Singapore Management University

Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences

School of Social Sciences

1-2000

Secrets for sale: How commercial satellite imagery
will change the world
Yahya DEHQANZADAAnn FLORINI
Singapore Management University, annflorini@smu.edu.sg

Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_researchPart of the Political Science Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public
Administration Commons
Citation
DEHQANZADA, Yahya and FLORINI, Ann, "Secrets for sale: How commercial satellite imagery will change the world" (2000).
Research Collection School of Social Sciences. Paper 2325.
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2325
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2325

This Monograph is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.

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Page 2© 2000 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means
without permission in writing from the Carnegie Endowment.
Additional copies of Secrets for Sale: How Commercial Satellite Imagery Will Change the World, as well as therelated working paper No More Secrets? Policy Implications of Commercial Remote Sensing Satellites, can beobtained from the Carnegie Endowment at the following address and contact numbers:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Phone 202.483.7600
Fax 202.483.1840
Email pubs@ceip.org
www.ceip.org
Library of Congress Card Number: 99-069173

Design by Manolo Bevia and Travis C. Daub.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace normally does not take institutional positions on public
policy issues; the views and recommendations presented in this publication do not necessarily represent theviews of the Carnegie Endowment, its officers, staff, or trustees.

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Page 4acronyms and abbreviations

iv

AMI

Advanced Measurement Initiative - program launched by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
to accelerate the adoption and application of remote sensing and other technologies for environmental monitoring and protection purposes.

AVIRIS

Airborne Visible and Infra-Red Imaging Spectrometer - aerial hyperspectral sensor developed by
the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

CSA

Canadian Space Agency - the organization in charge of Canadian space programs.

DOD

U.S. Department of Defense.

EOSAT

Earth Observation Satellite Company - a joint venture of RCA Corporation and Hughes Aircraft
Company. It was selected by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the U.S.
Department of Commerce to take over the Landsat program in 1985. Space Imaging acquired
EOSAT in November 1996.

EPA

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

ESA

European Space Agency - the body in charge of space exploration and development of new technologies for fourteen Western European countries.

GIS

Geographic Information System.

HS

Hyperspectral - electro-optical sensor capable of distinguishing fine shades of different colors andthereby providing information on the chemical composition of objects on the ground.

IRS

Indian Remote Sensing satellite.

LEO

Low Earth Orbit - circular orbits typically between 100 and 1,000 kilometers above ground. These
orbits are ideal for high-resolution commercial and military remote sensing systems because theylessen the technical demands placed on the satellite sensors.

MDA

MacDonald Dettwiler and Associates - a subsidiary of the U.S. company Orbital Sciences, which
was originally selected by the Canadian Space Agency to develop and operate the RADARSAT-2
satellite and market all the resulting data.

MS

Multispectral - electro-optical sensor capable of producing color imagery.

NASA

National Aeronautics and Space Administration - the U.S. agency in charge of research and development relating to space.

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NOAA

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration - the branch of the U.S. Department ofCommerce presently in charge of licensing and regulating the commercial remote sensing
industry.

PC

Panchromatic - electro-optical sensors capable of producing only black-and-white imagery.

RBV

Return Beam Vidicom - similar to a television camera.

RDL

Research and Development Laboratories - this company is currently developing the RADAR-1 commercial satellite.

SAM

Surface-to-air missile.

SAR

Synthetic Aperture Radar - radar sensor capable of collecting imagery at night and in poor weather conditions.

SPOT

Satellite Pour l'Observation de la Terre - although developed and operated by the French Space
Agency (CNES), Spot Image manages the SPOT systems on a commercial basis.

SSM

Surface-to-surface missile.

STDC

Space Technology Development Corporation - the U.S. Office of Naval Research is subsidizing STDC
in the amount of $60 million to develop and deploy the Naval EarthMap Observer (NEMO) satellite.

TEEMS

Texaco Energy and Environmental Multispectral Imaging Spectrometer - hyperspectral sensor
developed by Texaco for fracture analysis and environmental protection purposes.

UN

United Nations.

USGS

United States Geological Survey - the branch of the U.S. Department of the Interior presently incharge of Landsat 7 operations and data distribution.

WIS

West Indian Space Ltd. - a U.S.-Israeli joint venture comprised of the Israel Aircraft Industries
Ltd. of Lod, Israel; El-Op Electro-Optics Industries of Rehovot, Israel; and Core Software
Technology Inc. of Pasadena, California.

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foreword
We are living in a world of fundamental change. Transformations are under way inthe meaning and the relevance of national borders; in the relationship of governments
to one another; in the roles of other entities, private business and nongovernmentalorganizations that are capable of governance; and in the meaning of national sovereignty. One of the driving forces behind these changes is the information revolution, bymeans of which huge masses of information now flow widely around the world.
Another is the growing acceptance of transparency, which has led some governments
to relax long-held political restrictions on the gathering and dissemination of information. These two trends come together in the subject of this monograph: the adventand the likely impact of commercial high-resolution imaging satellites.
As the monograph makes clear, these satellites promise a quantum leap in theongoing information revolution. Although satellites have been observing the Earthfor nearly forty years, those that could provide highly detailed imagery were operated by secret military/intelligence programs. Governments made some satellite
imagery available for sale beginning in 1972, but that imagery showed broad
panoramas, not fine detail. Recently, however, governments and commercial firms
have begun to sell imagery that discerns objects as small as 1 meter across.
Public availability of timely high-resolution imagery represents a notable break withthe past. We are moving from an era in which only a handful of governments hadaccess to high-resolution imagery to one in which every government—and businesses,
nongovernmental organizations, and terrorist and criminal groups—will have suchaccess. Nonstate actors will be able to peer behind the walls of national sovereignty,
accelerating a shift in power that is already under way.
Yet governments throughout the world are woefully unprepared for the coming era ofglobal transparency. Most countries have chosen to ignore these recent developments.
Others have devised flawed policies that will prove unworkable in the long term.
To spur a debate on the possibilities and consequences of this technology, in May 1999,
the Carnegie Endowment's Project on Transparency sponsored a conference thatbrought together a range of specialists, policy makers, journalists, and diplomats from ascore of countries. The conference looked both at the implications for specific sectors,
such as national security, environment, the media, and humanitarian assistance, and at
the broad effects on governance and global politics. This monograph draws from andgoes beyond those discussions, providing a breadth of scope and a level of detail beyond
what could be covered in a one-day conference.
This is a timely and badly needed analysis of the remote sensing industry while
it is still in its infancy. Satellite imagery is a crucial component of an ongoing shift
toward greater transparency. Mishandling the technologies and the policies thatmake such transparency possible would impose heavy costs in missed opportunities and potential threats. But if handled right, the new transparency could offer
enormous benefits for nations and peoples around the world.
The Carnegie Endowment is grateful to the Rockefeller Brothers Fund for its support.

Jessica Tuchman Mathews, President—
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—v

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Each chapter opens with satellite images provided by Space Imaging. The two
images on the left show lower Manhattan, and the three on the right are of Ronald
Reagan National Airport in Washington, D.C.

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executive summary
By the year 2003 at least eleven privatecompanies from five different countries
expect to have high-resolution commercial remote sensing satellites in orbit.
These new satellites have capabilities
approaching those of military spy satellites, but with one key difference: theirimages will generally be available toanyone able to pay for them. This newtechnology raises a host of policy concerns with which governments, business executives, and analysts aroundthe world are just beginning to grapple.
This monograph, inspired by the discussions at a recent conference of theCarnegie Endowment for International
Peace, addresses those policy concerns1.
Key conclusions are that:■ Increased access to high-resolution
satellite imagery will shift powerfrom the former holders of secrets tothe newly informed. Governmentsthat previously had limited or noaccess to satellite imagery can for the
first time see what elite states haveobserved from the skies for many
years. In addition, commercial satellite imagery will provide an independent source of information to groups
in civil society. Both state and nonstate actors will employ satellite
imagery to monitor and sometimes
publicize the activities of various
countries and corporations.
■ High-resolution satellite imagery
has both beneficial and malignapplications. It can significantly

enhance the ability of governmental and nongovernmental organizations to respond quickly to sudden
humanitarian emergencies such as
in Somalia and Iraq, document andpublicize large-scale humanitarian
atrocities such as those witnessedin Kosovo and Rwanda, help control environmental problems ranging from impending droughts to
deforestation, monitor compliancewith international agreements, andassist in managing international
disputes before they escalate to
full-scale interstate wars. But abundance of information does notguarantee benevolent uses. Stateand nonstate actors could employ
remote sensing imagery to conductindustrial espionage, collect intelligence, plan terrorist attacks, ormount offensive military operations.
■ Attempts to control access to highresolution satellite imagery arebound to fail. Since the end of thecold war, technological progress, coupled with a greater appreciation forthe military, civilian, and commercial
utility of high-resolution satellitedata, has persuaded governments
and corporations in virtually every
region of the world to invest in
indigenous remote sensing industries. As a result, both the satellite
technology and the necessary support
infrastructure have become global. It
is unlikely that any one country,
regardless of its size or market share,vii

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Page 8can by itself curb access to high-resolution satellite imagery. And becauseof the large number and varied political
agendas of the countries that will
operate various satellites (Canada,
France, India, Israel, Russia, theUnited States, and possibly China),
multilateral agreements on control
seem elusive. Governments need toaccept this new era of mutual assured
observation, take advantage of its
positive effects, and find ways tomanage its negative consequences.

■ Expected gains from commercial
high-resolution satellite imagery
may be exaggerated. Satellite imagery
is only one source of data among
many. While it can detect large-scale
troop movements, mass graves, anddeforestation, it cannot reveal what
those troops’ intentions are, who isburied in the mass graves, or how
deforestation can be stopped.
Complementary data are necessary toturn satellite imagery into usable
information.

■ Commercially available high-resolution satellite imagery will trigger
the development of more robust
denial and deception and antisatellite countermeasures. Widely
available high-resolution satellite
imagery will undoubtedly compel
governments to develop effectivemeans for keeping their secrets hidden. Many states, especially thosewith regional adversaries, will invest
heavily in denial and deception andantisatellite countermeasures. Such adevelopment could have serious
implications for confidence-building
and crisis management among
mutually vulnerable states.

■ Good training for imagery analysts
is essential. Satellite imagery can bedifficult to interpret. It takes years
before an analyst gains the experience and expertise necessary to beable to derive useful informationfrom gigabytes of transmitted data.
Junior analysts are wrong far more
often than they are right. It is essential that imagery analysts go throughextensive training not only at the
beginning of their careers, but also
every time they shift the focus of
their work—analysts who specialize
in interpreting and analyzing theactivities of ground forces cannot
overnight become experts on nuclear
testing or environmental issues.

secrets for sale

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1 introduction
Over the next five years, at least five
private companies around the worldplan to launch commercial remotesensing satellites able to detect objects
as small as one meter across. Thatlevel of detail is not as good as that ofcurrent government-controlled spy
satellites, which by most accounts canachieve a resolution of just a few centimeters, but it is getting close. One
key difference renders the commercial
satellites far more interesting and possibly far more destabilizing than thestate-owned spy satellites: the operators of these systems are not going tohide the imagery in the bowels ofintelligence agencies, but are going tosell it to anyone able and willing topay. The new commercial satellites
will make it possible for the buyers ofsatellite imagery to, among otherthings, tell the difference between
trucks and tanks, expose movementsof large groups such as troops or
refugees, and determine the probablelocation of natural resources.
Whether this increased access toimagery amounts to a positive or negative development depends on whochooses to use it and how. On the plusside, governments, international organizations,andnongovernmentalgroups may find it easier to respondquickly to sudden movements ofrefugees, document and publicize largescale humanitarian atrocities, monitor
environmental degradation, or manageinternational disputes before they escalate to full-scale interstate wars. The

United Nations, for example, is looking
into the possibility that satellite imagery
could significantly help curtail drugtrafficking and narcotics production
over the next ten years. Similarly, theInternational Atomic Energy Agency is
studying the utility of commercial highresolution satellite imagery for monitoring state compliance with internationalarms control agreements.
But there is no way to guarantee
benevolent uses. Governments, corporations, and even small groups of individuals could use commercial satellite
imagery to collect intelligence, conductindustrial espionage, plan terrorist
attacks, or mount offensive military
operations. Even when intentions are
good, it can be remarkably difficult toderive accurate and useful informationfrom the heaps of transmitted data. The
media, for one, have already mademajor mistakes, misinterpreting images
and misidentifying objects, including
the number of reactors on fire during
the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986
and the location of the Indian nuclear
test sites just last year.
Such bloopers notwithstanding, the
new satellite imagery will provide
many people with information towhich they never before had access.
The implications for national sovereignty, international peace and security,
the ability of corporations to keep proprietary information secret, and thebalance of power among the former
holders of information (a few industrialized states) and the newly informed

1

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Page 2(other governments and global civilsociety) are serious. Undoubtedly
states will attempt to maintain tightcontrols over this new source of information. Whether their efforts will succeed remains to be seen.
In short, the new form of transparency
brought about by the advent of high-resolution commercial satellites raises a hostof pressing questions. Does it portend anage of peace and stability, or does it create
vulnerabilities that will make the world
more unstable and violent? What contributions can emerging remote-sensing
technologies make to the fields of news
reporting, humanitarian relief, environmental protection, and international
security? What policies could the UnitedStates and other countries adopt to secure
the benefits of growing internationaltransparency while limiting its potential
negative consequences?

2

secrets for saleIn addressing these questions, thismonograph builds on discussions at a
May 1999 conference of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace
entitled No More Secrets? Policy
Implications of Commercial Remote
Sensing Satellites. Chapter 2 describes
the range of security, environmental,
and humanitarian uses of satellite
imagery. Chapter 3 traces the emergence of what has now become a truly
global satellite remote sensing industry.
Chapter 4 explores the drawbacks tounfettered access to satellite imagery,and shows why satellite imagery byitself will not uncover all secrets.
Chapter 5 tackles the pressing policyquestions raised by the advent of powerful private remote sensing systems.
The report concludes by considering
the larger context and broad implications of the emerging era of global
transparency.

