Chinese Banking Business in Singapore
Background and Development in the First Half of the Twentieth Century

Ryoichi Hisasue
Introduction
In the late nineteenth century, the Asian economy became subsumed within the newframework of global free trade. This phenomenon brought modern business infrastructure, such as
banking, shipping, and communication, from the West. For example, British overseas banks, whichwere closely linked with the London-centered international financial system, provided a safety netthat helped guarantee global settlement and funds supply.1 These banks also developed relations
with commercial networks in Asia, including Chinese, Indian, Parsi, Jewish, Armenian, andMuslim networks, thus accelerating regional economic activity.
In the early twentieth century, however, native capital began to enter the modern banking
business. A typical example was the formation of banks by overseas Chinese. These banks did notchallenge the dominance of Western banks, but became significant players in local economic
activity. This phenomenon spread throughout the Asia-Pacific, and Chinese banks were soon
established in such Chinese business entrepots as Singapore, San Francisco, and Hong Kong. This
paper examines the Chinese banking business in Singapore as an example and elucidates its
background and development during the first half of the twentieth century.

Chinese Demand for Financial Services in Singapore in the Nineteenth Century
Singapore was established by the British in 1819 as a trading port linking the East and theWest. However, from the middle of the nineteenth century, Chinese immigrants from South China
flowed into Southeast Asia and became a driver of intra-Asia economic activity. Singapore thus
became not only a trading hub between East and West, but a distribution port for Chinese
economic activities both within and between Southeast Asia and China.
As an entrepot for Chinese commercial networks, financial profits from the activities of theSingapore Chinese community were remitted to China. For example, Chinese migrant workers inSoutheast Asia had to send money to their families in South China — including the Pearl River
Delta (珠江三角州), Teochew (潮州), and Hokkien (福建)2. Singapore thus became a central
accumulation point for remittance funds throughout Southeast Asia.
1

In the nineteenth century, many British banks opened branches in Singapore, including Union Bank of Calcutta(1840), Oriental Bank (1846), Asiatic Bank (1851), Mercantile Bank (1858), Chartered Bank (1859), and the Hong
Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (1866). Additionally, Dutch banks, such as N.H.M. and N. I. Handels,
opened branches in the 1880s.
2This paper transcribes the pronunciation of Chinese words in the original dialect as often as possible. Therefore,
the same Chinese characters may be transcribed in different ways.

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Ryoichi Hisasue

Because of the large demand for remittances, small Chinese trading shops also provided
private postal and remittance services. These private postal and remittance agents (信局) accepted
letters or remittance funds from the Chinese community and arranged for their transfer to South
China.3 In the process, they developed relationships with British and other banks to use theirremittance networks.
Foreign banks recognized that the large volume of accumulated remittance funds from the
Chinese community offered an important business opportunity. Therefore, foreign banks began toprovide short-term credit or other financial benefits to major remittance agents.4 Relationships
thus were formed among the various foreign banks and Chinese remittance agents. Restated, aco-relationship was established between the macro networks (banks), which were based in thesystematic business organization, and the micro networks (remittance agents), which were based in
the local business networks.5
However, Chinese demand for trade finance was limited. Because Chinese business activitiesin Singapore were based on trust within kinship and dialect groups, settlement between trade
partners used book-keeping barter.6 This method is a traditional Chinese tool for trade settlement,7in which each book is balanced almost evenly and actual settlement is only required twice a year.
Such demand as existed for trade finance was met mainly by the compradors or brokers thatcollected local products, such as tin or spices, for foreign trading firms. These compradors andbrokers enjoyed easier access to foreign banks, and thus could arrange short-term loans with credit
guaranteed by foreign trading firms.
Demand for industrial finance was also limited. For example, in the late nineteenth century,
Chinese dominated the tin mining industry in Malaya. However, the low initial investment was oneof the reasons Chinese could easily enter this business. Open cut mining did not require heavy
mining equipment, and tin miners raised the necessary funds from families or friends within thesame dialect group.
However, while Chinese demand for finance was limited, Chinese who did wish to use
foreign banks faced numerous constraints. From the foreign banks’ perspective, different views ofcredit made long-term loans to the Chinese a high risk. The foreign banks viewed credit solely interms of financial assets, whereas the Chinese viewed credit as based on personal reputation, andthus incorporating not only financial assets but also personal ability and social influence. For their3

