Narushige Michishita

Playing the Same Game:North Korea’s Coercive
Attempt at U.S.
ReconciliationT

he nuclear and missile capabilities of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) are certainly improving, but that does not mean its
strategy has changed. Those who argue that Pyongyang has abandoned
diplomacy and chosen a military path risk missing the point: nuclear weaponsand missiles are the means, not the ends. North Korea is actually taking
necessary steps to prepare for future talks with the United States. In other words,
North Korea is playing the same game again.
Three major diplomatic cards are on the negotiating table between North
Korea and the United States: the nuclear issue, the missile issue, and the issue ofsigning a peace treaty or agreement. During the Bush years, the missile and peaceissues were missing from the scene largely because the United States was notinterested in seriously engaging North Korea and declined Pyongyang’s
suggestion to negotiate a deal on missiles.1 Although North Korean nuclear
and missile tests must be strongly condemned, its recent actions suggest that thecountry has taken a note of the Obama administration’s willingness to engage
and has started to prepare for future negotiations by strengthening its bargaining
position.

Narushige Michishita is an assistant professor of the Security and International Studies
Program at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo. A specialistin strategic and Japan/Korea studies, he is author of North Korea’s Military-DiplomaticCampaigns, 1966—2008 (Routledge, September 2009). He may be reached at michi@grips.
ac.jp.
Copyright # 2009 Center for Strategic and International Studies
The Washington Quarterly • 32:4 pp. 139152
DOI: 10.1080/01636600903221924
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY/ j OCTOBER 2009139

Narushige Michishita

North Korean Prenegotiation Moves
While the Obama administration was making overtures for improved relations to
Pyongyang, a variant of the Taepodong-2 missile was launched by North Korea
on April 5, 2009, followed by a second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, and Scudand No-dong missile tests on July 4, 2009. Although these events startled theinternational community, they were not shocking and certainly not unlike North
Korea.
When North Korea first announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993, it was just after President Bill Clinton andPresident Kim Young-sam of South Korea were inaugurated. In fact, Kim Youngsam had reached out to North Korea. In his inaugural speech, he had expressed
his willingness to improve relations with his brethren in the north by saying,‘‘No alliance partner can be more important than the [Korean] nation.’’2 As aresult, North Korea’s withdrawal took both presidents by surprise. Similarly,
when North Korea launched a Taepodong-1
missile in 1998, Kim Dae-jung had justorth Korea’s
become president of South Korea. Similar
recent tests areto his predecessor, he had initiated an
engagement policy toward North Korea
actually preparations
dubbed the Sunshine Policy, which Northfor future
Korea immediately snubbed by launchingnegotiations.
the Taepodong-1.
Were these launches a rational move by
North Korea? There seems to be historicalevidence that they were indeed. If North Korea’s moves are viewed as rational, it
will be easier to predict their future actions, undermining the type ofbrinkmanship diplomacy practiced by the North Koreans. Maintaining a levelof ambiguity, therefore, is in North Korea’s interest, especially because it has
seemed to work. The U.S.—DPRK Agreed Framework, which required theUnited States to make arrangements for the provision of light water reactors andheavy fuel oil to North Korea in exchange for the DPRK freezing its graphitemoderated reactors and related reprocessing facilities and eventuallydismantling them, was signed in October 1994, 17 months after North Korea’s
announcement to withdraw from the NPT.3 Kim Dae-jung had a summit
meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in June 2000, a year and 10
months after the Taepodong-1 launch, followed by an October 2000 visit by U.S.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang.
So even though the Obama administration just became the latest target ofNorth Korean brinkmanship diplomacy, it seems that North Korea’s behavior has
been quite rational.

N

140

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY/ j OCTOBER 2009

Playing the Same GameNorth Korea’s Negotiating Agenda
North Korea’s relationship with the United States peaked toward the end of the
Clinton administration, when Vice Marshal Jo Myong-Rok visited Washington,
D.C. as a special envoy of Kim Jong-il in October 2000, and Albrightreciprocated by visiting Pyongyang in the same month. At that time, the twocountries were discussing three major issues: nuclear development, missile export
and development, and the establishment of a new peace mechanism.

