Emmanuel Vincent Nelson Kallon

Patterns of strategic interactive politics in transitioning states:
The case of post-conflict Sierra Leone and the challenge of the managementof development aid

Emmanuel Vincent Nelson Kallon
PhD Candidate, Graduate School of Global Studies, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan

Abstract
This essay situates causal explanation on how the use of strategic interactions in the mainstream
politics of aid dependent states that have weak institutional structures, and mostly in transition frompost-conflict to relative stability, challenge the management of development aid in those societies.
Building on the case study of Sierra Leone, this study argues that, strategic interactions within thepolitics of the post-conflict governments resulted into a pattern of instrumentalized policy
manipulation between political parties, policies that eventually metamorphosed into the government
development tool but not fundamentally founded on national development framework. This strategic
political interaction posed a systematic threat and challenged the management of development aid in
Sierra Leone, where in the post-conflict period, the country experienced massive aid but development
remained stagnated.

Keywords: strategic interactions, development aid, Sierra Leone, policies, political parties― 23 ―
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Patterns of strategic interactive politics in transitioning states

1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to analyze how the pattern of strategic interactions between two postconflict political party policy frameworks in Sierra Leone that were metamorphosed into the formationof postwar governments from 2002 to 2018, on which development assistance was concentrated
conceived could enhance national development and the consolidation of liberal peacebuilding for theenhancement of social change in the country, became the principal challenge of the management ofdevelopment aid in the country.
Several decades since its emergence, development assistance has been widely debated acrossdiverse development-oriented disciplines, particularly with reference to developing countries where its
engagement during both the post-independence and post-cold era has been expansively remarkable.
With contemporary context of development assistance discourse in the aftermath of post-cold war,countries transitioning from the devastation of intra-state post-conflict wars or societies confronted
with excruciating endogenous development dilemma, the notion of development assistance has been
conceived as an integral pillar which can largely effects a social change in the social structural
challenges of these societies, especially challenges hovering on underdevelopment, economic
stagnation, poverty, and the overall management of a functional state for the sustenance of global
stability etc.
Firmly established within the global development discourse, development assistance has become
an embodiment of the United Nations system, and its reflection among others was made perceptible in
the outcome of the United Nations World Summit in 2005, where it became exposed that ‘peace andsecurity and development and human rights, in particular are cogitated as interconnected elements andtherefore reciprocally reinforcing’ (Gisselquist 2018, United Nations 2018, Wennmann 2009: 83).
Recognition of development assistance for liberal post-conflict peacebuilding, the United Nations
established Peacebuilding Commission in 2005 through which countries in transition from war tostability are financially assisted as a pillar to prevent post-conflict degeneration into fresh warfare(Scott 2012). This has also been part of the international financial institutions such as the World Bank,International Monetary Fund, and also through bilateral and regional means. Thus, development
assistance has remained to be conceived as one of the most post-cold war development methodologies
situated both in the post-conflict and in an underdeveloped context characterize with harsh socioeconomic difficulties, and are countries found in what Paul Collier pigeon-holed as ‘Bottom Billion,’where unstable democratization, underdevelopment and instabilities have remained rife (see Collier2007). Moreover, beyond this conceived normative construct of development assistance for the lessdeveloped countries, the outcome itself has yielded insignificant consequent particularly spanning theseveral decades of its existence in the aid dependent countries, where many Sub-Saharan Africa
countries being a typical archetype.

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Emmanuel Vincent Nelson Kallon

Thus, this chapter asserts that a profound appreciation of development assistance management
challenge in aid driven societies particularly of the Sub-Saharan Africa region cannot be fully
conceptualized without due consideration of the political environment and the behavioral patterns ofexisting political party system that form the political environment and of which, political parties are
institutions of human creation that often metamorphosed into the formation of government at statelevel. Political parties and the pattern of strategic politics underlined in their practices in the lessdemocratized environment, provides unique conceptual argument on the challenge of the managementof development aid. This endogenous propositional assertion does not imply however that, exogenous
variables are not causally significant in the analysis of the challenge of aid in the recipient states. Yet,
the argument infers that the appreciation of the complex endogenous variables from the viewpoint ofdomestic politics, is an essential foundation to better acknowledge the patterns of the existential
challenge sometimes pose by externalities.
Institutions, noted Karol Soltan (2008:60), are an outcome of politics, and as outcome of suchcomplex interactions it can be destabilizing, in the senses that, it has the proclivity to scuttled ‘social
order.’ Political parties as institutions of the state are an outgrowth of human interactions, a patternreflected is the policies professed within them. Institutional policies or political party campaigned
policies as an embodiment are what metamorphosed into the formation of state government policies
within which development assistance largely operates in the transformation of societies. This meansthat aid provided to recipient states falls within the current political agenda or policies of the politicalregime and in many countries, incumbent government demands development aid donors to aligned aid
projects or assistance within their current government policies, and this has become largely a kind ofmodus operandi taken for granted in many societies, including Sierra Leone. But the foundational
policies inherent within state political parties that metamorphosed into full time government policies
of countries in the less democratized and heterogeneous environment, have largely not been founded
on a national development framework.
In a widely polarized environment challenge by problem of societal cohesion, and increased
penchant for particularities that appears to be deeply rooted, instrumentalization of political party
policies within the political structure by the political actors through strategic interactive means arewhat informed the pattern of governance of those societies not necessary to effect change but asconduit through which they could have access to the state economic opportunities over other adherents.
The context of post-conflict Sierra Leone provides this typical example, where political parties
between the period 2002 to 2018 projected policies that have been utilized as government tools that
attracted huge development assistance superficially conceived might lead to fundamental socialchange as a post-conflict country, nonetheless, its post-conflict development remains stagnated andone of the poorest countries in the Sub-Saharan Region. Thus, the central question of this essay is: To
what extent were the policies or campaigned manifestoes of the successive political parties that― 25 ―

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metamorphosed into the formation of post-conflict governments from 2002 to 2018 in Sierra Leone on
which development aid was largely concentrated, built on a national development framework or anational buy-in?
Causal explanation of social phenomenon is fundamental and foundational for a scholarly inquiry.
Particularly at societal level, causal explanation of social phenomenon has been viewed from wideranging perspectives. Two excerpts from such context is typical in the analytical viewpoint by Emile
Durkheim on one hand, and Georg Simmel and Max Weber on the other etc. For Emile Durkheim, he
has long postulated that ‘institutions, roles, rules and structures’ of societal settings are the integral
pillars that should set the agenda for the understanding of society and not individual concentration in
analytical inquiry (Barney and Felin 2013:139). For Georg Simmel and Max Weber, individual actors
are the fundamental pillars for social inquiries. This context implies that, the creed, inclinations, andinterest of actors in society are the useful insight from within which concepts of social structures haveemerged and evolved (Barney and Felin 2013:139). These two phenomena explain the complexity ofsociety, and largely so for causality analysis. The current chapter complimentarily builds on bothpatterns to interchangeably present the study on Sierra Leone, as its combination provides aninstructive insight in the appreciation of complex societal phenomenon.
Social structures often associated with societies are merely an outcome of social interactions, andnot as fundamentally a natural given condition. This pattern is beyond the naturalistic or positivist
perspectives where social phenomenon can be taken for granted as a natural given pattern. Suchperspective underestimates essential interactions within societies, and the outcome of thoseinteractions that invariably result into structures. This essay conceives that conceptualizing thedilemma of development assistance particularly for countries in transition, either from a post-conflictor underdeveloped into a stable or developed country, can be profoundly instructive and compellingwhen extensive analysis focused on the strategic interactive behavioral pattern between domestic
political parties of aid dependent states. These are generally not a naturally given adhesion, but asocially constructed pattern and structure as outcome of societal interactions of actors.
Conceptually, the concept of strategic interaction is a widely used analytical framework
explaining foundational social phenomenon of societies, particularly regarding actor’s calculation that
culminate to social structures in society. Sociologist Erving Goffman provided the theoreticalinference of strategic interaction as:‘… a situation of two or more parties find themselves in a well-structured condition ofmutual impingement where each party must take a move and where every possible
move carries fateful implications for all the parties. In this situation, each player must
influence his own decision by his knowing that the other players are likely to try to
dope out his decision in advance, and may even appreciate that he knows this is likely.
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Emmanuel Vincent Nelson Kallon

