No.72 AUTUMN 2015

Contents
003

Editorial

Special Feature: Reflections on Current Thai Politics
004

Thailand’s Royalist Democracy in CrisisThongchai Winichakul

007

Royal Succession at Stake: The Future of the Thai Monarchy
Pavin Chachavalpongpun

010

Thailand Purports to Be in Search of an Upright Political System, But Can “Democracy” Still Be
Regarded as a Viable Option?
Titipol Phakdeewanich

013

Thailand: A Year After
Tanet Charoenmuang

016“Constituting” the Nation: Modern-day Thai-style DictatorshipDavid Streckfuss

018

Understanding Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Mechanism in Cambodia
Sothun Nop

023

Researching the Indonesia’s 1965 Tragedy Today: A View from within
Agus Suwignyo

027

Youth, Voice, and Methodology: Learning (with) Young Migrants in a “Temporary Shelter Area”
Decha Tangseefa

031

Library

033

Publications

034

Fellows

Front Cover:Protesters photographed as they were leaving a protest, which took place in front of the Office of the Governor of the Province ofUbon Ratchathani, on December 9, 2013. They were acting in support of the political movement of the People’s Democratic Reform
Committee (PDRC), and this protest was part of the attempt to mobilize anti-government sentiment, outside of Bangkok. Suchprotests anticipated Thailand’s latest coup d’état of May 22, 2014. Photo: Titipol Phakdeewanich
Back Cover:
Democracy Monument Bangkok. Photo: Titipol Phakdeewanich

Editorial
The 18th military coup since 1932 has once again underscored the fragile nature of democracy in Thailand.
Tumultuous anti-government protests between November 2013 and May 2014 organized by the People’s
Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) led to the occupation of government buildings and offices, roadintersections, and mass rallies in the capital, Bangkok. After being found guilty of abuses of power, the thenPrime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, was removed from office. On May 20, 2014 martial law was declared
throughout the nation and then on May 22, after months of political unrest in Thailand, Prayut Chan-o-cha, aretired Royal Thai army officer and a former Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army overthrew
Niwatthamrong Boonsongpaisan in a coup d’état.
In this special issue we bring together a group of concerned Thai scholars who contextualize the current politicalturmoil that has engulfed the nation. Thongchai Winichakul examines the different discourses that have beenused to explain democratization in Thailand; one which revolves around military coups and new constitutions;another traces democracy as part of a linear process that emerges in 1932 with the transition from an absolute
to constitutional monarchy. Thongchai scrutinizes the role of the monarchy and contextualizes the issue ofroyalist democracy against the background of the current round of coups in the early 21st century. Leading on
from this analysis, Pavin Chachavalpongpun also focuses on the links between the military and the monarchyand examines the relationship between these two institutions and their influence on Thai democracy. Titipol
Phakdeewanich asks if the current “caretaker” military junta will set a long-term precedent for the autocratic
management of a society deemed unmanageable and irredeemable. Or will democracy return as a counterweight
to trump authoritarian interventions and solutions? Tanet Charoenmuang looks back over the last year andcompares the coup’s dynamics to the 2006 coup. He details what conditions have been reorganizing politics
within the nation and raises the issue that we may be seeing the “constitutionalization” of coups. Finally, David
Streckfuss comments on both the spectacle and drama of the coup and presents a concerned analysis of thesocietal effects of military intervention 15 months later.
This year celebrates CSEAS 50th anniversary and the Center is currently preparing for its anniversary event in
December 2015. This will be followed by the 1st consortium for Southeast Asian Studies in Asia (SEASIA)
conference in which 600 scholars from around the world will participate in Kyoto on December 12–13. This
event will be attended by our guest of honor his Excellency Fukuda Yasuo, the former Prime Minister of Japan(2007–08). CSEAS looks forward to all the guests, friends, and collegues, old and new, who will participate in
the events we have planned to help cement our position in Southeast Asian studies both regionally and globally.
Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University

The Editors

003

Special Feature: Reflections on Current Thai Politics

Thailand’s Royalist Democracy in CrisisThongchai Winichakul
University of Wisconsin-Madison; Former Visiting Research Scholar, CSEASTNEWSLETTER
No. 72004

he 2014 coup in Thailand is normally explained
according to two conventional discourses of democratization in Thailand. First is the vicious cycle
discourse: a repeated cycle of military coups, followed by a new constitution, a general election.
However, the serious failure of the elected government—either due to corruption scandals, threats tothe monarchy, by communists or a combination ofthem—leads to another coup. This discourse wasmore prevalent between the 1950s and 1980s whencoups were more frequent. Yet, from 1992 to 2006,
when electoral democracy was more stable, a second discourse became more common, one wherethe ­history of democratization in Thailand developed
through a process of linear progress starting in 1932;
from the end of the absolute monarchy, the 1973
popular uprising that ended 23 year-long military rulethrough to the 1992 uprising that finally put militaryrule to rest as it was believed up to 2006. The latest
two coups in 2006 and 2014 have revived the vicious
cycle as an explanation.
Both discourses have one thing in common, that
is, an understanding that democratization is the
struggle against the military for an electoral democracy of civilian rule. This is a common political experience for Thai adults today, almost all of whom wereborn in the 1940s or after and coming of age in thelate 1950s. Democratization in the world in the
1970s, as they might have learned, were mostly
struggles against military regimes. Apparently they,
including academics and historians, think that thepolitical role of the monarchy and monarchists1 completely stopped after the 1932 revolution which
ended absolute monarchy in Siam.
Over the past 50 years, this has been a common
historical misperception in Thailand. Thai historiography is oblivious to the counter-revolutionary battles
and actions by the monarchists long after 1932. It
overlooks the role of the monarchy in politics which
was revived in the late 1940s and has been active atleast since the 1960s. Generally, Thais believe thatthe monarchy is truly “above” politics as the official
mantra has propagated for decades. After the 2006
coup, however, people were increasingly aware of
the “palace’s” support for putsch. It then became
common knowledge to political observers in Thailand and around the world that the latest coup in2014 was about the palace.
For those who can explain the role of the monarchy in the current crisis, so far they have argued thatthe 2006 and 2014 coups were due to looming problem of succession. 2 The reign of King Bhumibol(1946 to present) and the source of privileges, powerand benefits for monarchists is coming to its end.
But his successor will unlikely be able to fill his
father’s shoes, and worse, could undermine theglory of the monarchy. Meanwhile, the former Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is considered as a threat
to the throne. His wealth, power and popularity put
him in direct contest with the royalist elite for the“kingmaker” in the post-Bhumibol era. The two
coups were attempts by a coalition of royalist kingmakers to secure the succession firmly in their hands(despite the differences among themselves).
Whether or not, or how much, Thaksin is truly athreat to the monarchy is beside the point. The monarchists’ fear of him is real.
The question here though, is why the succession
and why do the kingmakers matter so much? Why
would not a succession to the throne in, say, England, Denmark, or Japan, lead to a political crisis tothe extent that is unfurling in Thailand? The legal rule
for succession is not a cause for concern for it has
been clearly established. The answer lies in the factthat while in a democratic country the monarchy
does not have effective political or economic relevance, let alone real authority or power, such is not
the case in Thailand where the stake of the succession is very high. One might prompt to think of the005

The strength of royalist democracy thus far has
been developed in tandem with the one of King
­Bhumibol. Indispensable for royalist democracy, his
charisma and accomplishments have been amplified
by “hyper-royalism”—a politico-cultural atmospherein which the monarch is considered superlative inways not humanly possible. Hyper-royalism has­penetrated into and permeated the everyday life ofThais (Thongchai 2014). Together with the draconianlèse-majesté law, the monarch becomes literally,
ideologically, and legally inviolable. Thai royalism
becomes religious-like; violation becomes blasphemy (Streckfuss 2011).
The history of royalist democracy is closely related
to the history of democratization in Thailand. It is alegacy of the absolute monarchy (one that began in
the 1880s and ended in 1932) in the sense that it has
been formulated by the monarchists in their effort toregain power after the end of absolute monarchy.
After a short-lived initial revival in 1947–51, the development of King Bhumibol as ideal modern monarchbegan in the early 1960s, thanks to the US who promoted the monarchy as a strategic instrument tocounter communism. The turning point toward
supremacy for royalist democracy came with the
popular uprising in 1973 against military rule. The
monarchists grew to dominance in 1992 and royalist
democracy has thrived since then at the expense of
the military that has gradually declined in politicalpower.
Royalist democracy is also a main factor in thecurrent political crisis. Fundamentally, at the roots ofthe crisis is a conflict between a changing politicaldemography and an obstinate political system that
refuses to change accordingly. The semi-urban,
semi-rural people outside the metropoles and urban
poor in the metropoles are the emerging classes asa result of the changing socio-economy particularlyin the rural sector since the late 1980s. These emerging classes enjoy electoral democracy for it has provided better material benefits, a fairer share of publicresources, and above all better access to power.
This is in stark contrast with the benefits and services
provided by the centralized bureaucracy whichfavors the upper classes in Bangkok and themetropoles. The obstinate political system is a royalist democracy which relies on bureaucracy as its
backbone and dislikes electoral democracy.
The structural conflict above erupted into the open
when elected authority increased its power and wasmore aggressive during Thaksin’s period of government rule (2001–06), due to the huge popular mandates they got from landslide electoral victories.
Their efforts in trying to change too much too fast
(Suehiro 2014) thus became a threat to the statusquo of royalist democracy. Around the same time inCenter for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University

wealth of the crown (Porphant 2008), which is among
the richest in the world. But probably more importantbut much less known is the political power of themonarchy in the current political system—the “royalist democracy.”
Royalist democracy is a form of “guided democracy”—an ostensibly democratic polity but one inwhich the electorate and elected authority do nothave substantive power or have little impact on public policy because true power remains in the handsof the oligarchy or autocracy. Its formal name, “theDemocratic Regime with the Monarchy as the Headof the State,” is quite a revealing euphemism for apolitical system in which the formal parliamentary
system is under the domination of the unelected,
undemocratic power of the monarchy.
The monarchy is supposed to be “above” politics
in the sense of being uninvolved, beyond, or clearly
separated from politics. Instead, it is “above” politics
in the sense of being “on top of” the formal andapparent political system. It is not separated from,uninvolved, or beyond politics. On the contrary, themonarchy is actively involved, thanks to its enormous
influence, in the political system albeit informally. I
hope to show concretely how the royalist democracy
operates in the realms of public policies, key personnel, budgets, and resources allocation, although thelimited space of this essay does not allow to makefurther elaborations. Suffice it to say that the bureaucracy—literally servants of the king—is the mainfunctionary of royalist democracy. The military—who
often proclaim that they are “soldiers of the king”—
its protector. The judiciary—who by law is “thejudges of the king”—the ultimate lawmakers in thissystem.
The elected authority under the royalist democracy
is a necessary function in the operation of the state.
But it should stay within the guided parameters, notin competition or in conflict with royalist interests.
The elected authority should have as much power asnecessary for its role as the efficient manager of thestate. New initiatives, policies, personnel, budget
allocations, nevertheless, should reflect its role within
the limits but not beyond.
Royalist democracy relies on a charismatic kingwho is either genuine or an invented and orchestrated one. The ideal characteristics of modern monarchy, as put forward by royalist ideologues over theyears and successfully materialized in the reign ofKing Bhumibol, includes being sacred and extraordinary or super-human, yet a popular king who
appears close to and cares for the well-being of his
people (Dhani Nivat 1969). According to a royalist
ideologue, Thailand’s sovereignty is co-owned by
the monarch and people, hence the royalist democracy (Bowornsak 1994; 2007).

the early 2000s, royalist democracy also faced acrisis within. Given its reliance on the charisma of
King Bhumibol, his deteriorating health caused grave
concerns. The prospect of having a successor who
is anything but an ideal modern monarchy compounded issues. The looming problem of succession
could spell the end of royalist democracy from within
at a time when structural conflict is erupting.
The latest two coups in 2006 and 2014, thus, werethe efforts of the monarchists to take control of thestate and get rid of the perceived threats to royalist
democracy and critics of the monarchy. Unfortunately, these measures may backfire on two counts.
First, as the enforcement of the lèse-majesté law
becomes more frequent, harsher, and unreasonable(the number of people charged skyrocketed after the2006 coup; the unprecedented severity of punishments for a crime of expression; and the dubious
process with outrageous interpretations of the law),instead of eliminating the critics of the monarchy, it
has generated more dissent. Critics of the monarchy
are no longer limited to small circles of intelligentsia
as in previous periods, but are widespread among
common folk who were once the royalist populace.
Secondly, as the military was brought back toserve the monarchy while the latter is weaker andpotentially weakening even further, how long in the
future can the military remain the protector of royalist
interests? Is it possible that the monarchists haveunlocked the door for the return of Praetorianism,
themselves bringing the end to royalist democracy?
The answer depends on the post-Bhumibol situation,
particularly the next king’s charisma, performance,and his relationship with the military and with people,
all of which will be telling about the fate of the monarchy as a political force and how it will survive in thetwenty first century as well. On the other hand, apositive sign from the crisis in the past decade is that
Thai politics is no longer the exclusive business ofthe elites. Thai people have awakened. Popular
democracy will be a factor determining the future ofboth the monarchy and the possibility ofPraetorianism.

References
Bowornsak Uwanno. 1994. Kotmai kap thangluak khong sangkhom thai [Law and alternatives for Thai society]. Bangkok:
Nititham.
————. 2007. Kotmai mahachon, lem 2: kan bangyaek kotmai
mahachon—ekkachon lae phatthanakan kotmai mahachon
nai prathet thai [Public law, volume 2: The division between
public law and private law, and the development of publiclaw in Thailand], 5th printing. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press.
Dhani Nivat, Prince. 1969 [1947]. Thai Old Siamese Conceptionof Monarch. In Collected Articles by H.H. Prince Dhani Nivat,
pp. 91–104, Bangkok: The Siam Society. Reprinted from
Journal of the Siam Society Vol. 36, No. 2, 1947.
Marshall, Andrew M. 2014. A Kingdom in Crisis: Thailand’s
Struggle for Democracy in the Twenty-First Century. London:
Zed Books.
McCargo, Duncan. 2005. Network Monarchy and Legitimacy
Crisis in Thailand. The Pacific Review 18(4): 499–519.
Porphant Ouyanont. 2008. The Crown Property Bureau in Thailand and the Crisis of 1997. Journal of Contemporary Asia
38(1): 166–189.
Streckfuss, David. 2011. Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation,
Treason and Lèse-majesté. London: Routledge.
Suehiro, Akira. 2014. Technocracy and Thaksinocracy in Thailand: Reform of the Public Sector and the Budget System
under the Thaksin Government. Southeast Asian Studies
3(2): 299–344.
Thongchai Winichakul. 2014. The Monarchy and AntiMonarchy­: Two Elephants in the Room of Thai Politics andthe State of Denial. In “Good Coup” Gone Bad: Thailand’s
Political Developments since Thaksin’s Downfall, edited by
Pavin Chachavalpongpun, pp. 79–108. Singapore: ISEAS.

