Rana Al Mutawa
51-128220"Humanitarian Intervention"
International Political Economy
Professor Nobuhiro Hiwatari
July 21st, 2013
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

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Abstract:“Humanitarian Intervention” is considered essential by some to end the human rights
violations and abuses in other parts of the world. Now often labeled as the “Responsibility toProtect” (R2P), it was established by the UN and there are now six clear criteria of what factors
should be present for intervention to take place. However, humanitarian intervention is still seen
as controversial since it involves the use of military force to end violence. In fact, humanitarian
intervention has many times caused human rights violations of its own, sometimes making thesituation even worse than before the intervention. This is mainly due to the fact thathumanitarian intervention is not being used in the best way possible to ensure its success. For
example, motivations other than ending human rights violations, not having a clear picture of
the reality on the ground, not exhausting diplomatic and non-military methods first are factors
which usually lead to the failure of intervention. In my analysis, I looked at the consequences ofhumanitarian intervention and if it was being used to end human rights violations by looking at
the six factors and their applicability in the three case studies where intervention took place:
Libya, Kosovo and East Timor. I then compared that with Rwanda and Iraq, where there was
genocide but no intervention. The result was that with when all the six factors are not present,
humanitarian intervention is not being used in a way that end human suffering and theconsequences of the intervention may be failure, or at the very least, corruption.

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Research Question
Is “humanitarian intervention” being used in a way that ends human rights violations andsuffering?

Definition of Humanitarian Intervention
The definition of “humanitarian intervention” varies from context to context, and depends onwhether it is being viewed from a legal, human rights, and ethics…etc. perspective. However, ingeneral, it is the “state's use of "military force against another state when the chief publicly
declared aim of that military action is ending human-rights violations being perpetrated by thestate against which it is directed." (Marjanovik). There are three agreed upon characteristics ofhumanitarian intervention: (Frye)
1- It almost always involves the threat and use of military force.
2- It interferes in the internal affairs through military force.
3- It is in response to a humanitarian crisis which does not necessarily affect the interfering
states’ security.

Reasons for Intervention
The reasons cited for needing humanitarian intervention is first for saving lives.
Proponents claim that without humanitarian interventions, big conflicts can escalate and cause
death and killings on a massive scale, possibly leading to genocide if not stopped.

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Along with the first goal of saving human lives, humanitarian intervention is seen by
proponents as a tool used to end human rights violations and abuses. Another positive aspectaccording to proponents is that intervention deters future human rights abuses, as other statesknow and understand that the international community will intervene and stop them if need be.
Other than the above, intervening to end a conflict early on means less destruction interms of infrastructure, economics, politics, stability and so on. Ending a conflict early is also
seen as a prevention of the expansion of the conflict or war to other regions.

Criticism of Humanitarian Intervention
Opponents of “humanitarian intervention” see that it is a tool to further imperialist goals,
rather than save lives. Saving lives is considered a guise to interfere in a state where theintervening forces have motives for being involved in. Those ulterior motives can be interfering
to change a political regime or to get access to resources such as oil. Critics of humanitarian
intervention say interventions do not occur in areas where intervening forces do not haveanything to gain from, and cite Rwanda or Sudan as examples of mass killings that took place
without the action of the international community. This happened at the same time as theinternational community interfered in other regions with smaller conflicts to “save lives.”
Another criticism of intervention is that it causes deaths and human rights violations of its
own, as its core trait is using military force, which means ending some human lives to saveothers. This also means supporting one group over the other, wherein the supported group may
also start committing human rights violations of their own.

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Intervention may also lead to bigger conflicts, as intervening forces may start to fighteach other; and by supporting more military action and one group over the other, this may leadto bigger conflicts.
Critics also say that even if the goals of intervention were truly humanitarian, thosesituations are complex and can easily go array, causing more harm than good. Miscalculation
can occur and make the situation worse.

R2P
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a UN initiative from the 2005 World Summit. It may
be considered as a new label for “humanitarian intervention,” giving specific guidelines about
when intervention should take place and under what circumstances. To avoid being accused ofinterfering in state sovereignty, R2P calls intervention “responsibility to protect” rather than“intervention.” The three pillars of R2P are (“The Responsibility to Protect”):
1. The State has the primary responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.
2. The international community has a responsibility to help or assist the states in fulfilling the
primary responsibility
3. The international community should use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and otherpeaceful means to protect populations from these crimes. If a state fails to protect its
populations or commits above mentioned crimes against them, the international community
should intervene using coercive measures, such as economic sanctions. The last resort is
military intervention.
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As the R2P is the new, organized encyclopedia for “humanitarian intervention,” I will beusing some of its research for judging the success or failure of interventions, specificallythrough the “six factors” detailed later on.

Qualitative Methodology
1- Consequence of intervention (were more killed after or before intervention? How did thepolitical regime change? Etc.)
2- The six factors of the R2P and if they were present in the intervention cases

Why intervene in some countries and not in others?
From the five case studies detailed below, I found the patterns in behavior regarding
interventions. In general, military intervention is risky and without the incentive of benefit to theintervening states, most would prefer not to intervene. Reasons are:1- It is costly and requires large amounts of money to be spent for military intervention
2- Intervening states do not want to intervene if the other state is an ally or friendly state
3- There might be some opposition from the intervening countries’ citizens, especiallyover concern that scarce taxpayer money is being used
4- It may create political tension with other states. Not only will there be tension in thestate being intervened in, but also between the major powers if they disagree on
whether to intervene or not
5- Intervention may fuel a conflict and intervening countries may be blamed
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As such, intervention is not considered a favorable option to states, especially when there
is no benefit to be gained for the intervening states. This example may be seen in Rwanda, in
Iraq during the Kurdish Genocide, or in Darfur.
Countries then are pulled into an intervention when human rights abuses happen and they
believe they can also benefit by intervening. In some cases, human rights abuses have been used
as a pretext for invasion when intervening countries believe they have a high chance of successin achieving political or economic goals. Those include:
1-Intervention motivated for political regime change
2-Intervention motivated by economic gains and access to resources throughintervention
3-Intervention for other political reasons such as distracting from problems at home,and showing strength and ability to control the international arena
4-Worry that a humanitarian crisis might spill over to other strategic states or areas

The Six Factors for R2P
The International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) Report
says that military intervention must only be taken if those six factors are present (“TheResponsibility to Protect: Report of The ICISS”):
1- Just Cause - Is the threat a "serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings"?
2- Right Intention - Is the main intention of the military action to prevent human sufferingor are there other motives?
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3- Final Resort - Has every other measure besides military invention been taken into
account?
4- Right Authority-The UNSC is the best authority to make this decision (please refer tothe “If the UN Allows It, Does it Necessarily Reduce Human Suffering?” section below
for this factor).
5- Proportional Means - Are the minimum necessary military means applied to secure
human protection?
6- Reasonable Prospect - Is it likely that military action will succeed in protecting human
life, and are the consequences of this action sure not to be worse than no action at all?

If the UN Allows It, Does it Necessarily Reduce Human Suffering?
Under the “Right Authority” of the six factors of R2P, the UNSC is considered to be theright authority to decide if intervention takes place or not, and it is the unit which is legallypermitted to make this decision. Whether the intervention was legal or not does not necessarilychange the outcome regarding human security. If the UN legalizes a certain action, it does notmean that it necessarily improves human conditions and gives people more security.

Member Bias is Contradictory to Human Security
The UN has a member bias. There are only five permanent members in the UNSC,
meaning that not all voices are heard. The only voices heard are the ones of the most powerfulstates, and their decisions impact the lives of people in the least powerful states. In this sense, the
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UN may actually harm those people it claims to be protecting by putting their fate in the hands ofthe most powerful nations, instead of giving them the right to choose on their own. In this sense,
the UN is actually reducing human security-instead of empowering those people and giving thema voice, it is doing the exact opposite. In fact, it is doing to them what it claims it wants to protect
them from: authoritarianism.

Political Motivations
The fact that there are opposing viewpoints in the UNSC is not enough to come with adecision that is made on the basis of what is best for the people the decision is affecting. UNSC
members will usually vote while keeping certain factors in mind, especially politics or
economics, while human rights or human security may be very far below on the list. Russia andChina, which were against the intervention, did not veto the UNSCR 1973 and instead abstained,
citing the Arab League pleas as the reason. This shows that political tension was what motivatedtheir decision, and not human security.

