Brazilian democratic transition: elements for the analysis of a possible
transition in China
We conquered democracy again on our own way, through struggles andirreparable human sacrifices, but also through national pacts andagreements, which were in large extent translated into the 1988 Constitution.
Apart from respecting and honoring those who bravely fought for democracy, facing
the illegal truculence of the state, I recognize and appreciate the politicalpacts that led to democratization.
President Dilma Rousseff1

1. Introduction
Advocates of the impracticality of a democratic regime in China often point to
the fact that in such a big country with very unique characteristics only a strong
centralized regime can maintain harmony. The creation of a harmonious society is not
only one of Hu Jintao’s administration most important guiding principles, as stated in its
Scientific Development Concept, but it also stems from an ancient Chinese
understanding that emphasizes the collective over the individual and praises respect forhierarchy.
However, the same critics also seem to ignore the fact that democracy is not a
totally unknown concept in China or for societies based on Confucianism. China
experienced a democratic period in the 20th century, which was not perfect but yet
introduced some of the elements that characterize the current understanding of
democracy. Apart from that, the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan democratized its
political system in the 1980s and is considered now a society living under a democraticsystem.
India shares some characteristics with China, such as having a big and ethnicallydiverse population spread out in a huge territory. Democracy seems to work there, eventhough it has some flaws. However, some may argue that India does not share some ofthose elements that jeopardize the rise of democracy in China. Then, the suggestion isthat the combination of the features of a huge country with the elements inherent toChina creates a fatal impossibility for democracy to flourish.
The transition in Russia is often cited as an example of why democracy issometimes not desirable. The problematic Russian democracy would seem to create
1Part of President Dilma Rousseff’s speech delivered on May 16, 2012, during the ceremony of creationof a “Truth Commission” to investigate human rights violations committed by past authoritarian regimesin Brazil. Original in Portuguese: “Nós reconquistamos a democracia a nossa maneira, por meio de lutas
e de sacrifícios humanos irreparáveis, mas também por meio de pactos e acordos nacionais, muitos deles
traduzidos na Constituição de 1988. Assim como respeito e reverencio os que lutaram pela democracia
enfrentando bravamente a truculência ilegal do Estado, e nunca deixarei de enaltecer esses lutadores e
lutadoras, também reconheço e valorizo pactos políticos que nos levaram à redemocratização”.
Available at: http://m.noticias.uol.com.br/politica/2012/05/16/leia-a-integra-do-discurso-de-dilma-nacomissao-da-verdade.htm

1more instabilities than benefits, hindering its capacity of defending its own national
interests. That, therefore, would be something to be avoided by China.
Then, this paper intends to address the matter of a possible transition in China
looking at past experiences from a different perspective, which is the example of Brazil.
Brazil shares some common features with China – and many differences as well –, but it
is not often regarded as a possible model for a democratic transition in Asia.
Brazil has roughly the same territorial size as China, and it also has a big
population. Even though its 200 million inhabitants are dwarfed by China’s massive
population of more than 1.2 billion, Brazil is the 5th most populated country in the world.
The two countries are at least regionally relevant powers and also fast-developing
economies. They are said to be among the countries that will shape the futureinternational order; one argument in favor of that would be the growing importance thatthe BRICS is gaining in multilateral discussions, for example. In terms of past
democratic experiences, neither of them has a long tradition.
The Brazilian democracy is quite recent and also has some flaws, but looking at
the transition the way it happened in Brazil might highlight some features that could be
used in an analysis of a possible Chinese transition to democracy. Could a similar
process be conducted in China?

