Special

Article 4“Lowest-low Fertility” & Gender Inequality:
Japan from a Comparative Perspective
By Yoshikuni Ono and Fumiya Uchikoshi
Introduction
Low fertility is one of the most fundamental demographic
challenges in modern society. Scholars have paid close attention to
so-called “lowest-low fertility”, which refers to a designate situation
where the total fertility falls below 1.3, well below the replacementlevel (2.1) (Goldstein et al., 2009). Among the economicallyadvanced countries, the lowest-low fertility is particularly
pronounced in three groups of countries: East Asia, and Eastern andSouthern Europe. In this short note, we discuss theoretical
expectations regarding the role of gender context in understanding
cross-national variation in fertility in both low-fertility and relatively
high-fertility countries, with a specific regional focus on Japan. We
also briefly describe the strategies employed to empirically evaluate
these theoretical expectations.

A Theoretical Foundation: Second Demographic
Transition
A leading theory explaining sub-replacement fertility trends is theSecond Demographic Transition (SDT). This theory emphasizes atransition from material to post-material value (self-realization andautonomy) as a consequence of societal development. Under the
SDT framework, individuals with “untraditional” norms andindividualistic values pursue higher-order needs and choose multiple
forms of living arrangements (Lesthaeghe, 2010). During SDT,
fertility and nuptiality are increasingly less connected, and thus there
has been an increase in cohabitation, non-marital childbearing, anddivorce.
There are some critiques of this theory (see Zaidi and Morgan,
2017 for a review). Of specific relevance to the Japanese case are thefollowing two points. One is that the religious secularization and thepost-materialist culture discussed in the theory are rooted in theliberal individualism that is dominant primarily in Western societies(England, 2010), so it is an open question whether this theory isapplicable to non-Western contexts. Indeed, subsequent research
has not necessarily provided evidence to support this argument, forexample, in the Japanese context (Atoh, 2001; Raymo, 2022). In
particular, non-marital childbearing rates have been very low, whichreflect the tight link between marriage and fertility in Japan (andother East Asian contexts) (Raymo et al., 2015). Although the trends
towards “less family” are evident in Japan, recent studies suggest,for example, that the decline in marriage is mainly driven not by
52 Japan SPOTLIGHT • January / February 2023

Author Yoshikuni Ono

Author Fumiya Uchikoshi

normative change, but more by structural sources, including
growing economic uncertainty, limited opportunities to meetpotential partners, and persistent gender division of labor (Raymo etal., 2021; Raymo, 2022). Second, a theoretical expectation derived
from the SDT is a continuous decrease in the fertility levels, or moregenerally speaking, trends towards “less family” influenced by theemphasis on individualism (Esping-Andersen and Biralli, 2015). In
contrast to this expectation, however, some wealthy countries haveseen a reversal trend in the TFR. These countries are typically locatedin Northern Europe, and demographers have begun to explore
possible mechanisms that might explain this reversal.

Theory of Gender Equity
Another highly cited, and relatively recent, theorization of regionalvariation in fertility decline emphasizes the role of gender context(e.g., gender relationships, gender discrimination, gender attitudes,
and policies). In this context, McDonald’s (2000, 2009) gender
equity theory provides a compelling framework to understand thevery low levels of fertility in Southern Europe and East Asia. This
theory emphasizes tensions between improving women’s economic
opportunities and sustaining gender-inegalitarian family institutions.
On the one hand, women, like men, have increased their access tohigher education and labor market participation. On the other hand,
however, they also still face unequal demands in the home, including
norms and obligations that expect them to play a central role inchildcare and housework. When faced with the dilemma that apotential future family role conflicts with their aspirations as
individuals, women are forced to choose between career and family.
This theory has been tested by empirical studies, which generally
support the argument. For example, the association between female
labor force participation and fertility levels shifted from negative topositive over the period from 1970 to 1997 in OECD countries, with
speculation that these countries adopted a more flexible work
environment for women (Rindfuss et al., 2003). However, theassociation has also been found to differ significantly acrosshttps://www.jef.or.jp/journal/

countries, for example, between Southern Europe and Anglo-Saxon
nations. The cross-national variation in the relationship suggests that
institutional arrangements may play a key role in understanding low
levels of fertility in economically rich countries.

