Providing Human Rights? : An
Analysis on Donorʼs Influence on
Chinaʼs Human Rights
Observance

WANG Minzhao
	
  

	
  

	
  
Providing	
  Human	
  Rights?	
  :	
  An	
  Analysis	
  on	
  Donor’s	  Influence	
  on	
  China’s	
  Human	
  Rights	  	
  	
   Observance	
  	
  
WANG	
  Minzhao	
  51-­‐-­‐ 148239	
  	
  Abstract	
  	
  
	
  
It is widely accepted that globalization is reshaping the role of nation-state and further
influencing a nation’s domestic policy decision. This paper, bringing together
scholarly insights in the area of foreign aid and human rights, uses a case study toanswer one controversial question, namely in what ways and to what extend do
foreign aid influence recipient governments’ observance of human rights?
An analysis on Japan and EU’s foreign aid policy towards China since 1980s and a
cautious evaluation of their impact on China’s human rights behavior are used tosupport one simple claim: foreign aid, as a part of globalization, has been one of theimportant means encouraging recipient government’s observance of human rights
today. For an authoritarian recipient state with relative big domestic market like China,
donors can hardly convert its human rights behavior simply by cutting down or
putting conditions on aid. However, foreign aid may work by changing the
cognitively available choices of behavior in accordance with existing norms, andfurther encourage the observance of human rights.

Key	
  words:	
  foreign	
  aid,	
  human	
  rights,	
  China	
  	
  
	
  
	
  

1. Introduction
It has been widely recognized that the international political economy shapes not only
national economies, but also domestic social and political policies. Similarly, today inthe domain of human rights, rights that have been enshrined in international laws, anation’s human rights policy has as much to do with the international political
economy as it does with domestic institutions and leaders.

In 2000, for instance, the UN General Assembly emphasized the urgent need toanalyze the impact of globalization on the full enjoyment of human rights, and in its
resolution 54/165, requested the Secretary-General to submit a comprehensive reporton this issue1..The report portrayed a complicated situation under globalization,
pointing out that, “Globalization and continuing rapid technological advances offer
unprecedented opportunities for social and economic development. At the same time,they continue to present serious challenges, including widespread financial crises,
insecurity, poverty, exclusion and inequality within and among societies.”2 Thus, theinfluence of international factors on domestic human rights behavior is still to be
examined.
This paper, in this context, aims to answer the question whether foreign aid has
impact on recipients’ observance of human rights; if so, in what ways and to what
extend does foreign aid shape recipients’ human rights policy.
1.1 Main variables
1.1.1

Independent variable: foreign aid

The independent variable “foreign aid” can be measured from four aspects in relation
to recipients’ human rights record:
A. Gate-keeping stage: recipients’ human rights record determines whether they canreceive aids or not;B. Level stage: recipients’ human rights behavior influences the amount of ODA
they may receive;
C. The type of ODA: for instance, ODA for social infrastructure and service, ODA
for economic infrastructure and service, programme assistance aiming to promote
human rights condition, humanitarian aids, etc.;
D. Conditions attached with ODA: for instance, conditions regarding human rights
improvement.
1.1.2

Dependent variable: human rights

The dependent variable “recipient government’s observance of human rights” can be
1	
  	
  	
  UN	
  1000	
  A/55/342	
  	
  
2	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/55/a55342.pdf	
  	
  captured by:
A. Recipient country’s domestic condition of human rights: a general impression ofhuman rights condition can be formed through data from Freedom House (Civil
Liberty Index) and Amnesty International Reports (Political Terror scale);
B. Recipient government’s law-making process concerning human rights: for
instance, notification of human rights treaty and domestic law making.
In the case study, China’s distinctive changes in human rights realm would beperceived from: (i) official statements of government and scholarly works on humanrights; (ii) notification of international human rights treaties by Chinese government;and (iii) domestic law-making/policy-making process.
1.1.3

Controlled variables

There are three controlled variables aiming to eliminate local explanations for the
improvement of human rights.
A. Governmental administration: Elite-level explanations in human rights researchemphasize the dominant role of historical, social and psychological characteristics
and preferences of leaders in a nation’s repression of human rights (Bullock 1991).
A change in leader’s preference may improve a nation’s human rights condition.
B. Domestic institutional condition: Scholars who emphasize domestic institutional
explanations perceive human rights repression as a means of policy-making that is
restricted by state regimes (Henderson	
  1993;	
  Davenport	
  1997;	
  Richards	
  1997).
So that changes in rules and institutions may improve a nation’s human rights
condition.
C. Domestic economic development: Scholars who believe in modernization theory
and dependency theory prefer economic explanations, which locate the cause ofhuman rights repression in under-development (Mitchell	
  and	
  McCormick	
  1988).
A nation’s human rights record may increase when its economic growth reaches
expected level.
1.2 Literature review