Nuclear Items
Fast forward to June this year, North Korea took a surprising step to prepare
for future negotiations on a nuclear deal. It announced that it would beginenriching uranium and had decided to build its own light water reactors.4 Thisannouncement was significant for two reasons. First, North Korea acknowledgedthat it now has a uranium-enrichment program. North Korea’s secret program toproduce highly enriched uranium (HEU) has been one of the most importantstumbling blocks in nuclear talks. Since October 2002, the United States has
accused North Korea of possessing an HEU program for nuclear weapons, but
Pyongyang has always refused to acknowledge such a claim, even though North
Korea had already implied in past discussions that such a program was in place byhinting that it would be willing to negotiate on the program. In 2002, Kang Sok-ju,
first vice foreign minister and Jong-il’s right-hand man, reportedly said, ‘‘What iswrong with us having our own uranium enrichment program? We are entitled topossess our own HEU, and we are bound to produce more powerful weapons thanthat.’’ Kang Sok-ju also said that North Korea considered the 1994 Agreed
Framework nullified and stated that the DPRK would resolve this issue if theUnited States concluded a nonaggression treaty with the DPRK, lifted theembargo on North Korea and stopped interfering with Japanese—North Korean
normalization, normalized relations with the DPRK, and compensated North
Korea for previous delays in light water reactor construction.5 Now that North
Korea has acknowledged possessing the uranium-enrichment program, it is on thetable to be negotiated.
Second, the announcement highlighted North Korea’s continued interest in alight water reactor. After the second nuclear crisis erupted in 2002, the lightwater reactor project, which was promised under the Agreed Framework, wassuspended in 2003. As part of the negotiations that followed, the Joint
Statement adopted in September 2005 stated that the non-North Koreanparties to the Six-Party Talks were willing to discuss the provision of light water
reactors to the DPRK at an appropriate time.6 Nevertheless, just after the Joint
Statement was adopted, the United States announced that the ‘‘appropriate
time’’ for providing light water reactors to the DPRK would only come when
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY/ j OCTOBER 2009141

Narushige Michishita

North Korea had eliminated all nuclear
weapons and nuclear programs and was
yongyang has tested
complying fully with the NPT and thenew presidents twice
North Korean safeguards agreement with
the International Atomic Energy Agency
before.
(IAEA).7 North Korea was quick to
respond. On the next day, the North
Korean Foreign Ministry declared that
the United States ‘‘should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK’s
dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing LWRs [light water
reactors], a physical guarantee for confidence-building.’’8 In May 2006, however,the light water reactor project was terminated. In July, North Korea conducted
multiple missile launch exercises and then the first nuclear test in October.
North Korea’s announcement in June 2009 should be interpreted as a clear signalthat the provision of light water reactors should be discussed in future talks.

P

Missile Talks
Meanwhile, serious negotiations on missiles had started between the UnitedStates and North Korea in mid-1999 in response to former U.S. Secretary of
Defense William Perry’s suggestion to engage North Korea more proactively. The
DPRK proposed a moratorium on missile tests for the first time in June 1999.9 In
the meantime, Pyongyang started preparations for another missile test andconducted engine-burning and fueling tests.10 By early August 1999, a
Taepodong missile had been assembled and stored in a site near the launching
pad just as another round of U.S.—DPRK talks convened in Geneva.
In September 1999, North Korea had stopped preparations and agreed not tolaunch missiles while talks with the United States were underway, and theClinton administration subsequently decided to ease some sanctions against
North Korea in return.11 When Jo Myong-Rok visited Washington, D.C. in
October 2000, the two sides issued the U.S.—DPRK Joint Communiqué andagreed that resolution of the missile issue would make ‘‘an essential contribution
to a fundamentally improved relationship between them and to peace andsecurity in the Asia—Pacific region.’’12 During Albright’s visit to Pyongyang, Kim
Jong-il suggested that the United States sponsor satellite launches for North
Korean use so that North Korea would not further its indigenous missile
testing.13 In addition, he promised not to produce, test, or deploy missiles with arange of more than 500 kilometers; offered to halt all missile exports; and asked
for $1 billion worth of nonmonetary assistance such as food or coal.14 Several
issues, however, remained unresolved, such as verification, the question of
missiles already deployed, and the value of the nonmonetary aid that North
Korea should receive.15
142