Case Studies: Countries where humanitarian intervention took place
Case 1: Libya - Introduction:
The Libyan civil war in was fought between Muammar Al Gadaffi (and his loyalists) andthe rebel forces in 2011. Motivations for intervention in Libya were cited as “responsibility to

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protect” Libyans from Muammar Al Gaddafi’s regime which allegedly killed its own people on a
massive scale during the civil war.

Motivations
Libya was considered to be part of the “Axis of Evil” by the US. It’s foreign anddomestic policy focused on national development and were opposed to Western interests.
Gaddafi was a supporter of pan-Arabism and pan-African initiatives and made numerous efforts
to follow this path. He partly nationalized Libya’s oil wealth when he came into power, and wasconsidering nationalizing it completely in 2011. According to an article in the Financial Times,	  “Western oil companies operating in Libya have privately warned that their operations in the

country may be nationalized if Colonel Muammer Gaddafi’s regime prevails” (Blas & Pfeifer).
Such nationalist regimes reject Western influence and make clear efforts to control theirstate’s resources rather than allow foreign, especially Western, control. Such leaders are notfavorable to Western powers, as they many times do not allow them to promote their strategicinterests. For example, Iran’s Prime Minister Mossadegh, who nationalized the country’s oil
wealth in the 1950’s, was later overthrown by a coup d’état by the US and UK. There seems to
be a pattern of secular, nationalist leaders being removed by Western powers, ironically, to be
replaced with Islamist ones. In some cases, Western powers themselves funded or trained
Islamist groups which they consider to be terrorists, which later become a new source ofinstability - this includes the Taliban, the rebels in Libya, and now, the rebels in Syria.

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How Will Intervention Impact Libya in the Long Run?
Gaddafi’s rule changed Libya from being one of the poorest countries in the developingworld and into a country with the highest Human Development Index (HDI) in all of Africa. His
education reforms increased the adult literacy rate to 88.4%, and 99.9% youth literacy rates, oneof the highest literacy rates in the region. He provided free healthcare, leading to high life
expectancy rates and low infant mortality rates (UNDP). Although there is not yet any
information on how that has changed, there is a chance it ends negatively. For example, if the oil
industry is privatized as it was in Iraq, there may be not enough money to fund those social
reforms that were funded by the oil wealth.
This may be similar to Iraq’s case with Saddam. Thousands of illiterate Iraqis became
literate during his reign. His public-health system was awarded with a UNESCO prize ("Saddam
Hussein”). However, during that same time in Iraq were secret police, human rights abuses andunlawful killings. Saddam was removed from power supposedly for those reasons, however,human rights abuses and mass killings have not decreased- in fact, they have increased. But that is
not all- Iraqi oil has been privatized, and the social services people once enjoyed are now far
gone. Not only is there no stability in Iraq now, but the living standards that were once high under
Saddam are also now long gone (Shani, 21).

Death Toll
The main reason cited for intervention in Libya was saving lives. It was alleged that
Gaddafi killed tens of thousands of his own people. In the beginning, rebel officials estimatedthat 50,000 people have been killed by Gaddafi’s regime. This number has been revised down to
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25,000 sometime later, and on January 2013 it has been revised to 4,700 people from the
opposition killed ("Libyan Revolution Casualties”). This is a significantly lower number than the
one given in the beginning of the conflict. This shows that the intervention has been based on
misinformation and lack of credibility. In that sense, implementing the R2P may be considered
as a failure as it may have increased the deaths that were not as large as expected to begin with.

War Crimes
War crimes were another reason for intervention. Everyday, mass media spoke about the
terrible atrocities Gaddafi and his loyalists committed; yet not as much attention was given to thewar crimes committed by the rebels. Crimes reported included unlawful killings, torture,detainment without charges, and so on.
Many of the people were killed or tortured only because they were black Africans andsuspected to be Gaddafi’s foreign mercenaries or supporters. Black African women reported
rapes and night-time kidnapping in their refugee camps by Libya’s opposition, the National
Transitional Council (NTC) members. There was an estimate of more than 5,000 black migrants
being detained in makeshift jails, ones who faced beatings, revenge killings, and mass execution.
Most of the detainees say they were not mercenaries and did not take part in the war, but weredetained with no evidence. ("Black Africans Under Attack”)
A video showed black Africans being tortured in what appeared to be a zoo cage. Theirhands tied to their backs, they were being verbally abused forced to eat a flag. Human Rights
International suspects the rebels of ethnic cleansing. Amnesty International says that sub-Saharan
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Africans “became targets of stigma, discrimination and violence ("Libyan Rebels Cage
Africans”). The rebels in Libya many times come from terrorist groups, and have been affiliatedwith Al Qaeda. ("Washington May Arm Al-Qaeda”). Those organizations are known for their
human rights abuses and violations, which the West has been fighting in Afghanistan since 2001.
It is ironic then, that they start funding them in another part of the world.
Incidents of sectarian violence has also increased with the fall of Gaddafi and the rise ofIslamist groups, such as the bulldozing of a Sufi mosque by armed groups including somegovernment officials who took part in the destruction of the mosque. The people calling for its
destruction were claiming “black magic” was being practiced there. Reuters has information that
the Minister of Interior gave them the “green light.” In another event, the tomb of a 15th-century
Sufi scholar was burnt along with the mosque’s library ("Libya's Sufism Bulldozed").
Violence against Christians has also been reported. Unidentified men assaulted a Coptic
church in Benghazi, which was the third reported assault on a church during that time, and an Al
Qaeda flag was raised above the church, according to an eyewitness. A militia also kidnapped
tens of Coptic Christians and took them to a detention center where they say they were tortured
and threatened to be killed (Elhelwa)
If Gaddafi’s rule was marked by corruption, this may show that corruption still exists in
the government, with authorities allegedly joining in the rape of black African women or indemolishing a Sufi religious site. If it was marred with violence, this shows other types ofviolence have risen, maybe only directed at other people. There is even more fear now Gaddafi’s time was not characterized by chaos and absence of law. This, along with the new

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types of violence that have risen (sectarian, racist, religious…etc.) can be more problematic than
Gaddafi’s violence towards those who spoke out against him.

UN Security Council Resolutions: UNSCR 1970
The UNSCR 1970 was passed on February 26th, 2011 because of what wasperceived as Gaddafi’s “outrageous violence” against the Libyan people. The UNSCR 1970
condemned the use of lethal force by Gaddafi’s regime and demanded an end to the violence in
Libya, calling for the Libyan government to respect human rights and allow humanitarian aid
and foreign media a safe passage. It imposed an arms embargo, meaning that no weapons should
be sent in or out of Libya ("Fact Sheet: UNSCR 1970 "). However, France’s arming of the rebels
may be seen as an open violation of the UNSCR 1970 (Abu-Aun).
UNSCR 1973
Adopted on March 17th, 2011, The UNSCR 1973 was passed because of what wascalled the deteriorating situation in Libya. This resolution was seen as the “legal” basis for the
military intervention. Amongst others, the resolution demanded: (“UNSCR 1973”)•

the immediate establishment of a ceasefire and a complete end to violence and all
attacks against, and abuses of, civilians•

it imposed a no-fly zone over Libya•

authorized “all necessary means to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas”•

strengthened the arms embargo by allowing ships and planes to be forcibly
inspected
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•

requested a panel of experts to oversee the implementation

The resolution demanded an immediate ceasefire and end to all violence. This was quite
hypocritical as the rebels were being armed with weapons being sent by the same sources whichwere demanding an end to all violence, namely France and Qatar ("Libya Conflict"). Theinternational community, thus, was fuelling the conflict and giving people more means to extend
violence, rather than end it.
The most important part of the resolution, however, may be this:Authorizes Member States that have notified theSecretary-General, acting nationally or through regionalorganizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation
with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures,notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), toprotect civilians and civilian populated areas …("UNSCR
1973")
This may have been considered the green light for the intervention. However, thelegitimacy of the intervention may be questioned for two points:
1-The legitimacy of the regional organizations
2-The involvement of the international community in this intervention

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Legitimacy of the Regional Organizations
Although the UNSCR 1973 authorizes the intervention when members of the Security
Council (SC) are acting through the regional organizations, it is important to note that in thiscase, one of the regional organizations can be seen as an illegitimate group. The Arab League,
which was one of the regional organizations being consulted throughout the civil war in Libya
and has been given lots of attention in the UN and in the UNSC resolutions, is an organizations
comprised mostly of dictators, which do not represent the will of their people. Yet, it was being
used to give the appearance of regional democratic legitimacy to the intervention.
This signifies the hypocrisy and illegitimacy of this regional organization, as anorganization of dictators who commit human rights abuses in their own countries were coming
together to supposedly end human rights violations of another authoritarian government. For
example, protests and demonstrations have taken place in some of those same Arab countries,
such as in Bahrain, where the Western-backed government killed and tortured protesters. It is
ironic then that this same government would be assessing the human rights violations in Libya
and how to best end the oppression.

