Discussion Paper No.259
A Structural Analysis of Communal Forest Managementin the Low-lying Areas of Lao PDR
Tomoya MORI
Faculty of Economics
Chuo University
December 2015

INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
Chuo University
Tokyo, Japan

A Structural Analysis of Communal Forest Management in the
Low-lying Areas of Lao PDR
Tomoya MORI*This paper shows empirically how local communities in the low-lying areas of Lao PDR
manage the common-pool resources of the communal forest. Previous studies showedthat the local community participates in forest management. However, they did not
address the question of whether local communities can appropriately manage
communal forests. This question pertains to the management of common-pool resources.
According to Ostrom (1990), common-pool resources are excessively appropriated, due
to the negative externalities, and insufficiently managed, due to the free rider problem.
This paper focuses on the institutions that local communities establish in efforts toprevent or mitigate these problems and on the communities’ social capital. According toInoue (2009), Ostrom (2003), and Ostrom and Ahn (eds.) (2003), social capital plays arole in encouraging the members of local communities to contribute to the managementof common-pool resources. In this paper, we use structural equation modeling (SEM) to
analyze quantitatively the structure of communities’ social capital with regard to forest
management. We reach three conclusions. First, villages have institutions to preventthe problem of forest overuse. Second, local resident do not always manage thecommunal forest well, due to the free rider problem, but if they create and maintainlong-term social capital, they tend to manage the forest better than if they do not. Third,
combining reciprocity with other social capital factors—trust and the social
network—may mitigate the problem of overuse without the community having toestablish a formal institution.
Keywords: Communal Forest, Free Rider, Social Capital, Common-Pool Resources
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyze the role played by social capital in communal forest
management in the low-lying areas (altitude of less than 400m) of Lao PDR. In these
low-lying areas, villagers can gather some materials (e.g., firewood, food, and timber)from the communal forest.
Forest land area in the low-lying areas of Lao PDR has been shrinking anddeteriorating as a result of population growth and the influence of the market economy.
This population growth consists of not only natural growth but also migration from* Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Chuo University; moritomo@tamacc.chuo-u.ac.jp

1mountainous areas, because in the 1980s and 1990s the Lao government implemented
policies to encourage the migration from mountainous areas to low-lying areas. In
addition, after the Lao government adopted a market system, as part of chin tanakan
may, some people voluntarily migrated to urban areas and suburban areas (e.g., theVientiane capital, Vientiane province, and Bolikhamxay province). The market economy
also has influenced land-use patterns: for example, people have converted forest land to
agricultural land in order to cultivate cash crops and harvesting increasing volumes ofmaterial from the forests to sell at market). In addition, some companies have developed
forestland and closed it off to local residents.
Although residents of the mountainous areas mainly utilize forestland to produce somefoods by a slash-and-burn technique, residents of low-lying areas take some materials(e.g., firewood, food, and timber) from the forest for life. Moreover, in the low-lying areas,
as a source of water, flood control, and so on, the forest also plays a role in protecting
residents’ lives.
The Lao government’s forest policy permits local residents or organizations to use theland by allocating use rights to them (although the government retains property rights
to the land, because Lao PDR is a socialist nation. The aim of the government’s forest
policy is to utilize efficiently the lands and resources by delineating land boundaries andcategorizing forests.
In addition, the Lao government permits villagers to exercise the use right ofcommunal forestry, based on the national land management authority No. 564“Adjudications Pertaining to Land Use and Occupation for Land Regulation and Titling,”
enacted in 2007. Based on that forestry policy, the communal forest program issues to avillage the right to appropriate and manage the communal forest on behalf of thevillagers. For the purposes of this paper, we define the village’s management of thecommunal forest as community governance.
Resources, such as a communal forest, that are appropriated by a community can be
regarded as common-pool resources. Common-pool resources have as attributes
non-exclusion and rivals. These attributes cause negative externalities for thecommunity. In other words, common-pool resources are appropriated inefficiently andunsustainably (the problem of overuse). Furthermore, free riders benefit from thecommon-pool resources without having to participate in or contribute to their
management. The existence of these free riders prevents the appropriators who
co-manage the resources from improving the efficiency and sustainability of use even if
they attempt to do so; this is the problem of undermanagement.

2

Most previous studies of communal forests were based on forestry sociology (Inoue,
2000, 2003; Inoue and Hyakumura, 2000; Namura and Inoue, 1998). Specifically, they
focused on the participation of local communities. They did not discuss the free rider
problem or whether local residents participate in or contribute to the management of
the communal forest and what problems they face if they participate.
Inoue (2009), Ostrom (2003), and Ostrom and Ahn (eds.) (2003) mentioned thatwhether local residents participate in or contribute to the management of the communal
forest depends on the social capital of the community. Previous studies mentioned thatsocial capital represents social relationships and plays a role in restraining the
emergence of free riders. Many studies have defined social capital, generally as being
comprised of the societal factors trust, reciprocity, and social networks. However, few
studies have quantitatively analyzed social capital.
In this study, we use a common-pool approach to quantitatively analyze whether social
capital in community governance restrains the emergence of free riders.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical data based on theauthor’s field research in the Sangthong district, Vientiane Capital. First, theinstitution that was established in order to manage the communal forest is described.
Then, the analysis method—ANOVA, t-tests, and structural equation modeling(SEM)—is summarized. In section 3, the results of the analysis are presented. Section 4summarizes the results and their implications.
2. Empirical Survey in the Sangthong district, Vientiane Capital
2-1. Basic Information
The Sangthong district is located approximately 60 km west of Vientiane capital, along
the Mekong River (see Figure 1). This district is surrounded by mountains and includes
Phou Phanang National Biodiversity Conservation Area (NBCA) as well as residential
areas at altitude of less than 200 m. The district covers a land area of approximately
800,000 ha and consists of approximately 40% agricultural land, 50% forestland, 6%
wetland and 4% others.
Migrants from other area, especially Luang Phanbang province, entered the
Sangthong district in increasing amounts during 1995–2002 (Sayalath et al., 2011).
The increasing migration inflow resulted in the conversion of forestland to agriculturalland and the development of plantations such as rubber tree cultivation. Suchdevelopment have encourage forests degraded and decreasing. Forest degradation anddeforestation have led to disasters, such as soil erosion and landslides.
Some villages in this district have obtained communal forest rights, supported by the3Netherlands Development Organization (SNV), the World Bank Gender andDevelopment Group (GDG), and the (World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). This paper
uses three villages in the Sangthong district (Napo, Kouay, and Houytom) as the fieldresearch sites. Napo and Kouay have already obtained communal forest rights, but
Houytom has not.
Figure 1: Site of Sangthong district
Sangthong district

Lao PDR

Source: Author’s own construction based on data from MONRE and Google Earth.
Table 1: Basic information of three villages
Items
Village namePopulation (Person)

Household (HH)

Nuai (Group)

