Three Seas
Initiative
Mapping National
Perspectives
Editors:
Andris Sprūds
Mārtiņš Vargulis

Three Seas
Initiative

Mapping National
Perspectives

Three Seas
Initiative

Mapping National
Perspectives
Editors:
Andris Sprūds
Mārtiņš Vargulis

The publication “Three Seas Initiative: Mapping National Perspectives” offers
a collection of articles that discuss priorities of the Initiative from the countries’
perspective. Each of the article identifies both challenges and opportunities to themembers participating in the Initiative. The publication provides the reader with an
insight into the diversified views on the Initiative, the main shortcomings and the futureof the Initiative as envisaged by international experts. Noting the changing international
environment caused by the Russia’s aggression in Ukraine in 2022, publication is also
addressing how the recent security developments affects the Initiative.
Editors: Andris Sprūds, Mārtiņš Vargulis
Authors: Lívia Benko, Ana-Maria Boromisa, Vít Dostál, Kamil Jarończyk, Anthony
B. Kim, Egils Levits, Imants Lieģis, Lucia Mokrá, Illimar Ploom, Wojciech Przybylski,
Plamen Ralchev, Edgars Rinkēvičs, Mihai Sebe, Višnja Samardžija, Andris Sprūds, Velina
Tchakarova, Mārtiņš Vargulis, Gediminas Varvuolis, Viljar Veebel, Gediminas Vitkus,
Zsombor Zeöld
Language editors: Talis Archdeacon, Sarah Fish
Cover and layout design: Oskars Stalidzāns
The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
the position of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, any of the sponsors, or any
governmental or other entity.

ISBN 978-9934-567-82-7
UDK 32(08)Th773© Authors of the articles, 2022
© Cover design: Oskars Stalidzāns, 2022
© Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2022

Contents
EGILS LEVITS

Address by the President of the Republic of Latvia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
EDGARS RINKĒVIČS

Address by the Minister of the Foreign Affairsof the Republic of Latvia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
VELINA TCHAKAROVA, LÍVIA BENKO

Austria: The bridge-building approach to the Three Seas
Initiative — avenues for improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
PLAMEN RALCHEV

Bulgaria: Sense, sensibility and wariness  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
ANA-MARIA BOROMISA, VIŠNJA SAMARDŽIJA

Croatia: In search for visibility and stronger support  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
VÍT DOSTÁL

Czech Republic: A stalemate and promising circumstances . . . . . . . . 58
ILLIMAR PLOOM, VILJAR VEEBEL

Estonia: The increased focus on geopolitics
after Russia’s invasion in Ukraine  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
ZSOMBOR ZEÖLD

Hungary: Giving the minimum  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81IMANTS LIEĢIS

Latvia: Engagement in the Three Seas Initiativeand prioritising geopolitics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
GEDIMINAS VARVUOLIS, GEDIMINAS VITKUS

Lithuania: The search for synergies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  113KAMIL JAROŃCZYK, WOJCIECH PRZYBYLSKI

Poland: Regional leadership stunted
by governance dilemmas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
MIHAI SEBE

Romania: Transforming the Three Seas Initiative
into a strategic opportunity. A short overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  142LUCIA MOKRÁ

Slovakia: Strengthening regional position
and addressing new challenges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  157ANA BOJINOVIĆ FENKO

Slovenia: High interest in the complementarity of the Three
Seas Initiative with EU regional development frameworks  . . . . . . . .  173ANTHONY B. KIM

The Three Seas Initiative: A case for America’s
economic statecraft imperative  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
ANDRIS SPRŪDS, MĀRTIŅŠ VARGULIS

Conclusions: Putting together the puzzle
by mapping national perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Authors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

Address by the Presidentof the Republic of Latvia
Dear Reader,
On 20—21 June the 7th annual Three Seas Initiative (3SI) Summit and4th annual Business Forum is taking place in Riga.
My decision to host this event is based on the further potential I see
for the initiative. The 3SI is unique in its guiding principle — ‘politicallyinspired, commercially driven’.
Various cross-border infrastructure projects are submitted forfunding. They envisage digital, energy or transport connections between
the twelve participating countries which are all EU Member States,
sometimes involving also neighbours of the 3SI region. The crossborderinfrastructure needs of our twelve countries are still great, despite theconsiderable EU investment over many years. We shall continue to workon attracting more public and private investors to 3SI projects.
There is another dimension to the 3SI, especially in the light ofRussia’s war on Ukraine. I believe the 3SI drives the emergence of a
new region in Europe, a ‘democratic shield’ against authoritarianism
on our common external EU border. Today, as the people, the army,
the leaders of Ukraine are fighting for European values and liberty, I
envisage that the 3SI region could eventually extend further to Ukraine,
as well as Moldova and Georgia.
It is time for us to remind what we have contributed to Europe andwhat we still have to offer. The 3SI is a problem-solver, not problemmaker region. We have fast growth, resilience, an independent
spirit. We have soft power tools, with our history, culture and nature
becoming increasingly well-known in Western Europe and, indeed,among ourselves. Now we need more sustainable, secure connections
between us to boost our common potential. We need the ‘hearts andminds’ infrastructure in our region.
That is why we held the very first 3SI Civil Society Forum in Riga in
May 2022. I wanted to gather the ‘democratic security influencers’ of7

the 3SI, whose recommendations will be reported to the political andbusiness leaders at the Riga Summit. In the same spirit, I welcome thispublication by the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, which delves
into the various motivations and approaches by participating states of
the 3SI.
May all roads lead to Riga on 20—21 June and beyond!
Egils Levits
President of the Republic of Latvia

8Address by the Ministerof the Foreign Affairsof the Republic of Latvia
Dear Reader,
On 20—21 June 2022, Latvia is hosting the Three Seas Initiative Summit
and Business Forum.
The Three Seas Initiative (3SI) was born out of a shared interest in
developing infrastructure projects and reducing connectivity gaps in
the energy, transport, and digital communication sectors on the northsouth axis of the European Union. In the years since the initiative wascreated in 2016, the summits have faced major developments. The
Riga Summit will further contribute to this evolution by enriching thediscussion with new ideas and solutions. The summit will emphasise
the new opportunities that the 3SI is providing along with the existing
policies and programmes of the European Union — cohesion has always
been a significant benchmark for the initiative.
At the centre of the 3SI Riga Summit will be the presidential
meetings and Business Forum. The presidential meeting in Riga willenvisage and highlight the next 3SI development vectors of actionand emphasise the need to strengthen the region’s overall resilience.
The importance of well-developed infrastructure throughout theregion will also be stressed in the context of the initiative’s security
policy. Furthermore, the presidents are expected to discuss thepossibility of utilising the 3SI as an effective platform for rebuilding
Ukraine after the war. During the Business Forum, practical solutions
to issues in investment, digitalisation, transport and energy will also
be discussed.
As a part of the Three Seas Initiative, the Parliamentary Forum willtake place in Riga. The aim of gathering the region’s parliamentarians
is to enhance common efforts on cross-border projects. The forum will
also provide an opportunity to exchange views on how the planning9

of 3SI projects can achieve optimal effectiveness when legislative
processes are synchronised.
In this publication, you will find a collection of articles written byexperts from the member states of the Three Seas Initiative. In addition
to promoting the prosperity of the region, their thoughts will serve tobuild a joint 3SI identity based on the core values of the member states.
I believe that the concepts gathered in this edition will be useful
in both highlighting the current potential of 3SI member states while
also outlining the future development of the region. These ideas will
help to combine vision with action that fosters the sustainable growth
and resilience of the region as well as the well-being of the societies
involved.
Edgars Rinkēvičs
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia

10Austria: The bridge-building approachto the Three Seas Initiative —avenues for improvement
Velina Tchakarova, Lívia Benko

Russia’s war on Ukraine has made the role of the Three Seas Initiative(3SI) more pivotal than ever before, as the security of Central and Eastern
European (CEE) energy, transportation and digital infrastructure
became a geostrategic matter.1 Austria occupies a unique position
within the 3SI because of its geographic location as well as historicbackground. The Alpine republic has often pursued a bridge-building
approach between the traditional members in Western Europe and the
new members of the European Union (EU) from the former Soviet blocin the CEE. In fact, Austria is the only 3SI member that was not part of
the Warsaw Pact or Yugoslavia during the Cold War and thus plays an
exceptional role within the framework of the initiative. In this context,
Vienna is regarded as a spoiler but also a multiplier of the 3SI synergy
effects depending on its future role and contribution.

Energy security
Due to the historical legacy of the Soviet Union, east—west infrastructure
is more developed than north—south linkages, which presents asignificant obstacle that hinders Europe’s efforts to achieve energy
independence. Russia has achieved a substantial leverage over the EU
due to its gas, oil and coal supply.2 With the present energy crisis3 andRussia’s aggression against Ukraine, it is more important than ever toreduce the energy dependency of the CEE countries on Russia. The
sixth EU sanction package seeks to impose an oil embargo.4
Furthermore, Russia’s war on Ukraine has accelerated a major energy
supply crisis. European gas markets are in disarray and supplies from
11

Russia in the first quarter of 2022 were 30% lower than in the same periodof 2021.5 Policymakers are debating the possibility of a complete stop to
Russian gas flows to the EU that may lead to a six-fold gas price increasein the first quarter of 2022 compared to the previous year.6 Greater
competition for liquified natural gas (LNG) supplies is inevitable but alasting solution to the current energy challenges would be to accelerateenergy efficiency improvements among the member states and direct thetransition away from fossil fuels towards low-carbon sources of energy.7
According to the Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, theEU must become independent of Russian oil, coal and gas and cannot
rely on a supplier that explicitly threatens member states. The European
Commission’s proposal is known as RePowerEU, which highlights theimportance of developing renewable energy sources in line with the
bloc’s climate policy. Moreover, reducing consumption, improving
energy efficiency and promoting the use of hydrogen is high on theagenda. It also unveils a plan to invest in sourcing alternatives to the
150 billion cubic metres of natural gas the EU currently imports from
Russia each year. According to the European Commission, dependence
on Russia can be reduced by two-thirds, or 100 billion cubic metres,by the end of the year by importing more LNG. The EU could import
50 billion cubic metres more LNG annually. Further improvement
could be achieved by diversifying pipeline sources, which could
bring another 10 billion cubic metres of annual savings in Russian gas
imports. The goal is to reduce gas supplies from Russia by 2030. The
problem, however, is that Russia supplies about one-third of Europe’s
gas and stopping energy imports from Russia would cause inflation torise sharply and plunge the EU into recession. Another major obstacleon the path to a diversified energy portfolio is the fact that the Visegrád
Four (V4) countries8 and several other European countries, such as
Austria and Germany, still rely heavily on Russian gas, which means
their diversification would take time.
The LNG infrastructure in Central Europe is also underdeveloped,
which exacerbates the problem. The Russian invasion provided theimpetus to make such investments to improve the lack of infrastructure.
Germany, for example, is aware of the urgent need for LNG infrastructure.
Shortly after the Nord Stream 2 cancellation, Chancellor Olaf Scholz
announced plans to build LNG terminals in the country. The VisegrádGroup are also actively seeking to connect to LNG infrastructure.
12Currently, the situation in the energy sector is escalating. Russia hasrecently expressed its will to European countries and companies that
Russian gas must be purchased in its currency.9 Russian energy producer
Gazprom has already halted gas supplies to Bulgaria and Poland
because they had failed to pay for gas in roubles.10 The war in Ukraine
has highlighted the necessity for initiatives that aim at promoting
energy connectivity in CEE. Austria, however, does not always sharethe same geoeconomic interests as the other 3SI members, particularly
on key energy and infrastructure issues. For example, many Eastern
European countries, which were under Moscow’s domination for
decades, feared Russia’s growing influence in the region and opposed
the completion of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. Incidentally, theyalso favoured LNG imports, including those from the US, which are
increasingly expected to reach Europe via Poland’s Baltic coast. The
gas interconnection between Poland and Lithuania (GIPL) aimed atboosting energy security in the region by connecting the Baltic andFinnish with the Polish markets proved to be a smart investment. Theinterconnector was launched under the framework of 3SI and alreadyallows Lithuanian LNG to flow to Poland, which is a significant successfor diversification in the current geopolitical context.
Contrary to other members such as Poland and the Baltic states,
Austria has not diversified its energy supply from Russia, nor did Vienna
see any incentive to participate in the 3SI as a way of reducing thedependency of the EU on Russian oil and gas imports prior to Russia’s
war against Ukraine. The main reason for the lack of interest in energy
issues within the 3SI lies in the fact that the country has establisheditself as an energy hub for Russian supplies to the European market
over many decades. Moreover, Austria considered German’s mostrecent energy project, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, with participationof the state company OMV, primarily as a ‘commercial project’ rather
than a geopolitical instrument by Moscow. Following the war on
Ukraine, the dependence on Russian gas supply became increasingly
problematic given the debates between all EU members regarding thepossible embargo on Russian energy deliveries. OMV also had to booka EUR 1 billion (USD 1.1 billion) negative value adjustment item on theSouth Russkoye venture in the first quarter of 2022 because of its stakeof almost 25% in Severneftegazprom together with Russian gas giant
Gazprom which is developing the field in West Siberia.11 Currently,
13

OMV cannot sell its share because of changes in Russian legislation.
OMV also had to write down its EUR 1 billion loan to Gazprom’s Nord
Stream 2 because the pipeline’s operationalisation was put on hold.
Furthermore, OMV signalled that it was still considering the Russian
demands12 from Gazprom ‘to switch to a new payment method for
Russian gas that the company imports under its long-term contract toAustria and Germany, running until 2040’.13 OMV chief executive officer
Alfred Stern admitted that Austria was ‘painfully dependent on the
supply of raw materials from Russia’.
However, the diversification of energy sources, and likewise thediversification of energy routes, are of great importance for Austrianinterests in the long run. Austria is at the forefront of dependency
on Russian gas, as 80% of its natural gas supply comes from Russia.14
Many countries are looking around for alternatives. Austria is currently
interested not only in green hydrogen from the Emirates, but also in
LNG. The 3SI may provide workable solutions for Austria which is on
its way towards renewable energy sources and a circular economy.
There is a large gas pipeline project from Romania to Austria, the socalled BRUA project, that Austria is highly interested in. This pipeline isto supply natural gas to customers in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary andAustria in the future. In the construction of the pipeline, the 3SI could
be of decisive help.15 Austria consumes around 8.5 billion cubic metresof natural gas a year, four-fifths of which is sourced from Russia via
pipelines.16 If this gas were to be replaced by LNG, around 80 tankers
would be needed for Austria alone. The country could purchase LNG
in reverse flow via a pipeline from Italy. In the future, LNG could betransported from the terminal on Krk in Croatia to Austria; however,there is no import infrastructure yet.17 It would be in the Austrianinterest to develop this energy connectivity within the 3SI.
Another 3SI member, Hungary, has a considerable amount of
unconventional gas resources. A future 3SI project may evolvearound the extraction of unconventional gas aimed at decreasing theRussian dominance in energy supplies between Hungary, Austria,
Slovakia and Romania. The necessary investment would be more than
USD 200 million. The extraction of these unconventional gas resources
could decrease the Russian dominancy regarding gas supply but thisproject has not attracted the necessary funding yet.18

14

Reliable, sustainable and inclusive connectivity
The 3SI platform has a very high potential and aims to build a coherent
and integrated infrastructure in CEE and to help the region overcome
development gaps that were historically instigated, as they were
under the Iron Curtain after World War II, which severely affected thecountries’ economies.19
In general, Austria takes a positive view of the 3SI-led connectivity
projects for closer cooperation in CEE, but nevertheless opposes
possible ‘duplication’ due to other EU-funded projects and insistson the EU’s leading role in this framework. Austria wants to avoid
an overlapping of European structures, funding instruments andapproaches based on EU participation. From Vienna’s perspective, theinitiative offers a good opportunity to support EU efforts to strengthencohesion and reduce existing regional disparities, for example byexpanding infrastructure and improving connectivity.
One of the most significant arguments in favour of 3SI is that Austria
could contribute to the development of the transport and digital
north—south infrastructure due to its know-how and experience intransport infrastructure.20 The USD 80 billion high-capacity rail androad corridor is being considered to link the ports of Gdansk andŚwinoujście with those of Trieste, Ravenna and Ancona, after crossing
heavily industrialised areas such as Warsaw, the Upper Silesian coalbasin, Vienna and the Po Valley.21 Austria plays an important role in theBaltic—Adriatic European Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)
Core Network Corridor. The projects within this framework are planned
to be implemented over the period between 2016 and 2030. It isestimated that the implementation will lead to an increase in GDP overthe same period of EUR 489 billion in total. The Baltic—Adriatic Corridor
connects major transport nodes such as urban ones but also ports,
airports and other transport terminals through key rail, road, maritime
and air transport connections from the north to the south between
Austria, Czechia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Italy also participates inthis project as a non-3SI country.22
Another relevant project is the construction of the second railway
track to ensure capacity and reliability of traffic to and from the port ofKoper. The railway line is part of the Mediterranean and Baltic—Adriatic
TEN-T core network corridors, which serves all Central European
15

countries (Republic of Austria, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic,
Hungary). It connects the port of Koper with these countries, and it
represents the main port for the Republic of Austria and Hungary and is
an important port for others as well.23
The country sees the added value of contributing to theimplementation of already existing plans in the EU, for example in theareas of infrastructure, energy and digital connectivity. One of the
3SI’s priority projects is Fairway Danube. The project will modernisehydrological data processing, measuring and alarm systems of
the Danube waterway in the sections connecting Austria, Slovakia,
Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania. It has been announced thatthe cooperation between the twelve participating countries will be
expanded to include digital connectivity in addition to transport
infrastructure and the energy sector by 2030. Investment in transport
infrastructure within the 3SI is estimated at EUR 290 billion, while theenergy sector is expected to reach EUR 88 billion and the digital sector
EUR 160 billion.24 Digital connectivity in CEE is one of the three pillarsof the 3SI. Government and business professionals from the Three
Seas region increasingly consider the risks and opportunities of thecurrent digital transformation, security challenges and their impact on
the future of cybersecurity. One of the major advantages of 3SI is theeffective cooperation among all the services and institutions working
with cybersecurity platforms in this region which has experienced asignificant rise in cyberattacks. Cybersecurity is more than just a fightagainst disinformation; it is also essential in building resilient supply
chains and protecting markets. Possible cooperation with Ukraine
through the 3SI was discussed and the President of Ukraine Volodymyr
Zelensky has been invited to the upcoming summit in Rīga this year.
Due to the war in Ukraine, the main topic on the digital connectivity
agenda is the security of the supply chain. The situation in Ukraine is aclear indicator to the Three Seas region that supply chain security is of
the utmost importance. Examples of the latest successful cyberattacks
that have been going through supply chains were shared. For instance,
the LMT mobile telecommunications operator joining forces with ahigh-tech production company Mikrotik was a positive signal in thiscontext.25
The establishment of a network of data centres throughout theinvestment region of the Three Seas Investment Fund (3SIIF), including16

in Austria, is another focus of 3SI; however, it has not received funding
yet. The project aims to ensure secure and efficient cross-borderconnectivity through the acquisition of various regional data centres.26
A similar project is envisioned with regards to the development of an
optical fibre network in the entire investment region of the 3SIIF toachieve cross-border connectivity services throughout the region, as
part of the Digital Highway Project. The goal is to enable better andmore secure data transfer from the north to the south of the region andbridge the gaps in the communication infrastructure.27

Economic growth and resilience of the 3SI region
and greater interest among investors
The 3SI is known as a commercially driven platform aimed at improving
connections within the twelve EU member states located between theBaltic, Adriatic and Black Seas.28 The 3SI states are some of the fastestgrowing economies in Europe. Austria can contribute significantly
to the economic growth and resilience of the 3SI region because
its ‘economic development and infrastructure are relatively moreadvanced compared to the other member states’.29 The initiative brings
112 million people together in one of the world’s most dynamic markets
following the Covid-19 pandemic. By 2030, the economy between theBaltic, Black and Adriatic Seas is expected to grow by 35%.30
3SI can also play a supportive role in post-Covid recovery, as
investments and new projects under the 3SI in post-Covid Europe will
be highly needed.31 The EU agreed to provide funding for about half ofthe planned projects under the 3SI.32 However, more funds are needed
given that the financial means required to modernise the CEE region
are enormous and to date present approximately EUR 600 billion.33
The 3SIIF provides economic support to the initiative in developing
the region’s infrastructure. The Fund was registered on 29 May 2019,
in Luxembourg. Its initiators were Poland’s development bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK) and Romania’s national EximBank, whowere also the first investors. On 16 April 2020, Estonia became thethird country to join the 3SIIF, contributing EUR 20 million.34 Poland
contributed with USD 875 million and Slovenia with USD 28 million.
Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania have also17

contributed with large sums.35 These investments will hopefully help
the positive progress of the 3SI projects and will also support the
post-pandemic recovery. 36 It can be viewed as an investment in bothcollective and national defence as well as economic growth and an
initiative with further potential.37
As of April 2021, nine of the twelve 3SI countries have contributed,
amounting to about EUR 1 billion (USD 1.2 billion). The fund’s current
aim is to raise from EUR 3 billion to EUR 5 billion (USD 3.6 billion to
USD 6 billion). One of the main sources of financial support regarding
connectivity and other regional development initiatives is the EU.
Around EUR 150 billion (about USD 180 billion) was allocated to themember states under the EU’s 2014—2020 budget framework in regard
to regional development and cohesion funds. The Connecting Europe
Facility (CEF), a EUR 30 billion (about USD 36 billion) EU funding
instrument also shares the 3SI’s emphasis on strategic investments
in large-scale transport, energy and digital infrastructure networks.38
The US provides not only political but financial support to the 3SI. The
co-founder and largest shareholder of the Investment Fund, the Polishdevelopment bank BGK, announced an increase in contributions of
EUR 500 million from EUR 250 million. In early February 2021, banksfrom Lithuania and Slovenia joined the 3SIIF.39 The 3SIIF aims to support
the region in catching up with Western European countries, but also
to keep up with their pace in the long run. The 3SIIF combines public
and private funds to invest in commercial projects. While there are now
many projects in which the Fund could participate, the end amounts
are still not sufficient enough to invest in all valuable projects.40 Against
this background, Austria has not yet joined the 3SIIF and is still reluctant
to engage with investors within the initiative.
Moreover, Poland was behind a declaration signed by eleven EU
states on the need to establish a source of financing at the EU level forthe costs of medical services for Ukrainian refugees. It was basically a
3SI minus Austria, which Vienna should avoid in the future in terms ofopportunities and potential for regional cooperation.

18

Geopolitics
The 3SI is one of the boldest and most ambitious geopoliticalprojects of modern times, aimed at radically changing the destiny of
CEE. The initiative is geostrategic in nature because it promises tofurther integrate and connect this region to Europe’s major energy,transportation and communications networks. This will ultimately
create new opportunities for the EU to act as a coherent geoeconomic
actor in the region and to promote its further modernisation. The
objectives of the 3SI are fully in line with the EU’s priorities in areas suchas digital transformation, improved connectivity and the rebuilding of
economies after the Covid-19 crisis.41
The format is increasingly attracting attention, even though it isdesigned and implemented at the political level of ministers and is notthat much politicised.42 Austria occupies a geostrategic position not
only in Europe but also within the 3SI initiative. Furthermore, Vienna isa major multiplier due to hosting multilateral forums and internationalorganisations, which may turn be beneficial to the 3SI initiative in termsof cooperation with third partners.
As far as multiplier effects are concerned, the Alpine republicalso pursues a geopolitical agenda. If there is a geopolitical role thatfits Austria’s ambitions in Europe to a great extent, it is the role of a‘bridge-builder’, which Vienna has been eagerly exercising since the
EU enlargement waves of 2004 and 2007. The EU accession of the
CEE countries moved Austria from the periphery to the centre of the
EU’s borders, combined with a great potential to benefit economicallyfrom the new markets in the East. Austria is a strong supporter of theenlargement of the Western Balkan countries and may play a positiverole in propagating the importance of a membership perspective for
Ukraine among the EU members as well as in Brussels.
In addition, Austria expects the 3SI to raise political awareness of
this regional dimension of the European integration.43 Thus, Vienna
will continue to support the 3SI as a framework for the definition,
development and implementation of common objectives of thecountries of the CEE region, which is of utmost strategic importancefor its geopolitical and geoeconomic interests. Furthermore, important
future announcements are likely to be made at the 3SI summit held in
Rīga in June. One of the topics discussed should be the admission of19

Ukraine to the 3SI, with Latvia already making such a proposal. The
same is true for the Republic of Moldova and for Georgia, who in thepast have also experienced Russian aggression.44
The growing mistrust towards Russia following the war on Ukraine
has led to a shift in Austrian politics. Austria will turn increasingly towards
other external actors to diversify its energy, economic and trade ties.
The majority of 3SI countries strive for deeper cooperation with the US
and Vienna favours the pro-American approach of the initiative as well.
Given that the EU and the US will intensify their bilateral cooperation invarious fields such as energy, trade, technological transfer or security,
the 3SI is emerging as a useful platform for diversifying Austrianbilateral and multilateral relations with the Atlantic allies and partners
in CEE.
In this context, the 3SI reveals the overlap of geoeconomic interests
between Brussels, Washington and Berlin.45 Their interests overlap
not only in terms of coinciding geopolitical calculations, but also interms of building a solid counterweight to China’s own Belt and Road
infrastructure initiative and the 16+1 initiative in CEE. The China—Europe
Land—Sea Express Route includes Hungary, Serbia, North Macedonia
and Greece, and connects to the Chinese-owned port of Piraeus. Thisis a key project of China’s infrastructure connectivity in Southeast
Europe. Meanwhile, Lithuania was the first country to leave the Chinaled 16+1 format, calling on the EU to ‘move from a divisive 17+1 format
to a unifying and therefore much more efficient 27+1 format. The
EU is strongest when all 27 member states act together with the EU
institutions.46
Facilitating the geoeconomic nexus between the north (the Arctic
region), where the northern transport route is expected to significantly
shorten the global flow of goods, and the south in the Mediterranean
region, where member states are seeking new connectivity
opportunities with North Africa, is of strategic importance to the EU, theFranco-German engine of European integration and the US. As a resultof these realities, 3SI members also emphasise the need for better
communication by strengthening political and economic cooperation
within the region and within the framework of the EU itself. The 3SI
could help erase the traditional division of Europe into West and Eastand overcome this stigma, which would also benefit EU integration andcohesion towards a unified CEE.47 Increasing integration could also20

improve the overlapping interests of these countries, which in the longrun will strengthen their position in the EU itself.48
Countries from the Anglosphere,49 the Quad50 and 3SI countries
have all pushed for infrastructure projects, supply chain reconfigurationand military interoperability, in contrast to China’s global Belt andRoad Initiative and the 16+1 Initiative in CEE. In this context, the 3SI
should develop into a geopolitical and geoeconomic project ofboth the EU and the US aimed at creating north—south connectivity
corridors (Baltic—Adriatic—Black Sea) along transportation, energy andinfrastructure routes. This will be necessary for expanding EU—North
Africa links and containing the influence of the Dragon Bear (China andRussia). The CEE region has suffered far too long from its satellite role
within the Soviet Union during the Cold War and is now in danger of
becoming a ‘buffer zone’ squeezed between Western Europe on the
one hand and assertive regional players such as China and Russia on
the other.51 However, the race for new infrastructure, transportationand digitalisation connectivity between the main competitors could
lead to more incentives for the EU and the US to engage more actively,
which will have a positive impact on the balance of power in this region.

Conclusions and recommendations
In the past, the 3SI, and its potential for enlargement, remained vague;
however, Russian aggression has highlighted the importance of theinitiative’s mandate and the need for a concrete strategy to connect all
the Black Sea states. The surrounding countries have to be engaged
to help mitigate the current and future threats. Moreover, engaging
non-EU member countries in 3SI projects can benefit the EU, especiallywhen developing transport corridors and supporting the much-neededenergy diversification. Achieving this would shift the power dynamic in
Europe and weaken Russia’s geopolitical position.52
The initiative encompasses the most dynamic region in the EU
and consists of members that are among the strongest and most
vocal supporters of Ukraine. Cooperation formats within 3SI are more
important than ever and it is recommended that Austria seizes theopportunity to become a more active member in order to capitalise on
emerging synergy potentials.
21

The following recommendations are proposed:
1) Austria should join the 3SIIF and enhance its political profile within
3SI
A total of EUR 600 billion needs to be invested in 3SI infrastructure
by 2030 to tackle the imbalance between CEE and Western Europe.
The total value of trade of all 3SI countries exceeds EUR 225 billion.
It generates about 20% of the GDP of the entire EU community. The
3SIIF aims to support the region in catching up with Western European
countries, but also to keep up with their pace in the long run. While
there are now many projects in which the Fund could participate, theend amounts are still not sufficient enough to invest in all valuable
projects.53 Against this background, it is in Austria’s interest to engage
with investors within the initiative.
The 3SI is highly decentralised and project-based whichsuits Austrian interests similar to the Central European Defence
Cooperation.54 Its ambitious geopolitical and geoeconomic portfolio
should not be underestimated. The EU could finance certain projects
within the 3SI which are rendered relevant for the Global Gateway andthus could create a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative as
well as the 16+1 Initiative in CEE. Not only can Brussels maximise funds
that can be facilitated within the EUR 300 billion infrastructure project,but it can also steer concrete projects that will generate synergy effects
by facilitating and optimising north—south connectivity which may turnout to be attractive to third countries in West and South Asia (e.g. India).
So far, Austrian participation in the 3SI has been rather low-profile,whereas other 3SI members tend to send state ministers or even stateheads to the summits. The fact that the Austrian Economic Chamber
has announced the upcoming 3SI summit in Rīga and is recommendingthat Austrian companies attend the forum and explore business
opportunities should be considered as a signal in the right direction.
A clear recommendation for Austria in this regard is, that the country
should upgrade its participation by financially contributing to the Fundas well as by sending higher-ranked representatives to the businessforums and the summits to show an increased presence and interest.
2) Austria should immediately start diversifying gas supply from Russia
by using existing and potential projects under 3SI
22

The diversification of energy supply and the reduction of thedependency on Russia has never been as urgent as in 2022. Once seen
as a bridge-builder between the West and Russia due to its historicalpast, neutral status and geostrategic location, Austria can no longer
pursue such aspirations given the realities after 24 February. Being
significantly invested in the energy, banking and commodities sector in
Russia, the Alpine republic will be eager to diversify away from Moscow
sooner rather than later following the six packages of EU sanctions
against Russia. In this regard, the 3SI is increasingly becoming a usefuland beneficial framework in terms of trade and connectivity between
the twelve members. Moreover, Austria is seen as the most sympathetic
country to Russia after Hungary, a perception that can be shifted thanks
to more intensive cooperation with the other countries from 3SI.
3) Austria should urgently catch up in the area of digitization and draw
on the experience of the 3SI countries
The country is lagging behind in the field of digitalisation andcan benefit from participation in projects dedicated to such topics.
Investment in the digital sector is expected to reach EUR 160 billion
as one of the three pillars of the 3SI. Austria should draw from theexperience of government and business professionals from the Three
Seas region dealing with the risks and opportunities of the current
digital transformation, security challenges and their impact on the
future of cybersecurity. One of the major advantages of 3SI is theeffective cooperation among all the services and institutions working
with cybersecurity platforms in this region which has experienced asignificant rise in cyberattacks. Cybersecurity is more than just a fightagainst disinformation; it is also essential in building resilient supply
chains and protecting markets. Austria should also contribute to thedevelopment of the transport and digital north—south infrastructure
due to its immense know-how and experience in transport infrastructure
and the construction sector.
4) An urgent recommendation for Austria would be to change its
general stance on the initiative in geopolitical but also geoconomic
terms
Obviously, Austria was not convincing with its bridge-building
function between the West and the East while actively engaging with
23

Russia. However, Vienna could develop a new formula to connect the3SI countries with Ukraine and the rest of Europe in Brussels and theWest. The Alpine republic should not miss this opportunity to diversify
its ‘bridge-building’ role towards the north—south connectivity
corridors instead of sticking to its outdated east—west approach
following Russia’s war in Ukraine.
ENDNOTES
Kim A., B. 28.02.2022. How 3 Seas Initiative Could Be Antidote to Russia’s Energy
Coercion. The Heritage Foundation. https://www.heritage.org/energy-economics/
commentary/how-3-seas-initiative-could-be-antidote-russias-energy-coercion
2
Rosetti, P. 24.02.2022. How Russia got leverage over Europe’s Energy. RStreet. https://www.
rstreet.org/2022/02/24/how-russia-got-leverage-over-europes-energy/#:~:text=How%20
Russia%20Got%20Leverage%20Over %20Europe%E2%80%99s%20Energy%20
Russia,2%20pipeline%20and%20announced%20new%20sanctions%20against%20Russia
3
Grinschgl, J. 11.02.2022. A Perfect Storm: The Causes and Consequences of theEuropean Energy Crisis. AIES Fokus 1/2022. https://www.aies.at/download/2022/
AIES-Fokus-2022-01.pdf
4
Kirby, P. 04.05.2022. Ukraine war: EU plans Russian oil ban and war crimes sanctions.
BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61318689
5
What happens if Russia shuts of gas supplies to Europe? 30.03.2022. Euronews.
https://www.euronews.com/green/2022/02/24/what-happens-if-russia-shuts-offgas-supplies-to-europe
6
McWilliams, B., Zachmann, G. 09.04.2022. The European Union demand responses
to high natural gas prices. Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/2022/04/the-europeanunion-demand-response-to-high-natural-gas-prices/
7
Global natural gas demand set to decline slightly in 2022 as Russia’s war disrupts
markets and economies. 15.04.2022. IEA. https://www.iea.org/news/global-naturalgas-demand-set-to-decline-slightly-in-2022-as-russia-s-war-disrupts-markets-andeconomies
8
About the Visegrad Group. Visegrad Group. https://www.visegradgroup.eu/about
9
Davies, R. 27.04.2022. How worried should Europe be as Russia starts cutting off gas
supplies? The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/apr/27/howworried-should-europe-be-russia-starts-cutting-off-gas-supplies
10
Whiteside, P. 12.05.2022. Ukraine war: What impact will Russia’s decision to cut
off gas to Poland and Bulgaria have on Europe? Sky News. https://news.sky.com/
story/ukraine-war-what-impact-will-russias-decision-to-cut-off-gas-to-poland-andbulgaria-have-on-europe-12600049
11
Afanasiev, V. 01.05.2022. OMV writes down Russian assets and continues to study
ruble payment demands. upstreamonline.com https://www.upstreamonline.com/
production/omv-writes-down-russian-assets-and-continues-to-study-ruble-paymentdemands/2-1-1209564
12
Afanasiev, V. 31.04.2022. Putin decree requires intermediary to handle European gas saleproceeds. upstreamonline.com. https://www.upstreamonline.com/production/putindecree-requries-intermediary-to-handle-european-gas-sale-proceeds/2-1-1194386
13
Ibid.
1

24

Ersatz für russisches Gas in Österreich — das Problem mit LNG. 15.03.2022.
Industriemagazin. https://industriemagazin.at/news/europa-wendet-sich-lng-stattrussischem-erdgas-zu/
15
Van der Bellen, A. 18.09. 2018. Gipfeltreffen der Drei-Meere-Initiative in Bukarest:
Bundespräsident Alexander Van der Bellen befürwortet das Projekt, um die regionale
Zusammenarbeit in Mittel- und Osteuropa zu fördern. Bundespraesident.at. https://www.bundespraesident.at/aktuelles/detail/drei-meere-initiative-201816
Wie lässt sich russisches Gas ersetzen? — Österreich und LNG. 31.03.2022. Industriemagazin.
https://industriemagazin.at/news/oesterreich-und-lng-80-tanker-oder-leitung-ausitalien/#:~:text=bis%20nach%20Norditalien.-,K%C3%BCnftig%20k%C3%B6nnte%20
L N G % 2 0 a u c h% 2 0 a u s % 2 0 D e u t s c h l a n d % 2 0 n a c h% 2 0 % C 3 %96 s t e r r e i c h% 2 0transportiert%20werden,aus%20Russland%2C%20Algerien%20oder%20%C3%84gypten
17
Ibid.
18
Extraction of unconventional gas. Three Seas Initiative. https://projects.3seas.eu/
projects/extraction-of-unconventional-gas
19
Byczynski, G. 17.09.2021. Strengthening European Unity: The Three Seas Initiative.
RUSI. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/strengtheningeuropean-unity-three-seas-initiative
20
Zbinkowski, G. 2019. The Three Seas Initiative and its Economic and Geopolitical Effecton the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe. COPE Vol. 22 (2). https://czasopisma.uni.lodz.pl/CER/article/view/5276/4951
21
Schubert, G. 18.10.2020. Drei-Meere-Initiative tagt in Tallinn, Österreich ist dabei. Der
Standard. https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000120987326/drei-meere-initiativetagt-in-tallinn-oesterreich-ist-dabei
22
Baltic-Adriatic TENT Core Network Corridor. Three Seas Initiative. https://projects.3seas.
eu/projects/baltic-adriatic-ten-t-core-network-corridor
23
Construction of the 2nd railway track between Koper and Divača. Three Seas Initiative.
https://projects.3seas.eu/projects/construction-of-the-2nd-railway-track-betweenkoper-and-divaca
24
Bault, O. 26.07.2021. Die Drei-Meere Initiative zeigt, was Europe ohne die EU sein könnte.
Visegrád Post. https://visegradpost.com/de/2021/07/26/die-drei-meere-initiative-zeigtwas-europa-ohne-die-eu-sein-koennte/
25
The Future of Cybersecurity and the Three Seas Initiative: Ultimately It All Boils Down toTrust. Three Seas Initiative. https://3seas.eu/media/news/the-future-of-cybersecurityand-the-three-seas-initiative-ultimately-it-all-boils-down-to-trust
26
Development of Cross-Border Network of Data Centres. Three Seas Initiative. https://projects.3seas.eu/projects/development-of-cross-border-network-of-data-centres
27
Development of Cross-Border Optical Fibre Network. Three Seas Initiative. https://projects.3seas.eu/projects/development-of-cross-border-optical-fibre-network
28
Three Seas Initiative. Three Seas Initiative. https://3seas.eu/
29
Kornis, V. 14.02.2022. Austria’s Perspective on the Three-Seas-Initiative. Friedrich
Naumann Foundation. https://www.freiheit.org/central-europe-and-baltic-states/
austrias-perspective-three-seas-initiative-0
30
Ultsch, C. 28.04.2022. Das Energieproject an Europa’s Ostflanke. Die Presse. https://www.diepresse.com/6131684/das-energieprojekt-an-europas-ostflanke
31
Sál, K. 09.2020. Iniciativa Trojmorí: Velké ambice,’ Institut Pro Politiku A Společnost.
ht tps://w w w.politikaspolecnos t.c z /wp- content /uploads/2020/09/IniciativaTrojmo%C5%99%C3%ADVelk%C3%A9-ambice-IPPS.pdf
1425

Morris, D. 26.10.2020. The Three Seas Initiative: Europe’s Answer to the Belt andRoad? The Lowy Interpreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/threeseas-initiative-european-answer-china-s-belt-and-road
33
Lewicki, G. 26.01. 2021. Iniciativa Trojmoří: Jaký Má Geostrategický Význam pro Evropu a
USA? Forum24.cz. https://www.forum24.cz/iniciativa-trojmori-jaky-ma-geostrategickyvyznam-pro-evropu-a-usa/
34
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Estonia, Three Seas Initiative (3SI). Ministry ofForeign Affairs. https://vm.ee/en/three-seas-initiative-3si
35
Kochis, D. 05.01.2021. US Contributions to 3 Seas Investment Fund are Smart, Strategic.
The Daily Signal. https://www.dailysignal.com/2021/01/05/us-contributions-to-3seas-investment-fund-are-smart-strategic/
36
Kochis, D. 18.02.2021. The Three Seas Initiative Is a Strategic Investment that Deserves
the Biden Administration’s Support. The Heritage Foundation. 1—7. https://www.
heritage.org/europe/report/the-three-seas-initiative-strategic-investment-deservesthe-biden-administrations
37
Thomas, M. 16.03.2020. The Three Seas Initiative. Baltic Security Foundation. https://
balticsecurity.eu/three_seas_initiative/
38
U. S. Congressional Research Service. 26.03.2021. The Three Seas Initiative. Report
IF11547., https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11547.pdf
39Lang, K. Die Drei-Meere-Initiative: wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit in geostrategischem
Kontext. 16.02.2022. SWP-Aktuell. https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2021A16/
40
Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego. 21.05.2021. BGK: 600 Mrd. EUR für die
Infrastruktur in der Region der Drei-Meere-Initiative (3SI). APA OTS. https://www.
ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20210521_OTS0031/bgk-600-mrd-eur-fuer-dieinfrastruktur-in-der-region-der-drei-meere-initiative-3si
41
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. 11.02.2021. Meeting of government
coordinators for the Three Seas Initiative. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Office.
https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/meeting-of-government-coordinators-for-thethree-seas-initiative
42
Kornis, V. 11.02.2022. The Czech Republic’s Perspective on the Three-Seas-Initiative.
Friedrich Naumann Foundation. https://www.freiheit.org/central-europe-and-balticstates/czech-republics-perspective-three-seas-initiative
43
Industriemagazin. 07.07.2019. Drei-Meere-Initiative — Österreich pocht auf
Führungsrolle in der EU. Industriemagazin. https://industriemagazin.at/a/drei-meereinitiative-oesterreich-pocht-auf-fuehrungsrolle-der-eu
44
Latvian Public Broadcasting. 29.04.2022. Admit Ukraine to Three Seas Initiative today,
say European parliaments. Eng.LSM.lv. https://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/saeima/
admit-ukraine-to-three-seas-initiative-today-say-european-parliaments.a450072/
45
Kluth, A. 19.05.2021. This is how Europe can push back against China and Russia.
Bloomberg Opinion. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-05-19/europe-canfend-off-china-and-russia-via-three-seas-initiative?cmpid%3D=socialflow-twitter-view&utm_
medium=social&utm_source=twitter&utm_content=view&utm_campaign=socialfloworganic
46
Lau, S. 21.05.2021. Lithuania pulls out of China’s ‘17+1’ bloc in Eastern Europe. Politico.
https://www.politico.eu/article/lithuania-pulls-out-china-17-1-bloc-eastern-centraleurope-foreign-minister-gabrielius-landsbergis/
47
Urrutia, I. 24.02.2021. The Three Seas Initiative. Sistema Critico International.
https://www.sistemacritico.it/international/2021/02/24/the-three-seas-initiative-ageneralperspective-of-the-projects-geopolitical-realm/
32

26

Musialek, P. 21.02.2020. The Three Seas Initiative: Natural Gas in Central European
Foreign Policy. ISPI. https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/three-seas-initiativenatural-gas-central-european-foreign-policy-25128
49
Gregg, S. 17.02.2020. Getting real about the Anglosphere. Law & Liberty. https://lawliberty.org/getting-real-about-the-anglosphere/
50
Kutty, S. N., Basrur, R. 24.03.2021. The Quad: What it is — and what it is not. The
Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/the-quad-what-it-is-and-what-it-is-not/
51
Morris, D. 26.10.2020. The Three Seas Initiative: Europe’s Answer to the Belt andRoad? The Lowy Interpreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/threeseas-initiative-european-answer-china-s-belt-and-road
52
Ziedins, L. 04.2022. Three Seas Initiative: Instrument for Decreasing Dependency on
Russian Energy. ECIPE. https://ecipe.org/blog/three-seas-initiative-instrument-fordecreasing-dependency-on-russian-energy/
53
Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego. 21.05.2021. BGK: 600 Mrd. EUR für die Infrastruktur
in der Region der Drei-Meere-Initiative (3SI). APA OTS. https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20210521_OTS0031/bgk-600-mrd-eur-fuer-die-infrastrukturin-der-region-der-drei-meere-initiative-3si
54
Central European Defense Cooperation. CEDC. https://cedc.info/
48

27

Bulgaria: Sense, sensibility
and wariness
Plamen Ralchev

Although generally Bulgaria regards the Three Seas Initiative (3SI)
as an ambitious opportunity and this is the message eloquently
presented both at state level — by the president and the government —and at business level, a double reading of Bulgaria’s position helps
to understand the emergence of a dividing line within the expert
community and policymakers. Some circles in Bulgaria, involving thosewith access to high politics, claim that the 3SI has ambiguities that are
hard to disguise. The red line for Bulgaria goes along the economic
benefits as opposed to the geopolitical repercussions of the Initiative.
There is a distinctive cleavage in Bulgaria between public speaking
about the infrastructure development, innovation, economic growthand energy sustainability, on one hand, and public warning that in fact
this is a project against Russia, on the other. It is useful to analyse indepth these two opposing lines of arguments.
Bulgaria formally joined the 3SI and undertook engagement at
the highest possible level. Hosting the 3SI Summit in 2021, BulgarianPresident Rumen Radev emphasised ‘the political will for concerted
efforts for accelerated development of the region through improved
transport and energy infrastructure connectivity by stimulating publicprivate partnerships and introducing innovative development models.’1
At the third summit of 3SI in Bucharest, the first business forum
was launched within the Initiative, which turned into a platform forsharing projects of common interest. A joint declaration was signed
for establishing a network of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of
the member states. On behalf of Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Chamber ofCommerce and Industry participates in this format of the 3SI.
On the US initiative, at the Bucharest summit a new forum forcooperation with the 3SI member states was launched — the Partnershipfor Transatlantic Energy Cooperation. Bulgaria contributes actively to28

all the meetings of this format. Representatives of the Bulgarian Ministryof Energy participate in three of the four working groups for energy
cooperation.2 Economic interests as a driving logic for support for the
3SI suit the arguments used by the most eloquent business consultants,
analysts, lobbyists and pressure groups in Bulgaria to advance theidea among the public at large. They also target indecisive decisionmakers at the national level to advocate for more active engagementof the country in the Initiative. Among their leading arguments is that
infrastructure projects from the Initiative are expected to increase
European countries’ GDP by 2.5% in the long run.3

Economic development and resilience
The benefits for Bulgaria may not only come from specific projects, if
they are successfully selected, approved, funded and implemented,
but also from the idea of using​​
the common potential of the member
states to eliminate differences between Eastern and Central Europe
and as a contribution to cohesion, consolidation and prosperity in theEuropean Union (EU). Overcoming Bulgaria’s lagging behind of Central
Europe also means avoiding different speeds of development in the
EU. It gives us a chance to realise the benefits of our geographicallocation in order to better connect and interact in the Balkans as wellas with the Black Sea countries’ region. The Initiative helps to promotea friendly environment for investment and business climate throughdirect and active business contacts. Deepening the integration
between the countries of the region and the joint projects will create
many additional jobs.
In his speech at the summit in Tallinn in October 2020, President
Rumen Radev actually set out part of Bulgaria’s vision as the next host,offering to add to the current priorities educational and scientificconnectivity, as well as capacity building and connectivity between
young research teams, organisations and universities. ‘We can’t think
only in the perspective of laying pipes and asphalt,’ he noted, which
was a hint that the US approved its investment purposefully only forenergy infrastructure, that is, for the facilities for liquefied naturalgas (LNG) and for pipelines. The Bulgarian president also proposed
to expand the geographical scope of the Initiative with Greece and29

Cyprus, because we have no interest in staying at the geographicalperiphery and with all infrastructure, energy and digital routes endingat our border. However, what the president tactfully kept quiet about
was that the Bulgarian side has done nothing about moving our ideas
to advance some projects, for example the Petrohan Pass, a project
requested in 2018.

Connectivity missing
According to information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bulgaria
has submitted a total of four project proposals for financing within the
3SI: restoration of project parameters on the Ruse—Varna railway line;
building the tunnel under the Petrohan Pass; expansion of the natural
gas storage facility in the village of Chiren; construction of the BlackSea highway (Varna—Burgas).
It can be easily noted that transport infrastructure projects prevail
and there is no project within the third sector of the Initiative —digitalisation. According to the Director of Investments of Amber
Infrastructure Fund, three of them are accepted with priority (Chiren,
the Ruse—Varna railway line and the Petrohan tunnel), and by 18 May
2021 there have already been five to six new projects from Bulgaria. The
project for the tunnel under the Petrohan Pass faces some challenges,
since it had to be coordinated at the Ministry of Environment and Water
with two laws (for biological diversity and environmental protection),and it was suspended in July 2021, but following citizens’ protest it has
been resumed.
Of particular importance for Bulgaria is the completion of Corridors
No. 4 and No. 8. Eurocorridor No. 4 (along E79 in the direction Vidin—
Sofia—Blagoevgrad-Kulata border checkpoint) is key to the successful
implementation of the 3SI and the only one that passes through EU
member states only and provides the link between north and south,
between Dresden—Bratislava—Sofia—Thessaloniki. Corridor No. 8 is partof the pan-European road network, continues to Constanta, Vilnius,
Rīga and Tallinn, and is a strategically important highway connecting
the ports of the Western Black Sea with the Baltic Sea ports, which will
provide a very important connection for Bulgaria. Corridor No. 8 will
reduce transport traffic by two weeks on the new Silk Road through30

Bulgaria to Western Europe. And here the question of US and European
policy towards China and divergences in their interests arises.
The states themselves however do not have enough funds becausea corridor does not mean only transport connection, but includes roads
parallel to the railway line and built infrastructure for the transmissionof electricity, gas and internet. The Bulgarian Vision Paper states thatthe north—south infrastructure corridor can be further upgraded withbuilding value-added links, and it would be appropriate to build astrategic link between the north—south corridor and Corridor 8. Fromthen on however, the method of holding talks will have to change in the
future, for example with Greece, whose economic motives against thetunnel under the Makaza Pass are unacceptable and which also does
not allow the construction of higher class roads.
Bulgaria also needs other projects that address the criteria ofconnectivity and can bring benefit to neighbouring countries as well.
For example, at 3SI — Unity, Innovation, Connectivity conference heldon 8 June 2021 in Sofia the need to build new bridges on the Danube
River with road routes and railways was emphasised, justified by thefact that while in individual sections on the river the average distance
between the bridges is 5 km and 18 km, the distance between the twobridges on Danube between Bulgaria and Romania is over 300 km.
Until May 2021 there were still no new proposals from the Bulgarianrailway administration for projects in this area except for the Ruse—
Varna—Burgas—Alexandroupolis route. Bulgarian seaport renovation
projects would also meet the approval criteria. Bulgaria lags behind
Romania, which expanded and modernised the port of Constanta, forexample, even beyond the 3SI. In May 2021 it became known that talks
were already under way with the 3SI Investment Fund (3SIIF) for theconstruction of a port and for acquisition of a second one. Joe Phillips,
investment director of the Fund, admitted that their short-term interest
is focused on ports and gas storage.

