Print ISSN 2433-4189 / Online ISSN 2433-4197

グローバルセキュリティセミナー叢書

第1号

GLOBAL SECURITY SEMINAR SERIES NO. 1

NDA-FOI Joint Seminar

The Future of East Asian Security

Coedited by
Yasuhiro Takeda and John Rydqvist

防衛大学校総合情報図書館
グローバルセキュリティセンター

© National Defense Academy, Japan Ministry of Defense
1‐10‐20 Hashirimizu, Yokosuka, 239‐8686 JAPANGlobal Security Seminar Series No.1
NDA‐FOI Joint Seminar on

The Future of East Asian Security

Coedited by
Yasuhiro Takeda and John Rydqvist

October 2017

Center for Global Security, National Defense Academy
Yokosuka, Japani

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

iv

INTRODUCTION

1CHAPTER 1
John Rydqvist

Japan‐China Relations and the Risks of War

5

CHAPTER 2
Tetsuo Kotani

Balancing China’s Maritime Power in the East and South
China Seas

29

CHAPTER 3
Masahiro Kurosaki

The Rule of Law versus Lawfare in Asian Security:
A Regional Variation of International Law

40

China vs. Taiwan: Growing Uncertainties

55

CHAPTER 4
Jerker Hellström
CHAPTER 5
Hiroyasu Akutsu

North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Threats and Their
Impact on Japanese Security

63

SEMINAR PROGRAM

69

CONTRIBUTORS

71

ii

GLOBAL SECURITY SEMINAR SERIES

Global Security Seminar Series is published occasionally by the Center for
Global Security.

The Center designs series of international seminars and otherindependent seminars. This series consists of the working papers of these seminars.
The views expressed in this publication are solely of the authors, and do notnecessarily represent those of the institutions or governments of the authors.

Copyright ©2017 by National Defense Academy of Japan. Published by the Center
for Global Security, Information and Media Library, National Defense Academy,
Yokosuka, JAPAN.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Center for Global Security (GS), National Defense Academy, andTotalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), Swedish Defence Research Agency, launcheda joint research project, called NDA‐FOI Joint Seminar on “The Future of East Asian
Security,” based on the Memorandum of Understanding between Japan Ministry of
Defense and Sweden Ministry of Defense on mutual defense cooperation.
This volume is based on the working papers presented at the NDA‐FOI Joint
Seminar on “The Future of East Asian Security” held on January 25, 2017.

Most ofthe chapters are revised or up‐dated to reflect the views expressed during the courseof the seminar.
On behalf of GS an FOI, we would like to express our sincere appreciations not
only to the contributors for their precious time and efforts in the process of thispublication, but also to all those who attended the seminar and participated in thediscussions. The views expressed in each of the chapters, however, strictly represent
those of the respective authors, and so go the credits.
We hope the insights shared by the authors here invite a new round of
discussion among readers. Comments and suggestions on our joint research project
are more than welcome.

October 2017
Yasuhiro Takeda and John Rydqvist
Coeditorsiv

1

Introduction (Takeda and Rydqvist)

INTRODUCTION

Yasuhiro Takeda
Center for Global Security, National Defense Academy of Japan

John Rydqvist
Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)The East Asian security environment has become increasingly severe during thelast decade and Japan is facing various worrying challenges and so‐called ‘grayzone’ situations, i.e., antagonistic situations in between peace and armed conflicts
over territory, sovereignty, or maritime interests. In addition, there has been agrowing risk that security problems inside a single country or sub‐region could
destabilize the entire East Asian region.

China has rapidly expanded its maritime activities with regard to both naval and air
power. In 2013, China announced the establishment of the ‘East China Sea Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)’ near the Senkaku Islands, with Chinese
government vessel intrusions into the territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands
becoming routine in the past 5–10 years. In addition, there has been growing
friction with China over territorial disputes in the South China Sea because of
China’s land reclamation activities, its construction of a runway, and its
introduction of military hardware on the Spratly Island reefs. It remains to be seen
how and to what extent international law can play a role in dealing with these
territorial issues in both the East China Sea as well as the South China Sea and inunderstanding the future of East Asian security.

The development of nuclear weapons and missile delivery capability by North

2

Introduction (Takeda and Rydqvist)

Korea is a serious and imminent threat to regional and global security; however,
economic sanctions against North Korea seem to have failed because of discord
among the major powers. Military options to remove the nuclear assets is a highrisk endeavor favored by few in all but the most acute situations. Sino–Taiwaneserelations have remained unchanged and at times tense as Beijing remains adamantthat Taipei must accept unification with the People’s Republic of China. Meanwhile,
the military capability gaps continue to widen in China’s favor.

The Trump Administration’s commitment to a foreign policy focused on Americaninterests and American national security may result in surprising shifts ininternational relations. If the United States refrains from playing a leading role inregional affairs or makes substantial changes to the way it deals with security
problems in Northeast Asia, it may trigger hedging behavior by regional states whoare confronted by the rise of China, resulting in further destabilization of the
security situation in East Asia and an increased likelihood of friction andconfrontation.

Japan and other East Asian countries are the most likely to be directly affected bythese regional tensions and would also be the ones hardest hit should there be any
escalation into conflict. Geography, political differences, and the expanding
ambitions of the new superpower have put these countries on a collision coursewith China, which sees them as obstacles to its ambitions. However, the Northeast
Asian security situation also has indirect effects further away. Because of thegrowing trade relations between Europe and the region due to China’s economic
might, any conflict affecting East Asian economies would adversely impact Europe.
North Korean military proliferation is both a general problem for continued arms
control efforts and a real threat if long‐range nuclear capabilities are developed.
The cascade effects of what is likely to soon be a mature North Korean nuclear
arsenal will also be felt in Europe. Finally, the internationalization of trade andpolitics coupled with the continued championing of free societies and adherence tothe current global order makes it likely that European powers would be involved in
one way or another should hostilities break out in Northeast Asia.

In early 2017, The Center for Global Security at the National Defense Academy

Introduction (Takeda and Rydqvist)(NDA) in Japan and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) convened aseminar to address the current challenges and examine the potential influences thepolitical and security developments in East Asia could have in the medium‐term(5‐10 years). This publication is based on the papers presented at this joint
seminar and the discussions they provoked. The chapters presented herein givevarious perspectives on the security challenges in Northeast Asia as seen by both
Japanese and Swedish scholars.

In Chapter One, John Rydqvist of the FOI assesses the risk of war between Japanand China. He concludes that although any contingency surrounding the territorial
and maritime disputes between the two countries may be manageable and thatJapan with its alliance partner the U.S. would in the short term be able to negate
any Chinese attempts to change status quo, the broader shift of power associatedwith China’s rise already has increased the risk of armed conflict. The risks thatsuch structural contentions could trigger war will increase as we move forward.

In Chapter Two, Tetsuo Kotani reviews the regional approaches to maritime
dispute management in the East and South East China Seas, in which it is claimed
that there is neither a consensus nor an incentive in the region for a peaceful legal
resolution of the maritime disputes. He concludes that all regional players need todevelop flexible deterrent options to control any escalations by reinforcing internaland external balance and upholding the rule of law.

In Chapter Three, Masahiro Kurosaki examines a regional variation of international
law to deal with strategic Asian security issues. By paying special attention to a‘rule of law versus a lawfare’ perspective, he highlights the roles and functions ofinternational law as well as the conflicting approaches embraced by the regional
states in their operationalization of such laws.

In Chapter Four, Jerker Hellström of the FOI discusses current and future aspects of
the Sino‐Taiwanese relationship. While cross‐strait relations have, broadly
speaking, remained relatively unchanged, the future seems more uncertain. Mr.
Hellström concludes that there are three key uncertainties: it will remain unclear if

3

4

Introduction (Takeda and Rydqvist)

Beijing would revert to violence to prevent Taiwanese moves towards
independence; the U.S. might be less likely to come to Taiwan’s help in the Trumpera; and it is not certain that Taiwan will continue to favor the current status quo.

In Chapter Five, Hiroyasu Akutsu examines North Korea’s military strategy and its
nuclear and missile development programs, clarifies North Korea’s motivations
behind its assertive and aggressive behavior, and discusses the implications forJapanese security, arguing that Japan needs to strengthen its own defense
capabilities.

Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)

5

CHAPTER 1

Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War

John Rydqvist
Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the risk of war between Japan and China. The two countries
have had a long period of peace and stability but during the last fifteen years thebilateral relationship has become more contentious. Escalating tensions aroundcontested territories and China’s anxiety about being encircled by the United States,
Japan, and other American allies have been two of the main causes of the increased
strain. China’s expanding power as well as long held historic grievances andopposing political systems has further complicated the relationship. As a result of
the increasing tension between Japan and China, debates about the risk of war in
East Asia have intensified.

Research has suggested that the long peace enjoyed in East Asia was brought about
primarily as a result of the deepening economic interdependence between key
regional powers. 1 Arguments based in the liberal peace theory tradition has
claimed that the scale and success of regional economic expansion in the last few
decades has been enough to ‘inhibit the escalation of interstate conflict’.2 3 If the
Dingding Chen, ”Economic interdependence underpins peace between China and the US”,
South China Morning Post, June 9, 2015, on the internet:
http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight‐0pinion/article/1819183/economic‐interdependen
ce‐underpins‐peace‐between‐china‐and, (retrieved June 5, 2017).
2 Min Ye, Comparative Kantian Peace Theory: Economic Interdependence and International
Conflict at A Group Level of Analysis, Department of Government and International Studies,
University of South Carolina, 2000, on the internet:
1

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Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)

economic strategies of the key players remain the same, and focus continues to beon domestic economic development as has been the case according to one line ofargument, peace is likely to be maintained.4 This has been presented as a strong
argument for continuing peace even though two of the three key variables forliberal peace theory, democracy and strong multi‐lateral institutions, largely
missing in East Asia. There is no general adherence to democracy with thedominating power in the region being a one party communist dictatorship.
Informal regional confidence building networks have played a significant role inmaintaining peace5 but there have been few strong multilateral security accords
or organizations regulating the security interactions between the nation states
through legal and normative processes.

This paper explores the current trends in the Sino‐Japanese relationship tounderstand whether the risk of war has been increasing. Well aware that thenature of war is in itself an issue of major discussion today, war in this paper isdefined as the outbreak of armed hostilities and the use of force at any level
between Japan and China, including antagonistic cyber activities affecting criticalinfrastructure etc. Several factors at different levels interact and influence how therisk of war can be interpreted at any given time. The important drivers of theJapan‐China relationship are territorial disputes, cultural animosity, andcontradictory political systems and economic policies. These bi‐lateral factors also
relate to and are influenced by the broader global power reconfigurations thatprimarily involve the U.S./China relationship. The key question of this paper is,therefore:

Given current bilateral relations, is war between Japan and China becoming more
likely?

https://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/sites/sc.edu.poli/files/MinYe1026.pdf?q=sites/default/fil
es/MinYe1026.pdf, (retrieved June 5, 2017).
3 Benjamin E. Goldsmith, “East Asian Peace as a Second‐Order Diffusion Effect”, International
Studies Review, Vol. 16, 2014, pp. 275‐289.
4 Stein Tönnesson, Can the East Asian Peace Survive, PRIO Blog, May 11, 2017, on the internet:
https://blogs.prio.org/2017/05/can‐the‐east‐asian‐peace‐survive/ (retrieved June 8, 2017).
5 Mikael Weissman, The East Asian Peace: Conflict Prevention and Informal Peacebuilding,Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2012.

Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)

7

This paper describes the current trends and discusses how they influence the riskof war at present and in the immediate future, but does not make predictions anddoes not present scenarios of alternative futures. The chapter begins by examining
Sino‐Japanese relations and the escalating conflict over the Senkaku Islands. Next,
the overall Sino‐Japanese relationship is discussed within the context of ongoingregional and global power transitions. Finally, the empirical findings are
summarized and discussed.

TERRITORIAL CONFLICT OVER THE SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLANDS
A territorial dispute dating back to the late nineteenth century is nominally at theheart of the current conflicts between Japan and China. China and Taiwan bothclaim that the Senkaku Islands (referred to as Diaoyu in China) are historically partof their respective territories. A defining feature of the conflict is that the parties
have presented their key arguments by ‘cherry‐picking’ the facts or failing to
publically disclose information that would make the dispute easier to comprehendand judge.6 7This blurring of the issue has also affected the how the risks of war associated withthe dispute is judged. Assessments differ widely, with some suggesting that the
Senkaku Islands dispute is a manageable issue that will not lead to war between
Beijing and Tokyo,8 while others claim that the Senkaku controversy has thepossibility of escalating to armed conflict and that the risks have increased sharply
in the last decade. The Senkaku dispute is closely coupled to the Sino‐Japanesedisputes over maritime borders and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in the East

Example of key documents that, as far as the author knows, are not yet released to the public
are likely to be those underpinning the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of1978. See: Kawashima Shin, “The Origins of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Issue”, Asia‐Pacific
Review, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2013, p. 140.
7 William Choong, The Ties that Divide, Adelphi Series, 54: 445, IISS, London, 2014, p. 71.
8 Trefor Moss, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go Too War,” The Diplomat, 7 February, 2013,
on the internet:
http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/7‐reasons‐china‐and‐japan‐wont‐go‐to‐war/?allpages=yes(retrieved June 7, 2017).
6

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Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)

China Sea, which is discussed in the next section.9 10

The Senkaku Islands are situated a short distance north of Taiwan in the East China
Sea. The Chinese claim that the ‘Tiaoyou (sic, Diaoyu) and the other islands havebeen part of China’s territory since ancient times’.11 Beijing has also claimed that
‘Chinese sovereignty has sufficient historical, geographical and legal basis that theislands have been part of China’s sea defense region since the Ming Dynasty andpossibly as early as the fourteenth to fifteenth century’.12

China argues that Japan forcefully seized the islands as part of its imperial
expansion in the late nineteenth century, and specifically that they were occupied
during the first China‐Japan war (1894‐1895). Japan, in honoring the Cairo
Declaration (1943) and Potsdam Agreement (1945) which clarify that territories
seized as a result of Japanese aggression should be returned to the former
occupant, should have returned the islands to China as part of the peace accord of
San Fransisco from 1951.13
9 An example is the use of conflicting UNCLOS provisions of Exclusive Economic Zone’s (EEZ)

normal limit line (Japan) versus continental shelf prolongation (China). See: William Choong,
The Ties that Divide, Adelphi Series, 54:445, IISS, London, 2014, p. 60.
10 As shown by the 2012 Chinese submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of theContinental Shelf and responding Japanese Notes Verbal that include sections on thesovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islans. See : Submission by the People’s Republic of China
Concerning the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles in Part of the East
China Sea, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), The United Nations, August 13, 2012, on theinternet:
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_chn_63_2012.htm(retrieved August 24, 2016).
11 “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 30 November
1971,” Peking Review, No. 1, 7 January, 1972, p. 12, on the internet:
http://www.massline.org/PekingReview/PR1972/PR1972‐01.pdf, (retrieved July 23, 2016).
12 Note Verbal, Communication by the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to
the United Nations to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), The United Nations, January 7, 2013, on
the internet:
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/chn63_12/chn_re_jpn07_01_2013e.pdf, (retrieved August 24, 2016).
13 Akos Kooper, “Managing conflicting ‘Truth Claims’ – ambiguity in the diplomat’s toolkit in
East‐Asian Island conflict,” The Pacific Review Vol. 29, No. 4, 2016, pp. 605‐606.

Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)

9Japan bases its claim on a record of continuous control and independent
occupation. It holds that the islands were part of the Ryukyu kingdom, which wasincorporated into Japan in 1879, and for which Japan claimed sovereignty in 1884.
At this time the Senkaku Islands were unoccupied. Based on this historic record the‘Senkaku Islands are clearly part of the Territory of Japan and there are no
territorial sovereignty issues’.14 This also means that the islands were not occupied
as part of the 1894‐95 war against China and were therefore not aggressively
taken.15 Thus China is not in a position to claim the islands as part of any peaceaccord or ruling after the 1945. Consequently, from the Japanese perspective, there
is no dispute.

