Including Japan in South Korea’s “Trustpolitik”
By Leif-Eric Easley 1!
How can Seoul and Tokyo break their current cycle of mistrust? President Park
Geun-hye has been in office over a year, and her administration has kept her campaign
promise of framing South Korean foreign policy according to the concept of “trustpolitik.”2The Park administration has taken a principled approach toward North Korea and madesome progress on economic and social exchanges with Pyongyang, even whilestrengthening military deterrence. Outreach toward China has been reciprocated by Beijing,and Seoul’s alliance with Washington remains strong. But South Korea’s relations withJapan have suffered a notable decline in trust. Park long refused to meet with Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe, citing the need for Japan to deal with history issues.3!
A meeting among Park, Abe and President Obama on the sidelines of the Nuclear
Security Summit at the Hague in March 2014 offers an opportunity to improve relations.
Trust is a two-way street and the ball rests in no one country’s court. Troubled relations
between Tokyo and Seoul are against the national interests of South Korea, Japan and theUnited States.4 Two key American allies improving trust between them will help realize
shared efforts for dealing with North Korea, alleviate political tensions in Northeast Asia, andsecure the regional stability needed for continued economic growth. Progress on functional
issues of mutual interest will, in turn, reinforce levels of trust in a virtuous cycle ofcooperation, dispelling ominous comparisons of Asia today with Europe in 1914 or 1938.5!
To rebuild trust between Tokyo and Seoul, this article offers three sets ofrecommendations. The first set is about preventing the situation from getting worse.
Practicing diplomatic restraint is a matter of being strategic about national interests, notsacrificing core principles. The second set involves expanding and demonstrating the valueof functional cooperation. By racking up bilateral accomplishments, policies can havepositive feedback on perceptions. The third set of recommendations focuses on historicalreconciliation. Meaningful commitment displayed in symbolic gestures, and sustained
respect for each other’s national identities, can enhance a politically powerful sense ofcommunity and shared future.
1. Restraint on matters of history and territory
1.1. Yasukuni Shrine is a matter for Japanese, not international criticism, to decide!
Yasukuni is a domestically contested memorial, with many Japanese disagreeing
about who should or should not be honored there, and whether a new secular memorial isneeded. The vast majority of millions of souls enshrined at Yasukuni were not war criminals;
every nation has the right to honor its dead, and respect is usually afforded to the personalconvictions of leaders to do so. Private expressions of international concern over revisionist
elements associated with Yasukuni (such as the version of history offered at the YushukanMuseum) can be helpful, but public criticism from other governments is counterproductive toa domestic process whereby Japanese gradually resolve how to offer tribute to fallen
warriors without glorifying the evils of past wars.
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In the meantime, a critical mass of Japan’s foreign policy experts believe that, forJapan’s own national interests, a sitting Japanese prime minister should not visit Yasukuni
until the Japanese people resolve the “tainted monument” issue. Prime ministerial visits toYasukuni strain ties with Seoul and hand Beijing a hammer to swing at Japan. It may beunreasonable to expect a prime minister to publicly commit to avoiding Yasukuni, as thiswould elicit domestic charges of disrespecting the nation’s war dead and caving tointernational pressure. But returning to the policy of not going without promising not to go,
while allowing government liaisons to offer assurances of “no surprises,” would do much to
avoid further deterioration in Japan’s diplomatic relations.
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11.2. Avoid internationalizing history disputes!
The Chinese government maintains an unabashed strategy of using Yasukuni andother history issues as a diplomatic weapon against Japan. Tragically for Seoul-Tokyo ties,
the South Korean government has undertaken a policy of supporting civil society groups that
promote anti-Japanese sentiment abroad. Japanese diplomats are thus coming underdomestic pressure to counter overseas Korean efforts to erect “comfort women” statues andrevise American textbooks to label the Sea of Japan as the “East Sea” of Korea.
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However, it would be self-defeating for the Japanese government to quarrel withKorean-Americans on American soil. Such efforts are likely to fail and incur damage forJapan’s reputation. Instead, Japanese-Americans can make clear that actions that divide
the Asian-American community are misguided, and leaders in Washington can provide
political cover for local governments by stating that the textbooks of American children andparks of American towns are not appropriate battlegrounds for feuding international friends.