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY/ j OCTOBER 2009

Playing the Same GameNorth Korea characterized the Taepodong-2 launched in April 2009 as asatellite launch vehicle but remained silent about Scud and No-dong missiles
launched in July.16 In fact, North Korea had characterized the Taepodong-1 test
in 1998 as an attempt to launch a satellite before suggesting in 2000 that theUnited States sponsor satellite launches for North Korean use.17 North Korea
seems to be dividing the missile issue into two parts again: a missile issue and a‘‘satellite’’ issue. It will likely seek two separate deals on missiles in the future
based on such a distinction.

Peace Agreement
By launching missiles and conducting another nuclear test in the late spring of
2009, North Korea has unilaterally put nuclear and missile issues on thenegotiation table with the Obama administration. The only remaining issue tobe addressed is the establishment of a new peace mechanism. More specifically,
North Korea has long sought to replace the 1953 Armistice Agreement with apeace agreement in order to legally put an end to the confrontation with theUnited States. To resume the talks on this issue, North Korea will likely raise
tensions in the Yellow Sea, the Demilitarized Zone, or the Joint Security Area in
Panmunjom in the near future.
The North Koreans will contend that military tension is rising and the dangerof war is looming large on the Korean Peninsula; the current armisticemechanism is not functioning, and so the situation will escalate; and in order
to avoid another war, the United States and the DPRK must conclude a peaceagreement and establish a new peace mechanism. Then they will take military
actions to create the reality to fit their logic.
Although less visible than nuclear and missile tests, North Korea has alreadybeen taking measures to put this issue on the table. In January 2009, the generalstaff of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) warned that it would take measures todefend the ‘‘military demarcation line’’ in the Yellow Sea, which it had
unilaterally established in 1999, if South Korean vessels continued to violate
North Korean ‘‘territorial waters’’ in the Yellow Sea. It also predicted that the‘‘illegal’’ Northern Limit Line (NLL), a quasi-maritime borderline drawn by theUnited Nations Command in 1953 to separate the North and the South, would
disappear.18 In February 2009, the North Korean delegation demanded that the
UN Command be dissolved.19 In parallel with these pronouncements, the KPA
increased its military activities in the Yellow Sea near two South Korean offshoreislands. By May 2009, intensity of coastal gun fire exercises had doubled from theprevious year, and six times as many sorties of fighter aircraft had flown in thearea as in the last year. North Korean vessels crossed the NLL three times in
February and March 2009.20
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY/ j OCTOBER 2009143

Narushige Michishita

At the same time, North Korea hasreactivated a venue to address this issue. At
here are three
the request of the KPA, the General-Officers’
major diplomatic
Talks between the UN Command and the
KPA convened in March 2009 for the firstcards on thetime since 2002.21 The General-Officers’
negotiating table, notTalks have practically replaced the Military
just the nuclear issue.
Armistice Commission as the most important
administrative body to deal with armisticerelated issues due to the North Korean effort
to invalidate the existing armistice mechanism.
These actions are also a rerun of North Korean actions in the 1990s. In 1993,
North Korea started to claim that peace on the Korean Peninsula could be
realized only if the Armistice Agreement was replaced by a peace agreement andthe U.S.-led UN Command was dissolved.22 In 1994, North Korea proposed theestablishment of a new peace mechanism to the United States.23 Then in 1996,
it suggested that the two countries sign a ‘‘tentative agreement’’ that would
replace the Armistice Agreement until a peace agreement was concluded.24
Against this backdrop, North Korea embarked on a military-diplomatic offensive
in 1999 to nullify the Armistice Agreement by challenging the legal status of the
NLL. As a result, a major exchange of fire took place between North and South
Korean navies in June 1999. But more surprisingly, the United States secretly
suggested three separate peace agreements to South Korea in July: one between
the United States and North Korea, one between the two Koreas, and one
among these three countries plus China. Although South Korea rejected this
proposal, North Korea’s military-diplomatic campaigns were bearing fruit.25 In
September 1999, the KPA General Staff unilaterally announced theestablishment of the ‘‘Military Demarcation Line at the West Sea of Korea’’and claimed that, by avoiding discussion of the NLL, the United States hadabandoned its ‘‘duty under the Korean Armistice Agreement.’’26

