Strategic Annual Report 2019Japan and Post-INF Nuclear Arms Control /Non-Proliferation

Japan and Post-INF Nuclear Arms Control /Non-Proliferation

The Defense Department conducted a flight test of a conventionally configured ground-launched cruise missile,
Aug. 2019, San Nicolas Island, Calif. (Photo Scott Howe/Department of Defense/UPI/AFLO)

Ten years have passed since US President

Reagan and Soviet General Secretary

Barack Obama called for a “world

Mikhail Gorbachev, who shared thewithout nuclear weapons” in April 2009.

ideal of eliminating nuclear weapons

However, after short-term progress andand the recognition that there is noa surge in momentum, nuclear arms

winner in a nuclear war and such a war

control and non-proliferation graduallymust thus never be fought, and it obliged

turned sour.

the US and the USSR to reduce their
nuclear arsenals under strict verification

Among the negative trends for nuclear

measures, including on-site inspections,arms control in 2019 was the US

for the first time in history. The United

withdrawal from the Intermediate-

States argues that its withdrawal from

Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,

this historic treaty was in response towhich had a significant impact on theRussia’s noncompliance with the treaty

international community. The INF

through the clandestine testing andTreaty has been regarded as one of thedeployment of 9M729 ground-launchedsymbols of nuclear arms control; it wascruise missiles (GLCM) as well as

signed in 1987 by US President Ronald

China’s possession of hundreds of64

Strategic Annual Report 2019Japan and Post-INF Nuclear Arms Control /Non-Proliferationintermediate-range ballistic and cruise

since July 2019. The situation withmissiles.

respect to the North Korean nuclear
issue has also deteriorated from theIn addition, the United States has yet topositive atmosphere at the North-Southclarify its policy on the New Strategic

Korean/US-North

Arms Reduction Treaty (New START),

meetings in 2018. The second US-North

which will expire in February 2021. If

Korean summit meeting in Hanoi

the treaty expires without any extension

in February 2019 ended without any

or successor treaty, US-Russian bilateral

results, and the working-level talks innuclear arms control, which has been

October were reported to have broken

in place since the Cold War era fordown. Pyongyang has not yet mademaintaining strategic stability, will end

a strategic decision to dismantle its

after nearly half a century. Washington

nuclear weapons program.

Koreansummitproposes that not only the United States
and Russia but also China join theframework of nuclear arms control.
Beijing, however, has not changed its
stance that it will not participate ina nuclear weapons reduction processunless the United States and Russia,
which together hold 90% of the world’s
nuclear weapons, drastically reducetheir nuclear arsenals first.
Regarding nuclear non-proliferation,tensions over the Iranian nuclear issue
have increased since the United States
pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 andre-imposed

andsteadily

expanded

economic sanctions on Iran. In response,
Iran has gradually extended its partial
suspension of JCPOA implementation

65

A meeting of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
Jul. 2019, Vienna. (Photo Xinhua/AFLO)

The worsening of the nuclear situation
also cast a dark shadow on the third
PreparatoryCommittee(PrepCom)

for the 2020 Nuclear non-proliferation
Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.
The US-Russian, US-Chinese and USIranian confrontations were brought
to the PrepCom, where the respective
parties criticized each other. The
widening rift over nuclear disarmament

has become more pronounced between

on military power and the manner in

the non-nuclear-weapon states that had

which it is used. Where there is a highled the way in formulating the Treaty

degree of uncertainty and instabilityon the Prevention of Nuclear Weapons

regarding the prospects for the future(TPNW) and the nuclear-armed statesbalance of power among the major

and their allies that had opposed it.

powers, and where intense competition
is taking place over its maintenance and

The situation surrounding nuclear arms

revision, there will be little incentive forcontrol and non-proliferation is unlikely

the major powers to accept institutional

to improve, at least in the near future,

restrictions on their nuclear weapons

because the ongoing challenges arise

and policies.

from the faltering international system.
In the power transition stemming fromIn addition, changes in the balance

the re-emergence of China and theof power have shaken the existing

resurgence of Russia, rivalry over the

institutional foundations for nuclear

international/regional order surfaces asarms control and non-proliferation,

great power/geopolitical competition.