This paper is at the crossroads of two strands of literature. One is the well-examinedworks on the determinants and effects of foreign aid. The second strand of theliterature is the one on the measurement and causes of human rights.
As pointed out by scholars, the literature on foreign aid can generally be divided into
two parts. One studies the determinants of foreign aid; the other investigates theeffects of foreign aid on the receiving countries3.
For the former question, the conventional thinking among scholars is that even thoughholding donors’ interests constant, we may find some of recipients’ needs which canbe measured by per capita income, infant mortality and government effectiveness aretaken into consideration (Subhayu Bandyopadhyay and Howard J. Wall, 2007);
overall, donor countries disburse foreign aid largely as a function of strategic
considerations, rather than real needs of the receiving countries. Admittedly, different
donors have their own focus when determining aid allocation, but in general, thedirection of foreign aid is dictated by colonial past, political alliances as well as other
donor interests. (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Eric Neumayer, 2003).
An important claim by donor countries is that foreign aids serve the purpose not onlyof reducing poverty, but also of rewarding good policies and efficient and honest
governments. On the question whether foreign aids may foster economic growth,democracy and good governance, recent empirical research suggests that, on average,
foreign aid has very limited influence, if any, on recipients’ domestic performance (B.
Mak Arvin and Francisco Barillas, 2002; Stephen Knack, 2004; Daniel Yuichi Kono
and Gabriella R. Montinola, 2009; Alberto Alesina and Beatrice Weder, 2002; Jakob
Svensson, 2003). “Poor institutional development, corruption, inefficiencies andbureaucratic failures in the developing countries are often cited as reasons for theseresults”4. However, aid has a positive impact on economic growth as well as
democracy in the presence of good policies (Craig Burnside and David Dollar, 2000;
Paul Collier and David Dollar, 2001; Nita Rudra, 2009).
Regarding the relationship of foreign aid and human rights, the primary question forthe majority of studies is whether donors are concerned with human rights while
distributing foreign aid around the world. At the beginning of 1990s, scholars such as
Steven C. Poe (1992), Burton A. Abrams and Kenneth A. Lewis (1993) concludes
that human rights consideration plays a significant role in determining the distribution3	
  Alberto	  Alesina	
  and	  David	  Dollar:	
  "Who	  Gives	
  Foreign	
  Aid	  to	
  Whom	  and	  Why?",	
  Journal	
  of	
   Economic	
  Growth,	
  March	  2000,	  5(1),	
  pp.34.	
  
4	
  	
  	
   Alesina	
  Alberto	  and	
  Dollar	
  David:	
  "Who	  Gives	
  Foreign	
  Aid	  to	
  W hom	
   and	  W hy?",	
  Journal	
  of	
  Economic	
  Growth,	
  March	  2000,	  5(1),	
  pp.	
  33-­‐-­‐ 	
  63.	  

of U.S. foreign aids. But more recent research places these findings in doubt, arguingthat human rights play at best a rather limited role in aid allocation both for the U.S.
and other OECD countries (Clair Apodaca and Michael Stohl, 1999; Eric Neumayer,2003).
For the literature on human rights, traditionally, scholars who seek for explanation toa nation’s behavior in human rights emphasize three primary domestic sources ofrepression: individual-level explanations (Bullock 1991), institutional explanations(Henderson 1993; Richards 1997) and economic explanations (Mitchell and
McCormick 1988), attributing bad human rights behavior to domestic factors such as
the rule of dictators, poor institutional design as well as under-development. Somescholars also point out two pathways for international factors to change a nation’sobservance of human rights: wealth generation and institutionalization (Emilie M.
Hafner-Burton, 2003). However, in general, despite the growing public concern overthe effects of globalization on governments’ human rights practices, only few scholars
offer systematic analyses of the social effects of foreign aid on recipients’ humanrights behavior.
The existing literature provides a comparatively integrated map relating foreign aid torecipients’ human rights behavior. However, most of the existing works arecross-country, highly aggregated studies, and many of them focus on the question
whether human rights record determines aid allocation, rather than donors’ influenceon the observance of human rights in recipient nations. Thus a case study that would
more closely examine the effectiveness of foreign aid in promoting human rights
conditions may complement the existing studies.
1.3 Hypothesis
The main hypothesis is that “foreign aid has been one of the important means
encouraging recipient government’s observance of human rights”. Two pathways areemphasized for foreign aid to influence recipients’ human rights behavior: wealthgeneration and institutionalization of human rights. Thus the hypothesis can be tested
from following five aspects:
1.3.1

Foreign aid may serve as a promoter for recipient countries’ economic
prosperity: it is widely accepted that foreign aid itself cannot promoterecipient countries’ economic growth. However, foreign aid may serve as apromoter for foreign investment as well as domestic technical innovation,
which will foster economic prosperity;1.3.2Cutting off aid may force recipients to change its human rights policy (gatekeeping stage);

1.3.3

Foreign aid that has conditions or commitment on human rights may do better
encouraging recipient government’s observance of human rights (level stage);

1.3.4

Certain types of foreign aid that involve institutional design characteristics
may be more apt to shape recipient government’s observance of human rights(level stage);

1.3.5

Foreign aid promotes human rights condition by changing the cognitively
available choices on issues related to human rights for recipient governments.

