2013 Spring

Learning to Collaborate:
The impact of the Commons Systems
in Building Collaborative Capacity
through Enhanced Social Learning

International Political Economy (Case Study)
Professor. Hiwatari Nobuhiro

Onnuri Kim (51-118212)
Graduate School of Public Policy
The University of Tokyo

2013 Spring

International Political Economy Professor. Hiwatari

Learning to Collaborate:
The impact of the Commons Systems in Building Collaborative Capacity
through Enhanced Social Learning

Onnuri Kim (51-118212)
Graduate School of Public Policy
The University of Tokyo
Abstract

The commons systems or common pool resource systems have been described as theinstitutions for collective action which can deal with social dilemmas as an alternative to the market
and hierarchical institutions. The paper attempts to examine whether commons systems actuallyfacilitate collaborative capacity through a comparatively analysis of the outcomes of anexperimental game played by the commons group and non-commons group. Also, it intends toillustrate how institutions of collaboration emerge and evolve through observational analysis of theprocess and result of the experimental game.
The results of the experimental game demonstrate that individuals of the commons group wereable to initiate collaboration from the very beginning even in a new environment compared to theindividuals who are not familiar with collaborative regime of the commons system. The determining
factors of their capacity to initiate and develop collaboration were: 1) their perception on the game(zero-sum or non-zero-sum); 2) the existence of pooled resources; 3) the extent of the interactions(the level of deliberation and collective experiments).
Based on both quantitative and qualitative analysis on the outcomes of the experimental game,the paper argues that the commons systems do improve collaborative capacity of individual actors
involved in the community through social learning. The commons systems facilitate social learning
required for not only improving collaboration, but also initiating collaboration through a particularkind of social learning called triple-loop or transformative learning.

2013 Spring

International Political Economy Professor. Hiwatari

Learning to Collaborate:
The impact of the Commons Systems in Building Collaborative Capacity
through Enhanced Social Learning

Onnuri Kim (51-118212)
Graduate School of Public Policy
The University of Tokyo
Keywords
The Commons Systems, Social Learning, Collaboration, Collaborative Capacity, Deliberation,
Collective Experiment
1. Introduction
In recent decades, some scholars started to take collaboration seriously. Among them, Ostrom
analyzed multiple cases of collaborative resource governance systems across the world and cameup with institutional design principles of the collaborative systems or the common-pool resource
systems as she named. In recognition of the role of collaboration in dealing with the problem ofsocial dilemmas in which people cannot realize social optimal and instead end up choosing less
optimal options, she emphasized the institutional aspects calling the commons systems for
institutions for collective action (Ostrom, 1990). The commons systems are defined as thecollaborative resource governance systems (Ibid). The examples of the commons systems ranges
from communal grasslands, community forests, to a community restaurant in urban areas anddiverse forms of cooperatives through which a group of individuals collectively produce, manage,
and consume certain kinds of resources.
In both theoretical and empirical way, many studies found out that the Commons or CommonPool Resource systems can be an alternative to the market or hierarchical resource governanceregime by dealing with social dilemmas with collective actions or collaboration (Ostrom, 1990;
Wade, 1994; Gibson et al. eds., 2000; Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001; Ostrom and Nagendra, 2006).
For this reason, the commons systems are interchangeably called as "institutions for collective
action" Yet, questions remain. Do the commons systems actually facilitate individuals' capacity tocollaborative so that they can collaborate better than the individuals who are not involved in thecommons systems? If collaboration is of evolutionary and complex property, how collaboration or
the institutions of collaboration emerges and evolves?
So far, no study compared the collaborative capacity of the commons group and the noncommons group though an experimental game. Also, studies involving experimental games did
not focus on the emergence and evolution of the institutions for collaboration and collaborative
capacity because of the absence of communicative interaction in the game settings, and very
restricted control of the players in terms of changing game dynamics and thus results. Hence, thepaper attempts to examine the impact of the commons systems on collaborative capacity throughan experimental game. Also, it intends to analyze how the institutions for collaboration orcollaborative regime emerge and evolve through the experimental game.
In this paper, cooperation is differentiated from collaboration in order to avoid confusion with
the narrowly defined cooperation used in game theory literature. Although the terms likecooperation and collective actions are conventionally used in the commons literatures as wellincluding Ostrom’s work as the result of the relationships enabling people to overcome social
dilemmas for mutually beneficial outcomes (see Ostrom, 1990, 1998, 2003).
2. Framework
2.1. Methods/ Approach
In this paper, a dependent variable is collaborative capacity and independent variables
are the familiarity with the collaborative regime of the commons systems and absence of it.
The independent variables are represented by two different subject groups - commonsgroup and non-commons group. Regarding the concept of institutions, the paper follows
North's definition which identifies institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, moreformally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990, p
3).
For the comparative analysis on collaborative capacity depending on the independent
variables, the paper uses the first hand data produced by an experimental game because
data gathered from experimental settings give researchers a greater degree of confidencecompared to a simple conventional observational analysis. However, as it is an experimental
game, it shall be differentiated from “pure experiments”. The data analysis involves someobservational aspect based on the video recordings of the game sessions.

