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ArticlesThe Joseon Confucians’ Response to Zhu Xi’s “Treatiseon Humanity”*
Chun-chieh Huang 黃俊傑**Translated by Jan Vrhovski***

1. Introduction

In 1173, the great Neo-Confucian synthesizer Zhu Xi (朱熹, Hui-an, 11301200) composed an article entitled “Treatise on Humanity,” in which heexpounded on the most important core-value in the Confucian philosophicaltradition, “humanity” (ren 仁).1 Zhu Xi’s monumental treatise caused anenormous response among Korean and Tokugawa Japanese Confucian
scholars, thereby exercising tremendous impact upon the Confucian philosophy developed in Korea and Japan from the 13th century onward. Having
completed our analysis of the Tokugawa Japanese Confucians’ interpretationof Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity,”2 in this article we will proceed
discussing how Korean Confucians read and re-interpreted Zhu Xi’s theory ofhumanity during the Joseon period (朝鮮, 1392-1910). The texts in which
Joseon Confucians expound on Zhu Xi’s theory of humanity are extremely
numerous. Therefore, in order to be able to effectively grasp the Joseon
Confucians’ problematiques, I first intend to point out the 5 relatively important key-propositions of Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity.” These are as
follows:	   * Translation from the Chinese original: Huang Chun-chieh, Dongya Rujia Renxue
Shilun 東亞儒家仁學史論 (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2017),
chapter 7, pp. 331-348.
	 ** Huang Chun-chieh [Huang Junjie 黃俊傑] is Distinguished Chair Professor of
National Taiwan University and a member of Academia Europaea.
*** Jan Vrhovski is currently working as an independent researcher in intellectual
history of modern China.
1		 Zhu Xi, “Ren shou 仁說 [Treatise on Humanity],” in his Zhu Xi, Zhuzi Quan Shu 朱
子全書 [Complete Work of Zhuzi] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanzhe; Hefei: Anhuijiaoyu chubanshe, 2002), BK. 23, pp. 3279-3281.
2		 Chun-chieh Huang, “Discourse on Humanity in East Asian Confucianisms: Zhu Xi’s
“Treatise on Humanity” and its Reverbrations in Tokugawa Japan,” in Journal of
Culural Interaction in East Asia, vol. 10 (March, 2019), pp. 13-41.

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 11 20201.) The mind of heaven and earth gives birth to the myriad things. (天地以生
物為心者也)
2.) Humanity or ren is called the principle of love. (以愛之理而名仁)3.) “The unity of the myriad things and one’s self” is the substance of humanity.
(以 “萬物與我為一” 為仁之體)4.) The term ren is explained as “the consciousness of mind.” (以 “心有知覺”
釋仁之名)In addition, because the theoretical framework of the “Treatise on
Humanity” comes from Cheng Yi (程頤, Yichuan 伊川, 1033-1107), when the
Korean Confucians responded to Zhu Xi’s treatise, they often also integrated
Cheng Yi’s doctrine into the discussion. Consequently, we can also add thefollowing key-expression used by Zhu Xi, which originated in the work ofCheng Yi:5.) The common good (gong 公, ‘commonality’) is the principle of humanity.
(公即仁之理)The first among these five key-propositions, which says that “the mindof heaven and earth gives birth to things” and constitutes the first sentence of
Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity,” is a citation from Cheng Hao (程顥,
Mingdao 明道, 1032-1085).3 The subsequent key-expression is the core
proposition of the “Treatise on Humanity,” which defines ren as the “principleof what makes love what it is,”4 thus turning the notion of li 理 into “theexistence of love’s existence.”5 The third key-expression comes from Zhu Xi’s
response to an assertion given by Cheng Mingdao in his “On UnderstandingRen” (Shi ren 識仁), namely that “humanity is completely of the same
substance as things.”6 The fourth key-expression appears in the part of the
3		

4		
5		
6		

See Henan Chengshi yishu 河南程氏遺書 [Posthumous Writings of the Cheng Brothersfrom Henan], Vol. 3, in Cheng Hao 程顥 and Cheng Yi 程頤, Wang Xiaoyu 王孝魚
ed. Ercheng ji 二程集 [Collection of the Works of the Cheng Brothers](Beijing:
Zhonghua shuju, 1981/2004), Vol. 1, p. 336. Following Ming dynasty scholar Shen
Gui (沈桂), Wing-tsit Chan believed that this formulation was taken from Cheng
Mingdao. See Wing-tsit Chan 陳榮捷, Zhongguo zhexue wenxian xuanbian 中國哲學
文獻選編 [A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy](Taipei: Juliu tushu gongsi, 1993),
Vol. 2, p. 766.
This is Mou Zongsan’s definition. See Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Xinti yu xingti 心體與
性體 [The Substance of Mind and the Substance of Innate Nature](Taipei:
Zhengzhong shuju, 1969/1971), Book 3, p. 244.
Ibid.
See Henan Chengshi yishu, Vol. 2 (I), in Ercheng ji, Vol. 1, p. 16. Qian Mu interpreted
this sentence in the following way: “Heaven and earth and the myriad things are allcompletely fused into this absolute body of humanity.” See Qian Mu 錢穆,The Joseon Confucians’ Response to Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity”

5“Treatise on Humanity” where Zhu Xi refutes Xie Liangzuo’s (謝良佐, courtesy name Xiandao 顯道, popularly called Master Shangcai 上蔡先生, 10501103) teaching that “the consciousness of mind is called humanity.”7 The fifth
key-proposition is taken from Yichuan’s saying that: “Essentially, to describe
the way of humanity one only needs a single word: ‘common good’ (gong 公,‘commonality’). The common good is only the principle of humanity, and one
cannot simply refer to humanity as the common good. Rather, the common
good is humanity, because it is embodied by the people.”8
In different Korean Confucian treatises on humanity the five key-notionsof Zhu Xi’s treatise were presented to an unequal extent. We will discuss thisfact in the remainder of this article, together with the theoretical relations
between the above-listed five key-propositions. Instead of delving into
unnecessarily detailed enumeration of all the particular views expressed by
Joseon Confucians, the present discussion will focus only on a certain
number of those treatises, which can be deemed most representative.