The 1951 San‐Francisco Peace Treaty arguably supports the Japanese position.16
In it the Islands where treated as Japanese and the U.S. was granted administrativeand legislative power over them. Japans ‘residual sovereignty’ was cited and thisruling indicated that at some point the islands would be returned to Japanese rule,
which occurred in 1972.17 Japanese experts also point out that the Chinese did notinclude any mention of Senkaku Island sovereignty in the separate Japan‐China
peace treaty signed in 1952 or made any official claims to the islands at any time
between 1951 and the late 1960s.18 Chinese claims to the territory appear to havebeen rekindled by the 1968 UN Sea Charting venture that concluded a possibility oflarge natural resource reserves in the sea bed between Taiwan and the Senkaku
Islands. However, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) did not file any official“The Basic View on the Sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofJapan, May 8 version, 2013, on the internet:
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia‐paci/senkaku/basic_view.html, (retrieved July 23, 2016).
See also Note Verbal, Communication by the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), The United Nations, August 13, 2013, on theinternet:
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/chn63_12/jpn_re_chn_13_08_2013.
pdf, (retrieved August 24, 2016).
15 Ibid.
16 William Choong, The Ties that Divide, Adelphi Series, 54:445, IISS, London, 2014, p. 69.
17 Ibid.
18 There where recurrent incursion into the Senkakus by Taiwanese fishermen during all thepost war years, which for the duration of the occupation was the US responsible to handle. See:
Robert D. Eldridge, The Origins of U.S. Policy in the East China Sea Island Dispute: Okinawa’s
Reversion and the Senkaku Islands, Routledge, Oxon, 2014, p. 52
14

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Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)

claims to the Islands until late 1971 when the U.S. decided to return theadministration for the Senkaku Islands to Japan.19 Consequently, academics suchas Shin Kawashima have suggested that the prospect of access to resources was a
key reason for the sudden Chinese sovereignty claim.20

Even though the PRC had insisted on their claim to the Senkaku Islands, pursuing
the matter was not in Beijing’s interest at the time. The détente and restoration of
diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China during the 1970s also meant that
China and Japan could also normalize relations. While the U.S. recognized the PRC
in 1979, Japan had done so much earlier in 1972, and by 1978, Japan and China hadsigned a separate peace and friendship treaty. Although part of the reason for the
improved relations was to dampen the Soviet influence in the region, there werealso economic reasons. Japanese business was pushing the government to improve
relations so as to improve their economic opportunities.21 Therefore, it is widely
thought that in 1972, China and Japan made an agreement to shelve any Senkaku
island disputes so as to achieve diplomatic normalization, even though thisspeculation has been officially denied.22

INCREASE OF TENSIONS AROUND THE SENKAKU ISLANDS
The improved relations and the agreement to put differences aside did not stop
intermittent tensions over the Islands’ sovereignty to flare up. In 1978, just fourmonths before the Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between the People's Republicof China and Japan was signed, a massive armada of around 80 Chinese fishingboats, many of which were armed, came close to the Senkaku Islands displaying
signs that claimed that the island belonged to the Chinese. Most research has
claimed that there is little doubt that this flotilla had been sent with the“Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China”, Beijing
Review No. 1, January 7, 1972, p. 12.
20 Shin Kawashima, “The Origins of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Issue,” Asia‐Pacific Review, Vol.
20, No. 2, 2013, pp 122‐145.
21 Daniel Tretiak, “The Sino‐Japanese Treaty of 1978: The Senkaku Incident Prelude,” Asian
Survey, Vol. 18, No. 12, December, 1978, p. 1236.
22 Choong, 2014, p. 68.
19

Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)

11

government’s blessing;23 no military confrontation took place and the armada
returned peacefully to mainland China. The incident, however, did indicate that the
Chinese were willing to leverage protests and threats to get what they wanted.
Therefore, the connection between this Senkaku incident and Chinese discontent
with the ongoing peace negotiations was obvious.

Over the next two decades, there were several more incidents, but they were few,
far between and had little impact on overall relations. However, more recently,
China and Japan have increased pressure to protect their respective interests
around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In 2004, there was a much publicized incident
on Uotsurishima, the largest of the Senkaku Islands. A former Chinese civil servant
managed to land on the island, after which he was arrested by Japanese authorities,
the first time such an arrest had been made.24 In 2008, Chinese government
surveillance ships entered the Senkaku region for the first time, and in 2010, a
Chinese fishing boat deliberately rammed a Japanese coast guard vessel, prompting
the arrest of the captain. As a result, large anti‐Japanese protests were organizedon the mainland, in which some Japanese owned businesses were deliberatelylooted. Several high level Sino‐Japanese talks were cancelled, including talks on the
future of the East China Sea.

Since 2010, several other incidents have occurred and much points to China as theless conciliatory party. In 2012, when Japan nationalized the islands (as before thattime, they had been privately owned), large Chinese protests were again organized.
According to Japanese officials and unnamed Chinese military sources, in 2013, a
PLA Navy frigate targeted its weapons on a Japanese Self Defense Forces Navy
destroyer.25 This was the first incident of its kind and led to further military
escalation, as that same year, China established the contentious Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) over much of the East China Sea, including the Senkaku
Daniel Tretiak “The Sino‐Japanese Treaty of 1978: The Senkaku Incident Prelude,” Asian
Survey, Vol. 18, No. 12, December, 1978, p. 1242.
24 Sanaa Y. Hafeez, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Crisis of 2004. 2010 and 2014: A Study ofJapanese‐Chinese crisis Management”, Asia‐Pacific Review, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2015.
25 “China military officials admit radar lock on Japanese ship, says report”, South China
Morning Post March 18, 2013, on the internet:
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1193600/china‐military‐officials‐admit‐radar‐loc
k‐japanese‐ship‐says‐report (retrieved March 22, 2017).
23

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Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)

Islands.26 China has continued to increase the number of ships it has operating
within the Senkaku territorial waters27 , with 2016 seeing the greatest number yet.

U.S. SECURITY GUARANTEES AND THE SENKAKU DISPUTEAs tensions have risen over the Senkaku Islands, there has been speculation about
the role of the U.S. The Japan‐U.S. alliance has been the cornerstone of Japanese
security arrangements since 1945, with the U.S. having been the guarantor not only
for Japanese security but also for broader regional strategic stability. However,Washington has consistently stated it does not wish to take any position on who
has the sovereign right to the islands. On the other hand a research report from theCongressional Research Service has unequivocally concluded that the Senkakus areincluded in U.S. security guarantees to Japan.28 Even though the U.S. is refusing totake a formal position on Senkaku Islands sovereignty, the 1960 U.S.‐ Japan
Security Treaty on which the alliance rests states that the alliance parties‘recognize that an armed attack against either Party in the territory under theadministration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and declares thatthat it would act to meet the common danger’; therefore, administrative control,
rather than sovereign right, is the reference point for alliance commitments.

Lately, as tensions have risen, the U.S. has politically reinforced this commitment. In
2013, the then Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, said that the U.S. would oppose
any unilateral action ‘that would seek to undermine Japanese administration’ of the
Senkaku Islands. In 2014, during his visit to Tokyo, former President Obama
expanded on the Senkaku issue in both prepared remarks and in response toquestions at a press conference, the core message being that the defense

Mark E. Rosen, Chinas Reactions to the Arbitration Ruling’s Will Lead Into Battles It Won’t
Win, Part I, Center for International Maritime Security, September 6, 2016, on the internet:
http://cimsec.org/chinas‐reactions‐arbitration‐ruling‐will‐lead‐battles‐wont‐win‐part/27598,(retrieved November 27, 2016).
27 “Over the Line: Tracking Energy Competition in the East China Sea,” CSIS Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, 2016, on the internet:
https://amti.csis.org/energy‐competition‐east‐china‐sea/, (retrieved November 24, 2016).
28 Mark E. Manyin, The Senkakus (Diyaoyu/Diaoyutai) Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations,
Congressional Research Service, October 14, 2016.
26

Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)

13commitments of the alliance are ‘absolute’ and do include the Senkakus as they are
under Japanese administration. This position was reiterated by the new U.S.
administration. In February 2017, during a visit by Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo
Abe, President Trump stated that the U.S. was ‘committed to the security of Japanand all areas under its administrative control’.29 Any other contingency in the East
China Sea unrelated to the Senkaku Islands is, however, a less explored scenario
but as mentioned, one which currently has less potential of escalating into conflict.

In the case of the Senkakus, the strengthened and expanded alliance relationship,
Japan’s reinterpretation of the constitution to allow collective self‐defense, andexplicit U.S. security guarantees for the islands arguably strengthens thedeterrence against unilateral Chinese attempt to take control of the islands. On theother hand, the strong U.S. backing could lead Japan to overextend its response in
the event of a conflict. There is also the risk that China could miscalculate the U.S.
commitment and continue to pressure Japan over small territories such as the
Senkakus, and make territorial moves that could trigger alliance action.

FLASHPOINT ‐ THE EAST CHINA SEA AND THE CONTENTION OVER THE LAW OF
THE SEA, UNCLOS
The Senkaku Islands are situated close to the south‐western edge of the Okinawa
Trough, a geological depression and fault line extending northeast from Taiwan
towards Japan’s main islands. The through constitutes part of the sea bed of theEast China Sea which is at the heart of another Sino‐Japanese dispute, that overwater boundaries and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in this body of water.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that both China
and Japan have ratified makes it possible for a coastal state to claim an EEZ that
extends 200 nautical miles (nm) from its coast. If the stretch of water between the

The White House, “Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Abe of Japan in Joint
Press Conference, Office of the Press Secretary,” 2017, on the internet:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the‐press‐office/2017/02/10/remarks‐president‐trump‐and‐pr
ime‐minister‐abe‐japan‐joint‐press (retrieved March 24, 2017).
29

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Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)states is narrower than 400 nm, which is the case in parts of the East China Sea, thecountries must decide, through arbitration, where to draw the line.30 In a 2012
submission to the U.N., China argued that the slope at the western edge of the
Okinawa Trough constitutes the edge of the continental shelf. Here the sea bed
drops from shallows of around 100‐150 meters to between 1000 and 2000 meters
and then rises again to form Japan’s Ryukyu Islands, also known as the first island
chain.31 Pointing to this geological characteristic, China invokes a right known as
the natural prolongation of the continental shelf. 32 This UNCLOS provisionostensibly allows China to claim an EEZ beyond 200 nm from its coast line. Leaving
out the intricate details, this means that China is claiming an EEZ boundary thatenvelops most of the East China Sea, its furthest reaches eastward extending very
close to Japanese territory.

Japan disputes the Chinese interpretation and argues that the Okinawa Trough ispart of the continental shelf which, according to the Japanese interpretation,
stretches uninterrupted all the way to and beyond the Ryukyu Islands. As the shelfis located east of the islands, Tokyo argues that an equidistance principle must be
applied and that a median line must be calculated from the respective coasts ofChina and Japan.33 This is where the Senkaku Island and territorial water disputes
converge. Whoever has sovereignty over the Senkakus has the ability to expand its
territorial waters and EEZ at the expense of the other.

United States Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part VI Article 83, Continental Shelf, The
United Nations, on the internet:
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part6.htm(retrieved
November 28, 2016).
31 T’ai‐Wan to Okinawa Shima, T’ai‐Wan and Japan, Sea Chart, Scale 1:750 000, Hydrographic
Office, the Admiralty, United Kingdom, Crown Copyright 1985, 2008 edition, 2008.
32 “Submission by the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Outer Limits of theContinental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles in Part of the East China Sea,” the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas
(UNCLOS), The United Nations, August 13, 2012, on the internet:
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_chn_63_2012.htm(retrieved August 24, 2016).
33 Reinhard Drifte, Japanese‐Chinese territorial disputes in the East China Sea – between militaryconfrontation and economic cooperation, Asia Research Centre Working Paper 24, LSE Asia
Research Centre, 2008, p. 9, on the internet:
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20881/1/Japanese‐Chinese_territorial_disputes_in_the_East_China_Se
a_(LSERO).pdf, (retrieved November 27, 2016)
30

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15

The East China Sea issue has also seen some recent tension, primarily regarding oil
and gas fields situated close to the median line. In 2007 the two countries agreed
on a cooperative mechanism of exploitation these deposits even though the final
status of the EEZ had not been agreed upon.34 In 2015 Japan complained that
China was undertaking drilling activities that violate the 2007 agreement. 35
Overall, however, the sea right dispute has been much less tense than the island
conflict. This does not exclude future tensions in the East China Sea but at the
moment little evidence suggests there is any risk the sea control dispute could
escalate into open conflict.

THE SENKAKUS AND EAST CHINA SEA AS A FOCAL POINT FOR JAPAN‐CHINACONTENTION
China continues to patrol the area around the Senkakus in the East China Sea.36 In
June 2016, for the first time, a Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Frigate
violated Japanese waters around the Senkakus.37 Although it only entered the 24
nm contiguous zone and not the 12 nm territorial waters, Japan protested at theaggression; analysts speculated that China was again signaling its non‐acceptanceof the existing status quo and was indicating its preparedness for action to get its
way.38 After the Hague Permanent Arbitration Court ruled against China’s claims to
Japan‐China Joint Press Statement: Cooperation between Japan and China in the East China
Sea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 18, 2008.
35 Nicholas Szechenyi, ‘China and Japan: A Resource Showdown in the East China Sea?’ The
National Interest, August 10, 2015.
36 Oliver Holmes; Tom Phillips, “South China Sea Dispute: what you need to know about The
Hague court ruling,” The Guardian, July 12, 2016, on the internet:
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/jul/12/south‐china‐sea‐dispute‐what‐you‐need‐to‐know‐about‐the‐hague‐court‐ruling (retrieved July 22, 2016).
37 Steven Stashwick, “That Chinese Frigate in the Senkakus Was a Bad Move for China: Is China
escalating in the East China Sea, or tipping its hand?”, The Diplomat, June 13, 2016, on theinternet:
http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/that‐chinese‐frigate‐in‐the‐senkakus‐was‐a‐bad‐move‐for‐china/, (retrieved July 24, 2016).
38 ”Japan warns China on deteriorating relations over Senkaku Islands”, The Guardian, August 9,
2016, on the internet:
www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/09/japan‐warns‐china‐of‐deteriorating‐relations‐ov
34

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Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)

the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (SCS) in July 2016, Beijing took more
assertive steps in an attempt to display its displeasure (it does not accept the
court’s jurisdiction nor its ruling).39 Even though Chinese reactions were primarily
focused on the SCS, the Chinese decided on a show of force around the Senkakus aswell. In August Beijing claimed to have sailed a large number of ships, and to haveconducted air force exercises close to the Senkakus.40 Japan reacted by publicallystating that the government was examining further defense capabilities to protect
its administrative control over the islands.41

The question, however, is whether the shift to a more confrontative approach by
Japan would heighten the risk of war. The relatively smooth handling of the
Senkaku issue since 1972 built on a more or less tacit agreement by both countries
to keep their conflicting arguments ambiguous and not push territorial claims. Fora time this made these conflicts less of an issue domestically in both China andJapan. Today decision makers and the public have come to see the conflict as astrong symbols of national right.42 This could in turn force the two governments to
act with more determination in a continued escalatory cycle. China, in particular, isusing several ways to rally the public’s support for the communist regime including
nationalistic fervor. It has been speculated that China may escalate the Senkaku
conflict to divert the public’s attention away from issues related to public
discontent with the regime. Japan, for its part, is adamant about its position; there
is no conflict over the Senkakus.

Due to the worsening government to government relationship, there is a risk thater‐senkaku‐islands (retrieved September 18, 2016).
39 Full documentation for the case is found here: Case 2013‐19, The South China Sea Arbitration(The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), Permanent Court of
Arbitration, The Hague, 2016, on the internet: https://pcacases.com/web/view/7, (retrieved
July 25, 2016).
40 “Japan: Chinese fleet sails close to disputed islands”, BBC, 6 August, 2016, on the internet:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world‐asia‐36996534 (retrieved September 30, 2017).
41 “As Senkaku tensions surge, Japan eyes missiles to protect its islands: report”, Japan Times,
August 14, 2016, on the internet:
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/08/14/national/chinese‐fighter‐jet‐came‐within‐50‐km‐of‐disputed‐senkakus‐source‐says/#.WEfq6bLhBpg (retrieved September 7, 2016).
42 Akos Kooper “Managing conflicting ”Truth Claims” – ambiguity in the diplomat’s toolkit in
East‐Asian Island conflict”, The Pacific Review Vol. 29, No. 4, 2016, pp. 605‐606.

Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)

17

both countries may not be able to communicate effectively in a crisis,43 which may
be further compounded by the fact that there are no military focused maritime
confidence building and crisis management mechanisms between China and Japan.
There have been discussions of a Maritime Communication Mechanism for many
years but with few results. In 2013, there was a surge of diplomatic activity on thisissue and in 2015, a hot‐line between the two armed forces was being considered.44
However, to date, as there have been no concrete agreements, Japan and China
remain without a robust crisis management structure such as the U.S.‐China
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement from 1998 or the Incidents‐at‐Sea
agreement signed by the Soviet Union and the U.S. in 1972.

The lack of clear cut international rules that favor any one side has left China withenough political flexibility to maintain its stance;45 however, China has little to gain
by seeking international arbitration and Japan cannot appeal as long as it retains
its ‘no conflict’ position. The recent arbitration ruling by the Hague Court on
Chinese claims to the Spratly Islands mentioned above may also shed new light on
the conflict. The ruling included a provision stating that the Spratly Islands were‘rocks’, which by definition meant that they could not be claimed as an exclusive
economic zone. The largest of the Spratly Islands is similar to the Senkakus asneither can sustain permanent human settlements. If the Spratlys are notconsidered to be islands, the status of the Senkakus as islands may also be
debatable from a legal point of view,46 which would significantly reduce theirvalue; therefore, a ruling such as this would not be in either Japan’s or China’s
interests.

