Journal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 29, Number 2, 2007, pp83-95

83

Revival of Tourism in Sri Lanka following the December 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami
Vasantha WICKRAMASINGHE and Shin-ei TAKANO
Graduate School of Engineering, Hokkaido University, Japan(Received for 31 May, 2007 and in revised from 28 May, 2008)

ABSTRACT
Tourism, the fourth largest contributor of Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange was soon brought to halt with theDecember 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. An estimated damage of US$ 250 million to tourist assets and a loss ofover 27,000 livelihoods almost ruined the tourist industry of Sri Lanka. An imperative revival process was executed in two phases: immediate relief phase and rapid recovery phase. Immediate relief phase included provision ofreassuring measures for tourist victims and notifying the mass media with up to minute tourism situation. The
rapid recovery phase was incorporated with a short term recovery process and long term rehabilitation and reconstruction process aimed at recapturing tourist interest, and reestablishing the affected tourist communities and thetourist infrastructure respectively. The lack of a priori disaster management framework and the prevailing security
condition of the country impeded the tsunami revival process. This paper documents the impact of the December
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami on tourism in Sri Lanka and a detailed overview of the recovery strategies adopted in
the aftermath of the disaster. Furthermore, it assesses the challenges and way forwards providing guidance to formulate a comprehensive disaster management framework for the tourism sector through the influence of the recovery process.
Abbreviations: Attention to Sub-Editor;
Dear Sir, both peer-reviewers adviced to add a list of addreviations at the preface. It is reallyneeded for the clear understanding of the paper as there are 17 words/phrases are abbreviated in
the list.
Thank you very much!!

1. INTRODUCTION
On 26th December, 2004, an earthquake of magnitude 9.0
struck the North-West coast of the Indonesian Island of Sumatra.
The subsequent tsunami devastated the coasts of 12 nations in the
Asian region with massive damage to the economies and social
networks of individual countries. The absence of a tsunami warning system in the Indian Ocean, refrained the regional communities
from being forewarned of the impending disaster (Inderfurth et al.,2005). Sri Lanka, an island at the Southern tip of India, was thesecond worst damaged country; 35,322 people dead (210 tourists),
4,115 missing (65 tourists), over 500,000 homeless, and 275,000
livelihoods (27,000 in travel and tourism sector) lost (TAFREN,
2005a; USAID, 2005). Tourism, the fourth largest contributor to
Sri Lanka's GDP (4.6% of GDP) and a major employment generator (3.7% of total employments) was brought to halt in seconds(SLTB, Annual reports). Over three fourths of the coastal belt wasfilled with debris; nearly half of the hotels in the Southern andEastern coast belt were ruined by the destructive tsunami waves.
The tourism image was damaged more than the tourist assets
destroyed over US$ 250 million (ADB, JBIC & WB, 2005). The
tsunami struck at the peak of the tourist season affecting most of
the tourism indicators (annual tourist arrivals, annual revenue,
receipts per tourist per day, room occupancy rate, employment generation, etc.). An imperative tourism revival process: Bounce
Back Sri Lanka , was initiated to recapture tourism quickly, and to

reestablish tourist assets and secure the livelihoods of tourism
based communities. Today, two years after the tsunami, tourism
assets (e.g., hotels and room capacity) have returned to the pretsunami level; though, tourist arrivals, especially the Western
tourists have not yet reached to expected numbers (SLTB, Annual
Report, 2006). The major reasons to avoid visiting Sri Lanka is thesense that the area is not secure both due to the tsunami phobia, theactual physical damage to the tsunami, and the prevailing warfare.
Wickramasinghe and Takano, (2007) mentioned that destination
attraction and destination safety are the two most pertinent factors
to resume tourist arrivals after a sudden calamity.
This paper documents the impact of the December 2004 IOT
on tourism and a detailed overview of the recovery strategies
adopted in the aftermath of the disaster. Furthermore, it assesses
the challenges and way forwards to formulate a comprehensive disaster management framework for tourism sector through the influence of the recovery process to confront corresponding disasters in
the future. Sri Lanka, one of the most affected tourist destinations,
was selected as the case study focusing upon the pre-tsunami country specifics and tourism situation, the tsunami impact on tourism,
and the strategies and recovery plans adopted up to date for revivalof tourism. The influence from the revival process of tourism in
Sri Lanka can be exemplified for developing countries grapplingwith similar problems in the future. The proposed comprehensive
disaster management framework for tourist industry provides

KEY WORDS: 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, Sri Lanka Tourism, Comprehensive Tourism Disaster Management Framework

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VASANTHA WICKRAMASINGHE AND SHIN-EI TAKANO

Fig. 1

Schematic diagram containing the steps for descriptive analysis on revival of tourism in Sri Lanka following the December 2004 Indian
Ocean Tsunami and Comprehensive Disaster Management Framework for the Tourism Sector

assurance of tourists’ safety and pre-determined recovery planningin case of a sudden calamity. The scope of the study is however
narrowed excluding local tourists and the tourism image among
foreign tourists is boosted by reassuring the tourism value and safety improvements to confront future sudden non-escapable disasters.
2. METHODOLOGY
Descriptive analysis was performed upon the December 2004
IOT devastation and the effect on tourism in Sri Lanka in three
periods: Pre-tsunami, Tsunami and Post-Tsunami periods.
Relevant information was collected from personal interviews of theofficials involved in the tourism recovery process, government andinternational organization reports, and various project reports. The

