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ArticlesDiscourse on “Humanity” in East Asian Confucianisms:
Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity” and its Reverberations
in Tokugawa Japan*
HUANG Chun-chieh**
Translated and Abridged by Jan VRHOVSKI***

1. Introduction

In the intellectual history of East Asian Confucian discourse on humanity
there have been two major peaks. The first is Confucius’ statement that “to be
humane is to overcome one’s self and return to ritual propriety” (keji fuli
weiren 克己復禮為仁), which established a basis for the relationship of inseparability between humanity (ren 仁) and ritual propriety (li 禮), as well as forthe mutual tensions which exist between them. The very same statement also
initiated the subsequent discourses and polemics on humanity that ensued
among Confucian scholars of China, Japan and Korea. The second peak isrepresented by the monumental work “Treatise on Humanity” (Renshuo 仁説),written during the Southern Song dynasty by the renowned Confucian scholar
Zhu Xi (朱熹, Huian 晦庵, 1130-1200). In this article, we will explore anddiscuss the Tokugawa (1603-1868) Japanese Confucians’ response to Zhu Xi’s
“Treatise on Humanity.” In the 9th year of the reign of Emperor Xiaozong of
the Northern Song (9th year of the Qiandao 乾道 era, 1173), Zhu Xi composed
the text entitled “Treatise on Humanity,” in which he expounded on the mostimportant core-value in the Confucian philosophical tradition, “humanity”

	  *Translation from the Chinese original: Huang Chun-chieh, “Dongya rujia renxue
zhi naehan: Zhuzi renshou jiqi zai dechuan riben de huixiang 東亞儒家「仁」學之
內涵：朱子
〈仁說〉
及其在德川日本的迴響” in his Dongya Rujia Renxue Shilun 東亞儒
家仁學史論(Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2017), chapter 6, pp.
299-329.
** Huang Chun-chieh [Huang Junjie 黃俊傑] is Distinguished Chair Professor of
National Taiwan University.
*** Jan Vrhovski is an assistant professor and reasercher at the Philosophical Faculty,
University of Ljubljana.

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 10 2019(ren 仁).1 In this monumental work, Zhu Xi inherited and carried on Cheng
Hao’s (程顥, Mingdao 明道, 1032-1085) and Cheng Yi’s (程頤, Yichuan 伊川,
1033-1107) teaching, which proposes that “humanity is completely of thesame substance as things”( 仁者, 渾然與物同體)2 and that “the mind of heavenand earth is to give birth to things” (天地以生物為心)3, and at the same time
he also departed to some extent from Zhang Shi’s (張試, courtesy name 敬夫,
sobriquet Nanxuan 南軒, 1133-1180) “Treatise on Humanity” (Renshuo 仁説).4 Zhu Xi’s monumental treatise caused an enormous response among
Korean5 and Tokugawa Japanese Confucian scholars, thereby profoundly
1 Wing-tsit Chan (陳榮捷, Chen Rongjie) proposes that Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity”
was already completed in the year 1171. See: Wing-tsit Chan 陳榮捷. “Lun Zhuzi zhi
Ren shuo” 論朱子之仁説 (“On Master Zhu’s Treatise on Humanity”). In: Wing-tsit
Chan: Zhu xue lunji 朱學論集 (Essays on the Scholarship of Zhu Xi). Taibei: Taiwan
xuesheng shuju, 1982: pp. 155-157; Wing-tsit Chan. “Chu His’s ‘Jen-shuo’ (Treatiseon Humanity).” In his: Chu Hsi: New Studies. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
1989: pp. 155-157. Liu Shu 劉述 and Shu Jingnan 束景南, however, advocate that theexact year of completion should be 1173. See: Liu Shu 劉述. Zhuzi zhexue sixiang
de fazhan yu wancheng 朱子哲學思想的發展與完成 (On the Development andCompletion of Zhu Xi’s Philosophical Thought). Taibei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju,
1982: pp. 139-146; Shu Jingnan 束景南. Zhu Xi nianpu changbian (Zhu Xi
Chronological Biography of Zhu Xi: An Expanded Edition). Shanghai: Huadongshifan daxue chubanshe, 2001, Vol. 1: p. 506. Ming-huei Lee (李明輝, Li Minghui)
maintains that, from the perspective of the content of the treatise, the year 1173 is
the more credible date. See: Ming-huei Lee 李明輝. Siduan yu qiqing – guanyu
daode qinggan de bijiao zhexue tanlun 四端與七情—關於道德情感的比較哲學探論(Four Sprouts and Seven Emotions: A Comparative Philosophical Investigation
Concerning Moral Sentiments). Taibei: Taida chuban zhongxin, 2005: p. 80. In thistext I adopt the year 1173 as the date of completion of Zhu Xi’s treatise.
2 Cheng Hao 程顥. “Shi ren” 識仁 (“On Understanding Ren”), See: Henan Chengshi
yishu 河南程氏遺書 (Posthumous Writings of the Cheng Brothers from Henan), Vol.
2, Part 1. In: Cheng Hao 程顥 and Cheng Yi 程頤, Wang Xiaoyu 王孝魚 (ed.).
Ercheng ji 二程集 (Collection of the Works of the Cheng Brothers). Beijing:
Zhonghua shuju, 1981/2004, Book 1: p. 16.
3 Cheng Yi 程頤. Henan Chengshi cuiyan 河南程氏粹言 (Essential Sayings of the Cheng
Brothers from Hunan), Vol. 1, Ercheng ji 二程集 (Collection of the Works of the Cheng
Brothers), Book 2: p. 1179.
4 Ming-huei Lee 李明輝. “Zhuzi de ‘Renshuo’ jiqi yu Huxiang xuepai de bianlun” 朱子的“仁說”及其與湖湘學派的辯論 (“Zhu Xi’s ‘Treatise on Humanity’ and its argument with the Huxiang school”). In: Ming-huei Lee. Siduan yu qiqing – guanyu
daode qinggan de bijiao zhexue tanlun 四端與七情—關於道德情感的比較哲學探論(Four Sprouts and Seven Emotions: A Comparative Philosophical Investigation
Concerning Moral Sentiments): pp. 79-122.
5 Korean Confucians attached great importance to Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity.”
In his letter to I Hwang (李滉, Toegye 退溪, 1507-1570), the 16th century Korean Zhu
Xi scholar I Yi (李珥, Yulgok 栗谷, 1536-1584) suggested that the “Diagram of theTreatise on Humanity” (仁説圖) made by the former should be placed before the“Diagram of the School of Mind” (心學圖). See: I Yi 李珥. “Sang Toegye seonsaeng

Discourse on “Humanity” in East Asian Confucianisms

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influencing East Asian intellectual history, and therefore most certainly
deserves additional investigation.
In the present study, we will investigate how Zhu Xi’s teaching on ren
仁 (‘humanity’) was received and reinterpreted in the Tokugawa Japanese
Confucian circles. In so doing, we will particularly focus on how this groupof scholars deconstructed the metaphysical basis of Zhu Xi’s philosophicaldoctrine on humanity, as well as on the manner in which the notion of ren 仁
was assigned by them a new definition and significance within an entirely
new socio-political context. The Tokugawa Confucians’ deconstruction andreconstruction of Zhu Xi’s notion of ren not only illustrates the emergence ofthe orientation of “practical learning” (jitsugaku 實學) in Japanese Confucian
thought, but also reveals how the Japanese Confucian scholars diverged fromand questioned Song dynasty Neo-Confucian philosophy. In this essay we will
also discuss the position taken up by these Japanese Confucians in their critical remarks on Zhu Xi’s theory of ren within the framework of the intellectual history of East Asian Confucianism along with theoretical limitations.

2. The Doctrinal Content of the “Treatise on Humanity” and its
Relation to the Philosophy of the Cheng Brothers

Before proceeding with our discussion on the Japanese Confucians’
criticism and reconstruction of Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity,” we will first
briefly speak about the core structure of the argumentation of the treatise andabout its origin in the thought of the Cheng brothers.
Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity” is comprised of three long paragraphs.6
Zhu Xi first quotes Cheng Mingdao’s maxim that “the mind of heaven andmunmog” 上退溪先生文目 (“An Inquiry Presented to Master Toegye”), see Yulgok
seonsaeng jeonseo 栗谷先生全書, Book 2, Vol. 9. In: Hanguk munjip pyeonchan
wiwonhoe. Hanguk yoktae munjip chongso 韓國歷代文集叢書. Seoul: Gyeongin
munhwasa, 1999, Book 211: pp. 81-82. Kim Changhyeop 金昌協 (courtesy nameJunghwa 仲和, sobriquet Dongeum geosa 洞陰居士, Hanbyeog juin 寒碧主人, Samju
三洲, Nongam 農巌, 1651-1708) from the 17th century and Yu Chimyeong 柳致明(courtesy name Seongbaeg 誠伯, Jeongjae 定齋, 1777-1861) from the 18th century intheir work both discussed differences and similarities between Zhu Xi’s and Zhang
Shi’s “Treatise on Humanity.” See: Kim Changhyeop 金昌協. Yeodoii 與道以, see:Nongam seonsaeng munjip 農巌先生文集 (Collected Works of Master Nongam), Book
3, Vol. 19, In: Hanguk yoktae munjip chongso 韓國歷代文集叢書, Book 250: pp.
332-334. Yu Chimyeong 柳致明. “Dab sam jongje jungjiao jungsa byeolji” 答三從仲教仲思別紙. See: Jeongjae seonsaeng munjip 定齋先生文集 (Collected Works of
Master Jeongjae), Book 3, Vol. 16. In: Hanguk yoktae munjip chongso 韓國歷代文集
叢書, Vol. 995: pp. 275-281.
6 Zhu Xi 朱熹. “Renshuo” 仁說 (“Treatise on Humanity”). In: Chen Junmin 陳俊民(rev.) Zhuzi wenji 朱子文集 (Collected Writings of Zhu Xi). Taibei: Caituan faren defu
wenjiao jijinhui, 2000, Vol. 67: p. 3391.

