TOWARDS
MABIʼS RECOVERY- LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -Published and distributed by CWS JAPAN
Room 25, Japan Christian Center
2-3-18 Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-ku,
Tokyo 169-0051 Japan
TEL: +81-(0)3-6457-6840
EMAIL: public@cwsjapan.jp
WEB: www.cwsjapan.org

TABLE OF

CONTENTSThe Team
Jessica Alexander
Sangita Das
Mikio Ishiwatari
Sakiko Kanbara
Takako Izumi
Takeshi Komino
Aiko Sakurai
Rajib Shaw

Sophia University
CWS Japan
The University of Tokyo
Kochi University
Tohoku University
CWS Japan
Toyo Eiwa University
Keio University

Michiko Yamamoto

Designer

01

ABOUT THIS REPORT

02

02

INTRODUCTION

0403

MAIN FINDINGS
3.1 People and Communities
3.2 Natural Environment
3.3 Organization

06
16
18

Published by
Church World Service Japan
Room 25, 2-3-18 Nishi-Waseda,
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-0051 Japan04

http://www.cwsjapan.org+81-(0)3-6457-6840

July, 2019
We acknowledge Australia-Japan Foundation’s support through a project titled "Australian andJapanese Experiences and Challenges of Emergency Management Volunteers".

The contents of this publication may be copied, distributed and displayed
alike and with attribution only for non-commercial purposes.
Please refer to this publication as follows:

Alexander J., Das S., Ishiwatari M., Kanbara S., Izumi T., Komino T., Sakurai A., Shaw R. (2019):“Towards Mabi’s Recovery -Lessons One Year On”, CWS Japan, 25 pages, Tokyo, Japan

05

WAYS FORWARD
4.1 Sendai Framework for DRR Priority for Action 1:
Understanding Disaster Risk

21

4.2 Sendai Framework for DRR Priority for Action 2:
Strengthening Disaster Risk Governance22

4.3 Sendai Framework for DRR Priority for Action 3:
Investing in DRR for Resilience23

4.4 Sendai Framework for DRR Priority for Action 4:‘Building Back Better’

24

ANNEXES
5.1.1 Persons Consulted
5.1.2 Documents Consulted

25
25

01

TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -01

TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -ABOUT THIS REPORT

Basic Policies

1. Flood control measures to protect town

Policy 1

Issues related to recovery were not covered in depth
in that report, as Mabi’s Recovery Plan was only
released in April of 2019 (see Figure 1 outlining themain components of the Recovery Plan). With the
publication of the Recovery Plan and the passing of
more time, there was an opportunity to return to
Mabi and delve further into issues not covered in thesix month report as well as document early recovery
efforts.

The Main Findings (Chapter 3) are structured aroundcore themes which emerged during the field visit andinterviews: People and Communities, the Natural Environment and Organization. The analysis of these
themes leads to Ways Forward (Chapter IV) which arealigned with the four Priorities for Action of the Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR)
2015-2030. By linking these local level lessons to aninternational framework, the authors hope that they
can influence disaster recovery processes both within
Japan and elsewhere.
Climate change projections indicate that crises like the2018 floods can be expected with greater frequency,
not only in Japan, but globally. This report identifies
some of the most critical lessons from Mabi’s flood
response and recovery efforts. These insights can contribute to Mabi’s continuing recovery efforts as well as
their work towards preparing for future hazards. It is
hoped that this learning contributes not only to their
ongoing recovery, but is also used to inform otherdisaster and specifically flood prone areas globally.

The core of the report is based on direct field observations, interviews and document
review. (See Appendices for people consulted and documents referenced). A core teammade field visits and relied on purposive sampling as it was not possible to obtain representation from all stakeholders involved in the response and recovery efforts. Other
authors with specific expertise and knowledge supplemented the field data. To triangulate
field findings, a desk review and follow-up interviews by phone were conducted. This
report provides only a snapshot of the main findings; it is not a comprehensive documentation of all of the issues, nor was it designed to be scientifically rigorous.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

3. Strong, resilient infrastructure
4. Building resilience in each community
5. Strengthening disaster management capabilitiesof the Govt.

Policy 2
To build a town
where people cancontinue living
together

Policy 3
To create vitality
through revivalof businesses

Policy 4
To make the bestuse of local history
and resources

STUDY APPROACH

02

To build resiliencebased onexperience

2. Ensuring emergency shelters in each neighborhood

Policy 5
To build back throughmutual collaborationand support

6. Support for the affected people
7. Ensuring safe, stable living condition
8. Restoration of public facilities that support
everyday life
9. Restoration of agriculture
10. Restoration of local businesses
11. Creating opportunities for activities and interaction
12. To send out information about the rich culture andheritage outside the town

Specific Initiative / Projects“Towards Mabi’s Recovery – Lessons One Year On”
builds on findings from Church World Service’s(CWS) earlier Six Months Since Western Japan Flood:
Lessons From Mabi report which highlighted ten key
findings about the relief phase: flood risk communication, infrastructure measures, early warning, evacuation and emergency behavior, shelter management, volunteer management, health issues, temporary shelter, recovery planning process and periodic
changes in community perception and behavior.

Major Measures for Recovery and Reconstruction

13. Connecting the past and present to the future
through town planning
14. Resident-centered town planning
15. Provision of information through cooperation withthe country, prefecture and city level

Figure 1 – Summary of the Recovery Plan

ABOUT THIS REPORT03

TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -02

TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -INTRODUCTION

The Western region of Japan experienced heavy
rainfalls in the early summer of 2018 resulting indevastating floods in areas of Hiroshima, Okayama
and Ehime prefectures. The town of Mabi in Okayama prefecture was particularly affected as it stands
on two rivers, the Takahashi and Oda, both of which
overflowed and flooded one-third of the town. The
embankments broke in 8 places and floodwater roseas high as 5 meters in many areas. About 4,600
houses were affected and 51 people were killed,most of whom were older than 70 years.

CWS Japan responded to the emergency in the firstmonth of the floods by partnering with Humanitarian
Medical Assistance (HuMA) to provide medical
check-ups to affected people from a trailer outside
evacuation centers. It also worked with partners to
improve information management in the shelters sothat people could find appropriate assistance1.

Figure 2: Map showing the flooded areas(Source: The Daily Mainichi, July 11, 2018)

Figure 3: Summary of Damages

04

1

CWS Responds to Western Japan’s Floods: Emergency Appeal Issued and Early Recovery Work Begins, July 21, 2018.

