JOINT TRANSPORT RESEARCH CENTRE

Discussion Paper No. 2009-21
December 2009

Long-Distance Bus Services
in Europe: Concessions orFree Market?
Didier VAN DE VELDE
Delft University of Technology,
Netherlands

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 3
1.

COUNTRY CASES ............................................................................................................ 3
1.1
1.2
1.3.
1.4.
1.5
1.6.
1.7.
1.8.
1.9.
1.10.

2.

Scope and Definitions ............................................................................................. 4
United Kingdom ..................................................................................................... 5
Sweden.................................................................................................................... 6
Norway ................................................................................................................... 7
Poland ..................................................................................................................... 9
Spain ..................................................................................................................... 10
Italy ....................................................................................................................... 10
France ................................................................................................................... 11
Germany ............................................................................................................... 12
Eurolines ............................................................................................................... 13

MAIN TRENDS AND CHALLENGES ........................................................................... 14
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
2.4.
2.5

Organisational forms in long-distance passenger transport .................................. 14
Performances ........................................................................................................ 16
Markets served ...................................................................................................... 16
Network effects, monopolies, barriers to entry and regulatory needs .................. 17
Towards further deregulation: challenges for the near future .............................. 18

CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................................... 19
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................... 20

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1. INTRODUCTION

Long-distance coach services are not the most glamorous part of Europe‟s long distancepassenger transport system. High-speed rail or airlines attract much more political and media attention.
Rail and air are much more visible and require much more (public) investment in highly visible
infrastructures. Coaches on the contrary disappear in general traffic and do not require public
investments, except perhaps in suitable coach stations at attractive places in urban centres. Yet, longdistance „express‟ coaches cater for a substantial part of the mobility of Europe‟s less-wealthy citizens,at least in those countries that have appropriately (de)regulated this branch of activity.
Few international studies have been published on this topic. The report from the 114 th Round
Table organised by ECMT in 1999 (ECMT, 2001) was one such study, covering Britain, Poland,
Sweden and the Eurolines organisation. National studies on the topic are scarce too, except perhaps in
Britain, Sweden and Norway – three countries with a well-functioning deregulated coach market.
This paper makes a review of the current situation in the interurban passenger transport market bycoach in Europe, describing for a number of selected countries the regulatory setting, the main market
actors, the main developments have taken place in the last decade or two and a number of resulting
challenges, especially in terms of regulation. The paper starts with a chapter on country cases. The
next chapter summarises the main facts and trends that appear out of this review. The last chapter
draws a few conclusions.

2. COUNTRY CASESThis chapter presents an overview of the regulatory setting and main market actors in a selected
number of European countries. For each country, recent evolutions and a number of main challenges
are also presented. A few countries have been selected to provide, together, a good illustration of thediversity and similarities on the interurban passenger coach market in Europe, with a focus on theWestern part of Europe. These countries are: Great-Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Poland,
Norway and Sweden. The presentation of each country focuses on the national interurban coach
operations, being for most countries the main part of the market. International coach services areanother substantial part of the scheduled coaching business in Europe. We devote a separate section toEurolines as a main part of the international passenger coach services takes place under the flag of thisbrand.

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2.1.

Scope and Definitions

The passenger transport services reviewed in this paper are long-distance, scheduled, passenger
coach services. Only regular, scheduled passenger transport services are covered, meaning that the
touristic coaching sector, or private hire and organised package tours, are not covered here. The
services that will be described here are services open to everyone and operated according to a
published timetable, i.e. similar to local public transport, trains and airplanes.
The words „long-distance coach services‟ need, perhaps, some further definition in view of thediversity that can be encountered across Europe. „Long-distance coach services‟, also called „express
buses‟ or „interurban coaches‟, have in common that they cater for transport needs outside urban
agglomerations, usually from city to city, often also serving towns not well served by rail on their way.
Operations are generally done with coaches, not by buses, although the concepts „coach‟ and „bus‟ do
not necessarily exist distinctly in the various European languages. The exact definition of long
distance coach services varies also from country to country. This would not be very interesting if itwere not for the fact that these definitions also determine the regulation under which services will fall.
Distance is often a main criterion to fall under the regulatory regime applicable to long distance coachservices, but these distances can be highly different: over 15 miles in Britain, or over 100 km in
Sweden. Other countries often adopt an administrative distinction, where long-distance is defined as
those services crossing the borders of the regional transport authorities, as in Italy, Norway or as in
Sweden, where both definitions are combined.
It would be nice to be able to compare the size, modal shares and modal shift in interurban
passenger travel in Europe. Unfortunately, statistics of national and international interurban passenger
transport are difficult to compile. Numerous differences in definition exist from country to country,
making international comparisons hazardous. Census data for travel surveys often do not include trips
made by foreign nationals. Local and regional buses are often aggregated with coach statistics, making
this data rather useless for the purpose of the analysis presented here. Differences in the definition ofwhat „interurban‟ is, make international comparison of modal shares unreliable. The following tableshould therefore only be seen as a mere illustration of the limited size of mobility by bus and coachcompared to the share of mobility by car. It is also striking to see the similarity of the modal shares forbus (and coach) and for train. However, „bus‟ includes here urban buses, regional buses and interurbancoaches. While the share of interurban coaches could be 50% or more of the total of the category„bus‟ – this is probably the case in Spain with its extensive coach network and relatively limited rail
services – this percentage can however be much lower in other countries.