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 10 2019

earth gives birth to things,”7 which in turn he paraphrases into the statementthat “in their generation, man and things acquire the mind of heaven andearth as their own mind.” Subsequently, Zhu Xi further explains the meaningof ren in terms of four different orders, as Lee Ming-huei (李明輝, 1953-) has
so aptly noted and described: “Zhu Xi listed four different orders: an ontological order (origination, endurance, advantage, and stability), a cosmological order (spring, summer, autumn, and winter), an onto-ethical order(humanity, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom), and an ethicopsychological order (love, respectfulness, appropriateness and the discrimination between right and wrong).”8 Although these four sets of order can bedifferentiated from one another, they are all founded on Zhu Xi’s doctrine ofli and qi. In his “Treatise on Humanity,” Zhu Xi asserted: “What I argue for,is to use the name ren for the principle of love.”9 Furthermore, in manydifferent places of his Collected Commentaries (Sishu zhangju jizhu 四書章句
集注), he also gave a detailed exposition of his standpoint that “humanity isthe virtue of mind and the principle of love.”10 When Zhu Xi spoke about ren
as “the principle of love,” by so doing he in reality regarded the doctrine ofqi and li as the ontological and cosmological basis of humanity (ren). The gistof his “Treatise on Humanity” was repeatedly expressed in almost all his
writings throughout his entire life; thus, for example, in his commentary to
the sentence “all people have a mind, which does not tolerate the suffering ofothers” (人皆有不忍人之心) from Mencius 2A:6, Zhu Xi noted: “The mind of
7 Henan Chengshi yishu 河南程氏遺書 (Posthumous Writings of the Cheng Brothersfrom Henan), Vol. 3. In: Ercheng ji 二程集 (Collection of the Works of the Cheng
Brothers), Vol. 1: p. 366. Following the explanation of Ming dynasty scholar Chen
Gui, Wing-tsit Chan maintains that these words came from Cheng Mingdao. In
consequence, nowadays we follow this explanation. See: Wing-tsit Chan 陳榮捷(Chen Rongjie). Zhongguo zhexue wenxian xuanbian 中國哲學文獻選編 (ASourcebook in Chinese Philosophy). Taibei: Juliu tushu gongsi, 1993, Book 2: p.
766.
8 Ming-huei Lee 李明輝 (Li Minghui). Siduan yu qiqing – guanyu daode qinggan debijiao zhexue tanlun 四端與七情―關於道德情感的比較哲學探論 (Four Sprouts andSeven Emotions: A Comparative Philosophical Investigation Concerning Moral
Sentiments): p. 88.
9 Zhu Xi 朱熹. “Renshuo” 仁說 (“Treatise on Humanity”). In: Zhuzi wenji 朱子文集
(Collected Writings of Zhu Xi), Vol. 67: p. 3391.
10 For example: Mengzi jizhu – Liang Hui Wang I 1 孟子集注-梁惠王上1 (Collected
Commentaries on Mencius – Chapter “King Hui of Liang I 1”). In: Zhu Xi. Sishuzhangju jizhu 四書章句集注 (Collected Commentaries on the Chapters and Sentencesof the Four Books). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983, Vol. 1: p. 201. Also: “Humanity
is the principle of love and the virtue of mind”. See: Zhu Xi 朱熹. Lunyu jizhu –Xue Er 2 論語集注-學而2 (Collected Commentaries on the Analects – Xue Er 2). In:
Sishu zhangju jizhu 四書章句集注 (Collected Commentaries on the Chapters andSentences of the Four Books), Vol. 1: p. 48.

Discourse on “Humanity” in East Asian Confucianisms

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heaven and earth gives birth to things. And because all things thus bornacquire this mind of heaven and earth as their own mind, all people have amind, which does not tolerate the suffering of others.”11 In his commentary to
the above-mentioned text from the book Mencius, Zhu Xi also remarked that:“Humanity is the mind of heaven and earth that generates (gives birth to)things.”12 Finally, in 1172 during the Southern Song dynasty, when Zhu Xi
reached the age of 43 years, he composed a letter for his friend Shi Zichongentitled “Records from the Studio of Self-Mastery” (Ke zhai ji 克齋記), where
he put forward the following few explanations of the concept of ren. In thisessay Zhu Xi emphasized that the four fundamental virtues of “humanity,
righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom” belong to the category of ethicalvalues that are present before emotional arousal (wei fa zhi qian 未發之前),and that “compassion, shame, courtesy, modesty, and the distinction between
right and wrong” all belong to the category of mental states of affair thatarise after the emotions have already been aroused (yi fa zhi ji 已發之際). 13
However, these values and mental states were all founded in the cosmological
proposition claiming that: “The mind of heaven and earth gives birth to
things.”The most vital pivotal point of Zhu Xi’s discourse on humanity (ren)resides in how he treated humanity in terms of “the principle of love” (ai zhi
li 愛之理). Summarizing the doctrinal structure of Zhu Xi’s teaching on
humanity, Mou Zongsan (牟宗三, 1909-1995) once noted that “humanity is theprinciple which makes love what it is, and the virtue which is ultimately
possessed by one’s mind.” 14
Mou Zongsan also offers further explanation, saying: “‘That by whichthings are the way they are’ (suoyiran 所以然, ‘raison d’être’) is a transcendental cause of their thusness. The principle (li 理) is a static principle. It
belongs to the ontological principle of being; it is the existence of actual loveand love’s existence. The mind and emotions have the states of ‘alreadyaroused (manifested)’ (yifa 已發) and ‘not yet aroused (manifested)’ (weifa 未發), respectively, yet there in the principle, there is no state which could becalled “already aroused” and “not yet aroused”. On the contrary, the principle
11 Zhu Xi 朱熹. Mengzi jizhu 孟子集注 (Collected Commentaries on Mencius). 四書章
句集注 (Collected Commentaries on the Chapters and Sentences of the Four Books),Vol. 3: p. 237.
12 Ibid.: p. 239.
13 Zhu Xi 朱熹. “Ke zhai ji” 克齋記 (“Records from the Studio of Self-Mastery”). In:
Zhuzi wenji 朱子文集 (Collected Writings of Zhu Xi), Vol. 77: pp. 3861-3869. This
work was written one year before “Treatise on Humanity.”
14 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三. Xinti yu xingti 心體與性體 (Substance of Mind and Substanceof Human Nature). Taibei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1968/1973, Vol. 3: p. 244.

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 10 2019is existence, which does not possess anything called the state of being inmovement or standing still (dong jing 動靜, ‘dynamic and static’).”15
The most important contribution of Zhu Xi’s discourse on ren consists in
its promotion of the level of importance and scope of a human life, which
instigated the Song dynasty Confucians’ “search for understanding of thegreater self” (大我之尋證)16 to enter its cosmological and ontological stage. At
the same time, the notion of a human life became rooted in a transcendental
domain. In the pre-Qin school of Confucianism, the notion of humanity wasoften spoken about in terms of concrete human behavior. Hence, the Analects(“Xue Er 6”) reads: “to overflow in love for the masses and seek closeness tothe humane (ren)” and “when Fanchi asked about the meaning of humanity(ren), Confucius replied, ‘it is to love other people’” (“Yan Yuan 22”). Bothspeak about ren as “love” (ai). Even in Mencius (“Jin Xin I 46”) do we finda passage saying: “The humane person loves people.” As Liao Mingchun
noted, according to excavated documents, it has been proven that the character ren 仁 was originally composed of the ideograms ren 人 (human) and xin
心 (heart/mind), which suggests that the original meaning of the character ren
was “to love people” (ai ren 愛人).17 Similarly, the Tang dynasty scholar Han
Yu (韓愈, Tuizhi 退之, 768-824) asserted that “universal love (boai 博愛) is
called humanity (ren),”18 which is highly in accord with ancient learning.
However, in Zhu Xi’s doctrine of ren, the latter is interpreted as the principle(li 理) of love (ai 愛). Thus, the notion of ren as an ethical value put within
the social context of interactions between “the self” and “others,” what Han
dynasty Confucians referred to as “to greet and salute with human care andaffection” (xiang ren ou 相人偶), is transformed in Zhu Xi’s teaching into atranscendental principle, called “the principle of love,” which interpenetrates
and links together one’s “self” with the substance of the universe. Here, theconcept of ren taken as a transcendental principle, is exactly what Mou
Zongsan called “the existence of love’s existence” (愛之存在的存在性),19
namely a principle, which originates from heaven and yet is still contained inevery human mind. In consequence, Chen Lai called Zhu Xi the representative of substantialism (shitilun 實體論) in China, pointing out that: “Chinese
15 Ibid.
16 Qian Mu 錢穆. Guoxue gailun 國學概論 (An Introduction to Chinese Studies). In: Qian
Binsi xiansheng quanji 錢賓四先生全集 (The Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi).
Taibei: Lainjing chuban gongsi, 1994-1998, Vol. 1: p. 278.
17 Liao Mingchun 廖名春. “‘Ren’ zi tan yuan” 仁字探源 (“Exploring the Origin ofCharacter Ren 仁). In: Zhongguo xueshu, Vol. 8 (April 2001): pp. 123-139.
18 Han Yu 韓愈 (au.), Ma Qichang 馬其昶 (comm.). Han Changli wenji jiaozhu 韓昌黎
文集校注. Shanghai: Shanghai Guji chubanshe, 1986, Vol. 1: p. 13.
19 See note no. 15.