Energy security
In the second sector of the Initiative — energy —only two projects are ofcourse not enough (expansion of gas storage in the village of Chiren
and the solar park near Parvomay), but before we receive financing for31

an acceptable project, we must be able to formulate our own strategy,
and when trying to do so in February 2021 for the period 2030—2050
there were no included recommendations, even those of the EU plans,
not to mention the climate change and damage management risks, nora vision to replace reactors 5 and 6 of Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant
after 2030, nor a vision for the development of Bulgarian industry.
As of 6 June 2021 it became known that the 3SIIF would invest in
the largest solar park in Bulgaria — in the village of Karadjalovo near
Parvomay with an area of 1000 decares and installed capacity of over
50 MW, owned by an Austrian company. This is the first investment of
the Fund in Bulgaria.

Digitalisation
With regard to the third main pillar, digitalisation, although we area little late, the trend is inevitable: companies are accelerating theirdigitalisation performance at a faster pace, performing in just twoto three years their plans for the five-year period, and accelerating
automation to reduce costs: 31% of them are introducing new andmodern technologies, 29% are focusing on speed and efficiency
activity of production. This optimism should not be reassuring
because in the rest of Europe, more than 50% of foreign companies
believe they will increase the use of digital technologies in practice inthe long-term plan.
Bulgaria has expert potential in this technological field and perhaps
it would be appropriate to focus its efforts on artificial intelligence andthe quantum computer, which will affect encryption, optimisation, bigdata storage, detection of chemical compounds, etc. 5G connectivity
and optical networks will be a key factor that will help Europe develop
at a faster pace its digital economy, digitalisation of services andindustrial processes as well as reducing costs.
The idea for establishing a network of Innovation and Research
Agencies corresponds to Bulgaria’s interests in terms of improving
standards. On 9 March 2021 the Digital Decade Action Plan waspresented, which was an encouraging signal for a new technologicalstart with ambitious goals to strengthen the digital competitiveness of
the EU and reduce its dependence on the US and China. The digital32

economy and artificial intelligence have been subject to regulation in
the EU since 2018 and since then respective documents have been
adopted annually. A number of EU member states have developed theirown strategies. The deficit of visionary thinking in different sectors,
however, as well as the gap between expertise and public management
experience in such large-scale projects will affect the management andimplementation of these projects.

Wariness of geopolitics
Comments in Bulgaria on the 3SI outline two extremes resulting froma lack of a timely or a poor information campaign, as well as from thestrong fragmentation of public opinion and sharply deteriorating
relations between the West (US and EU) and Russia.
One extreme extrapolates the military-political nature and goals.
For them, however, there is another ‘track’ and NATO is on it. Anotherissue is that the combination of economic and military pressure, of
hybrid and military methods by external forces contrary to the interestsof the states in the region, can already shape an alarming trend. But
to declare 3SI efforts to bring together business, governments andinvestors, which can bring in three times more investment than alagging country like Bulgaria can afford to provide itself, to be a ‘safe
path to war’ is a clear ideological pro-Russian bias or disinformation.
Their only argument is that ‘infrastructure can be used for an
offensive operation’ against Russia. Although among these experts are
well-known names, expressions like that ‘those behind the Initiative willfight with Russia, with the citizens of the participating countries’ showcomplete ignorance of the content and meaning, but also deliberate
and gross deception.
Another more compelling point from this group of critics isfocused on the EU, which as a structure was rather small and alreadyinconvenient, while the small states of the 3SI were easier to manage
through the complex of anti-communist mentality and more inclined forradical communication in international relations. But their thesis that a
new bloc of countries within the EU is being formed confirms that such
critics are not aware of the main goal of the Initiative, which is aimed
precisely at the opposite.
33

Critics and opponents to the 3SI in Bulgaria raise the issue of its
geopolitical shadow and that intrinsic geostrategic parameters are set in
the Initiative. The problem sparked at the beginning in some countries
like Bulgaria where the interpretation of the Initiative was connectedwith the project from the beginning of the twentieth century of thePolish leader Josef Pielsudsky for the transformation of Poland into agreat power against Moscow and Berlin through the unification of thecountries between the Black, Baltic and Adriatic Seas. Though graduallythese concerns began fading away with the successful launch of the
project, they still deserve attention as they remain vibrant and sensitivein countries like Bulgaria where Russian influence is at the highest andpresents a serious challenge to Bulgarian national security agencies.
Opponents of the 3SI in Bulgaria claim that through it the US is
projecting its energy interest and curbing the stretch of Russian
influence. They speculate that the 3SI is creating a Union within the EU
against Russia. Some radical critics consider the 3SI as a military projectagainst Russia. Others are prone to wait and see, but highlight that
despite the economic rationality of the project, historical and natural
conditions predispose Western Europe and Russia to cooperation —Western Europe will hardly survive without Russian natural resources,
as well as Russia’s future being dependent on Western technologies,
innovations and capital flow.4
Though this type of critical discourse is limited to leftist intellectuals
and experts with explicit or implicit pro-Russian leaning with little
resonance in the general public discourse, it is indicative of why the
Bulgarian political establishment (including parties in government aswell as in opposition) is generally cautious and far less enthusiastic
compared to Poland, Romania or other countries involved in the 3SI.
The second type of discourse in Bulgaria regarding the 3SI
uncritically announces the benefits that the 3SI would strengthen theEU, or unreservedly supports the role of the US without going into thedepths of pursued interests. Just rallying around the slogan that the
3SI will defend democracy is far from convincing, and the technocratic
approach of perceiving 3SI as master project management facility
does not seem working either. We should be aware of the competing
national interests of different member states within the Initiative anddevelop the capacity to identify and pursue our own specific interests.
This capacity within the 3SI is still missing in Bulgaria.
34

The countries which founded the 3SI in 2016 strongly denied having
goals other than those in the three key areas — transport, energy, digitalconnectivity — and stressed that conditions now are different from thoseof the last century. In the north—south direction, Central Eastern Europe
is relatively underdeveloped in terms of energy as well as in terms oftransport. There is no high-speed rail network east of Germany. The
3SI offers excellent opportunities for working in this direction. But theGerman side rightly emphasises that such informal alliances also have‘geostrategic parameters’.5
In fact, the US does not conceal that they invest in the Three Seas
with political and business interests, mainly in order to curb Russian
influence in Europe. Poland and Baltic states are believed to channel
US interests in the Initiative.6
All previous declarations have always stated that ‘the economic
presence of the United States in the region can contribute tostrengthening the transatlantic connection’. But it is impressive thatwhile the US has invested USD 300 million of the promised USD 1 billion
under the 3SI, it is bilaterally investing much more in countries withgreater strategic interests. For example, in connection with the signed
agreements with Romania and Poland for the development of nuclear
energy and related infrastructure, the American EXIM bank will provide
a USD 7 billion loan. In Poland alone, six nuclear power plant reactors
will be built by 2043. With regard to telecommunications infrastructure,
the US is committed only at the level of bilateral relations. The wrong
policy of Bulgaria for its nuclear power plants against the backgroundof the huge potential in our northern neighbour means that in years
to come we will find ourselves in the position of Germany, forced tosupply electricity from France and maintain the highest electricity
price, which will affect the competitiveness of the economy. Anotherimportant point, however, is that declarations from previous summits
have always stated that the 3SI is fully in line with the EU’s efforts tostrengthen, converge and overcome regional disparities within the EU,
and reaffirms that the Initiative is complementary to the EU strategy
and programme, which is already becoming a contradiction given the
differences between the countries.7
Although the 3SI is an economic infrastructure framework forcooperation with pragmatic intentions, its critics in Bulgaria emphasisethat influential actors and partners are designing their own geopolitical35

aspirations, which do not always meet the interests of some member
states. Only with the accession of Ukraine would the Initiative comecloser to the idea of ‘Intermarium’.
The idea about Ukraine joining the 3SI has been publicly stated by the
executive director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Bulgaria(AmCham Bulgaria), Petar Ivanov.8 He announced that the form of the
3SI is to be updated — Ukraine will join the twelve countries after the endof the war, because without Ukraine it will not be sufficient in order tocomplete the infrastructure. He further added that ‘Ukraine will be thecatalyst that will help the Initiative gain popularity, but now small steps
are needed — to create a secretariat that works constantly, to engage
donors fully’. According to Ivanov, the 3SI is not so dynamic, but what ishappening in Ukraine will definitely be a turning point for it, whether theInitiative will keep the same name or be somehow supplemented.9
Besides AmCham Bulgaria, another prominent speaker in favourof the 3SI is the Bulgarian Development Bank (BDB), which is ashareholder of the 3SI Investment Fund (3SIIF). A commissioned reportof the BDB outlines major benefits, factors and drivers of the 3SIIF.10
Experts highlight the prospects and potential for economic growth andimproved connectivity in transport, energy and digital networks, andthe benefits this may bring to Bulgaria.
The report points out that economic growth has been strong in
the new EU member states since their accession. The area between
the Adriatic, Baltic and Black Seas has been a force for higher growthin Europe with noticeably better performance and macroeconomic
stance compared to the EU15 particularly in the period after the Global
Financial Crisis of 2007—2008 and the subsequent multi-year European
Debt Crisis. Notwithstanding the remarkable economic success of the
new member states in Central. Eastern and South-Eastern Europe overthe last fifteen years, convergence to the EU15 has remained lagging interms of GDP per capita, incomes, structurally and, overall, contrary to
the initial expectations before and at the time of accession.11
Inadequate connectivity and infrastructure create and exacerbatesocio-economic and trade imbalances between member states.
According to the World Economic Forum, the transport infrastructurein the countries participating in the 3SI remains at a substantially lower
level and quality compared to the old EU15 member states due tothe fact that the pace of infrastructural development is persistently
36insufficient to close the gap. The most noticeable and concerning is theshortfall in Bulgaria and Romania.12
The BDB, as well as different NGOs and policy institutes, strives
to attract the attention of businesses and policymakers to the 3SI byorganising discussions, which shed light on the projects and are a signal
to businesses and institutions to join the Initiative. An optimal solution
will be sought for investments in the Fund after combining private andpublic funds, according to Iliya Lingorski, chief economist of BDB.
Joe Phillips of Amber Infrastructure Limited, appointed as the
exclusive investment adviser of the 3SIIF, pointed out at a conference in
Sofia in May 2021 that the Fund will operate on a fully commercial basis
and will remain open to both public and private investors. He specified
that the Fund would review three project proposals from Bulgaria,
which fall within 3SI priorities. There were another two projects in thefield of transport, which did not, however, get priority. In his words,
there are other five or six pending projects. According to him, thefunding requested by Bulgarian projects is large, but it will be decided
which of them will receive support, because the limits are between
EUR 50 and 250 million per project. In a single project, between 50% to
70% is debt financing and attracted capital is 15%.13 Joe Phillips notedthat the investment fund will now only fund projects in the three priority
areas, but the provision of digital infrastructure will affect educationand social infrastructure, as proposed assessment by governments.
Beata Dashinska-Muzicka of the Polish Development Bank reminded
the conference that the idea in the beginning is to receive support
for the Initiative at the political level, because the twelve countries
participating in it represent 30% of EU territory. She further explainedthat EUR 600 billion are distributed as follows: EUR 300 billion forlogistics and transport — for roads, rail transport, airports and ports;
almost EUR 100 billion for the energy sector; and EUR 200 billion for
digitalisation that is needed to invest in the security of these sectors.14
Addressing the same conference held close to the 3SI Summit
hosted in Sofia, Bulgarian President Rumen Radev underlined: ‘We canunite efforts for the development of the economy and infrastructure
for the people, for education, for businesses in the countries, part of
the Three Seas Initiative.’ The Bulgarian head of state confirmed thatcountries such as Japan, Qatar and South Korea are already interested
in the Initiative.15
37

President Radev noted that ‘Bulgarian priorities are far beyond
geography; they are for smart project development. If we want to see
a complete solution to the interconnectedness of the north and thesouth, we need to think about enlargement, not just geographically.
Bulgaria must think beyond the next twenty to thirty years, until we areready with the new pipelines, roads, digital connections. We need towork with young people, with innovative organisations, and we needto think not only about connectivity, but about smart connectivity.’
He pointed out that so far EUR 1 billion has been collected in the
3SIIF from the participating countries and this is not enough for all
projects, but they can invest smartly for better results. President
Radev also mentioned that ‘the key to success is to unite the efforts ofgovernments, businesses, NGOs in all twelve countries to improve thelives of our citizens. Business is the key player.’16
His words were supported by Kiril Petkov, then minister of economy,
currently prime minister of Bulgaria. He believes that coordination in theregion is not only necessary, but it will bring the potential of the region
to its due level. Kiril Petkov stressed that the twelve EU member states
participating in the 3SI represent 22% of the population and generate
10% of GDP of the EU, and such initiatives will increase domestic
trade between them, which he says needs improved investment andinnovation infrastructure.
The Bulgarian Minister of Economy expressed the opinion that thefocus should be on innovation, digital technologies and start-ups. He
said that he had talked with the executive directors of the Bulgarian
Investment Agency (BIA) and the Executive Agency for Promotionof Small and Medium Enterprises (BSMEPA) with a request to focus
their efforts on small and medium enterprises and give them theopportunity to decide which sectors they want to cooperate with anddo business with.
Yassen Georgiev, the executive director of the Economic Policy
Institute, pointed out that in order to overcome the differences between
the regions, the countries participating in the Initiative have projects
worth EUR 75 billion, and their total value is expected to exceed USD 1
trillion. So far, the Fund’s list includes eighty-nine priority projects, 12%of which are either completed or active. The Initiative is an opportunity
for the transport sector, followed by the energy sector and less than
20% of projects are in the digital sphere. Romania, the Czech Republic
38and Bulgaria are the most active countries, and 33% of the projects
are for connectivity and include countries outside the initiative — theWestern Balkans, Ukraine, Finland.
According to Georgiev, the Initiative far exceeds the available
resources in the 3SIIF and that is why it is very important to attract
private investment. The Initiative must be market-recognisable andcombine different sectors. The analyst is also convinced that initiatives
can only become sustainable with a bottom-up approach and thatneeds assessment should come from the private sector.
Sofia Kasidova, adviser to the Managing Board of BDB, confirmedthat the projects financed by the bank stimulate green growth of
Bulgarian business and in each of them there are requirements forenvironmental protection. The 3SIIF has the potential to combine withother European instruments for a leverage effect. The goal is to financecommercial projects, but as bankers, Sofia Kasidova says, ‘we believethat capital investment in infrastructure is an opportunity to make it
more transparent in financing businesses that want to grow.’
Petar Ivanov, executive director of the American Chamber ofCommerce in Bulgaria, drew attention to the interest of business,
which, however, is interested in return on investment. He would
encourage business and the state to find a common ground in the fieldof tenders for concessions, and he advised that projects at the regional
level should be a priority in key cooperation between companies andcountries.

Conclusions and recommendations
The 3SI is a political project with economic means that promotes
cooperation in infrastructure development in the energy, transport anddigitalisation sectors. It aims to improve transport, energy and digitalconnectivity in the region. It is expected to become a real instrument
for social and economic cohesion in Europe in order to compensate forthe differences in the development of individual regions of the EU.
In the case of Bulgaria, a task of immediate necessity is countering
the opponents and critics of the 3SI. To this end, the economic
dimension of the 3SI should be better communicated even justifying
its geopolitical rationale, which critics warn about. There is nothing39

to be concealed. Geopolitically, it means creating a comprehensive
network, which in the field of energy will reduce gas dependency on
Russian supplies and will supplement with imports of LNG from the US,
Israel and Azerbaijan. Of course, Russian energy interests will thus beaffected, and this is the reason for so many voices against the 3SI among
the pro-Russian energy lobby in Bulgaria. Anti-3SI speaking includes
different types of disinformation and public opinion manipulation,for example, higher prices of gas imports from other destinations,engaging Bulgaria in hostilities against Russia, etc.
It was only in the spring of 2021 that a small expert group wasformed to reflect on the issues of the 3SI in public information spaces in
Bulgaria, with commissioned specialised publications, and conferencesthat are still few in numbers, where relatively objective analysis anduseful suggestions have been made. Extreme and incorrect estimates
shift the focus from the actual problems. Therefore, in such cases there
is usually no alternative. The Bulgarian position, which resembles a sea
chess game, evolves around coping with a threefold challenge: how tosuccessfully use the granted funds for qualified projects; how to keep
close to Brussels; and how to act as a bridge rather than a wall against
Russia and the East. This puzzle produces a complicated corollary for
Bulgarian politics. Economic dimension, connectivity and digitalisation
go more or less undisputed, whereas the geopolitical dimension
triggers frictions in Bulgaria.
It is obvious that sophisticated diplomatic skills are needed ina situation when Germany wants to join the Initiative as a matter ofbalance with the activity of the US and Poland in the region. For Bulgaria
it is vital to cater to all, or at least this tends to be the generalist thinking.
President Radev’s proposals in Tallinn were towards changing theInitiative even more meaningfully. In addition, criticism and proposed
actions must be timely and appropriately constructive. The mostdifficult part of the Bulgarian puzzle with the 3SI is how to mingle sense
and sensibility — making sense of its membership in the 3SI, EU and
NATO, and archetypal sensibility towards Russia. It is a vital matter ofhigh politics looping, but also a mass public communication challenge.
Therefore, the public communication aspect of the 3SI should not go
overlooked and unattended.

40

ENDNOTES
Radev: The Three Seas Initiative is becoming more and more recognizable globally.
09.07.2021. Official news portal of Bulgarian National Television. https://bntnews.bg/
news/radev-iniciativata-tri-moreta-stava-vse-po-razpoznavaema-v-globalen-plan1161810news.html hree Seas Initiative. 2022. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republicof Bulgaria. https://www.mfa.bg/bg/3109
3
Three Bulgarian projects are a priority for the Three Seas Initiative. 18.05.2021.
Investor Bulgaria. https://www.investor.bg/evropa/334/a/tri-bylgarski-proekta-saprioritetni-za-iniciativata-tri-moreta-327992/?page=1
4
Dobrev, C. The Three Seas Initiative: What it really is. Propagated and concealed goals.
20.06.2021. Newspaper Duma. https://duma.bg/?go=authors&p=list&authorId=134
5
Nikolov, S. et al. 2021. The Three Seas Initiative: between Geopolitical Confrontation
and Pragmatic Realism. Sofia: Economics and International Relations Institute.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ivanov, P. 03.05.2022. Three Seas will include Ukraine. Investor Bulgaria. https://www.
investor.bg/bloomberg-tv/461/a/petyr-ivanov-iniciativata-tri-moreta-shte-vkliuchi-iukraina-351386/
9
Ibid.
10
Lingorski, I., Bozhidar, V., Kassidova, S. and Andronova, I. 2022. Bulgarian
Development Bank Report: Mapping Out Tomorrow’s Infrastructure. BDB — a ClassA shareholder in the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund. https://bbr.bg/media/
uploads/2021/07/19/146-160-hr.PDF
11
Ibid., p. 6
12Ibid., p. 8
13
Three Bulgarian projects are a priority for the Three Seas Initiative.18.05.2021. Investor
Bulgaria. Available from: https://www.investor.bg/evropa/334/a/tri-bylgarskiproekta-sa-prioritetni-za-iniciativata-tri-moreta-327992/?page=1
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
1

41

Croatia: In search for visibility
and stronger support
Ana-Maria Boromisa, Višnja Samardžija

Croatia, along with Poland, is one of the co-founding states of theThree Seas Initiative (3SI). The former Croatian President Kolinda
Grabar-Kitarović and the President of Poland Andrzej Duda launched
the initiative at the inaugural summit in Dubrovnik, Croatia on
25 August 2016.1 The initiative established an informal political forum,
intended to function as a platform for economic cooperation. The
aim was to facilitate economic and infrastructural cooperation among
Central and Eastern European Union (CEEU) members along theEuropean north—south axis, between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black
Seas. The idea was that the initiative should serve as a tool for making
a better use of the existing structures in the fields of energy, transportand digital communication2. The 3SI is a presidential initiative in nature,
while the goals are implemented by the governments of the states.
The Initiative links today twelve EU member states (Austria, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia) which have the status of participating countries,
while the US, Germany and the European Commission are supporting
partners of the initiative. During the past six years the objectives, theframework and the forms of cooperation within 3SI have been defined3
and implemented in participating countries.
In spite of the fact that Croatia was directly involved in thedevelopment and launch of the initiative, the 3SI was not supported
later in the country in a way that might be expected. While the former
Croatian President Grabar-Kitarović was a very enthusiastic founder ofthe initiative4, the 3SI later faced a low level of political commitment.
The change of political leadership in Croatia resulted with more
controversial approaches and weaker support for the initiative. The
current President Zoran Milanović, elected in February 2020, does notshare the same, positive opinion from the start. He is quite sceptical42

regarding the 3SI and has argued on different occasions that theInitiative could potentially harm Croatia’s external relations, particularly
those with Germany and Russia.5

Croatia’s position on the Three Seas Initiative
The Initiative is today supported by the Croatian government of thecentre-right headed by Prime Minister Andrej Plenković (elected asin 2016 for the first mandate and in 2020 for the second). The prime
minister advocates the 3SI approach and is dedicated to its strategic
goals, particularly after Germany joined the initiative as a supporter.
Opposing views and attitudes on various issues, including 3SI, cause
conflicts between the president and prime minister6.
Regarding the institutional set-up for implementing the initiative in
Croatia, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MFEA) established
an independent service for the 3SI in 2020 to coordinate the activities
and participation of Croatia in the 3SI on behalf of the government.
The scope of work of the service is to monitor the process of the 3SI
and to coordinate cooperation among government departments andactivities related to the Initiative, as well as to provide assistance for
implementation. In cooperation with other state administration bodies,
the service monitors the implementation of national infrastructure 3SI
projects in the field of transport, energy and digitalisation. The national
coordinator of 3SI is the MFEA7. The newly established service is a step
forward in terms of goals and envisaged activities, but it relies on very
limited human resources and has a low level of visibility.
However, there is a lack of knowledge and understanding of the 3SI
idea, its concept and goals amongst the wider public in Croatia, for thedifference of Poland and some other participating countries where the3SI is more present in wider public. The projects implemented within theInitiative are not perceived as 3SI outcomes. From the very beginning,communication with the wider public on these issues has been missing in
Croatia. There is a lack of serious academic and political debate, research
and analysis of the potential outcomes and benefits. As a consequence,
there is still limited commitment in Croatia towards 3SI.
It should be mentioned that there are opinions that the 3SI should
be taken to a new level in Croatia. The fact that the US is supporting43

the Initiative is welcomed and the goal that Europe needs to be
independent from Russian energy is considered very important. ‘In
the new geopolitical circumstances, the 3SI has the potential to give
impetus to projects of energy and infrastructural connection of thespace between the three seas. With the liquified natural gas (LNG)
terminal on Krk, Croatia once again has the chance to make up forthe missed opportunity. But success also requires strong politicalleadership’.8
The question is, however, what are the main Croatian interests
and the position of the country within this informal political forum
functioning as a platform for facilitating economic and infrastructural
cooperation among Central and Eastern EU members? As alreadymentioned, the benefits of this cooperation were not obvious toordinary citizens when the Initiative was launched. However, following
the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine
and new geopolitical circumstances overall, the 3SI cooperation andjoint strategic projects focusing economic growth and resilience,
energy diversification and independence, sustainable and inclusive
connectivity and digitalisation might with additional efforts becamecloser to the general public.
All 3SI formal objectives are considered to be equally relevant for
Croatia. It is hardly possible to identify or select the most important
objective for the country out of the existing ones, or make an objective
gradation among them9. One of the reasons for it is the fact that formal
objectives are mutually strongly inter-connected so each of themcovers more areas.

Economic growth and resilience of the 3SI region
and greater interest among investors
The primary goal of the Initiative is to boost economic growth andresilience of the region by developing transport, energy and digital
infrastructure. These three dimensions are crucial for all participant
countries, bearing in mind that the 3SI region is lagging behind ineconomic development in comparison with the ‘old’ EU member statesfrom Western Europe. All three mentioned components are relevant
for Croatia, and included in relevant national documents, such as
44

the National Development Strategy10 or the National Recovery and
Resilience Programme11.
All 3SI participating countries are EU members. The area of the
3SI participating countries represents almost a third of the EU with apopulation of 111 million people. All of them (with the exception ofAustria) are former transition countries and the majority (all but Croatia
and Slovenia) were strongly influenced by the USSR. Despite significant
growth in recent decade (the average economic growth in the twelve
countries in the period 2015—2019 was 3.5%, compared to 2.1% in theEU),12 the 3SI countries are still lagging behind the EU average. Their
GDP per capita represented in 2018 some 78% of the EU average.
For comparison, Croatia’s GDP per capita represented in 2018 only
63% of the EU average.13 On the other hand, the EC Winter Economic
Forecast for Croatia (February 2022) shows that after a drop of 8.1% in
2020, the real GDP is estimated to have grown by 10.5% in 2021 with
output which is above the pre-pandemic level. The recovery in 2021 was
supported by exports, with tourism and private consumption playing
a key role. In 2022, growth is expected to remain dynamic, at 4.8% ofGDP, while in 2023 it is expected to be around 3%. Similar to other EU
members, the accelerated rate of inflation in 2022 to 3.5% is worrying,and it is mostly driven by energy prices.14 However, according to theEuropean Commission Report15, Croatia has experienced a lost decadein terms of economic catch-up with the rest of the EU. Following a sixyear recession and a moderate recovery, the economic output only
surpassed the pre-crisis level in 2019.
The infrastructure gap between 3SI participating countries andthe old EU members is large, and the transport network among
participating states is still inadequate, limiting connectivity. The wayof overcoming the mentioned disparities between old and new EU
members is seen through developing and implementing Priority
Interconnection Projects in all 3SI participating countries, such as gas
pipelines, roads, railways and other infrastructure. The mentioned
strategic projects are not necessarily commercially viable but areconsidered important by the states as the precondition for economic
growth.
So far, the 3SI has developed a number of Priority Interconnection
Projects. The list of projects16 includes ninety priority projects (as of July2021) with an estimated investment value of EUR 180.9 billion.17 These45

projects are expected to help stimulate economic growth, develop thenorth—south infrastructure corridor, align regional disparities within the
EU and boost cohesion and unity in Europe. Croatia is well represented
in the 3SI Database (project list), having the highest number of its
own strategic projects. The database includes seventeen projects in
Croatia, and some of them are already implemented (the LNG terminalon Krk).18 The total value of the projects is almost EUR 1.8 billion.19
Most of those strategic projects are related to transport, several arein the energy sector and in digitalisation. The implementation of the
projects depends on a number of factors, thus it is challenging to link
the success or failure of these projects with activities within the 3SI.
The participating countries consider EU funds as a possible source offinancing and joint application as a way to increase possibilities for EU
funding. Finally, it is important to underline that the membership in the
3SI is free of charge.
The Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund (3SIIF) has recently
been established to finance key infrastructure projects in the region.
Its role is to complement and strengthen the capital deployment of
individual Three Seas countries and EU financial instruments. The Fundis a commercial and market driven initiative that will grant a diversified
investment and an attractive return to investors. The Fund’s goal is toraise between EUR 1—5 billion. Participating countries are invited tocontribute to the Fund in order to attract private capital. Croatia hasinvested EUR 20 million from the Croatian Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (HBOR) for co-financing projects. It is the minimal
envisaged amount but proportional to the country’s level of GDP.
The Business Forum has recently become a trademark of theinitiative, as it attracts leading global organisations (International
Monetary Fund, World Bank, OECD, others) and businesses. The ideaof the Forum is to connect business to business, as well as business togovernment. The goal is to connect companies with partners, so thatprivate capital also enters into cooperation in this region20. While Brexit
has shrunk the EU at the West, new infrastructure links at the East andconnection with eastern neighbourhoods and beyond might create
interest for companies to invest in this region contributing to changes
to the global order and geopolitics.

46

Geopolitics
The mere geography of the twelve EU member states located between
the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas gives the 3SI a geopolitical dimension.
It can be seen as a buffer or a bridge towards Eastern EU neighbours.
The geopolitical importance of the 3SI, which is fully rooted in the EU
and supported by Germany and the US, can be evaluated towards otherinitiatives targeting the same region: namely the EU macroregional
strategies — the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, the EU Strategy
for the Danube Region and the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian
Region. Additionally, external strategic approaches should be also
taken into consideration, such as the China 17+1 initiative.
Within the EU, the 3SI can contribute to harmonising the views of
the participating countries on EU internal issues, but also to external
policies. The launch of the ‘Geopolitical Commission’ of President
von der Leyen in December 2019 indicated that political realities are
no longer exclusively shaped and produced by states. This emerging
context provides an opportunity to the newest member states to shift
their role from policy-takers into policy makers. This requires alsobuilding coordinating capacity, for which the 3SI provides a forum.
Recent policy shifts in the US and Germany have highlighted thepotential volatility of the relevant partners which can translate intochanges in Europe’s security structure. The rise of China and actors
such as Russia that shake up the global order requires increased
cooperation among and within the countries to face such challenges
and increase resilience.
Within its macroregional strategies, the EU addresses common
challenges faced by a defined geographical region. The 3SI connects
the Danube, Adriatic—Ionian and Baltic macroregional strategy. By
connecting these regions, the EU eastern periphery can be regarded asa geopolitical node, a strategic corridor from Europe and Central Asia,
on the one hand, and from the north to the south on the other. Thus,
the 3SI provides a forum for geopolitical cooperation and coordination,
and also for planning activities in the European context, supported by
the Commission (which aims to be geostrategic) and the US. This also
includes the formulation of policies and actions regarding the invasionof Ukraine, as Ukraine is participating in the Danube strategy which
identifies security as one of its priority areas.21
47

Table 1: Membership of 3SI, 17+1, the Danube Strategy, the Ionian—Adriatic Strategy
and the Baltic Strategy
3SI
EU members

Balkan/accessioncountries

Austria
Bulgaria
Czechia
Croatia
Estonia
Lithuania
LatviaPolandRomania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Hungary

DanubeStrategy

17+1

Ionian—Adriatic
Strategy

Bulgaria
Croatia
Czechia
Estoniaw
GreeceHungary
LatviaLithuania
PolandRomania
Slovakia
Slovenia

Austria
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czechia
Germany
Hungary
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia•

Croatia
GreeceItaly
Slovenia

Albania
Bosnia andHerzegovina
North
Macedonia
Montenegro
SerbiaBosnia andHerzegovina
Montenegro
SerbiaAlbania
Bosnia andHerzegovina
Montenegro
North
Macedonia
SerbiaNeighbouring
countries

BalticStrategy
Denmark
Estonia
FinlandGermany
LatviaLithuania
PolandSwedenMoldova
Ukraine

The 17+1 initiative is part of China’s promotion of the Belt and Road
projects and includes the same eleven EU member states as the 3SI,
although the twelfth participant country is different (without Austria,
but including Greece, see Table 1), and five Balkan countries. 3SI is
promoted as a politically inspired, commercially driven platform for
improving connectivity between the twelve EU member states, whilethe 17+1 initiative is the official cooperation between China and theCentral and Eastern European countries, and it promotes businessand investment relations between China and seventeen participating
countries. Thus, the 3SI can be also seen as the EU answer to balance
Chinese influence. Since the Croatian Pelješac bridge construction
project was awarded to the Chinese company, namely the China Road
and Bridge Cooperation in January 2018, Sino-Croatian relations
reached a new high point. Since then, and contrary to Croatia’s past48

activity and interest, Croatia not only opted to more actively participate
in the 17+1 cooperation framework, but even stepped forward by
hosting the most recent 17+1 summit, held in April 2019.22 While
the Pelješac bridge received financial support from the EU (EUR 357
million of Cohesion Policy) to connect the southern part of the country
and Dubrovnik to the rest of mainland Croatia, the role of Chinese
contractors has been quite visible. While it could be considered
relevant for the connectivity of the 3SI region, the project was notregistered to the 3SI.
Cooperation among the 3SI members is also adding to therelevance of the initiative, as they generally put emphasis on thedevelopment of their relations with the main external actors involvedin the region, rather than with each other. Also, the 3SI members
have had different threat perceptions from the ‘old’ member states,
particularly the evaluation of Russia’s ambiguous role in the sharedneighbourhood. Germany has built up business and economic
relations with Russia over the last decades prior to the military conflictin Ukraine, while the new member states predominantly perceive
Moscow as one of the main/predominant threats to their security23.
Thus, the view from 3SI can be relevant in defining the EU’s policy
towards Russia and Ukraine.
The invasion has raised hard power issues for the 3SI region inwhich the conventional security issues still have priority, due to theirdefence-related implications. While some of the 3SI projects relate todigital transition and connecting the LNG terminal in Poland with Krk
have significant energy security implications, the climate change anddigitalisation are not seen as high on the agenda.
Transition towards soft power requires bringing Europe closer to its
citizens and an agenda coherent with regional needs and capacities.
In this respect, 3SI can serve as a forum for political coordination in
the policy fields of interest at the intermediate level, including those
relevant for traditional challenges (transport and energy connectivity)
but also as climate change and digitalisation.

49

Energy security
Croatia has recognised the potential of the 3SI for increasing energy
security and strengthening the country’s relevance in the regional
context. The significance of the 3SI for energy security is primarily
linked to traditional energy sources (oil and gas), their supply routes,
sources and relations with investors.
Thus, one of the key projects for the 3SI region is the LNG terminalon the island of Krk. The terminal became operational in 2021. It was
selected as one of the key Croatian strategic priorities at the time thecountry joined the 3SI. The initiative was already in that early period
expected to support Croatia’s independence from Russian gas.24 The
project was also recognised as a Project of Common European Interest(PCI 6.5.1), with strategic importance for the security and diversificationof the natural gas supply in Central and South-Eastern Europe. It isalso one of the priority projects under the Central and South-Eastern
Europe Energy Connectivity initiative. The financial support received
through the Connecting Europe Facility in the form of grants for studies
and works has leveraged further public and private investment to a
total amount of EUR 182 million.25
The role of the EU in providing financial support has been clearlycommunicated to the public. On the other hand, the fact that the idea
was promoted within the 3SI has achieved limited attention. There
were only a few media reports indicating that idea for connecting the
Croatian LNG on Krk with the Polish LNG terminal and to achieve areversible flow that would provide the 3SI countries with gas from thesource of their own choice, which can often be cheaper, was promotedby the Atlantic Council and CEEP in 2014. Thus, it is not surprising that
the LNG terminal is regarded as a project of the government, supportedby the EU and the US, but without mention of the 3SI. The fact remains,
however, that 3SI facilitated obtaining the support for the project fromeleven participating countries.
LNG enables flexibility of the gas supply, primarily by providing
opportunities for using new sources and routes and reduces
dependency on Russian supplies. Today, after the embargo on importsof Russian energy sources to EU countries, the energy diversification
became crucial issue. The war in Ukraine made the LNG terminals
the most desirable projects26. For example, while preparing for a50

new energy paradigm, Germany is rapidly developing LNG terminal
projects.27
The creation of the north—south connection (the Świnoujście LNG
terminal in the Baltic Sea with the Adriatic island of Krk) allows LNG
to be shipped from the US, Norway, Algeria or Qatar to the European
energy market through a new route, crossing north—south connections
beyond the region. The LNG terminal on the island of Krk thus enables
the shift of the power-dependency issues and could have implications
on relations with the main suppliers — both traditional (Russia) andpotential (such as US and Qatar).28
Within 3SI, Croatia also promotes the Ionian Adriatic Pipeline (IAP)
project. The project is based on the idea of connecting the existing
Croatian gas transmission system, via Montenegro and Albania,
with the Trans Adriatic Pipeline system or a similar project. The
implementation of the entire IAP project enables the opening of the
new energy corridor, with the aim of establishing a new natural gas
supply direction from the Middle East and the Caspian region. The IAP
will have a bidirectional gas flow possibility, that is, it will be able toprovide a natural gas supply from the LNG terminal on Krk 29.
The potential of the 3SI for decarbonisation as a way for energy
independence and social sustainability is yet to be tackled. Alternative
energy sources and energy efficiency can reduce import dependency
and geopolitical implications of energy supply. In this respect, the 3SI
can support identifying geographical locations of prime interest forthe development of renewable energy sources, with a cross-borderdimension, connecting infrastructure needs and removing the technical,
regulatory and market barriers to cross-border cooperation and hinder
renewables deployment.30 This primarily relates to offshore wind power
technologies, where transfer of best practices, such as regarding
customisation of wind-technologies for specific seas, might be useful.

Reliable, sustainable and inclusive connectivity
Connectivity includes digital, physical (transport, energy) and humandimension. The 3SI focuses on the physical and, to a lesser extent, thedigital dimension, while the human dimension is very limited. The 3SI
promotes projects to be considered within the EU framework with51

the European Structural and Investment Funds, the European Fundfor Strategic Investments, which supports integrated investment
programmes, and the Connecting Europe Facility that mobilises
investments in cross-border infrastructures for transport, energy anddigital networks. The role of the 3SI is recognised in the Resolution of
the European Parliament on Connectivity and EU—Asia relations31. The
Resolution stressed that the Connectivity Strategy must be monitored
and coordinated with the pursuit of internal connectivity within the EU
and between the EU and its prospective members, such as through theTrans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) or the 3SI.
Within the TEN-T, the most relevant for the 3SI are the Baltic—Adriatic,
North Sea—Baltic and Mediterranean corridors.32 These are primarily
railways and road corridors, while the North Sea—Baltic corridor also
includes inland waterways. The North Sea—Baltic corridor connects theports of the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea with North Sea ports. The
Baltic—Adriatic corridor runs from the Baltic seaports of Gdansk, Gdynia,
Szczecin and Świnoujście in the north, to the Adriatic ports of Koper,
Trieste, Venice and Ravenna in the south, taking in the industrial regionsof Central and Southern Poland, before straddling the Czech, Slovakian
and Austrian/Slovenian boarders on its way south to Italy and Slovenia.
The Mediterranean corridor is the main east—west axis in the TEN-T
Network south of the Alps, and the only one going through Croatia.
The main bottlenecks and missing links in the Mediterranean
corridor include the cross-border links with Slovenia, Croatia andHungary, and the full integration of the newest member state, Croatia33,
is recognised as a specific challenge. Rijeka port and the rail connection
between Ljubljana and Zagreb and Rijeka—Zagreb—Budapest areamong the pre-defined Connecting Europe Facility projects under theMediterranean corridor. Some components of Rijeka port are included
as 3SI priorities.34
Croatia has proposed six transport projects related to the port of
Rijeka. They should strengthen capacity and the international role of
Rijeka’s port. In addition, the two-track Rijeka—Budapest railway is very
important for Croatia. This would be the most commercially viable
investment.
Among river ports, Vukovar is important for Croatia. It could profit
from the implementation of the transport projects proposed by theother countries. Namely, Czechia has proposed a strategic project52

to connect three rivers: the Danube, Oder and Elbe. The idea is tobuild a canal that would connect these three rivers, thus making the
Danube river navigable from Romania to the North Sea. This project,which is in the implementation phase, is the example of how the
projects developed by the other countries could contribute to Croatia’sconnectivity. Through it, the port of Vukovar would gain in importance,
becoming a link with the whole of central Europe35.
In relation to the digital dimension, the role of the 3SI was visible
in promoting the US ‘Clean 5G Network Security’ initiative, aimed
at assessing the trustworthiness of telecommunications equipment.
This was considered to be an attempt to counterbalance China’s
impact on data networks and the 17+1 initiative. As a follow-up, on
the margins of the Sophia Summit, the Croatian prime minister had ameeting with Amazon Web Services. Following this, a memorandum of
understanding was signed, the idea being to develop a regional centre
in Zagreb for projecting future data entries.36

Conclusions and recommendations
Along with Poland, Croatia was one of the co-founding states of the
3SI in 2016. The 3SI is understand by the government to be the mostimportant external policy initiative launched by Croatia. During the past
six years, the objectives, framework and forms of cooperation within
3SI have been defined and implemented in participating countries.
However, in the first years of implementation the 3SI faced a low levelof political commitment and was not supported in the country in theway that might be expected. Today, the prime minister advocates the
3SI approach and is dedicated to its strategic goals, particularly after
Germany joined the Initiative as a supporter. Recently the Independent
Services for 3SI was established within the MFEA to coordinate theactivities and participation of Croatia in the 3SI on behalf of thegovernment. On the other hand, the president does not consider the
3SI beneficial and useful. As the prime minister and president co-create
foreign policy, Croatia’s position towards 3SI is inconsistent.
In general, there is a lack of knowledge and understanding of
the 3SI idea and its concept, goals and activities among the wider
public in Croatia. However, following start of the pandemic, Russia’s
53

aggression in Ukraine and the new geopolitical circumstances overall,
3SI cooperation and joint strategic projects focusing on economic
growth and resilience, energy diversification, inclusive connectivity
and digitalisation might, with strong additional efforts, became closer
and more understandable to Croatian citizens. 3SI as a platform forcooperation can facilitate the development of the practical linkages
among the nations located between the Adriatic, Baltic and Black Seasthat complement EU goals, reinforce the overall resilience of the regionand strengthen the transatlantic link.
It seems that there is no clearly defined ranking of official 3SI
objectives from the point of view of Croatia. However, based on theinterest shown, the number and value of projects included in the 3SI
catalogue (implemented and planned), and considering the role ofenergy security, connectivity, geopolitics and economic growth andresilience in recently adopted development strategies, the authors
have attempted to rank 3SI priorities as follows.
1) Energy security is ranked as a first priority, primarily due to relevanceof LNG and the emerging context requiring fast and efficient
diversification of energy sources and routes, considering the role ofRussia.
2) The cooperation within 3SI on TEN-T projects, enabling reliable,
stable and inclusive connectivity might be regarded by ‘core EU’ as
a buffer towards Russia, which is needed and therefore it is ranked
in second place.
3) The economic crisis after the pandemic and the need for more
efficient catching-up with the ‘old EU’ members are the reasons for
positioning economic growth, resilience and attracting the interest
among investors in third place.
4) The fact that geopolitical concerns are strongly interlinked and arepresent in other above-mentioned objectives puts geopolitics infourth place, but still very relevant.
The institutional set-up for support for the implementation of the 3SI
in Croatia needs to be strengthened and better equipped with humanresources to be able to play a more active involvement in the initiative.
Together with other participating countries, Croatia needs to actively
contribute to networks and connectivity between parliamentary
institutions and local authorities. Business forums, through the networkof chambers of commerce, can promote cooperation among small
54

and medium-size enterprises, technology parks, start-up and fin-techcompanies, digital data hubs and green industrial zones, which bring
added value to the goals of the 3SI.
Communication with the wider public on 3SI issues needs to beintensified to raise awareness among citizens, civil society, academia
and political actors of 3SI issues. There is a need to initiate more serious
academic and political debate, and to prepare in-depth analysis andresearch papers focusing on potential outcomes and benefits of
the initiative. The lack of 3SI visibility on the websites of all relevant
institutions in the country requires diverse additional communication
activities.
The benefits of 3SI common projects (LNG as an example) and joint
activities in the fields of energy, transport and digitalisation need to be
more openly discussed in the country with clear examples.
ENDNOTES
Three Seas Initiative. 2022. 2022 Summit and Business Forum in Riga. https://3seas.eu/
about/threeseasstory2Gębska, M. H., Lewandowski, P. 2022. Geoeconomic Leaders Among the Three Seas
Initiative Countries. Part 2: Research Results. European Research Studies Journal. XXV(1), p. 113—132.
3
Summits 3SI were held in: Dubrovnik 2016, Warsaw 2017, Bucharest 2018, Ljubljana
2019, Tallinn 2020, Sophia 2021.
4
Starešina, V. 2022. ‘There were few who understood her then, and even fewer who
sincerely supported her’. Slobodna Dalmacija. https://slobodnadalmacija.hr/vijesti/
hr vatska/povratak-inicijative-triju-mora-daje-hr vatskoj-novu-priliku-1186883.
Kitarović, G. 24.05. 2022. Fenix Magazin. https://fenix-magazin.de/foto-bijeli-oraoza-bivsu-hrvatsku-predsjednicu-kolinda-grabar-kitarovic-dobila-najvise-poljskoodlikovanje/
5
Kornis, V. 16.03.2022. Croatia’s perspective on the Three-Seas Initiative. Friedrich
Naumann Foundation. https://www.freiheit.org/central-europe-and-baltic-states/
croatias-perspective-three-seas-initiative
6
Bajruiši, R., Vurušić, V. 24.10.2020. The President stated that the Three Seas Initiative
was unnecessary and harmful to Croatia. Is he right? Milanović explicitly sided withhis predecessor Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, who is among the initiators of the Initiative.
Jutarnji list. https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/predsjednik-je-izjavio-kako-jeinicijativa-tri-mora-hrvatskoj-nepotrebna-i-stetna-je-li-u-pravu-15027503
7
GRC — Government of Republic of Croatia. 2020. Decision on the designation of thenational coordinating body and the national coordinator for the Three Seas Initiative.
8
Starešina, V. 2022. ‘There were few who understood her then, and even fewer who
sincerely supported her’. Slobodna Dalmacija. https://slobodnadalmacija.hr/vijesti/
hrvatska/povratak-inicijative-triju-mora-daje-hrvatskoj-novu-priliku-1186883
9
The authors are grateful to MFEA experts for inputs on the 3SI issues.
155

Croatian Parliament. 2021. National Development Strategy until 2030 (NDS). Official
Gazzete, 13/2021.
11
GRC — Government of Republic of Croatia (2020). Decision on the designation of thenational coordinating body and the national coordinator for the Three Seas Initiative.
12
Three Seas Initiative. 2022. 2022 Summit and Business Forum in Riga. https://3seas.eu/
about/threeseasstory
13
Eurostat. 10.05.2022. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-accounts/data/maintables
14
Croatia. 2022. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
forecasts/2022/winter/ecfin_forecast_winter_2022_hr_en.pdf
15European Commission. 2020. Commission staff working document. Country Report
Croatia 2020. 2020 European Semester: Assessment of progress on structural reforms,
prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, and results of in-depth
reviews. COM(2020) 150 final.
16
Priority Projects. 2022. 2022 Summit and Business Forum in Riga. https://3seas.eu/
about/progressreport
17
There are 17 Croatian projects on the 3SI database. Out of them 7 relate to the Port of
Rijeka. Priority Projects. 2022. 2022 Summit and Business Forum in Riga. https://3seas.
eu/about/progressreport
18
Priority Projects. 2022. 2022 Summit and Business Forum in Riga. https://3seas.eu/
about/progressreport
19
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia. 2022. https://mvep.gov.hr/en
20
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia. 2022. https://mvep.gov.hr/en
21
Priority Areas — EUSDR — Danube Strategy Point. Danube Region Strategy. https://danube-region.eu
22
Stopić, Z. 2020. Croatia and the Chinese “17+1” Cooperation Framework, CroatianInternational Relations Review, XXVI (86), pp. 130-154. https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/345065
23
Tchakarova, V. 2017. Competing geopolitical approaches towards Eastern Europe.
Austria Institut für Europa und Sicherheitspolitik.
24
Dijanović, D. 2019. Inicijativa triju mora — korijeni, ideje i perspektive (Three Seas
Initiative — roots, ideas and perspectives). Journal Obnova, 12.
25First Croatian LNG terminal officially inaugurated in Krk island. 29.01.2021. European
Commission.
https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/news-events/newsroom/first-croatianlng-terminal-officially-inaugurated-krk-island
26
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs — MFEA. 2022. Independent Service for theThree Seas Initiative.
27
Starešina, V. 2022. ‘There were few who understood her then, and even fewer who
sincerely supported her’. Slobodna Dalmacija. https://slobodnadalmacija.hr/vijesti/
hrvatska/povratak-inicijative-triju-mora-daje-hrvatskoj-novu-priliku-1186883
28
Coote, B. 2016. Surging Liquefied Natural Gas Trade: How US Exports Will Benefit
European and Global Gas Supply Diversity, Competition, and Security. Atlantic
Council.
29
Energy Community. 2022. https://www.energy-community.org
30
Study on the Central and South Eastern Europe energy connectivity (CESEC)
cooperation on electricity grid development and renewables. 2022. European
Commission.
1056European Parliament resolution of 21 January 2021 on connectivity and EU-Asia
relations (2020/2115(INI)). European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/
doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0016_EN.pdf
32
TENtec Interactive Map Viewer. 2022. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/
transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-portal/map/maps.html
33
Mobility and Transport. Mediterannean Corriodor. European Commission. https://transpor t.ec.europa.eu/transpor t-themes/infrastructure-and-investment/transeuropean-transport-network-ten-t/mediterranean-corridor_en
34
Projects. 2022. Three Seas Initiative. https://projects.3seas.eu/
35
Independent Service for the Three Seas Initiative. 05.2022. Ministry of Foreign andEuropean Affairs of the Republic of Croatia.
36
Veljković, S. 09.07.2021. Croatia has 11 projects worth 1.7 billion euros in theinitiative. Vecernji News. https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/plenkovic-lng-terminalomna-krku-hrvatska-se-utisnula-na-kartu-europe-i-svijeta-1506761
31

57

Czech Republic: A stalemate
and promising circumstances
Vít Dostál

This chapter1 deals with the Czech Republic’s position vis-à-vis theThree Seas Initiative (3SI). Firstly, it analysis Czech interests in the 3SI.
Secondly, it lists key opportunities as seen from the perspective of
the government or key stakeholders. Thirdly, it introduces the limitsof more vigorous Czech engagement in the 3SI. The chapter reflects
on the objectives of the 3SI and focuses primarily on the geopoliticalaspect. The approach of the new government towards the 3SI priorities
and the region of the Central and Eastern Europe is also debated in thechapter. Several recommendations are listed in the final paragraphs ofthe chapter, as the Czech Republic lacks behind its promises vis-à-vis
the 3SI.