INTRODUCTION

05

TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -03

TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -MAIN FINDINGS

3.1 PEOPLE AND COMMUNITIESVOICES from the field

3.1.1
Awareness of “Bosai”
The magnitude and severity of thefloods took everyone by surprise.
Residents in the affected areas recalled only experiencing minor, knee-high flooding in recent years with
one saying “this is a sunshine area,” referring toOkayama as the Land of Sunshine. As noted in the Six
Month Report, many residents were unfamiliar withthe hazard maps distributed by the authorities, despite
them predicting where and to what level the floods
would emerge. People were unaware of their own risk,

A “Bosai Mindset” is evolving in Mabi,
but has not fully translated into action.

and did not understand the ‘Backwater Phenomenon’
where smaller rivers overflowed. Also, SNS was used
to convey general risk information, but many people,
the elderly in particular, were not connected this way.
False information was spread on these platforms
creating further confusion.

“

We live in a sunshine area! We
didn’t have preparation because
people believe Okayama is a site
to support other areas, not to experience disasters. Nobody saw it coming.
When people receive assistance, they
have to be receptive to assistance; thisis a new thing for them. We usually
think this place sends things to places
with disaster and now we are the ones
to receive. It’s difficult to be areceiver instead of a giver.

Unsurprisingly, where flood drills took place and werehighly attended, towns had higher evacuation rates.
In Shimohara, a community in neighboring Soja, forexample, previous high attendance at flood evacuation drills were noted as contributing to the near
100% evacuation rate during the flood. The town issituated closer to the bigger Takahashi river, thus
people have more awareness and fear of potential
flooding.

Dr. Kenmotsu Katashi, a Visiting Lecturer at Okayama University of Science, suggests that 2018
heavy rains are directly related to climate change. Other environmental changes he has noted
within recent years include: infrequent drizzling, irregular but more frequent typhoons, simultaneous booming of sakuras (cherry blossom) and Ume (plum) flowers, extreme summer heat, heavy
snowfall in winter and heavy rainfall (over 80 mm per hour) which has increased 1.7 times in thelast 30 years.

”

Increase of Heavy Rain in the Recent Years
Increased 2 to 3 times every 10 years (based on data from 1976 to 2016)(Number of times)

5-LEVEL WARNING SYSTEM
Warning
Level

Action to take

Information provided by local government

Weather alerts issued by JMA

5People must takemeasures to protect lives

Disaster information

Emergency warning

4

All residents must evacuate

Evacuation order/instruction

Landslide alert information etc.

3

Elderly people must evacuate

Evacuation preparation information

Rain/flood/storm surge
warnings etc.

2

You should checkevacuation procedure

Advisories

Rain/flood/storm surge
advisories etc.

1

You should stay onalert for disasters

Early warning information-

Due to the floods, awareness has been elevated in andaround Mabi and there is a change of mindset when it
comes to the need to prepare for disasters. There has
been increased technology penetration among theelderly, for example, as many realize how disconnected they are without access to mobile communication.
Many are buying smartphones, attending classes tolearn how to use them, and using social media apps
such as Line. However, it’s unclear the extent to which
this has shifted action. Alarmingly, only two months
after the summer floods, when the same region was
struck by typhoon Jongdari (Typhoon No.12), less thanfour per cent of people heeded the government’s
pre-emptive evacuation orders2.

Increased about

1.7

times

From 2007 - 201617.9 ontimes/year
average

From 1976 - 1985

10.7 ontimes/year
average(Year)

Figure 4: 5-Level Warning System
The Japan Meteorological Agency earlier this year rolled out a new five-level disaster warning scale to be used for floods and landslides.
It is designed both to simplify the existing system and to reduce casualties by speeding up evacuations.

Figure 5: Frequency of extremely heavy rainfall (80mm/hour) has increased 1.7 times in the last 30 years
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000514806.pdf)

Source: NHK World, June 27, 2019 (https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/backstories/587/)

06

MAIN FINDINGS2The Japan Times Online, “Only 3.6 percent of Hiroshima residents had evacuated when July rain disaster struck”, August 3, 2018.

07

TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -3.1.2 HealthAffected people faced numerous
health issues as a result of thefloods and ensuing evacuation.
In the immediate aftermath of the floods, elderly anddisabled were at highest risk and faced severe
potential health threats: many had evacuated without their medicines, others had dietary restrictions
such as high insulin and could not eat what wasprovided in the evacuation centers, and for some it
was difficult to cope with the summer heat. Psychosocial stress was also high among survivors andtheir family members.

because they knew the conditions would be so unfavorable to their circumstances. They turned to relative’s homes or other places not designated as shelters for assistance.

Many people with special needs are
now living with overstretched family
members or staying in hospitals or
nursing care.

For families with disabled children, circumstanceswere even more difficult. Many were late to evacuate, and by the time they did, there was no room forthem or the space that was left was inadequate, withmany saying “it was impossible to stay there.” Similar experiences were found in Tohoku after the Great
East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) of 2011 where evacuation centers seemed to disregard the needs ofwomen, children, the elderly, the disabled and othervulnerable groups3.

About a month after the flood, “Parents’ Support
STEP,” an Okayama-based NPO for parents ofdisabled children, conducted a survey of 17 caregivers of disabled children. Only one of the participatinginterviewees went to an evacuation center after
receiving the evacuation warning. The rest didn’t
consider it an option as they did not think their children could adjust to the environment there. These
parents instead chose to either go to a relative’shouse, or stay at home. Yet many children became
restless, depressed or fell sick within the first few
days after the floods. Parents who had moved
attended to their children almost round the clock, in
an unfamiliar environment, leading to burn out.

Formal evacuation centers were notequipped to handle the special
needs of the most vulnerable.
A total of 39 formal evacuation centers, mainly
public schools, were set up the morning of July 6th
in Kurashiki. By the next day, 4,800 people hadarrived in them. For families with disabled people –such as the blind or those in wheelchairs – many did
not even consider going to an evacuation center

Truck bringing water to an Evacuation Center

VOICES from the field(Photo Source: Sakiko Kanbara, July 7th, 2018)

08

”

3

“

I was in a temporary shelter,and saw many blind people orthose in wheelchairs come thefirst day. On the second day, they
disappeared. It was clear that theevacuation center was not
equipped to meet their needs
and they had no information.

