Neww Diplomacy Initiative
Ini ive

SEPTEMBER 2019019

ND Policy Brief

SEPTEMBER 2019019

Vol.

Entering a new, uncertain phase of the U.S.
- Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
Takehiro Fujitsuka, J.D.
Researcher, Energy Project TeamNew Diplomacy Initiative

What is a nuclear cooperation agreement?
A nuclear cooperation agreement sets the framework for cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. At thesame time, it is an international agreement concluded to regulate the use of nuclear fuel and equipmentfrom a non-proliferation standpoint, keeping in mind the two-sided nature of nuclear material and its
ability to be used for both peaceful, and military purposes.
As a general rule, in order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, these agreements have mechanisms
to stop countries from unilaterally engaging in reprocessing (the process of extracting plutonium, a raw
material for nuclear weapons, from spent nuclear fuel). If one of the concerned parties engages in
reprocessing, the other country who provided the nuclear materials or equipment which would be usedmust give consent (individual consent system).
When it comes to the individual consent system, there is always the possibility that consent will not beobtained. For that reason, the country’s nuclear policy would remain in a state of uncertainty.

Peculiarities of the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
The current U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement includes a clause for prior consent (priorcomprehensive consent), so the individual consent process, which requires consent be obtained from thecountry supplying nuclear technology, would not be applied in case reprocessing becomes necessary. At
the conclusion of the current agreement, Japan succeeded in revising the old agreement’s individual
consent system. This enabled the country to implement a nuclear policy that eliminates uncertainties
surrounding consent.
However, the prior comprehensive consent clause threatens to contradict the purpose of nuclear
cooperation agreements, which are supposed to be regulatory devices preventing proliferation. For thatreason, there are not many other examples of this around the world. Acquiring the current U.S.-Japan
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the prior comprehensive consent clause is said to be Japan’sgreatest diplomatic success.

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Japan’s Greatest Diplomatic Success
Looking back to the past, it is clear that it was not easy for Japan to acquire this prior comprehensive
consent clause.
The old U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement concluded in 1968 did not include a prior
comprehensive consent clause and instead stipulated that if Japan wanted to engage in reprocessing, both
Japan and the U.S. would have to come to a joint decision (Art. 8c). Although it was called a joint
decision, in reality, the U.S. held the power to veto Japanese reprocessing policy. This clause was seen as ahigh risk for Japan, as its nuclear policy could be influenced by the U.S.
In fact, there was an event where the U.S. veto was almost triggered. In 1977, when Japan’s first
reprocessing plant, the Tokai Reprocessing Plant, was about to start operations, the U.S., where theCarter administration had begun to make its non-proliferation policy stricter, objected to the plan. Japan’splan was not able to eliminate the risk of nuclear materials being used for military purposes and, therefore,
the U.S. insisted that that type of reprocessing could not be approved. If reprocessing were not possible,
the nuclear fuel cycle, a pillar of Japan’s nuclear policy, would be broken. This caused uproar in Takeo
Fukuda’s administration at the time.
Although a joint decision was made to allow the operation of the Tokai Reprocessing Plant, withconditions regarding the plant’s duration and throughput, this was a traumatic event for the Japanese
government.
This experience led Japan to move forward with diplomatic negotiations aimed at obtaining a prior
comprehensive consent clause in order to minimize the influence of U.S. interests on Japanese policy.
There had never been a case in which the U.S. gave a non-nuclear weapon state prior comprehensive
consent. The draft agreement with the prior comprehensive consent clause was strongly opposed by theUnited States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of Defense due toproliferation and security concerns. That being said, it was decided that a prior comprehensive consent
clause would be included in the agreement.
It is said that there was a desire to restore the U.S.-Japan relationship after the incident concerning theTokai Reprocessing Plant.
U.S. congressional deliberation was the climax in the process of reaching the current agreement. In theU.S., in order for a nuclear cooperation agreement to pass, it is necessary that a 90-day continuous sessionof congress adjourn without a resolution disapproving of the agreement being passed (Atomic Energy Actof 1954, Article 123).
During congressional deliberation for the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, in addition tostrong dissenting opinions stemming from safety concerns relating to the transportation of plutonium, theissue of whether or not the agreement would influence the non-proliferation policy was raised.
At the congressional hearings, there were critical opinions from a non-proliferation perspective, such aswhether giving Japan prior comprehensive consent would render the U.S. incapable of meeting its
requirements under non-proliferation laws.