In this sense, the experimental game can be categorized as mixed experimentalobservational design. The collaborative capacity is evaluated by both quantitative andqualitative outcomes. For simplicity, the main criteria for evaluation would be the quantitative
outcome which is the amount of payoff of the group per person. Yet, the emergence anddevelopment of collaboration in relation with social learning would be carefully analyzed
based on interactions and behaviors of the participants recorded on video tapes.
2.2. Background
Collaboration
One of the most cited works on collaboration (Gray, 1989), defines collaboration as a process
through which actors with different perspectives “can constructively explore their differences andsearch for solutions that go beyond their own limited visions of what is possible (emphasis added)”(p 5). A more recent definitions refer collaboration as “an approach to solving complex problems
in which a diverse group of autonomous stakeholders deliberate to build consensus and develop
networks for translating consensus into results” (Margerum, 2011, p 6). The list of key
components of collaboration can be summarized as below
1) interdependence,2) shared purpose of making positive changes,3) explicit but voluntary membership,4) organization or group forms (both formal and informal),5) collective decision making,6) constructive appropriation of the differences,7) interactive processes (deliberative processes emphasized)
8) mutual accountability (both in terms of burden and power) with the understanding on thenature of collaboration as an emergent process9) networks(Gray 1989; Robert and Bradely, 1991; Margerum 2011).
They are different as collaboration involves deeper level of interaction, integration, commitment,
and complexity (Melaville & Blank, 1991; Mattessich & Monsey, 1992; Himmelman 1996).
The additional emphasis made by Margerum on ‘deliberative process’ as a tool to ensure
consensus and’ networks’ to realize the collectively made decisions (2011, p 7) gives a better
representation of the contemporary context thus more applicability to the commons systems.
These accounts of collaboration reflect collaboration’s procedural nature, transformative purpose,and relational facet based on social interactions.
Although the term is often misused and overused without much discretion often
interchangeably with the term cooperation, many scholars specialized in collaboration
distinguishes it from cooperation as the former involves deeper level of interaction, integration,commitment, and complexity (Melaville & Blank, 1991; Mattessich & Monsey, 1992; Himmelman1996).
Figure 1

Cooperation and Collaboration

Interactions:
Simple discontinuous communication flo
ws

Relationship:
Loose short-term relationship with weakor moderate interdependency
Input & Output:
Low to medium/
Limited means of input or contribution

Collaboration

Cooperatoin

Function:
Exchange information// Behavioral Coordination without shared
goals

Function:
Exchange information /Creation & Revision of common visions
and collective actions
Behavioral Coordination with shared goals and visions /Sharing Resources in the common-pool f
ormInteractions:
Multiple continuous communication flows(including informal chatting and institution
alized deliberation)/
Active forms of interations possible (inclu
ding non materialistic social exchange lik
e praise , criticism& indirect reciprocity, and persuasive social interactions)
Relationship:
Strongly long term relationship based onmoderate to strong interdependency
Input & Output:
Medium to High/
Diversified means of input or contribution
is possible* Adapted from Himmelman 2002
From Table 1, one can notice that collaboration does require more than smart tactics andskills as cooperation does. On one hand, cooperation, especially in the way it is used in the gametheories, would allow agents to coordinate their behaviors even if they have different goals or
visions as the cooperative behavioral pattern is based on short term transactions or deals.
Although such cooperative deals can be repeated and sustained for some time, the depth ofrelations, interactions, and commitment involved for such repeated cooperation is still not as
extensive as those for collaboration. For instance, if the players are homo economicus they may
share an incentive of maximizing their personal benefit or utility in the given situation instead ofsharing a more other-regarding incentive of maximizing their collective utility in the social sphere.
On the other hand, collaboration requires creating common goal, visions, resources, andidentity. Furthermore, collaboration requires a paradigm change before it can take place. A
paradigm change refers to the change in underlying norms, and world views involving
transformative social learning. Due to such differences, collaborative process necessitates certain
institutional frameworks to enable and sustain it in the face of social and ecological disturbances.
In other words, both enabling and improving collaboration requires learning and repetitive
experiences through social interactions. This is why for collaborative systems like the commons
institutions and institutional design have been one of the focal issues.