Courses of action or moves will then be made in light of one’s thoughts about theother’s thoughts about oneself. An exchange of moves made on the basis of this kindof orientation to self and others can be called strategic interaction…

Strategicinteraction also involves decision making- decision made by directly orienting oneself
to the other parties and giving weight to their situation as they would seem to see it,
including their giving weight to one’s own. The special possibilities that result fromthis mutually assessed mutual assessment, as these effect the fate of the parties,
provide reason and grounds for employing the special perspectives of strategicinteraction’ (Goffman 1969: 100-101).
Building on this concept, the case study on Sierra Leone is aptly situated. Following the aftermathof the civil war in Sierra Leone in 2002, the political climate in which post-conflict political parties
emerged and operated was characterized by an extreme competitive political practice and this waslargely informed by the unbridled anticipation of political parties to secure control of the politicalspace at any cost, particularly given the context that in the post-conflict era, politics was conceived as
the means to the only state political economy and its access would imply excessive power and control
of state finance and regulation of the political and economic behavior of others. A country such as
Sierra Leone, unlike other societies characterized by diversified economic generation, it is politics that
became the main political economy and it came to be considered as the mainstay for political actors to
exercise their power and control. However, the political environment in the post-conflict period
dictated changed in the pattern of political practice. Political parties were confronted with thechallenge of fundamental social structural change at party and at national level. The challenge ofsocial change was confronted with their adherence to the liberal post-conflict political democratization,and development normative policies at the level of political party policies or in campaign manifestoes
that became as significant for political parties in order for their continued relevance in the politicalconfiguration for peacebuilding.
On the basis of this trend, strategically instrumentalized policy approaches were variedly adopted
by the two main political parties, the Sierra Leone People’s Party and the All People’s Congress Party
on which policies of governments were constituted between 2002 and 2018. As this chapter argues,
none of these policies adopted within these periods at the political party level which eventuallymetamorphosed into government policies were fundamentally founded on a cohesive national
development framework by the successive political regimes. Rather, their used were merely a patternof strategic interactions instrumentally employed in the immediate post-war political governancesystem as a calculative conduit merely to have accessed to state power in which development aid washugely deployed for post-conflict development, as aid became mainly the central post-conflict political
economy of the country extremely relied upon within the state politics.
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Additionally, on account of the strategic interactive pattern employed within the type politicalsystem, resulted to an uncoordinated development policy linkage between the political parties, as
gaining political power became much paramount than on collaborative agenda for post-conflict
peacebuilding within the political circle. For instance, development policies pursued by one politicalparty in one political regime often immediately become irrelevant or repudiated by another politicalparty that succeeds the regime. Such pattern, because of the cohesive absence of national development
approach it became a recurrent practice that has defined the pattern of the political culture. Tracing thechallenge of the management of development aid in the immediate post-conflict Sierra Leone cannot
be unconnected to the policy environment within successive governments. Generally, collaborative
agenda within the political space across parties was seen could undermine political party support baseand by extension reduce membership representation in party strongholds. The choice of building on a
disjointed policy approach to maintain status quo has been taken for granted within the nature of thepolitical practice and have remained largely informed by ethnic and regional identity manipulation asa means of party policy advocacy to elections as oppose cross-cutting policy ideas for national
development. Consequently, the challenge of the management of development aid in Sierra Leone, ischaracterized by a deeply-rooted policy failure, as existed policies at governmental level are informedby political party policies instrumentally designed as an outgrowth of the strategic interactive patternused as channel for the sole purpose of capturing the political space.
In their work, ‘Aid, Policies and Growth,’ Craig Burnside and David Dollar (2000) establishedfirm causational association between aid and policies, and showcase how such correlation bolster
development in aid recipient states. Burnside and Dollars examined fifty recipient countries in the
period between 1970s and 1993, and they specifically focused on the pattern of the existing regulatory
framework in those societies with the impacts of development assistance. The scholars statisticallyconcluded that, provision of development assistance in a state where effective and systematic
regulatory framework does not exist, aid could therefore not create impact. The implication of theirconclusion is that, transformation and effectiveness of development assistance is largely dependent on
effective policy environment, and usually policy environment is defines by the nature of the politicalsystem that exist, and the structured pattern on which the government is constituted. Particularly withthe party system in Africa, Carrie Manning (2016:101-112) described it as entirely different fromthose of the advanced democracies. Manning referred to the pattern of Africa political system as‘politically polarized immutably structured along cleavage lines.’ This pattern of fixated Africa
political system could be considered as challenging to the trend of social change in the politics andgovernance of many of her societies.
Sierra Leone in its post-conflict political system structurally patterned along strategic interaction
where ethnoregional-neopatrimonial (Kallon 2020) phenomenon is deeply established in thegovernance system as a political culture, such feature undermines effective policy guidance on― 28 ―

Emmanuel Vincent Nelson Kallon

national development framework in which development aid management is perceived could enhance
growth and consolidate peace. Also, the flourish of strategic interaction by political actors informed
mainly by extreme penchant for economic gains than on collaborative policy for strategic development
could also largely undermine the management of development assistance. The challenge of the
management of development aid has been reflected in the range of so-called development policies
adopted and progressed since 2002 to 2018, by the pattern of the political parties.
The essay used a qualitative methodological approach in data gathering, and in analysis. Random
and purposeful instruments were used in this process for data gathering from the field research
conducted through an unstructured interview as data collection method that was meant purely not tofundamentally guide this work but to merely gauge the different perspectives. However, large desk
review and relevant archival literature, participant observation, scholarly books and modicum internet
sources formed the bedrock for the data sources that informed the analysis of this study. The
subsequent sections of this chapter have two sections. In section one, it discussed briefly the historicalantecedent of development assistance ontology, and some of the main conceptual scholarly debates.
In section two, it outlines Sierra Leone within the current debates on aid, and the mechanism throughwhich the challenge of the management of development aid in the country have been patterned andconceptualized. The chapter ends with a conclusion.
2. Summarized overview of development assistance in historical context
From historic account, development assistance became extremely notable following the end of WorldWar II, where massive devastation was bequeathed on Western Europe, and through which the agendaof ‘Marshall Plan’ emerged to accelerate reconstruction through massive economic assistance asmeans of recovery process. The Marshall Plan was conceived as a bold economic policy ofdevelopment assistance for reconstruction, of which the sum of ‘US$ 13 billion’ was committed inrebuilding Western Europe from 1948 to 1951 that was administered through the Economic
Cooperation Administration (DeLong and Eichengreen 1991, Picard and Karasia 2015: 11-24).
Moreover, the United States in the form of development assistance also economically assisted
Japan, its former war enemy for reconstruction which laid the model for what development assistancewould be conceptualized. Nonetheless, beyond this minimal viewport, the broader agenda of theextensive economic assistance to Japan and Western Europe reconstruction was also not without
political ideological interest, as was also geared towards conflating alliances against the Soviet Union
Communist ideological penetration from establishing global impact during the emergence of postwar
squabbles, dubbed as the Cold War confrontation (Picard and Karasia 2015:11-24). Followed to the
Marshall Plan, was the Point Four Program as a Foreign Policy orientation, that was also
intellectualized within development assistance of President, Harry S. Truman, of the United States,
built upon technical international development assistance but strategically deeply rooted in interest― 29 ―Patterns of strategic interactive politics in transitioning states