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Table 1. Modal shares (in passenger-km)
Country
EU15
EU15
EU25
EU25

Year
1997
2007
1997
2007

Bus
8.9
8.7
9.3

Car
84.5
84.1
83.6

Train
6.6
7.1
7.1

Germany
Spain
FranceItaly
NorwayPolandSweden
UK

2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007

6.4
13.9
5.5
11.9
7
9.6
7.2
6.3

85.8
80.9
84.9
82.4
88
83.6
84.1
87.3

7.8
5.2
9.6
5.7
4.9
6.8
8.7
6.4

Source: Eurostat (2009).
United Kingdom
The British coach market was fully deregulated by the 1980 Transport Act. The only requirement(besides licensing requirements) to create services was that an authorisation was to be requested
28 days before starting the operations. This 28-day prior authorisation was scrapped under the 1985
Transport Act, hence no prior notice is now needed for operation of an express route.
Today, National Express is the main supplier of express coach services. National Express was
privatised in the 1980s and was the former monopolist on the express coach market as part of theformer NBC (National Bus Company). Most services are operated by local contractors under the
National Express brand rather than directly by National Express with its own staff.
The deregulation provided intense competition in the 1980s on some relations. A company called
British Coachways, grouping six existing operators, attempted to establish a network to compete with
National Express, but this failed as early as 1983 (Robbins, 2007). By the middle of the 1980s, mostcompetitors of National Express stopped their services as innovations such as lower fares or higher
comfort had been copied by National Express. Additionally, National Express initially had access tomost of the coach stations and refused access to other operators. An important issue at the time wascontrol on the Victoria Coach Station in central London. The coach station was subsequently
transferred to the control of the London transport authority (now Transport for London).
The decline of competition in the 1980s after a strong competitive period resulted in a de facto
monopoly by National Express. This disappeared in 2003 with the arrival of Megabus.com as a no
frills, low-cost, coach brand provided by the Stagecoach group another main player in local public
transport in the UK. Megabus strives to differ from National Express by concentrating on low incometarget groups such as students, young people without driving license, or elderly people. Its network is
less extensive, has lower frequencies and focuses on main relations between London and main cities.
It uses pre-booking with yield management in its pricing strategy, copying the success observed in the
low-cost airline business and to some extent by National Express. Megabus also tries to get closer to
its target groups by remaining outside the coach stations used by National Express and by stopping
closer to where its target groups are located, on the curbside or on university campuses. A higher
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propensity of the target groups to use the internet, and the strategy of Megabus to sell tickets via theinternet meant that access to a coach station, as a central information and access point to the coachnetwork, became less essential (Robbins, 2007), furthermore it also contributed to save costs.
Coach travel in Great Britain represents a substantial share of mobility, but a clear accounting of
the market share of the coach sector is difficult as statistics tend to combine (local) bus services in theaccounts.
National Express remains dominant in this market, despite the entry of Megabus. A study of thecompetition between National Express and Megabus on the relation London – Bournemouth, which
also showed that car ownership and access to car usage is about 50% lower for Megabus users,
calculated a market share on this relation of 79% for National Express and 21% for Megabus(Robbins, 2007).
One of the main challenges for new entrants on the British coach market was to find a niche that
National Express had not yet occupied. Another challenge was the implementation of appropriate
channels for ticket sales. The increasing usage of the internet was a chance for Megabus. It facilitatedmarket access for the company as it did not have to rely on the access to existing travel agents, where
National Express already had an advantage. Most of the ticket sales of Megabus.com are now done
through the Internet (Robbins, 2007).
SwedenLong-distance coach services are defined in Sweden as those running at least 100 km andcrossing at least one county border. This market is now completely deregulated and non-subsidised.
Deregulation took place in two steps, where the first step involved a reversal of the „burden of proof‟.
From 1993 on the national railway carriers SJ had to prove that the opening of a coach line would
damage seriously the railway business, or counties had to prove that it would seriously damage county
bus routes (contracted and subsidised) rather than the entrant having to prove that it would damage
neitherr the railway nor the regional bus services. Although this first step was neutral from anaggregate welfare point of view, it also led to gains for low income (low value of time) customers,
while the railways lost a little revenue (SIKA, 1997; Jansson et al. 1997). The second deregulation
step took place in 1999 with a full deregulation of the market with, however, a continued possibility
for the country passenger transport authority to prevent coaches from picking up and setting down
passengers in certain cases when these travel only within their area of authority.
Three main players dominate the Swedish market, providing 79% of the total supply in coachkm. A further 25 operators also provided long-distance coach services in Sweden in 2007. The maincoach station in Stockholm catered for 25 operators serving 53 routes in 2002 (BR, 2002). Swebus
Express is the main operator in Sweden. It is owned by Concordia Bus, a Swedish company active inall Nordic countries. Interestingly, Concordia originates in Norway, as a joint venture between a
Norwegian regional operator in Oslo and National Express in 1997. National Express sold its share in1999 after which Concordia acquired Swebus in 2000 from the British Stagecoach. Stagecoach itself
had bought Swebus from the Swedish state railway SJ in 1996. Concordia Bus states, in its 2008
annual report, having a market share of 50% in the express coach market, and a market share of 5% incollective transport, with rail having 75%. Svenska Buss is a co-operation company owned by five
regional Swedish bus and coach operators. Säfflebuss and Bus4you are now owned by the Norwegiangroup Nettbuss, itself part of NSB (the national Norwegian rail operator) and operate under the nameof GoByBus. Ybuss is a Swedish privately owned operator co-operating with Swebus Express. Manyother regional operators exist.
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About 90% of the Swedish long-distance coach services are run on a commercial basis, the rest is
run under contract from a transport authority. Coach services represented in 2005/6 about 5% of thenumber of long-distance trips and 6% of the passenger-km. Cars (66% in passenger-km in 2005/6) andtrain (about 15% in passenger-km in 2005/6) both have a larger market share in trips and in mobility,
as do airplanes (11% in passenger-km in 2005/6) in terms of kilometres only, as few people use buses