1.4 Methodology and structure
As mentioned in the literature review, this paper uses a case study to complement
existing cross-country qualitative studies. An analysis on Japan and EU’s foreign aid
policy towards China since 1980s and a cautious evaluation of their impact on
China’s human rights behavior are employed to test the above hypothesis.
Admittedly, case studies on individual countries always face a disadvantage of its
applicability. The case of China is no exception, especially when one takes into
account its relatively big economic and political influence, giving China morebargaining chips with donors. However, in the late 1980s, China is by large, still atypical developing authoritarian state that has been experiencing an identity change
under globalization in recent decades, which is representative for a considerable
number of aid recipient countries. Japan and E.U. are the biggest two donors for
China. Furthermore, we can observe an obvious difference in their aid policies toward
China in reaction of Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989, which is criticized bydonors as a violence of human rights. A comparison of the effects of foreign aid
provided by these two political entities can thus provide a better understanding of theways that foreign aid influences recipients’ observance of human rights.
In the following parts, an overall picture of China’s human rights behavior in change
since the late 1970s would be portrayed, and further Japan and EU’s aid policies after
1989 would be analyzed with attention to their influences on China’s policy decisionon human rights. It is argued in the final part that donors may “globalize” existing
human rights norms by changing the cognitively available choices of behavior forrecipient governments.

2. China’s human rights in change since 1978
In this part, China’s distinctive changes in human rights since 1978 would bepresented both from domestic human rights discourses (official statements ofgovernment and scholarly works on human rights) and real policy changes(notification of international human rights treaties and domestic law-making process).
It is generally agreed among social theorists that discourses do not merely reflect, butalso construct and shape social reality. Especially for the case of China, the ways
Chinese leaders and government state human rights strongly shape the nation’s
attitude on this issue. As summarized by Chinese scholars, prior to the very end of
1970s, “it is fair to say that the Chinese discourse on human rights did not exist, otherterms like ‘citizens’ rights’ and ‘people’s rights’ were used frequently though”5.
According to the logic at that time, since each human being belongs to certain class,there are no abstract human rights. Human rights advocated by western power are
thus a bourgeois slogan and political weapon to disturb socialist societies.
However, by the late 1970s, China began to shift to a more favorable attitude towards
international human rights norms. Based on official statements as well as its policymaking process, China’s approach to the international human rights regime can bedivided into three distinct periods.
2.1 From 1978 to 1989
After two years of political struggles since Mao’s death, Chinese leading groupdecided to shift the nation’s focus to economic construction and announced China’sreform and opening-up policy in 1978. This policy shift is important for the change ofhuman rights discourses not only because it de-emphasized the old ideology of classstruggle and thus legalized individual rights, but also because it is a sign of China’s
modernization. As Deng put it, “I am honored to be a world citizen while being amember of Chinese people”, China has made up its mind to embrace globalization,
and at the same time part of the existing international norms.
The official statements and scholarly works during that period show a nuanced
attitude towards human rights. The old thinking pattern can still be seen at the
beginning of 1980s, as stated in “Beijing Review”, the only national English journal
in China, “The struggle to guarantee fundamental human rights can onlybe5	
  Chen Dingding: “Transformation From Within: Chinese Agency and International Human Rights Norms,

1978-2005”, The University of Chicago, 2007, pp.	
  68	
  

meaningful and succeed after it is combined with the struggle against hegemonism,
imperialism and colonialism and becomes one of its components”6.
However, China’s change in attitude can be traced in its growing participation ininternational human rights activities. Beijing during 1980s, signed seven international
human rights treaties, namely “the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide; the International Convention on the Suppression andPunishment of the Crimes of Apartheid; the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women; the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees; the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees; and theConvention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment” 7.
The most significant document in 1980s that reflected the shift of human rights
discourses is the 1982 constitution. In the chapter of “Fundamental Rights and Duties
of Citizens”, the freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, ofprocession and of demonstration, as well as the freedom of religious belief wasclearly written into the constitution for the first time8. Although, those rights are
restricted by the “four cardinal principles”, namely the socialist road, the people’s
democratic dictatorship, the Communist Party leadership and Marxist-Leninist-Mao
Zedong thought, the amendment of constitution in 1982 is still a milestone for
China’s human rights improvement.
2.2 From 1989 to the mid-1990s
The positive trend of China’s human rights performance was interrupted by
Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989, during which Chinese government was criticized
to mobilize troops to inflict unarmed civilians and to arrest protesters. In preparation
for the state visit of President Gorbachev to Beijing in May 1989, major western
media have already begun to reinforce their networks in Beijing. Thus the Tiananmen
Incident was widely broadcast and attracted international criticism. Internationalpressure including a joint embargo and a resolution against Beijing in United Nations
Commission on Human Rights was put on Beijing to improve its domestic humanrights conditions.