schematic diagram in Fig. 1 developed by the authors describes theflow of the methodological analysis adopted in the current researchstudy in approaching to the final goal: a comprehensive disastermanagement framework for the tourism sector. Initially, pre-tsunami country specifics and tourism industry were deeply studied.
Next, the tourism situation analysis (i.e., damage and needs assessment to tourism assets) following the tsunami was brought up
using government reports and the initial damage assessment reports
jointly produced by the ADB, JBIC and WB. Then, recovery
strategies, challenges and the way forwards of the recovery process
were considered. Moreover, tourism indicators were monitored
using monthly data from the SLTB. Finally, the resultant analyzed
factors were incorporated to devise the four phase (i.e., pre-preparation phase, response and immediate relief phase, rapid reactionREVIVAL OF TOURISM IN SRI LANKA FOLLOWING THE DECEMBER 2004 INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI

and recovery phase, and monitoring phase) comprehensive disastermanagement framework for the tourism sector based on pros andcons of the recovery strategies adopted in the tourism revival
process in Sri Lanka.
3. PRE-TSUNAMI COUNTRY SPECIFICS AND
TOURISM IN SRI LANKA
3.1 Sri Lanka: Country Specifics
Sri Lanka, an island with a 65,610 km2 land area and a coastal
belt of 1,310 km, is situated in the Indian Ocean close to theSouthern end of the Indian peninsula (Fig. 2). Geographically, theisland has an irregular surface with low-lying coastal plains stretching inland from the Northern and Eastern shores while the Westernand Southern coasts slope into hills and mountains. Occasional
wind storms, droughts, landslides, floods, and coastal erosion are
the common natural hazards for the country; however, casualties
had not been more than few hundreds per event and also Sri Lanka
has not been marked as a disaster prone destination. According todemographic data, total population of Sri Lanka was 19.2 million(2003) making population density to 307 people per km2 and theannual growth rate of population was 1.1% in 2003 (Dep. of
Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka). Sri Lanka is governed by ademographic parliamentary system, in which the executive president is the first; uneven distribution of socio-economic features andpolitical features are common in the country. Western andSouthern regions are concentrated with most resources while theNorth and East are neglected mostly due to the ethnic conflict continuing over two decades (Godavitarane et al., 2006). The 25-year
civil war between the GoSL and LTTE has arrested the socio-economic progress of the country; military expenditure recorded US$

719 million (4.2% of GDP) in 1998 (CIA World Fact Book, 2002).
Peace negotiations in 2001 uplifted many socio-economic aspects;
the annual growth rate of GDP of -1.5% in 2001 reached to 5.9% in2003 (ADB, 2006a).
Sri Lanka is a low- to middle-income country. Textile andgarments, foreign remittance, tea, and tourism are the major
exchange earners of the nation (SLCB, Annual Report, 2004). In
2003, GNI per capita was US$ 930; population living below poverty line was estimated at 22.7% in 2002 (ADB, 2006a). Total external debts have increased by 27% from US$ 8.3 billion in 2001 to
US$ 10.6 billion (58.7% of GDP) in 2003 (SLCB, Annual Report,
2004). The total labour force increased from 5.8 million in 1991 to
8.3 million in 2004. The unemployment rate dropped from 14.7%
in 1991 to 8.4% in 2003 (Dep. of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka).
The tsunami struck at a time the country’s domestic and foreign
resources were under severe strain; the oil price shock, the droughtin early 2004, the post conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction,
and with an additional risk of phasing out of textile and apparelquotas of the USA (SLCB, 2004).
3.2 Sri Lanka: Tourism Industry
Sri Lanka’s tropical climate, palm-fringed beaches, diverse
landscapes, and historical sites are prime tourist attractions. By
1970s, sizeable investments were devoted to build the tourism
infrastructure. After facing promising prospects in 1970s, with anyearly growth rate of tourist arrivals surpassing 20%, tourism collapse started soon after the onset of the civil war conflict; 55% contraction in 1983-1989 period before starting the re-recovery inearly 1990s (Perera, 1995). However, tourist arrivals did not show
a steady increase with spiked drops in relation to devastating terrorism activities in 1996 and 20011. The Peace Accord between

Fig. 2 Geographical location of Sri Lanka
1

85Central Bank bomb attack on 31st January, 1996 and Bandaranayake International Airport bomb attack on 24th July, 2001

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VASANTHA WICKRAMASINGHE AND SHIN-EI TAKANO

Table 1.

Pre-Tsunami Tourism Indicators in Sri Lankan Tourist Industry

the GoSL and LTTE in February, 2002 provided necessary impetus
for tourism growth in the subsequent two years. Thus, tourist
arrivals reached to half a million mark in 2003 for the first time inhistory, totaling 500,642, an increase of 27.3% than the previous
year. Tourism had further continued its growth momentum andreached a new peak of 566,202 arrivals in 2004, with 13.1%
increase than the pervious year. Notably, values of the key tourism
indicators: annual tourist arrivals, annual revenue, total tourist
nights, receipt per tourist per day, room occupancy rate, and thenumber of employees, surpassed corresponding peaks in 2004
(Table1). Tourism was ranked as the nation’s fourth largest industry in terms of foreign exchange earnings in 2004; tourism based
foreign exchange receipts increased by 28.2% from US$ 340 million in 2003 to US$ 416.8 million in 2004. Receipts per tourist per
day rose substantially by US$ 5.4 from US$ 66.8 in the previous
year to US$ 72.2 in 2004. Sri Lanka tourism was working hard toboost per day spending of tourists targeting at US$ 84 per tourist
per day in 2005. The overall room occupancy rate in tourist hotels
increased substantially from 53.2% in previous year to 59.3% in2004 marking an increment of 6.1%. Tourism based employment
generation was increased to 129,062 in 2004, a 15% growth thanthe previous year. European tourists favour Sri Lanka for a winterholiday; Western Europe accounted for 50.2% of total arrivals in2004 while South Asia accounted for 23.6%. In 2004, for the firsttime in Sri Lanka, two individual markets surpassed the 100,000
mark of tourist arrivals namely the UK (106,645) and India(105,151) (SLTB, Annual Report, 2004).
Tourists flow in Sri Lanka is characterized by strong seasonal
fluctuations; a high season from November to March with peakarrivals in December and a low season in May to June. Sri Lanka
is not entirely dependent on beach tourism; rather, most tourists
prefer combined beach/cultural sites packages (ADB, JBIC & WB,
2005). Notably, over 40% of the foreign guest nights in 2004 werespent along the beaches of the island’s Southern and Eastern coasts
which were among the hardest hits of the tsunami (SLTB, Annual
Report, 2004).
In 2004, tourism industry consisted of 14,322 rooms in 242
hotels and 3,318 rooms in supplementary establishments such as
guest houses, motels and Inns (ADB & SASEC, 2006). A large
number of SMEs were associated with tourism; although, outside

