1

Current Developments in Arctic Law
Volume: 10 (2022)

Editor: Kamrul Hossain

Publisher: University of Lapland

Current Developments in Arctic Law is produced by the Northern Institute for Environmental
and Minority Law (NIEM), Arctic Centre, University of Lapland

In cooperation with the UArctic Thematic Network on Arctic Law & UArctic Chair in Arctic
Legal Research & Education.

© UArctic Thematic Network on Arctic Law
Current Developments in Arctic Law is licensed under the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License
Cover and Formatting: Zofia Hyjek and Cedric Pfeiler

ISSN: 2343-3418

2

Table of Contents
Editor’s Note ………………………………………………………………………………………..…………….. 5

Kamrul Hossain

The 2022-First Polar Strategy and the current state of the French Arctic Policy ………………….. 8

Julie Auffret-Cariou
Arctic Governance Research and the Green Transition:
A Perspective on Interdisciplinary Work ……………………………………………………...…………... 15

Ayonghe A. Nebasifu, Stefan Kirchner, Juho Kähkönen, Iiris Kestilä, Katharina Heinrich, Pavel
Tkach
Arctic law in the face of climate change – a turning point?
Anticipatory lawmaking and new modes of governance …………………….……………………… 39

Johanna Sophie Buerkert, Kristian Søby Kristensen, Frank Sejersen
The Future of Arctic Governance: Broken hopes for Arctic exceptionalism? …………………….. 49

Daria Shvets and Kamrul Hossain

War, exclusion, and geopolitical tension:
the accepted normal in Arctic Council governance? ………….……………………………………….. 64

Tina Soliman-Hunter
Global Polar Law? ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 70

Rachael Lorna Johnstone
The Western (Near-)Future of Arctic Law ………………………………………….…………………….. 75

Stefan Kirchner
Careful precautions or dangerous misperceptions? Analyzing the militarization strategiesof the Arctic countries following the Russian invasion of Ukraine …………………………………. 79

Christopher Kiyaseh3Japanese Master’s Students Contributing to the Arctic Legal Studies
through the 15th Polar Law Symposium ………………………………………………..………………… 87

Hiroto Kogo, Rena Takezoe, Taichi Inai, Akiho Shibata
Russia’s international Arctic policy after the invasion of Ukraine:
Experts’ voices in the domestic media …………………………………………….………………. 91

Marina Lomaeva and Fujio Ohnishi
Intrinsic Value of Arctic Cooperation for Future Generations ……………………………………….. 97

Alexandra Middleton
Changing Arctic governance landscape: The Arctic Council
navigating through geopolitical turbulence ………………………………………………….. 102

Fujio Ohnishi

A Heating Arctic: A Summary on the Legal
Status of Military Operations in a Foreign EEZ …………………..……………………………………. 108

Cedric Pfeiler

Return Of Geopolitics: Navigating Through A New Normal In The Arctic ………………………115

Rashmi BR
India & the Central Arctic Ocean Region …………………………………………..…………………… 121

Kanagavalli Suryanarayanan
Convention Theory as a Framework for Discourse Analysis in the Field ofInternational Relations: A Case Study of the European Union's Arctic Policy …………..……… 127

Ana Belén López Tárraga
Different scenarios, different policies: China’s engagement in
the South China Sea and in the Central Arctic Ocean ……………………………...………………… 140

Marco Volpe4

Editor's Note
Kamrul Hossain

well as other changes in the law and policy
dynamics applicable to the Arctic. Articles
responding to the special theme make up
approximately half of the volume, although
the others in many instances also refer tothe new shift in Arctic governance. Amongthe contributions is an analysis of thelegitimacy of the decisions of the Arctic-7
within the framework of the Arctic Council
now that cooperation with Russia is on
hold. The founding document of theCouncil – the Ottawa Declaration –explicitly states that decision-making in theCouncil is based on consensus, and thatmilitary perspectives fall outside theCouncil’s mandate. Keeping this particular
topic as a point of reference, contributions
highlight diverse perspectives on the Arctic
governance framework as we face a "newnormal". Russia’s viewpoint is among those
covered, culled from sources such as media
reports, official statements and scholarly
opinions. In this context, several
contributions analyze the (re)militarization
strategies of the Arctic states, adevelopment signaling no return to "Arctic
exceptionalism". Indeed, it appears that the
Arctic Ocean region, including its exclusive
economic zones, will become an arena
hosting military exercises, exacerbating
tensions leading to military conflicts andreplacing the Arctic as a “zone of peace".

This year, 2022, marks the tenthanniversary of Current Developments in
Arctic Law (CDAL). Over the years, laws andpolicies on the Arctic have seen crucial
advancements in response to the region's
novel challenges. These range from theimpacts of climate change and otherenvironmental concerns to the impending
shift in Arctic governance with thegeopolitical reframing of the region under
the sway of great power politics. The
Russian invasion of Ukraine in late February
has paused Arctic cooperation and split theeight Arctic countries on the Arctic Councilin two – the Arctic-7 on one side and Russia
on the other. Many Arctic scholars see thisrift as the end of Arctic exceptionalism, withno return to the present model ofcooperation. CDAL, celebrating its 10th
anniversary, – thanks go to the volume’scontributors – to address to address thisspecial and timely theme in the present
volume, Arctic governance: crafting a newnormal?
The
wideselectionofcontributions touches upon a range ofperspectives linked to Arctic governanceandtheregion’sframeworkforcooperation now that Russia, formally thecurrent Chair of the Arctic Council, is being
boycotted by the other seven members of
the Council.
The volume’s contributions broach novel
issues prompted by Russia's invasion as

5form venues for numerous academic andoutreach activities linked to developments
in Arctic law and policy. This work includes
handling research and Network interests,
organizing sessions at Arctic-related
international events and arranging guest
lectures in institutions that are part of the
Network. The Network and the Chair, incollaboration with the Northern Institutefor Environmental and Minority Law at the
Arctic Centre, co-host the annual Polar Law
Symposium and facilitate the publication of
the Yearbook of Polar Law. The Networkand the Chair jointly organized a panelsession at the 15th Polar Law Symposium
held in October 2022 in Reykjavik, Iceland,to celebrate the 10th anniversary of CDAL.
The panel, under the title "Arctic Law is anacademic discipline", attracted four
distinguished speakers – three professors
and a young research scholar – who shedlight on the need for Arctic and Polar
research as a more inclusive academic
discipline on a global scale. Picking up on
this theme, the volume features a shortreflection paper on the discipline of global
polar law as well as a report prepared byyoung scholars from the Kobe University
Polar Cooperation Research Centre. The
report suggests expanding Arctic researchbeyond the Arctic, to Japan for instance,and building career opportunities foryoung researchers working on Arcticrelated issues in Japan.

Many of the volume’s contributions take up
concrete legal and policy perspectives
while addressing the intrinsic value ofArctic cooperation for future generations.
For example, one article addresses a shift in
the formulation of Arctic law. Specifically, it
argues how the Arctic, in the face of climatechange, has adopted an anticipatory
approach leading to a transformative
governance, highlighting the role ofscience in the making of law. In the area ofpolicy assessments, contributions include
an analysis of the European Union's Arctic
policy in terms of the so-called convention
theory; Chinese policy and its engagementin the South China Sea and the Central
Arctic Ocean; the first polar strategy
adopted by France in 2022, and the current
state of its Arctic policy; India and its
presence and role in the Central Arctic
Ocean region; and a perspective paper withan interdisciplinary angle emphasizing
what the future Arctic research agenda
might include if it is to get us closer to thegoal of a green transition.
CDAL is an annual publication of the
University of the Arctic's Thematic Network
on Arctic Law (Network). The Network
comprises approximately 160 scholars
interested in Arctic law and policy issues,
representing
law,political
science,international relations, anthropology andgeography, among other disciplines.
Network members are affiliated witheducational and research institutions
across the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions.
From this year on, CDAL has also become apart of the remit of the UArctic Chair in
Arctic Legal Research and Education (theChair). Both the Network and the Chair

The contributions in this volume have notbeen peer-reviewed, and the opinions
expressed in the papers are those of theindividual authors. I sincerely hope that thearticles interest many of you – our readers.
I am grateful to all the contributors for their
6insightful thoughts and deliberations,which bring this tenth volume of CDAL one
step further in disseminating knowledge on
the state of the Arctic world. I also sincerely
acknowledge the role of my colleague
Cedric Pfeiler in re-designing the cover
page and formatting the publication.

Without his help, this volume would nothave the attractive presentation we may
now enjoy.

Kamrul Hossain
December 10, 2022

7

The 2022-First Polar Strategy and the current state of theFrench Arctic Policy
Julie Auffret-Cariou

Following the 2022 IPCC report underlying

France is rather late in the establishment ofonce again the rate of climate change andan Arctic strategy (Pelaudeix & Rodon,

the ongoing war in Ukraine paralyzing state2013). However, even if no official policy

cooperation, the Arctic seems to be

was yet implemented, France already had

increasingly strategic. France has beeneyes for the Arctic. In 2009, Michel Rocard,present in the region since the second half

who played a big role in the Madridof the XVII

thcentury (Henrat, 1984), andProtocol, known as the Protocol oneven more so from 1947 with the French

Environmental Protection to the Antarctic

Polar Expeditions led by Paul-Emile Victor

Treaty,(Rubinsky, 2016). Nonetheless, 2022 marks

ambassador’s function for internationala renewed focus with its first official Polarnegotiations in the Arctic and Antarctica.

strategy, following a call from the then-France then provided in 2016 a roadmap“ourfor the Arctic – for once, separately fromcommitment in Antarctica and our action in
the Arctic”. In this strategy for the

Antarctica – which already advised for a

upcoming decade, France recognizes thel'Europe et des Affaires étrangères, 2016).

predominancestates’Yet, the real strength of France in theforregion has never been political but rather

Prime

Ministeroftoestablishthesovereignty

while

multilateralapproach

Arcticadvocating
to

face

was

appointed

to

a

new

more serious involvement (Ministère deaglobalscientific.

challenges such as climate change and theIndeed, France has used its dynamic Arctic

development of research (Gouvernement,

research to establish itself as a credible2022).

actor while having no territorial possession,

This new stance on the Arctic, and morewith the exception of the subarctic

generally on the Polar regions, shows thearchipelago of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon

French will to position itself as a moreused as an outpost for oceanographic

involved actor acknowledging the need forexpeditions. France ranks 11th in terms ofa coordinated policy in a region of growing

publication on the Arctic and 4th in term ofinterest. Compared to other European

field-weighted citation during the period

states, Arctic such as Denmark or Finland,

2006-2015 (Aksnes et al., 2016). To

and non-Arctic, such as Germany or Italy,

encompass this research in the Polar

8

regions, France benefits from a dedicatedof the two regions probably explain former

research institute, the Institut Polaire Emile

claims for an Arctic that “does not belong

Victor (IPEV), which possesses two bases in

to anyone”, such as in 2019 with the

Svalbard. The Jean Corbel base built in

Defense Ministry’s note on the Arctic

1963 and the Charles Rabot base in 1999

(Ministère des Armées, 2019). However,both merged in the Germano-French

this new strategy – as did already the 2016-

station AWIPEV in 2003. France also hinted

roadmap – recognizes the differences thatat an interest in the establishment of aexist especially in the region’s structure –long-term installation in Greenland and of

the Arctic being an ocean surrounded bya floating research base with the Tarastates

Ocean Foundation, to support its ageing

surrounded by an ocean. The name of theinfrastructures (Gouvernement, 2022).

strategy, “Balancing the extremes”, reflects

while

Antarctica,acontinent

this idea of differences and similarities.

However, if research has been France’s
venture in the Arctic, it has been plagued

While France made a territorial claim overby a long-term lack of funding which thisa portion of Antarctica (Adélie Land),new strategy – as well as several previous

several islands located in the Southern

reports – advises to revise to stay credible

Ocean form integral part of France’s

on the international stage. In 2019, the IPEV

territory. Those possessions made France

has received 18 million euros for its actionan active actor in research but also politics

in the polar regions while Italy allocated 20

with its involvement in the Antarctic Treaty

million euros for the same missions andSystem. This position in Antarctica is an

Germany, 50 million euros (Assemblée

asset as it allows the country to define itself

nationale, 2019). The director of the IPEV

as a Polar power, another way to justify its

himself stated that the research survival ofpresence in the Arctic. The concept of Polar

France was a “miracle”. Moreover, thepower remains quite vague and rather self-

private sector’s participation in research is

appointed. It rests on the state’s history ofvery limited, the opening of a foundation

explorers in the regions, some territorial

focused on the Arctic is proposed as anclaimsadditional way to gather more funds andMiquelon in the Arctic) but mostly on the

launch a new dynamic.

dynamism of its research on polar topics

the near-Arctic approach.

different in nature but both are territories
leadingto(Saint-Pierre-et-

has rejected this term, could be linked tosimilarities, they are asymmetrical andexception,

proximity(Gaymard, 2020). This idea, though France

The two poles are understood as sharing

of

or

the

However, tackling the two poles at once,

implementation of this joint Polar strategy.

and due to France’s closer

Previous misconceptions and assimilations

Antarctica, led to create a disbalance

9link tobetween them. Indeed, the Arctic researchwould be implemented through a larger

is suffering from a lack of interest

attribution of funds as well as a better

compared to the Southern pole, posing a

repartition and organization, especiallychallenge

France’s

between the IPEV and the French Southern

involvement in the Arctic is specificallyand Antarctic Lands that both coordinate

based on this aspect. In 2019 and 2020, on

scientific

the 92 French ongoing projects in thesometimes overlapping.

especiallywhenpoles, only 30 were based on the Arctic andoperations

inAntarctica,

In the international context of climate

90% of the public actors’ funding to thechange and since the 2009 Grenelle

poles went to the South (Gouvernement,

Environment Forum, France’s position in2022).

the Arctic is fundamentally built around thequestion of the environment. Indeed, the“The rebalancing should be achieved by athreefold increase of the funds alreadyallocated for the Arctic, in order not tothreaten France’s role in the South pole’s
research.”

country recognizes the extreme rapidity ofclimate change and its impact on theenvironment as well as on the populationsin the Arctic. It stresses as well theconsequences those changes have on therest of the world, and how the entire planet,

Thus, the 2022 strategy calls for an increase

and not only the Arctic states, inducedof the projects and funding in the Arctic,

those changes. Thus, France, though

without impacting the budget allocated forrecognizing the primacy of the eight Arctic

Antarctica. The rebalancing should bestates due to their sovereignty, advocatesachieved by a threefold increase of theforfunds already allocated for the Arctic, inamultilateralapproachinthegovernance of the region. To do so, Franceorder not to threaten France’s role in theis trying to be more active politically within

South pole’s research. There are also calls

Arctic forums.

for a better collaboration between French
institutions with a clear policy aiming at

From the 1990’s, France joined different

giving an axis for the Arctic presence toArctic institutions as an observer member

become more efficient and organized bothsuch as the Barents-Euro-Atlantic Council

in terms of funds attributed to research andin 1990, the Council of the Baltic Sea Statesin terms of the different administrations’in 1999, and the Arctic Council in 2000

strategy. This enhanced coordination in the(Pelaudeix & Rodon, 2013). However, toadministration is planned to take placeweight more in the region, France has

through the creation of an inter-ministerial

increased its role in those organizationsgroup gathering all the public actors

includinginvolved in the Arctic. In research, thispresence in the six working groups. Its

10

the

ArcticCouncilwithapresence could nonetheless be more

EU’s admission as an observer in the Arctic

proactive and coordinated as promoted byCouncil, which has been delayed after its

the2008 communication concerning the ban

newstrategy.

Moreover,Francesupports a new vision of the observerofstatus that would play a greater role in theCommission, 2008). Interestingly, on theCouncil, once again with the idea that,question of governance, the 2019-notefacing climate change, collective decisions

appears similar to this EU publication thanand actions should be implemented. In

to the French 2016-roadmap. Furthermore,parallel, France is also reinforcing its

the EU is a space to find partners, such as

bilateral cooperation with Arctic states withthe deep cooperation built through thea form of North Pole – South PoleAWIPEV base with Germany. Moreover, thereasoning, possibly embodied by a system

French presidency of the Council of the EU

of exchange of services with Arctic States

appears to be the chance for France to takenot present in Antarctica such as Sweden

a renewed role in the European Arctic

or Canada. Such exchanges could allow

policy, which notably promotes numerous

France – the only G7 states not to possessactions to take against climate change andone – to conduct research with the help of

the degradation of the Arctic environmentan icebreaker when operational needs are(European Comission et al., 2021). France

notreaffirmed its support towards those

seen

worth

the

investment(Gouvernement, 2022).

seal

products’imports(Europeandifferent measures such as the ban on the
exploitation of fossil resources or theFrance, as a European Union member, iscreation of Marine Protected Areas in thealso involved in the 2021-European Union

Arctic.

joint communication for the region (Gadal,
2016). This dual role is not seen as a

However,paradox but rather as an opportunity to beenvironment

more visible and present. Thus, France, in

economic interests, if this new strategy

parallel to the call for more involvement on

remains quite vague about those interests,

the

more

the 2016-roadmap had underlined that theparticipation on the supranational one with

French interests – though existing – were in

an increased role of the EU in the Arctic andtruth quite limited due to the difficulty andan increased role of France within the EU

cost of Arctic activities. In term of economy,

policy. The EU has mainly a role of provider

France is particularly concerned withof funds for the Arctic research andfisheries, advocating for a moratorium

projects, on which France could rests for anespecially when resources gradually moveincrease of its research budget, especiallytowards the North. A French tourism

through the Horizon Europe program. On a

company also recently acquired an ice-more political note, France supports thebreaker to expand its activity in the North.

nationallevel,

calls

for

11

the

protection

alwaysofthecompeteswithHowever, CMA-CGM, the third container

The French government discourse can betransportation company in the world, has

questioned as well. Indeed, in 2021, Total

announced it will not use the Arctic

became part of a large-scale gas project inmaritime routes for now nor in the future.

the Russian Arctic called Arctic LNG2, aFinally, France, which calls for responsible

project

natural resources’ exploitation in theannounced it would fund up to 700 million

region, has key interests when it comes toeuros through public aids, despite its

heavy fuel oils extraction with ENGIE in

numerous claims to protect the Arctic and

Norway, CGG doing seismic surveys of theits resources. Following an importantregion or Total’s gas extraction in the

publicRussiancompany

backed out and all French banks also

nonetheless announced in 2012 giving up

announced they would not support theoil extraction in the region due to the highproject (Alvarez, 2021). Despite Total

risk of oil spill.

founding financing elsewhere, this event

Federation

–

the

that

the

Frenchmobilization,

government

thegovernmentshows the public opinion’s involvement in
the protection of the Arctic as well as the“the protection of the environment always
competes with economic interests, if this new
strategy remains quite vague about thoseinterests, the 2016-roadmap had underlinedthat the French interests – though existing –were in truth quite limited due to thedifficulty and cost of Arctic activities. In termof economy, France is particularly concernedwith fisheries, advocating for a moratorium
especially when resources gradually movetowards the North.”lack of political influence in the field when
opposed to economic prospect.
This LNG2 project like the cooperation in
the Arctic is now in jeopardy due to the war
in Ukraine and the exclusion, or retreat of
Russia from the diverse institutions of theregion.

Additionally,

it

led

to

the

suspension of an international Arctic
conference, the 4th ministerial meeting on
the Arctic Sciences, supposed to be held inFrance in the beginning of 2023 following

France’s involvement in the extraction

an agreement with Russia. In order not tonatural resources, through its companies orlose this opportunity of internationalbanks such as BNP Paribas or Crédit

recognition, the organization of another

Agricole, respectively the 7th and 13th mostinvolvedcommercial

banks

in

international conference on the poles in

Arctic2023 that would gather public and private

expansionism (Ileri et al., 2021), underlines

actors is in discussion, but would needthe difficulty to successfully combine

political support. The exchanges andeconomic prospect and climate change.

cooperation

Moreover, it highlights the ambiguity offundamental

the environmental discourse with thewithRussiawithin

the

are

seen

regionalorganizations as well as on a bilateral level,banks having an Arctic policy for instance.
12

but its continuation is dependent of thea country that still matters in international

future of the war. This new instability

politics.

threatens the collaboration in various
domains, including research. Thus, France
claimed

being

open

for

“In 2013, for the first time, the Arctic wasmentioned in the French White Paper on
Defense and National Security as apotential area of tensions, and again in 2017with its Strategic Review”

anycomplementary, alternative or new formsof cooperation to preserve this Arctic
exceptionalism.
The war increased the tensions within the2022 marks a new turn in the French

Arctic region, until then rather stable, andapproach of the Arctic as it offers the firstFrance as an EU, NATO, and UNSC member

strategy applied to the region, though it

as well as a maritime power believes it has

covers Antarctica as well. France aims at

a role to play. In 2013, for the first time, theexpanding its influence in the region

Arctic was mentioned in the French White

through its research capacity and its fightPaper on Defense and National Security as

againsta potential area of tensions, and again in

Despite the limited support to research in2017). To be ready for the escalation of

the Arctic and the controversial one totensions, more likely since February, theeconomic projects in the Arctic, France is

French Army, especially the Marine, hasnonethelessbeen exercising in the region, through(Vullierme,2018).

notably

Moreover,France,region,supportstheits

strategy is a way to reorient and give a newbreath to France’s position in the region
but, as many of its points such as thethough advocating for a peaceful use oftheincreasing

remain part of the discussion. The newJuncture with NATO in 2017, or throughCanadagraduallypresence in different forms in the Arctic tointernational actions such as the Trident
with

Nevertheless,appear as a major actor on the Arctic stage.

la Défense, 2013; Ministère des Armées,actionchange.

France still has steps ahead in order to2017 with its Strategic Review (Ministère debilateralclimateurgent need for funds were alreadymilitary

demands

development of some of the actors such as

of

the

2016-roadmap,

thetranslation of this strategy into real action

Denmark – the French company Nexterremains to be witnessed.

furnished 15 Caesar 8x8 artillery system to1

the country in 2021 and will provide an
additional four in 2023 (Nexter, 2019).

References
Aksnes, D., Osipov, I., Moskaleva, O., &Through the military preparation of its

Kullerud, L. (2016). Arctic research

forces and its collaboration with otherpublication trends: a pilot study.

actors, France is putting forwards that it isAlvarez, C. (2021, 01 Décembre). La France

ne soutient pas le porket gazier
13

Totalenergies en Arctique, Novethic:banks, investors and insurers are driving

Retrieved in La France ne soutient pas leoil and gas expansion in the Arctic.

projet gazier TotalEnergies en Arctique

Ministère de(novethic.fr)étrangères (2016). Feuille de route

Assemblée nationale (2019). Rapport

nationale sur l’Arctique.

d'information déposé en application de

Ministère de la Défense (2013). Livre Blanc

l'article 145 du règlement, par la

sur la Défense et Sécurité nationale.

commission des affaires étrangères, en

Ministère desconclusion des travaux d'une mission

stratégique de Défense et Sécuritéd'information sur la problématique desnationale.

pôles : Arctique et Antarctique.

Ministère des Armées (2019). La France etEuropeanCommission(2008).

l'EuropeetArméesdes Affaires(2017).

Revue

les nouveaux enjeux stratégiques en

Communication from the Commission

Arctique.

to the European Parliament and the

Nexter. (2019, 18 Octobre). Le Danemark

Council: The European Union and thecommande
4
supplémentaires.

Arctic Region.
EuropeanCommission&

Caesar®
Retrieved

8x8
in

Le

Danemark commande 4 CAESAR® 8x8

High

Representative of the Union for Foreign

supplémentaires

Affairs and Security Policy (2021). Joint

group.fr)

Communication

Pelaudeix, C., & Rodon, T. (2013). The

to

the

European|

Nexter(nexter-

Parliament, the Council, the European

European

Union

ArcticPolicyandEconomic and Social Council and the

National

InterestsofFranceandCommittee of the Regions.

Germany: Internal and External Policy

Gaymard, H. (2020). La France, puissance

Coherence at Stake?. Northern Review,polaire. Dans : Georges-Henri Soutou(37).

éd., L'action extérieure de la France :Rubinsky, Y. (2016). Arctic interests andEntre ambition et réalisme (pp. 429-

policy of France. Arctic and North, 24,450).

145-52.

Paris

cedex

14:

Presses

Universitaires de France.
Gouvernement

lesthe French policy in the Arctic.Вестник

extêmes: Stratégie polaire de la France àСанкт-Петербургского университета.

l’horizon 2030.

Политология.

Henrat,C.,(2022).

Gadal, S. (2016). Some fundamentals of(1984).

Equilibrer

FrenchNavalМеждународные

отношения: 110-117.

Operations in Spitsbergen During Louis

Vullierme, M. (2018). Évolution de la

XIV’s Reign. Arctic Vol. 37 No. 4 (1984):

stratégie française en Arctique, entre

December: 321–616.

réajustement

Ileri, E. C., Her H., Mazounie A., & Pinson

stratégique. Les Champs de Mars, 30+S,

L. (2021). DRILL, BABY, DRILL: How

167-177.
14

globaletcontinuité

Arctic Governance Research and the Green Transition: A
Perspective on Interdisciplinary Work
Ayonghe A. Nebasifu, a Stefan Kirchner, b Juho Kähkönen, c Iiris Kestilä, d Katharina
Heinrich, e Pavel Tkach f

Abstract: In June 2022, the Strategic

new normal, as to what connotations
interdisciplinary lines of thinking about
the green transition add to Arctic
Governance. Using contributions from
Researchers in varied disciplines living
and working in the Arctic, this paper
explores policy arrangements andrelated strategic elements, linked tosustaining the natural environment, withattention to Finland and the European
Arctic. It concludes reflecting future
implications of interdisciplinary work forresearch on Arctic Governance.

Research Council (SRC) of the Academyof Finland proposed to the Finnish
Government the need for "Just Green
Transition" as the 2023 theme ofstrategic research programmes. In it,
arises interest on adapting to societal
changes in an ecologically sustainable
manner, with purpose of shaping longterm developments in Finland andelsewhere, through evidence-informed
decision-making and sound engagementwith several actors and sectors in society.
The ongoing proposal forwarded to the
Finnish Government warrants further
sight to mark the tenth anniversary ofCurrent Developments in Arctic Law(CDAL). This paper builds on the above
proposal, in perspective, to ponder on a

Keywords: Arctic Governance Research,
Interdisciplinary Work, UArctic Network,
Just Green Transition, European Arctic,
Law and the Social Sciences

a Postdoctoral Researcher, Ph.D., Arctic Anthropology Team; Project Coordinator, Arctic Governance Research Group, Arctic

Centre, University of Lapland. Email: aayonghe@ulapland.fib Research Professor of Arctic Law and Coordinator of the Arctic Governance Research Group, Arctic Centre,
University of Lapland. Email: stefan.kirchner@ulapland.fi
c Doctoral Researcher, Doctoral Programme the Arctic in a Changing World, University of Lapland. Email:juho.kahkonen@ulapland.fi
d Doctoral Researcher, Faculty of Law, University of Lapland. Email: iiris.kestila@ulapland.fi
e Junior Researcher, Arctic Governance Research Group, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. Email:katharina.heinrich@ulapland.fi
f Junior Researcher, Arctic Governance Research Group, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. Email:pavel.tkach@ulapland.fi

15

1

Introduction

not the first, when we think of much earlieremphasis on other issues as conserving

To better understand what significanceglobal biological diversity. The biologicalinterdisciplinary work adds to the link

aspectbetween Arctic Governance Research andEnvironmental

to the Deal. The subsequent paragraphs

Programme,the

Nature and Natural Resources, the Foodresearchand Agricultural Organisation of the United

considering the proposal for “Just Green

Nations, and the International Union forTransition” as the/a theme for strategic

Conservation

research in 2023. In so doing, this paperof

NatureandNaturalResources) came together at a presspresents a joint authorship contribution,

conference in Washington. They had ainterdisciplinary in perspective, and tocommon goal demonstrating how essentialcommemorate the tenth anniversary of thethe conservation of living resources is for

Current Developments in Arctic Law (CDAL)

sustainable development (Mackinnon et al.

within the University of the Arctic (UArctic).

1986).

Our hope is that the contributions here
resonate in debates among researchers

Also,

and scholars of Arctic Governance andtheConvention

onBiological

Diversity, an international legal instrument,

Arctic Law, as well as, for those seeking newthat was opened for signature in 1992 at

perspectives on interdisciplinary work andthe Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, entered

its role in studies about the Just Green

into force in 1993 after receiving 168

Transition.

1.1

policyInternational Union for the Conservation ofwill highlight the papers’ specific objectives
of

with

conservation agencies (the United Nations

European Green Deal and recent additions

futurelight

Strategy (WCS) in 1981 when four leading

visiting some developments leading to the

the

to

arrangements as the World Conservation

the Just Green Transition, it is worth re-deliberatingcame

signatures. This convention pinpoints theThe
EuropeanGreendevelopments in perspective

need

Deal:

acknowledged

emergency

requestingtheEuropeanCommission

to

its

proposals

adjustthesustainability,

fairness,andequitability in sharing benefits that arise
fromEarly on, November 2019, the European
Parliament

forutilizing

genetic

resources,

ecosystems, and species (Penchev 2022).

climateIts underlining protocols as the Nagoya
Protocol (adopted in 2010 and entered into
force in 2014) and Cartagena Protocol

consistent with a 1.5 °C target to limit

serve as legally binding treaties andglobal warming and ensure a significant

supplementary

reduction in the emission of greenhouseagreements

to

the

Convention on Biological Diversity. Mattersgases (European Parliament 2022). Theof negotiating climate change mitigation,

above notice on climate change is certainly

adding to the existing agreements on

16

biological conservation, to advancing the

For the above transition to come by, it is

implementation of the above Convention,worth

has been the work of the Conference ofapproaches shaping legal arrangements in

Parties

Paris

response to global challenges – a practiceAgreement ̶ a legally binding internationalthat can equally benefit Arctic Governancetreaty on climate change adopted in 2015

Research. For instances, modulating (theat COP 21 in Paris by 196 Parties (UNFCC

practice of regulating, adjusting, and2022). Its goal, often described as afinding options) seems to be a typicallandmark in climate change practices thatexample, i.e., adopting newer, flexible,

are multilateral involves most of thetransformative elements to combat thenations (as adopted by 196 parties at COP

global ecological crisis. Even more obvious,21) on a common cause of limiting global

when we think of the unfolding EU energy

warmingbycrisis of 2022, triggered by the global

committing to undertake ambitious efforts

economic recovery from COVID-19 andtowards a climate neutral world.

later the dramatic inflation in gas andIn(COP).

to

Later

1.5

response

and

came

degreesupon

the

CelsiusaEuropeanParliamentary

request,theEuropeanCommission

developedtheEuropeanalterations to the European Green Deal. In
this example, modulating involved periodic
alterations to the European Green Deal anditsclimate-neutral continent by 2050. The EU’sablueprintchange

with

for
the

commitment of 27 EU Member States (Julya reduction target in emissions at 55% by2021). This process followed with new2030, thereby affirming the EU’s position as

proposalsleading the global fight on climate change.

to

halt

deforestation

andintroduce innovative sustainable waste

The law also provides grounds for EU

management (November 2021), towards

nations to meet emission targets using

decarbonising gas markets and reducing

policies and legislations (including national

methane emissions (December 2021); toand inter-regional) that can bring about

restoring Europe’s ecosystems (June 2022)

benefits such as: cleaner air, water and soil;

are some examples from the second half ofreduced energy bill; improved public

2021 (European Parliament 2022).

transport and more charging stations for erenovatedprovisions,transformational

Climate Law creates a legally binding with

waste;

onexample, modulating involves periodic

including the European Arctic, becoming alessknowledge

electricity (Homeyer et al. 2022). In thisGreen Deal, a roadmap for Europe,cars;

examining

1.2

homes;

healthier food and better health for current

Interest in the European Arctic

Thus, marking the tenth anniversary of theand future generations, among other

Current Developments in Arctic Law (CDAL)

benefits (European Parliament 2022).

within the University of the UArctic’s Law
Thematic Network, and, in light of/in line17with the Strategic Research Council’s (SRC)

the Arctic Council (AC), and later, theproposal to the Finnish Government on

Nordic Council of Ministers and the Barents“Just Green Transition” as a theme forEuro-Arctic Council ̶ all vital for cooperation

strategic research in 2023 - there is a needon sustainable development in the region.

to deliberate on the future of research

In the face of influential global actors’

within this context. The European Arctic, forinterests

this matter, continues to be a significant

international climate policy (Kopra 2018),

region with a growing global interest on

as well as EU policies (the 2016 EU Strategy

decision-making among Arctic and non-for Low-Emission Mobility and the 2019

Arctic actors. With the Arctic said to be

European Green Deal) applicable to thewarming four times faster than the global

Arctic (Koivurova et al. 2021), there will beaverage2022),a growing interest in multidisciplinary work

interdisciplinary work will be needed inapproaches capable to safeguarding theArcticArctic’s natural environment.

(RantanenetGovernanceal.

Researchasdevelopments of climate change go by

1.3

with a growing interest among non-Arctic

in

the

Arctic,

such

as

in

Specific objectives

actors wishing to be involved in decision-

This paper shares the hope to inspire amaking with regards to utilizing its richdebategenetic resources and species in both

Governance on the modalities of applying

terrestrial and marine ecosystems. Thus,

interdisciplinary

governing ecosystems will for a long-term

Governance, and its meaningfulness forbe central in Arctic Governance and Arctic

promotingLaw, especially for the northernmost(environmentally

regions of Finland, Sweden, and Norway

sustainable) ways of living in the Europeanthat is home to the Indigenous Sámi

Arctic. Our premise sets out with examples

people and several local groups thataligned with each author’s disciplinary

coincide with activities by stakeholders

expertise,from elsewhere. For instance, access tointerdisciplinary

naturalresources

iscontested

towards holistic approaches to cross-througheconomic

activities

suchborder

often

as

among

researchersofpracticesknowledgeinonfriendly,

includingpracticeenvironmental

ArcticArcticcleaner

safe,

and

consolidatinginresearch;governance;

mining, hunting, reindeer herding, andintroducing greener policies on climate

tourism, that overlap with Indigenous lands

migration; understanding the link between

and areas of spiritual importance (Ayonghe

climate& Francisco 2021; Kirchner et al. 2022). The

research; enabling inclusive governance ofEuropean Arctic also has a long history ofmarine protected areas in the Arctic;

environmental

theexploring good practices for research

1980s, when we think of the Arctic

ethics and heritage in Arctic Law. As

Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS),

observed

cooperation

since

18

changeinpolicyandcurrent-day

strategic

policydevelopments of adapting timelines toestablishing a new level of discourse andcombat present and future challenges in

integration of knowledge” (Klein 1990).

the EU (European Parliament 2022), it is

How will it be useful when adapted in thelikely such way of modulating can becontext of Arctic Governance Research

applied in Arctic Governance Researchlinked to the Just Green Transition? Turningessential to the Just Green Transition. The

to an earlier publication, Raymond Miller’s

authors of this paper therefore share the(1982) work “Varieties of Interdisciplinary

following objectives:approaches in the social sciences: a 1981(a) Todevelopainterdisciplinary

perspective
work

(and

overview”, shares thoughts on the practice

on

of

its

approaches

inacademia. In Miller’s overview, he recalls

modulating practice) and significancethe basis for creating the Social Science

for Arctic Governance Research on the

Research Council organized in the United

Just Green Transition.

States, 1920's, that was aimed at providing
a forum to promote integration across(b) To support the above objective withdisciplines. One of its purposes wascase examples using interdisciplinary

bridging gaps in the Social Sciences as the

topical issues in law and the social

inadequacies

sciences, relevant for research onofintegrating

severalresponsibilities in ways that could relate

environmental sustainability in thewhat he called the ‘analysis of parts’ to the

Arctic.

‘analysis of the whole’. The 1960s turmoil(c) To conclude with suggestions as to(tensions between global powers) madewhat present and future implications

multidisciplinary

exist for Arctic Governance when

disciplines and sub-disciplines becoming

incorporated

more numerous in academia.

withinterdisciplinary

work on the Just Green Transition?
2

interdisciplinaryThe

interdisciplinary

approach:relative validity of the descriptive andexplanatory statements derived therefrom”(p.4). In other words, disciplines do carry inenvironment has been debated as athem filter-interpreting principles. So, a

productive way of bridging across thescienceswithstudied, how it is understood, and theapproaches to studying society and thenaturalneed,determines “what aspect of reality is

The use of interdisciplinary theories andanda

To Miller (1982), the discipline’s structureknowledge sharing

socialwork

ingiven discipline carries a similar set oftheprinciples that direct the inquiries of thatdevelopment of new tools and theoreticaldiscipline. In this example, the Researcher

frameworks for environmental problem-

observes specific facts out of a variety ofsolving (Janssen et al. 2006). Also, defined

possibilities. These facts, Miller defines as

as “the synthesis of two or more disciplines,
19

organized by the "make-sense patterns" ofpart of many environmental problems,

the discipline that gives meaning to facts.

providing a neutral and common groundHence, interpretation of data also depends

for interdisciplinary integration. On theon principles of inquiry within a given

analyticaldiscipline. In integrating interdisciplinary

network approach has been shown totheories and approaches, it can be argued,

empirically test hypotheses theoreticallyit reveals benefits of working with several

derived, thus providing practical insights

sets of principles and inquiries resulting toabout human-nature interactions and theirbroader interpretations of facts.

social-ecological implications (Bodin and
Tengö

On the example of the Just Green

side,

2012;

the

social-ecological

Guerreroetal.

2015).

However, Bodin et al. (2017) cautioned

Transition and its connection to Arctic

against the possibility of interdisciplinary

Governance Research, the Arctic, like otherstudies to make limited progress with

regions elsewhere, continues to experience

imbalances across disciplines. This includes

novel changes that affect the natural

possibilities for delayed collaboration inenvironment. Arctic Governance Researchresearch that involves working across theand its contribution to combatting thenatural and social sciences with different

global ecological crisis aided with relevant

epistemologies and research traditions.

interdisciplinary theories and approaches
would be valuable to reveal a wide range ofA much more evident limitation concerns

information needed for sustaining thedistinctions in the use and definition of

Arctic environment. In line with Miller“knowledges” between the Natural and(1982),

interdisciplinary

Social Sciences vis-à-vis Scientific andkeeping

one’s

Traditional. It would be hard to ignore theresearch together when involved in a

rapid changes in Arctic ecosystems and its

holistic inquiry. Take the example on theknowledge-importanceinterdisciplinary integration of the social-globalecological network approach. Bodin et al.

environmental(2017) praised the works of David Bohan

ecosystems are sensitive to chemical andandstudiesbiophysical changes brought by humandemonstrating benefits of applying theactivities and natural events but are alsointerdisciplinary social-ecological network

indicators of early warning for global

approach for studies on human-naturegreenhouse warming and what measuressystems and ecosystem services. To Bohan

to take in response. As anthropologist,

and Dee, network approaches have greater

Pelliccioni (1998) puts it, “It affects the

chancestheglobal climate directly through interactions

interdependencies between the complex

between the atmosphere, ice cover andhuman and ecological changes that are

ocean, and through feedback processes”

applying

approaches

Lauraenables

Dee

of

for

their

disclosing

20

climateforchangecombatting
andproblems.

otherArctic(p.1). Knowledges about these changes inemphasized in this paper, there are lessons

Arctic ecosystems, their identification, use,

we can gather from earlier anthropologicaland exchange (through cross-disciplinary

contributions that include holistic andresearch,

policycross-disciplinary inquiry on varied forms

implementation, multi-sectoral industrialof knowledge (see: Pelliccioni 1998), that

activities, Indigenous livelihoods, and theoffer useful options for bridging current

everyday life of local residents in thegaps in the use of distinct knowledges

Arctic), will remain crucial for efforts to

between ecological and human systems.

combat ecological imbalances in the Arctic

Such as, adopting an interdisciplinaryand elsewhere in the globe. Also, theemphasisgrowing complexity of not only knowledge

convey regarding the ‘inter-relationships’

about ecosystems but that of humanbetween components of the environment

systems comprised of multiple land users

and their potential indicators for short andcan be of risk in what Pelliccioni calls

long-term“knowledge

instabilities in the Arctic.

governance,

confrontation”

(on

the

biophysical, economic, social, cultural, and

and

the

Socialsolutions

such

to

knowledges

environmental

focus on Arctic Governance Research andNevertheless, other than the disciplines of
Law

what

Comparing the above examples to our

spiritual aspects of the environment).
Arcticon

the SRC proposal to theming Just Green

Sciences

Table 1: Modulating in research: assumptions and possible outcomes
Researchers’ goals

Possibleassumptions

Possible outcomes (the example of Arctic
Governance Research on the Just Green
Transition)

Identifying a given phenomenon
impacting society

Higher chances forflexibility in actionplans and
implementation

Increase in the resilience-capacity to anticipate
delicate societal challenges in the Arctic andrespond accordingly

Bringing about clarity to different
audiences about the phenomenon,
making it meaningful or sensible toothersAdjusting/planning in response to
and consistent with circumstantial
needs linked to the phenomenon insociety
Finding alternative concepts
applicable to diverse societal
contexts that warrants short-term
and/or long-term solutions
Evaluate/assess a given
solution/plan/action for benefit ofsociety and environment

Enhances inclusive
practices in decisionmaking and promotes
knowledgeintegration
Facilitates changes or
updating policies
where (and when)neededBrings about greater
access to relevant
information in society

Enhancing the agency displayed in legislative
arrangements/ policies, making them morecapable to combat environmental instabilities
in the Arctic
Creates greater space for debates and thegenerating of knowledge for long-term
solutions on the ecological crisis
Greater chances for co-producing knowledge
and effort-sharing among various stakeholders
towards greener ways of living
Greater awareness in the public on urgent
needs and possible solutions, inclusive of
individual-based action against climate change

Source: Authors’ illustration example (2022)

21

Transition, worth mentioning, are thedirecting resources, making assessments,

developments in ‘research and sciencegathering public support to enhance social

cooperation’ that could play a central role

policy and bring about societal benefit

to interdisciplinary work. The example of(Simone et al. 2022). In the work of

the UArctic Network, its sub-thematicJohnson-Bailey (2003), modulating shares

networks, and institutions (UArctic 2022)

interest in the narrative methodology,

that connect plenty of Universities andexpressing

Research Institutions across Arctic States

purpose(including non-Arctic Member States).

appeals to experiences that are cognitive,

Through

networking,canaffective, and conative in nature. Putting

benefitfromacrossthis practice in the research context ofdisciplines, and with various expertise andArctic Governance and the Just Green

stakeholders for knowledge sharing. In

Transition necessitates identifying possible

such level of cooperation, are equally

hypothetical assumptions and outcomes

opportunities to advancing the frontiers ofwith an example (Table 1).

researchers

cooperation

policy research in the Arctic as the complex

Table

nature of global environmental challenges
often necessitate the need for crossdisciplinary inputs.
3

communication

of

easy

with

understanding - that1

illustrates

assumptions

possibleoutcomesofresearch,

such

when

as,

and

modulating
appliedininsituations of using interdisciplinary work to

Modulating as a research practiceadvance the Just Green Transition throughModulating generally refers to the practice

Arctic Governance Research. To develop aofregulating,adjustingtoperspective on interdisciplinary work, andcertainits significance for Arctic Governancemeasures, such as an action or a process,Research on the Just Green Transition, themaking it suitable for a given situation,subsequent

such as softening or toning down the

deliberate

amplitude or frequency of an occurrence.

paragraphs
on

the

will

matterfurther

with

case

Its use in behavioural, policy, and social

discussions.

science research, is not new. For instance,

4

Case examples: the European Arctic

In

this

Scherer et al. (2014) in their study likens
modulating to an unfolding articulative

section,theauthors,fromdisciplinary research areas of Law and theprocess that shapes different perceptions

Social Sciences, discuss relevant topics inand the embodied involvement of people

Arcticmade meaningful through varied ways ofGovernance

and

some

considerations for research on the Just

grasping experiences. Modulating is also

Green Transition.

used in the context of evaluating social
policy in response to an existing crisis ̶taking into consideration, aspects as;
22

4.1

Holistic cross-border environmental
governance: the European Arctic

approach that has been developed in

Environmental governance has to betransferred to the protection of the natural

marineenvironmental

law

can

be

environment on land. In some cases, we seeholistic. This does not mean that localized,

this already happening in Europe, including

targeted protective governance action isin

not necessary (to the contrary), but ittheEuropean

Arctic.

