Siting   of   Radioactive   Waste  Management   Facilities   in    Japan  and  Switzerland  
  
  
  
  
  
  

  
  
Research  Paper  

  
  
  
  
  
Author  Fuchs  Sarah  Student  ID  Number:  51-­‐‑138240      Thesis  Advisor  Prof.  Tanaka  Nobuo  Graduate  School  of  Public  Policy,  The  University  of  Tokyo      Date  of  Submission  22  May  2014  Update:  31  October  2014        Research  paper  submitted  to  the  Graduate  School  of  Public  Policy,  The  University  of  Tokyo  in  partial  fulfillment  of  the  requirements    for  the  degree  of  Master  of  Public  Policy,  International  Program,  2014      Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    Executive  Summary  This  research  paper  provides  an  analysis  of  the  siting  procedure  of  geological  repositories  for  radioactive   waste   in   Japan   and   Switzerland   from   a   public   policy   perspective.   The   aim   is   to  compare   the   policies   of   the   two   countries   to   develop   recommendations   for   site   selection  procedures  everywhere.    
The   methods   of   analysis   include   a   literature   review   and   semi-­‐‑structured   interviews   with  experts   from   the   professional   and   academic   world   in   Japan   and   Switzerland.   A   theoretical  framework   for   analyzing   and   structuring   the   case   studies   is   established   based   on   relevant  concepts  from  political  science  and  public  management.  The  interviewees  include  members  of   public   administration,   research   institutions   and   other   professionals,   who   were   chosen  because   of   their   practical   experience   and   their   insider   knowledge   of   the   procedures   and  challenges  of  the  siting  process.  
The   Japanese   muddling   through   approach   to   siting   has   made   very   limited   progress   in   the  past   decade:   no   municipality   applied   for   the   initial   stage   of   the   procedure   and   the  institutional   bodies,   in   particular   the   implementing   organization,   are   faced   with   a   massive  loss   of   credibility.   Since   the   Tohoku   earthquake   in   March   2011,   the   debate   reemerged   and  authorities   are   under   strong   surveillance   by   the   public.   Yet,   the   initializing   step   of   the   site  selection   is   still   discussed   with   calls   for   a   more   proactive   government,   and   trust   between  local   and   regional   authorities   and   the   central   government   is   shattered.   Hence,   the   major  challenge  in  Japan  is  building  trust  among  the  stakeholders  involved  based  on  a  sustainable  dialogue.    
The  Swiss  top-­‐‑down  approach  to  site  selection  is  working  smoothly  despite  minor  challenges  like  the  extension  of  the  timeframe  or  the  discussion  about  regulatory  capture.  In  particular,  the  regional  participation  guarantees  the  involvement  of  the  local  communities  by  focusing  on  its  demands  and  needs  to  develop  sustainably.  The  major  challenge  in  Switzerland  is  the  length  of  the  procedure  that  implies  a  high  turnover  of  stakeholders  and  requires  continuous  motivation  to  participate  and  maintaining  the  credibility  of  institutions.    
From  the  case  studies,  recommendations  for  the  characteristics  of  a  best  practice  concept  to  successfully  select  a  geological  repository  site  were  derived.  The  optimal  policy  is  based  on  a  stepwise,   predictable   and   flexible   procedure   with   an   explicit   institutional   framework   and  public   participation   favoring   a   partnership   between   all   levels.   International   cooperation  between   authorities   positively   affects   the   design   of   domestic   policies.   It   promotes   a  stakeholder   dialogue   between   all   interested   parties,   which   is   in   turn   shaped   by   national  concepts   of   democracy.   The   reciprocal   communication   aims   at   developing   risk   literate  citizens,  incorporating  the  values  of  endurance,  continuity  and  trust.    
  

	
  

Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    Table  of  Contents  1.   INTRODUCTION  1  2.   THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORK  

1  

2.1.	
   INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  THE  JOINT  CONVENTION	
  2.2.	
   RESPONSIBILITIES  OF  INSTITUTIONS	
  2.3.	
   THREE  APPROACHES  TO  SITING	
  2.3.1.	
   TOP-­‐‑DOWN  APPROACH	
  2.3.2.	
   MUDDLING  THROUGH:  TOP-­‐‑DOWN  AND  BOTTOM-­‐‑UP  MIX	
  2.3.3.	
   BOTTOM-­‐‑UP  APPROACH:  DISCURSIVE  SITE  SELECTION	
  2.4.	
   FAIRNESS  AND  EQUITY  AS  ETHICAL  CONSIDERATIONS	
  2.5.	
   PROBLEMATIC  ASPECTS  OF  THE  PUBLIC  DEBATE	
  2.6.	
   IMPORTANCE  OF  TWO-­‐‑WAY  COMMUNICATION	
  

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6	
  

3.   COUNTRY  CASE  STUDIES  

6  

3.1.	
   SITING  IN  JAPAN	
  3.1.1.	
   HISTORY  OF  SITING  AND  SOURCES  OF  REGULATION	
  3.1.2.	
   INSTITUTIONAL  FRAMEWORK:  ROLES  AND  RESPONSIBILITIES	
  3.1.3.	
   STAGES  OF  PROCESS  AND  STRATEGY  IN  SITING	
  3.1.4.	
   REGIONAL  PARTICIPATION	
  3.1.5.	
   PUBLIC  ACCEPTANCE	
  3.1.6.	
   POLITICAL  DEBATE  AND  CONTROVERSIAL  ISSUES	
  3.1.7.	
   FUTURE  CHALLENGES	  3.2.	
   SITING  IN  SWITZERLAND	
  3.2.1.	
   HISTORY  OF  SITING  AND  SOURCES  OF  REGULATION	
  3.2.2.	
   INSTITUTIONAL  FRAMEWORK:  ROLES  AND  RESPONSIBILITIES	
  3.2.3.	
   STAGES  OF  PROCESS  AND  STRATEGY  IN  SITING	
  3.2.4.	
   REGIONAL  PARTICIPATION	
  3.2.5.	
   PUBLIC  ACCEPTANCE	
  3.2.6.	
   POLITICAL  DEBATE  AND  CONTROVERSIAL  ISSUES	
  3.2.7.	
   FUTURE  CHALLENGES	
  

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21	
  

4.   ANALYSIS  OF  THE  COUNTRY  CASE  STUDIES  

22  

4.1.	
   POLICY  DESIGN	
  4.2.	
   STAKEHOLDER  DIALOGUE	  4.3.	
   RECOMMENDATIONS	
  

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24	
  
24	
  

5.   CONCLUSION  25  LIST  OF  REFERENCES  27  APPENDIX  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    Table  of  Figures  FIGURE  1:  NUCLEAR  FUEL  CYCLE  AND  RADIOACTIVE  WASTE  IN  JAPAN  ...........................................  7  FIGURE  2:  DEVELOPMENT  OF  JAPANESE  HLW  DISPOSAL  PROGRAM  .................................................  8  FIGURE  3:  GOVERNMENT  AND  ORGANIZATIONS:  HLW  DISPOSAL  PROGRAM  IN  JAPAN  .................  9  FIGURE  4:  IMPLEMENTATION  FRAMEWORK  IN  JAPAN  .......................................................................  10  FIGURE  5:  THREE  STAGES  OF  THE  SITE  SELECTION  PROCESS  IN  JAPAN  .............................................  11  FIGURE  6:  POSITION  AND  INTERRELATIONSHIPS  FOR  THE  SECTORAL  PLAN  FOR  DEEP  GEOLOGICAL  REPOSITORIES  IN  SWITZERLAND  .................................................................................................  16  FIGURE  7:  DIVISION  OF  ROLES  IN  SWITZERLAND  ................................................................................  17  FIGURE  8:  SELECTION  OF  SITES  IN  THREE  STAGES  IN  SWITZERLAND  ................................................  18  FIGURE  9:  TIMETABLE  FOR  SITE  SELECTION  IN  SWITZERLAND  ..........................................................  19  FIGURE  10:  OPTIMAL  POLICY  FOR  SITE  SELECTION  ............................................................................  25  

  

	
  

Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    1.

Introduction  Academics   and   the   general   public   alike   see   the   siting   of   radioactive   waste   management  facilities   as   the   stumble-­‐‑stone   in   high-­‐‑level   waste   (HLW)   disposal.   In   finding   an   adequate  approach   to   the   site   selection   process,   success   is   never   guaranteed   –   but   if   the   wrong  approach  to  siting  is  chosen,  failure  is  certain  (Streffer,  Gethmann,  Kamp,  Kröger,  Rehbinder,  &  Renn,  2011).    
In  my  research  paper,  I  analyze  the  siting  procedure  of  geological  repositories  for  radioactive  waste  from  a  public  policy  perspective  using  the  case  studies  of  Japan  and  Switzerland.  The  goal  of  the  research  paper  is  to  compare  the  policies  of  the  two  countries  in  order  to  develop  recommendations  for  site  selection  procedures  everywhere.  To  do  so,  I  interviewed  experts  from   the   professional   and   academic   world   in   Japan   and   Switzerland   and   reviewed   the  relevant   literature.   Through   my   research,   I   aim   to   contribute   to   the   development   of   best  practice  examples  for  nuclear  waste  management  policies.    
Among   radioactive   waste   management   facilities,   I   focus   on   the   site   selection   for   geological  repositories,  as  these  are  the  most  commonly  discussed  facilities  for  ultimate  storage.  I  limit  the   discussion   of   the   siting   process   to   a   policy   perspective   and   do   not   enter   into   technical  details.   The   interviewed   members   of   public   administration,   research   institutions   and   other  professionals  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  were  chosen  because  of  their  practical  experience  in  the  field  and  their  insider  knowledge  of  the  procedures  and  challenges  of  the  siting  process.    
In   chapter   2,   I   introduce   the   theoretical   framework   for   the   analysis   of   the   case   studies.   The  concepts  cover  different  approaches  to  the  design  of  a  policy,  as  well  as  relevant  aspects  of  the  interaction  between  stakeholders.  In  chapter  3,  I  describe  the  siting  process  in  Japan  and  Switzerland   in   regard   to   the   design   of   the   site   selection   process,   the   possibilities   of   public  participation,  public  acceptance,  the  political  debate  and  criticism,  and  future  challenges.  In  chapter  4,  I  compare  the  policy  design  and  the  stakeholder  dialogue  within  the  two  countries  and  develop  recommendations  for  an  optimal  siting  process.  In  the  final  chapter,  I  conclude  my  analysis  by  emphasizing  the  role  of  public  acceptance  and  generational  equity.    

2.