2. Democracy and democratic transition
This section presents a theoretical framework with some key concepts ofdemocracy and democratic transition that are used in the article.
One of the assumptions is that democracy is desirable over other forms ofpolitical systems, since it allows people to be free, express themselves freely and takepart indirectly in decisions through the delegation of power to the representatives whoare by them chosen. There are various definitions of democracy, such as the minimalist(Schumpeter, 1976) which focuses on the existence of elections. However, suchapproach is not appropriate for analyzing how effective democracy might be in acountry. Venezuela is an example: even though President Hugo Chávez was elected bypopular vote, there have been violations of freedom of press, and anti-government
individuals and organizations are oppressed.
This paper considers the fundamental elements of democracy as the ones present
in Dahl’s (1971) concept of Polyarchy, which are: freedom to form and joinorganizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right ofpolitical leaders to compete for support, alternative sources of information, and free andfair elections. It is not a perfect model of political organization, since problems such as
irrational voters or an oppression by the majority may exist, but yet it is the one thatbest promotes human rights, people’s freedom and freedom of speech and, hence,accountability.
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O’Donnel and Schmitter (1986) define transition as the “interval between one
political regime and another”. According to the authors, a transition starts with thecollapse of an authoritarian regime and the installation of a more democratic one, thereturn of a new authoritarian regime or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative.
Then, during the transition period there would be many uncertainties, while the rules of
the game are not yet defined.
Mainwaring (1989) highlights the difference between political liberalization andtransition to democracy: “political liberalization implies an easing of repression andextension of civil liberties within an authoritarian regime, whereas a transition todemocracy implies a change of regimes”. The difference is crucial, since one implies achange within the regime while the other focuses on a change of regime. Regime here
has a broader definition; apart from the government, it also includes other forms ofgovernance that might exist, such as institutions (Mainwaring, 1989).
Dankwart Rustow (1970) developed a model of transition to democracy withdifferent phases. Rustow’s required background condition for the rise of the democracy
is quite simple: national unity, where citizens know “which political community they
belong to”. The first phase or “Preparatory Phase” is where there are inconclusive
struggles between polarized social forces. During the “Decision Phase”, there is anacceptance of diversity in the national unity by the political leaders, which involves acertain degree of compromise. In the last phase, “Habituation Phase”, the politicalagreement from the previous phase gains legitimacy and acceptance by the society.
More important than pre-conditions in Rustow’s model is the agreement achieved bydifferent actors over the political debates.
That vision is different from authors such as Huntington (1991), for whom theexistence of certain conditions would facilitate the rise of democracy in a society. The
lack of a democratic tradition, for example, would hinder the prospects for democracy.
Regarding societies based on Confucianism, Huntington claims that they tend to be
antidemocratic, since they prioritize the group over the individual, defend patriarchal
traditions and do not require the inexistence of constraints above the state, such as alegal framework.
Finally, it is worth distinguishing different forms in which there might atransition: defeat or collapse of the regime, transition – where there is a change of
regimes but the formal framework is not broken – and extrication, in which there is suchchange and the rules are broken (Mainwaring, 1989 apud Valenzuela, 1992).
As we analyze democracy in Brazil, it will be possible to conclude that thetransition – understood as a change of regime in which the legal framework is notbroken – was achieved in accordance with Rustow’s model of phases. Brazil’s current
system, a Polyarchy, contrasts with the Chinese one, which probably will go throughsome process of liberalization before it achieves a full transition to democracy.

33. Democracy in Brazil
Brazil is not a country with a long democratic tradition, but yet it managed tobuild a democratic regime in the 1980s after facing various difficult challenges for
centuries. Even though it is not perfect, the Brazilian democratic regime is an example
in defense of the argument that democracy can be achieved even when circumstances
are not favorable. The President of the United States Barack Obama and the United
Nations Development Program recently praised the Brazilian transition to democracy asa model to be followed.2
The country only became independent from Portugal in 1822, after centuries ofcolonial rule and suppression of any movements towards the construction of an
independent nation. After 1822, however, Brazil saw the rise of a monarchic rule thatlasted until 1889. That was a very rare phenomenon in the history of the Americas, withparallels only found in the Mexican brief monarchic experiences of the 19th century(1821-1823 and 1864-1867). Even though the Brazilian Imperial rule had someliberalization periods, with the relaxation of press freedom for instance, it was a regime
that was not democratic and which also tolerated widespread slavery.
In 1889, Brazil became a Republic, which was predominantly dominated byoligarchies. It would take more than 40 years until the first direct and unrestricted
popular vote would elect members for the Parliament in 1930. Seven years later,
however, a dictatorial regime began and lasted until 1945, in what is known as theEstado Novo (or “New State”) period.
Only in 1946 Brazil would have what is now known as its first real democratic
rule. All the rights were reestablished after the end of the Estado Novo, including theright to establish political parties and the freedom of expression. However, in 1964, a
civil-military coup put an end to that brief democratic period.

3.1 The most recent dictatorship (1964-1985)
The last of the Presidents in the previous period, João Goulart, frightened theBrazilian oligarchic elites as well as other sectors of the society, especially the military,with his left-wing tendencies and sympathy towards communism. After President Jânio
Quadros resigned, vice-President João Goulart was to assume the presidency. So he did
as soon as he returned to Brazil after visiting the Communist China.