See Ryoichi Hisasue, “Connection Mechanisms for Chinese Remittances: From Singapore to the Pearl River Delta
via Hong Kong,” Southeast Asian Studies 44, no. 2 (久末亮一「華僑送金の広域間接続関係：シンガポール・香
港・珠江デルタを例に」『東南アジア研究』44巻 2 号) 2006: 204-222.
4
Bank of Taiwan, “Nanyou ni Okeru Kakyou (Sina Ijyumin) Tsuki Kawase Kankei,” (台湾銀行『南洋ニ於ケル華僑（支那移住民）附為替関係』“Overseas Chinese (Chinese Immigrants) in Southeast Asia and their Remittance
Relationship”) 1914. 113.
5
Hisasue, “Connection Mechanisms,” 211.
6
Rajeswary Brown, “Chettiar Capital and Southeast Asian Credit Networks in the inter-war period,” in Gareth
Austin and Kaoru Sugihara, eds., Local Suppliers of Credit in the Third World, 1750-1960 (London: The Macmillan
Press Limited, 1993), 272.
7
See W. G. Huff, “Bookkeeping Barter, Money, Credit, and Singapore’s International Rice Trade, 1870-1939,”
Explorations in Economic History 26 (1989): 161-189.

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Chinese Banking Business in Singapore

part, the Chinese considered the Western banking system inflexible. Furthermore, communication
problems existed between the two sides. To bridge these gaps banks employed compradors asintermediaries; however, these compradors mainly came from the Cantonese dialect group andpreferred to deal with other Cantonese. For example, since Cantonese dominated the comprador
positions of the Singapore branch of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation,8 Chinesemerchants from other regional groups, such as the Teochew or Hokkien, found it difficult to accessthe services the bank offered.
Direct use of foreign banks by local Chinese was not particularly widespread during thenineteenth century, other than remittance activity through agents or Chinese brokers raisingshort-term credit. Many Chinese raised necessary funds from within their own networks that werebased on ties of kinship or dialect group. When these avenues failed to supply necessary funds,
Chinese often borrowed at high interest rates from Indian usurers, the so-called Chettiar.

The Formation of Chinese Banks in Singapore
In the early twentieth century, the Singapore Chinese community began to establish their own
banks. The pioneer was Kwong Yik Bank (廣益銀行), established in 1903 by Wong Ah-Fook (黄亜福), a sub-contractor and planter, and some of his Cantonese colleagues in Singapore andMalaya, such as Loke Yeu (陸佑), a famous mining magnate. The Bank had its origins as amock-banking business on Wong’s plantation, where it issued bank notes to pay wages toplantation workers and accepted their savings deposits.9 Kwong Yik Bank provided deposit andcheck services, for which huge potential demand existed among Cantonese traders andshopkeepers.
Kwong Yik Bank was soon imitated by other Chinese banks throughout the Asia-Pacific. For
example, the Bank of Canton (廣東銀行) was founded in San Francisco in 1907 by a Cantonese
merchant group. The memorandums and articles of association of the Bank of Canton specificallyreferenced Kwong Yik Bank, as follows:
In recent years, Chinese private and official entities have been promoting business activities
in China and other commercial ports. “Kwong Yik Bank” was established in Singapore, and“Sino-Mexico Bank” was established in Mexico. These new banks are struggling to recovernational pride and interest, and promote the interests of fellow Chinese merchants.10

8Brown, “Chettiar Capital,” 291.
Lee Sheng-Yi, The Monetary and Banking Development of Malaysia and Singapore (Singapore: Singapore
University Press, 1974), 70.
10
Him Mark Lai, Cong Huaqiao Dao Huaren: Ershi Shiji Meiguo Huaren Shehui Fazhan Shi (麥禮謙『従華僑到
華人－二十世紀米國華人社會發展史』“From Overseas Chinese to Chinese America: A History of theDevelopment of Chinese American Society during the Twentieth Century”) (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Company(三聯書店(香港)有限公司), 1992): 94-95.
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Ryoichi Hisasue