2. “Humanity is the Principle of Love”: Kim Nakhaeng’s
Interpretation

Among the above-listed five key-propositions of Zhu Xi’s discourse onren, those most debated about and explicated upon by Korean Confucians
were the following three: (1) “humanity is called the principle of love,” (2)“the term ren is explained as ‘the consciousness of mind’” and (3) “thecommon good (gong 公, ‘commonality’) is the principle of humanity.” We will
begin our investigation with the first of the above-listed key-expressions.
Zhu Xi’s interpretation of humanity as “the principle of love” was anextremely original feature of his philosophy, which endowed an ethical theoryof humanity with ontological fundaments, and thus considerably elevated thedegree of value of human life. This very dimension of Zhu Xi’s philosophy
enabled the Song dynasty Confucians to attain new heights in their effort,
which Qian Mu (錢穆, Binsi 賓四, 1895-1990) called “the search to understandthe greater self.”9 Mou Zongsan (牟宗三, 1905-1995) said that in Zhu Xi’stheory, the notion of humanity was transformed into “the principle of what
Zhongguo sixiang shi 中國思想史 [A History of Chinese Thought], in Qian Binsi
xiansheng quanji 錢賓四先生全集 [The Complete Works of Mr. Qian Binsi](Taipei:
Lianjing chuban gongsi, 1994-1998), Vol. 24, p. 180.
7		 See Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 et al., Song Yuan xuean 宋元學案 [Song-Yuan Case Studies],in Shen Shanhong 沈善洪 ed., Huang Zongxi quanji 黃宗羲全集 [Collected Writingsof Huang Zongxi](Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe, 1985), Vol. 4, p. 693.
8		 Cheng Yi 程頤, “Yichuan xiansheng yu yi 伊川先生語一 [Sayings of Master Yichuan– Part 1],” in Ercheng ji, Vol. 1, p. 153.
9		 Qian Mu , Guoxue gailun 國學概論 [An Introduction to Chinese Studies], in Qian
Binsi xiansheng quanji, Vol. 1, p. 278.

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 11 2020

makes love what it is”10 or the “existence of love’s existence.”11 This proposition of Zhu Xi’s also received some further elucidation in a treatise written
by 18th century Korean Confucian Kim Nakhaeng (金樂行, courtesy nameGanbu 艮夫, sobriquet Gusadang 九思堂, 1708-1766).
Kim Nakhaeng first expounds on the implications of Zhu Xi’s statement“humanity is called the principle of love” as follows:12
I humbly say that the principle of love (ai zhi zhi li 愛之之理) is this mindof heaven and earth that gives birth to things, and also what each humanis endowed with to become human. Since its body is the same as that ofheaven and earth, the position it occupies must certainly be very vastand extensive. But this vast and extensive space is entirely located inside
the principle of love and does not rely on anything apart from it. In oneof his letters written in reply [to Zhang Qinfu], Zhu Xi wrote: “If one
says that humanity is a way embodied in everything and that it is not
rooted in the mind of heaven and earth, which gives birth to things, thenthis is only knowing that humanity is embodied in everything and notknowing the reason why it is embodied in everything.” He also said:“The state when the one yang returns occurs when the mind of heavenand earth is completely self-sufficient, not depending on anything outsideof it. That being the case, why must the myriad things of heaven andearth be the manifestation of this principle?” What is indicated here is
not the selfish matter of oneself—that much is definitely true. As far as
I can see, if what we call love is not meant to designate self-love, butrather the principle of loving other people and other living beings, how
could it then possibly be a matter completely centered on oneself? If one
assumes that this principle is commonly followed by humans and living
beings, then one must also admit that this is true indeed. But this is so
said after one was able to observe this principle. However, if in thepresent moment one discusses this principle, one is quickly lead to an
exposition of what is commonly possessed by humans and other living
beings. Do we in that way analyze everything [necessary]? Now,
assuming that it is inherently present in every human, this principle isalready completed on its own, so that one does not have to further
10		Mou Zongsan, Xinti yu xingti, Vol. 3, p. 244.
11		Ibid.
12		Kim Nakhaeng 金樂行, “Dab Yi Gyongmun 答李景文 [An Answer to Yi Gyeongmun],”see Gusadang jib 九思堂集 [An Anthology of the Works of Gusadang], Vol. 4, in
Minjog munhwa chujinhoe 民族文化推進會 ed., Yeongin pyojeom hangug munjib
chonggan 影印標點韓國文集叢刊 (Seoul: Gyeongin munhwasa, 1999/2001), Vol. 222,
p. 347.

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discuss any matter related to other people. I assume that this was also
the reason why Zhu Xi maintained that Nan Xuan’s (Zhang Shi’s)
doctrine on what is shared by all humans and other beings was not fully
resolved. However, if after we consider this principle, we further
develop it and observe, then people and other beings are all the sameway, and it is not solely possessed by me.
Kim Nakhaeng stressed that “what we call love is not meant to designate
self-love, but rather the principle of loving other people and other living
beings,” which is completely identical with the reasoning in Zhu Xi’steaching, where humanity is the principle of what makes love what it is. Kim
further also explained the meaning of Zhu Xi’s notion of the “principle oflove,” saying:13
Zhu Xi’s letter says: “Humanity is the principle of love. Without heaven,earth and the myriad things, this principle would also be deficient.”
Someone who reads this might think that if heaven, earth and the myriad
things did not exist, then how could this principle of love also be deficient? Now, it is from the learning of the Cheng [brothers] that there
exists the doctrine that humanity [unifies] heaven, earth and the myriad
things into one single body. Because all those who have spoken abouthumanity since then have maintained wrong views on it, they haveregarded this as the definition of the term ren. In fact, Nan Xuan’sdoctrine also contains this meaning. Consequently, Zhu Xi refutes it withthis exposition. Now, as I see it, humanity is the principle of love. If welook upon it in this way, then the substance (body) of humanity is
exhaustible (comes to an end). What unifies heaven, earth and the
myriad things into one single body is then speaking about the mind of
humanity, which is fair, impartial and omnipresent. Humanity is notnamed in that way, though. In its discussion of this idea, the “Treatise on
Humanity” is very clear. If we examine this letter from top to bottom,
when it says that “humanity is the principle of love,” it means that [toattain humanity] one does not have to rely on any other pursuits, but thathumanity is only the principle of love. When it says that “the principle
was originally very concise (yue 約), but today it is expounded on andmixed up together with heaven and earth, and the myriad things, whichrather confuse the understanding of it,” this means that the principle of13		Kim Nakhaeng, “Juseo aejijili byeonsi inbyeon 朱書愛之之理便是仁辨 [A Discussion
on Zhu Xi’s Doctrine of Humanity as the Principle of Love],” Gusadang jib, Vol. 3,
pp. 488a-489b.