Sanaa Y. Hafeez, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Crisis of 2004. 2010 and 2014: A Study ofJapanese‐Chinese crisis Management”, Asia‐Pacific Review, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2015, pp. 91‐92.
44 Marta M. Ross, The Japan‐China Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism: Operationaland Strategic Considerations, Japan Institute of International Affairs, JIIA, June 30, 2015, on theinternet: https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/fellow_report/150630_Ms_Ross_ECS.pdf (retrieved April
22, 2017).
45 Carlos Ramos‐Mrosovsky, “International Law’s Unhelpful Role In The Senkaku Islands”,
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2008, pp. 903‐946.
46 Ryan Scoville, “The South China Sea Arbitration: Implications for the Senkaku Islands”,
Lawfare Blog, July 18, 2016, on the internet:
https://www.lawfareblog.com/south‐china‐sea‐arbitration‐implications‐senkaku‐islands(retrieved May 24, 2017).
43

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Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)

China’s behavior in the East and South China Seas is often cited as key examples ofChinese assertiveness. Beijing’s challenges of existing international legal regimes
and the use of military coercion to push its claims display all the hallmarks ofrevisionist power politics, which is the main reason for the growing internationalanimosity towards China. If the ECS and Senkaku policies were the soledeterminant of bilateral relations between Japan and China, it could be speculated
that there could be a military conflict in the near future.

It still remains to be seen if China is willing to wage war or use violence to enforce
its claims or if it has the patience to continue using assertive methods below thethreshold of war. 47 However, there are many other elements that influencebilateral relations, most of which deal with wider regional security. Part of China’s
strategy is to use the Senkaku conflict as leverage for other more important foreign
policy agendas.48

REGIONAL RISKS, SYSTEMIC STABILITY, AND THE WAR PEACE EQUATION
China’s rise and quest for political stability, economic security, and great power
status continue to be at the heart of a general global shift of power to the Asia
Pacific. This ‘rise itself is enough to remake the physics of our world’, as one
prominent China‐expert once observed and is a key factor shaping Sino‐Japanese
ties.49 Beijing’s increasing power and ability to affect international affairs has
made it possible for China to expand its international ambitions. China’s pursuit of
its long term national goals has increasingly put it on a collision course with other
East Asian powers.

The current overall Japan‐China relationship is shaped not only by rivalry but also
cooperation. Key factors include economics, historic animosity, irreconcilable
Ben Connabel; Jason, H. Campbell; Dan Madden, Stretching and Exploiting Thresholds forHigh Order War: How Russia, China and Iran are Eroding American Influence Using Time‐Tested
Measures Short of War, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2016, pp. 20‐22.
48 Krista Wiegand, “China’s Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Issues andCoercive Diplomacy”, Asian Security, Issue 2, Vol. 5, 2009.
49 Joshua C. Ramo, The Beijing Consensus, Foreign Policy Center, London, 2004, p. 9.
47

Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)

19

ideological differences, and Japan’s alliance with China’s peer competitor the U.S.,in addition to territorial issues. It is, to borrow Steve Chan’s words an ‘enduring
rivalry’ but one which has remained peaceful and well managed since the end of
the Pacific War in 194550

A HISTORY OF CONTENTIONSThe Chinese and Japanese views on strategic relations have been deeply influenced
by their imperial rivalry before 1945. Both countries have internalized the bitter
lessons of strategic miscalculations from this era. China continuously invokes theJapanese atrocities inflicted on its people during this time and repeatedly
complains that Japan has not apologized sincerely. This perpetuates resentment
against Japan in Chinese society.51

Japan for its part, remains skeptical of China’s ‘peaceful rise’, partly because it
remembers its own 19th century transformation when unfettered imperial
ambitions brought about Japan’s ruin in 1945. The ‘keynotes of Japanese policy inthe post‐1868 period were peace abroad and reconstruction at home’.52 However,as soon as Japan had caught up with the European powers around the 1910’s, it
devoted itself to the same expansionist colonialism that the Europeans had
undertaken.

With this in mind, it is reasonable to question if a benign rebalance of power in
East Asia is possible. China talks of peace but is increasingly using force tostrengthen its economy and pursue historic claims and rights. To many, thisdemonstrates again that a quick rise to power rarely remains peaceful.

Steve Chan, Enduring Rivalries in the Asia‐Pacific, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2013.
51 “China marks 72nd anniversary of Japan’s WWII surrender”, Xinhua, August 15, 2017, on theinternet:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017‐08/15/c_136528809.htm(retrieved
October 6, 2017)52 Willmott, H. P, Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Strategies to April 1942, UnitedStates Naval Institute, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1982, p. 11.
50

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Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)

Japan’s anxiety about access to natural resources was a key driver of Japanesemilitary expansionism. Because of the lack of domestic natural resources needed tosustain modern industrialism, Japan relied heavily on sea transports to importwhat they needed. The deep seated anxiety about access to resources was reflected
in Japanese policies. While the seeds of military expansionism had already beensown by the 1930s, the impact of the Great Depression and the profound poverty it
brought to Japan was a key factor in forming national strategy before the PacificWar.53 The ‘Fundamental Principles of National Policy’ issued by the cabinet in1936 reaffirmed Japan’s quest for imperial control of the continent and their plans
for a ‘peaceful’ expansion into the ‘South Seas’. This expansion was seen asnecessary for the enhancement of foreign trade so as to achieve the independent
economic development ‘indispensable for the maintenance and betterment of
economic life…’.54

As much as anything, Japan saw itself as pursuing a policy of economic security.55
Imperial hubris and the inability to constrain expansionism, however, put thecountry on the road to war.56 Japan did not lose the war because of inferior war
fighting capabilities, but rather because of ‘superior American industrial power
and organizational ability’.57 More importantly, the Japanese also lost because it
pursued concurrent political, economic and military expansion, which brought it to
the attention of the other great powers; a recurring phenomenon in international
relations.58 These lessons have arguably been ingrained in the self‐image of theJapanese, and have also to some degree informed their concerns about China’s rise.

Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan, Vintage Books, New
York, 1985, p. 35.
54 Fundamental Principles of National Policy, 1936, on the internet:
http://ibiblio.org/pha/monos/144/144app01.html (retrieved July 23, 2016).
55 H.P. Willmott, Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942,
Naval Institute Press, 1982, p. 32ff, pp. 56‐57
56 Expression borrowed from: Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the
War on Terror, Potomac Books, Washington DC, 2004.
57 Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan, Vintage Books, 1985,
p. 560.
58 Edward Luttwak, The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy, The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, Cambridge Massachussets, 2012.
53

Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)

21

JAPAN, CHINA, THE CURRENT GLOBAL POWER TRANSITION AND RISKS OF WAR
Besides Japan and China, a number of the world’s great powers have key interests
and ambitions in East Asia. Despite or perhaps thanks to this convergence ofinterests, the region has experienced an unprecedented level of economic
development. Broader regional war in East Asia, it is often said, has been avoided
because of the implications of this economic expansion and the mutualinterdependence it has caused. This is seen as equally true of the bilateralSino‐Japanese relationship, as both countries have benefitted from their expanding
economic ties. As both countries have been able to gain what they want throughtrade, military expansion has not been a worthwhile option for either.59 Current
national priorities of the Chinese and Japanese governments reflect thisassessment. In Japan, as is often noted, Abenomics – the Abe government’s policyof economic reform ‐ is the main priority of the current government; that is,recovery and reinvigorated growth is of greater interest than security‐related
reforms. For China, the same has been said about the economic focus of the
Xi‐regime because of such ambitious projects such as the Belt and Road‐initiativethat aims to secure further growth and development in the Chinese economy.

Although the current economic interaction between China and Japan remains verysignificant, trade is no longer expanding and Japanese foreign direct investment
into China has been decreasing.60 While this to some degree is a reflection of theresidual effects of the 2009 economic crisis, Japanese firms are also moving
elsewhere as Chinese salaries and production costs increase. Decisions at thecompany level have also been influenced by the recent crisis, as exemplified by the2012 riots and the plundering of Japanese businesses and affiliates in China in theaftermath of the Senkaku Islands nationalization. According to a study by theJapanese Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (Rieti) , these events‘made Japanese companies hesitate to invest in China’.61 According to a research

Richard Rosecrance; Peter Thompson, “Trade, Foreign Investment and Security,” Annual
Review of Political Science, 6, 2003, p. 378.
60 María C. Latorre, Nobuhiro Hosoe, “The role of Japanese FDI in China,” Journal of Policy
Modeling, Volume 38, Issue 2, March–April, 2016, pp. 226–241.
61 Hongyong Zhang ,“Economic Relations between Japan and China in 2016,” Rieti Column,
Tokyo, 2016, http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/columns/a01_0441.html (accessed March 23,2017).
59

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Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)

paper on the link between the economy, security and mutual FDI rather than trade,has shown a stronger correlation with peaceful relations.62

The economy, therefore, has been negatively impacted by the increasingly strained
bilateral relations. The Rieti study concluded that ‘the deterioration of theJapan‐China relationship had an extremely large economic impact’ on bothcountries.63 Exports from Japan to China dropped 2.69% and Chinese exports toJapan decreased by about the same level, the majority of the declines coming themonth after the nationalization of the disputed islands was announced in
September 2012. Furthermore, despite frequent attempts at the highest diplomaticlevels, no Sino‐Japanese High Level Economic Dialogues have been conducted since
2010.

Prospects of a downturn in economic interdependence aside, the wider peace
through economic interdependence discourse has been contradicted byinconclusive scientific evidence of a strong correlation between economic
cooperative and peace. Pre‐World War I European affairs, for example,
demonstrated that cataclysmic war could erupt despite a high degree of economic
interaction.64 Unfair trade balances, skewed tariff arrangements, protective foreign
investment legislation, and currency disputes are all current issues in East Asia, allof which makes it seem politically questionable to rely on strong economic ties as aguarantee of future peace. Research has also shown that economic
interdependence and free trade are but one factor when assessing the risks of war;
power balances, power transitions, and diversionary politics at the inter‐state levelof analysis are some of the other important factors that need to be considered.65

International conflict triggered by the shifting balance of power could be a cause
Japan to be drawn into a war with China. In a recent book, Graham Allison
Richard Rosecrance; Peter Thompson, “Trade, Foreign Investment and Security,” Annual
Review of Political Science, 6, 2003.
63 Ibid.
64 Richard Rosecrance, Peter Thompson, “Trade, Foreign Investment and Security,” Annual
Review of Political Science, Vol. 6, 2003, p. 378.
65 Jack S. Levy, ”The Causes of War and the Conditions for Peace,” Annual Review of Political
Science, Vol. 1, 1998.
62

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23

examines 16 historic examples of power transitions and concludes that in 12 ofthese cases war was the result.66 However, others have pointed out that shifts in
power and the rebalancing of an international system do not by necessity mean
war or hostility. Chan, for example, argues that rebalancing could also be achieved
as a result of brokering. The logic is that the relative bargaining power of the states
can affect the shift, thereby allowing the rising power to demand more concessions.
If done in the right way, the weaker party might well be inclined to concede andaccommodate rather than violently resist; and this is what is going on in East Asia,
according to Chan.67

Studies have suggested, however, that the risk of war does increase in periods ofpower shifts, but that conflict is neither a logical necessity nor a deterministic
outcome. Power shifts alone, it seems, are not enough to explain wars. This is an
example of the Thucydides trap, of which Allison and many before him havereminded us; the notion that both the actual rise of a challenger and the fear it
causes in the challenged powers is what leads to war68; that is, what matters are
the power relations and the perceptions, political cultures and deep seated beliefsof the involved players. As early as 2004, Joshua Ramo, in his seminal paper, The
Beijing Consensus, notes that while China hoped that its international engagement
would reassure the world it was serious about a peaceful rise, such views were far
too optimistic and failed ‘to reflect the profound uneasiness in some quarters about
China’s rise’.69

Turning to the risks of war in East Asia today, Ramo’s question is still a valuable
starting point. Is China expanding in such a way that is instilling more fear thanhope at the systemic level? What opportunities are there for a peaceful rebalancing
through accommodation and agreement? An optimistic assessment is that China
does not pose any great threat to the current global order, specifically not to theGraham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydide’s Trap,
Houghton Mifflin, 2017. Harcourt and Graham Allison, ”The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. andChina Headed for War?”, The Atlantic, September 24, 2015.
67 Steve Chan (2013) p. 5.
68 Se J. McKinney, ”Four Questions for the Improbable War” Review Essay, Asian Security, Vol.
12, No. 1, 2016. and Christopher Coker, The Improbable War: China, The United States and the
Logic of Great Power Conflict, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016.
69 Joshua C. Ramo, The Beijing Consensus, Foreign Policy Center, London, 2004, p. 9, p. 53.
66

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Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)

power that matters the most, the U.S. For Ramo, the key variable is asymmetry;that is, China is using a new globalized development model that is more focusedinward and less interested in global issues. The key challenge is to ensure thestable development of Chinese society from the individual to the state level.
Therefore, with this somewhat internal focus, the rest of the world is of second
order interest at best, which is also mirrored in China’s military strategy. Ramo
believes that it is fundamentally driven by the conviction that fighting wars is
detrimental to the broader goals of development and would indicate political
failure. Consequently, its military strategy continues to emphasis strategic andoperational defense and deterrence concepts.

From this perspective China’s rise is an example of hope, rather than a threat.
Ramo suggests that Beijing is ‘marking a path for other nations around the world
who are trying to figure out not simply how to develop their country, but also how
to fit into the international order in a way that allows them to be truly independent,
to protect their way of life and political choices in a world with a single massively
powerful center of gravity’.70 Chan shares a similar view contending that East Asia
today is less polarized, and less competitive than before because of the new
approach China is taking, the examples it is setting, and the economic success it hasbrought to the region and the world including the U.S.71

This is why the U.S. is more likely to find a new deal with China that accommodates
its rise rather than focusing on conflict.72 This does not mean the U.S. needs tocapitulate or that it should relinquish its strengths. On the contrary, continued U.S.
strength is a guarantee that China does not overstep or overextend. As long as theWest finds an acceptable balance and remains strong rivalry and fear will notincrease. As a consequence, the risk of war should decrease.

Joshua C. Ramo, The Beijing Consensus, Foreign Policy Center, London, 2004, p. 3.
Jared McKinney, ”Four Questions for the Improbable War” Review Essay, Asian Security, Vol.
12, No. 1, 2016, p. 57.
72 Charles L. Glaser, ”A U.S.‐China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between MilitaryCompetition and Accommodation”, International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring), 2015. andHugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power, Collingwood, Australia, 2012.
70
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This optimistic view is contested by those more alarmed by China’s rise.73 Somepessimistic appraisals agree that even though China is not attempting to overthrow
the current liberal Washington centered world order from which it has so
benefitted, Beijing is increasingly attempting to reinterpret and if necessary
challenge the existing rules and norms for its own benefit, which it has been doing
piece meal by promoting local changes in particular areas of interest rather than
implementing systemic change. Had this been done in a way that convinced peers
and neighbors they had nothing to fear, there would be little to worry about and noreason for other states to react defensively to hedge against it.

The problem is that Beijing is acting in a particularly self‐interested way and has
shown little interest in promoting regional common good. For example, economic
regulation in China is often cited as unfair to foreign companies, with China’s wayof doing business in Africa and other countries often being described as
relationships in which Beijing ‘unabashedly pursues its self‐interests’.74 Chinese
exploitation and self‐interest has also been discussed in relation to initiatives suchas the Belt and Road (B&R) or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).75
China’s behavior has also become more assertive and coercive. With its growing
military prowess, China is putting increased pressure on neighbors to relinquish
territorial claims and even seeking to change the existing status quo by force as in
the South China Sea.

Were it not for the U.S. alliance structures in the region, Japan and other states may
have felt compelled to accept Chinese dominance a long time ago. The security
guarantees, extended deterrence, and forward military deployment of the UnitedStates have enabled states such as Japan to resist Beijing’s territorial claims. From apractical point of view the U.S. guarantees are what ensure stability in the region
Enrico Fels, Shifting Power in Asia‐Pacific: The Rise of China, Sino‐US Competition andRegional Middle Power Allegiance, Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 2017, p. 50.
74 David Haroz, ”China in Africa: Symbiosis or Exploitation?”, The Fletcher Forum of World
Affairs, Vol, 35, No. 2, Summer, 2011, p. 83.
75 Such assessments feature prominent in Chinas neighbour counties. Se for example:
Jagannath Panda, AIIB Chronicle: China’s Ambitions Behind Infrastructure Investment, Issue Brief,
Institute for Defence Studies – IDSA, March 21, 2017. and Simeon Djankov; Sean Miner, Chinas
Belt and Road Initiative – Motives, Scope, and Challenges, PIIE Briefing 16‐2, Peterson Institutefor International Economy, 2016.
73

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Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)by checking Chinas expansionist ambitions. At the same time, the U.S. engagement
prevents a recalibration of the relations in Asia to reflect the growing power ofChina. This causes a rise of tension in the regional context.

CONCLUSION – RISKS OF WAR AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONTINUED PEACE?
This chapter has explored if war is becoming more likely between Japan and China.
At the outset, it was suggested that economic interdependence alone is not enoughto ensure continued peace. Instead several factors at the bi‐lateral, regional, andglobal level interact and influence how the risk of war should be judged at any
given time. The main drivers of the Sino‐Japanese relationship are territorial
disputes, cultural animosity, and contradictory political and economic systems.
These bi‐lateral factors relate to, and are influenced by the broader global
reconfiguration of power between the U.S. and China.

This chapter began by examining Sino‐Japanese relations through the lens of theescalating conflict over the Senkaku Islands. Crises that involve military assets
increase the risk that incidents can turn into violent clashes. The lack of diplomaticand military communication mechanisms has complicated effective crisis
management, control, and de‐escalation. This is an environment in which militaryand political miscalculations leading to armed clashes is a risk, one exacerbated by
the lack of clear cut international rules, and the actor’s disinterest in pursuing apolitical solution.

