Afghanistan as a Buffer State between Regional Powers in the Late
Nineteenth Century
An Analysis of Internal Politics Focusing on the Local Actors and the British Policy

Masato Toriya

Introduction
Afghanistan is situated in the region between South Asia and Central Asia. In the latter half ofthe nineteenth century, British India and the Russian empire extended their territories and reachedthis region from the south and the north, respectively. In the 1860s and 1870s, Russia annexed thedomain of the Khoqand Khanate, and the Bukhara Emirate and the Khiva Khanate became Russian
protectorates. As the result of a series of military conquests, Russia now shared borders with
Afghanistan, and the British considered Russia a great threat to their control of India. Therefore,
preventing the Russians from penetrating the British Indian territory became the most significant
political task for British Indian authorities in the late nineteenth century. The political struggle
between British India and the Russian Empire in inner Asia including Afghanistan became known
as the Great Game.
This paper focuses on the period just after the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Afghan War,which began in 1878 and ended in 1881. According to a large number of previous studies,
Afghanistan was fixed as a buffer state between Russia and British India as a result of the war and
the Gandamak Treaty, which was concluded between Amīr Ya‘qūb Khān and the British on 26
May 1879, substantially as proof of the surrender of the Afghan side.1 In this treaty, the Amīr ofKabul, a previous ruler of Afghanistan, not only ceded various territories but also handed over
diplomatic rights to the British. In short, Afghanistan was virtually a British protectorate until 1919.
It is also well known that Afghanistan later became a major political battlefield between the US
and the Soviet Union during the Cold War era in the latter half of the twentieth century. This meantthat Afghanistan would again be considered a buffer state between two countries.
As a result, matters of geopolitical importance concerning Afghanistan have often been
discussed between regional powers (for example, Britain, Russia, the US, and the USSR) within
the framework of the buffer state concept. While there has been a tendency for studies on thepolitical history of Afghanistan to focus on regional power politics, the internal politics anddynamics of the country have been largely ignored, particularly regarding the period I examine
here. Thus, the main objective of this study is to shed some light on the country’s internal politicalaffairs through a re-examination of the political circumstances surrounding the Second
1

For further details on the Second Anglo-Afghan War and its aftermath, see Azmat Hayat Khan 2005; Davies
1932; Hassan Kakar 2006.

- 49 -

Masato Toriya

Anglo-Afghan War. The diplomatic relations between Britain, Russia, and Afghanistan have beenstudied in some depth. However, there has been much less attention paid to the policies that havebeen designed and implemented regarding Afghanistan’s internal matters. Accordingly, it has
become difficult to gauge the impact of various British policies on the internal political situation.
Most previous studies have mentioned that the British had little interest in the internal matters of
Afghanistan and did not interfere in internal political struggles. For that reason, it was said that theAmīr of Kabul had succeeded in the centralisation of Afghanistan. However, it is questionable
whether the centralisation of Afghanistan was achieved during the late nineteenth century and at
the beginning of the twentieth century, bearing in mind the political history of the country until
now.2
Research has recently begun to analyse a series of efforts of Amīr ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khān tocentralise the political institutions of Afghanistan. But two important studies came to contrasting
conclusions concerning the reign of the Amir. Amin Tarzi focused much attention on thecentralization of the judicial system, which, up until that point, had been led by regional tribal
societies3. The Amir tried to introduce a unified judicial court based on the Hanafi fiqh, similar tothat of the Ottoman dynasty4. Amin Tarzi also discussed in detail the introduction of the Hanafi asa formal fiqh and referred to his reign as an important historical era for the national integration of
Afghanistan. The other scholar, Shah Mahmoud Hanifi focused on the historical discourse of
Afghanistan itself.5 He expressed his opinion that the fundamental principles of the national unityof Afghanistan had been created by British “colonial knowledge” through the nineteenth andtwentieth centuries. Additionally, he stated that Afghanistan was unified by using this “colonial
knowledge” as a tool for centralisation during the reign of Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan. In otherwords, while Amin Tarzi assessed the Amir’s reign positively as a process of the national
integration, Shah Mahmoud Hanifi concluded that the Amir had played a decisive role in
Afghanistan falling under the colonial system, evaluating his reign negatively. At any rate, there is
no doubt that the reign of the Amir was one of the most significant historical turning points in
Afghanistan, not only with regard to its centralisation, but also the national identity of its citizens.
Consequently, the central task of this paper is to re-examine the details of the internalsituation in Afghanistan in the late nineteenth century. To determine the state of Afghanistan’s
internal affairs, I analyse a series of Persian correspondence exchanged between persons ofinfluence in Afghanistan and the British Indian authority, as well as a number of confidential
British documents.

