ISSN0286-312X

専修大学社会科学研究所月報

No. 609
2014. 3. 20

ASEAN and its Regional Integrationfrom the Perspective of “Regionness”
Takeko IINUMA目

次

Abstract ··································································· 1

1. Introduction ····························································· 1

2. Troubled definitions of “region” ············································ 3

3. Between “regional integration” and other regional activities ·················· 6

4. “Regionness” and free trade in ASEAN ····································· 9

5. “Regionness” and the enlargement of ASEAN ······························· 13

6. Conclusions ······························································ 16

編集後記 ··································································· 21doi.org/10.34360/00009382

ASEAN and its Regional Integrationfrom the Perspective of “Regionness”
Takeko IINUMA
Abstract
Despite the increasing number of regional arrangements anddynamics, the concepts of “region” and of “regional integration”
have been equivocally defined.
definitionsof“region”

andThis essay aims to revisit“regional

integration”

inacross-disciplinary manner by exploring an analysis based on theconcept of “regionness.”

Drawing on the case of regional

integration through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN), this study further attempts to clarify its characteristics
with regard to “regionness” and points out relations between theeconomic driving force and regional integration, in order todelineate how certain regional dynamics, driven by economic
liberalization, are paving the way to become a “region.”
1.

Introduction
Although regional integration is not particularly a new phenomenon, the recent

developments of regional arrangements especially in the economic domain have generated
renewed attention.

Whereas several integration arrangements can be traced back to wellbefore the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), regional
trade agreements (RTAs), which entered into force, have been proliferating in an
unprecedented manner since the early 1990s (Fiorentino, 2011:4, 6).

By January 2014,

the total number of RTAs in force grew to 377 (WTO Database). Regional integration
dynamics are often substantial part of globalization.

Some argue that the world economy

is increasingly a regionalized economy (Weiss, 1997: 22).

Given the large number ofactual trade arrangements based on regions, regional integration is becoming a more
concrete and pervasive manifestation of the world economy than globalization.

However,the process of region-making can take place in varied forms and under various names otherthan regional integration.

In spite of the growing interest in regional integration, what

“region” and “regional integration” virtually mean and how they work remain questionable.
The aim of this essay is to clarify the meanings of “region” and “regional integration”
by exploring the epistemology of “region” and the process of region-making that leads toregional integration.

The analyses will be made based on the concept of “regionness,”which can serve for understanding the “consolidation and construction of regions,” and it－ 1 －can range from the regional space, regional complex, regional society, regional community
to region-state (Hettne and Shöderbaum, 2002: 34).

This study draws on the case ofregional integration in Southeast Asia, namely the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN). 1

Southeast Asia’s developments provide us with a salient case of

epistemological challenges of regional integration as it is considered as one of the “mostadvanced” projects of regional integration in the developing world, or South-South
integration, while it is one of the most diverse areas of the world in terms of society, culture,ethnicity, language, history, politics and economy without inherently binding basis as aregion.
The majority of scholarly work on regional integration has been based on the empiricalobservations of the European Union (EU). Derived from the experiences of the EU, somestudies have presented policy and management suggestions in other areas of the world.
Meanwhile, there have been increasing activities related to regional integration in the
non-European world, where the lessons learned from the European case are being tested.
The emphasis on the EU experience in the studies of regional integration also raises an
epistemological issue. A phenomenon identified in the EU context might appear in otherregions under integration, but is it conceived in the same manner as in the EU?
“regionness” mean the same thing across different regions?
and the private sector perceive a region in making?

Does

How do people, policy makers

What are the consequences of it in

actual designing of regional policies and programs?
Apart from the regionally skewed tendency of regional integration studies, there is amethodological issue.

To what degree, can we build our arguments on functionalist

analyses, which prevail in the studies of regional integration and assume rational
perfection in the decision making of leaders and organizations? One task is to look into
what methodological lenses enable us to see (or prevent us from seeing) what dynamics areat work.

This study explores interdisciplinary analyses, encompassing political economy,

international relations, economic studies as well as area studies of Southeast Asia.

In thecase of Southeast Asia, which is an area of multiplicity, how are they making a region thatis equally conceivable by the participating members?

What constitutes a unity or any

basis for a region in ASEAN at the conceptual and functional levels? What elements does
ASEAN expect to be coherent to construct a region? Another way to put it is to look into
the opposite, -- what does ASEAN consider disuniting and therefore problematic?
In an effort to understand what “region” is, this essay re-examines interdisciplinary
discussions and their space creation of a “region” and of “regional integration” in Southeast
Asia. It will first discuss the definitions of “region” along the concept of “region” and seek
its meanings in the context of Southeast Asia.

Second, it will examine what elements

1
Its member states, as of January 2014, are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. This paper employs
commonly used names of the member countries.

－ 2 －constitute “regional integration” in juxtaposition to other forms of regional activities, aswell as what have been considered as drivers for “regional integration” in Southeast Asia.
The third section will review the emergence of “regional integration” through ASEAN and
explore how the move toward trade liberalization requires to construct a “region.”
Similarly, the fourth section will examine how ASEAN’s membership enlargement serves toconstruct a “region” and deals with the societal and other issues beside the economic goals.
The final section will integrate these analyses to indicate the characteristics of “regionness”
and region-making of ASEAN.
2.

Troubled definitions of “region”
This section examines definitions of “region” and discusses them in the context ofSoutheast Asia.

The lexicology of the term “region” points primarily to certain spatial unit

with homogeneity -- geographical, faunal, or vegetational.

Definitions of “region” in the

non-human spheres appear fairly defined as seen in specific measurable characteristics,
such as an area with a characteristic fauna and an area characterized by the prevalence of
certain vegetational climax types.2

Our concern here is “region” in the human world,

where homogeneity is a misleading concept. The meanings of “region” indicate a wide
range of spatial perceptions, from “an administrative area, division, or district,”3 which is abureaucratic space demarcation, to “an area of the world made up of neighboring countries
that, from an international point of view, are considered socially, economically, or politicallyinterdependent.”4

While the former deals with a spatial range of a region, the latter deals

with its inherent features.