Dynamics and development of 3SI
in the Czech Republic
Before debating the individual objectives, we need to discuss the Czech
approach towards the 3SI since its inception in 2016 as there were
number of turbulences that shaped the current image of the 3SI in the
Czech Republic. The Czech Republic was not among the proponents ofthe creation of a new cooperation format in Central and Eastern Europe.
Prague considered the number and scope of existing cooperation
formats sufficient. The Visegrád Group played a pivotal role for Central
European communication and coordination. It was complemented by
the Slavkov Triangle of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Austria. Keyrole played good bilateral relations with all neighbouring countries,
especially with Germany. Therefore, the launch of the 3SI during thefirst summit in Dubrovnik was given little political priority. However,from the perspective of the Czech diplomacy, it was considered better58

to be part of it to know what was being created, than to be out of it withno chances to impact the future shape of the project.2
The preparation of the Warsaw Summit in 2017 brought a greater
degree of caution or even clear distance on the Czech side. At thattime, the 3SI in Prague was perceived as a Polish political project,which worried Czech diplomacy.3 Poland’s new Law and Justice
government quickly plunged into conflict with the European Union (EU)institutions, earning the then centre-left Czech government the labelof an unpredictable partner. The 3SI was perceived as an initiative that
could be used for Poland’s power struggle against Berlin and Brussels.
The Warsaw Summit was thus held in an atmosphere of caution anddistrust on the part of the Czech Republic. The Czech position was also
signalled by anonymous comments criticising the 3SI by some senior
Czech diplomats.4
This reluctant and cautious approach has contributed to thetransformation of 3SI. There has been no change in the underlying
objectives, which were still to improve the infrastructure connectivity of
the region. However, Czech pressure was reflected in the involvementof partners and thus in the political message that the 3SI conveyed.
Czech diplomatic activity was confirmed at the Bucharest Summit
in 2018, which was a turning point for the Czech position on the 3SI.
First, the high-level participation of German and European institutions
allayed fears that the initiative could become a vehicle for Polish rivalry
with Berlin and Brussels or the germ of a future alternative to thecurrent form of European integration. Second, the announcement of
the creation of the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund (3SIIF) gave
tangible content to the 3SI. The general objectives of improving theinfrastructure links between the Three Seas region have at least gainedsome vision of their realisation. The involvement of the US also became
more credible, as previously repeatedly stated American goals in theregion (e.g. improving pipeline infrastructure) were written into the
3SI. The initiative could thus no longer be seen as a tool of the Trumpadministration to weaken Europe’s political unity.5
The 3SI Summit in Slovenia was the first summit attended byPresident Miloš Zeman. At previous meetings, the Czech Republic wasrepresented at the level of the president of the Chamber of Deputies
or minister. In 2020, prior to the Tallinn Summit, the deputy minister oftransport was tasked with coordinating cooperation on the 3SI from59

government level. This shifted the role from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to the Ministry of Transport, emphasising the focus on concrete
outcomes and the infrastructure dimension. Coordination of thesummits still remains the responsibility of the Office of the President.
There was no fundamental change in the Czech approach to the
3SI between the summits in Slovenia, Estonia and Bulgaria. The Czech
Republic was reluctant to create a permanent 3SI secretariat and seat andemphasised the focus on practical projects and the original connectivity
objectives. On the other hand, it has not been able to inject funds into
the 3SIIF. The outgoing government of Andrej Babiš originally wanted toapprove this at its last session, but eventually withdrew this item from theagenda and the Czech contribution has not yet been fulfilled.
Although there was no significant involvement of the Czech
Republic, the political debate on the Czech approach to the 3SI slowly
started during this period, thanks to the upcoming parliamentaryelections. Although the 3SI did not become a very important foreign
policy issue in the elections, it nevertheless indicated the attitude of
key players towards the project.
The SPOLU (Together) coalition mentioned 3SI among its sevenforeign policy priorities. It described it as ‘a geopolitical platform forstrengthening cooperation between the US and Central Eastern Europe’.6
The programme also touched on energy security, as it expressed
the intention of acquiring a stake in one of the liquified natural gas(LNG) terminals in a neighbouring country, which technically can only
be Germany or Poland.7 3SI was also supported by Jan Lipavský, arepresentative of the second opposition bloc from the Czech Pirate Party,
who became foreign minister after the elections.8 The manifesto of the
new centre-right government endorsed Czech involvement into the 3SI.9

Economic growth and resilience of the 3SI region andgreater interest among investors
As mentioned above, the 3SI, according to the Czech representatives,
should focus mainly on the development of infrastructure in the region.10
This intention also stems from the Czech reluctance to participate in
the creation of significant new regional political cooperation projects,
which will be discussed in a later section.
60

Although the Czech Republic lists infrastructure development as a
key aspect of the 3SI, it did not take a very responsible approach to theprocess of nominating its own priority projects before the Bucharest
Summit. The only project proposed was a waterway to link the Danube,
Oder and Elbe rivers. This idea has always been strongly supported byPresident Zeman. However, it has been called into question becauseof its questionable economic sense and its negative impact on theenvironment. However, during consultations on possible priority
projects of the Czech Republic for the 3SI, individual ministries did notcome up with any ideas. In the end, it was the task of the Office of the
President of the Republic as the coordinating body to come up with aproposal, and so the president’s pet project became an official priority.11
However, the Danube-Oder-Elbe waterway is not perceived as a
viable project by other Czech authorities because it does not meetthe conditions for 3SIIF funding at the current stage and because
it would be a long-term project that needs broad political support.
However, the Ministry of Transport considers the improvement of thenavigability of the Oder and Elbe rivers as the first steps in the medium
term that would bring the construction of the entire waterway closer tocompletion.12 With the arrival of the new government after the generalelection in autumn 2021, though, these plans have been revised. In
its programme statement, the government stated that it would ‘halt
work on the Danube-Oder-Labe Canal’.13 Although this clear signal
was already given at the beginning of 2022, this change in the Czech
approach has so far not been translated into the declared priorities of
the Czech Republic within the 3SI.
Another particular element of the Czech approach declaring an
infrastructure focus is the absence of a Czech government contribution
to the 3SIIF. Despite repeated expressions of interest, the governmentof Andrej Babiš has not decided to join the Fund and thus support theeconomic dimension of the 3SI. When it decided to put the topic of thecontribution on the government meeting after the last lost elections,
it withdrew the item from the agenda after public criticism, especiallytargeting the Danube-Oder-Labe Canal.14
Nonetheless, there are other structural reasons for the Czech
reticence. Czech entities are accustomed to financing public and private
projects through grants, especially under European cohesion policy.
For the years 2021 to 2027, a large amount of funds will be available for61the needs of the Czech economy. The 3SIIF with its investment logic istherefore not currently perceived as a highly necessary instrument. Yet,as emphasised by the National Development Bank, which has the 3SIIF
in its portfolio, as the relative socio-economic position of the Czech
Republic within the EU gradually improves, traditional grant schemes
will weaken. In the meantime, Czech entities will have to learn to use
other instruments such as the 3SIIF.15 One of the other advantagesof the 3SIIF (and similar public-private instruments) is that, unlike EU
funding, it is not strictly linked to other policy priorities, such as climate
objectives. For this reason, in the future, interest in 3SIIF resources
may come not only from the national but also from the regional andmunicipal level.
Some Czech officials also see a contradiction in the 3SIIF objectives.
On the one hand, it should finance projects that would contribute to theachievement of the 3SI objectives, i.e. to improve the connectivity ofCentral and Eastern Europe and thus its geoeconomic importance. On
the other hand, the Fund itself must seek investments that will generatea profit so that its good results attract other private contributors. The
difficulty is that the first objective is political, while to achieve thesecond objective the 3SIIF must be managed independently without
political pressures. Czech officials support any investment in the region
and do not limit themselves to the priority projects on the shortlist.
They are thus inclined towards strict independence of the 3SIIF.16
The contribution of this 3SI objective is mainly that Central andEastern Europe is a natural arena for the Czech export-oriented
economy. Trade with countries in the region has been growing rapidly
since 2004 and investment in connectivity would further contribute to
the development of business relations.

Geopolitics
The geopolitical goals of the 3SI can be seen primarily in two
dimensions — firstly, as an effort to establish the 3SI as a counterweightto Western Europe within the EU. Secondly, the 3SI can be thoughtof as a group of countries that are partners for some non-European
countries, especially the US, and also for Japan or South Korea, forinstance. Prague does not want the 3SI to become a replacement for62

any of the existing formats of Central European cooperation, especially
the Visegrád Group. In the context of the war in Ukraine and in viewof Hungary’s approach to Russia, a debate on the usefulness of the
Visegrád Group has been sparked in the Czech Republic.17 However, itremains the cornerstone of multilateral Central European cooperation.
The 3SI has a place in Czech Central European politics only if it
remains complementary to existing formats and if it brings some
added value. Any profiling of the 3SI in intra-EU contentions will not be
considered as such a contribution. Czech diplomacy does not assess
the tensions between the western and eastern parts of the EU arisingduring the so-called refugee crisis in 2015—2016 positively and willrather try to prevent similar EU divisions in the future.
In this spirit, the Czech Republic also pushed for Germany’s
involvement in the 3SI as a partner country between 2017 and 2018,both towards some of the countries participating in the 3SI, especially
Poland, and towards Germany itself. According to Prague, without theparticipation of Germany — a key trading partner of the region — theintentions of the 3SI cannot be well implemented. In the future, theCzech Republic would be open to full German membership in the 3SI.18
One of the political benefits of the 3SI was perceived as the factthat this initiative attracts US attention to the region and thus createsa certain platform for future Central European—American cooperation.
The Czech Republic has perceived the loss of US interest in (Central)
Europe since the last decade as detrimental. On its own, it has hardly
generated interesting projects for Czech—American relations thatwould approximate in weight the discussions on the Czech Republic’s
accession to NATO in the 1990s or the negotiations on the deployment
of US missile defence elements on Czech territory in 2007—2009.
At the same time, the Czech Republic has not been able to meet its
defence spending commitments in recent years, thus falling short of US
expectations.
Thus, the 3SI was originally conceived as a complement toother projects essential for the Czech Republic (e.g. in the field ofcybersecurity), creating a sufficiently strong agenda for relations
between Central and Eastern Europe on the one hand and Washington
on the other. However, this concept is undergoing a fundamental
change due to the war in Ukraine. The US has turned its attention toCentral and Eastern Europe and can be expected to show interest in the63region in the coming years, regardless of the 3SI. Moreover, the Biden
administration’s declaratory support for the 3SI is not yet accompanied
by a contribution to the 3SIIF, which raises questions on the Czech side
as to how sincere this backing is.
The above geopolitical considerations of the 3SI region, relative toboth other EU countries and the US, need to be complemented by thegeopolitical perception of the 3SI itself. While this dimension has notbeen much considered in the Czech Republic, with Russia’s aggression
against Ukraine, the region is gaining more security and thus politicalsignificance for the Czech Republic. In the first half of 2022, bilateralrelations between the Czech Republic and Poland were re-established.
They were unblocked by the agreement on the expansion of the Polishlignite mine Turów, the new government in the Czech Republic and,above all, the need for coordination in the context of the war in Ukraine.
In Slovakia, the Czech army will command a multinational NATO battlegroup.19 The Czech army is also participating in the Alliance’s enhanced
forward presence in Lithuania and Latvia.20 Yet, the only regional
format used by the Czech Republic for discussing security issues is the
Bucharest format, bringing together the countries of NATO’s eastern
flank, not the 3SI.

Energy security
Since the inception of the initiative, the 3SI energy security
dimension has not been considered very beneficial for the Czech
Republic. Although the country has participated in the Partnershipfor Transatlantic Energy Cooperation,21 it has not felt the need tostrengthen its energy infrastructure vis-à-vis the 3SI region. Until now,
it had been buying gas on the spot market and had an alternative
connection to the Druzhba oil pipeline via the Ingolstadt — Kralupy nad
Vltavou — Litvínov pipeline to Germany. However, Russia’s attack on
Ukraine and the articulation of the European intention to free itself from
Russian gas and oil have transformed Czech thinking about energy
security, which in recent years was considered a settled matter.
The Czech Republic will seek to strengthen alternative oil andgas pipeline routes. In the case of gas, negotiations on the STORK II
interconnection are being resumed. This idea was abandoned by both64

the Czech and Polish sides in 2016 due to the unprofitability of the
project, and now both countries are returning to it as they can bringgas to the Czech Republic from existing or future Polish LNG terminals
on the Baltic Sea.
Already the government’s manifesto from the turn of 2021 and 2022
spoke about the Czech interest in acquiring a stake in one of the LNG
terminals in the neighbouring country.22 The urgency of this movehas now increased significantly. The Czech Republic wants to secure
its future gas supply, even though it does not have its own access tothe sea and cannot build its own terminal. Prague may seek to enterterminals in Poland and Germany.
Central Europe’s energy security is now in a very turbulent period.
It can therefore be assumed that the importance of this objective for
the Czech Republic will increase not only in general but also within the
3SI. However, in the ongoing lively debates on security of supply, the3SI has not yet been discussed in the Czech Republic and the question
therefore arises whether the 3SI has suitable instruments or at leastideas in this area of cooperation. The upcoming 3SI Summit in Rīga will
be an opportunity to examine this question.

Reliable, sustainable and inclusive connectivity
The Czech Republic understands transport connectivity in particular in
the Central European dimension. As mentioned earlier, the importanceof energy interconnections has increased significantly since the start of
the Russian aggression against Ukraine, but is not yet clearly anchoredin the form of, for example, a government strategy. New transport links
are being prepared by the Czech Republic, especially in rail and roadtransport. In the case of railways, the main focus is on the constructionof high-speed railways, which are expected to bring two connections
to Poland (Prague—Wroclaw and Ostrava—Warsaw) and a connection
to Austria and Slovakia from Breclav within the 3SI region. However,the priority for the Czech Republic is to ensure a connection between
the largest Czech cities (Prague—Brno—Ostrava) and a connection toGermany.
The road infrastructure with the countries participating in the 3SI isto be complemented by a second motorway connection with Poland
65

(Hradec Králové—Wroclaw) and two connections to Austria (České
Budějovice—Linz and Brno—Vienna) by 2030. Austria currently remains
the only Czech neighbour not connected by the motorway. However,these plans are not considered in the context of the 3SI. They areenvisaged to be financed from European sources and the topic oftransport infrastructure is not associated with the potential benefits of
the 3SI in the Czech environment.
The only exception was the Danube-Oder-Labe Canal project,which, however, brought some controversy to the whole Czech
involvement in the 3SI, as mentioned above. Moreover, the practicalunfeasibility of the project has been confirmed by the new government
and the only possible option for a new connection is the revitalisationof the Bohumín-Kozle canal. However, this too is facing a number ofprotests from environmentalists and also from the town of Bohumín.23
The ICT connectivity dimension is not being intensively consideredin the Czech Republic. However, international cooperation in the ICT
field is important for the Czech Republic on the issue of building secure
5G networks. The Czech initiative resulted in the development of the
Prague Proposals as a direction to secure next generation networks.24
However, even this element did not make it into the Czech involvementin the 3SI.
In the case of connectivity, it can therefore be concluded that theCzech Republic is active in this direction, but does not perceive theadded value of implementing these activities through the 3SI formats.

Conclusion and recommendations
The Czech approach to 3SI is now in a transformative phase for several
reasons. Firstly, a new centre-right government has been installed.
While nominally supportive of the 3SI and clearly committed todeveloping relations with Central and Eastern European countries, itdoes not have a sophisticated strategy towards the 3SI. Second, thereality of Central and Eastern Europe has been transformed by the war
in Ukraine, which has worsened the Czech Republic’s energy security,
increased US interest in the region and forced the Czech Republic intoa stronger military presence on NATO’s eastern flank. Third, the new
government is revising some existing infrastructure projects, which has
66

so far led to the rejection of the Czech Republic’s priority project underthe 3SI, the Danube-Oder-Labe Canal.
The Czech approach to the Rīga Summit may indicate whether a
new position on the 3SI is already being formulated. It is also still thecase that the responsibility for the approach to the 3SI is spread among
several centres. It is a presidential initiative, so the position on thesummit is formulated by the Office of the President of the Republic. For
transport infrastructure issues, the Ministry of Transport is key. Energy
security is handled by the Ministry of Industry and Trade and foreign
policy is directed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is not entirely
clear among these actors who should be the leader in formulating theCzech strategy within the 3SI.
Until this is done, the Czech position on the 3SI will not be strong.
For the time being, it is still true that even after six years of its
involvement, the 3SI has not gained importance in the Czech Republic
and is perceived as marginal compared to other Central European
cooperation formats.
If the Czech involvement is to be strengthened, it is desirable toconsider these recommendations for the 3SI for the Czech Republic
as well. The 3SI should remain a loosely formalised, results-oriented,
flexible and low-cost undertaking at the political level, as strongpressure for institutionalisation or the creation of a political bloc would
discourage less enthusiastic participating countries such as the Czech
Republic.
The number of regional initiatives in Central Europe has increased
significantly in the last decade, 3SI being one of them. The Czech
Republic must therefore analyse the added value of each initiative andlook for synergies between them. In this context, the 3SI should occupy
a firm place in the Czech Central European policy framework, as it aims
to improve connectivity in the region and bring economic benefits tothe participating countries.
Despite the increased US interest in Central European security
caused by the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the 3SI should
continue to be seen as one of the tools for enriching and strengthening
the transatlantic link in the economic sphere. Prospective private
investment from the US made through the 3SIIF would give the Central
and Eastern European region more weight in the eyes of US strategists
in the coming decades.
67

The relevance of the 3SIIF to the region’s investment needs is likely
to remain low given the massive influx of EU funding and loans overthe next decade. But EU resources will increasingly be tied to certain
policy priorities, such as climate goals. Moreover, countries will have toadapt to new funding in the future as EU cohesion support will decline.
In this context, the 3SIIF could serve as a good test of the ability to use
alternative sources of financing for infrastructure projects.
Prague will be looking for new solutions to secure energy supply in the
coming years. This is an opportunity to implement some initiatives underthe 3SI. The 3SI should also comprehensively address Russia’s aggression
against Ukraine and the impact on the whole region at the Rīga Summit.
Energy security is one of them, but it equally touches on the topic ofrefugee integration, connectivity and, in particular, assistance to Ukraine
in its war effort or reconstruction. Therefore, the Czech Republic should
formulate its own strategy towards the Central and Eastern European
region, taking into account political, security and economic links. The roleof the region for the Czech Republic will grow on these levels.
The Czech Republic must then complete several homework tasks
related to its involvement in the 3SI. First, it should appoint a strong
coordinator at government level. This person could be tied to a particularministry (Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Ministry of Industry and Trade/
Ministry of Transport) or assigned to the Office of the Government. But
it must have a clear mandate given by the government. Secondly, it isnecessary to change the Czech infrastructure priority within the 3SI
and replace the Danube-Oder-Labe waterway with a feasible projectthat would be in line with the government’s programme manifesto.
Thirdly, the Czech Republic should finally earmark funds for the 3SIIF.
Fifth, Prague should use the Riga Summit to project the priorities of the
Czech EU Presidency onto the 3SI agenda. Topics such as assistanceto Ukraine and its reconstruction, securing energy supplies from nonRussian sources, strengthening European defence while maintaining
strong transatlantic ties or the resilience of the European economy
are very close to many 3SI countries. The Czech Republic should
also not forget that it has still not hosted any of the 3SI summits. The
organisation of such an event in the near future could be a stimulus for
the Czech domestic debate on its own interests in this grouping as wellas an opportunity for the next president to present himself or herself ina major international forum, and even in the role of a host.
68

ENDNOTES
Dostál, V., Strážay, T., Végh, Z. 2021. The perspective of the Czech Republic, Hungary,and Slovakia on the Three Seas Initiative. Association for International Affairs (AMO).
ht tps://www.amo.cz/wp-content /uploads/2021/06/AMO_The_Perspective_on_
the_3SI.pdf
2
Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic in discussion
with Vít Dostál. 25.03.2021.
3
Kautský, L. 05.05.2016. Speech by the Deputy foreign minister. Conference: The
role of the Visegrad Four in the light of the crisis of European integration. https://bit.
ly/3uqrCS0
4
Kokot, M. 19. 07. 2017. Wilo in Triomorz. Czechs do not want to be part of the antichemical pact. Gazeta Wyborcza. https://bit.ly/3xTLIWG
5
Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic in discussion
with Vít Dostál. 25.03.2021. Representative of the Office of the President of the Czech
Republic in discussion with Vít Dostál, 3103.2021.
6
Program SPOLU for a safe country. 2022. Official website of the political alliance
SPOLU. https://www.spolu21.cz/program/spolu-pro-bezpecnou-zemi
7‘Program SPOLU for a sustainable life. 2022. Official website of the political alliance
SPOLU. https://www.spolu21.cz/program/spolu-pro-udrzitelny-zivot
8
Drake, D. 21.09.2021. Central Europe is uniting: We want the same quality of life as
in the western EU. Novinky.cz News. https://www.novinky.cz/zahranicni/clanek/
stredni-evropa-se-sjednocuje-chceme-stejnou-kvalitu-zivota-jako-na-zapade-euburcuje-40372623
9
Government Program Statement. 07.01.2022. Official website of the Government of
the Czech Republic. http://www.vlada.cz/cz/jednani-vlady/programove-prohlaseni/programove-prohlaseni-vlady-193547/
10Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic in discussion
with Vít Dostál. 25.03.2021. Representative of the Office of the President of the
Czech Republic in discussion with Vít Dostál. 31.03.2021. Representative of the
Ministry of Transport of the Czech Republic in discussion with Vít Dostál. 31.03.2021.
Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic in discussion
with Vít Dostál. 05.05.2022.
11
Representative of the Office of the President of the Czech Republic in discussion with
Vít Dostál. 31.03.2021.
12
Representative of the Ministry of Transport of the Czech Republic in discussion with Vít
Dostál. 31.03. 2021.
13
Government Program Statement. 07.01.2022. Official website of the Government of
the Czech Republic. http://www.vlada.cz/cz/jednani-vlady/programove-prohlaseni/programove-prohlaseni-vlady-193547/
14
Tomeš, M. 14.10.2021. The government wants to send half a billion to the Trinity
project just before it leaves. The Czechia has only Zeman’s favorite channel in it. Daily
Newspaper Deník N. https://denikn.cz/727177/vlada-chce-tesne-pred-odchodemposlat-pul-miliardy-na-projekt-trojmori-cesko-v-nem-ma-jen-zemanuv-oblibenykanal/
15
Representative of the Czech-Moravian Guarantee and Development Bank in discussion
with Vít Dostál, 12.04.2021.
16
Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic in discussion
with Vít Dostál, 25.03.2021.
1

69

Dostál, V. 26.04.2022. Let’s Not Abandon Central Europe. Visegrad Insight. https://visegradinsight.eu/lets-not-abandon-central-europe/
18
Pirunčík, P. Speech of the Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of
the Office of President. Conference Czech priorities within the Trojmoří initiative.
29.09.2020. https://bit.ly/33iOhn9
19
Slovenia. Foreign Missions. 05.04.2022. Ministry of Defence & Armed Forces of Czech
Republic. https://mise.army.cz/aktualni-mise/slovensko/slovensko--234572/
20
Latvia and Lithuania. 27.01.2022. Ministry of Defence & Armed Forces of Czech
Republic. https://mise.army.cz/aktualni-mise/ll/default.htm
21
Deputy René Neděla met with the US Secretary of Energy Rick Perry in Houston.
20.03.2019. Ministry of Industry and Trade. https://www.mpo.cz/cz/rozcestnik/
pro-media/tiskove-zpravy/namestek-rene-nedela-jednal-v-houstonu-s-americkymministrem-pro-energetiku-rickem-perrym--244688/
22
Government Program Statement. 07.01.2022. Official website of the Government of
the Czech Republic. http://www.vlada.cz/cz/jednani-vlady/programove-prohlaseni/programove-prohlaseni-vlady-193547/
23
Januszek, T. 16.12.2020. Danube-Odra-Elbe Canal? From Bohumín, a clear NO sounds
again. The reason is meanders. Daily Newspaper Deník N. https://www.denik.cz/
regiony/kanal-dunaj-odra-labe-bohumin-20201231.html
24
Prague 5G Security Conference Announced Series of Recommendations: The Prague
Proposals. 03.05.2019. Government of the Czech Republic. https://www.vlada.cz/
en/media-centrum/aktualne/prague-5g-security-conference-announced-series-ofrecommendations-the-prague-proposals-173422/
1770

Estonia: The increased focus
on geopolitics after Russia’s invasionin Ukraine
Illimar Ploom, Viljar Veebel

Although the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) is sometimes described andpromoted in Estonia as an economic cooperation project, the current
turbulent times have brought up other benefits of the project. Today,in the light of the recent Covid-19 crisis and Russia’s ongoing war in
Ukraine, Estonia’s interests in the 3SI could be briefly described with
two keywords: inter-connectedness and security. The former refers
to the enhancement of multi-level linkages and connections at theregional level, particularly between Central and Eastern European
countries, and the latter relates to the need for obtaining additional
security guarantees to the greatest extent possible. The 3SI has a lot
to offer in this respect; however, it could also contain some traps andvulnerabilities for the 3SI member countries, including Estonia. This
article aims to describe Estonia’s most recent views on the 3SI andto discuss both potential gains and pitfalls of the initiative from theEstonian perspective.

Where do the pitfalls for small countries come from?
Theoretical consolidations
The conceptual foundations of the Three Seas Initiative could be
associated with the theories of functionalism and neo-functionalism.
Although the core idea of the Three Seas Initiative originates fromthe United States and the USA plays an important and strong role in
3SI activities today, the project also has close linkages to a primordial
European integration theory — functionalism, which relies on the logic
of interdependency.1 The theory argues that closer ties between
71countries and regions create higher economic growth potential andthereby — by diminishing the prominence of the state — also lessen
the danger that wars break out. In turn, the neo-functionalist theory2
concentrates on EU integration, and among other features, it outlines
the role of the state in integration.
However, there are some critical aspects related to these theories
that raise the question of whether this logic might actually not workin the case of the 3SI. The question is, should economic growth anddevelopment (including inter-connectedness) be related to thefunctions of the state? Infrastructure projects could be seen as either
a response to an already existing demand or as a pioneering attempt
to induce demand by first creating infrastructure. In this respect, the3SI can be basically seen as putting stress on the role of the state or
public sector, which can promote growth by promoting infrastructure.
However, it is also vital to understand the wider ideological context of
the initiative. In principle, the history of European integration could
conditionally be divided into two stages: the first stage extends fromthe creation of the Coal and Steel Community to the Single European
Act (SEA), and the second stage from the SEA to the Eurozone andglobal crises.3 The first period is characterised by a broad impulse tohelp member states to achieve economic equality. This was both an
aim in itself as well as a precondition for more inclusive and stronger
economic growth. This goal was also enhanced by the relatively small
differences between the member states who have joined the European
integration. The second period, however, carried a different ideology,
namely neoliberalism, by which economic growth was perceived as afunction of free market economy processes. In this period, member
states with much less-developed economies and significantly wider
disparities joined the EU. All this raises the question of whether the
logic that interdependence enhances economic growth, peace andprosperity works in the case of the 3SI. Alternatively, the process could
evolve in another direction based on the logic of imperialism, whereby
the core benefits stem from the resources of peripheral regions. So
far, to a large extent the 12 EU member countries participating in the
3SI project have more or less taken up a peripheral role and their main
activities have been targeted at being better connected with the coreof the EU, such as Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux countries.
In this respect, the 3SI ideally carries a wider strategic connotation in72

balancing the implicit imperial nature of the EU’s recent developments.
However, it is also true that at least in the early years after the initiation of
the 3SI, Western European countries have been somewhat standoffish
about it and expressed the fear that it splits EU countries and breaks
the coherence of the union.

Estonia’s views on the 3SI: unanimous support inpolicy circles, but critical views among academicians
Among Estonian public officials and policymakers, the overall
attitude towards the 3SI seems to be supportive and maybe even too
optimistic. This is well-reflected, for example, in an interview with an
Estonian Diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kaisa Hanna Parel.
She says that the initiative has strong and united political support in
Estonia, and the reason it is sometimes publicly criticised is related
to the problem that the initiative is still relatively unknown outside
political circles in Estonia.4 In this way, she basically argues that only
those people who do not know the essence of the initiative dare to
criticise it, while all well-informed and ‘wise’ Estonian politicians andpublic officials unanimously support it. This, however, seems to be asomewhat narrow-minded and limited approach, particularly keeping
in mind that it seems fully reasonable to ask how the initiative relates
to the European Union and what the role and ambition of the USA isin terms of it. It cannot be excluded that such a strong belief in the 3SI
among Estonian policymakers and public officials is associated withemotional connections, because very recently, in 2020, Estonia was thecoordinator of the initiative and hosted several high-level meetings on
this topic.5 Furthermore, former President of the Republic of Estonia
Kersti Kaljulaid was a strong supporter of the 3SI, which might havealso left its mark on the current attitudes of Estonian policymakers andpublic officials on the Three Seas Initiative.
However, the arguments that Kersti Kaljulaid highlights in defending
the 3SI seem to be fully reasonable and are therefore worthy ofelaborating further. In an interview, she argued that the 3SI is an
initiative that brings together the most dynamic EU member states andpromotes this region, which has more than 100 million people and is
the fastest growing part of the EU. Kersti Kaljulaid also points to the73

fact that so far this region has not fully exploited its economic potential
in its mutual relations within the EU. She mentions as an example
that ‘currently all good roots and connections are from east to west,
but there are no good connections from north to south’.6 She alsostrongly opposes the idea that the 3SI could compete with the EU andis convinced that this is a simple but successful ‘attempt’ to combine
public and private resources to achieve development goals. Last but
not least, she does not exclude that particular projects within theThree Seas Initiative could also cover countries outside the EU, such as
Ukraine and the Balkan countries.7
Members of the academic community in Estonia seem to be somewhat
hesitant in expressing their views on the 3SI. Some researchers, like Piret
Kuusik from the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS),
are slightly sceptical in terms of what Estonia gets out of the initiative,
how the country finds a balance between Europe and the USA, andwhat the relationship between the 3SI and the 17+1 initiative is (referringto the cooperation network headed by China).8 The topic has also been
covered by former diplomat and journalist Harri Tiido, with a main focus
on the role of Poland in guiding the initiative.9

The benefits of the 3SI for Estonia:
a focus on economic benefits, investments
and energy independence
It is clearly difficult to weight and rank the benefits of the 3SI for
Estonia. On the one hand, the Three Seas Initiative is highly importantfor Estonia for economic reasons. Since the initiative is aimed atdeveloping transport, energy and digital connections on the EUʼsnorth-south axis, it is per se of vital importance for Estonia as a small
country located at the EU periphery. Any measures that increase tradeflows within the region and with the neighbouring areas, that enhancecompetition and security in the regional energy market, that promote
the distribution of digital solutions and that make the north-south axisof the EU more attractive in the eyes of potential investors are directly
economically beneficial for Estonia. Topics like digital transformation,
new technologies and innovative solutions are in any case close to thehearts of Estonians. Next to that, political and economic turbulence74caused by the recent Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s ongoing war
in Ukraine have made many countries revise their supply chains todiminish dependency on Russia’s energy resources. Estonia is not an
exception here, which means that economic opportunities offeredby the Three Seas Initiative are basically invaluable for the country to
promote its economic growth and to gain energy independence from
Russia in times of worldwide disrupted supply changes and Russia’sconstant blackmailing of its neighbours and partners in Europe as
regards energy supply.
However, the most important benefit in this respect might be theregional dimension of interconnectedness. Interconnectedness has
a global dimension that has been most evident in the last wave ofglobalisation since 1970s, but it also has a regional dimension. The
latter is best exemplified by the phenomenal achievements of theEuropean Union: the free exchange of goods, services, people andcapital has assumed that there are multiple connections among themember states and has simultaneously enhanced those connections.
The 3SI departs from a realisation that in the CEE subregion of theEU, despite its remarkable growth rates since its accession to the EU,
there is a noticeable dearth in terms of connectivity. In that regard,
concentrating on connections within CEE as a subregion of the EU is
more than welcome.
This is also Estonia’s position: better connectivity within the
CEE region is clearly among country’s priorities and improves it
regional perspectives. The 3SI also matches with Estonia’s long-term
international strategy of being ever more integrated in international
networks. Estonia has high hopes for a lot of the current priority
projects submitted to the 3SI, such as the transport infrastructure
projects Rail Baltica and Via Baltica, the liquefied natural gas (LNG)
regasification terminal in Paldiski, the Estonian Pumped-Hydro Energy
Storage project and the synchronisation of Baltic power systems with
continental Europe.10 All these projects should in the long term ensure
a high level of economic growth and investments in Estonia as well as
increase country’s energy independence.
However, to sum up, the greatest benefits of these projects are
related to political geography, and in this respect, connectivity canbe seen as an aim in itself. Connections with friendly nations along
the Baltic land corridor, and on maritime or air routes, are a specific75strength of a project like the 3SI, but one should also not forget about
the downsides of interconnectedness, as the Covid crisis and Russia’s
war in Ukraine have demonstrated. Besides being a source of growthand stability, both the value chains and supply chains that characterise
the interconnected world today might also potentially generateinstability. Nevertheless, in a modern open world, connectivity among
nations of similar values is still favoured.

The greater focus on geopolitics:
the political balancing act
In addition to economic benefits, the 3SI has a clear strategic meaning
for Estonia, referring to the prioritisation of the initiative as the priority
cooperation platform for Estonian foreign policy.11 What makes the3SI vital for Estonia in this respect is the involvement of the USA in it.
Estonia has often declared, particularly in the framework of the NATO
Alliance, that good relations with the USA are extremely important forthe country, and Estonia does whatever it can to be a trustworthy andreliable partner of other NATO members. In practice, this message ismostly directed towards the USA, since — particularly in light of Russiaʼs
war in Ukraine — Estonia expects that the NATO Alliance, led by theUSA, will be able to defend Estonia against Russia, should Russia atsome point in time decide to attack Estonia. In this respect it seems
fully reasonable that Estonia also uses the opportunity to develop close
relations with the USA in the framework of the 3SI. The USA is the main
security-related priority of Estonia, and regional economic ties that areenhanced and supported by the main security provider (i.e. the USA)
offer a strong potential to boost security and peace in the region.
Furthermore, the 3SI cooperation format also indirectly competes withthe 17+1 format of Chinese-European relations, and, in the context ofthe latest developments between China and the West, Estonia has
every reason to support the alternative that the 3SI offers.12
However, as regards geopolitics, there is also a further and much
more complicated nuance that should be carefully considered, namely
the transatlantic relationship. The initial distancing of the EU from the 3SI
was perceived by many, including Estonian politicians and diplomats, asa way of driving the EU and the USA apart. Although the Donald Trump76era has receded and the EU has been more actively involved in theinitiative, there still exists a risk that the 3SI could potentially drive thetransatlantic partners apart. The risk is certainly higher today, when the
USA has taken an active role in supporting Ukraine in its righteous fightagainst Russia, while particularly the Western European countries havebeen hesitant and passive in doing the same. It is Estonia’s main, albeit
indirect, interest to ensure that within this the 3SI cooperation between
the EU and the USA will be enhanced instead of being harmed.
Another important geopolitical aspect for Estonia that has
emerged, particularly in light of Russia’s war in Ukraine, is related to therole of Poland in the 3SI framework. The geopolitical division of power
within the EU is clearly changing as a result of the passive, hesitantand sometimes even incomprehensive reaction of ‘Core Europe’ tothe war in Ukraine and the brave and supportive behaviour of Poland
in response to Russia’s aggression. Previously, Western European
countries like Germany have often served as a role model for Estonia,
and Estonia has considered Germany as its close ally and trustworthy
partner;13 however, the behaviour of Germany and France today ishighly questionable in the eyes of Estonians, who are currently among
the leading countries worldwide in offering military and humanitarian
support for Ukraine. Poland, on the contrary, with its strong messages
and encouraging behaviour, is clearly an example for Estonia. Thus, thetables have already turned in this sense, and whatever ‘Core Europe’hopes, it will be very difficult for them to restore their reputation andposition at the EU level, at least in the eyes of Estonians, and maybe evenin the eyes of the Central and Eastern European countries in general.
Furthermore, for the first time in recent decades, it might actually
happen that the term ‘Estonia as an ally’ could really mean something.
So far, although Germany and France have been supportive in theirwords declaring that Estonia is their close partner and ally, in real terms
this had no practical meaning until the war in Ukraine, because in reality
these big countries did not need Estonia’s support and contribution topush through their interests. This time, however, Poland might actuallyneed the support of Estonia, as well as the other two Baltic countries,
to fully develop itself as a ‘new core country’ that is surrounded bystrong partners and allies. In this way, the 3SI framework clearly offersa more balanced alternative to the recent model of Western European
countries as core and CEE countries as peripheral regions.
77

Conclusions and recommendations
To sum up, even though the motivation behind the 3SI could have somestrong geopolitical connotations, particularly in light of the current
security crisis in Europe, the main thrust of the 3SI is still economic.
So far, EU member states from the CEE region have experienced aremarkable trajectory of economic development within the EU, however,at the same time, most of them have also witnessed unfavourable
demographic and labour market trends, including the flow of labour
force to the more affluent labour markets of the old European member
states. Furthermore, the competitiveness of CEE countries has reacheda sort of glass ceiling in Europe. These two aspects make economic andsocial resilience high priorities for the CEE countries. In that regard, theemphasis that the 3SI puts on regional economic development is of theutmost relevance. If the transatlantic partnership will truly work within
the 3SI, the promise of making the future of the region more secure will
be of direct benefit not only for the CEE countries, but also for the EU
and the West as whole.
However, in addition to global geopolitical trends and the
distribution of power both in the transatlantic arena and within theEU, the future role of the EU peripheral countries, including Estonia,
also largely depends on the decisions that these countries make bythemselves. If they choose to be narrow-minded and boring, there is nochance for a better future even when using the opportunities that the
3SI framework offers. The main keyword here is ‘cooperation’, which will
be increasingly forgotten when cross-border initiatives are established.
Unlike in the early stages of European integration, today in practicecooperation tends to mean that actors attempt to get the biggest pieceof the pie at the expense of the others. However, this should not be thetrue meaning of enhancing cooperation and integration.
Last but not least, there is another very practical aspect that should
not be forgotten when discussing the sustainability of large-scale
infrastructure projects that are aimed to connect people, economic
agents and countries. As many studies have revealed, these projects
should be planned and executed very carefully, by realisticallycalculating both the costs and the revenues of the projects and making
decisions based only on realistic expectation, not emotional arguments.
Projects that do not respond to actual needs are not in the interests78

of the 3SI project either. For Estonia, the most complicated project inthis sense is the Rail Baltica railway project, which incorporates a clear
risk that the project could turn into an infrastructural ‘white elephant’and become a burden for a country.14 There are also short-term risks
related to the building of the Paldiski LNG terminal, however, in thiscase the risks are mainly related to the difference of opinion in Estonia
between the state and the private company of who should bear therisks stemming from the project. To avoid potential failures and pitfalls,
efforts should also be made at the EU level to combine the aim ofbetter connectivity with the renewed cohesion policy in general in theEU, whereby infrastructure projects should be optimised against the
backdrop of local needs.
ENDNOTES
See, Mitrany, D. 1933. The Progress of International Government. London: George
Allen & Unwin.
2
E.g. Haas, E. B. 1958. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces
1950—1957. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
3
See, e.g. Reinert, Erik and R. Kattel. 2013. “Failed and Asymmetrical Integration:
Eastern Europe and the Non-Financial Origins of the European Crisis.” Working
Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics 49. 20.05.2022 http://
technologygovernance.eu/files/main//2013041503510303.pdf
4See, Kornis, V. 21.02.2022. Estonia’s Perspective on the Three-Seas-Initiative. Friedrich
Naumann Foundation. 14.05.2022 https://www.freiheit.org/central-europe-and-balticstates/estonias-perspective-three-seas-initiative
5
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2021. Three Seas Initiative (3SI). 27.05.2022 https://vm.ee/
en/activities-objectives/three-seas-initiative-3si
6Estonian Public Broadcasting ERR. 21.10.2020. President: kolme mere algatus ei
konkureeri Euroopa Liiduga. 27.05.2022 https://www.err.ee/1146183/presidentkolme-mere-algatus-ei-konkureeri-euroopa-liiduga
7
Estonian Public Broadcasting ERR. 21.10.2020. President: kolme mere algatus ei
konkureeri Euroopa Liiduga. 27.05.2022 https://www.err.ee/1146183/presidentkolme-mere-algatus-ei-konkureeri-euroopa-liiduga
8
Kuusik, P. 13.11.2020. How Does the Three Seas Initiative Help Estonia? ICDS
Commentary. 24.05.2022 https://icds.ee/en/how-does-the-three-seas-initiative-helpestonia/; Kuusik, P. 19.10.2020. Kolme mere algatus avab Eesti välispoliitikas vanaarutelu uue peatüki. News Portal Postimees. 24.05.2022 https://maailm.postimees.
ee/7088928/kommentaar-kolme-mere-algatus-avab-eesti-valispoliitikas-vanaarutelu-uue-peatuki
9
Estonian Public Broadcasting ERR. 11.03.2021. Harri Tiido: Kolme mere algatus ja selle
ajalooline taust. 23.05.2022 https://www.err.ee/1608138733/harri-tiido-kolme-merealgatus-ja-selle-ajalooline-taust
10
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2021. Three Seas Initiative (3SI). 27.05.2022 https://vm.ee/
en/activities-objectives/three-seas-initiative-3si
179Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2021. Three Seas Initiative (3SI). 27.05.2022 https://vm.ee/
en/activities-objectives/three-seas-initiative-3si
12Kuusik, P. 13.11.2020. How Does the Three Seas Initiative Help Estonia? ICDS
Commentary. 24.05.2022 https://icds.ee/en/how-does-the-three-seas-initiative-helpestonia/; Kuusik, P. 19.10.2020. Kolme mere algatus avab Eesti välispoliitikas vanaarutelu uue peatüki. News Portal Postimees. 24.05.2022 https://maailm.postimees.
ee/7088928/kommentaar-kolme-mere-algatus-avab-eesti-valispoliitikas-vanaarutelu-uue-peatuki
13See, European Council of Foreign Relations. 2020. European Solidarity Tracker.
20.05.2022 https://ecfr.eu/special/solidaritytracker/
14See, e.g. Veebel, V., Ploom, I, Markus, R. 2018. EU-Financed Peripheral Large-Scale
Infrastructure Projects and the White Elephant Syndrome: the Example of Rail Baltica.
Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol 18, No 1. 12.05.2022 https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3296940
1180

Hungary: Giving the minimum
Zsombor Zeöld

Ahead of the 2022 Rīga Three Seas Initiative (3SI) Summit, key issues
concerning the financial component of the Initiative have not been
resolved, and the most important external supporter for 3SI, the US,changed its strategy towards Russia — only to revoke it around late 2021.
Due to the 2022 Russia—Ukraine war, external factors are emerging thatare likely to affect 3SI’s future. This expands to communication over theframework (that so far has lacked a military angle), and to the posture of
key member states on the Initiative itself. With the growing importanceof hard security issues and the need to find national answers to these,
the Hungarian standpoint over 3SI is not likely to change significantly.
Out of the areas of cooperation the Initiative mentions, the Hungarian
engagement is likely to grow concerning energy security — but partiallyfor other reasons than just concern for the future of 3SI.
Almost a year after the summit in Sofia, the countries of the 3SI haveorganised another meeting for the twelve member countries — this time,in the Latvian capital of Rīga. Past summits were unfortunately unable
to solve long-standing problems that hindered the development of theInitiative into its full potential. Moreover, during the course of the past
year, other problems surfaced or resurfaced that have added to thelist of issues standing in front of 3SI’s development. It is not only therenewed Russian—Ukrainian war that affects the atmosphere of the Rīga
summit, but also the inability of the US Biden administration to openly
support the regional initiative in a way that goes beyond sporadic press
statements. These, coupled with the unresolved issues surrounding thefinancial development of 3SI, yet again put the future of the Initiative inquestion — in 2022, in a way more serious geopolitical-security policy
environment than ever before.
The 2022 Summit provides an excellent opportunity to assess 3SI
member states’ opinions on a country-by-country basis. For Hungary, a
mid-size member of the Initiative, the task is different for a combination81

of domestic and foreign policy reasons. Assessing the standpoint of
Budapest, however, is only possible after painting a general picture of
3SI’s development and vision on the Initiative.

Inherent problems with 3SI
Since the creation of the 3SI, the European viewpoint on the Initiative
differed from Washington’s — a country whose attitude towards theregional cooperation was, and still is, essential. Defining the three mainareas of 3SI cooperation (energy security, development of physicalinfrastructure, digital development) was framed in Europe as tools
for enhancing economic (and trade) cooperation between Central
European states — publicly not admitting to the fact that at least two of
the three sectors are directly linked to military issues.
It is likely that the military component of 3SI was a core concern inWashington. Under the Trump administration, the key national security
policy position was a pushback on both Russia and on China, which
included political steps and had a military (planning) component
as well — as the example of the rising importance of the South
China Sea showed. Between 2016 and 2022, the US was looking forregional partners and initiatives supporting these goals. In the eyesof Washington, 3SI seemed a perfect European regional initiative tocontribute to these goals, but was treated as a European-led one —meaning that (significant) US, financial, support was conditional vis-àvis the shared goals. The US also expected consistency from the annual
3SI summits: the same level of commitment from countries holding
these occasions — namely whether other organisers would step up theirefforts to Poland’s level of engagement, and whether they would push
3SI forward not only in the year they took up the role of host. In regard
to US financial contribution, it is notable that after the 2020 presidential
elections (even during the transition phase) Washington significantly cut
back the possible support that then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
pledged to the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund (3SIIF) during the2020 Munich Security Conference — downsizing a potential US financial
engagement from USD 1 billion to a mere USD 300 million. Concerning
the track record of the Biden administration towards 3SI, setbacks do
not stop here: no significant, open political support has been mentioned
82

since President Biden has taken office — the most recent example of thisthat during the president’s April 2022 visit to Warsaw, 3SI was not namedin openly available speeches and statements. As 3SI is a low-hanging
fruit for enhancing transatlantic cooperation, this was a surprising move.
It is likely that changes in grand US strategy (which, until late 2021, did
not consider Moscow a main threat to Washington and shifted resources
towards Beijing)1 affected its standpoint on 3SI — the most visible exampleof this was the waiving of sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in May
2021. Introducing a climate component to the 3SI-supporting, separate
initiative Partnership for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation (then P-TEC;
now P-TECC) can be treated as lip service, especially when paired withthe passing of the USD 3 trillion infrastructure bill of 2021 that earmarked
the spending of significant resources in the home US market for digitaland physical infrastructure development. It is very likely that this step
affected the possible amount of US government-related financial
resources to be spent in European markets.
Changes in US foreign policy did not go unanswered by some 3SI
members: they also started shifting their China policies. Following
the Czech government’s example, Lithuania decided to open official
relations with Taiwan in October 2021 resulting in three actions:severing ties with China, the beginning of Taiwanese investments inthe country in January 2022 (in the industry and technology sectors),
and securing a USD 600 million export credit agreement with the
US in November 2021. From a strict 3SI standpoint, the latter can beconsidered as an act of ‘blackmailing’ US foreign policy that could have
led to unnecessary rivalry between 3SI members.
Another looming problem concerns the development of 3SIIF whichin 2022 not only lacks the capital itself deemed necessary, but needs todecide on core issues (e.g. whether allocated resources from Country‘A’ can be used to fund a joint project of Country ‘B’ and ‘C’; or how
to divide allocated funds between the three pillars). Due to the natureof financial planning, very limited information is available to the public
about these issues.
The 2022 Russian—Ukrainian war started to bring some 3SI-related
questions yet again to the surface. During the 2019 Ljubljana Summit,
agreement was made to link 3SI membership to European Union(EU) membership. As Ukraine has now delivered its EU membershipquestionnaire, 3SI will also need to address this issue in the coming years.
83Hungary and 3SI as it currently is: viewpoint,
domestic drives, general approach
Being a mid-sized country, it is not only the political approach thatshapes Hungary’s approach to the 3SI, but geography as well. The
negative component of the latter is the country’s landlocked nature:
regarding 3SI’s energy security pillar, it means that Hungary is (atleast partially) reliant on neighbouring 3SI members when it comesto non-Russian-origin energy sources. On the other hand, due toits geographical position and geography, developing transport
infrastructure has been the key priority of Hungary vis-à-vis theInitiative.
The Viktor Orbán-led government’s political approach towards
the regional format has been lukewarm since its creation: not only has
not Budapest undertook the role of hosting an annual summit so far,the country has treated the Initiative as one of the regional ones that
Hungary is interested in — and less important than compared to, forexample, the Visegrád Group.
If we examine the Hungarian stance on 3SI from the standpointthat the format was created to counter Russian and Chinese maligninfluence in the Central European region, there are three main possible
reasons for the lack of deep Hungarian interest. Hungarian (historical)
experience and geographical position resulted in the assumption ofa ‘minimum’ position in some cooperation formats — participation
does not result in a deep engagement. Moreover, it is possible that
Hungary’s standpoint can be, at least partially, explained by internal
factors (e.g. the fragmented governmental structure supporting theInitiative or the overshadowing by other regional foreign policy goals),or — given the Hungarian policy of ‘Opening to the East’ involving China
and the deepening of Hungarian—Russian bilateral relations marked
by, for example, the International Investment Bank’s presence in
Budapest — by foreign policy ones: Budapest treating the developmentof these connections as more important than mustering support for
3SI. I believe the answer lies a little closer to the first (however, using
open sources, it is not possible to find an exact answer to the extent
of the second factor). Key areas connected to the three main goals of
the 3SI have been divided between various Hungarian ministries: forexample, energy and energy security-related issues were handled by84

four resorts (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry for
Innovation and Technology, one minister without portfolio, and one
government plenipotentiary). The two ministries mentioned have some
responsibility concerning infrastructural development, the latter being
in charge of digitalisation issues.
On its nominal value, the Hungarian EUR 20 million contribution
to 3SIIF is not ‘shockingly’ low, but shows that Budapest negated apopulation-based proportionate approach to the extent of financial
contribution to the Fund. In essence, given that Budapest deemedother regional cooperation formats important, its approach to 3SI
can be described as ‘giving the minimum’ — with the exception of
infrastructural development.

