Korea–Japan Cooperation for
Building a Multilateral Security
Cooperation Institution in
Northeast Asia
漢陽大学校 国際学大学院 韓国学科

金裕殷

目次
Ⅰ-INTODUCTION

Ⅱ-POSITIONS OF MAJOR STATES
1. CHARCTERACTRISTIC OF NORTHEAST ASIAN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
2. POSITIONS OF MAJOR STATES

Ⅲ-CONSONANCE AND DISSONANCE
1. CONSONNACE
2. DISSONANCE

Ⅳ-OBSTACLES AND RECONCILIATION
1. MAJOR OBSTACTLES
2. HOW BOTH SIDES TO ACHIEVE RECONCILATION

Ⅴ-CONCLUSIONS
1. BROADER SIGHT AND A LONG-TERM VISION
2. FOR LEADERSHIP OF JAPANⅠ INTRODUCTION
The wind of new regionalism in East Asia since the late 1990s which saw the 1997 Asian financial crisis

The meaning of ‘new regionalism’: contrary to the cases of APEC and ARF
emphasizing “Asianization” and “East Asian Community (EAC)”expansion of a concentric circle unfolded around ASEAN with an exception of SCO

Security cooperative framework in East Asia including Northeast Asia
ARF, trans-Pacific security forum
No formal multilateral security cooperative framework in East Asia and Northeast Asia
In case of Northeast Asia, the Six Party Talks which is ad hoc multilateral andminilateral mechanism, not comprehensive one which deals with security
across the board

Need for Multilateral Security Cooperation Institution in Northeast Asia
Many security issues to address for a permanent peace and stability of the region such as
nontraditional issues as well as traditional issues, aside from the nuclear issue of North
Korea.
It is in the very Northeast Asia that they could be treated and their solutions be foundbetter in a situation that there is no suitable place to concentrate on and discuss them indetail in its own way among countries concerned.
Agreement with the establishment of the working group for Northeast Asia Peace andSecurity Mechanism as one of five working group in the Joint Statement in February 13,
2007 of the Six Part Talk
Need for South Korea-Japan cooperation in building a multilateral security institution in the Region

For a better desirable institution establishment in the long term
Balancing the rising Chinese power to guide in a direction of producing mutual gains

Core values such as democracy, human rights, rule of law and free market
Mutually compatible political and economic system.

The purpose of Today’s lectureTo present how to cooperate between Japan and South Korea is more practical and evenbetter in terms of building a multilateral security cooperation with reflection of two
countries’ interests at the level of both of them being able to accept
In addition, to identify obstacles to bilateral cooperation internally and to suggest thepracticable ways to be able to remove or overcome them.

For achieving the purpose
First, to examine positions of major states including U.S. and China as well as Japan and South
Korea on building a Northeast Asian security cooperation institution
Second, to examine important issues to need to accommodate between Japan and South Korea
for pursuing and consolidating bilateral cooperation and to search ways to promote a rational andpracticable institution
Third, to identify impediments to hinder upgrading of bilateral relations, which is crucial tocooperation for regional security institution building, and also to address approaches toreconciliation over the long term troubles between themFinally, conclusion with some suggestions about things that should be borne in mind forstrengthening and consolidating a bilateral desirable relations and for the leadership of Japan for
the future of Northeast Asian security institution.

Ⅱ POSITIONS OF MAJOR STATES
1. Characteristics of Northeast Asian International Relations
The rise of China and following concerns about the relative decline of U.S. powerwith damage of the “hub and spoke” system
Residues of the cold war which are represented by the division of the Korean
Peninsula and the China-Taiwan relations.
Continuous mutual mistrust by historical and territorial issues among countries

The emergence of new governments in the U.S., Japan, and South Korea☞ All of these characteristics are being reflected in the positions of theconstituent states including Japan and South Korea on the Northeast Asian andEast Asian Security cooperation institution building.

2. Positions of major states

The United StatesIt prefers more inclusive trans-Pacific multilateralism to the narrower
Asian regionalism. And August 20, this year, the ministers of Foreign
Affairs of ASEAN decided to admit U.S and Russia into the EAS.

The existing bilateral alliances should be maintained from theperspective that bilateral alliances and multilateral security
cooperation could be mutually supportive, not mutually exclusive.

An emerging Asian multilateralism has to adopt global norms,
especially in the area of counterterrorism, counterproliferation, andthe promotion of free and open markets

It has prefered ad hoc minilateralism aimed a special objective andcomposed of a “coalition of willing” to institutionalized multilateralmechanism in terms of East Asian level.

But it does not think in the negative about the development of the Six
Party Talks (ad hoc minilateralism) toward an Northeast Asian
multilateral security cooperation institution.

ChinaIt had been cautious to take part in APEC and ARF but it changed its position toembrace multilateralism as part of its new strategy after the end of the Asian
Financial Crisis.
It is willing to take part in trans-Pacific forums, but strong preference for narrower
geographic definitions of Asia that could increase China’s relative weight and influence.
The regional mechanism has to emphasize participatory countries’ sovereignty andnoninterference in domestic affairs as a norm.
It does not raise objection to the existence U.S. alliance system as part of themultilateral security arrangements in East Asia, at least for the foreseeable future.

Therefore, it supports transparent and open East Asian cooperation and inclusive,(not exclusive) officially, but it has also supports the APT as a vehicle for building the EAC
 It seems that China’s own plan does not command a fine prospect, considering thedecision of ASEAN to promote U.S. and Russia as members of the EAS.

JapanThe bilateral alliance with U.S. is the most important basis of security of Japan The regional architecture must allow both bilateralism and multilateralism.

U.S. should take comfort in its effort to promote regional integration; it promotes toexpand the membership of democratic states in East Asian multilateralism, while it
makes efforts to balance the increase of Chinese influence.
It prefers EAS to APT as a vehicle of the EAC.
It makes efforts to balance Chinese influence in East Asian multilateralism byexpanding the membership of democratic states.
It has emphasized functional cooperation first, and then nontraditional security
second, and traditional security last.
East Asian regionalism integration should reflect a respect and realization of
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as well as open and free market rather
than exceptionalismOn traditional security, the majority view is that it must rely on the bilateral alliancewith U.S.

The future regionalism should be not only open and inclusive but also outward-looking,not anti-Americanism or anti-West.
In approaching regionalism in Asia, the prevailing consensus in Japan is that de facto
regionalization should take precedence over institutionalization. An Asian community
will not necessarily be the same as the European community. (Akiko Fukushima)

It seems that Japan will not hasten to establish even the economic regional integration
like EAFTA, to say nothing of security cooperation institution, unless the conditions theyargue are accepted.

 International regime complexity contributes to international law
fragmentation and rule ambiguity. Where state preferences are similar,
states will coordinate to create a clear set of rules. Where preferences
diverge, ambiguity will persist, allowing countries to select their preferredinterpretation. The prospect of the EAC is similar to such a situation.
As for Northeast Asian multilateral security cooperation institution, it
has been passive, reflecting on its position on East Asian multilateralism. It
would likely continue to remain passive without solving the North Korea’s
nuclear issue and Japanese abductees’ problem.
After the incident of sinking of a Korean naval patrol ship in the Yellow
Sea, it seems that Japan’s attitude to Northeast Asian multilateral security
cooperation has gone back to the more negative atmosphere and its attituteseems to continue for the time being.

South Korea
Preoccupied with South-North relations and the unification, it thinks the alliance with
U.S. as the most important mechanism for the national defense.
Both bilateralism and multilateralism could run in parallel like Japan.
However it needs cooperation of China which is deemed to control North Korea tosome degree. China is the largest trading partner of Korea since 2004. However in aview of South Korea, China is still difficult to trust particularly in security sector. In
fact, it could have not thrown suspicion to China away because of some affairs such as
the Research Project of Northeast China and an attitude, sometimes, just to balance
relations between the two Korea.
It had preferred APT to EAS in former two administrations but now gives a feeling ofturning to the EAS format.
It supports universal norms as a principle of multilateral mechanism like Japan, but
the strength is weaker than Japan; functional cooperation and security cooperation
could be proceeded simultaneously, which is close to neo-functionalism.

Regular dialogue and institutionalization is important and could promote theadvancement of security cooperation
As for Northeast Asian security multilateralism, it had tried to develop a multilateral
security mechanism in Northeast Asia through the Six Party Talks as soon as possible,
which, Korean government thinks, is helpful to the unification of the Korean Peninsula
and the prosperity and stability as well as the solution of North Korea’s problem

However, it seems that the position of South Korean government has been changed
gradually. Current government does not emphasize “Northeast Asia” more than theformer governments.
The KIM Dae-jung government had highlighted East Asian regionalism revolved
around APT and the Noh Moo-hyun government had stressed Northeast multilateralism,making full use of the Six Party Talks. But it seems that the Lee Myung-Bak
government which has made use of a so-called ‘squeeze strategy to North Korea
sympathizes with the positions of Japan and United States, underscoring Korea-U.S.
alliance and Asian diplomacy including India, New Zealand, and Australia..

Ⅲ CONSONANCE AND DISSONANCE
The need to pursuit of multilateral regionalism (whatever it covers Asia-Pacific or just East Asia area)- Both are eager to be identified with the emerging multilateral institutions and Asian community.
- However they expose some different view how to approach to built a more beneficial framework.
- Distinction between consonance and dissonance is not easy because Japan and Korea often reveal
the delicate difference when one gets in depth review, though they are appeared to have the same
insistence on a certain issue at a glance.

Consonance
The role of U.S. in the promotion of multilateral security cooperation.
Both of them recognize well the importance of the alliance with U.S.
for their security and insist to have to go abreast bilateral alliance andmultilateralism.
Membership in Northeast Multilateral security cooperation
In case of East Asia, it seems to converge to the Japanese position in
Korean current government

DissonanceNorms and Values
The start of building a multilateral security mechanism occurs gradually,
which enables the parties in question to adjust their statecraft and domestic
foundations accordingly.

The lessons for today are very clear --- less may be more when it comes topreserving and expanding stable peace.
If cooperative security architecture is to emerge in Northeast Asia, it is likely
also to be based on the informality of the “ASEAN WAY.” (Kupchan)
ASEAN Way according to Lee Kuan Yew;
“So long as members who are not ready yet to participate
are not damaged by non-participation, nor exclude from future
participation, the power of veto need not be exercised….
when four agree and one does not object this can still be considereda consensus, and the four should proceed with a new regional
scheme.”Liberal democracy, although it is a facilitating factor, is not a necessary
condition for enemies to become friends. In case of ASEAN, village-based social
norms that emphasized consultation and deliberation provided an important basis
for restraint and consensual decision making at the interstate level, laying afoundation for the establishment of security community.
A concert of the great powers is a far better investment in the spread of peacethan a concert of democracies. Moreover, pressing major powers to quicken theirpace of democratization may do more harm than good in promoting great-power
peace.
In addition, even though states did not exercise political restraint at home likeauthoritarian states, they could practice strategic restraint in their external
relations.

If U.S. predicates partnership with China and Russia on their willingness todemocratize, threaten elite groupings may well react by seeking to block strategiccooperation.
It might be seen unenthusiastic about security cooperation to argue universal
norms like democracy and human rights as prerequisite even before starting tonegotiate for multilateral security cooperation.

Moreover, Economic liberalization may well induce political liberalization overtime, but it would be a mistake to precondition cooperation and the practice ofreciprocal restraint with Russia and China on their embrace of liberal democracy.
In history, the Concert of Europe succeeded in preserving great-power
cooperation among diverse regimes in no small part because its members did notseek to interfere in each other’s domestic affairs.
 If you want to promote the multilateral security cooperation institution, do notpress your partner to accept the norms you prefer as a prerequisite from the
beginning of negotiation.

Proper timing and modalities to pursuit a multilateral security mechanism(including Order of priority between security and functional approaches)
The causal insignificance of economic integration during the early phase of
stable peace. ⇒ In many case in history, there is no causal linkage between
commercial ties and the initial steps toward stable peace. Unilateralaccommodation and the practice of reciprocal restraint preceded economic
integration. Moreover, the advance of reconciliation was driven primarily bygeopolitical considerations, not economic incentive.
Economic integration does advance stable peace during later phases, whensocietal linkages serve to consolidate reconciliation and promote cooperationand trust.
Some Japanese scholar refer like Akiko Fukushima that “in approachingregionalism in Asia, the prevailing consensus in Japan is that de facto
regionalization should take precedence over institutionalization, (and in
addition,) an Asian community will not necessarily be the same as theEuropean community.” ⇒ In fact, it seems that Japan does not need to hasten
to push forward the institutionalization or integration.

However, when addressing long-standing rivalries, governments, international
institutions, and the private sectors should no longer labor under the illusion thatthe advance of economic interdependence will on its own lead to politicalreconciliation.
Trade between China and Japan may mount in the years ahead, but such flows
will have little impact on their bilateral relationship unless they are accompaniedby accommodation and reciprocal restraint on matters of geopolitics.

In addition, regional states in Northeast Asia might combine political andsecurity cooperation or its institutionalization efforts with economic
institutionalization. We have already lesson about the relations of security andeconomic cooperation from the EU that means that security cooperation isnecessary for and facilitates completing integration, and therefore we could
promote faster and efficiently with reducing trials and errors, using a strategy ofgoing side by side. An Asian community will not necessarily be the same as theEuropean community.
The imperative to cooperate for resolving nontraditional issues in the global age
promotes to combine economic cooperation with security. Some nontraditional
issues can be solved more efficiently by regional cooperation.

Ⅳ OBSTACLES AND RECONCILIATION
1. Major Obstacles
Historical IssueTerritorial issue

2. How both sides to achieve reconciliation
In How to make enemies become friends by Charles A. Kupchan,
Four phases to the pathway to stable peaceUnilateral accommodation to befriend an adversaryStable peace requires mutual reassurance and respect, not mutual suspicion and resentment.
Zones of peace form around cores of strength, but only when those cores withhold theirpower and demonstrate benign intent through the exercise of restraints.
Structure matters, but so does statecraft.
In most case, stable peace is promoted when stronger states make concession.
Costly and unambiguous concessions need to clear the way for reconciliation and starting
the sequential process that leads to stable peace.
Major concessions, not just token gestures, are essential they are necessary indicators ofbenign intent.
Implication:# It is natural that Japan as a stronger state has more benign attitude than Korea for reconciliation.

Institutionalized reciprocal restraint for regular cooperation which is connected
to dampen rivalryIf states abandon the practice of strategic restraint, they no longer appear as
benign polities to their partner.
Behavior can change perception of intent and motivation even as regime typeremains constant.

Implication:# Both should avoid behaviors to stimulate each other with strategic calculation for
acquiring the gains from cooperation in explicit or implicit agreement.
# Japanese say that “we apologized for the past regrettable history many times and how
many times we should do it?” But some Japanese politicians intermittently show
inconsistent behaviors with their words such as speaking to glorify Japan’s past historyor the visit to Yasukuni Shrine. ☞ defection from the path of strategic restraint# Such behaviors make the neighboring states doubt the intent and motivation of Japanagain, which let the neighboring states come back to before previous apologies.
Consistency of speech and action is important.

Social integration through building personal and institutional linkages between the partner
statesThe generation of new narratives of amity and the consolidation of compatible, shared,or common identities
The causal importance of political discourse should be recognized seriously among
elites of would-be partner states.
Words and symbols matter, especially when those wield instrumentally by government
officials and opinion makers.
As political leaders, economic interest groups, and media and cultural outlets generate
new narratives of partner states with big influence, they have the ability to alter the
deeply held identities that society hold of each other.
For example, “shared Anglo-Saxon race,” and “Special relations” between Britain andU.S., and “a single entity” and “Christian brotherhood” among the states of the EU helped
consolidate a shared identity.
Changes in discourse have also as much potential to be destructive as constructive.
Therefore, Today’s political leaders and opinion makers should take matters of
discourse and identity more seriously than they often do.

Implication:# Especially politicians and media in the two countries should avoid narratives tostimulate each other if they think strategically that bilateral cooperation need to be
cultivated carefully.
# When can we find a shared identity at present? The Chinese letters using world?
Confucius cultural world? We could or might find it by highly increasing cultural andeconomic exchanges with creating good narratives.
# Regional rivalries would similarly benefit from efforts to alter antagonistic discourses.
In East Asia, for example, the continuing controversy over whether Japan has acceptedsufficient responsibility for its behavior during the Second World War and revised its
history textbooks accordingly has more than symbolic importance. By maintaining
oppositional narratives among Japanese, Koreans, and Chinese, these issues represent asignificant impediment to rapprochement in Northeast Asia.

