JOINT TRANSPORT RESEARCH CENTRE

Discussion Paper No. 2009-20
December 2009

Lessons from the U.S.
Transport Deregulation
Experience forPrivatization
Clifford WINSTON
Brookings Institution, Washington DC
USA

1. INTRODUCTION

Travelers throughout the world are generally dissatisfied with their country’s transportation systembecause of the significant highway congestion, air travel delays, unreliable public transit service, and so on,which they are forced to endure. Public officials have sought to address such problems by increasing
government spending on transportation; but it has become quite clear that most, if not all, countries cannot
spend their way out of their transportation problems.
The failure of the public sector to manage and operate transportation systems efficiently has spurred
some countries to explore whether expanding the role of the private sector could improve the performanceof their transportation modes and infrastructure. Examples include privatized railroads in various countries
in Europe, privatized subways in Tokyo and Hong Kong, privatized airports in London and Sydney, andprivatized highways in a few parts of the United States.
Of course, the limited privatization of transportation that has occurred around the world is not pure
privatization because governments have maintained a presence by instituting some form of regulation suchas price caps and limits on entry. Thus, considerable uncertainly remains about the economic effects ofprivatizing and deregulating part of or an entire transportation system and how policymakers should
manage the transition to privatization to maximize its effectiveness.
The purpose of this paper is to suggest how the U.S. experience with deregulating its intercity
transportation system can identify important considerations for all countries that wish to pursue
privatization. Transportation deregulation in the United States gave private railroad, trucking, bus, andairline companies the freedom to set prices, choose which markets to serve, and what level of service toprovide. Because U.S. firms were saddled with inefficiencies that developed over decades of regulation,
their adjustment to deregulation has been difficult and time consuming. Nonetheless, deregulation has
succeeded to a notable extent in the short run and could provide even greater benefits in the long run.
Privatization would give companies that were formerly in the public sector, such as public buses,
railways, airports, and highways, the freedom to set prices, raise capital, and offer service in a competitiveenvironment. Based on the deregulation experience, privatization could generate large benefits byenabling transportation providers to develop efficient practices, to be more responsive to consumers’
preference, and to implement new technologies in a timely fashion. At the same time, privatized firms
would have to overcome inefficiencies that are even greater than those that deregulated firms had to
overcome because they were managed and operated by the public sector. Policymakers should be aware ofthis fundamental challenge and, if possible, take steps to ameliorate the difficulties that privatized firms
would inevitably encounter.

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2. TRANSPORTATION DEREGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Privatization and deregulation are transformative policies where the government transfers (through asale) the parts of the transportation system that it owns and operates to private firms and does not regulate
those firms’ prices, service, and expansion and contraction of their networks (entry and exit).1
With the exception of transferring the northeast freight rail system, Conrail, back to the private sector,
the United States has not had recent experience with privatizing any part of its transportation system; but
its recent experience with partially deregulating intercity transportation—railroads, trucking, airlines, andbuses—has given us an opportunity to accurately assess the economic effects of that policy and to identify
some important issues related to privatization.2 As indicated by the term partial deregulation, policymakers
did not deregulate every aspect, economic and otherwise, of carrier operations. For example, freightrailroads are still subject to maximum rate regulations. In addition, policymakers did not reform public
infrastructure policies to ensure that each mode’s infrastructure would be in accord with carriers’
adjustments to deregulation. For example, airports did not introduce congestion pricing even though
airlines’ accelerated development of hub-and-spoke route structures increased the demand for scarcerunway capacity during peak travel periods throughout the day.
Two important considerations should guide interpretations of the evidence from deregulating the U.S.
intercity transportation system. First, because regulation and deregulation never occurred at the same timeat the national level,3 the most accurate way to measure the economic effects of deregulating atransportation industry is a counterfactual analysis that estimates the price, cost, and service changes thatare solely attributable to deregulation and thus would not have occurred had the industry still been
regulated. Second, as noted, the intercity transportation industries are still subject to some government
regulations and some, if not all, firms that were subject to regulation have not fully shed their regulatory
bequeathed operating practices and capital structure.
It is therefore useful to distinguish between the short-run and long-run effects of deregulation on theperformance of an intercity transportation industry. In the short run, the industry has not been completely
deregulated and may be subject to other government policies that compromise its performance under(partial) deregulation. In addition, firms that existed in the industry prior to deregulation have not fully
adjusted their operations and investments to the deregulated environment. In the long run, the industry is
fully deregulated and firms have optimized their operations and investments to this environment.

