Economic Development, (A)symmetries and Local Geopolitics:
A New Approach to Studying Cross-Border Cooperation in Europe1
Margarita Castañer, Jarosław Jańczak and Javier Martín-Uceda*
Abstract
The article maps model(s) of cross-border cooperation in Europe by investigating the
INTERREG program as a source of data to evaluate the intensity of collaboration and agency in thearea. The authors view cross-border cooperation as an instrument for overcoming economic
underdevelopment, often in the context of (a)symmetries. They also use a geopolitical approach tointerpret their findings, despite the fact that these are local and regional relationships and are sometimes
considered outside the regular purview of geopolitics. Qualitative and quantitative investigation of fourinternal borders in the European Union leads to several conclusions. First, the INTERREG program is
the main instrument and source of funding for stimulating cross-border cooperation within theEuropean Union. Second, when similar types of European cross-border projects are investigated, mostof them reveal a concentration of project leaders and project partners on only one side of the border.
This can be explained with administrative models revealing structural asymmetries as well as therural/urban nature of the territorial units, uncovering an imbalance in potential on both sides of theborder.
Introduction
The European Union is at a defining moment marked by a number of features, including thecrisis of legitimacy. This is not a recent situation but it is definitely intensifying,2 with more and morecitizens feeling distant from a process of integration3 that seems stripped of the ideas considered partof the European normality: peace, overcoming borders that arose from conflict, democratization,
 Margarita Castañer is a geographer working of regional planning and cross-border cooperation. She is Associate

Professor at Girona University, Spain. She can be contacted at: mita.castaner@udg.edu Jarosław Jańczak is apolitical scientist working of European integration processes and cross-border cooperation. He is Associate
Professor at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Poland, and European University Viadrina, Frankfurt(Oder), Germany. He can be contacted at: jaroslaw.janczak@amu.edu.pl Javier Martín-Uceda is a geographer
working in political and urban geography, and in cross-border cooperation. He is PhD candidate at Girona
University, Spain. He can be contacted at: javier.martin@udg.edu
1 This paper is part of the ongoing research project “Cooperación Transfronteriza en Europa, una geopolítica deescala local. Análisis en cinco países europeos de buenas prácticas para la integración y el desarrollo global”(TRANSBORDEURCOP). CSO2015-67124-R (MINECO/FEDER,UE), lead by APTA (Environment andPlanning Analysis and Planning) research group, in the Geography Department, Universitat de Girona, Spain.
2 Desmond Dinan, Neil Nugent and William Paterson, eds. The European Union in Crisis (London: Palgrave,2017).
3 Claudio Castro Quintas, “Assessing the Democratic Deficit in the EU: Towards a Participatory Approach,” RIPS
14:1 (2015): 63–82.
DOI: 10.14943/ebr.9.1.67

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Eurasia Border Review < Article >alternatives to a world of polarized superpowers, competitiveness with a human face. At the same time,borders (still) do matter in Europe and are often considered the most important components of political,
economic and social processes there.4 The continent’s history is a (never-ending) process of border
creation, border redefinition and border shifting, only recently supplemented by border erosion.
Centuries of bordering, 5 visible in territorial conflicts, population resettlement, nation-state
consolidation and the domination of Westphalian principles,6 have been in many places replaced by debordering tendencies7 together with the expansion of the European integration project,8 especially as
embodied in the European Communities and later in the European Union.9 Fueled by neofunctional
paradigms (especially – as understood in European integration studies – barrier elimination and a linear
character),10 continental unification processes seek to create a space of peace and stability by means ofpractical solutions, starting with facilitation of free trade and the creation of benefits in economic
development.11 Gradually, these paradigms spilled over into other fields of integration, including otherfree flows, but also high politics, and were covered with an institutional layer, often supranational innature.12
At the same time borders very quickly became a part of these processes, playing a crucial rolein European integration at several levels.13 First, border erosion embodied the elimination of barriersin the European Union, enabling the creation of common spaces and free flows of people, goods,
services and capital. 14 This was translated locally into the tenet of creating new development
opportunities.15 Second, borders became laboratories of European integration where the European

4 Melina Pereira Savi, “How Borders Come to Matter? The Physicality of the Border in Gloria Anzaldúa’s

Borderlands/la Frontera,” Anu. Lit., Florianópolis 20:2 (2015): 181–191.
5 Alessandro Vitale, “Myths of Territory and External Borders in the EU’s Contemporary Idea and Europe in the

Middle Ages,” Acta Universitatis Lodzensis.Folia Geographica Socio-Oeconomica 26 (2016): 63–80.
6 Benno Teschke, “Theorizing the Westphalian System of States: International Relations from Absolutism to
Capitalism,” European Journal of International Relations 8:1 (2002): 5–48.
7 Jarosław Jańczak, “Symmetries, Asymmetries and Cross-Border Cooperation on the German–Polish Border.
Towards a New Model of (De)Bordering,” Documents d’Anàlisi Geogràfica (2018): 509–527.
8 Liam O’Dowd, “The Changing Significance of European Borders,” Regional and Federal Studies 12:4 (2010):
13–36.
9 Stephen Okhonmina, “States without Borders: Westphalia Territoriality under Threat,” Journal of Social Sciences
24:3 (2010): 177–182.
10 Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation State. Functionalism and International Organisation (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1964).
11 Philippe C. Schmitter, “Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neofunctionalism,” Journal of European Public Policy
12:2 (2005): 255–272.
12 Jürgen Bast, “Deepening Supranational Integration: Interstate Solidarity in EU Migration Law,” European
Public Law 22 (2016): 289–304.
13 Annekatrin Niebuhr, “Spatial Effects of European Integration: Do Border Regions Benefit above Average?”
HWWA Discussion Paper 307 (2004).
14 Mirza Totić and Ibrahim Totić, “The Common Market: Paradigm of the Integration Processes within theEuropean Community and the European Union,” Actual Problems of Economics 11 (2013): 342–551.
15 Rolf Bergs, “Cross-Border Cooperation, Regional Disparities and Integration of Markets in the EU,” Journal of
Borderlands Studies 27:3 (2012): 345–363.

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Margarita Castañer, Jarosław Jańczak and Javier Martín-Uceda

project was tested in everyday life on a manageable scale by common Europeans.16 Third, they allowedsocial and cultural flows between European nations, cultures and languages, (re)creating in-between
spaces through the exchange of ideas, solutions and understandings. At the same time, it quickly
became apparent that political will and the functional disappearance of borders was not enough toaccelerate these three tendencies and transform them into a sustainable process. 17 Cross-bordercooperation (CBC) requires additional financial and institutional support as the divisive power of stateborders has been much stronger than expected. The key initiative in creating that support was proposed
and implemented by the European Union in the form of the INTERREG program.18
The aim of this article is to outline the model(s) of cross-border cooperation in Europe by
investigating the INTERREG program as a source of data, evaluating its intensity and mapping theactors involved. The authors view cross-border cooperation as an instrument for overcoming economic
underdevelopment, often in the context of (a)symmetries. They also use a geopolitical approach tointerpret their findings,19 despite the fact that these relationships are often local and regional, outside
the regular purview of geopolitics.20 They assume that the globalization process induces a rethinking
of geographical scale,21 strengthening the relationship between global and local arenas. Using that new
rationale, regional and local actors become more active and play key roles in globalization.22 On one
hand, cities and regions create their networks, along with their own strategies to compete, and play arole in global relations.23 On the other hand, individuals act on a local scale with geopolitical logics,
with the idea of “controlling” territory.24 That does not mean denying the state or even the global scale,the usual subjects of geopolitics, but rather proposing a similar approach to understand local andregional developments.25
This paper consists of six sections. After this introduction, the main theoretical considerations
are outlined, followed by a short methodological debate. The studies of empirical findings are presented,
and interpreted in the following two sections, before a brief conclusion is offered.