for very long-distances (above 600 km) (SIKA, 2008). The relative share of collective means oftransport increased in the period 1993-1998, in line with the deregulation of both inland air traffic andlong-distance coach services. While mobility increased by 9% during this period, that of collective
transport grew by13%. This evolution was reversed between 1998 and 2004 (growth of 9% forcollective means of transport while total mobility grew by 13%), but the mobility by bus remained
stable during that period, illustrating a shift from air to rail (Banverket, 2006). As in other countries,
passengers are mainly students, elderly and low-income population groups.
Long-distance coach services are often included in regional fare integration schemes managed by
the county passenger transport authorities. This means that local customers can use the long-distancebuses as part of the total regional network and under the same fare conditions. This constitutes aninteresting additional source of revenue for the coach operators, while it constitutes an interesting
additional service for the customers of the county passenger transport authority.
The results of the deregulation started in 1993 and fulfilled in 1999 are perceived to be positive.
Coach services are seen in Sweden as a welcome addition to the rest of the public transport system.
Deregulation has become a part of the Swedish passenger transport system and it will gain importancein the near future. The national railway system is currently being deregulated, with open access being
implemented in a stepwise approach from this summer (2009) until 2010, in line with the Europeanwide deregulation and liberalisation of the international rail passenger market. Proposals for aderegulation of the local and regional bus transport are currently being discussed. If these plans go
ahead, this is certain to have substantial influence on the possibilities for a further development of theexpress coach network in Sweden.
NorwayThe current express coach services have evolved from the old authorisation regime, and the preexisting local public transport services. These local public transport services were and are regulated by
the counties, and appeared – historically – on the basis of route authorisations initiated by operators.
Many of these routes are subsidised by local authorities. Competitive tendering is also used since theend of the 90s for unprofitable area- or route-based contracts.
The current regulatory regime for long-distance coach services is in place since 2003 andrepresents an almost complete deregulation. It is the result of a gradual liberalisation that began in the
1990s after new initiatives for route co-operation by existing operators started at the end of the 1980s.
The express services developed from existing transport companies initiating new and faster transport
services crossing the boundaries of their traditional (county) areas to provide more attractive bus
connections. The extension of services mostly occurred in partnerships between the transportcompanies involved in the areas served. Other routes resulted from the extension to Oslo of the former
long-distance rail feeder routes.
In the first instance, these initiatives lead to some resistance from the side of the authorities, whofeared the weakening of local public transport, and from the national Norwegian railway company
Norges Statsbaner (NSB) which also wanted to avoid competition. However, the introduction ofinterurban express coach services through this market initiative lead to a high popularity amongst
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users (Leiren and Fearnley, 2008) and the fears for excessive competition between coach and rail
appeared unfounded (Hjellnes COWI, 1999).
Whereas route authorisations used to be issued by the national government, this competence wasdecentralised to the counties. In practice, all requests for authorisations are granted as long as quality
standards of operations are fulfilled. The counties can, though, impose some regulation to protect
subsidised local public transport services. However, it seems that in many cases counties have adapted
the local services to the existence of the express services and chose to „buy‟ specific additions to theexpress services to fulfil local needs (school transport, lengthening routes, etc.)
Today, most interurban coach services in Norway are organised via NOR-WAY BUSSEKSPRESS,
which is a marketing organisation owned by 40 member companies running the different coach lines,
some of which are run in co-operation with one another. The members are each responsible for thedesign of the services regarding timetables and fares. The main competitor to NOR-WAY
BUSSEKSPRESS is TIMEkspress, a coach brand of NSB in Southern Norway. The services are run by
Nettbuss, the coach operator of NSB, which also offers further coach brands like Komfortbussen,
Bus4you and Flybussen (the airport express bus brand of NOR-WAY BUSSEKSPRESS). It should be
noted that Nettbuss also runs further interurban services for NOR-WAY BUSSEKSPRESS. Other
competitors are Lavprisexpressen en Konkurrenten.
The main part of the express coach services is run commercially and market access is de facto
free. The current express coach network is seen more as a useful complement than as a competitor to
the rest of the public transport services. Studies conducted in Norway showed that most passengers are
new or attracted from using the car, rather than from train and airplane services (see Hjellnes COWI,
1999; Strand, 1991). Studies also showed that public transport usage has, on the whole, increased on
the corridors with train/coach competition. In total, ridership has more than doubled between 2002 and2007, while productivity has reached levels significantly higher than in neighbouring Sweden, that has
also deregulated its market but with less possibility for co-operation between operators(Alexandersson et al. 2009).
Policy documents, such as the National Transport Plan 2010-2019 reiterate that these services arewelcome additions to the public transport system, as it allows servicing areas that would otherwise notbenefit from public transport. Also, it is seen to contribute to a better environment and to fewer
accidents by reducing car traffic.
Leiren and Fearnley (2008) identify two challenges that currently face the express coach market.
The first is the subsidisation issue. Express coaches do receive some public payments in a number ofcases (providing fare rebates, some pupils transport or service to areas that would otherwise not be
served). The current European regulation prescribes to submit subsidised services to competitive
tendering. The simple application of this rule would threaten the nature of the industry, replacing itwith a more centrally planned system. The regulation can however be limited to those services
exceeding some limits regarding the height of subsidy or amount of kilometres produced. An
additional element is that some authorities report that buying additional services from commercial
long-distance operators proves to be cheaper than organising a separate local contract (competitively
tendered) (Leiren and Fearnley, 2008). A danger, though, of having too much such influences on thelong distance coach market is that this could lead to less attractive services, effectively taking the
economic basis for those services away. Cleary, further political decisions are required here.
Another issue mentioned by Leiren and Fearnley (2008) is that the Norwegian competition
authority (and then also European bodies) started to investigate some existing co-operation between
operators. Yet, co-operation is often perceived to be beneficial. A study by the Norwegian Transport
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Economic Institute (Leiren et al. 2007) showed that the coach network, including the routes with cooperation within that network, lead to substantial welfare gains (NOK 1.5 billion per year). The
National Transport Plan 2010-2019 now mentions an intention to exempt the co-operations thatappeared before 2003 from this control. Here, too, further (political) choices will need to be made to
decide how this issue should be regulated in the Norwegian context.
PolandPublic transport in Poland was, prior to 1990, organised in a similar fashion to that in otherformer communist countries. The State Road Transport (PKS) was the main carrier of passengers andgoods by road. Before 1988, passenger transport operations in more than one region (voivodship)required a permit from the Ministry of Transport. Permanent permits were only given to state carriers.
Other road operators‟ access to the market was limited to single or periodic permits. It was the Act on
Economic Activity (1988) that liberated many fields of activity, including road transport (Taylor andCiechanski, 2008).
PKS was split into four state-firms in the early 1980s: one national PKS and three regional
companies. The organisational structure of PKS counted numerous local branches receiving subsidies
from the state budget. In 1990, the four firms were disbanded and all 233 branches became individual
enterprises (Taylor and Ciechanski, 2008). There was little interest from foreign investors. Less thanhalf of all firms were subsequently privatised, the most popular form involving a privatisation to thecompany‟s employees. The only main international concern interested was Veolia, which has taken
control of 11 PKS companies as of mid-2006 (Taylor and Ciechanski, 2008). The limited interest in
privatisation by foreign investors could be linked to the rapid decline in ridership. By 2005, public
transport ridership was only one-third of the 1989 figure, due to the extensive development of
individual motoring (Taylor and Ciechanski, 2008)
Little competition appeared at the national level. A new company started in 1994: Polski Express,
as a subsidiary of Britain‟s National Express Group and targeting mainly connections not well servedby rail. This company experienced serious economic difficulties later on (Taylor and Ciechanski,2008).
In the late 1990s, real competition came from private „independent‟ operators having small
numbers of buses, usually of lower standard, serving the most profitable routes. These activities led toa worsening of the economic situation of local PKS companies (more involved in local and regionaltransport). In some areas, local PKS companies went out of business. PKS remained, though,dominant, accounting for 92% of passengers and 95% of scheduled bus and coach services in Poland(Taylor and Ciechanski, 2008).
Also, Polbus-PKS was created in 1995 as a reaction to Polski Express. Polbus PKS was set up
by 21 PKS companies and a couple of private companies as a marketing company, inspired by theexample of NOR-WAY Bussekspress. It aimed at providing a modern coach network for domestic
services, with a unified sales and information system throughout the services of its member companies
across Poland. The company started providing long-distance services, especially where rail links were
unattractive (Taylor and Ciechanski, 2008). Pekaes Bus, set up in 1996 as spin-off of PKS, also
provided long-distance services. It was subsequently taken over by Veolia Eurolines Polska.
Komornicki (2001) reported on the substantial supply of semi-legal and illegal bus connections
between Poland and neighbouring countries at the beginning of the 1990s. He reported that thisproblem (lack of quality certification, accidents, etc.) was considerably reduced from 80 to 20% of the
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market by 1998. It would be interesting to know whether the issue has completely vanished, now
Poland has become a member of the EU, and whether the issue has reappeared further east.
Spain
Long-distance concessions are granted by the national government on an exclusive basis. The
length of those concessions varies between 8 and 20 years. Regional inter-urban bus concessions areawarded by regional governments. In both cases, contracts are now mainly granted by means ofcompetitive tendering, although direct contracting is/was possible in some circumstances, but mainly
in urban transport. Until 1990, both long-distance and inter-urban services were under state control
and concessions were awarded directly, without tendering. A reform was introduced with thedecentralisation to the Autonomous communities (Regions) and a reform of the passenger transportlegislation (in 1987 and 1990). As a result of this, the 113 existing concessions for long-distanceservices (all of them not subject to tendering) could be extended until at least 2007, most wereextended until 2013 and some until 2018. New concessions for the provision of services on routes
insufficiently served, or replacing illegal lines, have to be awarded through public tendering.
Numerous coach operators exist on the Spanish market. In 1988 ENATCAR was created as apublic company, taking over all coach services of the national railway carrier RENFE. This operator
was subsequently privatised to ALSA, who is the main supplier of long distance coach services withnearly 10% of the market
and offering a wide range of differentiated services. The company isprivately owned, member of Eurolines. It was sold to British National Express Group in 2005. ALSA
is expanding its influence in the Spanish bus sector, integrating the second national transport operator
Continental Auto in 2007.
Coaches have traditionally a strong position in Spain‟s long-distance public transport market.
Reliable statistics seem to be absent, but the coach market is believed to be four times larger than thatof the train when measured in passenger-km (García-Pastor et al. 2003). The further development of
the Spanish high-speed network may bring a change in this situation though, as did low cost airlines.
The 2008 annual report of National Express, the owner of ALSA, mentions these competitive pressuresand their response to the entry of low-cost airlines and the development of high speed rail by varying
their frequency, adapting their prices and altering their network to provide complementary services.
Furthermore, they also announced the launch of new services, with revised on-board catering andoffering on-board WiFi, being the first transport mode in Spain to offer this facility.
Despite the usage of competitive tendering, Spain‟s long-distance coach services are all
profitable, in the sense that they do not receive public subsidy. García-Pastor et al. (2003) report that,
according to a study for the Spanish Ministry of Development (Consultrans, 1999), the competitive
tendering initiated in the 1990s did, however, have positive effects on service quality and ticket prices
for these concessions. According to this study, extended concessions appeared to have 46% higher
passenger-km fares than that in tendered concessions.

Italy
The Italian interurban coach market can be divided into national and regional services. National
interurban coach services (linee extraurbane statali) operate commercially on routes of 200-1 200 km
between the larger cities located in different regions. The legal regime applicable to those services has
recently been modified, with a decree from November 2005 aimed at opening the market. Services do
not receive any subsidy. Coach operators now have to apply for an authorisation at the ministry before
starting new services. While the former regime did not allow competition, the new authorisation
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regime is supposed to make competition on the road possible. However, little competition seems tohave taken place since, and successive changes in government seem to have delayed the deregulation.
Regional interurban coach services (linee extraurbane regionali) serve routes of 30-300 km
between larger cities located within the same region. Most regional routes are still directly awarded
concessions, subsidised and have regulated routes and fares. Some deregulation is also planned here as
some regions have developed regional legislation that follows the national decree. However, thiscompetition seems often restricted to those services that do not interfere with existing subsidised
regional services operating under concession contracts.
Operators differ significantly in size. No national operator dominates the market at the moment.
Sitabus, as a large operator, is owned by the national train operator Trenitalia. One of the largest
wholly privately owned operators is Arriva Italy. The rest of the market is highly fragmented, with alarge number of local operators, often owned by regions and municipalities, but privately owned
operators exist too. Most operators are based in one region and offer, in addition to regional services,connections with Rome or other main Italian cities. Few companies offer nationwide services. Arriva
entered the market by taking over 11 regional companies, many of which operate in the interurban
market.
Some services are supplied in complement to the existing high-speed trains of Trenitalia. Sita, as
a subsidiary of Trenitalia, is a main supplier of such services. Some services include high-quality seats
and on-board internet facilities. Other services are directly competing with long-distance train
services. Fares on those routes are comparable to the (highly subsidised) railway fares on thoserelations from the North to the South of the country. These fares are generally lower than domestic
airfares.
Recently, Ibus was initiated, a co-operation between nine operators integrating marketing andticketing activities, and also member of Eurolines.
FranceThere are essentially no long-distance express coach services in France. The regulation of public
transport is allocated to the State for interregional passenger transport services, and these are themonopoly of the national railway company SNCF. Regional and local transport services are organisedby the Départements (to be compared with counties) and by (co-operation of) municipalities. Most ofthese services are submitted to competitive tendering. Express services exist at the level of the
Départements, when ordered by the respective transport authority, but no services are operated on anational scale on real long distances.
As a result of this, and although some competition exists between SNCF‟s train services – inparticular its TGV high-speed train services – and the airline business, there is no such competition
between rail and road. Market entry by market initiative by individual transport operators is, for thetime being and since the enactment of the current transport legislation in 1982, not foreseen andprevents explicitly direct competition to SNCF services. As a result, such entry is de facto impossible.
Gaining the agreement of SNCF seems illusory, as the company has always been opposed to the idea.
This may change in the near future, as the current political majority announced, in July 2009, its
intention to introduce a number of amendments to the current legislation to allow international coachservices some degree of cabotage on the French territory and, more importantly, to allow a full
liberalisation and deregulation of the long-distance coach business at the national level. The idea
would be to introduce a system of largely deregulated authorisations, which would effectively abolish
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the monopoly of SNCF by the end of 2009. Incidentally, this would also be the moment when theliberalisation of international railway services decided at the European level would come to force.
With this in mind, SNCF reportedly started changing its mind, perhaps seeing also some
opportunities for its own bus and coach subsidiary (Keolis), that is currently expanding its activities
not only in France but also in the rest of Europe. Additionally, SNCF may benefit from replacing someof its loss-making interregional services by more profitable coach services (Kramarz, 2009). The
expectation is that, as in other countries, students, less wealthy customers, and people with a lower
value of time would be the main beneficiaries of such liberalisation. This, though, would require theappearance of a national network of services, which is perhaps still far-fetched. Yet, here too, somecombination with existing, but less profitable, regional services may lead to win-win situations if theregulation allows such combinations.
Germany
The basic regulatory principle of the German express coach market is that of free market
initiative by transport operators. The market is, however, strongly regulated by the National law onpublic transport. That law restricts direct, on-the-route, competition between transport operators andprovides some protection to incumbent operators. Supplying new, more or less parallel, services isonly allowed when these represent a significant improvement over existing services.
Today, there is an extensive interurban coach network with West Berlin as hub. Most of thoseservices are a relic of the division of Germany. West Berlin, as part of the Federal Republic of
Germany, was located inside the territory of the German Democratic Republic. The bus services
provided connections between West Berlin and other cities in the Federal Republic These connections
are operated by Berlin Linien Bus, a joint venture of various coach operators partly owned by DB.
Most connections are served once a day. Every journey must have Berlin as starting point ordestination. Services starting in Berlin cannot be boarded at other stops, and buses to Berlin can only
be left in Berlin (Maertens, 2008).
Other providers are Touring and Public Express. Touring – owned by Eurosur (a joint venture of
the Spanish and Portuguese bus operators Alsa, Linebus and Socitransa) operates a night service from
Hamburg via Kassel, Frankfurt and Darmstadt to Mannheim. Other services mostly go to other
European countries. These represent most of the services performed by Touring. Touring runs theseunder the flag of Eurolines. Further national services are provided by Public Express, who offers
coach services between Bremen, Oldenburg and Groningen in the Netherlands, and also between
Bremen and Aurich. Another segment of regular coach services are airport express buses. Manyregional airports are served by such coach services (Maertens, 2008).
The evaluation of the potential of interurban coach services shows that interurban coaches would
provide travel possibilities for people with lower incomes (Maertens, 2008). The services of current
suppliers like Touring and Public Express confirm this. It is obvious that Public Express, for instance,
focuses on students and families. Students receive discounts of approximately 50%. Adults travellingwith children are allowed one child to travel for free. Touring wants to attract travellers by offering
low fares for those who book the journey well in advance (Touring, n.d.).
Suppliers as Touring and Public Express show that there are market parties who want to expand
but are hindered by the current law. A problem with the existing market entry regulation is that therequired level in quality of improvement remains unclear. The extension of the existing Germaninterurban coach services is also confronted by resistance coming from the established passenger
transport branch. This causes long court trials between operators of new services and incumbents.
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Consequently, the efforts of Touring to extend its interurban coach connections are hindered by claims
from the German railway company Deutsche Bahn (DB). A recent example is the attempt by Touring
to open a coach service competing with DB on the Frankfurt-Cologne route (Köhler, 2009). However,
one can also observe that in 2009 a new company, AutobahnExpress, has managed to obtain a numberof authorisations for routes linking Potsdam, Dresden, Leipzig, Halle, Kassel and Göttingen via
motorways.
Two political parties (the liberal democratic FDP and the Green Party) tried to promote the ideaof deregulation for interurban coach services in 2005 and 2006, but the Parliamentary Committee on
Transport, Building and Urban Affairs rejected both requests (Maertens, 2008). However, deregulationof interurban coaches is now likely to go ahead as the recent coalition agreement of the Federal
Government (CDU, CSU and FDP), published in the autumn of 2009, includes the formal intention toderegulate this market.
Eurolines
Eurolines is a joint venture of European coach operators which organises most of theinternational coach services inside Europe. The brand name Eurolines groups 35 independent coachcompanies, operating in 32 countries and providing together Europe's largest regular coach network.
Eurolines developed common quality standards for all its members, and harmonised the sales andtravel conditions. The network currently connects over 500 destinations, covering the whole of thecontinent and Morocco.
Eurolines was founded in 1985 as a competitor to Europabus, that had been created by several
European rail companies in 1965 to prevent other coach operators from competing with their rail
services (Eurolines, 2008). While the transport services of Europabus remained limited, Eurolines
developed its market by providing services on international relations with significant demand, startingwith the travel needs of migrant and guest workers coming from Spain and Portugal. Various
initiatives in the various countries, such as Budget Bus in the Netherlands (and many more examples
in other countries), were eventually bundled together under the common flag of Eurolines asmarketing brand for regular international services.
The Eurolines Organisation is an International Non-Profit Organisation, according to the Belgianlaw. Membership is open to (groups of) companies operating international scheduled passenger
services by coach. Decisions concerning Eurolines Services, as commercial daughter of the Eurolines
Organisation, are made by a council of directors of all Eurolines member companies. Next to thiscouncil, an executive committee consisting of nine directors of the member companies guides theimplementation of new product developments. A main challenge for Eurolines has been the
differences in national legislation pertaining to the operation of passenger coach services as, forexample, differences in fuel taxes and the rules for value added taxation created a lot of bureaucracy(Bochar, 2001).
It is interesting to note that Veolia has now acquired a significant position in Eurolines, as it owns
the brand in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Portugal and operates the brand, in partnership, in
Scandinavian countries, Poland and Spain.