2

For a long time, most of the studies in this field have stated that Afghanistan became a unitary state during thisperiod. See Barfield 2010: 159-163.
3
Tarzi 2003.
4
A book entitled “Sarrishtah-yi Islāmīyat Rūm” was published in both Persian and Pashto, which was referred to as
Afghānī in it, by the order of the Amīr. The book was written as the word of the Amīr himself to all his subjects in
Afghanistan and dealt with the situation of the Ottoman dynasty at that time. See SI. Therefore, it seems that theAmīr considered the Ottoman dynasty as his model for consolidating Afghanistan on the basis of Islamic doctrine.
5
Hanifi 2011.

- 50 -

Afghanistan as a Buffer State between Regional Powers in the Late Nineteenth Century

The Second Anglo-Afghan War and the Divide and Rule Policy of Britain
A direct cause of the Second Anglo-Afghan war, which broke out in November 1878, was theacceptance of a tsarist Russian delegation to Kabul. The news of this development was
immediately reported by the Indian Muslim representative of British subjects in Kabul to the
British government.6 This was followed by the conclusion of a peace treaty between Amīr Sher
‘Alī Khān and Russia, and the subsequent rejection of the British delegation to Kabul.7 In fact, adraft of the peace treaty and a series of friendly correspondences between the Amīr and theRussian authorities in Turkestan were discovered later, when British forces occupied Kabul. Amīr
Sher ‘Alī Khān was evacuated to Mazār-i Sharīf, a central city in northern Afghanistan near to thearea under the Russian sphere of influence, having asked for the support of the Russian Turkestan
authorities. Amīr Sher ‘Alī Khān and the Governor General of Russian Turkestan, Konstantin
Petrovich Von Kaufman (in position 1867-1882), had exchanged letters from March 1970 onwards,
and the Russians at the beginning had promised to give him their full support if a foreign power
invaded Afghanistan. However, Amīr Sher ‘Alī Khān did not receive this promised aid and died at
Mazār-i Sharīf. General Kaufman wrote to Sher ‘Alī as follows:
I have written to you a letter to the effect that the Emperor, on account of your troubles, hadcommunicated with the British Government, and that the Russian Ambassador at London had
obtained a promise from the British Ministers to the effect that they would not injure theindependence of Afghanistan. Perhaps you sent your letter before you got mine. Now I have heardthat you have appointed your son Muhammad Yakub as your Regent, and have come out of Cabulwith some troops. I have received an order from the Emperor to the effect that it is impossible toassist you with troops now. I hope you will be fortunate. It all depends on the decree of God.
Believe me, that the friendship which I made with you will be perpetual.
[L/PS/18/A38, Letter from General Von Kaufmann to Shere Ali, dated 2nd January 1879]
Soon after the outbreak of the war, the British army occupied Kabul and other areas andsigned the Gandamak Treaty with Amir Ya‘qūb Khān, who became the new Amīr after the flight ofSher ‘Alī Khān to the north. This treaty made Afghanistan a protectorate of Britain. Under thistreaty, some of the eastern Afghan territories including the Khyber Pass, Kurram, and Swat (which
are now part of present-day Pakistan) were ceded to the British, and Britain obtained the right tostation her representatives in Kabul and other vital regions inside Afghanistan.8 At this time, theBritain tried to integrate the whole of Afghanistan under the rule of Amīr Ya‘qūb Khān, who wasoften seen as a puppet of the British.
However, having been imprisoned (after a civil war over the amīrship, in which he was
6

Political Inventories Urdu, Persian (List of Inventories) File No. 18.
Regarding the contents of the treaty between Sher ‘Alī Khān and Russia, see Russian Correspondence with Kabul
in L/PS/18/A38.
8
Regarding the Gandamak Treaty, see AW: 117-118; ST1: 218–219.
7- 51 -

