OSIPP Discussion Paper : DP-2014-E-008

East Asian Financial Cycles:
Asian vs. Global Financial Crises
November 12, 2014
Akira Kohsaka
Professor, School of International Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University

Jun-ichi Shinkai
Specially Appointed Researcher, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka
University[Keywords] Business cycles, Financial Conditions Index (FCI), Asian Financial Crisis, Global
Financial Crisis, East Asia
[JEL code] E32, E42, E44[Abstract] We examine the role of financial shocks in business cycles in general and in financial
crises in particular in East Asia (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand) since the 1990s.
Estimating a Financial Conditions Index, we found that financial shocks explain most of
business downturns in all the economies in the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997-98, butthat the effects of financial shocks are diverse across economies in the Global Financial Crisis(GFC) in 2008-09. In the GFC, the financial shocks played a relatively minor role in Indonesia,
Malaysia and Thailand, while it played a similarly dominant role in Korea. Among individual
financial channels, risk factors related to volatile external financial inflows were mostsignificant in all the economies in the AFC and in Korea in the GFC.
Corresponding author: Akira Kohsaka, E-mail: kohsaka@kwansei.ac.jp. Kwansei Gakuin University.
We gratefully acknowledge financial support from JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory
Research (23653067). We are grateful to the attendees in 2013 JEA spring Meeting and in the 14th
EAEA conference for their useful comments.

11. Introduction
The collapse of Lehman Brothers triggered sudden stops of financial flows to advanced
economies even without the original sin, and then their resulting recession spilled over to emerging
markets and other developing countries as well. Literature has discussed two types of transmission
channels of international business cycles, i.e. through trade and financial flows. Particularly, in thelatter, increased risk aversion causes sudden stops and/or capital flow reversals (Milesi-Ferretti and
Tille, 2010), accompanying liquidity shortage and falling asset prices as well as decreases in credit
supply (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2010, Chudik and Frantzsher, 2011, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011).
The magnitude of the spillovers to peripheral economies depends on their macro-financial andother conditions. The larger, for example, the credit expansion and/or asset price increases before thecrisis, the stronger the spillover through financial channels (Berkmen et al., 2009, Lane andMilesi-Ferretti, 2011, and Llaudes et al., 2010).
It is well known that East Asia, particularly Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, experienced
one of the worst sudden stops together with harsh output losses during the Asian Financial Crisis(AFC) in 1997-98. Despite the above significant spillover effect of the Global Financial Crisis(GFC), however, East Asia appears to be least affected among peripheral economies. In fact, IMF(2012) argues that some emerging market economies including East Asia proved to be resilient
against the GFC because of their policy frameworks and their policy space for monetary and fiscal
stimulus.
The purpose of this paper is to examine how precisely different are the role of financial channels
in explaining business cycles of East Asia between these two crises. We construct a Financial
Condition Index (FCI) to summarize the impact of financial shocks on business cycles in thesecountries. Focusing on recessions, which include economic crises such as the AFC and the GFC, weshow how financial some cycles are. That is, some business cycles led dominantly by financial
shocks can be called as financial cycles. Furthermore, we clarify which financial market such as
credit, stock, bond, property, and foreign exchange markets plays a leading role in financial cycles.
Credit supply, asset prices, interest rates and exchange rates interact one another, of course. We try todisentangle their interdependence and to identify which financial market plays a leading role in
impacting real economic activity in the four economies in the recent period.
We will show that the AFC was a financial cycle and literally a financial crisis in that it was arecession caused dominantly by financial shocks in all the four economies in East Asia. But it is not
the case for the GFC when global shocks played a significant role. We will show this by looking at
the role of financial shocks in business cycles in East Asia since the 1990s. Among individual
financial markets, the foreign exchange market and the stock market are shown to play dominantroles to generate recessions in the four countries throughout the previous two decades. Particularly, it
will be suggested that the exchange rate has reflected changes in risk perception rather than in2relative prices.
Below, in Section 2, we briefly discuss our methodology, a VAR model and data used to estimate a
FCI. Estimating the VAR model, Section 3 shows the results of estimated impulse response functions
and the variance decomposition of the real economic growth. In Section 4, we show the estimatedresults on the impact of the FCI, and the individual financial markets as well as global shocks on
business cycles, and discuss how different are the roles of financial shocks in the two crises in East
Asia. Finally, Section 5 concludes.

