京都
 大 学 防 災 研 究 所 年 報 第 49 号 C 平 成 18 年 4 月
Annuals of Disas. Prev. Res. Inst., Kyoto Univ., No. 49 C, 2006

Clarifying the Disaster Process of the Elderly in the Aspect of Social Welfare
Keiko Tamura*, Haruo Hayashi*, and Reo Kimura***Disaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University**Graduate School of Environmental Studies, Nagoya University
Synopsis
This study is aim for gathering the basic data of the response to elders and showing thenecessity of constructing the discipline of disaster management care, the systematic approach to
the disaster process of elders under the drastic social environmental changes. Two case studies
were conducted to clarify the disaster process of the elders in two disasters. The major findings
were as follows: 1) The care managers as the professionals licensed by the government-sponsoredLong-Term Care Insurance System worked effectively to manage the needs of moving temporarily
to care facilities, 2) 13% of elders, who moved to the care facilities as temporary shelters, still
stayed in the care facilities 6 months after the impact. Those results suggested that care managers
should be the more effective agent to respond elders in disasters; however, they need to learn thedisaster process of elders.
Keywords: disaster care management, Long-Term Care Insurance System, care manager, aging
society
1. Introduction
The Niigata Prefecture suffered two big disasters in
2004. The Niigata Flood occurred on July 13 andcaused 15 deaths, 13 of which were senior citizens. Of
those 13 deaths, 8 were 75 or older. The disasterreminded the public that disaster-prevention measures forthe elderly are necessary.
The Mid-Niigata Prefecture Earthquake occurred on
October 23 and had 1) long-lasting aftershocks, 2)
evacuations by the village units, 3) officials advised awide area to evacuate, and 4) substantial damage to thelife line, which resulted in a larger number of evacuees
and more senior citizens needed care. The aim of thisstudy is to gather basic data on the response to the elderly,
to show the necessity for disciplined disastermanagement care, and to develop a systematic approachto the disaster process for seniors under dramatic changes
in social environment.

Niigata Flood
Age

Young
Old
Old
Old

㪌
㪈㪇
㪈㪌
㪉㪇
㪉㪌
㪊㪇
㪊㪌
㪋㪇
㪋㪌
㪌㪇
㪌㪌
㪍㪇
㪍㪌
㪎㪇
㪎㪌
㪏㪇
㪏㪌
㪐㪇

Casualties

Mid-Niigata Prefecture
Earthquake
EQ Related
Casualties
Death㪊㪈㪃㪈㪃㪉㪃㪉

㪇㪅㪈㪍㩿㪉㫄㫆㫅㫋㪿㫊㪀

㪇
㪎
㪉

㪋
㪐
㪉

㪊

㪋
㪌
㪋

㪉㪃㪉㪃㪉
㪌㪃㪍㪃㪍㪃㪎㪃㪏㪃㪏㪉㪃㪋㪎㪌㪃㪍㪃㪎㪃㪏㪃㪏
㪈

㪉
㪈㪃㪊㪃㪋
㪏
㪊
㪐
㪇
㪌㪃㪎㪃㪏㪃㪐
㪇㪃㪇㪃㪇㪃㪇㪃㪈㪃㪊㪃㪋㪏㪃㪐㪇㪃㪈㪃㪊㪃㪋㪃㪋㪌㪃㪏㪃㪐㪈

Male(black letters), Female(red letters)
Fig.1 Age Distribution of Casualties in 2 Disasters

㧙㧙

2.

The 2004 Niigata Flood

2.1 Purpose of Research in the Case of Niigata Flood
The purpose of this study is to investigate the reason
for the concentration of elderly victims in the Niigata
flood on July 13, 2004 and propose an appropriate
measure for reducing the number of victims of flood
disasters in the future. There are tens of thousands ofpeople classified as elderly living in the districts strickenby the flood. It is essential to analyze the reasons why
only twelve elderly persons lost their lives and what
factors made these persons different from others.
Possible factors include the physical properties of thehazard, the geographical characteristics of the districts
where the victims lived, and the personal attributes of thevictims. This study aims to clarify and combine thesefactors and determine the causes of death in this disaster.
In other words, this study aims to “profile” the causes ofdeath.
2.2 Method of Survey in the Case of Niigata Flood
2.2.1 Subject s of disaster area
Sanjo City, Niigata Prefecture was the subject area
in Survey (1) on “the Niigata Flood on July 13”.
According to Hayashi et. al.(2005), the Kakenhi (Grants
in Aid for Scientific Research) report, four patterns ofdeath were observed in “the Niigata Flood on July 13”.
Deaths were caused by 1) a landslide, 2) house
destruction by gushing water, 3) moving outdoors after
the house was flooded well above the floor level, 4)