Masato Toriya

defeated) for many years with his father, Amīr Sher ‘Alī Khān, Amīr Ya‘qūb could not sustain
political stability. He was incapable of being a successful ruler during the destabilization of the war.
Therefore, the British found it necessary to station a large number of forces in Kabul and in othermain cities to maintain law and order. Because the presence of the British army was extended,
local hostility against the Amīr and the British, who were garrisoned in Kabul, quickly intensified
and spread. Although the British had stated from the beginning that they planned to retreat fromAfghanistan soon after securing order, they now felt that they had to reconsider a new scheme forkeeping Afghanistan within their sphere of influence. In Kabul, there was an attack on the British
Embassy by opponents of the puppet government and the British forces, and it had become
apparent that the new Amīr and the British army were in peril because of the rise of distrust andenmity against them. Consequently, the Amīr fled from his palace with a few attendants to the
British forces’ camp and asked for asylum in the British Indian territory to receive a pension fromthe Indian government. He expressed his decision to abdicate from the amīrship of Afghanistan.9
As the political situation worsened for British India, they were forced to drastically change
their policy. They now realised that the number of hostile tribes in the country made it difficult for
the government to be administered by any single ruler. Thus, they reached the following decisionthat the disintegration of Afghanistan could not be avoided in order to stabilize the situation:
It must not be forgotten that the absorption of the Afghan principalities into one kingdom
under Dost Muhammad, and again, after an interval, under Shere Ali, represented only atemporary, and to some degree an accidental, phase of their recent political history.
(abbreviation)…We are of opinion, therefore, that the question of the resuscitation of thefallen kingdom of the Barakzais cannot now be entertained, and that we must accept the
separation of its constituent provinces as our basis for the political reconstitution of
Afghanistan.
[L/PS/20/Memo8: Narrative of Events in Afghanistan from August 1878-December 1880, andconnected correspondence, India Office, 31st December 1880]
In short, Lord Lytton, who had been viceroy of India during the war, decided to divide
Afghanistan into a number of segments and to entrust those territories, apart from the southern
region of Afghanistan centred on Kandahar, to pro-British persons.10 The Kandahar area wasregarded as a strategically important tract for safeguarding India from outside threats, and theBritish Indian authority, having divided Afghanistan, continued to occupy the Kandahar area for awhile. Although it was desirable for Britain to withdraw the army from all parts of Afghanistan assoon as possible, she had also been searching for an appropriate indigenous future ruler ofKandahar. As a result, Sardār Sher ‘Ali Khān, a son of the former rulers of the royal family, wasselected as the hereditary ruler of Kandahar. His government steadily increased in prosperity under
9

Regarding the reign of Amir Ya‘qūb Khān, see L/PS/20/Memo8; ST1: 214-254; AW: 116-133.
See British Government records concerning the policy of disintegration of Afghanistan and the situation of eacharea in detail in L/PS/20/Memo5.
10- 52 -

Afghanistan as a Buffer State between Regional Powers in the Late Nineteenth Century

the British protectorate. However, as he could only exercise his influence under the support of theoccupation forces, it was obvious that he was a puppet ruler of the British:
The Viceroy informed the Secretary of State that he considered it was necessary to give theSirdar [Sher ‘Alī Khān] confidential but precise assurance that if he behaved well, Kandahar
would be placed under his hereditary Government, supported by us.
[L/PS/20/Memo8: Narrative of Events in Afghanistan from August 1878-December 1880, andconnected correspondence, India Office, 31st December 1880]
While Kabul and Kandahar were under the strong influence of the British, the western part ofthe country was under the direct control of a son of the late Amīr Sher ‘Alī, Sardār Ayūb Khān.
This meant that the Herat area was independent and could possibly become a major threat to theoccupation forces in Kandahar. However, according to British intelligence sources, at the time ofthe early phase of the war, the British had presumed that the power of Herat would automaticallyweaken because of the lack of effective governance of its leader Ayūb Khān.11 In reality, theBritish Indian officials had repeatedly discussed the political affairs of the Herat, assumed several
possible future scenarios, and prepared a number of options for the future. They seriously
considered the options of ceding Herat to Persia, creating a separate state outside the influence of
the Amir of Kabul, and annexing the area as a British territory:
As regards Heart and Seistan, Lord Lytton’s Government accepted in principle what wasunderstood to be the policy of the Government at home, viz., that Persia should be allowed tooccupy them upon suitable conditions, and upon this assumption they proposed tosubordinate the remainder of Afghanistan directly or indirectly to distinct Native
Governments at Kabul and Kandahar.
[L/PS/20/Memo8: Narrative of Events in Afghanistan from August 1878-December 1880, andconnected correspondence, India Office, 31st December 1880]
Ultimately, this option was rejected because of the financial and military responsibilities of
the rule being too great. The idea of handing Herat to Persia was also rejected, particularly in lightof the potential for conflict with Russia that might ensue. Britain had already fought many bloody
and costly conflicts with Russia in a number of struggles regarding colonies, and there was muchpolitical rivalry and public hostility between the two countries. The British also feared that if Herat
was ceded to Persia, then it would be incorporated into the Russian sphere of influence. For thosereasons, it was thought necessary to protect Herat from both Russia and Persia. The British wereleft with two options regarding Herat. One was to leave Ayūb Khān as its legitimate ruler, and theother was to install another ruler. However, for the meantime, Ayūb Khān remained in power,
although the British considered that his rule might be short lived.
11