16 Common Europeans as category indicates normal citizens of the member states in contrast to the European

Union’s political elites and bureaucrats. Alberto Gasparini, “European Border Towns as Laboratories ofDifferentiated Integration,” ISIG Quarterly of International Sociology 4 (1999–2000).
17 Antoni Durà and Xavier Oliveras, “Recent Dynamics in European Cross-Border Cooperation: towards a New
Period?” Paper presented during Regional Studies Association Annual International Conference (Brussels, 2010).
18 Eduardo Medeiros, “Is there a Rise of the Territorial Dimension in the EU Cohesion Policy?” Finisterrac 51:103(2016): 89–112.
19 Joan Nogué and Joan Vicente, Geopolítica, identidad y globalización (Barcelona: Ariel, 2001).
20 Oriol Nel.lo, Aquí no! Conflictes territorials a Catalunya (Barcelona: Empúries, 2003); Peter Taylor, Political
Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality (London: Longman, 1989).
21 Peter Taylor and Colin Flint, Geografía política: economía mundo, estado-nación y localidad (Madrid: Trama,
2002).
22 Joan Nogué and Joan Vicente, Geopolítica,identidad y globalización (Barcelona: Ariel, 2001).
23 Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy (Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, cop. 2006).
24 Philippe Subra, Géopolitique locale. Territories, acteurs, conflits (Paris: Armand Colin, 2016).
25 Philippe Subra, Géopolitique de l’aménagement de territoire (París: Armand Colin, 2007).

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Eurasia Border Review < Article >Theoretical and Conceptual Considerations
As the authors of this article work in various disciplines, it is based on several theoreticalconsiderations related to economic development, state sovereignty and geopolitical perspectives, aswell as an (a)symmetry framework. These considerations are briefly presented in the following sections
to provide readers with the perspectives used here for empirical study.
The INTERREG: Borders and Economic Development
The traditional underdevelopment of border regions, which suffered from both peripherality
and remoteness from national centers, as well as isolation from the neighboring spaces on the otherside of the border, was to be reversed (alongside border erosion in the European Union) by pushingthese regions into (dynamic) economic progress using their border potential. 26 Numerous studies,
especially recent ones, have been devoted to studying the interdependence between the de-bordering
process, external financial support for cross-border cooperation, and regional development.27 Most ofthem make the neofunctional claim that the elimination of barriers leads to better use of the economic
potential of underdeveloped regions.28 Many studies also stress, however, that border erosion is not a
sufficient condition for progress – due to additional obstacles (mismatched language, culture, legal
systems, etc.), these processes need to be enhanced and externally supported.29
Despite the fact that cross-border cooperation has been tolerated, supported or even initiatedin many European states by national authorities (especially in Scandinavia or Franco-German relations),
only the European integration processes has created the new quality here. This is true with regard to
the financial and legal framework as well as the massive amount of participation in cross-borderpolicies, reflected for example in one Euroregion encompassing all the continental borders.
Consequently, the European Union has been employing a set of instruments focused oncohesion policy, especially the INTERREG program. This has been especially relevant for regional
policy due to the fact that, as declared by the European Commission, the European Union has 38
internal border regions (covering in practice all the internal borders), which represent 37.5 percent of
26 Jarosław Jańczak, “Borders and Borderlands as a Source of Development Potential: Towards a New Paradigm

in Europe,” in Studies of Economic and Social Processes. Society and Economy in the twenty-first Century, ed.
Jerzy Babiak (Środa Wlkp.- Poznań: The Great Poland University of Social and Economics, 2014–2015), 65–86.
27 See, among others: Luis De Sousa, “Understanding European Cross-Border Cooperation: A Framework forAnalysis” Journal of European Integration 6:12 (2012); Lina, Diana M. and Bedrule-Grigoruta, Maria Viorica,
Cross-Border Cooperation - A Tool for Regional Development in Europe (March 2, 2009). Accessed August 10,
2018: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1351728
28 Francisco José Calderón Vázquez, “Fronteras intraeuropeas, desactivación fronteriza, cooperación transfronteriza
e instituciones: El caso de La Raya ibérica” Estudios Fronterizos 18:36 (2017); Liesbet Hooghe a and Michael
Keating, “The Politics of European Union Regional Policy” Journal of European Public Policy 1:3 (1994).
29 Eduardo Medeiros “Euro–Meso–Macro: The New Regions in Iberian and European Space.” Regional Studies
47:8 (2016); Juan Manuel Trillo and Rubén Lois “La frontera como motivo de atracción: una breve mirada a lasrelaciones Galicia-Região Norte,” Geopolitica(s) Revista de estudios sobre espacio y poder 2:1 (2011); Henk van
Houtum and Anke Strüver “Borders, Strangers, Doors and Bridges,” Space and Polity 6:2 (2002).

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Margarita Castañer, Jarosław Jańczak and Javier Martín-Uceda

the EU population. Border regions are distinguished based on NUTS 30 three regions bordering anational limit. Consequently, INTERREG’s main aim is to support cross-border development by
reducing costs and overcoming other obstacles to development that result from the existence of a border.
Moreover, all border regions are entitled (and take advantage of the opportunity) to use the INTERREG
for more intensive cross-border cooperation.
The INTERREG Community Initiative was established in 1990 with several cross-borderobjectives: planning and applying common action plans, creating measures to increase common
information, and creating institutional and administrative structures to consolidate cross-bordercooperation.31 Since that first edition of the initiative, five other programs have been developed, one
for each multiannual financial framework.32
After 2000, the INTERREG initiative was integrated into structural funds until 2014, when it
began to operate under its own regulations.33 From the 1.1 billion ECUs that it had in 1990, the budget
has now grown to more than 10.1 billion Euros, which is 2.8 percent of the Cohesion Policy budget.34
It is divided into three strands, A, B and C. The first, A, is designed for cross-border cooperation
programs between adjacent regions (NUTS 3).35 It aims to establish cross-border social and economic
centers through common development strategies and projects. The second, B, focuses on transnational
cooperation and involves national, regional and local authorities to promote better integration throughthe formation of large groups of macro-regions. Finally, C is earmarked for interregional cooperation,building networks to develop good practices and facilitate the exchange and transfer of experiences
throughout the entire European Union.36 Projects developed within the INTERREG framework are
related to challenges common to the majority of the local and regional partners, especially economic
development, the environment, health, transportation, and social cohesion or research.
As already mentioned, INTERREG projects have been a key element of economic
development in European borderland regions. Change in the meaning of borders in Europe, especiallyafter the states where they are located entered the European Communities/Union, transforms borders
into an opportunity for border administrative units. However, people still experience social cohesiondifficulties and integration problems across the border in the majority of cases on the Old Continent.
At the same time, issues of underdevelopment and asymmetry are supposed to be (at least partly) solved
through the INTERREG initiative and the projects stemming from this program. Criticism of
30 Common Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS)
31 María Isabel Heredero de Pablos and Blanca Olmedillas Blanco, “Las fronteras Españolas en Europa: de