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3. MAIN TRENDS AND CHALLENGES

Before drawing a few conclusions in the next chapter, this chapter will summarise the main facts
and trends that appear out of the countries reviewed above. Where relevant, a few challenges will also
be sketched.

3.1.

Organisational forms in long-distance passenger transport

There are two main families of organisational forms for passenger transport services. The firstone, that I call „market initiative‟ regimes, are those organisational forms where it is essentiallytransport operators that come up with ideas of markets to be served (van de Velde, 1999). Operators
are free, in such regimes, to suggest new services and request permission to operate them. In its pureform, the request for permission is a mere formality. „Authorisations‟ to operate (sometimes called„licences‟ and sometimes, unfortunately, called „concessions‟) are then granted without further
analysis by transport authorities of whether the market „needs‟ the additional service, whether anotheroperator already provides similar services, whether fares are appropriate, etc. But this regime can also
be combined with various forms of regulatory interventions, limiting the free access to the market byvarious requirements pertaining to the non-parallelism to existing services, to fare integrations, to theprotection of railway rights, etc. The principle remains that of market initiative, but regulation can beso tight as to effectively prevent any entry.
The alternative for market initiative is „authority initiative‟ (van de Velde, 1999). Here, it is atransport authority that is charged with the creation of the transport services. The authority can thenprovide the services itself, with its own staff or company, or it can concede these services to an
operator of its choice, which then usually takes place via competitive tendering. The essential
difference with „market initiative‟ is that this regime prohibits any spontaneous initiative from market
actors. It grants all rights of service creation to the authority. If the authority does not take any
initiative, nothing happens and nothing can – legally – happen. The private sector can be involved, but
this requires the authority first to realise that a transport service is needed, then to specify its
characteristics (in a more or less detailed way) and finally to organise a competitive procedure(tendering) in order to award the service to an operator under contract for a specific period of time.
Such contracts are then called „concessions‟ or sometimes, confusingly, „franchises‟. They are often
exclusive, but this is not necessarily the case.
In the countries presented, and as can be seen in Table 2, deregulated market initiative is clearly
dominant. France and Germany, two potentially main European markets, are still effectively closed
but an opening of both markets is expected. Concrete steps for liberalisation and deregulation arebeing taken in France. This is quite striking, as France has organised the rest of its local and regional
passenger transport system on the basis of a strict authority initiative and competitive tendering regime
that leaves no space for the free market. But this move will require a change in the current legislation.
Germany, too, is likely to move to a deregulated regime as this is now included in the new coalition
agreement for the Federal Government. Existing market actors are pressing in that direction: a few
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routes already exist as the existing legislation does not make it fundamentally impossible – althoughquite difficult – to enter the market at this moment. This means that it should be a relatively simple
move to realise as soon as all actors agree. A main resulting change will then be the necessary
abolition of the railway protection that is currently fiercely defended by DB. It could be that the
opening of the international railway markets in 2010 will also facilitate that shift in position.
As a result, Spain appears to be the only country in the sample (and apparently also in the rest ofEurope) that bases its regime not on the free market, but on a regime of concessions awarded bycompetitive tendering. It should be noted, though, that the current concessions are more the result ofhistorical rights that were probably initiated by the market, and not the authority, at their origin. Someof the existing concessions have already been submitted to tendering, but the bulk is still to come.
At the level of the operators, the organisational form is characterised by a diversity ofarrangements, many of which are hybrid. Operators provide services with their own vehicles and staff,
but also often make use of sub-contractors (such as National Express in Great-Britain). This can beobserved in most countries analysed. This, incidentally, allows smaller family-based operators toparticipate in larger network services. But smaller operators are also present individually on themarket, as can be seen in, for example, Sweden and Italy.
Table 2. Organisational forms in long-distance coach transport in Europe
Authority initiative
Public sector
Private concessions
France: long-distanceSpain: exclusive
monopoly for rail
concessions awarded(SNCF), no longincreasingly by
distance coachcompetitive tendering
services,to private operators,
competitively
both at the nationaltendered coachand regional levelservices at the
local/regional level