With regard to the spatial range, any region that is

administratively recognized is defined by a boundary.
to the boundaries of the states within that region.5

Regional boundaries are identical

As seen in the territories of state, city,

town and village around the world, the spatial demarcation often involves disputes andtremendous political confrontations.

The “region” we consider in “regional integration” isbuilt comfortably on the state boundaries.

2
3
4

As many studies have demonstrated the

Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield, M.A.: Merriam-Webser, 1988).
Ibid.
Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). It also indicates a domestic sphere, asa “relatively large subdivision of a country for economic, administrative, or cultural purposes thatfrequently implies an alternative system to centralized organization.” Furthermore, the origin of the
English term “region” was associated with regĕre “to rule,” and therefore, lexicologically speaking,whether domestic or international is not much of importance. Instead, to rule or to administer is themain connotation of the term.
5
In discussing “region,” we face with two types of regions: one that is broader than a state, in otherwords, a supra-state region, and the other within a state, or an intra-state region. There can be also a
region encompassing part of the territories of plural states. This essay focusses on the supra-stateregion in order to discuss the regional integration process of ASEAN. This does not mean that
intra-state regions have no relevance in regional integration. Plural intra-state regions can form a
supra-state region within the context of particular projects of regional integration, as seen in the casesof Singapore-Johor-Riau Growth Triangle and of Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle.

－ 3 －arbitrariness of state boundaries, the boundaries of regions are not free from questions on
their viability and legitimacy.

As for the inherent features of a region, if interdependency

is a prerequisite for a “region,” how to define and measure the level of interdependency is
an important yet difficult task. Cantori and Spiegel (1970: i) consider the regions to beareas of the world which contain geographically proximate states forming, in foreign affairs,
mutually interrelated units.

Mutual interrelatedness is even less specific thaninterdependency to discern and measure how it actually constitutes a “region.”
Given the wide and opaque range of meanings of “region,” the concept of “regionness” ishelpful in furthering the arguments. According to Hettne and Shöderbaum (2002: 38),
“regions” are “political and social projects, devised by human actors in order to protect ortransform existing structures,” which implies their intrinsic indefiniteness, and“regionness” is “the process whereby a geographical area is transformed from a passive
object to an active subject, capable of articulating the transnational interests of theemerging region.”

Thus, “regionness” speaks to the degree to which certain space isconsidered as a distinct entity.
By questioning how “regionness” emerged in Southeast Asia, the following part
reviews the multiplicity of “region” in concrete terms, especially with regard to its variablespatial range and its inherent features.

Although the constituent countries of Southeast

Asia are very clear, the sense of “region” and the definition of the “region” of Southeast Asia
are by no means self-explanatory. Southeast Asia as a spatial unit is a category created in
the process of world political history in the twentieth century.

During World War II, theAllies established in 1943 for strategic purposes an operational unit, the South East Asia
Command (SEAC), which forged this geographical unit as an entity for the first time.
While “South East Asia” is a name based on a view from Europe, other ways of conceiving
this area also reflected either hegemonic or colonial views: “Southern Seas” (“Nanyang” andNanyo”), viewed from China and Japan, and “Further India,” or the “Indies,” viewed from
Europe.

These names indicate that this area was not considered as an independent

geographical unit but rather as an area identified in relation to the ocean area or India.
After World War II, this geographical categorization of Southeast Asia diffused as a main
unit of spatial perception for this part of the world.
Even though the spatial demarcation per se of Southeast Asia seems to be
non-disputable, there are many signs of its ambiguity in practice. In the early years,
ASEAN rejected the membership applications from Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka, andthe rejection of Papua New Guinea was due to Indonesia’s objection, and that of Sri Lanka
was because “it was deemed to be beyond Southeast Asia’s geographic confines” (Ortuoste,
2011: 6). Regional identification is a result of international political relations rather thana geographically clear-cut classification.

Being within the obvious geographic range ofSoutheast Asia does not mean automatic accession to ASEAN either. Consensus from all
ASEAN member states is necessary to allow accession of a new member, which means the－ 4 －decision is heavily influenced by each member’s domestic political concerns, as seen inTimor-Leste’s difficulty in joining ASEAN (Ibid.: 16).
The region’s further ambiguity in practice is visible in the fact that Southeast Asia issometimes considered as part of East Asia. 6

Discussions on East Asian integration

usually include Southeast Asia, and ASEAN-related schemes are the most integrated
achievements (Huang and Zhang, 2011).

In trying to depict Asian regionalism, ADB

selected 16 economies that appeared to represent integrating Asia based on the regional
economic ties.

They were the 10 ASEAN economies and China, Hong Kong, India, Japan,

Korea and Taiwan, and ADB admits that this grouping is somewhat arbitrary because it
could have extended to West Asia, all of South Asia, Central Asia, as well as the Pacific(ADB, 2008: 24). If we build on a definition related to administration, “region” as anadministrative unit may appear well-delineated and, therefore, could be useful as a generalframework. Yet, an administrative demarcation is not an overarching definition or spatial
unit either. For the United Nations, albeit its major administrative role on a world scale,“regions” are directly related to its organizational and administrative structure rather thana holistic demarcation, and Southeast Asia is considered as a “subregion” rather than a“region.” 7These examples show Southeast Asia’s on-going elusive characteristics

influenced by varied international political interest as well as multiple administrative
perceptions.
Historical studies of Southeast Asia portrayed certain commonalties in history, society,culture and religion in this area.

Wolters’ classic study of pre-modern history of Southeast

Asia pointed to the mandala as a common thread of political dynamics characterized by avaguely definable geographical area without fixed boundaries, in which smaller centerstended to look in all directions for security (Wolters, 1999: 27-28). Having commonalties
and being aware of them are separate matters. Despite the similar modes of mandalabehavior, the existence of the local cultures prevented a “region-wide awareness of acommon ‘Indian’ heritage” (Ibid.: 56).

Steinberg’s edited volume, In Search of Southeast

Asia: A Modern History (1971), also looked for common themes in Southeast Asia’s modern
history.