Thereiscooperation along borders, for example

means that, in order to effectively protect

through the border rivers commissions at

the natural environment, it is not enoughthe borders of Finland and Sweden and of

to look only at the situation in one place,

Finland and Norway, respectively. In the

disconnected from the rest of the region’s

Finnish-Norwegian border area, we findenvironment. There are three fundamental

protected areas on both sides of the

aspects to the holistic approach in cross-border, like in the northernmost part of theborder environmental governance in theBaltic Sea, where both Finland and Sweden

European Arctic.

have taken measures to protect the marine

For this purpose of this part, the term

environment (Kirchner et al. 2022). The idea

European Arctic refers to the Arctic regionsof the ecosystem approach is beingof Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, andtransferred from marine environmental law

Greenland.

While

to environmental protection on land

environmental

governancecross-borderoften

already today. Indeed, this cooperation

perceived from a land-based perspective,

between the Nordic countries is hardly new

the significance of marine spaces and ofand they have long served as role-models

the marine environment for the Arctic

in this regard (although there remains, of

makes

course, some room for improvement).

it

necessary

to

is

take

marinegovernance into account as well when
discussing

cross-border

The second noteworthy aspect is that theenvironmental

humangovernance.
The

first

dimension

recognizedaspectofcross-borderasenvironmentalisincreasingly

playingaprotection.

role

in

What

the

environmental governance in the European

northern European States (apart from the

Arctic that is noteworthy is that theRussian Federation) have in common is aecosystem approach is being utilized forclear

cross-border environmental governance.

democracy, and the rule of law. European

Holism in cross-border environmental

Arctic States (Denmark, Iceland, Norway,

governance in the European Arctic can be

Sweden, and Finland) are parties to theinspired by experiences from marine

European Convention on Human Rights

environmental governance. This is the first(ECHR 1950). The European Court ofdimension

Human

of

holism:theecosystem

23

commitment

Rightstohuman(ECtHR)hasrights,longemphasized the importance of the natural

the natural environment, play an importantenvironment for human rights, particularly

practical role in cross-border cooperationin the context of the right to a healthy

for environmental protection.

environment. The Nordic countries have a

The practice of environmental protection inparticularly human rights-based approachtotheprotection

of

the

our region is one of interdisciplinarity.

natural

These dimensions show that effective

environment, as is also evidenced bycross-border environmental governance inregional international treaties, such as thethe European Arctic will have to transcend

Espoo Convention (EspooConv 1991) that
deals

with

environmental

not only borders but also traditional

impactstructures of work and knowledge sharing.

assessments, or the Aarhus Convention

Effectiveness is not only an important(AarhusConv 1998) that includes access to

aspect of European human rights law, but

information and procedural rights. Beyond

it should also have a place in the protection

these treaties, the human dimension ofof the natural environment on which we allenvironmental protection across borders

depend.

can also be recognized through the
improved implementation of Indigenous

4.2

rights and the integration of concepts suchas

One

Healthindecision-making

Climate migration: towards greener
reforms?

Climate migration might be seen as aprocesses.

reflection of how climate change can affectSuch processes happen on different levels

people’s freedom to choose their own waysof

Nordicof living. First time as a separate definition

countries, relatively similar governanceand problem within the EU, climate

structures can be found. In addition to

migration received attention in 2011 when

existing international and cross-borderin the European Parliament resolution of 5

institutions, these (relative) similarities canJuly 2011 on increasing the impact of EU

facilitate cross-border cooperation. Suchdevelopment

cooperation does not require identicalmentioned

governance structures but an ability tophenomenon that some estimate will cause

communicate

acrosspolitical

and

200 million people to leave their homes byorganizational

divides.

As

third

2050 as conditions in their lands graduallydimension of cross-border environmental

worsen (European Parliament 2011). In thatgovernance,

Arctic,resolution, the authors applied that thesimilarities in the legal cultures andEuropean Union must contribute throughadministrative

strengthened

its development policy to aiding andalso by the important role the law of the

reducing the number of refugees by

European Union plays for the protection of

investing in technologies, human resources

government.

inAcross

the

the

the

Europeanstructures,24

policy,climatetheauthors

migration

asaand financial aid (European Parliamentright to seek asylum in the EU and2011).

technology

Schengen Zone countries (including states

improvements that would help mitigateof the European Arctic, except Russia), but

potential

climatetheir chances of meeting the internationalmigration, the European Parliament hoped

protection criteria are slim (Prokkola et. al.

to limit the number of climate refugees.

2021). The protection gap in international

Still, even in 2011, it was clear that climate

law can be seen in the lack of regulation ofchange would not be halted. In 2016, thematters of climate-induced cross-borderauthors

Parliament

displacement (Prokkola et. al. 2021). The

on

1951

By

investingcausesofresolution

inapplying

thetoEuropean(2016/2814(RSP))

the

RefugeeConvention

or

other

implementation of the Paris Agreement

international agreements do not protect

andpeoplethe2016

Conference

ClimateMarrakesh,

ChangedisplacedforclimateandMorocco,environment-related reasons. Only if otherreiterated the issue and emphasised that it

factors amount to persecution or life-

should be addressed globally because

threatening conditions upon forced return

climateissue

can the national immigration services issue(European Parliament 2016). Finally, in

protection (Prokkola et. al. 2021). Further,2022, climate migration was listed as one

in the case “Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand”,

of the causes of global migration, asfrom the Supreme Court of New Zealand

important as global instability, conflicts,(Supreme Court of New Zealand 2015), theand state fragility in the Resolution of the

Human Rights Committee provided newEuropean Committee of the Regions on thecriteria for the assessment of threats fromcontribution

regional

climate change. This case shows, amongauthorities to the Conference on the Futureother things, that paying attention to theof Europe (European Union 2022). So, fromnational adaptation plans and actual2011 to 2022, climate migration’s relevance

protection measures of states affected bygrew from a phenomenon that might leadclimate and environmental changes is

to issues in the future to an alreadyrelevant. Therefore, it is possible to draw

recognised global issue and a catalyst of

the conclusion that the growing number ofglobal migration.

cases highlighting the current protection

Today,

inUN

migration

the

of

term

is

local

a

globaland“climate

gaps gives hope that the term “climate

migration”

migration” will be used more actively indeserves recognition and regulation in thedomestic regulation of climate adaptation

domestic legal systems of the Arctic states.

measures and the international regulations

This is often still missing, which leads to aon refugees’ protection, providing a clean-domestic protection gap in addition to thebased foundation for the regulation of thisalready existing international protection

crucial issue.

gap. In general, climate migrants have the

25

4.3

Climate change policies, biodiversity
preservation, and strategic research

example, the Climate Change Act of 2015,

Strategic research on Arctic Governancegas emissions by at least 80% by 2050 inaims at reducing the nation’s greenhousecomparison to levels in 1990 (Ministry ofand efforts to promote the transition to

the Environment 2022a). The new Finnish

greener ways of living presents useful

Climate Change Act updated in 2022

options for climate change policies andtargets emission reduction targets of -60%

reforms on preserving biodiversity thatfor 2030, -80% for 2040, and -95% by 2050

impact the everyday life of people in the(Ministry of the Environment 2022a). Other

Arctic. However, a retrospective analysis oncomponents of the national climate change

how such policies transform over time topolicy are those on energy and, the use andmeet present and future needs of the Arctic

preservation

environment would significantly benefitofbiodiversity.

Examplesinclude the 2008 National Climate andArctic Governance Research. Examples

Energy Strategy (Kivimaa & Per 2011), thecould include international agreements

National Strategy for the Conservation andand proposals, national reforms, strategic

Sustainable Use of Biodiversity 2006-2016plans, as well as Voluntary Guidelines as the(Heikkinen 2007), among others. Periodic

Akwé: Kon that matters for preserving

developments surrounding these policy

sacred sites, lands and waters traditionallystrategies and how they navigate the fairoccupied or used by Indigenous and local
communities in the Arctic and elsewhere.

and equitable sharing of benefits arising

The European Commission not so long-ago

resources, would be an aspect to consider

updated proposals of the European Greenin Arctic Governance Research.

from use of biodiversity and other genetic

Deal in response to energy disruptions

Finland and other European Arctic States

stressing EU Member States to increase

do share commitments to international

their share of renewable energy consumed

agreements as the 2015 Paris Agreement

to 32% by 2030 (European Commission

and the Convention on Biological Diversity2022). The Deal also shares proposals onthat entered into force in 1993, on

the possibility for people to produce their

combatting climate change. However, theown green energy. Finland, an EU Member

effectiveness of international agreements

State and the most forested country inin the Arctic is often aided by cooperation

Europe in terms of the proportional sharebetween European Arctic States. Finlandof forest land, shares commitment to thefor example, participates in the Nordic

Green Deal by means of a national climatechangenational

policy.

This

reforms

policyconnects

andstrategies,

Council of Ministers, the Arctic Council, andthe Barents Euro-Arctic Council, on matterspromotinginternational agreements and proposals,sustainability

theArcticenvironment. Its Northernmost region,

regional and municipal action plans. An
26

Lapland, recently drew interest of thestrategic research practices in the Arctic.

European Commission selecting the region

Thus, the Strategic Research Council’s

as one of the 118 European regions(SRC) proposal for Just Green Transition as

supported by the European Commission in

the 2023 theme for research programmes,

adapting to climate change through thepresents possibilities for which Arctic

EU's new Horizon Europe tool (TheGovernance Research can contribute to

Regional Council of Lapland 2022). At thelong-term progress in combating themunicipal level, the Regional Council ofglobal ecological crisis, especially in the

Lapland’s Climate Change Strategy for

Arctic.

2030 revealed climate change as a threat tonature-based

livelihoods,

and

4.4

the

measures being taken to preserve theInclusive
governance:
marineprotected areas in the Arctic

region’s nature (Mettiäinen 2013). A more

One cannot exclude the Arctic Ocean when

up-to-date publication recognizes the risks

studying and working in the Arctic. Whileassociated with the above threat, from

Finland and Sweden are not Arctic Coastal

extreme weather events, increased urban

States, they are Arctic States and are linked

flooding, to forest damage, requiring everto the Arctic Ocean through river inflows

more both policy and practical measures(Niemi 2009) and their contribution to theamong various actors in the region, toArctic blue economy through the export of

reduce, prepare for, and adapt to theminerals, as well as providing expertise andimpacts of climate change (Ministry of the

support for marine operations (Kotilainen

Environment 2022a). Reviews on theand Colpaert 2014; Lipponen 2015).

strategy illustrate Lapland as a carbon sink

Rapid and unprecedented changes in theattributed to its forest and snow cover.

ArcticAlso, a region perceived as producing morecreates

producingmore

renewablepossibilities

forenergy.

this

In

are

affectingglobalprocesses, opening the area up forenergy than what it uses locally. By impact,
this

Ocean

economic activities, and affecting coastal
communities that are using the ocean tosupportexample among others, Arctic Governancetheir

livelihoods,

includingcommercial fishing, transportation, mineral

Research can be useful to addressing

and hydrocarbon extraction, as well as

questions about risks to the natural

traditional practices of hunting, fishing,environment and what options exist forherding, and gathering (Huntington et al.

risk-reduction in the Arctic. As European2022). Thus, ecological, cultural and social

Arctic States shift towards greener living,sustainability of the Arctic is required.

such as the transition to renewable energy,
it’s likely there will be a growing need for

Also, the European Green Deal, which isclarity on what kind of mutual relations

also of relevance for Finland as an EU

exist between climate change policies and27member, recognizes the importance of the

While efforts, on an international andocean and the blue economy, including theregional scale, are increasingly related or

Arcticitestablished due to climate change impacts

acknowledges that a green transitionon the Arctic Ocean, they only marginallycannotblue

include climate change aspects and do notcountsprovide clear mechanisms that enable theespecially for the Arctic, where a strong

adoption or use of management tools in aland-ocean interface is present. Thereby,

more adaptive way. These include thean integral part of achieving a sustainable

adoption of the Central Arctic Ocean

blue economy is to safeguard and preserve

Fisheries Agreement (CAOFA, 2021), theArctic marine biodiversity, which alsoestablishment of a non-legally binding

generally reflected in the United Nations

Framework for a Pan-Arctic MPA Network(UN) Sustainable Development Goal (SDG)

by the Arctic Council (PAME 2022) as well

14 (Lee et al. 2020; Wenhai et al. 2019). To

as their research efforts related to theachieve sustainable use of the ocean,

Arctic Ocean, and the negotiations on aespecially the increasingly exposed Arctic

new

Ocean and its ecosystem, a balance

instrument on the conservation of marine

between the development of economic

biologicalactivities and the effective protection of thejurisdiction (BBNJ) (UN 2022). Even thoughenvironment,

these

Ocean.

More

importantly,

be achieved

transition(Taylorwithout

2021).

under

This

a

considerationofinternational
diversity

instruments

legallybindingbeyondnational

recognize

ocean

climate changes impacts, needs to beconnectivity, the far-reaching impacts andensured.

consequences of changing ecosystems,
and the need to utilize an ecosystem

A key tool with the potential to enhance

approach and protect marine biodiversity,

ecosystem resilience to climate change anduncertainties for the implementation ofachieve the SDGs are Marine Protected

these frameworks remain. Thus, merely aAreas (MPAs) (Pendleton et al. 2018; Sacha

basis for the effective conservation of

et al. 2021). However, in reality, the level ofmarine biodiversity is provided.

Arctic MPAs is low, leaving vulnerable
marine ecosystems unprotected (PAME

Against this background, a strong legal

2022; Wenzel et al. 2016). In addition, theframework that enables regional actors,

MPAs’ ability to dynamically adapt to rapid

such as the Arctic Council, for example, toclimatic changes is lacking (Sacha et al.

establish dynamic and adaptive ocean

2021; Stephanie et al. 2021), and the

management

establishment of MPAs in areas beyond

changes, is needed in order to provide thenational

effective

jurisdiction(ABNJ)

remains

unregulated and unclear.

ecosystems,

28

reflecting

conservation
which

ecosystemofmarineaccommodate

ecosystem services and support a truly

Ethically Sustainable Sámi Tourism 2018,sustainable blue economy.

pp.4).

4.5

Research ethics and heritage in Arctic
Law: Adapting good practices

On the European Union level, there is no

UNESCOis outside the competences of the EU) nor

The

Conventionforspecific legislation relating to Sámi (as thistheIndigenous cultural heritage. However,

Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural

many issues related to cultural heritage fall

Heritage defines cultural heritage as awithin the scope of intellectual property

legacy that is inherited from the past andrights (IPR), such as copyright, in the field

bestowed for the future, but it is also a
process,elaborated

inof which the EU has currently 11 directives

present

andcommunities. Global policies such, as thein many cases an insufficient legal regime

protection, access and management of also

to address the issues of Indigenous cultural

have

heritage (see e.g., Ballardini – Härkönen –emerged. Article 31 of The United Nations

Kestilä 2021; Kestilä 2021).

Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP) states that “Indigenous

One element of discussion about cultural

peoples have the right to maintain, control,anddeveloptheir

heritage is, in addition to ways of managing

culturaland protecting said practices and materials,

heritage”. This includes, for example,
traditional

knowledge

andthe question of research ethics. How can

traditionale.g., cultural heritage of Sámi people becultural expressions. In the specific case of
Sámi

culturalheritagetheresearched, and that way also archived andethicalpreserved in an ethically sound manner?

guidelines for responsible Sámi tourism

Currently, there are a number of ethicaldefine Sámi culture as including “among

guidelines

others, the Sámi language, Sámi cultural

and

force

or

being

ethical guidelines for Sámi health research

relationship of the Sámi with nature,
livelihoodsinSámi parliament in Norway has developed

traditional knowledge of the Sámi, theSámi

eitherdeveloped in the Arctic. For example, theheritage, cultural expressions, Sámi art,

traditional

These

Western framework of IPR’s appears to be

this context, questions related to theprotect

force.

However, it has been noted that thedevelopment, put culture at the center. In

heritageinperformers, producers and broadcasters.

form the most comprehensive agenda for

culturalregulations

harmonize the essential rights of authors,

UN Sustainable Development Goals thatIndigenous2

and research of Sámi human biologicalthematerial (Sámi Parliament of Norway 2020).

modern ways of practicing them as well as

From the Sámi parliament of Sweden there

other cultural customs and manifestations

is a policy document on traditional

practiced by the Sámi as an Indigenous

knowledge (Sámi Parliament of Sweden

people” (Principles for Responsible and29

2010). The Sámi parliament in Finland has

Torres Strait Islander peoples in Australia

developed a procedure for seeking the(AIATSIS Code of Ethics for Aboriginal andfree, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) of

Torres Strait Islander Research 2020;

the Sámi through the Sámi Parliament in

Aboriginal Knowledge and Intellectual

Finland for research projects dealing with

Property

Sámi cultural heritage and traditional2009), Maori in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Teknowledge (Sámi Parliament of Finland

Ara Tika Guidelines for Maori Research2019).

Ethics 2010) as well as First Nations, Inuit

Protocol:Community

Guideand Metis in Canada (see e.g. Tri-Council

In 2018 there was a working group

Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct forestablished in order to develop ethicalResearch Involving Humans 2018; Ethics inguidelines for Sámi research in Finland. The

First Nations Research 2009).

working group mentions as its goalcreating research ethical guidelines that

While some variation is bound to exist, also

will help researchers conduct sustainable

central themes appear to emerge. These

research on the Sámi. The guidelines areinclude, for example, principles of four R’s:

drawn up in close cooperation with theparticipation of the Sámi communities

responsibility, respect, reciprocity, andrights or respect, relevance, reciprocity andresponsibility. These serve often as a sort ofalready at the stage of drawing up theguiding or general principles, although

guidelines contributes to the realization of

they may be not explicitly mentioned.

the Indigenous people's right to self-

Thesedetermination (University of Lapland 2022).

concretised as more specific guidelines.

The working group composes of the

They might have been manifested via

universities

principles such as differences between

research and Sámi communities. The

in

Finlandrepresentatives from

as

well

as

point

that

research

in

many

cases

benefit-sharing,questions about intellectual property
rights, cultural sensitivity and free, priorand informed consent. Similar observations

Most of the ethical guidelines derive fromstarting

areknowledge-systems,

Sámi institutions(ibid.).

aprinciples

has

have been made by Áslat Holmberg (2021)

historically been rather exploitative andin the report drafted for the Sámi Council.

one-sided practice. Indigenous People are
no longer objects but are increasingly seen

What can be gathered from these notions

as

the

is that Indigenous peoples face globally

production of knowledge or materials. Thissimilar challenges in terms of research

has led to emergence of ethical guidelines

ethicsglobally as well. There are guidelines

appropriation,

developed e.g. for the Aboriginal andelements. Indeed, comparison and analysis

subjects

andparticipants

in

30

and

use,
of

as

well

culturalasevenheritageof the existing guidelines can be a useful5

starting

To commemorate the tenth volume ofpoint

guidelines

when

for

considering

ethicaltheguidelines

Current Development in Arctic Law (CDAL)

concerning Sámi, the process which isand the 'new normal' of Arctic Governance,

already ongoing from this premise. Also ad

this paper has put together some of the

hoc type of guidelines can benefit from thislatestexisting material. This type of work has

Governancedoes so, with the authors sharing interest

concerning use of the service that theinproject developed.

objectives

thattarget:(a)Interdisciplinary work, its related research
approaches, and importance for Arctic

As was mentioned above, IPRs havebeen

considered

Governance Research on the Just GreenasTransition; (b) Illustrating examples withinappropriate legal instruments in terms of

topical issues from the disciplines of Law

protecting Indigenous cultural heritage.

and the Social Sciences appropriate for

What ethical guidelines can possibly do in

Arctic Governance; and (c) suggestions as

this regard, is to “close the gaps” within

to what interdisciplinary work adds to thelegislation. Ethical guidelines can be usedpresent and future of Arctic Governanceto articulate the needs and wishes ofcommunities

theResearch on the Just Green Transition. The

culturalauthors used case examples with topics

heritage elements are associated with.

ranging from traditional in-depth Arctic

However, ethical guidelines are not binding

Governance Research topics such as naturein the similar sense as legislation and theyconservation and indigenous issues tocannot be easily enforced. Nevertheless, inemerging 'Arctic' issues such as climate

many cases the ethical guidelines may be

migration and the role of IPR in Arctic law

considered to have reached de facto

among others. In them, are evidence of an

binding status. For example, statements of
National

Arcticimportance to the Just Green Transition. It

where ethical guidelines were developed

Finnishofattention to interdisciplinary work and its

Access to Sámi Heritage Archives (2022),

Indigenous

outputs

Research – an up-to-date perspective with

been carried out in the project Digital

sometimes

Conclusion and outlook

Board

on

Arctic shaped by diversity not only in

Research

genetic resources, but, in the interplay

Integrity (TENK) are usually followed andbetween numerous actors, sectors, anduniversities in Finland are committed to

stakeholders. So too, are the challenges

them. It is of primary importance that thethat emerge during this diversity – awork of developing ethical guidelines iscontext that can be addressed with the aid

done from the initiative and in cooperationof interdisciplinary work.

with Sámi communities. Otherwise, there isa danger that the guidelines will only work

Strengthening

as a cosmetic improvement.

Arcticresilience

would

continue to be one of those essential needs
31whichinterdisciplinary

could

multiple ongoing transition(s) in the Arctic

contribute to, in shaping the present andand outside the region are not separated.

future Arctic Governance Research and theInstead,Just Green Transition. An example, toincreasingly

developing such resilience, can be theattention is needed to focus on the newpracticeamong

normal of Arctic Governance Research.

Researchers of Arctic Governance on the

While the local and global paradigms aremodalities of applying interdisciplinarytransforming,

practices in Arctic Governance. Also, paying

research should be able to develop its mostattention to case examples that arise withvaluable traditions while openly aiming todiverse perspectives and what meaning

integrate emerging sectors and the best

they indicate for improvements in Arctic

lessons learned.

ofinspiringwork

debates

Governance and the Just Green Transition.
practical

value

of

policyshouldcontinue

down coordination coupled with bottomup flexibility are essential to developing

through research ethics and heritage inregional resilience. While it is crucial to

Arctic Law. These are only a drop of topics
among several indicative of the Arctic's
diversity and the need for further resilience
vastlydevelopments

and future challenges. In this regard, top-

the Arctic, to incorporating good practices

the

and

setting clear timelines to combat present

governance for marine protected areas iningovernancepolitics and regulations are key drivers

greenerreforms on climate migration, inclusive

building

furtheranalysing. In the European Arctic, EUunderlined here, from holistic cross-border
governance,

Arcticandareamong the critical knots that current-day

promotingknowledge in new ways. Topical examples
environmental

interlinked,

processes

Conclusively, the Just Green Transition is

The authors have illustrated in this paper,thetransformation

maintain

flexibility

collateral

damagestoavoid

possiblefollowing

strictly

structured joint decision-making, sharedtransforming

action would also play a role to maintain

European Arctic. They, nevertheless, arethe resilience of Arctic societies and theexamples of the Just Green Transition's

natural environment. This paper showed

effects useful to revealing where additionalthat despite the global ecological crisis,

capacity building is needed to strengthen

analysing the vastly transforming local and

Arctic resilience.

global dimensions of the Arctic with the aid

Also, linked to interdisciplinary work, areof interdisciplinary practice, does add tothe transformation processes, and whatstrengthening the 'new normal' of Arctic

they imply for regional resilience under theGovernance. It does even better, enhancing

scope of Arctic Governance and research

thison the Just Green Transition. Analysis ofdevelopments emphasize on the role of thecase examples in this paper show that the

Just Green Transition in the Arctic.

32

‘new

normal’ifcurrent

policy6

References

Ballardini, Rosa & Härkönen, Heidi &Kestilä, Iiris 2021. Intellectual property

AarhusConv 1998. Convention on Accessrights and indigenous dress heritage:

to Information, Public Participation in

Towards more social planning types ofDecision-Making and Access to Justicepractices via user-centric approaches. –in Environmental Matters, adopted 25

Marcelo

June 1998, entered into force 30
October

Integrating Business, Design, & Legal
Thinking with Technology. Edward Elgar

35%20AM/Ch_XXVII_13p.pdf.

Publishing. 82-106.

Australian Institute of Aboriginal and

Bodin, Ö., Barnes, M.L., McAllister, R.R.J.,

Torres Strait Islander Studies 2020.
EthicalResearch

Rocha, J.C., Guerrero, A.M., 2017. Social–in

EcologicalAustralian Indigenous Studies, (AIATSIS).

Evol.

CriticalBodin,

Stewardship Unit 2009 Ethics in First

Ö.

and

Disentangling

Research.

547–549.

Tengö,

M.

intangible2012.
social–ecological systems. Glob. Environ.

http://www.afn.ca/uploads/files/rp-

Chang. 22, 430–439.

research_ethics_final.pdf

Bohan, D.A. et al. 2016. Networking OurÁslat Holmberg 2021. Working towards

Way

ethical guidelines for research involving

toBetterEcosystem

Service

Provision. Trends Ecol. Evol. 31, 105–115

the Sámi: A Discussion Paper on the

CAOFA, Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries

Work Done So Far and Considerations

Agreement

on a Process to Develop Common Sámi
Sámi

32,

03

Assembly of First Nations Environmental

Guidelines.

inhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2017.06.0

Thought 4 (11): 1-14.

Nations

Approaches

to Bohan et al. and Dee et al. Trends Ecol.

2021. Prospects for Localizing Co-

International

Network

Interdisciplinary Research: A Response

Ayonghe, Nebasifu, and Francisco Cuogo
management.

&

Michael Doherty (eds.), Legal Design:

8/06/19980625%2008-

forCompagnucci

Helena Haapio & Margaret Hagan &2001.

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/199

Guidelines

Corrales2021.

International

Agreement to Prevent Unregulated HighCouncil.

Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5

Ocean.

dfb35a66f00d54ab0729b75/t/62344c0b

https://www.dfo-

mpo.gc.ca/international/arctic-arctique-143a63615b8222d1/1647594508845/Di

eng.htmscussion+paper+for+the+Saami+counc

Dee, L.E. et al. 2016. Operationalizing

il+on+ethical+g+uidelines+for+researc

Network Theory for Ecosystem Service

h+involving+the+Sa%CC%81mi+FINAL

Assessments. Trends Ecol. Evol. 11, 1–13.

.pdf

33

Digital Access to Sámi Heritage Archives

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/eprojectn/headlines/society/20200618STO8151

2022.

https://digisamiarchives.com

3/green-deal-key- to-a-climate-neutral-

ECHR 1950. Convention for the Protection

and-sustainable-eu

of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms

European Parliament 2016. European[European

Human

Parliament resolution of 6 October 2016

Rights], adopted 4 November 1950,

on the implementation of the Paris

entered into force 3 September 1953,

Agreement and the 2016 UN Climate

consolidated

version.

ChangeConference

https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/co

Morocco(COP22)nvention_eng.pdf.

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

EspooConv

Convention

1991.

on

Convention

inMarrakesh,(2016/2814(RSP)).

oncontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016

Environmental Impact Assessment in a

IP0383&qid=1662445903122&from=E

Transboundary Context, adopted 25

N

February 1991, entered into force 10

European Parliament 2011. European

September

Parliament resolution of 5 July 2011 on

1997.

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/199

increasing

1/02/19910225%2008-

development policy (2011/2047(INI)).

29%20PM/Ch_XXVII_04p.pdf

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-

European Commission 2022. A European

content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011

Green Deal Striving to be the first

IP0320&qid=1662445903122&from=E

climate-neutralN

continent.

theimpactofEU

https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/prior

Guerrero, A.M. et al. 2015. Achieving

ities-2019-2024/european-green-social-ecological fit through bottom-up

deal_encollaborative governance: an empirical

European Union 2022. Resolution of theinvestigation. Ecol. Soc. 20 (4): 41.

European Committee of the Regions on

Heikkinen, Ilkka 2007. Saving nature forthe contribution of local and regional

people. National strategy and action

authorities to the Conference on theplan

Future of Europe (2022/C 270/01).

sustainable use of biodiversity in Finland

Available

2006-2016. Ministry of the Environment,

athttps://eur-

for

the

conservation

andlex.europa.eu/legal-

Finland.

content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021

http://hdl.handle.net/10138/212217

XR6503&qid=1662445903122&from=E

Homeyer, Ingmar, Sebastian Oberthϋr,

N

and Claire Dupont 2022. Implementing

European Parliament 2022. Green Deal:the European Green Deal during the

key to a climate-neutral and sustainable

Evolving

EU.
34

EnergyCrisis.

JournalofCommon Market Studies 2022: 1-12.

Klein, J.T., 1990. Interdisciplinarity: History,

10.1111/jcms.13397

Theory, and Practice, Detroit, Wayne

Huntington,

H.

P.,

Zagorsky,State University.

A.,

Kaltenborn, B. P., Shin, H. C., Dawson, J.,

Kopra, S. 2018. China and Great Power

Lukin, M., Dahl, P. E., Guo, P., & Thomas,

Responsibility for Climate Change (1st

D. N. 2022. Societal implications of aed.).

changing Arctic Ocean. Ambio 51 (2),https://doi.org/10.4324/978131515111

298–306.

3

https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-021-

Koivurova, Timo, Alf Håkon Hoel, Malte

01601-2

Humpert,Janssen, M.A. et al. 2006. Toward a

Raspotnik, Małgorzata (Gosia) Śmieszek,

Network Perspective of the Study ofAdam Stępień 2021. Overview of EU

Resilience in Social Ecological Systems.

actions in the Arctic and their impact. P.

Ecol. Soc. 11 (1): 15.

1-176,

Johnson-Bailey,

J.

2003.

Enjoining

Routledge.

StefanKirchner,

EuropeanAndreasUnion.

https://eprd.pl/wp-

positionality and power in narrative

content/uploads/2021/06/EU-Policy-

work:

Arctic-Impact-Overview-

Balancing

contentious

andFinal-

modulating forces. Foundations for

Report.pdf

research 139-154.

Kotilainen, J., & Colpaert, A. 2014.

Kivimaa, Paula, & Per Mickwitz 2011.

Repositioning Finland as an Arctic

Public policy as a part of transforming

country.

energy systems: framing bioenergy in

Publications, 43(1), 11–18.;

Finnish energy policy. Journal of Cleaner

Lee, K.-H., Noh, J., & Khim, J. S. 2020. The

Production

Blue Economy and the United Nations’

19

(16):

1812-1821.

NordiaGeographicalhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2011.0

sustainable

development

2.004.

Challenges

andKirchner, S., (Ed.) 2022. Security andEnvironment International, 137 (2020):

Technology in Arctic Governance. Lit

105528.

Verlag.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2020.10

Kirchner,

Stefan,NuccioMazzullo,

AyongheAkonwi

Nebasifu,

goals:

opportunities.

5528.

PamelaLipponen, Paavo 2015. A Strategic Vision

Katri-Maaria

for the North – Finland’s prospects for

Kyllöne and Katharina Heinrich 2022.

economic growth in the Arctic region.

Towards

https://ek.fi/wp-content/uploads/A-

Lesser,PaulaaEnvironmental

Tulppo,Holistic

Cross-Border

Governance

in

the

Strategic-Vision-for-the-North.pdf

European Arctic. Journal of Territorial

MacKinnon, J., MacKinnon, K.; Child, G.;

and Maritime Studies 9 (2): 31-46.

and

10.2307/JTMS.9.2.31
35

Thorsell,

J.

1986.

ManagingProtected Areas in the Tropics; IUCN:

intellectual-property-protocol-

Grang, Switzerland.

community-guide/

Mettiäinen, Ilona 2013. Climate Change

PAME, Protection of the Arctic Marine

Turn in the Regional Development

Environment

Strategies of an Arctic Region, Case

Network

Finnish Lapland. The Yearbook of Polar

https://www.pame.is/projects-

Law V, (2013): 143–183.

new/marine-protected-areas/mpa-

Miller,Raymond

1982.

Varieties

of

2022.

PAME'sMPAToolbox.

highlights/408-pame-mpa-network-

Interdisciplinary approaches in the social

toolboxsciences: a 1981 overview. Issues in

Pelliccioni, Franco 1998. Towards theIntegrative Studies: An Occasional
Publication of the Association for
Integrative Studies, (1982): 1-37.

necessity

Ministry of the Environment 2022a.

Traditional) Ecological Indicators", inFinland's national climate change policy.

Proceedings of the Fourth Ny-Ålesund

https://ym.fi/en/finland-s-national-

Seminar, 135-141. Pisa, NySMAC, CNR.

climate-change-

Penchev, G. 2022. The Convention on

policy#:~:text=The%20key%20pillar%20

Biologicalof%20Finland%27s,from%20the%20leve

Natural Territories: Environmental Law

ls%20in%201990

Aspects. University of National and

Ministry of the Environment 2022b. New

World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria, 1: 1-43.

Climate Change Act into force in July.

Pendleton,

https://ym.fi/en/-/new-climate-change-

Browman, H. I., Thurstan, R. H., Kaplan, D.

act-into-force-in-july

M., & Bartolino, V. 2018. Debating theNiemi, J. 2009. Water quality of arctic

effectiveness of marine protected areas.

rivers in Finnish Lapland. Environmental

ICES Journal of Marine Science, 75 (3):Monitoring and Assessment, 161: 359–

1156–1159,

368.

https://doi.org/10.1093/icesjms/fsx154

of

a

New

"Urgent"

Anthropology: Arctic Anthropology andthe

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10661-

"New"

(but

Ancient,

Diversity

L.

H.,

and

becauseProtected

Ahmadia,

G.

N.,

1156.

009-0753-8.

Prokkola E-K., et. al. 2021. Climate

Orr, Margaret & Kenny, P. & Gorey, IN. &migration:

Mir, A. & Cox, E. & Wilson, J. 2009.

understanding and management. Prime

Aboriginal Knowledge and Intellectual

Minister’s

Property Protocol. Alice Springs, NT:

https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstre

Desertam/handle/10024/163182/VNTEAS_202

Knowledge

Cooperative

Research

Centre.

towards
OfficeaHelsinki

better2021.

1_42.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y

https://www.nintione.com.au/resources

Pūtaiora Writing Group 2010. Te Ara Tika

/rao/aboriginal-knowledge-and-Guidelines for Māori research ethics: A
framework for researchers and ethics
36

committee members. Health Research

Simone Poledrini, S., Elizabeth A. M.

Council of New Zealand.

Searing,

Rantanen et al. 2022. The Arctic has

2022. A Model for Directing andwarmed nearly four times faster than the

Modulating

globe since 1979. Communications Earth

SocialandForum,

Environment3(168):

1-10.

and

Alessandro

PublicEnterprises.

MontroneInterventionsin

Nonprofit Policy2022.

doi:10.1038/s43247-022-00498-3

https://doi.org/10.1515/npf-2021-0030

Sacha M. O’Regan et al. 2021. A Global

Stephanie L. Barr et al. 2021. Assessing

Assessment

Climate Change Adaptation Progress inofClimateChangeThe
Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe
Canadien65(2):
152–65.

Adaptation in Marine Protected Area

Canada’s

Management Plans,” Frontiers in Marine

Science8(2021).

Protected

Areas,”

https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3

https://doi.org/10.1111/cag.12635.

389/fmars.2021.711085.

Supreme Court of New Zealand 2015. SC

Sámi

ParliamentofFinland2018.

7/2015 Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand.

Principles for Responsible and Ethically

http://climatecasechart.com/wp-

Sustainable Sámi Tourism. Accepted bycontent/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-

Sámi

documents/2015/20150720_2015-

Parliament

24.9.2018.

https://www.samediggi.fi/ethical-

NZSC-107_judgment.pdf

guidelines-for-sami-tourism/?lang=en

Taylor,retningslinjer for samisk helseforskning.

Green transition
impossible without “blue economy”, EU
says.
Www.Euractiv.Com.

https://sametinget.no/_f/p1/iab4f8a7f-

https://www.euractiv.com/section/ener

1c05-4f9f-a5e2-1d4f6196671d/etiske-

gy/news/green-transition-impossible-

retningslinjer-for-samisk-

without-blue-economy-eu-says/

helseforskning-ny.pdf

Tennberg, M., Broderstad, E. G., & Hernes,

Sámi Parliament of Sweden 2010. The

H-K. 2022. Indigenous Peoples, Natural

traditional

policyResources and Governance. Routledge.

(Árbediehtu/Árbbediehto/Aerpimaahto

Routledge Research in Polar Regions.

e: Sametingets Policydokument För

https://doi.org/10.4324/978100313127

Traditionell

4

Sámi Parliament of Norway 2020. Etiskeknowledge

Kunskap).

K.

2021.

https://www.sametinget.se/26119

The Regional Council of Lapland 2022.

Scherer, T., Greifenstein, S., & Kappelhoff,

LaplandH. 2014. 165. Expressive movements inforerunneraudio-visual

adaptation.

media:

Modulating

has

been
in

selectedclimateaschangeaffective experience. De Gruyter Mouton

https://www.lapinliitto.fi/lappi-on-

2: 2081-2092.

valittu-ilmastonmuutoksensopeutumisen-edellakavijajoukkoon/
37aTri-Council

PolicyStatement:

2016.

EthicalPolar

opposites?

MarineConduct for Research Involving Humans

conservation tools and experiences in(2018)

Responsible

the changing Arctic and Antarctic.

University of Lapland 2022. Saamelaisia

Aquatic Conservation: Marine andFreshwater Ecosystems 26 (S2): 61–84.

koskevan tutkimuksen eettiset ohjeet

https://doi.org/10.1002/aqc.2649.

Secretariat

on

Conduct of Research.

https://www.ulapland.fi/FI/Kotisivut/Saa
melaisia-koskevan-tutkimukseneettiset-ohjeetUN,

UnitedNations

Intergovernmental

2022.

ConferenceonMarine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond
National

Jurisdiction.

https://www.un.org/bbnj/
UNFCC,

UnitedNations

Framework

Convention on Climate Change 2022.
The

Paris

Agreement.

https://unfccc.int/process-andmeetings/the-paris-agreement/theparis-agreement
UArctic 2022. Thematic Networks andInstitutes.
https://old.uarctic.org/thematicnetworks/
Wenhai, L., Cusack, C., Baker, M., Tao, W.,
Mingbao, C., Paige, K., Xiaofan, Z., Levin,L., Escobar, E., Amon, D., Yue, Y., Reitz, A.,
Neves, A. A. S., O’Rourke, E., Mannarini,
G., Pearlman, J., Tinker, J., Horsburgh, K.
J.,

Lehodey,P.,

Yufeng,Y.

2019.

Successful Blue Economy Examples Withan

EmphasisonInternational

Perspectives. Frontiers in Marine Science6.
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3
389/fmars.2019.00261
Wenzel, L., Gilbert, N., Goldsworthy, L.,
Tesar, C., Mcconnell, M., & Okter, M.
38

Arctic law in the face of climate change – a turning point?
Anticipatory law-making and new modes of governance
Johanna Sophie Buerkert, a Kristian Søby Kristensen, b Frank Sejersen cd

1

Introduction

livelihoods (such as e.g. effects on access toand composition of food, 3 community

Temperature rise due to climate change issecurity, 4 and overall wellbeing moreprogressing twice as fast in the Arctic as on

generally) 5 the effects of climate change on

1

the rest of the planet, and the changes

the Arctic also affect the rest of the globe,

that follow as a consequence will directlyas the reduction of (sea) ice cover

impact the environment 2 and the people

decreasesthat inhabit it, both in the Arctic andthealbedoeffect,which

worldwide. Next to direct and indirect
negative impacts on ecosystems anda PhD fellow, Centre for International Law and Governance (CILG), University of Copenhagen, corresponding author.
b Senior Researcher, Centre for Military Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Copenhagen.
c Associate Professor, Department of Cross-cultural and Regional Studies, Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen.
d All authors are part of the interdisciplinary network on Climate Arctic Governance (CArGo) at Copenhagen University,

which aims to create synergies between different scientific domains to address Arctic climate and sustainability challenges.
More information: https://jura.ku.dk/cilg/research/cargo/.
1 M. Meredith et al., "Polar Regions," in IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate ed. H.-OPörtner et al. (In press: Cambridge University press, 2019), 205; Rune Grand Graversen and Minghuai Wang, "Polar
amplification in a coupled climate model with locked albedo," Climate Dynamics 33, no. 5 (2009/10/01 2009): 629,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00382-009-0535-6.
2 Meredith et al., "Polar Regions," 205.
3 Meredith et al., "Polar Regions," 205; R. Bezner Kerr et al., "Food, Fibre and Other Ecosystem Products," in Climate Change
2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, ed. H.-O. Pörtner et al., Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 63.
4 K. Kristensen & L. Mortensgaard, “Dangerous ice: Exploring the scales of climate change macrosecuritization through theGreenland Ice Sheet”, in Jacobsen et.al. (eds.) Greenland in Arctic security: (de)securitization dynamics under climatic thaw
and geopolitical freeze, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Forthcoming 2023).
5 Meredith et al., "Polar Regions," 259-60; Ashlee Cunsolo Willox et al., "Examining relationships between climate change
and mental health in the Circumpolar North," Regional Environmental Change 15, no. 1 (2015/01/01 2015),
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-014-0630-z; Frank Sejersen, "Mobility, climate change, and social dynamics in the Arctic:
the creation of new horizons of expectation and the role of community," Climate change and human mobility: global
challenges to the social sciences. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (2012).

39

reinforces global warming processes that
affect other parts of the Earth.
Despitethedestruction of ecosystems that are yet

6predominantly

unknown.
negative

Faced with these unprecedented, yetconsequences of climate change, melting

pressing changes, a new approach to Arcticof (sea) ice and rising temperatures due togovernance seems necessary. The term

global warming may also give rise to‘Anticipatory

certain

Arctictraction in the discourse around planning

Shipping, 7 or increased access to resources.

for the effects of climate change and

The possibility of ice-free summers in thesustainability. 11 We argue that this way ofCentral Arctic Ocean (CAO), for example,

thinking is also on the rise in Arctic

may generate opportunities to exploit (yetgovernance, with the 2018 Agreement tounknown)

Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries inopportunities,

fish-stocks,

such

which

as

may

be

Arctichas

Ocean

gainedeconomically attractive to states in thetheArctic and beyond. This is especially

Agreement) being a recent example.

relevant against the backdrop of a general

Despite the advantages of and the need for

decline in fish stocks in the rest of thethe anticipatory approach, we argue that8

CentralGovernance’(CAOF

considering the major role that

anticipation also calls for transformations

blue foods play in the global economy. 9of governance by including what can be

Yet, an unregulated exploitation of theseconceptualized

fisheries comes with dangers, such as stock

approaches in order to adequately cope

globe,

collapse10

as‘thickgovernance’with climate-change influenced futures inand the possible irreversible

6 For an explanation of the albedo effect, see T. M. Lenton et al., "Tipping elements in the Earth's climate system,"

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 105, no. 6 (2008): 1788,
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0705414105.
7 Jackie Dawson, "Arctic shipping: Future prospects and ocean governance," in The future of ocean governance andcapacity development (Brill Nijhoff, 2019).
8 Erik J Molenaar, 'Participation in the central arctic ocean fisheries agreement', Emerging Legal Orders in the Arctic(Routledge 2019) 133; Beth Baker, 'Scientists Move to Protect Central Arctic Fisheries' (2012) 62 BioScience 852, 852;
Elizabeth Mendenhall and others, 'Climate change increases the risk of fisheries conflict' (2020) 117 Marine Policy 103954,
2.
9 Michelle Tigchelaar and others, 'The vital roles of blue foods in the global food system' (2022) 33 Global Food Security
100637, 2.
10 Rosemary Rayfuse, "Regulating fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean: much ado about nothing?," in Arctic Marine
Resource Governance and Development (Springer, 2018), 38-39.
11 Ray Quay, "Anticipatory governance: A tool for climate change adaptation," Journal of the American Planning
Association 76, no. 4 (2010): 498; Karlijn Muiderman et al., "Four approaches to anticipatory climate governance: Different
conceptions of the future and implications for the present," Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 11, no. 6(2020).