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substantialism is not concerned with properties and types of substance, but
pays close attention to its application (employment), flow and spread.”20
Insofar as the main focus of the “Treatise on Humanity” resides exactly in theapplication and spread of the virtue of humanity, we can concur with Chen
Lai’s theory.
However, if we closely observe the ideological connotations of Zhu Xi’s
“Treatise on Humanity,” within his argumentation we can find two major
propositions that were adopted from the brothers Cheng. In the first place,
Zhu Xi’s explanation of ren as “the principle of love” was in fact inspired by
Yichuan’s (Chen Yi) assertion that “humanity is innate human nature (xing性) and love is emotion (qing 情).”21 Since it is already long ago that this waspointed out by Lee Ming-huei,22 there is no need for us to elaborate on it any
further. Secondly, the proposition that “in their generation, man and things
acquire the mind of heaven and earth as their own mind,” which Zhu Xistates at the beginning of his “Treatise on Humanity,” can in fact be traced
back to the work of Mingdao (Cheng Hao). It was he who already before Zhu
Xi noted that: “Humanity is completely of the same substance as things.
Thus, the virtues like righteousness, ritual propriety, wisdom and trustworthiness are all [parts of] humanity.”23 Thus, the source for Zhu Xi’s doctrine ofren can be identified in this quote. Of the Cheng brothers, it was Cheng Yi
who influenced Zhu Xi the most. Not only did Cheng Yi’s philosophy influence Zhu Xi’s doctrine of humanity, a great number of quotes from Cheng
Yi’s doctrine can also be found in other works by Zhu Xi, such as A Record
for Reflection (Jinsi lu 近思錄) and Collected Commentaries on Mencius.24 In
20 Chen Lai 陳來. Renxue bentilun 仁學本體論 (The Ontology of Ren). Beijing:
Shenghuo, dushu, xinzhi sanlian shudian, 2014: p 205.
21 Cheng Yi 程頤. “Yichuan xiansheng yu si” 伊川先生語四 (Sayings of Master Yichuan– Part 4). See: Henan Chengshi yishu 河南程氏遺書 (Posthumous Writings of theCheng Brothers from Henan), Vol. 18. In: Ercheng ji 二程集 (Collection of the Worksof the Cheng Brothers): p. 182.
22 Ming-huei Lee 李明輝. “Zhuzi de ‘Renshuo’ jiqi yu Huxiang xuepai de bianlun” 朱子的 “仁說” 及其與湖湘學派的辯論 (“Zhu Xi’s ‘Treatise on Humanity’ and its argument with the Huxiang school”). In: Ming-huei Lee. Siduan yu qiqing – guanyu
daode qinggan de bijiao zhexue tanlun 四端與七情—關於道德情感的比較哲學探論(Four Sprouts and Seven Emotions: A Comparative Philosophical Investigation
Concerning Moral Sentiments): p. 97.
23 Cheng Hao 程顥. “Shi ren” 識仁 (“Understanding Humanity”). See: Henan Chengshi
yishu 河南程氏遺書 (Posthumous Writings of the Cheng Brothers from Henan), Vol.
2. In: Ercheng ji 二程集 (Collection of the Works of the Cheng Brothers): pp. 16-17.
24 Wing-tsit Chan’s statistical analysis of the Jinsi lu revealed that in the entire text
there are 338 instances where Zhu Xi cited from Cheng Yi, which surpasses by far
the count of those taken from Cheng Hao (162 instances), Zhang Zai (110instances) and Zhou Dunyi (周敦頤, Maoshu 茂叔, 1017-1073) (12 instances)
together. Cf.: Wing-tsit Chan. “On the Chin-ssu Lu and Its Commentaries.” In:20

Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 10 2019

one of his works, Mou Zongsan systematically listed the differences between
the guiding principles in Cheng Hao’s and Cheng Yi’s expositions onhumanity. Mou’s contribution was most brilliant. In addition to his systematiccomparison, Mou also pointed out that Zhu Xi’s manner of speaking about
ren is not entirely consistent with that of Cheng Hao and that he adheres to
Cheng Yi’s approach of abstract analysis, according to which ren is dissected
into the structural layout of a tripartite division of “mind,” “nature” and“emotion” on one side, and the dichotomy of “the principle” (li 理) and“material force” (qi 氣) on the other, which is ultimately syncretized into asingle expression: “the virtue of mind and the principle of love.”25

3. The Tokugawa Japanese Confucians’ Responses to the “Treatiseon Humanity”: A Deconstruction of Zhu Xi’s Metaphysics
1. Rejection of Zhu Xi’s Ethical Dualism
The following part of our investigation is devoted to a discussion of theTokugawa Japanese Confucians’ criticism and subsequent theoretical reconstruction of Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity.” Following Confucius, theChinese and Japanese Confucians’ discourse on humanity encompassed
innumerable texts. A member of the older generation of Japanese scholars,
Yamaguchi Satsujō (山口察常, 1882-1948), collected the historical Chinese
Confucian material on ren and compiled it in the form of a monograph.
However, unfortunately, Yamaguchi never provided a thorough exposition on
the topic of the Tokugawa Japanese Confucians’ theories of humanity (ren),devoting to it just a brief parallelism in chapter 4 (section 9) of the abovementioned book, which does not include any detailed discussion.26
Wing-tsit Chan (tr.). Reflections of Things at Hand: The Neo-Confucian Anthology.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1967: p. 331. In Zhu Xi’s Collected
Commentaries on Mencius, there are altogether 48 citations from Cheng Yi, whichis the highest number of citations taken from Northern Song Confucians in theabove-mentioned work. See: Chun-chieh Huang. “The Synthesis of Old Pursuits and
New Knowledge: Chu His’s Interpretation of Mencian Morality.” In: New Asia
Academic Bulletin (Hong Kong), No. 3 (1982): p. 216, table 2.
25 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三. Xinti yu xingti 心體與性體 (Substance of Mind and Substanceof Human Nature), Vol. 3: pp. 231-232. Yang Zebo’s recent work collates interpretations of Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity” made by Mou Zongsan in his work
Substance of Mind and Substance of Human Nature. It is a very well-structured
piece of writing, which gets to the most essential points of Mou Zongsan’s work.
Cf.: Yang Zebo 楊澤波. Xinti yu xingti jiedu 心體與性體解讀 (Interpreting the work
Substance of Mind and Substance of Human Nature). Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe,
2016, (Chapter 7, Paragraph 2): pp. 164-177.
26 Yamaguchi Satsujō 山口察常. Jin no kenkyū 仁の研究 (Studies on Humanity). Tokyo:
Iwanami shoten, 1936: pp. 433-479.

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The first way of reasoning adopted by the Tokugawa Japanese Confuciansin their response to Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity” was a deconstruction of
Zhu Xi’s discourse on humanity that focused on the concept of li 理 aroundwhich he had based it. In that way, they refuted Zhu Xi’s entire theory of ren
as “the virtue of mind and the principle of love.” They also opposed Zhu Xi’s
ethics for being constructed on metaphysical foundations, which they argued
could not be accepted into the concrete and everyday moral life. Instead, they
separately established an abstract and universal li 理 as a controlling original
law or principle. A contingent of Zhu Xi scholars, and especially theConfucian scholars of the Kogaku school, advocated that what is called ren 仁(Jap. jin) can only be sought for in concrete and specific moral conduct.
The historical background of the Tokugawa Japanese Confucians’
deconstruction of the concept of li 理 (the principle) in Zhu Xi’s philosophy
in fact resides in the political system of the Tokugawa period. Watanabe
Hiroshi’s research has shown that the politics of the Tokugawa shogunate(Bakufu) was established on the samurai rule of violence, which was adopted
at the end of the Japanese Warring States period (Sengoku jidai). Thus, at the
beginning of the Tokugawa period, the official theoretical orthodoxy promulgated was on very frail footing, and what had been strengthened was theimage of the monarch, who preserved his sovereignty through “authority”(Ikō 威光).27 Hence, the greatest limitations of Japanese Confucianism resided
precisely in the fact that between the Confucian ideology of virtuous rule andthe Tokugawa military regime there existed fundamental contradictions.
Furthermore, the Confucianism sanctioned in Tokugawa Japan also lacked
value concepts which it could rely on and thus was reduced to a “wandering
spirit” (遊魂) of Japanese society. As a result, when Confucianism wasdisseminated throughout the society of Tokugawa Japan, the Neo-Confucian
elements of the concept li 理 were gradually extracted from the tissue of its
thought, and what was emphasized instead was the link between the dao (道)and the profane (su 俗).28
In that way, Tokugawa Japanese Confucians inverted the idea that “theprinciple is above particular affairs” (理在事上) into an ideological trend in the
belief that “the principle is inherent in particular affairs” (理在事中). This turn,which took place among the Tokugawa Zhu Xi scholars, occurred as early asin the 16th century. A Confucian official from the initial period of theTokugawa Bakufu, Hayashi Razan (林羅山, Nobukatsu 信勝, 1583-1657), who
27 Watanabe Hiroshi 渡邊浩. Higashiajia no ōken to shisō 東アジアの王權と思想(Kingship and Thought in East Asia). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1997: pp.
18.20.
28 Ibid.: p. 101.

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 10 2019

had studied the learning of Zhu Xi under the renowned scholar Fujiwara
Seika (藤原惺窩, also known as Shuku 肅, courtesy name Rembu 斂夫, 15611619), despite adhering to Zhu Xi’s doctrine of “substance and function”(ti-yong 體用), nevertheless stressed the importance of “function” over“substance” and interpreted the notion of function (yong) as concrete moral
conduct. Hayashi Razan thus asserted: “Now, if the virtue of the original
mind is substance, filial piety and reverence towards one’s seniors are its
function. In the case of being humane, then filial piety and reverence towards
one’s seniors are the substance of humanity, and being humane to the people
and loving all living beings is its function.”29 In the realm of Hayashi Razan’s
thought, the substance of practicing humanity is filial piety and fraternal duty,
whereas its function is represented by an universal love towards all living
creatures. Both aspects refer to moral conduct on the level of concrete
everyday life.
Although the Tokugawa Zhu Xi scholars did not by any means all
unequivocally criticize Zhu Xi openly—as did the “former Confucians” (先儒), notably in Itō Jinsai’s work, or the “later generations of Confucians” (後世儒者) of whom Ogyū Sorai is representative—criticisms of Zhu Xi were
often hinted at. Even when the Japanese Confucians were ostensibly
following Zhu Xi’s train of thought and expounding on ren, they were still
discussing ren within the context of concrete moral behavior. Thus, forexample, Kaibara Ekiken (貝原益軒, also known as Atsunobu 篤信, 16301714), a scholar from the Fukuoka domain, said: “The way (dō 道) of being
humane resides in being generous (厚) in human relations, and nothing else.
The priorities of the moral effort of being generous in human relations arelove and affection, reverence, prudence in speech, and diligence. And theirroots are filial piety and fraternal reverence….”30 Thus, in the above excerpt
we can observe how, instead of adopting Zhu Xi’s definition of humanity as“the principle of love,” Kaibara Ekiken set out to define the notion ofhumanity within human relations. Many Japanese Zhu Xi scholars believedthat the principle (li 理) was an ice-cold and heartless thing (emotionless), andthat only when there is the living “mind” (xin 心) can one start understanding
what is called “the principle of love.” Miyake Shōsai (三宅尚齋, 1662-1741),
who studied under Yamazaki Ansai together with Satō Naokata (佐藤直方,
1650-1719) and Asami Keisai (淺見絅齋, 1652-1711), and who together withthe latter two were known as the three distinguished scholars of the Kimon
29 Kyoto Shisekikai (Kyoto historical society) ed. Hayashi Razan bunshū 林羅山文集(Collected Writings of Hayashi Razan). Tokyo: Perikansha, 1979, Vol. 67: p. 832.
30 Kaibara Ekiken 貝原益軒. Shinshiroku 慎思錄 (Record of Careful Thought). In: Ekiken
zenshū 益軒全集 (Entire Works of Ekiken). Tokyo: Kokusho kankokai, 1973, Book 2,
Vol. 1: p. 4.

