JOINT TRANSPORT RESEARCH CENTRE

Discussion Paper No. 2009-23
December 2009

Competition for Long Distance
Passenger Rail Services:
The Emerging EvidenceJohn PRESTON
University of Southampton, UK

SUMMARY1.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 3

2.

THEORETICAL MODELS OF RAIL COMPETITION.................................................... 4

3.

OFF TRACK COMPETITION ......................................................................................... 13

4.

ON TRACK COMPETITION ........................................................................................... 16

5.

CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................... 18

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................... 19
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 20
NOTES.. .................................................................................................................................... 23

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1.

INTRODUCTION

Railways were initially envisaged as open access facilities with head-on competition
between service providers (Lardner, 1850). However, concerns about safety quickly resulted inrailways being largely developed as vertically integrated monopolies at a route level but withsignificant competition between these route-based companies. Over time, competition from othermodes reduced the scope for internal competition and led to the rationalisation of duplicatedroutes and the merger of railway companies. In most countries, long distance passenger rail
servicesi became a state-owned monopoly but in recent years there has been renewed interest incompetitive provision (see, for example, Gomez-Ibanez and de Rus, 2006).
Although route competition has remained a feature in countries such as Japan (Mizutani,1994), on the tracks competition between passenger rail operators has been limited. However, inGreat-Britain, the 1993 Railways Act promised open access competition between rail operators.
In the event, regulatory intervention heavily moderated competition up to 2002. Nonetheless,some open access competition has emerged in Britain with three passenger train operators having
entered the market (Griffiths, 2009). There has been open access competition in passenger rail
markets elsewhere – most notably, in Germany where open access has been permitted since 1999.
There have been around ten instances of entry of which four were still operating in 2009, centred
on Berlin (Séguret, 2009), but accounting for less than 1% of services.ii The liberalisation of long
distance passenger services has seen the incumbent operator Deutsche Bahn (DB) withdraw fromsecondary markets, with some 23 medium sized cities losing long distance train connections
between 1999 and 2009. When permitted, niche competition has emerged in other rail markets
such as St Petersburg - Moscow in Russia (Dementiev, 2007). The Netherlands has had someexperimentation with open-access, most notably the ultimately ill-fated Lovers Rail services(1996-1999), with the Dutch government subsequently favouring off-the track competition (vande Velde, 2009). Within the European Union (EU), open access for international passenger rail
services, with domestic cabotage, will be implemented in 2010 (Directive 2007/58). Nash (2009)
reports that in preparation for this SNCF has set up a subsidiary, Nuovo Trasporti Viaggiatori, tooperate in Italy, whilst TrenItalia is believed to be planning retaliatory action. Air France andVeolia have established a partnership, possibly with a view to competing with Thalys services,
whilst DB are believed to be considering competing with Eurostar services. On a domestic level,
Sweden is considering open access for its rail services in 2010/11 (Alexandersson, 2009)
Off-track competition, in the form of competitive tendering and franchising is more common
in the passenger rail industry than on track competition (Thompson, 2006). In Europe, thepioneers were Sweden, where competitive tendering for local services began in 1990 and
extended to regional services (many of which are long distance) in 1993, although key intercity
services remain a commercial monopoly. This model has also been adopted in countries such as
Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands and further afield in countries such as Kazakhstan(Sharipov, 2009). The EU’s subsequent intention was for a widespread roll out of competitive
tendering but this met opposition from some member states and Regulation 1370/2007 merely
requires clear and transparent contracts. In Latin America, urban and suburban services wereprivatised through concessions, with the Buenos Aires commuter network in Argentina beingtransferred to the private sector in 1992, as was the Rio de Janeiro Metro and commuter services

Preston – Discussion Paper 2009-23 - © OECD/ITF, 20093

(Flumitrens) in Brazil in 1997/8. These arrangements build on similar models in the United States
where commuter rail services have been contracted out in cities such as Boston,
Baltimore/Washington, Chicago and Los Angeles (Preston et al., 2001) and have been extended
to other urban rail systems, most notably in Melbourne, Australia (Kain, 2006). However,contracting out of long distance passenger services is relatively rare. In Argentina, it did notprove possible to find private operators for the long distance services and 70% of such services
were discontinued, with the remainder taken over by regional governments. The main exception
is Great-Britain where all passenger services were franchised in 1996/7, with five out of 25 Train
Operating Companies being particularly focused on long distance services (Cross Country, East
Coast Mainline, Great Western Mainline, Midland Mainline and West Coast Main Line).
The aim of this paper is to review the emerging evidence on competition in the long distancepassenger rail service. This draws on the three bodies of evidence. In section 2, we examine theex-ante evidence from theoretical models based on Preston (2008a). In section 3, we examine theex-post evidence on competition for the market, with particular emphasis on the East Coast MainLine franchise in Great-Britain, drawing in part on Preston (2008b). Likewise, in section 4, weconsider recent evidence on open access services that are competing in the market in GreatBritain, drawing on Griffiths (2009). Finally, we shall draw some conclusions.

2.