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Page 3the technology of remote sensing
An analysis of the implications of the new satellites requires a basic understanding of what
the various existing and future systems can see and do, what the jargon used in the remotesensing field means, and what types of sensors exist.1
Perhaps the best-known concept is that of spatial resolution. Spatial resolution refers to thesize of the objects on the ground that the satellite sensor is able to detect. A satellite image
is a mosaic. A sensor applies one value (a shade of gray or color) to each square of the mosaic. For a satellite with 1-meter resolution, each square in the mosaic corresponds to one
square meter of ground area, while 10-meter resolution corresponds to ten square meters on
the ground—a difference of a factor of 100 (see image on page 26).
At present, civilian and commercial satellites carry one of three types of sensors: film, electro-optical, and synthetic aperture radar (SAR).2■ Film sensors take actual photographs, with the film returned to Earth either by retrieving
ejected film capsules or by recovering the entire satellite. Both U.S. and Soviet spy satellites started off using film, and many Russian satellites still do. Film provides good highresolution imagery but has two real drawbacks. It can be slow, since it usually has to bephysically retrieved and developed, and the satellite becomes useless once it runs out offilm, a characteristic that requires frequent launches of new satellites.
■ Electro-optical sensors overcome these disadvantages. They measure the electromagnetic
radiation reflected off or emitted by objects on the Earth’s surface, creating digital imagesof ground features that are then transmitted to receiving stations on Earth in a matter ofminutes. However, these systems, like film, do not produce their own signals and therefore
depend on other sources of energy such as the sun to illuminate the objects being observed.
This characteristic constrains the use of both types of systems to daylight hours and favorable conditions. Bad weather or smoke can severely limit what these systems can see.3
There are three different types of electro-optical sensors. Panchromatic sensors detect energy
reflectance in only one band of the electromagnetic spectrum and thus produce black-andwhite imagery. Multispectral sensors can measure electromagnetic reflectance in several different color bands—usually three to seven4—and so produce color images. Hyperspectral sensors, through a similar technique, image objects using many different spectral bands. The ability of hyperspectral sensors to distinguish tens and sometimes hundreds of different shades ofcolor allows them to provide a great deal of information about the composition of features on
the Earth’s surface not discernible by either panchromatic or multispectral instruments.
■ With synthetic aperture radar sensors, the systems transmit a signal in the microwave
part of the spectrum to the Earth’s surface and then detect the characteristics of the return
signal after it reflects off objects on the surface. Because radar satellites emit their own signals and operate in longer wavelengths than electro-optical systems, their operations are
not limited to daylight hours. Synthetic aperture radar sensors can image any spot on
Earth day or night, in any weather, through clouds and smoke. As with the electro-optical systems, they produce digital data that can be downloaded to ground receiving stations moments after the images are collected.
For an overview of existing and emerging remote sensing systems, visit the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace website at www.ceip.org/programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/GuptaPage.htm.
1

The definition of spatial resolution applies to electro-optical and radar systems. Film is different.

2

The exception is infrared sensors, which detect the thermal infrared radiation emitted by warm objects.

3

At least three bands - red, green, and blue - are necessary to produce color imagery.

4

introduction

3

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Page 4applications of emerging
remote sensing capabilities
In 1858 the French photographer
Gaspard-Felix Tournachon (popularly
known as Nadar) pioneered the field of
remote sensing when he took the world’s
first aerial photograph of Paris from his
gas balloon, Le Géant, 250 feet above theground. Two years later Nadar foundhimself taking aerial pictures of enemy
troop movements during the 1870 FrancoPrussian war.2 What had started as one
man’s desire to capture the imagination of
the world through the lens of a camera
suddenly found novel applications in the
bloody field of interstate warfare.
Since those early days, many more
applications have been discovered forremote sensing data. Although the ageof easy access to timely high-resolution
satellite imagery is just now dawning,for several decades imagery has been
available from aircraft and even (atlower resolutions) from governmentoperated satellites (see Chapter Threeand Appendix B). Over the past thirty
years, governments, corporations, andnongovernmental organizations haveused aerial and space-based imagery
platforms to, among other things, collect intelligence, execute military operations, plan development projects, andmonitor the environment. It seems likely that as the availability of high-resolution imagery grows, and especially if
the prices drop, governments and nonstate actors will find new arenas where
remote sensing data can be of value.
Although a discussion of the fullrange of applications for remote sensing data is beyond the scope of this4monograph, the brief overview that follows provides a glimpse of the multifaceted significance of this powerfulform of global transparency.

security applications
Of all the applications of commercial
high-resolution satellite imagery, themost controversial and the most lucrative
are its security applications.3 In the shortterm, nearly half the sales of high-resolution imagery will be made to defense andintelligence organizations worldwide.
High-resolution commercial satellite
imagery can help governments, especially those with no indigenous
imagery collection capabilities, monitor
the activities of neighbors and regional
adversaries and expose violations ofinternational norms and treaties (seeTable 1). In August 1987, for example,
the German foreign intelligence service,
the Bundesnachrichten Dienst, used
10-meter resolution SPOT imagery to
publicize the construction of a chemical
warfare production facility near Rabta,
Libya.4 Space-based reconnaissance isparticularly well suited for this type of
intelligence collection because it issanctioned under international law andis considerably less intrusive thaneither aerial or on-ground surveillance.
An added advantage of commercial
satellite imagery is that it can be shared.
Whereas government officials closely
guard spy satellite images to conceal
the technical capabilities of national
reconnaissance systems, commercial
imagery can easily be shared with for-

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Page 5table 1
Approximate Ground Resolution in Meters for Target
Detection, Identification, Description, and Analysis
Detectionb

General
IDc

PreciseIDd

troop units

6.0

2.0

1.20

0.30

0.150

vehicles

1.5

0.6

0.30

0.06

0.045

aircraft

4.5

1.5

1.00

0.15

0.045

airfield facilities

6.0

4.5

3.00

0.30

0.150

nuclear weapons
components

2.5

1.5

0.30

0.03

0.015

missile sites (SSM/SAM)

3.0

1.5

0.60

0.30

0.045

rockets and artillery

1.0

0.6

0.15

0.05

0.045

surface ships

7.5-15.0

4.5

0.60

0.30

0.045

surfaced submarines

7.5-30.0

4.5-6.0

1.50

1.00

0.030

roads

6.0-9.0

6.0

1.80

0.60

0.400

6.0

4.5

1.50

1.00

0.300

radar

3.0

1.0

0.30

0.15

0.015

radio

3.0

1.5

0.30

0.15

0.015

3.0

1.5

1.00

0.15

0.090

supply dumps

1.5-3.0

0.6

0.30

0.03

0.030

land minefields

3.0-9.0

6.0

1.00

0.03

--

60.0

30.0

3.00

3.00

0.750

15.0-30.0

4.5

3.00

1.50

0.150

30.0

15.0

6.00

3.00

0.300

railroad yards and shops 15.0-30.0

15.0

6.00

1.50

0.400

--

90.0

4.50

1.50

0.750

Targetabridges

Descriptione Technicalf
Analysiscommunicationscommand and control
headquarters

urban areas
coasts, landing beaches
ports and harbors
terrainapplications of emerging remote sensing capabilities

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Page 6

Bomb damage
assessment photos
released by the U.S.
Departmentof Defense on
December 17, 1998,of the Baghdad
Directorate of
Military Intelligence
Headquarters.

eign governments and internationalorganizations, a considerable advantage in multilateral operations such as
those in Iraq, Bosnia, or Kosovo.
In addition to intelligence collection,
high-resolution commercial satellite
imagery can help identify enemy vulnerabilities, plan military operations,assess strike effectiveness, and prioritize
targets for follow-up missions. There issome evidence that the Iraqi military
may have used 10-meter resolution
SPOT satellite photographs for attack
planning and post-attack assessments
both during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war
and prior to the invasion of Kuwait inAugust 1990.5 SPOT and Landsat
imagery later helped the allied forces
expel the Iraqi troops from Kuwait.6
Technological advances are likely toincrease the demand for commercial
satellite imagery. With the launch of theworld’s first hyperspectral sensors on
board the OrbView 4, Naval EarthMap
Observer, and Aries satellites, all ofwhich are scheduled to begin opera-

6secrets for saletions within the next three years, security agencies worldwide will haveaccess to richer data for intelligencegathering and military planning.
Hyperspectral imagery can detect any
type of camouflage that is not naturaland growing. Green plastic and foliage
have unique spectral signatures thatare easily distinguishable from living
vegetation. Military planners can use
such information to design and carryout precision strikes against concealed
high-value targets. In addition, hyperspectral sensors may be able to identify
high concentrations of different chemicals in the soil.7 It may be possible toemploy these sensors to monitor, document, and publicize the production anduse of chemical weapons in different
parts of the world.
There is no reason to believe that thedemand for commercial satellite
imagery for intelligence collection andmilitary planning will abate any time in
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Page 7

remote sensing data is likely to remain
high, regardless of what happens to theprices of satellite imagery. If anything,with the launch of new systems with
better spatial and spectral resolutions
and shorter turnaround times, demand
will continue to grow.

demands, the United States and theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) released numerous satellite
images of mass graves in different partsof Kosovo, including Glodane, Velika
Krusa, Pusto Selo, Glogovac, and Izbica(see bottom of page 8).

On August 10, 1995, Madeleine K.
Albright, at the time the United States’
chief delegate to the United Nations,called the attention of the international
community to atrocities committed by
Bosnian Serbs against Bosnian Muslims
after the fall of the UN “safe area” inSrebrenica.8 Amb. Albright presented
the UN Security Council with American
spy satellite images that showed people
herded into a soccer field at Nova
Kasaba the previous July 13 and 14.
Imagery collected several days later
revealed an empty stadium but moundsof freshly dug earth in the nearby field(see top of page 8). After the end of hostilities, war crimes investigators
exhumed the graves and recovered thebodies of dozens of Bosnian Muslims9.

The flood of spy satellite imagery
made available to the public during the
Kosovo crisis was unprecedented. It is
not clear, however, whether the UnitedStates and its NATO allies will be so
open again. Publicizing the egregious
acts of the Serbian forces in Kosovo
clearly served the political objectives of
the Clinton administration, which wastrying to win the support of the international community in general and theAmerican public in particular. It seems
doubtful that a future U.S. administration would be as forthcoming if releasing spy satellite imagery meant having
to take action against states with close
ties to the United States or having toconsider undertaking a major engagement in less strategically significant
parts of the world, such as Rwanda,
Sudan, or Afghanistan.

The 1995 incident unveiled to theworld the power of satellite imagery inmonitoring, documenting, and, possibly, deterring large-scale humanitariancrises. On April 1, 1999, as a new chapter of Serbian aggression was being
written, this time against Kosovar
Albanians, members of ten humanrights and religious organizations gathered at the National Press Club inWashington, D.C., to call upon the
Clinton administration to “immediately provide the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
with all available intelligence information that reveals evidence of atrocities
in Kosovo, specifically imagery collected by satellites, aircraft, and unmanned
air vehicles.”10 Responding to such

The advent of commercial high-resolution satellites will guarantee that in
the future the Milosovics of the world
will not be able to carry out their sinister plans unobserved. Satellites candocument events in the remotest corners of the world, or in areas wheresecurity concerns limit access to international observers and media groups.
Such information can later be used to
publicize humanitarian emergencies
and possibly punish the perpetrators ofhumanitarian crimes. Commercial
satellite operators are generally not
restrained by the sort of political constraints that often muzzle the responseof state governments. Whereas states
may refrain from publicizing acts ofhumanitarian violence in other friendly

humanitarian applications

applications of emerging remote sensing capabilities

7

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United Statessurveillance photographin a handout presented
by the chief U.S. delegate to the United
Nations on August 10,
1995, showing alleged
mass graves in Nova
Kasaba, Bosnia (later
found to contain bodies of Muslim civilians
massacred by the
Bosnian Serbs).

(Reuters/Archive Photos)

Aerial imagery from a
NATO handout releasedon April 17, 1999,
showing what NATOdescribed as new
graves near Izbica,
Kosovo.

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Page 9Five-meter-resolution
imagery taken by the
Indian Remote
Sensing satellite (IRS1D) on May 8, 1999,
depicting thedestruction left behindin the wake of apowerful tornado near
Oklahoma City.

(Space Imaging)countries or in countries where they do
not wish to get involved, commercial
satellite operators will readily market
such imagery to a host of media andhuman rights groups. Such widely
available satellite imagery might deter
states from committing large-scale violence against ethnic minorities andmight compel the international community to take action once such acts ofviolence are committed.
High-resolution satellite imagery canalso provide state and nonstate actors
with valuable information on how to
respond to humanitarian emergencies.
Large refugee movements can betracked using imagery with a resolution of 1 meter or better. Such imagery
could help determine the direction of
refugee flows, the size of different
refugee pockets, ground surface
features, and the resources available
to humanitarian response teams.
Employing high-resolution satellite

imagery to plan relief operations could
significantly improve the ability of various groups to alleviate human suffering in the wake of large-scale humanitarian emergencies.

environmental
applications
For the past twenty-seven years, lowand medium-resolution civilian satellites have provided invaluable data on
the status of the Earth’s temperature,
land cover, water bodies, and atmosphere.11 For example, satellite imagery
has allowed scientists to monitor anddocument the depletion of the ozone
layer over the South Pole, the shrinkingof the Aral Sea in the former Soviet
Union, and the rate of loss of the tropical rainforests in the Amazon basin. In
addition, remote sensing systems haveat times played a central role in managing serious environmental emergencies. After the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf

applications of emerging remote sensing capabilities

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War, the thermal-infrared sensors on
board the Landsat 4 satellite provided
firefighters with critical information on
the exact location of some 529 oil fires
in liberated Kuwait.12 More recently, theCanadian RADARSAT-1 system helped
avert a potential disaster by providing
timely information on the size anddirection of a large oil slick near thewater intake pipes of a nuclear power
plant on the coast of Japan.
As these examples illustrate, remotesensing systems have for decades satisfied many of the data needs of various
government agencies, scientists, andenvironmentalists. In the future, emerging commercial satellites with higher
spatial and better spectral resolutions
will supplement and complement (butnot replace) existing environmental
monitoring capabilities. The primaryreason is that most environmental
changes are slow, evolving processes
that take place across extensive tracts ofEarth over lengthy periods. To monitor
and document long-term environmental change, scientists need continuous
coverage of vast regions. The existinghigh price of commercial satellite
imagery makes it virtually impossible
for anyone except the most affluent
environmental organizations to purchase large quantities of high-resolution
satellite imagery. Whereas the U.S. government provides Landsat 7 pictures for$475 to $600 per scene, commercial
satellite operators routinely charge$4,400 for a comparable product.
Although these prices may decline as
the number of commercial systems inoperation increases, that drop is unlikely any time soon, given that the commercial satellite companies are trying torecoup investments on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars.
While existing civilian satellites havea comparative advantage in long-term,