Korean concerns about history merit careful attention from Tokyo, but by taking its
grievances global, Seoul will see its own reputation suffer. Women’s rights and Korea’s
reputation would both be better served if, instead of taking historical grievances to theUNHRC and UNESCO, Seoul focused on improving Korea’s position from last place inOECD rankings on gender equality.6
1.3. Engage in “self-policing” to prevent nationalist spirals!
Both Japan and South Korea are vibrant democracies, so consensus of opinion is
not possible or even desirable within either country. But citizens and particularly public
figures on both sides need to criticize and hold accountable their countrymen who makeextremist and nationalist remarks. Citing “personal freedom of speech” is no excuse forallowing inflammatory and revisionist statements to go unchallenged.
Self-policing isneeded for civil public debate and to prevent a rapid spiral in diplomatic relations driven by
the interaction of hardliners focused on parochial interests and selfish political gains. Both
Korea and Japan ought to abstain from pushing patriotic education in public broadcasting,textbooks, and instructional guidelines. Japanese leaders can do more to protect the Konoand Murayama statements to ensure that Japan’s official remorse for the past is understoodinternationally. Meanwhile, more Korean opinion leaders need to stand up and explain
publicly why productive relations with Japan are in Korea’s national interests.
1.4. Minimize actions over disputed islets!
The Liancourt Rocks have great importance in terms of identity politics, but muchless material value in the context of larger issues at stake in Japan-Korea economic andsecurity relations. While a territorial understanding is possible between Seoul and Tokyo,
conditions will not be ripe for the foreseeable future. As Korea controls the islets and Japan
responsibly refrains from physically contesting that control (in contrast to Chinese behavior
over the Senkakus), the issue can be managed if both sides tone down their competing
public relations campaigns. This would mean not increasing mention in official documents
or educational texts, sticking to existing articulations of policy when the issue comes up inparliament or in press conferences, and abstaining from elevating government participation
in “Takeshima Day” and “Dokdo Day.”!
Korean government officials would be prudent to remind the Korean media thatJapan has made no physical provocation concerning the islets, so Korean diplomacy should
not hype the issue, as doing so actually suggests there is a territorial dispute where Seoul
maintains there is none. Many other countries disagree about a line on the map between
them, but manage to prevent the issue from spilling over into areas of significant mutualinterest. Toward that end, South Korea and Japan can better enforce fisheries agreements
and avoid wasting money on public campaigns that cause both sides to lose trust, not onlywith each other, but also with other countries.

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22. Increase functional cooperation
2.1. Resume high-level bilateral diplomacy to empower the working-level!
To overcome strong anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea and growing anti-Koreansentiment in Japan, positive signals are needed from the heads of government. The
resumption of summit meetings will help set the bilateral agenda and provide momentum forworking-level negotiations. Professional diplomats and government officials who know well
how to represent and advance national interests in Japan-Korea relations have had theirhands tied because their bosses were not talking with each other. Many domestic politicalactors matter, but it is up to Park and Abe to set the tone for diplomacy. U.S. officials arewise to avoid taking sides or sounding like history teachers, but President Obama’s April visit
to Asia could be an action-forcing event for coordination among the three countries.
2.2. Deepen trilateral cooperation with the U.S.
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There is much to discuss in terms of trilateral cooperation. Frequent working-level
consultations, such as those among Six-party Talks representatives, are key for coordinating
regional and international security policies, including dealing with North Korea. Morecombined exercises, from trilateral search and rescue, to multilateral military exercises such
as RIMPAC, will improve readiness and interoperability. Defense trilateral talks are an
important mechanism for pursuing maritime and missile defense cooperation. When politicalconditions improve, South Korea and Japan can sign a General Security of Military
Information Agreement (GSOMIA) for intelligence sharing, and an Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement (ACSA) providing logistical basis for further contingency planning.
