
Meanwhile, the company created a Dependent
Territories Department as a general communicationbody for business development in Manchuria and112

China. As well as managing the Sales Offices and
Branch Offices, the Dependent Territories Department
also served to enhance communications between thevarious bases. It took the principle that freezing andrefrigeration equipment should be used to ensure that
Nippon Suisan’s overseas business involved not only
marine products but also a wide range of foodstuff
provisions; eggs and livestock products were also
actively traded.

Start of Mother Ship-Type Tuna Fisheries inSouthern Seas
On October 30th, 1939, Nippon Suisan establishedTobu Suisan K.K. with capital of 1 million yen. With
its Head Office in Taiwan’s Hualian port town (now
Hualian City), it engaged in mother ship-type tuna
fisheries, as well as fish market agency, freezing andother business on the east coast of Taiwan.
In 1940–1941, Tobu Suisan fished for tuna in the
Indian Ocean and other south sea areas, using the Oi
Maru and Kitakami Maru as mother ships and 6–7
catcher boats. Sadly, though, operations were halted
just before the start of the Pacific War.
Canned Crab Sales under Wartime Control
Government control of marine products before thewar consisted of measures designed to increase output
at first, but was then extended to production, distribution and exports.
After the dissolution of Kani Kanzume Kyodo
Hanbai (crab cannery and joint sales by factory shipprocessors and land-based processors) in 1933, cannedcrab (processed both by factory ships and on land)
had been distributed to markets via several sales channels. The government, through the mediation of the
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (forerunner ofthe Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries),
then created Kani Kanzume Hanbai K.K. in June
1939. By so doing, it wanted to address export promotion as well as military demand, and to reorganize

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

sales control bodies to cope with shortages of bothmaterials and labor. With the establishment of Kani
Kanzume Hanbai, cooperative sales by factory shipand land-based processors became centralized, andthe system of sales under wartime control took shape.
The government now stepped up efforts to prepare
systems in readiness for a war scenario, and strongly
promoted exports aimed at improving the balance of
payments and strengthening the economy. Agricultural
products were earmarked for promotion of exports,
while positive efforts were also made to export canned
seafood. In response to this, the National Federationof Export Cannery Fishery Cooperatives was launched
in 1939 with the aim of centralizing export inspection
work and securing commodity distribution, overseas
market surveys, and so on. Its members were 10 related
fishery cooperatives, and it led to stronger controlson canned exports.
In September 1939, Britain and France declared
war on Germany following the German invasion of
Poland, signaling the outbreak of World War II. The
confrontation between the Triple Axis of Japan,
Germany and Italy against the allied nations ofAmerica, Britain, France, Russia, China and others
would soon develop into a conflict of unprecedented
proportions that would sweep through the wholeworld. Tension inside Japan now rose to new heights.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry issued anultimatum on prices of agricultural, forestry andmarine products, etc., while an Outline on Controlled
Distribution of Production Materials for Agricultural,
Forestry and Fishing Villages was decided. In this andother ways, controls on agricultural, forestry andmarine products were increasingly tightened.
Marine products were considered important not
only as food but also as military supplies, and despitecoming under various controls, Nippon Suisan applied
itself to the business with a view to meeting the spectacular growth in demand. With the start of the Pacific
War in 1941, the Fishery Control Ordinance was
imposed in the following year, forcing the company
to operate under a completely controlled economy.

113Nationwide Expansion of the Ice-Making,Refrigeration and Freezing BusinessKyodo Gyogyo had decided to proceed with development aimed at a nationwide presence for the refrigeration sector, to accompany the national expansion ofits sales sector. In March 1937, Kyodo Gyogyo changed
its company name to “Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.”,then absorbed Nippon Food Industries and made it
Nippon Suisan’s refrigeration sector. With this,Nippon Suisan had a total of 325 ice-making, refrigeration and freezing plants, including direct operationand investment companies, and thus now covered all
principal areas of the country. The facility scale wasa daily output of 8,000 tons, accounting for 50% of
the whole country’s ice making capacity. Cold storesarranged in important cities and major fishing ports
all boasted the very latest equipment, and also included
Japan’s only dry ice-making factory.
At around that time, a keener awareness of hygiene
began to take root, along with changes in lifestyles,
and started to spread throughout peoples’ daily lives.
Nippon Suisan had been investing energy in buildinga refrigerator network with the aim of providing fresh,
tasty marine products to every part of the country.
But now, with signs of increased requirements related
to hygiene, it anticipated growth in demand for frozen
products, and further accelerated its efforts to improveand increase equipment.
Formation of a Frozen Fish Sales Network
The sales outlets in 8 locations taken over from
Yamagami Gumi in 1919 had been boosted to 42 in
1936 and 48 in 1937, and now extended to all major
cities across the country.
Together with the nationwide expansion of therefrigerator network, a frozen fish sales network wasalso formed. Of the fresh fish caught by trawlers andfish frozen by on-board rapid freezing equipment,
40% were sold via direct sales outlets and just over 30%
were processed as frozen products, or else used for

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

export or as raw materials for chikuwa, etc. The fact thatless than 30% were sold to markets and other indirect
outlets shows the strength of the company’s sales network.

Z Process Quick Freezing Equipment —The Z Process
The Z process (Z process quick freezing equipment)
was invented by the American M.T. Zarochentsev.
When his son W.M. Zarochentsev visited Japan in
1937, Nippon Suisan decided to introduce the process
and acquired the rights to use it.
The details of the usage rights included the Z process quick freezing equipment, the Z process registeredtrademark, and patents for methods of pre- and postprocessing frozen foods. It was hoped that using theprocess would help to improve the status of frozen
products, while the trademark was respected on overseas markets and its use would promote exports.
Although there have been several methods of usingbrine (calcium chloride solution) as a refrigerant forfreezing since that time, this was a method of freezing
by applying brine directly to the product in spray form.
It was called the Z process after the initial Z of
Zarochentsev, the inventor.
Nippon Suisan thoroughly tested this device at its
cold stores in Misaki, Nemuro and Takao (Taiwan).
Because the brine was sprayed all over the targeted
product, it required a considerable amount of surrounding space, and for this and other reasons it wasused in land-based plants rather than at sea. Nippon
Suisan’s Director Jiro Shirasu was put in charge ofplanning an overseas strategy for the device, and inJune 1938, he went to Takao with Zarochentsev. There,
he took part in a project for freeze-processing tiger
shrimp farmed at Tainan, which he called “Horaishrimp” and sent to Japan. In 1939, frozen swordfish
freeze-processed at the Misaki cold store were exported
to America. But when the Pacific War started, all of
the equipment was transferred to “Teikoku Suisan
Tosei” established under the Fishery Control
Ordinance.

114

2. The Death of Kosuke Kunishi and Subsequent Development of
Nippon Suisan
The Death of Kosuke Kunishi
On April 2nd, 1938, Kosuke Kunishi died of heartdisease. He was 52 years old.
It was just over a year after Kyodo Gyogyo hadjoined the Nissan Konzerne and set sail anew under
the name Nippon Suisan.
Making it his mission to establish fisheries as anational enterprise, Kunishi had conceived numerous
businesses and personally brought them to fruition,
starting with the Tamura Steamship Fishery Company
and ultimately leading to Nippon Suisan. Of course,
he could not have done this without the financial
support of those around him, not to mention thecooperation and efforts of others who also devoted
themselves to fisheries. Nevertheless, the driving force
behind Nippon Suisan, a company that has played alarge part in developing Japanese fisheries, was unmistakably Kunishi’s sense of mission and passion forfisheries. Without those attributes, it would be no
exaggeration to say that Nippon Suisan, and therefore
also Japanese fisheries, would not have risen to thestatus they enjoy today.
Kunishi’s attitude towards fisheries went beyond
the realm of individuals or single companies; it started
from a sense of social mission. Kunishi took every
opportunity to explain to those around him the idealthat should be sought in fisheries, leaving them allwith the shared impression of the strength of his will,
as well as his perspectives on the state and theworld.
Yoshisuke Aikawa, for example, said the following
about Kunishi’s personality during a Buddhist memorial service to mark the first seven days after his
death.
“Only recently, (Kunishi) was repeatedly advocating nutritious foods; I myself heard him talk about
them time and time again. But even then, the starting
point was always the social concept of promoting
welfare, not of the individual, but of ordinary people,

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheries

in other words the masses” (Anthology of Writings andSpeeches of Mr. Kosuke Kunishi).
Another friend of many years’ standing, Toichi
Kuwata, recalled the following memory of Kunishi.
“The phrase ‘food patriotism’ was Kunishi’s creation, and it symbolized his belief in the state. Since
last year, he was advocating that we start a communal
kitchen business for nutritious food. He was proposing
the creation of a huge national policy body that would
handle everything from improving the physique ofthe people and promoting their welfare to enhancing
productivity by increasing the workforce, replenishing
the labor force in farming and fishing villages depending on prevailing circumstances, and preventing thedecline in birth rates and the increased birth of feebleor sickly children that would normally arise after aperiod of conflict” (ibid.).
In various respects, Kunishi had been a driving force
behind Nippon Suisan and Japan’s fishery industry,and on his death, the people around him could nothide a sense of despair. But their minds were united
in the thought that the best memorial to Kunishi
would be to promote the state enterprise he had envisaged and to achieve his ideal through Nippon
Suisan.
Kunishi was succeeded by Hiroya Ino, who resigned
as Vice-Minister for Agriculture and Forestry to takeup the post of Director.
Nippon Suisan Just Before the Pacific War
The economic climate remained harsh in the earlyShowa era, with exposure to the Showa Depression
followed by the worldwide Great Depression. During
this time, Nippon Suisan engaged in diverse businessinterests, aggressively expanding its bases not only inJapan but also in Manchuria, Taiwan, northern China
and central China. As of 1940, the year before thePacific War broke out, its capital was 93 million yen.
It had its Head Office in the Nissan Building in Shiba115

Ward, Tokyo City, as well as 2 branches, 7 sales offices,
46 branch offices, 25 sales outlets, 18 offices, 27 whaling stations and 255 ice-making, refrigeration andother plants. Its employees numbered about 6,100
working on land and about 7,100 at sea. The company
owned a total of 237 ships, consisting of 134 vessels
connected with trawling and west-water two boats
trawling, 27 connected with crab fisheries, 44 connected with whaling, and 32 other ships.
The business territory had expanded broadly into
ice-making and sales, in addition to various fisheries.
The company had opened up unexploited fishinggrounds around the world, and had extended its sales
channels not only across Japan but also in Hong Kong,
Singapore, Rangoon, Calcutta and other parts of Asia,
as well as Los Angeles in the U.S.A. and Buenos Airesin South America.
As a result of this diverse expansion of fisheries,
Nippon Suisan was now delivering its uniquely characteristic products all over the globe—high-quality

The Modernization of Japan and Japanese Fisheriescanned crab and Antarctic whale oil from mothership-type fisheries, whale meat from coastal whaling,
fresh fish, frozen fish and South China Sea frozen
bream, Taisho shrimp from Shandong coastal waters,
Minato shrimp from Baja California, and whale andsharkskin from trawling and west-water two boats
trawling, among others.
Nippon Suisan became Japan’s top fisheries company 26 years after the Tamura Steamship FisheryCompany was founded in 1911. Arguably, this successresulted solely from promoting fisheries from anational point of view but with a global perspective.
Later, as tension mounted in the years before thePacific War, Nippon Suisan would find the meaningof its existence more than ever in the form of a socialand state enterprise. And just as Japan would enter aharsh period of change in the wake of the Pacific War,
Nippon Suisan would also face trials exceeding all
imagination.

116

Section II
The Pacific War Era andPostwar Reconstruction
Chapter 1: The Controlled Economy and Fisheries
in Wartime
1940–1944

Part 1 Conversion to a Planned Economy and Changes to Industry
Expansion of Heavy Industries, Shift to Military
Demand and Planned Economy
The outbreak of the Sino–Japanese War in July 1937
triggered a sudden surge in the war footing, and Japanhurriedly introduced a controlled economy. Twomonths later in September, the Temporary Fund
Adjustment Act was promulgated to ensure priority
allocation of capital to military supply industries. This
meant that the permission of the government was
required whenever loaning equipment funds or offering and receiving securities. Another new law was the
Act for Temporary Measures on Exports and Imports
etc., whereby the government restricted or prohibitedthe export and import of specific products, and intervened in the use or transfer of said products. With theoutbreak of World War II in 1939 and the formationof the Triple Axis between Japan, Germany and Italy
the following year, Japan’s trade forcibly shrank. As acountermeasure, the government vigorously promoted
the concentration of resources in important industrial
sectors.
As transportation of commodities became more
active with the start of hostilities in World War II,
Japan (which depended on foreign sources for many
strategic materials including iron ores, oil, rubber andfoods) was confronted with the problem of securing
its shipping capability. Moreover, as the concept of a

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was developed
at the start of the Pacific War, the importance of transporting commodities grew ever greater, and demand
for ships grew to astonishing proportions. Plans tomobilize commodities and measures to regulate supply
and demand were drawn up, with a view to securing
raw materials such as steel and related industrial products, mainly for the military demand sector. At thesame time, controls were imposed on maritime shipping. Other measures included setting official prices
for transportation costs and charter fees, a ban on freetransactions, and collective transportation ofcommodities.
A state of surplus demand continued in shipbuilding, and measures to regulate supply and demandthrough planned shipbuilding were started. The government now set out to expand production facilities,
and supported technology development, assisted withcapital procurement where appropriate, and provided
low-interest loans of shipbuilding capital. Vessels werestandardized for mass production, and in April 1942
the first wartime standard ships based on ten shiptypes were decided. To further promote mass production, the second wartime standard ships with significantly simpler designs were decided in December. But
the shortage in production capacity inevitably createddifficulties. There were many reasons for this, but an
absolute shortage of steel materials had a particularly117large impact. The government addressed this withlimited consumption allocations and planned production. The targets were far from met, however, andshipbuilding plans had to be repeatedly revised.
Expansion of the War and its Impact on Fisheries
Oil and steel materials were vital for fisheries, andthese depended heavily on imports, as well as being
important materials for military demand. As the wartime regime took shape, it was inevitable that less oiland materials would be allocated to fisheries. And to
add to these woes, oil and steel prices became inflated,
dealing a direct blow to the business of all fisherycompanies.
What made things even worse for the industry wasthat, with the outbreak and progression of World War
II, imported products were refused by European markets. Furthermore, the Treaty of Commerce andNavigation between the United States and Japan
expired in 1940, and Japanese products started to besqueezed out of American markets as well. The government amended the Enforcement Regulations of
the Trade Control Ordinance in July 1941, shortly
before the start of the Pacific War, and imposed severe
regulations on food exports. Now steps were taken toswitch salmon, trout, canned king crab and others todomestic consumption and military demand, and theexport destinations shifted to China, Manchukuo andthe Kwantung Leased Territory (now part of DalianCity in Liaoning Province, China). Exports were also
made to Germany, Italy, Thailand, Indonesia, thePhilippines, Burma and elsewhere, but with the exception of Germany and Italy, nearly all of this was tomeet military demand. The result was that, with thestart of the Pacific War, ways of obtaining foreign
currency grew even more limited.
As the war increased in severity, military demand
started to increase. Japan fell into a food shortage, andsupplementing and stockpiling foods became anurgent task. The fishery companies bore the expectation of expanded production, but even if they wanted

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

to go out on fishing operations, imports of fuel oil,fishing nets and other fishery requisites had beeninterrupted, and they were forced into an extremely
difficult business environment.
Restrictions on Deep-Sea Fisheries
As the war situation progressed, restrictions came tobe imposed on deep-sea fishing operations.
In west-water fisheries, there were more than 600
licensed ships with bases inside Japan as of 1939. Evenin Korea, the Kwantung Leased Territory, Taiwan andother overseas locations, there were more than 550
ships. With the start of the Pacific War, however, thesea areas subject to operations became increasingly
fraught with danger. The number of requisitioned
ships also increased, and under government control,
the number of licensed ships itself was restricted. By
the end of the war, the number of ships had decreased
dramatically and fish catches by west-water fisheries
had fallen to less than a tenth of the 1941 level.
Nevertheless, while the fishery majors were forced tosuspend almost all fishing operations except coastal
whaling, west-water fisheries continued operations
right up to the end of the war, even as hostilities raged
around them.
In Nippon Suisan’s west-water fisheries, only 3 outof 61 licensed fishing boats were able to operate in1945. For Hayashikane Shoten, it was 4 out of 8
licensed ships.
In mother ship-type crab, salmon and trout fisheries, exports of canned products became restricted as
Japan–U.S. relations worsened. Moreover, output also
fell owing to the requisitioning of fishing boats, andoperations were consequently abandoned.
In the spring of 1941, the six Japanese whaling fleetson their way home from the Antarctic were refused arequest to refuel in Java, leaving them stranded.
Indonesia was a Dutch colony at the time, and theDutch government had imposed sanctions against
Japan. On rerouting to Singapore, the ships somehow
managed to obtain fuel oil and return to port in Japan.

118However, the incident prompted a decision to suspend
the following year’s Antarctic whaling expeditions. In
response, the whaling companies now switched theirattention to coastal whaling. Although catches gradually decreased after the start of the war, even at theend of the war more than 500 whales were caught.

Fisheries Administration Shifts to a Policy ofControlled Economy
Under these circumstances, the fishery industry had
no choice but to change. In peacetime, the main focus
of fisheries administration lay in boosting production,
improving quality and developing fisheries in order
to raise national living standards. But in a time of war,
its more pressing challenge was to carry out planned
production and rational distribution to maintain foodsupplies, and to do so efficiently with limited
resources.
In October 1941, the government disbursed a totalof 3,440,000 yen for emergency measures designed
to ensure high levels of productivity in fisheries, despite
regulations on oil consumption. The main targets ofassistance included a shift to less oil-consuming fishingmethods, or a shift from oil to charcoal gas burning
engines, and the installation of sail power equipment
on ships.
Meanwhile, the ships owned by fishery companies
were successively requisitioned, including most large

vessels used by deep-sea fisheries. And as the war situation worsened, more sea areas became too dangerous
to enter; even if the companies had any ships capableof operating, it was becoming increasingly difficult tosend them out. The focus of active fish catch production was gradually narrowed down to coastal fisheries
and freshwater aquaculture. To avoid a squeeze on thenation’s food self-sufficiency, the government now
actively supported coastal fisheries in the East andSouth China Seas as part of its policy for increased
output. Fishing boats in the Kumamoto, Hiroshima,
Kagawa and Okayama areas formed fleets and engaged
in barracouta troll line, flounder gill net, bream bottom
line and other fisheries from bases in Haikou and Yulin
on Hainan Island. As Hainan was also home toHayashikane Shoten’s refrigeration equipment, production activity in the area continued until nearly theend of the war.
Despite these various measures to cope with difficulties, the business environment for fisheries merely
continued to deteriorate; the requisitioning of ships
and increasing severity of the war forced unplannedsuspensions of operations, personnel were enlisted formilitary service, and commodities and fuel were
becoming palpably harder to obtain. Full intervention
by the government became unavoidable, and fisheries
were soon to be radically reorganized and controlledwith the aim of securing and stockpiling food to meet
military demand.

Part 2 The Choice of Nippon Suisan
1. Moves Towards the Fishery Control Ordinance“Serving the Nation with Food” is Made theCompany Motto
In January 1941, Nippon Suisan President Keizo
Tamura issued a circular to the effect that “Serving
the Nation with Food” would be made the company’s
motto. In his statement, he wrote “ Everyone is aware

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstructionthat our Nippon Suisan has taken the stance of‘Serving the Nation with Food’ ever since its inception, and in conducting its business, has worked tirelessly in pursuit of diverse profit. … This company’s
employees feel pride in being members of an Imperial
industry that can shoulder this supreme national mission …”

119

2nd President Keizo Tamura

In other words, even before “Serving the Nation
with Food” was named the company motto, it was
Nippon Suisan’s sense of mission and tradition. The
fact that the company sought out fishing grounds allover the world in order to provide large volumes offish inexpensively and promote the health of thenation, and aimed for general fisheries covering everything from production and processing to storage andsales, originated from a wish not only to deliver seafood products to the nation’s dinner tables, but also
to win pre-eminence in the world of Japanesefisheries.
On establishing the company motto, Keizo Tamura
said, “We should think of the state before all else, andif required by the state, we must even engage in unprofitable operations”.

Enforcement of the National Mobilization Law
and Delays in Controls on Marine Products
With the promulgation of the National Mobilization
Law in April 1938, the government was given a mandate to pass laws for the control and deployment of
human and material resources. From then on, a seriesof edicts and ordinances based on the Law were issued,and controls on the production, distribution, prices,
import and export of a whole range of commodities
became a reality.
In 1940, official prices were set for all marine products, and materials and canning came under control
at the same time. In the following year, fresh fish wereplaced under state control, followed in January 1942
by marine products. It took longer for controls to be
imposed on marine products than on other

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstructioncommodities; rice, barley, wheat, fruit and vegetables,
among others, had already been placed under control
in 1940. The delay in controls on seafood products,
despite the fact that they were important commodities
in terms of military demand, resulted from the sheer
variety of fresh fish and processed products, etc., aswell as the complexities of the system of control.
Integration of Ocean Fisheries Starts
Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933
triggered a process of isolation from the international
community. A series of blockade measures were taken
against Japan; in particular, trade with America andBritain was banned and Japan’s assets there were frozen.
China and the Netherlands also aligned themselveswith these measures, and economic and trade sanctions
by these four countries forced Japan into what was
known as “ABCD encirclement” (ABCD = “American,
British, Chinese and Dutch”). This came as a major
blow to fisheries, which depended on imports forfishing nets and ropes, fuel oil and other production
materials, as well as materials for shipbuilding, etc.
Even amid such harsh conditions, however, an
important task for fisheries administration at the time(1937) was to vigorously promote measures for foodself-sufficiency in Japan and China. To this end, it wasessential that the shortage of materials and manpowerbe filled and seafood products be efficiently procured;
moreover, steps had to be taken to sustain and nurturefisheries. State control was a measure forced by thiskind of necessity.
In August 1941, the Important Industrial Orga­nization Ordinance was issued with the aim of centrally mobilizing the economic power of the statethrough direct intervention by the government. A
series of national control bodies were formed forimportant industries, and the fishery industry was oneof them. The government divided fisheries into ocean
fisheries and coastal fisheries, and first embarked onbuilding a control system for the former. After thestart of the Pacific War in December that year,120however, priorities shifted to measures for food selfsufficiency in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere.
The Minister of Agriculture and Forestry at thetime was Hiroya Ino. After the death of Kosuke
Kunishi, Ino had joined Nippon Suisan as an Executive
Director, but resigned in August 1940 and was
appointed Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in the
2nd Konoe Cabinet the following June. In that capacity, Ino invited representatives of ocean fishery companies to an informal meeting in which he explained
the need for state control of ocean fisheries. Given thenation’s readiness for war, the representatives were
only too aware of that need. They agreed with thegovernment’s idea, and it was decided that a Fisheries
Control Preparation Committee would be set up to
prepare a concrete proposal for the control system.
Twelve men were chosen as the committee’s members:from Nippon Suisan, they included Kenkichi Ueki
and Shizuo Minoda; from Nichiro Gyogyo, Tsunejiro
Hiratsuka, Shintaro Shinto and Hatsushiro Miyake;from Taiyo Hogei, Kenkichi Nakabe; and from
Hayashikane Shoten, Shishiroku Ito.
Agriculture Minister Ino’s idea was to establish acompany for centralized control of production plans,material distribution, supplies and sales, with capitalfrom the existing fishery companies, and in addition,
to create an ocean fisheries control company thatwould conduct actual fishing operations as a subsidiaryof the former. However, the proposal tabled by theCommittee was far removed from this. The existing
companies insisted on the control association method,whereby a control association would be set up as asupervising body but the existing structure would
remain intact. As such, they hardened their stance ofwanting to avoid the establishment of a national enterprise through integration of the industry.
Once before, in 1935, the government had attempted
to impose state control of north-sea fisheries. At thetime, Nichiro Gyogyo was in favor of the proposal,
but it was blocked by opposition from Nippon Suisan
and Hayashikane Shoten. Then in the spring of 1940,

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

20th Minister of Agriculture and Forestry
Hiroya Ino

a cross-sector informal meeting on the issue of thecontrol of north-sea fisheries was held. This time, Ino,an Executive Director of Nippon Suisan at the time,
opposed the control of north-sea fisheries alone, andargued that all ocean fisheries should be integrated.
Yusaku Nishimura, himself a Managing Director,
agreed with Ino’s view. At this time, then, Hiroya Ino
had already conceived the idea of integrating all ocean
fisheries. However, the fractious relationship between
the fishery companies and the government, not tomention differences in the various companies’ plans,also surfaced at the same time.
Discussions on the control of ocean fisheries in1941 also looked likely to follow the same pattern.
That is, discord between the government and thefishery companies was combined with uncertainty
among the fishery companies to make the situationeven more complicated.
In the face of opposition from the Fisheries Control
Preparation Committee, Agriculture Minister Ino
invited three of the Committee’s members—Kenkichi
Ueki, Tsunejiro Hiratsuka and Kenkichi Nakabe—to
his official residence for informal talks. His intention
was to have a cozy chat with the principal membersof the Committee in which he would persuade themto accept the government’s proposal. But the respective
positions remained entrenched; the three resolutely
insisted on the proposal of establishing a control association above the existing companies. Agriculture
Minister Ino took the diametrically opposed view,and declared his readiness to force the establishmentof a national enterprise through corporate amalgamation, even if the private sector refused to cooperate.
Neither side yielded ground, and the fractious

121surprise that the adjustment process had a rocky ride,owing to the uncertainty between them.
The government took a surprisingly long time todraw up a concrete proposal; it was not until the
Fishery Control Ordinance was issued in May 1942
that the full content of fishery controls became clear.
In fact, the content was more or less exactly the sameas the idea extolled by Hiroya Ino from the very beginning. Specifically, Teikoku Suisan Tosei would first be
established as the central control body, capitalizedwith assets (ships, freezing and processing facilities,etc.) from companies connected with ocean fisheries.
To achieve planned production, the company would
take care of distributing materials for fisheries, processing, storage and sales, as well as finance, research, etc.
Next, an ocean fisheries control company under its
control would be established through amalgamationof the fishery companies, and the company would
engage in actual fishery production by leasing ships
from Teikoku Suisan Tosei.
The range of fisheries undertaken by the ocean

relationship merely became clearer. Realizing thelimits of cross-sector negotiation, Ino concluded that
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry would haveto unilaterally draw up its own concrete proposal for
corporate integration.

Fishery Control Ordinance Issued, Control Takes
Shape
Although the Fishery Control Ordinance was decided
by the Cabinet in December 1941, it took anotheryear before the central control body, Teikoku Suisan
Tosei K.K. (Teikoku Marine Products Control
Company), could be established. This was because
Nippon Suisan and other civilian fishery companies
had expressed opposition to the government’s proposal
for control, and the process of adjusting positions wastime-consuming. Considering the histories, businessterritories and background to market dominance ofthe three biggest companies—Nippon Suisan, Nichiro
Gyogyo and Hayashikane Shoten—it should be no

Corporate Reorganization under the Fishery Control Ordinance
Unit = 10,000 yen C = Capital T = Teikoku Suisan paid-in capitalCompanies subject to control

Control companies

After the war

Nippon Suisan (C 9,300 T 1,109.8)

23/12/1942
Teikoku Suisan Tosei K.K.
(C 5,000)

Nippon Reizo Co., Ltd.

Hokuyo Hogei (C 150 T 30.5)
Hinode Gyogyo (C 100 T 13.0)
Takasago Gyogyo (C 62.5 T 10.2)
Kyodo Gyogyo (C 30 T 6.1)

23/03/1943
Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei K.K.
(C 9,426.246 591.2 paid-in)

Nichiro Gyogyo (C 5,380 T 888.4)
Kita Nihon Gyogyo (C 2,290 T 466.0)

Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.

Taiheiyo Gyogyo (C 800 T 162.8)
Kita Chishima Suisan (C 1,100 T 223.8)
Hokuyo Kani Kanzume (C 170 T 34.6)

31/03/1943
5 companies absorbed
Nichiro Gyogyo K.K.
(C 8,650)
Later indefinitely postponed(Kita Taiheiyo Tosei K.K.)

Nippon Kani Kanzume (C 1,000 T 203.5)
Hayashikane Shoten (C 1,500 T 551.7)
Taiyo Hogei (C 2,750 T 432.2)

Nichiro Gyogyo K.K.

Enyo Hogei (C 30 T 6.1)
Kyokuyo Hogei (C 2,000 T 305.2)
Ayukawa Hogei (C 30 T 6.1)
Washiji Yamada(Representative, west-water trawling T 280.0)
Kamekichi Hattori(Representative, bonito & tuna fisheries T 70.0)
Mitsui & Co. (T 100.0)

Control not yet started

Mitsui Corporation (T 100.0)

26/03/1943
Nishi Taiyo Gyogyo Tosei K.K.
(C 6,000)

Taiyo Gyogyo K.K.

Removed from control

Kyokuyo Hogei K.K.

23/03/1943
Nisso Gyogyo K.K.
(C 1,000)— Management entrusted to
Nichiro —(dissolved)

Source: 100-Year History of the Japan Fisheries Association

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

122

fisheries control company would consist of five types:(1) north-sea fisheries = salmon and trout (motherships, northern Kuril, Soviet territory) and crab
(mother ships, land-based), (2) whaling (mother ships,
North Pacific, Antarctic) and coastal whaling, (3)steam trawling, (4) west-water trawling west of 130°east longitude, and (5) bonito and tuna fisheries,
together with related ice-making, refrigeration andfreezing, and salmon, trout and crab canneries.
Although coastal fisheries were excluded, the broad
area of control encompassed the north-sea, South
Pacific and Antarctic oceans, as well as Korea, Taiwan
and Sakhalin. The 16 fishery companies that had
previously undertaken these operations would be condensed down to just one. Nevertheless, in terms ofcapital, the three companies of Nippon Suisan, Nichiro
Gyogyo and Hayashikane Shoten accounted foraround 90% of the entire capital of the 16 companies,
and the government’s proposed control would, as it

were, signify an amalgamation of these threecompanies.
By contrast, the proposal tabled by the fishery companies was for all ocean fisheries to be integrated inseparate blocks capitalized by Nippon Suisan, Nichiro
Gyogyo and Hayashikane Shoten, under the supervision of a control association entrusted with runningthe entire industry. The point of contention in discussions with the government was whether to amalgamate
into a single ocean fisheries control company, or into
separate blocks centering on the major fisherycompanies.
The most hard-line opponent to the government’s
single company amalgamation proposal was Hayashikane
Shoten. Nichiro Gyogyo’s opposition was also quite
vehement, though not to the extent of Hayashikane
Shoten. In other words, Nippon Suisan was the mostcooperative of the three.

2. Control of Ocean Fisheries
Internal Division within Nippon Suisan
There was, however, a sharp internal division within
Nippon Suisan over the proposal for a single ocean
fisheries control company presented by Agriculture
Minister Hiroya Ino. On one side was the anti-nationalization faction led by Vice-President Kenkichi Ueki,
and on the other, the reform faction led by Executive
Director Yusaku Nishimura.
Kenkichi Ueki was completely and utterly opposedto the idea of entrusting fisheries management to the
public sector. For he knew very well, from his longyears of experience in fisheries, that public intervention in the private sector was very difficult and did
not necessarily produce good results. In addition to
his reputation, both internally and externally, as theforemost figure in mother ship-type crab fisheries,
one of the major mainstays of Nippon Suisan’s business, his pride and feelings towards having singlehandedly run the company, in essence, since the death

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstructionof Kosuke Kunishi, gave him an element of dislike forgovernment intervention. He consistently stressed his
opposition to corporate amalgamation.
Yusaku Nishimura, on the other hand, resonatedwith Hiroya Ino’s conception of a national enterprise,
and adopted the stance that reform was necessary.
When the earlier north-sea fisheries control proposal
had surfaced, Yusaku Nishimura had concurred with
Ino’s proposal for total control of ocean fisheries, andhe maintained that assertion. Nishimura believed that
Nippon Suisan depended on the nation for its existence, and that when the nation was fighting a war for
its very survival, notions like an individual company’s
profit or self-preservation were matters of noconsequence.
After a fierce debate, Nippon Suisan converged on
the reform faction’s proposal, itself based on the government’s proposal. Although the inclination to
oppose corporate amalgamation was deeply rooted,
it was a conclusion reached after envisaging all possible

123scenarios and taking them all into account.
Conflicting Positions of the Fishery Companies
The other companies continued to be unanimously
opposed to Nippon Suisan’s stance of advocating thegovernment’s proposal. The feeling was that Nippon
Suisan was using its capital power and previous trackrecord in a plan to take the other companies under its
control. There was even a flurry of speculation thatthe company was taking advantage of the emergency
situation to collude with the government in seizing
hegemony.
The large fishery companies, in particular, fearedthat their supremacy in their own business territories
could collapse, and hardened their stance against the
government’s proposal. Ikujiro Nakabe of Hayashikane
Shoten went in person to Agriculture Minister Ino
and the authorities to present his view, and even produced a pamphlet calling for a revision of the government’s proposal. The smaller companies also wentaround petitioning the Ministry of Agriculture andForestry, the Ministry of Finance and the military
authorities, as there was a very real possibility of being
absorbed by the larger companies.
One reason for the differences of opinion between
the companies was that, when the controls started in
1937, the purpose of control was to strengthen thesystem of food self-sufficiency in Japan, Manchuria
and China, but that after the start of the Pacific War
in 1941, its scope expanded to the Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere. As a result, the expectations
and roles demanded of fishery operators became geographically wider and more important. But in spiteof this, the environment for undertaking fisheries
merely worsened as the war situation progressed. It
was understandable that the companies would turnto self-preservation under such circumstances.
When the negotiations had run aground, it was
Tatsunosuke Takasaki, Vice-President of theManchurian Industrial Development Company, who
set out to broker a deal. Takasaki showed understanding

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstructionof the fishery companies’ claims, and reached theconclusion that integration in a single company would
be difficult. He proposed a plan to Agriculture
Minister Ino whereby ocean fisheries control companies should be established for different blocks of major
fishery companies, and that, beneath a central fisheries
control company, three ocean fisheries control companies centered on Nippon Suisan, Nichiro Gyogyo
and Hayashikane Shoten should be established.
To avoid any further delay and confusion, Agri­culture Minister Ino accepted this proposed compromise. He then took the opportunity to attempt acentralization of north-sea fisheries, a matter of concern for some time. But Nippon Suisan raised objections. In the end, it was decided that mother ship-type
crab fisheries would be separated off, northern Kuril
and mother ship-type salmon and trout fisheries
would be integrated in Nichiro Gyogyo, and Soviet
territory fisheries would be continued separately fromthe three companies with the establishment of Nisso
Gyogyo K.K.
It was in August 1942 that an outline of the controlof ocean fisheries took firm shape after all these twists
and turns. Teikoku Suisan Tosei, as the central control
body, would be established by December 31st thatyear, and four ocean fisheries control companies—
Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei K.K. centered on Nippon
Suisan, Kita Taiheiyo Gyogyo Tosei K.K. centered on
Nichiro Gyogyo, Nishi Taiyo Gyogyo Tosei K.K.
centered on Hayashikane Shoten, and Nisso Gyogyo
K.K. in charge of Soviet territory fisheries—would
be set up by August 1943. Agriculture Minister Ino
invited representatives of 16 related companies to his
official residence to explain the finally decided proposal, and the companies all pledged their cooperation.
Now, at last, the views of both public and private
sectors seemed to be converging on a consensus. But
from that point on, further turbulence would arise
over the establishment and running of the newcompanies.
The general appraisal of this process of fisherycontrol was that the government’s proposal originally124

tabled by Hiroya Ino had been accepted in a watereddown form. In his autobiography “Moshiogusa”, Inolooked back over those times, and said he was accusedof putting his weight behind Nippon Suisan because
he had originally been an employee of Nippon Suisan.
But Ino himself by no means considered his own rolein arranging the control to have been a failure. His
reason for this assertion was that, although the ocean

fisheries control company was eventually divided, his
original purpose was fulfilled by the companies being
comprehensively united under Teikoku Suisan Tosei.
Besides, he explained, the process could not be calleda failure because the three big companies all recovered
and continued their characteristic businesses after thewar, and because Teikoku Suisan Tosei was still continuing its business as Nippon Reizo Co., Ltd.

3. Teikoku Suisan Tosei
Establishment of Teikoku Suisan Tosei
On September 9th, 1942, an order for the establishment of Teikoku Suisan Tosei under the Fishery
Control Ordinance was issued to 16 companies—
Nippon Suisan, Nichiro Gyogyo, Hayashikane Shoten,
Taiheiyo Suisan, Kita Chishima Suisan, Kita Nihon
Gyogyo, Taiyo Hogei, Kyokuyo Hogei, Hokuyo
Hogei, Ayukawa Hogei, Enyo Hogei, Nippon Kani
Kanzume, Hokuyo Kani Kanzume, Hinode Gyogyo,
Takasago Gyogyo and Kyodo Gyogyo. The Inaugural
General Meeting was held in the Nissan Building on
December 23rd, and the company’s establishment was
registered on the 24th. With this, at long last, Teikoku
Suisan Tosei came into being. Its capital was 50 million
yen, mainly in the shape of asset financing from the
16 companies. For this, Nippon Suisan supplied its
refrigerator ship Kosei Maru, Nichiro Gyogyo supplied
Shiina Maru along with 8 other ships, and Taiyo Hogei
supplied its vessel Banshu Maru No.7. All of thesewere refrigerator ships. Once the capital amount ofthese assets had been determined by an Asset Financing
Evaluation Committee, the shortfall was made up
with allocations according to the capital scale of eachcompany.
As capital amounts, Nippon Suisan companies
provided 11,696,000 yen, Nichiro Gyogyo 19,791,000
yen and Hayashikane Shoten 9,900,000 yen. Besides
these, Mitsubishi Corporation and Mitsui & Co. were
each asked to provide 1 million yen as cooperative
capital.

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

On the personnel side, the company’s president was
to be former Minister of Agriculture and Forestry
Yoriyasu Arima, while other posts were to be filled bypersonnel from fishery companies and coastal fisheries,
the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative
Associations, etc. Senior military personnel were
included among the company’s consultant directors.
From Nippon Suisan, Yusaku Nishimura was appointed
executive director, and Junji Hayashi, Jiro Shirasu andShoichi Kaneko as directors.
At the time of its launch, the company had a large
internal organization consisting of 8 departments and
40 sections, in addition to examination rooms, testinglabs and research facilities. With the deterioration of
the war situation, however, it was forced to revise its
organization, shrinking to 3 departments and 22 sections. Meanwhile, the country was divided into four
control regions (west, central, east and north), managed by the executive director and the vicepresident.
The regional organization consisted of 8 branches
inside Japan and 4 in overseas territories, with branch
offices under direct management of the Head Officein 3 locations and 254 factories below these. This wasmore or less a straight continuation of Nippon Suisan’sorganization. But soon, communications would be
hampered by air raids, and 10 branch offices were set
up beneath the domestic branches to prepare emergency systems. The overseas establishments would
also be forced to change their structure as the war
situation shifted.

125Transfer of Refrigeration Equipment from
Nippon Suisan
With the aim of opening for business on April 1st,
1943, Teikoku Suisan Tosei started negotiating withthe companies on the purchase of refrigeration plants
and the transfer of sales facilities. Normally, this kindof facility would have been requisitioned by the government and the usage rights granted to Teikoku
Suisan Tosei, or else transferred from the companies
via asset financing. Owing to the difficulty in negotiating the establishment of the national enterprise, however, the remaining adjustment procedures were
postponed to a later date.
Teikoku Suisan Tosei and Nippon Suisan came toan agreement that all of the latter’s freezing and sales
business would be taken over intact by Teikoku Suisan
Tosei as of March 31st, 1943. Nippon Suisan transferred 248 factories and 29 sales outlets for a price of
59,058,000 yen. Rather than a cash settlement, thepayment would be divided into seven yearly installments in the form of a special debtor’s loan.
Hayashikane Shoten initially refused to transfer
facilities, on grounds that its refrigeration plants andfisheries formed a single business. After negotiations,
it was finally decided that, of its ten refrigeration
plants, three in Shimonoseki would be operated
directly by Nishi Taiyo Gyogyo, and the other seven
would be leased to Teikoku Suisan Tosei on a limited
term lease. These seven would be leased back from
Teikoku Suisan Tosei and would, in essence, continue
to be used exclusively by Hayashikane Shoten.
Moreover, Teikoku Suisan Tosei was to make no directintervention in the sales sector.
As a result, the internal organization of Teikoku
Suisan Tosei was based around the facilities transferredfrom Nippon Suisan. After the war, in December
1945, Teikoku Suisan Tosei would be renamed Nippon
Reizo. At this time the refrigeration plants leased from
Hayashikane Shoten were immediately returned, but
the facilities and ships sold or forcibly provided by
Nippon Suisan and Nichiro Gyogyo were not returned,

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

with a few exceptions.
Teikoku Suisan Tosei Starts Business
On April 1st, 1943, Teikoku Suisan Tosei at last opened
for business. As many as 3,582 employees (excluding
those working at sea) were transferred from the various
companies to Teikoku Suisan Tosei, and the majorityof them were from Nippon Suisan.
The Head Office was installed on the 4th floor of
the Maru Building in Marunouchi, Kojimachi City,
Tokyo, before moving to a building in Minato
3-Chome, Chuo City, in June 1944.
Although Teikoku Suisan Tosei was described as
an ordinary limited liability company in its Articles
of Incorporation, its original Articles of Organization
specified that it would be subject to government supervision and constraints based on the Fishery Control
Ordinance. Article 2 of the Articles of Incorporation
states that “The purpose of this company shall be to
conduct business necessary for comprehensive controlof fisheries”, identifying it as a private company whose
prime significance lay in pursuing profit.
When the company started business on April 1st,
the president issued a circular titled “On the Start ofBusiness”, setting out the matters agreed with thefishery companies and the basic principles of the company’s management. Then, on the 16th, the Head
Office staff received their instructions from President
Yoriyasu Arima in the Lecture Hall of the Nissan
Building. Arima appealed that fish catches should be
increased in line with the national economy andnational policies, and that, to this end, the employees
should disregard the philosophies of their originalcompanies and establish the corporate culture of
Teikoku Suisan Tosei in a state of harmony, based on
the background to the company’s establishment.
By this time, Japan’s war situation had alreadyturned to a considerable disadvantage. Japanese forces
had suffered a crushing defeat at the Battle of Midway
in June 1942, had retreated from Guadalcanal in
February 1943 and had been wiped out on Attu Island126

in May that year.
Amid these developments, a number of vessels in
mid-operation were sunk by enemy fire, and supplies
of production commodities like oil, fishing tackle andfishing nets continued to diminish. Output fell sharply.
Now, the collection and processing of agricultural,
livestock and marine products based around refrigeration plants and coastal fisheries came to play a majorrole in the food supply. Positive use was made of therefrigeration plant network in collecting and processing agricultural, livestock and other products.
In July 1943, Teikoku Suisan Tosei was designatedas a control body for north-sea salt-dried salmon andtrout and as a distribution control body for cannedmarine products (salmon, trout and crab). It was also
designated as a central distribution organization for
ocean fishery commodities and as a distribution control body for empty cans for canning food. And in thefollowing month, it was designated as a collection
body for animal oil and fats (whale oil). To fulfill thisseries of distribution operations more efficiently, it
now stepped up its investment and loan activity.
Teikoku Suisan Tosei was successful in sales offrozen fish, frozen vegetables and frozen meat, etc.,
particularly in Korea, Manchuria, northern China
and central China. These operations had originallybeen developed by Nippon Suisan, but when Teikoku
Suisan Tosei took over, the business content was
expanded. The company would take bulk orders for
products such as frozen and dried fish from buyers(mainly the military) inside Japan, and would supply
them via refrigeration plants around the country.
Besides seafood products, it also actively collected anddistributed others including frozen meat, frozen vegetables and frozen eggs.
By 1944, however, shipments from within Japan
had almost completely ceased. As a result, the company
itself undertook fishing operations in Bohai Bay andthe Yellow Sea coast, processed the fish catches andthereby maintained the supply of processed marine
products. It also promoted the handling of livestock

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

meat, agricultural processed products and others.
As the food situation became increasingly tight,
the need arose to concentrate commodity supplies
around the Peking area. Thus, in 1944 the Peking
branch was liquidated and the Kahoku Suisan Tosei
Kyokai or Association for Control of Northern China
Fisheries (later renamed Kahoku Suisan Chikusan
Tosei Kyokai) was established. Teikoku Suisan Tosei
capitalized the company through asset financing, andat the same time sent its employees on secondment.
Teikoku Suisan Tosei newly developed business insouthern regions, which played a pivotal role in military terms. Japan was making aggressive moves towards
the south, and ensuring a reliable supply of food tothe area was an important duty in which failure would
not be tolerated.
Although it was relatively easy to procure rice inJapanese-occupied Malaya and Java, sources of animal
protein were harder to obtain. Another challenge wasto strengthen the system of stockpiling by refrigeration
plants.
The military commissioned all of these operations
from Teikoku Suisan Tosei. Specifically, the request
was that Teikoku Suisan Tosei would undertake all of
the work of delivering marine products and otherfoods in the southern military administrative region
to the military. The management of refrigeration
plants, canning factories and other onshore facilities
owned by Nippon Suisan and Hayashikane Shoten
would be transferred to Teikoku Suisan Tosei from
April 1st, 1943 onwards, and Teikoku Suisan Tosei
would use these facilities to run its own ice-making,refrigeration and freezing business.
To meet the request from the military, Teikoku
Suisan Tosei established branches and branch offices
as appropriate in various locations, and as well as
operating refrigeration plants, it also took care ofoperating ice-making factories, fish farms, marine
product processing plants, and agar factories, among
others.

127

4. From Nippon Suisan to “Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei”
Establishment of Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei
Nippon Suisan and its subsidiaries Hinode Gyogyo,
Kyodo Gyogyo, Hokuyo Hogei and Takasago Gyogyo
were now ordered to form a new company called“Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei K.K.” by the end of
August 1943. A committee was quickly formed toprepare for the establishment. The committee waschaired by Keizo Tamura, with Kenkichi Ueki as vicechairman, and Tatsusaburo Shibuya, Yusaku
Nishimura, Rokuro Masui, Fumio Matsuo, Susumu
Masui and Shizuo Minoda as members.
On December 29th, 1942, Nippon Suisan held an
Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders inadvance of the establishment of Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo
Tosei, due in the following year. Documents preparedby the Establishment Committee concerning theestablishment of the company were presented andapproved by the Meeting. According to these documents, the shares of capital in the new company would
be 93 million yen from Nippon Suisan, 222,000 yen
from Hokuyo Hogei, 640,000 yen from Hinode
Gyogyo and 400,000 yen from Takasago Gyogyo.
Because Nippon Suisan held all of Kyodo Gyogyo’s
shares, Kyodo Gyogyo’s share of capitalization in themerger was zero.
On March 27th, 1943, Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei
held an Inaugural General Meeting of Shareholders,and on the 31st, the company’s registration was complete. Keizo Tamura was elected president and
Kenkichi Ueki vice-president. The capital was
94,262,000 yen.
Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei took over all of
Nippon Suisan’s business, including mother ship-type
crab business, mother ship-type whaling, steamshipwhaling, steam trawler business and west-water twoboats trawling business. It also took over 10 trawlers,
6 hand trawl vessels, 3 transport ships, whaling equipment and others from the other four companies.
However, Antarctic whaling had already been sus-

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

pended in 1941, while the mother ship-type crab business was made idle in 1943.
All land-based facilities and plants, ice-making,refrigeration and freezing business, together with sales
business, had been transferred to Teikoku Suisan Tosei,
and now all ocean fishery business was taken over by
Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei. From that time on,
Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei sold fish and products
to Teikoku Suisan Tosei, which controlled the distribution of marine products.
Keizo Tamura said that the change from “Nippon
Suisan” to “Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei” was not
merely a change of company name or organization;rather, it signified a change from a profit-making company oriented towards its shareholders, to one oriented
towards the state. In that case, he said, since Nippon
Suisan had always conducted its business with orientation towards the state under the company motto of“Serving the Nation with Food”, the fact that Nippon
Suisan had now been transformed to a company basedon the Fishery Control Ordinance should arguably
mean that it had become a national enterprise in bothname and substance. He went on to say that the company should be aware of its serious mission as a national
enterprise, a quasi-state organ, and should perform its
business in line with state objectives while remaining
in accordance with national policy.
Although Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei had been
established by Nippon Suisan absorbing the otherfour companies and increasing its capital by 1,262,000
yen to 94,262,000 yen, most of the ships it acquired
had been requisitioned by the navy, and its assets nearly
all existed on paper only. The only actual contribution
to increased productivity came in the form of three
trawlers and four hand trawl ships. Other businessthat could be continued was limited to steamshipwhaling with bases inside Japan, in Korea and Sakhalin,
north-sea fisheries centering on Kamchatka, and westwater otter and two boats trawling in the East China
Sea and the Yellow Sea. Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei

128

took its first step as a company amid this harsh business environment.
In February 1944, based on the Company Control
Ordinance, Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei along withmore than ten other companies established Minami
Nippon Gyogyo Tosei K.K. based in its Taiwan Sales
Office, with capital of 50 million yen and 57% of its
shares owned by Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei. Nippon
Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei provided asset financing in theform of 43 fishing boats and 17 ice-making and refrigeration plants under the management of the Taiwan
Sales Office, as well as onshore facilities and associatedrights. The Head Office was established in Taipei,
with branches, branch offices, factories and otherfacilities distributed throughout Taiwan; others were
set up in Guangdong, Hong Kong, Shantou, Hainan,
Haiphong, Timor, Okinawa and elsewhere. The company engaged in a wide range of operations, including
west-water trawling, ice-making, refrigeration andfreezing, and sales.

Other Control Companies and Control of Coastal
Fisheries
Preparations for establishing the other three control
companies besides Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei now
went ahead, in line with the Fishery Control Ordinance.
In some cases, the original plans were significantly
changed before they came to fruition.
In March 1943, Hayashikane Shoten with Taiyo
Hogei and Enyo Hogei established Nishi Taiyo
Gyogyo Tosei K.K., capitalized at 60 million yen. The
company would be engaged in mother ship-type whaling, steamship whaling, trawling and west-water twoboats trawling.
Meanwhile, Nichiro Gyogyo and five other companies were ordered to establish Kita Taiheiyo Gyogyo
Tosei K.K. However, Nichiro Gyogyo was desperate
to avoid coming under the Fishery Control Ordinanceat any cost. It decided that it would first merge all six
companies into Nichiro Gyogyo as a parent company,
based on the Corporate Liquidation Ordinance, in

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

which guise they would become the control company.
It also planned to obstruct its assets and fishing zones
in Soviet territory fisheries from moving to the control
company. Its assertion here was that separate diplomatic negotiations would be needed to change theregistered ownership, and that it would be disadvantageous to Japan–Soviet relations if the “Nichiro” (=Japan–Russian) part of its name ceased to exist.
Nichiro Gyogyo carried out further mergers, etc., at
the end of July, taking control of all north-sea operations except mother ship-type crab fisheries.
Consequently, the establishment of the control company, scheduled for the end of August, was postponed
indefinitely, and the name of Nichiro Gyogyo was toremain unchanged.
Nichiro Gyogyo and two other companies werethen ordered to establish Nisso Gyogyo K.K., mainlyfor Soviet territory fisheries, which they duly did in
March 1943 with capital of 10 million yen. However,this was nothing more than a paper company, and inreality Nichiro Gyogyo remained in control of Soviet
territory fisheries.
Thus, a system for fish catches and production wascompleted with the various control companies set up
around the core of the three giants of ocean
fisheries.
Now the government embarked on the control ofcoastal fisheries, as distinct from that of ocean fisheries.
At the same time as promoting the control of ocean
fisheries, Agriculture Minister Hiroya Ino moved topropose the integration of coastal organizations. The
Fisheries Organization Act was promulgated in March
1943, and based on this, the Central Fisheries
Association was established in September that year.
The Association took over all the business of the
National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative
Associations, as well as its claims, debts, rights andobligations, and was established with capital from 44
organizations. The Central Fisheries Association successively absorbed control companies for fisheriesrelated commodities and fishery products, and was torule as the controlling organization for coastal

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fisheries.
The Central Fisheries Association guided and promoted production, as well as vigorously controlling
products and the distribution of commodities.
However, the commodity distribution performancein fiscal 1944 was only a third of the planned figure,while the trading performance fell as much as 100
million yen short of the target of 267 million yen. A
decrease in requisitioned vessels combined with aweakening of the workforce and material supplies led
to a fall in fisheries output.
No matter how many attempts were made to forcibly apply controls, the business environment still grewincreasingly harsh with changes in the war situation,and this had a direct impact on fish catch performances.

Management of Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei in
the Closing Stages of the War
As the likelihood of Japan’s defeat grew stronger witheach passing day, Japanese ships were being sunk everywhere, while air raids and bombing were making theseas around Japan increasingly dangerous. Fisheries
were not spared the ravages of war, with fishing operations in Japanese waters out of control by 1944; by1945, even going out in surfboats was life-endangering.
Nevertheless, Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei stoicallypushed on under the banner of “Serving the Nation
with Food”. Though greatly depleted, it continued its
west-water fisheries, steamship whaling and north-sea
fisheries along the coasts of Hokkaido. And althoughfish catches fell from 39,572 tons in 1943 to 29,399
tons in 1944 and 9,821 tons in 1945, a shareholder
dividend of 10% was resolutely maintained each term
until the end of the war.
A total of 154 Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei vessels

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

with a gross tonnage of 134,920 tons were sunk, captured or seized during the war years from 1941 to 1945.
Of the requisitioned vessels, the Tonan Maru (usedin support of Antarctic whaling ) was sunk off
Indochina in November 1943, followed by the Tonan
Maru III off Truk Island the following February and
the Tonan Maru II in the South China Sea in August.
Besides these, the mother ship Kasato Maru and 55
trawlers including Ryokai Maru and Suruga Maru all
failed to return. The only vessels that were not requisitioned and survived were antiquated whaling ships,
trawlers and west-water trawlers.
Altogether, 681 employees are known to have losttheir lives in the war.
In 1943, fearful of American air raids, Kenkichi
Ueki proposed that the Head Office be evacuated to
Shinshu in central Japan. Most of the management
team unquestioningly believed in Japan’s supremacy,
however, and Ueki’s proposal was rejected. In May
1944, the Nissan Building, which housed the Head
Office of Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei, was commandeered by the Imperial navy, and the company’s Head
Office was relocated to the Hokuryu Building in Makicho, Kyobashi City, Tokyo. Ueki again urged that, atthe very least, part of the Accounting Department
and the Shares Section should be evacuated in preparation for emergencies. As a result, the accounting documents and share certificates were moved to Nikko andKaruizawa in September that year. In May 1945, theHead Office was destroyed in an air raid, and a temporary office was set up in Shimo-Takaido, Suginami
City, Tokyo. Only the part of the Accounting
Department and the Shares Section that had been
evacuated the previous year, along with the Whaling
Division and the Ship Division that had been relocatedthat December, were spared destruction in the raid.

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Chapter 2: Fisheries in Occupied Japan

1945–1950

Part 1 War Damage and Food Crisis
The End of the War and the Ensuing Food Crisis
On August 14th, 1945, the Japanese government
accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The
following day, Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s
unconditional surrender. The war was over.
The war had brought disastrous consequences to
the Japanese economy. Enemy air raids had reduced
not only large cities but also many smaller provincial
cities to piles of rubble. The physical damage wrought
on facilities, housing and other infrastructure wasestimated at 65.3 billion yen, excluding the loss of
weapon-related property. If the war had never takenplace, the gross national wealth should have grownfrom an index of 100 in 1935 to 135 in 1945, but hadin fact stopped at 101. This meant that a full 25% of
the nation’s wealth was lost in the war (Shiro Yamazaki,
Nihon Keizaishi “History of the Japanese Economy”,
New Edition).
While defeat in the war brought the production of
military supplies to a complete halt, the increased issue
of Japanese banknotes to pay for extraordinary military
expenditure, etc., led to spiraling inflation in Japan.
Although the transition from military demand production to civilian demand production advanced at
a rapid pace, the work was slow to progress because
civilian demand production had been reduced to aminimum during the war. Moreover, the necessarycommodities were in severe shortage, and the recovery
of production was hampered by tremendous
difficulties.
Shortages of food and everyday requisites had ahugely damaging effect on people’s lives. The General

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers (GHQ) promoted the production ofdaily requisites, but the recovery of civilian demand
production did not proceed as smoothly as had been
expected. Although GHQ had banned import andexport activity in September, soon imports of theminimum requirement of daily commodities werepermitted.
Food shortages had a particularly severe impact on
people’s lives. The causes of this serious food crisis
were a shortage of minimum requisites and deficiencies in food control immediately after the end of thewar. No reliance could be placed on imports, moreover,as there was a worldwide food shortage, and a breakthrough was not easy to find.
No food was being distributed in urban areas, placing them in a harsh situation. The Engel’s coefficient(ratio of food expenditure to general consumer expenditure) of workers before the war was in the mid-30%
range, but after the war it climbed up to about 70%
among workers in urban areas. Late or failed deliveries
were commonplace. This encouraged black market
trading, causing massive inflation of food prices.
It was in fiscal 1948 that domestic food production
recovered. Then, when worldwide food production
turned upwards and imports increased, Japan’s foodcrisis gradually subsided. Not only did the disparity
in the food situation between urban and rural areas
shrink, but late deliveries also became a thing of thepast. Nevertheless, although the total supply of staple
foods at last showed signs of a recovery, qualitative
sufficiency was still a long way off; it would still beseveral more years before the calorie supply would131

return to prewar levels.
War Damage to Fisheries
The Pacific War also left deep scars on Japanese fisheries. The damage incurred by fisheries lay in the loss ofprocessing, ice-making, refrigeration and otheronshore facilities, fishing boats and fuel, and fishinggrounds.
During the war, Japan’s worsening situation had led
to damage that vastly outstripped the number of vessels
built. And as the shortage of ships became acute, themilitary started to requisition many of the remaining
civilian vessels for transporting troops or military
supplies. This soon came to include fishing boats, large
vessels being used for military supplies and trooptransport, and bottom trawlers as minesweepers. By
October 1944, a total of 1,700 fishing boats weighing
330,000 tons had been requisitioned (Hiroshi Tanaka,“Compendium of Principal Japanese Industries, New
Edition: Fisheries—Taiyo Gyogyo”). If we include
fishing boats wrecked or sunk due to direct damage
from air raids, 20% of all fishing boats and 50% of thegross tonnage were lost.
Meanwhile, the heavy oil used as fuel for fishingboats fell into short supply, as did cotton, Manila hemp
and other materials for fisheries. Taking the prewar
level as an index of 100, by 1944 these had fallen to
6.26, 1.56 and 13.3, respectively.
The damage to processing, refrigeration and otheronshore facilities was also considerable. Ice-making,refrigeration, freezing and ice storage facilities weretargeted by strategic bombing, and the damage rate
due to the war in 1943 was 46% for ice-making, 44%
for refrigeration, 30% for freezing and 46% for ice
storage. In 1946, the year after the war ended, thenumber of ice-making facilities had decreased from
999 in 1940 to 520, and ice-making capacity (tons perday) had fallen to around 48.8%.
Teikoku Suisan Tosei, which had taken over nearly
all of the land-based assets previously owned by
Nippon Suisan, lost 42% of the equipment capacity
in its domestic refrigeration plants due to war
damage.
The loss of fishing grounds was also severe, nearly
all international fishing grounds developed by Japanesefishery companies before the war being now inoperable. Lost fishing grounds extended over a very widearea, including the coast of the Soviet territory
Primoriye, the east and west coasts of the Kamchatka
Peninsula, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Bering Sea, theSakhalin coast, the Japan Sea, the East China Sea, theYellow Sea, the Bohai Sea, the coast of Taiwan, theGulf of Tonkin, sea areas from the Philippines to
Micronesia, off the northwest coast of Australia, off
French Indochina, and from the Gulf of Siam to theIndian Ocean. The total area of these lost fishinggrounds extended to 78,947 square miles, from which
the gross output was 384,326 tons.

Part 2 The GHQ Occupation Policy and Fisheries
1. Dissolution of Zaibatsu, Agrarian Reform, Labor Reform
Dissolution of Zaibatsu and Promotion of
Democracy Through Public Office Purges
Economic reforms by GHQ had a huge impact on
the Japanese economy after the war. The GHQ reforms
consisted of three major elements: dissolution of the

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

zaibatsu, agrarian reform and labor reform.
The dissolution of the zaibatsu was implemented
under the perception that the zaibatsu were linked tothe military and had contributed to the adoption of
militarism in Japan. In November 1945, GHQ ordered
the dissolution of holding companies and decided to132close the Head Offices of the big four zaibatsu (Mitsui,
Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda), establish a
Holding Companies Liquidation Committee, andprohibit the sale of assets by the Head Offices andzaibatsu family members. In line with this, the Head
Office general management functions of the big fourzaibatsu were terminated, and zaibatsu family members and Head Office directors were made to standdown.
The scope of dissolution was now widened, andunder the Holding Companies Liquidation
Committee Order issued in April 1946, a total of 83
companies including the Head Offices of smallerzaibatsu besides those of the big four zaibatsu, as wellas other functioning companies having the nature ofa holding company, were designated as holding companies and were either liquidated or their shareholdings disposed of. With this, Nissan (Aikawa),
Furukawa, Asano, Okura, Nomura and others that
had formed corporate groups lost their dominance.
Direct subsidiaries of the big three zaibatsu (Mitsui,
Mitsubishi and Sumitomo) and giant corporations
such as Nissan (Aikawa) were also targeted by the
dissolution policy. Further steps were taken, such as
the abolition of monopoly laws, elimination ofmonopolies, and elimination of inter-company shareownerships, and with these the dissolution of thezaibatsu became more wide-reaching.
The dissolution of the zaibatsu also targeted power
vested in individuals. Altogether, 56 individuals in 10
zaibatsu designated as zaibatsu families (Mitsui,
Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, Nissan, Okura,
Furukawa, Asano, Fuji and Nomura) were forced tostand down, and interlocking directorships amongsubsidiaries were prohibited.
To achieve a permanent end to militarism as
demanded by the Potsdam Declaration, GHQ issuedorders for a purge of public officials in January 1946.
Public office purges started with war criminals andprofessional soldiers, but also extended to politiciansand others. In January 1947, the purge of undesirablesfrom public office was revised, with the scope now

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

broadened to target people who had been engaged in
the economy and media at central level, as well as
leaders at local level. This included some of the top
businessmen of the day, while the purge also targeted
the officers and auditors of monopoly corporations
and companies deemed to fall under excessive concentration of economic power. As a result, more than
2,000 business leaders were purged, including theentire management of Nippon Suisan. The reinstatement of anyone connected with the zaibatsu was thenmade impossible by their elimination from economic
positions in June that year, followed by the enactmentof the Law for the Termination of Zaibatsu Family
Control in January 1948.
In November 1945, the Japanese government issued
the Restricted Companies Ordinance to increase therigor of zaibatsu dissolution. This was designed tocontrol attempts to evade dissolution by preventing
companies targeted for dissolution from carrying out
demergers for their own convenience. On being designated as restricted companies, they required thepermission of the Minister of Finance for sales or giftsof movable property, real estate, securities, etc., orother acts giving rise to the transfer of rights, andborrowing of capital, receipts of deposit repayments,
or other similar acts, thus vastly restricting their corporate activity.

Agrarian Reform, Labor Reform and Labor
Disputes, Deconcentration Policy
Agrarian reform was imposed by forcing landowners
to sell off tenant farmland and at the same time promoting cash payment of tenant farm rents. Tenant
farmland purchased by the government was then soldto tenant farmers at reasonable prices. This brought
the ratio of tenant farmland to the total farmland area
down to 9.9% from 45.9% before reform. At the sametime, it dismantled the landowning class, empoweredsmall farmers and increased farm householdincomes.
The main aims of the labor reforms were to activate

133

labor unions and the middle classes while reducing
the influence of zaibatsu and other large corporations,and to prevent “social dumping” by raising wages.
Another intention was that increased worker incomes
would stoke domestic demand and prevent military
expansion due an improved balance of payments.
The enactment of the Trade Union Law inDecember 1945 sparked a rash of labor disputes allover the country. The Labor Division of GHQ’s
Economic and Scientific Section (ESS), concernedover this increased activity, prepared a new draft of
the Law, as a result of which the Labor Relations
Adjustment Act, mainly designed to prevent andresolve labor disputes, became law in September
1946.
Before this, in May 1946, the labor unions had
demanded the creation of a Labor Protection Act. In
response, the Labor Protection Division of the
Ministry of Health & Welfare drafted a Bill, and in
April 1947 the Labor Standards Act came into
being.
The spate of labor disputes following the enactmentof the Trade Union Law came against a backgroundof consumer anxiety due to food shortages, growing
inflation, labor uncertainty and other social
problems.
A common form of dispute at the time was that ofa struggle for control of production. This was a meansof waging a conflict whereby the workers themselves
would attempt to wrest control of the sites of production. It came with a large number of demands, including control of personnel administration, participationin management, and creation of management councils.
These struggles for control of production were highly
effective, and management councils were created innumerous companies in line with labor agreements
concluded from summer 1946 onwards. Management
councils were bodies for joint decision-making basedon discussion between labor and management. When
discussions failed to bear fruit, collective bargaining
was implemented. Although the matters discussed
mainly concerned labor conditions, they sometimes

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

also extended to management principles, personnel,
production plans and other wide-reaching management issues.
The method of labor-management discussion
through management councils came to an end withthe progressive rationalization of management triggered by the “Dodge Line” in March 1949. In May
1949, the Trade Union Law was amended to prohibit
automatic extensions of labor agreements. Mattersrelated to management rights were placed outside thescope of collective bargaining, and the involvementof unions in personnel administration was diluted.
The function of management participation throughmanagement councils was also lost, and they became
simple discussion and consultation bodies. This
resulted in the abolition of management councils inmany companies, and a switch to production councils
or labor councils was promoted.
An important mainstay of postwar reform by GHQ
was the elimination of large monopoly corporations
and the creation of competitive markets.
In April 1947, the Antimonopoly Act was enacted
to maintain the effects of dissolution of the zaibatsu.
It was a more rigorous version of the U.S. Antitrust
Law, and prohibited cartel and trust activity by limiting private monopolies and unfair trade, banning
unfair competitive practices, and so on. It also forbade
holding companies and share ownership by operatingcompanies, and made it impossible to form businesscombines.
The scope of the deconcentration policy graduallywidened, extending from the zaibatsu to other large
corporations. In May 1946, GHQ decided to demand
war reparations of 15 billion yen. The Special Measures
Act for War Reparations was enacted in November
1946, leading to losses of 91.3 billion yen, mainly inthe military supply industries. As measures to bail out
companies that had been brought to the verge ofbankruptcy by these reparations, the Enterprise
Reorganization Act and the Financial Institutions’
Reconstruction and Readjustment Act were enactedin October 1946. The main thrust of these two

134

reconstruction laws lay in calculating special losses
associated with war reparations and special losses todeal with losses arising after defeat in the war, andimplementing reorganization plans to establish futurebusiness infrastructure; they were originally intended
to rescue companies. As standards for applying theEnterprise Reorganization Act, the Antitrust andCartel Division of ESS cited the abolition of Head
Office structures, regional decentralization of large
corporations, separation of unaffiliated businesses,
and dismantling of vertical and horizontal connections. As a result, many companies started to split
themselves voluntarily. In other words, the two reconstruction laws, while ostensibly designed for company
bailouts, were used as a measure for company splits.
Furthermore, in December 1947, GHQ promulgatedand enforced the Economic Deconcentration Law,making 325 companies subject to the deconcentration
policy.
Eventually, as the Cold War took hold, Americachanged its policy towards Japan. The focus shiftedfrom a demilitarization policy to one of economic
reconstruction, and the deconcentration policy tooka back seat. Based on a judgement that the Economic
Deconcentration Law was delaying the reconstructionof the Japanese economy, financial institutions were
removed from the scope of application under the
Economic Deconcentration Law, and designation
removal procedures were put in motion to bring thenumber of targeted companies down to 20 or less. In
the end, the Economic Deconcentration Law only
applied to 18 companies.

2. Postwar Control of Marine Products
Abolition of the Fishery Control Ordinance andthe Impact of Renewed Control
The “Law for the Abolition of the National Mobilization
Law and the Wartime Emergency Measures Act” waspromulgated on December 20th, 1945. As well as
abolishing the National Mobilization Law, this alsoabolished, annulled or revoked a number of laws,
ordinances and edicts in connection with wartime
control. This marked the end of the foundation uponwhich the wartime regime had been formed acrossthe country.
When supplies dried up due to food shortages after
the war, significant volumes of fresh foods came to be
traded on the black market. The central wholesalemarket authorities, concerned over the worsening
situation, asked the Japanese government to abolishcontrols at the earliest possible juncture. As well as arequest to halt the rampancy of black marketeers, thisalso embodied hopes for an increased intake of stocks.
In response, the Japanese government presented GHQ
with a proposal to abolish the wartime regime, and in
September 1945, as a transitional measure for abolition

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstructionof the Fishery Control Ordinance, it was decided thatmeasures would be taken to improve the efficiency ofmarine product distribution. The fact that moves toabolish the Control Ordinance were set in motion
only one month after the end of the war signaled an
intention to break through the food crisis as soon as
possible through the strength of private business.
Among the specific details were that the names of thefishery companies would be changed and they would
be made limited companies based on the Commercial
Code; sales of marine products would be undertaken
via shipment control associations in the respective
source areas; and the distribution of commodities,
coordination of labor, and communication and collaboration between the companies would be carriedout by setting up organizations. This sparked a sharp
increase in buying at source and spurred inflation of
black market prices, which were already above theofficial prices.
This situation was unacceptable to GHQ, which
moved to reimpose controls in a bid to stabilize publicorder. On April 1st, 1946, the Marine Products
Control Order came into force, bringing marine

135

products under central control once more. However,
the official prices were unrealistically low, exposing
the business of fishery companies to a harsh environment. The only sector to scrape a meager profit was
east-water trawling; the rest all fell into deficit. Losses
were particularly severe in trawling and west-water
trawling. According to an announcement by the DeepSea Trawling Association at the time, for fishery companies to remain healthy, prices in trawl fisheries
needed to be about 1.7 times and those in west-water
trawling about twice the official prices.
Easing and Abolition of Postwar Control
Restrictions on marine products were gradually eased
as the Japanese economy recovered. The Ashida
Cabinet formed in March 1948 changed restrictions
on the distribution of fresh fish and shellfish to restrictions on the distribution of fresh marine products in
July, and removed high-grade fish from the targets ofcontrol. This was based a judgment that, since theconsumption of high-grade fish was limited in volume,
it would have little direct impact.

Restrictions on other foods were gradually abolished from around 1949 onwards. Output volumes ofmarine products at last showed signs of increasing,and in October 1949, the government amended therestrictions on distribution of fresh and processedmarine products and eased controls on marine products. With this, products with good freshness andquality become available for distribution as rationed
goods, and free competition was permitted within thecontrols, including goods for ordinary distribution
and non-controlled goods.
However, as marine products were still being tradedat prices higher than the official prices, it would stilltake time before controls could be completely abolished. One factor that delayed abolition was that
inflation of fishery producers’ prices was expected toresult when imported commodity subsidies were
stopped.
By 1950, prices of marine products had fallen to alevel below that of the official prices. That April,controls on the distribution and prices of marine products were abolished. They were the last of all fresh
foods to reach this point.

Part 3 Resumption of Fisheries
1. Establishment of the MacArthur Line and Permission for Shipbuilding
GHQ Policy on Fisheries
The main aim of GHQ policy in the early stages ofthe occupation was to demilitarize Japan and establish
democracy; reconstructing and sustaining the Japanese
economy were of secondary importance. Nevertheless,preventing famine, disease and social unrest due tofood shortages were also important tasks. To this end,
measures taken for fisheries were aimed at promoting
the reconstruction and modernization of fisheries
while taking steps to protect marine resources, so thatthe people of Japan could receive an adequate supplyof food.

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

As well as increasing output, GHQ positively promoted measures and guidance on conserving andmanaging marine resources. Nippon Suisan had until
then been engaged in voluntary regulation of crab fish
catches, while some other fishery companies had also
operated with consideration for marine resources.
Nevertheless, there was a low awareness of conserving
resources in the fisheries industry as a whole. GHQ
took the view that this kind of approach by the Japanesefisheries industry was causing a sense of distrust among
other countries, and thus gave guidance to various
experts and other important people related tofisheries.

136

Establishment of the MacArthur Line
After Japan’s formal surrender aboard the USS Missouri
on September 2nd, 1945, navigation by Japanese vessels was forbidden, making operations by fishing boats
impossible.
This unduly extreme regulation was merely a shortterm military measure, however; on September 14th,
wooden ships were permitted to navigate within 12
nautical miles (about 22 km) from shore. This did notmean, however, that ships could navigate freely within
the permitted range, as each individual voyage had to
be cleared by SCAJAP (Shipping Control Authority
for Japanese Merchant Marine). Although fishing
could now resume, this served as a major obstacle to
Japanese fisheries.
No ships were allowed to use guns with barrels of
2 inches (about 5cm) or more, creating a problem forcoastal whaling, where whaling guns with 1-meterbarrels were used. Eventually, it was judged that “whaling guns have no rifling grooves and therefore cannot
be said to have a barrel as such”, and whaling guns werethus exempted from the ruling.
These constraints were somewhat eased by the first
concession presented by the “MacArthur Line” on
September 17th, 1945. The purpose of the MacArthur
Line was to expand the fishable area available to Japan
while eliminating the cumbersome procedures applied
until then. Provided a fishing permit was obtained inadvance, vessels could now operate within an area ofjust over 630,000 square nautical miles without having
to be cleared each time.
The fishing area initially permitted by the
MacArthur Line was defined by a northernmost pointat 45°30’ north latitude near Cape Nosappu in
Hokkaido, a southernmost point at 26° north runningsouth of Okinawa, and an easternmost point at 123°
east longitude. This made it possible to fish in mostareas within three nautical miles of the coasts of Japan,
including Hokkaido.
Although the restrictions had been vastly eased,
there were still many problems; for example, there

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

were good fishing grounds outside the Line in the
Yellow Sea, while there were some places that
obstructed navigation by fishing boats. Fishery operators gradually became frustrated with the narrow rangeof fishing grounds, and requested, via the Japanese
government, that the Line be expanded. The naval
authority in the U.S. Department of state, the bodyin charge of deciding policy on Japanese fisheries at
the time, accepted the request in a bid to solve Japan’s
food shortage. As a result, the fishing area gradually
expanded until the Line was finally abolished in
1952.
The expansion of fishing grounds under the first
concession was designed to eliminate obstructions tonavigation in the La Pérouse Strait and Nemuro Strait,
and was carried out in September 1945. This madeoperations along the Hokkaido coast possible, andfisheries output increased slightly. As the food shortage was still not resolved, the Japanese government
petitioned GHQ to expand the fishing area as far as
the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea. The request
was turned down, however, as the areas in question
adjoined Chinese and Soviet territorial waters andtherefore posed a security problem, and because
Sketch map of the MacArthur Line

June 1946
Sept. 1945

Sept. 1949

May 1950

Progressive expansion of the permitted fishing area
1. Sept. 14, 1945: Fishing permitted within 12 nautical miles of
the Japanese coast
2. Sept. 27, 1945: 1st Concession, Memorandum No. 80
3. Nov. 30, 1945: Ogasawara whaling permitted
4. June 22, 1946: 2nd Extension, SCAPIN No. 1033
5. Sept. 19, 1949: 3rd Extension, SCAPIN No. 2046
6. May 11, 1950: Mother ship tuna fishing permitted, SCAPIN
No. 2097

137

Japanese fishing fleets had not completely exhausted
marine resources in the existing area of operation.
In September 1945, whaling operations in the
Ogasawara Islands were permitted between December
1st that year and March 31st, 1946.
The second expansion came in June 1946. Japanesefishing boats were quickly increasing in number ataround this time, and fish catches inside the permittedarea had become limited. Meanwhile, tuna fishingboats, trawlers and other such vessels were not suited
to operating in fishing grounds inside the Line, andwere being forced to operate inefficiently. Moreover,animal protein intake among the Japanese people
remained seriously deficient. In view of this, fishinggrounds were newly added in eastern and westernwaters, and the operational area was expanded to about
double the size. But even now, west-water trawlingand bottom trawl grounds were still too constricted,
and the majority of promising fishing grounds for
trawling and bottom trawl fisheries in the East China
Sea, the Yellow Sea and elsewhere remained outside
the operational area.
In September 1949, the third fishing ground expansion was carried out. At the time, there was ongoingdebate in the U.S.A. as to whether American taxpayers
should bear the cost of occupying Japan. Marine products imported into Japan were first bought up by theAmerican government and then redistributed inside
Japan, and GHQ, thinking it imperative to increase
Japan’s food self-sufficiency, expanded the operational
area for fisheries. The area expanded greatly eastwards,
and at latitudes south of 40° north, operations became
possible up to 180° east longitude.
The fourth expansion took place in May 1950. Tuna
operations in the East China Sea, permitted in the
2nd expansion, had resulted in overfishing, and as ameasure to prevent this, the Japanese government had
limited fishery activity that year. As this would leadto a supply deficiency, the operational area was thenextended to the Equator and operations by mothership-type tuna fishing boats were permitted. And
although these concessions were accompanied by

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

numerous constraints—including a requirement to
fly markings, submit fishing logs, be accompanied bygovernment and GHQ monitors, etc.—with this,Japanese tuna fisheries could now reach as far as theEquator.
With each passing year, operational waters within
the MacArthur Line were steadily expanded, andoperations were permitted in view of the food situation inside Japan. Although the MacArthur Linehelped Japanese fisheries output to recover to a certain
extent, it also undeniably restricted free fishing activity
by Japanese fisheries for around seven years until it
was abolished in 1952.
GHQ Permits Shipbuilding
Japanese fisheries had lost countless ships during thewar, and reconstruction depended on building new
fishing boats. In December 1945, the Japanese Cabinet
decided on a plan to build wooden ships totaling
120,000 tons and steel ships totaling 210,000 tons,
and submitted a request to GHQ. GHQ took a positive view and granted the request.
The specific plan was, first of all, to build 795 ships
weighing 95,172 tons in three stages over the courseof 1946. West-water trawling boats accounted for 73%
of the total in the first stage, while in stages two andthree, bonito and tuna fishing boats were most numerous with 64%. The majority of applicants in the firstand second stages were major fishery companies, butmany smaller companies and individual shipowners
were included in the third stage.
The company that built most vessels at this time
was Taiyo Gyogyo. It had been given permission fora total of 209 ships, accounting for around 26% of thetotal number built. Following this were Kawanami
Kogyo K.K. with 77 ships and Marutoku Taiyo
Gyogyo K.K. with 70. Of these, Nippon Suisan would
later absorb the Kawanami Kog yo Fisheries
Department as a measure to secure vessels.
In the spring of 1947, fishery operators asked GHQ
to permit a fourth stage of shipbuilding. The numbers

138requested were 135 bonito and tuna fishing boats, 58
west-water trawling boats and 22 transport ships,
totaling 215 ships in all. Most of these had already hadbudgets and materials allocated on the assumptionthat permission would be given; construction work
had already started in some cases.
However, the company’s plans were thrown into
disarray by the Herrington Statement in June thatyear. At a press conference, W.C. Herrington, Chiefof the Fisheries Division in GHQ’s Natural Resources
Section, made it clear that the fourth stage of fishingboat construction would only permit the constructionof 22 transport ships weighing 2,000 tons, that thefishing boats under construction were liable to betransferred as reparation in kind, and that there was
no intention to permit the construction of ordinary
fishing boats, except wooden ships of less than 100
tons, for the foreseeable future.
The Shipping Bureau and Fisheries Bureau of the
Ministry of Transport petitioned GHQ to tone down
the Herrington Statement. Opposition was also
expressed by the private sector, a cross-sector joint

coordination committee was set up, and there weresigns of a social problem in the making. GHQ now
allowed the construction to go ahead under the nominal condition that the new vessels would replace dilapidated ones, thus bringing the problem to a conclusionof sorts.
As well as giving the go-ahead for shipbuilding,
GHQ also instructed that the present status of vessels
be ascertained and managed. In response to this,Emergency Fishing Boat Control Regulations were
promulgated in October 1945, and all fishing boatsof 5 tons and above were registered. Then in October
1947, an order for “Registration and Marking of All
Japanese Fishing Boats” was issued, and now evenfishing boats of less than 5 tons had to be registered.
The Fisheries Bureau promulgated Regulations on
Fishing Boat Registration, added an additional budgetof 12.3 million yen, and provided other forms of support to promote the registration work. By the end of
March 1948 all fishing boats had finally been registered, whereupon the status of all fishing boats inJapan became known for the first time.

2. Resumption of West-Water Trawling and Whaling
Resumption of West-Water TrawlingWest-water fisheries were sustained without interruption throughout the war, despite gradually shrinking
in scale. Immediately after the war, however, they were
forcibly interrupted by the GHQ restrictions on navigation and the establishment of the MacArthur Line.
West-water were resumed thanks to the government’s
mediation with capital for new shipbuilding after theestablishment of the MacArthur Line in 1945.
In 1947, Japan had 56 trawlers and 895 west-water
trawling boats, both already higher than prewar levels.
But there was still a shortage of the commodities
needed to propel these boats. Supplies of heavy oil,the source of motive power, were only 44% of therequired level, while those of the timber and nails
needed to make fish cases were only 63% and 14%,

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

respectively. Supplies of ice were even less adequate,
with a meager 6%–7% of requirements being supplied,
owing to a deterioration in the electric power situation.
And although the lineup of vessels was in place, thecapacity utilization ratio of west-water trawling in 1947
was only 56%, owing to the shortage of commodities.
Although the utilization rate of west-water fishingboats was poor, the number of vessels themselves had
increased sharply. As a result, fish catches by west-watertwo boats trawling had already surpassed prewar levels
within five years, and continued to increase thereafter.
West-water otter trawling also recovered, but the
number of ships was low and fish catches did not reachprewar levels, gradually declining from this peak.
Catches by west-water fisheries during this timeincreased in the case of squid, yellow croaker andconger, but those of the high-priced red sea bream and139

yellow porgy decreased, and a tendency towards
resource depletion became problematic. Some operators even started to cross the MacArthur Line in searchof resources.
To address this problem, the Japanese government
promulgated the Act for Preventing Depletion ofFishery Resources in May 1950, the first step in a
downward revision of vessel numbers designed toprotect marine resources. Based on the number ofvessels at the end of 1949, trawlers were to be reduced
by 23% and bottom trawlers by 33%, these thereby
decreasing to 58 and 697 ships, respectively. Coupledwith the “Dodge recession”, small to medium operatorsand companies that had shifted from other industries
to start up in fisheries after the war now withdrew, or
were forcibly absorbed into large companies, leading
to an ongoing reorganization of the industry.
Amid a state of confusion, the various companies
developed measures such as concentrating their best
ships in the best fishing grounds, in an attempt tosecure fish catch volumes. The value of landings atbases in Nagasaki, the center of west-water fisheries,
was 2,026,440,000 yen from September 1949 toAugust 1950, but 2,003,180,000 yen from September
1950 to August 1951. Thus, despite the harsh operating
environment, companies were able to keep the decline
in output performance to a minor decrease in value.

Resumption of Ogasawara Whaling andAntarctic Whaling
Ogasawara whaling had continued until the year
before the end of the war, but was interrupted with
the American occupation of the Ogasawara Islands.
The door to a resumption of operations was opened
when Taiyo Gyogyo applied to GHQ for permission
to operate. Although flensing of whale carcasses onland was not allowed, operations over a sea area of
30,000 square nautical miles, including the Ogasawara
Islands, were permitted from December 1st, 1945 to
the following March 31st only. Taiyo Gyogyo set out
with a former navy transport ship as the mother ship

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

leading two whalers, and caught 113 whales. Nippon
Suisan also expressed an inclination to send an expedition during this permitted fishing season, but was
unable to prepare ships in time and so had no choice
but to postpone its plans.
In June 1946, the fishing zone was expanded andthe whaling grounds came inside the MacArthur Line,making it possible to send expeditions with permission
from the Japanese government. However, these werelimited to expeditions using mother ships, as entry
within 12 nautical miles of the islands as well as landing and negotiating with the islanders wereforbidden.
The resumption of Ogasawara whaling gave rise tohopes among fishery personnel that Antarctic whaling
might also be resumed. The food supply in Japan was
still inadequate at this time, and the Ministry ofAgriculture and Forestry appealed to GHQ for a
resumption of Antarctic whaling. GHQ took a positive stance on this appeal, as it felt that a resumptionof whaling would lead to the acquisition of foreign
currency through exports of whale oil. On August
6th, 1946, permission was granted to Nippon Suisan
and Taiyo Gyogyo to send one fleet each for Antarctic
whaling.
Taiyo Gyogyo’s President Ikujiro Nakabe had long
yearned for a resumption of whaling in the Antarctic,
and was eager to revive it. As soon as Ogasawara whaling had been resumed, Nakabe had started making
preparations in anticipation of a resumption in the
Antarctic. Taiyo Gyogyo purchased a half-finishedwartime standard ship that had been retained as stockat the Nagasaki Shipyard of Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, and quickly proceeded to refurbish it. The
ship was named Nisshin Maru No.1, and was sent to
the 1st Antarctic whaling expedition as a mothership.
Although Nippon Suisan also had various problems
to solve, it decided to refurbish the damaged tanker
Hashidate Maru and use it for expeditions. With this,Japan could now send two fleets on whaling
expeditions.

140

The Postwar Scheme of International Whaling
The postwar scheme of international whaling was first
set in motion at the International Whaling Conference
held in London in January 1944, the year before thewar ended. The decision to hold the Conference wasmade after lobbying by Britain and Norway, which
had foreseen an impending crisis over resource depletion due to overfishing since before the war. The
Conference was attended by representatives fromseven countries—Britain, Norway, America, Canada,
New Zealand, Australia and the Union (now Republic)of South Africa.
Based on the Conference’s main theme of conserving resources, a proposal to limit the number of whalescaught was tabled. Before the war, the International
Whaling Convention and International Whaling
Agreement had merely restricted whaling seasons andwhale body length. Since the various whaling countries
had increased their fleets to ensure catches, these agreements were barely effective. To address that problem,
steps were taken at the London Conference to restrict
the numbers caught.
The system adopted to reduce numbers was basedon the Blue Whale Unit (BWU). Since it was difficult
to place restrictions on all of the numerous types ofwhales, each species would be converted to its equivalent in blue whales to calculate the BWU. To makethis calculation, 1 blue whale was taken as the equivalent of 2 finback whales, 6 sardine whales and 2.5
humpback whales. In addition, the annual catch was
limited to 16,000, two-thirds of the prewar annual
average.
Along with the BWU system, the “Olympic

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

method” was also adopted. According to this method,
whaling was only permitted within dates prescribedby the International Bureau of Whaling Statistics as
the start and end of the whaling season. Within thatseason, each country could conduct whaling freely up
to the overall limit on numbers caught. The Interna­tion­al Bureau of Whaling Statistics would forecast
the date on which this limit was reached, based on
weekly reports on numbers caught by each country.
It would then would set the date for the end of theseason based on this, and notify the countries one
week in advance.
Contrary to their intentions, however, both the
BWU system and the Olympic method resulted inexcessive whaling by each country, and resources continued to decrease. Nevertheless, these attempts earnt
a degree of praise, in that imposing a direct restriction
on the number of whales caught was in itself a major
step forward.
In December 1946, the International Whaling
Conference was held in Washington. Among others,
the Conference led to the adoption of the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and theestablishment of the International Whaling Commission(IWC), thus paving the way for subsequent developments in the scheme of international whaling. The
International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling set out the IWC system, consisting of one
member for each participating country, while theregulations adopted at the Conference could be implemented without needing to be ratified by each country.
The International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling came into effect in 1948; Japan joined in
1951.

141

Chapter 3: Reconstruction of Fishery Companies

1945–1950

Part 1 Relaunch of Nippon Suisan and Company Reconstruction
After the War
Revival of the Nippon Suisan Company NameWith the abolition of the Fishery Control Ordinancein December 1945, Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei relocated its Head Office to Inari-cho, Asakusa City,
Tokyo on December 1st and changed its trading nameback to “Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.”. The name
“Nippon Suisan” was thus revived after a hiatus of 2
years and 8 months, and the company was to start life
anew as a fishery company with fishing at its core.
Nippon Suisan had incurred very great damage inthe war. As a consequence of pursuing business in linewith national strategy under the motto of “Serving

the Nation with Food” during the war, it had suffered
enormous losses of ships and overseas assets. As of1941, Nippon Suisan possessed 236 ships weighing a
total of 162,091 tons, but 65% of the ships and 83%of the tonnage were lost in the war. The surviving
fishing boats were nearly all antiquated.
Losses of overseas assets and fishing grounds also
had a huge impact. The former included 77 fishingboats but also 93 sales offices and premises of associated companies in Manchuria, northern, central andsouthern China, Taiwan and elsewhere, 232 items ofmachinery, as well as coal, fishing tackle, consumables,
etc., resulting in lost assets worth 30 million yen at

Vessel damage/Damage to ships
Division
Trawling
Northern Seas
Whaling
Total

Ships owned (1941–45)
NumberGross tonnage
136
29,74525
38,17475
94,172236

162,091

Ships damaged (1941–45)
NumberGross tonnage
101
25,02312
31,772
41
78,125
154

134,920

Damage ratio
84%
83%
83%
83%

Loss of overseas assets
Item
Fishing boats
Land
Buildings
Structures
Machinery & equipment
Fixtures
Securities
Investments & loans
Stocked goods
Receivables
Advance payments
Cash & deposits
Total

Details of loss
Total 77 vessels/Cost price 63,677 yen/Depreciation 41,912 yen
Total area 106,839 tsubo (1 tsubo = about 3.3m2)
Total area 12,772 tsubo/Cost price 777,294 yen/Depreciation 162,607 yen
Total 93/Cost price 189,100 yen/Depreciation 24,985 yen
Total 232/Cost price 184,693 yen/Depreciation 65,189 yen
Cost price 38,750 yen/Depreciation 9,529 yen
875 shares/15,988,993 yen/Government bonds 51,674 yen/Corporate bonds 2,960 yen
Investments 1,213,052 yen/Loans 10,871,637 yen
Coal/Fishing gear/Consumables, etc.
Reserves

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

Monetary value
21,765yen
219,887yen
614,687yen
164,115yen
119,504yen
29,221yen
16,043,627yen
12,084,689yen
15,380yen
67,602yen
50689yen
581,327yen
30,597,493yen

142

the time.
Under the wartime Fishery Control Ordinance,
Nippon Suisan had transferred all of its refrigeration,
freezing, processing and sales business to Teikoku
Suisan Tosei, and had been divided into the two companies Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei and Minami
Nippon Gyogyo Tosei. Teikoku Suisan Tosei became
independent as Nippon Reizo after the war, and for
Nippon Suisan, which had developed the whole
sequence of fishery operations from fisheries to refrigeration, processing, storage and sales before the war,
the loss of these functions presented a major hurdle
to achieving early reconstruction. Furthermore, othernegative factors (such as being targeted under the
Deconcentration Law and public office purges)
mounted up, with the result that the company wasplaying catch-up with the other companies in theirpostwar reconstruction.
In January 1947, Keizo Tamura, Kenkichi Ueki and
Shizuo Minoda were targeted by the purge of public
officials and had to resign their posts. In their place,
Executive Director Susumu Masui stepped up as
President, but in 1948, Masui was also purged, alongwith Executive Director Tadao Katsuragi, Managing
Director Shigeo Kuboi and Auditor Shigeji Matsuda.
Masui was central to promoting the company’s reorganization plan in conformity with the Economic
Deconcentration Law, and was moreover an indispensable element in conducting Antarctic whaling, Nippon
Suisan’s lifeline at the time. For these reasons, Nippon
Suisan requested a one-year moratorium for Masui.
It was permitted, but next Masui was forced to standdown in June 1949 under the Law for the Terminationof Zaibatsu Family Control. For about a year after
that, the President’s chair at Nippon Suisan was vacant.
This brought a huge burden on the company’s management, given the already difficult situation presented
by the period of postwar reconstruction.
Again, in February 1948, Nippon Suisan was named
as a designated corporate entity under the Economic
Deconcentration Law, and was required to divide into
three separate companies.

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

In March that year, Nippon Suisan drew up a reorganization plan based on a division into three companies called Company A, Company B and Company
C. The aim was to canvass suggestions for the company
names internally at a later date. But just as the division
plan was being formulated, developments in the Cold
War started to shift America’s stance on Japan. The
possibility arose that restrictions aimed at Japan could
soon be lifted. Masui explained the situation insideand outside the company to GHQ, and tried to get
the division postponed. As a result, Nippon Suisan
managed to avoid the division into three companies,and could continue on the path ahead as a single
company.

Delays in the Resumption of Fishingby Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan resumed coastal whaling as well as
trawling and west-water two boats trawling as part ofits west-water businesses in 1945, followed by Antarctic
whaling in 1946. However, for its west-water otter
trawling, north-sea mother ship-type crab fishery andothers in which it had built up experience over many
years, it could hope for no expansion in the operational
area until the MacArthur Line was abolished in April
1952.
In view of these circumstances, Nippon Suisan
started preparing for a resumption of business bymaking maximum use of its surviving vessels in coastal
fisheries. It sent some of its trawlers to Hokkaido,
where they fished for flounder and Atka mackerel, as
well as carrying out set net fisheries and squid anglingfrom a base in Hakodate. The company used its ingenuity in various ways, such as converting herring carriers, used during the herring season, for use as othertransport ships outside the fishing season.
One factor behind the delay in the company’s
resumption of fishing was that it had adopted a negative approach to new shipbuilding. In the first concession for shipbuilding in May 1946, Nippon Suisan
had only been permitted to build 14 ships, including143

trawlers and west-water trawling boats. When it cameto large ships, the Kaiko Maru was at last built in 1948,
but no others from then until 1950. There were twomain reasons for this.
The first was that, on December 8th, 1945, Nippon
Suisan became the first company in the industry to
be designated as a “restricted company”. In August
1946, moreover, it was designated as a special accounting company under the Act on Emergency Measures
Concerning Companies’ Accounting and the Enterprise
Reorganization Act.
The second reason was that the company had beenreluctant to build new ships, out of fear that ships
could be confiscated for war reparations. Immediately
after the war, the American government and GHQ
had presented a proposal for severe reparations in
kind, with the aim of demilitarizing Japan and weakening her capacity for economic dominance. Whilehe was serving as President, therefore, Kenkichi Ueki
maintained a cautious stance towards building new
ships. Ueki would later describe this stance as follows
in his Ueki Memoirs (serialized in “The Suisan Keizai”
Newspaper):“Thinking about it, ships would have been perfectly
suited to reparation in kind. In particular, theAmericans were worried about a lack of oil in thosedays, and they dearly wanted tankers for carrying oil.
A ship could be taken to America, but buildings andrailways did not so easily lend themselves to reparations. I could not bear the thought that we would go
to the trouble of building a ship only for it to be taken
away as reparations. We would have gone under. That
was my worry”.
Having lost about 83% of its prewar vessel tonnage
as a result of the war, Nippon Suisan needed to add
more fishing boats before it could resume fisheries.
To avoid the risk of newly built ships being confiscatedfor war reparations, therefore, the company attempted
to boost its fleet by using overseas assets that had beensalvaged after the war. One such measure involved
using ships owned by Nansei Suisan K.K. (formerly
Minami Nippon Gyogyo Tosei). Nansei Suisan had

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

been established in 1950 with capital of 30 million
yen, and had inherited 20 or more ships as well as
employees from the former Minami Nippon Gyogyo
Tosei. Nippon Suisan owned 17% of its shares, andthe ships owned by Nippon Suisan (Tatsuta Maru
and Tenryu Maru) were used by switching nominal
ownership between Nippon Suisan and Nansei Suisan
as circumstances demanded.
In March 1951, 3 trawlers were acquired from
Nichibei Suisan, followed by another trawler and 11
west-water trawling boats from Nansei Suisan in
September that year.
In November, the Kawanami Kogyo Fisheries
Department was absorbed, and the company now
owned 5 trawlers and 20 west-water trawling boats.
These ships were kept at the Tobata Branch. Kawanami
Kogyo, a shipbuilding company established in 1936,
had created a Fisheries Department in March 1946and started fishery operations, mainly in west-water
trawling. It took a positive stance on building fishingboats, and in the three stages of shipbuilding concessions in 1946, it built and sold 77 new ships, second
only to Taiyo Gyogyo.
The number of ships owned by Nippon Suisan was
still inadequate, even with this series of measures. In
spite of numerous management efforts, Nippon
Suisan’s performance did not recover as expected, andit was overtaken by Taiyo Gyogyo.
Relaunch of Teikoku Suisan Tosei
During the war, Teikoku Suisan Tosei had wielded
considerable power in its business in Asian colonies
and occupied territories. The assets invested in thatbusiness were on a par with the total asset value ofrefrigeration plants inside Japan, and the profits
accounted for around 70% of all company earnings.
The establishment of Teikoku Suisan Tosei had notbeen without its ups and downs, and even after establishment, it still faced problems such as the conflicting
aims of fishery companies. In its overseas businessdevelopment, in particular, it faced an uphill struggle144

to fulfil its mission as the war situation unfolded.
With the end of the war on August 15th, 1945, allbusiness sites owned by Teikoku Suisan Tosei overseas
were seized; the employees cleared the remaining work
while preparing for repatriation with nothing but theclothes on their backs. Employees stationed in northern Korea were captured by the Red Army, some falling
victim to starvation and cold. In Sakhalin, too,branches were seized as the Red Army advanced, theiremployees forced into a life of captivity. In northern
China, several lost their lives due to malnutrition
caused by food shortages. The employees cleared theremaining work in a harsh environment in which death
was their neighbor, and repatriations from abroad
continued until 1947.
On November 24th, 1945, Teikoku Suisan Tosei
tabled proposals for amendments to its officers andto its Articles of Incorporation at an Extraordinary
General Meeting of Shareholders. And on December
1st, the company was relaunched as Nippon Reizo.
The process of deciding the new name “Nippon
Reizo” was beset with disagreement. Many in thecompany wanted the name to be “Nippon Food
Industries”, recalling the foundation upon which
Nippon Suisan’s old network of refrigeration andfreezing equipment was built, in the sense of goingback to basics and rebuilding brick by brick. But the
major shareholders, including Nippon Suisan, Nichiro
Gyogyo, Taiyo Gyogyo and Kyokuyo Hogei, recommended “Nippon Reizo” as a company name thatwould refer directly to the company’s business (“Reizo”= refrigeration). Ultimately the major shareholders
had their way, and the name “Nippon Reizo” wasadopted at the Extraordinary General Meeting of
Shareholders.
All 16 of Teikoku Suisan Tosei’s directors and auditors agreed to resign upon completion of their mission,and their retirement was decided at the Extraordinary
General Meeting of Shareholders. The resignation of
Executive Director Yusaku Nishimura was sincerely
regretted. New officers were elected; Junji Hayashi
became president, Yajiro Miyata executive director,

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

and Kohei Iesaka managing director.
According to the business aims expressed by Kojiro
Kimura, who was appointed a director at that time,
the state of Nippon Reizo at the time of its launch was
pitiful. The company’s performance was extremely
poor owing to a wartime business strategy that haddisregarded profitability, while large volumes of assets,materials and equipment had been lost in the ravagesof war. Not only that, but the company had more than
twice as any employees as it needed, and its financeswere being squeezed. The only thing that supported
Nippon Reizo in its relaunch amid this awful environment was the thought that the refrigeration business
was extremely important for Japan’s reconstruction,and that it was indispensable to the lives of the Japanesepeople. This much can be discerned from the closing
line of Kimura’s business aims:“My sincere hope is that each of our employees willchange from the negative mood that has prevailed
until now to a positive one, overcome the obstacles
facing our business with a spirit of courage and protect
our precious workplaces, and help to stabilize the livesof the people, as well as breaking through this difficult
situation and striving for a revival of the company’s
fortunes” (“A Quarter-Century of Nippon Reizo Co.,
Ltd.”).
Having relaunched the company, procuring recovery funds and operating capital became an urgent task,
and borrowings in 1948 were as high as 552 million
yen. To enhance its capital structure, Nippon Reizo
made its first capital increase that year. But owing to
the difficulty in equity underwriting—for example,
Nippon Suisan and many other shareholders wereprohibited from increasing their shareholding—employees, family members and business partners wereasked to underwrite. A second capital increase wasmade the following year, taking the new capital to 500
million yen. With this, at long last, a glimpse of theroad to reconstruction could be seen.

145

Taiyo Gyogyo’s Losses and Reconstruction
Strategy
The requisitioning of fishing boats during the war
caused Taiyo Gyogyo to lose 80% of the vessels it had
previously owned. It also lost all its facilities, equipment, rights and other property in Korea, Kuril,
Sakhalin, Taiwan, Manchuria, China, southern territories and elsewhere; the combined value of theselosses was said to be as high as 100 million yen.
Despite suffering such tremendous losses, Taiyo
Gyogyo had the most ambitious reconstruction strategy of the three major companies, and started workon mass construction of fishing boats immediately
after the war had ended. President Ikujiro Nakabe hadforeseen the postwar food shortages, and was resolved
to build ships quickly in order to increase the output
of food. At a Board Meeting on September 15th, 1945,a proposal to build 16 trawlers and 30 west-water
trawling boats was approved, and orders were immediately sent to the shipyards.
Fishery companies were officially permitted tobuild fishing boats from May 1946 onwards, andbetween the first and third phases of construction a
total of 776 fishing boats weighing 92,916 tons werebuilt. Of these, Taiyo Gyogyo built 14 whaling ships,
184 trawlers and west-water trawling boats, 10 bonito
and tuna fishing boats and 1 transport ship, totaling
209 ships in all. By the middle of 1946, Taiyo Gyogyo
had already reached the same level of vessel ownershipas before the war.
This policy of quick and proactive fishing boat
construction provided a major impetus for the company’s early reconstruction. From 1946 to 1947, Japan
fell into an unprecedented food crisis, and fish prices
became vastly inflated. The bigger the fish catches,

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

the greater the profit that was created, leading to a“fisheries boom”. And although this boom was beginning to run out of steam by around 1948, Taiyo
Gyogyo still succeeded in pocketing huge earnings bybuilding fishing boats ahead of the other companies.
Moreover, mass construction of fishing boats immediately after the war also helped the company to avoid
the effects of later rampant inflation, taking it to a
position of even greater superiority within theindustry.

Nichiro Gyogyo’s Losses and Reconstruction
Strategy
The most serious war damage suffered by Nichiro
Gyogyo was the loss of its north-sea fishing grounds,
the basis for its very existence. When the war ended,
Nichiro Gyogyo immediately forfeited all of its vast
overseas assets in Kamchatka, northern Kuril and
Sakhalin, as well as the north-sea fisheries. On theother hand, it still had its many employees and theplentiful fishing nets and tackle they brought backfrom Kamchatka. As such, the strategy adopted byPresident Tsunejiro Hiratsuka was to start west-water
trawl, Hokkaido coastal, bonito and tuna fisheries.
Having lost its north-sea fishing grounds, it was
imperative that Nichiro Gyogyo’s business activity
take it into other fishing grounds. It had great difficulty
operating in unfamiliar fishing grounds, and it had
not positively developed the profitable Hokkaido
coastal fisheries. The only activities to produce immediate effects just by using the materials and equipment
to hand were Hokkaido coastal fisheries, and the business by no means proceeded according to plan. Nichiro
Gyogyo’s revival would depend on that of north-sea
fisheries in 1952, when the allied occupation ended.

146

Part 2 Resumption of Fishing Operations by Nippon Suisan
Trends in West-Water Fisheries
Nippon Suisan resumed its west-water fisheries in1945. However, its fleet of west-water otter trawlingboats at the end of the war consisted of only four
antiquated steam trawlers that had escaped requisitioning; its west-water trawling boats had also been
reduced to four pairs and eight ships. With the expansion of the MacArthur Line and concessions for shipbuilding, it took the opportunity to build the 530-tonclass trawler Tone Maru, the 350-ton class trawler Saga
Maru and five 100-ton class west-water trawling boats
in 1946. It went on to complete four 100-ton classwest-water trawling boats in 1947, followed by the
trawler Shinano Maru and four west-water trawlingboats in 1948. As some of its trawlers and west-water
trawling boats came out of requisitioning at the sametime, Nippon Suisan’s vessel ownership recovered to
11 trawlers and 37 west-water trawling boats. But eventhis was far from the prewar record of 62 trawlers and
72 west-water trawling boats. Moreover, the impactof heavy oil and other material shortages meant that
only 10 trawlers and 28 west-water trawling boats
actually operated in 1948.
Ships owned by Nippon Suisan were included in
the ship reduction measure introduced to protect
marine resources in 1950, when 2 trawlers and 16
west-water trawling boats were liquidated. Nippon
Suisan now concentrated on priority operation of its
superior vessels and took steps to increase efficiency,
among other measures.
The performance of west-water fisheries between
October 1950 and March 1951 amounted to an output
of 11,416 tons with a value of 525,500,000 yen, a huge
improvement on the figures of 6,678 tons and
317,140,000 yen for the same period one year earlier.

1st-5th Antarctic Whaling Expeditions and theStart of Maritime Shipping Business
On August 6th, 1946, GHQ gave permission for
Nippon Suisan and Taiyo Gyogyo to send one fleet
each on Antarctic whaling expeditions, in an attempt
to ease the critical postwar food situation.
Compared to Taiyo Gyogyo, which had been preparing steadily for a resumption of Antarctic whaling,
Nippon Suisan was at first lukewarm towards the idea.
Not only had it delayed new ship construction out offear that ships could be confiscated for reparations,but official prices for whale meat were low at the time;
the company had judged it highly likely that whaling
would be a loss-making business.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had highlighted Antarctic whaling immediately after the war
as an industry that would provide sources of meat, oiland fats, as well as helping to acquire foreign currency
through whale oil exports. Considering an expedition
with just one Taiyo Gyogyo fleet to be inadequate,
the Ministry urged Nippon Suisan to take part in
Antarctic whaling, promising that it would raise official prices for whale meat and would make food provisions available to expedition members at distribution

The west-water trawling boats (operating in pairs) Yashima Maru
(top) and Toyoshima Maru, both completed in 1946

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

147

The whaler Koyo Maru No.2, completed after
the war in 1947
The salt-curing mother ship Tadotsu Maru

The whaling mother ship Hashidate Maru

prices.
In response to this request, Nippon Suisan at lastresolved to resume Antarctic whaling, but now the
problem was that its postwar whaling fleet had
decreased to only nine vessels. The company decided
to urgently set about acquiring whalers, and started
work on repairing and refurbishing its existingships.
First, it refurbished the tanker Hashidate Maru,
which had been bombed at Takao in Taiwan and now
remained moored at Osaka docks, as a whaling mothership in October 1946. It then chartered the Tadotsu
Maru from the Vessel Management Association, which
had continued its central management of merchantvessels and seamen after the war (and was reorganized
as the Civilian Merchant Marine Committee in 1950)
in January that year, and refurbished it as a salt-curingmother ship.
In November 1946, the 1st Antarctic whaling expedition, consisting of nine ships with the Hashidate
Maru as the mother ship, set out from the port of

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

Osaka. It produced 391.5 BWU, 3,700 tons of whale
oil and 1,608 tons of salt-cured whale meat. The 2nd
expedition sent a larger fleet, increasing the numberof vessels to twelve. Whale oil production was higher
than in the previous expedition with 6,775 tons, but
the whaling catch fell to 383 BWU. These accounted
for more than half of Nippon Suisan’s gross sales inthat period.
However, neither the 1st nor the 2nd expedition
met the original targets, owing to a lack of ships andequipment. So now the plans were enhanced and madeas rational as possible, including detailed study of the
fleet composition with the primary objective of
increasing output. In the 3rd Antarctic whaling expedition from November 1948, the fleet consisted ofthe mother ship Hashidate Maru, the freezer ships
Tadotsu Maru and Settsu Maru, and the tanker Gyokuei
Maru, joined by two 1,000-ton class freezing transport
ships and seven 350-ton class whaling ships. The whale
catch was 504 BWU, while 8,900 tons of whale oiland 15,504 tons of whale meat were produced, yielding
an output close to the planned target.
In the 4th expedition the following year (1949),
one freezing transport ship and one whale scouting
ship were added to make a fleet of 15 vessels. The
outcome was a catch of 632 BWU, 12,200 tons ofwhale oil, 1,463 tons of frozen whale meat, and 2,059
tons of salt-cured whale meat, the total output being
higher than before. The Dodge recession drove spending power down, however, while the abolition of the
Marine Products Control Order caused prices of whale148

oil and whale meat to fall. The impact of these wasthat, although the output was higher, profits were
below the planned amounts.
In the 5th expedition in 1950, another whaling ship
was added to bring the fleet to a total of 16 vessels.
Catches of baleen whales decreased to 550 BWU, but
the number of sperm whales caught increased fromzero the previous year to 243. Compared to the previous year, sales of whale oil and whale meat increased,
while on the other hand the value of whale meat sales
fell owing to a slump on the market. The saving factor
was that the Oil & Fats Distribution Corporation
purchased the whale oil at a high price.
Meanwhile, because whaling mother ships had alarge capacity for storing whale oil, they could also be
used as tankers to carry heavy oil.
In October 1946, Nippon Suisan had refurbishedthe Hashidate Maru and converted it to a whaling
mother ship, but the Hashidate Maru was not only
active in Antarctic whaling. When GHQ allowed
Japanese tankers to take on cargoes of heavy oil in the
Persian Gulf in 1948 for the first time after the war,
the Hashidate Maru set out for the Middle East in
August that year. Imports of crude oil from the Middle
East increased sharply from that time on, and it was
the Hashidate Maru that set the pattern for this. Before
the war, crude oil would be loaded onto the Itsukushima
Maru in Panama on the way home from the Antarctic
and brought back to Japan, this being the pioneer of
the tanker business in Japan. This was continued as
the tanker business after the war.
Even after the resumption of fishing, Nippon
Suisan’s business still had not stabilized. In 1949, therefore, it applied for inclusion in the 5th shipbuilding
plan. This time, the focus was to be on reconstructing
and improving ocean-going vessels, with a view toreinforcing business management via the maritime
shipping business. From that time on, the company
was to put energy into the maritime shipping business.

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

Expansion into Ogasawara Whaling andResumption of Mother Ship-Type Tuna Fishing
Following the permission to resume fishing on
November 30th, 1945, Taiyo Gyogyo had resumed
Ogasawara whaling in 1946, and Nippon Suisan followed suit in 1947. Nippon Suisan joined Kyokuyo
Hogei in an expedition to Ogasawara, using the former
navy’s No. 13 transport ship as a mother ship. Thenfrom 1948, Nippon Suisan used the Kaiko Maru as amother ship in a two-way joint expedition with
Kyokuyo Hogei in 1948 and a three-way expedition
with Kyokuyo Hogei and Taiyo Gyogyo in 1949. In
1950, Nippon Suisan and Taiyo Gyogyo ceded mothership-type whaling rights in seas around Ogasawara to
Kyokuyo Hogei, whereupon that company continued
operations as a monopoly business.
Nippon Suisan had owned 19 whaling ships at theend of the war, but when it was named a designatedbusiness operator under the 1948 Deconcentration
Law, it transferred eight ships to the other companies.
Specifically, three ships were transferred to Kyokuyo
Hogei in 1948, one to Nitto Hogei in 1949, two to
Nippon Kinkai Hogei in 1950 and another two to
Kyokuyo Hogei in 1951. At first, Nippon Suisan
claimed that its operations did not amount to amonopoly, on account of the importance of whaling
to its management and its contribution to Japanesewhaling. However, out of consideration for companies
that could not take part in Antarctic whaling expeditions, and taking account of improved efficiency if thenumber of ships were trimmed, it accepted the orderto reduce its ships.
Kyokuyo Hogei used the Baikal Maru as a mothership in its 1950–1951 operations, but because
Ogasawara coastal waters had always been low inresources of whales, did not achieve the anticipatedresults. The path to north-sea whaling would be
opened when the “Treaty of Peace with Japan” cameinto effect in the following year (1952), whereupon
fishery companies would all find a source of renewed
vigor in north-sea whaling.

149

Odawara Research Center
The building at rear left is the processing plant

The expansion into Ogasawara whaling also provided the stimulus for a resumption of mother shiptype tuna fishing. When the Kaiko Maru fleet went
to Ogasawara for a whaling expedition in 1949, it also
fished for tuna inside the MacArthur Line north of
24° north latitude, but the results were not encouraging.
In May 1950, mother ship-type tuna fishery operations were permitted in certain fishing grounds outside
the MacArthur Line. Various companies moved inand tuna fisheries expanded, but Nippon Suisan was
not a direct participant; its involvement consisted
merely in leasing the Kaiko Maru to Hoko Suisan.
In the following year, 1951, Nippon Suisan resumed
tuna fisheries using the freezer ship Settsu Maru as amother ship and 27 catcher boats. Its performance infish catches was good, with 3,750 tons equivalent toa third of catches by all fleets. On the profit side,
however, the news was not so good, owing to a slump
in exports to America and stagnant fish prices.
With the abolition of the MacArthur Line in 1952,
the company concentrated on expanding fishing

Manufacturing underway at the Tobata Refrigeration Plant

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

grounds, and sent the Kaiko Maru as a mother shipwith 10 catcher boats to the Banda Sea in Indonesia.
The results were not impressive, however, with fish
catches of only 2,130 tons. A two-year slump then led
to a temporary suspension of the company’s mothership-type tuna fishing from 1953.
Nippon Suisan did not restart tuna fishing until
1956 and onwards. That was when increased demand
for fish sausages and canned products made securing
tuna (as the raw material for these) an urgent task. It
was a resumption designed to expand the processedfood business.
Resumption of the Processing Business
From around the autumn of 1945, Yamato Suisan
K.K., an affiliate of Nippon Suisan, started producing
tsukudani (fish or meat simmered in soy sauce) using
desalinated salt-cured whale meat from sperm whales
mixed with amino acid soy sauce, at a small scale factory within its Odawara research facilities and a factoryrented at Mikawashima, Tokyo. When the ban on
Antarctic whaling was lifted in August 1946, it also
resumed the manufacture of processed products fromwhales caught in the Antarctic. In 1947, Yamato Suisan
started producing “honey meat” and “whale bacon”,
made by smoking whale meat marinaded in aminoacid soy sauce.
Nippon Suisan also produced honey meat andwhale bacon in 1947, using the former cargo ship
Harada Maru moored at the quayside in Osaka docks
as a factory.
Again, it started producing canned whale yamatoni(fish or meat stewed in sweet soy) at Yamato Suisan’s
Odawara factory from 1948, and in the following year
made canned products at its Hakodate factory. In
1950, Nippon Suisan dissolved Yamato Suisan andbrought the Odawara factory under its direct control,
starting the production of canned whale meat.
On January 1st, 1946, the Tobata Refrigeration
Plant was returned to Nippon Suisan from Nippon
Reizo. Of all the assets originally transferred to Teikoku

150

Suisan Tosei, this refrigeration plant was the only
onshore facility returned to Nippon Suisan.
The company resumed the production of chikuwa
at the Tobata Plant in 1946, but this was discontinued
in 1954 due to the increased production of fish sausages from October 1952 onwards.
In a complete transformation from its diverse business content before the war, Nippon Suisan started
its postwar reconstruction with fisheries only.
Nevertheless, to expand the distribution andconsumption of marine products, it was vital that theland-based sector be established as a second core ofits business. In that sense, it was important to resume
the processing business. The starting point was the
single facility of the Tobata Plant, with a refrigerating
capacity of 1,600 tons, ice-making capacity of 250
tons per day and freezing capacity of 10 tons per day.
From this modest start, the company would pursue
its strategy for reconstruction with slow and steadysteps.

Part 3 The Road to Management Reconstruction
Shareholder Equity Enhanced
Nippon Suisan’s shareholder equity ratio at the endof fiscal 1945, the year the war ended, was around40%. The company had to depend on borrowings fornearly all the cost of developing its business, startingwith locating a Head Office but also including thearrangement of ships and materials, hiring staff, andso on. Cash reserves for the resumption of Antarctic
whaling and massive borrowings for refurbishingmother ships were particularly necessary, with theresult that the shareholder equity ratio at the end of
fiscal 1949 had fallen to around 20%. The figure subsequently recovered to 30%, but hovered around thatlevel for a while afterwards.
In 1950, the company started borrowing from theReconstruction Finance Bank and the Occupation
Assistance Investment Fund, allocating the capital
mainly for purchasing equipment. It also started borrowing from the Japan Development Bank in thefollowing year. Loans from the Reconstruction FinanceBank and the Occupation Assistance Repayment Fund
were repaid in 1952, but repayments to the Japan
Development Bank continued for another ten years.
As for operating capital, particularly that for Antarctic
whaling expeditions, the company relied on co-financing from commercial banks through the mediation of
the Bank of Japan.
While taking out loans, the company also focused

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

on boosting its shareholder equity. It made a paid-in
capital increase of 205,578,000 yen in November 1948,
followed by another of 350 million yen in November
1949. It also made a further paid-in capital increase of
700 million yen in 1953.
The company’s corporate acquisitions, starting withthe absorption of the Kawanami Kogyo Fisheries
Department in 1951, continued with the establishmentof Nagasaki Shipyard Co., Ltd. in the following year,
and the acquisition of refrigeration plants owned by
Hakodate Teion Soko K.K. in three locations(Hakodate, Aomori and Ominato) in 1953. In thesame year, it established the new company Hakodate
Teion Soko K.K. (a different company). It also purchased all the shares of Kyowa Yushi Kogyo K.K. andmade the latter its sperm whale oil processing division.
In 1945, when the Nippon Suisan company namewas restored, its capital amounted to 94,262,000 yen.
This was increased to 350 million yen in February
1949, 700 million yen in November that year, and 1.4
billion yen in 1953.

Implementation of the Dodge Line and theEnsuing Dodge Recession
In December 1948, the American government
instructed GHQ to curb inflation in Japan and toestablish a single exchange rate in line with the “NinePrinciples of Economic Stabilization”. To see this151

through, Joseph Dodge, Chairman of the Detroit
Bank, came to Japan in February 1949 and proceeded
to implement a rigorous policy for economic stabilization called “the Dodge Line”. Government subsidies
including new financing by the Reconstruction
Finance Bank and price differential subsidies were
scrapped and a single exchange rate established.
Although the effect of the Dodge Line was to completely halt Japan’s postwar inflation, it also caused
instant deflation owing to its extreme monetary tightening policy. Cash flow crises caused a series of corporate bankruptcies and unemployment increased.
Labor disputes over staff cuts broke out all over thecountry, and labor-management conflicts arose inmany places.
The Dodge Line and the ensuing recession also hada significant impact on fisheries. Firstly, the abolitionof price differential subsidies caused prices for fisheryrelated commodities to rise, and the cost of fisheries
increased massively. At the time, most fishery-relatedcommodities depended on imports, but the prices forcotton and Manila rope were particularly high, andthose prices had been kept artificially low by the pricedifferential subsidies. The abolition of the price differential subsidies instantly caused a three-fold rise in
prices.
Secondly, there was a huge fall in fish prices. The
Dodge recession had reduced consumer purchasing
power, and demand for marine products was stagnant.
On the other hand, fisheries output was rising year by
year. This led to an oversupply and a collapse of marine
product prices all over the country. The abolition ofcontrol on marine products in April 1950 merely
exacerbated the situation, and many small and medium
fisheries operators were faced with the prospect ofbankruptcy or withdrawal from the industry.

Nippon Suisan’s Crisis and Personnel
Reorganization
Deflation caused by the Dodge Line came as a major
headache for Nippon Suisan. Price cuts forced the

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

company to restrict its production of whale meat andwhale meat processed products, which accounted for
40% of its sales turnover in 1950, and this had a disastrous impact on its business performance.
The savior of this situation came in the form ofwhale oil purchases by the Oil & Fats Corporation.
The Corporation was responsible for distributing oil
and fats after the war, and proactively purchased whale
oil from Nippon Suisan and Taiyo Gyogyo. In May
1950, it was decided that 27,000 tons of whale oil
produced in the 4th Antarctic whaling expedition
would be purchased by the Corporation. What’s more,
the purchase price would be significantly higher thanthat paid in the same period of the previous year. The
impact of reduced whale meat prices due to the abolition of control on marine products had led Nippon
Suisan and Taiyo Gyogyo to borrow expedition fundsof 3.3 billion yen from commercial banks in theautumn of 1949, but purchases by the Oil & Fats
Corporation at high prices allowed them to repay
these loans.
Although Nippon Suisan had thus survived theimmediate crisis, the marine product market had still
not recovered and restrictions on fishing grounds
remained harsh. Another pressure on the company’sbalance sheet was its payroll for 4,000 employees,
including those repatriated from abroad at the war’s
end. Nippon Suisan now resolved to undertake a
sweeping personnel reorganization as a reconstruction
measure aimed at radically solving this situation.
On May 16th, 1950, Nippon Suisan proposed arationalization plan including 1,151 redundancies (266
office staff, 564 seamen, 321 workers) and criteria forreorganization, pay cuts and other measures to its
labor unions at a meeting of the Central Production
Council (previously known as the Management
Council).
The first Nippon Suisan labor union had been theTokyo District Labor Union, formed in October 1946.
This was followed by a series of others: the Tobata
Branch Labor Union (formed in November 1946),
the North Sea Division Employees Union (December152

1946), the Osaka Sales Office Employees Union(December 1946), the Whaling Division Labor Union(August 1947), the Trawl Division Seamen’s Union(March 1947), and the Whaling Division Seamen’s
Union (February 1948). In March 1947, the Federationof Nippon Suisan Labor Unions (hereinafter “theFederation”) was formed. The Federation served tocoordinate the positions of individual unions onimportant issues related to labor conditions, as wellplaying a role in collective bargaining and holding
management council meetings.
The labor unions vehemently opposed the proposedseries of personnel reorganization measures. Discussions
by the Central Production Council and regional production councils, as well local and central collective
bargaining sessions, were continued from the time of
the rationalization plan proposal until June 25th. No
compromise could be reached, however, and so thecompany announced that it would enforce named
redundancies on June 30th, 1950.
Outraged by this unilateral decision, the labor
unions went on strike in protest. The company now
negotiated with each union separately in an attempt
to reach a settlement. As discussions with each union
progressed, solidarity among the unions began tofalter. Each union in turn signed a compromise agreement, whereupon, for the company at least, the problem was resolved. Throughout this series of union
activities, doubts had come to be raised over the usefulness of the Federation, and following a ballot ofunion members, it was dissolved at a meeting on
August 28th, 1950.
In the end, Nippon Suisan dismissed 972 employees(242 office staff, 432 seamen and 298 workers) or 26%
of its total workforce. A total of 96,660,000 yen was
paid to compensate the dismissed workers, of which
23,660,000 yen came from shareholder equity andthe remaining 73,000,000 yen was furnished by loans
from the Industrial Bank of Japan, Nippon Kangyo
Bank and the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank.
This large-scale personnel reorganization had theeffect of reducing Nippon Suisan’s payroll from 1,146.5

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

million yen to 850 million yen, a saving of nearly 300
million yen. The decision to dismiss employees who
had been instrumental in the company’s growth tothat point had not been taken lightly. But the fruitsof that decision opened the way for a reconstructionof Nippon Suisan’s management.
Salvaging of the Tonan Maru III
Since the first permission for Antarctic whaling in
1946, five expeditions of two fleets had been sent,
each producing significant results and helping to easethe food situation after the war. Even before the Peace
Treaty came into effect in 1952, the fishery companies
had anticipated an increase in the number of fleets
permitted to operate in the 6th Antarctic whaling
expedition in 1951, and had taken steps to strengthen
their fleets with a view to expanding business scale.
Nippon Suisan also planned a business expansion
for the 6th expedition, but as the mother ship
Hashidate Maru had an inadequate whale catch capacity, the company was keenly aware of the need for a
new mother ship that could outperform it. At thetime, however, Nippon Suisan was designated as a
restricted company, and was unable to take on new
shipbuilding above 12,000 tons. The company decided
to find a way around this by salvaging and repurchasing
the Tonan Maru III, which had been requisitioned
during the Pacific War then sunk off Truk Island.
In 1950, a proposal for salvaging the Tonan Maru
III was received from a Hong Kong company. Exec­utive Director Rensaku Onishi, who was managing
the whaling division at the time, signed a salvage rights
agreement for the sum of $ 35,000 plus 9 million
Japanese yen (a total of 21.6 million yen based on the
yen rate at the time). The total cost of salvaging, repairs
and associated expenses was 1.1 billion yen. Once
permission had been given to salvage the Tonan Maru
III, the next problem was how to raise the capitalneeded. Nippon Suisan negotiated with the Japanese
government, and won an allocation of 630 million
yen of GARIOA (Government Appropriation for

153

Relief in Occupied Area) over 2 years. In addition,
Haruo Nakai, Manager of the Financial Affairs Section
at the time, repeatedly negotiated with various banks,and succeeded in obtaining loans mainly from theReconstruction Finance Bank, the Industrial Bank ofJapan, the Nippon Kangyo Bank and other government-related financial institutions.
The work of salvaging and towing Tonan Maru III
was fraught with risks, which no Japanese insurancecompany was willing to cover; in the end, insurance
was provided by the American company AIU.
After all these complications, the work of salvaging
the Tonan Maru III could at last commence. To conduct a preliminary survey, the salvage vessel Kimishima
Maru departed from the Kure Dock of Harima
Shipyard carrying 45 persons including the survey
team and crew members in April 1950. The survey
lasted two weeks or so, and produced the finding thata salvage operation could be achieved within a periodof five months’ work on site. Nippon Suisan therefore
resolved to go ahead with the salvage.

Once the ship had been refloated, it waited for thearrival of the tanker Gyokuei Maru which was on its
way home from the 5th Antarctic whaling expedition.
The Gyokuei Maru then towed the ship back to Japanover a distance of 3,700 km. However, major hurdles
still lay in wait. At the time, there were no nauticalcharts for the seas around Truk Island, and the narrow
channel through coral reefs presented considerable
difficulty for towing. After at last managing to squeeze
through, the ships were only 100 km from Japan when
they were hit by a storm packing maximum windspeeds of 35 m per second. The Gyokuei Maru was
exposed to typhoon conditions for two whole days as
it towed the Tonan Maru, but somehow managed tomake it through, and returned safely to port at
Wakaura. After that, refurbishment work was undertaken at the Aioi Plant of Harima Shipyard, and in
October 1951, the Tonan Maru III was relaunchedunder the new name of “Tonan Maru”.
The new Tonan Maru led the 6th Antarctic whaling
expedition in 1951 as the whaling mother ship. For

Tonan Maru III after grounding and sinking in the TrukAtoll

The operation to refloat Tonan Maru III in the TrukAtoll

Arrival off Aioi, Hyogo Prefecture, in April 1951

Restored to life as Tonan Maru, the ship sets off for the
6th Antarctic whaling expedition that October

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

154

the company’s employees, whose spirits must havebeen dampened by the painfully slow progression of
Nippon Suisan’s reconstruction and rehabilitation,
the Tonan Maru must have been like a beacon ofhope.

Enhancement of the Marine Product Sales
SystemTo avoid the ills of a monopoly in the GHQ economic
reforms after the end of the war, the number of marine
product wholesale companies was not limited, but
those answering to certain conditions determined byprovincial governors (based on instructions from the
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry) had to be registered. This led to a flood of wholesale companies
being launched on various markets in 1947. Nippon
Suisan, which had lost its entire sales network in Japanowing to its cooperation in the Fishery Control
Ordinance, could now sell fish caught in its various
operations through wholesale companies all overJapan.
Meanwhile, for a short time after the war, Nippon
Suisan had sold fish through its own independent
wholesale company in the Tokyo Central Wholesale
Market. However, as the business could not be continued with sales of Nippon Suisan’s fish catches alone,

The Pacific War Era and Postwar Reconstruction

Chuo Gyorui Co., Ltd., with which the company had
shared close interpersonal relations since before thewar, took over the business, including transferring allof its employees. This was the beginning of a cooperative business relationship between the two companies.
In November 1952, the Zenkoku Nissui Kai(National Nissui Association) was formed, and a sales
network was built around leading consignee agencies
all over the country.
Jun-ichi Kishimoto, later to be appointed Executive
Director, recalls the situation at the time as follows:“The Zenkoku Nissui Kai included many business
partners who had been tremendously helpful in oursales of fresh west fish and others since before the war.
(part omitted) Our fish catches were sold via the routeof fisheries producers—wholesale merchants—middlemen—retailers, and consignment sales were thebasic format between fisheries producers and wholesalers. Settlements were based on itemized invoices(showing sales minus the cost of sales) issued by thewholesalers. The system of consignment sales continued for both fresh fish and frozen fish until the system
of normal sales was introduced in 1968”.
A powerful sales network based around the National
Nissui Association was eventually to make a huge contribution to Nippon Suisan’s postwar reconstruction.