However, continuing U.S. support has provided deterrence, and in the last few
years, Japan has taken more firm military measures to ensure it can effectively
resist Chinese incursions without the need of going to war.76 A Sasakawa Peace
Foundation scenario gaming report also supports this view, 77 the key insightsfrom which were that none of the three actors; Japan, China and the U.S.; want to go

Interviews with acting and former officials and think tank experts by the author in Japan in
2010, 2012, 2013 2015 and 2017. Records held by the author.
77 Michael McDevitt, Senkaku Islands Tabletop Exercise Report, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
USA, Tabeltop held at Lockheed Martin Center for Innovation, March 28‐30, 2017.
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Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)27

to war over the Senkakus and would attempt to de‐escalate any crisis.78 However,this is no insurance against mistakes that may be caused either by a lack ofcommunication or as a result of political considerations beyond the narrow issue ofthe Senkaku/Diaoyu Island sovereignty.

War can be triggered by incidents and mistakes but are rarely fought or pursued
solely because of them. Major wars are fought because the warring parties are atcross purpose regarding fundamental principles of co‐existence and at the sametime in competition for power and prestige. Japan and China are currently caught
in such a relationship and it is this aspect rather than the Senkakus territorial
dispute that makes war more probable.

There are fundamental rapid geopolitical changes in the region. The ongoing powertransition caused by the rise of China has resulted in the status quo powers such as
Japan and the U.S. feeling increasingly nervous and fearful. Therefore, bothcountries are subtly building up their military capability in response to China’s
force modernization. Deep and seemingly unsolvable grievances and to someextent xenophobia against the ‘other’ has exacerbated the contentious atmosphere,
making reconciliation all but impossible to pursue.

Were it not for the U.S. alliance structures in the region, Japan and other statesmight have felt compelled to accept Chinese dominance. However, it is the security
guarantees, extended deterrence, and forward military deployment of the UnitedStates that has enabled states such as Japan to resist Chinese territorial claims.
From a practical point of view, the U.S. guarantees ensure stability in the region by
restricting China’s ‘expansive ambitions. At the same time, U.S. engagement hashindered a recalibration of the relations in Asia given China’s growing power. As
pressure from China mounts, the fear is expected to increase, which in turn willencourage greater military action and reaction, thereby strengthening thefundamental preconditions for war.

This is a possible concern in at least two ways. If the U.S. shows less interest in East
78

Ibid.

28

Chapter 1 ̶ Japanese‐Chinese Relations and the Risk of War (Rydqvist)

Asian affairs, withdraws and downgrades its alliance relationships, China would bein a more favorable position to advance its interests and expand its footprint at theexpense of its neighbors. If this where to transpire Japan would be hard pressed toresist China. To thwart China’s ambitions in the region and protect its own position,
Tokyo may need to resort to extreme measures, such as acquiring a nuclear
deterrent. At the moment, the U.S. abandonment of its East Asian allies seems very
unlikely. Washington and its partners are convinced that China is in fact
challenging the global order in an attempt to gain influence and power. The alliancewith Japan is the key to preserving presence and influence in East Asia and as longas the U.S. sees a need to balance China, it will retain strong ties with Japan.

Chinas behavior, however, results in a stronger challenge to international order in
its immediate vicinity than at the global level. In East Asia, territorial issues andrelationships with its neighbors has become the main issue influencing China’s
internal political processes and the attempts by Beijing to keep the country fromsplintering. Territorial claims and historic grievances are being pursued to expand
power and rally support for the regime. Therefore, even if China is not challenging
the Washington centered global order, it is challenging the regional order in East
Asia. As a consequence, old cultural rivalries, especially those between Japan and
China, are intensifying, thereby strengthening the risk of war between Japan and
China. It is not certain that the Japan‐U.S. alliance is capable of warding off ormanaging this local challenge in the long run, and it is not certain whether Japan
can resist China’s attempts to expand its territorial, economic and politicalinfluence in its near abroad. Therefore, even if war is improbable in the near term,
there is enough evidence to suggest that China’s expansion in East Asia does
constitute an increased risk, at least with regards to historic precedence and theThucydides trap. Rivalry is on the rise, fear is increasing, and hedging behavior is
becoming more dominant.

Chapter 2 — Balancing China’s Maritime Powerin the East and South China Seas (Kotani)

29

CHAPTER 2

Balancing China’s Maritime Power in the East and South
China Seas

Tetsuo Kotani1
Japan Institute of International Affairs

INTRODUCTION
Tensions in the East and South China Seas have increased for several reasons. First,
there is no consensus on the legal basis for maritime boundaries in postwar Asia.
The national sea boundaries in Asia are based on the 1951 San Francisco Peace
Treaty signed between Japan and 48 other countries; however, as those countries
were not party to the treaty, they are not bound by its provisions.

For example, none of Japan’s immediate neighbors was party to the San Francisco
Peace Treaty, and for that reason Takeshima and the Northern Territories, despite
being recognized as Japanese territories in the San Francisco Treaty, remain
occupied to this day by South Korea and Russia respectively. The Senkaku Islands
were also treated as Japanese territory in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, but both
Taiwan and China have voiced objections to this status.

Circumstances in the South China Sea are even more complex. Japan relinquishedthe Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands as part of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, China, and Taiwan all claim some of theland features in the South China Sea. Both Vietnam and the Philippines were1

The author is a senior fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

30

Chapter 2 — Balancing China’s Maritime Powerin the East and South China Seas (Kotani)

signatories to the San Francisco Peace Treaty but their interpretations of this treaty
differ. While not a party to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Taiwan and China drewa “nine‐dash line” in the South China Sea and declared territorial rights to all of theislands within based on a historical claim dating back 2000 years. These
differences in the grounds on which these countries have asserted territorial
claims makes the problems surrounding the South China Sea all the more difficult.

Second, there is little consensus on the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes.
The United Nations Charter and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) are the foundation of today’s open and stable maritime order.
However, some states have been reluctant to resolve territorial disputes byarbitration mechanisms such as the International Court of Justice and theInternational Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, even if negotiations fail. China
sometimes does not refrain from using force to change the territorial status quo.
Different states interpret the UNCLOS differently on the delimiting of maritime
boundaries, disagreements about which have at times sparked diplomatic disputes
and precarious military encounters.

Third, the faltering of the maritime order in Asia is not unrelated to changes in the
global power balance as regional order must be backed by power. Indeed, it has
been U.S. power that has maintained the San Francisco treaty requirements to date;however, with emerging countries such as China and India on the rise, the US rolein maintaining regional order has been diminishing in relative terms, which has
prompted some coastal countries to seek to change the status quo.

China is at the center of the maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas.
Given China’s assertiveness, other claimant states have responded by building up
their defense and constabulary capabilities (internal balancing) and strengthening
their ties with other like‐minded partners (external balancing). Those claimant
states have also sought to establish risk mitigation mechanisms with China. This
paper reviews these efforts in the East and South China Seas to understand theregional approaches to maritime dispute management.

Chapter 2 — Balancing China’s Maritime Powerin the East and South China Seas (Kotani)

31

MANAGING TENSION IN THE EAST CHINA SEA
China’s government ships have been intruding into the Japanese territorial waters
around the Senkaku Islands since December 2008. A Chinese fishing boat, which
was conducting illegal fishing in the Japanese territorial waters around the
Senkaku Islands, rammed two Japanese coast guard patrol vessels in September
2010. After the arrest of the fishing boat skipper by Japan, China strongly protested
and ceased rare earth metal exports to Japan.

The frequency of intrusions by Chinese ships increased dramatically after
September 2012 when the Japanese government purchased three of the Senkaku
Islands from a private owner, then gradually declined from the latter half of 2013.
The number of Chinese public vessels and the frequency of their intrusions
gradually stabilized to a pattern known as the 3‐3‐2 method, in which three public
Chinese vessels enter Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands fortwo hours, three times a month.2

By increasing the presence of its government ships around the Senkaku Islands,
China is challenging Japan’s administrative sovereignty. In August 2016, hundredsof Chinese fishing boats escorted by 20 Chinese coast guard vessels appeared inand around the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands.3 In 2015, China had 120
large coast guard vessels, with the number expected to increase to 135 by 2019.

Since 2008, China’s naval activities have grown increasingly frequent in the wider
East China Sea and beyond. Improved access to the open ocean through theJapanese straits is sought in an effort to develop its anti‐access/area‐denial(A2/AD) and counter‐intervention capabilities. A Japanese annual defense white

For the data of Chinese intrusions, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Trends in Chinese
Government and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan's
Response,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html.
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Status of Activities by Chinese Government Vessels and ChineseFishing Vessels in Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands,” August 26, 2016,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000180283.pdf.
2

32

Chapter 2 — Balancing China’s Maritime Powerin the East and South China Seas (Kotani)

paper described Chinese naval activities around Japan, 4 claiming that the mostfrequently used route was the Miyako Strait, the widest channel along the firstisland chain, and that the Chinese Navy used most of Japan’s major straits on amore regular basis.

China has taken some provocative actions. In January 2013, for example, a Chinese
naval ship directed fire‐control radar at a Japanese destroyer near the medium lineof the East China Sea. The Chinese government denied this incident but criticizedJapanese surveillance activities as a “source of the safety problem.” In June 2016, a
Chinese frigate entered Japan’s contiguous zone near the Senkaku Islands, which
was the first time a Chinese Navy combatant vessel had ever entered the zone.

Intrusions have taken place in the sky as well as at sea. The number of Chinese
naval aviation and air force aircraft approaching Japanese territorial airspace has
increased since 2010, with Japan’s Air Self‐Defense Force conducting scrambles

Every year Japan’s defense white paper updates China’s maritime activities around Japan.
The most recent one is Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2016, July 2016, pp. 52‐54,
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2016/DOJ2016_1‐2‐3_web.pdf.

4Chapter 2 — Balancing China’s Maritime Powerin the East and South China Seas (Kotani)33

vis‐à‐vis Chinese aircraft more than 550 times in 2015.5 After the announcementof the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” in November 2013, theChinese military commenced scrambles against Japanese and US military aircraftwith the intention of restricting foreign military aircraft overflight freedom above
the Chinese‐claimed EEZ.6

With the increases Chinese assertiveness in the East China Sea, Tokyo revised the
National Defense Program Guidelines in 2013, which called for a dynamic joint
defense force. Under this concept, the quantity and quality of Japan’s Self‐Defense
Force (JSDF) is to be strengthened to defend the Nansei (Southwestern) Islands.7
The dynamic joint defense force concept envisions air and maritime superiority
with active and regular surveillance, as well as a rapid deployment of combat
troops, armored vehicles, air‐defense units, and surface‐to‐ship missile launchers.
In essence, it is a Japanese version of the anti‐access/area‐denial (A2/AD) strategy
along the Nansei Islands. This enhanced defense posturing has been designed tosend a message of deterrence to Beijing.

To more effectively deal with the Chinese challenges in the East China Sea, Japan
has strengthened its alliance with the United States. Beijing became more assertive
when the Democratic Party of Japan’s administration mismanaged the US‐Japan
alliance, in particular over the base problem in Okinawa. Prime Minister Abe
pledged to restore the alliance, and the then US President Obama confirmed thetreaty commitment to the Senkaku Islands during his visit to Tokyo in April 20148.

Defense of Japan 2016, p. 55.
For the analysis on China’s ADIZ practices, see Tetsuo Kotani, “Reviewing the First Year of
China’s ADIZ: A Japanese Perspective,” CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, November
25, 2014,
http://amti.csis.org/reviewing‐the‐first‐year‐of‐chinas‐adiz‐a‐japanese‐perspective/.
7 The English text of the NDPG is available at the Ministry of Defense website,
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/national.html; the NDPG was first written in 1976
and revised in 1995 and 2004, 2010, and 3013.
8 The White House, “Joint Press Conference with President Obama and Prime Minister Abe ofJapan,” April 24, 2014,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the‐press‐office/2014/04/24/joint‐press‐conference‐president‐obama‐and‐prime‐minister‐abe‐japan.
5
6

34

Chapter 2 — Balancing China’s Maritime Powerin the East and South China Seas (Kotani)

Tokyo and Washington then revised their bilateral defense cooperation guidelines
to upgrade bilateral operational cooperation and enhance the alliance structure.9
Under the new Guidelines, the JSDF has the primary responsibility for the defenseof the Nasei Islands, while the US military has a supporting role with long‐range
strategic strike capabilities.10 The new Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) is
expected to endorse this upgraded operational cooperation, as under this ACM,
Japan and the United States are going to share information and situationalawareness from peacetime to contingencies, while coordinating their bilateral
responses.11

In addition to the deterrence enhancement, Japan has been seeking crisis
management discussions with China. Japan and China essentially reached anunderstanding on the structure of a military to military maritime and air
communication mechanism in June 2012, under which the two defense authorities
would establish hotlines, have regular consultations, and implement common
communication methods between ships for risk mitigation. However, after
September 2012, Beijing refused to talk about this mechanism and demanded
concessions for territorial and historical issues. In November 2014, Beijing finallyagreed to disagree with Tokyo on these issues, and talks on the communication andcrisis management mechanisms resumed.12

Tokyo and Beijing have agreed on the structure of the mechanism but cannot agree
on the geographical coverage. Tokyo does not assume the communication
mechanism is to be applied to the 12 nautical mile territorial seas and skies, while
Beijing insists the mechanism is to be applied to the territorial seas and skies.13
The
GuidelinesforJapan‐U.S.
DefenseCooperation,
April
27,
2015,
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/pdf/shishin_20150427e.pdf.
10 For the analysis of the NDPG, see Tetsuo Kotani, “U.S.‐Japan Allied Maritime Strategy:
Balancing the Rise of Maritime China,” CSIS Strategic Japan, April 2014,
http://csis.org/files/publication/140422_Kotani_USJapanAlliance.pdf.
11 For the analysis of the US‐Japan defense guidelines, see Tetsuo Kotani, “The Maritime
Security Implications of the New U.S.‐Japan Guidelines,
http://amti.csis.org/the‐maritime‐security‐implications‐of‐the‐new‐u‐s‐japan‐guidelines/.
12 For the analysis of Japan‐China crisis management, see Tetsuo Kotani, Crisis Management in
the East China Sea, “SIPRI Policy Brief, February 2015,
http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIPB1502b.pdf.
13 Yomiuri Shimbun, October 5, 2015.
9

Chapter 2 — Balancing China’s Maritime Powerin the East and South China Seas (Kotani)

35

Beijing is attempting to use the mechanism to justify its presence and intrusions
into Japanese territorial space; therefore, Beijing continues to use the crisis
management issue to achieve its political purposes.

The overall military balance still favors Japan and the United States, and China
therefore takes measures it believes are below the threshold that would prompt
military intervention by Japan and the US — constituting gray‐zone coercion that isshort of war. China has not attempted to take the Senkaku Islands by force,indicating that China is deterred by the US‐Japan alliance. On the other hand, China
has regularized the presence of its coast guard in the vicinity of the Islands and has
recently dispatched armed vessels converted from warships—making the grayzone increasingly darker.14 Chinese gray‐zone coercion, therefore, has not been
deterred by the strengthened US‐Japan alliance.

To respond to China’s gray‐zone coercion, Tokyo has been reinforcing the Japan
Coast Guard (JCG), the first responder to such coercion. The JCG is establishing a
special unit for the Senkaku patrol, with 10 patrol ships now present at Ishigaki
Island.15 However, as Beijing has greater coast guard shipbuilding capacity, Tokyo
has also changed its procedures for issuing maritime security orders so that the
JSDF is able to conduct law enforcement operations in support of the JCG, meaningthat the JSDF can be swiftly dispatched; however, a JSDF presence in such asgray‐zone environment could only serve to escalate tensions.

INCREASED TENSION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
Beijing has increased its footprints in the South China Sea by exploiting power
vacuums since the 1950s. However, in recent years Beijing has become more
assertive despite the US rebalancing in Asia. For example, China took control of the
Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012, which was a challenge to the US
interests in Asia as well as a test of the US’s reliability as a security guarantor to its

Mainichi Shimbun, January 5, 2016.
This is explained in the annual JCG report 2014 (in Japanese),
http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/books/report2014/html/tokushu/toku14_01‐3.html.
14
15

36

Chapter 2 — Balancing China’s Maritime Powerin the East and South China Seas (Kotani)regional allies.16

China’s rapid and massive land reclamation of seven land features in the Spratly
Islands has been intensifying tensions in the South China Sea. Despite its publicpledge not to militarize the South China Sea, China has been building facilities andintroducing equipment that could be used for military purposes. The Japanese
Defense Ministry has concluded that the militarization of these artificial islands is
improving China’s law enforcement, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance(ISR) capabilities, as well as its air power and has warned that China’s ability tointerrupt navigation and overflight freedoms has expanded as a result.17

China is on the verge of acquiring modernized and reliable second‐strikecapabilities with the development of the JL‐2 SLBMs in addition to the alreadyoperational DF‐31 and DF‐41 road‐mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs). In addition, China has plans to introduce up to five Type 094, or Jin‐class,strategic nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) armed with JL‐2 missiles,
and is constructing an underwater submarine base on Hainan Island in the South
China Sea. 18 As China acquires more credible second strike capabilities, thecredibility of the US extended deterrence for Japan and other US allies in the region
might be undermined over the longer term.