For more information about the situation of Heart and Ayūb Khān at that time, see AW: 110-160.

- 53 -

Masato Toriya

The Selection of Sardār ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khān as the New Amīr of Kabul
So far as the northern area, so-called Afghan Turkistan, was concerned, the British did notintend to directly intervene.12 However, in trying to find someone to take over as the Amīr ofKabul, the British discovered Sardār ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khān, who had been active in the northernarea of the country. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khān’s father had a stronghold in the northern part of thecountry and had been a major rival of his brother, Sher ‘Alī over the amīrship. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān
Khān, who had lived in Samarqand receiving a Russian pension for several decades,13 was now
installed by the British as the Amīr of Kabul.
As mentioned before, during the war, numerous insurgencies had occurred throughout thecountry. In Ghazni, located in southeast Afghanistan between Kabul and Kandahar, a group ofrebels under the leadership of Mullā Mushk-i ‘Ālam had mobilized opposition forces against the
British and their collaborators. The group was called the National Party, and it made strong
demands for the imminent withdrawal of occupation forces.14 Similarly, a large number of people
launched an attack on the Kabul authorities and the British.
The basic political principles, which were based on the existing conditions of the British
Indian government for her profit, are as follows:
The situation can only with advantage be discussed with reference to the definite policy
which has now been sanctioned by the Government of India, which may conveniently besummarized here:First. The Government has no intention of permanently annexing Afghanistan, or of retaining
under its control any other portions of the country than may be necessary for the defence andsecurity of its own frontier.
Second. Ameer Yakub Khan, who has been proved to have been unmindful of the obligations
imposed upon him by the Treaty of Gandamak, will not, under any circumstances, bepermitted to return to Afghanistan.
Third. The policy of the disintegration of Afghanistan has been definitely accepted, andKandahar, and probably Heart, will be permanently severed from Northern Afghanistan.
Fourthly. The Chief whom the Government have determined to accept for the Ameership of
Kabul and Turkistan is Sirdar Abdul Rahman Khan, if only he shows himself animated byfriendly, and not hostile, sentiments towards the British Government.
Fifthly, The evacuation of Northern Afghanistan by British troops is to be carried out at as
early a date as may be possible, having due regard to the desirability of making sucharrangements for the administration of the country as will not necessitate its speedy
reoccupation.
12

See L/PS/20/Memo8; ST1; Political Dep. (List of Inventories) File No. 333.
More about the ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khān in exile in Russian territory, see LA: 42-162.
14
L/P/20/Memo5: Northern Afghanistan: Memoranda and Reports by Mr. Lepel Griffin, C.S.I., Chief Political
Officer at Kabul, from 1st to 24th April 1880, on state of Affairs in Northern Afghanistan.
13- 54 -