INTERREG a la cooperación territorial Europea,” Investigaciones Regionales 16 (2009): 191–215.
32 Birte Wassenberg, Bernard Reitel, Jean Peyrony and Jean. Rubió, Territorial Cooperation in Europe - A
Historical Perspective (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015).
33 Eduardo Medeiros, Cross-Border Cooperation in EU Regional Policy: a Fair Deal? (Lisboa: Universidade deLisboa, 2009).
34 DG Regio. European Comission. (2018)35 Mission Operationelle Transfrontaliere. Accessed June 17, 2018: http://www.espaces-transfrontaliers.org/en/
resources/european-programmes/cross-border-cooperation/cross-border-cooperation/
36 Comunicación De La Comisión Al Consejo Y Al Parlamento Europeo. Impulsar el crecimiento y la cohesión enlas regiones fronterizas de la UE (Brussels: European Commission, 2017), 1–18.

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Eurasia Border Review < Article >INTERREG, however, should not be forgotten. Numerous studies, especially those with a long-term
perspective, claim that the relationship between INTERREG financial support and the degree ofcooperation created,37 as well as the dynamics of economic development, are not clear.38
Still, these considerations lead to the question: what type of project dominates the INTERREG“portfolio” in various regions of the European Union? And what does this structure mean for thedevelopment principle?
Cross-Border Cooperation and European Geopolitics at the Local Level: From Fracture to Suture?
The academic (like the non-academic) literature on borders – presenting the concept of borderitself, border history, the present and future developments – is indeed enormous, especially thatconcentrating on geopolitical perspective.39 The reflection on borders within the context of European
integration and inside the European Union is similar.40 Despite the original reason behind European
integration being conflict prevention, the Union was also created in an attempt to limit the negative
effects and the influence of borders on the continent. Consequently, integration results not only inpolicy coordination between states, it can also be seen as a gradual process of cession of statesovereignty to the common institutions, which in turn would deepen their democratic legitimacy. Thisis, in practice, a process of border dissolution.
Undoubtedly, between 1951 (when the European Coal and Steel Community united six
countries) and the present, this approach has had its difficulties.41 Especially recently, and opposed
most understandings to the integration process, the reappearance or reinforcement of borders as anadministrative and territorial reality (often with a strong ideological component, as seen during theimmigration crisis that started in 201542) is more and more noticeable.43 In classic political geography,
37 Patricia Garcia-Duran, Toni Mora and Montserrat Millet, “Measuring the Impact of EU Support for Crossborder

Regional Cooperation,” Journal of Contemporary European Research 7:3 (2011): 359.
38 Eduardo Medeiros, Cross-Border Cooperation in EU Regional Policy: a Fair Deal? (Lisboa: Universidade deLisboa, 2009), 24.
39 Claude Raffestin, “Elements pour une théorie de la frontière,” Diogène 34:134 (1986): 3–21; Michel Foucher,
Fronts et frontières. Un tour du monde géopolitique (París: Fayard, 1991); James Anderson and Liam O’Dowd,“Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality: Contradictory Meanings, Changing Significance,” Regional Studies
33:7 (1999): 593–604.
40 James Anderson, Liam O’Dowd and Thomas. Wilson, New Borders for a Changing Europe: Cross-Border
Cooperation and Governance (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Gerard Delanty, “Borders in a Changing Europe:
Dynamics of Openness and Closure,” Comparative European Politics 4 (2006): 183–202; Jean Baptiste
Harguindéguy, Frontière en Europe: un territoire? Coopération transfrontalière francoespagnole (París:
L’Harmattan, 2007); Francisco Letamendia, “Cooperación transfronteriza Europea: regulación historia y trabajo,”
Documents d’Anàlisis Geogràfica 56:1 (2010): 71–88.
41 Anthony Cooper and Chris Perkins, "Borders and Status-Functions: An Institutional Approach to the Study ofBorders," European Journal of Social Theory 15:1 (2012): 55–71.
42 Stefania Panebianco, “The Mediterranean Migration Crisis: Border Control versus Humanitarian Approaches,”
Global Affairs 2:4 (2016): 441–445.
43 Jarosław Jańczak, ed. De-Bordering, Re-Bordering and Symbols on the European Boundaries (Berlin: Logos
Verlag, 2011).

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the border was present in the form of an organic analogy: as the skin of the state, the fundamental
indicator of its health and its expectations.44 Leaving this analogy behind, it is true that the vitality ofborders within the European Union is a symptom not so much of good health but rather the opposite, asymptom of wider problems that affect the very nature of the European project. In this sense, the crossborder policies of the Union are not simple territorial policies, but have an obvious geopolitical function:
they transform spaces that have experienced fracture and have symbolized fragmentation into spacesthat overcome this division and also symbolize the Union.45 If borders serve as a visual representationof political fracture and its historical course, the European Union wants them to represent the suture as
well.
The previous considerations about local geopolitics should also be reviewed here, withgeopolitics understood as “political approach to social–spatial analysis,” considering cross-bordercooperation as a “tool for socio-spatial control.”46 Cross-border cooperation also connects local andcontinental dimensions of governance where, due to the model of multi-level governance, power isshared and regional actors become an element in the geopolitical strategies of state systems.47 And at
the supranational level, the EU – when supporting cross-border cooperation – describes harmonizedspaces as being a part of the European project, placing its discourse within geopolitical logic.48 Crossborder geopolitics, however, reveal tension between this EU narrative and states’ interest in preserving
territorial sovereignty.49 Moreover, regions and cities play key roles in the construction of border areas
and the de-bordering process50. European politics give sub-regional actors a chance to take part in theinternational scenario, and states try to benefit from it. The state becomes another geopolitical actor,
with the necessary practices and instruments. After years of isolation caused by the limit effect of the
44 Markus Pekmann, “Bulding Governance Institutions Across European Borders,” Regional Studies 33:7 (1999):

657–667; Markus Pekmann, “Cross-Border Regions in Europe: Significance and Drivers of Regional CrossBorder Co-Operation,” European Urban and Regional Studies 10 (2003): 153–171; Markus Pekmann,“Construction of New Territorial Scale: A Framework and Case Study of the EUREGIO Cross-Border Region,”
Regional Studies 41:2 (2007): 253–266; James Anderson; Liam. O’Dowd and Thomas Wilson, New Borders for a
Changing Europe: Cross-Border Cooperation and Governance (London, Frank Cass, 2003); Jean Baptiste
Harguindéguy, “Cross-Border Policy in Europe: Implementing INTERREG III – A, France-Spain,” Regional andFederal Studies 17:3 (2007): 317–334; Xavier Oliveras,; Antoni Durà and Markus Pekmann, “Las regiones
transfronterizas: balance de la regionalización de la cooperación transfronteriza en Europa (1958–2007),”
Documents d’Anàlisis Geogràfica 56:1 (2010): 21–40.
45 Jarosław Jańczak, “Integration De-scaled. Symbolic Manifestations of Cross-Border and European Integrationin Border Twin Towns,” Journal of Borderlands Studies (2018).
46 Marcelo Lopes de Souza, “Urban Eco-Geopolitics,” City 20:6 (2016): 779–799.
47 Wojciech Kazanecki, Géopolitique des regions. Linkage between French Geopolitics and Regional GovernanceConference paper, CEEISA Sixth Annual Conference “Global and Regional Governance – European Perspectives
and Beyond” (2007).
48 James Derrick Sidaway, “Rebuilding Bridges: A Critical Geopolitics of Iberian Transfrontier Cooperation in a
European Context,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 19:6 (2001).
49 Gabriel Popescu, “The Conflicting Logics of Cross-Border Reterritorialization: Geopolitics of Euroregions in
Eastern Europe, Political Geography 27 (2008): 434.
50 Todd Hataley and Christian Leuprecht, “Determinants of Cross-Border Cooperation,” Journal of Borderlands
Studies 33:3 (2018): 319.

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Eurasia Border Review < Article >border, the process of integration at European internal borders, the possibility of participating ininternational affairs for local and regional actors,51 and specific policies like INTERREG create all theconditions for the development of CBC along the European borders.
Finally, it is appropriate to point out that this geopolitical perspective – in the historicalmoment of regression or, at least, a slowdown of the process of European integration and thereappearance of strong nationalist and statist forces – would appear especially suitable.
The considerations presented above provides the foundations for an analysis of cross-borderspaces, not only per se and as the object of specific community policies, but also as territories that areespecially innovative and indicative of the much more general logics of European unity and cohesion.52
Consequently, a geopolitical reading of local cross-border cooperation is of great significance,53 andthe analysis of concrete projects (including the logic of action of the agents involved, the alliances andconflicts that arise among them – public and private, local, regional or local, of different political
options) must also be taken into consideration. These projects reveal power relations at the local level,mapping the de facto domination of regions from one side of the border over their partners on the other.
In this way – and INTERREG provides data for empirical analysis here – cross-border projects say a
lot about power relations, not between states, but primarily between regions, including those not in
conflict, but in a state of cooperation. Consequently, a question arises: What makes the position of someregions stronger? When trying to explore this issue, the authors decided to investigate one of themarkers of diversified power apparent in cross-border cooperation: (a)symmetries.
(A)symmetries
This paper refers to the concepts of symmetry and asymmetry. They serve as a framework tounderstand the previously described tendencies. The wide range of literature referring to asymmetry,however, does little to conceptualize it. This literature includes security studies (asymmetric conflicts)54
geography (development and economic relations), 55 international relations (elements of states’
dominant position)56 and anthropology (components of social hierarchies).57 In the European Union’s
development policies, this concept is often applied to situations where the asymmetry is to be changed58
51 Alexander Sergunin and Pertti Joenniemi, “Paradiplomacy as a Sustainable Development Strategy: The Case of

Russia’s Arctic Subnational Actors,” Eurasia Border Review 4:2 (2014).
52 Matteo Berzi, “The Cross-Border Reterritorialization Concept Revisited: the Territorialist Approach Applied to
the Case of Cerdanya on the French-Spanish Border,” European Planning Studies 25:3 (2017): 1–22.
53 Béatrice Giblin, Nouvelle géopolitique des régions françaises (París: Fayard, 2005).
54 Timothy L Thomas, “Deciphering Asymmetry’s World Game,” Military Review July-August (2001).
55 Guichonnet Paul, Raffestin Claude, Géographie des frontiers (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1974)
56 Robert Kupiecki, “The Poland-United States Security Relations in the Light of Asymmetry Theory,” Przegląd
Strategiczny 9 (2016): 31–48.
57 Jutta Lauth Bacas and William Kavanagh, eds., Border Encounters: Asymmetry and Proximity at Europe’s
Frontiers (Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books, 2013).
58 Bernard Reitel, “Asymétrie des formes et différentiels morphologiques dans l’agglomération transfrontalière deBâle : des propriétés de ville-frontière?” in Villes et Frontières, eds. Bernard Reitel et al. (Paris: Economica,
Anthropos, col. Villes, 2002), 84–98.

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Margarita Castañer, Jarosław Jańczak and Javier Martín-Uceda

or overcome,59 marking asymmetry as something negative, problematic or simply temporal. Sometimes,
however, asymmetry is considered a precondition of cross-border cooperation, especially in cases of aneofunctional view of cross-border integration where asymmetric resources supplement each other.60
The question here, however, refers primarily to the very nature of (a)symmetries: the authors
claim that further conceptualization is necessary. They propose distinguishing between a mismatch ofboth sides of the border with regard to structures (cultural, political, administrative, etc.) and resources(human, financial, etc.). Consequently, they categorize this mismatch as manifested within two
dimensions: structural asymmetries and imbalanced potentials.
The former is linked to structural elements and describes different origins and models oforganization of the units being compared. Thus, it pictures different mechanisms, procedures orschemes of management in neighboring border structures. Jussi Laine claims that “in sub-nationalcross-border contexts, the [structural] asymmetry is regularly manifested by differences in competences,
central-local relations, budgetary cycles, administration hierarchies, the roles of elected officers andpublic servants, and by the extent of central government engagement.”61
Imbalanced potentials, on the other hand, will be associated with different levels of resources,
as manifested by GDP, development, human resources of the key actors involved in the cross-borderprocesses, etc., on both sides of the border.
Both structural asymmetry and imbalance in potentials will be employed in this investigation
to frame and interpret cross-border projects with regard to the elements being studied. To make use ofthis framework, it is necessary to mark (a)symmetries in cases being investigated with regard to thesetwo dimensions. In each case, however, structural asymmetry can be high or low, as can imbalance inpotentials. This results in a matrix of four possible model-situations in (a)symmetries. Moreover, how
do these two concepts determine the structure of cross-border cooperation? Do more resources
contribute to a more active approach? Do specific cultural-political models stimulate activity? In thefirst case, is it simply a higher level of GDP that makes partners from that side of the border more
dynamic in taking the initiative and becoming project leaders? And in the second case, is there any
specific model, e.g. based on decentralization, that may enhance involvement?
Conceptual Setting
The above considerations, in the framework of the article’s aims, result in questions – asmarked in previous sections – about: 1) the categorization of the cross-border projects supported by
INTERREG in the context of their role in economic development; 2) the power relations of regions as
revealed by the spatial distribution of INTERREG projects; and 3) the role of (a)symmetries in this

59 Christophe Sohn, “El papel ambivalente de las fronteras en la construcción de las metrópolis transfronterizas en

Europa. Los casos de Basilea, Ginebra y Luxemburgo,” Documents d’Anàlisi Geogràfica 56:1 (2010): 167–184.
60 Jussi Laine, “Border Paradox: Striking a Balance between Access and Control in Asymmetrical Border Settings,”
Eurasia Border Review 3:1 (2012): 51–79.
61 Ibid.

75Eurasia Border Review < Article >process. After merging the three perspectives presented above, the authors present the following
hypotheses.
First of all, projects in thematic areas crucial for reducing the underdevelopment of borderregions shall dominate in a cross-border cooperation “portfolio.” Second, one could expect some of theregions (or more precisely actors from some of the regions) to be more eager and active in both creating
and implementing projects than their neighbor regions. In asymmetric relationships (and incircumstances of de-bordering), this could lead to the domination of one region by another. At the sametime, asymmetries on the regional level can be structured differently than at the state level forneighboring units. Finally, the authors assume that GDP is the main indicator of imbalance in potentials,
and models of (de)centralization reveal the most important aspect of structural asymmetry. This is
expected to translate into a more or less dominant position in cross-border cooperation.
Methodology and Case Selection
To answer these questions and to verify their hypotheses, the authors decided to combine
various methodological approaches. As their work involves different territorial and academic fields, it
expected, on the one hand, that different authors establish their own channels for information about anddocumentation of cross-border cooperation. On the other hand, formal structures and common content
have been introduced to allow for analysis and comparison. The authors consequently searched andanalyzed bibliographies and general documentation on cross-border cooperation in Europe with regard
to specific European Union programs. They then prepared geographical, socio-economic andinstitutional profiles of all border territories covered by the common framework. Finally, empiricalstatistical research was implemented. The research team searched for data on cross-border cooperation
for all the investigated areas, using the INTERREG program, due to its nature and character as
described in the previous sections. Because they are the main instrument of the European Union’s crossborder policies, INTERREG projects seem to be an analytically convincing and academically reliable
source of information, especially because of their dominant position on the CBC “market” in Europe.
They also provide a more general picture of CBC cross-border cooperation in Europe. Due to thelimitations of this analysis, the period 2007–2013 was chosen. It represents the most current andcomplete time slot with data available for analysis as projects from the next Multiannual Budgetary
Framework, 2014–2020, are still being prepared and implemented.
To create a comprehensive picture of cross-border cooperation at the borders underinvestigation, statistical treatment of the data was needed to elaborate common databases that allow theuse, mapping, joint analysis and comparative analysis of the cases. The quantitative approach was
supplemented with qualitative methods, using fieldwork in the form of interviews. Data for each border
was collected based on Operational Programs for the 2007–2013 period. Within the legal order of theEuropean Union, INTERREG projects constitute public information that is available for interested
individuals and institutions. Practically, however, it was often necessary to ask for data from several
institutions, especially from national ministries responsible for development policies. This quantitative
approach was supplemented by a qualitative one in the form of interviews conducted between July76

Margarita Castañer, Jarosław Jańczak and Javier Martín-Uceda

2017 and March 2018. The interviews were semi-structured and addressed politicians, members of civilsociety, INTERREG project partners and academic scholars – three on the German-Polish border, fouron the Portuguese-Spanish border and four on the Spanish-French border.
The methodology used in this analysis was developed and tested in a previous research projectfocused on the Spanish-French 62 border and carried out by the APTA (Environment and Planning
Analysis and Planning) research group.63 Here it was used to create a database of three tables related
to common, cross-border projects. 64 Using the geographic codes in the database, we employedcartographic analysis to help understand the results.
To sum up, both direct and indirect, as well qualitative and quantitative, sources have beenused in the research. This combination was required due to the breadth and diversity of the field ofstudy.
For this analysis, an empirical look was taken at specific borders in Europe. To create adiversified sample, the authors searched for cases representing varying lengths of European Union
membership, location in various parts of the continent (and consequently various cultural-politicallegacies), and a wide spectrum of economic development. Given the statistical data available, four
examples were selected: the borders between Portugal and Spain, Spain and France, Austria and Italy,
and Germany and Poland65 (Figure 1).
Consequently, the analysis tested cross-border spaces that affect seven European Union
member states. These spaces and states have notable historical and contemporary differences; therefore,
direct or immediate comparison is impossible unless standardized data – as offered by the INTERREG
co-financed projects – is used. Using this data means that careful analysis of the extent to which thesame starting intentions and – to a large extent – similar instruments provide similar or diverse results
is methodologically and conceptually possible. Consequently, the research deals with the borders
between the states listed above. To continue with the analysis, a short presentation of the chosen cases
seems necessary to provide context.
The Portuguese-Spanish border is about 1,214 kilometers long and represents a legacy of greatstability (despite the historic conflict around the town of Olivenza). However, geographical elements
62 Jaume Feliu, Mateo Berzi, Joan Vicente, Mita Castañer and Rafel Llussà, “Análisis de los proyectos y actorestransfronterizos españa-francia en el período 2007–2013, Geographicalia 63–64 (2013): 75–93.
63 For more information and examples about the methodology: Jaume Feliu, Matteo Berzi, Joan Vicente, Mita
Castañer and Rafel Llussà, “Analysis of Cross-Border Projects between France and Spain 2007–2013.
Stakeholders and Territorial Impact,” European Journal of Geography 4:4 (2013): 33–46.
64 The information about each project was developed in the different table, such as the complete name, the leader,
all the partners that take part in a project and funding. Each partner was assigned a geographic code. The first tablecontains general information, such as the name, the leader, the funding and the geographic code of cross-borderprojects. The second table holds information on all the partners participating in the projects, all the stakeholders
and their geographic codes. The last table lists the territories where the projects have a direct impact (territorial
unit where it was implemented, generalized to the NUTS3 level – the impact of the project is often more extend
then the location of the project partner), also with the geographic code of each territory.
65 For the last case, Germany-Poland, the data represents (due to the difficulties in receiving information fromrespective institutions) only the northern section of the border, including Mecklenburg-Vorpommern / Brandenburg– Zachodniopomorskie.

77Eurasia Border Review < Article >Figure 1: Studied INTERREG 2007–2013 Cross Border Project Areas
Source: The authors

facilitate real or potential conflicts, especially around the use of shared rivers (although it is clearly amatter of state-scale interactions). This area’s common cultural heritage again explains theconsolidation of cross-border exchange. Galicia and northern Portugal have become a functional
space66 with an articulated urban network that strengthens economic and social relationships.67 Bothstates entered the European Communities in 1986 and required strong support for development. The
southern and western regions of Spain are less advanced as measured by GDP per capita whencompared to the rest of the country. At the same time, Spanish Galicia is the most advanced of all
regions bordering Portugal. When comparing the development of the border regions, the differences
are more visible in the north (in favor of Spanish provinces), and are more balanced in the central andsouthern regions, with a similar GDP per capita.68 As a semi-federal state, Spain is more decentralized,with regional and local actors equipped with more powers than actors in Portugal, which is a unitarystate.
The Spanish-French border, defined by the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659, is about 656
kilometers long with no major changes over the last 360 years, or virtually no relevant conflicts sincethen. However, particular geopolitical factors of a nationalist nature affect both sides, especially the

66 Rubén Camilo Lois and Antón Carballo, “La frontera hispano-lusa en la actualidad : una visión geográfica,”

Revista de Historiografía 23 (2015): 191–214.
67 Juan Manuel Trillo-Santamaría and Rubén Camilo Lois González, “La frontera como motivo de atracción: una

breve mirada a las relaciones Galicia-Região Norte,” Geopolítica(s) - Revista de Estudios Sobre Espacio y Poder
2:1 (2011): 109–134.
68 All the statistical data in this section are based on the official information collected by the European Union,
Eurostat, GDP at Regional Level. Accessed August 17, 2018: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/
index.php/GDP_at_regional_level#Regional_gross_domestic_product_.28GDP.29_per_inhabitant78

Margarita Castañer, Jarosław Jańczak and Javier Martín-Uceda

Basque and Catalan independence movements69. It is also a border marked physically by the Pyrenees,with few spaces or elements of conflict, where the mountains are an unquestionable physical limit. In
some areas, like the Mediterranean (Catalan Cross-border Area)70and Atlantic (Basque Country) endsof the border and La Cerdanya Valley in the central Pyrenees, interactions are easier. This has led tomore consolidated and functional areas.71 Cultural and historic links are also important and help tomaintain cross-border relations between both sides. A common culture, language and history in thesethree areas also help maintain and develop relationships between both sides of the border.72 After thefall of Franco’s regime and Spain’s entrance into the European Community in 1986, the exchange
became more consolidated. At the regional level (as opposed to the state level), the Spanish side ismore developed when comparing GDP, with higher levels between Basque Country and Aquitaine, andbetween Catalonia and Languedoc-Roussillon. Spain, as previously mentioned, is a semi-federal state,compared with centralized France.
The 430-kilometer long border between Austria and Italy is neither an unstable nor acontroversial frontier today but at the same time is rooted in a history of conflict. It took its present
form after the end of the First World War when the German-speaking region of Tyrol was divided,leaving an Austrian minority south of the border in Italy. A site of irredentist tendencies, the region’shigh level of prosperity resulted in moderation of attitudes and intensive cooperation.73 Additionally,both the attitudes and the cooperation accelerated together with Austria’s entry into the European Union
in 1995. The border is the result of wars and the history of the Austrian Empire, as well as the creationof Italy as a modern state in the nineteenth century. This common history is also an important part of
the Italian side: the Bolzano province, Austrian cultural roots and the German language help to maintainexchanges and mutual interest. At the regional level, GDP is similar on both sides of the border, butreferring to competences is more complicated. While Austria is a federal state, with competences shared
between the national government and the states, Italy is a unitary state, in which regions have legislative
powers but not all at the same level. Five regions, including Trentino-Alto Adige, have special status
with more power than the rest of Italy’s regions, even more than the Austrian states.
Finally, the border between Germany and Poland is currently about 456 kilometers long. In
this case, the adverb currently is necessary, since it is one of the most unstable and tragic borders in the
69 Klaus-Jürgen Nagel and Stephan Rixen, eds. Catalonia in Spain and Europe. Is there a Way to Independence?

(Badan Baden: Nomos, 2015).
70 Antoni Durà and Xavier Oliveras, “La cooperación territorial en el Arco Mediterráneo: una tipología de actoresy temáticas,” Cooperación transfronteriza comparada: Catalunya, Galicia, País Vasco, ed. José Luis de Castro,
Framcisco Letamendía and Francesc Morata (Barcelona: Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus, 2010), 103–120.
71 Juan Creuz Alberdi Collantes, “La cooperación municipal en el Bidasoa: de la acción local al consorcio
internacional,” Lurralde: Investigación y Espacio 29 (2006): 87–113; Matteo Berzi, “Cross-Border Cooperationand Local Development in the Pyrenees. The Case of Cerdanya,” European Journal of Geography 4:4 (2013): 47–
60; Mita Castañer, Jaume Feliu, “L’Eurodistricte Català Transfronterer. Un espai emergent sense marc
administratiu,” Treballs de la Societat Catalana de Geografia 74 (2012): 41–58.
72 Mita Castañer, Jaume Feliu, Obdúlia Gutiérrez, “Llibre Blanc de l’Eurodistricte Català Transfronterer: creació
de projecte i reestructuració territorial,” Documents d’anàlisi geogràfica 57:2 (2011): 281–292.
73 Günther Rautz, “South Tyrolean Autonomy as a Model for Coexistence between Ethnic Groups,” in Autonomies
in Europe: Solutions and Challenges, ed. Zoltán Kantor (Budapest: L’Harmattan 2014), 59–67.

79Eurasia Border Review < Article >continent’s modern history.74 This makes cooperation especially relevant and positions cross-bordercooperation as a very important element of interstate relations, as well as continental processes, as
manifested by the 2004 European Union’s enlargement.75 It is also important to remember the isolationthat Poles and Germans living on the border experienced under communist rule (resulting in culturaland social alienation)76 as well as significant differences in level of development between both states77
reflected in a per capita GDP ratio of 1 to 4 in favor of Germany. At the regional level, however, thisindicator is less striking. Germany represents a decentralized system resulting from a federal statemodel, while Poland is relatively centralized.
The set of cases presented here reveals various legacies of European borders and, consequently,
a variety of types of borders currently within the EU. The cases represent territorial units from founding
states of the European Communities (France and Germany), as well as expansions in 1986 (Spain andPortugal), 1995 (Austria) and 2004 (Poland). At the same time, they are located in the western, eastern,northern and southern parts of the continent and involve partners from the most economicallydeveloped member states, along with those of mid-range and low-level development. As such, thesecases build a research environment where cross-border cooperation as revealed by INTERREG
program can be tested, compared and generalized.
Empirical Results
With the methodology presented above, the authors began their empirical investigation. The
2007–2013 INTERREG projects were statistically analyzed and regularities of cross-bordercooperation were mapped. The data is divided here into two parts for each of the tested borders. First,
to understand the thematic concentration of cross-border initiatives supported by the European Union,
projects and their typologies are studied. Then, to explore the aspect of local geopolitics visible inactors’ agency, the spatial distribution of project leaders and partners is studied.
Project Typology
Analysis of the collected empirical material reveals interesting regularities with regard todominant project types in the borders under investigation (Graph 1). The different circumstances of theinvestigated borders are reflected in diverse socioeconomic realities, but some of the results show
74 Tomasz Kamusella, “The Twentieth Anniversary of the German‐Polish Border Treaty of 1990: International

Treaties and the Imagining of Poland’s post‐1945 Western Border,” Journal of Borderlands Studies 25:3–4 (2010):
120–143.
75 Jarosław Jańczak, „Polityczne i społeczne konsekwencje członkostwa Polski w UE dla granicy i pograniczazachodniego,” in Polska pięć lat w Unii Europejskiej, ed. Stanisław Konopacki (Łódź: Ibidem, 2009), 151–168.
76 Jarosław Jańczak, „Śląska transformacja z perspektywy obrzeży: Goerlitz-Zgorzelec i Cieszyn-Cesky Tesin jako
laboratoria regionalnej integracji europejskiej,” in Śląsk – 10 lat członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej, ed. Rafał Riedel(Racibórz-Wrocław: o-to.pl, 2014), 27–44.
77 James Wesley Scott and Kimberly Collins, “Inducing Transboundary Regionalism in Asymmetric Situations:
The case of the German‐Polish Border,” Journal of Borderlands Studies 12:1–2 (1997): 97–121.

80

Margarita Castañer, Jarosław Jańczak and Javier Martín-Uceda

common patterns. For this methodology, the authors created ten project categories and assigned eachproject to one of them: accessibility and transportation, cohesion and social integration, education andculture, environment, health, local administration, local economic development, regional planning,
research, and security.
Portugal-Spain

Spain-France

Austria-Italy

Germany-Poland

Graph 1: Project Typology in Borders under Investigation
Source: The authors

One of the main results of the analysis is that local economic development is the main type of
project implemented on the investigated borders, except in the German-Polish program, where it is thesecond biggest, very near to the top category (education and culture). The second category, also in all
the borderlands except the Polish-German border, is environment. This reflects the physical reality inthe majority of European borderlands, which are generally natural and rural areas, with mountains orrivers as main elements in dividing countries. The two other main categories are culture and education
in some areas, and accessibility and transportation in others. These results show that underdevelopmentof border areas is still a dominant theme for cooperation and a focus of the European Union’s support.
At the same time, weak social, cultural and linguistic cohesion between communities from both sides

81Eurasia Border Review < Article >is relevant in the case of the borderland with the most difficult legacy, the German-Polish borderland.
This results in a predominance of projects focusing on cohesion and social integration as well as
education and culture in that border area. In addition, the shorter duration of EU membership meansthat accessibility and transportation projects are much more dominant compared to other cases, wheresuch projects were more visible in previous INTERREG budgets. Consequently, both a difficult history
and the length of access to European funds shape project portfolios differently in different border areas.
Still, in all cases studied here, the INTERREG project can be seen as the key instrument in overcoming
underdevelopment, despite the fact that the components of this underdevelopment are manifested
differently in each case.
Project Leaders’ Spatial Distribution
This analysis takes into account not only the type of project, but also the leading actors’
location and the locations of all participating actors. The authors concentrated on this issue because
leading actors in cross-border projects not only have more administrative responsibilities regarding
project organization and management, they also represent more dynamic structures equipped withresources and representing (pro)active attitudes. All the INTERREG projects must have one leading
actor and at least one other actor on the other side of the border.
Analysis of the actors who played roles in different projects was divided into two parts. The
leading actors were studied first, then all the other involved parties. Second, the analysis accounted for
all the partners in the project, not only the leaders. The following graphical presentation of the resultsshows the concentration of actors in territorial units on both sides of the border. The darker the color,the more actors are located in that specific area.

Figure 2: Location of Project Leaders along the Spanish-French Border
Source: The authors82

Margarita Castañer, Jarosław Jańczak and Javier Martín-Uceda

A brief comparison of the situation
pictured in Figures 2 through 5 shows that there
is a common element: a concentration ofleaders on one side, which can be seen along allof the borders. All four borders have one sidewith more leading actors than the other. Thiscan be explained by unbalanced potentials(more leading actors as the result of morehuman/financial resources) or, alternatively, by
structural asymmetries (more leading actors as
the result of specific political-cultural solutions,especially more de-concentrated power). On
both Spanish borders, the Spaniards lead more
projects than the French or the Portuguese(Figure 2 and Figure 3). The same discrepancy
is apparent for Germans compared to Poles(Figure 5) and Italians compared to Austrians(Figure 4).

Figure 3: Location of Project Leaders on the Spanish-Portuguese Border
Source: The authors

Figure 4: Location of Project Leaders along the Italian-Austrian Border
Source: The authors83Eurasia Border Review < Article >Consequently, the differences between countries in terms of administrative structures andpolitical decentralization could be key elements and structural asymmetry the main explanation for thedominance of one side of the border over the other in terms of the number of leaders. Spain andGermany are more decentralized than France, Portugal and Poland. The Trentino Region in Italy has
special powers compared with the other border regions in Italy and Austria. Significant differences incompetences, especially at the regional and local levels, reveal structural asymmetry between partners
that can explain the concentration of leading partners at specific parts of the border.
When looking for unbalanced potentials, no regularity became apparent. However, the authors
identified one additional factor that they had not taken into consideration when designing their research:regional typology. Rural and urban areas have different capacities to lead projects, as we can see in themaps. Szczecin, Poland (Figure 5) or Zaragoza, Barcelona and the Basque urban corridor on the
Spanish-French border (Figure 2) exemplify how urban spaces often have more capacity to leadprojects, in contrast to rural areas. Generally, in areas that are more rural or in the absence of animportant urban center, the regional administration becomes the main leader. Differences in potentials
thus serve as an explanation here but not in the form of measuring GDP at the regional level. They do
suffice, however, when including rural/urban character in scaled-down form.

Figure 5: Project Leaders along the Polish-German Border
Source: The authors

These considerations allow us to analyze the number and spatial location of project partners.
Project Partners’ Spatial Distribution
Another aspect to analyze is the joint participation of all actors, whether or not they are project
leaders. Here again, the authors identified interesting regularities. Again, relationships marked by84

Margarita Castañer, Jarosław Jańczak and Javier Martín-Uceda

dominance of one side of the border are common to all the investigated borderlands.

Figure 6: Project Partner Distribution along the Spanish-French Border
Source: The authors

With the exception of the SpanishFrench border (Figure 6), in the remaining borderareas the countries with more partner leaders also
have more project partners. Again, urban spaces
have more capacity to take part in projects. Herethe situation is even clearer than on the project
leaders’ maps. Regional actors are the main
partners in the more rural spaces, as seen on thePortuguese-Spanish (Figure 7) or Austrian-Italianborders (Figure 8).78
In three cases, the more active side of theborder was clearly marked not only with thepresence of leaders, but also with a concentrationof partners (Figure 7, Figure 8, Figure 9).

Figure 7: Project Partner Distribution along the
Spanish-Portuguese Border
Source: The authors

78 Additionally when comparing project partners distribution to the population one can see that the population

density is similar on both sides of the border (Austrain-Italian, German-Polish cases) or is more lower on the more
dense region (Spainish border regions) – all the data based on the official information collected by the European

85Eurasia Border Review < Article >Figure 8: Project Partner Distribution along the Italian-Austrian Border
Source: The authors

Figure 9: Project Partner Distribution along the Polish-German Border
Source: The authors

Additionally, local authorities are the main actors in the most centralized countries, as in
Poland or Portugal, and regional authorities have more agency in decentralized countries. This

Union, Eurostat, GDP at the MUTS 2 level . Accessed September 22, 2018: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?title=File:Population_density,_by_NUTS_2_regions,_2007_(1)_(inhabitants_per_km%C2%B2).PNG&oldid=28081

86Margarita Castañer, Jarosław Jańczak and Javier Martín-Uceda

phenomenon is easily observed, for example, at the Spanish-Portuguese border. In Spain, adecentralized country, regions take part in 259 projects, but municipalities participate in just 76.
Whereas in Portugal, representing a centralized model, regional authorities take part in 89 projects, but
local authorities participate in 192. Here another element, visible in both the quantitative and qualitative
elements of the research, is worth taking into consideration: participation of academic partners,
especially universities or research centers. With the methodology used, this type of partner is limited
as a sub-regional actor. These partners became the main sub-regional actors in some countries, as thecase of Portugal reveals. Also, in the Portuguese example, there is participation from 162 sub-regional
actors, 78 of which are universities.
The analysis presented in the previous sections clearly marks the more dominant position of
one side of the border when compared to the other. This dominance refers to the presence both ofleading partners and all partners together. The presence of more actors (especially leaders, who are
required to have more duties but also enjoy skills and benefits) creates a situation in which some regions
exhibit dominance over their partners. This dominance changes the regional geopolitics and poses thequestion of cross-border cooperation as a venue for creating new inequalities and multiplying both
structural asymmetries and imbalanced potentials. This is especially visible in cases of “reversed
relations” where partners from the “weaker” states dominate stronger states in border regions.
The empirical data presented above allow for further interpretation in the next section.
Interpretation
With regard to the territorial dynamism of the 2007–2013 INTERREG projects and partners’
spatial composition in the four tested borderlands, the following findings can be formulated.
Regarding project typologies, four main types (development, environment, education, culture)
depict the majority of projects that are highly representative of the most striking difficulties in borderareas: shortages in economic development, education and culture; as well as environmental issues withpredominance of rural areas and specific challenges; especially water management and climate changeof natural parks. Length of access to European funds (resulting from EU membership) as well as theborder legacies determine the specific composition of the priority fields.79 Projects are used to facingthese challenges and problems that are common in all borderlands across Europe. European Union andnational authorities have been trying to facilitate projects to achieve better cohesion in Europe’s
territory, empowering regional and local actors across borders.
On the other hand, structural asymmetry and imbalanced potentials explain other findings
about how cross-border cooperation is implemented in practical terms to achieve the aims describedabove. Regarding project leaders, a structural asymmetries perspective (when approaching political andadministrative structures and capacities) helps to understand the picture presented. More or lesspolitical power corresponds to more or less capacity. Clearly, the more decentralized the country, the79 Interview 3. Scholar. Spain, March, 2018.

87Eurasia Border Review < Article >more leading actors in cross-border projects. This means that more flexible administration,80 more
power and resources are the factors that result in high numbers of project leaders. There are, however,other aspects as well, and they are especially visible after interviews with key actors during thefieldwork. Technical capacities from actors on one side, as represented by German actors whencompared to Polish,81 or more interest in cooperation, also have an impact.82
When taking into account all the partners involved in a project, the key element is not thedirect imbalance in potentials at the regional level, but the space typology that corresponds with thepotential of both sides of the border. Urban areas have more participation, probably because they havemore resources to take part in projects. 83 Local partners are also more active in more centralizedcountries where regional authorities have less political power, as the cases of Portugal, France or Poland
illustrate. As for the project typology, it is important to stress that depending on the project, partners
represent different levels in the administrative structure. For example, in environment or transportation,
regional partners are more visible (normally the scale of the project is bigger, as in the case of a naturalarea management plan, river basin investment or new infrastructure).84 On the other hand, local actors
participate more in economic development projects. For example, the projects may be related to tourism
or to culture and education, with projects in schools or for young inhabitants.
The considerations presented above also reveal another factor: they picture local and regional
geopolitical constellations at two levels. First, they show power relations between European Union
member states’ centers and their peripheries. The center of the state, which serves as the engine of
economic, social and political development, dominates in spatial logics while still to some extent
trapped in a Westphalian model. The periphery, suffering from underdevelopment but offered adevelopment opportunity together with a de-bordering process, obtains a new supranational ally in theform of the EU and an additional set of instruments supporting their cross-border efforts. Second, theyalso inform power relations between neighboring subnational territorial units across state borders. To
some extent, they deny simple duplication or reproduction of the logics of inter-state relations to the
local/regional-scale environment. Structural asymmetries resulting from a degree of centralization givesome regions dominance over others in cross-border cooperation, sometimes reversing the logics ofstate-level differences in potentials. Urban centers that concentrate local and regional resources, as wellas power delegated to local and regional structures, determine mutual position and power relations inshaping the cross-border project landscape.
European Union priorities, related to Lisbon and the 2020 Strategy, can also be visualized withthe project typologies and participants, especially when related to a boost in technology and innovation.
Universities and research centers are important players in many of the projects. Participation isespecially high in cities like Zaragoza (Spain), Toulouse (France), Porto (Portugal) or Bolzano (Italy).

80 Interview 5. Border town representative. Poland, October 2017.
81 Interview 5. Border town representative. Poland, October 2017.
82 Interview 7. Scholar. Poland, October 2017.
83 Interview 8. Scholar. Portugal, May 2018.
84 Interview 4. Regional administration representative. Spain, July 2017.

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Margarita Castañer, Jarosław Jańczak and Javier Martín-Uceda

Conclusions
The main aim of this text is to outline the model(s) of cross-border cooperation in Europe, byinvestigating the INTERREG program as a source of data, and to evaluate its intensity and map theactors involved there. All of that is a response to different historical, geographical, economic and/or
institutional realities. Consequently, one can examine why the same policy and financial tools – asinvestigated with the INTERREG example – may lead to similar or different results. The authors also
assumed that analysis of cross-border cooperation at the sub-national level is a good indicator of theevolution of the European integration project. Moreover, instruments, concepts and approaches fromdevelopment studies, geopolitics and (a)symmetries were considered useful for analyzing this type ofcooperation, stakeholder logics and results. After testing the selected border areas on the PortugueseSpanish, Spanish-French, Austrian-Italian and German-Polish borders, the following conclusions canbe presented.
Many of the border areas in Europe still face difficulties in development and integration withnational and global networks. The European Union, with its cohesion85 and cross-border policies, hasbeen trying to reverse this situation and advance into a more coherent and balanced territory. At thesame time, the INTERREG program is the main (and the most common) instrument and source offunding for stimulating cross-border cooperation within the European Union. Consequently, it can beone of the best data sources for understanding cross-border cooperation dynamics. While the European
Union tries to focus projects in some areas to face challenges related to the main European agendas,
the projects also address global challenges in border areas, especially economic development,
transportation, environment and education together with culture. The specific balance among thesefields depends on local border legacies as well as the duration of membership in the EU.
Second, the structural asymmetry and imbalance in potentials, in various aspects, correspondto specific patterns of cross-border relations at many European borders and can be considered thereasons for those patterns. Regarding project leaders, in all the borderlands analyzed, the structural
asymmetry visible in the level of (de)centralization coexists with higher activity in project initiationand leadership, and qualitative analyses suggest a causal relationship here. It refers especially tomismatches of regional authorities’ political power when actors are located on opposite sides of theborder. With regard to imbalance in potentials, the picture is more complex than the simple GDP
comparison would suggest. It reveals the relevance of other factors, like territory typology (urban-rural),that influence the cross-border processes. Urban areas have greater capacity to take part in projects, butborderlands in Europe are still more rural than urban.
Third, both the quantitative and the qualitative approach suggest that differences in the numberof leaders and partners in cross-border projects on both sides of the border strongly suggest the presenceof dominant regions in “cross-border couples.” This may result in further strengthening of one side
over the other, sometimes reversing the model seen at the state scale. Both structural asymmetries andimbalances in potential seem to play a key role in favoring the position of some regions over others.
85 Interview 6. Project partner and civic society representative. Poland, October 2017.

89

Eurasia Border Review < Article >From this point of view of local geopolitics, cross-border cooperation on the one hand aims to equalize
disproportional development, but on the other reproduces inequalities in the new form.
Finally, the authors believe that the investigation presented here can be an inspiration for all
actors (especially institutional ones) designing and stimulating cross-border cooperation in Europe.
This study can facilitate responses to the challenges the border areas face and inspire increasing
participation by specific project participants with limited opportunities, especially those from more
centralized states and rural areas.

90