 Other considerations

Establishing common vision for prosperity and stability in the region

If Japan and South Korea forge an agreed common vision for East Asia as well asNortheast Asia in mutual trust, it will be easier to cooperate closely and productively forthe region and both countries.
There is no better partner than each other in Northeast Asia considering shared values
and compatible economic and political systems. Only for two countries to rely on U.S.
has a limit geopolitically and globally and close cooperation between two (with a good
relationship with U.S.) in right direction will amplify the synergy effect to two countries.
So, two countries have to make an effort to forge a common vision in the long-termby various ways including establishing a committee or common research institute at agovernmental level and an academic circle at a private level.

Avoiding conflictual issues consciously under an implicit agreement each otherIn case of the territorial issue, Dokdo island (Dakeshima), it would be better torefrain strategically from making mention of it not to stimulate each other, especiallyamong elites of both sides including political leaders in particular.
In case of the historical textbook issue, Japanese government should expand no
more of the problem with self-restriction.
If the relationship becomes bad because a Japanese political leader makes acomment on Dokdo and stimulates Koreans again or Japan government does notdemonstrate its self-restraint, how can we, Japanese and Koreans who want toreconcile each other on a strategic thinking, do?

 There will be no way without just waiting a longer time to return to a good
relationship again like a rollercoaster. But to increase exchanges, making a thickreconciliation, can reduce the time to come back a good relationship and also thenumber of roller coasting times

Increasing exchanges
According to Croker, reconciliation can be divided into “thin” and “thick.”Thin reconciliation means that formerly hostile parties continue to coexist without
taking active revenge. Diplomatic normalization is important part of reconciliation but
it is only a thin one because reconciliation was purely a state-to-state affair. In roller
coasting relations, the relations between Japan and Korea stay still in a thinreconciliation.
Thick reconciliation which entails forgiveness, mercy, a shared comprehensive vision,mutual healing, or harmony. For cultivating a thick reconciliation, to increaseexchanges is a very good method. But we have to consider that some exchanges should
be designed carefully. For example, media should make an effort to convey good
images of its partner state rather than bad to their people as far as possible. It would begood idea to increase exchanging social science scholars of both sides strategically,
enabling to study bilateral reconciliation and cooperation jointly in a joint support ofgovernments.
Exchanges of Pop culture, animation industry, and drama, joint production for movie
or music album, exchange of youth, establishing a jointly participating organizationsuch as the Peace Corps for community service in developing countries, etc. are further
encouraged by active support of the governments.

Ⅳ CONCLUSION
1. Broader sight and a long-term visionWe had better have a broader perspective on the global world, not just only
focusing on a narrow East Asia or Northeast Asia.
We could find many areas to cooperate closely each other with a whole world.
It would be better to keep conflictual issues inside its wardrobe deeply for a
strategic cooperation.
To build a long-term vision for prosperity and peace in East Asia and Northeast
Asia would be helpful to cooperating each other.
All of them would eventually contribute to build a preferable multilateral
security regime in the region through a closed cooperation between two countries.

2. Finally, for Leadership of Japan

Japan is the second largest economy in the world and has a democratic and stable
political system and liberal market system which the many neighboring states want
to follow.
It is still difficult to trust China as a benign state from a perspective of theneighboring states, rather it is a worrisome partner, to a degree which China does
not accept universal values actively and sometimes shows an aggressive behaviors
with closed nationalism.
Though China is emerging power in no small part because it has a very big scaleof economy and the biggest population in the world, it is difficult to predict to go
beyond Japan and become a hegemonic power in region in the short and mid-term.
It has not only domestic affairs to mitigate such as the intensified gap between therich and poor and almost daily happening of demonstration in its west region but
also GDP per capita is considerably low.
Therefore Japan has more resources for the leadership any other countries in theregion. And its leadership needs to balance and guide China in a right way, as well.

However, Japan has not been recognized yet as the most prospective leader, in nosmall part because it does not often show consistency between speech and action interms of apology to the unfortunate history in the past including the historicaltextbook issue and there are still longstanding territorial disputes with theneighboring states.

That is connected to an image of benign hegemony or leadership. If Japan
continues to maintain and repeat the aforementioned behaviors, it will be difficult to
get recognition as a leader from countries in East Asia.
Japan ought to accommodate more with the neighboring states and to act morestrategically for emerging a regional leader as a benign hegemony.
If then, Japan could receive much more support from the many neighboring states
including South Korea and reborn as a global as well as regional leader.