Country-Specific
Safety Culture Forum

SwedenCountry-Specific Safety Culture
Forum: Sweden© OECD 2018
NEA No. 7420
NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENTORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENTThe OECD is a unique forum where the governments of 36 democracies work together to address the economic,
social and environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD is also at the forefront of efforts to understandand to help governments respond to new developments and concerns, such as corporate governance, theinformation economy and the challenges of an ageing population. The Organisation provides a setting where
governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice andwork to co-ordinate domestic and international policies.
The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Korea, the Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The
European Commission takes part in the work of the OECD.
OECD Publishing disseminates widely the results of the Organisation’s statistics gathering and research on
economic, social and environmental issues, as well as the conventions, guidelines and standards agreed by its
members.
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD.
The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of theOrganisation or of the governments of its member countries.

NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCYThe OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) was established on 1 February 1958. Current NEA membership consistsof 33 countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Korea, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The European Commission and the International Atomic
Energy Agency also take part in the work of the Agency.
The mission of the NEA is:–

to assist its member countries in maintaining and further developing, through international
co-operation, the scientific, technological and legal bases required for a safe, environmentally soundand economical use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;–

to provide authoritative assessments and to forge common understandings on key issues as input togovernment decisions on nuclear energy policy and to broader OECD analyses in areas such as energy
and the sustainable development of low-carbon economies.

Specific areas of competence of the NEA include the safety and regulation of nuclear activities, radioactive
waste management and decommissioning, radiological protection, nuclear science, economic and technicalanalyses of the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear law and liability, and public information. The NEA Data Bank provides
nuclear data and computer program services for participating countries.
This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty
over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory,
city or area.
Also available in Swedish under the title:
Säkerhetskultur i ett nationellt perspektiv: Sverige
NEA No. 7445

Corrigenda to OECD publications may be found online at: www.oecd.org/publishing/corrigenda.
© OECD 2018
You can copy, download or print OECD content for your own use, and you can include excerpts from OECD publications, databases andmultimedia products in your own documents, presentations, blogs, websites and teaching materials, provided that suitableacknowledgement of the OECD as source and copyright owner is given. All requests for public or commercial use and translation rights
should be submitted to neapub@oecd-nea.org. Requests for permission to photocopy portions of this material for public or commercial
use shall be addressed directly to the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) at info@copyright.com or the Centre français d'exploitation dudroit de copie (CFC) contact@cfcopies.com.
Cover photos: Stockholm, Sweden (Bengt Nyman); safety helmets (Shutterstock, Nuei57); central control room of nuclear power plant (Shutterstock,
Nordroden).

FOREWORD

Foreword

NEA Director-General Magwood
Of the many important lessons learnt about nuclear safety over the years, theone that has been most difficult to communicate and difficult to address is thelesson that human aspects of nuclear safety may be as important as any
technical issue that arises in the course of nuclear operations. Nuclear power isa highly technical undertaking and those who design, build and operate nuclear
power plants are highly experienced, very qualified specialists in a wide range
of engineering and scientific fields. Often, nuclear technologists are among thebest and brightest of the technical community in a country.
Given this, it is not always easy to present these experts with the realitythat issues such as safety culture, organisational effectiveness andcommunications may weigh as heavily in determining the success of safe
nuclear operations as might material conditions, health physics andmaintenance practices. Engineers are well-qualified and prepared to confront achallenging vibration or sign of wear in a nuclear component; they are perhaps
less able to address problematic sociological issues among plant staff.
However, it is now widely understood that nuclear safety culture is an
issue that requires substantial attention. The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), forexample, has made this area of safety a key area of work and has formed theDivision of Radiological Protection and Human Aspects of Nuclear Safety (RPHANS) to lead the way. With the engagement of experts from across its
member countries, the NEA has begun to address these non-technical areas of
nuclear safety, exchanging experiences and identifying best practices.
As work in this area has progressed, the challenging issue of therelationship of national culture on nuclear safety culture has also arisen as anarea of focus. Operators from many countries can easily work together to
identify and address an issue associated with nuclear fuel operating undercertain conditions and compare experiences; but how do they address areas ofhuman behaviour and evaluate best approaches from country to country?
Physics always works across borders; but can the same be said of issues ofsafety culture and communications within organisations? For many years, it
was assumed that the answer was “yes”.
However, practical experience has shown that there are importantdifferences in how people work together and communicate as one travels
across borders. The national context in which people live does not stop at thegate of a nuclear plant. The NEA Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum (CSSCF)

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 20183

FOREWORD

was thus established to begin creating an understanding of how a national
context relates to safety culture, and how operators and regulators could think
about these effects in their day-to-day activities.
We have learnt that all cultures have characteristics that reinforce nuclear
safety culture; and all have characteristics that may not. No national culture ispreferable to another but as safety culture is optimised in any setting, an
understanding and reflection of the relevant national context can make training
and absorption of nuclear safety culture principles more effective.
The outcome of a CSSCF will hopefully help regulators and operators to
improve their training activities and thus make further improvements to their
nuclear safety cultures. Because this is a first-of-a-kind NEA activity, it requiredconsiderable work and thought from many people. This would not have beenpossible without the incredible efforts of our partners, the Swedish Radiation
Safety Authority (SSM) and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO),
and the dozens of people from the Swedish nuclear community that took thetime to engage in this project. The multi-organisational team that assembled
and implemented this forum, co-ordinated by the creative and dedicated staffof the NEA’s Division of Radiological Protection and Human Aspects of Nuclear
Safety, worked very hard to achieve this outcome and should be very proud of
their efforts. The NEA would like to thank everyone involved for theircontribution to this successful first CSSCF.
William D. Magwood, IV
Director-General, Nuclear Energy Agency

WANO Chief Executive Officer Prozesky
The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) certainly has theopportunity to appreciate the influence of regional, national and enterpriselevel cultures on the nuclear industry and the way in which it carries out themission of delivering safe and reliable energy to stakeholders and customers.
This is perhaps best reflected in WANO’s internal slogan, “Think globally, but
act locally”, when providing guidance to staff as they go about delivering
products and services from the WANO regional centres. We acknowledge that
there is not a single, universal recipe that can be effectively applied in our morethan 30 member countries, and that local cultural influences are a fundamental
part of what we need to consider in seeking out and promoting best practiceacross the global nuclear power fleet of plants.
With this in mind, WANO nevertheless does believe that there are anumber of fundamental principles that underpin the behaviours of leaders andworkers that are necessary to deliver safe and reliable operations. WANO has
documented these in the report titled “Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety
Culture”.

4

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

FOREWORD

The importance of entering into a local dialogue with leaders and workers
to understand these traits in the context of local prevailing norms andstandards is vital if we are to ensure that the resultant safety-focused
behaviours are nurtured and deployed. WANO was therefore delighted tocollaborate with the NEA, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) andSwedish nuclear industry to ensure progress in this dialogue on nuclear safety
culture.
Peter Prozesky
Chief Executive Officer, World Association of Nuclear Operators

SSM Director-General Persson
In Sweden and in the Swedish supervision of nuclear power plants, there has
been a strong commitment to safety culture and human, technology andorganisation (HTO) aspects and their interaction. For the past 30 years, there
has been a great and passionate focus in Sweden on emphasising theimportance of safety culture in supervision. To a great extent, this is due to theaccidents that have occurred. Over time, we have acquired solid experience inapplying a systematic HTO strategy for safety.
One question that has been updated in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power plant accident is how safety is affected by the national context
and culture. Based on this, it was important for the SSM in Sweden to also
revise not only the operators’ safety culture but also our own safety culture. For
several years now, we’ve been working on our safety culture and on the way inwhich we all contribute to our national context and to the operators’ safety.
Since our supervisory culture is a part of the national context, it is essential toremember that we, as a regulatory body, also influence the safety culture of thelicence holders.
There is an international focus on how the national and cultural context
affects safety. This question is not new, but the Fukushima accident brought itto the fore. Within this context, WANO and the NEA discussed how they could
support NEA member countries based on the respective country’s culture. The
SSM was contacted to support the creation of a new concept: the CountrySpecific Safety Culture Forum (CSSCF). Sweden thus became the first country to
conduct this forum.
The idea behind the CSSCF is to start out from the respective country’s
cultural realities and conduct a reflective dialogue about strengths andweaknesses, as well as what can be done to strengthen the safety culture
within the authorities and operators concerned. Above all, in such a context,
daring to look at oneself in the mirror and being able to openly discussshortcomings within both the authority and the operators are essential to
becoming aware in the long term.

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

5

FOREWORD

It is always easier to see problems in other people’s cultures and so mucheasier to consider one’s own culture the norm. The challenge with this forum
was to identify whether there was anything in our Swedish culture that could
affect safety both positively and negatively. The CSSCF enabled us to reproduce
our national culture in a cross-organisational dialogue. The outcome of theforum provides us with a better understanding of the factors that contribute toor undermine a sound safety culture in the Swedish context. We have alreadygiven the results from the forum careful consideration, and we have also heard
from industry representatives who took part in the forum and who thought that
it was very worthwhile, having made similar observations.
We believe that openly discussing weaknesses and strengths in the light ofnational characteristics both within an organisation, as well as between theauthority and licensees, fosters and improves an effective safety culture at alllevels within an organisation, which leads us to be able to ensure continuous
improvement of nuclear power plant safety.
Having said this, I’d like to highly recommend other countries to follow
our lead and choose to participate in the forum.

Mats Persson
Director-General, Swedish Radiation Safety Authority

6

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of contents
List of abbreviations and acronyms .................................................................. 9
Executive summary .......................................................................................... 11
Background .................................................................................................... 11
Methodology................................................................................................... 11
Outcomes ....................................................................................................... 12
The Methodology of the Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum ................. 15
Purpose of the forum ..................................................................................... 15
Conducting the first Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum:
CSSCF Sweden ............................................................................................... 15
Analysis.......................................................................................................... 18
Safety culture in a national context ................................................................. 19
Background on safety culture ........................................................................ 19
National culture ............................................................................................. 20
International normative frameworks ............................................................. 21
General observations related to culture in a national context ........................ 22
The Swedish cultural context ........................................................................... 23
Facts and figures............................................................................................ 23
Swedish nuclear programme ......................................................................... 25
Safety culture in the Swedish context: Observations from CSSCF Sweden .. 27
Introduction ................................................................................................... 27
Swedish national attributes highlighted during CSSCF Sweden .................... 28
Samskap ................................................................................................... 28
Allskap ...................................................................................................... 29
Security and trust ..................................................................................... 31
Freedom ................................................................................................... 32
Complacency/national pride ..................................................................... 32
A drive towards shared understanding .................................................... 33
Typical behaviours in Swedish nuclear organisations identified
during CSSCF Sweden.................................................................................... 34
Employeeship/leadership/management ................................................... 34
Decision making ....................................................................................... 35
Accountability ........................................................................................... 37
Feedback .................................................................................................. 39
Learning ................................................................................................... 39

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

7

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Reflections on safety culture in a Swedish context and paths forward ....... 41
Characteristics of national attributes ............................................................. 41
Potential influence of Swedish national attributes on nuclear safety ............. 41
Enhancing safety culture in a national context .............................................. 42
Further considerations................................................................................... 43
Suggestions for paths forward ....................................................................... 43
Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 47
References ......................................................................................................... 49