Afghanistan as a Buffer State between Regional Powers in the Late Nineteenth Century[L/PS/20/Memo5: Northern Afghanistan: Memoranda and Reports by Mr. Lepel Griggin,
C.S.I., Chief Political Officer at Kabul, from 1st to 24th April 1880, on state of Affairs inNorthern Afghanistan]
It appeared to be generally understood by the local people that the British did not intend toannex the country. However, the various claimants to the throne were reluctant to submit to British
authority because they had already suffered for their adhesion to the British cause and considered
that, as the British were soon to leave Afghanistan, their chances of standing well with the next
ruler would be improved if they now abstained from declaring themselves to be on the British side.
At any rate, although the British had estimated that of all possible claimants to the throne ofnorthern Afghanistan, there was no one who could be favourably compared with the ‘Abd
al-Raḥmān Khān, it seemed that there was no doubt that his nomination presented some dangers.
Despite the risks, there was no possible course that could be followed in Afghanistan that would
not be beset with difficulties. Therefore, the British began negotiations with ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khānand a large amount of correspondence was exchanged concerning how northern Afghanistan,
including Kabul, would be ruled and the future relationship between him and the British.15
According to British sources, there was no longer any doubt in April 1880 as to ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’ssuccess in Afghan Turkistan, and using a confidential agent, letters were delivered to him and his
subordinate and responses were received.16 On the whole, the tenor of these documents was not
unfriendly to the British government and they showed a desire to come to some understanding.
Consequently, the British decided to entrust the amīrship to ‘Abd al-Raḥmān. They discussedwith him some issues that had arisen regarding the Indian government. First of all, there was thematter of the position of the ruler of Kabul in relation to foreign powers. As the British
government admitted no right of interference by foreign powers in Afghanistan and because both
Russia and Persia had pledged to abstain from all political interference with Afghanistan’s affairs,
it was plain that the ruler in Kabul could have not political relations with any foreign power except
the British. In addition, if any such foreign power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan and if
such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression by the ruler in Kabul, then the British
government would be prepared to aid him, if necessary, to repel such actions, provided that hefollowed the advice of the British government in regard to his external relations. Second, withregard to limits of territory, the whole province of Kandahar had been placed under a separate ruler,
with some tracts ceded to British India as a result of the Gandamak Treaty. Thus, the government
was neither able to enter into any negotiations with ‘Abd al-Raḥmān on these points, nor in respect
to arrangements with regard to the North-West Frontier of India, which had been concluded withthe ex-amīr, Ya‘qūb Khān. With these reservations, the British government were willing for ‘Abd
al-Raḥmān Khān to establish rule over Afghanistan including Herat, but the possession of which
could not be guaranteed. However, the government were not likely to hinder any measures he
15

L/P/20/Memo5: Aide Memoire. Negotiations with Abdul Rahman Khan, 1880.
Regarding the process of the negotiation between ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khān and the British, my discussion is basedlargely on L/PS/20/Memo8; L/PS/20/Memo5; ST1: 237-251.
16- 55 -

Masato Toriya

might take to obtain possession of the area, giving him as complete and as extensive authority as
had been exercised by any amīr of his family.
In addition, the British government wished not to interfere in the internal government of these
territories, nor would they be required to admit English residents. However, for the convenience ofregular friendly intercourse between the two states, it was suggested by the British that a Muslim
agent of the British Indian government be stationed in Kabul. The British pressured ‘Abd
al-Raḥmān Khān to decide whether he would accept the offer.17 In fact, it had taken just fourmonths between March and June 1880 for the process of the selection of the amīr. It is obviousthat the British government pushed through the appointment the new amīr in an attempt tostabilize the country. Having resided in Russian territory for many years, the amīr’s loyalty wasseen as suspect by some of the British policymakers. However, despite these apprehensions, theBritish could not find anyone else they considered suitable for the amīrship.
‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khān was officially selected by the British government as the new amīr ofKabul and, at the same time, recognized as a legitimate ruler of the northern and eastern regions of
Afghanistan. After long deliberations as to whether to accept the offer from Britain, he accepted
the proposal that he assume the amīrship and work toward mutual understanding with the British
authorities. As a result of this, he was invited to Kabul by the British:18
In those days, Amīr ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khān was in Tashkent. The British official and officer
had sought the best mesure for entrusting Kabul and designating one of Sardārs of Afghans torule Afghanistan. Therefore, they wrote an epistile which prompted Amīr ‘Abd al-Raḥmān
Khān come to Kabul immediately. [AW : 131]
From that time, he sought to consolidate areas in which numerous small forces remained
under his leadership. As mentioned above, with regard to western Afghanistan, the British had
approved the amīr ruling this area, hoping that he could retrieve Herat by himself. However, in
reality, Herat had been a virtually autonomous region under the rule of Sardār Ayūb Khān. The
British government believed Kandahar would be an excellent example for northern Afghanistan tofollow, and the autonomous Kandahar government existed with full British support.
Suddenly, however, the situation in Afghanistan changed because of the invasion of Kandahar
by Sardār Ayūb Khān from Herat, which began with his defeating the British army in the southernarea of the country. The fact that he was about to secure control of the region forced the British
government to modify her future plans, and a new strategy to deal with the political difficulties
was suggested. Under this plan, the northern and eastern regions of Afghanistan were to betransferred to ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khān, and the western and southern regions to Ayūb Khān.
However, Ayūb Khān had shown greater hostility towards the British, calling them infidels, and his
followers were at the ready to expel foreign influences from the country. Although the British