remaining in a house flooded well above the floor level.
It was determined that most of the deaths of the elderly
who normally needed daily care were caused by 4)
remaining in a house flooded well above the floor level.
Therefore, we collected data to assess this issue. We
mailed the questionnaires to the subjects and asked themto return the completed survey via mail. We mailed
the questionnaires on March 18, 2005 and collected them
until April 5, 2005. Toward the end of March,reminders were mailed to those who had yet to return
their questionnaires.
2.2.2 Subjects of this survey
Participants in Survey (1) included 1) leaders andsub-leaders of community associations in the area where
the elderly victims lived, 2) nursing-care insurance
service providers, who provided services in the subject
area, and 3) care managers, who were caring for theelderly victims. Care managers are nation-certified
specialists, who have special knowledge and techniques,
which help senior citizens receiving care to lead an
independent daily life.
2.3 Results of Survey in the Case of Niigata Flood(1) The conditions that surrounded the deaths of theelderly care receivers
On July 13, 2004 at 13:07, the left bank of the
Igarashi River at Suwa (Magaribuchi) broke. The
surveyed area (Rannan, Sanjo City, which is on the west

Table 1. Situations when the People who Needed Assistance Died in the Niigata Flood
Community Association C

Community
association

Community Association A

Community Association B

Attributes

Female, 87, walking with acane, living alone

Female, 76, needed nursing
care, living alone

Female, 84, needed nursing
care, living alone

Male, 77, confined to bed

Estimatedtime of death

13th in the afternoon

13th around 20:00

13th in the afternoon

13th around 17:00

Time the bodywas found

15th around 12:40

14th around 09:00

15th around 17:45

13th around 21:00

Place thebody wasfound

In between the flooded
kitchen and living room inher house

In the flooded water on thefirst floor of her house

In the flooded living room inher house

In the flooded water on thefirst floor of his house

Cause ofdeath

There are traces of the flood
up to 130 cm above the floor
in her house. It seems thatshe stayed home without
being able to evacuate byherself and drowned in therush of the flood

It seems that a neighborinitially carried her to thesecond floor, but she laterwent downstairs by herself
for some reason anddrowned, probably as she
fell

There are traces of flooding
to 110 cm above the floor inher house. It appears thatshe stayed home without
being able to evacuate byherself and drowned in therush of the flood

He was confined to bed andreceived nursing care athome. He drowned in his
house that was flooded 120
cm above the floor level,although his wife tried tosave him㧙㧙side of the Shinetsu Line, the railroad) was a little far
from the broken bank. Flooding began at 15:00 or laterand reached 1.5 m. In the interview, the leaders andsub-leaders of community associations uniformly toldthat 1) they assumed it was “a typical flood” since thesurrounding area had frequently flooded, 2) although theofficial advice to evacuate was issued at 11:40, they were
unaware that an evacuation had been issued, 3) when thefloodwater rose swiftly, all they could do was to go
upstairs, 4) they felt that the residents of their community
association would manage to survive the flood bythemselves since the seniors lived by themselves.
The four senior citizens, who died in this area, were
75 or older and they all died in their homes. Theinterview revealed that these four people “needed someassistance to walk”, or “could not walk by themselves”.
It was confirmed that three of them were receiving
in-home nursing care services, but at the time of flood,none were receiving care from a caregiver (Table 1).
(2) Action taken for the elderly care receivers in the
Niigata Flood
Care managers and nursing care workers havebecome social resources to assist the elderly since many
senior citizens that live in their own homes receive
nursing care insurance. Those professionals essentiallyworked well during the disaster. However, one reason
for the elderly deaths is that there was not a systematic
emergency preparedness plan for community caremanagers. It was also concluded that there was a clear
gap in understanding the senior citizens’ needs between
the nursing care workers and the leaders and sub-leadersof community associations or district welfare officers.
3. The 2004 Mid-Niigata Earthquake
3.1 Purpose of Research in the Case of 2004
Mid-Niigata Earthquake
The Mid-Niigata Prefecture Earthquake occurred on
October 23 and had 1) long-lasting aftershocks, 2)
evacuations by the village units, 3) officials advised awide area to evacuate, and 4) substantial damage to thelife line, which resulted in a larger number of evacuees
and more senior citizens needed care. The aim of thisstudy is to gather basic data on the response to the elderly,
to show the necessity for disciplined disastermanagement care, and to develop a systematic approachto the disaster process for seniors under dramatic changes

