Navigating by Sun and Compass
Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations
Mirna Galic
Visiting Research Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs
Council on Foreign Relations-Hitachi International Affairs Fellow
Although Japan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have enjoyed formal
relations for nearly thirty years, the relationship has followed an uneven growth trajectory.
After establishment in the early 1990s, the relationship plateaued through the early 2000s
before ramping up precipitously to direct practical cooperation in 2007. The growth ofJapan-NATO relations has accelerated under the tenure of Japan’s current Prime Minister,Shinzo Abe, with Japan and NATO conducting their first joint military exercises andsigning an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme in 2014.
Thesedevelopments, along with security reforms passed in 2015, appear to provide Japan andNATO with the platform necessary to move their relationship to a new phase; whether they
will do so remains to be seen. As Japan navigates changing regional and global power
dynamics, its growing alignments with non-U.S. partners have taken on increasing
significance. Just where NATO fits into this schema is unclear, however. While relations
have continued to progress in the late 2010s, with Japan establishing a formal mission to
NATO in 2018, policy-makers and scholars have expressed doubts about how much further
the relationship can deepen, given priorities, resources, and practical realities on both sides,
including Japan’s constitutional restrictions on the use of force.
This policy brief is the first in a series of three seeking to explore the future trajectory ofJapan-NATO relations. The first brief focuses on the history of the Japan-NATO
relationship in order to provide context for its current state. The second brief examines
how Japan’s security reforms create space for greater Japan-NATO operational cooperationin the military sphere, an area that has yet to be explored by either side. The third brief
identifies possible models for the future of the relationship. The historical perspective inthis first brief provides information on the factors that shaped the growth of the relationshipand might impact its further development. A deeper dive into the history of the relationshipand the broader conditions under which it evolved also provides clues to whether its
meteoric rise over the past decade has been accompanied by the kinds of conceptualchanges that would connect Japan and NATO more deeply than simple procedural
arrangements. The policy brief concludes that such conceptual changes have indeed takenplace, providing an important internal rationale for the relationship. At the same time, it
notes that the high rate of engagement seen in the relationship during the past decade has
resulted in part from temporal factors that will not endure into the future, creating thepotential for a decrease in the level of activity between Japan and NATO in the coming
years. Conversely, it finds that the influence of third parties on the relationship, which has
been relatively significant, is likely to continue, if not increase, in the future.

1
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Navigating by Sun and Compass
Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations

Initial Phase and Establishment of Formal Relations
Japan is NATO’s longest-standing out-of-theater partner, with informal contacts, consistingof engagement by Japanese ministers and parliamentarians, dating back to 1979.1 Althoughformal relations between Japan and NATO began in the early 1990s, Japan reportedly madean initial, unsuccessful attempt to establish more formal relations in the early 1980s,
through an effort led by Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe (father to the current Prime
Minister) on behalf of the administration of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. 2 Abe
traveled to major European capitals in 1983 to promote a Japan-NATO consultation
mechanism, the apparent intent of which was to provide a vehicle for Japanese inputs into
security discussions in Western Europe that stood to impact Japan’s interests.3 The threatof possible Soviet nuclear missile reductions in Europe leading to the displacement of such
weapons to Asia was a major concern of Japanese policymakers at the time, as was thepotential economic impact of tightening sanctions on the Soviet Union.4 Japan’s effort togive itself a channel to NATO on such issues was reportedly scuttled by France, on thebasis of NATO’s geographical limitation to Europe and North America, and almost anotherdecade would pass before the beginning of more formal Japan-NATO relations in 1990.5
These took the form of biennial security conferences bringing together senior officials andsecurity experts from Japan and NATO countries.6 In 1991, Secretary General Manfred
Wörner became the first NATO head to visit Japan.7 Regular High-Level Consultations
between Japanese and NATO officials were established in 1993 and continue to the present
day.8
That Japan and NATO developed formal relations only in the waning days of the Cold War
is no coincidence. France’s 1983 focus on NATO’s European identity reflected theAlliance’s formal mission of defending Western Europe’s territorial integrity from Soviet
aggression. The end of the Cold War both freed and forced the Alliance to begin
contemplating a role for itself outside of this traditional sphere, opening the door for
relations with new partners such as Japan. On Japan’s end, the opportunity was not wasted.
Yukio Satoh, then Director General for North American Affairs at the Japanese Ministry ofForeign Affairs, articulated Japan’s views on the benefits of cooperation with NATO in a
1992 article in the NATO Review.9 The common security interests he identified included
containing the fallout from the collapse of the former Soviet Union, facilitating Russia’sinternal reforms (along with an appeal for European support for Japan regarding islands
occupied by the Soviet Union after World War II), maintaining U.S. engagement ininternational affairs, and addressing trans-national issues such as the environment andrefugees.10 Highlighting the comparative advantages of Japan and NATO, (the former infunding for reconstruction and development, the latter in the maintenance of security in
critical regions) he advocated for the incorporation by each side of the views and interestsof the other into its area of expertise. These same common security interests remained at
the forefront in 1995, as stated by then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Hiroshi Fukuda
in a second Japanese article for the NATO Review.11

2
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Navigating by Sun and Compass
Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations

Japan’s continued desire for vehicles to inform and influence European views is clear in
Satoh and Fukuda’s writing. Although this effort went beyond NATO, seeing Japanestablish relationships with other European bodies during the 1990s, including theOrganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe, NATOhad value as a platform for security discussions, not only with Europe, but also between the
United States, Japan, and Europe. 12 The importance of “trialogue” between the UnitedStates, Japan, and Europe through NATO was emphasized in the 1992 Tokyo Declarationon the U.S.-Japan Global Partnership made under President George H.W. Bush and Prime
Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, underscoring U.S. support for relations between Japan andNATO. 13 Japan-NATO engagement during the 1990s and early 2000s also took placeagainst the backdrop of broader Japanese efforts to collaborate with international partners
on the management of threats to international peace and security. This trend, coming on
the heels of heated domestic and international debate about an appropriate Japanese
response to the Gulf War, saw Japan’s passage of the landmark International Peace
Cooperation Act, as well as its significant humanitarian and reconstruction support to theBalkans.14
Japan’s participation, alongside NATO, in international efforts to stabilize Bosnia andHerzegovina was highlighted by Secretary-General Javier Solana during his visit toTokyo in 1997, the first by a NATO Secretary General since 1991.15 Japanese and NATO
officials discussed Bosnia and Herzegovina in various meetings during the mid and late
1990s and both Japan and NATO participated in the multilateral Peace Implementation
Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but their efforts were parallel rather thancollaborative. As characterized by Solana, Japan, “[i]n providing assistance in the rebuilding of [Bosnia and Herzegovina]…” was “involved in European security, and working
to the same ends as NATO.”16 Regardless of the absence of collaboration between Japan
and NATO on the Balkans, a clear recognition of Japan’s important status as one of thelargest and most active donors to the region was evidenced by NATO’s advance briefing ofJapan on its bombing campaign of Serbia over Kosovo.17 The fact that NATO’s actions on
Kosovo made Japanese officials deeply uncomfortable, owing to the lack of United Nations
Security Council backing for NATO’s use of force, was important enough for Secretary
General George Robertson to devote the majority of his opening address at the 1999 JapanNATO security conference to justifying NATO’s approach on Kosovo. 18 Despite these
open communication channels and mutual recognition, the Japan-NATO relationshipduring the 1990s and early 2000s remained limited in substance and function, largely
contained to what Japan-NATO scholar Michito Tsuruoka has called “the world of
diplomatic niceties.”19
Direct Cooperation
The relationship took on greater significance after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
on the United States and the resulting U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, into which both
Japan and NATO were drawn. At first, Japan and NATO’s engagement on Afghanistan
was incidental, although, as in the Balkans, their participation in complementary
3
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Navigating by Sun and Compass
Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations

multilateral initiatives established familiarity and made them relevant quantities for one
another. These initiatives included the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),
which came under NATO leadership in 2003; Japan’s refueling mission in the Indian
Ocean in support of U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (separate from, but related to,ISAF), from 2001 to 2010; Japan’s leadership, in coordination with the United Nations, ofinternational community efforts for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of
Afghan ex-combatants from 2002 to 2006; and the 2002 Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan,hosted by Japan, which generated $4.5 billion for Afghan reconstruction and developmentfrom 61 countries, including key NATO Allies. Direct practical cooperation took off in2007 with a Japanese initiative to provide funding for local development projects inassociation with ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), temporary basing units in
far-flung areas of Afghanistan.20
The initiative, launched amid speculation about a possible SDF deployment to Afghanistan
and, according to Tsuruoka, partly as a substitute, eventually included the deployment ofJapanese civil servants to one of the PRTs. 21 Both sides benefitted; funding projects
identified through the PRTs enabled Japan to target its development assistance into parts ofthe country it would not have been able to reach on its own, while providing NATO with asource of funding to address the needs of local communities, a component of ISAF’s“hearts and minds” efforts.22 Japan also provided direct financial support for NATO-led
efforts by contributing to the NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund (ANATF), alongwith funding it provided for the policing complement to the ANATF, the United Nations
Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). 23 Although Japan’s LOTFA
contributions far outstripped its ANATF contributions, which were restricted to limitedavailability, non-lethal projects, such as literacy training, Japan’s LOTFA funding
benefitted the ANATF in an indirect way. 24 Because international fundraising efforts
targeted the Afghan security forces as a whole (police and military), encompassing both
LOTFA and ANATF, Japan’s LOTFA contributions freed other donors to focus funds on
the ANATF that they might otherwise have split between ANATF and LOTFA
requirements.25
As the site of NATO’s largest and first outside-of-theatre mission, Afghanistan commanded
significant attention from the leaders of NATO and key NATO Allies, whose efforts
extended beyond the execution of the military mission to broader economic and politicalmanagement of and advocacy for Afghanistan. Japan, restricted from participating in ISAF
militarily, but willing and practiced in economic development and financial assistance, thus
found a unique platform for interaction with NATO and NATO Ally leadership. This
platform, together with Japan’s efforts and initiatives, allowed it to increase its profile atNATO. As a result, Japan was invited to NATO Summit meetings on Afghanistan
beginning in 2008, the only non-troop contributing, non-Ally country so designated. 26
Additionally, after Japan and NATO signed a Security of Information and Material
agreement in 2010 permitting them to share classified materials, NATO was able to makedocuments on Afghanistan, generally restricted to Allies and troop contributing partners,
available to Japan.27 Such developments signal the value placed by the Alliance on Japan’s
4
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Navigating by Sun and Compass
Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations

contributions to NATO efforts in Afghanistan – non-traditional though they might havebeen – and the beginning of a transformation in the psyche of the Alliance regarding theutility of Japan-NATO relations.28
As time went on, exposing the extent of the gap between Afghanistan’s needs andcapabilities and revealing the indivisibility of economic development and sustainablesecurity in the country, Japan’s added value to the NATO effort became increasingly
apparent. A case in point is Japan’s donor coordination effort for Afghan reconstruction
and development. The 2002 Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan had inaugurated a biennialseries of international funding conferences with rotating leadership. In 2012, thatleadership returned to Japan, with a second Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan generating$16 billion in pledges. The 2012 Tokyo Conference was closely aligned with the 2012
NATO Chicago Summit session on Afghanistan. The two meetings had complementary
fundraising initiatives (Tokyo for development assistance and Chicago for security
assistance) and produced inter-referential declaration texts. 29 Together with the 2011
United Nations Bonn Conference on Afghanistan, they set the stage for a new phase in theinternational community’s joint efforts, the so-called Transformation Decade of 2015 to2024. Underlining the commonality of effort, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen highlighted the Tokyo Conference and the importance of donor country pledges
at Tokyo during appearances ahead of the event, while NATO Senior Civilian
Representative in Afghanistan Simon Gass spoke at the conference.30
The 2000s and early 2010s also saw a budding of the Japan-NATO relationship outside ofAfghanistan. Beginning in 2009, Japan and NATO both participated in internationalcounter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding waters, leading to direct
operational cooperation in the foiling of a pirate attack on a Greek vessel in August 2010.31
Japanese and NATO leaders also participated in a series of mutual visits that emphasizedshared values and interests. During his 2005 visit to Tokyo, Secretary General Jaap deHoop Scheffer highlighted NATO and Japan’s mutual respect for democracy, pluralism andfundamental freedoms and underscored NATO’s interest in collaboration with Japan on
global challenges.32 Foreign Minister Taro Aso, who became the first Japanese minister toaddress the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in 2006, asserted Japan’s intention to work moreclosely with NATO in an era of common global threats.33 Later that year, he featured
NATO in another landmark speech on Japan’s strategic foreign policy vision, in which hedescribed NATO as a partner for Japan in promoting freedom and prosperity among
countries along the rim of the Eurasian continent.34 Abe, elected as Prime Minister in 2006,
became the first Japanese head of government to visit NATO headquarters in 2007. His
speech before the NAC characterized cooperation between Japan and NATO in protecting
and promoting common values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as“only natural,” and called for Japan and NATO to “move on to a new phase ofcooperation.”35
The Japan-NATO relationship in the 2000s and early 2010s was underpinned by various
global changes – in particular, those related to the September 11 attacks, U.S. alliance
5
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Navigating by Sun and Compass
Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations

politics, and Japan’s regional security. For NATO, September 11 demonstrated therelevance of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (collective self-defense) beyond thecontext of the Soviet threat and the territorial defense of Europe. It also accelerated thetrend toward broader international engagement begun after the end of the Cold War. In the
post-September 11 environment, NATO developed a new focus on collaborative action
against global threats, and, with it, a new appreciation for the benefit of relationships withcountries outside of the Euro-Atlantic area. 36 As Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer
succinctly put it, “we do face global threats – terrorism, WMD – and we do need global
partners.”37 This broader awakening was compounded by the experience of Afghanistan,which showed Alliance leaders how much more readily out-of-theater missions could beundertaken with a global network of military and operational partners. 38 Accordingly,
NATO’s 2006, 2008 and 2010 Summits saw strides in the development of programs for
non-traditional partners such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea.39 NATOrevised its partnerships policy in 2011 to enable such partners “deeper political andpractical engagement” with the Alliance based on “individual needs, circumstances andaspirations,” a policy orientation well-suited to Japan’s specific needs and restrictions. 40
For Japan, September 11 underscored the importance of countries acting together against
global threats like terrorism, providing additional support for cooperation with multilateral
partners like NATO that held similar views.41 Accordingly, Japan’s 2004 National Defense
Program Guidelines (NDPG), which outlined its security policy in the post-September 11
era, called on Japan to “voluntarily and actively participate in activities that nations of theworld cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment” andplanned for Japan to develop “multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces thatare highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose.”42 September 11 also created animperative for active political support by Japan of its injured ally, the United States.43 This
imperative prompted Japan to take as proactive efforts in support of U.S. operations in
Afghanistan as its domestic constraints allowed, paving Japan’s way to direct practicalcooperation with NATO in Afghanistan. Along with the 2004 NDPG, legislation passed insupport of the United States on both Afghanistan (2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures
Law allowing Japan’s refueling mission to the Indian Ocean) and Iraq (2003 Iraq Special
Measures Law enabling SDF participation in international humanitarian and reconstruction
efforts for the country) eased the path forward for NATO engagement by chipping away at
traditional boundaries on the use of the SDF outside of Japanese territory.
Outside of the indirect role U.S. alliance politics played, the United States also advocateddirectly for greater Japan-NATO cooperation during the 2000s. This advocacy wasformalized in the 2007 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting between the
countries’ respective foreign and defense ministers, which classified the broader
development of Japan-NATO cooperation as a common strategic objective of the UnitedStates and Japan. 44 The growing security challenges posed during the 2000s and early2010s by China and North Korea, both of which feature prominently in Abe and Aso’s
speeches to the NAC, also played a role in Japan’s orientation towards NATO. During the
2000s, Japan worried about the lack of transparency in China’s growing military build-up, a
6
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Navigating by Sun and Compass
Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations

concern compounded by the European Union’s mid-2000s forays into lifting its China arms
embargo. 45 In the early 2010s, Japan’s concerns expanded to China’s increasing
assertiveness in the East and South China Seas. The threat from North Korea was starker,
following its efforts to intensify nuclear and missile programs throughout the 2000s,
including through the test-firing of ballistic missiles in 2006 and conduct of nuclear tests in2006 and 2009. In this regard, NATO was again seen as a venue in which Japan could
inform European countries’ security perceptions of Asia and affect European views of andbehavior toward China and North Korea.46
Engagement under the Second Abe Administration
The Japan-NATO relationship took on new momentum in the early 2010s, facilitated by thedevelopments in NATO’s partnership policy and the second administration of Prime
Minister Abe. Abe’s return to office in 2012 kick-started the “new phase of cooperation”
between Japan and NATO that he had promised during his short-lived first term.47 In 2013,
Japan and NATO signed a Joint Political Declaration laying out their priorities for futurecooperation and paving the way for a formal partnership agreement.48 Secretary General
Rasmussen marked the occasion with a visit to Tokyo, during which he delivered a speechcharacterizing NATO and Japan as “like-minded,” “natural partners,” and asserting, “Weshare the same values. We share the same security challenges. And we share the samedesire to work together.” 49 The formal agreement, the Individual Partnership andCooperation Programme (IPCP), came a year later, elevating the Japan-NATO relationshipto a new level. The IPCP mechanism is intended to enhance political dialogue andstrengthen cooperation between the Alliance and its partners. Signed during a visit byPrime Minister Abe to NATO Headquarters in May 2014, the IPCP laid out nine specificareas for Japan-NATO cooperation, including cyber, arms-control and non-proliferation,
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, and counter-terrorism.50
Abe addressed the NAC for a second time during his 2014 visit, delivering a major policy
speech affirming his intention to develop Japan’s partnership with NATO through the lensof “proactive contribution to peace,” the catchphrase of his foreign policy vision.51 Abe
echoed Rasmussen’s “natural partners” language, stating, “We are more than simply‘natural partners’ that share fundamental values. We are also ‘reliable partners’
corroborated by concrete actions.” 52 Continuing the trend, Secretary General Jens
Stoltenberg invoked the “natural partners” language in 2017, during a major speech inTokyo outlining NATO’s interests in the stability and security of the Asia-Pacific region.53
Stoltenberg’s Tokyo visit was preceded by one to NATO by Abe earlier in 2017. The
exchange of visits set the stage for a 2018 renewal of the IPCP.54 While largely similar to
the 2014 version, the 2018 IPCP streamlines the priority areas for cooperation from nine toseven.55 Additionally, it contains modified language on participation in military exercises.
Whereas the 2014 version cited Japanese participation in NATO exercises, the 2018
version changes the language to “participation in each other’s exercises.” Moresignificantly, it adds new language noting that “NATO may consider contributing assets to
7
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Navigating by Sun and Compass
Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations

Japanese exercises in the Indo-Pacific region,” an area where Japan is seeking to show anactive presence in light of China’s activities.
In accordance with the cooperation areas identified in the IPCP, and taking advantage ofthe proximity of assets deployed in the Gulf of Aden, Japan and NATO held their first joint
naval exercise in September 2014, involving a Japanese Maritime SDF destroyer and theflagship of NATO’s counter-piracy mission in the region, Operation Ocean Shield.56 A
second exercise followed in November 2014 and two others in February and October
2015. 57 Coordination between Japan and NATO as part of international counter-piracy
efforts in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding waters had continued since 2009 andsurveillance by Japanese air patrols had become a leading source of information forparticipating international vessels by 2014, but direct operational cooperation between
Japan and NATO against pirate vessels had been minimal.58 Joint exercises were therefore
important for increasing interoperability between Japanese and NATO naval assets andmoving operational cooperation from incidental to intentional. Maritime security
cooperation with NATO fits Japan’s broader interests in international maritime law,
protection of international shipping lanes, and freedom of navigation.59 In line with thesepriorities, Japan and NATO have made moves to expand their maritime cooperation beyond
piracy. Taking advantage of the presence of a Japanese Maritime SDF training squadron
sailing around Europe in August 2018, they undertook basic exercises in the Baltic Sea andoff the coast of Spain, involving the squadron and NATO Standing Maritime Groups.60
Additionally, Japan has appointed a liaison officer to NATO’s Allied Maritime Commandin London, United Kingdom.61
The designation to Allied Maritime Command complements Japan’s designation of aliaison officer to NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, in Mons, Belgium,
the headquarters of NATO Allied Command operations.62 Additionally, Japan provides a
SDF officer to NATO Headquarters as a voluntary national staff contribution to the officeof the Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security. 63 All ofthese appointments serve to familiarize Japan with NATO bureaucracy and procedures andto enhance information exchange and/or interoperability. Further to this end, Japan becamea member in 2014 of the newly-created NATO Interoperability Platform (IP), a standing
NATO initiative intended to increase general interoperability with partners.64 In addition toits interoperability benefits, the IP can meet in various formats, including NAC, MilitaryCommittee, and Operations Policy Committee, enhancing partner access to NATOdeliberative forums. 65 Japan also announced its intention in January 2018 to join theNATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia, andcontributes experts to multiple projects under the NATO Science for Peace and Security
Partnership, a consortium for collaboration on security-related research and development.66
Additionally, Japan established an official mission to NATO in July 2018, based on an
earlier NATO request. 67 Although the establishment of Japan’s mission to NATO wasdone via the dual-hatting of Japan’s Embassy in Belgium, the move nonetheless creates amore official channel of communication between Japanese, NATO, and Ally officials in
Brussels.
8
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Navigating by Sun and Compass
Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations

The relationship between Japan and NATO has flowered during the 2010s. This growthhas been accompanied by a solidifying of common values, a deepening understanding by
each party of the mutual relevance of revisionist powers in their respective regions, and agreater concurrence between Japan and NATO’s strategic orientations. The period has also
seen an uptick in the formalization of Japan’s engagement with key NATO Allies like theUnited Kingdom and France.68 As in the 1990s and 2000s, the United States has played arole, including through behind-the-scenes diplomatic support for closer Japan-NATO ties.69
The joint respect for common values first invoked by Secretary General Rasmussen andPrime Minister Abe in the mid-2000s has become an established narrative with theshorthand “natural partners” during the 2010s. Shared values have become the semantic
bridge used by both Japan and NATO to span the geographic divide between Japan’s seatin Asia and NATO’s core in Europe. These values – individual liberty, democracy, humanrights, and the rule of law – are also invoked as values shared in contrast to Russia andChina. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and China’s increasing military
assertiveness and buildup in the East and South China Seas during the early and mid-2010s
set the stage for a greater acknowledgement by both Japan and NATO of the benefits ofcommon positions on the challenges to the status quo posed by the actions of these states
and North Korea.
A significant portion of Abe’s 2014 address to the NAC was devoted to the aspects ofChina and North Korea’s behavior that held repercussions for the broader international
community, continuing his 2007 approach of utilizing NATO as a platform for influencing
European perceptions of the region. This time, however, Abe also used his address to draw
parallels between the behavior of China and Russia, framing Japan’s concern over China ina way that could resonate with Europe, stating, “…Ukraine is the greatest challenge forpost-Cold War Europe. We cannot accept changes to the status quo by force or coercion.
This is a global issue that also impacts Asia.” 70 Notably, these views were echoed byNATO leaders, lending credibility to Abe’s approach. During Abe’s 2014 visit, Secretary
General Rasmussen, in talking about the impact of the crisis with Russia over Ukraine,
stated, “…there is no doubt that the security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic and AsiaPacific regions cannot be treated separately.”71 Secretary General Stoltenberg made similarstatements during his 2017 speech in Tokyo, asserting that NATO’s security was “boundup” with that of its close partners in the region. 72 He also classified North Korea as threat
to both regional partners and NATO Allies, given the country’s development ofintercontinental ballistic missiles, following an earlier condemnation of North Korea’s
nuclear and missile programs by the NAC. 73 Additionally, Stoltenberg took the highly
unusual step of criticizing China in an official statement (although indirectly). In a jointpress release with Abe, issued during Stoltenberg’s 2017 visit, the two “…express ourconcern about the situation in the East and South China Seas…” and “…reaffirm ouropposition to unilateral coercive actions that could alter the status quo and increase
tensions.”74