Energy security
In recent years, not completely independent from some US efforts,
steps that various 3SI members (e.g. Poland, Slovakia, Romania)
took concerned three aspects of energy security: the developmentof underground natural gas storage facilities, limiting Russian andChinese influences in the supply of nuclear fuel rods, and enhancing
energy efficiency.2 Resulting from the 2022 Russian—Ukrainian war,
two developments can already be seen in May 2022: ending a yearslong issue, part of the Neptun Deep underwater gas field on the BlackSea became a Romanian acquisition, and the development of theAlexandroupolis liquified natural gas (LNG) terminal (yet another entry
point for US LNG for Europe) in Greece and connecting infrastructure
has been sped up. It is not unlikely that the long-standing rule-ofthumb that market actors will not take part in the development ofphysical infrastructure will change. On the other hand, Europe faces the
problems of securing natural gas, and possibly oil, from non-Russian
sources — concerning volume only, the USA cannot, and most likely will
not, step in as the sole supplier. (Under the Trump administration, thegoal was to force Gazprom to act as a responsible provider, not to bar
them from the European market.3)
The main Hungarian goal is twofold: to secure the necessary amountof resources to fulfil the needs of the industry (as a side note: risingenergy prices and the war forced the main Hungarian fertiliser producer,
85

Nitrogénművek Zrt, to suspend its operations), and to provide energy
to the population at a reasonable price.4 Tools to achieve these goals
are either connected to EU policies (e.g. enhancing energy efficiency),or are dependent on other 3SI countries.
With regard to natural gas, the literal bottleneck is the transition
capacity of natural gas interconnectors, and their possible
development. In recent years, some planned projects that could haveyielded positive results for Hungarian energy security have been
delayed. One of these projects concerns Hungarian—Romanian energy
cooperation (e.g. enlarging the Romanian—Hungarian interconnector) —due to the ongoing war, its future might bear fruit, but the project’s
development is more in the hands of Bucharest than Budapest. It is notunlikely that the Romanian decision to buy ExxonMobile’s investmentin the Neptun Deep project might be one of the driving factors fordeveloping joint Romanian—Hungarian projects — however, it needsa change in the Romanian approach that, in some instances in recent
years, treated a more prominent Hungarian role as a security threat
to the country.5 Another possible entry point of non-Russian natural
gas to the Hungarian market is likely to be via Poland and Slovakia —once, according to the plans, the Polish—Slovakian interconnector iscompleted in 2022.
However, it is the financial nature of the development of suchprojects that acts as the main question — and affects not only Hungary
but other 3SI members as well. Before the 2022 Russian aggression
in Ukraine, it was a widely shared notion that non-state market actors
are not willing to invest in large infrastructure projects that are aimed
at enhancing energy security. It is not unlikely that the war will change
this approach (the first sign of this is the case of the Alexandroupolis
LNG terminal); however, the issue of enlarging already existing
capacities (e.g. interconnectors) would still be open. It is likely that theenlargement of these interconnectors would be the main subject for
Hungary.
As of May 2022, if the planned and possibly planned investments
are completed in time, the discussion in Hungary concerning energy
security is likely to move from natural gas to oil and nuclear. No matter
how rational the Hungarian government standpoint is on opposing thecomplete and imminent ban of Russian-origin oil in the EU, external
factors (such as a changing EU position that is pointing towards the86complete ban of Russian-origin energy resources) might force the handsof the Hungarian government in the coming years to change its current
approach, and either look for other suppliers or enter a costly processof altering the oil refineries to other type(s) of oil (here, it is not theorigin, but the sulphur content and the density of the oil that matters).
This step, once taken, is likely to limit the available governmental funds
to achieve other goals outside of the realm of energy security.
With reference to energy security and the Hungarian standpoint, adistinction must be made. In recent years, the Hungarian government
could have done more in limiting the country’s exposure to Russianorigin sources — especially regarding the planned expansion of thePaks nuclear power plant whose plans, according to media information,
might be unchanged even in May 2022. However, in realising some ofthese plans, Budapest was heavily reliant on other 3SI members (e.g.
Romania and Croatia). It is likely that the main challenge for Budapest in
coming years will be how to find a balance between needed changes(such as detaching from, some, Russian sources) in a way that would
not hinder the Hungarian economy that was, at least partially, built onenergy-intensive sectors (such as the automotive industry).
It is not unlikely that offsetting these issues might be possible inside
the framework of 3SI; however, in May 2022 there are both external andinternal factors that make it difficult to even assume a possible, growing
level of Hungarian engagement towards the energy pillar of 3SI.

Economic growth and resilience of the 3SI region
Pushing back on Chinese, and to a lesser extent Russian, economic
influence was one goal that decision-makers on both sides of theAtlantic thought 3SI could be used for. Inside the Initiative, the digital
sector became the forefront of limiting Chinese presence in the Central
and Eastern European region — steps taken by 3SI governments inrecent years concerned, inter alia, limiting Huawei and other Chinesecompanies in taking part in the development of 5G networks, andattracting foreign (Western) capital.
This created competition between 3SI members regarding whom
to attract. Companies such as Microsoft or Google, on the other hand,made rational choices regarding where to invest (Poland). 3SI’s overall
87problem was twofold: the underdeveloped nature of 3SIIF as a ‘vessel’for attracting possible investors, and the lack of an external (nonregional) financial source to contribute to building up the resilience ofthe region. In relation to the second factor, the US was first unwilling,
then had reservations to be the sole ‘financial patron’ to the region, andabout providing a Marshall plan-like solution. The 2021 Lithuanian casementioned previously showed not only that ‘blackmailing’ the Biden
administration is possible when it comes to a pushback on China, butthat the step attracts investors who consider Beijing a threat and arewilling to invest in IT and advanced technology (Taiwan).
3SI members, however, all being at the semi-periphery of the EU, areexposed to the same challenges Western EU members are facing — themain difference being the more limited amount of financial resources
available to tackle these problems (e.g. carbon emission reducing,etc.). The 2022 war is likely to lead to the securization of food security,
the return of larger-scale national military spending — all affecting
even theoretical possibilities of economic growth. The main challenge
for 3SI countries is whether they can either invest in high-added value
sectors or find willing investors for the same goal to avoid economic
shrinking and rising inflation. Concerning this, given a more-inward
turning US, it remains an open question whether there is a non-regional
investor that makes a political decision not only to take a firmer stanceagainst Beijing but is ready to invest in the 3SI region. Regarding a‘pure’ business approach, in the course of some Polish-organised
conferences that were dedicated to the future of 3SI, the business side
deemed it key to find investment areas that are resilient to inflation, andare related to metallurgy, for example.
From the 2010s and under the Orbán governments, Hungary chosea path that did not focus on high-added value sector development.
Besides the defence industry, the main area to attract foreign direct
investments was the automotive industry and sectors connected to it,
the main investors originating from Germany and the Republic of Korea.
The picture is complex: publicly available information states that
defence industry R&D capacities will be developed in Hungary, there
are plans to create a super computer cluster, and the creation of
an EV (battery) plant by the Korean company SK Innovation can also
contribute to the country’s economic growth. On the other hand, the2018—2022 Orbán government not only welcomed Huawei in the88

development of the 5G network in Hungary, but signed a memorandumof understanding with said company that involves the digitisationof education, 5G and wired network development, and extends tosolutions related to smart cities. Based on this, it is more than likelythat the Orbán government does not see China a threat in the digital
sector — this is likely to limit the country’s international cooperation visà-vis one of the pillars of 3SI.
As well as IT (and also resulting from the ongoing war), it is likelythat the Hungarian government will have problems with sectors orcompanies that are linked to 3SI’s transport pillar, for example. Twoparticular cases stand out: ISD Dunaferr, the country’s leading steel
manufacturer (that, even before the war, was stuck in a battle overmanagement issues of Russian and Ukrainian circles), and DunakesziJárműjavító, a company that renovates and produces train carriages(the firm is 50% owned by the Russian Transmashholding).
In recent years, the main driving force for attracting foreign direct
investment to Hungary was the large subsidiary schemes the Orbán
government provided that did not consider the origin of the investors
a security risk. It is not likely that the war has changed the general
regional picture, and we might see potential investors who are willingto enhance their regional ties based on the assumption of countering
Russian or Chinese capital in Central and Eastern Europe. On the other
hand, as capital tends to follow rational decisions, these assumptions
might be premature. On the brink of a possible economic recession,for Hungary — a country that invested in building up more industrial
production capacities in recent years than R&D ones — the main
challenge is whether it is possible to attract more high-added value
investments to strategic sectors during times where the country iscompeting with other 3SI members as well.
Linked to a possible economic recession stands the issue of anenhanced Hungarian contribution to 3SIIF. In May 2022, due to thegrowing internal problems of the Hungarian economy (the threatof growing inflation, the possibility of a governmental restructuring
programme), it is unlikely that the Hungarian state budget would be
open towards allocating more funds to the Investment Fund.
Concerning the above-mentioned memorandum of understanding
signed with Huawei, the date of signing (26 October 2021) is particularlyinteresting, as on the same day, Prime Minister Orbán opened the89

last section of the M30 motorway linking the town of Miskolc with
the Hungarian—Slovakian border. With the completion of M30, thefull Hungarian section of Via Carpathia — one of the flagship projectsof the 3SI — has been completed. (It is not unlikely that the sameday announcements show the balancing position of the Hungarian
government between ‘maverick’ policies and regional policies that
Budapest found advantageous to follow.)

Reliable, sustainable and inclusive connectivity
Although participating states do not admit to it, 3SI connectivity
flagship projects, such as the standard-gauge Rail Baltica railway, Via
Carpathia, or the Polish ‘national’ flagship of the Solidarity Transport
Hub airport, are all dual purpose plans serving both commercial andmilitary purposes. Before February 2022, their commercial nature
was highlighted (ensuring the creation of a long-needed north—south
infrastructural axis and linking the Baltic States to Central Europe via
European-gauge rail), but the chances are that the current Russian—
Ukrainian war will affect this approach. The military rationale behind thedevelopment of these project was to ensure first the rapid developmentof troops stationed elsewhere to the region via air (and their equipment
via rail), then their intra-regional rotation mainly via road and rail. If
we examine the rapid US deployment to Poland using the Rzeszów—
Jasionka airfield, or the transport of heavy equipment from Germany
via Poland, Poland becoming a logistical hub for heavy equipment
inbound to Ukraine, the military component is visible.
Concerning the three 3SI pillars, Hungary has done the mostregarding physical infrastructure development, and has completed all
the motorways (along the E71 and E79 European roads) that are all partof Via Carpathia. There is no publicly available indication that Budapest
ever admitted to the military nature of the projects.
Following their completion, it is an open question as to whatplans Budapest could consider starting and completing. Railroad
development projects mainly concern the east side of the country (partsof the main railroad between Budapest and the Hungarian—Ukrainian
border), and the controversial Belgrade—Budapest development
project that utilises Chinese money. (From a security policy perspective,
90

one other problem regarding the latter is that it directly links a NATOmember with its non-NATO counterpart.) As of May 2022, an open
question concerns possible Russian involvement in the developmentof a (cargo) railroad ring around the Hungarian capital — this, however,concerns an east—west development axis.
A May 2022 decision puts the development of the high-speed road
network into the hands of a concession that will be responsible forsystem enlargement for thirty-five years — according to earlier plans thatenvision the development until 2030, another north—south axis linking
Slovakia with Slovenia and Croatia, one corridor linking Budapest
directly with the Hungarian—Croatian border, and two corridors linking
Hungary up with Romania are missing.
Regarding the use of the network for military reasons (and, especiallyin the light of the ongoing Hungarian military reform that envisioned
new equipment, e.g. main battle tanks, that are way heavier than theirpost-Soviet counterparts), one key component is missing: bridge
development — so far, only one complex project has been publicly
announced, in late February 2022 (shortly before the war’s outbreak).
In addition to the government plans to buy back the country’s main
airport located in Budapest, a similar development strategy can beseen concerning the development of regional airports. These plans
are ongoing (in late 2021, sporadic media coverage mentioned the,possible, enlargement of airports in, for example, Debrecen, Pécs,
Békéscsaba), and are likely to be realised either by using Hungarianfunds, or by a combination of national and EU resources.

Geopolitics
Derived from the original goals of 3SI (pushback on malign Russian andChinese influence), the Biden administration’s approach did little to nogood to support cooperation. By shifting resources towards Beijing,
Washington weakened its posture towards Russia, and the US politicalplanning was caught off-guard by the February 2022 war. It is likely that
this renewed interest in Russia will be only temporary (and will last until
Germany finds its new role vis-à-vis both the EU and Central Europe
as well). It is likely that the geopolitical future of 3SI will depend on thefollowing factors:
91• German position towards the region• the future of the European strategic autonomy• the success of Polish foreign and military policies in striving for aregional leader position, at the expense of Germany• the future of Ukraine’s EU membership• larger processes that affect 3SI as a regional cooperation.
With the idea of the Swedish and Finnish NATO accession, it
is not only the regional focus that is shifting towards the north, but
the focus of the planning towards military and hard security issues
as well — something that was not openly attributed to 3SI. Fromthe perspective of a regional balance, Germany’s choice to spend
more on the military goes against Polish interests: Warsaw wants
to attract as much attention to itself and its own (regional) policies
as possible, in a relatively short timeframe that lasts until a possible
German consolidation, and has allocated diplomatic and economic
resources for this goal. However, as of May 2022, the role of 3SI in
Polish foreign policy is seemingly unclear: as a ‘low-hanging fruit’, thetopic was not openly mentioned during President Biden’s Warsaw
visit, raising some questions about the perseverance of high-level
political support towards the Initiative (however, in Polish—Croatianand Polish—Romanian inter-governmental discussions, the issue waspresent). Concerning strategic autonomy, it is not only the military
dimension that matters, but the industrial capacity (chemical industry
and other heavily energy dependent sectors included), and R&D. In
the end, at least a good part of the questions would boil down totackling financial issues — including a Ukrainian EU accession process
that, upon completion, would lead to EU funds channelled to Kyiv,
possibly limiting the budget of other EU goals.
Concerning Budapest, a myriad of external factors affects, or withgood probability will affect, the national standpoint. Hungary’s position
towards the geopolitical aspect can be described from two angles: astrategic level one (including relations with the US, Russia, and China),
and from a regional one. In the case of the former, Hungarian—US
relations have been deteriorating since the Biden administration
assumed office, and it is not unlikely that the level of cooperation
will stay at the same level as it currently is. On the other hand, there
is no public indication in early May 2022 that the elected Orbán
government will cease the level of economic engagement with China,
92and discussions concerning the future role of Russia in the Hungarian
economy are also exposed — due to Hungary’s EU membership — toexternal factors.
As an EU member, Hungarian foreign policy and foreign policy
planning need to find answers to all these questions, the mostimportant of which concerns regional policy as envisioned by Budapest
in the coming years. With the discussion turning towards military issues,
Hungarian regional policy suffered a dire setback: the Visegrád Group(V4), the main regional format for Budapest, is unable to handle military
security issues. An additional issue for Budapest is that in recent years,
V4 became the regional cooperation for the Orbán-led governments,
leaving little room for others (such as 3SI).
Due to the war, Hungary — at least partially — needs to redesign
both its regional policy and Hungarian—Polish bilateral relations. In
the coming years, due to the rotational presidency and the end of the
Hungarian tenure in mid-2022, Hungary will have limited opportunities
to actively steer V4 towards certain directions, and the fate of theorganisation will be more in the hands of a Slovak, a Czech, and a Polishpresidency. Moreover, Hungary must meet with a Poland that, since
February 2022, has started to play on a larger international field — asof May 2022, it is unclear what consequences this will have for 3SI. It is
not unlikely that if Warsaw decides to continue promoting 3SI, one ofthe possible Hungarian steps to ease bilateral issues between the twocountries could be an enhanced role in the framework.
The issue of Ukraine consists yet another problem for Hungarian
foreign policy. The matter is twofold, and extends not only to theunsolved problems of the Hungarian community in Ukraine but toBudapest’s communication (and the difference between actions andcommunication) vis-à-vis the ongoing war.6 No matter how long a
possible Ukrainian EU accession would be, should it be completed,
it would by definition bring forward questions for 3SI as well. So
far, only a small handful of 3SI projects have considered Ukraine
as a participating state. As of 2022, there is no experience as to theenlargement of 3SI: no formal procedures, no deadlines, and more
importantly no publicly available plans as to how to involve the‘newcomer’ into projects that are already running, or how to handle
its possible accession to 3SIIF (taking into account all previously
mentioned issues in regard to the financial organisation). Given the93general state of Hungarian—Ukrainian relations, a unanimous decision
concerning the Ukrainian 3SI membership seems to be more unlikely
than likely.
Another open question for Budapest is how to reassess relations
with the EU. Putting aside topics related to Russia, two issues stand out:
the future of German—Hungarian (economic and political) relations, anda possible change in the EU foreign policy decision-making process.
Given the presence and proportion of German capital in Hungary, it
is likely that the former would play a role in formulating Budapest’s
standpoint towards 3SI; the latter — if implemented — does not concern
the coalition-building capacities of the Hungarian diplomacy, but could
limit Budapest’s foreign policy vis-à-vis external, non-European actors.

Conclusions and recommendations
As of May 2022, writing about a possible future for 3SI is difficult, mainly
for three reasons. The 3SI was created as an operational level framework
derived from assessing the strategic level (great power competition
between the US, Russia, and China) and with the aim of finding regional
solutions that could be fitted into a larger framework. 3SI, however, wasinsufficiently backed by tactical decisions and steps (such as resource
allocation for 3SIIF). The 2022 Russian—Ukrainian war showed that the
future of the Initiative would be at least partially dependent on answers
given to external threats. Before the 2022 Rīga 3SI summit, it is unclear
whether (1) the renewed US interest in Russia would be permanent —but it is more likely to be temporary; (2) how a possible Swedish andFinnish NATO accession would change the operational frameworkof the region (the semi-periphery would grow, regional centre ofgravity would definitely move north; in addition to hard security issues
becoming more important); or (3) the financial issues and 3SIIF-related
open questions would be resolved by 3SI member states. A remaining
open question concerns whether, under a Russian and Chinese threat,a foreign investor would make an investment decision that is based
not solely on economic factors but political as well (such as Taiwan
in the Lithuanian case) — if so, answering the last point is likely to beeasier. However, after the US infrastructure bill passed, the pool of suchpotential investors became smaller.
94

At the crossroads of these three factors is the Polish standpoint.
Warsaw, as a creator and a staunch supporter of 3SI, needs to decide
whether to grow its ambition level towards the Initiative — there is noclear indication for this.
For Hungary — a country that has been historically closer to being
an adopter than an initiator, and a member state whose foreign policy
was at least partially built on joining an initiative to avoid being leftout — the main challenge concerns general foreign policy planning.
During previous Orbán-led governments, Budapest’s foreign
policy was good at making tactical decisions, but it was difficult toanalyse these steps from a strategic level. This flexible approach
generally allowed Budapest to craft another line in foreign policy intimes of need. In February 2022, the Hungarian tactical-to-strategic
perspective clashed with top-down planning, leaving Hungarian
foreign policy at a standstill — in regard to its future involvement invarious regional cooperations (hence the uncertainty about V4’s
future), and in finding answers to developments threatening the verybasis of Hungarian foreign and domestic policy (e.g. the possibilityof upholding Russia as a key energy supplier to Hungary, or relations
with the EU).
The new, fifth Orbán government was formed in late May 2022, andopted for a structure that divided economy and energy-related issues
between various resorts. 3SI-related topics could be easily fitted into
the portfolio of at least three separate ministries. Until the structure
starts working, it should not be expected that the new Hungarian
government would decide on emphasising 3SI. Concerning internal
factors, given the general stance of the Hungarian economy and macroeconomic indicators, it is unlikely that Budapest will allocate morefinancial resources for 3SIIF. On the other hand, some government
plans that have been publicised point towards the development ofelements (e.g. airfield development) that can be fitted into (and not
driven by) a 3SI framework.
Yet another issue is the attractiveness of the Hungarian economy
in the eyes of foreign investors. Past experience shows that businessdecisions made in relation to Hungary were made on an economic (andnot on a political) basis. An open question remains as to the future of(1) Russian capital already present in the country, and (2) the alreadyannounced Hungarian—Chinese joint investments.
95

It is likely, therefore, that an external dimension will be the main
deciding factor in Hungary’s future approach towards 3SI areas ofcooperation — and not necessarily towards the cooperation itself.
Budapest has completed minimum goals inside 3SI’s connectivity pillar,
never deeply shared 3SI’s geopolitical approach, and upheld energy
and economic ties with Russia and China. It is possible that Budapest
will allocate resources to solve issues concerning energy security, but
mostly out of necessity. It is not unlikely that the rapid (and, to someextent, short-sighted) change in EU policies7 towards Russia would
force Budapest to allocate resources to solve energy security issues.
However, as Hungary is a landlocked country, some steps are only
possible if its 3SI neighbours (Romania and Croatia) share the same
goals, and are ready to cooperate with each other.
In light of all these (for instance the most likely presence ofcompeting interest groups/ministries inside the government, a myriadof external, pressing factors ahead of Hungarian foreign policy, a nonclear future for Hungarian regional policy, a foreign policy approachthat so far has lacked a hard security aspect), it is basically impossible
to give recommendations. However, in the shadow of the Russian—
Ukrainian war, it would be still a desirable path to rework Hungariancore documents such as the National Security Strategy — once it iscompleted, it is possible to develop a comprehensive, standalone
regional foreign policy strategy. This could aim at finding answers anddeveloping scenarios inter alia for the Visegrád Group or for 3SI. A
follow-up recommendation concerns this regional approach: work on
scenarios that assume (1) the devaluation of the Visegrád Group in the
mid-term; (2) the need to find an ‘alternative’ regional format for the V4.
May 2022 events concerning the sixth sanctions package (the futureof Russian oil and natural gas on the EU market) showed that the issue
of energy security is becoming the key priority for Budapest. In thelight of governmental communication over the issue, it must be noted,
however, that the reasons behind this mainly concern domestic politicalreasons.

96

ENDNOTES
Biden, J.R. Jr. 03.2021. US National Security Strategic Guidance. Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC1v2.pdf
2Khakova, O. 10.10.2019. Transatlantic energy cooperation gains momentum at thesecond P-TEC ministerial. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/
new-atlanticist/transatlantic-energy-cooperation-gains-momentum-at-the-secondp-tec-ministerial/
3
Background talk with a US Department of Energy representative. 2019. Washington
DC.
4‘Rezsicsökkentés’ (‘utility cost reduction’) provides e.g. gas and electricity at apredefined price for non-industrial consumers — the difference between this price andthe actual one being paid from the state budget.
5
Besides the role of the Romanian off-shore law (the same whose faultiness led
ExxonMobile to leave the country), it is likely that the Romanian press was keen on
putting pressure on Romanian governments as to ‘whom to sell national resources’.
6
In short, it is really hard to find common ground between Budapest’s communicationand the actual actions done by Hungarian institutions. The Hungarian politicalcommunication stressed that the country is unwilling to let its own airspace and land be
used to the transport of lethal weapons (the governmental decree [1120/2022. (III. 7.)
Korm. határozat] allows these transports to other EU and NATO member countries).
Without the electricity system regulator MAVIR Ukraine would not and could not havejoined ENTSO-E.
7
No matter how understandable the EU’s approach to limit payments to an aggressor
Russia, European institutions should also work on ensuring the feasibility of European
industry and industrial output.
197

Latvia: Engagement in the Three Seas
Initiative and prioritising geopolitics
Imants Lieģis

There is a popular Latvian saying that could be attributed to Latvia’s
participation in the Three Seas Initiative (3SI): ‘ne mana cūka, ne mana
druva’, which means ‘it’s not my pig, nor my crop’. In other words,‘I don’t have a dog in the fight’ and therefore ‘it doesn’t concern me andI won’t get involved’. This Latvian phrase characterises Latvia’s initial
engagement in the 3SI. The idea to establish this new forum was firstpromoted by the Polish and Croatian presidents on the eve of the UN
General Assembly meeting in New York in September 2015. Latvia’sforeign minister attended that first event along with other presidents
and ministers from twelve European Union (EU) countries from the
Adriatic, Black and Baltic Sea regions.
A disinterested engagement was reflected by the level of attendanceat the first summit launching the 3SI in Dubrovnik in 2016. Latvia wasrepresented by the director of the Transit Policy Department of the
Ministry of Transport at what was, after all, supposed to be a meeting ofheads of state. The ‘wait and see’ approach meant that Latvia’s interestat the start appears to have been derisory. Given that the follow-on
summit in Warsaw in 2017 secured the attendance of president Trump,not surprisingly the president of Latvia also showed up. The annual
event saw the Latvian level of representation again drop to that offoreign minister at the Bucharest Summit in 2018, although in parallel
Latvia began eyeing the importance of the economic dimension of 3SI
by signing a memorandum of understanding on the establishment of
the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund (3SIIF) along with five othercountries.
A national coordination group for the 3SI at Latvia’s Ministry ofForeign Affairs was established only in September 2020 with the aimof giving recommendations about and organising Latvia’s engagementin the 3SI, and coordinating Latvian interests within the initiative.
98Latvia’s involvement has, since then, matured sufficiently to result in
Rīga hosting a 3SI Heads of State Summit and Business Forum in June
2022, with a Civil Society Forum taking place in May. Following an
initiative from Latvia’s Saeima (Parliament), a Parliamentary Forum of
3SI members of parliament and like-minded countries will also run inparallel to the Summit and Business Forum. These events now offer aplatform for Latvia to display its interests in this regional initiative, makeuse of the opportunities offered by 3SI and deal with current challenges
faced by the region and beyond.
Virtually no regional or global organisation in Europe has been left
unscathed by Russia’s eight-year war against Ukraine developing intoa full-scale military assault against the whole country on 24 February
2022. The 3SI is no exception. The fact that seven of the twelve 3SI
countries border either Russia or Ukraine means that ongoing brutal
war has inevitably affected the agenda. Therefore, for the purposeof this paper, the current 3SI objectives offering opportunities andchallenges for Latvia will be considered in four groups as follows:
1. geopolitics
2. economic growth, regional resilience and investments
3. energy security
4. reliable, sustainable and inclusive connectivity.
There are no clear dividing lines amongst these four areas, but thereis rather an overlap and blurring of such lines of separation.

Geopolitics
The first priority for the 7th 3SI Summit and Business Forum in Rīga isstated as being ‘high-level US participation’. This itself is an indicationthat Latvia regards the 3SI primarily as a geopolitical project. America,
Germany and the European Commission have partner status in 3SI.
Germany’s President Steinmeier is due to attend the summit in Rīga.
President Trump attended the second 3SI Summit in Warsaw in 2017. The
Latvian Foreign and Security Policy Yearbook 2022 also recommends
a strong push by Latvia’s Foreign Ministry to ensure the presence ofPresident Biden at the Rīga 3SI Summit given that ‘whilst China remains
the main strategic challenge, it is Russia that continues to pose thebiggest threats to Europe and Europe’s Euro-Atlantic partners’.1
99Latvia’s foreign policy has, since 1991, been grounded in engaging
US interests in Latvia. Latvia considers that the 3SI is primarily apolitically inspired platform with the US being the main strategic
partner. Since 2004 and accession to NATO, the main tool to retain
US interests has indeed been in the defence and security sector
through the transatlantic link of the Alliance. Hence the 3SI is currently
being used as an additional tool to engage the US, as reflected in thefollowing quote: ‘Latvia’s priorities in the context of cooperation with
the United States remain unchanged: strengthening of the US militarypresence in the region, promotion of cooperation in the digital andtechnology field, as well as a more active US involvement in the Three
Seas Initiative’.2
Strengthening European national security and its ties to the US
through the 3SI has also been acknowledged as being of relevance tothe US. A Congressional Research paper points out that ‘In November
2020, the House of Representatives passed a bipartisan resolution“expressing support of the Three Seas Initiative in its efforts toincrease energy independence and infrastructure connectivity thereby
strengthening the United States and European national security”(H.Res. 672, 116th Congress)’.3 The mutual interests of the 3SI and the
US will not necessarily secure the highest US level of attendance — thepresence of President Biden — at the Rīga Summit on 20—21 June. It
seems unlikely that he would spend ten days in Europe, given that hewill undoubtedly attend the NATO Summit in Madrid on 29—30 June.
The president would be more likely to combine his trip to Europe witha visit to Kiev following the visits by his Secretaries of State Blinken andDefence Austin to Ukraine on 24 April and the First Lady on 8 May. Thisessentially means that Latvia will have been pushing for the presence atthe 3SI Summit of either Vice President Kamala Harris or, at a minimum,
Secretary of Commerce Gina M. Raimondo.
Latvia’s foreign minister has also stated that ‘the Three Seas
Initiative creates better preconditions for the region’s security’.4 This
year, regional security would be given an extra focus by the presenceof Ukraine’s President Zelensky in Rīga. He has formally been invited
to attend in person. If Russia’s war is still in an active phase, he would
clearly not attend, but join online. Because the 3SI consists only of
EU member states, Ukraine’s push for EU candidate status, strongly
supported by Latvia, could again be highlighted at the Rīga Summit,
100

even if the membership aspirations are replaced instead by decisions
about the renewal of post-war Ukraine. Especially as the EU Commissionis also a partner of 3SI and will be represented in Rīga by the Executive
Vice President Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis.
Irrespective of the ongoing war, there have been pre-existinggeopolitical or ‘politically inspired’ interests surrounding the 3SI
since its inception which extend over and above engaging the US. It
is pertinent to be reminded of these in considering Latvia’s interests.
One of them is the promotion of a stronger north—south coalition as acounterbalance to the Franco-German ‘motor’ which is often perceived
with negative connotations, particularly relating to French ambitions
surrounding EU sovereignty and Germany’s overreliance on gas
supplies from Russia through the Nord Stream pipelines. Both of these
aspects have been affected by Russia’s war in Ukraine. With the reelection of President Macron for a further five-year term, his ambitions
for greater EU sovereignty will continue to be promoted by France.
Germany has halted the finalisation of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline
and is working on a reduction of reliance on energy supplies from
Russia in concert with EU partners, but at a politically reduced pace.
Germany is formally a partner of 3SI; France is not, but has been invited
to attend the summit. Whilst many EU policies cannot be advanced
without agreement by the Franco-German motor, Latvia has not shiedfrom expressing opposition to greater EU autonomy in defence, or to
the Russian—German Nord Stream project. Nor has Latvia shied fromdirect contacts with German and French partners, as noted by the
anticipated presence of President Steinmeier at the summit and theinvitation extended to France’s foreign minister to attend. The levelof French attendance is in doubt given elections and the process of achange of government. The 3SI can certainly be used as a forum to clip
the wings of attempts to maintain dependency on Russia or attempts tolessen US and transatlantic engagement in the defence of Europe.
Poland, as the sixth largest EU country by territory and fifth largest
by population, also has regional ambitions which may not always tallywith the interests of Latvia. No doubt in formulating and announcing
the idea of the 3SI in 2015, the year of their taking up office, Poland’s
President Andrzej Duda and President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović of
Croatia had both domestic considerations and geopolitical aspirations
in mind. Hence, perhaps, the initial caution by Latvia to fully engage.
101

From a geopolitical, strategic and security perspective, Poland plays aparticularly crucial role within the Baltic Sea part of the 3SI region. Thisis based on its history of over one thousand years (e.g. former Empire
together with Lithuania; founder of the Solidarity resistance movementin the Cold War) and geography (Baltic Sea country with a land borderwith Germany, Ukraine, Russia (Kaliningrad), Belarus, Slovakia andCzech Republic). 3SI was established in 2016 during turbulent years,
given the Brexit referendum in the summer of 2016 and the electionof controversial President Trump in the US in November 2016. Poland’s
government since 2015 has been dominated by the Law and Justice
Party. Labelled as ‘populist’, it has crossed swords with the EU overthe compatibility of EU law with Polish law and related issues about EU
funding for Poland.5
From a Latvian perspective, whilst the Polish endeavours toenhance the transatlantic link (as illustrated by Trump’s presence at the
Warsaw Summit) can be viewed positively, there could be concernsthat Poland’s regional ambitions and spats with Brussels could havenegative consequences in the EU context. But such negative elements
are being overshadowed this year by Poland’s crucial and laudable rolein helping Ukraine on the political, military and refugee front.
China has also figured as a factor in the development of the 3SI, to theextent that it can serve as a counterbalance to the influence of China’s
financial infrastructure investments and diplomatic assertivenessthrough the Belt and Road Initiative. This has been noted by the US.6
In spite of a large overlap between China’s 17+1 format (engaging
mostly Central and East European partners) with the 3SI countries,
the original flirting between the two initiatives has subsided since theinitial contacts, when China was invited to, and indeed represented at,the 3SI Summit. The 17+1 format has recently been reduced to 16+1
with the departure of Lithuania and indications are that EU participants
within this format may prefer henceforth to rely more on dealing with
China at a full EU 27+1 level.
Latvia’s position about relations with China has at times been
ambivalent, for example, with attempts to develop transport services
going east along the China—Europe land transport route.7 But dreams
about China’s investments in Latvia’s infrastructure, culminating in the
Chinese prime minister’s presence in Rīga in 2016, have since evaporated.
Funds from Latvia which were due to be allocated to projects with China
102

were switched to the 3SIIF. Today’s orientation seems firmly anchoredin a pro-US approach towards China, with a focus moving away fromallowing any foothold for China in Latvia. As illustrated, there are othergeopolitical factors affecting the agenda of the 3SI meetings in Rīga.
An interesting counterbalance to China is emerging in view of potential
participants at the summit from Japan. Canada’s foreign minister has
been invited so as to firm up the transatlantic link, especially bearing
in mind Canada’s lead role in the NATO Enhanced Forward Presencebattalion based in Latvia. Hence Latvia is expanding the interests of likeminded countries to this regional format.

Economic growth, regional resilience and investments
Latvia’s foreign ministry, in non-public working documents has
indicated that, from the very beginning, Latvia has supported thecreation of the Initiative’s economic dimension. This dimension isentrenched in the 3SIIF, which complements EU financial strategies andsupports priorities in the fields of climate, green mobility, transport,
digitalisation and energy. Rather than from ‘the very beginning’, it
would perhaps be more accurate to say ‘since 2018’ when, as alreadymentioned, Latvia was one of six 3SI countries signing up to theestablishment of the 3SIIF. To date, two of the six (Czech Republic andSlovakia) have not committed funding, whereas Latvia agreed on a
20-million-euro commitment, the majority of which has been paid in.
Last year, Latvia’s foreign minister recalled that the 3SI region
experienced a set-back in its development during the Cold War, when
the infrastructure and economy were weakened and depleted.8 This
seems to indicate that Latvia views the 3SI as an additional economic
instrument within the EU to counter the effects of the Cold War. From
today’s perspective, it seems apparent that the primary focus will be
on EU instruments and funds to alleviate the negative effects of twocrises. EU money will be utilised to the maximum, firstly, to assist withrecovery from the Covid-19 pandemic and, secondly, to deal with theconsiderable economic consequences flowing from Russia’s ongoing
war against Ukraine.
Latvia’s current economic priorities within 3SI are reflected in
the information about the summit, where the following aspects
103are highlighted: a) strengthening a genuine EU level cohesion andresilience of the region; b) development of projects in the region
that promote sustainable connectivity of infrastructure as well as
economic growth; c) attracting public and private investments for thedevelopment of the region’s connectivity.9 The prospects for goodlong-term investments for businesses were also stressed by Latvia’spresident in November last year when speaking at EXPO2020 Dubai,
at a special meeting devoted to the 3SI Summit and Business Forum.10
Moreover, Latvia is actively pitching for US investors to participate in
the Business Forum, according to Latvia’s ambassador in Washington.11
The primary vehicle for investing in large regional infrastructure
projects is the 3SIIF. The fund has been created and is run by the Amber
Infrastructure Group in London, with the Latvian financial development
institution Altum12 representing Latvia within the consortium. Altum isinterested in ensuring that investment projects for the fund are viable
and sustainable, and not based on ‘wishful thinking’. This applies asmuch to Latvian projects as those from other 3SI countries.
Established in 2019 with an initial commitment of 500 million euro
from development banks in Poland and Romania, the fund was set
up as a financial platform for developing infrastructure projects inthe energy, transport and digital communication sectors, in orderto promote economic growth and cooperation prospects within theregion. 3SI members have pledged around 1 billion euro to the fund.
The Trump administration has also pledged up to $1 billion in support,
but payments into the fund have yet to be finalised. In February
2021, a bipartisan group of members of the US Congress urged
the Biden administration to continue the previous administration’s
pledged financial support for the 3SI and called on the approved$300 million investment to be finalised. The summit in Rīga will
provide an opportunity for that investment to be finalised. Apart fromstrengthening cooperation and improving infrastructure within theregion, the fund’s goal is to provide profit to its investors. Professional
and independent entities are responsible for the fund’s investment
process.
Institutions representing the Three Seas countries, international
financial institutions and private investors from all over the world areable to invest in the fund. It is estimated that the fund will ultimately
have at its disposal from 3 to 5 billion euro, investing in projects worth104

a total of up to 100 billion euro. The 3SIIF funds are complementary to
public money and EU funds.13 Latvia has pledged 20 million euro, of
which part has been paid. Three countries — Austria, Czech Republicand Slovakia — have not yet pledged to pay into the fund. Rīga
organised a fund conference in February 2020, with representatives
from 3SI countries teaming up with Latvian governmental and businesscolleagues. Clearly, the planned Business Forum will present an
opportunity to focus on Latvia’s eight projects submitted to the fund,namely:1. Rail Baltica
2. Development of a wind farm project
3. Introduction of smart outdoor lighting technologies
4. Development and implementation of mobility solutions
5. Construction of a part of the Via Baltica project
6. Construction of a coastal liquified natural gas terminal
7. Development of cross-border optical fibre network
8. Development of cross-border network of data centres.
None of these projects from Latvia have yet been operationalised
or granted finance by the Amber Infrastructure Group. Two projects
from Poland (transport) and Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Slovakia(sustainable energy) are currently up and running, with a third from
Estonia (digital infrastructure) pending. At the 3SI Summit, Latvia will
be endeavouring to obtain payment (or pledges) by all 3SI countries
into the investment fund, ensure the payment pledged by the US
materialises and push to attract private investments into the fund.
Other like-minded countries will also no doubt be lobbied to invest in
the fund, with an interest from Japan already having been expressed.

Energy security
Although the 3SI was established, amongst other things, to reduce
connectivity gaps in the energy sector, it seems doubtful that it can
provide added value in the short-term situation when the question ofEurope’s dependency on energy from Russia has become so acute.
Indeed, Russia’s escalatory war may turn out to be a blessing in disguiseto cut off the supplier whose income has been used to fund the brutal
military actions against Ukraine. For Latvia and other 3SI countries,105

it is the crisis of war itself, rather than the existence of 3SI, that haspresented an opportunity not to be missed to achieve greater energy
independence.
As noted already, two of the eight Latvian projects submitted to the
3SIIF relate to the energy sector — developing a wind farm project andbuilding a liquified natural gas (LNG) terminal. Neither of these projects
have become operational within the Amber Infrastructure Group, which
manages the fund. What are the opportunities and challenges within
3SI in the energy sector? Efforts to increase energy independence are
crucial to the region as a whole and Latvia in particular. Latvia has beenpurchasing some 90% of its gas from Russia. In line with EU sanctions
and the clear need to diversify, the Latvian Parliament recently voted to
ban Russian gas supplies completely by 1 January 2023.14
Latvia has been slow in reducing its dependency on Russian gas
and only now is pushing ahead with decisions about building its
own LNG terminal. There have been estimates indicating that such aterminal could be ready no earlier than the summer of 2023, which initself may prove to be an unrealistic and unattainable time frame. The
government is in the process of deciding where such a terminal should
be located and who will construct it. Any shortfall during this transition
period is likely to be accessed via the existing Lithuanian LNG terminal,or the one scheduled to be built this year at Paldiski in Estonia.
Doubts have been expressed about the need for Latvia to construct
an LNG terminal, which could become a ‘stranded asset’ within adecade, given the need to move towards renewable energy supplies
during a time frame when there will also be a reduced requirement
for gas. There are also estimates that the Klaipėda LNG terminal couldin fact supply 80% of the gas needs of all three Baltic countries. Prior
to upcoming elections in October 2022, there may be pressure fromsome quarters in the current Latvian government to push ahead with
the LNG project in Skulte, which has been on the agenda for a numberof years. It would be preferable to consider alternatives, but if the
project is pursued, it should be solely on a commercial basis without
any government financial support, so as to avoid the Latvian taxpayer
having to fund it. In the long term, it seems more logical to opt forprioritising the wind farm project within the 3SI.
Infrastructure and the source of supply are issues that require
urgent attention and are being prioritised in the lead-up to the106

3SI Summit. The Latvian president’s participation with his Lithuanianand Polish counterparts at the official opening ceremony of the Gas
Interconnection Poland—Lithuania (GIPL) linking the Polish grid witha route to Lithuania’s LNG terminal on 5 May 2022 indicates how
politically significant supply routes have become for the region with theprevailing need to ‘break free of Russia’s influence’.15
Although the UK is not formally a partner of the 3SI, there areunconfirmed reports about the attendance of Foreign Secretary Trussat the meetings in Rīga with indications about the UK interest in using
the summit to promote the use of nuclear energy as another option toachieve energy security. Whilst the question about nuclear energy has
not surfaced on the political agenda in Latvia, the presence of the UK
Foreign Secretary at the summit would be a welcome addition.
Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine has given the necessary impetus
for Latvia to urgently improve the situation in energy security. Latvia
was ‘pushed’, but did not ‘jump’ at previous chances to voluntarily
reduce dependency on Russia. This was probably due to pressure
being exerted on previous Latvian governments by former politicians(e.g. former Prime Minister Aigars Kalvītis) and others who took up lead
positions in energy companies which represented Russian interests.
Internal political decisions about alternative supplies and the switch torenewables lie ahead. Given the external and independent assessmentof infrastructure projects within the 3SIIF, the opportunity to focus more
on renewable supplies through 3SI should be utilised. This approachties in to EU policies to reduce dependency on fossil fuels. Such a longterm choice would help to strengthen the Latvian economy as well as
making it more stable and predictable. An increase in north—south
infrastructure within the 3SI could help Latvia reduce geopoliticalvulnerabilities because of the heritage of links to the East.

Reliable, sustainable and inclusive connectivity
At the beginning of the year during the annual foreign policy debate
in the Latvian Parliament, Latvia’s foreign minister acknowledged that
‘The Three Seas Initiative was established in order to develop important
infrastructure projects and reduce connectivity gaps in the energy,transport and digital communication sectors on the north—south axis
107

of the European Union’.16 The brief mention of the 3SI Summit andBusiness Forum in Rīga was made towards the very end of the minister’s
address to Parliament.
The opportunities and challenges from improved connectivity
within the 3SI region of some 110 million inhabitants offer the chance
to untap the continuing potential for economic growth. The 3SI virtual
summit organised by Estonia in 2020 emphasised the concept of smart
connectivity through expanding digital components for infrastructure
in energy and transport.17
Energy security, as discussed already, is an intrinsic part ofconnectivity. How else is Latvia tapping into any other opportunities for
economic growth through greater connectivity? Latvia’s connectivity
begins with our neighbours to the north and south. Latvia’s
geographical location between Estonia and Lithuania has meant thatconnectivity through Baltic cooperation is part of Latvia’s DNA. It alsomeans that this is a value to be offered to partners further afield in the
3SI area. Latvia needs to use its current positive engagement to reachout to the partners with whom we have been less connected. Transport
connectivity with, for example, Romania and Bulgaria is poor. Romania
and Bulgaria do not have embassies based in Rīga, just as Latvia is notpresent on the spot in Bucharest or Sofia. The 3SI gives an opportunity
to connect directly with the Visegrád countries individually, at a time
when Visegrád as a four-country entity is confronted with internal
problems.
In the run-up to the 3SI Summit, US chambers of commerce in Latvia
and Bulgaria teamed up with Digital Poland and Google to host a digitalconference on 28 April 2022. It highlighted the need to cooperate in thedigital area, boost cross-border connectivity and secure smart energy,transport and digital networks.18 A further focus on connectivity took
place with an event organised by the Latvian and Polish embassies
in London on 12 May promoting business opportunities in filling thenorth—south connectivity gap in the energy, transport and digital
sectors and engaging the 3SIIF.19
One of Latvia’s priority projects in 3SI is Rail Baltica, where rail
connectivity is the order of the day and offers opportunities forconnectivity and economic growth. The UK—France Eurotunnel andthe Oresund bridge linking Sweden and Denmark are examples ofprojects producing vibrant regional economic benefits which were108

not necessarily evident during the planning stages. Rail Baltica itself
has been bedevilled by management problems, with the three Baltic
countries failing to allow an independent, professional structure to leadthe project and stand above national interests. The Rail Baltica elementfrom Latvia that has been submitted to 3SI relates to the Salaspils
freight terminal. There seem to be doubts about whether this projectwill gain funding from the 3SIIF. The project may well lack soundeconomic justification as it envisaged linking the east—west rail androad connections with Rail Baltica’s north—south connection. It is notclear that Salaspils is perceived as being a hub/logistics centre which
attracts interest beyond Latvia’s borders. Circumstances today meanthat both rail and road freight between Latvia and Russia will continue
to diminish, thereby placing in doubt the commercial prospects for
combining the east—west and north—south routes through Salaspils.
The Salaspils project has also failed to attract private investments
during almost the last ten years, which presumably would make itunattractive to potential investors looking for profits within the 3SIIF.
The inherent difficulties surrounding Rail Baltica may well handicap
the project in its attempts to gain additional financial support from the
3SIIF.