in social environment.
3.2 Survey 1: Social Random Sampled Survey inthe impacted Areas
3.2.1 Subject s of disaster area
The survey was conducted in Ojiya City and
Kawaguchi Town where the casualties and damage tothe houses were serious throughout the area. Both maleand female adults living in this area participated in thissurvey. The adopted method was stratified two-stage
sampling. Initially, 50 spots in this area were randomly
selected: 43 spots in Ojiya City and 7 spots in
Kawaguchi Town, which is proportional to the
population ratio. Then a sampling was conducted withthe probability proportional to size. Using the basic
registers of the residents, we sampled 20 individuals,
which did not reside in the same household, from each
spot. We specified the individual to complete thesurvey so that an equal number of male and female
subjects were sampled. Consequently, 1,000 subjects
were sampled, i.e., 2.19% of the population in the area
(45,668 persons as of March, 2005).
We mailed the questionnaires to the subjects andasked them to return the completed survey via mail.
We mailed the questionnaires on March 18, 2005 andcollected them until April 5, 2005. Toward the end of
March, reminders were mailed to those who had yet toreturn their questionnaires.
3.2.2 Basic Attributes
We collected 543 responses (response rate:
54.3%). Responses, which 1) were partially or notcompleted, 2) were error laden, 3) did not specify sex orage, and 4) were from individuals that did not reside in
Ojiya City or Kawaguchi Town during the earthquake,were excluded. Hence, 518 completed surveys werecollected (effective response rate: 51.8%).
To ensure random sampling, we verified that the
respondents reflected the features of the general
population in terms of basic attributes, i.e., sex and age(generation). The number of households and estimatedpopulation per municipality (as of March 1, 2005) andthe estimated population per age (5-year increments)(aggregate) (as of January 1, 2005), which was publishedby the Emergency Management and Disaster Division,
Niigata Prefecture Government, was used to determine
the basic attributes of the general population.
The result of the goodness-of-fit test did not show㧙㧙own Garage, and 13.8% stayed in the cars. The survey
asked the respondent who chose to stay at home (Fig.3),
35.7% of them answered because they had the elderly intheir family so they did not move to somewhere else but
home.

significant differences in sex and age (generation)
between the respondents and the general population(sex:X2(1)=0.85, n.s., generation:X2(2)=5.82, n.s.).
Since there were not significant differences in the basic
attributes, it was concluded that respondents do represent
the tendencies of the area.

3.3 Survey 2: Social survey of the Care Managers andSenior Citizens
3.3.1 Subjects of this survey
Survey (2) included 23 care managers that provided
home-based nursing care support in Ojiya City and 399
senior citizens, who were sent to welfare facilities for theelderly or hospitals during the emergency evacuation.
Since it is difficult for some seniors to answer the

3.2.3 The Results of the Survey 1
Fig. 2 showed 80% of people who lived in theimpacted Area because many numbers of Aftershocks
were occurred (over 500 times of aftershocks were
occurred from Oct 23-31), while 10.6 % of the people
chose to stay at home. 20.1% of them were evacuated toopen spaces, 19.2% went to roads, 17.9 went to their㪉㪇㪅㪈㪦㫇㪼㫅㩷㪪㫇㪸㪺㪼