In November 1906, the Sze Hai Tong Banking and Insurance Company, Limited (四海通銀
行保険積聚有限公司) was established by Teochew merchants, including Wee Song-Tin (黄松亭),
Tan Ah-Goh (陳亜鵝), Tan Swi-Khi (陳瑞麒), and Cheong Khwi-Thiam (鍾癸添). The enterprise
was backed by the issue of ten thousand shares at 100 straits dollars per share.11 As the name of
the bank suggests, an insurance business was simultaneously established, and branches wereopened in Bangkok, Hong Kong, and Swatou in line with Teochew commercial networks.
Interestingly, shares of the Sze Hai Tong Banking and Insurance Company, Limited werecategorized into two types, ordinary shares and founders shares (Table 1), where the latter werede-facto preferred shares with the right to a special dividend, the so-called “red share” (紅股份).
This business practice originates in South China. In China, joint-stock businesses (合股) paid
special dividends to such qualified persons as founding shareholders or executive managers.12
While the Sze Hai Tong Banking and Insurance Company, Limited was established as a modern
financial institution, it reflected the mindset of its founders by preserving traditional Chinese
business practices.13
Names Addresses and Descriptions ofShareholders

Number of Ordinary Shares Number of Founders Shares
taken by each Shareholder taken by each Shareholder

Wee Song Ting, of Singapore, Merchant

1980

20

Tan Ah Goh, of Singapore, Merchant

1287

13

Tan Swi Khi, of Singapore, Merchant

1089

11

Cheong Kwi Thiam, of Singapore, Merchant

1089

11

Tan Swi Phiau, of Singapore, Merchant495

5

Yeo Chang Boon, of Singapore, Merchant495

5

Leow Chia Heng, of Singapore, Merchant495

5

Yeo Piah Kwi, of Singapore, Merchant495

5

Tan Choon, of Singapore, Merchant495

5

Sim Khiok Choon, of Singapore, Merchant495

5

Yeow Lee Chinag, of Singapore, Merchant495

5

Teo Hoo Lai, of Singapore, Merchant495

5

Lee Leng Hoon, of Singapore, Merchant495

5

Table 1. Original Shareholders of the Sze Hai Tong Banking and Insurance Company, Limited
Source: “Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Sze Hai Tong Banking and Insurance Company,
Limited.” November 1906. 9.

11“Memorandum and Articles of the Association of the Sze Hai Tong Banking and Insurance Company, Limited,”
November 1906.
12
Kitsu Negishi, Shouji ni kansuru Kankou Chousa Houkokusho; Gouko no Kenkyu (根岸佶『商事に関する慣行
調査報告書 合股の研究』 “Report of Business Practice: Research about Traditional Chinese Joint StockBusiness”) (Toa Kenkyujyo (東亜研究所), 1943), 558.
13
This practice also introduced the “Bank of Canton” to both San Francisco and Hong Kong. See Ryoichi Hisasue,“The Rise and Fall of the Bank of Canton,” Asian Economies 49, no. 3 (久末亮一「廣東銀行の興亡 近代華人資本の銀行業展開とその限界」『アジア経済』第49巻第 3 号) 2008: 2-29.

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Chinese Banking Business in Singapore