Conclusions and recommendations
Continuing to engage the US in the 3SI must remain as a priority.
Latvia needs to make full use of the 3SI as a forum that rejects
attempts to maintain dependency on Russia or attempts to lessen
US and transatlantic engagement in the defence of Europe. Given
the multiplicity and variety of interest and issue-based groupings
within the EU, Latvia will not need to emphasise that 3SI is a type ofcounterbalance to the Franco-German motor. Bearing in mind themixed geopolitical messages coming out of Berlin, Latvia will need tocarefully nurture Germany’s partnership with the 3SI.
Poland’s role as a strategic regional actor that strengthens thetransatlantic security link, forms part of NATO’s eastern flank with theBaltic states and supports Ukraine means that Latvia must continue to
use the 3SI as a tool for supporting Poland’s regional role. Latvia should
help to ensure that Ukraine stays on the 3SI agenda in the short term,
109especially given Ukraine’s location as a crucial Black Sea country andits expressed interest in joining the group. Ukraine could be offered atype of special partnership status to 3SI, given that membership itself isconfined to EU members.
Latvia needs to get the acceptance of support for Latvian projects
by the 3SIIF. The Latvian taxpayer may well want to know what returns
Latvia will receive from the 20-million-euro investment into the fund.
Altum should continue with its strong engagement with the fund. If thesummit fails to secure the finalisation of the $300 million US investment
and to obtain payment (or pledges) by all 3SI countries into theinvestment fund, these outstanding matters must be further pursued
by Latvia. Latvia should also continue with efforts to encourage likeminded countries (Japan, the UK) to invest in the fund.
Given the urgency to pursue a policy of reducing regional energy
dependency on Russia, Latvia can use the 3SIIF as an additional financial
instrument to achieve this goal. Instead of focusing on the constructionof an LNG terminal, the use of which could become redundant within adecade, Latvia needs to instead focus on developing renewable energy
supplies within 3SI. Opportunities for reducing reliance on fossil fuels
through 3SI projects will need to dovetail with EU policies and financial
resources. In the long term, it seems more logical that Latvia opts
for prioritising the wind farm project within the 3SI. The LNG project
should only be pushed ahead if it is a commercially viable projectthat the Latvian taxpayer avoids subsidising. Moreover, Latvia needs
to pursue a positive engagement of connectivity with the less wellknown partners within 3SI, such as Romania and Bulgaria. Diminishingeast—west connectivity needs to be further replaced with north—south connectivity, where the 3SI offers clear political and economic
opportunities.
Latvia has successfully broadened the outreach and expanded theboundaries of 3SI to encompass civil society and the parliamentary
dimension. The parliamentary and civil elements must stay focused on
the priorities relating to economic improvements for the region rather
than being bogged down by other aspects. An indicator of success at
the Rīga meetings may relate to the payments into the 3SIIF by member
countries and the US. The regional and geopolitical relevance of the
3SI will continue to be enhanced as a result of Russia’s expanded war
against Ukraine.
110Latvia has recently used all available resources through the
President’s Chancery, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Altum to lobby
the 3SI agenda both in North America and Europe. The recent impetus
for Latvia’s greater involvement and commitment to 3SI appears tohave come from President Levits, who no doubt appreciated the apt
description of this format — ‘politically inspired, commercially driven’.
Rather than waiting to see how 3SI develops further, he realised that
there were advantages to be gained by Latvia from the commerciallydriven element. Latvia now has ‘a dog in the fight’ of the 3SI and, as
shown by the events organised in Rīga in May and June 2022, is fully
engaged. ‘Ne mana cūka, ne mana druva’ no longer applies to Latvia’s
approach to the 3SI.
ENDNOTESLieģis I., 2022. How Will Latvia Hande the Cocktail of Threats, Inattention and France in
2022? In: Broka, S., Sprūds, A. ed. Latvian Foreign and Security Policy, Riga: Hansa Print
Riga, 52. https://lai.lv/publikacijas/latvijas-areja-un-drosibas-politika-gadagramata2022-956?get_file=2
2
Rinkēvičs E., eds. 2022. Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In: Broka, S., Sprūds,
A. ed. Latvian Foreign and Security Policy, Riga: Hansa Print Riga, 10. https://lai.lv/
publikacijas/latvijas-areja-un-drosibas-politika-gadagramata-2022-956?get_file=23
Gardling, S. E. and Mix D. E. 2021. The Three Seas Initiatives. Congressional ResearchService. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11547
4
Rinkēvičs, E. 27.01.2022. Speech by Foreign Minister at the Foreign Policy Debate in
the Latvian Parliament (Saeima). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia. https://www.mfa.
gov.lv/en/speech-foreign-minister-foreign-policy-debate-latvian-parliament-saeima
5
Hutton, W. 31.10.2021. The EU Is Locked in a Momentous Fight with Poland. And
the UK Is Backing the Wrong Side. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2021/oct/31/boris-johnson-picked-wrong-side-polands-battle-witheu-over-rule-of-law
6
Gardling, S. E. and Mix D. E. 2021. The Three Seas Initiatives. Congressional ResearchService. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11547
7
Eichmanis, J. 2021. The Three Seas Initiative: Its Future Course. In: Broka, S., Sprūds, A.
ed. Latvian Foreign and Security Policy, Riga: Hansa Print Riga, 52. https://www.liia.lv/
en/publications/latvian-foreign-and-security-policy-yearbook-2021-902?get_file=1
8
Rinkēvičs, E. 27.01.2022. Speech by Foreign Minister at the Foreign Policy Debate in
the Latvian Parliament (Saeima). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia. https://www.mfa.
gov.lv/en/speech-foreign-minister-foreign-policy-debate-latvian-parliament-saeima
9
Three Seas Initiative. 2022. 2022 Summit and Business Forum in Riga. https://3seas.eu/
event/2022-summit-and-business-forum-in-riga
10
Levits, E. 27.11.2021. President of Latvia: EXPO 2020 DUBAI Gives Latvia an Opportunity
to Show Itself to the World. Chancery of the President of Latvia. https://www.president.lv/
en/article/president-latvia-expo-2020-dubai-gives-latvia-opportunity-show-itself-world1

111

Selga, M. 28.04.2022. Panorāma. LSM Official news portal of Latvian Radio and Latvian
Television. Available from: https://ltv.lsm.lv/lv/raksts/28.04.2022-panorama.id259954
12
ALTUM. 2022. Development Finance Institution ALTUM. https://www.altum.lv/en
13
Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund. 2022. Development Finance Institution ALTUM.
Available from: https://www.altum.lv/en/services/Three-Seas-Initiative-InvestmentFund/Three-Seas-Initiative-Investment-Fund/tris-juru-iniciativas-investiciju-fonds/
and Gardling, S. E. and Mix D. E. 2021. The Three Seas Initiatives. Congressional
Research Service. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11547
14
Exiting Russian Gas Market Supported by Latvian Saeima. 31.10.2022. LSM Official
news portal of Latvian Radio and Latvian Television https://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/
saeima/exiting-russian-gas-market-supported-by-latvian-saeima.a454424/
15
President: The Polish-Lithuanian gas interconnection will make a significant
contribution to security for all the Baltic States and Finland. 05.05.2022. Chanceryof the President of Latvia. https://www.president.lv/lv/jaunums/valsts-prezidentspolijas-lietuvas-gazes-starpsavienojums-sniegs-butisku-drosibas-pienesumu-visambaltijas-valstim-un-somijai
16
Rinkēvičs, E. 27.01.2022. Speech by Foreign Minister at the Foreign Policy Debate in
the Latvian Parliament (Saeima). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia. https://www.mfa.
gov.lv/en/speech-foreign-minister-foreign-policy-debate-latvian-parliament-saeima
17
Smart Connectivity. 2022. 2022 Summit and Business Forum in Riga. https://3seas.eu/
about/smart-connectivity
18
Digital Transformation in the 3SI Region Addressing New Challenge. 2022 Summit
and Business Forum in Riga. https://3seas.eu/media/news/digital-transformation-inthe-3si-region-addressing-new-challenge
19
Three Seas Initiative: Business Opportunities in Filling the North-South Connectivity
Gap. 2022. Eventbrite. https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/315340099727?aff=efbneb
11112

Lithuania: The search for synergies
Gediminas Varvuolis, Gediminas Vitkus

In order to understand better Lithuania’s attitude towards the Three
Seas Imitative (3SI) it is necessary to take into account its more general
attitude towards regional integration and subregional cooperation.
Lithuania as a full fledge member of the European Union (EU) is deeplycommitted to the European project. The Lithuanian political elitesees the preservation and strengthening of the Union itself as a vital
national interest. At the same Lithuania is involved in various formats
of subregional cooperation. However country’s attitude towards
subregional cooperation is more selective. At the same time it waspossible to observe rather differentiated behaviour towards different
subregional groupings. In 2021 Lithuania decided to pull out of ’17+1’
bloc in Eastern Europe1. Meanwhile Lithuania’s attitude towards the 3SI
was steadily positive since the very beginning of the Initiative.
This case presents not only practical, but also interesting theoretical
puzzle on the causes, purposes and motivation of involvement ofcertain countries into various subregional structures and how thisinvolvement interacts with the wider regional structures. In orderto solve this puzzle, it is important to agree on theoretical concepts.
Firstly, the hierarchy of these entities should be noted. On the one
hand, there is the EU, as the main regional entity, which has been
entrusted by its member states with a wide range of economic, socialand political tasks and has been given extensive (in some cases evensupranational) powers. On the other hand, it is nevertheless clear thatstates are not fully satisfied with this and still see enough reasons forcreating smaller ‘subregional’ entities, like 3SI, which may pursue some
additional objectives and tasks of interest of the participating states
and which are not fully covered by the main regional entity.
The concepts of ‘regionalism’ and ‘subregionalism’ are quite widelyused and discussed in the research literature. Studies of ‘regionalism’
are more developed. All the literature on European integration can be113considered as part of them. ‘Subregionalism’, on the other hand, is alsoa fairly common term, but according to Shintaro Hamanaka, who has
produced a comprehensive review of the concept of subregionalism,‘the exact meaning of the term, especially how it differs from otherterms, such as regionalism and microregionalism, is unclear’.2
According to the researcher, this is due to the fact that, on a global
scale, it would be difficult to classify all forms of cooperation between
states into ‘regional’ and ‘subregional’. However, relying mainly on the
results of three major previous research projects,3 the author suggests
a distinctive concept of ‘subregionalism’ based on the goals andmotivations of the participating states. Shintaro Hamanaka argues thatthe same variables can be used to identify cases of regionalism andsubregionalism, but their meanings will vary from case to case.4
For the sake of clarity, we will review criteria, linking them closely
to the cases in the EU and the 3SI, which we equate to the cases of‘regionalism’ and ‘subregionalism’ in this context:5• Design of political and economic cooperation. While in the caseof regionalism (EU) the design of the cooperation is defined
exclusively by the member states themselves, in the case of the‘subregional’ 3SI the participants usually refer to the wider EU
project and emphasise the complementarity and synergy of theirinitiative.6• Members or participants. In the case of regionalism, thenumber of participants will always be higher than in the case of
subregionalism. In this case, we have twenty-seven EU countries incontrast to twelve 3SI participants.
• Leading party. In the case of regionalism usually the founding
states execute a lead. EU member states are the real masters of
the Union even if they are using a relatively powerful agent suchas the European Commission. In the case of subregionalism, there
is no such strict clarity. While leadership can continue to be at
the disposal of member states, cooperation could be more open,
involving substate entities, business, civil society, international
institutions or even other ‘external’ states outside regionalorganisation. For instance, in case of the 3SI the participation of
the US is highly welcomed.7• Space with boundary. In the case of regionalism, the boundariesof the structure are defined by the borders of the participating114

member states, as it is in the case of the EU. In the case of
subregionalism the formal borders are less important than thenatural geographical or economic boundaries (e.g. the NordicBaltic group). The geographical dimension of subregionalism
schemes opens up the possibility of participation not only forthe states but also for their constituent components, such as not
the whole of Germany, but the individual German Länder. In thecase of the 3SI, we again have a geographical criterion, as theparticipating states are located in the space between three seas —the Baltic, the Black and the Adriatic.
Thus, bearing in mind all these modalities, the case of Lithuania’s
participation will be examined further in the text. The text will showhow, from Lithuania’s perspective, efforts are being made to contributeto maintaining the rational and synergistic nature of the interaction
between ‘regionalism’ and ‘subregionalism’ in the planning andimplementation of 3SI objectives and projects.

Lithuania and 3SI objectives
The 3SI was formally launched by the Polish President Andrzej Duda
and the Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, with the very
first summit of this young European format taking place in Dubrovnik
in 2016. Since then annual summits of twelve heads of states havebeen organised every year, providing the political inspiration andoversight of this framework. Lithuania has taken part in the 3SI rightfrom its inception. President Dalia Grybauskaitė lent her support
to this Initiative by joining her fellow colleagues in Dubrovnik andemphasising Lithuania’s intention of deepening the engagementwith this multilateral cooperation platform. The 3SI’s core objectiveof improving the infrastructure among its member states and closing
the economic gap between Western and Eastern Europe was highly
welcomed by Lithuania. After all, Lithuanian authorities, together
with other members of this Initiative, were perfectly aware of hugeinfrastructure needs in this part of Europe, with the International
Monetary Fund estimating 1.15 trillion € for the total infrastructure
costs for the Three Seas region.8
115

Drive for energy security
While the 3SI comprehensively focuses on fostering transport, energy
and digital infrastructure, investments in energy infrastructure anddiversification were generally viewed as higher priorities for Lithuania
in the beginning.9 After all, Lithuanian accession to the 3SI coincidedwith its drive for energy independence, and deliverance from Russian
gas supplies, which had long been used as a political weapon aimed
at trying to coerce Lithuania (dependent on Russian gas until then) toalter its value-based foreign policy. In autumn 2014, the first liquified
natural gas (LNG) terminal in the eastern Baltic Sea, the so-called
floating storage regasification unit (FSRU), with the symbolic nameof ‘Independence’, was commissioned in the Lithuanian port city ofKlaipėda, allowing Lithuania to fulfil its energy diversification goal. ThisLNG terminal was built to ensure Lithuanian consumers could still get
gas even if political relations with Russia soured to such an extent that
supplies from the East had to be switched off. The story of Lithuania’s‘Independence’ could offer a useful case study for other countries in
the region of the Three Seas looking to pivot away from Russian gas10.
LNG is pumped onto the vessel from a transport ship where it is turnedback into gas for use or storage. FSRU systems can be built relatively
quickly — project lengths are estimated between one and three years —and generally require fewer planning permits than a permanentland-based equivalent. They can be moved from place to place andswapped out for bigger or smaller units as needed with comparative
ease. Importantly, they also allow a country to pick and choose where
its LNG supplies come from: Lithuania currently sources much of its
LNG from Norway, the US and Qatar.
Vindicated with this success in the area of LNG, Lithuania Has
been also spearheading efforts with other energy projects, such asa submarine power cable between Klaipėda in Lithuania and Nybro
in Sweden, known as NordBalt (also formerly as SwedLit), achievedin 2015, the purpose of which was to facilitate the trading of power
between the Baltic and Nordic electricity markets, and to increase
supply and energy security in both markets. Synchronisation between
the electricity grid of the Baltic States and Continental Europe’s TSOs
(European transmission system operators) was also finding its way tothe political agenda around those years, attesting to the pioneering role116

that Lithuania was playing in the Three Seas region in terms of energy
diversification and explaining why energy security could be considered
as one of the most important objectives for Lithuania in the first yearsof the 3SI. The latest achievement, which only reinforces this thesis, wasthe successful launching on 1 May 2022 of the Gas Interconnection
Poland—Lithuania (GIPL) pipeline between Poland and Lithuania,
allowing for the physical transmission of gas flows and helping tointegrate the Baltic States and Finland into the European gas market.
This latest infrastructure project constitutes another milestone in thehistory of the development of energy independence between Lithuania
and Poland and in the region in general, especially in the context of
securing a reliable gas supply in the current geopolitical conditions,when we witness a major disruption unfolding with Russia, which choseto isolate itself from civilised international community by waging a war
on Ukraine and overtly blackmailing and threatening some EU member
states with the cessation of supplies of energy resources.

Transport connectivity
However, energy security was not the only priority of Lithuania in termsof infrastructure development. Another important domain, which
traditionally attracted the full attention of the Lithuanian authorities,
was transport connectivity. It is not a coincidence that among theeight priority interconnection projects identified by Lithuania in thecompiled database, serving as a pool of projects that should be carriedout in order to improve the connectivity of the Three Seas region, four
belonged to transport domain, with other four pertaining to energy.
In the area of transport within the Three Seas region, Lithuania wasclearly adhering to the logic that the east—west transport infrastructure,
which remained more developed as part of the Soviet legacy, had tobe replaced with a greater emphasis on north—south linkages, just as
the dominance of east—west pipelines and limited alternatives to thosepipelines have been factors in Europe’s continued dependence on Russia
in the area of energy. Evidently, all four Lithuanian transport projects
in the above-mentioned database (Viking Train, Rail Baltica, Via Baltica
and 5G cross-border transport corridors for connected and automatedMobility (CAM) in the Baltics) were aiming at reinforcing the north—south vector and increasing the collective connectivity of the Baltic
117

States with Poland and the wider central European region. President
Gitanas Nausėda, who for the first time took part, virtually, in the 3SI
Summit in Tallinn, opted to project continuity with his predecessor Dalia
Grybauskaitė by reiterating the importance of geopolitical aspects inrelation to the transport and energy infrastructure in the region. He
mentioned that energy and transportation are the strategic sectors
for Lithuania, which ensure economic growth and national security.
Further, he highlighted that Lithuania has been already undertaking
several pan-European infrastructure projects such as Rail Baltica, Via
Baltica and the synchronisation of the electricity grid with continental
Europe and the connection of the gas distribution network with Poland.

Digital and cybersecurity
With energy and transport projects clearly taking centre stage in thelist of Lithuania’s priority projects submitted to the 3SI database, theabsence of digital connectivity projects has been somewhat salientin the beginning. However, lately Lithuanian’s attention has also
started shifting to digital and cybersecurity. When attending the last
3SI Summit in Sofia, Bulgaria on 9 July 2021, the Lithuanian PresidentNausėda was very explicit in pointing out that while creating vibrantdigital economies it is important to stay protected from cyberattacks
as well.11 In fact, since 2019 Lithuania has been trying to put anemphasis on the creation of very practical tools aimed at dealing withcyber emergencies. Upon the initiative of Lithuania as a lead nation,
the EU’s Cyber Rapid Reaction Team (CRRT) was founded in 2020 bya handful of like-minded EU member states, most of them part of the3SI (Lithuania, Croatia, Estonia, Poland, Romania and the Netherlands),
in the framework of the Permanent Structured Cooperation of thecommon security and defence policy of the EU.12 It was conceived asa very practical tool, oriented towards addressing cyber emergencies
and cyber crisis management, a sort of cybersecurity rapid response
force, agile, on stand by and ready to deploy the necessary toolkits.
It came to prominence recently, right before the Russian aggression
on Ukraine, when upon Ukrainian request it was activated by the EU
in February 2022, and although the physical deployment of CRRT
was suspended, its alert and monitoring level has been maintained,
assisting Ukrainian authorities in identifying support needs.
118

Another expression of growing Lithuanian involvement incybersecurity issues on a regional scale was the creation in 2020 of
the regional cybersecurity centre in Lithuanian’s second biggest cityof Kaunas, with a strong US involvement and with the participation of
Ukraine and Georgia.13 Furthermore, in the framework of the 3SI itself
and in collaboration with Poland, a seminar on boosting cybersecurity
was held in Vilnius, with thew participation of representatives offour countries — Latvia, Estonia, Poland and Lithuania — offering to
explore further cooperation in the field of cybersecurity and to assess
the region’s capacity in developing secure and resilient solutions,through dialogue and cooperation between public and private
entities. Cybersecurity in the 3SI framework could also be linked to adevelopment of telecommunication technologies of tomorrow and theimplementation of 5G corridors, as part of the wider EU Trans-European
Transport network. For Lithuania a regional approach to those kinds ofprojects could be a perfect way to proceed and would allow privatecompanies to seek joint solutions.

Economic growth
The objective of economic growth of the Three Seas region andgreater interests among investors has also been positively perceived
by Lithuania. In January 2020, Lithuania formally adhered to the Three
Seas Initiative Investment Fund (3SIIF) by making an EUR 20 million
contribution via its National Promotional Institution (VIPA). Lithuania
takes part in all the governing bodies of 3SIIF and encourages its
companies and business entities to seek opportunities with this capitalfund as an alternative financing instrument to foster growth andconnectivity in the Three Seas region.

Geopolitical dimension of the 3SI
However, while adhering to the formula that the 3SI is an economicallydriven and politically inspired framework, Lithuania has always put astronger emphasis on the geopolitical nature of this unique subregional
format.

119

European framework
From the outset, one of the recurrent elements in the position of
Lithuania towards the 3SI has been the prominence given to the roleof the EU in this project. Indeed, Lithuania sees this intra-European
connectivity initiative, with all twelve participants belonging to theEU, as a great opportunity to strengthen regional cooperation anddeepen EU integration. Therefore it has always been of upmost
importance for the Lithuanian authorities that the Initiative operates inaccordance with EU policies. As long as this criterion is met, Lithuania
expects the Initiative to positively contribute to the EU market andincreased connectivity among EU countries. Furthermore, Lithuania
would endorse even tighter cooperation between the EU and theInitiative than is currently the case.14 Besides the political participationin the summits of high EU officials, Lithuania would welcome the actual
contribution of European specialised financial institutions, such as theEuropean Investment Bank or the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, to the 3SIIF. To Lithuania’s liking, this coalitionof twelve EU member states is also underused in Brussels and could
better advocate for the goals of the Initiative there, by working moreclosely with various EU institutions. After all, whether we want it or not,the main vehicle to address the connectivity gaps within the 3SI region
and implement large-scale strategic interconnection projects will be
EU instruments and the funding avenues they offer, be it through TransEuropean Transport and Energy Networks, Connecting Europe Facility,
Recovery and Resilience Fund and others.

Beyond Europe
Another fundamental political point in the attitude of Lithuania within
the 3SI was the emphasis on the transatlantic dimension, which
has been systematically reflected in all interventions by Lithuanianleaders attending the high-level events in this framework. At thesummit in Sofia, President Nausėda unequivocally stated that the 3SI
serves as a platform for enhanced regional cooperation with the US,
which also makes the whole of Europe stronger.15 It should be notedthat fostering strong transatlantic ties has always been at the core of
Lithuanian foreign policy across all international formats and is equally120

prominent in the context of the 3SI Lithuania has been in favour ofmore active US involvement in regional projects and the 3SI activities,
be it bilaterally, or through a US financial contribution to the 3SIIF. The
Lithuanian authorities appreciate and welcome the strong politicalsupport that the 3SI has been enjoying from the previous and current
US administration as well as bipartisan support in the US Congress.
In terms of geographical reach and geopolitical approach, Lithuania
has always advocated for the convergence of the 3SI with other likeminded partners across the globe, who have a similar approach tovalues-based connectivity and aim to offer quality infrastructure tovarious regions in the world. Therefore, a closer association to the 3SI
framework of such partners as the United Kingdom, Japan, Republicof Korea, Canada and others has always been strongly supported by
Lithuanian authorities. According to Vilnius, the investment potential
embedded in some of the leading financial institutions of those major
world economies would certainly be able to significantly contributeto increasing the overall capital value of the 3SIIF and would help toachieve its goal of reaching the target size of EUR 3—5 billion. Moreover,involvement of those countries in the 3SI could contribute to theconsolidation of the emerging, worldwide trusted connectivity alliance,with its two biggest pillars, the US-inspired Build Back Better World
initiative and the EU Global Gateway programme, taking centre stage.

Eastern Partnership
Another very clear priority for Lithuania in terms of the geographic
outreach of the 3SI was its closest vicinity with the three associatedpartners of the EU from the Eastern Partnership countries in particular.
It should be said that despite the strategic importance of the BlackSea region, the 3SI politically only consists of EU member states,
even though the format does not set any formal limitations to nonmembers. In January 2021, in a joint statement the presidents of
Ukraine and Moldova reaffirmed their interest in joining the 3SI andlater on, on 19 July at the Batumi Summit, all three countries — Ukraine,
Moldova and Georgia — underlined the importance of the Three Seas
framework for the region.16 From Lithuania’s perspective, the greater
assistance that this framework could offer to those three countries aswell as other hopefuls from the Balkans, by extending the connectivity
121

projects, could help to better anchor those states physically with the
EU and would allow for better mobility and connectivity of the north—south axis of Central and Eastern Europe. In this regard, Lithuania has
been setting an example by undertaking practical steps, such as thecreation of the above-mentioned regional cybersecurity centre, withthe participation of Ukraine and Georgia.

Micro-regional component
It is interesting to note that in terms of the correlation of regional,
subregional and micro-regional or local dimensions of the 3SI, Lithuania
has also been actively taking part in the so-called 3SI Forum ofRegions, initiated by the Lubelskie voivodeship (region) and composedby five Polish voivodeships: Lubelskie, Mazowieckie, Podkarpackie,
Podlaskie and Świętokrzyskie, joined by the Lithuanian regions Alytus
and Marijampolė, and the city of Panevėžys, the Presov Region from
Slovakia, the Hungarian Hajdú-Bihar County, as well as five Romanianregions: Călărași, Caraș Severin, Dolj, Maramureș and Timiș. The
signing of a formal interregional agreement establishing the Networkof Regions is planned to be achieved in 2022, with the participation of
the Lithuanian municipalities mentioned above, and would encompass
the adoption of the network’s statute, creation of specialised sections
for transport, tourism, economy, etc., admission of new members fromother 3SI countries, implementation of joint projects from available EU
programmes and a series of events on local level.

Conclusions and recommendations
After reviewing Lithuania’s participation and interests in the 3SI, it is easy
to note that among all the main objectives so far, priority has definitely
been given to energy security. Lithuania has learned the painful ‘lessons’of unilateral dependence on one supplier and has focused as muchas possible on solving the problem of energy independence. Initially,in implementing the LNG terminal project, Lithuania did not receive
the support of either the European Commission or neighbouring
countries and had to rely on national resources. However, now that thegeopolitical and geo-energy situation has changed dramatically, it has
122become a role model not only for its neighbours, but also for the EU’s
largest economy — Germany. Cooperation within the framework of the
3SI opens new opportunities and perspectives for Lithuania not only tofurther strengthen energy security, but also to profitably participate in
the regional energy market.
On the other hand, with significant progress in the problem ofenergy security, other 3SI objectives — transport connectivity, economic
growth and cybersecurity — should naturally receive more attention in
the future. Lithuania, along other countries in the region, is graduallyrealising that this initiative should positively affect its national security.
For Lithuania, the 3SI should follow primarily national security aims andstrengthen defence capabilities in the region through the reinforcementof physical and digital infrastructure interconnected between the
twelve countries of this format and also with the western part of Europe.
Besides that, the 3SI projects may become increasingly relevant fromthe perspective of the security architecture in the region since they
include infrastructure projects that can contribute to the strengtheningof the military logistical capabilities of the NATO forces deployed in theregion and the improvement of overall infrastructure resilience.
But the biggest changes, no doubt, will be in geopolitics. Geopolitics
is the main stimulus encouraging Lithuania not only to support but also
to actively operate in the subregional 3SI format, as here Lithuania
sees the greatest added value to the already existing European‘regionalism’ format. Russian aggression and the war in Ukraine arechanging the total regional paradigm. The 3SI and the north—south
axis is becoming a backbone of subregional dynamics. Furthermore,the 3SI reveals itself geopolitically particularly relevant in the context ofLithuania’s withdrawal from the so-called ‘16+1’ format of cooperation
between China and Central and Eastern European countries and theresolute determination of Lithuanian authorities to pursue a values anddemocratic standards based approach towards interaction with nonEuropean countries through regional and subregional frameworks.
Finally, the case of Lithuania is interesting not only in a practicalpolitical but also in an academic sense, as it significantly contributes tosolving the puzzle of ‘subregionalism’ mentioned at the beginning of
this text. It provides a better understanding of why countries alreadyinvolved in ‘regionalism’ (in this case in the EU) nevertheless choose tojoin additional formats for subregional cooperation (in this case the 3SI).
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ENDNOTES
Lau, S. 21.05.2021. Lithuania pulls out of China’s ’17+1’ bloc in Eastern Europe. Politico.
https://www.politico.eu/article/lithuania-pulls-out-china-17-1-bloc-eastern-centraleurope-foreign-minister-gabrielius-landsbergis/
2
Hamanaka, S. 2015. What is Subregionalism? Analytical Framework and Two Case
Studies from Asia. Pacific Focus. Inha Journal of International Studies, vol. 30, no 2,
p. 3893
Gamble, A., Payne, A. eds. 1996. Regionalism and World Order. Basingstoke: Palgrave;
Glenn Hook, Ian Kearns (1999), Subregionalism and World Order, Basingstoke:
Palgrave; Shaun Breslin, Glenn Hook, eds. (2002), Microregionalism and World Order,
Basingstoke: Palgrave.
4
See. Hamanaka, S. 2015. Op. cit, Table 3 on p. 397.
5
It should be noted that the term ‘subregionalism’ is used here only in an academic
sense and not in a practical political sense. Commonly the concept of ‘regional
cooperation’ or ‘regional effort’ is used instead of ‘subregionalism’ in the Three Seas
Initiative’s formal and informal discourse.
6
See Paragraph 3 of the Joint Declaration of the Sixth Summit of the Three Seas
Initiative, Sofia, 08.07.2021. https://3seas.eu/event/joint-declaration-of-the-sixthsummit-of-the-three-seas-initiative
7
Ibid.
8
Ari, A. et al. 2020. Infrastructure in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe:
Benchmarking, Macroeconomic Impact, and Policy Issues. International Monetary
Fund, p.15, footnote 7. https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/DP/2020/
English/ICESEEBMIPIEA.ashx
9Kornis V. 31.01.2022. Lithuania’s position on the Three-Seas-Initiative. Friedrich
Naumann Foundation for Freedom, Guest Commentary. https://www.freiheit.org/
central-europe-and-baltic-states/lithuanias-position-three-seas-initiative
10
See: DW Wirtschaft — Nachrichten. 20.04. 2022. LNG-Terminal versorgt Litauen mit
Flüssiggas. https://www.dw.com/de/lng-terminal-versorgt-litauen-mit-fl%C3%BCssiggas/
av-61513693
11
Media Center of the President of the Republic of Lithuania. 09.07.2021.The President
stressed the importance of transatlantic cooperation for the Three Seas Initiative.
https://www.lrp.lt/en/media-center/news/the-president-stressed-the-importance-oftransatlantic-cooperation-for-the-three-seas-initiative/36289
12European Defence Agency. 24.02.2022. Activation of first capability developed under
PESCO points to strength of cooperation in cyber defence. https://eda.europa.eu/
news-and-events/news/2022/02/24/-of-first-capability-developed-under-pescopoints-to-strength-of-cooperation-in-cyber-defence
13
Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania. 2021. Regional Cyber
Defence Centre officially starts work. https://kam.lt/en/regional-cyber-defencecentre-officially-starts-work/
14
Valerie Kornis (2022), op. cit.
15
Media Center of the President of the Republic of Lithuania (2021), op. cit.
16
Davlashelidze, M. 27.10.2021. The importance of joining the Three Seas Initiative forGeorgia, Ukraine and Moldova. Foreign Policy research Institute, Eurasia program,Intern Corner. https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/10/the-importance-of-joining-thethree-seas-initiative-for-georgia-ukraine-and-moldova/
1124

Poland: Regional leadershipstunted by governance dilemmas
Kamil Jarończyk, Wojciech Przybylski

The Three Seas Initiative (3SI) is the Polish answer to the infrastructure
deficiency gap in Europe, especially on the north—south axis. Poland,in order to maintain its leading role in the 3SI, promotes the necessary
governance upgrade that would allow it to deliver greater investment
in and visibility for the 3SI success story. It may also consider boosting
the European dimension of the initiative, which has been lost due toongoing struggles with the European Union (EU) over the rule oflaw. Leaving aside its grand historical narratives for emphasising theusability and uniqueness of this format in the context of EU macroregions will also allow Poland and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
to deliver added value also to its neighbourhood, and especially to
Ukraine, by embedding it in the ongoing connectivity plans for CEE.

The economic growth and resilience of the 3SI region
and greater interest among investors
Poland, due to its geographic position in the centre of the 3SI, hasmuch to gain from the development of north—south connections
within the 3SI region. This is why its priority projects focus so heavily
on the development of these routes and this was the driving force
economically for it pushing for the 3SI initially in 2016. Since the2004 accession into the EU of Poland and eight other 3SI member
countries (Austria joined in 1995, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, andCroatia in 2013), the primary focus was put on developing east—west
connections in all forms of infrastructure due to the closest economic
and industrial centre being Germany. At the same time, the VisegrádGroup (V4), established in 1991 to nurture the westward politicaland military direction of Czechoslovakia (before the Velvet Divorce),125Hungary and Poland, has been working on the centuries-long ambition
to improve north—south connectivity and cohesion, with a windowof opportunity to accomplish those goals opening after their EU
accession.1 Poland plugged its industry into German supply chains as
this was the quickest path towards the development of the country. This
path of development was mirrored throughout the region. Starting its
economic transformation in the 1990s on borrowed money from theUS, Germany and other EU countries, it achieved levels of growth thatplaced Poland among the top five trade partners for Germany by theearly 2020s.
One criticism of developing the north—south connections in Central
and Eastern Europe is that it can never be as economically feasible
as east—west connections due to current trade routes within Europe.
This macro-region-wide infrastructure deficiency, which blocks thefurther economic development of the whole EU, was the primary policy
objective forwarded by the Polish government when setting up the
3SI. It is important to underline that it was set up in accordance withthe grand EU objective of fostering connectivity on the continent.
Until today, there has been no railroad connection between Estonia
and Poland — the Rail Baltica route is only in construction and therailroad infrastructure between Warsaw (Poland) and Sofia (Bulgaria) is
so poorly developed that it takes twice the time to cover that route incomparison to the Paris—Warsaw route (which is twice the distance).
The lack of satisfactory trade between CEE actors has been
attributed by Poland to subpar infrastructure, and it was assumed that
if a functioning route existed then trade would increase, along withprofits for investors. The most ambitious innovation of the 3SI was thecreation of an investment fund. The Three Seas Initiative Investment
Fund (3SIIF) is a private fund exclusively advised by the UK-based
Amber Infrastructure Group and registered in Luxembourg.
The 3SIIF was an innovation brought about at the 2018 3SI summit in
Bucharest to be a practical way of leveraging national investment plans,
propelled primarily by hundreds of EU funds allocated from national
chapters of the EU budget to the macro-regional level. The funding of
3SI connectivity projects is expected to be a mix of private and publicfunds, with the initial funds coming from the national developmentbanks, to be bolstered by global investors at the next stage. As of May
2022, the fund is yet to receive donations by all the members of the 3SI
126

(Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are missing), but the bulk of
the seed funds have been provided by the Polish Bank Gospodarstwa
Krajowego (Polish National Development Bank, BGK) along with the
Romanian investment bank in the amount of over EUR 500 million.2 The
objective of the fund is to raise an estimated EUR 3—5 billion, whichmakes Poland the largest investor in the fund, and the US administration
has promised to match the amount, which would increase the visibility
and reliability of the investment fund. The fund’s first project was
acquiring a 100% interest in Cargounit, the largest private locomotive
leasing company in Poland.3 This investment is always mentioned as an
early success of the fund in its presentations for investors.4 The fund has
many connections to Poland, which is to be expected as Poland is theinitiator and main driver behind the 3SI. Beata Daszyńska-Muzyczka,
President of BGK, is also the Chairperson of the Supervisory Board of
the 3SIIF and appears in most events connected to the 3SIIF. But after
the initial Polish investment, the fund has yet to fund another project inPoland, instead choosing to fund projects in Slovakia, Estonia and mostrecently Romania.

Priority projects
3SI cooperation is based on a set of priority projects which eachgovernment sets out and which are supposed to have benefits formore than just one country in the 3SI. Priority projects became a partof the 3SI in 2018 with the summit in Bucharest. Although the idea ofthe priority projects was to shortlist a concrete set of projects for the
3SI, this did not happen — the Czech Republic, for example, only put
forward a very unpopular project, the Danube—Oder—Elbe Connection(something Poland has prioritised as well), while other countries suchas Hungary put forward many projects which were entirely within theirborders and quite small in scale. Poland currently has ten priority
projects which meet the above-mentioned criteria, and it has been
actively reporting on them. Although the digital element of the 3SI has
been proclaimed as one of its three key areas, for Poland the priority
projects almost exclusively cover energy and large scale infrastructure,with only the 3 Seas Digital Highway being the exception.5 The Digital
Highway was introduced by Poland and sets the broad goal to ‘[create]127

cross-border cyber resilient digital infrastructure projects (the 3 Seas
Digital Highway) that enable better and more secure data transfer from
north to south of the region and bridge the gaps in the communication
infrastructure, including fibre optics and 5G technology infrastructure.’
As was agreed upon in the Ljubljana summit of 2019, yearly reports on
the priority projects by each country are published on the 3SI website.6
Rail infrastructure plays an important role in Poland’s plans for the
3SI, as is evidenced by the first 3SIIF investment and the prominentrole that rail plays in Poland’s priority projects. One successful priority
project is the planned expansion of the ‘Amber Rail Freight Corridor’,
which is a corridor between Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia.
The project helps facilitate freight shipments between all countries
involved and connects Slovenia’s Adriatic port to Hungary’s andSlovakia’s Danube ports. Developing freight infrastructure within
the region is in Poland’s economic interests as its rail industry is thelargest in the region, with PKP and PKP Cargo being two state-owned
railway companies. PKP Cargo is hoping to expand its role in Europe
as the facilitator of EU-Chinese rail freight trade, as it already has anadvantageous position due to the dry land port of Małaszewicze on theborder with Belarus.7
Another railway project is Rail Baltica — although this is notconsidered to be a Polish project, it has much to offer the country.
Rail Baltica is a shared priority project of Poland and the Baltic Statesand envisions linking up the Baltics (and possibly Finland) to the restof the EU by rail.8 The Baltics up to this point have had an issue withconnections to the EU by rail due their rail networks having wider
gauges due to their occupation by first the Russian Empire and then theSoviet Union. Any rail connection between the Baltics and the rest of
the EU will go through Poland. Such rail infrastructure would open up
new markets and new trade, which would all flow through Poland andgive Polish railroad companies new opportunities in the Baltic markets.
The key infrastructure project that has been closely connectedto the 3SI since its inception and is of particular interest to Poland is
known as Via Carpatia. Via Carpatia is a highway that would connect
Klaipėda, Lithuania with Thessaloniki, Greece and run through theentirety of the eastern part of the 3SI — Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia,
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. The Polish government has alreadysecured funding for building the road through its territory, but one
128

of the main objectives of Poland is to have Via Carpatia added as aCore Network of the EU’s Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T),
which would massively increase the funding for the entirety of the
project. The reason it is currently not part of the core network is dueto the way the TEN-T network is agreed upon, through the balancingof geographic and economic needs for a particular network. Currently,
TEN-T is going through a possible redesign, and with proper lobbying
from the region it could be possible to have Via Carpatia added to
the TEN-T Core Network, which would open up many more funds aswell as give the project the institutional oversight of the transnational
EU instead of being under the auspices of individual states, some ofwhich (Slovakia and Hungary) seem to be not so keen on prioritising
this project. The project is key to Polish interests due to the potential
trade and development it can bring to the eastern regions of Poland,
which are traditionally agrarian and less developed than the central or
western parts of the country. It also happens to be the most loyal votingbase for the ruling PiS government.
Aside from transit infrastructure, the other big area in which
Poland sees a large amount of potential for itself economically is
gas infrastructure. Poland’s state-owned PGNiG has the strategy of
becoming a gas broker within the region, with the strategic benefitof having the region move away from Russian gas. To this end, Poland
has spent considerable resources diversifying its gas in the past few
years, with LNG ports in Świnouście and a planned Baltic pipelinefrom Norway. One of Poland’s largest goals with the 3SI other thaninfrastructure is to build gas interconnectors with Lithuania and Slovakia
to be able to sell non-Russian gas to the landlocked countries of Central
Europe and to the Baltics along with Finland. Another neighbour forwhich Poland has strategic hopes is Ukraine, which does not have LNG
ports and could be cut off from Russian gas at any time. Currently, thereverse flow to Ukraine is only possible from Slovakia, and therefore
Poland is looking to open an interconnector with Ukraine, being one of
the key providers of gas to its largest continuous neighbour.
Poland — as the initiator, the largest funder and the country withthe most ambitious 3SI projects — sees a lot of economic potential in
the cooperation. The projects, though they have economic merit,cannot be disconnected from the national strategic element that drives
the most ambitious projects. Large-scale infrastructure and energy
129projects stand to benefit the national industries of Poland, namely thestate-owned railway company PKP (PKP Cargo) and the gas company
PGNiG. Poland, being the largest state within the cooperation format
and with the largest state-owned companies in these strategic fields,
stands to gain the most from this economic interconnectedness, yet it
remains to be seen if it will reach its ambitious goals and whether thesegoals will collide with the ambitions of its neighbours, who could fear
economic and political influence coming from their larger neighbour
if interconnectedness in the region is developed solely according to
Poland’s vision.

Geopolitics
The backbone of Poland’s security policy after 1989 can be found in thearticles of Juliusz Mieroszewski (also known as ‘Londyńczyk’) in Jerzy
Giedroyc’s Polish exile paper Kultura Paryska (Parisian Culture). The
most influential article being Rosyiski “kompleks polski” i obszar ULB(‘The Russian’s “Poland issue” and the territory of the ULB’), where ULB
refers to Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus.9
The fundamental theory is that Poland can only be secure if it issurrounded by independent democratic nation-states that are free from
Russian or other foreign imperialist domination. This particular angle on
ULB has been developed and elaborated further in Kultura Paryska toalso include the project of liberating Czechoslovakia and Hungary from
Russian imperialism (as well as the most ambitious stipulated hopes for
the Russian nation-state itself to be liberated from its imperial legacy)
and laid the foundations for underground cooperation between themain democratic opposition actors in the region.
The Visegrád Group, which materialised after its founding members
successfully coordinated the withdrawal of the Red Army from theirterritory, laid the foundations for a common understanding of the
security strategy and helped pave the way to NATO and later to the EU.
The Visegrád Group along with its grassroots cooperation, supportedby the International Visegrád Fund among others, remains the
backbone of regional identity and planning, although several parallel
regional formats have emerged since and will probably continue toemerge, while others lose prominence (e.g., the Central European
130

Initiative, the Slavkov Triangle, the Central Five, the Bucharest Nine, theNorth Baltic Eight, etc.).
Over the three decades of its independence, Polish foreign policy
has always prioritised two European formats, in which Poland saw its
strength through interconnectivity in Europe: the Visegrád Groupand the Weimar Triangle, the latter of which had France and Germany
on board but was largely unfulfilled in terms of political and policy
coordination when compared to the former format. Additionally, overthe past decade or so Poland has been actively involved in cooperationin the Baltics, building up the strength of that cooperation upon thepremise of interconnectedness across Europe. Such platforms havebeen serving as a pivot for larger ambitions within the EU throughjoint initiatives for policy frameworks such as the Eastern Partnership(initiated jointly by Sweden and Poland to be later embraced byregional partners and eventually the EU overall) or the Bucharest Nine(for CEE positions within NATO, initiated with Romania).
The 3SI can be viewed as Poland’s further attempt to create
real material connections between CEE countries in the EU, thus
leading to closer economic and political ties and helping to achieve
the overarching geopolitical goal of being surrounded by friendly
democracies. As an initiative by the president of Poland, 3SI policies
were not initially executed by the relevant national governments, andit has been updated in that respect over time. In the case of Poland,
the presidential format has followed the previous track record of Polishpresidents hosting larger CEE delegations of national leaders in Warsaw
and representing their voices to global stakeholders, especially to the
US. However, previous formats of CEE groupings lacked a cohesion of
objectives and status, as there was a mix of EU countries and non-EU
counterparts.
Poland, due to its size and location, is simultaneously a large country
in its own region, but at best a medium-sized one when it comes tothe whole of the EU. A country of slightly over 38 million people (asthe preliminary results of the 2021 census show10) and a land area of
312,679 square kilometres makes it by far the largest in terms of sizeand population of all 3SI countries. But not when compared to Western
Europe, as Germany has a population of roughly 83 million and France
67 million. Not to mention the size of the economy of Poland’s Western
European neighbours. This has sparked a debate in Poland about its
131role in Europe and the proverbial dilemma of whether to be a relatively
small fish in a big pond or to be a big fish in a smaller pond (thisbeing Central Europe). Those in Poland’s foreign policy community
who are more connected to the previous ruling party of PO stressed
Poland’s relationship with Germany and France, creating the Weimar
triangle, while the more conservative PiS stressed firstly the Visegrád
cooperation format and are viewed as the architects of the 3SI, thisbeing the culmination of their geopolitical view of Poland’s place inEurope, as the leader of the Central European region.
Before Brexit process started, the current PiS government pivoted
from Germany towards the UK in their coordination on EU policy; thisdirection had to be reversed only a couple years later, but with much
hesitancy from Warsaw towards Berlin. While post-Brexit Europe only
emphasised the potential role of Poland in coordinating positions withsmaller countries on future EU policy directions, the PiS government
has also emphasised their bid for CEE to become the leading actor in
Europe in terms of the transatlantic partnership, countering Joe Biden’s
strategy to build transatlantic relations primarily through Germany. The
PiS government strategy was based on the assumption that Donald
Trump’s administration would not choose the same path for theirrelations in Europe and would in comparison elevate CEE’s position intransatlantic relations. In reality, neither of these two strategies is fully
integrated due to the ongoing war in Ukraine, in which Poland’s roleas the main response hub has given it a natural leadership positionin CEE and Germany, and which has shown, despite lamentable
political communication, that it is an indispensable element of security
architecture and responses to the needs of Ukraine and CEE.
The most compelling argument for Poland’s ambition for Via
Carpatia is the military implications of the project. All countries
along the route are NATO members, but due to the existence of the
Carpathian Mountains and a low state of development, there is no large
scale infrastructure connecting the Baltics to Romania and Bulgaria; forthe hypothetical defence of the eastern flank, this could be disastrous
as there would be no way to move people and equipment efficiently
along the entirety of the front.
Looking at the geography of the 3SI region from the Polishperspective, the only natural border on the east—west axis is the OderRiver, which has not hindered infrastructure development and made132

the building of east—west connections much easier. This in not thecase for a north—south connection between Poland and the southerncountries of the 3SI. In between lies the large Carpathian mountain
range with its highest peaks, the Tatra mountain range, being Poland’s
most ancient border.
The traditional routes around this mountain range go throughextreme border points connecting to the Czech Republic and goingfurther towards Vienna, but there is no significant infrastructure in theeast that connects Poland and the southern 3SI countries, as for theseregions it was much easier to go westward through the Great European
Plain into the economic hubs of Germany and Austria than to cross the
Carpathian mountains to the much poorer regions to the south. Thisposes a challenge for the 3SI — just as the creation of the road networks
through the Alps, it requires large sums of resources that the region
might not be willing to spend unless through large-scale pan-EU
funding schemes, such as those the CEE region enjoys today.
In terms of geopolitical analysis, Poland is considered only througha fatalist lens that subjects it to the great power game of global players.
Its current strength has been formed primarily through an agile buildup of networked interdependence that is aimed at defying thesegeopolitical narratives. Despite the ongoing clash with EU institutions
over the rule of law, Warsaw is continuously emphasising the primacy
of international law and rule-based order, which are preconditions of
security for a country that is largely exposed from the point of view of
geopolitical risks. Nevertheless, the narrative of geopolitical analysis
has recently been popularised, especially among analytical circles close
to right-wing optics. It has also been instrumental in finding common
ground between policy influencers of US origin and the CEE region
in the context of the global competition between the West and therevisionist powers (Russia and China). With the Chinese format for CEE
cooperation falling under the 17+1 brand, the 3SI has been considered
as a better alternative and a quite important element of the US global
strategy, approved by both main parties. Poland, demonstrating its firm
commitment to the US as a key transatlantic ally in Europe, considers
the 3SI to be a pillar for further economic and security cooperation
across the Atlantic.

133

Energy security
Currently in the 3SI region there is an overwhelming reliance on Russiangas. Between 2014 and 2019, there was a 16.5 billion cubic-metre
increase in the volume of imported Russian natural gas to 3SI countries,
which marked nearly a 50% growth in consumption. As the economies
of Central Europe grow, the need for energy grows as well, leading
to imports from outside the region, namely Russia. There is around a
50% energy dependency on Russia on average across the region, witha steady increase since 2000 (when it was 44%). As economies grow,the need for foreign energy imports increases and the region needs
to find supplies from outside. This reasoning has also consolidated thecommon V4 position on their nuclear energy strategy; while Poland is
still the only one that does not have such a power plant, the rest of V4
is planning to maintain, modernise and expand their nuclear powersources.
Poland recognised the need for diversification early on due its tobelonging to the Warsaw Pact and being completely dependent
on Russian gas flowing through the Yamal pipeline. This absolutedependency led to Poland being one of the highest payers for gas
within the entirety of the EU. Gas diversification was one of the main
catalysts in Poland for the formation of the 3SI in the first place, alongwith Croatia, which was working on an LNG port in Krk in 2016. Oneof the original visions for the 3SI was to create a gas network throughthe east of the EU from Krk to Świnouście, giving all the countries
traditionally dependent on Russian gas the ability to buy from theinternational LNG market using the Polish and Croatian LNG ports.
Poland still hopes for this gas network to become a reality, and with thecurrent war in Ukraine it has a historic opportunity to push this ambition
for regional gas diversity forward, as evidenced by the visit of Polish
President Andrzej Duda to Slovakian President Zuzana Čaputová in May
2022, during which swift action on an interconnector between Poland
and Slovakia was promised. Poland also is looking to be a primaryenergy broker for the region through the state-owned company PGNiG
and is planning to build a gas interconnector with Ukraine, helping thecountry move away from Russian gas as quickly as possible.
Poland’s energy policy for the 3SI so far has been highly gas-focused,without any priority project that concerns green energy. One part of134

Poland’s energy mix which is not mentioned in the 3SI but should bemuch more deeply looked into is its reliance on coal, much of which
is imported from Russia.11 Coal constitutes around 40% of Poland’s
energy mix, making Poland one of the dirtiest energy producers
within the European Union; while the diversification of gas supplies
has been a priority for this government, relatively little has been done
to substantially reduce the amount of coal used in the production ofenergy in the country.
Poland and the 3SI countries as a whole would have much more
to gain energy-wise if more of an emphasis were placed on divertingaway from gas and fossil fuels rather than mere diversification. As far asdiversification is concerned, unless the US becomes the sole supplier of
LNG, it will likely mean trading Poland’s dependence on one autocraticenergy-rich neighbour to a series of autocratic energy-rich countries
such as Saudi Arabia or Qatar.

Reliable, sustainable and inclusive connectivity
While the importance of the region in trade is already significant andever-growing, its infrastructure, both in quality and quantity, is far
behind its Western counterparts. While east—west connectivity has
been prioritised as the most profitable route for commerce, the north—south connection has been left relatively overlooked within the generalplan for EU infrastructure, and the Trans-European Transport Network(TEN-T) has a clear gap in north—south connectivity in the 3SI region.
An example of this disparity can be seen in how a theoretical trainride would look from Warsaw to Paris vs Warsaw to Sofia. Accordingto Rome2Rio, a train ride from Warsaw to Paris which is almost
300 kilometres further than the distance to Sofia, is only 15 hours and
40 minutes long with two transfers.12 A trip from Warsaw to Sofia cantake over 34 hours to complete and requires 4 transfers. This perceived
gap between north and south is currently being discussed between
some 3SI member states and the EU as a necessary project that must
be included in the TEN-T (which would lead to significant development
funds from the EU).
The need for such connectivity is clear from an inclusivity
perspective, and many perceived historical and ethnic issues could135be addressed through beginning the proper process of dealing withnot only the legal opening of borders, which is already the case for all
members of 3SI, but also the creation of rail and road infrastructurethat could make a rail or car trip from Warsaw to Sofia as feasible as it
already is between Warsaw and Paris. But in order to achieve the samelevel of cohesion as has been achieved between Germany, France and
Italy, the rail and road infrastructure in the 3SI region should become
somewhat comparable with its Western counterparts. While thecase for the inclusiveness of these connectivity projects is clear, thesustainability and reliability of Poland’s — and therefore the entirety of
the 3SI’s — projects are questionable.
While the Polish projects and the 3SI as an ambition for Poland
as a whole revolve around the idea of inclusive connectivity, as eachproject must benefit more than one state in the 3SI and ideally as many
as possible, the sustainability and reliability of connectivity is still afundamental question. The north—south connection, while clearlynecessary from a strategic and military point of view as the initiative
comprises of almost all of the eastern flank of NATO (with the exceptionof Greece and Turkey), there may not be as much necessity for intra-3SI
trade as such connections would warrant. Amongst all the regions thata potential Via Carpatia would go through, there is no real economic
demand for such a connection, which is the reason that the EU has not
adopted it into the Core Network so far.
The benefits of such north—south connections could be vital forthe immediate connectivity of the Western Balkans and the Eastern
Partnership (most importantly Ukraine and Belarus in Poland’s case),but furthermore, it would naturally extend the connectivity of Finlandand Greece. With the creation of an eastern north—south connection ofsuch size, it would be much easier to feasibly connect the trade systemsof Poland’s eastern neighbours with wider EU trade systems as well as
Poland’s Baltic ports.
The reliability and sustainability of these projects are also an issue
in Poland due to the perceived nature of the 3SI in Polish politics. Dueto the presidential offices being the backbone of the initiative, and withpresidents being elected by popular vote in eight of the twelve 3SI
members, the initiative and its projects run the risk of being politicisedand scrapped or significantly downsized as a result of the election ofan opposition candidate. In Poland, the 3SI is very seldom spoken of136

by the opposition, and those who do know of the project view it as a
PiS pet project. This is a symptom of the Polish political scene and thepolarisation both of Polish societies and of Polish politics. The 3SI isunlikely to continue if Poland as a country were to stop pushing for itas the largest donor and proponent, and this is the largest risk to thesustainability and reliability of the project.