2. Estimation Methodology
2.1．Methodology
FCI is an index for financial conditions, which combine the impacts on the real economy offinancial variables such as interest rates, asset prices, and exchange rates. As a broader measure offinancial conditions, the FCI is used to predict business cycles and measure the impact of financial
conditions on the real economy. 1
To construct an FCI, weights of financial variables need to be estimated. 2 We follow a VAR
method in Swiston (2008) to construct FCI in this paper. 3 First, we estimate a VAR model withfinancial variables and real GDP and then calculate structural shocks of the financial variables.
Second, by combining the estimated financial shocks and the parameters of the impulse responses as
weights, an FCI is constructed as follows:

1

The Bank of Canada first constructed the Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) as a weighted average of
exchange rate and short term interest rate with a macroeconometric model in order to show a monetary
policy stance. Then the MCI was expanded to include additional financial variables such as a long terminterest rate, a stock price, a real estate price and so on, and became an FCI.

2

In prior studies, three types of methods had been used. They are a large-scale macroeconometric model(Beaton et al. 2009), reduced-form aggregate-demand equations such as IS and Phillips curves (Gauthieret al., 2004; Goodhart and Hofmann, 2001; Montagnoli and Napolitano, 2004), and a VAR model(Gauthier et al., 2004; Goodhart and Hofmann, 2001; Guichard et al., 2009). Regressing financial
variables on the real economy, these methods use their relative impacts as weights.
Recently, there are two new methods that are a dynamic factor model (DFM) method (English et al.,2005; Hatzius et al., 2010; Matheson, 2011) and a Swiston’s VAR method using impulse response
function as weights (Beaton et al., 2009; Duttagupta and Barrera, 2010; Shinkai, 2012; Swiston, 2008) ,both of which are more dynamic in setting the weights.
3
Swiston’s VAR method has two advantages. First, we can avoid an endogeneity problem. Since
financial market and real economic variables are essentially endogenous, if we assume that the financial
variables are exogenous in the estimation model for FCI, the estimators would be biased. Second, because
the parameters of impulse responses are used as weights, we can analyze dynamic responses of the real
economy to financial shocks.

3

m
 n

FCI t = ∑  ∑ wij u tj−i 
j =1  i = 0
where wij is a parameter for an i quarters-lagged impulse response of the real GDP growth rate to a
shock of a financial variable j and ut-ij is a structural shock of a financial variable j in period t.
Namely, FCIt is a combination of impulse response parameters multiplied by shocks across time lags.
In this paper, assuming that financial shocks persist for two years (eight quarters), we set 8 lags for
the FCI.

2.2．Data
For the FCI, we select representative financial variables in view of their availability, the usage inprior studies and the statistical significance of the impulse responses of real GDP growth to theirshocks. Here, we use five financial variables, i.e. credit volume, stock price, property price,exchange rate and short-term interest rate.
We use real credit to the private sector by financial institutions as credit volume for the credit
market 4 and a stock price index as stock price for the corporate stock market both from IMF’s
International Financial Statistics (IFS). As property price, we use a land price for Indonesia, ahousing price for Korea, and a combined land and housing price for Thailand from the CEIC
database. A housing price is available for Malaysia, but only after 1999, so that we drop it. Also, we
use a real effective exchange rate as exchange rate and a money market rate for a short-term interest
rate from the IFS and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
As variables for the real economy, we use a real GDP growth and CPI inflation from the IFS and
Abeysinghe and Rajaguru (2004). A crude oil price (West Texas Intermediate ($)) downloaded fromthe IFS is included simply to avoid the “price puzzle” (Sims (1992)). Finally, in order to exclude theimpact of common global shocks, we add the real GDP growth of the United States and her Federal
Fund rate in our estimation.

2.3. VAR ModelIn this subsection, we estimate a VAR model with 10 variables (oil price, US GDP growth, US
Federal Fund (FF) rate, real effective exchange rate, short-term interest rate, credit volume, stock
price, property price, inflation, real GDP growth) for Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand and a 9 variable
VAR model without property price for Malaysia. We use quarterly data over the periods from
4

Prior studies such as Lown and Morgan (2006) and Bayoumi and Melander (2008) use lending
attitudes of financial institutions instead of credit volume, because the former better reflects demandand supply conditions of the credit market. We use credit volume simply due to the data availability
for the sample countries, while it is available since 2002 in Korea.
4