10

secrets for salewide-area monitoring of the environment, emerging commercial satellites
seem to be particularly well suited for
periodic assessments of areas of greatest concern. Possible environmental
applications of emerging commercial
satellites include: studying the impactof land development and energy exploration on wilderness areas, developing
more complete wetland inventories,
monitoring the health of vegetation in
all regions of the world but particularly
in remote or inaccessible areas, anddetecting toxic discharges from minesand production facilities.
Governments, corporations, and conservation groups are slowly beginningto understand the immense potential of
remote sensing data for environmental
monitoring and are taking steps to better incorporate such data into theirdecision making. In 1995 the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
conducted a study on the possibility of
employing hyperspectral sensors tomonitor toxic runoffs from abandoned
mines. It conducted the experiment at
the CalGulch Mine Superfund site in
Leadville, Colorado, which is home tohundreds of relict gold, silver, lead, andzinc mines suspected of contributing
acid drainage and heavy metals to
downstream supplies of drinking water.
Using NASA’s aerial hyperspectral sensor, the Airborne Visible and Infra-Red
Imaging Spectrometer (AVIRIS), theEPA was able to study the site while saving approximately “80 percent of thetime and cost of traditional groundbased analysis.”13 After the success of
the CalGulch Mine experiment, the EPA
launched an Advanced Measurement
Initiative (AMI) to accelerate the adoption and application of remote sensing
and other technologies that could provide more timely, accurate, and costeffective environmental monitoring

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data. Under the initiative, the EPA has
undertaken two new projects involving
hyperspectral sensors to monitor thepresence of jarosite (a mineral that cancontribute to acid drainage and therelease of heavy metals into the environment) in the Ray copper mines in
Arizona, and to measure the concentration of suspended minerals, chlorophyll,
and dissolved organic carbon in the surface waters of the Neuse River in North
Carolina. The results of both studies
were to be released at the end of 1999.
Mindful of the bad publicity associated with lax environmental practices,a number of multinational corporations have also begun using remotesensing technologies to police theirown activities. The Texas oil giant,
Texaco, for example, developed an aerial
hyperspectral sensor called Texaco
Energy and Environmental Multispectral Imaging Spectrometer (TEEMS)
to help it pursue environmentallysound policies. Once fully operational,
this imaging capability will allow Texaco
to, among other things, establish environmental baselines prior to commencing exploration, conduct fracture analysis on its vast network of pipelines, identify oil seeps and oil spills, and, whennecessary, take action to minimize andreverse damage done to the environment.
The use of remote sensing data forenvironmental monitoring is not limited to state governments and large corporations. Environmental nongovernmental organizations have for years
made extensive use of existing relatively low-resolution imagery to monitor
enforcement of the U.S. Endangered
Species Act, document the destructionof coral reefs around the world, andgenerate plans for ecosystem management.14 As more sophisticated commercial remote sensing systems become
available, and especially if the prices

drop, it can be expected that environmental groups will expand their activities, monitoring compliance with existing environmental standards and publicizing violations.

media uses ofsatellite imagery
On Saturday, April 26, 1986, two explosions destroyed Unit 4 of the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant in Ukraine andreleased 100 million curies of radionuclides into the environment.15 Hoping tokeep the incident secret, the Soviet government immediately sealed off a 100mile radius around the stricken reactor
and banned all foreign travel to Kiev, thelargest city nearest the site of the accident.16 Two days later, as radioactive
clouds began setting off radiation alarms
throughout Europe, the Soviet news
agency Tass confirmed Western suspicions by disclosing that one of its atomic
reactors had indeed been damaged.
Within hours of the announcement
the United States’ top-secret spy satellite, Keyhole (KH-11), began collecting
imagery of the Chernobyl power station. By Tuesday, April 29, KH-11 photos were in the hands of U.S. policy
makers in Washington, D.C. But thistime government officials did not haveexclusive access to satellite imagery.
Less than twenty-four hours after
Keyhole images reached the WhiteHouse, the American Broadcasting
Company (ABC) aired medium-resolution Landsat images of the blazing
nuclear reactor.17 Shortly thereafter, anumber of media organizations began
broadcasting higher resolution SPOT
images of the Chernobyl power plant.
In the decade and a half since theChernobyl accident, the use of satellite
photos by news organizations has
increased significantly. Despite the relatively low resolution of publicly avail-applications of emerging remote sensing capabilities

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Page 12able satellite systems, media groups
have employed remote sensing technology to report on important events suchas the military buildup in the former
Soviet Union, the Persian Gulf War,
weapons proliferation in the third world,the U.S. assault on Osama bin Laden’s
hideaway in Afghanistan, the devastation left by a tornado that swept throughOklahoma City, the nuclear tests in India
and Pakistan, and, more recently, thehumanitarian atrocities in Kosovo.
With the advent of commercial highresolution satellites, the use of remotesensing imagery by media groups is likely to grow. Imagery, even relatively fuzzycommercial satellite photos, allows news
agencies to convey important information visually to their audiences. More
important, satellites can go places that areotherwise inaccessible to media groups.
These two features alone will ensure thecontinued use of satellite imagery bynews organizations for years to come.

business applications
The full range of commercial applications
for satellite imagery is not yet known. A
number of factors, including cost, timeliness, and spectral as well as spatial resolution, will ultimately determine how
narrowly or broadly remote sensing
imagery is employed. However, several
commercial applications of satellite
imagery are worth noting here.
Satellite imagery has important
applications in map making. While 95
percent of the world’s land mass ismapped at a scale of 1:250,000, only 33
percent is mapped at 1:25,000. Less
than 10 percent of Africa and SouthAmerica and less than 20 percent ofAsia and Australia are mapped at thehigher scale. In many cases the maps
available at the higher scale are outdated
or incomplete. Emerging high-resolution commercial satellites will signifi-

12secrets for salecantly improve both the scale and quality of maps of the more remote and lessdeveloped regions of the world.
Another major commercial application of high-resolution satellite imagery
is in the field of agricultural management. Agriculture is a volatile fieldwith pronounced effects on the economic well-being and political stabilityof nations. Satellite imagery can help
take some of the unpredictability out of
this important sector. Multispectral andhyperspectral sensors are well suited to
predicting crop yields, detecting crop
disease and insect infestation, andmonitoring thermal stress.18 Satellite
imagery can be used to prepare
detailed maps of agricultural fields todetermine the best seeding and irrigation patterns, as well as the optimum
amounts of fertilizer and pesticides
needed to obtain higher crop yields.
Satellite imagery can also help pinpoint the probable location of nonrenewable natural resources, a capability
that can dramatically reduce the economic risks of exploration. Radar
imagery, for example, has for years
helped oil companies identify new offshore oil reserves. According toRoger Mitchell of the Earth Satellite
Corporation, nearly 80 percent of offshore oil exploration starts by searchingfor oil seeps.19 Oil’s viscosity retards
wave formation, causing a “calm spot”
on the ocean surface. Radar satellites
can detect these calm spots and analyze
their suitability for future exploration.
Similarly, hyperspectral sensors caninspect the Earth’s surface for uniquespectral signatures associated with particular resources. Once a signature is
detected, mining companies can begin
exploration activities with muchgreater confidence. In the next few
years, hyperspectral sensors may revolutionize exploration for natural

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resources in all corners of the world.
Unlike the traditional methods, satellites can image any region on Earthregardless of its accessibility and canprovide accurate information at a significantly lower cost. However, forhyperspectral imagery to be useful,
additional research is needed to compile a more thorough library of thespectral signatures associated with different natural resources.
Urban planners can also use satellite
imagery to improve efficiency andreduce costs. Houses, water tanks,
canals, sidewalks, pavements, and parking lots are easily distinguishable on
high-resolution satellite imagery. City
officials can use such information to plan
new development projects and design
improved networks of public utilities.
Remote sensing data can provide engineers and construction companies withvaluable information on soil composition and structural morphology before
substantial investments are made.
Finally, remote sensing data provide
corporations new opportunities to spy
on their competitors. A comparison ofarchived and more recent satellite
imagery can reveal important information about the production capacity ofrival companies at dispersed locations
around the world. For example, highresolution satellite imagery can reveal
new construction, new types of shipping containers on loading docks, oran increase in the number of railcars used to distribute products. 20
Although traditionally observers on
the ground have obtained such information, commercial satellite imagery
may prove to be more cost-effective
and significantly less intrusive.

applications of emerging remote sensing capabilities

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Page 14competitive intelligence or industrial espionage?
There has never been a ruling on the legality of space-based imagery for competitive intelligence. The only relevant case, which may form the basis for all future litigation, dates backto 1970. In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher, DuPont sued the Christopher
brothers for taking aerial pictures of its Texas plant while the plant was under construction
to learn DuPont’s new process for methanol production.1 In this case, the court ruled in
DuPont’s favor, citing the steps taken by the company to protect its trade secrets and theimproper means used by the Christopher brothers to uncover those secrets.
The advent of commercial high-resolution satellite imagery may have a profound impact on
how cases involving remote sensing imagery are adjudicated in the future. In DuPont the
court adjudged the actions of the Christophers to be improper primarily because, at thattime, the method they used to determine DuPont’s secrets was considered so out of the ordinary.2 Once high-resolution satellite imagery becomes widely available, it will be harder toargue that overhead observation of the production facilities of rivals is an extraordinary
and, therefore, improper means for carrying out competitive intelligence. Instead, businesses may have to take additional steps to protect valuable trade secrets.
Even assuming that the use of satellite imagery for competitive intelligence is consideredunlawful, it will be difficult for corporations to prove any wrongdoing by industrial competitors. Current statutes do not require satellite operators to disclose either their imagery
or the identity of their clients to third parties. Thus, it is nearly impossible for companies toknow whether a passing satellite collected imagery of their facilities and, if so, who asked
for specific images. This task becomes even more arduous as the number of domestic and,more importantly, international sources of high-resolution imagery increases. Whereas
greater regulation and closer government scrutiny can restrain domestic vendors, controlling international vendors is likely to prove far more elusive.
1

Fred Wergeles, "Commercial Satellite Imagery: New Opportunities for Competitive Intelligence," Competitive
Intelligence Magazine, vol. 1, no. 1 (April-June 1998), p. 38.

2

Ibid.

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growth of the commercial
remote sensing industry
Given all these applications, it is perhaps
not surprising that since the first launchof a civilian remote sensing satellite in1972, some twenty-one governmental
and private entities in thirteen countries
have committed billions of dollars to thedevelopment and operation of land
observation satellites and have espoused
relatively open data distribution practices. Many of these programs havealready borne fruit. As of October 1999
there were eight sources of high-resolution film, electro-optical, and radar
imagery (see Appendix A).21 The Russian
KVR-1000 camera, for example, provides
customers with 2-meter panchromatic
photographs of Earth. The Indian IRS-1C
and -1D satellites routinely take 5-meter
panchromatic and 23-meter multispectral
images. The French SPOT-1, -2, and -4
systems provide 10-meter panchromaticand 20-meter multispectral images ofobjects on the ground. Once system testing and calibration are complete, Space
Imaging’s IKONOS-2 satellite will, forthe first time, provide 1-meter panchromatic and 3-meter multispectral images.
At present the Canadian RADARSAT-1
remains the only source of high-resolution radar imagery, providing consumers
with 8-meter resolution SAR images.
Over the next five years, however, thenumber of high-resolution electro-opticaland SAR satellites in orbit is expected to
explode. By December 2000 at least two
more private U.S. companies, EarthWatch
and OrbImage, will have launched systems capable of collecting 1-meter
panchromatic and 3- to 5-meter multi-

spectral images of Earth. OrbImage’s second high-resolution satellite, OrbView 4,
will also carry the world’s first hyperspectral sensor, the WarFighter. Although
access to WarFighter’s 8-meter resolution
imagery will be restricted to the U.S. government, OrbImage will be able to sell 24meter hyperspectral images to nongovernmental entities. Space Technology
Development Corporation is developing,in conjunction with the U.S. Navy, a highresolution system capable of collecting 5meter panchromatic and 30-meter hyperspectral images. Southern California’s
Research and Development Laboratories
is currently developing a 1-meter resolution radar system for launch by 2001.
In addition to the United States, manyof the countries already active in remotesensing plan to have more capable satellites operational by 2003. India plans tolaunch IRS-P5, which will be able todetect objects as small as 2.5 metersacross, and IRS-P6, which will be capable of providing 5-meter panchromaticand 23-meter multispectral images.
France plans to augment its capabilities
by adding SPOT-5 to the constellation of
SPOT satellites already in orbit. SPOT-5
will provide 2.5-meter panchromaticand 10-meter multispectral images ofthe planet. Canada will launch a second generation of radar satellites,
RADARSAT-2, with a resolution of 3
meters. Russia may launch the moreadvanced RESURS-DK system, which
has the ability to take 2-meter panchromatic and 3-meter multispectral andradar images of objects on the ground.

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Also within the next five years a number of new countries will enter the market for high-resolution remote sensing
data. Starting in 2000, West Indian Space
Ltd., a joint venture of two Israeli and one
American firms, plans to launch a constellation of three satellites able to provide 0.8- to 1.8-meter panchromatic
images.22 Japan is currently developing
one satellite, ALOS-1, with a 2.5-meter
panchromatic sensor and two 10-meter
multispectral and SAR sensors. Japan is
also considering developing a second
satellite, Info-Collectic, with 1-meter
panchromatic and 3-meter SAR sensors.
Taiwan is constructing a 2-meter
panchromatic system that will be readyfor launch in 2002. China and Brazil haveundertaken a joint effort that may ultimately lead to the development of
CBERS III and IV, with the ability to collect 5-meter panchromatic and 10-meter
multispectral images. Brazil andArgentina have agreed to develop the
SABIA system, which will have a 6-meter
multispectral capability, by 2003.
Pakistan, the Republic of Korea (South
Korea), and Australia are also eager toenter the business of providing remotesensing data, albeit with lower resolution
systems. Pakistan is developing the BadrC satellite, able to take color images ofobjects 10 meters or bigger. South Korea iscurrently developing the Kompsat-1 system with 10-meter panchromatic and 20meter multispectral resolutions. The South
Korean government is also planning tolaunch Kompsat-2, an improved version of
the Kompsat satellite, by 2003. Assuming
continuity of funding, Australia intends todevelop the Aries satellite, to be equippedwith 10-meter panchromatic and 30-meter
hyperspectral sensors.
This burgeoning global interest reflects
economic, political, and technologicaltrends that have fundamentally reshaped
the commercial satellite sector, leading