40

an equitable and just manner and enhance

preparedness” in order to prepare for

legitimacy and effectiveness of measures.

future disruptions. 16

2

3

The

Anticipation as a concept
concept‘anticipation’is

The CAOF Agreement as an example
of

used

anticipatory

lawmakingandgovernancedifferently in different bodies of literature(e.g. resilience, physics, psychology) but

The Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) is one ofalmost always contains some form of

the areas that are currently ice-covered but

action, in view of future changes. “While

likely free up more and more due to rising

anticipation and expectation are closely

temperatures. This increases the likelihood

related”, 12 anticipation is different fromof commercial fisheries in the future.

expectation in the sense that it includes

Despite the fact that the ecosystem in thepresent action to change the course of the

CAO

is

In

short,

thepossibility of a northwards migration of
species into the CAO following ocean
warming, as well as the possible discovery
of local fish stocks in the future posed therisk of an unregulated CAO fisheries withpossibly disastrous consequences for local
ecosystems. 18

future, instead of a mere contemplation of
future events. 13 If undertaken by a group ofpeople, the term collective anticipationrefers to the joint effort of a communitythat is in realization that a change is about
to happen, and tries to both prepare for
future events, as well as change the courseof events at the same time. 14 Anticipatory
governance involves “changing short-term

stilllargelytheunknown, 17

Agreementprohibits

unregulated commercial fishing in the Highdecision making to a longer-term policy

Seas portion of the Central Arctic Ocean,vision, including the notion of foresight.” 15This can be done, by employing tactics of“precaution,

preemption

and

12 Rebecca Bryant and Daniel M Knight, The anthropology of the future (Cambridge University Press, 2019), 22.
13 Bryant and Knight, The anthropology of the future, 22.

14 Bryant and Knight, The anthropology of the future, 42, 43.

15 Emily Boyd et al., "Anticipatory governance for social-ecological resilience," Ambio 44, no. 1 (2015): 153.

16 Ben Anderson, "Preemption, precaution, preparedness: Anticipatory action and future geographies," Progress in humangeography 34, no. 6 (2010): 791.

17Pauline Snoeijs-Leijonmalm et al., "Review of the research knowledge and gaps on fish populations, fisheries and linked

ecosystems in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO)," (2020): 45..
18 Rosemary Rayfuse, "The role of law in the regulation of fishing activities in the Central Arctic Ocean," Marine Policy 110(2019); Andrew J. Norris and Patrick McKinley, "The central Arctic Ocean-preventing another tragedy of the commons,"
Polar Record 53, no. 1 (2017).

41

through a precautionary approach, 19 while

ecosystems and fish stocks in the CAO, thesetting up a Joint Program of Scientificstate parties followed a call by the scientific

Research and Monitoring, 20 in order tocommunity, 26 to address the problem of

make science-based decisions about aunregulated fishing in the CAO before it

possible

emerges in the first place. 27 While thecommercial

fisheries

inthefuture. 21 The parties to the Agreement also

Agreement’s

may only establish a commercial fisheries

temporary, it nevertheless sets the tone forsubject to (interim) conservation andfuture science-based management andmanagement measures that are to be

stewardship. The Agreement aims toestablishedthe terms of thecontribute to a “long-term strategy toAgreement as well as general applicablesafeguard healthy marine ecosystems”, 28

rules of international law. 22

establishing modes of cooperation that

under

following climate change impacts. 29 All

and its reliancethese elements match the definition of

on science in decision-making. 24 Due to its
future-oriented

approach, 25

anticipation,

the

of

as

anticipatory

disputes, and is only a first step taken

the absence of scientific certainty about theproperties

well

Agreement is not able to preclude allof anticipatory lawmaking in the oceans. In
andasgovernance. It needs to be noted that theAgreement is also one of the first examples

existence

only

about resources that may arise in the Arctic

progressiveness in terms of adaptive
governance, stewardship,aremay contribute to prevent future disputes

The Agreement has been hailed for its
23

provisions

towards fisheries management subjected

possibletomanagement

andconservation

19 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (Ilulissat, Oct 3 2018, entered into

force Jun 25 2021), Art. 2.
20 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (Ilulissat, Oct 3 2018, entered into
force Jun 25 2021), Art. 4.
21 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (Ilulissat, Oct 3 2018, entered into
force Jun 25 2021), Art.5 (1) (b) & Art. 5 (1) (c).
22 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (Ilulissat, Oct 3 2018, entered into
force Jun 25 2021), Art.3.
23 Alexander N Vylegzhanin, Oran R Young, and Paul Arthur Berkman, "The Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement as anelement in the evolving Arctic Ocean governance complex," Marine Policy 118 (2020): 9.
24 Rayfuse, "The role of law in the regulation of fishing activities in the Central Arctic Ocean."
25 Timo Koivurova, Pirjo Kleemola-Juntunen, and Stefan Kirchner, "Emergence of a New Ocean: How to React to theMassive Change?," in The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics (Springer, 2020), 420.
26 Norris and McKinley, "The central Arctic Ocean-preventing another tragedy of the commons," 47.
27 Koivurova, Kleemola-Juntunen, and Kirchner, "Emergence of a New Ocean: How to React to the Massive Change?," 420.
28 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (Ilulissat, Oct 3 2018, entered into
force Jun 25 2021), Art. 2.
29 Jessica Spijkers et al., "Exploring the future of fishery conflict through narrative scenarios," One Earth 4, no. 3 (2021).

42

measures. Nevertheless, the Agreement

may be a possible solution to bring about

moves away from a tradition of regulating

more equity and justice.

after the damage to ecosystems has
already materialized, 30 towards a new

Thick governance values “incorporate a richportfolio

anticipatory approach to manage Arctic
resources.
4ofethicalvalues” 33

governanceapproaches

suchinclusiveness,accountability,

into
as

capacity

Towards new governance modes inbuilding, stakeholder accountability andanticipation of coming changes

transparency. 34

these values in governance is key for

Despite the anticipatory approach in terms“effective problem-solving and durableof the regulation of state actors in fishing

behavioral change within an institution” 35

in the CAO, comprehensive collective

andanticipation requires the inclusion of allactorsthatcommercial

mayfisheriesbeimpacted
in

the

by

measurespeoples, 31

forequitable

and

the

respective

nourish a ground for public participationand the inclusion of a variety of voices thatclimate change will disproportionately
indigenous

enhancemeans that governing institutions have tofuture.

Arcticcaninstitution’s legitimacy. 36 Thick governanceConsidering the fact that the impacts ofimpact

The implementation of

have

the

space

to

unfoldtheirinterpretations of potential impact andjustchange elaborately. If thick governance ismechanisms are necessary. 32 Thick values

pursued, it entails an engagement inin governance, as well as thick governancedifferent understandings of data, action,
contexts and interpretations, and elaborate

30 Rayfuse, "The role of law in the regulation of fishing activities in the Central Arctic Ocean," 4.
31 Elizabeth Kronk Warner and Randall Abate, "International and domestic law dimensions of climate justice for Arctic

indigenous peoples," Revue générale de droit 43 (2013): 118; Yuko Osakada, "From Victims to Contributors: A Human
Rights Approach to Climate Change for the Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic," The Yearbook of Polar Law Online 13, no. 1(2022): 21; See also H.-O Pörtner et al., "Summary for Policymakers," in Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, andVulnerability, ed. H.-O Pörtner et al., Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 12 stressing the severity of
the impacts of ecosystem loss especially on indigenous peoples as a whole.
32 Even considering the argument that the possible impact of a high seas fishery on coastal Arctic Indigenous peoples andother residents is unclear.
33 Tim Cadman, Charles Sampford, and Rowena Maguire, "Introduction: Governing the climate regime," in Governing the
Climate Change Regime (Routledge, 2016), 16.
34 Hugh Breakey, Tim Cadman, and Charles Sampford, "Governance values and institutional integrity," in Governing the
Climate Change Regime (Routledge, 2016), 30.
35 Bridget Lewis, "Enhancing good governance within the international climate regime through human rights principles," inGoverning the Climate Change Regime (Routledge, 2016), 181.
36 Breakey, Cadman, and Sampford, "Governance values and institutional integrity," 30.

43and detailed inquiries are means to add

bringing thickness into governance opens

thickness. Because such an open andup the potential of pushing anticipatory

inclusiveentails

governance into a more robust and flexible

ontologicalposition. The CAOF Agreement recognizes

discussions (i.e. Indigenous knowledge vs.

“the interests of Arctic residents, including

engagement

epistemologicalandknowledge) 37

often

governmental

indigenous peoples” in the preamble, andpractices become more surprising, difficult

expressly stipulate the taking into accountand time consuming. Thick governanceof Indigenous and local knowledge in theapproaches in anticipatory governing and

Joint Program of Scientific Research andlawmaking in an era of rapid environmental

Monitoring. 41

change is more than expanding thepeoples and their representatives are not

portfolio of ethical values; it is creating agiven their own vote or voice in thespace for committed exploration, newness

decision-making procedure of Article 6,38

and are only given the opportunity (“may”)

scientificand transformation.

However,

Indigenous

to participate in “committees or similar

In the Arctic, there is a long tradition of thebodies” that can be established to further

integration of different voices and thethe Agreement’s implementation. 42 Thus,

setting up of hybrid government (co-while some elements of participation are

management, trans-national institutions

available, the Agreement presents more ofetc). 39 In some cases, the Indigenous voices

whathave been not only integrated into but also

Breakeyetgovernance values.

driven policy-making. 40 This legacy of

43

al.

call

“thickish”

They are a step up

from thin values that describe the “limited

37 Frank Sejersen, Rethinking greenland and the arctic in the era of climate change: new northern horizons (Routledge,2015).

38 Frank Sejersen, "Resilience, human agency and climate change adaptation strategies in the Arctic," in The Question of

Resilience. Social Responses to Climate Change ed. Kirsten Hastrup (The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters,2009).

39 Henry P Huntington, Wildlife management and subsistence hunting in Alaska (Belhaven Press, 1992); Fikret Berkes and

Derek Armitage, "Co-management institutions, knowledge, and learning: Adapting to change in the Arctic,"
Etudes/Inuit/Studies 34, no. 1 (2010); Derek Armitage et al., "Co-management and the co-production of knowledge:
Learning to adapt in Canada's Arctic," Global environmental change 21, no. 3 (2011); Paul Nadasdy, "Reevaluating the comanagement success story," Arctic (2003): 368.
40 See e.g. Annika E Nilsson, "Arctic climate change: North American actors in circumpolar knowledge production andpolicy making," Changing Climates in North American Politics: Institutions, Policymaking, and Multilevel Governance(2009): 209.
41 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (Ilulissat, Oct 3 2018, entered into
force Jun 25 2021), Art. 4 (4) & Art. 5 (1) (b).
42 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (Ilulissat, Oct 3 2018, entered into
force Jun 25 2021), Art. 4 (4) & Art. 5 (2).
43 Breakey, Cadman, and Sampford, "Governance values and institutional integrity," 30.

44

and basic” element of governance values, 44

Armitage, Derek, Fikret Berkes, Aaron

but not sufficient to depict thick values that

Dale, Erik Kocho-Schellenberg, and Eva

are “the full gamut of social and moral

Patton. "Co-Management and the Co-

qualities that can be demanded of an

Production of Knowledge: Learning toinstitution’s

mechanisms”.

45

The lack of

Adapt

in

Canada's

Arctic."Globalappropriate thick governance mechanisms

environmental change 21, no. 3 (2011):

within the Agreement, as well as a lack of995-1004.

space for thick governance approaches is

Berkes, Fikret, and Derek Armitage. "Co-problematic in the climate change context,

Management Institutions, Knowledge,

as it leaves out an important group of

and Learning: Adapting to Change in theindividuals affected by the consequences

Arctic." Etudes/Inuit/Studies 34, no. 1of climate change, which, in the end, may(2010): 109-31.

hinder comprehensive anticipation andBezner Kerr, R., T. Hasegawa, R. Lasco, I.

thus effective problem solving.

Bhatt, D. Deryng, A. Farrell, H. GurneySmith, et al. "Food, Fibre and Other

Due to its anticipatory approach, the CAOF

Ecosystem Products." In Climate Change

Agreement is a good example for a

2022:
Impacts,
Adaptation,
andVulnerability, edited by H.-O. Pörtner,(hopefully) new trend in Arctic governance,
taking action now to positively impact the

D.C.

future, while preparing for adverse events.
However,ananticipatory

E.S.

Poloczanska,

K.

Mintenbeck, M. Tignor, A. Alegría, M.

standpoint

Craig, et al. Contribution of Working

requires also further investigating newGroup Ii to the Sixth Assessment Reportmodes of governance and diverting fromof the Intergovernmental Panel on

old pathways in order to ensure a just andClimateequitable progression into Arctic futures

Change,1-63.

Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2022.

determined by global warming.
5

Roberts,

Boyd,

Emily,

Björn

Nykvist,Sara

Borgström, and Izabela A Stacewicz.

References"Anticipatory Governance for Social-

Anderson, Ben. "Preemption, Precaution,

Ecological Resilience." Ambio 44, no. 1

Preparedness: Anticipatory Action and(2015): 149-61.

Future Geographies." Progress in human

Breakey, Hugh, Tim Cadman, and Charles

geography 34, no. 6 (2010): 777-98.

Sampford. "Governance Values andInstitutional Integrity." In Governing the

44 Breakey, Cadman, and Sampford, "Governance values and institutional integrity," 26.
45 Breakey, Cadman, and Sampford, "Governance values and institutional integrity," 28.

45

Climate

ChangeRegime,34-62:

React to the Massive Change?". In The

Bryant, Rebecca, and Daniel M Knight. The

Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and
Politics, 409-25: Springer, 2020.

Anthropology of the Future. Cambridge

Kronk Warner, Elizabeth, and Randall

University Press, 2019.

Abate. "International and Domestic Law

Cadman, Tim, Charles Sampford, andDimensions of Climate Justice for Arctic

RowenaIndigenous Peoples." Revue générale deRoutledge, 2016.

Maguire.

"Introduction:

Governing the Climate Regime." In

droit 43 (2013): 113-50.

Governing the Climate Change Regime,

Lenton, T. M., H. Held, E. Kriegler, J. W.

21-33: Routledge, 2016.

Hall, W. Lucht, S. Rahmstorf, and H. J.

Cunsolo

Willox,Ashlee,EleanorSchellnhuber. "Tipping Elements in the

Allen,

François

Earth's Climate System." Proceedings ofBourque, Alexander Drossos, Sigmund
Elgarøy, Michael J. Kral, et al. "Examining

the National Academy of Sciences of theUnited States of America 105, no. 6

Relationships between Climate Change(2008):and Mental Health in the Circumpolar

https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.07054141

North." Regional Environmental Change

05.

15, no. 1 (2015/01/01 2015): 169-82.

Lewis,

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-014-

Governance within the International

0630-z.

Climate Regime through Human Rights

Dawson, Jackie. "Arctic Shipping: Future

Principles." In Governing the Climate

Prospects and Ocean Governance." In

Change Regime, 195-214: Routledge,

The Future of Ocean Governance andCapacity Development, 484-89: Brill2016.
Meredith,Nijhoff, 2019.

Cassotta, C. Derksen, A. Ekaykin, A.

Graversen, Rune Grand, and Minghuai

Hollowed, G. Kofinas, et al. "Polar

Wang. "Polar Amplification in a Coupled

Regions." In Ipcc Special Report on the

Climate Model with Locked Albedo."

Climate Dynamics 33, no. 5 (2009/10/01

Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing
Climate edited by H.-O- Pörtner, D.C.

2009):

Roberts, V. Masson-Delmotte, P. Zhai, M.

Stephenson,

Jim

629-43.

1786-93.

Bridget.

M.,"Enhancing

M.

Good

Sommerkorn,

S.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00382-009-

Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck,0535-6.

et al. In press: Cambridge University

Huntington,

Henry

P.

Wildlifepress, 2019.

Management and Subsistence Hunting

Muiderman, Karlijn, Aarti Gupta, Joostin Alaska. Belhaven Press, 1992.

Vervoort, and Frank Biermann. "Four

Koivurova,

Timo,

Pirjo

Kleemola-

Approaches to Anticipatory Climate

Juntunen,andStefanKirchner.

Governance: Different Conceptions of"Emergence of a New Ocean: How to

the Future and Implications for the46

Present." Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews:

Rayfuse, Rosemary. "Regulating Fisheries

Climate Change 11, no. 6 (2020): e673.

in the Central Arctic Ocean: Much Ado

Nadasdy, Paul. "Reevaluating the Co-

About Nothing?". In Arctic Marine

Management Success Story." Arctic(2003): 367-80.

Resource
GovernanceandDevelopment, 35-51: Springer, 2018.

Nilsson, Annika E. "Arctic Climate Change:———. "The Role of Law in the Regulation

North American Actors in Circumpolarof Fishing Activities in the Central Arctic

Knowledge

Ocean." Marine Policy 110 (2019):

Production

andPolicyMaking." Changing Climates in North

103562.

American
Politics:
Policymaking,andGovernance (2009): 199.

Sejersen,Institutions,
Multilevel

Frank.

Arctic: The Creation of New Horizons ofExpectation"The Central Arctic Ocean-Preventing

Community."

Polar Record 53, no. 1 (2017): 43-51.
"From

Victims

and

the

Role

of

Climate change andhuman mobility: global challenges tothesocialsciences.
Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK (2012):

Another Tragedy of the Commons."
Yuko.

ClimateChange, and Social Dynamics in the

Norris, Andrew J., and Patrick McKinley.

Osakada,"Mobility,

toContributors: A Human Rights Approach

190-213.

to Climate Change for the Indigenous———. "Resilience, Human Agency and

Peoples of the Arctic." The Yearbook of

Climate Change Adaptation Strategies in

Polar Law Online 13, no. 1 (2022): 16-38.

thePoloczanska, K Mintenbeck, M Tignor, A

The Question of
Resilience. Social Responses to Climate
Change edited by Kirsten Hastrup: The

Alegría, M Craig, et al. "Summary for

Royal Danish Academy of Sciences andPolicymakers." In Climate Change 2022:

Letters, 2009.

Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability,———. Rethinking Greenland and theedited by H.-O Pörtner, D.C Roberts, E S

Arctic in the Era of Climate Change: New

Poloczanska, K Mintenbeck, M Tignor, A

Northern Horizons. Routledge, 2015.

Alegría, M Craig, et al. Contribution of

Snoeijs-Leijonmalm,

Working

Pörtner,

H.-O,

D.C

Group

Pauline,

Hauke

Sixth

Flores, Filip Volckaert, Barbara Niehoff,

of

the

Fokje Schaafsma, J Hjelm, J Hentati-Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Sundberg, et al. "Review of the Research

Change, 1-35. Cambridge: Cambridge

Knowledge

andUniversity Press, 2022.

Populations,Fisheries

Quay, Ray. "Anticipatory Governance: A

Ecosystems in the Central Arctic Ocean

Tool for Climate Change Adaptation."(Cao)." (2020).

Journal of the American Planning
Association 76, no. 4 (2010): 496-511.

Spijkers, Jessica, Andrew Merrie, Colette

Report

to

E.S

In

the

Assessment

Ii

Roberts,

Arctic."

Gaps

on

and

Fish
LinkedCC Wabnitz, Matthew Osborne, Malin47

Mobjörk, Örjan Bodin, Elizabeth R Selig,

Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement as an

et al. "Exploring the Future of Fishery

Element in the Evolving Arctic Ocean

Conflict through Narrative Scenarios."

Governance Complex." Marine Policy

One Earth 4, no. 3 (2021): 386-96.

118 (2020): 104001.

Vylegzhanin, Alexander N, Oran R Young,and Paul Arthur Berkman. "The Central

48

The Future of Arctic Governance: Broken hopes for Arctic
exceptionalism?
Daria Shvets a & Kamrul Hossain b

1

Introduction

potentiallystates. This in turn has led to heightened

Russian Federation (hereinafter “Russia”),

tensions between the West and Russia on

Vladimir Putin, started a “special military
in

which

Russianpolitical, diplomatic and economic fronts.

troopsWestern nations located along the Arctic

entered the territory of Ukraine. The

Circle found it increasingly challenging toreaction to this act by the international

maintain dialog, collaboration and joint

community was almost unanimous; a few

projects with Russia. Despite the epicenter

regimes 2 supported the attack and aof military actions being located outside ofnumber remained “neutral” 3 in relation to

the Arctic, it soon became clear thatthe conflict. The collective opinion of mostcooperation on Arctic matters would suffer

states characterized Russia’s move as anserious consequences. Geographically, half

act of aggression against Ukraine, aof the Arctic belongs to Russia, and overmember of the United Nations and an

the years Russia has been an active player

independent state. In invading Ukraine,in Arctic cooperation via the Arctic Council,

Russia is clearly in breach of the norms ofa high-level intergovernmental forum of

the United Nations Charter under its Article
2(4), 4anunprecedented

violation

confrontation,

primarily with the West, including the Arctic

On 24 February 2022, the president of theoperation” 1

long-lasting

the Arctic nations. Interestingly, Russia isofthe current Chair of the Council and theinternational law. After the escalation ofnext Ministerial Meeting – the highest-level

military operations, Russia entered into aa Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Public International Law (Barcelona, Spain).
b Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law (NIEM), Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, and UArctic Chair in
Arctic Legal Research and Education.
1 Transcription of the “Communication of the President of the Russian Federation”, official website of the President of theRussian Federation, 24 February 2022, available at http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67843.
2 Belarus – para. 10 of the Resolution deplores the involvement of Belarus in this unlawful use of force against Ukraine, andcalls upon it to abide by its international obligations, available at https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14808.doc.htm.
3 China, India and the UAE all abstained in voting on the Resolution, available athttps://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14808.doc.htm
4 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 2 March 2022 ES-11/1. Aggression against Ukraine, available athttps://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/293/36/PDF/N2229336.pdf?OpenElement.

49

gathering of the Council – was to be held

normal” in Arctic governance vis-à-vis thein Russia in 2023. With the invasion causing

broken hope of Arctic exceptionalism.

serious mistrust, the seven Western Arctic2

states – Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland,states regarding the “new normal”

Norway, Sweden and the United States –suspended

cooperation

within Arctic governanceRussia.

The invasion of Ukraine marked the

Although the founding document of the

beginning of an era of substantial policy

Arctic Council, the Ottawa Declaration, 5changes in the Arctic and forced the seven

explicitly excludes military security from its
mandate,regional

securityhas

Western Arctic states to reconsider theirnowplans for mutual cooperation with Russia.

become a salient concern in the present

For decades the Arctic was considered tocircumstances, leading as it has to the

be a peaceful region unaffected bysuspension of Arctic cooperation. Amongthe

immediate

consequencesof

geopolitical tensions, a status that came tothebe termed “exceptionalism”. 6 However, theinvasion one saw Finland and Sweden

invasion of Ukraine is precipitating a “newapplying for NATO membership; if andnormal” in Arctic cooperation, dashingwhen they are admitted, the reshaped

hopes that the Arctic as an exceptional

Arctic security infrastructure – NATO vs.

region might become a zone of peace. The

Russia – will pose an intractable challenge

fastest reaction to the invasion was thefor continuing the present model of Arctic

suspension by the seven Arctic states ofcooperation. In fact, this can be felt already:any official meetings of the Arctic Council

the perception of Arctic exceptionalism,
much

desired,hasapparently

The position of the seven Arctic

or its subsidiary bodies during the Russian

beenChairmanship until further notice. 7 Since

shattered, with no, or very little, hope of

the Arctic Council is frequently considered

revival, at least in the foreseeable future.

the most progressive regional forum on

Against this background, the following

Arctic issues, this also marked the end ofarticle aims to sketch what might be a “newany discussions of Arctic affairs for the time

5 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Article 1 (a)*, Ottawa, Canada, September 19, 1996, available athttps://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y.
6 P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Ryan Dean, “Arctic Exceptionalisms” (Chapter 14) in Kristina Spohr and Daniel S. Hamilton,
Editors; Jason C. Moyer, Associate Editor, The Arctic and the World Order, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, available at https://transatlanticrelations.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/The-Arcticand-World-Order-ch14.pdf.
7 See the official website of the Arctic Council, available at https://www.arctic-council.org/.

50

being. 8 Among the interests that have been

aggression”. 14 The EU has stated that full

affected are collaborative efforts on global

engagement in the Arctic was not a

climate change, biodiversity, energy, food,question of convenience, but a geopolitical9and water security, as well as issues relatednecessity. 15 In the framework of the Arctic

toCouncil, the other seven Arctic states

Indigenous peoples

andscientificcooperation.

unanimously

expressed

theiropinionconcerning the Russian invasion in Ukraine,

Moreover, shortly after the beginning ofwith the opinion supported by the EU.

the invasion, the Diplomatic Service of theEuropean Union’s suspended regional

The collective position of the seven Artic

cooperation with Russia in the Arctic. 10 It

states shortly after the beginning of theissued three joint statements regarding

invasion was to temporarily isolate Russia

11

Barents

from joint Arctic governance and to focus

Euro-Arctic cooperation, 12 and the Council

on results that might be achieved without

the Northern Dimension policy,of the Baltic Sea States,13

all of which

Russia’s

involvement. 16

Ofparticular

highlighted the “special military operation”

concern is how the Arctic Council´sasStrategic Plan for the period 2021 to 2030

an“unprovokedandunjustified

8 Benjamin J. Sacks and Kristin Van Abel, August 22, 2022, “How the Russian Invasion of Ukraine May Impact the Arctic”,

Los Angeles Times, available at https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/08/how-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-may-impactthe.html.
9 Andreas Raspotnik, Adam Stępień and Timo Koivurova, “The European Union’s Arctic Policy in the Light of Russia’s War
against Ukraine”, 26 April, 2022 , The Arctic Institute, available at https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/european-union-arcticpolicy-light-russia-war-against-ukraine/. See also Žižek S., “From Cold War to Hot Peace”, Project Syndicate, 25 March
2022, available at https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/hot-peace-putins-war-as-clash-of-civilization-by-slavojzizek-2022-03.
10 See the official website of the European Union (External Action), available at https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/euarctic_en#:~:text=The%20EU%27s%20updated%20Arctic%20policy,least%20Indigenous%20Peoples%2C%20and%20future.
11 European Union website, The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, press release dated 08.03.2022, available athttps://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/northern-dimension-policy-joint-statement-european-union-iceland-and-norwaysuspending_en.
12 European Union website, The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, press release dated 08.03.2022, available athttps://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/northern-dimension-policy-joint-statement-european-union-iceland-and-norwaysuspending_en.
13 European Union website, The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, press release dated 08.03.2022, available athttps://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/russiabelarus-members-suspend-russia-and-belarus-council-baltic-sea-states_en.
14 Denmark, Finland and Sweden are members of the EU; Iceland and Norway belong to the European Economic Area
(EEA).
15 European Commission, Questions and answers on the EU's Arctic Strategy, official website of the European Union,
available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_5164.
16 See Trine Jonassen, “An Arctic without Russia”, High North News, 12 June 2022, available athttps://www.highnorthnews.com/en/arctic-without-russia and Timo Koivurova, “The Arctic Council can continue without
Russia”, Arctic Today, available at https://www.arctictoday.com/the-arctic-council-can-continue-without-russia/.

51

can be implemented without Russia.

when voting for the Security Council´sNamely, the plan sets the goals of

resolution on the Ukrainian crisis in“strengthening
throughtheCouncil” 17

Arcticeffective

2022,

the

Norwegianandrepresentative added a remark saying

cooperation as well as improving its ability“Norway will join its allies and partners in

to

swift

efficiently

coordination

February

respondtoemerging

challenges and opportunities in the Arctic.

including
These

Apart from the collective position statedtheintensified

words

have

developments

for how the Arctic will be governed in the

sanctions.” 20

hadconcreteareaffecting

Norwaydirectly: Russia has recently positioned

future in the light of events in Ukraine.

strategic forces in the Arctic 21 next to the

These positions are taken up below.

Norwegian border; it has expanded its

Norwaycivilian and military infrastructure22; and it
may even renew claims to Spitsbergen

After the Crimean crisis in 2014, relations
Russiaandheightened

tensioncontinued. 18

Ingovernment

countermeasures,

between two neighbors. A number ofindividual reactions and put forward ideas

betweenconcreteconsequences and heightened tensions

above, each Arctic state has expressed its

2.1

and

Norway

but

2021

the

it

for

cooperationotherstatestoexercisecertainNorwegianannounced

official platform that

Island 23 (Norwegian territory with a right

saw

would

on

its

“furtherdevelop bilateral cooperation with Russia
in the north” in addition to “strengthening
the foreign and security policy dialogue.” 19
However, as a reaction to Russia’s invasion,

17 Arctic Council, Arctic Council Strategic Plan 2021 to 2030, goals 6 and 7.
18 See more in Norwegian Arctic Strategy 2021, at 19, available athttps://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/vedlegg/nord/arctic_strategy.pdf.
19 Andreas Østhagen, “Relations with Russia in the North were already tense. Now it’s getting worse”, 25 February 2022,
The Arctic Institute, available at https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/relations-russia-north-tense-getting-worse/.
20 Security Council, 8979TH MEETING (PM), SC/14808, 25 FEBRUARY 2022, MONA JUUL’s speech as a representative of
Norway, available at https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14808.doc.htm.
21 See Andreas Østhagen, “For Norway, the risk of conflict in the Arctic has increased”, 20 October 2022, The Arctic
Institute, available at https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/norway-risk-conflict-arctic-increased/.
22 Norwegian Arctic Strategy 2021, at 16, available athttps://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/vedlegg/nord/arctic_strategy.pdf.
23 See Gonzalo Vázquez, “High North, low tension: Norway´s challenge in the Arctic with Russia and China”, available athttps://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/norway%C2%B4s-challenge-in-the-arctic-with-russia-and-china.

52

activities 24). Another source of tension isNATO´s particular interest in the north.

2.2

because the two “share a distaste for a full

25

NATO membership” 28; this no longer
appears to be a relevant position. The

Finland and Sweden

Finnish government issued a report on 11

One of the promptest reactions of theOctober 2022 analyzing the impact of theWestern countries to Russia’s invasion of

Russian

Ukraine was the sudden readiness of andinternational

states that there will be “no return to theto join NATO, despite popular opinion

pre-war reality” in the implementation ofpreviously being opposed to the countries
doing so.

oncooperation in the Arctic. The document

active steps taken by Finland and Sweden

26

aggression

Finland’s Arctic policy strategy; the report

Finland and Sweden joining

nevertheless admits the possibility thatwould mean extension of the physicalmany things may change in the following

border that Russia shares with the NATOmonths. 29

allies. What is more, it would give theWith the expression of a strong desire toalliance the possibility to conduct morejoin NATO one may clearly observe how

exercises in the Arctic under its severe

the position of both countries has changed

climatic conditions and to increase its

after the Russian invasion. Finland andpermanent military presence 27 in the

Sweden reconsidered their course ofregion. This in turn would change the Arctic

neutrality and opted to join the defense

from a region of low tension to one of hightension.

alliance to deter any potential aggression

Finland and Sweden have customarily

to this immediately, pointing out “This is, of

by Russia. The Russian Federation reacted

focused on developing closer security ties,

course, a very alarming tendency, the24 See Treaty between Norway, The United States of America, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Great Britain

and Ireland and the British overseas Dominions and Sweden concerning Spitsbergen, signed in Paris 9 February 1920,
available at http://library.arcticportal.org/1909/1/The_Svalbard_Treaty_9ssFy.pdf.
25 Op-ed article by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, “NATO is stepping up in the High North to keep our peoplesafe”, 24 August 2022, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_206894.htm.
26 Paul, Michael (2022), “Arctic repercussions of Russia's invasion: Council on pause, research on ice and Russia frozen out”,
SWP Comment, No. 39/2022, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin, available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/263350
27 After joining the North Atlantic Treaty, Sweden and Finland would become full members of NATO, whose Article 3
allows treaty members to “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” See thetext of the Treaty here: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.
28 Nima Khorrami, “Sweden’s Arctic Strategy: An Overview”, The Arctic Institute, available athttps://www.thearcticinstitute.org/sweden-arctic-strategy-overview/.
29 A report commissioned by the Prime Minister’s Office and published on 11 October 2022, English summary, available athttps://www.arcticcentre.org/loader.aspx?id=dc19ee9b-6ede-4ffb-9611-0aa531bef0b7.

53

transformation of the Arctic region into an

jointly with the United States and named

international theater of military actions andthe United States its premier partner in thethat it is a matter of concern for Russia.” 30

Arctic. 34 This might be indirect evidence of

2.3

Canada’s realization that more military

Canadacapabilities have to be transferred into the

Canada’s reactions were visible in its
initiativetoexpandmilitary

Arctic territories and it has to prepare an

defenseadequate response to any threats to themeasures in the Arctic. In summer 2022, it
unveiled

anambitious$4.9

region.

billioncontinental defense program with Arctic

2.4

dimensions to help detect and track

Iceland appears to have reacted the least

military threats,

31

Icelandand announced the(individually) to the Russian invasion

purchase of F-35 fifth-generation fighters

among all Arctic countries in terms of32

to replace its aging fleet of F-18s. Canada

changing its own Arctic strategy 35 andis also planning to allocate funds fortaking any concrete responsive actions.

“satellite-based

spot

However, even Iceland made its position

incoming bombers or missiles “over theclear, highlighting that "[t]he reality is thathorizon” and to deploy a network of

everything has changed, and … the worksensors with “classified capabilities” towithin the Arctic Council will change given

radar”

thatcanmonitor Arctic air and sea approaches tothe continent. Earlier, in March 2022, thecountry

announced

Arcticmilitary

exercises, the Noble Defender operation, 33

30 Ambassador-at-Large of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Chairman of the Committee of Senior Officials of the Arctic

Council Nikolai Korchunov, 22 May 2022, available at https://katehon.com/ru/news/mid-rf-arktika-prevrashchaetsya-vinternacionalnyy-teatr-boevyh-deystviy.
31 Legere Hope, “Canada to Invest Billions in Military Spending to Counter Russia, China Threat in Arctic”, 24 June, 2022,
available athttps://www.visiontimes.com/2022/06/24/canada-to-invest-billions-in-military-spending-to-counter-russia-china-threatinarctic.html.
32 Pierre Leblanc, “In a Conflict, the Canadian Arctic Could be on Russia's Radar”, The Maritime Executive, 6 June 2022,
available at https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/in-a-conflict-the-canadian-arctic-could-be-on-russia-s-radar.
33 Leyland Gecco, “Canada and US announce Arctic military exercises amid Russia tensions”, The Guardian, 16 March 2022,
available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/16/canada-us-arctic-military-exercises-russia.
34 See STATEMENT ON CANADA’S ARCTIC FOREIGN POLICY, available at https://www.international.gc.ca/worldmonde/assets/pdfs/canada_arctic_foreign_policy-eng.pdf.
35 Iceland’s Policy on Matters Concerning the Arctic Region was issued in October 2021, and since that time hasannounced no change concerning Icelandic policy in the Arctic even in the light of the Russian aggression against Ukraine,
available at https://www.government.is/library/01-Ministries/Ministry-for-Foreign-Affairs/PDFskjol/Arctic%20Policy_WEB.pdf.

54

main

services about Russian cyber espionage 39

messages communicated by the Icelandic

and recent undersea cable accidents near

Minister for Foreign Affairs is that thethe Faroe Islands, 40 which might qualify as

North should continue to work together inacts

the light of the new geopolitical situation.

dependence

Russia’s

2.5

attack.” 36

One

of

the

of

its

two

the

great

territories–

undersea cables and increased concerns

Denmark’s Arctic strategy was drafted forover

the period from 2011 to 2021, and thecablesecurity,

Denmarkisstrengthening its security policy. One

country was working with the Faroe Islands

recent measure it has taken in response to

and Greenland on a new strategy for 20212030

sabotage. Given

Greenland and the Faroe Islands 41 – on

Denmark37

of

Russia’s aggression 42 is to join the EU’s

until work stopped due to elections

defense pact with the aim, among others,in Greenland. While the Arctic strategy hasof defending its submarine cables in the

not yet been released, a new strategy for

Arctic.

foreign and security policy was issued inwhich the Arctic was mentioned as one of

2.6

United States

five priorities. 38 Significantly, the skepticism

In October 2022, the United States issued aabout involving NATO in the Arctic has

new National Strategy for the Arctic

been replaced by support, especially after

Region, 43 in which it reconsiders its

warnings from the Danish intelligenceinterests in the Arctic in the light of the

36 See quotations of Icelandic Foreign Minister Thórdís Kolbrún Reykfjörd Gylfadóttir, available athttps://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/arctic-cooperation-shadow-russian-aggression-armchair-discussion-icelandic-foreignminister.
37 See the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, available at https://um.dk/en/foreign-policy/thearctic.
38 Dr. Andreas Østhagen & Peter Wilhelm Lund Linde, “Why Norway and the Kingdom of Denmark should work closer
together vis-à-vis the United States on security in the Arctic”, 6 July 2022, available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blogpost/no-13-why-norway-and-kingdom-denmark-should-work-closer-together-vis-vis-united-states.
39 Marc Jacobsen, “Arctic Aspects in Denmark’s New Foreign and Security Policy Strategy”, The Arctic Institute, 8 February2022, available at https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-aspects-denmark-new-foreign-security-policy-strategy/.
40 “Fiber-optic Submarine Cable near Faroe and Shetland Islands Damaged; Mediterranean Cables also Cut”, High North
news, 24 October 2022, available at https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/fiber-optic-submarine-cable-near-faroe-andshetland-islands-damaged-mediterranean-cables-also-cut.
41 Greenland is connected by the cable Greenland Connect to Iceland and the United States, while the Faroe Islands arelinked by the SHEFA-2, FARICE-1 and CANTAT-3 cables to the United Kingdom, Iceland and Denmark, respectively.
42 “Denmark set to join EU defence pact in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine”, South China Morning Post, 2 June 2022,
available athttps://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/3180088/denmark-set-join-eu-defence-pact-response-russias-warukraine.
43 The United States National Strategy for the Arctic Region is available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf.

55

Russian invasion. Security is named Pillar 1

million to set up an Arctic Security Cutterof the Strategy and the document asserts

program office in 2023. 46

that the United States will exercise U.S.

3

government presence in the Arctic to

The Russia’s position on the futureof Arctic governanceprotect American interests. Moreover, theDevelopment in the Arctic region was one

Strategy puts an emphasis on cooperationof the Soviet Union’s internal priorities. 47

with the allies, other Arctic states, toThepromote the rule of international law andSoviet

era

saw

many

scientificdiscoveries, infrastructural achievements

states that the United States “will enhanceand much social progress. After the fall ofand exercise both […] military and civilian

the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation

capabilities in the Arctic as required topaused development in the Arctic due thedeter threats”. 44 Since the Russian invasioninternal crisis of the 1990s. It restored thebegan, the United States has taken several

Arctic as one of its strategic objectives insteps towards implementing the Strategy:

the mid-2000s and again held itself out as

it has signed an agreement with Norway
allowing the use of agreed areas in

the dominant Arctic state. 48

NorwegianSince invading Ukraine, Russia has become

territoryfortraining

and

45

and

exercises, deployment of forcesmore proactive and strengthened its

similar activities and has allocated $20

militarypresenceintheArcticbycommitting increased resources and using
internally available tools. 49 The decision of

44 See page 8, section “Pillar 1—Security: Develop Capabilities for Expanded Arctic Activity” of the United States National

Strategy for the Arctic Region.
45 New Norway-USA Defense Agreement Allows Extensive US Authority in the North, 6 June 2022, High North News,
available at https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/new-norway-usa-defense-agreement-allows-extensive-us-authoritynorth.
46 Bryant Harris, “White House Arctic strategy calls for enhanced military presence”, 7 October 2022, DefenseNews,
available at https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/10/07/white-house-arctic-strategy-calls-for-enhanced-militarypresence/.
47 For instance, the mining industry. See Gonzalo Vázquez, “High North, low tension: Norway´s challenge in the Arctic with
Russia and China, 12 July 2022, Universidad de Navarra, available at https://www.unav.edu/web/globalaffairs/norway%C2%B4s-challenge-in-the-arctic-with-russia-and-china.
48 Sergey Sukhankin, “War in Ukraine dilutes Russia’s Arctic successes and damages future plans”, North American and
Arctic Defence and Security Network, 25 July 2022, available at https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/22julSukhankin-upload.pdf, p. 2.
49 See, for instance, the Order dated 1 August 2022 No. 2115-p signed by the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation M.
Mishustin approving the development plan for the Northern Sea Route for the period up to 2035. It includes, among otherobjectives, implementation of projects at the oil fields "Vostok Oil"; implementation of the coal project "North Star"¨;organization of regular coastal flights over the waters of the Northern Sea Route; preparation of the list of critical products;
requiring import substitution for Arctic investment projects; construction of facilities for the liquefied natural gas and gas

56the other Arctic states to suspend the work

technology. The focus has recently shiftedof the Arctic Council prompted Russia to

to identifying the threats and challenges inessentially shift its focus from internationaltheArcticposed

theso-calledThe

president

cooperation to domestic Arctic interests“unfriendly”

and to pursue its aims with respect to thehighlighted various external restrictions

region without external support. 50 One ofand pressures from sanctions affecting

the important events in elaborating the

projects in the Russian Arctic. He did notdomestic Arctic strategy after the events ofurge that projects be postponed but, on

February 2022 was the meeting held by V.

the contrary, that their implementation

Putin on 13 April 2022 dealing withshould be expedited. In his view, a fitting

strategies of development for the Russian

response to attempts to restrain Russian

Arctic zone.

51

states.

by52

Some statements formulated

development would be to maximize theduring this meeting are worth discussing inpace of efforts of current and future tasks. 53

detail, and these are taken up below.

The president mentioned that the actionsof “unfriendly countries” have disrupted a

In the beginning of his speech, thenumber of transport and logistical chainspresident highlighted that implementationand that some foreign companies haveof large-scale investment projects in thefailed to fulfill their contractual obligations.

Arctic has always been and remains a

However, he reiterated that Russia has all

priority for Russia. All of the country’s

the resources it requires and, despite thenational security interests are represented
intheArctic,

with

these

imposedincludingsanctions,canconfidently

continue with its own development andresources, military-political concerns andcondensate terminals "Morning" in the port of Sabetta; construction of a marine terminal at Cape Nagleinin in the seaport
Pevek; building a fleet for liquefied natural gas production projects; construction of an additional 4 icebreakers;
construction of 30 ships for a rescue fleet for the Northern Sea Route by 2030, and many more. In total, more than 150
actions are planned, available at http://static.government.ru/media/files/StA6ySKbBceANLRA6V2sF6wbOKSyxNzw.pdf.
50 For example, Russia has ambitious plans to finish building the unique ice-resistant platform "NORTH POLE", a specialpurpose ship with the functionality of a research center, by the end of 2022 (see https://www.aari.ru/fleet/ledostoykayaplatforma-%C2%ABsevernyy-polyus%C2%BB). Moreover, domestic military exercises of the Northern Fleet were conductedin September 2022 in the area of the Northern Sea Route (see https://rg.ru/2022/09/08/reg-szfo/korabli-severnogo-flotav-arktike-vstupili-v-boj-s-uslovnym-protivnikom.html). The Decree "On the Approval of the Naval Doctrine of the RussianFederation" was signed on 31 July 2022 specifying development of the Arctic zone as a strategic resource base (seehttp://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69084), etc.
51 Official internet portal of the President of the Russian Federation, Meeting on the matters of Arctic zone development,
available at http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68188.
52 The designation “unfriendly states” refers to those that have imposed sanctions on Russia. See the list available athttps://m.gazeta.ru/infographics/infografika_nedruzhestvennye_strany.shtml.
53 Official internet portal of the President of the Russian Federation, Meeting on the matters of Arctic zone development,
available at http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68188.

57

projects in the Arctic. 54 Apart from these

Arctic Official Nikolai Korchunov said thatobservations, the speech placed a clear

the temporary freeze would lead to soft

focus on the involvement of extra-regional

security risks and challenges in the region.

states and associations in cooperation in

He also pointed out that the Arctic Council

the Arctic.