2

UNDP, 2012. Egyptians learn from transition to democracy and social-economic advances in Brazil.
Available at: http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/articles/2012/04/19/egyptianslearn-from-transition-to-democracy-and-social-economic-advances-in-brazil/ And Bacon Jr., Perry &Forero, Juan. Obama praises Brazil as Model of Democracy. The Washington Post, March 21, 2011.
Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/obama-visits-brazil-with-libya-on-hismind/2011/03/20/ABZrNb1_story.html

4That was the Cold War period, and João Goulart’s promises of education, tax,
electoral and especially land reforms created a feeling of uneasiness among those who
saw the possibility of drastic changes rising. In terms of foreign policy, Goulart refused
to join the American-led sanctions against Cuba, and Brazil strengthened its ties with
the Communist bloc, increasing the tension that involved the opposition between thetwo ideological sides of the Cold War. Brazil was the second biggest country in theAmericas; its turning into a Communist country was obviously not favorable for theUnited States or the rest of the Western bloc.
The coup that overthrew Goulart was not exclusively military, but rather
military-led. There were many sectors that opposed his administration. The UnitedStates had prepared a contingency plan that was to assure the success of the coup.3 Then,on March 31, 1964, the Brazilian authoritarian regime started its rule, which would last
until 1985.
The two decades of authoritarian rule in Brazil were a cruel period in the
country’s history. Many were killed, imprisoned or had to seek exile abroad. Anderle
and Girón (1997) highlight that the regime, in spite of being ruthless, had legitimacy togovern. According to them, for the period between 1964 and 1974, such legitimacy was
founded on the defense of national security and of “civil values”, on geopoliticalreasons in the context of Cold War and on the promotion of economic development,
which pleased a great part of the Brazilian population and the country’s closest allies.
The regime allowed a very limited degree of political freedom with the creationof a two-party system. Arena (Aliança Renovadora Nacional) was the supporting party,
while MDB (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro) was the party where the moderate
opposition groups could find a way to have political expression. Left-wing forces andradical groups were outlawed and persecuted by the regime. The two-party systemcreated a façade of political democracy, which increased the legitimacy of the regime;
the real influence of elections and of the MDB itself was negligible (Horváth, 1997).
The liberalization of the regime started in the mid-70s. During the two decadesof authoritarian regime, many opposition groups were active, including the ones thatused armed actions in some occasions. President Ernesto Geisel announced a “slow,

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Recently released cables show that the American involvement was not necessary, but the country was
prepared to take action. “A cable from the US ambassador the first day of the coup quotes Brazilian
General Humberto Castelo Branco, the leader of the uprising, ‘He has told us that he doesn’t need ourhelp’. The next day a U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff memo summed up the situation: “Package of arms andammunition continue to be held at McGuire [U.S. Air Force Base] pending Ambassador Gordon’sdetermination of whether Brazilian military forces or state police forces will require early U.S. support.
MercoPress, April 12th, 2012. The 1964 ‘Made in Brazil’ coup and US contingency support-plan if theplot stalled. Available at: http://en.mercopress.com/2012/04/15/the-1964-made-in-brazil-coup-and-uscontingency-support-plan-if-the-plot-stalled5

gradual and safe” liberalization, 4 indicating the regime was unilaterally willing topromote reforms. The reasons behind that are summarized by Horváth (1997).
First of all, the argument of national defense was no longer appealing in the 70s,
since most of the opposition or guerrilla groups had already weakened or beenannihilated. Second, the promise of economic development also failed. After the socalled “Brazilian miracle” years, a period of high-economic growth that ended with theoil shocks, the popular support as well as the business class support to the regime
declined. Thirdly, the international environment also changed. That was the period ofdétente between the two superpowers, so the relative importance of Brazil inside theWestern bloc declined; the Brazilian regime was now criticized by the international
community for its violations of human rights. Apart from that, the MDB victory inparliamentary elections in 1974 presented a new challenge for the authoritarian regime.
It is worth noticing that the liberalization promoted by the regime was morederived from the perceived inevitability of its collapse rather than from any concern
over respect for human rights or democracy. As noticed by Horváth (1997) thetransition process was long enough to allow the authorities to organize and control thechange in a top-down way. Then, the military force would safely leave the power
without losing prestige. That is the essence of the negotiation transition (transition
négociée) which is believed to have happened in Brazil (Oliveira, 1984 apud Horváth,1997). It involved negotiations not with the whole society, but with those who hadpolitical power.
Moisés (1995) adds that the terror campaigns promoted by the regime madesome political actors change their behavior and also their perception about democracy,
which started to be considered more beneficial than the authoritarian regime itself.
Moreover, the limited and partially competitive election system allowed debates in thesociety, giving room for the perception that the authoritarian regime was not legitimate
to govern the country. As a result, dissidence grew among the elites. Finally, two
decades of economic and social modernization caused big social changes, making thesociety more urban and industrial and also created greater demands and expectations.
A series of surveys conducted by Rochon and Mitchell (1987, 1989 & 1993
apud Moisés, 1995) indicate that there actually was a drastic change in the support fromthe public to the participation of the military in politics. The figures dropped from 79%
in 1972, to 52% in 1982 and to 30% in 1993. People in favor of direct elections rosefrom 57% in 1972 to 82% in 1982, right before the democratization.
Another factor that has to be considered in the Brazilian transition to democracyis the so-called Snowball effect. The cases of successful democracies in the region
might have been an incentive for other countries to also democratize, including Brazil.
Moisés (1995) mentions that the expansion of the communication industry improved
4