T

The U.S. Response
Even after the missile and nuclear tests, the United States has expressed
willingness to engage with North Korea. On June 11, 2009, Ambassador Stephen
Bosworth, special representative for North Korea policy, revealed a ‘‘fourpronged strategy’’ toward North Korea, which emphasized close regional
consultation and cooperation, UN and national sanctions, defensive measures,and diplomatic engagement to negotiate a path to denuclearization if North
Korea showed serious willingness. Bosworth reiterated U.S. policy not to
144

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY/ j OCTOBER 2009

Playing the Same Game

threaten to change the North Korean regime through force and its continued
commitment to the September 2005 Joint Statement.27
The United States is willing to address not only nuclear and missile issues, butalso signing a peace treaty with North Korea. On this point, Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton stated in February:
If North Korea is genuinely prepared to completely and verifiably eliminate their
nuclear weapons program, the Obama Administration will be willing to normalizebilateral relations, replace the peninsula’s longstanding armistice agreements with apermanent peace treaty, and assist in meeting the energy and other economic needsof the North Korean people.28

This position did not change after the nuclear and missiles tests. On June 9,2009, Bosworth envisioned the future of Northeast Asia as including ‘‘adenuclearized North Korea, a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula toreplace the Armistice of 1953 and normal, interlocking relations among all
countries, including the DPRK and the United States.’’29 On June 11, 2009, he
expressed his willingness to talk with the North Koreans about the normalizationof relations and about new arrangements that might replace the 1953
armistice.30

Risks and Limits
Despite the indications that both sides are paving the way for eventual talks,
there remain risks and limits. For one, talks might not produce positive results.
For another, North Korea’s improved nuclear and missile capabilities, combinedwith the ongoing succession process in Pyongyang, have heightened risks.
Pyongyang’s ReluctanceFuture talks between the United States and North Korea might not produce
good results. North Korea’s brinkmanship diplomacy has produced fairly
beneficial, but not outstanding, results for Pyongyang since 1993. For example,
the 1994 Agreed Framework was good, but North Korea failed to obtain a lightwater reactor in the end. Its active missile diplomacy in the late 1990s resulted in
the 2000 U.S.—DPRK Joint Communiqué, but diplomatic normalization was notachieved. In 2006, North Korea successfully used nuclear coercion to force theBush administration to reengage with it and remove it from the list of state
sponsors of terrorism. Yet, the U.S.—DPRK relationship did not improve too
much.
Despite the tension arising from North Korea’s brinkmanship diplomacy, its
policy objective since the end of the Cold War has been simply to preserve its
regime by exercising coercion and caution. Normalization, or at least improving
its relations with the United States, was the most important means of achieving
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY/ j OCTOBER 2009145

Narushige Michishita

that goal. North Korea might fail to achieve this ultimate goal of normalizing
relations with the United States again if it continues to be too coercive or too
cautious.
Improved Nuclear Capabilities
North Korea’s improved nuclear capabilities have exacerbated the potential risks
in future contingencies, such as North Korea’s collapse. North Korea is believed
to have produced 40 to 50 kilograms of plutonium, which is enough for five toeight nuclear bombs. The two nuclear tests have reduced these numbers toapproximately 26 to 38 kilograms, which is still enough for three to six nuclear
bombs.31 The May 2009 nuclear test proved that North Korea has successfully
manufactured a nuclear device. In 2006, North Korea predicted a four-kiloton
test but achieved less than one kiloton.32 It achieved a much larger nuclear
explosion, however, in the range of several kilotons, in May 2009. Siegfried S.
Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, estimated it to
be in the two- to four-kiloton range.33
The only remaining missing link in determining whether North Korea’s
nuclear weapons have become usable is the issue of miniaturization. In March
2009, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessed that North Korea‘‘may be able to successfully mate a nuclear warhead to a ballistic missile.’’34
Although not a definite answer, it is certainly a scary suggestion.
Improved Missile Capabilities
North Korea fulfilled its most basic goal of successfully launching the variant of
the Taepodong-2 missile in April 2009. It was a success in the sense that the July
2006 missile test had failed disastrously when the missile disintegrated in the airless than on minute after launch.35 In 2009, both the first stage and the second
stage rockets flew smoothly and impacted in the designated areas in the Sea ofJapan and the Pacific Ocean, respectively, as predicted. The missile flew morethan 3,000 kilometers. North Korea now has a ballistic missile capable of striking
Guam.36
Yet, the missile launch failed to achieve what it could have. First, it was not a
full-range flight of a Taepodong-2 missile. The missile is assessed to have a rangeof some 6,000 kilometers with a 1,000-kilogram payload.37 The variant in the
April test flew only half that range, far short of the 7,000 kilometers needed toreach Hawaii. Second, North Korea failed to put a satellite into orbit as it
predicted. The United States estimates the range of a three-stage Taepodong-2 tobe 15,000 kilometers with a small amount of payload.38 With this, North Korea
could deliver the small payload, be it a biological or chemical weapon, to New
York or Washington, D.C. Although its impact would have been largely
psychological instead of military, its implications for future U.S.—DPRK talks
146

