Comparing the Material and Political Determinants of Cooperationin the International Climate Regime

Graduate School of Public Policy (MPP/IP), The University of Tokyo
Joshua Weeks
Submission Date: 7/18/2012

Introduction
Climate change is one of the most pressing issues on a global scale facing
policymakers, and its impacts are increasingly affecting natural and man-made systems.1
As a transnational and intertemporal policy issue, it is often acknowledged that climatechange requires a global response. Climate change is a classic “tragedy of the commons”:
states face material incentives and no repercussions from adding to the level ofgreenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere, unless some sort of global governance isinstated. Furthermore, as carbon dioxide is removed from the atmosphere over a period of
20-200 years, the benefits of action taken and financed now will not be experienced until
the future. National political and economic organizations, in which future benefits
beyond election and business cycles are heavily discounted, are poorly equipped to deal
with this intertemporal aspect of climate change.
The international community, however, has not been particularly adept in its
response. Since the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC) was produced at the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992, states have varied
widely in their support for the regime and its principal update, the Kyoto Protocol. Somedeveloped nations, notably those in Western Europe, have committed themselves toambitious reductions of GHGs and called on other states to do so, whereas others haverefused to ratify the Protocol or to a second commitment period, or renounced
commitments already made. At the 17th session of the Conference of the Parties in
Durban in 2011, member states agreed to continue negotiations toward an agreement thatwould include all nations and would be finalized by 2015. As the period between now
and 2015 will be a critical time in determining long-term policy outcomes, the questionof what motivates states’ cooperation is of key import.
The factors influencing states’ actions in the international realm are complex andmultidirectional. While the conventional view of international relations scholarship is thatstates seek to maximize their material interests,2 political science and political economy
scholarship has demonstrated how domestic political factors also explain states’ actions
at the international level.3 The goal of this paper is to identify which between material
and political determinant have played a greater role in determining states’ levels ofcooperation in the international climate regime. It seeks to answer the question: can states’levels of cooperation be more readily explained by their material interests, or more by
their domestic political institutions and circumstances?
An empirical study by Harvard professor Paul Bodnar found only weakcorrelation between states’ material interests and their cooperation in the global climate
regime (Bodnar, 2004). This provides ample basis for my study: material interests are
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1

E.g. Stern, Nicholas (2006). Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. HM Treasury.
E.g. Morgenthau, Hans and Kenneth Thompson (1985). Politics Among Nations. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
3
E.g. Lantis, 2006; Shreurs and Tiberghien, 2007; Bättig and Bernauer, 2009.
2

	
  

2	
  

perhaps a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of support for a climate treaty, andpolitical and other factors also likely play a role. Similarly, a study by Bättig andBernauer found that democracy had a positive effect on levels of political commitment toclimate change mitigation, but did not examine specific political mechanisms (Bättig andBernauer, 2009). There are no studies to my knowledge that compare the relative
importance of specific material interests and political factors.
I will limit my discussion to Annex 1 countries under the Kyoto Protocol, as only
they were called upon to make legally binding reductions commitments during the first
reduction period (2008-2012). My methodology will be as follows: I will begin with a
discussion of the material and political factors determinants I propose to examine. Then I
will present three pairings of countries to compare the relative impact of political andmaterial factors in each. Finally, I will conclude with a summary of results andimplications.
Material Determinants
The conventional wisdom of international relations scholarship is that states arerational actors that seek to maximize their utility, or material gain.4 While many believethat states also have reason to cooperate with each other, and may make concessions inorder to do so, few would deny that states usually, or always, consider their materialinterests to at least some degree in the international arena. Under international climate
treaties, states negotiate individual reduction commitments, which subsequently requirechanges in domestic policy. The extent to which states cooperate in such treaties,
therefore, is related to states’ perception of the costs and benefits of the domestic action
required.
A concern shared widely among actors is that national commitments togreenhouse gas (GHG) reductions will harm the economic competitiveness of theindustrial sector. This is mainly due to the fact that most policies implemented bygovernments and geared toward reducing GHG emissions include as a key component
reductions in high emitting sectors. Because of this, states with larger industrial sectors
can be expected to experience greater opposition toward GHG reduction policies, both on
the national and international levels. Indeed, the effect of such opposition has been
demonstrated at the national level: a 2010 survey by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development found that larger industrial sectors were correlated withlower implementation levels of domestic climate change policy (EBRD, 2010).
Similarly, states that are heavily dependent on fossil fuels as an energy source
face greater costs in transitioning toward a low-carbon energy model. As these states will
experience resistance in reducing emissions from the energy sector in the short run, they
are less likely to make reduction commitments on the international level. It can also be
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
4

E.g. Morgenthau, Hans and Kenneth Thompson (1985). Politics Among Nations. New York:
McGraw-Hill.