55

He specifically mentioned thehasalwaysbeenaplatformfor

Russian priority of shifting collaboration to

depoliticized dialogue and that questions

partnership with non-Arctic states such asof military security are not included in the

China, Brazil and India rather than withorganization’s terms of reference. As henorthern neighbors.

stated,“[t]he founding

andstrategic

documents of the Council clearly spell out

There were also comments relating to thethe need to preserve the Arctic as asituation with the Arctic Council. Here theterritory of peace, stability and constructive

president recalled that the main theme ofcooperation. And in this regard, it isRussia’s Chairmanship of the Arctic Council

important to protect this unique format offor the period 2021-2023 is the sustainableinteraction from the introduction of extra-

development of the region and joint action

regional topics so that it does not become

to combat climate change. He noted that

their hostage.” 57

no country in the world will be able to carryout this work alone, and it will be all the

Since the beginning of invasion Russian

more impossible without Russia, which

researchers working for national researchspans 58 percent of the Arctic coast. The

institutes have also given their views on

Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology

how governance of the Arctic will develop

called upon neighbors in the Arctic region

and which problems and challenges may

to realize their responsibility and return toappear.

working together.
Ministry56

The Russian Foreign

Ambassador-at-Large,

The mainexternal challengementioned is the embargo on the supply of

SeniorRussian oil and gas. This will reduce the54 For instance, the "North Pole" a project to build a special vessel,

unique and the first multifunctional ship in the word to
conduct Arctic research; the project “Clean Arctic” (internal Russian project to clean Arctic territories) (see more athttps://cleanarctic.ru/); the project "Arctic hectare", offering every Russian citizen the opportunity to receive one hectare ofland for free in the Arctic to build a house or start economic activity on (see more athttps://www.kp.ru/putevoditel/dom/arkticheskij-gektar/)
55 Official internet portal of the President of the Russian Federation, Meeting on the matters of Arctic zone development,
available at http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68188.
56 Speech of A.A. Kozlov, Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology, Official internet portal of the President of the RussianFederation, Meeting on the matters of Arctic zone development, available at
http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68188.
57 Ambassador-at-Large of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Chairman of the Committee of Senior Officials of the Arctic
Council Nikolai Korchunov, 22 of May 2022, available at https://katehon.com/ru/news/mid-rf-arktika-prevrashchaetsya-vinternacionalnyy-teatr-boevyh-deystviy.

58

quality of life of the permanent population

collaboration, for instance a plan with theof the Russian Arctic, cut investments –Finnish company Cinia to construct a joint

leading to an economic recession – andcable, was already discontinued in 2021. 61

causeThis development places the constructiondifficulties

in

implementing

previously announced national projects.

58

of the first large-scale submarine cable in
the Arctic squarely in Russia’s domain,

Leaving aside official announcements andbringing yet another potential source of

opinions of Russian scientists, it is worth

tension to the Arctic. The project islooking at what Russia has done in practice

encumbered by the prospect of potential

in the Arctic after the beginning of thesabotage,invasion. One of the alarming activities is aintentional

growing military presence in the north,markedby

missiles,submarines

which

would

crippling

lead

to

an

of

criticalinfrastructure as a means of warfare.

andRecent cases of damage to the Nord

military exercises. 59 On the civilian side, theStream pipeline 62 and probable cuts of“Polar Express” submarine cable project

undersea cables suggest such incidents

keeps evolving slowly; the most recent

might be repeated in the Arctic. The Arctic

milestone was completed in July 2022

Council would have done well to think

when the Government of the Chukotka

earlier about a strong legal framework forAutonomous Okrug and Morsvyazsputnik

submarine cables in the Arctic, adequate

signed a cooperation agreement. 60 Polar

responsibility

Express is a fully state-owned project to lay

andinvestigate such cases.

the first transarctic submarine cable. All

joint
63

efforts

toHowever, this nolonger appears to be feasible, at least in the

58 Lukin Y.F., “Arkticheskiye vysovy Rossii” (Arctic challenges for Russia), Obschestvennye process y yavlenya N 2(2), May

2022, available at https://www.ru-society.com/jour/article/view/24.
59 Ethan Wong, “The Arctic This Week Take Five: Week of 19 September, 2022”, 23 September 2022, The Arctic Institute,available at https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-week-take-five-week-19-september-2022/?cn-reloaded=1.
60 See official website of the Polar Express submarine cable, available at https://xn--e1ahdckegffejda6k5a1a.xn--p1ai/.
61 See more on the Polar Express submarine cable in Daria Shvets, “The Polar Express Submarine Cable: The First
Transarctic Cable and Security Concerns in the Arctic”, 2021, University of Lapland, available athttps://lauda.ulapland.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/64902/The%20Polar%20Express%20Submarine%20Cable%20The%20First%20Transarctic%20Cable%20and%20Security%20Concerns%20in%20the%20Arctic.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowe
d=y.
62 Julian Borger, “Nord Stream attacks highlight vulnerability of undersea pipelines in west”, 29 September 2022, The
Guardian, available at https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/sep/29/nord-stream-attacks-highlight-vulnerabilityundersea-pipelines-west.
63 Daria Shvets, The Polar Express Submarine Cable: The First Transarctic Cable and Security Concerns in the Arctic, 2021,
University of Lapland, available athttps://lauda.ulapland.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/64902/The%20Polar%20Express%20Submarine%20Cable%20The%20First%20Transarctic%20Cable%20and%20Security%20Concerns%20in%20the%20Arctic.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowe
d=y.

59

near future. Submarine cables located incooperate with Russia. This is the case with

the Arctic might become the next target as

South Korea, which canceled a contract toa critical element of infrastructure in thebuild several ships for transporting liquified

light of the Russian confrontation withnatural gas to the Russian state-owned

Western countries and the United States.

64

company Sovkomflot. 67

Such a possibility has led some RussianSecond, it has become clear that Russia will

experts to believe that the Arctic has

work to make domestic industry connected

become a territory marked by high military

to the Arctic as independent as possible oftension. 65

foreign actors. For this purpose, it would

There are some tendencies that might be

aim to build its own infrastructure without

identified in the announcements made byexternal

Russia after February 2022. The first is ainternational cooperation with Arctic states

reorientation

Arctichas shifted to internal policy. Russia’s

development to cooperation with non-revised position on the Arctic after theArctic states. One is China, which calls itself

invasiona “near-Arctic state” and is expressly

sanctions, and the country is looking forinterested in Arctic issues. On the otherways to continue with internal projects

hand, there are some states that did notwithout

think of the Arctic as a potential policy

counts on alternative initiatives and aims at

objective but may soon realize it might beestablishing

beneficial.

66

ofRussia’s

involvement.

takes

into

The

account

international
its

focus

own

support.
strongonWestern

RussiaArcticThen again, some states might

governance. Paralleling this effort, thefind it harmful for their reputations andother seven Arctic countries are discussing

further relations with the EU and the West

how to continue the Arctic Council´s work

to maintain business relations with theRussia. They might be afraid or reluctant to

64 John Naughton, “Vladimir Putin’s latest frightening gambit lies at the bottom of the ocean”, 1 October 2022, The
Guardian, available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/oct/01/vladimir-putins-latest-frightening-gambit-lies-at-the-bottom-of-the-ocean.
65 Viktor Sokirko, “Opasnost conflicta v Arktike perestala byt teoreticheskoy”, Gazeta.ru, available athttps://www.gazeta.ru/army/2022/04/18/14749502.shtml and Lukin Y.F., “Arkticheskiye vysovy Rossi” (Arctic challenges for
Russia), Obschestvennye process y yavlenya N 2(2), May 2022, available at https://www.ru-society.com/jour/article/view/24,
page 67.
66 See, for instance, Prof. Kamrul Hossain´s article “WHY SHOULD BANGLADESH SEEK AN OBSERVER SEAT ON THE ARCTIC
COUNCIL?” providing arguments why Bangladesh is interested in Arctic affairs and why it should get observer status in the
Arctic Council, available at https://polarconnection.org/bangladesh-observer-arctic-council/.
67 Sergey Sukhankin, “War in Ukraine dilutes Russia’s Arctic successes and damages future plans”, North American and
Arctic Defence and Security Network, 25 July 2022, available at https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/22julSukhankin-upload.pdf, p. 6.

60

without Russia. 68 Here they face theagreements and affect the rule of law in thechallenge of answering the question of

Arctic. 71 Another major concern is the

how much the Arctic countries may

effort to prevent climate change and how

progress without Russia´s participation in

the dramatically changing Arctic climate

the areas of environmental governance,

willmaritime regulations, and climate change.

involvement. While all these concerns

Arctic exceptionalism ended in February

dialog and cooperation. Severing scientific2022. The Arctic has apparently become acooperation will further worsen transfer ofregion like any other in global great power

knowledge about the Arctic and increase

politics, and governance of the Arctic is

the gap with Russian scientists. For

now

example, the future of the Agreement to

on

a

new

security

Russia on the other.

the Central Arctic Ocean 69 might be4

affected, bearing in mind that sustainable
only

predicatedinfrastructure with NATO on one side andprevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries inmay

Russianregion, it has become clear that the era ofareas that have previously been ones offishing

without

position of the Arctic as an exceptional

policy in the Arctic will be noticed in many

regulatedaddressed

argue for maintaining the long-standing

Third, the consequences of Russia’s new

and

be

be

Conclusion

The question of Arctic governance in theimplemented and achieved by mutual

future and how the new normal might lookefforts of all Arctic states. The same applies

is very multifaceted and dynamic. It entails

to the United Nations Convention on thevarious

Law of the Sea and the passage rights 70

issuesanddimensions

since

governance in the Arctic affects manythrough the Northern Sea Route, a large

spheres of activity. What appears to be

stretch of which arguably belongs toclear today is that when Russia invaded

Russian internal waters. Russia’s self-

Ukraine, a shield fell that had protected theinterpretation of international law may

regioninfluence the implementation of these two

frombroadergeopolitics—a

68 Nikolaj Skydsgaard; editing by Barbara Lewis, “Arctic Council to resume limited work excluding Russia”, 8 June 2022,

Reuters, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/arctic-council-countries-resume-limited-work-excluding-russia-202206-08/.
69 Agreement to prevent unregulated high seas fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, ST/10788/2018/INIT, available athttps://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A22019A0315%2801%29.
70 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 397, 21 ILM 1261 (1982), available athttps://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en.
71 See, for instance, the recent draft law discussed in the Russian State Duma on the requirement that foreign war ships
request authorization 90 days in advance for passage through the Northern Sea Route in Russian internal waters, eventhough this right is foreseen in Part 2, Section 2, Article 8.1 of UNCLOS, available at http://duma.gov.ru/news/55051/.

61

privileged position it enjoyed for many
72

ambitious plans Russia drafted before the

To be sure, some opinions

invasion might also be jeopardized with thesuggest that the absence of an open

need for investments and the redirecting ofconflict in the Arctic has not meant that thefinancial resources to military actions inconflict

Ukraine rather than the High North.

decades.

potential

of

the

Cold

War

disappeared. These voices would say it justOn the other hand, and all Arctic states

took a little nap and is now coming back,understand it very well, the Russian

replenished with new triggers, 73 as seen inFederation territory is home to some one

the remilitarizing of the Arctic.

half

of

the

Arctic’s

populationandOn the one hand, we are witnessing aencompasses half of the region’s coastline.

blockade and isolation of Russia fromIt dominates Arctic energy production,

discussing the Arctic matters. The Arctic

shipping, fishing and other industries. The

states (excluding Russia) appear to be

Russian Arctic also remains critical tosome of the most advanced and innovative

addressing

economies in the world, 74 and certain

issues such as permafrost thawing andsectors may succeed in developing evenwildfire prevention. 75 For this reason, thewithout Russia’s involvement. Examples are

EU has left the door open for “cooperationsocial welfare of Indigenous peoples,on

Arctic-7

interlocutors, in relevant bodies and via

scientificcooperation

andArcticglobal environmental

matters

withlike-mindedsuitable channels.” 76transportation. Russia’s reaction to thisisolation has been to increase its power in

In anticipating what Arctic governancethe Russian Arctic and shift its focus tomight look like in the future, one may

domestic Arctic issues. However, theassume that each of the Arctic states will

72 Abbie Tingstad, Stephanie Pezard, Benjamin J. Sacks, Scott R. Stephenson, “Putin's Actions in Ukraine Are Spilling North”,

Rand corporation, available at https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/03/putins-actions-in-ukraine-are-spilling-north.html andSergey Sukhankin, “War in Ukraine dilutes Russia’s Arctic successes and damages future plans”, North American and Arctic
Defence and Security Network, 25 July 2022, available at https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/22julSukhankin-upload.pdf, p. 1.
73 K. Labetskaya, “Arctic as a military actions theatre”, 29 May 2022, Independent Newspaper, available athttps://www.ng.ru/dipkurer/2022-05-29/9_8447_arctic.html.
74 Sergey Sukhankin, “War in Ukraine dilutes Russia’s Arctic successes and damages future plans”, North American and
Arctic Defence and Security Network, 25 July 2022, available at https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/22julSukhankin-upload.pdf, p. 2.
75 Daniel McVicar, “How the Russia-Ukraine War Challenges Arctic Governance”, Council on Foreign Relations, available athttps://www.cfr.org/blog/how-russia-ukraine-war-challenges-arctic-governance.
76 See the official website of the European Union (External Action), available at https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/euarctic_en#:~:text=The%20EU%27s%20updated%20Arctic%20policy,least%20Indigenous%20Peoples%2C%20and%20future.

62

face a considerable dilemma in deciding

uniform region might deepen the post-

how to act towards Russia in Arctic matters.

invasion split and would undoubtedly

On the one hand, many states haveundermine comprehensive and sustainablemutually beneficial links with Russia, in

Arctic development.

particular social ties in border regions andAs recently as 2021, all eight Arctic statesbilateral relations in areas such as science

were hoping that the Arctic would be “aand energy. 77 On the other, geopoliticalchange

does

not

go

region of peace, stability and constructive

unnoticed:

cooperation” by 2030. 78 However, with thedevelopments will force the Arctic states to

Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Arctic noadjust their policies and prepare anadequate

response

political

environment

to

the
in

longer has the freedom to see itself as anchanging

theexception, as a region free from military

region.

confrontation; there is a strong signal that

Selective cooperation in some spheres,the era of Arctic exceptionalism is over. The

especially at a very local level, will still belesson has been learned from the current

possible, but at least in the short term there
seems

to

be

no

possibilityofsituation, and it is of great concern. As yeta

we are unable to depict what form of Arctic

comprehensive and integrated partnershipcooperation we will have in the future, butwith Russia in the Arctic. One alarming

obviously there is no return to a normalized

prospect is that the Arctic might be split incooperation like that in the pre-invasion

half, into the Russian Arctic, some 50% of

infrastructure. We are probably in thethe region, and the Western Arctic,

process of crafting a new normal in Arctic

comprising the other Arctic states. Suchcooperation.

“bi-polar” development of what is a77 “Ukraine and the Arctic: Perspectives, Impacts, and Implications”, 14 March 2022, Wilson Centre, available athttps://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/ukraine-and-arctic-perspectives-impacts-and-implications.
78 Arctic Council, Arctic Council Strategic Plan 2021 to 2030.

63

War, exclusion, and geopolitical tension: the accepted
normal in Arctic Council governance?
Tina Soliman-Hunter

The Russian invasion of Ukraine inandFebruary 2022 has led to heightened

environmental protection in the Arctic. 2

geopolitical tension, on a scale unheard

Other goals of Russia during itsof since the Cold War. The invasion has

Chairmanshipnot only affected the security of Europe,

governance for a sustainable Arctic by

but has also had a profound impact on

promoting collective approaches to thethe relationship of Russia with fellow

sustainable development of the Arctic,

Arctic states. The military dimension ofenvironmentally,

the Russian invasion of Ukraine has

economically balanced development ofovershadowed Arctic cooperation, andthe region, enhanced synergy andaccording to Wishnick and Carlson, thecooperation and coordination withinvasion has distracted attention fromother regional structures, as well as ‘thekey Arctic issues such as climate

implementation

change, socio-economic development

Strategic Plan, while respecting the ruleand Indigenous communities. 1 Russia

of law’. 3

was keen to utilize its tenure as Chair ofits

impactontheincluded

Arctic,responsible

socially

of

the

and

Council's

In advance of its tenure as Arctic

the Arctic Council from 2021 to engage

Council Chair, Russia released several

with other Arctic Council states tocriticaladvance its priorities, which included

Arcticdocuments:

On

the

fundamentals of the State policy ofthe development and improvement of

Russian Federation in the Arctic for thethe life of Arctic inhabitants andperiod up to 2035 (2035 Russian Arctic

Indigenous peoples, climate change

1 Elizabeth Wishnick & Cameron Carlson, ‘The Russian Invasion of Ukraine Freezes Moscow’s Arctic Ambitions’(2022) Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3172713/the-russianinvasion-of-ukraine-freezes-moscows-arctic-ambitions/
2 Arctic Council, Russian Chairmanship 2021-2023 (2021) https://www.arctic-council.org/about/russianchairmanship-2/.
3 Arctic Council, Russian Chairmanship 2021-2023 (2021) https://www.arctic-council.org/about/russianchairmanship-2/.

64Policy), and the Russian Arctic Strategy
to

2035

(2035

ArcticStrategy).

We remain convinced of the enduring

4

value

of

the

ArcticCouncilfor

Together, these documents define thecircumpolar cooperation and reiterategoals, strategies, directions, and tasks

our support for this institution and its

Russia will undertake to implement

work. We hold a responsibility to theRussianeconomic

people of the Arctic, including thedevelopment in the region on the backindigenous peoples, who contribute toof petroleum development and theand benefit from the important work

expansion of the Northern Sea Route.

undertaken in the Council.

The Arctic Council, arguably the mostThe core principles of sovereignty andimportant intergovernmental platform

territorial

for addressing key questions of Arctic

international

regional development, was rapid andunderpinned the work of the Arctic

loud in its response to the Ukraine

Council, a forum which Russia currently

invasion, issuing a Joint statement onchairs.

Arctic Council Cooperation Following
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine on 3 Marchviolation

2022:

for

ambitions

for

have

long

In light of Russia’s flagrant
of

these

principles,ourmeetingsoftheArcticmeetings of the Council and its

unprovoked invasion of Ukraine andimpedimentslaw,

temporarily pausing participation in all

the United States condemn Russia’s
grave

on

Council. Additionally, our states are

Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and

the

based

representatives will not travel to Russia

Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark,note

integrity,

tosubsidiarybodies,pending

considerationofnecessarythemodalities that can allow us to continueinternational cooperation, including in

the Council’s important work in view of

the Arctic, that Russia’s actions havethe current circumstances. 5

caused.

This pause in the Arctic Council’s
cooperation with Russia means that

4 Russian Federation, Strategy of development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation andthe provision of national security for the period to 2035, signed into law October 2020. This strategy
followed the document On the Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic to2035 signed into law 5 March 2020.
5 Arctic Council, Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine 3 March
2022, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-ofukraine/65

Russia’s

attempts

toaddress

its

protecting

pressing

Arcticissuesduringits

environment during the commercial

significantly

development of resources. 6 Thus, thehampered at the very least, and moregoal of the Arctic Council is to provide

likely completely shelved. The Joint

cooperation at a governmental level on

Statement

issuedissues dedicated to the Arctic area, withworded,withchairmanship

will

be

was

the

deliberatelyterm‘pauseArcticCouncil

or

There

a

This

the

raisesthestipulates the necessity for rotation of

the Council’s activities, to the exclusion
participation.

incontrary, Article 5 of the Declaration

Arctic Council members will continue
andprovisions

capacity to host meetings. On thethis means that the remaining sevenchairmanshipnoof host country’s chairmanship or

without Russia as a member. In reality,

Russia’sare

Declaration regarding the cancellation

reconstitution of the Arctic Council

of

the

forefront.

rather than an action to remove Russia
theassistingIndigenous peoples’ involvement at thetemporarily’ an indication of a pause
from

and

the hosting of the meetings between all
members of the Arctic Council. The
cancellation of the right of a hostfundamental question that addressed incountry to hold a meeting must be bythis article - can the Arctic Council

consensus

operate without Russia?

of

ALL

ArcticCouncilMembers, as Article 7 requires that ALL

According to Article 1 of the Ottawa

Arctic Council states agree with the

Declaration on the establishment of the
Arctic Council (‘the Declaration’), thedecisions of the Council. This means

Arctic Council was established as amembers of the Arctic Council tohigh-level forum to provide a means for‘temporarily pausing participation in all

promoting cooperation, coordination

meetings of the Council and its

and interaction amongst Arctic states,

subsidiary bodies’ 7 lacks legitimacy

particularly regarding the sustainable

under the provisions of the Declaration.

that the decision of the other sevendevelopment of the region, and theTheinterests of the Indigenous peoples in

ArcticCouncilisanintergovernmental forum that operates

6 Ottawa Declaration on the establishment of the Arctic Council (1996) Article 1(a).

7 Arctic Council, Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine 3 March
2022, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-ofukraine/66

by consensus, as required under Article

Council member that does not act in a

7 of the Declaration – ‘Decisions of theway that others agree with.

Arctic Council are to be by consensus of

The neutral nature of the Arctic Council

the members’. Therefore, the Arctic
Council is not

the forum foracontemplationofor

legitimacy

waspolitical

conservativeBårdLudvigThorheim declaring that ‘we believe thisdecision of the remaining seven Arctic‘temporarily

NorwayPrize in early 2022, with Norwegianor a forum for unilateral action. The
tobynominating the AC for Nobel Peaceotherwise of Russian actions in Ukraine,

statesdemonstrated

cooperation

pausingis

exceptional

ininternational politics and demonstrates

participation in all meetings of thethe need for cooperation and trust

Council and its subsidiary bodies,

between countries at a time where

pending consideration of the necessary

peace is threatened around Ukraine andmodalities that can allow us to continue

other regions’. Russia’s military actions

the Council’s important work in view ofin the Ukraine, whilst clearly a breach of

the current circumstances’ 8 is a breachinternational law, need to be separatedof Article 7 of the Declaration, sincefrom its membership, chairmanship,

Russia has not agreed to the temporary

and participation in the Arctic Council

pause in meetings, and therefore such a

to protect the continued apolitical andpause, temporary or not, violates Article

non-military focus of the Arctic Council

7.

and to ensure that all Council members

The operation of the Arctic Council

adhere to both the purpose andshould not depend on the actions orobjectives of the Declaration and to themisdeeds of any state. It should

spirit of the Arctic Council, especially infunction for the aims that it was formed

relation to Indigenous peoples andfor, as a high-level forum to promotenations. Indeed, matters related tocooperation,andmilitary security are specifically carved

interaction amongst Arctic states, rather

out of Article 1(a) of the Declaration,

than as a forum for punitive action

indicating the wish of the signatories toagainst a state. Otherwise, the Arctic

not include or consider matters of aCouncil leaves it open to politicization

military nature within the confines offor the misdeeds of any other Arctic

the Arctic Council.

coordination

8 Ottawa Declaration on the establishment of the Arctic Council (1996), Article 7.

67

In practice, this means that although

the chair without Russia from a legal

Russia’s military actions in the Ukraine

point of view.’ 9 Although only an

requiretheobserver state to the Arctic Council,

international geopolitical arena, theChina undertakes substantial research

Arctic Council is not the forum toactivities in the Arctic, as well as heavily

undertake such a response. The Arctic

investing in the region, particularly

Council should not conflate Russian

through the establishment of the Polar

military aggression and action with

Silk Road as part of its Belt and Road

ArcticandInitiative. 10 Such activities are designed

cooperation, environmental protection,

to buttress China’s Arctic influence andclimateIndigenous

strategic position, given it seeks tomatters, especially since the role of the

become a great polar power by 2030. 11

aresponse

regional

withindevelopmentchange,andArctic Council is to be depoliticized andWhether such Chinese ambitions will

demilitarized, sitting outside of politics

come to pass remains questionable,

and military security.

given the complex relationship between

Such conflation has attracted the ire of

Russia and China, and Russia’s ongoingthe crucial Arctic Council observer

caution over Chinese ambitions in thenation China. In October 2022, China’s

region. Although China asserts itself as

special Envoy to the Arctic for China

a near-Arctic state and important Arctic

Feng Gao questioned the actions

stakeholder with the right to a greateragainst Russia, commenting that ‘The

role in Arctic governance, 12 Koivurova

Arctic Council is based on a declaration

notes thatand there is no procedure for leaving

governance to be part of a greater

theglobalcouncil.

I

doubt

that

the

China

governance,

perceivesandArctictherefore

China’s role in such governance ischairmanship can be transferred toanyone or that Norway can take over

9 China: “Will not acknowledge Arctic Council without Russia” High North News, 15 October 2022,

https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/china-will-not-acknowledge-arctic-council-without-russia.
10 Rush Doshi, Alexis Dale-Huang and Gaoqi Zhang, Northern Expedition: China’s Arctic Activities and Ambitions(2021) Brookings Institute Report, https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2021/04/FP_20210412_china_arctic.pdf
11 Rush Doshi, Alexis Dale-Huang and Gaoqi Zhang, Northern Expedition: China’s Arctic Activities and Ambitions(2021) Brookings Institute Report, https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2021/04/FP_20210412_china_arctic.pdf, 1-2.
12 P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse, and Ryan Dean, ‘Why China is not a peer competitor in the Arctic’(2022) Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3172586/why-china-isnot-a-peer-competitor-in-the-arctic/.

68significant. 13 China openly declared its

Council remains the purview only ofinterest in the Arctic in its Arctic White

ArcticPaper, which Hossain notes is probably

Declaration requires the consensus ofbest read as a policy declaration

all Arctic Council states (including

reaffirming China’s adherence to pre-Russia) before Russia can be restrictedexisting legal frameworks governingor prevented from participation in

the Arctic region.

14

Councilmembers.

The

Such reaffirmation,

Arctic Council meetings or holding thewhilst important in a global context, has

Chairmanship. Such consensus fromlittle bearing on the decisions andRussia is not forthcoming. Thus, theactions of the Arctic Council, given

present temporary pause on Russia’s

China’s observer status and concurrent

Chairmanshiplimited ability to influence the actions

breaches Articles 5 and 7 of the Ottawa

and decisions of the Council.

Declaration on the establishment of the
Arctic Council.

Thus,

the

actions

to

limit

the

and

participation

participation of Russia in the Arctic

13 Timo Koivurova, ‘The current and future role of non-Arctic states in Arctic governance’ in Akiho Shibata, Leileu

Zou, Nikolas Sellheim, and Marzia Scopelliti (eds) Emerging Legal Orders in the Arctic: The role of non-Arctic
actors (Routledge, 2019), 26
14 Kamrul Hossain (2018) “China’s White Paper on the Arctic: Legal Status under International Law”, ASIL Insight
22–7. www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/7/chinas-white- paper-arctic-legal-status-under-international-law

69

Global Polar Law?
Rachael Lorna Johnstone
The preamble to the Antarctic Treaty points
to global interests:

These brief, personal reflections are basedon an intervention at the 15th Polar Law
Symposium in Reykjavík, on 14th October
2022 on the panel “10 Years of Current
Developments in Arctic Law: Arctic Law isan Academic Discipline” organised by
Kamrul Hossain.

Recognizing that it is in the interestof all mankind that Antarctica shallcontinue for ever to be used
exclusively for peaceful purposesand shall not become the scene or

The geophysical interconnections of theobject of international discord. 2

polar regions to the rest of the world are
well-recognised.

Thephrase,And article 10 of the same treaty sees the“Whatstates parties, especially the consultative

happens in the Arctic does not stay in theparties, as self-appointed stewards who

Arctic” has become so commonplace at

determine the rules for the benefit of the

Arctic events that it has become a cliché.

whole world.

Meanwhile, the Russian aggression in

Each of the Contracting Parties

Ukraine in 2022 demonstrated beyond any

undertakes to exert appropriate

doubt that polar affairs cannot be fully
shelteredfrominternational

efforts, consistent with the Charter

tensionsof the United Nations, to the end

elsewhere.

that no one engages in any activity

Polar law is, inter alia, part of internationalinlaw and there is no doubt that international
Wild-Wests

awaiting

contrary

totheprinciples or purposes of the present

law applies at the Poles. These are not1

Antarctica

treaty. 3

discovery,

Meanwhile, in the North, the eight Arctic

colonisation and exploitation despite theStates, and sometimes the five States that

regular clickbait headlines.

border the Central Arctic Ocean, consider

1 Not that the Wild West was not an empty land, devoid of Peoples or Law before the arrival of Europeans.
2 Antarctic Treaty, December 1, 1959, United Nations Treaty Series 402 (1960): 71, Preamble.
3 Ibid, Article X.

70themselves as stewards, or even guardiansof the Arctic Ocean.

deference4ofobserverStatesandinstitutions.

But how global are the influences thatIn the Antarctic, the Asian States, possibly

create the body that we call polar law?

excepting Japan, are viewed as interlopers

In the Arctic, the eight States with territoryon the “white continent” (pun intended). 7
The resistance to China’s proposals for theabove Arctic Circle jealously guard their

Dome A Antarctic Specially Managed Area

sovereignty and sovereign rights – even if(AMSA) around Kunlun station epitomises

one fundamentally violates the sovereignty

the fear that this is a cover to restrict accessof its neighbouring state in the mostto other States’ missions or even that it is a

egregious and brutal way. 5 The rules forpreliminary “land grab,” 8 even while theobservers to the Arctic Council make itclaimant

clear that while they welcome support from
non-Arctic

States,organisations

andgovernmentalorganisations,

and
only

play

with

area

management in their sovereignty games.

intergovernmental
fora

States

The claimant States are behind 2/3 of all

non-

the Antarctic Specially Protected Areas andthe

AMSAs in the Antarctic, nearly all within

Arctic States and permanent participants

their own “claim” while there is no

have a say (quite literally) at the ministerial

protected area in the unclaimed sector.

and Senior Arctic Official meetings. 6 Even

Ferrada describes this succinctly as “putting

the structure of the meetings ensures the

4 Foreign Ministers of Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States of American, The Ilulissat Declaration, May

28, 2008.
5 Ibid.
6 Arctic Council Rules Of Procedure, as adopted by the Arctic Council at the First Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Iqaluit,

Canada, September 17-18, 1998 and Revised by the Arctic Council at the Eighth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Kiruna,
Sweden, May 15, 2013, especially Annex 2, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/940; and Arctic Council
Observer Manual for Subsidiary Bodies, as adopted by the Arctic Council at the Eighth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting,
Kiruna, Sweden, May 15, 2013 and Addendum, Approved by the Senior Arctic Officials at the Meeting of the Senior Arctic
Officials, Anchorage, US, October 20-22, 2015 and Portland, Maine, US, October 4, 2016 , para 7.3, https://oaarchive.arcticcouncil.org/handle/11374/939.
7 Elizabeth Leane, “Fictionalizing Antarctica“ in Handbook on the Politics of Antarctica, Klaus Dodds, Alan D Hemmings andPeder Roberts, eds. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017); see also Anne-Marie Brady, China as a Polar Great Power (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2017).

8 Sakiko Hataya, “Legal Implications of China’s Proposal for an Antarctic Specially Managed Area (ASMA) at Kunlun Station

at Dome A,” Yearbook of Polar Law 12 (2020): 75, 76. See also Dodds, “Sovereignty Watch,” 238 on similar reactions to
China’s earlier plans to built a research station at the same location.

71

stewardship
purposes.”

to

work

for

sovereignty

papers9offering

insights

andanalysis, as will officials, scientists,and people of experience from theApartheid South Africa was a founding
member of the Antarctic Treaty and

Third Pole region. 11

welcomed

decades,Lessons learned from collaboration

notwithstanding the racist regime that wasin the Arctic present many usefula pariah in other international fora. Sixty

examples for other parts of theyears later, South Africa remains the only

world and can serve as an inspiration

State party from the African continent. The

for and find application in the Third

research requirements in order to become

Pole and Himalaya region. 12

a consultative party effectively preclude

Glacial melt and sea-level rise is not thethroughtheany developing State from obtaining

only thing now exported from the Poles todecision-making power. It is not surprisingother regions; now Arctic institutions offerthat they do not bother to join the treaty atadvice about how they should govern

all.

themselves.

Amongst the “thinkers” of polar law, there

Yet perhaps in current times, polar scholars

is a great deal of talking at other regions

should be asking what the Himalayan canand not so much listening to. The “Third

teach us. The region boasts three nuclear-

Pole Process” under the Arctic Circle

armed States with disputed borders whobanner is described as:

have survived seven decades of on-off

A comprehensive effort to introduce

skirmishes, four outright Indo-Pakistani

the Arctic model of collaboration towars and a Sino-Indian war. The Himalayan

the Third Pole region.

10

region may have something to say about
managing international relations in times

People of experience who haveof hot conflict and hotter rhetoric.

played an important role in Arctic
collaboration will submit articles and9 Luis Valentin Ferrada. “Five Factors that will Decide the Future of Antarctica,” Polar Journal 8(1) (2018): 84, 99.
10 “The Arctic Circle UAE: Third Pole Process,” Arctic Circle, accessed November 7, 2022, https://www.arcticcircle.org/third-

pole-process.
11 United Arab Emirates Ministry of Climate Change and Environment and Arctic Circle, “The Arctic, Third Pole and COP28:

Launch of the Arctic Circle – United Arab Emirates: Third Pole Process,” Press Release, TP process press release (n.d.)
https://prismic-io.s3.amazonaws.com/arctic-circle-www/07e98c8f-20f1-4c39-b2426d8e9a21dae4_TP+Process+Press+Release+2.pdf.
12 Ibid.

72

Within the more traditional academe,

The perspectives they bring from post-

structural barriers to a global scholarshipcolonial

remain. Much of this can be attributed tofundamentally enrich our discussions andlackrequireschallenge our assumptions about decision-

investment and this is heavily weighted

making in the polar regions. Yet many

towards large institutions with access tomore promising applicants have beennational and EU grants (as well as thosedenied by our immigration laws – and ininstitutions with strong grant-machine

one case by the Danish immigration

support offices). Scholars from developing

authorities

countries are locked out.

notwithstanding a valid study permit for

Participation in keystone events like the

Iceland!

Polar Law Symposia and contributions to
the Yearbook of Polar Law and the Current
Developments in Arctic Law series also failA global discipline requires diversity: notonly in representation of different persons

to represent voices from all regions of theperspectives.

world. Since the first volume of thereveals a dominance of western legal-

Yearbook of Polar Law was published inthinking, especially positivist approaches to2009, nearly all the contributions haveinternational law. There is extensive focus

come from citizens of Arctic States andon treaties and instruments of international

Antarctic Consultative Party States.

organisations

When it comes to our research projects,

Nations). But there is a shortage of criticaloffunding:

research

participation

in

Can

we

supportour conferences andthird language?
consideringtheHowever, most of the Yearbook’s articles
are on the law about Indigenous Peoples,

masters programmes at the University ofthree

UnitedPeoples in its work in the Arctic context.

discipline. In fourteen years of the polar law
only

the

law

seeks to centre the law of Indigenous

be stronger to build a truly global

Iceland,(especiallypolar

The polar law academic community rightly

next

generation of polar lawyers, efforts might

Akureyri,on

Who gets to make law?
Why does international law haveauthority over communities thatnever accepted it?
• What about the other “civilised
nations” in the Arctic?

editing for scholars writing in a second or
when

Literature••seminars? Can we offer support with copy-

Similarly,

airportinternational law at the Poles.

and in allocating limited – often very
funds.

Copenhagenvoices questioning the very structures ofconsider diversity when seeking partners–

atnationsfrom different places; but also different

established polar law scholars should

limitedindependentlaws approved by States, and not the laws

Africanof Indigenous Peoples – and most of it isstudents have taken the programmes andwritten by outsiders like the present author.

the first Indian student began only in 2021.
73

Scholars including John Borrows, Mariano

and Tierra del Fuego should equally give

Aupilaarjuk, Marie Tulimaaq, Lisa Qiluqqi

rise to a claim.

Koperqualuk, Christina Allard and Susan

Polar law is no longer an emerging

Funderud Skogvant are all mapping theirdiscipline; it is an established discipline. But

legal systems. This is undoubtedly polar

it is not a mature discipline and will not be

law - but are we doing enough to welcome

until it is more inclusive – of different

them to the polar law network? In theregions and different, critical perspectives.

south, Māori explorers probably knew ofThat requires the old guard of polar law to

the Antarctic continent hundreds of years

step outside the comfort of our familiar

before Bellingshausen. 13 Yet where are the

networks and reach out. To be realised, it

Indigenous Māori, Australian and native

will require outreach and support to be

Patagonian scholars? If the Chilean anddirected towards new or underrepresented

Argentinian territorial claims are based – invoices. And it may even require us topart – on proximity and continental
continuity,

then

the

much

challenge our states’ own immigration laws

older

and

sovereignty of the Indigenous of Patagonia

policiesthat

prevent

ambitious

students from studying in our countries.

13 Priscilla M Wehi, et al, “Transforming Antarctic Management and Policy with an Indigenous Māori lens,” Nature Ecology &Evolution (2021), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41559-021-01466-4.

74

The Western (Near-)Future of Arctic Law
Stefan Kirchner aTheescalationof

Russia’s

warof

the beginning of the escalation, there areagainstUkrainesince

24

no indicators that Russia would change the

February 2022 has led to the greatest

destructive course it has chosen anytimechanges in Arctic governance since the end

soon. Instead, while Russia’s advances onaggression

1of the First Cold War. Although there werethesome efforts at international cooperation,

Ukrainian forces, rocket attacks targetingthe development of Arctic Law only reallycivilians across Ukraine continue daily andtook off since 1989. 2022 marks a similarlystatements from Russian officials make it

important incision in the evolution of Arctic

clear that this war is waged with genocidal

Law. The seven Western Arctic states (A7),intent. 2 Russia is waging a genocidal war of

have suspended cooperation with Russia inaggression against Ukraine. This war is not

the Arctic Council (AC), making the grouponlyof eight Arctic states (A8) practically

Conducting this war and committing

irrelevant as a cooperative collection ofnumerous crimes against the civilian

states. Instead, Sweden and Finland are on

population of Ukraine would not be

the way to joining the North Atlantic Treaty

possible without the active involvement ofOrganizationup

hundreds of thousands of soldiers andgenerations of nominal neutrality almost

millions more people in Russia and abroad.

(NATO),

givingthree decades after joining the European

The

Union (EU) - another development of thegroundPutin’scurrent

questions

1990s that was facilitated by the end of the

are

war

largelybutsituation

regardingblockedRussia’sraises
the

by

war.

serioususeofinternational law in Arctic governance andFirst Cold War. At the time of writing, inconcerning the future of Arctic Law. With

mid-August 2022, about half a year after

the cooperation with Russia, which covers

a Research Professor of Arctic Law, Arctic Centre, University of Lapland
1 For an overview see Timo Koivurova (2022). “Is It Possible to Continue Cooperating with Russia in the Arctic Council?”, in:Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 29 June 2022, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/06/29/is-it-possible-tocontinue-cooperating-with-russia-in-the-arctic-council/.
2 See e.g. Thomas Kika (2022). “Ukraine Slams 'Genocidal Language' by Russian Ambassador Pushing 'Final Solution'”, in:Newsweek, 20 August 2022, https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-slams-genocidal-language-russian-ambassador-pushingfinal-solution-1735413 (last accessed 21 August 2022).

75

half of the lands and half of the population

downsized from a law of cooperation to ain the Arctic, in the AC already suspended,bare minimum of law to allow for co-

how can Artic Law be developed further?

existence. But one of Russia’s neighbours,
Ukraine, is even being denied its very

Arctic Law is a product of an inherently

existence. Therefore, a third potential path

optimistic time. While it is based on

emerges for the future of Arctic Law, a path

optimism, it is not unaware of risks. Its basic

that has been chosen by Russia: Russia has

premise is one of trust in international

abandoned

cooperation to address critical issues that

fundamental

norms

of

international law - although it relies on

are relevant for all Arctic states. Regarding

international law elsewhere, for example in

the Russian Federation, this premise is no

the contexts of the international law of thelonger valid because it can no longer besea or in Antarctica. Russia has been

assumed that the wellbeing of others

excluded from the Council of Europe andelsewhere in the Arctic is also in Russia’s

de facto from the Arctic Council. It mightinterest. Regarding the cooperation withinfind itself outside of the G20 but its

the A7, this cooperation still remains

positions in the Organization for Security

relevant - in fact, today, it might be more

and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and in

relevant than ever before.

the United Nations (UN) are, from theperspective of international law, secure for“At first sight, the choice might seem
twofold: Arctic Law can retain the characterof optimistic cooperation but reduce thegeographical scope by excluding Russia,
being limited to the A7. Alternatively, it canretain the geographical scope of the A8 butchange its character and content, being
downsized from a law of cooperation to abare minimum of law to allow for coexistence.”

the moment. This selective reliance on andcommitment to international law on thepart of the Russian Federation also has
implications

for

its

positioninthecommunity that forms the fundament forthe development of Arctic Law as a part of
PublicInternational

Law.

Cooperation

through Arctic Law is now limited de facto
to the A7. Russia remains a party tointernational treaties that have been

Arctic law, therefore, is at a crossroads“With regard to the internal coherence of
the A7, it is noteworthy that this is
strengthened in ways that were
unimaginable just a year ago. Finland andSweden are on course to join NATO,
meaning that all A7 states will soon be
NATO members and that the Arctic will beclearly split into two halves.”

today. At first sight, the choice might seem
twofold: Arctic Law can retain the characterof optimistic cooperation but reduce thegeographical scope by excluding Russia,
being limited to the A7. Alternatively, it canretain the geographical scope of the A8 butchange its character and content, being76

created as part of Arctic Law, 3 but at thefor fundamental principles of international

moment this appears to be law that exists

law. This makes it difficult to perceiveon paper more than in practice. With

Russia as a partner that can be trusted.

regard to Russia, cooperation has already

Russia has abandoned international law,

been reduced dramatically. With regard to

not the other way around. Instead of

the internal coherence of the A7, it iscooperation with Western neighbours,

noteworthy that this is strengthened in

Moscow has chosen a path of aggression

ways that were unimaginable just a yearthat leads to isolation, similar to that

ago. Finland and Sweden are on course tochosen by Teheran. Today, the Russian

join NATO, meaning that all A7 states willstate, its institutions, representatives, andsoon be NATO members and that the

supporters,

Arctic will be clearly split into two halves.

genocidal war of aggression. Russia’s

The scope of Arctic Law is expanding as it

behaviour forms an antithesis to thewill include a stronger component ofcooperative spirit that is the fundament of

security-related norms, such as the North

Arctic Law. During the First Cold War, East

Atlantic Treaty. While Arctic Law has longand West were split and in opposition to

been more than the international treaties

each other. Arctic Law could emerge on thethat the A8 has created with a focus on thebasis of the recognition of shared interests.

Arctic,increaseToday’s situation is characterized not only

cohesion between the A7 and deepen theby opposition but by aggression. The

legal chasm between Russia and thecurrent situation, therefore, appears worse

Western Arctic.

than

these

developments

the

are

Cold

associated

War

with

when

the

mutualcooperation was possible, for example inThis also means that actors that are not

the form of the Polar Bear Agreement 4 or

Arctic-exclusive, such as NATO and EU, willwhen the United States of America and theplay a bigger role in cooperation in theSoviet Union cooperated to rescue whales

Arctic. Arctic Law has never been limited totrapped off the coast of Alaska. Arctic Law

the A8 but today, this is becoming evenreflects the spirit of cooperation. Between

clearer. In Ukraine, but also in Georgia,

the A7, this spirit exists and the desire to

Syria, and elsewhere, Russia’s current

cooperate only grows due to Russia’s

government has exhibited a clear disregard

3 See in detail Timo Koivurova, Pirjo Kleemola-Juntunen & Stefan Kirchner (2020). “Arctic Regional Agreements andArrangements”, in: Karen N. Scott & David L. VanderZwaag (eds.), Research Handbook on Polar Law, Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, pp. 64-83.
4 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, adopted 15 November 1973, entered into force 26 May 1976, 2898
United Nations Treaty Series I-50540.

