For Official Use

CEMT/CM(2002)18/FINAL

Conférence Européenne des Ministres des Transports
European Conference of Ministers of Transport

06-Jun-2002___________________________________________________________________________________________English - Or. English

EUROPEAN CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS OF TRANSPORTCOUNCIL OF MINISTERS

CEMT/CM(2002)18/FINALFor Official Use

Council of Ministers

TRANSPORT SECURITY AND TERRORISM
SUMMARY NOTE AND DECLARATIONThis document was submitted for discussion under item 5 "Transport Security and Terrorism" of the Agenda ofthe Bucharest session of the Council of Ministers.
It also includes a Ministerial Declaration on Combating Terrorism in Transport, which was approved by theCouncil of Ministers.

English - Or. English

JT00127653

Document complet disponible sur OLIS dans son format d'origine
Complete document available on OLIS in its original format

CEMT/CM(2002)18/FINAL
1. CONTEXT
The terrorist attacks of September 2001 in New York and Washington modified probably forever
the way security is approached in the transport sector. The use of transport vehicles as actual weapons ofdestruction targeting both passengers in the vehicles and individuals located in the target buildings exposed
a whole new degree of vulnerability within the transport system. As a result of the previously
inconceivable magnitude of physical destruction and loss of life, transport authorities and service providers
on all levels and in all sectors are having to adjust traditional security assessment procedures and tools tomanage and effectively respond to this new level of risk.1
Well before these terrorist strikes on the United States, transport infrastructure and equipment has
been the target of terrorist action for a number of reasons, among them, it is:−−−−relatively accessible;
can attract significant public attention and media coverage;
is often linked with national symbols such as national airlines;
can affect large numbers of people in a single strike.

Transport sector experience since the events of late 2001 has revealed a number of areas ofuncertainty with regard to ensuring security against terrorism attacks in transport. Transport authorities andoperators have since September 11 found themselves seeking answers to a number of security-related
questions, among them:−

Are existing security measures and procedures sufficient in the current post-September 11
context? Where are the remaining vulnerabilities in the system and how best can they beaddressed? Is it just a question of better implementation/greater enforcement of existingprocedures or are new measures needed?

−

Are the current evaluation tools, including risk and vulnerability assessment methodologies,
sufficient to provide the necessary information to decision-makers given the magnitude andpotential impact of the terrorist threat, particularly with perceptions of heightened insecurity
in certain areas since the attacks? What are the costs of using these tools, and who should
cover these costs? What are acceptable levels of risk?

−Similarly, how much security is « enough »? That is to say, where is it necessary to draw theline in tightening security so as to avoid unnecessarily increasing transport costs without
adding benefits, and thereby constraining transport activity which is essential to national
economic health?

In seeking to come to grips with these and other questions, transport entities have been meetingon local, regional and national levels of government and within some sectors on a multilateral basis to takestock of security considerations relative to counter-terrorism, share best practice, and evaluate necessary
technical, legal and legislative adjustments to ensure maximum protection based on evaluated risk against
terrorist activity in transport.
Experience in the transport sector since the 11 September attacks also reveals that most activities
to enhance security since that time have been concentrated within individual transport modes.2 Counter1.

Please see reference document CM(2002)19 for complete bibliographical references for this report.

2.

Please see reference document CM(2002)19 for examination of specific activities in each mode.

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terrorism in the aviation and maritime sectors -- though actively debated at present in multilateralorganisations -- remains focused on those individual modes. Rail security appears to be largely focused onnational-level initiatives, with little inter-governmental exchange to date. Terrorism in road transport hasreceived relatively little attention. There appears to be no multilateral discussion underway on potential
risks concerning inland waterway terrorism. And whilst there does appear to be significant experience inestablishing an intermodal, public transit system-wide approach to counter-terrorist policies and measures,the debate remains logically focused on a local and national level.

2.

CO-ORDINATION ON SECURITY AMONG MODES AND SECTORS

If this mode-focused approach to counter-terrorism measures is indeed the case in most countries,
then it would seem that there may be further need to ensure that the linkages among air and rail, rail androad, inland waterway and maritime transport are seen in the context of an intermodal transport security
framework. Several factors stand out as particularly important. Whilst some counter-terrorism measures
are clearly mode-specific -- e.g., barring cockpit access in planes, mandatory installation of automatic
identification systems for ships, etc. – others have implications for several modes, e.g., transparency intracking of container goods in transit via road, rail or waterways to airports and maritime ports. The
involvement of several modes in the latter example demonstrates, it would seem, the need for a coordinated security approach: lack of vigilance at any point in the transport chain could render the entire
chain vulnerable to terrorist action.
Moreover, security measures imply costs, and fragmented, mode-specific security measures maylead to inefficiencies in resource allocation across the sector. A co-ordinated and level playing field asconcerns costs is important notably for industry: piecemeal security requirements in individual sectors that
do not take account of initiatives in related modes can result in inconsistent demands being made ontransport service providers, operators, etc. Co-operation with the private sector may be especially
important in this regard.
Co-ordination on transport security and terrorism – be it among modes, private and public sector
entities, or countries – necessitates some degree of policy transparency. Whilst caution is running high at
present with regard to the sensitivity of information related to terrorism in the transport sector – andunderstandably so -- it may nevertheless be important that national counter-terrorism experience for modes
other than aviation and maritime -- which already benefit from multilateral co-ordination -- be shared tothe extent deemed possible by national authorities with other countries in a multilateral setting. In this way,
best practice is shared (e.g. information exchange on new security technologies), vulnerabilities within thesystem are better understood (and thereby can be more effectively addressed) and co-ordination among
countries is enhanced. If determined by its members to be of potential use, ECMT could serve as a forum
in which this enhanced, intermodal discussion on terrorism and security in the transport sector could bepursued.
3.