	
  

3	
  

expected that states for which fossil fuel products comprise a large portion of exports willapproach an international treaty with more caution, as such a treaty might adversely
demand for their products. On the other hand, a global climate regime would benefit
states that have a comparative advantage in alternative energy technologies, as they are
better poised to reduce domestic energy emissions, and international demand for theirproducts may increase.
Another way to gauge how states assess the material costs of cooperating in a
climate change regime is to look at actual emissions trends as a generalization of states’
emissions abatement costs. All other things equal, countries whose emissions havedeclined from the base year of the treaty to the present day (e.g. Russia) should be morecooperative in an international climate regime, because they expect to be able to meettargets more easily and with minimum disruption to their economies. In contrast,
countries whose emissions are climbing due to economic development (e.g. India, China)
might be less supportive of an international regime, as reducing emissions or limiting
emissions growth could have a disruptive effect on their economies.
While the material determinants outlined above are comprised of the actual andperceived costs of mitigation action, another way to assess material costs is to look at thepotential costs of not taking action—i.e., the damages states can expect to incur fromclimate change. Such damages are extensive; however, in the context of this study, thecosts of inaction can be considered mostly negligible, as all states are industrialized ortransitioning Annex 1 countries that have a comparatively high capacity for adaptation.
Summary of Material Determinants(1) Size of the carbon-intensive sector, defined by the percent contribution of this
sector to national GDP, averaged from 1995 to 2012. Data was obtained from theWorld Bank.5(2) Relative dependence on exports of fossil fuel products, measured by the percent
fuels (coal, oil, and gas) comprise of total exports, averaged from 1995 to 2012.
Data was obtained from the World Bank.
(3) Relative use of fossil fuels for domestic energy, measured by the percent of fossil
fuels in the country’s primary energy supply, averaged from 1995 to 2012. Data
was obtained from the World Bank.
(4) National investment in clean energy, as measured by percent growth of electricity
production from renewable sources (excluding hydroelectric) between 1995 and2012, and the five-year growth rate of investment between 2005 and 2010. The
former data was obtained from the World Bank, and the latter from Bloomberg(Pew, 2010).
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
5

	
  

http://data.worldbank.org/4	
  (5) The opportunity cost of abatement, as measured by emissions trends between
1990 and 2010. This data was obtained from the UNFCCC’s website, and is basedon national reports.6
Political DeterminantsBecause states’ responses to developments in the international arena occur under
the sphere of domestic politics, such responses are subject to the context of homegrownelectoral interests, national discourse, and domestic political institutions. The role ofthese interests, ideas, and institutions in determining states’ level of cooperation in theinternational climate regime has been of interest to political science scholars.7 In myanalysis I will focus on certain factors: the electoral structure of state legislatures, thedistribution of authority, the effect of multi-level governance and leadership, the politicalorientation of the government, and the direction of public opinion.
Among different types of electoral systems, it has been argued that proportional
representation allows for a greater representation of voters’ environmental interests(Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007). Proportional representation systems tend to result ininclusive governments with a greater number of parties than majoritarian electoral
systems, which tend to result in dominance by two large parties. A greater number ofparties in turn means that parties with explicit environmental agendas, such as the green
parties active in Europe and elsewhere, are able to participate in governance. The
effective number of parties and the relative representation of green parties, then, can beused as indicators to measure how the electoral system lends itself to cooperation in the
climate regime.
If authority is highly concentrated within a government, it may be easier forpolicymakers who are personally committed to particular goals to act (or, conversely, forpolicymakers to easily avoid action). When authority is more dispersed, even highly
motivated policymakers might not be able to pass climate change policies, as opponents
can easily take advantage of multiple veto points. In this regard, it has been observed thatparliamentary systems are more aggressive in implementing climate change policies(Dolsak 2001) and more successful in ratifying international treaties (Lantis, 2006) thanpresidential systems.
The concentration of authority is also a key concept in explaining the unique role
played by the European Union in leading the climate change negotiations. While theEU’s proactive stance appears puzzling at first considering the diversity of viewpoints
and emission reduction capacities among member states, rotating leadership in theEuropean Council has encouraged each member state to leave its “imprint” in thenegotiations. This system of "collective entrepreneurship" has meant that the most
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
6

http://unfccc.int/
E.g. Victor, 2006; Shreurs and Tiberghien, 2007; Harrison and Sundstrom, 2007; Bättig andBernauer, 2009.
7