16

secrets for salegovernments and private companies toinvest large sums in the belief that themarket for space-based remote sensing
data will grow exponentially. One is thatthe market for satellite imagery is alreadygrowing. Over the past decade it has morethan tripled in size, jumping from $39 million in 1988 to $139 million in 1998.23 It isestimated that by 2005 the market willreach $420 million, an increase of over 202
percent.24 Potential customers include
farmers, city planners, map makers, environmentalists, emergency response teams,
news organizations, surveyors, geologists,mining and oil companies, timber harvesters, and domestic as well as foreign
military planners and intelligence organizations. Many of these groups already use
imagery provided by existing aerial andspace-based imagery platforms, despite
the fact that these systems lack some of theunique capabilities of the emerging commercial satellites—better spectral and spatial resolutions, greater timeliness, accessto remote areas, non-invasiveness, costeffectiveness, and ease of use. Satellite
operators contend that in the next few
years the demand for data from emerging
space-based remote sensing will grow significantly, at times complementing but
often replacing existing sources of remotesensing imagery. This optimism about the
future of the remote sensing market, coupled with the desire to capture a larger
share of the market, has driven many
companies to invest in commercial satellites and associated ground systems.
The collapse of the Soviet Union also
aided the growth of the remote sensing
industry. Before 1992, both Eastern andWestern bloc countries subordinated economic interests to the conduct of the cold
war. They often barred investors fromdeveloping or employing sensitive dualuse technologies for commercial purposes. After the dissolution of the Soviet
threat, many of the political barriers that

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had stifled private initiatives in high-resolution remote sensing evaporated.
In the United States and Russia, theend of the cold war had the added benefit of making existing sensitive remotesensing technologies available to the private sector. After the collapse of theSoviet Union, Russian firms began marketing 2-meter resolution satellite photographs from the government’s KVR1000 camera, which was designed forand used by the Soviet intelligence community.26 Discussions are now underway
to market even higher resolution photographs (1-meter resolution) from
Russian spy satellites. In the UnitedStates, military contracting companies,
including Lockheed Martin, Ball
Aerospace, and Northrop Grumman,
which during the cold war had been
deeply involved in the development of
the highly classified U.S. aerial andspace-based reconnaissance programs,
were allowed to offer their technicalexpertise and services to commercial
satellite companies.

commercial sales of imagery in a numberof countries. In France, Russia, and India,
for example, while governments own
and operate the satellite systems, once
the imagery is collected, private firms market and distribute the data. In the case ofFrance, the French Space Agency operates
and maintains the SPOT satellites, leaving
the sale of imagery to the Spot Image
Corporation.28 The Russian and Indian
governments maintain control of data distribution through state-controlled agencies(Sovinformsputnik in Russia and Antrix
in India), which have separate agreementswith U.S.-based companies to expand theirmarketing capabilities. Sovinformsputnik
has entered into a joint venture with Aerial
Images, Inc. of Raleigh, North Carolina, andCentral Trading Systems, Inc. of Huntington Bay, New York, to establish the terraserver data distribution system, for marketing SPIN-2 products. Antrix has contracted with Space Imaging of Thornton,
Colorado, to expand the sale of imagery
fromIndia’sIRS-1Cand-1Dsatellites.

Another factor facilitating the growthof the remote sensing industry has been
the recent technological advances in satellite data acquisition, storage, and processing, along with the ability quickly andefficiently to transfer such data files electronically. In the early 1980s information
technology had not yet advanced to thepoint of providing a robust infrastructure.27 Since then the situation haschanged dramatically. The advent of powerful personal computers capable of handling large files of data, the developmentof geographic information system software designed to manipulate spatial data,
and the growth of mechanisms for data
distribution such as CD-ROM disks andthe Internet have all facilitated the marketing and sale of satellite imagery.

In Canada, following years of government control over the RADARSAT program, the Canadian Space Agency has
agreed to transfer the program to the private sector. In December 1998 Industry
Minister John Manley announced that
MacDonald Dettwiler of Richmond,
British Columbia, would develop andoperate RADARSAT-2, the successor to
the government-owned and -operated
RADARSAT-1.29 To facilitate the transferof the RADARSAT program from thepublic to the private sector, the Canadiangovernment has agreed to provide $225
million of the $305 million (Canadian)needed to construct the satellite. Under
the terms of the agreement MacDonald
Dettwiler will reimburse the governmentof Canada with RADARSAT-2 imagery
once the satellite is operational.30

Last, active government support hastremendously encouraged the growth of

The support of the Israeli governmenthas been indispensable to the plans ofgrowth of the commercial remote sensing industry

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West Indian Space, an American-Israeli
joint venture comprised of the government-owned Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd.
of Lod, Israel, El-Op Electro-Optics
Industries of Rehovot, Israel, and Core
Software Technology, Inc. of Pasadena
California. The Israeli government has
assisted West Indian Space by permitting
the company to use Israeli spy satellite
technology for commercial purposes. In
addition, it has agreed to purchase all
imagery collected by the company’s threeplanned satellites over the Middle East fora period of eight years, providing both amarket for West Indian Space products
and a means of ensuring that regional
rivals do not gain access to the imagery.31
In the same manner, the government of
the United States has been central to thesuccess of the U.S. commercial land observation satellite industry. Ever since thelate 1970s, successive U.S. administrations have enacted legislation to encourage private initiatives in remote sensing.
Wary that the customer base for satellite
imagery was not sufficiently mature tosustain an entirely private satellite industry, the government initially focused oncommercializing NASA’s civilian satellite
program, known as Landsat (for a comprehensive history of the Landsat program see Appendix B). In July 1984,
President Ronald Reagan signed the Land
Remote Sensing Commercialization Act(Public Law [P.L.] 98-365), instructing the
Department of Commerce, which wasthen in charge of the Landsat program, toselect a private contractor to operate theLandsat systems and market the resulting
data. Although the act also established alicensing and oversight mechanism for acommercial remote sensing industry, nosuch industry emerged. In part the reason
was that the law required commercial
operators to sell all available imagery toanyone who wanted it at a set, nondiscriminatory price, making imagery less18

secrets for saleattractive to the many potential users whowanted exclusive access to the imagery
they purchased.
In a second attempt to jumpstart privateinterest in commercial land observation
satellites, the Congress passed the Land
Remote Sensing Policy Act (P.L. 102-555),
which was signed into law in October
1992. The new law allowed satellite operators to sell any given image exclusively to
one customer without any restrictions on
pricing. To reconcile U.S. domestic law
with the 1986 United Nations Legal
Principles (see page 31), the act required
private companies to make unenhanced
data available to the governments of thesensed states. In March 1994, in a further
attempt to clarify the regulatory framework and improve U.S. commercial competitiveness, President Bill Clinton issued
Presidential Decision Directive 23. The
directive, among other things, loosened
the restrictions on the sale of high-resolution satellite imagery to foreign entities.32
The 1992 legislation and the 1994 directive spurred significant interest in commercial remote sensing. In July 1992, shortly
before passage of the Land Remote Sensing
Policy Act, WorldView Inc. filed the first
application for a license to operate a highresolution commercial satellite. Since theneleven more U.S. companies have applied
for such licenses, investing an estimated$1.2 billion in commercial satellite remotesensing activities33 (see Table 2). One ofthese, Space Imaging, successfullylaunched the world’s first 1-meter resolution satellite on September 24, 1999.
The U.S. government has also tried topromote the growth of the U.S. commercial remote sensing industry throughdirect subsidies to private companies andguaranteed purchases of data. EarthWatch,Space Imaging, and OrbImage have, forexample, all been awarded between $2
million and $4 million to upgrade their

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ground systems to facilitate the transfer ofimagery data from their satellites to the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
In addition, the U.S. Air Force has agreed
to subsidize OrbImage for up to $30 million to develop and deploy the WarFighter
sensor on board its OrbView 4 satellite,
which will have both military and commercial applications. Similarly, the Officeof Naval Research recently concluded anagreement with the Space Technology
Development Corporation whereby the
U.S. Navy will provide the company
approximately $60 million to develop
and deploy the Naval EarthMap
Observer satellite.
In addition to direct subsidies to satellitecompanies, various U.S. national security
agencies have reached separate agreements with a number of current andfuture satellite operators to purchase highresolution satellite imagery. Since FY1998,
for example, the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency has “spent about $5
million annually on commercial imagery,”and has promised to increase its purchases of data significantly “once the 1-meter
commercial imagery systems are available.”34 According to a number of sources,
the U.S. intelligence community as awhole plans to spend $1 billion during thenext five years on purchases of satellite
imagery from private U.S. sources anddevelopment of the capability needed to
exploit such imagery fully.35

the future of thecommercial remotesensing market
The market for satellite imagery will, as
noted, continue to grow, although thescope and pace are uncertain. Four factors will ultimately determine the sizeof the market: the extent of government
interference; the price of satellite
imagery; the timeliness of access toremote sensing data; and the ability ofsatellite operators to market their products to new customers.
Government Regulation
As of the end of 1999, none of the spacefaring nations has allowed the floweringof a truly independent commercial remotesensing industry driven solely by the tidesof the free market. Given the dual-use
nature of remote sensing data, states haveconsistently opted to subordinate economic gains to security and political considerations. Most countries, includingFrance, India, and Russia, have chosen to
maintain physical control over their country’s satellite systems and all the data collected. In contrast, Canada, Israel, and theUnited States have permitted private companies to launch and operate land observation satellites, with the stipulation that,when necessary, national authorities cantemporarily block the collection and dissemination of satellite imagery—a policy
commonly referred to as shutter control.36
Although some form of government
supervision may be essential, commercial
operators fear that excessive government
interference could stifle the growth of themarket for commercial satellite data, bothregionally and globally. Potential consumers of satellite imagery need assurances that reliable sources of imagery exist
before they alter established procedures ordevise new ways to incorporate satellite
imagery into their day-to-day activities. In
the absence of such assurances, growth of
the remote sensing market could suffer.
Cost
Commercial imagery prices currently
range from as little as $10 for historic
American and Soviet reconnaissance photographs to as much as $10,000 for more
recent high-resolution images. On average, however, consumers interested inhigh-resolution commercial satellite
imagery can expect to pay between $1,000
and $4,000 for a single image with agrowth of the commercial remote sensing industry

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ground resolution of 10 meters to 1 meter.
Generally, the cost of imagery increases
proportionally with either higher resolution or greater area coverage. At theseprices it is unlikely that anyone except forthe most affluent organizations, typically
government agencies and large corporations, will be able to purchase large quantities of commercial satellite imagery. Even
though many other potential users, such as
humanitarian relief agencies and environmental activists, could benefit from theinformation contained in satellite imagery,few will be able to afford regular purchases
at current prices.
Timeliness
At present, it takes anywhere from twodays to well over four weeks before customers receive imagery from vendors.
This time lapse clearly is a major problem
for users of imagery with rigid time constraints. Data providers are well aware ofthis fact and are preparing to meet the20

secrets for salechallenge. As Appendix A indicates, mostof the new commercial satellites have arevisit cycle (the time it takes to pass twiceover any site on Earth) of one to five days.
However, with the number of satellites inorbit increasing as existing companies
deploy larger constellations of satellites
and new companies enter the market, thetime it takes to image any location on
Earth is likely to decrease considerably.
Moreover, satellite operators claim thatonce the imagery is collected, it can be
downloaded, processed, and distributed
to customers within one to four hours. The
implication is that in the near future on
average it could take as little as 25 to 40
hours from the time the customer places
an order to receipt of the images.
Marketing
The ability of satellite operators to makethe value and utility of space-based data
known to new potential consumers will
also have a pronounced effect on the

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growth of the commercial remote sensing industry

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growth of the imagery market. One of themain reasons for the relatively slow
growth of the remote sensing market has
been a lack of knowledge about the potential benefits of satellite imagery. Manybusinesses, nongovernmental organiza-

tions, and even government agencies arefor the most part unaware of the different
applications of remote sensing data.
Aggressive salesmanship is needed todevelop the market further and demonstrate the utility of satellite imagery.

globalized ownership?
Developing a single high-resolution commercial satellite costs anywhere between $45 million and $300 million.1,2 Building the associated ground segment adds another $33 to $65
million to the total cost.3 A basic insurance package and the launch vehicle raise the pricetag by an estimated $19-132 million.4 In total, commercial companies need to invest
between $97 million and $497 million before they collect any revenues (see Table 3).
The exorbitant cost of entering the remote sensing market has compelled many commercial satellite operators to seek a variety of domestic and international sources of funding.
For example, Spot Image, although a French company operating under French laws, has
several prominent foreign shareholders, including Aerospatiale-Matra group (Italy),
Alcatel Space Industries (Spain), and the Swedish Space Corporation (Sweden). Similarly,
the U.S. company, Space Imaging, which successfully launched the world’s first 1-meter
resolution commercial satellite on September 24, 1999, has secured funds not only from
U.S. sources, but also from a number of foreign investors, such as Japan’s Mitsubishi
Corporation, Singapore’s Van Der Horst Ltd., South Korea’s Hyundai Space & Aircraft,
Sweden’s Swedish Space Corporation, and Thailand’s Loxley Public Company Ltd. Earth
Watch, another U.S. company, has obtained funding from the Japanese conglomerate
Hitachi Ltd. and the Italian firm Telespazio.
This internationalization of the space industry may present yet another challenge to theability of nations to pursue the contradictory policy of limiting access to high-resolution
satellite imagery for national security purposes while promoting the growth of a profitableremote sensing industry. Whereas domestic investors may be more receptive to the security interests of their state governments, foreign investors are interested only in maximizing
their own profits. Consequently, any policy that is likely to reduce sales is also likely todeter foreign investments. This restraint may over time cripple the domestic remote sensing industry as foreign and, perhaps, domestic financiers seek more profitable investments
in less restrictive commercial environments.
1

For a discussion of the globalization of the remote sensing industry, visit the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace website at www.ceip.org/programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/WilliamsonPage.htm
and www.ceip.org/programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/StoneyPage.htm.
2

Satellite costs are directly related to key system characteristics such as the number and type of sensors, spatialand spectral resolutions, swath width, platform stability, and satellite agility. Moreover, satellite costs also
reflect whether a planned system makes use of existing technologies or whether substantial funds are needed
for additional research and development activities. Numbers are based on figures provided by commercial
satellite operators and aerospace industry officials.
3

Jim Martin, Raytheon Systems Company, Arlington, Virginia, September 29, 1999, provided the ground segment costs.

4

In general, insurance costs can be expected to range between 13 percent and 20 percent of the combined valueof the satellite and the launch vehicle. Launch costs depend on the weight of the satellite and the type of launchvehicle used to deploy the system. Clayton Mowry, of Satellite Industries Association, Alexandria, Virginia,
September 28, 1999, provided the insurance costs. The launch vehicle costs can be found in Commercial SpaceTransportation, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C., 1999.