List of figures
Figure 1: Structure of the CSSCF methodology .............................................. 16
Figure 2: Snapshot study analysis process..................................................... 18
Figure 3: Interpersonal trust .......................................................................... 24

Table
Table 1: Exploratory questions ...................................................................... 44

8

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

List of abbreviations and acronyms

CSSCF

Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum

HTO

Human, technology and organisation

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

INSAG

International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (IAEA)

NEA

Nuclear Energy Agency

NPP

Nuclear power plant

NPT

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OSART

Operational Safety Review Team (IAEA)

SKI

Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate

SSI

Swedish Radiation Safety Institute

SSM

Swedish Radiation Safety Authority

WANO

World Association of Nuclear Operators

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 20189

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive summary

BackgroundAchieving and maintaining high levels of safety is the goal of all organisations
involved in nuclear energy. Experience has shown that a healthy safety cultureis essential to the overall safety performance of any organisation, and thatsafety culture is influenced by many factors. Over the years, it has become
increasingly evident that among these factors are elements characteristic of thenational context. Hence, it is important that the nuclear community take time to
uncover these national influences, realise their potential impacts on safety anddevelop a path towards sustaining a healthy safety culture. The CountrySpecific Safety Culture Forum (CSSCF) is a step in this development, conceived
jointly by the NEA and WANO as a means of providing an arena to explore theimpact of the national context on nuclear safety and derive approaches tosustain and improve nuclear safety culture.
In order to improve safety culture, the attributes that make up the national
context must be understood. It is important to keep in mind that national
attributes are neither good nor bad. They can support a sound safety cultureor, if disregarded, can in some instances counteract safety culture. The goal of
the CSSCF is not to change the national attributes but rather to createawareness of how they manifest in organisational behaviours. The aim is towork within the national context for sustainable change.

Methodology
The main components of the CSSCF methodology consist of carrying out aprocess of reflection and dialogue to collect information on the national
attributes and of finding ways to work within this context in order to sustain ahealthy safety culture.
The first step of CSSCF Sweden, prior to the forum, was to capture andidentify the elements of a Swedish national context related to nuclear energy. A
series of interviews and focus groups took place with various licence holders,owner organisations and the nuclear safety authority, the SSM. The
information gathered was analysed and several national attributes andorganisational behaviours were initially identified. This step will hereafter bereferred to as “the snapshot study”.

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 201811

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The result of the snapshot study was integrated into a technical role playbased on a scenario provided by WANO, which was designed to start a dialogue
between forum attendees on the impact of the national context on nuclear
safety culture.
The actual CSSCF, a one-and-a-half day programme, allowed time forreflection and dialogue. All licence holders in Sweden were invited –Westinghouse Electric Sweden, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering (the Swedish
Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company), Ringhals nuclear power plant(NPP), Forsmark NPP, Oskarshamn NPP, Vattenfall and Uniper Sweden.
Between five to seven representatives (mostly senior managers and executives)
from each of these organisations took part. Seven international guests werealso invited to contribute their perspectives and observations at the conclusionof the forum. The programme mainly consisted of structured group and plenary
discussions that were prompted by role play. This programme led to fruitfulconversations about nuclear safety culture and aspects considered to be typicalof Swedish organisational behaviour.
Extensive notes were taken during the study and forum dialogue sessions
and a qualitative thematic analysis was carried out. This report presents theresults from the forum. It aims to encourage further dialogue to explore how
the identified national attributes and patterns of organisational behaviour may
influence nuclear safety.
The authors emphasise that this report should be considered as material
from which to draw inspiration for further reflection rather than viewed in any
way as a definitive study of Swedish culture.

Outcomes
The results of the snapshot study and the forum
identified Swedish national attributes that generateorganisational behaviours which may or may not
reinforce a healthy nuclear safety culture. Other than afew specifics that forum participants observed in thecourse of the exercise, this report does not present
judgements or broad recommendations, but invites theSwedish nuclear community to further explore anddetermine how the identified cultural features need tobe addressed in relation to nuclear safety. Some culturalfeatures may need to be fostered and some others may need to be attended toin a proactive manner. A matrix with explorative questions is provided totrigger further dialogue and to start actions for improvements. Internationalframeworks for sound safety culture are suggested to be used as guidance inthis process.

This report is based on
views of representativesof the Swedish nuclear
community, as
expressed during focus
groups, interviews andat the 2018 CSSCF held in
Stockholm, Sweden.

The identified Swedish national attributes have been named below, using,in some cases, terms that are unique to this report. These terms are explained
in detail in the report, and include:

12

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY• samskap (being in unity/harmony);• allskap (everyone having the same rights/fairness);• security and trust;• expectations of freedom;• complacency/national pride;• desire for shared understanding.
The national attributes described above manifest in various organisational
behaviours. Consideration of the discussions reflected in CSSCF Sweden
identifies the following five principal areas:• employeeship/leadership/managership;• decision making;• accountability;• feedback;• learning.
The CSSCF proved to be an appreciated and valuable initiative for all those
involved. The SSM’s active partnership in developing the methodology, and asa pioneer to host the first CSSCF, was pivotal to its success.
Judging from the wealth of exchanges in both the snapshot study and in
the forum, CSSCF Sweden contributed to greater insight into how national
attributes can influence organisational behaviours, which can in turn impact
nuclear safety culture. The dialogues identified several questions for future
exploration, particularly, “what does successful leadership look like in the
Swedish nuclear operations context?”
The hope is that this first CSSCF will provide the impetus of a process thatwill continue in Sweden and that will encourage other countries to start theirjourney into better understanding their national attributes and their relation tosafety culture. The forum also demonstrated that the national context clearly
has a very powerful impact on nuclear safety, and it will be important for all
countries to address the individual aspects affecting their own cultures.

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 201813

THE METHODOLOGY OF THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM

The Methodology of the Country-Specific Safety
Culture Forum

Purpose of the forum
The Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum (CSSCF) was developed jointly by
the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the World Association of Nuclear
Operators (WANO) to provide countries with a forum for dialogue and reflection
on how the national attributes of a given country can influence nuclear safety
culture. The forum enables the country’s licence holders and regulatory body to
examine which factors can influence safety culture. The forum was designed tofacilitate dialogue about what is required to maintain the sound aspects ofsafety culture and what can be done to mitigate the possible negative aspects
and identify best practices.
One of the forum’s primary objectives was to conduct an open andexplorative dialogue, which was achieved at CSSCF Sweden held in Stockholm.
Participants had clear instructions that they were to share information in theirpersonal capacity rather than as a representative of their organisation or of
their profession. The organisation of the forum was designed to create an
informal atmosphere and this approach contributed to the open dialogue.
It should be noted that relating the national attributes to the culture of anorganisation is not an absolute science. As a result of several factors, it isdifficult to determine what the typical behaviour or traits of a nation may be.
For example, there may be major cultural differences even within a country,
whether these are geographical or related to social class, ethnicity, politicalorientation or profession.

Conducting the first Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum:
CSSCF Sweden
The programme for CSSCF Sweden was developed by a team consisting ofrepresentatives from the NEA, WANO and the Swedish Radiation Safety
Authority (SSM).

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 201815

THE METHODOLOGY OF THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM

The structure of the CSSCF methodology consists of five steps (as shown
below in Figure 1).
Figure 1: Structure of the CSSCF methodology

1st step

2nd step

3rd step• Conduct a snapshot study to capture information about national
cultural aspects, including through interviews and focus groups.
• Qualitatively analyse the captured data to distinguish themes
related to the national attributes of the culture.

• Integrate the national attributes into the role play used as the basis
for the dialogues during the forum.

• Conduct the forum with a wide representation of the nuclear
community (regulator and licensees).
• Include dialogues in smaller groups and in plenum.

4th step• Undertake a descriptive analysis of material collected from both thesnapshot study and the forum.
• Present the identified national attributes, based on the analysis ofresults, and their manifestation in organisational behaviours.

5th step• Produce the report.
• Include explorative questions intended to inspire self-reflection, anddetermine nuclear safety implications and any follow-up proactive
actions.

In preparation for the forum, a joint NEA-SSM team conducted a snapshot
study in the form of interviews and focus groups. This activity was performed
during 2017 to develop an appreciation of Swedish national attributes relevant
to nuclear safety culture. Personnel from the nuclear authority, nuclear power
plants and owner organisations, as well as licence holders, took an active rolein these interviews and focus groups. The method applied for the snapshot
study was inductive with semi-structured questions. Three levels – the macrosociety/national, the meso-organisational and lastly, the micro-group level –were used to cover various cultural dimensions. Interviews and focus groups
were introduced with questions about what behaviours are generally

16

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

THE METHODOLOGY OF THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM

considered “typically Swedish,” and this was followed by questions regarding
specific areas. The participants’ active involvement enhanced the material
considerably.
The results of the activity were used to inform a role play scenario basedon a scenario provided by WANO. The scenario was further developed by theteam to reflect the Swedish context.
The forum was convened in Stockholm in January 2018. The programme
ran over a period of one and half days. The following Swedish nuclear
operators and nuclear installations were invited: Westinghouse Electric
Sweden, Svensk Kärnbränslehantering (the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste
Management Company), Ringhals NPP, Forsmark NPP, Oskarshamn NPP,
Vattenfall and Uniper Sweden. Five to seven individuals from each organisation
took part in the forum. In addition, seven international guests were invited tocontribute their perspectives. The forum was held in Swedish withsimultaneous interpretation in English.
The forum was kicked off by the Swedish author and comedianFredrik Lindström, who provided a humorous and culturally insightfulmonologue. Participants were then divided into seven groups, with each groupconsisting of representatives from participating organisations. These groups
explored Fredrik’s dialogue and started to distil a set of cultural traits – theSwedish “national attributes”.
The matter of cultural aspects was placed in a nuclear safety context by
the Deputy Director-General of the SSM, Fredrik Hassel. This context provided
insights into the subsequent role playing. The sessions were designed toprovide reflection and cross-organisational dialogues. Each group included adesignated facilitator and note-taker. The facilitators were from the Swedish
licensees and the note-takers were from the SSM and the NEA, to help create
an open and inviting atmosphere in the groups.
The next stage of the forum consisted of a series of role plays, where
several participants became characters in a “real-life” situation in a nuclear
power plant. There were seven scenes divided into three acts. Each scene waspart of a story of how decisions made and attitudes projected by the company
head office impacted the power plant refuelling outage, which, ultimately,
resulted in a significant nuclear event. The role plays were anchored in the
Swedish context, which increased their relevance and resonance with theparticipants. After each act, the participants broke into the seven smallergroups to converse, in order to try to understand how the Swedish national
context may have influenced the role play either in a positive or negative way.
Eight rounds of group and plenary dialogues were conducted. All
dialogues were recorded in writing. This report is based on these recorded
notes and on the focus groups and interviews carried out in 2017.
Participants have indicated that they found the forum to have been a great
success, with all of the role players and participants taking an active part in thediscussions. All were open to the idea of reflecting on safety culture from theSwedish perspective regardless of their different positions and organisational

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 201817

THE METHODOLOGY OF THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM

affiliation. Participants in the focus groups and interviews were so engaged thatit proved difficult to end the exercises at the scheduled time. The same
enthusiasm was demonstrated at the forum where several groups continued
their conversations during the breaks. All participants openly reflected on theirexperiences and shared their views of aspects that are positive and those thatare less so.