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school (Kimon san ketsu崎門三傑), put forward the following reinterpretationof Zhu Xi’s theory of ren:31
Humanity (ren) is the principle of love and the principle (理) is anemotionless (無情) thing. When the principle of love is embodied in themind, then thoughts become flavored (with feeling) and the mood ofcordialness and intimacy ensues.
Miyake Shōsai emphasized that “the principle (理) is an emotionless (無情) thing.” It is a dry principle, and not a moist creative virtue, existing
universally in all things. He further advocated that the “the principle of love”
needs to be personally experienced through humanity (ren), so as to return toprinciple as “a living thing.” In this way, Miyake Shōsai attempted to deconstruct the metaphysical bases of Zhu Xi’s doctrine of ren with the use of
concrete life.
The discursive method utilized by Tokugawa Japanese Confucians in theireffort to eliminate the metaphysical fundaments of Zhu Xi’s philosophy
resided in an attempt to deconstruct and discard the presuppositions of ethicalduality concealed in his doctrine of humanity. As I have already noted in oneof my previous works, Zhu Xi’s interpretation of humanity as “the virtue ofmind and the principle of love” was in fact theoretically founded on his li-qi
dualism. Thus, when in the first paragraph of his “Treatise on Humanity” Zhu
Xi cited Confucius’ words “to be humane is to overcome one’s self and return
to ritual propriety,” he explained their meaning in the following way: “Theyspeak about how being able to overcome and eliminate one’s own selfishness
and return to the heavenly principle (tianli 天理), the substance of this mind
will then exist everywhere, and there will be none who would not carry out
its function.”32 The binary ethical construction of the opposition between “thecommonality of the heavenly principle” (tianli zhi gong 天理之公) and “theselfishness (privateness) of human desires” (人欲之私) can also be seen in Zhu
Xi’s explanation of the phrase keji fuli 克己復禮 in the “Yan Yuan 1” chapterof the Analects. In his interpretation of this chapter, Zhu Xi remarked: “Renis the complete virtue (quande 全德) of the inherent mind (benxin 本心). Ke
克 is “to overcome.” Ji 己 designates the selfish desire of one’s character(shen 身)…. Therefore, the practice of humaneness (ren) must include a return
to ritual propriety by overcoming one’s selfish desires. In this case, all affairs
31 Miyake Shōsai 三宅尚齋. Mokushiroku 默識錄 (Record of Silent Knowing). In: Inoue
Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎, Kanie Yoshimaru 蟹江義丸 (ed.). Nihon rinri ihen 日本倫理彙編 (Japanese Writings on Ethics). Tokyo: Ikuseikai, 1901-1903, Book 7, Vol. 1: p.
482.
32 Zhu Xi 朱熹. “Renshuo” 仁說 (“Treatise on Humanity”). In: Zhuzi wenji 朱子文集
(Collected Writings of Zhu Xi), Vol. 67: p. 3390.

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 10 2019are of the heavenly principle, and the virtue of the inherent mind will return
to its wholeness in one’s self.”33 Again, when Zhu Xi discussed the same
matter with his students, he also remarked: “To overcome one’s self andeliminate selfishness, and consequently to return to this heavenly principle, isthe meaning of ren.”34 The presuppositions of “ethical dualism” in Zhu Xi’s
doctrine of humanity are precisely the element of his philosophy which wascentral to the Tokugawa Confucians’ criticism of Zhu Xi, and which wasconsequently also the most intensely criticized element of his thought.
Generally speaking, Japanese Confucians were all inclined to a standpointthat sought for the heavenly principle in human desires. A work representative of this tendency was the “Treatise on Humanity” composed by the 18th
century Japanese Confucian scholar Toshima Hōshū (豐島豐洲, 1737-1814). In
his treatise, the latter wrote:35
Moreover, what speaks of the correct principle is his doctrine, which
differentiates between heavenly principle and human emotions. However,
Mencius said: “All the myriad things are provided (perfected) in me.”This means that amongst the various principles within the heavenly
sphere, there is no good or evil. All (their good and evil) are provided
and contained within the discrimination of my inner nature. However,human desires are things that are necessarily endowed to a person fromthe time of his birth on. These desires are also bestowed [upon a person]by heaven. But whether they are ultimately considered good or bad is achoice made in one’s own mind. This is the entire cause of humandesires.
In the above excerpt, Toshima Hōshū advocated that “human desires” are“bestowed by heaven,” and that what people call good or evil (bad) is all
decided in the human mind. He further advocated the view that humanity can
only be observed in concrete actions. When Toshima Hōshū proposed that all
the various “principles” are “provided and contained within the discriminationof my inner nature,” he was following the reasoning of Mencian philosophy.
Moreover, he did not adopt Zhu Xi’s “ethical dualism,” but instead main33 Zhu Xi 朱熹. Lunyu jizhu 論語集注 (Collected Commentaries on the Analects). In:
Sishu zhangju jizhu 四書章句集注 (Collected Commentaries on the Chapters andSentences of the Four Books), Vol. 6: p. 131.
34 Li Jingde 黎靖德 (ed.), Wang Xingxian 王星賢 (comm.). Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類
(Classified Conversations of Master Zhu). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986, Vol. 41:
p. 1051.
35 Toshima Hōshū 豐島豐洲. “Jinsetsu” 仁說 (“Treatise on Humanity”). In: Seki Giichirō
關儀一郎 (ed.). Nihon Jurin sōsho 日本儒林叢書 (Japanese Confucianism Book
Series). Tokyo: Ho shuppan, 1978, Book 6: p. 5.

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25

tained that humanity cannot be seen in the moral effort of overcoming“human desires” with the help of “the heavenly principle,” but rather in the
spontaneous and autonomous awareness of the original mind, which naturally
arises in concrete conduct in one’s life.
As a matter of fact, Toshima Hōshū’s treatise on humanity represents acommon understanding prevalent among the 18th century Japanese
Confucians. Thus, for example, at the beginning of the 18th century Asami
Keisai (淺見絅齋, 1652-1711) in his Kijinsetsu 記仁說 wrote: “While I was
reading the ‘Treatise on Humanity’ I also examined the ren diagram, and only
then became aware that how ren interpenetrates substance and function, how
the substance and function of love interpenetrate, and how the substance andfunction of human nature are interpenetrated, all represent the same substanceand function, and that there is not even one tiny hair [of difference] between
them.”36 By following the overall context of Zhu Xi’s reasoning and thereby
aiming to stress the consistency of substance and function, Asami Keisai
proposed the inseparability of the abstract from the concrete. Similarly, Bitō
Nishū (尾藤二洲, Kōhajime 孝肇, 1747-1813), one of the three Kansei-era
professors (寬政三博士) also emphasized that: “One can grasp and understandthe way (道) after one has observed the principles at work in heaven andearth. One must first observe the principles at work in one’s mind and person,
and afterwards one can also grasp and speak about humanity.”37Further, theJapanese diplomat and sinologist Takezoe Koko (竹添光鴻, commonly known
as Shinichiro 進一郎, sobriquet Seisei 井井, 1841-1917) also advocated thathumanity can only be embodied and manifested in the five human relationships. He said:38
To be a humane person is the way (dao 道) of treating (receiving, jie 接)
people. The way of the sage is to receive (treat) everyone. The intimacy
between father and son, righteousness between the ruler and his ministers, the differences between husband and wife, and the trust between
friends, are all born during their mutual reception (treatment, 相接). The
way of everything is to receive people. If during treatment of otherpeople there is a lack of the mind of mutual love, then the five relations
will disintegrate, and the way of the human (dao) will perish. Therefore,
36 Asami Keisai 淺見絅齋. “Kijinsetsu” 記仁說. See: Keisai sensei bunshū 絅齋先生文集(Collected Writings of Master Keisai), Vol. 6. In: Tōru Sagara 相良亨(ed.) et al.
Kinsei Juka bunshū shūsei 近世儒家文集集成 (Series of the Literary Corpus of Early
Modern Confucians), Vol. 2. Tokyo: Perikansha, 1987: pp. 124-125.
37 Bitō Nishū 尾藤二洲. Sosanroku 素餐錄. In: Nihon rinri ihen 日本倫理彙編 (JapaneseWritings on Ethics), Book 8: p. 356.
38 Takezoe Koko 竹添光鴻. Lunyu huijian 論語會箋 (Collected Commentaries on the
Analects). Taibei: Kuangwen shuju jingben, n.d.: p. 5.

