COVER STORY • 6Impact of Covid-19 on GVCs &Implications for the Second &Third Unbundling

By Mitsuyo Ando
Introduction
East Asia – including Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia – has led
the world in aggressively using international production networks(IPNs), which are a sophisticated version of global value chains(GVCs). Machinery industries typically consist of multi-layered
production processes with different technologies and diversified
materials, involving many players domestically and internationally.
Thus, machinery industries are at the center of IPNs or the second
unbundling (the concept proposed by Baldwin, 20161). Trade inmachinery parts and components are, in general, active within aregion, because such transactions require appropriately timed
procurement, subtle coordination among production blocks, lowservices link costs, tight information and information andcommunication technology (ICT) connectivity, and reliable logistics
connectivity. Machinery IPNs in East Asia, however, involve many
countries at more widely different stages of development in theregion and extend tighter trade and investment links with other partsof the world.
GVCs are prone to bring about the contagion of shocks throughthe supply chains. Hayakawa and Mukunoki (20212), for instance,
demonstrated the negative impact of the novel coronavirus (Covid19) damage in countries supplying machinery parts and components
on countries exporting final machinery products. The emergence of
the Covid-19 pandemic became a trigger to increase concerns about
globalization again. Although the vulnerability of GVCs has been
often addressed, machinery IPNs, particularly those in East Asia,
revealed their robust and resilient nature during Covid-19, as
experienced in past shocks, regardless of whether they are demand
shocks (e.g., the 1997 Asian Currency Crisis and the 2008-2009
Global Financial Crisis) or supply shocks (e.g., the 2011 Great East
Japan Earthquake and the 2011 Thailand Floods).
This article reviews the impact of Covid-19 on trade in goods andservices by shedding light on two kinds of international division oflabor – machinery IPNs and digital-related services trade – anddiscusses the potential role of mega–free trade agreements (FTAs)
such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Significance of Machinery IPNs in East Asia
Massive machinery IPNs have been formed in three regions: East
Asia, North America, and Europe. Chart 1 presents each country’s
machinery shares in the total exports and imports of major countries
in the world in 2019 (Ando, Yamanouchi, and Kimura, 20213).
https://www.jef.or.jp/journal/

Machinery sectors here include general machinery (Harmonized
System (HS) 84), electric machinery (HS85), transport equipment(HS86-89), and precision machinery (HS90-92). To focus on the
degree of participation in IPNs, the Chart arranges countries withhigher export shares of machinery parts and components from left toright.
Apparently, many East Asian countries have high shares of partsand components for both exports and imports, suggesting theexistence of back-and-forth transactions. In addition, export sharesof parts and components are relatively high for these countries,
indicating their export-oriented operations. These findings confirm
the active participation of many East Asian countries in machinery
IPNs. In the early 1990s, most countries with higher export shares ofparts and components were developed countries. By 2000, in linewith the expansion of the second unbundling, machinery parts andcomponents trade became more active, and the shares of machinery
trade rose in many countries. Reflecting the rapid development ofmachinery IPNs in East Asia since the 1990s, many East Asiandeveloping countries moved to the left, with high export shares ofparts and components in both absolute and relative terms. Now,
most countries on the left side are these East Asian developing
countries, in addition to some developing countries such as Mexico
and Central and Eastern Europe countries, which are involved in IPNs
in North America and Europe, respectively. In contrast, mostcountries on the right are those in Latin America with low shares ofparts exports and high shares of parts imports, indicating theirimport-substituting operations.

Strong Intra- & Inter-Regional Linkages
for East Asia
To evaluate the degree of East Asian machinery trade, considering
the basic conditions such as economic size and the geographicaldistance, Ando, Kimura, and Yamanouchi (20224) applied a
traditional gravity equation to machinery trade and compared theactual trade value with the fitted value that is predicted by the model.
Table 1 summarizes the gap ratio for each country/region of theworld, in which a ratio over 1 indicates that the actual value exceeds
the predicted level. Their results clearly demonstrate that machinery
trade is basically regional within Factory Asia, Factory America, andFactory Europe, but inter-regional linkages are also strong for
Factory Asia. The gap ratios for intra-regional trade are 1.5 for East
Asia (including the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
plus China, Japan and South Korea), 2.7 for ASEAN only, 1.0 for
Japan SPOTLIGHT • May / June 2022