based conceptualization (Picard and Karasia 2015, Zeiler 2015).
Development assistance of the Point Four Program mainly in the form of technical assistancewhich began in earnest 1949-1950, coincided with wave of independence of which the newly
independent states were considered within the spate of political correctness, but strategically as thosein dire need of development, especially in Africa, Latin America and some locations in Asia, which
beneath it was also a strategy to curb communist amplification among these newly independent states
especially in the wake of colonial disintegration. As noted by Jacob J. Kaplan (1950):‘We are living through a period of international crisis during which our economic
strength is one of the most effective tools we have for promoting peace. United States
Foreign Aid has been a powerful instrument for strengthening orderly social processes
in an era during which the exploitation of poverty, of bleak economic horizons, and of
frustration of even modest national aspirations threatens both our national security andthe peace of the world.’
Whilst development assistance in many respects was perceived as having undisguised ideologicalundertone on its onset, yet, was also phenomenal in responding to the less developed societies as stark
underdevelopment was conceived as threat to global stability and peace. This led to the need fordevelopment assistance expansion in orientation particularly towards structural transformation in theeconomic and political context of these less developed states in which, concept of modernization
became the catchy phrase (Picard and Karasia 2015). But in the Africa continent and in the wave of
the postwar II climate, such pattern and advocacy began in earnest after the end of the Cold war
tension in the 1989.
Tracing development assistance in Africa is dated as far back to many centuries ago. Yet, atbilateral level prominent and outstanding process tracing of its tracking have come to be distinctly
centered particularly around the era of Cold War, when the East and West Bloc propped different
political regimes during the wave of political ideological contestations for alliance formation(Schraeder et.al 1998, Boschini and Olofsgard 2007, Ball and Johnson 1996). Equally important
within such era, was also the economic leitmotif considered as strong underpinned factor that attracted
earliest foreign aid operationalization in Africa. This is noted in the work by Peter J. Schraeder, Steven
W. Hook and Bruce Taylor (1998), which noted Japan’s foreign aid intensification to Africa aslargely driven by economic interest especially in 1980s, that were predicated on the need for ‘rawmaterials like copper, uranium and chromium from Zambia, Niger and Madagascar etc., and market,’whilst at the same time, foreign assistance from France, as noted by the authors, was concentrated
towards it former colonized states and other French speaking countries as underlined strategy inconsolidating ‘French cultural nationalism’ (1998:312-319). From the perspective of rational choice― 30 ―

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argument, it is explicit that the authors emphasized among others the underlined conceptualization ofassistance development especially from historical context and its evolution inherent within aninterdependent relationship.
At the multinational level, development assistance in Africa beginning 1980s was largely linked
with structural adjustment program, instituted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund(IMF) in which structural conditionalities became the main linchpin for the devolution of development
assistance in Africa, some part in Asia and Latin America. In the post-cold war, its largely appearedthat development assistance within such epistemological advancement have not been compelling, but
seems to be linked towards some assumed strands of development undertone, nonetheless, it was still
very critical and widely ambivalent whether development assistance have any correctional link todevelopment, particularly in the states it is meant to be impactful.
Perhaps, taking from the context of cold war experiences in the context of path dependent
perspective, this critical juncture period could underline why numerous scholarly accounts remainsustained in arguments about development assistance as purely along principles of interest (Mckinlay
and Little 1978, Griffin and Enos 1970, Boschini and Olofsgard 2007, Maizels and Nissanke 1984). At
the same time, extended arguments around its utilization and interaction is believed to beconceptualized along reciprocal approach mainly between givers and receivers (Alesina and Dollar
2000). These deeply rooted phenomenal viewpoints have remained firmly established in dominant
literatures on development theories between the interaction of both the global north and the global
south states, and for the most part, have also progressed within the analysis of the behavioral pattern ofthe newly emerging countries from the global south which set forth to becoming major players within
the donors’ club circle. Also, the relationship between development assistance and national growth ofrecipient countries has not been feasible in realistic term, if any, it widely undermines it (Griffin and
Enos 1970).
In the apparent post-conflict countries, particularly in intra-state postwar climate type of thedeveloping countries characterized by complex emergencies of war devastation, underdevelopment,
and poverty etc., development assistance has been conceived as an essential pillar in their recovery
processes, in particular, underscored by the motive of preventing their relapse. This notion is advanced
by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2007:731-736), who noted that such intervention engenderedpoverty reduction and the acceleration of growth. Additionally, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler further
reiterated that the sustainability of countries at war end, depends largely on effective policy
development and development assistance which together combines to diminish danger of post-conflictcountries from relapsing into fresh warfare (Collier and Hoeffler 2002. Also see Collier et al. 2003).
While such model has the tendency to yield result, nonetheless, the scholars’ shortcomings lie inthe challenge of concentrating more on the normative existence of policy and development aid incontext, but with insignificant concentration on the effective implementation of those mechanisms.
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Many post conflict countries, including Sierra Leone have had both aid and varied policies following
the end of the country’s civil war, however, the component of effective implementation is considered
to be largely displaced. Such factor could be a demonstration of poor institutional reform where theabsorptive ability from within domestic states not harnessed for a long-term liberal post-conflict
peacebuilding process.
2.1. Contextual debates on the efficacy of development assistance
Official Development Assistance (ODA) also known as aid or foreign assistance is characterized by
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2016: 194) as ‘government aid todeveloping countries aimed to promote economic development and welfare of recipient countries…’‘It further states that, aid may be provided bilaterally from donor to recipient or channeled throughmultilateral development agencies such as the World Bank or the United Nations etc…’ Additionally,it also asserts that ‘aid comprises grants, soft loan and provision of technical assistance,’ (Also see
Lancaster 1999). On account of this characterization, ODA is conceived to be apparently engrossed ina binary fusion along two continua in an asymmetric power relation, binds together on negotiatedinstitutional power conditionalities. In development assistance discourse the strategic power relations
between donors and recipient countries is made visualized through conditionalities. Conditionality inthis context is illustrated by Phillip Dann (2013:360) as ‘any regulations that a donor attaches
unilaterally to an official development assistance payment or any sanction that it attaches to nonfulfillment.’
Therefore, development assistance and conditionalities are underscored as compatible andinseparable framework oriented towards advancing development in the developing countries of the
global south. Thus, there have emerged unabated scholarly debates on what epistemologicalrelationship underlined the ontology or reality of development assistance and its conditionality, as wellas the effectiveness in the so-called recipient countries. In what appears as the critical school
perspective, Gordon Crawford (1997) in his examination of development assistance with its associatedconditionalities which is patterned along the political construct, opined that the associated notion of
conditionality has been blatantly ‘inconsistent’ and ‘ineffective’ in the attempt towards reform agenda
in the donor dependent states. On consistency, Gordon Crawford survey examined few countries on
how aid conditionalities were dispensed. The conclusion of Crawford’s work revealed that, theapplication of drastic conditionality was more pronounced in countries of less economic interest to thedonors, and less or nonexistent in countries where donors have maximum economic interest, eventhough, as noted by Crawford, human rights and governance challenges were at an alarmed rate insuch societies. For instance, he indicated that, especially in the early 1990s the case of Nigeria, Turkey,
and China, suffered aid sanctions on conditionalities, whilst countries such as Indonesia, Algeria,
Colombia, and Egypt amidst their reputational challenges of human rights and governance related― 32 ―