Notes

NEWSLETTER

1

By “monarchy,” I mean a social institution and entity that are
active in cultural, social, economic, and political life likeevery other. Duncan McCargo (2005) shows that the monarchy “institution,” as it is often called, is a network of nonmonolithic groups and people whose interests rely on, andwho get legitimacy from, their varying associations with themonarch (king). It is “network-monarchy.” The monarchy inthis sense is a larger entity than the king. The charismatic
king himself is the pivot of the machine, not an unknowing or
passive part. The monarchy in this sense is a very active
political force. I use the term “monarchy” in this sense
throughout, in contrast with the monarch, king, queen,
prince, princess, and so on for the individuals. Another term,
the “palace,” is ambiguous but justifiably so to denote thefuzzy actor(s) or subject(s) who can be identified only by its
spatial metaphor.

2

Among the proponents of this view are Andrew MacGregor
Marshall (2014), and Pavin Chachavalpongpun in his several
writings and public addresses.

No. 72006

Special Feature: Reflections on Current Thai Politics

Royal Succession at Stake:
The Future of the Thai Monarchy
Pavin Chachavalpongpun
Associate Professor, CSEAS

I

007

has caused anxiety among Thais about what the
future holds. This nervousness is partly due to thegenerally uncertain political environment now that thenation is once again in the custody of a selfappointed military government. But it is also theresult of Bhumibol’s reign having been perhaps too
successful: Can his successor match up? Reveredby the military, bureaucrats, big businesses, andmainstream society alike, the king is extolled inschools and the media as a demigod and lauded as
the people’s monarch. Photos released by the palace show him travelling through remote regions withmaps and cameras in hand, a trickle of sweat on his
brow.
The royal family has long played an indispensablerole in Thai politics, especially by maintaining close
relations with the military, even during periods ofcivilian rule. Over the years, Bhumibol has managed
to become an indispensable partner of the generals,
and they have cast themselves as the monarchy’s
ultimate defenders. In the late 1950s and early
1960s, the king developed ties with Field Marshal
Sarit Thanarat, who ruled Thailand like a strongman.
In exchange, obsolete practices honoring the royalfamily, such as prostration before the king, wererevived, as part of further sanctifying Bhumibol. Old
and invented royal ceremonies snowballed, according to Thongchai Winichakul (Thongchai 2014, 90).
In the 1980s, Bhumibol appointed General Prem
Tinsulanonda as prime minister; Prem is now thehead of Bhumibol’s Privy Council, where he fends off
any attempts by the government to curtail royal prerogatives. British scholar Duncan McCargo argued
that Prem is a part of the “network monarchy”
designed to safeguard the power position of theking, and is often in competition with civilian governments (McCargo 2005, 499).
Bhumibol has exercised clout with the army inways that are widely perceived to have been in thenation’s general interest. During massive protests in
1992, he persuaded the unpopular prime minister ofthe day, General Suchinda Kraprayoon, to step
down. Suchinda staged a coup in 1991, overthrowing the government of Chatichai Choonhavan. Afterallowing an election in 1992, Suchinda appointed
himself as prime minister, prompting the public’s

Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University

n this short essay my argument on the grounds ofthe current Thai political crisis is straightforward:
The military staged a coup on May 22, 2014 mainly
to take control of the upcoming royal succession.
This important event will determine the future of Thailand, simply because the monarchy has long beenat the center of Thai politics. The military, during thistransitional period, has continued to exploit the revered institution, not only to defend the political interest of the monarchy, but also that of its own.
Now more than a year since the latest coup, themilitary has evidently failed to bring peace and stability back to Thai society. On the contrary, the military
government of Prime Minister General P­ rayuth Chanocha has further deepened rifts in society, among
other things, by incessantly tracking down those withdifferent political opinions. Among these targets, critics of the monarchy are dealt with ever more harshly.
The fact that King Bhumibol Adulyadej has been an
active political player periodically intervening in politics over the past decades seems to indicate whywhat has been going on within the walls of the palace stirs up a deep sense of apprehension among
the Thai public (Handley 2006, 9).1
On May 31, 2015, King Bhumibol was hurriedly
airlifted to Bangkok’s Siriraj hospital following his
return to Bangkok from his seaside palace at Hua
Hin just three weeks before. His ailing wife, Queen
Sirikit, who had suffered a severe stroke in 2012,
accompanied him. Their latest hospitalization ignited
frenzied speculation about the looming end of the
Bhumibol era. The king has been in and out of thehospital since 2009. In the past, rumors about the
king’s deteriorating health badly impacted the Thaistock market. Yet, while the king has played a tremendous role in politics, being able to talk openly
about the monarchy is still forbidden in Thailand. Asan academic working on the Thai monarchy, I myself
have become a victim of the draconian lèse-majesté
law, or the crime of injury to royalty, which is definedby Article 112 of the Thai Criminal Code. It states thatdefamatory, insulting, or threatening comments
about the king, queen, and regent, are punishable
by 3 to 15 years in prison.
On the throne since 1946, Bhumibol is the world’s
longest-reigning monarch. But his worsening healthFig. 1 Queen Sirikit attended a funeral of a royalist yellow shirt
who was killed in a fatal clash with the police in 2008
Source: Khom Chut Luek Newspaper, October 15, 2008

NEWSLETTER
No. 72008

resentment, which led to widespread protests andviolent crackdowns by the army. In 2006, aftermonths of demonstrations against Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra, the king endorsed the coup that
deposed him. The footage of the king and the queen
granting an audience with Prem and General Sonthi
Boonyaratglin, one of the coup makers, signified thepalace’s backing of the military’s political intervention. However, because his interventions have been
periodic and limited, Bhumibol is somewhat perceived as being above politics.
This would be a tough act to follow for anyone, but
Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn needs to step up
to the plate. Yet his recent attempts to signal that heis a worthy successor appear to be falling short. In
1972, the king designated Vajiralongkorn, his only
son, as heir to the throne, and under current succession law, Parliament should simply ratify the king’s
preference after his death. But for many years, thecrown prince, now 62, showed little interest in royaland political affairs. Vajiralongkorn spent much of histime in Munich, living a life some consider dissolute,for example taking naked photos of his wives andmarking the death of his dog Foo Foo, which he hadpromoted to the rank of air marshal, with a lavish
funeral. These eccentricities contrast with thesqueaky-clean image of the king, and have not

Fig. 2 Princess Chulabhorn offered her support to the antiYingluck protesters in 2013
Source: ASTV Manager Weekly, Number 225, January 25–31,
2014

played well with either the people or the generals.
Despite holding many military titles, Vajiralongkorn
lacks the support of the armed forces. Since 1978,
he has maintained a vast praetorian guard, known inThai as the Rachawallop unit. Supposedly in place toensure his security and perform charitable works, it
is seen as a counterforce to the official military.
Despite consisting of around 5,500 members, theRachawallop has been unsuccessful in expanding its
troop numbers due to its direct connection with the
Crown Prince.2
For a time, Vajiralongkorn sought to boost his
appeal by cultivating relations with Thaksin, who wonelections in 2001 and 2005. But the strategy backfired. Vajiralongkorn could have perceived that had
he been alienated by the army, leaning toward
Thaksin might have earned him some kind of popular support from Thaksin’s loyal fans. Thus accordingly, he could have also earned a popular mandate.
This explains why some of Thaksin’s supporters in
the red-shirt movement have openly endorsed thecrown prince as the next monarch. In November
2013, during the protests against the government ofPrime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister,
Vajiralongkorn asked the bureau chief of the Metropolitan Police, a known confidant of Thaksin, tonegotiate with the demonstrators. This only alienatedthem further—as did the prince’s decision, a few
months later, to allow Thaksin’s supporters to campoutside one of his residences and to send his personal guard to protect Yingluck.
After Yingluck was ousted and the military took
control in May 2014, Vajiralongkorn seemed to havechanged tack. He started reaching out to the new
Prayuth government. (As the king’s designated heir,
the crown prince’s accession should simply beendorsed by Parliament, but under military rule, thearmy’s support is also necessary.) In August 2014,
Vajiralongkorn presided over the inauguration ceremony of the new military-appointed National Legislative Assembly, implicitly endorsing the coup. This
March, he sent Prayuth flowers on the occasion ofhis 61st birthday. The prince also appeared to havebeen cleaning house. He divorced his wife, Princess
Srirasmi, in December 2014, reportedly out of concern that her relatives had damaged the monarchy’s
dignity by exploiting his name for financial benefit.
Her parents and brothers were later charged undert h e l è s e - m a j e s t é l a w. I t i s u n c l e a r w h e t h e r­Vajiralongkorn’s efforts are paying off, but there are
no realistic alternatives. One of Vajiralongkorn’s threesisters, Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, is beloved
by the people, thanks partly to her charitable activities. She is seen as humble and down to earth, much
like her father. But current succession law and established practice does not readily allow her to accede
to the throne. The constitution was amended in 1974
to permit a daughter of the king to ascend thethrone—but only in the absence of a male heir
apparent and under other strict requirements. This
presumably means that Sirindhorn could become
queen only if Bhumibol demoted Vajiralongkorn anddesignated her as his new heir—which would be
unprecedented. The king may already be too weak
to make such a daring move, especially since it
might shake the entire monarchy by triggering a
power struggle between the conservative royalists

who favor Sirindhorn, and the crown prince and his
supporters. It is possible that the military government, which is wary of Vajiralongkorn, could disregard the king’s preference and designate anothercandidate to the throne. But that decision would
surely divide this already fragmented nation. It is
unlikely and the prince’s newfound behavior may
bring rapprochement with the military.
The monarchy remains a major political symbol in
Thailand. But now, with the Bhumibol era in its twilight and a problematic succession ahead, the institution is weakening. Under these circumstances,
Vajiralongkorn should be allowed to take the throne
as prescribed by law, but with the understanding that
he will essentially forgo politics. By withdrawing fromthe political fray, it is the royal family’s best chance of
maintaining its moral authority. It is also Thailand’s
best chance for some measure of stability.
References
Handley, Paul M. 2006. The King Never Smiles: A Biography ofKing Bhumibol Adulyadej. New Haven and London: Yale
University Press.
McCargo, Duncan. 2005. Network Monarchy and Legitimacy
Crises in Thailand. The Pacific Review 18(4): 499–519.
Thongchai Winichakul. 2014 The Monarchy and Anti-Monarchy:
Two Elephants in the Room of Thai Politics and the State of
Denial. In “Good Coup” Gone Bad: Thailand’s Political
Developments since Thaksin’s Downfall, edited by Pavin
Chachavalpongpun, pp.79–108. Singapore: ISEAS.

Notes
1

He asserted, “Unlike other monarchs in the world, Bhumibol
made himself a full-fledged, dominant political actor.”

2

In an email interview with Paul Chambers, who is Director of
Research Institute of Southeast Asian Affairs (ISEAA),
Chiang Mai University, on January 21, 2015.

Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University
009

Special Feature: Reflections on Current Thai Politics

Thailand Purports to Be in Search ofan Upright Political System, But
Can “Democracy” Still Be
Regarded as a Viable Option?
Titipol Phakdeewanich*Former Visiting Research Scholar, CSEASTNEWSLETTER
No. 72010

hailand has been a society in limbo ever since
the Thai military coup d’état of May 22, 2014, andyet, it remains as seemingly divided as it ever has
been, after a decade and more of almost continualsocial-political discord. Nevertheless, in the wake ofthe coup—which was led by the National Council for
Peace and Order (or NCPO)—and with it, the resulting establishment of an arbitrary and non-democratic
authoritarian jurisdiction, Thailand’s intractable problems now only threaten to escalate existing entrenched divisions.
In, what has been a concerted effort to further
secure the power and status of this ruling Thai Junta,
the attempt to silence the more vocal opponents will,
most assuredly, have been a matter of primary concern. According to a recent report by the Freedom ofExpression Documentation Center (based at iLaw, aThai NGO), by the end of August 2015, the Junta
had either directly summoned, or sent their military
representatives to “visit” the homes of at least 782
Thai civilians—and at least 144 civilians have been
repeatedly trailed by the military, since the coup, itself(Freedom of Expression Documentation Centre 2015).
Although Thailand’s dwindling numbers of democratic stalwarts are attempting to retain some senseof conviction in making the case for a swift return todemocratic norms—to those who are still preparedto listen, or entertain such notions—it is a dawning
reality that Thais, in their millions, are becoming
increasingly accepting of the resort to authoritarian
approaches, in attempting to resolve the Thai socialpolitical impasse. Moreover, because many of thelatter have already emerged as avowed advocates
for authoritarianism over democratization, whilst theremaining voices for democracy are now necessarily
prudent in their seeming diffidence, in general, thisforeshadows the likelihood of a continued worsening
outlook for Thailand.
The Junta, and their Constitution Drafting Committee (or CDC), had been hoping that their August
2015 draft proposal for a 20th Thai constitution—
since the “Siamese coup d’état” (or “Siamese Revo-lution”) of 1932 brought Thailand from the status of“absolute monarchy,” to that of “constitutional monarchy”—would lead to the installation of what isbeing referred to as “Thai-style” democracy.
However, this draft was considered so profoundly
undemocratic by many millions of Thais—perhaps,
most especially, because the new constitution would
have established the National Strategic Reform andReconciliation Committee (or NSRRC), which was toconsist of top bureaucrats and military officials, byappointment—that it was ultimately blocked by the
National Reform Council (or NRC), in September.
This only further delayed any apparent progress
towards more democratic structures. Despite thisapparent, albeit temporary, setback for the Junta,
many Thais sneakingly suspect that the NSRRC, or avariant thereof will ultimately be put into place, one
way or another.
Notwithstanding the various behind-the-scenes,
and more overt strategic maneuverings, there aremany millions of other Thais who remain quite inagreement with the intention for Thailand to establish
an NSRRC-type of body. This suggests that open
military involvement in Thai politics can gain a significant amount of public support, regardless of the oftrepeated arguments that such forms of interventionism are reflective of a nefarious desire to illegitimately
coerce and influence society, and likely future outcomes. Thus, the question arises as to whether there
can be a realistic prospect for internationally established and recognized democratic principles withinsuch a Thailand.
Although they must, for the foreseeable future,remain on the sidelines of the debate, the two major
political parties—namely, the Democrat Party and the
Pheu Thai Party—were for disparate strategic reasons, both clear in publicly stating that they would
not accept the revised draft of the CDC. In addition,
Suthep Thaugsuban, the President of the People’s
Democratic Reform Foundation (or PDRF, which wasformerly known as the People’s Democratic Reform
Committee, or PDRC), was quick to officially endorse