THEORETICAL MODELS OF RAIL COMPETITIONRail competition, where it occurs, is likely to be small group in nature. Market demand isoften too thin to support a large number of operators, whilst there may be some economies ofscale and density that limit the optimum number of firms in rail markets (see, for example, Smithand Wheat, 2009). The relevant industry structure is therefore that of oligopoly competition.
Classical models assume competition occurs either in the price dimension (Bertrand competition)or in the service dimension (Cournot competition). The conventional wisdom is that where
capacity is difficult to increase (e.g. rail) competition will be of the Cournot type but where
capacity can easily be increased (e.g. bus) competition will be of the Bertrand type (Quinet andVickerman, 2004, p.263). However, this ignores demand side aspects. The urban rail market has
turn-up-and-go characteristics which mean that passengers will tend to board the first train toarrive. Price competition is more effective in book-ahead markets such as long distance rail
services. Indeed, price competition was a strong feature of the competition between British
Coachways, National Express and British Rail in the early 1980s (see Douglas, 1987). However,
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show that with appropriate quantity pre-commitment (which islikely to be the case in rail) Bertrand and Cournot competition can be equivalent.
Economic models of competition in rail have focused on the development of route basedmodels in which the impacts of particular timetables (schedules) are examined and have somesimilarities with the dynamic schedule-based approaches developed by others (Wilson andNuzzolo, 2004). An example is the PRAISE (PRivatisation of Rail SErvices) model (see Preston
et al., 1999, 2002). A similar modelling approach was adopted by SDG (2004) in modelling rail
competition on the Brussels-Cologne and Madrid-Barcelona. The demand module of PRAISE
assumes that individuals make their travel decisions at three linked stages (shown in Figure 1). At thefirst level (lower nest), the traveller’s choice of service and ticket type is modelled, next the4

Preston – Discussion Paper 2009-23 - © OECD/ITF, 2009

traveller's choice of class of travel is assessed in the middle nest and finally, the choice of travellingby train and not travelling by train is modelled in the upper nest. The model is therefore capable of
distributing demand between trains and ticket types and allows for the overall rail market to expand
or contract in response to fares and service level changes.
Figure 1: Schematic Representation of the PRAISE Demand Model

Upper Nest
(Mode Choice)

Train

Middle Nest
(Class ofTravel)First Class

Lower Nest
(Train& Ticket Type)

1

2

. .

Services

Not TrainStandard Class

n 1

2

. .

n

Services

The choice of service and ticket type on the outward and return legs of the journey areassessed in the lower nest of the model. For a given individual with a given set of tastes (attributevalues) and preferred departure times for the outward and return legs of the journey, we canallocate a “utility weight” to each available train and ticket type combination. Choiceprobabilities are then estimated for the best nine return-trip combinations using a multinomial
9

Pij = exp (λU j ) / ∑ exp (λU j )j=1

logit formula.
where Pij is the probability that individual i will choose service and ticket combination j, andU j is a utility weight typically based on fare, adjustment time (i.e. the difference between when aperson would ideally like to travel and the scheduled departure time), journey time, advanced
purchase requirement and interchange, though it can include other rail attributes such as rollingstock quality. λ is a spread parameter that governs the sensitivity of choice between services andticket combinations.
The middle nest of the model examines the choice between first and standard class travel.
This is done by estimating a representative measure of utility for each class of service by way of

EMU class =91ln ∑ exp (λU j )λ j=1

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the expected maximum utility (EMU).
The choice between first and standard class of travel is then determined by the binary logit

PFirst = exp (θEMU First ) / (exp (θEMU First ) + exp (θEMU Standard ))model.
where θ is a scaling coefficient that determines the sensitivity of choice between first andstandard class travel. Different θ values are estimated for different journey purposes.
The final stage of the model represents the individual’s choice between travelling by train
and not travelling by train. This is done by estimating a representative value of rail travel for theindividual (EMUtrain) and allocating market shares using another binary logit model.

EMU Train =1θln(exp(θEMU First ) + exp(θEMU Standard )) andPTrain = exp ( γEMU Train ) / (exp ( γEMU Train ) + 1)
Initial versions of the model involved setting the utility of not travelling by train equal tozero and estimating two separate γ values to restrict the fare elasticity of demand for business andnon-business travel in Britain at -0.5 and -1.0 respectively (consistent with British Railway
Board, 1990). In the Swedish application, elasticities of -0.4 for business travel, -0.6 forcommuting and -0.9 for leisure were used (supplied by the state operator SJ). The British versionof the model was based on a business value of time of 60 pence per minute and a non-businessvalue of three pence per minutes (rebased to 2000 prices), based on local survey data (Preston etal., 1999). The Swedish version of the model was based on a business value of time of
approximately 16 pence per minute and a non-business value of approximately eight pence perminute (again in 2000 prices) based on national values and the work of Rosenlind et al. (2001).
Based on existing demand patterns, the model determines ideal departure times and the penalties
for travelling earlier or later than the desired time. Changes in timetables will change the extent ofthese penalties. These ideal departure times are used to determine choice sets and reduce some of
the concerns stemming from the independence of irrelevant alternatives property of multinomial
logit models (Jansson and Mortazavi, 2000).
For a given route, the cost module is based on a fully accounted cost formulation which took
the following general form:
TC = (1 + A) (aV + bVH + cVKM + dPKM)
where
TC
=
Total costA=
Administrative mark-up
V=
Vehicles
VH=
Vehicle Hours
VKM =Vehicle Kilometres
PKM =Passenger Kilometres.
Such a linear function is clearly a simplification of more complex relationships but has been
widely used in the rail industry (Rosenlind et al., 2001) and has some empirical support(Jörgensen and Preston, 2003). Parameters for the cost module were provided by the incumbent

6Preston – Discussion Paper 2009-23 - © OECD/ITF, 2009

operators. A crucial difference relates to track access charging. In Great-Britain, the track
authority is a commercial enterprise (Railtrack from 1996 to 2002, Network Rail thereafter) andcharges are based on the principle of full cost recovery. In Sweden, the track authority(Banverket) is a public body and charging is based on short run marginal costs. The upshot isthat, at 2000 prices, track access charges were around GBP5 per train km in Great Britain
compared to 65 pence per train km in Sweden.
The appraisal module calculates profit as the difference between total revenue and total costand calculates changes in consumer surplus using the rule of half. Change in welfare is simply thesum of the change in profits and in consumer surpluses.
Tables 1 and 2 summarise the findings of the PRAISE model in applications to a broadly
hourly inter city service in Great-Britain (Route GB1), with approximately 2 million passenger
journeys per annum. This route links two major cities but has substantial commuting at either endof the route. It is assumed that both the existing (incumbent) operator and the new (entrant)
operator use the same rolling stock so that the quality of service is the same and, with the same
stopping patterns, the speed of services is also the same. In reality, it is likely that competition
will occur with respect to the quality of service as well as with respect to the quantity of service
and fares, but this would require detailed modelling of the rolling stock market.
Table 1. Sample Fringe Competition Results – Route GB1
Model
Run