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Working-level progress could culminate in a trilateral security statement at a 2+2+2
meeting of foreign affairs and defense ministers. In the meantime, a Track-1.5 consultative
mechanism organized by policy think tanks would be useful for transparency of the planned
revision of U.S.-Japan alliance guidelines. Those revisions are of interest to South Korea as
they may involve cyber, space, upgraded exercises, disaster relief, capacity building, andJapan possibly exercising its right of collective self-defense. On the trade side, the TransPacific Partnership will not be easy to conclude, but could also enhance U.S.-Japan-Korea
trilateralism, especially in terms of norm and standard setting in the Asia-Pacific.
2.3. Strengthen commitment to Japan-Korea-China trilateralism!
Advancing international norms and standards is particularly urgent in the context ofJapan and South Korea’s relations with China. There is already much functional integration
among the three countries, driven by business interests. Governments can do more byagreeing on standards for air pollution reduction, intellectual property protection, and crisis
communication in case of a maritime incident, natural disaster or pandemic disease. A
coordinating body already exists — the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul — but its
efforts have been hampered by a failure of national leaders to meet each other. For building
trust and stability in Northeast Asia, the governments of China, Korea and Japan should
agree not to cancel trilateral meetings because of bilateral disputes or domestic politicalcalendars.
2.4. Coordinate development assistance!
South Korea is becoming an influential player in overseas development assistance(ODA). South Korea joined the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD in2009 — the first former aid recipient country to do so. South Korea since pledged to double
its ODA, which is significant when many countries’ aid budgets are under downward
pressure. However, South Korea’s aid policy is experiencing growing pains, especially given
an apparent priority of benefiting Korean companies. As one of the world’s top donors,
Japan has much experience in improving aid programs and policies, and can be an!

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important partner for Korea. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Korea
International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) can do more to coordinate on best practices,efficiency, and effectiveness of development assistance in Myanmar, Africa and elsewhere.
Such coordination will benefit recipient countries, and will help build trust between Japanand South Korea regarding each other’s international contributions.
3. Redouble efforts at reconciliation
3.1. Recall past accomplishments!
The South Korean and Japanese governments, and especially the Korean media, do
not sufficiently recognize and remind their publics of past bilateral accomplishments. These
include rapid and integrated economic development and technological advancement, tradepromotion policies, trilateral cooperation with the U.S. over North Korea’s nuclear program,and coordinated engagement of China and ASEAN. Tokyo and Seoul often support eachother in hours of need, including during the Asian Financial Crisis, in the face of North
Korea’s 2010 attacks on South Korea, and after Japan’s March 11, 2011 earthquake andtsunami. The two sides should recall the understanding on matters of history achieved by
the 1998 Kim-Obuchi statement.7 These accomplishments ought to be celebrated in 2015
as Japan and Korea mark fifty years since diplomatic normalization.
3.2. Korea-based compensation for Korean wartime labor!
The 1965 Korea-Japan normalization treaty legally settled all claims related toJapan’s colonization of South Korea. However, the treaty remains controversial because thethen Korean government did not disburse the large amount of money paid by Japan to alldeserving individuals in Korea. Instead, the funds were mostly invested in modernizing theKorean economy. Recently, the Korean government has moved away from recognizing the1965 agreement as having closed compensation claims, and Korean courts have ruled infavor of new compensation for wartime laborers. If such rulings are upheld after appeal,
there would be serious repercussions for Korea-Japan political and economic relations.
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President Park often recalls the legacy of her father, former President Park Chunghee, in building the economic “Miracle on the Han River.” Park could also address how herfather’s government used the enormous sums that came with normalizing relations withJapan. The current Korean government would be judicious to uphold the 1965 treaty, whilesetting up a public-private fund for outstanding compensation of wartime laborers. Japanesecompanies could then voluntarily contribute to the fund.
3.3. Peace for women scarred by war!
Japanese government officials are not in a moral position to argue about details of“comfort women” history (e.g. how many were coerced by Japanese, how many by Koreans,
how many volunteered and were compensated, to what extent other countries committed
comparable atrocities, etc.)