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 11 2020

love, that is humanity, is very concise. To maintain that humanity makes
one single body out of heaven and earth and the myriad things, is rather
a mixture creating a confusion [out of everything]. The letter also saysthat “when Confucius answered questions on extensively benefiting andassisting the masses, the idea he intended to express was also along
these lines.” As I see it, this says that Zi Gong’s pursuit of humanity bymeans of widely benefiting and aiding the masses, is to search for thesubstance of humanity through the merit and function of humanity. That
is why Confucius explained the substance of humanity by saying that“when [the humane person] wishes to be established himself, he establishes other people; when he wishes to attain something, he makes otherpeople succeed. To be able to take as an analogy what is near can becalled the method of humanity.” I suppose that the doctrine to widely
benefit and aid the masses has exactly the same cause as the doctrinethat heaven and earth and the myriad things form one single body. Whenit says that “if in returning (fu 復, ‘the cycle of life and death’) we
recognize the mind of heaven and earth as the one yang moving through[the cycle of] stages, the mind of heaven and earth is completely selfsufficient, and does not depend on anything else outside of it,” thismeans that the one yang moving through its stages is the mind of heavenand earth that we call “humanity.” When there is no dependency onanything beyond it, after that we see the mind of heaven and earth. The
four characters “愛之之理” (“the principle of love”) speak about humanity
which is already self-sufficient and does not depend on heaven and earth
and the myriad things. It is in this that [its meaning] becomes evident.
When in the above excerpt Kim says that “the four characters ‘愛之之理’ (‘theprinciple of love’) speak about humanity which is already self-sufficient anddoes not depend on heaven and earth and the myriad things,” it is as if hewere saying that the aseity of “the principle of love” can exist only if it does
not depend on all existing things. In other words, Kim Nakhaeng advocatedthat the “principle of love”—in Zhu Xi’s words, “humanity is the principle oflove”—belongs to the noumenal domain, and does not constitute a part of thephenomenal world. This kind of interpretation corresponds entirely to Zhu
Xi’s discourse on humanity. In his conversation with Yi Gyeongmun (“Ui yeo
Yi Gyeongmun (byeongsul)” 擬與李景文) (1766) Kim said: “What is here
called the principle is the principle of love. The principle of love is a principle which exists fundamentally in itself (ziran benyou 自然本有, “existing
fundamentally in nature”). It does not exist only after the existence of theconsubstantiality (tongti 同體) of heaven and earth and the myriad things.
This is Zhu Xi’s doctrine. That this principle then does not depend on theThe Joseon Confucians’ Response to Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity”

9

consubstantiality with other beings, and is thus by itself fundamentally given,is evident. The fact that it exists fundamentally in itself does not result in any
deficits if it is the case that it does not depend on heaven and earth and the
myriad things, thus being completely self-sufficient. That much can be clearly
seen.”14 This paragraph can confirm that Kim Nakhaeng truly understood thefact that in Zhu Xi’s teaching on humanity “the principle” (li 理) possesses thecharacteristic of aseity.
The words “The principle of love is a principle which exists fundamentallyin itself,” which Kim Nakhaeng quoted in the above text, were taken fromZhu Xi’s “Reply to Zhang Qinfu: On the Treatise on Humanity Again 15”(“Da Zhang Qinfu you lun renshuo shiwu” 答張欽夫又論仁說十五), whichreads:15
In your letter you say: “The cause of why it forms one single body withheaven and earth and the myriad things, is possessed by this mind ofheaven and earth. This [mind] is then the repository of generation andregeneration, common to people and all things. It is what is called theprinciple of love.” Now, if I closely inspect these few sentences, itappears that they are rather unresolved. Now, suppose we assume thathumanity is solely the principle of love, which exists in all humans.
Then, if a person happens not to be impartial (gong 公, ‘work for thecommon good’), this resides in the fact that contrary to harboring love as
he should, there is something he does not love. It is then only in thecommon good (公) that one witnesses heaven and earth and the myriad
things all together comprising one single body, where nothing is without
love. Therefore, if the principle of love is a principle which exists
fundamentally in itself, then it does not necessarily [start] existing only
after the consubstantiality of heaven and earth and the myriad things.
(…)
Considering Zhu Xi’s ideas, the “principle of love” which is the “principle
which exists fundamentally in itself” precedes heaven, earth and the myriad
things and is as such in possession of its aseity. In his “Reply to Hu
Guangzhong 5” (“Da Hu Guangzhong wu” 答胡廣仲五) Zhu Xi also
14		Kim Nakhaeng, “Ui yeo Yi Gyeongmun (byeongsul) 擬與李景文丙戌,” in Gusadangjib, Vol. 4, p. 350.
15		Zhu Xi, “Wang Zhang Lü Liu wenda er - Da Zhang Qinfu you lun renshuo shiwu
汪張呂劉問答二-答張欽夫又論仁說十五 [Conversations with Wang, Zhang, Lü and Liu
2 – Reply to Zhang Qinfu: On the Treatise on Humanity Again 15],” in Chen
Junmin 陳俊民 ed., Zhuzi wenji 朱子文集 [Collected Writings of Zhu Xi](Taibei:
Caituan faren defu wenjiao jijinhui, 2000), Vol. 32, p. 1267.

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 11 2020

remarked:16
One definitely cannot refer to humanity with the name love, yet the
principle of love designates the so-called substance (body) of humanity.
Forming one body with heaven, earth and the myriad things, must
undoubtedly be the reason why I would love everything, yet still theprinciple of love would exist regardless of that. It needs to be known
that the four terms “humanity, righteousness, ritual propriety andwisdom” all generally refer to virtues of one’s inherent nature (xing 性).
Thus, the principle which exists fundamentally in what is natural(tianran 天然) is like that without having been made thus. Ren, however,is the principle of love, it is the way of generation (sheng 生,‘becoming’), and consequently, even if it is like that, it can still embrace
the above four virtues. This is the reason why humanity is such an
essential component in learning.
In the two texts quoted above, Zhu Xi asserts that “the principle of love”
is “a principle which fundamentally exists in itself”, “a principle which exists
fundamentally in what is natural (tianran 天然) is like that without having
been made thus.” This is also exactly what the Korean Confucian Kim
Nakhaeng had in mind when he spoke about Zhu Xi’s doctrine on humanity.
It is quite probable that Kim Nakhaeng’s exposition on humanity conceals
two further questions, which can be set in relation to the above-discussed
content, namely: (1) If the “principle of love” is “a principle which exists
fundamentally in itself,” then how is it possible that “what is so in itself”(ziran 自然, ‘natural’) is transformed into “what is necessary” (biran 必然,‘inevitable’). This is also to say: how can the “principle of love” which is“the existence of love’s existence” (in the words of Mou Zongsan) be transformed into a mere fact of “love”? (2) If the statement that “the principle oflove” equals “a principle which exists fundamentally in itself,” which represents the ontological basis of humanity, and is “like that without having been
made thus”; then does Zhu Xi’s discourse on ren not to some extent contradict his philosophical standpoint in the “Supplement to the Investigating
Things Section of the Great Learning” (“Daxue gewu buchuan” 大學格物補傳), which speaks about “investigating the principles of all things we comeinto contact with” (jiwu qiongli 即物窮理)? Kim, however, did not ponder thesetwo questions at all.
16		Zhu Xi, “Zhi jiu menren wenda – da Hu Guangzhong wu 知舊門人問答‧答胡廣仲五[Conversations with Old Friend and Disciples – An Answer to Hu Guangzhong 5],”in Zhuzi wenji, Vol. 42, p. 1813.