Regional states are responding to China’s assertiveness by increasing defense
spending, particularly their navy and coast guard potential: Singapore, Malaysia,
Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand are all acquiring or upgrading their submarine
fleets; Hanoi’s request to lift the 40‐year ban on lethal weapon sales was acceptedby Washington; the Philippines has received patrol vessels from the United Statesand Australia, and the United States is going to provide two additional ships to the
Ely Ratner, “Learning the Lessons of Scarborough Reef,” The National Interest, November 21,
2013,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/learning‐the‐lessons‐scarborough‐reef‐9442?page=s
how.
17 Ministry of Defense, “China’s Activities in the South China Sea, December 2016,
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/surround/pdf/ch_d‐act_20161222e.pdf.
18 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016, April 2016, p. 58.
16

Chapter 2 — Balancing China’s Maritime Powerin the East and South China Seas (Kotani)

37

Philippines; and Japan is providing patrol vessels to the Philippines, Vietnam, andMalaysia.

The ten ASEAN member states are expected to spend $58 billion on new militarycapabilities over the next few years, mostly on maritime procurement. However,while the maritime shopping lists are long, Southeast Asian budgets are tighteverywhere except Singapore.19 Despite its slowing economic growth, China is still
spending large to bolster its military and maritime capabilities. Overall, however,
the regional military balance favors China, as the internal balancing by several
ASEAN members is insufficient to manage the increasing tensions in the South
China Sea.

Despite China’s opposition, Vietnam and the Philippines have internationalized theSouth China Sea dispute as part of their external balancing, with both countries
seeking to involve major powers outside the region such as the United States andJapan. In July 2010, Hanoi hosted the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and included
the South China Sea issue in the agenda. The then US Secretary of State, Hillary
Clinton, stated in her speech that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea was
a US “national interest.” However, ASEAN cannot take a unified position against
China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea primarily because of the members’
economic dependence on China.

At the request of Vietnam and the Philippines, Washington and Tokyo doubled
their capacity building efforts in providing maritime capabilities and joint training.
In addition, they reinforced their military engagements in the South China Sea:
Hanoi opened Cam Ranh Bay for US, Japanese, and other foreign navies; Manila
signed an enhanced defense cooperation agreement with Washington in 2014; US
Navy port visits to Subic Bay are on the rise; President Obama pledged $250
million in maritime security assistance to allies and partners in the region over two
years.20; and Manila is seeking a similar visiting forces agreement with Tokyo as“Southeast Asia Maritime Build‐up Accelerates, Raising Risks in Disputed Seas,” Reuters, May
26, 2015,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/southchinasea‐maritime‐buildup‐idUKL3N0YC60W20150525.
20 “Obama Boosts Philippine Navy, Sends China A Message Not to Expand Presence,” USA Today,
19

38

Chapter 2 — Balancing China’s Maritime Powerin the East and South China Seas (Kotani)

well as agreements to refuel Japanese naval forces operating in the South China
Sea.21

External balancing has had limited effect in influencing Beijing’s diplomatic
behavior. ASEAN and China signed a Declaration on Conduct (DOC) in the South
China Sea in 2002, which set out the basic principles for the peaceful resolution
and management of any disputes. The DOC envisioned a legally binding code of
conduct (COC) for better management of any disputes; however, China has beenreluctant to discuss this, preferring bilateral negotiations.

Manila’s efforts to bring Beijing to arbitration under the UN Convention on the Lawof the Sea (UNCLOS) were an important external balancing strategy by thePhilippines. The arbitration award announced on July 12, 2016 rejected China’s“historic rights” in the South China Sea based on the nine‐dash line and designated
China’s activities as a violation of international law.22 However, China’s rejection of
the legitimacy of the arbitration is a challenge to the entire UNCLOS regime andcould have a negative impact on events in the East China Sea and other regional
waters.

CONCLUSION
Upholding the rule of law in the East and South China Seas is essential for thestability of the Indo‐Pacific region. In reality, however, as there has been noconsensus on the legal basis for maritime boundaries in postwar Asia, there is little
incentive for the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes among the regional
November 17, 2015,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/11/17/obama‐boosts‐philippine‐navy‐sends‐china‐message‐not‐expand‐presence/75935378/.
21 “Tokyo, Manila Eye ‘Visiting Forces’ Pact to Rein in China,” Japan Times, June 5, 2015,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/05/national/politics‐diplomacy/japan‐will‐help‐boost‐philippine‐coast‐guard‐abe/#.VpMKPN_hBE5.
22 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Press Release: The South China Sea Arbitration (The
Republic of the Philippines V. The Peoples Republic of China), July 12, 2016,
https://pca‐cpa.org/wp‐content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH‐CN‐20160712‐Press‐Releas
e‐No‐11‐English.pdf.

Chapter 2 — Balancing China’s Maritime Powerin the East and South China Seas (Kotani)

39

countries.

The tension between Japan and China in the East China Sea has been managed by
Japanese internal and external balancing; however, China’s gray‐zone coercion
continues to be a significant challenge in the East China Sea. For Japan, it isimportant to effectively respond to China’s gray‐zone coercion by controlling theescalation while at the same time maintaining its overall military superiority.

The situation in the South China Sea continues to be difficult to manage given
China’s proactive assertiveness. Because the military balance favors China in theSouth China Sea, internal and external balancing by the regional states has had
little effect on Chinese behavior. Beijing is expected to continue to militarize theSouth China Sea while carefully avoiding US military intervention.

Regional players need to develop a better response to Chinese gray zone challenges
by reinforcing their internal and external balancing and upholding the rule of law.
As it is difficult to deter gray zone coercion, regional countries need to develop
flexible deterrent options for escalation control.

40

Chapter 3 — The Rule of Law versus Lawfare in Asian Security (Kurosaki)

CHAPTER 3

The Rule of Law versus Lawfare in Asian Security:
A Regional Variation of International Law

Masahiro Kurosaki1
National Defense Academy of JapanINTRODUCTION
Amidst growing regional military tensions, international law is now central to thenational security strategies of many Asian countries, with a number of key
countries embarking on a (re‐)construction of the law so as to advance theirnational interests in the face of their changing security environments, occasionallycreating a legal divergence in the region.

It remains to be seen whether, when and how these strategies can converge into asingle legal order in Asian security. The question is, however, why these countries
rely on international law in the first place? What roles and functions do they expectfrom the law for their security strategies? In this respect, how international law isconceived by these countries, and notably by China and Japan, is important inunderstanding the future of Asian Security in the coming decades.
With this in mind, this paper aims to present the ‘the rule of law versus lawfare’perspective, which will be discussed below, to shed light on Asian security issues,
highlighting the roles and functions of international law as well as the conflicting
Associate Professor of International Law and the Director of the Study of Law, Security and
Military Operations at the National Defense Academy of Japan Ministry of Defense. The author
is grateful to Dr. Adriana Lins de Albuquerque for her valuable comments. The opinions
expressed here are solely those of the author in a private capacity and do not necessarily
represent the position of Japan Ministry of Defense or the Japanese government.

1Chapter 3 — The Rule of Law versus Lawfare in Asian Security (Kurosaki)

41

approaches of the regional states in their operationalization of the law.

In so doing, this paper focuses on the regional aspects of international law.
International law is a multi‐layered normative system composed of a cluster ofgeneral (or universal) and special principles, rules, and regimes involving
regionalism in their creation, interpretation and application.2 A great deal ofattention has been paid to the dynamic process of integration and fragmentation ofinternational law. To discuss the ‘the rule of law versus lawfare’ in an Asian
perspective allows for a reflection on the implications of such regional or
geographical international law variations from a juridical and legislative point ofview.

GENERAL ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAWNORMATIVE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Despite imperfections in the centralized enforcement mechanisms, internationallaw has been invoked by many states to justify their conduct in cases of conflict.3.
This is not unrelated to the fact that the structure of international relations haschanged dramatically in the last half century and can no longer be analyzed from a
Thucydidean viewpoint of anarchical power politics in interstate security.

Indeed, the major international relations actors have become diverse, with many
See Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification andExpansion of International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law
Commission Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, Fifty‐Eighth Session, Geneva, 1 May‐9 June and 3
July‐11 August 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, April 13, 2006, pp. 102‐113.
3 As Louis Henkin famously wrote, ‘[i]t is probably the case that almost all nations observe
almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of thetime.’ Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Columbia University
Press, 1979), p. 47. Other international law scholars likewise put forward the generalpropensity of states to comply with international law. See, e.g., Abram Chayes and Antonia
Handler Chayes, “On Compliance,” International Organization, Vol. 47(2) (1993), p.178; The
New Sovereignty Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University
Press, 1995), pp. 3‐9.
242Chapter 3 — The Rule of Law versus Lawfare in Asian Security (Kurosaki)non‐state actors and international organizations that represent multiple interests
beyond the states now actively participating in the operationalization ofinternational law in terms of creation, interpretation, and application. The rapid
development of communitarian norms has thus been made possible throughinteractive international law expert networks focused on international crimes,
human rights, trade, investment, environment, and so on. 4 This increased
involvement in global issues has brought about the ‘legalization’ 5 and‘constitutionalization’ 6 of international relations and boosted the normative
credibility of international law. As a result, many international relations scholars;
liberalists,7 the English School (British institutionalism),8 constructivists9 rational
choice theorists10, and international lawyers;11 now take the normative status orvalidity of international law seriously from their respective perspectives andquestion why states obey or comply with international law. It appears that thefocus is now shifting towards empirical evaluations of how international law works
on the premise of its normative status and effectiveness.

Admittedly, there is still strong skepticism by some realist scholars.12 It would
See, e.g., Holly Cullen, Joanna Harrington and Catherine Renshaw (eds.), The Role of Experts
and Networks in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
5 See, e.g., Judith L. Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane and Anne‐Marie Slaughter,
Legalization and World Politics (The MIT Press, 2001).
6 See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization ofInternational Law (Oxford University Press, 2009).
7 See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press, 1999); Robert
O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton
University Press, 1984).
8 See, e.g., Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: Study in World Politics, with Forewords byAndrew Hurrell and Stanley Hoffmann, 3rd ed. (Columbia University Press, 2002); Tim Dunne,
Inventing International Society: A History of the English School (Macmillan, 1998).
9 See, e.g., Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change,” International Organization, Vol. 52 (1998) pp. 887‐917; Jonathan Mercer, Reputation
and International Politics (Cornell University Press, 1996); Alexander Wendt, Social Theory ofInternational Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1999).
10 See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford
University Press, 2005); Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice
Theory (Oxford University Press, 2008).
11 See, e.g., Abraham Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliancewith International Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University Press, 1995); Harold Hongju
Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 106(8) (1997).
12 See, e.g., Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed.
4Chapter 3 — The Rule of Law versus Lawfare in Asian Security (Kurosaki)

43

nevertheless be appropriate to say that, at the very least, a state would be highly
unlikely to accept the disregard of international law due to the following roles andfunctions that international law has achieved against the above background.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AS UNIVERSAL COMMON SENSEFirst, international law is reflection of common sense in international society. If a
state violates the law, it is considered to lack common sense and also tends to lose
its credibility and reputation, which undermines its diplomatic relations withothers as no other state would seek to establish an economic partnership with anon‐law‐abiding country which behaves unpredictably or irrationally. The moreglobal, interdependent, and communitarian international society becomes, themore an international law violator becomes vulnerable, which is one of the main
reasons that states do not wish to admit to any actions that may have brokeninternational laws.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AS THE COMMON LANGUAGE OF DIPLOMACY

Secondly, international law serves as a common language for diplomacy. Should astate wishes to explain and justify its policies and convince others, it is necessary torely on an adherence to relevant international laws followed by all respectablenations. Therefore, as international law is the operating system (OS) forinternational relations,13 it incentivizes states to take it seriously when conducting
international relations.

REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR ASIAN SECURITY(Knopf, 1973); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Addison‐Wesley, 1979); John J.
Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol.
19(3) (1995), pp. 5‐49.
13 See, e.g., Charlotte Ku and Paul F. Diehl, “International Law as Operating and Normative
Systems: An Overview,” in Charlotte Ku and Paul F. Diehl (eds.), International Law: Classic andContemporary Readings, 3rd ed. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), pp. 1‐18.

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Chapter 3 — The Rule of Law versus Lawfare in Asian Security (Kurosaki)

CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

This certainly holds true for strategic Asian security issues. It should be noted thateven the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and China have reiterated
that they attach high value to international law and have stressed that theirconduct is in accordance with it. On the other hand, it is also true that these twostates have rejected the validity of international law when they have found therules in question lack support for their causes. This can be clearly seen in thecontroversies over the DPRK’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the
Non‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as well as its fierce criticism against
the US‐led UN sanctions resolutions for the lack of legitimacy and fairness backed
by the UN member states for the validity of legal norms.14 For China, it has
manifested itself in the South China Sea arbitration case under Annex VII of the
UNCLOS 15 , which China rejected. 16 While sometimes criticized as a double

See, e.g., Korean Central News Agency Network, Korean Lawyers Committee Sheds Light on
Criminal Truth of UN “Resolutions on Sanctions,” 16 March 2017, at<http://kcna.co.jp/item/2017/201703/news16/20170316‐14ee.html>; also available in fulltext at <http://dprk‐doc.com/en/archives/574>. It argues: ‘the “sanctions resolutions” of the
UN Security Council are criminal documents stained with high‐handedness and arbitrariness of
the United States. The “Sanctions Resolutions” of the United Nations against the DPRK are
criminal documents devoid of legality, morality and impartiality ... The UN Security Council is
not a legislative organ creating new laws. Neither has it the authority to do so. Not a single
provision of any international laws including the UN Charter, UNGA resolutions, CTBT, NPT,
Outer Space Treaty stipulates that nuclear test or satellite and ballistic missile launches
themselves constitute a threat to international peace and security. ... Our nuclear tests andballistic missile launches are just and righteous self‐defensive measures to safeguard thesovereignty and right to existence to cope with the nuclear threat of the United States
persisting for more than half a century and they do not run counter to any international law
including Article 51 (right to self‐defense) of the UN Charter. ... As our withdrawal from the
NPT followed the legitimate procedure, it is not the issue to be approved or disapproved byanyone. If the United States has anything to say they should come out and speak out at a forumof international legal experts, instead of disseminating unreasonable words by using those who
do not even know international laws.’
15 In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration, Republic of Philippines v People’s Republicof China, Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Law of the
Sea Convention, Case No. 2013‐19, Award of July 12, 2016, at< http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2086>.
16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Lu Kang’s Remarks on Statement by Spokesperson of US State Department on South China Sea
Arbitration Ruling, July 13, 2016, at
14

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45

standard or the selective operation of international law,17 neither country hasdenied the effectiveness, roles, and functions of the law per se; rather, they haveexpressed dissenting views on the way in which the international laws are created,interpreted, and applied.18 It could be argued, therefore, that they are challenging
the western approach to international law, leading to a controversy regarding therule of law versus lawfare.

RULE OF LAW

The rule of law, which was first formulated by a British jurist, A.V. Dicey,19 isgenerally understood as the normative idea that all (natural or legal) persons shall<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1424544.shtml>:‘thearbitration ..., which violated international law, is a political farce under the cloak of law. What
the arbitral tribunal did and ruled severely deviated from the common practice of international
arbitration. The ruling is null and void with no binding force.’
17 China too criticized the United States for its selective operation of international law in theSouth China Sea issue, claiming that “[t]he US is always selective when it comes to theapplication of international law: citing international law when it sees fit and discarding
international law when it sees otherwise. It keeps urging others to abide by the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) while refusing to ratify the Convention to this day.
What makes the US think that it is in a position to make all these irresponsible remarks against
others? We urge the US to think over its words and deeds, stop advertising the illegal
arbitration and meddling with the South China Sea issue, and cease undermining China's
sovereignty and security interests and escalating regional tensions.” Ibid.
18 This vividly illustrates the recent failure of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context ofInternational Security, tasked with clarifying the common understanding of international law
applicable to cyberspace. See, e.g., Michael Schmitt and Liis Vihul, International Cyber Law
Politicized: The UN GGE’s Failure to Advance Cyber Norms, Just Security, June 30, 2017 at<https://www.justsecurity.org/42768/international‐cyber‐law‐politicized‐gges‐failure‐advanc
e‐cyber‐norms/>; Arun Mohan Sukumar, The UN GGE Failed. Is International Law inCyberspace Doomed As Well?, Lawfare, July 4, 2017, at<https://lawfareblog.com/un‐gge‐failed‐international‐law‐cyberspace‐doomed‐well>; Elaine
Korzak, UN GGE on Cybersecurity: The End of an Era?: What the Apparent GGE Failure Meansfor International Norms and Confidence‐Building Measures in Cyberspace, The Diplomat, July
31, 2017, at<https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/un‐gge‐on‐cybersecurity‐have‐china‐and‐russia‐just‐ma
de‐cyberspace‐less‐safe/>.
19 See, e.g., Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed.
(Macmillan, 1959).