㪈㪐㪅㪉

㪩㫆㪸㪻㫊

Inside Building
10.6%

㪈㪎㪅㪐

㪞㪸㫉㪸㪾㪼㪈㪊㪅㪏㪚㪸㫉㫊㪦㫋㪿㪼㫉㫊

㪍㪅㪈㪚㫆㫄㫄㫌㫅㫀㫋㫐㩷㪚㪼㫅㫋㪼㫉

㪌㪅㪐
㪋㪅㪌

㪪㫋㫆㫉㪸㪾㪼㩷㪟㫆㫌㫊㪼㪊㪅㪏㪧㫃㪸㫐㩷㪞㫉㫆㫌㫅㪻

Outside Building㪝㫀㪼㫃㪻㫊

㪉㪪㪺㪿㫆㫆㫃㩷㪙㫌㫀㫃㪻㫀㫅㪾㫊㪈㪅㪏㪥㪼㫀㪾㪿㪹㫆㫉㫊㪈㪅㪋㪟㫆㫊㫇㫀㫋㪸㫃㫊

㪈㪅㪈

89.4%

㪦㫎㫅㩷㪟㫆㫌㫊㪼㪇㪅㪐㪧㫃㪸㫊㫋㫀㪺㩷㪞㫉㪼㪼㫅㪿㫆㫌㫊㪼

㪇㪅㪎

N=442

㪩㪼㫃㪸㫋㫀㫍㪼㫊㩾㩷㪟㫆㫊㪼㪇㪅㪌㪧㪸㫉㪼㫅㫋㫊㪆㪚㪿㫀㫃㪻㫉㪼㫅㩾㫊㩷㪟㫆㫌㫊㪼

㪇㪅㪉
㪇

㪌

㪈㪇

㪉㪇 䋦

㪈㪌

Fig.2 After the impact, which place were you evacuated to ?

㪊㪌㪅㪎㪟㪸㫍㫀㫅㪾㩷㫋㪿㪼㩷㪜㫃㪻㪼㫉㫃㫐㪪㫋㪸㫐㫀㫅㪾㩷㪸㫋㩷㪿㫆㫄㪼㩷㫀㫊㩷㫊㪸㪽㪼㫉

㪉㪏㪅㪍
㪉㪈㪅㪋

㪥㫆㫋㩷㪩㪼㪺㪼㫀㫍㪼㪻㩷㪜㫍㪸㪺㫌㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪦㫉㪻㪼㫉㪉㪈㪅㪋㪝㪼㪸㫉㩷㫆㪽㩷㪘㪽㫋㪼㫉㫊㪿㫆㪺㫂㪈㪋㪅㪊㪦㫋㪿㪼㫉㫊㩷㫅㫆㫋㩷㪘㫊㫂㫀㫅㪾㩷㫋㫆㩷㪞㫆㩷㪜㫃㫊㪼㫎㪿㪼㫉㪼㪥㫆㫋㩷㪢㫅㫆㫎㫀㫅㪾㩷㪮㪿㪼㫉㪼㩷㫊㪿㪼㫃㫋㪼㫉㫊㩷㫎㪼㫉㪼㪈㪋㪅㪊㪥㫆㫋㩷㪢㫅㫆㫎㫀㫅㪾㩷㪜㫍㪸㪺㫌㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㫎㪸㫊㩷㫆㫉㪻㪼㫉㪼㪻㪎㪅㪈㪥㫆㩷㪮㪸㫐㩷㫋㫆㩷㪤㫆㫍㪼㪎㪅㪈㪪㪿㪼㫃㫋㪼㫉㫊㩷㫎㪼㫉㪼㩷㪝㪸㫉㩷㪘㫎㪸㫐㪎㪅㪈㪟㪸㫍㫀㫅㪾㩷㫋㪿㪼㩷㪝㪸㫄㫀㫂㫐㩷㪤㪼㫄㪹㪼㫉㫊㩷㫎㫀㫋㪿㩷㪪㫇㪼㪺㫀㪸㫃㩷㪥㪼㪼㪻㫊㩷㪎㪅㪈㪟㪸㫍㫀㫅㪾㩷㪙㪸㪹㫀㪼㫊㪎㪅㪈㪛㫀㫊㫉㫌㫇㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㫆㪽㩷㪮㪸㫋㪼㫉㩷㪪㪼㫉㫍㫀㪺㪼㪎㪅㪈㪮㪸㫅㫋㪼㪻㩷㫋㫆㩷㪧㫉㫆㫋㪼㪺㫋㩷㪦㫎㫅㩷㪧㫉㫆㫇㪼㫉㫋㫀㪼㫊㪎㪅㪈㪮㪸㫅㫋㪼㪻㩷㫋㫆㩷㪧㫉㫆㫋㪼㪺㫋㩷㪦㫎㫅㩷㪟㫆㫌㫊㪼㫊㪎㪅㪈㪥㫆㫋㩷㪮㪸㫅㫋㪼㪻㩷㫋㫆㩷㪪㫆㫄㪼㫎㪿㪼㫉㪼㩷㪤㪸㫅㫐㩷㫇㪼㫆㫇㫃㪼㩷㪾㪸㫋㪿㪼㫉㪼㪻㪛㫀㫊㫉㫌㫇㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㫆㪽㩷㪪㪼㫎㪸㪾㪼㩷㪪㪼㫉㫍㫀㪺㪼㪛㫀㫊㫉㫌㫇㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㫆㪽㩷㪞㪸㫊㩷㪪㪼㫉㫍㫀㪺㪼