9The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Navigating by Sun and Compass
Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations

Japan and NATO’s strategic orientations have also coincided more significantly during the2010s. Japan’s 2013 National Security Strategy (NSS), the country’s first, establishes
Japan as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” a status that can be understood to encompass
more active Japanese promotion and fostering of international peace and stability, incooperation with the international community.75 In describing the proactive contribution topeace concept, Abe notes, “…Japan must, on the basis of international cooperation, play aneven more proactive role than ever before in maintaining world peace and stability.”76 He
draws a distinct connection between global security and Japan’s security, arguing that“[w]ithout world peace and stability, Japan cannot safeguard its own peace and stability.”77
The means through which Japan intends to pursue its proactive contribution to peace
include: “playing a leading role in the settlement of disputes,” including by working
through the United Nations on preventive diplomacy, mediation and post-conflictassistance; leading international efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation;“strengthening the international order based on universal values and rules, including via
capacity-building efforts for developing countries;” and promoting cooperation against
terrorism.78 In this regard, Abe is clear that Japan’s proactive contribution to peace will
involve the more active participation of the SDF. 79 Juxtaposing the importance of
operational cooperation with Japan’s SDF prohibitions, he states, “[t]hat is exactly why it isincumbent upon us in Japan to reconstruct the legal basis pertinent to the right of collective
self-defense and to international cooperation...”80 Security reforms passed by the Diet in2015, which will be discussed in the next policy brief in this series, effectively accomplish
this goal.
NATO’s strategic orientation portrays the Alliance as one that not only protects its member
states from attack, but also “projects stability” beyond its borders by engaging in “crisis
management” and “cooperative security” with partners. In their 2016 Warsaw Summit
Communique, in a formulation similar to Japan’s proactive contribution to peace language,
NATO heads of state and government “…seek to contribute more to the efforts of theinternational community in projecting stability and strengthening security outside ourterritory, thereby contributing to Alliance security overall.”81 Their means of doing so arethrough the “essential core tasks” of the Alliance detailed in NATO’s 2010 Strategic
Concept, its ten-year framework. The Strategic Concept lays out three such tasks:
collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. 82 Collective defense(deterrence and defense against aggression and mutual assistance against attack) is aimed
largely inward, towards NATO territory, but also includes working with partner countries
on countering terrorism beyond NATO territory. Crisis management and cooperative
security, meanwhile, are capabilities explicitly directed beyond NATO’s borders. Crisis
management involves NATO’s role in preventing and mitigating conflicts, along with postconflict stability and reconstruction operations. Cooperative security encompasses
deepening cooperation with the United Nations, arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation, the induction of countries sharing common values, and practical cooperationand capacity-building with partners, including for counter-terrorism. Both capabilities
involve activities similar to those identified in Japan’s NSS.
10The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Navigating by Sun and Compass
Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations

Conclusions
The preceding survey brings to light four aspects of Japan-NATO relations that may be
relevant to the future trajectory of the relationship. First, as indicated above, the growth in
the relationship has been accompanied by an alignment in values and strategic orientations
between Japan and NATO. Scholars Paul Bacon and Joe Burton posit a similar state ofaffairs in their 2017 study, which notes that NATO’s projection of narratives of natural
partnership, “strategic parallelism,” and cooperative security to Japan was successful
precisely because “Japan was ready and waiting to embrace [these narratives] for its own
reasons, and indeed had already articulated its own versions of them.”83 This alignment invalues and strategic orientations enables each side to articulate the benefits of therelationship in a way that aligns with its policies and resonates with its publics, providing arationale for Japan-NATO engagement that is not dependent on outside factors or events.
Second, practical and/or operational cooperation in the Japan-NATO relationship has
expanded over time, in both incidence and focus area, but it has also appeared to result
primarily from seized opportunities that are temporal in nature. These opportunities havemostly come from mutual participation in multilateral initiatives with overlapping
relevance to each side, principally, Afghanistan and piracy, but have also, as in the case of2018 naval exercises, resulted from occasions of mutual proximity.
New opportunities for practical and operational cooperation from Afghanistan and piracy
are effectively finished, at least for the time being. Although both Japan and NATO remain
engaged on Afghanistan, they have long since reached the limits of their practicalcooperation options there. Similarly, the success of counter-piracy operations around the
Gulf of Aden has vastly reduced further need for them, and, while Japan continues tomaintain assets in the area, NATO ended its Operation Ocean Shield in 2016.84 In theabsence of another international security threat that rises to the level of their mutual
engagement, Japan and NATO will have to actively create opportunities for practical andoperational cooperation to continue the growth of such cooperation going forward.
Although the long plateau to the relationship during the 1990s and early 2000s does notprovide a positive precedent in this regard, the Japan-NATO relationship has evolved
significantly during the mid-2000s and 2010s, bringing into question the predictive value ofthe earlier plateau phase. Japanese officials continue to view cooperation with NATO as
desirable.85 Further military exercises remain an option and non-regionally specific issue
areas, like cyber defense, which provide fruitful opportunities for cooperation between
geographically distant partners, are particularly interesting. 86 Even if Japan and NATO
eventually decide to become the kind of partners that only come together actively torespond to intermittent crises, they will still need to pursue a level of practical andoperational cooperation to ensure compatibility and interoperability in crisis situations. The
second and third policy briefs in this series explore how Japan and NATO can create
opportunities for such cooperation.
Third, the momentum surrounding the Japan-NATO relationship during the late 2000s and2010s was boosted not only by cooperation opportunities derived from Afghanistan and
11
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Navigating by Sun and Compass
Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations

piracy, but also by the low-hanging fruit of novel high-level visits and administrative
formalizations like the signing of the IPCP, joining of the IP, and designation of a Japanese
mission to NATO (finished in 2018 but in the works for some time). Although clearlysignificant, both practically and symbolically, such events are the standard steps partner
nations use to climb the NATO threshold and the flurry of activity surrounding this initial
climb eventually levels off for all partners. It would be a mistake to automatically equate aleveling off of this kind in the coming years with a change in the health or vitality of theJapan-NATO relationship. Administrative formalization and diplomatic signaling throughspeeches and visits remain an important and necessary part of Japan-NATO relations, but abetter barometer for the trajectory of the relationship will be the steps each side takes todeepen relations beyond such formalities, an issue that will be addressed in the third brief.
Finally, the Japan-NATO relationship has been influenced by third-parties, particularly theUnited States, China, and North Korea, but also Russia. While U.S. direct and indirect
influence has had a positive effect on the relationship, waning U.S. focus on the priority ofNATO under the administration of President Donald Trump leaves in question how muchhigh-level support the United States will provide for the Japan-NATO relationship going
forward. With the evolution of the Japan-NATO relationship, direct U.S. support is likely
less important than ever before, but it certainly remains helpful. Given the slow pace of
bureaucratic change, the longer-term U.S. orientation toward NATO – that is, beyond thecurrent Trump administration – will have significance; a second Trump administration
would likely be more determinative of the direction of U.S. support. Meanwhile, Japan
and NATO have found increasing common ground on challenges to the status quo posed by
Chinese, North Korean and Russian actions, even though that common ground has, thus far,been largely semantic.87 The challenges posed by these states, and how/whether Japan andNATO choose to respond to them, will likely continue to impact the relationship. China’s
influence, in particular, is likely to grow as Japan reorients the SDF to face new challenges
from China and NATO powers like France and the United Kingdom become increasingly
active in the Indo-Pacific region.88 China’s military buildup and activities have alreadyaffected Japan’s security posture and legislation in ways that facilitate operational
cooperation with NATO Allies, a topic that will be discussed in the next brief.
1

The head of Japan’s Defense Agency visited NATO Headquarters in 1979, 1981, and 1984 and the Japanese foreign
minister met with the NATO Secretary General in 1986. Additionally, after 1980, Japanese parliamentarians participatedas observers in what later became known as the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. See Masashi Nishihara, “Can Japan Be
a Global Partner for NATO?,” Riga Papers, NATO and Global Partners: Views from the Outside, Ronald D. Asmus,
Editor, Riga, Latvia, November 27-29, 2006, pp. 36, 37; and Brian Bridges, “Japan and Europe: Rebalancing a
Relationship,” Asian Survey, Vol. 32, No. 3 (March 1992), p. 236.
2
Henry Scott Stokes, “France Blocks Japanese Bid for Informal Ties to NATO,” New York Times, April 2, 1983,
https://www.nytimes.com/1983/04/02/world/france-blocks-japanese-bid-for-informal-ties-to-nato.html.
3
Stokes.
4
Takashi Oka, “Japan takes firm stand with West on defense issues at summit,” Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 1983,
https://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0601/060153.html.
5
Stokes.

12
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Navigating by Sun and Compass
Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations

6

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Joint Press Statement, Fifth NATO-Japan Security Conference at NATO
Headquarters on 15 October 1999,” October 15, 1999, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-C9656C2CE7EF8F13/natolive/news_27092.htm.
7
Bridges, p. 236.
8
Nishihara, p. 3.
9
Yukio Satoh, “Japan and NATO Agenda for Political Dialogue,” NATO Review, Vol. 40, No. 3, June 1992, pp. 18-22,
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/1992/9203-4.htm.
10
Satoh.
11
Hiroshi Fukuda, “Regional Security Initiatives and NATO-Japan Relations,” NATO Review, Vol. 43, No. 4, July 1995,
pp. 22-26, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/1995/9504-5.htm.
12
On relations with European institutions, see: Bridges, p. 236; and Takako Ueta, “Japan and the European Security
Institutions,” Studia Diplomatica, Vo. 54, No. 1/2 (2001), pp. 137-140.
13
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), “Tokyo Declaration on the U.S.-Japan Global Partnership,” theWorld and Japan Database Project, http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPUS/19920109.D1E.html, accessed
January 10, 2019.
14
Kent E. Calder, “Japan in 1991: Uncertain Quest for a Global Role,” Asian Survey, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 1992), pp.
32, 35, 36.
15
Javier Solana, “NATO’s Role in Building Cooperative Security in Europe and Beyond,” North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, October 15, 1997, https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s971015a.htm.
16
Solana, “NATO’s Role in Building Cooperative Security in Europe and Beyond.”
17
Julie Gilson, “Japan in Kosovo: lessons in the politics of ‘complex engagement’,” Japan Forum, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 67,
68, 70.
18
Ueta, p. 134; Robert M. Uriu, “Japan in 1999: Ending the Century on an Uncertain Note,” Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No. 1,
January/February 2000, pp. 148-149; and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Opening Remarks by NATO Secretary
General, Lord Robertson at the NATO-Japan Security Conference,” October 15, 1999,
https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s991015a.htm.
19
Michito Tsuruoka “NATO and Japan as Multifaceted Partners,” NATO Defense College, Rome, Research Paper No. 91,
April 2013, p. 2.
20
The PRTs proposed the projects, which were implemented by NGOs or local governments. See North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, “Fact Sheet: NATO/Japan Cooperation in Afghanistan,” Media Operations Center, December 2007,https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2007/0712-hq/pdf/factsheet-gagp.pdf.
21
Michito Tsuruoka, “NATO and Japan: a View from Tokyo,” RUSI Journal, Vol. 156, No. 6, December 2011, p. 64.
22
Tsuruoka, “NATO and Japan: a View from Tokyo,” p. 64.
23
Japan also provided funding for a NATO munitions trust fund for Afghanistan.
24
For Japan’s contributions to the ANATF, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Afghan National Army (ANA) TrustFund,” Media Backgrounder, April 2018,https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_04/20180425_1804-backgrounder-ana-trust-fund-en.pdf.
For Japan’s contributions to LOTFA, see United Nations Development Programme, “Law and Order Trust Fund For
Afghanistan (LOTFA) – Support to Payroll Management,” https://open.undp.org/projects/00089137, accessed September
20, 2018.
25
The author led U.S. efforts to raise funding for the ANATF and LOTFA at the United States Department of State.
26
See for example: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “ISAF nations affirm long-term commitment to Afghanistan,”
April 3, 2008, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_7196.htm; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Declaration by
the Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to the UN-mandated, NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan,” November 20, 2010, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_68722.htm; andNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Monthly Press Briefing by Secretary-General Andres Fogh Rasmussen,” May 11,2012, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_87078.htm.
27
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Agreement between the Government of Japan and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation on the Security of Information and Material,” June 25, 2010,https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/nato/pdfs/agreement_sim2010.pdf.
28
The author, who coordinated U.S.-alliance relations on Afghanistan at the United States Department of State between
2010 and 2017, witnessed the evolution of NATO’s engagement of Japan on Afghanistan.
29
See the Tokyo Declaration on Afghanistan,
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/tokyo_conference_2012/tokyo_declaration_en1.html, accessed
September 20, 2018, and the Chicago Summit Declaration in Afghanistan,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87595.htm, accessed September 20, 2018.