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY/ j OCTOBER 2009

Playing the Same Game

could have been significant. The third stage did not separate in the April launch,however. In other words, North Korea failed to demonstrate rudimentaryintercontinental ballistic missile capabilities in the test. Finally, North Korea
failed to conduct a useful warhead reentry test. It is not clear what was loaded in
the third stage, but warhead separation did not take place.
These limits of the April missile test are not necessarily a blessing to South
Korea and Japan. Although the international attention has largely been focusedon Taepodong missiles, what really matters to South Korea and Japan are Scud andNo-dong missiles, respectively. Scud missiles are capable of attacking anywhere in
South Korea, with hundreds deployed in the North. The No-dong has a range of
1,300 kilometers with a payload of about 1,000 kilograms.39 A recent report statedthat as many as 320 No-dong missiles have been deployed.40 In fact, seven Scudand No-dong missiles were all successfully tested on July 4, 2009.41
As a result, North Korea is already capable of attacking South Korea and Japan
with ballistic missiles. Given the DIA’s estimate of North Korea’s ability tominiaturize a nuclear device, North Korea may
be able to use nuclear weapons against Southorth Korea will likely
Korea and Japan today. Consequently, it isimperative that the international community,
raise tensions in theespecially Japan, South Korea, and the United
Yellow Sea, the DMZ,
States, work hard on the second and third items
and/or Panmunjom.
in Bosworth’s announced four-pronged strategy,
namely the sanctions to prevent North Korea
from engaging in the proliferation of dangerous
technologies as well as to dry up funding for its nuclear and missile-related entities
and other companies, and the steps to implement defensive measures aimed atenhancing U.S. military capacity and the extended deterrence provided to its
allies in the region.42

N

Succession
Kim Jong-il reportedly suffered a stroke in 2008. Although his condition has
improved since then, his ability to govern North Korea effectively seems
doubtful. When he dies or if he remains severely incapacitated, his personality
cult in North Korea will be weakened, and an opportunity for change mightarise. Positive change, however, may not necessarily result. A new North Koreanleader can decide to inherit Kim Jong-il’s legacy and govern his country as his
predecessor did. This may not be too difficult, given the highly institutionalized
totalitarian governing system. Most of the top leaders in North Korea have ties
to him and, therefore, are likely to inherit his policies. The most likely successor
is his third son, Kim Jong-un. The second most powerful man in North Korea,
Jang Song-thaek, is the husband of Kim Jong-il’s sister. The fact that the state
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY/ j OCTOBER 2009147