Is the International Community Included?
Intervention is usually forbidden by international law, but allowed only in specific cases
and when the international community intervenes collectively (Modeme). The legality of thewar, then, is questioned as the international community may not be said to have collectively
intervened. Although the UNSCR 1973 was not vetoed by any members, those which abstained
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cited credible reasons for abstaining. For example, India abstained because of the lack of credible
information on what really was happening on the ground in Libya, while Brazil abstained
because of the contradiction of military intervention being used to “end violence.” Russia, China
and Germany were also against the intervention. NATO is comprised of 28 countries, allEuropean or North American. NATO in no way represents the international community, but
represents the Western nations of the “Old Europe” and the “New Europe” which is now alignedwith the developed Western nations after the fall of Communism.
As such, the intervention in no way represents the international community. The
abstaining countries raised doubt about the intervention. The Arab League which supported it
was an organization ruled by Arab dictators committing crimes in their own countries. NATO,
which led the intervention, is a collection of Western states. It can be said then, that theinternational community did not agree to or take part in this intervention, but it was only a few
Western or pro-Western governments which did.

Success or Failure: R2P - The Six Factors
1-

Just Cause - Is the threat a "serious and irreparable harm occurring to humanbeings"?
There was a threat to human beings in Libya, and it may be considered as “serious” asthousands of people have died. However, it cannot be confirmed if those people have died before
the intervention or after. The extent to how serious this threat was is not clear. It may be said that

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even the death of hundreds of people is a serious threat, and the Libyan cause may be considereda just cause.
2-

Right Intention - Is the main intention of the military action to prevent humansuffering or are there other motives?
As mentioned above, in the case of Libya, the intervention seemed more intent on regimechange and access to resources such as oil, rather than being done for humanitarian intentions.
3-

Final Resort - Has every other measure besides military invention been taken

into account?
In Libya, the fact that many members of the international community armed the rebels
and gave them means to kill each other indicates that measures have not been taken to help withpeace process, rather, it helped to exuberate the conflict. Proper measures have been ignored,
rather than taken into account.
4-

Right Authority-The UNSC is the best authority to make this decision

As mentioned above, the UN, especially the UNSC, has a member bias and does notallow the people who will be affected to make the decisions. In contrast, powerful countries
make the decision for them, usually with the decision being influenced by politics. This is in
direct contrast to the human security approach of empowering individuals and giving them avoice which the R2P is based on ("Responsibility to Protect"). The regional organizations
consulted were mostly dictator regimes which were committing their own war crimes, while theinternational community did not agree to this intervention.

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5-

Proportional Means - Are the minimum necessary military means applied tosecure human protection?
It is difficult to say how many people were killed by the NATO bombs because NATOrefused to investigate or even acknowledge the number of deaths caused by their bombs.
Bombings took the lives of children and civilians, and not just “militants.” The death toll causedby NATO airstrikes is 72 civilians killed, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW). Those do
not include military figures (Milne). According to the Libyan government, however, the death
toll caused by NATO is 1,080 (“Counting Cost of Nato”). Arming the rebels as well has been incontradiction to this principle. The minimum military means necessary means that both sides
should not be getting more means to violence when the stated objective is to protect lives.
6-

Reasonable Prospect - Is it likely that military action will succeed in protecting

human life, and are the consequences of this action sure not to be worse than no action at all?
Because of the lack of credible information in Libya, and the complex situation on the
ground (rebels being part of Al-Qaeda, and so on), it would be very difficult to predict theoutcome and acting on it, even with good intentions, would be reckless.
Only one factor of the six required for intervention is present in the Libyan case.
The NATO intervention in Libya is seen as a success to some who find that Libya has been“liberated” and “democratized.” However, the intervention created problems of its own. First, it
is not clear how many people were killed before and after the NATO intervention - some claimthat the majority of deaths came with the NATO bombs. Although there is freedom of the press
and a growth of NGO’s, there is more chaos and no stability. Violence has only changed
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direction and is being targeted at different groups now. The social welfare of the Libyans, which
was once high under Gaddafi, may someday change, especially if oil supplies are privatized. It is
too early to judge how things are going, but from the realities on the ground so far, the situation
is much worse than it was before.

Case 2: Kosovo - Introduction:
From the 28th February, 1998 and until 11th, June 1999 the Kosovo War took place,fought between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) and NATO. On the 24th of March 1999, NATO intervened, citing saving human lives
and ending human rights violations such as ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population as
the reason ("Timeline: Kosovo”).
Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia, was to be tried in the International Criminal
Tribunal (ICT) for committing war crimes. However, what is important to note that NATO
leaders themselves were on top of the list of people to be tried-including Bill Clinton.
Because of political games, trying Clinton or American leaders for war crimes was difficult,and Clinton and other NATO leaders were removed from the list (Mandel, 57). Nevertheless,NATO’s name being on top of the list of ICT signifies that NATO has indeed committed war
crimes of its own in Kosovo.

Death Toll

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There has been some controversy regarding the death toll amassed by the Serbia
Army. In March 1999, the US Defense Secretary stated that 100,000 “may have beenmurdered” (Dogget). This number was never again mentioned, and in fact later went down toless than 3,000 people killed (Steele).
According to the Humanitarian Law Center, around 13,000 people were killed in the
Kosovo war (“Serbia: 13,000 killed”). However, 10,000 of those deaths occurred after theNATO intervention (Wippman). Indeed, before the NATO intervention took place, the death
toll was 2,500. When NATO intervened, 10,000 people were killed in just eleven months,
mostly committed by Serb forces against Albanians (Mandelbaum). NATO claims that this is
why they intervened-because they knew that the Serbs would commit these monstrous
atrocities (Wippman). There is no evidence to support their claims, and all that can be seen
here is that with the arrival of NATO came the deaths and destruction. It is widely acceptedthat the NATO intervention was the cause of most of the ethnic cleansing and war crimes thattook place. The OSCE inquiry said that there was a pattern of increasing killings and war
crimes since March 24th 1999, when NATO’s air war began (Bancroft). Regarding thedeaths committed by NATO itself - according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), 500 people
were killed by the NATO bombs, while the FRY says that the figure is 1,800 (Mandel 60).
International Community
The intervention of Kosovo lacked the approval of the UNSC, as well as the people of theUN. The international community appeared to be mostly against it too. For example, a poll by
the Economist on April 1999 half of the population of Italy was against the intervention, 89%against it in Ukraine and 94% against it in Russia (“World: Europe Support”). In Greece, 99.5%
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of the people were against it. China and India also officially opposed the intervention. A majorityof the people polled - 69% - believed that Clinton should be tried for war crimes, compared to
14% for the Serbian president Milosevic (Mandel, 59). Even the weaponry and military
involvement, although by NATO, did not signify the NATO countries. The US was the leader of
the NATO mission - 80% of all strike missions were American, 90% of the intelligence andreconnaissance missions and 95% of Cruise missiles used were by the US (Mandel, 64).
Therefore, even the NATO countries were not really represented within NATO’s operations.
Therefore, some critics of the intervention claim that this was actually an American intervention,and not an “international one.”

War Crimes: The Racak Massacre
The Racak massacre is the event which is often cited as an example of Milosevic’s
aggression towards the Albanians and as an example of why intervention was required. The
ICTY indicted Milosevic with the murder of 45 unarmed Kosovo Albanians on Januarys 15th,
1999 (Mandel, 72).
However, the attack on that village and three others was pre-announced to track a KLA
group which attacked and killed four policemen in the previous week. The Serbs withdrew and
the KLA re-occupied the village after heavy fighting in the area. KLA fighters were killed, andthe Serbs say that those were the 45 who were killed. A Finnish forensic team, after performing
autopsies, confirmed that 37 out of the 40 bodies showed evidence that the people had usedfirearms (Mandel, 73). This seemed to indicate a battle between two armed groups, rather than amassacre, with the KLA being accused of terrorism.