Conclusions and recommendations
Poland, as the largest and most influential player in the 3SI, would
benefit from emphasising the European dimension of the 3SI by giving it
the status of a macro-region of the European Union. Macro-regions are
a European tool that all current members of the 3SI already belong to.
Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are all part of the Baltic Sea macroregion, while Slovenia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary,
Romania and Bulgaria are all members of the Danube macro-region.
Becoming a macro-region would have the added benefit of having amacro-regional strategy created to deal with common challenges andopportunities. This would help formalise the initiative and address theissue of politicisation that the initiative suffers, particularly in Poland,
due to being tied to the president in particular and to the ruling party
in general. Having it more formally be a part of and recognised by the
EU would make the initiative more resilient and have the added benefitof giving voice to the regions that these large-scale projects all affect.
The 3SI should emphasise the European dimension of the initiativeby also setting more ambitious goals regarding the Core Network
Corridors in the Trans-European Transport Network plan withmilestones in 2030 and 2050. This would allow much-needed north—south connections such as the Via Carpatia to be implemented andregulated on the EU level, obligating countries who are currently
stalling projects to complete them as well as opening the possibility ofgetting more EU funding for these costly projects.
Poland has also been among the advocates of establishing asecretariat as a possible way of institutionalising the format in orderto give it longevity. As the projects mainly concern infrastructurethat requires years of constant funding and oversight, it would be in
Poland’s interest to have an institution that continues the format,
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achieving funding as well as longevity in terms of other countries whose
presidencies may change or whose ambitions may shift.
The strained relationships with other V4 partner countries, first due
to Poland’s perceived subjugation to the particular policy line led by
Hungary, its internal troubles with the rule of law and inconsistent EU
policy (shifting from Germany to the UK and then back to Germany,
as well as voting against its own politician Donald Tusk to remain the
EU President) have weakened bonds between the Czech Republic andSlovakia, whose policies have been clearly distinct from the direction
formulated in Budapest. The two latter states still have not internalised
the 3SI agenda and do not participate in the investment fund yet, butwith fairly good chance that it can be changed in the future.13
Furthermore, Austria has traditionally been reluctant to accept Polishleadership in the region, but it is likely to catch up in this and otherformats due to the continuous increase of economic interdependency
through trade — Poland has a rising role in the ranks of Austria’s main
trade partners, which translates to an increased intensity of politicalinteractions.
Poland has understood the challenge of misperceptions anddivergent optics which present a long term risk for the 3SI sustainability
and cohesion. As a response, on 18 September 2021, the State ofPoland Foundation, which is set up as a government-organised nongovernmental organisation, has organised the Three Seas Generation
Freedom Conference (GENFREE)14 bringing together primarily youth,
think tanks and media representatives from across the 12 participating
countries. In its rationale it has listed a number of projects which
would help bring about public opinion cohesive views on 3SI on board
including a) Creating TV and film productions, both to promote tourism,
history, issues connecting the region’s countries and product placement(all categories), b) Promoting various historical figures, especially thosethat played an important role in multiple countries across the region, c)highlighting examples of past cooperation between nations within theregion, d) Creating a network of experts and ambassadors promoting
the 3SI, or e) creating an atlas of mutual positive stereotypes. It remains
questionable if the proposed modes of action including the GONGO
operator would be fit for purpose.
At the same time, a comparable Polish initiative by non-governmental
actors — for the disclosure, by the authors of this chapter — has taken
138shape in 2022. On the 20—21 May 2022 the Latvian President of
this years 3SI forum has hosted the first-ever Civil Society Forumorganised by the Latvian Transatlantic Organisation (LATO) and set
up on the recommendation to engage a broader array of civil society
actors (such as business associations, researchers and democratic
security advocates) for the purpose of providing a third-leg format
for the Initiative focused on the Western values and principles: ‘The
CSF provides a support mechanism for strengthening democracy,
security and sustainability, building links of mutual benefit between
the Member States and their partners — both in and out of Europe.
This means supporting civil society in the 3SI by protecting democratic
principles and values, such as public participation in decision making,
maintaining the transparency of political and economic decisions, andinvolving citizens in regional and European initiatives.”15 That framework
has reflected the recommendations of the strategic foresight project
published a year earlier in the Visegrad Insight report: Towards the 3SI
Civil Society Forum, July 2021.16
Ultimately, the 3SI is an open format. Connectivity across the region
as seen from the far north and the far south geographical borders are in
the best interests of non-3SI EU members like Finland or Greece as well
as non-EU neighbours as well. While it was initially not considered asa format with future prospects for Ukraine — and this was even initially
protested by policy advisors in Poland when Ukraine was mentioned
in that context by the Atlantic Council fellows in 2021 — there is a way
to include more countries from the Eastern Partnership and Western
Balkans (Ukraine and potentially Belarus will be much better connected
to Polish infrastructure if such connections are built now) later on.17
Today, this idea — starting with Ukraine — is also advocated for as oneof the policy responses to Russian aggression (see the Visegrad Insight
Report: Russian Invasion of Ukraine. How Nine Central and Eastern
European Countries Will Respond, February 202218) and has alreadybeen embraced by Polish leadership, most prominently manifested
recently in the speech by the Polish president in the Ukrainianparliament on 22 May 202219.
The 3SI is at a crucial point in its development, and Poland must
look beyond its current political divides to achieve the longevity sucha project requires to come to fruition. Tying the 3SI to the EU and not
closing it to further expansion from for example Ukraine would give it
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the longevity and stability that it requires to come to fruition and to be
the antidote to the age-old issue of north—south connectivity in theCentral and Eastern European region.
ENDNOTES“[The signatories] shall focus on the development of the infrastructure incommunications, with regard both to links between the three countries and those withother parts of Europe, mainly in the north-south direction, and shall coordinate thedevelopment of their power systems and telecommunication networks”. The Visegrad
Group: The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. 24.08.2006/ Www.
visegradgroup.eu. https://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/visegrad-declarations/visegrad-declaration-110412-2
2Czyż, A. 07.07.2019. The Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund Officially Established.
Media.bgk.pl. https://media.bgk.pl/61041-the-three-seas-initiative-investment-fundofficially-established3
The Three Seas Fund Agrees Its First Investment. 23.10.2020. Three Seas Initiative
Investment Fund. https://3siif.eu/news/the-three-seas-fund-agrees-its-first-investment
4
Financing Regional Security: An Update on the Three Seas Initiative Investment
Fund. 14.04.2022. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/financingregional-security/5
The 3 Seas Digital Highway — Three Seas. 2022. Three Seas Initiative. https://projects.3seas.eu/projects/the-3-seas-digital-highway
6
Ljubljana Summit 2019/ 2020. Three Seas Initiative. https://3seas.eu/about/pastsummits/ljubljana-summit-20197
Przybylski, R. 06.09.2021. Małaszewicze Z Rekordem Przeładunków. Rzeczpospolita.
https://logistyka.rp.pl/szynowy/art18890251-malaszewicze-z-rekordem-przeladunkow
8
Rail Baltica — Three Seas. 2022. Three Seas Initiative. https://projects.3seas.eu/
projects/rail-baltica-submitted-by-poland
9
Mieroszewski, J. 09.1974. Rosyiski ‘Kom Pleks Polski’ I Obszar ULB. Kulturaparyska.com. https://
kulturaparyska.com/pl/search/searched-attachment/1112/1/ULB#page=1&search=ULB
10
Szałtys, D. 2022. Preliminary Results of the National Population and Housing Census
2021. Stat.gov.pl. https://stat.gov.pl/en/national-census/national-population-andhousing-census-2021/national-population-and-housing-census-2021/preliminaryresults-of-the-national-population-and-housing-census-2021,1,1.html
11Energy Policy Review Poland 2022. International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/
reports/poland-2022
12
Przybylski, W., Jarończyk, K. 2021. Towards 3SI Civil Society Forum. Visegradinsight.
eu. https://visegradinsight.eu/3si2025/
13
Dostál, V. 23.06.2021. The Perspective of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia
on the Three Seas Initiative. Association for International Affairs. https://www.amo.cz/
en/the-perspective-of-the-czech-republic-hungary-and-slovakia-on-the-three-seasinitiative/
14
PAP Mediaroom. 22.09.2021. The GenFree: Three Seas Generation Freedom
Conference Has Freedom in Its DNA. Www.thefirstnews.com. https://www.
thefirstnews.com/video/the-genfree-three-seas-generation-freedom-conferencehas-freedom-in-its-dna-563
1

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The Three Seas Initiative Civil Society Forum. 05.2022. Three Seas Initiative.
https://3seas.eu/event/the-three-seas-initiative-civil-society-forum
16
Przybylski, W., Jarończyk, K. 2021. Towards 3SI Civil Society Forum. Visegradinsight.
eu. https://visegradinsight.eu/3si2025/
17
Fried, D., Mosbacher, G., Brzezinski, I. 01.05.2021. Brzezinski, Fried, Mosbacher: Czym
Jest Inicjatywa Trójmorza? Od Wizji Do Działania — Trimarium. Trimarium.pl. https://
trimarium.pl/projekt/brzezinski-fried-mosbacher-czym-jest-inicjatywa-trojmorza-odwizji-do-dzialania/
18
Russian Invasion of Ukraine: How Nine Central and Eastern European Countries Will
Respond. 2022. Visegradinsight.eu. https://visegradinsight.eu/reports/
19
Speech by the President at the Verkhovna Rada. 22.05.2022. Oficjalna Strona
Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. https://www.president.pl/news/speech-by-thepresident-at-verkhovna-rada
15

141

Romania: Transforming theThree Seas Initiative into a strategic
opportunity. A short overview
Mihai Sebe

The end of the Cold War and the advent of democracy in Central andEastern Europe brought new hope to a region that up till then was theplayground of the great powers. As the process of European and EuroAtlantic integration moved forward, the states in the region seem to beclearly on the path towards a better future. The necessary reforms thatwere adopted by their national governments brought the societies closer
to the Western model, while providing extra security, at a level neverseen before in the region. After the 1999 and 2004 NATO enlargementin the region, as well as the European Union (EU) enlargement of 2004
and 2007, the Central and Eastern European states seemed to be at theapex of their international prestige and influence.
Yet soon after, the international competition became more intenseand started to affect the region as the states needed to take sides, while
facing once more potentially existential threats to their sovereignty, suchas energy dependence, that can be used to influence national decisions,etc. For that purpose, they resorted to a creative foreign policy meant
to preserve the existing international order based on multilateralism,
human rights and the pre-eminence of international law, an order thatwas more than favourable to the post-communist states, with a difficult
past marked by injustice, international diktats and a general disregardof their sovereignty. For that purpose the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) was
created, as a way to enhance regional cooperation.
This article intends to present the role of Romania in the 3SI. It isan exploratory article, a report of what was done and what needs
to be done, that intends to be the starting point of further, more indepth analysis. Why Romania matters and what is the (potential) roleof Romania would thus be the key questions that guide this article. In
142order to provide a tentative answer, an analysis of official statements,
scientific literature and similar sources was effectuated, in an attempt
to provide an empirical and descriptive answer to be used later on for
more related papers.

The 3SI. What it is about?
The 3SI is a flexible and informal political platform at the presidential
level, bringing together the twelve EU member states between the
Adriatic, Baltic and Black Seas (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia). The initiative aims to increase convergence and cohesion,
while reducing the economic development gap between different
areas and EU member states, by increasing interconnectedness in theregion, in the fields of energy, transport and digital. The basic principlesof the 3SI are: promoting economic development, increasing cohesion
at European level and strengthening transatlantic ties.1
In fact the 3SI comes in a region with a historical background ofregional cooperation, known as Intermarium, the land between theBaltic and Black Seas in Eastern Europe. The area is the last unabashedrampart of Western civilisation in the East, and a point of convergenceof disparate cultures.2
From Romania’s perspective, this project can be seen as based ona single most sustainable relationship, between Romania and Poland.
In fact it is a continuation of the interwar alliance project between thetwo nations having as a starting point the 1921 defensive alliance. ‘This
alliance was the first collective security project at regional level and,ultimately, our first strategic partnership.’3 It would further be developed
after the end of the Cold War by the signature of the Strategic Partnershipin 2009, and its renewal in 2015, being based on a political-diplomatic
dialogue and substantial economic and sectorial cooperation.
Romania’s interest in the 3SI initiative was obvious from the very
start as it took part in the first Dubrovnik Summit in 2016 with adelegation led by the then Minister of Transportation Sorin Bușe,4a political signal that, at the time, the 3SI had a strong economic andinfrastructural significance, a pragmatic one rather than a political one.
For that purpose, the Dubrovnik Declaration seems to have fulfilled the143expectations, as the emphasis was put on the cooperation ‘on specificcross-border and macro-regional projects of strategic importance to
the States involved in energy, transportation, digital communicationand economic sectors in Central and Eastern Europe’.5
This statement was in line with a previous 2015 meeting held at New
York by the leaders of the riparian states bordering the Adriatic, Baltic
and Black Seas, where Romania’s President Klaus Iohannis underlined
the importance of the Three Seas region, perceived as connecting theregion with the wider world. The president of Romania stressed theimportance of energy security and the interconnection of transport
corridors (road, naval, air), which must unite not only the states of theBlack, Adriatic and Baltic Seas, but also the citizens of this European
region into an area of prosperity and economic stability. At the sametime, President Klaus Iohannis stressed that, for the interconnection
project to be a success, action should be taken on three levels. First,
states must act to advance their own interconnections with neighbours;
second, action should be taken to promote transport corridors on thenorth—south and east—west axes; and, third, the Three Seas region
should also aim for global integration with both Central Asia and Africa
and the enlarged Euro-Atlantic region.6
The 2017 Warsaw Summit saw an increase in the level ofrepresentation. The US President Donald Trump attended the Summit,
and Romania started to see the opportunity represented by the 3SI,
resulting in it being represented by the Romanian President Klaus
Iohannis. The Summit was a success from the national point of view
as it was decided, in unanimity, upon the proposal of the president ofRomania, Klaus Iohannis, to organise the 2018 Summit of the 3SI and
the first edition of the Business Forum in Romania.7
It was then when Romania formulated a clearer vision on what we
expect from the 3SI, a vision shared by all the political mainstream
parties. Romania sees the 3SI as a useful tool for modernising the region,
which must be developed in such a way as to support unity and cohesion
within the EU. Regional interconnectivity must be part of and contributeto the process of European integration. Thus, projects for the regional
interconnection of transport infrastructure, energy and digital markets,
especially on the north—south axis, must be in full compliance with EU
policies. And to eliminate some of the confusion that has been created insome Western chancelleries, the Bucharest Format is intended to discuss
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issues of common defence on the Eastern Flank. The 3SI has no militaryand defence component; it is intended for regional civilian development.
Therefore, we participate in two important regional formats, one on thedimension of collective defence, the other on the dimension of regional
development.8 Another proof that reflects the newly gained importanceof the 3SI is the fact that it was for the first time officially mentioned in
Romania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Activity Report in 2017.9

The Bucharest Summit and why it mattered
The Bucharest Summit of 2018 was important both because of its
decision to enhance the 3SI practical importance, as well as becauseof the high level representation that brought together a transatlantic
vision, as well as a more Eurocentric vision on the future of the region.
From the European perspective, the speech of Commissioner
for Regional Policy Corina Crețu, at the opening of the 3SI Summit,
underlined the economic approach focusing on cohesion andconvergence: ‘it is essentially about lessening the gap between Westernand Eastern Europe.’ For that, two prerequisites are needed: a strong
EU budget and the right resources at the right place (‘to the regions
still struggling with high unemployment, especially amongst young
people; to the regions who are on the frontline of the refugee crisis;to those who suffer the most from the side-effects of globalisation andtechnological change’), and in that scenario the 3SI plays a crucial rolein ensuring the success of connectivity projects.10
A similar perspective was that of the then European Commission
President Jean-Claude Juncker who underlined the virtues ofcooperation and spoke about the need for investment in thedevelopment of infrastructure as well as in the area of energy supply
and natural gas transportation.11
Another first at the Bucharest Summit was the presence of a German
official, invited by the Romanian president. Heiko Maas, the chief of theGerman diplomacy at the time, underlined Germany’s desire ‘to be abridge builder and moderator in the spirit of European unity’, while
proposing increasing Germany’s involvement in the initiative.12
What is also worth mentioning is the competitive vision of a closer
US relationship as the US Secretary for Energy Rick Perry was among
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participants at the event. He underlined the need for stronger
cooperation and emphasised that ‘the United States supports the core
principle of energy diversification as a key pillar of the 3 Seas Initiative’,promoting the development of the ‘critical infrastructure for a North—South energy corridor’ that in retrospect seems to be the right one.13
Speaking on Romania’s behalf, President Klaus Iohannis underscoredthe main objectives: ‘pro-economic development in the region,
pro-European Union and pro-transatlantic ties’ and the need ofinterconnectivity on the north—south axis.14 The 3SI progressed thenfrom concepts to practical aspects as seen from the organisation, forinstance, of the first edition of the 3SI Business Forum, as well as fromthe decision to create the 3SI Network of Chambers of Commerce andthe signing of the Letter of Intent in relation to the establishment of theThree Seas Investment Fund (3SIIF).15
It was a defining moment for Bucharest as emphasised by the Polishside: ‘from this moment on in the development of the Three Seas,
Bucharest has been striving to present to the public as the third driving
force behind the Initiative (after the initiators, Croatia and Poland)’.16 It
was a success since it was, according to the Romanian MFA, a summit withhigh stakes including economic (promoting the priority implementationof major regional interconnectivity projects; facilitating the relationshipof economic actors in the 3SI region and beyond, in order to identify new
business opportunities), policy (developing resilience and strengthening
the EU through growth), economic and social convergence (between EU
member states, as well as substantiation of the economic dimension of
the transatlantic relationship), image (increased visibility for Romania, atregional and Euro-Atlantic level, in the period immediately preceding
the taking over of the Presidency of the Council of the EU). At thesame time, the Bucharest Summit also marked the confirmation of theEuropean dimension of the Initiative.17 Moreover a list of priority projects
was adopted.18

After the Bucharest summit
The fourth Summit and second Business Forum were held on 5−6 June2019 in Brdo and Ljubljana respectively, and were meant to put into
practice the Bucharest Summit decisions. For Romania it was an146

opportunity to further enhance what was decided in Bucharest, witha focus on energy security in the region, especially the Bulgaria—
Romania—Hungary—Austria (BRUA) interconnector.19
The Covid-19 pandemic forced the organisation of a hybrid
summit as the Three Seas Virtual Summit and Web Forum held in
Tallinn on 19 October 2020 was the fifth summit to be held, but
the first organised in a unique hybrid format. 20 Romania attended
at the highest level through the virtual participation of President
Klaus Iohannis who stated: ‘Romania’s main objective is theimplementation of strategic interconnection projects, an important
step being the completion of the first phase of the natural gas
transmission project — the so-called BRUA project and the transition
to the implementation of the second phase. In the field of transport,
I would like to emphasise the special economic and strategic
importance of the railway line called Rail2Sea, which connects theports of Constanța and Gdansk, as well as the trans-European roadroute Via Carpathia.’ 21
Finally, the most recent summit was held on 8−9 July 2021 in Sofia,
Bulgaria22. As was the case during the previous summit, the focus ofRomania was on the infrastructure projects, the Rail2Sea and the Via
Carpathia.23 What was of importance for the Romanian side was thepresence of and dialogue with the US Congress delegation to thesummit. It was a signal of US support for the 3SI and an opportunity
for Romania to insist in favour of US support for a series of projects.
‘President Klaus Iohannis stressed the importance for Romania of theimplementation of the Rail2Sea and Via Carpathia projects and called
for a substantial US involvement, including financial, in these projects,
in order to strengthen its economic presence in the region, especiallythrough such projects of strategic nature.’24

Economic growth and resilience of the 3SI region andgreater interest among investors
The 3SI has a series of strategic objectives and Romania plays an active
part, yet national involvement differs in accordance with the objective.
As of 2021, Romania had registered a total of seven projects in various
stages of implementation.25
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Projects related to the economic growth and resilience, as well as
similar ones, came to fruition as a result of an insight of the foundersof 3SI — that the north and the south are not connected due to theircommunist past. ‘The initiators of 3SI remarked that the Soviet Union
had built land or rail access routes that connected only Russia to thesestates, but not between them, which led to a premeditated poor north—south connection behind the Iron Curtain. In general, Moscow saw amovement of troops from east to west and thus did not build anythingthat would directly connect the occupied countries after World War II.’26
As the above mentioned objectives are broad and transversal, in thisauthor’s opinion they require a dual approach: they require a strong
internal reform agenda and a strong internal support. Given this, manyof the transport projects are, from a formal point of view, at the top of
the agenda.
Two projects that stand out and that have been repeatedly
mentioned throughout the years by the officials are the Via Carpathia
and Rail2Sea projects, while the Fairway Danube is less frequently
mentioned. These are projects for which there is a constant interest in
attracting funding not only from the EU but also from the US as they
are considered vital in the recent context.27 The Romanian sectionsof these corridors have been mentioned in the national investments
programmes for transportation.28
Via Carpathia is intended to create a transport corridor from thenorthern part of Europe to the south through the Republic of Lithuania,
Republic of Poland, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Romania, Republic of
Bulgaria and Hellenic Republic (Greece). On the Romanian territory, it
involves the construction of new infrastructure along most of its length
or modernisation of some existing roads. The estimated total budget
is EUR 11.31 billion (85% secured), as of 2021. Via Carpathia represents
a strategic infrastructure project which captures the essence of the 3SI
approach: pro-economic growth, pro-transatlantic (it will better connect
EU and NATO member states) and pro-European, by filling an important
existing connectivity gap in terms of transportation in this region.29
The Rail2Sea project aims to construct a railway line between the portof Gdansk and the port of Constanţa, crossing four countries: Republicof Poland, Slovak Republic, Hungary and Romania. The total necessary
investment is estimated to be EUR 13,832.36 million without VAT ofwhich EUR 5,873.13 million is secured. The railway route has a greatcommercial potential because it unites the most important industrial
148

centres (Timişoara, Craiova, Bucharest) from Romania with the port ofConstanţa. The funding of some segments in this route has a special
commercial value, having a very high efficiency and thus fulfilling theconditions for financing on 3SI. The development of this system would
reduce the transit times on the Constanţa— Curtici corridor by at least
two hours; the digital infrastructure related to this investment would
become the main voice and data traffic network, which is linked to an
urban agglomeration of over 3.5 million inhabitants. This investment will
include passages, tunnels, and multimodal and intermodal stations, all ofwhich are duplicated by digital infrastructure and, of course, with Smart
City technologies for each and every part of the infrastructure. The
railway lines can be used also for the transport of passengers between
European states from the 3SI region in safe and security conditions.30
Finally, FAIRwayDanube has, as its general objective, the elaborationof coordinated action plans for the implementation of the Master Planfor the Fairway Rehabilitation and Maintenance on the Danube Riverand its navigable tributaries, developed within the EU Strategy for
the Danube Region. The project aims to contribute to an increased
safety, efficiency and environmental friendliness of inland navigation.
In Romania, the project aims to develop and acquire databases
for information obtained from hydrology, hydrography, signalling,
electronic mapping; computing systems and dissemination of waterlevel forecasts; innovative technologies by monitoring the signalling
scheme using aids to navigation equipment, the use of autonomous
land, air and water systems as a support for current administration
activities; and procedures and systems for identifying and monitoring
factors influencing airworthiness on the Romanian Danube sector. The
total amount of the project is EUR 21721347 out of which EUR 8704098
is allocated for the Romanian administrations, Lower Danube River
Administration (AFDJ) and the Administration of the Navigable Canals(ACN). The project is financed through the Connecting Europe Facility.31

Geopolitics
As seen above, Romania is focusing more on the 3SI from an economic
point of view and less from a geopolitical perspective. There is thestrong desire to bring together both the EU and the US in the region,
as seen from the previous summits’ manifestations and declarations.
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Recently a series of expert discussions in the region started the debate
of a more political role for the region in the great power competition of
the twenty-first century, yet this political component needs to be more
crystallised. Issues such as how the 3SI deals with the war in Ukraine
and with the possible inclusion in the region of Ukraine, Republic ofMoldova and Georgia are still incipient.

Energy security
Energy security is of the utmost importance for Romania in the region
and a national priority as such. The most recent initiative in this area isin the field of nuclear energy as Romania wants to attract US support inorder to ‘deploy “first-of-a-kind” US-built small modular reactors (SMR) by
2028’.32 It is also an official priority in the current governing programme:‘Completion of a first SMR project in one of the partner countries of theThree Seas Initiative (I3M) is essential to demonstrate the effectivenessof the strategy for replacing coal-fired power plants with SMRs. Romania
has all the prerequisites for the first development of SMRs in the region
on a 50 Hz system and maybe become a hub for the production of SMRs
in the region, as well as a base for training and support operation of thisnew technology in other countries under the Three Seas Initiative’.33
Yet before SMR the main focus from the energy point of view was
the BRUA gas transmission system meant to improve interconnectivity
in the region and to reduce energy dependence. The BRUA project
implies the development on the territory of Romania of the National Gas
Transmission System along the Bulgaria—Romania—Hungary—Austria
corridor (BRUA Phase 1 and 2), the enhancement of the bidirectional
gas transmission corridor (BRUA Phase 3) and finally the developmenton the territory of Romania of the Southern Gas Transmission Corridor
for taking gas from the Black Sea shore (Tuzla-Podisor). The total budget
is EUR 14.55 billion (0% secured) as of 2021. The implementation of the
BRUA project will ensure permanent bidirectional flows between theinterconnections of the Romanian National Gas Transmission System(NTS) with Bulgaria and Hungary.34

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Reliable, sustainable and inclusive connectivity
The element of novelty brought by the 3SI initiative is the emphasis
put on the development of the digital infrastructure of the region.
This development in the ICT sector would benefit both the region
and the EU in its capacity as a global actor. Moreover, ensuring betterinterconnectivity would enhance the digital expertise of the region’s
ICT hubs and their coordination capabilities and provide them with thenecessary collaborative input that could compensate for the lack of
capital invested in research and development.
One such project with which Romania is involved is the Digital
Platform on monitoring hydrographic bases in the 3SI region that aims
to create an intelligent digital platform for real time monitoring ofwater from hydrographic basins in the 3SI region, digital modelling ofpollutants, water discharge, risk analysis, calculation and monitoring ofwater currents. The budget is EUR 2.5 million (0% secured) as of 2021.35
Another project is the Transportation stock exchange in the 3SI region
that wants to create an intelligent digital platform with possibilities
to transpose transport services and international expansions, realtime transport of goods for the optimisation of transport services, theevidence of provisions and accessing information about the tariffs,
special services, incident evidence and transport journal. The total
budget is EUR 4.5 million (0% secured) as of 2021.36
As can be seen from the above mentioned objectives and official
statements, not all of them have the same practical importance in the
Romanian programmes. The focus remains as mentioned earlier on the
pragmatic side of the 3SI with a direct focus on digital and transport aswell as energy connectivity

Conclusions and recommendations
The 3SI has an immense potential in the region given the common
historical and geographical references as well as its level of ambitionand human resources. It is a singular integration initiative, which
originated in the region and which has a series of long-term objectives.
In order to realise north—south connectivity, time and money are
required, yet the rewards are greater than all the efforts necessary.
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What started out as an infrastructure completion based project
is now a project based on solidarity and cohesion. If it can overcome
the obstacles generated by divergent national interests, the need to
identify the required resources and a possible leadership competition,
the 3SI can bring a positive result to European cohesion and strengthen
the European economy.
The 3SI is a project that must not remain stuck in the bureaucratic
mind-set of a project-orientated structure. Giving its political support,
the 3SI can evolve further into becoming an engine of regional
development, especially in the context of granting Ukraine, Republicof Moldova and Georgia the status of EU candidate countries. The 3SI
can expand faster than the EU and include these three countries as anantechamber of the EU.
We need to put our individual differences/backgrounds aside inorder to do something more in the region and also we need to havethe bigger picture in mind as the 3SI needs to be put into the global
context in order to fully understand its potential in world competition.
For that reason, we need to understand that the war in Ukraine does
not only have a local or regional impact but a global one (for instance if
we take into consideration the global food crisis generated by the war).
For that purpose, a series of analyses should be carried out in order tosee how to reorganise economic circuits and production supply chainsin order to become more resilient and self-sufficient.
A Permanent Secretariat may be of use in order to coordinate
investments in the region. The 3SI is a great hope in the region andit should focus more on attracting investments also from Japan andSouth Korea, not solely from EU funds and the US. Further attention
should be invested in developing the financial infrastructure of theregion and in its consolidation.
Putting together the digital resources of the 3SI can compensate forthe insufficient investments funds needed for big ICT projects and newtechnologies development. A common pool of intellectual and physicalresources in the digital sector may prove decisive in shaping the digital
future, enhancing the research on artificial intelligence and so on.
The 3SI should also pay particular attention to the most important
yet the most vulnerable resource — the human resource. We need in
the region better human-centred policies, to create a safe and friendly
space, with guaranteed access to quality educational and medical152

services as a must, alongside all the perks of a modern society, for all
citizens in order to keep them here, convince those who have left toreturn and also to attract skilled human resources from all over theworld, based on the region’s needs. In the end it is about creating
throughout the 3SI a series of democratic and social states that would
become a model for the future.
The 3SI is becoming the powerhouse of the EU because of its
structure and has a bright future ahead as long as it takes the initiativeand creates a political identity. The future is yet to be written; however
we have all the ingredients needed for success.
ENDNOTESInițiativa celor Trei Mări (I3M) (Three Seas Initiative). Romanian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. http://mae.ro/node/49437
2
Chodakiewicz, M. J. 2016. Intermarium. The Land Between the Black and Baltic Seas.
Routledge.
3
Mesajul Președintelui României, Klaus Iohannis, transmis în cadrul Conferinței
internaționale dedicate marcării centenarului Alianței defensive dintre România și
Polonia — ‘Un singur popor, două drapele’ (Message of the President of Romania, Klaus
Iohannis, at the international conference dedicated to the centenary Romanian-Polish
Alliance — ‘One nation, two flags). 12.05.2021. Official website of the President of Romania.
https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/mesaje/mesajul-presedintelui-romaniei-klausiohannis-transmis-in-cadrul-conferintei-internationale-dedicate-marcarii-centenaruluialiantei-defensive-dintre-romania-si-polonia-un-singur-popor-doua-drapele
Moreover as a historical background in the interwar period Romania’s government
also spoke about a so-called Danubian Confederacy Romania, Poland, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, Austria and Yugoslavia meant to create an economic block in theregion. See more in: Sebe, M. 2011. Romanian Perspectives Regarding the Inter-war
Plans of Creating a ‘Danubian Confederation’. Toward a European Danube Strategy
avant la lettre. European Institute of Romania. http://ier.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/
publicatii/wp_31.pdf
4
Raport de activitate pentru anul 2016 [Activity Report for 2016]. Ministry of Transportation.
ht tp://www.mt.gov.ro/web14/documente/interes-public/rapoar te/RAPORT%20
final%202016.pdf
5
The Joint Statement On The Three Seas Initiative (The Dubrovnik Statement). 2018.
http://three-seas.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/DUBROVNIK.pdf
6
Reuniune la New York a liderilor statelor rivane Mărilor Adriatică, Baltică și Neagră. Klaus
Iohannis: Regiunea „celor trei mări’ ar trebui să vizeze integrarea pe scară globală, atât
cu Asia Centrală și Africa, cât și cu regiunea euroatlantică extinsă [High-level meetingin New York between representatives of riparian countries to the Adriatic, Baltic, andBlack Seas. Klaus Iohannis: ‘The three seas’ region should aim to a global integration,with Central Asia and Africa, and the broader Euro-Atlantic region’], 30.09.2015. Calea
Europeana. http://www.caleaeuropeana.ro/reuniune-la-new-york-a-liderilor-statelorrivane-marilor-adriatica-baltica-si-neagra-klaus-iohannis-regiunea-celor-trei-mari-artrebui-sa-vizeze-integrarea-pe-scara-globala-atat/
1

153

Previous Summits. 2022. Three Seas Initiative. http://three-seas.eu/previous-summits/
Discursul Președintelui României, domnul Klaus Iohannis, susţinut cu prilejul primiriișefilor de misiuni și a consulilor generali cu ocazia Reuniunii Anuale a Diplomației
Române [Speech of the President of Romania, Klaus Iohannis, to the Diplomatic Corps
during the Annual Meeting of Romanian Diplomacy]. 30.09.2017. Official website of the
President of Romania. https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/agenda-presedintelui/
discursul-presedintelui-romaniei-domnul-klaus-iohannis-sustinut-cu-prilejul-primiriisefilor-de-misiuni-si-a-consulilor-generali-cu-ocazia-reuniunii-anuale-a-diplomatieiromane
9
Raportul Anual al Ministerul Afacerilor Externe. 2017. [Annual Report of the Ministryof Foreign Affairs. 2017]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mae.ro/sites/
default/files/file/anul_2018/17072018_raportul_anual_al_ministerului_afacerilor_
externe_2017.pdf
10Speech of Commissioner Cretu at the Three Seas Initiative Summit — Conference‘The 3 Seas Initiative as a catalyst towards cohesion and convergence in the EU’.
18.09.2018. European Commission. https://web.archive.org/web/20181003093036/
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/cretu/announcements/
speech-commissioner-cretu-three-seas-initiative-summit-conference-3-seasinitiative-catalyst-towards_en
11Juncker, la summitul I3M: Investiţiile nu au sens dacă lipseşte respectul faţă destatul de drept [Juncker at the TSI Summit: Investments make no sense without
the rule of law], 18.09.2018. Digi 24. https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/politica/juncker-la-summitul-i3m-investitiile-nu-au-sens-daca-lipseste-respectulfata-de-statul-de-drept-998610?_ _grsc=cookieIsUndef0&_ _gr ts=51242091&_ _grua=355797456e3e6e5be830df39aa1e4901&__grrn=1. Message of President
Juncker at the Three Seas Initiative Summit. 18.09.2018. https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=ezQ8XUt2sFI
12
Germany wants to fully participate in the Three Seas Initiative. !9.09.2018. Remix
News. https://rmx.news/article/germany-wants-fully-participate-three-seas-initiative/.
Primirea de către Președintele României, domnul Klaus Iohannis, a ministrului
afacerilor externe al Republicii Federale Germania, domnul Heiko Maas [President ofRomania, Mr. Klaus Iohannis, received the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal
Republic of Germany, Mr. Heiko Maas]. 27.08.2018. Official website of the Presidentof Romania. https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/agenda-presedintelui/primirea-decatre-presedintele-romaniei-domnul-klaus-iohannis-a-ministrul-afacerilor-externeal-republicii-federale-germania-domnul-heiko-maas
13
U.S. Secretary of Energy Rick Perry at the Three Seas Initiative Business Forum.
20.09.2018. US Embassy in Romania. https://ro.usembassy.gov/secretary-of-energyrick-perry-at-the-three-seas-initiative-business-forum/
14
Alocuțiunea Președintelui României, domnul Klaus Iohannis, susținută în cadrul
sesiunii plenare „An Initiative which delivers — key projects in energy, transport, digitalinterconnections. The 3SI as catalyst for the cohesion and convergence of the EU andfor the strengthening of the transatlantic link’ [Speech by the President of Romania,
Mr. Klaus Iohannis, at the plenary session, „An Initiative which delivers — key projects
in energy, transport, digital interconnections. The 3SI as catalyst for the cohesion
and convergence of the EU and for the strengthening of the transatlantic link’].
18.09.2018. Official website of the President of Romania. https://www.presidency.
ro/ro/media/discursuri/alocutiunea-presedintelui-romaniei-domnul-klaus-iohannissustinuta-in-cadrul-sesiunii-plenare-an-initiative-which-delivers-key-projects-in7
8154

energy-transport-digital-interconnections-the-3si-as-catalyst-for-the-cohesion-andconvergence-of-the-eu-and-for-the-strengthening-of-the-transatlantic-link
15
Joint Declaration of the Third Summit of the Three Seas Initiative 18.09.2018. 3 Seas
Initiative Summit. http://three-seas.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/BUCHARESTSUMMIT-JOINT-DECLARATION.pdf
16
Lewandowski, P. 2022. The Warsaw-Bucharest axis and Romania’ s place in the Three
Seas initiative? Polish-Romanian Leadership in the Three Seas Initiative (3SI). Wschód
Europy. Studia humanistyczno-społeczne. 7. 45-59. 10.17951/we.2021.7.2.45-59.
17
Raportul Anual al Ministerul Afacerior Externe. 2018 [Annual Report of the Ministryof Foreign Affairs. 2018] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mae.ro/sites/default/
files/file/anul_2021/2021_pdf/1final_raport_mae_2018_-_varianta_aprobata.pdf
18
The Three Seas Initiative. 2019. Priority Interconnection Projects. https://www.presidency.
ro/files/userfiles/Lista_regionala_de_proiecte_prioritare_de_interconectare_I3M.pdf
19
Declarații de presă susținute de Președintele României, domnul Klaus Iohannis, înaintea
participării la Summitul Inițiativei celor Trei Mări [Press Statements by the Presidentof Romania, Mr. Klaus Iohannis, before the Three Seas Initiative Summit]. 05.07.2019.
Official website of the President of Romania. https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/
agenda-presedintelui/declaratii-de-presa-sustinute-de-presedintele-romanieidomnul-klaus-iohannis-inaintea-participarii-la-summitul-initiativei-celor-trei-mari
20
Three Seas Initiative. 2020. Tallinn Summit 2020. https://3seas.eu/about/past-summits/tallinn-summit-2020
21
Conferința de presă susținută de Președintele României, domnul Klaus Iohannis [Press
Conference by the President of Romania, Mr. Klaus Iohannis].19.09.2020. Official
website of the President of Romania. https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/declaratiide-presa/conferinta-de-presa-sustinuta-de-presedintele-romaniei-domnul-klausiohannis1603124062
22
Three Seas Initiative. 2021. Sofia Summit 2021. https://3seas.eu/about/past-summits/
sofia-summit-2021
23
Declarații de presă susținute de Președintele României, domnul Klaus Iohannis,înaintea participării la Summitul Inițiativei celor Trei Mări [Press Statements by the
President of Romania, Mr. Klaus Iohannis, before the Three Seas Initiative Summit].
09.07.2021. Official website of the President of Romania. https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/agenda-presedintelui/declaratii-de-presa-sustinute-inaintea-participariila-summitul-initiativei-celor-trei-mari-sofia-republica-bulgaria
24Întrevederea Președintelui României, Klaus Iohannis, cu senatorii care conduc delegația
Congresului SUA participantă la Summitul Inițiativei celor Trei Mări [Meeting between the
President of Romania, Klaus Iohannis, and the Senators leading the delegation of the US
Congress at the Three Seas Initiative Summit]. 09.07.2021. Official website of the Presidentof Romania. https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/comunicate-de-presa/intrevedereapresedintelui-romaniei-klaus-iohannis-cu-senatorii-care-conduc-delegatia-congresuluisua-participanta-la-summitul-initiativei-celor-trei-mari-sofia-8-iulie-2021
25
Three Seas Initiative. 2021. Status Report of 2021. https://projects.3seas.eu/report26Mădălin Necșuțu, De la Intermarium la Inițiativa celor Trei Mări: cum pot limita foștii
sateliți ai URSS influența Rusiei în Europa [From Intermarium to the Three Seas Initiative.
How can the former satellite countries of the USSR limit the Russian influence in Europe].
27.09.2021. Veridica. https://www.veridica.ro/ro/editoriale/de-la-intermarium-lainitiativa-celor-trei-mari-cum-pot-limita-fostii-sateliti-ai-urss-influenta-rusiei-in-europa
27
Ministerul Transporturilor, Infrastructurii și Comunicațiilor salută intenția partenerului
strategic, Statele Unite ale Americii, de a sprijini construirea unei autostrăzi și a unei155căi ferate între România și Polonia [The Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure andCommunications welcomes the intention of the strategic partner, the United Statesof America, to support the construction of a highway and a railway between Romania
and Poland]. 10.10.2020. Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure. http://www.mt.gov.
ro/web14/spatiul-media/comunicate-de-presa/3134-10102020
28
Sorin Grindeanu: „Aprobarea Programului Investițional este un asumat de către
România în cadrul PNRR, care trebuia aprobat până la sfârșitul anului 2021 și
ministerul pe care îl conduc s-a ținut de cuvânt. Programul este în același timp și ocondiție favorizantă pentru aprobarea noului cadru financiar multi-anual 2021—
2027. Prin aprobarea acestui act normative se vizează o schimbare de pradigmă cese concentrează pe un set clar de priorități investiționale care să dezvolte rețeaua
națională de transport, fie ea rutieră, feroviară, aeriană, navală sau multimodală’[Sorin Grindeanu: „The approval of the Investment Program is a milestone assumed
by Romania within the PNRR, which had to be approved by the end of 2021 andthe ministry I lead has kept its word. At the same time, the program is a favourable
condition for the approval of the new multiannual financial framework 2021-2027. The
approval of this normative act aims at a change of paradigm that focuses on a clear
set of investment priorities that will develop the national transport network, be it road,rail, air, naval or multimodal’]. 30.12.2021. Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure.
http://www.mt.gov.ro/web14/spatiul-media/comunicate-de-presa/3721-30122021-2
29
Via Carpatia. 2022. Three Seas Initiative. https://projects.3seas.eu/projects/via-carpatiasubmitted-by-romania
30
Rail2Sea. 2022. Three Seas Initiative. https://projects.3seas.eu/projects/rail-2-seamodernization-and-development-of-railway-line-gdansk(pl)-constanta-(ro)31
FAIRwayDanube. 2022. Three Seas Initiative. https://projects.3seas.eu/projects/fairwaydanube
32
Joint Statement on the Seventh Round of the Strategic Dialogue between the UnitedStates and Romania. 10.11.2021. US Department of State. https://www.state.gov/jointstatement-on-the-seventh-round-of-the-strategic-dialogue-between-the-unitedstates-and-romania/
33
Program De Guvernare 2021—2024. Coaliția pentru reziliență, dezvoltare și
prosperitate [Governing Programme 2021—2024. The Coalition for resilience,development and prosperity]. https://gov.ro/fisiere/programe_fisiere/Program_de_
Guvernare_2021%E2%80%942024.pdf
34
BRUA. 2022. Three Seas Initiative. https://projects.3seas.eu/projects/brua-developmenton-the-territory-of-romania-of-the-national-gas-transmission-system-along-thecorridor-bulgaria-romania-hungary-austria-(brua-phase-1-and-2)-and-enhancementof-the-bidirectional-gas-transmission-corridor-bulgaria-romania-hungary-austria(brua-phase-3)-and-the-development-on-the-territory-of-romania-of-the-southern-gastransmission-corridor-for-taking-over-gas-from-the-black-sea-shore-(black-sea-podisor)
35
Digital Platform on monitoring hydrographic bases in the 3SI region. 2022. Three
Seas Initiative. https://projects.3seas.eu/projects/digital-platform-on-monitoringhydrographic-bases-in-the-3si-region
36
Transportation stock exchange in the 3SI region. 2022. Three Seas Initiative. https://projects.3seas.eu/projects/transportation-stock-exchange-in-the-3si-region

156

Slovakia: Strengthening
regional position andaddressing new challenges
Lucia Mokrá

The fundamental objective of the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) is connectedto the cooperation of states for the development of infrastructure in
the energy, transport and digital sectors. There are objectives focusedon the increase of new investments, economic growth and, last but
not least, energy security. The Slovak Republic and its foreign policyin particular, determined by the government’s programme declaration
but also by medium-term strategy, establishes the basic framework of
its activities also in this international initiative. The Slovak Republic since2020 has adopted or revised a number of strategic documents andframed the discussion as well as concrete policies (especially European
policy, but also security and defence policy) at the centre of discussion
and policymaking. Given the specific nature of European politics, which
is very much a domestic agenda with a direct impact on Slovak citizens,
the government has already made a strong pro-European and, in thecontext of security policy, transatlantic stance when it was inaugurated.
Since then, we can again explicitly see concrete pro-European steps,
which during the last decade were rather an implicit part of domestic
policy and in many cases subsumed under the general concept of
foreign policy. The changing foreign policy environment, significant
stimuli as well as the behaviour of some actors, including specific states,
have brought many questions to the formulation of Slovak Republic’s
foreign policy in the medium term, including the need to innovate, forexample, migration policy strategy or security strategy. The content
and scope of these strategies are also strongly determined by the
Slovak Republic’s membership of the European Union (EU), but also in
the light of various regional collaborations; therefore we analyse how
the Slovak Republic’s foreign policy priorities, particularly security andeconomic ones, have shifted in the new decade.
157

Security policy in the EU and Slovak position
The Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic of 2005 was adopted after
the Slovak Republic’s accession to the EU and NATO and identifies
a broad spectrum of threats — ‘failing states, the growth of power
influence of some countries, the use of information technologies
for terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc.,
and basically “timelessly” names the security interests of the Slovak
Republic, the goals and means of security policy’.1 At the same time, theSlovak Republic security strategy contains a provision which foresees
its revision ‘as necessary to reflect fundamental changes in the security
environment’.2 We consider that the developments in Ukraine since2014 in particular represent a fundamental change in the security
environment in Europe of a long-term nature, which was also confirmedby the government of the Slovak Republic adopting operational
measures to minimise security risks in 2014 (e.g. Government
Resolution No 236/2014) and continues through the current ongoingaggression on Ukrainian territory. These had been reasons, together
with others identified as follows, to revise the Security Strategy of the
Slovak Republic, which had been only partly achieved. The renewed
strategy had been unanimously adopted by the government of
the Slovak Republic in 2017, but never got to the parliament (theNational Council of the Slovak Republic).3 The aim of the presented
material was to replace the Security Strategy of the Slovak Republicfrom 2005, thus responding to fundamental changes in the security
environment and new security threats. The strategy itself reflected theinterconnectedness of the internal and external dimensions of security
and thus the need for a comprehensive approach to security policy,
while the continuity of the pro-European and pro-Atlantic orientationof the security policy of the Slovak Republic, based on a broad politicalconsensus, remains the main basis of the strategy.4
The security challenges which have been present in Europe sincethen, including pandemics, cyberattacks and the invasion of a sovereignneighbouring country, led the new government established in March
2020 to prepare after sixteen years a new strategy, which was adopted
by the National Council of the Slovak Republic on 27 January 2021.5 The
Security Strategy notes that global security has deteriorated in a numberof ways, which has a direct impact on the security and resilience of the158

Slovak Republic. The threats and challenges we face are, according
to the strategy, increasingly complex, interconnected, immediateand have greater implications for the Slovak Republic’s security. The
strategy recalls that the global pandemic, particularly in 2019—2020,
has made some vulnerabilities more visible. It has also accelerated
and deepened already existing trends of weakening multilateralism,
renewed geopolitical rivalry, assertive pursuit of individual interests
and the continued instability in Europe’s neighbourhood and regional
crises around the world. Accordingly, we identify the following areas
which the Slovak Republic, within its transatlantic security setting,considers the most significant as potential risks for the country as well
as for the neighbouring EU territory.