Distensão in Portuguese, which can also be translated as détente.

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connectivity and hence the simultaneous diffusion of information. Right before Brazil
did it, some other countries had already democratized in Latin America and in Europe(Spain and Portugal), which might have served as a model.
All the factors mentioned above, as well as the moves of the Catholic Church
and of European countries and the United States are the causes identified by Huntington(1991) behind the Third Wave of Democratization, where the Brazilian transition can be
categorized.

3.2 The transition
In 1985 a non-military President was elected by indirect vote, putting an end to
the Brazilian dictatorship. The first direct Presidential election was carried out in 1989,
when Fernando Collor was elected. The first years of consolidation of democracy were
unstable in various realms. The 80s are known as a “lost decade” for the Brazilian
economy, which was plagued with hyperinflation and low economic growth. It was alsoa politically unstable period; President Collor suffered an impeachment amid corruption
scandals.
Since the election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1994 the political realm has
gained stability. Freedom House classifies now Brazil as a free country. It is an electoral
democracy with free and fair elections. Constitution guarantees the freedom of
expression and there are no restrictions on internet access, freedom of association orright to strike. 5 However, the organization also highlights that corruption, criminal
violence and discrimination are still widespread problems in the country. Freedom of
expression is hindered, not by actions of the state, but by criminal organizations that
often target journalists.
The distinctiveness of the transition in Brazil lies on the fact that the process
took a long time and was top-down managed, which did not include negotiations withthe opposition groups (as in Hungary or Poland) or a social pact (as in Spain) neither. It
was not an abrupt change triggered by the collapse of the regime neither, as in most of
Latin America (Horváth, 1997). There seemed to be a transition that followed Rustow’s
Phases model. During the Brazilian Decision Phase, however, the debate was not as
inclusive as proposed by the author.
Problems exist, but Brazil seems to be willing to continue on the democracy pathof Dahl’s Poliarchy, solving the remaining issues. Human rights violators from theDictatorship period were never punished criminally due to an amnesty law from 1979
that is still valid. However, recently the country created a “Truth Commission” that will
investigate all the crimes perpetrated by the state in previous authoritarian regimes.

5

http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/brazil

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Brazil went through a unique transition process. Some anomalies, such as thefact that human rights violators were never punished are some of the caveats. However,such a consensual and agreed process guaranteed a smooth transition and allowed thesociety to work on the consolidation of democracy, an important step towards
democratization. It is a model that did not treat justice and fairness in a quite appropriate
way, but it did emphasize harmony. If China is ever to face a dilemma on which model
to follow when seeking to liberalize, the harmonious and agreed transition model ofBrazil might be a real option.