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Other Controversies
Reporters said it was impossible to get eyewitnesses in refugee camps that could confirm
that mass killings, systematic rape or robberies took place (Mandel, 62).
The Trepca mines, where corpses of over a thousand of Albanians were allegedly
dumped, contained no bodies at all (Mandel, 62). The majority of the 385 murders that Milosevic
was indicted with by the ICTY were committed after the NATO intervention - only 45 of thealleged murders, which are attributed to the Racak massacre, happened before the intervention(Mandel, 63). There is also controversy regarding the Racak massacre - some sources report thatthe people killed in the massacre where KLA fighters and not civilians. This will be described in
more detail later on.
When NATO started bombing, they gave space for the KLA to reign over Kosovo
without restraint, committing some horrible crimes themselves (Mandel, 63). What happened iswhat some refer to as “reverse ethnic cleansing”	
   The main wave of internal displacement took
place after the NATO intervention. More than 245,000 people, mostly non-Albanians, left
Kosovo. Ethnic violence continued many years after ("Durable Solutions"). Officials in
Yugoslavia estimated 70,000 Serbs fleeing from Kosovo since the beginning of the NATObombing campaign (Becker).

Refugees

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One million people became refugees through the bombing campaign in Kosovo (Mandel,
60). During the five months before the intervention when the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE) was in Kosovo there were no refugees ("Testimony of
Monitor”). Three days after the bombing started, there were only 4,000 refugees, but one week
after the refugees amounted to 350,000 (Mandel, 60). Although it was said that Milosevic hascommitted ethnic cleansing against the Albanians, documents show that displacement andrefugees increased only when NATO started bombing, and not before (Mandel, 61).This showsthat the people were fleeing from NATO, or the violence on the ground which started after
NATO intervened-not before.

KLA and “acts of terrorism”“The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was considered a terrorist organization by the US,
the UK and France for years until, in 1998, it was taken off the list of terrorists with no
explanation given (“Syrian Opposition”). The Albanians opposed, non-violently, Serb rule from1989 till 1996. It was only in 1997 that the violence started, spurred by impatience by the nonviolent methods, the availability of cheap weapons in the market, and so on. The KLA appeared
then, and their first step was to assassinate Albanians who were “collaborating” with the Serbs.
By February 1998, they had 40% control of Kosovo for a short period of time (Mandel, 69).
The UNSC itself recognized the acts of violence committed by the KLA. They
condemned the use of “excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peacefuldemonstrators in Kosovo” as well as condemning “all acts of terrorism by the KLA” (Mandel,
24	
  
	
  

70). According to Mandel, KLA incited the violence. Even the pro-interventionist Michael
Ignatieff said that the Kosovars were not ready for compromise, and their hidden strategy was toprovoke the Serbs into committing war crimes, therefore making the case for NATO intervention(Mandel, 71).

The Rambouillet Summit: Introduction
President Milosevic was summoned to a peace conference in Rambouillet, France, on the
30th of January 1999. This peace conference is considered by many as a “war” conference rather
than a “peace” conference. It was frequently noted by independent observers that thisconference’s goal was to make ridiculously unacceptable conditions in the peace deal so the
Serbs would refuse it and it would be a pretext for intervention. What is interesting to note also isthat the Serbs in the beginning agreed to the peace deals, while the Albanians refused("Rambouillet Agreement”). The “non-negotiable principles” which the Serbs agreed on were:An immediate end to all hostilities, broad autonomy for
Kosovo, an executive legislative assembly headed by apresident, a Kosovar judicial system, a democratic system,
elections under the auspices of the OSCE within nine monthsof the signing of the agreement, respect of the rights of all
persons and ethnic groups, and the territorial integrity of the
FRY, with Kosovo remaining within the country (Mandel,
80).
25	
  
	
  

Albanian Refusal and its Consequences
The Albanians refused this deal because it did not grant independence to Kosovo, nor did
it require the presence of NATO, which the KLA wanted ("The Kosovo Crisis”). Because of thedisagreements, another deal was drafted, this one requiring a NATO led international peace
keeping force and a mechanism that would lead to the independence of Kosovo in the next three
years depending on the will of the people (“The Kosovo Crisis”).
The Serbs naturally rejected the NATO operations on their territory. The power given to
NATO to act as it wanted in not just Kosovo, but all of the FRY, was not something a sovereignstate would accept. For example:
NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles,
vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage
and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including
associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include,
but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet,
and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support,
training, and operations (Rambouillet Agreement)
Although the Serbs naturally rejected this imposition on sovereignty, they accepted therest of the agreement, such as giving an interim constitution and a large degree of autonomy to
Kosovo. According to the co-chairs, there was agreement from the Serbs on everything except
the NATO intervention and the referendum for the final settlement of Kosovo. But the co-chairs
26	
  
	
  

insisted that the whole agreement be accepted and signed (“The Kosovo Crisis”). Had the cochairs not pushed for NATO intervention, the peace deal would have been signed and that might
have meant an end to violence - at least, from the FRY side.
Even ex-secretary of state Henry Kissinger said: "the Rambouillet text, which called on
Serbia to admit NATO troops throughout Yugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to startbombing" (Bancroft).	
  The former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia said: "it is now generally
accepted by those who have seen the Rambouillet agreement that no sovereign state could haveagreed to its conditions. The...demand that a referendum on autonomy be held within three years
guaranteed a Serbian rejection” (“The Kosovo Crisis”).

The Beginning of the NATO Intervention
On the 15th of March 1999 the talks resumed, and the Albanians signed the agreement.
After the Albanian signatures were obtained, the prospect of negotiation was over. This is incontrast to the situation in the beginning, where when the Serbs were willing to sign and the
Albanians were not, further negotiations took place. NATO told the FRY to sign the deal or bebombed, and when they did not, they were bombed five days after (“The Kosovo Crisis”).
Also significant to note that is that before the bombing, independent observers said that
there was substantial progress on the ground. There were no international refugees for the past
five months before the intervention, with the internal refugees amounting to a few thousand - amuch smaller number than what would come after NATO’s intervention. Independent observers

27	
  
	
  

also noted that mediation programs between the diverse ethnic communities were successful. At
that time, what was considered to be the problem was the KLA provocations (Mandel, 83).

Motivations for Intervention
Some people cite “saving lives” as the reason for intervention. However, seeing as“saving lives” was not a concern when almost one million were killed in Rwanda; or 150,000
people were killed in Iraq; or when 200,000 were killed in East Timor, it may be a bit naïve toclaim that humanitarian concerns were the reasons for intervention. They were, however, apretext used for intervention.

Distracting from Problems at Home
The first reason for intervention, especially in the case of the US, was distracting fromproblems at home. In the US, Clinton’s extra-marital affair with his intern, Monica Lewinsky,
was still getting more attention than Kosovo. In his press conference on March 19, 1999, in
which the main topic of discussion was the NATO intervention, Clinton took nine questions
from the audience - yet six of those questions were on Lewinsky and Clinton’s personal life
rather than on Kosovo (Mandel, 87). Problems at home have been many a reason for leaders tomake drastic choices so as to distract their audience from the issue at hand. With the biased
media attention in the US giving a one-sided view of the conflict, the president may also be seen
as a “hero” for wanting to end Milosevic’s “massacres” and save the Albanian Kosovars. Thisseemed like an appropriate opportunity to get out of the mess Clinton started.
28	
  
	
  

Credibility
Credibility is another reason cited for intervention. In a speech Clinton gave, he said:“Failure to take action will undermine NATO's credibility, on which stability in Europe and ourown credibility depend” (Linda). The credibility of NATO and Western powers thus seemed to
be a concern to Clinton and other Western powers. Indeed, those powers wanted to show thatthey could and would take down anyone or anything that posed any type of disturbance to them.
The West seemed especially keen on proving that during this specific time period because ofNATO’s declining “credibility.” In the end, NATO was born only to defeat the USSR, and after
the Soviet Union’s demise, there was no longer a role for it to play. To prove that NATO is acredible organization on which Europe’s stability and the US’s credibility depends, NATO had
to go out there and address those “perceived threats,” as well as end any supposed “human rights
abuses,” thus regaining its glorious place in the international arena.