Fares

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

A*
A*
B*
B*
C*
C*
A*
A*
B*
B*
C*
C*

Entrant
Service
Pattern
1*
1*
1*
1*
1*
1*
2*
2*
2*
2*
2*
2*

Interavailabilityof tickets
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

Incumbent
Share (%)

Rail Market
Growth (%)

93.9
94.6
88.9
87.4
93.3
94.3
89.8
89.6
86.0
84.3
88.7
88.6

0.6
0.4
2.5
1.8
10.8
10.4
-2.6
-3.1
-0.3
-1.1
7.3
6.6

Notes:
1*
Entrant provides two additional express services in the morning and evening peak periods in both
directions of travel.
2*
System is at capacity, the entrant replaces two of the incumbent’s services in the morning andevening peak periods in both directions of travel with express services.
A*
Entrant price matches incumbent’s base fare levels
B*
Entrant discounts fares by 20%
C*
Both operators discount fares by 20%

Table 1 examines the possible demand impacts of fringe competition. It indicates that two
additional peak services provided by a new entrant may attract between 6% and 12% of themarket and grow the market by between less than 1% and more than 10%, depending principallyon whether there is fares competition or not. When the entrant replaces two of the incumbent’s

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peak services, it can capture up to 15% of the market but the overall market size decreases
slightly. This is because it is in the entrant’s interest not to serve some intermediate stations
previously served by the incumbent but an abstractive service of this type is unlikely to be in the
public interest.
Table 2 indicates that with matching competition, in which the entrant provides the same
service frequency as the incumbent, the entrant can capture between 45% and 57% of the market.
However, the overall market will only grow by between 6% and 19%. Again, this is largely
because the entrant will not serve some intermediate stations. However, the incumbent also has anadvantage in that its existing timetable should have been designed to best match customers’
preferred arrival times.
Table 2. Sample Head-on Competition Simulation Results – Route GB1
Model
Run

Fare
Incumbent

Fare
Entrant

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

0
0
0
0
-10%
-10%
-10%
-10%
-20%
-20%

0
0
-10%
-10%
-10%
-10%
-20%
-20%
-20%
-20%

Note:

Interavailabilityof tickets
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

Incumbent Share
(%)
54.8
54.0
48.7
43.6
55.1
54.4
48.9
43.8
55.3
54.8

Rail Market
Growth (%)
8.6
6.1
11.2
8.6
13.6
11.1
16.3
13.6
18.7
16.1

Entrant matches service frequency of incumbent

Similar work in Sweden modelled the effect of various competitive scenarios for two lines.
The results are shown by Tables 3 and 4 which summarise the findings with respect to a highfrequency inter city service, with an average service frequency of less than one hour (Route S1),and a low frequency inter city service, with an average service interval in excess of two hours(Route S2) respectively. Route S1 has approximately two million passengers per annum, with
commuting at both ends of the route, whereas Route S2 has only around 0.25 million passengers
per annum, with commuting at only one end of the route. Two service options are examined: theentrant matches the number of services provided by the incumbent or the entrant only runs one
train in each direction in the peak periods (two trains for the high frequency service). This isreferred to as fringe competition. With respect to fares it is assumed that the entrant matches theincumbent’s fares or introduces 10% or 20% reductions across all ticket types. The incumbent
either maintains existing fare levels or matches the entrant’s fare reductions. It is assumed thattickets are not interavailable between operators.

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Table 3. Competition on a High Frequency Inter City Route S1
FareIncumbent

Fare
Entrant

ServiceIncumbent

Service
Entrant

As Now
As Now
As Now-10%-20%
As Now
As Now
As Now
-10%
-20%

Match
-10%
-20%
-10%
-20%
Match
-10%
-20%
-10%
-20%

As Now
As Now
As Now
As Now
As Now
As Now
As Now
As Now
As Now
As Now

Match
Match
Match
Match
Match
FringeFringeFringeFringeFringeTotal
Patronage
Base=100
112
126
139
130
144
101
103
105
122
136

Incumbent
Market
Share
47%
15%
6%
47%
47%
99%
95%
85%
99%
99%

Entrant
Market
Share
53%
85%
94%
53%
53%
1%
5%
15%
1%
1%

Table 3 shows that for Route S1 if an entrant matches the incumbent’s fares and services it
gains a 53% market share. This is greater than 50% because the entrant can design a timetable togive particularly good coverage of the busiest times of day. In practice, the incumbent would
adjust its existing departures in the light of the entrant’s timetable, initiating an iterative processthat might be expected to result in equal market shares. Fares competition from the entrant canhave a dramatic effect on the incumbent’s market share – reducing it from 47% to 6%. Fares
competition has a greater impact on the high frequency route because the fare reductions morethan compensate for the adjustment of schedules. Fringe competition from the entrant has aminimal impact, capturing 1% of the market without fare reductions, rising to 15% of the market
with a 20% fare reduction. If the incumbent matches the entrant’s fare reductions, it reduces theentrant’s market share back to 1%. In this instance competition may not be academic. Bothmatching and fringe competition can be profitable for both parties.
Table 4 shows that for the low frequency service (S2) an entrant that matches theincumbent’s fares and service levels can capture 56% of the market. This is greater than 50% for
the same reasons as for Route S1, but in the low frequency case there are more gaps in thetimetable at busy times of day for the entrant to fill. Fares competition from the entrant can
reduce the incumbent’s market share further from 44% to 30%. If the incumbent matches theentrant’s fare cuts, it returns to obtaining a 44% market share. With fringe competition, theentrant can capture 23% of the market without fare cuts, rising to 31% with a 20% fare reduction.
If the incumbent matches these fare cuts, the entrant’s market share is reduced back to 23%. It
should be noted that for such a low frequency route, competition may be largely academic asnone of the scenarios examined revealed a profitable entry opportunity.