77

aggression and threats. With regard toequality of states and the prohibition of theRussia, it is impossible to see how anduse of force in international relations.

when the current situation will change

Russiaagain. The positive experience of 1989-

has

moved

away

from

this

fundamental consensus. For the time2022, when cooperation was possible

being, it does not play a role in the further

despite political differences and when thedevelopment of Arctic Law - and Arctic Law

Arctic, like Outer Space, was seen as an area

is being developed further. It is not goingin which international law was protected

to remain static. By abandoning the corefrom disputes elsewhere, might serve as anconsensus that made Arctic Law possible,

inspiration for future cooperation.

Russia has placed the power to develop

At the moment, though, Russia does not

Arctic Law in the hands of the A7. If, when,meet the requirements for cooperation.

and how, Russia might be able to catch up

Historical experiences show that it can takein the future remains entirely unclear andgenerations of efforts to allow for a return

this is a topic for future discussions. The

to the table (for example when West

A7’s commitment to international law

Germany and East Germany joined thetoday is reflected in its support for those

United Nations in 1973). Creating the

who repel Russia’s aggression. Arctic Law

necessary conditions that will allow for acontinues to develop, but Russia has

resumption of cooperation within theremoved itself from the circle of those whoframework of Arctic Law is up to thehave a say in its development. This is a loss

Russian people alone. All actors in Arctic

for the Arctic community as a whole, but

Law, state and non-state actors alike, will

even more so for the people who live in thehave to be clearly committed to the core

Russian Arctic.

values of international law, including thoselaid down in the Charter of the United
Nations, as well as to the rule of law ininternational relations. International law
does not require all states to share a single
political ideology - on the contrary, it
allows for peace despite differences. Whatis necessary is a basic consensus on
essential rules, such as the sovereign

78

Careful precautions or dangerous misperceptions?
Analysing the militarization strategies of the Arctic countries
following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Christopher Kiyaseh

Abstract: Following the February 2022

focuses on Russian deterrence andcontainment. On the other hand, Russia has
nearlycompletedits
military
modernization strategy in the Arctic andclaims it is not interested in further militarybuild-up. This implies that the RussoUkrainian conflict has not only broken
down Arctic cooperation, it also acted as abreaker of observed Arctic military activity
by drawing away resources towards thefrontlines and away from the Arctic.

Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Arctic has
evolved into a sensitive security
environment. Uncertainty regarding theduration of the war in Ukraine,misperceptions around Arctic military
exercises, and growing tensions among
Arctic states have opened an opportunity
for accidental encounters or spillover
conflict. Therefore, this analysis seeks to
explore the militarization strategies ofNATO and Russia within the Arctic
following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
To supplement the analysis, this article will
also examine military exercises as anindicator of militarization strategies byusing the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies (CSIS) Arctic Military
Activity Tracker. Specifically, by quantifying
open-source articles from prominent Arctic
media outlets to record the most recent
military events. The findings indicate thatcurrent perceptions of militarization do notmatch actual observed military activities.
Specifically, military activities fell by nearly
half following the Russian invasion of
Ukraine compared to military activity
before the conflict. In addition, NATO has
returned to a Cold-War era doctrine that1

Introduction

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine
in February of 2022, tensions among theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)and the Russian Federation have becomeheightened. As countries react to the
dynamic

security

misperceptions

environment,

regardingmilitary

capabilities and activity arise as a result.
This analysis will seek to examine themilitarization

strategies of

the Arctic

countries following the Russian invasion of
Ukraine. Secondly, using the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Military Activity Tracker, a supplementary
examination of the state of military activity
in the Arctic will be quantified to gauge
79activity before and after the Russo-

military and infrastructural capabilities

Ukrainian conflict. From the initial data, it

within the Arctic. This can be seen in thecan be seen that prior to the conflict,revision of maritime strategies to restore

military activity had been steadily growing.

Cold War-era doctrines with the focus on

However, following the commencement ofdeterring and containing Russia and an

hostilities in February of 2022, Arctic

emerging China. With the impacts ofmilitary activity has been reduced by nearlyclimate change acting as a threat multiplier,

half.

and

the Russian invasion of Ukraine has

attention that the Russo-Ukrainian conflict

increased the intensity of climate change’s

has required.

consequences. Countries have been forced

This

shows

the

resources

to reallocate resources and shift focus from

It is also clear that the invasion has eroded

climate mitigation and adaptation efforts

away the concept of Arctic exceptionalism, 1

to military security. These environmental

seemingly no longer applying as external

impacts seek to act as barriers to effective

geopolitical realities have solidified themilitarization of the region and potentiallysecuritization of the Arctic from thechallenge conventional applications ofperspective of the eight Arctic Council

strategies.

member states. 2 This has been reflected in2

the sudden breakdown of cooperation
between NATO and Russia both within and

In recent years, Russian President, Vladimir

outside of the Arctic. This has been

Putin has made a concerted effort toprominently represented by the sudden
endof

diplomaticandRussian Military Strategy

increase the Russian military's presence inscientific

the Arctic region. This has included thecooperation as seen for many decades inconstruction of new military bases, thecooperative bodies like the Arctic Council,

deployment of additional troops andamong other Arctic institutions. As ahardwareresponse, the conflict in Ukraine has

to

the

region,andtheestablishment of a new Arctic commandstrengthened NATO’s resolve in the Arctic(Paul 2022). Putin has also been working toand unified previously neutral hesitant

increase the Russian civilian presence in thestates in Sweden and Finland.

Arctic,

along

with

energyandFinally, NATO is using the conflict intransportation infrastructure in part to

Ukraine as an opportunity to bolster theirsupport the military's increased activity in

1 Arctic exceptionalism
2 United States of America, Russia, Canada, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark

80

the region. Following the Russian invasion

challenge and destabilizer in the region.

of Ukraine, Russia had nearly completed its

This is because it increases the instance formilitary modernization process in the Arctic

misperceptions, accidental confrontation,(Center for Strategic and Internationalor escalation of a security dilemma

Studies 2022).

(Sergunin2022).

From

Swedenand

Finland’s perspectives, this was a necessary
defensive geostrategic measure to secure“Putin has also been working to increase theRussian civilian presence in the Arctic,
along with energy and transportation
infrastructure in part to support the
military's increased activity in the region.”

their long and short-term national defense
interests. Despite these efforts, Russia
argues that it does not want to further
militarize the region upon the completionof its modernization process but focus onpreserving

The Russian Arctic region acts as a key
region

is

home

to

balance rather than deploying offensive
potentials (P. W. Lackenbauer 2022).

Fleet. The Northern Fleet is a criticalcomponent of the Russian nuclear triad,3

which is designed to ensure the Russian
andSwistek2022).

the Russian invasion of Ukraine is focusedThe

on closing the capability gap by investing

Northern Fleet is also responsible forin new assets, scientific research, increasing

patrolling the Arctic Ocean and protecting

military

Russian economic interests in the region,

surface-to-air

missileS-350

launchers

were

and

This includes both naval and air assets, as

and security barrier. In 2019, new airandvisibility,

potential Russian aggression in the region.

(NSR) acts as key transportation corridor
systems,andArctic allies to deter and contain any

natural resources. The Northern Sea Routemissilepresence

maintaining strong cooperation among

which are significant given the region's vastdefenseNATO Military Strategy

The NATO Arctic military strategy following

nuclear deterrent is invulnerable to a first(Paul

cooperation.

working to maintain the regional power

Russia's

northernmost military base, the Northern

strikeandFurthermore, Russia perceives its actions as

strategic location for the Russian military.
The

peace

well as troops on the ground (Odgaard2022). NATO is also working to improve its
ability to operate in the Arctic, including ininstalled along the NSR near Novaya

the event of a conflict. NATO has classified

Zemlya and Franz Josef Land among otherarchipelagos in the Arctic. (Bertelsen 2022)

the region of both geostrategic andFrom the Russian perspective, the decisionof Russian nuclear capabilities in the

military interest due to the large proportion

for Finland and Sweden to formally join

region. Furthermore, maritime chokepoints

NATO in response to Russian actions inlikeUkraine is seen as a significant security
81

theGreenland-Iceland-UnitedKingdom (GIUK) gap and the chokepoint

theatre for deterring and containing any

between Svalbard and Norway (Bear Gap)

Russian military aggression (Buchanan

have come under mounting tensions due2022). This has been exemplified byto the hostilities of Russia in Ukraine.

individual country strategies, like the recent

Consequently,

have

U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region

recommended that Nordic states be tasked

2022. As stated within the strategy, the U.S.

with leading alliance efforts to ensure

aims to “maximize our cooperation with

sufficientsituational

andArctic Allies and partners to enhance ourreinforce

regional

againstshared security and deter aggression in the

Russia.

Arctic, especially from Russia.” (The White

adversarial

NATO

strategists

awareness
resiliencebehavior

from(Buchanan 2022)

House Washington 2022)

From a maritime security perspective,

In addition, Norwegian Armed Forces have

NATO has acknowledged that there is aalsoneed to update its Arctic/ High North

preparedness to reflect the “most serious

strategy to reflect the dynamic geopoliticalsecurity policy situation in decades” as theenvironment. As a result, NATO has also

Norwegian Prime Minister, Jonas Gahrcalled for a return to the Cold War-era

Støre emphasized. Furthermore, Canada

Atlanticonand the United States have invested heavily

featuring the High North as a prominent

in the North American Aerospace Defense

Command.

This

focusesraised

their

level

of

military

Figure 1: Created by: Christopher Kiyaseh 2022 using opensource data from CSIS Arctic Military Activity Tracker https://arcticmilitarytracker.csis.org/

82

Command (NORAD) and to ensure its

Arctic beyond these constraints can bemodernization process makes NORAD aunderstood through military exercises andleader of NATO’s northern and western

drills. These military activities give a uniqueapproaches. (NATO 2022) In addition, theinsight that either contradicts or confirms

Swedish Chief of Defense has recently

the countries’ strategies and allows thecalled for the increase of its military

measurement of military competition andpresence in the northern regions of thecapabilities in the Arctic. The Center forcountry. Particularly, through establishing a

Strategic and International Studies, a

new unit in the Kiruna municipality ofWashington, D.C. based think-tank createdupper Norrland (Gunn-Bye 2022). Finland

the Arctic Military Activity Tracker (AMAT)

has also reacted in a similar sense, stating

which acts as an up-to date repository ofthat the Finnish Arctic policy “needs tostrategic competition in the Arctic (Choiadapt to the realities of a new Cold War”.

and Harris 2022). AMAT covers six different(Humpert 2022)

classifications of military activity and4includes overflight, exercises and training,

Analyzing the state of military

missile test, deployment, air defense

activity

operations, and air policing. Each event is

While NATO and Russia have outlined theirrespective

militarization

strategies

in

dated,

geolocated,labeledwithcategorized,
the

type

and
of

equipment/capability recorded along with

reports or documents, their behavior in the

Figure 2: Created by: Christopher Kiyaseh 2022 using open-source data from CSIS Arctic Military Activity Tracker https://arcticmilitarytracker.csis.org/

83participating countries and hyperlinked

gap in military activity within the Arctic

sources.

region between Russia and the United
Sates. It also shows that the United States

In total, between September 2020 andcannot stand alone in the Arctic, nor can

October of 2020, there have been 105
eventsrecorded,

with

the

other NATO allies. Notice that Combined

following

NATO Military activities (78) outweighclassifications, 53 exercises and training, 24

Russia’s (54) by a significant margin as

overflight, 15 missile test, 11 deployment, 1

opposed to being measured individually. If

air defense operation, and 1 air policing

NATO is to navigate external shocks and(figure.1). A noteworthy statistic is viewing

potential spillover effectively and efficiently

the average monthly frequency of thesefrom Russia or China intervening in theexercises before and after the 2022 Russian

Arctic, that they must do so as a coherent

invasion of Ukraine. Prior to the Russianand singular unit.

invasion of Ukraine, (Sep.2020-Jan.2022)
there were 4.82 exercises a month on“In proportion to the total 105 exercises,
Russia is responsible for 54 activities orapproximately 51% as opposed to theUnited States with 35 activities or 33%.”

average. After the Russian invasion of
Ukraine (Feb.2022-Oct.2022) there were2.55 exercises per month on average, for adifference

of

2.27

exercisesorapproximately a 47% decrease.

5This data offers a unique angle that

From this analysis, it can be understood

illustrates the impact of the Ukrainian war

how external geopolitical conflict canon both NATO and Russian militaryimpact militarization and military activity

resources. It also gives insight into how

within the Arctic region. It also allows us toother conflicts outside of the Arctic could

pause and ponder the differences between

act as a potential decelerator to further

observed military activity and perceived

military activity. In addition to viewing

capabilities of NATO and Russia. From

military activity on a country-by-countrybasis(figure2)

can

expandLooking forward

these conclusions, it is evident that further

ourresearch needs to be conducted in thisunderstanding of who is responsible for therealm to inform both policymakers andmost military action in the region. In

scholars alike on the importance ofproportion to the total 105 exercises,

accurately

Russia is responsible for 54 activities orrepresenting

adversarial

tensions or lack thereof. Perhaps theapproximately 51% as opposed to thegreatest

United States with 35 activities or 33%. This

dangerintheArcticismisperception, which in the past hasshows that there is not only a perceived

contributed to the acceleration of several

gap within military capability but a visible

global conflicts.
84

Furthermore,

the

need

interdisciplinaryforapproachanwhen faced with dynamic and emerging

tothreats.

understanding the militarization strategies“Perhaps the greatest danger in the Arctic ismisperception, which in the past hascontributed to the acceleration of several
global conflicts.”

of different countries within the Arctic are
crucial. Social scientists and policymakers
must collaborate with natural scientists andclimatologists in joint or multilateral efforts
in order to accurately inform military
strategies

andassociated6

risks.

References

Understandably, the findings in this article

Bertelsen,

could

by

"Unipolarity and Order in the Arctic."

military

Springer, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham 313-

have

additional

been
data

strengthened

on

other

RasmusGjedssø.

2022.

capabilities in the Arctic but is limited due

331.

to the unavailability of the data or classified

Buchanan, Elizabeth. 2022. "Cool change

nature of the information.

ahead? NATO's Strategic Concept and theHigh North." JSTOR 1-5.

For example, tracking the quality andCenter for Strategic and Internationalfrequency of military bases in the Arctic or

THE ICE CURTAIN:RUSSIA’S ARCTIC MILITARY PRESENCE.

Studies.

deployment of offensive versus defensive
capabilities can contribute to a greaterhttps://www.csis.org/features/ice-

understanding of Arctic militarization. Thiscurtain-russias-arctic-military-presence.

would help to act as a preventative
measureagainstoverinflated2022.

Choi, Jonathan, and Tucker Harris. 2022.

military

Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program
ArcticMilitary
Activity
Tracker.

posturing from countries like China who
continues to disruptively lay claim to thehttps://arcticmilitarytracker.csis.org/.

region as a “near-Arctic state”. Inaccurate

Gunn-Bye, Hilde. 2022. High North News.

resource or land claims to the Arctic left

November 3. Accessed November 3,

unvetted can act as dangerous landmines2022.

in each nation’s geopolitical strategies. This

https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/swe

can increase the likelihood for accidental ordens-chief-defense-wants-strengthen-unaccounted for reactions to imagined

military-presence-northern-sweden.

threats. Continued communication andHumpert, Malte. 2022. High North News.

diplomatic efforts across political, scientific,

October 12. Accessed October 12, 2022.

and military mediums are crucial tohttps://www.highnorthnews.com/en/new

maintaining peace in the region and-finnish-government-report-finds-more-deescalating military buildup. As a final

complicated-arctic-security-environment.

note, caution and careful calculation can be

Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Alexander

the greatest ally to each respective nation

Sergunin. 2022. "Canada’s and Russia’s
85Security and Defence Strategies in thePaul, Michael, and Göran Swistek. 2022.

Arctic: A Comparative Analysis." Arctic"Russia in the Arctic: development plans,Review on Law and Politics 232-257.

military

Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Alexander

prevention." Stiftung Wissenschaft und

Sergunin. 2022. "“Canada’s and Russia’s

Politik 1-47.

Security and Defence Strategies in the

Sergunin, Alexander A. 2022. "International

Arctic: A Comparative Analysis”." Arctic

Cooperation in the Arctic." Palgrave

Review on Law and Politics 13, 232–257.

Macmillan, Singapore 1-21.

NATO. 2022. Joint press conference with

The White House Washington . 2022.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
and the Prime Minister of Canada, Justin

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTICREGION October 2022. Government

Trudeau. Joint press conference, NATO.

Report, Washington : The White House,

Odgaard, Liselotte. 2022. "Russia’s Arctic

Washington.

Designs and NATO." Survival Global

Politics and Strateg 89-104.
Paul, Janis Kluge and Michael. 2022.
"Russia’s Arctic Strategy through 2035."

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 1-4.

86

potential,andconflictJapanese Master’s Students Contributing to the Arctic Legal
Studies through the 15th Polar Law Symposium
Hiroto Kogo, ab Rena Takezoea Taichi Inai,a Akiho Shibata c

1Introduction

The

Arcticiscome from professors, and the Graduate
bothphysically

Schoolandgraduatestudents.

courses on “International Polar Law I” in
Japanese and “International Polar Law II” inin the Arctic legal studies. Utilizing theEnglish. GSICS is the only university inopportunities provided through the Polar

Japan that provides polar law courses at

Law Symposium and the Arctic Circle

the graduate level. In the spring semester

Assembly, this paper describes a uniqueandestablishedinresearchJapan

toof 2021, the Japanese course focused onschemethe Antarctic Treaty System. In the fallpromotesemester of 2022, the English course

prospective Japanese early-career scholars

focused on the Arctic international law.

and practitioners to be interested in theProfessors Rachael Lorna Johnstone andArctic legal and policy issues.
2

Antje Nuemann at University of Akureyri,
Iceland, were the guest lecturers, eachFirst Impetus: Credited courses atteaching two classes online on human

Kobe University
Japanese

studentsrightsentering

Cooperationsuch opportunity through the 2-credit

Severalimpetuses are needed for them to engage

educational

International

Studies (GSICS), Kobe University provides

conceptually far away from Japan and forJapaneseofprotection

andenvironmental

graduate

protection in the Arctic. The three co-schools majoring in international law would

authors of this paper have registered to therarely have original interests in polar law:latter course in 2022.

they are usually interested in “mainstream”
topics such as human rights law, economic“GSICS is the only university in Japan thatprovides polar law courses at the graduatelevel.”

law, environmental law, etc. The firstencounter to the polar law must necessarilya LL.M. candidate, Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies (GSICS), Kobe University Japanb Corresponding author. Email: 229i011i@stu.kobe-u.ac.jp.
c Professor and Director, Polar Cooperation Research Centre (PCRC), Kobe University, Japan87

In addition, GSICS provides a 2-credited

from April 2022 at Osaka University ofcourse on international fieldwork, in which

Economics and Law in Japan. Another hasaprofessor

designsafieldworkof

become a diplomat in Japanese Ministry of

abroadwith

Foreign Affairs. Similarly, a bright futureasahead is expected from those attending

minimum

10-daystay

concreteacademic

exercise,suchinterviewing at international organizations,this year’s 15 PLS.

participating in United Nations treaty

3

negotiations, and attending and making
researchpresentations

atFunding from ArCS II

academic

conferences. In fall semester of 2022, an

With increasing international travellinginternational fieldwork in Iceland wascosts due to fewer flights between Asia anddesigned by the co-author of this paper,

Europe caused by COVID-19, the fuel hikewith the expected exercise to make ancaused by the Ukraine crisis, and theacademic presentation at the 15th Polar

weakening of Japanese Yen, how to finance

Law Symposium (15 PLS) and to expand

the students’ travel to Iceland had become

academic network through the Arctic Circle

an important issue. In this regard, the co-

Assembly (ACA) participation. A visit to
Akureyri

wasincludedtoauthors are very appreciative of the

conductfinancial support provided by the Arctic

interviews at University of Akureyri andChallenge for Sustainability II (ArCS II)

Arctic Council Working Group Secretariats,

Overseas Fellowship Program. ArCS II is a

CAFF and PAME. Five first-year master’sJapanese national flagship project for

students, including the three co-authors ofArcticthis paper, and one second-year student
to

try

to

make

made

with

11

research

Internationallawresearchauthor of this paper, implemented throughthe Polar Cooperation Research Centre(PCRC), which has become one of the

In 2015, through the same scheme, three
students

1

program is one of them and led by the co-academicpresentations at the 15 PLS.

master’s

research,

programs.

registered to this fieldwork. Four of themdecidedSecond Impetus: Money, of course!

world’s leading polar legal research hubs. 2

research

The state-of-the-art Arctic legal research atpresentation at 8th Polar Law Symposium in

PCRC is fed into educational opportunities

Alaska. Today, one of them assumed an

at GSICS with the ArCS II project funding,assistant professorship in international law

1 Juha Saunavaara and Fujio Ohnichi, ”Arctic Challenge for Sustainability II: Japan’s New Arctic Flagship Project”, Current

Developments in Arctic Law, Vol.9 (2021), p.40.

2 PCRC website: < https://www.research.kobe-u.ac.jp/gsics-pcrc/index.html >

88

to

promotecapacitybuildingofmade two oral presentations: one onprospective early-career scholars.

“Interim Conservation and Management
Measures

The ArCS II Overseas Fellowship Programin the Arctic”. The first examined the legal

Japanese universities and other research

structure of the newly entered-into-force

institutions, as well as young practitioners

treaty,from public and private institutions, toCentralconferences for making presentations andthe introduction of the precautionary
approach based on the “Guidelines for thetheir personal networks at the international

Reduction of Underwater Noise fromlevel. 3 This funding is on a competitive

Commercial Shipping to Address Adverse

basis based on candidates’ applications.

Impacts on Marine Life” adopted by the

Owing to this funding opportunity, theInternational Maritime Organization ininternational field work in Iceland was able
several2014 to address the issue of underwater

students,

noise in the Arctic.

including the three co-authors of thispaper.
4

Final

Fisheries

Article 3. Second presentation proposed

careerprofessionals and will help them expand

for

(CAO

being agreed to by all 10 Parties underexperiences will stimulate further researchrealized

Ocean

Conservation and Management Measures

Its expectation is that thesebeArcticArticle 5 and the importance of the Interim

expanding contacts along with fieldwork

toPrevent

commercial fishing could start under

institutions for conducting research and

early

to

It examined in detail how the potential

at overseas universities and researchbyAgreement

Agreement) and its “step-wise approach”.

collecting information, as well as their stay

activities

theUnregulated High Seas Fisheries in the

support their participation in international

otherFisheries

Legal Means to Regulate Underwater Noise

early career researchers belonging to

and

CAO

Agreement”, and another on “Potential

provides funding to graduate students,

trips.

under

The research on those topics and the
Impetus:Whatapreparation

great

for

presentations

wereintensive and time-consuming. The co-opportunity at the 15th Polar Law

authors have started researching on the

Symposium!

subject matters around mid-August, withthe guidance of their professor. They madeIn the morning of the second day of thea practice presentation before leaving

Symposium, the co-authors of this paper

3 ArCS II website: https://www.nipr.ac.jp/arcs2/e/info/essential2-2022/

89

Japan,utilizinglaw

Assembly (ACA). With 2,000 participants

seminar at GSICS, with several usefulfrom both Arctic and non-Arctic states, thecomments from two other professors and a

ACA was one of the best opportunities todozen students of GSICS’ International Law

build human networks with the Arctic

Program.

theexperts. The co-authors were able toPowerPoint presentations were done inobserve the sensitive political positions ofconsultation with the professor during the

China, Korea and Japan as regards the CAO

snow storm in Akureyri, just a few days

Fisheries

before the Symposium. All these efforts

participation in breakout sessions. It wasbore fruit in the presentations, as they

useful to obtain information from theattracted several questions from the floor.

participants on the implementation of the

The co-authors were very grateful to theAgreement

friendliness of the Polar Law Symposium

Conference of the Parties at the end of

towards early-career scholars and to theNovember 2022, as none is yet available

academic encouragements received frompublicly. These experiences will be shared

its participants.

with other graduate students at GSICS in

The

the

final

international

revisionstoAgreementsuchthrough

as

the

their

inauguralorder to further enhance interests andThroughout the two-day 15 PLS, the co-academic

authors exchanged their thoughts andstudiesregarding

Arcticinternational law at Kobe University andopinions with other participants regarding

more generally in Japan.

the Arctic and Antarctic legal and policy
issues. They were very much encouraged

In conclusion, the participation in the Polarby the participation of master’s andLawdoctoral students from all over the world,

assistance of ArCS II Overseas Fellowshipinterested in polar legal and policy matters.

Program and the educational assistance

From interactions with them, the co-from GSICS and PCRC, enabled Japanese

authorsofmaster’s students to identify and propose

incorporating knowledge and perspectives

solutions to the legal challenges facing thefrom other academic fields such as natural

Arctic through their research and oral

science into the research of legal study,

presentations. This is an important means

since issues in the Arctic cannot be

for Japan, as a non-Arctic state, toresolved by international law alone. They

contribute to the development of Arctic

also participated in the 2022 Arctic Circle

governance based on the Rule of Law.

realizedtheimportance90

Symposium,

with

the

financialRussia’s international Arctic policy after the invasion of
Ukraine:Experts’ voices in the domestic media
Marina Lomaeva,a Fujio Ohnishi a

In the second year of Russia’s chairmanshipis to shed some light on the discussionof the Arctic Council (AC), the other seven-involving

member states unanimously condemned

academia, as transmitted by the popular

its invasion of Ukraine and suspended

media to the general public.

cooperation with Russia, later partiallymembersoftheRussianRussian scientists have traditionally been

resuming the Council’s work on projects

influential in the Arctic community, havenot involving Russia (AC a, 2022; AC b,

long-established ties with their foreign2022). The Barents Euro-Arctic Council

counterparts, and have communicated with

(BEAC), the International Arctic Science

them via conferences and meetings held

Committee (IASC), and UArctic took similar

within and outside Russia, visited Arctic-

steps (BEAC, 2022; IASC, 2022; UArctic,

related research institutions all over the2022). This isolation – along with security

world,

challenges posed by Finland and Sweden’s

and

have

joinednumerousinternational research projects (many ofdecision to join NATO – became a major

which have been put on hold after the start

topic in Russia’s domestic media, as theof the invasion) (Breum, 2022).

Arctic narrative has traditionally been highThe scope of our study ranged from digitalon the agenda in Putin’s Russia (similar toIzvestia,
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, and RIA Novosti) to
local papers (e. g. Sankt-Peterburgskie
Vedomosti) and portals specializing in the
Arctic and international issues (such as Go
Arctic, Arctic: Territory of Dialogue, Russianbroadsheets

the Soviet period).
This short paper is a report on the
preliminary results of a study reviewing theassessments of the current situation andforecasts by Russian experts published in
March-October 2022 in the domestic,
government-controlled media. Its purposea Hokkaido University Arctic Research Center

91

(such

as

International
website etc.).

Affairs

Council(RIAC)’s

the legitimacy of AC (Danyuk citedin Kazargin, 2022).

The experts quoted represent such centers○ The

situationisfurtherof international relations research in Russia

exacerbated by proposals of new

as MGIMO University, Saint-Petersburg

cooperation frameworks excluding

State University, Russian Academy of

Russia such as Nordic Plus or Arctic

Sciences Institutes (the Institute of WorldCouncil 2.0 (see Kirchner, 2022;

EconomyRelationsRogoff, 2002). Such steps may(IMEMO), Institute of Northern Europe

jeopardize the Arctic foothold ofetc.),

andandInternational

think

(the

Russiansuch states as Denmark (connected

Council,

Russianto the Arctic only via Greenland)Institute for Strategic Studies, Institute ofand the US, which is facing serious

Regional Expertise etc.).

competition

International

tanks

Affairs

from

China

(as

demonstrated, for instance, by

It should be kept in mind that the Russiancomparison of the two states’

government further tightened its control

icebreaker fleet) (Belukhin, 2022;

over the media and research institutions

Fedorov, 2002).

after the invasion, so the authors of the● Russia

articles and the experts they interviewed

may

move

to

other

had to weigh each word so as not to beinternational Arctic forums. If thecharged with violating the repressive

current deadlock persists, Russia will

legislation adopted on March 4 after thehave to consider such alternative

start of the hostilities (Meduza, 2022).

forums for discussion of the Arctic

The

main

pointsoftheagenda as the Arctic Circle or Arctic

reviewed

Frontiers (Lipunov, 2022; Zhuravel,

commentaries, columns and interviews2022; Korchunov, 2022).

may be summarized as follows:● The

Arcticseven’s

jeopardizes

thegovernancestructure● Russia should focus on its domestic

decisioncurrent

Arctic agenda and cooperate with

Arcticandnon-Arctic states. In the face of thetheboycott by the rest of the AC states,

privileged position of the Arctic

Russia will concentrate its efforts onstates.

the domestic Arctic agenda, inviting○ Decision on the exclusion of Russia

non-Arctic states such as China orfrom the AC by the rest of its

India to join partnerships with Russian

memberthepublic bodies and private companies

consensus as the decision-making

for the development of the Russian

rule of this forum and undermines

Arctic zone (AZ) (Lipunov, 2022;

statesbreaches

92

Zhuravel, 2022; Arctic: Territory ofinternational

Dialogue, 2022).

cooperation in the Arctic are crucial
the Russian AZ, although theyclosed to unfriendly states. The

emphasize Russia’s self-sufficiency

closure of the Northern Sea Route to(Koktysh cited in Kazargin, 2022).

the vessels of unfriendly states is the
security

measureandfor the sustainable development of● The Northern Sea Route may benecessarydialogue

2. Russia’s

indeparture

from

its

response to NATO’s expansion and its“exclusionist” Arctic stance vs.

military maneuvers in the Arctic

apprehensions(Fedorov, 2022).

encroachment of “extra-regional”
players. The gradual worsening of● AC breakup is detrimental to Arctic
researchandthe relations with the rest of the ACenvironmental

members led Russia to reconsider its

protection. Scientific research in the“exclusionist”

Arctic, which is pivotal to studying theArctic. On the other hand, thethe largest Arctic state (Lipunov, 2022;

experts show apprehensions about

Mikhailichenko,

the consequences of the breakup of2022).

the Arctic states’ regional unity and● Science diplomacy may be a way
out

of

the

deadlock.

the advance of “extra-regional”

Scienceplayers such as China or the UK

diplomacy, in which non-state actors(Lipunov, 2022; Izvestia, 2022).

are the key players, may pave the way

3. Hopes for mediation by theout of the current deadlock. The

expert community vs. Russian

expert community should act in theinterests of humanity in general(Sergunin,

Devyatkin

cited

in

the

Russian

grip

over

educationandresearch,the expert community could be
discourse

beneficial,

domestic

experts’impressive

theviews,

following“antithetical”

dialogueconsidering
recordofthescientificcooperation in the Arctic since thepropositions may be distilled:
1. Internationaltightening

media

communicatingthegovernment’s

media. Although the mediation by

Sukhoverkova, 2022).
From(formerly

Arctic states’ involvement in therequires the participation of Russia as
2022;

stanceshared with Canada) on the non-impacts of global climate change,

Labetskaya,

overMurmansk

Initiative,itappears

problematic in view of the tightandcontrol (financial, regulatory) of thecooperation vs. self-sufficiency infederal agencies over research andthe Arctic. Most experts concur that93

educational

institutions

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine [in English].

andactivities, as well as the media.

URL:

https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-

We will continue monitoring the Russiancooperation-following-russias-invasion-

experts’ assessments and forecasts andof-ukraine/

their coverage in the Russian media as partof the larger Arctic-related policy discourse

AC b. 8 June 2022. Joint Statement on

in Russia. Next steps could be to include
independent media as sources, to broaden

Limited Resumption of Arctic Council
Cooperation[in
English].
URL:

the scope of the study to other non-statehttps://www.state.gov/joint-statement-

actors such as subnational governments,

on-limited-resumption-of-arctic-council-

businesses and Indigenous communities,

cooperation/and to trace the Arctic and non-Arctic

Arctic: Territory of Dialogue. “Prospects forstates’ academia responses to their Russiancounterparts’statements.

These

International Cooperation in the Arctic

steps

Discussed

would allow us to explore the impact ofcooperation,

and
and

broader

Arcticnumerous

regional(last

10.11.2022;

inaccessed

Economic

Forum”.
URL:

https://forumarctica.ru/news/na-pmefotsenili-perspektivy-mezhdunarodnogosotrudnichestva-v-arktike-/

members of the Arctic community.
References

Saint-Petersburg

20.06.2022.

forums involving Russian actors and other5

theInternationalsuch a dialogue on the future of scientificcollaboration

at

BEAC. 4 March 2022. The joint statementon

Abdullin, R. “Point of No Return: Will Russia

of Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway,
Sweden and the European Union
regardingBarents
Euro-Arctic
cooperation[in
English].
URL:

Lose the Arctic?”. RIA Novosti. 21.07.2022.

https://www.barents-

Citing Zhuravel, V. (Leading researcher ofcouncil.org/news/joint-statement-of-

the Center of Northern Europe, thefinland-denmark-iceland-norway-

Institute of Europe of the Russian

sweden-and-the-european-union-

Academy of Sciences) and Ermakov, S.

regarding-barents-euro-arctic-(Leading

cooperation

Russianunlessotherwise specified)expertattheResearch

Coordination Center, Russian Institute forStrategic

Studies).

Belukhin, N. (Junior Research Fellow at

URL:

IMEMO

https://ria.ru/20220721/politika-

RAS)“Rebillious

Islands:

Greenland and the Faroes are Harboring

1803829818.html

RussianCouncil: RIAC.

Sovereign

Ambitions”.

AC a. 3 March 2022. Joint Statement on

International

Affairs

Arctic Council Cooperation Following

22.08.2022.
94

URL:

https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-Kazargin, A. “The US is Resuming thecomments/columns/arcticpolicy/nepokor

Meetings of the Arctic Council without

nye-ostrova-grenlandiya-i-farery-leleyut-

Russia”. Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti.

suverennye-ambitsii/

17.06.2022. Citing Koktysh, K. (Associate
professor at MGIMO) and Danyuk, N.

Bloom, E. T. “A New Course for the Arctic(AssistantCouncil in Uncertain Times” [in English].

headof the Institute ofStrategic Studies and Forecasting (ISIP) at

Arctic Today. 18.03.2022. URL:

the

RussianPeople’s

Friendshiphttps://www.arctictoday.com/a-new-

University).

course-for-the-arctic-council-in-

https://spbvedomosti.ru/news/country_a

uncertain-times/

nd_world/ssha-vozobnovit-rabotu-

Breum, M. 19 October 2022. “Thougharkticheskogo-soveta-bez-uchastiya-

URL:

Official Arctic Contacts with Russia arerossii/

Closed, an Array of Unofficial Bridges

Kirchner, S. “Nordic Plus: International

Could

Cooperation in the Arctic enters a New

Stay

Open”

[In

English].

ArcticToday. URL:

Era” [in English]. Polar Research and Policy

https://www.arctictoday.com/though-Initiative(PRPI).

6.03.2022.

URL:

https://polarconnection.org/nordic-plus-

official-arctic-contacts-with-russia-areclosed-an-array-of-unofficial-bridges-

cooperation-arctic/

could-stay-open/

Korchunov, N. “Russia is interested in the

Fedorov, E. “Ice Curtain: Russia vs. NATO indevelopment

of

URL: https://topwar.ru/200838-ledjanoj-

beneficial

Dialogue.

20.07.2022.

URL:

https://forumarctica.ru/news/rossija-

zanaves-rossija-protiv-nato-v-

zainteresovana-v-razvitii-

arktike.html

vzaimovygodnyh-form-

IASC. 7 March 2022. Statement on Ukraine
English].

mutually

cooperation in the Arctic”. Arctic: Territory

the Arctic”. 30.08.2022. Military Review.

[in

of

mezhdunarodnogo-sotrudnichestva-v-

URL:

arktike-/https://iasc.info/news/iasc-news/957iasc-statement-on-ukraine

Labetskaya, E. (Lead Researcher at IMEMO

Izvestia. “The US Will Cooperate with

Russia’s

RAS). “The Arctic as a Battleground:Finland and Sweden as Part of the New
ArcticStrategy”.

7.10.2022.

Leadership

Under

Threat”.

Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 29.05.2022. URL:

URL:

https://www.ng.ru/dipkurer/2022-05-

https://iz.ru/1406970/2022-10-07/ssha-

29/9_8447_arctic.html

budut-sotrudnichat-s-finliandiei-i-

Lipunov, N. (Analyst at the Institute forshvetciei-v-ramkakh-novoi-strategii-v-

International Studies, MGIMO University).

arktike95

“Northern Influence”. Izvestia. 17.03.2022.

cooperation-in-the-arctic-scenarios-

URL:

after-putins-war-on-ukraine/

https://iz.ru/1305812/nikita-

lipunov/severnoe-vliianie

Rogoff, A. “It’s Time for an Arctic Council

Meduza. 4 March 2022. “The Placard ‘** ***’

2.0” [in English]. Arctic Today. 5.03.2022.

is now ‘discreding the Russian Armed

URL:

Forces’, and replacing the price tags with

time-for-an-arctic-council-2-0/

cards with information on the casualties –https://www.arctictoday.com/its-

Sukhoverkova, A. “Arctic Sessions: Sciencea ‘fake’. What penalties will they entail?”

Diplomacy

URL: https://meduza.io/cards/gosduma-

as

the

key

to

Reviving

Cooperation in the Arctic”. Go Arctic.

predlagaet-davat-do-15-let-za-

13.08.2022. Citing Sergunin, A. (Professor

rasprostranenie-feykov-o-deystviyah-

at Saint-Petersburg State University) androssiyskih-voennyh-i-chto-zhe-u-nas-

Devyatkin, P. (Research Associate at The

schitaetsya-feykom

ArcticInstitute)

URL:

Mikhailichenko, D. “Without Russia: Howhttps://goarctic.ru/politics/arctic-

Realistic Is the Scenario of Her Leaving thesessions-nauchnaya-diplomatiya-klyuch-

Arctic Council?”. Go Arctic. 8.07.2022. URL:

k-vozrozhdeniyu-sotrudnichestva-v-

https://goarctic.ru/politics/bez-rossii-

arktike/realistichen-li-stsenariy-vykhoda-iz-

UArctic. 4 April 2022. UArctic Statement byarkticheskogo-soveta/
Riedel,

A.

et

al.

“What

the Board of UArctic [in English]. URL:
Futureforhttps://www.uarctic.org/news/2022/4/uar

Cooperation in the Arctic? Scenarios After

ctic-actions-on-ukraine

Putin’s War on Ukraine” [in English]. Blog

Viakhireva, N. (RIAC Program Manager).

of the German Institute of Development
and Sustainability (IDOS). 16.03.2022.

“On Pause: Dialogue with Russia in the
Arctic” [in English], Russian International

URL:

Affairs Council: RIAC. 20.04.2022. URL:

https://blogs.idos-

https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-

research.de/2022/03/16/what-future-for-and-comments/analytics/on-pausedialogue-with-russia-in-the-arctic/

96

Intrinsic Value of Arctic Cooperation for Future Generations
Alexandra Middleton a

During last 30 years Arctic scientific

Denmark,

cooperation has created both tangible andSweden, and the United States issued aintangible

thejoint statement on March 3, 2022 3 to pause

institutes and intergovernmental fora likecooperation due to Russia’s invasion of

ArcticUkraine.

assets.

Council.

Tangibles
Intangibles

are
are

the

Finland,

Other

Iceland,

Norway,cooperation

avenuesknowledge networks, relationships, and the

between all eight Arctic countries are alsopoolpaused,ofsharedexpertiseofArctice.g., the Barents Euro-Arctic

researchers from around the globe built on

Council suspended activities involving

principles of trust and respect for scientific

Russiainthe

Barents

Euro-Arctic

4

rigor. Science from the Arctic and about thecooperation and the Northern Dimension

Arctic is used, for example, in International

followed sued 5. Considering the Arctic

Panel on Climate Change reports 1, incooperation

negotiations

oncountries the following questions need toand many otherbe addressed: Why do we have Arctic

initiatives that are crucial for sustainable

cooperation in the first place? What is at

development

stake? How do we continue?

on

the

Biological Diversity

2

Convention

worldwide.

The

Arcticvoid

betweenall

Arcticcooperation via the Arctic Council, theprimary intergovernmental cooperation, is
on pause. Canada, the Kingdom ofa Postdoctoral Researcher, Oulu Business School, University of Oulu, Email: Alexandra.middleton@oulu.fi
1 Abram, N., Carolina, A., Bindoff, N. L., & Cheng, L. (2019). Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing

Climate. Intergov. Panel Clim. Chang, 1, 1-36.
2 UN Biodiversity Negotiations. https://www.conservation.org/events/biodiversity-negotiations.
3 US Department of State (2022, March). Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia’s Invasion of
Ukraine. US Department of State. 3, March 2022. https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperationfollowing-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/.
4 The Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation (2022, March). Statements regarding Barents Euro-Arctic cooperation. The Barents
Euro-Arctic Cooperation. 4, March 2022. https://www.barents-council.org/news/joint-statement-of-finland-denmarkiceland-norway-sweden-and-the-european-union-regarding-barents-euro-arctic-cooperation
5 EU External Action (2022, March). Northern Dimension Policy: Joint Statement by the European Union, Iceland andNorway on suspending activities with Russia and Belarus. EU External Action. 8, March 2022.
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/northern-dimension-policy-joint-statement-european-union-iceland-and-norwaysuspending_en.

97

1

Why do we have Arctic cooperationinternational researchers. These challenges

in the first place?

are here today, and they are not going toThe

Arcticregions

unprecedented

aredisappear unless something is done.

undergoingchangesboth2

environmentally and socio-economically.

As it stands, humanity and other species

The impact of climate change is the mostare facing existential threat due to climate

pronounced here. Scientists have now

crisis. Adverse effects of unmitigatedfound that the Arctic area is warming up
even

fasterthan

previously

climate change could endanger survival ofthought.

the species and permanently change the

Researchers reported on August 11, 2022,

earth. Future generations do not havein Communications Earth & Environment

control over the kind of world we will leavethat over the last 40 years, the averagetotemperature in the Arctic has risen almost
four

times

as

fast

as

the

have

shown

the

accordingtothepolitical priority 10. We have a responsibility

averageto ensure future generations are given theopportunity to thrive. Future generations

to three times faster than everywhere else.

are fundamentally disempowered: they will

From a social perspective, the Arctic isdemographic

which

representation an important moral andtemperature in the Arctic to be rising two

experiencing

them,philosopher Nick Bostrom makes theiraveragetemperature around the world 6. Previous
studies

What is at stake?

inherit the world and society we leave

challenges,

behind yet have no influence in how ourrapid urbanization and the emergence ofsocieties are governed. They are unable to

new industries 7. Intensification of extractive

vote and are not considered by our legal

industries, increased inequality, plastic

systems, the rights of future generations

pollution 8, loss of biodiversity and energy

are compromised due to non-existence

insecurity 9 are just few challenges facing

challenge, non-identity challenge, and their

the Arctic. Monitoring and analysis of these

unactionable

trends require a large scientific base as wellrights 11.

Yet

futuregenerations, including our children andas coordination and cooperation between

6 Rantanen, M., Karpechko, A. Y., Lipponen, A., Nordling, K., Hyvärinen, O., Ruosteenoja, K., ... & Laaksonen, A. (2022). The

Arctic has warmed nearly four times faster than the globe since 1979. Communications Earth & Environment, 3(1), 1-10.
7 ECONOR (2020). The Economy of the North. Sustainable Development Working Group. Arctic Council.
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/2611.
8 Arctic Council (2021). Plastics in the Arctic. https://www.arctic-council.org/explore/topics/ocean/plastics/.
9 Gjørv, G. H., Lanteigne, M., & Sam-Aggrey, H. (Eds.). (2020). Routledge handbook of Arctic security. Routledge.
10 Bostrom, N. (2013). Existential risk prevention as global priority. Global Policy, 4(1), 15-31.
11 Gosseries, A. (2017). On future generations’ future rights. In Environmental Rights (pp. 335-363). Routledge.

98millions of future generations are all

Israel (active during 2001-2008) 14, thesignificant.

