From Decentralized Management to Localized governance: The importance of legitimizing self-governance through the case of Zaisan-ku (財産区)
Onnuri Kim
The Graduate School of Public Policy
The University of Tokyo
Supervisor: Professor Sato Jin

Keywords: Local Governance, Resource Governance, Self-governing Common-Pool Resource(CPR) systems, The Scale of Governing Regime, Zaisan-ku, Decentralization, Governmentalized
Commons

Introduction

In recent decades, common-pool resource (CPR) systems have been suggested as aneffective institution to manage resources. By definition, a common-pool resource (CPR) system isa resource management system for common resources from which it is undesirable to “exclude
potential beneficiaries” from benefiting from its utilization (Ostrom, 1990, p 30) due to the resource
systems’ impact on and relationship with the potential beneficiaries. Such characteristic of CPR isshared with public goods (Ostrom, 2005, p. 80). In other words, CPR systems are collective
resource stocks that have a critical impact and influence on individual agents embedded in the
resource systems. This implicates that every society can benefit from careful application of thegovernance of CPR systems as every society is dependent on resource stocks foraccomplishment of its welfare and progress. Although the utility efficiency and the structure ofresource flow may vary from one to another, every society sustains itself and develops through theuse of the resource flows or the mechanism of social and ecological metabolism (Marx, 1976). In
general, such localized governance system produces positive impacts in utilization and allocationof resources as local units are conditioned to be more sensitive and responsive to the needs anddemands of local communities (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972; Qian & Weingast, 1997; UNDP, 2000).
In the light of such benefits of localized system, the importance and rationale of localized natural
resource management is supported by increasing number of scholars (Ostrom, 1990; Bromley etal eds, 1992; Agrawal, 2001; Dosak & Ostrom eds., 2003; Mitsumata, Suga & Inoue eds., 2010 toname only few). Expanding the concept of CPRs beyond commonly mentioned natural resources,
the paper perceives self-governing CPR systems as a critical governing mechanism applicable togovernance in general.

The Importance of Having a Big Picture – Polity system structure

Many researchers in the field of commons tend to focus on politics or policy through detailed
descriptive illustration of specific CPR cases. In such approach, serious discussion for macroscale institutional arrangement or system structure can be missing or insufficiently touched upon.
The internal institutional conditions required for sustainable CPR systems are already analyzed by
Ostrom in her seminal book Governing the Commons (1990). In the last chapter of the book, sherightly acknowledges the challenge and importance of adoptability of individual agents in a CPR

system (1990), and in more recent work, she goes further to describe the lack of large-scale
supportive institutions as one of the threats to self-governing CPR systems (2005, p. 278).
Nevertheless, the discussion does not include the matter of polity system structure in a broad
sense. The example she uses for a large-scale supportive institutions is the U.S. Geological
Survey which is a single institutional entity rather than macro level institutional arrangement or
system structure.

Without a doubt, analyzing the characteristics of successful or unsuccessful individual cases
provides us not only a hopeful sense but also informative lessons on how to sustain and develop
more successful commons. The merits are undoubtedly clear. However, it is also important toremind ourselves that such successful cases are not the majority story. Today’s challenges facedwith local CPR systems are of multi-level due to the “increased interconnectedness” among
natural environment and human institutions of different scales (Dolsak & Ostrom, 2003, p 338).
Furthermore, in modern era, most of human society is under the governance of a nation state
which boasts the authority and legitimacy on the allocation of access or rights to resources whichhave been previously under the realm of the commons. These two factors inevitably make CPR
systems of today a part of larger systems, asking for a greater attention to the last design principleof sustainable CPR systems - “nested enterprises” (for detailed explanation, look Ostrom, 1990, p.
90).
Moreover, regarding adaptability, which is emphasized as a critical strategy for enduring CPR
systems in Ostrom’s recent works, if both immediate and surrounding systems’ structures aretransformed and when the transformation hinders individual agents from keeping their commitment
to the CPR system, adaptability of individual agents loses its power and raison d'être. In otherwords, CPR systems cannot be sustained with mere micro-level institutional arrangements in thisinterconnected society. Hence, it is inevitable to discuss what can be done with the macro-levelinstitutional arrangement and system structure in order to create a polity system which can foster and sustain self-governing CPR systems through multi-layered nested systems.