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 10 2019

humanity is the same as love.
Because of their rejection of the ethical dualism within Zhu Xi’s doctrineof ren, the Japanese Confucians had to adopt the discursive approach oftreating humanity as being equal to love.
2. Itō Jinsai’s Transformation of the Discourse on Humanity
In the Tokugawa Japanese Confucians’ undertaking of a critique of themetaphysical inner structure of Zhu Xi’s doctrine on ren, the great master ofthe Kogaku school Itō Jinsai was the most representative thinker, and as suchdeserves additional consideration.
Itō Jinsai’s taking into consideration of the socio-economic circumstancesof the Japanese chōnin (町人, townsmen) social class gave rise to exquisitely
delicate and meticulously composed treatises, the most representative of
which was his Gomō jigi (語孟字義, The Meaning of Terms in the Analects and
Mencius).39 In his early years, Jinsai’s thought was completely shrouded
under the dogma of Zhu Xi learning, and only started to transform after hereached the age of 36. In his later years, Jinsai thus changed his intellectual
orientation from the ideological world of Zhu Xi learning, with the concept li
理 at its center, to an ideological realm centered around the concept of qi 氣(“material force”). When at the age of 32 years Jinsai composed his “Treatiseon Humanity”, he was still following the same reasoning as contained in Zhu
Xi’s synonymous work. Thus, Jinsai defined ren as “the excellence and virtueof human nature (性情), the original human mind,” because “the great virtueof heaven and earth is called generation (sheng 生), the great virtue of thehuman is called humanity (ren). But what is called humanity also gathers thisvirtue of generation and regeneration (生生) of heaven and earth and endows(具) the human mind with it.”40 Hence, Jinsai advocated that ren both exists
in the “whole,” as well as residing scattered in different “parts”—whichapparently superficially corresponds to Zhu Xi’s exposition stating that “intheir generation, man and things acquire the mind of heaven and earth as theirown mind”41 and, thereby, interlinking cosmology with ethics and at the sametime making cosmology the foundation of ethics. Similarly, in the following
39 Cf.: John Allen Tucker. “Introduction: Itō Jinsai and His Masterwork”. in: John Allen
Tucker. Itō Jinsai’s Gomo Jigi and the Philosophical Definition of Early Modern
Japan. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998: pp. 1-68.
40 Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁齋. “Jinsetsu” 仁說. See: Kogaku Sensei shi bunshū 古學先生詩文集(Collected Writings of the Master of Ancient Learning), Vol. 1. In: Tōru Sagara 相良
亨(ed.) et al. Kinsei Juka bunshū shūsei 近世儒家文集集成 (Series of Literary Corpus
of Early Modern Confucians), Vol. 1. Tokyo: Perikansha, 1985: 60。
41 Zhu Xi 朱熹. “Renshuo” 仁說 (“Treatise on Humanity”). In: Zhuzi wenji 朱子文集
(Collected Writings of Zhu Xi), Vol. 67： p. 3390.

Discourse on “Humanity” in East Asian Confucianisms

27

parts of his “Treatise on Humanity,” where Jinsai employed a variety ofcorrelative concepts such as ti-yong (substance – function) and xing-qing(innate nature – emotions) in order to expound on the meaning of ren, we canalso recognize the remaining shadow of Zhu Xi’s philosophy. Zhu Xi’s influence on the middle-aged Jinsai resided primarily in the latter’s treatment of
ren as the common interface of the “what is” (shiran 實然) of cosmology andthe “what ought to be” (yingran 應然) of ethics, which makes human life
possess a certain amount of breadth and depth. However, if we penetrate
further into the delicate tissue of his thought, we can discover that when
32-year-old Itō Jinsai discussed the meaning of ren, he had already set out ona path different from that of Zhu Xi. When Jinsai said “what is called
humanity (ren) also arose by the virtue of the generation and regeneration ofheaven and earth and endows with it the human mind,” according to his
understanding humanity originated in heaven and earth’s great virtue ofgeneration and regeneration, its stimulation and penetration is omnipresent,
and all life imbibes on it. Here, Jinsai has already gotten closer to themeaning of ren as proposed by Cheng Mingdao, namely that “humanity iscompletely of the same substance as all things.”42
In his Gomō jigi, composed in the year 1683 when he was age 56 andhis thought had reached maturity, as well as in his work Dōjimon (童子問,Inquiries from a Child), composed when he was already 65 years old, he hadabandoned to an even greater extent Zhu Xi’s doctrine of li contained in thelatter’s “Treatise on Humanity.” Instead, Jinsai started explaining li (理,‘principle’) as being akin to “the refined patterns [of veins] (文理) within jade,it is the ordered pattern that can describe an object, but which does not
suffice to describe the mystery of the [never-ending] regeneration and transformation of heaven and earth.”43 Furthermore, he also asserted that:44
The Song dynasty Confucians thought that ren was innate human nature(性). I, however, am deeply convinced that in this they violated the way(道). Now, if we abide by the doctrine put forward by the Song dynasty
Confucian scholars, then human nature is something which is not yet
aroused (未發), whereas the human emotions are already aroused (已發).
Thus, humanity (ren) abides in the domain of not yet aroused, akin to
42 Cheng Hao 程顥. “Shi ren” 識仁 (“On Understanding Ren”). See: Henan Chengshi
yishu 河南程氏遺書 (Posthumous Writings of the Cheng Brothers from Henan), Vol.
2. In: Ercheng ji 二程集 (Collection of the Works of the Cheng Brothers), Book 1: p.
16.
43 Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁齋. Gomō jigi 語孟字義 (The Meaning of Terms in the Analects and
Mencius). In: Nihou rinri ihen 日本倫理彙編, Book 5, Vol. 1: p.p. 22.
44 Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁齋. Gomō jigi 語孟字義 (The Meaning of Terms in the Analects and
Mencius): p. 29.

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water which is stored under the earth[‘s surface]. Like in the case ofunderground water, one cannot just extend one’s hand and obtain their
humanity, and thus also cannot implement the effort at purification. The
effort to apply [humanity] thus does not take place until it is put forth
into operation (發用), and regarding its original substance there is nothing
one can do about it…. Moreover, when Confucius and Mencius spoke
about humanity, they only touched upon its function (用) and had notreached [the topic] of its substance. In that way, did Confucius’ andMencius’ words without losing one aspect of humanity thus fail toprovide its principle?
In the above text, Itō Jinsai emphasizes that one can grasp the essence ofhumanity through its function (用) and not its substance. This position
completely reveals that he has adopted the ideological tendency of the schoolof Practical learning. On another occasion, Jinsai also remarked that: “In thebooks of the sages I [strive to] understand practical principles with practicallanguage. Consequently, when the words are about filial piety, brotherly
propriety, ritual propriety or righteousness, their do (道) becomes transparent
by itself. On the question of what should be called the correct do (道), one
need not spend too many words.”45 Furthermore, he instructed his students to“completely disregard Neo-Confucian commentary , and focus on carefulreading of the original text of the Analects and Mencius for two or three years
and carefully ponder the subtleties of its content. Thus does one get close to
having obtained [their meaning] by oneself.”46 Therefore, although the trainof thought expressed by Jinsai in his early years when he wrote his “Treatiseon Humanity” is also quite close to Cheng Yi’s doctrine that “humanity
unifies heaven, earth and the myriad things into one single body (一體),”Jinsai also clearly believed that the doctrine of humanity, which is based on
the concept of li 理, is “difficult to put into practice” (難施之用).47 Wielding
the sharp sword of the thought of the School of Practical Learning, Jinsai
attempted to chop off the entanglement between heaven and man as containedin Neo-Confucian thought, and in thus doing deconstruct the metaphysicalfundaments of Zhu Xi’s theory of principle (li). Thus, he asserted that “outside
the human there is no dao, beyond the dao there is no human…. If one seeks
for the dao outside of human relations, like chasing the wind and clutching at
45 Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁齋. Dōshikai hikki 同志會筆記 (Notes of the Society of Comrades).
Kogaku Sensei shi bunshū 古學先生詩文集 (Collected Writings of the Master ofAncient Learning), Vol. 5: p. 107.
46 Ibid.: pp. 110-111.
47 Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁齋. Dōjimon 童子問 (Inquiries from a Child). In: Nihon rinri ihen 日
本倫理彙編 (Japanese Writings on Ethics), Book 5, Vol. 2: p. 134.

Discourse on “Humanity” in East Asian Confucianisms

29

shadows, it is certainly impossible [to find it there].”48
However, here we shall go one step further and point out that the sharp
sword of practical learning Itō Jinsai held in his hands was unable tocompletely sever the tangles and bonds between cosmology and ethics within
Zhu Xi’s doctrine of humanity. This was because, although Jinsai claimed that“the great virtue of humanity is described by only one word: ‘love,’ and thatis all,”49 on the other hand he also emphasized that “the way (dao) of man
consists of humanity and righteousness, because in the heavenly way there
are the principles yin and yang. Besides humanity and righteousness, how canthere be another way (dao)? On the other hand, humanity embraces righteousness in the same way as yang governs over yin. It was for this reason that in
the school of Confucius humanity was considered to be cardinal and righteousness only a virtue assisting the former.”50 Here, the so-called “heavenly
way” was still the referential framework from which Jinsai proceeded in his
analysis and discussion of the notion of “the human way.” Therefore, it could
be said that even though Jinsai’s new discourse on humanity, which in his
later years he put forward as a critique of Zhu Xi’s old doctrine of humanity
based on the concept of the principle (li), was firm and powerful, it still
appears not to have proven to be fatal to the criticized dogma. On thecontrary, his attempt might be aptly described as an “incomplete revolution.”

4. Tokugawa Japanese Confucians’ Responses to the “Treatise on
Humanity”: A Reconstruction Within a Socio-Political Context

The second approach in the Tokugawa Japanese Confucians’ discourse on
Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity” was to reconstruct the meaning of ren
within a sociopolitical context. If we say that a necessary condition of theJapanese Confucians’ deconstruction of “ethical dualism” inside Zhu Xi’s
“Treatise on Humanity” was to disassemble the latter’s doctrine of the principle (li), then we can also consider their redefinition of ren within a sociopolitical context as a sufficient condition of their dissection of the very same
doctrine. These two trains of thought together define the special character of
the Japanese School of Practical Learning from the 17th century onwards.
In our present discussion of the Japanese Confucians’ redefinition of thenotion of ren within a socio-political context, we can set off from Itō Jinsai’s
eldest son Itō Tōgai’s (伊藤東涯, Nagatsugu 長胤, 1670-1736) questioning of
Zhu Xi’s proposition that “the mind of heaven and earth is to give birth to48 Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁齋. Dōjimon 童子問 (Inquiries from a Child), Vol. 1: p. 80.
49 Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁齋. Dōjimon 童子問 (Inquiries from a Child), Vol. 1: p. 95.
50 Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁齋. Dōjimon 童子問 (Inquiries from a Child), Vol. 2: p. 104.