6	
  	
  	
  Beijing	  Review,	
  1982	
  
7	
  	
  	
  Chen Dingding: “China’s Participation in the International Human Rights Regime: A State Identity

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2, 2009, pp.401
8	
  	
  	
  Constitution Of The People's Republic Of China, 1982

Perspective”,

However, the pressure on China seems to have only limited influence. For instance, in
October and November 1989, Nixon and Kissinger, known as “friends of China”
within western world, visited China and delivered the massage that if Chinese
government releases the students and show its attitude to improve human rights
conditions, the U.S. is willing to maintain good relationship with China. However,Deng refused to make the concession first, saying that, “provided Bush made the firststep to improve relations, he would find China ready to reciprocate.” 9	
   Indeed, as areaction towards western criticism, Jiang Zemin and Li Peng on several occasions
asked Chinese scholars to develop China’s own theories of human rights, and later in
October 1991, China promoted its own view of human rights through the publicationof a Human Rights White Paper. It emphasized China’s uniqueness, as well as theimportance of sovereignty and national stability over individual rights, saying that“the preservation of national independence and state sovereignty and the freedom
from imperialist subjugation are, therefore, the very fundamental conditions for thesurvival and development of the Chinese people”, and “it is the fundamental wish anddemand of the Chinese people and a long-term, urgent task of the Chinese
government to maintain national stability”10.
2.3 Since the mid-1990s
This negative attitude towards human rights began to fade out after the mid-1990s,
when Clinton Administration announced to de-link the country’s human rights record
from its trading status, and China was welcomed to the international community
again.
As noted by some scholars, “State Council white papers published (during thisperiod)…shift their focus from China’s past humiliation at the hands of foreign
powers to its positive developments since the reform era”11.
Cooperation and dialogues regarding human rights issues with NGOs as well as
western countries also increased during this period. More notably, Beijing signed theInternational Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights (ICSECR) in 1997,
and International Covenant on Civil and Political Right (ICCP) in 1998, which are thetwo core international human rights treaties. The former one was ratified by China’s
National People’s Congress in 2001, and the later is still awaiting ratification.
9	
  Rosemary	  Foot:	
  “Rights	
  Beyond	  Borders:	
  The	
  Global	
  Community	
  and	  the	  Struggle	
  over	  Human	
  Rights	
   in	
  China”,	
  Oxford	
  University	
  Press,	
  2000,	
  p.124	
  
10	
  	
  	
  “Human	
  Rights	
  in	
  China”	
  (White	  Paper),	
  November	  1991,	
  Beijing	
  11	
  Chen Dingding: “China’s Participation in the International Human Rights Regime: A State Identity
Perspective”, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2, 2009, pp.403

In retrospect, China’s approach to international human rights has changed a lot since1978, while the period from 1989 to the mid-1990s is unique, during which China
was hesitating whether to accept or to fight against existing human rights norms. Then
next key question is whether donors influenced China’s policy choice during thisperiod.

3. Japan’s ODA and its influence on China’s human rights
3.1 Japan’s ODA at glance
Japan’s ODA started in 1954 firstly by joining Colombo Plan. As the economy ofJapan grew stronger and its international status improved during 1960s, its foreign aid
expanded both in quality and in scale. As of the year 2000, Japan had been thenumber one donor in the world for ten consecutive years. Lacking the ability to wage
war and exert other military methods, Japan values the influence of ODA inpromoting diplomatic relations more than other nations do. Geographically speaking,a large part of Japan’s ODA is allocated to Asian countries (see Chart below).
Japan’s trend in bilateral ODA by region12

With the growing magnitude and influence of Japan’s ODA, redefining thephilosophies and objective of its ODA became more and more important. However,
12	
  	