However, lack of a branch network and practical knowledge meant the Kwong Yik Bank andthe Sze Hai Tong Banking and Insurance Company, Limited were unable to independently operate
clearing and foreign exchange business. In fact, they merely acted as intermediaries between
Chinese customers and foreign banks. Their loan business had the same structure. Chinese banksraised funds from foreign banks at low interest rates and sub-financed them to Chinese customers.
In this sense, early Chinese banks played a similar role to the bank comprador but served a wider
range of Chinese customers. This business model was excessively limiting for a modern bank,causing the collapse of Kwong Yik Bank in 191314 and constraining the expansion of the Sze Hai
Tong Banking and Insurance Company, Limited.
In the early 1910s, the altered economic environment in Malaya encouraged the establishmentof more Chinese banks. Beginning in 1908, the first boom in the rubber industry gave Chinese
entrepreneurs an opportunity for capital accumulation. Besides reinvesting in plantations,
successful planters jointly invested in the banking business. Unlike the tin industry, the rubber
industry had enormous demand for long-term capital investment, particularly investment inlarge-scale plantations. However, many foreign banks refused Chinese planters long-term credit
because they felt that the associated exposure to the volatile global rubber market was too risky.15
Therefore, the Chinese business community in Singapore and Malaya promoted the formation of
new banks to meet this untapped demand.
In 1912, Chinese Commercial Bank (華商銀行) was established with capital of 1 million
straits dollars. The primary founder was Lim Peng-Siang (林秉祥), a Hokkien merchant who
owned the trading and shipping firm Ho Hong (和豊). Many leading figures from the Hokkien
community also participated in the establishment of this bank. For example, Lee Choon-Guan (李俊源), a Malacca-born plantation tycoon and a member of the legislative council in Singapore,
was appointed chairman. Moreover, Lim Boon-Keng (林文慶), a skilled doctor, educator, andsocial worker in Singapore, was appointed vice chairman. 16 The main business of Chinese
Commercial Bank was providing checking and savings account services to Hokkien traders andshopkeepers, and financing the Hokkien business community, particularly the plantation sector. In
1914, a run on the bank forced restructuring through government intervention.17 As a result of thisincident, Lim Peng-Siang resigned as managing director, and the bank resumed operations under astricter and more conservative management policy.
In 1917, Lim Peng-Siang reentered the banking business with a new banking venture, Ho
Hong Bank (和豊銀行), which was founded with capital of 2 million straits dollars. Lim funded
this venture with capital accumulated during the commodity export boom following the First
14

A portion of the shareholders of Kwong Yik Bank re-opened their banking business in Malaya and registered
Kwong Yik Selangor Banking Co. in Kuala Lumpur in 1914.
15
W. G. Huff, “Capital Markets, Sharecropping and Contestability: Singapore Chinese in the Interwar British
Malayan Estate Rubber and Pineapple Industries,” in Austin and Sugihara, Local Suppliers of Credit, 293.
16
Dick Wilson, Solid as a Rock: The First Forty Years of the Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation (Singapore:
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd., 1972), 9.
17
Ibid., 10. Colonial authorities were obviously afraid that a worsening run on the banks would produce social andeconomic unrest in the territory.

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Ryoichi Hisasue

World War. Directors and shareholders were drawn from the Hokkien community in Singapore andMalaya, and even Lee Choon-Guan and Lim Boon-Keng of Chinese Commercial Bank joined theboard.18 Ho Hong Bank used the business networks that Ho Hong Shipping had establishedthroughout Malacca, Moore (Johor), Batopaha, Penang, Palembang, Seremban, Kuala Lumpur,
Ipoh, and Batavia. The bank also opened branches in Hong Kong and Shanghai and began
remittance and foreign exchange operations. Deposit business was important to the bank’s
activities, and deposits totaled 14 million straits dollars in 1920, 20 million in 1925, 23 million in
1930, and 26 million in 1931.19
In 1919, Oversea-Chinese Bank (華僑銀行) was established with capital of 5.25 million
straits dollars. The founders and shareholders again were leading Hokkien merchants, and included
Khoo Kok-Wah (丘國瓦), Tan Ean-Kiam (陳延謙), Oei Tiong-Ham (黄仲涵) and Oei Ik-Tjoe (黄弈注).20 Interestingly, Lim Boon-Keng, who was already vice chairman of Chinese Commercial
Bank and director of Ho Hong Bank, was appointed chairman of the board. Oversea-Chinese Bank
opened branches in Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Malacca, Rangoon, Sumatra, Hong Kong, Shanghai,
and Xiamen, and began its own foreign exchange operations in 1925. The bank experienced steady
growth, and net total assets reached 8 million straits dollars in 1922 and 17 million straits dollars
in 1931.21 Oversea-Chinese Bank also became one of the six founding members of the Chinese
Bankers Association in Hong Kong in 1919.22
In addition to this series of Hokkien banks, in 1920 a Cantonese entrant emerged in the formof Lee Wah Bank (利華銀行). The main founder was the famous Cantonese tycoon Eu Tong-Sen(余東璇), who controlled a trading, mining, and plantation empire. Lee Wah Bank provided
checking and savings account services for Cantonese traders and shopkeepers and also offeredforeign exchange and remittance services through an alliance with the Bank of East Asia (東亜銀行 ) in Hong Kong. 23 Finally, in 1935, another Hokkien merchants group, led by Wee
Kheng-Chiang (黄慶昌) and based in Sarawak and Singapore, established the United ChineseBank (大華銀行).

Limitations of the Chinese Banking Business in Singapore in the 1930s
A notable feature of Chinese banks in Singapore is that they were built on a framework ofshared backgrounds, such as dialect or trade groups. For example, the three major Hokkien banks
were founded by members of the Hokkien merchant community, many of whom were involved in
18

Ibid., 17.
Ibid., 18.
20
Ibid., 21.
21
Ibid., 22.
22Founding members included the Bank of China, Bank of Canton, Bank of East Asia, National Commercial and
Savings Bank, Yien Yi Bank, and Oversea Chinese Bank.（“Introduction of the Association” 『本會簡紹』(), Chinese
Banker’s Association (香港華商銀行公會), 2002.
23
Elizabeth Sinn, Growing with Hong Kong: The Bank of East Asia, 1919-1994 (Hong Kong: Bank of East Asia,
Ltd., 1994). As a result of the marriage of Eu Tong-Sen’s son, Eus would be related to Kan Tong-Po (簡東浦), theChairman of the Bank of East Asia.
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Chinese Banking Business in Singapore

plantation business.24 These common backgrounds helped the banks access potential customers
and their credit information by using personal networks within the small Chinese dialectcommunities. However, the monopolization of banks by closed personal networks createdpotential for favoritism.
For example, the three major Hokkien banks loaned heavily to rubber plantations because of
the background of their controlling interest groups. This imbalanced lending exposed the banks tocommodity prices, and they suffered temporary damage in the early 1920s when rubber prices
dropped during the post-World War I recession. However, the rapid expansion of the automobile
industry continued to fuel the growth of the rubber industry. The Hokkien business community,
backed by financing from the three major Hokkien banks, was able to dominate the Malayanrubber industry.
In the 1930s, the Great Depression seriously impacted economic activity in Malaya, andparticularly affected the rubber industry. The price of rubber plunged to just 4 straits cents perpound in 1932, compared with 1.14 straits dollars in 1925 and 34 straits cents in 1929. With theirbreak-even price at approximately 25 straits cents per pound, many planters opted to halt
production. Planters obviously suffered enormously. Tan Kah-Kee (陳嘉庚), one of the mostprominent Hokkien business tycoons in Singapore and Malaya was a typical example. Tan
expanded his rubber and pineapple plantations in the 1920s, but the collapse in rubber prices
caused tremendous losses for his business empire, and he went bankrupt in 1934.25
The rubber price crash during the Great Depression seriously impacted the Chinese banking
industry because of its imbalanced loan exposure to the plantation business. For example, Chinese
Commercial Bank experienced serious financial difficulties in 1931 following an increase in
nonperforming loans. The bank appointed Yap Twee (葉玉堆) as the new general manager and herestructured the business. Yap disposed of non-performing loans as quickly as possible. He also
increased capital through a share issue that saw a 30% interest in the company sold to the Bank of
China.26
Besides suffering enormous losses from plantation loans, Oversea-Chinese Bank also
experienced foreign exchange losses due to Britain’s 1931 abandonment of the gold standard.
Moreover, there was a run on the Rangoon branch in 1932.27 The situation at Ho Hong Bank was
far more serious. The bank was very active in foreign exchange operations within its branch
network, and was badly damaged when Britain abandoned the gold standard. The bank did nothedge silver-based deposits in its Hong Kong and Shanghai branches, and suffered tremendous
foreign exchange losses when the straits dollar plunged in tandem with the British pound. The
bank’s reserve fell by one-third and the bank confronted a serious financial crisis. The board of24

Chinese banks in other areas had the same features. For example, the Bank of Canton in San Francisco and Hong
Kong was established by Cantonese traders, the so-called “Gold Mountain House” (金山荘). The same group of
Cantonese traders was also involved in and supported the revolutionary activity of Sun Yat-Sen.
25
Tan Kah-Kee, Nan Qiao Hui Yi Lu. (陳嘉庚『南僑回憶錄』“Reminiscence of Overseas Chinese in South”)(Fuzhou Ji Mei Xiao You Hui (福州集美校友會), 1950).
26
Wilson, Solid as a Rock, 10.
27
Ibid., 22.