Research Question
Considering the importance of multi-layered nested systems in nurturing CPR systems intoday’s interconnected society, this paper aims to investigate the impact of macro scale system ona system called Zaisan-ku (財産区) which is intended to assist or even replace traditional CPR
systems – community Iriai (入会) systems. Also, this study attempts to analyze the roles of local
commons management system prescribed by the state government as the state’s governmental
tool and its impacts on local common resource governance. So the central research question
would be“What is the de facto function of Zaisan-ku system as a governmental tool in natural resource
governance?”“What is the impact of Zaisan-ku system in relation with CPR systems? Does Zaisan-ku systemreally serve as a local commons system or CPR system as some scholars argue?”“What is needed to sustain and promote CPR systems amid of increasing interconnectivity andcomplexity?”

Methods and Procedures
In an attempt to answer the question, the paper uses two different categories in regard withdecentralization. One is administrative decentralization - the governing technology for the big
scaled governance system, and the other is comprehensive decentralization - the governingtechnology for small scaled localized governance system. Based on this framework, the paper
carries out a secondary and tertiary literature/data analysis examining the specific cases of
Zaisan-ku in Japan and concludes that the system is an administratively decentralized natural
resource management and thus the decentralization technology for a big-scaled governanceregime. In the discussion, the paper introduces a new term - governmentalized commons to depict
the creation of governmental subjectivity in commons or CPRs and argues that thisgovernmentalization of commons has a negative impact on CPR systems. To achieve somedegree of depth with limited time and pages, the paper does not dare to further its scope ofinvestigation to the decentralization technology for small scale governance regime in detail(devolution or democratic decentralization). Yet, it provides a brief explanation on the recent
examples of it – the case of UK and India. An important presumption is that self-governing CPR
systems is the way to achieve sustainable governance of resources as commons scholars argue.
Based on this presumption, the paper’s argument is built.

Zaisan-ku - Its creation and the Status quo
Since start of the Meiji era, the Japanese government implemented laws and policies thatenabled centralized nation-state governance; land-tax reform policies through land registration andcategorization (1876-1881), introduction of municipal system (1889), Unification of common land
(部落有林野) Policy (1910-1939), Modernization of common land Policy (1966-present) (Saito &Mitsumata, 2010 in Mitsumata, Suga & Inoue eds, 2010). Due to the imposition of these bigchanges, a great number of farmers resisted against the new system (Watanabe eds., 1974; Saito& Mitsumata, 2010).
From farmers’ point of view, their resistance was legitimate attempt to protect their access to andself-governing authority on the village commons, the very source of their livelihoods. It is important
to notice that the enfeebling process included not only taking the common resources away putting
them into the realm of private or state property, but also disabling communities as governing
bodies of their CPRs. This means that the series of modern technology of the centralized nationstate government alienated the commoners from both the economic and the political realm of thecommons.
Strong responses from farmers alarmed the state government so that it had to come up withsome sort of compromise to calm down the anger spurred by the new system (Saito & Mitsumata,2010) and the resulted policy was Zaisan-ku system. In 1889, the system was introduced alongwith the introduction of municipal system (Izumi, Saito, Asai & Yamashita, 2011). Today, 3,710
Zaisan-ku areas exist in 442 different municipalities (24.2 percent of the entire municipalities)
taking up 1.46 percent of the land (zumi, Saito, Asai & Yamashita, 2011, p. 61, 86).
According to its operational style, the majority of Zaisan-ku can be divided into two kinds, onewith a governing assembly (議会制財産区) and the other with a management board (管理会制財産区) (Mitsumata, 2004). If the head of prefectural government recognizes the necessity, membersof a Zaisan-ku can have a governing assembly to self-govern their CPR systems (Izumi, Saito,
Asai & Yamashita, 2011). Also, while no tax is levied on revenues from Zaisan-ku, it is required tospend the revenues for public purpose only (Saito & Mitsumata, 2010).