1994Q1 to the most recent available one, which are 2011Q2 for Indonesia, 2010Q4 for Korea,
2011Q4 for Malaysia and 2011Q2 for Thailand.
Structural shocks and impulse responses of the financial variables are calculated using theCholesky decomposition, when the order of variables in VAR is important. We place, first, US GDP
growth, the FF rate and the oil price as the most exogenous because it would be least affected by thefinancial conditions and business cycles in the four countries. Then, since our goal is to examine theeffects of shocks through financial channels on the real GDP growth, the next are the financial
variables and the last are the real economic variables, assuming that they are most endogenous.
Among the financial variables, the first is real exchange rate because it is affected mostly by theinternational economic environment, and the next the short-term interest rate because it is expected
to be significantly affected by the central bank―although it is not a policy rate itself. And thenfollow credit volume, the stock price and the property price which are affected by the domestic
business cycles.
All the variables are seasonally adjusted and short-term interest rate, credit volume, stock priceand property price are deflated by CPI. The Augmented Dicky-Fuller and the Phillips-Perron tests
show all the variables as I(1), so that we take their log differences except for the interest rate. The
AIC shows that 1 lag is appropriate for the VAR model.

3. Estimation Results 1: Impulse responses and variance decomposition
3.1. Impulse responses
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of the real GDP growth to financial shocks in the four
countries estimated over each sample period. Central solid lines stand for dynamic responses of the
GDP growth and upper and lower dotted lines for confidence bands with one standard error,
calculated by the Monte Carlo Integration.
>>Figure 1 around here
Expected effects of financial shocks on the GDP growth are generally as follows. First, a shock ofreal exchange rate appreciation decreases the real GDP growth through expenditure switching
between domestic and foreign goods. Second, a positive shock of the stock price increases the real
GDP growth by stimulating domestic investment as well as consumption. Third, a positive shock of
the short-term interest rate puts a brake on the GDP growth by constraining investment and durable
consumption. Finally, both a property price increase and a positive shock in credit volumes increase
the GDP growth by stimulating investment through increased collateral values in the former andthrough reduced credit constraints in the latter.
As Figure 2 shows, however, these expected effects are sometimes not ensured in the four
countries in practice. Let us discuss individual cases. First, the real exchange rate appreciation has a5positive, instead of negative, effect on the GDP growth in all the four cases and it is very significant.
One possible interpretation of this paradoxical result is that the effect picks up the impact of actualand possible sudden stops of foreign financial inflows to these economies rather than expenditureswitching or that the former overwhelms the latter. This effect appears to reflect changes in risk
perception so that real exchange rate depreciation (appreciation) is a proxy for increasing (declining)risk aversion. In fact, currency depreciation often happens simultaneously with sudden stops offinancial inflows and resulting output decline in these countries.
Second, positive shocks of the stock price, property price and credit volume show more or lesssignificantly positive impacts on the GDP growth as expected. Third, the expected negative impactsof short-term interest rates are sometimes found only with lags. Indeed, impulse responses of the
GDP growth to the short-term interest rate are unstable across time and country.
To sum, the estimated impulse responses are mostly usual as far as domestic financial variables
are concerned, but those of real exchange rates and part of short-term interest rates in the very short
run show some features specific to small open emerging market economies susceptible to possible
sudden stops of foreign financial flows. In the next section we use these estimated impulse response
functions to discuss the relative role of financial shocks in financial crises as extreme cases ofbusiness cycles.

3.2. Variance decomposition
Before discussing the role of financial shocks in business cycles, we show the results of the variancedecomposition of forecast errors on the real GDP growth over the whole sample period. The values
in Table 1 show (average) relative contributions of the financial variables and other global variables
to forecast error variances of the real GDP growth at the 10th quarter after a shock.
>>Table 1 around here
In the case of Indonesia, in explaining the GDP growth variance, the (paradoxical) real exchange
rate shock contributes more than the own shock, then followed by the short-term interest rate shock.
Other financial variables, i.e. credit volume, stock price and property price, as well as global
variables are minor contributors, explaining as little as 2-3 % of the total variance each.
In the other three countries, the real exchange rate shock also explains a significant part of thetotal variance of the GDP growth, but it is less than that of the own shock. Other financial variableshocks play a part, i.e. a short-term interest rate shock in Indonesia and Thailand, and a stock priceshock in Korea and Malaysia. Credit volume and property price shocks are relatively minor
contributors to the variance of the GDP growth. Note, further, that global shocks through US GDP
and FF rate also contribute to growth variances of these economies to a non-negligible degree.
To sum, our impulse response estimates suggest major roles of the real exchange rate, theshort-term interest rate and the stock price shocks in generating business cycles, and then asecondary role of global shocks, but minor ones of the credit volumes and property price shocks
6throughout the sample period in the four countries. Note that, since we use ex post credit volumes
for the credit market, the VAR model may fail to capture credit supply shocks, so that the role of thecredit market for business cycles may be understated.