Finnish Committee for the Future wasestablished in 1993 and is still active 15 andHowever, it is not easy to represent

thegenerations that do not yet exist and do
not

have

a

voice.

Professor

institutions for future generations, theneed to address this issue at the UN levelhas been evident since 2012 17. The UN

claims that there is a tendency to neglect

report “Our Common Agenda” from 2021

long-term environmental risks and thatlooks ahead to the next 25 years anddemocracy is partial towards present. In the
futuregenerations

Generations

2016 16. Apart from the creation of national

Future Generations: Political Presentism
and Democratic Trusteeship” from 2010 12of

FutureCommissioner has been operational sinceDennisThompson in his essay “Representing

context

Welsh

represents the vision on the future ofshort-

globaltermism means discounting future well-cooperation 18.

“Our

CommonAgenda” claims that addressing risks to ourbeing for time preference, discounting

planet needs to be part of every decision,

future benefits due to uncertainty andevery policy, every investment and every

discounting the moral importance of futurebudget. It also recognizes how existential

people 13.

risk reduction is beneficial for those alive
today, but an overwhelming amount of theStill there is a hope that the interests offuture generations have started to bevalue accrues to future generations.

recognized. Several countries have had

The UN declaration on Human Rights 19

initiatives to address the rights of futurecelebrated its 70th anniversary in 2018. The

generations, e.g., The Commission for

UN is currently working on a Declaration on

Future Generations was established in

12 Thompson, D. F. (2010). Representing future generations: political presentism and democratic trusteeship. Critical review

of international social and political philosophy, 13(1), 17-37.
13 González-Ricoy, I., & Gosseries, A. (Eds.). (2016). Institutions for future generations. Oxford University Press.
14Foundation for Democracy and Sustainable Development (2022). Knesset Commission for Future Generations.
https://www.fdsd.org/ideas/knesset-commission-future-generations/
15 Parliament of Finland (2022). The Committee for the Future.
https://www.eduskunta.fi/EN/valiokunnat/tulevaisuusvaliokunta/Pages/default.aspx
16 Future Generations Commissioner for Wales (2022). https://www.futuregenerations.wales/about-us/future-generationscommissioner/
17 Ward, H. (2012). Committing to the future we want: a High Commissioner for Future Generations at Rio+ 20. Londres:Foundation for Democracy and Sustainable Development. World Future Council. https://www.fdsd.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/Committing-to-the-future-we-want-main-report.pdf
18 UN (2021). Our Common Agenda. https://www.un.org/en/common-agenda
19 UN (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-humanrights

99

Future Generations. The current draft paper3

makes a distinction between youth andCurrently, formal cooperation channels

future generations (the Elements Paper 20

between seven Arctic countries and Russia

defined Future Generation as ‘all thoseare paused. Still, at the same time, thegeneration that do not yet exist, are yet tomessage issued by the University of thecome and who will eventually inherit this

Arctic is that” “collaboration between

planet’). The draft paper is built on

individual researchers in
Thematic
Networks and educational activities forstudents shall continue where possible” 21.

recognition of the need to identify, monitor
and manage existential risks as key toensuring that Future Generations can

Similarly, the Human Rights Committee of

benefit from the full range of measures

the Council of Finnish Academies statedidentified in the Sustainable Developmentthat “collaboration with individuals can in

Goals.
ArcticscientificcooperationisHow do we continue?

many cases be continued or evenreinforced during times of crisis” 22.

anInternational

indispensable part of our human activity

ScienceCouncil,in

its

statement from February 28, 2022, warns

toward reducing existential risks andthat “our capacity to work collaboratively

cannot be neglected. The Arctic is an

the Arctic are likely to experience evenon global challenges, and on cutting edge
research such as Arctic and space research,is only equal to our capacity to maintainstrong collaboration amidst geopoliticalturmoil. Ultimately the isolation andexclusionofimportantscientificcommunities is detrimental to all” 23.

graver effects of climate change first-hand.

We need to ask ourselves what happens if

essential piece in the puzzle to understandand mitigate climate change; it is home to
Arctic Indigenous Peoples and local Arctic
peoplealreadyconsequencesofexperiencing
climatethechange.

Moreover, the future generations living incooperation between Arctic researchers
does not continue. How can we address

20 UN (2022). Elements Paper for the Declaration for Future Generations. https://www.un.org/pga/76/wp-

content/uploads/sites/101/2022/09/Elements-Paper-Declaration-for-Future-Generations-09092022.pdf
21 University of the Arctic (2022). UArctic Actions on Ukraine. https://www.uarctic.org/news/2022/4/uarctic-actions-on-

ukraine/22 The Council of Finnish Academies (2022). Human Rights Committee’s recommendations for organising research andcollaboration during the times of crisis. https://academies.fi/en/uutiset/human-rights-committees-recommendations-fororganising-research-and-collaboration-during-times-of-crisis/
23 International Science Council (2022). International Science Council Statement on Ukraine.
https://council.science/current/news/isc-statement-ukraine/100

existential risk and safeguard the interests

scientists. We need to utilise the crucialof future generations in the Arctic andintangible

worldwide?

community

expertise and related scientific networks.

should be empowered to inform, create

One option could be the creation of anawareness, cooperate, and be engaged in

Envoy for the Arctic or Arctic programme,

science diplomacy when the future of thefor instance, under the UN cooperation

Arctic and the whole world is at stake whileumbrella to represent the interests of all

government-to-government

cooperation

Arctic People and the interests of futureis on pause. Scientific cooperation needs togenerations. The Envoy for the Arctic cancontinue despite political tensions.

be

The

scientificexplicitly

addressscientifictofacilitate

sciencetheArcticinvolving

inclusion. Furthermore, dialogue on the

futureavenues for scientific cooperation on

generations, existential risks, and long-climate change and human adaptation toterm thinking. Let’s engage in scenario

climate change in the Arctic needs to beplanning: what if scientific cooperation

initiated. As the international scientificdoes not continue in the long perspective?

community, we are the holders of the

Can the Arctic science community self-

intrinsic value of Arctic cooperation, andorganize, or does it need a facilitating

we need to act and come up with theagent?

solutions to be accountable to future
generations and preserve our planet and all

We should consider different options forsustained

Arcticusing the principles of impartiality andcall it “Our Common Arctic Agenda”, in
we

in

of

scientists and Arctic Indigenous Peoples

adopt the same thinking for the Arctic andwhich

entrusted

cooperation

Inspired by “Our Common Agenda”, we canassets

Arcticcooperation

life.

between101Changing Arctic governance landscape: The Arctic Council
navigating through geopolitical turbulence
Fujio Ohnishi a

1

War period 2. Some have argued that the

Introduction

Arctic international cooperation would

The Arctic governance landscape has been
experiencing

profoundchangesgeopoliticalturbulence

since

begin to move into the ‘two Arctic’, withamid

closer cooperation between the Western

Russia’s

States in the Arctic on the one hand andunprovoked aggression against Ukraine

intensified regional cooperation between

initiated in February this year. The mostRussia and China on the other 3. Therefore,

distinct change is the widespread moveinvestigating the prospect for the Arctic

suspending cooperation with Russia, thatgovernance landscape is an emerging andis, the ‘deep freeze’ in cooperation withcrucial agenda for understanding theRussia 1. The Arctic Council, the EU’s

future stability and peace in the region. For

Northern Dimension and the Barents-Eurothe moment, arrangements of Arctic

Arctic Council have all suspended theircooperation

activities involving Russia. One can add theArcticEconomic

Council,aextentplatforms

hold

and

have

abolished. Besides the progress of Russia’s
war in Ukraine, which exceeds the scope oflist. Considering the fact that these were to
significant

onpossibilities both to be resumed and to benon-governmental international body, to theaarethis study, the key factor deciding suchforpossibilities could be the function provided

cooperation with a Russia that was law-bybinding and predictable after the collapse

thesecretariats

ofcooperative

frameworks since they are supposed toof the USSR, this reality might have

serve not for individual member states but

implications for the region and entail anfor the interest of arrangements. Bearing

end of ‘a zone of peace’ in the post-Colda Hokkaido University Arctic Research Center, fujio.ohnishi@arc.hokudai.ac.jp
1 Paal Sigurd Hilde, “Deep Freeze: Security and International Relations in the Arctic Following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine”,

Security Policy Working Paper (No. 8, Federal Academy for Security Policy), 2022, ISSN 2366-0805.
2 Stefan Kirchner, “Nordic Plus: International Cooperation in the Arctic Enters a New Era”, Polar Connect, March 6, 2022
<https://polarconnection.org/nordic-plus-cooperation-arctic/> (accessed 29 June 2022).
3 Timo Koivurova, Marc Lanteigne, “One Arctic or Two? Polar Geopolitics in the Wake of the Ukraine Conflict”, Polar
Connect, May 11, 2022 <https://polarconnection.org/one-arctic/> (accessed 4 August 2022).

102

this perspective in mind, the author

believeconducted

exceptionalism’.

interviews

withseveraldiplomats and officers related to the Arctic‘Arctic

allow the Arctic Council to stand outside

research.

the geopolitical clouts. The Council for theArctic Council on holdfirst time in its history risked breaking
down.

The Arctic Council, being established incurrently

speech of 1987 and efforts taken under thepredicted

sittinginthechairmanshipposition, and proposed alternatives such as

Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy,

the ‘Nordic Plus’ 4 and the ‘Arctic Council

has been a key international cooperation

2.0’ 5. Judging the situation and acting

tackling Arctic issues such as environment

accordingly on March 3, seven members ofprotection and sustainable development,

the Arctic Council (hereafter mentioned as

except ‘matters related to military security’.

the A7) issued a joint statement saying,

Although it is merely a ‘high level forum“ourwith no legally-binding authority over thealikeexperts

being the member of the Council andof peace’ made by Gorbachev’s Murmansk

not

Severalinfeasibilities of cooperating with Russia,

1996 and succeeding the spirit of the ‘zone

states,offull-scale aggression in Ukraine did notsummarizes the findings out of this

Arcticrobustness

Contrary to this background, the RussianCouncil in September 2022. This article

2

thestatesaretemporarily

pausing

participation in all meetings of the Arctic

international

Council and its subsidiary bodies, pendingorganizations, it was believed the Council

consideration of the necessary modalities

to be the most important building blocks

that can allow us to continue the Council’s

cementing the region in cooperation andimportant work in view of the current

thus keeping it predictable, stable andcircumstances”. They claimed that the ‘core

peaceful. It’s 26 years’ experience of theprinciples of sovereignty and territorial

well-functioning and no interruption from

integrity’ based on international law which

the geopolitical clouts, most eminently as

had long underpinned the work of thein the case of the 2014 Russia’s invasion to

Arctic Council was flagrantly violated 6.

Crimea, led Arctic officials and observers to

While this move was unilaterally done, it is

4 Kirchner op.cit.

5 Alice Rogoff, “It’s Time for An Arctic Council 2.0”, Polar Connect, March 5, 2022 <https://polarconnection.org/arcticcouncil-2/> (accessed 29 June 2022).
6 Office of the Spokesperson, “Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine”, U.S.
Department of State, March 3, 2022 <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-followingrussias-invasion-of-ukraine/> (accessed 29 March 2022).

103

worth noting that the official account of theRussia, arguing that the Arctic Council

Twitter of the Council updated andshould remain the key international forum

reiterated its pausing in participation all

for the region and be resumed as soon as

meetings in the next day.

possible 9. Accusing the A7’s decision,

Thestatement

causedconcerns

Russiaon

workcontributing

totoimplementtheCouncil’s programs domestically. Thereprospects of the Council, especially its
importantcontinued

were also demands from different local

thecommunities including the Indigenous

communities of Circumpolar North inpeoples for resuming the work of the Arctic

terms of adaptation to the impacts ofCouncil.

climate change, sustainable development
and environmental protection. Importantly,

Circumvented from the situation being

the joint statement stressed the “enduring

locked in the imperative both of immediate

value of the Arctic Council for circumpolar

restart of the Council’s work and ofcooperation” and a “responsibility to the

avoiding cooperating with the war fighting

peoplethe

Russia, the A7 announced to resume theirindigenous peoples, who contributed towork in the Arctic Council with the projects

and benefit from the important workthat did not involve the participation of theundertaken in the Council” 7. Arctic officials

Russian Federation on June 8 10. It is no

generally understand its importance andwonder that in the announcement, the A7

responsibility that the Arctic Council has

stressed

taken so that there was a broad set of

responsibility to the people of the Arctic,

consensuses on maintaining the Arctic

including Indigenous peoples 11.

of

the

Arctic,includingtheimportance

of

their

Council without changing its membershipand structure8. It was no surprising with

7 Ibid.
8 Astri Edvardsen, “USA’s Arctic Coordinator: “We Do Not Want to Change the Structure or Membership of the Arctic

Council”, High North News, May 18. 2022 < https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/usas-arctic-coordinator-we-do-not-wantchange-structure-or-membership-arctic-council > (accessed 29 June 2022).
9 Astri Edvardsen, “Arctic Council Paused: The Search for A Future for Arctic Cooperation Continues”, High North News,
April 27, 2022 <https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/arctic-council-paused-search-future-arctic-cooperation-continues>(accessed 29 June 2022).
10 Trine Jonassen, “The Arctic Council: The Arctic 7 Resume Limited Work Without Russia”, High North News, June 8, 2022
<https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/arctic-council-arctic-7-resume-limited-work-without-russia> (accessed 29 June2022).
11 Office of the Spokesperson, “Joint Statement on Limited Resumption of Arctic Council Cooperation”, U.S. Department ofState, June 8, 2022 < https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-ofukraine/> (accessed 29 June 2022).

104

3

Where the Arctic meets global - thecountries had a will to cooperate withissue of setting modalities to resume

Russia in the medium or long term, if not a

the work

shorter term. Without such a politicalmessage, the Arctic governance landscape

In addition to such the responsibility, an

would risk deteriorating to the point of nourgent issue is to tackle with global
warming. In so doing, it is needed toreturn.

resume scientific collaboration with Russia

Against this background, however, setting

in areas like monitoring and observation intheArctic

Ocean

and

its

agreeable modalities among the A7 would

landmass.

be

Needless to say, Russia occupies a half of

among

economic zones. Addressing the impacts of
on

the

A7

according

to

their

geopolitical realities in relation to Russia 13.

climate change in the field of research has
implications‘Domestic’collaboration with Russia would be diverse

including territorial seas and the exclusive

significant

straightforward.

pressures for resuming the Arctic scientific

the Arctic landmass and marine areas

also

not

In sum, setting such modalities represent

local

crossroads

communities across borders. In this vein,

whereArcticofficers

anddiplomats meet with requirements fromthe discussions on possible modalities tolager

resume the work in the Arctic Council

geopoliticallandscape

such

as

Russia’s war in Ukraine and global strategic

centered on how to resume collaborationcompetition.

with Russia at scientific level 12.

4

Pending consideration of the necessary

Navigating

throughpolitical

turbulence with cautious optimism

modalities to resume the work is also
important in terms of saving the Arctic
governance intact. Even though it is not

Thesepractical to set realistic modalities todevelopments

described

above

brought the Arctic governance into a

resume the work in the Arctic Council while

uniqueRussia does not stop resorting its politicalsituation.

The

projects

andprograms installed by the Strategic Plan

agenda by means of military power in

2021 to 2030 at the Reykjavik ministerial

Ukraine, placing a sort of reservation inmeeting in May 2021 are now separately

resuming cooperation showed that the A7

operated in Russia which holds the current

12 An Interview with officials at the Arctic Council Secretariat, Tromø, Semptember 14, 2022.
13 An Interview with officials at the Arctic Council Secretariat, Tromø, Semptember 14, 2022. Same is observed in aninterview with Mr. Pétur Ásgeirsson, Ambassador, Senior Arctic Official, Director for bilateral and regional affairs, at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland, Reykjavik, Sempember 7, 2022.

105chairmanship and in the A7 countries.

problem to hold a ministerial meeting in

Norway is supposed to take over the

next May.

chairmanship from Russia in Spring 2023.

Under this circumstance, what seems to be

In fact, Norway began the preparation forin a crucial position for successfully

its own priorities for the next term early thisnavigating the situation is the Arctic

year 14. The procedure that chairmanshipCouncil Secretariat (ACS), which serves notmember state is supposed to propose afor the interest of individual member state

date and the location for a biennial

but one for the whole. In an interview, theministerial meeting at least six months in

Director of the Arctic Council Secretariat

advance signifies that the transition of

Mr. Mathieu Parker explained the situation,

chairmanship from Russia to Norway is the“currently, the secretariat started working

first and foremost important agenda now

with Norway preparing their incomingin the Arctic Council (See Art. 18 of thechairmanship. We are also involved in

Arctic Council Rules of Procedure). In a

discussions with current and incoming

normal setting, there used to review thechairmanship to determine on how theaccomplishments during the term of theoutgoingchairmanshipandprocess of transition unfolds this time

discussaround. Because our governing documents

priorities for the next chairmanship in theoccasionofmeeting.

Such

the

biennial

agreements

and procedures are not developed underministerialonthis type of situation in mind, it will be atheseunique transition process. But we help it asmatters formalize in a format of asmooth as possible. We have ‘cautious

ministerial declaration, which need to be

optimism’” 16.

on the basis of consensus. The Senior Arctic
Officials (SAOs) are supposed to support

5

and give advice to the transition process ofthechairmanshipamong

Conclusion

Big picture is important to grab the trends

others 15.

of times but always involves speculations

However, the SAOs’ advisory function isand often misses to overestimate things. To

also severely limited under the current

avoid such mistakes in the similar vein, thesituation. These difficulties amount to thebig picture needs to be scrutinized

14 Trine Jonassen, “Gathering Input for Norway’s Chairmanship”, High North News, January 25, 2022
<https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/gathering-input-norways-chairmanship-arctic-council> (accessed 17 September2022).
15 Senior Arctic officials meet at least twice a year. Their general function is to oversee the work and ensure that thepriorities of chairmanship are met.
16 An Interview with officials at the Arctic Council Secretariat, Tromø, Semptember 14, 2022.

106carefully. In the Arctic context, it happened

latter issue the role of the ACS would beonce when the Russian expedition placed

important especially when normal contacts

its national flag on the seabed under theamong state representatives are severelypole in the summer of 2007. The event

restricted. It also revealed that negotiations

incurred speculations on scramble foron how transition uphold was about toresources in the Arctic, but it tuned out

start.

misleading later. Now, we are facing with

understanding of the changing Arctic

the moment that risks speculating or

governance landscape this research needs

overestimating about “what could be thetolonger-term consequences of the war” ininvestigation on the Arctic Council andthe Arctic 17.

other

The

Arcticgovernancelandscape

In

be

order

to

improvecomplemented
Northernbythefurtherarrangementsofinternational cooperation.

isinevitably affected by geopolitical clouts as

6they now loom into everywhere in theThis work was supported both by Grant-in-world. The Arctic could not stand out of it

Acknowledgement:

Aid for Scientific Research(C) (22K01352)

as it did before and will continue to standand (20K01449). It was also supported

in the midst of it for at least a certain time

partially by the Arctic Challenge forbeing. However, this process does not

Sustainability II (ArCS II), Program Grant

undergo overnight. It incrementally andNumber JPMXD1420318865.

necessarily involves push and pull factors.
In this research the paper found that there
were two important issues related to the
Arctic Council in prospecting the Arctic
governance landscape. One is about themodalities to resume its work, and anotheris the transition of chairmanship from
Russia to Norway. It also found that in the

17 Timo Koivurova, Marc Lanteigne, op.cit.

107

A Heating Arctic
A Summary on the Legal Status of Military Operations in a
Foreign EEZ
Cedric Pfeiler a1

on both sides, the European and Russian. 1

Introduction

Most of the Arctic Ocean has been claimed

The Arctic Ocean area can be likened to a

by one state or another as part of its

family’s house – a small area and many

exclusive

actors, all vying for space. If the family is at

economic

zone

(EEZ)

or

continental shelf, and this has therefore

peace, this results in harmony, but once thecaused significant tension when one statefamily begins to fight, that utopia falls

starts a military training exercise in theapart. For decades since the Cold War, themilitary activities taking place in theregion.

cramped and controlled Arctic region have

The Law is unclear on the legality of military

been of little significance, but over the last

exercises in foreign EEZ. Some non-western

years, Russia’s military presence in thestates, however, most notably China, India,

Arctic Ocean region has become moreand Brazil, consider such military activities

aggressive in nature, and this, along withillegal without prior approval from theRussia’s illegal attacks on Ukraine, has

coastal state. 2 Although, it must be pointed

caused a rise in tension, calling for concern

out that western states and scholars,a Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. Email: cedric.pfeiler@ulapland.fi.
1 For more on the increasingly aggressive approach, see ‘The Study on Legal Analysis of Military Activities Hindering

Energy Installations in the Exclusive Economic Zone or International Water: Chornomornaftogaz Rigs Case in the Black Sea
and the NordBalt Cable Case in the Baltic Sea’ 8; For news sources, see, among others, ‘Northern Fleet Exercise Area
Overlaps into Norway’s EEZ amid Europe Tensions’ (The Independent Barents Observer)<https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/01/northern-fleet-will-exercise-maritime-border-norway-amid-europetensions> accessed 9 November 2022; Reuters, ‘Russia Starts Navy Drills in Barents Sea - Report’ Reuters (15 February2022) <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-starts-navy-drills-barents-sea-report-2022-02-15/> accessed 9
November 2022; ‘30 Russian naval vessels stage show of force near coast of Norway’ (The Independent Barents Observer)<https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/08/30-russian-naval-vessels-stage-show-force-coast-norway>
accessed 9 November 2022.
2 For more discussion on the non-Western approach see Keyuan Zou, ‘Peaceful Use of the Sea and Military Intelligence
Gathering in the EEZ’ in Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee (eds), Asian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 22 (2016) (Brill
Nijhoff 2018); Jing Geng, ‘The Legality of Foreign Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone under UNCLOS’ (2012)108

generally

tend

to

disagree:Military

It must be noted that the UNCLOS, often

operations

in

other

states’exclusive

consideredthe‘Constitution

Oceans,’ 5

due

to

economic zone are legal, or at least, anignoredissue.

3

Although

Russia,theadministration

and

its

of

the

far-reachingwidespread

European Union, and Norway actuallyacceptance, is unclear on the legality ofagree, their current status quo, wherein

military operations in

Russia continues to build up its military

reason for this is twofold and stems fromprowess in the region and is becoming

the history of the negotiations of UNCLOS.

more active and hostile, has brought about

Firstly, the post-World War II politicalthe current untenable situation.

landscape saw widespread decolonization

In this paper, I will define the conflicting

and new, small states were all vying for partof the pie and wanted more rights in thecurrent legal arguments surrounding theseas. 6 These new states, along withpossibility of military operations within aalready-existing politically weaker states,

foreign EEZ, and explore the real costbegan fighting for recognition and rights ingenerally, specifically in the Arctic. This

the seas. As a compromise between the

essay aims to bring this debate to the

new and old, powerful and weak, States,

forefront of legal issues again.
2

UNCLOS

2.1

Introduction

a foreign EEZ. The

they developed the EEZ.
A note on this debate is called for. It
regards the age-old debate between

The regulations on the law of the sea come

Grotius’s mare liberum theory, describingfrom the United Nations Convention on thean open sea, for all to access equally, and

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or customary

the mare clausum theory, wherein the sea

international law. Notably, both demand

is divided into sections for each state. Whilepeace and the peaceful use of the seas.

4

at first glance, the mare liberum theory

28 Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 22; Silvia Menegazzi, ‘Military Exercises in the Exclusive Economic
Zones: The Chinese Perspective’ [2015] Maritime Safety and Security Law Journal 15.
3 For examples of this see Murray, Jack Whitacre, Chapter 4: Military Activities in an EEZ – Law of the Sea (John Burgess,Lucia Foulkes, Philip Jones, Matt Merighi, Stephen ed); Menegazzi (n 2).
4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (entered into force 16 November 1994) 1835 UNTS 3 preamble, art 88,
301.
5 Tommy T. B. Koh, “A Constitution of the Oceans”, in: Myron H. Nordquist (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Dordrecht, 1985 xxxvii.
6 For information on this debate, including a group of (new) states, the Group of 77, see Boleslaw Adam Boczek, ‘Peacetime
Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Third Countries’ (1988) 19 Ocean Development and International Law
445, 448; See also generally Satya Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A
Commentary, vol III (Martinus Nijhoff) Volume II.

109

provides for equity, in reality, it provides for

Therefore, the extent of this rule is unclear

equality. Due to unequal

resources,

but can be viewed through the lenses ofstates have different levels of access to thethe different legal arguments contained in

7seas, and its resources. For example, while

UNCLOS. First, this section will scrutinize

the United States is able to traverse the sea

military operations with regard to theat relatively high speeds, another state

freedom of navigation, then compare

does not have the same resources and may

military operations with exploration of the

only be able to access a few nautical miles

EEZ, and finally analyze the principle of dueof sea. Conversely, it is often those states,

regard for the rights of other states.

therefore, that most need the sea for

2.2

sustenance and economic prosperity that

The first argument regards the extent of

do not have the resources to access the

freedom of navigation under UNCLOS. The

sea. As a result, less powerful states often

Corfu Channel case established that, underfound their resources exploited by morecustomary international law, the freedom

powerful global players. 8 The exclusiveof navigation did not limit the navigational

economic zone was created, among otherrights of military vessels in straights, but it

reasons, to remedy this.

also did not specify a scope. 10 In other

Secondly, the two opposing Superpowers

words, it did not determine whether it wasof the time – the Soviet Union and thejust the movement or also the operation ofUnited States – were not known for their
goodwill

towardeachother,

so

Freedom of navigation

its military hardware that was covered. The

ancase was, however, influential in theagreement would be groundbreaking.

creation of the freedom of navigation.

Therefore, to facilitate the negotiations,

UNCLOS later adopted and expanded thishighly contentious issues, such as militarydefinition but left unanswered many

operations, were left off the docket. 9 The

questions. Article 58 confers the rights

issue has, since then, once again comereferred to the high seas, listed in article 87,

front and center.

to the Exclusive Economic Zone. 11 While

7 Geng (n 2) 24 and; Charles E Pirtle, ‘Military Uses of Ocean Space and the Law of the Sea in the New Millennium’ (2000)

31 Ocean Development & International Law 7, 36.

8 See, for example, Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland) [1974] ICJ Rep 1974.
9 Note: articles 29-32 of UNCLOS do provide rules on warships, their responsibilities and their immunities; however,UNCLOS does not go into the extent of the freedom of navigation for the warships, or the operation military vessels. For
more on this, see Boczek (n 5) 448; Pirtle (n 6) 9; also, generally, for the Cold War and Western-centric law of the sea
regime, see Menegazzi (n 2).
10 Geng (n 2) 26; Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Albania) [1949] ICJ Rep 1949.
11 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (n 4) 58, 87.

110article 87 of UNCLOS does allow for theclaim there is no concrete answer in the law

freedom of navigation, the extent isand, therefore, cannot be bound by it. 15

unclear. For example, the question arises

Secondly, the scope of ‘operation of ships’

whether the use of weapons in naval

is inconclusive, and the definition of

exercises is included within the freedom of

military operation is currently non-existentnavigation, usually reserved for innocent

in the current law. 16 However, some havepassage. Additionally, article 58 itself goes

split the definition of military operations

further and commands that states “enjoy …

into

the freedoms … associated with themilitary

ships?

Firstly,

vessels to navigate the seas freely, without

this article referring to civilian ships only, or
includegroups. 17

navigation, relates to the right of military

articles bring about two questions: firstly, isitgeneralmovement rights, or the freedom of

operation of ships” within the EEZ. Both

does

two

disturbance. Secondly, operational rightsAnd

refer to the use of military equipment

secondly, what is the scope of thebeyond simple navigation. This includes‘operation of ships’?

“maneuvering,anchoring,

intelligence

firstquestion,thecollection, surveillance, military exercises,

Corfu

Channelcase

ordnance testing and firing, and surveys.” 18

equates civilian and military vessels. 12 This

The latter definition suggests that thefollows the line of thinking of the United

operations of military equipment wouldTo

answertheaforementioned

States and its western allies.

13

They arenot be accepted under the umbrella of the

of

the

freedom of navigation. This is not currently

negotiations of UNCLOS, who condemned

regulated by the law, however, andstates that restricted the freedom of

therefore requires codification.

supportedbythePresident

navigation. 14 Other states, including China,
point out the ambiguity here, though: they

12 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania (n 9).

13 Murray, Jack Whitacre, Chapter 4: Military Activities in an EEZ – Law of the Sea, p 4 (John Burgess, Lucia Foulkes, Philip

Jones, Matt Merighi, Stephen ed).
14 Some states, most notably Brazil, were vocal about their interpretation of the treaty. The President of the Conference(UNCLOS III) said to this: ‘Nowhere is it clearly stated whether a third state may or may not conduct military activities in the
exclusive economic zone of a coastal state. But, it was the general understanding that the text we negotiated and agreed
upon would permit such activities to be conducted.’ Geng (n 2).
15 Menegazzi (n 2) 59, 60, 65.
16 For the debate, see ibid 58; ‘Military Activities in the EEZ: Preventing Uncertainty and Defusing Conflict’ 260; Young-Kil
Park, ‘Different Voices on Military Activities in the EEZ’ (2011) 3 KMI International Journal of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
183, 184.
17 For example, Zou (n 2) 163; Pirtle (n 6) 8; Boczek (n 5).
18 Zou (n 2) 163.

111

2.3

Exploration

include scientific exploration by military
ships, as often done by China in the Arctic?

The second legal issue regards exploration.

What about weapons testing? How far

Article 56 of UNCLOS provides that thedoes “exploration” go?

coastal state has

More to the point, under UNCLOS, a“sovereign rights for the purpose ofcoastal state is given priority for Marine

exploring and exploiting, conserving

Scientific Research (MSR). While, in theseand managing the natural resources,

instances, the MSR is not exclusively for thewhether living or non-living, of thecoastal state, it requires notification. Could

waters superjacent to the seabed and of

it be that scientific research is protected

the seabed and its subsoil, and with

but not the fundamental security interests

regard to other activities for theof the state? 20 Logically, neighboring states

economic exploitation and exploration

operating military technology near orof the zone, such as the production ofwithin their respective borders may beenergy from the water, currents, andmore worrying for the other state. 21

winds [emphasis added];” 19

would, therefore, not be far-fetched toPrimarily this article is meant to refer toeconomicandscientificconsider military exploration of the EEZ as

exploitation.

requiring notification.

Beyond that, however, the article also
guarantees

sovereignrights

for

It

2.4

the

Due regard

exploration of a coastal state’s exclusive

The final legal argument to be madeeconomic

thisregards the due regard obligations at the

exploration, however, is unclear; the article

end of article 87 of UNCLOS, restricting thedecidedly allows for economic exploration,

freedoms of states, including the freedom

such as the production of energy orof navigation.

zone.

The

extentofexploration of hydrocarbons. However,“These freedoms shall be exercised by all

similarly, military exercises are meant toStates with due regard for the interests

provide for the exploration of an area andof the mechanisms to be used in times ofwar. Would such military exploration

19 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (n 4) art 56.
20 Zou (n 2) 164. In his article, Zou weighs the freedom of navigation with limitations such as the one clearly established in

UNCLOS for MSR.
21 Take, for example, the issue at hand on the second question in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland v. Albania (n 9), wherein Albania was apparently unable to ascertain the intent of the British Naval warships. For
further examples and analysis, see also Menegazzi (n 2) 57.

112

of other States in their exercise of thefreedom of the high seas.”rights, Article 69 of UNCLOS requires states22

to come to an equitable agreement, “taking
into account the respective importance ofAccording to the ICJ’s Chagos case, due

the interest involved.” 25 There is no

regard requires states to ensure that thepresumption of benefit to the coastal state,allocation of rights and obligations is equal

but instead, the importance of each party’s

and that each state shall not infringe on theinterest must be weighed against eachother’s rights. The Court makes clear that

other. It is easily argued that the integrity

the coastal state nor any other state hasof the coastal state is the most crucial

priority in claiming any right. A balanceinterest, as without which it cannot protect,based on the necessary information would

defend, and ensure its survival as abe required to strike a conclusion. 23 Of

sovereign state.

importance here is the emphasis often put
on sovereignty in international law and the

Looking back at the beginnings of maritime

necessity to protect that sovereignty. 24 As

delimitation,stated before, part of that sovereignty isestablished a territorial sea of three

the integrity and security of the state andnautical miles, or the distance the cannons

the right of a state to ensure another state

could shoot. Today, weaponry can go

is not actively working against it or at least

further, and surveillance is a serious threat

for the coastal state to be aware of theto national security, and therefore theactions in its area of influence.

protections, in the form of more autonomy

3over the EEZ, should be bolstered.

Discussion

rathermore states have highly capable military
the

that

there

shouldbeclearly

established rules in this regard. In theweaponry, the necessity for states to
in

rule

cannot not act in the EEZ of another state,

where technology is rapidly improving andsafetyshot”

construed to believe that a foreign state

impacts of a purely open ocean. In a timetheir“cannon

The argument herein should not be

Of issue with many states are the security

ensuretheauthor’s

Exclusive

opinion,asimpleruleofnotification would be sufficient. Therefore,

Economic Zone is not without merit. In

the safety of actors, both military andsuch cases, where there are non-attributed

otherwise, at sea are kept safe, as well as

22 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (n 4) art 87.

23 Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius [2019] ICJ Rep 2019.

24 For more on states in international law, reciprocity, and sovereignty, see Gleider I Hernández, International Law (Oxford
University Press 2019) chapter 1.
25 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (n 4) art 69.

113

the interests of the coastal state. To

military

appease the states insisting on keeping themilitarization of the oceans and attempted

oceans open to all, notification of theto ban military activities in the high seas. 26

coastal state may not necessarily allow theA reversion back to this policy for Russia is

coastal state to refuse the operation of

possible, however, unlikely, as the policies

military equipment by the non-coastalof both sides have become entrenched instate, or the coastal state may only refuse

the region, and changing it would bein certain situations.

tantamount to changing the balance ofmight,

wasagainstthepower in the area.

The situation in the Arctic is slightly
different, however. Here, there is noThis, however, does not mean that there isdisagreement by the states - the parties

no cause for concern. As stated in thelegally agree, but Russia is using it its

introduction, the war with Russia has

benefit, increasing its military maneuvers in

exacerbated the available legal structures,

the Arctic. It should be noted, however, thatand the posturing on both sides has not

the Soviet Union, before it gained its later

turned down the thermostat.

26 Boczek (n 5) 457.

114

Return Of Geopolitics: Navigating Through A New Normal In
The Arctic
Rashmi BR a
On 20 May 2021, when the 12th Arctic

resource ‘rush’ fuelled by climate change

Council Ministerial meeting adopted theand technology, overlapping maritime

first ‘Arctic Council Strategic Plan 2021-

claims2030’ 1, it marked the culmination of the

diplomatic relations.

Icelandic

chairmanship

and

more

ended and cooperation began. However,conflict that is geographically not in thestanding by that expression is the fact that

Arctic, but one that involves the Arctic

thestates. The post-Cold War achievement incooperative

mechanisms

successfully found ways to use diplomatic

danger. Does this mark the ‘return oftools, negotiate, initiate dialogue andgeopolitics’ to the region and its numerous

sustain the process.

institutions? This may or may not be the
new normal, but it certainly has impacted

In 2010, Norway and Russia signed thethe dynamics in the Arctic.

Treaty on the Maritime Delimitation and
the Cooperation in the Barents Sea and theArctic Ocean, ending a forty-year-old

Cooperation and sustaining peacefrommultiplerealized among the Arctic actors, havecooperation in the Arctic now seems inperceptions

West-Russia

it was never absent even after the Cold War

functioning would be paused owing to athethawing

Arctic’ may not find consensus, given that

Lest one would have suspected that its

Often,theThe expression ‘return of geopolitics to theimportantly, 25 years of the Arctic Council.

1

andoutsidedispute over 175,000-square kilometer

debated and predicted (and continue to do

area 2. The treaty divided the area equallyso) the outbreak of conflicts in the Arctic,
owing to its growing global importance,a Rashmi is a doctoral student (registered with TDU) at the School of Conflict and Security Studies, National Institute ofAdvanced Studies, Bengaluru, India. She is a Visiting Researcher with the Arctic Governance Research Group at the Arctic
Centre, University of Lapland, Finland.
1 Gunn Bye, H. (2021). Arctic Council Adopts First-ever Strategic Plan. High North News.
https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/arctic-council-adopts-first-ever-strategic-plan
2 Henriksen, T., & Ulfstein, G. (2011). Maritime Delimitation in the Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty. Ocean Development andInternational Law, 42(1–2), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2011.542389

115

and enabled both Norway and Russia tolatter has been successful in sustaining

3

carry the oil and gas exploration .

cooperation among the countries that wereon different sides during the Cold War.

On 14 June 2022, Foreign Ministers of

2

Canada and Denmark and Prime Minister

How will the ‘new normal’ shape theArctic?

of Greenland signed an agreement toresolve the outstanding maritime border

In March this year, the seven Arctic

dispute over the small, uninhabited Hans

countries

Island in the Kennedy Channel of the Naresissuedajointstatement

condemning Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Strait 4. Being the only land dispute in theStating violation of the principle ofArctic, there was no actual confrontation,

sovereignty, they called for a temporary

barring planting national flags, the ‘whiskey

pause in the Arctic Council meetings andwars’ and occasional verbal exchanges

their participation in pending projects 5. The

between the leaders.

Arctic, since the end of the Cold War, has

Outstanding security issues are often

largely been protected from bearing thestrong reasons for states not to engage inconsequences

cooperation - bilaterally, regionally, or on

issues, irrespective of differences between

global forums. Additionally, it may upset

the US and Russia, the impact of which is

the working of an organization. The South

reflected across the world in different

Asia Association for Regional Cooperation

regions.

(SAARC) is a classic example of howofexternal

geopolitical

The Crimean Annexation in 2014 strained

geopolitical conflicts, unsettled borders

West-Russia relations, and the latter was

and historical grievances will impede asanctioned by the remaining members ofregional cooperative initiative. Though

the Arctic Council. Barring the effect ofSouth Asia and the Arctic are notsanctions on Russian oil and gas, the event

comparable in terms of the magnitude of

did not threaten cooperation and the soft-the security and political challenges, thelaw regime in the Arctic. The cooperation

3 Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperationin the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, September 15, 2010.
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/smk/vedlegg/2010/avtale_engelsk.pdf
4 Global Affairs Canada. (2022, June 14). Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark, together with Greenland, reach historic
agreement on long-standing boundary disputes [Press release]. https://www.canada.ca/en/globalaffairs/news/2022/06/canada-and-the-kingdom-of-denmark-together-with-greenland-reach-historic-agreement-on-longstanding-boundary-disputes.html
5 Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. (2022). US Department of State.
https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/116

continued, and the Council functioned.

Council is possible. However, there is noWith the current developments at theknowing of the right time, and it is a

Council, the Arctic is no longer unaffectedgamble to keep 50 percent of the Arctic out

by external occurrences, which in itself is aof the primary pan-regional institution 7.

‘new normal’.

When the Council resumes its work when it

Have the ‘hard’ issues and the situation inthinks it is the right time, differences are

Ukraine taken centre stage compared tobound to cause friction. With Finland andthe more non-traditional challenges like

Sweden opting to join NATO, sevenclimate change in the Arctic? The statescountries would be part of the military

have often pondered over the possibility ofalliance essentially against Russia- in short,‘buying’ time in case of climate change and‘NATO-ization of the Arctic’. In March,

associated initiatives while they have to

NATO held an exercise called “Coldswiftly deal with hard-pressing military

Response” north of Norway, where theconflicts and ‘national priorities’ with allcountry is fictionally under attack and thetheir options and resources at their

allies are responding in its aid. This is an

disposal. The joint statement by the seven

exercise that has been held over the years.

countries, in an attempt to balance, said

Yet, due to the war, it gained more traction,that “we remain convinced of the enduring

more mobilization, and approximately

value of the Arctic Council for circumpolar

30000 troops, including 3000 US marines 8 ,cooperation and reiterate our support forin preparation for an unpredictable Russia.

this institution and its work. We hold a

The ‘return of geopolitics’, militarization,

responsibility to the people of the Arctic,

and strong borders with Russia have mostincluding the Indigenous peoples, who
contribute

to

and

importantwork

benefitfromtheundertaken

in

the

negatively affected the Indigenous peopleof the Arctic. Suspension of cross-border
movement, internet and free speechCouncil.” 6 Some of them have reiterated

restrictions, political pressure, and Russia’sthat currently, their work is focussed on
ensuring

that

when

the

time

isolation have again divided the Sámi

iscommunity and the Sápmi since state‘appropriate’, a smooth return to the Arctic

6 Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. (2022). US Department of State.

https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/

7 Edvardsen, Astri. (2022). Arctic Council Paused: The Search for a Future for Arctic Cooperation Continues. High North

News. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/arctic-council-paused-search-future-arctic-cooperation-continues
8 Ali, Idrees; Emmott, Robin. (2022). NATO, in Arctic training drills faces up to Putin’s ‘unpredictable’ Russia, Reuters.
https://www.reuters.com/world/nato-arctic-drill-takes-new-significance-after-russia-invasion-ukraine-2022-03-23/

117

borders came into force 9. The Russian Sámi

the flow of funds from the Nordic

arepolitical

countries, data collection and sharing that

oppression, forced relocation and isolation,is critical for sustaining climate action in thewhich they experienced during the Soviet

Arctic and scientific cooperation. In Morten

Union era. Since the fall of the USSR, the

Høglund’s (Norway’s Arctic Ambassador)

Sámi leaders and activists tried and pushedwords, “neither the working groups nor thefor rights that their counterparts would

expert groups are meeting, and nobenefit from in Finland, Norway andoutreach activity is taking place. The

Sweden. Decades of efforts were alsoaffiliated scientists can work on theirchannelized towards building contacts

analyses, each on their side; however, there

between the Nordic and Russian Sámi,

should be no data exchange or official

involving the latter in the Sámi Council andpublishing.” 12

not

new

to

suspicion,

the Arctic Council meetings. In Liisa

3

Holmberg’s words, multiple collaborative
initiatives

happened,cross-border

In a world that is closely related, connectedmovements existed and the once-dividedbyfamilies could meet their relatives, all ofandpolitical

through different means is a naturalconsequence. Joseph Nye and Roberthave helped to preserve and revitalize the

Keohaneendangered Sámi languages and dialects,
track

call

this

a

‘complexinterdependence’. They put forth threeparticularly in Russia, and implement Arctic
thatsocialweightage, cooperation between states

Cross-border collaborations and meetings

projects

multiplerelationships, and in which force has lesswhich no longer happens 10.

Council’s

Conclusion

conditions for complex interdependence -mining,first, increased ways of contact between

drilling, pollution levels and effects ofstates; second, reduced use of militaryclimate change 11. The war has now paved

might; and lastly, security is no longer thethe way for suspicion. There is a pause on

main concern in the international system 13.

9 Last, J. (2022, June 28). The Russia-Ukraine War is Dividing the Sámi Indigenous People of the Arctic. Foreign Policy.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/27/russia-ukraine-war-saami-indigenous-arctic-people-norway-sweden-finland/
10 Excerpts from the interview (conducted on 11 June 2022 at Inari, Finland) with Liisa Holmberg, Film Commissioner,
International Sámi Film Institute-Norway; Rector, SIIDA- Sáami Museum and Nature Centre; former Rector, Sámi Education
Institute, Inari; and former Chair of the Council of the University of Arctic.
11 Last, J. (2022, June 28). The Russia-Ukraine War is Dividing the Sámi Indigenous People of the Arctic. Foreign Policy.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/27/russia-ukraine-war-saami-indigenous-arctic-people-norway-sweden-finland/
12 Edvardsen, Astri. (2022). Arctic Council Paused: The Search for a Future for Arctic Cooperation Continues. High North
News. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/arctic-council-paused-search-future-arctic-cooperation-continues
13 Maxime, G. (2013, March 8). Joseph Nye on Soft Power. E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/34119

118

For defining an “ideal type” of complex

more say in regional governance. Climate

interdependence, neoliberalism takes threechange, however, may come back as thediametrically opposite assumptions as

central element in how the Arctic is

opposed to realism. First, states are not theperceived, given that it is at the frontline of

only actors in the international system.

facing climate catastrophes and existential

Second, military power is secondary inchallenges. Climate change, therefore, will

relationships of interdependence. Third,

still be the push factor for the states to findgoals are not hierarchical; instead, many

ways to cooperate in the future using the14“issue areas” exist horizontally .