Area (ha)The Beginning of village

Napo

476

97

10

2,591

1961

Kouay

660

142

13

6,035

1897

Houytom

577

111

8

2,100

1993

Source: Author’s own construction based on Sayalath et al. (2011) and Mori (2015).
Table 1 summarizes basic information about the three villages.1 The population ofeach of the villages is relatively small—only approximately 100 households and
400–600 people.
Table 2 and Figure 2 show that Houytom was established in 1993 and thus is arelatively new village. Furthermore, over 80% of Houytom’s households are migrants
Please see Sayalath et al. (2011) for information about the ages of the villages.
Houytom’s age is estimated based on interviews. However, it is clear from interviews of
the village elders that Napo and Kouay have longer histories than those villages’ strictages. The estimates in Table 2 are based on when administrative villages were
established in those locations, but some households lived in those locations earlier,when they were natural villages.
1

4

from other areas. In contrast, Kouay, has existed for more than 100 years. Kouay also
has fewer migrant residents than do the other two villages.
Table 2: Proportion of the forest
Proportion of Forest
Total Area (ha)Village

Protection (ha)Conservation (ha)Production (ha)Burial (ha)Communal (ha)Napo

1,356.2

0.00 (0%)

1,122.40 (83%)

168.11 (12.3%)

14.77 (1.0%)

50.94 (3.7%)

Kouay

2,434.11

670.00 (27.5%)

1,453.00 (59.7%)

168.11 (6.9%)

8.00 (0.3%)

135.00 (5.6%)

Houytom

401.6

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

3.5 (0.8%)

Source: Author’s own construction based on Sayalath et al. (2011) about Napo andKouay, field survey about Houytom.
* However, in Houytom, the information about Protection, Conservation and Production forest is unclear because
local people don’t have the information in detail and there are no their materials.

Napo

60

4%
28%

50

Born in this village

40
23

30
20
10

Invited

20

10

5

4

1%

3

0

Voluntary choice
other

67%

2011∼2015

2001∼20101991∼2000

1981∼19901971∼1980∼1970

the number of the migrantion

Figure 2: Situation and reasons of the migrant in each village

42%

40
30
20
10

18

17

12

7

Born in this village
58%
1

0

Voluntary choice

0

13%

51

7

2

1%
1%

27

Born in this village

118Required to join
Invited2011∼2015

2001∼20101991∼2000

1981∼19901971∼1980

0

2011∼201540
20

2001∼20101991∼2000

1981∼19901971∼1980

Houytom60∼1970

the number of the migration

50

∼1970

the number of the migration

Kouay
60

Voluntary choice85%

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey and Mori (2015).

5

Figure 3: Proportion of ethnic group
Khmu
21%

Phu noy1%

Phu noyThai Dam
Khmu 3%
1%
2%
Hmong
1%

No answer
4%

No
answer9%

Phu noy
1%
Khmu
12%

Hmong
4%

Lao
74%

N=97

Lao
89%

N=137

N=111

Kouay

Napo

Houytom

Lao78%

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey and Mori (2015).
The ethnicity of the population of Napo is 74% Lao, 21% Khmu, 4% Hmong and 1%
Phu noy. Kouay consists of 89% Lao, 3% Phu noy, 2% Khmu, 1% Thai dai, 1% Hmong,
4% unanswered. Houytom consists of 78% Lao, 12% Khmu, 1% Phu noy and 9%
unanswered. The Lao government categorizes ethnic groups into three broad groups
based on altitude: Lao lum, Lao sung, and Lao Thong.
In short, Napo and Houytom were established later than was Kouay and their
populations include more migrants than does Kouay’s. This is especially true for the
Khmu ethnic group, which generally lives in hillside areas. In contrast, Kouay has alonger history, has a lower proportion of migrants, and consists of over 90% Lao.
Figure 4: Distribution of income per year in households
Napo

Kouay

(kip)
8

Over 50,000,000

53

Under 20,000,000-5,000,000

0

20

40

60

N=137

0

20

40

60
(HH)

(kip)

Over 50,000,000

25

Under 50,000,000-35,000,000

2644Under 35,000,000-20,000,000

14Under 20,000,000-5,000,000

2Under 5,000,000

N=111

32
25

Under 5,000,000(HH)

Houytom

15

Under 20,000,000-5,000,000

19

Under 5,000,000

N=97

43

Under 35,000,000-20,000,000

12Under 35,000,000-20,000,000

22

Under 50,000,000-35,000,000

5Under 50,000,000-35,000,000(kip)

Over 50,000,000

0

20

40

60

(HH)

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey and Mori (2015).

6

Figure 4 reports the average annual household income for each of the three villages.
Napo, contains the fewest low-income households. Houytom contains the mosthigh-income households. Kouay has two groups of low income households and highincome households.
2-2. The Institutions That Manage the Communal Forest
Studies by Terade (1993), Ostrom (1990), and Yabuta (2004) have described theinstitutions that manage communal forests. Those studies detailed the community
governance of the common-pool resources by focusing on the boundary rule (which
specifies the membership and the boundary of the resources), the allocation rule (which
restricts the use of the resources), and monitoring and penalty rules (which monitor useof the resources and imposes penalties on rule breakers). In Laos, the boundary rule isdefined by Land Forest Allocation Program. Therefore, this paper focuses on the
allocation rule and the monitoring and penalty rules.
All three of the villages studied can make and modify allocation, monitoring, andpenalty rules in village meetings. The purpose of village meetings is not only to inform
villagers of decisions made by the district’s administration but also to discuss village
issues and reach agreement about potential solutions to them. Table 3 provides detail.
Meeting topics are discussed by the village leader and deputies in advance of themeeting. In Napo and Houytom, Nuai’s leaders also participate in the advancediscussion of topics. In a village meeting, if 60% of the meeting participants agrees witha proposal, it is passed. At least one person from each household must participate in themeeting. In Napo and Houytom, the first time a household misses a meeting without
the permission of the village leader, it is cautioned; and the second time, the householdmust pay 30,000 kip.

Kouay does not impose such a penalty for missing village

meetings.
Table 3: Details of the village meeting
Contents
Frequent
Participators (person)
Village

Chairmans

Decision(times/month)･least one person per a household.

･a village leader and deputy (three persons)* If one doesn’t participate in the･the topic in the meeting is discussed by ameeting, he has to pay 30,000 kip.

village leader,･an agreement ofNapo

2

60% participators
deputy and Nuai’s leaders.

･least one person per a household.
Kouay･an agreement of･a village leader and deputy (three persons)1* If one doesn’t participate in the

60% participators7

meeting, he doesn’t have to pay thepenalty･least one person per a household.

･a village leader and deputy (three persons)* If one doesn’t participate in the･the topic in the meeting is discussed by a village

meeting, he has to pay 20,000kip.

leader,･an agreement of
Houytom

1

60% participators
deputy and Nuai’s leaders.