4. Estimation Results 2: Financial Cycles in East Asia
Now, using the VAR results obtained in the previous subsection, we calculate the FCI bycombining the estimated exogenous shocks of the financial variables with their impacts on the real
GDP growth, i.e. the estimated parameters of the impulse responses, as weights. Namely the FCI
measures the total effect of exogenous financial shocks on the real GDP growth.

4.1. Casual observations
Figure 2 shows the FCI calculated as above and the actual GDP growth. Both are expressed infour-quarter moving averages. Shadowed periods in the Figure represent recessions or contraction
phases (from peak to trough) of business cycles, where peaks and troughs are identified by applying
the method of Harding and Pagan (2002). Estimated recession periods and their characteristics suchas duration, amplitude, slope and average growth rate, are given in Appendix Table 1.
>>Figure 2 around here
The FCI in Figure 2 demonstrates the role of financial shocks in the business cycles quantitatively.
Their positive (negative) values mean positive (negative) impacts on the real GDP growth. Amongsome recession periods, let us focus on two crisis periods, i.e. the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in
1997-98 and the Global Financial Crisis in 2008-09.
Casual observation shows apparently very close movements between actual GDP growth rates and
FCIs in all the four countries in the case of the AFC. This implies that the AFC was driven
dominantly by financial shocks, i.e. the AFC was a financial cycle. Then, if we turn to the GFC, we
see some close movements between the two series in the case of Korea and Malaysia, to a lessdegree in Thailand and none in Indonesia, suggesting that the GFC is not a financial cycle at least inIndonesia, and probably in Thailand.
As a matter of fact, when we look at not only crisis periods, but also other recession episodes in
Figure 2, we find diverse roles of financial shocks in affecting the real GDP growth. For example, inIndonesia, the negative FCI in the recession in 2005-06 was as large as that in the GFC, but the real
economic activity was not affected much. In Malaysia, the FCIs in the 2000-01 recession appeared
larger than that in the GFC, whereas the former recession appeared fairly financial but the latter did
not. Only in Korea, the FCI in the GFC was almost as large as that in the AFC, while the FCIs in the
2000-01 (dot-com) recession and in the 2002-04 (credit-card scandal) recession were comparablylarge.
7

4.2. Cumulative effects of financial shocks
Now, beyond casual observation, we try to quantify FCIs relative to actual GDP growth in Table 2.
The first two columns in Table 2 show the amplitude of actual GDP growth from peak to trough andthe cumulative total effect of financial shocks, i.e. cumulative FCI during identified recessions
including the two crisis periods. In all the four countries, the FCI dominated actual (negative) GDP
growth in the AFC. In contrast, in the GFC, the FCI was significantly smaller than actual negative
GDP growth in Malaysia and Thailand, and GDP slowdown itself was small in Indonesia, while the
FCI overwhelmed actual negative growth in Korea.
>>Table 2 around here
The other five columns represent the cumulative effects of individual financial variables on the
GDP growth. We can summarize what Table 2 suggests as follows:
In Indonesia, the short-term interest rate played the most dominant role generating a financial
cycle in the AFC. In fact, the impact of this factor (-6.0%) was almost as large as the total economic
slowdown (-6.2%). It probably reflected not only the degree of monetary tightening, but also
increased risk premium in the market. While Indonesia witnessed a negative GDP growth in the GFC,
the slowdown (-0.5%) was limited in scale, which was smaller than that in the 2001 recession. In theGFC, the real exchange rate played a relatively dominant role (-1.9%) larger than that (-0.5%) in theAFC, reflecting increased risk aversion. Similarly, real depreciation shocks played a relatively majorrole impacting on the GDP growth in the 2005-2006 recession.
Korea was among the hardest hit by the AFC and the deterioration of her FCI (-10.5%) explained
more than a real economic slowdown (-3.6%). Major contributors to the slowdown were stock prices(-5.0%) and the real exchange depreciation (-4.8%). In contrast to the other three countries, only
Korea experienced a harsh deterioration of the FCI (-6.3%) again in the GFC. Then, the major
individual contributor is the real exchange depreciation first (-5.7%). In two other recession episodes
in the early 2000s, financial shocks in terms of the FCI were -3 to -6 %, which were larger thanactual cumulative GDP growths and the stock price contributed most to drive down the real growth.
Both Malaysia and Thailand suffered from harsh slowdown in the GDP growth (around -5%) in
the AFC, whose main drivers were the real exchange depreciation, the short-term interest rate, andthe stock price. In contrast to the AFC, even though they suffered from the GFC in terms of GDP
growth (-3.4% each), financial variables were not major contributors to the slowdown, when thestock price drove down the GDP growth to some extent but financial risks did not work out this time.
In other recession episodes in the early 2000s, the stock price mostly contributed to real growth
slowdown.
To sum up, while the slowdown in actual GDP growth was relatively smaller in the GFC than thatin the AFC, the role of financial variable shocks was very different in the two Crises. The AFC was a8