3. Experimental Game
A simple experimental game was carried out for comparative analysis the collaborative
capacity of two different groups of people who have been engaged in the commons systems on along term and those who are unfamiliar with the commons systems. Specifically, the experimental
game was played by a group of graduate students who are not extensively engaging in thecommons systems, and a group of citizens who have been active members of the urban commonssystems at least for 5 years in Seoul. The data resulted from the experimental game played bythese two different groups shall be helpful in illustrating the role of the commons systems infacilitating collaborative capacity through social learning.
Given that collaboration is an interactive and emergent process, the experimental game isdesigned in a way the interactive and emergent aspects can be also analyzed. To begin with, inthe game, the decisions made by participants are designed to resemble the decision making
process in real life by enabling interactions to a greater extent , and various communicative
actions so that individual players would have more influence and power in regard with the game
dynamics and results.
The limit of the conventional game theory related experiments is that their game settings do notallow interactions to a meaningful extent for simplicity. In many cases, players communicate
whether they will cooperate or not in 'yes' or 'no' form in a given condition or term over which they
do not have a control or influence to change the game structure and dynamics. Moreover, toanalyze the emergent property of the collaboration, the whole process is recorded on a video tapeand qualitative outcomes were carefully analyzed. By integrating the process related andqualitative data gained from observation will allow better understanding on the emergence andevolution of collaboration by social learning.
3.1. Game Settings- Experimental Factor:
Treat factor: The characteristics of the group
Two groups with different familiarity with the commons systems played the same
experimental game separately. A group of people with high familiarity to the commonssystems or collaborative institutions is categorized as the commons group, while the ones
without such familiarity are sorted as the non-commons group.
Confounders: The rest of game settings
The same game settings were applied to both groups except the minor difference in thenumber of players (The commons group had 15 participants whereas the non-commonsgroup had 16 participants).
- Subject Groups
1) The commons group: A group of people from different grass-root community organizations inSeoul who have been actively engaged in such commons systems at least for 5 years.
2) The non-commons group: A group of graduate students from the same department who havenot been engaged in the commons systems more than one year.
- Number of Participant1) The commons group: 3 groups with 5 people in each group (15 people participants intotal)2) The non-commons group: 4 groups with 4 people in each group (16 people participantsin total)- Number of Rounds per Game: 3 rounds- Duration: 35 minutes or so (5 minutes per round)- Game Rules
1) Participants who manage to make someone (including her or himself) stand in front or
behind of their chairs through communication can get $ 100 per person. No irrational or
violent measures such as threatening are allowed.
(Standing in front or behind of one’s own chair would get the person $ 100 - the sameamount the person can get when she or he make other players stand in front or behind
her or his chair. For instance, if a person succeeds to make 2 other players stand in frontof the person's chair, and stand behind one’s own chair, the person would get $ 300 as
the person would have 3 people standing in front or behind the person's chair including
oneself)
2) Except changing the location of table and chairs, any creative trials are allowed andencouraged3) Each group should report the resulted process & outcome briefly to other groups after
each round3.2. Results
3.2-a. Expected Results
Based on the hypotheses of this paper, it is expected that the commons group will havea higher group pay-off compared to the non-commons group. Also it is expected that the
non-commons group will display highly self-regarding attitudes and come up with efficient or
aggressive strategies in to maximize their individual outcomes instead of collective outcomesof their groups. It was further assumed that the non-commons group will set competitive
games as the basis of institutions and legitimatization to enable individuals who are "thefittest" to earn more than others.
3.2-b. Actual Results- Quantitative Outcomes
1) Non-commons Group(per person)
Pay-off
Group1
Group2
Group3

Group4

Round 1

100

100

100

100

Round 2

100

100

100

100

Round 3

100

200

100

100

2) Commons Group(per person)
Pay-off
Group1
Group2

Group3

Round 1

200

100

100

Round 2

500

200

500

Round 3

500

500

500

-Qualitative Outcomes
Analysis of the process of the game based on the recorded tapes revealed several
significant differences between the two groups in terms of interaction and pooling resources.
1) Non-commons Group<Pooling Resources>
No group succeeded or attempted to pool resources.
No individual suggested pooling resources to create a common pool.
<Interaction>
The majority were passively engaged in interactions.
Only a few tried to engage others for a group dialogue.