23

CHART 1

Machinery shares in exports to & imports from the world: 2019%80

Second unbundling(task-by-task divisionof labor)

70

Exports: machinery final products
Imports: machinery final products
Exports: machinery parts andcomponents
Imports: machinery parts andcomponents

First unbundling(industry-by-industry divisionof labor)

60

50

40

30

20

10

Ho

ng
Ph Konilipg
Si pineSo ngap s
uth oreK
Ma orealays
Ja ia
Ro panmanCz
ec Hung ia
hR
a
ep ry
ub
Me licxic
C o
Ge hinarm
Vie any
tna
m
U
Au K
s
Th triaaila
Po nd
Slo landvak
Fra ia
nc
e
US
I
t
al
S
Ne love y
the niarla
Bu ndslgari
Sp a
Es ainton
Tu iar
Ca keynada
Lit India
hu
an
L ia
Ind atviaonesia
Co Brasta zilEl
Sa Ricalvad
Gr orPa eece
rag
Ca ua
mb y
od
Ne Aust ia
w Z rali
ea a
la
Ru nd
Arg ssiaen
Co tinalomb
Bru ianei
My Laosanma
C r
Ec hile
ua
do
r
Gu Pe
ate rumala0

Source: Ando, Yamanouchi, and Kimura (2021 3)
TABLE 1

The gap between actual & predicted values of machinery trade: 2019
East
Asia

China

East Asia

1.5

1.6

China

1.2

Exporter

Importer

Japan

1.4

1.1

South Korea

1.9

1.8

Japan

South Korea

ASEAN

North
America

EuropeRest ofthe world

Total(World)

0.8

1.1

2.7

2.1

1.5

1.6

1.6

0.6

0.9

2.2

1.8

1.4

1.5

1.4

0.9
0.4

2.8

2.0

1.1

1.2

1.4

6.3

3.1

1.6

2.1

2.1

ASEAN

2.4

2.1

2.1

3.7

2.7

3.4

2.2

2.3

2.5

North America

0.7

0.6

0.4

1.2

1.0

1.0

0.6

0.5

0.8

Europe

1.1

1.2

0.6

1.4

1.3

0.9

1.2

0.8

1.0

Rest of the world

0.5

0.5

0.3

0.6

0.9

0.4

0.4

0.5

0.5

Total (World)

1.1

0.9

0.6

1.1

1.8

1.1

1.0

0.9

1.0

Source: Author’s calculation, based on Ando, Kimura, and Yamanouchi (2022 )4

North America, and 1.2 for Europe. These figures suggest that intraregional machinery trade is active in East Asia, particularly in ASEAN,
and that ASEAN has been playing an important role in Factory Asia.
Moreover, inter-regional ratios of East Asia are as high as 2.1 forexports to North America and 1.5 for exports to Europe, and the
24 Japan SPOTLIGHT • May / June 2022

ratios of ASEAN only become even higher, 3.4 and 2.2, respectively.
Moreover, the corresponding ratios are high for both final products
and parts and components. These findings indicate that Factory Asia
has strong linkages as a supplier of intermediate goods as well as
final products in these two regions. In contrast, inter-regional ratios

of North America and Europe are around the predicted level or much
lower than predicted, unlike the case of East Asia. In addition, intraregional ratios for two regions rose in the 2010s. Such a tendency
may imply stronger regionalization and possibly regional reshoring
for Factory America and Factory Europe.
The extent and depth of machinery IPNs in East Asia developed
further in the 2010s. An outstanding change is observed for Vietnam;
the ratios for intra-ASEAN trade increased from 1.4 to 3.2 for exports
and from 3.9 to 7.3 for imports, together with the ratios for exports
to the world (China, Japan, and South Korea only) that reached 4.6(3.6) from 0.9 in 2010. This clearly demonstrates how rapidly
Vietnam became involved in IPNs in the 2010s, turning into one of
the core players in machinery IPNs in East Asia. Moreover, the export
destinations of Cambodia and Myanmar were diversified among
other East Asian countries, though their actual exports are still lower
than predicted, and their ratios for imports significantly increased.
This indicates their participation in IPNs has just started.
Note that machinery trades among China, Japan, and South Korea
are not connected with each other as closely as we expected, after
controlling for country size and geographical distance: China’s
exports to Japan and South Korea (0.6 and 0.9), Japan’s to South
Korea (0.9), and South Korea’s to Japan (0.4) are lower than
predicted. In other words, there is room for their trade expansion.