financial cycle where the financial risk proxied by the real exchange depreciation and/or the
short-term interest rate had an overwhelming negative impact on the GDP growth in all the four
countries. Whereas, the GFC did NOT cause a financial cycle in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand,and only Korea suffered from similar impact to that in the AFC. The impact of the GFC spilled overto Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, but not very much to Indonesia. The FCI or the total effect offinancial shocks on the GDP growth showed relatively minor contribution to real economic
slowdown in Malaysia and Thailand. The GFC caused a financial cycle only in Korea.
As to the relative role of individual financial variables, the stock price is an important financial
channel second to the risk factor across the four countries in the two crises. In the case of otherrecession episodes in the 2000s, however, our results suggest that the stock price turns out to be mostdominant financial channel to affect real economic slowdown in the four countries.

5. Global Shocks
So far, we focused on the effects of financial shocks on the real economy. But, emerging
economies have been susceptible to business cycles in advanced economies. Particularly in the GFC
business cycles of emerging economies are pointed out to be highly correlated with those ofadvanced economies (IMF, 2013). Accordingly, in this section, we focus on the shocks of global
variables and examine their impact on East Asia together with FCI.
Looking at impulse responses (Figure 3), a US GDP shock has significantly positive impact on
GDP growth in East Asia except for Indonesia. It persists less than half a year, though. FF rate shock
has significantly negative instantaneous impact in Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia, but significantly
positive impact after the shock in Korea and Malaysia. The variance composition (Table 1) showsthat US GDP shock explains 0.5%, 7.3%, 9.3% and 9.2% of variations in GDP growth in Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, respectively, while FF rate shock explains 3.3%, 8.4%, 4.5% and0.8% each. This suggests that US GDP shock is relatively strong in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand,
while FF rate shock is relatively strong in Korea and Malaysia.
>>Figure 3 around here
Figure 4 demonstrates the effect of global shocks together with FCI. It shows that, while global
shocks did not influence much (or even positively affect) on GDP growth in the AFC, they depressed
it in the GFC. In fact, Table 3 shows that their cumulative effects are -0.63%, 2.06%, -0.69% and4.97% in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand in the AFC, while they are 0.02%, -1.44%,-2.08% and -2.16% in the GFC. In contrast to the AFC, negative global shocks are larger in the GFC
in East Asia, particularly in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, whose cumulative effects are as large as
60% of total shocks. Exception is Indonesia, where global shocks are small throughout the whole9period. Looking into the global shocks in the GFC, negative impacts come mainly from US GDP
shocks, while FF rate shocks moderate negative shocks through monetary easing.

>>Figure 3 around here>>Table 3 around here

6. Robustness Check
In this section we examine the robustness of the results of the previous sections. 5 We have used
the Cholesky decomposion to calculate financial and other shocks and impulse response functions.
This method requires us to place exogenous variables before endogenous ones so that the order ofvariables may affect the estimation results. In the previous subsections we place global variables first,
then financial variables, i.e. exchange rate, short-term interest rate, credit volume, stock price andproperty price, and finally real variables, i.e. inflation and real GDP growth. Here below, in order tocheck the robustness of our previous results, we estimate FCI using VAR models with different
orders of variables within the three groups of variables as well as alternatively using the method ofgeneralized impulse responses.
First, we estimate FCI with alternative orders of financial variables and then by placing realvariables prior to financial ones. In the former, impulse responses and FCI do not change much, but
the impacts of some individual financial shocks change particularly with exchange rates andshort-term interest rates. This is probably because their shocks are very large in concentrated
quarters so that their impacts are generally hard to be disentangled. In the latter case, FCI isestimated to be smaller as expected because financial shocks are not initially supposed to affect GDP
growth, but general patterns remain the same. When using generalized impulse responses, impulse
responses, FCI and individual effects all show the similar patterns to those in the previous sections.
We next examine alternative global variables. In previous sections we include US GDP and theFederal Fund (FF) rate as global shocks. Here, we use GDP-weighted averages of G6 advanced
countries GDP and interest rates of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and US. Instead of interest
rates, we also use stock prices (US and G6) as controls. The results show patterns generally similar
to the previous results, while the effects of stock price shocks in the GFC become a little weaker. All
in all, we conclude that our examination on the order of variables and the use of alternative global
variables show the robustness of our estimation results in the previous sections.