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Chapter 3 — The Rule of Law versus Lawfare in Asian Security (Kurosaki)

abide by the rules that have been created and rendered legitimate throughconstitutionally prescribed law making processes, which is a multifaceted notionthat comprises, but is not limited to, certainty, predictability, even‐handedness,
impartiality, and universality. Albeit elusive, ‘its essence is the prohibition of theexercise of arbitrary power’20 by the impartial application of a law that is detachedfrom politics. From this viewpoint, international law is perceived to govern
sovereign states from the outside as a communitarian norm inherent in aconstitutionalized international society.21

Sharing the idea of ‘the superiority of the law over all other forms of power,’22Japan has characterized ‘the rule of law in the international community as one ofthe pillars of its foreign policy’23 and ‘been making significant and constructive
contributions toward’ its establishment.24 This is exactly what Japan is currently
exploring to ensure security and stability at regional (Asian‐Pacific) and global
B. S. Chimni, “Legitimating the International Rule of Law,” in James Crawford and Martti
Koskenniemi (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge University
Press, 2012), p. 290.
21 The UN characterizes international human rights norms and standards as the central
communitarian norm for the rule of law within its organizational system: “For the United
Nations system, the rule of law is a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions
and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are
publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which areconsistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires as well measures
to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of the law, equality before the law,accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers,
participation in decision‐making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and proceduraland legal transparency. Justice is an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection andvindication of rights and the prevention and punishment of wrongs. Its administration involves
both formal judicial and informal/customary/traditional mechanisms. Within this paradigm, arange of terms are used to describe various approaches and activities that strengthen the ruleof law, such as security sector reform, administration of justice, protection, combating
impunity.” United Nations, Guidance Note of the Secretary‐General: UN Approach to Rule of
Law Assistance, April 2008, p. 1, at<https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/RoL%20Guidance%20Note%20UN%20Approach%20F
INAL.pdf>.
22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook 2016, Chapter 3(6): The Rule of
Law in the International Community, at<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2016/html/chapter3/c030106.html>.
23 Ibid.
24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, International Law, January 24, 2017, at<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/inter_law/law/index.html>.
20

Chapter 3 — The Rule of Law versus Lawfare in Asian Security (Kurosaki)

47levels. Japan has not only confirmed the importance of the rule of law in bilateral
security with the United States for the maintenance of international peace andsecurity in the Far East,25 but it has also devoted itself to the propagation of thisidea to its Asia‐Pacific regional partners.26 Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe,made the following statement in a speech entitled ‘Peace and prosperity in Asia,
forevermore: Japan for the rule of law, Asia for the rule of law, and the rule of law
for all of us’ at the 13th IISS Asian Security Summit:[A]ll countries must observe international law. … This law was not createdby any particular country or countries, nor was it the product of some sortof group. Instead, it is the product of our own wisdom, cultivated over agreat many years for the well‐being and the prosperity of all humankind.27

LAWFAREOn the other hand, some have criticized the idea of the rule of law, claiming that it
assumes ‘superiority and universal applicability of the Western model.’28 Assertingthat the principle of sovereign equality is crucial for the stability of international
relations and, as such, must be considered universal and supreme, they haveexpressed great concerns about delegating sovereignty to the international
community and have striven to shield their authority and independence from theIn the Preamble of the Japan‐US Security Treaty, Japan and the United States emphasize
their desire “to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law” inthe region for mutual cooperation and security. See also, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,
The Senkaku Islands: Seeking Maritime Peace based on the Rule of Law, Not Force or Coercion,at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000018519.pdf >.
26 This can also be confirmed in Japan’s recent joint statements with the Philippines, Australia,
Indonesia and Vietnam in the beginning of 2017. The rule of law was highlighted therein as thebasic principle of international order in the region primarily in the context of the South China
Sea. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Prime Minister Abe Visits Southeast Asia
(Philippines, Indonesia, Viet Nam) and Australia (January 12‐17, 2017), January 16, 2017, at<http://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea1/page3e_000639.html#section1>.
27 “Peace and prosperity in Asia, forevermore: Japan for the rule of law, Asia for the rule of law,and the rule of law for all of us,” The 13th IISS Asian Security Summit ‐‐The Shangri‐La
Dialogue‐‐ Keynote Address by Shinzo ABE, Prime Minister, Japan, May 30, 2014, at<http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page4e_000086.html>.
28 Chimni, supra note 20, p. 291.
25

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Chapter 3 — The Rule of Law versus Lawfare in Asian Security (Kurosaki)Western‐centric standards of international law.29 This can be seen in a series ofcriticisms from non‐Western countries and exemplified in the (albeit backtracked
later) withdrawal of African countries from the International Criminal Court (ICC)30,
Russia’s ‘unsignature’ of the ICC Statute, 31 Russia’s and Iran’s harsh protests
against the US military strikes on Syrian air base,32 and the problems associatedwith the Eurocentric hegemony that permeates the progressive human rights
jurisprudence developed in the European Court of Human Rights.33 From thisIn this respect, it is worthy of note that Russia and China made a joint declaration on theoperation of international law centered on the principles of sovereign equality andnon‐intervention in the internal or external affairs of states. The Declaration of the RussianFederation and the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion of International Law, June 25,
2016, at<http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/‐/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/
2331698>.
30
See
South
Africa:WithdrawalofNotificationofWithdrawal,
C.N.121.2017.TREATIES‐XVIII.10, at<https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2017/CN.121.2017‐Eng.pdf>.
31 See, e.g., Embassy of the Russian Federation in Malaysia, Press Releases: Statement by the
Russian Foreign Ministry on signing the Decree «On the intention not to become a party to theRome Statute of the International Criminal Court», November 17, 2016, at<http://argentina.mid.ru/web/malaysia‐en/archive‐2015/‐/asset_publisher/C22pu9HTgYl0/
content/17‐11‐16‐statement‐by‐the‐russian‐foreign‐ministry‐on‐signing‐the‐decree‐on‐the‐intention‐not‐to‐become‐a‐party‐to‐the‐rome‐statute‐of‐the‐internation?inheritRedirect=false>
It says: “[u]nfortunately the Court failed to meet the expectations to become a truly
independent, authoritative international tribunal. The work of the Court is characterized in a
principled way as ineffective and one‐sided in different fora”.
32 See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign Ministry Statement on
US Military Action in Syria on April 7, 2017, at<http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/‐/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/
2717798>; President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, US Missile Attack on Syria Aggression,
against Int’l Laws, UN Charter/Washington Attack Helping Terrorists/Stressing Need for
Supporting Syrian People, 9 April 2017, at <http://www.president.ir/en/98626>. In contrast,
the United States claimed that its military action was in humanitarian response to the alleged
use of chemical weapons against innocent civilians in Khan Sheikhoun by the Assad regime. At
the moment, however, it has not yet made clear its legal justification for the action. See US
Department of Defense, Statement from Pentagon Spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis on US strike in
Syria, Release No: NR‐126‐17, April 6, 2017, at<https://www.defense.gov/News/News‐Releases/News‐Release‐View/Article/1144598/state
ment‐from‐pentagon‐spokesman‐capt‐jeff‐davis‐on‐us‐strike‐in‐syria>.
33 E.g., Aaron Matta and Armen Mazmanyan, “Russia: In Quest for a European Identity,” inPatricia Popelier, Koen Lemmens and Sarah Lambrecht (eds.), Criticism of the European Court of
Human Rights: Shifting the Convention System: Counter‐dynamics at the National and EU Level(Intersentia Publishers, 2016).
29

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49

perspective, many countries see that the rule of law is nothing more than aWestern ideological political instrument to legitimize Western‐centric values suchas ‘liberal interventionism’ in the name of global order.34

Most notably, China has forcefully advocated its own proactive legal strategy, which
has sometimes been called ‘lawfare (legal warfare)’35, which, according to Charles J.
Dunlap, Jr., can be defined as ‘the strategy of using— or misusing— law as a
substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.’36 For
the Chinese, its purpose is ‘to gain international support and manage the possible
political repercussions of China’s military actions’37 under the precept that the law
is an instrument of politics rather than ‘a check on politics and an autonomous,
objective arbiter of justice’38 as assumed in the Western rule of law.39 At its core,
China’s lawfare strategy is in sharp contrast to the Western or ‘Westernized’ legal
order in Japan and other Asian states, which is symbolized by the rule of law notionthat subjugates politics to the law.

For all the conflicting approaches to international law in its creation, interpretation,
and application, however, it is important that China continues to optimize aSee, e.g., Andrew Gamble, “The Western Ideology,” Government and Opposition, Vol. 44(1)(2009).
35 The notion, allegedly coined by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., has become prevalent in recent years ininternational law and IR scholarship to describe the concept of law as a weapon of war
although there is no consensus of the definition. See, e.g., Orde F. Kittrie, Lawfare: Law as a
Weapon of War (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 1‐27. See also David Kennedy, “Lawfare andWarfare,” in Crawford and Koskenniemi (eds.), supra note 20.
36 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “Lawfare Today,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, Winter 2008,p.14.
37 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s
Republic of China 2008, at 19 (Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2008), at<http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf>.
38 Kittrie, supra note 35, at 163. See also Samuli Seppänen, Ideological Conflict and the Rule of
Law in Contemporary China (Cambridge University Press, 2016).
39 See, e.g., Katrin Blasek, Rule of Law in China: A Comparative Approach (Springer, 2015); Paul
Gewirtz, What China Means by ‘Rule of Law,’ New York Times, October 19, 2014. Carl Minzner,“Rule of Law in China: Past, Present, and Future: Beijing has turned against legal reforms it hadlaunched in the 1990’s. Will this change after the 18th Party Congress?,” The Diplomat,
September 7, 2012 at<http://thediplomat.com/2012/09/rule‐of‐law‐in‐china‐past‐present‐and‐future/>.
34

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Chapter 3 — The Rule of Law versus Lawfare in Asian Security (Kurosaki)

universal common sense and common diplomatic language to justify its military
actions for regional primacy.40 No doubt, the strategy has taken a dramatic turn inthe past few years with China’s escalating militarization and provocative actions
across several operational domains (on land, at sea, in the air, in outer space, and incyberspace). Suffice to say, China has been actively engaged in legal claims againstneighboring countries that involve the United States in the East and South China
Seas, which has culminated in controversies over the ‘nine‐dash line’ claim basedon historic rights in the South China Sea over the land reclamation in the Spratly
Islands and the challenges to the high seas freedom of navigation and overflights
including military activities as well as several military activities such as the captureof a US (sovereign immune) underwater drone.41 In the same vein, Japan now faces
intense contestations with China over the passage, navigation, and overflight rights
in the Straits of Japan (Tokara, Miyako, etc.) and in the question surrounding thesovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.42

See, e.g., Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “Lawfare,” in John Norton Moore, Guy B. Roberts and Robert F.
Turner (eds.), National Security Law & Policy, 3rd ed. (Carolina Academic Press, 2015), pp.
825‐826.
41 See, e.g., US Department of Defense, Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on
Incident in South China Sea, Releas No: NR‐448‐16, December 16, 2016, at<https://www.defense.gov/News/News‐Releases/News‐Release‐View/Article/1032611/state
ment‐by‐pentagon‐press‐secretary‐peter‐cook‐on‐incident‐in‐south‐china‐sea>; Statement by
Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook on Return of U.S. Navy UUV, Release No: NR‐451‐16,
December 19, 2016, at<https://www.defense.gov/News/News‐Releases/News‐Release‐View/Article/1034224/state
ment‐by‐pentagon‐press‐secretary‐peter‐cook‐on‐return‐of‐us‐navy‐uuv>. See also Terri Moon
Cronk, “Chinese Seize U.S. Navy Underwater Drone in South China Sea,” DoD News, Defense
Media Activity, December 16, 2016, at<https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1032823/chinese‐seize‐us‐navy‐underwate
r‐drone‐in‐south‐china‐sea>. See also Xinhua, China to Hand over Underwater Drone to U.S. in
Appropriate Manner, December 18, 2016, at<http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016‐12/18/content_7412715.htm>; China Hands over
Underwater Drone to U.S., December 20, 2016, at<http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016‐12/20/content_7415536.htm>. In the meantime,
China has recently been reported to advance a new legal theory for its territorial claim in theSouth China Sea instead of the Nine‐Dash Line. See, e.g, Julian Ku and Chris Mirasola, The South
China Sea and China's “Four Sha” Claim: New Legal Theory, Same Bad Argument, Lawfare,
September 25, 2017, at<https://www.lawfareblog.com/south‐china‐sea‐and‐chinas‐four‐sha‐claim‐new‐legal‐theory‐same‐bad‐argument>.
42 See, e.g., Japan Ministry of Defense, Reading the Chinese Ministry of National Defense’s Press
Release Dated December 10, 2016, titled “China Urges Japan to Stop Interfering with Its High40

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51

A REMNANT OF THE THUCYDIDEAN WORLD? IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ABSENCEOF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ASIA
Asian security has therefore witnessed a bifurcated and divergent
operationalization of international law with these rule of law versus lawfare
approaches. As indicated in the introduction, if international law is influenced byregional factors in its creation, interpretation and application, how do these factors
engage with these conflicting approaches? It seems safe to assume that suchdisparities can be partly ascribed to the regional or geographical specialties inAsia; namely, the lack of a dynamic regional integration that accommodates thegaps in perception and characterization of international law in the Asian states.

As some scholars have pointed out, Asia’s under‐participation in andunder‐representation of international law 43 suggest that its regional or
Sea Military Training,” 11 December 2016, at<http://www.mod.go.jp/e/press/release/2016/12/11a.html>; China's Ministry of National
Defense, China Urges Japan to Stop Interfering with its High Sea Military Training, 10
December 2016, at<http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016‐12/10/content_7400920.htm>.
43 Simon Chesterman argues this in light of Asia’s deep‐rooted skepticism of international lawthat comes from the past negative experiences with the law as an arbitrary instrument tojustify colonial rule and to impose Western standards and victors’ justice. Simon Chesterman,“Asia’s Ambivalence about International Law and Institutions: Past, Present and Futures,”
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 27(4) (2017). The article was followed by the
online debate among prominent experts in the EJIL: Talk! and the Opinio Juris. Simon
Chesterman, “Asia’s Ambivalence About International Law & Institutions: Introduction to
Opinio Juris and EJIL:Talk! mini‐symposium,” EJIL: Talk!, January 16, 2017, at<http://www.ejiltalk.org/asias‐ambivalence‐about‐international‐law‐institutions‐introduction‐to‐opinio‐juris‐and‐ejiltalk‐mini‐symposium/>; Eyal Benvenisti, “Will the Asian Vision ofInternational Law become Dominant in 2017?,” ibid., January 16, 2017, at<http://www.ejiltalk.org/will‐the‐asian‐vision‐of‐international‐law‐become‐dominant‐in‐201
7/>; Robert McCorquodale, “Clarity and Ambivalence: Asia and International Law,” ibid.,
January 17, 2017, at<http://www.ejiltalk.org/clarity‐and‐ambivalence‐asia‐and‐international‐law/>;
AntonyAnghie, “Comment on Simon Chesterman, ‘Asia’s Ambivalence about International Law andInstitutions: Past, Present and Futures,’” Opinio Juris, January 16, 2017 at<http://opiniojuris.org/2017/01/16/comment‐on‐simon‐chesterman‐asias‐ambivalence‐abo
ut‐international‐law‐and‐institutions‐past‐present‐and‐futures/>; Judge Jin‐Hyun Paik, “AsianStates’ Participation in International Adjudication: Comments,” EJIL: Talk!, January 18, 2017, at<http://www.ejiltalk.org/asian‐states‐participation‐in‐international‐adjudication‐comments/

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Chapter 3 — The Rule of Law versus Lawfare in Asian Security (Kurosaki)

geographical commitment to the international community as a whole is possibly
uncertain. Of particular relevance is that there is no single united regionalorganization such as the EU, AU or OAS, or any regional treaties that enforce corehuman‐rights principles, such as the European Convention on Human Rights(ECHR), the Inter‐American Convention on Human Rights (IACHR), and the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Banjul Charter), primarily because of alack of underlying regional values and identities. Leaving aside the appropriatenessof denominating a certain region as ‘Asia,’ this geographical area is thus not truly‘constitutionalized’ or less ‘legalized’ at the regional level compared to other areasof the world.44

The lack of common values within the Asian region has hampered the actions ofindividuals, NGOs, and international organizations such as international courts andtribunals from participating in the any regional international law operations tostrengthen the implementation of communitarian norms. Asia, therefore, could beseen to be a remnant of the Thucydidean world; with no regional integration
mechanism, an Asian state remains an independent normative hegemon in whichinternational law operates only to advance its own national policy, staying outsideof the communitarian regimes of general international law that allows for theparticipation of diverse non‐state actors in its operationalization. This renders theregional operation of international law more susceptible to power swings andinstrumental uses. Either way, the current situation is that key countries like China
and Japan (as well as India) are political power rivals, with each seeking to take theinitiative to develop a regional regime to implement an international law that can
maximize their own regional security interests. The rule of law approach is no
exception in this regard; even if the basic idea detaches the law from politics, theimplementation is nothing more than a policy‐oriented strategy to achieve that
goal, not to mention the lawfare strategy.45>; Judge Xue Hanqin, “An Asian Perspective,” Opinio Juris, January 18, 2017, at<http://opiniojuris.org/2017/01/18/an‐asian‐perspective/>.
44 Therefore, Judge Xue Hanqin of the International Court of Justice states that “[a]bove all,Asia has the least prospect for regional integration.” Hanqin, ibid.
45 In this context, Japan’s new optional clause declaration at the ICJ on October 6, 2015
following its judgement in the Whaling in the Antarctic case might be worthy of analysis. The
declaration appears to seek to confine disputes regarding living marine resources to being
heard under other dispute settlement mechanisms than the ICJ, such as the relevantChapter 3 — The Rule of Law versus Lawfare in Asian Security (Kurosaki)

53

CONCLUSION
International law is not merely a matter of diplomatic rhetoric. As has been
illustrated, international law has become intrinsically intertwined with security
policy issues in and across Asian countries. At the risk of oversimplification, it
could be concluded that current security tensions in the Asia‐Pacific display aconflict between the communitarian‐based (Western) rule of law and thesovereignty‐based lawfare.