  	
  “Japan’s	
  ODA	  White	  Paper”,	
  2012	  before 1990s, even though Japan stated some objectives such as to promote economic
prosperity as well as to maintain the peace and stability, there is no clearly-statedphilosophies for Japan’s ODA. Nor is there any evidence that Japan has ever
evaluated recipient countries political conditions (including but not limited to humanrights record) in its allocation of foreign aid. However, after the Cold War, Japanbegan to attach more significance to its ODA.
In 1991, Prime Minister then Toshiki Kaifu proposed the “Four Principles of ODA”,
mentioning four aspects of recipient’s domestic condition to be considered in Japan’s
aid allocation, namely whether the recipient develops or manufactures weapons ofmass destruction (including nuclear weapons); its attempts to promote democracy; its
effort to move towards a market-oriented economy; and its human rights record13. In
the following year, the “Four Principles” was inaugurated and written into Japan’s
ODA charter as14:
1) Compatibility between preservation of the environment and development;2) Avoidance of the use of ODA funds for military purposes and for purposes
liable to inflame international conflicts;
3) Monitoring of military spending of developing countries, their activities ofdeveloping and producing weapons of mass destruction, and the export orimport of weapons;
4) Monitoring of activities for the promotion of democratization in developing
countries, and their efforts to introduce a market-oriented economy andprotect basic human rights and freedoms of their citizens.
The introduction of the ODA Charter, emphasizing value such as democracy andhuman rights, marked the efforts of Japan to influence political situation in aid
recipients.
3.2 Japan’s ODA policy and its influence on China’s human rights
Even though Japan’s economic support to China from unofficial sources has emerged
rights after the normalization between two countries, Official Development Aid to
China provided by Japanese government started in 1979. The aim of Japan’s ODA to
China at that time, recalled by one of the former officers in Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan, could be captured from three aspects: to deepen China’s reform andexpedite market economy, to fight with Communism and to serve as a substitute of
13	
  	
  	
  外務省.「政府開発援助(ODA)白書（上）」、財務省印刷局、1991、第 42 頁
14	
  	
  	
  “Japan's	
  Official	
  Development	
  Assistance	
  Charter,”	
  Cabinet	
  Decisions,	
  June	  30,	
   1992	
  war commendation15.
From the perspective of its original objective, Japan’s ODA did a good job in China.
China is the biggest recipient country for Japan from 1982 to 198616, and Japan has
been the biggest donor for China throughout the last two decades of 20th century. In
the official report presented in CPC Central Committee conference in 1979, after the
Cultural Revolution, Chinese sovereign debt was about ten billion dollars and the
deficit was expected to hit ten billion yuan17. Since a majority of Japan’s ODA is loan
aid without any condition, and what China lacked at its beginning of reform andopening-up is funds to restart economic construction. Japan’s ODA played asignificant role for economic growth in China. During the early 1980s, it took up
about 10% of total foreign investment China received. According to a formal
government official in China, at the beginning of reform and opening-up, Chinese
government even made its five-year economic plan partly based on Japan’s ODA plan
to China. Japan’s ODA also helped China with technical improvement as well as
many crucial infrastructure project such as Beijing subway system and Shanghai
Pudong airport, which provides a more attractive environment for further foreign
investment in China. It is fair to conclude that Japan served an important role in
China’s economic growth in the 1980s.
However, when it comes to the promotion of human rights, it seems that Japan isreluctant to intervene China’s human rights performance via ODA. After Tiananmen
Square Incident occurred on June 4th 1989, Japan suspended its negotiation with
China on a five-year loan aid program (the third loan aid plan) on June 20th, andannounced to act with other G-7 countries, suspending high-level contacts andreexamining new aid to China on G-7 economic summit in July. But on 7th August,Japan gave one million yen as emergent aid on account of flooding disaster, and as
early as 18th August 1989, former aid projects were reopened. Reports show thatabout 80% of Japanese firms in China were in full operation in the mid-August 1989,
and the two countries fully normalized in January 1990. Even though there is a delayof negotiation regarding the third loan aid, Japan’s ODA to China was hardly cut
down in practice. Especially if we take into account the fact that Japan reopened its
third loan aid in 1990, and there is no blank period between the second and third loan
aid plan18.

15	
  	
  	
  青木直人.「日本の中国援助·ODA:

怒りを超えてもはやお笑い!誰も知らない血税 3 兆円の行方」.東京:祥伝社, 2001.
16	
  	
  	
  外務省.「政府開発援助(ODA)白書（下）」、財務省印刷局、1991、第 86 頁
17	
  	
  	
  	
  迟爱萍，熊亮华：《陈云：在历史瞬间》，人民出版社，2005	
  年，348	
  页
18	
  	
  	
  外務省.「政府開発援助(ODA)白書（下）」、財務省印刷局、1991、第 87 頁

Stated in its aid philosophy since 1960s, Japan is known for its non-conditional aid,
which is also applicable to its aid to China even in 1990s. Despite the “FourPrinciples of ODA” announced in 1992, Japan did not ever reduced its aid because of
China’s human rights record. Nonetheless, this is not to say that Japan as the biggest
donor does not intend to shape China’s human rights attitude. In fact, in the ODA
White Paper published in 2000, Japanese government announced a shift of focus frompromoting economic development in coastal region to improving people’s livelihood
nationwide in China19.
Japan’s stance on China’s human rights situation could be perceived in its adjustmentof aid structure. Japan’s ODA in China can be generally divided into three types: loanaid; grant aid and technical cooperation. It is difficult to control and evaluate theeffects of loan aid on human rights, which accounts for the majority of Japan’s ODA
in China, since it is usually merely fund that recipient government may manipulate. In
comparison, technical cooperation often consists of projects aiming to improve local
governance or to help grassroots NGOs. It is obvious from the table that since theearly 1990s, the percentage of technical cooperation in Japan’s ODA has been
increasing. The increase of human rights-related projects may indirectly provide
China experience as well as cognitively available choices to embrace international
human rights norms.
Types of Japan’s ODA to China20(Million dollar)
Percentage
Year