7. Concluding Remarks
5

The results are provided upon request.
10

We have examined the role of financial shocks in business cycles in general and in financial crises
in particular in East Asia (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand) since the 1990s. Estimating a
Financial Conditions Index, we found that financial shocks explain most of business downturns in all
the economies in the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997-98, but that the effects of financial
shocks are diverse across economies in the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008-09. In the GFC,
the financial shocks played a relatively minor role in Indonesia and Thailand, while it played asimilarly dominant role as in the AFC in Korea and Malaysia. Among individual financial channels,
the risk factor related to volatile external financial inflows were most significant in all the economies
in the AFC and in Korea and Malaysia in the GFC, while the stock market remains another main
conduit of financial cycles in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand more in the AFC, but less in the GFC.
We estimated a Financial Conditions Index by constructing a VAR model to consider the impactof financial market shocks on business cycles. Even within this limited framework, we need toaddress a few issues to solidify our results. First, our selection of financial variables could be
problematic. It is well known that credit volume sometimes fails to reflect a true demand and supply
condition in the credit market, some interest rates are regulated, and exchange rates are not always
market-determined. Second, our interpretation of the puzzling effect of real exchange rates may notnecessarily appropriate. It may have suggested that we simply could not distinguish crisis periods
from normal ones. Third, this line of argument may lead us to possible structural breaks of a VAR
model. These and other problems in mind, we would like to leave them for the future research.
One other not least important and interesting point is why are this difference in responses in thesecountries between the AFC and the GFC. Is it really because they have become resilient in the past
decade as suggested by IMF (2012) or because they have become more financially internal-oriented
than in the previous decade? Korea, who has dutifully followed the IMF guidance and then the mostfinancially open economy among the four, could suggest some good answer to the question, but wewill remain to see for the future research, again.

11

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Table 1: Variance Decomposition: Relative Contribution to real GDP growth (%)
US GDPFF rateOil price

Exchange
rate

Short-term
rate

Creditvolume

Stock
price

Property
price

Inflation

Real GDP
22.8

Indonesia

0.5

3.3

6.6

41.5

14.6

2.8

1.4

2.3

4.1

Korea

7.3

8.4

2.6

14.7

0.2

4.2

19.2

0.6

0.5

42.3

M alaysia

9.3

4.5

12.7

7.8

3.0

4.3

19.4

4.3

34.7

Thailand

9.2

0.8

4.2

19.8

12.0

2.8

9.6

1.1

36.2

4.2

This table shows the results of variance decomposition that shows the relative contribution of foreign and financial
shocks to real GDP growth over the whole period. We show the values of 10 quarters after a shock.

14

Table 2: Cumulative Effects of Financial Shocks on GDP Growth (%)
GDP
Recession

Exchange

Short-term

CreditFCIgrowthProperty
Stock Price

Rate

Rate

VolumePrice

A. Indonesia
1997:4-1998:4

-6.19

-8.21

-0.52

-5.97

-1.31

-0.22

-0.19

2001:3-2001:4

-0.81

1.89

0.22

1.12

0.33

-0.83

1.05

2003:3-2003:4

-0.05

2.19

2.72

-0.43

-1.01

0.29

0.62

2005:1-2006:2

-0.50

-3.58

-8.06

4.10

0.60

0.63

-0.85

2008:4-2009:2

-0.50

-2.17

-1.85

0.73

-0.05

-0.07

-0.92

1997:3-1998:3-3.61-10.53

-4.76

-0.02

-0.41

-5.00

-0.34

2000:4-2001:4

-1.54

-2.93

3.37

-0.01

-0.73

-6.61

1.05

2002:3-2005:1

-1.00

-6.21

-0.75

0.00

-0.73

-3.32

-1.41

2008:2-2009:1

-2.42

-6.29

-5.66

0.02

0.34

-0.96

-0.03

1998:1-1998:4

-4.46

-4.42

-3.89

2.12

-0.07

-2.58

2000:4-2001:4

-2.13

-4.79

2.09

-0.54

0.43

-6.76

2002:4-2003:1

-0.22

-0.23

-0.79

1.10

0.48

-1.03

2004:4-2004:4

-0.69

0.53

-0.33

-0.01

0.38

0.48

2006:2-2006:3

-0.02

-0.14

0.32

-0.12

-0.33

0.00

2008:2-2009:1

-3.38

-1.52

0.62

-0.43

-0.32

-1.39

1996:3-1998:3-5.24-10.30

2.65

-6.12

-1.06

-4.76

-1.00

2000:2-2001:3

-0.89

-1.09

-1.62

3.20

0.73

-4.02

0.62

2008:2-2009:1

-3.38

0.89

0.65

-0.32

0.09

0.35

0.12

B. Korea

C. Malaysia

D. Thailand

This table shows the estimated cumulative effects of financial shocks and their components on the real GDP growth during eachrecession. We define recession as from peak to trough on de-trended GDP, which were determined by method in Harding and Pagan(2002). Bold types show the largest negative effect in the recession. GDP growth is the amplitude of GDP growth rate from peak totrough.