Beside pointing out certain ecological commonalities that lead to a similarity offlora, fauna, climate and human cultivation, this volume employs the term “Southeast
Asians” to illustrate their shared experience and historical trajectories in the pre-colonial,

6
Due to the continuously blurring use of regions in Asia, all or part of Southeast Asia has been at times included in
East Asia. A 1993 World Bank report examined four of the Southeast Asian economies as cases of“economic miracles” of East Asia. For its purpose of tracing the paths of fast growth and development,
it was logical for the World Bank to categorize Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand as part of
East Asia (World Bank, 1993). More commonly, though, studies of East Asia included all of Southeast
Asia.
7
Its five regional commissions in Europe, Latin America, Africa, Western Asia, and Asia and thePacific, represent regions, and the United Nations administrate them separately. All internationalorganizations follow this classification, and thus Southeast Asia is categorized as a “subregion” underthe “region” of Asia and the Pacific.

－ 5 －colonial, and post-colonial periods.

There are solid cross-cutting issues and themes acrossthe experiences of these societies over these periods such as traditional kingdoms,
colonialism, nationalism and nation construction.

Yet, these are only thematically related

without actual sharing of the same experience, and observations that Southeast Asia fallshort of a “region” are recurrent (Tarling, 2006: 35) as this area has no inherent
homogeneity in terms of language, religion, ethnicity, and a wide variety of pre-colonial
kingdoms flourished, and different colonial powers ruled in different manners.

Without

pre-existing “regionness,” this area has much space for the new “regionness” to maneuver.
One would see easily a parallel between region and nation-state building through the workof Ben Anderson regarding nationalism and nation-state construction because “Southeast
Asia’s claim to be a region was largely self-constructed and self-promoted” through theprocess of “imagining the region” (Acharya, 1999).

According to Acharya (2012),

Southeast Asia is “a region in making,” and this largely owes to “a significant andself-conscious effort at regional identity-building,” especially since the formation of ASEAN
in 1967. If a “region” is being made and strengthened without significant commonalties orwithout awareness of such commonalties, we shall look into what becomes an engine, otherthan the mere geographical proximity, of regional integration.
3.

Between “regional integration” and other regional activities
Given the problematic definitions of “region,” how can we understand “regional

integration”?

Studies of regional integration started in the mid-1950s drawing on the caseof the European Community. As a leading scholar of studies of the European integration
and a strong advocate of it, Haas (1970: 610) warned that for evaluative clarity the study ofregional integration should exclude from the discussion “overlapping and cognate
activities,” such as “regionalism, regional cooperation, regional organization, regional
movements, regional systems, or regional subsystems of a global system.” Despite his
methodological suggestion, many studies since then have dealt with a variety of regional
activities as components of, if not identical to, regional integration. In fact, the differences
between “regional integration” and all other regional dynamics and activities are not clear.
In using the terms “overlapping and cognate activities,” one may think that there is“genuine” regional integration.

Even if there is any, “overlapping and cognate activities”

might be simply “on the way to fully-fledged” regional integration or might be completely ofa different nature from “genuine” regional integration.

It is, hence, not as easy as Haas

hoped in theory to discuss regional integration exclusively as it might not be possible tocompletely distinguish those “overlapping and cognate activities” from “non-overlappingand specific” regional integration.
It is, on the contrary, instrumental to consider similar terms and concepts in order toclarify the meanings of “regional integration.” “Regionalization” and “regionalism” both
－ 6 －imply dynamics of a “region” in making, but their specific meanings ought to be
distinguished from one another. One distinction can be made by de facto and de jure
“Regionalization,” or de facto aspects, represents “actual mechanisms deployedaspects.

and decisions made by private agents in their integration and interdependency,” while“regionalism,” or de jure aspects, represents the “way public bodies and public policy
actively promote integration and interdependency between countries” (Hirst, Thompson,and Bromley, 2009: 159). In a similar vein, “regionalization” is a type of a process while“regionalism” is usually a state-led project (Breslin, et al., 2004: 16), and more specifically,“regionalization” can be seen as a bottom-up process of cross-border cooperation driven by
non-governmental actors, and “regionalism” can be seen as a top-down process ofgovernment-to-government formation of institutions (Pempel, 2005: 6).

Even “region” perse can be considered as a discursive tool used to refer to “governance units that are notstates but have some statehood properties” (Langenhove, 2013).
Then, how can we define “regional integration” in a manner applicable to Southeast
Asia?

Southeast Asia’s region-making through ASEAN fits de jure aspects, state-led

projects and government-to-government formation of institutions as the government bodies
have taken most of the initiatives in promoting the integrative projects under ASEAN
while private agents have usually been absent in this process.

“Regionalism” as astate-led process is shaping the region-making of ASEAN, and “regionalization” might
follow as a result of the implementation of regional integration schemes.

For Langenhove(2011, 48), “regional integration” indicates a process of complex social transformations“with or without” some kind of permanent institutional structure or mutual cooperation.
ASEAN’s integration is impossible without institutional structure or cooperation.

The

state-led aspect of “regional integration” automatically means institutionalization andstrengthened diplomatic relations.
Ginsberg (2010: 12) broadly defines “regional integration” as “a process by whichhighly interdependent, like-minded states in a region, which have a degree of economic andpolitical complementarity, engage in intensive and binding cooperation in selective areas ofcommon interest.” This definition, obviously presupposing the European integration, hasa great difficulty in applying to the case of Southeast Asia. Only a few of the member
states

of

ASEAN

are

highlyinterdependent,

andhardlyany

like-minded.

“Interdependency” is a problematic definition of “region” as discussed earlier and remains
equally problematic for the definition of “regional integration.”

Even if we delimit

interdependency in terms of trade and investment, those who are interdependent arebasically the less developed economies such as those of Laos and Myanmar in relation to
Thailand.

ASEAN’s overall intra-regional economic activities have traditionally shown arelatively low level of interdependency. 8

The economies in ASEAN have been more

8
The ratio of its intra-regional trade in general is between 22-27% in 2011-2012 (ASEAN Merchandise
Trade Statistics Database), and, although the ratio of the intra-regional investment is growing, ASEAN’s－ 7 －strongly connected with the economies of the industrialized countries in East Asia, Europe,and North America.