011

racy” in itself risks merely becoming a vaguely hoped
for aspiration or ideal, and as something which canbe forever sidelined in favor of the practical realities
that pertain to any given immediate social-politicalconcern—especially with Thailand seemingly everlurching from latest crisis, to the next. Moreover, if
the Junta and its civilian executives can make sufficient, if disagreeable “progress” over the next few
years, then what case would there be left for democracy in what may come to be otherwise regarded as
an unmanageable and irredeemable society?
When the promise of democratic progress was stilla sufficiently tenable notion, then those who had
been historically sidelined and marginalized by thestate, and by relatively privileged Thais, could believe
in democratic means as long as they could also
believe that it would bring them full state recognition,
and with it and increased regard of the more advantaged demographics.
This hopeful sense of optimism was perhaps felt
most keenly by the otherwise forgotten and vulnerable rural poor who have lived an often marginal existence in North and Northeast Thailand. They had
been repeatedly discounted by government after
government, and also, by generations of increasingly
affluent urbanized Thais. Their well-documented
developing relationship with Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra,
who was Prime Minister of Thailand between 2001
and 2006, reflected, despite very real and continuing
problems with Thai democracy, the probable highwater mark for any reasonable belief in it—and withthis latest coup, its possible death knell.
Sustained political upheaval has significantly
undermined the prognosis for an already unsettled
Thai economy. Nearly 20 years have passed since
the Asian financial crisis of 1997, when Thailand lostits status as a potential contender that could hope totie in with the leading “Asian Tiger” economies, andthe path that they had forged. In the intervening
years, Thailand has continued to discover new ways
to prove to the wider world just how much of an illusion that ambition really was—and so the flagrant
disregard for democratic values now being
witnessed,only acts to reinforce such perceptions.
When we also consider that the global economic
outlook remains quite uncertain for so many countries, not least, with the recent corrections to the Chinese, and then the wider Asian stock market indices,then Thailand can hardly afford the indulgence offurther compounding obstacles to progress.
It does not appear that 2015 will be a promisingyear for a Thai economy that is increasingly reliant
on tourism and therefore on a positive image abroad.
The August 2015 Bangkok bombing at the Erawan
Shrine, in the key commercial district of Ratchaprasong, made the world’s headlines and in the fallout,

Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University

what became a failed draft, and he continues topublicly advocate for a national referendum on theissue. On the other hand, despite still sharply divided
public opinion, to publicly criticize a mere draft proposal is to risk the ire of the Junta.
In attempting to better contend with the phenomenon of Thai authoritarianism, it should be understoodthat Thais are certainly well aware of its various pernicious effects, as it continues to operate not only inoverseeing Thai society from the top, but also
because of the ways in which it imbues society at amore mundane day-to-day level. This has been ahistorical problem which informs Thai societal
dynamics at almost all levels, and it has manifested
itself in a number of ways.
From various approaches to Thai Buddhism, children’s education, and the family, as well as in relation to the structures of the developing nation state,most of this is subtly (or not so subtly) influenced bya long-established and pervasive Thai patronage
system. It predates societal problems that may otherwise be ostensibly regarded as newly emergent
and its consequential myriad compound effects that
historians have been attempting to fathom, withregard to the past several hundred years, and moreof Thailand’s perennial misadventures and travails.
In terms of the relatively recent historical periodsof overt authoritarian control, the eras of Field­Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram (Prime Minister ofThailand between 1938 and 1944), Field Marshal
Sarit Thanarat (Prime Minister of Thailand between
1958 and 1963), and Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn (Prime Minister of Thailand between 1963 and1973), are some of the more notorious, and these as
well as other similarly testing times certainly left theirmark on the wounded, and now highly susceptible
Thai psyche.
What are the consequences? All too many Thais
reflexively believe that in order to get things done theends very often really do justify the means. But only
for so long, of course, as this accords with their own
will and desire. Ultimately, this is a mentality that will
only lead to yet further violence and chaos. The solution to this predicament will almost inevitably be an
intensified pursuance of autocratic and often egregiously implemented statist solutions, in relation towhich Thais are already so well accustomed.
Concurrently, this is also a time when an increasingly large number of Thais are looking to the Chinese political model, as they begin to believe thatwestern-identified democratic values may not be theanswer. This is a challenging time for the democratic
movement within Thailand, because the language of
democracy has become ever less convincing within
this ever-divided land.
In such an overall context, the notion of “democ-

NEWSLETTER
No. 72012

the Thai tourist industry has been directly affected atleast for the time being.
According to the Bank of Thailand, in July 2015,
economic growth across all the major sectors of theThai economy had evidenced a slowing down (ascompared to July 2014), with the exception of the
tourist industry and public spending (although theeffect of the bombing will not be accounted for withinthese figures). It will therefore also be of a significant
concern to the Junta that in July 2015, Thai exports
actually declined by 3.1 percent (Bank of Thailand
2015).
The Junta has anticipated many of the questions
that are now being raised in relation to the aforementioned and has put into place a number of new policy
mechanisms that are intended to at least mitigate
the severity of the potential problem of lower than
anticipated governmental revenue from tourism.
Indeed, there is now a general consensus that theJunta should act to ensure that the tourist industry
will continue to enjoy a level of growth which canhelp to keep the Thai economy afloat.
Nevertheless, there is rather less that the Junta
can do to convince the international markets that
Thailand is a place to be investing in these uncertain
times. This will be, to a significant extent, out of theirhands. Although the tourism policy mechanisms are
not in themselves significantly affecting overall governmental spending, without continually healthy foreign inputs from tourism, foreign direct investment,
and international finance, the attempt to moderate
the situation through further state intervention andindebtedness, would seem to be inevitable.
It is uncertain whether such indebtedness is limited to the short to medium term or becomes anunavoidable long-term quandary. However should it
be the case that over the next few months Thailand’ssocial-political-economic position continues toworsen, then this could provide a shock to the Thai
economy that can only be realistically contended
through a furtherance of the role of the state. This
would, almost assuredly only further the pretext for
the Thai authoritarian statist imperative.
Thailand’s economic problems will more than likely
have been a significant contributing factor in thedecision of the Junta to reconsider the policies thatwere originally introduced by Thaksin Shinawatra. At
the time of their original implementation, these policies were contentiously contested by Thaksin Shinawatra’s critics who now overwhelmingly constitutethe very same demographics in support of authoritarianism as the means by which to implement whatamounts, in practice, to the very same policies.
These include the “Village Fund” policy, and One Village One Product (or OTOP), as part of the latest
urgent policy proposal for a stimulus plan to reener-

gize the Thai economy. The contradiction is glaring.
The alliance between Thaksin Shinawatra and therural poor had, in certain respects, helped to bring agreater semblance of legitimacy to Thai democracy.
This included a way in which to begin to rectify historical injustices. Although their alliance was strongly
resisted by their critics throughout the period during
which either Thaksin Shinawatra or his surrogateswere in office, when democracy threatened to finallyshift Thailand into an era of truly widespread progress, then it was really only a matter of time before
the inevitable.
Admittedly, the effort to subvert this allianceresulted in a protracted battle, by way of Thailand’s
democratic structures at first, and when that failed,by way of the public stage of the PDRC, and the­rabble-rousers of the Bangkok street protests of2013 and 2014. Then finally, with the alliance remaining resolute and undeterred, the cracked facade ofThai democracy would finally crumble, only for thecoup to explicitly reveal—to both Thai citizens and to
the world, and with it the evident public criticisms
from much of the international community—the often
implicitly understood reality of the Thai state
structure.
And now that the once grudgingly accepted Thai
social-democratic contract has been so categoricallyrescinded, an underlying historical truth has been
revealed. Thais who have been relatively advantagedby the all-too-often rigged and corrupt social-politicaleconomic dynamics of Thailand and therefore consider themselves either well established, or on therise, will only concede to a semblance of democracy
for so long as they are guaranteed not to be sidelined or otherwise disadvantaged.
The Thais that share this essential mindset are, toa greater or lesser extent, the very same demographics that previously argued for a coup, and who advocate for authoritarian solutions today. So much for“democracy” then, “Thai-style” or otherwise. Boththe months long lead up to the coup, and themonths since, already indicate the fading chances
for a once more widely held Thai ambition.
References
Bank of Thailand. 2015. Press Release on Economic and Monetary Conditions: July 2015, No.45/2015. Bangkok: Bank ofThailand.
Freedom of Expression Documentation Centre. 2015. Statistic
as of August 2015, under NCPO Regime. Available at http://
freedom.ilaw.or.th/. Accessed on September 2, 2015.
*Dr Titipol Phakdeewanich is a visiting fellow at the Centre for
the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the Universityof Warwick, United Kingdom, and is based at the Faculty of
Political Science at Ubon Ratchathani University, Thailand.

Special Feature: Reflections on Current Thai Politics

Thailand: A Year After
Tanet Charoenmuang
Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science andInternational Relations, Faculty of Political Science andPublic Administration, Chiang Mai UniversityE013

of the coup, pro-democracy Redshirt leaders all overthe country were arrested and detained in military
camps.
Unlike the coup in 2006, in which the coup leader
gave power to an appointed government shortly
afterwards, the military junta remained in power andestablished four more organizations to form five
“major currents of power.” These are namely, the­military-dominated cabinet with the junta leader as
premier; the NLA (National Legislative Assembly);
the NRC (National Reform Council); and the CDC(Constitution Drafting Committee). All have been
appointed by the junta and obviously played a role inoverthrowing an elected government.
After detention in military camps for one week, allmembers of the Yingluck cabinet and over 500 Redshirt leaders nationwide had to sign an agreement
not to initiate or take part in any more political activities and were released. Some who refused to report
themselves to the military had to go to a military
court and the hearings and reporting have draggedon until now. In the meantime, hundreds fled toneighboring countries and scores of them have now
secured or sought political asylum status in Europe,
Australia, Japan, and the U.S. In the U.S., the New
Free Thai Movement for democracy led by Dr.
­Jarupong Ruangsuwan, Pheu Thai Party leader and
Dr. Sunai Julpongsatorn, prominent Pheu Thai MP,
was set up urging the end of a military rule. Groupsof Thai citizens around the world have many times
demonstrated their opposition against a military
regime in their country.
In Thailand, a number of opposition campaigns
against the coup took place in different forms andareas. The examples included wearing redshirts,
writing on public buildings, showing a three-finger
sign, and a group reading of George Orwell’s
famous “1984” in public. Several arrests of university
students were made in an open opposition movement. Their release followed after the military did notwant to create any greater tension, but they moved
on to conduct psychological war against students’parents and teachers. Most alarming, however,appears to be the cases of lèse-majesté. Over the
past 12 months, at least 40 people have beenarrested, charged, and sentenced in violating sec-

Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University

ven though Thailand has already had 17 coupsin the past 81 years (1932–early 2014), when the
18th strike took place on May 22, 2014, the world
seemed to be sinking deeper into more ponderingrather than being surprised. It was a surprise formany people when the coup took place on September 19, 2006 after Thaksin Shinawatra led his Thai
Rak Thai Party to set an unprecedented four records
in Thai politics: the first elected leader to complete a
4-year term in office; the first to win re-election; thefirst to win two consecutive big victories, especiallythe second; and the first to form a one-party
government.
In fact, these four characteristics have made theestablishment worry and fear the possibility of astrong and stable democratic regime and further
changes which would undermine the status quo.
Thus, a coup was carried out and an elected andhugely popular government was overthrown by the
military power forcing Thaksin to live in exile. However, Thaksin’s successors continued to win two following general elections, one in December 2007 andthe other in July 2011. Instead of calmly accepting
defeat and seeking ways to improve themselves forthe next election, the conservative plotted anothercoup. So the latest military junta overthrew anotherelected government on May 22, 2014. Whether it wasanother surprise or an experience that left one with aheavy heart depended very much on how one looks
at it.
The 18th military coup in Thailand in May 2014
was, by Thai standards, well planned and quickly
executed. Suthep Thuagsuban, vice chairman of the
Democrat Party (DP), resigned from his post andparty to lead an anti-Yingluck government, called thePeople’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC).
They seized several intersections for demonstrations
sites and the Government House, clashed with thepolice with weapons, prevented voters from going tovote, and along the way led the cries for a militarycoup. The political turmoil lasted from late November
2013 to mid-May 2014. Finally, the military enacted
martial law on May 20, 2014 forbidding any politicalgatherings and two days later staged a coup, citing
the necessity to save the nation from deteriorating
national disunity, crisis, and demise. Within one hour