Source: Author’s own construction based on field survey and Mori (2015).
2-3. Analysis of the Institutions That Manage the Communal Forest
Based on information obtained from the field survey, the allocation rules, monitoring
rules, and penalty rules of the three villages have both similarities and differences.
Tables 6, 7, and 8 report the details of each rule. The similarities are that villagers’ useof the communal forest is limited to house use, meaning that the villagers areprohibited from gathering materials from the communal forest for sale at market. The
three villages limit the instrument for gathering forest materials to human labor. Napoand Houytom limit transportation of forest materials to human labor. In order toconserve forest resources, private roads and cultivation are prohibited in the communal
forest. However, in Houytom and Kouay, one can do so, if agreement is obtained in avillage meeting. Basically, a villager can appropriate non-timber forest products withoutagreement in a village meeting, but the villager cannot appropriate bamboo from acommunal forest. This restriction on bamboo is limited to zones of degraded forest,
specifically, the site of the SNV’s project in Kouay. In Napo and Houytom, in order to cut
down trees in the communal forest, a villager must request and obtain approval fromthe village leader. On the other hand, during any season, a villager can use otherresources from the communal forest, can graze livestock there, and can enter it.
As shown in Table 4, Kouay’s allocation rule is less stringent than the allocation rulesof the other two villages. According to Kouay’s village leader, its villagers do notcompete for forest resources, because its communal forest is larger than those of theother two villages. In contrast, Houytom prohibits its villagers from cutting down any
Afzelia Xylocarpa.2
Table 4: Details of allocation rules
Village2

Afzelia Xylocarpa is a southeast Asian tree that grows in Myanmar, Thailand, Lao
PDR, Vietnam, and China. A hardwood, it is used in construction, including
homebuilding. However, it is on the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s(IUCN) red list of threatened species. (http://www.iucnredlist.org/details/full/32811/0,
last accessed on June 28, 2014)8

RulesRequest

Napo

of

the

appropriation

Kouay

Houytom

If one cuts down tree of DBH over
20cm, one has to request village leader
and pay money;
If one cuts down tree, one has to➢ 100,000kip (20-30cm per a tree.

None
request village leader.

➢ 120,000kip (over 30cm per a tree.
* The tree of DBH under 20cm is free
until 5 trees.
Use restricted

Villagers can appropriate communal

Villagers can appropriate communal

Villagers can appropriate

forest for only home use. If heforest for only home use. If hecommunal forest for only home

appropriates it for sales, he has to pay

appropriates it for sales, he has to pay

use. If he appropriates it for sales,

the penalty.

the penalty.

he has to pay the penalty.

Trees prohibited to be cut
None

None

Afzelia Xylocarpa

down.
Period and part

One must not appropriate a whole･One must not appropriate abamboo clump and bamboo in a year inwhole bamboo clump and bamboo

SNV project site, but can do in other site.

in a year.

One must not appropriate a whole
permitted to bebamboo clump3 and bamboo in a year.
appropriatedGrazing prohibited
Cultivation prohibited
Opening

the

way

None

None

None

Existence

Existence

Existencein

If one can get the permission in
If one can get the permission in village

communal forest

The prohibitionvillage meeting, he can open themeeting, he can open the way.
way.

Available seasons
Entrance
Placesrestrictedcommunal forestin

All seasons

All seasons

All seasons

Village can enter anywhere.

Village can enter anywhere.

Village can enter anywhere

Villagers must not appropriate in the

One must not appropriate a bamboo andVillagers must not appropriate inplace where the sustainable condition

cut down tree in a year in SNV project

the place where the sustainable

is bad.

site, but can do in other site.

condition is bad.

* SNV staffs judge the condition, but* Village leader judges theforest manager hopes to judge in

condition.

future.
* SNV staff remark trees as the sign inthe restricted place.
Transportation restricted

Villagers can carry by only
Villagers can carry by only manpower.

Villagers can carry by a track.
manpower.

3

Whole bamboo clump is the population composed of some clumps.

9Instrument restricted

Villagers can appropriate with only

Villagers can appropriate with only

Villagers can appropriate withmanpower.

manpower.

only manpower.

Source: Author’s own construction based on field survey and Mori (2015).
Table 5 shows the village leader, deputies, police group, soldier group or land manager
that participate in the monitoring activity with the forest manager. The monitoring
activity is not done frequently during the rainy season, because it is difficult to do so.
Table 5: Details of a monitoring rule
Village

Contents
Forest manager
Monitoring member (person)

Frequency

Police group, solider group and forest manager (2).

One time per two months* If necessary, land manager participate in the monitoring.

* There are some differences in each

* Members in police group and solider group participate in a rotation.

season; less in rainy season and more

* Solider members have some arms in monitoring.

in dry season.

Police group (2), solider group (1), land manager (1) and forest manager (3).

One time per a month* If necessary, village leader and deputy participate in the monitoring.

* There are some differences in each

* Solider members have some arms in monitoring.

season; less in rainy season and more(person)
Napo

Kouay

2

3

in dry season.
Houytom2

Village leader, Police group (11), solider group and forest manager (3).

two times per one month* If necessary, land managers participate in the monitoring.

* There are some differences in each

* Solider members have some arms in monitoring.

season; less in rainy season and more

* Members in solider group participate in a rotation.

in dry season.

Source: Author’s own construction based on field survey and Mori (2015).
Table 6 lists each village’s prohibitions and penalties with regard to the gathering of
bamboo and non-timber forest products for sale at market and cutting down trees forany purpose. Houytom prohibits cutting down one specific type of tree (Afzelia
Xylocarpa). The rules in Kouay are less stringent than those in the other two villages.
Table 6: Details of penalty rule
Village

The contents･Rule breaker to cut down illegally must pay 2,000,000kip per tree in the case of tree of DBH 20-30cm, and 3,000,000kip per tree in the case oftree of DBH over 30cm.

Napo･If one appropriates bamboo in a year, one must pay 5,000kip per a bamboo.
･If one appropriates bamboo roots for sales, one must pay 5,000kip per a bamboo root.

10

･If one clears trees or some resources for cultivation or the open of the way, one must pay the sum.
･Rue breaker must be asked by other villagers in the village meeting.
･If one appropriates bamboo in a year in SNV project site, one must pay 1,000kip per a bamboo.
Kouay* Kouay has not decided the value of the penalty because rule breakers have not appeared ever. If they appear, the value will be decided in thevillage meeting.
･Villager must not cut down illegally trees, but can appropriate freely non timber forest products.
･Villagers must not cut down tree without the permission from village leader.

Houytom
Houytom has not decided the value of the penalty because rule breakers have not appeared ever. If they appear, the value will be decided in
the village meeting.