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3. “The Term Ren is Explained as ‘The Consciousness of Mind’”:
Yang Eungsu’s and Yi Sangjeong’s Interpretation

In the final paragraph of the “Treatise on Humanity,” Zhu Xi responds tothe theory proposed by the great disciple of the Cheng school of thought, Xie
Liangzuo, namely that “the term ren is explained as ‘the consciousness ofmind’ (xin you zhijue 心有知覺).” Zhu Xi says: “From what the other calls ‘theconsciousness of the mind,’ we can see that humanity embraces wisdom, yet
it is not the reality after which ren has obtained its name.”17 Korean
Confucians have also devoted quite a good deal of their discussions to thetheory that humanity should be interpreted as “the consciousness of mind.”
Among those Korean Confucian scholars who have most discussed theabove-mentioned interpretation, the 18th century scholars Yang Eungsu (楊應秀, courtesy name Gyedal 季達, sobriquet Baegsu 白水, 1700-1767) and Yi
Sangjeong (李象靖, courtesy name Gyeongmun 景文, sobriquet Daesan 大山,
posthumous name Mungyeong 文敬, 1711-1781) can be taken as representative. In his essays entitled “Treatise on Two Generative Forces” (“Igiseol” 二氣說) and “A Dispute on Consciousness” (“Jigag seolbyeon” 知覺說辨), Yang
Eungsu proposed that in the human “mind” (xin 心) “the principle” coexists
with “consciousness.” Yi Sagjeong, on the other hand, was a Namin (南人)scholar, who used to travel together with Kim Nakhaeng and other scholars.
His opus encompassed books such as “Yagjung pyeonje” (約中編制) and“Sachil seol” (四七說). Yi Sagjeong deduced how in the “Treatise on
Humanity” Zhu Xi obtained the conclusion that “humanity embraces
wisdom” setting out from “the consciousness of mind,” noting that:18
Nonetheless, in the past someone asked Zhu Xi [the following question]:“Consciousness (知覺) is the supreme efficaciousness (ling 靈, ‘intelligence’) of the mind; this definitely is so. Or, is it the case that it ismanifested by the generative (material) forces (qi 氣)?” [Zhu Xi] said: “Itis not entirely caused by the generative forces, for before them there[already] exists the principle of consciousness. Yet, the principle is not
yet consciousness; it takes shape [only when] the creative forces haveaggregated. Consciousness is possible only when the principle and thegenerative forces are joined together. For instance: this lamp, it [burns]
with a much brighter flame only because it received this oil.” He further
17		Zhu Xi, “Ren shuo 仁說 [Treatise on Humanity],” in Zhuzi wenji, Vol. 55, p. 3392.
18		Yi Sangjeong 李象靖, “Dab Jo Seongso 答趙聖紹 [An Answer to Jo Seongso],” seeDaesan Seonsaeng Munjib 大山先生文集 [Collected Works of Master Daesan], Book
4, Vol. 28., in Hanguk munjip pyeonchan wiwonhoe ed., Hanguk yoktae munjipchongso 韓國歷代文集叢書(Seoul: Gyeongin munhwasa, 1999), Book 175, pp.
351-352.

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 11 2020

said: “All that is perceived (所覺) is the principle of mind. The capability
to perceive (能覺), though, is the supreme efficaciousness of the generative forces. Thus, it appears to be the case that the wonder of the existence of consciousness, which [occurs] after the principle and thegenerative forces have combined and the mind has been created, is likethe lamp which took in oil and has now got a glowing flame. Therefore,
when regarding only the mind, then one speaks about the consciousnessof the mind; and when regarding the principle, then one speaks about thefunction (yong 用) of wisdom. Now, if we say that consciousness is acreation of the generative forces, and that it is not created by the principle, this is only to perceive that the bright flame [of the lamp] is fire,
without knowing that it is accomplished through a combination with oil.”In his response to Pan Qian’s (潘謙) letter, Zhu Xi noted: “The innate
nature (xing 性) is only this principle (li 理), emotions (qing 情) are thestage when it comes flowing out and is put to use, and the mind’s
consciousness is what possesses this principle but also carries out these
emotions.” If we speak about it in terms of wisdom, then wisdom is theprinciple of knowing (zhi 知) right and wrong. Emotions are to do rightand wrong by knowing what is right and wrong. What implements thisprinciple to perceive its rightness and wrongness is the mind. To groundoneself in this law to do right and wrong by knowing what is right andwrong is then the realization of what is perceived. To perceive what isdone right and what wrong is the realization of the capability toperceive. Besides speaking about mind in terms of its capability toperceive and speaking about the function of wisdom in terms of what isperceived, is there any other level at which one can ponder over it?
Zhu Xi’s words, “wonder of the existence of consciousness, which [occur]
after the principle and the generative force have combined and the mind has
been created,” cited by Yi Sangjeong in the above text, were taken from theexposition in the former’s work Jinsi lu 近思錄 (Reflections on Things atHand). Zhu Xi, however, believed that “one cannot speak about humanity interms of consciousness (jue 覺 ‘feeling, sensation; awareness’); even though
it suffices for knowing humanity, it still constitutes wisdom. In love, though,the traces of humanity are clear and distinguished.”19 He also remarked that:“In humanity there indeed exists consciousness. Yet one still must not callhumanity consciousness.”20 In that manner, Zhu Xi opposed Xie Liangzuo’s
19		Li Jingde 黎靖德 ed., Wang Xingxian 王星賢 comm., Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類 [Classified
Conversations of Master Zhu]( Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), Vol. 6, p. 118.
20		Ibid.

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explanation of ren through sensation (jue 覺). Yi Sangjeong was really able tograsp Zhu Xi’s explanation of ren via the tripartite structure of mind (xin 心),
innate nature (xing 性) and emotions (qing 情), and at the same time regarded
the “mind” (xin 心) to be a “cognitive mind” (renzhi xin 認知心). This isevident from the way he cites from Zhu Xi’s “Letter in Response to Pan
Qian” (“Da Pan Qian zhi shu” 答潘謙之書)21.
Because Joseon Confucians were profoundly immersed in the mentalityof Zhu Xi learning, they faithfully followed Zhu Xi’s way of reasoning, andin turn also refuted Xie Shangcai’s doctrine which “glosses humanity as
sensation” (yi jue xun ren以覺訓仁). Nevertheless, the Joseon Confucians
mostly had not taken into consideration that the “sensation” (jue 覺) in Chen
Mingdao’s and Xie Shangcai’s interpretation of humanity as sensation reallyis not “perception” in the cognitive sense, but in a moral sense. Now, let us
take a look at the 18th century Korean Confucian Yang Eungsu’s further
interpretation. Yang said:22
Someone might ask Yu Xiu: Contemporary scholars might maintain that
consciousness (zhijue 知覺) is consciousness of mind and not a function(yong 用) of wisdom. What do you think of this theory? Answer: No,
this is not the case. Whence does one know that this is not the case?
Answer: This is evident according to Zhu Xi’s doctrine. In his “Treatiseon Humanity,” Zhu Xi writes: “Consciousness is a matter of wisdom.”
The Classified Conversations (Yulei 語類) read: “Wisdom is the principleof knowing.” It further reads: “Nominally speaking, humanity per se is
the substance of love and perception (覺) itself is the function of
wisdom.” Or someone might question Zhang Wugou’s claim that:“Humanity is perception.” Zhu Xi said: “Since consciousness is wisdom,
to consider humanity to be consciousness then equals saying thathumanity is wisdom.” In his “Reply to Hu Guangzhong’s Letter,” Zhu Xi
discussed how Mencius and Shangcai spoke about consciousness indifferent ways, and remarked that: “Its greater body (大體) is all a matterof wisdom.” If we consider these five assertions, then is there anythingwhich makes us doubt that consciousness is a function of wisdom? Like
Zhu Xi once said: “Humanity, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom
21		Zhu Xi, “Zhijiu menren wenda – da Pan Qianzhi yi 知舊門人問答‧答潘謙之一[Conversations with Old Friends and Disciples – An Answer to Pan Qianzhi 1],” inZhuzi wenji, Vol. 55, p. 2607.
22		Yang Eungsu 楊應秀, “Se – Jigagse 說・知覺說 [Doctrines – The Doctrine ofConsciousness],” See Baegsu Seonsaeng munjib 白水先生文集 [Collected Works of
Master Baegsu], Book. 2, Vol. 6, in Hanguk yoktae munjip chongso, Book. 1652, pp.
216-219.