International law provides all states with equal opportunity in international
relations. As tensions rise between the Asian states, it is increasingly importantthat international law be seen as a universal common sense and a common
language of diplomacy in the region so as to gain international support for theircommunitarian or national policies and operational objectives.

On the other hand, in the absence of a regional integration mechanism tocoordinate the involvement of those states, the regional operation of internationallaw has become more susceptible to power swings and instrumental uses, which
could lead up to a serious legal divergence and thus deprive the law of regulatory
power throughout the region. As we are in a period of power transition at bothregional and global levels amidst concerns of the reduced US engagement in the
Asia‐Pacific region,46 it is now critical that Asian states wishing for peace andmechanisms of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. See Declarations Recognizing
the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, at<http://www.icj‐cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=JP>.
46 In this respect, it is worthy of note that China’s commitment to international organizations
is reported to become conspicuous, as opposed to the US. See Elias Groll, As U.S. Retreats FromWorld Organizations, China Steps in to Fill the Void: Beijing is Trying to Repurpose Abandoned
International Agencies like UNESCO to Serve its Strategic Interests — such as Controlling theInternet, Foreign Policy, October 6, 2017, at<http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/06/as‐u‐s‐retreats‐from‐world‐organizations‐china‐steps‐in‐the‐fill‐the‐void/>. On the other hand, Slaughter and Hooper argue that America’s Asian
allies who have grown accustomed to America’s predictable commitment to their security
should establish ‘their regional security network from a US‐centric star to a mesh‐like pattern’by ‘building and institutionalizing ties among themselves’ to prepare and ‘strengthen stability
for unsteady times’ in the Trump administration. Anne‐Marie Slaughter and Mira‐Rapp Hooper,

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Chapter 3 — The Rule of Law versus Lawfare in Asian Security (Kurosaki)

stability in the region take the lead in the creation, interpretation and applicationof international law in a way that maximizes their security interests.47 However, inthat context, the ‘the rule of law versus lawfare’ perspective would be, from astrategic point of view, conducive to an assessment of future prospects for ongoingand emerging issues in Asian security.

“How America’s Asian Allies Can Survive Trump,” Project Syndicate, January 24, 2017, at <https://www.project‐syndicate.org/print/trump‐security‐guarantees‐asia‐allies‐by‐anne‐marie‐slaughter‐and‐mira‐rapp‐hooper‐2017‐01>.
47 Sceats claims that ‘China will not eclipse the US as an international law powerhouse anytime
soon, but if Trump’s campaign rhetoric is translated into US policy, the tables may begin to turn,’
given that ‘China has begun to project its stronger capabilities via an international law training
and exchange programme with Asian and African countries,’ and that ‘[i]t is also experimenting
with norm entrepreneurship in newer areas of international law, where it hopes to exert more
influence, including cyber governance.’ Sonya Sceats, “Trumpian Isolationism Could Help China
Become a Leader in International Law,” Chatham House Expert Comment, January 19, 2017, at<https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/trumpian‐isolationism‐could‐help‐china‐
become‐leader‐international‐law>.

Chapter 4 — China vs. Taiwan (Hellström)

55

CHAPTER 4

China vs. Taiwan: Growing Uncertainties

Jerker Hellström
Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)INTRODUCTION
Despite several crises since the 1990s, the relationship between China and Taiwan
has remained at status quo, which can be broadly defined as de facto Taiwanese
independence. Today, economic interests still appear to outweigh the nationalistic
sentiments on both sides of the Taiwan Straits Nevertheless, in the long run, theChinese Communist Party (CCP) may have to deliver on its pledge to eventuallyunify Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The U.S., for its part, hasreaffirmed its commitment to Taiwan despite initial signals from President Trumpthat the decades‐old bilateral agreements could be revised.

Even though it is still claimed by the PRC, which sees the Taiwanese flag as aseparatist symbol, Taiwan has been self‐governing for seven decades. As part of the“One China principle,” Beijing has continued to block Taiwan’s aspirations toengage in international fora. Despite the island’s de facto independence, only 20
governments officially recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state.

At the core of the dispute between Beijing and Taipei is the question of how todefine the status quo in the relationship. From the PRC’s standpoint, as Taiwan isregarded as a Chinese province that “has belonged to China since ancient times”, it
does not have the right to represent itself internationally. Beijing’s understandingof the status quo is based on the so‐called “1992 Consensus” (九二共识), which
was a term coined by the Taiwanese official Su Chi in 2000, in which both Beijing

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Chapter 4 — China vs. Taiwan (Hellström)

and Taipei acknowledge that there is only “one China.” However, as both parties
have their own interpretation of what the ambiguous concept “one China” entails,
there have been few attempts to define it in detail.

Taipei’s definition of the status quo varies between political parties. During the
Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) Government from 2008‐2016, President Ma
Ying‐jeou based his interpretation on the so‐called “three noes” formula; nounification, no independence, and no use of force. President Tsai Ing‐wen of the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), for her part, asserted that the status quo was
based on the Constitution of the Republic of China (ROC) and previous agreements
signed between Taiwan and China.

For at least two decades, the Taiwanese public has consistently been in favor ofmaintaining the status quo in their relationship with the mainland; defined as defacto independence. Opinion polls conducted in 2016 found that the vast majorityof Taiwanese were in favor of maintaining the status quo; 1 therefore, public
support for Taiwanese de jure independence, let alone for unification with the PRC,
is limited. From the standpoint of the current DPP‐led government in Taipei, astable relationship with the mainland is the prerequisite for its ability to deliver on
important policy objectives such as job creation and economic growth. The PRC
has been Taiwan’s largest trade partner for more than a decade.

KMT, DPP AND BEIJING’S ROLE
Taiwan became a Japanese colony in 1895 when it was ceded by the Qing
government in Beijing to Japan. After Japan’s World War II surrender in 1945, theROC, under the leadership of the Kuomintang (KMT) became Taiwan’s newlegitimate government. After having lost the civil war against the communists in
1949, the nationalists fled to Taiwan and continued to govern the island as the ROC.

National Chengchi University Election Study Center, ”Taiwan Independence vs. Unification
with the Mainland Trend Distribution in Taiwan(1992/06‐2016/12)”. URL:
http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=167#
1

Chapter 4 — China vs. Taiwan (Hellström)

57

Today’s Taiwan is a relatively young democracy. While the ROC began holding local
elections in the 1940s, the first direct presidential elections were not held until
1996. The DPP became the KMT’s first political opponent on its founding in 1986
and ruled as a minority government from 2000 to2008. This period wascharacterized by weak relations with Beijing due to the Chen Shui‐bianadministration’s pro‐independence stance. Ironically, the KMT is today the party
with stronger ties to the CCP; while the KMT identifies with the idea of a “Chinese
nation,” the DPP is the main advocate for a Taiwanese, as opposed to a common
Chinese, identity and is therefore more outspoken in terms of pro‐independence.

Despite a doubling in cross‐strait trade and a rapid rise in the flow of tourists
between Taiwan and the mainland during the Ma Ying‐jeou presidency(2008‐2016), Taiwan’s citizens have in recent years become increasingly
concerned over political deals with the mainland after the Ma administration
attempted to accommodate China’s interests on issues such as Tibet, Xinjiang, andhuman rights. In 2013, the KMT signed a controversial trade agreement with Chinathat fueled concerns that Taiwan would become vulnerable to Chinese politicalpressure that could negatively affect the economy. At the same time, Beijing has
continued to block Taiwan’s aspirations to engage internationally in organizations
such as the World Health Organization (WHO).

Concerns over the KMT’s policies towards the mainland contributed to the DPP’slandslide victory in the 2016 national elections, when Tsai Ing‐wen became
Taiwan’s first female president. Importantly, the DPP for the first time gained amajority in the parliament, the Legislative Yuan, which had been KMT‐controlled
since its creation in 1950. Despite the change in government, Beijing has
maintained close communications with the KMT while keeping the new rulingparty at arm’s length.

CROSS‐STRAIT TENSIONS
Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, Taiwan and China have gone through several
crises that have raised concerns in the region and internationally over the risk of58

Chapter 4 — China vs. Taiwan (Hellström)

armed clashes and potentially with the U.S. The most serious crisis to‐date was the
Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis in 1995, which was sparked by ROC President Lee
Teng‐hui’s private visit to the United States. Despite U.S. assurances that it was not
an official visit, China interpreted it as the latest in a series of pro‐independence
provocations, and responded by conducting missile tests from its eastern coast.

Other Chinese military exercises followed later the same year and tensions
culminated ahead of Taiwan’s presidential elections in March 1996. Prompted byconcerns that a pro‐independence candidate would win the elections, Beijing
carried out joint air, ground, and naval exercises in the Taiwan Strait and tested its
nuclear‐capable missiles. In response, the U.S. deployed two aircraft carrier battlegroups near Taiwan. The tensions however quickly cooled after Lee won theelections and toned down his stance on Taiwan independence.

Relations between Beijing and Taipei deteriorated even further over the following
decade, as President Lee and, to a greater extent, his successor, Chen Shui‐bian of
the DPP, were perceived by Beijing as deviating from the “One China principle”.
However, frictions remained within the diplomatic sphere and did not escalate to
the level seen during the 1995‐96 crisis. However, there was no noticeable thaw inthe relationship until 2008, when KMT leader Ma Ying‐jeou was elected president.
Ma pursued a policy of cross‐strait “peaceful development” on the basis of aparty‐to‐party agreement made between the KMT and the CCP in 2005.

After one year with Tsai at the helm, it has become clear that the old frictions with
the CCP remain. In May 2016, President Tsai gave her inaugural address, in which
she refrained from explicitly mentioning the “1992 Consensus.” The omission of theterm prompted strong criticism from Beijing which suspended all official contact
with Taiwan the following month. During 2016, Beijing attempted to exert pressure
on Taiwan by limiting the flow of Chinese tourists to the island, acceding torequests from Taipei’s diplomatic allies to switch recognition to the PRC, and byblocking Taiwanese participation in international high‐level meetings.

Chapter 4 — China vs. Taiwan (Hellström)

59

STATUS QUO AT RISK?
Amid the deterioration of cross‐Strait contact in 2016, many observers concluded
that the potential of armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait had increased. However, it
should be noted that regardless of the diplomatic tensions, there is little
enthusiasm from Taiwan or the United States and China to change the current
situation. All parties realize that any significant changes in the status quo could
trigger a military conflict which would put regional security at risk and havepotential global repercussions. As Beijing, Washington, and Taipei all have a vested
interest in stable cross‐Strait relations, the likelihood of a change in the status quo
is low; however, in the long run, there are several uncertainties.

The CCP has declared that the Taiwanese “separatist forces” are threatening peacein the Taiwan Strait, but does not specify the constituents of those forces. Beijing
has also vowed to “employ non‐peaceful means and other necessary measures” if
Taiwan were to declare independence from China.2 In light of the strong support of
the Taiwanese public for a continuation of the status quo, the likelihood of a formal
declaration of independence in the foreseeable future is low; therefore, the riskthat China could resort to military aggression to unify Taiwan with the PRC is alsolow.

That said, China has refused to provide a clear definition of the actions it regards as
declarations of independence. Moreover, while China has stated that non‐peacefulmeans shall be used in the event that “possibilities for a peaceful reunification
should be completely exhausted,” the Chinese government has not specified onwhat grounds this will be assessed in the future if all efforts to rein in Taiwan fail.
Further, there has been no clear deadline for any possible reunification; however,
the CCP Chairman, Xi Jinping, hinted that it should at least be before the 100th
anniversary of the People’s Republic in 2049 as the inclusion of Taiwan in the PRC
remains one of Beijing’s most important “core interests” for territorial integrity.

China Internet Information Center, “Anti‐Secession Law,” Adopted at the Third Session of theTenth National People's Congress on March 14, 2005. URL:
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005lh/122724.htm

2

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Chapter 4 — China vs. Taiwan (Hellström)

Taiwan, for its part, is concerned about the military pressure China continues toexert on the island. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, China has
deployed no less than a thousand short‐ and medium‐range ballistic missiles along
the coastal areas facing the Taiwan Strait. In its National Defense Report 2015, theMinistry stated that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plans to establish“a formidable military arsenal for conduct military operations against Taiwan”
before 2020.3

The United States Department of Defense noted that China’s development ofmilitary capabilities “to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion” pose major
challenges to Taiwan’s security. While the PLA has been increasingly focused on
potential contingencies in the East and South China Seas, according to thePentagon, the Taiwan Strait has remained the primary driver of Chinese military
investment.

WILL THE U.S. DEFEND TAIWAN?
A fundamental factor in Taiwan’s defense planning is its military relationship with
the United States. When the U.S. shifted diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the
PRC in 1979, it agreed to continue relations with Taipei under the Taiwan Relations
Act (TRA), which was drawn up to “help maintain peace, security, and stability in
the Western Pacific”, but has often been misinterpreted as a legal obligation on the
U.S. to defend Taiwan. In the TRA, a policy is stated that maintains the capacity toresist coercion against Taiwan; however, it is not an explicit commitment to use
those capabilities.4

The TRA was, in fact, more of an intention to assist Taiwan to maintain its own
defensive capabilities rather than a vow to defend Taiwan. As such, it states that the
U.S. will provide military equipment to the Taiwanese armed forces “in such
Ministry of National Defense, ROC, “2015 National Defense Report,” Chapter 2, Section 2.
URL: http://report.mnd.gov.tw/pagee495.html?sn=9&lang=en
4 See, for example: Ku, Julian, ”Taiwan’s U.S. Defense Guarantee is Not Strong, But It Isn’t That
Weak Either,” Lawfare, January 15, 2016. URL:
https://www.lawfareblog.com/taiwans‐us‐defense‐guarantee‐not‐strong‐it‐isnt‐weak‐either
3Chapter 4 — China vs. Taiwan (Hellström)

61

quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self‐defense
capability”.

In 1979, Taiwan had the capabilities to deter and defend itself from a Chinese
invasion; however, with China’s ambitious military build‐up, especially since thelate 1990s, it has become difficult for Taiwan to maintain these capabilities. Under
the TRA, Taiwan has become one of the top recipients of U.S. arms; for example,
from 2004‐2007, Taiwan received U.S. defense equipment worth $4.3 billion,
making it the fourth‐largest recipient of U.S. arms globally, and from 2008‐2011,
Taiwan ranked fifth.5

American arms transfers to Taiwan have led to frustration in Beijing and haveprompted strongly‐worded statements by the CCP leadership. China requires that
the U.S. abide by its commitments in the 1982 Sino‐U.S. joint communiqué, whichstated that the U.S. “intends gradually to reduce its sales of arms to Taiwan”.

In response to Chinese concerns, the Obama administration did not authorize anyarms sales to Taiwan for four years until December 2015 when it offered an arms
package worth $1.8 billion,6 which was the longest gap between notifications toCongress of planned arms sales to Taiwan since the U.S. diplomatic recognition of
the PRC in 1979. The 2015 arms deal came just months before the Taiwanesepresidential elections.

LOOKING AHEAD
Going forward, cross‐strait stability rests on three major uncertainties.

Grimmett, Richard F., “U.S. Arms Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major Clients,
2004‐2011,” Congressional Research Service, September 19, 2012, p.6. URL:
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/natio
nal_reports/united_states/USCRS_2004‐2011.pdf
6 Brunnstrom, David and Zengerle, Patricia, “Obama administration authorizes $1.83‐billion
arms sale to Taiwan,” Reuters, December 17, 2015. URL:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us‐usa‐taiwan‐arms‐idUSKBN0TZ2C520151217
5

62

Chapter 4 — China vs. Taiwan (Hellström)First, Beijing’s red lines are highly uncertain; in other words, it is not known underwhat circumstances the CCP would resort to “non‐peaceful means” to rein in
Taiwan. Beijing has intentionally refrained from stating explicitly when it would nolonger be possible to unify with Taiwan using peaceful means, or whether there is a
unification deadline.

Second, it is uncertain whether the U.S. would intervene militarily in the event ofChinese aggression towards Taiwan. These uncertainties may increase with the
Trump administration, which, while reaffirming its commitments towards Taipei inearly 2017, has sent mixed messages as far as its China policy is concerned. In
terms of military engagement, it is clear that the TRA does not require the U.S. todefend Taiwan in the event of a clash with China; that said, there may be several
reasons for Washington to show its resolve in responding to Chinese assertivenessin the Asia‐Pacific, not least in order to send a message of continued resolve to its
allies.