Source: Author’s own construction based on field survey and Mori (2015).
3. Quantitative Analysis
3-1. Method
In this study, questionnaires were collected from 335 households in the three villages.
However, the factors of social capital (trust, reciprocity, and network) cannot be easily
observed as variables. In order to incorporate such factors in a statistical model, latentvariables are better than observed variables. Therefore, in this paper, we use structural
equation modeling (SEM), a type of covariance structure analysis, to analyze the social
capital factors. SEM is a methodology for deriving latent variables from observed
variables and analyzing the correlations among the latent variables.
Table 7 summarizes the three latent variables, the observed variables from which thelatent variables are derived, and their components. The latent variables are createdbased on Linkert’s scale with five stages, from (1) very good to (5) very poor and from (1)very often to (5) never.
Table 7: Latent and Observed Variables in this model11

Latent variable

Observed Variable

Communal Forest Management

Contents( 1)

How often do you voluntarily participate in community forest management?

How often do you voluntarily participate in group work in this village? Please choose one in the following
Group Work ( 1 )words.
Reciprocity ( )Mutual Aid ( 3 )Ceremonial occasions ( 4 )Network ( 1 )Trust ( 2 )How often do you voluntarily participate in mutual help in this village?
How often do you voluntarily participate in ceremonial occasions in this village?

Village Meetings ( 5 )How often are the meetings about community management held?

Acquaintances ( 6 )How many persons outside this village do you interact with?

Friendships ( 7 )Do you often communicate with friends in village?

Relatives ( 8 )Do you often communicate with relatives in village?

Trust for insider ( 9 )How strong do you have trust for members in this village?

Trust for outsider ( 10 )How strong do you have trust for the people outside this village?

Strength of relationships ( 11 )Do you agree that the relationship in this village is good?

Source: Author’s own construction.
Based on Ostrom’s studies (1998, 2003), we assume that trust and network enhancereciprocity and, therefore, that enhanced reciprocity encourages villagers to participate
in collective actions. 4 Furthermore, we assume that the network and trust areinterrelated. Namely, because a person is connected to other people, he or she trusts
them, and because a person trusts other people, he or she is connected to them.
See the model diagram shown in Figure 5.
First, we assume that the latent variable for reciprocity ( ) enhances villagers’ level ofparticipation. Then, we set the variables for communal forest management ( ), group
work ( ), mutual aid (), ceremonial occasions (), and village meetings () asdescribing the village’s collective actions and construct the latent variable forreciprocity from these variables. Second, we assume that the latent variable for the
network ( ) is composed of the human relationships within a village and influences thevillagers’ actions. We set the variable for acquaintances (), friendships (), andrelatives ( ) and construct the latent variable for the network from these variables.
Third, we assume that the latent variable for trust ( ) represents how a villager
expects other villagers to cooperate with him or her. We set the variables for trust in
insiders ( ), trust in outsiders (), and strength of relationships () and construct

the latent variable for trust from these variables.

Ostrom (1998, 2003) did not use the term network but rather used the term
reputation. However, because the terms have similar meaning and scale, in this paper4

we treat reputation as the network.
12In addition, we define the variables

andis the correlation coefficient between

as error terms. The factor

and of, and the values ofare fixed at 1 due to normalization. Finally, in this model there isassumed to be a covariance ( ) between trust and network.
Figure 5: Path diagram of this model(Reciprocity)(Network)(Trust)Source: Author’s own construction.
The purpose of the SEM analysis is to determine the path and the degree of influence
from trust and network to reciprocity. However, the history and social backgroundvaries among the three villages. Therefore, the differences among the villages, in termsof the observed variables, must be considered. So, we analyze the variables, both acrossvillages and within each village, by use of ANOVA and t-testss.
3-2. Results of the ANOVA and t-testss
Tables 8 and 9 report the results of the ANOVA and t-testss. The main effects of thedifferences across villages, in terms of observed variables related to reciprocity otherthan ceremonial occasions are clear. Kouay villagers are more likely than Napo or
Houytom villagers to voluntarily participate in communal forest management. Kouay
and Houytom villagers are more likely than Napo villagers to voluntarily participate ingroup work. Napo villagers are more likely than Kouay or Houytom villagers tovoluntarily provide mutual aid and participate in village meetings. There is no
significant difference between Houytom and Kouay in terms of participation in village
meetings. However, Houytom villagers are more likely than Kouay villagers tovoluntarily provide mutual aid.
With regard to observed variables related to trust, the main effects of the differences
across villages are as follows. Napo and Houytom villagers have more trust in insiders
than do Kouay villagers. There is significant difference across the three villages interms of trust in outsiders, with Houytom villagers trusting outsiders the most andKouay villagers trusting outsiders the least. Napo villagers have stronger human13relationships than do Kouay or Houytom villagers.
Table 8: Result of ANOVA for observed variables in each village
items

Village

Vake

SE

F

Napo

3.18

1.561

8.63***

0.561

Houytom

2.72

0.94

2.53

0.877

Kouay

2.56

0.895

Total

2.70

0.886

Total

2.78

1.163

Napo

1.88

1.166

Ceremonial

Napo

2.28

.100

Houytom

2.19

0.741

occasions

Houytom

2.20

.071

Kouay

2.42

0.905

Kouay

2.40

.083

Total

2.19

0.966

Total

2.30

.049

Napo

1.8

0.571

Napo

1.79

1.035

Houytom

2.34

0.742

Houytom

1.71

0.911

Kouay

2.5

0.739

Kouay

1.47

1.261

Total

2.25

0.753

Total

1.64

1.103

Napo

1.59

0.955

Napo

1.27

0.638

Houytom

1.96

0.719

Houytom

1.55

0.739

Kouay

2.33

0.884

Kouay

1.93

0.906

Total

2.00

0.906

Total

1.62

0.828

Napo

2.07

0.696

Napo

2.58

0.643

Houytom

2.16

0.496

Houytom

2.35

0.5

Kouay

2.38

0.729

Kouay

3.00

0.748

Total

2.22

0.666

Total

2.68

0.705

Strength of

Napo

2.01

0.685

relationships

Houytom

2.43

0.567

Kouay

2.48

0.768

Total

2.33

0.714

Communal Forest
Management

Mutual Aid

Village Meetings

Friendships

Trust for insider

Vake

SE

F

Items

Napo

2.87

1.124

4.60**

Group Work

Houytom

2.76

Kouay

9.57***

29.87***

Acquaintances

21.4***

Relatives

7.04***

Trust for outsider

Village

1.51

2.83*

20.36***

31.22***

14.93***

SE: Standard Error,

N=97～137***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey
Table 9: Multiple comparison between three villages by HSD method

Communal

ForestVillage I

Village J

Difference (I-J)

SE

Napo

Houytom

0.102

0.123

Kouay

.337**

0.117

Napo

-0.102

0.123

Management

Houytom

Village I
Group work

Napo

Houytom

14

Village J

Difference (I-J)