years. In particular, Sweden has seen a dramatic reversal trend in
fertility rates from the late 1990s to the late 2000s, as the Chartshows.
While the gender equity theory provides a theoretical foundation
for understanding the relationship between women’s labor market
opportunities and low fertility, it is not a theory specifically developed
to explain these changes. In response to the recent reversal trends offertility in some rich countries, the Gender Revolution Theory
proposed by Goldscheider et al. (2015) has gained considerable
attention in demography in recent years. This theory focuses on
structural changes in gender relationships in the public and private
spheres.
According to Goldscheider et al., the gender revolution has twophases. In the first phase, when women’s participation in the labormarket started to rise, there was a delay in marriage, a decrease in
the probability of marriage, a delay in childbearing, and an increasein divorce. This trend towards “less family” is what the SDT
predicted as we discussed earlier (Esping-Andersen and Billari,2015). In the second phase, however, the relationship between
women’s labor participation and these demographic behaviors has
gradually weakened or even reversed. In European countries today,
especially in Nordic countries like Sweden, the fertility rates are also
higher in countries with higher women’s labor participation.
Goldscheider et al. also pay attention to the importance of changes inmen’s domestic roles. Specifically, they argued that men’s increased
involvement in housework and childcare contributes to family
stability and higher fertility. As such, the Gender Revolution Theory

Japan’s Puzzle: Very Low Fertility Despite Friendly
Family Policies

Theory of Gender Revolution
As we highlighted above, studies haveshown that women’s participation in thelabor market is no longer a signal of low
fertility. This is especially the case forsome Northern European countries, where
fertility levels have been rising in recent

Total Fertility Rate

If family-friendly policies are important to mitigate the tension
between family and work, the Japanese case provides an interestingpuzzle. Compared to other countries, Japan’s family policies arecharacterized by relatively generous parental leave for mothers andhigh-quality childcare, yet Japan’s fertility levels are among thelowest. To solve this puzzle, Boling (2008) compared Japan andFrance, which have differing fertility rates (1.98 v 1.29) despite theirfamily-friendly policies.
Boling argues that it is not only institutions that matter, but also
whether cultural expectations activate or hinder these institutionalarrangements. Specifically, she pointed out the important role playedby the cultural norm of the “ideal worker” in Japan. In such cultural
norms, workers, especially those in permanent positions, areexpected to demonstrate their commitment to the company as core
members of the organization. In exchange for relatively richcorporate welfare arrangements, their working hours tend to be
extremely long from a comparative perspective.
As such, scholars have argued that the Japanese labor market has
been built on the assumption that men play the role of breadwinnercommitted to the company rather than thefamily, and women play the role ofCHART
homemaker expected to devote
Fertility trends in selected OECD countries 1970themselves to their children and home
2020
(Osawa, 1993). With childcare centers
usually not open for long, having bothparents work full-time is not considered afeasible option, even for well-educated4and wealthy couples (Brinton and Oh,2019). The cultural expectations force
working women in Japan to choose3
between having a good job and having
children
France2

SwedenUnited States
OECD average
Japan
Italy

1

South Korea
1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

Source: OECD Family Database

Japan SPOTLIGHT • January / February 2023

53

focuses not only on fertility but also on other family dimensions,particularly changes in gender relations that transform the logic offertility behaviors.
As we discussed earlier, the SDT theory initially attempted to
explain the very low fertility in Western countries by focusing on
religious secularization and post-materialist culture. However, thistheory may dismiss potentially important socioculturalcharacteristics in non-Western countries. In contrast, the Gender
Revolution Theory focuses on gender inequality in the public andprivate spheres, a perspective that seems applicable to affluent
countries, including Japan and East Asia in general.