	
  

5	
  

proactive countries, as opposed to the least, have had their agendas promoted at theinternational level (Shreurs and Tiberghien, 2007).
Government orientation should also matter for several reasons. Left-wing
governments are more likely to employ tax-based policies, which can be used to stimulateclean energy development and penalize carbon emissions. Left-wing voters also view
government intervention and market-shaping policies more favorably than right-wing
voters. Finally, it has been observed that green parties most often form coalitions with
left-wing parties (Burchell, 2002). For these reasons, a left-leaning administration can beconsidered more likely to support an international climate regime than a right-leaning one.
Finally, voters’ awareness of climate change as a policy issue will determine theextent to which policymakers feel compelled to deliver climate-related results, including
cooperation in the international climate regime. The 2007–2008 Gallup Poll, which asked
participants in 128 countries “how much they know” about climate change, can be used
as a measure of how voters are aware of climate change in relation to other potentiallyconflicting policy issues.
Political Determinants Summary(1) The effective number of political parties, which describes the degree of party
fragmentation in the legislature, averaged from 1995 to 2011. Values are obtained
from Michael Gallagher’s book The Politics of Electoral Systems.8(2) The percentage share of legislative seats held by the green party, averaged over
the years that the green party has been a governing party, and obtained from theElection Results Archive of the Center on Democratic Performance.9(3) Whether the state is parliamentary or presidential.
(4) Whether the state is a member of the European Union.
(5) Government orientation, describing the orientation of the ruling party or coalition,
averaged from 1995 to 2009. Values obtained from the “Database of Political
Institutions” (Beck, et al., 2001).
(6) Voters’ awareness of climate change, as measured by the percentage of
respondents that declared they know “something” or “a great deal” about climatechange. Data obtained from the Gallup Poll.10

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
8

Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell (eds) (2008), The Politics of Electoral Systems, Oxford
and New York: Oxford University Press.
9
http://cdp.binghamton.edu/
10
http://www.gallup.com

	
  

6	
  

Measuring Cooperation
States’ levels of cooperation in the international climate regime can be measured
in a number of ways, and several political economy scholars have come up with methodsof quantifying them.11 For my analysis I will borrow a measure created by Bättig et al,comprised of five indicators: (1) a UNFCCC indicator that measures if and how quickly astate ratified the UNFCCC, (2) a Kyoto Protocol indicator that measures if and how
quickly a state ratified the Kyoto Protocol, (3) a reporting indicator that measures if astate has submitted national communications on time, (4) a finance indicator thatmeasures how timely a state’s payments to the UNFCCC have been, and (5) an emission
indicator that measures a state’s improvement in per capita emissions (Bättig et al, 2008).
The scores for Canada, Russia, and Japan have been downgraded due to Canada’s
withdrawal from the treaty and the other states’ statements of non-cooperation in asecond commitment round. The results are indicated below in Fig. 1 (highest possible
score is six).
Fig. 1 – States’ Cooperation Levels (Bättig et al, 2008)
Australia Canada France Germany Japan Russia
2.54
2.02
4.24
4.85
2.34
2.99

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
11

	
  

E.g., Bodnar, 2004.

7	
  

UK
4.92

US
2.53

Pair Comparisons
1 – Germany and Australia
Material Determinants

Australia
Germany

Percent of
GDP fromindustry,
1995-2012average

Fossil fuelenergyconsumption(% of total),
1995-2012average

Fuel exports(% ofmerchandise
exports), 19952012 average

Percent growthof renewableelectricity
production,
1995-2012

Five-year
growth rate ofrenewable
investment,
2005-2010

25.45
29.92

94.09
82.79

23.38
1.71

457.901616.32

62.5
75.3

Percentchange intotal GHG
emissions,
1990-2010

13.62-21.72

Political Determinants

Australia
Germany

Effective
Number ofParties,
1995-2012average

Percent ofseats held bygreen parties,
1995-2012average

3.35
4.48

5.04
8.8

Parliamentary/
Presidential
Parliamentary
Parliamentary

EU?