There is a discrepancy between a seeming definition of “regional

integration” and the actual state of “regional integration.”
From international relations’ perspectives, Yoshimatsu (2008: 7) also chooses to define
regional integration loosely, but points to the characteristics of state behaviors in it, as“voluntary collective actions among states to resolve common regional problems that havethe possibility of affecting the states’ sovereignty.”

Among various theories ofinternational relations, realism and constructivism are particularly of relevance inanalyzing regional affairs as the former highlights the behaviors of the state and the latter
looks into the process.

The earlier discussions on “regionalization” and “regionalism”

pointed out that the on-going regional integration is led by the states. In this sense, therealist logic still serves to a great degree as it maintains much importance in explaining
how states lead the evolutions in a given region.9

Realists’ assumption goes further thatthe state makes rational decisions as it “calculates positive and negative effects of
intra-regional and extra-regional forces on its interests by engaging in cost-benefit analysis”(Yoshimatsu, 2008: 9). It is, though, unlikely that the member states of ASEAN rely on
straightforward cost-benefit analyses to make decisions because rational decisions made at
the state level do not necessarily sum up as a collective rational decision.

With regard to

the decision making process, the constructivist perspectives may explain better a process of
integration as they stress the importance of “transformative or generative processes” suchas socialization or internationalization through which actors -- in this case the member
states -- construct their interests and identities or accept collective norms for the
emergenceanddevelopmentofregional

integration(Yoshimatsu,

2008,

15).

Constructivists’ assertion that collective identity or regional awareness is sociallyconstructed among the states and that norms effectively mediate this socialization processfacilitates the understanding of the dynamics of ASEAN, which launched the process ofregional integration despite the absence of common characteristics and of commonly shared
identity or awareness.
The main actors of regional integration through ASEAN are the member states andtheir policy makers, and they are engaged in the process of creating regional identity,
awareness and norms. What is peculiar here is that actual “regionalisms” around theworld, including ASEAN, demonstrate objectives and reasons of governments through theutilization of market forces.

The whole process of creating regional identity, awarenessand norms is taking place in a context of economic globalization and increasing competition.
share of the total FDI in the region remains 23% in 2011 (ASEAN Foreign Direct Investment Statistics
Database).
9
He points out that the state primarily pursues self-interest and that the realist reasoning for thestate to promote regional unity is to secure the convergence of national interests through theharmonization of rules and policies and the moderation of distributional conflict (Yoshimatsu, 2008,9-10).

－ 8 －In this respect, we need to add an economic notion to the definitional discussions ofregional integration.

The states engaged in regional integration have a desire to maintainsovereignty “by pooling it with others in areas of economic management where mostnation-states are too small to act alone” (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 8).
These discussions reveal the state-centered characteristics of “regionalism” in thecontext of the increasingly competitive global economy.

In spite of its call for freer

economic factor movements, currently growing “regionalisms” paradoxically are set toserve sovereignty of the states.

While the centrality of the free market principles in theinitiatives of regional integration is fairly distinctive, it is important to look into how suchan economic drive configures a spatial unit as a region.

The next section depicts how

ASEAN embarked on a new emphasis of free trade and why the framework of a “region”
was considered necessary to achieve the goal.
4.

“Regionness” and free trade in ASEAN
ASEAN’s characteristics transformed enormously in its history over four decades.

Having started as a loosely connected diplomatic alliance, ASEAN came to be fully engagedin economic relations to promote economic liberalization as a region.

In the course of

setting free trade as its main focus, ASEAN strengthened the aspect of regional integration,in other words, engaging in the formation of “regionness.”
ASEAN came into being with a minimum institutional structure when the original
founding states, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, adopted
the ASEAN Declaration, the so-called Bangkok Declaration, in 1967. At the beginning,
ASEAN’s major concern was to ensure peace and security in Southeast Asia. In 1976,
ASEAN reached an agreement on the “Declaration of ASEAN Concord” and the “Treaty ofAmity and Cooperation (TAC),” which expressed political and security-related concerns of
the member states as they were, with the exception of Thailand, still relatively new statesthat achieved independence from the colonial rules. The principles of the TAC called for“independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of allnations,” “the right of every State to lead its national existence free from externalinterference, subversion or coercion,” and “non-interference in the internal affairs of one
another,” the last point being a distinctive norm of ASEAN.
involvement in economic agenda was scarce.

Until the 1980s, its

As Wong (1988, 327) points out,

intra-ASEAN economic cooperation in the 1980s was at the “low-level equilibrium.”
The 1990s marked a new era for the “region” of Southeast Asia as it started
demonstrating completely different manifestations from those in the previous period.

The

end of the Cold War in 1991 greatly affected the activities and the membership of ASEAN.
After the Cold War, ASEAN changed its norms and emphases from a politically-oriented
coalition to an association with a strong economic imperative.
－ 9 －The four countries incontinental Southeast Asia, three of which were formerly part of the communist bloc, joined
ASEAN: Vietnam in 1995, Laos in 1997, Myanmar in 1997, and finally Cambodia in 1999.
By this transformation, ASEAN came to cover fully the whole geographical area ofSoutheast Asia.10
ASEAN’s move toward trade liberalization was especially fast. In 1992, it became thefirst regional group in Asia to agree on the establishment of a free trade area, the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA). AFTA originally targeted for tariff reduction among ASEAN6 to
be carried out by 2008, but this process was brought to completion by 2003. The newer
member states, namely Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV), are expected tocomplete the same process of tariff reduction by 2015.
Furthermore, ASEAN signed the ASEAN Charter in 2007 to support and to accelerate
the process of building the ASEAN Community. The Charter entered into force in 2008
and stipulates the goal of economic integration by the creation of the ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC) with a single market and production base by 2015. In 2008, ASEAN
adopted AEC Blueprint, according to which AEC has four characteristics: 1) a single
market and production base, 2) a highly competitive economic region, 3) equitable economic
development across countries, and 4) full integration into the global economy.

AEC

encompasses not only the aspect of trade and investment liberalization, but also the social
aspect of equity (ASEAN, 2007). ASEAN agreed in 2009 on the ASEAN Trade in Goods
Agreement (ATIGA), and it entered into force in 2010 to reinforce comprehensively all the
initiatives for tariff reduction.

Bolstered by these newly established agreements andschemes, ASEAN seeks to realize free flows of goods, services, capital and skilled labor.

Inthe earlier years, ASEAN used to be known for its distinctive communication forcooperation by informal understandings without legal binding rules, so-called “ASAN Way.”In the new era, ASEAN’s economic activities are clearer and more active than ever, which
requires greater degree of regional governance.

Its cooperation is also becoming morerule-based and more formally institutionalized as seen in the increase in the secretariat
power (ADB, 2011: 122).
There are certainly numerous economic justifications for greater economic integration.
It is widely accepted that regional economic arrangements develop through hierarchicalcategories according to the definitions presented by Balassa (1961: 2) with incremental
steps toward greater integration.11

There are also reasons that commonly derive from

Timor-Leste became independent in 2002 and has been requesting the accession to ASEAN
membership.
11
Balassa enumerated five levels of regional integration. The first level is a free trade area,
wherein intra-regional tariffs and non-tariff barriers are removed for the free movement of goods andservices within the region. The second level is a customs union, which keeps common external tariffs
as well as a common set of policies toward imports from countries outside the region. The third levelis a common market, which includes a customs union and allows for free movement of labor and capital
within the region. The fourth level is an economic union and includes a common market and acommon currency and/or the harmonization of monetary, fiscal and social policies. Finally, the fifth10－ 10 －

concerns about economic management in the international milieu.

These justifications

include: to access major markets in the world, to increase the scale of economy by creatinglarger and competitive regional markets, to lower transaction costs, to attract foreign
investment, which eventually leads to technology transfer.
discussed in the context of poverty reduction as well.

Trade liberalization is

Econometric analyses of ASEAN

economies show evidence that FDI inflows are associated with an economic growth andthat FDI in the region can be poverty reducing more strongly than elsewhere (Jalilian andWeiss, 2002).

Also, there are forces of globalization that pressures firms and countries toseek efficiency, and stabilization of the neighboring countries’ economies can be an
important concern (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 6-8).
While most of these justifications seem to call for a regional framework, a question
remains with regard to the need to take the form of a “region” in order to promote economic
liberalization.

There are mainly two reasons in which economic integration does not haveto take the form of a region.

First, before the acceleration of regional economic integration,

there were systems of mutual assistance between the industrialized economies anddeveloping economies.

By the initiative of United Nations Conference on Trade andDevelopment (UNCTAD), the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was established in
1968, with preferences given to all developing countries. Similarly, developing economies
were granted with protective trade measures through the Most Favored Nation (MFN)
status.

For instance, the garment sector in the least developed countries in Southeast

Asia benefited from the GSP and the MFN despite the fact that the market for garment
relies on such special measures and the market in the industrialized countries. In theleast developed countries, these bilateral non-reciprocal measures contributed to attracting
FDI and to increasing foreign currency earning, but developments of reciprocal agreements
in regional economic integration can erode the privileges developing countries have hadthrough these measures.

Besides, North-South and South-South RTAs represent

approximately 80 percent of the total number of agreements that have entered into force
since 1995 (Fiorentino, 2011: 8).

RTAs involving developing countries are the majorcluster, and especially a rapid increase in the number of North-South RTAs implies
forgoing non-reciprocal systems of preferences under schemes like the GSP in favor ofreciprocal trade regimes such as RTAs (Ibid.).
Second, it is instrumental to distinguish different characteristics of economic
integration, FTAs and RTAs. Proliferating trade agreements include ASEAN+3 (China,
Japan and Korea), ASEAN+6 (ASEAN+3 plus Australia, India and Taiwan), Japan andSingapore, Singapore and New Zealand, and Vietnam and the United States.

Besides,some dialogue groupings are coming into shape, such as ASEAN+8 (ASEAN+6 plus the U.S.
and Russia) and ASEAN+10 (ASEAN+8 plus the EU and Canada).

Several groupingslevel is an economic and political union with fully integrated economic policies and supra-national
institutions in full function.

－ 11 －

hold ASEAN as the core of the collaboration.
geographically coherent center.

Yet, others involve individual ASEAN members incollaboration with a distant economic partners.
such economic arrangements.

In this regard, ASEAN acts as aGeographical proximity is irrelevant in

Moreover, in Southeast Asia and a broader area of Asia andthe Pacific, most of the regional trade agreements recently negotiated are bilateral, whichis leading to the increasing overlapping of memberships, and intra-regional trade relations
are becoming more and more complex (Fiorentino, 2011: 16).
In addition, Schiff and Winters point out that “deep” cooperation may be limited toonly a few areas of little economic consequence and that it may even be welfare reducing for
one or more participating members if it involves the adoption of rules that are suboptimal
from a national perspective (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 151).12

ASEAN’s case presupposes“deep” cooperation principally in terms of tariff removal with much liberty allowed to thenational sphere. ASEAN’s integrative policies have been minimal outside of the effort toliberalize the flow of economic factors.

Economically driven regional integration of

ASEAN propels the idea of regional integration as a whole, but in reality the integrative
process is limited to the economic domain.
Free trade does not mean unleashed imperatives of the market as if it had its own will.
There are always deliberate measures to promote freer trade and they come from not only
states and the business sector but also international institutions.

In order to strengthen

the market-driven aspect in regional integration by ASEAN, international banks andorganizations have played important roles.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) expects

ASEAN to be the driver for regional integration, and its suggestions include building
stronger and more effective regional institutions to protect the economies of the region froma financial or economic crisis (Asian Development Bank, 2010: 20).
General assumptions regarding a “region” are associated with the notions ofinterdependency and relatedness. When applied to economic integration of a region in thecontext of economic liberalization, such definitions imply greater intra-regional trade.
However, the case of ASEAN’s integration aims at increasing extra-regional trade. As
mentioned earlier, despite general expectations that intra-regional trade would increase
with a greater level of integration, the intra-ASEAN trade share has been low. ASEAN is
fully aware and in fact conscious of this status because that is the exact reason for forming
a single production base. For ASEAN, the most important reason for regional integrationis the “formation of the region as a single production base for extra-ASEAN export”(ASEAN, 2013: 38).