Narushige Michishita

functioned normally while Kim Jong-il
was supposedly hospitalized indicates that
PRK leaders arechange may not be on the horizon.
bold in taking hostile
Quite apart from the new leader’spersonality,
his ability to adopt a new set ofactions, but cautious
policies would be limited by the resourcesin taking positive
available to him. Nuclear weapons andsteps.
ballistic missiles are the only internationally competitive policy tools that North
Korea possesses. The DPRK’s geostrategic
position would not be changed by succession.
In fact, succession in North Korea might mean more to the international
community and highly concerned countries such as the United States than toNorth Korea itself. A change of top leadership in North Korea will likely
enhance policy flexibility in Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Kim
Jong-il’s record as a perpetrator of the abduction of South Korean and Japanesecitizens in the 1970s and 1980s, the Rangoon incident and the bombing of a
Korean Air passenger aircraft in the 1980s, and massive human rights violations
throughout his rule have remained major obstacles for the governments in all
three democracies to normalize relations with North Korea. If a new leader in
Pyongyang could plausibly claim that he was not involved in the major incidents
or past human rights violations, it would make it much easier for the threedemocracies to talk to the new leader and look for ways to normalize relations
with his country. In a way, a stereotypical dictator such as Kim Jong-il affords anopportunity for the future leaders of North Korea. When he goes, he could takemost of the historical baggage with him.
There is certainly a limit to these positive implications. Most of North Korea’s
top leaders are related to Kim Jong-il and, therefore, are not free fromaccusations that they were collaborators rather than reformers. If Kim Jong-un
is to succeed Kim Jong-il, he must find ways to do so without inheriting hisfather’s negative historical baggage. The good news for the new leader is that, if
he fulfills the minimum necessary demands of North Korea’s neighbors fordecency in the conduct of internal and external policies, they might be willingto support him and his self-characterization as a new and open-minded leader
with whom they can do business in order to avoid instability or the possible
eruption of a crisis and to resolve pending issues.

D

The Way to Go
North Korean leaders are bold in taking negative, hostile actions but extremely
cautious in taking positive, conciliatory steps. They risked war in the nuclear
148

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY/ j OCTOBER 2009

Playing the Same Game

crisis of 1994, and they failed to take theoffer made by the Clinton administration to
hat will make anormalize relations in 2000. They agreed todifference is how the‘‘disable’’ part of their nuclear program but did
not go any further.
United States plays the
From Pyongyang’s perspective, this mightgame this time.
actually be the optimal strategy. North Korean
brinkmanship diplomacy has been executed ina halfhearted manner and has produced
commensurately mediocre results. The reason behind this is the dilemma that
North Korea faces: it could obtain large gains if it completely abandoned its
nuclear and missile programs, but once it did, it would be left with no effective
policy leverage. Nobody knows better than Kim Jong-il what his portfolio of policy
options looks like and how solid or fragile his regime might be. It is perfectly
natural that North Korean leaders try to play some cards but keep others.
By now, North Korea has used every possible tool in its brinkmanshipdiplomacy. North Korea will keep playing the same game. What will make adifference is how the United States plays the game this time. Robust engagement,
including an option to normalize U.S.—DPRK relations, combined with strenuous
counterproliferation and defensive efforts is the way to go.

W

Notes
1.

2.

3.

4.

The missile issue did not become a major topic in the Six-Party Talks although theNorth Korean side actually suggested it be one. North Korea proposed a ‘‘package
solution’’ in 2003. According to the proposal, the United States would conclude a
nonaggression treaty with the DPRK, establish diplomatic relations with it, guarantee
economic cooperation between the DPRK and Japan and between two Koreas, andcompensate North Korea for the loss of electricity caused by the delayed provision oflight water reactors and complete their construction. In return, North Korea would not
make nuclear weapons, accept nuclear inspections, eventually dismantle its nuclear
facilities, freeze missile tests, and stop missile exports. See ‘‘Keynote Speeches Made at
Six-way Talks,’’ Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), August 29, 2003, http://
www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200308/news08/30.htm.
Kim Young Sam Daetongryeong Yeonseolmunjip, Vol. 1, February 25, 1993—January 31,
1994 (Seoul: Daetongryeong Biseosil, 1994), p. 59 (given before the National Assemblyin Seoul on February 25, 1993).
See Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), ‘‘Agreed Framework
Between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea,’’ October 21, 2004, http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf.
‘‘DPRK Foreign Ministry Declares Strong Counter-Measures Against UNSC’s‘Resolution 1874,’’’ KCNA, June 13, 2009, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200906/
news13/20090613-10ee.html.

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY/ j OCTOBER 2009149

Narushige Michishita
5.
6.

7.

8.
9.

10.

11.

12.
13.

14.