No
Yes

Government
orientation,
1995-2009average (1 –right, 3 - left)

1.53
1.93

Percentage
knowing“something”
or “a greatdeal” about
CC

97
96

Cooperation Levels
Australia
Germany
2.54
4.85
While Germany played a leading role in establishing the EU agenda for theinternational climate negotiations and convincing other countries to accept ambitious
emissions cuts,12 Australia has been a cautious participant, initially refusing ratificationand not joining the Protocol until 2007. Both countries are currently on track to meet theirrequirements; however, Germany has agreed to an eight percent cut in emissions, with avoluntary target of 21%, whereas Australia negotiated an eight percent increase inemissions, both from 1990 levels. Looking to the future, Germany continues todemonstrate leadership: it argued at Durban for an ambitious treaty for the post-2012
period while agreeing to participate in a second round of commitments. In contrast,
Australia joined a group of countries calling for a legal framework rather than a treaty,
not to be established before 2015, with no mechanism for guaranteeing ambitious cuts
from industrialized nations.13
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
12

E.g. Goodenough, Patrick, “German Leader to Press Bush on Kyoto Protocol,” CNS News. July
7, 2008.
13
Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Volume 12 Number 534, December 13, 2011.

	
  

8	
  

What best explains this difference? Political institutions in both countries can beconsidered conducive to cooperation. Both governments have parliamentary legislatures,in which political parties must form coalitions and authority is highly concentrated.
Green parties have served as governing parties in both governments’ legislatures. The
green party in Germany, however, can be considered to have had more influence as it has
occupied more seats for a longer period of time. In Australia, the green party has not beenable to initiate legislation, as Australia’s electoral system prevents minor parties fromentering the House of Representatives, which serves as the introductory chamber for mostbills. However, the direct influence of the green party in determining Germany’s climatechange stance is questionable. The green party was, in fact, initially hesitant about
supporting climate change policy, as it was loudly championed by the nuclear lobby(Hatch, 2007).
There are few other differences between Germany and Australia in terms of noninstitutional political variables. Public awareness of climate change is high in bothcountries. Both countries experienced left- and right-leaning governments between 1995
and the present. The most recent shift, however, was in the opposite direction, withGermany moving from left to right in 2005, and Australia moving from right to left in
2007. The shift could be said to have more meaning for Australia than for Germany.
While Angela Merkel’s conservative government continued to take a supportive stancetoward environmental policy and the Kyoto Protocol, it was Kevin Rudd’s left-leaning
government that decided to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 2007.
Compared to political factors, material interests provide a clearer explanation of
the two countries’ levels of cooperation. Germany is clearly less dependent on fossil fuels
than Australia, both as an energy source and as an export commodity. Australia has ahighly developed coal extraction industry. Black coal is the country’s single largest
export, comprising 16 percent of all commodity trading in 2011, and the government hasannounced that domestic coal supplies will last for nearly 100 years.14 Because of this,the country would face significant economic disruption if forced to implement large GHG
reductions.
On the other hand, the growth in renewables tells an opposite story for Germany.
With 1616% growth between 1990 and 2010, Germany had 36.2 GW of renewableenergy capacity in 2009, compared to only 3.3 GW in Australia.15 Germany’s head startin clean tech can help to explain why it would be more willing to accept ambitious cuts inthe future; it relies less on fossil fuels for its own electricity, and domestic suppliers ofrenewable energy technology would stand to profit for increased demand for theirproducts.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
14

Department of Resources, Energy, and Tourism, Australian Government(http://www.ret.gov.au), 2012.
15
International Energy Agency (iea.org), 2012.

	
  

9	
  

In addition to fossil fuel dependency, emissions trends can explain the countries’
behaviors. While Germany’s emissions have been continually decreasing since 1997 dueto the collapse of industry in the East, Australia’s have risen over 13% between 1990 and2010. Looking at the years between 1990 and 2000 is also telling: while Germany’s
emissions decreased 16.9%, Australia’s increased 8.44%.16 The opposite trends inemissions during the years that Kyoto Protocol was negotiated means that Germany was,and continues to be, more confident of its ability to meet challenging reduction goals,
whereas Australia would, for the reasons detailed above, need to make fundamental
changes to its industry in order to do so.
In conclusion, compared to political factors, a combination of material factors
provides a clearer explanation as to why Germany has been consistently more supportiveof the international global climate regime than Australia. While support from the green
party and the phenomenon of “collective entrepreneurship” in the EU likely played a rolein determining Germany’s strong support, the goals eventually reached were unambitious
enough given Germany’s established declining trend in emissions, and provided enoughflexibility and exceptions for German businesses (Hatch, 2007), that the industrial lobby
was willing to accept them. On the other hand, while Australia’s left-leaning party
hurried to ratify the Protocol in 2007, the fundamental economic problems that thecountry would face if it were to adopt ambitious emissions cuts continue to prevent itfrom doing so.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
16

	
  

UNFCC (http://unfccc.int/), 2012.

10	
  2 – Japan and the UK
Material Determinants

Japan
UK

Percent of
GDP fromindustry,
1995-2012average

Fossil fuelenergyconsumption(% of total),
1995-2012average

Fuel exports(% ofmerchandise
exports), 19952012 average

Percent growthof renewableelectricity
production,
1995-2012

Five-year
growth rate ofrenewable
investment,
2005-2010

29.65
25.57

81.45
88.03

0.83
8.55

67.43
841.9251.1
127.4

Percentchange intotal GHG
emissions,
1990-2010-0.99-23.47

Political Determinants
Effective
Number ofParties,
1995-2012average

Percent ofseats held bygreen parties,
1995-2012average

3.68
3.45

0
0

Japan
UK

Parliamentary/
Presidential
Parliamentary
Parliamentary

EU?

No
Yes

Government
orientation,
1995-2009average (1 –right, 3 - left)

Percentage
knowing“something”
or “a greatdeal” about
CC

1.27
2.6

99
97

Cooperation Levels
Japan
UK
2.34
4.92
The UK and Japan were the 71st and 73rd countries to ratify the Kyoto Protocol,
respectively. While both committed to sizeable reductions in the first commitment period(eight and six percent reductions, respectively, compared to 1990 levels), only the UK
will meet its reduction goals. Japan has struggled since ratification to maintain a negativeemissions balance in relation to 1990 levels, and, after the disastrous earthquake of 2011
and the subsequent loss of nuclear power, will see a sharp increase in emissions fromfossil fuels use.
The UK has been one of the most ardent supporters of ambitious reduction
commitments from developed nations. In formulating the EU’s position for the
Copenhagen talks in 2009, the UK was in favor of “almost unilateral” increases in the
EU’s target, without any commitments by third party countries.17 At the Durban talks in
2011, the UK indicated it would participate in a second round of commitments for the
Kyoto Protocol, while also calling for a legally binding commitment for all countries(“Durban,” 2012). This stance contrasted sharply to Japan’s, which has formallyannounced that it will not participate in any future commitment periods for the Kyoto
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

17	
  “EU countries get cold feet on raising climate goals,” Yahoo News. October 14, 2009.	
  

	
  

11	
  

Protocol, as it believes that “setting the 2nd commitment period will lead to solidifying
the unfair and ineffective framework beyond 2012.”18
Looking at the political variables, the two salient differences are the UK’s
membership in the EU and the political orientation of the parties. In all other regards, theUK and Japan have very similar political structures: both legislatures are parliamentary
and neither has active political participation by green parties. Awareness of climatechange is high in both countries.
While the UK government had a more leftward political orientation between
1990-2009, climate change action enjoys a wider base of support in the UK, even amongright-leaning political groups. For example, the Conservative Party was in full support of
The Climate Change Act 2008, which commits the country to an 80% reduction ofremissions by 2050 compared to 1990 levels, and aims to enable a “low-carbon economy.”
The right-leaning newspaper The Telegraph has run several editorials supporting the UK
and the EU’s climate change agenda and criticizing the US’ withdrawal from the Kyoto
Protocol.19 Because of this, it is implausible to state that leftward political orientation in
the UK itself was a deciding factor for its cooperation in the global climate change
regime.
Other arguments have been made that the UK had special political motives tosupport the Kyoto Protocol; in particular that Prime Minister Tony Blair sought to prove
his independence from the US, especially after his administration had been criticized for
its central role in the invasion of Iraq. However, it can be argued that this particularpolitical consideration also applies to the Japanese government, as Japan was also amember of the “coalition of the willing.” Furthermore, the fact that a Japanese city namewas given to the treaty should have exerted special political and emotional pressure on
the Japanese government to lend its support.
Looking at material determinants provides a clearer explanation for the twocountries’ differences in support. There is wide difference in emissions trends, as well as
an almost tenfold difference in the growth of renewable energy production between 1995
and 2010. Since 1990, the UK government has initiated large-scale privatization ofenergy-consuming industries and liberalized its electricity and gas systems, which
improved energy efficiency and also resulted in a change from coal to gas (the "dash forgas"), dramatically lowering emissions. It is estimated that these policy changes, enacted
in the early 90s, contributed about half of the total reductions in GHG emissions since1990.20 Japan, on the other hand, had already made the shift to gas and reduced its coalconsumption to 18 percent of total electricity by 1988, based on diversification efforts
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

18	
  Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mofa.go.jp), 2012.	
  19

E.g. Lean, Geoffrey. “Conservatives have always been green.” The Daily Telegraph,
June 19, 2009; Rudd, Roland, “EU must lead the world on climate change,” The Daily
Telegraph, July 11, 2009.	
  	
  
20
Clark, Pilita. “CO2 emissions at lowest levels in 40 years.” Financial Times. March 29, 2012.

	
  

12	
  

following the two oil crises in the 1970s. In other words, Japan had already taken
advantage of the “dash for gas” reductions by 1990, the base year for calculations.
Similarly, Japan’s economy was already more energy-efficient than the UK’s by
1990. In 1990 Japan consumed 134 kg of oil equivalent per $1000 (constant 2005 PPP) of
GDP, compared to 160 kg of oil equivalent by the UK. In 2010, the figures were 125
kgoe for Japan and 101 kgoe for the UK. While Japan still has room to improve its
energy efficiency, the fact that UK had more wiggle room at the base year meant that it
could cut emissions at a lower cost than Japan. Like Germany, the UK was more
confident of its ability to meet challenging reduction goals, whereas Japan would need tomake fundamental changes to its economy in order to do so.
Furthermore, the UK has been significantly more proactive than Japan in its
investments in renewable energies since 1990, indicating that it anticipates growth in, andintends to support, these sectors in the future. Considering the national law passed in2008 that promises a decrease of 80% emissions from 1990 by 2050, the UK seems
serious about transitioning its economy to a low-carbon model. The UK, like Germany,
has taken greater action to reframe material interests as compatible with future reductions
in emissions. In summary, looking at historical trends and current initiatives, it isapparent that material interests more easily explain the UK’s ongoing support, andJapan’s wariness, of the international climate regime.

	
  

13	
  

3 – Canada and Russia
Material Determinants

CanadaRussiaPercent of
GDP fromindustry,
1995-2012average

Fossil fuelenergyconsumption(% of total),
1995-2012average

Fuel exports(% ofmerchandise
exports), 19952012 average

Percent growthof renewableelectricity
production,
1995-2012

Five-year
growth rate ofrenewable
investment,
2005-2010

31.46
36.37

75.65
91.16

16.73
53.5

111.63636.7870.2
0Percentchange intotal GHG
emissions,
1990-2010

46.35-54.82

Political Determinants
Effective
Number ofParties,
1995-2012average

Percent ofseats held bygreen parties,
1995-2012average

Canada3.78

0.32

Russia7.72

0Parliamentary/
Presidential
Parliamentary
SemiPresidential

EU?

Percentage
knowing“something”
or “a greatdeal” about
CC

Government
orientation,
1995-2009average (1 –right, 3 - left)

No

2.6

95

No

1

85

States’ Cooperation Levels
Canada Russia
2.02
2.99
Canada and Russia are the 99th and 127th parties to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, andCanada is the first and only party to withdraw from the Protocol after ratifying it, in 2011.
Originally, Canada had committed to a GHG reduction of 6% from 1990 levels by 2012,
but its emissions soared to 46% more than 1990 levels by 2010, making it clear that it
would not meet its targets. On the other hand, Russia committed only to not increase its
emissions beyond 1990 levels, and has easily overshot that target by cutting 55 percent
off 1990 levels by 2010. Neither country supports the Protocol going forward: both givethe reason that the Protocol is flawed because it does not include the world’s largest
emitters.
With a more liberal, parliamentary government with green party representation
and a higher awareness of climate change, the political factors indicate the Canada shouldhave a higher level of cooperation in the climate regime than Russia. Yet Russia remains
a party of the Kyoto Protocol. In this pairing, it is clear that material factors are dominant
in determining the outcome. While Russia is even more fossil fuel dependent than
Canada, its emissions trajectory, a result of collapse of industry following the fall of theSoviet Union, means that it has absolutely nothing to lose from its zero reduction pledge,
and that it would have to take no action at the domestic level. On the other hand, Canada
	
  

14	
  

does depend on fossil fuels for a large percentage of its energy consumption as well as its
exports, and would be faced with large and expensive adjustments in its economy if itwere to attempt to decrease its emissions. The fact that Russia is growing quickly and its
emissions will likely begin to bounce back may also explain its current wariness towardmaking further commitments.
While material factors are more important than political factors in determining thedifference in levels of cooperation in this pairing, it is also true that the politicalcircumstances in Canada played a role in its initial ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, andthe timing of its eventual withdrawal. The change of political power from the Liberal
Party to Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party spelled the fate of the Kyoto Protocol in
Canada, as Harper was an outspoken critic. Additionally, the federal system in Canada,
where provinces retain a high level of sovereignty, made it exceedingly difficult toimplement climate change policies at the national level, as some states opposed them.

Conclusion and Implications
In the three pairings examined in this paper, material interests played adiscernably greater role than political factors in determining states’ levels of cooperationin the international climate change regime. In particular, it was primarily states’
established emissions trajectories that determined whether they were willing to make andfollow through with legally binding commitments. The effect of political institutions andcircumstances was also apparent, but could not provide as plausible an explanation forstates’ levels of cooperation. The importance of established emissions trajectories indetermining states’ final cooperation implies that more care should be taken in designinga treaty that takes into account states’ varying opportunity costs for abatement.
While this conclusion could be taken cynically to mean that states will only act inaccordance with their material interests, an additional observation is that states withhigher levels of growth and investment in renewable energy were also more cooperativein the international climate regime. This means that states that view climate change action
as a chance to achieve material gains will be more likely to support climate treaties in the
future. States’ perception of their material interests in relation to an international climate
regime may be changing as the economic viability of sustainable development, corporatesocial responsibility, energy efficiency, and “green jobs” becomes more apparent, alongwith further knowledge and empirical observation of the negative effects of climatechange.

	
  

15	
  

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16	
  

Appendix
Mapping of Variables
Material Determinants

Australia
CanadaFranceGermanyJapan
RussiaUK
US

Percent of
GDP fromindustry,
1995-2012average

Fossil fuelenergyconsumption(% of total),
1995-2012average

Fuel exports(% ofmerchandise
exports), 19952012 average

Percent growthof renewableelectricity
production,
1995-2012

Five-year
growth rate ofrenewable
investment,
2005-2010

25.45
31.46
21.97
29.92
29.65
36.37
25.57
22.75

94.09
75.65
52.51
82.79
81.45
91.16
88.03
85.68

23.38
16.73
3.11
1.71
0.83
53.5
8.55
3.09

457.90111.63445.86
1616.32
67.43
636.78841.92104.54

62.5
70.2
97.9
75.3
51.1
0
127.4
102.7

Percentchange intotal GHG
emissions,
1990-2010

13.62
46.35
-8.61
-21.72-0.99-54.82-23.47
8.57

Political Determinants	
  Effective
Number ofParties,
1995-2012average

Percent ofseats held bygreen parties,
1995-2012average

Australia
Canada

3.35
3.78

5.04
0.32

FranceGermany
Japan

5.46
4.48
3.68

1.55
8.8
0

Russia
UK
US

7.72
3.45
2.16

0
0
0

Government
orientation,
1995-2009average (1 –right, 3 - left)

Percentage
knowing“something”
or “a greatdeal” about
CC

Parliamentary/
Presidential

Feder-alist?

Parliamentary

Yes
Yes

No
No

1.53
2.6

97
95

No
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
No

1.67
1.93
1.27

93
96
99

Yes
No
Yes

No
Yes
No

1
2.6
1.93

85
97
97

Parliamentary
SemiPresidential
Parliamentary
Parliamentary
SemiPresidential
Parliamentary
Presidential

17	
  

EU?