NEWSLETTER
No. 72014

tion 112 of the Thai criminal code. Several of theindicted have faced up to 20–60 years of imprisonment and the punishment rate has increased under
military court control. The increase of these politicalconflicts has led the UN Office of Human Rights tovoice concern and call for a halt on harshpunishment.1
International pressure on Thailand to return to a
democratic regime has appeared to be a constantproblem for the Prayut government. Apart from an
open criticism against a backward regime and thecalls for a return to democracy, Western governments including Australia have forbidden the coup
leaders to enter their territories and have adopted
different methods to pressure Thailand. These range
from, a reduction of military exercises between the
U.S. and Thailand, EU and the U.S., pressure on theThai government to solve the problem of illegal workers in the fishing industry, to requests to improve thequality of Thai Airways flights to meet international
standards. Increasingly friendly relations between theThai government and China, seen by remarks fromthe military junta leader and several visits to Thailand
by high-ranking Chinese officials, include an attemptfrom the Thai side to purchase three submarines anda fast train project. These all point towards a coolingof relations between Thailand and the U.S. for the
first time in six decades.
The sending back of 109 China’s Uighur people to
China in early July has also drawn strong criticism
not only from the U.S. government but also fromgroups of Muslims in Turkey who have opposed theChinese government’s treatment of ethnic groups inXinjiang Province. There were hundreds of Uighur
people in Xinjiang who fled into Thai territory andwould like to seek refuge in Turkey. Upon the Chinese government’s request and against a plea fromthe Turkish government, the Thai government sent
them back to the Chinese authorities. The action of
the Thai junta-government sent a clear message to
Washington how well the Thai leaders have
responded to the requests of the Chinese government. In addition, many have worried that Thailand
could be another target of international conflicts withregard to the mishandling of human rights in Muslimrelated issues.
As the military regime now moves on into its second year of rule, three major problems have emerged
and are likely to remain for some time. First, theeconomy is slowing down and the junta government’s treatment of rice and rubber producers has
been negative. There has also been a decrease intourism and the flight of foreign investment due toboth the coup situation and/or investment privilegesin “developing economies” like Vietnam and Myanmar. Thailand for the first time has seen her eco-nomic growth rate drop to 1–2%. At the same time,
more and more complaints have been heard concerning people’s low purchasing power and an economic slump in almost all areas of life. General­P rayut appointed Somkid Jatusripitak, Thaksin’s
deputy prime minister, to head a new economic
team, who has already announced a major plan torevive the economy by increasing the income of thelower classes. However, it remains to be seen
whether the national economy can be stimulated
based on Thaksinomic approaches amidst international calls for an open political system and the government’s refusal to listen.
The second is the political crisis concerning thedraft of the constitution. On September 6, 2015, theNational Reform Council (NRC) made a surprise vote
to reject the draft by 135 to 105. Most scholars andNGO leaders voted to accept it. Yet almost all militaryand police officers voted no, indicating a new moveby the coup leaders. The draft fully advocates a
weak political party system, a powerful appointed
senate, an outside prime minister, and a powerfully
appointed and strategic committee to control overthe elected government, ironically labeled by someacademics as the “constitutionalization of coups.”
However, both the Democrat Party and Pheu Thai
Party have opposed the draft. So the coup leadersknew that if the draft were approved by the NRC, it
would be very likely that the new constitution would
be rejected by a national referendum. Heateddebates over the new constitution would allow more
people to be politicized and turn against the military
regime. The rejection of the draft by the referendum
will cause a huge embarrassment to the junta. On
the contrary, the no vote at the NRC will not only
eliminate all political conflicts that may arise before
and during the referendum, but also allow the military
government to hold on to power for at least another18 months.
The third involved the recent August 17 bombing
at the Erawan Shrine that caused the deaths andinjuries of many foreign tourists and Thais. The
clean-up of the scene within 16 hours after the tragic
event surprised many people especially in terms offorensic evidence search. One source casts doubt
over the arrest of “middle eastern” looking people in
Bangkok with regard to the bombing. Confessions
can be made, but how much can they be authenticated? The situation is more complicated when otherfactors are taken into account: the conflict between
the pro-election side and pro-coup side, the struggle
for power among the pro-coup factions, the conflictover the military appointments, the conflict between
the Thai government and the Muslim forces over the
Uighur problem, and the violent conflict in the Southof the country.

Thus, the transition towards democracy in Thailand will not just be a long road, but also difficult one
which requires us to understand the nature of allactors within an ongoing and rapidly developing
context.
References
Anudit Nakornthap. 2015. You Drafted It, Wrote It, and Rejectedit ร่างเอง เขียนเอง คว่ำ�เอง. Loke Wanni [Today world] 16 (531,September 12–18): 8. (in Thai )Chachavalpongpun, Pavin. 2015. Thai Terror Blast a Symptomof Deeper Illness. The Japan Times, September 9, 2015.
Accessed September 11, 2015. http://www.japantimes.
co.jp/opinion/2015/09/09/commentary/world-commentary/
thai-terror-blast-symptom-deeper-illness/.
Column “Domestic.” 2015a. Political Lessons of 2006 and2014 Coups: Offense and Defense, Offensive Defenseบทเรียนการเมือง รัฐประหาร 2549 และ 2557 รุก-รับ รับมีรก
ุ . Weekend

Matichon 35 (1820, July 3–9): 910. (in Thai)————. 2015b. How have We Arrived at This Point?
เรามาถึงจุดนี้ได้อย่างไร? Weekend Matichon 35 (1822, July
17–23): 10. (in Thai)
Pichet Yingkiatkhun. Analysis of Thaksinomics: Will Somkid and
His Military Government Fail? วิเคราะห์ 7 ข้อทักษิโณมิคส์: สมคิด
คสช. จะล้มเหลว? Lok Wanni [Today world] 16 (529, August
29–September 4): 8–9. (in Thai )Suthachai Yimprasert. 2015. The Constitutionalization of Dictatorship ระบอบเผด็จการโดยรัฐธรรมนูญ. Lok Wanni [Today world]
16 (530, September 5–11): 10. (in Thai )Willlis, Rachael. 2015. Thailand’s Junta Is Overstaying Its­Welcome. Huffington Post, September 9, 2015. Accessed
September 11, 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rachaelwillis-/thailands-junta-is-overst_b_8100196.html.

Note
1

Thai Lawyers for Human Rights. See tlhr2014.wordpress.com
and new.voicetv.co.th. Accessed August 11, 2015.

Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University

Protesters photographed leaving a protest in front of the Office of the Governor of the Province of Ubon Ratchathani, December 9, 2013.
Photo: Titipol Phakdeewanich

015

Special Feature: Reflections on Current Thai Politics“Constituting” the Nation:
Modern-day Thai-style DictatorshipDavid Streckfuss
Honorary Fellow, University of Wisconsin-Madison;
Former Visiting Research Scholar, CSEASINEWSLETTER
No. 72016

t is inevitable that the dictator tends toward megalomania as the entire structure of power focuses
upward to the one individual in charge. The dictatoris the regime, the human face that becomes essentially the sole symbol of dictatorship. The “cabinet” ismerely an expression of the dictator; the “parliament”
is a facet of the dictator; other bodies created by theregime are also just aspects of the dictator. It reallydoesn’t matter if the dictator is a “team player” whoworks on the basis of some sort of “consensus” withthese various other bodies, or whether he (or she) isa “take charge” kind of leader. Anyone in these bodies can be summarily dismissed and so they are at
the end of the day irrelevant. Under dictatorship,­everyone else is a bit player.
The politicians are remnants of the overthrowngovernment. They, like everyone else, are legallybanned from criticizing the regime. They are allowed
to kick up a little dust now and again, but they arecarefully monitored and kept from mounting any sortof opposition. The people have been cowed. Those
who don’t get in line with the regime (or at least staysilent) are politely harassed, called in for attitude
adjustments, pressured by their bosses. The namesof persistent offenders are removed from committees, boards, directorships. It is communicated tothem that not only will there be no institutional support for them if they run into trouble, but that theinstitution will collaborate fully with the regime to isolate and intimidate them. Other than perhaps symbolic support by, say, signing a public letter of concern, no one will stand up in the name of thosepersecuted by the regime as a matter of principle.
There are no principles under dictatorship properly
defined. It’s all about emotion, faith, a glorious future.
In such a coerced silence, the dictator keeps dictating, a single voice that speaks for a nation.
Over time, the dictator forgets the opposition has
been silenced and starts believing the regime’s own
propaganda. The dictator forgets that he was“elected” as prime minister by a group of people
carefully hand-picked by the regime. The dictator istouched by polls that tell him he is admired and thatthe people want him to serve longer, perhaps forever.
Petulance is unbecoming but inevitable for dictators,

especially for the ones who believed they came tothe position reluctantly. The dictator is irritated when
the word “dictatorship” is used or implied, or whensomeone says that the regime came to power
through a coup. The dictator wants—he needs—tobelieve that power was seized with the consent of
the people. The dictator always affirms his own sincerity and believes with all his heart that he is loved
by the nation. As he is sincere, displays of opposition
must be the result of a misunderstanding (fixablewith an attitude adjustment), or the result of an illintentioned group whose nefarious impact must be
reduced or eliminated.
The dictator ever speaks of the importance of ruleof law. “Everyone must follow the law,” says the dictator, forgetting perhaps that it was he who overthrew
the existing law and constitution, forgetting that hehas said time and again that it is he who now makes
the law. No matter: everyone must follow the law.
The dictator is right to recognize that democracy isunder siege everywhere these days. He sees himself
perhaps as a kind of fighter for democracy. Yet what
the regime is peddling has very little resemblance tothe range of ideas surrounding democracy outsideof Thailand. The regime has focused most of it “reconciliation” efforts on teaching Thai people abouttrue democracy. The military intervention last year
was not for the military to seize power but to build up
democracy. True democracy does not come fromelections but from a duly appointed government thatsaves the people from the dirty business of politics.
That’s the core proposition of military-style reconciliation: people have to reconcile themselves to a true
democracy that ends any hope of popularsovereignty.
The dictator was wrong to think, though, that a“democratic” coup would open doors to foreign governments. It has been a hard go. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs seems to have had a single purpose
since the coup: explain to the world why the coup
was necessary and how everything has returned tonormal. Repeatedly hurt, the regime has attacked
statements made by other governments about thestate of Thailand. The dictator “prime minister” hasonly been received by ASEAN governments andChina. It has moved closer to, not without irony,
North Korea.
The lifeblood of dictatorship is to be taken seriously on its own terms, to have people forget how
the power was gotten. It thrives when people starttalking about details or implications of this or thatpolicy, of this or that constitutional provision, themerits of this or that law. Once the population gets
involved in the nitty-gritty of activities the regime hasbrought about, it legitimizes indirectly but powerfully
the core illegality of the regime.
* * *Thailand has been a captive subject to a grossabsurdity since the military seized power in 2014. It
has all been a ridiculous spectacle, a ludicrous
drama. The cruelest episode has been about thedraft constitution. The regime handpicks legal“experts” who draft a constitution that is plainly
undemocratic, perhaps intentionally so. The constitution is passed on for approval to another handpicked
body, the National Reform Council. If passed, thejunta could stay in power indefinitely, albeit lessdirectly. But as it turns out, the junta itself lobbied tohave the draft constitution voted down, perhaps fearing it would fail to pass in a promised nationwide referendum. Then the junta appoints a new constitutiondrafting committee, and the farce begins again.
The regime controlled all the factors going into theconstitutional drafting and should be held solely
responsible. That the constitution didn’t pass the
National Reform Council, that the junta sought tobring it down, should have been a repudiation of theregime and ought to have brought jeering crowds
out into the streets. Out of good sportsmanship, thejunta should have stepped down. But the dictator will
not step down. He and his motley production will
absurdly go on and on.

An anonymous satirical rendering of the leader of the junta in“glorious leader” style floated on Facebook six months after
the coup. The words read: “Congratulations to Gen. Prayud
Chan-o-cha.” On the flag it says, “Returning Happiness to [your]
Followers.”

And this seems to be a function of Thai-style dictatorship following a polite coup: overwhelm andexhaust the captive audience with an onslaught ofdaily absurdities. The opposition began in anger following the coup, but that was followed with frustration and sometimes even mocking amusement. But
after some time, there arose a feeling of bewilderment, then boredom, and finally now it is silence. To
look upon this absurd spectacle after 15 months canphysically sicken and psychologically cripple. The
political folly that is Thailand has gone beyond themerely absurd or ludicrous. It has now become
utterly grotesque.
Even writing this hurts. Maybe I’ll return to my silence.

Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University017

Understanding Climate Change Impacts
and Adaptation Mechanism in Cambodia
Sothun Nop
Lecturer-Researcher, Faculty of Development Studies,
Royal University of Phnom Penh (RUPP), Cambodia;
Former Guest Scholar, CSEAS

Background of Cambodia
Cambodia is located in mainland Southeast Asia. It
covers an area of 181,035 km2 and is divided into 25
provinces. The population in 2013 was 15.14 million(WB 2015). Cambodia shares a border with three
countries (Fig. 1) and the mainland is divided into
three main parts (the middle, the mountains, and thecoast). The flat areas are in the middle of the countryaround Tonle Sap Lake, which are the main areas forrice cultivation. The country is surrounded by plateau
and mountainous areas, which are mostly located in
the north and northeast of the country including theDangrek, Cardamom, and the Elephant mountain
ranges. These areas are useful for agro-industrial
crops such as rubber, cassava, cashews, and so on.
The third region is the coastal zone located in thesouthwest of the country, which is beneficial forsome kinds of agro-industrial crops particularly oilpalm. Some parts of this coastal area are covered bymangrove forest (Nguyen and Shaw 2010; RGC

NEWSLETTER
No. 72018

Fig. 1 Administrative Map of Cambodia
Source: Nationasonline.org

2001; UNDP 2013a).
As a tropical country, Cambodia has sunshine
almost all the year with high average temperatures,and has two distinct seasons namely the dry and therainy seasons. The rainy season lasts for six months
from May to October, with south-westerly winds
accompanying clouds that bring around 75% to 80%of the annual rainfall, often in spectacular intensebursts for an hour at a time with fantastic lightening
displays. The other half of the year is the dry season,
which runs from November to April where averagetemperatures range from 27 to 40ºC. The most
comfortable and coolest period in the country is
between October and January (Nguyen and Shaw
2010; RGC 2001).
Cambodia is known as a developing country,
which experienced a long civil war and “dark age”
(Pol Pot regime between 1975–79). It is also an agrarian country where more than 80% of the total population live in rural areas with about 52% living in thecentral plains and 30% around the Tonle Sap Lake.