Other Considerations
In addition to those two points above, a few other expected benefits would come out of
this intervention for the political elite. Arms manufacturers and reconstruction companies would
be huge beneficiaries-and indeed they were. For example, Vice President Dick Cheney’s
Halliburton got the contract for its subsidiary, Brown & Root (B&R), in Kosovo in 1999. One ofthem was a $1.5 million project of housing Kosovar refugees with portable houses (NCE). Afterthe NATO bombing on June 1999, US forces took 1,000 acres of farmland in Kosovo to
29	
  
	
  

construct Camp Bondsteel, an American military base. It was also built by B&R, which was thelargest employer in Kosovo (Stuart).

Damages from the NATO Airstrikes
The 78-day NATO campaign caused significant damage, including firing around 25,000
powerful non-nuclear bombs and missiles. There was large infrastructure damage due to thebombs, such as the destruction of ancient churches and archeological sites, as well as hospitals,
schools, factories and so on. The bombs that hit oil refineries, chemical plants, fertilizer andelectronic factories created huge environmental problems. Toxins such as chlorides, ammonia
and mercury were released in the air and ground as well as into Danube’s water, which was used
for drinking. There were also unexploded cluster bombs and residue of depleted uranium for the
exploded ones (Mandel, 60).

Success or Failure: R2P – The Six Factors
1-

Just Cause - Is the threat a "serious and irreparable harm occurring to humanbeings"?
The death toll in Kosovo only became large after the NATO intervention. There were2,500 killed before NATO intervention, but the death toll during the eleven weeks of NATObombing alone was 10,000. Milosevic was indicted for the murder of 385 people - only 45 ofthem having been killed before the intervention. There is controversy whether those killed were
30	
  
	
  

KLA fighters or civilians. Refugees also came out after the NATO bombing, not before.
Repression against the Albanians was definitely present; however, looking at the death toll
before the intervention, intervening was not warranted.
2-

Right Intention - Is the main intention of the military action to prevent humansuffering or are there other motives?
The intent for intervention as cited above were reasons such as credibility and distracting fromproblems at home. Humanitarian intervention may be cited as the main reasons for intervention
by some, but in the end the intention is debatable.
3-

Final Resort - Has every other measure besides military invention been taken into

account?
No, they have not, and efforts have been sabotaged. For example, there was relative
peace when the OSCE mission was in Kosovo - at that time, there were zero international
refugees. However, the Ramboulliet agreement that was supposed to create peace between thetwo sides led to the war. As said by Kissinger and many others, the deals made would not be
accepted by a sovereign state and Serbia was expected to refuse NATO’s outrageous deals. By
not accepting a biased agreement, NATO bombing took place..
4-

Right Authority-The UNSC is the best authority to make this decision

The UNSC was not even given consideration in this intervention. The international
community was split-some in NATO countries supported the intervention, while some did not(for example, in Greece where 99% of the population were against it).

31	
  
	
  

5-

Proportional Means - Are the minimum necessary military means applied to secure

human protection?
NATO’s use of force was disproportionate to the situation at hand. The issue could have beenpossibly solved through respectable negotiations for both sides, yet that was never tried.
6-

Reasonable Prospect - Is it likely that military action will succeed in protecting

human life, and are the consequences of this action sure not to be worse than no action at all?
There was reason to see this intervention as causing more damage, mostly because thedamages before the intervention may not have been as great as some claimed them to be.
Damages to the environment and infrastructure ensued after the bombing, along with economic
damage. The death toll went from 2,500 to 13,000 when NATO intervened.

Case 3: East Timor - Introduction
East Timor was colonized by Portugal up until 1974. In April of that year, the left-wing
Armed Forces Movement (MFA) in the military made a coup d’état against the government in
Lisbon. They decided to withdraw from Portugal’s colonies, which marked the birth ofindigenous political parties in East Timor. The most popular ones were the Timorese
Democratic Union (UDT) and the Fretilin (the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor).
UDT’s supporters were the traditional elite. They were considered to be conservative andaligned themselves to their previous colonial power (“History of East Timor”). Fretilin’s
supporters were mostly young Timorese and lower level colonial officials. Fretilin’s social
programs may have been a reason why it became more popular than UDT. However, both
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parties entered a coalition by January 1975 (Burr & Evans). The goal of the coalition was selfdetermination, and the coalition was supported by the majority of the people. APODETI(Popular Democratic Association of Timor) was a third minor party which called for integration
with Indonesia, but had very little support (“History of East Timor”).

Conflict Fuelled By Indonesia
However, the UDT and Fretilin split up because of internal conflicts only a few
months later, in April 1975. Those conflicts were said to be caused by Indonesia’s military
intelligence (BAKIN) which wanted to create a rift between the parties calling for an
independent East Timor. Many Indonesian military leaders met with UDT leaders and spoke
to them about how they did not want the left-leaning Fretilin to be in power. They were also
promoting the support of the pro-integration party, Apodeti (“History of East Timor”).
On 11th of August, UDT attempted to end Fretilin’s dominance and popularity bystaging a coup, which resulted in what some portray as a civil war. The East Timorese
government states that this was how Indonesia wanted it to be portrayed, but that thesituation was in fact stable, according to aid agencies visiting the area only one month after
the coup began (“History of East Timor”).
On November 28, 1975, Fretilin declared the independence of the Democratic
Republic of East Timor, a declaration not recognized by Portugal, Indonesia, or Australia. In
response, Indonesia asked Apodeti and other political party leaders to sign the Balibo
Declaration, which calls for integration. This declaration did not have much East Timorese
involvement - it was drafted by Indonesian intelligence and signed in Bali, Indonesia
33	
  
	
  

(“History of East Timor”). On October 1975, Indonesian Special Forces slowly started
penetrating into East Timor, hoping to fuel conflicts that would lead to what would look likea “justified” Indonesian invasion. The West did not condemn Indonesia’s actions, andIndonesia thus increased its attacks (Burr & Evans).

Geostrategic Concerns: Indonesia and the Threat of Communism
Indonesia was considered by the Western world as a major strategic and economic asset,
where “vast potential resources and a strategically important chain of islands” exist, according to
a US government document (Ahmed, 231). The US and UK were particularly interested in theIndonesian Communist Party (PKI), and how to combat communism.
Another threat to them, however, was independence and independent development. A
Special National Intelligence Estimate by the CIA found that: “The PKI under Sukarno’s
presidency was moving “to energize and unite the Indonesian nation… if these efforts succeeded,
Indonesia would provide a powerful example for the underdeveloped world and hence a credit tocommunism and a setback to Western prestige” (Ahmed, 231). A 1964 cable from the USambassador in Malaya to Washington said: “our difficulties with Indonesia stem basically fromdeliberate GOI [Government of Indonesia] strategy of seeking to push Britain and the US out ofsouth-east Asia.” On March 1965, George Ball, US Under-Secretary of State stated his worry
about the deteriorating relationship with Indonesia. He noted the takeover of American rubber
plants and the threat of takeover of the American oil companies as well (Ahmed, 231).

34	
  
	
  

Indonesian Invasion
Indonesia, ruled by the US-backed President Suharto, invaded East Timor on
December 7th, 1975. This was named “Operation Lotus” and consisted of air and sea
invasion, almost entirely done through US weapons (“History of East Timor”).
The UN General Assembly did not condone the invasion, however, and only a few
days later, on the 12th of December, 1975, it passed a resolution condemning Indonesia’srole. Some parts read: “…concerning developments in Portuguese Timor...deplores themilitary intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in Portuguese Timor and calls upon the
Government of Indonesia to withdraw without delay its armed forces from the Territory...andrecommends that the Security Council take urgent action to protect the territorial integrity ofPortuguese Timor and the inalienable right of its people to self-determination" (“History of
East Timor”).
On May 31, 1976, a 'People's Assembly' in Dili, took place, which led to theintegration. East Timor became a province of Indonesia, supposedly by people’s choice.
However, the “Popular Assembly” was selected by Indonesian intelligence (“History of East
Timor”).