Three Types of Shocks on IPNs amid Covid-19
What has happened to machinery IPNs during Covid-19? Chart 2
shows monthly machinery exports to the world in 2020 and 2021
until August by three sectors, as an index to each month of 2019
(Ando and Hayakawa, 20215). Worldwide machinery exports
recorded their lowest level in April and May 2020, but returned toreach or even exceed pre-pandemic levels by September 2020 in all
three machinery sectors (Chart 2 (a)). Such a rapid V-shaped
recovery in 2020 suggests the resilience of machinery IPNs ingeneral.
As Ando, Kimura, and Obashi (20216) demonstrate in theiranalysis using finely disaggregated machinery trade of Japan, thetransactions of parts and components within machinery IPNs areunlikely to be disconnected because firms intend to optimize their
supply chains, considering both cost reduction and risk
management. In addition, the import diversity of inputs mitigated theharmful supply-side effects of Covid-19 – particularly during theearly period of February-March 2020 when uncertainty due to Covid19 suddenly increased – by allowing the flexible adjustment oftransactions (Ando and Hayakawa, 2022a7). Moreover, e-commerce(EC) development in importing countries contributes to mitigating
the negative effect of Covid-19 on trade (Hayakawa, Mukunoki, andUrata, 20218). Furthermore, positive demand shocks due to Covid19-specific demand for certain products related to teleworking, stayat-home activities, and preventing infection, partially offset negative
supply shocks and negative demand shocks (Ando, Kimura, andObashi, 20216).

Smaller Negative Impacts for East Asia
Importantly, the negative impacts were much smaller formachinery IPNs in East Asia (Chart 2 (b)) than those in North
America and Europe. In particular, exports of general and electricmachinery final products and parts and components as well as
exports of precision machinery final products returned to their prepandemic levels already in April 2020. In the case of East Asia,
negative supply and demand shocks were relatively small because
East Asia curbed the Covid-19 spread more successfully than North
America and Europe and took government policy responses to thepandemic with an emphasis on IPNs, including the excepting
treatment of their important areas from factory closures.
In addition, machinery IPNs in East Asia enjoyed great benefit
from positive demand shocks. Among the top 20 countries ofmachinery exports in the world in 2019, East Asia occupies 10
countries/regions for both general and electric machinery andprecision machinery parts and components (Ando, Kimura, andYamanouchi, 20224). Even for their final products, eight and six arethose in East Asia, respectively. East Asia has established a strong
position in the world as an important supplier of machinery goods,
particularly of these final products and parts and components, andmaintained its international competitiveness effectively utilizing IPNs.
The positive demand shock products of these sectors, together withactivated e-commerce for their purchases amid Covid-19, must havecontributed to such a rapid recovery in East Asia by partiallycompensating for the effects of the negative supply and demand
shocks.
As Chart 2 clearly shows, sectoral heterogeneity exists among
machinery sectors. While general and electric machinery exports
already returned to the pre-pandemic level in June 2020, transport
equipment exports had a more prolonged influence, with a decline bymore than 60%/50% for final products/parts and components in
April 2020 (Chart 2 (a)). In particular, the negative effects on this
sector were much more serious for North America (Chart 2 (c)) andEurope (Chart 2 (d)) than East Asia. The aforementioned increasing
preference to EC and the Covid-19 specific demand became
additional reasons behind the heterogeneity of the impacts acrosssectors or even among products in the same sectors.

New Challenges for Machinery IPNs in 2021
In 2021, machinery IPNs faced several new challenges, including ashortage of containers (and high transport costs), a shortage ofsemiconductors, and the emergence of the Delta variant of Covid-19.
The shortage of semiconductors, for instance, is induced not only by
the pandemic (e.g., the temporary closure of factories) but also by
structural changes (e.g., an accelerated production shift toward
electric motor vehicles (EV) and the rapidly expanded demand for 5G
smartphones and solid-state drive laptops). Sectoral heterogeneity
seems to have gradually expanded again in 2021 (Chart 2 (a)). The
exports of the transport equipment sector reveal the declining trend,
particularly for North America and Europe, which may partly reflect
the negative supply shocks largely due to the shortage ofsemiconductors, the negative demand shocks on durable goods due
Japan SPOTLIGHT • May / June 202225