the Registration and License Scheme of the SLTB; thus, they
were regarded as unauthorized operations (SLTB, Annual Report,
2005). In 2002, a five year tourism master plan: Transforming the
Sri Lankan Tourism Industry-A Five Year Strategy for Growth ,containing a substantial framework of tourism strategies was
implemented and served as the primary guide for tourism policies
at the time of the tsunami devastation. With all the recent advances
in tourism industry after the Peace Accord , SLTB was working
hard towards a target of one million arrivals by 2010 (ADB&SASEC, 2006).
4. THE IMPACT OF TSUNAMI ON TOURISM IN
SRI LANKA: DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
The December 2004 IOT was by far the most devastating natural catastrophe in the recorded history of Sri Lanka. It affected
the Northern, Eastern, and Southern coastal regions of Sri Lanka
most severely and with a marked damage to the Western coast as
well. The total economic damage equaled 4.5% of GDP, demanding US$ 2.2 billion for recovery and reconstruction efforts of Sri
Lanka according to ADB, JBIC & WB (2005) Joint Needs
Assessment.
Unfortunately, it was the peak of tourist arrivals in so far
tourism history of Sri Lanka apparently following two consecutive
years of sustained growth experienced after two decades of oscillation and stagnation due to the prolonged ethnic conflict. The
impact of the tsunami on Sri Lanka tourism was grave. When thetsunami waves hit the beaches in Sri Lanka, 6,000 tourists occupied the affected coastal belt; out of them 4.5% of tourists wereaffected. Most of the 14,500 tourists out of 17,000 tourists who
occupied the country at the time of the disaster left the island
immediately (SLTB). Out of 105 hotels located in the tsunami
affected areas, 53 were partially damaged and 8 were down to theground (ADB, JBIC & WB, 2005). Besides, 352 tourism based
SMEs were severely damaged. Also 3,553 out of the total 14,322
rooms were damaged in medium to large scale hotels estimating adamage of US$ 200 million. The damage to tourism related assets(souvenir shops, restaurants, vehicles, etc.) accounted for US$ 50
million (ADB, JBIC & WB, 2005; WB, 2005). TAFREN (2005b)
mentioned 27,000 loss of tourism based livelihoods. Fig. 3a andFig. 3b illustrate the tourist assets as well as tourism image damage

REVIVAL OF TOURISM IN SRI LANKA FOLLOWING THE DECEMBER 2004 INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI

Fig. 3a (Upper) Debris and waste material along the coast lineand (Lower)

to beach tourism in Sri Lanka.
The tsunami has damaged tourism constructions which is visible, tangible and quantifiable. Similarly, it affected the tourism
image, which is invisible, intangible and therefore not quantifiable.
The best means to measure the invisible damage is by quoting
potential visitors’ views to perform a detailed analysis, which had
not been performed in Sri Lanka tourism sector. The image damage was caused by two means; the actual physical damage and theperception that the entire beaches in Sri Lanka and overall tourism
has washed away rising a sense of insecurity. This negative
tourism image has possibly affected the non-beach tourism indirectly. Random inquiries revealed that this perception was particularly strong among European travelers (Samaranayake, 2005). Yet
Sri Lanka had significant tourist resources such as the cultural triangle and the hill country, which had not been touched by thetsunami. Thus, in the recovery process the utmost priority was
given to correct the perception of potential travelers that tourism
still exists and the most locations are in safe custody.
5. POST-TSUNAMI TOURISM SITUATION IN
SRI LANKA
5.1 Tourism Recovery in Sri Lanka
The recovery process of tourism in Sri Lanka was implemented in two phases: immediate relief and rapid recovery phases.
Immediate relief phase included provision of reassuring measures
for tourist victims and notifying the mass media with up to the87

Fig. 3b (Upper) Damaged Tourist hotel and (Lower) Rest-housedamaged by tsunami waves

minute tourism situation. While the rapid recovery phase consistedof a short term recovery process, and long term rehabilitation andreconstruction process aimed at recapturing tourist interest, andreestablishing the affected tourist communities and the tourist
infrastructure respectively. The cooperation between main tourist
bodies (i.e., SLTB and MoT) and other ministries of GoSL wasremarkable in the rebuilding process, highlighting the importanceof tourism for the nation’s economy. The government has noticed
the importance of rapid recovery of the tourism industry andunconfined the resources immediately. A tourism recovery plan:
Bounce Back Sri Lanka , was initiated with US$ 320 million by
the GoSL including an extensive infrastructure and construction
program, investments for community development, import duty
waivers and a marketing and promotion campaign worth US$ 5.3
million (PATA, 2005). The commitment on tourism was high dueto the steady progress shown in the recent two years prior to thetsunami and that tourism has shifted from fifth to fourth position in
Sri Lanka’s GDP (SLTB, Annual Report, 2004).
5.1.1 Immediate Relief Operation
The immediate relief operation was independently carried out
by the SLTB. Main goals of this process included evacuation of
tourists from the coastal belt, supplying emergency medical treatments and basic needs, provide communication with origin countries, tourist repatriation, and mass media co-ordination. The
process was initiated with immediate evacuation of tourists fromthe beach front and locating a 24hr tsunami information management call center. Tourists receiving centers were set up equippedwith 24hr medical services, meals and bottled water. Special trans-