155

Section III
Development and Expansion during
Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth
Chapter 1: Laying the Groundwork for Growth1950 – 1955

Part 1 The Korean War and Special Procurements
Falling into recession due to the so-called “DodgeLine” and subsequent “Dodge Recession”, the Japanese
economy was saved by the outbreak of the Korean
War in June 1950. The Korean War generated economic effects that were favorable to Japan’s economy.
Demand for special procurements of military supplies
by United Nations forces in Korea had ripple effects
on Japan, an industrialized nation geographically situated near the Korean Peninsula. And the international
repercussions of the special procurements led to
expanding exports from Japan.
On the other hand, as tensions rose between the
Eastern and Western Blocs with, among other developments, the emergence of the German Democratic
Republic (East Germany) and the People’s Republicof China in 1949, the United States worked to makepeace with Japan with an eye to keeping it as a U.S.
ally. However, the Soviet Union was wholly opposedto the U.S.’s intentions, and even members of theWestern Bloc—namely Australia, New Zealand, theUnited Kingdom, the Philippines, and Burma among
others—felt that American peace overtures to Japan
were overly magnanimous. The U.S. assuaged theconcerns of these Western Bloc nations by signingsecurity treaties and defense treaties with them. Then,on September 8, 1951, the U.S. signed a peace treaty
with Japan in San Francisco. The Japan–U.S. Security
Treaty was concluded in the afternoon of the sameday.
In 1952, following the security treaty’s conclusion,ceasefire talks began in Korea. This same year, South
Korea issued a declaration concerning maritime sovereignty that established the so-called “Syngman RheeLine”. The following year, 1953, an armistice agreement was signed on the Korean Peninsula, and with
it came the full-scale arrival of the Cold War era in
East Asia.
During this time, Japan’s industrial production andreal GNP (gross national product) surpassed theirprewar levels in 1951 as a result of the Korean War’s
special procurements. The following year, 1952, theJapanese economy began to see signs of a consumption
boom. Demand for textile goods grew suddenly, driven
by Korean War-caused interruptions of raw material
imports and rapid declines in production. At the sametime, demand for furniture and fixtures, which had
been sluggish, also improved rapidly. The result wasa “consumption boom” that reflected high growth inconsumer spending. This boom continued into 1953
and became what an economic white paper called an“investment boom”. However, in 1954, the economic
cycle once again brought Japan’s economy back into
recession. In 1952, restoration of the corporate namesof former zaibatsu was allowed, and as a result,
Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and other companies
retook their former names.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth156

Later, in 1955, Japan entered an era of rapid economic growth under what became known as the “1955
System”. This was a political system formed by two
main parties: the Liberal Democratic Party, which
was born when conservative forces joined together,and the Japan Socialist Party, which stood as a secondary party.
In 1955, the cabinet of Ichiro Hatoyama approved
a five-year plan for economic self-support that called
for Japan’s economic autonomy and full employment.

Then, in 1957, Nobusuke Kishi’s cabinet announced
a new long-term economic plan. This same government also devoted itself to shifting its labor policy to
one based on labor-management cooperation while
expanding employment and eliminating wage disparities. These policy directions were continued in an“income-doubling plan” put forth by Hayato Ikeda,
who had previously supported the Dodge Line policy
as Minister of Finance and who became Prime Ministerin December of 1960.

Part 2 Establishing Postwar Maritime Order
The Truman Proclamations and Disturbance of
Postwar Maritime Order
In September 1945, immediately following the end ofWorld War II, U.S. President Truman made two proclamations (the so-called “Truman Proclamations”)
that laid out the United States’ basic policies regarding
preservation zones for fishery resources and continental shelves.
The first proclamation states with regard to preservation zones for fishery resources that “the natural
resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental
shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coastsof the United States, subject to its jurisdiction andcontrol”.
And, the second states with regard to the continental shelf that “the exercise of jurisdiction over thenatural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of thecontinental shelf by the contiguous nation [to a depthof 200 m] is reasonable and just”. Factors behind thisproclamation were the fact that development ofAmerican oil drilling technologies had advanced to apoint where drilling beyond three nautical miles(approximately 5.6 km) was possible, and the emerging
need to clarify federal and state authority for licensing
oil drilling and tax affiliation.
Regarding high-seas fishing off the coasts of the
U.S., these proclamations intended to preserve fisheryresources by establishing that preservation zones

would be set up by the U.S. in areas where American
fishermen had traditionally operated alone, and basedon agreements with other countries in areas where
both American and foreign fisherman had operated
together. It was said that this approach was taken as aprecaution against the reemergence of Japan’s prewar
practice of actively moving into fishing grounds. In
response, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida said in a
letter to U.S. Secretary of State Dulles in February
1951 that Japan was prepared to enter into fishery
agreements with other countries as soon as it regained
its sovereignty. The Prime Minister also said that Japan
would prohibit operations in new preserved fisheries
that are outside marine areas in which Japan operated
prior to the war.
The Truman Proclamations served to ignite claims
by coastal countries that the marine areas around themwere their own territorial waters. From 1946 to 1951,
Mexico, Argentina, Panama, and other Latin Americancountries stretched the meaning of the proclamations
to assert their jurisdiction over offshore fisheries aswell as substantial expansions of their territorial waters.
In August of 1952, the four nations of Chile, Ecuador,
Peru, and Costa Rica issued the “Santiago Proclamation”,
thereby declaring their complete sovereignty and jurisdiction over waters out to 200 nautical miles fromtheir coasts. The proclamation later became the sourceof a unified view among Latin American nations that
their territorial waters extended out for 200 nautical

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth157

miles. It also influenced South Korea’s establishmentof the “Syngman Rhee Line” in the oceans around
Japan.
In this way, nations began claiming territorial waters
ranging from three nautical miles to 200 nautical miles
and thereby disrupting maritime order.
Meanwhile, as a new body launched in October
1945, the United Nations established the International
Law Commission to codify international laws. And
one of the tasks the U.N. entrusted to the commission
was the codification of a maritime law. From 1951 to
1956, 15 esteemed international legal scholars deliberated maritime law within the commission. These
deliberations led to the preparation of a draft Law of
the Sea that took into account the conclusions of theInternational Technical Conference on the Conser­
vation of the Living Resources of the Sea that was heldin Rome in 1955. The commission also recommended
that national representatives should be invited to aninternational forum to study the Law of the Sea.
Taking this recommendation, the United Nations
held an international meeting on the matter in Geneva
in February 1958. It should be noted that Japan gained
United Nations membership in 1956.
This meeting was the First United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I). It
Rough map of western fishing ground restrictions

A
B
C
D

M
 acArthur Line (initial permission)M acArthur Line (secondary expansion)
Rhee Line
Kato Line

was attended by 86 countries, including Japan. The
conference resulted in the adoption of the so-called“four Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea”:
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone, the Convention on the High Seas, the Convention
on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources ofthe High Seas, and the Convention on the Continental
Shelf. It deserves mentioning, however, that no agreement was reached on the most basic problem of territorial water size.
Abolishment of the MacArthur Line
Three days before the San Francisco Peace Treaty cameinto effect on April 28, 1952, the “MacArthur Line”,
which had been in place since September 1945, wasabolished. The purpose of the MacArthur Line wasto promote the fishing industry within limited fishinggrounds to satisfy postwar Japan’s food demand.
During the years prior to the line’s removal, Japan’s
fishery production expanded with the building offishing boats and procurement of fishing equipment.
At the same time, restrictions on Japanese fishing andfisheries were gradually relaxed. However, the line
seriously constrained the development of Japan’s fishing industry, which sought to move onto the high seasand expand. Thus, the MacArthur Line’s abolition
opened the door to the development of Japanesefishing.
On the other hand, the MacArthur Line’s abolition
meant that Japan—now a sovereign nation—wasentering the difficult era of nation-to-nation fishingnegotiations in a post-Truman Proclamation world.
Here, Article 9 of the Treaty of San Francisco states
the following: “Japan will enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing
for the regulation or limitation of fishing and theconservation and development of fisheries on the highseas”. Thus, the Japanese government began entering
fishery negotiations immediately following the treaty’s
coming into force.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth158

Establishment of the “Syngman Rhee Line” andJapan–R.O.K. Negotiations
In October 1951, GHQ mediated an agreement tohold a meeting for restoring diplomatic relations
between Japan and South Korea. Among other topics,
this meeting would discuss fishery-related issues
between the two countries. However, on January 18,
1952, just prior to the meeting, South Korean President
Syngman Rhee issued a “proclamation of sovereignty
over the seas”. The president declared that South Korea
had sovereignty over mineral and fishery resources ina vast sea area around the Korean Peninsula and that
it would place these resources under its management.
This was three months prior to the MacArthur Line’s
abolition.
The Japanese government protested the drawingof this so-called “Syngman Rhee Line” (Rhee Line)on the grounds that it violated the principles of freedom of the seas and of development and protectionof marine resources of the high seas. Nonetheless,South Korea began stepping up its seizure of Japanese
vessels within the Rhee Line on April 25, 1952. Seoul
justified its actions by citing the Truman Proclamations
as well as fishery restrictions being enforced by Latin
American countries, and later by mentioning the “seadefense zone” (the “Clark Line”) that UN forces had
established around the Korean Peninsula in September
1952.
Japan responded by dispatching private self-defense
vessels to ensure the safety of its fishing boats near the
Rhee Line. Seizures of fishing boats nevertheless continued and Japan was forced to refrain from operatingin those waters.
Until the Rhee Line was abolished with the signingof a fisheries pact between Japan and the Park Chunghee administration in 1965, South Korea seized a totalof 328 Japanese vessels and detained 3,929 people.
Forty-four Japanese died or were injured as a result of
these seizures.

Conclusion of a Japan–China Fishery Agreement
On December 7, 1950, a Japanese fishing boat was
fired upon and seized by Chinese vessels in the East
China Sea. This was followed by similar acts in thefollowing year and thereafter. These incidents were
the result of a December 1950 decision by theCommission of Military Administration for Eastern
China’s fisheries management bureau to establish a
no-bottom trawl fishery zone along China’s coasts.
However, the existence of this demarcation—the socalled “Kato Line”—was not reported to Japan by
China.
The frequent seizures were a significant threat towest-water trawling operators. In 1952, they launched
a Japan–China fisheries roundtable to discuss theissue. They also requested that the Japanese government and U.S. forces in Japan provide protection, andtook repeated steps to demand compensation.
However, their efforts failed to produce clear results,
as Japan and China had no diplomatic relations at thetime and Sino–American relations had worsened.
In 1952, Japan and China signed a trade agreementthat provided the foothold needed to resolve the problem. In 1953, Japanese crewmen held by China werereturned to Japan, and it became clear that China had
held them for reasons that included violation of its
territorial waters, obstruction of coastal fishing, andsuspicion of spying. In addition, China’s seizures ofJapanese fishing boats began falling off about this time,
as international tensions showed signs of relaxing
against the backdrop of the Korean War armistice and
the Geneva Conference.
In October of 1954, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai
informed a visiting Japanese cultural mission that
China was prepared to enter into fishery negotiations.
This led to the establishment of the Japan–China
Fishery Association in November and the beginningof negotiations in 1955. The result was the signing ofa non-governmental fishery agreement on April 14.
The agreement came into effect on June 13, 1955.
Valid for a period of one year, this agreement was

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth159

later extended twice. However, in May of 1958, aJapanese youth pulled down the Chinese flag at astamp exhibition in Nagasaki. This Kokki Jiken (flagincident) as it was known soured Sino–Japaneserelations and led to China’s refusal of Japan’s request
to extend the agreement once more. Consequently,
Japanese fishing boats continued to voluntarily restrain
their operations.

Part 3 Fishery Negotiations and the Resumption of Fishing
Operations
1. International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the Northern Pacific
Ocean, Japan–U.S.S.R. Negotiations on Fishery, and Fishery in the North-Seas
Signing of the International Convention for theHigh Seas Fisheries of the Northern Pacific
Ocean and Resumption of Mother Ship-Type
Fishery of Salmon and Trout
Beginning in November 1951, Japan, the United States,
and Canada began holding meetings to discuss negotiations for fishery negotiations based on Article 9 of
the Treaty of San Francisco. The Japanese side maintained a careful posture throughout the meetings, as
it saw their results as a precedent for negotiations withother countries. On the other hand, the American andCanadian sides also asserted their own rights, and as
a result the meetings did not proceed smoothly.
However, ultimately Japan won permission to operate
in western waters by agreeing to voluntarily refrainfrom salmon and trout fishing east of 175° west longitude. Japan also agreed that if its boats violated thiscondition, they could be boarded, inspected, or seized.
Meanwhile, Japan was allowed to begin mother ship-

type fishery of crab, a practice that it had pursued
prior to the war.
After some 50 meetings, a basic convention andannex were drafted and adopted. They were signedby plenipotentiaries of the three countries on May 1952.
And on June 12, 1953, the International Convention
for the High Seas Fisheries of the Northern Pacific
Ocean came into force.
Around this time, the profitability of tuna fisheryand Antarctic whaling, which had supported Japan’s
fishing industry in the days immediately following
World War II, was worsening. Japanese marine products companies thus began seeing the resumption ofnorth-sea fishery as a path to business recovery, andthey applied en masse for the fishery permits needed
to do so.
In 1952, three companies—Nippon Suisan, Taiyo
Gyogyo, and Nichiro Gyogyo—were granted permits
to begin north-sea mother-ship salmon and trout

Tenryu Maru on its first postwar north-sea expedition

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth160

The Japan–U.S.S.R. Convention on High Seas
Fisheries in the Northwest Pacific Ocean andMother Ship-Type Salmon and Trout Fishery
In December of 1955, Agricultural Minister Ichiro
Kono announced a concept for systematizing northsea salmon and trout fleets. The next year, 1956, fivefleets were added to make 19 fleets leaving port. And
their area of operations expanded greatly in the seas
to the east and west of Kamchatka.
The concept sought to increase business efficiency.
It established a Nippon Suisan grouping (two Nippon
Suisan fleets and one Hokoku Suisan K.K. fleet), a

Setup of the Bulganin Line (1956)

Bulganin Line

U.S.S.R.

K
Pe amcnin hatsu ka
lafishery. Because operations during this year were to
be on a trial basis, restrictions were placed on sea areasof operation and operational methods. Among theserestrictions, the number of mother ship fleets that
could operate was limited to three. Even so, for thesethree companies seeking business recovery, the reopening of north-sea operations was the messiah they had
been hoping for.
Taiyo Gyogyo set sail with a fleet of 38 ships, while
Nichiro Gyogyo did so with a fleet of 16. Nippon
Suisan dispatched the trawler Tenryu Maru as its mothership, together with 10 catcher boats and two researchships. These three fleets embarked on their first fishingvoyages in May of 1952.
Of the three fleets, the one making the largest catch
belonged to Taiyo Gyogyo. It hauled in a total of 1,22
million fish, which was 58% of all three companies’
total catch. This number far exceeded Nippon Suisan’s
catch of approximately 471,000 fish (22%) and Nichiro
Gyogyo’s catch of roughly 429,000 fish (20%).
The catches were landed and sold as frozen fish,
salt-cured fish, and salted salmon roe. Partly because
they were the first north-sea salmon and trout products of the postwar era, the catches were traded at highprices in competitive bidding by marine products
dealers. As for can products for export, Nippon Suisan
and Nichiro Gyogyo each produced just 2,000 boxes(48 half-pound cans to a case), as they judged thatsuch products would not be profitable.

Area of drift-net operations south of 48 degrees
Area of salmon/trout operations

Taiyo Gyogyo grouping (three Taiyo Gyogyo fleets,one Hakodate Kokai Gyogyo K.K. fleet, and two fleets
affiliated with the Hokkaido Fisheries Bureau), a
Nichiro Gyogyo grouping (six Nichiro Gyogyo fleets
and one fleet affiliated with Taiyo Reito Bosen K.K.),
and other fleets (two Kyokuyo Hogei fleets and one
Hoko Suisan fleet).
However, just as preparations were being made forthese fleets to begin operations, something happened
that shook the entire Japanese fishing industry.
On March 21, 1956, the Soviet government
announced its decision to temporarily establish a“salmon and trout fishery regulation zone” on thehigh seas around the Kuril Islands. Claiming that lower
salmon and trout catches were being caused by Japanese
overfishing, Moscow established what became called
the “Bulganin Line” as a means of preventing such
overfishing. It limited catches inside this line to500,000 centners (approximately 22,700 tons) andplaced the Soviet Ministry of Fisheries in charge ofsupervising the zone. The Japanese government protested this move as a violation of international law,
but began fishery negotiations with the U.S.S.R.
nonetheless.
On May 9, 1956, Agricultural Minister Kono met
with Premier Minister Bulganin. This meeting subsequently led to the May 14 signing of the Japan–
U.S.S.R. Convention on High Seas Fisheries in the
Northwest Pacific Ocean, which established quotasof 65,000 tons within the Bulganin Line. Moreover,

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth161the two sides decided to establish a Japan–Soviet
Fisheries Commission. The commission was charged
with holding deliberations on various issues, including
correction of annexes attached to regulatory actions
and setting of yearly quotas for specific fish types.
Following these developments, the previously rocky
Japan–U.S.S.R. negotiations for restoration of diplomatic ties moved forward under Prime Minister
Hatoyama and Premier Bulganin and eventually led
to the signing of the Japanese-Soviet Joint Declaration
on October 19, 1956. The fisheries convention cameinto effect simultaneously with the Japanese-Soviet
Joint Declaration. The result was that Japan’s fishingindustry was now subject to regulation in the North
Pacific Ocean as well.
On May 14, 1956, the delegation that had just concluded the fisheries convention laid out Japan’s northsea fishery policy for fiscal 1956. This policy reduced
Japan’s fifth fishing expedition down to a total of
sixteen fleets: two Nippon Suisan fleets, five Nichiro
Gyogyo fleets, two Taiyo Gyogyo fleets, and sevenother fleets. These fleets were unable to reach theirallotted yearly quota of 65,000 tons of salmon andtrout within the regulated zone, as their total catch
reached just 47,775 tons.
Japan’s mother ship-type salmon and trout fisherybecame subject to the decisions of the Japan–Soviet
Fisheries Commission beginning with the sixth

expedition of 1957. The sixth expedition enjoyed abountiful catch and all fleets returned to port aheadof schedule. A bumper haul of sockeye salmon madeit possible to increase production of canned sockeye
salmon, a highly valued export item. As a result, Japan’s
production of canned salmon and trout in 1957
exceeded 1 million boxes for the first time in the
postwar era.
The allotted quota for the seventh expedition of1958 was 110,000 tons. However, the loss of one fleet
to the Sea of Okhotsk, which enjoyed exceptional
operating conditions, and poor weather following thefleets’ departure led to predictions that some fleets
would return with catches that were far short of theirallotments. In order to maintain the quota for thefollowing fiscal year, the fleets took various measures
to avoid this problem, including tacking shortfalls
onto fleets that had good catches. In the end, thisallowed them to squeeze by with the claim that they
had reached 99% of the quota.
Later, the salmon and trout quota was reduced to
85,000 tons in the third round of Japan–U.S.S.R.
fishery negotiations of 1959 and 67,000 tons in the
fourth round of 1960. In the fifth round of negotiations in 1961, the quota was further dropped to 65,000
tons and a new no-fishing zone was added in the sea
area south of 48° north latitude.

2. Resumption of Mother Ship-Type Crab Fishery
Resumption of Mother Ship-Type Fishery inBristol Bay
Mother ship-type crab fishery was a practice that Japan
started during the Taisho period (1912–1926) but
stopped during and after World War II. It ranked
alongside salmon and trout fishery as an important
north-sea operation for Japan’s fishing industry.
As meetings for the International Convention for
the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean
got underway in November 1951, it became apparent

that mother ship-type crab fishery in the eastern
Bering Sea’s Bristol Bay would become possible. Crabfishery was expected to deliver high profitability, andthus Nippon Suisan, Taiyo Gyogyo and Nichiro
Gyogyo each applied for permits from the Fisheries
Agency. However, the king crab fishing grounds inBristol Bay were small, making operations by three
fleets unrealistic from the standpoint of resource preservation. Because of this, the Fisheries Agency proposed establishing a new company or even joint
management by the three major companies. However,Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth162

Tokei Maru: Sent to Bristol Bay after postwar resumption of mother ship-type crab fishery

the three companies rejected these proposals andinsisted on operating independently, citing their own
respective advantages in crab fishery. For its part,
Nippon Suisan emphasized its strong prewar performance in north-sea crab resource management andtechnical proficiency.
This squabble sparked a major political issue. The
Fisheries Agency sought to resolve the problem byproposing a three-way joint management scheme inwhich Taiyo Gyogyo would operate the fishing boats,Nippon Suisan would provide the personnel, andNichiro Gyogyo would take charge of sales. Howevereven this proposal did not go far. Ultimately, in orderto make fishing the priority, Nippon Suisan indicatedthat it would leave the final decision to the others,
while Taiyo Gyogyo and Nichiro Gyogyo agreed tothree-way joint management. How­ever, there was a
growing number of people in the U.S. who misinterpreted this three-way arrangement as actual fishingby three companies and opposed it as such.
Consequently, GHQ advised cancelling fishery operations in 1952, thereby ensuring that no operations
would take place that year.
The next year, 1953, the Japanese government took
steps to avoid repeating the problem of the previous
year. From the start, it announced a policy that only
one mother ship would be permitted to engage in crab
fishery in Bristol Bay, and that the permit would be
issued in response to joint applications submitted
based on mutual coordination among concerned
operators. Given this permit policy, the presidents of
Nippon Suisan, Taiyo Gyogyo, and Nichiro Gyogyo
held discussions that actualized three-way joint

management. Regarding the problematic issues ofcapital and sales, the presidents decided to resolve theformer by splitting responsibility among the threecompanies, and the latter by dividing canned king crab
products evenly among the three companies, who
would affix their own labels to their shares. The permit
period was set at three years, from March 28, 1953, to
March 27, 1956. The operating area was limited to theBering Sea located east of 166° west latitude, with the
exception of areas within three nautical miles of thecoastline. The number of cans that could be produced
was limited to 50,000 boxes. Restrictions were also
placed on by-catch of salmon, trout, halibut, Pacificherring, and other fish.
On March 30, 1953, six catcher boats set sail fromHakodate for Bristol Bay. They were followed on April
8 by the Tokei Maru.
Onboard was Yasuo Haraguchi, a managing director at Nippon Suisan who served as the fleet’s leader.
After arriving in Bristol Bay, the Tokei Maru fleet
began operating on April 20. It concluded operations
on April 16, having produced its quota. The entire
amount of canned king crab was exported to the U.S.,
which had great demand for the product. The export
value totaled 540 million yen. Thus, the catch proved
to be a valuable source of foreign currency for Japan
at that time.
Subsequently, a second and then a third fleet left
port in fiscal 1954 and 1955. Because these fleets werestill operating within the permit period, they weremanaged like the first fleet under the three-way
arrangement. The number of cans produced was fixedat 57,000 boxes to avoid provoking the U.S.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth163

Thus, crab fishery in Bristol Bay had proceededsmoothly up to the third expedition and produced
excellent results.
Operations under the three-way arrangement continued as is until 1962, when two fleets were formed—
one around the Tokei Maru (Nippon Suisan andHokoku Suisan) and one around the Dainichi Maru
(Taiyo Gyogyo and Nichiro Gyogyo). The following
year, 1963, a much larger joint management arrangement involving two fleets and nine companies wasformed. The permitted number of produced canspeaked this year at 235,000 boxes.
Mother Ship-Type Crab Fishery in Soviet Waters
On the other hand, marine products companies maintained a careful stance vis-à-vis operations in Soviet
waters. This was partially due to concerns over vessel
seizures by the U.S.S.R. However, given progress innorth-sea fishery, which had resumed in 1952, andpredictions that high-seas operations would be safe
based on successful operation of Kyokuyo Hogei’s Fuei
Maru cod fleet in 1954, the government decided topermit mother ship-type crab fishery off the western
coast of Kamchatka in 1955. Although this decision
led to a flood of permit applications, in the end two
fleets were granted permits as joint management partnerships, with one fleet operated by Nichiro Gyogyo
and Nippon Suisan and the other operated by Taiyo

Gyogyo and Hokuyo Suisan.
The Nichiro Gyogyo and Nippon Suisan partnership had trouble deciding on a mother ship, as bothcompanies insisted on being the leading fishing entity.
Ultimately, mediation by the Fisheries Agency led tothe decision that Nippon Suisan would be the leading
entity and that its Yoko Maru would be the mothership. Profits would be distributed so that Nippon
Suisan and Nichiro Suisan would receive three-fourths
and one-fourth, respectively. As for the Taiyo Gyogyo
and Hokuyo Suisan partnership, it was decided that
the Taiyo’s Hakuyo Maru would be the mother shipand Hokuyo would be the leading entity. Profits were
to be split evenly.
Initially, the Fisheries Agency limited production
from mother ship-type crab fishery in Soviet waters
to 60,000 boxes of canned king crab per partnership.
However, catches were far better than anticipated,
prompting the partnerships to ask the Fisheries Agency
to raise their quotas by an additional 10,000 boxes.
Noting improved Japan–Soviet relations, the agency
complied on the conditions that the partnerships
conducted their operations over as wide an area as
possible and that they understood that the expanded
70,000-box quotas were for the current fishing year
only. Then, having achieved their production targets,
the Yoko Maru returned to port two weeks early inAugust, followed by the Hakuyo Maru returned in
September.

Fishing grounds visited by north-sea crab fleets (1956)
Soviet Union

AlaskaOlyutor Peninsula fishing ground

Bristol Bay fishing groundWestern Kamchatka Peninsula fishing ground

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth164

Yoko Maru

Shokyu Maru

In 1956, the Fisheries Agency used the previous
year’s success as the basis to grant Nippon Suisan,which had few permits for salmon fishery, permission
to independently engage in trial operations off of
Olyutor Peninsula (eastern Kamchatka). Moreover,it gave the four companies that had operated within
partnerships the previous year permission to go italone. Blessed with bountiful fishing, the four fleets
had a combined production of 313,000 boxes thatyear. With the entire amount going to exports, thisbusiness became highly profitable for each company.
Nippon Suisan dispatched its Yoko Maru fleet to thearea west of the Kamchatka Peninsula (western
Kamchatka) as well as a fleet centered on the Shokyu
Maru to the sea off the Olyutor Peninsula for trial
operations. However, the Shokyu Maru fleet’s results
were poor, with production reaching just 54,500 boxesof the allotted 70,000. In the end, Nippon Suisan
achieved a total production of 147,000 boxes by having

the Yoko Maru make up the shortfall. However, it
decided not to send the Shokyu Maru out in subsequent years.
As for operations in 1957, there were concerns about
possible negative impacts from the Japan–U.S.S.R.
Fisheries Convention that was concluded in 1956.
However, in general, Japan’s fishery requests werelargely accepted and no restrictions were placed on
production. Consequently, the Fisheries Agency
allowed four fishing fleets to leave port, the same
number as the previous year. In terms of production,
each company was initially issued a quota of 70,000
cans; however, these quotas were later raised. Nippon
Suisan—which had shown strong performance but
whose Shokyu Maru fleet out of operation—was allotted a quota of 92,400 boxes. Taiyo Gyogyo, Nichiro
Gyogyo, and Hokuyo Suisan were each allotted quotasof 80,000 boxes.

3. Tuna Fishery, West-Water Trawling, and Mother Ship-Type Trawl Fishery
Rapid Expansion of Tuna Fishery
Tuna fishery was one of the forms of fishery that wererestricted by the MacArthur Line. It was also a businesslooked to for early recovery, as it received financing
to help it get back on its feet as part of efforts toincrease food production by the Japanese government
and GHQ. Japan’s participation in the tuna businessexpanded rapidly following the MacArthur Line’s
second fishery zone expansion in June 1946, and thenumber of licensed tuna boats exploded from 323 in
1946 to 1,146 by the end of 1948.
On top of active government-led efforts to support

tuna fishery, there were expectations that demand forcanned tuna both in Japan and the U.S. (which had
been a tuna exporter prior to World War II) would
grow. Exports of canned tuna to the US started in
1948, followed by frozen tuna the following year. In
addition, GHQ began allowing mother ship-type tuna
fishery in May 1950, a development that led to participation by major marine products companies andfurther escalation of tuna fishery.
The result was a period of dramatic growth in thetuna business. However, this period was abruptly
halted in March 1954, when the tuna boat Fukuryu
Maru No. 5 was exposed to radiation produced by an

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth165

American hydrogen bomb test on Bikini Atoll of the
Marshall Islands. The test exposed all 23 crewmembersof the Fukuryu Maru No. 5 to radiation and subjectedmany other fishing boats to radioactive fallout. It alsoruined tuna fishing grounds for 425 tuna boats andirradiated and forced the disposal of some 326 tonsof tuna catch onboard boats. The resulting damage
to tuna’s reputation among Japanese consumers led toa precipitous drop in fish prices that even hurt manytuna fishing businesses, distributors, and processors
with no connection with the irradiated tuna. Their
vast accumulated stocks became ingredients of fishsausage and ham products that major marine products
companies were actively promoting.
Strong tuna demand returned once the uproar had
settled down, and catches once again grew spectacularly. However, the growth of yields far outpaced
growth in demand. This caused major marine products
companies to reinforce their freezing facilities andraise their production ratios of frozen tuna in order
to avoid oversupply.
Transition of Fishery in West-Water Fishery
For five years following the MacArthur Line’s establishment in 1945, west-water trawling in the East
China Sea and Yellow Sea rapidly recovered and prospered. A large number of new boats were constructed
and yields surpassed prewar levels. Meanwhile, while
west-water otter trawling also saw rapid improvements,
it did not reach prewar levels. This was because westwater trawling boats were cheaper to construct thantrawlers and better adapted to the fishing grounds
there.
The massive yields led to smaller resources, particularly of high-quality fish, and by extension lowered
productivity. In search of new resources, the government petitioned GHQ to expand the MacArthur Linein 1947 but was refused. A result was illegal fisherythat spurred a combined 20% reductions in thenumber of west-water trawling boats in July and
September 1950.

Then, South Korea started seizing Japanese fishingboats around 1947. By the end of 1952, South Korea
seized some 130 vessels. Meanwhile, between May
1948 and August 1949, 29 vessels were seized and 2
vessels sunk by Taiwan. And 107 vessels and 1,281
crewmembers were seized by the People’s Republic ofChina between December 1950 and the end of
1952.
The San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed in 1951
and came into force in April 1952, and with it camethe MacArthur Line’s abolishment. In tandem withthis move, however, were China’s drawing of the KatoLine in February 1950 and South Korea’s establishment of the Rhee Line in January 1952. For Japan, anewly sovereign country on the road to recovery, theselines took a heavy toll on its west-water trawling.
The fishery agreement that Japan and China concluded in 1955 expired in June 1958 when China refused
to extend it. Japan subsequently refrained from fisheryoperations during the next five years, and the Japanese
government maintained a stance that consistently paid
attention to China’s concerns. This included strictly
controlling illegal Japanese fishing within the Kato
Line. Nonetheless, violations by Japanese operators
continued, and incidents of Chinese fishing boats’
firing on Japanese vessels did not abate. The day when
Japanese vessels could operate safety seemed a longway away.
In the meantime, Japan and South Korea concluded
negotiations for the mutual release of detainees in
December 1958. However, although 922 Japanesecrewmen held in South Korea did indeed return homein the wake of the negotiations, seizures of Japaneseboats by South Korea did not slacken and the numberof detainees continued to grow.
Construction of west-water trawling boats also
continued into the 1950s, with between 50 and 100
vessels being built each year. Looking to achieve larger
catches, operators sought to improve their productivity by converting to steel vessels, building larger vessels,
and modernizing their equipment. Consequently,
yields grew dramatically. Factors behind this were theDevelopment and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth

166

MacArthur Line’s abolition and establishment of fishery safety with the Japan–China non-governmental
fishery agreement. However, while catches of mediumpriced fish (such as lizardfish, white croaker, cultassfish, and conger eel) and miscellaneous fishes pureed
to make fish paste grew, those of high-priced fish (suchas sea bream, tilefish, and yellow sea bream) decreased.
Permission to operate in the South China Sea was
granted with the establishment of temporary regulations on trawling in July 1952. Thus, Japanese operators
began operating west-water otter trawlers and westwater trawling boats on a trial basis. However, the next
year ( June 1953), operators were permitted to send
fleets to the South China Sea as per the conventional
practice by stopping their west-water otter trawlingand west-water two boats trawling. In addition, operators’ permits for west-water fishery were withdrawn,
and they were authorized to operate in the South
China Sea only. At the same time, they were permitted
to use larger ships for deep-seas fishery. Accordingly,
permission to operate in west-water fishing grounds
was withdrawn and a trend toward the constructionof large fishing boats began. Both Nippon Suisan andTaiyo Gyogyo built large trawlers in the 1,000-tonclass. However, voyages to the South China Sea subsequently declined, and operations began shifting to
the Bering Sea from 1954.
In this way, the number of west-water otter trawlers
operating in west-water fishing grounds began declining around 1953, and the number of west-water trawling boats having superior attributes in terms ofefficiency and profitability increased.
Beginning of Mother Ship-Type Trawl Fishery
From around the mid-1950s, marine products companies began to sense that operating in west-waters
offered only limited resources and profitability. They
thus began north-sea mother ship-type trawl businessas a substitute business.

Itsukushima Maru

Nippon Suisan and Taiyo Gyogyo began mothership-type trawl fishery in the Bering Sea in 1954. Bothcompanies engaged in refrigerated factory ship-based
flounder fishery in which a licensed mother ship transferred catches to a refrigerated ship. Both companies
produced frozen fish such as yellowfin sole, Alaska
plaice founder, and flathead sole and achieved considerable success. Two fleets operated again in 1955;
however, the number doubled to four in 1956 and1957, and the size of operations gradually grew as othercompanies joined in. In 1958, fishmeal factory shipbased fishery resumed for the first time in 20 years.
In line with this development, mother ship-type fishery regulations were revised to bring a shift from conventional catch transshipment permits to mothership-type trawl fishery permits.
Likewise in 1954, small-scale trawl fishery by independent vessels also began in the Bering Sea region
for the purpose of producing frozen flounder andother fish.
Bottom trawl fishery in the Sea of Okhotsk (offthe western shore of the Kamchatka Peninsula) also
started in 1954. Fourteen vessels left port with theprimary purpose of catching cod. However, initialcatches were not good, and it was not until 1957 thatfishery activities finally got into full swing.
Moreover, Nippon Suisan’s trawler Uji Maru began
trial operations off the Olyutor Peninsula in 1958.
Here, the company developed its own fishing groundfor crab, halibut, cod, Alaska pollack, and otherfish.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth167

Part 4 Development of Nippon Suisan’s Marine Products Business
Development of the North-Sea
Mother Ship-Type Salmon and Trout Businessand Bottom Trawl Business
Having formulated a vision for its mother ship-typesalmon and trout business in north-sea fishing grounds
through its first expedition in 1952, Nippon Suisan
set out to expand the scale of the second expedition
by replacing the mother ship with the Kaiko Maru. It
also expanded the number of participating catcher
boats from 12 in the first expedition to 27, including
a survey vessel. The result was a record catch value
from frozen and salted fish alone of 470 million
yen.
The results of trial operations during these two

expeditions gave Nippon Suisan confidence that it
could enjoy stable operation and high profitability inmother ship-type salmon and trout fishery. This confidence set the stage for full-scale operations beginningwith the company’s third expedition in 1954. The
third expedition generated a much higher yield and,
when canned products made with salmon and trout
from Hokkaido’s coastal areas were included, had atotal production that was roughly 50% larger than theprevious year’s. Moreover, both domestic and overseas
demand remained robust, generating a supply shortage
that kept prices high. As a result, exports were particularly strong and largely surpassed the previous
year’s level.
Beginning with the fourth expedition, Nippon

Salmon/trout caught by an catcher boat are loaded onto a mother ship.

Asama Maru

The mother ship Miyajima Maru

Hauling work on an catcher boat

Kashima Maru

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth168

Suisan’s affiliate Hokoku Suisan formed a fleet together
with Hoko Suisan to participate in salmon and trout
fishery. The expedition’s catch was bountiful, particularly for trout, and produced a yield that was triplethat of the previous year. However, the high yield led
to a fall in prices for salted products and other products. Nippon Suisan and the other major marine products companies strove to maintain their profits byadjusting sales while watching market conditions. In
canned goods exports, they coordinated their sales
methods and prices within the framework of the Japan
Salmon and Trout Canned Export Fisheries Cooperativethat was formed in August 1955. This and other factors—including the effects of broader import permit
applicability in the United Kingdom and growinginterest from the United States due to lower production of canned salmon and trout products in Alaska
and Canada—let to record production of 12,704 tons,
far exceeding the previous year’s result.
Thus, Nippon Suisan’s north-sea mother ship-typesalmon and trout business became an important component of its overall operations in the first half of the
1950s. In 1955, mother ship-type salmon and trout
fishery accounted for 22% of production and 19% of
total sales in all businesses.
Meanwhile, Nippon Suisan built the trawler Asama
Maru in May 1954 to begin operating in the Bering
Sea. She blazed a path to new fishing grounds by successfully producing 92 tons of frozen fish, two tonsof salted cod, and two tons of salted flounder. In
September of the same year, Nippon Suisan began
flounder operations in the eastern Bering Sea with afleet centered on the mother ship Miyajima Maru,
which had previously been engaged in salmon andtrout fishery. Although something of a secondary
operation behind salmon and trout, this ship joinedwith the Einin Maru—a vessel jointly operated by
Hokuyo Suisan and Taiyo Gyogyo that began operations at about the same time—to lift the curtain on
later north-sea mother-ship trawl fishery. Leading five
trawlers, the Miyajima Maru produced a total of 4,500
tons during this expedition.

Nippon Suisan subsequently lifted its mother shiptype trawl business in the eastern Bering Sea to fullscale status by dispatching the Miyajima Maru fleet
again in 1955 and then two fleets centered on the
Miyajima Maru and Kashima Maru in 1956.

Opening of the Nagasaki Branch andStrengthening of West-Water Trawling BusinessAround 1952, the year the MacArthur Line was abolished, Nippon Suisan was gradually approaching the
production capacity for west-water trawling businessthat it possessed prior to World War II.
In November of 1952, Nippon Suisan establisheda branch in Nagasaki to strengthen its west-water
trawling business. It attached west-water trawlingboats from the fisheries department of Kawanami
Kogyo, a company it purchased in 1951, as well as someof the west-water trawling boats of its Tobata Branch
to the new Nagasaki Branch. Otoharu Kajiyama, who
had moved Nippon Suisan to Kawanami Kogyo after
the war, was named the office’s general manager.
Kajiyama would later become a vice president of
Nippon Suisan.
At the same time, Nippon Suisan enhanced its
supporting functions in order to reinforce its framework for west-water trawling business. It purchased
the Naminohira yard of Izutsu Shipyard Co., Ltd.,and established Nagasaki Shipyard Co., Ltd., to repair
its operating vessels. It also set up Fuji Gyokan K.K.
as a division to manufacture and supply fish containers.
However, stronger fishery controls enforced bySouth Korea and China in the 1950s presented a serious problem for Nippon Suisan as it planned to expand
its west-water trawling business.
Between 1952, when the Rhee Line was established,
and 1959, Nippon Suisan vessels seized by South Korea
numbered four trawlers and six bottom trawlers. And
although, as a preventative measure, the company
ordered its vessels to operate at a distance of at least
60 nautical miles from coastal islands, seizures continued unabated.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth169

The west-water trawling boat Koyaki Maru purchased from
Kawanami Kogyo

Despite such constraints, Nippon Suisan continued
to construct west-water trawling boats. In 1953 it
launched the Tokiwa Maru, Onoe Maru, Suwa Maru,
Ise Maru, Nishiyama Maru, and Tateyama Maru, allwooden 57-ton west-water trawling boats. And in 1955
it launched the Shinyo Maru, Takuyo Maru, and Katori
Maru, each of the 112-ton class.
With the Japan–China fishery agreement of 1955,
Nippon Suisan enjoyed some measure of safety in its
west-water business. This, combined with improvements in business efficiency, led to stable production
and higher sales. The value of production, which stoodat 1.5 billion yen in 1953, grew to 2.15 billion yen in
1958, while sales grew from 1.72 billion yen to 1.99
billion yen. However, this rate of growth was small
compared to other businesses, and consequently theshare of west-water business among all businesses
shrank in terms of both production value and sales.
Nippon Suisan owned 23 of the total of 58 trawl
fishery boats in Japan at its base for trawling businessat Tobata Port. In all, it owned 11,343 tons of shipping
and landed catches of 11,330 tons, or more than halfof the national catch. However, restrictions on fishinggrounds imposed by Japan’s neighbors led to overfishing and resource exhaustion, and ultimately west-water
otter trawling business began to fall below west-water
trawling business in terms of operational efficiency
and profitability. This spurred Nippon Suisan todevelop new fishing grounds, build larger trawlers,and move into deep-seas trawling business.

The west-water trawling boat Unzen Maru No.23, built in 1952
following the Nagasaki Branch’s founding

Antarctic Whaling from the Sixth Expedition andLater
The sixth Antarctic whaling expedition in 1951 left
port with the Tonan Maru replacing the Hashidate
Maru as the mother ship. The fleet was largely
expanded from the customary 16 ships to 24 ships,
making it the largest operation of the postwar period.
The expedition was highly successful, catching 711
BWU (“blue whale unit” conversion) of baleen whalesand 362 sperm whales, which are toothed whales. It
produced 19,868 tons of whale oil and 9,277 tons ofwhale meat.
The seventh Antarctic whaling expedition of 1952
was stricken by an unforeseen disaster—the sinkingof the refrigerator ship Settsu Maru with 3,800 tonsof whale meat in its hold in March 1953. Fortunately
the entire crew was rescued; however, the loss cast adamper on Antarctic whaling business that, to thatpoint, had been progressing nicely. The accident meantthat Nippon Suisan could not supply whale meat towholesalers and led Rensaku Onishi, the company’s senior
managing director, to resign to take responsibility.
While the Settsu Maru’s sinking threatened to harm
Nippon Suisan’s standing in some industrial circles,
the company recovered by taking fast action. In
November of 1953, it launched the Miyajima Maru,a highly sophisticated refrigerator ship whose capabilities far eclipsed the lost Settsu Maru, and assigned herto the eighth Antarctic whaling expedition. The newship not only served as a refrigerator ship for Antarctic
whaling but also as a mother ship for the north-sea

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth170mother-ship salmon and trout fleets and flounder
fleet.
During this crisis, Nippon Suisan’s fifth president,
Kyuhei Suzuki, issued a manifesto stating the following: “It is said that a business is what people make of
it. Even it has superior ships and flawless equipment,
the business cannot improve efficiency if it does nothave the people to operate them. On an individuallevel, what these people can achieve is limited andinfinitesimal. However, they can show unlimited
strength if they all band together and manifest oneness” (Nissui Koho, volume 4, October 1953). He also
sent plaques bearing the phrase “shinwa kanto” (friendship and fighting spirit) written in his own hand to
all operating ships. “Shinwa kanto” subsequently
became Nippon Suisan’s motto and was displayed inall vessels, factories, and offices.
The eighth Antarctic whaling expedition caught
811 BWU, an achievement that surpassed the sixth’s
mark. Additionally, its catch of sperm whales reached322, a number that was roughly on par with the sixth
expedition. Thus, Nippon Suisan’s Antarctic whaling
business had achieved its target production for the
first time in the postwar era.
The ninth expedition broke the 1,000 BWU barrier
for the first time ever. However, the tenth expedition’scatch fell back below this mark the following year.
For the 11th Antarctic whaling expedition (1956
to 1957), Nippon Suisan dispatched two fleets byadding a fleet built around the 11,956-ton mother ship
Matsushima Maru. The Matsushima Maru was originally a tanker constructed under the fifth planned
shipbuilding phase of 1949. Although a tanker, she
was built with an eye to future conversion into awhaler. The planned shipbuilding program was implemented by the Japanese government in 1947 for the
purpose of alleviating vessel and capital shortages
among shipping companies. It set shipbuilding tonnages and monetary amounts, and then allocatedlow-interest loans for shipbuilding capital and hulls
to qualified shipowners. For a time after its construction, Nippon Suisan put the Matsushima Maru into

service as an oil tanker in the Persian Gulf, a movemade out of consideration for wariness of Japan among
other whaling nations, such as Norway and the United
Kingdom. In the wake of Taiyo Gyogyo’s dispatch of
two fleets for the ninth Antarctic whaling expeditionof 1954, Nippon Suisan modified the Matsushima
Maru in June 1956 and then attached her to the 11th
expedition after putting her through trials in north-sea
whaling in July. Now as a company operating two
fleets, Nippon Suisan posted excellent results that
helped put the disappointing tenth expedition behindit.
Nippon Suisan began augmenting its entire whaling
fleet in 1954. Until then, the company’s standard
whaler was in the range of 400 to 500 tons. Now, one
after another, it was building whalers in the 750-tonclass. The launch of the Konan Maru No.10 in 1954
opened the door to a steady procession of new whalers.
As a result, the fleet of six whalers that participatedin the first Antarctic whaling expedition ballooned
four times to 24 by the time of the 13th expedition(1958 to 1959).
As it augmented its fleet, Nippon Suisan’s production increased in step. A comparison of the first and13th Antarctic whaling expeditions shows that thebaleen whale catch grew from 392 to 1,622 BWU; thesperm whale catch rose from 4 to 748; whale oil production grew from 3,700 tons to 35,759 tons; whale
meat production increased from 10,608 tons to 31,837
tons; and liver oil went from zero to 42 tons. Thus,
major increases were achieved in all categories.

Matsushima Maru operating as a whaling mother ship (she waslater renamed the Tonan Maru II).

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth171

Resumption of North-Sea Whaling
In 1952, postwar north-sea whaling started when the
Fisheries Agency announced that it would allow one
fleet to operate. Whaling would focus on baleen
whales and sperm whales around the Aleutian Islands
north of 45° north latitude and the Bering Sea. Nippon
Suisan joined with Taiyo Gyogyo and Kyokuyo Hogei
to send out a fleet centered on Kyokuyo’s Baikal Maruas mother ship. Nippon Suisan was originally reluctant
to join in north-sea whaling due to falling whale oil
prices. However, it decided to go ahead with the threeway arrangement after considering future potential.
The first and second expeditions of 1952 and 1953
produced favorable results. This led Taiyo Gyogyo tosuccessfully apply to the Fisheries Agency for the
addition of its Kinjo Maru as a mother ship. Thus, thethird expedition of 1954 set sail with two fleets, one
centered on Taiyo Gyogyo’s Kinjo Maru and the otheron the Baikal Maru.
For the fifth expedition of 1956, Nippon Suisan
asked for and received permission to operate theMatsushima Maru as the mother ship of a fleet toconcentrate on sperm whales. From this time, Nitto
Hogei and Nippon Kinkai Hogei joined with Nippon
Suisan, Taiyo Gyogyo, and Hokuyo Hogei to form afive-way joint management framework to conduct
north-sea whaling. Nippon Suisan and Taiyo Gyogyo
provided mother ships on an alternating basis.

Part 5 Full-Scale Shipping Business
Postwar Shipping Business
Promoting the planned shipbuilding program as ameans of economic revitalization, the government
began efforts to reconstruct the ocean-going shipindustry in the fifth planned shipbuilding phase of1949. Theretofore, the government had establishedan entirely government-funded public ship corporation to promote demand for ships. With the public
ship corporation’s involvement, 93 vessels totaling
188,000 tons were constructed under planned shipbuilding phases 1 to 4. The corporation supplied justless than 60% of the required capital. It was disbanded
in 1950 when GHQ lifted regulations designed tosupport the controlled economy.
When the Korean War broke out in June 1950,
Japan’s just privatized shipping businesses were suddenly faced with a shortage of ships. And although
the special procurements and increasing imports andexports were helping revitalize the shipping industry,
the profits were being enjoyed by only a very small
percentage of shipping businesses.
The Korean War cease-fire talks of July 1951 marked
the beginning of the end of the shipping boom. The

Baltic Dry Index (an index of tramp steamer freightcharges calculated by the U.K.’s Chamber of Shipping)recorded 203.8 in May 1951, before the end of the
Korean War; however, it began to plunge from thespring of 1952 and fell to 79.2 in August 1952. The
slump in the shipping industry continued until 1954,
when marine transport became rejuvenated with thereemergence of European economies. It steadily
improved in subsequent years.
Another boom—the “Suez boom”—occurred in
1956. Following the Egyptian government’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956, Israeli, British,and French forces attacked Egypt. Egypt resisted bysinking ships in the canal to block passage through it.
Consequently, all freight that normally would havetransited the canal had to make the much longer journey around the Cape of Good Hope. This led to goods
stockpiling that in turn generated a shortage of ships.
Tanker fees skyrocketed and eventually fees for dry
cargo transport did as well. However, the boom subsided when the Suez Canal was reopened, and theshipping industry again fell into a slump as a result.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth172

Nippon Suisan’s Entry into the Shipping BusinessIn 1948, the Shipping Control Administrator, Japan(SCAJAP) issued a directive allowing Japanese tankers
to carry Persian Gulf oil for the first time since theend of the war. Nippon Suisan responded by sending
the Hashidate Maru to the Middle East in August of
the same year.
Looking to expand its shipping business, Nippon
Suisan applied for the fifth planned shipbuilding phasein 1949. It then employed the program to build thetanker Matsushima Maru, which was completed at
Hitachi Zosen’s Sakurajima shipyard in May 1951.
After concluding a contract with the oil company
Caltex, Nippon Suisan began operating the Matsushima
Maru the following June. This marked the first timethat Nippon Suisan had operated a full-time tanker
in the postwar era.
With the Matsushima Maru operating successfully,
Nippon Suisan looked to strengthen its shipping business. In 1951, it converted the refrigerator/saltedstorage ship Tadotsu Maru into a full-time tanker. It
also sent the whaling mother ships Tonan Maru andTonan Maru II, the tanker Gyokuei Maru, and otherships to the Middle East, Indonesia, and the U.S.
during non-Antarctic whaling months.
The following year, 1952, Nippon Suisan enteredinto a two-year chartered ship contract with Caltex
for use of the Matsushima Maru and Tadotsu Maru.
In 1956, Nippon Suisan converted the Matsushima
Maru into a whaling mother ship. The following year,
it renamed her Tonan Maru II, and built the tanker
Matsushima Maru II to replace her in November. It
then concluded a three-year chartered ship contract

Hashidate Maru

for use of the Matsushima Maru II with the Caltex
Group.
Beginning in 1952, the company made effective useof non-tankers in its shipping business. Examples
include leasing the mother ship Tokei Maru, which
had been used in mother ship-type crab fishery, to ashipping line and using the Yoko Maru to transport
iron ore and cement.
Moreover, after abandoning its effort to develop
crab resources off the coast of the Olyutor Peninsula
after one expedition, Nippon Suisan leased the Shokyu
Maru—which it had purchased for the endeavor—toa shipping company during the 1956 offseason andall of 1957. It later sold her at the end of 1957.
Other examples include the company’s use of the
Eiko Maru (built in 1953 as a refrigerated carrier) andMeiko Maru (built in 1956) as offshore loading ships.
Both ships were used as cool carriers during theoffseason.
In fiscal 1954, Nippon Suisan’s shipping businessaccounted for 12% of the company’s total sales. It
therefore played an important role in Nippon Suisan’s
rebuilding as a company.

Part 6 Development of the Processed Foods Business
Growth of the Fish Canning Business
Postwar Japan’s fish canning business got off to a rocky
start. Many onshore canning factories were damaged
during the war. There were shortages of canning

products due to bans against fishing activity. And
there were shortages of cans due to inadequate suppliesof tin. The result was insufficient production capability. Production of canned fisheries products totaled
40,000 cases in 1945, 220,000 cases in 1946, andDevelopment and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth173

120,000 cases in 1947. These figures fell far short of
the 8.89 million cases produced before the war in
1937.
Canning of blueback fish, such as sardines, mackerel, and saury, resumed together with fishing activity
shortly after the war’s end. However, their export was
initially prohibited. When export restrictions werelifted in 1947, canning of tuna and bonito as well asof mandarin oranges was promoted as a means ofearning foreign currency. Production remained
unsteady for a period of time. However, by around1949 yields returned to their prewar levels and it
became easier to procure cans. These developments
led to expanding production for export.
Tuna canning for export was particularly robust
given growing demand in the United States. In fact,tuna canning was so strong that it was known as the“axis of exports”. In terms of both production andexport volume, tuna ranked with salmon and trout asa leading canned fishery product.
Overall production of canned products grewsteadily. Between 1948 and 1958, production increased
by roughly 40 times from 11,885 tons to 449,841 tons.
The share for export saw particularly strong growth,
as the value of exports surpassed the $100 million
mark in 1956. Export volume also grew from 2,059
tons in 1947 to 190,659 tons in 1958. On the other
hand, because canned products tended to be marked
for export in order to earn foreign currency, the canned
products market in Japan was slow to develop.
However, entering the 1950s, the canned goods industry stepped up their efforts to expand domestic
demand, and as a result markets for whale meat, fruit,and livestock products grew. By 1957, 60% of all canned
goods produced were consumed domestically.
Meanwhile, international regulations on Japanesefishery were becoming stronger with each passing year.
Consequently, marine products companies werepressed to diversify their operations in order to maintain profits. One area demanding particular attention
was onshore processing.
It should be noted that the Japan Canners Association,an organization that inherited the operations of the
Dai-Nippon Canners Federation in 1927, ceased its
activities during the war years. However, in 1948 theCanners and Bottlers Association was formed when
the Japan Canning Research Laboratory and Canners
and Bottlers Promotion Organization merged. On
May 27, 1952, the association renamed itself, once
again taking its original name of Japan Canners
Association.
Expansion of Nippon Suisan’s Canning BusinessIn 1950, Nippon Suisan dissolved its affiliate Yamato
Suisan. and took over production of canned whale atits own Odawara cannery. And in 1953, it leased acannery in Ishinomaki City and began production
there. This cannery canned not only whale but also
locally caught saury, bonito, and mackerel.
With the resumption of north-sea fishery in 1952,
Nippon Suisan restarted its mother ship-based canning of salmon and trout as well as Bristol Bay crab.
The north-sea mother ship-type crab fishery was managed jointly through a three-way arrangement comprised of Nippon Suisan, Taiyo Gyogyo, and Nichiro
Gyogyo. In 1955, the Japan Crab Canning and Sales
Company and Japan Crab Canning and Export
Fisheries Cooperative were formed to coordinate sales
and exports. However, each of the participating companies utilized their own brands. For Nippon Suisan,
this allowed it to retain the hinomaru (rising sun) logo
it had used since before the war and which later became
the foundation of its brand in the food products business. The same year, Nippon Suisan doubled thenumber of its salmon and trout fleets from seven to
14. However, its efforts to develop overseas markets
did not proceed as hoped, and thus it turned its attention to developing the domestic market as a new sourceof demand.
Also in this same year, Nippon Suisan formed the
Nissui Hinomaru Association to popularize andexpand sales of canned products bearing the hinomaru
logo.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth174

Theretofore, Nippon Suisan had engaged in sales
only to the wholesale shops of three companies inTokyo (Hokuyo Shokai K.K., Itsumi Sunyo-do
Co.,Ltd., and Kokubun Shoten K.K.), one company
in Osaka (Nodaki Shoji K.K.), and one company in
Nagoya (Yamada Trading Company). However, withthe formation of the Nissui Hinomaru Association,
Nippon Suisan was expanding its sales routes. Seeking
to raise willingness to sell Nippon Suisan products by
establishing close relationships with wholesalers, thecompany built a framework of seven chapters in the
Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Koshin-etsu, Chubu,
Kinki, and Seibu regions. Members were secondary
wholesalers having links to primary wholesalers. It
should be noted that the Nissui Hinomaru Association’s
range of products handled expanded to reach acrossthe entire spectrum of processed foods, and that it
eventually transformed into the Nissui Valued
Customers’ Association. It was a major contributor
to the success of Nippon Suisan’s food products
business.
Moreover, from 1956, Nippon Suisan stepped up
its advertising and public relations activities in orderto promote penetration of the hinomaru logo among
consumers.
At the same time, it also expanded its canning operations. In March 1956 it closed the leased Ishinomaki
cannery and opened a more sophisticated facility in
Onagawa to replace it. It also acquired a cannery from
Asahi Can & Co., Ltd. in Shimizu City and started
full-scale canning there in June 1956. At this time, it
shut down its Odawara cannery and moved themachinery and equipment there to the new Shimizu
cannery. Nippon Suisan now had three canneries—inHakodate, Shimizu, and Onagawa—that primarily
canned whale but also salmon and trout, bonito, tuna,saury, mandarin oranges, and other products. The
company’s production volume rose steadily in linewith its increased capacity, which grew from 200 casesa day in 1949 to 4,000 a day in 1958.

Advertisement for the canned product “Nissui no Kosen Kani”(Nissui’s factory ship crab)

The Shimizu Plant

Beginning of Nippon Suisan’s Fish Sausage
Business
Nippon Suisan’s fish sausage business had its true
beginnings at the company’s Tobata Plant. Productdevelopment was led by Isamu Yoshimura (later asenior managing director), who was assigned to the
Tobata Plant in January 1946. Yoshimura deemed thatthe chikuwa fish-paste cake that the plant was producing at the time had poor profitability. He also felt thatthe company needed new products that were capableof meeting future changes in dietary habits. He later
recalled, “At the time, we were making chikuwa. But
this product just wasn’t succeeding for the company
in terms of cost and other aspects. I thought that
because Japan had lost the war, the Japanese diet would
inevitably become Americanized. I had this vague ideathat we must create a product with an English-sounding

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth175name” (Nissui Koho, volume 150, June 1966).
In 1947, Yoshimura tried manufacturing a sausagethat combined white croaker with beef and pork.
However, this product suffered from poor shelf lifeat room temperature. Yoshimura solved this problem
by packing the filling into “Ryphan”, a tubular casing
with superior moisture-prevention and contraction
qualities that was developed by Ryphan Industry Co.,
Ltd. He then switched the main ingredient from whitecroaker to tuna. This was because the tuna price wasdepressed at the time and only about half that of whitecroaker. With the product now made primarily fromtuna, it was marketed as “Tuna sausage”.
Initial efforts to sell tuna sausages did not fare wellin either the fish or meat market because they contained both fish meat and livestock meat. To boost
sales, Yoshimura worked to promote using straightforward methods, such as holding tastings and othersuch events. Eventually, the sausages gained popularity
when served in school lunches and hospital meals,
and by 1951 the company was producing between

20,000 and 30,000 sausages a day. In February 1952,use of preservatives (nitrofurazone) in fish-paste products was approved, which made it possible to store
sausages for long periods of time at room temperature.
This spurred the company to begin full-scale production and sales of tuna sausages in October of 1952.
Later, beginning in April 1954, Nippon Suisan
began producing and marketing “Isana sausage” madewith whale meat and pork. That autumn it began
developing “pressed ham” made from whale. This
product began appearing on shelves in 1955.
With sales growing steadily, the company expandedtuna sausage production by adding its Hokkaido Plant
to the Tobata Plant in March 1955. It further built a
new tuna sausage facility at its Onagawa Plant in Julyof the same year, and then expanded this facility inNovember 1956 and July 1957. The company also built
a tuna sausage plant in Tsukishima, Tokyo, in August
1956, and later expanded its production capacity
through expansion and improvements in July 1958.
In this way, Nippon Suisan established its

Packing and shipping “Tuna Sausage” (1952)

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth176

production system as it simultaneously developed andenhanced its sales organization. Although it started
its sales using sales routes for dry products centeredon Kyushu, it later came to sell at fish and dry products
retailers through licensed consignee located throughout Japan. It also rapidly expanded its sales routes bymarketing fish sausages through the Nissui Hinomaru
Association established in 1955.
Three other companies also began producing andmarketing fish sausages. They were Seinan Kaihatsu
Co., Ltd., of Ehime Prefecture, which started full-scale
production in 1952; Taiyo Gyogyo, which entered themarket around 1953 to 1955; and Nichiro Gyogyo,
which entered in 1955. The market began expanding
as competition intensified.
Around this time, Nippon Suisan began stepping
up its advertising and sales promotion. Discussing thestate of the company’s sales promotion effort in its
product distribution, an anonymous article submitted
to the company newsletter Nissui Koho (March 1955)
said, “Of course, we must not forget that consumers
are the public at large. [Given this], would it not bebest to engage in advertising that is directly linked tothe mass consumer market? [Part omitted] The company should etch the hinomaru logo into the mindsof consumers”. In response, the Sales Department’s
Processing Division stated the following in the next
month’s volume: “Advertising must be matched withproduct sales. If a product is not available in retailshops, it matters little how much advertising moneyis spent or how consumers are targeted; indeed, theresult of advertising under such conditions could evenbe a loss of consumer confidence. [Part omitted] Only
recently have we finally reached full-scale production,and now we are focusing our attention on advertising
accordingly. We are steadily expanding our activities
based on yearly sales activity. [Part omitted] To repeat,
we are prepared to reinforce consumers’ recognitionof the hinomaru logo over the course of the next twoor three years”. Advertising and sales promotion activities gained momentum the following year (1956), as
Nippon Suisan worked to permeate its brand—thehinomaru logo—by sending out advertising soundtrucks, participating in product exhibitions, strengthening the Hinomaru Association, organizing movie
tours, setting up billboards, and sponsoring radio
broadcasts.
For approximately two years beginning in 1957,
Nippon Suisan sponsored a radio program called
Akado Suzunosuke. A nationwide program broadcast
from Radio Tokyo, Akado Suzunosuke was a public
sensation. It was so popular that it became a televised
program of the Tokyo Broadcasting System in its firstyear. Victor Company of Japan, Limited, and Nippon
Columbia Co., Ltd., competed to provide its theme
song, and there were even offers to turn it into a
motion picture immediately after it began airing.
Nippon Suisan reorganized itself in order to promote advertising that is effective and company-wide.
Until then, the company did not have an office charged
with supervising advertising activities, as the General
Affairs Department was in charge of company P.R.
and the Sales Department was in charge of advertising.
The reorganization established an Advertising
Division within the General Affairs Department inApril 1957. This new division was placed in charge ofconsumer-oriented advertising based on the philosophy that company P.R. and producer advertising are
two sides of the same coin.
The company also set up an organization to support
sales activity. In September 1957, it established Osaka
Nissui Shoji K.K. to expand sales routes in the Osaka
area. And the following November, it launched Nissui
Service K.K. in Tokyo. Rather than working in sales,
Nissui Service’s activities centered on delivery to retailshops under the Nissui Hinomaru Association’sumbrella in Tokyo and the rest of the Kanto area aswell as sales promotion.
Nippon Suisan’s sales of fish sausages grew steadily
as a result of its efforts to establish production andsales frameworks. Sales of fish sausages (includinghams) grew significantly from 467.81 million yen in
1954 to 2.187 billion yen in 1958.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth177

Early Steps into the Frozen Food Products
Business by Marine Products Companies
Japan’s postwar frozen foods production resumed in1946 with frozen foods made from fishery and agricultural products at Nippon Suisan’s Tobata Seafood
Processing Plant (formerly Tobata Reizo) and “Reika”,
a Popsicle-like product made by Nippon Reizo.
Subsequently, production took such forms as frozen
vegetables to feed Antarctic whaling crews and frozen
foods (edible frog, boiled and shelled shrimp, frozen
strawberries, frozen mandarin organs, swordfish steak,tuna steak, and rainbow trout) for export by Nippon
Suisan and Nippon Reizo.
Entering the 1950s, repairs to factories damaged
during the war were largely complete and various
controls were lifted. This led some companies to begin
full-scale resumption of their frozen food products
businesses. Nippon Reizo was particularly conspicuous in this regard. Nippon Reizo began comprehensive
research toward production of food product prototypes in 1950, beginning with trial production of
mandarin oranges, frozen strawberries, and other fruit.
In 1951 it began producing frozen mandarin oranges
at its Yaizu plant; some of these oranges were exported
to the United States. Its frozen strawberries were soldas an ingredient for frozen fruit juices at department

stores. Beginning in 1954, it increased its productdevelopment to include precooked frozen foods, suchas chawanmushi egg custard and tempura sets, andexpanded sales to all regions. That same year the
School Lunch Act was enacted, and Nippon Reizo’s
fish fillets, croquettes, and fish sticks were used inschool lunches. Also around this time, researchadvances and facilities improvements helped raise
quality. Nippon Reizo took advantage to introduce
the latest technologies and equipment in order tofurther enhance the quality of its frozen foodproducts.
Around the mid-1950s, marine products companies
were entering the frozen foods category one after
another, developing their production and sales systems
as they did so. With an eye to selling canned and frozen
foods at department stores, Nippon Reizo launched
Yukiwa Shokuhin K.K. (currently Ryoshoku Limited)in January 1954. And in May of the same year, it begansales of commercial-use frozen foods for mass meal
services, such as those in schools, hospitals, and factories, by established Maruichi Shokuhin, Ltd.
Subsequently marine products companies continued striving to create sales avenues. For example, topromote sales of frozen foods, they purchased large
numbers of refrigerated showcases for distribution
and leasing to retail shops throughout Japan.

Part 7 Management Status of Nippon Suisan
Reconstruction of the Business Structure
At the end of fiscal 1945, Nippon Suisan’s capital
structure was 40% owned capital and 60% borrowed
capital. This forced the company to rely on loans tocover capital requirements for reconstruction. Nippon
Suisan’s capital stock was 700 million yen in 1949;
however, it increased its stock to 1.4 billion yen in1953 and then doubled it by another 1.4 billion yen
to 2.8 billion yen in 1955. As for dividends, it resumed
dividend payments at 12% in 1951 and 15% until thesecond half of 1957.

From around 1950, Nippon Suisan rebuilt its business structure through active capital investment andcorporate acquisitions. Following its acquisition of
Kawanami Kogyo fisheries department, which was
involved in west-water trawling, it purchased all of
the stock of Kyowa Yushi Kogyo in November 1953.
It established this new acquisition as its arm for sperm
whale oil processing, a business that was seeing yearon-year production increases.
Then, in June 1955, it acquired the stock of Hokoku
Suisan when that company doubled its capital. Hokoku
Suisan was established in August 1945 and took its

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth178first steps in west-water trawling and mother ship-typetuna fishery the following year. In 1950 it began fullscale mother ship-type tuna fishery. Having acquired
Hokoku Suisan, Nippon Suisan expanded Hokoku’sbusiness and had it begin north-sea mother ship-typesalmon/trout fishery and mother ship-type flounder
fishery.
Moreover, it established Fuji Gyocan, as its fishcontainer division in 1952; Hokko Gyogyo K.K. tomanage deep-seas and coastal trawl fishery, crab fishery, and squid fishing in August 1954; Nippo Sangyo
K.K. as its materials division in October 1955; andSanwa Kogyo K.K. as its canning machinery repair
arm in December 1956.
It also established Osaka Nissui Shoji in Osaka in
September 1957 and Nissui Service in Tokyo in
November to promote more efficient sales of processed
foods.
Looking to reinforce its capabilities in refrigerationand freezing, Nippon Suisan established Tsurumi
Reizo K.K. in February 1951; Hakodate Teion Soko,
in April 1953; and Tokyo Teion Reizo K.K. in May
1953. It charged each of these companies with refrigerated warehousing businesses.

Chapter 2: Strong Strides Forward during Japan’s Periodof Rapid Economic Growth
1955–1964
Part 1 Japan’s Period of Rapid Economic Growth and Changing
Dietary Habits
For Japan’s economy, 1955 proved to be the best yearof the postwar era. Exports were booming on the backof strong economies in Europe and the U.S. as well as
intensifying international competition. As a result,Japan’s trade balance saw significant improvement.
Japan had also greatly surpassed its prewar levels interms of both per-capita real national income andmining and manufacturing production. Moreover, its
production capacity was twice what it had been in
1935. Private-sector capital investment was growing,as was consumer spending symbolized by purchasesof the “three status symbols” (televisions, refrigerators,
and washing machines). The Japanese economy had
thus entered the economic boom (called the Jinmu
Keiki) of the mid-1950s, a period that would last 31
months.
However, the Suez crisis of 1956 put a brake on
Japan’s economic growth. Excessive capital investment
fell as a result of the government’s financial belt-tightening. Production and prices nosedived after peaking

in June 1957, as the economy fell into what was called
the Nabezoko Fukyo, or “bottom-of-the-pot recession”.
The effects of the recession were relatively minor,
however, and in the end Japan’s international balanceof payments improved thanks to the government’s
austerity measures.
After the recession bottomed out, Japan once again
enjoyed an economic boom (called the Iwato Keiki)that would last until December 1961. Active privatesector capital investment was the engine that drove
this period of long-term growth. Coming to power inJuly 1960, the government of Hayato Ikeda put forth
an “income-doubling plan” that called for maintaining
average economic growth of 7.2% and doubling thereal national income over the course of ten years (fiscal
1961 to 1970). This plan generated additional capital
investment and led to growth that far exceeded thatenvisioned by the plan.
From the end of 1962, a new period of economic
growth—called the Olympic Keiki—began. Here,Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth179

Japan’s economy became buoyed by expanding public
investment for infrastructure as the nation preparedto host the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. This boom lasted
until October 1964, when the economy fell into theShowa 40-nen Fukyo (1965 recession). Despite thegovernment’s introducing a series of monetary easing
steps, recovery from this recession was slow. Conse­
quences included a high rate of corporate bankruptcies, stagnating stock prices, and higher consumer
prices. The bankruptcies even reached major corporations and highlighted the recession’s severity. The
government responded by actively implementing measures to increase demand, including the issuance ofgovernment construction bonds.
The recession finally bottomed out in October
1965, after which the economy was back on the path
to recovery. What followed was a long 57-month-longeconomic boom called the Izanagi Keiki. And in 1968
Japan’ GNP surpassed West Germany’s to become theworld’s second largest economy.
Changing Dietary Habits
The period of rapid economic growth brought withit mass production and mass consumption. It was also
a time of radical change in the traditional dietary
habits and values of the Japanese people.
As the labor population concentrated into urban
areas, the “nuclear family” of two generations (parents
and their children) living together came into being.
And as their economic means grew, people became
capable of purchasing their own homes and possessing
various appliances and devices that enriched theirlives. During the 1950s, the “three status symbols” were
black & white televisions, electric washing machines,
and electric refrigerators. However, during the long
period of rapid economic growth, “three new status
symbols”—called the “3 Cs” (color television, cooler[air conditioner], and car [automobile])—emerged.
Small residences characterized by housing blocks
and tiny houses were built one after another. And as
a result, the place where people eat—in other words,

the place that forms the nucleus of daily living—
moved from its traditional setting in the kitchen to a“dining room-and-kitchen” space.
Meanwhile, economic growth made the postwar
food shortages a thing of the past, and from around1955 people enjoyed significant improvements in theirdiet. The percentage of rice, the main staple in Japan,
in people’s calorie intake fell. Conversely, that of wheatrose gradually throughout the length of the period of
rapid economic growth. At the same time, the percentages of meats, dairy products, and fats and oils alsorose. Fish, which was at the center of the Japanese dietsince before the war, maintained high percentages inboth calorie intake and consumer spending.
Consumers now had a broader range of options
when it came to food ingredients. They could easily
obtain not only fisheries products but also meat, andthey could purchase agricultural products from overseas. Moreover, selection and volume were no longer
their only concerns, as they were now also paying
attention to freshness, quality, and safety.
Moreover, the main ingredients comprising daily
meals were no longer just the “three fresh product”
categories of fish, fruits and vegetables, and meat. Thiswas because new processed foods were appearing in
the market and gaining more and more consumer
attention. In addition to conventional preserved foodstuffs and seasonings (such as instant coffee, instantnoodles, and vacuum-packed foods), consumers were
now showing fondness for various processed foods
that offered new tastes, convenience, and simplicity.
As more ingredients became available, cooking
classes and dietary information in magazines and othersources became increasingly detailed. At the sametime, new ingredients led to a greater variety of menus.
Now, in addition to the traditional menu of rice, miso
soup, and several side dishes, Japanese consumers could
also choose Western foods and menus featuring bread,dairy products and salads.
Such sophistication in food consumption wasunderpinned by the development of Japan’s foodproducts industry, expansion of food imports, andDevelopment and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth180growth of the distribution industry that delivers theseproducts to consumers.

Part 2 Rising International Concern about Fisheries Resources
The Rise of New Fishery Powers
In the 1960s, a succession of former colonies gained
their independence. And membership in the United
Nations, which stood at 55 countries when the organization was founded in 1947, reached 123 in 1970s.
In 1962, resource claims were established within a
U.N. resolution titled “Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources”; such claims would later become
known as “resource nationalism”. At the same time,
the so-called “North-South problem” emerged within
the trend toward colonial independence, and developing countries formed a coalition called the “Group of77” to present a united stance.
Meanwhile, a vast competition to develop technologies was underway, symbolized by U.S.–U.S.S.R. spacedevelopment. And countries were beginning todevelop continental shelf oil fields to meet growing
energy demand generated by economic growth.
The world’s fisheries also saw dramatic development. The total world catch, which stood at 27.48
million tons in 1955, ballooned to 34.70 million tons
in 1960, 48.58 million tons in 1965, and 63.85 million
tons in 1970. The main methods used were net fisheryand bottom trawl fishery. In 1962, Peru’s catch reached7.16 million tons, surpassing Japan’s 6.89 million tons
and ranking it number one in the world. In bottom
trawl fishery (including trawling), the major players
were the Soviet Union, Western and Eastern Europe,
and Japan in the North and South Atlantic Oceans,
and the Soviet Union and Japan in the North Atlantic
Ocean.
This growth in fishery activity led to the expansionof territorial waters and establishment of exclusive
fishing zones, particularly among developed fishingnations. In January 1966, New Zealand began enforcing its exclusive fishing zone. In January 1967, Argentina

established that its territorial waters extended 200
nautical miles from its shores, and Mexico declaredan exclusive fishing zone of three nautical miles beyond
its territorial waters of nine nautical miles. The next
month (February), Brazil enacted a new fisheries law
with a provision setting 200-nautical-mile territorial
waters after three years. And in March, Mauritania
declared an exclusive fishing zone around Cape
Blanco.
Apart from these developments, the Soviet Union,a nation possessing many fishing waters, began
strengthening its regulatory measures on a yearly basis.
This trend emerged following establishment of theJapan–Soviet Fisheries Commission, which was basedon the Japan–U.S.S.R. Fisheries Convention following
the U.S.S.R.’s declaration of the Bulganin Line in 1956.
In 1959, it implemented fishery restrictions in the Seaof Okhotsk, and in 1962 it established “Zone B” andreduced yearly quotas. Mother ship fishery was particularly affected by these actions in the beginning.
Then, on May 20, 1964, the United States enacted
the so-called “Bartlett Act” (a law prohibiting fishingby persons other than U.S. citizens and residents
within the U.S.’ territorial waters or specified sea areas).
A characteristic of this law was its setting of penalties
for violations.
In Search of a New Maritime Order
The Second United Nations Conference on the Lawof the Sea (UNCLOS II), held in 1960, advanced
discussions focused on the problems of territorial
waters and exclusive fishing zones, which had beenleft unresolved following the first conference of 1958.
Here, the leading proposal, put forth the United States
and Canada, advocated that territorial waters should
extend out six nautical miles and then exclusive fishing

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth181

zones should extend out for another six nautical miles.
After being passed unanimously by committee members, the proposal was sent to the General Assembly.
However, it was rejected after failing to receive thetwo-thirds approval required for passage. Nonetheless,the proposal spurred nations to harden their stances
concerning resources protection in territorial waters.
More and more countries began independently establishing fishing zones and expanding their territorial
waters to 12 nautical miles as domestic measures.
Subsequent to UNCLOS II, many countries unilaterally set their territorial waters or fishing zones at
12 nautical miles. Conflicting interests between coastal
fishing nations and deep-seas fishing nations sharpened, and discontent began to build in coastal anddeveloping countries. Meanwhile, the number of countries claiming territorial waters/exclusive fishing zonesof 12 nautical miles and even territorial waters of 200
nautical miles grew.
In December 1967, Arvid Pardo, ambassador to the
U.N. from the tiny Mediterranean country of Malta,
made an historic speech at the United Nations.
Ambassador Pardo told the U.N. that even deep seabedmineral resources, assets shared by all of mankind,
were presently in danger of seabed segmentation. He
pointed out the need to establish an international
body to begin studying peaceful use of these resourcesin ways that consider the interests of impoverishedcountries. Based on the ambassador’s proposal, theU.N. General Assembly resolved in 1970 to hold a
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea during 1973.
The U.N. then established the Committee on thePeaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor
beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (CPUSOF)
as a preparatory body for the conference. Once formed,
the committee set about preparing a list of problems
with the Law of the Sea. Two years in the making, thisvast list covered the full range of issues concerning thesea. During the list’s preparation, a new concept called
the Exclusive Economic Zone, or EEZ, started to gain
traction. Located outside of territorial waters, an EEZ

would be a sea area that, in return for allowing freenavigation, would give economic sovereignty to thecoastal country. Such sovereignty would include theright to explore and develop fishery and mineral
resources. Within a short period of time, countries
came to see EEZs as extending 200 nautical miles fromthe coast, and this became the dominant international
viewpoint.
In the sense that resources belonging to all mankind
would be used equally, Pardo’s proposal was strongly
rooted in fair-minded globalism. However, discussions
within CPUSOF moved in the opposite direction,
toward sea segmentation based on 200-nautical-mile
EEZs that tacitly recognized 12-nautical-mile territorial waters, and thereby reflected the self-serving
resource nationalism of developing countries
Liberalized Importation of Fishery Products
In 1959, the International Monetary Fund’s Board ofGovernors and the General Agreement on Tariffs andTrade (GATT) Conference passed resolutions lifting
import restrictions imposed on Japan and other countries. In response, the next year (1960) the Japanese
government approved its “Outline of the Trade andExchange Liberalization Plan” to promote the liberalization of trade. As a result, imports of all fisheryproduct items were liberalized in October 1961, withthe exceptions of major coastal fishery products (sardine, horse mackerel, mackerel, Pacific herring, yellowtail, cod, squid, scallop, nori seaweed, and kombu
seaweed), salmon and trout eggs, whale meat, agaragar, fish oil, fishmeal, pearls, and other such items.
Subsequently, Japan’s imports of fishery products
grew each year. In 1959, prior to the lifting of import
restrictions, imports amounted to approximately $7.71
million. This figure rose to roughly $59.40 million in
1963 and to approximately $191.57 million in 1967.
While the share of imports against exports stood atjust 3.3% in 1959, it grew to 20.9% in 1963 and 58.7%
in 1967, thereby resulting in an import surplus. Whileliberalization certainly contributed significantly to

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth

182

the rapid increase in imports, declining domestic production and increasing demand for fisheries products
also played a role.
The marine products companies saw liberalized
fishery product imports as a threat. However, Japan,
which was then enjoying astounding economic growth,
was being asked to behave with a more international
viewpoint. This included giving consideration to developing countries, for example. On the other hand,accelerated liberalization would be unavoidable in theeffort to stabilize consumer prices. Thus, it was apparent that import liberalization would continue whether
the marine products companies liked it or not.
Consequently, these companies that had previously
supported Japan’s deep-seas fishery now took advantage of liberalization to promote joint ventures for the
purpose of developing and importing fishery resourcesalong foreign coasts. The ventures formed during thistime sought to engage in highly efficient operations
in excellent fishing grounds near Africa. A little later,
joint imports of shrimp began to flourish.
The Status of Japan’s Fishing Industry

This growth was largely attributable to high-seas fishery and offshore fishery. At the same time, the shareof coastal fishery in the total catch fell rapidly.
Looking at the catch in term of fish type, the relative
shares of sardines and Pacific herrings were reduced
from the postwar reconstruction period into theperiod of rapid economic growth, while those of horsemackerel, mackerel, tuna, and cod were raised.
Changes in consumption and dietary habits in theJapanese public during times of economic growth,
structural changes in the fishing industry, and, above
all, the direction of fisheries negotiations were all felt
keenly in the management of major marine products
companies. Moreover, a succession of developmentsthat included the drawing of the Bulganin Line, stricter
regulation of north-sea fishery by the Japan–Soviet
Fisheries Commission, and tougher international
regulation of whaling cast a dark shadow on the futureof fishery operations. Major marine products companies attempted to fight back by reinforcing theironshore operations. This strategy was referred to as
suisan-kaisha no joriku sakusen (an amphibious landingby marine products companies).

Japan’s total catch continued to show healthy growth.

Part 3 Nippon Suisan’s Five-Year Reformation Plan
1. Proposal and Capital Procurement
The establishment of the Bulganin Line in 1956
rocked the fishing industry. This combined with theNabezoko Fukyo recession further reinforced theindustry’s negative outlook.
Haruo Nakai, a senior managing director at Nippon
Suisan, adopted a strategy of reinventing the company
by making bold investments during this difficult
period. Taking the form of a Five-Year Reformation
Plan, the strategy’s plan’s main thrust was to inject
massive investments designed to bring management
stability by cultivating the company’s fishery, foodprocessing, and shipping businesses into three main
operations. Specifically, it promoted development of
new fishing grounds to break through stagnation innorth-sea fishery, reinforced the onshore business withfocus on construction of new processing plants andseafood processing plants and development of thesales network, and expanded the shipping business.
The plan started in 1959 with efforts to reinforce theonshore business. And until 1964, it invested hugeamounts of capital into maritime operations amid
encouraging signs in the economy and fishery

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth183environment.
Nakai explained the plan to stockholders as follows:“The plan is an attempt to take a new look at Nissuibased on a long-term program. It seeks to preserve thecompany against the current backdrop of rapidly deteriorating performance, and to respond to poor conditions in the fisheries business, which will likely groweven worse in the future. [Part omitted] Last fiscal
year, we made various endeavors on both the management and labor sides and asked for patience and effort
from our employees. And now, looking over the next
two years, we are asking you, our stockholders, toextend to us your patience and understanding as wetake extremely proactive measures. Specifically, we
will take the initiative in addressing future deteriorations in our fishery operations in both the north andsouth by cutting production costs (mainly interest,
amortization, etc.) through fundamental reformationof the company. And we will seek to achieve autonomous development and overall stability in the company through a rapid shift to full-scale food productmanufacturing and processing by keeping capital of
up to 1.5 billion yen that would ordinarily leave thecompany through taxation, dividends, etc., over the
next two years” (Nissui Koho, volume 66, June
1959).
This was not the first time that Nippon Suisan
dared to take proactive measures during difficult times.
When its trawling operations suffered during the early
Taisho era (1912–1926), the company responded bybuilding a large number of new trawlers. Moreover,during the Great Depression, it built a comprehensive

fishing and processing base in Tobata and shifted its
operations there. Thus, Nippon Suisan had experience
approving and executing large-scale management strategies during times of business stagnation. Prepared tobe fired if his efforts failed, Nakai knew that he hadno option but to resolutely execute the reformation
plan.
Ultimately, the company invested 33.4 billion yen
over five years. Wherever possible, it used its own
funds to provide the capital, and it employed a variety
of means to make this happen. With the understanding of its banks and major stockholders, it cut dividends from 15% to 12% and executed a fractional freeissue of 3% for two years beginning with the secondhalf accounts settlement of 1958. It also executedmeasures that integrated a portion of its reevaluation
reserve into capital, and increased its internal reservesby 1.5 billion yen over the course of two years.
Management personnel cut their own executive
bonuses by 20% and executive remuneration by 10%
while also reducing entertainment expenses. The company further amortized 4.5 million yen in two years.
The company also actively increased its capital. In
January 1962 it raised its capital stock to 10 billion
yen with a paid-in capital increase of approximately
6.3 billion yen. Because the company posted a real
deficit due to the economic recession and its capital
investment, it lowered dividends to 10% from the firsthalf of 1962 (with the exception of a 15% payment tocommemorate Nippon Suisan’s 50th anniversary infiscal 1961).

Capital investment (based on completion) (1959 to 1963)
Offshore(year)

Onshore

1959
60
61

Haruo Nakai when senior
managing director

Major investment
1959 : Construction of Harumi Seafood Processing
Plant
60 : Modification of Gyokuei Maru into a meal
factory ship, construction of Amagi Maru
61 : Construction of Matsushima Maru II ;construction of Hachioji Plant, etc.

62

62 : Construction of Andesu Maru

63

63 : Construction of Kiso Maru and Kurama
Maru

0

3

6

9

12

15

(100 million yen)

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth184

2. Execution of the Five-Year Reformation Plan
Start of Efforts to Reinforce Onshore BusinessNippon Suisan set out to invest in and reinforce its
onshore business for two years beginning fiscal
1959.
It took this approach for two reasons:1) There was a need to cultivate onshore business as
a new main operation given the poor outlook forthe fishing business at the time that the plan wasformulated. Theretofore, the fishing business had
been the company’s chief focus; however, tightened
fishery regulations in coastal nations cast doubt on
the future of this business. The Nabezoko Fukyo
recession that started in 1957 also had a hand inpoor fishery performance.
2) Products produced by onshore business were gaining greater importance in line with changing dietary
habits and consumption trends.
In the first fiscal year of the Five-Year Reformation
Plan, half of the 1.653 billion yen in onshore investment went to construction of the Harumi Plant.
Touted as the best multifunction plant in the Orient,
the Harumi Plant began frozen processing of fisheryproducts after its completion in May 1960. The nextyear, a frozen foods plant was added to the premises,
allowing the facility to begin full-scale production offrozen foods. It became the Harumi Coldstore in
1966.
In fiscal 1960, the plan’s second year, the company
reinforced its processed food manufacturing functions, developed its sales organization, and cultivatedand strengthened affiliates. At the same time, it developed bases for purchasing, producing, and storingprocessing ingredients, a strategy outlined by the following statement: “By possessing refrigerated warehouses and processing plants in the fishery production
bases of Kyushu, Hokkaido, and Sanriku, let us turndisadvantage into advantage to take Nissui forward
by securing processing ingredients through purchasesof non-Nissui offshore products in order to cover

lower production by our own fishery operations”(Nissui Koho Tokubetsu-go, May 1959).
In the third year, fiscal 1961, the company invested
more than 1.6 billion yen to start construction of theHachioji Plant. Work was completed in 1962. In 1965,
the facility became the Hachioji General Plant.
The company steadily developed it systems withan eye to strengthening its sales of processed foods. It
divided the entirety of Japan into seven districts:
Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Chukyo, Keihanshin,
Chushikoku, and Kyushu. The existing Osaka andTobata Branches and Fukuoka resident office as well
as sales bases established until 1962 were placed withinthese districts. Namely, these sales bases where the
Sapporo Branch (1961), Sendai Branch (1960), Tokyo
Branch (1962), Nagoya Branch (1962), and Hiroshima
Office (1961).
At the same time, it expanded Nissui Service, aprovider of sales support functions, to all parts of thecountry. In addition to the Nissui Service K.K. in
Tokyo, which had already been in existence since 1957,
it established Hiroshima Nissui Service K.K. (1959),
Sendai Nissui Service K.K. (1960), Sapporo Nissui
Service K.K. (1961), and Nagoya Nissui Service K.K.
(1962). It also later established Osaka Nissui Service
K.K. (1966).
Nippon Suisan also formed the “Nissui Ham andSausage Hinomaru Association” to expand its sales
networks.
Plants in each region were then linked to these sales
networks. In addition to the existing plants in Tobata,
Hakodate, Onagawa, Tsukishima, and Shimizu,
Nippon Suisan added the Tobata Daini Coldstore in
1959, Harumi Plant and Itami Plant in 1960, and Anjo
Plant and Hachoji Plant in 1962 (the Tsukishima Plant
was closed in 1960). It also set up the “Hinomaru
Packers’ Association” to organize plants involved incanning operations.
In the ways described above, the company successfully reinforced its production and sales networks forDevelopment and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth185processed foods. Between the end of fiscal 1958 (prior
to the plan’s implementation) and fiscal 1963, sales ofprocessed seafood products (such as fish sausages andhams) grew from a monthly output of 4.74 million to28.94 million products, and those of canned products
were raised from a monthly output of 77,000 boxes
to 224,000 boxes.
From 1961, the plan’s third year, the company began
entering into new fields as it also reinforced its existingprocessed foods business. That year it began producing
mayonnaise and ramen, and in 1962 it started producing cheese. The amount of money it invested into
building new plants for these operations reached 4.1
billion yen.
Also, as north-sea fishery expanded, it enhanced
its seafood processing plants to freeze and process
growing catches as well as refrigerated warehouses tostore them.
It added Sapporo Hinomaru Reizo K.K. and the
Sapporo Coldstore in 1959; the Harumi Coldstore,

Sendai Hinomaru Reizo K.K., Hachinohe Coldstore,
Sendai Coldstore and Nagoya Coldstore in 1960; andthe Aomori Coldstore and Fukuoka Coldstore in
1963. The Onagawa Coldstore (1957) and Tobata
Daini Coldstore and Kushiro Coldstore (1958) werebuilt prior to the Five-Year Reformation Plan’s
implementation.
Construction of Two Major Plants
Around this time, the three companies of Nippon
Suisan, Taiyo Gyogyo, and Nichiro Gyogyo weredeveloping a joint plan to build a new wharf in therelatively undeveloped Harumi district of Tokyo.
However, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government
required that they build a 10,000-ton pier as part ofthe project. Meeting this requirement proved toughfor the companies as they struggled under the weightof the Nabezoko Fukyo recession, and as a result Taiyo
Gyogyo and Nichiro Gyogyo pulled out. However,Harumi Coldstore (bird’s-eye view)

View of a warehouse’s interior

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth186for the remaining company, Nippon Suisan, making
Harumi a base for operations was an essential component of its effort to successfully promote onshorebusiness and expand maritime operations based on its
Five-Year Reformation Plan. It therefore decided tobuild the pier on its own.
Located on a plot measuring 17,357.15 m2, theHarumi Plant was constructed as a three-story reinforced concrete building with a total area of 15,069.9
m2. It was equipped with 35 refrigerators that maintained internal temperatures of between −26 and−30°C and had a combined capacity of 12,100 tons.
Freezing facilities were comprised of four ammonia
direct expansion-type contact freezers, one air-blast
freezing room, and two semi-air-blast freezing rooms.
They had a single-time freezing capacity of 20 tons.
The freezers maintained a freezing temperature of−35°C or lower and had the capability to quickly
freeze various product types and shapes. The plant
could be operated safely and efficiently with automated and remote control, which included centralized
monitoring of temperature management and theoperational status of automated equipment among
other items. Moreover, the plant possessed a 10,000ton pier and railroad siding. Known at the time as thepremier facility of the Orient, the Harumi Plant wasvital as a supply and storage base for the vast consumption area consisting of the Tokyo metropolitan area
and Keihin region.
The total construction expenditure of 1.4 billion
yen, which included 200 million yen to build the pier,was the largest short-term expense ever before borneby Nippon Suisan. Moreover, the plant was expected
to be in the red by about 60 million yen for the firstfiscal year after completion even if the plant ran at full
capacity, and to face tough business circumstances forthe first four years after construction. The company
attempted to cover anticipated plant deficits by lowering transport costs, loading and unloading costs, delivery costs, packaging costs, and production costs for
products and purchased commodities.
As one Nippon Suisan executive put it, the Harumi

Plant “forms the core of a nationwide refrigerated
warehouse network in the seafood products businessof Nippon Suisan—now a general foods company—that links production and sales” (Vice President Haruo
Nakai in Nissui Koho, volume 77, May 1950). Speaking
at the completion of the Harumi Plant, Vice President
Nakai also said, “It is our mission to use this effective
weapon, the likes of which we will never see again, inthe highest possible manner to overcome our present
difficulties and win the battle for the future”. Indeed,the Harumi Plant was capital investment that symbolized the Five-Year Reformation Plan, a strategy forlong-term productivity expansion to ensure Nippon
Suisan’s future growth.
In June 1962, two years after the Harumi Plant’s
opening, the Hachioji Plant was completed at a costof 1.643 billion yen. This new facility was built as areplacement plant to eliminate insufficient production
capacity at the Tsukishima Plant, which supplied fishsausages and hams to the Tokyo metropolitan region.
It also served as a general plant capable of producing
the string of new products that were coming out then.
With an area of approximately 70,000 m2, it was thelargest food products plant in the Orient of its day.
Equipped with the latest facilities and built with attention to all necessary aspects—including access fromits inland location to ports, industrial water, environmental hygiene, plant exhaust, labor, and welfare—it
was the ultimate food processing plant of its time.
In terms of production capacity, it had a daily
output of 500,000 sausages and hams, 30 tons ofmayonnaise, three tons of cheese, and 200,000 servingsof ramen.
Construction of the Hachioji Plant represented thefinal element of onshore investment under the FiveYear Reformation Plan. And with it, Nippon Suisan
had seen the completion of its new fishery processing
and sales system.
The Hachioji Plant and Harumi Plant complement
each other to supply products to the Kanto andKoshin-etsu regions.
Haruo Nakai later recalled, “I was always thinking

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth187about our effort to promote onshore business andexpand marine business under the Five-Year
Reformation Plan. So I knew that if we built theHachioji Plant, fish as ingredients and fish for sale in
Kanto that was brought in by 10,000-ton refrigerator
ships would have to be landed in Tokyo or Yokohama.
That is why Nippon Suisan approved the building of
the special 10,000-ton pier” (Saburo Koshikawa,
47-nen no Koseki, 1979).
The Harumi Plant and Hachioji Plant were built
not only to simply enhance the company’s production
capacity, but also to achieve mutual linkage.

Switch to Investment to Strengthen Maritime
Operations
Nippon Suisan’s fishing business, which had been
performing well since its postwar resumption, wasstarting to fall on harder times. Stricter regulations bySouth Korea and China and worsening profitability
in west water business, stronger international controls
on north-sea salmon and trout operations and crab
operations, and lower allowable catch numbers in
Antarctic whaling made it necessary to develop new
fishing business.
Given this need, the Five-Year Reformation Plansought to expand the company’s trawling and shipping
businesses.
Nakai explained this strategy as follows: “Afterconsidering the development of new fishery operations—such as the conversion in maritime operations,in other words, mother ship-type bottom trawl fisheryin north-sea waters, large-scale trawling fishery off ofAfrican coasts, the new trend toward supertankers,
and other matters—as well as the particulars of associated fishery rights, actions by other companies in thesame industry, and forecasts of the future, what wecame to was a policy of doing everything in a single
stroke before construction costs went up” (Nissui Koho
Tokubetsu-go, June 1961).
In part, what rushed the decision to proceed withinvestment was the “income-doubling plan” announced

by the government of Hayato Ikeda. Nakai predictedthat the plan would require the development of infrastructure, and that such development would cause
basic prices to rise and invite cost inflation.
In its fishing operation, the company began by
employing larger trawlers and switching to deep-sea
trawling in the world’s fishing grounds. In 1960, theJapan’s largest stern trawler Amagi Maru was completed and then followed by a series of 2,500-ton
trawlers. Then, in 1964, even larger trawlers in the
3,500-ton class were brought into service.
Meanwhile, the company took a major step forward
in its shipping business. Previously, this business centered on using vessels as tankers, carriers, and cargoships during the fishing offseason. However, the shipping industry was prone to economic fluctuations,and there were concerns that the business would notrebound from the effects of the continuing Nabezoko
Fukyo recession. Consequently, the company decided
to switch to a business structure that could promise
stable shipping profits based on long-term contracts
for large tankers. It further decided to cultivate thisbusiness into a new main operation to support the com­pa­ny’s management. It built the tanker Matsushima
Maru II in September 1962, the ore carrier Andesu
Maru in November 1962, and the tanker Matsushima
Maru III in April 1964. These vessels operated underlong-term contracts extending over ten or more
years.
Investment under the Five-Year Reformation Planfor these maritime operations stopped at just 294
million yen in the first fiscal year of 1959. However,with full attention given to this area from the second
year, a total of 2.150 billion yen was invested for thedevelopment of new fishing grounds in 1960.
Subsequently the figures were 8.715 billion yen in thethird year, 4.755 billion in the fourth year, and 2.086
billion in the fifth.
From the end of fiscal 1958 until the end of fiscal
1964, Nippon Suisan’s gross tonnage grew greatly,
more than doubling from approximately 140,000 grosstons to more than 300,000 tons. This increase came

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth188

from the construction of larger vessels. During thisperiod, the company built 12 trawlers, 24 west-water

trawling boats, six refrigerated cargo carriers, one
tanker, and one ore carrier.

3. Results of the Plan
Sales by Business TypeAs Nippon Suisan greatly raised its production capacity through the Five-Year Reformation Plan, its sales
also grew greatly. Sales in fiscal 1958, which was prior
to the plan’s implementation, stood at 28.9 billion
yen. This contrasts with 1963, the final year of theplan, when sales grew by over 80% to reach 53.7 billionyen.
By category, fishery business grew by 1.9 times, from
13.3 billion yen to 25.0 billion yen, while processing
grew by 2.7 times, from 5.9 billion yen to 16.3 billionyen.
Growth in Nippon Suisan’s food products operations was driven by fish sausages and hams. Operations
that could not grow were whale meat/whale oil,salmon/trout, mother ship-type crab operations, andwest-water trawling fishery. Whale meat/whale oil
operations failed to grow because the company voluntarily restricted the number of whales it caught, amove in step with other whaling nations responding
to tougher international whaling regulations. Salmon/
trout operations did not grow due to stricter controls
on north-sea operations arising from the Japan–
U.S.S.R. Negotiations on Fishery. And both mothership-type crab operations and west-water trawling
fishery were strongly affected by various countries’
fishery regulations.
The operations holding up the company’s fisherycategory were mother ship-type bottom trawl fisheryand trawling. Southern trawling, which the company
began in 1959, posted sales of 5.262 billion yen, or
9.5% in terms of percentage of sales by category, infiscal 1964. This figure propelled it to second placein the fishery category, behind whale meat/whale oil.
Sales of northern trawling grew by roughly 7.1 times
to 1.581 billion yen, which pushed it up to 2.9% interms of percentage of sales by category.
Sales by the shipping business doubled from 1.496
billion yen to 3.0 billion yen. What allowed this stable
increase in profits amid uncertainty throughout theentire shipping industry were the new constructionof tankers under the Five-Year Reformation Plan andthe signing of long-term contracts for them.
Investments and loans to affiliates amounted to
6.041 billion yen. Group members grew during theplan’s implementation from 12 companies to 37.
Breaking down the 25 newly added companies, threewere in fisheries, three were in shipping and container
manufacturing, two were in cold storage, six were inprocessing, 10 were in sales, and one was an overseas
company. The plan met its objectives in the areas ofreinforcing and expanding the onshore processing
category, developing a nationwide refrigeration network, and establishing the sales network. And theplan significantly increased the number of affiliates
in refrigeration and processing businesses as well as insales.
Focusing on Securing Profits
Total investment under the Five-Year Reformation
Plan reached 33.4 billion yen. Breaking this figure
down, maritime operations accounted for 18 billion
yen, onshore operations accounted for 9.4 billion yen,
and investment and loans accounted for 6 billion
yen.
During this time, the company’s long-term debt
amounted to 6.3 billion yen and its bonds issued
reached 2.2 billion yen; these figures accounted for
25% of the investment amount. In general, the company followed a policy of covering investment with
its own capital and borrowed only as required; nonetheless, the company’s debt increased steadily. During

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth189this time, the company’s interest owed reached 2 billion yen in fiscal 1961 and 3 billion yen in fiscal
1962.
At the same time, the company’s capital stock,which stood at 3.5 billion yen in 1957, grew dramatically to 5.768 billion yen in 1959, 6.329 billion yen in
1960, and 10 billion yen in 1962. Dividends paid also
grew during this time.
Beginning in 1962, the fourth year of the Five-Year
Reformation Plan, the company’s focus shifted tosecuring profit.
The period of rapid economic growth was a time
when all companies—not just Nippon Suisan—engaged in capital investment to increase theirproduction. The result was overproduction. It wasalso a time when Japan’s economy suffered a worsening
international balance of payments arising from excessive investment. Financial belt-tightening in September
1961 as well as business-curbing measures (such as“international balance-of-payment improvement measures”) led to lower wholesale prices and fish prices.
Thus, the next management challenge facing thecompany was how to recover the massive investment
it had made under the Five-Year Reformation Plan.
On the other hand, it could not be denied that the
new business fields into which the company was now
venturing as a result of the plan laid the foundation
for growth in the coming generation.

Part 4 Tightening Fishery Regulations and Nippon Suisan
The Direction of Fishery Negotiations andNorth-Sea Fishery
In June 1963, ten years following the International
Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North­ern Pacific came into effect in 1953, it became time torevise the convention. However, negotiations toward
this revision had hit a snag. The problem was a clash
between the positions of Japan, which wanted to abolish the abstention principle applied to areas east of
175° west longitude, and the United States and Canada,
which felt it was better to maintain the principle inorder to preserve resources.
Japan proposed a new convention that would abolish the abstention principle, divide catches fairly
among the three countries, and implement appropriate
resource preservation measures that are scientifically
based. On the other hand, the U.S. and Canada
demanded that the abstention principle remain inplace and operational improvements be made under
the current convention. They also sought further
tightening of restrictions by emphasizing three items:
a new proposal for regulating catch periods, zones,
operation methods, etc., to address overfishing of
halibut; a proposal that, in effect, would prohibit

salmon fishing west of 175° west longitude, and a newinterpretation of the abstention principle. As a resultof these opposing viewpoints, no progress was madein dialogue, even at the 1964 Ottawa meeting held
the next year.
Initially, Japan’s stance was so unbending that iteven threatened to withdraw from the negotiations.
However, it later relaxed its position and continued
talking out of concern for the negative impact such a
move would have on its fishery exports and possible
retaliatory restrictions on Japanese crab fishery by the
U.S. under its “Prohibition of Foreign Fishing Vessels
in the Territorial Waters of the United States” law.
Nonetheless, the two sides failed to reach a new agreement. Negotiations toward revising the convention
were eventually called off, and talks on catches inregularly scheduled committee meetings continued
as per the previous practice.
Meanwhile, a new fishing zone was established in
the sixth round of Japan–U.S.S.R. Negotiations on
Fishery in 1962. The Soviet Union insisted on regulating the area south of 45° north latitude, while Japan
pushed for self-imposed regulation in this area. These
conflicting stances resulted in the establishment of a“Zone A” in the previous fishery area and a new “Zone

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth190

B” in a sea area where Japan would regulate itself.
Negotiations established yields of 55,000 tons in Zone
A and 60,000 tons in Zone B.
Beginning the following year, Japan–U.S.S.R. fishery negotiations regulated salmon and trout fisheryby setting single-year no-fishing areas, shortening
catch seasons, and taking other such actions. However,they did not drastically reduce overall yields, andtherefore catches remained in the 90,000 to 120,000ton range until 1971.
Amid stricter international fishery regulations,Japan’s mother ship-type salmon and trout fisherybegan to decline in the mid-1960s. This decline took
forms of smaller fleet numbers and smaller fleet sizes.
However, while catch sizes fell accordingly, the percentage of relatively higher priced sockeye salmoncaught rose.
The overall salmon and trout catch fell from 54,000
tons in 1960 to 40,000 tons in 1969. Its production
value also declined slightly from 20.3 billion yen to19.8 billion yen. Nonetheless, profits remained comparatively strong due to growing domestic consumption of fishery products and rising sales prices.

Tougher Regulations on Mother Ship-Type CrabFishery in Soviet Waters
Because the Soviet Union suggested implementing
strict regulations on mother ship-type crab fishery in
its waters at the second round of the Japan–Soviet
Fisheries Commission in 1958, the number of fleetsthat Japan sent out was set at four. At the same time,
fishery of king crab off the western coast of theKamchatka Peninsula, which previously had been left
to self-regulation, was placed under numerical restrictions. This led to a decline in the per-fleet quota offrom 88,000 cases (one case = 48 half-pound cans) in1957 to 70,000 cases in 1959. Consequently, king crab
can production from Japan’s mother ship-type crab
fishery, including that from Bristol Bay, fell from
400,000 cases in 1957 to 350,000 cases in 1959.
Entering the 1960s, Japan continued to operate

four mother ship fleets. However, its quota fell eachyear, falling to 224,000 cases in 1968. On the other
hand, the number of Soviet fleets grew from six in
1960 to eight in 1968, and its yield increased from
390,000 cases to 432,000 cases. In various ways—
including restrictions on fishing season; contractionof operating area; and controls on periods for submerging nets, reciprocal number of casting nets, andmeshes—regulations were being strengthened toJapan’s disadvantage.
In 1966, Nippon Suisan’s Tenryu Maru engaged intrial operations outside of the king crab fishing grounds
near the Kamchatka Peninsula’s western coast. She
caught golden king crab and processed it as frozen
product. This trial was followed by fleets comprisedof a 1,000-ton mother ship and six or seven catcher
boats beginning in 1968. However, eventually golden
king crab also became subject to a Japan–U.S.S.R.
Crab Agreement that dramatically reduced catches.
The Olyutor Peninsula in the western Bering Sea
was a main fishing ground for king crab, and until
1959 it was open to operation by one small-scale
mother ship fleet only. However, from 1960, a fleet
centered on a large-scale mother ship that also usedbottom trawl nets, Pacific herring gill nets, and otherequipment began catching blue king crab and processing it as frozen product. From 1963, a fleet that hadcompleted king crab fishing near the Kamchatka
Peninsula’s western coast began operating in the areaaround the Olyutor Peninsula and manufacturing
canned blue king crab. Because this area was not subject to the Japan–U.S.S.R. Fisheries Convention, production grew steadily. And around 1966–67, catchesof snow crab off the Olyutor Peninsula and Navarin
Canyon sea area started to show promise, thereby
attracting a growing number of single-ship operations.
However, catches and production of these items plummeted when they, too, became subject to the Japan–
U.S.S.R. Crab Agreement of 1969.
In the area to the east of Sakhalin, operations forsnow crab began in 1963, followed by trial operationsfor king crab and blue king crab in 1965. However,Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth191these catches also decreased sharply as a result of theJapan–U.S.S.R. Crab Agreement.
In the eastern Bering Sea, canning as part of mothership-type king crab fishery began in 1953. Initially,
Japan voluntarily restricted its mother ship operations
in order to avoid a conflict American king crab fishingboats. However, both the number of ships and production grew rapidly in the early 1960s, spurred by demandfor increased production and entry into the region bySoviet crab factory ships. However, the resulting fierce
competition among the king crab fleets of Japan, U.S.,
and U.S.S.R. brought to the fore fishing ground disputes and overexploitation of resources in the region.
In 1966, the U.S. restricted activities by Japanese andSoviet mother ships in the eastern Bering Sea by enacting the Prohibition of Foreign Fishing Vessels in the
Territorial Waters of the United States law based on
the Bartlett Law. And in 1965, the Japan–U.S. King
Crab Agreement came into force, causing catches in
the region to plunge thereafter.
A Shift Toward West-Water Trawling
In 1960, a “revision of permits for west-water twoboats trawling fishery and trawling” was implemented.
Then, in 1963, the Fisheries Agency, taking note of
the sluggish performance of fishery in seas near Japanand north-sea waters as well as the advance of foreign
trawling, moved to promote the development of deepseas fishing grounds and use of their resources by
accepting applications for new 12 new licensed vessels
on the condition that they abandoned west-water
fishery.
With this action, west-water otter trawlers—whose
numbers had been declining and which suffered fromlower catches and productivity since the 1950s—gaveup their west-water fishery permits in the 1960s andshifted to deep-seas trawling.
On the other hand, west-water trawling boats continued to be built at a rate of between 70 and 100 ayear, continuing a trend from the 1950s. From themid-1960s, operators were switching to larger vessels

and stern trawlers in order to streamline their operations. The growing size of vessels was further accelerated by increasing numbers of vessels that wereoperating in summer north-sea fishery as catcher boats
affiliated with north-sea mother ship-type bottom
trawl fishery. Consequently, many operators tookolder vessels out of service to supplement tonnages,
and thus the number of licensed west-water trawlingboats decreased.

Growth of North-Sea Mother Ship-Type
Trawl Fishery and Resumption ofFishmeal Factory-Ship Fishery
The Japan–U.S.S.R. Negotiations on Fishery of 1957
led to the steady decline in salmon/trout fishery andcrab fishery that had, until then, been the mainstaysof Japan’s north-sea fishery. On the other hand, theyalso brought the catching of groundfish living on ornear the ocean’s floor, such as flounder and Alaska
pollack, into the spotlight.
In the Bering Sea, bottom trawl fishery from flounder refrigerated factory ships began in 1954. The catchstarted with flounder but later grew to include halibut,
Alaska pollack, sablefish, Pacific Ocean perch, shrimp,
and Pacific herring. However, sales of these fish did
not take off immediately as they suffered from low
market recognition. Consequently, Nippon Suisan
and Taiyo Gyogyo both reduced their fleets by one in1958, leaving two fleets in operation: Nippon Suisan’s
Miyajima Maru fleet and Taiyo Gyogyo’s Chiyo Maru
fleet. Nonetheless, as fish types diversified, products
also become more varied. To expand public acceptance, Nippon Suisan began making prototypes for
dressed and fillet, dressed meat, salt-cured, and frozen
products, while Taiyo Gyogyo did the same for dressed
and fillet, fishmeal, and fish liver oil products.
It should be mentioned that regulations controllingmother ship-type bottom trawl fishery were revisedin 1958 to institutionalize mother-ship dragnet fisherypermits. At this time, flounder refrigerated factory
ship fishery was moved from its conventional

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth192

Hokuyo Suisan’s meal mother ship Hoyo Maru

Gyokuei Maru, a tanker that was modified into a meal mothershipclassification under the catch transshipment permit
system to the mother ship-type bottom trawl fisherypermit system.
Around 1958, sablefish, a fish caught around the
Aleutian Islands and the Gulf of Alaska, gained popularity among the American public and soon became
subject to fishery restrictions. And catches of Pacific
Ocean perch, a fish caught since around 1962, hit theirpeak in 1968 at 150,000 tons; however, subsequent
yields fell rapidly. Gradually, the target of catches
switched to Alaska pollack.
On the other hand, in 1958, Hokuyo Suisan revived
its fishmeal factory-ship fishery to catch groundfish
in the Bering Sea, which was known from prewar
operations to have plentiful stocks, for the first timein some 20 years.
After five fishmeal fleets were added in 1960, marine
products company engaged in mass production in
fierce competition with each other. Accordingly, theamount of fishmeal produced skyrocketed from justless than 20,000 tons in 1959 to 58,000 tons in 1962.
However, such mass production suppressed prices andcaused profitability to fall below the break-evenpoint.
The company most affected by this was Hokuyo
Suisan. The fact that its fishmeal fishery was not breaking even put pressure on its profitability and ended
up eating away at earnings from its strong western
Kamchatka Peninsula crab fishery. At the time of its
settlement of accounts at the end of 1962, Itochu
Corporation, a Hokuyo Suisan stockholder and its
major creditor, demanded that the company be rebuilt

under Nippon Suisan’s umbrella. This demand led toits being placed within the Nippon Suisan Group.
By 1963, fishmeal production by Japan—registered
vessels had fallen to 25,000 tons. Nonetheless, Nippon
Suisan’s Gyokuei Maru kept her production at theprevious year’s level, and as a result the company’s
fishmeal operation enjoyed profitability by benefittingfrom a price rise when supply fell.
North-sea groundfish fishery that had started in
1954—specifically, fishery by deep-sea trawlers converted to north-sea waters using mother ship-type
bottom trawl, longlines, single-ship trawling, andcoastal bottom trawl nets in the Sea of Okhotsk,
Bering Sea, Gulf of Alaska, and part of the North
Pacific Ocean—took off in a very short period of time.
In 1960, 12 fleets left port. This number consisted offour fishmeal factory-ship fleets, four refrigerated
factory ship fleets, and four longline fleets. The nextyear, 1961, an unprecedented north-sea fishery boom
occurred, as 33 fleets and 380 catcher boats caught
620,000 tons. Nichiro Gyogyo entered operations in
1961, sending its 1,500-ton stern trawler Akebono
Maru No.50 to Bristol Bay. Such excessive activity
produced furious competition and lower fish prices.
The turbulence of this time was followed by a periodof stability when operations were scaled back to 14
fleets and a catch of 410,000 tons in 1964.
Originally, fishmeal was sold by Nosan Corporation,
Mitsubishi Corporation, and others. However, as fish
prices fell, Nippon Suisan, Taiyo Gyogyo, and Hokuyo
Suisan started joint sales of white meal.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth193

The Start of Southern Trawling
From the 1950s, a time of decline in west-water trawling, into the 1960s, southern trawling developed
quickly as trawlers operating off the coasts of New
Zealand, Africa, North Atlantic Ocean, and otherregions grew larger.
Sparking this development was the discovery offishing grounds to the west of New Zealand by Taiyo
Gyogyo’s Taiyo Maru No.51 in 1959. Seeing great possibilities for these fishing grounds, Taiyo Gyogyo
followed up by sending out Taiyo Maru No.56, No.57,
and No.61. That same year, Nippon Suisan also senta trawler to the northwest coast of Australia and, in
1960, to an area off the coast of New Zealand. Nichiro
Gyogyo, which initially only participated in northern
trawling, sent its Akebono Maru No.53 to New Zealandfishing grounds and Akebono Maru No.50 to fishinggrounds west of Australia in May 1963.
Development of West African fishing grounds also

gained considerable momentum around this time.
With an eye to developing them, Nippon Suisan, Taiyo
Gyogyo, and Nanpo Gyogyo Kaihatsu conducted trial
operations there. After concluding that they wereindeed bountiful, all three companies sent out a succession of trawlers. Nippon Suisan dispatched its
trawler Uji Maru in July 1959, and in 1960 it beganbuilding and operating a series of 2,500-ton trawlers
as part of its Five-Year Reformation Plan. Taiyo Gyogyo
also built a 1,500-ton stern trawler and sent it toAfrican fishing grounds. And it similarly began building and operating large trawlers in excess of 2,000 tons
in 1963. Nichiro Gyogyo began participating in southern trawling in 1962 when it sent out its Akebono Maru
No.50.
African fishing grounds can be divided into thenorthwest coast of Africa, the offshore area of southern
Africa, and the offshore area of southwestern Africa.
Catch resources in the northwest coast of Africa
were mainly cherry bass, sea bream, common pandora,

The trawler Uji Maru

Portugal

Spain

Las Palmas
MoroccoAlgeria
Western Sahara

Italy
GreeceTunisia

Piraeus
Libya

Mauritania

Unloading at the port of Piraeus, Greece, a baseof operations for the northwest coast fishingground of Africa

African northwest coast
fishing ground

African northwest coast fishing ground

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth194

common cuttlefish, and octopus in the northeastern
fishing ground, and yellow sea bream and hake in thesouthern fishing ground. Demand for common cuttlefish and octopus, in particular, was high in Japan, andthus these fishing grounds were an important resource,
so much so that “the size of the catch [there] plays ahuge role in determining the success of offshore trawling in Africa” (Fumio Imanaga, “Enyo Tororu Gyogyono Shinkadai”, Suisan Hyoron Bessatsu: Yakushin-suru
Enyo Tororu Gyogyo [“new issues in deep-seas trawl
fishery”, fisheries critique supplement: deep-seas trawl
fishery in an era of remarkable growth]). However,yields peaked in 1963–64 and steadily declined thereafter. This was due to resource depletion resulting
from competition among not only Japanese vessels
but also those of companies in the Soviet Union, Spain,
Italy, the Netherlands, and other countries. It was also
attributable to coastal nations’ setting of exclusive
fishing zones. As for the fishing grounds in offshore
areas of southern and southwestern Africa, companies
set up bases in Cape Town and other locations to target
fishing grounds along the Agulhas Bank of the continental shelf near the southern coast of southern
Africa and the edge of the continental shelf near thewest coasts of southern and southwest Africa. Catchesfrom the southern Africa coastal fishing groundincluded yellow sea bream, hake, and horse mackerel.
The yellow sea bream catch in 1964 reached 20,000
tons, making it the largest catch of any single varietyof the Sparidae family ever made overseas. In Japan,
catches were used in catering to New Year’s celebrations, weddings, and other festive occasions.
In the beginning, Japanese trawlers caught yellow
sea bream along the Agulhas Bank off of Cape Town’s
coast, but they later began harvesting hake in 1963 asresources declined. However, Japanese vessels did not
make this switch enthusiastically, as hake had low
popularity in Japan, European import regulations
placed strict limitations on amounts that could besold there, and competition with European operators
was fierce.
Japanese marine products company also began

catching horse mackerel from around 1963. Catches
were used to make dried fish products.
Whaling Trends
As the IWC reduced total whaling quotas, Japan
shifted the focus of its harvest to sperm whales, whichwere outside the IWC’s regulations. This shift beganwith the 18th expedition of 1963. However, a worsening whale oil market caused by overproduction of
sperm oil spurred Japan reduce its sperm whale catches
between the 21st expedition of 1965 and the 24th
expedition in an effort to restore the market.
Around 1964, Antarctic whaling quotas fell below
10,000 BWU to 8,000, and Japanese whaling companies started purchasing the quotas of whaling motherships of countries that had discontinued whaling.
They also promoted whaling from foreign bases byusing leases and forming joint enterprises.
From 1963, Nippon Suisan started operating froma base on South Georgia, a territory of the United
Kingdom. It had been searching for opportunities toengage in whaling from South Georgia, which was
exempt from quotas, as a way of dealing with shrinking
quotas. It began negotiating with Salvesen, one of thecompanies operating on South Georgia, and conducted onsite studies that ultimately led to its signinga contract with Salvesen in June to use that firm’s
facilities for a subleasing fee of 50,000 pounds.
Similarly, Taiyo Gyogyo and Kyokuyo Hogei also
concluded contracts to use a base on South Georgia
using Kokusai Gyogyo K.K. as their representative.
There, they harvested baleen whale prior to leaving

The South Georgia baseDevelopment and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth

195

for Antarctic whaling.
However, IWC regulations were changed in 1966
so that whales harvested at South Georgia werecounted within Antarctic whaling quotas. This led
Nippon Suisan to abandon its whaling there. In theend, during the three years that it operated on South
Georgia, the company lost about one billion yen.
Advancement of Shipping BusinessIn 1957, prior to the Five-Year Reformation Plan,
Nippon Suisan operated four vessels in its shipping
business. These were the dedicated tanker Matsushima
Maru II and operated three vessels that served astankers during the fishing offseason; namely, theTonan Maru and Tonan Maru II, and Tadotsu
Maru.
During the plan’s implementation, the company
used investment allocated to reinforce its shipping
business to complete the Matsushima Maru II in
September 1962 and the ore carrier Andesu Maru in
November 1962.
At the time of its construction, the Matsushima
Maru II was Japan’s largest tanker. This fact attracted
considerable attention given that she was built by amarine products company rather than a shipping company. Built at a price of 2.1 billion yen, she carried
petroleum between the Persian Gulf and Japan undera 12-year long-term contract with Tokyo Tanker K.K.
The Andesu Maru was built for 2.3 billion yen, andplied the oceans between Chile and Peru and Japan
under a 15-year contract with Kawasaki SteelCorporation.

The ore carrier Andesu Maru (completed in 1962)

In 1964, Nippon Suisan built the Matsushima
Maru III, which also hauled petroleum between the
Persian Gulf and Japan under a long-term contract
with Tokyo Tanker. This same year, the shipping industry was beginning to enjoy strong economic times
following a successful reorganization. Nippon Suisan’s
shipping business was also showing stable and strong
performance on the back of its long-term contracts.
In 1961, Nippon Suisan launched Nissui Kaiun
K.K. to handle the maritime transport of catches andproducts as well as general shipping business for the
Nippon Suisan Group. At the time of its establishment, Nissui Kaiun worked to enhance its cool carrier
service by operating three ships: the refrigerated carriers Eiko Maru and Meiko Maru and the refrigerated
carrier Tsukishima Maru owned by Nippon Suisan
affiliate Tokyo Teion Reizo. The need for its cool
carrier service was growing with the expansion ofnorth-sea mother-ship fishery. Thus, beginning in
May of this year, Nissui Kaiun also put the new 1,700ton refrigerated carriers Nanko Maru, Hokko Maru,
Toko Maru, and Seiko Maru into service as they left
the shipyards. And in 1967, it built the Asakaze Maru
and Harukaze Maru to further expand its fleet ofocean-going vessels.
Beginning of Overseas BusinessJapan’s deep-sea fishery was being increasingly
squeezed by a number of international regulations,
including the Japan–U.S.S.R. Convention on High
Seas Fisheries in the Northwest Pacific Ocean, Japan–
U.S. King Crab Agree­ment, Japan–U.S. Fishery

The fast refrigerator carrier Asakaze Maru (completed in 1967)

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth196

Agreement, and Japan–U.S.S.R. Crab Agreement.
Consequently, marine products company began reconsidering their focus on fishing and examining ways ofbuilding onshore business and securing fisheryresources through non-fishing means.
The following three factors were behind the emergence of overseas businesses. First, there was growing
need to develop and supply new and different fisheryresources to meet growing domestic demand for fishery products. Second, imports of main fish types—
namely, sea bream, tuna, salmon and trout, shrimp,
and crab—had become possible through fisheryimport liberalization in 1961, and marine products
company were using this as an opportunity to promote
the development and import of fishery resources along
foreign coasts by applying their accumulated fishingtechnologies and information-gathering capabilities.
And third, developing countries in Southeast Asia,
Latin America, Africa, and other regions were actively
promoting tie-ups with Japanese enterprises in orderto develop their coastal fishery resources. Developing
countries hoped to absorb the know-how possessedby Japan’s marine products company, and Japaneseenterprises sought to meet domestic demand by developing the fishery resources of these regions.
In 1951, Taiyo Gyogyo set up a trade department
in its Tokyo head office. That same year, it beganproviding technical guidance on bottom trawl fisheryin India, and it began full-scale efforts to enter overseas
markets through joint ventures in 1953.
On the other hand, Nippon Suisan started its overseas business in the South China Sea using Hong Kongas a base. A shortage of vessels and capital forced thecompany to start off in a nearby country. In October
1954, Nippon Suisan entered into a technical tie-up
with Hong Kong’s Kai Cheung Shipping Company
and dispatched two groups of 100-ton bottom trawlboats. Then, in March 1955, it put forth the boats as
contributions in kind to establish the wholly owned
affiliate Tung On Fisheries Development Company
Limited. This company engaged in bottom trawl
fishery and trawling. That same month, Nippon
Suisan established Premier Development Company
as a joint venture with Taigho Construction Company
Limited to conduct bottom trawl fishery.
In 1959, Nippon Suisan purchased a stake in theArgentine company Aurora Astral Sociedad Anomina.
This allowed it to begin tuna operations in Argentina,
where tuna fishery had been neglected since the endof the Pacific War. At this time, Nippon Suisan
entrusted operation of its tuna boats to Hokoku
Suisan. When it dispatched the Eisei Maru, one of
Hokoku’s fleet, to Argentina and Uruguay, it foundthat the tuna fishing grounds there were plentiful.
However, unstable tuna migration combined with
continuing inflation-fueled instability in Argentina
led the company to pull out in 1967.
In June 1960, it began tuna operations in Las Palmasof the Spain-governed Canary Islands. It establisheda liaison office there in April 1962.
In 1964, Nippon Suisan set up a West Africa Officein Accra, Ghana, and concluded a service agreementwith the Ghanaian government. Ghana was actively
developing and promoting its fisheries and had built
two 1,500-ton trawlers in Japan. Nippon Suisan was
charged with operating these vessels. Under the agreement, Nippon Suisan sent 16 top crewmen to the twovessels (one of which was the Ghanaian vessel Banko)
to provide technical guidance. However, this arrangement was ended in 1973 due to psychological differences between the two sides, political instability in
Ghana, a weak economic foundation, and uncertainty
in the foreign exchange situation among othercauses.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth

197

Part 5 The Evolving Processed Food Industry and Nippon Suisan
Changing Dietary Habits and Innovations toFood Distribution
Many processed foods emerged during Japan’s periodof rapid economic growth, and the convenience of
these foods had a major impact on the Japanese public’s
values vis-à-vis food and culinary styles.
In August of 1958, Nissin Food Products beganmarketing “Chicken Ramen”, the world’s first instantramen noodles product. And in 1960, Morinaga &Co. began selling instant coffee, thereby sparking amajor boom when other companies soon followed
suit. Indeed, the 1960s were a time when a great variety
of processed foods became available and gained rapid
acceptance. Among them were so-called “instantfoods” that included instant curries and soups; condiments and seasonings such as mayonnaise, salad dressings, and soup stock base; furikake seasonings tosprinkle on rice; and snack foods.
Frozen foods represented one form of these processed foods. Previously, frozen foods had primarily
been sold for commercial use. However, now they
were becoming popular in the home as more households came to possess refrigerators.
The Japanese diet was becoming increasingly diversified, broadening from the traditional Japanese-style(rice-based) menu to also include bread, meats, andother Western foods.
Supermarkets played an important role in this diversification of dietary habits. Bringing in streamlined
management methods—such as creation of self service-oriented stores and chain store operation—they
revolutionized conventional retail and wholesalebased food distribution by employing mass procurement and mass sales of the rapidly growing range offoods and ingredients made possible by innovationsin processing technologies as well as household
goods.
It is said that Japan’s first supermarket was
Kinokuniya, a produce shop catering to foreigners

that was established by Tokuo Masui in Tokyo’s
Aoyama district in 1953. In 1956, a number of supermarkets opened throughout Japan, including Maruwa
Food Center, established by Hideo Yoshida in Kokura
on the island of Kyushu, and “housewifely store” Daiei,
established by Isao Nakauchi.
In the early 1960s, capital from various sourcesbegan flowing into supermarket management, and as
a result the number of stores to balloon from 283 in
1957 to 2,682 in 1962. This pace gained even further
momentum from the mid-1960s.
The Fish Sausage BusinessIn the mid-1950s, fish sausage production benefitted
from a major innovation that lifted productivity andcaused production to skyrocket in the early 1960s.
The original way of making fish sausage involved
packing the casing film with filling by hand and thensealing the ends by tying them with cotton string. Thismethod was replaced when a device was developedthat could automatically fill and tie off the casing using
polyvinylidene chloride film and aluminum wire. The
advancement in filling material and automated manufacturing processed raised production efficiency andthe quality of the finished product.
Fish sausage production grew strongly by 15% ormore year-on-year until 1963. However, that the rateof growth fell that year and then declined year-on-year
until 1967. The reason for this decline was the appearance of competing products.
As incomes rose with economic growth, the statusof livestock products among the broad range of food
options for consumers also rose. Hams and sausages
made from beef and pork gained attractiveness among
consumers as symbols of Western-style dining. Forfish sausages, this meant the arrival of formidable
competitors.
At the same time, major marine products companies
were reinforcing their production plants as part ofDevelopment and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth198business expansion plans during the growth period.
They then boosted their production in order to maintain operating rates at their new plants, which caused
an oversupply of fish sausages. The result was falling
sales prices that led to cutthroat competition.
Moreover, demand for tuna, the basic ingredientof fish sausage, was growing because it was now being
sold as frozen food and in cans. This rising demandmeant that tuna no longer fit with the cost price structure for fish sausage. Because of this, whale began to
be used from around 1963.
However, as sales of fish sausage declined, fish ham
started seeing stronger performance as the Japanesediet became more westernized.
Canning Operations
While can production grew steadily during the 1950s,
the rate of growth dropped off entering the 1960s. In
fact, some years saw year-on-year declines. The year
1962 had a particularly large falloff from the previous

year. During this time, the share of canned fisheryproducts of all canned products entered into a declining trend, while the share of canned fruit products
was rising.
One product that was well received by the public
despite this trend was “Nissui no Yakiniku”, which
Nippon Suisan developed in 1956. It was manufactured by boiling thinly sliced red whale meat, deepfrying the meat in tallow (beef fat), and then richly
seasoning it to produce a taste resembling yakiniku(grilled beef ). Between 1962 and 1964, Nippon Suisan
produced one million boxes a year (one box = 72 unit
products). At that time, only “Nissui no Yakiniku”
and “Hagoromo no Sea Chicken” stood as products
enjoying yearly sales in excess of one million boxes ona single company, single product basis. Thus, it truly
was a major hit. However, later production declined
when whaling restrictions cut into the supply of whale
meat.
Entering the latter half of the 1960s, slumping production of canned fishery products once again

Frozen food products circa 1960

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth199

rebounded. This was led by swelling consumption
during the Izanagi Keiki period of economic expansion
and new demand for canned products as a form ofprocessed food that delivers convenience and newtastes. The result was growing production from
726,000 tons in 1965 to 1,028,000 tons in 1970. And
as domestic demand gained strength, exports also
showed strong and stable performance throughout
the 1960s.