1

The government may retain some control over firms’ exit through the application of bankruptcy andmerger and acquisition laws.

2

Recent leases of U.S. highway facilities to the private sector, which are subject to regulations, do notconstitute privatization.

3

Regulation and deregulation have simultaneously occurred at the state level. Comparisons of prices andservice across states with different regulatory policies have been used to predict and assess theeffects of deregulation.

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3. THE SHORT-RUN EFFECTS OF DEREGULATION

Beginning with the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act, prices, service, entry and exit in the intercity
transportation industries were substantially deregulated. However, travelers are still experiencing theshort-run effects of airline deregulation because carrier competition and operations have been constrainedby the lack of available gates at some congested airports; inefficient airport pricing and investment haveallowed travel delays to grow, especially at hub airports, which handle far more operations under
deregulation than they did under regulation; various hearings on and potential regulatory interventions inairline service and competition have partly diverted managements’ focus from improving carrier
operations; and tensions between managers of legacy carriers and labor continue to exist because the “rentsharing” mentality that developed under regulation has persisted under deregulation.4
The nation is still experiencing the short-run effects of railroad deregulation because maximum rate
guidelines have not resolved the captive shipper problem—that is, some shippers have access to only one
railroad; the threat of some form of rate-regulation has, at times, diverted the attention of rail managers
from improving carriers’ operations; and railroads have not completed the task of optimizing their
networks and realizing greater economies of density by abandoning and consolidating the extensive track
network that was built under regulation and by building new lines to serve high-volume shippers. And thenation is still experiencing the short-run effects of trucking deregulation because inefficient highway
pricing and investment has caused delivery times to become longer and less reliable, which makes it moredifficult for truckers to provide high-quality service to facilitate shippers’ just-in-time inventory policies.
Despite being adversely affected by the lingering effects of regulation and deficient infrastructure, theintercity transportation industries have significantly improved their efficiency under deregulation andbenefited users by reducing prices and providing better service.5 The key steps in the industries’ process ofadjustment have been the entry of new firms and the expanded entry by incumbent firms that has increased
competition, and the freedom and incentive to improve operations and service quality to users.
Deregulation also has its critics who point to financial crises, losses to labor, degradations in service, andthe like as indicative of its failings.
Entry and price changes. Intercity transportation firms compete at the market or route level. It is
often thought that the number of firms in a market is the most accurate indication of the level ofcompetition; but deregulation showed that the identity of the firms may be as, if not more, important than
the number of firms in determining the intensity of competition.
Competition increased in the deregulated airline industry because more (equivalent-sized) carriers
competed on airline routes over given distances and because of the growth of new low-cost (low-fare)carriers such as Southwest Airlines. Morrison and Winston (2000) found that Southwest sharply reduced
4

Carriers were able to earn excess profits because regulation elevated fares and prevented entry. Labor
unions’ wage and workrule demands reflected their desire to share in carriers’ rents.
Deregulation has made it much more difficult for carriers to earn excess profits, but labor and thelegacy carriers still have an adversarial relationship that can be traced to their hard fought
negotiations during regulation. Carriers that entered the airline industry after deregulation have
had to contend much less with this history when they negotiate with labor.

5

Morrison and Winston (1999) summarize the empirical evidence on the economic effects of airline,
railroad, and trucking deregulation. Borenstein and Rose (2007) and Winston (2006) provide
recent surveys of the evidence for airlines and railroads, respectively. Much less empiricalevidence is available for the economic effects of intercity bus transportation.