2) Commons Group<Pooling Resources>
From the first round, every sub-group pooled their resources creating a common fund.
Multiple players suggested pooling the money from the beginning.
<Interaction>
The majority showed proactive attitude in terms of interacting with each other. They actively
engaged themselves in communicative actions to the extent to have a deliberation regarding
the strategies to maximize the collective group pay-off and how to use the collective fund.
Also, along with the deliberative process, they collectively carried out experiments or trials
to examine suggested strategies.

3.3. Data Analysis- Categorization of the Outcomes (in the case of 5 participants and $ 100 pay-off perperson)1) The non-commons group
1-A. Homo-economicus Paradigm: The total payoff of the group = $ 500

1-B. Leadership-based Cooperative Paradigm– Pretty Social Homo-economicus Version: The total payoff of the group = $ 500

1-C. Transactional Cooperative Paradigm – Social Homo-economicus Version: The total payoff of the group = $ 500

1-D. Transactional Cooperative Paradigm – Strategic Social Homo-economicus
Version: The total payoff of the group = $ 1,000
Each individual earns $ 200 by standing in front of their own chair and counting the otherperson who is standing on the opposite side towards them

2) The Commons Group
2-A. Collaborative Paradigm - Initial Version: The total payoff of the group = $ 500
In Collaborative Paradigm, more extensive informal institutional building and interactions canbe observed (e.g. the creation of a common fund)2-B. Collaborative Paradigm – Simple Circle Version: The total payoff of the group = $ 1,000

2-C. Collaborative Paradigm – Extended Circle Version: The total payoff of the group = $ 2,500
In this extended circle version, people play the game more creatively by counting all othermembers in the circle as standing behind their chair allowing $ 500 payoff for each.

2-D. Collaborative Paradigm –Extended Network Circle Version: The total payoff of the group = $ 7,500-

The Comparison of the total pay-off per group and individual in each round

Graph 1 The Group Pay-off per capita of the Non-commons GroupPay off ($)

200	
 
150	
 
100	
 
50	
 

Round	 3	 Round	 2	 Round	 1	
 0	
 Round	 1	 Round	 2	 Round	
 3	
 Group1	 Group2	 Group3	 Group4	 Round	
 1	
 

100	
 

100	
 

100	
 

100	
 

Round	
 2	
 

100	
 

100	
 

100	
 

100	
 

Round	
 3	
 

100	
 

200	
 

100	
 

100	
 

Graph 2 The Group Pay-off per capita of the Commons GroupPay off ($)

500	
 
400	
 
300	
 
200	
 
Round	 3	 Round	
 2	
 

100	
 
0	
 

Round	
 1	
 Group1	 Group2	 Round	 1	 Round	 2	 Round	
 3	
 Group3	 Group1	 Group2	 Group3	 Round	
 1	
 

200	
 

100	
 

100	
 

Round	
 2	
 

500	
 

200	
 

500	
 

Round	
 3	
 

500	
 

500	
 

500	
 

Graph 3 The Comparison of the Pay-off per capita of the entire group

600	
 

Pay off ($)