15.
16.
17.
18.

19.
20.

150

See Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Nuclear Crisis(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), pp. 94—95.
‘‘Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,’’ Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 19, 2005, http://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t212707.htm.
Embassy of the United States in Beijing, ‘‘Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R.
Hill’s Statement at the Closing Plenary of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,’’
September 19, 2005, http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/0919p.html (press release).
‘‘Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Six-Party Talks,’’ KCNA, September 20,
2005, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2005/200509/news09/21.htm.
Joel Stephen Wit, interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 27, 2002 (former U.S.
Department of State official); Robert Carlin, e-mail communication with author,
February 24, 2008.
Yoon Young Chan, ‘‘The North Conducted a Taepodong Missile Engine Burn Test in
Early Last Month,’’ Dong-A Ilbo, June 21, 1999, p. 1, http://www.kinds.or.kr/ (in Korean);
Koichi Kosuge, ‘‘North Korea Conducted a Rocket Burn Test, U.S. Satellites Detected,
Thought to be for the Taepodong-2 Missile,’’ Asahi Shimbun, June 24, 1999,
p. 1 (in Japanese).
Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, ‘‘Easing Sanctions Against North
Korea,’’ September 17, 1999, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/
1999/990917-dprk-wh1.htm; Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, ‘‘Easing
Sanctions Against North Korea,’’ September 17, 1999, http://www.fas.org/news/dprk/
1999/990917-dprk-wh2.htm (fact sheet); ‘‘DPRK Not to Launch Missile,’’ KCNA,
September 24, 1999, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/1999/9909/news09/24.htm.
‘‘U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué,’’ Washington, D.C., October 12, 2000, http://www.
nautilus.org/archives/pub/ftp/napsnet/special_reports/US-DPRK_Joint_Communique.txt.
Madeleine K. Albright, press conference, Pyongyang, October 24, 2000, http://
www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB164/10_24_00%20Albright%20press%20
conference%20in%20North%20Korea.pdf.
Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: Miramax Books, 2003),
p. 465; Michael R. Gordon, ‘‘How Politics Sank Accord on Missiles With North
Korea,’’ New York Times, March 6, 2001, p. A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/06/
world/06MISS.html; Nam Mun Hee, ‘‘North Korea Promised to Abandon No Dong
Missile Development,’’ Sisa Jeonal, no. 597 (April 5, 2001), http://www.sisapress.com/
news/articleView.html?idxno 21895# (interview with National Assembly National
Defense Committee Chairman Chun Yong Taek) (in Korean).
Gordon, ‘‘How Politics Sank Accord on Missiles With North Korea.’’‘‘KCNA on DPRK’s Successful Launch of Satellite Kwangmyongsong-2,’’ KCNA, April
5, 2009, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200904/news05/20090405-11ee.html.
‘‘Successful Launch of First Satellite in DPRK,’’ KCNA, September 4, 1998, http://
www.kcna.co.jp/item/1998/9809/news09/04.htm#1.
See ‘‘Principled Stand of KPA to Defend Socialist Country as Firm as Iron Wall
Clarified,’’ KCNA, January 17, 2009, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200901/news17/
20090117-10ee.html.
‘‘DPRK Delegate on UN Peace-keeping Operations,’’ KCNA, March 3, 2009, http://
www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200903/news03/20090303-02ee.html.
Yoo Yong Won, ‘‘The North Intensifies Gun Fire and Fighter Aircraft Sorties by Two to
Six Times Near Baengnyeongdo and Yeonpyeongdo,’’ Chosun Ilbo, May 9, 2009, http://
news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2009/05/09/2009050900052.html (in Korean).
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY/ j OCTOBER 2009

Playing the Same Game
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.

26.
27.

28.

29.
30.
31.

32.
33.

34.

35.
36.

37.
38.