Full-Scale Entry into the Frozen Food Products
Business
Nippon Suisan actively promoted its frozen foodproducts business as part of its effort to strengthen
onshore business under the Five-Year Reformation
Plan.
In 1958, Nippon Suisan resumed its frozen foodproducts business by beginning full-scale productionof frozen agricultural and fishery products at its Tobata
Plant. That same year, it began producing “fish sticks”
for commercial use at Tokyo Teion Reizo’s Tsukishima
Plant. And in 1959 it began producing “Chawanmushi”
egg custard at its affiliate, Hakodate Teion Reizo.
“Chawanmushi” was Nippon Suisan’s first precooked
frozen food that targeted ordinary households, andit remained an enduring seller until the 1990s.
The brand-new Harumi Plant began manufacturingfrozen foods under the Nippon Suisan banner in 1960.
Among other products, it produced shrimp sticks,
salmon sticks, deep-fried Oriental shrimp, and deepfried oysters. The following year, 1961, a new frozen
foods facility was built at the Harumi Plant. This new
factory produced squid sticks, tatsuta-age fried whale,
deep-fried shrimp, and “hinomaru balls”. As productdevelopment continued, production of new items
such as spinach, edamame soybeans, soramame broadbeans, strawberries preserved in syrup, and otherfrozen foods began in 1962, followed by curry blocks

for commercial use and cream soup in 1963.
As products became increasingly diversified,
Nippon Suisan began dividing its sales activities into
those targeting ordinary households and those targeting commercial food preparers (or, in other words,
businesses preparing meals for “mass feedings”). Sales
activities targeting ordinary households began by first
securing sales spaces. Sales personnel worked to foster
consumers’ recognition of the Nippon Suisan brandby installing freezer showcases in department storesat company expense. In order to devise products andmanufacturing/sales policies that grasp the trends andfoci of consumer preferences, the company set up
frozen showcases at three stores in the Tokyo metropolitan area (Shinjuku Isetan Department Store,
Shibuya Tokyu Department Store, and a department
store in the Kawasaki Station building) to conduct
test marketing. This approach was later expanded to
the Kichijoji Takashimaya and Ikebukuro Seibu
Department Stores.
Nippon Suisan also implemented a plan to further
expand sales avenues by distributing 2,000 freezer
showcases to retail shops in Tokyo and Osaka.
However, the company faced a tough battle here, as
the showcases’ performance did not meet requirements, product handling at the distribution stage
tended to be rough, and raising consumers’ recognition of frozen foods proved more difficult than
expected. Consequently, it began looking for sales
avenues in the commercial-use food market, with focus
on school lunch programs.
The company set out to sell 350,000 meals a monthto school lunch programs. Using the sales network ofTamai Shoten Co., Ltd., a wholesaler of commercialuse products, it sold “stick” foods to 800 elementary
schools in Tokyo. Its sales of commercial-use frozen
foods for mass feedings and the restaurant industry
grew in 1963 and 1964 and made up for poor growthin sales to households.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth200

Chapter 3: New Developments in the Fishing Industry
1965–1970
Part 1 Development and Commercialization of Frozen Surimi
Onshore Development
From the late 1940s until the mid-1950s, the fish
landed in the greatest amounts in Hokkaido was
Alaska pollack. At that time, Alaska pollack was usefulfor its roe; however, its meat tended to spoil easily anddid not freeze well, and therefore was not often used.
Typically, only a portion of landed meat was used inlocally produced fish-paste and fishmeal products.
However, from the mid-1950s, Hokkaido’s abundant Alaska pollack resources began attracting considerable attention, which in turn sparked attempts
to find ways of utilizing them. Advancement of bottom
trawl fishery in Hokkaido increased the Alaska pollack
catch by some three to four times. It also led to thelanding of the majority of catches at specific fishingports and lengthening of the fishing season. As a result,it became necessary to process large quantities of fish
while taking measures to stabilize fish prices. The
Hokkaido Fisheries Experimental Station and Nippon
Suisan took advantage of this situation to developfrozen surimi (fish paste) made from Alaska
pollack.
The central figure in research on frozen surimi at
the experimental station was Kyosuke Nishiya, who
was head of its processing department. One day,Nishiya froze some leftover fish meat paste from anexperimental fish-sausage filling machine. When hethawed the paste several days later, he found that its
elasticity remained just as it was before freezing. Thisfinding contradicted the conventional wisdom thatfreezing filling as is would cause it to harden afterthawing, and suggested the possibility that surimi

could be kept in cold storage.
This discovery gave Nishiya an idea. He conducted
an experiment whereby he cut frozen surimi for fishsausage into cubes, joined the cubes with fresh fishmeat paste, packed them into casing, and then heatedthem. The consistency of the resulting sausage was
uniform, and there was no difference in quality withsausages made with uncooked meat.
Nishiya took the results of his experiment to
Nippon Suisan’s Hakodate Branch to discuss the possibility of using frozen Alaska pollack surimi as aningredient in fish sausages.
Meanwhile, Nippon Suisan was also exploring possibilities for cold storage of Alaska pollack. At thetime, its mother ship-type bottom trawl fishery mainly
produced catches of flounder; only a tiny amount of
Alaska pollack was caught as bycatch. However, Isamu
Yoshimura, general manager of the Hokkaido Branch,
had the idea of using Alaska pollack as an ingredientin fish-paste products, for which future shortages werepredicted. Yoshimura said, “If it is possible to store
Alaska pollack meat without freezing denaturation,[Part omitted] this will allow us to not only effectively
utilize vast north-sea resources of Alaska pollack thatare currently used only to make fishmeal, but also to
streamline our fishmeal business” (Nissui Koho, volume
750, March 1960).
Thus, Nippon Suisan began joint research with the
Hokkaido Fisheries Experimental Station in late1959.
In 1960, the research team invented a surimi that
suffered no loss of quality even when frozen. This wasachieved by cleansing minced Alaska pollack with

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth201

pure water and then adding saccharides and polymer
phosphate. The water-cleansing process enhanced
product strength after heating and texture when eating
by improving gel formation. And the addition of saccharides and polymer phosphate worked to prevent
freezing denaturation.

Development and Commercialization of
Offshore Surimi
In 1960, as it pursued joint research with the Hokkaido
Fisheries Experimental Station, Nippon Suisan alsobegan research on offshore manufacture of frozen
surimi aboard the fishmeal mother ship Gyokuei Maru.
Onboard the Gyokuei Maru was Osamu Tanaka, anengineer with the experimental station, who cooperated in the research.
The development of offshore surimi processing
faced problems that were unlike those of onshore
processing. The process of cleansing minced fish withpure water was an essential part of the manufactureof frozen surimi; however, obtaining sufficient quantities of pure water onboard ship proved difficult. In
addition, it became clear that there was a limit to thedegree that freezing denaturation could be prevented
when post-spawning Alaska pollack was used. As aresult, the quality of frozen Alaska pollack surimi
produced offshore came nowhere near that producedin onshore plants. Moreover, because Alaska pollack
was bycatch that accounted for only a small portionof the fishmeal fleet’s catch (including that of the
Gyokuei Maru), technical research for its use did not
go beyond the basic level.

The surimi factory ship Shikishima Maru

However, Nippon Suisan felt that there would be
no future for mother ship-type bottom trawl operations if they could not conduct offshore productionof frozen surimi efficiently and supply ingredients tothe large fish-sausage and fish-paste market.
In 1962, the Gyokuei Maru fleet’s voyage to theBering Sea suffered an abnormally poor catch of yellowfin sole that prevented it from producing the 600
to 800 tons per day needed to make fishmeal. Conse­
quent­ly, around the midpoint of the fishing season inlate May, the fleet moved to fishing grounds further
west based on a report by a survey ship. There, it
encountered an abundance of Alaska pollack thatexceeded expectations.
From the next year, 1963, the Gyokuei Maru fleet
switched from yellowfin sole to Alaska pollack. The
bountiful resources of Alaska pollack and uncertain
future of the fishmeal business reinforced the company’s recognition of the importance of offshore
surimi manufacture. Yoshimura and others suggested
that Nippon Suisan should attempt to mass produce
frozen Alaska pollack surimi, which it decided to do
during the 1964 fishing season.
Because it benefitted from the kind of fish freshness
that only offshore operations could achieve, the completed trial product attained quality that exceededthat of onshore frozen surimi. For Nippon Suisan,which, before the test, had hoped to reach a quality
level of around 80% of onshore frozen surimi, thisresult turned out to be a very happy miscalculation.
Nippon Suisan then installed fish meat processing
machines and dehydrator on the Gyokuei Maru. Thus,
now equipped to produce 60 tons a day, the Gyokuei
Maru set out for the 1965 fishing season. However,while offshore manufacture had produced solid results
during the test, the start of actual production sooncaused headaches, including an abnormally black colorand impurities in the products. Furthermore, the products’ elasticity worsened significantly about halfway
through the fishing season. In the end, a decision wasmade to catch flounder for the rest of the season while
conducting tests to raise the quality of frozen surimi.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth202

Processing Alaska pollack on a mother ship

The surimi freezing process

Nonetheless, the test was ultimately successful inresolving all concerns regarding the offshore production of frozen surimi. And at about the same time,
Taiyo Gyogyo was successfully producing salted surimi
onboard its factory ships.
Also around this time, the industry was under pressure to quickly begin using surimi as a replacement
for whale meat in fish sausages. Nippon Suisan
responded by beginning full-scale offshore productionof surimi. To add to the capacity Gyokuei Maru gaveit, it modified the Shikishima Maru, which had been
operating as a refrigerated factory ship near the
Olyutor Peninsula, by installing a surimi plant capableof producing 70 tons a day. She set sail as a surimi
factory ship in 1967. That year, Nippon Suisan’s offshore surimi production skyrocketed to 16,810 tons
from 1,013 tons 1966.
In 1968, the company further reinforced its facilities. It completed the Haruna Maru and Kongo Maru,
the first 4,000-ton refrigerated surimi trawlers fittedwith machinery to produce 30 tons of surimi per day
as well as the latest equipment capable of processing
150 tons of raw fish per day. It also extended the hullof the Shikishima Maru by 19 meters and raised thecapacity of her surimi plant to 90 tons per day. Thatsame year, Nippon Suisan roughly doubled its offshore
surimi production compared to the previous year to
32,169 tons.

The surimi production process

Appearance of the General Factory Ship
Mineshima Maru and Trawler Yamato Maru
In February of 1970, Nippon Suisan put the generalfactory ship Mineshima Maru into operation in northsea waters with an eye to further strengthening its
offshore frozen surimi production. The Mineshima
Maru was originally the Ominesan Maru, a tanker
owned by Mitsui O. S. K. Lines Ltd. Nippon Suisan
purchased and modified her into a general factory
ship to replace the Gyokuei Maru, which was built
before the end of the war in 1944. Interestingly, theOminesan Maru and Nippon Suisan had crossed paths
before. In 1965, Nippon Suisan’s crab factory ship
Tokei Maru, which had been serving as a cargo ship
during crab fishery’s offseason, caught fire for an
unknown reason and sank off the west coast of thePhilippines. The ship that arrived to rescue the Tokei
Maru’s crew was none other than the Ominesan Maru.
Bringing the latest equipment to the manufacturing

The general factory ship Mineshima Maru, modified in 1970

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth203

The 5,000-ton trawler Yamato Maru, built in 1970

process and improving both productivity and productquality, the Mineshima Maru outshined all other vessels in the production of frozen surimi.
In July of 1970, Nippon Suisan launched the 5,000ton trawler Yamato Maru. It sent this new 5,000-ton
trawler to northern trawling, primarily for the reason
that it could handle expanding “fishponds” (fish congregations). Because, by nature, Alaska pollack tend

to come to the surface during the nighttime, harvestingthem required concentrating work during the daytime
when the fish are on the seafloor. While a 4,000-ton
trawler could only hold about 80 tons of raw fish, theYamato Maru could hold 250 tons. Moreover, she hadstronger winches and components for more effective
operation during daylight hours. This equipment
allowed her to lift around 100 tons per haul, as compared to the conventional 40 tons. As a result, theYamato Maru had a fishing capacity that was 1.4 times
greater than the Haruna Maru’s. Moreover, she hadenhanced fishing capability, as she was equipped withthe most advanced loran course recorder, sonar, net
recorder, and fishfinder, all of which raised fishingefficiency. She also had an improved fillet machine
having superior operational capabilities compared toconventional machines.

Part 2 The Arrival of a New Generation
Development of New Fishing Grounds
Through Trawling
Based on its Five-Year Reformation Plan, Nippon
Suisan began developing a succession of new fishinggrounds through trawling. And it maintained its fishing operations by continuing this effort into the late1960s, even after the plan had concluded.
The northwestern coastal region of Africa—an area
where Nippon Suisan began operating in 1959—wasseeing competition-caused yearly declines in yield thatdrove the company to began developing other areasin the vicinity. In 1967, it finally discovered a fishingground for hake off Africa’s southwestern coast. And
it later developed a large hake fishing ground off thesouthern coast of the Republic of South Africa.
Nippon Suisan successfully maintained stable catches
by effectively utilizing the resources of these multiple
fishing grounds.
When it began harvesting hake in 1963, prices forthe fish in Japan were low due to its low recognition
compared to other whitefish in the Japanese market.

Consequently, catches were sold in Spain, Italy, andother countries where it was more commonly eaten.
The Kirishima Maru, a trawler that entered service
in 1964, was equipped the latest fillet machine andweight sorter. These devices allowed her to raise added
value and lower cost by standardizing products andconsuming less energy in production.
As it was developing fishing grounds off the northwestern coast of Africa, Nippon Suisan continued
trial operations in other parts of the world in the hopeof finding new fishing grounds and fishery resources.
This effort was based on its view that the good times
for trawling in African fishing grounds would one day
end.
In 1967, the trawler Kaimon Maru conducted surveys and trial operations off the coasts of Florida, New
York, and Nova Scotia of North America. Because
these activities produced favorable results, Nippon
Suisan began full-scale operations to harvest butterfish
and spear squid. The next year, 1970, it began conducting year-round operations to increase catches and fish
types, harvesting banded reef-cod and deep-sea smelt

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth204during the summer, Pacific herring in September, andspear squid and butterfish in the winter. In the caseof spear squid and butterfish, however, adequate surveys to ensure stable harvests could not be conducted,
as schools tended to move erratically in response tochanges in water temperature. Accordingly, catches
ultimately failed to meet expectations.
At the same time, Nippon Suisan began developing
fishing grounds around New Zealand from 1966.
The company had already known about favorable
fishing grounds for sea bream, horse mackerel, andtrevally off the North Island’s west coast, which werediscovered through trial operations by the trawler
Ikoma Maru in 1961. However, it decided to temporarily suspend operations there as it put priority on
the plentiful northwest African fishing grounds. Then,in 1966, the Ikoma Maru discovered a fishing groundfor Japanese Spanish mackerel off the coast of
Canterbury on the eastern side of the South Island.
Nippon Suisan responded by sending the Amagi Maru
in 1967 to primarily harvest horse mackerel andJapanese Spanish mackerel off the North Island’s west
coast and offshore of Canterbury on South Island’s
east coast. However, this operation did not lead tostable sales, partially because its profits were largely
affected by market price fluctuations brought by varying catch sizes in waters near Japan.

building large trawlers of 2,500 tons or more thatpromised even greater productivity. Completed 2,500ton vessels were the Teshio Maru, Tokachi Maru, Zao
Maru, Shirane Maru, and Suzuka Maru, and completed 3,500-ton vessels were the Aso Maru, KirishimaMaru, and Takachiho Maru.
The growing size of these large trawlers was madepossible by the use of stern trawling. Previously, trawlers used side trawling, in which trawls were towed
from lines thrown over one of the gunwales. However,this method did not permit the use of larger vessels
due to balance restrictions. As a result, the largest
vessels were in the 1,000-ton class, which included the
Asama Maru. The change from side trawling to stern
trawling improved stability during operation.
Increasing trawlers’ size brought a number of advantages. It gave them greater range, larger catch storage
capacity in expanded holds, room for better processing
equipment, and improved operability that allowed
operation during rough weather. It also provided larger

Construction of Large Trawlers andVessel Enhancement
Nippon Suisan began bringing in large-scale 2,500-ton
stern trawlers in 1960, using investment for offshore
operations provided under the Five-Year Reformation
Plan. What sparked this development was a visit toEurope by Fumio Imanaga, the first captain of theAmagi Maru (and later president), where he saw thedegree to which stern trawlers had advanced.
Thereafter, the company put 2,500-ton trawlers into
service in African fishing grounds one after another.
Beginning in 1964, it sought to overcome worsening
profitability from stricter fishing regulations by

Amagi Maru, 2,500-ton class (completed in 1960)

Kirishima Maru, 3,500-ton class (completed in 1964)

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth205onboard space for living areas that helped crews withstand long voyages.
Additionally, the use of electronics technology
made more efficient fishing possible. A succession ofelectronic devices were introduced, among themhighly precise fishfinders, “net sondes” that allowed
crewmen to ascertain conditions within towed trawls,
systems for integrated control of trawl casting andhauling from the bridge, and loran and radar to establish ship position. Large stern trawlers that were soequipped could process large catches at even greater
distances from port, which made them the mainstay
of a new era in fishery.
It should be noted that the Japan Overseas Fishing
Association was established on August 1, 1968, to
promote Japanese trawlers’ expansion into the world’s
fishing grounds.
Efforts to Streamline Whaling
When it became time for 21st expedition of 1966, theinternational whaling yield been lowered even further
from 4,500 BWU in the previous year to 3,500 BWU.
Consequently, settling of per-country quotas did notproceed smoothly, and there even calls for a return to
the Olympic System. Eventually, it was decided that
quotas would be set at 1,633 for Japan, 1,067 for theSoviet Union, and 800 for Norway. Beginning thisyear, Nippon Suisan reduced its fleets to one by eliminating one of the Tonan Maru fleets. This left Japan
with four fleets.
Against this backdrop, Norway announced in 1968
that it was suspending its whaling operations due toa downturn in the whale oil market. And in Japan,
Taiyo Gyogyo operated only one fleet beginning withthe 23rd expedition, thereby lowering the total numberof Japanese fleets to three.
The quota was again reduced at the time of the 26th
expedition in 1970, with Japan’s figure lowered to 1,346
BWU. The Fisheries Agency responded by dis­trib­ut­
ing domestic shares in line with the shrinking quota;
however, for the marine products company—whichwere already reaching the bounds of profitability—thequestion of how the year’s quota should be divvied up
produced an intense tumult. Ultimately, the Fisheries
Agency mediated an arrangement whereby 15.92
BWU of Taiyo Gyogyo’s basic quota of 541.92 BWU
would be given to Nippon Suisan and Kyokuyo Hogei.
Thus, Taiyo Gyogyo’s share became 526 BWU while
those of Nippon Suisan and Kyokuyo Hogei became
410 BWU.
As for north-sea whaling, members of a three partnership arrangement—namely, “Nippon Suisan andNitto Hogei”, “Taiyo Gyogyo and Nippon Kinkai
Hogei”, and “Kyokuyo Hogei and Hokuyo Hogei”—
were granted permission to operate one fleet each,with each fleet comprised of no more than seven vessels. This permission was based on consideration of arequest by Nippon Suisan, Taiyo Gyogyo, and Kyokuyo
Hogei, who desired to operate independent specialized
fleets beginning from the 11th expedition in 1962.
The result was the realization of three general fleets
capable of harvesting baleen whale and sperm whale.
However, when the IWC placed restrictions on sperm
whale harvests in 1970, production and sales suffered
dramatic declines, as the catch was limited to 10% ofwhat it was in 1968.
Now faced with intensifying whaling harvest
restrictions and lower profits, the whaling companies
sought to streamline their operations and raise productivity by reorganizing their fleets and improving
vessel performance.
Nippon Suisan began its effort here by making the
Tonan Maru II fleet its only Antarctic whaling fleet
from the 21st expedition in 1966. Then, after receiving
permission from the IWC to have the Tonan Maru
II handle both Antarctic and north-sea whaling in
1970, it added north-sea whaling to her duties in 1971and scrapped the Nichiei Maru (formerly the Nitto
Maru, purchased from Nitto Hogei and renamed in1964), which had been used in north-sea whaling until
then. Having the same mother ship engage in both
northern and southern whaling added momentum tothe company’s drive to achieve more efficient whaling

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth206

operations.
Meanwhile, Nippon Suisan sought to bring greater
efficiency to coastal whaling by closing whaling bases
in Senzaki (1965), Kushiro (1968), and Oshima andTomie (1970), while also using large 750-ton
whalers.
Nippon Suisan also strove to improve the productivity of its whaling operations. In order to produce
even more high-quality products from a single whale,
it set out to improve product yield and promoteresearch on fine-tuned processing methods in all
aspects of whaling. In addition, it implemented evenstricter measures to raise efficiency and lower cost in
fleet operation; tracking, capture, and hauling by whalers; and performance of accompanying refrigerator
ships.
For example, in 1970, the company modified the
90-mm whaling guns it had been using to make them
75-mm guns, which helped raise catch efficiency andwhale meat yield. In 1971, it refitted the Tonan Maru’s
main engine to improve her speed, reduce the numberof sailing days, and accelerate movement to fishinggrounds. And in 1972, it built the 900-ton whalers
Shonan Maru and Shonan Maru No.2, which consumed far less power compared to 750-ton whalers,
the mainstays of the whaling fleet.
In addition, it shifted the cooling devices used onrefrigerator ships from calcium chloride brine freezers
to ammonia direct expansion-type contact freezers,
thereby improving performance and quality. As a resultof such streamlining efforts, Nippon Suisan’s whaling
operations recorded a percentage of total sales of 5.7%
at the end of fiscal 1971. This and other achievements
helped whaling maintain its standing as a main company business.
Crab Fishery in Decline
As the U.S.S.R.’s restrictions against mother ship-type
crab fishery in its waters tightened, Nippon Suisan’s
Tenryu Maru and two catcher boats conducted trial
operations for golden king crab outside of the kingcrab fishing ground in 1966. The next year, 1967, thisoperation was picked up by a fleet comprised of themother ship Asama Maru and six catcher boats. And
from 1968, a fleet consisting of Hokoku Suisan’s Eihei
Maru and nine catcher boats began operating.
However, catches suddenly dropped off as golden kingcrab also became subject to the Japan–U.S.S.R. Crab
Agreement in 1966.
Meanwhile, around July of 1966, catches of snow
crab off the Olyutor Peninsula and Navarin Canyon
sea area started to show promise and attracted a growing number of single-ship operations. However,catches and production of snow crab plummeted whenit, too, became subject to the Japan–U.S.S.R. Crab
Agreement of 1969.
On February 16, 1968, the Soviet Union issued adecree on the continental shelf (“Decree of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on the Continental
Shelf ”). It stated that the Soviet Union, which was
regulating crab as a continental shelf resource, would
now handle crab covered in the Japan–U.S.S.R.
Fisheries Convention signed in 1956 as a separate
matter. Accordingly, crab fishery was separated fromthe Japan–Soviet Fisheries Commission and placed
within discussions toward conclusion of a new agreement by the two nations’ agricultural ministers.
When the Japan–U.S.S.R. Crab Agreement was
concluded in 1969, the scope of regulated crab types
and regions expanded through the execution of regulations based on the agreement. To the previously regulated area off the west coast of the Kamchatka Peninsula
were added six new restricted fisheries (golden kingcrab in the area off the west coast of the Kamchatka
Peninsula; snow crab in the western Bering Sea; kingcrab and blue king crab in the area east of Sakhalin;snow crab in the area east of Sakhalin; horsehair crabin the area around Kamen Opasnosti; and king crab,
horsehair crab, and Hanasaki crab near the four southern Kuril Islands).
Previously both Japan and the Soviet Union set
regulations. However, under the new agreement, theSoviet Union would first set regulations on Japanese

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth207

The mother ship Keiko Maru

Frozen snow crab from a factory ship

crab fishery and then later notify the Japan of its production plan. Moreover, while the Japan–U.S.S.R.
Fisheries Convention dictated that fishery resources
harvested on the high seas would be distributed
between Japan and the U.S.S.R., the Japan–U.S.S.R.
Crab Agreement established that Japan would be using
resources under Soviet sovereignty. Furthermore, itestablished that decisions on crab quotas would no longer
be made by the Japan–Soviet Fisheries Commission,
but rather through discussions by a newly establishedHauling in a crab trap

Japan–U.S.S.R. intergovernmental conference on crab
fishery.
In 1969, Nippon Suisan was running three crab
operations. Specifically, they were king crab fisheryby the Keiko Maru fleet in Bristol Bay of the eastern
Bering Sea and Yoko Maru fleet off the western coastof Kamchatka, and golden king crab fishery by the
Eihei Maru, also off the western coast of Kamchatka.
The Keiko Maru fleet was subject to regulations of
the Japan–U.S. King Crab Agreement, while Yoko
Maru and Eihei Maru fleets were subject to regulations of the Japan–Soviet Crab Agreement.
Japan was given permission to harvest 216,000
boxes of king crab in 1969. However, negotiations at
this time prohibited Japan from operating off the coastof the Olyutor Peninsula, an area that Nippon Suisan
developed and from which it had enjoyed good catches
for many years.

Part 3 Nippon Suisan’s Food Products Business
1. Expanding Existing Processed Foods
The Fish Sausage and Ham Business
Amid Intensifying Competition
Faced with shortages of tuna, which had been themain ingredient of fish sausage, Nippon Suisan
switched to whale in 1963. Then, when supplies ofwhale meat declined, it began using frozen Alaska

pollack surimi, a product for which full-scale production began in 1967.
At the same time, it worked to develop new fishsausages. And it strove to expand its business by producing fish hams, which continued to have growing
demand, and “fish hamburger”. Fish hamburger saw
rapid growth, in particular.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth208

For fish sausages, the prices of ingredients wereskyrocketing as market growth stagnated and competition intensified. Accordingly, Nippon Suisan madethe bold decision to raise the prices of its fish sausages
and hams in September 1965. It had not raised theseprices in over ten years. However, the entry of newcompetitors and emergence of mass retailers had created price competition that was based on mass production rather than product quality, and this trend wasshowing no signs of abating.
Nippon Suisan employed a variety of measures inorder to consistently ensure both product quality andprofits. Among them were 1) improving productivity
by using high-performance manufacturing machinery,2) conserving power with automatic control systems,3) streamlining costs by unifying quality control, 4)
integrating quality standards for identical products
across all branches and plants, 5) controlling costs byintegrating designs and product content amount/packaging standards, and 6) improving the capabilities
of sales personnel and lowering distribution costs. For
example, in 1968, it conducted tests to dramatically
improve process automation at its Hachioji General
Plant. Here, it installed two lines each capable ofproducing 65,000 fish sausages a day, thereby allowing
it to reduce line personnel by half.
In addition, it strove to unify nationwide sales prices
while establishing collaboration among neighboring
branches and a head office-led sales structure in orderto address the formation of regional distribution networks and national spread of mass retailers.
Because these measures were enacted, Nippon
Suisan’s fish sausage and ham production remainedat roughly the same level from 1961, achieving 34,860
tons and a 20.8% share of all production in 1971.

were comparatively strong, exports suffered fromlower prices due to intensifying competition. Although,from around 1966, the amount of canned salmon andtrout exported to the United Kingdom stayed roughly
unchanged even amid increasing U.S. and Canadianproduction and exports to the U.K. as well as poor
economic conditions in the U.K., the company wasforced to lower its product prices. Prices subsequently
remained low in part because of Alaskan and Canadianproduction.
Meanwhile, the amount of canned crab exported
saw yearly declines due to growing domestic demand.
Moreover, a glut of Alaskan products in the American
market, which was a major export destination, caused
prices to fall from around 1969.
In October 1969, the U.S. government banned theuse of the artificial sweetener cyclamate (sodium cyclamate), citing it as being highly carcinogenic. In
response, the Japanese government and Ministry of
Health and Welfare issued an order prohibiting useof cyclamate that would take effect after a grace period
lasting until September 1970. As a result, sales of products made with the sweetener plummeted.
In addition to the ban on cyclamate, 1969 saw the
price of canned crab nosedive. For Nippon Suisan,these developments led to a nearly 20% year-on-year
decline in both production and sales. The company
countered by conducting special sales and shifting
sales destinations for stockpiled products among othermeasures. Such actions resulted in an early recovery.
Although the business lost 90 million yen in fiscal
1970, it returned to post a profit of 210 million yen
in 1971.

Stable Sales in the Canning Business
Between 1964 and 1971, Nippon Suisan’s canningbusiness saw generally stable growth in terms of bothproduction and sales.
However, while can sales in the domestic market

Fish sausage and ham products of the 1970s

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth209

In December 1970, mercury in excess of the U.S.’s
permissible amount was detected in canned tuna in
the United States. Cans produced in Japan were among
the products violating this standard. The discovery
led the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
to prohibited imports of products containing mercury
in excess of 0.5 ppm.
Furthermore, beginning in April 1971, the FDA
started conducting not only mercury inspections but
also strict quality inspections when products were
imported into the U.S. As a result, a combined totalof 460,000 boxes of cans from Japan failed to passquality inspection or mercury inspection in fiscal 1971.
Of these, 430,000 boxes of canned tuna were shippedback to Japan. Additionally, the so-called “Nixon
Shock” of 1971 had a serious impact on exports ofcanned goods. The cumulative effect of these negative
factors caused exports to attain just 95.6% of the previous year’s level.
Thus, despite grappling with various problems,
Nippon Suisan’s canning business in the era of rapid
economic growth registered stable sales that were
supported by strong demand in the domestic market.
Consequently, it joined the frozen food products
business—a sector that enjoyed remarkable growthduring this time—as one of the core businesses of
Nippon Suisan’s processed food operations.
A Revolution in Processed Food Sales
Sales of Nippon Suisan’s canned goods, fished sausages,
and other processed foods were based on a system ofauthorized dealers. Even during this time of increasingly common mass retailing and great transformation
in food distribution, Nippon Suisan continued toplace emphasis its use of authorized dealers.
Nippon Suisan was unable to see changes coming
to the distribution system. It was aware of the existenceof mass retailers when they emerged in the mid-1960s,
and it recognized that the roles of wholesalers werechanging. However, President Haruo Nakai and othermembers of management stuck to strengthening theexisting system (by, for example, checking on wholesalers’ management conditions and selecting appropriateones) out of concern for how changing the system
might affect authorized dealers. Consequently, they
modified only portions of the system.
Nippon Suisan’s delay in reinventing its distribution
system led to its late response to distribution’s regionalization. Consequently, intense competition flaredup among wholesalers that had been segregated byregion under the conventional system. This led tofrequent bankruptcies among secondary wholesalers,
which significantly lowered distribution. This washandled by supplying products from major primary
wholesalers; however, it was unavoidable that the
problem would have an effect.
The company finally got on track toward reinventing its distribution structure in 1971. Recognizing thatconventional region-specific sales measures were limited in how they could respond to the growing size ofmass retailers and spread of nationwide chains, it set
out to standardize sales throughout the country.
Theretofore, plants were placed under managementof branches; however, the company decided to place
all plants under the jurisdiction of company head
office and separated sales from production.
It also implemented fine-tuned distribution measures. In the Tokyo district, for example, it set up asystem of “helpers” who visited retailers to improveexchanges of product information. It also enclosed“Nissui coupons” redeemable for prizes in packagesof fish sausages, fish hams, and chikuwa to boost retailers’ desire to stock these products.
Nippon Suisan also took various measures aimed
at cultivating secondary wholesalers that excel at smalllot sales. Among them, it sent out more vehicles tomake routine visits to wholesalers, and increased thefrequency of visits by Nissui Service employees andsales personnel from the traditional once monthly totwice monthly.
At the same time, it worked to maintain its official
price system and took measures to avoid price competition in shops so as to unify its prices.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth210

Expansion of Frozen Foods for Household Use
From the mid-1960s, the “main product” crown inmarine products companies’ processed food businesses
was moving from fish sausages to frozen foods.
What contributed significantly to the growth offrozen foods for household use was the rapidly increasing number of mass retailers. For mass retailers, whowere continually opening new stores, frozen foods
became one of their most eye-catching sales sections
and were thus a key attraction to customers. The formation of frozen foods sections combined with the increasing popularity of household refrigerators and freezers
expanded demand for convenient frozen foods.
Efforts by individual companies and industrial
groups paid off, as the value of frozen food production
grew rapidly from a value of 234 million yen in 1958
to 3.845 billion yen in 1965. The number of precooked
frozen foods and dishes—including deep-fried foods,
tempura, hamburger steak, and shumai and gyoza
dumplings—entering the market grew at an astounding rate.
It was proposed that a refrigerated temperaturezone in the storage and distribution processes—called
a “cold chain” (low-temperature distribution system)—should be established to support the diffusion offrozen foods for household use. A cold chain is aconcept whereby perishable foods are distributed at
a controlled temperature from the production stage
through to consumption. Although the term “coldchain” does not necessary refer to frozen foods alone,
its use promoted higher interest in and recognitionof frozen foods.
The Japan Frozen Food Association was establishedin January 1969. It was comprised of 20 members,
including 12 food manufacturers and seven electricalmachinery manufacturers.
Although the association’s activities covered an
extensive range, its quality control arm promoted thor­ough­going attention to quality control at the manufacturing and distribution stages. In June 1971, it laid
put “voluntary standards for frozen food handling”

that require foods to be kept at a temperature of −18°
or lower in line with international standards. The
purpose was to ensure thorough temperature control
at all distribution stages, including manufacture, storage, transport, distribution, and sales.
Like its competitors, Nippon Suisan’s frozen foodproducts business had struggled to succeed in thehousehold foods sector until around 1965. This had
led it to concentrate on frozen foods for commercial
use, such those used in school meals. However, everything changed in 1967, when demand for frozen foods
for household use took off, particularly in the Kansai
market. What sparked this new demand was thesudden popularity of a bale-shaped potato croquettecalled “Chibikko Korokke”.
Chibikko Korokke was jointly developed by Nada
Kobe Seikyo (Nada Kobe Consumer Cooperatives’
Union) and Nakamura Hirokazu Shoten K.K. of the
Kansai region. Unlike the standard oval croquettes,
it suggested a more refined quality that generated
growing sales, most notably in Kansai. As a cooperative, Nada Kobe Seikyo sought to handle foods madewith as few preservatives as possible, and frozen foods
fit perfectly with this aim. And for frozen foods forhousehold use, which at the time did not have established sales channels, the emergence of the cooperative’s sales channels and floor space proved highly
significant.
At the same time, Daiei, a company that was opening new stores in Kansai and other regions, began
actively installing large showcases in its stores toexpand its handling of frozen foods.
Propelled by this increase in stores handling frozen
foods for household use in Kansai, Nippon Suisan
expanded its sales of these projects. Over the courseof three years, sales of Nippon Suisan’s frozen foods
grew by nearly four times, from 2.8 billion yen in 1968
to 10.4 billion yen in 1971. What drove this growth
were frozen products for household use. This is demonstrated by the fact that the ratio of household-use
to commercial-use frozen foods in sales went from
22:78 in 1968 to a more balanced 41:59 in 1970.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth211

Among the products that supported Nippon
Suisan’s frozen foods business were “Kani Kurimi
Korokke” (creamed crab croquettes) and “Kani
Shumai” (crab shumai dumplings), which entered
stores in 1969. These products were representative of
Nippon Suisan as a company primarily oriented toward
fisheries products. At the time, many companies wereentering the frozen foods industry; however, most of
their precooked foods were made with livestock oragricultural products. In contrast, Nippon Suisan wascharacteristic in that it sold fisheries products. And it
thus strove to differentiate itself from competitors bysecuring abundant fisheries resources.
Start of Chikuwa Production and National Sales
In 1968, Nippon Suisan began national sales of yakichikuwa (grilled chikuwa fish-paste cake). This product, which could be eaten raw, was made possible by
the development of full-scale offshore surimi in the
mid-1960s.
Around this time, the quality of chikuwa products
was rising throughout the industry, and chikuwa production was growing in all parts of the country.
Reasons for this were improvements in Alaska pollack
surimi, which is the main ingredient of chikuwa, anduniformity and stability of quality brought about by
the automation of chikuwa plants.
However, Nippon Suisan’s relationship with fishpaste product manufacturers proved to be an obstacle
to its effort to produce and market chikuwa. As it used
its surimi to make its own fish sausages and hams,
Nippon Suisan also supplied it as a basic ingredientto fish-paste product manufacturers. Nippon Suisan’s
entry into the “Yaki-Chikuwa” market could put it incompetition with these business partners and possibly
endanger their relationship. Nonetheless, Nippon
Suisan felt it could utilize its offshore frozen surimi
to create a completely new type of “Yaki-Chikuwa”,
and had high expectations that this product could
generate new business. It ultimately determined that
it would be possible to separate its own product fromexisting products and therefore avoid competition.
It began producing “Yaki-Chikuwa” at the Hachioji
Plant in October 1967. Made using technologies
passed down from the prewar Tobata Plant, the product was well received by consumers and enjoyed strong
sales within the Tokyo Branch’s service area. The company took this success to successively expand production to other plants. It began production at the Anjo
Plant in November 1967 and the Itami Plant in August
1968. By October 1972, its production system covered
all parts of the country, with the Hachioji, Hakodate,
Onagawa, Shimizu, Himeji, and Tobata Plants all
making “Yaki-Chikuwa”. The 13 lines of these six
plants achieved daily production of 810,000 units.
Nippon Suisan’s “Yaki-Chikuwa” was made fromfactory ship-made surimi as well as lizardfish, whitecroaker, and conger eel and given a unique seasoning.
Conventional chikuwa suffered from poor shelf life
and was usually eaten after boiling or heating. However,
Nippon Suisan’s chikuwa had high freshness because
it was made in a short period of time with fresh ingredients, and had a “deliciously uncooked flavor” that
could be enjoyed as is. What made this possible wereefforts by manufacturers of seafood processing machinery that allowed both mass production and energysavings, and linkage between production and sales. In
the Anjo Plant’s case, production was based on a principle of immediate production/next-day sales, and the
supply area was limited to that which could coveredby distribution vehicles within one hour’s driving fromthe plant. These efforts bore fruit and sales grewstrongly. By 1971, it was selling as many as 200,000
cases a month (one case contained 25 packages).
The chikuwa business benefitted from Nippon
Suisan’s ability to create its own “value” by catchingand processing fishery products. It had successfully
industrialized chikuwa—a product that was traditionally produced in a cottage industry-like fashion—by
changing it into something made with frozen surimi
in an industrial process. However, its success here also
put it into competition with major marine products
company.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth212

2. The Ups and Downs of New Businesses
The Mayonnaise Business
In March 1961, Nippon Suisan began marketing“Nissui Delux Mayonnaise” as part of a strategy toreinforce its processing operations under the Five-Year
Reformation Plan. All major marine products companies were expanding their participation in processed
foods at this time, and Nippon Suisan was no
exception.
A motivation behind Nippon Suisan’s decision toenter the mayonnaise market was a relationship it
formed with Nosan Corporation, which was a mealbuyer. At the time Nosan was collecting shipments ofeggs, and the two companies decided that they could
form a “give-and-take” partnership if Nippon Suisan
purchased the eggs to make mayonnaise. Production
was handed by Nippon Chomi Shokuhin Corporation,a Nippon Suisan affiliate. Although, early on, there
were instances of mayonnaise being returned due toinconsistent quality, this problem was resolved around1963 and sales began to see steady growth.
As Japan’s mayonnaise industry adapted to the westernization of eating habits, production grew from15,574 tons in 1960 to 48,976 tons in 1965. In fiscal
1966, the mayonnaise market’s value surpassed 20
billion yen. The market share of the top manufacturer,
Kewpie Corporation, grew from 70% in 1962 to 85%.
Kewpie’s strength came from its high product quality,
price competitiveness, and marketing prowess. Many
latecomers struggled to compete with Kewpie andMayonnaise

eventually pulled out of the market or switched to themayonnaise-for-commercial-use market in order toavoid competing with Kewpie.
Nippon Suisan took variety of measures to compete,including developing an almost completely airtightcontainer and sales of mayonnaise made without additives. And in 1970 it reentered the market with
“Fleuret”, which was sold in an “upside-down” container with a large squeeze spout. However, profits
worsened and production was stopped in December
1971.
The Cheese Business
Cheese production and consumption grew in Japan
from the mid-1950s. As dairy companies set up production systems, national consumption grew from2,570 tons in 1956 to 13,239 tons in 1964.
Nippon Suisan launched its cheese business in 1961.
After hearing about a patented cheese manufacturingmethod from Koichi Nakanishi, a professor at Tohoku
University, the company became determined to enter
the cheese business as a general food products company given future demand for animal protein andcheese business potential. It won the rights toNakanishi’s method after bidding against Taiyo
Gyogyo, and began production at Nippon Rakuno
Shokuhin K.K., a member of the Nippon SuisanGroup. Sales began in July 1962. Nippon Suisan’scheese was unique in that was manufactured in only
two to three weeks rather than the usual six months.
Japan’s cheese industry continued to expand fromCheeseDevelopment and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth213the mid-1960s. National consumption grew by 2.6
times over the course of five years, from 15,500 tons
in 1965 to 40,313 tons in 1970. The growing cheesemarket led existing cheese manufacturers to step up
their capital investment and new companies to enter
the industry. The result was intensifying competition.
In 1968, in particular, a succession of meat businesses
began entering the market. This caused considerable
instability, as now more than 20 companies were making
cheese, and generated fierce price competition.
Nippon Suisan’s cheese business got off to a rocky
start, as it had difficulty balancing quality and cost.
The company nonetheless worked to distinguish itself
from other companies by selling pencil-shaped “babycheese”, which was smaller than available “minicheeses”. This baby cheese was well received among
consumers; in fact, sales were so strong that production
could not keep up with demand, even when the
Hachioji Plant was at full operation.
However, Nippon Suisan’s performance stalled out
amid cutthroat competition that was generated whenmeat manufacturers and overseas firms partneringwith Japanese manufacturers entered the market. It
subsequently moved to actively develop original products that take advantage of its position as a marine
products company. It attempted to link the cheesebusiness with other businesses by, for example, developing kamaboko with cheese and chikuwa with cheeseas products for commercial use and fried cheese rings
as frozen food. However, these efforts did not capture
the anticipated market share and failed to eliminate
business losses. Consequently, the company ended
production in 1971 and withdrew from the cheeseindustry.

Ramen

The Instant Noodles Business
Production and sales of instant noodles developed by
Momofuku Ando began at Sanxee Shokusan (a company operated by Ando himself; it became Nissin
Food Products in December 1958) in August of 1958.
By 1959, sales of instant noodles were growing strongly
as a result of advertisement and sales by department
stores and word of mouth.
The instant noodles market expanded rapidly as
demand skyrocketed and more companies joined in.
Over the course of a first “golden period” (1959 to1961) and then a second golden period (1963 to 1964),
production ballooned from 110.7 million servings in
1959 to 2.3 billion servings in 1966.
However, after years of rapid growth, the instantnoodles industry became disrupted by ruthless sales
practices as competition intensified. Competition
became particularly fierce in late 1964, spurred byovercrowding by over 300 manufacturers coupledwith moves to augment facilities and expand production by major manufacturers.
In 1965, Nippon Suisan became the first marine
products company to enter the rapidly growing instantnoodles industry. Initially it engaged in purchasebased sales only; however, by the following year, 1966,
it had begun production at the Onagawa Plant.
Seeing instant noodles as a promising business, thecompany began production at locations throughout
Japan. Production bases included not only the
Onagawa, Hachioji, and Tobata Plants but also Nippo
Shokuhin Corporation in Kumamoto, Hachinohe
Teion Reizo K.K. in Aomori, and Mogami kanzume
K.K. in Yamagata. It also sold distinctive products inparticular sales regions, such as stick ramen in Sapporo,flavored ramen in Sendai, and ramen with attachedsoup packets in Tokyo.
However, specialty noodle manufacturers had apowerful grip on the instant noodle market, andNippon Suisan’s standing in the market gradually
weakened. Amid tough competition, its efforts toimprove the quality of its regionalized products did

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth214not go well outside of Tohoku and Kyushu. Facedwith an increasingly difficult fight, the company began
reducing the number of factory lines. At the beginningof fiscal 1970, it was operating just two lines at its own

Onagawa Plant and one line each at its affiliates,
Mogami kanzume, Hachinohe Teion Reizo, andNippo Shokuhin. It completely shut down production
by around 1973.

Part 4 Nippon Suisan’s Overseas Business
1. Overseas Business in the 1960
A New Era of Joint Ventures
From the mid-1960s, Japanese interests were accelerating their movements overseas. However, of fish sales,
ship chartering, services, and joint ventures, theirprimary focus was on conducting business by establishing joint ventures with local companies.
Of these joint ventures, many involved arrangements whereby the Japanese side would provide necessary capital to local companies and, in essence, sponsor
the facilities and vessels they needed for operation,and the local companies would manage and operate
the facilities and vessels. In return, the local companies
would give all rights to catches to the Japanese side.
In many cases, the Japanese side was comprised of amarine products company and a trading company.
The marine products company was responsible forfishing operations, while the trading company was incharge of negotiations with the local government aswell as importing/exporting after the joint venture
was established. Produced goods were distributed
between the marine products company and trading
company in accordance with their investment
ratios.
The number of overseas joint ventures entered into
by Japanese fishery and trading companies grewsteadily from the mid-1960s. However, of all companies, the one that was actively developing local venturesfrom the earliest stage was Taiyo Gyogyo. Its efforts
go back to 1951, prior to the San Francisco Peace
Treaty’s coming into effect. At that time, it responded
to a request for assistance from the Indian businessconglomerate Tata Group by dispatching technicaladvisors on bottom trawl fishery methods and providing guidance to Indian fishermen. It began full-scale
overseas business in 1953 by setting up a joint venture
in Burma, and by the end of 1970 it had established
22 joint ventures in 16 regions. These were overwhelming numbers compared to Nippon Suisan’sseven ventures in five regions and Nichiro Gyogyo’s
four ventures in four regions.
Formation of Overseas Business
From the mid-1960s, Nippon Suisan departed fromits previously cautious posture to begin actively promoting overseas business. This was because, amid not
only stricter bilateral fishery regulations and growing
momentum in efforts to regulate use of the high seas,
there was growing consensus within Nippon Suisanthat the company must enter into tie-ups with coastal
nations (for example, through development imports
or technical collaboration) as a step toward the future,even if such tie-ups were disadvantageous in somerespects, in order to continue gaining access to fisheryresources.
Nippon Suisan established a Remote Operations
Department in its head office in 1966. The company
already had a Trade Department (established in 1960)
and overseas operations division in the Tobata Branch(established in 1961). However, the Trade Department
was mainly responsible for import and export administration, such as gathering information from trading
companies and selling products purchased by other

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth215

departments within the company. Its activities were
not centered on overseas business. Given the need to
expand overseas business in response to the changing
environment surrounding fishing operations, the company abolished the Tobata Branch’s remote operations
division and set up a new Remote Operations De­part­
ment in the head office to have full-time jurisdictionof overseas business. Subsequently, the Trade De­part­
ment took charge of import/export administrationand the Remote Operations Department had responsibility for administration of overseas business.
As for remote bases, the company elevated the statusof its Las Palmas Office, whose primary responsibility
had been procuring tuna, from liaison office to fullscale office in 1967, and established a Cape Town
Office in the Republic of South Africa the same year.
These new offices were in addition to the West Africa
Office that it had set up in 1964.

2. Development of Shrimp Fishery
Start of Joint Ventures in Australia and Indonesia
Between the end of the war and 1960, Japan was a
shrimp exporter. In fact, in 1960, 98% of shrimp consumed in Japan was domestically produced. Moreover,Japan’s shrimp exports reached some 3,000 tons.
However, the liberalization of imports of shrimp alongwith tuna, salmon, and trout in October 1961 begana period of 10 years when frozen shrimp coming into
Japan grew by more than 10 times, from 4,000 tons
in 1961 to 57,000 tons in 1970.
Rising dietary standards during the era of rapid
economic growth increased shrimp consumption.
Ultimately, Japan’s coastal shrimp fishery could not
keep up with domestic demand, and this opened thedoor to imports from many overseas regions, includingSoutheast Asia, the Middle East, China, and Latin
America.
The actors that were actively promoting shrimp
imports during the 1960s were trading companies andmarine products company. Because shrimp importing
was a high price/high profit business with standardized products, companies could enter without possessing strong expertise in the field. Consequently,
trading companies actively promoted shrimp importing following liberalization of fishery imports in
1961.
Nippon Suisan began a region-wide onsite shrimp
fishery survey in New Guinea and Australia in theautumn of 1966. One result was the verification ofplentiful shrimp fishing grounds off of the northerncoast of Australia by the 1,000-ton trawler Asama
Maru. This led Nippon Suisan to ask the Australian
government for permission to begin operating andbegin selecting partners with which to form a joint
venture.
After receiving unofficial approval from theAustralian government in June 1968, Nippon Suisan
formed the Northern Research Pty., Ltd. as a joint
venture with its affiliate Nanpo Gyogyo Kaihatsu,
Itochu Corporation, and Hickman as the venture’sAustralian partner. It was agreed that the company
would establish its base of operations in Darwin, that
Northern Research would build 20 shrimp trawlers
within six years, and that Nippon Suisan would provide eight or nine trawlers to Nanpo Gyogyo Kaihatsu
until the fifth year. It was further decided that thechartered ship fees would be paid by exchanging harvested fish products at the F.O.B. price in Darwin.
Northern Research began operating in October
1968, harvesting banana prawn, tiger prawn, and othershrimp. Shrimp that passed screening for export wassent to Japan and the rest was supplied to cities insouthern Australia. It should be noted that Northern
Research suffered enormous damage from a cyclone
in 1974.
Following this business in Australia, Nippon Suisan
began a survey and trial operations in the sea area ofWest Irian, Indonesia, with an eye to shrimp fisherydevelopment. Following a one-year survey, Nippon

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth216

Suisan set up two joint ventures in quick succession
in 1970.
In May 1970, Nippon Suisan established P.T. West
Irian Fishing Industries (W.I.F.) in partnership with
Nanpo Gyogyo Kaihatsu, Mitsubishi Corporation,
and a local company. W.I.F. operated three 300-ton
shrimp trawlers, including Nippon Suisan’s Kashii
Maru, and eight 100-ton shrimp trawlers, including
the Fukuma Maru. Its base of operations was locatedin Ambon. The company showed strong performancefor the most part, with catches growing 640 tons infiscal 1970 to 1,318 tons in fiscal 1973. During thissame period, the per-vessel catch grew from 58 tons
to 88 tons.
Then in July of the same year, Nippon Suisan
launched P.T. Irian Marine Product Development(I.M.P.) with Hokoku Suisan, Nissho Iwai Corporation,
and a local company. This joint venture placed three
300-ton shrimp trawlers, including Nippon Suisan’s
Yamashiro Maru, and six 100-ton shrimp trawlers,
including the Iki Maru, into operation.

Part 5 Development of Nippon Suisan’s Shipping Business
The Shipping Business during the Era of
Rapid Economic Growth
The era of rapid economic growth was a time of
unprecedented expansion for the shipping industry,
this despite ups and downs that included the Suez
crisis shipping boom and subsequent poor economic
times on the boom’s downside.
In December 1962, the Ministry of Transport
revised its “Guideline on Measures for the Shipping
Industry” and drafted the guideline’s governing laws
(namely, the “Act on Special Measures concerning
Shipping Industry Reconstruction” and the “Act on
the Partial Revision of the Act for the Subsidizationof Interest Payments on Loans for Construction of
Oceangoing Vessels”). These laws passed both chambers of the 43rd Diet and were promulgated andexecuted on July 1, 1963.
As a result, approximately 90% of Japan’s oceangoing shipping tonnage (including that of affiliates)
was integrated by, among other actions, condensing
the core of the shipping industry from 12 companies
to six. After this success and then the resumption ofdividends by Nippon Yusen K.K. in the September
period of 1965, the remaining five shipping companies
also resumed dividend payments by the September
period of 1967. The resulting industrial structure laid
the groundwork for a period of growth and prosperity

known as the “10 golden years”, which lasted from1964 until the oil crisis of 1973. During these 10 years,
the gross merchant ship tonnage owned by Japan grewby 4.1 times. With the exception of a unique period
immediately following the end of World War II, thisrate of growth was unprecedented in the modern history of Japanese shipping. Moreover, Japan’s shipping
industry posted extraordinary figures in terms of net
profit and special depreciation reserves during thistime.
Construction of the Nippon Maru
Against this backdrop of unprecedented growth inJapan’s shipping industry, Nippon Suisan’s shipping
operations also experienced tremendous development.
“Seeing Japan’s growing trade as a golden opportunity,
Nippon Suisan further expanded its shipping operations by expanding its tonnage. The company’s thinking here is revealed by the following statement by
President Haruo Nakai.
“Every country in the world worries about unusual
economic stagnation. That’s why they all must implement economic promotion measures to raise theircitizens’ standard of living. This requires them to maketheir industries prosperous, which leads to growing
amounts of goods distributed worldwide. In actual
fact, last year Japan alone imported between 500 andDevelopment and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth217

The ore/oil combination carrier Nippon Maru (completed in1967)

600 billion tons of raw materials. We are building
large ships with this kind of long-term vision in mind”(minutes of a Central Producers Conference in fiscal
1971).
“In the future, food will move internationally. Japan,
in particular, must import its food from countries
around the world. And this is where medium-sizedrefrigerated carriers and meal/oil combination carriers
will come into play. [Part omitted] In the shipping
industry, large ships will respond to growing distribution needs. Moreover, as Nippon Suisan’s fishing
operations expand globally, medium-sized refrigerated
carriers will serve to import Japan’s food—beginningwith these fishing cargoes—and thereby ensure theirimportance to our business” (ibid).
In September 1967, Nippon Suisan built the Nippon
Maru (deadweight tonnage of 88,550 tons, gross tonnage of 53,751 tons) at a cost of 2.8 billion yen. The
most important characteristic of the Nippon Maru
was that she was the only ore/oil combination carrierin Japan. Core companies that had been affected by
the government’s shipping industry integration policy
became eligible for treasury funds and other subsidy
measures. This put companies extraneous to the policy,
such as Nippon Suisan, at considerable financial disadvantage. To address this, Nippon Suisan endeavoredto distinguish itself from the integrated companies bybuilding a combination carrier that they did not have.
After receiving a positive response from IshikawajimaHarima Heavy Industries Co., Ltd., (currently IHI
Corporation) about the building of such a vessel,
Nippon Suisan made the decision to go forward withthe project and began looking for shipping customers.

Initially, Nippon Suisan entered into negotiations
with Mobil of the United States. However, at the time,
the U.S. government was pursuing development ofsubsea oil fields off the coasts of Alaska and California.
Consequently, while Nippon Suisan desired a longterm contract for services between the Persian Gulf
and U.S., Mobil sought a short-term contract of aroundfive years. The negotiations became snagged and ultimately broke off.
Next, Nippon Suisan approached Kawasaki SteelCorporation (currently JFE Steel Corporation), a
company with which it signed a long-term contract
for the Andesu Maru in 1962, about the possibility ofan ore shipping contract. Kawasaki Steel agreed to
Nippon Suisan’s proposal and the two companies
signed a 15-year contract for regular charter service.
The ship’s specifications were then studied with thiscontract in mind, and the decision was made at thebasic design stage to give her a gross tonnage of 53,751
tons, which would allow passage through the Suez
Canal and entry into the Port of Chiba. Although thetwo sides had difficulty seeing eye to eye in negotiations on carriage charges, ultimately it was decided
that the charge rate would be adjusted every five years.
During the course of the negotiation, it was decided
to make the ship’s deadweight tonnage 88,550 tons,
which was 4,000 tons more than originally planned.
The result was a Nippon Maru equipped with thevery latest equipment. To reduce the labor burden on
crewmembers, a broad array of remote-control systems
were employed to open and close cargo pipe vales,measure tank ullage and draft, and operate main andauxiliary machinery. The ship was also designed toconserve power with automatic battery chargers madewith transistorized voltage fluctuation-detecting
circuits, and she employed emergency warning equipment to improve safety. Additionally, air conditioners
were installed in all living quarters to improve crewwelfare and raise operational efficiency.
The completed Nippon Maru made her maiden
voyage in October 1967. After one year and threemonths at sea, she safely returned to port in Japan inDevelopment and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth218

January 1969.
Construction of Nippon Maru III
Having been engaged in negotiations with Kawasaki
Steel concerning the affixation of a back letter sinceAugust 1968, Nippon Suisan reserved a shipbuilding
berth at Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries thenext year, 1969.
What led Nippon Suisan to build a new ship wasan accident involving the ore-bulk cargo combination
carrier Bolivar Maru. In January 1969, the Bolivar
Maru sank due to hull fatigue southeast of Nojimazaki point. Because she had been built by IshikawajimaHarima Heavy Industries, the shipbuilder sought torestore its honor by offering to build a new ship within
the ongoing Nippon Suisan-Kawasaki Steelnegotiations.
The result was the keel laying for what would beJapan’s largest combination carrier, with even higher
economic performance than the Nippon Maru, atIshikawajima-Harima Heavy Industry’s Kure Shipyardin August 1970. The new ship was completed in May
1971. She was given the name Nippon Maru III, which
was selected from proposals submitted by company
employees. It should be noted that she was named“III” rather than “II” was because it was decided that
“Nippon Maru II” did not have a pleasant ring to it.
The Nippon Maru III had a length of 305 m, beamof 43.3 m, a depth of 24.7 m, gross tonnage of 89,500
tons, and deadweight tonnage 157,260 tons. She could
cruise at 15.5 knots when fully loaded. Moreover, she
was even more automated than the Nippon Maru. She
had a control room even in the engine room and wascertified as “M-Zero” (capable of operating with anunmanned engine room during nighttime). She also
gained attention as the first Nippon Suisan vessel to
employ two female crewmembers (mess workers).

The meal/oil combination carrier Suzukaze Maru (completed in
1970)

The Nippon Maru III set sail from Japan on May
20 under a 15-year chartered ship contract with
Kawasaki Steel. First, she was loaded with crude oilat Ras Tannurah in the Persian Gulf, which she carried
to Northern Europe. Next she was loaded with coalat Hampton Roads on the North American Atlantic
coast and then iron ore at Tubarão, Brazil. She thencarried this consolidated cargo back to Japan. The
entire voyage took four months to complete andinvolved four continuous legs.
In addition to the Nippon Maru III, Nippon Suisan
built the 3,000-ton fast refrigerator carrier AsakazeMaru, which was capable of cruising at 17 knots, in
1967, followed by her sister Harukaze Maru in 1968.
Both ships were equipped with the latest equipment
and integrated control systems to save energy andmanpower. Both were leased to Nissui Kaiun. In theirfirst voyages in 1968, they carried frozen pork from
Shanghai to Europe on their outward legs, and were
loaded with catches from southern trawlers at Las
Palmas, Cape Town, and other ports for the return
journey to Japan.
And in 1969, Nippon Suisan built the SachikazeMaru, a meal/oil combination carrier designed torefuel northern meal and surimi fleets and ship meal.
The next year, 1970, the company built her sister ship,
the Suzukaze Maru.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth219

Part 6 Successes in the Last Half of the Era of Rapid Economic Growth
Continuing Growth
In April 1966, Nippon Suisan moved its head office
to the Nippon Building in Tokyo’s Otemachi district.
The move was symbolic of a company that was finally
emerging from reconstruction under its Five-Year
Reformation Plan and positioning itself for a periodof strong growth. This was a time when the Japanese
economy had come out of the Showa 40-nen Fukyo
recession and was now entering the last half of the eraof rapid growth.
It was also a time when Japan’s fishing industry wasseeing growing production, particularly in deep-seasand coastal fishery. And although Nippon Suisan was
suffering from stagnating sales in some of its processing
categories, it was enjoying steady growth in terms ofboth ordinary and net income.
In the wake of the Five-Year Reformation Plan’scompletion, Nippon Suisan’s gross sales reached 95.6
billion yen in fiscal 1970, an increase of more than
70% compared to fiscal 1964’s mark of 55.2 billion
yen. Thus, sales momentum that had been generated
during the plan’s implementation had largely been
maintained.
Looking at sales by category, fishing accounted for56.8 billion yen in fiscal 1970, or 59% of the total.
This was followed by processing at 29.7 billion yen(31%) and shipping and refrigerated storage at 4.2
billion yen (4%). Compared to fiscal 1964, fishing
had grown by 2.3 times while processing had grownby more than 60%.
In particular, since 1969, when priority investment
in offshore operations and efforts to maintain andimprove the company’s financial composition began
to bear fruit, ordinary income rose dramatically fromits usual place around the 3-billion-yen level to oversix billion yen. Meanwhile, net profit rose also skyrocketed from the 1-billion-yen level to around 3
billion yen.
In the last half of fiscal 1969, Nippon Suisan

announced it was increasing dividends payments byraising its dividend rate from the traditional 10% to12%. Then, in the last half of fiscal 1970 and first halfof fiscal 1971, it again increased dividend payments
by 3% to commemorate the company’s 60th anniversary, and it retained this rate of 15% into the last halfof fiscal 1971. However, even with the increased dividends paid from 1969 to 1971, the company still maintained consistently excellent earnings as its dividend
payout ratio remained under 40%.
Although the company was faced difficulties during
this period—specifically in the forms of tightening
overseas fishing regulations and stagnating sales insome onshore sectors—its fishery business was growing thanks to progress in its offshore frozen surimi
operations and joint ventures. Moreover, its shipping
business was also growing with the construction of
new large combination carriers. However, in foodprocessing, sales of fish sausages and hams that werepreviously mainstays were flattening out. And new
businesses such as mayonnaise, cheese, and instantramen were facing tough competition.
During this time, the company reduced the numberof ships in its possession from 130 to 115. As its whaling operations shrank, it cut the number of its motherships from three to one and of its whalers from 23 to
13. And it greatly decreased its fleet of west-water
trawling boats from 61 to 46.
Offshore frozen surimi operations, which wereincreasingly becoming the core of Nippon Suisan’s
fishing activity, saw an increase in the number of ships,
as the number of surimi trawlers expanded from one
to three.
However, as the number of vessels declined, gross
tonnage increased from 291,569 tons to 459,359 tons.
In its effort to reinforce its shipping business, Nippon
Suisan added the fast refrigerator carriers Asakaze
Maru in 1967 and Harukaze Maru in 1968 as well as
the meal/oil combination carriers Sachikaze Maru in
1969 and Suzukaze Maru in 1970. Also added wereDevelopment and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth220the ore/oil combination carrier Nippon Maru in 1967
and iron ore/oil combination carrier Nippon Maru
III in 1971; the sheer sizes of these ships drove up thecompany’s owned shipping tonnage during thisperiod.
Also during this time, Nippon Suisan added twofrozen food processing plants (Anjo and Hachinohe)and two cold stores (Sapporo and Hachinohe) to its
onshore production bases.
At the end of fiscal 1971, Nippon Suisan had thecapacity to produce 1.86 million fish sausages andhams, 810,000 chikuwa and kamaboko units, 7,200
cans, 840,000 servings of frozen food, and 250,000
servings of ramen each day.
As a result of its adding refrigerated warehouses
and expanding plant capabilities, the company’s refrigeration capacity grew from 50,000 tons at the end of
fiscal 1964 to 70,586 tons by the end of fiscal 1971.
This was to cope with its growing catch production,
which went from 6.35 million tons to 9.91 million
tons, as well as imports, which went from 230,000
tons to 398,000 tons. Hand-in-hand with such expansion, production capacity at its seafood processing
plants also grew from 276 tons to 393.6 tons per

day.
Newly added affiliates included one marine products company (Nanpo Gyogyo Kaihatsu), one transport and container-manufacturing company(Marushin Sharyo Seibi), refrigeration and processing
company (Mogami Kanzume), three were sales companies (Nagoya Nissui Service, Osaka Nissui Service,
and Yamatsu Suisan), and three were overseas companies (Northern Research [N.R.P.], W.I.F., and I.M.P.).
The number of affiliates decreased from 41 in 1964
to 36 in 1971. Meanwhile, affiliate-oriented investments to promote overseas business began becoming
increasingly conspicuous.
Nippon Suisan’s strong performance throughout
the 1960s was the product of advance investment
under the Five-Year Reformation Plan from 1959 to
1964, and then expanded business made possible byenhanced production functions and mass production/
mass sales.
Furthermore, even after the plan’s completion,
Nippon Suisan did not scale back its effort to raise
productivity by building larger ships with an eye toexpanding its fishing and shipping businesses. This
allowed it to maintain its positive momentum here.

Chapter 4: End of the Era of Rapid Economic Growth
1971–1977
Part 1 Rapidly Changing Economic and Industrial Environments
1. Japan’s Economy of the 1970s
The “Nixon Shock” and Yen Appreciation
One event Japan hosted during the 1970s was theJapan World Exposition, Osaka, 1970. Held in the
Senri Hills of Suita City, Osaka Prefecture, it was thefirst international exposition ever held in Japan. It

attracted 64.22 million people (a new World Exporecord) during its 183 days. Although the economy
was still showing improvement following the Showa
40-nen Fukyo recession’s bottoming out in October
1965, this improvement peaked during the World
Expo’s run in July 1970. Lasting 57 months, theDevelopment and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth221expansion was the longest of the postwar era andbecame known as the Izanagi Keiki.
In August of 1971, the following year, U.S. President
Richard Nixon announced an emergency economic
policy. The main points of this policy were that it
terminated convertability of the U.S. dollar to gold,
froze prices and wages for 90 days to curb inflation,and levied a uniform 10% import surcharge to correct
the trade balance. In other words, it demanded thatcountries running trade surpluses with the UnitedStates, such as West Germany and Japan, allow theircurrencies to appreciate. It therefore signified thecollapse of the Bretton Woods system that had continued since the war and the end of the fixed exchange
rate system. Because maintaining an exchange rate of
360 yen to one U.S. dollar was thought to be essential
to protecting Japan’s economy, the impact on Japan
was tremendous. This impact became known as the“Nixon Shock” (“Dollar Shock”).
Subsequent attempts were made to maintain the
fixed exchange rate system through multilateral coordination. In December 1971, a meeting of financeministers from ten countries approved the Smithsonian
Agreement, which put into place provisional measures
to revalue the yen at 308 to the dollar. However, Japan’s
trade surplus continued to expand even after the agreement, leading to greater pressure to raise the yen’svalue. A rekindled dollar crisis made it apparent that
fixed exchange rates could no longer be maintained,
and ultimately Japan joined other developed countries
in moving to a floating exchange rate system in
February 1973.
The First Oil Crisis
The year of the Nixon Shock, 1971, was a time of
economic downturn following the Izanagi Keiki recovery. Fearing the effects that a stronger yen would haveon the economy, the Japanese government and Bankof Japan implemented a broad range of fiscal andmonetary policies. One result was the beginning ofefforts to expand Japan’s money supply.

In July 1972, Kakuei Tanaka was elected presidentof the Liberal Democratic Party and became Japan’s
prime minister. Looking to realize his pet theory of
Retto Kaizo (remodeling the Japanese archipelago),
Prime Minister Tanaka set into motion proactive fiscal
and monetary policies that reached beyond the levelsof 1971 and the first half of 1972 and expanded investment for large-scale public works projects. The money
supply was rapidly expanded to support these policies,
and prices began to rise as a result. At the same time,land was bought up throughout the country in anticipation of future development, which caused land
prices to skyrocket.
It was then that the first oil crisis hit. In October
1973, the Fourth Arab-Israeli War erupted. Initiating
an oil strategy designed to help it win the war, theOrganization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC), a body comprised of oil-producing Arabstates, decided to cut crude oil production, place anembargo on developed countries favoring Israel andraise the price of crude oil to as high as four times its
pre-conflict value.
For Japanese industries, which had developed
thanks to the availability of cheap oil, soaring oil prices
delivered a tremendous blow. This blow was even felt
in daily life, as a variety of actions were taken to conserve oil. Businesses voluntarily shut off their neonsigns and broadcasters ceased making late-night broadcasts, while gas stations closed for business on weekends and public holidays. Moreover, consumer panic
caused by uncertainty swept through the nation,
resulting in the hoarding of toilet paper, detergent,and other daily items. The oil crisis also caused commodity prices to climb pronouncedly, generating what
was called kyoran bukka (a wild price spiral). At theirpeak in February 1974, wholesale prices had risen by
37% and consumer prices by 26.3% compared to thesame month of the previous year. This same year of
1974, the government implemented a policy to restrict
overall demand that led to Japan’s first year of negative
growth since the end of World War II.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth222

End of Rapid Economic Growthand Shift to Growth Industries
These two overseas crises—the Nixon Shock and oil
crisis—stalled Japan’s rapid economic growth andbrought the nation into an era of low economic
growth. For Japan and the rest of the world’s countries,
stagflation marked by economic doldrums and inflation became a universal problem. The rapidly changing
economic environment significantly eroded companies’ willingness to make capital investments. To put
themselves on better footing, companies engaged instreamlined management aimed at lowering energy
consumption, reducing debt, and achieving cost reductions through energy savings. Materials industries andother industries that were huge oil consumers frantically developed energy-saving technologies, and as aresult, energy efficiency for manufacturing industries
as a whole improved by almost 20% by the time of thesecond oil crisis in 1979.
Japan’s industrial structure began undergoing a
powerful shift toward more energy-conscious industries in the wake of the oil crises. “Heavy industries”
such as steel, shipbuilding, and petrochemicals that
had led Japan’s postwar economy went into decline.
And in their place arose new “processing and assembly”
industries—such as an automobile industry excellingat fuel-efficient cars and electrical machinery industry
that made full use of Japan’s microelectronics technologies—to take the lead in the 1980s.

2. Diversification of the Food Industry
With the end of rapid economic growth, the industrial
structure saw stagnation in manufacturing and othersecondary industries and the rise of service industries(tertiary industries). Leading this rise was the foodservice industry. The gyudon (beef bowl) chain
Yoshinoya had already opened its first store in Tokyo’s
Shimbashi district by 1968, and Genroku Sushi set
up a store at the Japan World Exposition, Osaka, 1970.
This same year, family restaurant chains also began
full-scale operation, with Skylark and Royal Host
opened their first restaurants in 1970, followed by
Denny’s in 1974.
Meanwhile, overseas fast-food restaurants beganappearing one after another. In 1971, McDonald’s
opened its first store in the Mitsukoshi Department
Store in Tokyo’s Ginza district and was followed by astring of new businesses selling fried chicken, doughnuts, ice cream, pizza, and other fast foods.
In all cases, the stores of these food-service businesses employed uniform designs and kitchen equipment. They also prepared manuals detailing cooking

times and customer service that allowed even employees without food-service experience to do their jobs
effectively. The emergence of new shop management
methods that were based on such manuals attracted
a considerable amount of public attention.
Likewise, processed foods were becoming increasingly developed and easier to use. Cup Noodles, whichappeared on the market in 1971, could be eaten anywhere and anytime so long as hot water was available.
Such convenience made it the leading product among
instant noodles. The appearance of foods in retort
pouches also sparked a revolution in processed foods.
Soon a series of products were hitting store shelves,
including curry sauces, meat spaghetti sauces, creamstew, zenzai (red bean soup) and base for mabo-dofu(Szechuan-style bean curd).
Frozen foods, too, saw expanding consumption
from the end of the 1960s until the early 1970s. In
1970, yearly per-person consumption of frozen foods
stood at 1.43 kg; by 1975, it had grown to 3.4 kg.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth223

Part 2 International Fishery amid Tightening Regulations
1. UNCLOS III and Fishery Resources
Application of the Evensen Proposal Concerning
200-Nautical-Mile EEZs
In 1974, discussions by an informal group gatheredby Jens Evensen, a Norwegian minister in charge ofmatters concerning the Law of the Sea, led to the tying
up of the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone
issue as text within the Law of the Sea.
Evensen had pointed out that resolving this issue
would not be easy, stating, “It will be extremely difficult to reach a compromise within the official settingthat is UNCLOS”. Regarding common ground, heconcluded that, “Judging from the discussions thathave taken place thus far, I believe that the only way
forward is compromise that recognizes freedom ofnavigation in passages used in international navigation,rather than recognizing 200-nautical-mile EEZs”.
From this analysis, Evensen notified participating
countries that he was “prepared to host informal discussions to prepare a draft compromise”.
This proposal was welcomed by the United States,
which, at least officially, had been opposed to 200-nautical-mile EEZs. Consequently, the “Evensen meeting”
was held just prior to the second session (Caracas,
Venezuela) of the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) in 1974.
Participants were primarily countries promoting
200-nautical-mile EEZs, and included Latin Americancountries promoting 200-nautical-mile territorial
waters as well as developed countries ( Japan, UnitedStates, Soviet Union, etc.). Indeed, the meeting was avirtual “mini United Nations”.
Discussions of this issue continued until the conference’s third session (Geneva, Switzerland) in 1975.
The Evensen proposal to “establish EEZs of 200 nautical miles” was adopted in a draft prepared by thesecond committee. It was eventually incorporated

almost without modification when the Convention
on the Law of the Sea was enacted in 1982.
During the second session, the majority of countries
were in favor of 12-nautical-mile territorial waters.
Japan, which had continually supported three-nautical-mile territorial waters at UNCLOS I and II, also
expressed its support for the 12-nautical-mile designation at this session.
UNCLOS III and Major Fishery Consensus
Looking to establish comprehensive international
order on the seas, UNCLOS III, which had first met
in December 1973, concluded in 1982 with enactmentof the “United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea”. Major items in the convention pertaining tofishery were the establishment of 200-nautical-mile
EEZs, principle of surplus distribution to promote
optimum use within EEZs, the state of origin principle
for anadromous species, and optimum use of highly
migratory species.
The following is a summary of important items forwhich consensus was achieved in fishery stipulations.
Exclusive economic zones
In their EEZs extending out 200 nautical miles fromtheir coasts, coastal states have 1) sovereign rights forthe purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving, andmanaging the natural resources, whether living andnon-living, of the seabed and waters superjacent tothe seabed; 2) exclusive jurisdiction over other activities and scientific services for the economic exploration and exploitation of sea areas; and 3) jurisdiction
over matters concerning preservation of the marine
environment, including control of pollution.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth224

Utilization and distribution of fishery resources

Anadromous stocks (salmon, trout, etc.)

Where a coastal state does not have the capacity toharvest its entire allowable catch, it shall, throughagreements or other arrangements, give other statesaccess to the surplus of allowable catch. In giving accessto other states, it shall take into special account provisions concerning land-locked states and geographicallydisadvantaged states and, particularly, to provisions
concerning developing countries.

1) A state in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate
shall have the primary interest in and responsibility
for such stocks. 2) A state of origin of anadromous
stocks shall ensure their conservation by the establishment of appropriate regulatory measures for fishingin all waters landward of the outer limits of its exclusive
economic zones. A state of origin may, after consultations with the other states fishing these stocks, establish total allowable catches for stocks originating in
its rivers. 3) With respect to fishing of anadromous
stocks beyond the outer limits of an exclusive economic zone, states concerned shall maintain consultations with a view to achieving agreement on terms
and conditions of such fishing, giving due regard to
the conservation requirements and the needs of therelevant state of origin in respect of these stocks. The
relevant state of origin shall cooperate in minimizing
economic dislocation in such other states fishing thesestocks. States participating by agreement with a stateof origin in measures to renew anadromous stocks,
particularly by expenditures for that purpose, shall begiven special consideration by the state of origin in
the harvesting of stocks originating in its rivers.
Enforcement of regulations regarding anadromous
stocks beyond an exclusive economic zone shall be byagreement between the relevant state of origin andthe other states concerned.
For Japan’s fishing industry, which was centered onfishing operations on the open sea, including EEZs,
the above consensus ensured that the day was coming
when it would have to make major concessions.

Highly migratory species (tuna, etc.)
Coastal states shall cooperate directly or indirectly
through appropriate international organizations witha view to ensuring conservation and promoting theobjective of optimum utilization of highly migratory
species both within and beyond the exclusive zone.
In regions for which no appropriate internationalorganization exists, coastal states and fishing statesshall cooperate to establish such an organization andparticipate in its work.
Marine mammals (dolphins, fur seals, whales, etc.)
The convention does not limit the right of coastal
states or international organizations to prohibit, limit,
or regulate the exploitation of marine mammals morestrictly than provided for in the convention whereappropriate. States shall cooperate with a view to theconservation of marine mammals and in the case ofcetaceans shall in particular work through the appropriate international organizations for their conservation, management, and study.

2. Trends in North-Sea Fishery
Regulations on Alaska Pollack
Nippon Suisan began full-scale offshore productionof Alaska pollack surimi in 1967. However, not longafter, Alaska pollack also became subject to fisheryregulation. During Japan–U.S. fishery negotiations in
1972, the United States complained about Japan’s large

harvests of Alaska pollack. The next year, 1973, Japan
was again confronted with a similar complaint during
Japan–U.S.S.R. fishery negotiations. Japan responded
in the form of self-imposed restraint in its harvests.
Nonetheless, restrictions were tightened to 1.3 million
tons in 1974 and further to 1.1 million tons in 1975.
Moreover, new no-fishing zones were established,

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth225closed fishing seasons were extended, and Japanesefishing boats were boarded by American observers.
Furthermore, Japan–U.S. fishery negotiations in
1974 resulted in the establishment of no-fishing zones
not only in the Bering Sea but also the Gulf of Alaska.
They also placed restrictions on total harvest and on
harvests of various species. Japan was instructed tokeep its harvest of Alaska pollack in the eastern Bering
Sea at the fiscal 1975 level of 1.5 million tons, and to
cut its number of operating catcher boats and fishingseason length by approximately 10% of their actual
fiscal 1976 figures. In 1977, Nippon Suisan implemented voluntarily restrictions that kept its catch
quota at 569,200 tons.
Regulations on Salmon and Trout
Of all forms of deep-seas fishery that postwar Japan
had pursued, north-sea salmon and trout had, since1952, been the one most expected to deliver reliable
and stable revenue.
However, the United States, Canada, and Soviet
Union were strengthening their interpretations of“state of origin” (specifically, that a “state in whoserivers anadromous stocks originate shall have the primary interest in and responsibility for such stocks”)
vis-à-vis salmon and trout, which are anadromous
species, and began enforcing stricture fishery regulations as a result.

In 1972, as preparations toward holding UNCLOS
III were underway, the United States and Soviet Union
each presented proposals concerning the state of origin
principle. Both proposed that, under the principle, acoastal nation could claim rights to relevant species
stocks even if they were outside its 200-nautical-mile
EEZ. Subsequently armed with the established
200-nautical-mile EEZs and the state of origin principle, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. separately entered into
new fishery negotiations with Japan.
In the previously mentioned consensus, it was determine that “a state of origin must consult with otherstates habitually fishing anadromous stocks [in its
EEZ] when establishing total allowable catches for
said stocks, and must cooperate to minimize economic
dislocation in states whose nationals have habitually
fished [in its EEZ]”. Thus, the state of origin principle
had a major impact on north-sea salmon and trout
fishery.
Entering the 1970s, trout harvests grew in place ofsockeye salmon catches.
In 1971, the Soviet Union decided within Japan–
U.S.S.R. fishery negotiations to set a 10,000-ton quota
for its salmon and trout harvest in international waters.
Traditionally lacking experience in coastal salmon andtrout fishery, the Soviet Union appeared to have established this quota with an eye to lowering Japan’s quota
in international waters.
The next year, 1972, Japan–U.S.S.R. fishery

Changes in salmon/trout allowances to Japan in Soviet waters (1956 to 1988)(1,000 tons)

120
Total
Allotment to mother ship-type
operations

100

80

60

40

20
0

1956

60

65

70

75

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth

80

85

88

(year)

226

negotiations resulted in an 8,000-ton reduction in
the total quota to 87,000 tons. Moreover, Japan was
asked to reduce the number of its operating ships by
10%, to which it complied by implementing voluntary
curbs.
That year, Nippon Suisan dispatched its Nojima
Maru fleet with 32 vessels. This number was achievedby reducing the number of the fleet’s catcher boats(from 33 to 30) and then adding two catcher boats
affiliated with Hokoku Suisan.
Regulations on Crab Fishery
Of the many international regulations applied to fishery, the strictest and most quickly implemented were
American and Soviet restrictions on north-sea crab
fishery.
In 1971, Soviet regulations forced a two-thirds cut
in Japan’s king crab quota compared to the previous
year. They also dropped the number of king crab fleetsfrom four to two. As companies dealt with this sudden
halving of fleets, confusion and pessimism permeatedthrough the industry. On top of this, during the 1973
negotiations, the Soviet side declared its intention tocompletely close king crab fishery in the near future.
Conse­quently Japan approached the 1974 negotiations
with considerable trepidation. Although complete
closure was avoided through painstaking preliminary
talks that began in January 1974, the negotiations
ended with even stricter regulations’ being slapped onking crab fishery. The king crab harvest was halved
from 60,000 cases of king crab cans to 38,000 cases(1.224 million crabs). Moreover, the remaining two
mother-ship fleets were no longer permitted to operate, as the line was drawn at nine single ships. Thesedevelopments led Nippon Suisan to bring its king crab
factory-ship, which had a 60-year history reachingback to the Taisho era, to an end.
However, in 1975, a total ban on king crab fishery
was indeed put into effect off of the Kamchatka
Peninsula’s west coast. Japan grudgingly accepted theclosure through a compromise by which it demanded

larger crab quotas in other areas. The result was a shift
from king crab fishery off of Kamchatka’s west coast
to golden king crab fishery as well as snow crab fisherynear the Olyutor Peninsula. Specifics of this unusual
quota increase were as follows. The limit on golden
king crab caught by mother ship operations would
remain at 500,000 crabs (of which, Nippon Suisan’sshare was 333,000 crabs), which was the same level as
the previous year. In addition, four single catcher boats
would be allowed as converted king crab vessels, witheach vessel permitted to catch 10,000 crabs for a totalof 40,000 crabs. The fishing grounds for these vessels
were also expanded. Likewise, the quota for snow crab
fishery off of the Olyutor Peninsula was increased by
32,000 crabs from its previous level to 97,000 crabs,
also with expanded fishing grounds. Against this backdrop, Nippon Suisan, which had pursued king crab
fishery in this area until 1968, returned for the firsttime in seven years to engage in snow crab fishery.
Meanwhile, harvests under the Japan–U.S. King
Crab Agreement (which was revised every two years)
were on a precipitously downward trend. Harvests
that had been reduced down to 163,000 cases in fiscal
1966 and 1967 were further reduced to 85,000 casesin 1968. The 1970 Japan–U.S. King Crab Agreement
then brought an even further decline down to 37,500
cases for the two years of 1971 and 1972.
The mainstream practice in Japan’s crab fishery at
the time was to can king crab and produce snow crab
as frozen food. Since the Japan–U.S. King crab agreement of 1965, Japan’s fishing industry had felt that thetrend toward lower king crab quotas would not be
stopped. King crab fishery used tangle nets that caught
crabs by entangling their legs in the mesh. However,tangle nets were not suitable for snow crabs, whichhave long legs, two more legs than king crabs, and a
fragile shell. Consequently, round cages were used.
Because winches on kawasaki crab boats that cast andhauled in lines in conventional crab fleets could nothandle the heavy cages, it was decided to use 100-ton
catcher boats.
The United States began setting quotas andDevelopment and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth227

regulations for round-cage crab fishery in 1969. In
1969, the quota was set at 16 million crabs; in 1971,
it had fallen to 14.6 million crabs.
Under the 1972 Japan–U.S. King Crab Agreement,
1973 and 1974 king crab quotas were lowered from 1
million crabs to 700,000. Quotas for snow crab werealso lowered by 600,000 crabs to 14 million. Moreover,
Bristol Bay was divided into two zones (north andsouth), with quotas assigned to each. Of these, thesouthern zone (Zone B) was an area for bottom trawl
fishery that had never been exploited by crab operations. Accordingly, this move generated suspicionsthat the U.S. was strategically acting to exclude Japanesecrab fleets from Bristol Bay. Initially, Japan was
required to allow American observers to board oneof its two fleets; however, in 1973 this requirement

was changed to two observers on both fleets as
American monitoring became stricter.
In 1976, the U.S. established a 200-nauticial-mile
exclusive fishing zone. Enforcement of this zone began
on March 1, 1977. With this move, the Japan–U.S.
crab agreement was allowed to expire. Beginning in
1977, crab joined other species subject to regulations
under the Japan–U.S. Fishery Agreement that was
signed on March 18 of the same year. Thereafter, crabs
landed with bottom trawl nets were immediately
returned to the ocean as prohibited species.
In 1977, the king crab quota for the eastern Bering
Sea fell to zero. Subsequently all Japanese crab fisheryin American waters, including the eastern Bering Sea,
ended in 1980. That year, the Keiko Maru fleet left
port for crab fishery in Bristol Bay for the last time.

3. Antarctic Krill and Whaling Operations
Krill Operations
Measuring six inches in length, krill (Antarctic krill)
belongs to the order Euphausiacea together withshrimps and crabs. It was known among whalers as
food for baleen whales and other animals living in the
Antarctic Ocean.
Krill was abruptly thrust into the spotlight around1973, a time when fishery controls were tightening on
north-sea fishery.
Among the reasons for this sudden attention wasthat its vast stocks would not dry up even if harvested
in large amounts. Moreover, it matched well withshrimp and fish in terms of both taste and nutrition,and it presented no danger of contamination. But
above all else, what made krill attractive was that it
could be harvested unencumbered in international
waters and, at least for the immediate future, there
were no international regulations in place to control
its fishery.
Between 1973 and 1974, the Marine Fisheries
Research and Development Center (currently the
Fisheries Research Agency) conducted krill fisherytrials. Subsequently, Nippon Suisan became the firstprivate-sector interest to begin krill operations in
October 1974, when the trawler Aso Maru harvested
1,400 tons off the coast of Enderby Land, Antarctica.
This was followed by a 2,500-ton harvest in 1975. In
1976, Nippon Suisan sent two ships, the Aso Maru
and Yoshino Maru, with a view to mass production.
The result was a harvest of 6,400 tons. One purposeof this operation was to build up a history of krill
fishery in case it became subject to international controls in the future.
In 1977, the company tested a catch method thatinvolved sucking in krill with a pump. It also tried out
various methods for processing shelled, minced, anddried products. Thus, the company had growing
expectations that krill could translated into a successful business.
The Twilight of Whaling
On June 9, 1972, the United States put before theUnited Nations Conference on the Human
Environment (held in Stockholm) a proposal calling

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth228

Aso Maru operating in the Antarctic Ocean

Yoshino Maru, 4,000-ton class (completed in 1973)

for a 10-year moratorium on commercial whaling.
The emotionally charged proposal lacked scientificbasis and seemed intended to stir up a sense of crisis
concerning the global environment and its resources.
It was roundly criticized when it came up for debate
and was rejected at the International Whaling
Convention held on June 30. Nonetheless, international opinion against whaling subsequently began totake shape, led by the U.S.
This did not bode well for the future of whaling.
However, throughout the 1960s Nippon Suisan had
secured revenue from its whaling operations by effectively utilizing harvested whales and improving its
whale products in the face of shrinking quotas. It
anticipated that the fall in whaling quotas would
bottom out, and that then it could achieve sustainablebusiness by improving operational efficiency. In fact,
during this time Nippon Suisan invested as much as
3.1 billion yen to overhaul the main machinery on its
mother ships and build new whalers.
However, contrary to the company’s wishful thinking, cuts to whaling quotas continued unabated.
Concern about whaling and strong anti-whaling opinions gained strength from the global environmental
movement, whose point of reference differed fromthe resource-conservation mindset held by countries
in the fishing industry.
In addition to the per-country restrictions on thenumber of whales that could be harvested, which were
implemented from the 17th Antarctic whaling expedition of 1962–63, species-specific restrictions beganwith the 27th expedition of 1973–74. Until the 26th
expedition, if, for example, Nippon Suisan’s quota wasset at 410 BWU, the company could freely elect toharvest fin whales or sei whales, so long as it stayed
within this BWU quota. However, with the 27th
expedition, the company was given a species-specificquota—specifically, its catches could not exceed 346
fin whales and 885 sei whales. Once its quota for acertain species had been met, it could no longer catchany more whales of that species, even if it found more.
This lowered whaling efficiency and led to higher
costs to move and find whales.
Moreover, sea area-specific restrictions were addedfrom the 29th expedition of 1975–76. The coastal sea
areas around Antarctica were divided into six zones.
Each whaling fleet was assigned a zone, and the numberof whales of each species that a fleet could catch in its
zone was predetermined. At the time of the 30th

Australia

Area of krill
distribution
Atlantic Ocean

Enderby Land
Showa Station
Antarctica

Pacific Ocean

Area of krill distribution in the Antarctic Ocean

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth229

1975. The committee decided to proceed with integration after receiving assurances of legal and financial
support from the government and the understandingof labor unions. In February 1976, the new company,
Nippon Kyodo Hogei K.K., was born. It was comprised of six companies: the three original companies—Nippon Suisan, Taiyo Gyogyo, and Kyokuyo
Hogei—plus Nitto Hogei, Nippon Hogei, andHokuyo Hogei.
Of Nippon Kyodo Hogei’s 3 billion yen in capital,
Nippon Suisan contributed 32%. Iwao Fujita, a former
chairman of the Japan Fisheries Association, waspicked to be the new company’s president. Its fleet
consisted of three whaling mother ships and 20 catcher
boats that were sold to it by whaling companies. It
had 100 onshore employees (of whom, 27 came from
Nippon Suisan) and some 1,400 seagoing employees(434 from Nippon Suisan). As a rule, Nippon Suisan
found employment for those of its employees thatwere not transferred to the new company by reassigning them to other Nippon Suisan departments orproviding job-placement services to help them findwork in other companies.
The new company sent out two fleets, one eachcentered on the Tonan Maru II and Nisshin Maru
No.3, to conduct its first Antarctic whaling in October
1976. The Tonan Maru II was joined by eight whalers
and one refrigerator ship, while the Nisshin Maru
No.3 was accompanied by 10 whalers and one

expedition, Japan’s quota was reduced to slightly morethan one-third that of the previous year. Within this,Nippon Suisan’s quota was 61 fin whales and 358 sei
whales, figures that were less than half of the previous
year’s quota. On top of this, regulations became evenmore detailed, as the fin whale quota was limited tojust one of the six zones, and harvest of sei whales incertain zones was prohibited.
Regulations went so far as to even cover small minke
whales. And before long, minke whales became theonly species for which whaling was allowed in the
Antarctic Ocean.
In 1975, Nippon Suisan ended its whaling operations in the Antarctic Ocean and north seas when it
sent the Tonan Maru II on its final company voyages
to the north seas in May and then to the Antarctic in
October. The company also ceased whaling in waters
near Japan in 1976.
And thus the curtain closed on Nippon Suisan’s
whaling business, an activity reaching back 86 years
to its forebear that started commercial whaling,
Nippon Enyo Gyogyo K.K.
In 1974, the Fisheries Agency approached the three
Antarctic whaling companies with a plan to continue
whaling by combining operations and establishing an
integrated company as a countermeasure against stiffening whaling restrictions. In response, the three companies formed a preparatory committee to begin
studies toward integration in relevant fields in April

Changes in whaling harvests (1946 to 1975)(1,000 whales)

30
Worldwide
25

Japan
Nippon Suisan

20

15

10

5

0
1946

50

55

60

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth

65

70

75

(year)

230

refrigerator ship. These operations brought a total
catch of 1,237 sei whales, 3,950 minke whales, 234
sperm whales, and 225 Bryde’s whales. Their productproduction reached 40,289 tons, which included 5,819

tons of whale oil, 1,366 tons of sperm oil, 32,763 tonsof frozen food, 170 tons of salted food, and 172 tonsof collagen peptide and other products.

4. Development of Overseas BusinessNippon Suisan’s entry into North America started in1965 when it began purchasing and importing Alaskansalmon roe. This was five years after the 1961 liberalization of fishery product imports into Japan. In 1972,
Nippon Suisan opened a liaison office in Seattle toserve as a base for its fisheries business. It subsequently
expanded its purchases from salmon roe (for which
the market was extremely competitive) to include kingcrab and snow crab. And in 1973 it began a partnership with Gilman Brothers, which was its export partner for minced Alaska pollack.
Also in 1973, it provided $602,500 in investments
and loans to the Marpac, Inc. of Alaska and acquired
46% of its stock in return. It built a new canning plant
there for processing and sales of salmon cans, frozen
salmon, salmon roe, and frozen snow crab.
In May 1974, Nippon Suisan launched the Universal
Seafoods, Ltd., headquartered outside of Seattle in
Redmond, Washington, as a base for processing andsales of seafood products in North America. In Augustof the following year (1975), this new company began
full-scale operation with frozen processing of kingcrab and snow crab in a floating factory aboard the
UniSea, an engine-less cargo ship moored at Dutch
Harbor on Alaska’s Unalaska Island. In addition tocrab, it primarily processed surimi from Alaska pollack
and other fish as well as fish meal, and later expanded
to refrigerated warehousing and the hotel business.
Meanwhile, in March 1974, Nippon Suisan expanded
its representative office in Seattle and establishedNippon Suisan (U.S.A.), Inc. (capital of $30,000), a
wholly owned local affiliate, to oversee its North
America operations and locally invested companies
and to develop and promote new businesses and markets. The company’s head office was set up in Seattle(later moving to Redmond in 1997). Its purpose wasto purchase Alaskan surimi, salmon, Pacific herring,groundfish, roe, and fishmeal.

Overseas bases (1977)

Dutch Harbor
Seafoods

Las Palmas
resident office
MarpacDiego
NipponTrade Department

Universal Seafoods

Halifax resident office

Nippon Suisan U.S.A.
Remote Operations Department
Singapore resident office

Pacific Rim Seafoods

Maldives Nippon

SOSECHAL

W.I.F.
I.M.P.

Cape Town resident office

N.G.M.P.

N.R.P.
Wellington resident office

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth

Buenos Aires
resident office231

A shrimp trawler operated by N.R.P.

Alaska fishing base (Dutch Harbor, circa 1977)

Nippon Suisan dispatched the trawler Kirishima
Maru to conduct trail operations near Chile in 1976,
and did the same with the Kirishima Maru and Fuji
Maru in 1977. These operations led to the launch ofa joint venture to develop fisheries in Chile(EMDEPES) in 1978. However, after acquiring landto build a plant in Puerto Montt, the new company
had to proceed on shaky ground amid signs that theChilean government would alter its fisheries policy.
In Malaysia, a new company called Sarawak Suisan
Sdn, Bhd. was established in Sibu, Sarawak, with
360,000 Malaysia dollars in 1973. Nippon Suisan
entered into a technical tie-up with this company andapplied its expertise to producing high-quality frozen
shrimp.
In Europe, Nippon Suisan established Atlantic
Fisheries Development (A.F.D.) in Ireland in 1974.
This move was in response to a call by the Irish government, which had set forth a policy to develop fisheryresources in the North Atlantic Ocean in preparation
for the era of the 200-nautical-mile EEZ, and to attract
foreign industrial capital in view of its participationin the European Community. However, Nippon

Suisan pulled out of Ireland in 1978 due to difficulties
that EEZ regulations caused to operations in thenorthwest Atlantic.
In March 1977, prior to the 200-nautical-mile EEZ
era, Nippon Suisan’s had invested a total of $3.75
million in paid-in capital into eight overseas companies under the Trade Department, including Diego
Nippon (Spain), Sonigui (Guinea), Marpac (Seattle,
U.S.A.), and Universal Seafoods (Redmond, U.S.A.).
As for its Remote Operations Department, it wasinvolved in six joint ventures that included N.R.P.
(Australia), W.I.F. (Indonesia), I.M.P. (Indonesia),
and N.G.M.P. (New Guinea), and its operating fleet
consisted of one large trawler, 10 small trawlers, and50 shrimp trawlers. It achieved yields of 3,724 tons ofshrimp and 8,795 tons of groundfish, and sales equivalent to 10.1 billion yen.
It was exporting fishery products to Greece, Italy,
France, Spain, Portugal, Africa, and other destinations
through Nissho Iwai Corporation, Toshoku K.K.,
Itochu Corporation, Marubeni Corporation, andothers. And its local buyers were developing sales
avenues.

Part 3 Nippon Suisan during the Era of Slow Growth
A Rapidly Changing Management Environment
For the fishing industry, the 1973 oil crisis sparked
difficult economic times accompanied by inflation(stagflation). Among other problems, the industry
was now faced with skyrocketing prices for vessel fueland materials, rising personnel expenses, stagnatingfish prices, and poor sales of fish sausages, canned
products, and high-quality frozen fish. Althoughprices stabilized in 1975 as long-term government
measures for curbing overall demand took effect, theslump worsened as companies not only adjusted their

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth232production and inventories to match declining consumption but also curtailed employment.
During the UNCLOS III gathering of 1974, developing countries and others, spurred by “resource
nationalism”, put forward demands for the establishment of exclusive economic zones. There were increasingly louder calls for stronger restrictions against
north-sea fishery and whaling.
At a board meeting following the general stockholders meeting of late November 1973, Vice President
Masatake Suzuki was appointed Nippon Suisan’s newpresident, and outgoing President Haruo Nakai wasnamed chairman of the board with right of representation. On December 1, immediately after taking his
new post, President Suzuki issued an official message
to the company. Noting Nippon Suisan’s tough management environment, he urged employees to band
together and positively face the future, to improve
productivity, and to eliminate waste. Again, in May
1974, he issued a message calling on employees to“innovate everywhere”. Questioning the reasons for
year-on-year increases in personnel and material costsof 9 billion yen and 8 billion respectively, he called on
employees to eliminate these increases by changing
their ways of thinking and improving work methods
and mechanisms.
Faced with rapidly changing circumstances, Nippon
Suisan hammered out a new management policy forfiscal 1974 and thereafter that emphasized lower fishing costs and a stronger processed foods business infrozen foods and other areas. Although revenue wasup that year on the back of 174.5 billion yen in sales,
ordinary income amounted to 2.1 billion yen, while
net profit stood at 1.5 billion yen, which was far below
the previous year’s figure of 4 billion yen. Consequently,
the company cut executives’ salaries and made cost
reductions in all departments beginning in February
1975. On April 10, 1975, Suzuki issued an official
message titled “a request to all onshore and offshore
Nippon Suisan employees”. In it, he declared that,amid a worsening business environment, the company
was facing its worst crisis since its foundation andmust improve revenue by 5 billion yen. He called on
all employees, whether they worked on land or onboard
ships, to pull together to overcome the crisis, and heasked for their understanding and cooperation in
helping ensure Nippon Suisan’s survival. Five days
later, he issued another message announcing the establishment of the First Planning Committee (chairedby Shun-ichi Okuchi).
Reinforcing Processing Operations
At a board meeting following the general stockholders
meeting of December 1975, Vice President Juro
Osoegawa assumed the company’s presidency.
Over the two years that passed since UNCLOS III
opened in December 1973, the concept of “economic
zones extending out 200 nautical miles” gained increasing acceptance. That year, the United States’ Senate
debated the Magnuson-Stevens Act, which, among
other provisions, sought to establish a fishing zone
reaching out 200 nautical miles.
One area being considered under this law was the
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands region, a fishingground that provided half of Nippon Suisan’s fishingbusiness revenue. If its operations were to become
restricted there, the company could not expect toincrease its catch quantity. Indeed, such restriction
would mark the dawn of a new era of declining operations. Consequently, measures to promote intensive
use of fishing grounds and create higher added value
would be essential to future business management.
When he was still a vice president, President
Osoegawa had been in charge of Nippon Suisan’s sales
and processing operations for one year. He described
his impression of this time as follows.
“The company has large quantities of fish as raw
feedstock, but it is not necessarily utilizing these quantities effectively. Why hasn’t this advantage being tied
to sales? I think we should review our sales systemand consider a business method that interlinks fresh
fish and frozen foods” (Nissui Koho Tokubetsu-go, June
1975).

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth233

President Osoegawa thus made reinforcing processing operations throughout the entire company thefoundation of his management policy.
Osoegawa’s management policy was reflected on areport by the First Planning Committee, which beganwork in April 1975, and led to reorganization andrestructuring in 1975.
The settlement of accounts for fiscal 1975 (fullyear) showed a slight increase in profit, partially due
to a rebound in fish prices, with ordinary income
reaching 2.8 billion yen and net profit standing at 1.5
billion yen. During the fiscal year, dividends werereduced from 15% to 10% and then again down to8%; however, the company narrowly avoided having
to stop dividend payments.
Report of the First Planning Committee
The Planning Committee’s task was to formulate avision of Nippon Suisan in the 1980s. This vision was
to be a source of hope and vitality for regular employees, whose ambitions tend to atrophy.
Regarding the economic environment, the report
noted that structural changes in consumption causedby the oil crisis-sparked international economic downturn and slower growth in Japan’s economy were affecting Nippon Suisan’s business by causing low fish prices
and poor performance in frozen food products, andthat these conditions were placing downward pressure
on profits.
As for deep-seas fishery, it mentioned that the emergence of “resource nationalism” was driving enactmentof the new International Law of the Sea, and that thistrend was upsetting the foundation of Nippon Suisan’sfundamental businesses.
Given these circumstances, the report proposedthat Nippon Suisan should move forward by lowering
its high dependency on fishing operations and raising
the importance of non-fishing operations while simultaneously expanding sales through purchases in Japanand abroad. It recommended making stronger sales
capabilities and processing the foundation of these

efforts, and it proposed bringing greater efficiency tofishing in line with allowable limits and promoting
development imports in order to ensure stable supplyof fishery products.
It laid out the following directions for individual
business sectors:•Fishing:
Implement streamlining measuresin response to international order ofthe seas. Strive to maintain sales andpursue profits through intensive useof catches.
•Shipping:
Strengthen international competitiveness from a comprehensive viewpoint (including affiliates) towithstand sudden changes in theinternational environment.
•Processed foods: Take proactive steps toward becoming a general foods company.
•Trading:
Expand overseas and domestic purchasing by systematically utilizing
the company’s technical capabilities.
•New business: Actively develop new businesses inways that fit with the company’s
makeup.
According to the committee, what was needed torealize the new suggested policy was reorganization
to reinforce the sales system, strengthen purchasing
and trading components, and promote developmentof new products.
Taking these recommendations, the company
decided to reinforce its sales system by utilizing a “sales
headquarters” framework to preside over sales, processing , development, and the Central ResearchLaboratory, while at the same time clarifying its systemfor communicating with branches. Furthermore, tohandle more extensive regional distribution, it decided
to assign a board member to supervise eastern andwestern Japan as the general manager of both theTokyo and Osaka Branches. It also set about establishing a new product development office based on recognition that “the processed food business cannot
grow without the development of new products”.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth234

In its effort to ensure stable supply of fishery products, it decided to improve the efficiency of vessel
operations in accordance with allowable conditions
and promote development imports and domestic purchasing. Other measures it addressed included
strengthening the makeup of shipping operations andaugmenting holds to match shipping strength, reorganizing and reinforcing the processed foods business,bolstering the competiveness of cold storage business(specifically, equipment automation, labor-saving andexpanding warehouse capacity), improving production
through close labor-management consultations, andmeasures to address the aging society phenomenon
as a form of personnel administration. Still others
included active development of technical guidance,
common fishery, and joint ventures as circumstances
permit in order to secure fish protein.
Tough Times for the Food Products Business
The processed foods business had been expected tomake up for lost revenue in the fishing business.
Unfortunately, however, it did not produce profits aseasily as was hoped.
Around the mid-1960s, the fish sausage and hammarket, which had been growing strongly, began tocontract at a rate of about 3% annually. Amid cutthroat
competition, the company’s efforts to recover lost
revenue by raising prices did not go well, necessitating
action to adjust and streamline production. On theother hand, its frozen foods business was continuing
to show healthy growth, and thus the company was
attempting to differentiate itself from the competition
by offering fishery products and frozen foods madewith fishery products. However, its once promisingramen and mayonnaise businesses made little headway
and were being scaled back. Nippon Suisan began
adjusting its production systems for these products
and taking other actions to reconfigure its production
plants, a process that was completed in March 1972.
The company looked forward to returning to the blackin fiscal 1973.

In March 1972, Nippon Suisan presented a mediumterm processed foods plan for the three-year period
between 1972 and 1974 to the Central Producers
Conference. In effect, this plan was a growth strategy.
It put forth a scheme to establish the Nippon Suisan
brand by developing differentiated high-quality products using value-added processed foods made with
mass-caught species landed by fishing operations.
Because production and sales had been separated in1971 (the year prior to the plan’s implementation) andplants were now under the management of the head
office, the plan was praised for allowing the sales division to dedicate itself to sales.
However, just three months later, Nippon Suisan’s
overall business performance worsened due to sudden
yield reductions, falling fish prices, and other developments. This combined with rising feedstock and personnel costs in the food products business made itnecessary to review the plan. Of particular concern
was the need to break the slump in the fish sausage
and ham business. And this led to even greater consolidation of production plants.
That year, a public stir was created when suspicions
arose that AF2 (acrylic furylfuramide), a preservative
used in processed foods, was a potential carcinogen.
Predicting that use of AF2 would be banned, Nippon
Suisan developed a technology for sterilization withpressurization and heating that can maintain quality
without use of AF2. It began marketing fish sausages
and fish hams made with this new technology in 1973.
However, this incident spurred even further contraction of the fish sausage market.
In October 1973, a new medium-term plan to cover
the years 1974 to 1976 was prepared for Nippon
Suisan’s processed foods category. The plan called forthe processed foods business’s establishment as anindependent organization. It also proposed expanding
the product range by breaking away from reliance on
fishery products to also include agricultural and livestock products. It included the creation of a processed
foods division during the Nippon Suisan’s reorganization in December, and aimed to return plant

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth235management to the branches and realize an integrated
product-sales framework in each region by placing the
new Processed Foods Department in charge of national
coordination and integration of all activities between
production and sales.
The plan also included utilization of the company’s
production capabilities by using fishery products asfeedstock; efforts to reduce cost by holding down
distribution costs, etc.; setting up frozen food sales
sections in the Takamatsu Branch as well as the Sendai,
Nagoya, and Fukuoka Branches to reinforce the sales
system; organization of a wholesalers’ association andunification of business negotiations with mass retailers; and starting of new businesses.
From mid-1974, the previously high rate of growth
Processing plants in 1976

in frozen foods slowed as the industry entered a periodof stable growth. Companies concentrated on products that they could produce efficiently—such as
shumai and gyoza dumplings, hamburger steaks, andcroquettes—and thus set the stage for fierce
competition.
In January 1975, Nippon Suisan launched Nittake
Shokuhin K.K. to market retort-pouch foods in partnership with Takeda Pharmaceutical Company
Limited. Utilizing packaging developed with the technologies of Toyo Seikan, this new venture produced
products with high-retort sterilization, a process
whereby retort pouches were heated with very hot
steam to a temperature of 135°C for a short period oftime. This process maintained the texture and taste

Itami Plant (frozen foods)

Hakodate Plant(fish sausages and hams,
chikuwa)
Mogami Plant(canned foods)
Tobata General Plant(fish sausages and hams,
chikuwa, frozen foods)

Himeji Plant(chikuwa)

Onagawa General Plant(fish sausages and hams, chikuwa,
canned foods, frozen foods)

Shimizu Plant(canned foods,
chikuwa)
Hachioji General Plant(fish sausages and hams, chikuwa, frozen foods)

Anjo Plant (frozen foods)

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth236

of ingredients even better than conventional retortpouch products. The new company offered a broad
range of products that included hamburger steaks,
creamed whitefish, yakitori, and grilled eel. However,sales did not meet expectations and as a result Nippon
Suisan decided to pull the plug on the venture in
March 1977.
Meanwhile, the downsizing of fishing operations
was having an effect even on the processed foods business. In 1975, Nippon Suisan sent out its last Antarctic
whaling fleet. When it subsequently decided to scaleback work at the Onagawa Plant, which had been awhale canning plant, it sparked a labor problem. The
strife grew so large that it affected discussions on
improving the processed foods business until an agreement was eventually reached in 1979. The reconstruction policy that was formulated during this process
became a new medium-term plan for the processed
foods business.
Expanded Purchasing
The First Planning Committee noted that previous
emphasis on developing marine products had resulted
in delays in securing fishery products from trading
companies. It also put forth the following
recommendations:•Cover shortages in mother ship-type bottom trawl
fishery catches by making domestic purchases in
Hokkaido and the Sanriku region.
•Joint ventures by remote operations should introduce
fishery as a development system for underdeveloped
countries. This can benefit local countries if theRetort-pouch products

products are sent to local consumption and surpluses
are exported.
•In overseas purchasing, regard trading companies ascompetitors, paying particular attention to shrimp.
•Develop purchasing of frozen tuna.
•Expand investment and operations to the Alaskanproducers Universal Seafoods and Marpac, andexpand scale by diversifying partner companies.
•Also focus on Atlantic octopus and squid.
Around 1975, one problem concerning the distribution of fishery products was a changing environment
surrounding retail stores. Fish retail stores became
largely grouped into four classifications (i.e., traditional fresh fish shops, sushi restaurants, catering
shops, and fish sections of mass retailers) and store
sizes were becoming smaller. Thus, the committee
noted that any effort to increase sales volume would
require the development of off-market distribution
outside of existing routes as well as study of direct sales
to food product manufacturers and mass retail stores.
It also recommended improving Nippon Suisan’s
brand power by increasing added value through thedevelopment of new applications based on frozen fishprocessing.
Looking to reinforce its purchasing, Nippon Suisan
established special purchasing sections in its Tokyo,
Osaka, and Fukuoka Branches in 1976. At this time,
it was enjoying strong performance in its fish feed/oil
and meal purchasing, which was a new business forthe company, as well as fish oil refining at its Onagawa
Fish Feed and Oil Plant. As a result of these activities,
Nippon Suisan’s fresh and frozen fish sales grew by
41% in fiscal 1976, while its purchasing alone improvedby 81% and refrigerated warehousing grew by 31%.
The company also improved storage functions at catchlanding sites. In 1977 it built a new refrigerated warehouse at Hachinohe Teion Reizo and constructed a
new Kushiro Plant for Hakodate Teion Reizo.
Company-wide sales in 1977 exceeded budgeted
figures in terms of both sales and profit, despite thearrival of 200-nautical-mile EEZs. This was attributed
to the company’s effort to reverse its ratio of marine

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth237

products to purchased and imported products. Thus,
Nippon Suisan was achieving the First Planning
Committee’s recommendation to turn around theratio of own marine products to other products from
7:3 to 3:7 within three years.
Reinforcing the Cold Storage Business
The First Planning Committee was also the body thatadvised Nippon Suisan to enhance and reinforce its
national network of refrigerated warehouses toimprove its ability to sell marine products.
Nippon Suisan therefore began an organizational
review and aggregation effort that would allow it torespond to sales needs at the national level, with threetemperature zones (frozen, dry, and chilled), and with
365-days-a-year delivery, rather than at the local warehouse level, as was conventional practice.
In refrigerated warehousing, a great deal of time
passes before invested capital can be recovered.
Consequently, a company must have the financial
strength necessary to support it. With the arrival of
EEZs, it was inevitable that fishery regulations would

become tighter. Such regulations meant smaller yields
for Nippon Suisan and the rest of Japan’s fishing industry. Thus, Nippon Suisan’s effort to expand its refrigerated warehouse network was not only a proactive
countermeasure against regulations but also a strategy
to cultivate profit-earning business while it still had
the fundamental strength necessary. Moreover, it went
beyond intensifying the company’s food plants; it wasalso seen as a means to redistribute personnel fromshrinking fishing operations.
Nippon Suisan’s refrigerated warehouses took two
forms: coastal facilities serving as bases for landing
catches from deep-seas trawlers and receiving imports,
and refrigerated warehouses at points of consumptionthat supply large consumer markets. As of 1977, thecompany had a total of 18 such facilities. The arrivalof EEZ regulations was expected to lead to smallercatches. To respond, Nippon Suisan enacted a strategy
to develop profit-earning business by permitting general consignors to use warehouses that theretofore had
mainly served to store its own fishery products only,
allowing handling of not only fishery products but
also frozen foods and other items, and upgrading

Coldstores in 1976

SapporoKushiroIntegrated control room for freezing
machines

Hakodate
AomoriOi Coldstore

Hachinohe
Onagawa
SendaiTobataWarehouse work

HachiojiFukuoka

Harumi
Oi
Anjo
Oita

Heiwajima

NagoyaItami

Kumamoto

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth238

1976: Nippon Suisan’s Oi Coldstore
Ota City, Tokyo 20,000 tons

1976: Nippon Suisan’s Heiwajima Coldstore 1975: Nippon Suisan’s Anjo Coldstore
Ota City, Tokyo 2,814 tons
Anjo City, Aichi Prefecture 15,300 tons

warehouses’ functions to make them distribution centers that also provide freight transport.
Nippon Suisan implemented the various components of the expansion strategy in rapid succession.
In 1975 it completed construction of the Anjo
Coldstore (Anjo City, Aichi Prefecture). And in 1976
it began operating the Oi Coldstore (Ota City, Tokyo)
and Heiwajima Coldstore (Ota City, Tokyo).
It deserves noting that the Japan Association ofRefrigerated Warehouses was formed on October 4,
1973, when functions concerning business-oriented
refrigerated warehouses of the Japan Association ofRefrigerating Industry (founded in 1948) were spun
off into an independent organization. The association’s main purpose is to serve the public’s interest in
the refrigerated warehouse industry.
A Tough Fight in the Shipping BusinessEver since it was planned and implemented in theFive-Year Reformation Plan in 1959, Nippon Suisan’s
shipping business had been positioned alongside fishing and food processing as one of the company’s threemain businesses. And, although its sales were small incomparison with fishing, it provided stable profits.
However, the Nixon Shock of 1971 caused the fixedexchange rate regime (pegged at 360 yen to one U.S.
dollar) that had continued since the end of World War
II to collapse and hastened a shift to a floating regime
in February 1973. As a result, the yen quickly appreciated to 308 yen to the dollar and then further to 260
yen. The strengthening yen afflicted ocean-going shipping involving tankers, ore carriers, and other vessels
by dragging down its international competitivenessas costs for crews and other items rose. Then came thefirst oil crisis in October of the same year. Although
the crisis temporarily brought the exchange rate backup to around 300 yen to the U.S. dollar, it also caused
the amount of trade to plummet, thereby producing
a glut of vessels. This environment delivered a major
blow to the international shipping industry.
Moreover, Japan’s policy vis-à-vis shipping changed
following the oil crisis, as it now sought to integrate
major shipping companies. While the new integration
policy was designed to secure sea lanes, it also meantthat shipping companies that were not specificallytargeted would lose their subsidies. Accordingly, suchcompanies came under pressure to further reduce costsby various means, including selling their vessels tooverseas interests and crewing ships with foreigners.
In March 1976, the ore/oil combination carrier
Amazon Maru was completed at Ishikawajima-Harima
Heavy Industry’s Aioi Shipyard at a cost of 8 billion
yen. Nippon Suisan took delivery and began operating
her in May under a 15-year time-charter agreementwith Kawasaki Steel Corporation.
Establishment of Nissui Senpaku
As a response to such circumstances in its shipping
business, Nippon Suisan attempted to improve competitiveness and profitability by abolishing its Vessel
Operations Department and transferring the department’s duties to Group member Nissui Kaiun in July
1976. It then concentrated all aspects of the shipping
business, including those pertaining to tankers, inNissui Kaiun.
Behind this measure were the poor conditions

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth239

The ore/oil combination carrier Amazon Maru (completed in
1976)

facing shipping in general—namely, weakening competitiveness caused by the fluctuating exchange rate
regime and falling freight charges due to plummetingtrade volume—combined with a severe business environment for Nippon Suisan that was attributable togreatly lower freight flows from overseas fishery. This
environment made it necessary for the company tostrengthen its competitiveness and integrate management and operation systems. By separating the shipping business, Nippon Suisan sought to pursue theadvantages that come with being a specializedcompany.
In 1976, Nippon Suisan leased a total of nine vessels
on a bareboat basis (i.e., without crews) to Nissui
Kaiun. They included the Matsushima Maru,
Matsushima Maru II, Matsushima Maru III, Andesu
Maru, Nippon Maru, Nippon Maru III, and Amazon
Maru. At the same time, it renamed Nissui Kaiun as

Nissui Senpaku Co., Ltd. and increased its capitalfrom 50 million yen to 200 million yen (with a further
increase to 800 million yen in 1980). Furthermore, ittransferred the Isokaze Maru, which was the mostadvanced refrigerated carrier to date, to Nissui Senpaku
in October 1976. This move was intended to give
Nissui Senpaku depreciable funds and enhance thecomposition of its finances.
In line with these measures, Nippon Suisan transferred 375 of its large-ship crewmen and 26 of its
onshore employees to Nissui Senpaku in January 1977.
Simultaneously it leased the newly constructed
Nippon Suisan vessels Asama Maru and Ikoma Maru
to Nissui Senpaku on a bareboat basis. From its beginning, Nissui Senpaku had a total staff of 594 offshore
employees and 42 onshore employees. It should be
noted that Nippon Suisan also transferred 75 of its
large-ship crewmen to Nippon Kyodo Hogei when it
was established in 1976.
Thus, Nissui Senpaku was born as a company totake full-time charge of ship administration (tankers,
ore carriers, and other vessels), administer cool carrier
service to carry Nippon Suisan-affiliated fishery products from fishing grounds, and manage reefers (temperature controlled transport) that carry generalocean-going refrigerated cargo.

Development and Expansion during Japan’s Era of Rapid Economic Growth240Section IV
Structural Change during the Period of
Slow Growth
Chapter 1: Changes in the Economy and Fishery
Environment
1977–1985

Part 1 Trade Friction between the U.S. and Japan
U.S.–Japan Trade Friction in the 1980s
In 1979, the Iranian Revolution brought oil production in Iran’s neighbors to a halt. The result was asecond oil crisis that suddenly drove up previously
stable crude oil prices. Like the first oil crisis six years
earlier, this environment plunged the world’s economy
into stagflation. However, Japan, having learned wellfrom the previous crisis, was able to minimize theeffect on its own economy by taking an integrated
public-private sector approach that included earlyfinancial belt-tightening and thorough resource andenergy conservation.
Amid continuing stagflation, Ronald Reagan, who
had been sworn in as the new U.S. president in January
1981, announced three major policies for a return toa “strong America”. These were fiscal austerity measures
to curb inflation, major tax breaks to spur corporate
investment, and expansion of military spending.
However, these policies ultimately led to fiscal deficits
and trade deficits that were dubbed the “twindeficits”.
The U.S.’s twin deficits continued to grow at an

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

accelerated pace during the early 1980s. Eventually
the target of American anger at this situation became
Japan’s trade surplus with the U.S. Having quickly
shaken off the second oil crisis’s effects, the Japanese
economy was posting ever larger current account balances since 1981. According to statistics of the U.S.
Department of Commerce, around the mid-1980s
America’s trade deficit with Japan exceeded $50 billion, which was more than five times what it was in
the late 1970s.
U.S.–Japan trade friction that first emerged in the
1970s became increasingly intense entering the 1980s.
Specifically, this friction was felt in the automobile
sector and in high-tech sectors, such as semiconductors and electronics. In succession, Japan’s major exportindustries in these and other sectors began moving
production to the U.S. in a bid to avoid trade friction.
However, even with these efforts, the trade balance
failed to improve. Eventually the problem sparked
calls in the U.S. for Japan to improve its economic
structure, which in turn led to the Japan–U.S. Structural
Impediments Initiative (SII).

241

Part 2 Changing Consumption and Distribution of Food Products
Developing Infrastructure for Daily Living
From the end of the era of rapid economic growth,through the second oil shock and the rise and thencollapse of the “bubble economy”, to the Heisei Fukyo
recession, Japan’s economic circumstances evolved ata bewildering pace. Against this backdrop, the national
average yearly salary of working-class households morethan doubled from 2.834 million yen in 1975 to 6.85
million yen in 1995.
Consumer spending also increased in step, andaccordingly durable goods became more prevalent insociety. In particular, from the 1970s until the 1990s,
there was a conspicuous increase in consumer productsthat make life easier, among them room air conditioners, microwave ovens, large refrigerators, and video
tape recorders (VTRs). Moreover, the 1980s saw thearrival of toilet seats with a warm-water shower featurein ordinary households, marking a major change inliving styles. Also appearing were word processors,facsimile machines, and personal computers. The
popularity of PCs, in particular, had a profound
impact on subsequent lifestyles.
In terms of the structure of consumption, the percentage of money spent on daily essentials (e.g., expenditure for food, furniture and household utensils,
clothing, etc.) entered a declining trend, while thatfor communications and transportation grew strongly.
The share of expenditure for services, such as money
outlaid for education and amusement, also grew.

Greater Availability of Information on Food andDaily Living
In the 1980s, a series of new cooking magazines started
appearing on the market. Theretofore, cooking had
generally been featured as a single section in the content of general women’s magazines; however now
magazines almost entirely dedicated to cooking werebeing published.

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

The magazine that opened the floodgates here was
ESSE (Fusosha Publishing Inc.), which first appearedin 1981. ESSE used multipage layouts to present various recipes with color photographs to highlight their
attractiveness, and by doing so it influenced all subsequent cooking magazines. In actuality, ESSE’s content featured more than just cooking, as it also ran
articles on health, childrearing, and interior decorating, among other topics. These features made it alifestyle magazine rather than a simple cooking magazine. On the other hand, Orange Page (East Japan
Railway Company), a magazine that began publicationin 1985, first appeared on shelves of the national massretailing chain Daiei. This origin was reflected in its
becoming a true cooking magazine. Orange Page also
spawned a great number of cookbooks, leading to anincreasing number of housewives and single women
who used them as guides in the kitchen. Anothermagazine, Lettuce Club (Kadokawa Marketing ),appeared in 1987. Because it was initially under theumbrella of the Seiyu supermarket chain, Lettuce Club
was a lifestyle magazine that often presented newliving ideas by exploring supermarket circulars in great
detail. In a way, it served as a bridge between the
distributor and the homemaker. A major characteristicof Lettuce Club was its position as a daily living magazine found on shelves right next to the cash register.
The cooking magazines and books that appearedat this time popularized the joy of eating by highlighting the wide world of cuisine. They featured recipes
rich with variety and capable of adding spice to dailyliving. They presented cooking methods that taught
readers how to skillfully utilize ingredients in diverse
ways. And they suggested party menus for foods thatwere easy to prepare but looked gorgeous.

Changes in Dietary Habits andthe Food Products Industry
Consumption of rice, the main staple of the Japanese242diet, was in steady decline. In 1980, yearly per capita
rice consumption in Japan stood at 45.8 kg; by 1990,
this figure fell to 35.3 kg, or by 10 kg in 10 years.
However, consumption of bread and noodles did not
grow particularly strongly during this time. A look at
the compositional makeup of food expenditure showsthat, while the shares of purchased rice and perishable
foods generally declined, the share of processed foods
grew steadily. Moreover, the percentage spent in restaurants and other such establishments grew evenmore conspicuously than before.
The sudden growth of chain stores that began in
the 1970s was fueled by the entry of housewives into
the labor force as part-time workers. The more timethat housewives spent at their jobs, the less time theyspent doing housework, which in turn led to the simplification of meals served at home. At the same time,eating at home became less frequent and eating out atrestaurants became more and more routine. Moreover,the enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Law (revised) in 1985 further accelerated women’s
advancement into working society. Amid such circumstances, convenience stores began to stock a broad
range of onigiri rice balls, bento boxed meals, sandwiches, and other items on their shelves from themid-1980s. Additionally food services centered on
take-home precooked dishes in various forms—
including catering, home-delivery, and take-out—
grew. Indeed, it was boxed meals, prepared dishes, andother forms of precooked food that satisfied the needsof full-time working women.

Food Diversification and Expansion andDevelopment of the Food Products Industry
Changes in the household structure brought about
by lower birthrates and emergence of the nuclear
family were also becoming apparent. The percentagesof households comprised of a single person or married
couple without children grew rapidly. Among singleperson households, many consisted of an elderly
person or unmarried woman. And among households

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthcomprised of a married couple without children, many
enjoyed high household incomes because both members worked. There are significant differences between
senior citizens and young women in terms of the types
and quantities of food they want, and food demandvaries depending on income. Consequently, the kinds
of food required by society became more and morediversified compared to times when large families ate
the same foods together.
At the same time, general supermarkets expanded
their sales spaces for perishable foods and other foodproducts, while convenience stores fought back byintroducing a broad range of products to address consumer demand for precooked foods. The foods products industry also joined in by developing new menus;
for example, bento boxed meal chain stores createdproducts specifically targeting young women. The
growing range of available menus and rich variety of
products brought customers into stores. And as menus
became even more varied over the years, the foodproducts industry expanded and evolved to keeppace.
A supporting factor in the diversification of food
was the emergence of processed and frozen foods.
Various forms of processed and frozen food products
appeared on the market, and the range of advanced
processed foods broadened to include instant foods,
precooked frozen foods, and retort-pouch foods. This
was a result of efforts to satisfy demand among working housewives and single people for foods that wereboth easy to prepare and delicious. Consumption offrozen foods increased dramatically as more products
became available, with yearly per capita consumption
growing from 3.4 kg in 1975 to 15.24 kg in 1995, anincrease of approximately five times in 20 years.
Meanwhile, various problems threatening foodsafety, such as dioxin and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) contamination, came to light throughout the world from the early 1990s. As a result, healthconcerns joined demand for deliciousness and convenience as a factor that accelerated the diversificationof food needs.

243Part 3 Arrival of the Era of 200-Nautical-Mile Zones
1. The Shift toward 200-Nautical-Mile Zones in Major Developed Countries
and Japan
Enactment of the U.S.’s Fishery Conservationand Management Act
The Third United Nations Conference on the Lawof the Sea (UNCLOS III) of 1973 lasted nine years
between its start and eventual adoption of the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea. During this time,the idea that exclusive economic zones for fisheries
must be established quickly spread rapidly amongdeveloped nations.
In October 1975, almost two years since UNCLOS
III was first convened, Iceland stepped forward to
establish a 200-nautical-mile exclusive fishing zone.
Ireland’s main industry was fishing, as it was surrounded on all sides by excellent fishing grounds.
However, this excellence was attracting more and morefishing boats from the United Kingdom, other
European nations, and the Soviet Union. Thus, thefact that Iceland took the step of establishing an exclusive fishing zone ahead of the developed nations suggests its sense of crisis here.

Within the United States, as well, public debate
was taking shape over expanding the country’s exclusive fishing zone to 200 nautical miles as a provisional
measure until the Law of the Sea could be executed.
This was against a backdrop of growing dissatisfaction
among coastal fishery operators about operations byfishing boats from the Soviet Union, Japan, European
Economic Community (EEC), and other nations.
Amid such circumstances, Senator Warren G.
Magnuson (Democrat from Washington) submitted
a bill that would extend the U.S.’s exclusive fishingzone to 200 nautical miles to the Senate when thesecond session of UNCLOS III began in June 1974.
However, the “Magnuson Bill”, as it came to be called,
became shelved in the Senate and was eventuallyscrapped.
The following year, 1975, Magnuson again submitted the same bill to the Senate. A similar bill was also
submitted to the House of Representatives. The billpassed the House of Representatives in September
1975 and then the Senate in January 1976. It was signed

200-nautical-mile zones and high-seas fishing areas

200-nautical-mile zone

High-seas fishing area
Source: Japan Fisheries Association

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth244into law as the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act of 1976 (commonly known as the FCMA) by
President Gerald Ford in April and took effect on
March 1, 1977.
The following is an outline of the FCMA at thetime of its enactment.
(1) It establishes a 200-nautical-mile fishery conservation zone measured from the U.S. coast. (2) It
declares that the United States will exercise exclusive
fishery management rights for the following: all fish
species except tuna in the fishery conservation zone,
all anadromous species and sedentary species of thecontinental shelf in other sea areas that originate fromthe United States, and all continental shelf resourcesthat go beyond 200 nautical miles. (3) It allows foreign
fishing only when conducted under a governing international agreement in which the partner government
clearly recognizes the United States’ right to exercise
exclusive fishery management in the zone, and requires
partner countries to pay fees to cover a portion of U.S.
expenditure for enforcement and research. It also statesthat foreign fishing shall be practiced in accordancewith U.S. laws and controls based on permits issued
by the United States. (4) It stipulates that the Total
Allowance Level of Foreign Fishing (TALFF) will becalculated by six newly established Regional FisheryCouncils by subtracting the catch capacity of U.S.
fishing boats from the optimum yield (OY) for eachspecies of each year. And (5) for foreign fishing that
had been practiced under existing international agreements, it requires that the relevant agreements berenegotiated to ensure that they match with the content of the FCMA.
Accordingly, the FCMA stipulated that fishing
shall take place under the management of a coastal
country—specifically, the United States. It thus signaled the end of an era in which fishing could be
conducted freely in coastal waters.
Enactment of the Breaux Act
In 1978, a revised FCMA was enacted that, over andStructural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

above promoting seafood trade based on quotas, addeda system of surcharges to fishing fees in order to cover
expenses for natural disaster relief to American fishermen. The next year, 1979, laws (the PackwoodMagnuson Amendment [PM Act] and Perry
Amendment) were enacted that halved the quotas ofcountries that do not observe conservation measuresestablished by international organizations. And in
December 1980, the American Fisheries Promotion
Act (Breaux Act) was enacted to protect and develop
free fishing in the U.S.’s 200-nautical-mile zone.
A factor behind the Breaux Act was dissatisfaction
among U.S. fishery interests arising from skyrocketing
fuel costs and sluggish growth of the fishing industry.
Although all items concerning yields and operational
conditions in the American zone were now determined through management plans based on the
FCMA, the quota allocated to Japanese fishery for
1977, the first year of a new Japan–U.S. fishery agreement, was 1.14 tons (of which, the quota for Alaska
pollack was 836,400 tons). This was an 11% reduction
compared to the 1.32-million-ton quota allowed theprevious year. This reduction led to fleet reductionsof four vessels in trawl fishery and one vessel (suspension of fishing ) in north-sea longline/gill net
fishery.
Initially the bill included items having extreme
importance to Japan, among them the phasing out of
foreign fishing over a five-year period. Japan lobbied
hard for changes with concerned parties of the U.S.
government and Congress. This effort resulted inslight modifications to the phase-out and other itemsof the bill. The bill’s sponsor, Representative John
Breaux of Louisiana, was serving as chair of the fisheries and wildlife subcommittee of the House ofRepresentatives’ shipping and fisheries committee.
The following is a basic outline of the bill:
1) The United States can reduce the 1979 TALFF by
5 to 15% as U.S. yields grow.
2) Fishing fees will be set by multiplying the total costsof FCMA and its execution by the proportion offoreign yields against all yields (including the U.S.