Analysis
A qualitative thematic analysis of the material was conducted. The analysis
consisted of three iterative steps as follows and described in Figure 2:•

examination of data, collection of the material from interviews andfocus groups, and identification of cultural traits;•thematic analysis of cultural facts;•

establishment of an overall picture of national cultural aspects.
Figure 2: Snapshot study analysis process

The data collection and analysis were conducted by describing theobservations without ranking or comparing them. The snapshot study and its
analysis revealed a picture consisting of national attributes and organisational
behaviours that established what is referred to as the “Swedish context” for the
purposes of this report. The material from the forum was analysed with thedata from the snapshot study in the same manner. A more complete analysis of
this information is presented in the report.
A matrix was developed to provide questions to help explore further how
the national attributes study and forum findings – along with the matrix ofquestions intended to provide further reflections – are included in this report.

18

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

SAFETY CULTURE IN A NATIONAL CONTEXT

Safety culture in a national context

Background on safety culture
High levels of safety are not only a goal but an expectation of the nuclear
energy community. Although this expectation has been a driver in continuing
improvements in nuclear safety, the improvements have not been sufficient toprevent all accidents. Analysis of accidents at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and
Fukushima Daiichi has revealed that human and organisational factors playeda significant role in each of these events. The interplay between human,
technical and organisational (HTO1) factors has today become a concept for asystemic approach to safety. Safety culture is an essential prerequisite for aneffective HTO system. To summarise, the cultural context influences theconditions for the human and organisational factors that contribute to nuclear
safety. It is the people within organisations who direct and manage activities,
make decisions, write laws and rules, develop the design, etc. It is therefore
critical to assure safe nuclear operations within the context of specific human,organisational and cultural factors.
The broad consideration of nuclear safety culture stems from the
Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986 in the former Soviet Union. During the
1980s, the concept of organisational culture and its importance for businesssuccess was booming: books such as Theory Z, Corporate Cultures and In Searchof Excellence were best sellers in management literature. It was not acoincidence that the concept and understanding of the importance of such
issues in the aftermath of Chernobyl thus became known as “safety culture”.
These concepts were highlighted by the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), which was
created following the Chernobyl accident. The group investigated the reasons
why the accident had happened. One of the pivotal findings was the realisationthat the accident had not been caused by solely technical factors. The mostimportant factors that contributed to these accidents were related to safety
culture issues, both in the main control room and in the organisation as awhole.
In its essence, culture is about how behaviours are shaped as a result of
people’s interactions and the information that is collectively shared in people’s
minds. In other words, it is a shared phenomenon. Although safety culture canbe influenced by individuals – such as those in leadership roles, it is not an

1. Swedish organisations more commonly refer to “MTO (man-technology-organisation)” factors.

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

19

SAFETY CULTURE IN A NATIONAL CONTEXT

individual concept in the sense that while one person can exhibit problematic
behaviours, one person cannot have a weak safety culture. The outcome ofwhat culture creates, however, can influence a single person’s behaviour.
Safety culture is a concept, a lens used to understand organisational thinking
and behaviour, as well as an understanding of how a culture functions withregards to safety. When safety is used as a qualifier for culture, it becomes aconcept with a normative function. Assumptions, values, ways of thinking andbehaviours contribute to, or detract from, safety.
In nuclear safety, there are many written frameworks concerning what
type of behaviours and values are required to safely operate a system, andthese are generally well understood. People working in the nuclear safety areaaround the world have spent a great deal of time thinking about and creating
normative frameworks and defining safety culture. In this regard, the nuclear
sector is at the forefront of understanding the importance of culture as well as
how and what cultural factors influence nuclear safety.
Awareness of the cultural aspect of safety started to grow after the
Chernobyl accident, and the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident brought a new
impetus to the field of safety culture. The 2011 accident led to developments inthe understanding of the regulators’ role in safety culture, which have included
a better understanding of the interaction between the regulating body andlicence holders, as well as the safety culture of an effective regulating body.2
Moreover, the understanding of the systemic nature of culture and its deeper
aspects, such as the dynamics of how values and assumptions influence
behaviours, has significantly evolved in the seven years since the accident.

National culture
The national cultural context has also gained more attention worldwide.
Dr Kiyoshi Kurokawa, Chair of the National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear
Accident Independent Investigation Commission (Diet Report), took the boldstep of specifically addressing national cultural aspects. Dr Kurokawa’s
statements about the contribution of Japanese cultural aspects in the foreword
to the Diet Report were presented to the media in 2012. While his commentsthat the Fukushima Daiichi accident was “made in Japan” have been thesubject of considerable debate, they drew more attention to the subject of how
a national context might influence safety culture.
These concepts became an active area of discussion in fora associated with
the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA). While the conversation grew out of postFukushima Daiichi considerations, it was quickly recognised that no culture isbetter than another when it comes to achieving a high level of nuclear safety;
however, cultures do have different attributes. Different attributes may, at

2. For more information, please see the NEA green booklet, The Safety Culture of an Effective
Regulatory Body (NEA No. 7247, OECD 2016).

20

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

SAFETY CULTURE IN A NATIONAL CONTEXT

times, reinforce safety culture and at other times not reinforce it. Therefore,
looking at a national culture is not a matter of judgement or comparison; it is amatter of exploring, in a descriptive manner, which aspects support safety
culture and which aspects should be considered when enhancing safety culture
through discussion and training. The Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum(CSSCF) methodology was developed with this aim in mind – with the goal ofproviding a forum for a country to help organisations reflect on their national
attributes and identify what could be done to enhance safety culture.

International normative frameworks
The nuclear community has defined what a sound safety culture looks like innormative frameworks. The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO)
has developed their Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture, with ten traits,
their corresponding attributes and behaviour examples. The IAEA has
arranged similar standards into a framework of 5 characteristics and
37 underlying attributes. The NEA has developed a normative framework for
an effective safety culture in a regulatory body. The NEA framework isorganised into 5 principles and 21 attributes.
While these normative frameworks provide a baseline, the national
context must be taken into account. For example, in some countries, such as in
Sweden, it is part of the culture for people at all levels of an organisation toquestion decisions made at high levels. In other countries, it is more difficult toquestion higher-ranking individuals or authorities. There is therefore a need toadapt. In the airline industry, for example, where some national cultures led tocommunication difficulties with respect to hierarchy in the cockpit (i.e. it was
hard for the co-pilot to question the captain’s decisions), a solution that proved
helpful to overcome these barriers was to switch to English in the cockpit when
it became necessary to question authority.
In any example, international normative frameworks provide a baselinethat describes effective safety culture. The challenge is to find approaches thatallow those frameworks to be applied within the context of a local culture,
rather than against it.
The Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum originated in this context. The
NEA Director-General, William D. Magwood, IV, and the WANO Chief Executive
Officer, Peter Prozesky, shared the view that the sensitive and important issue
of national context needs to be addressed. Accordingly, the decision was madeto create a forum to support member countries in exploring their own local
cultures and other national contexts through the lens of safety culture. The NEA
Division of Radiological Protection and Human Aspect of Nuclear Safety (RPHANS) was designated to lead the project. The Swedish Radiation Safety
Authority (SSM) was asked to become an active partner in co-creating themethodology and pioneering the first Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum
held in Stockholm on 23-24 January 2018.

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 201821

SAFETY CULTURE IN A NATIONAL CONTEXTGeneral observations related to culture in a national context
Examining national aspects relating to culture is not an absolute science. For
many reasons, it is difficult to precisely determine what behaviours are typicalfor one country. For example, there may be major differences from one region
to the next within the country. There may also be differences between ruraland urban regions. It may be hard to distinguish cultural aspects between thenational (macro), organisational (meso) or group (micro) levels. There arecultural differences between various groups in society, e.g. based on social
class, ethnicity, political orientation or profession. There are culturaldifferences at the meso level, between organisations, even if they are working
in the same type of industry.
Another dimension is the contextual connection of culture, which shifts
according to the situation. A person may thus behave differently according to
the cultural context. A person may be willing to take risks when practising his
or her racing hobby together with others, but this same person may be very
conservative, for example, when he or she is facing risks as a nuclear reactor
operator. Most of the time, people adapt to the cultural context without thinking
about it. In other words, culture is multidimensional and complex, whichmakes it difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to precisely define national
culture. Furthermore, it was not the ambition of the snapshot study or of theforum, which were conducted with a small representation of the Swedish
nuclear community, to define the Swedish culture. The analysis of the data thatwas captured throughout the activities nonetheless shows that there are somecommon cultural aspects that can be called national attributes.

22

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

THE SWEDISH CULTURAL CONTEXTThe Swedish cultural context

This section of the report intends to give some context for the reader by
providing a brief glimpse of Sweden and the history of its nuclear industry.

Facts and figures
With an area of 447.4 km², Sweden is one of Europe’s largest countries. It had
a population of 10.1 million in 2016, which corresponds to an average of
24.4 people per square kilometre, the second lowest population density among
European Union member states (World Bank, 2018; Eurostat, 2018). Life
expectancy in 2015 was 82.2 years, which is 7 years more than it was in 1980
and 2 years more than the average life expectancy of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries (Eurostat,
2015; OECD, 2014).
Equality is a core value that extends throughout Swedish society andworking life. Compared to other countries, Sweden is highly egalitarian. In
2017, the Global Gender Gap Report1 ranked Sweden as fifth for its success ineliminating gender gaps in society (World Economic Forum, 2017).
Swedish citizens have some of the highest levels of trust in the state andinstitutions in the world. Data from the European Union and the World Value
Survey demonstrates that interpersonal trust in Sweden is not only high(see Figure 3 below), but has also remained stable for decades (Ortiz-Ospina
and Roser, 2018).
Between 1850 and 1930, 1.43 million people, a fifth of the population,
emigrated from the country. Most went to the United States while employment
conditions were favourable there, and attributed by some due to the concurrent
difficult living conditions in Sweden resulting from food shortages, harvest
failures, high unemployment, a lack of housing, and widespread poverty(Quigley, 1972). This massive emigration meant that Swedes benefited from an
exchange of new ideas in the form of the so-called “America letters”, whichbrought new ideas and an increased political awareness in the population(Barton, 1996; Runblom & Norman, 1976). The influence of citizens had
already increased during the industrial revolution in the 19th century, but by

1. The Global Gender Gap report benchmarks 144 countries on their progress towards gender parity
across four thematic dimensions: economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment,
health and survival, and political empowerment.