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Table 4. Competition on a Low Frequency Inter City Route S2
FareIncumbent

Fare
Entrant

ServiceIncumbent

Service
Entrant

As Now
As Now
As Now-10%-20%
As Now
As Now
As Now
-10%
-20%

Match
-10%
-20%
-10%
-20%
Match
-10%
-20%
-10%
-20%

As Now
As Now
As Now
As Now
As Now
As Now
As Now
As Now
As Now
As Now

Match
Match
Match
Match
Match
FringeFringeFringeFringeFringeTotal
Patronage
Base=100
122
127
133
131
140
108
110
112
116
125

Incumbent
Market
Share
44%
37%
30%
44%
44%
77%
73%
69%
77%
77%

Entrant
Market
Share
56%
63%
70%
56%
56%
23%
27%
31%
23%
23%

PRAISE is not an equilibrium model. Instead it is a model that is used to assess the impactof a number of scenarios. An example for Route GB1 is given by Table 5. This analysis suggeststhat matching competition is not feasible in most instances. However, Table 5 suggests that fringe
competition may be feasible in certain circumstances (for example, if there is regulation to ensureinteravailability of tickets – model run 5). However, in most cases welfare does not increase, withthe exception of model run 11.
Table 5. Example Results from the PRAISE Model – Inter City Route GB1 (per day)
Model
Run

Fares

Entrant
Service
Pattern

Interavailabilityof tickets

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

A*
A*
B*
B*
C*
C*
A*
A*
B*
B*
C*
C*

1*
1*
1*
1*
1*
1*
2*
2*
2*
2*
2*
2*

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

Incumbent
Profit (#)

Entrant
ProfitConsumer
surpluschange(Business)

Consumer
surpluschange (Nonbusiness)

30,81531,962
12,41917,79923,54525,01729,591
29,55320,05022,15823,241
23,2401,267-847
16,67010,379528-2,135
11,381
9,183
18,88814,700
10,259
7,999

1,528
891
4,686
3,510
12,741
12,055-3,578-4,603
446
-845
7,592
6,466

82
82
791
512
4,548
4,483
-1,046-1,153
-210
-507
3,380
3,230

WelfareChange-9,051-10,657-8,178-10,544-1,383-3,326-6,397-9,765-3,570-7,2391,727-1,810Notes:
1*
Entrant provides two additional express services in the morning and evening peak periods in both
directions of travel.
2*
System is at capacity, the entrant replaces two of the incumbent’s services in the morning andevening peak periods in both directions of travel with express services.
A*
Entrant price matches incumbent’s base fare levels
B*
Entrant discounts fares by 20%
C*
Both operators discount fares by 20%.
#
Incumbent base profit GBP42,746

Route GB1 is paralleled by a slower Route GB1A, with end to end journey times one hour
longer. It was found that if fares on Route GB1A were set at 50% of those of GB1, then Route
GB1A could capture 25% of the end to end market. We were not able to undertake a welfare

10

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analysis of this scenario, as we did not have full demand and cost data for Route GB1A.
However, this analysis suggests that route competition based on product differentiation may bepossible and has been a feature of a number of origin and destination pairs, most notably between
London and Birmingham.iii
An example of the PRAISE model results for the Inter City Route S1 in Sweden is given by
Table 6. It should be noted that this route is paralleled by the slower services of Route S1A,
which has end to end journey times that are around an hour longer. Route S1A has around one
million passengers per annum. This Table shows that, with a 20% cost reduction and nointeravailable tickets (arguably the most likely competitive scenario), fringe entry (scenarios 68 to72) is profit enhancing in that it encourages a shift from Route S1A services with low profit
margins to Route S1 services with relatively high profit margins. Head-on competition (scenarios
63 to 67) reduces overall profits by up to 30%, although the Route S1 services remain profitable
in total. The demand for Route S1 services, measured in terms of passengers, might increase by
over 40% but the change in demand for Route S1 and S1A services combined is more modest(with a maximum growth of 12%). Consumers suffer disbenefits in some scenarios because theincreases in service frequency are insufficient to compensate for the lack of integrated ticketing
between Route 1A feeder services and Route 1 trunk services. Our analysis suggests that with
open entry, the most likely outcome is scenario 67, which involves head-on competition with farecuts. This leads to an increase in welfare equivalent to 31% of base profits. It should be noted that
if the incumbent is forewarned of entry it is likely to blockade such an opportunity by doubling
frequency itself. Moreover, it should also be noted that a regulated monopolist in which service
levels are reduced slightly but fares are cut by 20% could increase welfare by a greater amount,equivalent to 118% of base profits.
Table 6. Example Results from the PRAISE Model – Inter City Routes S1 and S1AScenario

Fare
Route
1A

Fare
Route 1-Inc

Fare
Route 1
-Entrant

Service
Route
1A

ServiceRoute 1
-Inc

ServiceRoute 1
-Entrant

Route 1PaxchangeRoutes 1& 1AProfitchangeRoutes 1& 1ACSchange *Routes 1& 1A
WelfareChange
*

63

As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now

As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
-10%

Match

12.3%

-26.0%-8.6%-34.6%

Match

25.5%

-22.7%

12.3%-10.4%

Match

38.5%

-27.1%

42.6%

15.6%

Match

30.0%

-18.9%

20.8%

1.9%

-20%

-20%

Match

43.0%

-23.1%

54.4%

31.3%

As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
-10%

Match

Fringe

1.6%

42.3%

-20.3%

22.0%

Fringe

2.5%

42.6%

-19.5%

23.1%

Fringe

4.9%

41.3%

-16.6%

24.7%

-10%

Fringe

21.8%

54.4%

7.1%

61.5%

-20%

-20%

As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now

Match

-10%

As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now
As
Now

Fringe

36.4%

53.0%

39.3%

92.2%

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

-10%
-20%

-10%
-20%

Note: Inc = Incumbent, Pax = Passenger, CS = Consumer Surplus, * Expressed relative to base profit and abase situation in which tickets are interavailable.