Theoretical  framework  In  this  chapter,  I  introduce  relevant  concepts  from  political  science  and  public  management  to   establish   a   theoretical   framework   for   analyzing   and   structuring   the   case   studies.   This  includes   both   the   design   of   the   site   selection   policy,   including   the   institutional   framework  and   stepwise   procedure,   and   the   interaction   between   different   stakeholders   such   as   the  central  government,  municipalities  and  local  communities.  
In   the   following,   first   the   role   of   international   organizations   and   agreements   in   the   field   of  radioactive   waste   management   is   introduced.   Second,   the   responsibilities   of   institutions  involved   in   the   siting   process   are   discussed,   stressing   the   leading   role   of   the   national  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    government   and   the   polluter-­‐‑pays   principle.   Third,   three   approaches   to   siting   are  introduced:  top-­‐‑down,  muddling  through  and  bottom-­‐‑up.  Fourth,  the  normative  notions  of  equity   and   fairness   that   are   especially   important   for   stakeholder   dialogue   in   the   siting  process   are   outlined.   Fifth,   the   three   most   problematic   issues   for   the   public   debate   –   the  academic   disagreement   about   implementation   measures,   the   high   mobilization   and  amplification   potential,   and   the   differences   in   risk   assessment   between   experts   and  laypersons   –   are   outlined.   Lastly,   the   importance   of   two-­‐‑way   communication   based   on   a  fairness-­‐‑  and  discourse-­‐‑oriented  balance  of  interests  is  explained.    

2.1.

International  organizations  and  the  Joint  Convention  On   an   international   level,   mainly   two   organizations   are   generating   nuclear   regulations:   the  International   Atomic   Energy   Agency   (IAEA),   a   United   Nations   autonomous   body,   and   the  Nuclear  Energy  Agency  (NEA),  a  specialized  agency  within  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-­‐‑operation  and  Development  (OECD).    
The   IAEA   enacted   the   first   legal   instrument   to   directly   address   waste   management   on   a  global   scale,   namely   the   Joint   Convention   on   the   Safety   of   Spent   Fuel   Management   and   on   the  Safety  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management.  The  treaty  was  signed  in  1997  and  entered  into  force  in  2001  (International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  2013a).  Japan  and  Switzerland  are  both  parties  to  the  Joint  Convention  (International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  2013b).  The  Joint  Convention  requires   an   institutional   separation   between   the   management   of   radioactive   waste   disposal  and  the  regulation  and  supervision  authority  (Bredimas  &  Nuttall,  2008).  In  a  narrow  sense,  radioactive  waste  disposal  management  only  covers  the  technical  aspects  of  the  issue,  and  all  parties   of   the   Joint   Convention   respect   its   institutional   separation   from   the   regulatory  authority.   However,   the   principle   could   also   be   interpreted   in   a   broad   sense,   where  promotional  and  political  activities  are  also  part  of  radioactive  waste  disposal  management.  
In   this   case,   compliance   is   more   questionable   for   some   cases   (Streffer   et   al.,   2011):   where  responsibility  for  promotional  and  political  activities  is  assigned  to  the  regulatory  authority,  disposal  issues  can  still  become  politicized  and  the  advisory  function  of  existing  independent  or  separate  regulatory  bodies  is  limited.  Hence,  the  IAEA  recommends  the  establishment  of  a  regulatory   agency,   which   is   independent   of   both   the   management   of   nuclear   facilities   and  the  promotional  functions  of  nuclear  energy  (Bredimas  &  Nuttall,  2008).    

2.2.

Responsibilities  of  institutions  In  a  national  context,  the  ultimate  responsibility  for  radioactive  waste  disposal  lies  with  the  national   government,   which   reflects   the   precautionary   principle   and   the   principle   of   inter-­‐‑generational  justice  (Streffer  et  al.,  2011).  Still,  the  industry  is  required  to  contribute  its  share  to   the   process   by   establishing   organizations   responsible   for   the   management   of   HLW.   The  national  government  coordinates,  regulates  and  supervises  the  construction  and  operation  of  facilities  by  the  industry.    
Concerning   the   costs   of   the   radioactive   waste   management,   the   ‘polluter-­‐‑pays   principle’   is  applied.   According   to   the   Environment   Committee   of   the   OECD   (1972),   “this   principle  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    means   that   the   polluter   should   bear   the   expenses   of   carrying   out   the   above-­‐‑mentioned  [pollution  prevention  and  control]  measures  decided  by  public  authorities  to  ensure  that  the  environment  is  in  an  acceptable  state“.  In  regard  to  radioactive  waste,  the  principle  implies  that  the  nuclear  industry  must  bear  the  costs  of  high-­‐‑level  radioactive  waste  disposal  (Gaines,  1991).   In   general,   the   nuclear   facility   operators   are   obliged   to   ensure   the   coverage   of   the  radioactive   waste   disposal   by   establishing   and   maintaining   a   designated   fund   (OECD  Nuclear  Energy  Agency,  2010).  A  separated  administration  of  the  fund  shall  ensure  that  the  money  collected  is  exclusively  available  for  the  final  waste  disposal.    

2.3.

Three  approaches  to  siting  Even   though   it   is   by   no   means   a   sufficient   condition   to   reach   a   universally   acceptable  solution,   establishing   a   basis   for   communication   is   an   indispensable   pre-­‐‑requisite   to   do   so  (Streffer   et   al.,   2011).   In   view   of   the   challenges   and   conflicts   in   societal   debates,   three  theoretical  approaches  to  political  decision-­‐‑making  are  distinguished  and  applied  to  the  site  selection  process.    

2.3.1. Top-­‐‑down  approach  Under  the  top-­‐‑down  approach,  the  elected  representatives  in  a  democratic  system  have  the  sole  right  of  decision-­‐‑making  in  the  siting  process.  If  at  all,  the  population  participates  only  to  a  limited  extent,  for  example  by  voicing  opinions  during  hearings.  The  final  decision  is  in  the   hands   of   the   elected   representatives.   However,   decision-­‐‑makers   must   prove   that   all  objections  by  society  have  been  duly  dealt  with  before  taking  a  final  decision,  and  they  are  obliged  to  disclose  all  arguments  for  and  against  the  decision.  
The  legitimacy  of  this  approach  depends  heavily  on  the  trust  in  the  power  of  judgment  and  the   neutrality   of   legal   decision-­‐‑maker   (Löfstedt   &   Vogel,   2001).   Also,   society   must   perceive  the   decision-­‐‑making   process   as   fair   in   order   to   accept   it   (Linnerooth-­‐‑Bayer   &   Fitzgerald,  1996).   Hence,   a   decision   pushed   through   by   a   strong   state   against   the   will   of   the   citizens  would  come  at  the  high  price  of  lost  legitimacy  and  trust  in  the  system.  Few  politicians  are  prepared  to  pay  this  price  in  order  to  successfully  site  a  repository.  

2.3.2. Muddling  through:  top-­‐‑down  and  bottom-­‐‑up  mix  The  approach  based  on  a  minimum  consensus  is  called  muddling  through  (Lindblom,  1959).  
In   decision-­‐‑making,   only   those   options   with   the   least   societal   opposition   are   considered.  
Societal   groups   can   influence   the   process   of   political   decision-­‐‑making   to   a   certain   extent.  
Their   influence   depends   on   the   ability   to   connect   with   the   political   system   in   terms   of  language   and   processing   style   and   to   mobilize   public   pressure.   The   proposal   entailing   the  least  loss  of  support  by  interest  groups  for  political  decision-­‐‑makers  is  likely  to  be  taken  up  by  politicians.  Depending  on  public  pressure,  the  process  can  be  slowed  down  or  stopped  in  different   phases:   for   example,   sites   are   merely   explored   first,   decisions   are   postponed   or  already  made  decisions  are  revoked.  If  the  issue  is  as  controversial  as  disposal  site  selection,  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    muddling  through  can  only  lead  to  a  successful  conclusion  if  the  issue  eventually  dies  down  as  a  general  fatigue  sets  in.    
Again,   loss   of   legitimacy   of   the   involved   institutions   and   decreased   trust   in   the   system   are  side   effects   of   the   muddling   through   approach.   Also,   it   often   leads   to   a   solution   that   only  satisfies  a  few  people.  Furthermore,  collective  acceptance  behavior  is  often  inconsistent  and  changes   over   time   so   that   policies   aimed   only   at   acceptance   will   sooner   or   later   become  entangled  in  contradictions  (Gethmann  &  Mittelstraß,  1992).  The  affected  citizens  are  likely  to   eventually   become   increasingly   weary   of   policies   offering   neither   a   clear   course   nor   a  claim  to  leadership.    

2.3.3. Bottom-­‐‑up  approach:  discursive  site  selection  The   bottom-­‐‑up   or   discursive   approach   is   an   attempt   to   fairly   negotiate   between   different  stakeholders   (Renn,   Deuschle,   Jäger,   &   Weimer-­‐‑Jehle,   2007).   The   aim   is   to   provide  constructive  solutions  to  problems  while  allowing  for  more  than  one  outcome.  To  ensure  the  effectiveness   of   the   approach   and   to   prevent   strategic   behavior   amongst   participants,   the  dialogue   must   be   structured   according   to   certain   rules.   Habermas   (1984)   identified   three  conditions,   which   legitimize   collectively   binding   norms:   agreement   of   all   involved  stakeholders,   substantial   justification   of   the   statements   delivered   within   the   discourse   and  suitable  compensation  for  negatively  affected  interests  and  values.  
In  reality,  these  requirements  for  fair  discourse  are  difficult  to  fulfill.  In  a  politically  charged  and   polarized   debate,   many   strategically   oriented   stakeholders   have   a   strong   interest   in  paralyzing  the  process,  for  instance  by  creating  endless  marathon  sessions  through  countless  procedural   motions   and   peripheral   contributions   to   the   discussion   (Wiedemann   as   cited   in  Renn   et   al.,   2007).   According   to   Weinrich   (as   cited   in   Renn   et   al.,   2007),   the   dictatorship   of  persistence   determines   which   arguments   are   eventually   accepted.   Society   is   commonly  disappointed  and  alienated  by  discursive  approaches  that  start  out  with  high  aspirations  and  end  in  trivial  realizations.  

2.4.

Fairness  and  equity  as  ethical  considerations  Ethical   principles   of   fairness   and   equity   shape   the   discussion   about   radioactive   waste  management.   The   Radioactive   Waste   Management   Committee   of   NEA   distinguishes  between  two  types  of  equity:  “between   generations   (intergenerational   equity),   concerning   the   responsibilities   of   current  generations   who   might   be   leaving   potential   risks   and   burdens   to   future   generations;   and  within   contemporary   generations   (intragenerational   equity),   concerning   the   balance   of  resource  allocation  and  the  involvement  of  various  sections  of  contemporary  society  in  a  fair  and   open   decision-­‐‑making   process   related   to   the   waste   management   solutions   to   be  implemented”   (Radioactive   Waste   Management   Committee   of   the   OECD   Nuclear   Energy  Agency,  1995).  

The   principle   of   intragenerational   equity   also   applies   to   communities   affected   by   the  construction  and  operation  of  nuclear  waste  management  facilities.    

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    The  importance  of  intergeneration  equity  was  highlighted  in  the  2008  Eurobarometer  poll  on  attitudes  towards  radioactive  waste.  93%  of  the  interviewed  Europeans  responded  that  they  see   an   urgent   need   to   finding   a   solution   to   the   waste   issue   now   rather   than   leaving   it  unsolved  to  future  generations  (TNS  Opinion  &  Social,  2008).    