N=14㪥㫆㫋㩷㪮㪸㫅㫋㪼㪻㩷㫋㫆㩷㪤㫆㫍㪼

㪇

㪌

㪈㪇

㪈㪌

㪉㪇

㪉㪌

㪊㪇

㪊㪌

䋦
㪋㪇

Fig.3 The reasons of the people why they chose to stay at home after the impact㧙㧙received during the emergency evacuation based onreports from the care managers. The division continued
calling the facilities and hospitals until December 12,
2004, and the total number of people received reached399. On the day of the earthquake, the need for
emergency evacuations arose mainly for “the elderly,
who are highly dependent on medical care”. The needs
then shifted to “senior citizens, who have difficulties
staying at the shelters for a long period.” The needs
peaked on October 27, 4 days after the earthquake (Fig.
4).
(3) Actual situation of the elderly received at welfare
facilities or hospitals during the emergency evacuation
The average age of the 257 “senior citizens received
during the emergency evacuation” was 84. 89.9% were
75 or older, 6.2% were 65 to 74, and 3.9% were under 65.
The reasons for the emergency hospitalization or
reception at welfare facilities were: 1) their houses weredamaged and it became impossible to receive
home-based nursing care (58.2%), 2) it became
impossible for the family member(s) to care for them athome (19.5%), 3) their facilities suffered physicaldamage (8.6%), 4) their needs changed (2.3%), 5) theirconditions changed (1.8%), 6) they evacuated outside thecity (1.8%), and 7) other (7.8%). The resources
supported the home-based care decreased by 77.7%.
Before the earthquake, 65.9% of the received seniors

questionnaire, we asked the care managers, which cared
for the senior citizens that evacuated to welfare facilities
or hospitals, to answer the questions on the seniors’
behalf.
3.3.2 Results of Survey 2(1) The general situation
The questionnaires were distributed on January 15,
2005 through the Geriatric Welfare Division, Ojiya City
Office, and collected on January 31, 2005. A 100%
response rate was achieved with the assistance of theGeriatric Welfare Division since all 23 care managers
that provide home-based nursing care in Ojiya City
responded to Questionnaire-A in Survey (2).
Questionnaire-B was distributed to 399 senior citizens,
although 382 were returned, only 257 were assessed to
be useful for the survey. Consequently, the effective
response rate was 64.4%.
(2) Situation of the senior citizens received at welfare
facilities and hospitals in Ojiya City after the
Mid-Niigata Prefecture Earthquake
The graph in Fig. 4, which is based on the data fromthe Geriatric Welfare Division, Ojiya City,
chronologically shows the extent that care managers
coped with the emergency evacuation needs. The
division accumulated the data by calling the welfare
facilities and hospitals to confirm the senior citizens
Numbers of people
㪌㪇

10/27

㪋㪎
㪋㪌

Total number confirmed before
December 12th, 399 people

㪋㪇 㪊㪐
㪊㪌
㪉㪐

㪊㪇

㪉㪌

㪉㪌

㪉㪌

㪉㪍

㪉㪏

㪉㪎

㪉㪉
㪈㪐

㪉㪇
㪈㪎
㪈㪌

㪈㪍
㪈㪊
㪈㪇 㪈㪇

㪈㪇
㪎
㪌

㪎
㪌

㪋
㪉

㪊
㪇

㪈

㪉 㪉
㪇

㪇 㪇 㪇

㪈

㪉
㪇

㪇 㪇 㪇 㪇㪈㪉㪊㪈㪇㪋㪆㪈㪇㪆㪉㪊
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪇㪆㪉㪋
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪇㪆㪉㪌
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪇㪆㪉㪍
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪇㪆㪉㪎
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪇㪆㪉㪏
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪇㪆㪉㪐
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪇㪆㪊㪇
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪇㪆㪊㪈
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪈
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪉
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪊
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪋
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪌
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪍
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪎
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪏
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪐
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪈㪇
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪈㪈
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪈㪉
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪈㪊
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪈㪋
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪈㪌
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪈㪍
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪈㪎
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪈㪏
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪈㪐
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪉㪇
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪉㪈
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪉㪉
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪉㪊
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪉㪋
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪉㪌
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪉㪍
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪉㪎
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪉㪏
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪉㪐
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪊㪇
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪉㪆㪈
㪇㪋㪆㪈㪉㪆㪉