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drawbacks of commercial
satellite imaging
The widespread availability of commercial high-resolution satellite imagery will
for the first time reveal to many people
and organizations information to which
they never before had access. Somehave celebrated this new development,
calling it the emerging era of global
transparency. But transparency has both
positive and negative consequences.
In the field of international relations,
greater transparency could allay tensions among international rivals andherald a new era of peaceful coexistence. As one observer stated, “Nations
that know what their enemies are doing
are less likely to increase world tensions through activities born of fear.
And nations that know their enemies
are observing them are far less likely tothreaten international peace throughrash behavior.”37 According to thisview, if everyone is constantly watching everyone else, surprise attacks
become impossible and aggressive
actions unrewarding.
This premise may often be true, but
not always. When the success ofaggression is dependent on the elementof surprise, transparency will indeed
reduce the incidence of aggression. But
not all aggression requires surprise to
succeed. Transparency could aggravateinterstate conflicts by removing ambiguities about relative capabilities andallowing states to exploit each others’
weaknesses. To the degree that governments new to remote sensing misinterpret what they see, imagery could create groundless fears.

Even under the best of circumstances,transparency cannot ensure that theright decisions are made. Transparency
reveals behavior, but not intent.38 If
enemy troops are detected massing
along the border, is that just harmlessposturing, or are they preparing for apreemptive strike? If states reach thewrong conclusions, they may findthemselves spiraling uncontrollably
toward war.
Transparency could also complicate
decision making by introducing newparticipants into the policy process.
Widespread availability of high-resolution satellite imagery would allow private citizens, nongovernmental organizations, and particularly the media totake a more active role in policy making. These groups could independently
use satellite imagery to monitor statecompliance with international agreements, expose environmental degradation, and publicize large-scale humanitarian emergencies. In some situations
civil society groups and the media
might be able to compel states to takeaction, even when government officials
would much prefer to do nothing.
Here again, there are no guarantees
that greater transparency will produce
better outcomes. Nongovernmentalorganizations and the media rarely
have the resources, analytical skills, or
technical expertise that are more readily available to state governments. It is
inevitable that organizations will makemistakes as they begin to increasingly
rely on satellite imagery. The media

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Page 24have already made such errors on atleast four occasions. During the 1986
Chernobyl accident, in an attempt to be
the first with breaking news, a numberof media organizations misinterpreted
imagery and erroneously reported thattwo nuclear reactors had melted
down.39 Just a few weeks later, a number of networks in the United Statescited SPOT imagery of a Soviet nuclear
proving grounds at Semipalatinsk asevidence of Moscow’s decision to
resume nuclear testing. Further analysis revealed that the networks had completely misinterpreted the imagery,
falsely presenting routine activities in a
far more pernicious light.40
Another error occurred in 1992 whena newspaper called the European published SPOT images of what it labeled
an Algerian nuclear research complex.
Subsequent analysis of the image
revealed that the feature in the photo
was not a nuclear research facility but amilitary airbase. To make mattersworse, the European had published theimage upside down and backwards.41
More recently, on May 25, 1998,
Newsweek magazine published a satellite
image that it claimed showed the site in
the northern desert state of Rajasthanwhere India had conducted five nuclear
tests. Newsweek maintained that theimage dated from a week before the tests
and ran the picture with several captions
identifying specific objects and installations. None of the information was correct. It turned out that the imagery had
been collected over five years prior to theblasts, and the feature Newsweek identi-

24

secrets for salefied as the hole where one of India’s
nuclear explosions took place was in fact
an animal holding pen.42
Fortunately, no grave damage has yet
resulted from the erroneous reportsthat have appeared, but it is optimistic
to think that continued carelessness
will have no consequences. False
reporting, whether deliberate or unintentional, could easily embitter relations among nations and prevent theresolution of outstanding disputes.
Transparency raises major economic
concerns as well. Radar, multispectral,and especially hyperspectral sensors
may allow extraction companies toknow more about a country’s natural
resources than the country’s own government. This disparity in knowledge
could place state officials at a considerable disadvantage when negotiating
drilling rights and mining agreements.
As mentioned, governments are not the
only ones that may feel an acute senseof vulnerability. Corporations may findthemselves being observed by competitors trying to keep tabs on their construction of new production facilities
around the world and estimate the sizeof their production runs by looking attheir emissions.
In short, the emerging global transparency resulting from high-resolutioncommercial remote sensing satellites
promises both benefits and costs. The
challenge is to devise policies that harness the benefits of growing international transparency while minimizing its
many potential negative consequences.

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challenges of acquiring and interpreting imagery
Although a picture may be worth a thousand words, without context it reveals very little.
A picture of arid, cracked mud has very different meaning depending on whether the site
is a desert riverbed during the dry season or a spot that used to be several feet under the
fast-shrinking Aral Sea. Getting useful information out of satellite imagery requires significant prior knowledge about the precise site an image shows and what the image means.
If high-resolution satellite imagery is to fulfill its promise, much will depend on the abilityof satellite operators to obtain the imagery that addresses the specific needs of different
consumers and on the ability of analysts to derive useful information from the mountainsof transmitted data. In other words, data acquisition and interpretation are as importantas the satellites themselves.
To collect imagery of a particular site or activity, satellite operators need to ascertain theexact coordinates of the target. Satellites, particularly high-resolution systems, cannot findviolations of international treaties, signs of humanitarian atrocities, or evidence of environmental contamination unless they are told where and when to look. This precision cansometimes be very difficult, especially if the target is mobile and even more so if the target
is concealed through denial and deception techniques. Moreover, it is not always possible
to have a satellite at the right place at the right time. Existing commercial satellites canimage any spot on earth within 1 to 24 days, depending on the location of the target andthe availability of various systems. At present, most of the globe remains hidden most of
the time. Continuous global coverage will gradually become available in the next few
years as more commercial systems are launched, but until it is available, access to timely
satellite imagery will be limited and uncertain.
The technical limitations of emerging systems and the conditions under which they must
operate compound the difficulty of collecting useful satellite imagery (see box, page 3).
Electro-optical sensors, for example, can provide extremely useful imagery to consumers,
but they cannot operate at night or in poor weather. Radar satellites can operate day andnight and under all climatic conditions, but few of the new systems provide radar
imagery, and radar does not provide the same spatial and spectral information available
from the more common systems.
While the advent of 1-meter resolution satellite technology is a gigantic step, it, too, has
obvious limitations. As the image on page 26 indicates, considerably more information canbe derived from the 1-meter resolution image of this Yannan-class Chinese ship than fromthe 5-meter resolution image. But even the higher resolution does not show important
information, including available weapon systems, onboard cargo, and key features such as
the mast and boom. Even if all the planned systems become operational, much willremain hidden from prying eyes.
Assuming that the right imagery is collected by the right satellite, to make sense of it,
photo analysts need to understand weather conditions, surface features, seasonal changes,
shadows, surroundings, and differing shapes and sizes.1 In addition, they need a great
deal of prior knowledge about what various objects look like from space. It does very little
good to acquire an image of a clandestine missile site if the analyst viewing the image
does not know what a missile site looks like.
Mastering these challenges requires years of training and experience. In the government
sector, analysts undergo sixteen weeks of basic training and work one-and-a-half years
before they reach the apprenticeship level.2 Even so, there is an estimated 90 percent error
rate among government imagery analysts during their first three years on the job.3 To
avoid endless debate about what particular images really show, photo analysts must go
through extensive training not only in the beginning of their careers but also every time

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they shift the focus of their work. Analysts who specialize in interpreting and analyzing
the activities of ground forces cannot readily become experts on nuclear testing or environmental issues. In addition, peer review must be part of every analyst’s daily work tominimize mistakes.
Last and perhaps most important, satellite imagery cannot unlock every secret. While the
new high-resolution remote sensing systems will be able to detect large-scale troop movements, mass graves, and deforestation, they will not be able to reveal the intentions of
those troops or who is buried in the mass graves, or how the deforestation can bereversed. In virtually all cases, other sources of information will be necessary to unmask
what cannot be observed from space.
1

Robert Osterhout, Director, Spatial Information Customer Support Center, Science Applications International
Corporation (SAIC), statement made during the “No More Secrets? Policy Implications of Commercial Remote
Sensing Satellites” conference at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 26, 1999. For transcripts
of Osterhout’s remarks, visit the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website at www.ceip.org/programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/OsterhoutPage.htm.
2

Ibid.

3

Steven Livingston, statement made during the “No More Secrets? Policy Implications of Commercial Remote
Sensing Satellites” conference at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. May 26, 1999. For RealVideoof Livingston’s presentation, visit the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website atwww.ceip.org/programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/LivingstonPage.htm.

Comparing resolutions: Three views of thesame Yannan-class Chinese ship at 5-meter,
1-meter, and 20-centimeter resolutions.
(Agence France Presse/downgraded imagery
provided by Vipin Gupta, Sandia National
Laboratories.)

5 meter

1 meter

20 centimeter

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5 current policy choices
Over a decade ago, an article on thethen-nascent commercial satellite
industry observed that “the instinct ofgovernments confronted by new technologies is generally to bring themunder control (or at least try to), especially when those technologies are
related to matters of power and politics.”43 In the case of high-resolution
remote sensing satellites this observation has been borne out. Concernedwith the consequences of unchecked
global transparency, states have considered a number of different options that
may or may not prove workable.

unilateral measures
In addition to furthering U.S. commercial competitiveness, Presidential
Decision Directive-23 also empowered
the Secretary of Commerce to limit
commercial satellite operations “during
periods when national security or international obligations and/or foreign
policies [of the United States] may becompromised, as defined by the
Secretary of Defense or the Secretary ofState, respectively.”44 This policy of
shutter control was the result of the
U.S. government’s desire to balance its
competing interests with respect tocommercial satellite imagery.45
Satellite imagery represents a classic
case of the difficulty of regulating the“export” of dual-use goods (that is,goods with both civilian and military
applications). There are powerfulincentives working at cross purposes:
economic interests want to maintain amajor U.S. presence in what could be alarge and highly profitable industry
that the United States pioneered,
whereas national security interests
want to prevent potential adversaries
from using the imagery against theUnited States or its allies, and foreign
policy interests want to avoid having
certain situations publicized. Yet efforts
to deny imagery to potential enemies
undercut the building of a market for
U.S. companies and may leave the field
to competitors. As one former government official has observed, “the surest
way to lose to increasing international
competition is to adopt a restrictive regulatory environment at home which
encourages customers to seek out foreign sources.”46 After all, imagery
consumers who know access toimagery may be cut off at any timeby the vagaries of U.S. foreign policy
concerns may prefer to build commercial relationships with other, morereliable providers.
In addition, unilateral measures arelikely to be far more harmful to thecompetitiveness of U.S.-based imagery
providers than to the competitivenessof any of their economic rivals. Unlike
Canada, France, India, Israel, andRussia, the national security interests of
the United States are significantly
broader geographically. Unilateral controls could translate into more frequentinterruptions in the availability ofimagery from U.S. sources, giving consumers yet another reason to seek alternative suppliers.

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In the United States, shutter control
faces an additional challenge: it may beunconstitutional. As noted, the media
have already made extensive use ofsatellite imagery, and some news producers are eagerly anticipating the
emergence of the new high-resolution
systems. The Radio-Television News
Directors Association argues vehemently that the existing standards violate the First Amendment by allowing
the government to impose “prior
restraint” on the flow of information,with no need to prove clear and present
danger or imminent national harm to
an impartial judge.47 If the U.S. government exercises shutter control in any
but the most compelling circumstances,a court challenge is inevitable.
It is also not clear whether shutter
control will do much to protect U.S.
interests. Although U.S. satellites are
more advanced than any of the systems
currently in orbit, other than spy satellites, they hardly have the sky to themselves. Canada, France, India, andRussia are already providing high-resolution optical and radar imagery toconsumers throughout the world, with
Brazil, China, Israel, Pakistan, South
Korea, and Taiwan getting ready toenter the commercial remote sensing
market. Given the large number ofalternative sources of imagery, unilateral shutter control by itself cannot afford
the United States any meaningful levelof protection.

bilateral and multilateral approaches
An alternative is to try to get otheroperators of high-resolution satellites
to voluntarily restrict the collection anddissemination of sensitive imagery
from their systems. Israel has alreadyreached such an agreement with theUnited States. Following intense lobby-

28

secrets for saleing by Israeli officials and a number ofpro-Israeli groups, the U.S. government
adopted an amendment to the 1997
National Defense Authorization Act(commonly known as the KylBingaman amendment). It forbids U.S.
companies from collecting or selling
imagery of the entire country of Israel“unless such imagery is no moredetailed or precise than satellite
imagery. . . that is routinely available
from [other] commercial sources.”48
Although passage of the KylBingaman amendment was a clear victory for the supporters of the bilateralapproach, this victory will likely be
short-lived. The U.S. decision to limit
collection of high-resolution commercial imagery of Israel was based on fifty
years of close cooperation between thetwo countries. Israel does not enjoy
similar relationships with other spacefaring nations. It is rather unlikely that
Israel will be able to elicit similar concessions from other actors.
The feasibility of forging a multilateral control regime is even more uncertain. States are unwilling to forgo economic gains unless they are confronted
with a clear and overwhelming threat.
To most countries, access to high-resolution satellite imagery by third-rate
powers does not constitute such a
threat. Given that U.S. and Israeli firms
will be the first suppliers of 1-meter
satellite imagery and in all likelihood
will dominate the market, later entrants
will have no choice but to compete forthe segments that are still untapped.49
Therefore, while it is conceivable thatstates might agree to some international regulations (for example, no sale ofhigh-resolution imagery to active combatants), there is little reason to believethat they would jeopardize the futureof their commercial satellite industries
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clearly favors U.S. and Israeli politicaland economic interests.
The prospect of controlling access tosensitive high-resolution satellite
imagery through bilateral or multilateral agreements becomes even moredubious as remote sensing technology
proliferates further. As mentioned,
Canada, France, India, and Russia arealready providing high-resolution optical and radar imagery to consumers
worldwide. Over the next five to ten
years, at least eight more countries(Argentina, Brazil, China, Israel, Japan,
Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan) areplanning to enter the market. Even if
the United States can convince existing
imagery providers to restrict access totheir high-resolution imagery, which
seems extremely doubtful, there is no
reason to believe that the emerging
satellite operators would respect U.S.
wishes on what should be disseminated or to whom.

shutter control
by other means
In the long run, if it proves unworkable
to control the flow of information fromsatellites either unilaterally or by agreement with other countries, two options
remain: take direct action to prevent thesatellites from seeing what they would
otherwise see, or learn to live with the
new transparency.
Direct action requires states either tohide what is on the ground or to disable
satellites in the sky. Satellites generally
travel in fixed orbits, so that it is easy to
predict when one will be overhead andtake concealment measures. Hiding
assets from satellite observation is an
old cold war trick. The Soviets used to
deploy large numbers of fake tanks andeven ships. Sensitive objects can be covered with conductive material such as
chicken wire screening to create areflective glare that obscures the detailsof whatever is underneath. Indeed, one
concern for the United States iswhether countries that currently do notbother trying to conceal their activities
from U.S. spy satellites will instituteconcealment measures once they
become aware that commercial operators may sell imagery of them toregional adversaries. In other words,
the advent of commercial high-resolution satellite imagery may cause theUnited States to lose access to information it currently has.
At the same time, although concealment is often possible, it will become
harder as the number of eyes in the sky
proliferates. The advent of high-resolution radar technology, capable ofdetecting objects day or night, in any
weather and through clouds or smoke,
will further reduce the windows inwhich states can carry out sensitive
activities unobserved. Moreover, manyof the new systems have the ability tolook from side to side as well as straight
down, so that knowing when you arebeing observed is not so easy.
If hiding does not work, are countermeasures against a satellite possible?
There are many ways to put satellites
out of commission, especially unprotected civilian systems that are ofnecessity in low earth orbits.50
Electronic and electro-optical countermeasures can be used to jam or deceive
satellites. Satellites can also be
spoofed—interfered with electronicallyand made to shut down or change
orbit. The operator may never knowwhether the malfunction is merely atechnical glitch or the result of a hostileaction.51 (And the spoofer may neverknow whether the target satellite was
successfully affected.) Such countermeasures could prove very usefulduring crises or war to prevent accesscurrent policy choices

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to imagery of a specific, temporary
activity without the legal bother ofshutter control or the political hassle ofnegotiated restraints. During peacetime, they would become rather obvious if carried out on a routine basis toprevent imaging of a particular site.
The more dramatic approach would
be either to shoot the satellites down ordestroy data-receiving stations on the
ground. Short of imminent or actual
war, it is unthinkable that any country

30

secrets for salewould bring international opprobriumon itself by destroying civilian satellites
or committing acts of aggression
against the territory of a sovereignstate. Given that the more powerfulnations of the world will be developing
and operating most commercial satellites, it would be a self-defeating strategy for other, generally weaker, states totake direct action against these systems.
The costs of such a strategy would far
outweigh any potential gains.