13
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Navigating by Sun and Compass
Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations

30
See for example North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Monthly Press Briefing by Secretary-General Andres Fogh
Rasmussen,” July 2, 2012, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_88848.htm; North Atlantic Treaty Organization,“Monthly Press Briefing by Secretary-General Andres Fogh Rasmussen,” May 11, 2012,https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_87078.htm; and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Press Conference byNATO Secretary-General Andres Fogh Rasmussen after the meeting of the NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs with nonNATO ISAF contributing nations,” April 19, 2012, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_86299.htm.
31
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO-Japan cooperation thwarts pirate attack in Gulf of Aden,” August 16, 2010,
http://www.aofs.org/2010/08/16/nato-japan-cooperation-in-gulf-of-aden-disrupts-pirate-attack/.
32
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, in Tokyo, Japan,”April 4, 2005, https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/opinions_22004.htm.
33
Taro Aso, “Japan and NATO in a New Security Environment,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, May 4, 2006,
https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0605.html.
34
Taro Aso, “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofJapan, November 30, 2006, https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html.
35
Shinzo Abe, “Japan and NATO: Toward Further Collaboration,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, January 12, 2007,https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070112b.html.
36
See for example North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Global NATO: Overdue or Overstretch? Speech by NATO
Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, at the SDA Conference, Brussels,” November 6, 2006,
https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/opinions_22449.htm; and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “‘Projecting Stability’
Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the ‘Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el
Dialogo Exterior’ (FRIDE) in Madrid, Spain,” July 10, 2006, https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/opinions_22477.htm.
37
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in Riga, Latvia,” July
14, 2006, https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/opinions_22476.htm.
38
Rebecca Moore, “NATO’s Partners in Afghanistan: Impact and Purpose,” UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 22, January
2010, pp. 92-115; and Ellen Hallams, “NATO at 60: Going Global?,” International Journal, Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring 2009, p.
431.
39
See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Riga Summit Reader’s Guide,” 2006, p. 56, https://www.nato.int/docu/rdrgde-riga/rdr-gde-riga-e.pdf, accessed September 26, 2018; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Bucharest Summit
Declaration,” April 3, 2008, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm; and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, “Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation,” November 2010, https://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf, accessed September 26,
2018 (Japan is in the category “global partners”).
40
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Active Engagement in Cooperative Security: a more Efficient and Flexible
Partnership Policy,” April 15, 2011, https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_04/20110415_110415Partnership-Policy.pdf.
41
Tsuruoka, “NATO and Japan as Multifaceted Partners,” p. 2.
42
Ministry of Defense of Japan, “National Defense Program Guidelines 2005 -,”http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/national_guidelines.pdf, accessed September 3, 2018.
43
See, for example: John H. Miller, “Will the Real Japan Please Stand Up,” World Policy Journal, Winter 2005/06, p. 43;
and Edward J. Lincoln, “Japan in 2001: A Depressing Year,” Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 1 (January/February 2002), pp.
76-79. See also statements from Prime Minister Koizumi issued after September 11,
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/index2001_e.html, accessed January 16, 2019.
44
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee,” May 1, 2007,https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/pdfs/joint0705.pdf.
45Frans Paul van der Putten, “The EU Arms Embargo against China: Should Europe Play a Role in East Asian Security?,”
Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, January 2009,https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20081202_cscp_eu_embargo_china.pdf.
46
Tsuruoka, “NATO and Japan a View from Tokyo,” p. 65; and Christopher Hughes, “Japan’s response to China’s rise:
regional engagement, global containment, dangers of collision,” International Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4, 2009, pp. 837, 850.
47
Abe’s first term as Prime Minister ended in 2007.
48
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Joint Political Declaration between Japan and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization,” April 13, 2013, https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/official_texts_99562.htm.
49
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO and Japan-natural partners,” NATO, April 15, 2013,https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/opinions_99634.htm.
50
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme between Japan and NATO,”
May 6, 2014, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_05/20140507_140507-IPCP_Japan.pdf.

14
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Navigating by Sun and Compass
Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations

51

Shinzo Abe, “Japan and NATO as ‘Natural Partners,’” Kantei, May 5, 2014,
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201405/nato.html.
52“Japan and NATO as ‘Natural Partners.’”
53
Jens Stoltenberg, “The geography of danger has shifted,” NATO, October 31, 2017,https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/opinions_148125.htm.
54
IPCPs are meant to be reviewed and renewed regularly.
55
Explicit reference to counterterrorism and comprehensive approach to conflict management were dropped. See North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme between Japan and NATO,” May 31,
2018, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2018_05_pdf/20180719_180531-ipcp-japan.pdf.
56
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO and Japan conduct first ever joint counter- piracy drill,” September 25,
2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/news_113373.htm; and Alessio Patalano, “‘Natural Partners’ in Challenging
Waters? Japan-NATO Co-operation in a Changing Maritime Environment,” RUSI Journal, Vol. 161, No. 3, June/July
2016, p. 46.
57
Japan also participated in NATO’s annual crisis management table top exercise in 2015, focused on maritime security.
See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan’s Participation in NATO Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) 2015,”
March 3, 2015, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000659.html; NATO Allied Maritime Command, “NATOand Japan Counter-Piracy Forces Strengthen Relations in the Gulf of Aden,” November 27, 2014,
https://mc.nato.int/media-centre/news/2014/nato-and-japan-counterpiracy-forces-strengthen-relations-in-the-gulf-ofaden.aspx; NATO Allied Maritime Command, “NATO Warship TCG BUYUKADA Exercises with International
Counter-Piracy Forces,” February 13, 2015, https://mc.nato.int/media-centre/news/2015/nato-warship-tcg-buyukadaexercises-with-international-counterpiracy-forces.aspx; and NATO Allied Maritime Command, “Cooperative Security in
the Maritime Domain and MARCOM’s Vital Role,” December 7, 2015, https://mc.nato.int/mediacentre/news/2015/cooperative-security-in-the-maritime-domain-and-marcoms-vital-role-.aspx.
58
The only publicized instance of direct joint operations is the 2010 incident with the Greek vessel. Abe asserts in 2014
that Japan’s maritime patrol aircraft cover 60% of all warning and surveillance flights over the Gulf of Aden. See Abe,
“Japan and NATO as ‘Natural Partners.’”
59
Kantei, “National Security Strategy,” December 17, 2013,
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/2013/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NSS.pdf.
60
Specifically, Passing Exercises (PASSEX). NATO Allied Maritime Command, “NATO Maritime Group Sails withJapanese Training Squadron,” August 22, 2018, https://mc.nato.int/media-centre/news/2018/nato-maritime-group-sailswith-japanese-training-squadron.aspx.
61
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Meets with the Secretary General of NATO,” July 6,
2017, https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/ep/page1e_000165.html.
62
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program between Japan and NATO,” May
31, 2018.
63“Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program between Japan and NATO,” May 31, 2018.
64
There has been little reported activity within the IP, however. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Wales Summit
Declaration,” September 5, 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.
65
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Partnership Interoperability Initiative webpage,https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_132726.htm, accessed October 2, 2018.
66
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, “Japan to Join the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn,” January 12, 2018, https://ccdcoe.org/news/2018/japan-tojoin-the-nato-cooperative-cyber-defence-centre-of-excellence-in-tallinn/; and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “TheNATO Science for Peace and Security Programme, Country Flier 2018: Japan,” August 2018,https://www.nato.int/science/country-fliers/Japan.pdf.
67
Embassy of Japan in Belgium, “New Establishment of the Mission of Japan to NATO,” July 1, 2018,https://www.be.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/nato_newopening.html, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe Meets with the Secretary General of NATO.”
68
Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Defense of Japan 2016,” p. 315, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2016.html,
accessed September 4, 2018; and Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Defense of Japan 2018,” pp. 370-372,
https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2018.html, accessed March 4, 2019.
69
Author interview with former official at the United States Mission to NATO, October 16, 2018.
70
Shinzo Abe, “Japan and NATO as ‘Natural Partners.’”
71
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Joint Press Point with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and thePrime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe,” May 6, 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/opinions_109507.htm.
72
Jens Stoltenberg, speech at the Japan National Press Club, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, October 31, 2017,https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/opinions_148125.htm.

15
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Navigating by Sun and Compass
Policy Brief One: Learning from the History of Japan-NATO Relations

73

NAC statements, in that they must reflect the consensus views of all NATO member states, are more difficult to achieve
than statements by the Secretary General. See: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Statement of the North Atlantic
Council on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” December 15, 2016,
https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/news_139426.htm?selectedLocale=en.
74
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Joint press statement issued on the occasion of the meeting between the NATO
Secretary General, H.E. Mr. Jens Stoltenberg and H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan,” October 31, 2017,https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_148029.htm.
75
It is important to note that Japan’s strategic orientation as a Proactive Contributor to Peace is not an entirely new
development of the 2010s. Rather, this orientation is the leading edge of a trend-line that dates back to the early 1990s,
and its antecedents are clearly visible in the preferences and policies of the Koizumi and first Abe administrations, as wellas the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administrations of 2009-2012. However, Abe’s ability to institutionalize thisstrategic orientation within the Japanese security policy-making structure – through the creation of the NSS and theestablishment of other important legislative and administrative changes – is new in the 2010s.
76Kantei, “‘Second Gathering with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’ hosted by Japan Akademia, Speech by Prime Minister,”December 19, 2013, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201312/19speech_e.html.
77“‘Second Gathering with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’ hosted by Japan Akademia, Speech by Prime Minister.”
78
Kantei, “National Security Strategy,” pp. 5, 28-31.
79
Kantei, “The 13th IISS Asian Security Summit – The Shangri-La Dialogue – Keynote Address by Prime Minister Abe,”May 30, 2014, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201405/0530kichokoen.html.
80
See Abe’s keynote address at the 13th IISS Asian Security Summit – the Shangri-La Dialogue, May 30, 2014,
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201405/0530kichokoen.html, accessed October 12, 2018.
81
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Warsaw Summit Communique,” paras. 6 and 80-85,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm#outside-nato.
82
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence andSecurity of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,” para. 4,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm.
83
Paul Bacon and Joe Burton, “NATO-Japan Relations: Projecting Strategic Narratives of ‘Natural Partnership’ andCooperative Security,” Asian Security, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2018), p 2.
84
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Concludes successful counter-piracy mission,” December 15, 2016,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_139420.htm.
85
Author interview at Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, February 6, 2019.
86
Author interview at Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, February 6, 2019.
87
Bacon and Burton also note that Japan’s actions toward Russia are sometimes out of sync with these semantics. See“NATO-Japan Relations: Projecting Strategic Narratives of ‘Natural Partnership’ and Cooperative Security,” pp. 1,2,9.
88
See for example: Erik Brattberg, Philippe Le Corre, and Etienne Soula, “Can France and the UK Pivot to the Pacific,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 5, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/07/05/can-france-anduk-pivot-to-pacific-pub-76732.

16
The Japan Institute of International Affairs