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Ryoichi Hisasue

directors asked the Au brothers, most famous as the Tiger Balm tycoons, to bail the bank out, but
their support was inadequate.28
Chinese Commercial Bank
(1912)

Ho Hong Bank
(1917)Lee Choon-Guan

Lee Choon-Guan

Lim Boon-Keng

Lim Boon-Keng

Lim Peng-Siang

Lim Peng-Siang

Oversea Chinese Bank
(1919)Lim Boon-Keng

Yin Suat-Chwan

Yin Suat-Chwan

Tan Sian-KeongTan Sian-KeongYeo Cheng-Hai

Tan Cheng-LockTan Ean-Kiam

Tan Jiak-Kim

Chang Kang-Swi

Khoo Kok-Wah

Tan Chay-Yan

Lim Nee-Soon

Lim Kwee-Eng
Table 2. Interlocking Directorships among the Three Hokkien Banks
Source: Dick Wilson, Solid as a Rock: The First Forty Years of the Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation(Singapore: Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd., 1972), 9, 10, 17.

The challenging environment led the Hokkien banks to begin merger negotiations. In fact, thethree banks already shared certain common founders, directors, and shareholders from within the
Hokkien community in Singapore and Malaya (Table 2). The banks also had a gentlemen's
agreement to offer mutual aid if one of them faced a crisis.29 Therefore, Chee Suee-Cheng (徐垂青), the chairman of Ho Hong Bank, approached Lee Kong-Chian (李光前), the vice chairman ofChinese Commercial Bank, to propose merger talks, where Oversea-Chinese Bank also
participated. The three banks reached an agreement in October 1932, and jointly established a newbank, named Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation, in December 1932.

Conclusion
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, Singapore functioned not only as a trading hub
between East and West, but also as a distribution port supporting Chinese economic activities inand between Southeast Asia and China. Because of its unique economic position and conditions,Singapore attracted both foreign banks, linked with the London-centered international financial
system, and native commercial networks, based on local economic activities. Both of thesedevelopments accelerated regional economic activity.
In the early twentieth century, native capital began to establish its own banks, and Chinesebanks were founded in such entrepots of Chinese business activities as Singapore, San Francisco,and Hong Kong. Although they did not usurp the dominance of Western banks, these Chinese

28
29

Ibid., 18.
Ibid., 6.

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Chinese Banking Business in Singapore

banks established a significant position in local economic activities, such as in the development of
the rubber plantation industry in Malaya throughout the 1920s.
A notable feature of Chinese banks in Singapore is that they were built on frameworks ofshared backgrounds, such as dialect or trade groups. In other words, while they took the form ofmodern banking institutions, they were also defined by traditional Chinese business practices.
Reliance on networks that stretched across a framework of common backgrounds made it easy forthese banks to access potential customers and their credit information via personal networks.
However, this heavy reliance on close personal networks also created vulnerability to favoritism
within the inner circle. This weakness became apparent in the 1930s, when the Great Depression
seriously impacted economic activity in Malaya and the collapse of rubber prices
disproportionately affected the Chinese banks. The associated crisis led to the merger ofSingapore’s three Hokkien banks in 1932.
Singaporean Chinese society established a series of new banks, but these Chinese banks
lacked sufficient business scale and faced barriers to growth.30 Chinese banks could not directly
access the London-centered international financial system, and therefore were unable to compete
on an equal footing with foreign banks. However, Chinese banks were able to enter regional nichemarkets, such as financing the local plantation business, and in so doing exploited theirconnections in the local Chinese business community. The Chinese banks were a driver of therapid expansion of the Malayan rubber plantation industry.
The business model of overseas Chinese can be seen as gradually transforming from relianceon long-distance networks to establishing a more local basis. Reflecting this trend in the early 20th
century, the influence of Singapore-Hokkien community intensely investing in the plantation
business surpassed that of the Cantonese community concentrating on long-distance trade.
Subsequently, the late 1930s through the 1950s saw the collapse of the regional free trade
framework that had existed since the nineteenth century. This development disrupted long-distance
trade networks and led to commercial activity by overseas Chinese following a more regional ordomestic pattern.

30
In the late 1930s, the deposit share in Chinese banks in Singapore and Malaya was less than 25% of the total
amount. Brown, “Chettiar Capital,” 275.

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