500	
 
400	
 
300	
 
200	
 
100	
 
0	
 
Non-commons	 Commons	 	
 Round	 1	 Round	 2	 Round	
 3	
 

100	
 

100	
 

125	
 

133.3333	
 

400	
 

500	
 

In the case of the non-commons group, despite the variations of individual pay-off
distribution, the average pay-off of sub-groups per person were same ($ 100) for all subgroups in the first and second round. Only in the last round, one sub-group (Group 2)
managed to double the amount showing the strategic social homo-economicus behaviors of
the transactional cooperative paradigm as categorized by the paper. Every player earned $200 as they all stood in front of one’s own chair and but at the same time each wasstanding in front of the other person who is standing diagonally across each of them.
Hence, the sub-group does not show the collaborative paradigm in which resources arepooled, but the sub-group showed smart cooperative behaviors (or strategic social homoeconomicus behaviors – Category 1-D).
Although qualitative results of the commons group were considerably
distinguishable from that of the non-commons group, the quantitative result for the firstround was not so different from its counterpart. The sub-groups of the commons groupdisplayed just slightly higher outcome in the first round – $ 200 for one sub-group and $100 for the rest two groups.
Nevertheless, it is important to notice that the result of $ 200 appeared from the very
first round whereas the non-commons group only saw it appearing in the last round.
Furthermore, in the second round, the commons group was able to produce much higher
outcomes: $ 200 for one sub-group and $ 500 for two sub-groups. All the sub-groups
reached $ 500 in the last round. The important difference between the commons and thenon-commons group is that, the former not only produced the higher pay-off but also
increased the pay-off more dramatically through three rounds.
Another unexpected outcome was that participants from the non-commons group did notdisplay selfish or competitive behaviors as initially assumed. In fact, they were very
concerned with their social positions and relationships. Instead of establishing competitive
game settings within each sub-group and let "the fittest" members to win more rewards,
they choose to both economically and socially rational behavior patterns which iscategorized as strategic social homo-economicus pattern. In this sense, the data does notsupport the expectation that the commons group would produce much higher groupoutcomes whereas the non-commons group to produce better individual outcomes.
Why the commons group was able to achieve much better group outcome compared to
the non-commons group even when individuals of the non-commons group showed otherregarding behaviors instead of Machiavellian behaviors, and outcomes of the two groups
were not so different from each other in the first round. A careful analysis of the processillustrates that three factors were responsible for significantly different eventual outcomes of
the two groups: 1) their perception on the game (zero-sum or non-zero-sum); 2) the
existence of pooled resources; 3) the extent of the interactions (the level of deliberation andcollective experiments).