Western Support for Indonesia
Suharto, with the backing of the Western countries, created chaos and instability inEast Timor as a pretext for the need for Indonesia’s intervention (Ahmed, 232). On 17th
September 1975, the CIA reported: “Jakarta is now sending guerrilla units into thePortuguese half of the island in order to provoke incidents that would provide theIndonesians with an excuse to invade. Also, in that same month, a US State Department
35	
  
	
  

official said: “we are more or less condoning the incursion into East Timor” since “we regard
Indonesia as a friendly, non-aligned state - a nation we do a lot of business with.” According
to Burr and Evans, the US completely approved of the invasion (Burr & Evans).
Declassified documents released by the National Security Archive (NSA) in
December of 2001 show that US President Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger met with
Suharto and condoned the plans for invasion. In response to Suharto saying "We want yourunderstanding if it was deemed necessary to take rapid or drastic action [in East Timor]."Ford replied, "We will understand and not press you on the issue. We understand the problem
and the intentions you have." Kissinger agreed as well, but was worried about a public outcry
regarding the use of US arms and spoke about wanting to “influence the reaction in America"so that "there would be less chance of people talking in an unauthorized way” (“History of
East Timor”).
But it was not only the US which supported Suharto in his invasion. On the 17th ofAugust 1975, Richard Wilcott, Australian Ambassador to Jakarta, sent a secret cable to his
Department of Foreign Affairs telling them: “leave events to take their course…and act in a
way which would be designed to minimize the public impact in Australia and show private
understanding to Indonesia of their problems.” The British said: “Certainly, as seen fromhere, it is in Britain’s interests that Indonesia should absorb the territory as soon and as
unobtrusively as possible, and that if it should come to the crunch and there is a row in the
United Nations, we should keep our heads down and avoid taking sides against theIndonesian government” (Ahmed, 233). On 1974, Australia's Labor Prime Minister, Gough
Whitlam said that an “independent Timor would be ‘an unviable state, and a potential threat
to the stability of the region’” (“History of East Timor”).
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The US, UK and Australian governments’ military and financial aid to Indonesia
played a big role in facilitating the 25-year occupation of East Timor. Australia’s military aid
doubled between 1975 and 1981, continuing through to 1999. Ninety percent of the arms
used in the invasion and occupation were supplied by the US, according to the US State
Department, while other weapons significant to Indonesia’s saturation bombing such as
Hawk attacker jets and other weapons were supplied by Britain (Ahmed, 234).

Benefits of the Occupation for Supporting Countries
The benefits for those countries in Indonesia’s occupation were many. Maybe themost well-known is America’s obsession with combatting communism. In this case, the US
was using Indonesia to combat left-wing independence movements and communism in theregion.
Australia, on the other hand, was getting great economic benefits. The Timor Sea,rich in oil and natural resources, meant big profits, and Australian made agreements withIndonesia on seabed rights and oil exploration. Indonesia began negotiations with anAustralian company regarding the extraction of oil resources in the Timor Gap, which is a“seabed” between Timor and Australia, located just off the coast of East Timor. By
December 1989, US, UK and Australian companies had a joint agreement called the “Timor
Gap Treaty” (TGT) with Indonesia. “A month after the 1991 Dili massacre, the Australian
government alone approved with Indonesia eleven oil production contracts for exploitation of

37	
  
	
  

a jointly controlled area of the sea. The Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans said thatthe benefits from the TGT amounted to ‘zillions of dollars (Ahmed, 235).

War Crimes
There were “random massacres, extra-judicial killings, starvation, deaths frompreventable diseases, torture, forced movement of populations, coerced sterilization of
women, rape and imprisonment without charges. Institutionalized and systematic rape took
place to “phase out” Timorese blood and neutralize the population, making it less Timoreseand “more” Indonesian. Although Indonesia’s human rights record was so low that it wascondemned by no less than ten UNSC resolutions, the leading countries in the organization
did not do anything to stop these violations because of the benefits described above (Center
for Southeast Asian Studies). Between 100,000-200,000 East Timorese were killed during
the occupation, from around only 800,000 people (“History of East Timor”).

Change of Events
From 1998 a change of events starts to take place when President Suharto resigns andPresident Jusuf Habibe becomes president of Indonesia. This change may also be due to thefact that Indonesia was undergoing the Asian financial crisis and occupying East Timor
would be very costly for Indonesia. On January 1999, Indonesia said it will consider
independence for East Timor based on the result of a referendum (“East Timor Timeline”).
On May 1999, an agreement was signed between Indonesia and Portugal, allowing the East
38	
  
	
  

Timorese to vote for autonomy or independence, which was accepted by the UN. Before thevoting took place, anti-independence guerillas started spreading havoc and violence, andwarned of a “scorched earth policy” if the result was in favor of independence. A program ofterror took place to threaten the people from choosing to vote for independence by the militia
that was trained and supported by the Indonesian army (“Indonesian Occupation”).

Continued Support of Western Allies to Corrupt Indonesian Policies
A quote in London’s Observer said that Indonesia was “both running a campaign topersuade people not to vote for independence and funding paramilitary groups that arebringing a reign of terror to the territory” (Ahmed, 236). And so, it did not accept the UN’s
security conditions to ensure a free and fair vote in East Timor, and no UN international
force was positioned to ensure stability and security before and during the referendum.
Western powers, which were still at that time supporting Indonesia both diplomatically andthrough essential financial and military aid, did not support an international force in East
Timor either and put pressure on the UN Peacekeeping Operation department to keep thesecurity management and handling up to Jakarta (Ahmed, 235).
But some say that those plans for terrorizing the East Timorese population wereplanned and even known by Western powers, including the UN. This was noted bynewspapers such as the London Observer. Western intelligence warned the UN about thoseplans. On the 4th of March, representatives of Australia’s Defense Intelligence Organizationin Jakarta cabled their headquarters that the Indonesian military was ‘clearly protecting andin some cases operating with’ militias… they said that the militias would implement a
39	
  
	
  

‘scorched earth policy” (Ahmed, 236). The UN was also getting the same information aboutIndonesia’s engagement in terrorizing the Timorese by resistance sources. The military
documents spoke about the aid Indonesia was giving to those militias, such as helicopters,
cars, communication equipment and so on (Ahmed, 236). Yet, the Western countries
pressured the UN to not allow international forces in East Timor, and the UN had to agree.
In his biography, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the US ambassador to the UN at the time,
wrote: "the United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring thisabout. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective inwhatever measures it undertook [with regard to the invasion of East Timor]. This task wasgiven to me, and I carried it forward with not inconsiderable success." He then admitted that
he took part in a "shameless" Cold War policy toward East Timor (“History of East Timor”).

Referendum Results and the Scorched Earth Policy
That did not stop the East Timorese from voting-almost 99% of them voted on the
30th of August, 1999, with 78% of them favoring independence (“East Timor Timeline”).
However, the campaign of terror continued from the pro-integration militias. After the voting
took place and before the results came out, the militias engaged in violence with the help of
the Indonesian army. The militias forcibly removed over 250,000 Timorese from their homes
and brought them to West Timor where they lived in refugee camps described to be diseaseridden, overpopulated and controlled by the militia (“Indonesian Occupation”).
A big part of the territory was destroyed or set in flames. This was a well thought
out plan and not just random acts of savagery. The plan was to make East Timor so
40	
  
	
  

undeveloped in terms of infrastructure, economy and social capital that they would not beable to almost impossible to build the country. There are estimates that about 70 percent of
East Timor’s basic infrastructures was destroyed, and that aid workers and journalists werestunned at the extent of destruction. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
said that 7,000 people were killed only in a matter of days (Lachicas).

Motivations for Intervention	  The Dili massacre, which was part of the scorched earth policy and where hundreds ofpeople were killed, marked the beginning of international awareness of East Timor. NGO
reaction increased, and people started pressuring the UN and their own governments to condemn
the Indonesian occupation (“Indonesian Occupation”). Public outcry and pressure was one
reason why the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was sent to East Timor, with
Australia being the biggest contributor to the intervention (“History of East Timor”).
Australia was also worried about the increased instability in the region and what it
would mean to them. The violence perpetrated by the Indonesians might could mean a flowof asylum seekers asking for refugee status in Australia-something they wanted to avoid. But
Australia would still be morally and legally bound to accept refugees if that ever did happen(Lachica).

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When the East Timorese voted for independence, Australia was also worried about its
relationship with the East Timor. There was always the threat of security-if East Timor andAustralia would be on negative terms, East Timor could be used as a haven for gangs andmilitias that threaten Australian security. But that was not the only loss if relationships would
be strained. If they became independent without Australian support, Australia would be
losing out on huge profits it gained in the Timor Gap Treaty. Australian interests in East
Timor were secure so long as Indonesia was controlling East Timor. However, when thepeople voted for independence Australia realized a change to their economic interests willtake place. Australia could not force the East Timorese to accept the deals they had cut when
Indonesia was controlling East Timor (Lachica).