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VASANTHA WICKRAMASINGHE AND SHIN-EI TAKANO

portation was organized for tourist victims; within 24 hrs, firstbatch of tourists were repatriated. Information dissemination wasenhanced by a dedicated website: www.contactsrilanka.org, providing information on survivors, death tolls, damage maps, hotel/room status, etc. with twice daily updates. British embassy andmany foreign consular services assisted the SLTB to pick up
stranded tourists, arrange communication with origin countries, andfor return travel arrangements (NAO, 2006). Further, SLTB has
arranged no cost vacations for the affected tourist victims directing
them to unaffected inland destinations.
The SLTB actions (e.g. evacuation of tourists from affectedareas) were publicized and the International society was informedthat only the coastal areas (less than 15% of land area) of Sri Lanka
were affected and there still remains unharmed inland areas (e.g.,cultural triangle, world heritage sites, hill country); this supported
to dispel the tourist perception that whole island was struck by thetsunami. Communications were further dilated to pre-empt andbalance the negative coverage of international media and kept all
information disseminators (e.g., SLTB offices overseas, foreign
mission, and associate agencies) informed of the key massages tobring consistency to messages.
5.1.2 Rapid Recovery Phase
5.1.2. a. Short Term Recovery Process
As the first step of the short-term recovery process, tourism
authorities in Sri Lanka, namely the MoT and the SLTB, have initiated actions to collect detailed information on the damage caused
to tourism infrastructure to schedule rehabilitation programs.
Information was collected by means of press advertisements
requesting the affected tourism enterprises to provide detailed
information on the extent of damage, estimated cost of damage,number of people who lost employment, and the type of assistanceneeded to retrieve the business. The response was exceptionallyhigh.

tion (Cooray, 2006). Thus, local victims have purposely or without
knowing neglected reassurance of their livelihoods and failed toassist the initial reconstruction work.
(ii) Concessions to Industry/Hotel Refurbishment: The
government allowed duty free concessions covering import duties
for all goods needed for renovation of damaged resorts and hotels(US$ 6.7 million) as well as for replacement of vehicles (US$ 1
million) required for tourist transportation (TAFREN, 2005a;
GoSL, 2005a). The registered tourist hotels under SLTB were eligible to apply for the post-tsunami reconstruction loan scheme providing loans up to LKR10 million at an interest rate of 7% with a
one-year grace period. Further, the larger establishments had good
insurance coverage to compensate the damages (Rice and Haynes,
2005; UNWTO, 2005a). However, the buffer-zone or coastal conservation zone of 100m-200m land stretch, which was declared as ano-build zone without any careful study of socio-economic impacts
or public awareness, created hardships in reconstruction plan.
Only hotels partially damaged (i.e., if the cost of repair is below
40% of the replacement value) were allowed to reconstruct within
the buffer-zone. However, any establishment or SMEs outside theRegistration and Licensing Scheme of the SLTB were notallowed for reconstruction within the buffer-zone. The reconstruction of houses within the buffer-zone was completely banned.

Unless strategic tourism recovery planning and promotion isdone, it is impossible to recover such a tourism disaster. Under the
short term recovery, the SLTB and MoT developed a two-parttourism recovery strategy to restore both tangible and intangible
tourism assets within the shortest possible time. The first half
aimed at resorting tourism facilities rapidly to bring back tourists
and initiate the livelihoods involved in tourism. The second half
included an international marketing and promotion campaign under
Bounce Back Sri Lanka developed with the help of tourism private sector (Rice and Haynes, 2005). These strategies included following programs and activities.

(iii) Loans for SMEs involved in Tourism Sector: Themajority of tourism SMEs were unable to re-start operations without assistance either as outright grants or soft-loans. Despite thisfact, tourism SMEs were not given due consideration by the government. There had not been any special assistance schemes inplace of tourism SMEs other than the Central Bank which supported the SMEs of all economic sectors with a soft-loan scheme called
Sahana Scheme : loans up to LKR 1-5 million, with an interest
rate at 6%, with a maximum grace period of 1 year and repayment
period of 3-8 years (GoSL, 2005a, 2006). The Phuket Action
Plan initiated by the WTO in February, 2005 came forward to
rescue and rebuild the livelihoods of tourism SMEs focusing on
human elements in order to save tourism jobs, re-launch SMEs andrecover the flow of tourists. The top priority from the above plan
towards the tourism sector in Sri Lanka was identification and provision of assistance to SMEs through grants and micro-financing(UNWTO, 2005b, 2005c). The Phuket Action plan recommended
that soft loan facilities should be made available through international leading institutions for SMEs and these should be channeledthrough the designated local banks. Further, the plan helped inmarketing communications, capacity building exercises, and professional training towards sustainable development.