17
18

LP/S/20/Memo8; Political Dep. (List of Inventories), File 332.
L/PS/20/Memo5.

- 56 -

Afghanistan as a Buffer State between Regional Powers in the Late Nineteenth Century

troops could possibly defeat Ayūb Khān’s army and succeed in withdrawing to Herat, he remainedin Herat until 1881. Finally, Ayūb Khān was expelled to Persia by ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khān, who
successfully gained the support of the National Party in Ghazni, which a large number of religious
personnel had joined, in exchange for high ranking posts in the government.19

Relations between the Amīr and British India Concerning Autonomous Tribal Principalities
in Eastern Afghanistan
With its unique features, eastern Afghanistan has been excluded from the analysis so far. In
this part of the country, a large number of small Pashtun forces existed for a long time with virtualautonomous status. In addition, the British had already contacted these tribal people because of
their proximity to the North-West Frontier of India (known as Yaghistān at that time) and eastern
Afghanistan, some of which was ceded by the Gandamak Treaty and theoretically became an
Indian domain. 20 In deciding to commence war against Amīr Sher ‘Alī Khān, the British
Government deliberately spread notification that it was trying to conciliate the sentiments of thepeople of Yaghistān, where the Pashtun formed the majority. It was obvious that the announcement
was preventing them from cooperating with their fellow Afghanis. The notification was written inboth Urdu and Pashto, which were the area’s lingua franca and the mother tongue of Pashtun,
respectively. 21 In addition, the British started to exchange correspondence with local
representatives in eastern Afghanistan. Britain had tried to interfere in local politics to make local
leaders recognize their virtual sovereignty over them.
Kunār and La‘lpūrah were comparatively powerful states in spite of the official recognition of‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khān as the new amīr. By entrusting him with the east as well as the north of thecountry, the British authorities had continued to act as if both states were under their protection.
The British source referred to the importance of both states and their positions as follows:
When Muhammad Sadiq, Khan of Lalpura, who had been nominated by the ex-Amir as Chief,joined the opposition on the deportation of Muhammad Yakub Khan, a guarantee of his
estates, jagirs, and allowances was made to his brother in the name of the British Government.
On receiving this pledge, he at once elected for the Government side, and has been doing
good service as Khan of Lalpura ever since.[abbreviation] Of a similar character is theguarantee of his ancestral and acquired estates and jagirs to Syud Mahmud, Badshah of
Kunar[abbreviate] was assured by the Government of India of the continuance of his
possessions. [abbreviate] Both the Chiefs of Kunar and Lalpura have consistently, relying on
the word of the British Government, done good service [abbreviate] Their position, too, with19

See LP/S/20/Memo8.
Regarding the relationship between the British and Pashtun tribal communities from the second half of the 19th
century to the first half of the 20th century, see Harun, 2007.
21
In this notification, the British government consistently called the Amir as wālī of Kābul (governor of Kabul), not
the Amīr of Afghanistan. See Political Inventories Urdu, Persian (List of Inventories), File 16.
20- 57 -

Masato Toriya

reference to our line of communication, made it of the highest concern that those Chiefs
should not only be neutral, but friendly.
[L/PS/20/Memo8: Narrative of Events in Afghanistan from August 1878-December 1880, andconnected correspondence, India Office, 31st December 1880]
First of all, regarding the Khān of La‘lpūrah, the British confirmed his position earlier thanthey did that of the Amīr of Kabul and forced the Amīr to ensure the position later.22 Interestingly,
the Khān of La‘lpūrah had received a considerable subsidy from both the Amīr of Kabul and theBritish Indian government. Before the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the main source of income forLa‘lpūrah had been the toll at the Khyber Pass. However, the Khyber Pass had been ceded to the
British after the war and La‘lpūrah’s income had decreased sharply. Therefore, it was also
confirmed from historical documents that the British had not only given subsidies but had also lenta great sum of money to La‘lpūrah.23 Furthermore, the British had given protection to the rival
brother of the Khān in the form of a large pension in India, to prevent him replacing the Khān,which would have been disadvantageous for British profit.24 In fact, the Khān of La‘lpūrah had
been very cooperative towards the British and had continuously exchanged letters with themregarding important political matters. For instance, after being summoned by Amīr ‘Abd
al-Raḥmān Khān to his Court in Kabul, the Khan of La‘lpūrah asked the British for point-by-point
instructions about how to act.25