Fig. 2 Cambodian Land Cover Change between 2004–13
Data Source: OpenDevelopment Cambodia

Contemporary Climate Related Issues in
Cambodia019

Cambodia is one of the least developed countries in
the region and is more vulnerable to climate change
impacts due to its limited adaptive capacity (UNDP
2013b; Yusuf and Francisco 2010). Cambodia isaffected by climate changes in four ways: anincrease in temperature; a change in rainfall patterns; a high prevalence of floods and droughts; anda rise in sea levels (Nang et al. 2014). According to
Baran et al. (2009) the temperature of Cambodia is
expected to increase between 0.3 to 0.6ºC by 2025.
McSweeney et al. (2008) has similarly confirmed that
average temperature of Cambodia is projected toincrease between 0.7 to 2.7ºC by 2060, and between
1.4 to 4.3ºC by 2090 (Fig. 3).
Cambodian rainfall has not shown any consistentincrease or decrease since 1960s (Fig. 4), but this is
projected to increase on a magnitude of one-day
and five-day rainfalls of up to 54 mm and 84 mm
respectively by 2090 (ibid.).
However, Diepart (2014) contended that eventhough there is no significant variation in terms of theamount of rainfall, there are changes in relation torainfall patterns. He argued that before 1930s rainstarted falling down in May and increased to its peakin July, then declined until November. But later in the
1980s, less rain started falling in May and continued
increasing to its peak in September, before declining
in November (Fig. 5). Changes in the rainfall period
can lead to the failure of agricultural crops due to alack of water supply with more loss and damage due
to heavy rain during the late crop calendar in
September.
Although there are no clear statistics that indicate
the current impacts of rising sea levels on coastal
areas of Cambodia, there are lots of concerns
regarding this problem. McSweeney et al. (2008)
have claimed that sea-levels in the region are projected to increase between 21 to 52 cm by 2090.
With this significant increase, it will bring about morerisks of severe flooding, and effects on fresh water

Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University

Due to the substantial destruction of the country’s
physical infrastructure during the civil war, Cambodia
still faces many social and economic issues as its
continues to develop (Nguyen and Shaw 2010; RGC
2001; UNDP 2013a).
In term of economic factors, UNDP (2013a) has
demonstrated that Cambodia has experienced
strong growth rates during the last decade. The
Cambodian economy is estimated to have increasedby 7.6% in 2013. According to the Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF) cited by UNDP (2013a),the current annual GDP per capita is US$1,036 compared to around US$200 in 1992. This growth will
help Cambodia to become a lower-middle income
nation in the near future.
Along with growth and the process of national restoration, many natural resources have been usedleading to significant changes in term of land usedduring the last decade. In 2004, for instance, forest
areas largely covered Cambodia, but those areas
have gradually declined and been replaced by agricultural and barren land (Fig. 2).

Fig. 3 The Projection of Temperature in Cambodia
Source: McSweeney et al. (2008)

Fig. 4 The Projection of Cambodian Precipitation
Source: McSweeney et al. (2008)

Fig. 5 Change in Rainfall Patterns: Chrey Bak (Kg Chhnang Province)
Source: Diepart (2014)

NEWSLETTER
No. 72020

quality in the coastal zones.
Cambodia has experienced more extreme floods
and droughts during the last decades. According to
the National Committee for Disaster Management(NCDM) cited by Heng (2014), flood intensity trends
have increased between 2000 and 2013. In 2013, forexample, 20 of 25 provinces of Cambodia wereaffected by floods (Fig. 6).
Consequently, lives and crops were lost and people were seriously affected by vector born diseases.
The trend of drought frequency has also increased in
the same period (ibid.). In 2012, for instance, 14 of
25 provinces of Cambodia were affected by drought(Fig. 7), which lead to crop failure and landdegradation.
In relation to losses and damages, NCDM (2013)
confirmed that between 1996–2013, 2,050 people
were killed due to disasters. About 1.7 million ha(accounting for 67% of total losses) of paddy field
were damaged by floods, while around 0.77 millionha (31%) were devastated by droughts. Physicalinfrastructure included 45,372 house, 194 hospitals,
schools, roads, and irrigation systems which werealso affected. Average annual economic loss of
Cambodia was $16.1 million from floods affects and$7 million from drought (UNISDR and WB 2010).
This current situation means that Cambodia isconfronting many potential climate related hazards
including floods, drought, windstorms, landslides,and diseases. Due to the greater frequency andintensity of these climate risks, the livelihood of communities have been severely affected and are at highrisk (CDRI 2012; Nguyen and Shaw 2010; RGC
2013; Sreng 2013). In particular, the impacts of climate change affect the livelihood of poor communities leading to serious problems relating to foodsecurity, ill health, and a loss of livelihoods activities.
Simultaneously, there is an added burden on thegovernment to achieve its goals of poverty eradication and sustainable development.

Fig. 6 Flood Situation and Its Intensity in Cambodia
Source: NCDM (2013)

Fig. 7 Drought Situation and Its Intensity in Cambodia
Source: NCDM (2013)

Table 1 Key National Policies
Policies/ Strategies

Description
39 priority projects (focus on improving
agriculture, water resource management, coastal
protection and human health)Cambodia Climate Change Strategic Plan
(CCCSP)-2013

Overall strategic plan comprising inputs from 9
different ministries

Strategic National Action Plan for Disaster Risk
Reduction

Strengthening the disaster management system
in Cambodia

Decentralization and Deconcentration(D&D)-2002

Empower local government

National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP)

Overall national development and poverty
reduction

Rectangular Strategies-2004

Growth, Employment, Efficiency and Equity

Cambodian Climate Change Alliance (involvementof NGOs and development partners)

Climate change projects have been integrated
into development programs.

National Policies and Mechanism for Climate
Change(CDRI 2012; RGC 2006; Sreng 2013). The establishment of these policies, strategic plans and framework is a commitment of the RGC that aims at
assisting communities to better adapt to climate
related hazards and contribute to fulfilling global targets in addressing climate change issues (RGC2013). Key national polices related to climate change
adaptation are included in Table 1.

021

In response to these issues, the Royal Governmentof Cambodia (RGC) developed its climate change
adaptation policy (CCAP), which aims to increase
the roles and responsibilities of relevant ministries
and institutions from a national to grassroot level

Development of
Cambodia towards agreen, low carbon,
climate resilient,equitable and sustainable
society

Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University

National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA)
-2006

Goals

Even though these national policies and frameworks have been established, the number of communities, which are affected annually by the issuesof climate change, has proliferated leading to moreconcerns about future impacts (D’Agostino andSovacool 2011; Ros et al. 2011).
Way Forward
In order to minimize the negative impacts of climatechange, strengthening adaptive capacity of individual and institution is a key. By way of conclusion, toachieve this long-term goal, I suggest that the following potential areas be taken into account and put
into action:
1. Encourage more studies on climate change
related topics. Empirical findings should be available in Khmer language and be distributed to all
relevant stakeholders.
2. Change communities’ perceptions/attitude throughenhancing their knowledge and understanding
about climate change impacts. This can help them
to be more aware and cautious about contemporary issues related to climate change.
3. Enhance community-based natural resource management through providing communities with fullauthority, support, and incentives to protect theirlivelihood dependent resources in a sustainable
way. Policy legislation needs to be strictly enforced
without any discrimination.
4. Provide farmers with irrigation systems, water
resource management tools, and introduce themto more climate resilient crops. Local seed
improvement should be promoted.
5. Disseminate climate change policies to the general public and highly consider community’s input
in policy establishment and adjustment.
Acknowledgements

NEWSLETTER

The author would like to thank Center for Southeast
Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University, Japan forsupporting three-month stay as a visiting researcher.
He would also like to extent grateful thanks to Professor
Yasuyuki Kono, Director of CSEAS, and Associate
Professor, Satoru Kobayashi, and other staff members for their coordination and kind support during
his stay in Japan.

References
Baran, E.; Schwartz, N.; and Kura, Y. 2009. Climate Change
and Fisheries: Vulnerability and Adaptation in Cambodia.
Penang: World Fish Center.
CDRI. 2012. Challenge of Rural Livelihoods in the Context of
Climate Change. Cambodia Development Review 16(3): 1–5,
10.
D’Agostino, A. L.; and Sovacool, B. K. 2011. Sewing ClimateResilient Seeds: Implementing Climate Change Adaptation
Best Practices in Rural Cambodia. Mitigation and Adaptation
Strategies for Global Change 16(6): 699–720. doi: 10.1007/
s11027-011-9289-7.
Diepart, J.-C. 2014. Learning for Socio-Ecological Resilience:
Insights from Cambodia’s Rural Communities. Paper presented at the Development Research Forum, Phnom Penh,
Cambodia.
Heng, L. A. 2014. Country Report of Cambodia Disaster Management. Kobe: Asian Disaster Reduction Centre (ADRC).
McSweeney, C.; New, M.; and Lizcano, G. 2008. UNDP Climate
Change Country Profiles: Cambodia. School of Geography
and the Environment of the University of Oxford and UNDP.
Nang, P.; Sam, S.; Lonn, P.; and Ouch, C. 2014. Strengthening
Adaptation Capacity of Rural People in the Main Agroecological­Zone in Cambodia, Vol. 5. Phnom Penh: CDRI
(Cambodian Development Resource Institute).
NCDM. 2013. Cambodia Disaster Loss and Damage Analysis
Report 1996–2013. Phnom Penh: National Committee forDisaster Management/United Nation Development Program.
Nguyen, H.; and Shaw, R. 2010. Climate Change Adaptation
and Disaster Risk Reduction in Cambodia. Community, Environment and Disaster Risk Management 5: 59–79.
RGC. 2001. Draft Second Five-Year Socioeconomic Development Plan 2001–2005. Phnom Penh: Ministry of Planning.
————. 2006. National Adaptation Programme of Action to
Climate Change (NAPA). Phnom Penh: Royal Government of
Cambodia.
————. 2013. Cambodia Climate Change Strategic Plan
2014–2023. Phnom Penh: National Climate Change Committee.
Ros, B.; Nang, P.; and Chhim, C. 2011. Agricultural Development and Climate Change: The Case of Cambodia, Vol. 65.
Phnom Penh: CDRI.
Sreng, S. 2013. Climate Change Issues in Cambodian Coastal
Area Related to Water. Paper presented at the Climate
Change Issue and Urban Flood Management, Daegu,
Korea. Retrieved August 15, 2013, from http://www.unescap.
org/sites/default/files/S3a1_Cambodia.pdf.
UNDP. 2013a. About Cambodia. Retrieved August 22, 2013,
from http://www.kh.undp.org/content/cambodia/en/home/countryinfo/————. 2013b. Case Study in Cambodia Community Based
Adaptation: Two Examples from Rural Affected Communities.
Phnom Penh, Cambodia: United Nation Development
Program.
UNISDR; and WB. 2010. Synthesis Report on Ten ASEAN Countries Disaster Risks Assessment. United Nation Office forDisaster Risk Reduction and The World Bank.
WB. 2015. Cambodia Population. Retrieved February 20, 2015,
from http://data.worldbank.org/country/cambodia.

No. 72022

Yusuf, A. A.; and Francisco, H. 2010. Hotspots! Mapping
Climate­Change Vulnerability in Southeast Asia. Singapore:
Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia
(EEPSEA).

Researching the Indonesia’s 1965
Tragedy Today: A View from within
Agus Suwignyo
History Department, Gadjah Mada University

F

ifty years have passed, but the so-called 1965
tragedy in Indonesia remains an unsolved puzzle, making it one of the darkest spots in the country’s contemporary history. Today, the challenges toresearching the tragedy have emanated as muchfrom ideological as from psychological questions.
In this essay, I attempt to portray the collective
mental state that some of my fellow Indonesian citizens have continued to hold in regards to the 1965
tragedy and hence to show the gaps in the ways theIndonesian general public and (foreign) scholars
have perceived the tragedy. I argue that, while boththe ­general public and scholars have suggested an
approach they assume to be the “right one” as tovoice out what they respectively believe to be “thetruth” about the tragedy, an inclusive middle way isnecessary. Researching the Indonesia’s 1965 tragedy today requires an understanding of the overall
psychological setting of the Indonesian people in thelong-term aftermath of the event. It is crucial toemploy a methodology that is considerate and proportional of different perspectives, for example bytaking balanced coverage of both preceding and following historical events and factors involved, and by
re-defining some of the so-far taken-for-granted

Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University023

terms, such as “victims” and “perpetrators.”
The so-called 1965 tragedy in Indonesia was aseries of bloody events that resulted from ideologicaland political contestation during the 1960s. Existingstudies refer to the tragedy as a series of killings ofthousands of people—some claim a total of
500,000—as an impact of power contestation
between the Indonesian Communists on the one
hand, and the Liberals and the Army on the otherhand. The pretext to the mass killing was the murderof six Indonesian Army generals by the presidential
armed guards, who allegedly operated under the
auspices of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai
Komunis Indonesia, PKI) in the cities of Jakarta andYogyakarta on the night of September 30, 1965. The
Indonesian Army under the command of Lieutenant
General Soeharto saw this murder as an attempt tocarry out a coup d’etat and immediately launched amilitary counter-attack against the insurgent armed
forces. However, the Army’s conquest of the rebelling military on October 5, 1965 was not the end of
the bloody drama. In the years that followed, retaliation was paid back against the Communists by different groups of people who allegedly moved under
the commands of the Army. Hundreds of thousandsof the members, sympathizers, and leaders of the
PKI were reportedly killed or imprisoned without
being tried between October 1965 and 1966(­Schonhardt 2012; Cribb and Ford 2010).
This very last episode of mass killings that cameafter the crush of the PKI by the Army on October 5,1965 is, however, excluded by Indonesian official history. It remains a subject of intense study exclusively
by foreign scholars and few Indonesian historians
alike. The series of killings itself has spurred various
theories about the persons, plots, purposes, andperiodization involved. Scholarly attention to study
the topic in academia outside of Indonesia has progressed from void historiography (see Cribb 1990) tovarious kinds of scholarly analyses including encyclopedia entries (McGregor 2009) to a model that ismore popular and engaging such as semidocumentary­ films (for example, Lemelson 2007;
Oppenheimer 2012; 2014). However in Indonesia,
efforts to re-examine the tragedy cannot yet freeresearchers from clumsy reactions, intimidation, andeven terror.