245

yield).
3) As a general rule, American observers will board
100% of foreign fishing boats, with the expenses
for this boarding collected from the foreign fishingboats.
4) When setting fishing quotas, the first consideration
will be the amount of cooperation relevant countries
give to U.S. seafood exports.
Regarding item 1), in particular, although conditions barring foreign fishing (a so-called “phase out”)
were slightly modified after intense lobbying in the
U.S. government and members of Congress, the bill
was nonetheless signed into law by the president in
December 1980 and became known as the Breaux
Amendment (I). In addition, item 4) marked a policy
shift from emphasis on actual catches to emphasis oncooperation with the United States.
Later, a draft amendment to the FCMA that was
proposed by Representative Breaux and enacted in
January 1983—which was known as the Breaux
Amendment (II) to distinguish it from the earlier
amendment—led to a “fish-and-chips” policy thatbrought countries’ cooperation with U.S. efforts topromote seafood exports to the fore and reinforced
the authority of the Regional Fishery Councils (RCs).
Specifically, foreign operators would have to operate
within fishery quotas set by the Department of State
based on fishery management plans and other items
prepared by the RCs.
The PM Act and Breaux Act seemed to pit thebenefits of Japan’s commercial whaling in the Antarctic
against those of Japanese fishery in the Americanzone.

Enactment of a Canadian Governor
General’s Order on Fishery Zones
In June 1976, two months after the FCMA was enacted
in the United States, the U.S.’s neighbors of Mexicoand then Canada proclaimed 200-nautical-milezones.
Canada already had a fisheries agreement for salmon

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthand other species with the United States. Consequently,
it was clear that U.S.’s establishment of a 200-nauticalmile zone would generate a boundary problem between
the two countries in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
Canada immediately resolved to not be left behind.
In January 1977, two months before the American law
came into effect, Canada established a 200-nauticalmile fishing zone under an order by the Canadiangovernor general (provided as a provisional measurefor one year). It should be noted that Mexico set up
a 200-nautical-mile exclusive fishing zone in July1977.
In this way, the neighboring counties of the North
American continent mutually agreed to 200-nauticalmile exclusive fishing zones even before consensus on
the matter was reached at UNCLOS III. This trend
toward establishing such zones in domestic laws aheadof international consensus led to the placement ofmajor fishing grounds of the northern hemisphere
under 200-nautical-mile zones within a short periodof time.

Establishment of 200-Nautical-Mile Exclusive
Fishing Zones by E.C. Countries
The American and Canadian declarations of exclusive
fishing zones had an immediate effect on European
Community countries. Major fishing grounds for E.C.
fishing boats were the Norwegian coast and Atlantic
coasts of the U.S. and Canada. Because Norway, theU.S., and Canada had each enacted domestic laws
concerning 200-nautical-mile exclusive fishing zones
between April 1976 and January 1977, the E.C. countries knew that they would be shut out of these fishinggrounds in the future. Moreover, it was clear that
Soviet fleets that were denied access to these areas
would come rushing into E.C. coastal areas.
Seeking to counteract the three countries’ moves,
E.C. members held an informal foreign ministers’
meeting in October 1976. There, they decided toestablish a 200-nautical-mile exclusive fishing zone
along the coasts of the North Sea and North Atlantic

246

Ocean beginning in January 1977.
Moreover, the E.C. nations demanded that unified
fishery negotiations concerning operations in thiszone by third-country fleets, such as those of the Soviet
Union, take place premised on the zone’s establishment. The Soviet Union initially refused the demand,as it did not recognize the E.C. as a political entity;
however, in the end it agreed to enter negotiations.
Establishment of the Soviet Zone
Soviet deep-sea fishery was highly dependent upon
American and E.C. waters. In American waters, theU.S.S.R. was in the same position as Japan in that it
was subject to constraints under the FCMA. At thesame time, however, it was being shut out of the E.C.’s
200-nautical-mile zone. Thus it was also forced tofundamentally rethink its fishery policy.
It began by signing a fisheries agreement with theUnited States in November 1976 whereby it recognized the U.S.’s right to manage fishery within the
200-nautical-mile zone. Then, almost immediately
afterwards, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet issued
an order in December announcing the decision toprovisionally establish a 200-nautical-mile exclusive
fishing zone until the Convention on the Law of the
Sea could be enacted. A Council of Ministers meetingin February 1977 decided to establish this zone on
March 1, 1977, the same date as the American zone’s
establishment.

Enactment of Japan’s Territorial Waters Act and Act
on Temporary Measures Concerning Fishery Waters
At the second session of UNCLOS III, Japan announced
its support for an international agreement setting
12-nautical-mile territorial waters. That was in1974.
To address the issue of 200-nautical-mile fisheryzones, a bill for amending the Territorial Waters Act
and a draft of the Act on Temporary Measures
Concerning Fishery Waters (the so-called

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth“200-nautical-mile fishery zone act”) were submitted
to the 80th National Diet. They were promulgatedon May 2, 1977, and put into effect on July 1 of thesame year.
Japan adhered to the basic principles of narrowterritorial waters and freedom of the high seas, andthus it opposed attempts to expand territorial waters
and establish 200-nautical-mile fishery zones. As the
majority of opinions at UNCLOS III leaned toward
12-nautical-mile territorial waters and 200-nauticalmile fishing zones, Japan hardened its resolve not to
set a 200-nautical-mile zone so long as there was no
UNCLOS agreement. However, it eventually shifted
its position from generally opposing such zones torecognizing fishery performance within them. The
U.S. and U.S.S.R. had both set 200-nautical-milezones, thereby putting pressure on Japan’s north-sea
fishery. Moreover, it became apparent that the Soviet
Union would draw the line for its zone between
Hokkaido and the four disputed Kuril Islands known
in Japan as the “Northern Territories”. Japan therefore
began leaning toward establishing a 200-nautical-mile
exclusive fishing zone along Japanese coasts, including
the disputed Northern Territories, as a way of resisting
the Soviet move.
Consequently, Japan became the 26th country in
the world to establish a 200-nautical-mile fishing zone.
It subsequently became generally necessary for foreign
fishing boats to receive permission from the Ministryof Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries if they wishedto operate in Japan’s 200-nautical-mile zone.
Thus, while maintaining its basic policy, Japan had
provisionally decided to establish a 200-nautical-mile
exclusive fishing zone as a response to fishing andterritorial issues.
At the same time, however, Japan recognized thatneither China nor South Korea had established a200-nautical-mile zone. It therefore decided against
establishing its own zone near these two countries in
the Sea of Japan and East China Sea so as to maintainorder in fishery activities.

247

2. Japan’s Fishery Negotiations with Other Nations
Conclusion of a Japan-U.S. Fishery Agreement
The United States’ FCMA stipulated that the U.S.
could enter into “governing international fishery agreements” only with countries that recognized its exclusive fishery management right. Accordingly, Japanesefishing vessels would be banned from American waters
if Japan did not recognize the U.S.’s right and sign anagreement before the FCMA’s execution date.
However, at the time, the Japanese government wasmaintaining its basic stance of not recognizing any
200-nautical-mile zones laws without a UNCLOS
consensus. Hence neither the first round of Japan–U.S.
fishery negotiations (held in Washington in August1976) nor the second (in Tokyo in November 1976)
went smoothly. Meanwhile, however, more and morecountries were setting 200-nautical-mile zones. It was
becoming clear that no breakthrough could be achieved
if Japan alone stuck to the conventional viewpoint.
At the third round of negotiations held in
Washington in December, Japan wholly recognized
the FCMA and accepted American right to set quotas,
right to collect fishing fees, and jurisdiction. This led
to the conclusion of a five-year Japan–U.S. fishery
agreement that was in line with the FCMA. The
agreement came into effect in November 1977. Thus,
for the moment at least, Japan would have continued
fishing access to American waters. This agreement
expired in 1982 after a period of five years and was
replaced by a second Japan–U.S. fishery agreementthat came into force in January 1983. The agreement
was subsequently renewed every two years.
Even though the first agreement had been basedon the FCMA, which the U.S. enacted in April 1976,
American fishing did not develop as expected and as
a result legal restrictions became increasingly tighter.
First, quotas were lowered after they became entangled
in the whaling issue under the FCMA amendment of
1978. Then there were the 1980 Breaux Amendment(I), which included provisions for the phasing out ofStructural Change during the Period of Slow Growthforeign fishing over a five-year period, and the 1983
Breaux Amendment (II), which brought to the forea “fish-and-chips” approach demanding cooperation
with American fishery aims in exchange for quotas.

Conclusion of a Revised International Convention
for the High Seas Fisheriesof the Northern Pacific Ocean
For a quarter of a century, the International Convention
for the High Seas Fisheries of the Northern Pacific
Ocean signed by Japan, the U.S., and Canada had
contributed to the development of fishing in the
North Pacific Ocean. However, in February 1977, theU.S. declared that the convention was incompatible
with the FCMA. It announced that it would scrap
the current convention in one year and demandedthat revisions be made before this time
Including a round of preliminary negotiations inAugust of 1977, it took five sessions to complete negotiations for the revised convention.
The negotiations focused on a number of problems,
including 1) regions for operation by Japanese salmon
and trout fishing boats, 2) control of high-seas areas
outside the 200-nautical-mile zones, and 3) bycatchesof marine mammals.
For problem 1), the following compromise wasreached at the third round of negotiations in February
1978.
In waters where North American and Asian salmon
and trout mingle, regulations will become correspondingly stricter in areas where the seasonal migration of
North American fish is larger. On the other hand,some operation by Japanese fishing boats will beallowed within the U.S.’s 200-nautical-mile zone, evenin areas populated by migrating North American
salmon and trout.
The abstention line for salmon and trout will be
moved 10 degrees west from the former convention
to 175° east longitude. Even in areas west of the248abstention line, operational periods and numbers ofoperating vessels will be regulated for each sea zone
noted in the convention’s annex.
For items 2) and 3), agreements were reached at
the fourth round of negotiations held in March andApril 1978. In accordance with the convention, operation areas and seasons for Japanese mother ship-typesalmon and trout fishery would become restricted infishing grounds for migrating Alaskan salmon andtrout of the western Bering Sea.
The work of revising the convention also included
discussion of the problem of Dall’s porpoise bycatches.
The U.S.’s Marine Mammal Protection Act prohibitedthe unauthorized capture of marine mammals.
However, Dall’s porpoises live in the North Pacific
Ocean in large numbers, and their accidental capturein drift nets for salmon and trout fishery was unavoidable. Here, the U.S. and Japan reached a compromise
whereby unauthorized bycatches would be allowed
for a period of three years. This compromise wasclearly stated in an annex to the convention.
The revised International Convention for the High
Seas Fisheries of the Northern Pacific Ocean did notcome into effect until February 1979 due to domestic
procedural delays in the U.S. and Canada.

Conclusion of a Provisional Japan–U.S.S.R.
Fishery Agreement and Provisional
U.S.S.R.–Japan Fishery Agreement
The Soviet Union’s decision to establish a 200-nautical-mile exclusive fishing zone in February 1977 was
keenly felt by Japan’s fishery industry. The zone wasan area in which Japanese had long engaged in northsea fishery. Moreover, the date of the zone’s establishment—March 1—was soon approaching. The Japanese
government hastily approached the U.S.S.R. with arequest for negotiations that led to the beginning oftalks between Japanese Agricultural Minister Suzuki
and Soviet Fisheries Minister Ishkov in Moscow on
February 28.
Although the negotiations did not proceed

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthsmoothly due to the two sides’ conflicting viewpoints,
they did confirm a basic framework that allowed
mutual fishing with mutual exercise of 200-nauticalmile zone rights. The two ministers exchanged a letter
detailing short-term measures, thus securing Japanese
operations within the Soviet 200-nautical-mile zone
during March (however, it was decided that Japanesefishing boats would not fish for salmon, trout, orPacific herring). It was further decided that negotiations would begin on March 15, and that a provisional
agreement would be reached on Japanese operating
conditions and methods in Soviet waters by April 1.
A major point of contention between the two sides
was the Northern Territories dispute. The Soviet
Union demanded that Japan recognize a 200-nauticalmile management right that included waters aroundthe Northern Territories; this was a demand that theSoviet side had not made theretofore. Another point
was a Soviet request to operate within Japan’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters based on the principle ofmutual fishing. Around this time, Soviet operations
in waters near Japan were reaching an intolerable level,and protests from coastal fishermen were becoming
more and more intense each day.
Because Japan was being forced to choose between
the Northern Territories dispute and fishing, the negotiations failed to produce an agreement and were thus
discontinued on March 31. Japan thus had no choice
but to withdraw all of its fishing boats from the
U.S.S.R.’s 200-nautical-mile fishing zone. Entering
April, Japan separately sent Special Emissary Sonoda
and Agricultural Minister Suzuki to the U.S.S.R. tocontinue talking; however, these efforts also failed tobring an agreement and negotiations stalled once
again.
Negotiations did not restart until after May 2, when
Japan’s Territorial Waters Act and Act on Temporary
Measures Concerning Fishery Waters were enacted.
Japan approached the negotiations with the hope ofreaching an agreement whereby, in exchange for Japan’srecognition that the Northern Territories were partof the Soviet zone, the U.S.S.R. would recognize that249

they were also part of Japan’s zone. Although the Soviet
Union initially opposed this idea, it eventually led toan agreement to proceed by separating the territorial
dispute from the fishery issue. The result was thesigning of a provisional Japan–U.S.S.R. agreement on
May 27. It should be noted, however, that this was asingle-year agreement that came into effect on June
10 and expired at the end of the year.
Under the agreement, Japan’s total fishing quota
within the Soviet 200-nautical-mile zone in 1977
(beginning in June) was 455,000 tons, which marked
a steep drop of 36% compared to the actual catch of
the same period of the previous year. The agreement
did not allow fishing for salmon, trout, and Pacificherring, and it significantly cut quotas for Alaska
pollack and flounder. Moreover, a “window frame”
method was employed whereby operations wererestricted to seven sea areas, with all other areas remaining off-limits. Fishing quotas were subdivided forspecific species in each sea area. And the number of
permitted vessels was lowered to 6,335, or more than
100 fewer than had operated the previous year, which
delivered a serious blow to north-sea fishery. Eying
the situation with alarm, the Japanese government
hammered out a basic policy to provide relief measures
to cover the loss in vessel numbers. The policy was
passed by the Cabinet on June 21.
On the other hand, negotiations to determine
operations by Soviet fishing boats in Japan’s 200-nautical-mile fishing zone—in other words, a provisional
U.S.S.R.–Japan fishery agreement—began on June30, 1977. These talks resulted in a total Soviet quota
beginning in July 1977 of 335,000 tons, and set two
sea areas where Soviet fishing boats had previous
operational experience as fishing areas. They alsoestablished regulations on prohibited areas and seasons based on Japanese domestic regulations and selfimposed regulations of the fishery industry. The
provisional U.S.S.R.–Japan fishery agreement was
signed on August 4.
Japan pursued talks to make both the provisional
Japan–Soviet and Soviet–Japan agreements long-term

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthdeals valid for five years or three years. However, theSoviet side did not respond favorably, and thus theagreements were finalized at the single-year level.
Accordingly, in their protocols it was agreed that
extensions would be single-year extensions of the 1977
agreements.
At Japan–Soviet and Soviet–Japan agreement negotiations held the next year, 1978, the U.S.S.R. strongly
insisted on equality of fishing quotas. Thus, when
Japan proposed setting the U.S.S.R.’s quota for Japan
at 700,000 tons and Japan’s quota for the U.S.S.R. at
378,000 tons, the U.S.S.R. countered by demandingthat the quota for the U.S.S.R. be raised to 700,000
tons. It moreover took a hard-line stance by sayingthat if Japan refused to accept this demand, the U.S.S.R.
would lower its quota to Japan. Eventually, talks concluded with a quota for Japan of 850,000 tons and aquota for the U.S.S.R. of 650,000 tons. Negotiations
were similarly rocky the following year (1979), again
due to Soviet demands for equality. However, an agreement was ultimately reached by setting a quota forJapan of 750,000 tons and a quota for the U.S.S.R. or
650,000 tons.
The 1979 quotas for both sides remained unchanged
until the 1983 fishing season. However, Soviet fishing
was not performing well vis-à-vis its quotas. This led
the U.S.S.R. to demand relaxed conditions against
Soviet operations in Japanese waters or stronger regulations against Japanese operations in Soviet waters.
Eventually, in 1987, a charged quota system was added
to the traditional charge-free quota system in Soviet
waters.

Conclusion of a Japan–U.S.S.R.
Fishery Cooperation Agreement
On April 29, 1977 (the year the Soviet Union decided
to establish a 200-nautical-mile fishing zone), theU.S.S.R. notified Japan on April 29 that would scrap
the Japan–U.S.S.R. Fisheries Convention that had
been in effect until then. On top of the convention’sscheduled expiration expire one year later (April 28,

250

1978), the U.S.S.R. noted the need for a new Japan–
U.S.S.R. agreement for salmon and trout fishery in
the era of 200-nautical-mile zones.
Japan–U.S.S.R . negotiations that ran from
September until April the following year became
entangled in discussions surrounding offshore harvests. The Soviet Union strongly asserted that Japan
should abstain from offshore harvests of salmon andtrout. Japan countered forcefully by arguing that offshore harvests were not prohibited under the integrated draft of the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea, and that the actual catches of harvesting countries are in line with respected regulations. The talks
faced extremely tough going, as neither side budged
from its position. However, a Japanese proposal tocover a portion of the costs for renewed Soviet salmon
and trout production proved successful in finallymoving the talks toward a signed Japan–U.S.S.R. fishery cooperation agreement.
The Japan–U.S.S.R. fishery cooperation agreement
stipulated that both sides would cooperate in conserving and rationally utilizing fishery resources (including
anadromous species) in waters outside their 200-nautical-mile zones originating from their northwestern
Pacific Ocean coastlines. It further included provisions
calling for the yearly preparation of concrete measures
to be based on the agreement that would be finalized
through the signing of Japan–U.S.S.R. protocols. The
agreement was concluded on April 23, 1978. It had afive-year term of validity and included provisions
allowing automatic extension.
The two sides also opposed each other in subsequent talks on protocol content, as they approached
the table from completely opposite viewpoints. The
Soviet Union demanded that Japan accept drasticallyreduced quotas and expanded no-take zones while
also covering a portion of the expense needed to maintain and expand Soviet salmon and trout resources.
The restricted fishing zones in particular dealt a serious blow to Japan’s salmon and trout fishery. The final
proposed agreement set Japan’s quota at 42,500 tons,
opened up from the Soviet proposal (a triangular

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

no-take zone surrounded by 44° north latitude, 175°
east longitude, and the outer edge of the Americanand Soviet 200-nautical-mile zones) the area east of
170° east longitude as Japan’s fishing area, and established that Japan would provide the equivalent of 1.76
million yen in actual goods to the Soviet side as fisherycooperation expense.
Under such circumstances, Japan was forced to scaleback its salmon and trout fishery due to drasticallyreduced catches, greater restrictions on fishing zones,
and the burden of paying fishery cooperation
expenses.
Fishery Relations with China
Negotiations toward an intergovernmental fishery
agreement with the People’s Republic of China began
in 1973, the year following restoration of Japan–China
diplomatic relations. These talks bore fruit with thesigning of a three-year agreement in August 1975.
The era of the 200-nautical-mile exclusive fishingzone arrived during the agreement’s term of effect. As
the international trend toward partitioning sea areas
gained momentum, Japan became wary of how Chinamight react when the agreement expired in December
1978. However, China made no mention of any desire
to establish a 200-nautical-mile zone during negotiations for a new agreement. Rather, China’s position
was that the agreement could be automaticallyextended if Japan agreed to modify an annex tostrengthen regulatory measures. Japan and China
subsequently reexamined the measures and agreed tomodify the annex. And the agreement was automatically renewed as a result.
Specifically, the reinforced regulatory measures
included extended suspended fishing zone periods formotorized bottom trawl fishery, expansion and new
establishment of protected zones and stronger restrictions on vessel numbers, and yearly provision of a listof Japanese fishing vessels operating within horsepower-regulation zones and notification of their fishing locations from Japan to China. This Japan–China

251

fishery agreement remained in effect until a new agreement was signed in 1997.
Fishery Relations with South Korea
Japan’s fishery relations with the Republic of Korea
had continued smoothly and uneventfully since theJapan–South Korea fishery pact’s signing in 1965.
However, the arrival of the era of 200-nautical-milezones brought unexpected trouble.
Many South Korean large trawlers operated on thehigh seas of the North Pacific Ocean. However, these
trawlers were shut out of their fishing grounds when
the Soviet Union enforcing its 200-nautical-mile fishing zone. They responded by moving south in great
numbers to the seas around Hokkaido, which wereprime fishing grounds for Alaska pollack and otherspecies. This development caused not only overfishing
but also major safety concerns, as it led to incidents
of damaged equipment on Japanese fishing boats andhit-and-run accidents. Japan had excluded South
Korean fishing boats from its Act on Temporary
Measures Concerning Fishery Waters. Consequently,
from the South Korean boats’ standpoint, all areas
outside of Japan’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters
were international waters. Emboldened by this view,
South Korean fishing boats pressed on with operations
near Hokkaido.
Japan filed a complaint with South Korea that
resulted in an October 1978 conference between the

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

two countries’ fisheries agencies. However, South
Korea maintained that its boats were acting in accordance with the “principle of freedom of the seas”, andthus the conference produced no clear path to resolution. Meanwhile, there were of course increasingly
louder calls in Japan for the fishery waters act to be
applied to South Korea as well.
A major breakthrough toward resolving the problem came early in early 1980.
The two sides’ repeated discussions generated a
growing desire to resolve the problem not just in termsof the Hokkaido situation but also in the overall interest of Japan–South Korea fishery relations. Specifically,a “package” was proposed that would combine selfimposed regulations on operations by South Korean
fishing boats near Hokkaido with measures to establish suspended fishing zones for Japanese west-water
trawling boats near Jeju Island. This proposal was
agreed upon by the Japanese and South Korean fisheries commissioners in October 1980. Although theagreement caused some mutual dissatisfaction among
Hokkaido fishery workers and west-water trawling
workers, it was the only available way forward to breakthe stalemate.
Subsequently, suspended fishery zones were established for west water trawling boats near Jeju Island,
and the number of such boats was reduced by 60. The
Japanese government provided operators with subsidies worth approximately 1.7 billion yen to help themcope with these changes.

252

Chapter 2: Nippon Suisan Phases Out its Fishing Business
1977–1985
Part 1 Shrinking Deep-Sea Fishery by Japan and Nippon Suisan
1. Shifting from Commercial Whaling to Scientific Whaling
In the summer of 1982, the 34th meeting of theInternational Whaling Commission (IWC) passed a
resolution calling for a complete moratorium on commercial whaling after three years. The resolution
included the condition that a comprehensive resources
evaluation would be conducted by 1990, and that later
whaling quotas would be set based on the results. The
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) criticized the moratorium, saying thatit had absolutely no scientific validity. In accordancewith rights guaranteed it as a signatory of theInternational Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling, the Japanese government submitted an
objection to the moratorium in November of 1982.
In it, Japan claimed that the IWC’s decision lacked
scientific basis and was not in line with the objectives
and purpose of the convention.
The United States, feeling intensifying domestic
antipathy to whaling, asked Japan to comply with themoratorium, saying that if Japan refused to accept the
IWC’s decision, Washington would have no choice
but to lower its fishing allowances to Japan based on
U.S. law. In response, the Japanese government noted
during Japan–U.S. whaling discussions that its “objection did not necessarily mean that Japan would continue whaling after three years”. This comment allowed
Japan to avoid reductions in its trawling and bottom
trawl fishery quotas.
In February 1983, the two countries began Japan–
U.S. whaling discussions to address the problem.

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

During these talks, the U.S. maintained its stance that
it would use fishing allowances to slap sanctions
against Japanese whaling. After undergoing a periodof tough negotiations, the two sides finally reached
an accord on November 14, 1984. Details were as
follows: 1) During the whaling seasons of 1984 and1985, Japan would be allowed to match its 1983 catchof 400 sperm whales in waters close to Japan. 2) During
the two years of 1986 and 1987, the United States
would not lower Japanese fishing allowances in retaliation against Antarctic whaling by Japan. 3) Japan
would withdraw its objection to the IWC concerning
the shelving of sperm whale quotas by December 31.
And 4) Japan would stop sperm whale whaling by
1988.
An American anti-whaling group that consistently
supported the moratorium filed suit against the U.S.
Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of State, who
had jointly led negotiations from the U.S. side,
demanding that the new Japan–U.S. Whaling Accord
be scrapped. What the group objected to was thetwo-year delay in the moratorium’s implementationfrom 1985 to 1987. Fearing that this international
agreement between the U.S. and Japan would becomecontested in U.S. courts, the Japan Fisheries Association
and Japan Whaling Association took intervening legal
action by stating Japan’s basic stance vis-à-vis whaling
and asserting the moratorium’s inconsistency with theInternational Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling. Ultimately, while both the district court

253

and high court ruled in favor of the case’s plaintiffs,
the U.S. Supreme Court overturned these rulings torule in favor of the defendants.
The result of the above-mentioned developments
was cessation of Antarctic whaling by Japan in April
1987. The final whaling expedition was conducted by
the mother ship Nisshin Maru No.3 and four whalers.
It caught 1,941 minke whales and produced 596 tonsof whale oil and 9,949 tons of frozen food products.
Moreover, in March of the following year, Japan also
terminated large- and small-scale coastal whaling(excluding that for Baird’s beaked whales and othersmall whales).
With the end of commercial whaling, Japan beganrandom sampling surveys based on the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. It started
by capturing 300 minke whales in a preliminary survey

during the 1987/88 fishing season in order to gather
data that commercial whaling could not provide. With
the start of scientific whaling, a cetacean researchlaboratory within the Japan Whaling Association wasgiven independent status with the government’s blessing and launched as the Institute of Cetacean Researchon October 30, 1987. The body charged with actual
capture of whales was Kyodo Senpaku K.K., a company that was established on November 5, 1987.
Purposes of the surveys included stock management
and gathering of biological data. It should be notedthat the IWC adopted a nonbinding resolution
demanding that Japan reconsider and stop its scientificwhaling program. Nonetheless, Japan commenced
full-scale surveys beginning from the program’s thirdyear.

2. Withdrawal from Mother Ship-Type Crab Fishery
The provisional Japan–U.S.S.R. fishery agreementthat was signed in 1977 greatly restricted operations
by Japanese fishing boats in the Soviet Union’s
200-nautical-mile zone. The impact on crab fishery
was severe, as quotas under the agreement fell steeply
to around 60% of actual catches in the year prior to
the agreement. At the same time, fishing for blue kingcrab near eastern Sakhalin, snow crab in the Olyutor
Peninsula and Navarin Canyon area, and king crab
and horsehair crab in the southern Kuril Islands was
now prohibited. This forced a dramatic reduction in
the number of crab fishing boats from 124 in theprevious year to 78.
With 200-nautical-mile regulations coming into
effect in 1977, discussion held based on stipulationsof the Japan–U.S.S.R. Crab Fishery Agreement (whichbegan on February 6, 1969) were concluded under
the new name “Japan–U.S.S.R. Crab Agreement”. The
new agreement was valid for one year and would be
subject to discussions held in Moscow in each subsequent year. In the seventh Japan–U.S.S.R./U.S.S.R.–
Japan crab and whelk talks of 1975, the Soviet Union

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

announced it would completely close king crab fishery
off of Kamchatka’s west coast, which was something
it had been pushing for two years. Japan agreed toaccept this in exchange for larger crab quotas in othersea areas. As a result of this compromise Japan’s crab
fishery off of western Kamchatka switched from kingcrab to golden king crab. During this first year of theera of 200-nautical-mile exclusive fishing zones, Japan’s
operations were not so unlike those in past years.
However, the situation would change radically thefollowing year.
Nippon Suisan had been fishing for golden kingcrab in this area with Hokoku Suisan’s mother ship
Eiho Maru. However, it was forced to shorten its
fishing season there amid falling numbers of Japanesefishing boats resulting from the smaller quotas as well
as lower efficiency caused in part by frequent Soviet
inspection visits.
Given the challenges these circumstances presented,
Japan’s fishery operators searched for ways to overcome
and survive. Here, they began negotiations towardforming partnerships with Soviet fishing interests that254

would exist outside the bounds of intergovernmental
agreements. Some of these partnerships would include
technical cooperation in crab fishery. The Japanese
government also stepped in to actively support suchinitiatives. As a result, between April and July 1979,
contracts for seven partnerships were signed by fishinginterests in both countries. Among them, those concerned with crab focused on snow crab in the Olyutor
Peninsula and Navarin Canyon area as well as horsehair crab and snow crab off of western Kamchatka.
These partnerships continued thereafter; however,they generally operated at a loss due to high contributions paid by the Japan side to the Soviet side and low
fish prices among other factors.
It deserves noting that 1995 marked the end ofJapan’s golden king crab fishery within the Soviet
Union’s 200-nautical-mile zone. Following the Eiho
Maru, Nippon Suisan Group-affiliated operations
involved the Hokko Maru No.177 from 1988 to 1993
and the Shinryu Maru No.8 in 1994. It then closed
the curtain on its crab fishery with operations by the
Shinko Maru No.11 in 1995.
Japan’s crab fishery faced a similarly tough challengein American waters. The Japan–U.S. King Crab
Agreement expired the same year that the U.S. established its 200-nautical-mile excusive fishing zone in
1976. The Japan–U.S. Fishery Agreement that cameinto effect in November 1977 lumped crab in withother species and instituted new regulations necessitating payment of fishing fees by Japanese fishingboats in the American fishing zone and operation
within set quotas. It also lowered the king crab allowance for the eastern Bering Sea to zero in 1977.
On the other hand, Japan was the only foreigncountry permitted to engage in snow crab fishery in
the east Bering Sea. Notwithstanding the fact that

Keiko Maru engaged in mother ship-type crab fishery in Bristol
Bay, U.S.A., between 1966 and 1980.

Japanese operations were limited to a species that the
U.S. did not target and to coastal areas in which
American boats did not operate, Japan was able tosecure comparatively stable allowances even after 1977.
However, excessive investments by U.S. crab operators
seeking to expand their yields resulted in overharvesting that caused financial hardship among them. Thisand other factors led to growing demands for theelimination of foreign snow crab fishery and a proposal
to set the TALFF at zero. Japan quickly urged theUnited States to maintain and preserve snow crab
fishery. There were even also some within the U.S.
who argued that setting the TALFF at zero was illegal
given the existence of bountiful snow crab resourcesthat the U.S. could not fully exploit. Nonetheless, aneconomists’ report explaining that a zero TALFF
would increase snow crab exports to Japan became
the basis upon which Japanese crab fishery in American
waters, including the eastern Bering Sea, ended in
1980.
Nippon Suisan had been conducting snow crab
fishery in the eastern Bering Sea by sending out a fleet
centered on the Keiko Maru through a four-company
arrangement together with Hokoku Suisan, Kyokuyo,
and Hokuyo Suisan. However, this operation came toan end in 1980.

3. Withdrawal from Mother Ship-Type Salmon and Trout Fishery
The Bering Sea, Sea of Okhotsk, and other North
Pacific fishing grounds had bountiful stocks of salmon
and trout, Alaska pollack, and other species. The

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

majority of these fishing grounds were located within
the 200-nautical-mile zones of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
As the world entered the era of the 200-nautical-mile

255

zone, these two countries wasted no time in expanding
the sea areas under their jurisdictions. And this ofcourse necessitated new fishery frameworks between
them and Japan, a nation that was highly dependent
upon the North Pacific fishing grounds.
In February 1977, the United States issued noticethat it was scrapping the International Convention
for the High Seas Fisheries of the Northern Pacific
Ocean because it conflicted with its FCMA (i.e., its
200-nautical-mile exclusive fishing zone law). The
convention thus expired in February 1978. To replace
it, a new International Convention for the High Seas
Fisheries of the Northern Pacific Ocean was put into
effect in February 1979. The U.S.’s original intention
was to possess exclusive control over all migratory
areas of salmon and trout originating in the U.S.
(excluding the territories and fishing zones of othercountries) and issue fishing allowances to foreigncountries when excess stocks existed. It intended to

do this while simultaneously maintaining the stipulations of the FCMA. In effect, however, what the U.S.
meant was that it would not issue any salmon andtrout allowances because excess stocks did not actuallyexist. Japan opposed the U.S.’s claim to exclusive control as the state of origin, citing the UNCLOS consensus that even when exercising primary interest in
and responsibility for anadromous species as the stateof origin, a state must give consideration to minimize
economic dislocation in states whose nationals have
habitually fished in the area. Although the U.S. andJapan held diametrically opposite positions, they ultimately agreed that, while the FCMA’s regulations
would remain in effect, Japan would be allowed toengage in some operations within the U.S.’s 200-nautical-mile zone, even in migratory areas for North
American salmon and trout. Even with this concession,
however, Japan’s mother ship-type salmon and trout
fishery in fishing grounds for migratory Alaskan
High seas of the Bering Sea
Operations begin on June 26
Soviet Union

180°

Soviet 200-nautical-mileline
Limit onnumber ofoperations:
Up to 21

Limit onnumber ofoperations:
Up to 30

U.S. 200-nautical-mile line

U.S. 200-nauticalmile zone
Operations begin
on June 10(Japan-U.S.-Canada
prohibited area)
New no-fishery zone
Soviet200-nauticalmile line
N46°00’W175°00’

140°

N45°00’W175°00’
High seas of U.S. 200-nautical-mile zone
Operations begin on June 1
175°E

180°

175°W

Mother ship-type salmon/trout fishing zones for fiscal 1978 Nissui Koho, October 1978

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth256

salmon and trout of the western Bering Sea would be
restricted in terms of fishing area and season.
In addition, the Soviet Union similarly used its
setting of a 200-nautical-mile fishing zone to place
tough restrictions on Japan. It completely banned
salmon and trout fishery in its 200-nautical-mile zone
and lowered allowances even on the high seas, citing
the “state of origin” principle. Furthermore, in 1988
Moscow demanded that Japan end its high-seas salmon
and trout fishery by 1992. The U.S.S.R. was joining
with the U.S. and Canada in holding firmly to thestate of origin principle, and thus 1991 marked theend of Japan’s high-seas salmon and trout fishery.
Tightening restrictions against Japan did not stop
there. In the U.S., indigenous Alaskans and environmental protection groups grew louder in their demandthat Japan phase out its mother ship-type salmon andtrout fishery with each passing year. On March 8,
1986, unofficial talks on salmon and trout between
Japan and the U.S. produced an agreement whereby
Japan would gradually scale back its mother ship operations in international waters of the Bering Sea west of
180° east longitude, with the goal of terminating suchoperations in 1988, and stop operations east of 180°

east longitude by 1994. At the same time, however,bycatches of fur seals and dolphins in salmon and trout
drift nets had spurred American environmentalists
and others to file a lawsuit demanding the suspensionof salmon and trout fishery under the Marine Mammal
Protection Act. A U.S. court of appeals ruled in favorof the plaintiffs on May 11, 1988, and the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the ruling in June of the same year.
Consequently, Japan became unable to continue
mother ship-type salmon and trout fishery, regardlessof any outcomes of Japan–U.S. fishery talks.
Operational circumstances for Japan’s fishery companies became increasingly severe during this time, ascompanies became subject to intensifying regulation
and were obliged to pay stiff fishery contributions to
the Soviet Union. Until 1977, the Nippon SuisanGroup engaged in joint operations with Hokoku
Suisan using a single fleet centered on the Nojima
Maru. These operations were expanded to a threecompany arrangement by adding Kyokuyo in 1978.
However, the Nippon Suisan Group’s operations effectively ended in 1987. Japan’s mother ship-type salmon
and trout expeditions drew to a close in 1988.

4. Withdrawal from Mother Ship-Type Trawl Fishery
Beginning of Offshore Purchases from
American Vessels
In 1977 (after the FCMA’s enactment), the U.S.’sfishing allowance to Japan stood at 1.191 million tons.
This compared to 1.30 million tons in estimated actual
harvest the previous year. The allowance remained
stable in subsequent years, standing at 1,158 million
tons in 1978, 1,160 million tons in 1979, 1,160 million
tons in 1980, 1,390 million tons in 1981, and 1,350
million tons in 1982.
Of the 1977 allowance, the quota for Alaska pollack
was 836,400 tons, which was broken down to 792,300
tons in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands area and44,100 tons in the Gulf of Alaska. The allowance

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

remained largely the same in 1978.
With the FCMA’s introduction, crab fisheryoperators in Seattle borrowed from a fisheries promotion fund to build and operate a large number offishing boats. However, this led to overfishing thatcaused crab stocks to dry up, which in turn forced
many operators toward bankruptcy. During Japan–
U.S. seafood trade meeting in July 1980, the U.S. government proposed a countermeasure that would have
American operators harvest underutilized Alaska pollack stocks and then have Japanese processing ships
purchase the harvests at sea. Fearing negative effects
on its fishing allowances, Japan accepted this proposal.
Thus, beginning in 1981, Japan commenced ship-toship purchases of 11,400 tons as an import allowance.

257

Offshore purchasing by a trawler

U.S. fishing boat supplying unprocessed fish to a Japanese vesselThis was the beginning of so-called “offshore purchasing” (as a joint venture).
At a Japan–U.S. seafood trade meeting in June 1981,
the U.S. pressed Japan to expand its offshore purchasesof Alaska pollack in 1982 to 200,000 ton or even
400,000 tons. However, when Japan countered thatsuddenly expanding purchases would generate a variety of problems, the two sides settled on 60,000 tons.
In the following year’s talks, they agreed to raise purchases to 120,000 tons between June of that year andMay 1983, and then to 200,000 tons over the courseof the following one year. That year, the first privatesector meeting on offshore purchases was held between
the U.S. and Japan. Until 1986, such Japan–U.S. interindustry meeting provided a venue for Japanese fisheryoperators to voice their opinions concerning the setting of offshore purchase amounts and U.S. fishingallowances to Japan.

the “fish-and-chips” policy, it led to Japan’s making
yearly concessions in terms of its offshore purchasesof Alaska pollack and other species. At the same time,
however, U.S. fishing allowances to Japan were cut
down to one-tenth their original size during a 10-year
period. Despite originally cooperating with the offshore purchasing scheme in order to receive higher
allowances, Japan was in fact seeing smaller allowances
due to increasing harvests by American fishing boats
combined with stronger processing capabilities in the
U.S. Forced to dramatically shorten its operating
season in line with its shrinking allowances, Japanbrought a surimi mother ship into offshore purchasing(which until then had employed surimi trawlers) in
1987. What this meant was that work typically handled
by mother ship-affiliated independent fishing boats
from Japan was now being undertaken by American
fishing boats. In the end, this turned out to be the lastyear in which Japan engaged in mother ship-type trawl
fishery.
Then, 1988, Japan’s allowance was finally reduced
to zero. Offshore purchasing amounts had also fallen
due to growing yields by American fishery operators,
and by now Japanese fishery companies had shiftedto local product production. The offshore purchaseamount for Alaska pollack fell to zero in 1990, followed by that for flounder in 1991. Thus ended theoffshore purchasing scheme in the Bering Sea andGulf of Alaska.

Tightening Regulations under the“Fish-and-Chips” Policy
The U.S. announced that, beginning in January 1982,
it would determine fishing allowances to Japan basedon Japan’s cooperation with efforts to promote theAmerican fishery industry—in other words, on Japan’s
offshore purchases and American seafood imports.
This forced Japan to accept the U.S.’s demand to greatly
expand its offshore purchases of Alaska pollack.
Behind this policy was a stipulation in the Breaux Act
stating that “the degree to which a company obstructs
U.S. seafood imports will be an item for consideration
when setting country-specific allowances”. Known as

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth258

Expansion of Nippon Suisan’s Offshore Purchasing
and End of its Mother Ship-Type Trawl Fishery
Mother ship-type trawl fishery was one of Nippon
Suisan’s key businesses. However, when the U.S. lowered its fishing allowances to Japan, the company wasforced to adjust the scale of its fishing to match. It
therefore focused on securing profit while raising
operational efficiency. In 1977, Nippon Suisan’s mothership-type trawl operations in the Bering Sea wereallotted a quota of 310,783 tons of unprocessed fish.
That year the company operated three fleets centeredon the Mineshima Maru, Shikishima Maru, andKashima Maru. It continued operating these three
fleets in later years and successfully posted favorable
results even amid declining quotas.
Meanwhile, Nippon Suisan also focused its attention on offshore purchasing, as purchasing helped
secure allowances for Japan in the U.S.’s 200-nauticalmile zone and alleviate U.S.–Japan trade fiction. In
June 1981, Nippon Suisan’s trawler Kongo Maru began
offshore purchasing and processing surimi and meal.
Again, in 1982, the company purchased 20,000 tons.
Understanding the necessity for offshore purchasing
for its influence on Japanese fishing allowances,
Nippon Suisan continued to expand the size of its
purchasing in subsequent years.
Accordingly, Nippon Suisan assigned three trawlers
to offshore purchasing in 1982. These trawlers purchased 46,711 tons of Alaska pollack. The company
then sequentially raised its purchases by sending out
four trawlers to purchase 91,189 tons in 1983, five
trawlers to purchase 145,000 tons in 1984, and six
trawlers to purchase 167,000 tons in 1985. The nextyear, 1986, it added the Miyajima Maru, MineshimaMaru, and Kashima Maru to the trawlers and madea combined purchase of 262,000 tons. Thus, at a time
when harvests were being squeezed by the setting of
200-nautical-mile fishing zones worldwide, Nippon
Suisan’s fishing business was being supported by offshore purchases.
However, contrary to Nippon Suisan’s original

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthhope, the U.S.’s fishing allowances to Japan decreased
in inverse proportion to expanding offshore purchases.
That year, Nippon Suisan’s mother ship-type trawl
fishery quota in the Bering Sea was 101,255 tons, orroughly half of the previous year’s quota. The company
responded by scaling down to two fleets, one eachcentered on the Mineshima Maru and Kashima Maru.
Then, the next year, 1987, its bottom trawl fisheryquota fell to zero. Until then, Nippon Suisan had
managed to make up for declining quotas with offshore purchases. However, in 1987 its purchases
totaled approximately 225,000 tons, which was below
the figure from the previous year.
The appearance of 200-nautical-mile fishing zones
around the world initially signaled an uncertain future
for Nippon Suisan’s fishing business. Just then, however, offshore purchasing stepped in to contributesignificantly to improved earnings. By focusing simultaneously on offshore purchasing and greater operational efficiency, Nippon Suisan successfully achieved
strong performance until the mid-1980s. And it was
because of this that the loss of offshore purchasing,combined with coincidentally poor performance inits fishing operations, caused Nippon Suisan’s earnings
to nosedive.
Shrinking High-Seas Fishery
With its operations being squeezed by overseas
200-nautical-mile zones, Nippon Suisan shifted to
midwater trawling for Alaska pollack in international
waters of the Bering Sea and drift-netting for neon
flying squid in the North Pacific. Although Nippon
Suisan’s high-seas harvest in 1978 was no more than
400,000 tons, this figure doubled in 1985 and thenquadrupled to 1.63 million tons in 1988. In fact, thislast figure was equivalent 13% of total production and
73% of Nippon Suisan’s deep-sea fishery catch.
Japanese fishing boats were not the only ones working in the Bering Sea, as South Korean, Chinese,
Polish, and Soviet fishing boats were also present.
These boats were taking in rapidly growing harvests,259

particularly of Alaska pollack. Around this time (inJanuary 1988), illegal fishing by Japanese boats was
discovered within the U.S. 200-nautical-mile zone,
near international waters of the Bering Sea, which
added fuel to calls to stop high-seas operations. At thesame time, the U.S. and U.S.S.R., seeing the rapid
depletion of fish stocks in international waters, became
concerned about negative impacts on stocks within
their 200-nautical-mile zones. This concern led themto insist on a total fishing ban on Alaska pollack ininternational waters of the Bering Sea in 1992. Also
around this time, a second preparatory meeting for
the U.N. Conference on Environment and Devel­
opment held in March 1991 included discussion on
high-seas fishery regulations. Moreover, at a fifth conference of nations concerned with high-seas fisheryin the Bering Sea that was held in 1992, participating
countries agreed to voluntarily halt fishing on a temporary basis for two years (1993 and 1993), thereby
effectively ending high-seas operations. Following this,a study on high-seas fishery in the Bering Sea wasconducted through a six-party conference and led to
execution of the Convention on the Conservationand Management of Pollock Resources in the Central
Bering Sea (CCBSP) in December 1995.
Furthermore, high-seas drift-net fishing for neon
flying squid by Japanese boats generated growing international concern for drying up stocks while

also inadvertently catching salmon and trout, marine
mammals, and seabirds. Such concern spurred the U.S.
Congress to enact the High Seas Driftnet Fisheries
Enforcement Act in 1987. Following this, the 46th
U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted a new
resolution that included a moratorium on high-seasdrift-net fishery at the end of 1992.
Shrinking Fishery in Soviet Waters
In annual talks on fishing quotas that took place following the signing of provisional Japan–U.S.S.R./
U.S.S.R.–Japan fishery agreements, the Soviet Union
insisted that Japan’s quotas should be lowered basedon the principle of equality. This position led to a
yearly decline in Japan’s quota for Alaska pollack. Japan
attempted to increase its quota for Alaska pollack inSoviet waters by raising its allowances for Japanesepilchard and mackerel, which were species the Soviet
Union most desired, in Japanese waters.
However, while Soviet quotas of Japanese pilchard
and mackerel rose, Japan’s quota for Alaska pollack
failed to recover, falling from 345,000 tons in 1978
to 300,000 tons in 1979, and then further to 290,000
tons in 1980 to 82.
In 1986, 100,000 tons of Japan’s 200,000-ton fishing quota were subject to fees. Subsequent yields
gradually declined, reaching 100,000 in 1994.

5. Trends in Southern Trawling
Tighter Regulations in U.S. East Coast
Fishing Grounds
Prior to the FCMA’s enactment, Nippon Suisan had
exported spear squid it caught in fishing grounds of
the American east coast to Europe as its main directsales product.
When the FCMA came into effect in 1977, the
U.S.’s allowance to Japan was set at 4,810 tons ofArgentine shortfin squid, 16,930 tons of spear squid,
3,300 tons of butterfish, and 7,000 tons of other

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

species for a total of 32,040 tons. The area in which
Japan was permitted to operate was a long strip running north-south along the edge of the continental
shelf off the coast of New York. Freedom to operate
there was heavily restricted; for example, operating
periods were established for each subzone within thearea, and prior notification was required whenevervessels moved from one subzone to another. The fishing ground was prone to trouble between U.S. andJapanese operators, as many American operators set
up fishing equipment there, and this equipment260frequently became entangled with or damaged by theequipment of Japanese trawlers.
Japanese trawlers often creatively adjusted theirtravel periods by utilizing this fishing ground together
with adjacent grounds off the coast of Canada.
In 1986, Japan was allowed a catch of 850 tons (250
tons of silver hake, 50 tons of red hake, 50 tons of river
herring, and 500 tons of other species) before thisfishing ground was closed. In preparation for this(thousand tons)
closure, Nippon Suisan
had entered into a joint ven120
100
ture with an American operator to catch spear squid
8060
and Argentine shortfin
squid; however, it withdrew
40
from this venture 20
in 1987.
(thousand
tons)
0

120
40
100
80
60
20
40
20
0
40

Regulations by South Africa and Withdrawal
from South African Waters
In the 1970s, Japan responded to U.N. resolutions
condemning the Republic of South Africa’s apartheid
policy by stopping20all economic assistance to South

Africa and posting only a consul general rather thanan ambassador. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
was acting with extreme caution vis-à-vis South Africa,
as the signing of intergovernmental agreements with
it and dispatches of government delegations to it could
anger African nations and spark an international
problem.
However, in November 1, 1977, South Africa notified fishing countries that if they did not enter into afishery agreement with it by November 1, 1977, theywould not be able to operatein South Africa’s 200-nauNew Zealandtical-mile zone. This put Japan in a serious bind, as
the area was a highly important fishing ground forit.
The Fisheries AgencyNew
waspersistent in urging the
Zealand
Greenland
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to move forward with thenegotiations needed for such an agreement. This perseverance paid off when Shun-ichi Okuchi, vice president of Nippon Suisan,wasdispatched toGreenland
U.S.
eastsuddenly
coastSouth Africa to begin fishery negotiations in October

Changes in catchfrom major countries in Nippon Suisan’s trawling in southern oceans (1977 to 1999)(thousandtons)
0(thousandtons)
0allotments
120(thousand tons)120
40
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
40

100
100
80
80
60
20
60
20
40
40
20
20
0
40
60
40
40
20

20

0
40

20

0
40

20
0
60
40
20
0

NeweastZealand
Canada
east
coast
U.S.
coast
New
Zealand
New Zealand

Canadaeast
coast
GreenlandSouth
AfricaGreenland
Greenland

20(thousand
tons)
0
0

120
60
40 1977 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 (year)
40
100
South
Africa
U.S.
east
coast
New
Zealand
U.S.
east
coast
80
40
U.S. east coast
20
60
20

40
20
20
0
(thousand
tons)
0
40
120
40 1977 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 (year)
100
Canadaeast
coast
Greenland
Canada
east
coast
New
Zealand80
Canada
east
coast
20
60
20
40
20
0
0
60
60
40
40
40
20
20
20

South
AfricaSouth
AfricaGreenland
U.S.
east
coast
South Africa

00(year)
40 1977
1977 78
78 79
79 80
80 81
81 82
82 83
83 84
84 85
85 86
86 87
87 88
88 89
89 90
90 91
91 92
92 93
93 94
94 95
95 96
96 97
97 98
98 99
99 (year)1977 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 (year)
Canadaeastcoast
coast
U.S. east
20
0
60
40

0
Structural Change during
the Period of Slow Growth
40

261
South
AfricaCanadaeast
coast

1977. At the time, only a few days remained until adecision would be required on whether or not towithdraw Japanese fishing boats that were alreadyoperating off the coast of Cape Town. Okuchi entered
South Africa and started talks together with theJapanese consul general on October 29, just prior to
the deadline’s expiration. These talks resulted in aprovisional decision to allow fishing operations fortwo months—November and December 1977—as
well as the effective conclusion of a basic fishery agreement. Japan’s fishing boats had narrowly escaped being
sent home. Then, on December 6, Japan and South
Africa signed a full fishing agreement. Japan’s fishingallowance that year was set at 15,180 tons. This wasfollowed in 1978 by an allowance of 40,200 tons,
which broke down to 27,000 tons of horse mackerel,
5,000 tons of hake, 3,000 tons of spear squid, 1,700
tons of sea bream, and 3,500 tons of other species.
These figures were far lower what anyone in Japan
imagined.
Subsequently, Japan and South Africa fishery held
annual talks to discuss and determine Japan’s fishingallowance for the following year. Unfortunately forJapan, these talks consistently ended in lower allowances. Japan was continuing to implement economic
sanctions against South Africa for continuing its apartheid policy, and these sanctions were influencing thefishery talks. It became apparent that the end of allowances was approaching.
Relations between the two countries improved in1991 when South Africa abandoned apartheid andJapan, in turn, announced the end of economic sanctions against it. Japan–South Africa talks in December
postponed the end the allowance for one year.
Ultimately, however, Japanese fishing boats left South
African waters at the end of 1992.
At the peak of its operations in 1978, Nippon Suisan
operated nine vessels in South Africa. This number
later fell until the Niitaka Maru became the last tooperate in 1992.

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

Regulations by New Zealand and Withdrawal
from New Zealand Waters
In September 1977 New Zealand enacted a law establishing its 200-nautical-mile exclusive fishing zone. Itthen set a transition period from October until Marchof 1978 during which operation by foreign fishingboats would be allowed, as it also established nofishing areas in which foreign fishing would be prohibited. Japan asked New Zealand for bilateral talks
during the transition period but was unsuccessful due
the effects of an agricultural trade issue. Consequently,
Japan was forced to call its trawlers—which were fishing at the time—back to port in March 1978. Latertalks did not proceed smoothly, as New Zealandsought to link fishing quotas with its trade complaints
against Japan concerning dairy products; however, anagreement was eventually reached and put into immediate effect on September 1. The quotas New Zealandpresented at this time were, in all areas, far below
previous catches by Japan’s squid boats, southern trawlers, and bottom set net long-line boats. Despite extensive negotiations, New Zealand did not allow larger
quotas, and thus Japan had no choice but to accept
what was presented and scale back its fleet
accordingly.
New Zealand’s fishery management year started in
October and ended in September the following year.
In order to accept its fishing quota for a particularmanagement year, a country had to pay the corresponding fishing fees prior to the start of that management year. In addition, fishing grounds were subdivided
into eight subzones, with harvestable fish species andamounts predetermined for each.
With the exception of 1982, New Zealand’s allowance to Japan declined as New Zealand’s own fisheryindustry grew. Eventually Japan’s quota-based fisheryended with horse mackerel fishing by the Akagi Maru
in 1991.
The basic principles behind New Zealand’s fisherypolicy were protection of its own fishery and promotion of joint ventures. Thus, as it shut out foreign

262

Kiso Maru

Kurama Marufishing boats on one hand, New Zealand conductedfishing within its own quotas by chartering foreignboats on the other.
Nippon Suisan’s operations centered on its leasing
the Kiso Maru and Kurama Maru through Sealord
Products Limited (S.P.L.) for use by Hokuyo Suisan(merged with Hokoku Suisan in October 1983; currently Hohsui Corporation) and Sealord Group, Ltd.
in June 1979, followed by the Rokko Maru from
October.
In October 1986, New Zealand implemented its
ITQ (individual transfer quotas) system. In addition
to offshore purchasing with S.P.L., this system led tooperations based on charter contracts between local
companies having quotas in New Zealand and Japanese
partners.
In 1987, Nippon Suisan began operating the Yamato
Maru and Rikuzen Maru, which had been involvedin Alaska pollack surimi operations in the North
Pacific, during New Zealand’s hoki fishing season from
July to August. Both ships continued operating there
until 1990. The Rikuzen Maru was sent again in
1992.
In 1994, Sealord Pacific Limited was established
as a member of the Sealord Group, and Nissui New
Zealand, Ltd. (hereafter “Nissui NZ”) was formed
within the Nippon Suisan Group. These two companies then set up a co-operation called Sea-Sui Joint
Venture. The Akagi Maru (renamed Pakura) began
operations under this joint venture in February 1994,
fishing with quotas leased to it by Sealord. Later, Nissui
NZ independently purchased Nippon Suisan’s Ibuki
Maru (renamed Taharaki) and began operating her

in May 1995. And in November 1997, Nissui NZ
chartered the Pakura from Sea-Sui and also began
operating her on its own. However, quota lease fees
were rising year by year and making operations uneconomical, and as a result the Pakura and Taharaki had
to be sold in 2002.

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

Regulations by Canada and Withdrawal from
Canadian Waters
At the end of 1976, following a special meeting of theInternational Commission for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries (ICNAF), Japan conducted talks with
Canada in the hope of continuing its operations in
Canadian waters. Canada agreed to allow Japaneseboats to operate and issued fishing quotas on thecondition that an intergovernmental agreement would
be signed at an early date. Talks between the two sides
for a provisional agreement were stopped as a result.
However, for operations in 1978 and thereafter,
Canada strongly desired an early agreement, sayingthat it would not allow fishing to proceed withoutone, and it put forward its own proposal to Japan in
the latter half of 1977. Negotiations to conclude theagreement continued in three sessions over the courseof three months beginning in January 1978. They
finally bore fruit when a Japan–Canada fishery agreement was signed on April 28, 1978.
In 1977, Canada issued a fishing quota of 21,550
tons to Japan (3,000 tons of Argentine shortfin squid,
14,300 tons of capelin, and 4,250 tons of deep-sea
smelt). However, with execution of the Japan–Canada
fishery agreement pushed back until April 1978,

263

Canada decided to allow fishing by foreign boats
without an agreement for an interim period during
the first year of its new 200-nautical-mile exclusive
fishing zone. Canada issued quotas to Japan for a long
period of time compared to other countries; however,the quotas finally came to an end in 1998.
It should be noted that Canada implemented various measures for countries that cooperated with its
effort to promote Canadian fishery and seafood processing. Among them, it allowed such countries to use
a portion of its own domestic catch. However, although
catches of Argentine shortfin squid in Canadian waters
remained strong until the early 1980s, they later
declined significantly.
Nippon Suisan was involved in partnerships forcod, Argentine shortfin squid, capelin, and red rockfish among other species. The last such partnership
involved fishing for red rockfish and capelin by the
Takachiho Maru in 1990.

Regulations by Greenland and Withdrawal
Greenlandic Waters
In 1984, two vessels from Japan—Nippon Suisan’sTeshio Maru and Taiyo Gyogyo’s Banshu Maru No.7—
engaged in red rockfish fishing off the western coastof Greenland. Each of these vessels was operating basedon a separate fishing contract between the Greenland
Trade Department and its marine products company
in Japan.
In May 1985 a first round of fishery negotiations
between Japan and Greenland took place based on
the results of these operations. This was followed bya second round in July that resulted in the setting offishery conditions and produced a fishing contract
for 1985 and thereafter.
That year, Japan was allowed a total catch of 36,580
tons. This broke down to 13,180 tons off of Greenland’s
eastern shore (6,180 tons of red rockfish, 1,000 tonsof Greenland halibut, and 6,000 tons of other species)and 23,400 tons off of its western shore (5,500 tonsof red rockfish, 7,500 tons of Greenland halibut, andStructural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

10,400 tons of other species). These figures were theresult of hard work put in by the Japan Overseas
Fishing Association and private fishery operators.
However, by 1995, the allowance had fallen to 800.
That year turned out to be the final one of Japanese
operations in Greenland, as Japan’s allowance was set
at zero the following year.
Between 1985 and 1988, Nippon Suisan sent out
between one and three vessels each year. It operated
two vessels—the Zao Maru and Tokachi Maru—in
1988, its final year in Greenland.
Launch of NAFO and Japan’s Withdrawal
The International Commission for the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) was launched in 1950 tomaintain fishery resources in waters near Canada’s
east coast, Newfoundland, and the Grand Banks.
Japan joined the ICNAF in 1970. However, all members withdrew from the ICNAF when the era of the
200-nautical-mile exclusive fishing zone arrived. This
led to the birth of a new organization, the North
Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), in 1979.
Nippon Suisan had been fishing for red rockfish andother species in the region since the days of the
ICNAF; however, it found that operating large trawlers within the quotas allowed by NAFO was unprofitable, and it ended its operations there with fishing by
the Takachiho Maru in 1991.
It should be noted that the management of resourcesin this region is based on decisions made by member
countries attending annual NAFO meetings.
Accordingly, Japan has continued to secure quotas
even since 1992 by operating fishing boats there andmaintaining the presence of a government delegation
at NAFO meetings. The Japan Overseas Fishing
Association continues to send boats there to fish for
red rockfish, Greenland halibut, squid, and shrimp.

264

Argentine Shortfin Squid Fishing Grounds ofArgentina
With a continental shelf that extends to the edge ofits 200-nautical-mile zone, Argentina was blessed withbountiful fishery resources. Nippon Suisan began
developing these resources as a major remote business,and it commenced fishing and processing at PESPASA,
which it established in 1981.
Meanwhile, in July and August 1978, the Zao Maru
confirmed the formation of Argentine shortfin squid
fishing grounds outside Argentina’s 200-nautical-milezone. In 1979, the number of Nippon Suisan boats
operating there began growing as boats that had beenworking in South Africa shifted over to Argentina.
Interestingly, the squid harvested there were larger insize than those of other regions, and thus market accep-

tance took a certain amount of time.
Trawlers owned by Nippon Suisan operated inArgentina from 1978 until around 1980. Then trawlers
and squid boats of other companies began moving inand creating a crowd of various boats during the fishingseason. The number of Nippon Suisan’s trawlers
peaked at ten in 1987 and then entered a decline.
Eventually, Nippon Suisan’s operations there ended
with fishing by the Niitaka Maru in 1994.
Squid boats began receiving permission to operate
within Argentina’s 200-nautical-mile zone by paying
fishing fees from 1993. This led to a harvest in excess
of 100,000 tons in 1999. In the end, however, declining
quality in Argentine shortfin squid resources andstricter fishing conditions led to a final operation by
five vessels in 2006.

6. Trends in West-Water TrawlingWest-water trawling had remained strong during the1970s, even amid declining resources and tougher
regulations by China and South Korea. However, thisstrength suddenly faltered in the 1980s. A decline in
the number of fishing boats that began in the lateWest-water two boats trawling diagram

one

line

Rough map of west-water fishing grounds

1960s became pronounced in the 1970s, and scaled
back operations led to significant decreases in thenumber of operating vessels. In the case of west-water
trawlers, in 1967, there were eight vessels based in
Shimonoseki (300-ton vessels owned by Taiyo Gyogyo

tly
reg
ula
te

dz

Shandong
PeninsulaGotoJeju IslandandsYellow
Sea

Isl

①

Joi
n

South
Korea

②
East China Sea

TobataNagasaki

Danjo
Islands
Tanegashima Island③
Amami Islands
Okinawa Islands
Uotsurijima Island
TaiwanMiyakojima Island

Structural Change during the Period of Slow GrowthWest-water trawling was practiced by Japan, China, South Korea, andNorth Korea in fishing grounds ranging from the Yellow Sea to the East
China Sea.
1) Prawns, young squid, flounder
2) Cutlassfish, conger eel, croaker, butterfish, squid3) Red sea bream, yellow sea bream, tilefish, trevally, black-throat seaperch,
red rice prawn, alfonsino

265

and Nichiro Gyogyo) and six in Tobata (300- and
500-ton vessels owned by Nippon Suisan). These
numbers fell to three in Shimonoseki (300- and 400ton vessels owned by Nichiro Gyogyo) and two in
Tobata (500-ton) in the early 1970s. The number ofvessels in Shimonoseki plummeted to zero in the latter
half of the 1970s. While two vessels remained at Tobata
until the 1980s, they were not operating in western
fishing grounds. The number of licensed fishing boats
fell dramatically from approximately 640 in 1970 toroughly 500 in 1980, and then further to 240 in 1990.
Major reasons for these decreases included shrinking
resources, tougher international regulations, and competition with foreign ships. Added to these were fallingdemand for fish-paste products due to the diffusionof Alaska pollack surimi and soaring fishery management costs.
Shut out of the U.S.S.R.’s 200-nautical-mile excusive
fishing zone in 1977, South Korean deep-sea fishing
trawlers stepped up their activities around Hokkaido.
This created various problems that included shrinking
stocks and fishery damage. In response, Japan andSouth Korea commenced talks on problems associatedwith South Korean fishing boats near Hokkaido in
August 1980. Through these talks it was decided that
South Korean fishing boats would halve their catch
capacity in waters near Hokkaido, and that Japan’s
west-water trawling boats would be asked to halve
their catch capacity in waters near Jeju Island, an area
on which these boats were highly dependent.
Specifically, a region covering 10 fishing grounds
between 125° and 127° east longitude to be jointly
regulated by Japan and South Korea would be designated as a “special regulated zone”. Fishing there would
be prohibited between February 16 and November
15 of each year for a period of three years beginningon November 1, 1980. It was further decided that the
total number of vessels permitted to fish during theallowed period would be set at 106, and the maximum
number of vessels that could operate simultaneously
would be 66. In response to this decision, the Fisheries
Agency issued a bulletin dated October 30, 1980,

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

stating that “operation of west-water trawling in thespecial regulated zone shall be prohibited during theperiod of February 16 to November 15 of each year”.
The Fisheries Agency completed preparing domestic
laws toward this end and started the work of reducing
vessel numbers.
This was the first period of self-imposed regulation.
In all, five such periods were implemented. The second
period began in 1983 and lasted for three years. The
total number of permitted vessels was lowered to 88,
and the maximum number permitted to operate simultaneously was reduced to 54. The third period lasted
four years, from 1988 to 1991. During this time, thetotal number of permitted vessels was set at 44 andthe maximum number of simultaneous vessels was 28.
The fourth period became a time of tougher controls;
however, the fifth period saw further cuts in the total
permitted vessels and simultaneously operating vessels
down to 35 and 22, respectively. The yield in the joint
zone fell below 20,000 tons in 1977, below 10,000
tons in 1981, and below 5,000 tons in 1988.
Nippon Suisan set up its Nagasaki Branch as a basefor west-water trawling in 1952 and was using it tovigorously promote its west water trawling business.
However, the branch’s west-water business began operating in the red in 1975, and its deficits grew larger
with each passing year. Consequently, Nippon Suisan
suspended operations of west-water trawing boats
there in 1980. It reassigned concerned employees to
the Tobata Trawling Department, which was its otherwest-water trawling base, and took various employment measures that included asking workers to accept
voluntary retirement. Year-round operation of westwater trawing boats was ended in 1982, and all ships of
the Nagasaki Branch and Tobata Trawling Department
were assigned to work as catcher boats in north-sea
mother ship operations during the summer months.
The following year, west-water trawling was scaled
back to the prime winter fishing months only. However,when even these moves failed to bring a positive turnaround, Nippon Suisan concentrated the Tobata
Trawling Department’s west-water business into the266Nagasaki Branch in January 1986, thereby making thebranch an arm dedicated to west-water business. Whenthe business environment still showed no improvement even after west-water operations from Tobata
ceased, the company sought to find a way to survive
by splitting the business into a separate company. Thus,
it launched Nikko Suisan K.K., in July 1988. Employees
affiliated with the Nagasaki branch had their employment terminated and were then were assigned to the newcompany. At the same time, Nippon Suisan transferredfour teams of west-water trawling boats and two carriers to Nikko Suisan. Nikko Suisan then inherited

Nippon Suisan’s west-water trawling business when
the Nagasaki Branch was closed down at the end of
August.
Nikko Suisan strove to improve its operating revenue by building energy-saving vessels with emphasison labor-savings and preservation of freshness, and by
narrowing down shipping destinations to focus on
major consumption areas. However, increasing pressure from foreign vessels—most notably from China
and South Korea—led to ballooning deficits from1990. Consequently Nikko Suisan was dissolved in
March 1993.

Part 2 Efforts to Create a New “Nippon Suisan”
Record Profits under the “200-Nautical-Mile
Zone Shock”
For Japan’s fishery industry, 1977 was the year of the“200-nautical-mile zone shock”.
The shock started when the U.S. and U.S.S.R. established 200-nautical-mile exclusive fishing zones on
March 1. They were soon followed by many coastal
countries. These zones meant that Japan’s fisheryindustry was now under new restrictions concerning
crab fishery, salmon and trout fishery, fishing boats
for north-sea fishery, and coastal bottom trawl fishery,
particularly in areas of the North Pacific Ocean inside
the U.S. and Soviet zones. As a result, more than 1,000
fishing boats became targets for vessel reductions.
However, Nippon Suisan’s fishing business was not
immediately affected. In fiscal 1977, its seafood sales—
which included those generated by fishing as well as
overseas joint ventures, trade, and domestic purchases—reached 276.3 billion yen. This figure was 1.5
times higher than the previous year’s sales of 175.2
billion yen. In terms of volume, harvests increased byjust 13%; therefore, the increase was largely attributable to soaring fish prices.
With business going strong, the company’s grosssales in 1977 reached 379.5 billion yen, or roughly 1.5
times sales of the previous year. Its net income also

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

grew by 1.6 times year-on-year to 9.9 billion yen. This
figure represented the company’s highest profit todate, and is a record that has not been surpassed since.
The next fiscal year, 1978, saw a slight decrease inrevenue and profit due to the effects of smaller quotas
and fewer operating vessels, with sales standing at
374.6 billion yen and net income at 8.1 billion yen.
A proposal to establish a Second Planning Committee
was brought up for discussion in April 1979. President
Juro Osoegawa weighed in on the matter by issuing apresidential notice on May 18. In it, he noted that thecompany had successfully maintained its performance
as a result of efforts to expand business that were basedon studies of countermeasures against 200-nauticalmile zones by the first committee in 1975. However,
he reiterated that the company’s profitability had not
broken its dependency on fishing. With regard to current performance, he further noted that clear qualitativechanges were afoot in terms of the company’s revenue.
Osoegawa therefore announced that, given structuralchanges taking place since the oil crises, Nippon Suisan
would set up a Second Planning Committee to formulate a new vision of the company in the 1980s.
Report of the Second Planning Committee
The Second Planning Committee (chaired by Sei-ichi

267

Kobayashi) submitted its report in December 1979.
It set a basic philosophy of “contributing to thebetterment of people’s lives by stably supplying foodsfrom a global perspective”. It established “securing
reasonable profits”, “pursuing rationality”, and “respecting human beings” as its management policies.
It also set forth the following as policy guidelines
for major business operations:•Fishing: Maintain business volume by actively developing partnerships and joint ventures.
It will be important to reinforce trading
functions and establish conditions for
those functions in order to maintain andstrengthen the company’s dominance infish distribution.
•Processed foods: Reduced in-house fishing means
lower profits. Thus, food processing
must become a stable source of future
revenue.
•Shipping: Shipping has a nature unlike other businesses in that it is affected by economic
fluctuations for longer periods of time.
Thus, it is advisable to separate it fromother businesses, and policies toward
this end should be fully implemented.
Specifically, it laid out the following measures.
In fishing, the report noted the importance of placing the highest priority on improving the company’s
profitability rate while also striving to maintain business volume by remaining number one in the industry.
It stated that the company should maintain and cultivate its fishing effort and strength where possible
over the short term, but also seek to rationally reorganize and qualitatively strengthen its business given
long-term limitations to fishing effort. Moreover, it
recommended that the company pursue possibilities
for partnerships and joint ventures as its in-housefishing decreases, and move quickly to deal with inevitable surpluses in workforce and hold space.
In particular, the report expressed the view that thecompany should actively operate its existing fishing
operations based on conviction that “the last vessels

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

operating in all fishing grounds will belong to Nippon
Suisan fleets”. In order to reinforce the underpinningsof Nippon Suisan’s fishing business, the report established that the company should invest in streamlining(for example, by building the latest energy-saving
fishing boats) as it also enters joint ventures to supplement its in-house fishing and searches for possibilities
for partnerships concerning North American Alaska
pollack. It further laid out a course for making its
west-water business independent in fiscal 1980.
In trading, the report set securing products andreinforcing the company’s distribution dominance as
top goals in making Nippon Suisan a “total producer”
of fish products together with its fishing category. It
established that the company should increase its shareby actively expanding its sphere of activities and stabilize the foundation of its profit-making structureduring the first half of the 1980s, and then aim tofirmly establish this structure in the latter half of thedecade. It also urged the company to devote itself tocommercial warehousing in its refrigerated warehousing business so as to steadily develop it into a sourceof stable revenue.
As for food processing, the report stated that firstreestablishing the category’s autonomy and then developing it into a stable source of revenue for the medium
and long term were priority items. The report alsoestablished that the company should seek to become
a general foods business in the future as it also fully
demonstrates its special characteristics as a fisheries
company. It further said the company should build
up trust as a brand owner by working to expand its
product lineup to meet consumer needs.
And in shipping, the report stated that the autonomy of Nissui Senpaku must be respected to the greatest degree possible. It noted that if it becomes necessary
for Nissui Senpaku’s growth to enter joint ventures ortie-ups with other companies, Nippon Suisan should
respond flexibly by not insisting on being a 100%
shareholder.
In addition, the report pointed out the need tomove trading functions of the Remote Business268

Department into the Trade Department and to closely
link the Trade Department and Fresh and Frozen
Products Sales Department. It also recommended
incorporating production plants into production
management rather than the head office/branch officesystem.
Striving to be a General Foods Company
Performance in fiscal 1979 showed sales of 407.9 billion yen, which was 109% of the previous fiscal year’s
figure. However, net income stood at 7.2 billion yen,which was 90% of the previous year’s figure.
The next fiscal year, 1980, marked the fourth year
since the beginning of the 200-nautical-mile zone era.
Nippon Suisan recognized that rapid changes capableof uprooting its key businesses of deep-sea trawlingand mother ship-type fishery would not happen in
the near future. Consequently, it formulated a schedule for operating all of its existing fishing boats as in
the past, and even began building highly advanced
trawlers with an investment of 8.5 billion yen.
In fiscal 1979, Nippon Suisan’s processed foods
business recorded sales surpassing the 100-billion-yen
level and earning a profit of 1.1 billion yen. Whether
or not the company could maintain these figures into
fiscal 1980 became the focus of attention. Successwould depend on a medium-term food products planthat reflected the results of labor-management talks
originating from the Onagawa Plant.
At a June 1980 board meeting that followed a general shareholders meeting, Vice President Shun-ichi
Okuchi was named the company’s new president.
Then, in July, Okuchi held an investigative meetingthat was based on general circumstances of the 14th
half-year period. The meeting’s purpose was to encourage awareness of how soaring fuel costs and stagnant
fish prices were impacting on the company’s rapidly
worsening business conditions, and to discuss ways ofminimizing the decline in revenues that had begun
the previous fiscal year.
Although sales reached 408.9 billion yen, which

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

was on par with the previous year, net income fell to
5.6 billion yen, or 77% of the previous year’s level.
This profit figure actually exceeded expectations andallowed the company to pay a commemorative 70th
anniversary dividend. However, it provided no indication that a better environment was on its way in the
coming fiscal 1981.
It should be noted that an Offshore Business
Division was launched in June 1980. The division wasplaced in charge of the Trawling Department, Nagasaki
Branch, Northern Seas Department, Vessels Department,
Remote Business Department, and International Fishery
Measures Office. This move was designed to integrate
fishing business-related offices in advance in order tohandle reducing in American quotas to Japan.
One goal of the fiscal 1981 plan was to secure sales
and revenue exceeding the previous fiscal year’s levels.
Saying that Nippon Suisan would “seek to become afirst-rate general foods company while remaining the
top marine products company”, President Okuchi
hammered out a management policy that encompassed multifaceted perspectives but still preserved
the company’s fishery core. Particularly with regard
to the fishing business, Okuchi’s plan demonstrated
his strong view that Nippon Suisan’s mission was todistance itself from the second-place company, particularly in a harsh environment, and to survive in theworld’s oceans.
However, when it became clear that realizing theplan would be doubtful at the time of the 14th halfyear period, a directive urging certain achievement ofa revised profit goal was issued under the name of Vice
President Sei-ichi Kobayashi. The purpose was to“spur each office to work even harder toward attaining
the new goal”. While fish prices had recovered compared to the previous year, prices for surimi and meal
fell below expectations. Nonetheless, the company
succeeded in attaining sales of 429.7 billion yen (or105% of the previous year’s figure) and attained its
profit goal of 5.0 billion yen (90% of the previousyear).
The goal for fiscal 1982 was to expand profits. By

269

setting this goal, the company hoped to brake falling
profits that had continued for the previous several
years. Its focus was on worsening market conditions
for surimi and meal and handling of west water business based at Nagasaki.
With no hope that it could expand its fishing business, the company sought to maintain volume.
Meanwhile, the processed foods business fell underpressure to achieve profits as soon as possible in order
to become a category capable of supporting Nippon
Suisan’s growth. And the seafood purchasing businesssought to make forward-looking responses, despitedifficulty avoiding exchange rate fluctuations, byincreasing domestic and overseas purchases to supplement the fishing business.
That year, Nippon Suisan also set as goals the operation of its own vessels within joint ventures in Argentina
and Chile, and the building of a new trawler to follow
the two built the previous year. President Okuchi
declared that these goals were demonstrations of his
determination to prevail during tough times in thefishery industry and of his confidence in the company’s
success. Another goal was to build the company intoa strong general foods company, without remaining
satisfied with its status as the top marine products
company.
The fiscal 1982 settlement of accounts posted
increases in both revenue and profit.
The fishing business succeeded in securing earnings
and South American joint ventures were developing
nicely. Efforts to streamline west-water business werecompleted the previous fiscal year. Moreover, the factthat the processed foods business was showing a profit
even after subtracting production management, product development, and advertising expenses was also
highly significant. Sales increased by 13% year-on-year
to 484.4 billion yen, which was Nippon Suisan’s highest sales figure ever. And profit rose for the first timein four years, reaching 7.4 billion yen for a year-on-yearincrease of 48%.

Structural Change during the Period of Slow GrowthReport of the Third Planning Committee
In fiscal 1983, Nippon Suisan wished to continue its
growth from the previous year. Here, it was particularly
vital for the fishing business to avoid allowing its
production to decline. Additionally, the purchasing
business was asked to bring handling fees to near 1%.
And the processed foods business was required tomake new efforts based on a revolutionary program
for the second medium-term plan’s first fiscal year.
Nippon Suisan launched its Third Planning
Committee in July. The committee’s highest priority
was the realization of long-term and continuous
growth. It was charged with addressing the need tosee in-house fishing, offshore purchasing, and onshore
processing as a tripartite undertaking, given concerns
about the future of North American west coast businesses; examining the ideal form of the seafood purchasing business, which had grown rapidly as asupplement to the fishing business; and, amid signs
that the newly profitable processed foods businesswould suddenly stagnate, establishing a corresponding
revenue structure in existing sectors.
Jun-ichi Kishimoto, a senior managing executive
officer, was named to be the chairman. The committee
was comprised of a main planning committee madeup of board members and specialized subcommittees
comprised of general managers of the company’s
departments. It submitted its report the following
year, in March 1984.
The report analyzed the strengths and weaknessesof Nippon Suisan’s key businesses as follows:
1)Fishing: Fishing must consistently remain a corebusiness in such forms as joint venturesand partnerships. The ability to comprehensively manage fishing business is
one of Nippon Suisan’s strong points.
The company’s deep-sea bottom trawl
fishery business has the greatest strengthand highest yields, which allow it tomaintain operational levels and enter
into joint ventures within countries’

270200-nautical-mile zones even amid tightoverseas fishery regulations. However,as the company withdraws from otherfishery sectors, it is specializing in deepsea bottom trawl fishery, and its technical capabilities are being limited to thisarea. Although it has maintained its costadvantage, aging vessels and tightening
regulations will make it difficult tomaintain this advantage under current
conditions. Thus, the company must
break away from its conventional thinking and reorganize its businesses
accordingly.
2)Seafood purchasing: Only recently have domestic/
overseas purchasing and sales begun
expanding. One of Nippon Suisan’smajor strengths is its stable supply ofcatches and imported commodities fromjoint ventures. In its imports of overseas
products, Nippon Suisan has room for
additional procurement efforts in areasthat differ from major trading companies. However, a stronger sales framework will be essential. In particular, there
is room for additional development ofsales routes for commercial products andprocessed products. The company’s
earning capacity remains unstable.
3)Food products: The food product business fell into
chronic deficits around 1975. Although
the company worked to rebuild it bytaking decisive streamlining measures in
1979, additional effort will be needed
to make it a contributor to overall revenue and expenditure. Efforts to reinforce product development capability,
which was a point of focus in labormanagement talks, have yet to bear fruit.
The business’s sales capacity of 130.0
billion yen is quite high and deservescommendation. The biggest problem is

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

its poor position in the Tokyo metropolitan area, where the nation’s population is concentrated. Moreover, the factthat products purchased from partner
plants (which make up the majority ofall products) do not produce profit is amajor problem. Shifting to directly managed or semi-directly managed plants
should be studied to secure producers’
profits. The company should raise its
in-house manufacturing rate, improve
productivity, and increase profitability
with lower costs by developing productsthat are suited to Nippon Suisanmanaged plants. Problems with the processed food business include quality
control capability, product development
capability, cost competitiveness, andsales strength. Higher earnings power isan area where improvement is expected.
The report further provided the following overview
of the company’s circumstances at the time.
Despite the long period of time that has passed
since calls to reform the company’s fishing-dependent
revenue structure were heard, Nippon Suisan has along way to go before it can supplement fishing withbusinesses expected to fulfill this role; namely, domestic/overseas purchasing and processed foods businesses. The fishing business is facing rising costs, andalthough it has been securing earnings by improving
productivity, this will be difficult from 1984. The
domestic/overseas purchasing business posted profits
in fiscal 1981 and 1982; however, it is expected toplunge back into the red in fiscal 1983. This points to
its susceptibility to exchange rate fluctuations andweak revenue base. The processed foods businessfinally turned a real profit in fiscal 1982. This waslargely due to EPA (eicosapentaenoic acid), and thus
the pace of improvement was slow. The company
urgently needs to improve the profitability of its
domestic/overseas purchasing and processed foods
businesses in order to transform its overall revenue

271

structure. At the same time, it must orient itself toachieve long-term and sustainable profit growth as it
also resolves a surplus workforce problem expected toarise from a shrinking fishery business and morestreamlined processed foods business.
The report stated that the company must set a
medium-term earnings target of at least 10.0 million
yen. It broke this figure down into at least 5.0 billion
yen for fishing, 3.0 billion yen for fresh and frozen
food products, and 2.0 billion yen for processed
foods.
Actual performance for fiscal 1983—the year of
the committee’s study—saw lower revenue and lower
profit due to red ink in the trading sector resulting
from falling fish prices during the second half of theyear. Sales reached 470.0 billion yen (98% of the figure
for the previous year) and net income stood at 4.8%
(65%).
In fiscal 1984, Nippon Suisan set about putting
itself on a path toward profit growth based on the
Third Planning Committee’s report. This included
structural reform designed to help the company demonstrate its collective strength. The Sales Division was
split into the Fresh and Frozen Products Division andFood Products Division. Together with the existing
Overseas Business Division and Offshore Operations
Division, this produced a total of four divisions. The
company then worked to achieve close coordination
among all four organizations. In addition, the Overseas
Business Division was reorganized by integrating its
Remote Business and Foreign Trade Departments.
Seven full years had passed since 200-nautical-milezones became the rule. Against this backdrop, theOffshore Operations Division set a policy of securing
interests in existing fishing grounds, pursuing tie-ups
and joint ventures with a close eye to trends in partnercountries, promoting operations in international
waters, and utilizing the company’s technologies andknow-how in non-fishing-related fields.
Although the food products business was achieving
sales of 140 billion yen, it was continuing to falter interms of profitability. At the same time, the business

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

circumstances of overseas joint ventures and Nissui
Senpaku had become a management issue.
The business environment during this fiscal year
was not entirely bad, as Nippon Suisan posted a 3%
gain in revenue to 484.3 billion yen and a 16% rise inprofits to 4.8 billion yen.

A Darkening Path to Profit Growth:
Toward the Fourth Planning Committee
Fiscal 1985 marked a turning point for Nippon Suisan’s
offshore business, as it was moving to battle its competitors with quality rather than quantity. It increased
investment to establish Great Land Seafoods, Inc.
(G.L.S.) as a surimi process plant, acquire all of sharesof UniSea, construct refrigerated warehouses (including the Tobu Reizo Shokuhin’s No.2 Coldstore as well
as facilities for Kinki Reizo Shokuhin and Kitakyushu
Reizo Shokuhin), and launch Esukei (S.K.) Suisan
K.K. as a seafood processing plant. On a completionbasis, this investment amounted to 14.7 billion yen.
It also moved to cultivate budding new businesses by
setting aside a special development fund of 100 million
yen. And it sent four trawlers to joint ventures in SouthAmerica; all of which were put into service. Meanwhile,
its offshore purchasing business expanded year by year.
Although Nippon Suisan started this business reluctantly so as to acquire government fishing quotas, it
had become necessary as a means of raising businessprofitability.
During the second half, all businesses with the
exception of offshore business appeared unlikely toachieve their planned goals. As a result, the company
took the unusual step of holding a management committee meeting prior to the mid-term settlement ofaccounts. The market was depressed due to a strong
yen as well as intensifying sales competition as well as
excess stocks from an oversupply of seafood products.
Meanwhile, even offshore business, which had been
the company’s only earnings source, began seeing
increasingly harsher fluctuations in its environment.
A Fourth Planning Committee was convened in272

November. Entering fiscal 1985, Nippon Suisan’s path
to real profitability darkened. In addition, the company feared that its revenue structure reforms were
not keeping pace with the speed at which the businessenvironment was worsening. The biggest problem was
the fact that the food products business’s 140.0 billion
yen in sales were not contributing to the company’s
revenue and expenditure.
It was decided that Nippon Suisan would implement measures under a fundamental reform plan
toward rebuilding the company’s revenue base overthe course of three years to begin in fiscal 1986.
In January 1986, the Fourth Planning Committee(chaired by Vice President Fumio Imanaga) submitted
its interim report at a regularly scheduled board meeting. The following are priority items contained within
it. 1) Guide grouping in the north-sea and trawlingbusinesses. 2) Reestablish west-water business. 3) Forma company-wide system in the development of North
American business. 4) Expand the refrigerated warehouse business nationwide. 5) Reorganize plants inthe food products business. 6) Resolve problems concerning personnel and labor policy and the hiring
structure. And 7) consider organizational problems
and consolidated management.
Fiscal 1985 was a year of lower earnings but higher
profits, as sales reached 473.9 billion yen, a figure
equivalent to 98% of the previous year’s sales, while
net income reached 5.8 billion yen, or 104% of theprevious year’s figure. There was divergence among
the businesses between their plans and actual performance. Nippon Suisan was making no progress toward
becoming a general foods company; indeed, its dependency on fishing was becoming even stronger. The
Fourth Planning Committee was charged with finding
emergency countermeasures against this trend.
It should be noted that, in December 1985, thewest-water trawling business of the Trawling
Department were merged with the Nagasaki Branch.
Additionally, a General Development Office was set
up in January 1986. These moves were intended to
expand the peripheral sectors of existing businesses in

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthorder to make the company a “first-rate general foods
company” and to promote Nippon Suisan’s entry into
new sectors.
Then, in June 1986, Vice President Fumio Imanaga
was named Nippon Suisan’s new president.
That year, Nippon Suisan’s offshore purchasing,mother ship-type trawl fishery, and trawling in the
Bering Sea performed better than expected. Contrib­
uting factors include a better-than-expected Alaska
pollack harvest and higher surimi prices. However,even more important was the fact that the government’s quota to Nippon Suisan from among the U.S.’s
Alaska pollack fishing allowance remained at 620,000
tons. Nippon Suisan was able to use this quota tosecure earnings from catching and processing with its
own boats.
In offshore purchasing, which was growing eachyear, fishing profits were going to the Americans, andthus purchasing was not contributing to earnings.
Meanwhile, while the food products business was ina tough fight amid excessive supply, the frozen foods
business was competing well and bringing in earnings
above the planned target.
Thus, although both earnings and profits were
down on a year-on-year basis, the company succeededin raising earnings according to plan. Nonetheless, it
still made no progress in improving its revenue
structure.
Of 15.0 billion in investment and loans, offshorerelated items, such as the surimi mother ship Miyajima
Maru and one team of west water hand-hauling boats,accounted for 8.0 billion yen.
Fiscal 1986 was also a year when Nippon Suisan
began searching for ways to expand its business. In
April, it began cultivating black tiger shrimp after
establishing Bangkok Shrimp Cultivation Co., Ltd.
(B.S.C.) in Bangkok, Thailand. It also began a study
toward building food for fish breeding into a businessby setting up a feed research team within the General
Development Office. It also entered the dining-out
industry.
Then, in October, it established a “business field273

selection committee” to study new business fields.
Vice President Katsusuke Minoda was appointed its
chairman. The committee was comprised primarilyof board members as well as a working group madeup of section leaders and assistant section leaders fromall departments.

Part 3 Nippon Suisan’s Shrinking Fishing and Shipping Businesses
Stability in the Fishing Business until
the Mid-1980s
In 1977, the year in which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. began
enforcing their 200-nautical-mile exclusive fishingzones, Nippon Suisan’s fishing business consisted ofmother ship-type salmon and trout fishery, mothership-type crab fishery, mother ship-type trawl fisheryunder the Northern Seas Department; northern trawling and southern trawling under the Trawling
Department; and west-water trawling under the
Nagasaki Branch. Nippon Suisan had already withdrawn from whaling in 1976 and was concentrating
its resources in joint whaling by Japan.
In fiscal 1977, Nippon Suisan suspended operationof the Miyajima Maru in salmon and trout fishery,terminated surimi operations by the trawler Kongo
Maru, and suspended snow crab and Pacific herring
fishing in the Bering Sea as well as flounder fishing by
the Nojima Maru off the west coast of Kamchatka.
However, the loss of these operations was covered byincreased production from mother ship-type trawl
fishery and South America-based trawling.
Operations in fiscal 1977 produced the following
results. In trawling, four trawlers operated in North
Pacific and North American east coast fishing groundswith a quota of approximately 70,000 tons, while seventrawlers operated in African fishing grounds with aquota of 43,000 tons. Three trawlers operated in thenorthwestern Atlantic Ocean while eight trawlers
operated off of New Zealand’s coasts and other areas
with a planned quota of approximately 44,000 tons.
Moreover, two large trawlers engaged in trial operations off the coast of Chile in South America, where
they produced 11,000 tons of hake and fish meal.
Remote businesses produced and imported 12,000

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthtons. Two trawlers worked in Antarctic krill fishinggrounds. In west-water trawling, two trawlers and 42
west-water trawling boats operated and harvested
approximately 7,600 tons. In north-sea operations, asmaller number of mother ships were employed inmother ship-type salmon and trout fishery. Nippon
Suisan co-operated the Nojima Maru fleet with
Hokoku Suisan in the Aleutian Islands and Bering
Sea with a quota of 4,000 tons. In mother ship-type
crab fishery, the Keiko Maru fleet was jointly operated
by Nippon Suisan and three other companies in the
Bering Sea under a snow crab quota to Japan of justunder 5,000 tons. And in the Sea of Okhotsk, theEiho Maru fleet operated with a golden king crab
quota of approximately 600 tons. In mother ship-type
trawl fishery, the fleets of the Mineshima Maru,
Shikishima Maru, and Kashima Maru each operated
in the Bering Sea with quotas of approximately
302,000 tons.
Compared to the previous year, trawling in fiscal
1978 had an increase of three operating vessels with ahigher quota of approximately 10,000 tons in North
Pacific and northwestern Atlantic fishing grounds,
but a decrease of one vessel and approximately 5,000ton quota reduction in Africa. For New Zealand fishing grounds, the plan was reduced by 24,000 tons andthe number of operating vessels was halved to four.
This same fiscal year, Nippon Suisan began operatingnear Argentina’s Patagonia region. There, large trawlers produced 7,400 tons of hake, Argentine shortfin
squid, etc. Mother ship-type crab fishery saw a 1,000ton increase in the snow crab quota of the Keiko Maru
fleet (joint operation by four companies) but a halvingof the Eiho Maru fleet’s golden king crab quota toapproximately 300 tons. Mother ship-type trawl fishery had an approximately 12,000-ton quota reduction.

274

Other operations saw little change compared to theprevious year.
Compared to fiscal 1978, North Pacific and northwestern Atlantic trawling had a 3,000-ton quota
reduction but a two-vessel increase in operating vessels
in fiscal 1979. African trawling had a quota reductionof slightly less than 10,000 tons, while New Zealand
trawling lost one trawler but had a roughly 10,000-ton
quota increase. In west-water business, the quota
increased by 1,600 tons. Mother ship-type crab fishery
had no year-on-year change. In mother ship-type trawl
fishery, the quota was reduced by 9,000 tons.
Performance in other operations was much the sameas it was the previous year.
In this way, in the three years following the birthof the 200-nautical-mile system, Nippon Suisan’s fishing business remained comparatively stable.
Even 1980, four years after the system came to be,
Nippon Suisan did not believe that coastal nation’s
fishing regulations on foreign boats would continue
indefinitely.
Nippon Suisan’s balance of payments in fishingbusiness was gradually declining after peaking in fiscal
1977. However, taking the view that U.S.’s fisheryallowance to Japan would not change beyond someminor adjustments, Nippon Suisan felt that its profits
would rise at a constant rate as soon as the problem
of surplus vessels was resolved. It believed there was alimit to the degree to which coastal nations could raise
their catch capacity so long as resources remained
stable; thus, it was anticipating that regulatory conditions would stabilize at some point. Nippon Suisan’splan here was to survive until that day arrived, and to
persist with its long-established technical capabilities
and high morals even as other companies droppedout.
As for north-sea mother ship-type fishery of fiscal
1980, the snow crab quota of the Keiko Maru fleet,which was being operated jointly by four companies,
was dropped to 2,800 tons in mother ship-type crab
fishery, while the quota for mother ship-type trawl
fishery was reduced to 266,000 tons. However,

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

trawling remained at the previous year’s level. However,the balance of payments worsened by 10% due to risingcosts.
West-water business was suffering from poor performance that began in the mid-1960s. Despite bountiful harvests of fleshy prawn in the 1970s, the businesslacked competitiveness and fell into the red from 1975.
The business structure required reinforcement.
West water business was scaled back in fiscal 1981.
Year-round operations were suspended, and a system
was employed whereby nine teams of the Nagasaki
Branch and six teams of the Trawling Department
accompanied north-sea mother-ship operations during
the summer and engaged in west-water operations
during the winter. Five teams of dedicated-use boats
were taken out of service, and employment measures
were taken for more than 100 crewmen. As a result,business returned to the black the following fiscal
year.
In fiscal 1981, the Keiko Maru fleet’s snow crab
quota in the Bristol Bay was cut to zero, meaning thefleet could not operate there.
Regarding the use of resources within the U.S.’s
200-nautical-mile zone, the Breaux Amendment (I)of December 1981 led to the setting of optimum production amounts for American fishery operators anddenied the allocation of surplus resources to othercountries. One result was the beginning of offshore
purchasing of Alaska pollack and other species in June
1981. The amount purchased grew larger with eachpassing year; it was slightly more than 10,000 tons infiscal 1981 and climbed to 66,000 tons in fiscal 1982.
Of these amounts, Nippon Suisan purchased 6,100
tons in fiscal 1981 and 21,000 tons next year.
Nippon Suisan’s total volume of offshore purchases
grew to 46,000 tons in fiscal 1982, 91,000 tons in fiscal
1983, 145,000 tons in fiscal 1984, and 167,000 tons
in fiscal 1985. On the other hand, government-set
fishing quotas for these same years were 294,000 tons,
252,000 tons, 254,000 tons, and 206,000 tons.
In fiscal 1984, golden king crab fishery off of western Kamchatka as part of mother ship-type275

Scaling Back and then Ending of the Fishing
Business

The surimi factory ship Miyajima Maru, completed in 1986

crab fishery was placed outside of intergovernmental
discussions. This was due to a decision by the JapanU.S.S.R. Fisheries Commission that crustaceans were
continental shelf resources that should be entirely
under the possessing country’s management. It was
expected that subsequent private-sector negotiations
would lead to operations in accordance with regulations based on Soviet law; however, such negotiations
did not take place and consequently fishery activities
remained in limbo. The next fiscal year, 1985, fishing
was suspended when negotiations broke down. Other
companies later continued fishing of some several
hundred tons through a joint-management approach;however, these companies pulled out in 1995.
Change began to appear in previously stable northern operations in fiscal 1986. Offshore purchasing was
growing significantly, reaching 262,000 tons. However
quotas had plunged to 101,000 tons. Thus offshore
purchasing and fishing had reversed position. The
new ship Miyajima Maru, Mineshima Maru, andKashima Maru were added to surimi trawlers engaged
in offshore purchasing. Traditionally, the fishery allowance to Japan had given to the Mineshima Maru,
Shikishima Maru, and Kashima Maru; however, now
it was given to two fleets—those of the Mineshima
Maru and Kashima Maru. The Miyajima Maru wasbuilt to substitute for the Shikishima Maru as a highly
advanced labor- and energy-saving surimi mothership.
Also in fiscal 1986, the west-water business of
Tobata’s Trawling Department was integrated into the
Nagasaki Branch.

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

From 1977, the first year of the 200-nautical-mile zone
system, until fiscal 1986, Nippon Suisan’s fishing business had proceeded smoothly, centered on Alaska
pollack and surimi. This was despite the decline of its
mother ship-type crab fishing and scaling back of its
west-water business. However, this changed completely in fiscal 1987.
In fiscal 1987, the U.S.’s fishing allowance to Japanin its waters was slashed to 110,000 tons. As a result,
Nippon Suisan chose not to operate. The allowance
to Japan was further cut to zero in January 1988.
This left offshore purchasing as Nippon Suisan’s
only north-sea operation. Offshore purchasing reached
225,000 tons in fiscal 1987 and 180,000 tons in fiscal
1988. However, the falling fishing allowance toJapan—which had been above 200,000 tons several
years prior and was even above 100,000 tons in fiscal
1986—dealt a serious blow to Nippon Suisan’s
management.
Other fishing operations in fiscal 1987 recorded
78,000 tons of bottom fish and other fish within the
200-nautical-mile zones of Canada, South Africa,
New Zealand, and Greenland; approximately 101,000
tons of bottom fish, squid, and krill in high-seas fishinggrounds of the Bering Sea, Antarctic Ocean, andAtlantic Ocean; 6,000 tons in western fishing grounds;
3,000 tons in mother ship-type salmon and trout
fishery; and 500 tons in jointly managed golden kingcrab fishery.
As a result of reduced fishery quotas, mother shiptype salmon and trout fishery was made a joint undertaking managed by all companies in fiscal 1988. Thiseffectively ended Nippon Suisan’s north-sea
operations.
That fiscal year, as west-water trawling business
continued to suffer worsening profits, Nikko Suisan
was established in July and received the Nagasaki
Branch’s operations. Then, in September, Nissui
Marine Service K.K. was launched to effectively utilize

276

Nippon Suisan’s fishing technologies.
The next year, fiscal 1989, Nippon Suisan’s offshore
purchasing plunged to 88,000 tons. This marked thelast year that it purchased Alaska pollack. In fiscal
1990 just yellowfin sole and some other species
remained.
Fishing operations in fiscal 1989 brought in approximately 130,000 tons of bottom fish, squid, krill, andother species from the 200-nautical-mile zones ofCanada, New Zealand, and others as well as high-seasfishing grounds of the Bering Sea and South America.
They also recorded 55,000 tons from partnerships in
New Zealand. Snow crab, golden king crab, and westwater trawling were practiced through joint operations; however, their intake plummeted. Fishing had
become a money-losing business.
As it scaled back its fishing business, Nippon Suisan
also made employment adjustments concerning 380
employees affiliated with the Northern Seas
Department by March 1989. Even so, it was pressed
to make further moves to achieve the optimum workforce size.
Fiscal 1990 was a year of vast and unprecedented
deficits in Nippon Suisan’s fishing business that arosefrom poor catches in international waters of the Baring
Sea. As a result, the company was unable to pay dividends that year. Fiscal 1990 became the last year for
Nippon Suisan’s operations in these waters.
The Maritime Operations Division, which oversaw
the fishing business, was incorporated into the Fisheries
Division in January 1990. The Fisheries Division’s red
ink had come from fishing operations of the Tobata
Branch. Business losses were attributable to poor fishing in international waters of the Bering Sea as well as
poor performance from southern fishing grounds. In
June, Nippon Suisan decided to end its mother shiptype trawl fishery permit expire.
In November, Nippon Suisan presented a plan todownsize its fishing business to the All Japan Seamen’s
Union. The plan called for a reduction in the numberof Nippon Suisan’s own fishing boats from 14 to eight,
raising the number of joint-venture boats from seven

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthto eight, and maintaining the number of outsourced
business boats at four. It would further implement
employment measures for all 300 offshore employees
who were expected to be affected by the fleet reduction. Specifically, these measures included transfers anddispatches; education, training, and acquisition ofqualifications at vocational skills development centers;
work in offshore-related positions; reassignment toonshore occupations; and assignment to duties in amutual assistance association (later named “NissuiTech”) that was formed based on the concept of mutual
assistance during an age of “joint fishing”. Nippon
Suisan also utilized a voluntary retirement system forpeople who desired to leave the company.
In February 1991, an occupational development
project team was formed to explore and develop offshore-related duties and peripheral duties in order tooperate Nissui Tech and better utilize the company’s
human resources.
In 1992, it looked unlikely that fishing operations
would be unable to continue. Given this, Nippon
Suisan reduced its Tobata fleet by eight trawlers. Withfishing near South Africa also coming to an end, thisleft krill fishery in the Antarctic Ocean and the partnership with S.P.L. in New Zealand as Nippon Suisan’s
only fishing operations. Nippon Suisan was making
a bid to keep its west water business alive by splitting
it into a separate company, Nikko Suisan; however,this company was ultimately dissolved in March
1993.
Moreover, in 1995, Nippon Suisan scrapped trawlers or sold them to overseas joint ventures as part ofa reworking of its trawling business structure. It reduced
its own trawling fleet of six trawlers to just two: theKoyo Maru No.8 and Niitaka Maru. Fundamental
employment measures needed for this reorganizationof trawling operations were discussed and determinedby company management and labor. All 716 crewmen
and administrators affiliated with the Tobata Branch
received lump-sum retirement payments. The company then rehired those employees who desired reemployment under set conditions. A total of 270

277

employees were rehired in the fishery technologies
field. It also rehired others who wished to accept dispatch assignments related to offshore engineering or
coastal service.
Nissui Marine Industries Co., Ltd. was establishedin 1996. The new company’s purpose was to develop
occupations outside of Nippon Suisan, and to do soin a manner integrated with Nissui Tech’s administration, which theretofore was the responsibility of the
Trawling Department’s labor section. Nissui Marine
Industries’ activities covered a broad range that
included offshore engineering, coastal shipping, andthe machine industry. It expanded its business byabsorbing similar businesses within the Nippon SuisanGroup. In 1998 it took over Wakamatsu Zosen K.K.,
a builder of small fishing boats. It merged with Nissui
Ship Management K.K., in 2003, and took on theoffshore functions of Nissui Engineering Co., Ltd.,in 2005. And it merged with Nichinan Sekiyu K.K.
in 2007.
A Smaller Shipping Business
In November 1979, an informal decision was reachedwhereby Nippon Suisan would be commissioned withthe operation, management, and administration of asubmersibles support vessel for the Japan Marine
Science and Technology Center (currently the Japan
Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology;
JAMSTEC), an organization under the Science andTechnology Agency. After assigning its Vessels
Department as the contact point for this operation,
Nippon Suisan launched Nippon Marine Enterprises,
Ltd., on January 31, 1980. (The new company became
a wholly owned subsidiary of Nippon Suisan in
1984.)
Nippon Suisan’s whaling business had already been
lost, and its north-sea mother ship fishery was being
scaled back. Thus, Nippon Marine Enterprises presented a perfect job opportunity for large vessel
seamen. Operating a marine research vessel requires
the ability to safely and precisely lower heavy objects

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

into the ocean and then bring them back up again
while at sea. It also necessitates a flexible work structure that meets existing conditions. Nippon Suisan
knew that its seamen’s skills and resources that had
been honed through mother ship operations would
prove useful here, and that it is why it responded tothe center’s call for a support vessel operator.
Of the 80 vessels that Nippon Suisan owned in
1980, those under the direct management of its Vessels
Department—which was in charge of building, modifying, and maintaining vessels as well as their communications and operational aspects—totaled six: fivemother ships and the Miyajima Maru. A total of eleven
vessels—two oil combination carriers, two meal combination carriers, and seven refrigerated carriers—werechartered on a bareboat basis to Nissui Senpaku, which
was established in 1976. In 1979, the company took
the tanker Matsushima Maru II out of service andtransferred control of the Nippon Maru III to Nissui
Senpaku to bolster that company’s financial
strength.
Around this time, the shipping business was stagnating due to chronic oversupply of hold space.
Although Nissui Senpaku was doing well based on its
long-term charter contracts for specialized vessels, itbuilt the modern tanker Nachi Maru in 1980 in a bid
to reinforce its standing. It made the decision to scrap
the ore/oil carrier Nippon Maru, as the ship’s charter
contract with Kawasaki Steel was due to end in
October 1982. And it drew up plans to build a refrigerated carrier to replace the aging Asakaze Maru.
In fiscal 1983, Nissui Senpaku’s specialized ship
category—its main revenue earner—suffered fromdeteriorating international competitiveness due to thestrong yen, and as a result it could not conclude any
contracts with shippers. At the same time, its reefer
category began suffering from a worldwide economic
slowdown and falling freight charges attributable toan oversupply of hold space. These factors plus abnormal climatic conditions plunged Nissui Senpaku into
the red.
In October 1984, Nissui Senpaku established278

Shinwa Reefer K.K. Designed to be a streamlining
measure for the future, this move separated the reefer
category that was based on time charters and illuminated problems with the existing business. The volume
of international trade of frozen and refrigerated cargo
was growing at an annual rate of 4%, and therefore it
was thought that the amount of such freight handled
by Japan would also increase. It was felt that the futureof the reefer business would be bright.
Then it established N.S. Marine K.K. in December
1985 in order to secure employment for employees inthe shipping business and operate low-cost vessels.
As measures to bring its deficits under control,
Nissui Senpaku scrapped the Asakaze Maru andHarukaze Maru in November 1984, returned theSuzukaze Maru and Matsukaze Maru to Nippon
Suisan, and built the cool carrier Sagami Maru. It also
built the Mazeran Maru to replace the Nippon Maru
III, and received the Asama Maru, Ikoma Maru, andAmazon Maru from Nippon Suisan. At the same time,
the company put forth a draft for a medium-term
plan. The Mazeran Maru was completed in 1986.
On September 25, 1987, Nissui Shipping Corpora­tion was launched to inherit the business of Nissui
Senpaku.
Although Nissui Senpaku had suffered from rapidly
deteriorating performance because of a slump in its
refrigerator ship business in 1983, its five-year mediumterm plan was steadily putting it back on the path torecovery. However, its balance of payments deteriorated once again when the yen rose against the dollar
from the end 1986 and contracts for the Amazon Maru

and Nachi Maru were canceled in the spring of 1987.
The company was also burdened by an excessive
number of seamen on its payroll. Thus the decision
was made to switch over to the new company as ameans of breaking out of these circumstances.
It was judged that creating a separate company was
the best way to streamline the onshore and offshore
workforce, settle past debts, and execute operations
without being restricted by the subsidization of interest payments on loans for construction of oceangoingvessels system.
At the time of its establishment, the new company
had the ore combination carrier Mazeran Maru, four
refrigerated carriers, 22 refrigerated carriers that weretime chartered to other companies, 37 onshore
employees, and 145 offshore employees. It also transferred the Isokaze Maru to N.S. Marine. N.S. Marinecrewed the Isokaze Maru together with the SoyokazeMaru, which it received from Nippon Suisan.
Immediately following its launch, Nissui Shipping
was able to secure earnings from lower costs by bringing down personnel expenses and charter fees and

The ore/coal combination carrier Mazeran Maru

Asama Maru (left) and Ikoma Maru, which transported fruit based on a time charter agreement with United Brands of the United States

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth279

benefitting from a stable freight charge market. Theseearnings allowed it to pay dividends. However, aninternational shipbuilding boom around 1990 brought
an excess of available hold space in refrigerated carriers.
Although fruit transport entailed the basic risk ofdemurrage resulting from crop-caused cargo instability, there was demand for new high-speed ships amid
increasingly intense competition, and thus Nissui
Shipping chartered many such ships to secure shippers.

The shipowners demanded that the charters be guaranteed for a minimum of five years and have fixed fee
rates; however, Nissui Shipping’s fruit transport contracts were valid for only a year at most. Within aslumping freight charge market, Nissui Shipping’s fees
for long-term chartering of 10 or more vessels fell
completely out of step with its freight charge revenue.
This led to a deteriorating balance of payments in thecompany.

Part 4 Sluggish Growth in the Food Products Business
1. An Effort to Rebuild the Food Products Industry
Evolving Retail and Growth in Frozen Foods
From the 1970s until the 1980s, Japan’s population
became more concentrated in urban areas and thetrend toward the nuclear family gained momentum.
At the same time, women came to take a more prominent position in society, and lifestyles and consumer
habits among the Japanese changed greatly.
The main players in retailing had already becomesupermarkets. And from supermarkets came generalmerchandising stores (GMS) of even larger size. GMS
made it possible for consumers to buy all of their daily
necessities at one store, as they sold not only food but
also daily goods, clothing, and electronic products.
Moreover, as motorization progressed, mega GMS
appeared in the suburbs, and with them came a new
buying pattern whereby families travelled by car to
GMS on weekends to buy everything they need atonce. However, this trend conversely led to the declineof ordinary small- and medium-size retail shops thatformed neighborhood shopping streets.
Meanwhile, convenience stores began appearing in
the 1970s and spread primarily in urban areas.
Convenience stores allowed consumers to buy what
they needed at any time from the early morning untillate evening—and sometimes even 24 hours a day.
This attracted customers who were unlike those of

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthmass retailers; specifically, they were visited by a growing number of young and unmarried customers thateven included men. Over the course of 10 years, thenumber of convenience stores grew from 6,000 toclose to 30,000 at the end of the 1980s. The fact thatconvenience stores began stocking bento boxed meals,
sandwiches, and rice balls whose sales depend on theirfreshness was indicative of their function as “refrigerators away from home”.
As these new forms of retail outlet developed, theygained strength and became increasingly widespread.
And as they did so, the food products industry changed
with them.
In that it changed consumer habits and made life
more enriched and convenient, the diversification ofretail sales had commonality with processed foods.
And other item to have this same commonality wasfrozen foods.
Frozen foods had continued to grow ever since first
appearing on the market. Production, which had stoodat 140,000 tons in 1970, reached 560,000 tons in 1980
and then 780,000 tons in 1985. This represented anincrease of 1.4 times in five years. Similarly, domestic
per capita consumption, which was 1.4 kg in 1970,
grew strongly to 6.0 kg in 1980 and then 7.9 kg in
1985.
During the process of this growth, the range of280

products grew from frozen seafood products andfrozen agricultural products to frozen precooked products, and targeted consumers expanded from commercial customers to include ordinary households.
Particularly in the case of frozen food products forhouseholds, the establishment of the cold chain
together with the technical development and diffusionof cooking equipment (e.g., household refrigerator/
freezers, toaster ovens, and microwave ovens) were
important contributing factors.
The value of a superior preservation technology—
namely, freezing that retains the food’s original flavor—became linked with consumers’ demand for
products they could buy and keep until a time when
they wanted food they could prepare easily and eat
quickly. And this point allowed frozen foods forhousehold use to become a favorite among
consumers.
Growth of Nippon Suisan’s Frozen Foods Business
From the mid-1970s, Nippon Suisan’s food products
business experienced a changing of the guard in its
primary products. There were signs that fish sausages/
hams and canned goods were in decline, while frozen
foods were showing strong growth.
In its frozen foods business, Nippon Suisan hadtaken a product policy that was founded on seafood.
Coming on the market in 1973, “Nissui Pack” wasa frozen seafood product made of shrimp, squid, andother seafood that was sold in small packs. In 1977,
Nippon Suisan began selling the “The Fish” series ofprecooked dishes that made eating fish easy. Productsof the series included “Florida Portion” battered whitefish, Chinese-style “Cooking Fry” made with surimi,
and “Creamy Croquettes” made with milk. Not longafter, one of Nippon Suisan’s long-running sellers“Squid Tempura” was also added.
The “L Pack” series that appeared in stores in 1979
was a lineup of high-quality frozen precooked products. It included “shrimp spring rolls” and “squid fritters” made primarily with seafood. The “L” stood for

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth“luxury”. These products were sold through routes
targeting both household and commercial customers.
Among the products sold at this time, many including“Squid Tempura” and “Squid Snack Fritters” remainedon the market for many years after undergoing modifications to their tastes and methods of preparation.
In 1983, Nippon Suisan began marketing a productseries called “Seafood NOW Nissui”, which was linked
to a “Seafood NOW” corporate advertising campaignthat had taken the country by storm during the 1980s.
Theretofore, most frozen food products were for deep
frying. However, this series offered food items thatcame in pouches for heating in boiling water, thus
saving the user the inconvenience of deep frying. A
variety of real, high-quality seafood items was sold,including “shrimp cooked in chili sauce”, “whitefish
umani stew”, and “salmon cheese sauce stew”. These
products were also sold for commercial use, particularly as products for restaurants, and their success here
spurred Nippon Suisan to expand its business to areas
outside of school meals and industrial catering, where
it had already proven its strength.
In November 1983, Nippon Suisan established
Chilldy Co., Ltd. to produce and market chilled foodproducts as a step into the frozen and chilled foods
business.
Then, in 1984, it began marketing a “Hitokuchi”(bite size) series that focused on prepared dishes forbento boxed meals. Here, Nippon Suisan was making
a point of advertising frozen foods as dishes for use inboxed meals, something that had only been implied
before. Product design was clearly oriented for such
use and contributed to the products’ becoming a hit.
Other companies began making similar moves aroundthe same time, leading to the arrival of “boxed meals”
as a new category in the household frozen foods market.
Rebuilding the Food Products BusinessNippon Suisan’s processed foods business had beentasked with providing steady earnings as a mainstay
business—together with fishing and shipping—since281

the Five-Year Reformation Plan of the early 1960s.
However, it became unable to meet expectations in
the 1970s. Although sales had grown as the business
was expanded, it became a losing undertaking whenadvertising expenses were taken into account.
During late 1970s, it was clear that the fish sausage/
ham and canned goods businesses had matured andthat frozen foods was growing. Nonetheless, evenduring this time, the frozen foods business failed toturn a profit.
Meanwhile, Nippon Suisan’s effort to convert production plants and consolidate product types was
unable to keep pace with this changing of the guard
among products, and thus improving this situation
became an urgent task. On the other hand, the company had to rearrange production equipment andpersonnel in line with its withdrawal from new businesses that it had pursued with an eye to future processed foods expansion.
In December 1978, a production conference on
improving the processed foods business was formed.
Here, Vice President Shun-ichi Okuchi noted, “Thebalance of payments in the processed foods businesshas been chronically bad in recent years. However, wecannot remain dependent upon the offshore businesses for profits. We must streamline processed
foods”.
Jun-ichi Kishimoto, a managing director, summarized problems with the processed foods business asfollows: 1) Poor sales profits due to problems withselling power; 2) a labor-intensive structure that isinconsistent with the growth-period principle of securing sales with small numbers of exceptionally talented
workers; 3) insufficient concentration on creating andcultivating products in the past; and 4) inadequate
scientific management that ascertains markets andconsumer needs.
Improvement measures that were mentioned
included: 1) Achieving unity of purpose in sales andenhancing use of wholesalers and the field system; 2)
improving producer focus and reinforcing productpower that targets consumer tastes; 3) adjusting theStructural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

product-specific team system; and 4) managing sales
efficiency numerically.
Indentified problems concerning processing plants
included the following: 1) Capital investment in theprocessed foods business stopped at partial energysavings investment, investment for product turnover,and pollution-related investment; there was no investment for converting production systems at Nippon
Suisan’s plants; 2) plant layouts and operational modes
have not been readjusted to meet sales trends; 3)
although investment has been made for plant mechanization, technologies for completing products are
inadequate; and 4) productivity at Nippon Suisan’splants is poor, while costs are high.
Furthermore, Kishimoto noted the company’s business philosophy. He said, “Nippon Suisan has grown
based on a management principle of ‘catching greatamounts of fish and delivering it to the dining table
in a manner akin to the way tap water flows into the
kitchen’. During Japan’s post-war reconstruction, we
primarily strove to fulfill our social mission of supplying fish-meat sausages to even the most remote agricultural villages to provide them with seafood protein.
While we later made priority investments in deep-sea
fishery in international waters, our basic mission as afood products company has not changed. It is myearnest desire to see us develop as a company that, in
addition to acting in accordance with its guiding principles thus far, also contributes to the joy of good
health. It is here that we should find the focus of theprocessed foods business”.
The production conference on improving the processed foods business continued meeting until
September 1979.
In April 1979, an agreement was reached on a basic
policy for management of the processed foods business. The basic outline of which was as follows: 1)
The processed foods business should be reestablishedand developed as one of Nippon Suisan’s mainstay
businesses; 2) the business must contribute to better
eating habits among the Japanese people; 3) Nippon
Suisan will seek to become a general foods company

282

with the special dimension of also being a fisheries
company; and 4) the company shall devote itself tobeing a “brand owner” that directly addresses consumer needs.
In June, a “long-term processed foods business planand near-term measures” was proposed. In production,
it included a recommendation to rearrange and consolidate production plants. For the Onagawa Plant,
it suggested closing the frozen foods, canned goods,
and ham sausage plants, leaving only the chikuwa plantand fish feed and oil plant. It also recommended concentrating frozen food operations in the Hachioji,
Itami, and Anjo Plants; canned goods in the Shimizu
Plant; and fish feed and sausages, hams, and hamburgers in the Hachioji, Hakodate, and Tobata Plants.
For sales, it recommended reinforcing the head
office’s sales guidance system by rearranging its marketing functions, changing over from a mindset fixatedwith sales performance to market objectives management, eliminating overlapping by seeking to makemaximum use of wholesalers and clarifying collaboration between Nippon Suisan and service companies,
and strengthening functions for introducing and cultivating new products. As near-term measures, it suggested paying full attention to behavior managementof personnel in charge of sales; working to accumulate
basic sales data that support strategy development;
conducting regular roller surveys, spot observations,and trade area analyses; and setting Tokyo, Nagoya,
and Fukuoka as priority regions, with particularemphasis on the Tokyo metropolitan area as a toppriority zone.
Additionally, regarding development, the basic
policy recommended making a full-scale effort toward
reinforcing the development system as a pillar of theprocessed foods business’s rejuvenation.
In July, discussion focused on the Onagawa Plant
problem. In the end, it was decided to continue thechikuwa plant, build a new processing plant having
cold-storage functions, ask for voluntary retirements
by offering a better retirement package, and shift somepersonnel to sales through rehiring or other means.

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

The basic policy for the processed foods businessthat was hammered out through this process became
the framework for the First Medium-Term Plan for
the Processed Foods Business, which was effectivefrom 1980 to 1982. The medium-term plan produced
streamlining effects during this period that in turnbrought higher earnings. In fact, during the plan’s final
year, fiscal 1982, the business returned to the lack evenwith advertising and development expenses considered. However, some issues remained unresolved,
including a reexamination of business by Nissui
Service, study of plant layouts, consolidation andmanagement of partner plants, and consolidation of
product types.
The Second Medium-Term Plan for the Processed
Foods Business came into effect from fiscal 1983 to
1985. The new plan sought to lift sales from 134.5
billion yen to 200.0 billion yen. Taking the successes
and remaining problems of the first plan, the second
plan strove to expand the entire processed foods business with new businesses and product development.
It placed particular emphasis on frozen foods, an area
expected to see growth.
Meanwhile, a separate medium-term plan for thefrozen food products business was also being
drafted.
In 1982, the frozen food market was expected to
be worth 450.0 billion yen, with 327.0 billion yen
coming from precooked foods. Nippon Suisan’s total
sales were expected to be 70.9 billion yen, which would
rank it number one in the sector, while its sales ofprecooked foods were forecasted to reach 32.0 billion
yen, which would make it number three. By channel,
Nippon Suisan was expected to rank fourth in products for household use, second in products for commercial use, and second in prepared dishes for massretailers; however, it was expected to rank no higher
than fourth in the dining-out segment. By product,
Nippon Suisan was expected to rank first in deep-fried
seafood (including squid tempura) and chawanmushi
egg custard, but second or third in deep-fried shrimp,
croquettes, shumai, gyoza, and spring rolls. The

283

question was: To what extent could the company offer
top products? In products for household use, it was
decided to put forth an image of Nippon Suisan as a“seafood manufacturer” and to center efforts on a
product range that utilized ingredients in which thecompany had an advantage. And on the commercial
side, it was decided to augment the product lineup
and focus particularly on products oriented toward
restaurants in order to respond to the various needsof a broad range of business categories.
The strategy for fiscal 1983 emphasized communication-oriented approaches, with focus on how tomotivate consumers rather than simply selling individual products. It presented measures capable ofinjecting products into eating habits by, for example,
utilizing advertising media, presenting ideas to consumers in stores, and suggesting menus.
The sales environment of fiscal 1983 was characterized by a scramble for market share among competingcompanies. Consequently, although the first year of
the medium-term plan had been positioned as a year
for preparation only, poor progress this year led to adecision to reexamine the second medium-term
plan.
The strategy for fiscal 1984 was as follows: 1) For
each product group, place emphasis on commercial
use in frozen foods; in particular, develop “Gourmail”
products. 2) In products for household use, focus on
bento boxed meals, prepared dishes, seafood ingredients, and frozen vegetables; also make new moves into
the chilled products field. 3) For canned goods, expand
seafood canning, particularly of tuna, bonito, andmutton yakiniku for the “Sea Gourmet” line. 4) For
processed products, work to raise recognition of existing fish sausage and ham products, and lift sales withimproved products; also, developed products forchilled distribution. 5) For fish-based products, expand
a product lineup centered on chikuwa; also, develop
a forward-looking production system by building newpartner plants. 6) Focus on reinforced managementof special sale costs and sales-promotion costs as wellas analysis and reduction of storage fees, freight

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthcharges, and distribution expenses as priority issues.
7) Although efforts have been made to expand standard products in the Tokyo metropolitan area, where
reinforcement is underway, by cultivating partner
wholesalers and strengthening contact points withmass retailers, the results have been poor. Measures
were taken in terms of personnel, organization, andfunding.
At the same time, product development was positioned as a strategic business category. Here, the decision was made to expand business by deepening
collaboration with sales offices and specifically pursue
diversification. The policy called for developing largescale products by reinforcing the product-development
capabilities of the Central Research Laboratory andacquiring know-how on product development andmanufacturing through tie-ups with other companies,
and, in new fields (such as fine chemicals), firmly
establishing business by actively entering domestic
markets. In the fine chemicals field, the policy called
for the manufacture of EPA (eicosapentaenoic acid)as a pharmaceutical together with business expansion
within the food products market and marketing oftaurine.
Fiscal 1984 saw higher production revenue due tocheaper prices for Alaska pollack surimi and lower
production plant costs. Even so, sales had to struggle
to achieve its goals, as it was forced to expand special
sale expenditures amid cut-throat competition.
In fiscal 1985, maintaining the size of the fish sausages and hams business as a major contributor toearnings became a priority issue. At the same time,
the canned goods business was called upon to expand
its size and improve its profitability, while the fishpaste products business was asked to grow in size while
maintaining profitability. In product development ofcanned goods, the company sought to step up its
activities by introducing high vacuum cans and aluminum containers and also enter the retort pouch
business.
In the frozen foods business, the company’s strategy
was to pursue product development by integrating284

development functions and clarifying responsibility
for market introduction, and to promote arrangementof existing products and market establishment. In
products for household use, priority was placed on
developing menus for specific categories, branding
seafood products, and strengthening agricultural product lineups and procurement capabilities. In sales
activity, the company strove to reduce special sale
expenditures, advance sales-promotion strategies andadvertising, and arrange and integrate package designs.
It also integrated purchasing and sales of frozen vegetables into the Agricultural Products Division No.3
and changed the orientation of persons in charge ofcommercial sales in each branch from being product-

focused to client-focused. In production, it sought toimprove the facilities and supply capabilities of partner
plants.
With the market environment reported to be saturated and demand for food products stagnating, sales
declined by 2% year-on-year (to 136.0 billion yen) andthe business’s balance of payments failed to reach thebudgeted level. Overlapping negative conditions werein play here; poor exports placed pressure on domestic
demand, the strong yen led to an increase in cheap
livestock products, and lower production of Alaska
pollack surimi brought higher raw material costs.

Chapter 3: Nippon Suisan Struggles to Change its
Business Structure
1985–1995
Part 1 A Frustrated Expansion Strategy and Sluggish Business
1. Rise and Collapse of the “Bubble Economy”
The Plaza Accord and the “Heisei Boom”
In the wake of the Plaza Accord of September 1985,
the yen’s strength against the dollar quickly intensified.
As a result, the yen strengthened from 240 yen to thedollar to 150 yen to the dollar in the autumn of 1986.
This rapid rise had a direct impact on Japan’s exportindustries and brought on a “high-yen recession”. The
Japanese government responded by implementing an
emergency economic policy to stimulate domestic
demand. At the same time, the Bank of Japan lowered
its official discount rate on five separate occasions,finally arriving at a post-war low of 2.5% from February
1987. As a result of these measures, the economy began
improving from 1987, and Japan entered its secondlongest period of economic expansion, which contin-

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthued until April 1991.
Among the driving forces behind the expansion
were active capital investment by corporations andexpanding personal consumption. Another characteristic of this period were diversified financing that
resulted from financial deregulation in the early 1980s.
In particular, convertible bonds and warrant bonds(bonds with stock acquisition right) came into widespread use in procuring capital investment. Companies
actively made procurements in overseas markets on
the back of expanding foreign-exchange gains thatwere made possible by the strong yen.
However, the continuing monetary easing policy
and large-scale fiscal action brought an overheating
economy and rapid increase in the money supply.
Because corporations could procure funds easily, they285

invested large amounts into stocks, real estate, andeven golf club memberships and artworks in order toutilize their surplus funds. On the other hand, because
major corporations were depending less on banks fortheir financing, banks shifted their lending targets tosmall- and medium-sized enterprises. In particular,
they expanded financing to construction, real estate,
and non-banking enterprises. Such massive funds also
flowed into all kinds of real estate investment.
Under such conditions, a “bubble economy”
emerged. The Nikkei stock average rose above the
20,000-yen mark for the first time in January 1987
and reached 38,915 yen—the highest value everrecorded—at the end of 1989. Meanwhile, land values
in Japan’s six major metropolitan areas more thantripled their 1985 level. Soaring asset prices, particularly of real estate, produced a cycle whereby corporations gained higher collateral strength, which in turnmade it even easier for them to procure financing.
One result was that corporations competed with eachother to expand overseas.
Collapse of the Bubble
The three years between 1989 and 1991 were a timeof great change in the world. The Tiananmen Square
uprising occurred in June 1989, the Berlin Wall felland Eastern Europe began democratizing in November,
East and West Germany reunited in October 1990,
the Cold War ended with the Malta Summit inDecember, and the Soviet Union collapsed in
December 1991, bringing an end to the Cold War
structure. In Japan, the death of Emperor Showa inJanuary 1989 brought a new era called Heisei, andthen the “bubble economy” collapsed in 1991.
The Nikkei stock average began falling in January
1990. What spurred this decline was a shift toward
belt-tightening by the Bank of Japan. As a result of
five reductions of the official discount rate from May
1989 until August of the following year, expectations
for stock investments rapidly deteriorated and the
Nikkei stock average fell below 15,000 yen in August

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

1982. The Tokyo Stock Exchange’s aggregate market
value, which had peaked at 611 trillion yen, fell to 305
trillion yen by the end of May 1992, representing aloss of more than 300 trillion yen. Meanwhile, land
values also began falling in 1991. This was sparked bytough total volume control against financing for realestate financial institutions that were implemented
by the Ministry of Finance in April 1990. The result
was a capital loss of approximately 110 trillion yen in
1991. Urban areas—and particularly Tokyo—
experienced particularly severe plummeting of land
values.
In the 1990s, the biggest problems for the Japanese
economy were bad debts and financial crisis. In thesummer of 1991, a series of misdeeds involving financing and securities, including compensation for losses
and fictitious deposits, were uncovered, thereby negatively affecting confidence in financial institutions.
Moreover, in 1991, the number of corporate bankruptcies that were direct results of the bubble economy’s
collapse exceeded 10,000 cases and recorded total
liabilities of 8.1487 trillion yen, which was the highest
such figure ever posted. Of all businesses, those in realestate and construction were the hardest hit by the
economy’s collapse. And consequently the financial
institutions that had financed them were saddled withan enormous number of bad loans.
The Japanese government and Bank of Japan relaxed
their tight-financing policy beginning in July 1991,
and hammered out large-scale comprehensive economic measures in August 1982. Nonetheless, aneconomic environment characterized by a persisting
sense of stagnation that would later be known as “thelost decade” was set to begin.
During this time, Japan’s deep-sea fishery was facing
rapidly declining fishing allowances from the UnitedStates. This decline gained even more momentum in1984 and thereafter. For Nippon Suisan, which hadviewed fishing as one of its mainstay industries, theimpact was severe. Despite managing to achieve goodresults until fiscal 1986, profits took a nosedive in
fiscal 1987 and turned into a loss in fiscal 1990. The

286

fall had occurred much faster than anyone in management had predicted, and made cultivating a second

and then a third stable profit-making business toreplace fishing an urgent task.