(i) Disposal of Debris: Disposal of debris and waste material
along the coasts was one of the urgent tasks. By tourism point ofview, it was important to clear the debris, remove unusable buildings and rebuild the locality as fast as possible (GoSL, 2005b).
Although, relevant national and sub-national institutions took safe
actions on this function, it did not progress well due to protest of
local victims. Rather, they kept most of debris on display, expecting benefits from local and foreign tourists and relevant authorities.
Nevertheless, in Thailand most affected areas were cleared shortly
as tourists disfavour the dreadful mementos of the tsunami devasta-(iv) Marketing and Promotion Campaigns to Re-gain
Tourists: The tsunami caused untold damage to the tourism image
creating an impression that beach tourism in Sri Lanka was totally
wrecked. It was important to initiate resilience actions to correctthese false assumptions in potential tourists. Media based tourism
marketing and promotion campaign was the main approach used
for restoring the tourism image of Sri Lanka as a world-class
tourist destination. The main aims of the campaign were managing
the negative perception created by the global mass media, draw
back tourists as soon as possible and thereby uplift the moral of

REVIVAL OF TOURISM IN SRI LANKA FOLLOWING THE DECEMBER 2004 INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI

89

local stake-holders, and highlight that tourism persists in Sri Lanka.
An active recovery communication strategy was launched with
US$ 5.3 million immediately following the tsunami under the
Bounce Back Sri Lanka campaign (GoSL, 2005a; Rice andHaynes, 2005). At the first stage of the campaign, an international
post-card advertisement strategy was developed. SLTB with thesupport of the Sri Lanka postal authority 600,000 prepaid postcards
were distributed globally. The post-cards featured six different
images of Sri Lanka’s main tourist venues with an invitation tovisit the country. Furthermore, both media and trade familiarization (FAM) tours were organized to showcase the diversity of Sri
Lanka tourism and experience the post recovery tourism situation.
The Buy One Get One Free package was launched from 14th
February to 24 th June, 2005 targeting the European market.
Meanwhile, another package was launched for India: (3nights/4days) Bed & Breakfast accommodation for the price of
airfare (SLTB). SLTB joined with the Sri Lankan Airlines and theTourism Cluster, a USAID supported program to promote tourism
in Sri Lanka, to spearhead a 3 1/2 months media campaign on global television and press ( Rediscover Sri Lanka ) starting from 16th
May, 2005 (UNWTO, 2005a). Further, the SLTB alone organized
two special events designed to attract more tourists: the World ofMusic Arts and Dance (WOMAD) drum festival from 21-25
September, 2005 and the spice festival featuring with seven of theworld’s top chefs in October, 2005 (UNWTO, 2005a; SLTB).

oriented infrastructure design, holding back illegal tourism establishments, get all tourism businesses registered under SLTB etc.)
and to manage these tourism zones efficiently, avoiding ad-hoc
tourism development in future. The layout of each proposed
tourism zone includes three zones: set back zone, tourism zone,
and community zone. Housing and related utility infrastructuredevelopments are to be completed in above 15 tourist zones inorder to reestablish displaced tourism based communities.

5.1.2. b. Long Term Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
Sustainable redevelopment of tangible tourism assets andhuman resources are important in the tourism revival process.
Therefore, in March, 2005, 15 coastal towns were announced as
tourism zones for restoration and redevelopment (Fig. 4). The
objective was to install specific guidelines (e.g., high-end tourism

The master plans of proposed tourism zones incorporated neither any public views nor a detailed feasibility study. The SRDP
for the tsunami affected Andaman region, meanwhile, consulted
every stakeholder and input their views for the regional development planning (ADB, 2006b); the final updated report of the 15
year master plan for Andaman was released nearly two years after
the tragedy, in October, 2006. Ironically, in Sri Lanka, the masterplan was designed and released in three months after the tsunami
without conducting a single public awareness workshop. Fernando(2005a) mentioned that the most important shortcoming is that themaster plan was isolated to Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka, withlittle or no stakeholder involvement. It contained several controversial issues which may cause to future complications.
Furthermore, consultants responsible of the project admitted thatthe master plan was heavily drawn upon the former plan (i.e. theTourism Master Plan- Transforming the Sri Lankan Tourism
Industry-A Five Year Strategy for Growth ) which was widely recognized as grandiose and inappropriate for the country due to theunbearably heavy capital cost for a country like Sri Lanka which
tourism contributes only 4.6% of GDP (2004); yet, with uncertainty of the benefits (Arcadis, 2005). If all 15 tourist resorts follow
the model of Arugam Bay, the number of families pushed away
could be well over 75,000. Further, if single tourism zone requires
an investment of US$ 80 million, the cost will be US$ 1.2 billion
or a massive 40% of the total amount rose as tsunami recovery
funds. Besides, the master plan explains that new housing for the
displaced families will be provided in separate inland locations, at
an average of over 1 km from the sea coast behind the tourist zone
giving rise to several social problems: breakage of social-network,
difficulties in carrying out livelihood etc. (Fernando, 2005a,
2005b).

Fig.4

Proposed locations for 15 Tourism Zones

The long term revival master plan was implemented by the
TAFREN which was formed as an extra-government body with ten
managing personals to carry out total tsunami reconstruction andmonitoring work (Rice and Haynes, 2005). The first plan was toredevelop the Arugam Bay, a small town nestled at the edge of a
300 hectare lagoon in the East coast of Sri Lanka (Fig. 4). The
Arugam master plan envisaged total re-orientation of the previously existed fishing and agricultural communities, supplementaryseasonal guesthouses into large hotels, build a commercial centre, ayachting marina, a floating plane pier and a helipad (Fernando,
2005a). This plan was initiated independently by the TAFREN
with little or no stakeholder involvement (Arcadis, 2005; Rice andHaynes, 2005). Past events indicated that affected communities geta higher contentment and a sense of ownership by involving inplanning their communities and livelihoods (Godavitarane et al.,2006).

90

VASANTHA WICKRAMASINGHE AND SHIN-EI TAKANOTourism industry in Sri Lanka largely focused on media based
marketing and promotion during and after the tsunami, yet, someinnovative marketing promotions were required for recovering theconfidence of potential tourists, especially in UK, Germany, andItaly (UNWTO, 2005a). Tourism in Sri Lanka historically had ahigh dependency on Western European markets, which accounted
for 63.2% of all visitors in 1999, but shrunk to 41.4% in 2005, and40.1% in 2006. Recently, a robust growth of tourists from SouthAsia, particularly the India as the single largest source providing
20.6% of the arrivals has overtaken UK. By all means, Sri Lankan
tourism has markedly declined due to the drop of Western market
following the tsunami. The North-East ethnic violence is also
believed to play a role in this drop out.