Russian aggression — from Crimea annexation
to invasion in 2022 — changes in the security
and challenges to energy sector
Slovakian relations with Russia could be characterised as getting colder
up to 2014, after the Crimea annexation by Russia, in contradiction tointernational law. The Slovak Republic had also presented its position
by supporting the UN General Assembly Resolution calling uponstates not to recognise changes in the status of the Crimea region6 andconfirming that the Slovak Republic considered Russia’s behaviour aviolation of international law.
The Slovak Republic takes a strong stance on obligations comingfrom international law and has always supported the UN in the adoptionof strategic political positions by UN General Assembly Resolutions7
as well as in an unified way supported the EU position adopted in thearea of external relations of the EU to Russia. The particular questions
formulated by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and International Relations of 25 February 20228 in relation to the illegal
annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol had been also communicated by
Slovak political representatives.
Nord Stream 2 and the Slovak position. Contemporary relations
between Slovakia and Russia are following EU policy goals, including thedraft of the Nord Stream 2 project, which had been mainly supportedby Germany. The Slovak Republic was together with other Central and159

Eastern Europe (CEE) countries not strongly in support of the buildingof Nord Stream 2 because of the draft proposal to connect Russia
and Germany through the Baltic Sea region and bypasses the transit
region of CEE. ‘The Nord Stream 2 is designated to be another key
gas pipeline supplying Europe with Russian gas (together with YamalEurope, Brotherhood and Nord Stream pipelines). The announcementof building a twin-sister to Nord Stream was made in 2015 by Gazprom
jointly with five major European energy companies, and ever since itis one of the most controversial and dividing projects in the EU. Nord
Stream 2 copies the route of the Nord Stream, connecting Russia
directly with Germany (bypassing transit countries), and should double
the existing supply capacity of Nord Stream.’9
With negative implications especially to Slovak energy security, theNord Stream 2 project was perceived as the practical implication of theRussian ambition to impact European policies by using gas supplies.
‘It is the completion of the second Nord Stream that will enable theRussians to transport 55 billion cubic metres more gas to Europe than
before. In 2019, for example, Russia exported up to 135 billion cubic
metres of gas to the EU, of which 95 billion were consumed by German
consumers alone.’10 As Wertlen argues, ‘Russia plays an important rolein the EU’s energy security discourse’.11
The latest events of 2022 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine confirm theusage of energy transit as a geopolitical tool. The EU including Slovakia
had adopted a strategic position and the Commission announced toradically decrease dependency on Russian gas within two years at thelatest.12 The Commission’s REPowerEU plan13 in a precise way introduces
the ambition to eliminate Europe’s dependence on Russian gas by 2030.
It focuses on two main objectives: ensuring the security of the gas supply
and accelerating the deployment of renewable energy sources, including
energy efficiency measures. These measures are designed to reduce
Europe’s dependence on Russian gas by two-thirds by 2023. Although
the Slovak position in the Council is clear, there is some mitigation by
Slovak MEPs in relation to the cut in Russian gas, as presented in recent
interviews.14 In sum, the message to transfer to more sustainable energy
resources and the necessity to simultaneously eliminate fossil fuels anddependency on Russia is however present. As one MEP states: ‘Cutting
ourselves off from Russian fossil fuels is both a necessity for our European
future and our moral obligation towards Ukraine.’15
160

The gas and oil embargoes also dominated the EU’s open proposals
as part of the fifth package of EU sanctions towards Russia. It is theirdisconnection or the cut of imports that would cause significant
economic problems for Slovakia’s industry, which is 100% dependent on
oil and 86% dependent on gas. Despite the announced efforts of somecountries not to support sanctions against Russia, the fifth package ofsanctions includes a coal ban.16 However, proposals to restrict gas oroil supplies are still under negotiation, not least in the wake of Russia’s
demand for payments only in roubles, which contradicts the sanctions
already adopted. Some member states have already presented thepossibility of vetoing such measures, as this could fundamentallyjeopardise the functioning of a country and its economy. Among thecountries under discussion is Slovakia, where the united position of thegoverning coalition is subject to the agreement of the coalition parties
and, given the economic impact, is currently generating a very broad
debate, with strong political, even electoral, potential.17

Digital challenges and cyber attacks“The need for the concept of cyberspace stems from the natural
human need to place objects, events and processes into space. Today,
cyberspace serves to satisfy a wide variety of human needs, frominformation gathering, to socialization, to entrepreneurship, to crime.”18
The cyberspace and digitalisation is present also in the security sector
and today even more frequently became under the threat of cyberattacks.
Cyberspace became integral part of security also within the NATOdefinition, alongside “with three traditional military battlefields (land,seas, air) a fourth battlefield — space had been added, and subsequently
the existence of cyberspace had been identified as the newest one.”19
Cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns had also been
identified by the Slovak authorities as threats to the security
environment and therefore a new law regulating protection before
cyberattacks and the enforcement of the strategic priorities connected
to digital development had also been adopted. In line with the national
legislation on cybersecurity (Law no. 69/2018 Coll. of laws), the following
measures were adopted: a national cybersecurity strategy and a single
cybersecurity information system, as well as security measures and a161

cybersecurity assurance system, monitoring and auditing compliancewith this law. Having efficient national legislation allows for a verytransparent way of dealing with the situation of an identified breachof the cybersecurity environment in Slovakia by the expulsion of three
Russian diplomats in October 2020, after the Slovak Information Service
published a report on hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns.20
Although the expulsion of diplomats and the use of persona non grata
status is considered a serious disruption of friendly bilateral relations,even the 2020 expulsion did not stop Russia from continuing its
illegitimate and illegal activities on the territory of the Slovak Republic.
In March 2022, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the
Slovak Republic decided to reduce the number of Russian diplomatic
staff in Slovakia by 35 diplomats, in line with Article 11 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. As argued by Minister Korčok:‘This step is a necessary reaction to the continuation of activities of theRussian Embassy staff, which are contrary to the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations, the interests of the Slovak Republic and thedevelopment of partnership relations with the Russian Federation. In
this context, we regret to note that, following the previous expulsions of
Russian diplomats in the last two years, the Russian diplomatic mission
has shown no interest in acting correctly on our territory.’21
Cyberattacks have highlighted problematic areas in digital security
in Slovakia. Despite the 2018 legislation, the reality has shown that thelack of a developed digital environment may have contributed to abusesby foreign powers. Thus, the government’s programme declaration
listed the development of digital services, the digital economy andthe digitalisation of society among its key priorities. The Programmeof the Government stated the following obligation: ‘To support thedevelopment of digital services in the state, the government will review
the regulatory burden and remove outdated regulations that hinder thedevelopment of the digital economy. The government will also support
new developments that contribute to new forms of digital economy.
The government of the Slovak Republic will ensure an appropriate
legislative framework to ensure that public administration is preparedand equipped for the adoption and use of digital technologies andwill create the conditions for a qualitative change in the functioningof public administration based on the principles of digitalisation. The
government of the Slovak Republic will also translate these objectives
162into long-term strategies for the new EU programming period in linewith the Digital Transformation Strategy of the Slovak Republic.’22
Special attention as well as modification is required forthe cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, where the recently
adopted Slovak Republic security policy has put into practice thegovernment’s priority aimed at the development and protectionof critical infrastructure and thus fulfilled the commitment from theprogramme declaration: ‘Information and operational security andprotection of critical infrastructure is a critical factor in the increasing
computerisation of society. The Slovak Republic government willconduct a thorough audit of cyber and information security and criticalinfrastructure. Government security policy by systematic measures
will encourage investment in ‘know how’, technology and a workforce
experienced in cyber and information security.’23 As one of the security
priorities, cybersecurity had been assigned to a newly establisheddepartment within the Ministry of Investments, Regional Development
and Informatisation of the Slovak Republic.

Migration policy
The Slovak Republic considers uncoordinated migration to be oneof the identified security risks according to the 2020 Government
Programme, although it considers migration to be a natural part ofhuman existence. The 2015 migration crisis has exposed many of
the risks associated with unmanaged migration flows and the EU’s
uncoordinated approach. The government of the Slovak Republic aims
to focus its efforts on ensuring that the legitimate interests of the Slovak
Republic are taken into account in the formulation of a new European
migration and asylum policy. The government therefore intended toassess the possibilities of centralising these agendas in one place formore efficient management on the national level and had prepared andapproved a new Migration Policy for the period to 2025.24 According to
the document ‘Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic for the period
to 2025’, the Slovak Republic underlined as the requested strategic
priorities in the field of migration ‘mainly labour mobility, ensured bylegal framework and managed in accordance with the needs of the
Slovak economy, the reintegration of Slovak citizens coming from163

abroad, integration of foreigners into Slovak society, as an integral
aspect of successful, managed migration, and an effective approach in
the area of return policy. In the field of migration, the Slovak Republicalso ensures the granting of international protection in accordance withthe legal order and to provide assistance in the humanitarian field andin developing countries.’25 What is actually not addressed in almost
any manner but related to migration policy, are the economic or fiscal
aspects of migration. The Slovak Republic has been predominantly acountry with experience of out-migrants, but nowadays, also due tothe decline in the birth-rate, it is struggling with the new phenomenonof a missing (skilled) workforce. Legal migration, especially economic
migration, or the effective management of the process of reception of
persons fleeing persecution and seeking asylum, is a tool by which the
Slovak Republic can contribute both to the fulfilment of its international
human rights obligations and to the filling of jobs.

How attractive is the business environment
in Slovakia?
These strategic security challenges, also set out in the Security Strategy,
are framed by contemporary geopolitical challenges. However, in termsof international positioning, these are not only security challenges, butalso related political and economic challenges. Thus, every politicalrepresentation is faced with the challenge of ensuring economic growthand presenting the country in a way that makes it not only interesting
but also economically attractive to investors and innovation.
The Slovak Republic is no exception and keeping the economic
environment attractive requires constant investment in the working
environment, strengthening the rule of law, but also supporting economic
development. According to statistics, the Slovak Republic experienced
the highest average growth of added value in the industrial production in
the Central and East European countries.26 As proof of this statement we
can use an indicator of GDP development over the last 5 years27:
Year

2016

2017

2018

2019

2021

Real GDP growth

2,1%

3,0%

3,7%

2,5%

4,9%

164

A healthy economic environment requires investment in development
directly from internal sources, mainly for two reasons: to ensure
continuity of development and to foster innovation, but also to ensurethat the national economic environment is competent and attractive toinvestors. For these reasons, the Slovak Republic and its governments
over the past decade have also introduced specific activities andmeasures to improve the quality of the business environment and makeexternal investment more attractive.
These measures may include the adoption of Research andDevelopment related tax regime in 2015, launch of official dual
education system in 2015 and decreased corporate income tax rate to21%, electricity price discount for energy intensive manufacturers in2019 or new social legislation on taxes and social contributions which
always enters into force by January 1st of actual year. With the pandemic
restrictions, the acceleration to introduction of Kurzarbeit mechanism
for ensuring retention of jobs during the crisis had been adopted.28
At first insight, it would seem that the Slovak Republic has all theprerequisites and is a significantly attractive investment environment.
In terms of international economic evaluation in the European Unionarea, in 2021 it represents the 1st place in the EU in the export of goods(76.3%) and the 4th place in the export of goods and services together(85.7%).29 The official presentation materials informed about the fact,that Slovakia ranks no. 12 in the world in the Open Markets Index
assessing openness to trade, trade policy settings, FDI openness andtrade-enabling infrastructure.30 However, to draw overall picture, there
are other sources on the state of the business environment in the Slovak
Republic. Every year the Government of the Slovak Republic discusses
the material Report on the state of the business environment, whichcontains an assessment of the state and development of the businessenvironment in the Slovak Republic in comparison with its evaluationby the World Bank (Doing Business) and other international evaluation
organizations and at the same time to specify and point out someproblems affecting the quality of the Slovak business environment andto propose measures for their elimination or mitigation of their impact.
The last available report for 2020 indicates that economic activity has
been negatively affected by the measures put in place to prevent the
spread of the coronavirus. A downturn in the economy was recorded
during 2020, and the Slovak economy is expected to continue to develop
165negatively in the future due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic
in the context of the restrictions. For this reason, the governmentis also preparing and adopting measures to support the businessenvironment both from the state budget and from EU funds. According
to the Report on the State of the Business Environment in the Slovak
Republic for 2020, measures to reduce the cost of electricity, which
are also proving crucial at present, and support for the co-operationof business entities with research and development organisations areamong the most important. These were intended to support innovative
projects, but administrative complexity and, in principle, infrastructuralunpreparedness severely limit this essential measure in its application.
Financial support from the European and investment structural funds
appears to be an important contribution to the development of theeconomy as well as to the attractiveness of the business environment.
However, the Slovak Republic has long had problems both with theabsorption of funds from the so-called EU funds and with subsequentcorrections. A new instrument at the level of financial support from the
EU — the Resilience and Recovery Fund — creates significant scope forthe future. And although the Slovak Republic has submitted its National
Recovery and Resilience Plan and strategic materials to the European
Commission for approval among the first Member States, to date, in
several areas, the calls themselves have not even been launched.
The Recovery Plan for the Slovak Republic includes component
14 (out of 18 overall), which includes activities and measures that are
aimed at improving the business environment. Among them, efficientpublic administration and digitalisation are considered as strategicareas.31 The Slovak Republic thus plans to support measures to reduce
the regulatory burden on business, to adopt new legislation to unify
and computerise the isolation procedure process, to reform the public
procurement system and to invest in the digitisation of processes overthe next 2 years. This would create space for making the businessenvironment more attractive. However, the limitation in terms of theabove, based on the data from the previous evaluation of the use offinancial resources from EU funds32, is precisely the low rate of use andthe excessive burden on the final beneficiaries. From the point of viewof effective implementation, it is thus essential that the Governmentof the Slovak Republic adopts measures that will also be applicableand admissible from the point of view of recovery and resilience in the166current economic environment, which is still facing the challenges andnegative impacts of the aforementioned security crisis, the energy crisis
and also the humanitarian crisis in connection with Russia’s aggression
in Ukraine.

Conclusions and recommendations
The Slovak Republic is one of the slowest to respond to new security
threats in the Central and South-Eastern European grouping. The
adoption of the Security Strategy in 2021, sixteen years after the original
strategy was adopted in the wake of a clear Euro-Atlantic orientation,highlights the problems associated with the national political scene
and its explicit expression or implementation of concrete actions
in a flexible and targeted manner towards specific threats. The post2020 period has brought challenges for Slovakia that have had tobe addressed in a fundamental way. Pandemics, new cyber threats,
energy shortages related to the crisis situation in Ukraine, culminatingin Russia’s illegal invasion of its neighbouring country, have forced
political leaders across the political spectrum to adopt a new Security
Strategy for Slovakia, but also to act.
The last two years have confirmed that Slovakia has the capacity andcapability to act, including the adoption of legislative changes to meetits foreign and security policy commitments to the EU, but also to its
citizens. In this context, it is necessary to draw attention to two topics
in which, however, the Slovak Republic has a different security set-up
compared to neighbouring countries. These are energy resources andmigration policy. In terms of energy resources, the Slovak Republic is
still inclined towards the use of ‘traditional’ fossil energy resources,
similar to Poland, although in this area we also see a shift towards
the adoption of policy decisions related to the transformation of theso-called mining regions. However, the smooth transfer to the use ofalternative resources is still a long way off. At the same time, in thearea of reducing dependence on gas and oil from Russia, we see aresistant attitude on the part of one of the coalition parties in Slovakia,
similar to that of Hungary on this issue. Given that the Minister for the
Slovak Republic can only vote in the Council in the way that the Slovak
government, as a collective body under the Slovak Constitution, has167

obliged him to do by resolution, there is still political room for a national
consensus to be reached in a way that is compatible with the European
Commission’s proposal. In the area of migration policy, however, we
continue to see a rather rigid attitude of the Slovak Republic towards
the management of migration and its perception as a security risk. Even
the government’s own programme statement continues to point to thenecessity of external border security, managing migration on the basisof the principle of subsidiarity and a strict approach to the adoptionof European legislation limiting migration, which, in a narrower sense,
could border on the principle of non-refoulement. However, theRussian invasion of Ukraine has shown the practical solidarity that the
Slovak Republic has been able to implement in the case of migrationfrom Ukraine, in a similar way to other countries in the region, including
Poland, Hungary and non-EU Moldova. Within this framework, I see
room for the adaptation and implementation of a migration policy thatis not primarily perceived as a security risk, but which distinguishes
between legal and illegal migration, especially of an economic nature,and refugees fleeing to the safe space of an EU member state in orderto save their own lives and human dignity.
On the other hand, in the area of economic development and theability to respond to new economic challenges, including in the context
of recovery and strengthening resilience as a way of coping with theconsequences of the pandemic crisis in particular, the Slovak Republichas demonstrated a strong ability to respond in a proactive andprofessional manner. The excellent level of elaboration of the National
Recovery Plan and its approval also creates room for strengthening
the economic environment, but also for strengthening actors andcombating new economic, security or cyber threats in the wake ofdigitalisation in a number of policies and in the public space in general.
With its geographical location in the centre of Europe, the Slovak
Republic enjoys a strategic position. In terms of security and stability ofthe political and economic environment, it was considered one of thesafest and most stable countries for the period 202133. A combinationof other factors, such as membership in the European Union, Eurozone
and NATO, undoubtedly contributed to this assessment. From an
economic point of view, there are valuable mainly factors such as a
cost-effective, skilled and loyal labour force with excellent multilingual
skills or the openness of the economy.34 Declared attractive investment
168

surrounding is rather existing in number of schemes, but the reality
differs. The Slovak Republic has a long way to go to actually deliveron its plans, both in the economy and in strengthening the security
environment. Social, political and economic developments in the
country and in the region point to the need to have a responsible
degree of flexibility in the targets and indicators set to respond to newchallenges, including unpredictable ones such as energy resource
constraints, armed conflict, cyber-attack or democratic backsliding.
However, even with flexibility and the ability to make decisions in
response to current developments and challenges or even threats, it
is important to point out that a country, and any governing politicalelite at any given time, must have a framework and benchmarks
for its actions. The adoption of strategic documents, follow-up
action plans and implementation without excessive administrative
burdens, especially in the digital age, will create the space for real
implementation aimed at eliminating threats, including their negative
impact on citizens. However, with such tools comes accountability
and the space to enforce it. Economic challenges and security threats
should thus be regularly assessed and the subsequent application offurther measures should be based on expert judgement, of course
in a strategic geopolitical context. This means, however, that fromlong-time perspective strategies have to be based on fundamental
values and their protection. Precisely those values that we share withother countries, whether in the European Union or in other respectedinternational organisations.
However, subsequent policies and specific decisions must be
responsive and reflective of emerging and rapidly evolving situations,weighing both positive and negative impacts and making decisions
for the benefit of the whole country. An example of the necessity of
rapid action in the conditions of the Slovak Republic would be secure
digitisation and the creation of a cyberspace capable of reflecting
security threats, or legal, regulated migration with a positive fiscal
effect.

169

ENDNOTES
Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic. 27.05.2019. National Council of the Slovak
Republic. https://www.mosr.sk/data/files/4264_bezpecnostna-strategia-sr-2005.pdf
2
Article 81 of the Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic. 27.05.2019. National Councilof the Slovak Republic. https://www.mosr.sk/data/files/4264_bezpecnostna-strategiasr-2005.pdf
3Government Resolution No. 459/2017 of 04.10.2017. https://rokovania.gov.sk/RVL/Resolution/16591/1
4
Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic — draft. LP/2017/627. Ministry of Justice of
the Slovak Republic. https://www.slov-lex.sk/legislativne-procesy/-/SK/dokumenty/
LP-2017-627
5The Government of the Slovak Republic by its Resolution No. 803 of 16 December
2020 approved the draft Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic, which was
subsequently submitted to the National Council of the Slovak Republic for approval as
Parliamentary Print No. 369 on 8 January 2021. Pursuant to Decision of the Presidentof the National Council of the Slovak Republic No 372 of 8 January 2021, the draft
was referred to the Committee on European Affairs, the Foreign Affairs Committeeof the National Assembly of the Slovak Republic and the Committee on Defence andSecurity of the National Assembly of the Slovak Republic, and the Committee on
Defence and Security of the National Assembly of the Slovak Republic was designatedas the committee responsible. The draft Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic wasincluded in the draft agenda of the 23rd session of the National Council of the Slovak
Republic and approved on 28 January 2021.
6
UN GA resolution GA/11493 of 27.03.2014. https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/
ga11493.doc.htm
7
UN GA resolution 76/179 of 16.12.2021., UN GA resolution 76/70 of 9.12.2021., UN GA
resolution of 68/262 of 27.03.2014.
8
Ukraine: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the illegal
annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. 25.02. 2022. Council of the European Union.
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/25/ukrainedeclaration-by-the-high-representative- on-behalf- of-the- eu- on-the-illegalannexation-of-crimea-and-sevastopol/
9
Wertlen, D. 2020. EU Energy and Climate Policy. European Union Foreign Policy.
External Dimension of European Policies in Area of Human Rights and Development.
Bratislava: UK, pp. 92-93
10
Hrabina, J. 28.07.2021. Nord Stream 2: What does this mean for Slovakia? WebNovinyNews. https://www.webnoviny.sk/venergetike/nord-stream-2-bude-co-to-pre-slovenskoznamena/
11
EU Energy and Climate Policy. European Union Foreign Policy. 2020. External
Dimension of European Policies in Area of Human Rights and Development. Bratislava:
UK, p. 91
12
Jenčová, I. 09.03.2022. The Commission wants to radically reduce dependence on
Russian gas within two years. Member States are on the move. Euractiv News. https://euractiv.sk/section/energetika/news/komisia-chce-do-dvoch-rokov-radikalne-znizitzavislost-na-ruskom-plyne-na-tahu-su-clenske-staty/
13
COMM/2022/108 final of the Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions. REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more
1170

affordable, secure and sustainable energy. 08.03.2022. European Commission. https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52022DC0108&from=EN
14
Reactions of Slovak MEPs to the energy crisis. 24.03.2022. European Parliament Office in
Slovakia. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/slovakia/sk/spravodajstvo-a-aktivity/spravy/
marec-2022/reakcie-slovenskych-europoslancov-k-rieseniu-energetickej-krizy.html
15Štefanec, I. 24.03.2022. EPP. In: Reactions of Slovak MEPs to the energy crisis.
European Parliament Office in Slovakia. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/slovakia/sk/
spravodajstvo-a-aktivity/spravy/marec-2022/reakcie-slovenskych-europoslancov-krieseniu-energetickej-krizy.html
16
Ukraine: EU agrees fifth package of restrictive measures against Russia. 08.04.2022.
European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
IP_22_2332
17
The Ministry of Economy wants to negotiate an exception from the EU’s gas and oil
embargoes to Russia. 03.05.2022. SME Index News. https://index.sme.sk/c/22900885/
slovensko-a-madarsko-sa-nepripoja-k-sankciam-proti-ruskej-energetike.html
18
Capková, E. — Konvit, M. — Grečnár, J. 2019 Virtuálne priestory. Bratislava: UK, p. 154
19
Capková, E. — Konvit, M. — Grečnár, J. 2019 Virtuálne priestory. Bratislava: UK, p. 159
20Mesežnikov, G. 08.10.2020. Did Russian diplomats from “friendly Slovakia’’ leave the
US for orders? Dennik N News. https://dennikn.sk/2077427/odisli-ruski-diplomati-zpriatelskeho-slovenska-na-prikaz-z-usa/
21
35 Russian Diplomats have to leave Slovakia. 30.04.2022. Dennik N News. https://dennikn.sk/minuta/2790781/
22
Programme of the Government of the Slovak Republic for the years 2020-2024, 69.
https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Dynamic/DocumentPreview.aspx?DocID=494677
23
Programme of the Government of the Slovak Republic for the years 2020-2024, 70.
https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Dynamic/DocumentPreview.aspx?DocID=494677
24
Migration policy of the Slovak Republic by the 2025. https://www.employment.gov.
sk/files/sk/uvodna-stranka/informacie-cudzincov/dokumenty/migracna-politikaslovenskej-republiky-vyhladom-do-roku-2025-nove-znenie-vlastnymat.pdf
25Ibid, p. 3
26
Why Slovakia? 01.2022. SARIO. https://www.sario.sk/sites/default/files/sario-whyslovakia-2022-02-01.pdf
27
Source: SARIO (2021: 5), retrieved from: European Commission, European Economic
Forecast Summer 2021
N.B. All EU countries experienced negative growth in 2020 due to global pandemic.
Sources: GDP Growth Data: European Commission, European Economic Forecast
Summer 2021;
Credit Ratings Data: S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, OECD (2021); Indebtedness Data: Eurostat(2020); Economy Openness Data: Eurostat (2020); Improving Business Enviroment:
SARIO (2021)
28
Why Slovakia? 01.2022. SARIO. https://www.sario.sk/sites/default/files/sario-whyslovakia-2022-02-01.pdf
29
Ibid, p. 10
30
Finger, K. M. Open Markets Index. International Chamber of Commerce Ranking.
https://www.iccrf.org/icc-open-markets-index.html
31
Recovery and Resilience Plan of the Slovak Republic. 2022. https://www.mfsr.sk/files/
archiv/1/Plan_obnovy_a_odolnosti.pdf
32
According to statistics, the Slovak Republic had been able to use only 45,32%of allocated finances in the amount of 16.678 bll.€ from the MFF 2014-2020 (by17118 October 2021). The rate had increased from 2020 to 2021 approximately 3.38% perannum, but still there is huge allocation without planned or contracted projects.
See more info: EUROFUNDS: Slovakia has used less than half of the European money,
nine billion euros remain to be spent by the end of 2023. Office of the Governmentof the Slovak Republic. 2021. https://www.partnerskadohoda.gov.sk/eurofondyslovensko-v yuzilo-z-europskych-penazi-necelu-polovicu-do-konca-roka-2023zostava-vycerpat-este-devat-miliard-eur/
33
Credit Insurance Group Credendo. In: Why Slovakia? SARIO. 2022. https://www.sario.
sk/sites/default/files/sario-why-slovakia-2022-02-01.pdf
34
OECD and Eurostat. In: Why Slovakia? SARIO. 2022. https://www.sario.sk/sites/
default/files/sario-why-slovakia-2022-02-01.pdf

172

Slovenia: High interest in
the complementarity of the Three
Seas Initiative with EU regional
development frameworks
Ana Bojinović Fenko

Slovenia positions itself within the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) based on
its general understanding of the origin and potential outcomes of theinitiative. First, the 3SI is understood as the US initiative originatingfrom the interest of the Trump administration to balance the power of
the Chinese 16+1 initiative that had been launched towards Central andEastern European Countries in 2012.1 From this outlook, 3SI for Slovenia
represents an important platform for strengthening transatlantic
relations not merely in terms of foreign policy economic or security
interests but, most importantly, as the commitment to the Euro-Atlantic
community of liberal democratic states and friends in the international
community.2 Slovenia does not have its own foreign policy capabilities
to organise a response towards 16+1. Therefore, it has duly taken theinitiative as a collective response to Chinese global interests (and thoseparticular to Europe) within its traditional multilateral strategy prioritising
European forums. The Slovenian political elite and society have beenhighly committed to EU values since the democratisation movements in
the 1980s.3 Therefore, the Slovenian political elite views the Chinese 16+1
initiative, which might economically represent good opportunities, withscepticism based on foreign policy reservation towards authoritarianpolitical regimes. Additionally, Chinese investment projects in manyother countries of the world, including the nearby Western Balkans,
have caused rather negative socio-political experiences confirming that
disrespect of EU-based standards in economic and business practices isdetrimental to local society and to the state governance itself.
A second — outcomes oriented — ground for Slovenian positioning
towards the 3SI is the objective development interest. 3SI has since173

its establishment in 2015 been understood as an economic-businessand infrastructure development opportunity that could help Eastern
Europe to catch up with the more developed north-western part of
the EU.4 To some extent, Slovenia therefore strives ‘to develop 3SI in
the direction of getting more attention and even power to Central East
Europe for a more connected Europe’.5 The current Slovenian Foreign
Policy Strategy (henceforth the Strategy)6 from December 2021, whichis largely based on the Strategy from 2015, defines Slovenia as a Central
European and Mediterranean country at the heart of the AlpineAdriatic-Danube area, three macro-regional strategies (Adriatic—Ionian,
Alpine, and Danube strategy) and at the crossroads of Western andSouth-Eastern Europe. The Strategy mentions the 3SI only once, in the‘Slovenia in Central Europe’ section.7 As a Central European country,
the Republic of Slovenia has centuries-old historical, political andcultural ties with other countries in the region. It is strongly connectedto this area economically and in terms of traffic. For the port of Koper —as the core port of the European Trans-European Transport Network(TEN-T) network — Central Europe is a natural hinterland. The Strategy
directly refers to the 3SI within this context: Republic of Slovenia
is strengthening political cooperation with all Central European
countries, especially Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia
and Poland. Given its geopolitical position, the Republic of Slovenia
is a natural partner of the Visegrád Group countries. Cooperation
focuses on strengthening economic, transport (in particular ensuring
adequate railway links between the port of Koper and Central Europe)and energy links between the Baltic and the Adriatic, including within
the Three Seas and the informal C5 groups.8
For Slovenia, integration into the trans-European transport network,
the port of Koper and the connection to the Baltic—Adriatic transport
axis has been a high priority specific foreign policy goal since its
inclusion into the EU. However, there exist other, more traditional andestablished regional initiatives in the EU/Europe in which Slovenia
actively participates, for example the Adriatic—Ionian and Danube
regions, and EU’s macro-regional strategies. For this reason, as the 3SI
is the most recent, it has not (yet) been assessed as more promising.
One of the reasons for that is also the unclear financial framework of
the 3SI.9 More concretely, there is much more identified financial needs
than resources assured therefore insufficient funding is currently a174significant challenge.10 Therefore, despise some 3SI objectives beingin line with Slovenian long-standing foreign policy goals, especiallyon regional connectivity, Slovenia is ‘particularly committed torunning parallel 3SI and macro-regional strategies of the European
Union’.11 On this ground, Slovenia ‘aims to develop the 3SI investment
projects towards their active implementation within the EU’s financial
instruments’.12
In short, Slovenia sees the 3SI initiative as an additional international
forum to implement two of its strategic goals: first, being a reliable
member of the liberal values and interests-based transatlantic Alliance.
The second goal is the Slovenian position as a core EU member stateof a more integrated and regionally equally developed EU, whereby
implementation of the 3SI should be complementary to already existingand EU-led regional development frameworks.

Analysis of Slovenia’s stance towards
the four objectives of the 3SI
Among the four objectives, Slovenia prioritises the strengthening oftransport, energy and digital infrastructure in the 3SI countries.13 Becauseof the less developed infrastructure of the Central East European (CEE)region compared to west Europe, stemming from historical reasons,
Slovenia understands the infrastructural development of the ‘3SI region’as oriented towards two aspects. One should include the strengtheningof infrastructural connectivity within the region and the second should
focus on the connectivity of the region with the western part of the EU.
‘It is in the vital interest of Slovenia as a country located at the crossroads
between west and east and north and south to integrate as much as
possible into modern European infrastructural connections. Only inthis way can Slovenia use all the potential offered by its geographicallocation and EU membership’.14
As the 3SI operates based on creating a list of projects to be eligiblefor 3SI financing, Slovenia strives for its own identification of suchstrategic national and regional projects and their active implementation.
The country has up to now submitted six such projects:15• three projects in the field of energy (second track Divača—Koper
and reconstruction of the Ljubljana railway hub)175• two projects on connectivity (the gas connection between
Slovenia and Hungary, the improvement of the electricity network
between Slovenia and Croatia, and the liquified natural gas (LNG)
terminal connection from Croatia to Poland)• one project in digitalisation (5G digital motorway).
Slovenia also assured its financial participation with the amount of
EUR 23 million via SID banka — the Slovenian export and developmentbank.16 As the 3SI financial resources and management are yet to beorganised, Slovenia prefers to keep its ongoing long-term engagement
in several of the EU-led regional frameworks. Thus, Slovenia ‘wishes toredesign the list of 3SI projects in a way to include projects which couldin the future be financed with the EU investment funds in cooperation
with investors in transatlantic cooperation, all in line with the EU
policies’.17 At the fourth 3SI summit, organised in Slovenia in June
2019, Slovenian President Borut Pahor stated that: ‘The initiative is fullyin line with the European Union’s efforts to strengthen cohesion andovercome disparities between EU regions. It is complementary to theexisting EU strategies and programmes’.18 In the analysis below, I focus
on the four 3SI objectives and offer a more detailed analysis of the mostimportant objective from the perspective of Slovenia, namely ‘reliable,
sustainable and inclusive connectivity’.

Economic growth and resilience of the 3SI region
and greater interest among investors
Slovenia’s interests
As a small state, Slovenia is often less attractive to foreign investors.
The solution to this challenge that Slovenia has incorporated into
its economic diplomacy is to present itself as part of a larger region
with good potential for economic growth. Slovenia assesses that the3SI can assume such a role of a larger region very well, as it is one of
the fastest-growing regions in Europe and the world.19 The potentialof the region is offered by its infrastructural development, which can
only be achieved through fairly even investment in all the countriesof the region. By coordinating infrastructure projects, the 3SI region
represents an interesting investment opportunity for foreign public
and private investors. Slovenia understands that by cooperating with
3SI countries, it could increase its economic resilience directly due to176the reduction of its dependence on other countries (of the EU common
market) and indirectly through higher economic development, yet thisexpectation is mainly linked to the Slovenian primary goal, namelydeveloping connectivity infrastructure.20
Opportunities identified by Slovenia
Slovenian links opportunities for economic development mainly to 3SI’s
project in the field of connectivity infrastructure. Here, Slovenia seesconsiderable untapped potential for deepening economic cooperation
with individual 3SI countries. The emphasis is put on the ‘importance ofthe south-western part of the 3SI region in terms of the Mediterranean
and Baltic—Adriatic core corridors and the key strategic role of thelocation of the Port of Koper in this context’.21 Another identified direct
development opportunity are the negotiations on the revision of the
TEN-T which are ongoing this year, and could enable balancing of theplanning of transport corridors.22

Geopolitics
Slovenia’s interests
In terms of the global power struggle in interest spheres, Slovenia
has reacted to the Chinese 16+1 initiative with reservations from theperspective of the greater global influence of authoritarian states23 andpotential negative social and political consequences brought about
by the Chinese type of investment and development cooperation
policy. Slovenia sees its and other 3SI states’ participation within the
US initiative as a firm support to NATO and the EU’s common values,24such as respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and also
EU market standards and investment practices, especially transparent
public tenders and loans or grants conditions. Support of EU values is
the most important domestic and foreign policy value for Slovenia who
strives to be the core EU member state also in this regard.25
As for the European geopolitical power struggle, Slovenia does nothold a historical experience of the two blocks bipolar Cold War system
as it was part of the former Socialist Yugoslavia leading the NonAligned Movement. Additionally, Russia had never challenged Slovenia
territorially or politically; thus Slovenia holds a rather positive historical,
cultural and political inclination towards Russia. ‘In the light of Russia’s
177

aggression against Ukraine, a group of ministers for the digitisation of
the 3SI countries has been formed within the initiative, which is directly
involved in helping Ukraine and is in regular contact with the Ukrainianside. There have also been concrete deliveries of telecommunications
equipment to Ukraine’.26 Additionally, unlike many CEE countries,
Slovenia has not been able to develop any meaningful bilateral politicalpartnership with the USA as a potential ‘protector’ state and thus
primarily cooperates with the US within multilateral forums, NATO
being the closest one.27 For this reason, in additional to the abovementioned location-originating transit interests, the participation of
Slovenia within the 3SI has to be primarily understood as yet anotherstrengthening of the EU and NATO as the most relevant regional
international organisations of states to whom Slovenia is friendly. The
Slovenian Foreign Ministry explains the country’s geopolitical viewon the 3SI as follows: Economic development of the 3SI countries istherefore in the strong interest not only of the EU, but also of other
Western countries who share common values. Greater economic
development will give the 3SI countries a greater ability to defend
these values, threats to which come mainly from the east. As the 3SI
countries are located in the eastern part of the EU, one could say thatstrengthening them in all aspects is essential for successful defence
against authoritarian countries in the east. EU Member States have thus
begun to adopt the 3SI as leverage to strengthening the Union.28
Opportunities identified by Slovenia
I refer to an opportunity relating to improving Slovenian—Croatianbilateral relations that the interlocutors from the Slovenian MFA havenot identified, yet bears relevance in the CEE regional cooperation
context. Slovenia has an unresolved bilateral border dispute witha neighbouring country, Croatia. The latter continues to deny
implementation of the international arbitration decision on the issue
from June 2017. As the EU institutions (the Commission and the Court)
have decided the matter remains ou3SIde their legal competence, it
seems that this international legally binding decision remains within thehands of inter-state politics. Having in mind that Slovenia itself is notcapable of forming regional let alone (external) big power support ingeneral,29 the country needs to actively make use of any relevant plurilateral frameworks. This is particularly true in case of 3SI, where Croatia,
178

in alliance with the regional power Poland, offers active engagement
based on US leadership and threatens the further marginalisationof Slovenia within the EU. To summarise, although 3SI is primarily
a framework in terms of global geopolitics, for Slovenia it could also
represent one of the relevant forums of political weight in the region of
CEE. I underline that this potential rests merely in the realm of informal
state-to-state relations as the European Commission has clearly shown
it will not be addressing (publicly) the issue within the 3SI. For example,
during the fourth 3SI summit in Slovenia, in June 2019, the at-the-time
outgoing European Commission President Juncker at the event’s
press conference did not want to answer a reporter’s question on the
Slovenian—Croatian border dispute at all but rather simply left thepress conference.30

Energy security
Slovenia’s interests
In comparison to the EU-27, Slovenia has a higher share of nuclear
energy and of renewable energy resources (mainly hydro), but asignificantly lower share of natural gas.31 Crnčec and Bojinović Fenko
in a recent analysis and evaluation of the Slovenian position within the
EU energy policy establish that Slovenia is a rather atypical country also
within the CEE region.32 Slovenia is highly energy independent from
Russia compared to other CEE countries. This gives the state a uniquepolitical and economic position of understanding Russia primarily as
an economic partner rather than as an economic or security threat,
yet this stance obviously became politically impotent after the Russian
aggression on Ukraine in March 2022. Another Slovenian energy-related
peculiarity is the fact that the state possesses a Cold War-inherited
advantage: it is the only CEE country that operates a US Westinghouse
nuclear power plant reactor. This fact has since 2020 become
prominent in relations with the US as Slovenia considers building a new
nuclear power plant in line with the EU decarbonisation strategy andits own aim to become climate neutral by 2050. The MFA believes that‘the main purpose of strengthening energy infrastructure in the 3SI
region is to strengthen energy security’. However, with the particularenergy situation in mind — relative independence from Russian gas
imports and potential US-related nuclear power cooperation —179

Slovenian interests within the 3SI in the energy objective are rather
weak. The state did not take the initiative with a particularly promising
new framework of energy cooperation as its own energy mix situationis stable. The country joined the initiative in a rather reactive fashion,
based on regional inertia with a lack of any specific expectations.33
In this fashion, Slovenia submitted within the 3SI two national energy
infrastructure projects that had long been identified as relevant withinseveral other regional initiatives or investment frameworks, but lacked
market interest for co-funding to be launched into realisation.34
Project Gas connection between Slovenia and Hungary. The
purpose of the first project is ‘to establish the return route of gas
with the Hungarian gas market, connecting gas markets, reducing
price differences and increasing security of supply in Slovenia. The
scheduled start of operation is October 2025. It involves cooperationby the system operators of the gas system in Slovenia and in Hungary,and companies Plinovodi and FGSZ’.35
Project SINCRO.GRID. This project involves the Croatian andSlovenian electricity system and distribution operators — Eles, HOPS,SODO and HEP ODS. ‘With the increasing integration of decentralised
renewable energy sources, both in Slovenia and in Croatia, there is a lackof sources of flexibility needed to regulate the electricity system. The
project establishes international cooperation on smart grids, enables
more efficient integration of distributed generation, improvement ofvoltage quality, inclusion of additional sources of system services andbetter control over the transmission and distribution network. The
project is expected to be completed in autumn 2022’.36
LNG terminal connection from Croatia via Slovenia to Poland. At
the fourth 3SI summit meeting in Slovenia, another project has been
revealed, aiming at improving energy security via diversification ofsources through the construction of pipelines in the region to connect
new LNG terminals with all states in the region.37 The MFA defines thisproject as ‘one of the most important 3SI infrastructure projects’. This is
the North—South Gas Corridor, which will connect the LNG terminal on
Krk in Croatia with Świnoujście in Poland, and then further on connect
to the Baltic gas pipeline. Yet, the biggest challenge identified remains
financial sources for such huge infrastructure projects.38 Additionally,
experts are rather critical about the potential outcome of any of the
projects listed above. They claim the projects have been simply added180

on the list, in line with having been listed on several other occasionsof (sub)regional cooperation initiatives.39 This means that Slovenia did
not construct or apply for any new energy-related projects within the
3SI, but rather sees 3SI as yet another forum where demanding andrisky development projects remain ‘wishful thinking’. In terms of energy
security, the 3SI did not increase Slovenian expectations or actions.
Opportunities identified by Slovenia
Contrary to expert assessments, the MFA’s official stance towards
energy projects is rather optimistic. In particular, they expose one
project, namely the Croatia—Poland LNG terminal connection, which
is of Slovenian interest for transit purposes. ‘A project of this scale will
strengthen the energy security of each country in the 3SI region. Energy
projects are the ones for which foreign investors have shown the mostinterest so far. An example of such an investor is the United States or
its Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which acts as the UnitedStates Development Bank. DFC wants to invest in 3SI almost exclusively
in energy projects. It is most keen to finance renewable energy sources
and projects that contribute to energy security and diversification of
resources’.40

Reliable, sustainable and inclusive connectivity
Slovenia’s interests
Due to its central geographical position in Europe, the country isinterdependent with all parts of Europe in terms of transit; thus
participating within 3SI could offer a boost to its comparatively
underdeveloped (logistical) infrastructure.41 At the fourth 3SI summit
meeting in Slovenia, the country put on the agenda the question ofconnectivity between the north and south of the EU integration, namely
between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas. Among 3SI objectives,
improving transport connectivity has been most exposed by Slovenia.42
Below I present Slovenian interests within the two strategic projects
that the country has submitted to the 3SI project list.
‘Second track of the Divača-Koper railway line’ project. Of the totaltranshipped goods in the port of Koper, about 60% of the cargo isbrought or taken by rail. Increasing market shares in existing hinterlandmarkets and growing market shares in relatively new markets,
181

especially in southern Germany, requires reliable and better hinterlandconnections, especially by rail. The cargo port of Koper and otherimportant northern Adriatic ports — Venice, Trieste, Ravenna, Rijeka —are of interest for overseas cargo, especially for cargo coming from Asia
via Suez. It arrives at the northern Adriatic ports about a week earlier
than the competing northern European ports (Rotterdam, Antwerp,etc.).43 The existing single-track electrified railway line between
Koper and Divača is the only railway connection between the port ofKoper and the hinterland. The capacity of the line is limited due to thetechnical equipment, and the line capacity and transportability arealso affected by extraordinary events and measures implemented on
the line. Especially in the summer months, traffic is limited by meadow
and forest fires, which are often the result of sparks when trains brakeon the tracks. The nature of the terrain means that landslides are also
common. The aim of the project is to remove the bottleneck on the
Divača—Koper railway section in order to ensure the long-term capacityof the railway transport infrastructure in Slovenia and consequently
increase the economy’s competitiveness. After construction, thesecond track will be 27km long and will run on demanding terrain,
leading through eight tunnels and through several bridging structures.
According to the schedule, the main construction works on the projectwill be completed by the end of 2024; the project will be completed by
the end of 2025 and put into operation in 2026.44‘Reconstruction of the Ljubljana railway hub’ project. The Ljubljana
Railway Hub (Ljubljansko železniško vozlišče — LŽV) is a connection
and a crossroads of various international, national and regional railpassenger and freight transport lines. LŽV is part of the wider Ljubljana
Transport Hub, which also includes road and indirectly airport traffic.
LŽV consists of the main passenger railway station Ljubljana and themain freight railway station Ljubljana Zalog. In addition, it consists ofan even larger number of regionally important passenger and railway
stations and stops. These include: the Ljubljana railway station, Ljubljana
Zalog, Ljubljana Moste and Ljubljana Šiška stations (including the lines
between these stations).45 In parallel with the LŽV, the operational
project ‘railway area of Ljubljana stations’ has been established. Froma traffic point of view, the Ljubljana station is an important generatorof passenger flows; at the same time it is also an important transit
station for freight transport, as it is the final, initial or scheduled station182

of the main and regional railway lines. It is also part of the TEN-T core
network and is included in the Mediterranean and Baltic—Adriatic core
corridors.46
Opportunities identified by Slovenia‘Today, the Port of Koper provides the shortest time for cargo to travelfrom Shanghai in China to Munich in Germany. Shorter sea navigation
time by 5 to 6 days is a key competitive advantage of Koper over
European North Sea ports. In 2030, the throughput in the Port of Koper
is expected to amount to 35 million tons, which means that due to thecurrent inadequacy of the existing Divača—Koper railway line, roadfreight traffic will increase by approximately 20 million tons. In sum,Slovenia expects that in 2030 there will be 2 times more trucks fromthe Port of Koper on Slovenian motorways than today’.47 The MFA ingeneral assesses that ‘reliable, sustainable and inclusive connectivity
will contribute to Europe’s greater prosperity, security and resilience’.48

Conclusions and recommendations
In this final section, I provide a reflection on the chapter’s overallfindings. I conclude with a look forward at how Slovenia’s perception
regarding the 3SI could further evolve and what circumstances could
affect it.
Slovenia is a country that has reacted to 3SI according to its foreign
policy strategy: primarily based on its values and secondly in line with
its strategic interests. In terms of values, 3SI represents for Slovenia astrengthened collaboration among a Western group of states in thecontext of global activities of authoritarian powers, such as China.
According to responses to the Russian aggression in Ukraine that 3SI
states have already organised, one can conclude that these responses
also aim at limiting the Russian threat to liberal values. In this regard,a strong common standpoint of Euro-Atlantic states, including CEE
states with a recent authoritarian past, is of particular importance andmakes the 3SI highly relevant. For this reason, in the summary Table
3.1 below I have marked geopolitics as the value-based importanceof 3SI objectives. Following that, Slovenia values balanced economic
cooperation in Europe and sees 3SI as an opportunity to contribute to183

eastern EU member states catching up with the western ones. Energy
security is the least important Slovenian value because of Slovenia’srather high independence from gas imports and high percentage of
renewable energy in its energy mix. Connectivity to states in central
and Eastern Europe does not feature as a political value in Slovenia
but rather as a central European transit location and history-based
economic cooperation interest. From the perspective of 3SI project
implementation, therefore, the interest of Slovenia is highest in relation
to the objective of reliable, sustainable and inclusive connectivity.
Energy security follows, because of the interest in extending andmodernising existing gas pipelines including LNG logistics.
Table 3.1: Summary of the importance of the 3SI objectives for Slovenia’s interests.
3SI
OBJECTIVE
IMPORTANCE
according to valuebased interest of
Slovenia
IMPORTANCE
according to
3SI project
implementationinterest of Slovenia

Economic growth &resilience of the 3SI
region, greater interest
among investors
2

3

Geopolitics

Energysecurity

Reliable,sustainable& inclusive
connectivity

1

3

4

4

2

1

1 — most important
4 — least important

According to interviewees,49 the biggest challenge to 3SI projects
remains establishing a viable and stable financial framework withresources to match the current disproportion between the demand
and available financial resources. Despite the fact that Slovenia has
identified and submitted six projects within the 3SI initiative andhas contributed EUR 23 million, there is still no prospect let alone
assurance that these projects are to be financed. Also, some of theseprojects are already in motion, like the Divača—Koper railway line whichis under construction. In this regard, a substantive argument given by
Slovenian expert public officials on the need to treat the 3SI projects
184complementary to the already existing EU frameworks for regional
development and cohesion potentially indicates a reference also
for financial complementarity between EU regional projects and 3SI
project realisation.
As other more immediate and pressing circumstances preoccupy
the CEE, the EU and NATO from March 2022 (Russian aggression),
one presumes that hard security challenges might take priority overconnectivity or building investment opportunities. On the other hand,
we have seen a swift new trajectory of the EU to reduce dependence on
Russia, which promises potential boost in energy security cooperation.
The final recommendation I would propose to the 3SI from theperspective of Slovenia is the following. One can observe that thetransition from socialism and communism did not only leave the CEE
coiuntries with challenges of economic underdevelopment, but alsowith weak consolidation of liberal democracy. At least the behaviourof V4 governments, especially Polish and Hungarian and Slovenian
from March 2020 to its change in April 2022, explicitly expose
instable democratic institutions and even authoritarian tendencies.
With Chinese extreme authoritarian domestic governance on the
one side and Russian foreign policy aggressive behaviour on theother, the CEE governments illiberal digressions is not the worst that
the EU has to deal with. Yet, this should not be the reason to settle in
3SI with pragmatic policy and focus only on issues less sensitive topolitical values, such as infrastructure, energy, business investments,
transport etc. A recommendation would be to link the 3SI projectsof economic development with value-based conditions, such as forexample transparent public procurement, anti-corruption measures,
oversight by and collaboration with expert civil society, including
independent science and tertiary education institutions not only
from CEE region but from the entire EU and also from the US as the
3SI initiator.
ENDNOTES
Kračun, T. 04.05.2022. Interview with Director at ISR — Inštitut za strateške rešitv.
Ljubljana, via e-mail correspondence.
2
MFA — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia. 11.05.2022. Answers on
the Three Seas Initiative by Sector for economic diplomacy and public relations. Via
e-mail correspondence.
1

185

Bojinović Fenko, A., Marjan, S. 2017. Slovenia and the European Union. In Oxford Research
Encyclopedias of Politics — OREP. https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/
acref/9780190856427.001.0001/acref-9780190856427-e-509?rskey=uXov7Z&result=1
4
Gaube, A. 16.04.2019. Pobuda treh morij se bo stekla v Ljubljano in na Brdo. Dnevnik.
https://www.dnevnik.si/1042883371
5Škoda, L. 10.05.2022. Interview with officer of the Sector for international affairs andprotocol at the Ministry of Infrastructure of the Republic of Slovenia.
6
Slovenian Foreign policy Strategy. 12.2021. Slovenija: varna, uspešna in v svetu
spoštovana. Zunanja politika Republike Slovenije. Endorsed by the Government of
the Republic of Slovenia in December. https://www.gov.si/assets/ministrstva/MZZ/
Dokumenti/strateski-in-programski-dokumenti/strategija_ZP.pdf
7
Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy. (2021). p. 16.
8
Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy. (2021). p. 16.
9
Gaube, A. 06.06.2019. Na sklad pobude Tri morja bo treba še počakati. Dnevnik.
https://www.dnevnik.si/1042888544 . Kračun, T. Šešum, S. 09.05.2022. Interview with
Director-General of Directorate for Economic and Public Diplomacy at the Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia.
10Šešum, Slobodan (2022).
11Škoda, Luka. (2022).
12Škoda, Luka. (2022).
13
MFA — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia. (2022).
14
MFA — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia. 2022.
15
Gaube, A. 2019. MFA — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia. 2022.
Škoda, L. 2022.
16Šešum, Slobodan. 2022.
17Škoda, Luka. 2022.
18
Cited in Gaube, A. 2019.
19
MFA — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia. 2022.
20
MFA — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia. (2022).
21
MFA — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia. (2022).
22
MFA — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia. (2022).
23
MFA — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia. (2022).
24
MFA — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia. (2022).
25
Slovenian Foreign policy Strategy. 2015. Slovenia: Safe, Successful, Globally Respected.
The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia. Government of the Republic of Slovenia.
https://www.gov.si/assets/ministrstva/MZZ/Dokumenti/strateski-in-programskidokumenti/strategija_ZP_ang.pdf. Slovenian Foreign policy Strategy. (2022).
26
MFA — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia. (2022).
27
Bojinović Fenko, A., Kočan, F. 2022. Slovenia and the great powers. In S. Keil &B. Stahl (Eds.), A New Eastern Question? Great Powers and the Post-Yugoslav
States. Columbia University Press. http://cup.columbia.edu/book/a-new-easternquestion/9783838213750
28
MFA — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia. (2022).
29
Bojinović Fenko, A., Kočan, F. 202230
Gaube, A. 2019.
31
Eurostat. 2021. Energy datasheets: EU countries. https://ec.europa.eu
32
Crnčec, D., Bojinović Fenko, A. 2022. Slovenia as a Boundary Case of Russian andAmerican Influence on EU’s Energy Policy. Czech Journal of Political Science, 57(1),
14—31. DOI: 10.5817/PC2022 1 14
3186

Crnčec, D. 09.05.2022. Interview with under-secretary at the Ministry of Infrastructureof the Republic of Slovenia.
34
Crnčec, D. 2022.
35Škoda, L. 2022.
36Škoda, L. 2022.
37
Gaube, A. 2019b.
38
Gaube, A. 2019b.
39
Crnčec, D. 2022.
40
MFA — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia. 2022.
41
MFA — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia. 2022.
42
Gaube, A. 2019b.
43Škoda, L. 2022.
44Škoda, L. 2022.
45Škoda, L. 2022.
46
Škoda, L. 2022.
47
Škoda, L. 2022.
48
MFA — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia. 2022.
49
Crnčec, D. 2022. Kračun, T. 2022. Šešum, S. 2022. Škoda, L. 2022.
33

187

The Three Seas Initiative:
A case for America’s economic
statecraft imperative
Anthony B. Kim

Latvia recently hosted the latest Three Seas Summit and Business
Forum. The June Three Seas Initiative (3SI) meetings provided atimed opportunity for the 3SI partners to work together to reboot andrevitalise their partnership and willingness to elevate the 3SI to the next
concrete level at a crucial juncture. Advancing pragmatic polices thatenhance collective defence and economic security based on sharedvalues of democracy and economic freedom must continue to be a
focal point for Washington’s strategic interaction with the 3SI countries
in comning months and years.
Launched in 2016, the 3SI covers twelve countries around andbetween the Baltic, Black and Adriatic Seas: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. It is designed to promote connectivity
among nations in the critical region by supporting infrastructure,energy and digital interconnectivity projects, with the ultimate goal ofstrengthening their security and economic integration with the rest ofEurope. If pursued in timely fashion and implemented successfully, the3SI can and will do as much for Central and Eastern Europe — indeed
for Europe as a whole — as membership of NATO.
This multidimensional infrastructure and regional connectivity
project driven by the twelve 3SI countries and the US has been an
obvious geopolitical opportunity. The perceived benefits are more thaneconomic. It is in the clear interest of both the US and the Three Seas
countries to remain united in effectively confronting Russian aggression
and navigating the challenges of economic growth and energy security.
The case for the 3SI has been regarded as compelling. As the US
State Department once noted, ‘a secure, prosperous, and resilient188

Three Seas region is key not only to binding the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe more closely with the rest of the European Union
but also to the United States’.1
Perhaps, not surprisingly, that is why the 3SI has received strong
bipartisan support in the US since its inception, and despite theongoing Covid-19 pandemic and other challenges, the initiative hascontinued to gain momentum, albeit slowly, over recent years.
However, the strategic need for the 3SI and its success has beensignificantly elevated in light of the recent invasion of Ukraine by Putin’s
Russia. Unquestionably, 2022 has turned out to be the most critical year
in transatlantic relations since the end of the Cold War three decadesago. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022,
has brought new urgency to the necessity for defence and economic
cooperation between the US and its European allies in the context ofNATO and beyond, which calls for greater cooperation in the sphere of
economic and energy security through the 3SI.
Washington will only be able to meet the demands of a new era ofregional conflicts and global struggle if the US builds on the strengthof the transatlantic Alliance, which remains more central to its security
that before.
To that end, the 3SI is vital and serves America’s security andeconomic interest. More substantial and proactive US support for andinvolvement in the 3SI, reinforced by political will and decisiveness ofthe 3SI partners in Europe, is necessary for the success of the initiative.
The Three Seas region boasts some of America’s most ardent andreliable allies. A more prosperous and better integrated Three Seas
region would yield a stronger Europe, one more economically resilient
and better capable of working with the US in addressing both regionaland global challenges.