Bowles (2002: 86) maintains that a central component of theneoliberal development strategy was the attraction of FDI to promote export-led growth

Schiff and Winters (2003: 151) refer to “deep integration” as agreements that aim at achievingsome measure of economic union and that create supra-national institutions for pursuing this goal
whereas the more general term “policy integration” is used for less far reaching cooperation on
domestic policies and regulations.

12－ 12 －

and that regional groupings of developing countries might attract such capital inflows.
This is a new type of development policy, which, before the rise of economic liberalization,used to be formulated at the national level and is now synchronized under the regionallyintegrated market. Its implications in theory are both in economic and political sphereswith increased trade and inflows of foreign capitals and a stable political rule.

The

ASEAN member states are particularly concerned about political stability and statesovereignty.

One may assume that multinational organizations “typically surrenderelements of their individual sovereignty in the collective quest for a broader and moredeeply institutionalized regional integration” (Pempel, 2005: 13). Nonetheless, the case of
ASEAN shows a type of regional integration that provides an arena where the state actors
to seek sustenance of their own sovereignty.
5.

“Regionness” and the enlargement of ASEAN
In contrast to the peculiar combination of free trade and “regionness,” ASEAN‘senlargement has had a direct influence on “regionness.” Bringing all the countries ofSoutheast Asia together was conceptually strong enough for ASEAN to embark on“regionness.”

Then, how did ASEAN’s enlargement serve its “regionness”?

Economic theories explain regional integration in various manners. Among them,
two schools of thought are of the opposite tenets: neo-classical and critical theories.

The

neo-classical perspectives presume that a free movement of goods, services and factors
would increase factor earnings and level out the economic conditions throughout the region
while critical perspectives emphasize disparities rather than trickle-down effect of
economic development in the region.

Evidently, the existing cases of regional integration

started off based on the market-driven aspiration.

The initiative for the prototypical formof the European regional integration, namely the EEC, materialized by signing the Treatyof Rome in 1957 derived from the belief that the formation of a common market andallowing the market function fully would assure economic development and would benefit
well-being of the people. A free-hand market mechanism may raise awareness at somepoint about the welfare aspect because it takes too long for a trickle-down effect to occur,
and a political need to intervene would arise, but studies show that, in the case of theEuropean integration, regional social policies to adjust the disparities moved up into themajor agenda only in the 1990s, almost four decades after the original initiation of the EEC(Hantrais, 1995; Jovanović, 1997: 297). The question here is how and when the concerns
about the adverse effect of the economic integration enter the organizational agenda ofregional integration.
Although ASEAN’s move toward regional integration was driven by the neo-classicalpremise, its actual schemes reflect mixed concerns over the social and political domains inaddition to the economic domain. Although it was in large part due to the Asian Financial－ 13 －

Crisis in 1997, ASEAN paid much attention, at least on the advocacy and policy level, tothe issues of inequality among the member states in its process of enlargement.
The Second Informal Summit of ASEAN adopted the “ASEAN Vision 2020” in 1997,
which addressed the ASEAN’s long-term objective “to become more competitive in the
global economy” and ASEAN’s commitment for “closer cohesion and economic integration,
narrowing the gap in the level of development among Member Countries, ensuring that themultilateral trading system remains fair and open, and achieving global competitiveness”(ASEAN, 1997). Despite the fact that its main ideas were agreed upon in 1996 at the First
Informal ASEAN Summit, the “ASEAN Vision 2020” responded to the Asian Financial
Crisis in 1997 and showed interest in building a type of community, as it projected “ashared vision of ASEAN as a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward looking, living inpeace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development
and in a community of caring societies” (ASEAN, 1997).
it implies certain directions of the community.

Although it is a vague statement,“Outward looking” indicates that ASEAN’s

regional grouping is for external connectivity. The last point, “a community of caring
societies,” was a new concept in ASEAN’s schemes and implied its rising concerns over thesocial dimension.

“ASEAN Vision 2020” included another section entitled and affirmed

the importance of tackling various economic and social problems by addressing “ACommunity of Caring Societies.” As the concrete plan for this long-term vision, “Hanoi
Plan of Action (1999-2004),” adopted in 1998, aimed to “implement initiatives to hasten
economic recovery and address the social impact of the global economic and financial crisis”(ASEAN, 1998).

The major preoccupation being on the influence of the financial andeconomic crisis, “Hanoi Plan of Action” held a full range of measures in financial andeconomic domains for greater economic integration but also called upon social andenvironmental protection, for the first time, with the attention paid to the social cost of thecrisis.13
To be one region was no longer sufficient for ASEAN to promote further integration,and the idea of building a community developed rapidly in the 2000s. The Ninth ASEAN
Summit in 2003 declared to establish the ASEAN Community by the “Declaration of
ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)” and indicated the burgeoning concepts of the threepillars of the ASEAN Community: the ASEAN Security Community, later renamed as theASEAN Political Security Community (APSC), AEC, and ASEAN Social and Cultural
Community (ASCC).

APSC is a continuation of the political and diplomatic concerns since

the time of ASEAN’s foundation. AEC is the central driving force of ASEAN’s regional
The main measures of action were to 1) strengthen macro-economic and financial cooperation, 2)enhance greater economic integration, 3) promote science and technology development and develop
information technology infrastructure, 4) promote social development and address the social impact of
the financial and economic crisis, 5) promote human resource development, 6) protect the environment
and promote sustainable development (ASEAN, 1998). The four other measures were related to theconventional concerns of peace and security.

13－ 14 －

integration.

ASCC builds partly on the concerns of the 1976 “Declaration of ASEAN

Concord” regarding “cooperation in social development aimed at raising the standard ofliving of disadvantaged groups and the rural population.”

The main focus of ASCC,

however, displays a new dimension in ASEAN’s agenda, that is, to “ensure the work force tobe prepared for and benefit from economic integration by investing more resources for basic
and higher education, training, science and technology development, job creation, andsocial protection.”

It also introduced cooperation in the areas of population growth,

unemployment, environmental degradation and trans-boundary pollution as well as
disaster management in the region.
For ASEAN, embracing new member states meant embracing a group of less developed
countries.