Preston – Discussion Paper 2009-23 - © OECD/ITF, 200911

Overall, on Route S1, of the scenarios examined, unconstrained profit maximisation was
found to be similar to the welfare maximising scenario. However, both situations require theRoute S1A services to be subsidised. This suggests that Route S1 services operated as a regulatedmonopoly for high speed services may promote static efficiency, provided there is fringe
competition from Route S1A conventional services in receipt of appropriate amounts of subsidy
and inter-modal competition from car, coach and air. Also, there appears to be a strong welfare
case for lower fares on Route S1 services compared to the current situation.
Further analysis indicated that, where tickets are not interavailable, it is still possible for two
operators to be profitable with head-on competition but matching fare reductions of around 10%
are more likely. With cost reductions, competition becomes more feasible but is still undesirable,
although to a reduced degree. Although it is possible for two Route S1 operators to be profitablewith head-on competition, even with interavailable tickets, the increase in welfare is only aroundone half of the maximum we have found. If tickets are not interavailable, the increase in welfare
is only around a quarter of the maximum we have found. Welfare is maximised where fares are
reduced by 20% and service levels are reduced slightly on route S1 whilst fare and service levels
on route S1A are unchanged.
For the low frequency Inter City Route S2, in the base it is found that the service is loss
making with a cost recovery ratio (expressed as a percentage) of around 60%. However, this isbased on fully accounted costs where administration costs comprise 15% of total costs, whilst
revenue calculations do not take into account contributory revenue elsewhere on the network andoff train revenue. When these facts are taken into account we find that the service is close to
break-even with current costs and will be profitable with the introduction of new rolling stock.
Overall, the modelling for route S2 indicates that competition is not feasible with current
cost levels. Welfare is maximised when there are substantial fare reductions and modest service
reductions. Losses are reduced by more than a third. By contrast, profit maximisation would
involve substantial fare increases and service reductions that would lead to a halving of losses but
an increase in welfare of only one sixth of the maximum found. With cost reductions of 20%, theprofit maximising scenario and the welfare maximising scenario remain dissimilar in theirwelfare impacts, although the service can get close to break-even. If tickets are interavailable,
there may be scope for some fringe competition on peak days (Fridays and Sundays when
demand is double average weekday levels – see for example Jansson, 2001) but this reduces
welfare.
It is possible to generalise the results of these computer simulations. A generic version of the
PRAISE model was developed for the Strategic Rail Authority (Whelan, 2002) and meta-analysis
of model runs has been undertaken to determine reaction functions. These results indicate that inGreat-Britain with prevailing track access rates, head-on competition is not commercially
feasible, even if sufficient capacity was available. However, cream skimming entry with train
movements focussing on the peak times and directions of travel and/or niche entry throughvarious forms of product differentiation could be commercially feasible, particularly if there wasregulation to ensure inter-availability of tickets. Moreover, competition would lead to service
withdrawal from thinner markets (in this case lightly used intermediate stops) and a concentrationon thick markets - a phenomenon also observed in the deregulated express coach market (Cross
and Kilvington, 1985) and in the German passenger rail market (Séguret, op cit.).
By contrast, the work in Sweden indicated that with lower track access charges, head-on
competition was commercially feasible on the busiest routes, although it might not be technically

12

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feasible because of capacity constraints. However, such competition was not desirable because it
led to too much service, at too high fares, compared to the welfare maximising configuration
which involved substantial fare reductions on the busiest route. An interesting feature was theimportance of competition between parallel routes. If the slower route was subsidised so thatfares and frequency were set at the welfare maximising level then a profit maximising monopolist
on the fast route would probably produce at a fares-frequency combination that was close to thewelfare maximum. Competition was not found to be feasible for thinner routes in Sweden.
The overall conclusion from models of this type is that competition in long distance rail
markets, where it occurs, is not characterised by oligopoly (either of the Cournot or Bertrandtype) but is likely to take the form of oligopolistic competition of the type described by Salop(1979) and Novshek (1980). This will involve too much service at too high fares, but also withspatial and temporal bunching.
The finding that competition in rail markets does not generally enhance welfare requires
numerous qualifications. The first is that it is assumed that firms are already cost efficient. Where
this is not the case, competition may be a powerful tool to promote cost efficiency. The second isthat dynamic efficiency is ignored. There may be an argument that competition promotes
innovation, particularly with respect to product differentiation, and this has not been taken this
into account. A third, and related point, is that uniform pricing is assumed, at least for individual
segments. Competition may particularly promote innovation in pricing, stimulated bytechnological developments in delivery channels such as the internet, smart cards and mobile
telephony. As a result, modelling work is now focusing on intra-modal and even intra-firmcompetition between ticket types (Wardman and Toner, 2003).

3.