Market initiative
Regulated
Deregulated
Germany: market
Great-Britain: open
initiative in theory but
market, freealmost no possibility
competition, noof entry in practice torailway protection
due protection of
Sweden: open market
railway monopoly
with some regulatory
rights for regionaltransport authorities,
no railway protecten
Norway: open
markets with someregulatory rights forregional transport
authorities, no railway
protection
Italy: open market,
but still in starting
stage
Poland: open market
but still many stateowned operatorspresent.

Another dominant feature of this market is the „marketing co-operation‟. Individual operators,
conscious of the existence of demand-side network effects present in this industry, bundle theirproducts under an attractive brand name allowing them to realise a wider service coverage andhigher product attractiveness together than would be the case as an isolated provider. Eurolines is the
Van de Velde – Discussion Paper 2009-21 - © OCDE/ITF, 200915

best example of this at the European level. NOR-WAY Bussexpress is another example at the scale of
one country. Further examples can be found in Sweden. At the extreme, the marketing co-operation,
which is a type of commercial franchise (contrary to the usage of the word „franchise‟ in the context ofcompetitively tendered concessions), approximates the model of the main operator subcontracting
most of its operations to local operators. Yet main differences exist, and lie in the balance of power
and attribution of risks between the small contractors and the main contractor, or the assembly of
operators in the case of co-operation.

3.2.

Performances

As can be read in the cases presented, the liberalisation and deregulation of the coach sector isperceived to be a success in those countries that have implemented it. Some countries went for a „bigbang‟ approach, as the UK in 1980. Others, very much in their tradition, went for a more gradualapproach, as Sweden; or pragmatic approach, as Norway; or incomplete approach, as Italy. It remains
to be seen how France and Germany will tackle to current reluctance to deregulate.
The competitive tendering alternative to the market, as used in Spain, also delivered good results
according to the studies reported in the case study. Tendered concessions proved to have lower fares
than extended (negotiated) concessions. This does not allow us to draw a conclusion on the relativeadvantage of tendering above a deregulated market, as one has to remember that the Spanish
concessions are exclusive and therefore lack the competitive pressure present in countries such as
Norway, Sweden, Poland or Britain. An international comparison of service levels, quality and fares
would be needed to be able to judge this.
Contrary to most of the rest of public transport, long-distance coaches are operated on acommercial basis in the sense that subsidisation is almost non-existent. The railway sector on thecontrary, even protected from competition from the coach sector, mostly requires subsidisation if notdirectly in operations, then at least through part of the infrastructure expenses.
Another attractive aspect of the coach sector can be found in several publications in the fact thatcoaches produce little pollution per passenger-km, and reach a safety level in terms of accidents that iscomparable to that of the train and airplanes which is substantially lower than the car system (see,e.g. ECMT, 2001). The proponents of deregulation then combine this argument with the observationthat in countries that have removed railway protection and deregulated the coach sector, coaches tend
to capture more passengers from the car than from rail, to conclude that coach deregulation would be
beneficial from an overall transport policy point of view.

3.3.

Markets served

Providers of long-distance coach services focus rather clearly on specific target groups: students,
elderly, people with no access to cars, and poorer people in general. Swedish and British studies haveshown the advantage of deregulation for these groups, while showing at the same time the limited
impact on the rail system in terms of passengers captured. Rail and coach seem to cater for people
with different values of time in terms of long-distance travelling. Some studies even show that directcompetition between both modes in one corridor tends to result in a growing market for both at theexpense of the car.
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In addition to this, coach tends also to serve quite successfully relationships that are not available
by rail, in particular by providing direct links between airports and various areas.
Eurolines is obviously the main player for international services in Europe. Clear statistics do notexist, making the presentation of clear observations on this market difficult. Poland, and probably also
the Czech republic and other former communist countries not reviewed here, appear to be main
players in term of the European network of coach services. This has much to do with the current
propensity of workers from Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries to seek job
opportunities elsewhere in (mainly) Western Europe. Family visits, tourism and further exchanges are
responsible for the growth of these markets since the fall of the Iron Curtain. As such, thisdevelopment is very similar to market developments that could be observed several decades ago andthat were responsible for the development of the coaching business at that time, especially in relation
to the transport flows between Spain and Portugal and the rest of Europe.
Two main European countries still have only very limited coach services, except for theinternational Eurolines services: France and Germany. Changes are clearly overdue here, and political
momentum is now building up for change in France and probably also in Germany.
Smaller European countries have, in view of their sheer size, limited or no long-distance coachservices. This is the case in the Netherlands, Belgium of Switzerland. Denmark does have a few longdistance coach relations from Copenhagen to Jutland. It should be noted that the railway services arerather excellent in these countries for the distances considered. These countries are of course also wellserved by the Eurolines services.

3.4.