Fig. 5Monthly Tourism Indicators (Tourist Arrivals and RoomOccupancy Rate)

6. TOURISM RECOVERY INDICATORS:TOURISM IN SRI LANKA REBOUNDS OR NOT
In early 2005, Sri Lankan tourist industry was severely set
back by the aftermath of tsunami. According to SLTB-monthly
statistical bulletins, Sri Lankan tourism industry recorded a negative growth with annual arrivals dropping by 3% from a value of
566,202 in 2004 to 549,308 in the following year. The actual figures of tourist arrivals are however, exaggerated by the large number of influx of tsunami aid workers from all over the world. The
loss of tourist receipts was more severe than the loss of arrivals,
with a drop of 13.0 % from US$ 416.8 million in 2004 to US$
362.3 million in 2005. For the first time in available history in Sri
Lanka tourism, the average duration of stay was reduced below
nine nights to 8.7 nights in 2005, compared with 10.1 nights in
2004. However, receipts per tourist per day recorded a significant
increase to US$ 74.6 in 2005 from US$ 72.2 in 2004 increasing by
US$ 2.4. The room occupancy rate dipped substantially from
59.3% in the previous year to 45.4% in 2005. Furthermore, theemployment generation in tourism sector decreased by 3.1% than2004 to 125,004 in 2005. Despite the set-back caused by the tsunami, tourism was yet able to retain its position as the fourth largest
foreign exchange earner in 2005, merely contributing 3.6% of the
GDP compared to 4.6% in the previous year. Recovery of theannual arrivals increased slightly by 1.9% than the previous year to559,603 in 2006. Monthly tourist arrivals are recovered alreadyduring the first eight months in 2005 and 2006, although hardly
during the high season, from September to December in both years(Fig. 5). This is due to the decrease of Western tourist market(SLTB, Monthly Statistical Bulletins).

The number of accommodation establishments increased from
209 in December 2005 to 241 in December 2006, while number ofrooms increased from 12,428 to 14,218; in December 2004, justbefore the tsunami, tourism sector in Sri Lanka consisted of 242
hotel establishments with 14,322 room facilities. This indicates thetourism facilities were replaced to the pre-tsunami condition. The
tourism industry is rebounding quickly although with a shortage ofvisitors in coastal areas. Room occupancy rate dropped by 16.5%
in Southern coast establishments in December, 2006 compared tothe same period in previous year, however, the number of rooms
increased from 3,961 in December, 2005 to 5,112 in December,2006 (SLTB, Monthly Statistical Bulletins).
7. RECOVERY CHALLENGES AND WAY FORWARDS IN TOURISM SECTOR
1. No-Build coastal buffer-zone: In order to reduce the loss
in a future disastrous event, GoSL decreed a mitigation measure;
No-Build coastal buffer-zone varying from 100 to 200 meters
depending of the coastal slope (GoSL, 2005a; TAFREN, 2005a;
Rice and Haynes, 2005). Only the already registered tourism
enterprises were allowed to carry out businesses inside the bufferzone. This further jeopardized the distressed enterprises; especially
tourism SMEs were deprived from getting government backed
loans delaying the post-tsunami recovery. Although, the setting of
new strategies should be transparent and consultative; declarationof the buffer-zone, however, happened without a careful study ofthe social and economic impacts or expert consultation (Cooray,2006). The buffer-zone was controverted by both local andinternational agencies. Finally, GoSL eased the controversial
buffer-zone to 40 meters in mid-October, 2005, which had prevented many reconstruction activities and government backed loans for
SMEs of the revival process (UNWTO, 2005a). This relaxation
allowed SMEs to establish themselves as close as 40 meters fromthe shore; however, this affected the once those had already started
their constructions beyond the 100 meter boundary.
2. Reduction of tourist arrivals due to prevailing security
condition: The recent conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE,
violating the Peace Accord signed in 2002, further worsened thetourism recovery process. The civil war dilemma has been influencing the tourist industry causing a negative economic growth andan unsafe environment which halt potential tourist arrivals (GoSL,
2006). The positive trend of tourist arrivals immediately prior toREVIVAL OF TOURISM IN SRI LANKA FOLLOWING THE DECEMBER 2004 INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI

91

the tsunami, initiated with the peace accord; thus, the success of thelong term tsunami recovery process further counts on peacekeeping. The Southern and Eastern coastal towns particularly, dependon tourism. There is a concept that any prolonged downturn intourist arrivals lead to serious social problems; depression, unemployment, crime, or hopelessness (ADB, JBIC & WB, 2005).

(Godavitarane et al., 2006).

3. Inequitable Distribution of Recovery Assistance: Successof tourism sector is characterized with combined activities of different parties: from large hotel operators to mobile vendors. Largeestablishments were eligible to apply for government backed loans
and offered duty waivers for all items needed for renovation andreplacement of damaged vehicles for tourism transportation(TAFREN, 2005a). Yet, such government involvement was notseen towards tourism SMEs; the enterprises, however, do not holdthe SLTB license were treated as illegal, in addition to the bufferzone restrictions. Only the Phuket Action Plan came up to safeguard the tourism SMEs providing several incentive schemes(UNWTO, 2005a, 2005b).