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 10 2019things.” Itō Tōgai said:51
Someone may claim: “The mind of heaven and earth is to give birth to
things. Yet that the bird of prey will inflict harm on beings and a foul(evil) beast will bite humans is also born inside this [mind]. How canthat be?”One might answer: “Heaven and earth’s generation of the myriad
things does not go beyond the vital forces (qi 氣) of yin and yang. And
what is bestowed by them is not uniform any longer. When things are
created by receiving these vital forces (qi), there exist differences
between their strength and weakness, alertness and sluggishness ofspirit. [Still] all of that is acquired by them from heaven and cannot bechanged. The strong feast on the weak and the crafty catch thedimwitted. The division between them is only natural. Consequently,
tigers and panthers eat people and venomous snakes poison them.
Therefore, from the human point of view, they are considered evil creatures. [Concurrently,] humans slaughter [other] living creatures, cormorants [dive and] catch fish, the chickens and ducks peck ants. Viewed
from the standpoint of these [slaughtered] creatures, could [humans,
cormorants, ducks and chickens] not be regarded as evil creatures? Then,
heaven and earth do not give birth to evil creatures. What is bestowed bythem is abundant (thick) and that which is weak (thin) is not able to be
its equal, and is [consequently] harmed by it. Therefore, a tiger’s andpanther’s violence can injure people, and human wisdom can also kill atiger or a panther, they overpower each other with their own superiority.
Do heaven and earth give birth to inhumane creatures in order to harm
humans? Though it is for that reason that because of some doubts one
might say that this is the case, still this is not in accordance with thelearning of the sage. So, if one exhausts [this possibility] there mostcertainly will not be any harm done, and if one does not exhaust [thispossibility] then there also is nothing to regret.
In the introductory part of his “Treatise on Humanity,” Zhu Xi quotes
Cheng Mingdao’s maxim that “the mind of heaven and earth gives birth to
things,” and subsequently also supplemented these words, stating that “intheir generation, man and things acquire the mind of heaven and earth as theirown mind.” Nevertheless, questioning Zhu Xi’s doctrine of ren, Itō Tōgai
51 Itō Tōgai 伊藤東涯. Kanki hitsuroku 閒居筆錄 (Reflections of a Life in Leisure). In:
Nihon Jurin sōsho 日本儒林叢書 (Japanese Confucianism Book Series), Book 1, Vol.
2: p. 59.

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demonstrated that the former’s “Treatise on Humanity” is unable to provide
an explanation for certain tragic occurrences that cannot be avoided in life,
such as “birds of prey inflicting harm on beings and foul (evil) beasts biting
humans,” where one life is often continued at the price of destroying anotherone. Hence, to offer an alternative explanation of this phenomenon, Itō Tōgai
based his own theory on the doctrine of qi, asserting that: heaven and earth
generate the myriad things from the vital energies of yin and yang, but eventhough all kinds of life are not bestowed with vital force (qi) of the same
strength, yet still whatever vital force they obtain is all received from heaven.
Thus, the fact that the strong devour the weak accords with the principles ofnature. So does the fact that even though tigers and panthers can injure
people, at the same time people can also kill tigers. In that way, there exists
a mutual balance between them, and it is not at all the case that the mind ofheaven and earth would not give birth to such things, but rather the consequence of the fact that “when things are created by receiving these [two] vital
forces (qi), there exist differences between their strength and weakness,
alertness and sluggishness of spirit.” Therefore, it does not matter whether Itō
Tōgai’s explanation was able to effectively settle the question he himself
directed against Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity” or not, it is still the factthat his answer was founded on the theory of qi, which illustrates how from17th century on the common fundaments of the Japanese Confucians’ critiqueof Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity” consisted precisely in the theory of qi.
Japanese Confucians did not accept the proposition of Cheng Mingdao and
Zhu Xi that above the concrete human relationships of everyday life there
also exists a transcendental entity of li 理, which acts as all-commanding anddominating abstract principle, or as Mou Zongsan so correctly noted, that thereal meaning of Zhu Xi’s “humanity is the principle (li) of love” is that “theprinciple” in fact means “the existence of love’s existence.”52 Instead, theTokugawa Japanese Confucians proposed the view that what is called“humanity” (ren) cannot be understood as “the principle of love” as spoken
about by Zhu Xi, rather it ought to be understood as the exercising of “love”
per se. By so reasoning, they wanted to draw down the concept of li 理, which
in Zhu Xi’s doctrine of li and qi existed elevated “above” concreteness, andturn it into a notion of li which exists “inside” of qi (material force). It wasexactly for this reason that they spoke about humanity in terms of love.
1. Yamaga Sokō, Itō Jinsai and Tōjō Ichidō’s New Definition of Ren: The
Notion of Ren in a Socio-Political Context
52 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三. Xinti yu xingti 心體與性體 (Substance of Mind and Substanceof Human Nature), Book 3: p. 244.

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In his critique of Zhu Xi’s statement that “the mind of heaven and earth
gives birth to things,” which the former adopted from Cheng Mingdao andquoted at the beginning of his “Treatise on Humanity,” the Tokugawa
Confucianist Yamaga Sokō (山鹿素行, 1622-1685) maintained that by so doing
Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity” already violated the pre-Qin Confucian
Youzi’s manner of interpretation, according to which filial piety and fraternal
duty are the root of humanity. In order to avoid repeating this violation,
Yamaga Sokō was one among those Japanese Confucian thinkers whobelieved that in practicing what is called “humanity” one should turn back to“the way of everyday, proper human relations.”53 However, the most representative thinker among those Tokugawa Confucians who spoke abouthumanity in terms of love, was still Itō Jinsai, who said that:
1. When all the dimensions of the virtue of caring love are completely
fulfilled and thoroughly understood, so that there is nothing of it left
unfulfilled, that is called humanity. 54
2. Now, if we assume that the main body (substance) of the mind of
humanity is love, then, consequently, this mind would be so broad as
to encompass everything. There would be happiness without worries
and all the numerous virtues would be provided by themselves.
Consequently, whenever in his answer the Master (Confucius) had tobring up the mind of humanity, he said: “The humane person is slow
and cautious in his words,” “the humane person never worries,” “thehumane person concerns himself with benefits only after having
overcome the difficulties,” “humanity is like archery.” All theseanswers emanate from a unified love and derive from the cause ofaccomplishing the numerous virtues. The scholar must pay attention tothe obscure purport of Confucius’ and Mencius’ teaching, whichcannot be sought after in the meaning of the characters in the text.55
In the two short texts quoted above Itō Jinsai explained “humanity” as
the “virtue of caring love,” advocating that “the body (substance) of the mind

53 Yamaga Sokō 山鹿素行. “Seigaku go: Jin” 聖學五‧仁 (“Learning of the Sages 5:
Humanity”). In: Yutaka Hirose 廣瀨豐 ed. Yamaga Sokō sensei zenshū – Shisō hen
山鹿素行全集‧思想篇. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1940-1942, Book 9: p. 457.
54 Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁齋. Gomō jigi 語孟字義 (The Meaning of Terms in Analects and
Mencius). In: Nihon rinri ihen 日本倫理彙編 (Japanese Writings on Ethics), Book 5:
p. 26.
55 Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁齋. Gomō jigi 語孟字義 (The Meaning of Terms in Analects and
Mencius): p. 29.

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33

of humanity is love.” He further remarked that:56
After Confucius and Mencius, those who were able to understand themeaning of humanity were rare. [……] During the Song dynasty,
Confucian scholars particularly focused on speaking about humanity interms of principle (li). As a result, they have also distanced themselves
quite far from the virtue of humanity. They have done so to the extent
that they even believed that being desireless is the substance ofhumanity, and that the state of inner emptiness and stillness is its root.
They not only misunderstood the virtue of humanity, they also harmed
the cause of [the teaching of] Confucius and Mencius. And the damage
they thus caused was great indeed.
In his criticism of Zhu Xi’s exposition on humanity, Jinsai maintainedthat in his treatment of humanity in terms of li the former deviated from theoriginal purport of why Confucius and Mencius spoke about the notion ofren. Contrary to Zhu Xi, Jinsai advocated that humanity can only come into
being within the web of social interactions between people.
Following Jinsai, in the 18th century, the Confucian scholar Ōta Kinjō (大田錦城, Gensei 元貞, 1765-1825) composed the work Jinsetsu sansho 仁説三書 (Doctrine on Humanity in Three Books), comprised of the three books
Confucian Doctrine on Humanity (洙泗仁説), General Clarification of its
Meaning (一貫明義), and Essentials of the Doctrine on Humanity (仁說要義).
In Confucian Doctrine on Humanity, Kinjō asserted: “Humanity (仁) is to be
human (ren 人), it is the way (道) of accepting (接, receiving) other people. Its
first and foremost meaning is love. Consequently, the wise and holy men
passed down a teaching of humanity as love, which is how [humanity]
undoubtedly should be [defined]….”57 151 years after Itō Jinsai, Tōjō Ichidō( 東條一堂, Hiroshi 弘, 1778-1857 ) wrote Rongo chigen ( 論語知言,
Understanding the Words of the Analects), in which he reviewed and reexamined—in many places throughout the work—Zhu Xi’s way of interpreting ren
as “the virtue of mind and the principle of love.” Tōjō Ichidō said:58
56 Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁齋. Gomō jigi 語孟字義 (The Meaning of Terms in Analects and
Mencius): p. 31.
57 Ōta Kinjō 大田錦城. Shushui jinsetsu 洙泗仁說 (“Confucian Doctrine on Humanity”).
In: Nihon rinri ihen 日本倫理彙編 (Japanese Writings on Ethics), Book: 9: pp.
456-472; for the above-cited text see: p. 460.
58 Tōjō Ichidō 東條一堂. Rongo chigen 論語知言 (Understanding the Words of theAnalects). In: Seki Giichirō 關儀一郎 (ed.). Nihon meika Shisho chūshaku zensho 日
本名家四書註釋全書 (Complete Works of Annotations and Commentaries on the Four
Books by Japanese Renowned Scholars). Tokyo: Ootori shuppan, 1922-1926, Vol. 1:
p. 35.