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 201823

THE SWEDISH CULTURAL CONTEXT

the beginning of the 20th century, various popular movements grew stronger,
including the labour and the women’s movement (Sweden.se, 2018). Whileunemployment increased, inflation skyrocketed, and the 1918 Spanish flu
wreaked havoc, 2 the demand for social and economic reforms grew. The
Nordic countries were the first in Europe to gain universal suffrage and nonproportional voting rights and, in Sweden, the law on universal and equal
suffrage for both men and women was approved in 1919 (Riksdag, 2018).
Figure 3: Interpersonal trust
Mean average, on a scale from 0 (you do not trust any other person) to 10(most people can be trusted), 2013Note:

The OECD average is population-weighted; it excludes Australia, Canada, Chile, Israel,
Japan, Korea, Mexico and the United States

Source: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), Statistics New
Zealand.

Sweden took a series of societal enhancement measures in the middle ofthe 19th century, such as those to fight corruption, ensure freedom of the press
and fair access to all professions. Recruitment in the public administration
began to be based on merit rather than lineage, and the abolition of the guild
system allowed more people to gain access to various areas of professional life.
Early adoption of patent legislation, along with the banking system, which
created a market for venture capital, contributed to considerably accelerated
innovation in the country (Schön, 2012). These conditions contributed to theadvent of many inventions, including dynamite, the primus stove, safety
matches and the tetra pack (Sweden.se, 2018a).
However, the real economic upswing occurred after the Second World
War. As the country remained neutral through the war, its undamaged
industrial infrastructure and very strong post-war development contributed tomaking Sweden one of the richest nations in the world on a per capita basis in1970 (Sweden.se, 2018, United Nations Data, 2018). The exceptional economic
development lasted until the 1970s oil crisis, when the country’s tradeconditions began to resemble those of the rest of the world (OECD, 2007).

2. At least one-third of the Swedish population (at the time 5.8 million) were infected, over
34 000 people (5.9 per 1 000 people) died in 1918 alone (Holtenius and Gillman, 2014).

24

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

THE SWEDISH CULTURAL CONTEXT

Swedish nuclear programme
In 1947, the Swedish government established an atomic energy researchorganisation, AB Atomenergi. Initially, the objective of this action was to create
an organisation as a basis for a nuclear weapons programme. However theplan to develop nuclear weapons was abandoned in the late 1960s. Sweden
signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968
(Jonter, 2016).
Sweden’s nuclear knowledge base was then shifted to nuclear energy
production. But instead of buying designs that had already been developed
overseas, Sweden decided to use its competence and industrial production
capacity to develop its own nuclear reactors. This led to the order of the
Oskarshamn 1 from ASEA in 1966 – the first western light water reactor
designed and built without requiring a technology from US vendors (WANO,
2018). The reactor started up in 1972. During the next 12 years, 11 morereactors were commissioned, of which 9 were of Swedish design.
After the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident and the subsequent
investigations, the nuclear regulator in Sweden at the time hired its first expert
in behavioural sciences. A Man, Technology and Organisation (MTO) section
was later established. The need for this kind of competence was underpinnedby the investigations of the Chernobyl accident. The development of this section
has continued and has grown continuously over the years. The section now
employs 12 behavioural scientists who conduct oversight in the human factors
field and contribute to the drafting of rules as well as supporting the authority’s
internal organisational development (Ministry of the Environment, 2017).
In 2006, the Forsmark unit 1 had an incident caused by a short circuit in
the 400 KV power supply. The complex situation that followed was handled by
the operators. The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) classified theincident as an INES 2 incident (SKI, 2007). The Forsmark incident offeredinsight within the regulator regarding the need to act more proactively when
there are indications of a decline in the safety culture of an operator/licensee(SSM, 2009). This knowledge has resulted in further actions to strengthen the
proactive actions taken by the regulator twice since 2006 (Ministry of theEnvironment, 2013).
After a long and successful operation of the 12 reactors, the decision tophase out the first two reactors, Barsebäck 1 and Barsebäck 2, was taken by
the Swedish government. Barsebäck unit 1 was closed in 1999 and unit 2 in
May 2005 (Ministry of the Environment, 2017). In 2015, it was decided by thelicensee, for economic reasons, not to complete upgrades to Oskarshamn 2 andto declare it permanently shut down (WANO, 2018). In 2017, Oskarshamn 1
was taken out of operation and permanently shut down. Vattenfall is the mainowner of Ringhals NPP, and the NPP licensee, Ringhals AB, announced in 2015that they plan to end operation of Ringhals 1 in 2020 and Ringhals 2 in 2019
for economic reasons (WANO, 2018).

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 201825

THE SWEDISH CULTURAL CONTEXTThe Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) was founded in 2008
through a merger of the SKI and the Swedish Radiation Safety Institute (SSI).
The authority has, as its mandate, to work “…proactively and preventively inorder to protect people and the environment from the effects of radiation, now
and in the future” (SSM, 2018). As such, it has overall responsibility in theareas of radiological protection, nuclear safety and nuclear non-proliferation(Ministry of the Environment, 2013). The authority currently employs about
300 people with skills in areas such as technology, the physical andbehavioural sciences, law, economy and communication (Ministry of theEnvironment, 2017).

26

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

SAFETY CULTURE IN THE SWEDISH CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF SWEDEN

Safety culture in the Swedish context: Observations
from CSSCF Sweden

Introduction
The snapshot study and the Country-Specific Safety
Culture Forum (CSSCF) provided information
regarding national attributes. These national attributes
are common themes that may manifest in variousorganisational behaviours.

CSSCF Sweden should beviewed as inspiration forfurther reflection rather
final conclusions.

As noted earlier, the outcome of CSSCF Sweden
does not represent a comprehensive study of the Swedish culture; it is aconsideration based on focused exercises reflecting approximately 100 people’s
perceptions about Swedish culture in a nuclear safety context. The results willthus entail some observations (and, inevitably, some overgeneralisations) that
we hope will spark a continued dialogue on how these identified culturalfeatures can influence nuclear safety.
The scenario used for the role play during the forum was an operational
event that takes place in a structured environment with, for example, meetingsand conversations related to operations. This role play fuelled conversations
during the forum in which participants asked
themselves what behaviours are typically Swedish andSeveral participants felt
which are specific to the nuclear industry. Mostthat plant operations
participants felt that the organisational culture differs
were less influenced bysignificantly between operations and other parts of athe national context than
nuclear organisation – although the culture isby other elements of aconsidered to be most nuclear industry-specific within
nuclear organisation.
operations.
Decisionmaking,communication,
leadership, follow-up, feedback and accountability
were considered to be managed to a greater extent using formalised processes
in the conduct of operations. Participants engaged in several conversations
regarding the distinction between industry-specific characteristics and thoseconsidered to be typical Swedish organisational behaviours. It should also be
noted that the discussions and reflections made during the forum were in thecontext of normal operations and day-to-day management, not under accident
conditions.

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 201827

SAFETY CULTURE IN THE SWEDISH CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF SWEDEN

Swedish national attributes highlighted during CSSCF Sweden
To label a thematic cultural phenomenon is to make the feature explicit andconscious. Much of any cultural feature “is under the surface” andunconsciously influences organisational behaviour. It is therefore helpful inclarifying the discussion to label cultural features to enable an exploration of
the underlying drivers. It must be noted that national attributes are not definite
and those discussed in this report may not be unique to Sweden and may well
exist in other countries. This report reflects the attributes that emerged
throughout the snapshot study and the CSSCF, and, for the purpose of thisreport, two deeply rooted Swedish cultural themes have been labelled as
samskap and allskap.

Samskap
The attribute samskap has been designated in this report to represent thecentral Swedish cultural aspect of being in unity and the will to take a collective
accountability for well-being and harmony. The snapshot exercise highlighted
that a tendency in working life is often centred on working in a group to solve a
given task. Two examples where samskap is a key to a transparent andinclusive way of dealing with tasks and providing for an efficient and wellinformed process are problem-solving and decision making. Sweden is acountry where collective processes are emphasised. Indeed, there is no single
word in English equivalent for the Swedish term sams (which is described as“being in unity,” “being in agreement,” and/or “keeping good relations”).
However, there are similarities in other countries that have a more societal
collective approach. Japan is such a country, where the word “wa” is a central
cultural notion that is similar to some extent to samskap. “Wa” is a culturalconcept or value that can be translated in English as meaning “to stay inharmony”, avoiding the creation of friction in relations and being mindful ofthe social context.
Language is an important cultural vehicle with many words in Swedish
containing sam. 1 It seems that being in unity (sams) and collaborating(samverka) produces some sort of sought-after harmony. In both the snapshot
study and the forum, it was revealed that not to be in unity (the opposite ofsams, or osams) or to challenge unity is something that is avoided. Often, it
appeared as if avoidance of conflict was a common behaviour. Participants inthe focus groups and small discussion groups discussed fear of conflict, which
can be expressed in the unwillingness to correct an inappropriate behaviour
and to provide feedback. “Clenching your fist in your pocket” was anothersubject of discussion (a Swedish expression meaning to be seething inside), or
not wanting to speak out during meetings in order to avoid creating dissension.
It may be that some believe avoiding conflict leads to a greater degree of
empathy and consideration for social aspects. It was mentioned both in the

1. The prefix is similar to “co” in English, but has another connotation as samskap, which has a
deeper sense of unity and striving for harmony.

28

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

SAFETY CULTURE IN THE SWEDISH CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF SWEDEN

study and in the forum that it is important to show consideration for others andavoid hurting them. Being in unity (sams) and collaborating (samarbeta) ismore demanding on individuals who should not only be empathetic with eachother but should also adjust their behaviour to each individual situation. This is
in contrast to cultures where, for example, a highly polarised discussion is anatural part of relations and is viewed as a “healthy debate” rather than adisagreeable conflict. Several managers said that leadership training taught
them that one way of creating well-being at work is to give directives by asking
questions; a coaching leadership style is considered to minimise conflict among
employees and at the same time increase their understanding of the task at
hand. Of course, heated discussions do occur in Sweden and different views
about a factual matter may be exchanged in meetings. This is especially thecase in nuclear operations and in matters related to safety. When functioning
well, combining consensus with openness means that an issue will behighlighted and anchored before a decision is made. This is because
everybody’s – not just the manager’s – knowledge is used when the decision ismade. In addition, feeling good in relations with others at work is somethingthat is valued. Employees want to feel appreciated at work; and feel as if
everyone’s opinion is worthwhile and must be respected. These are importantfactors for people to want to remain in their positions or in their teams. During
the forum, it became apparent that samskap may even outweigh theimportance of the issue at hand at times.
From the snapshot study, it was said that problems were more often
viewed as something needing a solution and not as something negative or
requiring punishment. The attitude is rather more focused on finding asolution. The tendency is to attempt to demystify problems, even controversial
problems, which are discussed openly. One example is the handling of final
storage of nuclear fuel and the transparent and open communication about the
problem of nuclear waste. With regards to the storage of nuclear fuel, the highlevel of inclusion of the community in the process has led to a high degree of
acceptance in society. It was almost a competition between the two selected
communities to have the final storage in their neighbourhoods. It was alsomentioned that, on most occasions, problems are often raised to the collective
or at the management level and that people work together to find solutions. So,
the desire for samskap can also be found in this regard.