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Page 31international law and remote sensing of earth
Despite burgeoning interest in civilian and commercial land observation satellites, few
internationally recognized and legally binding principles regulate remote sensing activities. Existing standards, the result largely of longstanding U.S. efforts to render legitimate
both military reconnaissance and civilian imaging from space, are codified in two UN
documents. The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
declares that “[o]uter space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject
to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty”1 and “shall be free for exploration anduse by all states.”2 States cannot exert control over any part of outer space in the same way
they do airspace above their national territories, so satellites are free to orbit over them.
The treaty stipulates, however, that exploration and use of outer space are to be carriedout for peaceful purposes and in a manner that benefits all countries of the world.3 It also
requires that “state parties to the treaty shall bear international responsibility for national
activities in outer space…whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies
or by nongovernmental entities.”4
The UN General Assembly adopted a second document, Principles Relating to Remote
Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, on December 3, 1986. Acceptance of the principles
in this document followed intense disagreement between the developed countries, led by
the United States, and the developing nations, led by the former Soviet Union. The U.S.
camp maintained that collection and distribution of civilian remote sensing imagery
should flourish unrestricted. The Soviet camp argued that the acquisition and dissemination of such imagery should only be allowed with the consent of the state that is overflown. The 1986 UN Principles were a clear victory for the U.S. position. Instead ofendorsing the right of prior consent, Principle XII of the document merely required that“[a]s soon as the primary data and the processed data concerning the territory under its
jurisdiction are produced, the sensed state shall have access to them on a non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable cost terms.”5 The principles did not specify whether a requestfrom the sensed state’s government triggers the obligation to make the data available, orwhether satellite operators have a responsibility to inform the sensed state that imagery of
its territory is available. This lack of precision has allowed satellite operators to interpretthe regulations in a manner that is most convenient to them. At present, Principle XII of
the 1986 UN document is interpreted to mean that only if a country being imaged knowsthat it is being imaged and asks for a copy is it entitled to one at the market rate. Eventhen, it will not know who requested specific images or for what purposes.
Whether the rather lackadaisical regulations of remote sensing activities embodied in the1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1986 Legal Principles will continue to satisfy governments whose territories are routinely being observed by large numbers of increasingly
sophisticated commercial satellites remains to be seen. It is quite possible that as the number of eyes in the sky increases, so will the demands of governments seeking greater protection for their territorial sovereignty.
1Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including theMoon and Other Celestial Bodies, Article II, United Nations, New York, January 27, 1967.
2

Ibid., Article I.

3

Ibid., Articles I and IV.

4

Ibid., Article VI.

5“Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space,” Principle XII, United Nations General
Assembly, New York, December 3, 1986.

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6 conclusion
This telephone has too many shortcomings to be seriously considered asa means of communication. The device
is inherently of no value to us.
—Western Union
internal memo, 1876

Heavier-than-air flying machines are
impossible.
—Lord Kelvin, president,
Royal Society, 1895

The wireless music box has no imaginable
commercial value. Who would pay for a
message sent to nobody in particular?
—David Sarnoff’s associates
in response to his urgings forinvestment in the radio in the 1920s

I think there is a world market formaybe five computers.
—Thomas Watson, chairman ,International Business
Machines (IBM), 1943

There is no reason anyone would
want a computer in their home.
—Ken Olson, president
and founder, Digital
Equipment Corporation, 1977

640K ought to be enough for anybody.
—Bill Gates, Microsoft Corporation, 1981

The success rate of prognostications about
how new technologies will fare approaches zero. No one really knows whether athriving satellite commercial remote sensing industry will develop over the next
decade, or whether the whole industry
will crash, figuratively if not literally.
The only sure prediction is that theindustry will change, drastically, in the32

next few years. Some of those changes
may come in the form of technologicalimprovements. Space Imaging, operatorof the IKONOS satellite now in orbit,
recently announced that it is thinking
about follow-ons with even greater
capabilities. Chief Executive Officer
John Copple noted in an interview thatthe market has changed notably in thefour years since the company wasformed. Not only is there competition
from other potential satellite operators,
but “we’re seeing much higher resolution from the aerial companies andwould like to be able to participate inthat market.”52 Although there is a widespread myth that Presidential Decision
Directive-23 limits the resolution ofAmerican satellites to no better than 1
meter, in fact there is no constraint on
resolution. Indeed, under ideal conditions IKONOS and some of the othersatellites scheduled for launch within
the next year will achieve resolutions
closer to 0.86 meter. Copple says that the
U.S. national security industry, likely to
be a major customer, is urging U.S. companies to move to higher resolutions infuture satellites.53
Some of the changes may involve theorganization of the industry. Spot
Image of France and OrbImage of theUnited States recently announced plans
for a partnership that would market
OrbImage’s high-resolution imagery(from OrbView 3 and OrbView 4,planned for launch in late 2000)
through Spot’s well-established global
sales network.54 Such cross-border

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alliances are becoming emblematic of
the globalization of the industry. Not
only are there many countries withcivilian or commercial operators, theoperators themselves are increasingly
multinational enterprises.
If commercial satellite remote sensing
does take off, the new availability ofimagery will raise further questions forgovernment officials and others aroundthe world, questions not easily answered
through purely national means. Because
information really is power, the spreadof this particularly vivid and comprehensive form of information will ripple
through all sorts of relationships—thoseamong states, and those between statesand other international actors such as
businesses and civil society.
The rapidly growing literature andplethora of conferences on the newsatellites have mostly focused on what
the availability of high-resolution
imagery will do to the conduct of war,and in particular whether it will undermine the overwhelming military preponderance of the United States.
Certainly it is possible to imagine circumstances in which the United States
would benefit militarily from the suppression of such imagery. It is more difficult to imagine military conflicts
involving the United States in which
France, India, Israel, Russia, and eventually China would all agree to go
along with the suppression of such
imagery. This battle is already lost.
The more fundamental questions
raised by the new satellites have to dowith basic issues about the meaning
and relevance of national borders,
about the relationships of governments
not only to one another but also to private businesses and nongovernmentalorganizations, and about the meaningof national sovereignty. Satellite
imagery is only one of a whole series of

information technologies that havecaused states to lose control over information about what is happening within
their borders. From now on, it will not
only be the U.S. Ambassador to theUnited Nations who can show imagesof atrocities in the UN Security Council
and demand action. Any governmenton the council will be able to do so, or
any government or nongovernmentalorganization that can persuade a council member to present the images.
International negotiations on everything from arms control to climatechange, already populated by evergrowing numbers of governments,
businesses, and nongovernmentalorganizations, will face new complications caused by their inability to suppress or ignore unwanted information.
Because information will be so widely
available, crises may become harder tomanage, as leaders find themselves
under relentless pressure to act quickly.
But this is not the first time the world
has had to adjust to a technologicallydriven jump in the availability of information. Printing presses were once
seen as tools of the devil because they
removed control over information fromthe hands of the medieval Catholic
Church and spread it across the (literate) populace at large. Every new stepfrom the telegraph to the Internet has
been greeted with proclamations ofapocalyptic change. Governments thathave tried to suppress and control
flows of information have, in the longrun, suffered for it. The wiser course ofaction, as well as the only practicableone, is to learn to live with the newtransparency.
For the United States in particular, it
is most unlikely that the shortsighted
policy of shutter control will do good,and it could do harm even to theUnited States itself by undermining an

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industry on which the national security
community will increasingly have torely. The United States would be better
served by policies that return to the traditional U.S. emphasis on open skies
and freedom of information. In the
1960s, U.S. policies helped bring about
the legitimacy of satellite reconnaissance. In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. leadership in both the technology and politics of civilian remote sensing led to
global acceptance of unconstrained
imaging from space. When theinevitable international disputes arise
over the new transparency, and when
the United States finds itself facing
short-term interests in suppressing
imagery, it is crucial that it stick to thelong-range policies in favor of transparency that have served it so well.
For the rest of the world, this newform of transparency will do far moregood than harm. Countries that now
live in fear of one another will be able
to learn whether those potentially hostile neighbors are in fact mobilizing for
attack, and would-be attackers, at least
sometimes, will be deterred by the over-34

secrets for salewhelming likelihood of detection. The
pressing environmental and developmental problems facing poor countries,
heretofore unseen and therefore easily
ignored by the rich, will become bothmore visible and better understood.
Most important, the new imagery
will contribute to a badly needed shift
in perspective. As Oliver Morton wrote
in an article on satellite imagery in
Wired magazine in 1997:
Like the telephone or the wrist watch, itis the sort of product that gets woven
into the fabric of life—in this case, as an
assumption that all the world is out
there to be seen, that it is all available,
comprehensible, and held in common…. With shared eyes we will watch
the world carry its cargo of civilization—its roads, its fields, its cities, its
landfills—through time and space. This
portrait will be an image that can zoom
in to the personal and pull out to thegeopolitical, a new way to look at borders, a new way to look at news. It will
be an illustration of everything: not, inthe end, a view from nowhere, but aview from everywhere, for everyone.55

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notes
1. For the RealVideo, transcripts, and summary of different presentations at the conference, visit the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace website at www.ceip.org/programs/transparency/
RemoteSensingConf/Agenda.htm.
2. Ralph Rugoff, “Fame,” LA Weekly, July 30, 1999.
3. For a discussion of the security implications of commercial high-resolution satellites, visit the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace website at www.ceip.org/programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/
BakerPage.htm; www.ceip.org/programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/BernsteinPage.htm; andwww.ceip.org/programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/MullenPage.htm.
4. Peter D. Zimmerman, “The Uses of SPOT for Intelligence Collection: A Quantitative Assessment,” in Michael
Krepon, Peter D. Zimmerman, Leonard S. Spector, and Mary Umberger, eds., Commercial Observation Satellites andInternational Security (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1990), p. 77.
5. It is well documented that during the Iran-Iraq war, images of battle areas were purchased frequently. It is notclear, however, who acquired the imagery or for what purposes. See Peter D. Zimmerman, “From the SPOT Files:
Evidence of Spying,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 45, No. 7 (September 1989), p. 24. Further, it has beenreported that “before invading Kuwait, Saddam Hussein bought imagery from the French SPOT satellites,”although the information could not be corroborated by the authors. See also Robert Wright, “Private Eyes,” NewYork Times Magazine, September 5, 1999.
6. Report 102-539, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, May 28, 1992, p. 26.
7. This level of detail is possible only if the sensor has a high enough spatial resolution and can detect objects inthe long-wave segment of the spectrum.
8. For more details visit the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website at www.ceip.org/
programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/PikePageHumanitarian.htm.
9. David Rohde, “A High-Tech Threat with a Low-Tech Track Record,” New York Times, April 4, 1999, p. 6.
10. The groups included: Physicians for Human Rights, Refugees International, International Crisis Group,
Network Bosnia, Coalition for International Justice, Institute for the Study of Genocide, Freedom House,
Network of East-West Women, Balkan Action Council, and Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights. Nora
Boustany, “The Heavens Look Down on Kosovo,” The Washington Post, April 2, 1999, p. A19.
11. For more details, visit the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website at www. ceip.org/
programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/HammondPage.htm and www.ceip.org/programs/
transparency/RemoteSensingConf/JanetosPage.htm.
12. The retreating Iraqi troops set between 640 and 650 oil wells alight; some, however, were already extinguished by the time Landsat imagery of the oil fields was collected. Peter D. Zimmerman, “The Use of Civil
Remote Sensing Satellites During and After the 1990-91 Gulf War,” Verification Report, VERTIC (1992), p. 239.
13. Frederick P. Hafetz and Gwen M. Schoenfeld, “Advanced Measurement Techniques: Technological
Breakthroughs May Usher in Era of Change,” Environmental Compliance & Litigation Strategy, Vol. 13, No. 3(August 1997), p. 1.
14. Karen Litfin, “Public Eyes: Satellite Imagery, the Globalization of Transparency, and New Networks ofSurveillance,” unpublished manuscript, 1999.
15. For more details on the media uses of satellite imagery, visit the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
website at www.ceip.org/programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/DubnoPage.htm andwww.ceip.org/programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/LivingstonPage.htm.
16. Oliver Morton, “Private Spy,” Wired (August 1997), p. 1.
17. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
18. Pierre C. Robert, “Remote Sensing: A Potentially Powerful Technique for Precision Agriculture,” paper presented at the conference titled Land Satellite Information in the Next Decade II: Sources and Applications,
American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, Washington, D.C., 1997.
19. “Offshore Oil Detection: Radar Imagery Offers a Slick for Locating Rich Reserves at Sea,” Imaging Notes,
Vol. 14, No. 2 (March/April 1999), p. 24.
20. Fred Wergeles, “Commercial Satellite Imagery: New Opportunities for Competitive Intelligence,” Competitive
Intelligence Magazine, Vol. 1, No. 1 (April/June 1998), p. 37.
21. To see William Stoney’s presentation on existing and planned land imaging satellites, visit the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace website at www.ceip.org/programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/
StoneyPage.htm.
22. One of the two Israeli firms involved in the joint venture, Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), is a governmentowned company.
23. The figures include revenues from the sale of satellite imagery and ground station fees; they do not include