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fares on routes that it serves, on routes that it could potentially serve (i.e., Southwest serves one or both of
the airports on the route but not the route), and on routes where it supplies adjacent competition (i.e.,
Southwest serves origin and destination airports that are within say fifty miles of the origin and destination
airports that make up a given route).
Competition increased in the deregulated LTL (less-than truckload) trucking industry because of thegrowth of low-cost (nonunion) regional carriers and because of increased competition from alternativesmall shipment carriers such as UPS and Federal Express. The TL (truckload) sector has always consistedof unregulated competitors in the form of private trucking. Still, competition in this sector intensified
following deregulation because of the growth of national mega-carriers (also called advanced truckload
carriers), such as Schneider National and Landstar, and because private carriers were given the opportunity
to transport other firms’ freight.
The railroad industry has not experienced entry of new carriers since deregulation. Nonetheless,railroads have had to contend with additional competition provided by advanced truckload carriers, andthey have enhanced their own competitiveness by accelerating the development of intermodal (truck-rail)
service. Moreover, competition among railroads has increased because a large fraction of deregulated rail
traffic moves under contract rates, thereby enabling shippers in many instances to play one railroad off
against another when they negotiate rates.
In the most intense case, two railroads compete directly for a shipper’s traffic if their tracks traverse
directly into the shipper’s plant or if they have access to the shipper through reciprocal or terminal
switching. As pointed out by Grimm and Winston (2000), shippers that are captive to one railroad may
benefit from locational competition supplied by a nearby carrier. For example, a shipper may be served byRailroad A but could threaten to locate a new facility on or build a spur line to Railroad B as a bargaining
chip to obtain a lower rate from Railroad A or to get Railroad B to commit to a reduced rate. Shippers
could also stimulate railroad competition in some cases through product or geographic competition. For
example, an industrial site served only by Railroad A in a given market may be able to use a substituteproduct shipped from a different origin by Railroad B, or the site could obtain the same product from analternative origin served by Railroad B. Finally, small shippers that may not be able to get railroads tocompete intensely for their traffic may improve their bargaining position by using third-party logistics
firms, which achieve cost savings for shippers by leveraging the volumes of all their clients to obtain
discounts from carriers.
Consumers benefited from lower prices generated by new sources of competition in the intercity
transportation industries, including incumbent firms, new entrants, and alternative modes. And those gains
were magnified because competition also caused firms to operate more efficiently and to pass on much of
the cost savings to consumers in lower prices. Deregulated competition has been sufficiently intense tocause airline fares on low-traffic density (nonhub) routes to fall (Morrison and Winston (1997)) and tocause rail fares to approach long-run marginal cost in duopoly markets for coal transportation (Winston,
Dennis, and Maheshri (2008)).
Improvements in operations and service. Deregulation enabled intercity transportation carriers tosimultaneously improve the efficiency of their operations and their service to travelers and shippers. Freedfrom entry and exit regulations, airlines have accelerated the development of hub-and-spoke route
networks that feed travelers from all directions into a major airport (hub) from which they take connecting
flights to their destinations. Carriers use hub-and-spoke route systems to increase load factors and reduceaverage costs, and, by increasing the number of feasible flight alternatives, to offer travelers much greater
service frequency. For example, an additional aircraft departure from a spoke airport to a hub airport canincrease the number of flight alternatives on many connecting routes.

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Railroads have improved the design of their networks to channel more traffic on a given route andhave made greater use of double stack rail cars and intermodal operations to reduce costs and provide
faster and more reliable service to shippers.6 Trucking firms have also improved the efficiency of their
networks, reduced costs, and provided faster and more reliable service to shippers.
Carriers have also made much greater efforts, sometimes with the aid of advances in information
technology, to tailor their services to travelers’ and shippers’ varied preferences. Airlines have developed
revenue (yield) management systems, which have helped carriers increase load factors by offering travelers
a wide range of fares from discount fares with various travel restrictions to much higher fares with notravel restrictions. Airlines’ computer reservation systems have helped to improve scheduling and flightreservations. Travelers are able to access those systems on airlines’ websites to book their travel, thereby
obtaining the lowest discount fares, to print their boarding passes and avoid the check-in line at the airport,
and to receive real-time schedule information.
Railroads and trucking firms have negotiated thousands of price-service contracts with shippers thatalign their services with shippers’ production and inventory policies and that make more efficient use of
their own capacity. For example, shippers can sharply reduce their rates by including backhaul shipmentsin their contracts. Third-party logistics firms analyze shipper distribution patterns and logistics costs anduse sophisticated software to determine the lowest-cost routes and the carriers with the lowest rates.
Trucks and railroads also use computer information systems to route their cargo more efficiently and to
track shipments.
It could be argued that carriers’ adoption of advances in information technology would haveoccurred regardless of deregulation. But the benefits from those advances were realized because
deregulated firms had the financial incentive and operating freedom to design new networks and to engage
with customers to determine their preferences. Under regulation, they had little financial incentive orcompetitive pressure to do so, and regulators certainly were not able to design regulations to stimulateinnovative activity.
Criticisms of deregulation. Intercity transportation deregulation has attracted its share of critics—
although generally not from academia—who allege that the benefits from the policy have not been widely
shared and that the deregulated transportation industries have been subject to service meltdowns andfinancial crises, which raise questions about their long-term viability. In fact, the benefits from
deregulation have been broadly shared among consumers, while the problems that firms have experienced
are either part of their long-run adjustment or not attributable to deregulation.
Price regulation benefitted certain travelers by, for example, keeping airline fares below marginal coston short-haul routes and cross-subsidizing them with fares above marginal cost on long-haul routes, andbenefitted certain shippers by preventing railroads from raising rates on bulk commodities. Thus, if
economic deregulation improved pricing efficiency, it was not expected to benefit every traveler andshipper. Surprisingly, in the process of improving the cost efficiency of the intercity transportation system,
the benefits to consumers from deregulation have been more broadly distributed than expected. And forthe most part, consumers’ losses can be explained by economic rather than anti-competitive forces.
About 80 percent of airline passengers (accounting for 90 percent of passenger miles) fly on routes
with lower average real fares since deregulation. Roughly 90 percent of the difference in the gains totravelers can be explained by the higher costs of serving travelers on low-density routes, where smaller
planes have a higher cost per seat-mile and fly with lower load factors (Morrison and Winston (1999)). As
6

6

Bitzan and Keeler (2007) estimate that freight railroads have reduced annual costs by as much as $10
billion from increased traffic densities attributable to deregulation.

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noted, deregulation reduced railroad rates, on average, and some small shippers have been able to share in
those benefits by using third-party logistics firms. All modes have improved their service quality in the
deregulated environment except when their operations have been compromised by public infrastructure
inadequacies (e.g., airline travel times have increased because of inefficient runway pricing andinvestment). Moreover, the benefits from deregulation have been achieved without compromising any
mode’s safety record (Savage (1999)).
Labor benefited from price and entry regulation because unions’ wage demands were not tempered bymarket forces. However, consumers’ gains from deregulation do not primarily consist of transfers fromlabor. Peoples (1998) concludes that deregulation of railroads, trucking, and airlines caused wages to fallin those industries and resulted in a $10.3 billion (1991 dollars) welfare loss to labor, which amounts toroughly 20 percent of the gains to consumers.
A fundamental challenge facing the intercity transportation industries is to match their capacity withdemand. The unpredictability of demand could be particularly problematic for an industry that must invest
in capacity long before actual demand materializes. If demand is lower than expected, firms may have tosignificantly cut prices to fill the available capacity. If demand is higher than expected, firms with thegreatest capacity are likely to gain market share. The airline industry has made capacity commitmentsroughly two years in advance because of the lead times needed to acquire aircraft. Railroads and trucking
firms face much shorter lead times when they invest in capacity.
Since it was deregulated in 1978, the airline industry has suffered huge financial losses because ofovercapacity that was attributable to the early 1980s and 1990s recessions and to the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks. It has also suffered losses from the sharp increase in fuel prices in 2008 that substantiallyraised the cost of carrier capacity. Of course, macroeconomic contractions, terrorist attacks, and spikes infuel prices are not attributable to deregulation. In fact, industry losses may have been greater if carriers did
not have the flexibility to respond to those shocks by adjusting fares and capacity throughout their
networks.
Railroads are able to contract with shippers to align their cars and equipment with shippers’ demand
and to reduce their vulnerability to financial problems caused by overcapacity. But railroad consolidationsin the aftermath of deregulation, such as the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific merger and Norfolk
Southern’s and CSX’s acquisition of Conrail, have resulted in service disruptions because the acquiring
carrier did not effectively integrate the acquired carrier into its operations. Fortunately, rail operations
have improved quickly after the service disruptions and shippers’ rates were not elevated because network
capacity was restored (Winston, Maheshri, and Dennis (2009)). In the future, railroads that are involved inconsolidations will hopefully take measures to avoid such disruptions.7
Finally, airlines have been sharply criticized for their lengthy delays, and in some cases forholding their passengers “hostage” on a tarmac for several hours. But as noted, air travel delays reflect toa large extent inefficient pricing and investment policies, while extreme delays suggest that an airport isindifferent toward the quality of service that its users receive. In my view, a private commercial airport
would seek to develop a reputation for safeguarding travelers and would find it in its interest to prevent
airlines from forcing passengers to remain in their aircraft for an excessive period of time (e.g., more thanan hour or so) before taking off. Public airports have little economic incentive to reduce travelers’ delays
and discomfort and are therefore bystanders while passengers are stuck on their infrastructure for hours.

7

Winston, Maheshri, and Dennis (2009) indicate that future consolidations may arise because theremaining major carriers in the west, Burlington Northern and Union Pacific, may merge with amajor carrier in the east, CSX or Norfolk Southern, to form two transcontinental railroads.

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4. THE LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF DEREGULATIONIn the long run, the benefits to consumers from intercity transportation deregulation will increase as
firms are no longer saddled by three short-run constraints:
suboptimal public infrastructure,counterproductive residual regulations, and inefficient practices and investments developed during theregulatory environment. The transportation industries cannot address the first and second constraints on
their own. Indeed, privatization could significantly ameliorate the first constraint. Unfortunately, even an
optimistic assessment would conclude that it would take decades to do so; in other words, the full benefitsof deregulation are many years away.
For their part, the intercity transportation industries continue to adjust to the deregulated environment
and improve their operations and investments. Through its travails with exogenous economic and noneconomic shocks, the airline industry has become more resilient and efficient. It is improving its ability tomatch capacity with demand under a variety of difficult circumstances. For example, during the past
several years airlines have reduced overbooking and denied boarding to fewer passengers by charging
higher fees to change flights. But despite some thirty years of deregulation, the industry has yet to be
profitable during an economic downturn. In addition, its labor relations are still contentious and it is not
well-positioned to compete as effectively as possible in a deregulated global airline market. When those
problems are adequately addressed, the industry will, at long last, have shed the inefficiencies ofregulation, fully adjusted its operations to the U.S. deregulated environment, and enhanced consumer
welfare even further.
The railroad industry has greatly improved its financial performance under deregulation, but it
has not earned a normal rate of return on its invested capital on a consistent basis.8 To achieve that goal,
carriers are slowly modernizing their equipment and optimizing their plant size by pruning their networks
of unprofitable markets and investing in potentially profitable ones.9 Rail will therefore continue to makeprogress in improving its service times and reliability, reducing its costs, and benefiting shippers. The
industry’s structure has also not fully adjusted to deregulation. It is possible that more rail mergers will be
proposed until only two (highly efficient) Class I railroads remain in the industry. This end-to-end
restructuring would create two transcontinental railroads, but still leave two large railroads in the East and
two in the West, thereby having little effect on competition. Indeed, this may be the final equilibrium for
the U.S. rail freight industry.
The trucking industry has alleviated the serious shortage of long-distance drivers by increasing the useof intermodal operations and increasing compensation. For-hire truckers have significantly reduced theirempty mileage under deregulation and they can make further progress by continuing to consolidate loads
and by attracting more traffic from private trucking.10
8