which were established under theThe nuclear-armed states, their allies

bipolar structure of the Cold War era

and countries of proliferation concern

and maintained under US leadershipthat are involved in this competition

during the unipolar moment after thehaveandend of the Cold War. The current US

military value of nuclear weapons for

retreat from US-Russian nuclear arms

their national security, and become

control is partly due to the great power

extremely cautious about accepting

competition with China, which has

and strengthening nuclear arms control

rapidly modernized its military forces,and non-proliferation that would oblige

including nuclear weapons. In thethem to reduce their nuclear arsenals ormeantime, Russia has not concealed its

to regulate their activities. Arms control

reluctance to further reduce its nuclear

andoriented

arsenal, looking ahead to competition

toward maintaining the status quo,with the United States over spheres ofin which the balance of power at theinfluence and seeking to maintain its

time they are enacted is fixed throughstatus as a nuclear superpower.

reaffirmed

thenon-proliferation

politicalarequantitative and qualitative restrictions

66

Strategic Annual Report 2019Japan and Post-INF Nuclear Arms Control /Non-Proliferation

The passive attitudes of nuclear-weapon

collapse of the NPT be expected forstates toward nuclear arms control havethe time being. Once an international

also negatively affected the NPT regime.

regime has been established, it has been

Despitediscriminativeargued that, even if the distribution ofnature of the NPT regime, whichpower and the structure of interests

divides the international community

among

into five nuclear-weapon states andwere to change, it would not be easily

other non-nuclear-weapon states andterminated because significant changes

which prohibits the acquisition ofor termination impose a heavy burden

nuclear weapons by only the latter, iton the participating countries; thehas achieved near-universality. This

legitimacy of regimes and the practiceis partly because the “three pillars ofof adherence have been establishedthe NPT” – nuclear non-proliferation,

through the acceptance of principles,

peaceful uses of nuclear energy, andnorms and rules by the participating

nuclear disarmament – are incorporated

countries, and constraints such as theinto the NPT regime to alleviate thiscost and criticism of deviant behavior

discriminative nature. In particular,would increase. However, it cannot

non-nuclear-weapon states emphasize

be ruled out that the collapse of one

the importance of nuclear disarmament.

of the “three pillars of the NPT” may

Theirtheweaken the cohesiveness and legitimacy

impasse on this issue made many non-of the NPT regime, and that actions

nuclear-weapon states and civil societythat violate the principles, norms anddecide to establish the TPNW in order torules of the NPT regime will increase

create a norm for the legal prohibition ofin future using this as a pretext or as anuclear weapons, even though nuclear-result of a deterioration in the security

armed states and their allies were highlyenvironment.

thestrong

highlyfrustration

withtheparticipatingcountries

unlikely to participate.
Northeast Asia is the region with67

Given their absence, the TPNW would

the greatest degree of instability andnot be an alternative to the NPT as a

uncertainty surrounding nuclear issues,

framework for nuclear disarmament

placing Japan at a critical strategic

and non-proliferation, at least in thecrossroads. The touchstone will be

short and medium term. Nor can theJapan’s policy planning on deterrence

as well as disarmament and non-launched intermediate-range missiles,

proliferation in the “post-INF Treaty

is inextricably involved, Japan should

period.” While Japan and the Unitedcontemplate how to develop arms control

Statesand non-proliferation measures in order

donot

possess

intermediate-range

land-based

missiles,North

to control and mitigate the negativehaveacquired

impacts that nuclear weapons andhundreds of such missiles respectively

missiles and their counter-measures may

and enhanced them both quantitatively

have on regional stability and security,and qualitatively, posing potential andwith the same priority as policies ontangible threats to Japan’s security.

deterrenceIn

anti-access/Constructing a multilateral frameworkarea-denial (A2/AD) capability – infor countries with asymmetric andwhich

missilesdiverse capabilities and interests acrossplay an important role – has also beena wide range of issues presents astrengthened, eroding the superiority

conundrum that will take a considerableof the Japan-US alliance at the regionalamount of time to resolve. However,level. The Japan-US alliance needs toarms control and non-proliferation

strengthen its deterrence capabilities,of intermediate-range missiles in theand careful and urgent consideration

post-INF Treaty period could indicate

must be given to whether ground-

the way forward for a new/renewed

launched intermediate-range missiles

paradigm of nuclear disarmament andcould be an option, what their advan-non-proliferation regime. It is therefore

tages and challenges are, and whether

an important policy issue that Japan

there are alternatives, taking into accountmust actively address.■

Korea

and

Chinaaddition,

China’sintermediate-rangeandcounter-measures.

the situation after the demise of the INF
Treaty.
At the same time, since Northeast
Asia is the region where the world’smost intense great power/geopolitical
rivalry is foreseen and the developmentofnuclearmissileweapons

forces,andvarious

includingground-68