2.5.

Problematic  aspects  of  the  public  debate  Streffer   et   al.   (2011)   identify   three   problematic   aspects   of   the   public   debate   that   pose  challenges  to  the  successful  selection  of  radioactive  waste  management  sites.  
First,   even   though   there   is   a   general   agreement   within   the   academic   community   that   deep  geological  repositories  are  the  best  currently  available  solution  for  radioactive  waste  disposal,  some   scholars   and   professionals   oppose   the   implementation   of   repositories.   They   stress  flexibility,  in  particular  regarding  organizational  learning  capacities  and  the  ability  to  adapt  to   future   scientific   and   technological   developments.   This   academic   debate   is   perceived   in  public   as   proof   for   the   lack   of   maturity   of   the   scientific   research   and   its   low   reliability   and  seriousness.   This   conflict   of   facts   hinders   further   research   and   undermines   public   trust   in  science  overall  (Streffer  et  al.,  2011).    
Second,   there   is   an   immense   discrepancy   between   the   perception   of   laypersons   and   the  opinion   of   experts   regarding   the   safety   of   final   disposal   (Streffer   et   al.,   2011).   That   the  scientific   concept   of   ‘technological   risk’   is   commonly   translated   into   ‘imminent   threat’   and  ‘creeping   danger’   highly   affects   its   evaluation   (Renn,   2008).   For   example,   risks   with   a   high  potential   for   damage   but   a   very   low   probability   of   fully   coming   to   bear   are   perceived   as  ‘imminent   threats’   because   of   their   randomness.   The   term   ‘creeping   danger’   explains   the  misperception  about  the  causal  relationships  of  events  and  latent  effects.  The  probability  of  an   event   is   interpreted   as   the   degree   of   certainty   for   a   causal   relationship   instead   of   a  significant  deviation  from  a  naturally  given  variation.    
Third,   the   issue   of   radioactive   waste   management   entails   a   high   mobilization   and  amplification   potential   within   most   industrialized   countries   because   it   touches   upon  fundamental   convictions   regarding   societal   development   (Streffer   et   al.,   2011).   The   highly  emotional  debate  about  final  disposal  reflects  the  worldwide  observed  stigma  effects  around  all  nuclear  issues  (Slovic,  Flynn,  &  Robin,  1994).  Merely  mentioning  the  term  ‘nuclear’  often  triggers   associations   in   citizens’   minds   that   lead   to   a   fundamental   debate   about   nuclear  energy   in   general   rather   than   a   more   practical   discussion   of   its   technological   viability   or  long-­‐‑term   safety   (Tochiyama,   2014).   The   conflict   about   preferences   and   normative  evaluations   manifests   itself   in   crises   of   legitimacy   and   dissatisfied   justice   claims.  
Consequently,   the   legitimacy   of   the   authorized   decision-­‐‑makers   is   increasingly   questioned  by  large  parts  of  the  population,  with  their  decisions  in  fact  rejected  (see  chapter  2.3.).  Local  communities   and   residents   sometimes   transfer   theses   conflicts   into   the   public   debate   by  employing   the   risk-­‐‑adverse   strategy   of   NIMBY,   ‘not   in   my   backyard’   (Fischel,   2001):   in  principle,  they  endorse  the  necessity  for  such  facilities,  but  under  the  condition  that  they  are  built  as  far  away  as  possible  from  their  home  (Fredriksson,  2000).  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah  

  

2.6.

Importance  of  two-­‐‑way  communication  According  to  Streffer  et  al.  (2011),  there  are  two  main  requirements  necessary  for  arriving  at  a   solution   for   siting   a   geological   repository   that   is   not   only   factually   sound,   but   also  politically   acceptable:   dialogue-­‐‑based   communication   with   the   society   and   a   policy   based  upon  a  fairness-­‐‑  and  discourse-­‐‑oriented  balance  of  interests.    
One  ultimate  goal  of  communication  is  that  the  population  should  become  risk  literate.  Risk  literacy   is   defined   as   the   ability   to   make   an   informed   risk   assessment   based   on   knowledge  regarding   the   factually   verifiable   consequences   of   risk-­‐‑causing   events.   This   goal   can   be  reached   through   an   interactive   process   that   promotes   the   exchange   of   information   and  opinions  of  all  stakeholders.  In  this  dialogue,  information  regarding  specific  risks  should  be  shared   and   concerns,   anxieties,   attitudes   or   reactions   related   to   particular   risks   should   be  addressed.    
Communication   is   understood   as   a   reciprocal,   dialogue-­‐‑oriented   exchange   process.  
Particular   attention   should   be   paid   to   an   increased   two-­‐‑way   communication   between   all  groups   and   institutions.   In   this   exchange   process,   trust   between   individual   stakeholders  should   be   build   by   means   of   comprehensive   understanding   of   problems   and   mutual  willingness  to  learn  in  order  to  establish  a  basis  for  a  universally  acceptable  decision-­‐‑making.  

3.

Country  case  studies  Countries   with   nuclear   facilities   share   common   features   such   as   the   influence   of   the   Joint  Convention,   a   vivid   international   exchange   including   peer   reviews   and   a   gradual  harmonization   of   regulations   regarding   the   disposal   of   nuclear   waste   (Streffer   et   al.,   2011).  
Differences   appear   in   the   political-­‐‑administrative   system   or   culture,   the   geological   and  economic   conditions,   and   the   objectives   of   site   selection.   Also,   public   attitudes   toward  nuclear  energy  in  general  and  radioactive  waste  disposal  in  particular  vary  largely  between  countries.    
I   chose   Japan   and   Switzerland   as   case   studies  based   on   a   most   different   case   design.   Japan  illustrates  a  classical  muddling  through  approach  in  siting,  whereas  Switzerland’s  procedure  is   a   top-­‐‑down   approach.   Moreover,   Japan’s   site   selection   process   has   been   stalled   for   a  decade,   while   the   Swiss   procedure   is   working   smoothly   and   already   incorporates   regional  participation.   I   conducted   semi-­‐‑structured   interviews   to   ensure   comparability   while   being  able   to   be   responsive   to   the   individual   experts.  I   interviewed   experts   from   the   professional  and   academic   world   in   Japan   and   Switzerland,   which   I   selected   because   of   their   practical  experience  in  the  field  and  their  insider  knowledge  of  the  procedures  and  challenges  of  the  siting  process.  For  the  Japanese  case  study,  I  personally  met  four  experts,  who  are  professors  at   universities   in   Japan   or   working   for   research   institutions.   For   the   Swiss   case   study,   I  interviewed   five   experts   by   phone,   who   are   members   of   the   ENSI   Board   or   working   for  either   Nagra   or   SFOE.   One   expert   was   interviewed   for   both   case   studies   (see   the   appendix  for  a  detailed  list  of  interviewees).    

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    In  the  comparative  analysis  of  Japan  and  Switzerland,  I  use  the  insights  from  the  theoretical  framework   to   structure   the   cases.   In   regard   to   the   policy   design,   I   focus   on   the   history   of  siting   and   sources   of   regulation,   the   institutional   framework,  and   the   stages   of  the   process.  
To   find   out   about   the   interaction   among   stakeholders,   I   discuss   the   possibilities   of   public  participation   and   public   acceptance   in   both   countries’   site   selection   procedures.   Lastly,   I  outline  the  political  debate  and  controversies  and  identify  future  challenges.  

3.1.

Siting  in  Japan  Figure  1  depicts  the  nuclear  fuel  cycle  in  Japan.  The  final  disposal  site  is  designed  for  HLW  and   TRU-­‐‑waste.   Reprocessing   spent   fuel   from   nuclear   reactors   generates   HLW   (vitrified  wastes),   whereas   reprocessing   and   MOX   fabrication   generates   TRU-­‐‑waste   (Tochiyama   &  Masuda,  2013).  
Figure 1: Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Radioactive Waste in Japan

Source: own illustration, adapted from Tochiyama (2014)

3.1.1. History  of  siting  and  sources  of  regulation  In  Japan,  the  debate  about  final  disposal  of  radioactive  waste  started  in  the  1970s  (Figure  2)  (Tochiyama  &  Masuda,  2013).  During  the  following  decade,  several  feasibility  studies  were  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    published.  In  the  late  1990s,  a  roundtable  discussion  including  technical  experts,  economists,  political   scientists   and   anti-­‐‑nuclear   activists   was   organized   in   order   to   advance   policy-­‐‑making  in  the  field  (Juraku,  2014).  In  1999,  another  feasibility  study  about  HLW  disposal,  the  second  progress  report  (referred  to  as  H12),  was  published  und  proposed  a  stepwise  process  that  is  also  open  to  the  public.  Consequently,  the  Specified  Radioactive  Waste  Final  Disposal  Act  (referred  to  as  Final  Disposal  Act,  FDA)  was  enacted  in  June  2000.  The  FDA  established  the  framework  for  the  implementing  organization,  the  financing  and  the  stepwise  site  selection  process.   However,   it   did   hardly   include   any   of   the   features   discussed   in   the   roundtable  debate  and  in  discussion  groups  within  international  organizations;  for  example,  there  was  no   mention   of   generational   equity   (Juraku,   2014).   The   FDA   itself   was   passed   within   a   few  days   and   even   without   controversial   debate   by   the  Diet,   so   that   no   deliberation   could   take  place  within  society  (Juraku,  2014).  
Figure 2: Development of Japanese HLW Disposal Program

  Source: own illustration, adapted from Tochiyama (2014)

Based   on   the   FDA,   the   Nuclear   Waste   Management   Organization   of   Japan   (NUMO)   was  created   as   implementing   organization   in   2002   (Kusaka,   2014).   In   the   same   year,   the   open  solicitation  process  started  (see  chapter  3.1.3.  for  a  detailed  description).  Five  years  later,  in  2007,  the  FDA  was  amended  to  include  TRU-­‐‑waste  in  the  HLW  disposal  program  under  the  responsibility   of   NUMO   (Tochiyama   &   Masuda,   2013).   In   2011,   some   municipalities  prepared  to  officially  apply  for  the  literature  survey,  but  then  the  Tohoku  earthquake  hit  and  the  central  government  suspended  the  program  (McKinley  I.,  2014).  Due  to  limited  progress  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    in   siting   and   the   tragic   events   of   2011,   the   Japan   Atomic   Energy   Commission   (JAEC)  published   a   statement   on   18   December   2012,   asking   the   government   to   restructure   the  process  and  review  the  FDA  (Japan  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  2012).  In  consequence,  the  Ministry  of  Economy,  Trade  and  Industry  (METI)  convened  meetings  of  two  subcommittees  (working   groups)   to   review   its   policy   of   final   disposal   and   to   re-­‐‑evaluate   the   scientific  knowledge  (Tokunaga,  2014b).  
Figure 3: Government and Organizations: HLW Disposal Program in Japan  Source: own illustration, adapted from Tochiyama (2014)  3.1.2. Institutional  framework:  roles  and  responsibilities  Figures   3   and   4   provide   an   overview   of   the   organizations   involved   in   the   siting   of   final  disposal  facilities  in  Japan  and  their  respective  roles.  The  JAEC  supervises  the  HLW  disposal  program.  The  Nuclear  Regulation  Authority  (NRA)  (the  former  Nuclear  Safety  Commission,  NRC)   supervises   all   safety   issues.   NUMO   is   the   implementing   non-­‐‑governmental  organization   and   is   supervised   by   METI.   METI,   in   particular   the   Agency   for   Natural  Resources  and  Energy  (ANRE),  develops  the  policy.  The  radioactive  waste  working  groups  are   composed   of   members   of   the   academic   community   and   advise   METI   and   NUMO   on  policy   and   technical   questions   (Tokunaga,   2014a).   The   operators   of   nuclear   power   plants  finance   the   expenses   of   NUMO   for   the   development,   selection   and   operation   of   the   deep  geological   repository   (Streffer   et   al.,   2011).   METI   annually   determines   the   specific   charge  paid  by  the  operators  into  the  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Fund,  which  is  administered  independently   from   waste   generators   by   the   Radioactive   Waste   Management   Funding   and  Research   Center   (RWMC).   Several   governmentally   funded   organizations   are   active   in  research  and  development  to  support  the  decision-­‐‑making  (Tochiyama,  2014).    