Loan aid(%)

Grant aid

Percentage

Technical

Percentage(%)

cooperation

(%)

Total

1979

0

0

0

0

2.6

100

2.6

1980

0.9

20.59

0

0.00

3.4

77.80

4.37

1981

15.6

53.13

2.5

8.51

9.6

32.70

29.36

1982

330.2

83.39

25.5

6.44

13.5

3.41

395.98

1983

299.1

79.52

30.6

8.14

20.5

5.45

376.12

1984

347.9

83.39

14.2

3.40

27.3

6.54

417.18

1985

345.2

83.27

11.5

2.77

31.2

7.53

414.57

1986

410.1

79.10

25.7

4.96

61.2

11.80

518.47

1987

422.8

74.08

54.3

9.51

76

13.32

570.74

1988

519

75.07

52

7.52

102.7

14.86

691.33

1989

668.1

78.31

58

6.80

106.1

12.44

853.11

1990

521.7

70.59

37.8

5.11

163.5

22.12

739.06

1991

391.2

65.62

56.6

9.49

137.5

23.06

596.16

1992

791.2

73.80

72.1

6.73

187.5

17.49

1072.091993

1051.2

76.01

54.4

3.93

245.1

17.72

1383.06

19	
  	
  	
  外務省.「政府開発援助(ODA)白書（下）」、財務省印刷局、2000、第 72 頁
20	
  	
  	
  “Japan’s	
  ODA	
  Annual	
  Report”	
  (named	
  “Japan’s	
  ODA	  White	  Paper”	
  since	  2001)	
  every	
   year	
  

	
  

Total

1994

1133.1

75.03

99.4

6.58

246.9

16.35

1510.15

1995

992.3

70.52

83.1

5.91

304.8

21.66

1407.06

1996

533

60.44

25

2.83

303.7

34.44

881.92

1997

309.7

51.85

15.4

2.58

251.8

42.15

597.34

1998

818.3

69.22

38.2

3.23

301.6

25.51

1182.24

1999

811.5

65.17

65.68

5.27

348.7928.01

1245.142000

397.18

51.64

53.05

6.90

318.9641.47

769.1911109.28

70.96

875.035.59

3264.2520.85

15657.23

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

4. EU’s ODA and its influence on China’s human rights
The official relationship between European Union (EU, which was called European
Community before 1991) and China was established in 1975. Several member
countries such as France and Germany began to give aid to China during the mid1970s, however aid provided by EU began in 1983. Originally, EU’s aid to China
focused on economic growth and technical improvement mainly. However, after 1989,
human rights became one of the dominant topics in aid negotiation.
4.1 Gate-keeping stage
Right after the occurrence of Tiananmen Square Incident, EU announced a joint
sanction against Beijing, which includes a ban on high-level ministerial visits, a ban
on sales of military equipment, a suspension of government-guaranteed loans, anissuing of a condemnatory statement and a decision to extend visas for Chinese
students21. The aid to China was thus cut down for years. Later in August 1989, EU
co-sponsored a resolution against China in the United Nation Commission on Human
Rights, and kept criticizing China on human rights issues in UNCHR for nine years.
Under serious criticism and a cut-down of EU’s aid, Chinese government was
expected to revert to the former human rights approach, endorsing the existing norms.
However, as discussed in the previous part, the Chinese leading group, emphasizing
domestic stability, perceived those sanctions and criticism as evidence of foreignattempts to intervene China’s domestic issues and reacted negatively. China refused
to be the first to compromise, and even promote its own view of human rights to
attack its major critics. One of Beijing’s most forthright statements, for instance,
occurred in 1992 at the UN Commission, describing the U.S. as a country where
21	
  	