Emmanuel Vincent Nelson Kallon

issues the implementation of conditionalities on aid were inconsistent in these states. On effectiveness,
Gordon Crawford further specified that many conditionalities that are applied in certain countries are
weak in nature, wherein certain recipient countries with influential internal mechanism such weak
imposed conditionalities could not yield dividend. Finally, Gordon Crawford work attempts to pointout that legitimacy is compromised on development assistance framework.
Furthermore, Tobias Hagmann and Filip Reyntjens (2016) attempted to explain how development
assistance that is meant to promote reforms and development within liberal architecture, have resulted
into producing strong correlation and maintenance of authoritarian regimes in Sub Saharan Africa
countries. These authors accounted that, what donors have wrongly assumed as development projects
in certain Sub Saharan Africa states are completely a mistaken notion to the broader objective ofliberal democratic promotion. In that, the author continued, such development assistance has
underpinned the consolidation of authoritarian regimes as oppose to fostering democratic
consolidation, and cited the case of Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique and Ethiopia in 2013 in particular.
The authors specified that, these four countries were the top highest recipients of development aid in
2013, and yet were under a single party-political system where political pluralism and dissension,considered as fundamental pillars for democratic consolidation were completely proscribed withinthese states. Additionally, the authors noted that from 1990s to 2013, development assistance in Sub
Saharan Africa States have been realized more in countries with low adherence to political rights as
oppose to those with improved adherence to these fundamental rights, hence, emphasized that in theendeavor of development promotion, development assistance has systematically consolidated
authoritarian regimes than democracy. Thus, they argued that certain Sub Saharan Africa countries on
aid are in the context of ‘development but without democracy.
Equally important on the continued ambivalent position on aid, is the work by Stephen Knack(2004). Stephen Knack draws to attention the question around the correlation between aid anddemocratization. The author argued that, development assistance has no fundamental fact that it leads
to democratization in recipient states, rather, the author continued, aid merely build upon thepreexisting efforts on democracy that have been in existence in those recipient states which aid
relatively contributes to its promotion, and not necessarily as the source of its emergence. He
advanced this argument by utilizing a multivariate test, which examined the political and civil libertyof Freedom House data set from Large-N cross country approach in the period from 1975 to 2000.
Stephen Knack specified that from 1975 to 1989, aid did not establish democratization as well as in
the period from 1990 to 1999, therefore, in places where much development assistance appeared to besituated with evidence of relative success, are dependent on those prior democratic advances made andnot necessarily that it can be appreciated to have been occasioned by aid. The work of Stephen Knackin summary refutes arguments that have been tailored on the correlation between aid democratizationas conceptually ineffective.
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Also, the work by Deborah A. Brautigam and Stephen Knack (2004), profoundly underscoreddevelopment assistance and its fundamental impact on the general governance pattern in Sub SaharanAfrica states. They characterized aid dependency as a ‘condition in which the state is far more
powerless to undertake and administer major responsibilities of governance within their states devoidof external financial assistance or assistance from external know-how.’ This phenomenon according to
the authors is exactly what the state of Africa has been in- hugely pervaded with aid and yet, poor
governance and institutional dilemma remains, implying that aid has much damaging impacts on
governance superstructure of the recipient states. The scholars added that, aid engenders ‘institutional
feebleness and tenacious inducements’ within state. In this case they stated that, development
assistance generates a space within recipient state where the limited qualified staff in government
structure are poached; it produces accountability dilemma and makes the dependent government
reticent to sincerely focus on sustainable internal income generation approach such as through taxationfrom inhabitants, which might warrant the citizens to hold their respective governments accountablefrom within as a key component of democratic norm. Also, Brautigam and Knack indicated that the
incentive and availability of large scale of aid, accelerates profound indebtedness on the state, as wellas undermines what they referred to as the ‘collective actions problems,’ together, these illustrate
instructive case in points among others, for the inimical association of aid governance capacity on
recipient societies.
Sustained Development assistance and its impact on local industries within the broader context ofdevelopment in the recipient states has also become notable in the ongoing aid debate. Typical of suchidea is reflected in the work by Ehizuelen Michael Mitchell Omoruyi, Sheng Zhibin, Gao Jun, Sidi
Yaya Sidi and Ye Pianran (2016). These authors pointed out that, particularly food aid often provided
as development assistance undermines the local food production industries in recipient countries, as
the proclivity of rendering their local productions undervalued and hence, stimulates the chances of an
employability dilemma. (In this case aid might be synonymous to one of the drivers of conflict incertain context beyond the conventional paradigm propounded by conflict analyst scholars). The
authors specifically cited the case of Zambia in particular, where the textile industry that used to be theleading producer of cotton cloths and creating employment for large sections of the population,
however, have almost become defunct, in the senses that, it is rare to now see cotton cloths being
produced by the local cotton as were previously, and as well for the industries. The authors affirmed
this as a result of the extreme concentration of development aid along different approaches.
Dambisa Moyo (2009) in her examination of the general development assistance network in
Africa, argued that aid has been an ‘unmitigated political, economic, and humanitarian disaster.’ She
asserted that in the last sixty years, Africa has accrued about One trillion United States Dollars in aid
assistance, nonetheless, the real per capital income in recent time is much lower than it was in the
1970s, and this is combined with nearly fifty percent of the population barely survive under less than a― 34 ―

Emmanuel Vincent Nelson Kallon

dollar per day, and Africa has remained extremely indebted which annual repayment of debt has
resulted to about twenty billion United States Dollars. Dambisa Moyo in her article, situated thecomplexity of development assistance generally as both a variable caused by the convoluted context
within which aid operates, as well as, the inherent reputed complexities in African countries.
Amidst the above noted conceptualization of development assistance, Ngaire Woods (2005) on hispart heralded that the apparent trend in the global society has even convoluted the primary initial
motive of development assistance, especially after the September, 2011 episode, and the new modethat awakened on the war on terror. Woods highlighted that these phenomena have clouded theoperationalization of development assistance globally on three thematic viewpoints, which included:(a) that development assistance actors as a result of the recent change in global security trend, havecommandeered aid ambience in pursuit of their own security interest abandoning the fight against thecollective action problems like global poverty reduction; (b) that the emerge war on terror appears to
be extremely capital intensive and this implies the shrinking expenditures that now directly go todevelopment assistance projects and finally; (c) that emerging interest of donors not synchronizing
their resources through multilateral organs is becoming situated, where donors instead have resolved
to seek new space and approach through which they propelled their individual interests. In sum, withthe critical arguments, these scholars doubt the general fundamental impacts development assistancecan have on macroeconomic, microeconomic and the overall democratization and governance pattern
and process in the less developed recipient states that have remained deeply oriented under the canopyof aid dependency.
Contrary to the aforementioned critical school conceptualization of development assistance,
sympathized scholars of development assistance have disseminated different perspectives on theeffectiveness of aid in the recipient countries. Arthur A. Goldsmith (2001) advanced argument thatdevelopment assistance has been more significant to the recipient states in aspect of the developmentof democratization and economic liberation contrarily to what he referred to as ‘Perversity Thesis’ hadinundated. Goldsmith further situated that on account of the little correlative progress aid had
produced on the level of governance and that of reformation in the economic sector, any attempt ofeither withholding or reducing development assistance in these societies might concomitantly havedeleterious effect on the evidential progressed already made which would degenerate into complete
failed state that could become an intense threat to the environment.
Followed along this perspective, Alberto Alesina and David Dollar (2000) also argued that, why it
is true that development assistance has been patterned along some colonial ties, nevertheless, aid has
been concentrated disproportionately more in countries that have appeared to be in democratization
process, while at the same token, aid donors are demotivated in providing substantial development
assistance to countries that have acted or produced insignificant democratization fundamentals.
Equally important in their argument is that, aid increment in recipient countries has been relied on how― 35 ―

Patterns of strategic interactive politics in transitioning statesliberalized these countries have operated their trades and economic space which incentivizes the
inflow of aid in such settings. However, given that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has now almost
become conceived as an assistance to the poorly underdeveloped, which helps opens their market
economic system for potential viability, these scholars argued that, FDI flows to recipient countries
are not conditional to the level of democratization but on effective state rules and economic policy
climate of the states.
In their Work, Paul Collier and David Dollar (2002), draws on the nexus between development
assistance availability to poor recipient countries, and the impact such produced in poverty reduction.
Collier and Dollar furthered their viewpoint that, in recipient countries where policy regulations are
effective, it does not matter the magnitude of poverty, but the inflow of development assistance could
fundamentally impact on poverty reduction, especially when donors build on ‘poverty-efficient
allocation’ approach (Ibid 1482-1495). Nonetheless, these scholars reject the notion that aid has
impact on policy reforms other than the inseparable associations between the two, which serve as
platform through which development assistance could mitigate the poverty demands of low-income
recipient states. Also, Sam Jones and Finn Tarp (2015) in their argument underscoring the notion thatdevelopment assistance has been punctuated by varied underlined motives, however, situated that withan extensive twenty-five years examination from 1983 to 2010 of Large-N data set on aid inflows andpattern of its behavior, concluded strong association between development assistance and institutional
improvement. They particularly emphasized that, in recipient states where ‘government aid’ has been
directed towards institutional reform such interactions have produced strong and positive relational
effect especially on political institutional reforms, and in instances where such aid has been andremained consistent.
In line with this above stated argument, Zohid Askarov and Hristos Doucouliagos (2015)
examined thirty-two countries for twenty-three years to understand the nexus between aid and it
impacts on transforming institutions. They observed that, development assistance can underwrite
democratization in a transition economy, but however noted that, such does not assure the efficacy of
good institutional behavioral performance or output which is often referred to as good governance.
Whilst addressing the fluidity in their argument on the aspect aid leading to democratization but low
impact on good governance, the authors stated that, development assistance especially in states thatare in transition and also immature, are accompanied by erratic result on both the ‘democracy andgood governance’ regarding their transformation, and that immature nature of the state in transition
might results in affecting the quality of governance, which does not necessarily implies that, there is
no relations between aid and democracy based on their statistical analysis.
In conclusion, as outlined in the reviewed it fundamentally shows wide range of perspectives on
the conceptual appreciation of development assistance. Yet, why scholars in their attempt explained
about the how and why questions of development assistance generally, still, conceptual and instructive― 36 ―

Emmanuel Vincent Nelson Kallon

perspectives on particularly the challenge of the management of development aid in certain recipient
states needed further contribution to the existing scholarship. Particularly important is the aspect ofpolicies that underlined domestic political parties, policies which eventually transformed into
government in these states. Policy development or adoption at political party level is the outcome ofpolitical actors’ behavioral patterns. The behavioral pattern of political actors within mainstream
political environment is guided by strategic actions, and in the less democratized states, such
behavioral actions are always informed by instrumentalized motive manipulatively designed in pursuitof certain interests as long as there are no strong institutions that check their excesses.
The overall agenda of this pattern can be informed by what Erving Goffman referred to as‘strategic interactions.’ In Sierra Leone, in the aftermath of the new political dispensation whereantiquated political practices were to give way to the liberal democratic paradigm, political actors
resulted into the practice of strategic political interactions using their political parties in adopting
policies that were fundamentally instrumentalized, policies that could make them appeared astransformed yet, remains with practices of old political tricks, and it was within this patterndevelopment aid inflows accelerated conceived post-conflict development could be attained. Suchpolicies of the parties were in dearth of a nationally planned approach, and were more of a calculated
strategy by one party or other competing to maintain their hold and access to the state economic
resource and power to control inflows of external support, whilst at the same operated politics of
exclusion which thereby undermined the prospect for national development agenda to flourished. In
the post-conflict development assistance challenge context of Sierra Leone, it is this strategic role ofthe political actors within which aid has become a monumental failure in the fifteen years of the liberalpeacebuilding process.
Political party policies or manifestos which are the foundation on which many governments havebeen constituted particularly governments in some of the less democratized, underdeveloped andmulti-ethnic states, are largely not founded on fundamental transformative conception. Rather, theseparty policies when examined substantively, they largely appear pseudo in nature, and designed
merely as an ideational strategy to secure political control of the state political opportunities.
Particularly in multi-ethnic societies, competition for elections for instance, by the so-called politicalparties are not absolutely contested or founded on ideas, but are elections that are characterized by
ethnic censusing, where identity becomes the Machiavellian instrument.
3. Sierra Leone post-conflict development assistance in context
As noted by Hollis B. Chenery and Alan M. Strout (1966), in the contemporary thinking of conceptual
thoughts on development, concurrence have appeared among scholars that deteriorated ‘economic
progress, poverty and underdevelopment of states can be enhanced through explorations andinvestments in areas such as human capital development, acceleration of state investment and savings,― 37 ―

Patterns of strategic interactive politics in transitioning statestechnological investment, institutional reforms and employment output.’ These factors as outlined areconceived as some of the essential features characterizing many developed states, attained during
years of evolutionary patterns, on which many in the developing South with recurrent decades of thestate status quo, have been encouraged was the means towards social change and transformation,
whether a country is transitioning from intra-state war to peace, or from a severely poor
underdeveloped state yearning for growth and development.
Emerged from one of the harst devasted civil wars in Africa, foreign aid was conceptualized
within the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding framework as characteristically paramount in therestoration of development across Sierra Leone. This was largely as a result of complex emergency
context within which the country was transitioning. Besides, the Sub-Saharan Africa economic based
have had history of negative sequential fiscal performance output, and as developing countries arefurther characterized by punctuated poverty scale that almost made the possibility for large scaleeconomic savings a farfetched reality. This is noted in the work of Chenery and Strout (1966), whodrew the nexus that within the chain of economic performance, it is through savings that investments
in society become materialized and through investments, the economic based become viable which
end result is growth in the economy of the state, a pattern they added, is absent in the developing
countries on which therefore, development assistance could be viewed as integral for such societies torevamp their economic status (Chenery and Strout 1966) as response to the social problems.
Periled by a failed state phenomenon and at the threshold of total collapse, bilateral development
assistance, multilateral aid through international financial institutions, and assistance under thetutelage of the United Nations were Sierra Leone’s greatest post-conflict anticipated hope in thriving
over the complex development challenge, such as poverty mitigation and socio-economic
enhancement among the already despondent and despaired post-conflict growing population.
International actors specifically the United Nations as a global effort, created an institutionalframework titled: ‘Peacebuilding Commission’ in 2005 to assemble and superintend as one of its key
roles, resources in the form of aid assistance for the acceleration of development in all post-conflicttransitioning countries for the enhancement of a relative stability (Scott 2005). Particularly, Sierra
Leone became one of the two maiden countries in which such framework was introduced in 2006, as a
post-conflict peacebuilding development agenda for societal social change.
Historically, theoretical analysis of social change in societies especially traditional statestransitioning to modernity were supposed to follow a specific unidirectional pattern, a pattern which isparticularly captured in evolutionary theory of social change, widely professed by scholars such as
George Hegel, Auguste Comte, (Bardis 1959) and Talcott Persons etc., an approach which became thecore for modernization theorists. Evidence of this among others for instance, was on economic
perspective taken by W.W. Rostow in his monograph titled: ‘Stages of Economic Growth: A NonCommunist Manifesto’ (1960). In similar context, reification of such unidirectional ideology was very
― 38 ―

Emmanuel Vincent Nelson Kallon

much evident in the Post-Cold War Era, where post-conflict intervention in the effort to establishedsocial change and to attain development, external aid became a pattern in similar unidirectional
approach to enhance social development and stability in the post-conflict societies.
Particularly in Sierra Leone, post-conflict development assistance did not only appear as
exceptionally designed and in substantial amount, but was considered within the development cycle as
the appropriate means for the attainment of stable development beyond the notion of mere statestability, as development was conceived could engender peace. Development assistance in this regard,
targeted multisectoral factors ranging from direct support within the running of the governments
through budget supports, and other financial supports within government for macro development
programmes. For instance, with external budget supports from 2002 to 2014, the government received
directly the sum of US$ 886 Million, wherein each year it approximately accounted for US$ 68
million respectively (2016). Table one below indicates a summary tracking data from a few key
development actors with direct development assistance to the budget support as mentioned:
Table 1: Budget Supports Disbursement by Agency 2002-2014. (Million of USD 1)
Year

UK-DFID
European
Union
AfDB
World
Bank
Others
Total

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

31.4
13.6

0.2
16.2

14.1
16.9

9.7
18.2

23.3
-

-

13.0

8.7
-

7.2
-

9.1
2.4

7.0
23.6

6.4

30.2
50.5

61.7

0.1
33.1

71.1

80.8

76.9

42.3

38.7

85.0

7.0
61.6

0.4
49.7

5.0
70.0

3.0
45.6

36.7
169.2

16.7
-

16.5
-

18.3
21.9

26.9
26.0

34.6
19.0

26.7
15.6

18.2
7.5

18.4
57.9

19.7
27.8

23.9
13.9

18.9
15.4

20.8
15.5

24.7
27.1

Sources: Sierra Leone 2002-2015 Budget Support Evaluation Report.
Moreover, beyond budget supports, development assistance consigned to Sierra Leone frombilateral and multilateral institutions also ranged from school feeding programmes to food security,
energy, roads, water sector, poverty reduction, employment, governance, institutional supports bothpublic and privates, as well as in the financial sector. Sierra Leone emerging from the civil war was
not only dearth of functional and result oriented institutions and domestic income generation platform,
but even access to common basic social amenities were incredibly not in existent. These dilemma
informed reasons as to why aid was conceived as remarkably important in the peacebuilding processes
towards the enhancement of fundamental social change, a framework that was ambiguously meant to
uplift the country from existed permeated threats of underdevelopment and poverty to a relatively
modern state structure.
Excerpt of data collected during field research in Sierra Leone from the Ministry of Economic
Development and Planning, under the section of Official Development Department in March 2019, isoutline below from the following organizations that committed development assistance during thepeacebuilding process in the country.

― 39 ―

Patterns of strategic interactive politics in transitioning states

3.1. World Bank development aid
World Bank was and has been one of the main multilateral institutions through which much of thedevelopment assistance to Sierra Leone generated. The institution undertook varied support
interventions. From excerpt of the data collected, between 2009 and 2017, on four thematic areas
substantial resources were consigned as development assistance by World Bank for the post-conflict
development of the country. For instance, on institutional reform and capacity building from 2009 to
2012, it committed in aid US$ 17,479,623. Also, on youth employment support, the institutioncommitted from 2010 to 2015 the sum of US$ 20,832,032, and similarly for energy sector on accessalone from 2015 to 2017, it committed US$ 12,292,949. On agribusiness development support for2016 and 2017, the institution also devoted US$ 8,676,891 respectively, etc.
3.2. United Nations Development Programme
As one of the main institutions for post-conflict development in the developing countries, the United
Nations development programmes in the post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone supported
governance on multifaceted areas and a few of these are outline as follows: On public sector reformand capacity building from 2009 to 2014, it dedicated US$ 3,909,780, whilst on support to access andjustice from 2009 to 2016, the sum of US$ 5,063,329 was committed. The United Nations
Development Programme also provided development assistance for youth employment andempowerment for seven years from 2011 to 2017 that totaled US$ 7,098,333, whilst on local
government and economic empowerment within the six years period from 2012 to 2017,
US$ 3,080,275, and in 2015 it supported the national constitutional review process with US$ 252,114
and security sector reform US$ 1,622,885 etc.
3.3. Department for International Development (DFID)
DFID is the United Kingdom overseas development assistance institution, and in Sierra Leone, is theleading bilateral development assistance organ towards the post-conflict peacebuilding process since1999. Among a range of thematic support areas, DFID provided aid for Sierra Leone Poverty
Reduction for 2009 that totaled US$ 19,221,642 and in 2010 US$ 15,810,277 was committed. On civil
service reform programme in the same year it provided US$ 852,288 and US$ 245,193 werecommitted whilst on the same context for public sector reform programme, DFID provided in 2009,
US$ 142,205 and in 2010, US$ 594,717 respectively. In rural electrification project, it is stated that for
both 2016 to 2017, the total amount of US$ 19,135,910 were committed by DFID as aid.
3.4. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and International Fund for
Agricultural development (FAO and IFAD)
On agriculture, through Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) on a project― 40 ―

Emmanuel Vincent Nelson Kallon

termed ‘Smallholders commercialization-global agricultural on Food and security’ for five years
period from 2011 to 2016, a committed sum of US$ 13,853,233 was provided as development
assistance, at the same time International Fund for Agricultural Development from 2009 to 2017,
committed to the rehabilitation and community-based poverty reduction project as aid the amount of
US$ 41,355,391.
3.5. United Nations Peacebuilding FundPeacebuilding fund provided wide range of aid to key thematic areas. One of such was to the energy
sector which in 2009, provided US$ 5,040,813, and Japan with aid towards the same sector in 2010provided US$ 469,134. Also, European Union on support of decentralization committed
US$ 8,557,659 etc.
3.6. International Monetary FundInternational Monetary Fund also contributed to the post-conflict development support throughfinancing, for instance the sum of US$ 164 million was approved as development assistance project in2001 for Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Facility for a three-year period from 2001 to 2004, by 2002,
a total of US$ 59 million was committed (IMF Press Release 2002. para.2). Also, in 2013, throughIMF extended credit facility for Sierra Leone, approved US$ 95.9 million on a three-year period onwhich US$ 13.7 million was disbursed for the start-up phase (IMF Press Release 2013.para.1) etc.
Furthermore, beyond these summarized excerpts on some aid donors to Sierra Leone, other extensive
bilateral aid supports were provided by the United States of America, China, Germany etc., and otherinstitutions such as the African Development Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank etc. These
were key development assistance actors to Sierra Leone post-conflict peacebuilding, which wereconceived such assistance could lead towards fundamental socio-economic and political social change
and development in the country. But, as aforementioned, the political pattern within which key of theirpolicies focused were more centered on a politically strategic interactions and policy
instrumentalization than on national development, completely resulted in creating an ambience of adeep-rooted challenge of the management of the aid that were provided for meaningful impacts.
4. Instrumentalization of post-conflict political party governance’s policy framework
On ending the war in 2002, it was practically obvious that the sustainability of political parties in theemerging post-war governance system was dependent on what policy framework operated byrespective political parties. This emergence political direction viewed as a somewhat deviation fromthe previously deep rooted pattern of political behavioral practices, resulted into political parties
identifying strategic pattern through which their parties can remain relevant and be factored within the― 41 ―

Patterns of strategic interactive politics in transitioning states

mainstream political superstructure, particularly with the advent of the international actors who wereconsidered as not only moral guarantors for the peace process, but as robust financiers to the state forpeace consolidation process as the only viable means of economic generation by the state.
Of the two political parties that administered the state during the period considered of its postconflict peacebuilding from 2002 to 2018, were the SLPP and APC, that became confronted with thisphenomenon in which within the process resulted into instrumentalization of policy adoption atpolitical party level, policies which eventually metamorphosed into governance framework that
became conceived as an agenda in pursuing socio-economic political post-conflict development forsocial change, but policies which merely lacked cohesive national development context. This patternchallenges the management of the development aid impact at a broad national transformative level of
Sierra Leone since 2002. The two subsections below present desk review on two of the politicalparties especially the patterns of their superficial policy codifications to suits the apparent politicalclimate, policies which largely assumed were predicated on national development strategies between
2000 and 2018.
4.1. Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), 2007-2007
The first post-conflict political party to govern Sierra Leone was the SLPP. Taken over the realm of
governance in 1996, during the epoch of the war and under its political administration international
supports and devoted cooperation from the rebels, resulted into creating an environment of stability
and peace in 2002. In the post-war elections of 2002, the SLPP party was given the second term
mandate of five years to govern the country and its political party manifestos metamorphosed into thefirst national working document of government for peacebuilding and development. The party policyor manifestos professed wide-range of policy outlines that served as the working tool for thegovernance between 2002 and 2007 in its second term of office. Excerpt of these policies as heraldedby the SLPP party was to particularly addressed issues such as: ‘(a) democracy and good governanceconsidered the bedrock for the attainment of economic and political development; (b) massive
agricultural investment that could ensure food security; (c) economic prudency and fiscal management
to improve on the quality of lives; (d) poverty reduction; (e) youth empowerment through trainings
and employments; (f) reformation within the judiciary to rendered it credible, effective and efficient;(g) pursue zero corruption and; (h) economic and institutional decentralization (Presidential Inaugural
Speech at Parliament, 2002)’ 1 etc. This party policies were what became the government directives
and as seen from the faced valued, international actor’s advocacy are always largely concentrated onsome of these terminologies particularly in the quest for stability recuperation in post-conflict societies,
and in Sierra Lone on account of this, it attracted massive concentration of aid support.
1
Inaugural Address by President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, 2002, Parliament Building, Tower Hill, Freetown, Sierra
Leone. <http://www.sierra-leone.org/Speeches/kabbah-071202.html / Accessed on 15 November 2019>.

― 42 ―

Emmanuel Vincent Nelson Kallon

These policies were under the canopy of what the regime called the ‘New Coalition for National
Development’, yet were more of an ideationally crafted political democratic jargons which substanceappeared much less attainable as the political parties were starkly bifurcated on differentiated policy
orientation as a country which therefore undermined the development of a nationally developed
framework from that initial post-conflict context. Yet politics of divisiveness became triumphed, andcommon ground for consensus building waned. Additionally, the SLPP while the internal politicalparty policy that became governance tool were not informed by inclusivity, it embarked on poverty
reduction approach through the development of Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, a document thatoutlined the approaches needed for transitioning the country from war to post-war development, andon which development assistance were hugely committed. The adopted PRSP sectoral policy reflectedin three thematic focused areas, which included ‘(1) Promoting good governance, security and peace;(2) Promotion of pro-poor sustainable growth for food security and job creation; and (3) Promoting
human development’ (Shinoda 2012). These policies as outline though fundamental for statedevelopment and particularly for conflict country in transition to peace. However, in the context ofSierra Leone, the pattern of politics that came to be infused by elite captured, these policies ended up
as a mere political tool typical of manipulation whilst issues of poverty, underdevelopment and youth
employment as macroeconomic pillars for transformation remained profoundly unaddressed for
majority of the citizens, especially at the time the Sierra Leone received tremendous financial
assistance as aid support. At the end of the five-year regime in 2007, food security was a failure, state
institution became politicized, and Sierra Leone was still least on the United Nations Human
Development Index.
4.2. All People’s Congress (APC), 2007-2018
Completing ten years of governance under one political party, where five years were during the reignof the warfare, and the other five years during the aftermath of the war, political governance was takenover by the All People’s Congress following the defeat of the SLPP in the second post-conflict generalelections held in 2007. The 2007 general election was particularly crucial in light of the extent of theeminent political fragility and the weak state institutions that were still eminent. Perhaps the positive
outcome of this pattern of electoral democracy is the recurrent change of political actors within thesame political cycle and yet profound development outcome for social change remained unfounded.
In the political manifestos of the APC regime that came to be known as ‘An Agenda for Change,’varied policy guidelines were also advocated which eventually became the policy framework on which
the state was governed in its first term from 2007 to 2012. Excerpt on three of the thematic policy
areas professed were as follows: (a) Economy, that the party shall signifies judicious economic
management, design large scale economic opportunities, eliminate barriers to trade, emboldened
strong micro economic policies, and ensures that the normal living standard of the population is― 43 ―