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    Figure 4: Implementation Framework in Japan  Source: own illustration, adapted from Tochiyama (2014)  3.1.3. Stages  of  process  and  strategy  in  siting    After   it   was   preliminarily   stopped   in   2011,   the   site   selection   process   was   amended   in   2013  and   is   today   divided   into   three   stages   (Figure   5).   To   seek   out   areas   to   carry   out   feasibility  studies   on   the   possible   location   of   a   final   repository,   NUMO   conducts   open   solicitations   of  municipalities   to   voluntarily   apply   for   the   literature   survey,   a   procedure   aiming   at  determining   the   long-­‐‑term   stability   of   the   geological   environment   (NUMO,   2014).   In  addition,   the   government   actively   approaches   suitable   municipalities   and   invites   them   to  participate   in   the   literature   survey.   In   the   first   step,   preliminary   investigation   areas   (PIAs)  are   chosen   based   on   the   submitted   literature   surveys   by   municipalities.   Surface-­‐‑based  investigations   are   conducted   in   the   PIAs   about   geological   characteristics.   Secondly,   the  stability   of   the   host   formation   and   its   vicinity   is   tested   in   the   detailed   investigation   areas  (DIAs).   In   addition   to   the   surface-­‐‑based   investigations,   underground   research   facilities   are  constructed  and  investigations  and  experiments  take  place.  In  the  third  step,  the  repository  construction   site   is   selected   by   confirming   the   physical   and   chemical   characteristics   of   the  geological  formation.  METI  approves  all  steps  during  the  selection  process  and  also  takes  the  ultimate  decision  on  the  site  selection  in  consulting  with  local  authorities  and  the  population  (Streffer  et  al.,  2011).    

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    Figure 5: Three Stages of the Site Selection Process in Japan  Source: own illustration, adapted from NUMO (2014)  Concerning   the   strategy   of   siting,   the   selection   process   in   Japan   appears   as   a   muddling  through   approach:   on   the   one   hand,   the   municipalities   are   supposed   to   apply   for   the  literature  survey,  which  represents  a  bottom-­‐‑up  strategy,  on  the  other  hand,  METI,  not  even  representing  elected  politicians,  takes  the  final  decision.    

3.1.4. Regional  participation  Municipalities  as  the  future  repository  sites  are  key  players  in  the  Japanese  selection  process.  
Yet,   the   details   of   their   role   are   rather   unclear.   Kusaka   (2014)   states   that   municipalities  generally   do   not   apply   for   the   literature   survey   because   they   do   not   know   ‘the   whole  package’.   To   encourage   more   voluntary   applications,   Kusaka   assumes   that   the   central  government  would  need  to  act  more  proactively,  for  example  by  offering  political  support  to  the  municipalities  in  preparing  their  applications  (Kusaka,  2014).    
One  municipality,  which  plays  an  important  role  in  the  history  and  probably  also  the  future  of  nuclear  energy  in  Japan,  is  Rokkasho  in  Aomori  Prefecture.  It  is  a  community  inhabiting  the  area  on  the  Northeastern  tip  of  Honshu.  Because  of  alliances  during  the  time  of  the  Meiji  Restoration,  its  inhabitants  are  said  to  be  more  suspicious  of  the  central  government  than  in  other   parts   of   Japan   (Juraku,   2014).   This   distrust   was   exacerbated   during   Japan’s   double-­‐‑digit  growth  years,  when  the  national  government  broke  its  promise  to  Aomori  Prefecture  to  site   heavy   industry   in   the   area   although   an   industry   park   was   already   planned   and   real  estate  was  bought  (Kusaka,  2014).  
In   light   of   these   difficulties,   it   is   surprising   that   today   Rokkasho   is   a   gathering   place   for  many   energy-­‐‑related   facilities,   including   radioactive   waste   management   facilities   (Aomori  Prefectural   Government,   2008).   McKinley   I.   (2014)   explains   this   with   the   fact   that   the  facilities   generate   employment.   Yet,   the   municipality   continuously   stresses   that   its  acceptance  is  conditional  on  the  fact  that  Rokkasho  and  Aomori  Prefecture  as  a  whole  are  not  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    considered   as   final   disposal   sites   (Kusaka,   2014).   However,   because   Rokkasho   has   already  been   an   interim   storage   facility   over   the   past   twenty   years,   the   prefectural   government  worries   that   it   is   a   de   facto   final   disposal   site   and   increasingly   pressures   the   central  government  to  speed  up  the  siting  process.  

3.1.5. Public  acceptance  Whereas   the   importance   to   engage   and   interact   with   the   local   community   is   stressed   by  Japanese  scholars  and  advisory  committees,  there  is  no  agreement  on  a  procedure  to  achieve  this  goal.  In  Japan,  the  siting  of  deep  geological  repositories  opens  up  two  types  of  questions:  a   technical,   scientific   one   and   a   psychological,   political   one  (Kusaka,   2014).   In   addition,   the  Tohoku   earthquake   created   new   fears   in   the   public   and   increased   anti-­‐‑nuclear   sentiments.  
From   a   technical   and   scientific   perspective,   citizens   are   worried   about   the   geological  structure  of  Japan  and  question  if  scientists  will  be  able  to  find  a  stable  site.  Politically,  there  is  increasing  NIMBY  activism  in  the  rural  areas  (Scalise,  2013).  Citizens  in  rural  areas  do  not  see   why   they   should   assume   the   role   of   a   final   disposal   site   for   the   sake   of   economic  development  in  urban  areas  (Kusaka,  2014).  Overall,  becoming  the  site  of  a  final  disposal  is  not  at  all  an  enticing  outlook.  

3.1.6. Political  debate  and  controversial  issues  Following  the  2011  accidents  in  Fukushima,  the  site  selection  policy  was  suspended  in  order  to  discuss  and  amend  it.  The  followings  paragraphs  outline  the  debate  inside  and  outside  the  two   METI   subcommittees   on   radioactive   waste,   which   met   as   preparation   for   a   ministerial  meeting   on   final   disposal   on   17   December   2013.   The   strategy   adopted   in   the   meeting   is  presented  as  well  as  further  controversial  issues  mentioned  by  the  interviewees.    
Overall,   most   criticisms   regarding   the   process   were   and   still   are   targeted   towards   the   slow  progress   in   waste   disposal   under   the   leadership   of   NUMO   (Kusaka,   2014).   Anti-­‐‑nuclear  activists  question  the  credibility  of  NUMO  by  comparing  the  status  quo  to  the  operation  of  an  apartment  without  a  toilet.  Kusaka  (2014)  accordingly  describes  the  credibility  problem  of  NUMO   as   the   Achilles   heel   of   nuclear   power   generation   in   Japan:   because   of   the   limited  space   in   the   pools   for   spent   nuclear   fuels   (SNF)   on   the   power   plant   sites,   SNF   must   be  removed   and   transported   to   an   interim   storage   facility   in   case   the   pool   is   full.   The  improvement   of   the   implementation   structure,   especially   the   role   and   responsibilities   of  NUMO,   was   also   a   fiercely   debated   topic   within   the   subcommittee   on   radioactive   waste  (Tokunaga,  2014a).  
In  the  preparatory  meetings  for  the  ministerial  meeting,  the  METI  subcommittee  debated  the  general   approach   to   HLW   disposal   including   alternative   options   to   deep   geological  repository   (Tokunaga,   2014a).   The   subcommittee   proposed   a   societal   deliberation   about  what   kind   of   disposal   is   suitable   for   HLW,   arguing   that   the   public   should   have   a   choice  between  different  strategies.  In  the  ministerial  meeting,  it  stated  that  a  geological  repository  is   the   best   option,   although   alternative   options   should   be   explored   as   well.   The   notions   of  generational   equity   and   fairness   were   also   touched   upon   in   the   subcommittee,   where   two  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    strands  of  argumentation  were  voiced  (see  chapter  2.5.):  one  called  for  immediate  action  by  the  government  to  move  ahead  in  the  concrete  issue  of  waste  disposal,  the  other  demanded  a  general  debate  about  the  future  of  nuclear  energy  in  Japan.  
Eventually,  the  ministerial  meeting  agreed  that  the  concepts  of  reversibility  and  retrievability  in  the  siting  process  should  be  explicitly  stated  and  institutionally  implemented  in  order  to  preserve   options   for   future   generations.   In   this   context,   reversibility   refers   to   the   decision-­‐‑making   during   the   project   implementation   phase   and   ensures   that   the   implementation  process   and   technologies   are   flexibly   designed   to   make   a   reversal   or   modification   possible  (OECD   Nuclear   Energy   Agency,   2011).   Retrievability   is   defined   as   the   ability   to   retrieve  waste.   Such   a   stepwise   and   reversible   decision-­‐‑making   process   aims   at   building   trust  between   stakeholders   (Tokunaga,   2014a).   In   addition,   the   ministerial   meeting   decided   to  review   scientific   research   regularly   in   order   to   implement   the   best   available   technology.  
Regarding  the  concept  of  reversibility,  the  flexibility  to  switch  technology  at  a  later  stage  in  the  progress  should  be  maintained.    
To   improve   the   site   selection   process,   the   possibility   of   the   government   to   request  participation   was   added   to   the   existing   but   under-­‐‑used   option   of   initial   applications   by  municipalities.  Tokunaga  (2014a)  explains  that  the  previous  open  solicitation  process  implied  that  deep  geological  repositories  were  possible  all  over  Japan.  However,  as  Tochiyama  (2014)  describes,   basing   the   process   on   excluding   geologically   unsuitable   sites   rather   than   on  finding  suitable  ones  resulted  in  about  70  percent  of  Japan  being  eligible  for  final  disposal  –  an   overly   large   area.   This   approach   undermined   NUMO’s   credibility   and   ability   to   rely   on  scientific   information.   The   requested   participation   approach   is   modeled   after   the   ‘EIC’  strategy:   engage,   interact,   cooperate   (OECD   Nuclear   Energy   Agency,   2012).   Scientifically  suitable   sites   are   selected   in   cooperation   with   the   technical   subcommittee   on   radioactive  waste   based   on   siting   factors   that   ensure   sufficient   geological   stability   (Tokunaga,   2014a).  
Furthermore,  the  government  proactively  provides  information  to  the  suitable  municipalities  and  engages  the  local  authorities  and  citizens  in  a  dialogue  about  the  site  selection  process,  geological   characteristics   of   a   site   and   other   issues.   This   is   an   improvement   over   the   past,  where  the  mayor  had  to  explain  the  project  to  the  inhabitants,  the  governor  of  the  prefecture  and  other  stakeholders,  even  though  he  or  she  might  not  be  knowledgeable  about  all  issues  concerning   final   disposal   (Juraku,   2014).   Juraku   therefore   suggests   that   NUMO,   the   central  government   and   national   politicians   should   further   support   the   mayor   in   this   task   in   the  future.    
Not   changed   in   the   meeting   was   the   compensation   mechanism   for   municipalities.   In   2000,  the   compensation   for   the   application   to   the   literature   survey   was   increased   from   two  hundred  million  to  one  billion  Japanese  Yen.  However,  Tokunaga  (2014a)  argues  that  rather  than  awarding  a  fixed  amount  of  money,  the  compensation  should  be  focused  on  promoting  local   development   and   seen   as   cooperation   between   the   local   community   and   the  government.   As   an   example   for   successful   cooperation,   McKinley   I.   (2014)   points   out   that  Aomori   Prefecture   benefited   significantly   from   the   siting   of   nuclear   facilities   because   the  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    negotiations   of   the   compensation   scheme   were   tough.   Currently,   the   municipality   has   no  need  for  further  financial  assistance,  yet  if  its  income  decreases  and  the  compensation  for  a  final   disposal   site   increases,   it   might   step   forward.   As   the   local   community   is   already  familiar  with  the  nuclear  industry,  there  are  no  reservations  like  in  other  areas,  which  might  facilitate  communication  between  the  relevant  stakeholders.    
In   summary,   Tokunaga   (2014a)   stresses   that   even   though   the   subcommittee   debate   led   to  very   similar   conclusions   as   the   report   already   published   by   JAEC   in   1999,   the   deliberation  process   itself   is   crucial   for   the   future   progress   of   the   HLW   disposal   program.   He   suggests  that   the   most   important   step   were   the   bilateral   discussions   among   the   members   of   the  subcommittee.   Debating   the   final   disposal   also   raises   awareness   in   society   and   emphasizes  the  need  to  find  a  solution  soon.  However,  even  though  the  process  is  helpful,  he  adds  that  it  might   take   a   long   time   to   increase   acceptance   in   society   (Tokunaga,   Siting   of   Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan,  2014a).  