Zaisan-ku areas in Esasi city (江刺市) and Koka town (甲賀町)
Mitsumata’s case study on Zaisan-ku areas in Esasi city (江刺市) and Koka town (甲賀町) may
give some contextual understanding on today’s Zaisan-ku system. Esasi city has 5 Zaisan-ku
areas which were all originally initiated as governing assembly in 1955 (2004). Currently, only one
Zaisan-ku (伊手 財産区) is remained as governing assembly, and the only remaining governing
assembly of Zaisan-ku is, in fact, consists of 8 assembly members only instead of all community
members (Mitsumata, 2004). Furthermore, its’ current operation is de facto managed by the forest
management department of the local municipal government.
In Koka town, on the other hand, one Zaisan-ku called Ohara Zaisan-ku (大原財産区) showshigh involvement of community members in management activities and financial stability thanks tothe community’s continued history of CPR governance and the high market price of Koka
Japanese cypress grown in the region. Naturally, the Zaisan-ku maintains a relatively independent
position despite the fact that it is operated with a management board not governing assembly.

Discussion
Zaisan-ku system and an administrative decentralization technology of a big-scaled
governing regime for Governmentalizing CommonsSome researchers (like zumi, Saito, Asai & Yamashita) who insist that the majority of Zaisan-ku
is as local commons as they are commonly owned property of communities (Izumi, Saito, Asai &Yamashita, 2011, p. 83). However, in fact, Zaisan-ku system is functioning as a mean forgovernmentalizing commons through administrative decentralization without self-governing CPR
systems to govern common resources. More detailed explanation on the the case of Ohara
Zaisan-ku in Koka city and recent changes surrounding the Zaisan-ku may illustrate this point.
Although Ohara Zaisan-ku seems to enjoy some greater domain of power within its designatedarea compared to other Zaisan-kus, such Zaisan-ku can be rarely found as Mitsumata admits(2004, p115). The number of its entire members is 50, which is exceptionally large compared tothe average 15. 5 of the other Zaisan-ku areas in the region (calculated based on Ordinance No.
20 of Koka city statutes). Moreover, since 2004 some important changes have taken place. In
2004, Koka town got merged into Koka city in the process of the great Heisei mergers ofmunicipalities (平成の大合併), and consequently new municipal bylaws on Zaisan-ku were madein 2006. The new bylaws clearly state that the managing authority (not governing) of Zaisan-ku is
the power delegated (“委任”) from the municipal government to the community (Ordinanceregulation No. 27 of Koka city statutes) implicating the system is rooted in deconcentration ordelegation rather than decentralization.
Also, it is stated that it is necessary to obtain an “agreement” from each Zaisan-ku’s
management board to implement decisions relevant to Zaisan-ku raging from financial plan, theuse of revenues, to establishing/disestablishing the relationship between Zaisan-ku and its
members (Ordinance No. 20). This is to say that, at least by its design, the decision making
responsibility and power regarding Zaisan-ku’s is with the municipal government and the functionof each management board is to passively accept or refuse its decisions. Here, no governing
authority exists. What is given to each Zaisan-ku is merely the choice to say no or yes to decisions
already made. Such tendency of the local government to consider Zaisan-ku as its property rather
than commons may be resonated by the fact that the Zaisan-ku system is under the responsibility

of government property administration related department in many municipalities (Izumi, Saito,
Asai & Yamashita, 2011, p. 78).

Hence, it is difficult to say that Zaisan-ku is really representing the community as a governing
unit of the community owned natural resources. In practice, Zaisan-ku is functioning as a local
branch of the municipal government built inside community rather than a resource governing bodyof communities. This point would be illustrated in the following discussion on decentralization anddevolution.

Decentralization

To understand why Zaisan-ku system does not help local communities govern their own
commons even as a decentralized resource management system, we need a proper clarificationon the concept called decentralization. Although ‘decentralization’ is increasingly mentioned in theliterature on natural resource governance, it is used alternatively to ‘devolution’ in an inattentive
manner. In similarly relentless manner (if not worse), states also have used the term with theincreasing emphasis on improving governance. Zaisan-ku is also created as a part of this“decentralization” process through the local autonomy law. However, based on its actual legal
identity and administrative rules, it is not appropriate to sort Zaisan-ku as a decentralization
technology.
Rather it should be considered as a deconcentration technology which ended up creating some
centralizing effects under the big scaled (centralized) governing regime. As to understanding why
Zaisan-ku system is a deconcentration technology, it is important to understand what isdecentralization and devolution, and how they are different from what is claimed as
decentralization by states and even by some imprudent researchers.
In principle, devolution involves power and duty transfer in three aspects – political decision
making, economic & financial management, and administrative and service delivery (UNDP, 1997).
In this sense, devolution refers to localization of governing regime for greater political power andresponsibility of the local citizens in decision making process. Both federation system and a group
autonomous governing regimes under a unitary system (i.e. UK) can be seen as devolved polity
system.
However, in natural resource governance, the term ‘decentralization’ is used to refer toadministrative or managerial decentralization which is “expansion of the array of institutions andorganizations carrying out collective public sector tasks” (Cohen & Peterson, 1999, p. 19). To be
more specific, administrative decentralization is a specific type of decentralization called
deconcenration (other two types being fiscal decentralization, and democratic decentralization)(Manor, 1999).
Deconcentration or administrative decentralization creates local administrative agents mainly
upwardly accountable (1999). Although, these local administration bodies may have somedownward accountability, their core responsibility is to central governing body and the scope of
their authority or power is controlled by state level administrative agencies such as supervising
ministries (Manor 1999; Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Ribot, 2000). Due to this primarily upward
accountability, deconcentration is considered as “weak form decentralization” (Ribot, 2000, p. 2).
Such deconcentration end up reinforcing centralization as it strengthens “the leverage of those at
the apex of the system” (Manor, 1999, p. 5).

In the case of Zaisan-ku system, “decentralization” of natural resource governance (includingland) through the system may have been intended but it came to be the mixture ofdeconcentration and delegation which make the system make local governance units as subordinate lower-level units and semi-autonomous lower-level units (UNDP, 1997). The absence ofpolitical decentralization (devolution) makes comprehensive decentralization of governance The
fact that Zaisan-ku system has been spread in increasing number of municipalities through threemunicipality mergers (through the Meiji, Showa, and Heisei eras) illustrates this point as well.
Municipality mergers are different from other policies as it is basically the state driven enlargementof local administration units having an impact on the whole polity system structure. As Zaisan-ku
system was coupled with such deconcentration policies for structuring centralized polity system, it
naturally came to serve as administrative decentralization technology.
The administrative decentralization gives local communities the authority to manage and thecomprehensive decentralization gives them the authority to self-govern as CPR systems. While
management is of operational aspect aiming the continuation of the management itself,
governance is a broader concept which deals with natural, social and political layers ofcommunities with a purpose to provide public goods necessary in realizing their shared vision –development. Motivation for members to cooperate and commit in the long term, and thus thecapacity of each system to adapt and evolve shall be quite different in these two different realms.
Naturally, one would expect that a self-governing institution would be more sustainable andadaptive as a system compared to a management institution which is governed by an external
system. The more the external system is far from the loci, the more effective governance becomes
and the more easy it becomes to result in control rather than governance. This implicates that
Zaisan-ku institution coupled with the three municipal mergers can hinder CPR systems to besustained by putting CPR resources under the realm of the municipal or national governments
which are external to each CPR system. This process deprives self-governing authority andeventually capacity of CPR systems.