Theoretical & Empirical Assessment of the Theory
As we noted earlier, the Gender Revolution Theory emphasizes therole of a structural shift toward gender-egalitarian regimes, but thechanges are largely attributable to individual behavior (women’slabor force participation, greater access to higher education, andmen’s increasing involvement in the private sphere). In that sense,
as Riley (1999) argued, this theory may ignore the socio-institutional
basis of gender. Comparing aggregate individual behavior acrosscountries with different institutional contexts may inhibit clear
empirical analysis. For example, it is skeptical of Goldscheider’semphasis on women’s labor force participation as a key indicator forunderstanding fertility changes. Women’s labor force participation in
Japan, for example, outpaced that of the United States in 2014. If
Goldscheider’s prediction is correct, women’s labor force
participation should increase in the US, but the rate has not shown
an upward trend. It is difficult to say, however, that gender inequality
in Japan is much smaller than in the US in many respects (persistentgender wage gap, father’s lower rate of taking parental leave, andmen’s lower contribution to housework).
In addition, focusing only on aggregate information ignorescontextual features that might be distal for low fertility. AlthoughGoldscheider et al. (2015: 222) argued that “there is growing
evidence that men’s increasing involvement in homemaking andchildcare may potentially increase fertility. Such evidence has beenfound in countries with ultra-low fertility”, this is still only one side of
the coin. Research provides mixed support for the relationshipbetween a father’s involvement and a fertility transition. A father’scontribution to childcare has a positive effect (but depends on themother’s employment status) on the likelihood of having a second
child in Spain, but not in Italy (Cooke, 2009). Also, women’s fertility
intentions are affected by inequality in the division of household
work only if they work long hours or have children (Mills et al. 2008).
Although evidence has been mixed within each country, crossnational comparative studies have supported the expectation derived
from the Gender Revolution Theory (Han and Brinton 2022). While
men’s contribution to housework is positively associated with the
54 Japan SPOTLIGHT • January / February 2023

transition to a second birth among dual-earner households in Japan(Nagase and Brinton, 2017), the ideal worker norm characterized bylong work hours and intensive commitment to the workplace
impedes the realization of more gender-egalitarian arrangements(Brinton and Oh, 2019).
Although Goldscheider et al. (2015) briefly discussed the growingclass inequality, another skeptical view stems from the fact thatfamily trends are not converging even within a single country.
Sociologists have argued that family formation is increasingly stable
among highly-educated couples and vice versa among less educatedones, or “diverging destinies” – a term coined by McLanahan (2004).
The Gender Revolution Theory does not clearly reconcile the gap
between their argument and the sociological literature on family
adaptation to demographic change. This is likely because the Gender
Revolution Theory originates from the Swedish experience, where
income inequality is not high under the strong welfare regime. Onevariant of this gender-based theory proposed by Esping-Andersen
and Billari (2015) explicitly incorporated this perspective when
discussing how social stratification changes the diffusion process of
newly formed normative expectations.

Japan in Comparative Perspective
Mixed support for the theory may be due to different institutional
contexts in those low and ultra-low fertility countries. Brinton et al.
(2018), for instance, examine the gap between desired and actual
fertility rates in four rich countries – Sweden, the US, Spain, andJapan – and focus on the role of gender inequality, as Goldscheider
et al. (2015) did. Although they share the same research interests,
they approached this question qualitatively, as opposed tocomparting quantitative measures in each country. Their analysis ofinterviews with married couples reveals that the influence of genderinequality on fertility intention varies across institutional contexts. In
Japan, most women tacitly accepted the unequal division of laborand did not mention the lack of a husband’s housework share as areason for constraining their intention. This finding is supported bytheir analysis of male interviewees among full-time couples, showingthat they are likely to have gender-egalitarian attitudes but their longwork hours prohibit the husband’s contribution to housework(Brinton et al., 2018). In contrast to the Japanese case, in Spain,
couples emphasized high levels of economic uncertainty as acondition for maintaining a full-time work arrangement for bothpartners. In these lowest-low fertility countries, gender inequality
does not play the role that the Gender Revolution Theory would haveexpected. Rather, the institutional contexts, possibly combined withgender inequality, create their perceptions of the gap between
desired and actual fertility.

Immigration: Last Resort?
Most low-fertility countries, including Japan, are economicallyaffluent countries and thus have a substantial number of immigrants
from developing countries. In this context, demographers as well as
policymakers are interested in the role that immigrants play inincreasing fertility. Some demographers argue that the native-born
population, which is considered the majority in a given society (e.g.,
non-Hispanic white Americans), may be replaced in the future by theimmigrant population. An implicit assumption behind this hypothesisis that immigrants tend to have higher fertility than the native
population. Indeed, some countries, such as those in Western Europe
and the US, are experiencing an increase in immigrant populations,and their relatively high fertility may be causing what demographerscall the “Third Demographic Transition” (Coleman, 2006).
Immigrant higher fertility has also attracted close attention frompolicy researchers, who often hope that the immigrant population
will help solve not only labor shortages but also the problems of
population decline and aging. Some consider that immigrant fertility
could play an important role in solving Japan’s population problems.
However, in contrast to these somewhat naïve expectations
regarding the role of immigrant fertility, the immigrant population in
Japan tends to have lower fertility than their native counterparts. One
recent study using the 2010 Japanese census has found that
immigrant fertility tends to be actually lower than that of the native
population with the exception of immigrants from Vietnam(Korekawa, 2013). This study suggests that Japan is a country where
it is difficult for anyone, even immigrants, to have and raise children.
One lesson from such a seemingly surprising finding is thatpolicymakers need to think carefully about how to reduce the cost ofchildbearing for women who are likely have to choose between
family and work in the Japanese labor market as an immediate
measure to mitigate the impact of low fertility in Japan.