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 11 2020are innate nature (xing 性). Compassion, sense of shame, courtesy andmodesty, distinguishing between right and wrong are emotions (qing 情).
To love with humanity, to feel shame with righteousness, to be courteouswith ritual propriety, and to know with wisdom is the mind (xin 心).”Now, if consciousness were only the consciousness of the mind and not
the function of wisdom, then why is it that Zhu Xi speaks about“knowing with wisdom” and not about “the mind knowing by itself”?
One might also set the following question: “Wisdom as one of the four
virtues (humanity, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom) is not thesame as being intelligent (聰明) and possessing wisdom of farsightedness(ruizhi 睿智). One is the nature [given] in itself (ziran 自然), to be able
to distinguish between right and wrong. And the other is the virtue of asage, being able to do everything. Zhu Xi said: “it is only this one
thing.” The wisdom of ritual propriety refers to intercommunication
between what is above and what is below. The wisdom of farsightedness
is to expand, reaching a comparative greatness. Like fire in the stove isthis wisdom of ritual propriety. Like the wisdom of farsightedness is to
illuminate [everything, from] the sky [down to the] deepest bottoms of
the earth. What the contemporary scholars call consciousness, does it
belong to the wisdom of farsightedness? Or is it not a part of thewisdom of farsightedness? If we say that it does belong to it, then, since
Zhu Xi taught that it is only one single thing, one cannot say that it is
not the function of wisdom. If, on the other hand, we say that it does notbelong to it, then in this one mind, there are both, the wisdom which
speaks about the intercommunication between what is above and what is
below, as well as the wisdom which expands, reaching a comparative
greatness; and besides that there is also consciousness. Is there really any
such principle in the world? One might also say: Another theory, which
proposes that consciousness is not the function of wisdom, speaks in thefollowing way: wisdom is the principle of [distinguishing between] rightand wrong, and dwells as one of the five natures (wu xing 五性,‘temperaments’); knowing is the subtle mystery of numinous awareness(lingjue 靈覺) and the function of the concentrated mind (zhuanyi xin 專一心). Can the function of the concentrated mind indeed act as the function of one of the five natures? But, does not his doctrine also containthe principle (li)? It says: “This also does not get as far as to speaking
about the innate nature and the principle.” Humanity also occupies theplace of one of the five natures, it is the complete virtue of mind. How
come? It is because humanity is capable of embracing all four virtues.
Zhu Xi said: “Wisdom can also embrace the four [virtues].” He further
said: “Humanity is the first (beginning) of the four virtues, and wisdom

The Joseon Confucians’ Response to Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity”

15

is capable of becoming [their] beginning or [their] end.” When theClassified Conversations question the four sprouts (beginnings) ofMencius, they also ask how come that wisdom is regarded as secondary(later)? It reads: “Mengzi only cyclically states that wisdom fundamentally conceals in itself humanity, righteousness and ritual propriety.
Wisdom is only understood in this way. It is only when it is in this waythat humanity, righteousness and ritual propriety are all concealed insideof wisdom. This is akin to origination (yuan 元), endurance (heng 亨),
advantage (li 利) and stability (zhen 貞), where stability (zhen) represents
wisdom. Stability, nevertheless, harbors the ideas of origination, endurance and advantage inside of it. It is like the four seasons, where
wisdom is winter, while at the same time the ideas of birth in spring,
growth in the summer and ripening in the autumn are all concealed
within Winter.” He further said: “Humanity and wisdom being yuan 元(origination), heng 亨 (endurance) is a matter of ending and beginning.
But, these two extremities are ever reoccurring.” If one grasps these few
dialogues and studies them carefully, then [one can conclude] that
wisdom occupies one of the five natures and is thus able to act as thesubstance of consciousness, in the same way as humanity occupies oneof the five natures and is capable of being the complete virtue of themind. If the function of the concentrated mind is great, to be in theposition of one of the five natures is petty. Thus, if we say that the great
consciousness cannot serve as the function of the petty wisdom, thenhumanity also must not act as the complete virtue of the mind. Can thisreally be so?
In the above text, Yang Eungsu displayed his extreme mastery of thecontent of Zhu Xi’s Collected Writings and his Classified Conversations,adeptly providing passages from the above-mentioned works and turning themover into grounds for his arguments as needed. Nevertheless, Korean
Confucians were still unable to really grasp the fact that Zhu Xi had actually
misunderstood the doctrine which interpreted humanity as sensation (以覺訓仁) that existed in his days. Mou Zongsan hit the nail on the head when hepointed out this issue within Zhu Xi’s doctrine, saying that:23
About the doctrine of glossing humanity as sensation (以覺訓仁); what ishere denoted by jue覺is clearly rooted in Mingdao’s notion of being
insensitive and unaware as timber (mamu bujue 麻木不覺), which comesfrom the presumption that “inhumanity is insensitivity and numbness”
23		Mou Zongsan, Xinti yu xingti, Vol. 3, p. 251.