Zaisan-ku as Governmentalized Commons – Paradox in Administration
In the process of municipality merges since the Meiji era, community resources or properties
have been dissolved into either public or private property realm and the same pattern of CPR
deterioration continues today (Mitsumata, 2006). Consequently, the role of Zaisan-ku as adeconcentrating and delegating tool of CPRs of a big scaled government regime has beenstrengthened through a series of municipal mergers.
In the case of Koka town mentioned before, after its merger into Koka city, an interesting new
bylaw was made regarding so called “contract” between two Zaisan-kus in the newly made Kokacity and the enlarged municipal government in 2007 - the Ordinance No. 28 (available fromhttp://reiki.city.koka.lg.jp/reiki_int/ reiki_taikei/r_taikei_15.html). It explicitly shows who owns andgoverns the two Zaisan-kus by specifying the types of natural resources which can be used by
Zaisan-ku members, and the cases when they must make a report to the municipal government.
Under the new “contract”, the Zaisan-ku members have to follow to (or cooperate with) the
directions of municipal officers, members of the Zaisan-ku management board, or the district forest
office (officers). Also, whenever they wish to collect natural resources from Zaisan-ku, they mustbring the certificate of permission issued by the head of municipal government and show themwhen requested by municipal officers, members of the Zaisan-ku management board, or the
district forest office (officers). The bylaw states that the purpose of this new contract isenvironmental conservation.
The series of changes taking place in Zaisan-ku areas in Koka town is in parallel with the storyof village forests in Kumaon region in North India discussed in Agrawal’s book ‘Environmentality’(2005). Both cases illustrate how the government makes local villages as governmentalized
localities through decentralized regulatory rules over previously commonly governed natural
resources. Focusing on the case of Kumaon region, Agrawal describes how the government of
United Provinces (UP), the state government of India under British colonial rule, successfully
made local communities as its governmental subjects. As the Japanese government of the Meiji
era introduced Zaisan-ku as a tool to ease out the severe opposition from local farmers against its
governmentalization process, the UP government introduced van panchayats (forest councils), in
its early stages, which allowed local villagers to control the use of natural resources in village
forests only ostensibly (p. 5). As the contact of two Zaisan-ku areas in Koka city did, vanpanchayats of Kumaon started to make some previously legal activities as inappropriate or illegal(p. 13) in the name of environmental conservation.
However, there are some critical differences between forest councils in India and Zaisan-ku inJapan. Forest councils later became a governing localities and with the redefined relationshipbetween communities and the state government through the establishment of Panchayati Raj(village self-governance) Institutions through the 73rd constitutional Amendment in 1993 (Mathew& Mathew, 2003) which increased the loci of decision making process and inclusion of community
members in the process. Along with the constitutionalized local governance system, new laws arealso getting passed to secure the legal legitimacy of commons in states following the 2002
National Policy for Common Property Resource Lands. For instance, the state of Rajasthan madeits Common Land Policy in 2010 (The Hindu Times, 2011) to bestow legal legitimacy to common
lands and resources. Moreover, the reform required not only the Union government but also every
state to establish the Ministry of Panchayati Raj (Government of India, 2007). This series ofsystem reform and policies at both national level and state level function as a multi-layered nested
system for CPR systems, the institutional condition for self governance of villages on local public
goods and resources.
On the other hand, Zaisan-ku still remains as the governmentalized commons with increasingly
weakening communities to assert governing authority over commons due to inaction of thegovernment in providing the platform for communities to strengthen its adaptability and capacity to
self-govern. Hence, the administrative paradox - decentralized CPR management system
undermining CPR governance system by local communities (Iriai 入会 system), can observed fromthe case of Zaisan-ku system.

.
Legal mechanism of Governmentalizing Commons – Paradox in Law
Today, by the current local autonomy law of Japan, it is recognized as one of special municipal
public organizations differentiated from general municipal public organizations which are basicallyadministrative units of municipal governments (Saito & Mitsumata, 2010). However, by law, theexecutive authority of the Zaisan-ku system is the head of each municipal government (Izumi,
Saito, Asai & Yamashita, 2011). This enigma causes the replacement of local governance ofcommons with the local management with upward accountabilities and dependency by hindering
self-governing aspect of CPR systems and increasing its control over CPRs.

Also, from the perspective of constitution of Japan, paradox can be witnessed in regard withthe govermentalized CPR systems. According to the legal rationality of the constitution of Japan,
common resources of communities should be perceived as the common property based on rights(入会財産) instead of the property owned Zaisan-ku (Watanabe in Watanabe eds., 1979, p253),
which is a sort of sub-ordinate organization of the municipal government. Watanabe Yozo, an
authority on the research of commons (入会) and Zaisan-ku, asserts that the matter of commons

has to be dealt in the realm of civil law (Watanabe in Watanabe eds., 1979). This is because only
the civil law (the article 263 and 294) provides the legal legitimacy of rights to commons thus, thecommons as well (the articles are available at E-gov Website of Ministry of Internal Affairs andCommunications). The fact that the legal rationality of the constitution, civil law and that of local
autonomy law (the article 294 on Zaisan-ku) are in contradiction, puts the whole Japanese legal
regime’s legal logic on local commons in inconsistency when it comes to local self-governance on
resources.
Due to this inconsistency, in reality, numerous legal disputes over the identification ofcommons have been created (Takei in Yatanabe eds., 1979, Okamoto, 2010). Strictly speaking, if
a common land is treated as Zaisan-ku, it is violation of property rights secured by civil law, and if
Zaisan-ku is treated as a common land, it is violation of local autonomy law (Okamoto, 2010, p.
222) as local autonomy law prohibits establishment of Zaisan-ku’s own organization or institution
in principle (Izumi, Saito, Asai & Yamashita, 2011, p. 46). More importantly, as a result of bothgovernance and legal paradox, Zaisan-ku system, impedes self-governance of local communities
regarding CPRs both at administrative and legal dimension. This is the critical problem with thesystem from the perspective of CPRs.

Clash of Intentions and rationalities – Problem with the system structureThis is not to say that the state and local governments are determined to block morecomprehensive decentralization with intention. It is naïve to believe so as much as it is to believethat they are always well intended and working purely on behalf of the public. In a democraticsociety, it is rather laughable to assume the government as a monolithic monster. A moresophisticated and practical approach would be analyzing which department or agent within thestate governing system has “de facto veto power” (Sato, 2011). Due to power dynamics within thegoverning system, intentions to decentralize may get overridden by other intentions which may
and may not work against decentralization, and thus resulting in inaction.

It is noteworthy that the technology of deconcentration and delegation of a big government was
not free from challenges. Some innovative efforts have been made such as the Nagano
prefectural government’s initiation of the Commons Fund program and Commons Policy Team
inside the prefectural bureaucracy as a bridging agent in 2004 (see Hashimoto, 2007 for further
description). Yet, after the change of the administrative head, such efforts could not be sustained.
So clashes of intentions can happen both for external and internal causes due to the problematic
system structure. In the case of Zaisan-ku system, such clash is echoed in both administrative andlegal paradox. Also, there is a clash of rationality as well. Often, economic and operationalrationality override other kinds of rationality of long term basis such as sustainability rationality andcollective rationality or substantive rationality in Weber’s words (Weber, 1978 - Roth & Wittch eds.).
The case of Saku city (佐久市) illustrates how predominant economic and operational rationality
within the governmental body can transform commons as not only governmentalized commons but
also comodified one.

Saku city of Nagano Prefecture recently started to hold series of auctions to sell the rights tocommons (入会権) to individual citizens and businesses. The Zaisan-ku areas on auction are theareas in Mt. Matsutake (松茸山) which is famous for Matsutake mushroom of high market value.

When the economic value of becoming a Zaisan-ku member is apparent and the resource systemboundary (zaisan-ku) does not match with governance system boundary (Saku city), giving theright to commons to the people through market mechanism makes the commons as commodityand disenables the commons system itself. This is because the market rationality and primary
rationality of agents outside of the system boundary may clash with the system rationality of Mt.
Matsutake.

Saku city is not the only municipality where the rights to use previous commons are being
traded as commoditized service through auction. Currently, at least 3 more municipal governments(Kitakyusyu city in Fukuoka Prefecture, Kobe city in Hyogo Prefecture, Kazuno city in Akita
Prefecture – check each municipalities website for details) are selling the rights to commons as
per their Zaisan-ku areas. In these 3 municipalities also, not only individuals but also businesses
can purchase the usage rights and Zaisan-kus. In addition, they can use the revenue from Zaisanku resource usage for their own purpose instead of using for public good or common good. Under
such condition, Zaisan-ku fails to maintain its “sort-of-commons” aspect even. Considering that the
majority of municipal governments now have the ordinance allowing the sale of the rights to use
resources in Zaisan-ku areas and Zaisan-ku themsevels through auction, the number ofmunicipality selling Zaisan-ku would increase along with the on-going municipal merger andweakening local communities due to aging process and declining population.
Original Iriai or CPR systems require spatial and system commitment from its members throughthe convergence of resource and governance system boundaries and such commitments are thekey conditions for sustaining effective self-governance. As Meadow explains, system structure
influences system behaviors which result in events (Meadows, 2008). In this sense, suchproblems of Zaisan-ku system are only symptoms of the problem with the whole polity system
structure in relation with local resource governance.