4. A transition in China?
This part discusses whether China has the potential to eventually democratize
and, if it does, whether the Brazilian experience could be broadly repeated in the Asian
nation.
China is currently not a Poliarchy or not even a democracy according to any
definition of the term. Rather, its ruling regime shares some characteristics with the onethat ruled Brazil between 1964 and 1985: lack of freedom of expression, control of
information, emphasis on nationalism, on national security and on economic
development, suppression of anti-government individuals or organizations. The elites
and the bureaucracy have connections with the ruling forces as well as they did in Brazil.
Some noticeable differences are the duration of the regimes and the inexistence of adual party system in China, which in Brazil fulfilled only symbolic purposes but
eventually became a way for the expression of dissatisfaction. The Brazilian
authoritarian rule was much shorter, and there seem to be no prospects for the end of theChinese one.
However, many authors argue that China will eventually have to at least go
through a process of liberalization if not a complete transition to democracy. Risinginequality, social unrest, unemployment, urbanization and environmental degradation
will pose a great challenge to the CCP, which will need to liberalize in order to provide
transparency, accountability and good conditions for economic growth (Saich, 2011).
Schubert (2012) adds other factors that are present in today’s China and thatmight lead to the demise of the authoritarian one-party rule: “political decentralization,
the rise of social movements, world market integration and, last but not least, China’squest for international respect”.
After understanding that a transition might happen, the question then is whether
democracy can fit in the Chinese cultural and historical backgrounds. Similarly to Brazil,
China does not have a long democratic tradition, but the Latin American country did notneed it to consolidate a democratic regime. Then, there is no reason to argue that it is anecessary pre-condition. The Chinese cultural uniqueness, however, is arguable.

8Some say that Confucionism and its emphasis on values such as the groupmentality and the respect for hierarchy would hinder the development of elements
which are important for a democratic regime (Huntington, 1991). Authors such as Anne
Cheng (2012) argue that“a consensus is forming today that while the ‘Confucian/Asian values’ defended byauthoritarian governments are the product of ideological manipulation, they may oreven must eventually be taken seriously when it comes to adapting these regimes tothe democratic model”.

On the other hand, Pierre-Étienne Will (2012) summarizes the “positive
evaluation of the Confucian philosophy”, which assumes that such group of beliefs does
foster democracy: the Confucian values would not only explain the economic successesof Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and China, but they should also“enable China to invent a participative, communitarian, sui generis democracy andevolve an approach to human rights distinct from the individualistic and competitive
conceptions of the West, which is in any case deep in the throws of a moral crisisand looking for new models”.

Refuting any possibility of a successful democratic in China based on culturalvalues means ignoring an academic debate that is not over.
Saich (2011) argues that “future scenarios for China’s development depend to alarge extent on the capacity for the economy to keep developing smoothly”. The
beginning of the liberalization period in the Brazilian authoritarian regime coincidedwith the end of the so-called Brazilian Miracle period. The trigger for that was the factthat the regime perceived the poor prospects for the continuation of its rule, so it tried tohandle the transition which was thought to be inevitable. In China, if such a perception
does not exist, then not necessarily a similar pattern might be repeated.
The CCP could then lead a process of liberalization if either moderates gain
more preponderance inside the party and work for democracy or if the Central Party
feels compelled to do so, similarly to what happened in Brazil. Gordon G. Chang (2011)
foresees a collapse of the regime in the short term due to the growing instabilities in the
country, and also sees the growth of social unrests in the country as a sign of the coming
process.
However, surveys conducted by Chu, Diamond, Nathan & Shin (2008) showthat in 2002, 17.1% of the people surveyed labeled the expected change from the current
to a future regime as a “struggle for democracy”, 43.2% as a “development of
democracy” and 23.3% as a “consolidation of democracy”. 72.3% of the surveyed
answered that democracy is desirable for China, whereas 67% did so for democracy
being suitable. Concerning the perceptions of the current regime, 59.3% said that China
is somewhat democratic and 24.5% very democratic, which were higher than the figuresin the Philippines (47.3% and 22.5%) and similar to the ones in Taiwan (60.9% and22.7%). In other words, the majority of the surveyed people seem to desire democracy,
whatever they consider it to be, but they do not feel that the CCP is obstructing it.
9Findings by Yun-han Chu (2011) show that the general level of regime support
in China is high. When asked if the current political system was the best for the country,
around 70% of the people “somewhat agree”, whereas around 10% of them “strongly
agree”. The interesting thing about it is that apparently the regime receives high support
from people at all ages and with different educational backgrounds.
Nonetheless, Kai He and Huiyun Feng (2008) argue that some present
conditions might be the causes of transition that will soon produce democracy in China,
such as the conflict between different factions inside the CCP and economic
development. A sign of that would be the current intra-party democracy that Hu andWen would be promoting. They suggest a model in which it could take form, theComplex Democratization Model.
This complex democratic model suggests a top-down type of democratic transition
and is a refined negotiation-pact transition model, also highlighting the importantbut secondary role of economic development, political culture, and the middle classin the process of democratic transition.