Intervention
The UN authorized the creation of a multinational force, called the Interfet,(International Force for East Timor). The soldiers came from seventeen different countries,
with about 9,900 in total. The majority came from Australia - 4,400 of them, while the restcame mostly from South-East Asia the Interfet came into East Timor on September 20, 1999.
The administration of East Timor was taken over by the UN through the United Nations
Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET), which was established on October
25, 1999. The Interfet mission ended on February 14, 2000 and the UN then took charge ofthe military command. They held elections in late 2001 for a constituent assembly for thedrafting of a constitution. This was finally done in February 2002, and a few months later in
May 20th was when East Timor became formally independent (“History of East Timor”).
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Success and Failure: Economic Impact After Intervention
Australia tried maintaining its favorable position in the economic activities with East
Timor even up to the early days of intervention. An exploitative deal where the UN
governing body of East Timor (UNTAET) agreed that oil investments and developments
would be overseen by an “Exchange of Notes” wherein the provisions of the Timor Gap
Treaty would occur with Indonesia replacing East Timor was opposed by East Timoreseleaders. They proposed to discuss the issue of commencing a permanent maritime boundary,which Australia rejected. The Australian government was said to have bullied andblackmailed East Timorese leaders to accept a deal that was favorable to Australia. “TheHoward government pressured East Timor into agreeing a series of dodgy resource sharing
deals allowing it to take billions of dollars that rightfully belongs to the East Timorese.” Theleaders of East Timor were attacked personally by Australian officials who acted as if East
Timor should be thanking them and obeying them for their intervention. Basically, what was
being implied is that East Timor would not be independent if Australia had not intervened(Lachicas).
A new agreement in 2002 fared slightly better for the East Timorese, yet still
exploited them. Australia agreed that 90% would go to East Timor, which was better than the
50-50 deal in the TGT. However, managing the “Greater Sunrise” was almost 80% up to theAustralians. The “Greater Sunrise” was the largest oil field in the area and was expected tobring up to $40 billion over its lifetime, it contains 9.5 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves and
300 million barrels of oil. East Timor would only be allowed to get 18% of the revenues fromthis project (Lachicas).
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Failed Expectations
In a sense, military intervention was successful in creating “instantaneous security.”
Miscalculations by the local guerrilla movement (FALINTIL) could have created moredeaths and violence. They were also unable to protect the people after their leader instructed
them to hide and refrain from attacking any Indonesian troops. The “peacekeeping” force
was considered important in keeping East Timor free from Indonesian military presence(“Successes and Failures”).However, during the occupation; it was the local East Timorese
guerrillas who were protecting the people. When the UN came, they did not give thoseguerillas the means necessary to defend their country and people but instead focused on
training for the local military (“Successes and Failures”).
The East Timorese and activists around the world were expecting that the Indonesiansponsored militias would be disarmed and disbanded by the UN. They also expected that war
criminals be tried for their war crimes, however, those people have been granted immunity
by the UN (“Successes and Failures”).
The East Timorese were also expecting to construct their country. However, thepresence of the UN did not allow them to have decision-making power- the decisions were
all being done by the UN transitional administrator. The few East Timorese which were partof the UN system were appointed and not elected. The people have not been told what theirrights are and how to use them, and this was especially confusing because of UN
bureaucracy. The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) did

44	
  
	
  

not prioritize the needs of the local people-for example, it built foreign supermarkets andhotels instead of roads and local markets (“Successes and Failures”).

Untimely response
The intervention happened only after the “scorched earth” campaign took place, after
over 200, 000 were killed in the decades-long occupation, and after the Indonesian militaryand paramilitary forces had mostly left. They also came in only after Jakarta gave theirconsent-and Jakarta’s consent may be largely attributed to the economic sanctions and thetemporary cut of financial and military assistance (Ahmed, 237).The occupation of East
Timor may not have been possible without the diplomatic support and military and financial
assistance of the same countries which in the end intervened with military force. The consent
of Indonesia for military intervention may have occurred mostly because of the threat ofsevering military and economic ties and assistance. Thus, tens of thousands of lives could
have been saved from the very beginning, if the West did not support Indonesia’s actions inEast Timor.

UN Failures in Protection
But the UN is said to have failed on a few other accounts. Documents in October1999 showed that the UN was not able to account for many of the people it was supposed toprotect. It is said that it could only account for 150,000 of 850,000 people. There were still
200,000 which remained in Indonesia against their will, and 260,000 living in very poor
45	
  
	
  

conditions in refugee camps in West Timor, without medical supplies and food, which were
controlled by the militias. People continued to disappear daily and the militia kept on
terrorizing the people from within and outside East Timor. According to Indonesia’s National
Commission on Human Rights, the militias in West Timor were committing “systematic andorganized human rights violations”, but Indonesian forces were doing nothing to stop it-they“let these things continue (Ahmed, 237).
An independent group of human rights advocates and journalists travelled to both
Jakarta and Dili on a fact-finding mission and spoke to church leaders, NGO’s, aid workers,
government officials and so on. They reported that although there was UN presence, the East
Timorese people were still under threat from the militias and Indonesian armed forces (TNI),
and that the TNI seemed to still be working with the militias. They found modern weapons,
as well as “several separate reports of a low level training plan, based on the continuous
drilling of fifteen militia members by the TNI with five men rotated in and out at a time”(Ahmed, 238).

Refugees
UNHCR ended the refugee status for East Timorese in West Timor and Indonesia on
the 31st of December 2002, although there were still significant numbers of refugees at thattime. From November 2003, they were 28,000 in the West Timor camps alone. However, allof those people would be denied refugee status, which meant they would be deprived ofinternational protection which they may have needed. This is especially true as the conditionsof the camps were poor and controlled by the militia. There was malnutrition, sexual assault,
46	
  
	
  

intimidation, disease, and isolation .The Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) had reported that in thecamps: “sanitation is poor, there’s no running water, and malnutrition is rife. Babies are borntiny and undersized because their mothers are so undernourished.” Consequently, anestimated five children die each day throughout the camps, while diarrhea has reachedepidemic proportions and food is increasingly scarce (Ahmed, 238)
The UN force was also unable to protect its own and other aid workers. Three
UNHCR workers were brutally murdered and showcased with their burnt corpses being
dragged down the street by militias. After this incident on September 2000, the UNHCR
ended its West Timor operations. The Jesuit Refugee Service was the only major remaining
organization, and it also had to end its assistance in some of the camps (Ahmed, 238).
UN did not disarm the militias. According to the Guardian newspaper, only one day
after the UN forces arrived, the Australian commander of the UN force “made a point ofcongratulating the Indonesian military for its ‘first class’ assistance and offered reassurancesthat his job was not to ‘disarm the militias’” (Ahmed, 240).

R2P: The Six Factors
1- Just Cause - Is the threat a "serious and irreparable harm occurring to humanbeings"?
There were around 200,000 East Timorese killed during the decades of Indonesian
invasion, which constitute as a genocide and does constitute a serious harm to human beings.
2- Right Intention - Is the main intention of the military action to prevent humansuffering or are there other motives?
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The main reason for intervention was not to end human suffering as human sufferinghas been present in East Timor for the past 25 years with the military, economic anddiplomatic support of the intervening forces. The reasons for intervention was a mix ofpublic pressure, economic benefits, and damages caused by the 1999 conflict that could
spillover and affect countries such as Australia.
3- Final Resort - Has every other measure besides military invention been taken
into account?
No, they have not. The intervening forces, namely the US, UK and Australia had 25
years to cut military, economic and diplomatic relations with Indonesia, pressuring them tostop their war atrocities - but they only supported them throughout. Jakarta’s approval of UN
intervention is mainly seen as a result of the pressure to cut economic ties. Had they
threatened to cut ties before, this conflict could have ended decades earlier without militaryintervention.
4- Right Authority-The UNSC is the best authority to make this decision
The East Timorese people did want UN intervention, which may have made the intervention
in East Timor (when it happened) more successful than the previous examples.
5-Proportional Means - Are the minimum necessary military means applied to secure
human protection?
Use of force was disproportionate. There was no need for military intervention in
1999, had there been a cut in military and economic assistance by intervening countries.
Thus, military intervention was too harsh. At the same time, when it was too late to fix
everything diplomatically, the UN was unable to disarm or disband the militias, and it was
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unable to try them for their crimes-it instead gave them amnesty. Refugees were unprotectedin the camps run by militia, both from the militia and by the conditions they were living in.
6- Reasonable Prospect - Is it likely that military action will succeed in protecting
human life, and are the consequences of this action sure not to be worse than no action at
all?
There was reason to see this intervention as helping the situation after 24 years ofoccupation. However, there were other means to end it without military force and without
ending so many human lives. There were also various UN failures that showed its inability inprotecting the people it was supposed to.