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Zhu Xi comments [in the following manner]: “Humanity is the principle(li) of love”. “The principle (li)” is what Laozi chanted about. The[formulation of] the virtue of mind flowed out of the mouths of thescholars of the School of mind. And all was then loaded on the shoulders of the Teaching of Confucius. This altogether was adopted by Zhu
Xi and made the dogma of his school. This is also what I refute.
He also said:59
When Song dynasty Confucians discussed humanity in the learning ofConfucius, their thinking was completely entangled in Laozi, Zhuangzi
and Buddhism. Often, they set out to defame these others as heretical
discourses and rejected divergent approaches and rejected them as heresies. In what manner is that restricted? Does Confucian doctrine on thehumane way indeed contain such a discourse on li? Because those whoare aggressive to themselves and are throwing oneself away cannot
tolerate it, they slander and damage the Confucian learning, making
themselves confused and far away [from the learning], thus mocking andridiculing the human dao. Contrary to their intentions, they parrot theopportunist and calculating doctrines of artisans such as Laozi,
Zhuangzi, Xunzi and Han Feizi. These are all faults of the Song dynasty
Confucians.
In the above two excerpts, Tōjō Ichidō pointed out that Zhu Xi’s doctrine
on humanity is completely founded in the philosophy of Laozi and Zhuangzi
as well as on Buddhist teaching, stressing that: “the Analects cannot be yokedby Laozi’s and Zhuangzi’s ideas.”60 He further indicated that the notion of“mind” (xin 心) as spoken about by Confucius is seen as above “things” (事)and that any human being who is endowed with “mind” consequently also
possesses “humanity” (ren). He also noted that:61
Ren (humanity) is human mind. Although [the mind] be not very
humane, it still would not be possible to describe it as absolutely devoidof humanity. Due to that reason, the ancients spoke about “inhumanity”(buren 不仁, ‘not humane’) which they never named “humane-less”(wuren 無仁, ‘without humanity’). The Shuo Yuan (說苑) reads:“Confucius replied to Zilu’s question: ‘When in the past, Guan Zhong
59 Tōjō Ichidō 東條一堂. Rongo chigen 論語知言 (Understanding the Words of theAnalects), Vol. 1: p. 36.
60 Tōjō Ichidō 東條一堂. Rongo chigen 論語知言 (Understanding the Words of theAnalects). Vol. 3: p. 128.
61 Tōjō Ichidō 東條一堂. Rongo chigen 論語知言 (Understanding the Words of theAnalects). Vol. 1: p. 36.

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35

wanted to reinstate prince Jiu and was not able to do so, Shao Hu was
executed and Guan Zhong was not. This was humane-less (無仁)’.”62 The
wording “humane-less” was first seen in this place, and Han dynasty
Confucians were unfamiliar with this word.
Tōjō Ichidō was opposed to a separate establishment of a “principle”
above concrete mundane human relations, which was supposed to master andmanage “humanity.” Moreover, so-called “humanity” ought only to refer tothe “human mind” and nothing else. In that way, he refuted Zhu Xi’s explanation of humanity through the concept of principle (li), and pointed out that“the formulation ‘to exhaust the principle’ (窮理) can be seen in the‘Explanation of the Hexagrams’ in the Book of Change, but we do not see itin the Book of Odes, the Book of Documents, the Analects and the Mencius.
However, the appellation ‘the principle’ (li) originates from Laozi andZhuangzi and refers to the heavenly principle. It is empty words which havenot any real function. And when Mencius speaks about li 理, it is the li as in
the word tiaoli 條理 (‘proper order’), and has never involved such blank
empty words as the heavenly principle. This went as far as when masters
Cheng and Zhu took over the words of Laozi and Zhuangzi, which werehanded over in the Ten Wings (Shi yi 十翼), and made them the method of theirschools.”63 Therefore, Tōjō Ichidō further asserted that: “Humanity is to be
human. What makes a human a human is completely contained in it. But
making love [one’s] master is what works as the root of the human dao.”64
Thus, the path he took at this place was still one of speaking about humanity
in terms of love. In Tōjō Ichidō’s “Treatise on Humanity” he explicitly andseverely differentiated between the “heavenly way” (tiandao 天道) and the“human way” (rendao 人道), emphasizing that ren has nothing to do with theheavenly way, but exists completely in the “human way.”2.) Ogyū Sorai’s Decipherment of the “Treatise on Humanity” in a PoliticalContext
Apart from Itō Jinsai and Tōjō Ichidō’s bestowing a new meaning on ren
within the sphere of social relations, as described above, which thus liberated
62 Here, Tōjō quotes the content extracted from Liu Xiang’s record on the divergent
opinions of Confucius and Zilu held about the figure of Guan Zhong. For acomplete dialogue between the two cf.: Liu Xiang 劉向, Xiang Zonglu 向宗魯 (ed.
and comm.). Shuo yuan jiaozheng 說苑校證 (Collations of the Garden of
Persuasions). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987, Vol. 11: p. 290.
63 Tōjō Ichidō 東條一堂. Rongo chigen 論語知言 (Understanding the Words of theAnalects), Vol. 3: p. 127.
64 Tōjō Ichidō 東條一堂. Rongo chigen 論語知言 (Understanding the Words of theAnalects), Vol. 2: p. 93.

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 10 2019the concept of humanity from the framework of li 理, the Japanese Confucian
Ogyū Sorai (荻生徂徠, Butsu Mokei 物茂卿, 1666-1728), who lived between
the second half of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th, went evenfurther and pondered over the concept of ren within a political context. Hence,in his work Distinguishing the Meanings of Terms (Benmei 辨名), one can finda section where Ogyū Sorai criticizes Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity.” Ogyū
Sorai criticizes Zhu Xi’s definition of humanity as “the virtue of mind and theprinciple of love” as a sign of his “not being familiar with the way of thesage and consequently also not being familiar with humanity.” 65 He maintained that Zhu Xi’s error resided in the fact that, being subjected to the
influence of Buddhist and Daoist philosophy, he attached the utmost importance to “the principle” (li 理), and thereby maintained that humanity is simply
inherent human nature. In that way, Ogyū Sorai ultimately did adopt theapproach of explaining humanity in terms of love, but at the same time stillinterpreted the meaning of “to love people” as “regarding people as one’s
parents,” and thereby assigned a new political meaning to the concept ofhumanity (ren). He further noted:66
Why is it that, in the teaching of Confucius, humanity is of the utmost
importance? It is because humanity is to be able to summon the way of
the former kings and embody it. The way of the former kings is the wayof pacifying all under heaven. Even though their ways were multifarious,
their essential point was their [common] inclination towards pacifying all
under heaven.
Sorai defined humanity as “being able to summon the way of the former
kings and embody it.” This definition of humanity is consistent with theapproach taken in his statement that “the way (dao) is the way of the former
kings.”67 They are bound together by a single thread in the way that theyboth reinterpret important Confucian concepts within a political context. Thus,
Sorai also remarked:68
Humanity designates a virtue which enables a person to grow and to
65 Ogyū Sorai 荻生徂徠. Benmei 辨名 (Distinguishing the Meanings of Terms). In: Nihon
rinri ihen 日本倫理彙編 (Japanese Writings on Ethics), Book 6, Vol. 1: pp. 38-39.
66 Ogyū Sorai 荻生徂徠. Bendō 辨道 (Distinguising the Way). In: Nihon rinri ihen 日本
倫理彙編 (Japanese Writings on Ethics), Book 6: p. 15.
67 Ogyū Sorai 荻生徂徠. Rongo chō 論語徵 (Commentary on the Analects). In: Nihon
meika Shisho chūshaku zensho 日本名家四書註釋全書 (Complete Works ofAnnotations and Commentaries on the Four Books by Japanese Renowned
Scholars): p. 324.
68 Ogyū Sorai 荻生徂徠. Benmei 辨名 (Distinguishing the Meanings of Terms), Vol. 1:
p. 37.

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pacify the people; it is the great virtue of the sage. The great virtue ofheaven and earth is called “life” (sheng 生, ‘creation/generation’) and thesage follows it as his guideline. Hence humanity is also called “a lifeloving virtue.” Because in antiquity the sages ruled over under heaven,nothing should be esteemed more than the ruler’s virtue. This is why thefollowing words have been passed on through the ages: “Being a ruler,
one rests only in humanity.” One cannot become a sage by studying. Yet,when the later noblemen studied the way of the sage in order to accomplish their virtues, humanity was the highest among them.
In Sorai’s new interpretation, humanity was transformed into a politicalcapability, “the virtue which enables a person to grow and to pacify thepeople.” In that way, Sorai’s “humanity” was no longer the abstract notion of“the virtue of mind and the principle of love” as it used to be in Zhu Xi’sphilosophy. It was rather the case that, at the same time when Sorai was
taking apart the metaphysical framework of Zhu Xi’s doctrine on humanity,
he developed an over-politicized interpretation of humanity and by turning it
into a political capability also considerably narrowed its former denotation.
Although one can readily admit that Sorai’s political interpretation ofhumanity made it possible for the concept of humanity to be incorporated
into his own intellectual context as well as the local conditions of Japanese
Practical learning, due to his excessive narrowing of the scope of humanity
his reinterpretation also evoked a series of criticisms from the later generations of Japanese Confucians, which in turn became an infamous “incident”
of Japanese intellectual history.69 To give an example: when in the 18th
century Toshima Hōshū composed his own version of “Treatise on
Humanity,” in his work he also criticized Ogyū Sorai’s interpretation of ren,noting that in truth the source of the latter’s definition of humanity was themeaning taken from the Great Learning (“being a ruler, one rests only inhumanity”), which speaks only about the nobleman who occupies thegoverning position and thus totally neglects the meaning of ren spoken about
by Mencius, namely that “humanity is to be human.”70 In opposition to Ogyū
Sorai, Toshima Hōshū advocated the view that ren represents a virtue which
does not differentiate between social classes, but is commonly possessed by
all people. He therefore deduced that the practical expression of what Ogyū
Sorai called “a virtue which enables a person to grow and pacifies the

69 Cf.: Koyasu Nobukuni 子安宣邦. “Jiken” to shite no Soraigaku「事件」としての徂徠學(Sorai Learning and the “Incident”). Tokyo: Seidosha, 1990.
70 Toshima Hōshū 豐島豐洲. “Jinsetsu” 仁說 (“Treatise on Humanity”). In: Nihon Jurin
sōsho 日本儒林叢書 (Japanese Confucianism Book Series), Book 6: pp. 5-6.