Allskap
Another deep-rooted national attribute in Sweden is related to samskap andhas been labelled allskap for the purpose of this report. It relates to the ideathat everyone should have the same rights and that all things should be fair.
Typical examples of this are the Swedish welfare state (“svenska folkhemmet”),
everyone’s right/freedom to roam (“allemänsrätten”) and the Co-determination
Act (“medbestämmandelagen”) intended to promote employee participation indecision-making on employment and working conditions (Eurofound).
Equality and justice can be viewed as central in Swedish culture. It may bethat this striving for equality has sprung out of samskap. Consensus was a topic
that was mentioned many times in both the forum and the snapshot study, and

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

29

SAFETY CULTURE IN THE SWEDISH CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF SWEDEN

its relation to the Law of Jante2 (“Jantelagen”) and to the Swedish concept“lagom”3 as well as its role in the shaping of conformity. Participants statedthat ranking, distinguishing between groups or being highly hierarchical are
not aspects of Swedish character.
Conformity was a topic mentioned several times in the snapshot study andit was said that it is not “Swedish” for someone to stand out from a crowd. The
football player Zlatan Ibrahimovic’s attitude of being outspoken about how
good a football player he is was an example used in the forum of a person thatbroke against what is typically Swedish. Stating that one is incredibly good, tostand out or be outspoken without taking others into consideration is
unwelcomed and considered rude. Paradoxically, Zlatan Ibrahimovic has
become one of the most admired Swedes during the last decade.
Another aspect of allskap that appears in both the snapshot study and theforum is the aim for common understanding. For example, it seems that in
Swedish culture, all participants in a meeting are expected to have the sameunderstanding. In fact, one of the reasons why some meetings are notdocumented is that all are expected to come out of them with the same
comprehension of what has been said and of what needs to be done. To
illustrate this, the example of an average meeting was given, which usuallyends with the chairperson asking whether everyone has understood, and allparticipants in the meeting answering yes. However, there is no verificationthat everyone really had the same understanding.
In both the snapshot study and the forum, it was emphasised that
openness and transparency regarding information are highly valued. There areeven laws to regulate openness and transparency. An example would be theprinciple of public access, which includes public access to most official records.
All must have the same rights to information, particularly in the case of workrelated information. It is often said that information is power, and it may bethat allskap eliminates these power dynamics to a certain extent.
The natural behaviour of inclusion was also addressed. A clear example
underlined was that of feeling better to include than to exclude people from ameeting. Several people may therefore take part in a meeting even though they
do not have a formal role in or are not concerned by the issue at hand. “Playon-word” jokes are made about “tekniker”, which means technicians, and“tycknicker” which is someone who only has opinions (“tycka” means to havean opinion). There is too often a tendency to believe that everyone has the rightto take part and give their opinion.

2. Law of Jante (Jantelagen) are ten social rules written by Aksel Sandemose to describe ahomogeneous pattern of group behaviour in the Nordic countries. The core of the rules can beshortened into, “You are not to think you're anyone special or that you're better than us”. The
Law of Jante may be less prevalent today in larger Swedish cities.
3 Lagom is a word for just the right amount – not too much, not too little. It is to be in the middle,
in moderation, in balance and not be excessive.

30

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

SAFETY CULTURE IN THE SWEDISH CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF SWEDEN

Finally, a semantic observation about allskap: in Sweden, titles or lastnames are rarely used in the working environment as may be customary inmany other countries. All people are at the same level; with people evenaddressing the topmost executive by his or her first name all the while
respecting each other. Clearly stating hierarchies or rank is not typical Swedish
behaviour. Several managers in the forum and in the snapshot study statedthat being a manager could be double-edged. In some instances, it has beenstated that managers could not always act as executives, i.e. take up too muchspace or skip the process during which everyone is given an opportunity tovoice their opinion before decisions are made, but that, on the other hand, theymust always set a good example in their day-to-day activities. They must also
be understanding and empathetic on a human level.
It was noted during the forum that, when allskap works well, the decisions
are not only well understood by everyone involved, but all those that have a
responsibility to implement a decision are committed to doing so. When allskap
does not work well, the decision-making process can be very time-consuming,and there can be different interpretations of a meeting’s or decision’s
outcomes.

Security and trust
From a cultural perspective, the core values of samskap and allskap appear topermeate the society. Public policies that emphasise equal right to education,
health care, retirement and senior care are examples. In both the snapshot
study and in the forum, it has been shown that these cultural values have aneffect on the workplace. It was also highlighted that there is generally great
trust in governmental authorities, the state, colleagues, co-workers, managers,
processes, rules and systems, and it is assumed that people take responsibility
and do what has been agreed in a safe and efficient manner. It is not always
considered necessary, for example, to check the work of others or how they
have carried out their tasks. This would simply be considered impolite as it
would be viewed as a breach of privacy or a lack of trust. It can go so far as toassume that co-workers who work without protective equipment must have agood reason for not following instructions, and therefore not questioning their
behaviour4.
Also mentioned in the snapshot study was the Swedish tendency to feelsecure and to trust that the system works correctly, which may explain why
Sweden has remained at the top in terms of anticorruption according toTransparency International’s Survey of Corruption Perception Index. Several
people stated in the snapshot study that they view other Swedes as honest andtransparent. This assumption makes it possible to trust each other to a greater
extent and may increase efficiencies in getting the job done. Honesty andtransparency were also exemplified by the fact that external reviews were

4. While this behaviour clearly has safety culture implications, it was not examined in detail in thisparticular exercise. It would, however, be appropriate to address this factor in future efforts toenhance safety culture in Sweden.

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 201831

SAFETY CULTURE IN THE SWEDISH CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF SWEDEN

invited from the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) under theirpeer review programme and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
under their Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme. Several
believed that it was typically Swedish and that in other countries there is not
such a great willingness to “hang out the dirty laundry”.

Freedom
It was found that the degree of freedom in working life is essential. Most
participants perceived the attribute of being “bossy” as inappropriate. Staff
expect to be provided with frameworks for work rather than to be
micromanaged, as it gives the necessary freedom to solve tasks by oneself
based on skill. Sweden is a country that has a high level of innovation capacity.
The Global Innovation Index 2018 ranks Sweden at second place in the world.
The freedom to make use of one’s own thinking and have an influence on how
work is to be carried out was said to stimulate innovation. Participants also
expressed that a major motivational factor is to be free to be creative.
Managers also expect employees to bring new ideas and solutions regardless of
their status or position.
Freedom in the form of time off work was highlighted as something almost
non-negotiable. It was pointed out that it should be avoided as far as possible
to contact a co-worker who is on leave. Examples were provided where
decisions or tasks sometimes were postponed deliberately because the person
responsible for the matter was on leave and had no chance to provide input.
However, it was also underlined that it is becoming more common, when there
is a good reason, for people to be contacted on their free time. If there is aquestion concerning safety that requires a quick action or a question ofoperations, the person in charge would be contacted regardless of whether they
are on leave or not.

Complacency/national pride
One topic that was brought up in the snapshot study and in the forum was thetendency to think that “Sweden is best” or that anything “Made in Sweden” isgreat. The conversations reflected a national pride that a country with such asmall population managed to become one of the best in the world in several
respects. Aside from the social perspective mentioned above, successes invarious industries such as Atlas Copco, ABB, Ericsson, Astra, SAAB (fighter
planes and cars), Volvo (cars and trucks), Scania (trucks), IKEA, H&M, Spotify
and Skype, must be mentioned. One discussion group during the forum
reflected upon the fact that the media likes to convey an image of Sweden as
being a world leader.
On the one hand, this pride and the confidence that comes along with itgives Sweden possibilities to do more than what can be expected from acountry of this size. On the other hand, it could lead to complacency.
The 2017 terrorist attack in Stockholm was given as an example during
the forum to illustrate national complacency. The event was something some ofthe participants never believed could happen in Sweden. It was even justified

32

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

SAFETY CULTURE IN THE SWEDISH CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF SWEDEN

as being somewhat of an isolated case, and this despite the fact that Stockholm
had already been a target at least once before. It was also mentioned thatpeople have become humbler and have started to realise that Sweden may
have been left behind in some areas, such as the educational system.
Certain cultural aspects in the role play were sometimes brushed aside,
but later in the group conversations participants admitted that behaviours suchas those displayed in the scenario do indeed occur. It was even mentioned on
several occasions in the plenary dialogues that care should be taken not to fall
into complacency. One example that was provided was that all three nuclear
power plants have been under special regulatory oversight because of
weaknesses in the leadership and management of safety.5

A drive towards shared understanding
Another theme that arose was that of “the driver” of shared understandings inworking life. All focus groups agreed that giving orders and blindly following
them would not be a way to achieve success in Sweden. Participants further
agreed that it is important to create a shared understanding for successful
implementation. If one does not understand why a job must be done in acertain way, according to decisions or rules, there is a tendency for people to
do as they think is best. Managers therefore have an important role to play inexplaining the rules so as to bring about shared understanding. The term“pedagogical approach” was used to describe this cultural expression. However,respect for and adherence to procedures was said to be strong in operations.
During the forum, the participants reflected upon the idea that it can berisky to assume that everyone has the same understanding. The logic is that
understanding drives action, and as a result, there is a risk that things do notturn out as intended because of divergent understandings. Furthermore, it wasoften brought up during the snapshot study and the forum that people too often
feel they have a preferential right of interpretation of the decision.
Skill and extensive experience are highly valued in Sweden. During theforum, it was highlighted that a person with extensive experience can achieve a“guru” status as an informal leader in the organisation. The latter’s opinion
weighs heavily on decisions or discussions. It was further underlined that tohave gone the long way, either by holding a number of different positions or byhaving held the same position for a long time, almost gives one an“unchallenged” status. Executives expressed that it may be difficult to oppose
the opinion of informal leaders, which tend to automatically be assumed to beright.

5. If the regulator in Sweden has observed weaknesses in the leadership and management forsafety, the licensee will be under special regulatory oversight, with increased numbers ofinspections and heightened surveillance.

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 201833

SAFETY CULTURE IN THE SWEDISH CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF SWEDEN

Typical behaviours in Swedish nuclear organisations identified
during CSSCF Sweden
The national attributes described above manifest in various organisational
behaviours. Consideration of the discussions reflected in CSSCF Sweden
identifies the following five principal areas:• employeeship/leadership/management;• decision making;• accountability;• feedback;• learning.
A description of how these national manifestations appear in Swedish
nuclear organisations follows, but it should be kept in mind that thesereflections are not absolute truths and should rather be viewed as inspiration
for further reflection.

Employeeship6/leadership/management
The information collected from the analysis of the snapshot study and theforum shows that the dynamics between employees, leaders and managers arepermeated with all of these national attributes. Regarding the attributes
samskap and allskap, it was unanimously agreed that a manager must be goodat establishing a collaborative and fair working environment. In both thesnapshot study and the forum, it was found that leadership should have moreof a coaching style, as mentioned earlier, with a pedagogical approach so as tofoster samskap through shared understanding. Asking questions, instead ofgiving orders, is a winning concept according to the participants in both thesnapshot study and the forum. Several people used the word “soft” to describe
Swedish leadership, which may relate to the leaders showing flexibility andadaptability. It was emphasised by participants that it is the leader’s duty tomotivate and inspire employees, with several groups underlining the negative
connotation of “bossy” characteristics. A manager is expected to be more of acolleague than a superior, and avoid “stating the obvious” as the majority
expressed. Managers should also avoid taking offence (samskap) and need toearn the respect of their co-workers in order to gain a hearing. In one of the
focus groups, one person expressed it as follows: “I would never want to be a
manager because you need to earn everyone’s respect to make it work.”
The cultural attribute of allskap evidently has an influence on leadership,
toning down how authority is exercised and demonstrated in the organisation.
Considering the impact of allskap and samskap, there is a tendency to strive for
equality in the workplace. Several participants indicated that Swedes may not

6. Employeeship (or Medarbetarskap in Swedish) is an approach to developing a culture ofownership and responsibility in an organisation. The philosophy has been adopted andresearched most notably in Sweden.