Reactionary Vigilantes and the Silent General
PublicNEWSLETTER
No. 72024

In the past couple of years, cases of suppression,
intimidation and attacks by vigilantes in Indonesia
have become more and more intense against those
who either held a discussion, carried out advocacy
projects, or conducted research on the issues
related to the 1965 tragedy. Although counterreactions­have started to occur among university
students recently (see, for example, Solidaritas.net,
March 11, 2015), public opinions about such attacks
and intimidation generally remain ambivalent.
Two of the most recent cases of intimidation by
vigilantes took place on 23 and 24 of February 2015,
respectively. A number of people forcefully
renounced and revoked two public seminars on the
topics related to the 1965 tragedy that were held in
two different Indonesian towns: in Solo, Central Java,and in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. In Solo, the seminar was organized by what calls itself “Joint Secretariat for the 1965 Victims in Surakarta,” and aimed to
discuss a health service program for mental andphysical rehabilitation of the elderly (Tempo.co.id,
February 24, 2015). In Bukitttinggi, the dispersed
seminar was held by an organization called “Foundation of the Murder Victim Researchers,” which
aimed to present research on the life of the people
who survived the mass killings and imprisonment
30 years after 1965 (Tempo.co.id, February 23,2015). In both cases, the spokesmen of local police
defended the vigilantes’ violent attacks by emphasizing that the seminar organizers did not have a permit
for organizing the events.
In previous cases, attacks and intimidations also
led to the cancellation of a number of gathering, discussions, and seminars organized by some community groups and university students in Java. In October 2014, the screening of British cineaste Joshua
Oppenheimer’s semi documentary “The Look of
Silence” at the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta had tobe called off because of “threats of enforced intrusion from vigilantes from outside of the campus,”
according to a university internal security officer.
Several months earlier, also in Yogyakarta, a rotary
meeting of people who called themselves “familiesof the victims of 1965 massacre” was crushed by avigilante group, who argued that the meeting could“stimulate the re-rise of Communism in Indonesia.”
Meanwhile, in the cities of Malang and Surabaya,
both in East Java, authorities of several universities
repudiated the screening of Oppenheimer’s documentaries and the seminars on Dutch historian Harry
Poeze’s Indonesian-edition book on a West-Sumatra
born socialist thinker and activist of the early twenti-

eth century, Tan Malaka. Many more examples ofattacks and intimidation can be presented, but all in
all they shared several points in common.
First, identification by the media of the vigilantes
who crushed university forums on the 1965 tragedy
often only addressed the point that they had operated under the banner of Islamic radical groups, but
no such identification was ever definite. Even if naming of such organizations as Front Pembela Islam(FPI, Islam Defender Front) and Forum Umat Islam(FUI, Islam People’s Forum) did occasionally takeplace, no further details and official statements wereever publicized. Moreover, the concerned attacks
can hardly be found in the next days’ news, making
them a one-time media blow, mostly on-line.
Second, official statements issued by local police
on such attacks always pointed to the failure of theorganizers of the seminars or gatherings to present
written permits to hold such assemblies. It is common that the official statements gave no word on theattacks or the attackers. Given the tone of the statements, one might assume that it was actually thepolice themselves who had backed up the attacks
and the vigilantes.
Third, generally, university authorities remained
silent about limiting the freedom of speech of theircivitas academica. In the case of the attack at Gadjah Mada University Faculty of Political and Social
Sciences, the rector of the university immediately
issued a condemning statement, which did not seemto go beyond the campus walls. In another case, atSunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, the rector of
the university himself attempted to prevent students
from screening the documentary while arguing thatthe movie “had not got a license for public screening
from the government.” Activists of the student organ­
izations who administered the screening argued
back by saying that the Indonesian Human Rights
Commission “had endorsed the film.” They said therector’s attempt to disperse the forum had resulted
from intimidation by vigilantes under the FUI banner
who, guarded by police officers, had crowded justoutside of the campus auditorium hall where theevent was to take place (Solidaritas.net, op.cit.).
Shared Resentment
Generally speaking, these cases of attacks, intrusion, and intimidation show a degree of reluctanceby the university and state authorities to take anactive role in protecting the freedom of speech of citizens especially when freedom was to be used inrelation with issues that dealt with the 1965 tragedy.
However, the silence and reluctance are not exclusively attributive to any authority group in particular.
Rather, it is the general public. It is just a common

Teachers’ Training School in their 1960s, just to makesure that I did not lead her to talk about the 1965
tragedy. In Jakarta, instead of asking me for an offthe-record interview, a male informant wasted my
90-minute recording cassette before telling his harshexperience as head of the teachers’ bureau at the
split Department of Basic Education during thetumultuous 1960s. The feeling of reluctance of thegeneral public in Indonesia to touch upon again the
topic of the 1965 tragedy is thus rooted in different
individual reasons. Yet, I observe one thing in common: some people do not seem to understand why
it is necessary to deal again with the dark past they
themselves had not expected to happen while now
they want to move on. Some others just cannot
admit that the comfortable country as they perceive
it can be ruined by “land of might-have-been”
realities.
It seems to me that the feeling of resentment isdeeply embedded and widely spread among peopleof different social and ideological backgrounds. It
encompasses the three categories of social groups
Robert Cribb identifies as having taken an active rolein spreading hatred against the Communists, i.e. theArmy, orthodox Islam, and “the conservative wing of
the secular Indonesian Nationalist Party”—which isthere no more (Cribb 2009, 289–291). The feeling ofresentment today concerns not only those who werein power or politically involved during the 1960s but
also the “nobody commoners” who passed throughthe years knowing hardly anything about what wasgoing on but having to experience impact of theseries of events both prior and after the September
30, 1965 murder drama. The feeling of resentment is
indeed overwhelming.
The Researchers’ Challenges

025

What is all this supposed to imply? I argue that the
recent cases of attacks, forced intrusion, and clumsy
reactions were not necessarily State-driven although
the Decree No. XXV of the Indonesian Temporary
Parliament of 1966 on the banning of the PKI and theCommunist ideology did still play effective (TAPMPRS No. XXV/MPRS 1966) and the Indonesian
National Archive (ANRI) still puts off releasing
50-year old classified documents on the 1965 case
(Merdeka.com, March 11, 2015), so does the Gadjah
Mada University Archive Bureau (interview with former head of UGM Archive Bureau, March 2015). I
also argue that although orthodox Islam has historically stood in the front line of refusal to deal with the1965 tragedy (Cribb 2009, 290), and although
Islamic organizations (such as Forum Umat Islam[FUI] and Front Pembela Islam [FPI]) involved inrecent attacks and intimidations against humanCenter for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University

fact that no reactions from public figures, political or
religious leaders are heard that condemn the attacks
and intimidation on those who work on the 1965
topic today. As in the case Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, only human rights activists took legal measuresagainst such attacks although what happened afterthat is not known to the public. Therefore, beyond
the resentment of university authorities and thepolice’s official statements that tend to defend
attackers and blame forum organizers, I notice there
is a shared feeling of resentment of the general Indonesian public when dealing with the 1965 issues. I
suggest that it is the feeling of collective fright of(imposed) impact of the 1965 tragedy, be it on the“victims” or on the “perpetrators.” For some, it is also
the feeling of collective self-defense of the politicalmovements that many seemed to be conscious
enough of the meaning and consequences only very
recently, not during the time period of the event.
I also observe a shared feeling of resentment insome details in different cases. First of all, there are
elements inside the universities and Indonesiansociety at large that do not want the 1965 tragedy to
be discussed, researched, or “revived” in the public
discourse today for reasons relating to “social harmony.” In the recent cases of attacks and intimidation, thus rumors have it, some individuals in thecampus faculties and internal security themselvestexted a message to the local police commanders
and the leaders of vigilantes informing them about
the events of the 1965 tragedy that were to be organ­
ized in the campus. In another case, a young colleague who was presenting a research project thataims to investigate the involvement of several prominent university professors in the 1965 tragedy,
received very sharp ad hominem comments from asenior staff member who, while questioning theyoung colleague’s religious orientation (sic!),
expressed his concern about “the threat to harmony
and unity” should the issue be raised again today.
Still in another different case, a senior professor, who
experienced the period of the tragedy in the late1960s as a teenager, told me that the mass killings
were what history was supposed to be because “thechoice was to kill or be killed by the Communists.”
During my doctoral research on the history ofschoolteacher training, I received clumsy reactions
from several informants whom I wanted to interview.
In Bandung, an elderly male informant struck meright at opening his house door by a high-toned
remark: “No interview about the PKI!” while I had
come for his schooling experience at the Hollands
Inlandse Kweekschool (HIK) in the 1930s. In Ungaran, Central Java, a woman informant waited for her
husband’s nods every time when I queried details ofher youth experience as a student of the Femalerights activists must have shared the ideologicalundertones for the banning of Communism andrelated issues, the public feeling of resentment at
dealing with 1965 today does not exclusively have to
do with them. Rather, the silent general public, reluctant university intellectuals and the ambivalent media
are indeed reflecting on an overall mental state of theIndonesian nation, which has its own historical rationale and explanation of the 1965 tragedy, whichshares an equal place of importance to be counted
in any narrative about the tragedy.
Saskia E. Wieringa rightly says that “[a]lmost all
people [. . .] in Indonesia have a story to tell about
the [1965] period” (Wieringa 2014, 3). This statement
is important to be kept in mind when we aim to heara plurality of voices. As the 1965 tragedy refers to thebloody dynamics related to ideological contestationof the 1960s, in order to present the different voicesof 1965 tragedy, studies should explore the entiretyof events preceding and following the September 30
murder of Army generals, not just the killings in theaftermath. The concept of “victim,” for example,
needs to be defined not only to represent those who
experienced the New Order imprisonment or lostfamily members in the aftermath of the September
30 murder of Army generals, but also those who survived tortures and also lost family members becauseof the Communists’ harsh propaganda in the period
before September 30 as some of those who
opposed discussions on the 1965 tragedy haveindicated.
To present a plurality of voices thus means to create balanced and proportional spaces to understanddifferent versions of experiences and facts fromwithin the inside. Because individual testimonies
cannot naturally be free of any bias that mixes
between factual experience and personal opinion—
I notice some Indonesian researchers even confuse
their personal emotion with informants’ narratives—to present a plurality of voices also means to doaway with judging one particular party while imposing tribunal agendas on the other. Unless a balanced
and proportional landscape of historical evidence isachieved and equally shared by both of those who
propose and oppose investigations of the tragedy,
any agenda for court of justice or reconciliation willremain a political absurdity, which only complicatesrather than eases the issues.

References
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————, ed. 1990. The Indonesian Killings 1965–1966: Studies
from Java and Bali. Clayton: Monash University Center forSoutheast Asian Studies.
Cribb, Robert; and Ford, Michele. 2010. The Killings of 1965–
65. Inside Indonesia 99 Jan.–Mar.
Lemelson, Robert. 2007. 40 Years of Silence: An IndonesianTragedy, http://40yearsofsilence.com/, accessed on March
25, 2015.
McGregor, Katharine E. 2009. The Indonesian Killings of 1965–
1966. Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence, http://www.
massviolence.org- ISSN 1961-9898, accessed on March 23,
2015.
Merdeka.com. March 11, 2015. Arsip Korupsi Bisa Dibuka, Tapi
Gestok 1965 Masih Terlarang [Archives on corruption madeopen to public, those on the 1965 movement not], http://
iorg.merdeka.com/khas/arsip-korupsi-bisa-dibuka-tapi-­
gestok-1965-masih-terlarang-wawancara-kepala-anri-4.html,
accessed on March 26, 2015.
Oppenheimer, Joshua. 2012. The Act of Killings, http://­theactofkilling.com/, accessed on March 23, 2015.
————. 2014. The Look of Silence, http://filmsenyap.com/,
accessed on March 23, 2015.
Schonhardt, Sara. 2012. Veil of Silence Lifted in Indonesia. The
New York Times, January 18.
Solidaritas.net. March 11, 2015. Mahasiswa Yogyakarta Bersatu, FUI Gagal Bubarkan Acara Nonton Senyap [Association of Yogyakarta students impeded FUI from disbanding
the screening of “The Look of Silence”], http://solidaritas.
net/2015/03/mahasiswa-yogyakarta-bersatu-fui-gagalbubarkan-acara-nonton-senyap.html, accessed on March24, 2015.
TAP MPRS No. XXV/MPRS 1966. Tentang Pembubaran Partai
Komunis Indonesia dan Pelarangan Ajaran Komunisme/
Marxisme-Leninisme [Parliamentary Decree on the Dispersalof the Indonesian Communist Party and the Banning ofCommunism/Marxism-Leninism].
Tempo.co.id. February 23, 2015. Diskusi Korban 65 Dibubarkan,
Nursyahbani Lapor ke Jokowi [Discussion held by victims of1965 disbanded, Nursyahbani files a report to Jokowi],
http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2015/02/23/058644703/­
Diskusi-Korban-65-Dibubarkan-Nusyahbani-Lapor-keJokowi, accessed on March 26, 2015.
————. February 24, 2015. Seminar Korban 65 di Solo Tak
Berizin, Ini Kata Panitia [On seminar permit, victims of 1965
in Solo speak out], http://www.tempo.co/read/news/
2015/02/24/058644977/Seminar-Korban-65-di-Solo-Tak-BerizinIni-Kata-Panitia, accessed on March 26, 2015.

NEWSLETTER

Wieringa, Saskia E. 2014. Breaking the Silence around the 1965
Indonesian Genocide. https://theconversation.com/solarpower-fluctuations-may-be-a-thing-of-the-past-1965,
accessed on March 26, 2015.
Interview with former head of the Gadjah Mada University
Archive Bureau, March 2015.