2. Business Field Reports and the Near-Term Vision
Formulating New Business Fields toReplace Fishing
The budget for fiscal 1987 showed year-on-year
declines in both earnings and profit. The income andexpenditure budget for offshore business amounted
to just one-third that of the previous year.
The strategy for formulating the budget was asfollows: 1) In offshore business, secure earnings by
responding to all circumstantial changes, while avoiding overconfidence in own strengths in traditional
business alone. 2) While noting that overseas businessis growing, remember that North America is a particularly important base for fishing business. Improveearnings by reinforcing the management of each joint
venture. 3) The fresh and frozen fish business has beena fish purchasing business since its foundation; develop
the scale of sales and earning power. Desired results
were obtained last year despite low fish prices; such
results should be enhanced. 4) In the food products
business, strive to reinforce new product development
and selling power, and strengthen competiveness bystreamlining and improving efficiency.
At the time that plans in all business categories werecompiled, the sales budget had fallen below the previous fiscal year’s level. Indeed, the entire group was
facing difficult circumstances. It was therefore necessary for board members to lead the way in establishinga revenue-earning structure, reinforcing selling power,
and controlling costs. This led to the decision that allsenior board members would take pay cuts beginningin April.
The “business field selection committee” presented
a basic strategy in May. The strategy included thefollowing analyses and points concerning businessconditions.
a) Changes in the fishing business environment andStructural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

response: The fact that fishing has continued its
predominance even after absorbing the effects of
two oil crises demonstrates the appropriateness ofprevious strategy. While maintaining fishing’s status
as the company’s “money tree”, it will be importantto rebuild the strategy within a rapidly changing
environment. It is anticipated that fishing sales,
which amounted to 73.1 billion yen in fiscal 1986,
will reach to just 60% of this figure in fiscal 1991.
b) Strategy maintainability: In general, profits thatare gained from a business’s “money tree” areinvested into growth fields and leading products.
However, in Nippon Suisan’s case, they have been
reinvested into maintaining fishing business. The
company has traditionally employed a strategy
whereby declines in fishing business are covered bypurchasing operations. However, this is a continuation of the “fishing as No.1” principle that began
in past times of food shortages. Consequently,
market development and R&D investment have
had secondary importance.
c) Future topics: Reflecting on the above, the company
must boldly venture into future growth businesses
while preserving its “money tree”. It will need toshift from a “production first” view to emphasis on
sales and markets. And it must also move frombeing a harvest- and trading-oriented food products
company to one based on development.
The basic strategy then presented the following
three points regarding the desired path forward.
a) Engage in business that contributes to people’s
health through production, trade, and multilateral
production of chiefly primary products.
b) Shift from being a conventional harvest- and trading-oriented company to development-based company in the broader sense in order to create new
businesses based on the company’s functions as a287

manufacturer and technologies produced by
R&D.
c) As a business vision for the company’s 80th anniversary, set a goal of 53.0 billion yen for new
businesses.
Examples of candidates for new business include
the following: in fishery: seeds/seedlings and aquaculture; in livestock: animal husbandry; in agriculture:
seeds/seedlings and agricultural processing; in finechemicals: natural seasonings, health foods, and pharmaceuticals; and in services: dining-out business,health and marine leisure, financing, and Harumi
development projects. At the time, the company had
already commenced activity in aquaculture, fresh fish
sales, fine chemicals, natural seasonings, restaurants,
and financing.
The strategy also presented specific measures forexisting businesses.
•Offshore business: It will be necessary to downscaleand reorganize surimi operations andtake measures to handle surplus employees. Further, study additives and develop
processing equipment to improve theadded value of products. Develop product forms for yellowfin sole operations.
Expansion of salmon/trout and crab
fishery should not be expected. In southern trawling, it will be necessary to reorganize operations and reinforce earning
power, respond to scaled-down fleets
and aging vessels, and deal with surplus
employees. Krill operations are stable
for the moment, but reuse development
remains an issue to be resolved.
•Overseas business: Improve earnings of joint venturesand stabilize their management foundation. For the UniSea Group, strengthen
production facilities, develop supply
bases for imported goods, and seek tobecome a general seafood business forfishing, processing, and sales. Get G.L.S.
on track by securing stable raw materials.

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

For PESPASA, improve the earnings
power of onshore plants, and cultivate
mainline goods, such as hake fillet andArgentine shortfin squid. For
EMDEPES, stabilize earnings byimproving the added value of krill, hoki,
and southern blue whiting. Work tostabilize the earnings of I.M.P. and W.I.F.
In addition, build a sales network in the
U.S., expand countries and species forpurchasing, develop fishing grounds,
and accumulate know-how in shrimp
operations and their commercialization.
•Fresh and frozen fish: Develop general supplier functions. Establish directly-managed plantsthat function as manufacturers (including product development) and systematize processors. For commercial
activities, engage in thoroughgoing individual management and improve earnings by employing suppliers that arecloser to product origins, diversifying
sales channels, and strengthening specified agents. Also, expand handled products, such as fresh fish, processed
products, and seafood items other thanfish.
•Food products: Improve earnings by reorganizing
production plants, consolidating product types, creating a more flexible production framework that can immediately
respond to sales conditions, and streamlining sales distribution. Expand therange of business and reinforce productdevelopment by diversifying feedstockfrom agricultural and livestock products
and entering/expanding chilled foodsrelated businesses Develop and importproducts from overseas and exploit overseas markets.
Capital investment for fiscal 1987 was large at 15.3
billion yen, which was a figure on par with the288

previous year’s. This included construction of the
Chikuzen Maru and expansion of refrigerated warehouse facilities in Seibu Reizo Shokuhin Co., Ltd.
Additionally there was investment for streamlining,
beginning with the dissolution of Nissui Senpaku.
Nippon Suisan simultaneously made investments
toward its own survival and for restructuring.
At the same time, Nippon Suisan obtained externalfinancing of 13.4 billion yen by, among other activities,
issuing Swiss franc-based straight corporate bonds
equivalent in value to 7.6 billion yen in order to procure financing of 18.3 billion yen.
On June 13, the Haruna Maru caught fire andbecame a total loss. Then, on November 28, South
African Airways Flight 295 crashed. Perishing in theaccident were 38 Nippon Suisan employees who were
due to replace the crew of a trawler operating off ofthe Cape Town coast.
On June 29, the company employed a “three division” structure—comprised of the Maritime
Operations Division, Sales Division, and Food
Products Division—in order to accelerate reform of
its business structure. Deep-sea fishery, an undertaking
in which Nippon Suisan had been a continuous participant since before World War II, was by definitiona global business. In this connection, Vice President
Minoda said, “Deep-sea fishery must not be thoughtof in terms of work methods or organization in aoverseas or domestic territory—in other words, basedon geographical criteria—but rather in terms ofwhether how work can be performed functionally andeven efficiently. The success of Nippon Suisan’s work
depends on how it can secure products while maintaining cooperative relationships with othercountries”.
The Maritime Operations Division was comprisedof the fishing component of overseas business, withfocus on offshore business, together with the North
America Department, which was in charge of North
America and expected to gain increasing importanceas a strategic category for the future, and theInternational Department, which had responsibility

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthfor other overseas business. The Fresh and Frozen
Products Division became the Sales Division, andpurchasing and sales functions that were traditionallyoverseas business were transferred there. This wasdone to create a structure in which purchasing andsales were linked on both the domestic and international levels. And food product-related duties of theOverseas Business Division were transferred into the
Food Products Division.
Performance in fiscal 1987 showed that sales
increased to 481.1 billion yen, or 103% of the previous
year’s figure, while net income fell conspicuously to
3.2 billion yen, or just 68% that of the previous year.
Reasons for this included greatly lowered fishingallowances within the U.S.’s 200-nautical-mile zone,
stagnating fish prices arising from a rapid rise in seafood imports due to the strong yen, a collapse in squid
prices resulting from an internationally strong harvest,
and falling surimi prices attributable to a growing
percentage of poor-quality products in offshore purchasing. Although the food products business had
improved earnings, the worsening balance of paymentsin the fishing business could not be checked. The
company covered its dearth of ordinary income, which
was the worst since the oil crisis, with gains on insurance claims and asset sales.
As the company was about to enter the new fiscal
year at the end of fiscal 1987, Vice President Minoda
said, “The truth is that, thus far, we have managed tomake it through this admittedly difficult year, andcircumstances remain such that we can continue toovercome them with effort”. He also declared that
“reducing the Nippon Suisan’s dependence on fishingearnings is imperative”. Here, he spoke of the need toraise productivity through enhancement and reinforcement by bringing greater efficiency and rationality to existing businesses, and the need to expand thecompany’s range of business fields by proactively entering new businesses.
The company’s basic strategy for achieving thisincluded 1) firming up the earnings base by reinforcing
business and sales capabilities and engaging in289

commercial activity, 2) bolstering competitiveness bydiffusing cost awareness throughout the company andcomprehensively lowering costs, and 3) stimulating
workplaces and raising employees’ desire to succeed.
The following describes the strategy for eachbusiness.
•Maritime Operations Division: Rebuild the revenue
system to correspond with extremechanges in the fishing environment inways that include developing overseas
businesses and review of the management system.
•Sales Division: Given the need to stably secure highquality products and an ever-changing
distribution environment, firm up therevenue base by reinforcing the sales
structure. This should be centered onoverseas and domestic bases and involve
more than simply compensating for
reductions in in-house catches and product biases.
•Food Products Division: Amid an intensifying environment generated by increasing importsof all food products on the back of thestrong yen, firm up the revenue base by
responding to internationalization andfurther reinforcing competitiveness inways that integrate product development, production, and sales.
Among new businesses, production and sales offeed for fish farming produced consistent results. In
the dining-out business, Nippon Suisan diversified
by opening a seafood restaurant in Tokyo’s Aoyama
district called “dede” and operating seafood restaurants
in partnership with department stores, shops specializing in seafood-on-rice bowls, and fast-food restaurants offering yakiniku menus. It also responded to
growing consumption of fresh fish by setting up a “livefish team” envisioned as a business that vertically integrates everything from eggs and fry to feed, culture,transport, processing, and sales.

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

Worsening Business Performance asa Near-Term Vision is Prepared
In September of 1988, a “Near-Term Vision” was put
forward by a “Near-Term Vision Committee” chaired
by Vice President Minoda. The committee was formedin December 1987. Its membership was comprised ofsenior board members and included working groups
formed around general managers of the company’s
departments.
The committee’s objectives were to formulate a
Near-Term Vision of the company and present a “newNippon Suisan” by taking into account Japan’s economy and the management environment. Its conclusions were to be premised on improvement and growthof existing businesses during the 1986-1988 reformation period that was set in the Fourth Planning
Committee’s plan of January 1986, and on the establishment of multilateral business fields for structuralreform by the business field selection committee of
May 1987. Its task was to prepare an “ideal form” and“desired form” of the company with a target year of
1995, which stood at the midpoint before the arrivalof the 21st century.
“Top priority on the customer”, “a solid technicalfoundation”, and “behavior-focused performance”
were established as new management guidelines.
Moreover, “a global initiative to the sea and eating”
was designated as a business field. The idea behind
this designation was to see the sea not simply in termsof fish but as the mother of boundless possibilities.
Five main areas of business were established.
Namely, they were the fishery business, which encompassed sales, fishing, marine development, aquaculture, and purchasing of frozen fish, fresh fish, surimi,
and other forms of processed and terminal processed
products, shellfish and seaweed, and other fisheryproducts; the processed foods business, which involved
sales, production, purchasing, and raw materials procurement concerning frozen foods, canned products,
fishery paste products, chilled foods, retort pouch
foods, dried foods, meat products, seasonings, and290

beverages; the general distribution business, which
covered cold storage and distribution; the services
business, which was in charge of dining-out business,
mail order sales, fish retail sales, direct sales, real estate,
and marine leisure engineering; and the fine chemicals
and pharmaceuticals business. Nippon Suisan sought
to develop all of these businesses on a global scale.
As for its business objectives, Nippon Suisan sought
to become a one-trillion-yen company by the early the
21st century, and to achieve sales of 750.0 billion andordinary income of 15.0 billion yen by fiscal 1992.
Looking at main activities, in the fishery business,the vision sought to make Nippon Suisan a “leading
seafood player” by forming a global production andprocurement network and expanding sales routes in
the world’s major markets. It saw the company’s fishingbusiness as a tool for achieving this, and set about
upgrading and applying long-cultivated systems andpersonnel in this area. It also sought to expand or
newly establish overseas joint ventures, placing priority
on South America but also beginning ventures with
the Soviet Union. And it advocated promoting domestic and overseas aquaculture and expanding overseas
purchasing as well as purchasing bases.
In the processed foods business, it called for Nippon
Suisan to reform its production system by establishingkey domestic production plants in Hachioji and theKansai region. It also sought the development ofoperations in South Korea and Southeast Asia. In
terms of its product groups, it called for expansion ofchilled and retort pouch products and entry into theprocessed livestock products, seasonings (including
sauces), dried foods, and beverages categories. It looked
to expand the company’s processed agricultural products business and enter the seeds, aquaculture, andfresh products businesses. Additionally, it sought todiversify the company’s raw materials business byadding such items as flour, meat, and rice to surimi
and other fish meat products. And it focused on bolstering selling power in terms of both quality andquantity from the standpoint that reorganizing branch
offices and expanding sales locations will make theStructural Change during the Period of Slow Growthcompany more customer-oriented.
In the general distribution business, the visionsought to expand and diversify Nippon Suisan’s refrigerated warehouse business and increase its warehouseand hold capacity by a yearly average of around 20,000
tons to secure 400,000 tons in the Group. It alsosought to diversify the storage business by accumulating know-how on the handling of special-purpose
items. It further advocated study toward entry into
the refrigerated warehouse business overseas. It additionally looked to begin a frozen and chilled distribution business in the Kanto and Kansai areas with aneye to future nationwide expansion.
In the fine chemicals business, it sought to promote
fine chemicals founded on biologically active agentsthat come from fishery products. It further aimed toenter the pharmaceuticals business through bulk
manufacture of curative drugs that utilize these agents.
And it looked to move forward with these activities
based on collaboration with Nissui PharmaceuticalCo., Ltd.
And in the services business, the vision aimed tomake this business an effective means of ascertaining
market needs and obtaining long-term earnings. It
looked to move forward by utilizing the company’s
long-cultivated management resources as well as partnerships and joint ventures with other companies. It
aspired to make the dining-out business the core of
Nippon Suisan’s services business by developing seafood restaurant and fast-food formats and taking a
multi-store approach. It further advocated research
into new forms of fresh fish retailing, close study of
the results, and utilization of these results to entersuch retailing. It also looked to redevelop Nippon
Suisan’s existing real estate business, and to expand its
engineering business by developing and accumulating
required human resources for offshore and onshorebusiness. It also advocated taking on challenges in allother feasible fields.
Other items included in the vision included expanding the R&D system and clarifying its objectives tounderpin the company’s position as a manufacturer

291

and raise efficiency, and studying relocation of Central
Research Laboratory or establishment of a maritime
laboratory. It also mentioned promoting use of information systems, rebuilding the organizational structure, and reforming the personnel system.
The Near-Term Vision was approved as the new
medium-term plan by the board of directors in
October 1988.
However, by this time, the U.S.’s fishing allowance
for Alaska pollack to Japan—which had been one of
the few remaining pillars of Nippon Suisan’s fisherybusiness—had already been reduced to zero, leaving
only offshore purchasing. The announcement of thisreduction was delivered to Japan from the U.S. in
January, and it delivered a stinging blow to Nippon
Suisan’s business management.
The Nagasaki Branch, which had been engaged inwest-water business, was closed on August 31, 1988.
The Trawling Department and Northern Seas
Department were eliminated when the Maritime
Operations Division was reorganized, and administration of scaled back fishing business was inherited by
the Operations Department and Tobata Branch.
As Nippon Suisan put the Near-Term Vision into
effect, it also felt growing pressure on its businessperformance. In August, the company’s mid-term
dividend payment policy came under reconsideration.
Although some wanted to see payments decreased, adecision on the matter was put off due to the availability of earnings carried forward and internal
reserves. In September, a special production conference was held to receive an explanation of first-half
performance and the Near-Term Vision. Addressing
this performance, President Fumio Imanaga said, “In
the face of a strong yen, increasing amounts of imported
seafood, and liberalization of agricultural and livestock
products, we must recognize that management predicated on rising fish prices will no longer succeed”.
Here, Imanaga noted that declining earnings in fishingbusiness were due to delays in structural change—i.e.,
downscaling of Nippon Suisan’s business—arisingfrom an increasingly difficult business environment.

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

Imanaga also spoke of the fresh and frozen fish business, which theretofore had maintained superiority
in the domestic market, by pointing out the need torebuild the sales network, the function of which waseroding due to decreasing availability of attractive
product catches.
In order to rectify its slow response to these environmental changes, the company became determinedto spare no effort in reinforcing and thoroughly
streamlining its business and sales capabilities,
strengthening its competitiveness by reducing cost,and stimulating its workplaces. It further set about
forcefully promoting improvements in the balance of
payments of existing businesses, thereby restoringbalance between sales and expenditure.
Nippon Suisan’s investments and loans in fiscal
1988 reached 17.0 billion yen. In the Maritime
Operations Division, 5.5 billion yen went to financing
for operations bases (such as UniSea in North America
and PESANTAR, EMDEPES, and S.A. in SouthAmerica) and Nikko Suisan and 1.0 billion yen went
toward converting the Miyajima Maru into a trawler.
In the Food Products Division, 3.1 billion yen went
to frozen noodles and cooked rice businesses and thedevelopment of new products, 2.5 billion yen went
to refrigerated warehouse-related items, and 4.2 billion
yen went to other items. These figures were appropriated by borrowing.
Worsening performance in the second half of fiscal
1988 forced Nippon Suisan to revise its targets downward. While year-long performance showed that sales
had reached 464.0 billion yen, or 96% of the previous
year’s figure, net income had plunged to 1.6 billion,
or just 51% compared to the previous year. The company continued to pay dividends by selling assets.
At the end of the fiscal year in March, Nippon
Suisan designated the coming fiscal year 1989 as the“first year of the near-term future” and revamped its
corporate philosophy, company creed, management
policy, code of conduct, and corporate slogan.
•Corporate philosophy: To seek to become an internationally established general marine292

and food corporation, and to contributeto better health and living among the
public.
•Company creed: Creation and challenge•Management policy: “Top priority on the customer”,“a solid technical foundation”, and“behavior-focused performance”•Code of conduct: 1) Stimulate the workplace throughceaseless self-reform; 2) Seek to improve
performance with a constant eye to profits; 3) Strive to become a company thatis depended upon and trusted bysociety.
•Corporate slogan: Confronting marine and foodissues from a global perspective.
The budget plan for fiscal 1989—the “first year of
the near-term future”—was formulated under circumstances in which almost no increase in profit could be
anticipated and continued payment of dividends was
doubtful due to a business climate that offered no hintof a positive turn. Thus, the highest priority goals forthe fiscal year were to secure earnings and build an
earnings-producing system.
Beginning in fiscal 1987, Nippon Suisan’s operating
income plunged as sales fell. The worsening operating
income suggested not only deteriorating earnings fromfishing but also weakening vitality within the entire
company. The fresh and frozen fish and food products
businesses that were expected to supplement fishingwere stagnating, unable to maintain past performance.
Moreover, the company’s management culture was
not being reformed and little headway was being madein changing employees’ attitudes.
Fiscal 1989 similarly saw lower earnings and profits,
as Nippon Suisan reported just 1.1 billion yen in profits
from 437.7 billion yen in sales.
Already by December, a study toward revising the
Near-Term Vision had begun. The vision was failingeven in just its first fiscal year.
It should be noted that Nippon Suisan newly established a “Sumiri Operations Department”, “Logistics
Department”, and “Service Operations Department”

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

on April 1. This move coincided with its effort torebuild its businesses and actively move into new fields
based on the Near-Term Vision. In the Maritime
Operations Division, the “Operations Department”
was abolished and the duties of its labor section weretransferred to the Labor Department No. 1, andmother ship-type crab fishery was transferred to theSoviet Union and Europe Section. A new “AquacultureTeam” was also established.
Moreover, “AAA-21” (read “triple A twenty-one”)
was commenced as a “movement to activate people
and organizations” from the autumn. This was a threeyear activity that sought to identify individual issues
in specific business categories and then make reforms
to address them. It was also designed to change thecompany’s organizational climate through voluntary
activities.
Then, in January 1990, the Maritime Operations
Division and Sales Division were merged to form the
Fisheries Division. This was a step toward building
an integrated production-sales system and tying it tothe business structure. The result was a two divisionsystem comprised of the new Fisheries Division andthe Food Products Division.
Nonpayment of Dividends in Fiscal 1990
Nippon Suisan’s fiscal 1990 strategy placed priorityon 1) reinforcing corporate competitiveness and 2)
strengthening the company’s business and sales
capabilities.
The company established a “Business Administration
Division” to promote management reform and a“Marketing Division” to strengthen the company’s
selling power. President Imanaga was placed in chargeof the former, while Vice President Minoda tookcharge of the latter. The Business Administration
Division’s Corporate Strategic Planning Office,Finance & Accounting Department, and Systems
Department studied business management systems,
business operations systems, and awareness-raisingtargeting section heads. And the Marketing Division293was charged with clarifying sales strategy and implementing cross-cutting policies concerning customers,
products, and services that reached beyond the jurisdictions of individual divisions. It was also given the
responsibility of integrating the advertising aspects ofsales policies, advertising activities, and each divisionin line with the corporate philosophy. These steps
were designed to reinforce the selling power of theFisheries Division and Food Products Division.
With an eye to realizing the Near-Term Vision, theNippon Suisan launched a special committee in
September to establish a foundation for preparing,
implementing, and managing the progress of fiscal
year budgets based on a medium-term three-year planfor the fiscal years 1991 to 1993.
In November, the committee began an examinationof current mindsets, problem areas, and plan orientation in preparation for a medium-term management
plan. It studied a new medium-term plan by using thethree-year period between fiscal 1991 and 1993 as atime to establish a system for stably securing earnings
and laying the groundwork for the next leap
forward.
A new pay and personnel system was introducedin December 1990. Founded on the basic concepts of“merit-based pay”, “human resources development”,
and “response to diversified values and motivations”,
the new system changed organizational names from“department” and “section” to “group” and “team”,
brought a shift from the board members-led system
to one led by organizational leaders, reorganizedemployee classifications for onshore workers, andintroduced course-specific personnel management
and ability-based grade systems as well as performancebased pay.
In February 1991, the company decided to introduce a new budget preparation system into sales of
the Fisheries Division and Food Products Division.
The new system was first brought into a portion ofbussiness operations prior to full-scale implementation

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

the following fiscal year. The basic thinking here wasto get all employees involved from budget preparation
to progress management, engage in achievable profit
planning that integrates all company strategies andthe goals of each organizational level, and strive forautonomous category-based operations as a target
management system that establishes organizational
teams as the smallest profit management unit. The
system also set priority management items at eachorganizational level and promoted organizational
activities based on an administrative cycle designed
to ensure budget attainment. The criterion for ascertaining the profit of each team was set as “contribution
profit”; in other words, profit remaining after theteam’s fixed expenses were accounted for. And thecriterion for determining product profit was made“marginal profit”; in other words, profit remaining
after variable expenses were deducted from grossprofit.
Settlement of accounts in fiscal 1990 ended up in
the red. Although sales reached 460.0 billion yen, net
income recorded a deficit of 1.1 billion yen. The biggest blow to the company’s hopes for profitability wasa slump in fishing that exceeded expectations. Here,poor performance in high-seas fishing grounds of theBering Sea was particularly costly. Meanwhile, thefood products business’s effort to break away from red
ink became bogged down. However, in the fine chemicals business, Nippon Suisan received approval tomarket EPA as a pharmaceutical. This led to operations at the new Tsukuba Plant that produced betterthan-expected results.
The cost of rebuilding the fishing business combined with 22.0 billion yen in investments and loans—which included increased financial charges in linewith expanded borrowing and 10.0 billion yen in
investment for a surimi plant in UniSea—meant that
Nippon Suisan could not pay dividends in fiscal 1990
even if it sold off some of its assets.

294

3. Action Plan 93 and the Emergency Rebuilding Plan
A Tough Fight for Recovery
Of course the most urgent issues for fiscal 1991 were
restoring the company’s positive performance andbuilding a framework that would allow resumptionof dividend payments. Amid great changes in thebusiness and social environments, it was thought necessary to reexamine whether or not structural reform
and mindset-changing had actually taken place within
Nippon Suisan’s organization and climate and tomorph them into a corporate constitution that canadapt to such changes.
At a March 1990 board meeting on formulation of
the fiscal 1991 revenue and expenditure plan and cashplan, President Imanaga issued a directive ordering
the preparation of a new medium-term three-year planand calling on employees to attain its goals for fiscal
1991—the new plan’s first year—with a responsibility
and tenacity. The directive was made with full awareness that a company must continually increase its
profits if it is to survive, and that Nippon Suisan’s
survival would be in doubt if it continued to operate
under its present profit structure.
At a board meeting held following a shareholders
meeting in June, Katsusuke Minoda was named
Nippon Suisan’s new president.
That same month, deliberations were held on a
medium-term plan called “Action Plan 93” that targeted the three-year period between fiscal years 1991
and 1993. This plan was approved by a board meetingin July.
Action Plan 93 was oriented towards Nippon
Suisan’s rebuilding as a company. Its purpose was tobuild a solid corporate foundation by bearing in mind
the difficulty Nippon Suisan was having in realizing
its Near-Term Vision. Part of it was devoted to summarizing areas in which the Near-Term Vision was
failing to become firmly established as an effective
management plan. For its first fiscal year, Action Plan
93’s most urgent task was to help the company break

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthaway from its present doldrums and pave the way topositive performance over the coming three years. To
make this possible, it was essential that it promote
corporate restructuring that covered both physicaland human aspects.
Action Plan 93’s first priority was to reform anddevelop Nippon Suisan’s business foundation while
seeking to achieve the Near-Term Vision’s goals. It
sought to reinforce the company’s revenue-earning
foundation during its first fiscal year, reinforce thisfoundation during the second year, and complete
structural reform in the third year. Benefits to begained as the plan moved toward attaining these goals
included better management quality, stronger competitiveness, and enhanced added value.
It deserves noting that the board of directors also
held a one-year “board members’ workshop” on management strategy in order to comprehensively promote
operational and organizational reform.
Business operations for the first fiscal year included
rebuilding the fishing business, streamlining the company as a whole while rebuilding systems, constricting
borrowing that had grown to 120.0 billion yen while
holding down costs, and strengthening businesscapabilities.
Sales in fiscal 1991 amounted to 444.2 billion yen,a figure representing lower earnings, as it was equivalent to 96% of the previous year’s level. However, net
income posted a positive figure of 600 million yen.
Both ordinary income and operating income showed
improvement, and thus some within the company feltthat the company had finally stopped the bleeding.
One reason for this turnaround was completed
adjustments to facilities and personnel in the fishingbusiness. A total of 404 employees decided to retire
early by taking advantage of the company’s elective
retirement scheme. The turnaround was also supported by strength in the surimi business and healthy
sales of Epadel (a product made with EPA marketedby the fine chemical business) by Mochida295

Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. Moreover, the frozen foodproducts business continued to show strong performance, and the canning business turned a profit bycompletely clearing out its stock.
However, the reason the bleeding was stopped was
not because a mechanism for producing earnings had
been completed. That year—the middle year of Action
Plan 93—President Minoda moved to further clarify
the plan’s targets and strategy. Saying “We must not
simply look at these figures and let the success theysuggest go to our heads”, he wanted to “develop andreinforce Nippon Suisan’s revenue-earning foundation” even more.
This was also the year when work efficiency activities began. These activities sought to analyze the workof individual employees in the fishery, food products,
distribution, and head office management categories
and then urge them execute their duties more
efficiently.
Budgeted sales for the next fiscal year (1992) were
unchanged for from fiscal 1991. Given forecasts thatthe market environment would make increasing salesdifficult, the budget focused on cost reduction andimproved financial strength. It also did not include
the practice of patching together profitability by easily
selling off assets, which was a method that had beenused continuously in recent years.
However, at the end of the first half, circumstances
suddenly changed compared to the previous fiscal
year, and it was predicted that business performance
would worsen. One reason was a reaction against
surimi prices that had skyrocketed compared to theprevious year. In addition, the company was forced tosell off assets when Nissui Finance disposed of large
investment losses. Sales were down at 412.7 billion
yen, or 93% of the previous year’s level. And net income
fell to the negative side by 300 billion yen. As a result,the company did not pay dividends for the third consecutive term.

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

Emergency Rebuilding Plan
At budgetary discussions for fiscal 1993, it was apparent that Nippon Suisan would not be resuming dividends soon—this despite the year’s being the final oneof Action Plan 93. Setting a proposed revision on topof the original plan as a minimum line, the board of
directors prepared a working budget that was premisedon improved after-tax performance and a review of
expenses by each department.
In the fisheries business, the company sought toachieve movement toward secure profits and highadded-value products, and set a 0.5% increase in fish
prices as a target. In west water business, it closed
Nikko Suisan. On the other hand, the food productbusiness turned around and performed strongly withsupport from profits in the fine chemicals businesses
and great strides in the frozen food products business;
however, such performance did not make up for losses
in other businesses.
Moreover, the dissolution of Nissui Finance inMarch 1994 added 9.2 billion yen in borrowings to
special losses. The result was a total mid-term burdenof 15.1 billion yen.
Fiscal 1993 sales fell below the 400 billion mark to383.3 billion yen. Net income also reported a loss of
6.1 billion yen. Of this, 16.4 billion yen in special losses
were covered through the disposal of marketable securities. Once again, Nippon Suisan did not pay
dividends.
It should be noted that the Central ResearchLaboratory’s Oita Marine Biological Technology
Center was completed in Tsurumimachi, MinamiAmabe-gun, Oita Prefecture (Currently Saeki City)in December 1993. The center was situated on thewaterfront as an R&D base in the aquaculture field.
Its purpose was to serve as a foundation for Nippon
Suisan’s efforts to fortify its feed, eggs and fry, andfresh and live fish distribution businesses.
In November 1993, Nippon Suisan hammered out
an Emergency Rebuilding Plan for the coming fiscal
1994. Given expectations that Action Plan 93 would296

conclude before achieving its goals, the company
extended the plan one year and added bold emergency
measures added to it.
In the fiscal 1994 management policy (which
included this emergency plan), President Minoda
spoke of the company’s determination to succeed,saying “Although Nippon Suisan stopped paying dividends in fiscal 1990, in truth the point at which we
started sliding toward deficits was in fiscal 1987, when
our main business—fishing—failed to turn a profit.
That was the year when we started selling off assets.
Over the course of the next six years that ended infiscal 1992, our assets sales reached a staggering 63.0
billion yen, from which we had a capital gain of 41.6
billion yen. While our overall net income during thistime totaled 4.6 billion yen, we were actually runninga loss of 37.0 billion yen when this capital gain was
subtracted”. He added, “Over the past two decades orso, we have ventured down a dark road from our glorious past to our gloomy present. If we stay on this road,we face the distinct possibility of going bankrupt.
Right now, we are faced with the most basic challengeof revitalizing our company. We cannot allow ourselves
to sink to the ocean floor with everything we have.
We must work to rebuild Nippon Suisan with bold
emergency measures”. The objectives here were to stop
the company’s flow of red ink as soon as possible andmake it possible to resume dividend payments.
To achieve these objectives, the plan would seek toprevent assets outflow and achieve diminishing equilibrium. Measures toward these ends would include
reduction and reassignment of the company’s overall
workforce, organizational integration and realignment, reexamination of business, contraction of fixed
expenses, review of deficit businesses and preparationof improvement scenarios, lowering of distribution
costs, execution of financial improvement measures,development and rebuilding of affiliates, and expansion of investment return.
In the Fisheries Division, the plan would bring theworkforce down to the minimum level necessary byintegrating the Offshore Operations Group andStructural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

Oita Marine Biological Technology Center

Tobata Branch. In the fishing business, it would seek
to improve international competitiveness by continuing the company’s presence in other countries whileachieving lower costs. It would also strive to raise sales
and productivity and enhance earning power by establishing a Surimi Operations Department. And in the
fresh fish business, it would switch to fresh fish sales
based on ikejime (killing fish immediately prior to
cooking) and processed products while also conducting a fundamental reassessment of all stages between
production and sales.
Moreover, in the food products business, the plan
would endeavor to raise the productivity of processed
foods sales and bring greater efficiency to fish sausage/
ham and canning businesses.
During the process of settling on the fiscal 1994
plan, it was confirmed that the plan would lay the
managerial groundwork for raising profits sustainably,rather than delivering stronger performance instantaneously, and that it would be a top-down plan. It
was also decided that progress management would be
conducted once every two months.
However, the company could not expect to achieve
the Emergency Rebuilding Plan’s intended results infiscal 1994. Although it was moving forward withinternal reform of its own accord, its effort was notbearing fruit in its relationships with customers andthe market. Consequently, Nippon Suisan decided to
begin a follow-up medium-term management planthat would present new trends in fiscal 1996. It alsodecided to implement an Emergency Rebuilding Plan
for an additional year. This was a single-year plan for297

fiscal 1995.
In August 1994 an explanation of the single-yearplan for fiscal 1995 was presented to a special board
meeting called to discuss important business. Under
the plan, fiscal 1995 would be positioned as a “period
to prepare Nippon Suisan for alignment with new
growth trends as a manufacturer with special advantages in fishery”. The plan’s concept was centered on
three “shinkas” (homophonous wards meaning,respectivety, deepening, evolution, and growth) andpositioned under the banner “the year of shinka: realizing new aspiration and action”. Under the first shinka(deepening), Nippon Suisan would fully execute voluntary reforms to break away from deficit operationand promote efficient management, and deepen its
efforts to tackle problems that were not addressed infiscal 1994. Under the second shinka (evolution), thecompany would study changes in the marketplace andamong customers, and use what it learns to acceleratebold measures to ascertain problems and transform
its functions. And under the third shinka (growth),
it would enhance recognition of Nippon Suisan’s true
worth by growing and expanding its business activities
in order to continuously provide value to the marketplace and consumers.
The board held discussions on what represented
Nippon Suisan’s main business, and on whether thecompany was “selecting” and “concentrating” on business in the true senses of the words. The board concluded that “main business” is business that is important
for the company’s growth, and business that has highproductivity and competitiveness. It felt that “selection” should take into account level of leadership in
the marketplace, earning power, clear competitive
advantage, application of company strengths, andother factors based on evaluation of current conditions
and relative positioning. And it saw “concentration”
as the pulling together of management resources—inother words, human resources, capital, and technologies—into selected businesses, and the sharing ofcommon functions and support functions.
It was further concluded that, for Nippon Suisan,

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

the yardstick for measuring selection and concentration
was success as a “food products manufacturer withspecial advantages in fishery”. For Nippon Suisan,being a “manufacturer” meant generating earnings by
supplying value (represented by cost performance andattractiveness) to targeted customers through products
developed around technology.
At the November 1994 board meeting at which thefiscal 1995 plan was approved, President Minoda madethe following statement: “In fiscal 1991, we did not
pay dividends. We formulated Action Plan 93 to makereforms toward resolving this situation, but unfortunately the plan failed to reach all of its aims. That is
why we have formulated an Emergency Rebuilding
Plan and are making a company-wide effort to implement it. Although we successfully achieved most of
our first-half goals in the previous mid-term settlement, we have not carried this success through theentire year. [Part omitted] The Emergency Rebuilding
Plan seeks to reduce stocks, borrowings, and personnel
by downsizing management resources. However,
simply downsizing will cause the company to atrophy.
That is why I want to prepare a growth-oriented planfor next fiscal year. It is extremely regrettable that
achievement of the Emergency Rebuilding Plan’s goals
is in doubt. I am concerned that Nippon Suisan will
be unable to attain any of its objectives if it cannot
implement carefully formulated, fully understood,
and fully prepared plans. This is why I am asking all
board members to clarify into concrete form thoseareas under their responsibility where goals have notbeen reached”.
The fiscal 1995 budget under the plan was not thekind of partial optimization-based bottom-up budgetthat had been used in the past. Instead, it was formulated in a top-down manner from a total optimizationbased standpoint. It set borrowing at 100 billion yen
or less and did not include any new large-scale capital
investment. It prepared a 2.0-billion-yen strategic
special reserve for operational considerations with aceiling of 3.0 billion yen.
Focus points in actualizing the management plan298

were 1) accurate and speedy progress management
and performance evaluation, 2) thoroughgoing accomplishment based on quick execution of decisions, and3) bold selection and concentration of management
resources.
On the business category level, the plan called forthe setting of individual stock standards and efforts
to promote stock reductions. And on the company
level, it noted the need to promote “total cost innovation”. To accomplish this, it called for the redefinitionand clarification of items and setting of goals by seeing
management mechanisms, operational mechanisms,
and organizational and personnel aspects as forms ofcost. In addition, it called for the introduction of a
new system and maximization of user benefits basedon newly established system guidelines. It also called
for the standardization and full use of information.
Cross-cutting company-wide products were implemented to make maximum use of this new system.
At 5:46 A.M. on January 17, 1995, the Great
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake struck with a magnitudeof 7.5. The disaster took the lives of some 6,500 people.
Although all of Nippon Suisan’s employees were safe,
approximately 200 of them suffered damage to theirhouses or other property. The disaster caused the
Osaka Branch’s online system to shut down and damaged the production line at the Itami Plant, causing
it to be inoperable for several days. The Osaka Branchcontinued operating with employees who were capableof commuting to the office. Nippon Suisan provided
canned goods and fish sausages to the afflicted Hanshin
region as relief supplies.
In January 1995, discussions between Nippon
Suisan and the All Japan Seamen’s Union resulted inan agreement to rebuild trawling operations. The
agreement reduced Nippon Suisan’s trawler fleet ofsix vessels to two through sales to overseas joint ventures or scrapping. It also led to the dismissal of all
716 crewmen and office workers affiliated with the
Tobata Branch. Of these employees, 401 were rehired
and 125 were transferred to other companies, etc.
Nippon Suisan covered the approximately 14.0 billion

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

yen in special losses it incurred this fiscal year, which
included losses associated with the agreement, by
selling off marketable securities and other assets.
Fiscal 1994 sales stood at 400.9 billion yen, or 105%of the previous fiscal year’s sales. Net income was in
the black by 400 million yen.
For its fiscal 1995 business plan, the company
decided to conduct business with focus on the breakeven point and based on the single-year plan. The planemphasized the following points:
1) Aim for a three-pronged revolution comprised ofseeing invisible costs, reducing distribution costs
by 30% while reducing cost price (including overseas transfer) by 50%, and doubling productivity.
2) Bring in fishery business producers’ profits.
Eliminate mismatches between policy and execution by providing the equipment needed to be amanufacturer.
3) Make every effort to promote awareness of returnfor investment.
To satisfy these points, Nippon Suisan determined
to divide its work management into four classifications: manufacturing, partnerships, trade, and hedging. It also saw division of commodities as an essential
element of a new business system.
Particularly in food products, the division of
Nippon Suisan-made products and purchased products was an important issue. Urgent tasks included
bringing commercial and product distribution in linewith price on the sales side, and integrating production
bases (and particularly establishing overseas production bases) on the production side. Moreover, thecompany recognized that if unit prices were to belowered, then expanding sales and engaging in mass
selling were essential. It also noted the necessity ofcompletely controlling distribution costs with integrated distribution.
Board of directors’ strategic study meetings thatwere attended by all board members commenced in
May 1995. The meetings analyzed stagnating performance from all angles and included repeated andthorough discussions to illuminate causes and find299

solutions. General managers also participated in themeetings to promote study from a company-widestandpoint. The meetings resulted in a shared awareness of problems facing Nippon Suisan that reachedfrom the president down to board members and general managers.

Yasuo Kunii was named Nippon Suisan’s new president at the annual meeting of shareholders held in
June.
Sales in fiscal 1995 fell to 383.4 billion, or 96% of
the previous fiscal year’s figure. Net income fell backinto the red by 3.5 billion yen.

Part 2 Diversification in the Fisheries Business
1. Shifting from Remote Business and Foreign Trade to Overseas Business
Overseas Joint Ventures that Started as“Remote Businesses”
Nippon Suisan’s overseas joint ventures began with“remote businesses” immediately after World War II.
From then until the early 1970s, Nippon Suisan
engaged in fishery resources development that was
based on trawling primarily in developing countries.
However, with the emergence of “resource nationalism”, operational risks were generated from increasing
economic demands and basic contract cancellations.
Nippon Suisan responded by shifting its operations
to developed and semi-developed nations. Developed
nations represented lower risk, as they had stable
political environments and utilized contracts between
private enterprises and individuals that helped ensurethat contracts were honored. Around the mid-1970s,
Nippon Suisan studied Brazil, Argentina, Chile, theUnited States, Canada, and other nations as possible
partner countries. These studies led to the opening oftrial operations by the Kirishima Maru off the coastof Chile. Nippon Suisan also gained a foothold in
herring roe and frozen fish imports on the Canadianwest and east coasts.
In 1976, Nippon Suisan opened liaison offices in
New Zealand and Argentina to begin gathering information on trends in partner countries. In some cases,
developing countries and semi-developed countries
wanted not only to establish their fishing industries
but also comprehensive development that included

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthconstruction of refrigerated warehouses, canneries,and shipbuilding facilities as well as operational infrastructure. Resolving these issues in political terms tooktime.
Nippon Suisan sought to secure fisheries resourcesin its remote businesses through a variety of avenues.
As its existing fishing areas shrank, it needed to findways to expand to alternative fishing grounds.
Accordingly, it endeavored to develop products by,for example, exploiting species that it had not hitherto
utilized. This was in additional to its conventional
practice of purchasing products while providing production guidance through partnerships with fisherybusinesses in partner countries. It also developed fishing grounds in international waters that were outside
countries’ 200-nautical-mile zones. And naturally it
did not neglect to also strengthen its existing joint
ventures.
As of the end of fiscal 1977, Nippon Suisan’s major
overseas joint ventures were as follows:•Australia: Northern Research (N.R.P.); shrimp
trawling•Indonesia: W.I.F. and I.M.P.; shrimp trawling•Papua New Guinea: New Guinea Marine Products
Pty., Ltd. (N.G.M.P.); shrimp trawling•Malaysia: Sarawak Suisan Sdn, Bhd; shrimp
purchasing•Spain:Diego Nippon S.A. (DIPPON); octopus
and squid operations•Ireland: Atlantic Fisheries Development Co., Ltd.

300

(A.F.D.); trawling•Maldives: Maldives Nippon Corporation., Ltd.;tuna and bonito canning and processing
Continuing to face shrinking existing fishinggrounds as it entered the 1980s, Nippon Suisan’s
remote businesses sought to expand business using
trawling that the company had cultivated throughjoint ventures and partnerships with resource countries and, by doing so, secure products and work areas
and effectively sell the products of operating vessels.
This effort took a variety of forms, including developing the management of existing joint ventures, studying and commercializing new development projects,
promoting direct sales of products produced by
Nippon Suisan vessels, and bringing in products fromjoint ventures into Japan and exporting them to third
countries. It also included product purchasing, technical guidance, and sales of Nippon Suisan products.
Sales that had stood at 13.7 billion yen in fiscal 1977
grew to 21.0 billion yen in fiscal 1981.
Nippon Suisan was particularly focused on developing independent businesses in South America.
Japan’s fishery companies were directing their attention to undeveloped fishery resources of Chile andArgentina. In Nippon Suisan, the Remote Business
Department took charge of these areas by setting up
local corporations to engage in fishing and processing.
In 1976 it began trial trawling in fishing grounds off
the coast of Chile that led to the establishment of
EMDEPES in 1978. Nippon Suisan dispatched the
trawler Kirishima Maru to EMDEPES in 1978 (followed by the Fuji Maru the next year) to begin hake
fishery. Because these grounds also had plentiful horsemackerel stocks, it also began developing horse mackerel surimi there as it simultaneously wound down
production of north-sea surimi.
In Argentina, Nippon Suisan prevailed in international bidding for the right to develop resources inPatagonia in 1978. It began trial operations there thatsame year. In 1981 it set up PESPASA, to which it
dispatched the Rokko Maru and Kasuga Maru to fishfor hake, hoki, and Patagonian toothfish and develop

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthfishing grounds for whiskered velvet shrimp andArgentine shortfin squid. In addition to trawling,
PESPASA constructed processing plants and refrigerated warehouses in Puerto Deseado in 1982.
In 1988, Nippon Suisan concluded an agreementwith Mejino Company to set up a joint venture forsurimi production. The same year, it establishedPESANTAR to conduct trawling and dispatched the
Kongo Maru and Rikuzen Maru. These new companies pioneered Argentine surimi operations.
Nippon Suisan provided technical assistance infishery in response to requests from developing countries. It also worked to stably secure catches throughtrawling for shrimp and other fish. However, changes
in social circumstances produced cases in which
Nippon Suisan was forced to transfer its assets to local
interests. The company responded by redirecting its
investments to other countries and regions.
In 1972, Nippon Suisan set up Diego Nippon on
the Spanish territory of Las Palmas. Diego Nippon
engaged in octopus and squid fishery off the coast ofnorthwest Africa and sold catches to Spain and Japan.
From 1977 it possessed 18 trawlers.
As shrimp consumption expanded during the eraof rapid economic growth, Nippon Suisan developed
its business with focus on shrimp in Asia and Oceania.
This focus continued into the 1970s.
In Indonesia, W.I.F. and I.M.P. were established in1970 with joint investment by Nippon Suisan andseveral other companies. These companies engaged
in shrimp trawling in the sea area near West Irian withtrawlers that were previously assigned to west-water

The Kirishima after being transferred to EMDEPES

301

I.M.P.’s trawler Aman No.2

business.
Sarawak Suisan was established in Malaysia as a
joint venture in 1974. Its business involved cargo booking and processing of shrimp. It should be noted that
Toei Reefer Line Ltd., a company that entered into atuna transport partnership with Sarawak Suisan in
1980, took on shrimp transport.
In 1983, Bangladesh’s I.F.L. began shrimp trawling.
Nippon Suisan helped it proceed smoothly by loaning
three trawlers. However, Nippon Suisan was forced
to pull out in 1985 when Bangladesh instituted newlaws requiring that ships’ registries be shifted to
Bangladesh.
Nippon Suisan also made numerous advances todevelop non-shrimp resources in Oceania.
In New Zealand, S.P.L. was established in 1961,
followed by Sealord Development (S.D.L.) in 1971.
Hokuyo Suisan invested in both. S.P.L. engaged in
trawling while S.D.L. conducted stationary net
fishery.
In 1993, Nissui NZ was launched in New Zealand.
Here, Nippon Suisan operated in a partnership with
S.P.L. by sending its trawler Akagi Maru, which was
renamed the Pakura. In May 1995, Nissui NZ purchased Nippon Suisan’s Ibuki Maru and operated it
under a new name, the Taharaki.
In the Maldives, Nippon Suisan established
Maldives Nippon in 1977. The new company began
producing canned bonito and tuna products using
local resources in 1978. Products were exported toEurope and the United States. However, Nippon
Suisan withdrew from this business in 1982 due to

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

Unloading of a shrimp trawler

poor profitability expectations.
In Papua New Guinea, Nippon Suisan set up New
Guinea Marine Products Pty., Ltd. in 1971 to trawl in
the Gulf of Papua. It also built a refrigerated warehousethere in 1975.
Nippon Suisan’s trawling business developed new
fishery resources in Europe as well.
In 1974, Nippon Suisan established Atlantic
Fisheries Development in Ireland and commenced to
exploit undeveloped fishery resources of the northeastern and northwestern Atlantic Ocean near Ireland.
In 1977 it began operating in waters near Europe, as
it could no longer work in the northwestern Atlantic
due to the setting of American and Canadian 200-nautical-mile regulations zones.
Development of Foreign Trade
Similarly, purchasing of seafood through trading
became an important means of securing fisheryresources for remote businesses that were expanding
trawling overseas.
The Trade Department’s activities, which began in
North America, came to form the core of Nippon
Suisan’s trading business.
In 1972, Nippon Suisan established a Seattle liaison
office under the Trade Department for the purposeof purchasing Alaskan seafood products. This office
was reorganized and formed into Nippon Suisan(U.S.A.) in 1974.
Meanwhile, it established the Universal Seafoods,
Ltd. in Seattle in 1974. This enterprise processed and302packed king crab and snow crab on a Liberty factory
ship moored in Dutch Harbor. In 1977 it built a basefor procuring and processing Alaskan crab and otherseafood by building a refrigerated warehouse andacquiring Vita Food Company’s Dutch Harbor plant.
However, falling crab stocks in the late 1970s negatively affected profitability.
At the same time, Nippon Suisan established theAberdeen Trading Co., Ltd., in Hong Kong in 1975
to serve as a China-Southeast Asia base for seafood
imports. And in 1981, the Singapore liaison office was
expanded and reorganized to form Nippon Suisan(Singapore) Pte, Ltd.
In 1980, the Trade Department, which had posted
a deficit the previous year, moved to realize appropriate
product supply in collaboration with specific productteams of the Fresh and Frozen Products Sales
Department.
Establishment of the Overseas Business Division
The Remote Business Department and Trade
Department were merged in 1984 to form the Overseas
Business Division. Supervision of the shrimp purchasing business was moved to the Fresh and Frozen
Products Division. Around this time, Nippon Suisan
began expanding its view to include aquaculture andit took steps to enter the large shrimp culture market.
A Shrimp Aquaculture Team was set up within the
Remote Business Department No. 3 in September

A dry pellet plant operated by Salmones Antártica that was completed in August 1989

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

1985.
It began a joint venture for shrimp culture in thesuburbs of Bangkok, Thailand, in 1985. The following
year it set up Bangkok Shrimp Cultivation Co., Ltd.
(B.S.C.). For several years thereafter B.S.C.’s production went according to plan. However, later contamination of culture ponds and other problems led tocontinuing sub-par performance that resulted in
Nippon Suisan’s withdrawal.
Nippon Suisan was also involved in aquaculture aswell as fishery in Chile. An international fishery cooperative began a project to stock rivers with chumsalmon in 1969.
Beginning in 1982, Salmones Antártica (S.A.) promoted the salmon culture industry under the Chilean
nonprofit corporation Fundación Chile. When S.A.
completed its work, the right to continue this work
was put to international bidding in 1988. Nippon
Suisan acquired this right the following year and beganculture of salmon and trout in Chile. It later constructed processing plants and refrigerated warehouses
and established an integrated system for salmon culture that included fertilization and feed.
Although Nippon Suisan had a previous friendshipand cooperation agreement with China’s largest fishing company, China Federated Fishery Company, it
agreed to engage in new fishery cooperation with
China in 1985. It dispatched captains to China’s firstdeep-sea fishing fleet, provided guidance in fishing,
and began purchasing catches. And in 1986 it set up

A fish preserve operated by Salmones Antártica303

G.L.S.

a Beijing liaison office to serve as a portal for businesswith China.
At about this time, Nippon Suisan also began processing Alaska pollack roe by outsourcing operations
to Yantai Trading and Refrigeration Company. It
exported products to Japan.
In 1987 it began purchasing cultured shrimp afterinvesting in a shrimp aquaculture company in
Zhuanghe, Dalian. That same year, it began exporting
meal for use as eel feed to Fisheries Development
Company in Xiamen. And the following year, 1988,
it established Xiamen Ryuwa as a joint venture withthis company. The venture processed broiled eel forexport to Japan.
In the Soviet Union, Nippon Suisan helped establish Okhotsk Fishery Co., Ltd., as a joint Japan–Soviet
venture in January 1989. Nippon Suisan leased out
the Nojima Maru to land and process Pacific herring,and shishamo smelt.
In Northern Europe, Nippon Suisan set up a
Copenhagen liaison office in 1985 to purchase frozen
seafood. The office was later moved to Amsterdam in1989 and incorporated into Nippon Suisan (Europe),
B.V.
In North America, Nippon Suisan’s business expansion accelerated from the latter half of the 1980s.
In 1984, Nippon Suisan entered into a partnershipwith Fishking to manufacture crab-flavored kamaboko.
Seeing this as a first step toward developing its businessin North America, Nippon Suisan exported crabflavored kamaboko that it produced at its Hachioji
General Plant to Fishking, which in turn sold the
product in the United States.

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

In 1986, Nippon Suisan took on increased capitalof Ocean Products, Inc., a salmon farming company
in Maine, and sent employees to it to study farming
technology.
Universal Seafoods, which was Nippon Suisan’s
primary base for business in North America, became
a 100% Nippon Suisan Group company in 1986. At
this time, the company’s name was changed to UniSea.
Nippon Suisan acquired its processing ship Omnisea,
built new facilities for producing processed seafoodat its Redmond plant, and used it as a conduit to begin
production of crab-flavored kamaboko.
Meanwhile, Nippon Suisan established G.L.S. in1985 to begin onshore production of surimi at Dutch
Harbor. At Japan–U.S. private-sector fishery talks heldin 1984, the two sides agreed that, in exchange forreceiving U.S. fishing allowances, the Japanese side
would purchase Alaska-produced Alaska pollack products that were in addition to its offshore purchases of
Alaska pollack. At that time, American companies
lacked production capability and had to develop theirfunctions on their own.
Through these two companies, Nippon Suisancame to possess general business functions that coveredfishing, purchasing, processing, and sales on the North
American west coast.
However, UniSea’s processed seafoods arm was
suffering from a weak sales section, deteriorating production line operation caused by mismatches between
produced products and market needs, and stagnating
refrigerated warehouse section. These circumstances
led Nippon Suisan to overhaul the processed seafoods
business in January 1988. Redmond’s refrigerated
warehouse section, crab sticks section, and sales section
were spun off to create Unisea Foods, Inc. and becomea production base for Nippon Suisan’s Food Products
Division. Around this time, Nippon Suisan also
expanded the number of independent crab catcher
boats amid signs that crab stocks were rebounding.
In 1988 Nippon Suisan decided to integrate management by making the president of Nippon Suisan(U.S.A.) a board member in order to unify the304activities of North American group companies underthe Head Office’s strategy. Moreover, in addition to
taking on integrated management duties, Nippon
Suisan (U.S.A.) was made the contact point for theSales Division and Food Products Division. It wasalso given responsibility for purchasing of North
American products, sales of surimi produced by G.L.S.
and other products within the United States, promoting joint ventures, and gathering information on U.S.
domestic fishery.
Furthermore, UniSea absorbed G.L.S. in 1989 tounify Alaskan operations. And, as a countermeasureagainst the U.S.’s setting of quotas for domestic interests (DAP), UniSea also built a second plant and madesecuring Alaskan whitefish resources and productionof surimi at Dutch Harbor its main businesses.
Overseas Business in the Food Products Sector
Nippon Suisan in overseas products procurement in
not only fishery but also the food products field.
In Taiwan, Nippon Suisan began importing frozen
edamame from Tai Mei Food Industrial Corp. in
Kaohsiung in 1973. It also expanded this business bymoving into China in the mid-1990s. In 1993 it began

producing salted edamame that were developed by
Nippon Suisan and gradually expanded operations.
It also began cultivating and exporting black tiger
shrimp in 1984; however, over-cultivation exhausted
cultivation ponds and forced Nippon Suisan to end
this activity after five years.
In South Korea, Nippon Suisan received a request
for food products-related technical guidance from
Dongwon Industries Co, Ltd., a major fishery company, in 1987. This led to the launching of Dongil
Frozen Foods Co., Ltd., as a joint venture. The newcompany produced gyoza and other products that it
sold in South Korea through Dongwon Industry’s
sales network as well as exported to Japan. Dongil
Forzen Foods was merged into Dongwon F&B Co.,
Ltd., in December 2002.
And in Thailand, Nippon Suisan established A&N
Foods as a joint venture with Apitoon, a seafood processing company. There it built a plant for producing
crab-flavored kamaboko. Nippon Suisan’s plan was toexport crab-flavored kamaboko to Europe, where salesof the product were growing, in line with the appreciating yen. However, ultimately Nippon Suisan withdrew from the company after transferring its shared
to Apitoon in November 1991.

2. Moving from Fresh and Frozen Fish Sales tothe Marine Products Business
Expanding Seafood Purchasing
Until the mid-1980s, the business of procuring andselling fresh and frozen fish was called “fresh andfrozen fish sales”. The focus of procurement was varied
and included seafood by Nippon Suisan’s fishing andremote business arms, imported products by the tradearm, and seafood bought independently in Japan andoverseas as part of fresh and frozen fish sales.
From the mid-1970s, Nippon Suisan stepped up its
fresh and frozen fish sales activity in anticipation ofshrinking fishing business.
In fiscal 1977, Nippon Suisan domestic sales of freshand frozen products broke down as follows: 33.2%

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthfrom fishing by Nippon Suisan or affiliates, 54.9%
from domestic purchasing, and 11.9% from overseas
trade. Just a few years before, catches by Nippon Suisan
accounted for 70% of all sales. Thus, the fiscal 1977
figures reflected Nippon Suisan attempt to reverse
the share of purchased/traded products so as to control
the effects of new 200-nautical-mile zones. Whilefishing accounted for a high percentage of earnings,
it was declining in terms of quantity, and thus theincrease in domestic purchasing and foreign tradebusiness served to compensate. However, thereafter
the domestic purchasing and trade businesses faceddifficulty securing gross profits on sales while buffeted
by changing fish prices.

305

Nippon Suisan reorganized its surimi sales in fiscal
1980. It expanded its staff of surimi sales engineers to
help it ascertain consumer needs and reflect theseneeds on production and sales. It also changed its
branch-based sales management system to a blockspecific sales system in order to rearrange increasingly
complicated surimi sales routes and achieve more
efficient sales. In its effort to improve sales routes,
Nippon Suisan developed and strengthened wholesale
dealers existing between producing and consuming
districts.
In January 1981, it implemented a restructuring of
its Sales Division that abolished the Cold Storage
Sections of the Tokyo, Nagoya, and Fukuoka Branches.
It also placed cold stores that had operated under these
sections within an independent framework.
In April 1982, Nippon Suisan set up a two-department system made up of the Fresh and Frozen Products
Sales Department and Processed Foods Department
to engage in more fine-tuned management with aneye to expanded business. The Fresh and Frozen
Product Sales Department No.1 took charge of salesof all products, while Department No. 2 was given
responsibility for sales and distribution of oils andmeal. At the same time, cold stores were separated
from the branches and placed under the control of
the Distribution Section of the Sales Division.
The next year, fiscal 1983, the Fresh and Frozen
Product Sales Department No.1 underwent even further compartmentalization. Section 1 was placed incharge of shrimp; Section 2: surimi; Section 3: tuna;
Section 4: overseas frozen fish, krill, and whale; Section
5: squid and northern frozen fish; and Section 6:
salmon, trout, eggs, and crab. Fishing, imports, anddomestic purchasing were placed under integrated
product-specific leadership to achieve specialization.
The priority issues for 1983 were strengthening collaboration with the Offshore and Overseas Business
Divisions and reinforcing product team activities,
including those in the Head Office, branches, andOffshore and Overseas Business Divisions. Handledvolume that year reached 553,000 tons and had a

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthmonetary value of 290.0 billion yen.
In fiscal 1984, the Sales Division was split into theFresh and Frozen Products Division and the Food
Products Division. As a result, “fresh and frozen fish
sales” came to be seen as a full-scale “business”. The
purpose of the split was to allow Nippon Suisan tobuy and sell fresh and frozen fish as a general supplier
while maintaining sales as a foundation. The aim of
this restructuring was right on the mark, as positive
results appeared from that very fiscal year. Shrimp,
salmon, and crab, which are particularly susceptible
to market movements, were placed under the Fresh
and Frozen Product Sales Department No.1. Although
Nippon Suisan had integrated overseas purchasing
for shrimp, it was efforts to reinforce team activities(including those of branch offices) that allowed it tomake swift reactions to market trends. Additionally,
the strong market allowed achievement of desired
goals.
Fiscal 1985 saw total sales of fresh and frozen products reach 569,000 tons with a monetary value of
301.8 billion yen. It was around this time that the
supply of seafood products underwent a major shift.
In addition to slackening supply due to international
regulations, growing supplies of cultivated shrimp
from Southeast Asia and farmed salmon from
Northern Europe brought changes to the market that
led to competition among fish species as well as
between cultured and natural products. Moreover,seafood supplies were becoming abundant and theappreciating yen was attracting more seafood imports.
Meanwhile, ample financing and falling interest rates
led to a structure whereby companies possessed andturned over large inventories. With inventories remaining large, spot purchases by buyers became the primary
practice. Thus, primary buyers took on higher risks
in that they had to retain running inventories.
Three primary challenges faced Nippon Suisan’s
fresh and frozen business: securing commodities,
streamlining distribution, and actively developing thecold storage business.
To streamline distribution, Nippon Suisan worked306

to shrink inventories and set about raising its inventory
turnover rate. In January 1986, it tackled the distribution issue by separating its Refrigerated Distribution
Department.
As for its cold storage business, Tobu Reizo
Shokuhin’s 10,000-ton Coldstore No.2 began operating in August 1985, followed by Kinki Reizo Shokuhin’s
10,000-ton cold store and Kitakyushu Reizo Shokuhin’s
12,000-ton cold store in March 1986. At the sametime, a 10,000-ton cold store was under construction
at Hakodate Teion Reizo, as was a 9,000-ton cold store
at Sendai Hinomaru Reizo. The Fourth Planning
Committee decided to reinforce the company’s revenue base by independently reestablishing the cold
storage arm as a sales and cold storage business, securing stable earnings, and promoting expanded cold
store capacity at every opportunity.
In fiscal 1986, the environment surrounding the
fresh and frozen business changed greatly. The cause
was a change in fish distribution. For example, smalllot purchasing, spot purchasing, and imports were
becoming increasingly common. In the case of shrimp,
the quantity of cultured shrimp and black tiger brought
into Japan soared. This quantity remained high despite
a surplus and led to plummeting prices. At the sametime, salmon and tuna prices stagnated. Performanceremained flat as sales of offshore surimi lagged due tohigh prices and prices of fish feed and oil products
fell.
In February 1987, the General Development Office’s
Feed Research Team began experiments toward establishing cultured fish feed manufacture and sales as abusiness. This field had been identified as a promising
direction in which Nippon Suisan should proceed in
the future. The goals here were to achieve comprehensive use of coastal mass-catch fish species (such as
sardines and mackerel) and vertical integration ofcultured fish.
Expanding Domestic and Overseas Purchasing
In July 1987, the Fresh and Frozen Products Division

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

was re-launched as the Sales Division. This movemarked a shift toward a unified sales and purchasingsystem that incorporated overseas purchasing.
In fiscal 1987 sales reached 620,000 tons valued at307.2 billion yen. While these figures surpassed thoseof the previous year, Nippon Suisan’s balance of payments fell steeply into the negative side. Among thecauses were falling surimi prices caused by over-production and plummeting squid prices arising from abountiful international harvest.
During this time, Nippon Suisan sought to expand
its seafood processing bases in production areas. It
began establishing bases prepared to handle chilled
fish distribution by, for example, building a processing
plant in Seibu Reizo Shokuhin and subcontract plants
even in Tokyo.
In the cold storage business, as well, Nippon Suisan
expanded the capacity of Seibu Reizo Shokuhin andTobu Reizo Shokuhin by 12,000 tons and 24,000
tons, respectively.
In November 1988 Nippon Suisan began a live fishbusiness by establishing the Harumi Live Fish Center.
This was an important step toward building a major
integrated business for the future to be linked to existing businesses, such as aquaculture, sales of fisheryfeeds and fry, live-fish transport, and meal.
Nippon Suisan also began seafood processing at an
overseas location. This involved Alaska pollack roe
processing at Yantai Trading and Refrigeration
Company in China.
The challenge for fiscal 1989 was to establish thecompany’s earnings structure by improving the earnings rate, raising sales efficiency, differentiating products and services, and arranging and expanding
business fields.
According to the Near-Term Vision, fields to be
developed in the future were meal, shrimp, salmon,
tuna, fishery feed, fresh fish, and live fish. These fields
were expected to have high market appeal and produce
strong market-wide growth rates, although all except
meal required strengthening. Areas in which Nippon
Suisan had an advantage but needed to secure earnings

307

by quantitatively expanding its presence in terms ofmarket appeal were crab, squid, Alaska pollack roe,and surimi. Areas in which it had no advantage andlittle market appeal were octopus, Pacific herring,
herring roe, and salmon roe. Nippon Suisan’s steps
forward were planned based on this analysis.
Nippon Suisan also continued to develop processing bases for domestic fresh and frozen fish and set up
specialized supervision of these bases.
In April 1989, activities associated with surimi wereseparated from the Sales Division and formed into
the Surimi Operations Department. The general distribution business was also separated from the Sales
Division when a new Logistics Department wasformed. Inheriting the activities of the Refrigerated
Distribution Department, the new department was
created to keep tabs on distribution of imported anddomestically purchased products and integrate distribution activities associated with processed foods.
Meanwhile, Nippon Suisan sought to achieve the400,000 tons in warehouse capacity that the NearTerm Vision called for and successfully secured
290,000 tons.
In January 1990, the Sales Division became theFisheries Division together with the Maritime
Operations Division and Surimi Operations
Department. With this move, Nippon Suisan had

placed the production and sales of fishery products
within an integrated system. Here, Nippon Suisan
was seeking to create an organization that merged
production, purchasing and sales; executed its duties
based on shared awareness and information; and waslinked to customers.
In fiscal 1990, purchased items—which Nippon
Suisan had long been expanding to cover fallingcatches—accounted for as much of 80% of Nippon
Suisan’s fishery product sales. The biggest challenge
facing the company at this time was how to improveearnings from these items. Nippon Suisan thus established the following strategy points: 1) better precisionof supply and demand forecasts and risk hedging, 2)
inventory management, 3) shift to purchasing branch
offices, 4) improved added value from processing, and5) better inspection accuracy. It further set 1) standardization of work and 2) building of individualized
profitability management systems and distribution
systems as goals in anticipation that systems supported
by sales activity would bolster competitiveness.
In the first fiscal year of the Fisheries Division’s new
system, fishing-related operations posted a loss of 4.0
billion yen. Although sales-related operations were in
the black by 1.6 billion yen, the Fisheries Division
recorded a total deficit of 5.2 billion yen.

3. Birth of the Logistics Department
Expansion of the refrigerated warehouse network,
which was an item put forth by the First Planning
Committee in 1975, was persistently promoted by
Nippon Suisan through the expansion of affiliatecompanies. Nippon Suisan’s refrigerated warehouses
took two forms: coastal facilities serving as bases forlanding catches from deep-sea trawlers and receiving
imports, and refrigerated warehouses at points ofconsumption that supply large consumer markets. Asof 1977, the company had a total of 18 such facilities.
The arrival of 200-nautical-mile regulations was
expected to lead to smaller catches. Thus, Nippon

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

Suisan enacted a strategy to develop profit-earningbusiness by permitting general consignors to use warehouses that theretofore had mainly served to store its
own fishery products only, allowing handling of not
only fishery products but also frozen foods and otheritems, and upgrading warehouses’ functions to makethem distribution centers that also provide freighttransport. This strategy was called the “national distribution point network concept”. Under it, Nippon
Suisan newly built or expanded facilities in 14 locations by 1988. Some of these refrigerated warehousecompanies took names that did not suggest an308

association with Nippon Suisan in order to attract
many local customers.
Marushin Unyu K.K. (Ota City, Tokyo) began acold storage business in 1984. Kinki Reizo Shokuhin
K.K. (Itami City, Hyogo Prefecture) completed andbegan operating a cold store in 1986, as did Kitakyushu
Reizo Shokuhin K.K. (Kitakyushu City, Fukuoka
Prefecture). The next year, 1987, Tobu Reizo Shokuhin’s
Funabashi office (Funabashi City, Chiba Prefecture)
was completed. This was followed by a port plant
belonging to Sendai Hinomaru Reizo K.K. (Sendai
City, Miyagi Prefecture) in 1990. Nippon Suisan’s
main organization also got into the act by completing
its Kawasaki Coldstore (Kawasaki City, Kanagawa
Prefecture) in 1990 and Rokko Island Logistics Center(Kobe City, Hyogo Prefecture) in 1995.
Goals of the “Near-Term Vision” of September
1988 included making distribution one of five key
revenue-earning businesses, and, after establishing a
Logistics Department in 1989, achieving 400,000
tons in warehouse capacity by 1995 in order reinforce
the overall strength of the Nippon Suisan Group.
Nippon Suisan sought to get closer to points of consumption by building inland refrigerated warehouses
that were in addition to its conventional refrigerated

warehouses concentrated in coastal areas. At this stage
the Nippon Suisan Group had an overall capacity of
280,000 tons.
In January 1990, Nippon Suisan integrated andconsolidated distribution work by conducting a reorganization that involved moving the Distribution
Management Section, which was under the Food
Products Operations Department, to the Logistics
Department and installing Distribution Teams inbranch offices that did not have distribution sections.
The responsibilities of these teams would include foodproducts. That year, Nippon Suisan’s cold storesreached a capacity of 320,000 tons.
This time was characterized by an industry-widerush of new cold store construction. It was also a time
when even further effort was needed to secure cargos
amid declining inventories caused by rising interest
rates.
The number of cold stores was growing throughout
the industry. Although this expanding warehousecapacity needed to be addressed with caution, thenecessity for inland cold stores that also functioned
as distribution centers was growing.
Nichirei Corporation and other companies werealso making the switch to distribution, and with its

1979: Sapporo Hihomaru Reizo Coldstore
Nishi Ward, Sapporo City 12,790 tons

1986: Kitakyushu Reizo Shokuhin Coldstore
Kokurakita Ward, Kitakyushu City, Fukuoka
Prefecture 12,116 tons

1987: Tobu Reizo Shokuhin’s Funabashi
Coldstore
Funabashi City, Chiba Prefecture 12,430
tons

1980: Tobu Reizo Shokuhin’s Hachioji
Coldstore
Hachioji City, Tokyo 10,064 tons

1986: Hakodate Teion Reizo’s Hakodate
Coldstore
Hakodate City, Hokkaido 11,491 tons

1989: Nippo Shokuhin Kogyo’s Jonan
Coldstore
Jonan Town, Shimomashiki-gun, Kumamoto
Prefecture 8,362 tons

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth309

1990: Nippon Suisan’s Kawasaki
Coldstore
Kawasaki Ward, Kawasaki City, Kanagawa
Prefecture 31,200 tons

1990: Sendai Hinomaru Reizo’s Minato
Coldstore
Miyagino Ward, Sendai City, Miyagi
Prefecture 10,895 tons

1995: Nippon Suisan’s Rokko Island
Logistics Center
Higashinada Ward, Kobe City, Hyogo
Prefecture 10,768 tons

strength in coastal warehouses, Nippon Suisan alsoneeded to quickly increase its inland cold stores andswitch to a distribution center-type business.
Specifically, the company was entering an era thatdemanded inter-industry consolidation of bases (e.g.,
for seafood, frozen foods, etc.), accompanying online
functions, and setting of standard services. Its sales
that year reached 11.43 billion yen and delivered a net

1991: Kinki Reizo Shokuhin’s Otsu Logistics
CenterOtsu City, Shiga Prefecture 9,625 tons

profit of 552 million yen.
In April 1991 imports of beef and oranges were
liberalized. Imports of food products were growing
steadily, and oversupplies of all foods, including seafood, were continuing.
In fiscal 1991, approximately 70% of logistics sales
came from general consignors. This meant that thesales ratio had been turned around over the course of
10 years. That same year, Nippon Suisan came intopossession of its own trucks and began operating themfor transport and delivery. Nippon Suisan recognizedthat it had to offer regular delivery services that could
transport cargos to customers at any time, and therefore it continued research to gain know-how for setting
fee systems and routes and raising loading
efficiency.

Part 3 Advancement of the Food Products Business
1. An Energized Frozen Food Products BusinessHousehold Frozen Foods Expand across more
Categories
Production of frozen foods slowed somewhat in the
mid-1970s after posting continuous growth of around
30% in the early 1970s. It then grew at an annual rateof 6% over the next 20 years until the mid-1990s.
The household frozen foods market of the early
1980s was comprised of precooked dishes consistingof prepared dishes (including those for bento boxed
meals) and snack foods, which were the market’s

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

mainstream, together with frozen vegetables and asmall number of frozen seafood products.
Although the main snack foods of the mid-1980s
were pizzas and gratins, frozen rice-based productssoon appeared and were followed by frozen noodle
products. Both of these product lines rapidly gained
momentum in the market. These items came to beclassified as “main course” snack foods as opposed toconfectionaries and other “between-meals” snack
foods. The range of products available at supermarket
frozen food sections—which theretofore had

310principally featured prepared dishes—grew. And as aresult frozen foods quickly gained consumer appeal.
Specifically, “frozen rice-based products” included
pilafs, fried rice, and roasted rice balls. These were
products that could be prepared not in a frying pan
or toaster oven, which were the primary cooking formsof the 1980s, but also in microwave ovens, which were
becoming increasingly common in households.
“Frozen noodles” were made by quickly freezing boiled
noodles. Because this method maintained noodles intheir boiled state through freezing, it gave them atexture that was far superior to chilled noodles or
shelf-stable instant noodles. Appearing alongsidenoodles-only products were products sold in sets withtoppings and soup that provided value only frozen
foods could deliver.
These frozen noodles and rice menus could beenjoyed by all members of a household. Because they
could be prepared quickly using simple cooking methods, they were often prepared by the people who would
actually eat them. Accordingly, although “purchasing”
customers were often housewives, “actually consuming” customers existed throughout the entire household. Meanwhile, the products were eaten at all timesof the day, including breakfast, lunch, dinner, andbetween meals. Consequently frozen foods gained astronger presence as familiar processed foods.
By the early 1990s, microwave ovens—which were
now found in almost all households—became essential
as appliances for cooking frozen foods. Indeed, almost
all prepared dishes for bento boxed meals were prepared in microwave ovens. From the mid-1980s, croquettes, deep-fried shrimp, and other products that
previously required frying in oil could be prepared in
toaster ovens due to advancements in processing technologies. The popularization of microwave ovens
allowed even further shortening of preparation times.
Frozen foods thus met the needs of mothers who
wished to save time and trouble preparing their children’s lunches during busy morning hours. And as aresult precooked foods for microwave ovens took oversupermarket frozen food shelves.

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

In this way, frozen foods for household use enjoyeda growing customer base due to growing productcategories and technical advancements, and they cameto be commonplace in the public’s daily diet. And themore that frozen foods gained customer value, themore they also gained value for mass retailers as tools
for attracting customers through special sales.
Around this time, the managers of the frozen foods
departments of three companies—Nippon Suisan,Ajinomoto, and Nichirei—promoted the establishment of a VAN company as a response to increased
use of IT in other companies. The basic thinking here
was “to compete in the market fairly, and to shareinfrastructure”. This company, which was established
as Finet, Inc., on April 1, 1986, served as a platform
for information exchange between manufacturers of
not only frozen foods but also processed foods andwholesale companies. It added an alcoholic beverages
VAN in 2002 and became the industry’s de facto
standard, a position that it retains today.

A Turning Point in Nippon Suisan’s Household
Frozen Foods Business
For Nippon Suisan’s frozen food products business,
its decision to enter the frozen rice and noodles market
at the end of the 1980s represented a significant turning point.
In 1987 it began selling “COOK FOR ME Daigaku
Imo” (fried and candied potatoes) with an eye toentering the snack foods segment. The product became
a hit among consumers. Although the potatoes wereprecooked foods made for heating in microwave ovens,
they gained popularity for being delicious even wheneaten cold after natural defrosting. Six months later,
Nippon Suisan led other companies in marketing“Chanpon”, a product containing frozen noodles withtoppings. It gradually expanded distribution of
Chanpon and captured consumer loyalty along theway. Nippon Suisan added production lines for frozen
noodles and frozen rice dishes to its Hachioji General
Plant, and in 1988 it began marketing “Umi no Pilaf ”

311

Changes in domestic production of frozen foods (1958 to 2009)(10,000 tons)

200
Snack foods
Precooked foods
Livestock products

150

Agricultural products
Fishery products

100

50

0

1958 61

64

67

70

73

76

79

82

85

88

91

94

97 2000 03

06

09(year)

Source: Japan Frozen Food Association

Main products of the 1980s

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth312

“COOK FOR ME Chanpon” in the new “frozen noodles with toppings” category
Sales began in 1987.

“COOK FOR ME Yaki-onigiri” as an established grilled rice-ballproduct on frozen food shelves
Sales began in 1989.

“Ebi no Tsutsumi-age”, winner of a gold medal at the 1994 Salon
International de l'Alimentation (SIAL)

The “Obento ni Benri” series as part of Nippon Suisan’s moveinto naturally defrosting frozen foods
Sales began in 1986.
The series became an enduring seller after being redesigned in1999.

(pilaf of the sea) as a full participant in the frozen ricedish market.
Moreover, Nippon Suisan led the competition inmarketing “COOK FOR ME Yaki-onigiri” (roasted
rice balls). These savory rice balls that could be eaten
after simple heating in a microwave oven gained widespread market approval. Both Chanpon and Yakionigiri overcame competition from subsequently
arriving companies and became enduring bestsellers
that were representative of Nippon Suisan’s householdfrozen foods. As for snack products, Nippon Suisan
began marketing “COOK FOR ME Atsu-Atsu!
Takoyaki” (baked octopus balls) for preparation in
microwave ovens in 1991. Their large chunks of octopus and delicious batter made them a hit.
Meanwhile, Nippon Suisan also continued tomarket new products in the prepared dishes
segment.
In prepared dishes for bento boxed meals, Nippon
Suisan began marketing “Curry & Hamburg Fry”
(deep-fried hamburger with curry) as part of its“Hitokuchi” (bite-size) series in 1984. With characteristics that included having the perfect size for lunchboxes and deliciousness even when eaten cold, theproduct enjoyed strong sales due to a design that specifically targeted boxed meals. In 1986 Nippon Suisan
began selling “Obento ni Benri Green Pack” (convenient green packs for boxed meals) as side dishes that
could be defrosted naturally. These products came inthree assortments that included burdock roots sautéand stewed hijiki seaweed. And in 1989 it began salesof the “Oven Toaster de OK!” series of foods designed
for preparation in a toaster oven. The series was later
renamed “Obento ni Benri” (convenient for boxed
meals) and then revamped to include products for
preparation in microwave ovens in 1994. The bestsellers crab cream croquettes and deep-fried whitefish
were incorporated into the series.
In Chinese-style prepared dishes, Nippon Suisan
had a hit with “LITTLE CHINA Ebi no Tsutsumiage” (battered and fried shrimp) as a new item in its
regular lineup of shumai dumplings and spring rolls.
This product won the gold medal in the frozen foods
category of the 1994 Salon International del’Alimentation (SIAL), a contest of international hit
products.
Amid revolutionary changes in food preparation,
Nippon Suisan was quick to take on the challenge ofStructural Change during the Period of Slow Growth313

Introduction of the “Green Giant” brand in the frozen agricultural
foods category Nissui Koho, March 1979

marketing products for use in microwave ovens. It
started by marketing first three microwave oven-oriented products, one of which was “Range Mate
Benizake” (sockeye salmon), which hit shelves in 1987.
Range Mate Benizake was a grilled fish product consisting of a cut of fish wrapped in a sheet that washeated in a microwave oven. This design saved consumers the trouble of washing dirty grills after cooking.
However, it suffered from premature marketing, as
microwave ovens had not yet achieved high prevalencein society.
Among the precooked product for microwave ovens
that followed “Yaki-onigiri” was “Hakodate Range
Croquette Gyuniku” (beef croquettes), which cameon the market in 1994. Nippon Suisan’s decision tosell this product was spurred by the sudden popularityof microwaveable deep-fried products, something thatwas sparked by Nichirei’s sales of microwaveable
potato croquettes six months prior. Nippon Suisan
offered a range of main products, including “Ebi Fry”
(deep-fried shrimp) and “Shiromizakana Fry” (deepfried whitefish), which hit store shelves in the springof 1995, and “Harumaki” (spring rolls) and “KaniCreamy Croquette” (crab cream croquettes), whichappeared in the autumn. These products offered morethan just convenience of preparation; they were also
made with specially developed in-house technologies
that prevented foods from hardening even whenheated in a microwave oven. Thereafter, microwave
ovens became the primary means of preparing frozen
foods.

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

Although these products were produced at plants
in Japan, there were some moves underway to promotepartnerships with overseas interests as well as overseas
production.
Overseas procurement and production became
particularly conspicuous in frozen vegetables. Nippon
Suisan’s began importing and selling frozen vegetables
under the “Green Giant” brand through a tie-up with
the Pillsbury Company of the United States in 1982.
It deepened this relationship in 1992 by establishing
Green Giant Frozen Foods K.K. Utilizing bases inTokyo and Osaka, the new company sought to firmly
establish the Green Giant brand by distributing products nationwide and offering an expanded productlineup.
In 1990, Nippon Suisan established “ConAgra
Nissui Inc”. through joint investment with ConAgra
Foods, Inc. This new venture sold microwaveable ZIP
hamburgers.
Among Nippon Suisan’s independently developed
products was Taiwan-produced edamame, which it
had been promoting since 1973. In 1993, it beganselling “Shioaji Edamame” (salted edamame), a product that sparked a growing market as other companies
joined the competition. Nippon Suisan also began
expanding sales of frozen vegetables from China byentering into an importation contract with Anhui
Province following economic liberalization in the
1980s.
The imported frozen vegetables market grew fromthe mid-1980s, with potatoes from the U.S. andedamame from Taiwan and China showing particularly strong growth. Entering the 1990s, productionof prepared foods in China, Thailand, and other countries picked up steam, particularly for products involving many labor-intensive work processes. Nippon
Suisan joined this trend by becoming involved atnumerous production bases in China, an agricultural
producer that could easily supply the labor needed
for processing.

314

“Soft Karei Fry” (flatfish fry) for household use (left) and commercial use (right)

Development of Frozen Food Products
for Commercial Use
The counterpart to frozen food products for household use was frozen food products for commercial
use. This business expanded around school lunch
programs in the 1970s. The main products sold in thiscategory were deep-fried products, croquettes, andfried meat, as deep-frying made it possible to prepare
very large amounts of food at once. Here, Nippon
Suisan sought to separate itself from the competition
by producing products made with seafood, an area inwhich it held an advantage. Its products included
deep-fried whitefish and shrimp, as well as tempuraand “Squid Snack Fritters”, which it began selling in
1976. In 1979 it started marketing “Soft Karei Fry”
(deep-fried soft flounder) by packaging processed
yellowfin sole caught in the Bering Sea in retort
pouches. This product gained particular popularity
in school lunches, as everything including the bones
could be eaten.
During the 1980s, growth in frozen foods for commercial use was supported by the diversification ofbusinesses that use frozen foods. Among settings thatnow used these foods were industrial food services,dining-out industries, and prepared-dish counters atmass retailers. Each of these businesses had its own
requirements for frozen foods, and manufacturers
responded by expanding their product lineups andimplementing strategies targeting specific businesssegments. Because many of Nippon Suisan’s products
were for deep-frying, it focused on prepared dishes
sold by mass retailers and industrial food services.
However, it also devoted energy to developing

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth“Sasagata Shiromizakana Fly”

products for dining-out businesses that are sensitive
to new culinary trends. On the sales side, as well,
Nippon Suisan established a Special Sales Section in
1979 to develop sales to dining-out businesses.
In 1983, Nippon Suisan began selling “Sake
Paupiette” (salmon paupiette) and “Shiromizakana
Paupiette” (whitefish paupiette) made of surimi prepared to have a mousse-like consistency, and “Mousse
Base” as part of a “Yofu Gourmail” series targeting
dining-out businesses. This was an attempt to propose
new fish menus that differed from deep-fried foods.
And in 1984, it began marketing authentic Chinese
menus under a “Gourmail Chuka” series. Included
was “Ebi Chili Sauce-ni” (shrimp stewed in chili sauce)sold in “boil-in-pouch” packaging. It also sold “Ika
Dango Kanoko-age” (squid dumplings deep-fried
kanoko-age style) and “Ika Dango Mochigome-mushi”(steamed squid dumplings with sticky rice) in a
Chinese dumpling series intended to provide an alternative to shumai and gyoza.
At the end of the 1980s, Nippon Suisan kept entered
the frozen noodles and frozen rice dish markets, keeping pace with its moves on the household products
side. These products offered short preparation timeand “just boiled” texture that could not be matchedby chilled products, which made them perfectly suitedfor commercial food services.
Nippon Suisan sold frozen udon and soba as wellas toppings (such as kakiage mixed tempura and otherforms of tempura) and noodle sauce to go with them.
These products later led to the development of kakiagethat could be defrosted naturally as well as sauces andseasonings. Although the mainstream in the frozen
rice dish market was pilafs and fried rice, Nippon

315

Shiromizakana Fry”, a deep-fried whitefish productmade with “once-frozen” technology, had appeared.
This new product was produced by Sealord of New
Zealand. Product design involved processing and thenfreezing fish once shortly after harvest in order topreserve the fish’s deliciousness. With this product,
Nippon Suisan recognized that product differentiation and characterization could be achieved by producing at the site of origin. And this spurred it to begin
producing “once-frozen” deep-fried shrimp inIndonesia and “once-frozen” fried chicken in Beijing,
China.

Suisan began trial sales of roasted rice balls for sales nearconvenience store cash registers. These rice balls soon
became a hit in the household products segment.
At the same time, Nippon Suisan also returned toseafood—an area where it could demonstrate its traditional strengths—to sell fried squid products at massretailers’ prepared dish counters. However, the volume
of squid Nippon Suisan handled was decreasing amidchanges in squid fishing grounds. On the other hand,something new was occurring in deep-fried whitefish,
Nippon Suisan’s other product of expertise, as a resultof overseas production. Specifically, “Sasagata

2. The Fish Sausage/Ham and Fish-Paste Product Businesses
fish ham series called “NOW” in 1983. A product inthis series called “NOW Hamburger” became a longrunning best-seller. Nonetheless, Nippon Suisan could
not stop the business’s downward slide, as it was unable
to find effective means for restoring performance
during the 1980s. Consequently, it was forced to consolidate its fish sausage and ham plants into twoplants—Hachioji and Tobata—in 1988.
Nippon Suisan attempted to break out of the slump
by seizing on a health boom in the market. It developed“additive-free” sausages that contained no chemicalseasonings or preservatives in 1991. It also sold“Seafood Sausages” in a white bag marked with thecatchphrase “natural ingredients”. However, while

Fish sausages and hams were seeing a long downward
trend, with sales held down by processed meat products amid growing meat imports and increasing sophistication of tastes. The market’s scale had been in acontinuous 30-year contraction after production
peaked at 180,000 tons in 1972. Major influences
behind this trend were changing consumer trends andpreferences as well as production of Alaska pollack
surimi (the main ingredient of fish sausages and hams)
and market circumstances.
To reverse this trend, Nippon Suisan stepped up
its marketing in ways that included introducing sausages featuring numerous cartoon characters that were
popular among children. It also began selling a new

Changes in fish sausage/ham production (1955 to 2009)(10,000 tons)

200

150

100

50

0

1955 58

61

64

67

70

73

76

79

82

85

88

91

94

97 2000 03

06

09(year)

Sources: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Japan Fish Sausage Association; Japan Canners Association

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth316

Main fish sausage and ham productsof the 1980s“Doraemon Sausage”
Sales began in 1978.

“NOW Burger”
Sales began in 1983.

Changes in fish-paste product production (1957 to 2009)(thousand tons)

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0

1957 60

63

66

69

72

75

78

81

84

87

90

93

96

99 2002 05

09(year)

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, “Annual Statistics on Marketing of Fishery Products”

Sales of oden in retort pouches that can be served
after heating only began in 1987.

Sales of heat-resistant “Sea Grace”
began in 1990.
“Seafood Sausage” marketed with emphasis on natural ingredients
Sales began in 1988.

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth317consumers in the Tokyo metropolitan area and otherurban areas reacted well to the new “healthy” side of
Nippon Suisan’s products, sales in more rural areas
remained poor. Nevertheless, the company’s attempts
here laid the foundation for later reform of Nippon
Suisan’ fish sausage business.
As for chikuwa, the market was in a continuous
decline after peaking in the mid-1970s. Sales werehighly susceptible to changes in the surimi market,
and price competitions were common. Thus Nippon
Suisan continued to do all it could to differentiate
itself. This included further expanding its productlineup.
In 1987 Nippon Suisan suggested salads as a newuse for chikuwa by marketing “Salad Chikuwa”, a product made to taste good in salads.
Moreover, in 1993, Nippon Suisan began selling“Umi no Genki DHA-iri Chikuwa” (chikuwa madewith healthful DHA from the sea), which contained
the same amount of DHA (docosahexaenoic acid)obtainable from a single serving of northern bluefin
tuna sashimi. Here, Nippon Suisan was adding DHA
produced by its fine chemicals business to appeal tothe public’s interest in healthy lifestyles. And in 1995

it successfully differentiated itself from the competition by selling “Chikuwa” made with southern blue
whiting caught in its Argentina operations.
In its crab-flavored kamaboko business, Nippon
Suisan focused on exports. Introduced in 1973, crabflavored kamaboko grew into a major hit in 1983
because it met consumer needs. But with the domestic
market subsequently becoming saturated, Nippon
Suisan looked to find avenues for export. However,exports plunged when the yen rapidly appreciated in1986 and overseas production grew.
In 1990, Nippon Suisan began selling “Sea Grace”
made with a Nippon Suisan-developed manufacturing
technology called “extrusion cooking”. The productbecame a consumer favorite for being useable in various forms of cooking, as it was highly resistant to heatand did not become mushy. It also had a firm texture
attributable to a delicately fibrous quality and anauthentic flavor coming from crab and scallop extract.
Nippon Suisan took broad-ranging steps to reinforce
manufacturing facilities at the Hachioji General Plant
and other plants in preparation for nationwide delivery
in 1992.

3. The Canning Business
Canned goods were also products suffering fromdecline and stagnation. Because the canned goods
industry began emphasizing domestic demand following the “dollar shock” of 1971, exports had beenfalling since peaking in 1976. Although Nippon Suisan
had lagged behind others in entering the canned tunasegment, which was the leading field of the canned
goods market, it eventually entered the growing oilpacked canned tuna and bonito market by selling“Tuna White” in 1975, followed by “Sea Gourmet”
in 1977.
It also took on the gift market by utilizing the“Nippon Suisan” brand, an established name in factory-ship crab and salmon canning since before WorldWar II.

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

The 1980s were marked by a flood of new products.
For the canning industry, companies urgently needed
to keep their traditional customers and acquire newcustomers at a time when many shelf-stable processed
foods were designed to be fashionable as well as
convenient.
A wide variety of products were developed to generate new customers and new usages. With attention to
the growing convenience store market, companies
offered product lineups that included canned snacks
and prepared foods made from seafood and meat,canned fruit for deserts, and prepared curries andsoups designed to compete against retort pouch products. Companies also developed “series” products
offering a variety of items under a single name with318

Changes in domestic production of canned products (1949 to 2009)(million boxes)

100

Meat, precooked foods, other.
Fruit
80

Vegetables
Fishery products

60

40

20

0

1949 52

55

58

61

64

67

70

73

76

79

82

85

88

91

94

97 2000 03

06

09(year)

Sources: Japan Canners Association, “The Canners Journal”; “Nihon Kanzumeshi” (history of canning in Japan)*“Other” includes juices from 1952 to 1958.

Canned products of the 1980s

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth319

Sales of okayu (rice gruel) in retort pouches
also began in 1988.

Nippon Suisan developed gift-oriented products mainly
consisting of high-quality canned crab and scallops.

The “Yaki” series, 1985

The “Meat Company” series sold amid diversifying product lineups, 1985

an eye to capturing specific areas of store shelves.
However, this flood of new products also brought the
problem of increasing items and excessive
inventories.
Companies also took measures to bring greater
convenience to consumers. In 1983, easy-opening cansentered the market, followed by lightweight aluminumcans. However, these methods faced significant limitations due to the high cost of their packaging
materials.
In canned seafood ingredients, sales were successfully expanded through sales-promotion campaigns
that suggested new recipes to consumers. In a tie-up
with Kewpie Corporation, Nippon Suisan suggested
cross-matching canned scallops with other products
under the theme “daikon radish salad”. This approach
was later expanded to attention-grabbing menus for
salads, pastas, and other dishes. Meanwhile, Nippon
Suisan promoted in-store sales using lifestyle-related
events, and supported the in-store marketing activities

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthof sales personnel through “four-season sales promotions”. Because canned goods were shelf-stable products, Nippon Suisan promoted their sales by placing
them in mass displays in traditional store settings. It
strove to promote sales that matched the times byadding specific sales themes to displays. This approach
was not limited to just canned goods, as it was also
extended to all household-related businesses, including
fish-paste products, fish sausages and hams, and frozen
foods.
Scientific in-store marketing gained attention as
use of the POS system became more widespread during
the 1980s. Nippon Suisan participated in an experimental study on in-store merchandizing and in-store
promotion through a project with the Distribution
Economics Institute of Japan and major mass retailers.
It then reflected the results on its own sales promotion
activities.
In March 1988, the effects of the whaling ban
brought a stop to manufacturing and sales of canned

320

“Seadish” packed in a lightweight aluminum can, 1985

“Yakiniku Mutton”, 1988

whale meat. As a result, canned whale production that
had peaked at one million cases—and even reached200,000 cases the previous year—now stood at zero.
Nippon Suisan’s black-labeled canned whale wasundoubtedly representative of its canned whale business, and it was a vital component of the company’s“Gyu Yakiniku”, 1990

effort to remain on retail store shelves. Nippon Suisan
looked to replace this product by selling canned New
Zealand mutton for yakiniku. And it began stressing
canned meat by adding beef products to its lineup in
1991.

Part 4 Formation and Growth of New Business Fields
1. The Fine Chemicals Business
Beginning of EPA Research
The origin of Nippon Suisan’s fine chemicals businesscan be traced back to the company’s foundation. The
need to conduct research on oils was understood fromthe earliest days. In 1920, the Hayatomo FisheryResearch Group was organized and began studying
seafood refrigeration methods. Some time later achemistry department was added to begin researchon oils.
Research on EPA (eicosapentaenoic acid) began in
1978. That year, Dr. John Robert Vane of the United
Kingdom released a study on the effectiveness of EPA
on arterial sclerosis. Employees of Nippon Suisan who
read the study believed that EPA offered promise forthe future and commenced pertinent research.
EPA is a type of unsaturated fatty acid. It is a classic
example of an aquatic oil, as it is found in fish andplankton but not in land-based animals and plants.
Examples of effects that have been identified thus far
include lowering neutral fat in the blood, lowering
the level of total blood cholesterol, increasing HDL

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthcholesterol, lowering platelet aggregation, and increasing erythrocyte deformability.
Research initially started as a joint undertaking by
Nippon Suisan with Nissui Pharmaceutical and Kyowa
Yushi Kogyo K.K. Nippon Suisan took charge ofadvanced extraction using rectification, and Kyowa
Yushi was responsible for research on supply of raw
oil.
In 1980—the target year for successful extractionof high-purity EPA—Nippon Suisan entered into a
partnership with Chiba University’s School of
Medicine to conduct on-the-spot verifications of EPA
efficacy measurements. These verifications were aimed
at practical use of EPA for medical purposes. In 1981,
Nippon Suisan entered into a research and commercialization contract with Mochida PharmaceuticalCo., Ltd., which would serve as Nippon Suisan’s partner in translating research into actual pharmaceuticalproducts. Chiba University’s School of Medicine
determined that Mochida Pharmaceutical had superior technologies in fields necessary for converting
natural products into pharmaceuticals and was the321The “Umi no Genki” series sold as products for general
consumers

Supply of basic components for pharmaceuticals:
Mochida Pharmaceutical’s “Epadel”

A new Tsukuba Plant was built in 1990 to expand the fine chemicals
businesscompany most qualified to use EPA. Nippon Suisan
and Mochida Pharmaceutical engaged in joint researchon pharmaceuticals to treat chronic arterial obstructions that eventually led to the completion of clinicaltests and an application to manufacture EPA as apharmaceutical in 1986.
Establishing EPA as a BusinessNippon Suisan began full-scale sales of EPA in 1984
with exports to Shaklee Corporation of the UnitedStates. Shaklee is a direct marketer of dietary supplements that operates a subsidiary in Japan. Nippon
Suisan also sold EPA to Warner-Lambert.
Other byproducts that are extracted during EPA
production include DHA (docosahexaenoic acid)and taurine. DHA is an important constituent fatty
acid of the cell membranes of the brain, nervous
system, and retina. It is known to be effective in lowering the amount of fat in the blood and as a treatment

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growthfor Alzheimer’s dementia and depression. Taurine isa type of sulfur amino acid. Although produced invery small amounts by the body, it is thought thattaurine must also be directly ingested from plants. It
functions include lowering blood pressure, producing
anti-arrhythmic effect, lowering blood glucose, lowering cholesterol, and producing anti-atherogenic action.
Among other effective fatty acids that are extracted
when producing EPA is arachidonic acid, which has
a significant effect on infants’ body growth. Nippon
Suisan looked at translating these byproducts into
products as well.
Nippon Suisan began sales of taurine in 1985.
Taurine was purchased by dairy product manufacturers who added it to infant formula as an essential acidfor infant growth.
Because the fine chemicals field had thus developed
into a stable business for Nippon Suisan, the company
spun it off from its parent organization, the ProductDevelopment Department, to form the Fine Chemicals

322

Department in 1987. It simultaneously added a biochemistry research arm to the Central ResearchLaboratory to handle fine chemicals and bio­tech­nolo­g y.
Beginning the next year, 1988, Nippon Suisan
began full-scale sales of the dietary supplements “Umino Genki EPA” and “DD Oil DHA” as Nippon Suisan
products.
In 1990, Nippon Suisan received approval to market“EPA-E Nissui”. Mochida Pharmaceutical then started
marketing “Epadel” as a drug for chronic arterial
obstruction made with EPA-E Nissui. Epadel soon
started showing indications of strong sales. The resulting stable supply of EPA-E Nissui to MochidaPharmaceutical firmly established EPA as a Nippon
Suisan business.
Given these positive indications, Nippon Suisan
built a new plant at Tsukuba in April 1994. The plant
was established for the simultaneous purposes of production and research toward productivity improvement, and in 1992 it developed a new manufacturingmethod that could extract EPA with extremely highefficiency. This new method represented a technologythat was unique to Nippon Suisan. That same year,
Nippon Suisan completed construction of a second
wing of the Tsukuba plant and began full-scale production using the new method.

Research and Development in the Seasonings
Business
Meanwhile, Nippon Suisan was also developing
seasonings.
At the time, the public wanted more than chemicalseasonings; it also wanted flavors and richness thatapproached authentic seasonings. Stronger healthconsciousness was also producing greater demand fornatural seasonings. These factors spurred the industry
to take a new look at extract-based seasonings madewith natural extracts. With this in mind, Nippon
Suisan established Kyowa Protein K.K. as a wholly
owned affiliate in April 1985. This new company was
charged with manufacturing and marketing seasonings
made based on extracts produced from seafood, meat,
vegetables, and other products.
With the subsequent Near-Term Vision of 1988
listing seasonings as a candidate for new businessexploration, Nippon Suisan’s Product Development
Department began importing bonito extract fromThailand and marketing it for commercial use in1989.
In 1991 Kyowa Yushi Kogyo and Kyowa Protein
were merged to form Kyowa Technos Co., Ltd. This
move added extract-based seasonings and food additives to the traditional product line of oils and fats
and chemical products.
Nippon Suisan began using the seafood extracts
extracted and concentrated by Kyowa Technos tomanufacture extract-based seasonings, bouillon, soups,
and other products. It then marketed these products
for commercial use and even exported them. Because
Nippon Suisan had an advantage over other companies
in that it could stably acquire seafood extracts, it
attempted to find ways to utilize this advantage by
expanding these products into a strong business.
However, their high costs compared to chemical seasonings subsequently led the company to decide toconcentrate on sales for commercial use.

2. The Chilled Products Business
Products in the chilled temperature range make sections selling daily foods and prepared dishes in growing
mass retail stores more attractive, and thus the market
for chilled products was expected to grow. Such expectations led Nippon Suisan to establish Chilldy Co.,

Structural Change during the Period of Slow GrowthLtd. as an experimental business in Hachioji, Tokyo,
in November 1983.
Chilldy initially made and sold frozen/chilled products, such as deep-fried seafood as well as salted anddried products. It later began supplying vegetable323

nience store products.
As the business of supplying to convenience storesmatured, Nippon Suisan kept pace by establishingaffiliates similar to Chilldy throughout Japan. In 1988
it established Kansai Cookery K.K. in the Kinki
region, followed by Hello Delica K.K. in the Kanto
region in 1989; Sante Foods K.K. in 1990; Cherry
Fresh Foods Ltd. and Eniwa Fresh Foods Co., Ltd. in
1992; Hokuriku Fresh Foods Co., Ltd. and Himeji
Fresh Foods Co., Ltd. in 1993; and Gunma Fresh
Foods Co., Ltd. in 1995. These companies supplied
salads, noodles, prepared dishes, rice-based menus,
bento boxed meals, and sandwiches among otherproducts.

Chilldy products at the time of the company’s establishment

salads, sets of ingredients for nabe one-pot dishes, andother chilled products for sales in convenience stores.
These products were placed under a new manufacturing arm in 1985 as business stabilized, and Chilldy
became established as a vendor specializing in conve-

3. The Service Businessidea for dede came from an in-house open recruitmentof business concepts that could be started with 100
million yen or less in capital.
The Service Operations Department launched anumber of shops to follow dede beginning in 1989.
However, restaurant management did not fit well with
Nippon Suisan’s corporate culture. Many of its shops
were closed or had their rights transferred to business
partners until only “Nanatei” in Kayabacho remained.
Nanatei’s management was handled by Nissui Food
System Co., Ltd., a company that was established in

In April of 1989, Nippon Suisan established a Service
Operations Department in accordance with its “NearTerm Vision”. The new department’s main duties
concerned food services and real estate services.
By then, Nippon Suisan’s seafood restaurant “dede”
was already open in Tokyo’s Minami-Aoyama district.
Dede was an “antenna shop”—in other words, anestablishment used to test sales of new products—used
to nimbly ascertain diversifying culinary habits. This
was a time when many food and beverage companies
were opening antenna shops one after another. The

Changes in sales of mass retail stores and convenience stores (1980 to 2010)(10,000 stores)

54(trillion yen)

Convenience store sales (right scale)
Mass retail store sales (right scale)No. of convenience stores (left scale)No. of mass retail stores (left scale)

20

15

3
10
2
5

1
0

1980

83

86

89

92

95

98

2001

04

07

10

0

(year)

Sources: Prepared based on Ministry of Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, “Current Survey of Commerce”, and Japan Statistical
Association, “Historical Statistics of Japan, New Edition”. Convenience store performance is from Japan Franchise Association, “JFA Franchise
Chain Statistics”. Mass retail store performance is from Japan Chain Stores Association, “Sales Statistics”.

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth324

1994.
The other main duty of the Service Operations
Department was real estate. Among other activities,
it made arrangements for real estate required by
Nippon Suisan’s departments and offices and redeveloped Nippon Suisan-owned real estate.
In 1991 it joined with Duskin Co., Ltd. to establish
Don Co., Ltd. as a chain of restaurants serving ricebowl dishes made primarily with seafood. With aneye to nationwide expansion, Don opened its first
store under the name “The Don” in December of thesame year. By December 2001, the company had
opened 100 stores.

Structural Change during the Period of Slow Growth

Also in 1991, a retail fish shop management project
was added to the Service Operations Department.
The first shop was opened in Kawaguchi City and asecond was set up in Tama; however, the Tama shop
was not situated in an ideal location and was soon
moved to the Daiei Building in Shin-Urayasu.
Establishing a network for sales of fresh and live fish
was one theme of the Near-Term Vision, and thus the
shops were set up with the brand and know-how of
Nakajima Suisan and served as final outlets for live
fish sales. Keiko Suisan K.K., an affiliate of Nippon
Suisan, was charged with their day-to-day management.

325Section V
Realizing Nippon Suisan’sFounding Philosophies
Chapter 1: Management Reforms Based on
Selection & Concentration

1996–2000

Part 1 Business Environment during the Second Half ofthe 20th Century
1. Japan’s Prolonged Economic Slump and Reforms ofIndustrial Structures
Accelerated Globalization through Deregulation
Japan’s economy started to again turn lower from thesecond half of 1997. The burdens placed on Japanesehouseholds increased during that fiscal year due to ahike in the consumption tax and an increase in the
portion of healthcare expense shouldered by recipients. Concerns about the future were heightened bya string of financial institution failures from the autumnof that year. Stock markets declined and Japan’s real
growth rate, according to statistics compiled by the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications,declined 0.1% in 1997 and 1.3% in 1998, falling fortwo straight years. The unemployment rate reacheda high level as corporations started cutting jobs, which
increased anxiety about employment conditions. In
February of 1999, the Bank of Japan introduced its“zero interest rate policy” as an economic stimulus
measure, but this did not dispel financial and employment concerns. As a result, private sector equipment
investment and personal consumption fell. At thesame time concerns started to emerge about depressedsocial and economic activity due to the Japan’s declining birthrate and rapidly growing elderly population.

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

From fiscal 1998 the government began introducing
bold deregulation measures, including financial sector
liberalization, in order to support healthy economic
growth and bolster Japan’s international competitiveness. Around this time large Western corporations
started entering Japanese markets through partnerships and the establishment of joint ventures withJapanese companies. These developments accelerated
globalization in various fields. For example, in theautomobile industry France’s Renault S.A. enteredinto a capital alliance with Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. in
1996. Likewise, America’s Costco Wholesale Corpo­
ration. entered Japan’s retail market in 1999 followed
by France’s Carrefour SA in 2000. With foreign companies entering the Japanese market one after another,domestic industrial structures started to adapt to thiswave of globalization. As the yen strengthened, large
volumes of cheap goods produced in countries withlow production costs such as China and the NIEs
(newly Industrializing economies; in Asia this refers
to South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore andothers) began pouring into Japan. International pricecompetition became fierce, spurring on deflationary
trends.

326

Continued Western Economic Growth
During this period the advancing IT (information
technology) revolution helped the U.S. economy
recover. The IT revolution introduced information
services, equipment and technologies to a wide range
of industries. IT-related industries enjoyed rapid
growth with this prosperity continuing to around1999 and 2000. The Asian currency crisis that erupted
from Thailand in the summer of 1997 roiled the foreign exchange markets of not only Asian countries,
but those in Russia and Latin America and placed
more downward pressure on Japan’s struggling economy. However, Western economies managed to brushaside the Asian currency crisis and maintain good
growth. Then eleven E.U. members in January 1999
adopted the euro as their single, shared currency. This

new “eurozone” had a population of about 300 million
people and a GDP (gross domestic product) of $ 6.5
trillion (as of 1999), creating an economic powerhouseon par with the United States.
The influence of the America’s IT revolution started
to emerge in Japan in the late 1990’s. Japan’s economy
continued to struggle, but the sudden developmentof the Internet and related technologies changed society and individual lifestyles. New industries and business styles started to emerge in line with these newlifestyles.
Environmental problems such as global warming
and dioxin contamination became more serious on a
global scale. There were growing concerns that pronounced climate changes such as heat waves and flooding could negatively impact ecosystems and humansociety.

2. Marine Products and Food Industry Trends
Marine Products Industry — Growing Global
Demand for Main Products
Japan’s domestic output of marine products (total foredible and inedible marine products) has been in aclear downward trend in recent years due to declining
marine resources and tougher international restrictions on fishing. This output declined to 6,384,000
tons in 2000, approximately 86% of the level in 1996
(7,417,000 tons). Domestic consumption is roughly
twice as large as domestic output, so imports areneeded to cover this shortfall. The volume of marine
product imports grew sharply with Japan lowering
import duties by roughly 33% over five years startingfrom fiscal 1995 in accordance with agreements madeat the 1994 Uruguay Round of GATT (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations. The
Japanese marine products industry was confronted
with the difficult conditions of weaker consumption
and lower prices for imported fish due to the strongyen.
Global output of marine products (including fish

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

farming) has increased steadily each year, growing
from 128,560,000 tons in 1996 to 141,800,000 tons
in 2000, an increase of 10.3%. This increase has comemainly from fish farming. As such, the percentage offish farming to overall output has increased from
26.4% in 1996 to 32.2% in 2000. Meanwhile, theoutput of natural marine products has been flat or has
declined slightly. Interest in healthier foods has grown,
particularly in the U.S. and Europe. Meanwhile, populations are increasing in developing countries and theireating habits are changing along with their emerging
economic growth. These trends have driven growthin global demand for marine products, and thisdemand is being supported by the fish farming
industry.
Protections of natural marine resources, including
restrictions on their usage, have become stronger globally. The main trend among most countries had been
to use Olympic method fishing (harvesting throughfree competition) management under the Total
Allowable Catch (TAC) system that sets specific limits
for each fishing site and species. With Olympic327

method management, fishing companies freely competed against each other until their overall hauls
reached the TAC, at which time fishing in that area
was suspended. However, the United States enacted
the American Fisheries Act (AFA) in 1998 and introduced the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ)
system the following year. Under this system, catchingand processing quotas were assigned to fishing companies and processors based on their past results.
Furthermore, fishing vessels were obligated to joinfishing federations (co-ops) at each processing plantand supply 90% of their quota to that plant. The ITQ
system unified fishing, processing and marketing,while helping to optimize resource management andmaximize resource value.
Meanwhile, the Japanese government in July of
1996 ratified the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea. In accordance with this ratification,
the government then enacted the Act on the
Preservation and Control of Living Marine Resources
and in January of the following year introduced
resource controls based on the TAC system whereby
annual catch limits were set for each species based on
past fishing capacity and fishing effort.

Food Industry—Food Safety, Reliability,
Convenience and Low Price Trends
Japan’s sluggish personal consumption impacted
spending on food with steady on-year declines ofbetween 1% and 2% each year following the peak in
1992. The trend towards cheaper prices strengthenedin the food industry, evidenced by the emergence of
100 yen sushi in 1999 and 65 yen hamburgers in 2000.
Amid deflationary trends for consumer goods in general, consumers supported this trend for lower foodprices.
A series of events rocked confidence in food reliability. Specifically, there were cases of food contamination with E. coli O157 in 1996, as well as a foodpoisoning scandal in involving a major dairy company
in 2000. These events heightened interest in foodRealizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

safety and reliability. The food industry took a big hit
with declining sales for food overall, particularly fresh
foods. Until that time, food safety and reliability were
not big concerns, but suddenly they became important
issues that corporations would need to spend a lot ofmoney to address. The introduction of food management standards such as the ISO 9000 series and
HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Point) encouraged food producers to correct theirapproaches and review their operations.
The government also began preparing new laws in
response to the public demands for greater food safety
and reliability. A revised JAS Law was enacted in April
2000 and standards for displaying quality informationon all food items were adopted. From July of that year,
marine products that were “frozen” or came from “fishfarms” had to be labeled as such, in addition to theconventional “fish name” and “place of origin” labeling. From April of 2001 processed foods were required
to indicate their “raw materials”, “expiration dates”
and “use-by dates”, while the “place of origin” also had
to be displayed for imported processed foods.
The food industry was called upon to improve
quality and make more precise quality guarantees at
a time when raw materials costs were surging andproduct prices were declining. These points, alongwith tougher regulations and environmental considerations, produced very difficult management conditions for the industry.
Consumer demands of food products became moresophisticated as people wanted products that were
flavorful, healthy, convenient and fresh. In the mid1990’s the category of Home Meal Replacement(HMR) attracted considerable attention in the U.S.,
but the Japanese market was already offering takehome prepared foods and bento boxed meals. However,from the early 2000’s the new concept of “ready-made”
meals emerged, providing a breakthrough for the saturated food-related business and allowing for somemarket growth. Consumers were eating out less inorder to save money, but “ready-made” meals provided
additional options for consumers looking for greater328

convenience. This trend was driven in part by a collapse of the conventional eating pattern involving threemeals a day enjoyed by the entire family unit, as more
women joined the workforce, the number of singleperson households (young and old people) increased
and 24-hour/day lifestyles became more common.
In order to respond to these calls for food that isconvenient, delicious and enjoyable, retailers began
diversifying their sales spaces by introducing in-store
bakeries, open kitchens, food courts and salad bars.
Easing of the Large-scale Retail Store Law allowed

large retailers to extend their operating hours.
Competition with convenience stores intensified asthese retailers bolstered their lineups of preparedfoods, bento boxed meals and easy-to-prepare processed foods, while extending operating hours untillate at night. With 24-hour lifestyles becoming morecommon, purchasing trends among male customers
started to change. This overturned the conventional
wisdom that large retailers should target primarily
housewives.

Part 2 Conversion to a Profitable Company Structure— NCR Management
1. Avoiding a Business Slump
Poor Results even after Switch to Expansion
Strategy
Nippon Suisan’s profitability began to worsen fromthe middle of the 1980’s. In response, the sales of somecompany assets began with the settlement of accounts
for fiscal 1986. In November 1988, the company
unveiled its “the Near-Term Vision” that attempted
to map out a future for the company through an
expanded business range. However, this did not
improve profitability for existing businesses and dividend payouts were cancelled for fiscal 1990. The“Action Plan 93” was launched in 1991 and improvements in profitability were seen during the following

fiscal year. However, these improvements could not
be maintained. Emergency restructuring plans thateven involved adjustments to the employment of fishermen were adopted in fiscal 1994 and fiscal 1995,
but solid improvements were not seen and the foregoing of dividend payouts continued.
Conditions for Nippon Suisan were at that time
described by then president Yasuo Kunii in the following manner:“This chronic illness of poor business conditions
characterized by repeated downward revisions of ourearnings has failed to make a turn for the better. It
would probably be accurate to say that this illness has
actually gotten worse. Our hands will remain tied as

Business Results (parent-only FY80 to FY95)(100 million yen)

Ordinary Profit (right axis)

Sales (left axis)(100 million yen)

5,000

150

4,000

120

3,000

90

2,000

60

1,000

30

0

0
Began selling assets
Dividend suspended-1,000-2,0001980 81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

-30
93

94

95

-60

(FY)

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies329

long as operating profit is not being generated. Marine
Products and Foods, our two greatest management
resources, are like two poor performing ‘prodigal sons’that have led a once prosperous house (Nippon Suisan)
to the edge of ruin. Something must be done to breakthis pattern”.
Switch to a Profit-Oriented Management System
In fiscal years 1991 and 1992, ex­ec­utive officers usedmanagement study meetings to uncover the reasons
why past management plans did not function as
intended and to study new strategies for corporate
reconstruction.
Improved results from 1991 for individual departments such as Marine Products, Food Products,
Distribution and Management helped to bolster company structures and develop revitalization activities
even at the work site level. Even though these activities
were not directly tied to improving immediate results,
they supported a gradual change in awareness within
the company. In fiscal 1993, study meetings at thesection head level were established to create a sharedawareness within the company.
These activities helped to uncover management
problems and countermeasures, which led to the creation of management reform concepts andmethods.
The business process was a main factor behind thepoor results. The groping about for new businesses
by each division resulted in the dispersion of management assets in all areas (business, goods, operations),
the disappearance of core businesses and the continuation of high-cost business structures. Various divisions such as Marine Products, Food Products,
Production, Sales and Distribution were developing

expansion policies without working together. This“partial optimization” business management resulted
in business redundancies and increased waste. As sales
increased, more management assets had to be deployed,
which resulted in a vicious cycle where the costs
required for business operations and management
continued increasing while earnings deteriorated.
In order to create a profit-generating management
system, eliminate accumulated losses and resume dividend payments, a switch from this high-cost structure
to a profitable structure became essential.
This switch would involve eliminating waste andconcentrating management resources into those corebusinesses that generate the most profit. The fiscal
1995 executive strategic study meeting thoroughly
examined the prevailing conditions and decided toadopt management reforms based on a “selection &concentration” method.
President Kunii decided that between fiscal 1996
and 2000 the company would fight with its back to
the wall by implementing “NCR Management”. A
decision was also made to adopt a top-down approachinstead of the conventional bottom-up approach inorder to accelerate realization of these reforms. The
implementation of NCR Management was viewed as
a commitment to the “aspirations and promise” of all
employees and Nippon Suisan. In other words, numerical targets that had to be reached and the responsibilities in achieving these targets were clarified. NCRManagement was steadily realized through the achievement of targets. For one month from March 1996,
President Kunii held discussions at company HQ andeach branch so that all employees could appreciate
the very difficult conditions and understand plans toreform the management methods that had been usedby Nippon Suisan for so many years.

2. Reconstruction Scenario — NCR Management
Drastic Review of Business Mechanisms
The “NCR” of “NCR Management” was created by

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

combining the “N” from “Nippon Suisan” with the“C” and “R” from “Category Management” and“Relationship Marketing”, the two key ideas for330

implementing this plan. First, ABC analysis was used
to sort and select products and businesses with highprofitability for the purpose of concentrating management resources in those areas. Efforts were also madeto optimize earnings for those categories seen as
Nippon Suisan strengths. Furthermore, “relationshipmarketing” was adopted as a mechanism that does notview relationships with customers as simple transactions, but strives to realize win-win relationships basedon trust.
The three key issues for realizing NCR Management
were “selection & concentration”, “business standardization” and “information-based management”.
Specifically, “selection & concentration” referred
to reviewing businesses, products and operations fromthe perspectives of efficiency and profitability, concentrating on the better fields that bring out thestrengths of Nippon Suisan and then focusing management resources into those fields. At the same time,business operations that improve approaches to dealing with customers were also promoted.
“Business standardization” was adopted to promote
standardization suitable for the entire company sothat individual business divisions would not conductbusiness with their own unique methods, but could
adopt more general-purpose business processes. The
Sales Department also took steps to simplify tradeconditions.
Aware of the emerging IT revolution at that time,“Information-based management” was used to promote the gradual provision of information terminals
to each employee, with an inclination more toward
mobile information terminals for the Sales Department.
The introductions of ordering by EOS (Electronic
Ordering System), the digitalization of business documents such as order forms and bills, and EDI(Electronic Data Interchange) for transactions withother firms, were all accelerated. At the same timeorders were integrated and construction of a system
supporting this integration began.
Among these three key issues, “selection & concentration” was the core strategy for NCR Management.

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

This issue was the key to rebuilding core businesses
and switching to a profit-generating business structure.
Every business department conducted ABC analysis for each of their projects, products and operations.
This analysis showed that A Products, which accountfor the top 70% of sales, generate profits, while products that accounted for the bottom 10% of sales did
not generate profit. It was then determined that products in the top 70% in terms of customers support
plus those in the following 20% (total of 90%) would
be recognized as AB products, for which management
resources would be concentrated. Those products inthe bottom 10% were classified as CZ products, forwhich reductions were made. “Selection & concentration” based on the results of this ABC analysis wasused to eliminate waste and cut costs for all businessprocesses including production, sales anddistribution.
Sales departments (including branch offices) serveas points of contact with customers, the source of
earnings, and so were recognized as “profit centers”,
or in other words, profit-generating departments.
These departments were given the rights to makeindependent decisions regarding prices and otherconditions. The aim was to concentrate on the profit
core strategies and achieve goals while allowing thesales departments to grasp market and sales trends andquickly respond to the needs of consumers and markets.
In order to ensure the steady implementation of
NCR Management, an “NCR Promotion Council”
and “NCR scores” were introduced as mechanisms
for the managing progress. The NCR Promotion
Council was a monthly management conference thatallowed the company president, officials and section
heads to check the progress of “selection & concentration” efforts based on the NCR scores. Wheneverprogress was delayed, the cause of the delay would be
uncovered and corrective steps would be taken to bringabout a course correction. Implementation was thenreflected in activities for the following month. NCR
scores were management indices for production, sales
and inventories, as well as numerical indicators for331

an electronic registry system and a new personnel
system were started up.
In addition, the “Brand Management Project” waslaunched in fiscal 1996 to further enhance the Nippon
Suisan brand. During the following fiscal year the logo
for the company name and the Nippon Suisan brandmarking placed on products were unified into a single
corporate brand marking. At the same time, different
Nippon Suisan brand marks used for different products and businesses were also integrated into the single
corporate brand marking. Furthermore, four individual brands were established for frozen foods andmarine products in order to clarify brand missions.
Efforts were also made to raise the brand value throughstrict application of the brand and by linking the brandto quality assurance.

those in charge of sales. These scores included suchfactors as planned activities, business discussions andsales results.
“Business standardization” helped to simplify business processes that had become complicated and distinct to each section, while bringing about a switch
to operations based on unified rules. The key component for “information-based management” was theintroduction of new information systems.
In April 1996, the food production plant management system MAPS was launched and in October ofthat year the NCR system was put into place.
Furthermore, in addition to information terminals
for each employee, groupware was introduced andefforts were made to share more information via
e-mails and electronic message boards. Then in 1999

3. Marine Products Business Reforms
Suisan and group companies, as well as those fields
that harnessed Nippon Suisan capacities as a manufacturer (such as overseas joint ventures developed
through Nippon Suisan technologies and investment)
were recognized as core businesses and received particular attention. ABC analysis was also applied tothe production sites and purchasing (stocking) conditions for all products. Efforts were then made to reduce

Product Concentration and Improved
Management Efficiency
Building a profit-oriented management structure able
to withstand changes in marine resource prices becamea pressing issue for the Marine Products Business.
All products were arranged into four classifications.
Those products generated from assets held by Nippon

Marine Products Business Group Product and Purchased Product Trends (FY96 to FY00)(100 million yen)

3,000

Sales of purchased products (left axis)
Sales of Group products (left axis)
Gross margin ratio of purchased products (right axis)
Gross margin ratio of Group products (right axis)

(%)

12

2,500

10

2,000
8
1,500
6
1,000
4

500

0

1996

97

98

99

2000

2

(FY)

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies332

less profitable products and scale back inventories.
Organizational reviews were also made from theperspective of business and product “selection & concentration”. Conventionally, sections in charge ofmarine product management were established atbranch offices across the country to handle procurement and sales. However, in August 1996 all procurement and sales functions except for those handled by
the Sapporo, Osaka and Fukuoka branches were concentrated in the Fisheries Business Department 1 andDepartment 2 established at the head office. The
former was placed in charge of frozen fish purchasing
and sales, while the latter was put in charge of surimi
purchases and sales. In March of 1997, a Food Materials
Management Section was established in the Regional
Headquarters in order to improve sales of marine
products (including food materials) and to prepare a
subscription sales system in which sales plans wereshared with customers.
The construction of a global supply chain was promoted so that the range of activities would not belimited to just Japan, but could spread out across theworld. In particular, roughly 60% of purchases weremade overseas, while sales were still primarily concentrated in the Japanese market. So an effort was madeto move toward selling more in foreign markets. The
Global Marketing Officer and Global Logistics Center
were established to support these global businessactivities.
“X Business” for the Marine Products Business
Until that time the Marine Products Business reliedheavily on bulk frozen fish (low-order processing
frozen fish) easily influenced by changes in marine
resource prices. As such, earnings growth remained
limited. So the “X Business” was established separate
from the bulk frozen fish operations as a new businessfor improving earnings.
First, the Chilled Foods Division was started withthe aim of converting marine products into food materials. A clear line was drawn between the conversion

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

Minh Hai Nissui Girimex Co. (NIGICO)of marine products into food materials and the bulk
frozen fish business. As such, Nippon Suisan could
utilize its functions as a manufacturer to process foods
for kitchen tables with increased added value. For
example, fish were cut into slices for sashimi, cut fish
was flavored and processed as pickled fish, and marine
food materials were sold to the fish and prepared foods
sections of large retailers. In August of 1996, Tokyo
Nissui Foods Co., Ltd. (TNF) and Fukuoka Nissui
Foods Co., Ltd. (FNF) were established to serve as
processing centers.
Nippon Suisan also launched a marine products
distribution business to support sales. Specifically,
proposals were given to the fish markets of large retailers regarding the arrangement of products to better
consider customer needs. These efforts even included
the establishment of sales sites. Stores were opened
on a trial basis in November 1995 and then in Marchof the following year a Marine Products Distribution
Department was established to launch this businessin earnest. The introduction of category management
within the Marine Products Distribution Business
contributed to better profits for sales sites.
Steps were also taken to bolster shrimp procurement
and processing functions in Southeast Asia. In
December 1995, Minh Hai NIGICO was established
as a joint venture with a government-owned enterprisein Vietnam and the production of processed, one-timefrozen “NIGICO Muki Ebi” was started using shrimp
raised by a “natural catch” method that employs theebb and flow of tides in the Mekong Delta.
In August 1996, an agreement was reached withIndonesia’s Jayanthi Group to jointly operate a shrimp
cultivation business and comprehensive processing

333business on the Indonesian island of Seram. Thesebusinesses have been wholly owned by Nippon Suisan

since October 2004.

4. Foods Products Business Reforms
manufacturer and those with good market support
were selected as “Power Items”. Efforts were made toachieve market predominance by concentrating management resources into these products and conducting
frequent renewals in order to improve product competitiveness. As power items were products produced
at directly managed plants, the enhancement of theseproducts helped to secure earnings for the overallbusiness, including production and sales. This policy
helped to greatly improve earnings for the Food
Products Business. This was especially true for the
Frozen Prepared Foods segment, which tended to see
increases in the number of offered products. Here,con­cen­trating on Nippon Suisan core products suchas “Yaki-Onigiri” (roasted rice balls) and “Kani Kurimi
Korokke” (crab cream croquettes) proved successful.
The number of products handled by the Food
Products Business was reduced to just over 2,300 by
the final year of the NCR Management Period (fiscal
year ending March 2000). This was roughly 60% of
the some 3,700 items offered as of the end of March
1997.
Operating efficiency at directly managed plants
increased and efforts were made to combine operations

Concentration on “Power Items”
The Food Products Business was reconfigured tocreate a more profit-oriented business structure.
Specifically, the “selection & concentration” process
was applied to the product line.
As the Sales Division strived to meet the needs ofindividual customers, the trend that developed wasto handle a wide variety of products in small lots.
However, this approach lowered the operating efficiency of production lines, increased costs and pressured earnings. The remedy was to have the Sales
Division conduct thorough item control of small-lot
products and focus on those that have the highest
demand. In conjunction with these steps, separate
production line management for each product was
introduced at directly managed plants and losses werereduced. By increasing production efficiency and altering procurement methods so that raw materials could
be obtained at lower prices, annual cost reduction ofaround one billion yen were achieved during the NCRManagement Period.
As part of the product strategy, products expected
to harness the strengths of Nippon Suisan as a

Production Site Cost Cutting (FY96 to FY00)(100 million yen)

(%)

60

7.0
Cost cutting amount (left axis)
Aggregate amount (left axis)
On-year production cost change (right axis)

50

6.0
5.0

40

4.0
30
3.0
20
2.0
10
0

1.0

1996

97

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

98

99

2000

0

(FY)

334

Product Number Trends (FY97 to FY00)(number of product items)

1,500
Commercial-use frozen foods
Household-use frozen foods
Room-temperature foods
Processed foods

1,200

900

600

300

0

1997

98

99

2000
(FY)

Beijing Jiayi Food Joint Factory

Summer 2000 edition of the in-house magazine “Challenge”

with partner plants. Reforms of management activities
were carried out and new “approaches” were developed
for core businesses with large-lot/important customers
with the aim of realizing increased profits for bothparties.
Furthermore, importance was placed on category
management and customer research in order to bolster
sales capabilities and marketing functions.
Category management was positioned as the coreof marketing strategy within NCR Management.
Products of the relevant sales sites were arranged into
product categories based on customer consumption
trends. Then using analyses and evaluations based onsales/market data, proposals were made for the optimal
sales site plans from the perspectives of consumer

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

appeal and maximizing sales site efficiency. The aim
was to build win-win relationships with the sales sites.
The required tools and expertise were accumulatedwith horizontal development as a practical method
for sales.
Consumer research was used to grasp changes incustomer consumption trends and to study changes
in the underlining senses of value. Understanding
these changes allowed for much more accurate productproposals and new product development.
X Business within the Food Products Business
Poultry was developed as a new segment within the
Food Products Business.

335

In May 1998, Nippon Suisan started operations at
the Beijing Jiayi Food Joint Factory in China throughcooperation with Pengda Co., Ltd. and launched production of the one-time frozen “Tori Kara-age” (friedchicken) frozen food product. This provided Nippon
Suisan with the opportunity to break into this main
segment of the household-use frozen foods market.
This product used the New Zealand one-time frozen
white fish filets that were launched in 1995 as a commercial-use frozen food product. This product wasfrozen only once to fully realize the freshness and good
taste of the materials used. The superior taste of thecooked items was a key point for product differentiation. Chicken meat from partner company Beijing

Huadu Broiler Co. was used and products were produced
based on unique Nippon Suisan technologies at afrozen food production site directly connected to thechicken processing plants. This allowed for the realization of lines integrating every step from the introduction of raw materials to completion of the final products.
Efforts were made within the Frozen Foods Businessto establish production sites mainly in China. In 2000,
production sites jointly operated with Beijing Jiayi
Food Joint Factory were set up in Anhui and Zhejiang
provinces. These farm produce frozen food plants
helped to bulk up the Nippon Suisan product linewith such products as frozen fried foods, vegetables
and pre-cooked meals.