34

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

SAFETY CULTURE IN THE SWEDISH CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF SWEDEN

have the same respect for authority as in some other countries. In both thesnapshot study and the forum, it was said that co-workers have little inhibition
about questioning and challenging authorities and managers. The participants
thought that this was a result of job security, as well as the norm stipulatingthat everyone has the same value. Because it is important that everyone’s
opinion be taken into account, and particularly differing opinions andperspectives, this was said to have a positive influence on nuclear safety. It isalso in line with the international normative frameworks, which emphasise theimportance of having a questioning attitude, of ensuring a reporting culture,and of encouraging openness without fear of retaliation.
One topic that several focus groups reflected on was the nature of Swedish
leadership as it can often be ambiguous in nature: regarding roles andresponsibilities, decisions, follow-up on decisions and feedback. Most
participants indicated that they would like to have clearer leadership, but not at
the expense of samskap or allskap. This particular element was underlined in
the snapshot study as well – that Swedish leadership style could be combinedwith greater clarity.
Employeeship in the Swedish context is characterised by having a highdegree of freedom to work “as one sees fit”. It is expected that managers will
not micromanage, as micro-management is not perceived to be acceptable. The
example was provided of when an authoritarian and micromanaging manager
had brought about such a high degree of dissension within an organisation that
more than half the employees had quit or moved to other departments.
The material from the forum and the snapshot study thus show that thesocial aspect of the workplace is of utmost importance. Samskap and allskap
have a strong influence on organisational behaviour with respect to the
dynamics between managers, leaders and employees.

Decision making
Decision making in Swedish nuclear organisations was described from several
perspectives during this project. The focus groups were unanimous inconsidering the decision-making process in Sweden to be unique. Decision
making is characterised by involvement of everyone and striving for consensus.
Once again, samskap, allskap and understanding of the background andreasoning for a decision have an important role in the Swedish context. Giving
one’s opinion and being able to influence a decision is considered to be a right.
As mentioned earlier, it is viewed as necessary that a person who is to take partin implementing an action must understand the decision for the action and its
basis. It is also imperative for Swedes to feel that they were involved in theprocess and given an opportunity to voice their opinion. It can otherwise result in
the decision not being adhered to or that sub-optimisation occurs and the person
in question does as he or she feels would be best. Some of the focus groups
considered that not following this approach could result in deviations as a resultof the fact that the person does not know the greater perspective. Anotherinteresting aspect related to implementation of decisions is that if a person does
not implement the decision accordingly, it could be explained by the fact that the

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

35

SAFETY CULTURE IN THE SWEDISH CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF SWEDEN

person did not understand the decision. In such cases, it was considered to be asystemic error rather than misconduct by the individual.
Examples were given showing that if the person does not feel involved in thedecision or the decision is vague, there is room not to follow the decision. The
focus groups were unanimously convinced that a high degree of involvement isvaluable. They believed that this provided all-around insights and helped achieve
shorter implementation times. In the scenario, it was recognised that new
employees may freely express their opinions. It is even welcome. In most cases,
even challenging the manager is acceptable. In this context, it was emphasisedthat experts, on the other hand, are rarely challenged.
Participants reflected on the social aspect sometimes taking the upper handin decision-making meetings, with one focus group joking that the only missing
element in meetings was the cinnamon rolls. Due to the importance of sams, insome situations, a divergent opinion can be perceived as a source of conflict, andthis may cause “lobbying” for their cause ahead of a meeting to guarantee that
potential opponents support the desired decision. The social aspect was also
accounted for through the influence given to informal leaders, largely as a resultof their extensive experience or as a result of the local social structure. Several of
the organisations are located in smaller communities, and people know eachother privately. This may unconsciously weigh in on behaviour since one does
not want to offend someone and thus avoids voicing a view if it goes against the
proposal. It should be added that all focus groups called attention to the fact that,when decisions regarding operation are concerned, the process is different andclosely managed. Participants believed that the practice in nuclear organisationsof placing safety first would override the social aspects in crucial decisions
regarding safety.
Some discussion took place on the informal aspect that pervades decision
making. Decisions are sometimes taken outside the decision-making forum, forexample in preliminary meetings, at the coffee corner or in other informal
situations. This organisational behaviour would benefit from further exploration
so as to identity what impact it may have on nuclear safety.
Participation in decisions was discussed in terms of it being fairly common
for many people to take part in decision-making meetings. It may happen thatpeople take part because they have an opinion but no actual formal role in thedecision-making process. It was mentioned that decisions may even be taken in
an informal forum with people who do not have a formal role to make decisions.
Examples were given of people who do not really have anything to do with thedecision but still may sometimes play a central role in the process.
In the snapshot study, and to a certain extent during the forum, the so-called“interminable delays” that occur because of allskap and samskap were discussed.
In some cases, it can take years for a decision to be reached, e.g. complex
technical issues at NPPs that have no imminent impact on safety. Examples wereeven given of instances where it took so long that when the decision was finallymade, it was no longer relevant. Again, decision making within operation was
said to differ in that there is a highly structured procedure, having clear roles of
responsibility.

36

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

SAFETY CULTURE IN THE SWEDISH CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF SWEDEN

It was highlighted both in the snapshot study and during the forum that theassumption of a common understanding became particularly clear in meetings
with other countries. A participant gave a telling example of this, when during ameeting between top executives from Sweden and another country, the Swedes
reported back that it had been a very productive meeting and that manydecisions had been made, whereas the other party’s feedback stipulated that nodecisions had been made.
A common observation during conversations related to the “woolliness” ofthe decision-making process. Decision-making meetings were described as
unclear with regard to the basis of the decision, the meeting participants, theperson responsible for making decisions, the desired outcome of the decision, theimplementation of the decision and how follow-up should be carried out. This
woolliness can be interpreted as a freedom to do as one sees fit, with the lack ofclarity used in a strategic manner.
The lack of follow-up was attributed to work not being micromanaged andpeople being reluctant to “dig around in the work of others”. While there is trustthat what has been agreed will be done and that individuals will report any
problems that may arise, the discussions reflected the concern that decisionmaking meetings could end with a lack of clarity and that individuals could
emerge with differing views as to what was agreed and what next steps were tobe pursued. It was considered that meeting best practices could be shared as away of addressing such concerns, such as having managers ask participants tosummarise their understanding of next steps at the conclusion of the discussion.

Accountability
In discussions about accountability, it was highlighted that very often Swedes liketo take on responsibility and to feel accountable, but they also often shift
responsibility to the collective or to the system.
Based on comments made during the forum, it seems that if people arewilling to take on responsibility and do take this responsibility seriously then theygenerally set high expectations for themselves. For example, they may take on
additional responsibilities when they see an opportunity to improve a skill or gain
knowledge. Employees are considered to be the driving force in an organisation,
taking on the responsibility for carrying out the work in consultation with the
manager. Occupational burnout was discussed as a consequence of people taking
on too much responsibility and a lack of clear frameworks for such
responsibilities. The focus groups also mentioned that it is common for formal
job descriptions to be missing or generally unclear. Several examples were
provided concerning employees taking on more responsibilities than had beenformally agreed. This particularly applied to questions of who is responsible forsafety. Several focus groups said that they acknowledged responsibilities forsafety at the employee level, and all focus groups agreed that there was no lack ofemphasis on safety in terms of the responsibility of the plant manager.

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 201837

SAFETY CULTURE IN THE SWEDISH CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF SWEDEN

Both in the snapshot study and during the forum it was noted that there
exists a tendency to shift responsibility to someone else. This may happen whenpeople rely on the system to take care of the issue. The system may for example
consist of the review process, the hierarchy, the rules and the exercise of
authority. Responsibility is preferably taken jointly, which results in responsibility
resting with several people. The attributes samskap, allskap, security andfreedom manifest themselves in this behaviour. It is perceived as more secure toshare the responsibility, and there is more individual freedom as there is lessimpetus for a manager to follow up individually, which could be perceived as
micromanaging as outlined earlier in this report.
As described above, the decision-making process was said to be ambiguous
in some regards and may lead to decisions with considerable space forinterpretation. Such ambiguity has an influence on an individual’s
responsibilities.
Another aspect regarding responsibility that was discussed concerns theunwillingness of people to get involved in the responsibility of others even if one
notices something that has gone awry. Several focus groups used the example ofwhen someone observes a person who is not using the required safety helmet but
does not want to call attention to this fact, revealing a tendency to try to avoid
offending others. The same desire to not cause conflict from a manager to his or
her subordinate exists between peers who similarly do not want to be perceived
as interfering in their colleagues’ areas of responsibility.
The question of the amount of time it takes to get things done was also
discussed in both the snapshot study and the forum. Several examples wereraised by participants that there is usually no consequence if a person does notdeliver on time on less pressing issues. In many cases, an acceptable excuse isthat the person “did not have time to complete”, which generally is driven by thedesire to take the time needed to achieve high quality results. It was also notedthat important and high priority issues, for example linked to operations, areaddressed on time, and, if not, there will be consequences.
Several of the forum discussion groups noticed the absence of the safety
department’s presence during the role play scenario. Participants were told toassume that the fictional nuclear power plant in the scenario had developed aculture in which staff had become accustomed to not contacting the safety
department first, but instead directly calling the regulatory authority. This
scenario triggered a conversation both in the forum discussion groups and in theplenary on the responsibility for safety and the authority’s role. The opinions
diverged with regard to how common it is for staff to informally contact theauthority. Some felt that this happens “all the time” and others felt that it was
extremely rare. Opinions were also divided about how contact occurs.
While whistle blowing is unusual, talking to the authority informally to voice
one’s views on a particular issue is more common. Sometimes, a more informal
approach may be used to get an issue across, for example by simply bypassing
the formal internal path. The reason for using such an approach may result fromdifferent factors, including a desire to have a decision approved more quickly, toavoid internal resistance, to have one’s voice heard regarding a particular38

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

SAFETY CULTURE IN THE SWEDISH CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF SWEDEN

question or to appease the concerns of a person who has a strong feeling of
responsibility about safety. It was, however, considered disloyal to turn to themedia or to go to the regulatory authority without first trying to go via formalinternal channels. According to the participants, there is generally a strong senseof loyalty when it comes to safety in Sweden, and people take their personal
responsibilities seriously when it comes to safety.
This particular style of open dialogue between licence holders and thenuclear regulator was said to belong to the Swedish model of nuclear regulation
through self-supervision and to suit the particular Swedish culture.