”

Signboard of Budo no ie-a make-shift healthcare space for elderly(Photo Source: Dr. Sakiko Kanbara)

An elderly receiving care at Budo no ie(Photo Source: CWS Japan)“

When people evacuated, they
didn’t bring everything withthem. They didn’t have their regular medicines, those with high insulin
have dietary restrictions and couldn’t
eat the same bread every day. Someforgot their teeth. People with special
needs went to hospitals or stayed withrelatives outside of the city and we
didn’t have information about thosepeople for over six months. We foundout about where people were in thenewspaper. We need to develop an
evacuation center for those withspecial needs because everything
was in chaos.

Support for family members caring for elderly or
disabled people was described as inadequate. Manyof these caretakers also lost assets during the floods
and were struggling to care for their relatives without medical specialization nor additional financial
provisions. Parents of disabled children noted that if
they were not connected on social media, they could
not access information about where to receive additional support.

VOICES from the field

A board at an evacuation center. Kurashiki Disaster
Recovery Organization (KuraDRO) was set up at thewake of the disaster on July 8th, 2018, to combine
various organizations and stakeholders, and this is
how people were trying to understand how they
were all linked.
(Photo Source: Sakiko Kanbara, July 7th, 2018)

Domoto, Akiko. “Disaster Risk Reduction: A Japanese Women’s Perspective on 3.11” Japan Women’s Network for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2013.

Some elderly ended up in a communal hall of a primary school
which was converted to a makeshift healthcare space for elderly
by a group called Budo-no-Ie(meaning House of Grapes). They
provided round the clock services
for elderly and those sufferingfrom dementia. The services
were kept intentionally minimaland bare bones, to avoid creating
dependency. Others left the city
altogether, resulting in a disruption of care, or are scattered indifferent hospitals, some staying
there for up to three months.

MAIN FINDINGS

09

TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -Health care providers struggled to
get information about those withspecial needs who were staying informally run evacuation centers.
Care services, paid for by the government under
non-emergency times, effectively failed in the immediate aftermath of the floods, as there were no communication channels to determine the whereaboutsof the elderly or disabled. Groups like Mabi-care
reported learning the locations of some of theirpatients through the newspaper. Certain legal obstacles such as the Personal Information Protection
Law, prohibit sharing critical information with NPOs,
therefore limiting their awareness of where affected
people are located.
Furthermore, while numerous Information and Communication Technology (ICT) platforms exist which
can expedite and facilitate information sharing, they
were not effectively leveraged during the response.
This is in part because many government sectors
and organizations are unfamiliar with them. In addition, staff turnover within Social Welfare Councils(responsible for coordinating volunteer efforts andsharing information) is high, resulting in important
information on the needs of the affected people
being lost from one staff member to the next.
Although health care professionals such as the “Minsei-iin ( 民生委員 )” have a wealth of information
about the health needs of the most vulnerable, it was
not utilized because they did not know where people
evacuated to. These providers spent days in theearly stages going to formal and informal evacuation
centers as well as relatives’ homes to check on theirpatients. At the same time, many survivors did notunderstand where to access both physical and psychological first aid that was being provided due tolack of information on health care provided in the
shelters.

10

TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -Where prioritization treatment
methods were applied, care for themost vulnerable improved.
In the neighboring town of Soja, a prioritization
system was established to ensure appropriate care
was provided to the various needs of the disabled
and elderly. AMDA, the organization in charge ofhealth care provision in the Evacuation Centers there,
categorized people based on the severity of theirneeds using a color coded system (ranging from red– yellow- green, indicating the severity of theirissues). Care was thus efficiently and appropriately
targeted and disease spread controlled. The system
was developed in response to the Kumamoto earthquake, which helped AMDA’s leader identify andapply these kinds of best practices.

3.1.3 Psychosocial health andcommunity cohesion
Opportunities for communities toassemble played an important partin psychosocial recovery andmaintaining and building social
cohesion.
Affected people were dispersed to non-designatedtemporary shelters, rental homes, or to relatives’houses outside of town. As a result, they did not havea space to meet, share experiences, or exchange support. In addition, all summer festivals were cancelled
due to the floods.
Various NPOs organized events and meeting circles,
known as ‘salons’ which were effective spaces forpeople to share updates and information, listen to andsupport one another over a drink or a meal. Thesesalons don’t follow a specific formula – they can be as
big as an emergency evacuation center, and as small
as the corner of someone’s living room, and anyone
can register with a space and a focus activity. Similar
meeting places were formed after the GEJE and Kumamoto earthquake of 2016 and have been useful fora tohelp people get through the most difficult phases ofrelief and recovery.

MAIN FINDINGS

Community gathering in Makibi (Source: 豪雨ニモマケズ)「豪雨ニモマケズ」“Not Losing To Heavy Rain”

The Council of Social Welfare has published a Booklet
called “ 豪雨ニモマケズ ” (meaning “not losing toheavy rain”), where they wrote about these community
circles or Salons around Kurashiki and introduced theiractivities.
Those who cannot go to the community circles orsalons either because of physical difficulty, lack oftransport, or simply lack of willingness, are visited
periodically by the officers of Mabi Support Center.
People can call the Center if they have a specific need,but some do not have access to a phone. For them,these officer’s visits become a critical connector for
information and support.

Programs targeting children wereparticularly helpful in reducing theiranxiety.
During the evacuation period and while living in temporary shelters, children were separated from theirfriends and many were left unattended as theirparents were busy with recovery efforts. Local NPOs,
Save the Children, Okayama Prefecture and Okayama

MAIN FINDINGS

Community gathering in Yata (Source: 豪雨ニモマケズ)
Prefectural University jointly established a child-friendly space (CFS) at Okayama Prefectural University
during summer holidays. In total 787 children (including 489 elementary school pupils and 296 infants)
used the space, which was supported by 397 volunteers and qualified nursery teachers. Although thecenter was located outside of Mabi, twice daily bus
transportation was arranged between 3 evacuation
shelters in Mabi. In previous disasters, Save the Children set up child-friendly-spaces at evacuation shelters by itself; this was the first time the prefecture
itself created an integrated CFS.
Other efforts, such as “Refresh Camps” were organized to reduce stress and promote positive psychosocial recovery among children. The one set up by
Setouchi YMCA, for example, gave children a chance
to play games, learn camp songs and archery, go kayaking and fish. Children were encouraged to speak
about their experience and feelings around the floods,
a successful initiative brought from the Kumamoto
earthquake response. Parents reported that as a resultof the outings children were more cheerful, talkativeand independent.

11TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -To support children’s psychosocial healthin schools, the Kurashiki-City Board of
Education dispatched additional teachersand school counselors. EARTH of Hyogo
Prefecture also helped schools andteachers with shelter management andmental care support in Kurashiki-City.

TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -The flier distributed at the evacuation centers

The floods resulted in significant
disruption to education and an
unstable learning environment.
All eight public elementary and junior high schools in
Mabi were forced to close between July 8 until September 3, 2018 because they were either damaged by
the flood, used as an evacuation shelter (3 elementary
schools were used as evacuation shelters for 1,680
evacuees), or because they lacked life-line infrastructure (electricity, water, sewage). This long disruptionof school education only occurred in Mabi, whereas
other schools in Kurashiki city resumed on July 11,2018.

3.1.4 Inclusion(see also Health Section 3.1.2)

Evacuation centers madeattempts to ensure genderbased security.
Between July 9th and August 17th, city
officers visited each formal evacuation
center to monitor the environment andcertify it was favorable to women and children. The Shelter Management Manual ofKurashiki City advises complete segregation of men and women wherever possible, to prevent cases of abuse. The city
officers advised evacuation center managers to use cardboard partitions to create
semi-private areas for women and confirmed that the toilets had electric lights
and security alarms.
While there were toilets and bathing areas designated specifically for men and women, some were kept
for common use in order to accommodate the needsof transgender and other sexual minorities. In addition, phone companies donated tablets to circulate
information about gender safety. This is an improvement from previous disaster responses, especially
the GEJE, where many reports found gender sensitivity was not taken into account in the design andimplementation of many evacuation centers.
In mid-July, gender abuse hotline numbers were
distributed. The hotline number was also written on
cards kept in bathrooms and circulated on the city’s
website from August 9th on. A hotline specifically for3.1.5 Education

Out of the four damaged schools, children at twoelementary schools and one junior high school had tochange schools up to three times. In September,these children commuted to shared classrooms
outside of Mabi until temporary classrooms wereready. They now commute to the temporary classrooms built at the playground of non-damaged
schools in Mabi, still exposed to an unstable learning
environment, with potential long term negative mental
health or academic impacts.
matters related to LGBT abuse/discrimination was
also established.
The recovery plan itself uses language to be more
inclusive. For example, “men, women” was changed
to “men, women, other” to account for sexual minorities. The Gender Equality Promotion Center tried toraise awareness and understanding about sexual
minorities while visiting various shelters. In the Recovery Plan, this issue, unfortunately, was not mentioned.
To quote from the Shelter Management section,
Article 4-3: “Review of the Operation Manual of Evacuation Centers will be done to make them moreaccessible, where enough consideration will be given
to the needs of disabled and elderly people and theircaregivers, where privacy of women will be secured,and separate spaces will be kept for pets.”

The government and NGOs provided
financial support for education.
At 16 evacuation shelters in Kurashiki-City, learning
rooms for junior high and high school students wereopened to support their studying. Based on the Disaster Relief Act of Japan, educational materials, including school bags and textbooks were provided for freeto the affected school children during summer holidays.
In October, Okayama Prefecture announced financial
support of 20,000 yen per affected household (whose
homes were inundated above floor level) with achild/children under age 18. More than 6,000 households were targeted. While other educational expensesubsidies for poor household children exist, this disaster relief program specifically for affected householdswith children, was the first of its kind in Japan. In
addition, Save the Children also supported children’s
graduation expenses (30,000 yen for 6th grader,
40,000 yen for 9th grader and 50,000 for 12th
grader), reaching a total of 428 children. Further
investigation is needed to determine the outcome ofthis support and how it is viewed by the authorities.

Half of the children previously
attending a badly damaged special
needs school have now been transferred.
Kurashiki Makibi Special Needs School, establishedin 2013 in Mabi, targets elementary to high school
students with intellectual and physical disabilities,
with a total of 327 attendees. The school was inundated with 4.8 meter high water, which reached
5cm above the second floor level, damaging all of
the rooms and six school buses. About half ofstudents now study at classrooms held at other special needs schools, resulting in longer commuting
time and stress, while the others are studying in
temporary classrooms on the original school ground.

Temporary building of Kawabe Elementary School in the
ground of Sono Elementary School(Source: CWS Japan, November 9th, 2018)

12

MAIN FINDINGSMAIN FINDINGS

13

TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -3.1.6 Housing

3.2 NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

Shelter and lack of information
regarding housing options, remain
the most critical issues for those
displaced.

3.2.1
Improvement works of river
channels

14

MAIN FINDINGSClosedOdagawa River

Kasai Castle

Yanaibara Weir

Odagawa River
ClosedWest Takahashi River

Survey Area
East
TakahashiRiver

Excavation

In 2007, the government formulated the revised
flood protection plan and excluded water resource
development of constructing a weir. The revised plan
was aimed at decreasing the flood water level of the
Odagawa River by some 5 meters by using the old

Sakazu(Source: 豪雨ニモマケズ)

Old confluence
point of East&West
Takahashi River

Takahashi
River

Mizue

Prefabricated temporary shelters in Yanaihara area

The government formulated the Yanaibara Weir project in 1968 to resolve the flooding issue in the
Odagawa River and to supply water to Kurashiki City.
Yet it faced difficulties building consensus among
local communities and governments and responding
to the changing water demands. While the project
would have mitigated flood damage upstream inplaces like Mabi town and supplied water downstream to Kurashiki city, the town of Funaho would
not benefit from the project and thus did not approve
it until 1995 in exchange for other development projects, such as highway, sewage, and irrigation projects. In 1997, the government started the comprehensive project of moving the confluence point with
the Odagawa River downstream and constructing aweir. However, as population growth was declining,
so too were the water demands, and as such, thegovernment suspended the project in 2002.

Left Bank

Takahashi
River

Mizue

Furthermore, there are only a handful of construction
companies and materials to rebuild with, causing
significant delays. The government has provided
support to cover half of the rent for 2 years with theamount depending on family composition, but thiswill end in a year. With poor information flow
between the government and those affected, anxiety
and confusion about next steps is high.

The Takahashigawa River originally flowed as an
X-form in the Kurashiki and Tashima plains (SeeFigure 6). After joining with the tributary Odagawa
River, the main river divided into two rivers flowing
separately into the Setonaikai Sea. Following severe
flooding in 1893, the government improved therivers by combining two channels to make one withlarger flooding capacity (See Figure 6). While thismitigated flood damage in Kurashiki City in thedownstream areas, flood issues remained along the
Odagawa River.

fall of 2018. Had this project been completed, flood
damage could have been significantly reduced.

Right Bank

Delay in decision for river channel
works hindered hard mitigation
measures.