Network effects, monopolies, barriers to entry and regulatory needs

Network effects need to be recognised in this industry. The marketing co-operations presented
above appear out of the market process in a profitable, competitive and open market. This is anindication of their desirability. But it is also an indicator of their questionability from a regulatory
point of view. The British, Norwegian and also the Eurolines case show the attractiveness of thisconcept for the passengers (information, ticketing, image, attractiveness, etc.) The sheer existence of
co-operation between providers in a competitive market is prone to attract suspicions fromcompetition authorities, as can be seen in the Norwegian case reported earlier or in the acquisition of
the Scottish Citylink by National Express at the end of the 1990s (followed by a forced divesture) as
reported by White (2008).
Yet, as already stated by the 1998 Round Table on Interurban coaches (ECMT, 2001), these cooperations and the resulting conglomerates of operators do not seem to lead to abuse of dominantpositions. This is due to the strength of the intermodal competition with (mainly) the car, low-costairlines and, to a lesser extent, rail. Furthermore, as exemplified by the Megabus entry in Britain, themarket seems to remain sufficiently contestable in terms of intramodal competition. It is important tostress that this lack of concern can only be true inasmuch as entry barriers are appropriately removed.
This relates to non-discriminatory access to coach stations, fair licensing requirements, and fairauthorisation procedures. This also requires non-exclusive route authorisations, or a very cleverauthorisation-issuing authority (which is perhaps too much to ask for in many cases). Last but notleast, it requires the enforcement of a fair access to existing marketing organisations where these havea dominant position on some markets. Indeed, competing marketing organisations could also exist, but
their viability will very much depend upon the size of the market to be served.
Van de Velde – Discussion Paper 2009-21 - © OCDE/ITF, 200917

The fair access to coach stations seemed to be more of a problem in the 1980s than it appears to
be nowadays. None of the studies accounted for in this research mentioned coach station access as amain issue. Stations can be owned either by the public sector or by a main operator but need, andseem, to be accessible according to fair rates. Furthermore, the relevance of stations as places to findinformation and buy tickets has lost much of its relevance with the advances reached in internet sales
in this sector.
While coaches are often operated through numerous local, small, family operators, one can also
observe the continuous expansion of a few main European-wide operators. While the traditional modelof small operators as sub-contractors of larger brand-holder or member of market association does not
yet seem to be threatened, it will also be interesting to see whether this model will lose in importanceand be gradually replaced by larger operators. The expansion of Veolia, as main French group, iscurrently very visible all across Europe. The British National Express is a second example, althoughless prominent. Earlier expansions of international groups, such as Stagecoach, have been witnessed in
Sweden, but the events showed that these expansions could be very volatile. The future will tell, but apoint for further study, in terms of regulatory preoccupations, is whether expanding large
conglomerates pose a larger competitive threat to the coaching market rather than the co-operations
per se.
The European Union adopted, in 2007, a new regulation on public service obligations in thepassenger transport sector (Regulation 1370/2007) that is applicable to the end of 2009. In short:services granted exclusive rights or financial support must be submitted to competitive tendering.
There are a number of (complex) exceptions to this, however (see van de Velde, 2008 for moredetails). Deregulated markets without exclusive rights are not directly affected by the Regulation.
Furthermore, compensation for fare rebates can continue to exist, when accessible to all operators.
This would mean that the long-distance coach sector is not affected by the measure as it operates
without subsidy and without exclusivity. The main exception is Spain, but as competitive tenderinghas been chosen as the awarding mechanism in that country, it all seems compatible with theRegulation. However, as could be seen in, for instance, Sweden and Norway, long-distance coaches do
not exist in isolation from other public transport services. As it happens, regional transport authorities
in countries with low densities of population, and under whose responsibility local public transport
falls, have many times discovered the mutual benefits that may exist between local buses and longdistance coaches. Integrating coach services with regular local services can realise service
improvements (speed) for local customers, and can allow serving remote areas that would otherwise
not be served if a long-distance bus did not stop on its way to the next remote main city. Combining
both types of services often requires subsidisation of the long-distance coach. A problem may appear
here with the new Regulation when this amount, or the size of the contract, would exceed somethreshold, forcing the authority to use competitive tendering, which would only be counterproductivein this case. There is no clear view at the moment on the extent of this problem, but it could constitutea (probably minor) challenge in the years to come if pragmatism cannot be used.

3.5.

Towards further deregulation: challenges for the near future

The points of view and opinions in markets that are currently closed, such as France andGermany, have much in common with what could be heard in countries such as Sweden and Norway
before their own deregulation: the railways needed to be protected against coach competition as the
opening up of that market would result in losses of attractiveness for the rail system by substantial
losses in passengers. The facts proved different in those countries; rail hardly suffered and coaches
opened up new markets with people that could not afford the train anyway. Main opportunities are18

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certainly present in these two countries as well. And France is, unexpectedly, likely to be the first of
the two to open the market.
A new factor for the near future is the opening of the international passenger rail market forcompetition in 2010. The European Parliament forced this unexpected move. It is until now rather
unclear how this will work in practice. International passenger train services will, from then on, be
able to operate in an open-access regime. However, existing national public service concessions will
benefit from some protection. It is as yet unclear how this will be interpreted in the various countries.
Germany, as main promoter of this liberalisation, seems favourable to a simple opening. The positionin France is likely to be much more restrictive. This deregulation of the international rail travel could
have some effect on the international coaching business, although it is likely that here, too, just as forthe deregulation of the national coach markets, coach and train will hunt for customers with different
values of time.

4. CONCLUSIONSThe title of this paper is “Long-distance Coach Services in Europe: concessions or free market?”
The review illustrates that the clear choice of most countries is for a free market, and neither for asystem of competitively tendered concessions, nor for a regime of exclusive rights.
Those countries that have not yet opened up their markets are also more likely to move to aderegulated regime rather than a system of tendering concessions. In short: competitive tendering does
not seem to be the most favourite choice in this market. Deregulation has shown that it can work andthe markets seem to remain sufficiently competitive, both in an intermodal and intramodal sense.

Van de Velde – Discussion Paper 2009-21 - © OCDE/ITF, 200919

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