Feedback
It was stated both in the snapshot study and the forum that people in Sweden are
called upon to be critical and to question things. Because it is easy to talk withmanagers at all levels and to call things into question, the focus groups believedthat information flows faster in Swedish organisations.
It appears in the material from both the snapshot study and the forum that it
is generally easier to provide upward feedback in a Swedish organisation than
downward. Most managers said that it can easily become problematic to provide
feedback to employees. Words such as “silk gloves” and “restraint” were used todescribe the sensitivity of feedback. According to responses provided in thesnapshot study, criticism is difficult to give, and everything should be presented
in a positive manner. Someone reflected upon the fact that society has becomelargely based on everything being positive, especially in schools, where positive
reinforcement is used. It has thus become difficult to accept criticism and a kindof hypersensitivity has developed in Sweden, which could explain why following
up and providing feedback goes against the grain.
Sensitivity to feedback and differences in communication styles between
Swedish and foreign cultures were also discussed during the forum, particularly
with regard to interactions with several international organisations. Some
concern was expressed about the risk of a message not getting through becauseof cultural misunderstanding. On the surface, it appears as if a consensus has
been reached, but it later turns out that the situation has been interpreted orunderstood in different ways. During the focus groups and interviews, a couple ofpeople with foreign backgrounds who had been working in Sweden for many
years gave examples of such cases, with one person saying, “In Sweden, youhave to keep restraining your feedback and, even when I really think I'm being
careful, it unleashes a strong backlash.”

Learning
The material from both the snapshot study and the forum reveals a paradox in
how self-perception is handled. On the one hand, there may be some insecurity
and, on the other hand, there is a sort of self-satisfaction in that Swedes seethemselves as very capable. The “Swedish Model” was mentioned as an
example of how to achieve success with regard to industrial and social
development, given that Sweden is a small country that holds its own at theinternational level. There is perhaps some complacency, therefore, when it

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

39

SAFETY CULTURE IN THE SWEDISH CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF SWEDEN

comes to the collective level and a tendency to feel greater insecurity at theindividual level.
Several focus groups felt that this Swedish complacency works against awillingness to accept criticism. The attitude was said to be, “we know ourfacilities better than outside people (WANO/OSART) and other industries”. The
spirit of this statement was discussed in several forum discussion groups andduring the focus groups. It was stated that results from international peer
reviews may be difficult to accept without considering the national andtechnical context in Sweden. One illustrative example was given in which a
WANO support mission to one of the nuclear power plants had resulted in alarge number of points noted that needed improvement. After a number ofinternal discussions, it was decided that only a handful of points remained to
be improved.
The issue of accepting criticism and learning from something was
discussed in the focus groups, interviews and during the forum. The focus
groups felt that external reviewers could be insensitive to cultural differences.
As mentioned earlier, it is easier for Swedes to openly report shortcomings
among themselves, which is in contrast with the reception ofinternational/external feedback. While openness to accepting international
feedback has been growing, the dilemma regarding cultural differences inrelation to communication between external audits and Swedish culture
remains.
Feedback is an important factor for learning. Considering that Swedes
may have difficulty with managing feedback, this may lead to learning not fully
taking place. However, employees pursue their skills development by taking
personal responsibility for their improvement. This leads to both individual andorganisational learning, but, if done in isolation, there is a missed opportunity
to gain valuable external feedback to contribute to further learning.

40

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

REFLECTIONS ON SAFETY CULTURE IN A SWEDISH CONTEXT AND PATHS FORWARD

Reflections on safety culture in a Swedish context
and paths forward

Characteristics of national attributes
National attributes are neither good nor bad, but could have positive or
negative implications depending on the context. An attribute has the potential
to manifest itself in an organisational behaviour in a way that leads to astronger safety culture, but it also has the potential to counteract a sound safety
culture. The results of the forum and of the snapshot study showed that all
national attributes generate organisational behaviours that can be positive andless positive. The next step is to put these in the context of nuclear safety.
International normative frameworks such as those advocated by the
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), the World Association of Nuclear Operators(WANO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provide a
description for what a sound safety culture entails. These frameworks can be
helpful to compare and to use as references to frame the Swedish context.
However, in making such a comparison, the international frameworks have to
be interpreted and applied respecting the national context, and should be usedas guidance and not as absolute norms.
This is an invitation to the Swedish nuclear community to further explore,
through dialogue, how the identified Swedish attributes and their
manifestations in organisational behaviours may influence nuclear safety. The
findings of this report could be used to further explore the questions below, todetermine strengths and to address aspects that should not be neglected.

Potential influence of Swedish national attributes on nuclear safety
The attributes referred to as allskap and samskap in this report appear to be
two fundamental and major driving forces that emerged from the snapshot
study and the forum. The CSSCF participants seem to support the view thatcollaborating harmoniously, including everyone in decisions and giving
everyone equal terms is a good model at the macro (societal/national), meso(organisational) and micro (group) levels in Sweden. The positive aspects froma safety culture perspective could be a high degree of participation,transparency in the decision-making process, a freedom to address problems
and a high degree of collaboration to devise solutions. Problems andmisconduct tend to be addressed by solution-oriented approaches and are
addressed using a human, technology and organisation systems perspective. It

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 201841

REFLECTIONS ON SAFETY CULTURE IN A SWEDISH CONTEXT AND PATHS FORWARD

also seems as if the leadership style generates motivation, open communicationand encourages a questioning attitude. Information is shared openly and freely
within the organisation, i.e. blocked to a lesser extent by hierarchy.
All of the above aspects promote a sound safety culture in accordance withwhat WANO, the NEA and the IAEA normative frameworks prescribe. Other
aspects of Swedish culture that should be analysed with caution are whensamskap affects the willingness to challenge decisions or opinions, to express
one’s own opinion, to follow up or to provide feedback because it might resultin a disagreement that could potentially disturb the unity (a condition known as“osams”). It is also possible that allskap may result in a “false consensus”
where dissenting views are withheld in order to avoid a potential conflict. On ageneric level, there may be agreement, but on a more detailed and specific level
there may be disagreement. To stay on the generic level might be a way toremain within samskap and remain united, without the risk of becoming“osams”. On the other hand, the model to reach consensus in the decision
making and create full understanding of what needs to be done in theimplementation phase can be a very powerful tool for effectiveness andefficiency.
Once again, it is important to bear in mind that a national attribute is notinherently good or bad. The challenge of examining attributes in a specificcultural context is to be aware of and handle such aspects that might negatively
affect sound safety culture, while at the same time preserving and encouraging
the more positive aspects.

Enhancing safety culture in a national context
National attributes are difficult – if not impossible – to change rapidly. For an
organisation, however, change may be possible by examining the driving forcesof organisational behaviours and their effects. This can be achieved by better
understanding the inner workings of the national attributes and their influence
on organisational behaviour. With such insight, it may be possible to encounter
deeply rooted cultural behaviour that may have negative impact on safety
culture.
A theme that emerged from the snapshot study and forum reveals thatsamskap is a basic assumption that may be taken for granted. Samskap

produces values such as the importance of social aspects at work, for example
being compassionate and showing consideration. These values may manifest
themselves in a willingness to become involved, openness about problems,
motivation, teamwork, etc. Such values form a good basis for a sound safety
culture, by creating opportunities for open-minded group discussions about
self-reflection. The forum discussions were a perfect example of this. These
values can also manifest themselves in not wanting to offend and create
discord, which can result in conflict avoidance. Because of the importance ofthe social aspects and showing consideration for others, avoidance of follow-up
can thus become a norm without any further thought. One option to become
conscious of this behaviour and start taking action is to be faced with a

42

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

REFLECTIONS ON SAFETY CULTURE IN A SWEDISH CONTEXT AND PATHS FORWARD

proactive intervention, for example a new insight as a result of a safety culture
assessment or as a result of self-reflection. Such insight would require
structural organisational support and shared understanding to sustainably
change the organisational behaviour. In this particular case, introducing anorganisational initiative that fosters non-confrontational follow-ups, such ascoaching sessions on how to ask open questions, could be explored.

Further considerations
It is important to underpin that the Swedish nuclear programme has shown
good results regarding safety and the capacity to take proactive safety decisions.
Swedish leadership is one subject that was discussed by all groups in theforum. Analysis of the material from the snapshot study and forum have shownthat leadership challenges and advantages should be further explored. Since
managers play a key role in influencing the culture, further exploration of how
the Swedish context affects leadership in the nuclear field would be valuable.
The snapshot study and the forum presented many views on leadership,
employeeship and management. There was unanimous agreement thatexercising leadership hierarchically, micromanaging or being bossy are notsuccessful approaches. When this is combined with assumptions about freedom
to do as each individual believes is best and a lack of clarity in decision making,there is a risk that the manager could lose their overall view and the ability todirect employees.
It was also consistently stated that a manager should not be “digging
around” in others’ work. Managers and employees alike indicated that
following up and giving feedback posed challenges. As internationalframeworks emphasise the importance of clarity in leadership in decision
making, in roles and responsibilities and for ongoing follow-up and feedback at
the individual, micro, meso and macro levels in order to ensure safety, thesechallenges could be explored further. Posing exploratory questions to tackle
these challenges appears to be a method that fits well with the Swedish
leadership style; for example posing questions will not only help explore how toaddress challenges but can increase common understanding. Furthermore, if
the questions are further focused on the underlying factors, such as values andassumptions, this can help depolarise any antagonism.

Suggestions for paths forward
There is an opportunity for nuclear organisations in Sweden to build on thefindings of the CSSCF and explore ways to support the continuous improvementof their safety culture. Exploratory questions could be used to work with theSwedish national attributes and their manifestation in organisational
behaviours. This could help pave a way forward that takes into account
opposing views and thus provides a better understanding of different
perspectives, all the while encouraging organisational learning. In this spirit, a

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 201843

REFLECTIONS ON SAFETY CULTURE IN A SWEDISH CONTEXT AND PATHS FORWARD

set of exploratory questions is proposed in Table 1 to inspire the Swedish
nuclear community for further reflection and dialogue. For example,
organisations could use these questions in their training and employee
engagement activities, with intact teams or open to all, to start a dialogue on
national attributes and how they impact behaviours at work. The discussions
could focus on identifying those that positively impact safety and should be
reinforced and those that may distract from safety and find ways to work withor around them.
Table 1: Exploratory questions
Organisational behaviours
National
attributes

Employeeship/leadership/
management

DecisionmakingAccountability

Feedback/
follow-up

Learning

Samskap

How might
What might besamskap influence the safety
relations between implications of
striving for
managerconsensus in
employee,decisionmanager making?
manager, or
employeeWhat types of
employee?
decisions result
from samskap?

What might be
the safety
implications ofsamskap in
relation toaccountability?

Allskap

What might theWhat might besafety implications the safetyof allskap be in
implications
when allrelation toopinions are
employeeship?
taken into
To leadership?
account?

What might be
How canthe safety
individual
implications offeedback beallskap in relation provided, whichto accountability? ensures safety inthe long term?

How might the
aspect of equality
influenceorganisational
learning?

What is the
How might trust What might berelation between
and verification the safety
implications
providing regularimpact the
between trust and feedback andoutcome oftrust?
decisions taken? accountability?

What safety
implications mighttrust have on
learning?

Security and trust How might ahigh level oftrust andsecurity influencesafety?