㪇㪊

Fig.4 Elderly people evacuated to hospitals/welfare facilities in Ojiya city after the Mid-Niigata Prefecture Earthquake㧙㧙dwelled at home and 27.1% resided in welfare facilities(Others were 7%). On the day of the earthquake,
37.1% stayed in a tent or a car, 16.3% evacuated toshelters, 17.6% stayed in welfare facilities, 6.9% stayed
in hospitals, and 10.6% remained at home. Two to fourdays after the earthquake, 20% were still living in tents,
cars, or shelters. One week after the earthquake, thenumber of senior citizens received at welfare facilities
and hospitals increased and peaked one month after theearthquake. By that time, 61.7% had moved to welfare
facilities and 23.0% to hospitals (Others were 15.3%).
Two months after the earthquake, the number ofseniors at welfare facilities and hospitals decreased,
implying that they started to return home. However,three months after the earthquake only 42.0% of thereceived seniors had returned home (Fig. 5).
(4) Senior citizens returning home from hospitals/welfare
facilities
Figure 6 chronologically compares “the number ofsenior citizens received at hospitals/welfare facilities
during the emergency evacuation” and “the number of
evacuees staying at shelters”. The number of evacuees
peaked five days after the earthquake. 29,000 of the
44,000 residents in Ojiya City evacuated. The numberof evacuees started to decline two weeks after theearthquake and all of them returned home by December

20, 2004. On the other hand, the number of elderly
people received at welfare facilities and hospitals during
the emergency evacuation increased in accordance with
the increase of evacuees at the shelters and peaked 12days after the earthquake. Although the number of
evacuees sharply declined two weeks after theearthquake, the number of the seniors at the welfare
facilities and hospitals did not decline as rapidly. The
number of senior citizens staying at welfare facilities andhospital gradually declined to 177 as of December 12.
These finding suggest that the senior citizens, who
needed care, were unable to reconstruct their lives
compared to the other evacuees.
Via a verbal
confirmation on February 17, 2005, 67 seniors were stillat hospitals and welfare facilities. As of May 27, 2005,
that number decreased to 50. Thus, our current task is tohelp these 50 seniors return to their own homes.
4. Observations and Conclusions
An essential issue in disaster planning is how to help
people that have difficulties evacuating by themselves.
Typically, the welfare services that support the life ofthese people are only provided during fixed hours andare unable to handle abrupt catastrophic disasters.
Nevertheless, care managers play a pivotal role in the㪈㪇㪇㧑㪥㪔㪉㪋㪌㪄㪉㪌㪍㪐㪇
Private home 㪏㪇(before the Earthquake)

65.9%

㪎㪇
Nursing care insurance service facilities

㪍㪇㪌㪇
Private home

㪋㪇
27.1%

㪊㪇
Hospital

Welfarefacilities(before theEarthquake)

㪉㪇

7%

㪈㪇

Others(before theEarthquake)

Tent/car/garage/parking lot

Shelter㪇

The person diedTemporary housing

With relatives
At friends/neighbors

Rented house

The day of earthquake

2-4 days 2 weeks







1 month 2 months 3 months

2 years 3-6 years7-8 years

1 year:NQI‘6KOGGNCRUGFUKPEGVJGGCTVJSWCMG’

Fig.5 Changes in dwelling places of victims received during the emergency evacuation㧙㧙than 50 senior citizens (as of May 27, 2005 when thispaper is written) had yet to return to their previous lives
within the community.
The resources available to care receivers living at
home decreased due to the disaster, which prevented
these seniors from leaving the hospitals and welfare
facilities, and returning home.
Hence, a new special area called “disaster caremanagement” must be established. This area allows
care managers to play a leading role in systematizing
knowledge, techniques, and networking for total caremanagement during a disaster and remain within theframework of nursing care insurance system.