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revenues from the sale of geographic information system software. Karen Kaplan, “An Eye in the Dark: Radar 1
Satellite to Sell Unobstructed Views of Earth,” The Austin American-Statesman, September 21, 1998, p. C1. See also
Space Business Indicators (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics
Administration and Office of Space Commerce, June 1991), pp. 31 and 55.
24. Adrian Murdoch, “Pie in the Sky,” Worldlink (September/October 1999), p. 1. For the full article, visit
www.worldlink.co.uk/articles.
25. Statement by the Press Secretary, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, D.C., March 10,
1994, p. 1.
26. Vipin Gupta, “New Satellite Images for Sale,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 98.
27. Ray A Williamson, “The Landsat Legacy: Remote Sensing Policy and the Development of Commercial
Remote Sensing,” Photogrammetric Engineering & Remote Sensing, Vol. 63, No. 7 (July 1997), p. 883.
28. Spot Image’s main shareholders are the French Space Agency (35 percent), the French National Geographic
Institute (10 percent), Matra Marconi Space (23 percent), and a number of government and private entities in
Belgium, Sweden, and Italy (11 percent).
29. MacDonald Dettwiler and Associates, “Government of Canada Successfully Negotiates RADARSAT-2
Agreement with MacDonald Dettwiler: A New Earth Observation Satellite for Canada,” Vancouver, B.C.,
December 18, 1998.
30. Ibid.
31. Peter B. de Selding, “Israel Approves Sale of Images from Spy Satellite,” Space News, Vol. 10, No. 25 (June 28,1999), p. 7.
32. Statement by the Press Secretary, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, D.C., March 10,
1994, p. 1.
33. Courtney A. Stadd and Ronald J. Birk, “No Strings Attached? Commercial Remote Sensing Companies HopeThat U.S. Government Policy Will Keep Pace with the Industry’s Rapidly Expanding Needs,” Imaging NOTES,
Vol. 14, No. 4 (July/August 1999), p. 20.
34. Statement made by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Office of Congressional and Public Liaison,
May 20, 1999. This figure does not include funds spent by other organizations such as the U.S. Army and Air
Force.
35. “United States Negotiates Sale of Turnkey Remote Sensing Systems,” Geo Info System, Vol. 9, No. 7 (July 1999),
p. 18.
36. The Canadian government has not yet released its regulations for the Canadian remote sensing industry. It
has indicated, however, that its laws will be very similar to those of the United States and that it will release
them before the first privately owned and operated Canadian satellite, RADARSAT-2, begins operations in 2002.
37. R. Jeffrey Smith, “High-Tech Vigilance,” Science (December 1985), pp. 26-33.
38. Ann M. Florini, “The End of Secrecy,” Foreign Policy, No. 11 (Summer 1998), p. 60.
39. Dino A. Brugioni, “Satellite Images on TV: The Camera Can Lie,” The Washington Post, December 14, 1986, p. H1.
40. Ibid.
41. Vipin Gupta, statement made during the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace conference entitled No
More Secrets: Policy Implications of Commercial Remote Sensing Satellite, Washington, D.C., May 26, 1999. To
watch the RealVideo of Vipin Gupta’s presentation, visit the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website at www.ceip.org/programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/GuptaPage.htm.
42. Statement made by Steven Livingston at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace conference entitled
No More Secrets: Policy Implications of Commercial Remote Sensing Satellites, Washington, D.C., May 26, 1999.
See also “Correction” in the August 31, 1998 issue of Newsweek. To see more of Steven Livingston’s presentation,
visit the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website atwww.ceip.org/programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/LivingstonPage.htm.
43. Robert P. Merges and Glenn H. Reynolds, “The News Media Satellites and the First Amendment: A Case
Study in the Treatment of New Technologies,” High Technology Law Journal, Vol. 3 (Spring 1988), p. 31.
44. Application to Operate a Commercial Land Observation System, U.S. Department of Commerce, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Washington, D.C., Section B, part 1.
45. To learn more about U.S. policy on shutter control, visit John Barker’s page on the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace website at www.ceip.org/programs/transparency/RemoteSensingConf/BarkerPage.htm.
46. Scott Pace, testimony before the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology and the Permanent SelectCommittee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., February 9, 1994.
47. To learn more about the Radio-Television News Directors Association’s position, visit Barbara Cochran’s page36

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Page 37on the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website at www.ceip.org/programs/transparency/
RemoteSensingConf/CochranPage.htm.
48. “Prohibition on Collection and Release of Detailed Satellite Imagery Relating to Israel,” National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, P.L. 104-201, Sec. 1064(a), Washington, D.C., 1996.
49. Russia may begin marketing 1-meter resolution satellite imagery in the near future. However, given the unreliabilityof Russian vendors, it is unlikely that they will be able to capture a significant portion of the remote sensing market.
50. Michael M. May, “Safeguarding Our Military Space Systems,” Science, No. 232 (April 18, 1986), pp. 336-40.
51. The U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate is developing a system called Satellite
Threat Warning and Attack Reporting (STW/AR) designed to detect intentional interference with U.S. and allied
satellites. William B. Scott, “New Satellite Sensors Will Detect RF (Radio Frequency), Laser Attacks,” Aviation
Week & Space Technology, August 2, 1999, p. 57.
52. Warren Ferster, “After IKONOS, Space Imaging Plans Even Better Satellite,” Space News, Vol. 10, No. 36(September 27, 1999), p. 3.
53. Ibid.
54. Warren Ferster and Peter B. de Selding, “Spot Image, Orbital Plan Reciprocal Sales Deal,” Space News, Vol. 10,
No. 36 (September 27, 1999), p. 3.
55. Oliver Morton, “Private Spy,” Wired (August 1997), p. 9.

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appendix a: selected commercial
and civilian imaging satellites
north america
Satellite

Launch(end of service)

Operator

Capability Swath Width Revisit Time(meters)(kilometers)(days)

StatusLandsat 31978 (1983)

NASA/NOAA

30RVB/80MS

185/18518

retiredLandsat 4

1982

EOSAT/Sp. Imaging

30MS/80MS

185/185

16

operational

Landsat 5

1984

EOSAT/Sp. Imaging

30MS/80MS

185/185

16

operational

Landsat 61993 (1993)

EOSAT

15PAN/30MS

185/185

16

failedaLandsat 7

1999

USGS

15PAN/30MS

185/185

16

operational

IKONOS 1

1999 (1999)

Space Imaging

0.82-1PAN/4MS

13/13

3 to 5failedIKONOS 2

1999

Space Imaging

0.82-1PAN/4MS

13/13

3 to 5operational

EarlyBird

1997(1997)

Earth Watch

3PAN/15MS

3/15

1 to 5failedQuickBird 1

2000

Earth Watch

1PAN/4MS

22/22

1 to 5plannedQuickBird 2

2000

Earth Watch

1PAN/4MS

22/22

1 to 5plannedOrbView 3

2000

OrbImage

4MS/8HS

8/8

3plannedb

OrbView4

2000

OrbImage

1PAN/4MS/8HS

8/8/5

3

planned

NEMO

2001

STDC

5PAN/30HS

30/30

1 to 7plannedResource21

2001

Boeing

10PAN

200

7

plannedRADAR 1

2002

RDL

1SAR

4

1

plannedRADARSAT-1

1995

CSA

8SAR

50-5003 to 24

operational

RADARSAT-2

2002

MDA

3SAR

50-5003 to 24plannedrussiaSatellitea

SPIN-2

Launch(end of service)
PeriodicbcOperator
RussiaCapability(meters)

Swath Width Revisit Time

Status(kilometers)(days)

2PAN/10PAN

180/200

N/A

N/A

RESURS-F

Periodic

Russia5-8MS/15-30MS

N/A

N/A

N/A

RESURS-DK

2000

Russia2PAN/3MS/3SAR

N/A

N/A

N/A

western europe
Satellite

38

secrets for sale

Launch(end of service)

Operator

Capability(meters)

Swath Width Revisit Time(kilometers)(days)

Statusa

SPOT 1/2

1986/90

Spot Image

10PAN/20MS

60/60

1 to 4operational

SPOT 3

1993 (1996)

Spot Image

10PAN/20MS

60/60

1 to 4failedSPOT 4

1998

Spot Image

10PAN/20MS

60/60

1 to 4operational

SPOT 5

2002

Spot Image

2.5PAN/10MS

60/60

1 to 4planned

ERS-1

1991

ESA

30-50 SAR

100-500

3 to 35

operational

ERS-2

1995

ESA

30-50 SAR

100-500

3 to 35

operational

ENVISAT 1

2000

ESA

30 SAR100

3 to 35

planned

ENVISAT 2

2003

ESA

N/A

N/A

N/A

planning

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southeast asia and south america
Satellite

Launch(end of service)

Operator

Capability(meters)

Swath Width Revisit Time(kilometers)(days)

75/75

44

Status

JERS-1

1992 (1998)

Japan

ADEOS1

1996 (1997)

Japan

8PAN/16MS

80/80

41

failedALOS-1

2003

Japan

2.5PAN/10MS/10SAR

70/70/70

46

plannedInfo-Collectic

2003

Japan

1PAN/3SAR

N/A

N/A

planning

Kompsat-1

1999

South Korea

10PAN/20MS

40/40

2 to 3operational

Kompsat-2

2003

South Korea

1PAN/4MS

N/A

2 to 3plannedRocsat 2

2002

Taiwan

2PAN

N/A

1

planning

CEMD

2003

China

4SAR

700

N/A

operational

CBERS I1999

China/Brazil

20MS/80-160MS

120/120

26

planned

CBERS II

2001

China/Brazil

20MS/80-160MS

120/120

26

planning

CBERS III

N/A

China/Brazil

5PAN/10MS

N/A

N/A

planning

CBERS IV

N/A

China/Brazil

5PAN/10MS

N/A

N/A

planning

SABIA

2003

Brazil/Argentina

6MS

400

N/A

18MS/18SAR

retiredaustralia
Satellite
Aries

Launch(end of service)
2003

Operator
Australia

Capability(meters)

10PAN/30HS

Swath Width Revisit Time(kilometers)(days)

15/15

6 to 7

Statusplannedmiddle east
Satellite

Launch(end of service)

Operator

Capability(meters)

Swath Width Revisit Time(kilometers)(days)

StatusEROS-A1

2000

WIS

1.8PAN13

2 to 3planned

EROS-A2

2000

WIS

1.8PAN13

2 to 3planned

EROS-B1

2001

WIS

0.8PAN13

2 to 3plannedsouth asia
Satellite
IRS-1C

Launch(end of service)

Operator

Capability(meters)

Swath Width Revisit Time(kilometers)(days)

Status

1995

India

5PAN/23MS

70/1505 to 24

operational

1997

India

5PAN/23MS

70/1505 to 24

operational

2000

India

2.5PAN30

5 to24plannedIRS-P6

2001

India

5PC/23MS

750/750

5-24planning

CartoSat-2

2003

India

1PAN

N/A

N/A

planning

Badr-C

2000

Pakistan

10MS

205

N/A

planned

IRS-1Da

IRS-P5bappendix a39

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appendix b: policy history
In grappling with the policy implications of high-resolution satellite imagery, it is helpful to have a good understanding of how current policies came about. Because civilian
remote sensing has been so heavily dominated by the United States until quite recently, in both technological and policy terms, much of the history occurred there.
The history begins with the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA), which developed the first civilian remote sensing satellite, Landsat. The
launch of Landsat 1 in 1972 gave the global public its first glimpse of satellite imagesof Earth. However, Landsat 1’s relatively low resolution (80 meters multispectral) was
too coarse for most commercial purposes. During these early years research scientists,
educators, and government agencies were the principal users of Landsat imagery.
To expand the user base for Landsat data and set the stage for the eventual commercialization of the civilian remote sensing industry, the Carter administration
issued Presidential Decision Directive-54 in July 1979. The directive transferred theoperation of the Landsat systems to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) in the U.S. Department of Commerce and directed NOAA
to “seek ways to further private sector opportunities in civil land remote sensing
activities … with the goal of eventual operations of these activities by the private
sector.”1 The administration hoped that under NOAA the management cost of theLandsat program would decline significantly, improving the prospects for its eventual commercialization. Moreover, it was believed that the future availability of 30meter resolution imagery from Landsats 4 and 5 (planned for launch within thenext five years) would dramatically increase the revenue earned from the sale ofLandsat imagery.2 These two factors, it was reasoned, would ultimately lead to thecreation of an affordable and robust market for remote sensing data. That market inturn would encourage the growth of a commercial satellite industry that could
develop and operate remote sensing systems for government and private markets.3

the unpromising start of commercialization
Following the election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980, the government abandoned the Carter administration’s gradual approach to commercialization of theLandsat program in favor of a far more accelerated plan. To cut federal spending byprivatizing government programs, the Reagan administration ignored evidence
that suggested that the remote sensing market was not sufficiently mature to sustain an independent commercial industry. That evidence included four feasibility
studies commissioned by the U.S. government between 1982 and 1983. The first,
undertaken by the Civil Operational Remote Sensing Satellite Advisory Committeeof the Department of Commerce, found that the commercial market for Landsat
data was seriously underdeveloped and recommended that “commercialization of
the Landsat program should be done gradually.”4
The other three studies supported the committee’s conclusions. Following an indepth analysis of the satellite imagery market, ECON Incorporated concluded that“full transfer of the civil land remote sensing system to the private sector, with the
expectation of a viable self-sustaining enterprise, is premature.”5 Similarly, EarthSatellite Corporation declared that “No option was found that would permit the[Landsat] program to be commercialized, today or in the near future, without substantial subsidies or government-guaranteed data purchases.”6 Using a much40