SakazuRespondents noted that the most difficult recovery
issue today is housing. Currently, people displacedby the floods are scattered with very different situations. Some homes were completely submerged andalthough residents want to return to Mabi, they haveno financial support to rebuild. Many of them may
have had earthquake insurance, but did not haveflood insurance because of the prohibitive cost.
Others would like to return to Mabi, but face highrents and a limited supply of empty houses.

channel to move the confluence point with the main
Takahashigawa River some 5 km downstream. The
government planned to start construction work in theSurvey Area

Takahashi River

Closed East
Takahashi River

Setonaikai Sea

Setonaikai Sea

Figure 6: River improvement works before the project (left) and after the project (right) after the severe flood of 1893
(Source: MLIT)

3.2.2
Green issue and infrastructure
Green infrastructure is an essential
part of mitigation measures.
Greenery volume had increased inside the Odagawa
River over the past decades. Since greenery in rivers
provide various benefits such as habitats for ecosystem and scenery, cutting trees is a controversial
issue. The River Law was revised in 1997 to include
environment preservation as one of the objectives inriver projects. The Ministry of Land Infrastructure

MAIN FINDINGS

and Transport (MLIT) requires balancing environment
and flood management issues, but the greenery in
the Odagawa River has certainly disturbed river flows
and may have contributed to increased flood damage
in 2018.
The MLIT is considering constructing the new channel of Odagawa River as green infrastructure. Experts
and academic researchers are examining the widthand forms of the river channel by conducting simulation of water flow and sedimentation movement withconsiderations of impacts on ecosystem, scenery,

15

TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -

(ha)
50

40

Orchard
Locust30

BambooDeciduous broad-leaved forest

20

Scrub forest
10

Willow forest

Green in Odagawa River before flood

0
1994

1999

2004

2010

2014

(Source: MLIT)

Figure 7: Trends of green area in Odagawa River(Source: MLIT)

A pond for ecosystem in new channel (Source: MLIT)

needs not being covered by other actors. For example,
numerous relief items were collected and distributedout of a community store called Kanbara Gofukuten.
The store also served as a hub to coordinate volunteers
and for affected people to exchange views, get information and relieve some of their distress. There wereso many activities being run out of Kanbara Gofukutenthat they created an information management system
to track distributions and volunteer dispatches to evacuation centers. Within one month, 147 people were
provided support with donated items housed at theirstore. However, the amount of un-needed andultimately unused donations became a problem, andmany clothes that were inappropriate for the season
were discarded or transferred elsewhere.

Normal time: Used as a common ground, community house etc.
Emergency: Base for Disaster Management

VOICES from the field“

The first days were the worst;
volunteers were pouring in fromeverywhere and we could not
manage. We developed a system tocoordinate them all using an information board which detailed who wasgoing to what evacuation center.
The local government was the focal
point for larger support, but they don’t
receive the small-scale relief items likebottles of water, so there was limited
coordination with them for these things.
We set up a private place for people
from the outside to come and provide chiropractic activities.

”

Kanbara Gofukuten, a community store which served as
an ad hoc relief hub, coordinating volunteers, providing
space for community exchange, temporary childcare andstorage of donations.

Will be developed with theaccess and use of the bankin mindaccess to water, etc. Based on the examination, the
MLIT is planning to create habitat for diverse ecosystem by constructing wetlands, a pond, and a small
channel. These facilities are crucial to preserving thecurrent rich ecosystem in the Takahashigawa River
including “asaza”, floating plant, an endangered
species (See picture above). The pond and surrounding areas are expected to become recreation areas
for local communities and disaster managementbase as well.

16

3.3 ORGANIZATION
3.3.1 Community Organizations
Community members played acritical role in Mabi’s response andrecovery.
Numerous global frameworks recognize affected communities as being best positioned to flexibly andquickly meet needs, with strong local networks andknowledge. The strength of the Mabi community wasevident in response to the floods as several ad hoc
relief centers arose to fill critical gaps and tend to

MAIN FINDINGS

3.3.2
Non-profit organizations (NPOs)“Without NPOs, we could not have
handled this disaster.”
The NPO response in Mabi was incredibly strong;groups were agile and creative during the initial phases,
coming up with solutions on the spot, and finding ways
to reach affected people before other forms of support
even arrived. A white paper published by Okayama NPO

MAIN FINDINGS

Center based on surveys conducted 3 months after thedisaster, reported that 90% of relief goods were
distributed through NPOs and that 66% of emergency
spaces (such as for storage of goods, meeting venue,
parking cars etc.) were provided by NPOs for the
longest duration. For other support such as cleaningand sanitizing submerged houses, moving furniture,
distributing freshly cooked warm food, providing massage and salon services, NPOs were credited with covering 75% of the total.

17

TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -Number of times relief goods were distributed (out of 1157 times)

3.3.3 Government

Other
PrivateSectorPrevious disaster management
training and exposure among somegovernment leaders helped steer
critical decisions.

NPO

For example, as a result of her previous training with
UNHCR, the Mayor of Mabi immediately prioritizedsupplying water to evacuation centers and communities for cleaning and sanitation. Drinking water would
come, she was certain, but providing people water toclean themselves, their houses, the washroom facilities was critical to maintaining hygiene and limiting
disease outbreak.

Amount of relief goods distributed (out of 1,114,268 tems)
Other
PrivateSectorNPO

Figure 8: Graphs showing number of times and total volume of relief goods distributed by NPOs during
the first three months after the flood.
(Source: Source:「岡山県における平成30年7月豪雨への民間支援白書」, Okayama NPO Center, Japan Platform (JPF), JVOAD, 2018)

Ten out of 17 of Japan Platform’s partner NGO projects were based in Okayama. Activities included renovation of facilities for the disabled, Volunteer Center(VC) management support, dispatching medical doctors, and providing household appliances to families
living in the prefabricated Temporary Shelters.

OVERVIEW OF RESPONSE
Volunteers

10,662 persons took part For a total of 3,319 days
Relief Goods
Distributed

Coordination among NPOs was
impressive, due to pro-active effortsof the Okayama NPO Center.
The Okayama NPO center ran regular coordination
meetings which were an opportunity to aggregate andshare information on the status of shelters and home
evacuations, and to identify the location of activities
and distributions in the affected areas. Part of thecoordination success was a result of the Center’s foresight and preparedness, as two months prior to thefloods, the Okayama NPO Center developed a robust
coordination mechanism in which they developed consensus and understanding among NPO actors. Successful sectoral coordination also took place, such as
health cluster meetings, which happened daily throughKurashiki Disaster Recovery Organization (KuraDRO).