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 11 2020

(weibi wei buren 痿痹為不仁). Jue is the sensation as in “sensation arisingfrom sympathy” (ceran you suo jue 惻然有所覺), it is the sensation of not
being pacified and not being able to bear (tolerate) something, it is thesensation of moral truth, it is the sensation when the emotions are one
with the silence (jigan yiru 寂感一如), it is a matter of the sympathy inhuman minds (hearts), and not a matter of wisdom. Thus, its meaning isequivalent to the word feeling and not perception. Now, when Zhu Xi
explains ren through the matter of wisdom, stating that “[from] theconsciousness of the mind, we can see that humanity embraces wisdom,
yet it is not the reality after which ren has obtained its name,” this indeed
is a great error.
Mou Zongsan’s assessment is most precise and appropriate, so much thatit allows us to accept it as the final argument.
However, when Yang Eungsu refuted the statement that “consciousness
is consciousness of mind and not a function of wisdom,” he was completely
unable to recognize that by claiming that “consciousness is a matter of
wisdom” Zhu Xi also failed to grasp the meaning of Cheng Mingdao’s
teaching that: “insensibility and numbness of hands and feet is inhumanity,(…) humanity unifies heaven, earth and the myriad things into one single
body (一體),”24 which specifically indicates that the “substance of humanity”
possesses the quality of being syngenetic and sympathetic with heaven andearth and the myriad things. As a matter of fact, because Zhu Xi maintainedthat in pursuit of ren one needs to attach particular importance to moral effort,
he was in extreme discord with Yichuan’s teaching of humanity being“completely of the same substance as things.” Thus, in his “Ke zhai ji” (克齋記, “Records from the Studio of Self-Mastery”) Zhu Xi remarked: “Theessence of pursuing humanity is also called ‘getting rid of all that harms
humanity’ and that is all.”25 In relation to that, Qian Mu further noted that:“Zhu Xi was not fond of the Cheng brothers’ manner of speaking about renin terms of consubstantiality (tongti 同體) with all things, nor of their doctrineof humanity forming one single body with heaven and earth and the myriad
things.”26 He was quite right to claim so. Zhu Xi’s viewpoint, that the pursuitfor humanity can only start after one has first understood and grasped theprinciples of effort to remove one’s own “selfishness of human desires”
24		Zhu Xi, Sishu zhangju jizhu 四書章句集注 [Collected Commentaries on the Chapters
and Sentences of the Four Books](Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), Vol. 3, p. 92.
25		Zhu Xi, “Ke zhai ji 克齋記 [Records from the Studio of Self-Mastery],” in Zhuzi
wenji, Vol. 77, p. 3869.
26		Qian Mu, Zhuzi xin xuean 朱子新學案 [New Studies on Master Zhu](Taipei: Sanmin
shuju, 1989), Vol. 2, p. 60.

The Joseon Confucians’ Response to Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Humanity”

17(renyu zhi si 人欲之私), considerably differs from the standpoint advocated by
Wang Yangming,27 and it is also the reason behind his misunderstanding of
consciousness (jue 覺) as wisdom (zhi 智). Nevertheless, when the Joseon
Korean Confucians discussed the doctrine which taught about humanity
through the notion of consciousness (jue 覺, ‘sensation’), they had not theslightest idea about the existence of such an important misconception in Zhu
Xi’s thought.

4. “The Common Good is the Principle of Humanity”:
Yun Sungeo’s interpretation

The third key-proposition from Zhu Xi’s doctrine of humanity most
discussed by Korean Confucians asserted that “the common good (gong 公,‘commonality’) is the principle of humanity.” This statement does not appear
in the “Treatise on Humanity” nor in the “Records from the Studio of SelfMastery” but in the work Classified Conversations of Master Zhu, where, inthe context of the antagonism between the “common (good)” (gong 公) andthe “private (selfish)” (si 私), Zhu Xi often stated that “gong 公 is the moral
principle (daoli 道理) of humanity,” as in the following cases quoted from thespecified chapters:28(1) The common good (gong 公) is in the front, consideration (shu 恕,‘altruism’) follows behind, and humanity is in-between. One can only behumane when the common good has been completed. Where there isselfishness, there cannot be humanity.
(2) Humanity is the moral principle of love and the common good is the moral
principle of humanity. In consequence, when there is common good, there
is humanity, and when there is humanity, there is love.
(3) The common good is the method of humanity, the human person (renshen人身) is the tissue of humanity.
(4) The common good is the place from which humanity issues forth. Without
the common good, humanity cannot be carried out.
(5) Humanity is embodied by the character gong 公. So that, even if thecharacter gong were to be omitted, it would live in humanity.
(6) In the case that one might inquire about the difference between humanity
and common good (gong 公), the answer would be: “Humanity is on theinside, common good is on the outside.” One could also say: “Only if
27		Cf. Chen Lisheng 陳立勝, Wang Yangming “wan wu yi ti” lun – Cong “shen – ti”
de lichang kan 王陽明“萬物一體”論: 從“身－體”的立場看 [On Wang Yangming’s
Doctrine of Things as One Body: From the Perspective of the Body-Substance](Taipei: NTU press, 2005), pp. 42-43.
28		Li Jingde ed., Wang Xingxian comm., Zhuzi yulei, Vol. 6, pp. 116-117.

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 11 2020

there is humanity can there afterwards be common good.” And also:“Humanity is a fundamentally existing principle. Common good is thehighest stage of attainment in the moral effort of overcoming one’s self.
Therefore, only if one is humane can one later also act for the common
good (gong 公); the principle is very clear. Consequently, master Cheng
said: ‘act for the common good and embody it through humanity.’ Then,after one has overcome and exhausted the selfishness of one’s self--only
then, when one observes one’s own character, will one be able to see
humanity.”(7) Even though one cannot designate humanity with common good (gong),
still humanity is to act for the common good (gong) and to be selfless.
Respectful diligence (jing 敬) cannot be called the mean (zhong 中), yetstill to be respectfully diligent and not miss the mark is to be in the mean(zhong).
(8) If dwelling within unselfishness, then one is acting for the common good(gong). If one is acting for the common good, one is humane. As for
instance, if a stream of water encounters a slight obstruction, it will form
two separate streams, but what you need to do is to put together anunpassable block, then it will inundate and overflow the earth.
The proposition stating that “gong 公 is the moral principle (daoli 道理)
of humanity” (gong shi ren de daoli 公是仁底道理), which Zhu Xi refers to in
the above examples, was taken from Cheng Yichuan. The latter namely
taught that:29
Essentially, to describe the way of humanity one only needs one word:‘the common good’ (gong 公, ‘commonality’). The common good is only
the principle of humanity, and one cannot simply refer to humanity as
the common good. Rather, the common good is humanity, because it isembodied by the people. If it is only the common good, then it shines
down on every living being and me at the same time. Therefore,
humanity is the reason why there can be consideration (shu), why there
can be love. Thus, consideration is bestowment of humanity and love is
its use.
Zhu Xi’s high regard for these words of Yichuan’s was not only recordedin the work Reflections on Things at Hand (Jinsi lu)30, but appeared also in
29		Cheng Yi , “Yichuan xiansheng yu yi 伊川先生語一 [Sayings of Master Yichuan –Part 1],” see Henan Chengshi yishu, Vol. 15, in Ercheng ji, Vol. 1, p. 153.
30		Zhu Xi, Lü Zuqian 呂祖謙, Jinsi lu 近思錄 [Reflections on Things at Hand], in Zhang