Public Affairs Office, United States Forces Korea, ‘‘UN Command and North Koreans
Hold Talks,’’ 090302-1, March 2, 2009, http://www.usfk.mil/usfk/ShowArticle.aspx?
ID184 (press release).
‘‘Our Republic Will Be Faithful to the Cause of Global Independence, Says Head of
DPRK Delegation at 48th Session of UNGA,’’ Pyongyang Times, October 16, 1993, p. 8.
‘‘FM Urges U.S. to Respond to DPRK’s Peace Proposal,’’ Pyongyang Times, May 7, 1994,
pp. 1 and 3.
‘‘Three Point Proposal for Peace Mechanism,’’ Pyongyang Times, March 2, 1996, p. 1.
Lee Jong-seok, ‘‘Debate on Establishing the Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula:
Issues and the Search for Alternatives,’’ Sejong Jeongchaek Yeongu 4, no. 1 (2008): 20,
http://www.sejong.org/Pub_st/PUB_ST_DATA/k7.PDF (in Korean).
‘‘Special Communiqué of KPA General Staff,’’ KCNA, September 2, 1999, http://
www.kcna.co.jp/item/1999/9909/news09/02.htm.
Stephen Bosworth, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 11,2009, http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/BosworthTestimony090611p.pdf (hereinafter Bosworth testimony).
Hillary Rodham Clinton, ‘‘U.S. and Asia: Two Transatlantic and Transpacific Powers’’(remarks, Asia Society, New York, February 13, 2009), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
rm/2009a/02/117333.htm.
Stephen W. Bosworth, ‘‘Remarks at the Korea Society Annual Dinner,’’ Washington,
D.C., June 9, 2009, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2009/06/124567.htm.
Bosworth testimony.
Siegfried S. Hecker, ‘‘Report of Visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of North
Korea (DPRK): Pyongyang and the Nuclear Center at Yongbyon,’’ Center forInternational Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, February 12—16, 2008,
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22146/HeckerDPRKreport.pdf.
Ibid., p. 3.
See Blaine Harden, ‘‘North Korean Nuclear Blast Draws Global Condemnation,’’Washington Post, May 26, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/05/25/AR2009052501672.html. See also United States Geological Survey(USGS), ‘‘Magnitude 4.3 - North Korea,’’ October 9, 2006, http://earthquake.usgs.gov/
eqcenter/eqinthenews/2006/ustqab/; USGS, ‘‘Magnitude 4.7 - North Korea,’’ May 25,
2009, http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/recenteqsww/Quakes/us2009hbaf.php.
Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, ‘‘Annual Threat Assessment,’’ statement before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 10, 2009, p. 26, http://www.dia.mil/
publicaffairs/Testimonies/statement_31.pdf.
Japanese Ministry of Defense, ‘‘Summary Press Meeting With Minister Nukaga,’’
September 15, 2006, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/kisha/2006/09/15.html (in Japanese).
For the details of the launch, see Japanese Ministry of Defense, ‘‘On the North Korean
Missile Launch,’’ May 15, 2009, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/bmd/20090515.html (inJapanese).
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2008 (Tokyo: Urban Connections,2009), p. 36.
Brig. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly, ‘‘Missile Defense Program Overview for the Washington
Roundtable on Science and Public Policy’’ (presentation, Missile Defense Agency,
Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., January 29, 2007), p. 4, http://www.marshall.
org/pdf/materials/495.pdf; Brig. Gen. Patrick J. O’Reilly, speech, George C. Marshall
Institute on U.S. Missile Defense, Washington, D.C., January 29, 2007, http://video.
aol.com/video-detail/george-c-marshall-institute-on-us-missile-defense/161178968.

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY/ j OCTOBER 2009151

Narushige Michishita
39.

40.
41.

42.

152

Shigeru Ishiba, testimony before the House of Councilors Budget Committee, March 5,
2003, http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION24405&
SAVED_RID2&PAGE0&POS0&TOTAL0&SRV_ID8&DOC_ID7213&
DPAGE1&DTOTAL13&DPOS13&SORT_DIR1&SORT_TYPE0&MODE
1&DMY25188 (director general of the Defense Agency) (in Japanese).
International Crisis Group, ‘‘North Korea’s Missile Launch: The Risks of Overreaction,’’
Asia Briefing, no. 91 (March 31, 2009), p. 5.
For the details, see Japanese Ministry of Defense, ‘‘Summary of the Defense Minister’sPress Conference,’’ July 6, 2009, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/kisha/2009/07/06.html (inJapanese).
Bosworth testimony.

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY/ j OCTOBER 2009