18

At

1,157 times Worth of 44,322,964 yen

Space Offered/ Provided

Total Donation

33 places for 761 days

350,007,258 yen-Organization Type-NPO
Political

Private Sector
Religious

Academic
Professional

MedicalCooperative

Figure 9: An overview of response after the WesternJapan Floods(Source:「西日本豪雨災害被災者支援 初動対応期レビュー報告書」,
Japan Platform Emergency Response Division, 2018)

MAIN FINDINGS

However, not all responders had this kind of exposure, leaving other government officials poorly
prepared to manage a disaster of this scale, including those at the emergency shelters. Smaller cities
and town offices such as Mabi have a severe shortage of human resources in general, and these deficiencies become even more pronounced during
disasters as they struggle to manage the massive
influx of assistance including volunteers, care givers
and relief items. This “Jyuen-ryoku”, or capacity ofreceiving assistance at the local government level,
has also been observed as a critical factor in previous disasters.

Coordination between NPOs and the
local authorities was uneven.
The central government has acknowledged that it
cannot support all relief and recovery efforts andmust work more closely with NPOs to meet needs.
For the first time, multi-stakeholder central coordination meetings were held with the Cabinet office toaddress system-wide issues such as disaster debris,
equipment for clean-up. Gaps in local level coordination efforts were also discussed.
While this was an important first step, the meetings
were not as useful as anticipated. NPOs, intimatelyfamiliar with issues facing the affected communities,

MAIN FINDINGSVOICES from the field“

We were waiting for the administration, but the administration
had no experience and no knowledge of disaster management. They had
so little experience with managing volunteers and this became ahuge problem.

”

brought problems they could not resolve at the fieldlevel to the central coordination body with hopes ofgetting answers. However, due to the fragmentationof government ministries, as well as confusion as towhich issues needed to be addressed by whom andat what level, decisions could not be made. The
process of consultation with and clearance fromother offices took considerable time and was notconducive the fast action required during an emergency response.
At the local level, coordination efforts between thegovernment and NPOs were similarly strained. NPOs
unsuccessfully tried to include local government intheir weekly coordination meetings at the prefecturaland municipal levels. However, since government
had never worked with local NPOs before there was
mistrust about which ones were legitimate or professional and what their intents were. As a result, NPO
and volunteer activities in Mabi were largely separate
from government. This not only created disparity inthe affected areas, but also generated confusion andfrustration among aid agencies and volunteers. Recognizing this problem, Japan Platform with otherpartner organizations urged the Cabinet office tocreate a registry of credible and trustworthy NPOs tosend to the Municipal office. However, to date, thishas not been done.

19

TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -Where NPOs and local authorities did
collaborate, successful outcomes
were achieved.
For example, the government relied on NPOs who
had direct access to and strong relationships with
communities to determine what materials to reorderfor the reopening of schools. Also, AMDA, a healthorganization in neighboring Soja, had a pre-existing
relationship with the local authorities and as a result
was immediately designated as coordinating thehealth response in that town. This resulted in thequick establishment of the effective prioritization
system (as described above).

Although the city government madeefforts to ensure the recovery planning process was inclusive, gaps
still remain.
Respondents felt that the community consultation
process was more perfunctory than participatory andhave difficulty understanding how the Recovery Plan
directly impacts their lives. The biggest question thatgovernment heard from people during consultations
was when the river bypass would be created and thelevees repaired, which they are currently addressing.
Participatory recovery planning is a time-consuming
process, and recovery needs a balanced approach of
speed and quality. From the limited interviews, itappeared that some issues of gender, aged population, physically/ mentally challenged were unnoticed
in the recovery process as a “silent majority”.

4

20

TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -VOICES from the field“

People recognize the link
between government and NPOs
is missing but they can’t put it
forth. Recognizing these problems is
not taking us anywhere. NPOs played
a big role in the communities but there
is no manual to bridge the formal
structure and these networks. NPOs
understand the needs of the communities and their capacities should
be linked to government efforts.

”

Technological hazards are importantpart of risk assessment.
“Natural” disaster induced technological hazards(NaTech) risk has been identified in the Sendai
Framework, 4 and its incorporation in local risk
assessment has been discussed in OECD countries
for the past several years. During the floods, theimportance of this kind of assessment was clearly
demonstrated as an aluminum factory in neighboring
Soja city exploded, affecting over 40 houses.
Although the explosion did not result in any casualties (due to an early evacuation of factory workers),
the risk was not communicated properly to the local
residents.

WAYS FORWARD

04

The research uncovered numerous issues, some of which contributed to success in Mabi’s response andrecovery, but others which need strengthening. These lessons and recommended actions are organizedaround the four priorities for action of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (SFDRR).

4.1 SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DRR PRIORITY FOR ACTION 1:
UNDERSTANDING DISASTER RISKThe SFDRR underscores the importance of understanding disaster risk “in all its dimensions ofvulnerability, capacity, exposure of persons andassets, hazard characteristics and the environment.”5 Such awareness is essential for prevention
and mitigation and ensures proper preparedness andresponse measures are taken.

Raising and maintaining citizen awareness:
Residents, NPOs even government actors in Mabi
recognize the limited awareness of and preparations
made for the floods. There was insufficient attention
paid to hazard maps,6 poor attendance at evacuation
drills, and weak communication networks among
stakeholders. Since the floods, awareness of theimportance of Bosai has been raised, but needs tobe maintained. Promoting community wide evacuation drills, and disaster awareness raising events
which include all members of community (including,importantly, elderly, disabled and youth), will be
critical for maintaining this heightened awarenessand ensuring better preparedness for future disas-ters. Also, given the hesitation of many parents withdisabled children to go to evacuation centers, drills
can give families a better understanding of what toexpect, and can also help evacuation center management understand the special needs exist andhow best to address them.

Incorporating technological hazards in risk
assessment: The SFDRR identifies multiple hazards and the need to prepare for them. 7 As the Soja
aluminum factory explosion showed, a comprehensive NaTech risk assessment and a proper risk communication mechanism among local residents is anecessary part of any community based risk reduction measures.