Case Studies: Countries where intervention did not take place
Case 4: Rwanda - Introduction
The Rwandan genocide took place from April 6th to mid-July between two ethnic
groups, the Tutsis and Hutus, which ended with an estimated 20,000-100,000 (with highestimates being 20% of the population) dead in only a matter of 3 months (Lemarchand ).
The Tutsis, a minority in Rwanda who were in power over the Hutus for decades, were
replaced by a Hutu government during a revolution in 1959-1962 (Lemarchand). A series ofconflicts ensued, and this escalated to the genocide of the Tutsis by the Hutus. Tutsi civilians
were accused of supporting a rebel group dominated by Tutsis, called the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF). The Hutu president of Rwanda, Habyarimana was killed. This, along with the
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fact that the minority Tutsis had been ruling over the majority decades ago fuelled thealready brewing conflict ("Genocide in Rwanda”).

War Crimes
Political leaders who opposed the Hutu plans for war against the Tutsis wereimmediately killed. An estimate of 200,000 people is the number of people who participatedin the genocide. The Tutsis were killed on a massive scale, possibly amounting to threequarters of the Tutsi population. Hutus who opposed the killings of Tutsis were also
murdered. Tutsi were not only murdered by the Hutu government and gangs, but many times
by their own Hutu neighbors, former friends, colleagues or relatives by marriage who wereencouraged or forced to kill them ("Genocide-Rwanda”). The civil war ended when the RPF
defeated the Hutu regime and President Paul Kagame became in power ("Genocide in
Rwanda”).

International Response
Political leaders in the US, UK, France and UN knew about the genocide taking place
as well as the preparations for it, but declined to acknowledge it. Acknowledging genocide
would require international intervention, and those states did not want to intervene. They
also declined to use their “political and moral authority to challenge the legitimacy of the
genocidal government”, as well as declining to say that they would never give international
assistance to the Hutu government for committing those genocidal crimes ("Genocide in
50	
  
	
  

Rwanda”).	
  The USA had actually banned its officials from using the term “genocide” so as to
avoid intervention. Regarding the US presence in UNAMIR, the US was asked for its
assistance in shutting down the radio channels that called for the slaughter of the Tutsis. The
US replied that “the traditional US commitment to free speech cannot be reconciled withsuch a measure.” It was said that France also backed the genocidal Hutu government and told
them “to improve their image” ("Genocide-Rwanda”).

Failure of UNAMIR
UN force (UNAMIR) came into Rwanda to monitor the ceasefire, but it had noauthority to militarily intervene. The UNAMIR was accused of standing still and watching
while the Tutsis were being slaughtered in front of their eyes. The UNAMIR was eventuallypulled out of Rwanda, and was internationally criticized for being no help to ending theconflict ("Genocide-Rwanda”).
Although almost a million people were killed in Rwanda, the international
community was trying its best not to portray the situation as genocide as to avoid therequirement for intervention. However, they did not hesitate to use that label in Kosovo,
where a tiny fraction of the death toll in Rwanda occurred. There was no benefit inintervening in Rwanda, and so the international community left it to itself, and instead
intervened somewhere with a much smaller, if not disputed, human rights violations took
place. In this particular case, there was a more “just cause” for intervention than in Libya or
Kosovo, but there was no intervention because there was no benefit in intervening.

51	
  
	
  

Case 5: Iraq - Introduction
The Kurdish genocide in Iraq is known to be the genocide during the Al Anfal
Campaign in 1988, but its beginnings started much before that. In the 1970’s and 1980’s,
there were many cases of deportation and disappearances of Kurds. On 1983, 8,000 male
Barzanis were killed. In the late 1980’s, chemical weapons were used on the population,
especially in Halabja, followed by the Anfal campaign in 1988. Hundreds of thousands died,and the use of chemical weapons resulted in severe health problems. Up to 4,500 villages
were destroyed by Saddam from 1976 to 1988. This destroyed the agricultural resources andKurdistan’s traditional way of life and heritage which was focused on agriculture and rural
living ("What Happened in the Kurdish Genocide”). Human Rights watch estimated that aminimum of 50,000 and up to 100,000 were killed by Saddam (“Genocide in Iraq”). Other
sources say that the death toll reached 182,000. During the Al Anfal Campaign, 90% of
Kurdish villages were completely destroyed ("What Happened in the Kurdish Genocide”).

International Response and Western Support
However, not only was there no “humanitarian intervention” to save the Kurds at that time,
but the Western powers that usually intervene for “humanitarian” reasons were supporting
Saddam during that time. According to the Kurdistan Tribune, Saddam’s regime was sustained
through military aid he got during the 1980’s which he got from Ronald Reagan’s administrationin the US and Margaret Thatcher’s administration in the UK. It was only when Saddam invaded
Kuwait that their position towards him changed.

52	
  
	
  

Throughout the 1980’s, $1.5 billion was given to UK arms companies to facilitate theirdelivery of military equipment and technology to Saddam. After the Halabja massacre which
killed about 5,000 Kurds, British citizens urged their governments to act regarding Saddam’s
brutal actions. However, what happened is that the UK government increased arms sales to
Saddam (Karem).	
   Saddam was supplied with arms, money, satellite intelligence, and chemicaland biological weapons during the 1980’s by the US and UK. Britain’s Labour MP Jeremy
Corbyn, condemned the UK government for its role in supporting the Iraqi government during
the times of the Kurdish Genocide (“UK Duplicity Exposed”).
Indeed, most of the West supported Saddam during that time, especially with arms andfunds. France lent the Iraqi government a Super Etendard aircraft while Iraq was fighting a war
with Iran, while Germany supplied them with much of the technology needed for creatingchemical weapons. While Saddam was doing his Al Anfal campaign (which began fromFebruary 1988 and ended on September 1988), the members in the United Nations SubCommittee on Human Rights, such as the US and UK, voted not condemn him for human rights
violations on August 1988 (Nezan).
Only a few years later, when Saddam was no longer seen as an ally to the West but athreat was there intervention and was he removed from power. Indeed, it was only then thatintervening countries suddenly cared about “human rights,” when they were funding thehuman rights abuses of their friend Saddam only a few years earlier. That is not to say thathumanitarian intervention should have happened in Iraq in the 1980’s. It may have sufficed if
the West had cut arm sales to Saddam at that time. Yet, even such a step was not taken by the

53	
  
	
  

same forces that claim they intervened in Libya, Kosovo and East Timor for humanitarianreasons.

Conclusion
In conclusion, from the facts gathered above, it is clear that humanitarian intervention
is not being carried out in a way that would end human rights violations. As seen from thefive case studies above, it is not humanitarian reasons that lead to humanitarian interventionrather it is the benefits to the intervening states that leads to it. If there is reason to believe
there will be benefit for the intervening states in terms of regime change, access to resources,
economic gain and such, there will more likely be intervention than if those factors are notpresent. That is true even when a million people are being killed in regions with nogeopolitical significance or strategic benefits to be gained, as seen in Rwanda, compared to2,500 being killed in another where there are benefits to intervening countries. Because
strategic interests are what motivate the intervention, the people in need of the protection are
not being prioritized, and many times there is corruption to reach the end goals.
Having a clear picture of what is going on in the ground, having credible facts andinformation and being able to predict the consequence of the intervention are also essential to
the success of intervention. Otherwise, this may lead to more chaos, for example, by funding
terrorist groups which in the end commit human rights abuses of their own. It is especiallyessential to exhaust non-military means first. Sometimes more death and destruction ensues
from the use of military force, and so peace dialogues and negotiations should take place and

54	
  
	
  

should be fair for both sides. In all the cases I’ve presented so far, no fair and genuine efforts
have been made to end the violence.
Having pure motivations is not enough to guarantee the success of intervention,
however, its absence will usually mean a high chance of failure and widespread corruption.
This in the end creates its own human rights violation, the same thing the intervention was
supposed to stop. If all the six factors are earnestly applied, there may be hope for the successof humanitarian intervention in ending human rights violations. Otherwise, failure, or at thevery least corruption, will be widespread.

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