15

Table 3: Cumulative Effects of Global Shocks on GDP Growth (%)
GDP

Global
FCI

growthUS GDPFF rateshocksA. Indonesia
1997:4-1998:4

-6.19

-8.21

-0.63

-0.78

0.15

2001:3-2001:4

-0.81

1.89

-0.93

-0.14

-0.79

2003:3-2003:4

-0.05

2.19

0.14

0.22

-0.08

2005:1-2006:2

-0.50

-3.58

1.02

-0.67

1.69

2008:4-2009:2

-0.50

-2.17

-0.12

0.56

-0.68

1997:3-1998:3-3.61-10.53

2.06

2.62

-0.56

2000:4-2001:4

-1.54

-2.93

1.90

0.84

1.06

2002:3-2005:1

-1.00

-6.21

1.59

2.50

-0.90

2008:2-2009:1

-2.42

-6.29

-1.44

-2.03

0.59

1998:1-1998:4

-4.46

-4.42

-0.69

0.12

-0.81

2000:4-2001:4

-2.13

-4.79

3.21

0.88

2.32

2002:4-2003:1

-0.22

-0.23

0.48

-0.01

0.48

2004:4-2004:4

-0.69

0.53

-0.87

0.11

-0.98

2006:2-2006:3

-0.02

-0.14

0.81

1.24

-0.44

2008:2-2009:1

-3.38

-1.52

-2.08

-3.49

1.41

1996:3-1998:3-5.24-10.30

4.97

4.77

0.20

2000:2-2001:3

-0.89

-1.09

1.27

0.36

0.92

2008:2-2009:1

-3.38

0.89

-2.16

-2.44

0.28

B. Korea

C. Malaysia

D. Thailand

This table shows the estimated cumulative effects of global shocks and their components on the real GDP growth during eachrecession. We define recession as from peak to trough on de-trended GDP, which were determined by method in Harding and Pagan(2002). GDP growth is the amplitude of GDP growth rate from peak to trough.

16

Figure 1: Impulse Responses of real GDP growth
A. Indonesia

B. Korea
Stock price shock

Exchange rate shock
2.5
2.0

Stock price shock

Exchange rate shock

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.5
0.5

0.5

1.0
0.5

0.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

-0.5

-0.5

-0.5

-1.0

-1.0

-1.0

0.0
-0.5
-1.0
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0

1

Short-term rate shock

2

3

4

5

6

7

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0

1.5

1.5

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

-0.5

-0.5

-0.5

-0.5

-1.0
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

4

5

6

7

5

6

7

5

6

7

5

6

7

-1.0
0

7

3

0.5

-1.0
0

2

Property price shock

1.5

-1.0

1

Short-term rate shock

Property price shock

1.5

1

Credit volume shock

2

3

4

5

6

7

5

6

7

0

1

2

3

4

Credit volume shock

1.5

1.5

1.0

1.0

0.5

0.5

0.0

0.0

-0.5

-0.5

-1.0

-1.0
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

0

7

1

2

3

4

C. Malaysia

D. Thailand

Exchange rate shock

Stock price shock

Exchange rate shock

Stock price shock

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

-0.5

-0.5

-0.5

-0.5

-1.0

-1.0

-1.0

-1.0

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

0

7

1

Short-term rate shock

2

3

4

5

6

7

0

1.5

1.0

1.0

1.0

0.5

0.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

-0.5

-0.5

-0.5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3

4

0.5

-1.0

-1.0

2

Property price shock

1.5

0

1

Short-tem rate shock

1.5

-1.0
0

1

Credit volume shock

2

3

4

5

6

7

5

6

7

0

1

2

3

4

Credit volume shock

1.5

1.5

1.0

1.0

0.5

0.5

0.0

0.0

-0.5

-0.5

-1.0

-1.0
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0

1

2

3

4

This figure shows the impulse responses of the real GDP growth to financial shocks. A solid line in the center is a point estimate of the impulse responses and top and bottom dottedlines are confidence bands with 1 standard error.