5

SFDRR relevant articles: 24 (c): To develop, periodically update and disseminate, as appropriate, location-based disaster risk information, including risk
maps, to decision makers, the general public and communities at risk of exposure to disaster in an appropriate format by using, as applicable, geospatial
information technology; 24 (g): To build the knowledge of government officials at all levels, civil society, communities and volunteers, as well as theprivate sector, through sharing experiences, lessons learned, good practices and training and education on disaster risk reduction, including the use ofexisting training and education mechanisms and peer learning

6

See “Issue 1: Flood Risk Communication” in CWS Six Months Since Western Japan Flood: Lesson From Mabi Report

7

SFDRR Scope and Purpose: The present framework will apply to the risk of small-scale and large-scale, frequent and infrequent, sudden and slow-onset
disasters, caused by natural or manmade hazards as well as related environmental, technological and biological hazards and risks.

Sendai Framework Scope and Purpose: The present framework will apply to the risk of small-scale and large-scale, frequent and infrequent, sudden
and slow-onset disasters, caused by natural or manmade hazards as well as related environmental, technological and biological hazards and risks.

21

TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -4.2 SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DRR PRIORITY FOR ACTION 2:
STRENGTHENING DISASTER RISK GOVERNANCE
Managing disaster risk and response requires strong
governance, including “guidance and coordination
within and across sectors, as well as participation of
relevant stakeholders.”8 The SFDRR recognizes theneed for “the public and private sectors and civilsociety organizations… to work more closely together and to create opportunities for collaboration.”9

Coordinating among multiple stakeholders:
The legal provisions around the Basic Countermeasures Act could be reviewed to address several
issues within resource constrained local governments, including cooperation with and among
non-government organizations, informal networks
and the private sector. Each brings various strengths
and capacities for all stages of response to recovery,
which when recognized and leveraged appropriately
can ensure a more comprehensive and holistic contribution to disaster response and recovery.

Improving communication channels, especially with the most vulnerable: Although moreelderly residents are signing up for social media apps
like LINE, information sharing gaps still exist. In
non-crisis times, communication flows and information channels should be established, including an
open digital information system between care providers and those in need of care, as well as among
service providers. During non-emergency times itwill be important for NPO and government staff tofamiliarize themselves with these systems so thatthey can be quickly activated during times of crisis.
The same is true during recovery phases, as thedisplaced community still needs accurate and timely
information about housing and other reconstructionplans.

8

22
9

Building ex-ante trust, relationships andpartnership agreements between government and NPOs: Examples of successful collaboration between the government and NPOs reinforce
the need to systematize these relationships prior todisaster not only to fill gaps, but to ensure a morecommunity-driven disaster response and recovery
process. While this missing linkage is recognizedamong stakeholders, further efforts to mainstream
NPO activities and voices, especially those of
women, in official coordination mechanisms. Efforts
can include mapping local capacities and developinga registry of pre-existing service delivery systems tominimize fragmentation, confusion, delay and/or
duplication.

Building consensus among national government, local governments, local communities, civil society organizations and otherkey stakeholders: While the government formulated a flood protection program half century ago, it
could not start it due to lack of consensus among
concerned organizations and key stakeholders.
Coordinating interests and concerns is crucial inpromoting infrastructure projects. Risk governancemechanisms need to be strengthened by engaging awide range of key stakeholders.

SFDRR Priority 2, Para 26. Relevant Articles: 27 (f) To assign, as appropriate, clear roles and tasks to community representatives within disaster risk management institutions and processes and decision-making through relevant legal frameworks, and undertake comprehensive public and community consultations
during the development of such laws and regulations to support their implementation; 27 (h) Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk.
To empower local authorities, as appropriate, through regulatory and financial means to work and coordinate with civil society, communities and indigenous
peoples and migrants in disaster risk management at the local level.
SFDRR, Preamble

4.3 SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DRR PRIORITY FOR ACTION 3:
INVESTING IN DRR FOR RESILIENCE
Inclusive recovery has been a consistent and core
theme of international frameworks set up by the
Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development Goals, inwhich 193 countries have pledged to “leave no one
behind” and “endeavor to reach the furthest behind.”
The topic was most recently prioritized at the FourthWorld Reconstruction Conference (WRC4) 2019,whose theme was “Inclusion for Resilient Recovery,”which stressed the need to “put people at the centerof recovery processes, making certain that they havea role in assessments, planning, policy development,
implementation, and monitoring of recovery.” It alsoemphasized the need for “local and national governments to include vulnerable groups in the planning,
implementation and monitoring of resilient recovery
as well as ensure that the benefits of building backbetter are equitably shared.”10
These global commitments reflect an attempt toremedy the current situation where a large part of the
population (e.g. women and girls, people with disabilities, people in rural areas, indigenous peoples,
ethnic and linguistic minorities, migrants, displaced
people, gender and sexual minorities, youth, and theelderly) are disproportionately excluded from several
dimensions of development, including post-disasterrecovery.11

Ensuring evacuation centers meet needs ofmost vulnerable (including disabled, elderly):
Prioritization of care approaches applied by AMDA
helped provide people with varying health conditions
appropriate care and special attention. Plans forevacuation centers should include similar systems
which categorize people according to the severity of
their health needs, as well as specific gender andage requirements, and ensure they are equipped tohandle them.

Recognizing informal evacuation centers: Informal
evacuation centers sprung up as a result of the formal
centers being unable to attend to the most vulnerable.
However, in order for an evacuation center to be designated as ‘formal,’ a city official must be present to manage
the assistance. Without this formal recognition, informal
centers received limited assistance. A mechanism torecognize informal evacuation centers, perhaps as“annex” to the formal centers, should be established sothat these critical centers are not excluded from assistance.

Establishing co-design and co-delivery mechanisms of the recovery plan: As described above, in
Mabi, inclusive recovery planning was limited. Aside fromthe direct community meetings conducted by the city
office, there needs to be a strong link between Shakyo(Social welfare Association) and the city recovery planningdepartment, so that local social welfare, health, housing
and livelihood related issues can be conveyed through aproper channel.

Promoting structural measures which incorporate green concepts: This disaster demonstrates thatstructural measures can be crucial to protecting human
lives and assets from flooding. If flood protection structures had been completed as planned, the damage would
likely have been far less severe.
Rivers provide important environmental functions such asoffering habitats for various ecosystems, giving an opportunity for water leisure and enhancing the scenery. In
urban areas, they are particularly valuable to maintaining
an eco-friendly environment. When promoting structuralrisk reduction measures, balancing the management offlood risks with environmental protection is a challenge.
River environment and water flow simulations can help
decision making. Green structures, as opposed to grey
structures, should be included as much as possible tomitigate environment impacts.

10

Joint Communique on Inclusion for Resilient Recovery, World Reconstruction Conference 4. 14 May 2019.

11

Joint Communique on Inclusion for Resilient Recovery, World Reconstruction Conference 4. 14 May 2019.