OFF TRACK COMPETITION

It was noted in the introduction that off track competition for long distance rail service has
been limited. In part, this may be because such services already face competition from car andcoach for shorter distances and from air for longer distances. It also reflects that the case forsubsidising long distance rail services is not strong. First best arguments for subsidisation related
to user benefits increasing with service output (the Mohring effect) are limited for infrequent
services where passengers time their arrival to match train departure times, whilst second bestarguments related to the relief of road congestion are also diminished. As a result, there may be
predilection for competition in the market for long distance services, as reflected by EC Directive
91/440. However, a combination of institutional inertia and limited commercial opportunities
means that the development of such competition has also been limited.
The evidence of competition for the market in Great-Britain is therefore relevant. Here, there
have been three broad rounds of franchising (see also Preston, 2008b). The first round, organisedby the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising, was undertaken between 1996 and 1997 and based in
the main around seven year net cost contracts, with minimum service levels specified and around
50% of fares regulated. An important exception was the West Coast Main Line where a 15 year
franchise was let, as the infrastructure was to undergo an upgrade to permit 200 km per hourtilting Pendolino trains, an upgrade which was only completed in 2008.

Preston – Discussion Paper 2009-23 - © OECD/ITF, 200913

The second round, associated with the Strategic Rail Authority, saw some eight franchise relet. Initially the focus was on longer franchise for 20 years in which the operator was given
greater commercial freedom. In the event only two such franchises were let – for the urban
services centred on Liverpool (Merseyrail) and for Chiltern Rail (which does include some long
distance services from Birmingham (and beyond) to London). The rest of the re-let franchises
were in response to the financial meltdown in the industry that resulted from the Hatfield accident
in 2000 and the subsequent failure of Railtrack and some 13 of the 25 Train Operating Companies(Nash and Smith, 2006). Thompson (2006) notes that of these 13 failures only two were long
distance operators whose holding company (Virgin Trains) had been affected by the delays andcost over-runs on the West Coast Main Line. Partly as a result of these franchise failures, there
was a switch back to more tightly specified, shorter franchises.
The third phase of franchising – run by the Department for Transport (DfT) since 2005 – hasseen ten further franchises re-let. A feature of this round is that the distinction between long
distance intercity franchises and suburban and regional franchises has become blurred, with theGreat Western incorporating the former Thames (London commuter services out of Paddington)
and Wessex (regional services in the South West) franchises. Similarly, the Midland Main Linefranchise was merged with some regional services to form East Midlands Trains. One feature of
the third round is the cap and collar incentive regime which shares commercial risk between the
franchisor and the franchisee. This typically means that after the first four years of the franchisecontract have passed: 50% of any fares revenues in excess of 102% of the TOC’s original
forecasts are shared with DfT; DfT makes a contribution equivalent to 50% of any revenue
shortfall below 98% of the TOC’s original forecast; and for any short fall below 96%, DfT’scontribution increases to 80%. This revenue risk-sharing mechanism is intended to constrain
overzealous bidding, something that was a particular feature towards the end of the first round(see Preston et al., 2000). However, it may encourage backloading in which bids are moreaggressive in later years when the risk sharing comes into force.
One initial concern about off track competition was that it may not prove to be very
competitive (Preston, 1996). This has not proved to be the case given that the privatised bus
companies have been heavily involved in bidding from the start, whilst interest from internationalorganisations has grown so that currently organisations from France, Germany, Hong Kong and
the Netherlands have stakes in franchised rail operators. In the first phase, there were an average
5.4 bids per franchise. This has reduced slightly so that there were 4.2 bids per franchise in thesecond phase and 3.8 bids per franchise in the third phase. There is some concern that highbidding costs (which are estimated at around GBP5 million per bidder) may be deterring entry.
Table 7. The East Coast Franchise
Date Started

GNER
GNER
National Express

April 1996
May 2005
Dec. 2007

Expected
Duration
7 years
10 years
7 ¼ years

PVNP
1st year(GBPm)
651
(50)
7

PVNP
Final
(GBPm)
0
(219)
(311)

year

PVNP = Present Value of Net Payments. Figure in brackets denote premia paid.
1
Out-turn.
Source. Preston and Root (1999) and www.dft.gov.uk