17

Figure 2: FCI and Business Cycles

A. Indonesia

B. Korea

3

4

2

3

1

2

0
1
-1
0
-2
-1

-3

-2

-4
-5

-3
1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

1994

1996

1998

C. Malaysia

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2006

2008

2010

D. Thailand

3

3
2

2

1
1

0

0

-1
-2

-1

-3
-2

-4

-3

-5
1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

This figure shows the estimated FCI (a red line) and the actual real GDP growth (a black line), both in four-quarter moving averages. Shadowed periods in the figure represent
contraction phases (from peak to trough) of business cycles determined by a method in Harding and Pagan (2002). The value of FCI is a magnitude of the effect of changes infinancial conditions on the real GDP growth, showing how large a positive (negative) change in financial conditions increase (decrease) the real GDP growth.

18

Figure 3: Impulse Responses of real GDP growth
A. Indonesia

B. Korea

USGDP shock

USGDP shock
1.5

2.0

1.0
0.5

1.0

0.0
0.0

-0.5

-1.0

-1.0
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0

1

2

FF rate shock

3

4

5

6

7

4

5

6

7

5

6

7

5

6

7

FF shock

1.5

1.5

1.0

1.0

0.5

0.5

0.0

0.0

-0.5

-0.5

-1.0

-1.0
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0

1

2

C. Malaysia

3

D. Thailand

USGDP shock

USGDP shock

1.5

1.5

1.0

1.0

0.5

0.5

0.0

0.0

-0.5

-0.5

-1.0

-1.0
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0

1

2

FF rate shock

3

4

FF rate shock

1.5

1.5

1.0

1.0

0.5

0.5

0.0

0.0

-0.5

-0.5

-1.0

-1.0
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0

1

2

3

4

This figure shows the impulse responses of the real GDP growth to financial shocks. A solid line in the center is a point estimate of the impulse responses and top and bottom dottedlines are confidence bands with 1 standard error.

19

Figure 4: FCI, Global Shocks and Business Cycles

A. Indonesia

B. Korea

3

4

2

3

1

2

0
1
-1
0
-2
-1

-3

-2

-4
-5

-3
1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

1994

1996

1998

C. Malaysia

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2006

2008

2010

D. Thailand

3

3
2

2

1
1

0

0

-1
-2

-1

-3
-2

-4

-3

-5
1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

This figure shows the estimated global shocks (a blue line), the actual real GDP growth (a black line), and FCI (a red line), all in four-quarter moving averages. Shadowed periods inthe figure represent contraction phases (from peak to trough) of business cycles determined by a method in Harding and Pagan (2002). The value of global shocks is a magnitude ofthe effects of changes in US economic conditions (rea GDP and FF rate) on the real GDP growth, showing how large a positive (negative) change in US economic conditions increase(decrease) the real GDP growth.

20Appendix Table 1: Contraction Phases
Duration

Amplitude

Slope

Average1997:4-1998:4

5

-6.19

1.24

-2.75

2001:3-2001:4

2

-0.81

0.40

0.67

2003:3-2003:4

2

-0.05

0.03

1.12

2005:1-2006:2

6

-0.50

0.08

1.34

2008:4-2009:2

3

-0.50

0.17

1.13

1997:3-1998:3

5

-3.61

0.72

-0.74

2000:4-2001:4

5

-1.54

0.31

0.94

2002:3-2005:1

11

-1.00

0.09

1.05

2008:2-2009:1

4

-2.42

0.60

-0.01

1998:1-1998:4

4

-4.46

1.11

-1.89

2000:4-2001:4

5

-2.13

0.43

0.43

2002:4-2003:1

2

-0.22

0.11

1.58

2004:3-2004:4

2

-0.69

0.35

1.39

2006:2-2006:3

2

-0.02

0.01

1.46

2008:2-2009:1

4

-3.38

0.84

0.34

1996:3-1998:3

9

-5.24

0.58

-0.84

2000:2-2001:3

6

-0.89

0.15

0.78

2008:2-2009:1

4

-3.38

0.84

-0.22

A. Indonesia

B. Korea

C. Malaysia

D. Thailand

This table shows the contraction phases (recession) defined as from peak totrough, which was determined by a method in Harding and Pagan (2002).
Recessions with the Asian financial crisis in Korea were modified because it
included obvious expansion period. Duration, Amplitude, Slope and Average
stand for the number of quarters in recession, a difference of growth rates
between peak and trough, a GDP growth decline per quarter and the average
GDP growth rate during recession, respectively.

21