The railroad industry’s profitability is a controversial issue. However, it does appear that the industry’s
returns on investment have been below its cost of capital (Grimm and Winston (2000)).

9

Daniel Machalaba, “New Era Dawns for Rail Building,” Wall Street Journal, February 13, 2008 points outthat for the first time in nearly a century, railroads are making large investments in their
networks—adding sets of tracks, straightening curves that force engines to slow, and expanding
tunnels for bigger trains.

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There has been little analysis of the intercity bus industry’s adjustment to deregulation. But as noted by
Schwieterman (2007), the industry has started to assert itself some 25 years after being
deregulated by expanding service in several national markets.

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5. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATIZATION

By relaxing the federal government’s control over airlines’, railroads’, and truckers’ pricing, entry,
and exit decisions, deregulation has tried to improve social welfare by accomplishing three goals for
consumers and firms: first, to enable them to behave more efficiently within the technological “frontier;”
second, to enable them to behave more efficiently as firms innovate and expand the frontier; and third, toenable them to respond more effectively to external shocks to reduce their costs.
Deregulation of the intercity transportation system has accomplished the first goal to a significant
extent as firms have improved their basic operations and reduced prices, while heterogeneous consumers
have selected price-service packages that are aligned with their varying preferences. Deregulation has
made some progress in accomplishing the second goal as firms have successfully implemented advances in
information technology to improve their operations. And firms and consumers—in particular, airlines andair travelers—have adjusted their behavior to reduce the cost of economic shocks that have occurred sincederegulation began.
Because deregulation is a long term process, firms and consumers have not completely adjusted to it.
First, regulation constrained and strongly influenced firms’ operations and technology. Economists andother observers have underestimated the time that firms have required to optimize their pricing and service
decisions to unregulated competition, to learn how to adjust those decisions to changes in the businesscycle, and to shed inefficient operating practices, technology, and counterproductive frictions with laborand their competitors that may seek to gain a political advantage. Firms that have never been regulated
occasionally make erroneous and costly business decisions; not surprisingly, deregulated firms have madetheir share of mistakes and have required considerable time to learn from those mistakes and how to
respond to changes in their competitive and macroeconomic environment.
Second, it has been argued that regulation stymies innovation and technological advance (e.g.,
Gallamore (1999)) and that deregulation provides greater incentives and opportunities for firms toinnovate. At the same time, the timing and location of technological advances is difficult to predict.
Intercity transportation technology has improved under deregulation; but even after decades of
deregulation, it is likely that further innovations that would not occur under regulation await the future.
Finally, the government must adjust its actions in light of deregulation. Counterproductive residual
regulations, the threat of re-regulation, and inefficient infrastructure policies have undermined theperformance of the deregulated intercity transportation industries.
Similar to deregulation, privatization has the potential to improve the performance of transportation
services and infrastructure that are provided in the public sector by giving private firms the opportunity todevelop efficient operations and to introduce technological innovations in a timely fashion. In the process,consumers could reap substantial gains.
But privatization differs from deregulation in at least two important respects. First, it would enableprivate firms to provide transportation services that were formerly provided by the public sector, but unlike
deregulated firms most of the private firms would have little, if any, experience competing in thoseservices. Second, unlike deregulated firms, private firms would inherit to a large extent the public sector’shighly inefficient operations, investments, and technology.
Thus, transportation firms in a privatized environment are likely to face even greater challenges andmore uncertainties in their adjustment to unregulated competition than private deregulated firms may face