System for Governance not Management

The problem is not with a specific policy or institution but with the whole polity systemgenerating certain political relations and institutional framework. As discussed above, Zaisan-ku
system, as a tool of administrative decentralization of a big scaled governance regime, allows the
management only. This trait of Zaisan-ku system and other governmentalized commons systems
makes them non-CPR system failing to satisfy the foremost prerequisite of a CPR system – selfgoverning, not to mention 8 designing principles. In comparison to the Satoyama (里山) or Iriai (入会) system which satisfied the prerequisite and 7 designing principles (look Ostrom, 1990, p. 180),
Zaisan-ku system cannot fully clear even one principle as the system is not a self-governing
system, but an imposed or delegated commons management system. Ostrom also points out thedanger of having decentralized branches of central bureaucracy stating that having a begin andwell-intentioned officials who are willing to shoulder the problem of CPR systems as their own
problems, in fact, hinders local appropriators from creating or sustaining their own local institutions
for self-governing (1990). It is supported by Manor’s analysis that deconcentration can end up
reinforcing centralization (1999).
In this sense, the polity system reform allowing local communities to self-govern is desirable as
the majority of commons scholarship support the importance of nested levels of governancebesides appropriation, provision, enforcement (Agrawal, 2001, p 1659). This is not about a day
dreaming story. Many states are actualizing such reforms the most notables being the governmentof U.K. and India. Besides, India’s efforts to decentralize governance (especially over commons),
the U.K. is also making an example in creating more decentralized governance system. In 2008,
the UK introduced the Planned Community Empowerment, Housing and Economic Regeneration

Bill and a new Ministry for Decentralization (State for Communities and Local Government of theUK, 2008). In the White Paper published, the UK government explicitly stresses that the foremost
goal of the UK government in localizing governance is “to generate vibrant local democracy inevery part of the country” (2008) enabling them to achieve self-governance. Also recently, it has
introduced the Localism Act which allows communities more power and bigger roles on governing
matters within the official polity system (Government of the UK, 2011). Contained in the Localism
Act, the four Community Rights (The Right to Build, The Right to Challenge, The Right to Bid andNeighbourhood Planning) provides strong legitimacy for self-governance at community level.

These efforts are the way to achieve multi-layered nested systems for sustainable CPR
systems. Thus, if the Japanese government hope to achieve real local self-governance (自治), it
has to reform the current polity system which encourages de facto self-management system andcreates both administrative and legal paradox through comprehensive localization or
decentralization. As suggested in the cases of the U.K. and India, such reform for comprehensive
decentralization can be carried out only through constitution-backed supporting system for multilayered nested systems for self governing CPR systems and securing real governing power ofcommunities – the governing unit of CPR systems.

Conclusion
This paper discussed the way big scaled governance regime (or centralized governanceregime) controls CPR systems through governmentalized commons using the example of Zaisanku system in Japan. Through analysis of Zaisan-ku system in general and specific cases, thepaper found out that Zaisan-ku system functions as a tool of administrative decentralization by
governmentalizing commons which increases its control over CPRs. Zaisan-ku system has
contributed in centralizing natural resource governance along with 3 municipal mergers. Moreover,the paper argued that Zaisan-ku institution disenables self-governance of CPR systems and thus
weakening the systems as it poses the problem of administrative and legal paradoxes. Based onthese points, the paper concluded that the polity system must undergo localization orcomprehensive decentralization constitutionally ensuring the legal legitimacy of local village
governing bodies and their CPR systems, and creating supporting institutions to achieve multilayered nested systems necessary for self-governing CPR systems to be sustained. As the cases
where such reform is taking place to enable self-governance of local communities, to the processof Panchayati Raj Institutions establishment in India and comprehensive decentralization reform in
the UK were briefly mentioned.

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