5. Distribution Business Reforms
From fiscal 1996 Nippon Suisan began separating sales
and logistics. Distribution operations for individual
businesses were all transferred and concentrated at
the Central Distribution Business Section. Further­more, product supply/demand was adjusted based on
the sales plan and a shipping and production plansystem to be reflected in the factory production plans
was started. This helped to greatly reduce inventories,
lower storage and other distribution costs, and improve
efficiency.
Distribution operations for marine products werethen concentrated at the Global Logistics Centerestablished in 1997.
Functions for frozen storage sites and otherTokyo General Logistics Center

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

distribution points across the country were enhanceby establishing new facilities and refurbishing obsolete
facilities. Along with the creation of distribution functions as infrastructure within the company, efforts
were also made to begin handling consigned freightfrom other companies.
In 1996, automated storage was completed at the
Sendai Hinomaru Reizo’s Minato Coldstore in Miyagi
Prefecture. Then in October 1997, construction wascompleted for the Seibu Reizo Shokuhin’s Amagi
Logistics Center in Fukuoka Prefecture, which
replaced the Fukuoka Coldstore as a key shipping basefor the Kyushu area. With the introduction of automated storage and sorting equipment, Nippon Suisan
realized integrated control of freight within theextremely low temperature to room temperature range,
allowing for a multi-functional distribution centerwith a system for processing, storing and shipping
products 24 hours a day. The Fukuoka Coldstore wasclosed in December 1997. In January of 1998, automated storage was also introduced at the Kinki Reizo
Shokuhin Co., Ltd. Itami Center in Hyogo Prefecture,creating a distribution center with distribution processing functions.
In September 1999, the Tokyo General Logistics

336

Center (TSC) was completed in Ota City Tokyo.
This multi-functional distribution base for the Kanto
Area became the biggest such facility within the
Nippon Suisan Group with storage capacity of 35,500
tons. This center was equipped with automated storage and storage facilities covering four temperaturezones from room temperature to extreme cold. The
center was also equipped with distribution processing
functions and was even able to handle some distribution center operations on behalf of large retailers.
Along with starting TSC operations, the Harumi
Coldstore was shut down in January of 2000, brining

to a close its history of roughly 40 years.
Along with this consolidation and maintenance ofdistribution centers, efforts were also made to integrate
food product ordering centers. In 2000, all orders foreastern and western Japan were consolidated into two
locations; Hachioji and Himeji.
Along with this maintenance and consolidation of
the distribution business and order centers, distribution efficiency was further improved through direct
shipping from the production site, product lot integration and even operating joint shipment of frozen foodproducts with competing companies.

6. Transition to Group Management
Transition to Group Management
Nippon Suisan took steps to reform the managementof overseas group companies during the NCRManagement Period.
In 1999, the general manager of North America,
who also served as president of Nippon Suisan (U.S.A.)
Inc., and the general manager of South America, who
also served as president of N.A.L. (Nippon Suisan
America Latina S.A.), became the exective director ofNorth American operations and exective director ofSouth American operations, respectively. This helped
to bring together the operations of individual companies within the group with production functionsin North and South America for better execution ofbusiness operations in these two regions.
UniSea, Inc. in North America is a good exampleof these reform efforts. This company encountered
management difficulties between 1996 and 1998 as
the depletion of snow crab resources resulted in smaller
hauls and shorter operating periods.
In 1998, the U.S. government enacted the American
Fisheries Act (AFA). This act reduced the number oflarge, foreign-owned fishing vessels and factory ships,
while assigning individual fishing quotas to local fishery cooperatives. Furthermore, processing quotas
allowing for the monopolistic purchase of a certain

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

amount of fishing hauls were also introduced. This
resulted in a mechanism under which hauls within
the assigned fishing quotas could basically only besold to a business possessing the requisite processing
quotas. Introduction of the Individual Transferable
Quota (ITQ) system for Alaska pollack in 1999
allowed marine products companies in the U.S. torealize more planned production.
From around 1999 attention was focused on
America/Bering Sea resources with supplies declining
as Alaska pollack hauls started to shrink under Russia’s
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) system. The end use
for Alaska pollack caught in the Bering Sea was shifting from the conventional surimi for the Japanesemarket to filets for the growing European and North
American markets.
Based on these changing market conditions, UniSea
had to make a drastic review of operations and began
implementing reforms based on business “selection &concentration”. UniSea had focused on only making
surimi from Alaska pollack, but from 1998 it started
to earnestly produce fillets as well. The Saint Paulplant was closed in June of 2000 due to the decline in
Alaska pollack resources and pollack operations werescaled back. As a result, the company was able to posta profit for fiscal 1999 after recording losses since fiscal
1996.

337

In South America, Chilean group company
EMDEPES also encountered difficult management
conditions as a new fishing law enacted in 1992 tightened restrictions on fishing hauls. So EMDEPES
adopted a new business by making a switched fromblue hake (Melanotaenia splendida australis) to hoki
and southern blue whiting in its fishing activities.
Hoki is a white fish in the same family as blue hake socould be supplied as a material for white fish filets,
but until then southern blue whiting was not commonly used in products. Several trials revealed thatsouthern blue whiting could be used as surimi and in
October 1994 the Chilean government granted permission to conduct fishing operations within an areaof 200 nautical miles for surimi operations using southern blue whiting. The same year Nippon Suisan provided EMDEPES with the trawler Tsuda Maru (namechanged to Unionsur after the transfer) and the surimi
business was able to begin in earnest. These efforts
helped EMDEPES to turn around its earnings.
The fishing law enacted by the Chilean government
in 1985 obligated companies to invest the same amountin land operations as for their open sea (fishing vessel)
operations. So to comply with this law, salmon/trout
aquaculture operations were started. Until that timethe marine product exports from Chile were

dominated by fish meal in terms of both amount andvalue. However, 1998 marked the turning point fromwhich high value-added salmon and trout from fish
farms became the leading marine product export withthe value of these exports suddenly surging.
Salmones Antártica (S.A.) was one of the leading
Chilean firms involved in the farming of salmon.
Since becoming a Nippon Suisan Group company
in 1998, S.A. has farmed and processed coho salmon
and has produced seedlings and feed for Nippon
Suisan at bases in Dalcahue in the Chiloé district, Los
Lagos Region, and Chacabuco in the Aisén Region.
The 1990s marked the dawning of the Chilean salmon
industry. Initially exports were mostly coho salmon
and trout bound for Japan, but the increase in global
demand for salmon provided S.A. with good results
and allowed for an expansion of business operations.
In order to help Argentina’s PESPASA bolster its
fishing operations, Nippon Suisan provided the former
trawler Echizen Maru in 1994 and the ship Azuchi
Maru in 1995. However, business results remainedsluggish due to the unstable conditions of the Argentine
economy. Even though debt/equity swaps were conducted in 1993 and again in 1999, the company was
unable to avoid posting huge losses in fiscal 1999 and2000. With enactment of the Federal Fishery Law

FishKing Processor, LLC

Echizen Maru (Completed 1984)

Nippon Cookery’s Atsugi Plant

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

338

(Law No. 24922) it was assumed that ITQ systems
would be introduced under TAC systems for eachtype of fish, but some time was required to establish
the ITQ system for hoki and southern blue whiting.
Thus it took some time before an improvement inmanagement conditions could be seen.
Meanwhile, the Nippon Suisan Group added companies with new functions previously not seen among
overseas affiliates. Through Nissui U.S.A., which had
integrated all North American operations, Nippon
Suisan in August 1996 purchased roughly 90% of theoutstanding shares in major U.S. commercial frozen
seafood producer Fishking Processor, LLC for about
3.1 billion yen. Fishking was a Japanese maker of frozen
seafood products founded in 1955 by Masashi
Kawaguchi. The company expanded its business range
and grew into a prominent west coast food producer
in the field of high quality commercial-use frozen
foods. FishKing had three plants in Los Angeles andone in Alabama and owned the famous “Mrs. Friday’s”
brand. FishKing was a very significant acquisition,
providing Nippon Suisan with its first frozen foodproduction sites and sales divisions in the U.S.

Consolidation and Reorganization ofDomestic Group Companies
Reforming the management of domestic group companies was indispensable for establishing sound earnings
for Nippon Suisan. Chilled foods and distributionrelated companies were consolidated to enhance business
operations, while marine products-related companies
were mainly reorganized with the aim of streamlining
management.
The Chilled Foods Business produced bento boxed
meals for convenience stores. However, convenience
stores were streamlining operations in order to survive,
and the Chilled Foods Business accordingly had toreorganize in order to bolster operations and improve
efficiency. Nippon Cookery Co., Ltd. was then establishedin January 1998. Then in March of that year, Eniwa
Fresh Foods, Sante Foods, Himeji Fresh Foods, Kansai

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

Cookery, Hello Delica and Chilldy Narashino Plant
were all integrated into this new company.
The Marine Products Business dissolved NikkoFisheries in fiscal 1997, Hokko Gyogyo and MarusuiCo., Ltd. in fiscal 1999, followed by Tosco Corporation,
Esukei Suisan, Nippon Suisan (Halifax)., Ltd., Saeki
K.K. (Chiba) and others in fiscal 2000. The Marine
Products Business liquidated a total of 17 companies
by fiscal 2000. Likewise, between fiscal 1999 and 2000
the Chilled Marine Products Business liquidated
Tokyo Nissui Foods Co., Ltd., Kansai Nissui Foods
Co., Ltd. and Fukuoka Nissui Foods Co., Ltd. These
steps were taken because the desired number of customers in the chilled foods delivery area could not be
secured and the resulting disparity with the production capacity could not be filled. Then in 2000, Saeki
Co., Ltd. was established as a directly managed plantwith plans to newly develop pickled fish as a coreproduct.
Furthermore, between fiscal 1996 and 2000 a totalof 39 companies including Wakamatsu Zosen K.K.,
NNS, Sendai Ham K.K. and Nippo Sangyo wereconsolidated/reorganized.
Dissolution of Nissui Shipping
Nissui Shipping, a component of Nippon Suisan’sMarine Transport Division, operated many time charters belonging to ship owners outside of the company,
mainly for shipping fruits. The ship owners wanted
fixed charter fees and guarantees that their ships would
be used for a minimum of five years. However, shipping contracts tended to be for only one year at thelongest. As such, earnings soured when conditions forthe freight shipping market turned sluggish in the
1990’s. For the more than ten long-term charters(mainly new boat charter contracts), the gap between
charter fees and earnings from freight shipping widened, resulting in big losses.
To address this problem, a project team was formed
in 2000 to consider the future of Nissui Shipping.
This team compiled the following proposals:

339

1) For long-term charters with average remaining
contract period of three years, guarantee the contract
period and maintain customer service. At the sametime, establish two joint-management companies,
one for fruits and one for marine products, in orderto maintain employment for workers. Transfer
operations to these companies.
2) After three years (March 2005) when most of thelong-term charter contracts have expired, transfer
management rights to these two companies andthe completely withdrawal Nippon Suisan fromthe marine transport business.
3) Hold negotiations with ship owners regarding lower
charter fees as a condition for guaranteeing use of
their charters.
These policies were approved at the March 2001
Board of Directors meeting and Nippon Suisan finallycould abandon the marine transport business.
In 2001, Nissui Shipping renegotiated charter feeswith boat owners, which resulted in a decline of about
14% for these rates. At the same time, capital was also
reduced. The joint venture Fresh Carriers Co., Ltd.
was established with a foreign corporation engaged
mainly in the import and sales of bananas from thePhilippines and Nissui Shipping’s fruit-related operations were transferred to this new company. Similarly,
the joint venture Tokyo Reefer Chartering K.K. wasestablished with Seatrade Group N.V. of theNetherlands. Frozen freight operations, includingintermediary operations, were then transferred to thisnew company. These measures were significant in thatthey allowed for utilization of expertise held by Nissui
Shipping workers.
These steps all went according to plan. Management
rights were entrusted to the new companies in 2005,
there were no employment or other problems, andRealizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

Nippon Suisan was able to make a complete breakfrom the marine transport business.
Looking back at this period, incorporating themarine transport business into the Nippon Suisan
business was one consideration. Even after the founding of Nissui Senpaku in 1976, most sea freight washandled through bare boating vessels belonging to
Nippon Suisan. This was a business structure without
clear management responsibility as overall results(earnings/expenditures) were a combination of
Nippon Suisan’s charter results and Nissui Senpaku’s
results from running shipping routes. The Special
Vessel Section handling tankers, ore-carrying vessels
and other special ships for Nippon Suisan’s marinetransport business basically entered into long-term
contracts with major freight owners. However, thesecontracts could not be concluded due to changes inthe economic environment and tough international
competition made a withdrawal from this businessinevitable. On the other hand, Nissui Kaiun K.K.’s
refrigerated and frozen shipping business mainly
picked up on the ocean fish caught using its own fishing operations, including mother ship-type fisheryand trawling. The company advanced into the Reefer
Department in place of the Special Vessel Section.
However, costs were high due to the strong yen andsurvival was not possible in the existing domestic/
foreign specialized industries that were deftly adapting
to changes through mergers & acquisitions and the
trading of ships. Nippon Senpaku’s objective was tomaintain this business scale and secure employment
for ship workers, however mother ship-type fishery
started to contract due to the changing fishing environment. This is believed to be one reason why adaption to the market changes was not achieved.

340

7. Overview of NCR Management
yen, ordinary income was roughly 2.5 billion yen aftera loss of 2.1 billion yen during the previous year, andnet income was 3.036 billion yen. Accumulated losses
were removed in fiscal 1997, just the second year of
the implementation period, bringing to an end theworsening trend for business results. In fiscal 1998,
Nippon Suisan was able to pay an annual dividend of
3 yen/share, the first such payout in nine fiscal periods.
This dividend was raised by 1 yen in fiscal 1999 andagain in fiscal 2000 as earnings continued to improve.
In June of 1996 Yasuo Kunii was appointed
Chairman of the Board and Naoya Kakizoe took theposition of company president.

Switch to Profit-Oriented System
Nippon Suisan’s management and business practices
were drastically reviewed during the five-year period
for implementing NCR Management between fiscal
1996 and 2000. Constructing a completely new framework focused on establishing a profit-oriented system
was revolutionary. These were five very difficult years
for both management and employees. Reducing thenumber of products also caused inconvenience forcustomers and gaining their understanding was notalways an easy task.
However, the results of these efforts quickly materialized. For fiscal 1996 net sales came to 371.9 billion

Business Results (parent-only FY96 to FY00)(100 million yen)(100 million yen)

80

4,000
Ordinary profit (right axis)
Sales (left axis)

3,500

70

3,000
60

2,500

50

2,000
1,500

40

1,000
30

500
0

1996

97

98

99

2000

20

(FY)

Inventory Trends (FY96 to FY00)(100 million yen)

400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

1996

97

98

99

2000
(FY)

The adoption of NCR Management also contributed to lower inventory levels.

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

341

Results, Key Factors and Remaining Issues
The following results from NCR Management wereclearly evident in all business divisions:•It realized focus on strategic products and increased
sales of products produced at directly managed
plants,•Cut costs for the Production Division,•Reduced inventories for the Marine Products andFood Products divisions,•Reduced distribution expense, and•Streamlined personnel.
The following were recognized as factors behindthe success of NCR Management:•It launched efforts to learn about and understand“strategy”.
•Top management made decisions with unflinching
resolve.
•It created frameworks/mechanisms for execution
and made honest efforts towards implementation.
•Aspects that were “difficult” or “troublesome” wereadopted into the policy and given structure. At thesame time progress was thoroughly monitored using“NCR scores”.

By adopting NCR Management, Nippon Suisan
was able to establish a profit base by applying “selection & concentration” to business, products and operations. However, sales continued to decline and growth
was not realized. The specific remaining issues
were:•It succeeded in reducing the number of productitems, but this concentration did not extend to areas,
categories and core businesses.
•Delays existed in standardizing the Marine Products
Business.
•It did not succeed in sharing/increasing speed of
information within the group.
Improvements to address these points will be incorporated into the next business plan.
There are issues that still need to be addressed.
However, NCR Management, which was adopted
with the awareness that the company’s resolve would
be unflinching, succeeded in realizing the primary
goal of constructing a profit-oriented structure.
Specifically, accumulated losses were cleared from thebooks and dividend payments were resumed. As such,
this was the first business plan to really function as
hoped since the introduction of the 200 nautical mile
territorial water system was put in place.

Chapter 2: Aiming for True Globalization TGL Plan
and New TGL Plan
2001–2010
Part 1 Environment Surrounding Nippon Suisan
1. Chaotic International Situation
A Domestic Economy in Decline
The start of the 21st Century was soon followed by
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

States. These attacks shocked the entire world, rocked
global political and social conditions and led to wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The result was that Japan’s economy, which was342

gradually recovering from a prolonged slump, once
again turned lower. Japanese corporate earnings worsened and employment contracted. The decline in the
consumer price index spurred on asset deflation in theform of falling prices for land and equities. In 2002,
the government hammered out a comprehensive antideflation package focusing on disposing of bad debts
and reviving industry. The economy gradually recovered from the start of that year, but the recovery was
mainly supported by expanded corporate investment
in new equipment. Administrative reforms also began
in earnest in 2001 with the reorganization of central
government agencies. The four main public highway
corporations were privatized in 2005 and the postal
system was privatized the following year. The mergerof municipalities, sometimes referred to as the “great
Heisei mergers”, progressed from 1999 to 2011. During
this time the number of municipalities decreased toabout 47% compared to 1999.
Revisions to the Worker Dispatching Act in 2004
lifted the ban on the use of temporary workers by
manufacturers, completely changing Japan’s employment structure. There was an increase in the numberof temporary workers and other non-regular employees, but the unemployment rate still rose to over 5%.
From the second half of 2004 to the first half of 2005,
global demand for IT-related goods softened, export
growth slowed and the economy temporarily
paused.
Between 2005 and 2006, private consumption grewat a relatively strong pace and stock prices turned up.
In March of 2006 the Bank of Japan ended its quantitative easing policy and in July concluded its zerointerest rate policy.
From around 2007, international prices for crudeoil, grains and other raw materials surged, spurring on
cost inflation. Corporate earnings improved and theJapanese economy finally began to break from its
slump. However, the severe aftershocks from theSeptember 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers caused
a sudden drop in share prices in Japan and around theworld, as well as a rapid appreciation of the yen. This

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

marked the start of profound changes for social andindustrial structures. The trend among manufacturers
to shift production overseas accelerated. 2007 also
marked the start of Japan’s declining population phase.
This produced apprehension about declining demand
for food products, decelerated economic growth andother losses of national vitality.
In 2010, the Japanese economy began to see some
improvements in exports and production, but the
global economy continued to struggle. There were no
real improvements for the Japanese economy as sluggish corporate earnings resulted in worsening employment conditions and reduced personal incomes.
Personal consumption remained weak due to uncertainties about the future.

Western Financial Crisis and Prosperity ofEmerging Nations
The U.S. economy started to slow with the burstingof the IT bubble in the second half of 2000. Then the
global economy turned lower following the September
11, 2011, terrorist attacks in the U.S. However, sizable
tax cuts and extensive financial easing policies helped
to stimulate domestic demand and the U.S. economy
recovered relatively quickly. The European economy
also started to recover gradually from around 2003.
Even the Asian economy, which was a bit of a laggard,
started to grow again, led by China.
In 2001 China was granted membership to theWorld Trade Organization (WTO). Chinese tariffs
on agriculture and other products were lowered andthe opening of the Chinese markets for goods andservices accelerated. In 2004 the E.U. enlarged to 25
members following the accession of ten Eastern
European countries. The new entity became theworld’s largest economic bloc with a population ofroughly 455 million people and a GDP of around 9.7
trillion euros. At the same time, economic activity was
being stimulated by various free trade agreements.
Such multifaceted integration made particular progress in South America and East Asia.

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Asset prices started to collapse in July of 2008 as
the U.S. subprime loan (home loan) problem caused
a bursting of the housing bubble. Then in Septemberof that year the U.S. brokerage firm Lehman Brothers
failed and the impact rattled global financial markets.
The impact on the real economy was so great that itcame to be called the “Lehman Shock”. Markets wereagain rattled in November of the following year when
the Dubai government announced its flagship holding
company was seeking a reprieve on debt repayments.
This “Dubai shock” resulted in a sharp drop in global
stock prices and ushered in the emergence of the Greek
debt crisis from the end of that year into 2010, a crisis
that resulted in the steep depreciation of the euro andincreased uneasiness about the European economy.
While Western economies were tossed about by
these various economic crises, Asian economies werequick to return to recovery paths, mainly due to China
and India where solid domestic demand fueled economic expansion. Fallout from the Lehman Shockwas relatively light for countries that were enjoying
remarkable economic growth such as the BRICs (Brazil,
Russia, India and China). Brazil in particular was
enjoying an economic recovery led by the automobile
industry. By the first half of 2009, economic activity
in this country had returned to pre-Lehman levels.

The Lehman Shock ushered in a global shift in thebalance of economic power. Economic growth foradvanced nations such as the U.S., Japan and E.U.
countries declined in 2009 in the wake of the collapseof Lehman Brothers, but firm growth for the newly
emerging nations was unchanged for the most part.
Similar firm growth could be seen in ASEAN, Middle
Eastern and African countries.
Environmental problems have become increasingly
severe in emerging and African nations with further
progress in modernization and industrialization.
Global efforts to protect the environment gained
momentum and increased demands were placed on
corporations to address the damage that economic
activities can inflict on the environment. In 2005 theKyoto Protocols went into effect, establishing greenhouse gas reduction targets for participating countries.
Japan enacted various laws to better protect the environment. In 2003 the “Revised Act on Promotion of
Global Warming Countermeasures” was enacted andin 2006 the “Energy Conservation Law” was adopted.
Also in 2006, the “amended Containers and Packaging
Recycling Law” was established, effectively promoting
the reduction, reuse and recycling of product containers by consumers and various organizations, including
corporations.

2. Marine Products Business — Food Industry Trends

Marine Products industry — Expanding Global
Demand and Heightened Efforts to Preserve
Resources
Cases of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE),
first identified in Britain in 1986, had spread globallyby 1996. This strongly increased awareness and interestin food safety and reliability. In 2001 Japan confirmed
cases in Chiba Prefecture and Hokkaido, followed byconfirmed cases in Kanagawa and Kumamoto prefectures in 2004.
Demand for marine products was pushed up by
this heightened consumer awareness of food safety,

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

combined with increased health consciousness.
Demand for marine products was also pushed up by
the rising living standards in regions enjoying remarkable economic growth, such as the newly emerging
countries, Russia and former Soviet Union countries
that make up the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS). However, the amount of marine resourcescaught naturally remained flat, so reliance on aquaculture increased each year. In 2008, the global output
of marine resources hit a record high of 158,83 million
tons, 42.8% of which came from aquaculture.
Production through aquaculture has increased eachyear with a growth rate of 38.6% between 2000 and344

2005 and a growth rate of 8.0% between 2005 and2008.
Fishing hauls were impacted by tougher international restrictions and resource management by individual countries. Many countries started adopting ITQ
systems. Total allowable tuna catch quotas became
smaller each year. Restrictions on deep-sea trawling
were also toughened. In December 2006, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution to regulate deep-sea trawling in international waters. Then in
September 2008 the Food and Agriculture Organizationof the U.N. (FAO) adopted guidelines for restricting
deep-sea trawling in international waters.
There have been increased global demands on thefishing industry for greater resource sustainability andproduction traceability. The presence of activities
promoting these changes has also increased.
Turning to consumer trends, there has been
increased global consumer interest in not only foodsafety/reliability, but also in foods that are producedin harmony with the natural environment. Consumers
came to value products with the Marine StewardshipCouncil (MSC) mark, which indicates compliancewith sustainable fishing practices and traceability.
From 2007 Japan took a more active stance in protecting resources and ecosystems by adopting the “Marine
Eco-Label” verification system for its fishing industry.
Even for aquaculture, greater importance was placed onprotecting and harmonizing with the environment.
Japanese eating trends have been moving away fromfish. The annual amount of seafood purchased perhousehold declined from 43.6 kg in 2000 to only 35.9
kg in 2009. However, demand for easy-to-eat processed seafood has remained deep rooted.
Sluggish sales of marine products and declining fish
prices have forced many marine product companies
to reform their operations. In 2003, Nippon Meat
Packers, Inc. took a stake in troubled seafood trader
Hoko Fishing Co., Ltd. which it later re-launched as
Hoko Co., Ltd. In 2005, Nichirei spun off various
divisions such as Processed Foods, Marine Products
and Logistics.

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

Food Products Industry—Tougher Regulations
for Food Safety and Reliability
Japan’s first confirmed case of BSE in 2001 dealt a
serious blow to the food products industry. BSE wasspreading globally and countries were banning certain
beef imports and taking other measures. Then in 2002
a pesticide residue for which production and usage
had been banned internationally was detected in spinach imported into Japan from China. This incident
threw into question the safety of Chinese food products. This was followed by a string of other food safety
related incidents. These cases involved falsification of
product origin, expiration dates, production locations
and other information. The government began enacting legal measures to ensure food safety and reliability.
In July 2003, the Food Safety Basic Act was enacted.
Then in 2006 the Revised Food Sanitation Act was
adopted and the Food Safety Commission was established. Unlike in the past, these legal measures werebeing created more from the viewpoint of protecting
the consumer. In May 2006 a “positive list” system
was introduced for pesticide residue and other threats.
This system prohibited the distribution of foods forwhich prohibited agricultural chemical residue was
detected. The food industry was called upon to provide stricter quality control through management
functions such as quality assurance and crisis
management.
There was a particularly large impact from thedamage to consumer trust caused by the 2008 incident
in which agricultural chemicals were discovered infrozen foods imported from China. In addition toenhancing their compliance and risk management
systems, various food producers introduced “fooddefense” measures to guard against the factitious introduction of foreign substances for every stage frommaterials procurement to sales.
Consumer behavior turned more defensive due tothe economic downturn and more people starting
cooking at home instead of eating out. There was aclear shift toward the “home-cooked meals” and345

“ready-made meals” segments. There was also further
diversification of the food service industry to respondto an increase in the number of working women anda decrease in the standard family structure consistingof two parents and two children.
There was greater interest in foods with healthfunctions amid indications that health trends weretaking root and with increased consumer awarenessabout obesity and the need for healthier lifestyles.
One such example was the interest shown in EPA(eicosapentaenoic acid) and DHA (docosahexenoicacid) contained in fish oil. Many food makers quickly
created businesses in the fine chemicals field in order
to use fish oil and other health items as raw materials
for functional health foods and supplements.
In Japan accelerated industry realignment throughmergers and acquisitions, in order to increaseinternational competitiveness, was not limited to foodmakers, but extended to distributors and others as
well. Foreign-affiliated distribution companies weremaking an active push into Japan up until around2000, but some of those companies started to pullback after failing to break down Japan’s entrenchedbusiness culture. Some mass merchandisers and convenience stores confronted excessive competition due
to their aggressive expansion strategies and began
pursing originality in order to survive this competition.
In recent years poor weather, major earthquakes
and other natural disasters have altered crop harvests
and international prices for crude oil, corn, wheat andother commodities have soared. Problems surrounding
food such as increasing populations, particularly inthe emerging countries, have become more serious.

Part 2 Creating “Global Links” —The “TGL Plan”
for Fiscal 2001 to 2005
1. Nippon Suisan Starting Point — “Founding Philosophies”“Founding Philosophies” as the Key to Victory
The year 2001 was not only the opening page of the
21st century, but also marked Nippon Suisan’s 90th
year in business. This year also marked the start of a
new medium-term management plan setting a new
Nippon Suisan Group vision for the 21st century.
Many serious global problems awaited the 21st
century including population growth, energy, foodsupply and the global environment. However, at thesame time tremendous progress was expected for technological revolutions, particularly in the fields ofinformation communications and biotechnology.
Furthermore, economic and industrial globalization
rapidly progressed in many fields and corporate reorganization accelerated. Large multinational corporations became larger through mergers and acquisitions
and their conquest of world markets was spurred on

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophiesby absorbing those companies that failed to keep pacewith this globalization.
The NCR Management adopted between 1996
and 2000 helped Nippon Suisan establish a profitoriented structure, but this did not translate into further growth. So the aim of the next medium-term
management plan was to create a new business modelfor the 21st century that would allow the Nippon
Suisan Group to survive global competition andachieve continued growth. Two years (fiscal 1999 andfiscal 2000) were spent developing this plan andinvolved an analysis of current conditions and very
precise studies from various perspectives.
At this time the “founding philosophies” that had
been maintained since the establishment of Nippon
Suisan were reexamined. These philosophies are as
follows:“A tap water supply system is exactly what marine

346

products should be like in their production and distribution. We seek marine resources from everywherein the world, ensure that product are always as freshas possible, set up their worldwide marketing network,
just like the tap water pipeline, and distribute them,adjusting their marketing prices in response to
demand... Excess costs related to the distribution ofmarine products also need to be eliminated to realize
the distribution costs lowest possible. Earnings
through speculation should not be sought in thecourse of this supply” (Anthology of Writings andSpeeches of Mr. Kosuke Kunishi).
In developing this plan, the actual conditions for
global marine products and the food industry were
carefully examined. Nippon Suisan’s competition was
no longer just domestic rivals in the same industry,
but global food-related corporations.
The “founding philosophies” provided some hints
for how to best confront the major global revolutionthat was unfolding. The aim was to create a new business model that remained true to the “founding philosophies”, particularly in regards to the shift in focus
from “catching fish” to “creating value from marine
resources”.
Dramatically Changing Seafood Market
In establishing this medium-term management plan,
Nippon Suisan carefully analyzed profitability for a
global corporation in the seafood and food products
industry, as well as the environment surrounding theseafood industry including the domestic and overseas
markets and consumer trends.
The markets for the main seafood products suchas salmon, shrimp and white fish were much bigger
in North America and Europe than in Japan. For
example, specific market scales in 1998 were 2,750,000
tons for Europe, 1,630,000 tons for North America,
840,000 tons for Japan, and 620,000 tons for Asia
excluding Japan. Demand for seafood products was
also growing suddenly in the newly emerging
countries.

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

At the same time the amount of fish caught naturally had peaked and the increase in demand was being
met by aquaculture. Fish farming production accelerated from 1992. In 1998 this production increased
9% on-year to 39,430,000 tons, accounting for 31%
of global seafood output. Many companies started
using repeated M&A to compete on the global stage.
For example, Dutch animal feed company Nutreco
Holding N.V. added a fish feed business and evenentered the fish farming field (this business was latersold off ). The new trends in the global seafood industry were the promotion of aquaculture and participation by companies from other industries.
Furthermore, many countries rich in sea resourcesbegan introducing the ITQ system. Under the former“Olympic method” the large vessels required in order
to win the competition consumed lots of fuel, andfishing activities became a war of attrition that disregarded cost performance. As such, marine productcompanies were unable to turn a profit and maintaining sea resources became problematic. Under the ITQ
system, catch quotas were assigned to each company,so they could then catch fish at their own optimum
pace. This system was expected to allow for the sustainable, economical and profitable utilization of sea
resources, while streamlining investment.
Meanwhile, the global retail industry and foodmakers were pursuing expanded scale through realignment. In 1999, the world’s largest retailer Wal-MartStores, Inc. purchased England’s biggest retailer Asda
Stores Ltd. In 2000, Holland’s top retailer Royal Ahold
N.V. purchased the American food wholesaling giant
U.S. Foodservice Inc., Unilever N.V. acquired Best
Foods Inc. and PepsiCo, Inc. acquired Quaker OatsCompany. Such purchases spread as big companies
sought to occupy global markets and enhance supply
chains. This trend even extended to pharmaceuticalcompanies. For example, in 2000 drug giant Pfizer
Inc. took over Warner-Lambert Co.
Furthermore, the IT revolution started to dramatically change how business was conducted in the global
marine products and food industries. Electronic347

trading between companies over the Internet became
more common, particularly in North America andEurope, with the introduction of the producer unionsite “Seafood Alliance”, the world’s largest retailer joint
procurement site “World Wide Retail Exchange” andother platforms. An environment, including logistic
systems, was in place allowing major global companies
to quickly procure products and materials and conduct
other business 24 hours a day. Business had reached
an age where time and location no longer mattered.
Consumer lifestyles and eating habits were alsochanging. In most advanced nations, including Japan,
more women were joining the workforce and societal
structures were changing due to declining birthrates
and larger elderly populations. As a result, lifestyles
and values changed, such as greater importance being
placed on convenience. Food needs also changed.
On reflection, Nippon Suisan’s global position was
small, with its share of the global frozen foods market
coming to less than 0.5%. Nippon Suisan held the top
shares in Japan for salmon, crab and surimi, but held
only a very small percentage of the global markets forthese items. This was the same for shrimp and whitefish. Under these conditions it was very difficult for
Nippon Suisan to compete with the top global corporations so an expansion policy became essential.
Aiming to Become a Global Player
Looking at the business environment at the start ofthe 21st century, many countries were adopting
tougher regulations to protect their marine resources,

The Starting Point of Nissui — Excerpts from Anthology of Writingsand Speeches of Mr. Kosuke Kunishi (March 2003)

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

new major customers were emerging for the foodindustry due to realignment of the retail industry, andfood makers were expected to adapt to these changes.
Business was becoming borderless due to advances in
information technologies, biotechnology and otherfields, while at the same time consumer lifestyles anddemands for food continued to evolve.
This environment required a global leader who
could bring together the marine resources and marketsof the world. Such a leader needed to be a global player
who could conquer world markets and stand toe-totoe with global retail, restaurant and food production
giants. On this point, Nippon Suisan had the potential
to be a global player who could take on this role ofglobal leader. This is because Nippon Suisan was constructing a framework for global access to marine
resources, and had established the technologies andorganizations needed for converting these resources
into products valued by consumers.
In order to compete against global players that havegone beyond business categories, industries and borders, 21st century growth companies need to establish
business models that cannot be easily copied by rivals,
and must compete through those sectors where mostmanagement resources have been accumulated, as well
as sectors that will be challenging for rivals. In the caseof Nippon Suisan, this referred to the ability to accessmarine resources and convert these resources into
products valued by consumers. The advantage heldby Nippon Suisan was its ability to, based on thesestrengths, form a supply chain between marine
resources and delivery (sales) to consumers, and construct unique business models that could meet thedemands of the times.
The goal of the medium-term management planfrom 2001 was to become a global leader by enhancing
these strengths. The following two points were set forthis policy.
•Possess the ability to convert (manufacture) marine
products into goods valued by consumers and provide
these goods globally.
•Provide global leadership for the seafood industry

348

that puts Nippon Suisan on par with global foodcompanies.
True globalization refers to creating value that will
win the support of people in Japan and around theworld. The Nippon Suisan Group viewed globalization as a means for uncovering opportunities for
growth and returns (profits). In order to win the support of global customers, Nippon Suisan aimed to 1)
hold specific shares of global markets, 2) hold brands
that will be popular in global markets, and 3) be able
to make use of the influence of global quality
standards.
The message contained in the “founding philosophies” suggested that reworking the marine products
supply chain used since the founding of the company
to better suit the 21st century should be a goal in theimmediate medium-term management plan. In March

2000, excerpts from the posthumous writings of
Kosuke Kunishi, a key person in the founding of
Nippon Suisan, were published as The Starting Pointof Nissui—Excerpts from Anthology of Writings andSpeeches of Mr. Kosuke Kunishi. Copies were presented
to each employee to foster a shared understanding of
the company’s origin.
Then in 2001 Japan enacted the Fisheries Basic Act.
In order to switch away from the conventional policies
that focused mainly on coastal fishing, this Act incorporated overall development and comprehensive promotion of fishing regions, including the stable supplyof quality marine products, management of marine
resources/promotion of aquaculture, protecting andimproving living environments, processing, distribution and importing.

2. “Global Links” for Entering the Global Marine Products Market
The “TGL Plan” as a Strategy for the 21st Century
The idea of “converting marine resources into products
valued by consumers” was positioned in the mediumterm management plan (2001 to 2005) as the sourceof strength that would make the Nippon Suisan Group
victorious in the 21st century. As such, the main goals
were to become a link between marine resources andglobal markets, and to build a global supply chain ofmarine products to serve as this link. This plan wasnamed the “TGL Plan” to represent the two goals of“To be a Global Leader” and “Toward Global Links”.
“Converting marine resources into products valuedby consumers” specifically refers to maximizing thevalue of marine resources, creating a diverse lineup of
products including seafood materials (frozen andother processed foods and fine chemicals), while clarifying potential customer and market needs. This is
the exact area where Nippon Suisan has been building
up strengths since its founding, or more specifically,
the high demands of a manufacturer based on skills
obtained through the production of goods.

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

The term “global supply chain” refers to integrated
management reaching across borders for each stepfrom accessing marine resources to processing andsales. A good model can be found during the global
depression of 1929. At that time Kosuke Kunishi concentrated all business operations at Tobata in KitaKyushu, creating a supply chain for fishing (access tomarine resources), ice making, refrigeration, freezing,processing, distribution and sales. This model of linking business operations supported growth of Nippon
Suisan before World War II. However, as the scale ofbusiness grew during post-war reconstruction andJapan’s period of high economic growth, each businesseventually reverted to partial optimization and theidea of a global supply chain was lost. Establishmentof the TGL Plan helped to bring this idea back tolife.
Global Links are essential for constructing a global
supply chain. Here “Global Links” refers to the network of Nippon Suisan Group companies (domestic
and overseas group companies and equity-method
affiliates) and partner companies responsible for each349

function in the supply chain, as well as the businessgrowth realized through cooperation among thesecompanies.
As the market economy grew on a global scale,building supply chains with the optimal positioningof various business functions in terms of global perspectives became an important strategy for survivalin the 21st century, not only for the marine products
and food industries, but for all corporations.

A Manufacturer Converting Resources into
Products Valued by Consumers
With the launch of the TGL Plan, Nippon Suisan
reconfirmed its commitment to being a “manufacturer
converting marine resources into products valued byconsumers”. The essence of a manufacturer is to concentrate the strengths of each division into the product. Nippon Suisan’s desire is to put this into practicefor the benefit of the customer. The TGL Plan aimed
to further enhance functions as a manufacturer in thearea of “converting marine resources into products
valued by consumers” where Nippon Suisan strengths
had been accumulated and realize growth along withcustomers and partners by creating value for global
customers. To this end, the following policies wereenacted:1) Insist on being a manufacturer based on skills
obtained through the production of things.
2) Develop brands that will be supported by people
in Japan and around the world.
3) Bolster R&D and quality assurance, while making
efforts to remain in harmony with nature.
4) Integrate Marine Products Business and Food
Products Business, promote globalization of
production and sales.
5) Enhance business systems for creating value alongwith customers.
The first step was to deepen linkage with overseas
group companies within the fishing field in terms ofaccess to global resources and sales networks. Nippon
Suisan had been utilizing fishing, aquaculture,

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

processing, sales and other individual functions(domestic and overseas) within activities targeting theJapanese market. However, this was completely different from the globalization approach taken by the
TGL Plan. A global supply chain was built for the
optimal linkage of global group companies and partnercompanies, including those in Japan responsible foreach of the supply chain functions, and products withhigh added value meeting the needs of the Japaneseand global markets were sold. This was Nippon
Suisan’s new and original business model. The aims
were to maximize profits and optimize each businessby implementing marketing mix and product mix.
Linkage to corporations sympathetic to the TGL
idea were promoted in order to cover gaps where
Nippon Suisan did not have corporations responsible
for supply chain functions in domestic and overseas
regions.
Management Supporting the TGL Plan
In order to realize a corporation that can continue
succeeding on the global market, it was essential foreach employee to independently participate in the
TGL Plan. Therefore, the “My Plan” system was introduced for all Nippon Suisan employees from fiscal
2002. This mechanism for bolstering “initiative &competition” was based on the theories of Stanford
University professor and Gorton’s outside board
member John Roberts. This is a form of organization
management in which individual employees and teams
are allowed to maintain their own independence andcreativity in addressing management issues with theirresults linked to overall company management.
In fiscal 2002, “My Plan” seminar working groups
that put into practice and gave form to the TGL Plan
across divisions were launched so that employees could
have a concrete understanding of the significance of“My Plan” within the TGL Plan. These seminars wereused to consider the issues that needed to be addressed
and the scenarios for realizing TGL. In order to apply
the “My Plan” seminar activities to actual business,

350

project teams known as Linkage Management Teams(LMT) were also formed with the aim of creating new
projects across divisions.
At the end of fiscal 2002, the first Nissui Linkage
Convention (NLC) was held. The aim of this management conference attended by all employees (approximately 1,200 people) was to obtain understanding of
the relationship between “My Plan” and the Nippon
Suisan Group, and then participate in the TGL Plan.
Through “My Plan” and the “My Plan” seminars,
individual employees were able to consider results andprogress for not only their own departments, but forthe overall Global Links, and then work to address
problems and bring about improvements. The “MyPlan” seminars brought about reviews of various projects from the perspective of Global Links. These
efforts helped to set the orientation for current business projects such as a vertically integrated businessstructure for white fish operations, bolstering thebottled salmon flakes segment (a major room-

temperature food product) and the newly developed
rice and poultry businesses.
Furthermore, Global Links require the optimization of each supply chain, real-time sharing of information between bases both inside and outside of Japan,
and dramatically improved business activities andproductivity. Along with introducing information
systems for meeting these requirements, the Business
Process Re-Engineering (BPR) Project was launchedfrom November 2003. This project was an evolutionof the “BPR 2001 Project” started in 1999 when drafting the TGL Plan was just underway. The BPR 2001
Project aimed to reform business systems across various Nippon Suisan fields such as procurement, production, distribution, operations and management.
The new BPR Project was formed to reexamine the“business” field. Contribution statements were provided daily with the aim of streamlining in-housetransactions, cutting business costs and improving
supply chain management.

3. Becoming a Global Leader through a Business Model Unique to Nissui
Vertically Integrated Business Structures— Indicative of TGL
In fiscal 2002, Nippon Suisan began promoting theidea of “vertically integrated business structures”,
which is very indicative of business concepts derived
from Global Links. Vertically integrated businessstructure means that for Nippon Suisan, its groupcompanies and partner companies, every operationfrom accessing marine resources through fishing andaquaculture to the manufacturing and marketing offinished products will be contained with the conceptof Global Links.
The white fish business and salmon aquaculturebusiness were cited as examples of vertically integrated
business structures. White fish and salmon are categories that have helped to form markets mainly in the
U.S. and Europe as opposed to Japan. These businesses
allow Nippon Suisan to harness its strengths and are

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

important from the perspective of bolstering manufacturing functions within the Marine Products
Business.
For the white fish business the aims were to enhanceaccess to resources, effectively utilize these resources
and maximize the added value by making white surimi
and filets. For the salmon aquaculture business theaim was to pursue high quality under the “FIVESTAR” brand with traceability available for everythingfrom eggs to processing, even including feed. Verticallyintegrated business structures were applied to both
the white fish business and the salmon aquaculturebusiness, with sales reaching global markets.

Sealord Tie-Up Highlights White Fish VerticallyIntegrated Business Structures
The first step taken to enhance vertically integrated
business structures for the white fish business under351

The Sealord Trawler Rehua

J.P. Klausen & Co. A/S
Svenborg, Denmark

the TGL Plan was the January 2001 purchase of a 50%
stake in New Zealand’s Sealord Group Ltd. (hereafter“Sealord”). Sealord is New Zealand’s largest fishingcompany and holds one-fourth of all fishing rights
granted by the New Zealand government. Sealord has
also obtained fishing rights from various countries inthe southern hemisphere. Sealord’s main areas of business are trawling, processing and aquaculture withsales activities all around the world. When the shareswere purchased, Sealord had bases in 20 countries
around the world, owned 25 fishing vessels and had
processing plants in seven countries. The company
already had deep ties with Nippon Suisan. In 1973,
Nippon Suisan took a stake in Sealord Products(which would later become Sealord) through Hokuyo
Suisan Co., Ltd. In the early days of New Zealand’s
fishing industry, Nippon Suisan participated in thedevelopment of the country’s marine resources.
Afterwards, Nippon Suisan provided and operated
up to seven fishing vessels. From 1999 joint deep-sea
trawling for sea perch was conducted in Chile alongwith EMDEPES and Pesquera Friosur.
Nippon Suisan Group’s access to white fish resources
was greatly improved by the addition of Sealord. Atthat point Nippon Suisan had access to Alaskan pollack resources through Sealord, Nippon Suisan Group
companies in South America, UniSea and partnercompanies in North America, along with access towhite fish resources through the Nippon SuisanGroup. As a result, Nippon Suisan’s name recognitionon the global market was elevated.
In addition to fishing, Sealord also processes fresh
fish, cultivates white fish and produces processed

products such as green mussel. Furthermore, Sealord
provided white fish to Gorton’s, a North American
producer of household frozen foods, and developed
a sales network through the European companies J.P.
Klausen & Co. and Nordic Seafood. The previously
weak Nippon Suisan Group’s sales functions in Europe
were suddenly enhanced through this linkage and a
new foothold for expanding sales routes wasestablished.
Four international companies, including Nippon
Suisan, placed bids to acquire a 50% stake in the
Sealord. One reason cited for the selection of Nippon
Suisan was because the company “had built deep ties
with our country in many areas”. For example, Nippon
Suisan purchased meat from New Zealand’s Anzco
Foods Ltd., supported the All Blacks rugby team as
an official sponsor since 1993 and procured New
Zealand brand frozen vegetables, white sauces andother products. Nippon Suisan built relationships
based on trust by contributing to both New Zealandbusiness and culture.
In approving this deal, the New Zealand government said it expected development of the nation’s
marine resources would be advanced, the added valueof marine resources belonging to the Maori people
would be raised, national industry would be promoted
and jobs would be created. These positive results
would come from the transfer of Nippon SuisanGroup aquaculture technologies to New Zealand andthe introduction of Nippon Suisan fishing and marine
resource-related technologies to the Sealord.

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies352

Gorton's HQ in Gloucester, Massachusetts
Gorton's Products

Reorganization for Vertically Integrated
North American White Fish Operations
In October 2001, global consumer products giant
Unilever sold its North American seafood business to
Nippon Suisan (U.S.A.). This acquisition included
Gorton’s (U.S.), a North American maker of frozen
seafood, and BlueWater Seafoods (Canada), both ofwhich became consolidated units of Nippon Suisan.
Gorton’s was a long-established brand with a history
dating back to 1849 and held the top share of theAmerican market, while BlueWater was the No. 2
seafood company in Canada. In 1962, Gorton’s became
an important partner of the McDonald’s Group when
the two jointly developed and commercialized theFilet-O-Fish sandwich.
Nippon Suisan thus attracted the attention of the
global fishing industry through the acquisition of the
Raw Fish

Alaska pollack, hoki,
southern blue whiting

Gorton’s and Sealord brands. As a result, more companies wanted to work with the Nippon Suisan Group,
which promoted the further expansion of Global
Links.
Access to North American marine resources was
further bolstered in 2002 through the purchase of a
25% stake in Alaska Ocean Seafood, L.P. (AOS)
through Nissui U.S.A. AOS owned the trawler Alaska
Oceans and produced Alaska pollack paste, sukeko(Alaska pollack eggs) and meal in Alaska. Sukeko, arefined product from the Alaskan waters, has been a
top brand. This acquisition was in response to a sharetransfer request from Hoko Fishing, which held acapital stake in AOS.
AOS owned catching quotas for Bering Sea Alaska
pollack and Pacific whiting along America’s west coast.
The catch quota for the Alaska Oceans trawler increased

Fishing & Landing

UniSea, Sealord, others

Filet and Surimi Processing

UniSea, Sealord, others

Surimi processed as fish sausage, ham, tube-shape cakes

Domestic processing site

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

Gorton's, others353

from 1999 in accordance with the introduction of the
ITQ system following enactment of the new U.S.
Fishing Law in 1998.
So at this stage, North American operations consisted of the following five companies: (1) Nippon
Suisan (U.S.A.) in charge of imports and exports, (2)UniSea handling Alaska pollack and crab processing
businesses, (3) Fishking, a commercial-use frozen foodmaker, (4) Gorton’s, a household frozen foods makerusing Alaska pollack, hoki and shrimp, and (5) AOS.
Through these five companies, Nippon Suisan wasable to create a supply chain and enhance integrated
white fish operations covering all aspects from accessto marine resources to production, processing andmarketing for both commercial and household
customers.
Reorganization of North American Crab BusinessIn 2005, the U.S. enacted a law promoting the management of crab resources including the introduction ofan ITQ system for crab fishing in the Bering Sea andAleutian Islands. Under this law boats were assigned
catching quotas and processors were given processing
quotas based on their hauls and processing resultsfrom 1995 to 2000. Under this law fishing vessels wererequired to sell 90% of the fish caught within their
quota to a processor that had been given a processing
quota. Fishing vessels were prohibited from providing
fish to processors who did not have such quotas.
Furthermore, these processing quotas were transferable and producers could subcontract product operations between themselves depending on the processing

Europacífico Alimentos Del Mar S.L.
Bilbao, Spainfacilities and location of the issued quotas.
UniSea received processing quotas based on past
production results, which meant that this processing
company could secure a stable supply of fish. Thissystem allowed for production that aimed to maximize
resource value, starting with controlling the freshnessof materials. In July 2005, UniSea established Bering
Sea Partners and purchased Royal Aleutian Seafoods(RAS), which operated a crabbing business in Dutch
Harbor, Alaska. UniSea was able to expand its crab
business by acquiring RAS’s Brown King Crab fishingand processing quotas.
Enhancing European Sales Functions
With the addition of Sealord to the Nippon SuisanGroup, the functions of Sealord’s sales agents in Europe
were combined and reorganized with those of Nippon
Suisan (Europe), B.V., greatly enhancing marketing
functions in Europe. As a result, Nippon Suisan’s salesin Europe surged 30% in 2001 from the previous year,
and the sales amount in Europe for the first time eversurpassed the amount purchased for the Japanesemarket.
Then in 2003, Nippon Suisan made an equity
investment in J.P. Klausen & Co. (Svenborg, Denmark),
Sealord’s sales company in Europe. The white fish sales
functions of Nippon Suisan (Europe), which wastargeting the Northern European market, were integrated with those of J.P. Klausen & Co. Through J.P.
Klausen & Co., sales functions for Alaska pollack filets
from UniSea in North America, as well as Merluccius
hubbsi and hoki filets from PESPASA and PESANTAR

Nissui (Thailand) Co., Ltd.
Hat Yai, Songkhla Province, Thailand

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

P.T. Nippon Suisan Indonesia
Jakarta, Indonesia

354

S.A.’s “FIVE STAR” Brand

Completion of feed plant in Los Ángeles,
Chile’s No. 8 state, renovated with an integrated production system

Processing Plant at Nissui (Thailand)

S.A.’s sea surface aquaculture

in South America were dramatically improved.
Channels for directly selling white fish products tomajor marine products processors in France, Spain,
Germany, Holland, Lithuania, Estonia and other
European countries were opened.
Then in 2004, Nippon Suisan, along with Sealord
and Friosur (belongs to group partner DERIS) established Europacífico in Spain and sales functions for
Spain, Portugal and other Southern European countries were integrated. Along with J.P. Klausen & Co.
(covering Northern Europe), this company served asanother Nippon Suisan sales base for the European
marine products market.

King & Prince Seafood Corp.
Brunswick, Georgia, U.S.A.

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

Vertical Integration for Salmon Operations
In recent years the consumption of salmon has grownalong with that of white fish, particularly in Westernand BRIC countries. For the past ten years the amountof salmon caught naturally has remained roughly flat,
while the amount produced through fish farming has
grown sharply. In 1992, fish farming accounted for
40% of global salmon production, but this percentage
reached about 70% in 2002. During the TGL Plan
period, vertical integration was expanded, particularly
for the Chilean aquaculture group company S.A. Thisvertical integration was applied to all stages from

Shandong Sanfod Nissui, Ltd.
Qingdao, China

355

selecting parent fish and hatching to raising fish toadulthood, landing, processing and sales (coho salmon,
trout, Atlantic salmon).
Along with bolstering the production systems of
S.A., a core salmon farming company in the Nippon
Suisan Group, efforts were made to expand these sales
beyond Japan to the entire world. By fiscal 2001 shipments of Atlantic salmon to the North American
market had already started. Sales were launchedthrough cooperation with North American Nippon
Suisan Group companies, and in 2002 a new formula
feed factory was built, production of the pellet-type
feed expansion started, the quality of farmed salmon
was raised and traceability became more complete. As
a result, fiscal 2002 production was 2.5 times the levelin 1998 and S.A. became the No.8 fish producing
company in Chile. Furthermore, smoked salmon production was also started in fiscal 2004.
Nissui (Thailand) Co., Ltd. (NTC), a salmondedicated processing site, was established in February2005 in order to further expand sales routes into global
markets. NTC fulfilled its roles of complimenting
S.A.’s processing, while creating new types of products.
This allowed Nippon Suisan to prepare a foundationfor vertical integration of salmon operations.

Global Links for Shrimp Farming and Processing
Bolstering shrimp operations was another key policyin the TGL Plan. Natural shrimp catching had been
the main trend in Asia, but shrimp farming operations
started in earnest with the establishment of P.T.
Nippon Suisan Indonesia in 2004, which included
construction of a system for all stages from hatching
to product processing. Furthermore, in 2001 theCirebon plant of P.T. AGS was completed in Indonesia
allowing for the provision of one-time frozen deep-fried
shrimp, an item with good product differentiation.
Then in July 2005, Nippon Suisan acquired
America’s King & Prince Seafood (K&P), a major
frozen foods producer with a focus on shrimp processing (based in Brunswick Georgia). This acquisition
further enhanced vertical integration of procurement,
production and processing between group companies
in North American (UniSea, Fishking and
Gorton’s).
In order to bolster the production of marine products and frozen foods in China, the joint venture
Shandong Sanfod Nissui, Ltd. was set up with
Shandong Sanfod in Qingdao city, Shandong, China
in June 2004.

4. Strengthening and Reorganizing the Domestic Foods,
Fine Chemicals and Distribution Businesses
Processed Foods Business Reforms throughVertical Integration of White Fish Operations
Conventionally Nippon Suisan entrusted the production and processing of surimi to group and partnercompanies mainly in North and South America andthen the headquarters’ Marine Products Business
Division sold the paste to domestic producers of foods
using surimi. The TGL Plan achieved vertical integration for white fish operations from resource access tomarine products, processing and finished products.
This helped to realize new business strategies harnessing the strengths of Nippon Suisan by combining thissurimi supply chain with the Food Products Division’s

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

fish sausage/ham and other products using surimi.
Specifically, unique technologies were developed tomaintain surimi product quality without the use ofegg whites and in 2002 the use of egg whites waseliminated for every step from surimi processing to
the domestic production of fish sausages and chikuwa(tube-shaped surimi cakes), allowing for the production of surimi products that could be enjoyed by thosewith egg allergies. This is just one example of value
generated from vertical integration.
Then in 2003, the Food Products Division established a production line for flake-type flavoredkamaboko (boiled surimi) at the Himeji General Plant.
This division was then able to produce and market

356

“Obento ni Benri” series at the time of 1999 launch
Iki-Chikuwa (tubes made fromsurimi without egg whites)

Osakana no Sausage (sausage
made from surimi without egg
whites)“Umi kara Sarada Fureku” (salad flakes from theocean) kamaboko using egg-free, high-quality flavoredsurimi produced by group companies. At this time
the consumption of flake-type products in the domestic crab flavored kamaboko market was growing sharply.
Nippon Suisan was a bit late, but finally broke into
this field. In addition to great taste, this product usednatural coloring and no eggs or preservatives. Sales
grew due to the product originality and high qualitythat satisfied consumer demands for greater food safety
and reliability.
Frozen Foods Business within TGL Plan
During the NCR Management period the householdfrozen foods business continued to concentrate on“Power Items” and product appeal was maintained
through frequently renewing products. At the sametime new categories were being tested with the aim of
spurring on further business growth.
The thaw-at-room-temperature “Obento ni Benri”
series of bento boxed lunch side dishes introduced in
1999 were very easy to use as these items could beplaced into box lunches while still frozen. This productbecame more popular in 2005 with its evolution into
various menu combinations and grew into a major
category at frozen foods sales sites with other companies even deciding to participate. This line wasreformed as the “Shizen Kaito de Oishii!” (meal naturally defrosted and delicious!) series in 2007, with the“thaw-at-room-temperature” concept providing a new
opening to target consumers who did not want toRealizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

spend too much time and energy on cooking.
Then in 2005, a series of deep-fried foods with
reduced fat was introduced as more health-conscious
side dishes. Using a special cloth to limit the absorption of frying oil, the amount of fat for all productsin this line was reduced by between 30% and 40%.

Enhancing Nature of Sales
for Food Business Division
As a key issue in the TGL Plan for the Food Business
Division, the Regional Sales HQ was in March 2001
broken into three divisions: Regional Sales HQ,Consumer Products Department for Tokyo
Metropolitan Area, and Food Service Products
Department for Tokyo Metropolitan Area. Staffing
levels were increased and capacities for negotiating
and make proposals were enhanced.
A greater focus was also placed on area marketingand in 2001 Nissui Area Marketing Management(NAMM) was introduced for the core categories in
the Consumer Products Section such as householdfrozen foods, paste products and fish sausage and ham.
Television advertising targeting individual regions was
also introduced at this time. In 2002, Food Service
Products User Marketing Management (GUMM)
was introduced in the Food Service Products Section.
Instead of focusing ideas on products, sales were developed more from the perspective of functions to meetthe demands of customers and markets.

357

Yaki Sake Arahogushi

Restoration of the Shelf-stable Foods Business
Earnings improved temporarily for the shelf-stable
foods business (canned goods, retort pouches, etc.)
due to a reduction in the number of products during
the NCR Management period. However, the decline
in sales due to a shrinking market could not be halted
and there were even rumors the business would be
abolished at the end of 2002. Those in charge wanted
to restore the shelf-stable foods business and directly
appealed for the opportunity to newly establish a
Shelf-stable Foods Business Division in which they
could manage all production, procurement and sales
supply chains. In March 2003, they were granted permission to continue working to restore this businessover a three-year period.
This re-launch came at a time when future prospects
were cloudy with the market size shrinking each year,
materials costs rising and sales prices declining. The
product mix was reviewed with a focus on those products that could harness the strengths of Nippon Suisan.
This resulted in a better mix of profit generating products, diversification of bottled products, retorts andgift products, appropriate product management forthe bottled goods segment, the promotion of direct
shipping utilizing wholesalers and better inventory
control. Based on these approaches, the bottled product “Yaki Sake Arahogushi” (grilled salmon flakes)
was developed into a core product and success wasachieved in cultivating new categories such as the“Nabe Soup” retort pouches. Income and profits continued to increase from 2003 when the balance(income and expenditures) for this business took aturn for the better.

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

IMARK

Chilled Foods Business Expansion andConcentration
There was a turnaround for the Chilled Foods Business,
which was scaled back during the NCR Management
period, and plants were newly established in regions
throughout Japan. This turnaround was due toimproved approaches for dealing with the chainsreceiving these products.
Nippon Cookery increased its scale by taking overfrom various vendors the Aichi Prefecture Komaki
Plant in July 2003, as well as the Osaka Hirakata Plant
and the Okinawa Plant in October of that year. In
January 2005, the Shimada Plant was built to serve asa base for all of Shizuoka Prefecture and the Mikawa
region of Aichi Prefecture. Then the Kanazawa Plant
was acquired in June of that year, the Yachiyo Plant
was built in July and the transfer of business from theChilldy Narashino Plant was completed, creating asystem for enhancing business in the Kanto region.
This resulted in nine production sites, when including
the already existing Atsugi, Oita and Itami plants,
which together covered the key Kanto, Tohoku,
Hokuriku, Kinki, Kyushu and Okinawa regions.
Meanwhile, Chilldy merged with Kanto Fresh
Foods Co., Ltd. in July 2008 and its business was
passed on as the Chilldy Narashino Plant.
Reforms of the Fine Chemicals Business
Expansion of functional lipids (oils and fats) andcreation of new values for marine resources were key
growth strategies for the Fine Chemicals Business.
EPA, DHA and other functional lipids based on358

fish oils were at the core of the Fine Chemicals Business.
EPA and DHA used as pharmaceutical materials andas functional lipids for foods had been produced incooperation with group company Kyowa Technos.
Results for the pharmaceuticals materials segment
grew steadily from 1990, but regular drug price cuts
were implemented from 1992. As such, significant
growth in earnings and profit was thrown into doubt
after peaking in 1996.
Under the TGL Plan the aim was to replace thispharmaceutical materials segment by expanding functional lipids as the core to growth for the fine chemicals
segment. Efforts focused on producing EPA and DHA
to be sold domestically and internationally as materials
for dietary supplements, nutritional pills and foodadditives. Sales for the functional lipids business grewsteadily along with the domestic and international
growth in health food and industrial-use customers.
However, production was strained due to obsolete
production equipment at Kyowa Technos, environmental problems, insufficient capacity at the Tsukuba
Plant, dispersion of base production sites and otherproblems.
To address these problems, a functional lipids production site was established at the Tsukuba Plant in
February 2004, production capacity was increased,
and functions for future production, quality and technical development were put in place. In April of thatyear, “IMARK”, a specified health food based on EPA
for those concerned about triglyceride, was launched
as a mail-order business. The product name “IMARK”
comes from the Inuit word for water. This name waschosen out of the desire to share with many people
EPA, a key to the health of the Inuit people who eat
plenty of fish.

Integrating and Reorganizing
the General Distribution Business
Rationalizing distribution is an important cost management issue for any company. From the late 1990s
there was an increase in 3rd Party Logistics (3PL) andRealizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

outsourcing services handling all of a company’s logistics functions. There were also many cases of companies reaching beyond the walls of competition to teamup with other companies for shared inventory management and transport.
In 2002, Japan had roughly 1,800 managed refrigerated storage facilities with capacity of about 11 million
tons, but these levels were than expected to decline.
Earnings for refrigerated storage continued to decline
after peaking in 1992 and there has been on-goingreorganization and weeding out of weaker facilities.
Progress was made in further integrating distribution bases for Nippon Suisan’s General Distribution
during the TGL Plan period. In October 2002, Tobu
Reizo Shokuhin Co., Ltd. absorbed Sendai Hinomaru
Reizo and Marushin Unyu Co., Ltd. Functions andcompetitiveness were enhanced so this company could
serve as a key base in Eastern Japan for the Nippon
Suisan Group’s distribution operations. Operations
were concentrated at Seibu Reizo Shokuhin (in chargeof western Japan) and Tobu Reizo Shokuhin (in chargeof eastern Japan). This allowed the group to provide
prompt and balanced distribution services covering awide area.
Issues with Intellectual Property Rights
In recent years Nippon Suisan has appealed for greaterrespect of intellectual property rights in the foodindustry.
Nippon Suisan’s “Shioaji Edamame”, a salt-flavoredfrozen green soybean product that can be thawed
naturally at room temperature, has been a popular
product since its introduction in December 1993. A
unique feature of this product is that the salt flavor isabsorbed right into the beans. On May 20, 1993,
Nippon Suisan applied for a patent covering thisinvented product and its special packaging and on
September 25, 1998 this patent was registered. During
this time the strong sales of the “Shioaji Edamame”
contributed to the overall growth of the frozen soybean market.

359

However, eight objections to this patent were submitted to the Patent Office by June 1999. The Patent
Office’s Appeal Board made a comprehensive review
and concluded on June 30, 2001 that the patents were
to be upheld. Based on this confirmation of the validityof the patent rights, Nippon Suisan in October 2001
began holding negotiations with other firms regarding
their usage of this patent.
Then on February 13, 2002, a few corporations
opposed to these negotiations requested that the
Patent Office decision be overturned. In response,
Nippon Suisan on March 13, 2002 filed a patent
infringement lawsuit with the Tokyo District
Court.
On February 18, 2003 the Patent Office decided

to void the patent and on February 26 the Tokyo
District Court dismissed the case filed by Nippon
Suisan. Not wanting to intentionally cause any further
distress for the industry, Nippon Suisan decided not
to appeal this decision.
Nippon Suisan is competing with other companies
through the development of unique technologies andbelieves that an environment in which there is mutual
respect for intellectual property rights is essential for
gaining consumer confidence. In this era of competition among similar products, Nippon Suisan has
stressed the importance of respecting intellectual property rights. At the same time, functions within thecompany regarding patent information werebolstered.

5. Quality Assurance and Environmental Preservation
Quality Assurance
For any producer of foods, a quality assurance systemis the foundation for gaining consumer trust and confidence. Quality assurance is a very important issue as
it entails implications that could determine the life ordeath of a corporation.
In 1964, Nippon Suisan established a Food ProductsTechnology Department in charge of technical support for the production of processed foods and a
Quality Control Section was established within thisdepartment. Since then this Quality Control Section
was positioned within the Food Products Business
until 1990. Then in April 1991, this section was split
into the Marine Products Quality Control Section
and the Food Products Quality Control Section tocreate an independent quality control group directly
overseen by the company president. In 1995 an
Overseas Quality Assurance Section was establishedalong with new quality assurance sections for the
Fukuoka, Osaka and Sendai regions in Japan.
Quality control operations expanded during thistime along with the globalization of production andprocurement, expanding business fields and a growing

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

number of offered products. Improving the quality
assurance system became imperative for Nippon
Suisan as quality control was becoming much more
important for business in regards to raising customer
satisfaction.
In 1998, Nippon Suisan established a Quality
Assurance and Environment Preservation Office. In
addition to enhancing the shift in focus from quality
control to quality assurance, activities were also
expanded to include measures for protecting the environment. The issues addressed were increased andefforts were made to obtain ISO 9000 series quality
control management system certification, comprehensive sanitation management and production process approval from the Minister of Health, Labourand Welfare and approval for exporting marine products to the U.S. Through these activities Nippon
Suisan created and implemented its own sanitation
control standards in accordance with the approaches
of HACCP. Inspections and improvement activities
were also regularly conducted to maintain the levelof quality control and production sites.
However, the event that led to a fundamental reviewof the quality assurance system was a product recall

360

in the summer of 2000 after a small fly was discoveredin Nippon Suisan’s frozen “Chanpon” (noodles withtoppings dish). On July 8 of that year, a customer
contacted the Customer Service Center to complainthat an insect, likely a small fly, was found in the purchased “Chanpon”. However, an insufficient response
from the company invited customer distrust and unfavorable media coverage. Nippon Suisan eventually
recalled the relevant product lot. At that time there
was heightened interest in food safety following a foodpoisoning case at a leading dairy products maker.
Nippon Suisan recognized this as a very serious
management crisis that required a company-wide
response. An emergency meeting of department heads
was called, quality assurance was recognized as themost urgent management issue requiring direct participation from top management and decisions weremade regarding three items. Specifically, decisions
were made to realize HACCP or equivalent management for the production of all Nippon Suisan products. A decision was also made that the closest sales
representative should visit customers making serious
complaints to apologize for any inconvenience andverify details of the complaint. Furthermore, steps
were taken to operate customer service centers on
weekends and establish emergency response rules forthe entire company.
In October 2002, the quality assurance system wasreformed and a Quality Assurance Charter was established. All employees were requested to take this charter to heart. The main approaches are as follows.
1) Safety and reliability are the ties between producer and consumer. The assurance of safety andreliability are what make our brand.
2) Quality assurance is a reflection of the qualityof management.
3) Quality assurance costs shall be compatible withbusiness results.
4) All executive and employees from the president
down shall be responsible for quality
assurance.
In August 2003, a Quality Assurance Management

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

Meeting made up of representatives from all domestic
production sites, including affiliated production sites,
was convened so that the above points could be sharedwith all relevant parties.
Furthermore, in addition to keeping quality assurance functions under the direct control of the president as before, a Quality Assurance Committee
chaired by the president and an Executive Council
were newly established. These gatherings were convened about three times a month in order to establish
various policies for the effective functioning of the
Quality Assurance Charter, to quickly respond to
customer comments about quality and quality assurance problems arising inside and outside the company,
and to establish philosophies for the company.
Furthermore, in October 2002 the Food Safety
Research Center was established, enhancing functions
for scientifically verifying food safety. This center
conducts chemical and microbiological inspections
for agricultural chemicals, antibodies and others,
mainly for imported products. This center also conducts independent inspections of imported
products.
For Nippon Suisan, a company promoting global
activities, quality assurance is an issue to be taken up
by each company within the Global Links. In 2003,
Nippon Suisan initially started thorough implementation of a quality control system in Asia where there isa concentration of group production sites engaged inhigh order processing. In addition to quality control
organizations established at each production site, theQuality Control Center China (later became the
Qingdao Nissui Food Research and Development
Co., Ltd.) was established in Qingdao, China. In 2004,
a quality control center was also established in
Bangkok, Thailand. Systems were put in place formanaging the quality of raw materials, semi-processed
goods and finished goods in each country and forproviding instruction and guidance at local production sites.

361

Environment
The Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in
1992 adopted two important conventions: the Climate
Change Convention and the Convention on
Biodiversity. Then in 1997 the Kyoto Protocols wereadopted at the third Conferences of the Parties(COP3). In 2000, the Japanese government enacted
the Basic Act for Establishing a Sound Material-Cycle
Society, established the “3 R’s Philosophy” (reduce,reuse, recycle), ratified the 2002 Kyoto Protocols anddecided to take steps to reduce greenhouse gases by
6% from 1990 levels.
In 1998, Nippon Suisan established its Quality
Assurance and Environment Preservation Office,placed parties in charge of company environment
policy and started taking measure to preserve theenvironment. Around this time Nippon Suisan also
started taking steps to receive certification under the
ISO14000 series of environmental management
system international standards. The Shimizu Plant
was the first to be awarded with this certification,
which was followed by certification for other production and distribution sites.
In 2001, Environment Relations Officers were
established, marking the start of company-wide
approaches for preserving the environment.
In June 2003, the Environment Committee wascreated and the Environment Code was established.
This code, along with the Quality Assurance Codeand Code of Ethics expressed Nippon Suisan’s corporate stance and declared that corporate activities would
be promoted based on these philosophies.
The Environment Code expresses the company’s
philosophy on the environment as: “Since we gain
benefits from nature in our business activities, we makeit the basic principle of our Philosophy & Ethics todeal with the earth and the sea with gratitude. We willcontinue to work toward harmony and coexistencewith the global environment in our global business,and help create a sustainable society”.
Of all the major foods in the world, only marine
products rely on nature for more than half of its supply
and the impacts that global environmental changes
have on ocean resources are progressing at an accelerated pace. In light of these conditions, the entire grouphas been making efforts to reduce burdens placed on
the environment.
Nippon Suisan’s environmental preservation activities
include reducing waste and recycling at production
and distribution sites, reducing CO2 emissions as a
global warming prevention measure and preserving
water resources.
An in-house Environment Report was issued infiscal 2004 and a general Environment Report wasissued in 2005.

6. Reforms of Management Support Divisions in the TGL Plan
Introduction of New Personnel System
In October 2001, a new personnel system using a jobbased grade system was introduced. This was the first
drastic reform in 11 years, since the introduction of acourse-specific personnel system in December 1990.
In fiscal 1999 the “New Personnel System Project”
was launched, discussions between labor and management were held and a new system was considered. The
aims of the new system were to adapt to the changing
environment confronting corporations (sudden

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

economic changes, deregulation, global competition,
declining birthrate and growing elderly population),establish job standards, handle employees in a fair andeasy-to-understand manner, motivate employees andsecure competent workers.
There was a complete change from the previous“ability-based grade system” in which employee compensation was based on ability and years of service, toa “job-based grade system” in which salaries differ
based on the scale and difficulty of work entrusted toeach employee. The new system was applied to all

362Compliance Guide containing the Quality Assurance Charter, Code of Ethics, andEnvironmental Code (October 2010 edition)

Nippon Suisan employees including management.
Based on this approach, the company-owned housing
system was abolished and the previous welfare system
was completely reviewed. The basic philosophies of
the new employment system were as follows:
1) Employee compensation and evaluation will bebased on “duties”, “results” and “ability”.
2) Support will be given to raise the specialized abilitiesof each employee and to develop professionals.
3) Support will be provided so employees continue
to work under healthy, safe and secure conditions.
4) Work options will be expanded.
5) Promote the development of executives fromthe perspective of group management.
Furthermore, the employee assessment system usedachievement score assessments of the degree to which
results were achieved and measurements of the degree
to which skills were used in performing duties. The
former is reflected in bonuses and the latter in wage
revisions.
This evaluation system was reviewed in fiscal 2010.
Greater importance was placed on assessments ofresults and actions in order to assess those who act inaccordance with the image of the desired employee
and to promote personnel development. It was also
determined that these assessments would be reflectedin bonuses.
Corporate GovernanceJapanese accounting standards were drastically changedby the sweeping reforms in 2000 that came to be
known as the “Big Bang” accounting reforms. These

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

reforms included the introduction of consolidating
accounting, cash flow statements, current value
accounting, retirement benefits accounting andincome tax accounting. These reforms were intended
to meet financial market needs and bring Japanese
accounting practices more in line with international
standards. These changes also applied pressure on
corporate management to carry out reforms. There
were greater calls for corporate disclosure includingthese points from the fiscal year ended March 2000.
Nippon Suisan began making preparations to fully
disclose management/financial information andexplain group activities. IR activities were also started
along with launching the TGL plan in 2001. In June
2001 the president held a briefing to explain the fiscal
2000 results and the TGL plan to institutional investors and brokerage analysts.
In September 2002, Nippon Suisan formed a“Compliance Preparation Committee” to study thecompany’s approach to compliance. Then in March
2003 the company’s Code of Ethics was established.
This code was created to clearly express the value that
Nippon Suisan places on corporate ethics, clarify themental attitude employees should take in their actions
and ensure that these ideas are shared by all employees.
At the same time an Ethics Committee was launchedand compliance activities were put in place with theaim of elevating the level of ethical behavior, includingthat of group companies. This Ethics Committee built
the group’s compliance system, enhanced educational
activities, thoroughly managed information and promoted fair trade.
An Information Security Section was created in363

order to establish and enforce regulations for handlingpersonal information and for managing confidential
business information. Furthermore, the Basic Policy
for Information Security was set in February 2005.
Risk management was also started with the launching of a Risk Management Committee in 2005. Issues
were resolved by uncovering and assessing businessrisks, and then prioritizing the development of countermeasures. These efforts led to the establishment ofrisk management regulations in February 2006.
Accounting and Finance Streamlining
In April 2003, Nissui G Net Co., Ltd. (hereafterreferred to as “G Net”) was established to take overduties from the Business Affairs Center. The “G” of
G Net refers to Global, Group and General. The
purpose for setting up this new company was to support financing-related operations for the Nippon
Suisan Groups and concentrate service operations inorder to clarify costs, standardize operations and realize efficient fund procurement within the group. G
Net was also responsible for requesting payment for
products sold by Nippon Suisan and for handling

payments received.
In November of the previous year, a CashManagement System (CMS) was introduced as a fundmanagement mechanism for the overall group and topromote efficient fund raising within the group. CSM
was incorporated into the Nippon Suisan’s Finance
Section and systems were put in place for stable, lowinterest fund procurement and receipt/disbursement
operations. The individual external fund procurement
operations used by each group company up until thenwere all brought together. This promoted operational
efficiency, creditworthiness of the Nippon SuisanGroup, realization of low-interest fund procurementby harnessing the merits of Nippon Suisan’s scale, andreductions in interest costs for the overall group andfund flows outside the group. The introduction of
CMS resulted in a reduction in group interest bearing
debt of more than 10 billion yen and a reduction in
financing charges of more than 100 million yen.
In order to increase the number of shareholders
and create greater share liquidity, the minimum trading lot for Nippon Suisan shares was lowered from
1,000 to 100 shares in September 2005.

Part 3 “New TGL Plan” as Management Strategy for
Nippon Suisan’s Next 100 Years for Fiscal 2006 to 2010
1. New TGL Plan as Foundation for Next 100 Years
Suddenly Changing Business Environment
From around 2005 various problems involving global
population growth, food/natural resources and thedestruction of the environment on a global scale came
more into focus. Attention turned to the BRICs(Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries which
account for close to 40% of the world’s population,
but higher resource prices due to the economic activities of these countries became unavoidable. Meanwhile,
Japan’s economy entered a declining phase from 2005.

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

As such, it became increasingly important for Japanesefirms to not rely solely on the domestic market, but
to also develop overseas markets, particularly in the
newly emerging countries.
As global demand for marine products increased,
Japan’s position in the global trade of marine products
began declining. The global trade of marine products
has been increasing each year and record high levels
were hit in 2007 in terms of both import amounts
and value. Japan had been the world’s largest importerof marine products, but this amount has been364

Changes in Sales Composition — Fiscal 2001 vs. Fiscal 2005
Fiscal 2001: 483 billion yen

Fiscal 2005: 539.6 billion yen

Integrated
Integrated
business:business:
11%
11%Integrated
Integrated
business:business:13%
13%

Trading/
Trading/
Manufacturing:
Manufacturing:
wholesale:64%
wholesale:
64%
21%
21%

Trading/
Trading/
wholesale:46%
wholesale:
46%Manufacturing:
Manufacturing:
37%
37%

Distribution:
4% 4%Distribution:

Distribution:
4% 4%Distribution:

Overseas Sales and Sales Ratio Trends (Fiscal 2001 to 2005)(100 million yen)

1,500
1,200

Overseas sales ratio (Global Links*) (right axis)
Overseas sales ratio (consolidated) (right axis)
Overseas sales (Global Links*) (left axis)
Overseas sales (consolidated) (left axis)

(%)

30

20
900
600
10
300
0
0
2001
02
03
04
05 (FY)(FY)*Overseas sales including those of Global Links companies (equity-method and partner companies)

decreasing after peaking in 2002 and China took overthe spot of top importer in 2005. There has also been
in upward trend for marine product imports to the
U.S. and Europe due to greater health awareness andunease about meat and poultry safety following casesof BSE and bird flu. Demand for marine products has
increased in China along with that country’s economic
growth. In these regions there has been increased
interest in marine products, particularly salmon, which
has sent prices sharply higher. Japan’s imports havedecreased and there has been the so-called “kaimake”
phenomenon (loss of purchases to others).
Japan is a country that relies on imports for roughly
half of its marine product consumption. Efforts wereneeded to reform marine products policy in accordance with a new marine products master plan for
securing a stable supply of marine resource. These
efforts included the recovery and maintenance ofmarine resources and the development and protectionof fishery management bodies with international

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

competitiveness.
In 2002, the Basic Plan for Fishery was enacted inaccordance with the Fisheries Basic Act and various
policies were put forth to secure a stable supply of
marine resources and for the healthy development ofJapan’s fishing industry. However, good results were
not obtained and the Basic Plan for Fishery was
reworked in 2007 in order to change marine productpolicy.
Reorganization of Japan’s marine products and foodindustries were promoted amid a string of global mergers and acquisitions involving huge corporations. In
October 2007, Maruha Group Inc. (capital: approx.
29 billion yen) merged with Nichiro Corporation(capital: approx. 12.2 billion yen) via a share swap.
The new entity, Maruha Nichiro Holdings, Inc. had
capital of 31 billion yen and annual consolidated salesof 850 billion yen. This merger came when the Maruha
Group was approaching its 127th year in business andNichiro was getting ready to celebrate its 100th365

anniversary. The following year Japan Tobacco Inc.
(JT) acquired Katokichi Co., Ltd. (current TableMarkCo., Ltd.) and made it a group company.
Aiming to become a “True Global Leader”
The following are the results of the “TGL Plan”
adopted by Nippon Suisan between 2001 and 2005.
•Improved access to global marine resources•Increased influence over global markets andcustomers•Established footholds in the fishing and aquacultureindustries within Japan’s EEZ (exclusive economic
zone)•Further expanded global networks•Continued bolstering of financial strengths•Created group appeal as a company that acquires anddevelops global talent
However, a major problem is that returns on suchinvestments take time and the investment cannot
always be sufficiently recovered.
The “New TGL Plan” medium-term business plan
started from fiscal 2006, gave careful consideration
to the suddenly changing business environment, whilepursuing returns on investments in the previous TGL
Plan and taking steps to enhance functions complimenting Global Links. The New TGL Plan was
intended to make the Nippon Suisan Group’s businessmore cutting edge and sophisticated. The period forthis new plan was seen as a time for Nippon Suisan
to achieve its centennial goals and build a solid foundation for the company’s next 100 years.
Nippon Suisan greeted it’s the centennial anniversary of foundation in fiscal 2011 with the aim of being“a company which boasts unsurpassed strength andcustomer support in the field of creating value forcustomers from marine resources” and a “global leader
in creating value for customers from marine resources”.
In terms of group management strategy, Nippon
Suisan decided to create value under this shared vision
and work to strengthen the Global Links. “Global
Links” refers to a network of companies which share

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

the Nippon Suisan Group vision and work together
to create value through win-win relationships that do
not necessarily involve capital support.
The basic management policy for the New TGL
Plan was defined as: We help people around the world
achieve a rich, healthy lifestyles by creating a diverse
set of values from marine resources and delivering
them to customers.
The image of the business structure was described
as realizing a unique business model that links thepower of nature and the power of science to lifestylevalues in order to create the most trusted network in
the global marine products industry.
The following are specific images of business structures for the Nippon Suisan Group.
1) Improve the profitability of core businesses(improve business structure through measuresto acquire resources)• Improve profitability through cost reductions
in core businesses.
• Secure profit by developing and selling highly
functional products.
• Change the sales style to link with “pull marketing” through advertising.
• Further enhance vertically integrated businessstructures and maximize profits through marine
product and marketing mixes.
2) Expand profits through more sophisticated business (reform business structure through methods
for acquiring resources)• Secure safety, reliability and traceability throughvertical integration, by achieving advances forthe aquaculture business and by developing a
cutting-edge aquaculture (fish farming) model.
• Team up with outside research organizations
to develop and commercialize various sophisticated functional materials based on natural
materials.
3) Acquire new technologies such as bio-production technologies (structural reforms based ona third resource acquisition method that does
not rely on the harvesting of natural resources)366

• Begin researching and commercializing thebio-production of EPA, DHA and other functional materials.
4) Reorganize group companies and focus management resources on manufacturing functions.
Cooperate with partner companies to create
structures for highly efficient management oftrading and wholesaling. Switch from the consolidated method to the equity method toachieve scale realizing better functions andservices.
5) For all businesses make a deeper push into thedomestic markets, create global markets andcustomers, and bolster systems for maximizing
the value for marine resources.
6) As a leader in the marine industry, show stakeholders a commitment to plans and become amore trustworthy corporation.
The following are the key strategies for achieving
this goal.
(1) R&D Strategy: Refine techniques so as to avoid
any waste of the limited marine resources.
Establish aquaculture and bio-based technologies. Establish research facilities for the scienceof food functions and for bio-production. Alsoestablish a section promoting aquaculture, place
this section in charge of the Oita Marine
Biological Technology Center and pursue
cutting-edge aquaculture operations in termsof both research and business execution.
(2) Resource Production Strategy: Expand andbolster access to marine resources by enhancing
frameworks for accessing fishing and by expanding/deepening aquaculture operations. Acquirebio-production technologies as a new meansfor obtaining resources. Hold specific shares ofthe main seafood resources such as white fish,
salmon, shrimp and crab. Enhance frameworks
for accessing overseas fishing, participate in thedomestic fishing industry.
(3) Processing/Production Strategy: Newly establish, reorganize and concentrate domestic andRealizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

overseas production sites, including group companies, for the purpose of better global area
marketing. Promote the “2 in 5” activities (=double productivity in five years). Bolster thefunctional materials business as a new value
added-type business.
(4) Quality Assurance Strategy: Adhere to the
Quality Assurance Charter and build a quality
assurance system for realizing the group’s
responsibilities for guaranteeing quality.
Establish a system for ensuring consistent quality from the fish farms and produce farms to
the processing plants and distribution.
(5) Marketing Strategy: Conduct marketing strategies suited for the needs of customers in each
global region. With Global Links as the core
concept, bolster domestic and overseas salesorganizations, and establish a network with astrong a presence and sense of trust. Build abrand system that combines the Nissui brandwith other current brands.
(6) Logistics Strategy: Integrate logistics functions
and promote better supply chain efficiency.
Establish a Supply Chain Management Section,
integrate control of domestic and overseas logistics for production, inventory and shipping,and improve supply chain efficiency.
(7) Business Innovation Strategy: Continuously
innovate business and enhance executive abilities
in order to realize strategies. Establish a “Business
Reform Council” with the aim of converting
business structures to high-profit models. Work
across all sections to resolve problems such as
how to best maximize group functions and how
to eliminate the “unseen negatives”.
(8) Group Management Strategy: Conduct groupmanagement so as to elevate synergies and leverage. Promote cooperation and use scrap & buildfor various group functions in order to realize
synergies. In addition to the quarterly groupmanagement conference, hold Global Links
management conferences twice a year.

367

The approach was to spend the first three years of
the plan implementation period (fiscal 2006 to 2008)
creating high profit-oriented management and business structures and then spend the second three years(fiscal 2009 to 2011) acquiring results and achieving
the two main TGL goals; specifically “True Global
Links” and “True Global Leader”. The first three years
were for raising competiveness and converting management and business structures to high profit-oriented models by promoting efficient management of
the Global Links built within the TGL Plan.
Furthermore, the New TGL Plan was launchedwith the indomitable resolve to adhere to the “2008
Rule”, which stated that “businesses and offices that
do not have a goal for switching to high profit models
by fiscal year 2008 would be abandoned”.
Functions Supporting the New TGL Plan
The new TGL Plan used the following meeting structures to share goals, progress and measures for the new
TGL Plan.
As for the meeting structures used by the parent
Nippon Suisan, monthly TGL Promotion Meetings(section head level management conferences in accordance with the Board of Directors meetings and management conferences) were continued for making
decisions regarding management policy. These meetings were used to make decisions on company-wide
policy, conduct monthly follow-ups for each projectand share management information. In fiscal 2006, aManagement Innovation Meeting under the directcontrol of the company president was established.
Taskforces cutting across all organizations were formed
to tackle individual problems in order to maximize
group functions, eliminate “unseen negatives” andconvert business structures to high profit-oriented
models. Some of the main themes addressed wereenhancing vertical integration, bolstering manufacturing functions, strengthening group synergies, improving supply chain functions and promoting cost
cutting.

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

Other meetings were also continued. These
included the section head management roundtables
for managing/sharing sectional My Plans and for
improving management by section heads through theexchange of opinions on management. Employee
management roundtables for improving My Plans,
accelerating results and allowing management andemployees to understand their roles within management policies and plans were also continued.
For the overall group, the “Nissui Global Links
Conference” launched in 2002 was continued in orderto establish implementation plans for strengthening
Global Links with overseas group companies. The
study of issues for each region became particularly
important. Furthermore, group management conferences were held to improve the management of groupcompanies. These included group management meetings for sharing fiscal year policies with major domestic
and overseas group companies and quarterly discussions with major domestic and overseas group supply
chain-related companies regarding progress and specific measures.
Enhancing Business in Europe
The New TGL Plan determined that the Nippon
Suisan business model would need to be reformed
along with the paradigm change. Under a new businessmodel that raises the value of goods and things, thefocus would be placed on R&D and manufacturingfunctions that create value, and sales functions would
be improved through cooperation with Global Links
companies and partner companies.
The addition of Sealord to the Nippon SuisanGroup in 2001 provided the opportunity to strengthen
Nippon Suisan’s existing sales functions by utilizing
the global sales functions of Sealord. The New TGL
Plan aimed to move further towards completing a
global supply chain by adding improved sales functions
to the Global Links for accessing marine resources
prepared by the TGL Plan.
The first task was to reinforce the group’s functions368

Nordic Seafood A/S Hirtshals, Denmark

Cité Marine S.A.S. Kervignac, Francein Europe.
In May 2006, the Nippon Suisan Group took astake in Nordic Seafood (Hirtshals, Denmark) throughEuropean group company Nissui Europe. The marine
products sales functions of Nissui Europe, based on
the Sealord sales network, were integrated into thoseof J.P. Klausen & Co., in which a stake was taken in2003 for commercial-use white fish sales, as well as
those of Europacífico, for which a stake was taken in2004 for the same functions in Spain and Portugal.
The stake in Nordic Seafood enhanced sales functions
allowing for coverage of three business segments; specifically the restaurant and retail segments, in addition
to the conventional industrial-use segment.
A particular focus was placed on France, Europe’s
largest market for marine products. In October 2007,
shares in Cité Marine (Kervignac), a leading producer/
marketer of frozen and chilled foods (mainly seafood)were purchased through Nissui Europe. This moveprovided the Nippon Suisan Group with its firstmanufacturer in Europe. Cité Marine possessed uniqueprocessing technical skills and product development
capabilities, and held a commanding 70% share of theFrench market. This stake bolstered the supply chain
in Europe and put in place functions for changing
how customers value Nippon Suisan Group marine
resources.

of marine products. F.W. Bryce develops and imports
various marine commodities such as Canadian snow
crab, Norway salmon and Alaska pollack developedin China. The company sells industrial-use food materials mainly to major food service companies.
Along with the acquisition of F.W. Bryce, Nippon
Suisan merged Fishking with K&P, and transferred
the marine commodities sales division of Fishking toF.W. Bryce.
In June 2008, Nippon Suisan acquired shares in
AOS through Nissui U.S.A. When this company thenmerged with the Glacier Fish Company (G.F.C.)(Seattle, Washington) the Nippon Suisan Group wasable to take a stake in G.F.C. through a share exchange
and additional investment. Through this merger,
G.F.C. newly obtained the Alaska Oceans vessel, so
the size of its fleet came to three trawlers and twolong-line fishing boats. This investment improved thecompany’s ability to supply Alaska pollack and otherhigh quality products processed at sea, and allowed
for greater synergies with the group’s global production and sales networks.

Enhancing Business in North America
In April 2006, Nissui U.S.A. acquired F.W. Bryce, Inc.
(Gloucester, Massachusetts), a developer and importer

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

The trawler Northern Glacier Glacier Fish Company (G.F.C.)
Seattle, Washington, U.S.A.

369

Enhancing Business in Latin America
Since enactment of the Provisional Fishing Law in
2002, quotas for each type of fish and for each company were set for 10 years in Chile.
In October 2007, the Nippon Suisan Group established the sales and marketing firm DOSA in Santiago,
Chile, along with marine products/aquaculture investment firm Dersa to bring together the operations of
Nippon Suisan Group firm EMDEPES and Dersa
Group company Friosur.
EMDEPES independently operated trawl fishing
operations, while the Friosur Group independently
operated ice storage boats and on-land processing
facilities for those hauls. Dersa took over the sales andmanagement functions of both companies, sold the
products from both companies on domestic and overseas markets, and even sold products from Nippon
Suisan “Global Links” companies, all with the aim of
expanding business in Latin America. By working withDersa, Nippon Suisan was able to jointly operate fishing quotas, strengthen resource management, jointly
operate vessels, and make businesses more profitablethrough the efficient operation of sales, marketing andmanagement organizations.
This business integration marked an important
turning point for Nippon Suisan’s operations in Latin
America. This integration reinforced the “Global
Links” being promoted by Nippon Suisan and was
positioned as one of the “Local Links” connecting
Nippon Suisan with regional business partners.
Chile’s S.A. was hurt by the spread of ISA

The trawler Oceandawn Desarrollo Oceanico S.A. (DOSA)
Santiago, Chile

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies(infectious salmon anemia) among Atlantic salmon
in all regions in 2007 and damage from severe earthquakes. In 2008 it closed one of its two plants andposted huge losses. The company focused on trout
salmon, which was much less effected by the ISA
outbreak. Conditions improved with good sales of its“Sashimi Trout Trim E” sushi and sashimi fish for theJapanese market sold under its respected “FIVE STAR”
brand.
A new fishing law enacted in Argentina in January
1998 introduced a true ITQ system for the next ten
years (until 2008) for the main fish targeted by the
Nippon Suisan Group such as sea bass, southern blue
whiting, hoki, Merluccius hubbsi. The fish allotment
ratios under the ITQ system were in philosophy effective for 15 years. This allowed for an environment
where planned hauls, production and investment weremore possible than before. As of 2010, quotas provided
to Nippon Suisan Group companies for the abovelisted fish came to a total of 47,000 tons.
The Nippon Suisan Group also targeted Brazil,
one of the newly emerging economies where consumption of marine products was increasing along witheconomic growth. In June 2007, Nippon Suisan andFriosur each purchased 40% stakes in Brazilian seafood
distributor Nordsee in São Paulo. This company wasa Friosur trading partner with good results as a supplierto the commercial-use market. Sales routes in Brazil,
a country with a population of 180 million people,
were expanded by offering salmon and white fish
produced by Nippon Suisan Group companies.

Unionsur 1 (formerly Koyo Maru No.8; renamed in 2003)
Empresa de Desarrollo Pesquero de Chile S.A. Santiago, Chile370

Enhancing Domestic Aquaculture BusinessIn order fulfill its role in reviving Japan’s fisheries
industry, Nippon Suisan helped to bolster access tomarine resources within Japan. One example is Nippon
Suisan’s aquaculture business, which is seen as a promising business as access to natural marine resources
becomes more difficult.
In January 2004, Nippon Suisan was asked to takeover the operations of the failed Takamaru Co., Ltd.,
which was involved yellowtail aquaculture. Nippon
Suisan then established Kurose Suisan Co., Ltd.
(Kushima City, Miyazaki Prefecture) and entered theyellowtail fish farming business.
During that same year the Imari Fish Feed and Oil
Plant was completed, becoming the second domestic
production site for aquaculture formula feed after the
Onagawa Fish Feed and Oil Plant. Advanced measurement and mixing equipment were installed and asystem for instantly understanding the history of thematerials used in the feed production was adopted.
Feed types best suited for each stage of yellowtail
farming at Kurose Suisan, from hatching to adulthood,are mixed and produced based on the results of research
conducted at the Oita Marine Biological Technology

Imari Fish Feed and Oil Plant (Imari City, Saga Prefecture)

Center.
In fiscal 2006, an Aquaculture Promotion Section
was established and placed in charge of the Oita
Marine Biological Technology Center and aquaculture
was positioned as a core business for Nippon Suisan.
The Oita Marine Biological Technology Centerstarted research activities from 1994. Along with supporting the development and expansion of Nippon
Suisan’s aquaculture business, the center also studied
measures for fish diseases, developed artificial seedlings, researched breeds, developed land-based aquaculture, feed supply and offshore aquaculture
technologies. The center also supported the foundations for the aquaculture business and establishedtechnologies for raising the value of the entire aquaculture business.

Kurose Suisan’s process of yellowtail culture and processing
Landing
Processing

Adult fish

Packaged “Kurose Yellowtail”

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

Kurose Suisan Co., Ltd.
Kushima City, Miyazaki prefecture371

In May 2006, Nippon Suisan took a stake in tuna
farming company Nakatani Suisan Co., Ltd. (Setouchicho, Oshima-gun, Kagoshima Prefecture) and tuna
farming operations were started at Amami Oshima
in Kagoshima Prefecture. Synergies were generated
between Nippon Suisan’s research of feeds/cultivations and fish farming technologies/expertise accumulated by Nakatani Suisan. At the same time, systems
were put in place for delivering to markets a stablesupply of cultivated tuna, which are excellent in termsof traceability, safety and reliability. Along with entry
into this tuna farming business, Koshikijima in
Kagoshima Prefecture was added as a base for tuna
cultivation operations.
In 2007, short-term large bluefin tuna farming
operations were started in Ine Bay, Kyoto Prefecture.
Bluefin tuna weighing around 100 kg caught by Kyowa
Suisan Co., Ltd. were cultivated in a fish preserve
established by Nakatani Suisan in Ine Bay. From
November of that year, the “Ine Maguro (Ine’s tuna)”brand was shipped to upscale sushi bars, Japaneserestaurants and inns. Ine Maguro was well received,with flavor said to be comparable to that of high quality tuna caught in the ocean.
Nippon Suisan also conducted fishing operations
within Japan’s EEZ as a measure for bolstering accessto marine resources in Japan. Japan ranks 60th in theworld in terms of national land area, but 6th in termsof EEZ area, which is indicative of a major island
nation. However, policies and research for increasingthese fish hauls have become issues to address. In orderto drastically revive Japan’s fishing industry, there
needs to be thorough resource management based on
science, marine products that will appeal to the world
will need to be produced and supply chains will need
to be built.
Based on these considerations, Nippon Suisan
decided to participate in fishing within Japan’s EEZ.
This decision was spurred on by a request to provide
business and financial support in 2005 to net fishingand offshore trawl fishery firm Kyowa Suisan of Tottori
Prefecture and affiliated company Tokai Gyogyo
K.K.
In order to stabilize management for Kyowa Suisan
and Nakatani Suisan, Nippon Suisan in March 2008
began participating in the management of Kyowa
Suisan, making it a Group company, and in May ofthat year began participating in the management ofNakatani Suisan, also adding it to the Group. Nippon
Suisan took these developments as an opportunity toraise the value of marine resources with the aim ofdrastically reviving Japan’s fisheries industry.

Nakatani Suisan Co., Ltd.
Oshima-gun, Kagoshima Prefecture
Fish breeding preserve (Amami Oshima)

Kyowa Suisan Co., Ltd.
Sakaiminato City, Tottori Prefecture

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

Antarctic Krill Business and Mission
In October 1974, Nippon Suisan began operating the
trawler Aso Maru, the first private-sector vessel to fish
for Antarctic krill. At that time the boiled-food product “Oki-Ebi” was being sold as a shrimp substitute.
In 1982, Chile’s EMDEPES began operating the vessel
Fuji. In 1994 the vessel Tsuda Maru was purchased,
refitted and introduced as the EMDEPES vessel

372

Unionsur. However, in 2004 this ship was returned
to Japanese ownership in order to develop a businesswith stable earnings. Operations were started withthis vessel renamed the Niitaka Maru.
The total volume of krill resources in Antarctica isbelieved to be between several hundred to several
billion tons. Since 1980 these resources have been
managed by the Commission for the Conservationof Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).
Krill is mainly used as fishing bait, but other applications include biologically active substances, gyosho
fish sauce, foods, aquaculture feed, pet foods and meal.
In 1998 krill was processed into a powder and used to
manufacturer fermented seasonings, a product thatwas later patented.
Since its founding, Nippon Suisan had conductedboth fishing and sales operations. However, in 2001
it established a Krill Operations Department combining these two operations, in order to better respondto market and customer changes. In terms of thehandled products, there was a shift from the previous
sales of frozen bulk products to a specialization infishing bait. Raw frozen packaged products and powdered products such as “TSURI-MAO” were developed and marketed. However, earnings declined as
the market for fishing bait contracted and bait produced overseas began entering the market. Searchingfor some way to continue the business became a pressing matter.
From 2002 sales were expanded to target the leisurefishing market as a product strategy measure, while atthe same time development of industrial-use pharmaceuticals and chemicals products were promoted.
Efforts were also made to reduce costs related to distribution and operation of the Niitaka Maru. A “Krill
Project” was launched in 2004 to pursue new possibilities for krill. A krill extraction method was established and a patent application was submitted in
March 2007. Functionality was researched with a focus
on the EPA and DHA contained in krill. Tests suggested that EPA and DHA could deliver certain effects
such as improved brain functions and functions

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

promoting the metabolism of alcohol in the body.
Applications as feed for aquaculture were also studied,and krill was used as fish-luring agents and early-stage
feed for fish breeding.
In April 2008, group company Esa Ichiban Co.,
Ltd. was merged with Nippo Shokuhin Kogyo Co.,
Ltd. in order to expand operations and improve management efficiency. Nippon Suisan’s sales of feed todealers were transferred to Nippo Shokuhin Kogyoand efforts were made to improve earnings throughexpanded krill sales and more efficient operations.

Establishment of Food Products Business
Production Bases
In order to generate high earnings and increase competitiveness for the Food Products Business, domestic
production sites were concentrated to the greatest
extent possible and optimal arrangement of sites waspromoted with the aim of streamlining production
functions and reducing labor for domestic group companies. New investment was also made whennecessary.
Shandong Sanfod Nissui, established in China in
June 2004, completed construction of its production
plant in 2005. This comprehensive plant handling the
production of frozen foods and the processing ofmarine products became a core production site in
China for not only the Food Products Business, but
for the Marine Products Business as well. New businesses are also being sought through reforms in cooperation with group companies such as F. W. Bryce,
Nordic Seafood and Cité Marine.
In November 2004, Hachikan Co., Ltd. was established in Hachinohe City with joint investment from
Hachinohe Kanzume Co., Ltd. This new company
handled the production of mostly bottled shelf-stableand frozen foods, and was considered a main domestic
production site. At the same time, Hachitei Co., Ltd.
and the Nippon Suisan Shimizu Plant were mergedwith their production functions concentrates at
Hachikan.

373

Marusa Sasaya Shoten Co.
Kushiro City, Hokkaido

In September 2008, the group’s largest frozen foods
production plant was established within Hachikan inorder to develop the Food Products Business andrealize higher profits, particularly in terms of expanding production for commercial-use frozen foods. The
Hachinohe region is a prominent landing site fordomestic marine products. Hachikan was positioned
as a site for the production and processing of principal
marine raw materials with an eye on linking the raw
materials procurement capabilities of Hachinohe
Kanzume with the Hokkaido marine products procurement capabilities of Marusa Sasaya Shoten Co.
Hachikan has functions for primary processing ofmarine raw materials, as well as various processing
functions for precooked seaweed such as fried seafood,gratins and croquette. This modern plant puts safety
and reliability first in consideration of food defense.
The plant also considers high productivity, energy
conservation and environmental preservation. Before
the established of this plant, Hokkaido Teion Shokuhin

K.K. was dissolved in July 2008.
As an initial step for the “2 in 5 Plan” (doubling
food plant production in five years), a production line
for the core yaki-onigiri product was started at the
Nippon Suisan Hachioji General Plant.
Furthermore, capital participation was used to makeimportant companies long entrusted with production
operations as affiliates for which the equity method
would be applied. In October 2007, investments weremade in Kaneko Shokuhin Co., Ltd. (Mitoyo City,
Kagawa Prefecture) a producer of frozen preparedfoods, Kunihiro Inc. (Onomichi City, Hiroshima
Prefecture) a producer of processed and frozen foods(mainly oyster), and Marusa Sasaya Shoten (Kushiro
City, Hokkaido), a supplier of Hokkaido surimi. Thenin December of that year, investment was made in Tai
Mei Food Industrial Corp. (Kaohsiung City, Taiwan),a Taiwanese firm that grows and processes (freezes)
edamame. Then in November of the following year,
investment was made in Tomiso Co., Ltd. (Nagoya
City, Aichi Prefecture), a producer of kneaded marine
products. Efforts were made to strengthen partnerships with these companies, share the development,
production and sales functions of the Nippon SuisanGroup and create value.
Bolstering Fine Chemicals Business Systems
The Kashima Plant in Kamisu City, Ibaraki Prefecture,

The Kashima Plant: The second construction phase was completed in October 2008.

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies374

completed in October 2008, has served as a base fordeveloping advanced fish oil manufacturing technologies and new materials for the pharmaceutical, functional lipids and feed fields. All fine chemicals-related
production functions within the group were concentrated and integrated at this site, which was considereda core production site for boosting production capacity and technological reforms for the entire Fine
Chemicals Business.
Production of this site was divided into two phases.
The first phase, completed in April 2007, covered
equipment for the production of pharmaceuticals andsubsidiary products. The second phase considered the
expansion and integration of functions for production
equipment used for the group’s fine chemicals fields
such as functional food products and chemical products. This helped to enhance development for thepharmaceuticals, nutrition and cosmetics fields,
including such items as advanced unsaturated fatty
acids, chitin/chitosan derivatives, marine wax andcholesterols. Leveraging this plant helped open up
new areas in the fine chemicals field and increaseawareness of Nippon Suisan as a producer of finechemicals.
In April of 2008, group company Kyowa TechnosCo., Ltd. (Sanbu-gun, Chiba Prefecture), which manufactures pharmaceutical progenitor starting materials,
chitin/chitosan and marine waxes to be sold as industrial-use products, was absorbed. Along with optimizing lipids distribution that was dispersed throughout
the group, the integration of this company’s finechemicals material production functions was also
intended to improve business growth and earning
capacity through business selection & concentrationand more advanced development functions.
In June of that year, the Fine Chemicals Department
was changed to the Fine Chemicals Business Operations
Department and the Tsukuba and Kashima plants wereplaced under the control of this new department.

Kurahashi Co., Ltd. Fukuyama City, Hiroshima Prefecture
Fukuyama regional wholesale market (fish market)

Hiroshimasuisan Co., Ltd.
Hiroshima City, Hiroshima Prefecture

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

Fine Foods Business Approaches
The Fine Foods Business was started in the mid 1990’s
as a food-related business within the Fine Chemicals
Department. Along with Chilldy, this business produced dressings, sauces and other seasonings for convenience stores.
The line of products was expanded in 1994 andmentaiko (spicy fish eggs) pasta sauce for convenience
stores and white sauces for restaurants became major
products.
In March 2002, a separated and independent Fine
Foods Business Department was established. Then in
March 2009, the Fine Foods Business Department
was incorporated into the Food Service Products
Department in order to boost synergies with thecommercial-use foods business.
Scrap & Build for Domestic Group Companies
In April 2008, the marine products sales section of
Nippon Suisan’s Marine Products Division—Sapporo

375

Marine Products Section and the food products sales
section of the Nippon Suisan Sapporo branch office
were separated and absorbed by group company Teion
Co., Ltd. with the aims of building a supply chain basein the Hokkaido region and a new foundation forearnings. Teion’s headquarters were moved to Sapporo
and the company name was changed to Hokkaido
Nissui Co., Ltd. In this manner an earnings foundation
was established for the sales business in the Hokkaido
region through improved business efficiency.
Nippon Suisan decided to reorganize its trading
and wholesale operations in order to focus on its manufacturing functions. Under this policy, some consolidated group companies were converted to equity
method companies, avenues to open business development were created and a broad contribution to society
was made by providing more advanced functions andservices.
Nippon Suisan in March 2006 participated in the
rehabilitation of Kurahashi Co., Ltd. (Hiroshima
Prefecture) and, with joint investment, established a
new company. Nippon Suisan took over the management rights of the new company and kept the company
name unchanged. This wholesaler of marine products
and marketer of frozen and processed foods had built
a solid relationship with Nippon Suisan over many
years and fulfilled an important role in supplying
marine products and other foods to the local region.
More effective ties with the Nippon Suisan Group
were promoted and the company was rebuilt with afocus on its main operations.

In April 2006, the food service and chilled foods
business of comprehensive wholesaler Kato Sangyo
Co., Ltd. were spun off to form Kato Teion Co., Ltd.
(Nishinomiya City, Hyogo Prefecture). Then in
October 2008, Kato Teion was merged with Nippon
Suisan Group company Kanesho Co., Ltd. (Itami City,
Hyogo Prefecture). The aim was to expand businessin the food services and chilled foods distribution
fields through specialization, enhanced intermediate
distribution functions and a higher level of service.
Upon the merger, the company name was changed to
K-Teion Foods Co., Ltd. and the new entity was madea Nippon Suisan equity method company.
In April 2008, Nippon Suisan and Chuo Gyorui
Co., Ltd. merged their group companies Hohsui and
Chuo Reito K.K. in order to reorganize the parent
companies’ marine products distribution functions
in order to build a stronger distribution network.
Hohsui was the surviving company and became amember of the Chuo Gyorui Group. Nippon Suisan
spun off its marine products logistics business to create
Suisan Ryutsu Co., Ltd., which became a Hohsui
consolidated company.
Nippon Suisan invested in Hiroshimasuisan Co.,
Ltd. (Hiroshima Prefecture) in September 2008 andMaruuo Suisan Co., Ltd. (Hyogo Prefecture) in March
2010. These two marine products wholesalers wereturned into Nippon Suisan equity method
companies.
In March 2009, Nippon Suisan increased its stakein Daisui Co., Ltd., a major marine products

Maruuo Suisan Co., Ltd.
Himeji City, Hyogo Prefecture

Daisui Co., Ltd.
Osaka City, Osaka

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies376

wholesaler in the Osaka, Kyoto and Kobe central
wholesale markets, making it an equity method company. Daisui had long been an important customer
for Nippon Suisan. When Daisui asked for management support, Nippon Suisan agreed to buy new sharesthrough a public offering.
Strategic Reforms of Distribution Functions
Business reforms were also applied to the General
Distribution Business, which supports the Marine
Products and Food Products business. A new Supply
Chain Management (SCM) section was establishedin 2006, integrated management was applied todomestic and foreign production, inventory and shipping, and joint distribution of chilled/frozen foods
with other firms was adopted. Organizations werereconfigured, an International Distribution Section
and Distribution Section were established under aSupply Chain Officer, inventory analysts were introduced, the ordering centers for the Hachioji and
Himeji Plants were consolidated, integrated management was applied to the supply chain and functions
were expanded.
Refrigerated storage operations within the groupwere consolidated and integrated in order to realize
the New TGL Plan strategies of “improve profitability
for core businesses” and “create leverage and synergies
with group management strategies”. In April 2007 the
Nissui Logistics Corporation was launched to consolidate the 26 frozen storage operations across Japan

from Tobu Reizo Shokuhin, Seibu Reizo Shokuhin
and those directly operated by Nippon Suisan. The
aim was to increase profits by uncovering local customers and capturing customers over a wider areas, as wellas improving competitiveness through low cost operations. In order to cope with a decline in incoming
shipments of marine products from overseas, Nissui
Logistics bolstered 3PL operations in which it takeson comprehensive distribution operations for domestic mass retailers and restaurant industry. There wereincreases in handled items other than marine products,
such as precision equipment and flowers.
The area covered by joint shipping of chilled andfrozen foods with competing companies, which started
in 1999, was gradually expanded to cover Hokkaido,
southern Kyushu, and the Chukyo region (Gifu and
Mie Prefecture). This development of joint distribution, which included joint storage, in 2007 expandedfrom the distribution base in Osaka to all of Shikoku.
In 2009 this joint distribution included the Kinki
region. Joint distribution was started for northern andcentral Kyushu in 2008. The background for establishing such joint distribution was the spirit behind theestablishment of FINET; specifically “joint infrastructure for fair market competition”.
In June 2009, a joint storage and shipping base wasestablished in Hiroshima for coverage of the Shikoku
and western Chugoku regions. This base was authorized as a business promoting the Green Partnershipand CO2 emissions were cut by about 14%.
Stronger Quality Assurance

Nissui Logistics Corporation
Kawasaki Distribution Center

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

The global inspection system, based mainly on the
Food Safety Research Center, was further improvedin order to address the “positive list” system introducedin May 2006 to guard against pesticide residue infoods. Standards were set for the use of agriculturalchemicals and animal drugs at farms and fish breeding
grounds, and a system was put in place to manage thetracing of raw materials for processing and otherinformation.

377

Between 2006 and 2008 the food industry was
impacted by a series of scandals that increased mistrustin food. These included the use of expired raw materials, altering of expiration dates, camouflaged raw
materials and malicious food tampering. These incidents prompted reviews of quality control. So in
March 2008, Nippon Suisan established a Prevention
Management Section within the Quality Assurance
Office and prevention management was promoted.
This meant that the focus of the established mechanisms was not restoration after a quality control event,but rather preventing the occurrence of such eventsin the first place.
Also in March of 2008, the Quality Control Center
China was reorganized as a company organization
with the establishment of the Qingdao Nissui Food
Research and Development Co., Ltd. This company
not only made verifications so the Nippon SuisanGroup could guarantee the safety of its raw materials
and products, but also engaged in the developmentof products produced in China.
This provided Asia with two major quality assurance bases, along with the Quality Control Center
Thailand established in January 2004.
Even before the Tokyo regulations of June 2009
regarding the provision of information on where raw
materials were produced, Nippon Suisan in November
2008 established a Raw Materials Information Section
and began operating a system for managing such information on raw materials origins.

Chanpon product without tray
Before (left) and after (right) change to tray-less packaging

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

Expanded Environmental Approaches in
Business Divisions
In June 2006, an Environment Office was establishedseparate from the Quality Assurance and Environment
Preservation Office’s Environment Section in order
to better promote corporate activities for a “materialcycle society”, such as reducing burdens placed on theenvironment. The level of awareness for the overall
group was raised by issuing Environment Reports,
confirming progress in reducing environmental burdens by each division and sharing good examples.
At the same time, environmental awareness activities spread to each division.
The Food Products Division became increasinglyinterested in environmental measures pertaining topackaging materials. In late 2005, trays used for noodles, ingredients and soups were abolished in order toreduce the amount of packaging materials used forthe frozen food product “Chanpon Noodles”.
Changing the form of frozen noodles to support easierpreparation also resulted in downsizing for all
products.
The fish sausage product “Osakana no Sausage”
became recognized as a product with environmentallyfriendly packaging and a big marketing effect wasachieved. The aluminum wire used for many years toclose the fish sausage packaging film was abolishedthanks to technology that realized a sealing tape madefrom the same materials as the packaging film. This
revamped product, launched in September 2007 as

Eco-Clip Osakana no Sausage
Before (left) and after (right) change to Eco-Clip378

“Eco-Clip Osakana no Sausage”, reenergized the stagnant fish sausage market and helped Nippon Suisan
retake market share.
The group’s main production sites and distribution
businesses adopted individual environmental preservation activities in line with the content of their businesses. The Kashima Plant used byproducts from theproduction process as fuel for boilers, and implemented other hardware solutions for the effective
utilization of marine resources without any waste. For
example, the Hachikan frozen foods plant introduced
various types of equipment to reduce burdens placedon the environment and became a model plant interms of energy-saving and environmental preservation measures. All new freezers used natural coolingagents and frying oils were reused to power boilers. A
solar power system installed on the roof is expected
to generate 40,000 kilowatts of electricity each year
and reduce CO2 emissions by about 22 tons.
Nissui Logistics worked with the Nippon Suisan
Supply Chain Management Department to from fiscal
2007 replace the conventional pallets made from woodand resin to pallets made from plastic bag sheets, andto recycle these pallets. Only one sheet pallet can beused for the entire journey to the delivery destination.
This reduced loading labor, improved load volume
efficiency and reduced the amount of time needed forloading. Natural cooling mediums were adopted forrefrigerators when additions were made to the
Kawasaki Distribution Center. Refrigeration equipment at distribution centers was gradually replacedwith energy-saving models in order to reduce energy
consumption.
Improving Internal Controls
Internal controls were improved in order to prepare
for the so-called Japanese version of SOX laws.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX Act or the U.S.’s“Corporate and Auditing Accountability andResponsibility Act”) enacted in July 2002 drasticallyreformed corporate internal controls and auditing

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophiessystems with the aim of increasing the transparency
and accuracy of corporate accounting and financial
reporting. The Act also defined the responsibilities
and obligations of corporate managers, and set forpenalty-based regulations. Improving internal controls
became necessary for Japanese corporations as greater
globalization of corporate activities led to calls formore management and accounting transparency. In
September 2007 the Securities and Exchange Law wasrevised and became the Financial Law, which included
enactment of the so-called Japanese version of the
SOX Act ( J-SOX), which would be applied to listed
firms from the fiscal year ending March 2009.
In order to comply with these legal changes, Nippon
Suisan in April 2007 launched the Internal Control
Project and in March 2008 built an internal control
system for realizing social responsibilities as a listed
firm. Standards and procedures were set so that eachbusiness division could effectively manage operations
and accurately prepare financial statements. Efforts
were also made to build an information system forbuilding the related management and supervisorysystems. For affiliated companies as well, systems were
gradually built to support their internal controls.
Research & Development
An R&D strategy in the New TGL Plan was to establish bio-production aquaculture technologies in orderto create new values for marine resources. The Food
Functions Research Laboratory (name changed to
Human Life Science R&D Center in fiscal 2009) andBio-production Research Center were established infiscal 2006.
The Food Functions Research Laboratory established functions linked to the development of new
products with the aim of enhancing business for functional materials such as chitin/chitosan. The Bioproduction Research Center worked on bio-production
technologies as new methods for acquiring resources
so that EPA/DHA can be extracted from seaweed andother cultivated organisms instead of relying on natu-

379

ral fish oils.
Nippon Suisan has even participated in joint government/industry/academia research projects (including national institutions) and, in doing so, has
supported the development of Japan’s fishing industry
from the R&D side. In 2006, Nippon Suisan was
selected along with Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding
Co., Ltd. as partners in the “Innovation Platform for
Fisheries and Marine Technology” operated throughthe Tokyo University of Marine Science andTechnology. These partners worked together to create
strategic innovations for the marine biology (aquaculture) field. This project was one of the activities
put forth by the Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology to promote advanced,
cutting-edge research. Nippon Suisan also participatedin Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
research projects and has developed a system for maintaining a high level of freshness by introducing technologies for easing stresses from catching large fish, afeeding system for off-shore aquaculture and technologies for a high degree of freshness and efficient processing needed to make Japanese saury a global product.
The organization of the Central ResearchLaboratory was changed in 2007. Specifically, a laboratory system was used to progress management andpersonnel development, and a team system was used
to clarify responsibilities. The Aquaculture Basic
Research Laboratory, Marine Food Products ResearchLaboratory and Health Basic Research Laboratory
were established to serve as the sections responsible
for fulfilling the obligations of “achieve high earnings
for aquaculture business”, “high-degree application ofmarine resources” and “contribute to good healththrough ocean resources” specified in the New TGL
Plan. Furthermore, study sessions bringing together
laboratories with different functions to address ashared theme were held to reinforce cross-sectionalties.
In fiscal 2007, the Research Planning Promotion
Office was established as a section to compliment andsupport the effective functioning of research laboratories throughout group companies in order to enhance
R&D from a global perspective. During that same
year, Nippon Suisan established an overseas satellite
laboratory in Holland’s “Food Valley”, which has
attracted various research institutions and prominent
global food companies such as Nestlé Ltd. and
Masterfoods Ltd. Research activities mainly in theareas of food processing, functional foods, food safety
and fermentation (bio-production) were started.
Systems were put in place for joint research with external research organizations. Joint research was conducted with industry, government and academia.
Research was entrusted to related organizations andpartnerships were formed with other companies.
Between fiscal 2007 and 2008 the Bio-production
Research Center began research and development of
an EPA production method based on Labyrinthula(minute alga). Nippon Suisan launched a LabyrinthulaStudy Group and engaged in joint research with industry and academia with a focus on showing that
Labyrinthula accumulates DHA and other highly
unsaturated fatty acids, as well as the utilization of inproduction.

2. Approaches during Second Half of New TGL Plan Implementation Period
Qualitative Approaches to Individual Reforms
Operating profit could not be obtained as planned
during the three-year period between fiscal 2006 and2008. Operating profit in fiscal 2007 and 2008 fell
below the target levels. Targets were missed mainly

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

because fish prices were impacted by the surge in costs
for surimi and other raw materials. Group sales, whichwere 552.8 billion yen in fiscal 2006, declined to 533.9
billion yen in fiscal 2007 and 505.2 billion yen in fiscal
2008 as the status of some group companies waschanged to equity method companies.

380

With the interim rolling of the New TGL Plan,
conclusions were reached that the Nippon Suisan
business model would need to be changed in order tobetter match the times and that the New TGL Plan
could not be completed successfully without reforms.
Specifically, the target of becoming a high earning
corporation was not being reached with the prevailing
improvements. Decreased income was due to contractions for the purpose of business structure reforms,
but the targeted growth drivers did not function as
expected and the expectations for earning power
reforms were not met.
Very difficult business conditions were expected topersist in fiscal 2009. Against this background, thefollowing two self-reform items were noted as being
absolutely essential.
The first was to change from the current approachof “manufacturing linked to resources and dinnertables with integrated business as the core” to the new
approach of “manufacturing linked to resources andlifestyles with functions and technologies as the base”.
The goals were for the Marine Products Business toconsider consumer scenes, for the Food Products
Business to focus on creating categories, and for the
Fine Chemicals Business to work on raising the qualityof lifestyles. The aim was also to increase points ofcontact with consumer lifestyles by switching fromthe conventional supply chain approach to a new value
chain approach.
The second needed reform was a “quantitative
growth approach” to increasing market shares andimproving efficiency. Specifically, switch from thecurrent drive for quantitative expansion to cuttingedge technology/service levels, differentiation, uniqueness and individuality. Strive for a “qualitative growth
approach” that builds organizations with a higher
awareness of norms that act based on reason and logic,
in other words, reforms that pursue qualitative
fulfillment.
To this end, the following three policies were put
forward.
1) Do not maintain current businesses that cannot

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

be reformed. Determine if businesses should beabandoned, transitioned to equity-method companies with final decisions made after a grace
period, or aggressively expanded.
2) Accelerate reforms in order to create new growthareas. Especially for the fine chemicals business,use marine functional materials to create unsurpassed business structures and expand points ofcontact with consumer lifestyles. Improve R&D
efficiency from the viewpoints of enhancing
R&D/manufacturing functions and expanding
points of contact with consumer lifestyles.
3) Reform management structures with the aims
of matching the decision process with practice,maximizing group results and clarify returns on
investment. Strive for optimal sales, logistics andinventory management on a global scale.

Preparing Organizational Foundations for
Reforming Management
Falling just before the company’s 100th anniversary,
fiscal 2009 and 2010 were extremely important periods
for connecting the current Nippon Suisan Group with
its future.
Anti-takeover measures were introduced in June2009 to prevent entities from acquiring large amountsof Nippon Suisan shares. Measures were put in place
to prevent large share acquisitions that could damage
the value of the Nippon Suisan Group and the sharingof profits with shareholders. In order realize this basic
policy, improving corporate value and enhancing corporate governance were included in the New TGL
Plan (medium-term business plan). As for the latter,an executive officer system was introduced during thisperiod. The Board of Directors’ management decision
making functions and business administration/supervision functions were separated from the duties andfunctions of executive officers. At the same time thenumber of directors was reduced to no more than ten
and two external board members were appointed.
The realization of reforms was a key consideration381

in the reorganization of systems in March 2009. The
Fisheries and Food Products Business Operation
Division was newly established to promote the integration and enhancement of marketing functions andsupply chain management functions for the Marine
Products Business and Food Products Business.
Supervision of the four businesses of Marine Products,
Food Products, North America and South America
were placed under the chief operating officer anddeputy operating officer. Furthermore, the Marketing
Planning Office and Supply Chain Management
Department were installed as secretariat functions forthe chief operating officer and deputy operating officer. The Global Group Management Promotion
Council was established to optimize group management for global expansion and the Global Group
Strategic Planning Office under the direct supervisionof the president was newly established as a full-timesecretariat. Within the Support Administration
Division, the Food Function Research Center wasconverted to the Human Life Science R&D Centerwith the scope of its research expanded from foods toall lifestyle items.
The Marine Products Business was also enhancedby the March 2010 structural revisions. In order toenhance sales capabilities more from the perspectiveof the customer, sales functions and procurement
functions were separated. Sales functions were converted from the conventional system of responsibility
assigned by type of fish to a system of responsibility
assigned by type of customer. Moreover, a fisheries
products sales promotion officer was placed under
the direct supervision of the chief operating officer inorder to promote further evolution for cooperation
between the Marine Products Business and Food
Products Business.
The following four councils were also formed tosupport management reforms during the second halfof the New TGL Plan implementation period.
•Global Management Promotion Council: Provide
proactive management for group companies andstudy priority issues for the group.
•Innovation Promotion Council: Analyze the stateof progress for reforms within the group and consider
needed measures.
•R&D Promotion Council: Confirm the progress of
research, as well as obstacles and other problems.
Promote the “visualization” of research and consider
paths to commercialization.
•Fine Chemicals Business Promotion Council: Study
the overall Fine Chemicals Business across all sections, promote the “visualization” of this business,eliminate overlap and analyze the state of progressfor making reforms.
The following two councils were also formed tosupport the activities of the Fisheries and Food
Products Business Operation Division.
•Inventory Investment Council: Support the activitiesof the Fisheries and Food Products Business
Operation Division and consider global production,
sales and inventory.
•Marketing Council: Support the activities of theFisheries and Food Products Business Operation
Division and analyze sales trends, the progress of
new product development and market/competition
conditions for the main marine and food products.

3. Local Links for Independent Competitive Predominance
Enhancing Local Links
From 2007 the Nippon Suisan Group began constructing “Local Links” as mechanisms for the further
evolution of Global Links. The goal was for Global
Links member companies to cooperate with their

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

respective local regions, improve management efficiency, while becoming more entrenched in the local
regions and developing business opportunities ingrowth markets. The aim was to use this two-layered
structure (Global and Local Links) to realize independent competitive predominance in the respective382

local regions, drive further growth and increase earning capacity.
The establishment of DOSA in South America
bolstered management and marketing functions andallowed for the construction of a foothold in Brazil,
a newly emerging economy. The addition of the G.F.C.
to the Nippon Suisan Group drastically improved
production, procurement, processing and sales functions in North America. Participation in Cité Marine
not only provided Nippon Suisan with its first manufacturing functions in Europe, but combinations withthe already bolstered sales functions helped to further
strengthen the European supply chain. In Japan, participation in Kyowa Suisan and Nakatani Suisan
allowed for the development of a new business throughthe “Ine Maguro” brand.
Afterwards, further efforts were made to continue
strengthening Local Links.
The new Nippon Suisan Group company Netuno
Internacional was established in Brazil in May 2010,
allowing for participation in tilapia and shrimp farming, as well the sales of processed goods in Brazil. This
company was established with joint investment by
Chile’s DOSA and Netuno Alimentos S.A., Brazil’s
largest aquaculture/marine products processing company. The Nippon Suisan Group was able to realizeboth penetration into the strategic aquaculture fieldand development of a new market, while enhancing
Local Links in South America and Global Links.
UniSea in North America had succeeded in expanding its crab business in 2005, but still invested in

Netuno Internacional S.A.
Recife, Pernambuco, Brazil

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

Hakata Marukita Suisan Co., Ltd.
Fukuoka City, Fukuoka Prefecture

Alaskan Beauty, which held crab fishing quotas, inorder to further ensure a stable supply. K&P earnings
were hurt by cyclone damage and in 2009 its statuschanged from a Gorton’s affiliate to a Nissui U.S.A.
affiliate and support was provided for rebuilding
operations. Nippon Suisan was able to form threebusiness fields in North America: (1) UniSea’s Alaska
pollack and crab processing in Alaska, (2) marine
products frozen foods business based mainly on whitefish from Gorton’s and K&P, and (3) marine commodities business through F.W. Bryce.
In Japan the domestic supply chain for sukeko wasstrengthened by investing in a sukeko processing andmarketing company. Hakata Marukita Suisan Co.,
Ltd. was established as a wholly-owned subsidiary inDecember 2009, and Nippon Suisan began participating in the sukeko fields, utilizing the strength of its
access to marine resources. The HQ plant, Chikko
Plant, land and buildings at the Koga Plant and trademarks for “Hakata Ago-otoshi” and other productsTokyo Kitaichi Co., Ltd.
Yoshikawa City, Saitama Prefecture383

Sales Network Expansion

Delmar Co., Ltd.
Chiba City, Chiba Prefecture

held by Hakata Marukita, which was undergoing civil
rehabilitation, were all transferred to the newcompany.
Tokyo Kitaichi Co., Ltd., which had been supplying
Nippon Suisan with materials for sukeko processing,
became an equity-method company in February 2010
after a third party share issuance to raise capital. Thenin April of that year, additions were made to the Tokyo
Kitaichi’s Hokkaido Plant in order to boost production, while also expanding sales with a focus on massmerchandisers.
Frozen seafood producer Delmar Co., Ltd. (Chiba
City, Chiba Prefecture) was purchased in July 2010
with the aim of expanding the pre-cooked frozen
seafood business. The aim was to achieve strong synergies between Delmar’s seafood processing technologies
and production/sales networks with Nippon Suisan’saccess to marine resources, production/sales networks
and product development capabilities.

TN Fine Chemicals Co., Ltd.
Bangkok, Thailand

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

Sales networks in Japan and Europe were bolstered in2010 in order to further enhance Global Links.
In order to bolster sales networks in Asia, sales of
products to the Japanese and South Korean markets
by Sealord were handed over to the Nippon Suisan
headquarters in July 2010. With the Nippon SuisanGroup having made progress globally, this move wasin line with the policy for integrating sales functions
with the same markets. The aim was to boost sales
efficiency by eliminating overlapping functions within
the group.
By taking on these sales functions from Sealord,white fish produced in New Zealand were added to
the Nippon Suisan white fish operations, which consisted mainly of hoki from South American. This
move contributed to the predominant supply system
for the East Asian market, starting with Japan andSouth Korea. In addition to its conventional sales ofprocessing materials, Sealord was now also able toprovide high value-added products for sales best suitedfor each customer due to access to the Nippon SuisanGroup’s processing and other functions.
Nordic Seafood became a wholly-owned subsidiaryin August 2010. This acquisition increased recognitionof the Nippon Suisan Group in Europe and further
enriched the Global Links.