Such model is similar to the one that took place in Brazil. However, it isimportant to notice that, differently from the Brazilian experience, it was not the
military that took over the power in China. The CCP is more representative than that, so
it is natural that its interests are more diverse as well. The military intended to keep afavorable position in the Brazilian society after the democratization, but it does notseem plausible that the CCP would try to do something similar. It is not a constitutive
part of the society as the military. In other words, after a transition, the CCP might fall
into inexistence while the military could not in Brazil.

5. Conclusion
Brazil needed centuries to have a democratic regime. Overcoming pessimistic
prospects of the inadaptability of democracy in a multi-ethnic and colonized country,
which was plagued with authoritarian regimes, Brazil seems to have shown that preconditions for democracy are a very limited idea. The country democratized in a smooth
and agreed way in the 1980s. In recent years, the transparency and stability that a
consolidated democratic regime provides are part of the reasons why the Brazilian
economy is showing some vigor.
China and Brazil have remarkable differences, but by comparing the two it ispossible to highlight that a process similar to the one that happened in Brazil can takeplace in China, if some conditions are fulfilled. First, the CCP needs to perceive that itis lacking widespread support, which is not the current situation. It might choose tohandle a change that is thought to be inevitable. Second, it must be able to negotiatewith relevant actors a peaceful and not revengeful form to transfer power. Third, the
CCP might choose to continue being part of the politics in China. The chances of
causing a self-annihilation by being excluded from the decision-making are low, so the10party should also be interested in building an order where its own interests would tosome extent prevail. Fourth, and this is something that can still be improved in Brazil,
by increasing investments in education and culture, the consolidation of democracy
would be more achievable.
The transition could be, just like in Brazil, top-down managed and harmonious.
Those two elements seem particularly capable of fitting into the Chinese society and its
traditions.

6. References
Chang, Gordon G. The Coming Collapse of China: 2012 Edition. Foreign Policy,
December,
2011.
Availableat:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/29/the_coming_collapse_of_china_201
2_edition?page=0,1
Cheng, Anne. Seeds of Democracy in the Confucian Tradition? In: Delmas-Marty,
Mireille & Will, Pierre-Étienne (Eds.). China, Democracy, and Law: a Historical andContemporary Approach. Brill, Boston, 2012.
Chu, Yun-han. Sources of Regime Legitimacy and the Debate over the Chinese
Model. Working Paper Series: No. 52. Asian Barometer: a Comparative Survey of
Democracy,
GovernanceandDevelopment.
Availableat:
http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/publications/workingpapers/no.52.pdf
Chu, Yun-han; Diamond, Larry & alli. How East Asians view Democracy. Columbia
University Press, New York, 2008.
Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, 1971.
De Oliveira, Francisco. Reflexiones hétérodoxes sur la transition au Brésil. Cahiersdes Ameriques Latines, Printemps, Paris, 1984.
He, Kai & Feng, Huiyun. A Path to Democracy: in Search of China’s
Democratization Model. Asian Perspective, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2008, pp. 139-169.
Horváth, Gyula. La “Abertura” en Brasil. In: Anderle, Ádám & Girón, José (Eds.).
Estudios sobre Transiciones Democráticas en América Latina. Universidade de Oviedo,
1997.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late TwentiethCentury. University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
Huntington, Samuel. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late TwentiethCentury. University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
Moisés, José Álvaro. Os Brasileiros e a Democracia: Bases Sócio-políticas daLegitimidade Democrática. Editora Ática, São Paulo, 1995.
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O’Donnel, Guillermo and Schmitter, P. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
Tentative Conclusions. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986.
Rustow, Dankwart. Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.
Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3. (Apr., 1970), pp. 337-363.
Saich, Tony. Governance and Politics of China. Palgrave Macmillan, Third Edition,
2011.
Schubert, Gunter. Democracy Under One-Party Rule? On Village and Canton
Elections in China. In: Delmas-Marty, Mireille & Will, Pierre-Étienne (Eds.). China,
Democracy, and Law: a Historical and Contemporary Approach. Brill, Boston, 2012.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London, Allen and
Unwin, 1976.
Scott Mainwaring. Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation:
Theoretical and Comparative Issues. Kellogg Institute Working Paper, no. 130(November 1989), pp. 20-29. His own categories are presented on pp. 25-26
Valenzuela, Samuel J. Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings:
Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions. Kellogg Institute, Working Paper #150,
1990. Available at: http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/150.pdf

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