SE

Houytom.456**

0.160

Kouay

.620***

0.151

Napo

-.456**

0.16

KouayMutual aid

Napo

Houytom

Kouay

Acquaintances

Napo

Houytom

Kouay

Relatives

Napo

Houytom

Kouay

Trust for outsider

Napo

Houytom

Kouay

Kouay

.235*

0.114

Napo

-.337**

0.117

Houytom-.235*

0.114

Houytom-.311*

0.132

VillageKouay-.547***

0.125

meetings

Napo

.311*

0.132

Kouay

-0.236

0.122

Napo

.547***

0.125

Houytom

0.236

0.122

Houytom

0.081

0.154

Kouay

.325*

0.146

Napo

-0.081

0.154

Kouay

0.243

0.142

Napo

-.325*

0.146

Houytom-0.2430.142

Houytom-.282**

0.109

Trust forKouay-.657***

0.105

insider

Napo.282**

0.109

Kouay

-.375*

0.101

Napo

.657*

0.105

Houytom

.375*

0.101

Houytom

.225*

0.091

Strength ofKouay-.423*

0.086

relationships

Napo-.225*

0.091

Kouay

-.648*

0.084

Napo

.423*

0.086

Houytom

.648*

0.084

Kouay

Napo

Houytom

Kouay

Friendships

Napo

Houytom

Kouay

Napo

Houytom

Kouay

Napo

Houytom

Kouay

N=97～137

Kouay

0.164

0.147

Napo

-.620***

0.151

Houytom-0.1640.147

Houytom-.535***

0.098

Kouay

-.700***

0.092

Napo

.535***

0.098

Kouay

-0.1640.09

Napo.700***

0.092

Houytom

0.164

0.09

Houytom-.376***

0.12

Kouay

-.741***

0.114

Napo

.376***

0.12

Kouay

-.365***

0.11

Napo

.741***

0.114

Houytom.365***

0.11

Houytom-0.085

0.092

Kouay

-.307*

0.087

Napo

0.085

0.092

Kouay

-.222*

0.084

Napo

.307*

0.087

Houytom

.222*

0.084

Houytom-.416*

0.096

Kouay

-.471*

0.091

Napo

.416*

0.096

Kouay

-0.056

0.088

Napo

.471*

0.091

Houytom

0.056

0.088

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey
The results also demonstrate the main effects of the differences across villages interms of observed variables related to the social network. Kouay villagers communicate
more frequently with other people than do Napo or Houytom villagers. The frequency ofvillagers’ communication with friends and relatives can be ranked, in descending order,
as Kouay, Houytom, and Napo.

15

In summary, Napo and Houytom villagers provide more mutual aid, communicate
more with their friends and relatives, and trust insiders more than do Kouay villagers.
In contrast, Kouay villagers participate more in communal forest management than do
Napo or Houytom villagers. In addition, Kouay villagers participate more in group workthan do Napo villagers, although there is no significant difference in the group-workparticipation of Kouay villagers and Houytom villagers.
Next, we show the results of the ANOVA of collective action in each village and amultiple comparison (using the Bonferri method) of collective action in each village.
Figure 6 shows no significant differences across villagers with regard to factors related
to collective action in Kouay. On the other hand, Napo and Houytom have the higher
level of the mutual aid than the communal forest management and group work.
However, there is no significant difference about the village meeting in Napo, and thevillage meeting and the ceremonial occasion in Houytom.
Figure 6: Result of ANOVA about the collective action in each village
Village Meetings

1.8

Ceremonial occasions

3.18

Mutual Aid

2.51

Village Meetings

Ceremonial occasions

2.57

Ceremonial occasions

1.88

Group Work

2.28

Communal Forest
Management
N=97, F=38.58***

Village Meetings

2.87
1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

Mutual Aid

2.39

Group Work

2.4

Communal Forest
Management
N=134, F=1.411

1.5

2

2.5

3

2.69

Mutual Aid

2.16

Group Work

2.18

Communal Forest
Management

2.51
1

2.81

3.5

2.36
1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

N=106, F=17.76***

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey
Table 10: Multiple comparison of the collective action in Napo and Houytom byBonferroni method
Napo

Collective action (I)Communal
Management

ForestCollective action (J)Houytom

Difference (I-J)

SE

Collective action (I)Collective action (J)Group works-0.3090.145

Communal

Mutual aid.990***

0.142

Management.588***

0.125

Ceremonial

Group work

Group works

0.116

0.099

Mutual aid.653***

0.09.632***

0.081.453***

0.088-0.1160.099.537***

0.111.516***

0.113

occasions

1.062***

0.128

0.309

0.145

Communal Forest

Village Meetings
Group work

Management

Mutual aid

SE

Ceremonial

occasions

Village Meetings

ForestDifference (I-J)

Communal Forest
Management

1.299***

0.168.897***

0.144

Mutual aid

Ceremonial

Ceremonial

occasionsoccasions16

Village Meeting
Mutual aid

1.371***

0.164-.990***

0.142

Village Meeting

Communal Forest

Mutual aid

Management

Group works-1.299***0.168-.402**

0.119

0.09

-.537***

0.111-0.021

0.079

-0.2

0.099

-.632***

0.081

Ceremonial
occasions

0.072

0.127

-.588***

0.125

Village Meeting

Communal Forest
Management

Village Meetings-.653***

Communal Forest

Group works

occasionsCeremonial occasions

0.128

Management

Ceremonial

Village Meeting.337*

Ceremonial

Communal Forest

occasionsManagement

Group works-.897***

0.144

Group works-.516*

0.113

Mutual aid.402**

0.119

Mutual aid

0.021

0.079

Village Meeting.474***

0.101

Village Meeting-0.1790.105-1.062***0.128-.453***

0.088

Communal Forest

Village Meetings

Management

Communal Forest
Management

Group works-1.371***

0.164Group works-.337*

0.128

Mutual aid-0.072

0.127

Mutual aid

0.2

0.099

-.474***

0.101

0.179

0.105

Ceremonial

Ceremonial

occasionsoccasions

N=97

N=106

SE: Standard Error, ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey.
Table 10 shows differences between Napo and Houytom in terms of collective action
and the social network. One reason may be the higher proportion of migrants and ethnic
minorities (non-Lao people) in Napo and Houytom.
Table 11 shows the cross tabulation of ethnic groups and reasons for being residents ofthe villages. In Napo, 35% of the Lao residents were born in Napo, 61% voluntarily
migrated to Napo from elsewhere and 4% others. Most of the ethnic minority residentsof Napo were invited or voluntarily migrated there.
Table 12 shows that the population of Kouay includes fewer migrants and fewer
people of Lao ethnicity than do the populations of Napo and Houytom. Of the Kouay
villagers, 56% were born in Kouay, 41% voluntarily migrated to Kouay from elsewhere
and 4% others.
Table 11: Cross tabulation of ethic group and history of resident in Napo
Reasons17

Total

Born in this village

InvitedVoluntary choice

Other

Lao

35% (25)0% (0)

61% (44)

4% (3)

100% (72)Hmong

0% (0)

0% (0)

75% (3)25% (1)

100% (4)Khmu

0% (0)

5 (1%)

95% (19)

0% (0)

100% (20)

Phu noy

0% (0)

0% (0)

1 (0%)

0% (0)

100% (1)Total

26% (25)

1% (1)

69% (67)

4% (4)

100%（97）

1: Adding no answer all to other.