Patterns of strategic interactive politics in transitioning states

improved; on (b) Agriculture, that the party shall rejuvenates the agricultural sector to become theanchor for financial growth and decrease poverty, transform Sierra Leone into food self-security, andto ensure the sector becomes the fulcrum for job creation and; on (c) Decentralization, that the party
will embark on the devolution of ‘political, legislature, administrative and economic’ pillars withcapacitation of local governments as means to moderate the exponential rural poverty 2 etc.
Additionally, whilst in the first term of APC the political manifestos that was professed ‘An
Agenda for Change’ viewed simplistically as the PRSP II did not culminate into substantive socialchange across communities in the country amidst the external support as stated in the table, the party
invented another political manifesto and named it ‘An Agenda for Prosperity,’ on which it was reelected for another second term of five years where such policies were immediately metamorphosed
into government policy framework. In sierra Leone electoral victory are not determined by smart
political ideas that could be appropriately seen would lead to modicum social changes in society
because of the overt cleavage structure, therefore, the pattern of instrumentalization of policies bypolitical parties has become a well-established and founded pattern. The APC political party ‘2012 to2018 agenda for prosperity’ governance manifesto was metaphorically an assumption that conceived
that changed had been established in Sierra Leone during the era of the agenda for change period
initially professed as policy. However, the actual reality was, it was merely a political framing
strategically designed to manipulate the voting electorates especially given the taken for granted
pattern of ethnic and regional attachment, and the level of poverty the electorates were exposed, which
presuppose that the combination of these factors emboldened the permeation of elites’ manipulative
strategies within the political space.
The Agenda for Prosperity policies of the APC outlined many pillars, an excerpt on a few of themincludes: (a) Economy, which the party stressed on broadening the economic sector at both micro andmacro level for economic stabilization, management of reduced expenditure over revenue, andtransforming the sector to serve as a source for job creation; (b) On energy and power, the party
professed that all cities and major communities would access functional electrification to enhance
local economic promotion; (c) On jobs for youths, that the party would dedicate the entire five-year
term on improving the status of youths and enhancing their employments opportunities and; (d) On
agricultural sector, the party manifesto emphatically proclaimed reducing the pattern of subsistence
farming system with an immense scale of mechanize agriculture to increase national food productionthat ensures food security (Presidential Inaugural Speech at Parliament 2012) 3 etc.
It is interesting to note that, within these proclaimed political policies on which it constituted
mainly the roadmap through which post-conflict peacebuilding and development were supposed to be
2
Sierra Herald publication 2009. ’All People’s Congress Manifesto 2007 Elections‘.<http://www.sierraherald.com/apc-manifesto-2007.htm, 9 (1). /Accessed on 16 November 2019>.
3
Inaugural Address by President Ernest Bai Koroma, 2012. Parliament Building, Freetown.
<http://www.sierra-leone.org/Speeches/koroma-121412.html / Accessed on 15 November 2019>― 44 ―

Emmanuel Vincent Nelson Kallon

attained, were largely over ridden by severe elite capture by both political parties, that made used ofinherent peacebuilding opportunities to further personal agenda, whilst fundamental national
development agenda that were not built on cohesiveness for sustained growth and development in thefifteen years of governance, a pattern characteristic of a broader ethnoregional-neopatrimonial
political salience. In essence these policies were merely to serve as conduit to access power and therelated opportunities by the political class as oppose to fundamentally any realistic agenda for postconflict peacebuilding and development.
5. Pattern of strategic interactions in the post-conflict politics and challenge of aid managementin Sierra Leone
Even before the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone, a clear pathway on the pattern of how politics
was going to be shaped had already been established. From historical accounts, the political class that
captured the post-independence mainstream political system since 1961, did not pursue transformative
approach in the agricultural and mining sector- the two most viable productive sectors of the country
through which a sustainable national economic power of the state could have been established andstabilize. What resulted instead was elite manipulation of the sector along with an establishedpatronage structure that produced less dividend to the state. The sector became unattractive togovernment for capital investment that could enhance national development as huge capital intensive
was required for such engagement for which within the political cycle, beyond personal interest, were
not prepared and willing to undertake long term development strategy for these two sectors, which led
to the abandonment of the mining and agricultural sector completely.
Thus, with the overt abandonment of these sectors, politics become envisioned as the only majormeans through which post-independence transformation of the state could be realized. Nevertheless,even along this path the availability of the political space was constricted and was considered only fora few privilege class, and with limited openings through patronage or socio-political and culturallineage from village and at national level. Throughout the 1960s and onto early 1990s, it was thispattern that shrouded and characterized the political space to the extent that it became deeply rooted
and highly traditionalized.
During the post-conflict period, political transformation was absolutely imperative and suchtransformation was inherent within the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding process that led tofundamental openness within the political space. With the advent of exogenous pressure and theendogenous advocacies posed by domestic civil society groups for transformation within the political
cycle, the environment of politics was rendered a battlefield where struggle for survival within thepolitical system became the means to an end as democratic practice emerged as the conduit intransitioning the country from its deep-rooted traditionalize pattern of politics to one that emphasized
tolerance, competition, transparency and accountability in political space, and the subjugation of― 45 ―

Patterns of strategic interactive politics in transitioning states

parties and actors to public decision making. Thus, in its transition to democracy, existed fragile
institutions resulted into creating a political opportunity patterns in which structured political agenda
did not cohesively emerge, yet politics of cleavage structural contestation became triumphed and its
practice evolved over time into becoming the political culture that defines the overall politicalsuperstructure of Sierra Leone.
Informed by this pattern of strategic interaction of political parties, resulted into policy
formulation where post-conflict cohesive national development framework was not only compromised
but undermined, as political party resulted in pursuing social cleavage interest than on building solid
post-conflict national development agenda. It was within this pattern that the evidence of a deeplyrooted threat to the general societal development and social change became complex. Consequently,
informed by this pattern of political interactions, one typical phenomenon that became glaring was the
instrumentalization of governance policies that can appeal to international actors within which
resources can be committed, a pattern that became a taken for granted disposition adopted by thepolitical parties in their policy formulation and profession.
This reflected in the strategic interactive pattern of political parties resulting into policy framing
merely in the interest of meeting entrance requirement into the political space, whilst at the same time
viewed opponents as uncharacteristic of modern political practice in their political calculation and thiswas merely to control wider political environment. For instance, in one of the speeches in 2002, fromone of the political parties, the SLPP, the leadership opined that:‘We must not allow the electorates to be hoodwink by those who erroneously believethat they can walk and talk their way to parliament or state house through a patchworkof recycled ideas…The principle of democracy recognizes the rights of anyone or anygroup of persons who meet the appropriate constitutional requirements to contest
elections for public office. However, we should let the electorates be forewarned that
there are many out there who see the electoral process as an open and free-for- allpicnic…. National elections are a serious business based on public trust and public
responsibility. They should not be taken for granted, especially by those who are
sincerely committed to be servants of the people…’ (Speech by President Ahmad
Tejan Kabbah 2002) 4.
The idealistic policies adopted by these political parties were what became metamorphosed into
mainstream governance system on which post-conflict development and peacebuilding was

Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, ‘Speech on his re-election as leader of the SLPP and his nomination as the SLPP
Candidate for the 2002 Presidential Election.’<http://www.sierra-leone.org/Speeches/kabbah-031602.html / Accessed on 17 November 2019>4― 46 ―