No. 72026

Youth, Voice, and Methodology:
Learning (with) Young Migrants ina “Temporary Shelter Area”
Decha Tangseefa
Visiting Research Scholar, CSEAS

“S

027

one, old or young, “are learning how, or are being(re)socialized, to live in a new way.”6 Focusing on theyoung as parts of an ethnic nationality who were“unhooked from the reinforcing context of ‘their’
place” (Diehl 2002, 8), my research then aimed toilluminate these “new ways” of the exceptional
lives—lives that had been forced to leave home.
The notion of the young is not easily settled, however. Not only did my research agree with BluebondLangner and Korbin (2007) that a continued problematization of the nature and development of anindividual must be maintained, but also the definitions of the terms child, youth, and childhood cannot
be easily settled.7 Hence, “youngness” was treatedin my research with awareness that there was always
a tension between youth as a chronological age as
opposed to as a social construct. 8 In effect, thediversities that distinguished one young person fromanother were “as important and as significant as thecommonalities they might share” (James and James
2004, 16). It is critical to retain the tension as an existence called youth encompasses both a physicalaspect and cultural codes signified by it. In otherwords, the young need to be treated “very special”(i.e., need more care and protection) since many ofthem cannot “take care” of themselves, especiallythe very young. Because of this physical condition,
the young are often considered as the “incomplete”
of the grown-up. They are on the way toward adulthood and are measured against “an excessively ide-

Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University

hocking images of drowned Syrian boy show
tragic plight of refugees” is a headline of The
Guardian on September 3, 2015.1 Reading this news
reminded me of my engagements with young
migrants­along the Thai-Burmese borderland during
2008–11 when I continuously—almost every week—
went to work as a researcher, a teacher, and someone who hoped to offer a little help.2 For three years,
I was also teaching in what the Thai state calls a“temporary shelter area” named Blae Koh, as well as
conducting research on youth and music therein.3 It
was the plight of those displaced that have driven
me to directly learn from them since 2000.4
Going back to the borderland again in 2008, oneof a few main questions that guided me was: Howshould one understand the displaced’s socializationof the young? I was attempting to come to terms with
the intertwining relations between identity, music,
and socialization as well as ways in which such relations affect the displaced’s conceptions and experiences of “home,” especially those of the young
Karens in Blae Koh.5 This short article aims to discuss a methodological conundrum of the nexus
between the notions of youth and voice.
Bambi Schieffelin defines socialization as an“interactive process between knowledgeable members and novices (children) who are themselves
active contributors to the meanings and outcomes ofinteractions with others” (1990, 17). But in the caseof displaced people, such is not the case; as every-

alized version of adult autonomy, independence, andmaturity.” The younger they are, the more innocent
they are–in need of protection.9 Yet, “taking care” isas much a cultural act as—if not more than—it is aphysical imperative. But the socialization theory generally relies only on the physiognomy of youth without being adequately cognizant that vulnerability is acultural meaning. When the young are treated as
signifiers of vulnerability without any qualifications, itdisregards their potential and ability to be powerfulsocial actors and cultural producers. 10 In otherwords, vulnerability is a cultural sign that each society enacts and reenacts on the existence of theyoung. We, therefore, have witnessed many internationally ardent campaigns to protect young people.
The young are “constituted as…agent[s] or…
catalyst[s] by which the survival of the whole community is secured”; they signify “fragility of humanlife and its future” and, often, the words they speak“lie encapsulated the innocence and authenticity of
the human condition, fast being lost to the adultworld.”11 They are the cultural bearers of each ethnicity, society, or nation. “[I]n times of conflict, war,and social upheaval,” therefore, “children canbecome bearers of huge social anxieties” (Dubinsky
2007, 145). The grown-up often forget how much
cultural weight children “have to carry on their frail
shoulders” (ibid., 144).
Nonetheless, the body of research exploring theyoung’s lives most familiar to anthropologists is, byand large, the literature on socialization. For thisbody of knowledge, which perceives the young
through an adult lens by focusing on the adult’s influence on the young “achieving” it, the young’s activities are casted as auxiliary or subordinate. For

NEWSLETTER
No. 72028

My classroom when I was teaching in the camp.

instance, in his “Why don’t anthropologists like Children?” Lawrence A. Hirschfeld aptly articulates:“Socialization theory—the idea that adult dispositions are achieved largely through adult interventions
in children’s lives—... obstructs the appreciation of
the contribution children make to the acquisition ofcultural sensibilities” (Hirschfeld 2002, 614). As“adults-in-the-making,” the young have both beentreated, on the one hand, as “culturally incompetentcreatures, who are, at their most interesting, simply‘appendages to adult society’” (ibid., 613; Cf. Jamesand Prout 1997). On the other hand, they are perceived as possessing no mastery of their own culture, but in transition to culture—only adults “own”
the means of cultural reproduction (Hirschfeld 2002,
614). In this regard, although there has been theneed to listen to the young’s voices, “all too often
those voices are silenced” by images of the youngthat “cling to the more traditional, developmental discourse” of the young’s incompetence, rather thancompetence, as social actors (James 2007, 266). As
a consequence, discussion of the young is “typicallytransformed into talk about adults and the ways they
organize the environment” in which the young
develop “so as to facilitate the acquisition of the cultural competence appropriate to the society in which
they live” (Hirschfeld 2002, 614).
With this kind of awareness, my research was apart of an emerging anthropology of children andchildhoods, which not only incorporates children’s
views and perspectives, but also dovetails well withanthropology’s long-standing orientations toward
emic view and multivocity—hence, contributing to an
attempt to understanding kaleidoscopic landscapeof human societies under studied.12 This, in fact,each young person: “how that voice both shapes
and reflects the ways in which…[the young are]…
understood, and therefore the discourse within
which…[the young]…find themselves within any
society” (James 2007, 266).
With all these theoretical and methodological orientations, my study on youth and music in a “temporary shelter area” was open for the so-called unsettling notions: for instances, the young are perceived
not only aggressed against, but also as aggressor(e.g., child soldiers [Rosen 2007]); the young are not
only acted upon by adults, but are also “agents ofpolitical change and cultural interpretation andchange” (Bluebond-Langner and Korbin 2007, 242).
Such complexity informed the direction of theresearch project so as to ensure that the young werethen ascribed with agency and competency.
Acknowledging the young’s conscious decisions toparticipate in all kinds of activities was thus crucial.
As “thousands of children and youth caught up inarmed warfare who are committing horrible crimes,”
how should they be seen: “as innocent victims ofpolitical circumstance who should be protected andforgiven,” or “as moral agents who should be held
responsible for their actions?” (Rosen 2007, 304)
Hence, by not acknowledging the young’s conscious
decision to participate in such violence, “with all theattendant positive and negative pressures,” we are
inclined to fail to respect the young and to recognize
their agency.16

References
Black, Richard. 1994. Livelihoods under Stress: A Case Studyof Refugee Vulnerability in Greece. Journal of RefugeeStudies 7(4): 360–377.
Bluebond-Langner, Myra; and Korbin, Jill E. 2007. Challenges
and Opportunities in the Anthropology of Childhoods: An
Introduction to Children, Childhoods, and Childhood Studies. American Anthropologist 109(2): 241–246.
Chatty, Dawn et al. 2005. Theoretical and Methodological
Challenges of Studying Refugee Children in the Middle Eastand North Africa: Young Palestinian Afghan and Sahrawi
Refugees. Journal of Refugee Studies 18(4): 387–407.
Christensen, Pia Haudrup. 2000. Childhood and the Cultural
Construction of Vulnerable Bodies. In The Body, Childhoodand Society, edited by Alan Prout, pp. 38–59. London:
MacMillan.
Clifford, James. 1988. The Predicament of Culture: TwentiethCentury Ethnography, Literature, and Art. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press.
Clifford, James; and Marcus, George E., eds. 1986. Writing­Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Decha Tangseefa. 2003. Imperceptible Naked-lives andAtrocities: Forcibly Displaced Peoples and the ThaiBurmese­In-between Spaces. Doctoral dissertation, University of Hawai‘i.

————. 2007. Temporary Shelter Areas’ and Paradox of Per-029————. 2006. Taking Flight in Condemned Grounds: Forcibly
Displaced Karens and the Thai-Burmese In-between
Spaces. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 31(4): 405–429.

Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University

should not come as a surprise, given anthropology’s
experience of researching, theorizing, and writing
about “the other”—when the young, especially thevery young, have more often than not been considered as otherness to adults (James 2007, 262). Likea few studies in this regard, my research project on
youth and music, in effect, “move[ed] away fromrelying on statements by adults about children’s
worlds and experiences and, instead, toward considering statements by children themselves”13—surely,
not without a lot of obstacles. The act of listening to
the young was accompanied by awareness on thesocial and cultural constraints in operation at thetime of listening (Bluebond-Langner and Korbin
2007). Moreover, the study was well aware of three
critically interlocking issues when conducting thiskind of research—“giving voice to the young”:
homogenization of “the young” is greatly problematic; readily accessible and apparent voice is impossible; and the young’s active collaboration in the
research process is, thus a necessity and, highly
productive (James 2007).
First, the study did not clump the young together
as members of a category and disregarding theirraces, classes, and ethnicities, among others, sothat a singular category was not “made to masquerade for all children” (ibid., 262). Had we homogenized them, we would have not attempted to givethem “greater audibility and visibility as social actors
inhabiting a variety of different social worlds.” Moreover, the young would have simply been disempowered; and “their voices rendered silent once more.”14
Second, because the young’s voices and concerns
are not immediately accessible and apparent. There
are always complexities of the ways in which children’s interests are represented: by whom their
voices are represented, and for what purposes. I was
therefore well aware that as the writer of my text, I, an
adult “retain[ed] control over which children’s voices”
were “given prominence and over which parts ofwhat children have to say” were to be presented(ibid., 265). Or it is, in James Clifford’s words, “theethnographer who in the end assumes an executive,
editorial position” (Clifford 1988, 51). Precisely,
because of this complexity, the third issue of theyoung taking part as co-researchers becomes critical. The whole question of “voice” in conducting
research assumes, implicitly, the young’s active collaboration in the research process: a research is carried out with the young more than on the young.15
This is because, by presenting the young’s perspectives, youth research is not only about making theyoung’s voices “heard in this very literal sense,” butalso about exploring the forms and characteristics
that the “voice” gets enunciated. Such forms andcharacteristics, in turn, constitute the subjectivity ofceptibility: Imperceptible Naked-Karens in the Thai-Burmese
Border Zones. In Borderscapes: Hidden Geographies andPolitics at Territory’s Edge, edited by Prem Kumar Rajaram
and Carl Grundy-Warr, pp. 231–262. Minneapolis: Universityof Minnesota Press.
————. 2010a. Imperceptible Naked-lives: Constructing a
Theoretical Space to Account for Non-statist Subjectivities.
In Margins, Peripheries and Excluded Bodies: International
Relations and States of Exception, edited by Shampa Biswas
and Sheila Nair, pp. 116–139. New York: Routledge.
————. 2010b. Music of the Hearth: Young Karens’ Placemaking in a ‘Temporary Shelter Area’. Mimeographed.
Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund (in Thai).
————. 2013. Learning, Longing and Lying: Youths’ Musical
Voices in a ‘Temporary Shelter Area’ along the Thai-Burmese
Border Zones. In Greater Mekong Subregion Underneath an
Economic Quadrangle, edited by Yos Santasombat et al.,pp. 399–480. Chiang Mai: Biodiversity and Indigenous
Knowledge Research Center for Sustainable Development(BIRD) (In Thai).
————. 2015 (Forthcoming). ‘I Want to Stay Forever in You.
In Borders and the State of Myanmar, edited by Su-Ann
Oh. Singapore: ISEAS.
Diehl, Keila. 2002. Echoes from Dharamsala: Music in the Life ofa Tibetan Refugee Community. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Dubinsky, Karen. 2007. Babies without Borders: Rescue, Kidnap,
and the Symbolic Child. Journal of Women’s History 19(1):142–150.
Geertz, Clifford. 1988. Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as
Author. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Hirschfeld, Lawrence A. 2002. Why Don’t Anthropologist Like
Children? American Anthropologist 104(2): 611–627.
James, Allison. 2007. Giving Voice to Children’s Voices:
Practices and Problems, Pitfalls and Potentials. American
Anthropologist 109(2): 261–272.
James, Allison; and James, Adrian L. 2004. ConstructingChildhood: Theory, Policy and Social Practice. London:
Palgrave.
James, Allison; and Prout, Alan, eds. 1997. Constructing andReconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood. 2nd edition. London: Falmer
Press.
Jenks, Chris. 1996. Childhood. London: Routledge.
Rosen, David M. 2007. Child Soldiers, International Humanitarian Law, and the Globalization of Childhood. American
Anthropologist 109(2): 296–306.
Schieffelin, Bambi B. 1990. The Give and Take of Everyday Life:
Language Socialization of Kaluli Children. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tefferi, Hirut. 2007. Reconstructing Adolescence after Displacement: Experience from Eastern Africa. Children & Society 21:
297–308.

Notes
1 September 2, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/
sep/02/shocking-image-of-drowned-syrian-boy-showstragic-plight-of-refugees. Accessed September 3, 2015.

NEWSLETTER
No. 72

2 In this article, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar is called“Burma/Myanmar” in order to acknowledge the official
name, Myanmar, as well as to emphasize traces of the­Burmese junta’s attempt to Burmanize the whole social fabric of this land, which has also had a deep impact on both avariety of peoples and spaces along the Thai-Burmese/
Myanmar border. Nonetheless, for reason of brevity, the term
Thai-Burmese is used rather than the longer formula of ThaiBurmese/Myanmar.