Arctic Council as a platform.

When the Arctic landscape was crowdedGuðlaugur Þór Þórðarson, Iceland’s foreign

with cooperative initiatives in the 1990s, it

minister, wrote in Pathways (2021) that “itseemed a near “ideal type” complex

is now more important than ever before

interdependence. The states are certainlythat we, in the Arctic region, continue tonot the only actors in the Arctic. Added touse the platform the Arctic Council has

this is the important role of institutions,provided us with for the past 25 years to

sub-national governments, NGOs, scientificstrengthen

ourcooperation

in

the

15

groupings, and civil society in governancecircumpolar North” . When there werematters. The states were also hesitant totough

use military power as a political tool, andinstitutions, and multilateralism, the Arctic

commonclimateCouncil stood as an example that provided

change, encouraged them to cooperate. In

a forum for dialogue and cooperation. It iscurrent

now a test for the Arctic and its institutions.

issues,particularly

circumstances,theArcticgovernance is shaping in a manner in which
cooperation

has

taken

a

4

backseat,questionsonglobalization,

References

militarization is on the rise, and security is

Ali, Idrees; Emmott, Robin. (2022). NATO, ingrowing as one of the most discussed
issues in the region. In the coming days,

Arctic training drills faces up to Putin’s‘unpredictable’
Russia,Reuters.

sovereignty,

https://www.reuters.com/world/nato-

legal

issuessurrounding

shipping in NSR, resource extraction, hardarctic-drill-takes-new-significance-after-

power, and data exclusivity will be therussia-invasion-ukraine-2022-03-23/

important realist aspects that will have

14 Spindler, M. (2014). Interdependence. In S. Schieder, & M. Spindler, Theories of International Relations (pp. 60-61).

Routledge.
15 Council, A. (2021, May 10). Pathways, Issue 1, May 2021. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/2597

119

Council, A. (2021, May 10). Pathways, Issue

Spindler, M. (2014). Interdependence. In S.

1, May 2021. https://oaarchive.arctic-

Schieder, & M. Spindler, Theories ofcouncil.org/handle/11374/2597

International

Edvardsen, Astri. (2022). Arctic Council

Routledge.

Paused: The Search for a Future for Arctic
Cooperation Continues. High North

Statement on Arctic Council CooperationNews.

(2022).

https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/arcti

https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-

c-council-paused-search-future-arctic-

on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-

cooperation-continues

russias-invasion-of-ukraine/

Gunn Bye, H. (2021). Arctic Council Adopts

Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway

First-ever Strategic Plan. High Northand the Russian Federation concerning

News.

Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation inhttps://www.highnorthnews.com/en/arcti

the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean,c-council-adopts-first-ever-strategic-

Septemberplan

https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets

Henriksen,

T.,&

Ulfstein,G.

Relations(pp.

60-61).

Following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.

(2011).

US

Department

of

15,

State.

2010.

/upload/smk/vedlegg/2010/avtale_engel

Maritime Delimitation in the Arctic: The

sk.pdfBarents Sea Treaty. Ocean Development

Global Affairs Canada. (2022, June 14).

and International Law, 42(1–2), 1–21.

Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark,
together with Greenland, reach historic
agreement on long-standing boundary
disputes[Pressrelease].

https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2011.5
42389
Last, J. (2022, June 28). The Russia-Ukraine

War is Dividing the Sámi Indigenous
People of the Arctic. Foreign Policy.

https://www.canada.ca/en/global-

https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/27/ru

kingdom-of-denmark-together-with-ssia-ukraine-war-saami-indigenous-

greenland-reach-historic-agreement-on-

arctic-people-norway-sweden-finland/

long-standing-boundary-disputes.html

affairs/news/2022/06/canada-and-the-Maxime, G. (2013, March 8). Joseph Nye on

Soft Power. E-International Relations.
https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/34119

120

India & the Central Arctic Ocean Region
Kanagavalli Suryanarayanan a

The Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) region

CAO region is also important from acovers approximately an area of 28,00,000

maritime

sq Km covering 19% of the Arctic Ocean.

Transpolar shipping route (TSR) would passThis region is beyond the territorial

through the CAO region which is beyond

jurisdiction of any Arctic coastal state, eventhe territorial jurisdiction of any Arctic

though there are claims of extending thecoastal states. Some studies suggest that

continental shelf limits by the coastal states

the TSR will be equally or more viable thanas the Arctic seabed is believed to hold up

the Northern Sea Route (NSR) by 2050,

to 25 % of global oil and gas reserves, large

however, this is questionable considering

quantities of tin, manganese, gold, nickel,

the limited access to ports. Countries likelead, platinum and rough diamonds. There

China are keen on asserting their influence

has been no commercial fishing happening

in the regional governance of the CAO

in the region because throughout the year

region. China is also keen to explore fish

it is covered by thick sea ice. With

and Krill from the marine-rich CAO with theanthropogenic global warming, there is a

help of its large distant water fishing fleet.

drastic change in the Arctic ecosystem

Considering the growing interest andresulting in a rapid decrease in sea ice.

activity

region

rapid

the

and

the

decreaseof

sea ice in the Arctic Ocean, there will be notcreate new geopolitical scenarios. The

only an impact on the Arctic ecosystem but

unexploited CAO is rich in resources
organisms

theperspective,

summertime sea ice and loss of multiyear

create a scarcity of resources globally andmarineincorresponding

Climate change in the future is likely toincludingshipping

also a severe impact on the monsoon in theandIndian subcontinent. 1 Hence, it is also inhydrocarbons, which attracts both Arctic

India’s genuine national interest to lookand non-Arctic players to the region. The

into the CAO region and build its capacity

a Kanagavalli Suryanarayanan (kas2@unak.is), an Advocate and the first Indian to study LLM Polar Law from the Universityof Akureyri. Her field of research is in Indo-Pacific and Arctic Cooperation, the Antarctic Treaty system, UNCLOS,
Indigenous people’s rights, the Third Pole perspective, Climate change, and maritime security.

1 Arctic Circle Assembly, M Ravichandran Secretary, Ministry of Earth Sciences, Govt of India <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8m6YnmRHp-Q>

121

in the region, which is part of the ‘global

capacity and establishing India’s presence

commons’.

is important to understand the unexplored
region and at the same time to be the sane

India’s interest in the region has been

voice in a region where ‘economic interest’

mainly in conducting scientific research,especially

from

a

climateoutweighs the potential problems ofchangeClimate change. It is also in India’s interest

perspective. India’s Arctic Policy (IAP)

to protect the CAO region and protect theacknowledges and emphasizes the need tomarine resources from exploitation andstudy the linkages between the Arctic andpromotethe Himalayas, citing the IPCC’s Special

geographical positioning, is unlikely to use

presents itself as a ‘Tripolar state’ with its

the TSR or fish in the CAO region; hence it

presence in both the poles through its

is prudent for India to take a position

research facilities and in the Himalayas,

towardthrough which it can contribute efficiently
research, especially in the area of climate

Himalayas.

India’s

poles

and

ArcticPolicy(IAP)emphasizes the need for the conservationofmarineflora

environmental

andfauna,

protection,

marinecontribution

towards environmental emergencies, andback to 1920 as a party to the Svalbard

Ocean region. There is extensive scientificavailablethat

discusses

treaty 3 , but it has never focused onthecommercially exploiting Svalbard or the‘teleconnection’ between the Arctic and the

CAO region, although there is recent

rest of the world and its significant global
economic

impacts. 2

Hence,

andIndia’s association with the Arctic dates

search and rescue efforts in the Arctic
material

protection“India’s Arctic Policy (IAP) acknowledges
and emphasizes the need to study thelinkages between the Arctic and theHimalayas, citing the IPCC’s Special
Report on Ocean and Cryosphere (2019)from a climate change perspective.”change by harmonizing the Polar researchtheEnvironmental

marine conservation.

in the area of scientific and environmental

both

conservation

marine protection area. India, due to its

from a climate change perspective. India

inaregime in the region or even propose a

Report on Ocean and Cryosphere (2019)conducted

establishingcriticism that Svalbard is utilized by non-building

arcticstatestofurther

their

Arctic2 Stern 2007; Tol 2009; Hope 2013; Nordhaus 2013; Dietz and Stern 2014; IPCC 2014a, b; Burke et al. 2015 Whiteman etal. 2013; Hope and Schaefer 2016; Yumashev et al. 2019;

3 Treaty between Norway, The United States of America, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Great Britain, andIreland, and the British overseas Dominions and Sweden concerning Spitsbergen (The Svalbard Treaty 1920)

122

ambitions. 4 For example, China has sought

Policy (IAP) also strongly highlights themore autonomy on its research station andimpact of warming the Arctic on the rest ofasserted its rights as a contracting party to

the

world

and

vice

versa

through5

the Svalbard treaty . Interestingly the‘teleconnection’ between the Arctic and theChinese People’s liberation army is one of

Himalayas. Hence India is in a ‘unique’the main planners of the Chinese Polar

position to play a key role in Arctic

science program. CAO will be of strategic

Environment Protection, especially in theand geopolitical importance and is very

CAO region which is a region that falls

much under the radar of the Chinese, who

under the high seas.

are interested to establish a polar silk route

The CAO region is one of the few regions

in order to avoid the Malacca dilemma andin the world where Commercial fishing hascommercially utilize Svalbard as a base in
the High North. Chinese declaration as a
“Near Arctic state’ and India’s interest as a
“Tripolar state’ may sound similar, asserting
their presence over the region. Although
China’s stated interest is in research,especially climate change but China’s
major focus on the region is predominantly
based on its economic needs (blueeconomic passage…leading up to Europe
via the Arctic Ocean) 6 and to assert its rightin the Arctic region 7. On the other hand,
IAP focuses on its research capability in all
three poles and conducts research in asynergizedmannertoprovidekey

Figure 1 Arctic Centre, University of Lapland. Data source: Arctic
Biodiversity Data Service (ABDS)

solutions not only to its problems but also
to the global climate crisis. India’s Arctic

4 Torbjørn Pedersen,’ The politics of research presence revisited: A response to Molenaar and Ulfstein’ (2021) Vol 11(2) The

Polar Journal, Pg 438-440.
5 ibid6 State Council Information Office: The people’s Republic of China, “Vision for Maritime Cooperation under Belt and Road

Initiative,” 20 June 2017<http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2017/06/20/content_281475691873460.htm /> accessed on 30 April
2022
7 The People’s Republic of China, The State Council of Information Office (2018)’ China’s Arctic Policy, White Paper’ <https://www.uaf.edu/caps/resources/policy-documents/china-arctic-policy-2018.pdf> accessed on 08 May 2022123not yet started due to the heavy presence

The Agreement to prevent unregulatedof sea ice both in winter and summer andHigh seas fisheries in the Central Arctic

also because of the lack of commercially

Ocean (CAOFA)

viable resources at the ‘present moment’,This agreement has come into force on 25

else the region would have been exploited

June 2021. Although the intent behind thislong before the CAOFA 8 was agreed andagreement is to protect unregulated

probably there would not be a CAOFA.

fishing in the CAO region, through a joint

However, due to climate change and thescientific program the region would becorresponding melting of sea ice and with
theprimary

productionof

explored to understand the ecosystem andpelagic

the availability of fish stocks in the region.

microalgae there will be an increase in the

The agreement will be in force until 2037

fish stocks including cod, capelin, andand will be automatically renewed for aherring, etc, and hence the CAO is likely to

successive period of 5 years if no party

attract large distance fishing vessels in the
future 9.

Post

raises any objection. The parties to thethe Donut hole fiasco

agreement may in the future negotiate to(between the EEZ of Russia and the US in

set up Regional Fisheries Management

the Bearing Sea) due to which the fish

Organizations (RFMOs) for the CAO region.

stocks completely collapsed during the late

The moratorium imposed by the CAOFA is

1980s, the Arctic coastal states (Arctic 5-

in

US, Russia, Norway, Canada, and Denmark)

fact

on

“unregulated”

commercial

fishing, not on commercial fishing per se.

decided to protect the CAO region from a

The parties to the agreement include the 5similar catastrophe and stop exploitation

Arctic Ocean littoral states Plus the EU,by the distant water fishing vessels from

Iceland, China, South Korea, and Japanother countries. But Iceland raised its(Arctic 10). The only Arctic council observerconcern about excluding it from thestatesdiscussion to regulate the CAO region,

who

are

not

partiestotheagreement are India and Singapore. China

followed by voices from China, Japan, thehas ratified

EU, and as well the Indigenous people in

the CAOFA

which

bans

unregulated commercial fishing for thethe Arctic region (See ICC Inuit circumpolar

next 16 years in the Central Arctic Ocean at

declaration of sovereignty).

the same time China’s 13th Five-Year(2016-2020) Plan states that “China will pay

8 Agreement to prevent unregulated high seas fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean region June 25, 2021, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000449233.pdf>
9 Euorfish magazine 6/2020

124

more attention to and join other parties ininterest, what should be considered a realissues related to Arctic fisheries andinterest? Usually coastal states and otherparticipate in Arctic fisheries surveys andstates which have conventionally fished inmanagement.” China which is a party to thethe region become members of theagreement reserves the right to carry out

RFMOs. However, this region has never

harvesting activities in the agreement area.

seen commercial fishing, hence one cannot

It is important to note that the Joint
program of scientific research under theagreement is not only applicable to just fish
but to the entire marine ecosystem in the
CAO region. India’s Arctic policy explicitly

possibly argue that these 10 states alone

explains its interest in the conservation ofenvironmental impact and vastly impact

the marine resources in the Arctic region,

the marine biodiversity of the region. 10

hence if India is a signatory to the treaty it

Indian Arctic policy, on the other hand,

can engage in a Joint scientific researchcommits to research on Arctic Ecosystem

program and participate in the regional

values, and marine protected areas andgovernance of the CAO region.

contributes

have a real interest in the Central Arctic
Ocean region. The Economic gains that
China is interested though extraction andexploitation

will

resulttowards

inseriousenvironmental

management in the Arctic, and engages
with the Emergency preparedness and“Although the intent behind this agreement
is to protect unregulated fishing in the CAO
region, through a joint scientific program theregion would be explored to understand theecosystem and the availability of fish stocks
in the region.”

response working group of the Arctic
Counciltocontributetowardtheenvironmental emergencies in the Arctic.
India is supporting ACAP 11 with data on
atmosphericaerosols

andemerging

contaminants from IndArc and Gruvebedat
The agreement allows the expansion ofobservatory. India is working with AMAP 12

new participants by invitation by thein the monitoring of glaciers, Arctic

existing signatories to the treaty (Arctic 10)

Precipitation, and climate change studies.

provided they have a ‘real interest’ in the

India also works with CAFF 13 on microbial

CAO region (Art 10). To the question of real

diversity in Svalbard and Arctic breeding

10 Po-Hsing Tseng and Kevin Cullinane, “Key criteria influencing the choice of Arctic shipping: a fuzzy analytic hierarchy
process model,” (2018), 45 (4) Maritime Policy and Management 422-438,
https://doi.org/10.1080/03088839.2018.1443225.
11 Arctic Contaminants Action Program
12 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program
13 Conservation of Arctic flora and fauna125

birds that visit India on a yearly basis. 14

have conservation and protection ofIndia is also a member of the International

marine ecosystem as a priority. Thirdly the

Arctic Science Committee. However, India

CAO is part of the global commons, hence

needs to improve its participation in otherexploration, and protection of the region

working groups such as EPPR, PAME, andcannot be restricted just to the Arctic 10

SDWG, 15 and also increase its engagement

alone even though the coastal states havewiththe duty under the LOSC 16 to protect the

programs

under

the

Expertsurrounding“Indian Arctic policy, on the other hand,commits to research on Arctic Ecosystem
values, and marine protected areas andcontributes
towards
environmental
management in the Arctic, and engages
with the Emergency preparedness andresponse working group of the Arctic
Council to contribute toward theenvironmental emergencies in the Arctic.”

regions.

Also,

increasing

India’s presence in the region will give astrategic advantage to protect its own
interest in the future and at the same timeengage in regional governance in theregion which is environmentally vulnerable.
Hence, India needs to make a case forbecoming a party to the unregulated
fisheries

agreement

and

any

futureoverarching agreements or engagements
group

such

Biodiversity

as

the

program

Arctic(CAFF).

inMarinetheecosystem

management

andregional governance of the Central Arctic

The

Ocean region.

precautionary principle and the ecosystembased approach form the basis for thisagreement and the future Arctic RFMO soas to protect the CAO in such a manner soit does not end up like the Donut hole saga,
hence it is important to have states that

14 Arctic Council, ’Republic of India- observer report 2019-2021’< https://oaarchive.arcticcouncil.org/bitstream/handle/11374/2721/SAOXIS2_Arctic-Council-Observer-REPORT-20192021_INDIA.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> accessed on 12 May 2022
15 Emergency prevention, preparedness and Response, Protection of Arctic Marine Environment and Sustainable
development working group
16 United Nations Convention on the Law of the sea, 1982

126

Convention Theory as a Framework for Discourse Analysis in
the Field of International Relations: A Case Study of theEuropean Union's Arctic Policy
Ana Belén López Tárraga a

Abstract: The effects of climate change arepresents preliminary results derived fromthe use of this theoretical framework toanalyse the content of EU's Arctic policy.
The results are briefly discussed, and initialconclusions are drawn.

becoming increasingly evident in the
Arctic. Consequently, and due to emerging
economic opportunities, this region has
become one of the world's main
geostrategic hotspots. Arctic states, nonArctic
statesandinternationalorganisations such as the European Union(EU) are seeking to access theseopportunities. The theoretical frameworks
aboutinternational
relationshave
traditionally been used to understandrelationships among states and between
states and international organisations. This
article leaves international relations
theories aside and, divergently, uses
sociology as an approach to analyseinternational relations. Additionally, it takes
the analysis of the EU's discourse on the
Arctic region as a case study. The primaryobjective of this research is to show thatthe sociological theory of conventions canbe applied to discourse analysis in the fieldof international relations. This paper

1

Introduction

Nowadays, it seems problematic to denythat climate change is a reality that isincreasingly showing its effects more andmore severely. The polar areas of the planet
are the ones that are exhibiting theintensity of these consequences the most.
A rise in meteorological hazards caused byheat sources, such as fires, as well as anincrease in average temperatures, which
are rising in the Arctic twice as fast as theglobal average, especially during the winter(IPCC, 2022, p.2324), are causing the loss of
the ice sheet that covers the Arctic Ocean(Figure 1).

a PhD candidate in the Department of Geography at the University of Salamanca (Spain). Visiting researcher at the Artic

Governance Group in the Arctic Centre, University of Lapland (Finland). Email: ablopez@usal.es / ana.tarraga@ulapland.fi127

and Canada) and non-Arctic states (such as
China or India), as well as internationalorganisations (such as the EU) seek toaccess. A fact that has been heightened atpresent due to the energy crisis (Kirchner &Koivurova,

2022,

p.40)

and

Russia's

aggression towards Ukraine (Kirchner,
2022, p.8).
Thetheoreticalinternationalframeworks

relations

theoryabout
have

traditionally been used to analyse relations- either cooperative or conflictual between states. Considering that sociology
is the science that studies the nature andFigure 1: Comparison of sea ice extent in the Arctic Ocean
in September 2006-2022. Source: Arctic Centre, Universityof Lapland (www.arcticcentre.org/EN/arcticregion/Maps)

developmentofsocietyandsocialbehaviour (Oxford, 2022), this article leaves
international

These changes have turned the Arctic

Instead,region into one of the world's majoritrelations

theories

aside.

turns to sociology as apotentially useful science for analyzing

geostrategic hotspots due to naturalinternational relations and it takes theresources, shipping routes and tourism

analysis of the EU's discourse on the Arctic(Dodds & Woodward, 2021, p. 95-100)

space as a case study.

found in the region. Factors that both
Arctic states (Finland, Sweden, Norway,
Denmark, Russia, Iceland, the United States128

Orders of justification

Definitions

Concepts

Inspiration

This order is related to opportunities
and discoveries (Boltanski &Thévenot, 1991, p.87-161).

Opportunity, experimentation,
innovation

Domestic

This order is related to habits, culture
and traditions (Boltanski & Thévenot,
1991, p. 164-247).

Tradition, habit,
community

PublicThis order is related to popularity,
fame and reputation (Boltanski &Thévenot, 1991, p. 294-183).

Fame,
reputation, prestige

This order is related to security,
cooperation and rules (Boltanski &Thévenot, 1991, p.108-187).
Civic

Collectivity, common good, rules
Justification

Concepts

Security

Cooperation,agreement,
forum

MarketThis order is related to benefices,markets and utilities (Boltanski &Thévenot, 1991, p.143-199).

Market, competition, profit

Industrial

This order is related to efficiency andresources (Boltanski & Thévenot,
1991, p.123-204).

Efficiency, resource, standard

EcologicalThis order is related to theenvironment and sustainability(Lafaye y Thevènot, 1993)

Sustainability, nature

Figure 2: The orders of justification, definitions and related concepts.
Source: Author’s elaboration. Data extracted from Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991 and López-Tárraga, 2022.

The main objective of this research is toobtainedshow that the sociological theory offramework to scrutinize the discourse andconventions can be applied to discourse

policy of the EU regarding the Arctic

analysis in international relations. To thisregion. The results are briefly discussed,

end, this paper presents preliminary results

and initial conclusions are drawn.
129

by

using

this

theoretical

1

Convention theory and literature

an essential matter, this subject has beenreviewcategorised in this paper as an additional
category of justification within the civic

The theory of conventions was developedorder. Thus, eight worlds of justification areby the French sociologists Luc Boltanski

considered in total. Figure 2 develops theseand Laurent Thévenot in 1991. These

concepts further and provides examples ofresearchers sought to understand thethe content of each order of worth.

relationships between people and objects
in different situations of everyday life. TheyAs the authors explain, this theoreticalconstructed a scheme to analyse theframework can be used in a multitude ofcoexistence between people, things anddisciplines. Such approach enables thesituations within multiple orders of worth,connection of issues that are often

such as the orders of evaluation and, mostaddressed from different perspectives andrelevantly, justification. These worlds of

disciplines, such as the study of social

justification are coherent sets of values,

relations or contracts, on the one hand, andprinciples and arguments that make ittechnologicalpossible to evaluate people's behaviour inquality on the other (Boltanski anddifferent

objects

Thévenot, 1991, p.9). For these reasons, thisinvolved in each case as justifiable orsociological theory is suitable to study

unjustifiable (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991,

conflicts and compromises by categorizingp.14). In everyday human life, according to

the different positions, objectives, andthe authors, it is possible to distinguish upinterests of the actors around the sevento six principles or orders of worth

conventions outlined above. In democratic(Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991, p. 77):

environments, policy making is always ainspirational, domestic, public, civic, market

process that involves compromise to

and industrial (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991,

address problems and conflicts adequately.

p. 87-204). Later, in response to the natural

Therefore, EU policies may be properly

conflicts that were beginning to beunderstoodperceived,

wasstandpoint because their inception andincorporated (Lafaye & Thevènot, 1993, p.

practice involve very diverse actors in terms

521). Since this research goes beyondof their nature (public / private), their goals

relations between people and objects to(for profit / not for profit) and their scalesituations

the

and

ecological

the

world

relations between states, where security 1 is

1 Emphasise that security issues are in the civic sphere.

130

constraints

from

this

or

product

theoretical

(local,regional,

national,

1.1

and

supranational).
With this goal in mind, a literature review
2

The EU Arctic Policy: case study andcodification of results

The EU's Arctic policy, coordinated by thewere

European External Action Service, has been

selected and classified into six different

taken as a case study for this research. It

topics according to their subject matter.

analyses the discourse developed by the

From the highest to the lowest number ofinternational organisation over the years,

pieces,was carried out. 21 publications

the

first

categoryisand the different documents issued byconsumption/agri-foodmarket(10European institutions from October 2008

papers), followed by publications related toto October 2021. During this time, 19

institutions

documents have been issued by the

and

the

environment(3

papers), culture/society and energy (2following

institutions:

European

papers), and education (1 paper).

Commission, European Parliament, Councilof the EU, Court of Justice, Committee of

The literature review shows that the

the Regions and Economic and Social

convention theory, derived from economic

Committee (EEAS, 2022).

sociology, has been applied mainly to casestudies related to the market economy. No

All documents have been coded following

academic research has been found thatthe concepts related to the orders ofuses this framework with states as thejustification.

primary subject matter and international

software N-Vivo was used for this process.

relationsas

The results shown in this paper have been

Therefore,

this

the

objectofanalysis.

The

document

analysistoextracted from the primary documents

theoretical innovation by conceptualizing

issued by the European Commission:

the state as an actor that, in the field ofCommunication from the Commission tointernational relations, needs to deal with

the European Parliament and the Council

goals and interests related to the seven'The EU and the Arctic Region' (COM (2008)

orders of justification, with a strong focus

763 final); Joint Communication to theon security within the broader realm of theEuropean Parliament and the Council

civic justification.

'Developing a EU Policy towards the Arctic

paper

contributes

Region: progress since 2008 and next
steps'(JOIN(2012)

19

final);

Joint

2 As this is an abridged version of the presentation of this research, the bibliographical review has not been expanded.

However, the bibliographical references taken for the review are detailed in the references section.

131

Communication

to

the

EuropeanOrders of justification

Average number ofParliament and the Council 'An integrated

mentions in the main

EU policy for the Arctic (JOIN (2016) 21

documents (2008-2021)

final);

Joint

Communication

to

the

European Parliament, the Council, theEuropean Economic and Social Committee,
and the Committee of the Regions 'A
stronger EU engagement for a peaceful,sustainable and prosperous Arctic' (JOIN(2021) 27 final).
2

Results

The general results (Figure 3) obtained
from analysing the documents mentioned
above are presented below. It should be
noted that more than one type ofifitcontains

52.2

Market32.25

Domestic

30.75

Ecological56

Industry

26.25

Inspiration

29.75

Public

4.25

Security

29

Figure 4: Average number of mentions to each type of convention in
the main EU Arctic policy documents (2008-2021). Source: Author’s
elaboration. Data extracted from López-Tárraga, 2022

convention can be coded in the same
paragraph

Civic

arguments

concerning different issues.
The average number of references to eachagreement in the documents cited during
Figure 3: Number of mentions of each type of convention in the EU's main Arctic policy documents (2008-2021) Source: Author’s
elaboration. Data extracted from López-Tárraga, 2022
90
80
70
60
50
40

79

30
20

45

55 55 55
35

10
0

Civic

42

51

46
30

Trade

22

26

21

50

44

30

Domestic

Ecological
2008

2012

132

38

32 28

40

24 22 21

19

Industry

Inspiration

2016

2021

34 36
5 9 1 2Public19

27

Security

the period under consideration was also

to protect and preserve the marine

calculated (Figure 4).

environment”.

For a better understanding of the content

A clear example of the cross-cutting natureof these documents, the results andof the civic and ecological conventions can

specificeach

be found in how tourism is addressed in aargument are presented below. It should

way that respects the environment andbe kept in mind that different orders of

local communities (COM (2008) 763 final,

worth are usually interlinked, and that thep.13). This is a field that countries such as

actions promoted by the EU have a cross-

Finland, Sweden and Norway have been

cutting nature. Therefore, a specific activity

promoting since 2008, through developing

may impact several orders or conventions.

sustainable tourism projects supported byexcerpts

that

illustrate

the European Regional Development FundThe civic convention, which refers tocollectivity,

legislation,

and(ERDF) or the Northern Periphery andtheArctic Programme. Apropos of the blue

achievement of the common good (in thiseconomy,particular case, in the Arctic region), iscomplemented

bypromotion of sustainable practices inthefisheries, a field of its exclusive legal

ecological justification, which is the mostcompetence.

influential according to data (56 mentions

Framework

two orders of justification can be seen in

of

these

Directive,

which

since

its

updates, aims to ensure good quality waterCommunication (JOIN (2016) 21 final, p.8):

throughout the EU by managing river basin
systems in a coordinated manner at“The EU aims to protect, preserve andregional and national levels (2000/60/EC,

improve the environment, including in the2000). This is a prime example of thewider region, for present and futuretransversal nature of these issues in which

generations. The EU should continue its

the industrial and commercial conventions

engagement in multilateral environmental

can be observed.

agreements that also have particular
relevance to the Arctic, and encourage their

The domestic order of worth, which is

implementation. The EU should encourage

related to habits and traditions and thefull respect for the provisions of UNCLOS,
consideredreflection

issuance in 2000 and its subsequent

the following paragraph from the 2016

is

The

actions can be seen in the EU Waterin average). The connection between thewhichCommission

the organisation is highly committed to theevolution of EU policy documents. ThisisEuropean

expressed (JOIN (2016) 21 final, p.11) thatamong the most important ones in theconvention

theconservation of local communities, appears

customaryin an average of 30.75 mentions in theinternational law, including the obligation

sample of documents. The following text133

excerpt from the 2012 Communication

ecological conventions also appear in a

(JOIN (2012) 19 final, p.15) exemplifies thisdialectic manner (COM (2008) 763 final,

convention:p.13):"The EU has been actively involved in"Theworking towards the adoption of theCommunication aim to provide the basis

United Nations Declaration on the Rights

for a more detailed reflection. This will beof Indigenous Peoples. The EU seeks touseful for implementing the EU's strategic

integrate human rights and indigenous

initiatives,

includingtheIntegrated

issues into all aspects of its internal andMaritime

Policy.

The

present

external policies, including its politicalCommunication should also lead to a

dialogues with third countries and regional

structured and coordinated approach toand multilateral organizations. The EU also

Arctic matters as the first layer of an Arctic

provides financial support to civil society

policy for the EU. This will open neworganizationsindigenous

cooperation perspectives with the Arctic

issues, in particular through the European

states, helping all of us to increase stability

Instrument for Democracy and Humanand to establish the right balance between

Rights (EIDHR)"

the priority goal of preserving the Arctic

working

on

under

this

convention,

contained

in

this

environment and the need for sustainable

In this regard, and as an example of EU
actionssuggestions

use of resources".

theorganisation has been engaged since 2008

With

in a regular dialogue with indigenous

convention to which all innovation ispeoples of the Arctic coordinated by theattributed (29.75 mentions on average)

Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs

refers to the EU's investment in technology

and Fisheries (COM (2008) 763, p.5). It also

andsupports

throughinnovations in security. This can be seen inseveral funding programmes, such as thewhat follows in the next paragraph of the

INTERREG Northern Periphery and Arctic

2021 Communication (JOIN (2021) 27 final,

Programme mentioned above.

p.6), where the green convention is also

local

communities

the

2021

scienceandpolicyrelates

update,mainlythetohighlighted:

The commercial (market, profit, 32.25
mentions) and industrial (resources and"Timely and efficient search and rescue

efficiency, 26.25 mentions) worlds of(SAR) operations are crucial in the Arctic

justification orders appear to a similar

because of its severe climate, unpredictable

extent in the original texts. Both worlds ofweather, and the huge distances involved.

justification are interconnected on several

Galileo SAR significantly reduces the timeoccasions, including the conclusions of theneeded to rescue people at sea. The new2008 Communication, where the civic andGalileo Return Link Service offers new134

functions for sailors and pilots operating in“Ensure open access to information fromhostile environments and is currently

Arctic monitoring and research based onoffered uniquely by Galileo, worldwide andthe principle of the Shared Environmental

free of charge".

Information System. Facilitate and support
outreach to the broader public”.

In a cross-cutting manner, and to illustrate
what the actions concerning the industrial,

Lastly, all aspects related to security arecommercial and innovation conventions

mentioned an average of 29 times in thetranslate

four

into,

two

EU

financial

documents.

Throughout

thecontributions described in two different

development of the policy, security issues

periods may be mentioned. Firstly, in 2012,areto monitor changes in the region's naturalenvironment (COM (2008) 763 final:11). No

environment, the EU earmarked €200

mention is made of possible military

million for research activities under the

conflicts on the ground. A situation thatSeventh Framework Programme (JOINchanges entirely with the publication of the(2012) 19 final, p.4). Secondly, in the latest

new Communication, which alludes directly

policy update in 2021, the EU stated that it

to geopolitics and puts the focus on Russia

will provide, through the InvestEU Fund,and China (JOIN (2021) 27 final:3):€370 billion in public-private investments

positioning

new fields of action in the health sector andit
presence

in

the

and

domesticpriorities,

addition to increasing security challenges,(2021) 27 final, p.16).
scarcetoincluding dual use of infrastructure. In

the strategic technologies sector (JOINarelationseems to reflect both global strategic

digital transitions, research and innovation,isin"Military build-up across the Russian Arctic

to finance projects such as green andThere

addressed

could

also

furtheraggravate

the

the

consequences of climate change. It is likely

documents of references related to thetaking place partly because the longsearch for public recognition, reputation or

northern coastline is becoming much morefame (4.25 mentions on average). The

accessible but is largely related to non-manner in which the EU disseminates its

Arctic issues10. Many countries, including

obtained results to the public directly

the US, Norway, UK, Denmark, Canada andinfluences the reputation that it seeks to

Iceland, are following these developments

acquire among the public as an actor

closely, as is the North Atlantic Treaty

operating in the Arctic region. This matter

Organisation (NATO), with a view tois addressed in the following quote, where

responding

the convention of innovation also coincides

assertiveness in Arctic waters and airspace.

(COM (2008) 763 final: 7):

There has also been an upturn in thetoRussia's

increased

activities of other actors, including China,

135

ownership of critical infrastructure, theClimate
Adaptation

construction of sea cables, global shipping,

Contribution of Working Group II to thecyberspace and disinformation".

Sixth

and

growing

interest

in

areas

like

In:

Assessment

Intergovernmental

As illustrated, the mentions of the different

2022: Impacts,
Vulnerability.
Report

Panel

of

on

the

ClimateChange [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M.

orders of justification vary over time, as

Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck,they adapt to the relevant facts or events

A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S.

along the years. The interconnection of the

Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Ramaorders and further analysis around it are(eds.)].

not covered in this paper because it is only

Cambridge

University

Press,

Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA,

intended to show the research carried out.

pp.

However, it will be addressed in future2233–2272,

https://doi:10.1017/9781009325844.021

works of greater length.
3

ChangeandArctic Centre (2022). Arctic Sea Ice Extend
2006/2017/2022.

Conclusions

Retrievedfromhttps://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/arcticre

The results of the analysis show how thegion/Maps/Sea-Ice

different conventions are interconnected. It

Boltanski, L. & Thévenot L. (2006). On

can be observed that behind the EU's pro-

Justification: Economies of worth. Oxford:

environmental vocation for the Arctic area,

Princeton University Press

there is a strong economic purpose related

Commission of the European Communities

to industrial and commercial activities. The(2008).

results also show how security is present

Commission to the European Parliament

throughout the development of the policy.

and the Council. “The EU and the Arctic

However, in the latest update in October

Region”.

2021, the EU addresses the issue more(2008) 763 final.

evidently, pointing to Russia and China as

Dodds, K. & Woodward, J. (2021). The

specific countries to focus on. This issue isArctic, a very short introduction. Oxford:

expected

Oxford University PresstoincreaseinsubsequentCommunication

Brussels,from

20.11.2008,

the

COM

updates due to Russia's aggression against

EuropeanUkraine in February 2022 and the resulting

Communicationenergy crisis.

Parliament and the Council. “Developing

4

References

Ali,

E.,

W.

to

(2012).
the

Joint

Europeana EU Policy towards the Arctic Region:
progress since 2008 and next steps”.

Cramer,Georgopoulou,

Commission

N.J.M.

J.

Carnicer,
Hilmi,

G.

E.

Brussels, 26.6.2012, JOIN (2012) 19 final.

Le

EuropeanCommission

Cozannet, and P. Lionello, 2022: Cross-

CommunicationtoChapter Paper 4: Mediterranean Region.

Parliament

the

136

and

(2016).
the

Joint

EuropeanCouncil.

“Anintegrated EU policy for the Arctic”.

OxfordBrussels, 27.4.2016, JOIN (2016) 21 final.

Sociology. En Oxford English Dictionary.

European

Oxford University Press.

Commission

Communication

to(2021).
the

Joint

European

4.1

Parliament, the Council, the European

and purchasing behaviors in solidarity

Brussels,purchasing groups. Journal of Rural

13.10.2021, JOIN (2021) 27 final.

Studies.

Kirchner, S. (2022). International Arctic
Governancewithout

Russia.

.044
Climent-López,https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4044107
FacilitatingRodero, Valeriano, Ruiz-Budría, E.. (2014).
Measuring quality conventions in the

The Arctic Council as a Multi-Role Actor

food industry: Applications to the wine

and Forum. In A. Mineev, A. Bourmistrov,

sector in Spain. Geoforum. 56. 148–160.

GlobalDevelopment in the Arctic: International
Cooperation for the Future (pp. 33-46).
F.

Mellemvik(Eds.),

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.
07.004
Cloutier, C., & Langley, A. (2013). The Logic

Routledge. Routledge Explorations in
Developmentof Institutional Logics: Insights FromStudiesFrench Pragmatist Sociology. Journal of

https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003246015-

Management Inquiry, 22(4), 360–380.

3

https://doi.org/10.1177/10564926124690

Lafaye, C., & Thevenot, L. (1993). Une
justifiqueécologique?

Conflits

57

dans

Diaz-Bone,l'aménagement de la nature. Reveu(2013).

Discourse

qualities in the wine market, economic

https://doi.org/10.2307/3321928

sociology_the

López Tárraga, A. B. (2022). Evolución delEuropeanelectronic

newsletter, Max Planck Institute for the

discurso de la Unión Europea sobre la

Study of Societies (MPIfG), Cologne, Vol.

seguridad en la región del Ártico . Boletín

DeRainerconventions in the construction of winefrançaise de sociologique, (34), 495-524.

De La Asociación
Españoles,

Sánchez-

Alonso-Santos, José, Ramírez-García, S.,

Sustainable Development in the Arctic:&

Eugenio,

Hernández, José Luis, Fresno, Consuelo,

Kirchner, S., & Koivurova, T. (2022).
Governance73.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2019.10

SocialScience Research Network, (25.2.2022).

International

Literature review references

Organizational roles, quality conventions

engagement for a peaceful, sustainable
Arctic”.

(2022).

Roberto. (2019). Participation for what?

Committee of the Regions. “A stronger EU
prosperous

Dictionary

Barbera, Filippo, Dagnes, Joselle, Monaco,

Economic and Social Committee and theandEnglish14, Iss. 2, pp. 46-53

Geógrafos

Escobar-López, S.Y.; Amaya-Corchuelo, S.;(93).

Espinoza-Ortega, A. Alternative Food

https://doi.org/10.21138/bage.3268

Networks: Perceptions in Short Food

137

Supply Chains in Spain. Sustainability
2021,

13,

https://doi.org/10.1177/13684310114123

2578.

49

https://doi.org/10.3390/su13052578

Juusola, H., Räihä, P. Quality conventions in

Espinosa Seguí, A., Sánchez Hernández, J. L.

the exported Finnish master’s degree(2013). El mercado español del bacalao en

programme in teacher education insalazón: una aproximación regional desdeIndonesia. High Educ 79, 675–690 (2020).

la geografía de las convenciones. Estudios

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-019-

Geográficos,

439–467.

00430-3https://doi.org/10.3989/estgeogr.201316

Lejeune,Graf, Patricia, Jacobsen, Heike. (2020).

théoriques et incarnations des valeursInstitutional work in the transformation ofépistémiques et ontologiques de la

the German energy sector. Utilities Policy.

durabilité

68.

environnementales.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2020.10110

durable710.4000/developpementdurable.13741

Greis, A., Bärnighausen, T., Bountogo, M.,

Nyberg, D. and Wright, C. (2013), Corporate

Ouermi, L., Sié, A., & Harling, G. (2020).

corruption of the environment. The British

Attitudes towards female genital cutting

Journalamong adolescents in rural Burkina Faso:

https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-

a multilevel analysis. Tropical medicine &4446.12025

international health : TM & IH, 25(1), 119–

Miyake, Y.; Uchiyama, Y.; Fujihira, Y.;

131. https://doi.org/10.1111/tmi.13338

Kohsaka, R. Towards Evidence BasedGond, J., Barin-Cruz, L., Raufflet, E.B., &Policy Making in GIAHS: Convention

Charron, M. (2016). To Frack or Not to

Theory and Effects of GIAHS Registration

Frack? The Interaction of Justification andon the Wholesale and Retail Trade ofPower in a Sustainability Controversy.

Traditional

Emerging Research within Organizational
Behavior eJournal.
Hågård Brown, Maximilian, 2021. Values ofquality in ‘natural’ wine production : thestudy of ‘natural’ wine in Germany.

Sustainability

Patriotta, G., Gond, J.-P. and Schultz, F.

Second cycle, A2E. Uppsala: SLU, Dept. of

PublicUrban and Rural Development

Management Studies, 48: 1804-1836.

Jagd, S. (2011). Pragmatic sociology andhttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-

competing

6486.2010.00990.x

74(275),ordersofworth

Caroline.

forte

dans

et

of

(2019)

lespolitiques

Développement
territoires.
DOI:

Sociology,

andPortées

Local
2021,

64:

405-424.

Vegetables.
13,

5330.

https://doi.org/10.3390/su13105330(2011),

Maintaining

Legitimacy:

Controversies, Orders of Worth, andin

Justifications.

Journaloforganizations. European Journal of Social

Ruiz Budría, E., Castelló Puig, A., Climent

Theory,López, E., Escalona Orcao, A. I., Hernández

14(3),

343–359.

Navarro, M., Loscertales Palomar, B., &138

Frutos Mejías, L. M. (2013). La calidad delJournal of Macromarketing, 39(1), 37–52.

vino a la luz de la teoría de las

https://doi.org/10.1177/02761467188159

convenciones:

39

aplicaciónalas

denominaciones de origen aragonesas.

Swaffield, J., Evans, D., & Welch, D. (2018).

Estudios Geográficos, 74(274), 231–254.

Profit, reputation and ‘doing the righthttps://doi.org/10.3989/estgeogr.201308

thing’:

Sánchez-Hernández, José Luis, Espinosa-

problem of food waste in the UK retailSeguí, Ana (2015). Regional segmentation

sector.

of the salted codfish market in Spain:

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.

Implications for Norwegian producers,

01.002

Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift - NorwegianThorslund, C.A.H. and Lassen, J. (2017),

Journal of Geography, 69:3, 152-165, DOI:

Context, Orders of Worth, and the10.1080/00291951.2015.1040833

Justification

Sreekumar, H., & Varman, R. (2019).

Practices. Sociologia Ruralis, 57: 836-858.

Vagabonds at the Margins: Acculturation,

https://doi.org/10.1111/soru.12143

Subalterns,

andCompetingWorth.

139

Convention

theoryGeoforum,

of

Meat

89,

and

the

43-51.

ConsumptionDifferent scenarios, different policies
China’s engagement in the South China Sea and in theCentral Arctic Ocean
Marco Volpe a1Introduction

the country’s trade lines. While in the firstphase, their attention was on near seas,

American researchers have discussed thewhen China's shipping routes became

prioritisation of maritime capabilities in

globalised, it became necessary to improve

major national power strategising at the

Chinese maritime capabilities in far seas.

end of the 18th century. Across the 18th

This transition was crystallised in theand 19th centuries, the American Naval

Chinese military strategy released in 2015.