3.1.7. Future  challenges  The   nuclear   debate   is   currently   very   high   on   the   agenda   in   Japan.   The   government   and  parliament  are  driven  by  the  desire  to  restart  the  nuclear  power  plants  and  are  under  major  pressure  at  the  same  time  due  to  the  slow  progress  in  siting  (McKinley  I.,  2014).  Society  also  follows   the   site   selection   process   closely   and   evaluates   governmental   assurances   more  critically,  as  many  have  lost  credibility  in  the  authorities  since  the  Tohoku  earthquake.  In  this  context,   it   is   essential   for   the   authorities   involved   in   HLW   disposal   to   increase   public  acceptance,   to   build   up   trust   between   stakeholders   and   to   not   throw   off   the   municipalities  and  local  communities  by  pushing  ahead  with  the  process  too  fast.    
To  increase  public  acceptance,  Juraku  (2014)  suggests  that  a  nationwide  deliberation  process  about   nuclear   waste   needs   to   take   place.   Yet,   neither   the   authorities   nor   parliamentarians  seem  to  raise  the  issue,  as  it  offers  no  possibility  to  win  votes.    
In   regard   to   building   confidence   between   the   local   communities   and   the   authorities,   the  stepwise   nature   of   the   selection   process   –   that   the   community   has   the   possibility   to   stop  further  investigation  at  every  step  –  is  not  yet  known  and  trusted  in  enough  (Kusaka,  2014).  
The  same  is  true  for  the  benefits  of  hosting  a  final  disposal  site  (McKinley  I.,  2014):  NUMO  has  not  yet  made  it  clear  enough  that  the  major  advantage  is  not  the  financial  compensation  but  the  generation  of  jobs.  In  areas  experiencing  depopulation,  population  aging  and  where  communities   have   suffered   damages   from   the   tsunami   in   2011,   employment   opportunities  and  building  infrastructure  could  increase  public  acceptance.  In  this  context,  the  differences  between  a  geological  repository  and  a  nuclear  power  plant  need  to  be  pointed  out  to  face  the  increased  fear  of  radiation.    
The   safety   during   the   operation   period   is   a   topic,   which   requires   further   research  (Tochiyama  &  Masuda,  2013).  In  particular,  the  safe  transportation  of  radioactive  waste  from  the  power  plants  or  the  storage  facilities  to  the  repository  needs  to  be  tackled  (Juraku,  2014).  
Traditionally,   radioactive   waste   was   shipped,   as   most   power   plants   are   located   on   the  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    coastline.   The   overland   transportation   of   waste   through   noninvolved   municipalities   might  fuel   NIMBY   activism.   Hence,   only   a   final   disposal   site   on   coastline   might   be   acceptable,  narrowing  down  the  number  of  suitable  municipalities.    
Juraku  (2014)  and  Kusaka  (2014)  point  out  the  curious  fact  that  although  Japan  is  very  active  in  international  organizations  dealing  with  the  issue  of  radioactive  waste  review,  the  lessons  learned   from   international   experience   are   not   transferred   into   domestic   legislation   and  implementation.  
In  conclusion,  NUMO’s  muddling  through  procedure  has  made  very  limited  progress  in  the  past   decade:   no   municipality   submitted   an   application   for   the   literature   survey   and   the  institution  itself  is  faced  with  a  massive  loss  of  credibility.  Since  the  Fukushima  accident  in  March  2011,  the  debate  about  radioactive  waste  management  reemerged  and  authorities  are  pressured  to  move  ahead.  Yet,  the  initializing  step  of  the  site  selection  is  still  discussed,  and  trust  between  local  and  regional  authorities  and  the  central  government  is  shattered.  Hence,  the   major   challenge   of   the   site   selection   process   is   building   trust   among   the   stakeholders  involved  based  on  a  sustainable  dialogue.  

3.2.

Siting  in  Switzerland  The   final   disposal   site   in   Switzerland   will   hold   all   types   of   radioactive   waste,   including  vitrified  waste,  spent  nuclear  fuel,  waste  related  to  future  decommissioning  and  waste  from  a  reactor  accident  in  1969  (McKinley  I.,  2014).  Currently,  Switzerland  has  no  disposal  site  for  any  type  of  radioactive  waste.  Interim  storage  is  located  at  the  nuclear  power  plant  sites  as  well  as  the  centralized  storage  facility  ZWILAG.  The  ongoing  siting  process  will  result  in  the  proposal   of   tow   or   one   combined   site   for   low-­‐‑   and   intermediate-­‐‑   (L/ILW)   and   high-­‐‑level  waste  (HLW).    

3.2.1. History  of  siting  and  sources  of  regulation  In   1972,   the   National   Cooperative   for   the   Disposal   of   Radioactive   Waste   (Nagra)   was  established  by  the  nuclear  power  plant  operators  and  the  federal  government  and  entrusted  with  the  task  of  waste  management  (McKinley  L.,  2014).  Nagra  presented  a  first  concept  for  radioactive  waste  management  in  1978  and  started  location  investigations  in  1981.  In  1994,  it  applied  for  a  general  license  for  the  construction  of  a  repository  for  low-­‐‑   and  intermediate-­‐‑level  waste,  but  the  voters  of  the  respective  canton  denied  the  concession.  The  site  selection  procedure   was   subsequently   changed   to   a   staged   process   and   Nagra   submitted   another  application   for   a   concession   for   an   exploratory   drift   at   the   same   site   in   2001.   However,   the  cantonal  voters  also  rejected  the  second  application.  
After   the   two   failures,   a   nationwide   deliberation   process   started   about   the   final   disposal   of  radioactive  waste  (Schmid,  2014).  Even  though  the  possible  sites  for  selection  are  limited  to  a  few   municipalities   from   the   outset,   final   disposal   is   a   national,   not   a   local   concern.  
Consequently,   the   Swiss   parliament   enacted   the   Nuclear   Energy   Act   and   the   Nuclear   Energy  Ordinance  in  2003  and  2004,  which  entered  into  force  on  1  February  2005  (Bühlmann,  2014).  
The   Ordinance   states   that   the   objectives   and   requirements   applying   to   disposal   of   waste   in  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    geological  repositories  have  to  be  specified  in  a  sectoral  plan,  a  spatial  planning  instrument  used  for  the  siting  of  large  infrastructure  projects  (McKinley  L.,  2014).  Using  this  instrument,  the   federal   State   (Swiss   Confederation)   has   the   competence   to   site   infrastructure   projects  neglecting   the   cantonal   competences   in   spatial   planning,   particularly   the   canton’s   veto  power  (Bühlmann,  2014).  This  amendment  of  the  spatial  planning  regulations  ensures  legal  certainty   and   predictability   in   the   selection   procedure,   enabling   the   cantons,   municipalities  and  communities  to  voice  their  opinions  without  a  possibility  to  decide.    
Figure 6: Position and Interrelationships for the Sectoral Plan for Deep Geological Repositories in
Switzerland

  Source: own illustration, adapted from Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2008)  In  2006,  the  preparations  for  the  conceptual  part  of  the  sectoral  plan  started,  setting  out  the  sectoral  goals  of  the  federal  government  and  the  procedures  and  criteria  applying  to  the  site  selection   process   (Swiss   Federal   Office   of   Energy,   2008).   Over   two   years,   an   extensive  consultation   process   took   place   involving   multiple   stakeholders,   including   neighboring  states   (Eckhardt,   2014).   Figure   6   depicts   the   position   and   interrelationships   of   the   sectoral  plan  for  final  disposal.  