22

Political Dep. (List of Inventories), File No. 325; Fida Yunas 2005: 90.
Commissioner Office Peshawar, File No. 770.
24
Commissioner Office Peshawar, File No. 669-A.
25
Foreign Department (List of Inventories), File No. 6.
23- 58 -

Afghanistan as a Buffer State between Regional Powers in the Late Nineteenth Century

Similarly, the Bādshāh of Kunār paid his respects and offered to perform any service for the
British government, shortly after the arrival of the British forces in Jalalabad during the war.26 The
Bādshāh asked for recognition of his position by the British government and later tried to contact
them as he considered their reply inadequate. According to the contents of the correspondence
written in Persian, his requests were as follows.27 First, in spite of the British government’s
recognition of his family’s ancestral possessions, the assurance was in vague and general terms. He
demanded explicit promises in this regard. Second, he hoped that he might be made independent of
any ruler in Kabul and subordinate only to the British. The British had already debated carefully
whether the Bādshāh would be given full support as the most influential person in the areaadjacent to the Yaghistān frontier or whether he should be abandoned. The British wanted towithdraw their troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible and to reduce their responsibility.
According to ST2 and LA,28 ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan expressed his apprehension towards thesituations in both Kunār and La‘lpūrah:And when the imperial party moved from capital Kabul towards Kandahar, Sayyad
Muḥammad Kunarī and Akbar Khān Mohmand La‘lpūra pulled their leg from the way ofservive, and turned away from an attendance to the party of His Majesty. [ST2 : 15]
Because of their claim to virtual independence from the sovereignty of Kabul, they held thepossibility of disintegrating the eastern part of Afghanistan and weakening the position of the Amīr
of Kabul. The Amīr had frequently exchanged correspondence with the British during his reign,with regard to both foreign affairs and internal affairs. Although ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khān wasformally recognized by the British to incorporate the small states in eastern Afghanistan, he had tonegotiate with Britain about each matter. Thus, although the Amīr considered the Khān ofLa‘lpūrah a great threat in the east and desired to punish the Khān with armed forces, the Khān
was able to sustain his autonomous position thanks to a close relationship between La‘lpūrah andthe British Indian government. While La‘lpūrah remained under the domain of the Amīr of Kabul,‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khān could not ignore the influence of the British in eastern Afghanistan.

Conclusion
When we examine the political situation of Afghanistan as a buffer state, the role ofindigenous actors should not be ignored, as the British during the Second Anglo-Afghan War
repeatedly interfered in the internal politics of Afghanistan as well as in the country’s foreign
affairs. It was the British support of the selection of‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khān as Amīr that led him to26
Relations of the Amir of Kabul with the Khan of Lalpura and the Badshah of Kunar, in Political Dep. (List of
Inventories), File No. 325.
27
Correspondence from Badshah of Kunar, Sayid Mahmud to Commissioner of Peshawar, written May 14, 1882 in
Political Dep. (List of Inventories), File No. 325.
28
In LA, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khān called the Badshah of Kunār “foolish.” See LA: 233-234.

- 59 -

Masato Toriya

take the British voice seriously in dealing with the internal politics. Thus, regarding eastern
Afghanistan, his intention to consolidate and centralise the area moved forward slowly andremained unrealized. At the same time, it was obvious that the British could not help but change
their policy regarding the ruling of the country, as in the examples of Herat and Kandahar, which
they had decided to sever from the sovereignty of the Amir of Kabul. At any rate, although Amīr
‘Abd al-Raḥmān Khān partially succeeded in integrating the fragmented country into a centralised
one, a large number of small states remained, particularly in eastern Afghanistan. Furthermore, thecloseness of this area to Kabul made the Amīr apprehensive of the movement of Pashtun tribal
forces during his reign. If the Amīr desired to attack these states, the British Indian government’s
permission was vital. Consequently, to do so was outside the Amīr’s authority, particularly as the
British had actively communicated with such local states to secure their interests and keep themunder their sphere of influence. Although the Durand Line was drawn for the demarcation of theborder between Afghanistan and British India in 1893,29 this agreement worked only to a limited
degree due to the intensely intimate ties between the British government and the Pashtun tribal
forces in eastern Afghanistan.