Three determining factors of Social learning for starting and developing
Collaboration
Unfortunately, extensive and through deliberation could not take place among bothgroups due to the time restraint of the experimental game. Nonetheless, there weresignificant differences between two groups regarding deliberation.
In the case of the non-commons group, during the game, few people were actively
engaged in communication, but the communicative interactions did not evolve into
deliberation due to the lack of motivation, relational capital, and most importantly, thecommon framework for understanding or basis for joint action. In the absence of suchelements, the non-commons groups perceived the game as the zero-sum game creating
winners and losers. Thus, social interactions with other players meant either gain or loss
compared to the amount of pay-off they can get by standing in front or behind their own
chair.
In this light, extensive interactions regarding the pay-off could be considered as something
unnecessary and to be avoided especially given the short period time (5 minutes) tointeract per round. Two comments made by the non-commons group players during thegroup report session reflect this kind of perception clearly - “We decided to stay where weare as we can get the reward without moving and other hassles”; “I was hesitant to makea move as I did not want to take others to gain more pay-off”. It echoes the conclusion of
the recent studies on human decision-making and behavior that humans, in general, tend tocooperate with others as they are motivated by social preferences (Bowles and Gintis,2011). Yet, the non-commons group participants could be only cooperators not collaborators
to each other.
On the other hand, the people of the commons group, who are actively engaged in thecommons systems, were able to set the initial collaborative framework by suggesting thecollective fund for their group. This would not have been possible if they were unable tosee the game as a non zero-sum game from the very beginning.
As the non-commons group did, the commons group lacked the relational capital when
they started the game as the non-commons group did, since they were members ofdifferent communities or the commons systems. Some of them were acquaintances andmost of them were meeting each other for the first time. However, when the game started
people quickly introduced themselves to build the relations based on which they can havemore active social interactions. As the game proceeds, they were able to deliberate as agroup on possible options to increase the pooled resources (collective money) within thecollaborative framework. Furthermore, from the second round, all groups were discussing theusage of the commons fund.
Even more interesting behavior pattern was the expansion of collaboration to the entire
group creating one big group encompassing the all three sub-groups (refer to the 2-D.
Collaborative Paradigm –Extended Network Circle Version from the result category part).
The process of expanding collaboration occurred through expanded boundary of deliberationand collective experiment. In the third round, as they realized that there are no rules
prohibiting interactions between sub-groups, sub-groups started to interact with each otherand forming a big one group with a bigger common fund. In fact, there was an attempt toform a bigger group earlier in the second round by few individuals, but it did not work out
as they needed more time to communicate their ideas to others through deliberation. In thelast round, they could establish the communicative rationality on forming a bigger group forbigger common fund which could increase the possibility and power of the collective
monetary resource through deliberation within and among sub-groups.
Compared to the non-commons group, the commons group showed greater motivation,
relational capital, and the common framework for understanding and basis for joint action as
they continued the group deliberative process. It is possible that besides their experiences
and familiarity with the commons systems, the fact that they were aware that others arefrom the community organizations sharing similarly collaborative framework and experiences,also played a role in rapid. Due to these reasons, compared to its counterpart, thecommons group displayed more active and extensive deliberation enabling them to learn
faster to collaborate better.
By pooling the money, the groups managed to engage every player in the collective
thinking and experimenting process. Players were more proactive in trying to maximize thegroup pay-off with creative measures not only through deliberation but also actual
experiments. They actually tried the suggested options with their members to communicate
the options by demonstrating them and examine the real outcome of the options. The
experimental collective actions were useful in developing new options through collective
contemplation based on the experimental demonstration, and also in persuading othermembers by effectively communicating the options. Thanks to the activated deliberation andcollective experiment, the commons group were able to learn faster and better tocollaborate and how to collaborate better. As you can from Figure 6, the resulted outcomeby the commons group after each round increases much more rapidly than that of the noncommons group.
4. Social Learning and Collaborative Capacity through the Collaborative Interaction
Framework of the Commons
Collaboration and social learning is the key factors for capacity building. Collaborative
frameworks facilitate social learning via collaborative engagements among individuals. In otherwords, collaborative institutional framework structures social interactions so that substantial social
learning can take place. For this reason, essential elements of collaboration seem to reflect thenecessary conditions for social learning.
By definition, social learning is a change in understanding beyond individual level allowing
social changes through interactions across social networks (Keen et al., 2005; Reed et al., 2010)
through “collective action and reflection … among different individuals and groups” (Keen et al.,2005, p 4, emphasis added). It “occurs when people engage one another, sharing diverse
perspectives and experiences to develop a common framework of understanding and basis forjoint action” (Schusler et al., 2003, p311, emphasis added). These definitions implicate that social
learning requires collaborative interactions to produce positive social changes through joint action
and reflection. In this regard, it is possible to identify the commons as social learning systems as
they develop a common framework for understanding and decision making through collaborative
engagements.
Regarding the depth and scope of social learning, there are three different kinds including
single-loop, double-loop learning (Agrys and Schon, 1978), and triple-loop learning (Flood andRomm’s 1996; King and Jiggins, 2002; Diduck, 2004; Keen et al., 2005). Single-loop learning
enables incremental improvement by reflection of the relationship between certain outcomes andactions. Double loop learning refers to a learning process through which you are able to revisit andrevise underlying assumptions in the sense of cause–effect relationships (Argyris and Scho¨n,1978), whereas triple loop learning enables you to “reconsider underlying values, beliefs, andworld views, if assumptions within a world view do not hold anymore.” (Pahl-Wostl, 2009).
Consequently, the specific social learning resulting in positive transformation shall havecharacteristics of triple-loop or experiential learning process. Since the emergence of collaboration
or institutions for collaboration also demands experiential learning since it requires the revision ofperceptions, values, beliefs of people to see the given situation as a non-zero sum game andpotential of collaboration beyond the cloud of uncertainty.

Figure 2 Single-loop, Double-loop, and Triple-loop learning(Hargrove, 2003)

For self-governing or self-organizing collaborative systems like the commons, enhancedsocial learning through collective action and reflection enables further development of