Officer Alfred Mahan then contributed to

In the document, it was stated that thedrawing attention to the need to secure

People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)

American access to international markets

would gradually expand its activity fromto absorb the tremendous amounts of"offshore

goods produced domestically. Mahan's"Off-shore waters’ defence" refers to thetheory has since been crucial for thearea between China’s coastline and thedevelopment of American naval strategy
development

second island chain (that is, the Philippine

ofSea) including, of course, the East andmaritime-power strategising worldwide. In

South China Seas; "open seas’ protection"

recent decades, with the Chinese economy

essentially focuses on other missions,booming after the country’s opening-up

including protecting China’s sea lanes

reform, China became more dependent on(SLOC) that cross the Indian Ocean en

seaborne trade than it had been before,
and

the

Chineseleadershiptheof the People's Republic of China, 2015).

network of American naval bases. His

the

to

and "open seas’ protection" (State Council

an American battleship navy, and a

influenced

defence"combination of "offshore waters’ defence"idea consisted of building a merchant navy,

andwaters’route to or from China.

startedprioritising maritime interests to expand

a Ph.D. Candidate University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, Visiting Researcher at the Arctic Centre, Rovaniemi.

140

The

improvement

naval

policy. We must also pursue a deep

capabilities increases the possibility ofunderstanding of geopolitical scenarios in

China engaging in new and emerging

which China is engaged or planning togeopolitical scenarios. However, it alsoenhance its engagement. The South China

requiresspecific

Sea and the Arctic region are two relevant

strategies for different scales and strategies

geopolitical scenarios for China. However,modelled on regional specificities. For

there are profound differences between

instance, while China's strategy in thethe two pertaining to regional governance,

South China Sea is mainly focused onrights to conduct maritime activities, andsecuring China's maritime sovereignty overthe sociopolitical context, which may

a large area (the South China Sea), at the

profoundly influence China's strategy for

global level, is more oriented toward

each area.

China

to

of

Chinesedevelopstriking a favourable power balance.

Despite these discrepancies, former US

Recently, the Arctic has gained great

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, in 2019,attention for its potential, connected toproposed assimilating China's strategies innatural resources, fishing, and commercial

both geopolitical contexts under the threat

opportunities. The "Arctic race" narrative

theoryhas started to emerge, fuelling global

rhetorical question, "Do we want the Arctic

power competition. Since China started to

Ocean to transform into a new South China

show interest in the area, it has often beenSea,

regarded as a threat to the current order incompeting territorial claims?" represented

thethe peak of discourse-building on China's

region.

Scepticism

overChina'sdeclared interest in the region is based onandBy highlighting the reasons for China's

resources and fishing activities in the

different levels of engagement in the South

Central Arctic Ocean. It is thought China

China Sea and Central Arctic Ocean, thismight see there being opportunities tostability

militarisation

two geopolitical scenarios?

country’s opportunities to exploit natural

domestic

with

the

Yet, is it really possible to compare these

the Northern Sea Route, along with theitsfraught

Accordingly,

threat in the Arctic (Hounshell, 2019).

increasing commercial shipping throughimproveframework.

article's main aim is to show that bundlingandthe two geopolitical areas together toeconomic development. However, thejustify assertions that China will take along-term nature of China's policy in therevisionist approach to change the global

Arctic, the stalling of the Arctic Council, andorder is tendentious. The argument is built

the probable military escalation in thethrough an analysis on three levels. The

region make it crucial that we strive tofirst focuses on differences in regional

better understand the priority level the

maritime regimes, the second on how the

Arctic region occupies in China's foreign

regions differ in priority for China's national141

and foreign policy, and the third concerns

The leading international ruling instrument

the regions’ differences in how sovereignty

for maritime sovereignty claims is theclaims from regional state actors are

United Nations Convention on the Law ofadvanced and the mechanisms that have

the Sea (UNCLOS; United Nations (UN),been developed to resolve territorial

1982). It establishes territorial sea up to 12

disputes.

nautical miles from the baseline, the2

Regional maritime regimes

contiguous zone up to 24 nautical miles,

2.1

South China Sea

and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) up
to 200 nautical miles from the outer limit of

The South China Sea is an enclosed sea thatthe territorial sea. Despite those clear

stretches

demarcations,around3.5

millionsquarethere

areoverlapping

kilometres and consists of thousands ofdisputes over sovereignty claims, making

small islands, reefs, shoals, and atolls,

the area highly disputed, because of thespanning from the Singapore Strait to therichness of fisheries resources. No regional

Taiwan Strait. Many states have Southfisheries

China Sea coastline, including Indonesia,(RFMO) regulate fishing activities in the

Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Thailand,area. RFMOs are regional mechanisms that

Cambodia,thepromote coastal states or distant water

People's Republic of China, and Taiwan. In

fishing nations (DWFN) to share practical

the area, decades-long tension is mainly

and financial interests in managing fishingfuelled by overlapping sovereignty claims

stocks in a specific region. Their mandate

and fisheries disputes between regional

might address the regulation of a specificstates. The biggest archipelago in thespecies or a group of species or, broadly,South China Sea is the Spratly archipelago,

ensure that fishing does not endanger thewhich consists of an area of 409,000 squaremarine ecosystem. The absence of such akilometres, located between Vietnam, theruling mechanism increases the potential

Philippines, and Malaysia. Closer to thefor overfishing and illegal and unreported

Chinese coastline, the Paracel Islands arefishing, which not only endangers marine

mainly disputed between Vietnam andspecies but also increases the possibility of

China. This archipelago is 165 kilometres

disputes between neighbouring states. The

southeast of the Chinese island Hainan andfisheries management impact measures a

185 kilometres east of the Vietnamesestate's fisheries governance capacity, whichcoasts. The Pratas Islands, meanwhile, areissituated southeast of Hong Kong and aremanagement,

under Taiwan's sovereignty. Then, thesocioeconomics, and stock statuses, based

Macclesfield Bank, which consists of 25

on which all South China Sea states

reefs, is disputed between China and theperform poorly (Melnychuk et al., 2016). To

Philippines.

improve

Singapore,

Vietnam,142

management

assessedthethroughorganisations

research,
enforcement,

scenario,

creatingamultilateral ruling body may not only helparea, a real game-changer has since been

manage fisheries activities and reducethe melting of the ice of the Arctic Ocean

illegal fishing and overfishing but may also

(Koivurova, 2019).

help create a cooperation structure that

Regarding fisheries activities, the North

facilitates dialogue and eases overlapping
sovereignty

claimsandEast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC)

geopoliticalmanages the long-term conservation andtensions.

2.2

optimum utilisation of fishery resources inCentral Arctic Oceana swath of the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans
north of 36°N and between 42°W and 51°

The Arctic Ocean accounts for 8.6 million

E longitude, stretching all the way to thesquare kilometres (5.4 million sq. miles).

North Pole. With a specific focus on the

Depths of the Arctic shelves range fromCentral Arctic Ocean, in October 2018, the

100 meters for the Siberian Shelf to 2000

five coastal states together with China,

metres for the Alaskan Shelf (Stabeno et al.,Japan, South Korea, and the European

2004). The Central Arctic Ocean is theUnion—signed the Agreement to Prevent

largest area of high seas in the Arctic. Five

Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the

coastal states surround it, encompassing

Central Arctic Ocean (CAO Agreement;

an area of 2.8 million square kilometres.

MOFA, 2018). The main feature of the

The area beyond the EEZs, also known as

Agreement is to prohibit unregulated

the high seas, is ruled under article 89 offishing in the Central Arctic Ocean. It also

UNCLOS: "No State may validly purport toprovides for a Joint Program of Scientificsubject any part of the high seas to its

Research and Monitoring to assess thesovereignty" (UN, 1982). This resulted inprospects

the formation of high seas areas of the

for

the

developmentofcommercial fish stocks and, in the casewater column beyond the five coastal

commercial fishing becomes an attractive

states' EEZs and national jurisdiction: theprospect, aims to launch a regular meeting

Donut Hole in the Bering Sea, surroundedtoby the EEZs of the United States and Russia;

establish

fisheries

management

organisations (Vylegzhanin et al., 2020).

the Polygon in the Sea of Okhotsk,

The CAO Agreement is based on thesurrounded by the EEZ of Russia; and theprecautionary approach that, in the past

Loop Hole in the Barents Sea, surrounded

decades, has emerged in environmental

by the EEZs of Norway and Russia

law and natural resources conservation in(Vylegzhanin et al., 2020).

the face of scientific uncertainties. The

While for decades, the Arctic Ocean'sconcept emerged from the Rio Summit

coastal states' attention was focused onheld in 1992:

creating legal and policy arrangements toInallow the northern states to govern theorderenvironment

143

to

protectthetheprecautionaryapproach shall be widely applied

Persian Gulf suppliers for Asian markets.

byStatesaccording

to

their

The three major Asian importers of crude

Where

there

are

oil in the area are China at 42%, Japan atthreats of serious or irreversible

20%, and South Korea at 18%. China is thedamage, lack of full scientificworld's largest importer of crude oil; incertainty shall not be used as a2018, its oil dependence reached 72%, andreasonforcost-

80% of crude oil imports flowed througheffective

measuresprevent

the Malacca Strait. The high dependence

environmental degradation. (UNon this specific choke point is a long-

Conference on Environment andlasting concern for the Chinese leadership.

Development, 1992)

Moreover, the political instability andPriority given to China’s national

military conflicts that affect exporting

capabilities.

3

postponingtoregions have induced China’s leadership tosecurity

3.1

diversify energy supplies. Due to the long-

South China Sea

Accordingtothedistance shipments this entails, China
UnitedNationsshould increase its expenditure on the

Conference on Trade and Development

modernisation of the military force of the(UNCTAD), 80% of global trade by volume

PLAN, to improve its escort capabilities forand 70% by value are shipped by sea, andenergy supplies shipments (Wang and Su,

60% of maritime trade passes through Asia

2021).

(UNCTAD, 2015). The South China Sea

Liquified natural gas (LNG) is anotherrepresents a crucial maritime crossroads

energy resource vital for China's economy.

for trade not only for China but also for

China is the world's largest importer ofmany other states, including non-Asian

LNG, having recently surpassed Japan.

states.

China's leadership has decided to increase

China imports most of its energy supplies

the country’s LNG imports to meet(oil and liquified natural gas) from African

residential heating and industrial gas

and Middle East regions through shipping

demands, principally led by the risinglanes. According to the Energy Informationelectricity consumption accompanying theAdministration (EIA), more than 30% ofcountry's economic recovery from theglobal maritime crude oil passes through

COVID-19

the South China Sea, consisting of 15

motivated to increase the LNG market withmillion barrels daily (EIA, 2018). The

a view to the energy transition and moving

majority (90%) of the crude oil volumes

tomanaged in the South China Sea passdevelopment, with LNG the least polluting

through the Malacca Strait, representingof fossil fuels. Compared to crude oil

the shortest route between the African andimports, China has been better able to

144

more

pandemic.

China

environmentally

is

also

sustainablediversify its LNG imports: while Australia

and fishery supplies but is also related torepresents China's primary partner, Qatar,

estimates of natural resources. According

the USA, Russia, and Malaysia also stand as

to the US Energy Information Agency

relatively

Arctic(2013), the South China Sea holds about

represents one of the newest areas for LNG

190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 11

supplies destined for the Chinese market

billion barrels of oil. Control over reefs andthrough a collaboration with Russia on awaters in the area could also mean gaining

project in the Yamal Peninsula. Yet, despite

access to 105 billion barrels of hydrocarbon

China's diversification of LNG imports, thereserves, which may consistently lower

South China Sea still accounts for almost

dependence on imports of oil and LNG

40%

supplies.

ofstablethepartners.

LNG

The

moved

globally.

Meanwhile, the major Asian importers are

Energy and food security are the core

Japan with 42%, South Korea with 22%,

points of China's national strategy because

China with 17%, and Taiwan with 14% (EIA,

the government’s capacity to foster China's2016).

economic development and secure internal

Fishing is another highly contested issue instability legitimise the Chinese Communist

the South China Sea that profoundly

Party (CCP).

influences China's national policy. The

3.2

increasing fishing activities carried out by

China's Arctic engagement has been

China have been identified as a criticalescalating in the last few years. When

driver for overfishing in the South China

analysing China's most recent five-year

Sea, which highlights the lack of effective

plan (FYP), the increasing attention to theinternational governance in the region.

Arctic region can clearly be seen. While in

China officially recognised the South China

the first phase, attention was focused on

Sea in respect to the marine economy in its

enhancing scientific research capabilities, it

13th Five-Year Plan, in which China's

hasleadership clearly stated that the country
experimental

zones

distinctive

resources
marinetodevelopeconomy"expanded

togovernance. In the 12th FYP (2011–2015),
the Arctic was mentioned with regard to

and Tianjin, support Hainan in using SouthSea

graduallyenhance China's participation in Arctic

in

Shandong, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Fujian,
China

since

developing tools and mechanisms to"will develop national marine economic
development

Central Arctic Ocean

promotingathemarineeconomy'sdevelopment, and there was a focus on(Centralincreasing China's scientific capabilities in

Committee of the Communist Party of

the Arctic by conducting scientific research

China, 2016).

related to mapping and investigation

The importance of exerting influence on(British Chamber of Commerce in China,

the area is not limited to ensuring energy2011).
145

The importance of improving the country’s

System", in which China calls for an "active

scientific capabilities was then reiterated inrole in formulating international rules in

the

which

areas such as the internet, the deep sea, thementioned the country having objectives

polar regions, and aerospace" (Central

to

and

Committee of the Communist Party ofdevelopment of marine resources andChina, 2016). This last point is highly

expand scientific expeditions to marine

relevant because it highlights China's

polar regions" (Central Committee of thecommitment

Communist Party of China, 2016). Morepolicymaking process.

13th

FYP

"strengthen(2016–2020),
theprospecting

broadly, the polar-related policy covered:stationengaging

inthe

The 14th FYP concerns the period from● Establishing a new shore-based Arctic
observation

to2021 and 2025. In this document, the Arctic

through

is framed in many different areas thatcooperation;

range from the maritime community to the● Establishing a new Antarctic researchcommunity of destiny and from scientificstation;research to the development of blue

● Building new advanced icebreakers;

corridors (i.e. the polar silk road). The● Improving

concept

Antarctic

aviation

capabilities;of“communityofcommondestiny” was first mentioned by former● Completing the basic framework for a

ChineseCommunist

Party’s

Generalland/sea/air observation platform in

Secretary Hu Jintao to the 17th National

the polar regions;

Congress of the Chinese Communist Party● Researchingandexploration

developing

technology

in 2007, referring to shared blood andandcommon destiny of mainland China andequipment suitable for the polar

Taiwan. The current leader Xi Jinping has

environments;

slightly modified the concept into “a● Establishing a service platform for theprovisionandapplication

information

regardingcommunityofsharedfuture”

thatofconceptualizes the community of common

polar

destiny with mankind as the primary aim ofenvironments and potential polar

Chinese foreign policy (Mardell, 2017).

resources (Central Committee of theSection 3 of Chapter 33 is dedicated toCommunist Party of China, 2016).

China's participation in global ocean

Among these points emerges the ambition

governance, where it aims to "actively

theto advance the country’s capabilities toaccess polar regions by developing the firstdevelopblue

participate

in

partnerships,
thedeeplyformulation

andimplementation of international ocean

China-built icebreaker, and polar regions

governance mechanism and related rules,

are also mentioned in a section dedicatedpromote the construction of a maritime

to the "International Economic Governance146community of common destiny" (People's

To sustain such claims, China promulgated

Government of Fujian Province, 2021). In

in 1992 the "Law on the Territorial Sea andrelation to blue partnerships, the document

thestates that China "will deepen practicalestablished:cooperation with coastal nations in theContiguous

Zone".

ArticleThe territorial sea of the People's

fields of marine environmental monitoring

Republic of China is the sea belt

and protection, scientific research, andadjacent to the land territory andmaritime search and rescue. We will

the internal waters of the People's

participate in pragmatic cooperation in the

Republic

Arctic and build the Ice Silk Road" (People’sof

China.

The

land

territory of the People's Republic

Government of Fujian Province, 2021).

of China includes the mainland of

When analysing the last three FYPs, it can

the People's Republic of China andclearly be seen that the prioritisation of

its coastal islands; Taiwan and all

Arctic engagement has gone through an

islands

evolutionary trajectory, gradually shifting

including the Diaoyu Islands; thefrom

Penghuenhancingscientificresearch

appertaining
Islands;

there

the

to

Dongshacapabilities to improving participation in

Islands; the Xisha Islands; theglobalZhongsha Islands and the Nansha

governanceandbuilding

partnerships.

Islands; as well as all the other4

Regional diplomacy framework

islands belonging to the People's

4.1

South China Sea

Republic of China. The waters on
the landward side of the baselines

The contested area in the South China Seaof the territorial sea of the People's

has a decades-long history. China's claims

Republic of China constitute thein the area are the heritage of the eleven-internal waters of the People's

dash line marked by the nationalist party

Republic of China. (Government of

Kuomintang 国民党. China’s claims include

the People's Republic of China,
1992)

territorial sovereignty over the South China
Sea

Islands(Nanhai

Zhudao),which

Legal interpretations of the lines mainlycomprise the Pratas Islands (Dongsha
Qundao),Qundao),the2ParacelIslands(XishaMacclesfield

Bank

and

take one of four viewpoints:● They serve as a delimitation of theattribution of the islands therein;

Scarborough Shoal (Zhongsha Qundao),● They represent the scope of theand the Spratly Islands (Nansha Qundao)

historical rights, which indicate where(Gupta and Geraci, 2020). In the 1970s,

rights to fish and develop resources

Chinese premier Zhou Enlai reduced thewere historically exercised;eleven dash-line to nine.

147

● They delineate the boundaries ofChina has indisputable sovereignty

China's sovereignty historically;

over the islands in the South China● They resemble the traditional sphere

Sea and the adjacent waters, andwhere

China's

influencewas

enjoysestablished. (Ikeshima, 2013).

sovereignjurisdiction

overrightstheandrelevant

waters as well as the seabed andMany of China’s claims are based on

subsoil thereof [...] The continental

historical rights (Ikeshima, 2013; Dupuy

shelf beyond 200 nautical miles as

and Dupuy, 2013). Dupuy and Dupuy

contained in the Joint Submissions(2013) reconstructed the main stages China

by Malaysia and the Socialist

has gone through to establish and advance

Republic of Vietnam has seriously

the legitimisation of its historical rights: ininfringed

1958, with the Declaration of China's

China's

sovereignty,

sovereign rights and jurisdiction in

Territorial Sea, China considered the Pratas

theIslands, Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank,

South

China

Sea.

(no.

CML/17/2009)

and the Spratly Islands its territory; then, in
1992, article two of the Law on the

Just two years later, China reiterated its

Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone

position in a second note verbale (no. CML

echoed such sovereignty over other islands

08/2011), in which it stated:

and the South China Sea and surrounding

China's sovereignty and related

waters. At the third session of the Standing

rights and jurisdiction in the South

Committee of the Ninth National People's

China

Congress, in 1998, China adopted theSeaabundant

Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental

aresupportedhistorical

and

by
legal

evidence. The Republic of the

Shelf Act. Article 14 seems to make the firstPhilippines had never made any"historic rights" reference. It states, "theclaims to the Nansha Islands or its

provision of this Act shall not affectcomponents. Since the 1970s, thehistorical rights of the People's Republic ofRepublic of the Philippines has

China" (United Nations, 1998). A further

started to invade and occupy someofficial statement from China came inislands and reefs of China's Nansha

reaction to a joint submission by Malaysia

Islands

and Vietnam to the UN Commission on the

and

made

relevant

territorial claims, to which China

Limits of the Continental Shelf concerning

objects

the outer limits of the continental shelfstrongly.

(no.

CML

08/2011)beyond 200 nautical miles. In a note

Despite the narrative of "historical rights"

verbale (no. CML/17/2009) to the UN

to sovereignty over the South China Sea, as

Secretary-General, China stated that:is often adopted by China's leadership in
official statements, the meaning and148

relevance of such terminology remainprohibiting

unclear (Dupuy and Dupuy, 2013).

vessels from operating, failing to

One highly relevant player in the area is theprevent Chinese fishing vessels fromreclamation in areas where theSpratly Islands and the maritime spacethem,

includingPhilippines enjoys sovereign rights

Scarboroughto explore for and exploit natural

Shoal, a small ring of rocks and reefs more
than

200

kilometres

west

of

Luzon

(International

CrisisGroup,2021).

Overlapping

demands

also

involveresources;● Chinaobligations

protection

underreclamation

Brunei.

UNCLOSbyactivities

andharvesting of endangered species

In 2013, the Philippines initiated a case

(US–China Economic and Security

regarding China's claims and activities in

Review Commission, 2016).

the South China Sea. It mainly consisted in

The ruling represented a key moment inassessing the validity of China’s claims

the South China Sea geopolitics. It was

based on the nine-dash line under UNCLOS

welcomed by Vietnam through the words

and evaluating China's interference withofthe Philippines' rights to utilise resources

theMinistryofForeign

Affairs

spokesperson, Le Hai Binh, who not only

within its claimed waters. In July 2016, thedeclared

Permanent Court of Arbitration in The

Vietnam’s

supportforthepeaceful ruling from The Hague but also

Hague released a 479-page ruling mostly

reiterated Vietnam's sovereignty over bothfavouring the Philippines. The US–China

archipelagos (Spratly and Paracel), internal

Economic and Security Review Commission

and territorial waters, its EEZ, and its

listed the key results:

continental shelf (Vietnam Law and Legal● China's claims to historical rights

Forum, 2016). However, the ruling was met

and resources within its nine-dashwith strong opposition from China. Theline have no legal basis;

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) released

landthis statement:

features in the Spratly Islands are an

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofisland capable of generating a 200-

the People's Republic of China

nm exclusive economic zone;
themarinereef environment" with its land

Islands are also advanced by Malaysia andviolatedits

causing "severe harm to the coral

Paracel Islands. Claims over the Spratly● Chinaviolated

environmental

Vietnam, which claims the Spratly and● None of China's claimed

fishing

operating, and conducting land

Philippines, whose claims focus on thearoundPhilippine

solemnly declares that the award is

Philippines'

null and void and has no binding

sovereign rights by interfering withforce. China neither accepts nor

Philippine oil exploration activities,
149

recognizes it. [...] The Chinese(IASC). While the first aimed to enhance

government

that,

Russia’s capacity to manage radioactive

regarding territorial issues andwaste from its northern fleet, the latter was

maritime

disputes,founded to encourage cooperation over

China does not accept any means

Arctic research, a field that was also openof third party dispute settlement or

to non-Arctic states. It has already been

any solution imposed on China.

noted that China’s active engagement in(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016)

the Arctic started with improvements to its

reiteratesdelimitation

scientificThis statement showed China's willingness

interconnectedness

to resolve the issue through bilateralknowledge

negotiations as an alternative to a thirdYet,ingeopoliticalandcapabilities.
betweenexpertiseThescientificandArcticgovernance might have influenced China's

party entity ruling over the issue (e.g.
UNCLOS).

research

posturing in the Arctic and its commitment

terms,

to scientific work.

Beijing's opposition to the arbitration was
relevant for two main reasons: it supported

China is a member of the IASC, and thanks

the widespread Western perspective of

to its observer status in the Arctic Council,

China disregarding the international legal

has access to the its working groups. Under

order, and it deepened the country’s

the Arctic Council, three main international

strategic rivalry with the US, further

binding agreements have been negotiated:endangering regional stability.

the

4.2

aeronautical and maritime search andCentral Arctic Ocean

2013, and the Agreement on enhancing

a place of substantial military deployment.

international Arctic scientific cooperation

In the 1980s, the concept of security started
military

security

in 2017. These three key deliverables of thetoArctic Council show how cooperation andenvironmental security thanks to thescience have founded a common groundincreasing awareness of global warming

for fruitful cooperation between the Arctic

and concerns about the deterioration ofstates.

environmental conditions. This gradual

However,

shift led to the foundation of collaborative
suchEnvironmental

as

the

ArcticMilitary

Cooperation(AMEC)

negotiations

of

the

CAO

Agreement have also been opened up tomechanisms for addressing environmental
issues,onpreparedness and response in the Arctic in

between the US and the Soviet Union andfromcooperationon cooperation on marine oil pollution

a theatre for hegemonic competition

shift

on

rescue in the Arctic in 2011, the Agreement

During the Cold War, the Arctic region wastoAgreement

non-Arctic states, including China. Liu(2021) underlines that even though the
Chinese delegation’s presence has been

between Russia, Norway, and the US, and“under the radar”, it has marked the firstthe International Arctic Science Committee
150

time China has sat equally alongside Arctic

with little to offer. Even though in recent

states in the negotiation processes. Certain

decades it has attracted the attention ofissues with China's active participation in

Arctic and non-Arctic states, fishing still

Arctic platforms have been raised by Ren

represents a considerable challenge. To(2019), who has investigated China’s

regulate fishing, the NEAFC has been

participation in task forces and highlighted:

createdthe country’s non-attendance of some

However, fisheries activities are not ameetings, discontinuity of the delegation

game-changer

participating, and lack of expertise of theeconomies,delegates. While these insights show China

developed. More so than fishing activities,

should probably strive to improve its

Arctic states are concerned about othernegotiation capacity, its endorsement ofstates accessing international waters forinternational cooperation mechanism also

regional security issues.

seems to have set a precedent for China’s

whichcoastalarequotas.
states'mostlywell-

CAO Agreement highlighted the need toregion.

acquire more knowledge and expertise in

Discussion

the area. Yet, what led China to be part of
the Agreement? While in drafting theRegional maritime regimes shape theAgreement, some states were more active

manoeuvring space for regional actors and,than others, for China, this represented its

to some extent, result from the interests ofrelationsforfishing

regional maritime regime is science. The

towards maintaining the status quo in theandmanageA driving force that has helped shape theArctic engagement to be highly oriented

5

tobetweenthose

first opportunity to be involved in theactors.

negotiating

Accordingly, the differences between any

processforanArcticAgreement. It has been proposed that

two scenarios can be profound. In the

China flew "under the radar" during

South China Sea, fishing represents anegotiations, remaining largely quiet (Liu,priority for the regional economies, and the2021). From another point of view, thisabsence of an RFMO means there is little toapproachprevent illegal fishing from taking place. In

reflects

China'slong-term

strategy in the Arctic to be gradually

this area, disputes over fisheries have been

included as an actor in Arctic governance.

waging for decades and have contributed

Such a gradual process entails the need forto the difficulty in establishing an RFMO.

China to be perceived as a responsible

Even if the Chinese economy's dependence

actor in the region and as a contributor toon fishing differs from other countries', itstill represents an essential factor in its

fostering scientific knowledge.

engagement in the area. Meanwhile, for

While the South China Sea is entirely

most of the 20th century, the Central Arctic

accessible and China possesses the world's

Ocean has been perceived as a frozen sea

largest fishing fleet, the Central Arctic151

Ocean still requires us to gain much more

research and scientific access to improving

knowledge about the marine ecosystemits position in Arctic governance. Whileand the seabed. Making such contributions

both regions are relevant for natural

to our scientific knowledge is a key

resource access, a key difference lies in theobjective for China to secure its place in

actual and well-structured supply chain of

Arctic governance since one of the criteriaenergy resources through the South China

for observers is to "have demonstrated

Sea and the potential access to Arctic

their Arctic interest and expertise relevant

resources. The speculative narrative that1

to the work of the Arctic Council". While

presents China as a threat in the Arctic is

its engagement in the South China Sea isprincipally

guided by sovereignty claims over a large

exploiting Arctic natural resources (e.g.

part of the area, needed for it to keep

Rainwater, 2013; Robinson, 2013). Yet,

conducting (also) fishing activities, in the

Stunker (2022) and Pezard et al. (2022)

Central Arctic Ocean, it seems the country’s

have noted that there is a huge difference

engagement

between

is

more

based

on

based

the

on

rhetoricalits

interest

expansion

inof

consolidating its role in Arctic governance,

China's presence in the Arctic and thewhich requires its strong engagement withreality on the ground.

scientific knowledge production.

China has not hidden its intention to realise

The article has also addressed the extent to

the Polar Silk Road, framed as an extension

which these two different scenarios areof the larger Belt and Road Initiative.

relevant to China's national security. The

However, the actual route is ambiguous.

discourse has mainly been focused on

While its collaboration with Russia mayenergy security, with it highlighted thatfacilitate increased shipping along themost of the imported oil and gas pass

Northern Sea Route, the creation of athrough the Malacca Strait and the Southtranspolar route from the Bering Strait toChina Sea. It has also been argued that

Greenland has also been discussed. The

economic development in China is strictly

advantage of this last route lies in its

connected to the legitimisation of the CCP.

passage through the Central Arctic Ocean

On the other hand, analysis of the most(mainly international waters), lessening therecent FYPs has revealed how the Chinese

dependency on Russia. Given the harshleadership’s attention to the Arctic region

climate conditions, this will never represent

has gradually shifted from enhancing

China’s primary route for energy supply.

1 See the Arctic Council website: “Observers—Arctic Council” www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/obesrver-menu

152

Nonetheless, the development of northern

region, where Russia is not the only actor

shipping routes presents a means to avoid

involved.

the Malacca Strait at times, and the

The last section of this article analysed

Northern Sea Route has often been raised

regional

as an alternative to passing through the

diplomacyandChina's

sovereignty claims. In this context, theSuez Canal, especially after the accidents indifferences between the two scenarios

2020 (Abay, 2021).

appear incontestably profound. They are

While Wang and Su (2021) proposed thatprincipally based on legitimising (regional)

China should modernise the military force

rights. In the South China Sea, China hasof the PLAN to improve its capabilities tosovereignty rights and, through the nine-

escort energy supplies shipments, heavy

dash line, advances historical claims over a

military deployment in the Arctic is unlikely

large area of the South China Sea. In thedue to the obligatory passage throughArctic it has no rights. Meanwhile, in the

territorial waters. On the topic of the

Arctic, China has officially declared its

military,

Sino-Russian

adherence to the extant legal framework

relations offers another point to reflect on.

(UNCLOS), while in the South China Sea, it

Even though Russia's invasion of Ukraine

has disputed the arbitration against it ashas, to some extent, reinforced the Sino-raised by the Philippines and expressed a

Russian axis in the Arctic, Moscow showed

will to resolve disputes bilaterally rather

initialthan through international law.

thesolidity

distrust

of

about

the

internationalisation of the Arctic Council

For China, today, being part of global

when China first applied to become angovernanceobserver member of the Arctic Council inwithpolitics. In the Arctic, this approach has

Moscow to strengthen cooperation with

contributed to enhancing China's position

China. However, it is unlikely that we willin regional governance. Yet, China's claims

see China sustaining a Cold War model ofover the disputed area in the South China

division in the region, with Western

Sea have a long history, predating suchcountries on one side and Russia and China

modern strategising. China's assertion of

on the other. Instead, China’s long-term
of

line

perceived as a responsible actor in global

isolation in the Arctic and have pushed

maintenanceinessential strategic approach to being

contingencies have facilitated Russia’s

andfalling

international frameworks represents an2009 (Willis and Depledge, 2014). Current

policyandits rights in the area is twofold: at thestabledomestic level, it is oriented toward

relationships with other Arctic states seemestablishing a coherent legal framework,part of a step-by-step approach China isbuttaking to implement its strategy in the

at

the

international

level,

theadvancement of its rights is based on
historical rights. Engaging in disputes at

153

both

levelsshowshighlyworking to re-establish the work of thecommitted to asserting and legitimising its

Arctic Council, including Russia. Someregional rights.

insights came from the Arctic Circle

For actors with territorial rights in the

Conference held in Reykjavik last October

Arctic,meanwhile,

disputesfunctions

China

is

solvingtowhen Gao Feng, China's special envoy for

territorial

improve

Arctic affairs, publicly stated that "if an A-7

theirso-called Arctic Council is to come tocooperation and dialogue over relevant
factorsthat

mayfosterreality, I don't think that is the original—

economicthat will be a different one" (Schreiber,

development. While in the South China

2022). This last point is critical to underline

Sea, rivalry and confrontational attitudes
prevail,thepotential

the difference between China's approach incommercial

the two settings studied in this article.

opportunities in the Arctic contribute to

While China’s confrontational approach todeescalating power tensions and solving
decades-longdisputesoverinternational law in the South China Sea

maritime

reveals the country’s preference for solving

boundaries. The Arctic Council has also

disputes at the state level through bilateral

played a key role in generating effective

agreements, China's perception of thecooperation. This capacity to cooperate

Arctic is based on a global approach thatrather than fall into confrontation has led
totheconceptualisationofprivileges dialogues and relations throughArcticinternational

exceptionalism. Yet, even though theimpact of climate change-induced effects.

does not totally agree with viewing theexceptional

toglobalprofoundly shaped by the transnational

conflict in the past decades, the authorasIts

perception of the Arctic region is also

region has not experienced any military

Arcticplatforms.

Since the work of the Working Groups

states'under the Arctic Council is mainly focused

confrontation. The recent joint decision of

on dealing with environmental issues in thethe Arctic 7 to condemn Russia's invasion

region, China's efforts to restore the workof Ukraine and halt the work of the Arcticof the Arctic Council might be read as not

Council reveals the limitations of theonlyplatform when it comes to political and

as

a

means

of

avoidingthemarginalisation of non-Arctic states insecurity issues, which should be excluded

Arctic governance, but as also showing

according to the mandate. The freeze of

how China perceives the Arctic as a region

the Arctic Council may negatively impact

whose issues require global platforms andobserver states with limited rights, whichinternational mechanisms if they are to be

may lose influence in regional governance.

effectively resolved.

For China, the Arctic Council represents apivotal platform to better engage with
Arctic issues. It is likely we will see China

154

6

Conclusion

sovereignty confrontation even tenser. In
the Arctic, meanwhile, China’s declared

This article has analysed China’s approachalignment with the ruling order and its

and space of engagement in the Southparticipation

China Sea and Central Arctic Ocean togovernance

two areas when discussing China as a

assuming

threat to the Arctic regional order. The

from

China.

While

confrontationalthanstance.

theory, Pezan et al. (2022) and Stunkel

peculiarities of regional diplomacy. In all
emergedaratherstates has raised and fuelled the threatpriority in China’s domestic policy, and theapproaches

approach,bilateral agreements with many Arctic

three spheres: regional maritime regimes,

different

marineAlthough China’s dynamism in discussing

discourse has been built by focusing on

slightlysafeguarding

ecosystems shows it endorses a global

show it is inappropriate to assimilate thethree,

in(2022) have shown that China’s presence inthe region is still extremely limited. The

thereasons for such limitations include thelegitimisation of China’s claims has notdirect actions of other governments andbeen the core of the study, attention has

sub-local authorities, as well as resistancebeen paid to understanding the framework

fromand regional geopolitical and governanceindigenous

peopletomassivefeatures that induce China to shape its

infrastructural projects.

policy, and why it is hard to envision

China’s Arctic strategy is a long-term

China’s assertiveness in the South China

strategy highly dependent on regional

Sea being replicated in the Arctic region.

political stability, on bilateral relations with

While China's approach to the South China

the Arctic states, and on China’s position

Sea is guided by issues strictly related towithinnational security, in the Central Arctic

China’s approach in the South China Sea to

Ocean, China’s posture is far softer and intheline with multilateral agreements andinstrumental in fuelling Cold War rhetoric,

international platforms.

but due to the illustrated differences, it is

It has been argued that the South China

extremely hard to find deep strategic

ArcticCentralgovernance.
ArcticOceanbecause it represents a decisive area fordifferent geopolitical scenarios.

energy and food supplies. Moreover, the7lack of an RFMO means there is nothing tobycoastalofhydrocarbon

estimated

in

the

area

Route in Arctic waters. Middle East

Monitor.

deposits

makes

Bibliography
the Suez Canal is the Northern Sea

states,facilitating regional tensions. Lastly, therichnessbeAbay, E. G. (2021). Russia's alternative toadequately prevent illegal fishing fromconducted

maycommonalities for these two markedly

Sea is a core point of China’s foreign policy

being

Comparinghttps://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20

the210408-russias-alternative-to-the-suez155

canal-is-the-northern-sea-route-in-

Energy Information Administration (EIA)

arctic-waters/(2013). Contested areas of South China

British Chamber of Commerce in China

Sea likely have few conventional oil andgas
resources.

(2011). The 12th five-year plan foreconomic and social development of thePeople's
Republicof
China.

https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/det

https://d1bf23g64f8xve.cloudfront.net/s

EIA (2016). As Japan and South Korea

ites/default/files/downloads/policydatabase//CHINA%29%20The%2012th

import less LNG, other Asian countries
begin
toimportmore.

%20Five-Year%20Plan%20%282011-https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/det

2015%29.pdf

ail.php?id=27652

Broomfield, E. V. (2003). Perceptions of

EIA (2018). More than 30% of global

danger: The China threat theory. Journalof Contemporary China, 12(35), 265–

maritime crude oil trade moves through
the
South
China
Sea.

284.

https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detCentral People’s Government of theail.php?id=36952

People’s Republic of China (2011). The

Government of the People’s Republic of

12th five-year plan (2011–2015) for
national
economicandsocialdevelopment.

China (1958). Declaration on China’s

Territorial

https://policy.asiapacificenergy.org/site

ments/1341822-declaration-of-the-s/default/files/12th%20Five-

government-of-the-prc-on

Year%20Plan%20%282011-

Government of the People's Republic of

2015%29%20for%20National%20Econo

China (1992). Law on the Territorial Sea

mic%20and%20Social%20Development

and%20%28CH%29.pdf

https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLAT

Central Committee of the Communist

IONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992

Party of China (2016). The 13th five-year_Law.pdf

plan for economic and social
development of the People’s Republic ofChina.

Gupta, S., and Geraci, M. (2020). China’s

ail.php?id=10651

Sea.

https://www.documentcloud.org/docu

thecontiguouszone.

P020210527785800103339.pdf

claims in the South China Sea: Reviewing
the legal position of the United States
regarding China’s territorial andmaritime rights claims. Institute for

Dupuy, F., and Dupuy P-M. (2013). A legal

China–America

analysis of China’s historic rights claim in

https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/f4

the South China Sea. The American

1484de9d4144c59b22540cb94b150a

Journal of International Law, 107(1),Hounshell, B. (2019). Pompeo aims to

124–141.

counter China’s ambitions in the Arctic.

https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/policies/202105/

156

Studies.

Politico.

as a Maritime Power” Conference.

https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05

https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files//06/pompeo-arctic-china-russia-

pdf/china-far-seas-navy.pdf

1302649

Melnychuk, M. C., Peterson, E., Elliott, M.,

Ikeshima, T. (2013). China's dashed line inandthe South China Sea: Legal limits andmanagement impacts on target species

future prospects. Waseda Global Forum.

status. Proceedings of the National

https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/144455

Academy of Sciences, 114(1), 178–183.

129.pdf

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

International Crisis Group (2021). The(MOFA) (2018). Agreement to prevent

Philippines’ dilemma: How to manage
tensions in the South China Sea. Asia

unregulated high seas fisheries in theCentralArcticOcean.

Reporthttps://www.mofa.go.jp/files/00044923

n.

316.

https://icg-

Hilborn,R.

(2016).

Fisheries

prod.s3.amazonaws.com/316-the-

3.pdf

philippines-dilemma%20%282%29.pdf

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s

Koivurova, T. (2019). The current andRepublic of China (2016). Statement of

future role of non-Arctic states in Arctic

Liu, N. (2021). China and the agreement to

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of thePeople's Republic of China on the award
of 12 July 2016 of the arbitral tribunal in
the South China Sea arbitration
established at the request of the
RepublicofthePhilippines.

prevent unregulated high seas fisheries

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjd

Thet_665385/2649_665393/201607/t20160

governance. In A. Shibata, L. Zou, N.
Sellheim,

andM.

Scopelliti(Eds.).

Emerging legal orders in the Arctic (pp.
11–26).

intheCentralArcticOcean.

Diplomat.

712_679470.html

https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/china

Permanent-and-the-agreement-to-prevent-

Republic of China (May 7, 2009). Noteunregulated-high-seas-fisheries-in-thecentral-arctic-ocean/verbale no. CML/17/2009 to the UN
Secretary-General.

Mardell, J. (2017). The community of

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/

common destiny in Xi Jinping’s new era.

submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/

The

chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf;

Diplomat.

Missionthe

People’s

Permanent

community-of-common-destiny-in-xi-

Republic of China (2011). Note verbale

jinpings-new-era/
McDevitt, M. (2016). China’s Far Sea’s

no. CML/08/2011 to the UN SecretaryGeneral.

navy: The implications of the “Open Seas

https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new

157

of

the

https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/the-Protection” mission. Paper for the “China

Missionof

People’s

/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2

Stabeno, P., Bond, N. A., Hermann, A. J.,

011_re_phl_e.pdf

and Kachel, N. B. (2004). Meteorology

Pezard, S., Flanagan, S. J., Harold S. W.,

and oceanography of the Northern Gulf

Chindea, I. A., Sacks, B. J., Tingstad, A.,of Alaska. Continental Shelf Research,

Finazzo, T., and Kim, S. (2022). China's

24(7), 859–897.

strategy and activities in the Arctic:
Implications for North American andtransatlantic security. Rand Corporation

State Council of People’s Republic ofPeople’s Government of Fujian Province

e_paper/2015/05/27/content_28147511(2021). Outline of the 14th five-year plan

5610833.htm(2021–2025) for national economic andsocial development and Vision 2035 of
the People's Republic of China.

Stunkel, L. (2022). China’s polar silk roadhttps://www.fujian.gov.cn/english/news

https://www.isdp.eu/content/uploads/2/202108/t20210809_5665713.htm

022/10/Chinas-Polar-Silk-Road-

Ren, Y. (2019). China in the Arctic Council:

Revisited_Larissa-Stunkel.pdf

Existing

prospective

Swaine, M. D. (2010). China’s assertive

solutions. In A. Shibata, L. Zou, N.

behavior. Part one: On “Core interests”—

Sellheim,(Eds.).

Carnegie endowment for international

Emerging legal orders in the Arctic (pp.

peace. China Leadership Monitor, 34(2),244–260).

1–25.

Rainwater, S. (2013). Race to the north:

The State Council Information Office ofChina’sthe People’s Republic of China (2018).

problems
and

and

M.

arcticScopelliti

strategy

andChina (2015). China’s military strategy.
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whit

revisited. Institute for Security andDevelopmentits

policy.

implications. Naval War College Review,

China’s

66(2), 62–82.

https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whi

Robinson, R. W. (2013). China’s long con

te_paper/2018/01/26/content_2814760

Macdonald-Laurier(MLI)
Commentary.

26660336.htm#:~:text=China's%20polic

https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/M

0development%20of%20the%20Arctic

LIChina'sLongConInTheArctic09-

United Nations (1982). Convention on the

13Draft4-1.pdf

Law

Schreiber, M. (2022). China will nothttps://www.un.org/depts/los/conventi

recognize an Arctic Council without

on_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.p

in

the

Arctic.

Institute.

Russia,

envoy

says.

ArcticArcticpolicy.

y%20goals%20on%20the,sustainable%2

Today.

of

the

Sea

(UNCLOS).

df

not-recognize-an-arctic-council-

Exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf act.

without-russia-envoy-says/

https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLAT

https://www.arctictoday.com/china-will-

United158

Nations(1998).

IONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/chn_1998_

https://vietnamlawmagazine.vn/vietna

eez_act.pdf

m-welcomes-hague-ruling-5441.html

UnitedNations

Conference

on

the

Vylegzhanin, A. N., Young, O., andEnvironment and Development (1992).

Berkman, P. A. (2020). The Central Arctic

AgendaOcean

21.

Fisheries

Agreementasanhttps://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/

element in the evolving Arctic Ocean

content/documents/Agenda21.pdf

governance complex. Marine Policy, 116,

United Nations Conference on Trade and

1–18.

Development (UNCTAD) (2015). Review

Wang, K-H., and Su, C-W. (2021). Doesoftransport.

high crude oil dependence influence

https://unctad.org/system/files/official-

Chinese military expenditure decision-

document/rmt2015_en.pdf

making? Energy Strategy Reviews, 35.

US–China Economic and Security Review

Willis, M, and Depledge, D. (2014). How

Commission (2016). South China Sea

we learned to stop worrying about

arbitration ruling: What happened andwhat’snext?

China's Arctic ambitions: Understanding

https://www.uscc.gov/research/south-Thechina-sea-arbitration-ruling-what-

https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/china

happened-and-whats-next-arctic-ambitions-arctic-council/

maritime

China's admission to the Arctic Council.

Vietnam Law and Legal Forum (2016).

VietnamwelcomesHague

ruling.

159

ArcticInstitute.

160