The enlargement of ASEAN directly raised the awareness on the intra-regional

gap, which could be disuniting and therefore problematic for regional integration.

ASEAN

addressed its concerns on inequality by launching the “Initiative for ASEAN Integration(IAI)” in 2000, specifically aiming to narrow the development gap between ASEAN6 and
CLMV.

However, the focus on the gap between ASEAN6 and CLMV was addressed sostrongly that the equality aspects and social concerns that were addressed in HPA did notcarry on. IAI drew all the attention to the issue of the gap between ASEAN6 and CLMV,
which as a result became the most pronounced issue.14
As the succeeding plan of the “Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA) (1999-2004),” ASEAN
agreed on the “Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) (2004-2009)” at the Tenth ASEAN
Summit in 2004. VAP affirms that, for the sake of the ASEAN Community building, it isof great importance to narrow the gap between ASEAN6 and CLMV and indicate measures
for that. Furthermore, the Twelfth ASEAN Summit in 2007 decided to accelerate theestablishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015, as stipulated in the “Cebu Declarationon the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015”. Thus, theestablishment of the ASEAN Community became its most compelling goal supported by thethree pillars.

Each pillar has its own Blueprint, and, together with “IAI Strategic

Framework” and “IAI Work Plan Phase II” (2009-2015), they form the “Roadmap for
ASEAN Community 2009-2015.”
Views on inequality in the newly formed region can serve as an indicator of what they
consider as a region and their definition of responsibility in regional governance.
According to “ASCC Blueprint,” under ASCC the people of ASEAN are: 1) to promote
human development, 2) to enhance social welfare and protection, 3) to promote social
justice and rights, 4) to ensure environmental sustainability, 5) to build on the ASEAN
identity, and 6) to take initiatives to narrow the development gap (ASEAN, 2009).

Its

plans also include co-operative activities that are “people-oriented, environmentally
14
There are also arguments regarding whether ASEAN’s gap convincingly divides it into two groupsof ASEAN6 and CLMV. Where to draw the line is debatable, and how many groupings emerge
depends on the way to measure an economic gap (Iinuma, 2012: 190-194).

－ 15 －

sustainable, and built on strong foundations of mutual understanding, trust and a sharedsense of responsibility.”

ASEAN’s advocacy shows beginning signs of concerns other thannon-economic domains such as social justice, environmental protection and cultural
diversity.

Whether ASEAN will open up progressive measures to take care of social issues

remains uncertain.
The newly created ASEAN Studies Centre and the Regional Economic Studies
Programme at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies organized a workshop “The ASEAN
Community: Unblocking the Roadblocks” in 2008.

Participating scholars andpractitioners from the ASEAN member countries identified the following four issues
regarding ASCC: 1) unlike AEC, ASCC lacks concrete drivers, as the stakeholders for
ASCC are far more diverse and complex; 2) while AEC Blueprint has specific targets andtimelines, it is difficult for ASCC Blueprint to follow the same format; 3) ASEAN member
countries may not have a common understanding of social issues, such as values, ethics
and social justice; 4) unlike the EU, ASEAN does not have the institutional capacity totranslate these social issues into legislation (Asian Studies Centre, 2008: 6-7). Although
the participants seem to problematize the difficult characteristics of ASCC, I would argue
that these issues derive from the characteristics of the “regionness” of ASEAN. Regarding
the issue 1), ASCC directly deals with the population of the ASEAN member states, and it
involves politically sensitive issues as most ASEAN member states have certain types ofinternal and often ethnicity-based conflicts. In this respect, it is difficult to formulate
overarching social and cultural causes and detailed targets as pointed under the issues 1)
and 2).15

As for 3), not only with regard to social issues, ASEAN member countries never

had a common understanding of any matter.

Historically speaking, there was noperception of a region based on this geographical range except in the international politicalcontext, or no awareness of such regional identity.

With regard to 4), ASEAN

demonstrated its capacity to mobilize the resources to forge the multiple schemes andinitiatives for AFTA and AEC.

The resource mobilization for ASCC can depend on apolitical will and support from the public.
6.

Conclusions
This essay re-examined definitions of “region” and of “regional integration” andindicated the characteristics of “regionness” in the case of ASEAN’s regional integration.
Epistemologically, “region” has diverse meanings and does not necessarily imply inherent
commonalties.

The “region” of Southeast Asia has been constructed through substantial

and conscious effort of its stakeholders.

The statist aspect is still valid as ASEAN’s“regional integration” is led by states and is set to serve sovereignty of the states while
15
These are in fact issues of nation-states, and this poses a question regarding relationship between
the level of establishment of nation-states and the level of establishment of “regionness.”－ 16 －

private business sector has not been given a significant role in this process.

A “region”

does not manifest by itself or emerge naturally, and “regionness” requires much effort tocreate and reinforce.

In this respect, there might not be any ideal-typical regional

integration although many think of the EU as one. Instead, the characteristics of regional
integration is subject to the expectations and agenda of the actors to shape its “regionness.”
The range of “regionness” also encompasses governability as the major concern of thedefined space is to govern people, economies, and all social attributes within this boundary.
In the case of ASEAN, governing the economies is the leading principles. ASEAN has
crafted a region of economic incentives and gradually of other aspects such as social andenvironmental concerns.
ASEAN experienced in the post-Cold-War period enormous transformations withregard to economic liberalization and the enlargement of the membership. ASEAN’s newemphasis of free trade lead to the reinforced “regionness,” and its process has beensustained by institutions launched by the member states.
enlargement also granted opportunities for “regionness.”

ASEAN’s membership

As Hettne and Shöderbaum

suggest, the level of “regionness” can both increase and decrease, and “a region can be aregion more or less” (2002: 38). ASEAN’s “regionness” is a new phenomenon and hence
unsubstantial, which is understandable in the context of the nonappearance of “regionness”
in the long history of this area.
The ASEAN Community was created to serve for the liberal logic of trade liberalization,
and AEC remains virtually the most important mechanism of ASEAN. Such a strictly
economic cause could be enough to gain further international recognition as a region (justlike the strictly strategic purpose of setting up the South East Asia Command created arecognizable region).