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in their adjustment. Based on U.S. carriers’ experience with intercity transportation deregulation,
privatized firms’ adjustment process would most certainly be time consuming and far from error free.
Policymakers who have an interest in pursuing privatization should appreciate the magnitude of theadjustment process that firms in their country would have to endure to become efficient competitors.
Accordingly, they should not maintain or implement policies that may compromise adjustments. And they,
as well as the public, must be patient while firms try to overcome mistakes and setbacks that are bound tooccur. At the same time, the potential long-run benefits from privatization will hopefully justify theintervening struggle.

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REFERENCES

Bitzan, John D. and Theodore E. Keeler. 2007. “Economies of Density and Regulatory
Change in the U.S. Railroad Freight Industry,” Journal of Law and Economics,
Volume 50, February, pp. 157-179.
Borenstein, Severin and Nancy L. Rose. 2007. “How Airline Markets Work…Or Do
They? Regulatory Reform in the Airline Industry,” NBER working paper 13452,
September.
Gallamore, Robert E. 1999. “Regulation and Innovation: Lessons from the American
Railroad Industry,” in Jose A. Gomez-Ibanez, William B. Tye, and Clifford
Winston, editors, Essays in Transportation Economics and Policy: A Handbook in
Honor of John R. Meyer, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, pp. 493-529.
Grimm, Curtis and Clifford Winston. 2000. “Competition in the Deregulated Railroad
Industry: Sources, Effects, and Policy Issues,” in Sam Peltzman and Clifford
Winston, editors, Deregulation of Network Industries: What’s Next?, Brookings
Institution, Washington DC, pp. 41-71.
Morrison, Steven A. and Clifford Winston. 2000. “The Remaining Role for Government
Policy in the Deregulated Airline Industry,” in Sam Peltzman and Clifford
Winston, editors, Deregulation of Network Industries: What’s Next?, Brookings
Institution, Washington DC, pp. 1-40.
Morrison, Steven A. and Clifford Winston. 1999. “Regulatory Reform of U.S. Intercity
Transportation,” in Jose A. Gomez-Ibanez, William B. Tye, and Clifford Winston,
editors, Essays in Transportation Economics and Policy: A Handbook in Honor ofJohn R. Meyer, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, pp. 469-492.
Morrison, Steven A. and Clifford Winston. 1997. “The Fare Skies: Air Transportationand Middle America,” The Brookings Review, Fall, pp. 42-45.
Peoples, James. 1998. “Deregulation and the Labor Market,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, volume 12, Summer, pp. 111-130.
Savage, Ian. 1999. “The Economics of Commercial Transportation Safety,” in Jose A.
Gomez-Ibanez, William B. Tye, and Clifford Winston, editors, Essays inTransportation Economics and Policy: A Handbook in Honor of John R. Meyer,
Brookings Institution, Washington DC, pp. 531-562.
Schwieterman, Joseph P. 2007. “The Return of the Intercity Bus: The Decline andWinston – Discussion Paper 2009-20 - © OECD/ITF, 200911

Recovery of Scheduled Service to American Cities, 1960-2007,” DePaul
University, School of Public Service Policy Study, December.

Winston, Clifford. 2006. “The United States: Private and Deregulated,” in Jose A.
Gomez-Ibanez and Gines de Rus, editors, Competition in the Railway Industry:
An International Comparative Analysis, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, United
Kingdom, pp. 135-152.
Winston, Clifford, Scott Dennis, and Vikram Maheshri. 2008. “Duopoly Equilibrium
Over Time the Railroad Industry,” Brookings Institution working paper, November.
Winston, Clifford, Vikram Maheshri, and Scott Dennis. 2009. “Long-Run Effects ofMergers: The Case of U.S. Western Railroads,” Brookings Institution working
paper, May.

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