3.2.2. Institutional  framework:  roles  and  responsibilities  The   federal   State   bears   overall   responsibility   for   the   siting,   as   is   shown   in   Figure   7.   The  Federal   Office   of   Energy   (SFOE)   bears   the   responsibility   for   operational   aspects   (Swiss  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    Federal   Office   of   Energy,   2011a).   The   Swiss   Federal   Nuclear   Safety   Inspectorate   (ENSI)  focuses   on   technical   issues   of   safety   and   the   Technical   Forum   on   Safety   discusses   and  answers   questions   about   technical   safety   from   the   public.   There   is   a   clear   division   of  responsibilities   between   SFOE   as   the   leading   authority   and   ENSI   as   the   safety   assessing  institution   that   ensures   compliance   with   the   regulations   in   the   Joint  Convention  (Bühlmann,  2014).   Securing   the   required   cooperation   between   official   representatives   of   site   cantons,  neighboring   cantons   and   neighboring   countries   is   the   role   of   the   Commission   of   Cantons  (Swiss   Federal   Office   of   Energy,   2011a).   The   Siting   Cantons   Co-­‐‑ordination   Committee   is  responsible   for   the   coordination   between   the   siting   cantons.   The   Waste   Management  Advisory   Board   assists   in   the   site   selection   procedure   by   contributing   an   outsider’s  perspective.    
Figure 7: Division of Roles in Switzerland

  Source: own illustration, adapted from Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2008)  Based   on   the   polluter-­‐‑pays   principle,   nuclear   power   plant   operators   are   responsible   for   the  disposal   of   spent   fuel   elements   and   radioactive   waste   resulting   from   the   operation   of   the  plants,  as  well  as  the  decommissioning  and  break-­‐‑up  of  these  facilities  (Swiss  Federal  Office  of   Energy,   2011b).   To   finance   the   disposal   of   nuclear   waste,   operators   pay   annual  contributions   into   two   separately   established   funds,   a   decommissioning   fund   and   a   waste  disposal  fund.  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    3.2.3. Stages  of  process  and  strategy  in  siting    Figure   8   and   9   depict   the   stepwise   process   and   the   timetable   for   the   selection   of   a   final  disposal   site.   In   April   2014,   the   SFOE   decided   to   extend   the   timeframe   for   the   siting  procedure  by  approximately  ten  years  due  the  high  complexity  of  the  process,  its  pioneering  nature  and  the  willingness  to  allocate  more  time  to  the  participatory  elements  (Swiss  Federal  Office  of  Energy,  2014b).  
Figure 8: Selection of Sites in Three Stages in Switzerland

  Source: own illustration, adapted from Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2008)  In   the   first   stage,   the   waste   producers   propose   geologically   suitable   areas   based   on   safety  criteria   to   the   federal   government   (Swiss   Federal   Office   of   Energy,   2008).   The   spatial  planning   and   safety   situation   is   assessed   before   the   siting   areas   are   integrated   into   the  sectoral   plan.   A   cantonal   commission   is   established   that   prepares   the   groundwork   for  regional   participation   in   the   second   stage.   In   November   2011,   this   stage   was   concluded   by  selecting   six   siting   regions,   all   situated   in   the   Northern,   German-­‐‑speaking   part   of  Switzerland  (Swiss  Federal  Office  of  Energy,  2011c).    
During  the  second  stage,  the  Federal  Offices  undertake  a  spatial  planning  assessment  of  the  proposed  siting  areas  in  cooperation  with  the  siting  cantons  (Swiss  Federal  Office  of  Energy,  2008).   Also,   socio-­‐‑economic   studies   are   prepared   together   with   the   siting   regions.   Working  together   with   the   siting   regions,   the   waste   producers   draft   proposals   for   the   configuration  and   design   of   the   surface   infrastructure,   decide   on   the   layout   of   the   underground  components  of  the  repository  and  select  at  least  one  site  per  siting  area.  In  May  2014,  Nagra  submitted   the   last   report   about   the   surface   infrastructure,   which   was   written   taking   into  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    account   the   proposals   of   the   responsible   Regional   Conference   (Swiss   Federal   Office   of  Energy,  2014c).    
In   the   third   stage,   the   remaining   sites   are   investigated   in   depth   to   find   a   site   for   which   an  application   for   a   general   license   is   eventually   submitted   (Swiss   Federal   Office   of   Energy,  2008).  To  do  so,  the  repository  projects  are  specified  in  collaboration  with  the  siting  regions  and   socio-­‐‑economic   implications   are   analyzed   in   greater   detail.   The   siting   regions   propose  projects   for   regional   development   and   prepare   the   background   information   in   order   to  establish  compensation  measures  and  to  monitor  socio-­‐‑economic  and  environmental  impacts.  
Then,   compensation   measures   are   negotiated   and   made   transparent.   Finally,   the   waste  producers  submit  applications  for  a  general  license  (one  each  for  HLW  and  L/ILW  or  one  for  a  combined  repository).  The  SFOE  expects  that  Nagra  decides  on  the  provisional  sites  in  2020  (Swiss  Federal  Office  of  Energy,  2014b).  
Figure 9: Timetable for Site Selection in Switzerland

  Source: own illustration, adapted from Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2014b)  At  the  end  of  each  stage,  the  responsible  federal  authorities  conduct  a  review,  followed  by  a  three-­‐‑month  consultation  phase  before  the  Federal  Council  makes  its  decision  (Swiss  Federal  Office  of  Energy,  2008).  The  general  license  granted  in  the  last  stage  has  to  be  approved  by  parliament  and  is  subject  to  an  optional  national  referendum.  In  case  the  municipalities  and  cantons  concerned  support  the  siting  of  the  repository,  the  referendum  should  be  adopted  –  a  likely  scenario  according  to  McKinley  L.  (2014).  
The  Swiss  sectoral  plan  is  clearly  a  top-­‐‑down  approach  to  siting.  The  designated  authorities  and  parliament  have  the  sole  right  of  decision-­‐‑making  in  the  process.  The  final  decision  is  in  the   hands   of   the   elected   representatives.   The   possibility   of   an   optional   referendum   is   a  regular  part  of  the  Swiss  legislative  process  and  thus  does  not  challenge  the  assessment  as  a  top-­‐‑down  approach  in  itself.  Still,  the  population  is  able  to  participate  to  a  large  extent  in  the  decision-­‐‑making,  adding  important  elements  of  the  bottom-­‐‑up  approach.  

3.2.4. Regional  participation  In   the   regional   participation   procedure,   municipalities,   organized   interest   groups   and   local  population   of   the   siting   areas   have   the   opportunity   to   bring   regional   aspects   to   bear   in   the  siting   process   (Swiss   Federal   Office   of   Energy,   2014a).   For   each   siting   area,   a   Regional  Conference   with   about   one   hundred   members   from   elected   representatives   for   the  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    communes,  organized  interest  groups  such  as  businesses  or  associations  and  members  of  the  local  community  were  established  (Aebersold,  2014).  In  the  bordering  regions,  local  German  authorities   participate   in   the   Regional   Conference   as   well   (McKinley   L.,   2014).   The   goal   of  the  Regional  Conferences  is  to  propose  the  specifications  of  the  surface  facilities,  discuss  the  impact   of   a   repository   on   the   region   and   suggest   measures   to   promote   sustainable  development  within  the  regions.  The  SFOE  also  accompanies  in  the  Regional  Conferences  to  build   trust   between   stakeholders   and   provide   information   (Aebersold,   2014).   Additionally,  the  members  of  Regional  Conferences  have  the  opportunity  to  build  up  their  own  expertise  on   the   issue   of   final   disposal   and   call   on   experts   from   different   organizations   to   answer  technical   or   safety   questions   (McKinley   L.,   2014).   Trainings   about   safety,   ethical  considerations,   storage   of   waste   and   other   topics   take   place   and   the   SFOE   provides  personnel  and  monetary  resources  to  the  Regional  Conferences  (Aebersold,  2014).  
The   SFOE   emphasizes   the   importance   of   the   Regional   Conferences   as   policy   instrument   to  satisfy   the   demands   of   the   local   communities   wherever   the   sectoral   plan   provides   the  flexibility   (Aebersold,   2014).   It   also   creates   a   level   playing   field   between   the   communities  affected   and   experts,   as   it   promotes   their   risk   literacy.   According   to   Bühlmann   (2014),   the  SFOE   is   very   satisfied   with   the   process,   as   the   members   of   the   Regional   Conferences   are  highly  involved  and  interested  in  the  topic.    
In  the  third  stage,  the  regional  participation  will  propose  a  compensation  mechanism  for  the  siting   areas.   Up   to   now,   there   is   no   previous   experience   concerning   compensation   for  repository   hosting   (McKinley   L.,   2014).   Yet,   McKinley   (2014)   pointed   out   the   successful  compensation   measures   for   the   interim   storage   facility   ZWILAG.   The   concentric  compensation   mechanisms   benefits   not   only   the   hosting   commune,   but   also   other  municipalities  within  a  certain  radius.    

3.2.5. Public  acceptance  In  the  international  comparison,  Switzerland  is  rather  advanced  in  its  siting  procedure  and  encounters   high   public   acceptance   (Eckhardt,   2014).   Eckhardt   (2014)   stresses   that   the  authorities   have   learned   from   past   experiences   and   established   the   participation   procedure  to   ensure   public   acceptance.   Still,   this   process   requires   endurance   by   all   stakeholders   and  society  has  to  be  motivated  to  participate  over  a  long  period.    
Concerning   siting   of   nuclear   power   plants   in   Switzerland,   there   is   one   prominent   case   of  NIMBY  activism  during  the  late  1960s.  The  occupation  of  the  site  of  the  planned  Kaiseraugst  power  plant  in  1975  marked  the  high  point  of  activism  (Swiss  Federal  Office  of  Energy,  2008).  
Consequently,   the   members   of   the   Federal   Assembly   voted   to   abandon   the   Kaiseraugst  project   in   1988.   Hence,   the   possibility   that   citizens   block   the   decision   exists,   but   such   a  scenario   is   rather   unlikely   regarding   the   siting   of   nuclear   waste   management   facilities  (Bühlmann,  2014).  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    3.2.6. Political  debate  and  controversial  issues  All   interviewees   in   Switzerland   stressed   the   good   functioning   of   the   siting   procedure.   As  advantages   of   the   sectoral   plan,   Aebersold   (2014)   pointed   to   the   predictability   of   the  procedure,  which  allows  the  involved  stakeholders  to  build  up  confidence.  The  transparent  process  defines  steps  and  the  corresponding  decisions  to  be  taken  at  certain  points  in  time.  
Nevertheless,  the  sectoral  plan  only  provides  a  general  outline,  but  does  not  fix  all  the  details  at  the  beginning.  It  maintains  the  flexibility  to  adjust  to  time  constraints  and  new  scientific  or  technical  knowledge  and  to  determine  the  details  of  every  step  at  the  outset.  Schmid  (2014)  especially   praised   the   flexibility   of   SFOE   to   extend   the   timeframe   because   it   illustrates   the  importance  of  public  participation  and  trust  building.  However,  he  cautions  that  extensions  need  to  be  proportional  to  avoid  that  opponents  strategically  block  the  procedure.  Eckhardt  (2014)  positively  emphasized  that  the  siting  decision  is  not  made  politically  and  thus  is  not  subject   to   arbitrariness.   Schmid   (2014)   finally   highlights   the   participatory   element   in   the  siting  process.  Public  participation  such  as  the  Regional  Conferences  takes  more  time,  but  it  ensures   a   sustainable   decision.   As   the   only   disadvantage   of   the   chosen   process,   the  interviewees  mentioned  the  high  resource-­‐‑intensity  for  all  stakeholders  involved.    
Concerning  the  roles  of  the  institutions  involved,  a  clear  division  is  in  place  yet  not  always  perceived  as  such  by  the  public.  The  debate  about  regulatory  capture  in  2012  demonstrates  that   the   distinct   division   of   roles   and   responsibilities   needs   to   be   improved   (Federal  Department   of   the   Environment,   Transport,   Energy   and   Communication,   2012).   In   this  context,   SFOE   faced   some   challenges   at   the   beginning   of   the   siting   procedure   (Aebersold,  2014).  In  the  past  years,  SFOE  thus  increased  its  lead  towards  Nagra  by  building  up  expertise  and  resources  in  order  to  sufficiently  plan  ahead.  The  scientifically  oriented  ENSI  also  faced  initial   challenges   in   satisfying   the   information   needs   of   the   society   because   the   ENSI   staff  was   inexperienced   in   public   communication   (Eckhardt,   2014).   As   consequence,   ENSI  organized  communication  trainings  for  its  staff  and  increased  the  available  resources  for  this  purpose.    