2: The number in parentheses is one of answers.

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey.
Table 12: Cross tabulation of ethic group and history of resident in Kouay
Reasons
Total
Born in this village

Voluntary choice

Other

Lao

56% (68)

41% (50)

3% (4)

100% (122)Hmong

0% (0)

100% (1)0 (0%)

100% (1)Khmu

33% (1)67% (2)0% (0)

100% (3)Khmu

20% (1)80% (4)0% (0)

100% (5)Thai Dam

0% (0)

100% (1)0% (0)

100% (1)Other100% (5)0% (0)

0% (0)

100% (5)55% (75)

42% (58)

3% (4)

100% (137)Total

1: Adding no answer all to other.

2: The number in parentheses is one of answers.

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey.
Table 13 shows that, of the Houytom villagers, 83% voluntarily migrated there from
elsewhere, only 10% were born in Houytom and 6% others. As in Napo, most of theethnic minority residents were invited or voluntarily migrated to Houytom.
Table 13: Cross tabulation of ethic group and history of resident in Houytom
Reasons
Total
Born in this village

Required to join

InvitedVoluntary choice

Other

Lao

10% (9)1% (1)

1% (1)

84% (73)

1% (1)

100% (87)Khmu

0% (0)

0% (0)

0 (0%)

85% (11)0% (0)

100% (13)

Phu noy

0% (0)

0% (0)

0% (0)

100% (1)0% (0)

100% (1)Other

20% (2)0% (0)

0% (0)

70% (7)0% (0)

100% (10)Total

10 %(11)

1% (1)

1% (1)

83% (92)

1% (1)

100% (111)

1: Adding no answer all to other.

2: The number in parentheses is one of answers.

18

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey.
The above results illustrate that Houytom’s population includes a larger proportion of
migrants than do Napo and Kouay. In addition, the proportion of ethnic groups is large
in Napo and Houytom. Moreover, in Napo and Houytom, the proportion of the migrated
Lao group is larger than that of those born in each village.
In the following, we analyze the differences between ethnic minorities and the Lao
ethnic group and between the Lao group born in these villages and those who arevoluntarily migrated to these villages.
First, we find no significant difference between the Lao group and the Khmu group interms of the observed variables in Table 14. In contrast, Table 15 shows a significant
difference between the Lao group and the Hmong group. In Napo, members of the
Hmong group provide more voluntary mutual aid and more frequently communicate
with friends and relatives than do members of other ethnic groups.
Table 14: t-tests between Lao group and Khmu group in Napo
Value

SE

Communal Forest

Lao

2.88

1.125

Management

Khmu

2.90

1.252

Mutual Aid

Lao

1.92

1.264

Khmu

1.85

.875

Lao

1.81

.547

Khmu

1.85

.671

Lao

1.56

.948

Khmu

1.75

1.020

Lao

2.07

.718

Khmu

2.10

.641

Strength of

Lao

2.01

.682

relationships

Khmu

2.05

.686

Village Meetings

Friendships

Trust for insider

t

Value
.086

.271

.305

.799

.172

Group Work

SE

Lao

3.22

1.603

Khmu

3.10

1.518

Ceremonial

Lao

2.31

1.083

occasions

Khmu

2.25

.639

Acquaintances

Lao

1.73

.956

Khmu

1.90

1.252

Lao

1.25

.599

Khmu

1.30

.733

Trust for

Lao

2.60

.643

outsider

Khmu

2.55

.686

Relatives

.209

t
.305

.290

.555

-.314

.287

SE: Standard Error
N=20～72***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey.
Table 15: t-tests between Lao group and Hmong group in Napo

Communal
Management

Forest

Value

SE

t

Lao

2.88

1.125

0.659

Hmong

2.50

0.577

19

Group Work

Value

SE

t

Lao

3.22

1.603

0.054

Hmong

3.25

0.957

Mutual Aid

Lao

1.92

1.264

Hmong

1.25

0.500

Lao

1.81

0.547

Hmong

1.50

0.577

Lao

1.56

0.948

Hmong

1.00

0.00

Lao

2.07

.718

Hmong

2.00

.816

Strength of

Lao

2.01

.682

relationships

Hmong

1.75

.957

Village Meetings

Friendships

Trust for insider

2.291*

1.084

4.974***.187

Ceremonial

Lao

2.31

1.083

occasions

Hmong

2.25

0.500

Acquaintances

Lao

1.73

0.956

Hmong

2.00

1.414

Lao

1.25

0.599

Hmong

1.00

0.00

Lao

2.60

.643

Hmong

2.25

.500

Relatives

Trust for outsider

0.101

0.532

3.540***

1.060

.739

N=4～72***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey.
Table 16 shows significant differences in Kouay between members of the Lao groupand members of the Khmu group in terms of participation in village meetings,
communication with friends, and strength of relationships. Compared to members of
the Lao group, members of the Khmu group in Kouay communicate more frequently
with their friends but voluntarily participate less in ceremonial occasions and have
weaker relationships.
Table 17 shows that, compared to members of the Lao group, members of the Phu noygroup in Kouay communicate with more frequently with other villagers and relatives
but voluntarily participate less in group work.
Table 16: t-tests between Lao group and Khmu group in Kouay
Value

SE

t

Lao

2.49

0.848

0.149

Management

Khmu

2.67

2.082

Mutual Aid

Lao

2.42

0.889

Khmu

2.00

1.00

Lao

2.52

0.741

Khmu

2.00

1.00

Lao

2.32

0.855

Khmu

1.00

0.00

Lao

2.38

0.708

Khmu

2.33

0.577

Lao

2.44

0.761

Communal

Village Meetings

Friendships

Trust for insider

Strength ofForest

0.803

1.184

17.041***

0.106

8.089***

20

Value

SE

t

Lao

2.52

0.879

1.644

Khmu

1.67

1.155

Ceremonial

Lao

2.33

0.886

occasions

Khmu

3.33

1.528

Acquaintances

Lao

1.43

1.205

Khmu

2.33

2.309

Lao

1.89

0.896

Khmu

1.67

1.155

Lao

2.99

0.71

Khmu

3.00

0.00

Group Work

Relatives

Trust for outsider

1.912*

0.678

0.427

0.02

relationships

Khmu

3.00

0.00

N=3~122***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey.
Table 17: t-tests between Lao group and Phu noy group in Kouay
Value