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19

his Collected Works31 and then again in his Classified Conversations, where
Zhu Xi discussed the very same proposition with his students.32 The constantreoccurrence of this proposition conveys how highly Zhu Xi approved of it.
Yun Sungeo (尹舜擧, courtesy name Nojig 魯直, sobriquet Dongto 童土,
1596-1668) was a Korean Confucian scholar from the 17th century and adescendant of the renowned scholar Sung Hon (成渾, courtesy name Howon
浩原, sobriquet Woogye 牛溪, Moogam 默庵, posthumous name Mungan 文簡,
1535-1598) whose works include Noelungji (魯陵志, Local Gazetteer ofNoelung). Yun opposed the interpretation of humanity as human (ren 人) per
se, as well as the reading of humanity as sensation (jue 覺) or love (ai 愛), andinstead proposed an interpretation which equated the concept of humanitywith the common good (gong 公). He said:33
Humanity is for the human as the origin (yuan 元) is for heaven.
Humanity turns heaven and earth and the myriad things into one single
body. It embraces the five constant virtues, it strings together the myriad
forms of good, it really is the complete virtue of the mind. But, being
the right principle (zheng li 正理) under heaven, it completely overcomes
one’s selfishness, clearing and purifying [one’s mind], and all parts of the
body and mind become well-balanced, regarding all things under heaven
as oneself. By which way (dao 道) is [this achieved]? It is also by
following the common good (gong 公), and that is all. After there is [thecommon good], the atmosphere of life-generating activity (sheng yi 生意)
will arise by itself and day by day become more fulfilled; what one willreside in and what one will issue forth, everything will be the heavenly
principle, and their humanity will be inexhaustible. But if on thecontrary, one is overindulgent and excessively tolerant, then one willenter impropriety and diverge from uprightness. In that case, how could
the person be called humane? [Therefore], by knowing the [principle] of
Boxing 張伯行 ed., Zhengyitang quanshu 正誼堂全書 [A Collection from the ZhengyiHall], Vol. 2, p. 28.
31		Zhu Xi, “Zhijiu menren wenda – da Dong Shuzhong wu 知舊門人問答‧答董叔重五[Conversations with Old Friend and Disciples – An Answer to Dong Shuzhong 5],”in Zhuzi wenji 朱子文集 [Collected Writings of Zhu Xi], Vol. 51, pp. 2331-2332; “Zhijiu menren wenda – Da Chen Anqing san 知舊門人問答‧答陳安卿三 [Conversations
with Old Friend and Disciples – An Answer to Chen Anqing 3],” in Zhuzi wenji 朱子文集 [Collected Writings of Zhu Xi], Vol. 57, pp. 2777-2778.
32		Li Jingde ed., Wang Xingxian comm., Zhuzi yulei, Vol. 95, pp. 2452-2455.
33		Yun Sungeo 尹舜擧, “Jabjeo – Gong choegeun in se 雜著‧公最近仁說 [Miscellaneous
Writings – The Doctrine of Gong as the Closest to Humanity],” See Dongto seonsaeng munjib 童土先生文集 [Collected Works of Master Dongto], Book 1, Vol. 5, in
Hanguk yoktae munjip chongso, Vol. 2353, pp. 199-201.

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Journal of Cultural Interaction in East Asia Vol. 11 2020

common good (gong) one completely fathoms the method of humanity.
Indeed! Because the heavenly way is selfless, the cycle of four seasons
goes on. When the living things are prosperous (heng 亨) and the way ofhumanity attains the common good (gong), the four sprouts are fulfilled,
and the hundred endeavors will succeed. That being the case, the role oforigination (yuan 元) among the four virtues is equal to the role ofhumanity among the five constant virtues. And selflessness equals thecommon good (gong), and nothing else. Then, in the form of thecommon good one can observe the whole substance of humanity.
One could say: In that case, could we now not directly say that common
good is humanity? To which, one could respond: No. The common good
[we are speaking about] is only assisting humanity, so that it is definitely
the case that one cannot simply refer to humanity by calling it thecommon good. And it is as a result of this that the principle of humanity
resides in common good. How can we say that? Now, if we assume thata mirror stands as a metaphor for a human being, then humanity is thelight shining upon it, and common good is the cleanliness (wu chen 無塵“without dust”) of its surface. If on the mirror there is no speck of dust,
it can reflect the light shining upon it. Similarly, if a person is without asingle particle of selfish desire, he can perfect his humanity. But if themirror is dusty, so that its illumination is obscured, then it is not something I would choose to call “a mirror.” Thus, if a person has desires,
they extinguish and harm his acting for the common good, and such aperson cannot be called humane. What I deem to be the meaning of
humanity is to subdue one’s selfishness. By being selfless one acts forthe common good. When one acts for the common good, humanity isalready at hand. Thus, humanity is not far away from acting for thecommon good. Supposing that the common good is embodied by aperson, then that person will be able to sense (jue 覺), to love, to feel
empathy (shu 恕), to like and dislike people, to straighten the others. In
that way, one will attain the highest point of the way, which has one
principle and many manifestations (li yi fen shu 理一分殊), becoming
appropriately settled in all places. In my opinion, this is how closehumanity is to common good. Because of this proximity, humanity illuminates all things together with myself, it embraces and penetrates
everything, and is able to turn all under heaven into one family and the
Middle kingdom into one person. Every living being, which takes a form
between heaven and earth, be it an animal or a plant, having or nothaving emotions, they all obey their nature (xing 性) when bringing theirlife (sheng 生) to realization. The greatness of humanity’s meritorious use
goes so far as to assist one in one’s establishment (position) and inner

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21

nourishment, so that one attains a sage’s ability to perform tasks. The
words “to widely extend benefit and aid the masses” does not adequately
describe it. Confucius said: “The nobleman embodies humanity (ti ren 體仁) to the extent that he can lead people.” Therefore, it is said that when
he wishes to be established himself, he establishes other people, when hewishes to attain something, he makes other people succeed. And if for
one single day he overcomes his self and returns to ritual propriety, allunder heaven will follow and revert to humanity. In the humanity of asage, the common good should be esteemed and valued in this manner,and no other way. I have never seen that a person was able to become
humane by not working for the common good in this manner.
In the above excerpt, Yun Sungeo at first follows along Cheng Yichuan’sand Zhu Xi’s train of thought, expressing the idea that “humanity forms one
single body with heaven and earth and the myriad things,” yet in turnproposes the definition of humanity as “to subdue one’s selfishness,” andasserts that “by being selfless one acts for the common good” and that“humanity is not far away from acting for the common good.” In that way, heprovides a detailed exposition of Cheng Yichuan’s and Zhu Xi’s proposition
that “the common good is the moral principle of humanity” within the spectrum of antagonism between gong 公 (“common good; commonality”) and si
私 (“selfishness; privateness”). Compared to Cheng Yichuan’s and Zhu Xi’s
simplistic manner of expression and their concise use of words, Yun’s way ofreasoning was fairly meticulous and prolix.
As I have already pointed out in one of my previous studies, in the pre-Qin
philosophy of Confucius and Mencius it was still advocated that the domainof the “common good” (gong 公) is an expansion and extension of the domainof the “private self” (si 私, or “selfishness”). It was only with Xunzi (荀子,around 298-238 BCE), a successor to the Confucian school from the late
Warring States period (475-221 BCE), that the distinction between gong 公and si 私 started being made. Ultimately, from the 10th century on, theNorthern Song Neo-Confucians all started advocating the precedence of gongover si, and subsequently, in the Southern Song period, Zhu Xi further
stressed the antagonism between “the common good of the heavenly principle” and “the selfishness of human desires.”34 Then, following Zhu Xi’s
34		Cf. Chun-chieh Huang 黃俊傑, “Dongya jinshi rujia dui “gong” “si” lingyu fenji desikao: Cong Mengzi yu Tao Ying de duihua chufa 東亞近世儒者對 “公” “私” 領域分
際的思考: 從孟子與桃應的對話出發 [East Asian Modern Confucians’ Reflections on
the Boundaries Between the Domains of the Common Good and the Private:
Proceeding from the Dialogue Between Mencius and Tao Ying],” in Chun-chieh
Huang, Dongya Ruxue: jingdian yu quanshi de bianzheng 東亞儒學: 經典與詮釋的辯