Bibliography
Primary Sources
British Library, London, UK
L/PS/18/A38
L/PS/20/Memo5
L/PS/20/Memo8
Peshawar Archives, Peshawar, Pakistan
Commissioner Office Peshawar
Political inventories Urdu, Persian (List of Inventories)
Political Department (List of Inventories)
ST1: Fayẕ Muḥammad Kātib Hazārah, Sirāj al-Tawārīkh Vol.1-2, Kabul, 1331 A.H./1912-13.
ST2: ――, Sirāj al-Tawārīkh Vol.3, Kabul, 1333 A.H./1914-15.
AW: Muḥammad Yūsuf Riyāẕī Harawī, ‘Ayn al-Waqāyi‘, Tehran, 1369 A.H.S./1990-91.
SI: Mīr Muḥammad ‘Aẓīm Khān, Sarrishtah–yi Islāmīyat Rūm: Bih Zabān-i Afghānī, Kabul, 1304
A.H./1886-1887.
LA: Sultan Mahomed Khan, The Life of Abdur Rahman: Amir of Afghanistan Vol.1, London: John Murray,
1900.
Secondary Sources
Azmat Hayat Khan, 2005. The Durand Line: Its Geo-Strategic Importance, Peshawar: Area Study Centre(Russia & Central Asia) University of Peshawar.
Barfield, Thomas, 2010. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, Princeton & London: Princeton
University Press.
Davies, Collin, 1932. The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908 with a Survey of Policy since 1849,
29

For more about the contents of the Durand Line Agreement and the large number of political disputes between
Afghanistan and British India (now Pakistan) concerning it, see Yunus 2005.

- 60 -

Afghanistan as a Buffer State between Regional Powers in the Late Nineteenth Century

London: Curzon Press. (2nd, revised and enlarged ed., 1975)
Ghubār, Mir Ghulām Muḥammad, 1968. Afghānistān dar Masīr-i Tārīkh, Kabul. (2 vols., repr., Tehran, 1378
A.H.S./1999-2000)
Hanifi, Shah Mahmoud, 2012. “Quandaries of the Afghan Nation,” in Under the Drones: Modern Lives in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan Borderlands, ed. Shahzad Bashir and Robert D. Crews, 83-101. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Harun, Sana, 2007. Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland, London: Hurst & Company.
Hassan Kakar, Muhammad, 2006. A Political and Diplomatic History of Afghanistan 1863-1901, Leiden &Boston: Brill.
───, 1979. Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Abd al-Rahman Khan, Austin &London: University of Texas Press.
Hussain, S. Iftikhar, 2005. Some Major Pukhtoon Tribes along the Pak-Afghan Border (3rd and revised ed.),Peshawar: Area Study Centre University of Peshawar.
Noelle, Christine, 1997. State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost
Muhammad Khan (1826-1863), Richmond: Curzon.
Swinson, Arthur, 1967. North-West Frontier: People and Events 1839-1947, New York & Washington:
Frederick A. Praeger.
Tarzi, Amin, 2003. The Judicial State: Evolution and Centralization of the Courts in Afghanistan, 1883-1896,
PhD. Dissertation, New York University.
Tate, G.P. 1911. The Kingdom of Afghanistan, London. (repr. New Delhi, 2001.)
Warburton, Robert, 1898. Eighteen Years in the Khyber 1879-1898, London. (repr., Lahore: Sang-e Mir,
2007)
Yunas, Fida & Taizi, Sher Zaman (eds.), Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to The North West
Frontier Province (Covering the Period up to1930 based on the Mr. C. W. Aitchisons compilation(Reprint of Relevant portions)), Peshawar : Area Study Centre (Russia & Central Asia) University ofPeshawar.
Yunas, Fida (ed.), 2005. The Durand Line Boarder Agreement 1893 Special Issue (Second), Peshawar: Area
Study Centre (Russia & Central Asia) University of Peshawar.

- 61 -