Nevertheless, at certain point “regionness” calls for considerations

in non-economic spheres of that space when “regionness” is expected to be a more full-scale
entity.

Since 1997, ASEAN’s region-making included social concerns such as welfare

aspects and equality aspects.

ASEAN, then, turned its attention to the agenda of

decreasing the developmental gap between ASEAN6 and CLMV, which was increasingly
emphasized as its major strive for attaining “regionness.”
The process in which ASEAN considered its space as a unity was out of strategic needsof the new states. ASAEAN in the 1990s aimed to become a region with the full set ofarrangements and institutionalization geared toward economic liberalization, materialized
as AFTA. The enlargement of ASEAN, despite their economically driven justification,
called for a stronger notion of “regionness.” The creation and institutionalization of aliberalized market and the new goal to create the ASEAN Community both formed thesense of a “region” in ASEAN’s governance.

The regional drive for building a free market

does not have any direct imperative to secure regional welfare.

However, the ASEAN

Community is being addressed through a wide range of concepts such as community,
oneness, unity, and equality.

ASEAN, originally established for historical and political－ 17 －

reasons and further developed for the economic cause, faces the self-claimed imperative toestablish a totally new entity of governance, covering all the areas of the societies, culture
and environment.

In flux of numerous international economic dynamics, regional

integration is marked by the defined territoriality and a sense of governability, andtherefore bears wider responsibilities than other forms of economic liberalization
arrangements, encompassing all the spheres of the participating societies.
* The author gratefully acknowledges the support of Senshu University in the form of a
Senshu University Research Grant of 2011-2012.
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－ 20 －

研 究 会・シンポジウム報告2014 年 2 月 21 日(金)定例研究会報告テーマ：

長野県経済の現状

報告者：

宮嵜

時

間：

12：00～14：00

場

所：

生田社研会議室

晃臣（本学経済学部教授）

参加者:21 名

報告内容概略26

製造品出荷額等に対する輸出出荷額等の割合（％）

24
22

長野県

全 国

20
18
16
14
12

本研究会は 2013 年度春季実態調査の事前研究として実施された。同調査の対象は長野
県飯田市・阿智村であるが、飯田市経済ならびに同市が実施している諸政策については現地で詳しく識ることができるので、事前研究として範囲を広げ長野県経済を対象とした。
長野県経済は旧産業分類では電機産業に特化し、輸出比率の高い産業構造になっている。製造品出荷額等に占める電機産業の比率は 2000 年には 47.2％を占め、製造品出荷額等に占める輸出出荷額等の割合は図示されているように 1990 年代には全国のそれを優に上回っていた。その理由は長野県にはデファクトスタンダードとなっているプリンターを製造するメーカを有し、かつ全国有数の電子部品・デバイスの供給拠点になっていた点にある。90 年代後半以降ことに中国への直接投資が急増するも、それが長野県からの電子部
品・デバイスの輸出を誘発し、その効果が 90 年代長野県経済の良好な経済的パフォーマ
ンスを担保していた。

－ 21 －

長野県主要産業別製造品出荷額等

百億円

一般機械

350

電機

輸送

335

精密

300
250
200

171

150
100
50

1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

0

ところが東アジアでＮＣ工作機械の普及とともに裾野産業が整備され、その効果が薄まり、またデジタル化、モジュラー型オープンアーキテクチャの進展によって、電機製品、
情報通信機器のコモディティー化が急速に進展した。加えて、ASIC（Application SpecificIntegrated Circuit）から ASSP（Application Specific Standard Product）に大きく流れが変化
した集積回路等のパラダイム転換によっても日本企業の競争力が低下し、その結果長野県
電機産業の出荷額は 2000 年の 3.35 兆円から 2012 年には 1.71 兆円までに落ち込むことになった。
長野県経済はこれまでのような輸出に成長エンジンを持つことができなくなった以上、内需の掘り起しを喫緊の課題にせざるをえない状況にあるといえよう。
記：専修大学経済学部・宮嵜晃臣－ 22 －

執筆者紹介
いいぬま

飯沼

たけ こ

健子

経済学部教授〈編集後記〉
第 609 号は飯沼健子所員による力作 ASEAN and its Regional Integration from the Perspectiveof “Regionness” だけの掲載となった。この論稿では「地域」と「地域統合」の意味が問い直され、貿易・投資の自由化といった経済分野だけではなく、社会・環境・文化などといった経済以外の分野における governance（統治）への学際的なアプローチが探求されている。
ところで、ここで取り上げられている「地域」はもとより Region であるが、より狭い local な
community のレベルでの「地域」についても同じようなことがあるのではないかと兼ね兼ね思っていたことがある。福島第一原発事故により、「フクシマ」として世界に通用するようになってしまった福島県浜通り地方は、もともとは磐城国といって、いまの中通り地方の福島市が所在した岩代国とは別の行政単位であった。両国は交通的にも阿武隈山脈に遮られており、浜通り
はむしろ仙台や茨城方面とのつながりのほうが深かった。しかも、「フクシマ」という地名は、
もともとは西国から来た秀吉麾下の武将が付けたともいわれ（諸説あるそうだが）、徳川時代には五万石級の大名が何度も入れ替わり、とくに存在感のある地名ではなかったようである。しかし、今では浜通りも「フクシマ」として世界に通用し、浜通り出身の我が親・親戚たちも、昨年の大河ドラマ『八重の桜』で描かれた福島県会津地方（これまた浜通り地方とも中通り地方とも異なる）の物語を、我が同郷の事として思い入れて視ていたようである。世界中で紛争や相互排除の契機が絶えない一方で、単なる行政単位の統合によっても、共同幻想はできてしまうことの不思議さを感じていた次第である。

（n/s）

2014 年 3 月 20 日発行
神奈川県川崎市多摩区東三田２丁目１番１号

電話(044)911-1089

専 修 大 学 社 会 科 学 研 究 所
（発行者）
製

作

村

上

俊

介

佐藤印刷株式会社

東京都渋谷区神宮前 2-10-2 電話－ 23 －(03)3404-2561