current welfare service and are knowledgeable about
senior citizens and their need for assistance when adisaster occurs. Care managers also have a strong senseof responsibility for the safety of people in need. Thus,
these care managers must be involved in developing
individual evacuation plans for future senior citizens thatneed support. Since care managers determine theevacuation plan for senior citizens, who require care,
individuals and organizations, which will become thelife-saving resources in an emergency, must be secured.
Once these resources are ascertained, the administration,
the welfare-related employees, and the community needto simulate evacuations and provide training in order toimprove the disaster prevention abilities of thecommunity.
After the emergency period of the Mid-Niigata
Prefecture Earthquake was over, the care managers
mainly provided support to the elderly requiring care byfacilitating their reception at welfare facilities andhospitals. However, there are fundamental issues. 1)
The facilities were selected from the limited options
within the care managers’ network. It was difficult toselect the facilities that might help these seniors
reconstruct their lives. 2) These seniors tended to haveprolonged stays at these facilities. In Ojiya City, which
was hit by the Mid-Niigata Prefecture Earthquake, more

Acknowledgments
This research was partially supported by the Ministryof Education, Science, Sports and Culture, Grant-in-Aid
for Special Purposes, Research of the Niigata,
Fukushima and Fukui Flooding Disaster in July 2004,
and for COE Research, Center of Excellence for Natural
Disaster Science and Disaster Reduction (Disaster
Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University, Japan).

㪊㪌㪇㪇㪇

㪊㪌㪇

Number of people staying at shelters (line graph)

Number of senior citizens evacuated to hospitals/welfare
facilities during the emergency evacuation) (bar graph)㪇㪋㪆㪈㪉㪆㪉㪇

㪇㪋㪆㪈㪉㪆㪈㪏

㪇㪋㪆㪈㪉㪆㪈㪍

㪇㪋㪆㪈㪉㪆㪈㪋

㪇㪋㪆㪈㪉㪆㪈㪉

㪇㪋㪆㪈㪉㪆㪈㪇

㪇㪋㪆㪈㪉㪆㪇㪏

㪇㪋㪆㪈㪉㪆㪇㪍

㪇㪋㪆㪈㪉㪆㪇㪋

㪇㪋㪆㪈㪉㪆㪇㪉

㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪊㪇

㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪉㪏

㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪉㪍

㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪉㪋

㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪉㪉

㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪉㪇

㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪈㪏

㪇㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪈㪍

㪇㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪈㪋

㪌㪇㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪈㪉

㪌㪇㪇㪇㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪈㪇

㪈㪇㪇㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪇㪏

㪈㪇㪇㪇㪇㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪇㪍

㪈㪌㪇㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪇㪋

㪈㪌㪇㪇㪇㪇㪋㪆㪈㪈㪆㪇㪉

㪉㪇㪇㪇㪋㪆㪈㪇㪆㪊㪈

㪉㪇㪇㪇㪇㪇㪋㪆㪈㪇㪆㪉㪐

㪉㪌㪇㪇㪋㪆㪈㪇㪆㪉㪎

㪉㪌㪇㪇㪇㪇㪋㪆㪈㪇㪆㪉㪌

㪊㪇㪇㪇㪋㪆㪈㪇㪆㪉㪊

㪊㪇㪇㪇㪇

Fig.6 Comparison of the number of people staying at shelters and the number of senior citizens evacuated to hospital/welfare
facilities during the emergency evacuation㧙㧙

References
Burton, I., Kates, R. and White, G., 1993. The
Environmental as Hazard (2nd ed.), the Guilford Press,
New York.
Fire and Disaster Management Agency, Japan, 2004.
The Report of the Damage Caused of Niigata & Fukui
Flood. (Japanese)
Hayashi, H. (ed), 2004. Socio-economic Recovery fromthe 1995 Hanshin Awaji Earthquake Disaster-Reportof Panel Survey 2003-, Technical Report
DRS-2003-01, Research Center for Disaster
Reduction System, Disaster Prevention ResearchInstitute, Kyoto University. (Japanese)
Hayashi, H. and Tamura, K., 2005. Profiling Causes of
Deaths at the Niigata Flooding Disaster on July 13,
2004, Journal of Social Safety Science, No. 7,
pp.179-188. (Japanese)
Kimura, R., Hayashi, H., Tatsuki S. and Tamura, K.,
2001. Determinants and Timing of Housing
Reconstruction in the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake Disaster -A 2001 Replication-, Journal ofSocial Safety Science, No, 3, 23-32. (Japanese)
Kimura, R., Hayashi, H., Tatsuki S. and Tamura, K.,
2004. Psychologically Defined Life Reconstruction
Processes of Disaster Victims in the 1995 Hanshin
Awaji Earthquake, Journal of Social Safety Science,No, 6, 241-250. (Japanese)