CHART 2

Machinery exports to the world (each month of 2019 = 1)

8

7

6

5

4

3

12

2021.1
&2

11

9

10

8

7

Precision: Final
Precision: Parts

8

7

6

5

4

Precision: Final
Precision: Parts

3

2021.1&2

12Transport: Final
Transport: Parts

11

8

7

6

5

4

3

12

2021.1
&2

11

0.2

10

0.2

9

0.4

8

0.4

7

0.6

6

0.6

5

0.8

4

0.8

3

1.0

2020.1&2

General & Electric: Final
General & Electric: Parts

1.2

1.0

Transport: Final
Transport: Parts(d) Europe

1.4

Precision: Final
Precision: Parts

3

1.2

Transport: Final
Transport: Parts

General & Electric: Final
General & Electric: Parts

2020.1&2

General & Electric: Final
General & Electric: Parts

0.2

10

(c) North America

1.4

0.4

3

8

7

Precision: Parts

2020.1&2

Precision: Final

6

4

3

12

2021.1
&2

11

9

10

8

7

6

5

4

3

Transport: Parts

5

Transport: Final

General & Electric: Parts
2020.1&2

0.2

General & Electric: Final

8

0.6

7

0.6

6

0.8

5

0.8

6

1.0

4

1.0

5

1.2

4

1.2

0.4

(b) East Asia

1.49(a) World

1.4

Notes: “General & Electric”, “Transport”, and “Precision” refer to general & electric machinery, transport equipment, and precision machinery, respectively. “Final” and “Parts” indicate final
products and parts and components.

Source: Ando and Hayakawa (2021 5)

to prolonged Covid-19, and an accelerated EV production shift.
For East Asia, all three machinery sectors, including the transport
equipment sector, maintained export levels beyond the pre-pandemic
level at least at the regional level until August in 2021 (Chart 2 (b)).
Some sporadic declines, however, have been recently observed forspecific sectors in several countries (Ando and Hayakawa, 20215). In
the case of Japan, for example, while general and electric machineryand precision machinery sectors had no serious impact, exports oftransport equipment final products in 2021 were slightly lower thanthe pre-pandemic levels and drastically declined in August and
September, probably reflecting the shortage of semiconductors. As
for ASEAN, which experienced much more serious impacts due tothe Delta variant in 2021 than in 2020, machinery exports werefluctuating, but general and electric machinery goods as well as
precision machinery final products tended to maintain the export
levels beyond the pre-pandemic level in 2021. On the other hand,exports of transport equipment and precision machinery parts andcomponents declined in July and August 2021. Although the wholeof ASEAN’s exports did not have a significantly serious negative
impact in 2021 at least until August, we observe a severe export
decrease in July for Indonesia and a drastic export decline in Augustand September in the transport equipment sector of several
countries.

26 Japan SPOTLIGHT • May / June 2022

Impacts of Covid-19 on Services Trade
One of the distinctive features of Covid-19 is the introduction ofmobility restrictions and social distancing measures. Among the fourmodes of supply for trade in services, which is defined by the WTO
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), modes 2 and 4
require cross-border mobility of consumers and suppliers,
respectively, while mode 1 is typically provided online. Thus theimpact of Covid-19 may vary among service sectors, reflecting thenature of services. Chart 3 (i) shows quarterly exports and imports in2019 and 2020. While the 2nd quarter of 2020 (2020 Q2) recorded
the lowest levels for both trade in goods and services, the latter halfof 2020 witnessed a sharp contrast between them. In particular, theexplosive spread of Covid-19 in 2020 Q4 seems to have made thegap larger. Apparently, travel services in mode 2 are much more
seriously affected than other services (Chart 3 (ii)). In contrast,computer services, among ICT services, had double-digit positive
annual growth of exports in many countries in the world in 2020,
unlike other services sectors with negative growth.
Ando and Hayakawa (2022b9) quantitatively investigated theimpacts of Covid-19 on trade in services, using quarterly data on abalance of payment (BOP) basis for 146 countries in 2019 and 2020.
Table 2 summarizes their results for the Covid variables. It also
shows the major mode for each services sector. The major mode isCHART 3

Quarterly global trade in services(i) Services versus Goods(ii) By-Sector Services