Weighing the pros and cons of the strategies adopted for the
tourism recovery campaign in Sri Lanka and exploring the strategies that could have been implemented upon then existed internaland external environment condition, a comprehensive disastermanagement framework for the tourism sector was proposed asshown in Fig. 6. These strategies were further counseled by atourism expert involved in the tourist revival process in Sri Lanka.
The proposed framework consists four phases: pre-preparation
phase, response and immediate relief phase, rapid reaction andrecovery phase, and monitoring phase. This phasing system andcentric discern activities of the proposed framework reduce thecomplexity in resource allocation and administration malfunctions
following an unforeseeable major devastation.

4. Lack of Centralized Coordination: The tsunami has hit
the island quite unexpectedly and the massive damage caused was
extremely impossible to bare the nation alone. Almost all the relief
operations were performed in ad-hoc manner (GoSL, 2005).
Though, Tourism Relief Operation was totally coordinated by the
SLTB and proved successful. Being able to dispatch first batch of
tourists within 24hrs of the disaster, and absence of recorded
injuries and epidemic diseases spread during relief phase are someof the indicators to mention that tourism relief operation carried out
by SLTB was successful. The contribution of the national longterm rehabilitation process handles by the TAFREN made numerous complicated issues in tourism aspect: lack of public involvement, lack of proper economic and environment feasibility studies,etc. The ten management level members of the TAFREN werecriticized due to their novelty in such recovery processes as well as
the unawareness on victims and regions affected(Shanmugaratnam, 2005). Thus, it would have been effective if
TAFREN had come to an umbrella framework within which the
top members govern the total progression while the sub-branches
assigned in proportionate to the damage experienced, work withlocal and international experts.
5. Re-generating Livelihoods: Regenerating livelihoods wasa major challenge in the toppled tourism industry. Over 70% ofaffected livelihoods were directly or indirectly involved with
tourism industry (TAFREN, 2005a). Most activities were associated with SMEs; the damage to tourism assets and the drop in tourist
arrivals drastically reduced the employment opportunities in SMEs.
Thus, small tourism enterprises heavily depend on the recovery of
tourism itself.
6. Non-existence of a Priori Disaster Management Plan: Sri
Lanka was completely unaccustomed for the tsunami and never
had experienced a disaster of such a huge scale. The post-tsunami
recovery effort was therefore, complicated without a priori disastermanagement framework, and a clear rehabilitation framework.
The lack of administrative control of the whole island (e.g. NorthEast conflict) also affects the tourism revival process

8. COMPREHENSIVE DISASTER MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR THE TOURISM
SECTOR THROUGH THE TOURISM
REVIVAL PROCESS IN SRI LANKA(i) Pre-preparation Phase: The tourism recovery process in
Sri Lanka experienced that many of the SMEs involved in tourism
had not been registered under the SLTB thus; treated as illegal
tourist enterprises. The tsunami destroyed many of these SMEs
along the coastal belt. Henceforth, orderly planning of the industry
should be established (Godavitarane et al., 2006). Simultaneously,
steps should be taken to eradicate rest and block potential
encroachments to the tourism sector by strengthening the policy
issues. Furthermore, the absence of detailed data base of tourism
enterprises made the recovery process a complex (Samaranayake,2005). Develop a monitoring mechanism for tourism functions:licensing regulation updates, annual review of safety precaution
measures, cooperate work with Tourism Disaster Management
experts and perform SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses,
Opportunities, and Threats) analyses of the ongoing safety
improvement activities which enable evaluation of the likely
impact of foreseeable disasters are worthwhile components in priori actions. Preparation for prevention is also important as many
victims in the 2004 IOT were not familiarized with the tsunami:thus, did not know when to evacuate (Godavitarane et al., 2006).
Education and implementation of preventive measures are useful inminimizing the damage: awareness programs on disasters, establishment of disaster mitigation practices: installation of an early
warning system, maintain a green belt, land use planning updates(e.g., replace single story buildings with multi-story to provide vertical evacuation, double-walled buildings), evacuation drills andclearly directed routes, establishment of communication strategies(Cooray, 2006). Further, initiation of communication soon following a disaster is essential to block the spreading of erroneous information; thus, appoint and train a media spokesperson is worthwhilein the pre-preparation phase.
(ii) Response and Immediate Relief Phase: The successfulness of the immediate relief operation of the tourism in Sri Lanka
provides guidelines for utilization and duplication duly. Being able
to dispatch the first batch of tourist within 24hrs, and absence ofrecorded injuries and epidemic diseases spread during relief phase

92

VASANTHA WICKRAMASINGHE AND SHIN-EI TAKANO

Fig. 6 Comprehensive Disaster Management Framework for the Tourism Sector

are some of the indicators to mention that tourism relief operation
carried out by SLTB was successful. Evacuation plans and handling causalities, establishment of receiving centers with basic
facilities, provide communication facilities with origin
countries/embassies, tourist repatriation, correct information dissemination, and managing and preventing spread of erroneous andnegative news bulletins are to be highlighted during relief phase.
Information management in SLTB was performed in many means;
dedicated websites and e-news letters, interviews with international
media (e.g., Reuters, CNN, BBS etc.), highlighting supported
quotes from leading travel industry people. Further, communication was initiated with 24 hr calling center, via e-mails to foreign
missions and spread consistent messages to representative officers

in foreign markets.
(iii) Rapid Reaction and Recovery Phase: This phase can be
implemented in two phases: short-term recovery and long-termreconstruction and rehabilitation . Damage assessment anddetailed data gathering should be emphasized prior to launch therecovery process. Disposal of debris in coastal line, restoring
tourism facilities, initiating tourism based livelihoods, and marketing promotions of the destinations are notable components in the
short term recovery phase. Sustainable redevelopment of tangible
assets and community resettlement are highlighted in long-term
recovery phase. Community participation is vital during both planning and implementation stages. Economic and social feasibility