3.2.7. Future  challenges  There   are   several   challenges   to   the   successful   implementation   of   the   sectoral   plan   and   the  institutions   involved.   First,   the   length   of   the   procedure   implies   a   high   turnover   of  stakeholders   and   requires   continuous   motivation   to   participate   (Bühlmann,   2014).  
Representatives   of   communes   and   cantons,   which   participate   in   Regional   Conferences,   are  usually   elected   for   four   years.   Hence,   the   process   has   to   be   open   to   integrate   new  participants  and  provide  room  to  build  up  knowledge  on  nuclear  safety.    
Also,  political  support  has  to  be  guaranteed  in  order  to  ensure  public  acceptance  (Aebersold,  2014).  Although  politicians  are  less  likely  to  promote  a  particular  site  due  to  a  possible  loss  of  voters,   their   support   for   the   procedure   as   a   whole   is   essential.   Similarly,   the   involved  institutions  need  to  enhance  public  acceptance  by  credibly  implementing  tasks  and  assuming  responsibilities  (Bühlmann,  2014).  Eckhardt  emphasizes  (2014)  that  ENSI  for  instance  needs  to   maintain   its   role   as   independent   organization   and   therefore   publish   its   own   information  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    material.   As   trust   is   tied   to   persons   rather   than   organizations,   changes   in   publicly   exposed  staff   might   erode   credibility   (Bühlmann,   2014).   Hence,   changes   in   human   resources,  especially   in   the   SFOE,   need   to   be   planned   well   ahead   to   ensure   a   sustainable   transfer   of  knowledge  and  allow  juniors  enough  time  to  build  up  relationships  with  other  stakeholders.  
The  SFOE  has  already  intensified  its  research  in  the  field  of  knowledge  transfer  and  attempts  to  be  as  transparent  as  possible  to  prevent  information  loss  (Aebersold,  2014).    
In  addition  to  acceptance,  possible  changes  in  public  opinion  regarding  the  future  of  nuclear  energy   in   Switzerland   might   challenge   the   successful   implementation   of   the   sectoral   plan  (Bühlmann,  2014).  Institutions  like  SFOE  and  ENSI  need  to  anticipate  the  demands  of  society  and   shift   their   focus   accordingly:   according   to   Aebersold   (2014),   SFOE   is   sometimes  confronted  with  citizens’  demands  for  information  that  is  not  yet  available  due  to  the  early  stage  of  the  process.  
In   conclusion,   the   Swiss   top-­‐‑down   approach   to   site   selection   is   working   smoothly   despite  smaller   challenges   like   the   extension   of   the   timeframe   or   the   discussion   about   regulatory  capture.   In   particular,   the   regional   participation   guarantees   the   involvement   of   the   local  communities  by  focusing  on  its  demands  and  needs  to  develop  sustainably.    

4.

Analysis  of  the  country  case  studies  The   goal   of   the   site   selection   process   is   a   successful   choice   of   a   final   disposal   site   resulting  from   the   legislative   procedure.   This   decision   should   not   be   influenced   by   arbitrariness   or  political   considerations.   The   procedure   paves   the   way   for   a   factually   sound   and   politically  acceptable  solution.  Public  acceptance,  meaning  consensus  of  all  governmental  levels  and  the  local  community,  should  support  the  decision.  Although  public  acceptance  is  a  key  element  for  the  successful  siting,  it  is  only  a  necessary,  not  a  sufficient  criterion.  This  chapter  analyzes  how  to  achieve  public  acceptance  using  the  case  studies  of  Japan  and  Switzerland.  
Even  though  public  acceptance  is  to  a  certain  degree  dependent  on  the  political  culture  of  a  country,  some  features  in  the  process  can  be  considered  general  best  practice.  Following  the  theoretical  framework,  the  analysis  of  the  country  cases  of  Japan  and  Switzerland  is  divided  into   two   parts:   policy   design   and   stakeholder   dialogue.   The   concepts   are   interrelated:   a  sound   policy   based   upon   a   fairness-­‐‑   and   discourse-­‐‑oriented   balance   of   interests   lays   the  foundation   of   public   acceptance   and   thereby   opens   room   for   a   dialogue   involving   all  stakeholders.   In   chapter   4.3.,   recommendations   are   derived   on   how   to   establish   reciprocal  communication  as  the  basis  for  universally  acceptable  decision-­‐‑making.  

4.1.

Policy  design  The   Joint   Convention   demands   an   institutional   separation   between   the   management   of   the  waste   disposal   and   the   regulation   and   supervision   authority   (see   chapter   2.1.).   Defining  management   in   a   broad   sense   includes   any   promotional   and   political   activities.   Therefore,  IAEA   recommends   the   establishment   of   a   regulatory   agency   independent   of   the  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    management   of   facilities   and   promotional   functions   of   nuclear   power.   Although   the  regulatory   entity   was   separated   from   the   Swiss   Federal   Department   of   the   Environment,  Transport,   Energy   and   Communications   (DETEC)   and   ENSI   was   established   in   order   to  fulfill   this   requirement,   discussions   about   regulatory   capture   still   emerged   in   2012   (see  chapter   3.2.6.).   NUMO’s   slow   progress   since   its   establishment   in   2002   is   also   linked   to  unclear   responsibilities   (see   chapter   3.1.6.).   Therefore,   a   successful   institutional   framework  created   to   conduct   the   site   selection   procedure   needs   to   clearly   specify   the   roles   of   the  respective  bodies  and  sharply  divide  the  responsibilities  in  order  to  guarantee  the  credibility  and  independence  of  all  institutions.    
In   Switzerland,   the   votes   against   the   two   proposed   sites   in   1994   and   2002   emphasized   the  need   for   predictability   during   the   siting   process   (see   chapter   3.2.1).   Additionally,   the  flexibility  to  adjust  the  timetable  of  siting  process  by  ten  years  and  the  possibility  of  Regional  Conferences   to   propose   characteristics   of   surface   infrastructure   were   stressed   as   essential  characteristics  of  the  stepwise  process  (see  chapter  3.2.3.).  In  Japan,  the  METI  subcommittee  on   radioactive   wastes   suggested   explicitly   implementing   the   concept   of   reversibility   and  retrievability   as   it   allows   adapting   to   new   situation   and   technologies   (see   chapter   3.1.6.).  A  stepwise  procedure  should  thus  guarantee  predictability  without  losing  its  flexibility:  being  able  to  respond  to  demands  without  changing  the  rules  of  the  game  increases  confidence.    
The   open   solicitation   process   in   Japan   was   heavily   criticized   because   of   the   passive   role   of  the   government   (see   chapter   3.1.4.).   Other   authorities   did   not   support   the   municipalities   in  their   role   as   key   players.   In   response   to   this   criticism,   the   subcommittee   suggested   the  requested   participation   process,   a   joint   initiative   by   the   central,   prefectural   and   local  government   (see   chapter   3.1.6.).   Regional   participation   in   Switzerland   already   involves   all  interested   stakeholders,   even   from   neighboring   states   (see   chapter   3.2.4.).   The   cases   thus  show   that   sustainable   public   participation   needs   to   be   based   on   the   cooperation   of  municipalities,   regional   administration   and   local   communities   –   partnership   between   all  levels.  
The   provision   of   a   final   approval   of   the   site   selection   by   the   Swiss   parliament   and   an  optional   referendum   provides   additional   democratic   legitimacy   to   the   siting   (see   chapter  3.2.3.).   If   a   democratic   institution   takes   a   final   vote,   either   in   the   parliament   or   in   a   nation-­‐‑wide  referendum,  this  positive  effect  could  also  be  achieved  elsewhere.    
The  compensation  mechanism  in  Japan  creates  the  impression  that  paying  a  municipality  for  accepting   the   radioactive   waste   promotes   sustainable   development   (see   chapter   3.1.6.).  
McKinley  I.  (2014)  instead  suggests  emphasizing  the  benefits  of  hosting  a  final  disposal  site  such   as   the   newly   created   employment   opportunities   (see   chapter   3.1.7.).   In   Switzerland,  regional   participants   are   in   charge   of   proposing   a   compensation   mechanism   tailored   to   the  needs   of   each   municipality   (see   chapter   3.2.4.).   If   the   compensation   mechanism   focuses   on  infrastructure   and   other   needs   of   the   community   instead   of   financial   resources,   it   could  promote  the  development  of  the  affected  region  more  sustainably.    

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    An   external   element   influencing   the   policy   design   is   international   cooperation.   Although  Japan   is   very   active   in   international   organizations   dealing   with   the   issue   of   final   disposal,  Juraku   (2014)   and   Kusaka   (2014)   criticize   that   the   lessons   learned   from   international  experience   are   not   transferred   into   domestic   legislation   and   implementation   (see   chapter  3.1.7.).  Engaging  in  international  cooperation  is  crucial  to  promote  the  technical  expertise  of  the   institutions   and   to   review   domestic   siting   policies   by   implementing   established   best  practices.    

4.2.