Emmanuel Vincent Nelson Kallon

concentrated, and conceived, such policies would lead to fundamental transformation of social change
at the societal level. As a multiethnic country and as society where constructed identities appear tohave become the main determinant of political system evident in the nature of ethnoregionalneopatrimonial pattern, whatever policies become adopted by parties are largely supported by cleavage
identities sometimes without deeper conceptualization, a pattern that also prevented these two politicalparties from seeking national policy agenda as there were already established constituencies where
support based could always be invariably harnessed. For instance, given the nature of the politicalmanipulative pattern that became a structurally taken for granted style in the mainstream politicalsystem, in 2012, the political manifesto on ‘An Agenda for Change’ under the realm of one of thepolitical parties, the APC, was re-elected in 2012 under a new political policy/manifesto of ‘Agenda
for Prosperity,’ even though the agenda for change political policies were merely a sham as any
formidable transformative development were not realized within the period comparative to the huge
aid poured and the local income generated within the time frame concurrently.
This characterization provided profound space on which political party manifestos or policies thatwere translated into mainstream politics lacks national development framework. These policies weresymbolism of what the state of nature was, and can be conceptualized as manipulation of post-conflict
development opportunities by the political class through the nature and pattern of the strategicinteractive politics infused in the mainstream governance. Also, one fundamental means throughwhich the dearth of national development framework of these party policies was recognized wasthrough the recurrent discontinuity of succeeding political party policies of previous regime by another.
It became recurrent that immediately one political party term of office ends, all the established policiesof that regime automatically come to a halt whilst the new regime completely begin with a new policy
agenda relatively unconnected to the previous regime. And what has accounted for this largely is
because of the absence of a synergized national development framework adopted by the state
Additionally, such trend implies that within each regime development has to be started fromafresh instead of followed in similar trend of previous development agenda of succeeding regime.
Political parties consciously embarked on this pattern as strategic interaction because it was a common
thought within the political cycle that by merely following previous regime’s policy agenda it isbelieved could make their political parties lost firm grip within the political space, and especially in
Sierra Leone where political parties do not have established and identifiable political party ideology,
but merely an instrumentalized kind of political agenda mainly for gaining votes. In such patternnational development becomes a secondary concern for state actors. While political party policy
discontinuity between one political regime and another could be an obvious pattern of developed
democracies and workable in developed societies, yet in developing countries that are largely
dependent on development aid for their political transition, such as Sierra Leone, such pattern ofdisjointed policy approach can produce development stagnation and can posed strong challenge to― 47 ―

Patterns of strategic interactive politics in transitioning statessocial change in such societies. This pattern in the post-conflict trend is fundamentally the causal
factor through which the challenge of the management of development aid in Sierra Leone can beconceptualized.
6. Sierra Leone and the current state of post-conflict challenge
Sierra Leone from 2002 to 2018, a period described as the prime time of its post-conflict
peacebuilding process, experienced a heyday of a huge influx of development assistance both throughbilateral and multilateral means. It was categorical that the survival of Sierra Leone as a nation-state
was almost nonexistent, its domestic sovereignty was battered, and was only resuscitated by theintervention of the international community. As indicated in the above stated patterns, whilst
approaches were designed to accelerate Sierra Leone beyond a state failure status, political practices
by internal actors evident through the display of elite captured within the same period further rendered
the country into total stagnation. Such practice scuttled the development assistance impact, and Sierra
Leone currently presents a typical archetype of a development aid failure. This phenomenon has been
captured in several published reports describing the major variables of change in the country as
extremely at a poor performing status
For instance, in the published report by Statistics Sierra Leone titled: ‘Sierra Leone Integrated
Household Survey Report for 2018,’ extensively elaborated on the profound trend of the country’s
poverty level as been on a severely systematic increase (Statistic Sierra Report 2019). The reportstated that the current poverty status of Sierra Leone is 56.8 percent for the year 2018, and further
recognized that in the rural area alone, poverty level has remained so widespread with a current trend
at 73.9% (Ibid). Whilst poverty has systematically remained on the increase, food insecurity in the
country has also been widespread. According to World Food Programme Sierra Leone, food insecurity
in 2015 was at the level of 49.8 percent, in 2018 it was 43.7 percent, whilst in 2019 it increased to 53.4
percent respectively. 5 Beyond the food insecurity and poverty conditions across the country, problem
of unemployment has also been on a fundamental increase. Unemployment in this context implies
people who are keenly seeking job as part of the working force to improve their livelihood but simply
could not identify with any. According to the research work done by Molla Mekonnen Alemu (2016),
it stated that the country has about ‘60 percent of its population structurally unemployed.’ This level ofhigh unemployment rate is also recognized in the United Nations Development Programme data on
Sierra Leone. In fact, even for those working, it is stated that, four out of five are working under poor
condition below US$ 3.1 per day. 6

Presentation made in Sierra Leone by World Food Programme Sierra Leone Country Office on the activities ofthe organization’s role, food poverty profile and planned strategies towards its reduction / 25 November 2019.
6
Danish Trade Union Council for International Development Report 2017. Labour Market Profile of Sierra
Leone.<http://www.ulandssekretariatet.dk/sites/default/files/uploads/public/PDF/LMP/lmp_sierra_leone_201
7_final.pdf/ Accessed on 26 November 2019>5― 48 ―

Emmanuel Vincent Nelson Kallon

Additionally, Sierra Leone is still considered as one of those countries with limited scale ofelectricity energy consumption by its population. Electricity consumption is relatively and erraticallyvisible in a few urban centers, but these are merely intermittent, whilst vast majority of the ruralcommunities have never experienced any form of electrification. Naturally, energy generated throughelectricity and its consumption rate is considered as significantly important to accelerate both small
and big industrial growth within societies which empowers the internal economic growth, this reality
in the context of post-conflict Sierra Leone has been a farfetched reality. Moreover, for consecutive
years Sierra Leone has been ranked at the bottom of the United Nations Human Development Index
reports. For instance, for the period of 2017, the country was ranked 184 out of 189 and has been of asimilar pattern for all the years that preceded it. Sierra Leone within the same period has beencharacterized as one of the lowest income countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region. This is evident
in the United Nations Development Programme on Statistical update for 2015, 2016 and 2017, using
the GNI per capital which stagnated at US$ 1,297; 1,216; and 1,240 respectively 7. As mentioned inprevious sections, all of these trends occur at the same time when huge development assistance wereseen expended in the country expected could have resulted into tremendous transformation of thecountry and ultimately result into fundamental social change.
As reported on the tremendous inflow of development aid in Sierra Leone, the country hasremained one of the poorest in the world, and some of the created structural reality of this outcome as
highlighted in this section are fundamentally not unconnected to the nature and pattern of the domestic
politics and governance type that has been patterned to become a culture and practice.
7. Conclusion
This chapter has vividly argued on a mechanism through which the challenge of development aid inmost recipient countries can be conceptualized, using Sierra Leone as a typical archetype.
Development assistance challenge in ongoing scholarly literature have maximally concentrated on thecomplexity of the aid structural pattern and interest, as viewpoints through which the failure of aid
must be traced. In this essay, the central argument is that, in carefully appreciating domestic politicalparty policies or manifestos of the aid recipient countries, policies which eventually metamorphosed
into the formation of what appear as government policies of the country where development assistancehas been largely concentrated conceived transformation could be archived, provides instructive andcompelling conceptual viewpoint to the context of why aid management remains a challenge in somesocieties.
An internally engendered political parties that championed the post-conflict development
United Nations Development Programme 2018. Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical
Update. Briefing Note for Countries on the 2018 Statistical Update.
<http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2018_human_development_statistical_update.pdf / Accessed on 27
November 2019>7― 49 ―

Patterns of strategic interactive politics in transitioning states

approach in Sierra Leone did not fundamentally create national development agenda. Instead, cleavage
and incohesive development policies that fundamentally have no correlation to transformation waswhat informed Sierra Leone post-conflict development pattern from 2002 to 2018, hence, thechallenge of the management of development aid. These are socially created structural barriers thathave become a taken for granted pattern of Sierra Leone, and it is an outcome imbedded in the current
ethnoregional-neopatrimonial style of governance system in the country. This entire context implied
that, the liberal post-conflict peacebuilding occasioned in Sierra Leone its consolidation is in a deep
dilemma, threatened by emerge endogenous factors which has made its success untenable. Future
research along this pattern must therefore, systematically examine how strategic interactive politicalpractices in the less democratized societies fundamentally undermine state institutions.

Acknowledgment
The work is indebted to the African Studies Center – Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, for thegreat assistance in undertaking this field research. My esteemed gratifications to the entire staff of thecenter.

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