1.2

1.5
Services exports
Goods exports

1.4

Services imports
Good imports

1.3
1.2

1.1

1.1
1
0.9

1.0

0.8
0.7
0.6

0.9

0.5
0.4
0.3

0.8

0.2

Goods-related
Financial
Goods-related
Financial

0.1
0.7

2019.Q1 2019.Q2 2019.Q3 2019.Q4 2020.Q1 2020.Q2 2020.Q3 2020.Q4

0Transport
IP Charges
Transport
IP Charges

TravelICT
TravelICT

Construction
Other business
Construction
Other businessInsurance
Personal
Insurance
Personal

2019.Q1 2019.Q2 2019.Q3 2019.Q4 2020.Q1 2020.Q2 2020.Q3 2020.Q4

Notes: Services trade on the BOP basis. Straight lines and dotted lines express exports and imports, respectively.

Source: Author’s calculation, based on data available from UNCTAD STAT and WTO StatsTABLE 2

Summary of PPML results for the impact of Covid-19 on quarterly trade inservices & their major modes
Suggested major mode:
BOP

Major mode:
TISMOS

ExportImport

Case

Death

Index

Case

Death

Index

Total goods (PPML)-0.023***-0.010***-0.400**-0.010***-0.004-0.178***

Total goods (IV)-0.044***-0.038***-0.530***-0.041***-0.035***-0.506***-0.012*-0.320**-0.013*-0.012***-0.473***-0.097***-0.091***-1.204***-0.054***-0.050***-0.663***

Total services (PPML)
Total services (IV)
Goods-related services
Transport
TravelMode 2Mode 2Mode 1 (linked with Modes 2/4)

Mode 1-0.022***-0.541***-0.015***-0.010***-0.306***

Mode 2Mode 2-0.066**-0.045**-1.056**-0.091***-0.060***-1.854***-0.063***-0.039***Construction

Mode 4Mode 3-0.029***-0.018***Insurance

Mode 1Mode 3-0.026**-0.013*Financial services

Mode 1Mode 3-0.020**-0.024***IP charges

Mode 1Mode 1-0.030***-0.022***

ICT services

Mode 1Mode 3

Other business services

Mode 1Mode 3

Personal services

Mode 1Mode 3-0.008*-0.259*-0.210*-0.285***-0.027**-0.019*-0.339**Notes: Only coefficients with statistical significance are shown. The services sectors with larger negative effects than the goods sector are highlighted. As services trade based on the BOP
basis do not cover mode 3,”suggested major mode: BOP” is the most major mode, other than mode 3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Source: Author’s preparation, based on Ando and Hayakawa (2022b 9)

based on data for 2017 in Trade in Services by Mode of Supply(TISMOS), which offers data for by-mode services trade for the
2005-2017 period, and “suggested major mode: BOP” is the mostmajor mode, other than mode 3, because the BOP statistics do not
sufficiently cover services via commercial presence (mode 3). Theirresults suggest that Covid-19 had a negative impact on services
exports and imports, and such harmful effects tended to be larger for

trade in services than trade in goods, particularly on the import side.
Furthermore, we found heterogeneous effects among disaggregatedservices sectors. Specifically, travel services were the most affected,
followed by transport and construction services. While trade in travel
services, passenger transport services, and construction services
mostly require, or are directly related to, the cross-border movementof people and explain a substantial portion of the negative effects on
Japan SPOTLIGHT • May / June 2022

27the overall services trade, trade in services related to the crossborder movement of goods, such as freight transport services, alsooffers a partial explanation. Conversely, other services that are
typically provided through mode 1 experienced less/no significant
effect. In particular, ICT services had the smallest negative impact onexports, with no impact on the import side.
The Covid-19 pandemic became a trigger to accelerate the digitaltransformation of the whole economy. The results support theimportance of digital technology for ICT services as well as otherservices and manufacturing sectors. The importance of such a formof international division of labor will increase probably in the coming
decades. The expansion of services sectors and the utilization ofdigital technology will contribute to further developing IPNs or thethird unbundling, i.e., the individual-level international division oflabor.