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The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations decided to issue a letter requesting that the president
resubmit the agreement to congress for renegotiation and recommend that the senate make a decision toreturn the agreement to the president.
As such, there was a strong movement against the agreement and even a moment when the agreement’schance of being passed by Congress was threatened. However, there was also strong lobbying on behalf of
the Japanese government, and although the prospect of the draft agreement passing changed again andagain, in the end, a joint resolution disapproving of the draft agreement was not adopted and theagreement was approved.
The circumstances under which the current agreement was concluded show that the U.S. has deep-rooted
fears over non-proliferation in connection to reprocessing, and this must be kept in mind when thinking
about U.S.-Japan nuclear policy in the future.

Destabilization of the Agreement due to its Automatic Extension
The current U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was concluded in 1988 and was valid for a
30-year period. The future of the agreement attracted attention among the concerned parties on its
maturity date in July 2018.
For a Japanese government looking to promote nuclear policy stability, the best scenario was to complete
procedures to extend the existing 1988 agreement for a considerable period. However, for that to happen,
it would have to clear further debate in the U.S. Congress.
In the end, because deliberations in the U.S. Congress do not always warrant optimism, the current
U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was settled with an automatic extension that required nospecial procedures.
In the case of an automatic extension, Article 16 (2) of the agreement stipulates that the agreement can beterminated by a written notice from either Japan or the U.S. within six months of maturity. Therefore,
there is potential for the agreement to be unilaterally terminated in the future, putting the agreement in astate of uncertainty.

Increasing Fears in the U.S.
As a country that wants to continue reprocessing, it is unthinkable that Japan would submit a termination
notice under Article 16 (2).
That being said, is it possible for there to be a termination notice from the U.S., a country that continues
to express concern over Japan’s plutonium stockpiles?
When considering this question, it is important to recognize that Japan tends to look at nuclear policy as
an energy issue, whereas the U.S. sees it also as a security issue. The future will depend on how the U.S.

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judges whether or not the current U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement impacts non-proliferation.
In this regard, it has been clear that even within the Trump administration, which seems to be lesssensitive to proliferation issues, there is still skepticism surrounding Japan based on proliferation concerns.
These concerns come not only from a nuclear security perspective, but are also based on growing distrust
toward Japan in Northeast Asia and the threat of regional tensions increasing if a reprocessing
competition were to occur. Furthermore, there is the concern that it will be difficult for the U.S. topersuade other countries to stop reprocessing (in fact, South Korea and Saudi Arabia have made demands
for similar nuclear agreements to Japan’s, causing difficulty for the U.S.).
In fact, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations asked for a review of the U.S.-Japan Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement (February 2018), and a major news story was released in which it was stated that
the U.S. demanded that Japan reduce its plutonium stockpile (2018 June 10, The Nihon Keizai Shimbun,etc.). In response, the Japanese government has been forced to take concrete measures, such asdetermining a cap on the amount of plutonium it stockpiles (for more information, see future Policy Brief).

Revisiting Japan’s Reprocessing Policy
Given the current situation in Japan, where plutonium stockpiles have been increasing without a clear
consumption cycle, it can be said that some U.S. government officials and experts’ concerns surrounding
reprocessing in Japan are even greater than when the current U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement was concluded. The fact that the Japanese government, which is thought to have obtained
prior comprehensive consent for stability, had no other choice other than to automatically renew theagreement, may also indicate that concern from the U.S. is growing.
Responding to concerns from the U.S. should be top priority for the Japanese government and active
discussions are expected among stakeholders in Japan.

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