Finally, it is uncertain whether Taiwan’s stance towards independence will change.
Few observers expect the decades‐long public support for the status quo in therelationship to change substantially. Still, it cannot be ruled out thatpro‐independence or pro‐unification sentiment may grow 10‐15 years down theroad. In such a scenario, Taipei might adjust its policies in line with “the will of the
Taiwanese people”, which President Tsai has vowed to respect.

One of the Tsai administration’s main challenges in the years ahead will be tobalance stable and peaceful relations with the PRC against concerns by the
Taiwanese public. Taiwan knows that it would not be able to defeat China in theevent of an armed conflict; therefore, the overarching aim of the Taiwanesenational defense strategy is to ensure Beijing does not resort to force in the firstplace.

Chapter 5 — North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Threats and Their Impact on
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CHAPTER 5

North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Threats and Their Impact
on Japanese Security1

Hiroyasu Akutsu2
National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS)INTRODUCTION

Since Kim Jong Un came in power in the DPRK, the country’s military threat has significantly
increased both globally and regionally, with its 4th and 5th nuclear tests and the series oflaunches of various types of missiles only reinforcing the already strained security situationin Northeast Asia.3 For Japan in particular, the series of Nodong/Rodong missile launches in2016 significantly raised the threat level. North Korea’s development of these capabilities has
outpaced the general assessments of the country’s military capabilities. The Japanese
defense whitepaper now describes North Korea’s nuclear and missile developments as “aserious and imminent threat” to regional and global security.4 Further, North Korea’s
nuclear and missile activities as well as the country’s non‐traditional offensive activities suchas cyber and other asymmetric capabilities have reinforced Japanese security concerns.
What is behind North Korea’s assertive and aggressive behavior and how has Japan reacted
1 This paper is a revised version of the paper originally presented at the workshop on January 25, 2017.

The original version was based on Hiroyasu Akutsu, “Assessing North Korean Security and Military Threats:
A Japanese Perspective,” a background paper for Alliance Policy for Today’s North Korea at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace on December 15, 2016.
http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/12/15/assessing‐north‐korean‐security‐and‐military‐threats‐japan
ese‐perspective‐pub‐67743
2 The author is a professor and senior fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS). The viewsin this paper are solely of his own and do not represent those of NIDS or of any other institutions including
Government of Japan.
3 The DPRK conducted its 6th nuclear test on September 3, 2017. It should be reminded that this paper
reflects the situation before the latest test.
4 Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan (Tokyo: Japanese Ministry of Defense, 2016), p. 19.

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Japanese Security (Akutsu)

to North Korea’s recent nuclear and missile provocations?

This paper aims to answer these questions by briefly examining North Korea’s military
strategy as well as North Korea’s nuclear and missile development and its implications forJapanese security.

NORTH KOREA’S SECURITY STRATEGYKim Jong Un has consolidated his power base since officially becoming the supreme leaderof North Korea in 2012 through a reign of terror,. This has been demonstrated through hispurges of many of his father’s loyalists. He has also aggressively pursued and expanded the
DPRK’s military and strategic legacies inherited from his father. The new regime has thus
reaffirmed their grand strategy of making the DPRK into a strong and prosperous nation (強盛國家)5, and terminating the U.S. hostile policy toward the country (敵視政策). It has also
adopted a new strategy, called Byungjin (並進路線), to develop the economy while at thesame time acquiring a robust nuclear deterrence. This policy for the simultaneousdevelopment of DPRK’s military and economic capabilities was originally announced by Kim
Il Sung, the founding father of the DPRK and Kim Jong Un’s grandfather; however, therenewed strategy has given de facto legitimacy to the security strategies and military policiesof the Kim Jong Un regime.

While the DPRK’s economy has been recognized as one of the weakest in the world, anddespite the financial and economic sanctions imposed by the international community, someindicators have shown that the country’s economic growth rate has been positive and isbetter than during the later periods of the Kim Jong Il regime.6

However, the development of its nuclear capabilities has probably been the DRPK’s number
one priority. As a declared policy, the DPRK’s position as a nuclear weapons state wasstipulated in the preamble to the 2012 constitution and was at the heart of key legislation
The concept of “strong and prosperous nation” involves at least three aspects or stages: apolitico‐ideological giant, a military giant and an economic giant.
6 For more detailed analyses, see, for example, National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asia Strategic
Review 2015 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2015), pp. 62‐74; and National Institute for
Defense Studies, East Asia Strategic Review 2016 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2016), pp.
78‐90.
5

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65

adopted by the Supreme Peoples’ Assembly in 2013.7 This law appears to have been North
Korea’s first‐ever official “nuclear doctrine” as its 10 articles involved provisions that stated;
no first use, safe and secure storage and management of nuclear weapons, nonproliferationof nuclear weapons, technology and weapons‐grade nuclear materials, and so on. 8
Statements issued after North Korea’s 4th and 5th nuclear tests reinforced the spirit of thisnuclear doctrine. Importantly, the language used by North Korea suggested that the regime
was aiming to not only force the U.S. to acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear weapons state
officially or unofficially, but also to make such an acknowledgement a precondition for any
future negotiations. In such negotiations, North Korea appears to hope to reach an
agreement with the U.S. that North Korea is fully committed to nuclear non‐proliferation as“a responsible nuclear weapons state.” In return, North Korea would expect the U.S., its allies,
and friends to lift existing financial and economic sanctions, guaranteeing North Korea’s
security and economic sustainability. Of course, this does not mean that North Korea’s main
goal is to maneuver diplomatically to openly negotiating with the U.S.; on the contrary, thecountry is hell‐bent on becoming a nuclear weapons state. Nonetheless, the country’s past
behavior suggests that it has a holistic and sophisticated idea on how to use its nuclear
program both militarily and diplomatically.

NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR AND MISSILE THREATSWhile North Korea’s actual nuclear weapons capabilities involve many uncertainties, there islittle doubt that the country has made significant progress in its nuclear testing. The
management and control of the test environment for nuclear devices have significantly
evolved and yields have increased as testing has progressed. Although North Korea claimed
that the 4th test in January, 2016 was a hydrogen bomb test, the magnitude of the explosion
indicated that was probably not. However, the yield size of the 5th test in September, 2016
was approximately 11‐12kt, which is roughly equivalent to the yield of the nuclear bomb
(15kt) dropped on Hiroshima in August, 1945. As such, this test could not be dismissed asjust another provocation.

However, North Korea has not yet demonstrated the ability to mount a nuclear warhead on aballistic missile; however, given its technological progress in other areas, the accelerated pace
7 “Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State Adopted,” Korean Central News Agency, April 1,

2013.
8 See the author’s chapter in the forthcoming report on the NIDS 19th International Symposium on Security

Affairs, held on July 25, 2016. The agenda of the symposium was “The Kim Jong Un Regime and the Future
Security Environment Surrounding the Korean Peninsula.”

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Chapter 5 — North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Threats and Their Impact on
Japanese Security (Akutsu)

of the nuclear program, and especially the country’s determination to achieve its strategic
goals, it is reasonable to assume that North Korea already has this capability.

North Korea’s missile capabilities also appear to be advanced and diversified, as it now has
multiple missile types with different target ranges and strategic utilities. During the last few
decades, the DPRK has developed the Toksa/KN02, the Scud series, the Nodong, Musudan,
Taepodong I/II, KN08/14, and SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile) (KN‐11)
missiles. Except for the Taepodong series, the missile launchers have been generally mobile
and therefore difficult to detect. North Korea has also hinted that a solid fuel missile engine
was tested, and it is likely that solid fuel was used in the SLBM that was test‐launched in2017. A series of SLBM and Nodong missile launches in 2016 were especially threatening
because they were even more difficult to detect; which poses a greater challenge to existing
U.S.‐led ballistic missile defense (BMD) posturing and to Japan’s missile defense capabilities.
Further, especially from a Japanese perspective, if the DPRK’s Nodong/Rodong missiles havebeen modified to carry a nuclear warhead, this would be a major game changer andseriously disrupt existing strategic balances in the region.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPANESE SECURITY

As stated at the beginning, the threat of the DPRK’s nuclear and missile development toJapan has been reinforced over the past 23 years, especially since the Rodong/Nodong
missile was launched toward Japan in 1993. Defense of Japan, released in 1993, stated that
North Korea was probably developing Nodong/Rodong I missiles and also claimed that the
DPRK had test‐launched a ballistic missile that might have been a Nodong/Rodong I, which
flew about 500km into the Sea of Japan. The report also suggested that the test was
suboptimal or restricted as the missile was believed to have a maximum range of 1,000km
and thus could have targeted Western Japan.9 As the Japanese defense whitepaper stated,Japan was already back then “strongly concerned” about the possibilities of North Korean
nuclear and missile capability developments as this would destabilize the international
community as a whole.10

The first nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula in 1994 reinforced Japanese concerns, andthe current DPRK nuclear and missile developments have significantly raised the level ofJapanese
Ministryof
Defense,Defenseof(http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1993/w1993_01.html).
10 Ibid.
9

Japan

1993,

ArchiveChapter 5 — North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Threats and Their Impact on
Japanese Security (Akutsu)

67

concern about a real security threat to Japan. In response to the continued missile launches
by North Korea, in August 2016, Japan’s Ministry of Defense issued an order to destroy any
North Korea’s missiles and their fragments that fall on Japanese territory. Of the two
Nodong/Rodong missiles launched towards Japan, one fell within Japan’s exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) on August 3, and of the Nodong/Rodong or Scud ER missiles launchedon September 5, 2016, all fell within the Japanese EEZ; all of which has led to increased
concern about Japan’s security, as all were launched from transporter erector launchers(TELs), which were fired simultaneously without warning. Fortunately, there were no active
Japanese fishing vessels or civilian aircraft flying in the areas in which the missiles fell;
nonetheless, these missile launches demonstrated that regardless of whether they were
nuclear tipped or not, they could pose existential threats to Japan.

The series of SLBM launches by North Korea have also increased the alert levels in Japan’snational defense as the country has been continuously developing these technologies. While
the general level and quality of North Korea’s military and dual‐use technologies might still
be far behind those of the most advanced western countries, the accelerated pace of theNorth Korean developments and the improved capabilities have forced Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe to describe North Korea’s missile (as well as nuclear) threat as “a new dimension”
at a press conference after North Korea’s 5th nuclear test on September 9, 2016.11

While maintaining a basic, comprehensive policy approach of “dialogue and pressure” andtoughening the financial and economic sanctions on North Korea both individually andwithin the framework of the United Nations Security Council,12 it is important for Japan toenhance its deterrence capabilities, most of which are provided by the U.S., in response to
North Korea’s continued military provocations. It has also becoming critical for Japan tomaintain and enhance Japanese‐U.S.‐ROK trilateral defense cooperation to further improve
interoperability through joint exercises. It is encouraging that the U.S., South Korea, andJapan conducted the first‐ever trilateral joint BMD exercise (Pacific Dragon) in June, 2016;13
however, these three partners need to build on these exercises and further enhance theirinteroperability. Further, a long overdue General Security of Military Information Agreement
11 “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Seventy‐First Session of the United Nations General

Assembly,” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, September 21, 2016.
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201609/71unga.html
12 For Japan’s existing policy framework for North Korea, see Hiroyasu Akutsu, “A Japanese Perspective on
North Korea at the Crossroad,” Journal of International Strategic Studies (European Centre of International
Strategic Researches (CERIS), 2012), pp. 44‐49.
http://ceris.be/fileadmin/library/Publications/Journal‐N5‐E.pdf
13 “Trilateral Pacific Dragon ballistic missile defense exercise concludes,” US Navy News (U.S. Third Fleet
Public Affairs), June 27, 2016. http://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/130035

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Chapter 5 — North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Threats and Their Impact on
Japanese Security (Akutsu)(GSOMIA) was signed between Japan and South Korea on November 23, 2016, which should
contribute to the enhancement of Japanese‐ROK bilateral security cooperation and promote
Japanese‐U.S.‐ROK trilateral interoperability.

CONCLUDING REMARKSAs this paper has highlighted, North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats have grownsignificantly, with North Korea’s missile capabilities now a serious and imminent threat toJapanese security, as it is speculated that North Korea probably already has the capability tomount a nuclear warhead on a medium‐range missile. With the threat from North Korea
rapidly growing, Japan needs to continue to enhance its alliance with the U.S., strengthen its
security cooperation with South Korea, and strengthen its own defense capabilities.

Seminar Program

69

SEMINAR PROGRAM
NDA‐FOI* Joint Seminar on“The Future of East Asian Security”
January 25, 2017
At the Conference Room No.2 at the Head Quarter Building of National Defense
Academy, 1‐10‐20 Hashirimizu, Yokosukashi, Kanagawa 2398686 JAPAN
9:20‐9:50 Registration at Conference Room
9:50

Opening Remarks•

Japan side:

Prof. Yasuhiro Takeda
Director of GS, NDA•

Swedish side: Dr. Adriana Lins de AlbuquerqueProject Manager, FOI

10:00‐12:30 Morning Session Moderator: Prof. Ryuichi Shoji,
Head of Research Division, GS, NDA(1) “Sino – Japanese Rivalry and the Future of Asia‐Pacific Security: What
Risks of War?”•

Paper presenter: Mr. John Rydqvist, FOI•

Commentator: Associate Prof. Norihiro Sasaki, NDA(2‐1) “Maritime Security”•

Paper presenter: Dr. Testuo Kotani, Senior Fellow, JIIA•

Commentator: Mr. John Rydqvist
Prof. Teruhiko Fukushima, NDA(2‐2) “Lawfare versus the Rule of Law in Asian Security”•

Paper presenter: Associate Prof. Masahiro Kurosaki, NDA•

Commentator: Dr. Adriana Lins de Albuquerque, FOI

12:40‐14:00 Working Lunch at Conference Room•

“Trump Administration and the Future of the Japan‐U.S. Alliance ”•

Speaker: Prof. Matake Kamiya, NDA

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Seminar Program

14:10‐18:00 Afternoon Session
Moderator: Dr. Adriana Lins de Albuquerque(3) “China vs. Taiwan: Growing Uncertainties”•

Paper Presenter: Mr. Jerker Hellström, FOI•

Commentator: Associate Prof. Norihiro Sasaki, NDA(4‐1) “North Korea’s Advanced Military Capabilities and Their Impact on
Japanese Security”•

Paper Presenter: Dr. Hiroyasu Akutsu, NIDS•

Commentator: Mr. Jerker Hellström, FOI(4‐2) “South Korea under Security Readjustment”•

Paper Presenter: Prof. Hideya Kurata, NDA•

Commentator: Mr. John Rydqvist, FOI(5) “Conflict or Cooperation in the Sino‐Indo‐Pakistani Strategic Triangle?”•

Presenter: Mr. Samuel Bergenwall, FOI (absence)•

Commentator: Associate Prof. Toru Ito, NDA

18:30‐ Farewell Reception at Wasabi*FOI: Swedish Defence Research Agency
NDA: National Defense Academy
GS: Center for Global Security
NIDS: National Institute for Defense Studies
JIIA: Japan Institution of International Affairs

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Contributors

CONTRIBUTORS
Yasuhiro Takeda is the Director of Center for Global Security and a Professor ofInternational Relations at the National Defense Academy of Japan. Dr. Takeda isthe author of Comparative Politics of Democratization: Regime Transition in East
Asia as well as many articles on U.S.‐Japan relations and international security
affairs in East Asia.
John Rydqvist is a Researcher of FOI, and is a specialist in WMD strategy andAsian security. His research includes the dynamics of the strategic balance in East
Asia and the Pacific theatre, strategic weapons modernization and force
transformation in key regional and global powers. John has a MA in War Studies
from King’s College, London.
Tetsuo Kotani is a senior fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs(JIIA). He also teaches at Hosei University and JMSDF Command and Staff College.
His research focus is the US‐Japan alliance and maritime security. He received asecurity studies fellowship from the Research Institute for Peace and Security in
2006‐2008. He won the 2003 Japanese Defense Minister Prize.
Masahiro Kurosaki is the Director of the Study of Law, Security and Military
Operations and an Associate Professor of International Law at the National
Defense Academy of Japan Ministry of Defense. He has published a range of articles
and book chapters on the law of international security, the law of armed conflict,international criminal law, and Japanese security laws.
Jerker Hellström is a Deputy Research Director at FOI, where he heads the Asia
and Middle East Programme. Jerker specializes in East Asian security, with a focus
on China. His research includes Chinese foreign, security and defence policy;
EU‐China relations; Sino‐Indian relations; and China's role in Africa. Jerker hasstudied and worked in China for several years, most recently as a correspondent at
Reuters Shanghai bureau.
Hiroyasu Akutsu is a Senior Fellow and Professor at the National Institute for
Defense Studies (NIDS). Dr. Akutsu specialises in political and military affairs inNortheast Asia and the Asia‐Pacific. His studies also include scenario planning,71

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Contributors

strategic operations research (OR), policy simulation/strategic gaming andquantitative analysis of security issues. He received his BA and MA in Law from
Keio University and his PhD in Political Science and International Relations fromthe Australian National University (ANU).

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