Kimura, R., Hayashi, H., Tatsuki, S. and Urata, Y., 1999.
Clarifying the human behavior of the disaster victims
after the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, Journal ofSocial Safety Science, No, 1, 93-102. (Japanese)
Meteorological Agency, 2004. Report on the
2004Mid-Niigata Prefecture Earthquake (Bulletin No.
31), Press release materials, Meteorological Agency,
Japan.
Mileti, D., 1999. Disasters by Design, Joseph Henry
Press, Washington, D.C.
Nakanoshima Town Anti-Disaster Headquarters, 2004.
"A Quick Report on the July-13th Flood Damage"(issued on July 24)
River Department of the Hokuriku Regional
Development Bureau and the River Planning andManagement Division of the Department of Public
Works, Niigata Prefecture, 2004. "A Quick Report on
Heavy Rain and River Disasters in Niigata andFukushima in July 2004"
Sanjo City Office, 2004. "The General Situation of the
July-13th Heavy Rain Damage in 2004"
Ushiyama M., Imamura F., Katada T., Koshimura S.,
2003. A research of how to use disaster information by
local governments for heavy rainfall. the Journal ofCommittee on Hydroscience and HydraulicEngineering 5), No.47, pp.349-354. (Japanese)
Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., and Davis, I., 2004.
At Risk; Natural hazards, people's vulnerability anddisasters (2nd ed.), Routledge, New York.

␠ળ⑔␩ߩⷰὐ߆ࠄ⷗ߚ㜞㦂⠪ߦ߅ߌࠆἴኂㆊ⒟ߩ⸃᣿↰᧛࿻ሶ ࡮ᨋᤐ↵ ࡮ᧁ᧛⃍᰷ ੩ㇺᄢቇ㒐ἴ⎇ⓥᚲ
ฬฎደᄢቇᄢቇ㒮ⅣႺቇ⎇ⓥ⑼
ⷐᣦᣂẟ⽕㔎᳓ኂ㧘ਛ⿧࿾㔡ࠍ੐଀ߦ㧘㜞㦂⠪ߩᄌൻ࡮⺖㗴㧘ኻᔕߩታᘒߦߟ޿ߡ⺞ᩏߒߚ‫⚿ޕ‬ᨐ㧘੺⼔଻㒾ߩᜂ޿ᚻߣߒߡࠤࠕࡑࡀࠫࡖ࡯ߪ㧘࿾ၞߩⷐេ⼔⠪ߦኻߔࠆἴኂᤨᡰេߦ᦭ലߦᯏ⢻ߔࠆሽ࿷ߢ޽ߞߚ੐߇᣿ࠄ߆ߣߥߞߚ‫ޕ‬ߒ߆ߒἴኂᤨߩᵴേߪ㧘ኾ㐷⡯ߣߒߡߩ㜞޿ࡕ࡜࡞ߣ₂りߦᡰ߃ࠄࠇߚᵴേߢ޽ࠅ㧘ἴኂᤨߩ⽶ᜂჇߪ㗼⪺ߢ޽ࠆߚ߼㧘ἴኂኻᔕᓥ੐⠪߽฽ࠎߛ࿾ၞߢߩἴኂᤨࠤࠕߩ઀⚵ߺࠍ⑔␩ߣ㒐ἴߩ㑆ߢផㅴߔࠆᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ࠠ࡯ࡢ࡯࠼:ἴኂᤨⷐេ⼔⠪‫ޔ‬ෂᯏ▤ℂ‫ޔ‬㜞㦂ൻ␠ળ‫଻⼔੺ޔ‬㒾‫␠ޔ‬ળ⑔␩‫࠻ࡦࡔࠫࡀࡑࠕࠤޔ‬㧙㧙