  	
  EFPB	
  document	
  no.	
  89/171.	
  16.	
  EFPB	
  document	
  no.	
   89/180	
  police brutality, crime, and racial discrimination are rife22.
The sanction and cutting off aid eventually failed, and EU restarted its aid andgradually normalized its relationship with China in the early 1990s. The reasons for
EU’s failure to revert human rights policy in China may be twofold. One of thereasons may be the short duration of sanction. Due to internal differences among
western countries as well as the urgent need for China’s cooperation in UN regarding
Gulf War, western group ended the economic and political sanction at an early stage.
However, more importantly, it is argued that authoritarian leaders would notcompromise as long as his reigning is secured. Especially when we taking into
account its comparatively big economic and political power in the late 1980s, it ishighly possible that China can survive without aid and refuse to change even if the
sanction lasts for years.
4.2 Level stage
EU’s aid to China was reopened during the first half of 1990s, however at this time,
accompanied with series of human rights dialogue with China.
Faced with a failure in gate-keeping stage to force China revert its human rights
behavior, EU began to consider a policy shift towards China’s human rights. In its
democracy and development cooperation policy in 1991, EU stated that “thecommunity will also seek to promote frank and trusting dialogue on human rights
with developing countries, and to keep the channels for that dialogue open as far as
possible, even in difficult situations, notably where the aim is to protect specificrights”23. A human rights dialogue between EU and China has thus been going on
since 1995. Arranging a bilateral human rights dialogue is not necessarily noteworthy.
In fact, as argued by scholars, “the replacement of a resolution with a regular,
confidential dialogue on human rights represents not only a policy shift for the EU but
also a more general policy shift in the West’s human rights policy vis-à-vis China inthe mid to late 1990s”24. What makes EU’s effort more conspicuous is that its
involvement in China’s human rights realm is well planned and runs on three tracks
including diplomatic dialogues, expert seminars and technical cooperation
aid
projects. For instance, from 1999 to 2005, EU has funded 13.5 million euro in “EUChina legal and judicial cooperation programme”, EU’s biggest project in China
22	
  	
  	
  E/CN.4/1992/SR.38	
  21	
  Feb.	
  1992	
  and	
  SR.36,	
  20	
  Feb.	
   1992	
  23	
  Commission	
  of	
  the	
  European	
  Communities,	
  Commission	  Communication	
  to	
  the	
  Council	
  and	
   Parliament:	
  Human	
  Rights,	
  Democracy	
  and	  Development	  Cooperation	
  Policy	
  (Brussels:	
  Commission	
  of	
  the	
  EC,	  1991,	  Doc.	
  No.	
  SEC(91)	
  61	
  final),	
  p.	
  6	
  
24	
  	
  	
   Katrin	
   Kinzelbach	
   and	   Hatla	
   Thelle:	
   “Taking	   Human	
   Rights	
   to	
   China:	
   An	
   Assessment	
   of	
   the	   EU's	
   Approach”.	
  The	
  China	  Quarterly,	
  205	  (2011),	
  pp.	
  60-­‐-­‐ 79	
  related to human rights, sending groups of Chinese lawyers, prosecutors and judges toEuropean countries for training and practice, bringing them in touch with EU legal
systems. There are also law schools supported by EU in Beijing, providing lecturesand study tours aiming to promote human rights in China.
In its guidelines on human rights dialogues, EU stated its objective of involvement in
China’s human rights realm:
The European Union is committed to dealing with those priority issues whichshould be included on the agenda for every [human rights] dialogue. These
include the signing, ratification and implementation of international humanrights instruments, co-operation with international human rights procedures
and mechanisms, combating the death penalty, combating torture, combating
all forms of discrimination, children’s rights, and in particular those ofchildren in armed conflicts, women’s rights, freedom of expression, the role ofcivil society and the protection of human rights defenders, international cooperation in the field of justice, in particular with the International Criminal
Court, promotion of the processes of democratization and good
governance, the rule of law and the prevention of conflict.25
Given the lack of transparency of the dialogue as well as many programmes related tohuman rights, it is hard to make an overall assessment. Based on interviews with
officials who participated in relevant activities, some scholars pointed out the
influence of EU’s human rights dialogue is limited. For the Commission’s expectationis that each seminar will come up with joint recommendations, which feed into thediscussions at the official political dialogue, however in reality, most of the legal
seminars ended up with two separate sets of conclusions and nojoint
recommendations26. Some officials even assert that the human rights dialogue is a
failure for EU, and “it is hard not to regard the dialogue as a replacement for a realhuman rights policy on China”27.
However, when looking at Chinese human rights discourses after 1990 prudently, one
may notice that many scholars who promote human rights policy in China haveparticipated in relevant activities with or provided by EU. And in recent years, donor
meetings (not restricted to European projects) on detailed law and rights issues are
25	
  	
  	
  EU Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogues with Third Countries: Update, p.6
26	
  	
  	
   Katrin	
  Kinzelbach	
  and	
  Hatla	
  Thelle:	
  “Taking	
  Human	
  Rights	
  to	
  China:	
  An	
  Assessment	
  of	
  the	
  EU's	  Approach”.	
  The	
  China	  Quarterly,	
  205	  (2011),	
  pp.	
  60-­‐-­‐ 79	
  27	
  Philip Baker (2002). “Human Rights, Europe and the People's Republic of China”, The China Quarterly, 169,
pp 45-63

much easier to be convened in Beijing and taken into consideration by Chinese side. It
seems that detailed aid projects are more successful than general human rights
dialogue, and many projects are likely to have a long-term, indirect rather than
immediate impact.