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harsher tone, the National Academy of Public Administration argued that the
Reagan administration’s decision to transfer operations of the Landsat program tothe private sector “fails to meet sensible criteria of preservation of the national security” and represents a “forced premature privatization of these responsibilities.”7
Despite these cautionary words, the Reagan administration pressed ahead.
Faced with the likelihood that funding for the Landsat program would soon bediscontinued, Congress quickly approved the Land Remote Sensing
Commercialization Act (P.L. 98-365), which was signed into law on July 17, 1984.
The act directed the secretary of commerce to select a contractor to operate theLandsat system; instructed system operators to market the resulting data on a
nondiscriminatory basis; required the Department of Commerce to maintain anarchive of land remote sensing data for historical, scientific, and technical purposes; and established a licensing and oversight process for new entrants into theanticipated private remote sensing industry.
In September 1985, NOAA selected the Earth Observation Satellite Company(EOSAT), a joint venture of RCA Corporation and Hughes Aircraft Company, tooperate the Landsat satellites and market the resulting data for a period of ten
years. According to the terms of the contract, the U.S. government would continue
to cover the operational costs of the Landsat program through the three-year
expected lifetime of Landsats 4 and 5. In addition, because the market for remotesensing data was considered underdeveloped, the U.S. government agreed to subsidize EOSAT in the amount of $295 million over a five-year period to develop andlaunch two new Landsat spacecraft, Landsats 6 and 7. Upon the launch of Landsat
6, EOSAT would assume full responsibility for all operational costs of the Landsat
program. Policy makers and EOSAT executives believed—or hoped—that during
the lifetime of Landsats 6 and 7, EOSAT’s revenues would grow sufficiently toallow the company to finance the development, launch, and operation of future
land remote sensing systems.8
The government transferred responsibility for the operation of the Landsat program to EOSAT in October 1985. It then failed to keep its end of the bargain. The
Reagan administration deleted additional subsidies for EOSAT from its FY1987
budget proposal, arguing that the remaining $125 million called for in the EOSATNOAA contract would have to come from EOSAT or other private sources. In
December 1986, EOSAT began laying off employees and ceased all marketing andspacecraft development. Congress again intervened to ensure the survival of theLandsat program beyond Landsat 5: in FY1987 it appropriated $62.5 million to continue the development of Landsat 6. However, the funds could not be released until
NOAA drafted and Congress approved a new Landsat commercialization plan.
In June 1987 NOAA submitted its new commercialization proposal to Congress.
It called for EOSAT to develop only one additional Landsat satellite, and funds
were provided for a feasibility study for a second satellite that might include moreadvanced and commercially oriented sensors. Congress initially rejected the proposal but acquiesced in October 1987.
Between November 1987 and April 1988, NOAA renegotiated its contract with
EOSAT. The revised contract directed EOSAT to develop Landsat 6 and all associated ground systems. The government agreed to subsidize the project up to $220

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41

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million; EOSAT was to absorb any additional costs. Under an innovative “payback”
arrangement, EOSAT agreed to refund $10.8 million to the government over a period of approximately four years. In addition, EOSAT waived all rights to data fromfollow-on civil remote sensing spacecraft beyond Landsat 6. With this agreement inplace, Congress finally released the $62.5 million appropriated for the developmentof Landsat 6 in the FY1987 budget.
No sooner was the Landsat 6 dilemma resolved than the Landsat program faced yet
another crisis. The 1984 Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act had instructed
NOAA to finance the operations of Landsats 4 and 5 through the expected lifetime of
the two satellites, which was projected for 1987, and the support was due to expire at
the end of that year. NOAA, which had no particular institutional interest in continuing the Landsat program, made no arrangements to fund either satellite after the expiration date, regardless of whether the satellites were still operational. Thus NOAA did
not request any funds for the Landsat program in its FY1989 budget even though thesatellites were still functioning. Congress quickly appropriated $9.4 million to fundLandsats 4 and 5 for the first half of the fiscal year and asked NOAA to secure funding for the second half. Unable to obtain sufficient funds, NOAA directed EOSAT toturn the satellites off in April 1989. This proposal drew strong protests from Congress,
foreign governments, and data users in the United States and around the world. In
response to the outcry, the National Space Council, chaired by Vice President Dan
Quayle in the Bush administration, drafted an interim funding plan that asked government agencies that used Landsat imagery to provide money to NOAA. Moreover,the council recommended that the federal government ensure the operation ofLandsats 4 and 5 so long as the satellites were the only source of civilian remote sensing data.9 NOAA rescinded the shutdown order in March 1989.
The same routine played out during fiscal years 1990 and 1991. In both years
Congress provided $9.5 million for the first six months of the each year and asked
other government agencies that used Landsat imagery to provided the remaining
funds. Finally, on June 1, 1989, President George Bush “approved funding for continued operations of Landsat satellites 4 and 5 and for the completion and launchof Landsat 6.”10 In addition, President Bush “directed the National Space Council
and the Office of Management and Budget to review options with the intention ofcontinuing Landsat-type data collections after Landsat 6.”11

the undoing of landsat commercialization
By the early 1990s, several developments made it clear that the U.S. government
needed to review the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984. First,
the forced commercialization of the Landsat program had faltered badly. Instead of
spending $295 million to acquire and deploy two Landsat satellites, the U.S. government had committed itself to spending $245.7 million to develop and launch
only one. Moreover, commercialization of Landsat had dramatically increased theprice of imagery. Between 1982 and 1985, the prices of data from Landsat’s multispectral scanner and thematic mapper instruments more than doubled.12 The hikein prices led many of the former customers of Landsat imagery, including large
numbers of scientists and academics, to stop using Landsat products.
Second, the emergence of foreign competitors to Landsat imagery eliminated theUnited States’ comfortable position as the sole provider of remote sensing data.

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Following the successful launch of the French SPOT-1 satellite in February 1986,
Spot Image began marketing 10-meter panchromatic and 20-meter multispectral
images of the Earth. A year later a Soviet firm, Soyzkarta, initiated limited sale of 5meter panchromatic photographs from its Cosmos KFA-1000, MK-4, and MFK-6
cameras.13 These developments led many in the United States to worry that foreigncompanies might come to dominate the remote sensing market. This concern
gained new urgency as SPOT’s sale of remote sensing imagery surpassed that of
EOSAT by 1989.14 Many within and outside the U.S. government began to question
the wisdom of a policy that allowed foreign countries to surpass the United States
in an industry it had pioneered.
Third, Landsat imagery proved remarkably useful during the planning and execution of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. As D. Brian Gordon of the DefenseIntelligence Agency testified, “There were significant contributions by Landsat …
to the success of Operation Desert Storm.”15 According to some estimates, the U.S.
Department of Defense spent $5 to $6 million on Landsat imagery during the Gulf
War.16 Throughout the conflict, allied forces used Landsat imagery for terrain analysis, operational planning, and concealment detection.17
All these pressures led the U.S. Congress to pass the Land Remote Sensing Policy
Act (P.L. 102-555), which was signed into law by President George Bush on October
28, 1992. The act recognized that “the continuous collection and utilization of land
remote sensing data from space are of major benefit in studying and understanding
human impacts on the global environment, in managing the Earth’s natural
resources, in carrying out national security functions, and in planning and conducting many other activities of scientific, economic, and social importance.”18 The
act further acknowledged that “despite the success and importance of the Landsat
system, funding and organizational uncertainties over the past several years haveplaced its future in doubt and have jeopardized United States leadership in land
remote sensing.”19 The act rejected full commercialization of the Landsat program“within the foreseeable future”20 and transferred control of the Landsat system toNASA and the DOD. Authority for licensing any new private remote sensing satellites remained with the secretary of commerce, as it had been under the 1984 act,with advisory roles given to the secretaries of state and defense. The act repealed
the obligation established by the earlier act that compelled private companies tomake all raw data available to all potential users at the same cost and terms.
Instead, the new law merely required that satellite operators “make available to thegovernment of any country (including the United States) unenhanced data collected by the system concerning the territory under the jurisdiction of such government
as soon as such data are available and on reasonable terms and conditions.”21
Shortly after passage of the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, disagreements arose
between NASA and the DOD over what type of sensors to place on the Landsat 7
satellite. NASA favored the cheaper Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus, capable ofacquiring 15-meter images of Earth. The DOD pushed for the new High Resolution
Multispectral Stereo Imager sensor, which could collect 5-meter resolution data ofparticular interest to it.
The disagreement had not been resolved when disaster struck. At approximately
11:08 a.m. Pacific Standard Time on October 5, 1993, nearly 13 minutes after the

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launch of Landsat 6, a ruptured hydrazine manifold prevented fuel from reaching
the satellite engine, and the $256.5 million spacecraft plunged into the Pacific
Ocean.22 Following the failure of Landsat 6 to reach orbit, NASA concluded that thehigh cost of developing the High Resolution Multispectral Stereo Imager sensor
could undermine the timely development and deployment of Landsat 7. It therefore rejected placement of the sensor on board the new Landsat satellite.
Consequently, the DOD pulled out of the Landsat program.
With the DOD out, the question of which agency or agencies should develop andoperate the Landsat system and market the resulting data once again came to theforefront. The White House finally resolved the issue in Presidential Decision
Directive-3 of May 10, 1994: NASA would be responsible for developing andlaunching Landsat 7, NOAA would operate the spacecraft and all relevant groundsystems, and the Department of the Interior would archive and distribute the dataat the marginal cost of reproduction.
As this monograph went to press, yet another rearrangement of responsibilities for
the Landsat program was underway. A new Presidential Decision Directive wasdrafted that would transfer all operational responsibility for the Landsat 7 programfrom NOAA to the Department of the Interior’s U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).
Given that USGS had a more obvious interest in pursuing land remote sensing activities than NOAA, the transfer was expected to be approved in the very near future.
With the successful launch of Landsat 7 on April 15, 1999, the United States camefull circle, restoring a significant government subsidy to civilian remote sensing,although now with a substantially improved satellite. Landsat 7 is providing 15meter panchromatic and 30-meter multispectral images of Earth and is expected tocontinue functioning until 2004. It has the ability to re-image areas of interest every
16 days with its more accurate Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus sensor. More
important, Landsat 7 images are available to all consumers of satellite imagery “atthe cost of fulfilling user requests,”23 and anyone who buys an image is free to pass
it on at no extra charge. As of the end of 1999, prices were $475 per scene for minimally processed data and $600 per scene for radiometrically and geometrically corrected data (over 50 percent cheaper than any comparable commercially available
civilian or private satellite imagery).24
Although it might seem that the government is subsidizing a competitor to commercial operators, the Landsat 7 sensors are sufficiently different from the commercial sensors that direct competition is unlikely. Indeed, by helping build a market for satellite imagery in general, the Landsat program may in fact help the commercial prospects of private satellite operators.
The Landsat story nonetheless raises important red flags. The commercial success ofthe satellite remote sensing industry is by no means assured. Nations that try to privatize their government-controlled civilian systems may find themselves with neithera civilian nor a commercial system, as the United States almost did in the early 1990s.
1. Announcement of the President’s Decisions Concerning Land Remote Sensing Activities, The White House,
Washington, D.C., November 20, 1979.
2. “Remote Sensing and the Private Sector: Issues for Discussion,” U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Washington, D.C., March 1984, p. 62.
3. Ray A. Williamson, “The Landsat Legacy: Remote Sensing Policy and the Development of Commercial Remote

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Sensing,” Photogrammetric Engineering & Remote Sensing, Vol. 63, No. 7 (1997), p. 879.
4. David P. Radzanowski, “The Future of Land Remote Sensing Satellite System (Landsat),” U.S. Library ofCongress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., September 16, 1991, p. 3.
5. “Commercialization of the Land Remote Sensing System: An Examination of Mechanisms & Issues,” ECON Inc.,
Princeton, NJ, April 1, 1983.
6. “A Study to Examine the Mechanisms to Carry Out the Transfer of Civil Land Remote Sensing Systems to thePrivate Sector,” Earth Satellite Corporation, Rockville, MD, March 28, 1983.
7. “Space Remote Sensing and the Private Sector: An Essay,” National Academy of Public Administration,
Washington, D.C., March 1983.
8. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Report 102-539, May 28, 1992,
Washington, D.C., p. 20.
9. National Landsat Policy Act of 1992, Report 102-539, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, Washington, D.C.: GPO, May 28, 1992, p. 23.
10. “Statement by the Press Secretary,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, D.C., June 1, 1989.
11. Ibid.
12. National Landsat Policy Act of 1992, Report 102-539, footnote #48, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology, Washington, D.C.: GPO, May 28, 1992, p. 29.
13. Gerald M. Steinberg, “Dual Use Aspects of Commercial High-Resolution Imaging Satellites,” The Begin-Sadat
Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel, 1998, p. 8.
14. “Space Business Indicators,” U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Space Commerce, Washington, D.C., June 1991.
15. D. Brian Gordon, testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, andTechnology and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, D.C.: GPO, June 26, 1991, p. 28.
16. National Landsat Policy Act of 1992, Report 102-539, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, Washington, D.C.: GPO, May 28, 1992, p. 26.
17. Donald J. Kutyn, prepared statement, Hearings before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington,
D.C., April 23, 1991, p. 733, and D. Brian Gordon, testimony before the U.S. Congress Committee on Science, Spaceand Technology and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, D.C.: GPO, June 26, 1991, p. 29.
18. Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, Section 2(1), Washington, D.C., October 28, 1992.
19. Ibid., Section 2(7).
20. Ibid., Section 2(6).
21. Ibid., Title II, Section 202(b)(2), Washington, D.C., October 28, 1992.
22. “Landsat 6 Failure Attributed to Ruptured Manifold,” U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration, Washington, D.C., March 10, 1995. The price includes all costs borne by the U.S. government and EOSAT to develop and launch Landsat 6.
23. Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, Section 2(13), Washington, D.C., October 28, 1992.
24. “Landsat 7 Data Prices Announced,” U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Geological Survey, Washington, D.C.,
October 31, 1997.

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THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE is a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting active
international engagement by the United States. Founded in 1910, its work is nonpartisan and dedicated to achieving practical results. Through research, publishing, convening and, on occasion, creating new institutions and international networks, Endowment associates shape fresh policy approaches. Their interests span
geographic regions and the relations among governments, business, internationalorganizations, and civil society, focusing on the economic, political, and technological forces driving global change. Through its Carnegie Moscow Center, theEndowment helps develop a tradition of public policy analysis in the states of theformer Soviet Union and improve relations between Russia and the United States.
The Endowment publishes Foreign Policy, one of the world’s leading journals ofinternational politics and economics, which reaches readers in more than 120
countries and in several languages.

OFFICERS
Jessica T. Mathews, President
Paul Balaran, Executive Vice President and Secretary
Thomas Carothers, Vice President for Studies
Carmen MacDougall, Vice President for Communications
BOARD OF TRUSTEES
William H. Donaldson, Chairman
Gregory B. Craig, Vice Chairman
Charles W. Bailey II
Bill Bradley
Robert Carswell
Richard A. Debs
James C. Gaither
Leslie H. Gelb
Richard Giordano
Jamie Gorelick
Stephen J. Hadley

Stephen D. Harlan
James A. Johnson
Donald Kennedy
Robert Legvold
Wilbert J. LeMelle
Stephen R. Lewis, Jr.
Jessica T. Mathews
Barbara W. Newell
Olara A. Otunnu
Geneva Overholser
William J. Perry
W. Taylor Reveley III

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