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philosophy, in his work Benmei 辨名 (Distinguishing the Meanings of Terms),
the 17th century Japanese Confucian Ogyū Sorai (荻生徂徠, Butsu Mokei 物茂卿, 1666-1728) intensified the antagonism by strongly distinguishing between
the notions of “common good” and “privateness.”35 Maruyama Masao (丸山真男, 1914-1996) maintained that this kind of intensive differentiation
between kō 公 and shi 私, as present in Ogyū Sorai’s philosophy, represented
one of the most important turning points in Japanese intellectual history.36
Thus, it was within the context of the East Asian intellectual history of theconcepts gong 公 and si 私 that the 17th century Korean Confucian Yun Sungeo
proposed his interpretation of humanity as common good. Nevertheless, when
Yun Sungeo put forward the above-mentioned interpretation, he only
provided a detailed exposition of the standpoint previously taken by Cheng
Yichuan and Zhu Xi, namely that the concept gong 公 represents the methodof putting humanity into practice, and did not at the same time explicitly statethat gong 公 cannot be treated as entirely equal to humanity. As a matter offact, this problem was not properly clarified before the 18th century, when
Kim Nakhaeng pointed out that: “As far as I can see, the common good(gong) is something that embodies humanity, but is not the body of humanity.
If we now apply the theory, which says that it is something by whichhumanity is embodied, into the doctrine, which says that it is the body ofhumanity, this is exactly what was rebuked by Master Cheng, and what Zhu
Xi called confused talk.”37 Kim’s statement conveys his profound understanding of the problem, even to the extent that we could call it an exact
explanation of the sentence “the common good (gong) is the principle ofhumanity.”

5. Conclusion

In this article we have analyzed and discussed the opinions expressed in
the Korean Confucians’ debates on Zhu Xi’s discourse on ren 仁. In order toprovide a more focused discussion, we have selected three propositions most
證 [East Asian Confucianisms: The Dialectics between Classics and Hermeneutics](Taipei: NTU press, 2007), pp. 395-418; Chun-chieh East Asian Confucianisms:
Texts in Contexts (GÖttingen and Taipei: V & R unipress and NTU press, 2015),
Chapter 3, pp. 57-80.
35		Ogyū Sorai 荻生徂徠, Benmei 辨名 [Distinguishing the Meanings of Terms], in Inoue
Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎, Kanie Yoshimaru 蟹江義丸 eds., Nihon rinri ihen 日本倫理彙編[Japanese Writings on Ethics](Tokyo: Ikuseikai, 1901-1903), Book 6, Vol. 1, p. 69.
36		Cf. Maruyama Masao 丸山真男, Nihon seiji shisōshi kenkyū 日本政治思想史研究[Studies in History of Japanese Political Thought](Tokyo: Tokyo Universiy Press,
1952), p. 80.
37		Kim Nakhaeng, “Dab Yi Gyongmun 答李景文 [An Answer to Yi Gyeongmun],” See
Gusadang jib, Vol. 4, p. 345.

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commonly placed at the center of the Korean Confucians’ discussions,
namely: “humanity is called the principle of love,” “the term ren is explainedas ‘the consciousness of mind’” and “the common good (gong 公, ‘commonality’) is the principle of humanity.” At the same time, we considered Kim
Nakhaeng, Yang Eungsu, Yi Sangjeong and Yun Sungeo as the representative
thinkers who contributed to the above-mentioned discussions, and in turn also
examined the essential points of their discourse on Zhu Xi’s learning on
humanity, as well as the problems hidden underneath their surface. Having
closely examined the above-mentioned material, it is quite apparent that, incomparison with the Japanese Confucians, the Korean Confucian scholars
were able to delve deeper into the intellectual world of Zhu Xi.
Consequently, they were also able to penetrate deeper into the “hermeneuticalcircle” of Zhu Xi’s philosophy. They also demonstrated a refined use oflanguage and a skill to compose cogent and lucid texts that were unlike anyothers.
However, if we compare them with the Tokugawa Japanese Confucians,
who before having reached middle-age were still deeply immersed in Zhu
Xi’s philosophy, and yet after having reached this age mostly abandoned or
criticized Zhu Xi, the Korean Confucians, in contrast, can be said to haveremained completely immersed in Zhu Xi’s philosophy. It appears that they
made Zhu Xi’s philosophy their spiritual homeland and were not contented
until they had become perfectly familiar with every single detail of theirrealm, so that, in consequence, their interpretations of Zhu Xi’s learning on
humanity contained an abundance of conservative thought and lacked innovativeness. To give an example: in his interpretation of the teaching that“humanity is named the principle of love,” Kim Nakhaeng had fully grasped
the fact that Zhu Xi’s “principle of love” belonged to the domain of ontology,
yet was still entirely unaware of the problems that a theory such as Zhu Xi’smight involve. Yi Sangjeong followed Zhu Xi’s reasoning and refuted thetheory which equated humanity with consciousness (jue 覺, also ‘sensation,
feeling’), but had not the slightest idea of the fact that Zhu Xi himself
misinterpreted the meaning of the character jue 覺 in the first place. Similarly,
even though Yun Sungeo was able to elaborate on and elucidate the content
of the sentence “the common good (gong 公) is the principle of humanity,” hewas not able to really grasp the idea that the common good (gong) is themethod by which humanity is embodied (ti ren 體仁) and not the body(substance) of humanity (ren zhi ti 仁之體). In the same manner, all theseexamples strongly illustrate that Korean Confucians were shrouded under theauthority of the interpretation given by Zhu Xi’s study of humanity, to thepoint that their reformulation of the old exceeded their capability to invent thenew.