REVIVAL OF TOURISM IN SRI LANKA FOLLOWING THE DECEMBER 2004 INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI

studies of the projects should be considered mandatory. Re-assessment of enforced disaster mitigation actions and long term disastermitigation actions with expert opinions is advisable. Vital tacticalsafety improvement actions must be installed to improve the security and guarantee the safety of tourists. Further, following identification of vulnerable areas for natural disasters, the potentiallyaffected community and officials can be educated with workshopsof disaster management actions. Further, disaster management
education can be included in the school education curriculum todisseminate the knowledge of disasters and precaution actions tothe community.
(iv) Monitoring Phase: Regular monitoring of tourism indicators should be adopted to make sure the targets are achieved.
Furthermore, studying the revival practices adopted in neighbourhood countries for necessary amendments of the disaster management framework should be also spotted. International exchange ofbest practices and knowledge sharing after the recovery processcontribute to capacity building at all phases (ADB, JBIC & WB,
2005).
9. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONSThe December 2004 IOT was an unforeseen and intolerable
disaster to the tourism in Sri Lanka. The country was never ranked
as a disaster prone destination; thus, prior preventive actions forsuch a destructive event were not installed, even in the most susceptible tourist industry. Tourists are mostly concerned with thesafety and security in choosing tourist destinations in disaster
stricken regions. Yet, in Sri Lanka very little has been invested to
improve the safety or to formulate a disaster management framework; no early warning system in place up to now (UNWTO,
2005a). The nation long term recovery process including tourism
sector rehabilitation process was adhered to the opinions and guidance of novelty group members in TAFREN; the technical knowhow was demanding, no foreign experts were consulted at a single
stage.
Decline in tourist arrivals due to prevailing security and political instability was the biggest challenge in the tourism recovery
process (GoSL, 2006). Furthermore, inequitable distribution ofrecovery assistance, lack of centralized coordination, non-existenceof a priori disaster management plan, re-generation of livelihoods,
damage assessment, negative perception created among potential
tourists, and increase the knowledge on disasters among public
were major challenges. Community participation was hardly
observed in tourism recovery process. The practice used by the
ADB funded project to redevelop Andaman region provides aneffective mechanism to get the participation of victims and otherstakeholders. However, it was found that after two years, tourist
arrivals have reached the pre-tsunami level except the Westernmarket. Readiness and variation of marketing promotion tack ticks(not only media campaigns) would have shortened the time duration of recovery on Western tourists.
Tourism industry is different to other industries as there is aneed getting back to business faster, due to tourists having to returnfor economic rehabilitation (Cooray, 2006). In that context, a93

proper strategically robust relief and recovery planning framework
is inevitable. The first goal of recovery is to return to previous
level of economic function and social network. Pre-disaster experience, otherwise proper disaster management plan will immensely
guide in rapid recovery. Community participation is crucial for a
successful recovery process together with the role of the national
government. Negative trends before a disaster usually worsen therecovery process; these include declining economies, social problems, and political instability etc. Equity of resource allocation is
also important; the minor groups which are highly affected get lessattention and delayed in the revival process while the giants in theindustry better integrated into economic and social network arewell supported, thus recover faster. The national political context
is crucial for delivery of resources equally among the victim
groups and enterprises. Outside resources are vital, but local decision making should be prioritized. To resume tourists to destinations shortly, marketing promotions should be considered parallel
to physical reconstruction, community rehabilitation, and livelihood rebuilding. Moreover, the safety of the destination should be
strengthened to reassure security of tourists. Careful attention
should be paid on above mentioned features in the recovery
process after a disaster. Regular monitoring and evaluation of the
progress is necessary to realize goals attained and are to be
improved. Above generalized features are the resultants of thedetailed descriptive analysis performed on the recovery processadopted in tourism sector, Sri Lanka. The comprehensive disastermanagement framework, which is supported with pros and cons of
the strategies adopted in the tourism revival campaign in Sri Lanka,is the major contributory of the research in practical arena of
tourism. The phasing system and centric discern recovery activities in the proposed framework eliminates the complexity ofresource allocation and administration malfunctions following an
unforeseeable future devastation.
The developed disaster management framework based on Sri
Lanka tourism revival process can be considered for preparing
strategies or action plans in Hyogo Framework for Action ; the10-year plan to make the world safe from natural disasters adopted
by 168 governments at the World Conference of Disaster
Reduction held in Kobe, Japan, 2005. Moreover, this study would
be a valuable feedback for revising the Sri Lanka Disaster
Management Act No. 13 of 2005. Further, comparison of therevival strategies and practices of the here mentioned disaster management framework with two well-accepted tourism disaster management frameworks developed by Faulkner (2001) and Ritchie(2004) is subjected to future research. Faulkner and Vikulov(2001) applied Faulkner’s (2001) model to Katherine Floods inAustralia and there by a more applicable framework to flood situations was produced. The extended study will validate the strategies
of Faulkner’s (2001) and Ritchie’s (2004) models for a revival
process of a massive tourism disaster caused by giant tsunami
waves.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors would like to acknowledge the contribution of
Mr. Dharshan and Mr. Chandana Munasinghe of SLTB for providing the database and all necessary information regarding the94

VASANTHA WICKRAMASINGHE AND SHIN-EI TAKANO

tourism sector in Sri Lanka. Further, thankfulness is extended to
Mr. Ken Balendran and Mr. Indhra Kaushal Rajapaksa of
Reconstruction and Development Agency (formerly TAFREN) for
their guidance and Mr. Ravi Theaver of UNDP in Sri Lanka for the
information and the telephone interview. Authors gratitude to Dr.
Jayalath Edirisinghe of University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka forsharing his experience in tsunami reconstruction planning andactive participation in immediate relief operation. The authors
would like to thank anonymous reviewers for their comments toimprove the quality of the paper.
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