Potential Role of Mega FTAs for 2 Kinds ofInternational Division of LaborAt this moment, machinery IPNs, particularly those in East Asia
tend to be robust and resilient amid the ongoing Covid-19. As
discussed above, however, machinery IPNs are facing newchallenges, and some sporadic declines have been recently observed
for specific sectors in several countries even in East Asia, reflecting
not only the pandemic but also structural changes. To lessen thepossible negative effects in the future and make IPNs more robust
and resilient, it is necessary to improve location advantages andreduce the services link costs. Moreover, with the Covid-19
pandemic as a trigger to accelerate the digital transformation of thewhole economy, the servicification of the manufacturing sector or
the third unbundling will be enhanced. Furthermore, given theheightening of US-China confrontation and geopolitical tensions,though the decoupling is likely to be limited in scope, it is importantto keep the coverage governed by a rules-based trading regime as
broadly as possible and to maintain a healthy regime in sectors notunder intensified trade control.
In that sense, the utilization of mega FTAs would be useful. The
RCEP, for instance, covers the whole East Asia region. Although thecurrent RCEP agreement, with an emphasis on “ASEAN centrality”,
has various issues, including limited trade liberalization andinsufficient rules, it must be meaningful to cover China, Japan, andSouth Korea within the same framework. As discussed above, China,
Japan, and South Korea are not as closely connected as we expected
in machinery trade, after controlling for country size andgeographical distance, and thus there must be room for trade
expansion among them by the RCEP-based tariff removals. More
importantly, the cumulative rules of origin may expand the possibilityof using preferential tariffs for bilateral trade within East Asia, towhich preferential tariffs under FTAs such as ASEAN+1 FTA could not
be applied before. Making less restrictive and user-friendly rules oforigin is the crucial precondition, but RCEP-based tariff removals,
though limited, as well as the cumulative rules of origin, may benefit
the whole East Asia region and further activate IPNs in the region.
Moreover, the importance of creating new international rules suchas electronic commerce is increasing because cross-border
28 Japan SPOTLIGHT • May / June 2022

transactions are likely to expand according to the enhancement of
the digital transformation of the whole economy, including the
manufacturing sector, or the third unbundling. If the RCEP
agreement is improved to be an effective one, it could be used toreduce policy risks throughout the region, covering all countries
participating in IPNs including China, as well as to maintain a healthyrules-based trading regime, which should contribute to making IPNs
more robust and resilient.

REFERENCES
1 Baldwin, Richard (2016), The Great Convergence: Information
Technology and the New Globalization, Belknap Harvard
University Press.
2 Hayakawa, Kazunobu and Hiroshi Mukunoki, (2021), “Impactsof COVID-19 on Global Value Chains”, The Developing
Economies, 59(2): 154-177.
3 Ando, Mitsuyo, Kenta Yamanouchi, and Fukunari Kimura(2021) ‘Potential for India’s Entry into Factory Asia: Some CasualFindings from International Trade Data’, ERIA Discussion Paper
Series, No. 381. Jakarta: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN
and East Asia (ERIA).
4 Ando, Mitsuyo, Fukunari Kimura, and Kenta Yamanouchi(2022), “East Asian Production Networks Go Beyond the Gravity
Prediction”, ERIA Discussion Paper Series, No. 425. Jakarta:
ERIA. Forthcoming in Asia Economic Papers, 21 (2).
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Chains and COVID-19: An Update on Machinery Production
Networks in East Asia”, ERIA Policy Brief, No. 2021-04, Jakarta:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA).
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Shocks: Evidence from Japan’s Machinery Trade,” Asian
Economic Papers, 20(3), pp. 40–72.
7 Ando, Mitsuyo and Kazunobu Hayakawa (2022a), “Does theImport Diversity of Inputs Mitigate the Negative Impact of COVID19 on Global Value Chains?”, The Journal of International Tradeand Economic Development, 31(2), pp.299–320.
8 Hayakawa, Kazunobu, Hiroshi Mukunoki, and Shujiro Urata(2021), “Can E-commerce Mitigate the Negative Impact of
COVID-19 on International Trade?”, Japanese Economic Review.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s42973-021-00099-3.
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COVID-19 on Trade in Services”, Japan and the World Economy.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.japwor.2022.101131

Mitsuyo Ando is a professor in the Faculty of Business and Commerce at
Keio University. She received her Ph.D. in Economics from Keio. Before
assuming her current post, she served as associate professor at Keio University
and assistant professor at Keio and Hitotsubashi Universities, and as a researchanalyst at the World Bank Institute. Her speciality is international economics(international trade).