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An interesting case study is provided by the East Coast Franchise, the core of which is long
distance intercity services between London King’s Cross and Leeds/Edinburgh. Table 7 gives
some basic data. In the first round of franchising, the winning bid for this franchise was fromGreat North Eastern Railways (GNER), a subsidiary of the shipping company Sea Containers.
This service required some GBP65 million of subsidy in the first year of operation falling to zerosubsidy in the seventh year. Given the relatively good performance of GNER and uncertainties
following Hatfield a two year extension was negotiated, prior to refranchising in 2004. The
incumbent operator put in a robust bid which involved paying a premium of GBP50 million in thefirst year, rising to GBP219 million in the tenth year, indicating some backloading. However, thetrade press indicated that the incumbent’s bid was only a little higher than the second highest bid.
This bid was accepted and GNER started operating its renewed franchise in May 2005. However,this bid was quickly overtaken by a series of events. GNER had not anticipated the upsurge infuel costs that occurred in 2005/6, revenue was hit by the 7th July 2005 bombings in Central
London and entry by an open access operator, Grand Central, would abstract some revenue from
GNER, particularly at York. To confound matters, GNER’s parent company was also in financial
difficulties. It quickly became clear that GNER could not meet its premium payments and there
was still three years before the cap and collar scheme came into force. In December 2006, GNER
entered into a Management Agreement with the DfT, based on an incentive if revenue growth
exceeds an agreed target. Almost immediately, the process of re-letting the franchise was begun.
The bids for these were submitted in June 2007 and the award announced in August. The
winning bid came from the National Express Group, who began operations in December 2007.
Again, the bid was a robust one. Although for the first year of operation a subsidy of GBP7
million was required this would quickly convert into a premium of GBP311 million some sevenyears later – again indicating backloading. There was some concern that National Express wasbuying in work given that it had lost a number of franchises (including Central, Midland Mainline
and Scotrail) but the trade press also indicated that National Express was not the highest bidder.
Once again, the bid was overtaken by events. In the light of the credit crunch, the 10% perrevenue growth on which the bid was predicated was unlikely. In the light of this, and problems
with the parent company, in July 2009, National Express East Coast announced that it would only
be able to meet it contractual obligations up to the end of 2009. Mindful of evidence that renegotiations would lead to cost increases of the order of 23-28% (Smith and Wheat, 2009), theGovernment fulfilled its earlier commitment not to negotiate and prepared to exercise its operatorof last resort powers, a role it had previously exercised for South East Trains (formerly operated
by Connex) between 2003 and 2006. National Express East Coast will surrender a GBP32
million performance bond and in combination with accumulated losses will face an exposure ofsome GBP100 million. The Government is also minded to enforce cross-default provisions so that
National Express will have to give up its other two (profitable) franchises. However, there issome uncertainty over the future of National Express as a whole, with at the time of writing,Stagecoach plc (the operator of two franchises and the part owner of another) considering a takeover bid.
One of the dangers of contracting-out, particularly in railways, is related to the gaming
behaviour that can occur. In particular, there is the practice of low-balling in which bidders postan initial high bid in the belief that they can then re-negotiate or chisel on the offered level ofquality. The performance regime for railways in Britain (with financial penalties for poor
reliability and overcrowding) largely precludes the latter option. Re-negotiation is a high risk
strategy and one that might involve a loss of reputation, but is predicated on at least three points.
Firstly, the private sector is gambling that no Government could afford to let the railways (or apart of it) go bust. Secondly, in circumstances of a likely franchise failure, re-negotiations may beless costly (and speedier) than re-franchising. Thirdly, the private sector is assuming that in any

Preston – Discussion Paper 2009-23 - © OECD/ITF, 200915

re-negotiations it will exhibit better negotiation skills (and be able to devote more resources tothis task) than the public sector. In so doing, it may be assisted by information asymmetries.
There is some evidence that low-balling occurred in the first round of franchising, albeit it
unsuccessfully in the case of Connex but perhaps with more success in the case of Virgin.
Thompson (2006) notes that low-balling has been a feature of rail franchising elsewhere,
particularly in Australia and Latin America. In the third round of franchising, low-balling does
not seem to be effective given the Government’s firm stance on no renegotiations,
implementation of cross-default provisions and recovery of a performance bond. However, thefailure of the East Coast franchisee twice in three years is obviously a cause for concern andsuggests that there are problems with the winner’s curse. Options might involve moving awayfrom net subsidy to gross cost contract (as has occurred for the London Overground franchise)
but this would weaken operator incentives to grow revenue or considering flexible length
contracts which terminate once a franchisee has made its premium payments in PV terms – ineffect a variant of the least present value of revenue approach advocated by Engel et al. (2001).

4.

ON TRACK COMPETITION

As indicated above, open access competition in Britain has been moderated by the Office ofRail Regulation. In the first phase of moderation, open access competition was restricted to origin
and destination pairs that constituted less than 0.2% of a franchisee’ revenue – effectively
limiting competition to where franchises overlapped (see Shaw 2000). In the second phase, which
operated up to 2002, franchisees could register revenue flows and could only face competition on
20% of registered flows but all unregistered flows would be open to competition. In the third
phase, from 2002 onwards a more case by case approach has been adopted where services have todemonstrate that they are not primarily abstractive. It appears that the relevant threshold is thatgenerated traffic needs to be at least 30% abstracted traffic (Griffiths, 2009). So far there havebeen three instances of open access competition, with a further case approved. These are Hull
Trains, which has been operating services between Hull and London via the East Coast Main Linesince 2000; Grand Central which has been operating services between London and Sunderland,also via the East Coast Main Line, since 2007; and Wrexham, Marylebone and Shropshire
Railway, which has been operating services between Wrexham and London since 2008. In
addition, Grand Northern has been licensed to provide services between Bradford and London,
but has not yet started operation. Three open access proposals have been rejected: a Grand
Central service between Preston and Newcastle via Manchester and Leeds; a Hull Trains service
between Harrogate and London and a Platinum Trains service between Aberdeen and London.
Currently non-franchised operationsiv account for 0.1% of passenger journeys, 0.6% of passenger
revenue 0.8% of passenger kms revenue and 1% of train kms on the national network. (ORR,2009).

16

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Table 8. Open Access Services Summer 2009

London –Hull
London –Sunderland

Franchisee’s
trains per day
1 (19)

Open
access Franchisee super Open accesstrains per day
off peak return
Off peak return
7
GBP85
GBP69

0 (23)

3

GBP105

GBP71

Table 8 shows some data for the two most established open access operators both of which
are providing direct services to London from cities on the East Coast of England with populationsof around 250 000 that have traditionally been poorly served by rail. The franchised operator in
the main provides indirect services via Doncaster in the case of Hull and via Newcastle in thecase of Sunderland. It can be seen that compared to these franchised services, the open access
operator only provides 27% of service in the case of Hull and 12% in the case of Sunderland.
However, headline fares for the open access operator are some 18% lower in the case of Hull and
32% lower in the case of Sunderland. This has resulted in large increases in demand. Rail travel
between London and Hull has grown by some 60%, whilst on the uncompleted Grimsby toLondon route growth has only been around 10%. In terms of revenue, the first four Hull Trains
services were estimated to have a generation to abstraction ratio of 0.7:1. Another feature of open
access services is the high percentage of passengers on the main flows travelling on dedicatedtickets – well above the 10% threshold used by the Competition Commission (2005) and in somecase above 50%.
Table 9. Economic Benefit of Open Access Services (GBPm)

Economic benefit
Net financial cost
Net Present Value
Benefit Cost Ratio

Hull Trains
PV 5 years
47.3.
29.1
18.1
1.62

PV 10 years
96.9
45.4
51.5
2.13

Grand Central
PV 5 years
18.4
15.5
2.9
1.19

PV 10 years
38.2
24.3
14.0
1.57

Source: MVA, 2009.