collaborative capacity of the systems. In illustrating this point, the concept of “the communities ofpractice” is useful. The capacity of social learning units or “the communities of practice” develop
based on 1) members bounded by the jointly formed understanding of the group identity in termsof vision and function, and accountability of individuals in terms of both responsibility and rights; 2)proactive participation of members in establishing the learning units through collective
engagement; 3) the common pool of resources (Wenger, 2000). It reconfirms that the collaborativeinteractions, pooling resources and involving individuals in collaborative activities, is anindispensable component of social learning. Consequently, the more social learning take place inthe communities of practice, the better they become in collaborating.
As substantial “interaction and communication” among individuals is the key to social
learning (Röling and Wagemakers 1998, p 65), facilitating social learning involves indentifying
desirable forms of interaction and communication. As discussed earlier, if the collaborative
framework is the integral component of social learning, what kind of specific forms of interactions
are desirable in the collaborative framework? Two kinds of social interactions can be suggested: 1)
deliberation and 2) experimental collective action based on theoretical explanations on the meansof social learning and overcoming social dilemmas.
As collaboration is a mechanism to overcome social dilemmas creating social optimal
requiring social learning process, collaborative capacity of the commons necessitates continuoussocial learning. Considering that, “collective action and reflection” of different actors (Keen et al.,2005, p 4) enabling social learning shall be the desirable forms of social interactions in developing
collaborative capacity of the commons. Furthermore, “the two ways out from social dilemmas”
suggested by Ostrom: 1) communication and collective action; 2) innovation and collective action(1998, p 6), also suggest the deliberation and experiment as the desirable social interactions incollaborative capacity building as deliberation is a specific form of communication allowing
reflection and collaborative experiments is a kind of collective action that enables innovation. From
the results of an experimental game as well, the commons groups showed clearly showed much
more active engagements in terms of deliberation and collective experiments.
Some scholars in the field of social learning emphasize the value of experiments in learning.
Kolb emphasized the necessity of “creating adequate conditions to link experiences, reflection,and experimentation” among individuals or groups (1984). Diduck and his colleagues assert thatwhat renders learning is an eagerness to experiment along with a risk taking tendency, politicaland institutional frameworks conducive to learning, alteration of worldview and synthesis ofknowledge (2005). In addition, as was briefly mentioned earlier, the social learning of thecommons can be explained from the perspective of the “community of practice”. By definition,community of practice is a joint social entity with communal resources developed by members
who share the understanding of the community’s purpose and member’s mutual accountability toeach other, and develop the community through mutual engagement (Wenger 1998). As
communities of practice provide a chance to develop competence through an experience of direct
participation, they play the role of critical social units of learning (Wenger 2000). Applying theconcept of communities of practice, the commons offers the chance to enhance the capacity byparticipation and experience in the form of decentralized collective experiments.
Furthermore, in the complex socio-political systems of the current era, “multiparty
collaboration embedded in a specific context and leading to specific outcomes” enables social

learning extensive enough to change system structures and dynamics (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007, 3).
In this sense, decentralized arenas associated with sub-units of the commons can facilitate social
learning profound enough to revise preexisting frames and even transform the cognitive context bychanging system structure and dynamics.
The transformation of system structure and dynamics by triple-loop learning illustrates the shift
from cognitive context of social dilemma to that of social collaboration through the evolution ofcollaboration in which “individuals temporarily caught in a social-dilemma structure are likely toinvest resources to innovate and change the structure itself in order to improve joint outcomes”(Ostrom 1998, 8). In such a condition, learning that enables transformation occurs through a“continuous trial-and-error process until a rule system is evolved that participants consider yields
substantial net benefits” (Ibid).
5. Implications
After all, the commons group showed not only higher group pay-offs but also more
activated deliberation and collective experiments. Such qualitative differences allowed thecommons group to experience a greater level of social learning and collaboration. The
commons group showed a stronger ability in pooling resources as not only they were ablepool resources right from the beginning, but also they pooled increasingly more resources
after each round by coming up with creative strategies and expanding the network ofcollaboration through deliberative process and collective experiments. Such results implicatesthat the commons systems can make people learn to collaborate and do it better by
establishing and developing collaborative institutions.
Furthermore, triple-loop or experiential learning the specific kind of social learning
required for people to become collaborators to begin with. In other words, transformability
through triple-loop or experiential learning is a precondition to initiate a collaborative regime
or institutions for collective actions/collaboration. Unfortunately, social learning andcollaborative capacity building are not fully appreciated and studies in the commons study.
Hence, if we are to expand the concept of commons to include the commons systems, newprinciples relevant to social learning and collaborative capacity building such as deliberationand experimenting collective action shall be added to the original 8 principles of institutional
conditions for long-lasting self-organizing CPRs (for the detailed explanation refer to Ostrom,1990). Specific principles or conditions appropriate for the purpose can be the interesting
topic for future studies.
6. Conclusion
All in all, by qualitative and quantitative analysis of the outcomes of an experimental game,the paper found out that the commons systems do contribute to the development of collaborative
capacity of individuals through social learning. Although, the difference of initial outcome between
the two groups was not significant and the non-commons group was other-regarding enough, theeventual outcomes of the two groups were substantially. The comparative analysis of the results
illustrated that the commons group produced better group outcomes by establishing collaborative
institutions from the very beginning and learned faster to collaborate better than the non-commonsgroup. The determining factors of the different level of collaborative capacity and social learning
were 1) their perception on the game (zero-sum or non-zero-sum); 2) the existence of pooledresources; 3) the extent of the interactions (the level of deliberation and collective experiments).
Regarding emergence and evolution of institutions of collaboration, social learning played acritical role. Triple loop learning is particularly relevant type of social learning for the emergence ofinstitutions of collaboration and for its evolution social learning in general (including all three typesof social leaning - aka. single- double-, triple-loop) through reflective and experimental
collaborative engagements.