ROLE OF TRANSPORT MINISTRIES AND MINISTERS

Transport Ministers usually find themselves in the spotlight after violent attacks on transport
infrastructure and equipment, obligated to rapidly reassure a worried public that emergency security
measures are being taken to ensure safe transport. And co-ordination of transport-sector security initiatives
falls on their shoulders in times of terrorist or other violent activity. The necessity for Ministries to identify
and address vulnerabilities within and across transport modes has become particularly apparent since theevents of September 2001.

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Based on the information obtained to date, there appears to be a number of areas in which
Transport Ministries can effectively oversee the policy and technical debate surrounding counter-terrorism
in transport.
Transport Ministries and Ministers can:−−−−−

Ensure a co-ordinated inter-modal framework for security in the transport sector, in coordination with other Ministries handling national security and terrorist issues (e.g., theMinistries of Defence and Interior);
Provide support for risk and vulnerability assessments as well as training for personnel on
emergency procedures within and between modes as well as on regional and local levels;
Share to the extent possible experience and best practice on transport security and counterterrorism measures with other governments;•whilst a multilateral framework exists for aviation and maritime, it is lacking for surface
modes.
Build on already existing initiatives to improve security and reduce crime in transport (e.g.,tracking of goods transport) where possible to improve transport efficiency and counterterrorism measures; andSimilarly, seek measures that create complementarity among security, safety and counterterrorism initiatives.

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CEMT/CM(2002)18/FINALMINISTERIAL DECLARATION ON COMBATING TERRORISM IN TRANSPORT

We the Ministers of Transport of the Member and Associate Member Countries of the European
Conference of Ministers of Transport, having met in Council on 29-30 May in Bucharest, Romania:
CONDEMNING the horrific terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in
New York and on the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.;
CONSCIOUS that the nature of these attacks – the magnitude of physical destruction and loss of life, as
well as the use of transport vehicles as means to perpetrate these acts of violence – has changed
the context in which transport security policy is developed and implemented across modes;
EXPRESSING our determination to work at national and international levels to ensure that transport isable to exercise its vital role in society and the economy, unhindered by the threat of terrorist
action.
NOTING the work in several fora to address terrorism and transport, including:−

the Transport Ministers’ Statement on Counter-Terrorism in maritime and aviation transportof 15 January 2002 in Tokyo;−

the Declaration endorsing the establishment of a comprehensive Aviation Security Plan ofAction at the ICAO Ministerial Conference on Aviation Security issued at the Ministerial
Conference on Aviation Security in Montreal, 19-20 February 2002;−

work within international bodies such as ECAC, IMO, the G8, UNECE, the EC and OECD toreview and strengthen counter-terrorism initiatives within the transport sector; and efforts ofinternational industry entities such as the UIC and IRU to enhance understanding ofindustry’s concerns relative to transport terrorism and effective measures to improve security.

AWARE that:−most activities to enhance security since 11 September 2001 have been planned andimplemented within individual modes, necessitating a more global approach to security
covering all links in the transport chain;−

whilst in place for aviation and maritime, a multilateral framework for discussion on
terrorism in transport is necessary for surface modes.

CONSIDERING the need to find an appropriate balance between:−

improving security and ensuring the smooth flow of goods and people nationally andinternationally;−

the need for transparency in an exchange of ideas and best practice with other countries andthe importance of confidentiality in order to ensure the efficacy of measures.

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AGREE to:−Continue to work on implementing Resolutions 1986/58 on Aviation Security as well as
1997/2 and 1999/3 on crime in transport;−

Promote a co-ordinated intermodal approach to security in the transport sector in ourcountries in co-ordination with other relevant bodies in our governments;−

Share to the extent possible our experience and best practice on transport security andcounter-terrorism with other governments in order to further understanding and co-operationin this area;−Provide support as needed for risk and vulnerability assessments as well as training forpersonnel on emergency procedures within and between modes and on regional and locallevels;−

Seek measures that create complementarity among security, safety and counter-terrorism
initiatives.

REQUEST ECMT to:−

Develop its work on security and terrorism;−

Monitor developments in improving transport security and share experience on good practiceacross the transport sector among Member and Associate Members;−

Work with OECD, ECAC, and IMO to bring issues and experiences from the aviation andshipping sectors to Ministers’ attention and to ensure, as far as practicable, a consistent
approach across different modes;−

Seek ways to combine efficiency and security improvements in the transport system withmeasures combating terrorism, for example by examining effective ways of tracking goods
along the transport chain to prevent inconsistent and incompatible security requirements
among modes.

REQUEST UN/ECE to:−

Conduct a review of their legal instruments to verify that they adequately take into
consideration implications for transport security since the attacks of 11 September 2001.

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