Hokkaido Fine Chemical Co., Ltd.
Hakodate City, Hokkaido

384

Opening New Fields with Fine Chemicals Business
Production bases for the Fine Chemicals Businesswere bolstered. Through joint investment with Thai
seafood processing giant Thai Union Group, TN Fine
Chemicals Co., Ltd. was established to serve as an
Asian production base. The new company started
manufacturing fine chemical raw materials using
byproducts from seafood processed by the Thai Union
Group. TN Fine Chemicals business was supported
through ties with Nippon Suisan’s Kashima, Tsukuba
and Sakaiminato Plants.
Hokkaido Fine Chemical Co., Ltd. (HakodateCity) was established in December 2008 after a transfer of some business operations from Nippon Chemical
Feed Co., Ltd. Operations, mainly primary refiningof fish oils and the production of functional lipids,
were started from April 2009.
ARA (arachidonic acid) is valued around the world
as a key nutrient in the infant nutrition field after
DHA. In fact, the CODEX Commission (international intergovernmental organization protecting
consumer health, ensuring fair trade of food products
and setting international food standards) in 2007
recommended ARA along with DHA as an additive
for use in powder milk for infants. The market for
ARA grew suddenly in Japan with strong interest in
its application as a health supplement material. In
November 2009, Nippon Suisan took over some technologies and operations from Suntory Wellness Ltd.,
introduced bio-production technologies and started
manufacturing lipids containing ARA. This allowed
for the global production and sales of a functional
material for the infant nutrition field, similar to DHA
and cholesterols. Commercialization of bio-production, seen as a third method for procuring future
resources that is not dependent on catching natural
resources, was realized in the New TGL Plan implementation period.

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

Enhancing Quality Assurance
The number of key production sites increased in 2009
with operations set to kick off for Hachikan and withcapital participation in other plants. At the same time
activities in the quality assurance field wereexpanded.
New issues were addressed such as constructing a
raw materials information management system andbuilding a food defense system to prevent malicious
food tampering. Food analysis capabilities at eachplant were improved with the aim of having even moreaccurate inspection systems in place.
Nippon Suisan again took steps in 2010 tostrengthen its quality assurance system. The numberof customer complaints stabilized after completingthe quality assurance system stipulated in the 2002
Quality Assurance Charter, but complaints started totrend upward from 2007, producing a sense of alarmin the company. Approaches were taken to address
issues such as eliminating company-centric thinking,preventing the deterioration of standards, thoroughly
implementing prevention management and raisingcustomer satisfaction.
Production site prevention management activities
were enhanced. Two external members were added to
the Quality Assurance Committee so that conditions
could be inspected from perspectives outside of thecompany. Efforts were also made to listen to the opinions of consumers and raise customer satisfaction.
Efforts were made to again establish an integrated
quality assurance system covering all aspects of operations from fishing sites, aquaculture, produce farms
and poultry farms to production sites and distribution,right up to the dinner table. Specifically the philosophies of the Quality Assurance Charter were clearly
indicated, all employees were asked to completely
fulfill their responsibilities for ensuring quality andefforts were made to raise customer satisfaction.

385

Rapidly Progressing R&D
R&D activities play key roles in the three stated elements that make up the business structure image in
the New TGL Plan.
Specifically, the Marine Food Products ResearchLaboratory of the Central Research Laboratory contributes to “improve the profitability of core businesses”, the Health Basic Research Laboratory of theCentral Research Laboratory and the Human Life
Science R&D Center contributes to “expand profits
through more sophisticated business” and the
Aquaculture Basic Research Laboratory and the Oita
Marine Biological Technology Center contribute to“developing a cutting-edge aquaculture model”. The
Bio-production Research Center has also been working toward the goal of “acquire a third resource acquisition method that does not rely on the harvesting of
natural resources”.
The basic policies for R&D are as follows:
1) Promote research efficiency and commercialization with progress managed by the R&D
Promotion Council.

2) Create new values based on functions and technologies that link resources to lifestyles. Make
the aquaculture business more sophisticated andwith higher earnings. Develop functions withhigh added value for marine resources, as well as
advanced utilization methods.
3) Continue pursuing innovative technologies. Open
new avenues for bio-production technologies.
4) Improve ties within the group between each research
center and product planning department.
The Human Life Science R&D Center looks foradvanced values that can be added to marine resourcesin order to raise the quality of life. The Bio-production
Research Center works to acquire reproducible production methods for EPA and other items.
Furthermore, the Tokyo Innovation Center was
established in Minamino, Hachioji City to mark theapproaching 100th anniversary of Nippon Suisan in
2011. This new center bolsters R&D, contributes tomanagement and business, and supports communication with customers, local regions and society, while
helping to realize Nippon Suisan corporate
philosophies.

Part 4 Passing on the Aspirations of our Pioneers
Ichiro Tamura founded the Tamura Steamship FisheryCompany in Shimonoseki, Yamaguchi Prefecture in
1911 and started trawling operations with Kosuke
Kunishi, marking the foundation of what would
become Nippon Suisan. During the founding of
Nippon Suisan these pioneers expressed their aspirations for the company in the following manner: “Atap water supply system is exactly what marine products should be like in their production and distribution. We seek marine resources from everywhere in
the world, ensure that product are always as fresh as
possible, set up their worldwide marketing network,
just like the tap water pipeline, and distribute them,adjusting their marketing prices in response to
demand... Excess costs related to the distribution ofmarine products also need to be eliminated to realize

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

the distribution costs lowest possible. Earnings
through speculation should not be sought in thecourse of this supply” (Anthology of Writings andSpeeches of Mr. Kosuke Kunishi).
These founding philosophies for Nippon Suisancontinue to be passed down even today.
When we retrace the footsteps of company pioneers
over Nippon Suisan’s 100-year history, it is clear thatthese aspirations have been incorporated into thebusiness models of each era. Even during times ofturmoil, Nippon Suisan overcame difficulties andcontinued growing thanks to the wisdom containedin these aspirations.
Marine resources, the basis for Nippon Suisan’sbusiness, is the only main food staple in the world forwhich more than half of its supply is dependent on

386

nature. Marine resources are currently being placed
under the independent control of nations with sea
coasts, or under multinational joint management. As
such, various restrictions are being placed on capturing
these resources. Furthermore, the impacts of excessive
fishing and climate change on ecosystems have become
increasingly serious. There are many uncertainties
even for the future of aquaculture as various countries
impose restrictions and as environmental groups voice
opposition from the viewpoint of burdens placed on
the environments.
There is also a mountain of concerns for the overall
food industry such as future living environments forthe human race, food problems and food safety.
Demand for food will grow along with global population growth, but there are limits to how much the
supply of food can be increased. The importance offishing industries that can continuously access natural
resources goes without saying. Furthermore, the varieddemands for food are expected to become stronger aschanges in global food supplies produce a more intensecompetitive scramble for food resources.

Against this background, Nippon Suisan will continue to evolve so as to stay true to the ideas of our
founding pioneers, expressed as “The fisheries of ourcountry [Part omitted] not only to solve the foodproblem of our country, but also to help absorb theincreasing population” (Anthology of Writings andSpeeches of Mr. Kosuke Kunishi). Nippon Suisan’s management policy for the start of the 21st century is“Continue to innovate our business, create diverse
values from a sustainable business, specifically fisherybusiness managing resources and marine resources
obtained from aquaculture and bio-production inharmony with the global environment, and deliver
these resources in order to contribute to rich andhealthy lifestyles for the people of the world”.
Recognizing this as Nippon Suisan’s obligation, thecompany will maintain the humble position of “abusiness using resources cultivated in the natural environment”, will work to maximize the benefits of theseresources for the people of the world and continue topass on both the fisheries industry and the aspirationsof our founders to the future.

Photographs courtesy of:
Aioi Works, IHI Corporation
Ako Cultural Promotion Foundation
The Elementary School of Katagiri, Yamatokoriyama City, Nara Prefecture
Mochida Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.
Hiroko Tamura

Realizing Nippon Suisan’s Founding Philosophies

387

Postscript
At 2:46 P.M. on Friday, March 11, 2011, an earthquake
occurred off the coast of Japan’s Sanriku region. The
quake registered 7 on the Japanese seismic intensity
scale in northern Miyagi Prefecture and 5-upper inTokyo’s 23 wards. It generated an enormous tsunamithat struck Pacific coast areas from the Tohoku region
down to the Kanto region, and caused massive damage
that left 25,000 people dead or missing. It had a magnitude of 9.0, making it the largest earthquake inJapan’s recorded history.
In addition to being heavily damaged by the earthquake itself, the Pacific coast region was decimatedby a gigantic tsunami exceeding 10 meters in height.
Based on analysis of aerial photos taken by the
Geospatial Information Authority of Japan, it wasestimated that at least 401 square kilometers of land—or roughly 6.4 times the area enclosed by Tokyo’s JR
Yamanote Line—were inundated. The National Police
Agency estimated that 468,000 people had evacuatedtheir homes as of Monday, March 14 (three days after
the disaster).
The enormous tsunami also caused a nuclear accident. At Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Fukushima Prefecture,radiation was released when the plant’s reactors shut
down and power to equipment for cooling the reactors
and fuel rods was cut off. The government responded
by ordering residents within a 20-kilometer radius of
the plant to evacuate and instructing those within a
30-kilometer radius to remain indoors. The accident
also led to radioactive contamination of drinking
water, agricultural and livestock products, and fisheryproducts that caused shipments to be stopped andextremely harmful rumors to spread. There are also
concerns that long-term power shortages in the Tokyo
metropolitan area could occur.
On April 1, the Cabinet named this series of disasters—which includes the earthquake, tsunami, andaccident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Plant—the “Great East Japan Earthquake”.

Postscript

For Nippon Suisan, the disaster greatly damaged
business sites along the Tohoku and Kanto coasts. The
Onagawa Plant was constructed as a fish sausage production base five years after a whaling office was established there in 1950. This plant, which subsequently
functioned as one of Nippon Suisan’s food productplants for many years, was completely destroyed by
the tsunami. Similarly devastated was the adjacent
Onagawa Fish Feed and Oil Plant. All employees ofboth plants in Onagawa were ordered to evacuate
immediately following the earthquake, an act that
helped many escape the danger despite being near thecoast. Nevertheless, the tsunami still took the precious
lives of employees and their loved ones when it grew
so large that it even inundated evacuation centers.
The Hachikan Kuji plant was also completely
ruined. And Nippon Suisan’s Kajima Plant, Tsukuba
Plant, and Funabashi Food Processing Center as well
as Delmar’s Funabashi Plant and Nissui Logistics’Sendai Minato Logistics Center were so damaged that
repairs took considerable amounts of time.
Nippon Suisan placed the highest priority on confirming the safety of its employees and their families.
Particularly for employees working in Onagawa,Nippon Suisan made every possible effort to ascertain
their safety and rescue them. It further engaged inrelief activities in Sendai and other areas where electric
power, water, and other services remained severed.
Moreover, members of the Nippon Suisan Groupjoined hands to restore manufacturing lines andstrengthen production capacity to meet the productdemands of consumers and clients. Nippon Suisan
also provided fish sausages, canned goods, daily necessities, and other relief supplies to afflicted areas throughpublic organizations.
(Corporate History Office, April 20, 2011)388

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Bibliography of major sources390Basic Data

Company History at a Glance“Tamura Steamship Fishery Company”“Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.”“Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.”“Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei K.K.”“Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.”

Basic Data

May 1911“Tamura Steamship Fishery Company” established.

September 1919
“Tamura Steamship Fishery Company” reorganized,
becomes “Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.”.

March 1937
“Kyodo Gyogyo”, company name changed to “Nippon
Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.”.

March 1943
“Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei K.K.” established under
the Fishery Control Ordinance.

December 1945
Company name reverts to “Nippon Suisan Kaisha,Ltd.” with the abolition of the Fishery Control
Ordinance.

392

Trends in the Company’s Business
Performance
Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.: 1919-1937(unit: thousand yen)

PeriodNet Profit

Equity Capital

Paid-in Capital

Profit Margin1919. 4/1–’19.12/31’20. 1/1–­’20. 6/30
’20. 7/1–­’20.12/31’21. 1/1–­’21. 6/30
’21. 7/1–­’21.12/31’22. 1/1–­’22. 6/30
’22. 7/1–­’22.12/31’23. 1/1–­’23. 6/30
’23. 7/1–­’23.12/31’24. 1/1–­’24. 6/30
’24. 7/1–­’24.12/31’25. 1/1–­’25. 6/30
’25. 7/1–­’25.12/31’26. 1/1–­’26. 6/30
’26. 7/1–­’26.12/31’27. 1/1–­’27. 6/30
’27. 7/1–­’27.12/31’28. 1/1–­’28. 6/30
’28. 7/1–­’28.12/31’29. 1/1–­’29. 6/30
’29. 7/1–­’29.12/31’30. 1/1–­’30. 6/30
’30. 7/1–­’30.12/31’31. 1/1–­’31. 6/30
’31. 7/1–­’31.12/31’32. 1/1–­’32. 6/30
’32. 7/1–­’32.12/31’33. 1/1–­’33. 6/30
’33. 7/1–­’33.12/31’33.12/1–­’34. 7/31
’34. 8/1–­’35. 1/31
’35. 2/1–­’35. 7/31
’35. 8/1–­’36. 1/31
’36. 2/1–­’36. 7/31
’36. 8/1–­’37. 1/31

159
726
861
912
982
998
796
837
736
662
625
573
582
595
682
902
1,051
1,081
1,102
1,105
1,115
1,038
824
857
862
857
869
949
1,098
331
1,069
1,096
1,123
1,217
9,237

5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,740
5,740
5,740
15,00015,00015,00015,00015,00015,00015,00015,00015,00015,00015,00015,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00090,000

2,000
3,000
3,400
3,400
3,400
3,400
3,400
3,400
3,400
3,400
3,400
3,400
3,400
3,400
4,940
5,735
5,740
8,055
8,055
8,055
10,37010,37010,37010,37010,37010,37010,37012,678
12,685
10,00010,00010,00010,00010,00038,083

15.9%
48.4%
50.7%
53.6%
57.8%
58.7%
46.8%
49.3%
43.3%
38.9%
36.8%
33.7%
34.3%
35.0%
27.6%
31.4%
36.6%
26.8%
27.4%
27.4%
21.5%
20.0%
15.9%
16.5%
16.6%
16.5%
16.8%
15.0%
17.3%
6.6%
21.4%
21.9%
22.5%
24.3%
48.5%

Notes: “Tamura Steamship Fishery Company” was established on May 31st, 1911.
“Tamura Steamship Fishery Company” was reorganized to become “Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.” on September 27th, 1919.
“Kyodo Gyogyo” was merged into Hoyo Gyogyo, which in turn was renamed “Kyodo Gyogyo” on July 31st, 1934.

Basic Data

393

Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.: 1937-1943
Period1937. 2/1–’37. 7/31
’37. 8/1–’38. 1/31
’38. 2/1–’38. 7/31
’38. 8/1–’39. 1/31
’39. 2/1–’39. 7/31
’39. 8/1–’40. 1/31
’40. 2/1–’40. 7/31
’40. 8/1–’41. 1/31
’41. 2/1–’41. 7/31
’41. 8/1–’42. 1/31
’42. 2/1–’42. 7/31
’42. 8/1–’43. 1/31

(unit: thousand yen)

Net Profit
7,100
6,638
7,044
7,138
7,307
9,117
6,708
6,036
5,989
5,864
5,864
6,760

Equity Capital
91,50091,50091,50093,00093,00093,00093,00093,00093,00093,00093,00093,000Paid-in Capital
55,50067,48767,50068,25068,25068,25068,25068,25068,25068,25068,25068,250

Profit Margin
25.6%
19.7%
20.9%
20.9%
21.4%
26.7%
19.7%
17.7%
17.6%
17.2%
17.2%
19.8%

Notes: The company name “Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.” was changed to “Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.” on March 31st, 1937.

Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei K.K.: 1943-1945(unit: thousand yen)

Term

PeriodNet Profit

Equity Capital

Paid-in Capital

Profit Margin

1
2
3
4
5

1943. 3/31–’43. 9/30
’43.10/ 1–’44. 3/31
’44. 4/ 1–’44. 9/30
’44.10/ 1–’45. 3/31
’45. 4/ 1–’45. 9/30

9,588
9,634
8,808
8,973
2,747

94,262
94,262
94,262
94,262
94,26269,51269,51269,51269,51269,512

27.6%
27.7%
25.3%
25.8%
7.9%

Notes: On March 31st, 1943, “Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei K.K.” was established, mainly from the maritime division of “Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.”.

Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.: 1945-1946(unit: thousand yen)

Term

PeriodNet Profit

Equity Capital

Paid-in Capital

Profit Margin6
7

1945.10/1–’46. 3/31
’46. 4/1–’46. 8/10

1,951
76

94,262
94,26269,51269,5125.6%
0.2%

Notes: On December 1st, 1945, the company name reverted from “Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei K.K.” to “Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.”.

Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.: FY1946-2009
Term

Period

8
9
10
11
12
13

1946.8/11–’49. 9/30
’49.10/ 1–’50. 3/31
’50. 4/ 1–’50. 9/30
’50.10/1–’51. 3/31
’51. 4/ 1–’51. 9/30
’51.10/1–’52. 3/31

Basic Data

Sales
6,878
1,453
3,247
2,471
2,708
2,595

Ordinary
Profit––––––(unit: million yen)

Net Pre-tax
ProfitProfitMarginEquityCapital

155
43
77
106
177
188

2.3%
2.9%
2.4%
4.3%
6.6%
7.2%

350
700
700
700
700
700

DividendRate
non-dividend
non-dividend
non-dividend
12.0%
15.0%
15.0%

394

Term

PeriodSales

Ordinary
Profit

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

’52. 4/ 1–’52. 9/30
’52.10/1–’53. 3/31
’53. 4/ 1–’53. 9/30
’53.10/1–’54. 3/31
’54. 4/ 1–’54. 9/30
’54.10/1–’55. 3/31
’55. 4/ 1–’55. 9/30
’55.10/1–’56. 3/31
’56. 4/ 1–’56. 9/30
’56.10/1–’57. 3/31
’57. 4/ 1–’57. 9/30
’57.10/1–’58. 3/31
’58. 4/ 1–’58. 9/30
’58.10/1–’59. 3/31
’59. 4/ 1–’59. 9/30
’59.10/1–’60. 3/31
’60. 4/ 1–’60. 9/30
’60.10/1–’61. 3/31
’61. 4/ 1–’61. 9/30
’61.10/1–’62. 3/31
’62. 4/ 1–’62. 9/30
’62.10/1–’63. 3/31
’63. 4/ 1–’63. 9/30
’63.10/1–’64. 3/31
’64. 4/ 1–’64. 9/30
’64.10/1–’65. 3/31
’65. 4/ 1–’65. 9/30
’65.10/1–’66. 3/31
’66. 4/ 1–’66. 9/30
’66.10/1–’67. 3/31
’67. 4/ 1–’67. 9/30
’67.10/1–’68. 3/31
’68. 4/ 1–’68. 9/30
’68.10/1–’69. 3/31
1969. 4/ 1–’69. 9/30
’69.10/1–’70. 3/31
’70. 4/ 1–’70. 9/30
’70.10/1–’71. 3/31
’71. 4/ 1–’71. 9/30
’71.10/1–’72. 3/31
’72. 4/ 1–’72. 9/30
’72.10/1–’73. 3/31

2,552
3,561
4,716
4,280
6,926
6,172
7,609
8,441
10,7708,909
12,606
9,793
13,502
10,57615,85813,04017,721
15,453
21,15818,71822,164
22,174
26,146
27,516
26,87628,321
31,65028,034
31,37827,48933,49030,51538,52531,69245,562
36,57050,04645,592
61,161
48,15867,445
52,119

–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

Basic Data

959
2,180
1,425
2,088
1,791
1,345
1,416
1,419
1,684
2,863
3,184
3,393
3,755
4,577
2,854
2,688
3,443

Net Pre-tax
ProfitProfitMarginEquityCapitalDividend
Rate

138
156
203
262
311
413
471
506
516
524
551
513
517
261
270
283
301
901
651
738
785
761
764
791
899
905
915
917
1,025
1,031
1,047
902
1,237
1,371
2,856
3,005
3,010
3,605
3,456
2,932
2,268
2,978

5.4%
4.4%
4.3%
6.1%
4.5%
6.7%
6.2%
6.0%
4.8%
5.9%
4.4%
5.2%
3.8%
2.5%
1.7%
2.2%
1.7%
5.8%
3.1%
3.9%
3.5%
3.4%
2.9%
2.9%
3.3%
3.2%
2.9%
3.3%
3.3%
3.7%
3.1%
3.0%
3.2%
4.3%
6.3%
8.2%
6.0%
7.9%
5.7%
6.1%
3.4%
5.7%

700
700
1,400
1,400
1,400
2,800
2,800
2,800
2,800
3,500
3,500
3,500
5,600
5,600
5,768
5,941
6,119
6,303
6,303
10,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,000

15.0%
15.0%
15.0%
15.0%
15.0%
15.0%
15.0%
15.0%
15.0%
15.0%
15.0%
15.0%
12.0%
6.0%
6.0%
6.0%
6.0%
15.0%
12.0%
12.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
12.0%
12.0%
15.0%
15.0%
15.0%
12.0%
12.0%

395

Term

PeriodSales

Ordinary
ProfitNet Pre-tax
ProfitProfitMarginEquityCapitalDividend
Rate

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

’73. 4/ 1–’73. 9/30
’73.10/1–’74. 3/31
’74. 4/ 1–’74. 9/30
’74.10/1–’75. 3/31
’75. 4/ 1–’75. 9/30
’75.10/1–’76. 3/31
’76. 4/ 1–’77. 3/31
’77. 4/ 1–’78. 3/31
’78. 4/ 1–’79. 3/31
’79. 4/ 1–’80. 3/31
’80. 4/ 1–’81. 3/31
’81. 4/ 1–’82. 3/31
’82. 4/ 1–’83. 3/31
’83. 4/ 1–’84. 3/31
’84. 4/ 1–’85. 3/31
’85. 4/ 1–’86. 3/31
’86. 4/ 1–’87. 3/31
’87. 4/ 1–’88. 3/31
’88. 4/ 1–’89. 3/31
’89. 4/ 1–’90. 3/31
’90. 4/ 1–’91. 3/31
’91. 4/ 1–’92. 3/31
’92. 4/ 1–’93. 3/31
’93. 4/ 1–’94. 3/31
’94. 4/ 1–’95. 3/31
’95. 4/ 1–’96. 3/31
’96. 4/ 1–’97. 3/31
’97. 4/ 1–’98. 3/31
’98. 4/ 1–’99. 3/31
’99. 4/ 1–’00. 3/31
2000. 4/ 1–’01. 3/31
’01. 4/ 1–’02. 3/31
2002. 4/ 1–’03. 3/31
’03. 4/ 1–’04. 3/31
’04. 4/ 1–’05. 3/31
’05. 4/ 1–’06. 3/31
’06. 4/ 1–’07. 3/31

81,12275,062
94,32180,224
103,903
95,683
258,567
379,596374,588407,936
408,800
429,671484,464
470,001
484,351
473,921466,304
481,136
463,959
437,730
460,703444,221412,678
383,308
400,869
388,388371,889359,231
342,132
309,018
298,190317,073
315,623
321,915
321,434
331,771
343,666

7,562
4,410
1,928
165
1,926
958
7,937
11,68011,160
9,063
5,478
4,546
6,738
6,867
7,419
7,526
6,397
3,164
2,394
(263)
(1,400)5,218(2,594)(5,268)539(2,137)
2,492
2,419
3,637
5,653
6,611
3,006
5,019
1,044
5,500
5,720
8,248

5,517
3,546
1,938
430
2,195
1,340
6,048
9,926
8,086
7,219
5,558
5,023
7,431
4,802
5,568
5,780
4,701
3,182
1,616
1,108
(1,105)582(331)(6,003)540(3,436)
3,130
7,035
2,681
6,107
1,384
(24,111)(2,167)
3,928
5,495
8,767
8,387

6.8%
4.7%
2.1%
0.5%
2.1%
1.4%
2.3%
2.6%
2.2%
1.8%
1.4%
1.2%
1.5%
1.0%
1.1%
1.2%
1.0%
0.7%
0.3%
0.3%
-0.2%
0.1%
-0.1%
-1.6%
0.1%
-0.9%
0.8%
2.0%
0.8%
2.0%
0.5%
-7.6%
-0.7%
1.2%
1.7%
2.6%
2.4%

10,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,00010,042
12,287
15,921
18,861
20,82523,431
23,50423,53523,53923,53923,53923,692
23,72923,72923,72923,72923,72923,72923,72923,72923,72923,72923,72923,729

15.0%
15.0%
15.0%
10.0%
8.0%
8.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
12.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
non-dividend
non-dividend
non-dividend
non-dividend
non-dividend
non-dividend
non-dividend
non-dividend
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
18.0%

93

’07. 4/ 1–’08. 3/31

337,629

4,166

13,973

4.1%

23,72920.0%

94’08. 4/ 1–’09. 3/31

324,284764(5,756)-1.8%

23,72920.0%

95’09. 4/ 1–’10. 3/31

306,8622,102(2,294)-0.7%

23,72920.0%

Notes: Final accounts for Term 8 (Aug. 11, 1946 to Sept. 30, 1949) were deferred because the company had become a special accounting company with the enforcement of the
Act on Emergency Measures Concerning Companies’ Accounting.

Basic Data

396

Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd. (consolidated: FY1977-FY2009)(unit: million yen)

Term

PeriodSales

Ordinary Profit

Net Pre-tax
ProfitProfit Margin

Shareholder
Equity Ratio

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

1977.4/1–’78. 3/31
’78.4/1–’79. 3/31
’79.4/1–’80. 3/31
’80.4/1–’81. 3/31
’81.4/1–’82. 3/31
’82.4/1–’83. 3/31
’83.4/1–’84. 3/31
’84.4/1–’85. 3/31
’85.4/1–’86. 3/31
’86.4/1–’87. 3/31
’87.4/1–’88. 3/31
’88.4/1–’89. 3/31
’89.4/1–’90. 3/31
’90.4/1–’91. 3/31
’91.4/1–’92. 3/31
’92.4/1–’93. 3/31
’93.4/1–’94. 3/31
’94.4/1–’95. 3/31
’95.4/1–’96. 3/31
’96.4/1–’97. 3/31
’97.4/1–’98. 3/31
’98.4/1–’99. 3/31
’99.4/1–’00. 3/31
2000.4/1–’01. 3/31
’01.4/1–’02. 3/31
’02.4/1–’03. 3/31
’03.4/1–’04. 3/31
’04.4/1–’05. 3/31
’05.4/1–’06. 3/31
’06.4/1–’07. 3/31
’07.4/1–’08. 3/31
’08.4/1–’09. 3/31
’09.4/1–’10. 3/31

402,266
398,566
440,685
440,341464,342
528,190
517,134
540,639
528,420
521,378
531,012532,553
508,005
534,307519,244488,491
457,629
470,369
468,733
466,020
477,090442,998472,297463,747
482,953499,810494,644
510,889
539,653
552,871
533,970
505,250
481,574

18,801
14,77713,013
7,162
5,641
9,320
8,120
8,659
10,714
6,889
4,610
4,151
(1,144)(3,643)9,314(7,302)(6,528)
(204)
(607)
1,110
153
(928)
7,597
7,380
4,790
14,4898,643
12,615
11,88816,065
6,758(1,222)
6,174

15,43911,942
10,729
6,776
6,123
9,449
6,355
7,233
8,807
6,159
4,348
3,290
1,550
(7,894)
1,261
5,897(7,358)(629)(2,437)
7,411
8,052
(596)
10,876
3,899(14,094)
4,571
8,429
11,102
13,24816,257
19,879(16,182)
4,041

3.8%
3.0%
2.4%
1.5%
1.3%
1.8%
1.2%
1.3%
1.7%
1.2%
0.8%
0.6%
0.3%
-1.5%
0.2%
1.2%
-1.6%
-0.1%
-0.5%
1.6%
1.7%
-0.1%
2.3%
0.8%
-2.9%
0.9%
1.7%
2.2%
2.5%
2.9%
3.7%
-3.2%
0.8%

18.2%
18.6%
18.1%
18.3%
17.7%
17.4%
19.3%
21.3%
23.2%
23.5%
26.2%
26.9%
26.5%
23.7%
23.8%
23.0%
25.2%
24.6%
24.0%
24.4%
25.9%
25.3%
27.6%
26.3%
20.3%
22.0%
25.0%
26.7%
27.5%
27.7%
27.3%
14.5%
16.0%

Basic Data

397

Nippon Suisan Executives’ Terms of Office
Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.

Tamura Steamship Fishery Company
1911

’12

’13

’14

5

’15

’16

’17

9.27

’18

’19
9.27

’20

’21

’22

Ichiro Tamura

Hisazo Matsuzaki

9.27

Kosuke Kunishi

9.27

Jinpachi Hayashida

9.27

Kenkichi Ueki

9.27

Soji Yamawaki

9.27

Heikuro Sagiike

9.27

Kojiro Shimomura

11.1

Setsutaro Nakayama

11.1
Keizo Tamura

Legend:(year)

’23

1.29

Owner
ChairmanPresident
Executive Vice President
Executive Director
Managing Director
Board Member
Standing Statutory Auditor
Executive Adviser

Basic Data

398

ar)

Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.
7.31 (Hoyo Gyogyo K.K.)

Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.
’24

’25

’26

’27

’28

’29

’30

’31

’32

’33

’34

’35

(year)

’36

7.29
7.30

7.31

12.28

7.31

8.28

9.8
8.25

12.15

9.10

7.25
7.25
7.29
Hideo Suzuki
Chiyoma Iwamoto

7.29

9.10
1.30

7.30

7.31
7.31

Sentaro Yamaoka 7.25

8.28
Naoshiro Imai

7.30

7.29
Yoshisuke Aikawa

7.31

8.28

7.29

Shizuo Minoda

7.31

8.28

Seichu Takezaki

7.31

8.28

Rokuro Masui

7.31

8.28

Keisuke Yamada

7.31

Junji Hayashi

8.28
Juichi Maene 6.18
Toichi Kuwata 8.28

Tatsusaburo Shibuya 8.28
Yusaku Nishimura 8.28
Narimatsu Kimura 8.28
Shigeo Kuboi 8.28
Susumu Masui 8.28
Gentaro Hayashi 8.28
Kojiro Abe 12.28
Shigeji Matsuda 12.28

Basic Data

399

Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo
3.31 Tosei K.K.

Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.

3.31

1937

’38

’39

Hiroya Ino 9.27

’40

’41

’42

’43

’44

Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.

12.1

’45

’46

’47

(year)

’48

’49

8.13

Ganjiro Haga 9.27
KosukeHisao
3.6
Kunishi 4.2 Tamagawa 9.27
Tadao Katsuragi 3.27

3.31
3.31 □

12.1

2.12

Kenkichi Ueki

3.31

12.1

1.3

3.27

7.15

Tanji Katayama 3.27 3.28
Heikuro Sagiike 7.13 Michihiro Baikei 3.27

3.31
3.31 □

12.1

Isamu Miyazaki 3.31 □

12.1

3.31

12.1

Goshika Ueki
Keizo Tamura

3.31 □

12.1

Fumio Matsuo 3.31 ◎12.1

Michitora Baikei
ChiyomaIwamoto

9.27

5.
4.30

8.31

3.6

Kantaro Miho 3.31 ◎3.31 ◆

12.1 12.27
12.1

1.3

Rensaku Onishi
9.26

Rokuro Masui
3.6

Keisuke Yamada
Junji Hayashi

3.31

Juichi Maene

3.31 □

8.5

Yasuo Haraguchi 2.12

8.5

Shigesuke Yokoyama 2.12

8.5

12.1

12.24

5.

6

Suekichi Imamura 8.5
Ken Sabunji 8.5 7.9

9.27
3.27

3.31

Kenji Ito 8.31

3.31 □

12.1

2.12

Susumu Masui

3.31 □

12.1

1.15 6.2

3.6

3.27

3.31

Kojiro Abe

3.31

Shigeji Matsuda

3.31 ◎

3.31

Shigeharu Kato

3.31

Kei Miura

3.27

3.31

Masuji Bandai

3.27

3.31

Jiro Shirasu

3.31

Teizo Funazu

3.31

Teruo Muto

Basic Data

6

Kyuhei Suzuki 8.5

Shigeo Kuboi

Kenji Kawanabe

6

2.12

Yuichi Matsuzaki 2.12

Toichi Kuwata 9.27

6.5

5.

3.31

Yoshisuke Aikawa
ShizuoMinoda 9.27
Seichu1.31
Takezaki

Gentaro Hayashi

5.

3.31

Naoshiro Imai

Tatsusaburo Shibuya
Yusaku9.27
Nishimura
5.31 Narimatsu Kimura

8.31

S
K
A

7.15
6.22

Concurrently serving as president and chairman

K

K
12.1

Sh

7.15

9.27
3.31
3.31
11.30
3.31
3.6

400

ar)

4

Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.
’50

’51

’52

’53

’54

’55

’56

’57

’58

ChairmanPresident

Yukio Yamashita

5.31

Kisaburo Hara

5.31

Seini Kanda

5.31

Executive Vice President(year)’62

5.29

Isamu Yoshimura 5.29

Managing Director

Noboru Nishikawa 5.29

Board Member

5.30

’61

Eiichi Takashima 5.29

Executive Director

5.25

’60

5.29

Takeshi Miyata 5.28
Legend:’59

Standing Statutory Auditor

Kiichi Murakami 5.29

Executive Adviser

Kakuro Kodera 5.29

Note: In Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei,
Senior Director (◆) was equivalent to
Executive Director, Director (□) was
equivalent to Board Member, and Auditor(◎) was equivalent to Standing Statutory
Auditor

5.27

6.1

3.26

6.1

3.22
5.28

5.2

5.30
6.1

5.29 Concurrently serving as president and chairman
11.28
5.4

5.28

5.30 Ryuichi Matsuzaki
Sueo
3.26
5.29
Kamimura
Akira Kondo 5.29
3.26

11.28

Kenzo Sanada 5.29

11.28

Kingo Kawai

5.29

Shoshi Iwasaki 5.29

5.29
4.18
11.28

3.26
11.26

Haruo Nakai 5.27
Kumazo Mori

11.28
5.27

Takeo Ito

4.18

5.29

4.18

5.29

4.18

5.29

2.19

11.28

Otoharu Kajiyama

5.25

Yasushi Nagasawa 11.28

5.29

Takamura Tsuaki 11.28

5.29

Torao Murakami 5.28

Basic Data

5.29
5.29

5.29

401

Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.
1963

’64

’65

’66

’67

’68

’69

Takeshi Miyata 5.31
Yukio
5.29
Yamashita
5.29 Kisaburo Hara 5.30
5.29 Seini Kanda
Eiichi
5.29
Takashima
Isamu
5.29
Yoshimura
Noboru5.29
Nishikawa
Kiichi Murakami 5.29

’70

’71

’72

’73

6.

Hisao Fujita 5.30
12.23

5.30
6.30
5.30

5.29

3.29

5.29

Ken Otsuru 5.30

2.

Satoshi Shimoida 5.30
4.21 Katsumi 5.30
Takeda
5.29
5.30
5.29

1.28

5.30

5.28

Juro Osoegawa 5.29

5.30

5.28

5.30

Hatsuyu Takeko 5.29

5.30

5.28

5.30

Hirokichi Takahashi 5.29

5.30

Kijiro Kimura 5.29
5.29

Hisashi Fujii
Nagamitsu
Dosho

5.29
5.29

5.30

6.

5.30
5.30

Mamoru Someya

5.30

5.29

5.30

5.28

5.30
5.29

5.30

5.29

Hiroo Sakai

5.30

5.30

11.29

5.28

5.30

Eitaro Atsumi 5.30

5.30

5.30

Yoshitake Kuwahara 5.30

5.30

5.30

Kenji Ito

Motokazu Shimizu 11.29

11.28
Shoichi Koganemaru 5.30

5.30

5.30

5.30

Kiyokazu Kobayashi

12.23

6

5.28

11.28

Ichiro Ishii 5.30

Jun-ichi Sakata 5.30
Takashi Tanimura

4.12
5.30

5.29
11.29

11.28
Tetsuya Sakakibara

Basic Data

6.

5.30

Toyozo Mikumo 11.28

Takamura Tsuaki
Torao
5.29
Murakami

12.23

11.29

Tadao Kawai 11.29

Akio Sakonji 5.30

11.28 Kyuhei Suzuki

Takeo Ito
5.29
Otoharu
5.29
AjiyamaYasushi Nagasawa

12.23

Tomio Tominaga 11.29

Masao Seki 5.30

Haruo
Nakai

11.29

Akira Nishihara

5.31

Hirotake Watanabe 5.30

Akira
Kondo

12.23

Shigeto Suzuki

5.30

Masatake Suzuki 5.30

Concurrently serving aspresident and chairman

3.30

Masaichi Kawasaki 11.29

5.30
5.31

’75

Jun-ichi Kishimoto 5.30

Kakuro Kodera 5.29

Jiro Ito(year)

’74

5.29

12.23

1.21

Ta

Fu

11.28

5.30
5.30
5.30

5.30

Takasuke Chiba 5.29
Shun-ichi Okuchi 11.30
5.29
Namiki Hayashi 11.30

5.30
5.30

1.1

11.29
12.23

402

ar)

Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.
’76

’77

’78

’79

’80

’81

6.29 Katsusuke Minoda 6.29

’82

’83

6.29

Kazuya Hara 6.29

6.29

6.29

6.27
6.27

6.28

Akio Katakura 6.27

6.29

Yoshiomi Hoshino
6.27

6.28

6.27

6.29

6.27 Kazunori Sakai

Takao Fujita 6.29

6.29
6.29

Toru Fukui 6.29
6.27

Ikuya Ueki 6.29
6.29

Haruo Neo 6.29

6.29

6.29 Toshiro Yamaguchi

6.27
6.29

Tsutomu Kimura 6.29

6.29

Kunio Yonezawa 7.5

Yasuo Kunii 6.29
6.29

6.29

Hiroyasu Nonami 6.29

6.29
6.29

6.29
Tomoyoshi Furuya 6.29

6.29
Jun Uchida 6.29
6.29

6.28
6.27

3.30

6.28
6.28

6.28
Yasuo Tamura 6.29

6.18
6.29

Kunio Kasai 6.29

6.28

Taisuke Moriura 6.29

6.29
6.29

6.29

6.28

Jun-ichi Katayama 6.27

6.29

6.27

Hiroshi Ando 6.27
6.28

3

6.27 Hideaki Tokoro

6.28

Koichi Gomyo 6.27

3

6.29

6.28

6.27

3

6.27

6.29

Akira Miyazaki 6.27

6.29

’88

Juro Kuboi 6.28

6.29
6.28 Yukio Sakamoto
Yoshihiko
6.29
6.27
Taguchi 6.29
Mamoru Asakawa 6.27

6.29

(year)

’87

3.30

6.29

3

’86

6.29
Ken-ichi Kogure 6.28

Kazuo Asano 6.29

2.29

’85

6.29

6.27

3

’84

6.29
6.27

Yashichi Nakazawa 6.29
Ryoichi Nozawa 6.29

6.29

3

Takayoshi Ogawa 6.29
Eikichi Yoshihara 6.28

6.29
Takafumi Toda 6.29

6.27

Fumio Imanaga 6.29

6.27

Shigeru Fujioka 6.28

6.29

6.29
1.1

Bunshiro Kakimoto 6.29

6.28

6.27
Kazuyoshi Sasazawa 6.29

3

Basic Data

6.27
6.29

6.27

6.27

6.29

6.29

6.29

6.28
6.27

403

Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.
1989

’90

’91

’92

’93

’94

Katsusuke Minoda 6.27

’95

’96

’97

Atsushi Yasui 6.27
Koji Adachi 6.26

6.29

Mikio Satake 6.28
6.27

Aki

6.29
6.27

No
6.29

6.29

Ter

Kun
6.27

Ken-ichi Suzuki 6.29

6.29 Kazunori Sakai

Hiroaki Kunimasa 6.29

6.27
Takao Fujita
Toru
6.28
Fukui
6.9 Ikuya Ueki

Jiro Mizukami 6.29

6.29
6.26

6.27

6.29

Hidejiro Koizumi 6.29

12.1 6.26

Haruo Neo

6.27

6.29

11.29

6.29

Yasuhisa Sato 6.29

6.29 Toshiro Yamaguchi

6.29

Masahiro Yamada 6.29

6.27

6.29

6.29

6.27

6.29

6.29

Ken-ichiro Izawa 6.29

Kunio Yonezawa 6.27

Ikuo Matsuoka 6.29

6.29
2.17

Norihisa Yamao 6.27

6.26

Kunio Kasai
6.29 Kazuo Morita

6.29

6.29 Hiroshi Imachi 12.1

6.29

6.29

Katsunori Sasao 6.27
6.26
Masaaki Takahashi 6.27

6.27

Naoya Kakizoe 6.28
Ryoichi Nozawa

6.29

2.28

6.29 Seishiro Kataoka
Yasuo Tamura

6.29

6.29
6.29

6.26

6.29

6.29

Yoshimoto Ishikawa 6.27
Kunihiko Tsuruta

6.26

6.29 Eikichi Yoshihara

Hiroshi Shibuya

6.26

Shigeru Fujioka 6.28

Hiroshi Tanaka

6.26

Kiyohiro Nomura

6.26

6.29 Takayoshi Ogawa12.1

Fumio Imanaga 6.27
6.28

Toru Saigyo
Masahiro 6.28
HigasaShigehiro Suzuki 6.27
Yukio Yamamoto 6.27

Basic Data

6.28

6.27

6.29 Keinosuke Kondo 6.29

Tomoyoshi Furuya

6.29

’

Ichiu Mitarai 6.29

6.29

Yoshiomi Hoshino

Yasuo Kunii

’01

6.28

6.29

Juro Kuboi
Yukio
Sakamoto 3.30 Noboru Ueda 6.26
Koki
Akio Katakura 6.27 Hiraoka 6.26
HideakiKanji Kato 6.26
Tokoro 6.28
12.1
Akira Miyazaki

Hiroshi Ando3.30(year)

2000

6.26

Yasuyuki Kuboi 6.26

Koichi Gomyo 3.30

’99

Ryutaro Sato 6.29

6.27

6.29

’98

6.29

6.29
6.29

6.26
6.26

6.29

6.27
6.29

404

(year)01

Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.
’02

’03

’04

’05

’06

’07

6.29

’08

(year)’09’10

Takaaki Wakasugi 6.25
Yoshinori Hosoya 6.25
6.26 Yuji Kobayashi 6.25 ＊

6.28

6.25
Akira Someya 6.27

Shinsuke Oki 6.25 ＊

6.28

3.31
Norio Hosomi 6.27

6.27

6.25

6.29
Teruaki Kaneko 6.27

6.26

Kunihiko Koike 6.27

6.25
6.25

Kotaro Yoshikawa 6.29
6.29 3.31
6.27 Kimizo
ShimamuraSeiji Manabe 6.29

6.25

Susumu Kaneda 6.29

6.25 ＊

Kenjiro Fujimoto 6.29

6.25 ＊

Yoshio Osawa 6.29

6.25
6.25

6.27
Kozo Toyama 6.29

6.25
6.25

Naoto Ihara 6.28
3.31

Akiyo Matono 6.27

6.25 ＊

Yujin Watabe 6.27

6.25

Yasumasa Yamasaki 6.27
3.31

6.25 ＊

Masahide Koizumi 6.27
Koki Sato

6.26

6.25 ＊

6.25 ＊

4.1
Yoichi Sekiguchi
4.1

6.26

6.25 ＊

6.27
6.25
6.26

6.25 ＊

6.27

Hisami Sakai

6.27

6.27 Keishiro Kinoshita 6.25

6.27

6.27

6.27

ChairmanPresident
Executive Vice President
Executive Director

6.26
6.29

Legend:Jun-ichi Nishida 6.25 ＊Yuichi Makino 6.25 ＊Eiichiro Yamahashi 6.25 ＊6.27 Takeshi Wakizaka 6.25 ＊Managing Director
Board Member
Standing Statutory Auditor
Executive Adviser＊ indicates operating officer

Seiji Takahashi 6.25 ＊Basic Data

405

List of Group Companies* Company associated with Juro Oka** Company associated with Ichiro Tamura

Founding to 1945
No

Company

Time ofgroup
associationDate

1 Nippon Enyo Gyogyo K.K.* —ActionDateBusiness description

Description Post-action company name

Nagato City,
whaling
Yamaguchi Prefecture
2 Toyo Gyogyo K.K.*—
May 1909 Renaming Toyo Hogei K.K.
Shimonoseki City,
whaling
Yamaguchi Prefecture−—
May 1909 Merger (Teikoku Suisan K.K.)
Kobe City, Hyogo
whaling
Prefecture−—
May 1909 Merger (Dai-Nippon Hogei K.K.)
Tokyo City
whaling−—
May 1909 Merger (Nagasaki Hogei Goshi K.K.) Nagasaki City,
whaling
Nagasaki Prefecture−—
May 1916 Merger (Tokai Gyogyo K.K.)
Tateyama City, Chiba whaling
Prefecture−—
May 1916 Merger (whaling division of Iwatani Tokyo City
whaling
Shokai)3 Toyo Hogei K.K.*—
1934
Renaming Nippon Hogei K.K.
Osaka City, Osaka
whaling−—
1916
Merger (Nagato Hogei K.K.)
Nagato City,
whaling
Yamaguchi Prefecture−—
1916
Merger (Dai-Nippon Suisan K.K.)
Tokyo City
whaling−—
1916
Merger (Naigai Suisan K.K.)
Osaka City, Osaka
whaling−—
1916
Merger (Kii Suisan K.K.)
Kushimoto-Cho,whaling
Wakayama Prefecture−—
1919
Merger (Nikkan Hogei Goshi K.K.) Tokyo City
whaling
Reorganization Ichi-I Gumi
Hakodate City,
fishery (Pacific herring, salmon/
4 Ichi-I Gumi (The Ichi-I 1907
1911
Hokkaido
trout)
Group)**
Reorganization Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd. Hakodate City,
fishery (Pacific herring, salmon/
5 Ichi-I Gumi**
1911
March
Hokkaido
trout)
1914
6 Nichiro Gyog yo Kaisha, March
1916
Transfer −Hakodate City,
fishery (salmon/trout)
Ltd.**
1914
Hokkaido
7 Nippon Kisen K.K.**
December 1921
Dissolution −Kobe City, Hyogo
shipping
1915
Prefecture
8 Yamagami Gumi K.K.
December June 1917 Renaming Nippon Suisan K.K.
Osaka City
marine products/chilled foods
1916
wholesale
9 Nippon Suisan K.K.
June 1917 November Merged Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd. Osaka City
marine products sales
1926
10 Nippon Trawl K.K.
May 1919 September Renaming Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd. Shimonoseki City,
fishery (trawling)
1919
Yamaguchi Prefecture
11 Takatsu Shokai K.K.
AugustJune 1920 Renaming Nippon Gyomo Sengu Kaisha, Shimonoseki City,
manufacture and sales of fishing
1919
Ltd.
Yamaguchi Prefecture nets, fishing equipment, andship fittings
12 Hayatomo Fishery Institute 1920
April
Renaming Hayatomo Fishery Research Shimonoseki City,
survey, research, and technical
1932
Center
Yamaguchi Prefecture development
13 Marushin Unsoten K.K.
March
1933
Transfer −Osaka City
transport
1920
14 Nippon Gyomo Sengu Kaisha, June 1920 1946
Transfer −Shimonoseki City,
manufacture and sales of fishing
Yamaguchi Prefecture nets, fishing equipment, andLtd.
ship fittings
15 Chuo Suisan Hanbaisho K.K. August
November Renaming Nippon Suisan K.K.
Osaka City
marine products sales
1920
1926
16 Nissen Gumi K.K.
March
November Merged Nippon Suisan K.K.
Tokyo City
fishery (purse seine)
1921
1933
17 Kyodo Suisan Hanbaisho May 1921 February Renaming Kyodo Suisan K.K.
Tokyo City
marine products/chilled foods
K.K.
1928
wholesale
Shimonoseki City,
food products manufacturing/
18 Nippon Chikuwa Seizosho June 1921 December Renaming Nippon Gyoryo K.K.
K.K.
1923
Yamaguchi Prefecture sales
Reorganization Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd. Kobe City, Hyogo
fishery (trawling)
19 Nippon Trawl K.K.
October January
Prefecture
1921
1931
20 Asahi Suisan K.K.
June 1922 June 1929 Renaming Akebono Gyogyo K.K.
Tokyo City
fishery (fixed net)
21 Nissho Suisan K.K.
November 1927
Merged Hokuyo Suisan K.K.
Shimonoseki City,
fishery (trawling)
1922
Yamaguchi Prefecture
22 Nippon Gyoryo K.K.
December AugustMerged Godo Suisan Kogyo K.K.
Osaka City
food products manufacturing/
1923
1932
sales, feed manufacturing

Basic Data

1904

Location

Renaming Toyo Gyogyo K.K.

406

•The following items are listed in “post-action company name” of the “action” column· In cases of renaming or reorganization, the name following renaming/reorganization is provided.
· In cases of merger, the name of the merged company is provided in parentheses.
· When a company was merged with another, the surviving company name is provided.
· Cases of transfer and dissolution are marked with a “—.”No

Company

23 Hoyo Gyogyo K.K.

Time ofgroup
association
Date

ActionDateBusiness description

Description Post-action company nameNovember July 1934 Renaming Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.
1925
24 Hokuyo Suisan K.K.
January
November Merged Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.
1926
1926
25 Nippon Suisan K.K.
November June 1940 Renaming Yamato Suisan K.K.
1926
26 Chuo Reizo K.K.
June 1927 AugustMerged Godo Suisan Kogyo K.K.
1932
27 Horai Suisan K.K.
July 1927 1934
Merged Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.
28 Nippon Kosen Gyogyo K.K. November April
Merger Nippon Godo Kosen K.K.
1927
1932
29 Tobata Reizo K.K.
December May 1932 Renaming Godo Suisan Kogyo K.K.
1927
30 Fuso Gyogyo K.K.
1928
1933
Merged Hoyo Gyogyo K.K.
31 Kyodo Suisan K.K.

Location

Shimonoseki City,
fishery (Danish seine fishery)
Yamaguchi Prefecture
Hakodate City,
fishery (mother ship-type crab
Hokkaido
fishery)
Tokyo City
marine products sales/export
Osaka City

cold storage

Keelung City, Taiwan fishery (bottom trawling)
Kobe City, Hyogo
fishery (mother ship-type crab
Prefecture
fishery)
Tobata City, Fukuoka cold storage
Prefecture
Shimonoseki City,
fishery (Danish seine fishery)
Yamaguchi Prefecture
Tokyo City
marine products/chilled foods
wholesale
Shimonoseki City,
container manufacturing, fresh
Yamaguchi Prefecture fish transport, canningTokyo City
fishery (mother ship-type crab
fishery)
Tobata City, Fukuoka fishery (fixed net)
Prefecture
Tobata City, Fukuoka canning
Prefecture
Keelung City, Taiwan fishery (bottom trawling)

February August
Renaming Nippon Suisan K.K.
1928
1935
32 Kagotora Seikan K.K.
July 1928 December Renaming Nippon Gyokan K.K.
1931
33 Showa Kosen Gyogyo K.K. November April
Merger Nippon Godo Kosen K.K.
1928
1932
34 Akebono Gyogyo K.K.
June 1929 November Merged Nippon Suisan K.K.
1933
35 Tobata Seikan K.K.
November October Separation −
1929
1933
36 Horai Gyogyo K.K.
December AugustMerged Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.
1929
1936
37 Higashi Kosen K.K
1930
April
Merged Nippon Godo Kosen K.K.
Tokyo City
fishery (mother ship-type crab
1932
fishery)
38 Tobata Uoichiba K.K.
February November Dissolution −Tobata City, Fukuoka marine products wholesale
1930
1941
Prefecture
39 Sankyo Suisan Co., Ltd.
June 1931 February
Merged Nippon Food Industries K.K. Tokyo City
marine products export
1935
40 Nippon Gyokan K.K.
December November Merged Nippon Suisan K.K.
Tobata City, Fukuoka container manufacturing
1931
1933
Prefecture
41 Godo Gyogyo K.K.
December 1947
Dissolution −Otaru City,
fishery (Pacific herring, salmon/
1931
Hokkaido
trout)
42 Hayatomo Fishery Institute April
April
Dissolution −Tobata City, Fukuoka survey, research, and technical
1932
1935
Prefecturedevelopment
43 Nippon Godo Kosen K.K.
April
September Merged Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd. Tokyo City
fishery (mother ship-type crab
1932
1936
fishery)
44 Godo Suisan Kogyo K.K.
May 1932 May 1934 Renaming Nippon Food Industries K.K. Osaka City
food products manufacturing/sales, feed manufacturing, cold
storage
45 Nanbei Suisan K.K.
July 1932 June 1939 Dissolution −Tokyo City
fishery
46 Shinko Suisan K.K.
March
September Merged Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd. Tokyo City
fishery (mother ship-type crab
1933
1938
fishery)
47 Borneo Suisan K.K.
December December Forfeiture −Kojimachi Ward,bonito/tuna canning
1933
1941
Tokyo City
48 Nippon Hogei K.K.
May 1934 September Merged Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd. Tokyo City
whaling
1936
49 Nippon Food Industries K.K. May 1934 March
Merged Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd. Tokyo City
food products manufacturing/1937
sales, feed manufacturing, cold
storage
50 Nanyo Suisan K.K.
November December Forfeiture −Shiba Ward, Tokyo
food products manufacturing,
1934
1941
City
ice making/cold storage
51 Nissan Fishery Institute Co., April
February Renaming Nissan Research Institute Co., Odawara City,
pharmaceuticals
Ltd.
1935
1958
Ltd.
Kanagawa Prefecture
52 Nichiman Gyogyo K.K.
October January
Merged South Manchuria Kaiyo Dalian, China
fishery, marine products sales
1935
1945
Gyogyo Tosei K.K.

Basic Data

407

Time ofgroup
association
Date

Date

March
1936
54 Kyoritsu Suisan Kogyo K.K. February
1937

March
1943
February
1938

No

Company

53 Hokuyo Hogei K.K.

ActionLocation

Business description

Description Post-action company name
MergedNippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei Kojimachi Ward,
whaling
K.K.
Tokyo City
Transfer −Tsurumi Ward,fish leather
Yokohama City,
Kanagawa Prefecture
55 Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd. December March
Merged Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei Tokyo City
shipping(Kaiun)
1937
1943
K.K.
56 Takuyo Suisan K.K.
June 1939 February
Merged Minami Nippon Gyogyo Tosei Keelung City, Taiwan fishery (bottom trawling)
1944
K.K.
57 Tobu Suisan K.K.
October February
Merged Minami Nippon Gyogyo Tosei Hualien Harbor,
fishery (tuna)
1939
1944
K.K.
Taiwan58 Yamato Suisan K.K.
June 1940 1950
Dissolution −Shiba Ward, Tokyo
canning
City
59 Hinode Gyogyo K.K.
March
March
Merged Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei Shimonoseki City,
fishery
1943
1943
K.K.
Yamaguchi Prefecture
60 Takasago Gyogyo K.K.
March
March
Merged Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei Shimonoseki City,
fishery
1943
1943
K.K.
Yamaguchi Prefecture
61 Donoumi Zosen K.K.
July 1944 September Renaming Wakamatsu Zosen K.K.
Wakamatsu City,
shipbuilding
1964
Fukuoka Prefecture
62 Kanto Suisan K.K.
—
October
Merged South Manchuria Kaiyo Port Arthur, China fishery, marine products sales
1944
Gyogyo Tosei K.K.

1945 to 2010
No

Company

1 Tsurumi Reizo K.K.

Time ofgroup
association
Date

ActionDate

Location

Description Post-action company nameFebruary February
Transfer −Yokohama City,
1951
1969
Kanagawa Prefecture
2 Fuji Gyokan K.K.
July 1952 September Renaming Fuji Seikan K.K.
Nagasaki City,
1968
Nagasaki Prefecture
3 Hakodate Teion Soko K.K. April
February Renaming Hakodate Teion Reizo K.K. Hakodate City,
1953
1958
Hokkaido
4 Tokyo Teion Reizo K.K.
May 1953 April
Merged Nissui Logistics Corporation Chuo City, Tokyo
2008
5 Kyowa Yushi Kogyo K.K.
November April
Merger Kyowa Technos Co., Ltd.
Koto City, Tokyo
1953
1991
6 Hokko Gyogyo K.K.
August1997
Transfer −Otaru City,
1954
Hokkaido
7 Hokoku Suisan K.K.
June 1955 August
Renaming Hohsui Corporation
Chuo City, Tokyo
1984
8 Nippo Shokuhin K.K.
October June 1958 Renaming Nippo Sangyo K.K.
Hakodate City,
1955
Hokkaido
9 Sanwa Kogyo K.K.
December July 1962 Transfer −Machida City, Tokyo
1956
10 Oita Chuo Uoichiba K.K.
December October Renaming Oita Chusui Shoji K.K.
Oita City, Oita
1956
1977
Prefecture
11 Nisshin Sangyo K.K.
April
December Dissolution −Chuo City, Tokyo
1957
2008
12 Osaka Nissui Shoji K.K.
September December Dissolution −Osaka City, Osaka
1957
1990
13 Nissui Service K.K.
November March
Dissolution −Hachioji City, Tokyo
1957
2008
14 Nissan Research Institute Co., February January
Renaming Nissui Pharmaceutical Co., Bunkyo City, Tokyo
Ltd.
1958
1962
Ltd.
15 Hakodate Teion Reizo K.K. February OctoberMerger Teion Co., Ltd.
Hakodate City,
1958
1995
Hokkaido
16 Nippo Sangyo K.K.
June 1958 June 2000 Dissolution −Hakodate City,
Hokkaido
17 Aurora Austral Sociedad 1959
September Transfer −Buenos Aires,
Anomina
1967
Argentina
18 Sapporo Hinomaru Reizo March
October
Merged Teion Co., Ltd.
Sapporo City,
1959
1995
K.K.
Hokkaido

Basic Data

Business description
cold storage
container manufacturingcold storage
cold storage, food products
manufacturing/sales
lipids manufacturing
fishery
fishery
fishing net and ship fittings
manufacturing/repair
machinery (canning machinery) manufacturing
marine products wholesale
non-life insurance agency
food products sales
food products sales
pharmaceuticals
cold storage, food products
manufacturing/sales
fishing net and ship fittings
manufacturing/repair
fishery
cold storage

408

No

Company

Time ofgroup
association
Date

ActionDate

Location

Business description

Description Post-action company name

19 Hiroshima Nissui Service April
April
Dissolution −Hiroshima City,
food products sales
K.K.
1959
1992
Hiroshima Prefecture
20 Taiheiyo Yougyo K.K.
September November Renaming Kurumaebi Yoshoku K.K.
Futtsu City, Chiba
aquaculture
1959
1965
Prefecture
21 Tobata Unyu Seikan K.K.
September AugustMerged Carry Net Co., Ltd.
Kitakyushu City,
port transport, paper container
1959
2000
Fukuoka Prefecture manufacturing/sales
22 Nishisan Shoji K.K.
March
November Renaming Nishisho K.K.
Fukuoka City,
marine/food products sales
1960
1969
Fukuoka Prefecture
23 Marushin Unyu Co., Ltd.
May 1960 OctoberMerged Tobu Reizo Shokuhin Co., Setagaya City, Tokyo transport
2001
Ltd.
24 Sendai Hinomaru Reizo K. May 1960 OctoberMerged Tobu Reizo Shokuhin Co., Sendai City, Miyagi cold storage
K.
2001
Ltd.
Prefecture
25 Nippon Tanpaku Shiryo K.K. May 1960 February
Transfer −Funabashi City,
feed manufacturing
1965
Chiba Prefecture
26 Kaiko Shoji K.K.
June 1960 March
Dissolution −Kitakyushu City,
marine products sales
1966
Fukuoka Prefecture
27 Sendai Nissui Service K.K.
July 1960 April
Dissolution −Sendai City, Miyagi food products sales
1992
Prefecture
28 Hinomaru Unyu K.K.
September September Merged Sendai Nissui Service K.K.
Shiogama City,
transport
1960
1963
Miyagi Prefecture
29 Beppu Marukyo Uoichiba October October Renaming Oita Chusui Shoji K.K.
Beppu City, Oita
marine products wholesale
K.K.
1960
1977
PrefectureTokyofood products sales
30 Tamai Shoten K.K.
November November Reorganization Hinomaru Nissui K.K.
1960
1967
31 Nippon Chomi Shokuhin January
November Dissolution −Chiyoda City, Tokyo seasoning manufacturing
Corporation
1961
1965
32 Nippon Rakuno Shokuhin January
September Dissolution −Chiyoda City, Tokyo food products (che ese)
K.K.
1961
1964
manufacturing
33 Nissui Kaiun K.K.
February July 1976 Renaming Nissui Senpaku K.K.
Chuo City, Tokyo
shipping
1961
34 Kushiro Mink K.K.
May 1961 March
Dissolution −Kushiro City,
livestock
1966
Hokkaido
35 Wakayama Hinomaru Shoji May 1961 September Dissolution −Wakayama Prefecture food products sales
K.K.
1968
36 Nippo Gyogyo K.K.
June 1961 March
Dissolution −Nagasaki City,
fishery
1968
Nagasaki Prefecture
37 Sapporo Nissui Service K.K. July 1961 April
Dissolution −Sapporo City,
food products sales
1992
Hokkaido
November Dissolution
38 Kurumaebi Yoshoku K.K.
August1965
1962
39 Tobata Suisan Kobaikai K.K. October September Renaming Tosco Corporation
Kitakyushu City,
food products retail sales
1962
1986
Fukuoka Prefecture
40 Nagoya Nissui Service K.K. October April
Dissolution −Anjo City, Aichi
food products sales
1962
1992
Prefecture
41 Hokuyo Suisan K.K.
December OctoberMerged Hokoku Suisan K.K.
Chuo City, Tokyo
fishery
1962
1983
42 Beppu Reizo K.K.
September November Transfer −Beppu City, Oita
cold storage
1963
1970
Prefecture
43 Hachinohe Teion Reizo K.K. July 1964 June 1986 Renaming Hachitei Co., Ltd.
Hachinohe City,
food products (frozen foods)
Aomori Prefecture
manufacturing, cold storage
44 Marushin Sharyo Seibi K.K. September March
Transfer −Tokyo
vehicle maintenance
1964
1973
45 Wakamatsu Zosen K.K.
September March
Dissolution −Kitakyushu City,
shipbuilding
1964
1999
Fukuoka Prefecture
46 Sendai Hinomaru Shokuhin September February
Transfer Sendai Shokuhin K.K.
Sendai City, Miyagi food products sales
K.K.
1964
1970
Prefecture
47 Nanpo Gyog yo Kaihatsu September March
Dissolution −Chuo City, Tokyo
fishery
K.K.
1965
1994
48 Kitakyushu Kaisanbutsu K.K. February November Merged Nishisho K.K.
Kitakyushu City,
marine products sales
1966
1969
Fukuoka Prefecture
49 Osaka Nissui Service K.K.
AugustApril
Dissolution −Itami City, Hyogo
food products sales
1966
1992
Prefecture
50 Mogami Kanzume K.K.
February March
Renaming Mogami Foods Co., Ltd.
Tendo City, Yamagata food products (canned goods)
1967
1991
Prefecture
manufacturing
51 Hinomaru Nissui K.K.
November March
Transfer −Tokyofood products sales
1967
1969

Basic Data

409

No

Company

Time ofgroup
association
Date

ActionDate

September January
Dissolution −
1968
2011
53 Northern Research Pty., Ltd. October February Dissolution −(N.R.P.)
1968
1985
54 Nishisho K.K.
November December Renaming Nishisho K.K.
1969
1995
55 New Guinea Marine Products December 1992
Transfer −Pty., Ltd. (N.G.M.P.)
1971
56 Société de pêche Nissui-Guinée April
October Dissolution −(SONIGUI)
1973
1976
57 Morpac, Inc.
June 1973 March
Dissolution −1984
58 S O S E C H A L S o c i e t e September December Transfer −Sénégalais de Chalutage S.A. 1973
1978
59 Atlantic Fisheries Development April
January
Dissolution −Co., Ltd. (A.F.D.)
1974
1980
60 Universal Seafoods., Ltd. June 1974 January
Renaming UniSea, Inc.
(UniSea)1986
61 Sarawak Suisan Sdn, Bhd. June 1974 March
Transfer(S.R.S.)
1988
62 Nansui K.K.
November March
Dissolution −
1974
1980
63 Nittake Shokuhin K.K.
January
March
Dissolution −
1975
1977
64 Aberdeen Trading Co., Ltd. February September Dissolution −(ATRACO)
1975
1992
65 D i e g o N i p p o n S . A . July 1975 March
Dissolution −(DIPPON)1988
66 Dutch Harbor Seafoods., Ltd. April
December Dissolution −(D.H.S.)
1976
2003

68 Maldive Nippon Co., Ltd.
69 Oita Chusui Shoji K.K.

July 1976 January
Dissolution −1988
July 1977 May 1982 Transfer −Nagasaki City,
Nagasaki Prefecture
Darwin, Australia

container manufacturing
fishery (shrimp), cold storage

Fukuoka City,
marine/food products sales
Fukuoka Prefecture
Port Moresby, Papua fishery (shrimp)
New Guinea
Guineafishery
Seattle, Washington, food products (canned salmon)
U.S.A.
and marine products (frozencrab) manufacturing/sales
Ziguinchor, Senegal marine products (shrimp) purchasing/export
Cork, Ireland
fishery (bottom trawling)
Redmond,
Washington, U.S.A.
Sibu, Malaysia

marine products processing/sales
marine products processing/sales
fishery (squid, crab pot)

Sakaiminato City,
Tottori Prefecture
Hachioji City, Tokyo food products (retort pouch)manufacturing
Hong Kong
marine products export/
importLas Palmas, Spainfishery (octopus, squid), marine
products sales
Redmond,fishery (mother ship-type crab
Washington, U.S.A. fishery), seafood (salmon purchasing) processing
Chuo City, Tokyo
shipping
Male, Maldives

October November Dissolution −Oita City, Oita
1977
1999
Prefecture
70 Seibu Reizo Shokuhin Co., April
April
Merged Nissui Logistics Corporation Fukuoka City,
Ltd.
1978
2007
Fukuoka Prefecture
71 Northern S eafood Inc. April—
Transfer −Anchorage, Alaska,(N.S.I)
1979
U.S.A.
72 Tobu Reizo Shokuhin Co., August
April
Renaming Nissui Logistics Corporation Hachioji City, Tokyo
Ltd.
1979
2007
73 Saeki Co., Ltd.
March
September Dissolution −Chiba City, Chiba
1980
1995
Prefecture
74 Nippon Suisan (Canada)., MarchJanuary
Dissolution −Vancouver, Canada
Ltd.
1981
1987
75 Nissui Engineering Co., Ltd. December April
Merged Nissui Marine Service K.K. Chiyoda City, Tokyo
1981
1993
76 Tokyo Kaneka Shokuhin August
January
Dissolution −Hachioji City, Tokyo
K.K.
1982
2002
77 Nichinan Sekiyu K.K.
December April
Merged Nissui Marine Industries Shibuya City, Tokyo
1983
2007
Co.,Ltd.
78 Hokkaido Teion Shokuhin June 1984 July 2008 Dissolution −Hakodate City,
K.K.
Hokkaido
79 Nippon Suisan (Halifax), July 1984 December Dissolution −Halifax Nova Scotia,
Ltd.
2000
Canada80 Shinwa Reefer K.K.
October December Dissolution −Chuo City, Tokyo
1984
1991
81 Lifemin Co., Ltd.
October April
Dissolution −Taito City, Tokyo
1984
2010
82 Kyowa Protein K.K.
April
April
Merger Kyowa Technos Co., Ltd.
Hachioji City, Tokyo
1985
1991
83 Kitakyushu Reizo Shokuhin April
December Merged Seibu Reizo Shokuhin Co., Kitakyushu City,
Co., Ltd.
1985
1994
Ltd.
Fukuoka Prefecture

Basic Data

Business description

Description Post-action company name

52 Fuji Seikan K.K.

67 Nissui Senpaku K.K.

Locationfood products (canned goods)
manufacturing/sales
real estate management
cold storage
marine products purchasing/processing/sales
cold storage
marine products manufacturing/sales
marine products export/
importconstruction/design, production technology consulting
food products manufacturingpetroleum products sales
food products manufacturing
marine products export
shipping
food products mail orderseasoning manufacturingcold storage

410

No

Company

Time ofgroup
association
Date

ActionDate

Location

Description Post-action company name84 Kinki Reizo Shokuhin Co., April
September Merged Seibu Reizo Shokuhin Co., Itami City, Hyogo
Ltd.
1985
2000
Ltd.
Prefecture
85 Tokyo Bulk Carriers K.K.
July 1985 November Transfer of −Chuo City, Tokyo
1992
control
86 Northern Deep Sea Fisheries, July 1985 March
Renaming Northern Marine Services, Seattle, Washington,
Inc. (NORTHSFISH)
1990
Inc.
U.S.A.
87 Esukei (S.K.) Suisan K.K.
August2001
Dissolution −Oshika-gun, Miyagi
1985
Prefecture
88 Great Land Seafoods, Inc. August
January
Merged UniSea, Inc.
Redmond,(G.L.S.)
1985
1989
Washington, U.S.A.
89 N.S. Marine K.K.
December January
Renaming Nissui Ship Management Chuo City, Tokyo
1985
1999
K.K.
90 Seafood-Now Inc.
February June 1992 Dissolution −Minato City, Tokyo
1986
91 Bangkok Shrimp Cultivation April
February
Transfer −Bangkok, Thailand
Co., Ltd. (B.S.C.)
1986
1991
92 Tosco Corporation
September September Dissolution −Kitakyushu City,
1986
1995
Fukuoka Prefecture
93 Nissui Finance K.K.
September March
Dissolution −Chiyoda City, Tokyo
1986
1994
94 Tsukiji Kaneka Kitakyushu October April
Renaming Kitakyushu Kaneka Shokuhin Kitakyushu City,
K.K.
1986
1992
K.K.
Fukuoka Prefecture
95 Nissui Shipping Corporation September March
Shinagawa City,
1987
2005
Tokyo
96 Himeji Kaneka Shokuhin October January
Dissolution −Himeji City, Hyogo
K.K.
1987
2002
Prefecture
97 Dongil Frozen Foods Co., November December Transfer −Changwon City,
Ltd.
1987
2002
South Korea
98 Unisea Foods, Inc.
December February
Merged Fishking Processor, LLC
Redmond,
1987
2000
Washington, U.S.A.
99 A&N Foods Co., Ltd.

Business description
cold storage
vessel leasing
coordination of offshore
purchasing
marine products processing/sales, cold storage
marine products processing
shipping
restaurant managementaquaculture (shrimp)
food products retail sales
financing and securities
management
food products manufacturing
shipping
food products manufacturing
food products (frozen foods)
manufacturing and sales
cold storage, food products(crab-flavored fish paste) manufacturing/sales
marine products processing

February 1992
Transfer −Bangkok, Thailand
1988
100 Nikko-Fisheries Co., Ltd.
July 1988 March
Dissolution −Nagasaki City,
fishery (west-water trawling)
1991
Nagasaki Prefecture
101 Nissui Marine Service K.K. September April
Renaming Nissui Engineering Co., Ltd. Chiyoda City, Tokyo vessel operation/management
1988
1993
102 Sendai Ham K.K.
September December Dissolution −Sendai City, Miyagi food products manufacturing
1988
1999
Prefecture
103 Kansai Cookery Co., Ltd.
September March
Dissolution −Itami City, Hyogo
food products manufacturing
1988
1998
Prefecture
104 Xiamen Longpeng Food Co. November December Dissolution −Xiamen City, Fujian marine products processing/
Ltd.
1988
2006
Province, China
sales
105 Wakasawan Yoshoku K.K.
December May 1993 Dissolution −Mikata-gun, Fukui
aquaculture
1988
Prefecture
106 Okhotsk Suisan K.K.
February 1993
Dissolution −Khabarovsk, Soviet marine products processing/
1989
Union
sales
107 Société Caledonienne des May 1989 October Dissolution −Noumea, Newfisherypêches Industorielles S.A.
1991
Caledonia(SOCALPI)
108 Hello Delica Co., Ltd.
June 1989 March
Dissolution −Atsugi City,
food products manufacturing
1998
Kanagawa Prefecture
109 Esa Ichiban Co., Ltd.
AugustApril
Merged Nippo Shokuhin Kogyo Co., Miyaki-gun, Saga
feed manufacturing/sales
1989
2008
Ltd.
Prefecture
110 Inversiones Trans pacífico, November October Renaming Nippon Suisan America Latina Santiago, Chile
marine products purchasing/
S.A.
1989
1993
S.A. (N.A.L.)
export and sales
111 Nagasaki Nissui K.K.
December January
Dissolution −Nagasaki City,
fishery
1989
1995
Nagasaki Prefecture
112 Conagra Nissui Inc.
January
AugustDissolution −Chiyoda City, Tokyo food products sales
1990
1994
113 Northern Marine Services, March
October Renaming Pacific Food Systems, Inc. Seattle, Washington,
Inc.
1990
1993
(P.F.S)
U.S.A.
114 Southern Nissui., Ltd.
April
March
Share
−
Wellington, New
livestock ranching , meat
1990
1996
exchange
Zealandprocessing
115 Sun Delica, Ltd.
July 1990 March
Dissolution −Kumamoto Prefecture food products manufacturing
1998

Basic Data

411

No

Company

116 Sante Foods Co., Ltd.

Time ofgroup
association
Date

ActionDate

Location

Description Post-action company nameNovember March
Dissolution −Itami City, Hyogo
1990
1999
Prefecture
117 Kyowa Technos Co., Ltd.
April
April
Merged Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd. Sammu-gun, Chiba
1991
2008
Prefecture
118 C.R. Corporation K.K.
April
April
Merged Nissui Food System Co., Ltd. Chuo City, Tokyo
1991
2007
119 Keiko Suisan K.K.
January
MarchTransfer of −Chuo City, Tokyo
1992
1996
control
120 Green Giant Frozen Foods March
February
Transfer −
Tokyo
Ltd.
1992
2000
121 Kitakyushu Kaneka Shokuhin April
July 2001 Merged Kitakyushu Nissui Co., Ltd. Kitakyushu City,
K.K.
1992
Fukuoka Prefecture
122 Cherry Fresh Foods Co., Ltd. April
2006
Dissolution −Sendai City, Miyagi
1992
Prefecture
123 Eniwa Fresh Foods Co., Ltd. September March
Dissolution −Eniwa City,
1992
1999
Hokkaido
124 Saeki Co., Ltd.
March
AugustDissolution −Narashino City,
1993
Chiba Prefecture
2001
125 Hachinohe Food Chemical April
December Dissolution −Hachinohe City,
Co., Ltd.
1993
2005
Aomori Prefecture
126 Anny K.K.
May 1993 December Dissolution −Hachioji City, Tokyo2003
127 Himeji Fresh Foods Co., Ltd. September March
Dissolution −Himeji City, Hyogo
1993
1998
Prefecture
128 Kansai Nissui Foods Co., Ltd. October February Dissolution −Himeji City, Hyogo
1993
2001
Prefecture
129 Pacific Food Systems, Inc. October March
Dissolution −Seattle, Washington,(P.F.S)
1993
1996
U.S.A.
130 Carry Aichi K.K.
December August
Renaming Carry Net Co., Ltd.
Nagoya City, Aichi
1993
2000
Prefecture
131 Nissui New Zealand, Ltd.
December December Dissolution −Wellington, New
1993
2006
Zealand132 Hokkaido Pesca K.K.
January
February Transfer of −Sapporo City,
1995
2009
control
Hokkaido
133 Teion Co., Ltd.
October April
Renaming Hokkaido Nissui Co., Ltd.
Hakodate City,
1995
2008
Hokkaido
134 Minh Hai Nissui Girimix Co. December June 2006 Renaming NIGICO Co., Ltd.
Gia Lai, Bac Lieu
(MINH HAI NIGICO)
1995
Province, Vietnam
135 Marusui Co., Ltd.
May 1996 July 1999 Dissolution −Okayama Prefecture
136 Tokyo Nissui Foods Co., Ltd. August
March
Dissolution −Hachioji City, Tokyo
1996
2000
137 Fukuoka Nissui Foods Co., August
March
Dissolution −Fukuoka City,
Ltd.
1996
2000
Fukuoka Prefecture
138 Fishking Processor, LLC
AugustJune 2006 Merged King & Prince Seafood Corp. Los Angeles,
1996
California, U.S.A.
139 Kobe Kaisanbutsu K.K.
October 2000
Dissolution −Kobe City, Hyogo
1996
Prefecture
140 Alimentos Chacabuco Ltda. 1997
October Renaming Desarrollo Oceanico S.A. Puerto Chacabuco,
2007(DOSA)Chile
141 Hohsui Food Service Corp. March
July 2009 Dissolution −Hakodate City,
1997
Hokkaido
142 Kitakanto Food System K.K. October July 2009 Dissolution −Mito City, Ibaraki
1997
Prefecture
143 Nissui Ship Management Co., January
February Dissolution −Shinagawa City,
Ltd.
1999
2003
Tokyo
144 Alaska Ocean Seafood., Ltd. 2002
May 2008 Merged Glacier Fish Company, LLC Washington State,
Partnership(G.F.C.)
U.S.A.
145 Petuna Sealord Pty., Ltd.
March
April
Renaming Australian Longline Pty., Ltd. Tasmania, Australia
2004
2010
146 P.T. Nissui Investment and October 2006
Renaming P.T. Nippon Suisan Indonesia Jakarta, Indonesia
Management Indonesia
2004
147 Xiamen Longpeng Nissui January—−−
Xiamen City, Fujian
Cultivation Co. Ltd.
2005
Province, China

Basic Data

Business description
food products manufacturing
lipids manufacturing
real estate management
marine products sales
food products manufacturing/sales
food products manufacturing
food products manufacturing/sales
food products manufacturing
marine products processing/sales
seasoning manufacturing
food products sales
marine products processing/sales
marine products processing/sales
sales and service of seafood processing equipment, etc.
transport
joint business management ofvessels
marine products sales
cold storage
processed marine products/frozen
food products manufacturing
marine products sales
marine products processing/sales
marine products processing/sales
food products (frozen foods)
manufacturing and sales
marine products wholesale
food products (fried white fish)
manufacturing and sales
restaurant management
fresh foods processing/sales
shipping
marine products (Alaska pollack) manufacturing/sales
fishery, marine product processing/sales
aquaculture
aquaculture (eel)412Present
No

Company

1 Nissui Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.
2 Nagasaki Shipyard Co., Ltd.
3 Hokkaido Nissui Co.,Ltd.
4 Hohsui Corporation
5 Nippo Shokuhin Kogyo Co., Ltd.

Time ofgroup Founding
association
Date
Date

Location

April 1935 April 1935 Taito City, Tokyo
June 1952 June 1952 Nagasaki City, Nagasaki Prefecture
April 1953 August
Sapporo City, Hokkaido
1920
June 1955 August
Chuo City, Tokyo
1945
September September Kumamoto City, Kumamoto Prefecture
1961
1961

6 Yamatsu Suisan Co., Ltd.

November
1966
7 Mogami Foods Co., Ltd.
February
1967
8 P.T. West Irian Fishing Industries (W.I.F.) May 1970
9 P.T. Irian Marine Product Development July 1970
(I.M.P.)
10 Nippon Suisan (U.S.A.), Inc. (Nissui March
U.S.A.)
1974
11 UniSea, Inc.
June 1974

December
1950
February
1967
May 1970
July 1970

Niigata City, Niigata Prefecture
Nishimurayama-gun, Yamagata
Prefecture
Jakarta, Indonesia
Jakarta, Indonesia

March
Redmond, Washington, U.S.A.
1974
May 1974 Redmond, Washington, U.S.A.

12 Tokyo Suisan Unyu Corporation

March
March
Ota City, Tokyo
1976
1976
13 Oita Chuo Suisan Co., Ltd.
November November Oita City, Oita Prefecture
1976
1976
14 Oita Gyokan Service K.K.
April 1977 April 1977 Oita City, Oita Prefecture
15 Empresa de Desarrollo Pesquero de Chile October
October
Santiago, Chile
S.A. (EMDEPES)
1978
1978
16 Niigata Shokuhin Service K.K.
July 1979 July 1979 Niigata City, Niigata Prefecture
17 Nissui Logistics Corporation
AugustAugustMinato City, Tokyo
1979
1979
18 Nippon Marine Enterprises, Ltd.
January
January
Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture
1980
1980
19 Nishisho K.K.
20 Nippon Suisan (Singapore) Pte, Ltd.

February
1980

February
1980

Fukuoka City, Fukuoka Prefecture

April 1981 MarchSingapore
1981
21 Explotacion Pesquera de la Patagonia S.A. April 1981 April 1981 Buenos Aires, Argentina(PESPASA)
22 Chilldy Co., Ltd.
November November Hachioji City, Tokyo
1983
1983
23 Yamatsu Frozen Foods Co., Ltd.
October
October
Niigata City, Niigata Prefecture
1984
1984
24 Yamatsu Service, Ltd.
October
October
Niigata City, Niigata Prefecture
1984
1984
25 Hachitei Co., Ltd.
June 1986 March
Hachinohe City, Aomori Prefecture
1960
26 Sankyo Suisan Co., Ltd.
AugustJuly 1947 Shizuoka City, Shizuoka Prefecture
1987
27 Empresa Pesquera de la Patagonia Y November October
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Antartida S.A. (PESANTAR)
1988
1988
28 Nippon Suisan (Europe), B.V. (Nissui December December Amsterdam, Netherlands
Europe)1988
1988
29 Salmones Antártica S.A. (S.A.)
December February Santiago, Chile
1988
1982
30 Nippon Suisan America Latina S.A. February February Santiago, Chile(N.A.L.)1990
1990
31 Don Co., Ltd.
May 1991 May 1991 Suita City, Osaka
32 Kitakyushu Nissui Co., Ltd.
September September Kitakyushu City, Fukuoka Prefecture
1991
1991
33 Oita Rinkai Kenkyu Co., Ltd.
November November Saeki City, Oita Prefecture
1992
1992
34 Yokohama Trading Corp., Ltd.
December July 1968 Yokohama City, Kanagawa Prefecture
1992

Basic Data

Business description
pharmaceuticals manufacturing/sales
shipbuilding
cold storage, marine products manufacturing/sales, food products sales
marine products sales, fresh fish retailfood products manufacturing, cold storage,fishing equipment sales, bait manufacturing/sales
marine and food products sales, marine
products wholesale
food products manufacturing/sales
fishery (shrimp trawling)fishery (shrimp trawling)
marine products purchasing/export andsales
marine products purchasing/processing
and sales
cold store acceptance/delivery agency
marine products wholesale
fish container sales
fishery (trawling)food processing
cold storage, cargo transport andhandling
operation and management of mother ships
supporting deep-sea research submersibles
and undersea experimental work vessels
freezing and wholesale of dried and salted
products, frozen foods, process foods, andfish paste products
marine products purchasing/export andsales
fishery (trawling), seafood processing
food products manufacturing/sales
food processing, cold storage
market cargo-handling
real estate leasing
wholesale of processed marine/agricultural, livestock, and fishery products
fishery (trawling)
European holdings company
aquaculture
marine products purchasing/export andsales
restaurant management
food products manufacturing/sales
research support, seafood aquaculture/sales, etc.
marine products trading and import/
export413

NoCompany

Time ofgroup Founding
association
Date
Date

Location

35 Nissui Engineering Co., Ltd.

April 1993 April 1993 Chiyoda City, Tokyo

36 Carry Net Co., Ltd.

December
1993
February
1994
March
1994
August1994
May 1995

November Nagoya City, Aichi Prefecture1971
37 Hokuriku Fresh Foods Co., Ltd.
December Toyama City, Toyama Prefecture
1993
38 Nissui Food System Co., Ltd.
March
Chuo City, Tokyo
1994
39 Pesquera Sur Austral S.A.
November Puerto Chacabuco, Chile
1987
40 Anzco Foods, Ltd. (ANZCO)
September Wellington, New Zealand1984
41 Gunma Fresh Foods Co., Ltd.
November November Isesaki City, Gunma Prefecture
1995
1995
42 Pesquera Friosur S.A.
1996
AugustPuerto Chacabuco, Chile
1984
43 Nissui Marine Industries Co., Ltd.
January
January
Kitakyushu City, Fukuoka Prefecture
1996
1996
44 Nippon Cookery Co., Ltd.
January
January
Shinagawa City, Tokyo
1998
1998
45 Pesquera Mas Afuera S.A.
September September Puerto Chacabuco, Chile
1999
1999
46 Xiamen Longpeng Food Co. Ltd.
2001
2001
Xiamen City, Fujian Province, China
47 Sealord Group, Ltd.
January
1973
Nelson, New Zealand
2001
48 Gorton's, Inc.
September September Gloucester, Massachusetts, U.S.A.
2001
2001
49 Bluewater Seafoods, Inc.
September September Quebec, Canada
2001
2001
50 Nissui G Net Co., Ltd.
January
January
Chiyoda City, Tokyo
2003
2003
51 J.P. Klausen & Co. A/S
September 1990
Svendborg, Denmark
2003
52 Ryukyu Delica Service K.K.
October
March
Urasoe City, Okinawa Prefecture
2003
1998
53 Star Partners, LLC
December December U.S.A.
2003
2003
54 Kurose Suisan Co., Ltd.
January
January
Kushima City, Miyazaki Prefecture
2004
2004
55 Nippon Suisan America Latina Perú, S.A. February February Lima, Peru
(NAL PERU)
2004
2004
56 Australian Longline Pty Ltd.
March
December Tasmania, Australia
2004
1997
57 Shandong Sanfod Nissui, Ltd.
June 2004 June 2004 Qingdao City, Shandong Province,
China
58 P.T. Nippon Suisan Indonesia (Nissui October
October
Jakarta, Indonesia
Indonesia)
2004
2004
59 Hachikan Co., Ltd.
November November Hachinohe City, Aomori Prefecture
2004
2004
60 Nissui (Thailand) Co., Ltd. (Nissui February February Hat Yai, Thailand
Thailand)2005
2005
61 Kaiko Senpaku K.K.
March
March
Minato City, Tokyo
2005
2005
62 King & Prince Seafood Corp.
July 2005 1924
Brunswick, Georgia, U.S.A.
63 Bering Sea Partners, Inc.
July 2005 July 2005 Redmond, Washington, U.S.A.
64 ATLASOVO
2006
2006
Sakhalin, Russia
65 Kurahashi Co., Ltd.
66 Kyowa Sangyo Co., Ltd.
67 Kyowa Suisan Co., Ltd.
68 Tokai Gyogyo K.K.
69 F.W. Bryce, Inc.

Basic Data

March
March
2006
2006
March
December
2006
1972
March
June 1947
2006
March
August2006
1967
April 2006 1947

Business description
construction design, production technology consulting
transport
food products manufacturing/sales
restaurant management
fisheryfrozen food products manufacturing/sales
food products manufacturing/sales
fishery
ocean civil engineering contracting, vessel
operation/management
food products manufacturing/sales
fishery
food products manufacturing/sales
fishery, marine product processing/sales
frozen food products manufacturing/sales
frozen food products manufacturing/sales
fund management for Group companies
marine product purchasing/sales
manufacturing and sales of boxed meals,
rice balls, prepared dishes, noodles, etc.
fisheryaquaculture
marine products purchasing/export andsales
fishery
processed marine and food products
manufacturing
aquaculture
food products manufacturing/sales
processed marine products manufacturing

Fukuyama City, Hiroshima Prefecture

vessel operations, maintenance and management, fishery resources research, etc.
frozen food products manufacturing/sales
seafood processing
marine products purchasing/import andsales
marine products/chilled foods wholesale

Sakaiminato City, Tottori Prefecture

fresh/frozen fish sales

Sakaiminato City, Tottori Prefecture

fishery

Sakaiminato City, Tottori Prefecture

fishery

Gloucester, Massachusetts, U.S.A.

marine products purchasing/import and
sales

414

No

Company

70 Nakatani Suisan Co., Ltd.
71 Nordic Seafood A/STime ofgroup Founding
association
Date
Date

Location

May 2006 October
Oshima-gun, Kagoshima Prefecture
1991
May 2006 June 1987 Hirtshals, Denmark

72 NIGICO Co., Ltd.

June 2006 December Gia Lai City, Bac Lieu Province,
1995
Vietnam
73 K-Teion Foods Co., Ltd.
October
October
Itami City, Hyogo Prefecture
2006
2006
74 Nordsee Comercial Importadora Y June 2007 OctoberSão Paulo, Brazil
Exportadora, Ltda.
1994
75 Fierce Allegiance, LLC
July 2007 April 2003 Washington State, U.S.A.
76 Europacífico Alimentos Del Mar, S.L.
October
October
Bilbao, Spain
2007
2004
77 Cité Marine S.A.S.
October
February Kervignac, France
2007
1990
78 Desarrollo Oceanico S.A. (DOSA)
October
October
Santiago, Chile
2007
2007
79 Marusa Sasaya Shoten Co., Ltd.
OctoberJune 1983 Kushiro City, Hokkaido
2007
80 Kunihiro Inc.
October
July 1970 Onomichi City, Hiroshima Prefecture
2007
81 Kaneko Shokuhin Co., Ltd.
October
March
Mitoyo City, Kagawa Prefecture
2007
1966
82 Tokyo Suisan Terminal, Ltd.
November September Ota City, Tokyo
2007
1972
83 Tai Mei Food Industrial Corp.
December 1971
Kaohsiung City, Taiwan
2007
84 Suisan Ryutsu Co., Ltd.
March
March
Chuo City, Tokyo
2008
2008
85 Qingdao Nissui Food Research and June 2008 June 2008 Qingdao, Shandong Province, China
Development Co., Ltd.
86 Glacier Fish Company, LLC (G.F.C.)
June 2008 March
Seattle, Washington, U.S.A.
1998
87 Hiroshimasuisan Co., Ltd.
September April 1984 Hiroshima City, Hiroshima Prefecture
2008
88 Nigico Aquaculture Co., Ltd.
October
October
Hoabinh, Bac Lieu Province, Vietnam
2008
2008
89 Tomiso Co., Ltd.
November June 1989 Nagoya City, Aichi Prefecture
2008
90 Hokkaido Fine Chemical Co., Ltd.
December December Hakodate City, Hokkaido
2008
2008
91 Kiyono Suisan K.K.
February March
Niigata City, Niigata Prefecture
2009
1983
92 Alaskan Beauty, LLC
February August
Washington State, U.S.A.
2009
2001
93 Daisui Co., Ltd.
March
April 1939 Fukushima Ward, Osaka City, Osaka2009
94 TN Fine Chemicals Co., Ltd.
March
March
Bangkok, Thailand
2009
2009
95 Carry System K.K.
September November Bando City, Ibaraki Prefecture
2009
1993
96 Nishisho Sangyo K.K.
October
October
Kitakyushu City, Fukuoka Prefecture
2009
2009
97 Hakata Marukita Suisan Co., Ltd.
December December Fukuoka City, Fukuoka Prefecture
2009
2009
98 Tokyo Kitaichi Co., Ltd.
February July 1982 Yoshikawa City, Saitama Prefecture
2010
99 Maruuo Suisan Co., Ltd.
March
July 1957 Himeji City, Hyogo Prefecture
2010
100 Netuno International S.A.
May 2010 May 2010 Recife, Brazil
101 Delmar Co., Ltd.

July 2010

102 Thai Delmar Co., Ltd.

July 2010

Basic Data

September Chiba City, Chiba Prefecture
2010
November Samutprakarn, Thailand
1989

Business description
aquaculture
marine products purchasing/import andsales
processed marine products/frozen foodproducts manufacturing
comprehensive food products wholesaleand distribution
marine products purchasing/import andsales
fishery
marine products purchasing/import andsales
food products manufacturing/sales
management of Chilean fishery companies,
marine products sales
marine products manufacturing/sales
food products manufacturing/sales
food products manufacturing/sales
cold storage leasing
food products manufacturing/sales
seafood retail support
quality control and development of overseas production bases
fishery (trawling), longline fishery, seafood
processing
marine products/chilled foods wholesale
shrimp aquaculture
food products manufacturing/sales
lipids (EPA, DHA, etc.) manufacturing/
sales
marine products sales
seafood processing
marine products/chilled foods wholesale
functional materials manufacturing/sales
transport
wholesalemarine products manufacturing/sales
marine products manufacturing/sales
marine products/chilled foods wholesaleaquaculture, marine product processing/sales
food products manufacturing/sales
food products manufacturing/sales

415

List of Group Vessels
1) (*) in the “Name” column indicates vessels listed more than once due to a change of name, change of use, investment inkind, etc.
2) “Operator” indicates the company or individual operating the vessel for a specific purpose.
3) * in the “Operator” column indicates a company connected with Juro Oka.
4) ** in the “Operator” column indicates a company connected with Ichiro Tamura.
5) “Completed” means that construction was complete and the vessel was delivered from the shipyard to the owner.
6) “Chartered” means that the vessel was chartered at times when operating without own ships (business format generally
used in whaling and mother ship-type crab fisheries in the Meiji, Taisho and early Showa eras).
7) “–” indicates data unknown as of Dec. 31, 2010.

Up to 1945
Whalers
Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Dai-Ichi Choshu Maru

120.02 1899

Oruga Maru

125.56 1901

Rekkusu Maru

119.67 1902

Regina Maru

112.86 1903

Hogei Maru No.1
Nikorai Maru
Togo Maru No.1
Inatsuma Maru
Mein Maru
Ikazuchi Maru
Jingu Maru
Airando Maru
Kiworugi Maru
Sazanami Maru
Hogei Maru No.2
Hogei Maru No.3
Hogei Maru No.5
Togo Maru No.2
Togo Maru No.3
Avaron Maru

103.38 1903
132
1905
112.06 1906
116.04 1906
120
1906
113.82 1906
106
1906
105
1907
126
1907
107
1907
134.03 1907
109.1 1907
103.1 1907
115.06 1907
152.72 1907
110.74 1907

Rokko Maru
Amatomi Maru
Akebono Maru
Suwa Maru
Asahi Maru
Togo Maru No.5
Taihei Maru No.1

135.58 1907
123.58 1907
113.82 1907
114.95 1907
188
1907
81.4 1908
111.94 1908

Taihei Maru No.2

122.61 1908

Hakuun Maru No.1
Hakuun Maru No.2
Jingu Maru No.2
Toyo Maru No.3
Chidori MaruShowa Maru
Ganjitsu Maru No.1
Showa Maru No.2
Leslie107.49 1909
109
1909
124
1910
205
1924
103
1928
188
1928
213
1928
194.23 1930
224
1934

Basic Data

Operator

Remarks

Completed Nippon Enyo Gyogyo* Japan’s first iron-hulled whaler Dec. 1901 Grounded andsankChartered Nippon Enyo Gyogyo* From Rex Co. (Norway) (launched 1898) Renamed Nissui
Maru No.2
Chartered Nippon Enyo Gyogyo* From Rex Co. (Norway) (launched 1902) Renamed Nissui
Maru No.1
Chartered Nippon Enyo Gyogyo* From Rex Co. (Norway) (launched 1903) 1905 Grounded andsankLaunched Nippon Enyo Gyogyo* Norway
LeasedToyo Gyogyo*
from the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce
Completed Nagasaki Hogei Goshi* Built in Norway
Completed Toyo Gyogyo*
Arker’s Shipyard (Norway) 1933 Shipwrecked
Chartered Nagasaki Hogei Goshi* From Norway (launched 1906)
Completed Toyo Gyogyo*
Arker’s Shipyard (Norway) 1908 Grounded and sankChartered Toyo Gyogyo*
From Rex Co. (Norway) (launched 1906) 1929 Shipwrecked
BoughtNaigai Suisan*
From Norway (launched 1903)
BoughtNaigai Suisan*from a Russian whaling company
BoughtKii Suisan*
From Norway (launched 1906, formerly Lawless Za)
Completed Dai-Nippon Hogei* First whaler by Osaka Iron Works
Chartered Dai-Nippon Hogei* From Norway (launched 1902)
Chartered Dai-Nippon Hogei* From Norway (launched 1898)
BoughtNagasaki Hogei Goshi* Kneeland Shipyard (Norway, formerly Hamber)Completed Nagasaki Hogei Goshi* Osaka Harada Iron Works
BoughtTeikoku Suisan*from Arker’s Shipyard (Norway) (launched 1904) Dec. 1923
ShipwreckedCompleted Teikoku Suisan*
Osaka Iron Works
Completed Tokai Gyogyo*
Built in Norway
BoughtToyo Gyogyo*
From Norway (launched 1907, formerly Queen Alexandra)
Launched Teikoku Suisan*
Kneeland Shipyard (Norway)
BoughtTeikoku Suisan*
formerly Asahi Maru (sailing ship) converted to a whaler
BoughtNagasaki Hogei Goshi* From Norway
Bought
The whaling division from Taiheiyo Gyogyo (completed 1904)
of Iwatani Shokai*
Bought
The whaling division from Taiheiyo Gyogyo (launched 1902, Norway)
of Iwatani Shokai*
BoughtDai-Nippon Hogei* From Norway (launched 1906, formerly Fourie)
BoughtDai-Nippon Hogei* From Norway (launched 1906, formerly Worcester)Completed Nagato Hogei*
Osaka Iron Works 1929 Grounded and sankLaunched Toyo Hogei*
Norway 1925 Brought to Shimonoseki 1928 Shipwrecked
Chartered Toyo Hogei*
From Norway (launched 1903)
Completed Toyo Hogei*
Norway 1944 Sank while requisitioned
BoughtToyo Hogei*
Osaka Iron Works 1943 Sank while requisitioned
Completed Toyo Hogei*
Norway 1945 Sank while requisitioned
BoughtNippon Hogei
Bought together with the Antarctic Renamed Showa Maru
No.3

416

Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator

Galicia218

1934

BoughtNippon Hogei

William Wilson

221

1934

BoughtNippon Hogei

Shimura192

1934

BoughtNippon Hogei

Shitoka(*) Showa Maru No.3(*) Showa Maru No.5(*) Showa Maru No.6(*) Etorofu Maru(*) Shikotan MaruShowa Maru No.7
Showa Maru No.8
Showa Maru No.10
Takunan Maru No.1
Takunan Maru No.2
Takunan Maru No.3
Takunan Maru No.5
Takunan Maru No.6
Takunan Maru No.7
Takunan Maru No.8
Takunan Maru No.10
Shonan Maru No.1
Shonan Maru No.2
Shonan Maru No.3
Shonan Maru No.5
Shonan Maru No.6
Shonan Maru No.7
Shonan Maru No.8
Shonan Maru No.10
Shonan Maru No.11
Shonan Maru No.12
Shonan Maru No.15
Shonan Maru No.16
Shonan Maru No.17
Konan Maru No.1

192
1934
224
1935
218
1935
221
1935
192
1935
192
1935
264.3 1936
264.3 1936
264.3 1936
343.46 1937
343.46 1937
343.46 1937
343.46 1937
343.46 1937
343.46 1937
343.46 1937
343.46 1937
350.5 1938
350.5 1938
350.5 1938
350.5 1938
350.5 1938
350.5 1938
355.79 1938
350.5 1938
355.79 1938
355.15 1939
355.15 1939
355.15 1940
355.79 1940
455.85 1941

BoughtRenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedRenamed
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed

Nippon Hogei
Nippon Hogei
Nippon Hogei
Nippon Hogei
Nippon Hogei
Nippon Hogei
Nippon Hogei
Nippon Hogei
Nippon Hogei
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Remarks
Bought together with the Antarctic Renamed Showa Maru
No.5
Bought together with the Antarctic Renamed Showa Maru
No.6
Bought together with the Antarctic Renamed Shikotan
Maru
Bought together with the Antarctic Renamed Etorofu Maru
formerly Leslie 1944 Sank while requisitioned
formerly Galicia 1944 Sank while requisitioned
formerly William Wilson 1943 Sank while requisitioned
formerly Shitoka
formerly Shimura
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works Osaka
Osaka Iron Works 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works, Osaka 1961 Sold
Osaka Iron Works, Osaka
Osaka Iron Works
Osaka Iron Works, Osaka 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works
Osaka Iron Works, Innoshima
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works
Osaka Iron Works 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works
Osaka Iron Works 1942 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works
Osaka Iron Works 1943 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Sank while requisitioned

Trawlers
Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Dai-Ichi Maru

199

1908

Minato Maru

188

1911

Toyo Maru No.1
Toyo Maru No.2
Minato Maru No.2

180.3 1911
193.76 1911
224.6 1912

Meiji Maru

214.9

1915

Chokai Maru

222

1915

Kaiyo Maru

225

1915

Basic Data

Operator

Remarks

Completed Ichiro Tamura/Juro Osaka Iron Works ( Japan’s first steel-hulled trawler)
Oka**
Completed Tamura Steamship Smiths Shipyard (UK) “Tamura Steamship Fishery Company”
Fishery Company
started operations with this vessel
BoughtToyo Hogei*
From UK (launched 1896) March 1928 Grounded and sankBoughtToyo Hogei*
From UK 1913 Shipwrecked and sankCompleted Tamura Steamship Mitsubishi Goshi Kobe 1944 Hit and sank while operating
Fishery Company
BoughtTamura Steamship From Mitsubishi Goshi Kobe (launched 1912) 1944 Hit andFishery Company
sank while operating
BoughtTamura Steamship 1916 Sold
Fishery Company
BoughtTamura Steamship From Kawasaki Shipyard (launched 1911) Sold to former
Fishery Company
Nippon Suisan as a refrigerating transport ship

417

Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Nishimune Maru No.3

251

1915

Daitoku Maru

251

1915

(*) Minato Maru No.3

251

1915

Ibuki Maru
Rokko Maru
Hayama Maru
Niitaka Maru
Hoei Maru
Benten Maru
Tokiwa Maru
Kasuga Maru
Chihaya Maru
Nunohiki Maru
Rikuzen Maru
Rumoi Maru
Otowa Maru
Wakakusa Maru
Yoshino Maru
Takao Maru
Reisui Maru
Sonobe Maru
Hagoromo Maru
Chikushi Maru
Kamo Maru
Ujina Maru

225.79 1919
225.79 1919
219.59 1919
221
1919
219.47 1919
221.38 1919
221.82 1920
219.46 1920
221.97 1920
219.9 1920
221.82 1920
220.49 1920
220.49 1920
220.15 1920
220.42 1920
220
1920
219.15 1920
220.25 1920
234.02 1920
220.32 1920
234.13 1920
227.02 1920

Nemuro Maru
Musashi Maru

220
1920
227.02 1920

Ranzan Maru
Kiku Maru
Kaiko Maru
Takasago MaruAtaka Maru
Kurama Maru

219.11 1920
233.62 1920
233.62 1921
275.46 1921
275.46 1921
233.62 1921

Yahata Maru

267.14 1922

Tatsuta Maru

267

Keiun Maru
Horai Maru
Naruo Maru
Fuyo Maru
Kongo Maru
Noshiro Maru
Eifu Maru
Tamura Maru

215
1922
234.65 1922
216.24 1922
216.23 1922
216.22 1922
216.55 1923
216.33 1923
236.63 1927

Soga Maru
Kushiro Maru

247.47 1927
311
1927

(*) Karumo Maru

231.64 1927

Basic Data

1922

Operator

Remarks

BoughtTamura Steamship Renamed Minato Maru No.3
Fishery Company
BoughtTamura Steamship 1916 Sold
Fishery Company
Renamed Tamura Steamship From Nishimune Maru No.3 1916 Sold
Fishery Company
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Mitsubishi Zosen Kobe
Completed Kyodo Gyogyo
Mitsubishi Zosen Kobe 1944 Wrecked while requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works Innoshima
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Mined and sankLaunched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Hit and sankLaunched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works Innoshima
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Confiscated to China
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works 1943 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works 1943 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Ishikawajima Shipyard 1953 Seized by South Korea
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works 1943 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Ishikawajima Shipyard 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Uchida Shipyard 1921 Fitted with Japan’s first wireless telegraphequipment 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works 1932 Sank after collision
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Uchida Shipyard 1921 Fitted with Japan’s first wireless telegraphequipment 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Confiscated to China
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Ishikawajima Shipyard 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Ishikawajima Shipyard 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Nippon Trawl
Kobe Steel, Toba 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Kobe Steel, Toba 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Nippon Trawl
Ishikawajima Shipyard 1944 Mined and sank while
requisitioned
Bought/ Nippon Trawl
Kobe Steel, Toba (launched 1922, formerly Meiji Maru No.8)
RenamedBought/ Nippon Trawl
Kobe Steel, Toba (launched 1922, formerly Meiji Maru
RenamedNo.11)
Launched Nissho Suisan
Osaka Iron Works 1927 Sank
Launched Nippon Trawl
Ishikawajima Shipyard
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works 1943 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Nissho Suisan
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Confiscated to China
Launched Nissho Suisan
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Osaka Iron Works 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Launched Nissho Suisan
Osaka Iron Works 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Transferred Kyodo Gyogyo
Ishikawajima Shipyard (launched 1920) 1954 Seized by South
Korea
Transferred Kyodo Gyogyo
Teikoku Kisen, Toba (launched 1920)
Completed Kyodo Gyogyo
Mitsubishi Zosen Nagasaki Fitted with Japan’s first diesel engine
1933 Hull extended (412 tons) 1937 Sold to CACIP(Argentina)
Converted Kyodo Gyogyo
From a high-speed carrier to a trawler

418

Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator

Remarks

Keinan Maru
Gyokuen Maru No.1

316.8 1928
313.51 1928

Launched
BoughtNippon Trawl
Kyodo Gyogyo

Gyokuen Maru No.2

316.55 1928

BoughtKyodo Gyogyo

Gyokuen Maru No.3

316.55 1928

BoughtKyodo Gyogyo

Torishima Maru

268.82 1928

BoughtKyodo Gyogyo

Hakata Maru No.1

272.88 1928

Kyodo Gyogyo

Hakata Maru No.2

272.92 1928

Kyodo Gyogyo

Vessel belonging to Hakata Trawl (launched 1920)

Hakata Maru No.3

265.55 1928

Kyodo Gyogyo

Vessel belonging to Hakata Trawl (launched 1920)

Hakata Maru No.6

262.28 1928

Kyodo Gyogyo

Vessel belonging to Hakata Trawl (launched 1922)

Hakata Maru No.7

257.48 1928

Kyodo Gyogyo

Yuki Maru

388.95 1929

Jointly
operated
Jointly
operated
Jointly
operated
Jointly
operated
Jointly
operated
Completed

Kobe Steel, Harima 1945 Sank while requisitioned
From Nagasaki Kaiun 1945 Damaged while requisitioned 1952
Renamed Awaji Maru
From Nagasaki Kaiun 1945 Wrecked while requisitioned 1952
Renamed Naruto Maru
From Nagasaki Kaiun (launched 1920) 1944 Sank while
requisitioned
From Nagasaki Kaiun (launched 1922) 1944 Sank while
requisitioned
Vessel belonging to Hakata Trawl (launched 1920)

Myogi Maru
Yatsushiro Maru

325.84 1929
397.95 1930

Completed Kyodo Gyogyo
Completed Kyodo Gyogyo

Vessel belonging to Hakata Trawl (launched 1923) 1951 Seizedby China
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1933 Hull extended (412 tons)
1937 Sank
1932 Sank in Bohai Sea
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima Fitted with on-board rapid freezing equipment 1945 Sank while requisitioned

Kokusai Maru No.100
Mamiya Maru
Teshio Maru
Azuchi Maru
Kitami Maru
Sapporo Maru
Misago Maru No.1

281.17 1930
397.95 1930
397.95 1930
397.95 1930
397.95 1930
397.95 1930
265
1932

Launched
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
BoughtHinode Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Takasago Gyogyo

Misago Maru No.8

281

BoughtTakasago Gyogyo

Misago Maru No.11
Minou Maru
Shinkyo Maru
Himeji Maru
Sendai Maru
Momoyama Maru
Hakurei Maru
Toko Maru
Hokkai Maru(*) Hakata Maru No.1(*) Hakata Maru No.2(*) Hakata Maru No.3(*) Hakata Maru No.6(*) Hakata Maru No.7

318
1932
472.77 1933
472.75 1933
472.77 1933
472.77 1933422.53 1933
407.36 1933
407.34 1933
407.51 1933
272.88 1934272.92 1934
265.55 1934
262.28 1934
257.48 1934

BoughtCompleted
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Launched
Launched
Launched
BoughtBoughtBoughtBoughtBoughtTakasago Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Shinko Suisan
Shinko Suisan
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo

Hinode Maru No.11
Hinode Maru No.12
Hinode Maru No.15

281.78 1934220.88 1934220.88 1934

BoughtBoughtBoughtHinode Gyogyo
Hinode Gyogyo
Hinode Gyogyo

Hinode Maru No.16

234.67 1934

BoughtHinode Gyogyo

Minato Maru
Hinode Maru No.17

664.21 1934
235.58 1935

Launched
BoughtKyodo Gyogyo
Hinode Gyogyo

Basic Data

1932

Kyodo Gyogyo

Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1944 Hit and sankMitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1943 Sank while requisitioned
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1942 Sank while requisitioned
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Teikoku Kisen, Harima From Karafuto Gyogyo (launched1920) 1945 Sank while requisitioned
From Karafuto Gyogyo (launched 1922) 1944 Sank while
requisitioned
From Karafuto Gyogyo 1943 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1937 Sank
Osaka Iron Works 1936 Sold to Nanbei Suisan
Osaka Iron Works 1942 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works 1933 Sank
Mitsubishi Zosen Kobe 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Mitsubishi Zosen Kobe 1943 Sank while requisitioned
Mitsubishi Zosen Kobe 1944 Sank while requisitioned
From Hakata Trawl
From Hakata Trawl
From Hakata Trawl
From Hakata Trawl 1944 Sank while requisitioned
From Hakata Trawl 1944 Sank while requisitioned 1951 Seizedby China
From Dai-Ichi Suisan (formerly Dai-Ichi Maru)
From Dai-Ichi Suisan (formerly Chofuku Maru)
From Dai-Ichi Suisan (formerly Daifuku Maru) 1944 Sank
while requisitioned
From Dai-Ichi Suisan (formerly Kaifuku Maru) 1952 Renamed
Kamo Maru
Osaka Iron Works 1943 Sank while requisitioned
From Hoyo Trawl Goshi (formerly Inaba Maru) 1945 Sank
while requisitioned

419

Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Hinode Maru No.18

235.31 1935

BoughtHimeshima Maru

274.65 1938

BoughtSuruga Maru

991.75 1938

Launched

Oi Maru
Kitakami Maru
Misago Maru No.2

498.41 1938
498
1938
265.86 1940

Completed
Completed
BoughtMisago Maru No.3

267

Mogami Maru
Tokachi Maru
Hyuga Maru
Chikugo Maru

498.95 1941
498.95 1941
994.35 1942
557.11 1944

Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed

Yamakuni Maru

557

1944

Completed

Akashi Maru

344.65 1944

Launched

Tenryu Maru

557.11 1944

Launched

Tatsuta Maru

533.11 1944

Launched

Nippon Maru No.3

220.13 1945

Bought1940

BoughtOperator

Remarks

Hinode Gyogyo

From Hoyo Trawl Goshi (formerly Izumo Maru) 1945 Sank
while requisitioned
Nippon Suisan
From Kihira Goshi (launched 1927) 1946 Disappeared after
leaving Tobata Port
Nippon Suisan
Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Hikoshima 1939 Went to Baja California
as a refrigerating and freezing ship 1943 Sank while
requisitioned
Nippon Suisan
Osaka Iron Works 1942 Sank while requisitioned
Nippon Suisan
Osaka Iron Works Confiscated to UK
Takasago Gyogyo
From Karafuto Gyogyo (launched 1920) 1944 Sank while
requisitioned
Takasago Gyogyo
Teikoku Kisen, Harima From Karafuto Gyogyo (launched
1921) 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Nippon Suisan
1944 Sank while requisitioned
Nippon Suisan
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Nippon Suisan
1943 Sank while requisitioned
Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Kanasashi Shipyard 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Tosei
Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Kanasashi Shipyard 1945 Mined and sankTosei
Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Hayashikane Heavy Inds. (Shimonoseki) 1956 Seized by South
Tosei
Korea
Minam i Nipp on Kanasashi Shipyard 1950 Nansei Suisan 1952 Nanpo Gyogyo
Gyogyo Tosei
Kaihatsu 1975 Sold for scrap
Minam i Nipp on 1950 Nansei Suisan 1952 Nanpo Gyogyo Kaihatsu
Gyogyo Tosei
Nippon Suisan
From Nippon Gyomo Sengu (Completed 1936)

West-water trawling boats (hand trawling)
Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator

Kasuga Maru
Taiun Maru
Reiun Maru
Ise Maru
Shoshun Maru
Yayoi Maru
Hoyo Maru
Heian MaruTomino Maru
Choun Maru
Ryusho Maru
Oikaze Maru
Wakamizu Maru
Yoshun Maru
Sokai Maru
Tsukimi Maru
Naniwa Maru
Rakuei Maru
Murasame MaruUrakaze Maru
Takasago Maru
Horai Maru
Koshun Maru

49.04 1923
47.58 1925
47.58 1925
48.6 1925
48.38 1925
48.72 1925
47.66 1925
47.66 1925
47.66 1925
47.66 1925
49.38 1925
49.38 1925
49.38 1925
49.38 1925
49.94 1927
49.95 1927
49
1927
49.28 1927
49.74 1927
49.74 1927
88.79 1927
88.7 1927
88.7 1927

Completed
BoughtBoughtCompleted
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Launched
Launched
Launched

Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo

Aishima Maru
Ukujima Maru

50.63 1928
49.88 1928

Tie-upTie-upFuso Gyogyo
Fuso Gyogyo

Basic Data

Remarks
Amano Shipyard 1930 Sold to Nippon Kosen Gyogyo
From Nissen Gumi (Amano Shipyard, completed 1923)
From Nissen Gumi (Amano Shipyard, completed 1923)
Amano Shipyard 1930 Sold
Amano Shipyard
Amano Shipyard
Amano Shipyard 1930 Sold to Horai Suisan
Amano Shipyard
Amano Shipyard 1930 Sank
Amano Shipyard
Amano Shipyard
Amano Shipyard
Amano Shipyard
Amano Shipyard
Amano Shipyard
Amano Shipyard
Amano Shipyard 1929 Grounded, hull abandoned
Amano Shipyard 1930 Sank
Amano Shipyard
Amano Shipyard
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1945 Confiscated to China
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1945 Wrecked and sank while
requisitioned
1933 Merged with Kyodo Gyogyo
1933 Merged with Kyodo Gyogyo

420

Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

OperatorEjima Maru
Genkai Maru
Ejima Maru
Hakusa Maru
Fuki Maru
Taian Maru
Kumi Maru
Nohi Maru
Manju Maru
Keisho Maru
Koki Maru
Fuji Maru
Tenshin Maru
Kiyo Maru
Yuko Maru
Mizuho Maru
Shosei Maru
Hinode Maru

49.88 1928
51.17 1928
49.88 1928
89.15 1928
91.29 1928
86.93 192880.44 192980.44 192980.44 192980.44 192973.87 192973.87 1929
79.74 193080.37 193073.87 193080.13 193072.5 193072.5 1930

Tie-upTie-upTie-upLaunched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed

Fuso Gyogyo
Fuso Gyogyo
Fuso Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Horai Suisan
Horai Suisan
Horai Suisan
Horai Suisan
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo

Meiji Maru
Kusayama Maru
Seiten Maru
Moshun Maru
Isshin Maru
Zuiko Maru

72.5 193088.7 193272.5 193272.5 193288.29 193288.29 1932

Completed
Launched
Completed
Launched
Completed
Completed

Hoyo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo

Hakubi Maru
Royo Maru
Hokoku Maru
Nippon Maru
Toyo Maru
Heiwa Maru
Toshikuni Maru

88.29 193288.29 193288.28 193388.28 193388.28 193388.28 193388.56 1934

Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Launched

Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo

Chikyu Maru
Wafu Maru

88.63 193488.56 1934

Launched
Launched

Hoyo Gyogyo
Hoyo Gyogyo

Oyo Maru

88.63 1934

Launched

Hoyo Gyogyo

Yoko Maru

88.56 1934

Launched

Hoyo Gyogyo

Kashin Maru

88.63 1934

Launched

Hoyo Gyogyo

Sankyo Maru
Ukuru Maru
Taketo Maru
Kinsui Maru

89.43 193489.43 193489.43 193489.43 1934

Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched

Horai Gyogyo
Horai Gyogyo
Horai Gyogyo
Horai Gyogyo

Toseki Maru
Kenkai Maru
Tatsukiri Maru
Nagusa Maru
Daishin Maru
Reiko Maru
Ranyo Maru

89.43 193489.43 193489.43 193489.43 1934
89.58 1935
88.54 1935
89.58 1935

Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched

Horai Gyogyo
Horai Gyogyo
Horai Gyogyo
Horai Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo

Basic Data

Remarks
1933 Merged with Kyodo Gyogyo
1933 Merged with Kyodo Gyogyo
1933 Merged with Kyodo Gyogyo
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1960 Sold
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1960 Sold
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1948 Seized by South Korea
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1949 Scrapped
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1952 Sold
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1949 Scrapped
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1947 Sank
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1948 Seized by South Korea
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1940 Sank
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1941 When requisitioned,“Ni-Go Hinode Maru” 1945 Bombed and sankMitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1945 Confiscated to China
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1952 Sold
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1951 Seized by China
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1958 Shipwrecked and sank infishing grounds
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1954 Sank in a typhoon
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1954 Sank in a typhoon
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1958 Sold
Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Hikoshima 1948 Seized by South Korea
1958 Sold to Kyoei Suisan
Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Hikoshima 1958 Sold to Kyoei Suisan
Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Hikoshima 1945 Sank while
requisitioned
Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Hikoshima 1945 Sank while
requisitioned
Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Hikoshima 1945 Sank while
requisitioned
Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Hikoshima 1944 Wrecked and sankwhile requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Bombed and wrecked
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Bombed and grounded and while
requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works
Osaka Iron Works
Osaka Iron Works
Osaka Iron Works 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works 1955 Seized by South Korea
Osaka Iron Works 1944 Grounded and abandoned while
requisitioned

421

Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator

Kanan Maru
Daiton Maru

88.54 1935
88.54 1935

Launched
Launched

Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo

Nisui Maru
Hokuto Maru

89.58 1935
89.58 1935

Launched
Launched

Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo

Mazu Maru
Iran Maru
Bansan Maru
Shin-Minato Maru

89.58 1935
79.17 1936
79.17 1936
88.54 1936

Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched

Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo

Tonan Maru
Bosen Maru
Samizu Maru
Tsukai Maru
Chojo Maru
Ryuko Maru
Hinode Maru No.6
Hinode Maru No.7
Kaiyo Maru
Kaijo Maru
Hinode Maru No.8
Hinode Maru No.10
Inzan Maru
Sagisu Maru

79.17 1936
79.17 1936
88.62 1937
88.38 1937
80
1937
80
1937
70.52 1937
67
1937
—
1938
—
1938
70
1938
70
1938
99.96 1938
99.51 1938

Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched

Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nichiman Gyogyo
Nichiman Gyogyo
Hinode Gyogyo
Hinode Gyogyo
Nichiman Gyogyo
Nichiman Gyogyo
Hinode Gyogyo
Hinode Gyogyo
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Hassen Maru

99.97 1938

Launched

Nippon Suisan

Byoritsu Maru

99.51 1938

Launched

Nippon Suisan

Tatsui Maru

99.96 1938

Launched

Nippon Suisan

Susan Maru

99.51 1938

Launched

Nippon Suisan

Ruson Maru

99.96 1938

Launched

Nippon Suisan

Ota Maru

99.51 1938

Launched

Nippon Suisan

Wabi Maru

99.96 1938

Launched

Nippon Suisan

Yobai Maru

99.51 1938

Launched

Nippon Suisan

Ryosui Maru

99.96 1938

Launched

Nippon Suisan

Sobun Maru

99.51 1938

Launched

Nippon Suisan

Tsuran Maru

99.05 1938

Launched

Nippon Suisan

Musha Maru

99.05 1938

Launched

Nippon Suisan

Kyuryu Maru

97.89 1938

Completed Nippon Suisan

Yaryu Maru

97.89 1938

Completed Nippon Suisan

Asashio Maru
Bunzan Maru

97.89 1938
97.89 1938

Launched Nippon Suisan
Completed Nippon Suisan

Ensui Maru

97.89 1938

Completed Nippon Suisan

Basic Data

Remarks
Osaka Iron Works
Osaka Iron Works 1950 To Nansei Suisan 1952 To Nanpo
Gyogyo Kaihatsu
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works 1950 To Nansei Suisan 1952 Renamed Toko
Maru
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Ichikawa Shipyard
Ichikawa Shipyard
Osaka Iron Works 1950 To Nansei Suisan 1952 Renamed Eiko
Maru
Ichikawa Shipyard
Ichikawa Shipyard
Osaka Iron Works 1948, 1955 Seized by South Korea
Osaka Iron Works 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Ue’eda Shipyard (Yasugi, Shimane)Ue’eda Shipyard (Yasugi, Shimane)
1944 Shipwrecked and sank due to wartime disaster
1944 Shipwrecked and sank due to wartime disaster
Shikoku Senkyo
Shikoku Senkyo

Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1942 Mined and sankwhile requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1945 Confiscated to the
USSR
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1945 Confiscated to the
USSR
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1944 Sank while
requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1950 To Nansei Suisan
1952 Renamed Mishima Maru
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1950 To Nansei Suisan
1952 Renamed Himeshima Maru
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1950 To Nansei Suisan
1952 Renamed Tamashima Maru
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship1950 Transferred to Nansei
Suisan 1952 Renamed Washima Maru
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1945 Sank in foreignwaters (unconformed)
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1944 Sank while
requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1945 Shipwrecked andsank while requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1950 To Nansei Suisan
1952 Renamed Otowa Maru
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1950 To Nansei Suisan
1952 Renamed Kureha Maru
Osaka Iron Works 1950 To Nansei Suisan 1952 Renamed Oyo
MaruOsaka Iron Works 1950 To Nansei Suisan 1952 Renamed Wafu
Maru
Osaka Iron Works
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1950 To Nansei Suisan
1952 Renamed Asashio Maru
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship

422

Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator

Tenzan Maru

97.89 1938

Launched

Nippon Suisan

Akizu Maru

99.05 1938

Launched

Nippon Suisan

Yurin Maru

97.89 1939

Completed Nippon Suisan

Suijo Maru

97.89 1939

Completed Nippon Suisan

Hinan Maru

97.89 1939

Completed Nippon Suisan

Meto Maru

97.89 1939

Completed Nippon Suisan

Hinode Maru No.3
Hinode Maru No.5
Kokai Maru
Hakuyo Maru
Manzan Maru
Nan-o Maru
Takuyo Maru No.1
Takuyo Maru No.2
Koei Maru No.12
Tenyu Maru

76.14 1940
74.45 1940
73.46 1940
58.86 1941
93
1942
93
1942
117.09 1942
117.09 1942
77.61 1942
53.11 1943

Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
BoughtHoyu Maru

75.91 1943

Launched

Kochi Maru

94.1

1944

Launched

Ogon Maru

94.1

1944

Launched

Sado Maru

91.76 1944

Launched

Remarks
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1950 To Nansei Suisan
1952 Renamed Meiyo Maru
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1944 Sank while
requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1943 Sank while
requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1950 To Nansei Suisan
1952 Renamed Wakashio Maru
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1943 Grounded and sankwhile requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works Taiwan base ship 1950 To Nansei Suisan
1952 Renamed Royo Maru
Ishihara Shipyard (Shimonoseki)
Ishihara Shipyard (Shimonoseki) 1952 Sold
Shikoku Senkyo 1944 Sank
1948 Missing
Osaka Iron Works Confiscated to China
Osaka Iron Works

Hinode Gyogyo
Hinode Gyogyo
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo
Tosei
Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Kyodo Shipyard (Wakamatsu) 1949 Sold
Tosei
Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo
Tosei
Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo
Tosei
Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Kiyo Zosen (Tokuyama) 1949 Scrapped
Tosei

Whaling mother ships
Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator

Mihairu Maru

3,643

1905

LeasedToyo Gyogyo*

Beltana

11,220

1930

BoughtToyo Hogei*

Antakuchiku Maru(*) Tonan Maru

9,593
9,593

1934
1935

BoughtRenamed

Nippon Hogei
Nippon Hogei

Tonan Maru II

19,262.53 1937

Completed Nippon Suisan

Tonan Maru III

19,209.71 1938

Completed Nippon Suisan

Remarks
From the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (wale flensingship) 1913 Sold (to Ishikari Sekitan)
UK steamship bought for refurbishment Sold in 1933 before
refurbishment
From Norway (formerly Antarctic) Bought with 5 whalers
Renamed just before entering Osaka Port en route to the
Antarctic as Antakuchiku Maru 1943 Mined and sankOsaka Iron Works 1944 Bombed and sank while
requisitioned
Osaka Iron Works 1944 Sank near Truk Island while requisitioned 1951 Floated and major conversin Renamed Tonan
Maru

Factory ships
Name
Kamimori Maru(*) Kasado Maru
Ryokai Maru(*) Taihoku Maru
Kosei Maru

Basic Data

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.
4,758

1933

Operator

Remarks

BoughtNippon Godo Kosen Uraga Senkyo (launched 1917) 1945 Sank while
requisitioned
6,020.02 1934
BoughtShinko Suisan(formerly used for emigration to Hawaii and Brazil) 1932
Changed to a meal ship 1945 Sank while requisitioned
4,682
1934
BoughtNippon Godo Kosen (launched 1911, UK) 1943 Sank
8,252.64 1935 Change of use Nippon Suisan
Changed from crab factory ship to fishmeal factory ship
8,266.37 1939
Bought/ Nippon Suisan(launched 1920, formerly Narenta) 1943 Sank while
Renamedrequisitioned423

Crab factory ships
Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Jingu Maru
Itsukushima Maru
Moji Maru
Toyokuni Maru
Wakanoura Maru
Karafuto Maru
Tatsuhiro Maru
Higo Maru
Hakuai Maru

2,741.65 1926
3,875.31 1926
1,998.39 1926
2,344.62 1927
2,401.29 1927
2,818
1928
2,178
1928
1,287
1928
2,614.03 1928

BoughtChartered
BoughtChartered
BoughtChartered
Chartered
Chartered
CharteredBifuku Maru

2,559

1928

Chartered

Shunkai Maru
Fukuichi Maru
Ryoto Maru
Pusan Maru
Kanton Maru
Eitoku Maru
Kureha Maru
Sanuki Maru
Shohei Maru
Toten Maru
Hokushin Maru

1,579
1928
1,999.84 1928
2,374.01 1928
2,412.45 1928
2,566.37 1928
2,951.18 1928
175.9 1929
5,861.56 1930
3,771.4 1933
3,823.22 1934
5,819
1934

Chartered
Chartered
Chartered
Chartered
Chartered
Chartered
BoughtChartered
Chartered
Chartered
Bought/RenamedOperator

Remarks

Kyodo Gyogyo
From Mr Kotaro Suda (launched 1890, UK)
Kyodo Gyogyo
From Nissho Suisan (launched 1887, UK) Bought 1927
Kyodo Gyogyo
From Mr Naoji Nomura (launched 1877, UK)
Kyodo Gyogyo
From Mr Naoji Nomura 1927 Charter cancelled
Kyodo Gyogyo(launched 1885, UK) 1943 Mined and sankShowa Kosen Gyogyo (built 1884, Italy)
Showa Kosen Gyogyo
Showa Kosen Gyogyo (launched 1884, UK)
Showa Kosen Gyogyo 1926 Bought by Hayashikane Shoten 1945 Mined and sankwhile requisitioned
Showa Kosen Gyogyo (launched 1898, UK) (sister ship of Hakuai Maru) 1942 Minedand sank
Showa Kosen Gyogyo (launched 1919)
Nippon Kosen Gyogyo (launched 1882)
Nippon Kosen Gyogyo (launched 1882)
Nippon Kosen Gyogyo (launched 1883, Germany)
Nippon Kosen Gyogyo (launched 1883, UK)
Nippon Kosen Gyogyo (launched 1888, UK)
Nippon Kosen Gyogyo From Toyama Prefecture Fisheries Training InstituteNippon Godo Kosen
Nippon Godo Kosen
Nippon Godo Kosen 1944 Bombed and sankNippon Godo Kosen formerly Honoruru Maru (Osaka Shosen) 1945 Shipwrecked
and sank while requisitioned

Tankers and ore transporters
Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Itsukushima Maru

10,007

1937

Matsushima Maru

10,1001944

Hashidate Maru

10,798

1944

Operator

Remarks

Completed Nippon Suisan

Kawasaki Zosen, Kobe 1944 Bombed and sank while
requisitioned
Launched Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Nagasaki 2TL-type wartime standard
Tosei
ship 1945 Sank while requisitioned
Completed Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Kawasaki Zosen, Kobe 2TL-type wartime standard ship 1946
Tosei
Converted to whaling mother ship

Transporters (refrigerating & freezing, etc.)
Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Taisho Maru No.1
Taisho Maru No.2
Karumo Maru(*) Kaiyo Maru
Awaji Maru
Taihakusan Maru
Kosoku Maru No.1
Kosoku Maru No.3
Shinyo Maru

605
1917
614
1917
197.36 1923
225.16 1924
129.83 1926
466
1928
88.11 1931
175.66 1932
4,658
1933