References
Agrawal, A. and Ostrom, E. (2001).Collective Action, Property Rights,and Decentralization in
Resource Use in India and Nepal. Politics and Society, Vol. 29 (4), p 485-514.
Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (2011). A cooperative species - Human reciprocity and its evolution.
Princeton University Press.
Diduck, A., Bankes, N., Armitage, D., and D. Clark. (2005). Unpacking social learningin social-ecological systems: Case studies of polar bear and narwhal management innorthern Canada. In Breaking ice: Renewable resource and ocean management in the
Canadian north, ed. Berkes, F. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, p 269-290.
Gibson, C.,, McKean, M., and Ostrom, E. (eds.). (2000), People and Forests: Communities,
Institutions, and Governance, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gray , B. (1989) . Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems . San
Francisco :Jossey-Bass .
Gray , B., and Wood, D. (1991). Collaborative Alliances: Moving from Practice to Theory. Journalof
Applied Behavioral Science, Vol. 27 (2), p 3 – 22 .

Hargrove, R. [1999] (2003). Masterful Coaching (Revised Edition). Jossey-Bass/Pfeiffer,Wiley.
Himmelman , Arthur T . (1996) . On the Th eory and Practice of Transformational Collaboration:
From Social Service to Social Justice . In Creating Collaborative Advantage , edited by
Chris Huxham , 19 – 43 . Th ousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications.
Keen, M., Brown, V. A. and R. Dyball. 2005. Social learning in environmental management:
towards a sustainable future. London; Sterling, VA, Earthscan.
Kolb, D.A. (1984). Experiential learning: experience as the source of learning anddevelopment. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Margerum, R. D. (2011). Collaboration Beyond Consensus: improving collaborative planning andmanagement. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press.
Mattessich, P. W. & Monsey, B. R. (1992). Collaboration: What makes it work. St. Paul, MN:
Amherst H. Wilder Foundation.
McKean, M. A. (1992). Success on the commons: A comparative examination of institutions forcommon property resource management. Journal of Theoretical Politics Vol, 4 (3), p 247282.
Melaville, A., & Blank, M. (1991). What it takes Structuring interagency partnerships to connect
children and families with comprehensive services. Washington, D.C.: Education and
Human Services Consortium.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E. (1998). A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action.
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 1 (Mar., 1998), pp. 1-22.
Ostrom, E. & Nagendra, H. (2006). Insights on Linking Forests, Trees, and People from the Air, on
the Ground, and in the Laboratory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences(PNAS), Vol. 103 (51), p 19224 -19231
Pahl-Wostl, C., Craps, M., Dewulf, A., Mostert, E. , Tabara, D.., & Taillieu, T. (2007).
Social learning and water resources management. Ecology and Society,12 (2):5 [online] URL: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss2/art5/
Roling, R N. R., Wagemakers, M. A. eds. (1997). Social learning for sustainableagriculture. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Schusler, T. M., Decker, D. J., and Pfeffer, M. J. (2003). Social learning for collaborative
natural resource management. Society & Natural Resources. Vol. 16, p 309-326.
Wade, R. (1994). Village republics: Economic conditions for collective action in South India. ICS
Press.

Wenger, E. (1998). Communities of practice: learning, meaning, and identity. Cambridge
University Press.
Wenger, E. (2000). Communities of Practice and Social Learning Systems. Organization, vol. 7 no.
2, p 225-246