23

TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -TOWARDS MABIʼS RECOVERY - LESSONS ONE YEAR ON -4.4 SENDAI FRAMEWORK FOR DRR PRIORITY FOR ACTION 4:‘BUILDING BACK BETTER’SFDRR Priority for Action Four specifically calls forrecovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction processes
to “Build Back Better” 12 including minimization of
disruption of basic services, among them health, andeducation.13 It also recognizes psychosocial support asa priority in recovery.14 Building Back Better also refers
to training various stakeholders in disaster response
and strengthening technical and logistical capacities toensure better response in emergencies.

Emphasizing social cohesion for psychosocial
recovery: Psychosocial programs for children have
had positive results, but many parents report ongoinganxiety about their own futures. Close community
bonds have been found to not only facilitate evacuation
during crisis, but are also an important part of psychosocial well-being and post-crisis recovery. Promoting
community networks and ‘salons’ in non crisis times
has been an essential part of building and maintaining
this social cohesion and should be continued.
A critical but often overlooked group when consideringcommunity ties is youth. This demographic can provide

ANNEXES

important assistance during emergency times.
Strengthening community links with and among thisgroup should be prioritized.

Enhancing business continuity plans at
schools is essential to the continuity of education after crisis. Disruption of school education
has repeatedly occurred in Japan after disasters byusing the school facilities as evacuation center. It is
not enough for schools to strengthen collaboration
with the community on operating evacuation centerssmoothly. Schools should also prepare for where to
resume education for children in a case that theschool is occupied by evacuees.

Disaster management training and exposurefor local leaders: The research found that government actors with disaster management experience or
previous training were able to identify needs, makeimportant decisions and take quick response actions.
Training for municipal leaders, actors and decision
makers on disaster management and risk reduction
is critical.

05

5.1.1 Persons Consulted
Ms. Ito Kaori
Mr. Hara Tadashi
Ms. Namba Tae
Mr. Mitani Junjiro
Mr. Hinobayashi Norihito
Ms. Shibata Yuko
Ms. Yamamoto
Ms. Shikanae Junko
Ms. Yamanaka Yumiko
Ms. Kataoka Natsuko
Dr. Kenmotsu Katashi
Ms. Ando Kyoko
Mr. Kanbara Kazuyoshi
Ms. Kanbara Mitsuyo

Mayor, City of Kurashiki
Ex Director, Mabi Recovery Planning Committee, City of Kurashiki
Director, GPSP Support Bureau, AMDA
Director, Gender Equity Dept., City of Kurashiki
Director, Mabi Office, Council of Social Welfare, Kurashiki (Shakyo)
General Manager, Emergency Response Division, Japan Platform
Community Welfare Section, Council of Social Welfare, Kurashiki
ICT Officer, Okayama NPO Center
Disaster Nurse’ Support, NPO “Friendship”
Chair, SOUL Visiting Nurses’ Station
Visiting Lecturer, Okayama University of Science
Board Chair, Parents’ Support STEP (NPO)
Owner, Kanbara Gofukuten

5.1.2 Documents Consulted
1. CWS Situation Report #2: The 2018 Western Japan Floods, July 17th 2018
2. Das S. (2019): “Six Months Since Western Japan Flood: Lessons from Mabi”, 28 pages, CWS Japan, Tokyo.
3. Domoto, Akiko. “Disaster Risk Reduction: A Japanese Women’s Perspective on 3.11” Japan Women’s Network for Disaster Risk Reduction,
2013.
4. 「西日本豪雨災害被災者支援 初動対応期レビュー報告書」, Japan Platform Emergency Response Division, 2018.
5. “Impact of Recent Climate Change on Disasters,” presentation by Kenmotsu Katashi, Visiting Faculty at Okayama University of Science.
6. Kurashiki City Board of Education: Measures to support recovery of public schools and kindergarten affected by the 2018 flooding disaster,
July 19, 2018. . 和文タイトル倉敷市教育委員会：被災した倉敷市立学校園が復旧するまでの措置について.
7. Living "Guide to Place" Guidebook, Community Welfare Section Kurashiki
8. Nihon Keizai Shimbun: “When our school could be resumed? Confused teachers due to inundation and evacuation shelter at school.” July
「学校再開いつ…」浸水・避難所設置でメド立たず.教員ら困惑.
12, 2018.. 和文タイトル日本経済新聞：
9. 「岡山県における平成30年7月豪雨への民間支援白書」, Okayama NPO Center, Japan Platform (JPF), JVOAD, 2018.
10. Okayama Prefecture: Roadmap of Recovery and Reconstruction from the 2018 flooding disaster. July 2019. 和文タイトル）岡山県：平成30
年7月豪雨災害からの 復旧・復興ロードマップ. 令和元年7月.
11. Okayama Prefecture: Public Information Paper Harenohi Okayama, Special Volume, July 28, 2019.
12. Okayama Prefecture, Child and Household Division: Starting to receive application for child disaster relief grant. January 24, 2019. 和文タイトル）岡山県こども家庭課：子ども災害見舞金の受付を開始します！

13. Okayama Prefecture, Child Future Division, Health and Welfare Department: Final report on provision of safe and secured place for theaffected children. March 27, 2019.. 和文タイトル）岡山県保険福祉部子ども未来課：事業報告書「被災した子どもの安全・安心な居場所の提供」
14. Kurashiki Makibi Special Needs School HP
15. Sanyo Shimbun: Still commuting temporary school after eight months from the 2018 flooding disaster-Half of Kurashiki Makibi Special
Needs School students, March 6, 2019. . 和文タイトル）山陽新聞：豪雨８カ月経てもなお仮校舎通学 倉敷まきび支援学校生の約半数

SFDRR Para 33 (c) To promote the resilience of new and existing critical infrastructure, including water, transportation and telecommunications infrastructure,
educational facilities, hospitals and other health facilities, to ensure that they remain safe, effective and operational during and after disasters in order toprovide live-saving and essential services;
13
SFDRR Priority (d) Substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services, among them health and educational
facilities, including through developing their resilience by 2030;
14 Priority 4: Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to “Build Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction 33. (o) To enhancerecovery schemes to provide psychosocial support and mental health services for all people in need;
1224

16. “Saving Lives with Better Disaster Warnings”, NHK World Japan, June 27, 2019.
17. Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) 2015-2030
18. Shelter Management Manual of Kurashiki City
19. Suganami, Shigeru. “AMDA’s Activities and the Japan Medical Association.” JMAJ 53(2): 129–130, 201025