Stakeholder  dialogue  The   inefficacy   of   the   siting   process   in   Japan   best   highlights   the   need   for   an   interactive,  cooperative   approach   to   siting   as   proposed   by   the   METI   subcommittee   (see   chapter   3.1.6.).  
Communication  is  defined  as  a  reciprocal,  dialogue-­‐‑oriented  exchange  process,  focusing  on  an  increasing  two-­‐‑way  communication  between  all  groups  and  institutions.  Comprehensive  understanding  of  problems  and  mutual  willingness  to  learn  builds  trust  between  individual  stakeholders  (see  chapter  2.6.).    
Challenges   and   conflicts   in   society   have   the   potential   to   hinder   communication   between  stakeholders   (see   chapter   2.5.).   The   increased   NIMBY   activism   in   rural   areas   of   Japan  illustrates  the  high  mobilization  and  amplification  potential  of  the  topic  (see  chapter  3.1.5.).  
The   societal   conflict   might   cast   doubt   on   the   legitimacy   of   the   authorized   decision-­‐‑makers  and  undermine  public  trust  in  scientific  expertise.  Risk  literacy  of  the  population  is  one  of  the  goals  of  communication  to  avoid  these  conflicts.    
The   stakeholder   dialogue   needs   to   be   based   on   the   values   of   endurance,   continuity   and  credibility   in   order   to   build   confidence   between   them   (Schmid,   2014).   Credibility   of   the  persons   working   for   the   institutional   bodies   is   essential   to   ensure   public   acceptance  (Bühlmann,  2014).  According  to  Bühlmann,  it  is  a  skill,  which  can  be  acquired  over  the  years,  but  it  involves  a  large  degree  of  personal  engagement  for  the  cause.    
As  an  external  factor,  the  overall  concept  of  democracy  in  the  respective  country  influences  the  course  of  action  of  a  stakeholder  dialogue  and  thus  needs  to  be  duly  considered.  It  goes  beyond  issue  politics  and  is  defined  by  the  political  culture  of  a  country.    

4.3.

Recommendations  Figure   10   summarizes   the   best   practice   concept   for   the   policy   design   and   stakeholder  dialogue  derived  from  the  analysis  of  the  case  studies.  It  shows  that  a  sound  policy  includes  a   distinct   institutional   framework   promoting   credibility   and   independence   of   the   bodies,   a  stepwise  procedure  focusing  on  predictability  and  flexibility,  public  participation  favoring  a  partnership   between   all   levels,   a   final   decision   by   a   democratically   legitimized   institution,  and   a   compensation   mechanism   promoting   the   sustainable   development   of   the   affected  regions.   International   cooperation   between   authorities   positively   affects   the   design   of  domestic   policies.   Such   a   policy   guarantees   a   stakeholder   dialogue   between   all   interested  parties,   which   is   in   turn   shaped   by   national   concepts   of   democracy.   The   reciprocal  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    communication   aims   at   developing   risk   literate   citizens,   incorporating   the   values   of  endurance,  continuity  and  trust.    
Figure 10: Optimal Policy for Site Selection

  Source: own illustration  5.

Conclusion  Japan   and   Switzerland   both   started   discussing   radioactive   waste   management   for   the   first  time   in   the   1970s.   How   complicated   the   issue   is   can   be   seen   in   the   fact   that   the   currently  enacted  policy  for  the  site  selection  of  a  geological  repository  dates  from  2002  in  Japan  and  2008  in  Switzerland.  Both  countries  chose  a  stepwise  process  to  siting,  but  Japan’s  approach  is  mostly  muddling  through,  whereas  Switzerland  chose  a  top-­‐‑down  approach.    
When  investigating  the  current  situation  and  the  future  challenges  of  the  siting  processes  in  Japan   and   Switzerland,   I   found   that   the   site   selection   in   Japan   has   been   stalled   for   about   a  decade   because   of   the   large   reliance   on   the   role   of   municipalities,   the   passive   central  government  and  the  recent  Tohoku  earthquake.  Japan  faces  the  challenge  to  amend  or  restart  the  process  and  build  confidence  between  all  stakeholders  in  the  coming  years.  In  contrast,  the   extensive   regional   participation   contributes   significantly   to   the   progress   in   siting   in  Switzerland.  Anticipating  the  demands  and  questions  of  the  public  and  accordingly  shifting  the   institutional   focus   is   one   of   the   major   challenges   in   Swiss   procedure.   Both   countries  highly  value  the  possibility  to  exchange  best  practices  in  international  organizations.    

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    From  the  case  studies,  I  derived  recommendations  for  the  characteristics  of  an  optimal  policy  to   successfully   select   a   geological   repository   site   following   the   legislative   procedure.   The  optimal   policy   is   based   on   a   stepwise,   predictable   and   flexible   procedure   with   a   clear  institutional   framework.   It   promotes   two-­‐‑way   communication   between   all   stakeholders,  which  establishes  the  basis  for  a  universally  acceptable  decision-­‐‑making.  
Throughout   the   analysis,   public   acceptance,   meaning   consensus   of   all   governmental   levels  and  the  local  community,  emerged  as  a  key  element  for  the  successful  siting  as  the  result  of  an  optimal  policy  design  and  a  well-­‐‑balanced  stakeholder  dialogue.  It  is  related  to  the  values  of   equity   and   fairness:   intragenerational   equity   concerns   influence   acceptance   of   a   siting  decision  by  all  stakeholders.  And  a  fair  and  open  decision-­‐‑making  process  involves  various  sections   of   contemporary   society   and   balances   the   resource   allocation.   It   also   emphasizes  equity   towards   communities   affected   by   the   construction   and   operation   of   nuclear   waste  management  facilities.    
The  perspective  of  the  local  communities  and  local  and  regional  authorities  on  the  siting  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  appears  promising  for  future  research.  For  instance,  the  viewpoints  of  mayors  and  active  citizens  on  the  current  status  of  the  site  selection  and  the  future  challenges  could  add  a  valuable  perspective  that  is  not  yet  heard  often  in  academic  research.    
I   hope   that   my   research   paper   can   contribute   to   advancing   the   discussion   by   raising  awareness   of   the   importance   of   appropriate   procedures   to   deal   with   the   final   disposal   of  radioactive  waste,  one  of  the  biggest  challenges  in  energy  policy  today.  
  

	
  

  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    List  of  References  Aebersold,  M.  (06.  05  2014).  Siting  of  Nuclear  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Switzerland.  (S.  
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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    Kusaka,  K.  (16.  04  2014).  Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan.  (S.  
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Löfstedt,  R.  E.,  &  Vogel,  D.  (2001).  The  Changing  Character  of  Regulation:  A  Comparison  of  Europe  and  the  United  States.  Risk  Analysis,  21  (3),  399-­‐‑416.  
NUMO.  (2014).  The  repository  site  selection  process.  Retrieved  on  14.  04  2014  from  Nuclear  Waste  Management  Organization  of  Japan:  http://www.numo.or.jp/en/jigyou/  new_eng_tab03.html  McKinley,  I.  (01.  05  2014).  Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland.  (S.  Fuchs,  Interviewer)  McKinley,  L.  (01.  05  2014).  Siting  of  Nuclear  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Switzerland.  (S.  
Fuchs,  Interviewer)  OECD  Nuclear  Energy  Agency.  (03  2012).  Geological  Disposal  of  Radioactive  Waste:  National  Commitment,  Local  and  Regional  Involvement.  Retrieved  on  10.  05  2014  from  OECD  Nuclear  Energy  Agency:  https://www.oecd-­‐‑nea.org/rwm/reports/2012/7082-­‐‑geo-­‐‑disposal-­‐‑statement.pdf  OECD  Nuclear  Energy  Agency.  (2010).  Radioactive  waste  in  perspective  (Bd.  NEA  No.  6350).  
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r_id=06153  Swiss  Federal  Office  of  Energy.  (06.  12  2011c).  Newsletter  Tiefenlager:  Dezember  2011,  No.  1.  
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r_id=05197  

	
  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  Fuchs  Sarah    Swiss  Federal  Office  of  Energy.  (15.  05  2014c).  Platzierung  der  Oberflächenanlage  für  geologische  Tiefenlager:  Weitere  Planungsstudie  der  Nagra.  Retrieved  on  16.  05  2014  from  Swiss  Federal  Office  of  Energy  SFOE:  http://www.bfe.admin.ch/energie/00588/00589/00644/  index.html?lang=de&msg-­‐‑id=52961  Swiss  Federal  Office  of  Energy.  (02.  04  2008).  Sectoral  Plan  for  Deep  Geological  Repositories:  Conceptual  Part.  Retrieved  on  10.  04  2014  from  Swiss  Federal  Office  of  Energy  SFOE:  http://www.bfe.admin.ch/radioaktiveabfaelle/01375/04389/index.html?lang=en  Swiss  Federal  Office  of  Energy.  (26.  03  2014a).  Regional  Participation.  Retrieved  on  01.  05  2014  from  Swiss  Federal  Office  of  Energy  SFOE:  http://www.bfe.admin.ch/radioaktive  abfaelle/01277/01309/01327/02621/index.html?lang=en  Scalise,  P.  J.  (2013).  Who  controls  whom?  Constraints,  challenges  and  rival  policy  images  in  Japan'ʹs  post-­‐‑war  energy  restructuring.  In  J.  Kingston,  Critical  Issues  in  Contemporary  Japan  (S.  92-­‐‑106).  Abingdon:  Routledge.  
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Fuchs,  Interviewer)  
  

	
  

  

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Siting  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  Facilities  in  Japan  and  Switzerland  

     

  

  

  

  

Fuchs  Sarah    Appendix  List  of  interviewees    Last  Name  Aebersold  First  Name  Michael  Title  Dr.  

Bühlmann  Werner  Dr.    

Eckhardt  Scheck  Juraku  Anne  
Kohta  

Kusaka  Kazumasa  McKinley  Position  Head,  Disposal  of  Radioactive  Waste  Member  Organization  Swiss  Federal  Office  of  Energy  ENSI  Board  Advisory  Function    Date  
6  May  2014  Place  Phone  

Topic  Switzerland    Phone  

Switzerland  ENSI  Board  Tokyo  Denki  University    METI  subcommittee  on  radioactive  waste  Skype  Tokyo  

Switzerland  Japan  

University  of  Tokyo    Japan  MCM  Consulting  Skype  

Japan  and  Switzerland  McKinley  Linda  

  Nagra  NUMO  International  Technical  Advisory  Committee    16  April  2014  
1  May  2014  Tokyo  

Ian  G.  

Dr.  
Chair  Prof.   Assistant  Professor,  Ph.D.   School  of  Science  and  Technology  for  Future  Life  
Prof.   Professor,  Graduate  School  of  Public  Policy  Dr.  
Partner  12  May  2014  
5  May  2014  9  May  2014  1  May  2014  Skype  

Switzerland  Schmid  Tochiyama  Jürg  V.  
Osamu    Dr.  

ENSI  Board  Nuclear  Safety  Research  Association    5  May  2014  METI  subcommittees   2  May  2014  on  radioactive  waste  Skype  Tokyo  

Switzerland  Japan  

Tokunaga  Tomochika  Prof.  

University  of  Tokyo  METI  subcommittees   1  May  2014  on  radioactive  waste  Tokyo  

Japan  

Coordinator  of  Information  and  Translation  Services  Vice-­‐‑Chairman  Director,  Radioactive  Waste  Disposal  Safety  Research  Center  Professor,  Department  of  Environment  Systems  

  

	
  

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