Table 9 shows that there appears to be a strong economic case for both the Hull Trains andGrand Central services, with a ten year benefit:cost ratio in excess of 1.5 for both services.

Preston – Discussion Paper 2009-23 - © OECD/ITF, 2009

17

5.

CONCLUSIONS

Competition for long distance rail services remains relatively limited. On track competition,
where it has occurred seems to focus on niche markets which the incumbent operator has
neglected. However, modelling work indicates that if track access charges are based on short run
marginal cost, head-on competition may be feasible for densely trafficked routes but notnecessarily socially desirable, with a tendency to result in too much service, at too high fares.
Where track access charges are based on fully allocated costs, competition may be more limited,even for densely trafficked routes, and this competition may have some cherry picking
characteristics. Again, competition may be feasible (particularly if there are regulations enforcing
interavailable ticketing) but not necessarily desirable. By contrast, analysis of the niche open
access entry in Britain, based on marginal cost based track access charges, does appear sociallydesirable. An interesting question is whether the ratio of generated to abstracted traffic is a usefulindicator. The most likely outcome for the heavily trafficked route in Sweden (S1- head-on
competition, Table 6, Model Run 67) results in a ratio of 0.57, well in excess of the ORR’s 0.3
threshold. By contrast, the most likely outcome on the heavily trafficked route in Great-Britain(GB1 - fringe competition, Table 5, model run 1) gives a ratio of only 0.10. With head-on
competition and matched fares (Table 2, model run 13) this ratio increases to around 0.18.
However, the ratio become difficult to interpret when there are matched fare cuts. For example,
with fringe competition and fare cuts (model run 5, Table 5) generated traffic exceeds that
abstracted by the entrant. However, this scenario results in an 11% reduction in total revenue anda welfare loss. Interestingly, for Table 5, model run 11 (fringe competition in which the entrant
replaces the incumbent fro some services with matching fare cuts), the ratio is 0.6. This option is
welfare enhancing despite a 14% reduction in total revenue, although this is partly due to theentrant cutting out some intermediate stops. Some of these results have echoes of the work
undertaken by SDG (2004) that found that competition on European high speed rail routes was
feasible, provided track access charges were based on marginal costs and provisions were madefor interavailable tickets, but the case is not particularly robust.
Off track competition is relatively untested for long distance services, particularly those thatare good commercial prospects, with the main evidence coming from Great-Britain. Such a model
has been able to attract sufficient numbers of bidders, has coincided with strong demand growthand can result in large premia being paid to the franchisor. However, such competition isvulnerable to the winner’s curse which may be exposed by unexpected events (Hatfield, the 7/7
bombings, the credit crunch). Risk sharing mechanisms may reduce this exposure but do notremove it all together and alternative contractual models may be worth considering including
flexible term contracts and Vickrey style second best auctions.
Where on track competition provides direct services to new markets, experience from GreatBritain indicates this is commercially feasible and socially desirable, but capacity constraints on
the main lines and at key terminals mean that such competition may be limited and there is thewider issue of whether these services are making the best use of limited capacity. There areindications from modelling work in both Britain and Sweden that route competition can bebeneficial, but this will be limited by railway geography, although the scope for such competition
will increase where new high speed lines are being constructed.
The overall impression is that the evidence in support of competition for long distance rail
services, either in the market or for the market, is mixed. Indeed a commercial ‘monopoly’ may
approximate a first-best solution if some conditions are met. First, this monopoly needs to face

18

Preston – Discussion Paper 2009-23 - © OECD/ITF, 2009

modal competition, particularly from deregulated coach and air markets. Secondly, where feasible
this monopoly should face route competition. This may take the form of product differentiation,with the alternate route being slower but cheaper. Where there is sufficient capacity suchdifferentiation may be provided on track, with express services competing with stopping services.
It could be that the slower services are in receipt of subsidy, in which case they should becompetitively tendered. Third, where possible there may be some benefits in terms of niche
competition in which infrequent direct services compete with frequent indirect services. Of
course, if these conditions are met then the commercial operator does not really have a monopoly,at least for significant parts of its market, although it may have some incumbency advantages.
Where such conditions can not be met, then some competition for the market might beconsidered.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The development of the PRAISE model and the Great Britain rail case study was undertaken
at the University of Leeds, with a key role played by Gerard Whelan (now at MVA Consultancy).
The Sweden rail case study was undertaken at the University of Oxford, with a key role played by
Biao Huang (now at the Asian Development Bank). Numerous other colleagues contributed tothis work, including Tim Griffiths of ORR, but the interpretations here (and any mistakes therein)
are purely my own.

Preston – Discussion Paper 2009-23 - © OECD/ITF, 200919

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NOTESi

We consider long distance services as serving city pairs that are more than 50 miles (80km)
apart, although there may be intermediate stops.
ii

These were the night ferry service from Berlin to Malmo, the InterConnex service between
Leipzig and Rostock (via Berlin), Vogltand – Berlin and Harz – Berlin services.

iii

Currently, Virgin Trains operate express services between Birmingham New Street and London
Euston, with London Midland operating stopping services. Chiltern Trains operate stopping
services between Birmingham Snow Hill and London Marylebone.
iv

Also include Heathrow Express.

v

Now published by the Association of Train Operating Companies. Version 5 was released in2009.

Preston – Discussion Paper 2009-23 - © OECD/ITF, 200923