The 3SI matters to the US more than everIndeed, a heightened level of urgency to making the 3SI really
operational has been injected since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A
strong, prosperous and secure Europe is in America’s interest, and the3SI can and should play a role in enhancing the transatlantic bond to anext level.
189

The US has indicated notable support for the 3SI over the past
years. Since 2016, officials from both Republican and Democratic
administrations have expressed diplomatic support for the 3SI,
and high-level US officials have joined its annual summits. From
Washington’s foreign policy perspective, the 3SI strongly merits to beviewed as the most significant political and economic policy initiative
to emerge in Central and Eastern Europe since the enlargements of
NATO.
The strategic objectives of the 3SI largely aligns with a number of
key US security and economic goals that have received Washington’sinterest and support. In a broader geopolitical context of strategic
concerns, particularly concerning Russia and China, a growing numberof policymakers in Washington have viewed US involvement withthe 3SI as an integral component of American’s existing diplomatic,
security and economic cooperation with the countries of Central andEastern Europe.
As a matter of fact, the 3SI has garnered a notable degree of US
government support and elevated engagement. The US strategicinterest in this linkage has been clear: to bolster the economic
sovereignty and resilience of all the countries involved in the Initiative
and to enable them to withstand Russia’s efforts to manipulate its
smaller neighbours through economic and energy levers.
The Trump administration had been vocal in its support for the
3SI as an opportunity to strengthen the economies of key US allies in
the region and to lessen the region’s dependence on Russian energy
imports, a key US concern. In 2017, President Donald Trump became
the first US president to attend a 3SI meeting. As noted by the president
at the time, ‘The Three Seas Initiative will transform and rebuild theentire region and ensure that your infrastructure, like your commitment
to freedom and rule of law, binds you to all of Europe and, indeed, tothe West’.2
In addition to political support, the US made efforts to help spur
private investment in some of the projects. During the 2018 Bucharest
Summit, then US Energy Secretary Rick Perry announced a new‘Partnership for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation’ initiative to help
‘raise these projects to the top of the political and economic agenda for
their wider visibility and attractiveness’.3 The US energy secretary noted
his hope that”the 3SI could attract substantial investment from US and
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multinational businesses to work in partnership with governments tobuild new energy and transportation infrastructure.”4
At the Munich Security Conference in February 2020, then Secretaryof State Mike Pompeo announced an US commitment of USD one
billion in matching funds to the Three Seas Investment Fund (3SIIIF).
Highlighting that the US is firmly committed to forward-looking
engagement with its partners in the initiative during the October 2022
Three Seas Summit in Estonia, Secretary Pompeo underscored that‘the United States has skin in the game, and we look forward to every
member of the Three Seas Initiative contributing as well’.5 Reaffirming US
support for the free market-based efforts ‘to expand energy, digital, andtransportation infrastructure in a way that will improve economic security
for generations to come’, Pompeo further noted: ‘America is with you.’6
Equally notable has been support from the US Congress. In
November 2020, the House of Representatives passed a bipartisan
resolution ‘expressing support of the Three Seas Initiative in its efforts toincrease energy independence and infrastructure connectivity thereby
strengthening the United States and European national security’.7
In December 2020, the Development Finance Corporation (DFC)
approved a USD 300 million investment in the fund to be used ‘primarily
for projects focused on energy security.’8 This investment authorization
was “facilitated by the European Energy Security and Diversification
Act of 2019, which eases country-income-level restrictions for certain
energy infrastructure projects in Europe.”9
In February 2021, bipartisan members of the US Congress urged
the Biden administration to push forward the previous administration’s
pledged financial support for the 3SI and called on DFC to finalise
its approved USD 300 million investment, in particular concerning
infrastructure deficiencies that make the 3SI region ‘overly dependent
on Russia and China for energy and economic needs’.10
Since 2021, the Biden administration has likewise given strong
rhetorical support to the 3SI. In his videoconference remarks on the
3SI summit in Bulgaria last year, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken
reaffirmed the US’ robust support for the goals of the 3SI. Blinken’s
message was reinforced and amplified by the virtual speech to thesummit by President Joe Biden who declared that the US will bean ‘unfailing partner’ of the 3SI countries. President Biden further
noted, ‘There is incredible potential for increasing cooperation and191

connectivity among this group that will enhance the security andprosperity of the region and, quite frankly, benefit the world.”11
Given the strong support from the highest levels of the Biden
administration, however, US implementation of its support for the 3SI
needs to be elevated and more practical. Indeed, the 3SI matters morethan ever in light of Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. The US
should seek to play an elevated leadership role in advancing the 3SI,
which will should be considered as another critical pillar of transatlantic
cooperation in terms of both defence and economic security in a newera of global challenges highlighted by Putin’s hostile Russia.
Over the past decades, the US and its allies in the Three Seas region
have made the strategic choice to defend the principles of the freemarket rules-based order in the region. However, now that choice must
be reinforced with stronger commitment and concrete action in order
to confront grave security and economic challenges injected by Putin’s
Russia.
The overall landscape in the region has been unambiguously
changing. With the risks to US interests increasing on a number ofkey policy fronts that include economic and security dimensions, US
leadership is being tested both by new challenges confronting theregion and by uncertainty about America’s own policies, particularly
concerning trade and investment.
The US cannot decide for the countries in the Three Seas region
whether to uphold and defend the rules-based order. Nevertheless, theUS should make the decision an easier one by demonstrating renewed
leadership in the region, by choosing to remain actively engaged in theregion as an indispensable partner through economic and commercial
engagements. A strong and focused partnership requires leadershipthat can go deeper than a set of talking points, to the tough and highly
complicated issues facing the region.

Time to forge strategic partnershipsthat center on economic freedom
Economic engagement is essential for America’s engagement with
the Three Seas region and other parts of Europe. However, it will behollow without Washington’s leadership in trade and investment. In
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fact, more than ever, trade and investment issues meld foreign policy
and economic policy. There are many areas of potential cooperation,
but without vibrant commercial links and practical entrepreneurialinteractions, economic cooperation between the US and the Three
Seas countries cannot flourish.
Fundamentally, a network of vibrant free markets, underpinned by
the rule of law, accountable government, regulatory efficiency andmarket openness, fosters the spirit of constructive partnership among
the countries that share values and economic bonds. At the heart ofdefending the principles of the rules-based order and ensuring broadbased economic dynamism is the task of advancing economic freedom.
Economic freedom sustains competitiveness and thus economic
prosperity for the countries that embrace freedom-enhancing policies.
Market openness is a critical pillar of economic freedom. In an
increasingly integrated global market, countries with more open
markets benefit from the free exchange of commerce and thereby
enjoy greater economic prosperity. This multidimensional relationshipis well documented in the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic
Freedom.12 More specifically, consumers and producers who live incountries with low barriers to trade and investment are better off thanthose who live in countries with high barriers. Reducing those barriers
remains a proven recipe for prosperity.
In fact, it is notable that Latvia’s economic freedom score has risen
significantly over time and is now well above the regional and world
averages, according to the Index.13
Latvia’s ongoing transition from a one-time Soviet satellite state toa more vibrant and market-oriented economy has been facilitated by
openness to foreign trade and the efficiency of business regulations
that promote entrepreneurial dynamism. The Northern European
nation has maintained fiscal discipline and enhanced its banking sector.
As policymakers in the US and Europe think about how to effectively
revitalise economic dynamism, Latvia is well positioned to strengthen
our understanding of how to successfully navigate the crisis.
Moving forward, particularly given the clear relationship between
economic freedom and economic dynamism, the overarching
objective of America’s strategic economic interaction with the Three
Seas region must be to facilitate the expansion of vibrant trade andinvestment environments that provide the best chance of translating193

opportunity into prosperity. A strong economy undergirds a strong
national defence, and a vibrant economy is an imperative source ofstrong defence. Capitalising on all opportunities to deepen practicaltrade and investment relations is in the mutual interests of Washington
and the countries of the Three Seas region.
While each of the twelve countries has undergone different phasesof transition over the past decades, by and large they as a group
have turned away, dramatically so, from the collectivist philosophies
of socialism and communism and embraced a variety of free-market
policies that have led to growing prosperity and stability. Having
secure, stable and economically viable strategic partners in the Three
Seas region is in America’s security and economic interest.
In deepening engagement with the US, the 3SI countries should
implement reforms that open them further to international investment
and strengthen their institutions. Central to the task of advancing
economic freedom and an enabling business environment in the region
must be committed economic statecraft that creates a more inviting
playing field for US companies and private investors, as well as ensuring
US leadership in market opening and high-standard rulemaking.
Needless to say, Washington cannot provide countries in the Three
Seas region with the political will that they need to transform theireconomies according to free-market principles. However, by getting
more directly and practically involved in critical policy dialogues, theUS can and should ensure that its constructive engagement is taken
into account.
Washington can also engage at the technical and practical level ina way that enables countries to advance their economic development.
Fundamentally, America’s economic relationship with the region will
be exercised best through the private sector: the catalyst for real,
meaningful economic transformation.
In the end, if it is to be a credible leading force in the Three Seas
region, the US has to prove itself a positive and dependable actor, not areactive and unpredictable one.

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The 3SI must be cultivated to be an antidote
to Russia’s energy coercion
Unambiguously, the crisis in Ukraine underscores the elevatedimportance of the initiative for the US and its allies in Europe. The
ongoing barbaric conflict in Ukraine imposed by Putin’s Russia has
ushered in a new era for energy security. Russia’s war against Ukraine
has shocked Europe into re-evaluating long-decided policies, including
the phasing out of nuclear power, the curtailed use of important
European fossil fuels, and, most critically, Europe’s reliance on Russianenergy.
Also notable is that strategies that would have normally taken years
or decades now must be formed and executed far more urgently. It alsopresents a unique opportunity to forge an unprecedented cohesion
to address future energy security threats, particularly at a time when
Russia is instigating European countries to compete for limited
alternative supplies and clash over sanctions guideline.
European countries’ governments, particularly driven by the 3SI
countries, and the US must act swiftly to form a resilient strategy against
Russia’s energy security offensive while making progress on mid- andlong-term initiatives such as deployment of new routes and sources.
The 3SI aims to spur economic growth, reinforce economic resiliency
and energy security, and deepen regional connectivity — including with
Western Europe.
In the current geopolitical context, intensifying US efforts to secureenergy connectivity through the 3SI is far more critical and deserves
immediate concrete action. Fundamentally, America’s economic
relationship with the region will be exercised best through the private
sector, the catalyst for real and meaningful economic transformation.
Regardless of how the Ukraine calamity plays out, it is undeniably
clear that Russia’s autocratic dominance as an energy source for mostof Europe has given Moscow outsized political and economic leverage.
It has been weaponised against many of America’s transatlantic allies
and partners.
Indeed, in the face of Russian aggression and manipulation ofenergy markets, the transatlantic community needs to upgrade andsecure energy supply chains. It needs a vibrant private energy sector
that delivers reliable, affordable energy.
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Everything needs to be in the mix of that effort, to ensure robust
US exports, natural gas exploration, and the facilitation and renewed
adoption of greater nuclear energy. In facilitating much-needed
greater energy cooperation and connectivity independent of Russia’s
influence, the 3SI can and must play a vital role and must be enhanced
accordingly, particularly with the US becoming a more proactive anchor
investor.

The path forward
The upcoming months will likely prove a pivotal moment for 3SI — eitherwith tangible outcomes starting to magnify, or with the initiative fading
away as a missed opportunity due to a lack of political will. The 3SI willallow the US to build strengthened business, energy and geopoliticalties to the emerging Europe region.
A stable, secure and economically viable Europe is in America’s
economic interest. Some of America’s oldest and closest allies are inEurope. The US shares with this region a strong commitment to therule of law, human rights, free markets and democracy. The economies
of Europe, along with the US, account for almost half of the global
economy. The US and Europe are each other’s principal trading
partners. The US and Europe are each other’s top source of foreign
direct investment.
History shows that a stable Eastern Europe means a stable Europe as
a whole. This is why making the 3SI meaningfully viable is so strategicallycrucial to the US. From a broader and long-term perspective, since theend of the Cold War, the US has repeatedly tried to hand the job of
securing the peace of Europe to the Europeans. But with Russia foreveron Europe’s door, that job is too big for Europe alone. While remaining
committed to NATO in word, the US has downsized its militarypresence in Europe. This yawning gap between words and deeds has
emboldened Russia, with results now obvious in Ukraine.
The European failure has been equally obvious, if not more. By
refusing to spend enough to fulfil NATO commitments, and failing torecognise that a feckless multilateralism would never deter Russia or
China, European nations have virtually invited Russian aggression andChinese exploitation.
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Because of these failures, the current challenge is formidable. The
US and its European allies, spurred on by Russia’s naked aggression
against Ukraine, must act to reverse the errors of past policies as rapidly
as possible by building the deterrence and prosperity that will be thefoundation of peace in the transatlantic world.

Time to make the 3SI pragmatically operationalised
As demonstrated by the current Ukraine crisis, the 3SI countries
are partners of critical importance to the US, both politically andeconomically. Having secure, stable and economically viable strategic
partners in the Three Seas region and beyond is in America’s security
and economic interest. To that end, elevating US support for the 3SI —which encompasses a strategic, long-term outlook for energy resilienceand independence for Europe — is a valuable economic and security
approach to counter Russia’s energy weaponisation.
In fact, there is an added urgency to the initiative. If the US were serious
about helping Europe to be peaceful and prosperous, Washington
would really need to gin up some momentum behind the 3SI. This year
is likely the crucial year when the US and its allies will decide whether the
3SI remains just a diplomatic agenda or can become a serious pragmatic
project. Grasping and capitalising on all opportunities to further deepenpractical trade and investment relations is in the mutual interests ofWashington and countries in the Three Seas region.
It is indeed in the interest of long-term transatlantic foreign policy
objectives to take a multifaceted approach to building greater economic
relationships and security, and upholding the shared values of democracy
and the rule of law, together with like-minded, willing allies around theregion. The 3SI can play an important role in achieving those goals.
The global relevance and significance of the regional initiative,
especially in relation to current security threats in Europe, has neverbeen cleared and sharper than now. Advancing pragmatic polices thatenhance economic dynamism and energy independence should be a
focal point for Washington’s strategic interaction with the 3SI countries.
Now is the time to act on that. It is in the clear interest of the US tofollow through discussions of the 3SI Summit in Rīga, Latvia, to elevatethe initiative to a next practical level.
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Conclusions and recommendations
In crafting a coherent and comprehensive road map that will advancethe region’s strategic interest of enhancing economic prosperity
through greater private-sector engagement and regional connectivity
in the Three Seas region, the 3SI countries and the US should work
together to:• Keep the US pledge made at the 2020 Munich Security Conference
regarding matching US funds. The US commitment of USD 1 billion
in matching funds for the 3SIIF shows that the US is serious aboutstability and security in Europe. As reinforced in June 2020, the UnitedStates is ‘proud to have pledged substantial funding to implement
this important initiative and call on others to join us’14. It is a concrete
example of much-needed practical leadership in the transatlantic
community. The administration should continue thinking strategicallyand keep this commitment to advance US economic, security andgeopolitical interests in partnership with the 3SI countries.
• Implement greater pro-market, pro-investment policies in theregion. Despite notable progress, a number of countries in
the region need to be encouraged to adopt policies that willlure private investment and spur market-led economic growthand development. Greater economic freedom means freeing
untapped entrepreneurs and unleashing the 3SI countries’
economic potentials, which are necessary for sustained growth anddevelopment. They should be encouraged to adopt greater freemarket policies that facilitate development that is led by the private
sector, because the real long-term transformative investments inthe critical region will come ultimately from the private sector.
• Amplify a bold, consistent narrative about the benefits of market
liberalisation and openness. This narrative should highlight thepositive consequences of economic freedom, including its positive
impact on individual states, the value of imports to the national
economy, the realities of the global value chains and their value
to the US and the Three Seas region as well as the constructive
effects of economic growth on overall development.
• Elevate existing security engagement and economic interaction
with more committed outreach. The US starts with massive
advantages, not the least of which are decades of positive198

engagement in the region, world-class investment and businesspractices, a global profile, military alliances, and partnerships. The
list of advantages the US has is long. Yet the US can and should
step up its own game considerably. Washington’s evolving efforts
to become more deeply engaged in the Three Seas region, raise
the American profile and elevate its participation in the region arevery well advised.
• Strengthen enduring alliances and build on nascent ones by
increasing measurable economic opportunities and collaboration.
Without a discernible trade component, particularly America’s
leadership in building a predictable trading environment, it would
be an empty gesture. The US needs substance, and the substancethat counts in a concrete and practical way is trade and investment
led by the private sector, among other dimensions.
• Exercise strategic flexibility and incentivise reforms. Washington
should work with the Three Seas countries proactively to facilitate
dynamic trade, open investment environments, transparent
agreements between nations, and improved connectivity to drive
regional ties. That is in the interest of the US and of the countries
in the Three Seas area. But the US can be strategically flexible inits approach — not needing formal agreements in every case. The
US and countries in the region have a mutual interest, for instance,in helping small and medium-size businesses, including thosein the financial sector, grow and compete regionally as well as
globally. Positive actions in this regard can be taken by the US andindividual 3SI countries on independent timetables.
• Consider opportunities to fund 3SI projects that advance America’s
interests. The US should consider better and more strategicallyutilizing the DFC for 3SI projects that advance US economic,
security and geopolitical interests. Once again, fundamentally,
the 3SI is and should be a practical platform for attracting
private-sector investors, but the initiative’s ultimate success also
undoubtedly hinges on building public-private partnerships.
• Encourage continued contributions to the 3SIIF. To date, nineof the twelve 3SI members have contributed to the fund. The
US should encourage every member to contribute, while also
encouraging wealthy non-members, such as France, Germany andthe UK, to make similar matching contributions to the US.
199

Grasping and practically capitalising on all opportunities to further
deepen practical trade and investment relations is in the mutualinterests of Washington and countries in the Three Seas region.
The US and the Three Seas countries must remain steadfast in theirdetermination to ensure that the evolving strategic partnership grows
stronger as they move forward together.
More than ever, particulay in light of Russia’s unprovoked invasionof Ukrinae and its evloing geopolitical context, the US should take amultifaceted approach to advancing its transatlantic foreign policy
interests, building greater economic relationships and upholding theshared values of democracy and the rule of law through the 3SI thatshould rely on ‘fairness, transparency, and mutual benefit’15.
Those words must be followed with action. US political andeconomic support for 3SI are in line with America’s national interest,
and Washigntong should be urged to sustain them over the long term
and must elevate its practical engamgent with the allies of the Three
Seas Initiative.
The time to act on that is now.
ENDNOTES
Deputy Secretary Biegun’s Remarks at the Three Seas Initiative Virtual Ministerial.
Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Embassy in Estonia. https://ee.usembassy.gov/202007-02-6/
2
Trump, D. J. 06.06.2017. Remarks at the Three Seas Initiative Summit in Warsaw,
Poland. Government Publishing Office. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD201700452/pdf/DCPD-201700452.pdf
3Wemer, D.A. 11.02.2019. The Three Seas Initiative explained. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-three-seas-initiative-explained-2/
4
Ibid.
5
Pompeo, M. R. at the Three Seas Virtual Summit and Web Forum. 19.10.2020. U.S
Embassy in Estonia. https://ee.usembassy.gov/2020-10-19-2/
6
Ibid.
7
“H.Res.672 — Expressing support of the Three Seas Initiative in its efforts to increaseenergy independence and infrastructure connectivity thereby strengthening theUnited States and European national security,” November 18, 2020, Congress.Gov.,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-resolution/672/text
8
The Three Seas Initiative, In Focus. 26.04.2021. Congressional Research Service.
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11547.pdf
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
The Head of State: Our Region Will Become Increasingly Attractive for Strategic
Investments, Thanks to the Strengthened Partnership Within the Three Seas.
1200

Three Seas Initiative. https://3seas.eu/media/news/the-head-of-state-our-regionwill-become-increasingly-at trac tive-for-strategic-investment s-thanks-to-thestrengthened-partnership-within-the-three-seas
12
Miller, T., Kim, A. B., Roberts, J. M. 2021 Index of Economic Freedom. Washington, DC:
The Heritage Foundation, 2021. https://www.heritage.org/index/
13
Ibid.
14
The White House. 24.06.2020. Joint Statement by President Donald J. Trump andPresident Andrzej Duda. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/
joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-president-andrzej-duda/
15
The White House. 24.06.2020. Remarks by President Trump and President Duda of the
Republic of Poland in Joint Press Conference. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/
briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-duda-republic-polandjoint-press-conference-3/

201

Conclusions: Putting together
the puzzle by mapping
national perspectives
Andris Sprūds, Mārtiņš Vargulis

In modern European history, there have been a number of geopoliticaland geo-economic initiatives aimed at strengthening the prosperity
and competitiveness of particular regions, both in Europe and in thewider international environment. Not all of them have been successful
or long-lasting. Many have lost meaning and relevance, which has
resulted in them being transformed or ceasing to function altogether.
The Three Seas Initiative (3SI), launched in 2016, is one of the more
ambitious initiatives in recent times, incorporating several dimensions
and aspects and taking a long-term view to strengthening cooperation
between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Sea countries.
Several years after the launch of the initiative, we can already saythat it has undergone a major transformation, both in its strategic
vision and also as a result of national ownership and interest. As thispublication demonstrates, each of the 3SI countries had, if not varied,then at least different approaches and interests in joining the initiativeat its inception. Whether it was due to a reluctance to remain outsideof the club or, conversely, a desire to become a leader in a particularcommunity of nations, each of these countries has had different
interests and aspirations.
As several contributors to this publication point out, this is potentially
one of the biggest challenges that the 3SI will face in the future.
Namely, what unifying factors will encourage and motivate countries toinvest both financially and politically in the further development of thisinitiative. It is hoped that these strategic questions will be answeredat the Rīga Summit and future 3SI summits. Whatever the challenges
and the different perspectives of countries may be, the 3SI must not
be allowed to become ‘just another’ initiative in Europe that ceases toexist if countries lose interest.
202

At the same time, it must be noted that there is a consensus among
the authors of this publication that, although there are significant
differences in national interests, the 3SI region is generally more united
than it might initially appear. This is due to the shared history of theregion, the geopolitical challenges it faces and the EU integration thathas already taken place at one stage or another of EU enlargement. Thisinitiative therefore serves as a tool to strengthen a common position
vis-à-vis the countries of Central and Western Europe. At the sametime, it cannot be denied that there is internal competition between the
3SI players. However, as argued by several authors of this publication,
this is a positive form of competition that encourages each member
state to strengthen its position by developing its national economy andcompetitiveness.
The mapping of national perspectives can be broadly divided into
the following gradations, as shown in the table below.
Economic growth &resilience of the 3SI
region, greater interest
among investors

Geopolitics

Energysecurity

Reliable,sustainable& inclusive
connectivity

Austria

3

4

1

2

Bulgaria

3

4

2

1

Croatia

3

4

1

2

Czech Republic

2

2

2

1

Estonia

2

1

3

4

Hungary

4

3

1

3

Latvia3

12

4

Lithuania

3

1

1

3

Poland3

4

1

2

Romania

1

3

2

1

Slovakia

1

3

2

4

Slovenia

3

4

2

1

3

4

1

2

Table developed by the authors
Gradation: from 1 as the main priority to 4 as the least one

203As we can see, energy is coming to the fore. Reliable, sustainable& inclusive connectivity as a determining factor is important, but not
absolutely above other interests. The 3SI is seen as a multidimensional
entity, with each member state seeking to maximise the benefits
to its advantage. It is expected that national positions may change
significantly, firstly as the geopolitical situation changes, and secondly
as the activities of the 3SI transform, becoming more attractive tonational companies. The ability to offer multiple strategic objectives
and benefits is certainly seen as a strength of this initiative. Thesevaried lines of activity show not a lack of focus, but the strength andattractiveness of diversity.
The initiative was launched mainly due to the international
environment and external factors (US involvement, and attempts to
reduce the role of Russia and the PRC in the region). To be successful
in the future, it needs to be based on both bottom-up and topdown approaches. First of all, the attractiveness of the initiative forbusinesses, its impact on financial and economic cooperation, andits advantages compared to other EU ‘carrots’ will play an importantrole. The initiative has reached the stage where it should have practicalbenefits and interest from the public perspective. And its story is not
only about big projects, but also about day-to-day cooperation and theability of countries to make the 3SI attractive to national influencers.
The analysis of several countries presented in this publicationshows that one of the most important carrots, and a precondition
for development, will be the opportunity offered by the initiative toboost economic prosperity and thereby strengthen its position, firstly
regionally and secondly at European level. In this context, the reluctanceof a number of countries to contribute sufficient financial resources
to the initiative’s overall pot, as well as the failure to coordinate andpromote the involvement of local businesses in the absorption of theseresources, has a negative impact on the position of the initiative as an
attractive component of cooperation. In this context, it is the ability ofnational governments to provide the necessary support to the initiative,
clear messages to the public, and coordination between influencing
parties that will determine the long-term viability of the 3SI.
With only a few states as exceptions, the lack of coordination is
one of the most important gaps preventing the development of theinitiative, firstly at a national and secondly at a regional level. Only a few
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of the countries have established coordinating bodies that on a dayto-day basis, by understanding and being in contact with 3SI partnercountries, are able to provide the necessary information between
governmental and non-governmental organisations and companies.
By setting up separate focal points, this takes the overall 3SI position‘to another level’ nationally. It also allows appointed people to focus
their daily work on issues that directly affect the activities of theinitiative. The ability to update, prioritise and make the necessaryfinancial contributions when establishing the coordinating elements
will determine the success of each country in absorbing and reaping
the maximum (including financial) benefits from the 3SI.
Moreover, as the country mapping shows, although the 3SI operates
at the level of presidents, in several countries it is the line ministries
that play the biggest role. This approach has not always been worseor less effective. Rather, it is the story of how a particular 3SI ‘leader incharge’ in a particular country is able to consolidate the other politicalplayers and convince them of the need for the 3SI at the national level.
As this publication demonstrates, a higher level of representation does
not necessarily mean more successful activities. At the same time, theambition of most of the member states to ‘elevate it to the highest
possible level of representation’ shows that the initiative has the potential
to become an important agenda item at the highest possible level.
While the future of the initiative will largely depend on its member
states’ belief in the development of the 3SI and their national willingness toengage with it, it should be noted that two distinct actors will continue toplay an important role. Namely, this story is about Germany and the USA.
Germany, which currently has observer status, can significantly strengthen
the initiative and the overall dynamic. As the most important business
partner for most of the 3SI members, Germany has an interest in seeing
the region develop and in strengthening its competitive position. At theend of the day, this would also strengthen Germany and its economy.
Therefore, increased German involvement, especially in financial terms,
would significantly change the development and attractiveness of theinitiative, including from the perspective of the countries that are part ofthe initiative. However, for a complete shift of German focus to take place,the 3SI needs to be able to deliver mutual gains and benefits.
As for the USA, its involvement has been essential since the beginningof the initiative. Although initially viewed with concern from several
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national perspectives as an attempt by the Trump administration to use
the 3SI as a counterweight to China’s growing influence in the region,
the country’s presence and involvement, including financially, has been
essential to the overall development of the initiative. In this context, it
should be noted that with the change in the US administration and theoverall geopolitical setting of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the US’s
leadership and focus is to some extent disappearing. As several of theauthors in this publication point out, this may be crucial — firstly, for theoverall development of the initiative, and secondly, for the willingnessof specific countries to engage in the initiative. The presence of theUSA, both politically and financially, will play a decisive role. Without US
involvement and leadership, other actors, in particular China, may be
tempted to fill this geo-economic and geopolitical vacuum to advancetheir own interests. It should be pointed out that US involvement mustalso provide practical input and cover. Only then can it be seen as asufficiently reinforcing element.
Beyond these strategic challenges, the Rīga Summit should provide
clear answers on a number of issues: financial funds, energy, andUkraine. Although development funds were initially put forward as oneof the key elements of attractiveness, country case studies show thatfew countries are now making full use of the financial resources madeavailable by the 3SI.
The second important pillar is energy, which has become particularly
relevant in the context of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. There is arelatively common viewpoint, both nationally and at the European levelas a whole, that a solution to dependence on Russian energy resourcesmust be found. That is to say, it is necessary to do everything possible tominimise this cooperation, including as a way to affect Russia’s financial
situation. In the context of the 3SI, energy is a widely discussed subject.
One of the focuses of cooperation is directly related to the attempt tofind a solution to the dependence of these countries on Russian energy
resources, which could be addressed through closer cooperation andregional solutions within the 3SI. In this context, it should be noted that
the Rīga Summit should be used to build on this existing united andconsolidated vision and to start developing regional projects to address
the long-standing and long-postponed issue of dependence on Russia.
In this context, the frameworks identified by several countries in the
publication certainly serve as good starting points for an even stronger
206

and more empowering regional policy for north-south connectivity.
Successfully addressing this will require significant national financial
investment as well as the mainstreaming of sub-regional projects at theregional level.
The third important pillar relates to Ukraine’s potential links with the
3SI countries. As evidenced by national sentiments, it cannot be ruledout that in the future Ukraine’s formal inclusion in the initiative could
be confirmed; but more important than formal status at the moment
is to think about how to support Ukraine’s post-war recovery through3SI mechanisms and cooperation. The 3SI should have its own MarshallPlan for Ukraine, as the 3SI countries make up Ukraine’s primary market
connections. Including them in economic-financial projects, as well as
in the promotion of an energy policy, would generally facilitate andaccelerate Ukraine’s integration into Europe in practice. Here, the3SI and its member states must play an increasingly important andproactive role.

207

Authors
Lívia Benko obtained her master’s degree in Law at the Paneuropean
University in Bratislava, where she further continued with her doctoral
studies. In 2016, Mrs. Benko finished her Doctorate in Criminal law
focusing on the topic: “The Right to a Fair Trial in Criminal Proceedings”.
Simultaneously, she finished the Master´s Programme of European
Studies-Management of EU Projects at the University of Eisenstadt.
Mrs. Benko successfully completed diverse internships, at the United
Nations Development Programme in Bratislava and at the Institute for
Peace Support and Conflict Management- National Defence Academy
in Vienna. Mrs. Benko has been working as a Research Fellow at AIES
since 2016. Her areas of interest are foreign policy in Central Europe (inparticular in the Visegrad countries), migration and NATO.
Ana-Maria Boromisa is head of the Department for International
Economic and Political Relations at the Institute for Development andInternational Relations in Zagreb. She also teaches at University ofZagreb. Ms Boromisa took her doctorate at the Economics Faculty in
Zagreb, a master’s in European Studies, College of Europe, Natolin,
Poland and in the power engineering at University of Zagreb. She has
extensive research and consulting experience in the area of her interest
that relate to climate change and energy. She served as a Commissioner
at the Croatian Energy Regulatory Council and before that she worked
as an engineer at the Zagreb Airport.
Vít Dostál is the Executive Director of AMO. In his research, he focuseson Czech foreign and European policy, Central European cooperation,
and Polish foreign and domestic policy. Vít has worked for AMO since2006. During that time he authored or edited many publications
dealing with Czech foreign policy and Central Europe. Vít completed
a doctoral program on European Studies at Masaryk University in Brno
in 2017 with a dissertation on the “Paradiplomacy of Czech Regions —Regions as Actors of International Relations”.
208Ana Bojinović Fenko is Professor of International Relations (IR) at the
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ljubljana, Slovenia.
She got her PhD in 2009 in the field of IR at the same institution pursuing
also a PhD research visitation at CERI, Paris. She works at the Universityof Ljubljana as Lecturer in IR and in European Studies programmes at all
three levels of tertiary education. She teaches Introduction to academic
writing, Foreign Policy, International Regionalism, EU as a Global
Actor and Research seminar. She lectures regularly as guest lecturer
at various CEE universities, e.g. in Passau, Zagreb, Tetovo and Graz.
Her research interests include Analysis of Foreign Policy, EU external
Action and International Regionalism with geographical focus on postYugoslav space/Western Balkans and the Mediterranean region.
Kamil Jarończyk is managing editor at Visegrad Insight, a Warsawbased think tank focusing on Central and Eastern Europe. He holds an
MSc in European Governance from Masaryk and Utrecht University. He
co-authored the report on ‘Towards a 3SI Civil Society’ which was thebasis for the first 3SI civil society forum in Riga. He is also the authorof numerous articles focused on the Three Seas Initiative as well as
infrastructure in Central Eastern Europe.
Anthony B. Kim is a research fellow in Economic Freedom, editor of theIndex of Economic Freedom, and manager of Global Engagement for
the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom. Previously, Kim had served
as Deputy Chief of Staff to Dr. Edwin J. Feulner, founder of the Heritage
Foundation. Focusing on policies related to economic freedom,
entrepreneurship, and investment in various countries around theworld, Kim researches international economic issues.
Egils Levits is the President of Latvia. He graduated from the Facultyof Law of the University of Hamburg in 1982. In 1986, he graduatedfrom the Faculty of Philosophy and Public Science at the University of
Hamburg. He actively participated in the reconstruction of the Latvian
state in 1989—1991 and in the restoration of Latvia in 1989—1991. He wasa Member of the Council of the Latvian People’s Front and the Congressof Citizens. He was an author of the concept of the Declaration on the
Restoration of Independence of Latvia of 4 May 1990. He was the first
Minister of Justice after the full restoration of the Constitution, the first209

Ambassador of Latvia to Germany after the restoration of the country,
the first Latvian judge at the European Court of Human Rights (1995—
2004), and the first Latvian judge at the European Court of Justice. He
has been a co-author of many significant draft laws (including the Lawon the Constitutional Court of Latvia, the Administrative Procedure
Law, the Law on the Structure of the Cabinet of Ministers, etc.). Levits
is also the author of the Preamble (or Introduction) to the Constitution,
adopted in 2014. He is the author of many scientific publications on
the issues regarding state law, administrative law, human rights, anddemocracy. Levits has provided many opinions on various legal andpolitical issues to the Latvian Parliament (Saeima), the Cabinet of
Ministers, various ministries, the Constitutional Court, other courts,
public authorities, institutions of the European Union, and international
institutions. He publishes regularly on development challenges in
Latvia. Levits has been the Ambassador of Latvia to Germany, Austria,
Hungary, and Switzerland, as well as Deputy Prime Minister, Minister ofJustice, and a member of Saeima. He chaired the Commission of theConstitutional Law of the President of Latvia from 2007—2013. From
2004—2019 he was a judge at the European Court of Justice.
Imants Lieģis is a Senior Researcher at the Latvian Institute ofInternational Affairs. He has cooperated closely with the institute since2011. He was a Latvian public servant for 28 years, between 1992 and2020, during which time he served as Latvia’s Minister of Defense(2009—2010), a member of Latvia’s 10th Saeima (Parliament), and acareer diplomat with ambassadorial postings to NATO, France, Spain,
Hungary and the Benelux countries. He is on the Advisory Board andis an active member of the European Leadership Network. He has
published widely on foreign affairs and defense and security matters.
Lucia Mokrá graduated in Political Science and Law. She is professorof International Law and European Law. In her professional academic
carrier she is focused on International Public law and European law
from the institutional point of view, as well as from implementation
practice. Her main research area are Human Rights in International Law
and European Law, European Institutions, European Union Foreign
Policy and Humanitarian Law. She is actively involved in lecturing
process at universities abroad. She is dean of Faculty of Social and210

Economic Sciences of Comenius University in Bratislava, Jean Monent
Chair holder (Migration in International Relations), principal investigatorof Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, national representative in Intergovernmental Council of UNESCO MOST programme and Chair of
TEPSA. She published internationally on different aspects of humanrights protection, especially related to contemporary international andEuropean challenges: humanitarian development, external relations,
legal protection or environment.
Illimar Ploom is associate professor in strategy at the Estonian Military
Academy, Estonia. He holds a master’s degree from Tartu University inpublic administration and a doctoral degree in modern history (D.Phil)
from Oxford University. He has worked as lecturer and researcher
at Tartu University and Tallinn University of Technology. His main
research interests include European security strategy, Baltic defence
policy, comprehensive approach, civil-military cooperation, European
integration theory, and political theory.
Wojciech Przybylski is the editor-in-chief of Visegrad Insight, the main
platform of analysis on Central Europe by Res Publica Foundation, an
independent think tank in Poland. He also spearheads the ‘New Europe
100’ network of successful digital age leaders from CEE across thefields of business, research media, NGO and public administration.
His expertise includes strategic foresight on European foreign policy
and political culture. He is a Europe’s Futures Fellow at the Insituteof Human Sciences — IWM and previously has been a lecturer atthe Warsaw University, a guest lecturer at Pázmány Péter Catholic
University in Budapest and a junior research fellow at CEFRES in Prague
as well as Politische Akademie in Vienna. He serves as a member of
the advisory board of the LSE IDEAS Ratiu Forum, European Forumof New Ideas, Open Eyes Economy Summit, and co-chairs Social
Contract Incubator supervisory board. Mr. Przybylski also co-authoreda book ‘Understanding Central Europe’, Routledge 2017. He has been
published in Foreign Policy, Politico Europe, Journal of Democracy,
EUObserver, Project Syndicate, VoxEurop, Hospodarske noviny,
Internazionale, Zeit, Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, Onet, Gazeta Wyborcza
and regularly appears in BBC, Al Jazeera Europe, Euronews, TRT World,
TVN24, TOK FM, Swedish Radio and others.
211Plamen Ralchev is Associate Professor and Head of Department
of International Relations at the University of National and World
Economy in Sofia where he teaches courses in Contemporary World
Politics, Economic Diplomacy, Comparative Foreign Policies ofEuropean Countries, Theories of International Relations, International
Negotiations, Strategic Communications. He holds a Master’s degree
in International Relations and a Doctoral degree in Political Science(Foreign Policy and International Relations). From 2000 until 2007 he has
been working as Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Regionaland International Studies, Sofia. In 2003 he was visiting fellow at theEast Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington D.C. In 2004/2005 he was a Chevening Scholar(FCO/ British Council) at the Department of Sociology at the Universityof Bristol, UK. In 2008 Dr. Ralchev established and has been running
STRATCOM project, focused on research and study of strategic
communications, international public relations and public diplomacy.
His research interests focus on foreign policy, European politics
and security, identity politics, international communications, public
diplomacy and information operations. He employs constructivist andpost-positivist theories and approaches, researching the irrational
character of international relations and international communications,and the influence of subjective social and psychological factors. His
research, advisory and public activities in recent years concentrate on
domestic and foreign policy developments of Turkey.
Edgars Rinkēvičs has been the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Latvia since October 2011. Between 2008 and 2011,
Rinkēvičs was the Head of the President’s Chancellery. Between 1997
and 2008, he was the State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense.
From 2005 to 2007, Rinkēvičs was head of the NATO Summit Latvia
Task Force. In 1997, Rinkēvičs obtained a master’s degree in Political
Science. From 1999 to 2000, he studied at the Industrial College of theArmed Forces of the US National Defense University, where he received
a master’s degree.
Mihai Sebe is an expert in European affairs and Romanian politics,
currently coordinating the European Studies Unit at the European
Institute of Romania and guest instructor at the Faculty of Political212

Sciences, University of Bucharest. He holds a PhD in Political Science at
the University of Bucharest. His area of expertise includes topics suchas: the history of the European idea; populism; future politics. He writes
extensively on European politics both at home and abroad and is amember of the editorial board of the Romanian Journal of European
Affairs.
Visnja Samardzija is Meritorious Scientist at the Institute forDevelopment and International Relations (IRMO) Zagreb, where she
was the Head of the European Integration Department until 2017. She
obtained her PhD at the Faculty of Economics, University of Zagreb.
She is the author of numerous articles and the editor of several books
in area of EU enlargement, EU public policies and industrial relations.
She teaches on European doctoral study programs at two Croatian
universities. She was assistant minister in the Ministry for European
Integration of the Republic of Croatia (2000-2004) and a Board memberof the Trans European Policy Studies Association — TEPSA in Brussels(2010—2016).
Andris Sprūds is a researcher and the Chairman of the Board of theLatvian Institute of International Affairs. He also holds the positionof professor at Riga Stradins University. Andris Spruds has an MA in
Central European History from the CEU in Budapest, Hungary and inInternational Relations from University of Latvia. He has also obtained
a PhD in Political Science from Jagiellonian University in Krakow,
Poland. Andris Spruds has been a visiting student and scholar at
Oxford, Uppsala, Columbia and Johns Hopkins University, as well as
the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and Japan’s Institute ofEnergy Economics. His research interests focus on energy security andpolicy in the Baltic Sea region, the domestic and foreign policy of postSoviet countries, and transatlantic relations.
Velina Tchakarova has twenty years of professional career and academic
background in the field of security and defence policy and geopolitics.
Currently, she is the Director of the Austrian Institute for European
and Security Policy (AIES) in Vienna, Austria. She confucts Strategic
Foresight and Trends Analysis for the Austrian Ministry of Defence andis also an instructor at the Real World Risk Institute led by best-selling213

author Nassim Taleb. She holds a M.A. in political science/politicalscience of South Asia from the University in Heidelberg, Germany and a
B.A. in international relations from the University of World and National
Economy in Sofia, Bulgaria. Her work includes research, consulting,lectures, and publications on global and regional trends, futurescenarios and geopolitical topics for clients from the public and private
sector. She is currently writing a book on the Dragonbear’s (China andRussia) impact on global affairs based on systems thinking, strategic
foresight, geopolitics, and geoeconomics. She is also finishing PhD
dissertation on the Role of External Actors in Eastern Europe (the caseof Ukraine, Belarus and Azerbaijan) at the University of Vienna.
Mārtiņš Vargulis is a researcher at the Latvian Institute of International
Affairs and lecturer at the Riga Stradins University. He holds an MA
in International Relations and currently continues his PhD studies at
the Riga Stradins University. In his academic career, he has focusedon issues concerning Russia (particularly security, economy and soft
power), NATO and EU security related issues, as well as the European
Neighbourhood. He is the author of numerous articles and the scientificeditor of several books. In his long-standing professional career as
a representative at the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia,
he has been Head of Defence Policy and Strategy Section as well as
Diplomat at the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Latvia to
NATO and EU.
Gediminas Vitkus is a Professor and Head of the European Studies
Centre at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science(IIRPS), Vilnius University. He also has an appointment at the Military
Academy of Lithuania. He received a PhD in Political Science from
Vilnius University in 1993. 1993—1995 he was a Deputy Director for
academic work of the IIRPS. 1995—1998 — Director of the European
Integration Studies Center. In 2005 he has been a Fulbright scholar at
Virginia Military Institute. 2001—2013 — Head and Professor of Political
Science Department of the Military Academy of Lithuania. 2003—2021 —Editor-in-chief of “Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review“. 2011—2015 —a member of Committee for Humanities and Social Sciences of the
Research Council of Lithuania. 2016—2022 — a member of the Councilof the Centre for Quality Assessment in Higher Education.
214

Viljar Veebel is Researcher of the Department of Political and Strategic
Studies at the Baltic Defence College. He holds a BA in International
Relations from University of Tartu, MA in International relations
from University of Tartu (“Spill-over barrier in European integration
process”) and doctoral degree in political science (PhD) from Universityof Tartu (“The Role and Impact of Positive Conditionality in the EU
Pre-Accession Policy”). He has worked as academic advisor of theEstonian government in the European Future Convention and as
researcher for several research institutions, including OSCE, SIDA,
the European Council on Foreign Relations, Estonian Foreign Policy
Institute, Latvia Institute of International Affairs and Eurasia Group. He
has been lecturing in University of Tartu, Estonian National DefenceCollege, Ukrainian Diplomatic Academy, OSCE Border Management
Staff College and Estonian Diplomatic Academy. His main areas ofcompetence cover: Russian military doctrine and strategic ambitions;game theory non-cooperative game models in security studies anddeterrence; positive conditionality concept in initiating reforms andpolicy change; concepts and models of deterrence for small nation
states; hybrid warfare and concept of deterrence during hybrid warfare.
Gediminas Varvuolis is currently serving as Ambassador at Large forconnectivity and the Three Seas Initiative at the Europe Department of
the MFA of Lithuania Mr. Gediminas Varvuolis previously held various
positions at the Lithuanian diplomatic service. Between February 2018
and October 2021 Mr Gediminas Varvuolis served as the Ambassadorof Lithuania to Japan. From Tokyo he was also accredited to New
Zealand, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines aswell as ASEAN & Asia Europe Foundation. Before coming to Japan,
from 2013 to 2018 he served as ambassador of Lithuania to Belgium
and from Brussels was also accredited to Luxembourg and Algeria.
After graduating from the Faculty of History at Vilnius University andthe Institute of Political Sciences in Paris, Mr Varvuolis entered theMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania in 1995. His assignments in
Lithuania‘s diplomatic service included positions of Deputy Permanent
Representative to NATO and Director of the Transatlantic Cooperationand Security Policy Department, Head of Crisis management andNATO divisions, Lithuanian Embassy in France. Mr Varvuolis is awarded
with Medal for the civilians „for merits“ of the Ministry of Defence of215

Lithuania (2011), Order for Merits to Lithuania, the Cross of the Knight(2004) and French National Order of Merits, (Chevalier de l‘ordre
national du Mérite) (1997).
Mr Varvuolis is married and has two children.
Zsombor Zeöld is holding Masters degrees from the Jagiellonian
University, Poland (MA in Central and Eastern European Affairs), andfrom the Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest (MA in International
Relations). He is an associate research fellow at Institute for Strategic
and Defense Studies, Hungary. His professional career ties him to
Poland; as a former CEPA-HIF Andrássy National Security Fellow, hismain research areas include Polish foreign and security policy, andsecurity policies in the Central European region — with a particularfocus on the Visegrád Cooperation and on the Three Seas Initiative.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are his own.

The Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA) is the oldest Latvian
think tank that specializes in foreign and security policy analysis. LIIA wasestablished in 1992 as a non- profit association with the aim of providing
Latvia’s decision-makers, experts, and the wider public with analysis,recommendations, and information about international developments,
regional security issues, and foreign policy strategies and choices. It is
an independent research institute that conducts research, develops
publications, and organizes public lectures and conferences related to
global affairs and Latvia’s international role and policies.
Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA)
Address: 21 Pils street, LV-1050, Riga, Republic of Latvia
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The publication is supported by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia