Insights from Leadersin Nuclear Energy:
Leadership for Safety
Hans Wanner, Director-General,
Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate(ENSI)
Mike Harrison, Chief Nuclear Officer,
EDF Energy

NEA

Insights from Leaders in Nuclear Energy:
Leadership for Safety

Hans Wanner, Director-General,
Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI)
Mike Harrison, Chief Nuclear Officer,
EDF Energy
In conversation
with William D. Magwood, IV, Director-General
Nuclear Energy Agency
5 June 2019T

he mission of the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) is to regulate thenuclear safety and security of Swiss nuclear facilities. Hans Wanner joined ENSI in
1995 as a geochemist and was appointed its Director-General in 2010.
EDF Energy is the United Kingdom’s largest producer of low-carbon electricity and a
subsidiary of the French state-owned Électricité de France (EDF). Mike Harrison was
appointed Chief Nuclear Officer for the EDF Energy Region 1 fleet of nuclear power stations in January 2018.
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Director-General William D. Magwood, IV sat down with
Director-General Wanner and Chief Nuclear Officer Harrison during the NEA-IAEAWANO Human Capital Workshop in June 2019 in Paris for a wide-ranging discussion
regarding leadership and nuclear safety. The conversation touched on influencing behaviour, feedback culture, transparency, public communications, and the relationshipbetween the regulator and operator.

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Director-General William D. Magwood IV: I have often made the remark that, in the
post-Fukushima Daiichi era, we have done extensive work to improve safety across theworld. We have added equipment, procedures, and training, and the plants have neverbeen more resilient than they are today. I think that everyone would agree with this. It
is difficult to imagine, other than because of a major natural disaster, how a plant would
develop a significant nuclear safety problem unless someone, somewhere does not do his
or her job and do it correctly. So it comes back to the human aspect.
All of us have studied the famous three accidents – Three Mile Island, Chernobyl,
and Fukushima Daiichi. It is remarkable how each one of them has a significant humanaspect that either led to the conditions that allowed the accident to happen, or created theaccident itself. Human engagement played a large role in each of them.
I will start off with a story, because when I was reflecting on this, I remembered anissue which came up at the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) several years
ago. We were considering whether to follow the example of many European and Asian
regulators and require filters on vents for some containments. This is something that
Switzerland did a very long time ago in response to Chernobyl, and many others havedone in response to Fukushima Daiichi. In the U.S., this was a major debate. For small
containments, Mark I BWRs, if there is an incident where pressure builds because of asevere accident – just as we saw in Fukushima Daiichi – it is the responsibility of the operators to release the pressure by venting the vessel. This is the established procedure andis essential to protect the integrity of the containment. The linchpin of the NRC’s debate,
however, centred around whether the operators would actually follow the procedure. Or,
being human, would they consider what was happening outside the plant-whether or not
people had been evacuated?
Procedurally, operators are not supposed to take factors such as the outside environment into consideration. But when you look at the situation from a human perspective,
as a human being they may worry about what is happening outside and delay venting,which could lead to a bigger accident. It is a very human question, and these are the kindsof decisions that we expect our nuclear operators to be able to make at many junctures.

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INSIGHTS FROM LEADERS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY •This leads me to a proposition which I find quite interesting, that “regulators are supposed to influence behaviour.” When you think about these issues from the perspectiveof a regulator, how do you influence the behaviour of an operator to be sure that they
make those tough decisions? What is your role as a regulator in influencing behaviour,and how do you do it?
Director-General Hans Wanner: A regulator influences the behaviour of the operator
by setting the example. This is very important, and that is why it is key that the regulator
has a strong safety culture – not just the operator. It is fundamental for the regulator towork on its safety culture. Earlier, this was considered as something for the nuclear power
plant operator exclusively, but I cannot stress enough that as a regulator we need it as well,and at the same level as the operator.
I would also like to respond to your story about the filters. I find it quite interestingthat you mention this. You cannot necessarily improve the safety of the plant, but you
can certainly improve the safety of the population around in case of an accident. I think
this is one of the examples of how to upgrade nuclear power plants and to think about thegoal of the upgrade: It is the safety of the population above all. Of course, we must always
address the question of reasonable practicality. What is reasonable to request from licenceholders in terms of investments, not only for maintenance, but also for safety upgrades,for bringing the safety features of the older nuclear power plants closer to the safety levelsof the new reactors?
What we have learned is that improving safety is a continuous process, and safety
upgrades are determined in every periodic safety review, with the safety systems of thenewest nuclear installations as the reference point. While we know that the old plants will
not be able to achieve the standards of the newest, we can look at that gap and determine
how reasonably close we can bring the old plants up to that level.

Influencing behaviour
DG Magwood: Let me ask Mike to respond to this as well, because regulators may ask
operators to take certain actions which may be counterintuitive from a human standpoint. If someone has to make a tough decision, what is the kind of training they receive
and the type of environment that you strive to create to make sure that the right decisions
are made?
Chief Nuclear Officer Mike Harrison: I would like to givea few examples if I may. Looking at these issues from theengineering standpoint first of all, a few years ago we had aproblem with one of the reactors at our Heysham site. Whenthe engineer came forward to say, “I think I have a problem,”at that point, it is about how we respond as an organisation.
You can go into denial; you can ask for more information; oryou can shake the engineer’s hand and say, “You have done
your job to the best of expectations.” That sends a very strong
and powerful message throughout the whole organisation3

that you value nuclear safety; that you value professionalism; and most importantly, thatyou value initiative. When people are prepared to come forward very early on with a little
bit of information to say, “I think I’ve seen something which is out of the ordinary,” it enables the organisation to respond. That decision at Heysham ultimately led to four reactors
at two of our power stations being shut down for more than a year, but the individual did
the right thing in coming forward with the team supporting it. It enabled us to put a new
infrastructure around it for recovery.
The second question is, how do I know that the operators will respond correctly perprocedure? I believe in practice. We practice emergency schemes at the power stations,and this makes the response when you are in a real situation that much more ingrainedin your behaviour. I have been in the industry a long time, and unfortunately I was the
emergency controller of a site incident. Just describing the emotions you go through when
you come to the site and you see the flashing lights, the fire brigade, the ambulances – you
see the whole infrastructure in place, and you go to the emergency control centre to takeyour first steps. The first thing that you go through is the steps of your training. Get thefacts, understand, and make the decisions as you go forward. Now I think that practice
gives me the confidence that everyone will perform their role. The way in which individuals integrate into a team in that emergency control centre, and share the learning andexperience, enables you to do that.
The last example I want to introduce is that your learning never stops. The power andenergy which is contained within a nuclear reactor is such that, no matter where you arein the organisation, you need to completely assimilate and associate that understanding
and be aware of what your role is. Recently as part of the World Association of Nuclear
Operators (WANO) Chief Nuclear Officers (CNO) Forum, we met with CNOs in Japan tovisit the power stations and the Fukushima surrounding area and see what 5 000 people
are working on. Eight years after the event, that brings all the emotion back. For thisreason, we are focused on giving all of our operators that experience. We have takensome of our shift managers to Chernobyl. It is our duty to provide that emotional context
around the reason for procedures and behaviour, so that it cascades through the organisation. It is part of what we are. It is our responsibility not to forget the three events andto constantly live them.

Feedback culture
DG Magwood: Let me ask you to react to what was said a
few minutes ago regarding the example set by the regulator.
How do you see the nexus when it comes to motivating people
to have the right behaviours, to take the correct action, andto have an understanding of the environment in which they
operate? How do you see that nexus between what you do, andwhat the regulator does, in terms of galvanising behaviour?
CNO Harrison: When looking at the problem, identifying
the goal that we want to achieve enables and encourages thewider organisation to see the problem that we are trying to4

INSIGHTS FROM LEADERS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY •resolve. When it becomes prescriptive, then I think it drives a culture of “we will respondto what the regulator says,” and just deliver that. In that case, you are not engaging toresolve the problem that has been set. You need to look at what is the best solution forthat particular reactor in that specific situation to safeguard the entire range of scenarios that exist – from a small release to a Fukushima- or Chernobyl-type mess. My view isgoal-setting, rather than prescription.
DG Wanner: I fully agree that as a regulator we should not be prescriptive. With regards
to what we nowadays call our safety culture – or oversight culture, to distinguish thesafety culture of the regulator from that of the operator, because they are distinct – wereally do pay attention to the effect that our behaviour has on the operator. In order tosteer that behaviour, we have a feedback system with the operator. It is very importantto have an effective feedback system. We used to rely on feedback forms, in which every
regulatory decision we issued would include an impact form for the operator to fill out
and return to us. More than 90% of the feedback forms returned did not indicate any
problems. Only in very rare cases, where there had been delays caused by us, for example,
would the operator indicate dissatisfaction. However, we decided that this system was not
sufficient for us to learn enough from our regulatory work.
So, we decided several years ago to have impact assessed at different levels. For example, at the top management level, we have annual meetings with the heads of ouroperators, and one of our agenda items is “feedback from the operator to the work of theregulator.” That is where we learn many things. We collect all of this feedback from theyear and it is further discussed in our closed, two-day meeting of the regulatory executive
board. We then decide on measures to improve the situation. And the next year we give
feedback to the operators, and the whole process starts again. This top-level feedback
loop has been going on for several years, and last year we started the same process at thetechnical level. This has been quite successful, so we are in the process of establishinga continuous, ongoing process. I hope that these multiple feedback loops at the management and technical levels, in addition to the formal feedback form, will improve ourability to learn.
DG Magwood: So this is a mechanism for the operators to give feedback to the regulator regarding their perceptions of oversight and your function as a regulator. How about
internally? Do you have methods for soliciting feedback on your leadership from managers, inspectors, and other personnel?
DG Wanner: I am not sure if I have totally succeeded in this respect. We have regularmanagement meetings, and I have an informational meeting with all staff once a month– it used to be more often in the period right after F­ ukushima.
The all-hands meeting is an opportunity for everyone to ask
questions and give feedback. However, it is not used muchfor that purpose, because the group is too large – more than
100 people. You need a special personality to speak up in alarge an audience, and also as a leader you need a certain outlook to receive this feedback. This is where we get into how tobehave as a leader, and it is something that we are working on.
It also relates strongly to social competence, which I believe
is ever more important. Technical competency is of course
essential, but if you have a technical person with insufficient5social competence, it is not so easy to work with him or her – and this impacts knowledgetransfer as well. For example, retiring staff are supposed to transfer their knowledge tothe next person. Sometimes this works very well – other times, not at all. When a highly
competent specialist is not able to transfer his or her knowledge, whether orally, throughdemonstration, or documentation, it may often be due to insufficient social competence.
DG Magwood: Mike, I would like to hear your thoughts on feedback culture.
CNO Harrison: Regarding feedback culture with the regulator, if I went back 20 years in
the organisation, our relationship with our regulator was not good. We fought over many
detailed issues, and it was reflected in our performance. We lost the trust of the regulator,
and to a certain extent we also lost the trust of the public. I remember we had a workshop
with the regulator which was heavily facilitated. The facilitator previously worked on
the Irish peace process, so that tells you something! It was the start of something really
good. It was fundamental. We understood that our perceptions were different dependingon whether we were the operator or the regulator, and it enabled us to identify a common
goal and behaviours, which do diverge from time to time. Ever since then, we have continued to have regular facilitated workshops as a fundamental part of our culture to create asafe environment where we can come together and speak openly about our observations
and concerns. This method has helped us to reshape our relationships through different
levels of the organisation. In addition, EDF Energy uses a set of questions to gain insightas to how exchanges can be better facilitated.
The organisation’s internal regulator meets independently with the external regulator
the Office of Nuclear Regulation, ONR to share concerns, and these meetings are notattended by operational staff. Nor do I, as CNO, know what is going to be said in thoseconversations. The feedback is usually well-aligned, and it helps us understand where weare headed as an organisation.
Internally, we have the standard feedback loops. With our partners, every two years
we conduct an extensive survey, in which safety questions are included. This allows us
to observe trends among stations, and within stations by departments. Where there is a
decline, we can go in and remediate it.

Safety and transparency“The only way to build
trust with the regulator
as well as the wider
community is to be open
and transparent.”

DG Magwood: Some within the industry
suggest that we talk about safety too much.
Has the nuclear industry, in trying to promote safety, created an environment thatscares people?

CNO Harrison: We still have a duty
to open our doors and be transparent. In the 1990s, we closed our visitor centres. They were costly, and theview at the time was that they were stale, and that the public knew who we were.
However, as part of the reinvention and drive to improve our organisation, we reopened
them in the 2000s, and encouraged people to come into our power stations. We talk about

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INSIGHTS FROM LEADERS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY •safety when people come onto our stations, but that does not mean that we scare people.
Using the metaphor of an airplane, reviewing the safety procedures does not mean thatthe plane is going to crash, but rather it instils confidence that we know what we aredoing. Interestingly, our visitor centres are now listed in tourist guides as a local attraction. In this way, we engage not just our immediate stakeholders, but also the broader
community. Local residents in the vicinity of nuclear power stations are the most vociferously pro-nuclear. We have a responsibility to talk about the “what-if” and what we aredoing here, and its significance. The only way to build trust with the regulator as well as
the wider community is to be open and transparent.
DG Magwood: So if I understand correctly, you do not believe that you can have an
external message that deemphasises the safety message while also having an internal
message that emphasises it.
CNO Harrison: That is correct. For example, the graphite core of our current fleet isgoing to determine the length of service. It is aging, and we cannot replace the graphite.
Putting out a video and pictures and explaining the situation has reduced tension with thecommunity. We have an onus to speak openly. We will shut some of our power stationsin the not-too-distant future, and it will be the graphite core that determines that. With
that in mind, we should not just suddenly surprise the public, and when it does happen,
we should talk about it. While we have undertaken a phenomenal amount of work withresearch institutes and the like, we should be open and transparent about what we arefinding, and where we are going with that. That way ultimately the public can have confidence in our decision-making. That is the feedback we are getting from those who are
observing what is going on.
DG Magwood: Hans, the job of the regulator is supposed to be primarily focused onsafety. Yet at the same time, other realities come into the conversation. For example,
regulators are conscious of economic considerations, even if they theoretically are notsupposed to worry about that. In addition, the regulator plays a role in public perceptionsof nuclear power. There are pressures as well for further innovation within the industry,7

including to enhance the safety of plants, or for fuel, for example. And it is good that
regulators encourage innovation. So with all of those considerations in mind, how doregulators reconcile these factors with safety? Is the conversation with licensees about
safety straightforward, or complicated?
DG Wanner: It is straightforward, because the operators know that we have to focus
on safety and on continuous improvement. In Switzerland, the government, parliament,
and a clear majority in direct referendums have all decided on the phase-out of nuclear
power, so there is no question about that for the moment. However, there is the questionof how long the plants will operate, because the licence holders have unlimited operating
licences. Non-governmental organisations continue to press for an answer on this issue.
I think that a nuclear power plant can operate for as long as the licence holder is willingto invest in the safety of the plant. Of course, there are important issues surrounding
aging, especially for our older nuclear power plants, such as embrittlement of the reactor
pressure vessel. There are certain limits, which are reflected in our regulations and evenin our legislation. We know that our oldest plants will not reach this limit until at least
60 years of operation.

The relationship between the operator and the regulator“The regulator must haveconfidence and trustin the operator,
which requires a good
relationship.”8

DG Magwood: I am very interested tocompare how Switzerland handles these
considerations on a case-by-case basis,
which is very different from the U.S., where
the process is designed to make everything
as quantitative as possible. Moving on,
however, as you have these conversations
between the regulator and the operator,
there is a lot of contact. Independent

INSIGHTS FROM LEADERS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY •regulation does not mean isolation, and regulators engage in rich discussion with licensees
about upgrades, operations, the future, and many other issues. How do you draw the line
so that you avoid becoming inadvertent consultants?
DG Wanner: Engineers working for the regulator and the operators engage with one
another as specialists and even share a similar culture, and so it is natural that they feel
comfortable with each other. For that reason, we have to remind our staff that they are
not supposed to make suggestions to the operator, nor recommend any particular solutions. It is a delicate balance, and ENSI has to consciously work to maintain appropriate
awareness of the boundaries while staying in good communication with operators. A
healthy relationship between the regulator and operator is important; too much distanceis not productive. The regulator must have confidence and trust in the operator, which
requires a good relationship. Of course, we do regular inspections, and if we think thatan operator is not performing correctly, we pay closer attention. In addition, to support aculture of regulatory independence, our specialists interact with the operator and conduct
inspections in teams. If a team member becomes too close to the operator and regulatory
capture begins to occur, the other team members can spot it and correct it. This is anadded dimension to why it is important that all the members work together as a team.
And the team only works if the individuals on the team have a minimum level of social
competence, so that they can communicate well with one another, understand each other,and give and receive feedback in a supportive and constructive manner.
CNO Harrison: There is no line with regard to nuclear safety, but rather it is a journeyof continuous improvement. Across the world, different approaches flourish: for example, the Europeans want to resolve problems at the design level, whereas the U.S. wants
to raise regulatory and operational standards. In truth, you need to marry the different
approaches together. What is important is for operational excellence to drive safety performance to a higher level, and to look continuously at how you can improve. The challenge is to start with the problem, rather than a prescribed solution. Utilise the capabilities within the organisation to address the problem at hand; it is not necessary to spend
phenomenal sums of money coming in with a prescribed solution.

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DG Magwood: Talking about the relationship with the regulator, in the UK you have avery engaged regulator. You said earlier that if the regulator is prescriptive, you may react
to what the regulator wants, rather than taking actions to address the root of the issue.
Where do you see the boundary line between what the regulator is trying to accomplish,
and what you are trying to achieve within your own organisation? Is there a point at
which you feel that the regulator can be too intrusive and too involved? Or do you thinkthat you have found a good balance?
CNO Harrison: I am sure that my regulator would agree that there is not a perfectanswer to that question. Prescription comes about due to a lack of trust in what the operator is doing. If you have a safety case or a particular problem that is not getting resolved
satisfactorily, or if the trust barrier is breached, then the natural human reaction is tointervene and to challenge more directly. That then becomes a vicious circle, and you
end up with prescription at the end of it. If, conversely, there is an open, transparent, andeffective response, then it can be a positive cycle, and becomes more enabling. There is
not a direct point in time where you can say that you have mastered the situation and havea perfect relationship. Like all relationships in life, you have to work on it continually inorder to get the most out of it. If you become lazy, or overly confident, then the relationshipdeteriorates and you lose that trust. I am not answering your question directly, because
I do not believe that there is a line, but I hope that I am providing insight that while therelationship with the regulator can be very good, it will fluctuate depending on the specificissues that we are dealing with, and the performance that we put in. It is an open book.
DG Magwood: How does the conversation between the operator and regulator about
safety culture differ from more straightforward discussions of strictly technical issues?
CNO Harrison: We have a structured series of meetings with the regulator. We call them
Level 4, Level 3, Level 2, etc. It is set in a hierarchy, in which issues are elevated. It is not
usually the technical issues that get elevated, but rather the behavioural ones. So, forexample, if we have a working level meeting at Level 4 and there are differences of opinion and people are becoming fixated on certain challenges, rather than letting it become
protracted and intractable and people becoming more and more entrenched, the issue is

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INSIGHTS FROM LEADERS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY •elevated to Level 3. Then the issue can be discussed immediately. It will not be debated at
the detailed, technical level, but rather with regards to whether we are providing sufficientevidence and whether behaviour is becoming entrenched. Then if it comes up to Level 2,
the director level, we see some of the core themes that need to be addressed. Ultimately
if it reaches Level 1, it will be a one-to-one meeting between the chief inspector and thechief executive, and they will establish where the direction of the company is going andwhether we are seeing variation from that. I think it is important that we have this escalation route. It is not a problem if individuals within our regulator, ONR, or within our
industry disagree on certain points. What those disagreements should not do is cause
huge disruptions or silo thinking, which in the past may have happened.

The changing role of public communications“I realised that by becominga regulator, I was the one
responsible to the public for
ensuring safety, and that the
public was relying on me.”DG Magwood: Let me back up for a
moment and ask a few broader questions. How has your view of nuclear
safety evolved, and how do you think
your role as a leader has evolved?

DG Wanner: For me, the most significant change in my perception of safetyoccurred when I joined the regulator in
1995. I became very aware that I was aregulator now, and that my role had just become very different from what it had been
before. To adjust to this new situation, I became very intentional about changing my perspective to accommodate the new responsibilities that I was assuming. I realised that bybecoming a regulator, I was the one responsible to the public for ensuring safety, and thatthe public was relying on me. The public wants to know that the regulator is independentand is doing a good job. Communicating this message to the public has been the mostimportant development since I became director-general.

11When Fukushima occurred, I had been director-general for just six months. The existing communications strategy could not handle the scale of public interest in Switzerland, and we were quite overwhelmed. As the nuclear regulator, we were questioned andscrutinised by the media and by national politicians. This necessitated rapid changes tothe communications strategy. The greatest challenge was how to communicate what wewere doing, so that the public could trust our activities. Public communications is quite
a lot of work! Our communications team consists of five people, and in addition, we need
input from the technical staff, which was difficult in the beginning. At first, the importance of dedicating time to public communications was not self-evident to the technicalstaff. Public inquiries from press or politicians typically have short timelines, which canbe quite demanding for staff with other primary responsibilities. It was a challenge andtook a lot of effort and informational events to explain to staff why they were being asked
to dedicate resources to public communications, and the benefit to the regulator and to
the public of doing so.
CNO Harrison: I want to add to Hans’s remarks that the single most explosive changethat has happened in my career has been in the realm of communications. Just looking at social media, the speed of information and response has greatly increased. If an
ambulance is called to one of our sites because someone falls ill, for example, it will beknown about throughout the local vicinity before the ambulance has even arrived onsite. Therefore, how you respond, and how you set up the communications framework is
fundamentally important. Despite all the practice that goes into emergency simulations,on the communications side, the exercise is minuscule compared to what would happen ineven the smallest of actual events. If you have a Greenpeace invasion at a site, for example,
within an hour you will have four or five national media stations and 30 or 40 journalists on site. The communications team cannot be an afterthought – it must be the rootand branch of all activities. So we need that openness and transparency, and we have
got to get that professional coaching and training in communications. In addition, thecommunications strategy must consider multiple technical and non-technical audiences,
and appeal to those who are experts and want answers to technical questions, as well as
those from the general public who want reassurance. This is a huge change, and to mymind the one area where the regulator and operator should work together and have a joint
communications strategy. Knowing who is communicating what can assist enormously.

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INSIGHTS FROM LEADERS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY •DG Magwood: I agree with both of you. At the NEA, we spend a lot of time talking aboutpublic communications. How do you even talk about radiological risks with the public?
It is a difficult conversation. While the ideal is to educate people in advance, the reality
is that most people do not care to hear about nuclear technology issues until something
happens and they are already angry and afraid. Therefore, public communication is a
key issue for the industry and for regulators as well. In my view, it is always important toremember that at the end of the day, the regulator is a public servant. It is part of the job toanswer the public’s questions. How do you take these very complex, technical issues andcommunicate them to the public in a way that is useful? That will be an ongoing struggle,
and nobody does it flawlessly. The effort must be put forward, however. As we come to theend of our discussion here today, could you share with us your personal visions as leaders,
including what you aim to accomplish?
CNO Harrison: The role of leadership is to be a servant. My goal is to dedicate my time
to supporting and achieving excellence through the individuals who are operating thepower stations, and that is also where I get the positive reinforcement that things aregoing in the right direction. For example, I was filled with pride when I visited Heysham 1
power station last week, which is facing many of the challenges that we all face, with anageing workforce. Recently, the plant had to perform an exchange of the nozzles of thefuel machines, a complex procedure which had last been performed by staff who had
already retired. I met with the unit and walked through what they had achieved. The
team lead was 27 years old, and of the 15 team members, the average age was 30. Noneof them had performed the task before. However, as they went over the quality plans, theprocedures that they had updated, and the operational experience that they drew in, they
had pulled it all together and the project was completed uneventfully. The performance ofthe team unit was the best that it had ever been. The way in which they were supporting
each other, being humble, recognising the wider support of the organisation, and the way
in which they had linked up with and communicated with personnel at the centre and atother stations demonstrated how well they had managed it. It was a perfect example ofknowledge capture.

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I felt at that moment in time that this was a major step in what we are trying to drive
through. Any way that I can facilitate that, by sitting and listening, that is my role as aleader. In the past, I made the mistake of being too directive. My “ah-hah!” moment is tolook beyond the surface, to encourage and to support. The younger people coming into
the nuclear industry will take it to a new, higher standard. Overconfidence makes me
nervous, but I feel comfortable when I see the humility of the new generation leveraging
on everything they can possibly do to make sure that the job is done efficiently, and document it, and institutionalise it. Our so-called experts of yore have sometimes not captured
things in the right way, which our new generation has taken on board and is working ina far more consultative, proactive, and cross-functional manner than perhaps was donein the past.
DG Wanner: Modesty and humbleness will take you far. What I have not yet accomplished
is to achieve a resilient organisation as a regulator. More social competence in generalis needed in the organisation, including a greater ability to work in teams, to transfer
knowledge, and to welcome newcomers. While technical skills are the basic starting point,in the end it all comes down to social skills. When recruiting staff in Switzerland, they
are coming into a phase-out situation, which can be difficult. The Swiss regulator is criticised perhaps more often than those in other countries, because operating licences are
not time limited. This places more pressure on the regulator to determine whether theplants are safe. So in light of this public scrutiny, it is even more important to have a good
professional and social environment within the organisation. In addition, the staff has
been reduced because the first power reactor will be shutting down later this year. Our
people will have to become more flexible. We still have silos. We must do more rotations,and further embrace learning. Resilience is key.

Reflecting on the past, leading forward into the future
Magwood: Let me end with one“Celebrating drama and crisis DG
last question. Tell me about somemanagement creates a reactive thing that you think you did reallywell as a leader; something that didorganisation. I wish that I had not go as well; and the one thing thatreally want to accomplish oversought out and better rewarded you
the next few years.
the “boring”, safe, sustainable, DG Wanner: When I became chairof the Western European Nuclear
and reliable behaviour.”

Regulators’ Association (WENRA)
in 2012, a member came to see me and said that he would not participate in the meetings
because they did not provide enough value. I realised that one of my tasks would be toprovide sufficiently challenging and interesting content if I wanted members to participate, given that it is an entirely voluntary organisation with no obligation to attend. Seven
years later, I feel that I did my job well, because the chief inspectors are still coming to
the meetings. Regarding what has not gone as well as a leader, I realised only belatedly
the importance of social skills. Previously, I had believed that technical skills were all

14

INSIGHTS FROM LEADERS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY •that was needed, and I regret not having started working on this area earlier. In terms ofplans for the future, I think that nuclear safety culture is of key importance, and I hopethat we can continue with this concept of “continuous improvement”.
CNO Harrison: Starting with what am I most proud of, I think that the real opportunityof anyone who is as fortunate enough as I have been to enjoy the positions that I have beenin is to leave a legacy. It is not about what you personally do, but about what happens after
you are gone. If you look at the performance of a station that you have been involved in,what matters is not necessarily how it performed while you were there, but rather how
it did after you left. Did you make yourself dispensable? Personally, I was proud that thenuclear station where I served as director continued to achieve high safety performanceeven after I had departed. In terms of something that I have learned, in my younger years
as a manager, I often overly focused on and rewarded heroic behaviour, and did not doenough to recognise the staff who delivered consistent and reliable high performance.
Celebrating drama and crisis management creates a reactive organisation. I wish that I
had sought out and better rewarded the “boring”, safe, sustainable, and reliable behaviour. In terms of legacy and vision, my role at the moment is overseeing Region 1, whichcontains the old nuclear power stations. Within the next decade, we will transition to
end-of-generation and those assets will be closed. What I want to happen is the best-everperformance from those stations in the next years, and for everyone who then leaves – bethat to transfer to another station or to retire – to be proud of achieving and delivering
that. I do not want it to be a dramatic cliff-edge, “oh the reactor is closing!” That is what
I would want to see happen.
DG Magwood: I appreciate both of you participating in the conversation. It has been very
enlightening. Thank you to the two of you.


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16

INSIGHTS FROM LEADERS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY •William D. Magwood, IV
Director-General, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
Mr Magwood took up his duties as Director-General of the Nuclear
Energy Agency (NEA) on 1 September 2014. He has extensive
experience in both the regulatory and developmental aspects ofnuclear energy, including at the international level. From 2010 to2014, he served as one of the five Commissioners appointed by the
US President and confirmed by the US Senate to the US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC). While a commissioner, he advocatedthe importance of nuclear regulatory independence and the necessity of maintaining
strong, credible and technically sound nuclear regulation in the United States and all
countries that use nuclear power.
Previously, Mr Magwood was Director of the US Government’s civilian nuclear energy
programme at the US Department of Energy (DOE). During his tenure, he establishedthe Idaho National Laboratory; created activities that reversed the decline of US nuclear
technology education; and launched important initiatives such as the Generation IV
International Forum (GIF) and the US “Nuclear Power 2010,” which helped restart nuclear
plant construction in the United States. He was also actively involved in the work of the
NEA, serving as a Steering Committee Bureau member from 1999 to 2005, including aterm as Chair of the Steering Committee from 2004 to 2005. Mr Magwood, a US national,
holds Bachelor degrees in Physics and English from Carnegie Mellon University and a
Master of Fine Arts from the University of Pittsburgh.

Hans Wanner
Director-General, Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate
Mr Wanner studied chemistry at ETH Zurich and obtained his
PhD in 1984. Following a research assignment at the Paul Scherrer
Institute where he developed models for chemical processes in a
deep geological repository, he joined the NEA in 1986. He workedon the development of the international Thermochemical Databaseand quality standards for the verification of data by international
experts. He co-ordinated this project during 6 years.
On his return to Switzerland, he joined MBT Environmental Engineering Ltd. andmanaged projects in the field of deep geological disposal.
In 1995, Mr Wanner joined the Swiss nuclear safety a­ uthority HSK as a geochemist in
the geological disposal section. In 2007, he was appointed Director of the Transport andWaste Management Safety Division, and in 2010 D­ irector‑General of ENSI.
In November 2011, Mr Wanner was nominated Chairman of WENRA, the Western
European Nuclear Regulators’ Association.

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Mike Harrison
Chief Nuclear Officer, EDF Energy Region, United Kingdom
Mr Harrison has enjoyed a long, wide-ranging and diverse career
within the UK nuclear industry culminating in the appointment as
Chief Nuclear Officer for the EDF Energy Region 1 fleet of nuclear
power stations in January 2018.
Mr Harrison’s professional qualifications include a BSc in
Mechanical Engineering from the University of Leeds and an MBA
in Business Administration from Henley Management College.

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INSIGHTS FROM LEADERS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY •Previous Insights from Leaders in Nuclear Energy
are available on the NEA website:www.oecd-nea.org

19

NEA
The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) is an intergovernmental agency established in 1958.
Its primary objective is to assist its member countries in maintaining and further developing, through international
co-operation, the scientific, technological and legal bases required for a safe, environmentally sound and economicaluse of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It is a non-partisan, unbiased source of information,
data and analyses, drawing on one of the best international networks of technical experts.
The NEA has 33 member countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg,
Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The NEA co-operates with a range ofmultilateral organisations, including the European Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
46, quai Alphonse Le Gallo
92100 Boulogne-Billancourt, France
Tel.: +33 (0)1 73 21 28 19
nea@oecd-nea.org www.oecd-nea.org

OECD/NEA, September 2019

Insights from Leaders in Nuclear Energy shares personal
insights through a series of in-depth conversations between
the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Director-Generaland leading figures in the sector. Each conversation explores
the current issues and offers new ways to address challenges
and aim for excellence.