44

How cansamskap
influence theprovision of
feedback andfollow-up ofactivities?

How cansamskap support
or counteract
learning?

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

REFLECTIONS ON SAFETY CULTURE IN A SWEDISH CONTEXT AND PATHS FORWARD

Table 1: Exploratory questions (Cont.)
Organisational behaviours
National
attributes
Freedom

Complacency/
national pride

A drive towards
sharedunderstanding

Employeeship/
Decision
leadership/
makingmanagement

Accountability

How could a high What is the right How might thedegree ofbalance between factual
freedom
informal andaccountability be
influence
formal decision
made moreleadership formaking in relation explicit to ensure
safety?
to safety matters? safety?
What role does a How canleader play incomplacency in
avoiding
decision making
complacency?
influence safety?
An employee?
How can it be
How can one
avoided?
counteract
complacency?

What does itmean to takeresponsibility forcomplacency?

How canWhat safety
In what way
managers ensure implications can could sharingthat the team has the aim for shared understanding
the same
understanding
contribute toassumptions
have on decision accountability?
about safety
making?
matters?

Feedback/
follow-up

Learning

How can freedom
What is the
motivate people
relation between to learn andprovision of
improve safety?
feedback and asound level of
freedom?
How does one
What mindset is maximise andappropriate when integrate learning
receiving critical from external
feedback?
feedback?

What are the
How can shared learning
understanding
possibilities ofimpact feedback? sharedunderstanding asa driver for safety
culture?

What questions
can reveal if you
have or do nothave a sharedunderstanding?

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 201845

CONCLUSIONS

Conclusions

Conducting the Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum (CSSCF) in Sweden
proved to be a valuable effort appreciated by the participants. The decision tochoose Sweden as a partner for developing the methodology and as a pioneer
for the first CSSCF was well-founded. The curiosity, commitment, openness andflexibility of Swedish participants were notable from the beginning to the end.
Teams from the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), the Swedish
Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
collaborated to develop and implement the CSSCF. Participants in the snapshot
study and in the forum were highly engaged and active contributors to theprocess.
Participant appraisals show that the concept worked beyond expectations.
In addition to the topic itself, the role play and the ability to talk freely aboutcommon challenges across organisational boundaries were especiallyappreciated. The conversations were characterised by a high degree of
openness, and opinions were expressed without reservation or self-censorship.
Both national aspects that are perceived as positive and those that areperceived as having a less positive impact on nuclear safety were discussed
without constraint.
Judging from the results from the conversations in the snapshot study andin the forum, the CSSCF contributed to greater insight into how national
attributes may be reflected in organisational behaviour, which can in turn
favour or counteract a sound safety culture. Some national attributes, such assamskap, allskap, freedom, common understanding and trust, may reinforce asound safety culture. The difficult question remains of what successful
leadership looks like in the Swedish context. What could be modified to further
enhance safety culture while ensuring that the positive aspects of the national
attributes are taken into account and not lost in the quest for continuous
improvement?
In the latest research on safety culture, human, technology andorganisation approaches, dialogue, openness, trust, common understanding
and collaboration are put forth as being more successful than traditional, rulesbased leadership (command and control). Research also shows that the sociotechnical system is so complex that collaboration, good relations, trust,
openness and the desire for common understanding are decisive in preventing
risks. This is also true in crisis situations, when issues in an existing culture
may be reinforced. For example, if communication and collaboration are
already weak, there is a greater risk that things will go poorly.

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 201847

CONCLUSIONS

A learning organisation that strives to continuously improve safe
operations regularly reflects on its organisational behaviours and theirunderlying core values and deeply rooted assumptions. The hope is that thisfirst CSSCF is only the beginning of a process that will continue in Sweden andthat will also arouse the interest of other member countries, ultimately
inspiring them to start their own journey into better understanding theirnational context and its relation to safety culture.

48

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

REFERENCES

References

Barton, H.A. (1996), A Folk Divided: Homeland Swedes and Swedish Americans,
1840-1940, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville.
Eurofound(1976),
Co-determination
Act,
www.eurofound.europa.eu/
efemiredictionaryco-determination-act (Accessed on 3 June 2018).
Eurostat (2018), Population density – persons per km2, http://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/populationdata/main-tables (Accessed on 3 June 2018).
Eurostat,(2015),
Deathsandlife
expectancy
data:
Main
tables,http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migrationprojections/deaths-life-expectancy-data/main-tables (Accessed on 7 June 2018).
Holtenius, J., & Gillman, A. (2014). The Spanish flu in Uppsala, clinical andepidemiological impact of the influenza pandemic 1918–1919 on a Swedish
county. Infection Ecology & Epidemiology, 4, 10.3402/iee.v4.21528.
http://doi.org/10.3402/iee.v4.21528.
IAEA (2018), Country Nuclear Power Profiles: Sweden, https://cnpp.iaea.org/
countryprofiles/Sweden/Sweden.htm (Accessed on 3 June 2018).
IAEA (2006), Application of the Management System for Facilities and Activities
General Safety Requirements, Safety Standards Series, No. GS-G-3.1, IAEA,
Vienna.
Jonter, T. (2016), The Key to Nuclear Restraint: The Swedish Plans to Acquire
Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War, Palgrave Macmillan, London.
Ministry of the Environment (2017), Sweden’s seventh national report under theConvention on Nuclear Safety: Swedish implementation of the obligations of
the Convention Ds 2013:56, Ministry of the Environment, Sweden 14 October
2013, www.government.se/legal-documents/2013/10/ds-201356/ (Accessed 17
July 2018).
Ministry of the Environment (2013), Sweden’s sixth national report under theConvention on Nuclear Safety: Swedish implementation of the obligations of
the Convention Ds 2013:56, Ministry of the Environment, Sweden 14 October
2013, www.government.se/legal-documents/2013/10/ds-201356/ (Accessed 17
July 2018).
NEA (2016), The Safety Culture of an Effective Nuclear Regulatory Body, OECD,
Paris.
OECD (2007) OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 2007, OECD Publishing, Paris,
https://doi.org/10.1787/19990448.

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 201849

REFERENCES

Ouchi, W.G. (1981), Theory Z: How American Business Can Meet the Japanese
Challenge, Avon Books, New York.
Ortiz-Ospina, E. and Roser M. (2017) Trust, https://ourworldindata.org/trust(Accessed on 5 June 2018).
Quigley, J.M., "An Economic Model of Swedish Emigration" The Quarterly Journalof Economics, Vol. 86, No.1 (Feb 1972), pp 111-126.
Riksdag (2018), The history of the Riksdag, www.riksdagen.se/en/how-the-riksdagworks/democracy/the-history-of-the-riksdag (Accessed on3 June 2018).
Runblom, H. & Norman, H. (Eds), (1976), From Sweden to America: A History of
the Migration. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press and University of
Uppsala.
Schein, E.H. (2010), Organizational
San Francisco.

Cultureand

Leadership, Jossey-Bass,

Schön, L. (2012), An economic history of modern Sweden, Routledge, New York.
SKi (2007), Safety and Radiation Protection at Swedish Nuclear Power Plants 2006,
SKI Rapport SSI 2007:31.
SSM (2018), About us, www.stralsakerhetsmyndigheten.se/en/about-the-authority/(Accessed on 18 July 2018).
SSM (2009) Evaluating safety-critical organizations – emphasis on the nuclear
industry, SSM 2009:12, www.stralsakerhetsmyndigheten.se/en/publications/
reports/safety-at-nuclear-power-plants/2009/200912/ (Accessed on 18 July2018).
SwedishEnergyAgency(2017),
Energyin
Sweden2017,https://energimyndigheten.aw2m.se/FolderContents.mvc/Download?ResourceI
d=5733 (Accessed on 18 July 2018).
Sweden.se (2018), A History of Sweden, https://sweden.se/society/history-of-sweden/ (Accessed on 18 July 2018).
Sweden.se (2018a), Driving change through innovation, – https://sweden.se/society/history-of-sweden/ (Accessed on 18 July 2018).
United Nations Data (2018) Per capita GDP at current prices – US dollars,
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=sweden (Accessed on 18 July 2018).
WANO (2018), Nuclear Power in Sweden, www.world-nuclear.org/informationlibrary/country-profiles/countries-o-s/sweden.aspx (Accessed on 3 June 2018).
WANO (2013), “Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture”, WANO Principles,
PL 2013-1.
World Bank (2018), World Development Indicators database, http://databank.
worldbank.org/data/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=Country
Profile&Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=SWE (Accessed on
5 June 2018).

50

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

REFERENCES

World Economic Forum (2017), The Global Gender Gap Report 2017,www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-gender-gap-report-2017 (Accessed on
18 July 2018).
Note: The data for Figure 3 can be retrieved from http://appsso.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_pw03&lang=en and Statistics New Zealand,customised report and licensed by Statistics New Zealand for re-use under the Creative
Commons Attribution 3.0 New Zealand licence (received on 20 April 2017).

THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM: SWEDEN, NEA No. 7420, © OECD 2018

51

NEA PUBLICATIONS AND INFORMATION

The full catalogue of publications is available online at www.oecd-nea.org/pub.
In addition to basic information on the Agency and its work programme, the NEA
website offers free downloads of hundreds of technical and policy-oriented reports.
The professional journal of the Agency, NEA News – featuring articles on the latest
nuclear energy issues – is available online at www.oecd-nea.org/nea-news.
An NEA monthly electronic bulletin is also distributed free of charge to subscribers,
providing updates of new results, events and publications. Sign up at www.oecdnea.org/bulletin.
Visit us on Facebook at www.facebook.com/OECDNuclearEnergyAgency or follow us
on Twitter @OECD_NEA.

OECD/NEA PUBLISHING, 2 rue André-Pascal, 75775 PARIS CEDEX 16

Country-Specific
Safety Culture Forum
SwedenOne of the many important lessons learnt about nuclear safety over the years has been thathuman aspects of nuclear safety are as important as any technical issue that may arise in
the course of nuclear operations. The international nuclear community can work together to
identify and address issues associated with components and systems and compare operational
experiences, but identifying how human behaviour affects safety and the best approaches to
examine this behaviour from country to country remains less common.
Practical experience has nevertheless shown that there are important differences in how people
work together and communicate across borders. People’s behaviours, attitudes and values
do not stop at the gate of a nuclear installation, and awareness of the systemic nature ofculture and its deeper aspects, such as the dynamics of how values and assumptions influence
behaviours, continues to evolve.
The NEA safety culture forum was created to gain a better understanding of how the national
context affects safety culture in a given country and how operators and regulators perceive
these effects in their day-to-day activities. The ultimate goal is to ensure safe nuclear operations.
The first NEA safety culture forum – a collaborative effort between the Nuclear Energy Agency(NEA), the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and the Swedish Radiation Safety
Authority (SSM) – was held in Sweden in early 2018. This report outlines the process used to
conduct the forum, reveals findings from the discussions and invites the nuclear community tofurther reflect and take action.

Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
46, quai Alphonse Le Gallo
92100 Boulogne-Billancourt, France
Tel.: +33 (0)1 45 24 10 15
nea@oecd-nea.org www.oecd-nea.org

NEA No. 7420