SE

t

Lao

2.49

0.848

1.458

Management

Phu noy

2.80

0.447

Mutual Aid

Lao

2.42

0.889

Phu noy

2.40

0.894

Lao

2.52

0.741

Phu noy

2.60

0.548

Lao

2.32

0.855

Phu noy

2.60

0.894

Lao

2.38

0.708

Phu noy

2.40

0.894

Strength of

Lao

2.44

0.761

relationships

Phu noy

2.80

0.447

Communal

ForestVillage Meetings

Friendships

Trust for insider

0.044

0.249

0.717

0.07

Value

SE

t

Lao

2.52

0.879

1.690*

Phu noy

3.20

1.095

Ceremonial

Lao

2.33

0.886

occasionsPhu noy

2.80

1.483

Acquaintances

Lao

1.43

1.205

Phu noy

1.00

0.00

Lao

1.89

0.896

Phu noy

2.60

0.894

Trust for

Lao

2.99

0.71

outsiderPhu noy

3.00

0.00

Group Work

Relatives

1.136

3.905***

1.732*

0.026

1.689
N＝5~122***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey.
Table 18 shows significant differences in Houytom between members of the Lao groupand members of the Khmu group with regard to communal forest management,
communication with insiders, trust in outsiders, and the strength of relationships. In
Kouay, compared to members of the Lao group, members of the Khmu group
communicate more with insiders, trust outsiders more, and have better relationships
but voluntarily participate in communal forest management less.
Table 18: t-tests between Lao group and Phu noy group in Houytom
Value

SE

t

Lao

2.73

0.586

1.876*

Management

Khmu

2.92

0.277

Mutual Aid

Lao

2.20

0.745

Khmu

1.92

0.641

Lao

2.37

0.744

Khmu

2.08

0.669

Lao

1.75

0.909

Khmu

1.31

0.48

Communal

ForestVillage Meeting

Trust for insider

1.289

Group work

Ceremonial occasions

Value

SE

t

Lao

2.67

0.964

0.497

Khmu

2.54

0.519

Lao

2.21

0.753

Khmu

2.00

0.739

Lao

2.16

0.457

Khmu

2.00

0.447

0.904

1.277
N=13～83

2.640**

Trust for insider

21

1.116

Trust for insider

Relatives

Lao

1.93

0.72

Khmu

1.77

0.439

Lao

1.54

0.749

Khmu

1.54

0.519

0.778

Trust for outsider

0.013

Strength of relationships

N=13～85

Lao

2.34

0.501

Khmu

2.11

0.333

Lao

2.46

0.569

Khmu

2.00

0.408

N=9～851.860*

3.595*****p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey.
Next, we analyze the difference between Lao born in these villages and those who
voluntarily migrated there. Table 19 shows significant differences in Napo with regard
to communal forest management, group work, mutual aid, and communication withrelatives. Compared to members of the Lao group who were born in Napo, members of
the Lao group who voluntarily migrated to Napo voluntarily participate less incommunal forest management and group work, provide less mutual aid, andcommunicate less frequently with their relatives.
Table 19: t-tests for Lao group born in this village and one choosing voluntarily in Napo
Value

SE

t

Born in this village

2.28

0.98

3.340***

Management

Voluntary choice

3.07

1.105

Mutual Aid

Born in this village

1.52

0.823

Voluntary choice

2.00

1.279

Born in this village

1.84

0.473

Voluntary choice

1.78

0.573

Born in this village

1.56

0.961

Voluntary choice

1.58

0.972

Born in this village

1.84

0.688

Voluntary choice

2.15

0.68

Strength ofBorn in this village

1.88

0.781

relationships

Voluntary choice

2.06

0.649

Communal

ForestVillage Meetings

Friendships

Trust for insider

2.115*

0.543

0.097

Value

SE

t

Born in this village

2.64

1.524

2.073**

Voluntary choice

3.40

1.586

Ceremonial

Born in this village

2.16

0.746

occasions

Voluntary choice

2.34

1.081

Acquaintances

Born in this village

1.68

0.945

Voluntary choice

1.82

1.094

Born in this village

1.08

0.40

Voluntary choice

1.33

0.705

Born in this village

2.60

0.645

Voluntary choice

2.58

0.655

Group Work

Relatives

1.27

Trust for outsider

-0.92

0.557

2.113***

0.117

1.026
N=25～67***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey.
Table 20: t test for Lao group born in this village and one choosing voluntarily in Kouay

Communal
Management

Forest

Value

SE

t

Born in this village

2.51

0.895

0.134

Voluntary choice

2.53

0.883

Group Work

22

Value

SE

t

Born in this village

2.54

0.847

0.242

Voluntary choice

2.58

0.963

Mutual Aid

Born in this village

2.37

0.749

Voluntary choice

2.52

1.064

Born in this village

2.52

0.742

Voluntary choice

2.48

0.731

Born in this village

2.33

0.890

Voluntary choice

2.34

0.870

Born in this village

2.43

0.738

Voluntary choice

2.36

0.718

Strength ofBorn in this village

2.56

0.758

relationships

Voluntary choice

2.41

0.773

Village Meetings

Friendships

Trust for insider

0.876

0.289

0.075

Ceremonial

Born in this village

2.39

0.884

occasions

Voluntary choice

2.52

1.047

Acquaintances

Born in this village

1.60

1.424

Voluntary choice

1.33

1.049

Born in this village

1.85

0.917

Voluntary choice

2.02

0.884

Born in this village

3.05

0.567

Voluntary choice

2.93

0.814

Relatives

Trust for outsider

0.506

0.779

1.27

1.041

0.976

1.094
N=58～75***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey.
Table 20 shows no significant difference between natives of Kouay and migrants in the
Lao group in Kouay. Table 21 shows significant differences between natives of Houytom
and migrants in the Lao group in Houytom with regard to mutual aid, communication
with friends and relatives, and trust in outsiders. Compared to natives of Houytom,
members of the Lao group who voluntarily migrated voluntarily provide more mutual
aid, voluntarily participate more in village meetings, more frequently communicate
with their friends and relatives, and trust in outsiders more.
The results of the ANOVA and the t-testss illustrate that the villages vary in terms of
the social backgrounds of their populations. First, the degree of reciprocity differs acrossthe three villages. The SEM analysis confirms this conclusion. Second, collective action
and human relationships differ between ethnic groups and between members of the Lao
ethnic group who were born in the village and those who migrated there from
elsewhere.
Table 21: t-tests for Lao group born in this village and one choosing voluntarily in
Houytom
Value