5. Conclusion
Based on the two cases above, it is safe to come back to the relationship between
foreign aid and human rights, and test the hypothesis in this paper.
5.1 Donor’s influence on human rights through wealth generation
It is proved in Japan-China’s case that foreign aid may serve as a promoter forrecipient countries’ economic prosperity with the presence of a good policy, which
may in the long-run, foster a nation’s human rights condition both by improving
people’s livelihoods and by changing recipient government’s policy preference.
5.2 Donor’s influence on human rights through institutionalization
On gate-keeping stage, it seems that cutting off foreign aid could not force China tochange its stance regarding human rights, and even worse, provoked China.
On level stage, firstly neither Japan nor EU ever attached any human rights conditions
to its ODA to China. It is fair to speculate it is not only because a lack of willingness
on donor’s side, but also a reluctance to make any commitment in exchange of aid
from the recipient’s side.
For the types of aid, it is noteworthy that technical cooperation related to humanrights played a better role in promoting changes within China both from Japan’s andEU’s experience.
Based on the case of Japan and EU’s ODA to China, it is argued that for an
authoritarian recipient state with relatively big domestic market, donors can hardly
have direct influence on its human rights behavior simply by cutting down or putting
conditions on aid. However, foreign aid may work by changing the cognitively
available choices of recipient countries, and further encourage recipient government’s
observance of human rights.
By putting this conclusion, it is not to say that foreign aid is the most important

international factor in shaping China’s human rights policy. In fact, it serves only as arepresentative part of globalization. The interesting part is that even though Japan andEU have distinguishable aid policy towards China in reaction of Tiananmen Square
Incident, they served a similar role in changing China’s human rights discourse. For
Japan, it almost didn’t ask China to promote its human rights behavior directly and its
aid serves only as a mean to show the benefits of globalization. On the other side, EU
clearly stated its concern regarding human rights issues in China. But it’s noteworthy
that diplomatic dialogues directly dealing with human rights issues can hardly alter
China’s policy, it is the detailed projects that gradually changed the China’s stance inhuman rights realm. It seems that foreign aid can hardly exert independent effect onrecipient’s observance of human rights, while keeping negotiating via ODA andshowing the benefits of globalization as a whole can gradually persuade recipients tochange its stance.
Thus for future aid donors who want to exert influence on recipients’ human rights
issues, it is important to express their attitudes on human rights issues throughnegotiation even without successful outcomes. And compared to general criticism, themore detailed and constructive the aid projects are, the less the recipient governments
would feel threatened by human rights-related activities.

6 Reference
6.1 Data
Data on foreign aids:
World bank: http://data.worldbank.org
OECD: https://data.oecd.org
Japanese ministry of foreign affairs: http://www.mofa.go.jp
Chinese Ministry of foreign affairs: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/
Data on human rights:
Amnesty International: https://www.amnesty.org
Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org
United Nations Human Rights: http://www.ohchr.org/en
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[2] Eric Neumayer: “What Factors Determine the Allocation of Aid by ArabCountries and Multilateral Agencies?”, The Journal of Development Studies, 39:4
(2003), pp.134-147[3] Subhayu Bandyopadhyay and Howard J. Wall: “The Determinants of Aid in the
Post-Cold War Era”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, November/December
2007, 89(6), pp. 533-47.
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Foreign Aid?”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 4 (Sep., 2002),
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about it?”, Journal of Development Economics 70, 2003, pp.381–402[11] Nita Rudra: “Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in theDeveloping World”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 4, Oct.,
2005, pp.704-730[12] Paul Collier and David Dollar: “Can the World Cut Poverty in Half? How Policy
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[21]徐显芬.「日本の対中 ODA 外交: 利益·パワー·価値のダイナミズム」.東京:勁草書房, 2011.

[22]岡田実.「日中関係と ODA: 対中 ODA をめぐる政治外交史入門」.東京: 日
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[25] Rosemary Foot: Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and theStruggle over Human Rights in China, Oxford University Press, 2000
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Diplomacy and its Limits. London and New York: Routledge, 2015[27]歓鎮羅. "日本の対中国 ODA の規模と構造".国際関係研究.23.2 (2002): 1-25.
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[30] Chen Dingding: “Transformation From Within: Chinese Agency andInternational Human Rights Norms, 1978-2005”, The University of Chicago, 2007[31] Chen Dingding: “China’s Participation in the International Human Rights
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blocker or bystander?”, Democratization, 05 Mar 2015[33] Jing Men: “Between Human Rights and Sovereignty* —An Examination of EU–
China Political Relations”, European Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 4, July 2011, pp.
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Assessment of the EU's Approach”. The China Quarterly, 205 (2011), pp. 60-79[35] Philip Baker (2002). “Human Rights, Europe and the People's Republic ofChina”, The China Quarterly, 169, pp 45-63[36] Sophia Woodman: “Bilateral Aid To Improve Human Rights: Donors need toadopt a more coherent and thoughtful strategy”, China Perspectives [Online], 51,
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