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people” actually is to treat “the mind as universal love.”71 Toshima Hōshū’s
discussion of the “Treatise on Humanity” represented an attempt to draw andreturn Ogyū Sorai’s explanation of humanity from within a political context
back into a discourse of humanity within a social context.
To summarize the above discussion, we may conclude that the criticalremarks and arguments raised against Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity” by
Japanese Confucian scholars after the 17th century clearly illustrates theirattempt to deconstruct Zhu Xi’s world of ideas, which revolves around li 理
as its core concept, and to devote themselves to constructing and developing
a world of ideas centered around the concept of qi 氣 to replace it.
When Japanese Confucians criticized the old discourse of Zhu Xi, where
humanity was defined as “the principle of love,” they embarked upon a newpath of defining humanity as “love,” which was set within a concrete social
or political context.

5. Conclusion

From our investigation of the views expressed by the Tokugawa Japanese
Confucians in response to Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity,” one can distill
the fact that in the developmental history of modern Confucian thought inEast Asia, Zhu Xi’s philosophy played a dividing role. Therefore, for a great
number of treatises, regardless of whether they praised or opposed Zhu Xi’sphilosophy, it was almost necessary to open their discussion of any given
matter by mentioning Zhu Xi’s view and then to constantly revolve theirarguments around a comparison with his.
The analysis reveals that before reaching middle age, the Tokugawa
Japanese Confucians were mostly immersed in Zhu Xi learning and wereconsequently extremely well-versed and adept in every single argument of
Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity.” Nevertheless, they spared no effort in criticizing the very same treatise. The Japanese critique of Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on
Humanity” began its development in the early Tokugawa period, when
Yamaga Sokō proposed that “the root of humanity” rests with “the way (dao)of everyday, proper human relations.”72 Following Sokō, Itō Jinsai and Tōjō
Ichidō set out to expound on the meaning of ren in a political context. Finally,Ogyū Sorai also developed his own political interpretation of the notion ofren. All these cases reveal how the Tokugawa Japanese Confucians devoted
their efforts to resolving conflicts between the dominant political ideology of
71 Toshima Hōshū 豐島豐洲. “Jinsetsu” 仁說 (“Treatise on Humanity”). In: Nihon Jurin
sōsho 日本儒林叢書 (Japanese Confucianism Book Series), Book 6: p. 70.
72 Yamaga Sokō 山鹿素行. “Seigaku go: Jin” 聖學五‧仁 (“Learning of the Sages 5:
Humanity”). In: Yutaka Hirose 廣瀨豐 ed. Yamaga Sokō sensei zenshū – Shisō hen
山鹿素行全集‧思想篇. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1940-1942, Book 9, Vol. 37: p. 457.

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their times and Zhu Xi’s doctrine by reconstructing the metaphysical foundations of Zhu Xi’s discourse on humanity, centered around the concept of li 理(‘the principle’). With their minds thus set, they rejected the dualist opposition of “heavenly principle” and “human desires” in Zhu Xi’s ethics. After
their deconstruction of the metaphysical fundaments of Zhu Xi’s ethics wascompleted, they reintegrated the concept of li 理, which in Zhu Xi’s philosophy was elevated above “things” (shi 事), into the “thing” as such, and thus
embarked upon a theoretical path of qi-monism. Concurrently, by transforming
the meaning of ren, one of the core concepts of Chinese Confucianism, they
rendered it into a more ideologically palatable form capable of adapting to the
local intellectual conditions of contemporary Japan.
As I have argued elsewhere, the Japanese Confucians esteemed concreteness and were not at all fond of unfounded theories high up in the sky. They
praised the evaluation of what actually is and misesteemed deep meditation
on higher principles; they aspired to grasp the transcendental meaning of the“mandate of heaven” (tenmei 天命) in the everydayness and the ordinary andto embody the “single-threaded way” (一貫之道, ‘the way of all-pervading
unity’) of Confucius in mundane human relations.73 That is to say that theJapanese Confucians’ criticism and new commentaries on the “Treatise on
Humanity” were raised exactly in the intellectual atmosphere and climate ofopinion of Japanese practical learning (Jitsugaku 實學). In the 17th century,
Japanese Confucians started dismantling the metaphysical architecture of Zhu
Xi’s learning on humanity, rejecting the foundations of the “way of heaven”
as the “human way” in Zhu Xi learning, but at the same time still encountered difficulties in their endeavor to completely dispose and cleanse away themetaphysical and cosmological elements of Zhu Xi’s discourse on ren.
Consequently, in 17th century Japan, the “heavenly way” remained the referential framework for treating the “human way”74 for Itō Jinsai while Itō Tōgai
used the two generative forces of yin and yang (陰陽二氣) to explain a varietyof unavoidable tragedies of life,75 and in the 18th century, Toshima Hōshūbelieved that the “human desires” are “handed over to me by the heaven.”76
We could say that Tokugawa Japanese Confucians’ rebellion against Zhu Xi’s
73 Chun-chieh Huang 黃俊傑. Dechuan Riben Lunyu quanshi shilun 德川日本論語詮釋
史論 (A Historical Study of Hermeneutics of the Analects in Tokugawa Japan).
Taibei: Taida chuban zhongxin, 2006 (1st ed.) 2007 (2nd ed.): p. 3.
74 Itō Jinsai 伊藤仁齋. Dōjimon 童子問 (Inquiries from a Child), Vol. 1: p. 95.
75 Itō Tōgai 伊藤東涯. Kanki hitsuroku 閒居筆錄 (Reflections of a Life in Leisure). In:
Nihon Jurin sōsho 日本儒林叢書 (Japanese Confucianism Book Series), Book 1, Vol.
2: p. 59.
76 Toshima Hōshū 豐島豐洲. “Jinsetsu” 仁說 (“Treatise on Humanity”). In: Nihon Jurin
sōsho 日本儒林叢書 (Japanese Confucianism Book Series), Book 6: p. 5.

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“Treatise on Humanity” was in fact a kind of incomplete intellectual revolutionary undertaking. Furthermore, we could even say that with their new
discourse on humanity, which they developed using qi-monism, they wereunable to avoid turning the human into a “one-dimensional man,” and thereby
lost the elevation and thickness which was ascribed to the notion of humanlife in Zhu Xi learning in China.
Lastly, even though Tokugawa Japanese Confucians invested great effort
in their rejection and annihilation of Zhu Xi’s discourse centered around theassumption of ren as the “principle of love,” what they eventually established
was just a new belief in practical learning that was set within the ordinary
world of mundane human relations and centered around the doctrine of qi.
Regarding this single aspect, from the 17th century on, Japanese Confucianists
were quite similar to the continental thinkers of the 18th century in the way“they disdained metaphysics, yet still felt proud that they were called‘philosophers’ by the people.”77
As I have already disclosed in one of my previous works, 78the “contextual turn,” one of the most commonly seen phenomena in the history ofintellectual exchange in East Asia, also represents the theoretical basis of ourpresent analysis and discussion on the discourse on ren in East Asian
Confucianisms. In the present article, where we have taken a closer look at
the Japanese Confucians’ responses to Zhu Xi’s doctrine of humanity, we
have shown that when Japanese Confucians were responding to the argumentation of Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity,” they first “decontextualized” theabove-mentioned work by deconstructing its inherent metaphysical andcosmological foundations. In turn they disassembled its “ethical dualist” innerarchitecture so as to ultimately get rid of the notion of li 理 (‘the principle’)as the “existence of love’s existence” (Mou Zongsan’s formulation).
Subsequently, the Japanese Confucians then “recontextualized” the Confucianconcept of ren into the Japanese intellectual climate of practical learning fromthe 17th century onwards and integrated it into the political and social atmosphere of the Tokugawa period. Their enterprise could indeed be compared to“tearing down the flags of Zhao and setting up the red flags of Han in theirstead.”79 In an unprecedented and unsurpassed manner, the Japanese
Confucians succeeded in stealing heaven and exchanging it for the sun,turning their stolen dragon into a phoenix. Yoshikawa Kōjirō (吉川幸次郎,
77 Carl L. Becker. The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers. New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1932, 2003: pp. 30-31.
78 Chun-chieh Huang, East Asian Confucianisms: Texts in Contexts (Göttingen andTaipei: V & R Unipress and National Taiwan University, 2015), chap. 2, pp. 41-56。
79 Sima Qian 司馬遷. Shiji 史記 (Records of the Historian). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,
1959 & 1963. Vol. 92: p. 2616.

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1904-1980) believed that the sinology of the Edo period had conducted aJapanese-fashioned decipherment of Chinese culture, and was thus a kind ofnationalist learning.80 As a final conclusion, we must concur that this indeed
was the case.

80 Yoshikawa Kōjirō 吉川幸次郎 (au.), Qian Wanyue 錢婉約 (trans.). Wode liuxueji 我的
留學記 (The Records of My Study Abroad). Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe,
1999: p. 4.