SE

t

Born in this village

2.56

0.527

1.241

Management

Voluntary choice

2.79

0.532

Mutual Aid

Born in this village

2.60

0.699

Voluntary choice

2.11

0.714

Born in this village

3.00

0.816

Voluntary choice

2.29

0.694

Communal

ForestVillage Meetings

Value

SE

t

Born in this village

2.5

0.527

0.762

Voluntary choice

2.74

0.983

Ceremonial

Born in this village

2.18

0.405

occasions

Voluntary choice

2.22

0.761

Acquaintances

Born in this village

1.7

0.823

Voluntary choice

1.72

0.941

Group Work

2.051**

3.005***

23

0.277

0.069

Friendships

Born in this village

2.55

0.688

Voluntary choice

1.89

0.694

Born in this village

2.10

0.316

Voluntary choice

2.16

0.517

Strength ofBorn in this village

2.7

0.483

relationships

Voluntary choice

2.41

0.579

Trust for insider

2.964***

0.332

Relatives

Trust for outsider

Born in this village

2.00

0.447

Voluntary choice

1.48

0.738

Born in this village

2.70

0.483

Voluntary choice

2.30

0.485

3.355***

2.478**

1.519
N=10～90***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey.
3-3. Results of the SEM Analysis
Table 22 shows the result of the SEM analysis. For this analysis, questionnaire data
for which even one value is missing is eliminated, according to listwise deletion.5 The
goodness-of-fit index (GFI), the adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI), the comparative
fit index (CFI), the root mean square residual (RMR) and the root mean square error
approximation (RMSEA) are used as fit indices in this model. The model’s fit is better if
the values of GFI, AGFI, and CFI are near 1.00 and worse if the values of RMR and
RMSEA are greater than 0.10.
Table 22: Result of SEM
Napo

Kouay

Normalized

Houytom

NormalizedSE

Estimation Value

NormalizedSE

Estimation ValueSE
Estimation Value

Reciprocity ( )←Trust ( )

0.209

0.175

0.345*

0.144-0.2530.235

Reciprocity ( )←Network ( )-0.0790.226

0.643***

0.233

0.558***

0.114

Trust ( )↔

Network ( )

0.04

0.028

0.654***

0.055

0.171

0.028

Communal Forest Management ( )←Reciprocity ( )0.592***

0.325

0.529***

0.173

0.397**

0.302

Group work ( )←Reciprocity ( )0.722***

0.520

0.491***

0.177

0.370**

0.043

Mutual aid ( )←Reciprocity ( )0.490†－

0.619†－

0.509†－

Ceremonial occasions ( )←Reciprocity ( )0.690***

0.317

0.473***

0.207

0.837***

0.672

Village Meetings ( )←Reciprocity ( )

0.195

0.120

0.508***

0.162-0.1070.379

Acquaintances ( )←Network ( )0.602***

0.465

0.175*

0.180

0.723***

0.151

Friendships ( )←Network ( )0.627***

0.467

0.798***

0.177

0.829***

0.111

Relatives ( )←Network ( )0.639†－

0.762†－

0.937†－

Trust for insider ( )←Trust ( )0.707†－

0.638†－

0.633†－

Trust for outsider ( )←Trust ( )0.790***

0.407

0.389***

0.201

0.669*

0.578

For additional information regarding listwise deletion as a method for handling
missing data, refer to Toyota (ed.) (2011), pp. 110-111.
5

24

Strength of relationships ( )Fit Index←

Trust ( )0.289***

0.182

0.534***

0.230

0.345*

0.319

GFI = 0.895, AGFI = 0.831, CFI =GFI = 0.833, AGFI = 0.892, CFI =GFI = 0.676, AGFI = 0.780, CFI =0.852, RMR = 0.082, RMSEA =0.826, RMR = 0.063, RMSEA =0.646, RMR = 0.06, RMSEA =

0.079

0.096

0.162

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 and the coefficient with †is one when.

Source: Author’s own construction based on the questionnaire survey.
As shown in Table 25, the results for Napo and Kouay enable us to accept this paper’s
hypothesis, although they do not agree in terms of GFI, AGFI, and CFI. In contrast, inthe results for Houytom, especially the value of RMSEA being greater than 0.10, require
us to reject this paper’s hypothesis.
Figure 7 is the path diagram for Napo and Kouay. However, for Napo, although thecorrelations between the observed variables and the latent variables are significant, thedifferences in terms of the latent variables are not significant. In other words, although
the three factors of social capital can be modeled as latent variables, there is no
significant relationship among the factors of social capital. In contrast, for Kouay, thecorrelation coefficients between network and reciprocity and between network and trust
are high, and the correlation coefficient between trust and reciprocity is low.6
The relationship between each observed variable and the corresponding latent variable
is statistically significant at the 10% level. For Kouay, these results show that the latentvariables representing trust and the social network influence reciprocity, as was the
hypothesis. The influence of the network on reciprocity is especially large.
Figure 7: Path diagram in Napo and Kouay

The degree of correlation between two variables can be characterized as follows(Yonekawa and Yamazaki, 2010, p.77):: High degree of correlation: Medium degree of correlation: Low degree of correlation: No degree of correlation
625

<Napo><Kouay>Source: Author’s own construction.
4. Final Remarks
As discussed in sections 2-2 and 2-3 of this paper, the three villages have institutions
such as those described by Terade (1993), Ostrom (1990), and Yabuta (2004), but theinstitutions vary across villages. For example, Kouay’s allocation rule and penalty rule
are less stringent than those of Napo and Houytom.
The results of the quantitative analysis can be summarized as follows. We haveanalyzed differences in collective action within and across villages. The results of the
ANOVA show that Kouay villagers are more active in terms of participation in thevillage’s work, such as forest management and group work, and communicate more withinsiders than do residents of the other two villages. However, Napo and Houytom
villagers voluntarily provide more mutual aid to their friends and relatives than do
Kouay villagers. The reason for the difference in terms of mutual aid (reciprocity) may
be that Kouay has a longer history than do the other villages, and most of the Kouay
villagers are members of the Lao ethnic group and were born in Kouay. In contrast,

26

Napo and Houytom have shorter histories than does Kouay, and many of their residents
are migrants from elsewhere. Because in the populations of Napo and Houytom include
many migrants, a sufficient reciprocity norm does not exist and, therefore, cannot
motivate collective action for forest management and group work.
The ANOVA results are consistent with the SEM results. Although the SEM results for
Houytom do not enable us to accept the hypothesis, the SEM results for Napo andKouay are more fruitful. For Napo, the relationships among three factors of social
capital are not statistically significant. However, for Kouay, trust and network influence
reciprocity, as was hypothesized earlier in this paper.
Based on the statistical analyses, we have demonstrated that in a village that has arelatively long history, social capital plays a role in restraining the emergence andexistence of free riders. In contrast, in a village that has a relatively short history or hasheterogeneous attributes (e.g., various ethnicities or migrants from other areas), social
capital fails to play such a role.
Although Kouay’s institutions are less stringent than those of the other two villages,
reciprocity in Kouay is influenced positively by trust and the social network; thus, thereciprocity restrains the emergence of free rider. In other words, the combination ofreciprocity and other factors of social capital encourages villagers to contribute tocommunity governance without the need for a strict institution.
This study has reached three conclusions. First, the three villages analyzed haveestablished institutions, as described in previous studies of common-pool resources, tomitigate or even prevent the problem of overuse of the communal forest. Second,
residents cannot always manage the communal forest well, due to the presence of freeriders, but if they create and maintain long-term social capital, they can do so. Third,
combining reciprocity with other factors of social capital may mitigate the problem ofoveruse without the community having to establish a strict institution.
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