Sumiyoshi Maru

113.89 1934

Zuisho Maru
Zuiun Maru

245
250

Basic Data

1939
1939

Operator

Remarks

Launched
Launched
Launched
Converted
Chartered
BoughtCompleted
Completed
BoughtToyo Hogei*
Okajima Jiei Shipyard (wooden whalemeat transporter)
Toyo Hogei*
Okajima Jiei Shipyard (wooden whalemeat transporter)
Nissen Gumi
Osaka Iron Works Operated as a high-speed transporter
Kyodo Gyogyo
Converted trawler
Asahi Suisan(launched 1917)
Toyo Hogei*
Refrigerating steamship
Kyodo Gyogyo
Kyodo Gyogyo
Mitsubishi Zosen Hikoshima 1944 Sank while requisitioned
Nippon Godo Kosen Uraga Senkyo (launched 1918) 1944 Sank while
requisitioned
Launched Kyodo Gyogyo
Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Hikoshima 1945 Sank while
requisitioned
Completed Nippon Suisan
Ichikawa Shipyard (Ominato)
Completed Nippon Suisan
Ichikawa Shipyard (Ominato)

424

Longline vessels, round haul net vessels, purse seine vessels, dockside transporters, small
tankers, etc.
Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Suzu Maru
Kazu Maru
Tsuru Maru
Kokai Maru No.3
Kokai Maru No.6
Kokai Maru No.11
Kokai Maru No.12
Genkai Maru

40.12 1927
38.42 193040.23 1930
47.52 1937
47.52 1937
39.36 1937
39.13 1937
69.44 1944

Launched
Launched
Launched
BoughtBoughtBoughtBoughtBoughtIkuchiyo Maru

68.98 1945

BoughtOperator

Remarks

Kyodo Gyogyo
Crab catcher
Kyodo Gyogyo
Crab catcher
Kyodo Gyogyo
Crab catcher
Nippon Suisan
Bought from Chosen Yushi (built 1934)
Nippon Suisan
Bought from Chosen Yushi (built 1934)
Nippon Suisan
Bought from Chosen Yushi (built 1937)
Nippon Suisan
Bought from Chosen Yushi (built 1937)
Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo From Nippon Gyomo Sengu (launched 1924, tanker)
Tosei
Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo From Nippon Gyomo Sengu (launched 1919, tanker)
Tosei

PostwarWhalers
Name(*) Nissui Maru No.1(*) Nissui Maru No.2
Koyo Maru
Koyo Maru No.2
Koyo Maru No.3
Koyo Maru No.5
Konan Maru
Konan Maru No.2
Konan Maru No.3
Konan Maru No.5
Konan Maru No.6
Shin-ei Maru No.6
Konan Maru No.7
Konan Maru No.8
Konan Maru No.10
Konan Maru No.11
Konan Maru No.12
Konan Maru No.15
Konan Maru No.16
Konan Maru No.17
Konan Maru No.18
Konan Maru No.20
Konan Maru No.21
Konan Maru No.22
Konan Maru No.23
Konan Maru No.25
Konan Maru No.26
Konan Maru No.27
Shonan Maru
Shonan Maru No.2

Basic Data

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.
119.67 1946
125.56 1946
366.92 1946
367.88 1947367
1947367.88 1947
397.61 1948398
1949
417.43 1950
434.29 1951
433.83 1951
29.98 1951
471.16 1952
471.34 1952
741.76 1954
741.76 1954
746.11 1955
746.11 1955
743.44 1956
743.28 1956
742.61 1956
741.86 1956
753.72 1957
753.85 1957
753.40 1957
753.49 1957
752.78 1957
737.75 1958
916.96 1972
916.44 1972

RenamedRenamedCompleted
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
BoughtCompleted
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed

Operator
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Remarks(formerly Rekkusu Maru)(formerly Oruga Maru)
Hakodate Dock (launched 1944) 1966 Sold for refurbishment
Hitachi Zosen 1964 Sold
Hitachi Zosen 1967 Sold for scrap
Hitachi Zosen 1950 Sank in a typhoon
Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Yokohama
Hitachi Zosen 1967 Sold
Hitachi Zosen 1967 Sold
Hitachi Zosen 1967 Sold
Hitachi Zosen 1967 Sold
From Kawanami Kogyo
Hitachi Zosen 1970 Sold
Hitachi Zosen 1965 Grounded, hull abandoned
Hitachi Zosen 1972 Sold
Hitachi Zosen 1970 Sold
Hitachi Zosen 1972 Sold
Hitachi Zosen 1973 Sold
Hitachi Zosen 1976 Sold for scrap
Hitachi Zosen 1976 Sold for scrap
Hitachi Zosen 1972 Sold
Hitachi Zosen 1977 Sold for scrap
Hitachi Zosen 1976 Sold to Kyodo Hogei
Hitachi Zosen 1976 Sold to Kyodo Hogei
Hitachi Zosen 1976 Sold to Kyodo Hogei
Hitachi Zosen 1976 Sold to Kyodo Hogei
Hitachi Zosen 1976 Sold for scrap
Hitachi Zosen 1976 Sold to Kyodo Hogei
Hitachi Zosen 1976 Sold to Kyodo Hogei
Hitachi Zosen 1976 Sold to Kyodo Hogei

425

TrawlersNameCompleted/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Tone Maru
Saga Maru
Shinano Maru
Fushimi Maru
Yamato Maru
Omi Maru
Nichibei Maru No.1
Nichibei Maru No.2

533
1946
349.47 1946
538.59 1948
273.3 1949
291.42 1950291
1950
362.16 1951
362.16 1951

Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
BoughtBoughtNichibei Maru No.3
Koyaki Maru No.1

362.16 1951
273.68 1951

BoughtBoughtKoyaki Maru No.2

277.08 1951

BoughtKoyaki Maru No.3
Koyaki Maru No.6

277
1951
277.08 1951

BoughtBoughtKoyaki Maru No.7

272

1951

BoughtKoyaki Maru No.8

273.13 1951

Bought(*) Kashii Maru

362.16 1952

Renamed(*) Hakozaki Maru(*) Miyaji Maru

362.16 1952
357.05 1952

RenamedRenamed(*) Koyaki Maru(*) Ariake Maru(*) Kirishima Maru(*) Amakusa Maru(*) Yatsushiro Maru(*) Awaji Maru(*) Naruto Maru(*) Kamo Maru
Asama Maru
Ikoma Maru
Yamashiro Maru

273.68 1952
277.08 1952
277.08 1952272
1952
273.13 1952
313.51 1952
316.55 1952
234.67 1952
1,070
1954
993.20 1954
349.21 1955

RenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedCompleted
Completed
Completed

Uji Maru
Kawachi Maru

535.06 1957
300.21 1957

Completed
CompletedHyuga Maru

300.22 1958

Completed

Izumo Maru

301.01 1960

Completed

Amagi Maru

2,249.21 1960

Completed

Ibuki Maru
Unzen Maru
Ehiko Maru
Oe Maru
Kaimon Maru
Nichinan Maru

2,502.70 1961
2,524.68 1962
2,524.85 1962
2,524.77 1962
2,518.13 1962
2,518.37 1962

Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed

Hokko Maru No.30
Kiso Maru299
1962
2,522.43 1963

Launched
Completed

Basic Data

Operator

Remarks

Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Hikoshima (launched 1945) 1972 Sold
Saga Shipyard (Toyama, Takaoka) 1965 Sold
Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Hikoshima (launched 1945) 1970 Sold
Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Nagasaki 1963 Sold for scrap
Nishi Nippon Juko, Shimonoseki 1964 Sold for scrap
Nishi Nippon Juko, Shimonoseki 1967 Sold
From Nichibei Suisan 1952 Renamed Kashii Maru
From Nichibei Suisan Ishikawajima Heavy Inds. 1952 Renamed
Hakozaki Maru
Nippon Suisan
From Nichibei Suisan 1952 Renamed Miyaji Maru
Nippon Suisan
From Kawanami Kogyo (launched 1946) 1952 Renamed Koyaki
Maru
Nippon Suisan
From Kawanami Kogyo (launched 1946) 1952 Renamed Ariake
Maru
Nippon Suisan
From Kawanami Kogyo (launched 1946)
Nippon Suisan
From Kawanami Kogyo (launched 1946) 1952 Renamed
Kirishima Maru
Nippon Suisan
From Kawanami Kogyo (launched 1946) 1952 Renamed
Amakusa Maru
Nippon Suisan
From Kawanami Kogyo (launched 1946) 1952 Renamed
Yatsushiro Maru
Nippon Suisan(formerly Nichibei Maru No.1) 1968 Investment in kind to
N.R.P. 1970 Renamed UDANG NO.1
Nippon Suisan(formerly Nichibei Maru No.2)
Nippon Suisan(formerly Nichibei Maru No.3) 1965 Sank after collision in
Malacca Strait
Nippon Suisan(formerly Koyaki Maru No.1)
Nippon Suisan(formerly Koyaki Maru No.2)
Nippon Suisan(formerly Koyaki Maru No.6) 1963 Sold for scrap
Nippon Suisan(formerly Koyaki Maru No.7)
Nippon Suisan(formerly Koyaki Maru No.8)
Nippon Suisan(formerly Gyokuen Maru No.1) 1961 Sold
Nippon Suisan(formerly Gyokuen Maru No.2) 1955 Sold
Nippon Suisan(formerly Hinode Maru No.16) 1956 Seized by South Korea
Nippon Suisan
Mitsui Zosen, Tamano 1971 Sold
Nippon Suisan
Mitsui Zosen, Tamano
Nippon Suisan
Kure Shipyard 1970 Investment in kind to I.M.P. Renamed
RUMBATI NO.1
Nippon Suisan
Enzan Senkyo 1964 Sank off Angola
Nippon Suisan
Donoumi Zosen 1970 Investment in kind to W.I.F. Renamed
UDANG NO.3
Nippon Suisan
Donoumi Zosen 1970 Investment in kind to I.M.P. Renamed
RUMBATI NO.2
Nippon Suisan
Donoumi Zosen 1970 Investment in kind to W.I.F. Renamed
UDANG NO.2
Nippon Suisan
Kure Shipyard 1st Type 25 stern vessel 1972 Grounded in
Solomon Sea, hull abandoned
Nippon Suisan
Kure Shipyard
Nippon Suisan
Mitsui Zosen, Tamano 1982 Sold for scrap
Nippon Suisan
Mitsui Zosen, Tamano 1983 Sold to Nippon Kyodo Hogei
Nippon Suisan
Mitsui Zosen, Tamano 1982 Sold
Nippon Suisan
Mitsui Zosen, Tamano 1984 Sold for scrap
Na n p o G y o g y o Mitsui Zosen, Tamano 1983 Sold for scrap
Kaihatsu
Hokko Gyogyo
Nippon Suisan
Mitsui Zosen, Tamano 1988 Sold

426

Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator

Remarks

Nippon Suisan
Hokko Gyogyo
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Mitsui Zosen, Tamano 1987 Sold

Kurama Maru
Hokko Maru No.50
Aso Maru
Kirishima Maru

2,522.43 1963
192
1963
3,608.29 1964
3,470
1964

Completed
Launched
Completed
Completed

Koyo Maru
Takachiho Maru
Teshio Maru

2,521.23 1964
3,494.99 1965
2,500.94 1965

Completed Hokuyo Suisan
Completed Nippon Suisan
Completed Nippon Suisan

Tokachi Maru
Mogami Maru

2,501.31 1965
549.52 1966

Completed Nippon Suisan
Completed Nippon Suisan

Kitagami Maru
Zao Maru
Hokko Maru No.31
Shirane Maru
Okuni Maru
Suzuka Maru
Ishikari Maru
Koyo Maru No.2

549.86 1966
2,530.74 1966314
1966
2,528.80 1967
1,496
1967
2,529
1967
549.2 1967
3,456
1967

Completed
Completed
Launched
Completed
Launched
Completed
Completed
Completed

Koyo Maru No.21
Niitaka Maru
Fuji Maru

549
1967
3,910.2 1968
3,914.46 1968

Completed
Completed
Completed

Haruna Maru

4,049

1968

Completed

Kongo Maru

3,249.32 1968

Completed

Hokko Maru No.12
Yamato Maru

124
1968
3,990.67 1970

Completed
Completed

Rikuzen Maru

3,989.36 1971

Completed

Kasuga Maru

3,279.81 1971

Completed

Koyo Maru No.3
Rokko Maru

3,431.63 1972
3,268.87 1972

Launched
Completed

Yoshino Maru
Hokko Maru No.57
Hokko Maru No.17(*) ERIN FISHER

3,264.71 1973
348.77 1973124
1974
2,500.94 1974

Completed
Launched
Launched
BoughtHokko Maru No.77

349.62 1976

Completed(*) KIRISHIMA

3,612

1978

Transferred(*) FUJI(*) Teshio Maru
Akagi Maru
Ibuki Maru(*) KASUGA MARU

3,914
1978
2,500.94 1979
2,576.86 1980
2,577.08 1981
3,279.81 1982

Transferred
BoughtCompleted
Completed
Transferred(*) ROKKO MARU

3,268.87 1982

TransferredAzuchi Maru

2,802

Completed

Basic Data

1983

Mitsui Zosen, Tamano 1992 Sold for scrap
Mitsui Zosen, Tamano 1978 Investment in kind in EMDEPES
Renamed KIRISHIMA
Mitsui Zosen, Tamano
Mitsui Zosen, Tamano 1971 Sold to Hokoku Suisan
Mitsui Zosen, Tamano 1974 Investment in kind to A.F.D.
Renamed ERIN FISHER
Mitsui Zosen, Tamano 1989 Sold
Niigata Tekko, Niigata 1967 Collided with Taiyo Maru No.82
in Southern Alaska fishing grounds and sankNiigata Tekko, Niigata 1984 Sold for refurbishment
Mitsui Zosen, Tamano

Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Hokko Gyogyo
Nippon Suisan
Shikoku Dock (launched 1966)
San-in Enyo Gyogyo
Nippon Suisan
Shikoku Dock 1991 Sold
Nippon Suisan
Wakamatsu Zosen
Hokuyo Suisan
Mitsui Zosen, Fujinagata 1989 Sold to Nippon Suisan 1995
Sold
Hokuyo Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Hitachi Zosen, Mukojima 2003 Scrapped
Nippon Suisan
Mitsui Zosen, Fujinagata 1978 Investment in kind in EMDEPES
Renamed FUJI
Nippon Suisan
Hitachi Zosen 1987 Damaged by fire (Tobata Port), sold for
scrap
Nippon Suisan
Hitachi Zosen 1989 Investment in kind to PESANTAR
Renamed KONGO
Hokko Gyogyo
Nippon Suisan
Hitachi Zosen 1991 Investment in kind to PESANTAR
Renamed YAMATO
Hokoku Suisan
Hitachi Zosen 1992 Sold to Nippon Suisan Investment in kind
to PESANTAR Renamed RIKUZEN
Nippon Suisan
Hitachi Zosen 1982 Investment in kind to PESPASA Renamed
KASUGA MARU
Hokuyo Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Hitachi Zosen 1982 Investment in kind to PESPASA Renamed
ROKKO MARU
Nippon Suisan
Naikai Zosen 1989 Sank after collision off Argentina
Hokko Gyogyo
Hokko Gyogyo
A.F.D.
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Teshio Maru) 1979 Sold to
Nippon Suisan
Hokko Gyogyo
Narazaki Zosen 1987 Investment in kind to PESPASA Renamed
HOTAKA MARUEMDEPES
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Kirishima Maru) 1994 Sold for
scrap
EMDEPES
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Fuji Maru) 1989 Sold for scrap
Nippon Suisan
From A.F.D. (formerly ERIN FISHER) 1989 Sold
Nippon Suisan
Naikai Zosen 1993 Sold to SEA SUI JOINT VENTURE
Nippon Suisan
Naikai Zosen 1995 Sold to NISSUI NZPESPASA
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Kasuga Maru) 1999 Damagedby fire in Argentine fishing grounds, sank
PESPASA
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Rokko Maru) 2000 Sold for
scrap
Hokoku Suisan
Naikai Zosen 1992 Sold to Nippon Suisan 1994 Investment
in kind to PESPASA Renamed AZUCHI MARU

427

Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Echizen Maru

2,802

1984

Unzen Maru

2,591.31 1986

Completed

Chikuzen Maru(*) HOTAKA MARU

7,060
550

1987
1987

Completed
Transferred

Koyo Maru No.8(*) Miyajima Maru(*) Koyo Maru No.2(*) KONGO
ALYESKA

4,991
1988
6,370
1988
3,456.27 1989
3,278
1989
198
1989

Completed
Converted
BoughtBoughtBought(*) YAMATO(*) RIKUZEN(*) Koyo Maru No.8

3,989.36 1991
3,990.67 1992
4,991
1992

BoughtBoughtBoughtTsuda Maru

5,200

1993

Bought(*) PAKURA(*) AZUCHI MARU

3,067
2,802

1993
1994

BoughtBought(*) UNIONSUR

5,200

1994

Renamed(*) TAHARAKI
Shinkai Maru

2,577
2,802

1995
2000

BoughtBought(*) UNIONSUR 1

4,991

2003

Bought(*) UNIONSUR

4,991

2003

RenamedOperator

Remarks

Completed Nippon Suisan

Naikai Zosen 1995 Investment in kind to PESPASA Renamed
ECHIZEN MARU
Nippon Suisan
Naikai Zosen 1989Investment in kind in EMDEPES Renamed
UNZEN
Nippon Suisan
Hitachi Zosen 1991 Sold to Kyodo Senpaku
PESPASA
From Hokko Gyogyo (formerly Hokko Maru No.77) 1992
Sold
HohsuiNaikai Zosen 1992 Sold to Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Surimi factory ship converted to trawler 1990 Sold to Russia
Nippon Suisan
From Hohsui 1995 SoldPESANTAR
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Kongo Maru) 1995 Sold
DUTCH HARBOR 1991 Sold
SEAFOODSPESANTAR
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Yamato Maru) 2010 SoldPESANTAR
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Rikuzen Maru) 2002 Sold
Nippon Suisan
2003 Investment in kind in EMDEPES Renamed
UNIONSUR1
Nippon Suisan
From Hoko Suisan 1994 Investment in kind in EMDEPES
Renamed UNIONSUR
SEA SUI J/V
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Akagi Maru) 2002 SoldPESPASA
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Azuchi Maru) 2001 Sank after
collision in Argentine fishing grounds
EMDEPES
Formerly Tsuda Maru, 2003 renamed Niitaka Maru 2006 Soldfor refurbishment
NISSUI NZ
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Ibuki Maru) 2002 Sold
Nippon Suisan
From Shinkai Gyojo Kaihatsu 2000 Investment in kind to
PESPASA Renamed VIENTO DEL SUR
EMDEPES
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Koyo Maru No.8) 2003
Renamed UNIONSUR
EMDEPES
Formerly UNIONSUR 1

West-water trawling boats (hand trawling)
Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator

Oshima Maru
Takashima Maru
Yashima Maru
Toyoshima Maru
Iki Maru
Tsushima Maru
Kiku Maru
Choei Maru
Daikoku Maru No.11
Hokoku Maru No.11
Hokoku Maru No.13
Hokoku Maru No.51

75.17 1946
75.17 1946
99.5 1946
99.5 194675
194675.17 1946
81.81 1946
81.81 1946
135
1946
99
1946
99
1946
97.78 1946

Launched
Launched
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched

Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan

Hokoku Maru No.52

97.78 1946

Launched

Hokoku Suisan

Hokoku Maru No.53
Hokoku Maru No.55
Hokoku Maru No.56
Hokoku Maru No.57
Hokoku Maru No.58
Hokoku Maru No.60
Hokoku Maru No.61
Hokoku Maru No.62

97.78 1947
97.78 1947
97.77 1947
97.78 1947
98.29 1947
97
1947
98
1947
97
1947

Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched

Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan

Basic Data

Remarks

Shikoku Senkyo (Takamatsu) 1951 Sank
Shikoku Senkyo (Takamatsu) 1963 Sold

1953 Sank
1953 Sank
Uraga Dock
Nagoya Zosen
Nagoya Zosen
Hitachi Zosen 1951 Sold to Nippon Suisan Renamed Shunyo
Maru
Hitachi Zosen 1951 Sold to Nippon Suisan Renamed Rakuyo
Maru
Hitachi Zosen
Hitachi Zosen
Hitachi Zosen
Hitachi Zosen
Hitachi Zosen 1949 Seized by China / Taiwan
Hitachi Zosen 1949 Seized by China / Taiwan
Hitachi Zosen
Hitachi Zosen

428

Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator

Hokoku Maru No.63

98.29 1947

Launched

Hokoku Suisan

Hokoku Maru No.65
Hokoku Maru No.67
Hokoku Maru No.70
Hokoku Maru No.72

97.78 1947
97.78 1947
98.38 1947
98.9 1947

Launched
Completed
Completed
Completed

Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan

Hokoku Maru No.75
Daikoku Maru No.12
Matsu Maru
Suzu Maru
Gekko Maru
Tokai Maru
Miho Maru
Koyo Maru
Fukuyo Maru
Wayo Maru
Junyo Maru
Taiho Maru No.1
Taiho Maru No.2
Hizen Maru No.1
Hizen Maru No.2(*) Shunyo Maru(*) Rakuyo Maru(*) Nikko Maru(*) Yoko Maru(*) Heiyo Maru(*) Anyo Maru
Unzen Maru No.1

98.38 1947
136
1947
98.47 1947
98.47 1947
98.29 1947
99.26 1947
99.26 1947
98
1948
98
1948
99.4 1948
99.4 1948
81.81 1949
81.81 1949
54.97 1949
54.97 1949
97.78 1951
97.78 1951
98.29 1951
88.56 1951
98.9 1951
98
1951
99.38 1951

Completed
Launched
Completed
Completed
Launched
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
BoughtBoughtBoughtBoughtRenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedBoughtHokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Unzen Maru No.3

99.38 1951

BoughtNippon Suisan

Unzen Maru No.5

99.38 1951

BoughtNippon Suisan

Unzen Maru No.6

99.38 1951

BoughtNippon Suisan

Unzen Maru No.7
Unzen Maru No.9

99.11 1951
99.38 1951

BoughtBoughtNippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Unzen Maru No.11

99.38 1951

BoughtNippon Suisan

Unzen Maru No.12
Unzen Maru No.13
Unzen Maru No.15

99.14 195199
1951
97.87 1951

BoughtBoughtBoughtNippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Unzen Maru No.16

97.87 1951

BoughtNippon Suisan

Unzen Maru No.17
Unzen Maru No.18

97.87 1951
97.87 1951

BoughtBoughtNippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Unzen Maru No.19

97.87 1951

BoughtNippon Suisan

Unzen Maru No.20

97.87 1951

BoughtNippon Suisan

Nanyo Maru No.5(*) Washima Maru(*) Otoba Maru

99.67 1951
99.96 1952
99.05 1952

BoughtRenamedRenamed

Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Basic Data

Remarks
Hitachi Zosen 1951 Sold to Nippon Suisan, renamed Nikko
Maru
1951 Sold to Nippon Suisan Renamed Yoko Maru
Hitachi Zosen
Hitachi Zosen
Hitachi Zosen 1951 Sold to Nippon Suisan, renamed AnyoMaru
Hitachi Zosen
Uraga Dock
Donoumi Zosen 1965 Sold
Donoumi Zosen 1965 Sold
Hitachi Zosen 1963 Sold for refurbishment
Tokai Zosen (Shimizu) 1949 Seized by China/Taiwan
Tokai Zosen (Shimizu) 1963 Sold
Donoumi Zosen 1967 Sold
Donoumi Zosen 1967 Sold
Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Hikoshima 1967 Sold
Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Hikoshima 1967 Sold
From Shima Suisan 1952 Renamed Kiku Maru
From Shima Suisan 1952 Renamed Choei Maru
From Hizen Gyogyo Kumiai
From Shima Suisan(formerly Hokoku Maru No.51)(formerly Hokoku Maru No.52)(formerly Hokoku Maru No.63)(formerly Hokoku Maru No.65)(formerly Hokoku Maru No.71)(formerly Hokoku Maru No.72)
From Kawanami Kogyo (launched 1946) 1956 Renamed Unzen
Maru
From Kawanami Kogyo (launched 1946) 1956 Renamed
Katsuyama Maru
From Kawanami Kogyo (launched 1946) 1956 Renamed
Shiroyama Maru
From Kawanami Kogyo (launched 1946) 1956 Renamed
Minoshima Maru
From Kawanami Kogyo (launched 1946) 1953 Seized by China
From Kawanami Kogyo (launched 1946) 1956 Renamed Tomie
Maru
From Kawanami Kogyo (launched 1946) 1956 Renamed Tara
Maru
1953 Seized by China
1953 Seized by China
From Kawanami Kogyo (launched 1946) 1956 Renamed
Hinoshima Maru
From Kawanami Kogyo (launched July 1946) 1956 Renamed
Kamishima Maru
1953 Seized by China
From Kawanami Kogyo (launched 1946) 1956 Renamed Fukue
Maru
From Kawanami Kogyo (launched 1946) 1956 Renamed Himi
Maru 1953 Seized by China
From Kawanami Kogyo (launched 1946) 1956 Renamed
Shikimi Maru 1953 Seized by China
From Kawanami Kogyo 1956 Renamed Tagami Maru(launched 1938, formerly Wabi Maru) 1967 Sold(launched 1938, formerly Tsuran Maru) 1967 Sold

429

Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator(*) Kureha Maru(*) Meiyo Maru(*) Royo Maru(*) Toko Maru(*) Eiko Maru

99.05 1952
97.89 1952
97.89 1952
89.58 1952
88.54 1952

RenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedRenamed

Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan(*) Oyo Maru(*) Wafu Maru(*) Fuji Maru(*) Asashio Maru(*) Wakashio Maru(*) Mishima Maru

97.89 1952
97.89 1952
99.96 1952
97.89 1952
97.89 1952
99.51 1952

RenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedRenamed

Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan(*) Himeshima Maru(*) Tamashima Maru(*) Kiku Maru(*) Choei Maru
Unzen Maru No.23
Kashima Maru
Kasuga Maru
Tokiwa Maru
Onoe Maru
Suwa Maru
Ise Maru
Nishiyama Maru
Tateyama Maru
Matsuyama Maru
Hashima Maru
Takashima Maru
Shinyo Maru

99.96 1952
99.51 1952
81.81 1952
81.81 1952
98.56 1952
98.74 1953
98.74 1953
98
1953
79.72 1953
79.56 1953
79.57 1953
79.85 1953
79.85 1953
79
1954
79.39 1954
79.16 1954
106.75 1955

RenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedCompleted
Completed
Launched
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed

Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Takuyo Maru

106.75 1955

Completed Nippon Suisan

Katori Maru
Kaiyo Maru
Genyo Maru
Hokoku Maru No.3
Hokoku Maru No.5
Kazuki Maru
Iki Maru
Tsushima Maru

106.75 1955
136.4 1955
136.29 1955
91.59 1955
91.83 1955
1071956
108.29 1956
108.29 1956

Completed
Launched
Launched
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed

Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Hokoku Maru No.35
Hokoku Maru No.36(*) Unzen Maru(*) Katsuyama Maru(*) Shiroyama Maru(*) Minoshima Maru(*) Tomie Maru(*) Hinoshima Maru(*) Kamishima Maru(*) Fukue Maru(*) Tara Maru(*) Shikimi Maru
Aoba Maru

84.45 1956
84.38 1956
99.38 1956
99.38 1956
99.38 1956
99.38 1956
99.38 1956
97.87 1956
97.87 1956
97.87 1956
99.38 1956
97.87 1956
108.07 1956

Completed
Completed
RenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedRenamedCompleted

Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Basic Data

Remarks(launched 1938, formerly Musha Maru) 1967 Sold(launched 1938, formerly Tenzan Maru) 1953 Seized by China(launched 1939, formerly Meto Maru) 1953 Seized by China(1935 launched , formerly Hokuto Maru) 1964 Sold
(1936 launched , formerly Shin-Minato Maru) 1952 Seized by
China(launched 1938, formerly Kyuryu Maru) 1967 Sold(launched 1938, formerly Yaryu Maru) 1967 Sold(launched 1938, formerly Inzan Maru) 1967 Sold(launched 1938, formerly Bunzan Maru) 1953 Seized by China(launched 1939, formerly Suijo Maru) 1953 Seized by China(launched 1938, formerly Susan Maru) 1952, 1958 Seized by
China(launched 1938, formerly Ruson Maru) 1958 Seized by China(launched 1938, formerly Ota Maru) 1964 Sold(launched 1938, formerly Taiho Maru No.1) 1953 Sank
(launched 1938, formerly Taiho Maru No.2) 1953 Sank

1958 Sold to Hokoku Suisan
1971 Sank
1971 Sold
Koyo Zosen (Fukuoka) 1961 Sold
Koyo Zosen (Fukuoka) 1961 Sold
1954 Seized by China Repatriated 1962 Sold
Koyo Zosen (Fukuoka)
Koyo Zosen (Fukuoka) 1962 Sold
Koyo Zosen (Fukuoka) 1962 Sold
Kure Shipyard 1971 Investment in kind to W.I.F. Renamed
UDANG NO.15
Kure Shipyard 1971 Investment in kind to W.I.F. Renamed
UDANG NO.16
Kure Shipyard
Hayashikane Shipyard 1971 Sold
Hayashikane Shipyard 1971 Sold

Donoumi Zosen
1970 Investment in kind to I.M.P. Renamed AMAN NO.1
1970 Investment in kind to I.M.P. Renamed AMAN NO.2
1994 Scrapped(formerly Unzen Maru No.1)(formerly Unzen Maru No.3) 1965 Sold
(formerly Unzen Maru No.5) 1965 Sold
(formerly Unzen Maru No.6)(formerly Unzen Maru No.9) 1958 Seized by China(formerly Unzen Maru No.15) 1966 Sold for scrap(formerly Unzen Maru No.16) 1966 Sold for scrap(formerly Unzen Maru No.18) 1958 Seized by China(formerly Unzen Maru No.11)(formerly Unzen Maru No.20) 1966 Sold for scrap
Donoumi Zosen

430

Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator

Wakaba Maru
Shinryo Maru No.1
Shinryo Maru No.2
Akama Maru

108.07 1956
77.34 1957
78.07 1957
106.45 1958

Completed
BoughtBoughtCompleted

Fukuma Maru

106.47 1958

Completed Nippon Suisan

Kaiyo Maru No.31
Kaiyo Maru No.32
Dejima Maru

136.40 1958
136.29 1958
94.80 1959

BoughtNippon Suisan
BoughtNippon Suisan
Completed Nippon Suisan

Hirado Maru

94.71 1959

Completed Nippon Suisan

Seto Maru

99.07 1959

Completed Nippon Suisan

Mie Maru

99.01 1959

Completed Nippon Suisan

Oshima Maru
Aishima Maru
Tenzan Maru
Manzan Maru
Atago Maru
Yasaka Maru
Hokoku Maru No.1
Hokoku Maru No.2
Kunimi Maru
Takami Maru
Tamae Maru
Irie Maru
Hokoku Maru No.6
Hokoku Maru No.7
Suwa Maru
Ise Maru
Tokiwa Maru
Onoe Maru
Nikko Maru
Gekko Maru
Ose Maru
Shirase Maru
Hashima Maru
Takashima Maru
Koshin Maru No.8
Hizen Maru
Higo Maru
Heiyo Maru
Anyo Maru
Hoyo Maru
Fuyo Maru
Yuyo Maru
Hiyo Maru
Meiyo Maru

95
1960
95
1960
98.12 1960
98.21 1960
94
1961
94
1961
98.30 1961
98.35 1961
94
1961
94
1961
94
1962
94
1962
109.54 1962
109.69 1962
119.88 1963
119.78 1963
94
1963
94
1963
115.83 1963
115.77 1963
114
1964
114
1964
114
1964
114
1964
110
1964
115
1965
115
1965
114.82 1965
114.62 1965
168
1966
168
1966
168
1966
168
1966
184.79 1967

Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Launched
Launched
Completed
Completed
Launched
Launched
Completed
Completed
Launched
Launched
BoughtBoughtCompleted
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed

Royo Maru
Koyo Maru
Ryuyo Maru

184.61 1967
185.35 1967
185
1967

Completed Nippon Suisan
Completed Nippon Suisan
Completed Nippon Suisan

Basic Data

Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Hokuyo Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Remarks
Donoumi Zosen
Launched 1954
Launched 1954
Donoumi Zosen 1970 Investment in kind to W.I.F. Renamed
UDANG NO.6
Donoumi Zosen 1970 Investment in kind to W.I.F. Renamed
UDANG NO.5
From Kyoei Suisan (launched 1955)
From Kyoei Suisan (launched 1955)
1st ship built by Nagasaki Shipyard 1970 Investment in kind
to W.I.F. Renamed UDANG NO.7
Nagasaki Shipyard 1970 Investment in kind to W.I.F. Renamed
UDANG NO.8
Nagasaki Shipyard 1970 Investment in kind to W.I.F. Renamed
UDANG NO.11
Nagasaki Shipyard 1970 Investment in kind to W.I.F. Renamed
UDANG NO.12
Nagasaki Shipyard 1971 Sold
Nagasaki Shipyard 1971 Sold
Nagasaki Shipyard 1970 To Nanpo Gyogyo Kaihatsu
Nagasaki Shipyard 1970 To Nanpo Gyogyo Kaihatsu
Nagasaki Shipyard 1972 Sold
Nagasaki Shipyard 1972 Sold
Donoumi Zosen 1968 Investment in kind to N.R.P.
Donoumi Zosen 1968 Investment in kind to N.R.P.
Nagasaki Shipyard 1969 Investment in kind to N.R.P.
Nagasaki Shipyard 1969 Investment in kind to N.R.P.
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Donoumi Zosen 1968 Investment in kind to N.R.P.
Donoumi Zosen 1968 Investment in kind to N.R.P.
From Hokuyo Suisan (formerly Koshin Maru No.1) 1971 Sold
From Hokuyo Suisan (formerly Koshin Maru No.2) 1971 Sold
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Donoumi Zosen 1969 Investment in kind to N.R.P.
Donoumi Zosen 1969 Investment in kind to N.R.P.
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Wakamatsu Zosen
Wakamatsu Zosen
Wakamatsu Zosen
Wakamatsu Zosen
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Wakamatsu Zosen Investment in kind to W.I.F. Renamed
UDANG NO.17
Wakamatsu Zosen 1971 Sank in E.China Sea
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard 1980 Sank in Bering Sea

431

Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator

Oyo Maru
Eiyo Maru
Shoyo Maru
Kiyo Maru
Wayo Maru
Junyo Maru
Yashima Maru
Tsushima Maru
Shunyo Maru
Rakuyo Maru
Kakuyo Maru No.1
Kakuyo Maru No.2
Kakuyo Maru No.3
Kakuyo Maru No.5
Katori Maru
Kazuki Maru
Kakuyo Maru
Fukuyo Maru
Aoba Maru
Wakaba Maru
Shuyo Maru
Eiyo Maru
Mizuho Maru
Akiho Maru
Hokkai Maru
Hakurei Maru
Otowa Maru
Kureha Maru
Hokushin Maru
Hokuto Maru
Kakuyo Maru No.7
Kakuyo Maru No.8
Washima Maru
Toyoshima Maru
Suwa Maru
Ise Maru
Atago Maru
Yasaka Maru
Seto Maru
Mie Maru
Ose Maru
Shirase Maru
Dejima Maru
Hirado Maru
Katsuyama Maru
Shiroyama Maru

194.65 1967
194.88 1967
184.48 1967
184.68 1967
194.91 1969
194.55 1969
194.46 1969
197.25 1969
194.73 1969
194.42 1969
194
1969
194
1969
194
1969
194
1969
194.69 1970
194.66 1970
194.21 1970
193.25 1970
194.76 1970
194.97 1970
193.97 1970
193.10 1970
194.27 1970
194.23 1970
214.77 1971
214.77 1971
214.65 1971
214.67 1971
214.70 1971
214.37 1971
199.00 1971
199.00 1971
204.86 1972
204.53 1972
134.91 1973
134.33 1973
134.84 1974
134.32 1974
134.74 1974
134.11 1974
135.07 1976
135.10 1976
134.72 1976
134.58 1976
139.74 1977
139
1977

Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Launched
Launched
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed

Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Hokuyo Suisan
Hokuyo Suisan
Hokuyo Suisan
Hokuyo Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Hokuyo Suisan
Hokuyo Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Tateyama Maru
Nishiyama Maru
Kakuyo Maru No.11
Kakuyo Maru No.12
Matsuyama Maru

149.43 1977
149.39 1977
149
1978
149
1978
139.59 1978

Completed
Completed
Launched
Launched
Completed

Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Hokuyo Suisan
Hokuyo Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Basic Data

Remarks
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Wakamatsu Zosen
Wakamatsu Zosen
Wakamatsu Zosen 1986 Sold for scrap
Wakamatsu Zosen 1986 Sold for scrap
Nagasaki Shipyard 1988 Transferred to Nikko Fisheries
Nagasaki Shipyard 1988 Transferred to Nikko Fisheries
Wakamatsu Zosen
Wakamatsu Zosen
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard 1989 Sold
Nagasaki Shipyard 1989 Sold
Wakamatsu Zosen 1986 Sold for scrap
Wakamatsu Zosen 1986 Sold for scrap
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Wakamatsu Zosen
Wakamatsu Zosen
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard 1990 Sold
Nagasaki Shipyard 1990 Sold
Wakamatsu Zosen 1988 Sold
Wakamatsu Zosen 1988 Sold
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Wakamatsu Zosen
Wakamatsu Zosen
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Wakamatsu Zosen
Wakamatsu Zosen
Nagasaki Shipyard 1988 Sold to Nikko Fisheries
Nagasaki Shipyard 1988 Sold to Nikko Fisheries
Nagasaki Shipyard 1988 Sold to Nikko Fisheries
Nagasaki Shipyard Sank while operating in west-water fishinggrounds
Nagasaki Shipyard 1988 Sold to Nikko Fisheries
Nagasaki Shipyard 1988 Sold to Nikko Fisheries
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard Consort ship of Katsuyama Maru 1988
Sold to Nikko Fisheries 1993 Bought by Nippon Suisan 1998
Sold to W.I.F. Renamed UDANG NO.53

432

Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator

Nikko Maru
Yoko Maru
Kakuyo Maru No.17

155
155
165

1986
1986
1986

Completed Nippon Suisan
Completed Nippon Suisan
Completed Hohsui

Kakuyo Maru No.18

165

1986

Completed Hohsui

Wako Maru
Eiko Maru

164
164

1989
1989

Completed Nikko Fisheries
Completed Nikko Fisheries

Remarks
Nagasaki Shipyard 1988 Sold to Nikko Fisheries
Nagasaki Shipyard 1988 Sold to Nikko Fisheries
Nagasaki Shipyard 1989 Sold to Nikko Fisheries Renamed
Eko Maru
Nagasaki Shipyard 1989 Sold to Nikko Fisheries Renamed
Meiko Maru
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard

Shrimp trawlers
Name
Kachidoki Maru No.1
Kachidoki Maru No.2
Kachidoki Maru No.3
Kachidoki Maru No.5
Kachidoki Maru No.6(*) Kashii Maru(*) Hokoku Maru No.1(*) Hokoku Maru No.2(*) Hokoku Maru No.6(*) Hokoku Maru No.7(*) Kunimi Maru(*) Takami Maru(*) Nikko Maru(*) Gekko Maru(*) AMAN NO.1(*) AMAN NO.2
N.R.ANSON
N.R.BUCKINGHAM
N.R.CASTLEREAGH
N.R.DIEMEN(*) UDANG NO.1(*) UDANG NO.2(*) UDANG NO.3(*) UDANG NO.5(*) UDANG NO.6(*) UDANG NO.7(*) UDANG NO.8(*) UDANG NO.11(*) UDANG NO.12(*) UDANG NO.15(*) UDANG NO.16(*) UDANG NO.17
AMAN NO.3
AMAN NO.5
N.R.ESSINGTONUDANG NO.21
UDANG NO.22
Kachidoki Maru No.7
Kachidoki Maru No.8
Kachidoki Maru No.10
N.R.FRANCIS
N.R.GLYDE

Basic Data

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.
98
1968
98
1968
98
1968
98
1968
98
1968
362.16 1968
98.3 1968
98.35 1968
109.54 1968
109.69 1968
94
1968
94
1968
115.83 1969
115.77 1969109.37 1970109.37 1970
124.2 1970
124.2 1970
124.2 1970
124.2 1970
396.51 1970
301.01 1970
300.21 1970
106.47 1970
106.45 1970
94.8 1970
94.71 1970
99.07 1970
99.01 1970
106.75 1971
106.75 1971
184.79 1971
971971
99.44 1971
184.94 1971
133.13 1972
133.13 1972
98
1972
98
1972
98
1972
184.94 1972
184.94 1972

Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
BoughtBoughtBoughtBoughtBoughtBoughtBoughtBoughtBoughtTransferred
Transferred
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Transferred
Transferred
Transferred
Transferred
Transferred
Transferred
Transferred
Transferred
Transferred
Transferred
Transferred
Transferred
BoughtCompleted
Completed
Completed
Completed
Launched
Launched
Launched
Completed
Completed

Operator
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
I.M.P.
I.M.P.
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
I.M.P.
I.M.P.
N.R.P.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
N.R.P.
N.R.P.

Remarks
South America north coast shrimp trawl fisheries
South America north coast shrimp trawl fisheries
South America north coast shrimp trawl fisheries
South America north coast shrimp trawl fisheries
South America north coast shrimp trawl fisheries
From Nippon Suisan 1970 Transferred to W.I.F.
From Nippon Suisan 1974 Sold
From Nippon Suisan 1974 Sold
From Nippon Suisan 1974 Sold
From Nippon Suisan 1974 Sold
From Nippon Suisan 1972 Sold
From Nippon Suisan 1972 Sold
From Nippon Suisan
From Nippon Suisan(formerly Iki Maru)(formerly Tsushima Maru)
ASI (Western Australia)
ASI
ASI
ASI 1974 Sank in a cyclone
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Kashii Maru)
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Izumo Maru)
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Kawachi Maru)
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Fukuma Maru)
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Akama Maru)
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Dejima Maru)
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Hirado Maru)
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Seto Maru)
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Mie Maru)
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Shinyo Maru)
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Takuyo Maru)
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Meiyo Maru)
Built by Yokohama Yacht in 1971
Wakamatsu Zosen
ASI
Wakamatsu Zosen 2006 Sold for scrap
Wakamatsu Zosen 2006 Sank (damaged by fire)South America north coast shrimp trawl fisheries
South America north coast shrimp trawl fisheries
South America north coast shrimp trawl fisheries
ASI
ASI

433

Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator

N.R.HARRIS
N.R.JUNCTION
N.R.KENDALL
N.R.LIVERPOOL
N.R.MITCHELL
UDANG NO.23
UDANG NO.25
UDANG NO.26
N.R.NASSAU
N.R.ORD
N.R.PALMER
N.R.ROBINSON
N.R.SHOAL
N.R.TASMAN
UDANG NO.27
UDANG NO.28
AMAN NO.8
AMAN NO.10(*) UDANG NO.35(*) UDANG NO.36(*) UDANG NO.37
AMAN NO.11
AMAN NO.12
AMAN NO.16

184.94 1972
202.3 1972
202.3 1973
202.3 1973
202.3 1973
157.53 1973
157.49 1973
157.55 1973
219.88 1974
219.88 1974
219.88 1974
219.88 1974
143.42 1974
143.42 1974
169.56 1974
169.56 1974
157
1974
157
1974
147.79 —147.79 —147.79 —
150
1981
150
1981
105
1993

Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Transferred
Transferred
Transferred
Completed
Completed
BoughtN.R.P.
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
N.R.P.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
I.M.P.
I.M.P.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
I.M.P.
I.M.P.
I.M.P.

AMAN NO.18

124.69 1993

BoughtI.M.P.

(*) RUMBATI NO.1(*) RUMBATI NO.2
RUMBATI NO.3(*) UDANG NO.53

340.99 1970
298.73 1970
194.2—
154.09 1998

BoughtBought—BoughtI.M.P.
I.M.P.
I.M.P.
W.I.F.

TOYO 5TOYO 8TOYO 18

105.13 1993
104.25 1993
124.69 1993

BoughtBoughtBoughtI.M.P.
I.M.P.
I.M.P.

Remarks
ASI
ASI
ASI 1974 Sank in a cyclone
ASI
ASI
Wakamatsu Zosen 2006 Sold for scrap
Wakamatsu Zosen 2006 Sold for scrap
Wakamatsu Zosen 2006 Sold for scrap
ASI Sold to W.I.F.
ASI Sold to W.I.F.
ASI
ASI Sold to W.I.F.
ASI
ASI
Wakamatsu Zosen 2007 Sold for scrap
Wakamatsu Zosen
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
From N.R.P. (formerly N.R.ORD)
From N.R.P. (formerly N.R.NASSAU)
From N.R.P. (formerly N.R.ROBINSON)
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
From P.T.TOFICO 1970 Built by Yokohama Yacht (formerly
TOYO 7)
From P.T.TOFICO 1970 Built by Usuki Zosen (formerly
TOYO 20)
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Yamashiro Maru)
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Hyuga Maru)
formerly Kinya Maru
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Matsuyama Maru) 2006 Soldfor scrap
From P.T.TOFICO
From P.T.TOFICO
From P.T.TOFICO

Whaling mother ships
Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator(*) Hashidate Maru
Kaiko Maru(*) Tonan Maru

10,798

1946
2,940.67 1948
19,308.15 1951

Converted Nippon Suisan
Completed Nippon Suisan
Converted Nippon Suisan(*) Matsushima Maru

13,792.83 1956

Converted Nippon Suisan(*) Tonan Maru II

13,815.83 1957

Renamed

Nippon Suisan

Nichiei Maru

12,918

1964

BoughtNippon Suisan

Basic Data

Remarks
Former tanker 1951 Sold to Iino Kaiun
Operated by Ogasawara Hogei (launched 1946)
Former Tonan Maru III floated in March, towed and converted(Harima Zosen, Aioi) 1971 Sold for scrap
Tanker converted to whaling mother ship 1957 Renamed Tonan
Maru II(formerly Matsushima Maru) 1971 Main engine replaced 1976
Transferred to Nihon Kyodo Hogei(formerly Nitto Maru) (Nitto Hogei purchased Blommendahl)
1966 Sold for scrap

434

Crab factory ships
Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Tokei Maru
Shokyu Maru

5,385.66 1955
5,988.55 1956

Yoko Maru
Keiko Maru

5,763.62 1956
7,516.88 1966(*) Eihei Maru(*) Eiho Maru(*) Eitan MaruGALAXY

1,428
1,281
498
1,326

VICEROY

1,300

OMNISEA

4,948

BoughtBought/converted
BoughtBoughtOperator
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Remarks(launched 1919) 1965 Sank off Manila
From Matsuoka Kisen (built 1919)

Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

From Nippon Kisen (launched 1928) 1964 Sold for scrap
Cargo ship Kyowa Maru (completed 1950) converted to factoryship1968 Change of use Hokoku Suisan
From a longline vessel
1969
BoughtHokoku Suisan
From a transporter
1972 Change of use Hokoku Suisan
From a longline vessel
1976
Bought
DUTCH HARBOR 1997 Sold
SEAFOODS
1977
Bought
DUTCH HARBOR 1987 Sold
SEAFOODS
1985
Bought
DUTCH HARBOR Factory ships 2002 Sold
SEAFOODS

Freezer factory ships, factory ships
Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator

Tadotsu Maru

9,877.14 1946

Settsu Maru

9,329.06 1947

Bought/converted
BoughtHoyo Maru
Miyajima Maru

14,111

1951
9,598.76 1953

Launched Hokuyo Suisan
Completed Nippon Suisan

Itsukushima Maru
Kashima Maru
Nojima Maru(*) Gyokuei Maru

5,889.18 1955
7,163.2 1956
8,815.02 1958
10,181.01 1960

Completed
Completed
Completed
Converted

Shikishima Maru

9,176.09 1961

Completed Nippon Suisan

Takashima Maru(*) Kazushima Maru
Mineshima Maru

9,856.56 1962 Completed Hokoku Suisan
3,757
1967 Bought/built Nippon Suisan
21,050.99 1969
Bought/ Nippon Suisan
converted
6,370
1986 Completed Nippon Suisan

Miyajima Maru

Remarks

Nippon Suisan

Kawasaki Heavy Inds. Tanker converted to salting carrier

Nippon Suisan

Hitachi Zosen 1947 Converted to salting carrier 1948
Converted to freezer ship

Hokoku Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Hitachi Zosen 1968Converted (8,285.82 tons) 1984 Sold for
scrap
Hitachi Zosen 1966 Sold to Nippon Suisan 1977 Sold
Hitachi Zosen 1970 Hull extended by 12m 1988 Sold for scrap
Hitachi Zosen 1993 Sold for scrap
To a meal factory ship Contributed to development of surimi
production at sea 1975 Sold for scrap
Hitachi Zosen 1967 Surumi equipment added 1988 Sold for
scrap
Substitute for Kashima Maru 1965 Sold to Nichiro Gyogyo
Converted to two-tier deck 1979 Sold
Tanker Ominesan Maru (launched 1958) converted to surimi
factory ship 1989 Sold for scrap
Hitachi Zosen Surimi factory ship 1988 Converted to trawler

Tankers, ore transporters
Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator

Gyokuei Maru

10,181.01 1948

Matsushima Maru(*) Tadotsu Maru

13,792.83 1951

9,877.14 1951

Bought/ Nippon Suisan
converted
Completed Nippon Suisan
Converted Nippon Suisan

Matsushima Maru (II)Matsushima Maru II
Andesu Maru

13,103.36 1957
29,049.14 1962
32,068.08 1962

Completed Nippon Suisan
Completed Nippon Suisan
Completed Nippon Suisan

Matsushima Maru III

46,226.53 1964

Completed Nippon Suisan

Nippon Maru
Sachikaze Maru

53,751.59 1967

Completed Nippon Suisan
Completed Nippon Suisan

Basic Data

2,907.42 1969

Remarks
Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Yokohama Tanker converted to
Antarctic whaling tanker
Hitachi Zosen 1956 Converted to whaling mother ship
Salting carrier converted to tanker 1956 Main engine convered
to diesel 1962 Sold
Hitachi Zosen 1977 Sold for scrap
Kure Shipyard 1979 Sold for scrap
Ishikawajima Harima, Aioi 1967 Deck crane added 1979 Soldfor scrap
Ishikawajima Harima, Aioi 1967 Converted 1977 Damagedby fire off Muroto, irrecoverable
Ishikawajima Harima, Aioi 1982 Sold for scrap
Setoda Zosen Meal and oil transporter 1985 Sold for scrap

435

Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator

Suzukaze Maru

2,930.6

1970

Completed Nippon Suisan

Nippon Maru III

89,498.11 1971

Completed Nippon Suisan

Amazon Maru

85,690.3

1976

Completed Nippon Suisan

Nachi Maru
Mazeran Maru

49,974.05 1980
88,2861986

Completed Nissui Shipping
Completed Nissui Shipping

Remarks
Naikai Zosen, Taguma Meal and oil transporter 1985 Sold for
scrap
Ishikawajima Harima, Kure Ore/oil combination carrier 1986
Sold for refurbishment
Ishikawajima Harima, Aioi Ore/oil combination carrier 1987
Sold to Israel
1987 Sold for refurbishment
Ishikawajima Harima, Kure Ore/coal combination carrier 2000
Sold to Greece for refurbishment

Refrigerating & freezing transporters
Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator

Nichibei Maru No.2
Hokoku Maru No.66
Hokoku Maru No.71

357.05 1946
98.29 1947
98.9 1947

Completed Nippon Suisan
Completed Hokoku Suisan
Launched Hokoku Suisan

Hokoku Maru No.73
Hokoku Maru No.68
Kuroshio Maru No.1
Kuroshio Maru No.2
Sagami Maru
Eiko Maru

98
1947
98.9 1948
180
1949
180
1949
5,589
1951
1,140.43 1953

Launched
Completed
BoughtBoughtCompleted
Launched

Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan

Tsukishima Maru
Meiko Maru
Kasagi Maru(*) Yoshino Maru
Nanko Maru
Hokko Maru
Toko Maru
Seiko Maru
Asakaze Maru
Kazushima Maru
Harukaze Maru
Matsukaze Maru
Soyokaze Maru
Isokaze Maru
Asama Maru
Ikoma Maru
Suruga Maru
Sagami MaruSANTIAGO I
White Castle

1,170.19 1956
1,177.42 1956
1,502
1957
695
1961
1,696.57 1961
1,697.12 1961
1,695.56 1961
1,692.88 1961
2,816.05 1967
3,757.1 1967
2,815.91 1968
2,899.92 1971
2,907.71 1972
3,730.58 1973
8,371.89 1978
8,369
1979
4,846
1979
5,589
1986
7,534
1993
6,557
2003

Completed
Completed
Completed
Converted
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
BoughtCompleted
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
BoughtTokyo Teion
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Nissui Senpaku
Nissui Shipping
Fresh Carriers

Remarks
1952 Renamed Miyaji Maru
Hitachi Zosen Fish catch transporter
Hitachi Zosen Fish catch transporter 1951 Sold to Nippon
Suisan Renamed Heiyo Maru
Hitachi Zosen Fish catch transporter
Hitachi Zosen Fish catch transporter
From Terukuni Kaiun 1956 Sold
From Terukuni Kaiun 1956 Sold
Harima Zosen, Aioi Refrigerator ship 1965 Sold forrefurbishment
Enzan Senkyo
1966 Sold
1966 Sold
Converted from a longline vessel 1968 Sold
Hitachi Zosen 1979 Sold for scrap
Hitachi Zosen 1977 Sold for refurbishment
Ishikawajima Harima, Aioi 1977 Sold for refurbishment
Ishikawajima Harima, Aioi 1977 Sold for refurbishment
Miho Shipyard 1984 Sold for scrap
NKK, Shimizu From Hohsui 1979 Sold
Miho Shipyard 1984 Sold for scrap
Naikai Zosen 1986 Sold for refurbishment
Naikai Zosen 1989 Sold
Naikai Zosen 1993 Sold for refurbishment
1986 Sold for refurbishment
1986 Sold for refurbishment
2004 Sold for refurbishment
1989 Sold for refurbishment
2004 Sold
From Tokyo Reefer Chartering

Offshore trawlers, longline vessels, squid angling vessels, bonito fishing boats, round haul net
vessels, purse seine vessels, dockside transporters
Name
Hokoku Maru No.16
Hokoku Maru No.17
Hokoku Maru No.18
Hokoku Maru No.20
Hokoku Maru No.21
Hokoku Maru No.22

Basic Data

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.
98.00 1947
99.80 1947
99.80 1947
99.80 1947
99.80 1947
99.80 1947

Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed

Operator
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan

Remarks
Bonito and tuna fishing boat
Bonito and tuna fishing boat
Bonito and tuna fishing boat
Bonito and tuna fishing boat
Bonito and tuna fishing boat
Bonito and tuna fishing boat

436

Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

Operator

Hokoku Maru No.23
Hokoku Maru No.25
Keiura Maru
Eisei Maru
Eitai Maru
Hokko Maru No.5

99.80 1947
99.80 1947
204.43 1951
308.03 1953457
1954
70.97 1954

Completed
Completed
BoughtCompleted
Completed
Completed

Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokko Gyogyo

Eisho Maru
Shirashima Maru
Hokko Maru No.18
Yoshino Maru

1,049.61 1956
31.64 1957
74
1957
695
1958

Completed
Launched
Launched
BoughtHokoku Suisan
Nippon Suisan
Hokko Gyogyo
Nippon Suisan

Eiryu Maru
Eikyu Maru
Eio Maru

1,283.93 1959
679.95 1959
1,282.9 1960

Completed Hokoku Suisan
Completed Hokoku Suisan
Completed Hokoku Suisan

Eiho Maru

1,281.78 1960

Completed Hokoku Suisan

Eiko Maru
Eishin Maru
Eitan Maru
Eimei Maru

309.77 1961
1,494.78 1961
498
1961
544
1962

Launched
Completed
Launched
Launched

Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan

Eikei Maru
Eihei Maru
Hokko Maru No.5
Hatsutori Maru
Hokko Maru No.3
Tsukuba Maru
Hatsutori Maru No.5
Hatsutori Maru No.6
Hatsutori Maru No.7
Hokko Maru No.7
Hatsutori Maru No.2
Hatsushima Maru No.3
Hokko Gyogyo No.27
Hokko Gyogyo No.107
Hokko Gyogyo No.37
Hatsutori Maru No.8
Hokko Maru No.177

1,498
1962
1,428
1962
70
1963
192.36 1967
96
1967
344.78 1968
254
1970
59
1971
69
1973
98
1973
79
1974
79
1974
96
1978
99
1979
96
1981
99.36 1981
349
1988

Launched
Launched
Completed
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched
Launched

Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokko Gyogyo
Hokoku Suisan
Hokko Gyogyo
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokko Gyogyo
Hokoku Suisan
Hokoku Suisan
Hokko Gyogyo
Hokko Gyogyo
Hokko Gyogyo
Hokoku Suisan
Hokko Gyogyo

HUMBOLDT

224.71 1989

Transferred SOCALPIBasic Data

Remarks
Bonito and tuna fishing boat
Bonito and tuna fishing boat
From Kawanami Kogyo
Longline vessel
Danish seine fishing boat Investment in kind to Aurora Austra(Argentina)
Longline vessel 1968 Sold
Donoumi Zosen Tugboat (Tobata) 1974 Sold
Offshore trawler
Kanasashi Shipyard 1959 To Argentine tuna business 1961
Converted to transporter
Longline vessel
Longline vessel
NKKShimizu Longline vessel 1969 Converted totransporter
NKKShimizu Longline vessel 1969 Converted totransporter
Longline vessel 1975 Sold to Modena (Indonesia)
Longline vessel
Longline vessel
Kanasashi Shipyard Longline vessel 1969 Converted totransporter
Longline vessel
Longline vessel
Offshore trawler
Bonito ship
Offshore trawler
Gill net, longline
Bonito ship
Bonito ship
Bonito ship
Offshore trawler
Nagasaki Shipyard Bonito ship
Nagasaki Shipyard Bonito ship
Offshore trawler
Offshore trawler
Offshore trawler
Bonito ship
Squid angling, golden king crab single-vessel operation 1995
Sold
Longline vessel (formerly Fukuju Maru No.28) Tuna ship437

Today (as of December 2010)
Trawlers
Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

COALSA SEGUNDO 1,929
2001
BEAGLE 1
898
2001
AORAKI
2,926
2001
OTAKOU
799
2001
TAIMANIA
799
2001
THOMAS HARRISON 1,048
2001
REHUA
2,483
2001
FRIOSUR X
903
1996
FRIOSUR IX
930
1996
FRIOSUR VIII
930
1996
DON ENRIQUE
930
1996
OCEAN DAWN
1,900
2003
(*) UNZEN
2,985.48 1989(*) UNIONSUR
4,991
2003

Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
BoughtRenamed(*) ECHIZEN MARU
2,802
ESPERANZA DEL SUR 3,694(*) VIENTO DEL SUR 3,110
STARLITE
192
STARWARD
197
ALASKA OCEAN
7,419

1995
2010
2000
2004
2004
2002

BoughtBoughtRenamedBoughtBoughtGrouping

PACIFIC GLACIER
3,124
NORTHERN GLACIER 1,866

2008
2008

Grouping
Grouping

Operator

Remarks

SEALORDSEALOAD SOUTH AMERICA (Argentina)
SEALORDSEALOAD SOUTH AMERICA (Argentina)
SEALORDSEALORDSEALORDSEALORDSEALORDPESQUERA FRIOSUR WET FISH TRAWLERPESQUERA FRIOSUR WET FISH TRAWLERPESQUERA FRIOSUR WET FISH TRAWLERPESQUERA FRIOSUR WET FISH TRAWLERPESQUERA FRIOSUR FACTORY TRAWLER
EMDEPES
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Unzen Maru)
EMDEPES
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Koyo Maru No.8, previously
UNIONSUR1)PESANTAR
From Nippon Suisan (formerly Echizen Maru)PESANTARPESPASA(formerly Shinkai Maru)STAR PARTNERS From ALEUTIAN SPRAY FISHERIESSTAR PARTNERS From ALEUTIAN SPRAY FISHERIESALASKA OCEAN ALASKA OCEAN SEAFOOD joins GroupSEAFOOD
From GLACIER FISH GLACIER FISH
From GLACIER FISH GLACIER FISH

Shrimp trawlers
Name

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.

UDANG NO.30
UDANG NO.31
UDANG NO.32
UDANG NO.33
UDANG NO.20
UDANG NO.38
UDANG NO.1

169.69 1974
169.69 1974
193.36 1977
180.52 1980
190.17 1989
178
1992
129
2007

UDANG NO.2

131

AMAN NO.6
AMAN NO.7
AMAN NO.11
AMAN NO.12

155
155
150
150

Operator

Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed
BoughtCompleted
BoughtW.I.F.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.
W.I.F.

2007

BoughtW.I.F.

1973
1973
1981
1981

Completed
Completed
Completed
Completed

I.M.P.
I.M.P.
I.M.P.
I.M.P.

Remarks
Wakamatsu Zosen
Wakamatsu Zosen
Wakamatsu Zosen
Wakamatsu Zosen
From Fujishin (Shizuoka) (formerly Fukuei Maru No.18)
Built by Kodja Bahari (Indonesia)
From DEEP SEA FISHING (Australia) (formerly
INSPIRATON)
From DEEP SEA FISHING (Australia) (formerly
SUREFIRE)
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard
Nagasaki Shipyard

Purse seine vessels
Name
Koyo Maru No.8
Koyo Maru No.18
Koyo Maru No.28
Koyo Maru No.78
Koyo Maru No.88
Kaiko Maru No.1

Basic Data

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.
135
135
135
349
349
62

2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008

Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping

Operator
Kyowa Suisan
Kyowa Suisan
Kyowa Suisan
Kyowa Suisan
Kyowa Suisan
Kyowa Suisan

Remarks
Purse seine vessel
Purse seine vessel
Purse seine vessel
Purse seine vessel
Purse seine vessel
Exploration vessel

438

Name
Kaiko Maru No.2
Kaiko Maru No.6
Kaiko Maru No.7
Kaiko Maru No.16
Kaiko Maru No.17
Kaiko Maru No.23
Kaiko Maru No.33
Kaiko Maru No.35
Kaiko Maru No.36
Kaiko Maru No.37
Kaiko Maru No.38

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.
85
85
85
85
62
234
316
228
311
230
311

2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008

Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping

Operator
Kyowa Suisan
Kyowa Suisan
Kyowa Suisan
Kyowa Suisan
Kyowa Suisan
Kyowa Suisan
Kyowa Suisan
Kyowa Suisan
Kyowa Suisan
Kyowa Suisan
Kyowa Suisan

Remarks
Exploration vessel
Exploration vessel
Exploration vessel
Exploration vessel
Exploration vessel
Transporter
Transporter
Transporter
Transporter
Transporter
Transporter

Longline vessels
Name

JANAS
1,079
AVRO CHIEFTAIN
1,425
ANTARCTIC CHIEFTAIN 1,136
GLACIER BAY
982
NORTON SOUND
594

W.I.F.:
N.R.P.:
I.M.P.:
A.F.D.:

Completed/Launched/

Tonnage Bought/Chartered, etc.
2004
2005
2009
2008
2008

Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping
Grouping

Operator

Remarks

PETUNA SEALORD Australian waters
PETUNA SEALORD Australian waters
PETUNA SEALORD Australian waters
GLACIER FISHUS Pacific waters
GLACIER FISHUS Pacific waters

P.T. West Irian Fishing Industries
Northern Research Pty., Ltd.
P.T. Irian Marine Product Development
Atlantic Fisheries Development Co., Ltd.

Bibliography :Vessels in the Possession of Nippon Suisan, Summary Chart, Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd.
Journal of Japanese Whaling in the Meiji Era, Toyo Hogei K.K., Matsuno Shoten
Register of Japanese Vessel Names, Ship Management Bureau, Ministry of Post and Telecommunications
Data on Fishing Boats, Fisheries Agency
50-Year History of the Shimonoseki Shipyard, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.
50-Year History of the Harima Shipyard
108-Year History of Ishikawajima Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.
60-Year History of the Osaka Iron Works, Parts I and II
75-Year History of Hitachi Zosen K.K.
50-Year History of Wakamatsu Zosen
Data Tracing the Navigation of Vessels Lost by Nippon Suisan Companies in the Pacific War, H. Igarashi
In Memory of the Fallen Seamen of Nippon Suisan, T. Koga

Basic Data

439

Japan and the WorldGlobal Population(million people)

8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0

1910 20

26

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95 2000 05

10(year)

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ (UNDESA) “The World at Six Billion”, League of Nations’ Annual Report “Area andPopulation by Sex for All of the Countries of the World”, League of Nations’ Annual Report “Statistics Mondiales”, League of Nations’ “World Population
Prospects”

Japanese Population(million people)
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

1910 15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95 2000 05

10(year)

Source: Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Post and Telecommunications, Statistics Bureau’s “Population Census” and “Population Estimates”*Okinawa not included for period from 1945 to 1970.

Japan and the World

441

Global Food Staple Production Trends(million tons)
2,500
Soybean
Rice

2,000

Corn
Wheat

1,500

1,000

500

0

1928

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

2000

05

09
(year)

Source: League of Nations’ Annual Report “Agriculture”, United Nation’s Annual Report “Agriculture” and United Nations’ FAOSTAT “Crops
Production”*Soviet Union not included for the years 1935, 1940 and1945.

Japan Food Staple Production Trends(million tons)
20
Soybean
Rice
Corn

15

Wheat

10

5

0

1911 15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95 2000 05

09(year)

Source: Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Post and Telecommunications, Statistics Bureau’s “Historical Statistics of Japan” (Planted Area andAgricultural Production), Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries’ “Crop Statistics” and “Vegetable Shipment Statistics”, United Nations’ FAOSTAT“Crop Production”*Okinawa not included for period from 1945 to 1970.

Japan and the World

442

Global Meat Production Trends(million tons)
250
Poultry
Pork

200

Beef

150

100

50

0

1961

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

2000

05

09
(year)

2000

05

09
(year)

Source: United Nations’ FAOSTAT “Livestock Primary Production”

Japan Meat Production Trends(100,000 tons)
35
Poultry
30

Pork
Beef

25
20
15
10
5
0

1961

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

Source: Beef and pork data from Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries’ “ Statistics on Livestock Products Marketing”, poultry data from Ministry ofAgriculture, Forestry and Fisheries’ “Food Balance Sheet” and United Nations’ FAOSTAT “Livestock Primary Production”

Japan and the World

443

Global Fish Hauls and Aquaculture Trends(million tons)
200
CaughtRaised
150

100

50

0

1921

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

2000

05

08
(year)

Source: League of Nations’ Annual Report “Sea Fisheries”, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries’ “Statistics on Fishery and Aquaculture Production”,
United Nations’ annual reports “Fish Landings”, “Capture Production”, and “Aquaculture Production”.
*Captured amounts for 1940 and 1945 do not include the Soviet Union.

Japanese Fish Hauls and Aquaculture Trends(million tons)
15
CaughtRaised

12

9

6

3

0

1911

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries’ “Statistics on Fishery and Aquaculture Production”

Japan and the World

80

85

90

95

2000

05

08
(year)

444

Japanese Fish Hauls and Aquaculture Trends by Sector(million tons)
15
Sea surface aquaculture
Open sea

12

Offshore
Coastal

9

6

3

0

1956

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

2000

05

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries’ “Statistics on Fishery and Aquaculture Production”

08(year)

Japanese and Global Marine Products Import Trends(100 million tons)
1,200(100 million tons)
200
OthersNorth America

1,000Europe (including Russia)

150

Asia (excluding Japan)

800

Japan
100

600

400
50
200
0
1957

60

65

Source: FAO’s “Yearbook Fishery”

Japan and the World

70

75

80

85

90

95

2000

05

08
(year)

0445

Chronology·Items in this Chronology that appear in bold print pertain directly to Nippon Suisan.

1863

May 12

Kaoru Inoue travels to Europe together with Hirobumi Ito, Masaru Inoue, Yozo Yamao and Kinsuke
Endo.

1866

January 27

Ichiro Tamura (birth name Ichiro Kuhara) is born in Hagi, Choshu.

1868

September 8

The era name changes to “Meiji”.

1870

June 29

Juro Oka (birth name Juro Nishimura) is born in Nagoura, Abu County, Choshu.

1871

July 14Feudal domains are abolished and prefectures created.

1875

May 7
December 19

The Sakhalin-Kuril Exchange Treaty is signed.
The Grand Council of State proclaims state ownership of seas and a system of sea area leaserights.

1877

February 15

The Satsuma Rebellion.

1879

October 29

Edison invents the electric light bulb.

November 6		1880

Yoshisuke Aikawa is born in Ouchi,Yamaguchi Prefecture.

·Hayashikane Shoten is founded.

1881

April 11

A Fisheries Section is created in the Agricultural Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture andCommerce.

1882

February 12

The Japan Fisheries Association is founded.

1884

September 18 Fujita Gumi purchases the Kosaka Mine from the government.

1887

February 10

Kosuke Kunishi (birth name Kosuke Nomi) is born in Kobe, Hyogo Prefecture.

1889

January 20

The Fisheries Institute is established.

1890

July 1

Inaugural election to the House of Representatives.

1894

August 1

Declaration of war against China (start of the 1st Sino–Japanese War).

1897

March 31

Promulgation of the Distant Water Fisheries Promotion Act (effective from April 1898).

1899

July 20

Juro Oka and others establish Nippon Enyo Gyogyo K.K. (start of steamship whaling).

1904

February 10

Declaration of war against Russia (start of the Russo–Japanese War).

1906

June 1

Sakhalin becomes Japanese territory south of 50° N latitude.

1907

October –Thomas Albert Glover establishes Kisen Gyogyo K.K.
·Ichiro Tamura moves into north-sea fishery.
·Ichi-I Gumi is established.

		
1908

April –
November –Kosuke Kunishi goes to study in Britain and Germany.
Ichiro Tamura builds the trawler Dai-Ichi Maru at Osaka Iron Works (first iron-hulled trawler
built in Japan).

1909

April 6

Regulations for the Control of Steam Trawler Fisheries are promulgated.

1910

April 21
April –
May 20July –The Fisheries Law is promulgated.
Takatsu Shoten Fisheries Department is founded (Shimonoseki).
Tobata Foundry Co. is established.
Kosuke Kunishi goes to Britain to oversee construction of the steam trawler Minato Maruand bring it back to Japan.
November 29 Nobu Shirase and others set out on an expedition to Antarctica.

Chronology

447

1911

January 27
January –March –May –July 30
		
1912

1914

March 12

Regulations for the Control of Steam Trawler Fisheries are amended; vessels of 180 tons or moreare limited to the area west of 130° E longitude.
Umetaro Suzuki creates oryzanin (Vitamin B1).
Minato Maru is completed at the Smiths Dock shipyard.
Tamura Steamship Fishery Company is founded (Shimonoseki,Yamaguchi Prefecture).
Emperor Meiji dies, era name changes to “Taisho”.
·Fishery companies set up canneries in Kamchatka.
Ichi-I Gumi is reorganized and renamed Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.; Ichiro Tamura isappointed President.

July 28
World War I begins.
November 14 Trawl operators amalgamate to form Kyodo Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd. in Tokyo.
		·The Fisheries Training Institute vessel Unyo Maru starts trials for on-board crab cannery.
1915

December 15

1916
1917

Ichiro Tamura and Fusanosuke Kuhara establish Nippon Kisen K.K.
·Ichiro Tamura transfers all Nichiro Gyogyo shares to Tokuzo Shima.

June 3Ichiro Tamura underwrites a capital increase by Yamagami Gumi K.K. and changes thecompany name to Nippon Suisan K.K. (This company differs from the Nippon Suisan Kaisha,Ltd., that was founded on March 31, 1937.)

July 10The company emblem of Nippon Suisan (formerly Yamagami Gumi) is registered as atrademark.
September 12 Exports of gold are prohibited ( Japan leaves the gold standard).
October 8
Mitsubishi Zosen K.K. is established.
November 7 The “October Revolution” in Russia.
·Ichiro Tamura acquires a majority share in Kyodo Gyogyo.
1918

November 11

Germany and the Allies sign the armistice to end World War I.

1919

September 27 Tamura Steamship Fishery Company is reorganized to become “Kyodo Gyogyo”; Hisazo
Matsuzaki is appointed President.

November 25 A series of new ship launches is begun, starting with the trawler Rokko Maru.
1920

January 10
February –June 15
July 12

August 23
		
1921

March 13
March –March –The League of Nations comes into being.
Hayatomo Fishery Research Institute is established.
Takatsu Shokai K.K. changes its trading name to Nippon Gyomo Sengu Kaisha Ltd.
The Panama Canal is opened.
Chuo Suisan Hanbaisho K.K. is established.
·Kureha Maru, a vessel belonging to Toyama Prefecture Fisheries Training Institute, succeeds inproducing canned crab at sea.
Yushutsu Shokuhin, Kamchatka Gyogyo and the former Nichiro Gyogyo merge to establish Nichiro
Gyogyo.
Nissen Gumi K.K. is established.
The trawlers Ujina Maru and Musashi Maru are fitted with wireless telegraphequipment.

May –Kyodo Suisan Hanbaisho K.K. is established (the sales division of Yamagami Gumi is madeindependent).

June 2Chronology

Nippon Chikuwa Seizosho K.K. is established (jointly capitalized by Kyodo Gyogyo and448

Yamagami Gumi).

		·Teiji Wajima starts operating with two crab factory ships.

1922·1st Thanksgiving for living creatures in the sea.

1923

March 30
September 1

September 7
December 5
		

The Central Wholesale Market Law is promulgated.
The Great Kanto Earthquake.
The Emergency Edict on Implementation of a Payment Moratorium is promulgated.
Nippon Chikuwa Seizosho changes name to Nippon Gyoryo K.K.
·Official limit of 70 trawling vessels is reached.

1924

July 1

The metric system is adopted.

1925

November 1

Hoyo Gyogyo K.K. is established (anonymous association Shichida Gyogyo-bu is establishedon April 1, 1925 and converted to a public limited company; name changed to Hoyo
Gyogyo).
·The V-D method is introduced from Britain.

1926

January –Hokuyo Suisan K.K. is established (President: Kenkichi Ueki).
November 12 Kyodo Gyogyo absorbs Nippon Suisan and Hokuyo Suisan.
December 25 Emperor Taisho dies, era name changes to “Showa”.

March 15
April 22
April –
May 20June 1
July –
November 15
November 17
November 19
December 6
December 11
December 30
		
1927

1928

February 20
March 31Showa Depression starts, spreads nationwide.
The Emergency Moratorium Edict is promulgated.
Shimonoseki Fisheries Employee Training Center is established.
Kyodo Gyogyo mutual aid system is established.
Chuo Reizo K.K. is established.
Horai Suisan K.K. is established.
Showa Kosen Gyogyo K.K. is established.
Nippon Kosen Gyogyo K.K. is established.
The diesel-powered trawler Kushiro Maru is completed.
Tobata Reizo K.K. is established.
Kyoto Central Wholesale Market opens.
Tokyo subway opens between Ueno and Asakusa (first subway in Japan).
·First exports of frozen tuna to the United States.
16th General Election (first election based on universal suffrage).
Fusanosuke Kuhara retires as President of Kuhara Mining Company and is succeeded by
Yoshisuke Aikawa.

July –
September 27
November –December 29

Kagotora Seikan K.K. is established.

Nitto Seihyo K.K. changes name to Dai-Nippon Seihyo K.K.
The trawler Karumo Maru fishes in the Gulf of Tonkin for the first time.
Kuhara Mining is reorganized into a public limited company; name changes to Nippon
Sangyo Co., Ltd.

1929

1930

Chronology

January 22
June 28
October 24
December 15

Start of the worldwide Great Depression.
Kyodo Gyogyo begins moving to Tobata Fishing Port.

January 11

Ban on gold exports is lifted.

Completion of the Tobata Refrigeration Plant.
Kushiro Maru fishes in the Bering Sea.

449

April 27

The Taihoku Maru fishmeal fleet departs from Hakodate with Japan’s first fishmeal producing equipment.

May 1

Toyo Hogei K.K. purchases the British steamship Beltana for conversion to a whaling fac-

tory ship.
May –Kyodo Gyogyo completes its relocation to Tobata.
May~October Hayatomo Fishery Research Institute invents an onboard rapid freezing device, which isinstalled in the diesel trawler Yatsushiro Maru and 5 other vessels.
·Patent obtained for a “strawberry freezing method” developed by Shunro Kato at Tobata
Reizo.
1931

June –Sankyo Suisan K.K. is established.
September 18 The Mukden Incident.
November 11 Osaka Central Wholesale Market opens.
December 13

Gold exports are prohibited again.
·Kyodo Gyogyo devises operations using the “single quarter rope”; commercialized in 1934and used in all ships from around 1939.

1932

April 15

Nippon Kosen Gyogyo integrates Showa Kosen Gyogyo, Higashi Kosen K.K. and mothership-type fisheries of Hayashikane Shoten; changes company name to Nippon Godo Kosen
K.K.

April –
May 16
August –Hayatomo Fishery Research Institute is renamed “Hayatomo Fishery Research Center”.
Tobata Reizo changes name to Godo Suisan Kogyo K.K.
Godo Suisan Kogyo absorbs Chuo Reizo and Nippon Gyoryo (Head Office relocated to
Osaka).

1933

March 3
March 27
May –Major earthquake and tsunami in Sanriku, Tohoku (the Sanriku Earthquake).
Japan leaves the League of Nations.
Motosaku Fujinaga starts aquaculture research on kuruma prawn at Senzokujima
Laboratory.

July 29

Keizo Tamura becomes 2nd President of Kyodo Gyogyo; Yoshisuke Aikawa is appointed
Chairman.

1934

May 7
May 31
June –
July 31
July 31
December 24

Nippon Hogei K.K. is established.
Godo Suisan Kogyo changes name to Nippon Food Industries K.K.
Kyodo Gyogyo transfers its trawl division to Hoyo Gyogyo.
Kyodo Gyogyo,Toyo Hogei and Dai-Nippon Seihyo merge into Nippon Sangyo.
Hoyo Gyogyo changes name to “Kyodo Gyogyo”; Head Office relocated to Tokyo.
Nippon Hogei purchases the Norwegian whaling mother ship Antarctic (renamed Tonan
Maru on March 12, 1935) and five auxiliary whalers and begins first whaling operation in
the Antarctic on the way home.
·Kyodo Gyogyo absorbs Horai Suisan.

1935

February 11
April 6

Tokyo Central Wholesale Market opens.
Nissan Fishery Institute Co., Ltd. is established to replace Hayatomo Fishery Research Center(Odawara).

1936

Chronology

May 11
October 30

The trawler Minato Maru fishes for shrimp in Baja California, Mexico.

February 26

The February 26 Incident (attempted coup d’état).

The trawler Shinkyo Maru fishes off northwest coast of Australia.

450

May 21
June 9June 9June 15

The trawler Himeji Maru fishes off Argentina.
Completion of the Tobata Office’s new building.

Hayashikane Shoten establishes Taiyo Hogei K.K.
Compaña Argentina Commercial e Industrial de Pescheria (CACIP) is established with joint
capital from Nanbei Suisan K.K. and Argentina.

September 16 Kyodo Gyogyo absorbs Nippon Hogei and Nippon Godo Kosen and increases capital to 42
million yen.
September 28 Taiyo Hogei completes the whaling mother ship Nisshin Maru.
November – The trawler Shinkyo Maru fishes in the Bay of Bengal.

January –March 31
March 31
June 8August 17

The International Whaling Agreement is signed.
Nippon Suisan moves its Head Office from the Maru Building in Marunouchi, Kojimachi

September 3
September 26
November 6
November 20
December 17

City, to the Nissan Building in Tamura-cho, Shiba City.
Kyokuyo Hogei K.K. is established.
The Tonan Maru II fleet conducts first Antarctic whaling.
Japan, Germany and Italy form the Anti-Comintern Pact.
Imperial General Headquarters is established.
Nippon Sangyo is reorganized as the Manchurian Industrial Development Company.

1938

April 1
April 2June –
October 5
October 5
October 27

The National Mobilization Law is promulgated.
Kosuke Kunishi dies.
Japan sends its first official delegation to the International Whaling Conference.
The whaling mother ship Tonan Maru III fleet conducts first Antarctic whaling.
Kyokuyo Hogei completes the whaling mother ship Kyokuyo Maru.
The National Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations is established.

1939

September 3
October 30

Britain and France declare war on Germany (start of World War II).
Tobu Suisan K.K. is established in Taiwan and starts mother ship-type tuna fisheries.
·Motosaku Fujinaga succeeds in complete aquaculture of kuruma prawn.

1940

September 16 Fresh Fish and Shellfish Shipment Control Facility Grant Regulations are promulgated.
September 21 The government sets market prices for edible fresh fish and shellfish (1st official price standard).
September 27 Japan, Germany and Italy sign the Tripartite Pact in Berlin.

1941

January 1
January –March 17

The Ship Protection Act is promulgated (including defense of shipping by the Navy).

April 1
December 8

Fresh Fish and Shellfish Distribution Control Regulations are promulgated.
Japan declares war on the United States and Britain (start of the Pacific War).

December 16

The Commodity Control Ordinance is promulgated.

September 8Order for Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei K.K. and Teikoku Suisan Tosei K.K. to be established

1937

1942

Kyodo Gyogyo takes over all business of the former Chuo Suisan Hanbaisho.
Kyodo Gyogyo absorbs Nippon Food Industries.
Kyodo Gyogyo changes name to “Nippon Suisan kaisha, Ltd.”.

The company motto “Serving the Nation with Food” is established.
Nissan Fishery Institute starts drug manufacturing.

under the Fishery Control Ordinance.

December 24 Teikoku Suisan Tosei (mainly the refrigeration and sales divisions of Nippon Suisan) is
established; business starts April 1st, 1943.

Chronology

451

1943

March 11
March 31
March 31
September 2

The Fisheries Organization Act is promulgated; fishery cooperatives and associations are reorganized
and integrated.
Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei is established; Keizo Tamura is appointed President.
Nishi Taiyo Gyogyo Tosei K.K. is established as an amalgamation of the Hayashikane Shoten
Fisheries Division, Taiyo Hogei and Enyo Hogei K.K.
Nippon Suisan’s contract to transfer ice-making, refrigeration and freezing equipment toTeikoku Suisan Tosei comes into effect.

1944

1945

February –May 27
August –Tonan Maru III is bombed and sunk near Truk Island.

May 7
August 15

Germany surrenders unconditionally to the Allies.
Emperor Hirohito announces Japan’s surrender (end of the Pacific War).

September 27
November 20
November 24
December 1

1st concession against the MacArthur Line.
Control on distribution of fresh food is abolished.
Teikoku Suisan Tosei is relaunched as Nippon Reizo Co., Ltd.
Company name reverts from Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei to Nippon Suisan following aboli-

Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei moves its Head Office to Maki-cho, Kyobashi City,Tokyo.
Tonan Maru II is bombed and sunk in the South China Sea.

tion of the Fishery Control Ordinance.
1946

December 8

Nippon Suisan is designated as a restricted company.

January 1
March 16
August 11

The Tobata Coldstore is returned from Nippon Reizo.

The Marine Products Control Order is promulgated and implemented.
Nippon Suisan is designated as a special accounting company under the Act on Emergency
Measures Concerning Companies’ Accounting.

October 15
November 3

The Constitution of Japan is promulgated.

1947

May 3

The Constitution of Japan comes into effect.

1948

February 22
July 1
August 5

The Kaiko Maru fleet takes part in Ogasawara whaling.
The Fisheries Agency is inaugurated.
Hashidate Maru is put into service as the first postwar tanker carrying heavy oil from the

The tanker Hashidate Maru is refurbished as a whaling mother ship.

Persian Gulf.
1949

October 1

Founding of the People’s Republic of China.

1950

April 1
May 16
June 5June 25
October 12

The Marine Products Control Order is completely abolished.
Decisive action to curtail business (including workforce reduction).
Construction of the Onagawa whaling base.
The Korean War breaks out.
Nippon Suisan’s limited company designation is removed.

1951

March 3September 8

Tonan Maru III is successfully refloated.

November 5
November 91952

Chronology

The San Francisco Peace Treaty and Japan–U.S. Security Treaty are signed.
Japan, the United States, and Canada engage in fishery talks (on regulation of fisheries in the eastern
Pacific Ocean following reconciliation).
Kawanami Kogyo’s fishery division is acquired along with 25 vessels (including trawlers).

April 25

The MacArthur Line is abolished.

April 28

GHQ is abolished.

452

May 1The Tenryu Maru fleet leaves from Hakodate to begin first mother ship-type salmon/trout
fishery in the postwar era.

October 1
The Tobata Plant begins full-scale production of fish sausage.
November 10 The Nagasaki Branch is established and becomes a base for west-water trawling.
1953

March 13
April 8The refrigerator ship Settsu Maru sinks in the Antarctic fishing ground.
The Tokei Maru fleet leaves to engage in mother ship-type crab fishery in Bristol Bay,

Alaska.
April 10
Hakodate Teion Soko K.K. is established.
May 14
Tokyo Teion Reizo K.K. is established.
November 16 Kyowa Yushi Kogyo K.K. becomes an affiliate.
1954

March 14
September 6

Fukuryu Maru No. 5 returns to port after being exposed to a hydrogen bomb test on Bikini Atoll;tuna prices later plummet for an extended period.
The Miyajima Maru fleet begins mother ship-type flounder operations and north-sea
mother ship-type trawl fishery in the eastern Bering Sea.

1955

April 3
April 20
April –
June 27
July –

1956

1957

March 2

The Head Office moves to the Tokyo Building in Marunouchi, Chiyoda City,Tokyo.
The Tobata Seamen’s Training Center resumes activities.

King crab harvests begin off the west coast of western Kamchatka (total allowance of 147,000tons).
Hokoku Suisan K.K. becomes an affiliate.
A new fish sausage plant is opened in Onagawa.

March 29
June 5June 27

The Soviet government announces a salmon and trout fishery regulation zone and establishes the“Bulganin Line”.
A new cannery is built in Onagawa.
The Odawara cannery is closed and a new cannery is opened in Shimizu.
The tanker Matsushima Maru is converted into a whaling mother ship.

January 29
April –An Antarctic observation team successfully sets up the Showa Station.
The Nissui-sponsored radio program Akado Suzunosuke begins and becomes a popularsensation.

August 27
October 4
November 1
1958

February 24
February 27
April 16
May 17January 1
April 1
July 10		
1959

The nuclear reactor JRR-1 in Tokai Village, Ibaraki Prefecture, reaches the critical point for the firsttime in Japan.
The Soviet Union successfully launches the artificial satellite Sputnik.
Nissui Service K.K. is established.
UNCLOS I is held in Geneva.
Nissan Fishery Institute changes its name to Nissan Research Institute Co., Ltd.
Teletypes are introduced into the Head Office as well as Osaka and Tobata Branches.
The Uji Maru fleet leaves for the Olyutor Peninsula fishing ground.
The EEC (European Economic Community) is launched.
The Five-Year Reformation Plan starts.
The trawler Uji Maru leaves for Africa (beginning of southern trawling).
·A means for preventing occurrence of struvite in crab canning is successfully developed,
and a patent application is filed.
·The “Hinomaru Packers’ Association” is formed.

Chronology

453

1960

March 1
April 24
April –
May 17
September 17
October 15

The Trade Department is established in the Head Office.
The meal factory ship Gyokuei Maru begins research on offshore surimi production.
Ikoma Maru embarks on the first expedition to waters off the coast of New Zealand.
The Harumi Coldstore is completed.
The trawler Amagi Maru is completed.
A ceremony celebrating introduction of an IBM computer is held, and a punch card systemis started.

1961

February 1

Nissui Kaiun K.K. is established.

1962

January 1
January 31
April 1
June 7
August 12

Nissan Research Institute is renamed Nissui Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.
Paid-in capital reaches 10 billion yen.
The Las Palmas resident office is established in Spain’s Canary Islands.
The Hachioji Plant is completed.

Ken-ichi Horie crosses the Pacific Ocean in a small yacht.

1963

November 28 Haruo Nakai is named president.

1964

May 6
June 26

1965
1966

1967

The United States passes a law prohibiting fishing by non-U.S. vessels within the United States’
territorial waters or continental shelf (the Bartlett Act).
The IWC sets an Antarctic Ocean yield of 8,000 BWU and prohibits hunting of blue whales in the
Antarctic Ocean.
·Sales of the frozen products “Kani Kurimi Korokke” and “Kani Shumai” begin.

April 1
April 2
May 16The Cultural Revolution begins in China.

February 18

Surimi equipment is installed on the refrigerated factory ship Shikishima Maru, which

The Overseas Operations Department is established in the Head Office.
The Head Office is moved to the Nippon Building in Otemachi, Chiyoda City.

then leaves for mother ship-type trawl fishery in the Bering Sea.

1968

1969

July 1
August 5
August 20

The EC (European Community) is launched.
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) is formed.
The Japan Chain Stores Association is launched.

December –Japan’s GNP (gross national product) ranks third among capitalist nations, behind the United Statesand West Germany.

March –
June 26
November –Shikishima Maru is modified into a surimi factory ship.
The Ogasawara Islands are returned to Japan and placed under the Tokyo Metropolitan
Government.
Sales of “Yaki-Chikuwa” (baked tube-shaped fish cake) begin.

March 8The tanker Ominesan Maru is acquired, converted into a general factory ship, and renamed
Mineshima Maru.

1970

Chronology

July 1
September –October 29

The Japan Frozen Food Association is established.
Niitaka Maru engages in the first Japanese armorhead operations near Midway.
The Ministry of Health and Welfare bans use of the artificial sweetener cyclamate and orders a recall

December –of products made with it.
Japan’s GDP ranks second among capitalist countries, behind the United States.

February 11

Japan’s first domestically manufactured satellite Osumi is successfully launched.

454

March 15
March 311971

May 29July 30
October 14

Japan World Exposition 1970 opens in Osaka (77 nations participate).
Yahata Iron & Steel and Fuji Iron & Steel merge to form Nippon Steel Corporation.
P.T. West Irian Fishing Industries (W.I.F.) is established (Jakarta, Indonesia).
P.T. Irian Marine Product Development (I.M.P.) is established (Jakarta, Indonesia).
Yamato Maru (a 5,000-ton stern trawler, the world’s largest) is completed.

June 17
July 20

The United States and Japan sign an agreement to return Okinawa to Japan.
McDonald’s Company ( Japan), Ltd. opens its first store in the Ginza Mitsukoshi Department
Store.

1972

June 5The UN Conference on the Human Environment meets in Stockholm, Sweden (112 nations
participate).

September 29 Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visits China; Japan and China agree to normalize diplomatic ties.
1973

October 1
October 17

The Large-scale Retail Store Act is promulgated.
OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) initiates a petroleum strategy thatcauses the first oil crisis.

1974

March 26
May 3
October 28

Nippon Suisan (U.S.A.), Inc. is established (Redmond, Washington).
Universal Seafoods., Ltd. (UniSea) is established (Redmond, Washington).
Aso Maru leaves to fish for krill in the Antarctic Ocean (the first private-sector krill
operation).

		·Keiko Maru leaves for the final mother ship-type king crab expedition in Bristol Bay.
·Kitakami Maru leaves for the final single-ship king crab expedition off the west coast of
Kamchatka.

1975

January 17

Nittake Shokuhin K.K. is established as a fifty-fifty joint venture with Takeda PharmaceuticalCo., Ltd. and enters the retort-pouch foods business.

1976

1977

April 30
October 31

The Vietnam War ends.
The Tonan Maru II fleet makes its last Antarctic whaling expedition.

February 16
December –The trawler Kirishima Maru begins operating off the coast of Chile.

March 1The United States executes its Fishery Conservation and Management Act.

March 1
July 21
		
1978

May 13
May 20August 20
October 11

Nippon Kyodo Hogei K.K. is established.

The Soviet Union establishes a 200-nautical-mile fishing zone.
The Singapore liaison office is established (Singapore).
·Fish prices skyrocket due to catch instability arising from the trend toward establishment of
200-nautical-mile zones.
The trawler Rokko Maru begins trial operations off the coast of Argentina.

Narita Airport (New Tokyo International Airport) opens.
The Daiei, Inc. begins selling Japan’s first off-brand (“no brand”; NB) products.
Empresa de Desarrollo Pesquero de Chile S.A. (EMDEPES) is established (Santiago, Chile).

1979

February 6

1980

January 31
Nippon Marine Enterprises, Ltd. is established.
February 15
Keiko Maru leaves for the final mother ship-type snow crab expedition in Bristol Bay.
December 22 The United States enacts a fisheries promotion act (Breaux Amendment [I]).

Chronology

The second oil crisis occurs.
·Sales of “Soft Karei Fry” begin.

455

1981

December –Sales of “Mujirushi Ryohin (MUJI)” products at Seiyu Stores, Seibu Department Stores, and FamilyMart stores begin.

February –March 17
April 21

Technology for condensing EPA (eicosapentaenoic acid) is developed.
Nippon Suisan (Singapore) Pte, Ltd. is established (Singapore).
Explotación Pesquera de la Patagonia S.A. (PESPASA) is established (Buenos Aires,
Argentina).

June 1
1982

The trawler Kongo Maru conducts the first Japan–US offshore purchasing.

April 2The Falklands War breaks out.
November 21 The awards ceremony for the first “Umi to Sakana” independent research and artwork
contest is held.

1983

December 10

UNCLOS III signs a final protocol and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

November 1

Chilldy Co., Ltd. is established.

1984·Eiho Maru leaves for the final golden king crab expedition off the west coast of
Kamchatka.

1985

August 12

Great Land Seafoods, Inc. (G.L.S.) is established (Redmond, Washington).

1986

April 1
April 1
June 14
October 1

Finet, Inc. is established as a VAN operating company for the food products industry.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act is executed.
Mineshima Maru leaves for the final expedition under the US’s Pacific Ocean allowance.
New Zealand implements its ITQ (individual transfer quotas) system.

1987

April 16
June 1
September 25
September –December 10

Japan’s per capita GNP ranks the highest in the world.
Nojima Maru leaves for the final mother ship-type salmon/trout expedition.
Nissui Shipping Corporation is established.
Sales of the household frozen food product “COOK FOR ME Chanpon” begin.
Unisea Foods, Inc. is established (Redmond, Washington).

1988

July 26
October 27

Nikko-Fisheries Co., Ltd. is established.
Empresa Pesquera de la Patagonia Y Antartida S.A. (PESANTAR) is established (Buenos Aires,
Argentina).

December –The Chilean salmon culture company Salmones Antártica S.A. (S.A.) becomes an affiliate(Santiago, Chile).

December 20 Nippon Suisan (Europe) B.V. is established (Amsterdam, Netherlands).
1989

January 7
January 8

Emperor Showa dies.
The era name changes to “Heisei”.

April 1
June 8September –November 9
December 29

The Consumption Tax Act is executed (tax rate of 3%).
Mineshima Maru is sold.
Sales of “COOK FOR ME Yaki-onigiri” begin.
The Berlin Wall comes down.
The Tokyo Stock Exchange stock price average reaches 38,915 yen, the highest figure everrecorded.

1990

February 1
March 30

Nippon Suisan the United States Latina S.A. (N.A.L.) is established (Santiago, Chile).
Nippon Suisan receives approval for its EPA drug medicine and to manufacture pharmaceuticals at the Tsukuba Plant.

Chronology

456September 10 UniSea’s G.L.S. Plant No. 2 (surimi plant) is completed and begins production.
October 3
East and West Germany are reunified to form the Federal Republic of Germany.
·Sales of “Sea Grace” made with an extrusion cooking process begin.
1991

January 17
January 17
March 31
September 26

The trawler Miyajima Maru is sold to Russia and renamed Victoria.
The Gulf War breaks out.
Hohsui Co., Ltd. withdraws from trawling.
Kitakyushu Nissui Co., Ltd. is established.

1992

January 22
June 3

Keiko Suisan K.K. is established through a joint investment arrangement with Hohsui.
The Earth Summit is held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

1993

December 31
December –The Oita Marine Biological Technology Center is completed.
Sales of the household frozen food product “Shioaji Edamame” begin.

October 23

The frozen food product “Ebi no Tsutsumi-age” wins a gold medal at the 1994 Salon

1994

International de l’Alimentation (SIAL) (frozen foods category), a contest of international
hit products.

November 16 The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea comes into force.
·Final fishing operations within Argentina’s 200-nautical-mile zone take place.
1995

January 1
The WTO (World Trade Organization) is launched to replace GATT.
December 29 Minh Hai Nissui Girimix Co. (MINH HAI NIGICO) is established in Vietnam as a joint venture
to process shrimp.
·Sales of “Sasagata Shiromizanaka Fry”, a household frozen food made with “one-time frozen”
technology, begin.

1996

April 1
July 20
September 1

Implementation of NCR Management begins.

The Japanese government ratifies the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and executes relevant
domestic laws.
Sales of “Iki-Chikuwa (tube-shaped fresh fish cake)” using southern Blue Whiting surimi
begin.

1997

1998

1999

2000

April 1

Japan’s consumption tax is raised to 5%.

December 1

The Global Climate Summit opens in Kyoto, Japan (the Kyoto Protocol is adopted on Dec. 11).

January 12
October 21

Nippon Cookery Co., Ltd. is founded.

The United States enacts the the United Statesn Fisheries Act.

January 1

Eleven members of the European Union adopt the euro as their single currency.

March 3

The Bank of Japan expands liquidity in the short-term money market by the largest amount for theyear and introduces a zero interest rate policy.

April 22
October 18

US retail giant Costco enters the Japanese market.
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. announces its “Nissan Revival Plan”.

February 1
October 2

Fishking Processor, LLC. merges with Unisea Foods, Inc.
Joint distribution of frozen foods in southern Kyushu with Ajinomoto Frozen Foods Co.,
Inc. and Nichirei Foods Inc is started.

2001

Chronology

January 17
April 1
June 8

Nippon Suisan acquires a stake in Sealord Group, Ltd. (Nelson, New Zealand).
Implementation of the TGL Plan is started.
The first briefing on corporate earnings is held.

457

June 22
September 11
October 1

The Fisheries Basic Act is enacted.
Terrorists attack multiple sites in the United States.
Nissui U.S.A. acquires Gorton’s, Inc. (Massachusetts, U.S.A.) and BlueWater Seafoods, Inc.
(Quebec, Canada).

2002

July 5
July 20
October 1
October 1

2003

March 1
June 26
July 10
September 5

2004

January 8
January 26
February 2
February 9

Kinki University’s Fisheries Laboratory becomes the first in the world to succeed in producing
completely farm-raised bluefin tuna.
The use of egg whites in fish sausages / hams and other kneaded products is stopped.
The Food Safety Research Center is established.
The Quality Assurance Charter is drafted.
The Shelf-Stable Food Business Department is established.
The Environment Code is drafted.
The Fisheries Research Agency becomes the first in the world to artificially produce elver (glasseel).
Nissui Europe acquires a stake in J.P. Klausen & Co. A.S. (Svenborg, Denmark).
Kurose Suisan Co., Ltd. is founded.
The Imari Fish Feed and Oil Plant is completed.
Nippon Suisan America Latina Peru, S.A. (NAL PERU) is founded (Lima, Peru).
A function oil and fats production site at the Fine Chemicals Business Operations Department’s
Tsukuba plant is completed.

April 5June 16
October 1
October 13

Mail order sales of the specified health food “IMARK”are launched.
Shandong Sanfod Nissui Co., Ltd. is founded (Qingdao, China).
Europacífico Alimentos Del Mar S.L. is founded (Bilbao, Spain).
P.T. Nissui Investment and Management Indonesia (Jakarta) is established by Nissui
S’pore.

2005

November 1

Hachikan Co., Ltd. is founded.

February 3
March 2
July –

Nissui (Thailand) Co., Ltd. is established (Hat Yai,Thailand).
The United States enacts a law promoting management of crab resources.
Nippon Suisan acquires the United States’s King & Prince Seafood Corp. (K&P) (Brunswick,
Georgia).

2006

2007

July 13
July 15

UniSea is establishes Bering Sea Partners, Inc. (B.S.P.) (Redmond, Washington).

March 14
March 15
April 1
April 1
May 1
May 29May 31
December 29

Nippon Suisan invests in Kyowa Suisan Co., Ltd.

April 1
June 22

B.S.P. acquires Royal Aleutian Seafoods, Inc. (Redmond, Washington).
The Chiloé Office of Salmones Antártica S.A. is completed at the Chonchi processing site.
Implementation of the New TGL Plan is started.
Nissui U.S.A. acquires F.W. Bryce, Inc. (Gloucester, Massachusetts).
Nissui Europe invests in Nordic Seafood A.S. (Hirtshals, Denmark).

A positive list system for pesticide residue is enacted in accordance with the Food Sanitation Act.
Nippon Suisan invests in Nakatani Suisan Co., Ltd.
King & Prince Seafood Corp. acquires Fishking Processor, LLC.
Nissui Logistics Corporation is established.
Nippon Suisan invests in Nordsee Comercial Importadora Y Exportadora, Ltda. (São Paulo,
Brazil).

October 1

Chronology

Sales and management functions of EMDEPES and the Pesquera Friosur S.A. Group are458

transferred and consolidated in a newly is established company Desarrollo Oceanico S.A.
(DOSA) (Santiago, Chile).

October 1
October 1
October 10
October 25
December 1
2008

April 1
June 1

Nissui Europe invests in Cité Marine S.A.S. (Kervignac, France).

Maruha Group merges with Nichiro Corporation to create Maruha Nichiro Holdings, Inc.
Nippon Suisan invests in Kaneko Shokuhin Co., Ltd. and Kunihiro Inc.
Nippon Suisan invests in Marusa Sasaya Shoten K.K.
Nippon Suisan invests in Tai Mei Food Industrial Corp. (Koohsiung,Taiwan).
Hohsui and Chuo Reito.K.K. merge and become a unit of Chuo Gyorui Co., Ltd.
Qingdao Nissui Food Research and Development Co., Ltd. is established (Shandong,
China).

June 2September 11
December 25
2009February 10
March 26
March 27
April 1
June 25
November 1

Nissui U.S.A. invests in Glacier Fish Company, LLC (G.F.C.) (Seattle, Washington).
Nippon Suisan invests in Hiroshimasuisan Co., Ltd.
Hokkaido Fine Chemical Co., Ltd. is established.
UniSea acquires Alaskan Beauty, LLC (South Kirkland, U.S.A.).
TN Fine Chemicals Co., Ltd. (TNFC) is established (Bangkok,Thailand).
Nippon Suisan invests in Daisui Co., Ltd.

Meiji Seika Kaisha, Ltd. and Meiji Dairies Corporation is establish the joint holding company Meiji
Holdings Co., Ltd. and integrate their management.
An executive officer system and anti-takeover measures are introduced.
Nippon Suisan acquires technologies for cultivating arachidonic acid-producing fungus from
Suntory Wellness Ltd.

2010

December 7

Hakata Marukita Suisan Co., Ltd. is established.

February 28
April 20
May 25
May 31

Tokyo Kitaichi Co., Ltd. is converted to an equity-method company.

Major oil spill occurs in the US Gulf of Mexico.
Netuno Internacional S.A. is established (Recife, Brazil).
Nippon Suisan is awarded the “Kurumin Mark” in recognition of its contributions to help
raise the next generation.

July 29
December 15

Nippon Suisan acquires shares in Delmar Co., Ltd.

The kunimasu, a fish unique to Japan and believed to have been extinct, is discovered in Lake Saiko,
Yamanashi Prefecture.

Chronology459

IndexA

AAA-21
293
A&N Foods
305
Aberdeen Trading (ATRACO)
303
Act for Preventing Depletion of Fishery
140
Resources
Act on Temporary Measures Concerning
252
Fishery Waters
Action Plan 93
295 298 329
AF2235
Alaska Ocean Seafood (AOS)
353
Alaskan Beauty
383
All Japan Seamen’s Union
277
Amagi Maru
205
Amazon Maru
240 279
amended Containers and Packaging
344
Recycling Law
American east coast
260
American Fisheries Act (AFA)
328
American Fisheries Promotion Act
245(Breaux Act)
American-style whaling
29
Andesu Maru
188 218
Anjo Coldstore
239
Antakuchikku Maru
96
Antarctic
94 95
Antarctic krill
228 372
Antarctic whaling
93 147
Anthology of Writings and Speeches of
45 61 64 66 74 81
Mr. Kosuke Kunishi
82 87 92 115 349 387

Antimonopoly Act
134
Asahi Suisan K.K.
58
Asakaze Maru
196 219 279
Asama Maru
205 207
Aso Maru
205 228
Atlantic Fisheries Development (A.F.D.) 232 302
Aurora Austral
197

Bristol Bay
162
bubble economy
242 286
budget preparation system
294
Bulganin Line161 181 183
Business Administration Division293
business field selection committee 273 287 290
business standardization
331
C

Canada263
canning business
173 174
Cape Town Office216
Cases of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
344 345(BSE)
Category Management
330
Central Fisheries Experimental Stations
24
centralized government
17“Chanpon”
361“Chawanmushi”
200
cheese186
Cherry Fresh Foods
324“Chibikko Korokke”
211
Chilldy
281 324
Chilldy Narashino Plant
358
Chiyoma Iwamoto
54 58
Chuo Reito
376
Chuo Reizo
59 63
Chuo Suisan Hanbaisho
58
Cité Marine
369
Code of Ethics
363
compliance345 363
convenience store
243 280“COOK FOR ME”
311
Copenhagen liaison office304
corporate brand marking
332
corvée taxation17
cyclamate
209
D

B

baby cheese214
bad debts
286
Bangkok Shrimp Cultivation (B.S.C.)
303
Beijing Jiayi Food Joint Factory
335
Beijing liaison office304
Beltana
92 93
Bering Sea
259
Bering Sea Partners
354
Bio-production Research Center
379
Blue Whale Unit (BWU)
141
BlueWater Seafoods
353
boxed lunch chain store
243
BPR Project
351
Brand Management Project
332
Breaux Amendment (I)246 248 275
Breaux Amendment (II)
246

Index

Dai-Ichi Choshu Maru
31 32
Dai-Ichi Maru
43
Dai-Nippon Hogei
34
Dai-Nippon Seihyo
62 63
Daisui
376
Declaration on State Ownership of Seas
21
Delmar384
Denzaburo Fujita
42 101
DHA (docosahexaenoic acid)318 322346 358 367 379 380

Diego Nippon
301
diesel engine
66
diesel trawler
76
dissolution of zaibatsu
132
Distant Water Fisheries Promotion Act 22 25 26
Dodge Line134 156
Dongil Frozen Foods
305

DOSA
370
Draft International Convention to Regulate
91
Whalingdragnet17Eeazy-opening can
320
Echizen Maru
338
“Eco-Clip Osakana no Sausage”
378
Economic Deconcentration Law
135
Eihei Maru
207
Eiko Maru
173 196
Eima Takatsu
53
EMDEPES232 301 338 370
Emergency Rebuilding Plan
297
Energy Conservation Law
344
Eniwa Fresh Foods
324
Enterprise Reorganization Act
134
Environment Code362
Environment Committee362
EPA (eicosapentaenoic acid)284 295
321 346 358 367 379

Epadel295 323
equality
250
Europacífico
354 369
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
182
executive director of North American
337
operations
executive director of South American
337
operations
executive officer system
381
F

Faculty of Fisheries Sciences,23
Hokkaido University
FCMA amendment248
financial depression
52
Fine Foods Business375
first oil crisis
222 239 241
First Planning Committee
233 234 237
First United Nations Conference on
158
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I)“fish-and-chips” policy
246 248 258
fish sausage business
175
fish sticks
200
Fisheries and Food Products Business
382
Operation Division
Fisheries Division
293 294 308
Fisheries Law
18 24 25
Fisheries Training Institute23
Fishery Conservation and Management244 248 256
Act (FCMA)
Fishery Control Ordinance122
Fishking
304 339 354 356 369
fishmeal factory-ship fishery
193“FIVE STAR”
351 370460

5,000-ton trawler
204
Five-Year Reformation Plan 185 190 194 220
flounder operations
169
Food and Agriculture Organization of253
the United Nations (FAO)
food defense
345
Food Products Division（食品事業本部）
272 306

Food Products Division（食品本部）
289 293 294 304

Food Safety Basic Act
345
Food Safety Commission
345
Food Safety Research Center
377
Foreign Territorial Waters Fishery Cooperatives
22
Act
foreign trade
302
founding philosophies
346 349
Fourth Planning Committee
272 290 307
Fresh and Frozen Products Division272 289 306 307

Fresh Carriers
340
Friosur
355 370
frozen food products business
200
frozen food products for commercial use 315
Fuji Gyokan
169 179
Fuji Maru
26 232
Fujita Gumi
42
Fukae Maru
38
Fukuoka Nissui Foods (FNF)
333
Fukuryu Maru No. 5
165
Fumio Imanaga
205 273 292 295
Fusanosuke Kuhara
49 50 102 104
F.W. Bryce
369 383
G

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
182(GATT)
general manager of North America
337
general manager of South America
337
general merchandising stores (GMS)280
GHQ (General Headquarters of the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers)
131 137 138 140 159

Giichi Tanaka
52
Glacier Fish Company (G.F.C.)
369
Global Links
349 353 366 368 370 381
Global Logistics Center
333 336
Global Marketing Officer
333
global supply chain
349
Godo Suisan Kogyo
90
Goichi Nakano
42
Gorton’s352 353 356 382
Great Depression
52
Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake
299
Great Kanto Earthquake
52
Great Land Seafoods (G.L.S.)
304
Green Giant Frozen Foods
314
Greenland
264
Gunma Fresh Foods
324
Gyokuei Maru
148 154 193 202

Index

H

HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical
328
Control Point)
Hachikan
373
Hachioji General Plant
209 311 318 374
Hachioji Plant
185 187
Hakata Marukita Suisan
383
Hakodate Teion Soko
179
Harukaze Maru
196 219
Harumi Coldstore
185
Harumi Plant
185 200
Haruna Maru
203
Haruo Nakai
154 183 187 217
Hashidate Maru
148 149
Hayashikane Shoten
56 72 96 124 129
Hayatomo Fishery Research Center
79
Hayatomo Fishery Institute64 78
Heikuro Sagiike
57
Heiwajima Coldstore
239
Hello Delica
324
High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement
260
Act
hike in the consumption tax
326
Higashi Kosen
74
Himeji Fresh Foods
324
Himeji Maru
67
Himuro Gumi
63
Hinode Gyogyo
106hinomaru (rising sun) logo
174
Hinomaru Packers’ Association
185
Hirakata Plant
358
Hiroshima Nissui Service
185
Hiroshimasuisan
376
Hiroya Ino
109 121 123 125 129
Hisazo Matsuzaki
58 78
Hitachi
102 104
Hohsui376
Hokkaido Fine Chemical
385
Hokko Gyogyo
179
Hokko Maru
196
Hokoku Suisan
178
Hokuriku Fresh Foods
324
Hokusui Maru
35
Hokuyo Hogei
99 172
Hokuyo Suisan
72 193 263
Holding Companies Liquidation
133
Committee Order
Home Meal Replacement (HMR)
328
Horai Gyogyo
69
Horai Suisan
59household frozen food311 357
Hoyo Gyogyo
59
Human Life Science R&D Center
379
I

Ichi-I Gumi (The Ichi-I Group)
48
Ichiro Kono
161
Ichiro Tamura 42 44 45 46 48 50 57 71 109
I.F.L.
302
Ikoma Maru
205 279

Ikujiro Nakabe
56 124 146
Imari Fish Feed and Oil Plant
371“IMARK”
359
individual brand
332
Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ)
328 337 345 347

information-based management
331
Instant Noodles Business214
intellectual property rights
359
International Commission for the Northwest
263
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF)
International Whaling Commission (IWC)
141 253

International Whaling Conference held141
in London
Irian Marine Product Development (I.M.P.)
217 301

Isamu Yoshimura
201
Isana Shokai
34
ISO 9000 series328
IT (information technology) revolution
327
ITQ system
370
Itsukushima Maru
72 99
Iwamoto on-board rapid freezer
81
J

Japan Fisheries Association
22 34
Japan Overseas Fishing Association
264
Japan–China Fishery Agreement
166
Japan–China intergovernmental fishery251
agreement
Japan–China non-governmental fishery
167
agreement
Japan–China non-governmental trade159
agreement
Japan–South Africa fishery talks
262
Japan–South Korea jointly regulated
266
fishing zone
Japan–South Korea negotiations for166
the mutual release of detainees
Japan–Soviet Fisheries Convention
162
Japan–U.S. inter-industry meeting
258
Japan–U.S. private-sector fishery talks
304
Japan–U.S. seafood trade meeting
257
Japan–U.S. Security Treaty
156
Japan–U.S. Structural Impediments
241
Initiative (SII)
Japan–U.S. whaling discussions
253
Japan–U.S.S.R. Crab Fishery Agreement 254
Jingu Maru
72
Jinpachi Hayashida
54 59
Jiro Shirasu
109 111 114 125
job-based grade system
362
J.P. Klausen & Co.
352 354 369
J-SOX
379
Jun-ichi Kishimoto
270 282
Junji Hayashi
125
Juro Oka
31
Juro Osoegawa
233

461

K

Kaiko Maru（海幸丸）
149 168
Kaiko Maru（海光丸）
35
Kaimon Maru
204
Kampo Edict
18
Kanazawa Plant
358
Kaneko Shokuhin
374“Kani Kurimi Korokke”
212 334“Kani Shumai”
212
Kansai Cookery
324
Kaoru Inoue
44 103 109
Karumo Maru
66
Kashima Maru
169 259 276
Kashima Plant
374
Kato Line
159
Katsusuke Minoda 274 289 290 295 296 297
Kawanami Kogyo Fisheries Department 151 169
Kawasaki Coldstore
309
Keiko Maru
208 255
Keizo Shibusawa
85
Keizo Tamura 46 73 79 93 105 119 128 143
Kenkichi Nakabe
121
Kenkichi Ueki
43 50 71 93
121 123 128 130 143 144

Kii Suisan
34
King & Prince Seafood (K&P)
356 369 383
Kinki Reizo Shokuhin
309
Kirishima Maru
205 232
Kiso Maru
263
Kita Taiheiyo Gyogyo Tosei
124 129
Kitakyushu Reizo Shokuhin
309
Kojiro Kimura
145
Komaki Plant
358
Komao Baba
96
Konan Maru No. 10
171
Kongo Maru
203 259
Korean War
156
Korekiyo Takahashi
52
Kosei Maru
98 125
Kosuke Kunishi
39 44 45 46 51
56 57 61 64 65 69 78 80 81 85
87 89 91 92 93 106 108 115 349

Koyo Maru No. 8
K-Teion Foods
Kuhara Mining
Kuhara Shoji
Kurahashi
Kurama Maru
Kureha Maru
Kurose Suisan
Kushiro Maru
Kusuyata Kimura
Kuzuhara Refrigeration
Kyodo Gyogyo

277
376
102
50
376
263
71
371
66 67 76 77
44 10363
47 54 55 58
59 61 63 64 65 106

Kyodo Gyogyo Kyoshinkai
Kyodo Suisan Hanbaisho
Kyokuyo Maru
Kyoritsu Kigyo
Kyosuke Nishiya

Index

86
58 59
97
103
201

Kyoto Protocols
Kyowa Suisan
Kyowa Technos
Kyowa Yushi Kogyo
Kyuhei Suzuki

362
372
323 375

Musashi Marumutual aid“My Plan” system

76
86
350

151
96 171

L

Labor Relations Adjustment Act
134
Labor Standards Act
134
Las Palmas Office216
Law for the Abolition of the National
Mobilization Law and the Wartime
135
Emergency Measures Act
Lehman Shock344“LITTLE CHINA Ebi no Tsutsumi-age” 313
Local Links
370 382
Logistics Department
308 309
M

MacArthur Line137 159
Magnuson Bill
244
Maldives Nippon
302
Manchurian Industrial Development
110
Man-ichiro Hara
93
Marine Eco-Label
345
Marine Mammal Protection Act
249 257
Marine Stewardship Council (MSC)
345
Maritime Operations Division
289 293
Marketing Division293
marketing mix
350 366
Marpac231
Maruha Nichiro Holdings
365
Marusa Sasaya Shoten
374
Marushin Unsoten
58
Marushin Unyu
309
Maruuo Suisan
376
Masatake Suzuki
233
Matsushima Maru
171 173
Matsushima Maru II
188
Matsushima Maru III
188
mayonnaise
186
Mazeran Maru
279
Meiko Maru（明光丸）
196
Meiko Maru（明幸丸）
173
Minami Nippon Gyogyo Tosei
129
Minato Maru
67
Minato shrimp
67
Mineshima Maru
203 259 276
Mitsubishi Corporation
49 67
Miyajima Maru
169 170 276
Mochida Pharmaceutical
321
Moji Maru
72
moratorium
229 253
mother ship-type crab fishery
162 164
mother ship-type salmon and trout fishery 161
mother ship-type trawl business167
mother ship-type tuna fishery
150 165
Motosaku Fujinaga
79 84“Mrs. Friday’s”
339
Murata Tamotsu
23 24

N

Nagasaki Hogei
34
Nagasaki Shipyard
151 169
Nagato Hogei
34
Nagoya Nissui Service
185
Naigai Suisan
34
Nakahama Manjiro
29
Nakatani Suisan
372
Nanbei Suisan
66 107
Nanko Maru
196
Nansei Suisan
144
Nanyo Suisan
68
Naomasa Maki
22 33
Naoki Imai
67
Naoya Kakizoe
341
National Fisheries University
24
NCR Management
330 341 342
NCR Promotion Council
331
NCR scores
331
Near-Term Vision
290 292 293 295 329
net whaling method
28
Netuno International
383
New Guinea Marine Products
302
New International Convention for the High Seas
Fisheries of the Northern Pacific Ocean 256
new pay and personnel system
294
New TGL Plan
366
New Zealand
262
Nichiman Gyogyo
112
Nichiro Gyogyo
49 63 129 146
Nichiyu (NOF Corporation)
108
NIGICO333
Niitaka Maru
262 265 277
Nikkan Hogei
32
Nikko Suisan
267 276 277
Nippo Sangyo
179
Nippon Building
220
Nippon Chikuwa Seizosho
58
Nippon Cookery
339
Nippon Enyo Gyogyo
31
Nippon Food Industries
91
Nippon Godo Kosen
74
Nippon Gyomo Sengu
58 106
Nippon Gyoryo
58
Nippon Hogei
93
Nippon Kaiyo Gyogyo Tosei
124 128 130
Nippon Kisen
49
Nippon Kosen Gyogyo
60 72
Nippon Kyodo Hogei
230
Nippon Marine Enterprises
278
Nippon Maru
218 278
Nippon Maru III
219
Nippon Mining
104
Nippon Oil & Fats107
Nippon Reizo
126 145 150 178
Nippon Sangyo
93 104 110

462

Nippon Suisan (Europe)
304 354 369
Nippon Suisan (Singapore)303
Nippon Suisan (U.S.A.)
231 302 353 369
Nippon Suisan Gyofu (Guide to Japan’s
84
Marine Produce)
Nippon Trawl
54 59
Nishi Taiyo Gyogyo Tosei
124 129
Nissan Fishery Institute79 107
Nissan Informal Discussion Group110
Nissan Tursday Group110
Nissen Gumi
58 59 60
Nisshin Maru
96
Nisshin Maru No. 2
97
Nisshin Maru No. 3
230 254
Nisso Gyogyo
124 129
Nissui (Thailand) (NTC)355“Nissui Delux Mayonnaise”
213
Nissui G Net
364
Nissui Global Links Conference
368
Nissui Ham and Sausage Hinomaru
185
Association
Nissui Hinomaru Association
174
Nissui Kaiun
196 240
Nissui Logistics Corporation
377
Nissui Marine Industries
278
Nissui New Zealand (Nissui NZ)
263 302“Nissui no Yakiniku”
199
Nissui Pharmaceutical
79 321
Nissui Senpaku
240 278 340
Nissui Service
177
Nissui Shipping
279 339
Nittake Shokuhin
236
Nitto Gyogyo
106
Nixon Shock222
Nojima Maru
257
Nordic Seafood
352 369 384
Nordsee370
Northern Research (N.R.P.)
216
Northern Territories
249
Norwegian-style whaling
30“NOW Hamburger”
316
N.S. Marine
279
O“Obento ni Benri”
313 357
Ocean Products
304
Odawara cannery
175
Offshore Operations Division272
offshore purchasing (as a joint venture)257 258 259 263 275 276

offshore surimi
202
Ogasawara whaling
149
Oi Coldstore
239
Okhotsk Fishery304
Okinawa Plant
358
Okubo Toshimichi
21
Olympic method
141 327 347
Onagawa Plant
176 283
on-board rapid freezing equipment 66 77 80
once frozen
316

Index

Osaka Iron Works
Osaka Nissui Service
Osaka Nissui Shoji
Otoharu Kajiyama
Overseas Business Division
overseas joint ventures

43 50 55
185
177
169
272 289 303
300

P

Pacific War
117 118
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment
245[PM Act] and Perry Amendment
PESANTAR
301 354PESPASA265 301 338 354
Plaza Accord
285“positive list” system
345 377
postwar depression
51
Potsdam Declaration
131
Power Items
334 357
principle of freedom of the seas252
product mix
350 366
P.T. Nippon Suisan Indonesia
356
purge of public officials
133
Q

Qingdao Nissui Food Research andDevelopment
quality assurance
Quality Assurance Charter
Quality Assurance Committee
Quality Control Center China

378
360
361
361
361

R

ramen
186
Regional Fishery Councils (RCs)246
Regional Sales HQ
357
Regulations for the Control of Steam
40 53
Trawler Fisheries
relationship marketing
330
Rensaku Onishi
153 170
restoration of Japan–China diplomatic251
relations
Restricted Companies Ordinance133
restricted company
133 144
restrictions on the distribution of fresh
136
marine products
Revised Act on Promotion of Global
344
Warming Countermeasures
Revised Food Sanitation Act
345
revised JAS Law
328
revision of permits for west-water two boats
192
trawling fishery and trawling
Risk Management Committee
364
Rokko Island Logistics Center
309
Ronald Reagan
241
Royal Aleutian Seafoods (RAS)
354
Rules for Fishery Cooperatives
24
Russo–Japanese War
37
S

Sachikaze Maru

219

sailing trawler
34
Sakhalin-Kuril Exchange Treaty
35
Sales Division272 289 293 306 307
Salmones Antártica (S.A.)
303 338 355 370
Sankyo Suisan
67
Sante Foods
324
Sanwa Kogyo
179
Sapporo Agricultural College
23
Sapporo Nissui Service
185
Sarawak Suisan
232 302“Sasagata Shiromizanaka Fry”
316
“Sashimi Trout Trim E”
370“Sea Gourmet”
284 318“Sea Grace”
318
seabed power cable
41“Seafood NOW Nissui”
281
Sealord263 351 354 369 384
Sealord Pacific263
Sealord Products Limited (S.P.L.)
263 302
second oil crisis
241
Second Planning Committee
267
second round of the Japan-Soviet
191
Fisheries Commission
second session of UNCLOS III
247
Second United Nations Conference on
181
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II)
Seibu Reizo Shokuhin
359 377
Seibu Reizo Shokuhin’s Amagi Logistics
336
Center
Sei-ichi Kobayashi
267 269
Seiko Maru
196
Sekizawa Akikiyo
21
selection & concentration
331
shelf-stable foods business
358
Sendai Hinomaru Reizo’s Minato Coldstore
310 336

Sendai Nissui Service
185
September 11, 2011, terrorist attacks
342 343
Serving the Nation with Food
119 130
set net17
Setsutaro Nakayama
48
Settsu Maru
150 170
Shandong Sanfod Nissui356
Shikataro Fujita
42 101
Shikishima Maru
203 259
Shimada Plant
358
Shimizu cannery
175
Shimonoseki Fisheries Employee Training
88
CenterShinko Suisan
106
Shinkyo Maru
68
Shinsei Maru
56
“shinwa kanto” (friendship and fighting spirit) 171
Shinwa Reefer
278“Shioaji Edamame”
314 359
Shirane Maru
205
“Shizen Kaito de Oishii!”
357
Shizuo Minoda
59 143
Shoichi Kaneko
125
Shokyu Maru
165

463

Showa Depression
104
Showa Kosen Gyogyo
73
Shozaburo Kuhara
42 101Shun-ichi Okuchi
233 261 269 282
single quarter rope method
76“Soft Karei Fry”
315
Soji Yamawaki
58 72
South Africa
261
South African Airways Flight 295 crash
289
South Georgia, a territory of the United
195
Kingdomsouthern trawling
194
Special Measures Act for War Reparations 134“Squid Snack Fritters”
281“Squid Tempura”
281
state of origin principle
226
Suisan Denshujo (Fisheries Institute)
23
Suisan Ryutsu
376
Suisankai (“Fisheries World”)
23
Supply Chain Management (SCM) section 377
Suruga Maru
67
sustainability
345
Susumu Masui
143
Suzuka Maru
205
Suzukaze Maru
219
Suzuki Shoten
52
Syngman Rhee Line
159
System of Sea Area Lease Rights
21
T

Tadotsu Maru
148
Tahei Iiyama
81
Tai Mei Food Industrial
305 374
Taihoku Maru
66 82
Taika Reforms
17
Taiyo Gyogyo
146
Takachiho Maru
205
Takatsu Shokai
58
Takatsu Shoten
53
Takatsu Shoten Fisheries Department
54
Takatsu Shoten Net-Making Department
54
Takeshi Murayama
64
Tamura Steamship Fishery Company 45 47 54 85
Tatsunosuke Takasaki
93 109 111 124
Tatsusaburo Shibuya
92
taurine322
taxes on fishing
21
Teikoku Suisan
34
Teikoku Suisan Tosei
125 127
Teion
376
temporary regulations on trawling
167
Tenryu Maru
161 191 207
Termination of Zaibatsu Family Control 133
Territorial Waters Act and a draft of the
Act on Temporary Measures Concerning
247
Fishery Waters
Teshio Maru
205
TGL Plan
349 363 366
the former Chuo Suisan Hanbaisho
59 70
The Starting Point of Nissui—Excerpts

Index

from Anthology of Writings and Speeches349
of Mr. Kosuke Kunishi
Third Planning Committee
270
Third United Nations Conference on the
224 244
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)Thomas Albert Glover
38
Thomas Glover38
3rd Party Logistics (3PL)359
three-way joint management
163
TN Fine Chemicals
384
To be a Global Leader
349
Tobata Refrigeration Plant
150
Tobata Fishing Boat Staff Training Center 88
Tobata Foundry
62 103Tobata Plant
175
Tobata Reizo
62 63
Tobu Reizo Shokuhin
359 377
Tobu Reizo Shokuhin’s Funabashi office309
Toichi Kuwata
93 115Tokachi Maru
205 264
Tokai Gyogyo
34
Tokei Maru
163
Toko Maru
196
Tokyo General Logistics Center (TSC)336
Tokyo Innovation Center
386
Tokyo Kitaichi
383
Tokyo Nissui Foods (TNF)
333
Tokyo Reefer Chartering
340
Tokyo Teion Reizo
179 196
Tokyo University of Fisheries
23
Tokyo University of Marine Science and23
Techno­logy
Tomiso374
Tonan Maru
96 154 170
Tonan Maru II
97 206 230
Tonan Maru III
97 153
Tosaku Yamada
31
Toshio Kumada
78 84
Total Allowable Catch (TAC)327
total volume control
286
Toward Global Links
349
Toyo Gyogyo
33
Toyo Hogei
34 92
traceability
345
trawler75
trawling by steam
34
True Global Leader
368
True Global Links
368
Truman Proclamations
157
Tsuda Maru
338
Tsukishima Maru
196
Tsukuba Plant
359 375
Tsunejiro Hiratsuka
121
Tsurumi Reizo
179
Tsutsumi Shokai
49
tuna fishery
165“Tuna Sausage”
176
twin deficits
241
200-nauticial-mile exclusive fishing zone 228 246
2 in 5 Plan
374

2,500-ton trawler

194

U

Uji Maru
167 194
Ujina Maru
76
“Umi kara Sarada Fureku”
357
Unionsur
338
UniSea305 337 354 356
Unisea Foods
304
United Nations Convention on the Law of328
the Sea
Universal Seafoods
302 304
V

V-D fishing method

61 75

W

West Africa Office216
West Irian Fishing Industries (W.I.F.) 217 301
western coast of Kamchatka
164
west-water trawling
166 265
whaling division of Iwatani Shokai
34“window frame” method250
wireless telegraph equipment
66 76
World Trade Organization (WTO)
343
World War I
55
World War II
117
X

Xiamen Ryuwa

304

Y

Yachiyo Plant“Yaki Sake Arahogushi”“Yaki-Chikuwa”“Yaki-Onigiri”
Yamagami Gumi
Yamato Maru
Yamato Suisan
Yasuo Haraguchi
Yasuo Kunii
Yatsushiro Maru
Yojiro Shiraishi
Yoko Maru
Yoriyasu Arima
Yoshino Maru
Yoshisuke Aikawa

358
358
212
334
56
204
150
163
300 3297757
164 208125228
44 62 93 103 104

105 107 108 110 111 115

Yukichi Fukuzawa
Yusaku Nishimura
Yushutsu Shokuhin

31
121 123
49

Z

Z processZao Maru
Zenpei Ogura

114
205 26480

464