030

3 See my first research experiences in the “temporary shelterarea” during 2000–01 in Decha (2003; 2007). There are two
reasons for using quotation marks for the term “temporary
shelter area.” First, the term temporary negates a reality thatshelter areas along the Thai-Burmese borderland were officially established in 1984 and hence have been in existencefor 30 years. An entire generation was born and raised during that time. Hence, the term temporary does not capture
this reality, though one could understand that it is the Thaistate’s intention to emphasize the temporariness of the residence of those staying in these spaces and on Thai soil.
Second, people who have come to be involved with theseshelter areas call them “camps.” In 2001, while I was interviewing the Ministry of Interior’s (MOI) personnel who supervised a shelter area, I unconsciously called the shelter“camp” and was corrected by the MOI personnel almost
every time I uttered the word “camp.” Moreover, since Thailand is not a signatory of the 1951 Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees as well as the 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, the term “refugee” is not part ofthe o­ fficial lexicon of the Thai state, which designated forcibly displaced peoples from Burma/Myanmar, as “people
fleeing fighting.” Nonetheless, although the term “refugeecamp” is not officially used by the Thai state’s apparatuses,
it has been used by a variety of people who have come to
be involved with these shelter areas (see more details in
Decha 2007).
4 See Decha (2003; 2006; 2010a).
5 See Decha (2010b; 2013; 2015).
6 Diehl (2002, 16); Cf. Tefferi (2007) for discussion on tension­adolescence encounter during the process of achievingsocial adulthood simultaneously as gaining assistancethrough presenting themselves as children.
7 Bluebond-Langner and Korbin (2007, 245). See also otherarticles in this special volume of American Anthropologist
109(2).
8 Cf. e.g., Chatty et al. (2005); James (2007); James and Prout(1997).
9 Rosen (2007); see also e.g., Hirschfeld (2002); James (2007);
Jenks (1996).
10 See, e.g., Black (1994); Bluebond-Langner and Korbin(2007); Christensen (2000); James (2007); Rosen (2007).
11 Christensen (2000, 42); James (2007, 261); see also Jenks(1996, 73); James and Prout (1997); Cf. Clifford (1988); Clifford and Marcus (1986).
12 See e.g., Bluebond-Langner and Korbin (2007).
13 Bluebond-Langner and Korbin (2007, 243). However, in children’s statements, my research project was aware of:“selectivity of representation, uncritical quoting, polyphonyof voices, whose point is being made” (e.g., mine or that of
the children that I studied), whose agenda is being served(mine, children’s, or those of the humanitarian agencies inthe “temporary shelter area”) (ibid.). In other words, I waswell aware of the extent to which “the rhetorical power that‘the voice of the child’ wields” (James 2007, 268).
14 James (2007): see also James and James (2004).
In R. Morgan’s research (2005, 183), we learn that the young
people interviewed in that study asserted that they wanted
to be treated “as individuals, not an age group.”
15 Priscilla Alderson (2000) who conducted research on children’s rights is one among those in the movement toward
regarding children as researchers themselves: “as people
who can carry out their own research projects into areas thatare pertinent to their everyday lives” (James 2007, 262). Yet,
Allison James reminds us of two issues: first, what Clifford
Geertz calls “ethnographic ventriloquism: the claim to speakfrom within,” and, second, “text positivism” and “dispersed
authorship” which seem to assume that research done bychildren is an authentic representation of children’s voice(ibid.; see also Geertz 1988, 145),
16 Bluebond-Langner and Korbin (2007, 243); see also Rosen(2007). Yet, it should be noted as Rosen (ibid.) articulates inher study on child soldier that when war is seen as good,
greater agency is ascribed to children’s participation in war
than in times when it is seen as evil. The children are seen
as a hero in the former, whereas they are considered as
exploited victims in need of protection in the latter.

Modern Islamic Book Collection in Indonesian Language
Miichi Ken
Associate Professor, Iwate Prefectural University

J

031

Other titles are directly purchased from the publishers. Most publishers offer some discounts when adirect purchase. More importantly, however, some of
the books issued by rural publishers are rarely soldat book fairs and franchise stores.
Let’s briefly review the transitions in publication
trends, based on years of foundation as well as thenames of cities where the publishers in the collection
are located. The one who had set a precedent for
Islam books (buku Islam) was Alma’arif establishedin Bandung in 1948, which was then followed by
Diponegoro. Famous as Kitab publishers, Karya
Toha Putra (Semarang) and Menara Kudus (Kudus),
both located in the north coast region of Central Javaand have also issued classical books on Islamic
jurisprudence in Indonesian language written in
Roman characters. They started up publishing theKoran with Indonesian translation as well as booklets
for prayer with abstracted lines from the Koran, andplayed the role of familiarizing general interpretationsof Islam for the public.
The Islamic publication market rapidly expanded
in 1980s. It was again in Bandung, in which the two
publishers, Pustaka and Mizan were established by
the graduates of an elite school, Bandung Institute ofTechnology (Institut Teknologi Bandung). Reflecting
the idealism of the emerging Islamic Movements
centered on students, both publishers issued translated versions of various philosophical books as well
as research books in Arabic or in English. Their publication included a wide range of works by such
authors as Ali Shariati, who had received educationin France and was an ideologue of the Iranian Revolution, Sayyid Qutb, a militant intellectual of the Mus-

Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University

akarta has been hosting an “Islamic Book Fair”
since 2001 which has become an established annual event. The scale of the event has been growing
year by year and there has been an endless numberof visitors such as students visiting as part of theirschool event or groups from various regions. It also
involves events such as book reviews and discussions, as well as such corporate booths as shops
dealing with veils, Islamic bankings, and Halal cosmetics, which are quite successful. Lately, the book
fair started to travel around dozens of suburban cities all over the country. In the beginning, 70 publishers were participating in the fair, however by 2015,
the number grew to 92. They display and sell various
kinds of publications ranging from treasured dictionaries, books on the ideologies of armed struggle activists to children’s books.
The CSEAS Indonesia Islam Collection is composed of Islam related publications that have been in
the market over the last few decades. It covers morethan 50 publishers, about 2,000 volumes andincludes some journals. Inspired by the 900 religious
book (Kitab) collection at KITLV (the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde/Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean
Studies), the CSEAS Collection targets publications
in Bahasa written in Roman characters (buku),
instead of Kitab written in Arabic characters. Due tobudgetary restrictions, the collection is yet exhaustive, but the library is trying to collect as large aselection of books as possible. Some books are purchased at book fairs, major nationwide chain storessuch as Gramedia, and at Islam specialty bookshops, represented by Walisongo in central Jakarta.

LIBRARY

lim Brotherhood in Egypt, Mohammed Arkoun from
Algeria, who was influenced by Western postmodernism, and other English research books on Islamicstudies. However, as the market began to expand,ideological conflicts also arose. Media Da’wah(Jakarta) is a publishing department of DDII (Dewan
Dakwah Islam Indonesia), which served as a channel
to receive funds from Saudi Arabia for missionary
works in the 1980s. They have published journals
and books to attack Shiites and moderates within
Indonesia. In recent years, publications and websitesof the Salafists and the Jihadists (mentioned below)
have criticized by names the publishers, issuing Shiites related books (including Mizan and others in thecollection such as Al-Huda).
Those who emerged around the time of democratization in 1998, such as Syaamil (Bandung), Era
Intermedia (Solo), and Robanni Press (Jakarta) arerun by the members of the current Islamic Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS)
and have mainly issued translated works by theideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood, which theparty models itself on. In recent years however, they
have also published a growing number of essays
written by party members. With Salafists, who interpret Islamic law in the strictest and most conservative way, there are Al-Qowam and At-Tibyan, both
based in the area around Solo in Central Java.
Jazeera and Aquwam are the ones belonging to the
Jihadists school, who highly regard armed struggles.
Ar-Rahmah in Jakarta once drew attention by publishing the personal notes of three criminals, who
had actually played a role in the terrorist attack in
Bali in 2002, right after their execution. However, they
are mostly known as a news site today. HIT Press,
also in Jakarta, is a publishing department of the

Hizb ut-Tahrir, an international organization aiming toestablish the Caliphate.
The late 1980s was a time when the publishingmarket for general interest books experienced agreat expansion not only limited to those dealing withthe political ideologies of Islam. The growing presence of an urban middle-class, particularly women
emerged as consumer of Islamic books. Religious
interpretations corresponding to themes in modern
society such as the key to success, family life, andrelationships were often referred to. Established in
1986, Gema Insani Press (Jakarta) successfully met
those demands and grew to become a major publisher by providing various lineups. Mizan and
Syaamil, mentioned above also dealt with a type ofbusiness books for relatively upper-class people,
novels for young women as well as books for children. Publishers with strong ideological tones mentioned above, are also issuing books on guidelines
for society and family life in line with their own religious interpretations. Mizan has published a lot ofgeneral interest books and even embarked on film
making, but the collection only covers their books on
Islamic themes. On the other hand, Islam related
publications are also being issued by a media complex, Kompas Gramedia Group which are not in ourcollection. In addition, the arrangement of the collection is different from other shelves in that they are
stored by different publishers. Observing the rise andfall of publishers as well as the repertoire of works
within a publisher allows users to overview the transition of the Islamic Movement in Indonesia over thelast 40 years and its social positioning. It is hopedthat readers will pay a direct visit to CSEAS’s open
shelves and turn the pages of those books.

NEWSLETTER
No. 72032

Publications

http://www.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/edit/

CSEAS Monographs
Kyoto Area Studies on Asia Vol. 24

Ayako Masuhara. Translated by
Yuri Kamada

The End of Personal Rulein Indonesia: Golkar andthe Transformation of theSuharto Regime

Kyoto Area Studies on Asia
(in Japanese) Vol. 29

Akiko Morishita

Resources, Politics andViolence: Local Politics inContemporary Indonesia
2015. Kyoto University Press.

2015. Trans Pacific Press andKyoto University Press.

Kyoto CSEAS Series on Asian Studies
Vol. 14

Kyoto Area Studies on Asia
(in Japanese) Vol. 30

Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi

Masaaki Okamoto

Indonesian Women and Local
Politics: Islam, Gender andNetworks in Post-Suharto
Indonesia

Politics of Violence andAdaptation: Democratizationand Local Politics of Stabilization in Indonesia

2015. NUS Press and Kyoto
University Press.

2015. Kyoto University Press.

Kyoto Area Studies on Asia
(in Japanese) Vol. 28

Hiroyuki Seto

Center-Local Relationship in
Lao PDR: Local Administrationof Provincial Governor under
the Lao People’s Revolutionary
Party
2015. Kyoto University Press.

CSEAS JournalSoutheast Asian Studies

New Books by Staff
Caroline S. Hau

Fumiharu Mieno

Recuerdos de Patay and Other
Stories

Financial Reform andSoutheast Asia: Analyzing
Regional Long-term Trends
and Corporate Finance2015. The University of thePhilippines Press.

(in Japanese)

2015. Keiso Shobo.

Center for Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University

http://englishkyoto-seas.org/
Southeast Asian Studies, published as an all-English journal in 2012, aims to promote excellent,
agenda-setting scholarship and provide a forum for dialogue and collaboration both within andbeyond the region. SEAS engages in wide-ranging and in-depth discussions that are attuned tothe issues, debates, and imperatives within the region, while affirming the importance of learningand sharing ideas on a cross-country, global, and historical scale. An integral part of the journal’s
mandate is to foster scholarship that is capable of bridging the continuing divide in area studies
between the social sciences and humanities on the one hand, and the natural sciences on the other
hand.

033

Fellows
Visiting Research Scholars, Guest Scholars, and Guest Research
Associates at CSEAS

E

ach year CSEAS accepts applicants about 14
positions for scholars and researchers who workon Southeast Asia, or any one of the countries in that
region, to spend 3 to 12 months in Kyoto to conduct
research, write, or pursue other scholarly activities inconnection with their field of study. Since 1975, morethan 340 distinguished scholars have availed themselves of the Center’s considerable scholarly resources and enjoyed the invigorating atmosphere of
scenic Kyoto, the ancient capital of Japan and themain repository of the country’s cultural treasures, topursue their interests in Southeast Asian area studies. The Center’s multi-disciplinary character and thediverse research interests of its faculty offer visiting
scholars an ideal opportunity for the exchange ofideas and the cultivation of comparative perspectives. The highly competitive selection process hasbrought to the Center in recent years researchers
from Southeast Asian countries, Bangladesh, China,
Korea, and western countries including the UnitedStates and France. The visiting fellows represent various basic disciplines in their study of Southeast
Asia, and their official posts in their home institutions

Name

Periodinclude teacher, researcher, librarian, journalist, andNGO worker. Information and Technology (IT) experts
who conduct research on Southeast Asia are also
joining the Center, not only to manage various database systems but also to construct academic networks for area study throughout the world. Successful applicants receive an appropriate stipend to coverinternational travel, housing, and living expenses in
Kyoto. Research funds will also be provided to facilitate his/her work. Funds will also be allocated for domestic travel, subject to government regulations, anda number of other facilities are available to visiting
scholars. Fellows will be expected to reside in Kyoto
for the duration of their fellowship period. Fellows arenormally invited to deliver a public lecture during
their term at the Center and encouraged to submit
an article for possible publication in the Center’s
journal, Southeast Asian Studies and to contribute tothe online journal Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia.
CSEAS also received researchers, both Japaneseand foreign, who visit on their own funds or on external fellowships.

Position/Affiliation

Research Title

NEWSLETTER

2015/3/1–8/30

Librarian, Institute of Social Sciences
Information, Vietnam

The Digitalization of Microfilm and Sino
Nom Documents

Decha Tangseefa

2015/3/10–9/9

Lecuturer, Faculty of Political Science,
Thammasat University

Audible Politics & A Zone of Exception:
Linguistic Soundscape in a ThaiMyanmar “Temporary Shelter Area”

Amporn Jirattikorn

2015/6/1–11/30

Lecturer, Department of Social Sciences
and Development, Faculty of Social
Sciences, Chiang Mai University

From “Revolutionary” to “Regret”: Shan
Resistance in Burma over the Past 50
Years

Khin Lay Swe

2015/6/1–11/30

Special Affiliated Professor, Department
of Plant Breeding, Physiology andEcology, Yezin Agricultural University

Comparative Study on Traditional
Application of Resources of SATO in
Rural Development in Myanmar andJapan

Ooi Keat Gin

2015/7/15–10/14

Professor, School of Humanities,
Universiti Sains Malaysia

Borneo in the Midst of the Cold War,
1950–1970

Eva Hansson

2015/8/1–10/31

Senior Lecturer, Department of Political
Science, Stockholm University

Inequality, Social Conflict and Political
Regime Change in Southeast Asia

Bao Maohong

2015/8/1–2016/1/31

Professor, Department of History, Peking
University

The Making of Modern Agriculture in thePhilippines and Its Transformation: From
the Perspective of Agroecological History

No. 72

Van Thinh Nguyen

034Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 46 Shimoadachi-cho, Yoshida, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan
Tel: +81-75-753-7302 Fax: +81-75-753-7350
京都大学東南アジア研究所 〒606-8501 京都市左京区吉田下阿達町46 Tel: 075-753-7302 Fax: 075-753-7350
Editors: Mario Lopez, Shitara Narumi
Date of Issue: Autumn 2015

〈編集〉マリオ・ロペズ

設楽 成実

ISSN 2185-663X