Discussion
In this short note, we have reviewed several major theoreticalexplanations for the lowest-low fertility in some wealthy countries. In
their framework, Japan is only beginning to experience the gender
revolution. As Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015) pointed out, thekey to understanding cross-national variation in the changing
relationship between women’s economic opportunities and fertilitylies in the initiation of change by some external shock (theintroduction of family-friendly policies) and the diffusion of newnormative expectations about the family. Given that Japan has beencharacterized by relatively generous family policies, we speculatethat the main obstacle to achieving gender parity and a recovery offertility levels is likely to be the slow change in people’s attitudes
toward the gender division of labor. We should also emphasize thatJapan’s rigid labor market structure, characterized by lifetime
commitment with a company, serves as the institutional basis for thefamily model of male breadwinner and female homemaker.
While these theories help us to consider the case of Japan’s low
fertility from a comparative perspective, a few cautious remarks need
to be made. First, because the theory implicitly asserts thatdeveloped countries converge on a gender egalitarian regime(specifically, Sweden), it assumes that fertility trends are associatedwith social development. This assumption is very similar to what
Thornton (2001) calls “development idealism”, characterized by the
propositions that modern families are good and modern individuals
are free and equal. One possible critique of the Gender Revolution
Theory is the assertion that we must be cautious about linking
gender equality and fertility reversal trends, assuming that all genderunequal countries will converge to a situation like contemporary
Sweden.
Second, the argument about the shift from “less family” to “morefamily” (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015) or the gender revolution“strengthening families” (Goldscheider et al. 2015: 208) canoverlook important family diversity. While there is an implicit
assumption in these gender-focused theories that equal relationships
between men and women make families more stable and cohesive,the focus on gender inequality between men and women in theprivate sphere may ignore other types of families, such as singleparent families and same-sex couples. Especially in highly stratified
societies, it is an empirical question whether the gender revolution
produces equal family stability across the different segments of thesocioeconomic spectrum. An alternative scenario would be that there
is a divergent pattern of family formation according tosocioeconomic status, which may be reinforced by the stratified
gender revolution. Indeed, several studies have provided evidence
consistent with this expectation. Family stability and genderegalitarian practices are concentrated in well-resourced families,
while disadvantaged families are still characterized by instability andtraditional family norms.

Conclusion
Demographers have attempted to theorize global trends in fertility.
While the SDT explains why fertility rates have fallen below the
replacement levels, it cannot explain the recent reversal trend in
fertility in some wealthy countries. The Gender Revolution Theory
has emerged as an alternative theory to explain the reversal trends.
The theory’s most fundamental contribution to the demographictransition is its application of the gender equity theory (McDonald,
2000, 2009) to explain trends in fertility. That being said, this theory
is to be criticized both theoretically and empirically as we discussed
earlier. Yet the empirical expectations provided by the theory areclear and easily testable, so future studies will still benefit fromJapan SPOTLIGHT • January / February 2023

55

examining the trends in low fertility in Japan while referring to thistheoretical framework.

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Yoshikuni Ono is a professor of Political Science at Waseda University, afaculty fellow at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, and a
research director at the Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research. He completed
his Ph.D. in political science at the University of Michigan. Before joining
Waseda, he held academic positions at Tohoku University and the International
University of Japan. His work has appeared in the American Journal of Political
Science, Journal of Politics, Political Behavior, Political Science Research andMethods, Public Opinion Quarterly, and other journals.
Fumiya Uchikoshi is a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Sociology and
Office of Population Research, Princeton University. His research interests
include social stratification and family demography. He received his M.A. in
Sociology from the University of Tokyo in 2017 and his bachelor’s degree fromthe University of Tokyo in 2015. His work has been published in Demography,
Demographic Research, and Research in Social Stratification and Mobility,
among other outlets.