At the same time, Seoul ought to avoid pushing anoversimplified history of “sex slaves” where all Koreans were good and all bad actions werecommitted by Japanese. Nationalism stands in the way of reconciliation, as in the 1990s
when the Asian Women’s Fund failed to achieve its mission, in part because some Korean
activists wanted to continue using the “comfort women” as an anti-Japanese symbol.
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In 2012, Japan was close to offering a new apology, taxpayer funded compensation,
and a visit by the Japanese ambassador to each survivor. As a matter of human rights anddecency, these women deserve closure, and as they are advanced in years, their number
dwindles every month. The Korean government should make clear what gesture it will
accept, and then help implement and domestically defend the agreement, so that a final
Japanese gesture for the “comfort women” can be realized without delay.

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43.4. Joint commemorations, academic and media projects!
Joint commemorations and shared understandings of war have facilitated theestablishment of a security community in Europe. Europeans know well the image ofGerman Chancellor Willy Brandt falling to his knees before the Monument to the Ghetto
Heroes in Warsaw in 1970, and of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President
François Mitterrand grasping hands at the Douaumont cemetery at Verdun in 1984.
Japanese and Koreans need a similar reconciliation event photograph in their textbooks.
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Joint textbook publishing remains difficult given the gap between official histories, but
cooperative Japan-Korea research can be encouraged and supported by the respective
governments. Educational and cultural exchanges should be expanded rather than held
hostage to political cycles. Regular study trips by legislators and journalists would promotestronger ties and informed policymaking. Media cooperation could include a joint publicbroadcasting channel similar to the European Cultural Channel ARTE, a successful
collaboration of French and German public broadcasting. Mutual respect of cultures andshared understandings of history are the foundations for building agreement on Asia’s future.
Conclusion: toward a shared vision of regional order!
All these recommendations involve Japanese and Korean responsibility. Tactics ofdelay, isolation, and exchanging recriminations run counter to national and regional
interests. Lack of trust is preventing Tokyo and Seoul from acting on shared values, mutual
security concerns, and broad agreement on international norms. By deepening trust, SouthKorea and Japan will not only enhance their own security and economic prospects, they will
gain leverage in dealing with North Korea, be able to more productively engage China froma position of strength, and fortify relations with the United States. Restoring trust firstrequires that leaderships do no further harm to bilateral relations over historical and territorial
sensitivities. Officials can then demonstrate the value of bilateral relations via expanded
functional cooperation. Finally, leaders with strategic vision can invest political capital insustained reconciliation to see that Asia’s future greatly improves upon its past.
Notes
1 Assistant Professor, Division of International Studies at Ewha University and Research Fellow, Asan Institute for

Policy Studies in Seoul. The author appreciates valuable feedback from numerous scholars and policymakers,
including during a visiting fellowship at the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA). The analysis presented
in this article is solely that of the author and does not represent the views of any affiliated institutions.
2 Geun-hye Park, “A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust Between Seoul and Pyongyang,” Foreign Affairs,
September 2011; http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68136/park-geun-hye/a-new-kind-of-korea.
Park haslabeled trustpolitik at the regional level as the “Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative.”
3 Jiyoon Kim, Karl Friedhoff, Chungku Kang and Euicheol Lee, “Korea-Japan Relations in 2014,” Asan Institutefor Policy Studies, March 2014; http://en.asaninst.org/challenges-and-opportunities-for-korea-japan-relationsin-2014.
4 Leif-Eric Easley, “Korean Courage to Deal with Japan,” American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 36, No. 1,
January/February 2014, pp. 25-33; http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10803920.2014.879516.
5 Keith Bradsher, “Philippine Leader Sounds Alarm on China,” New York Times, February 4, 2014; http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/world/asia/philippines.html.
6 Statement by South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se at the 25th Session of the United Nations HumanRights Council (UNHRC), March 5, 2014; http://www.mofa.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/engreadboard.jsp?typeID=12&boardid=14137&seqno=313472; “S. Korea wants ‘comfort women’ on United
Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) list,” Taipei Times, January 16, 2014; http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/01/16/2003581394; for an interactive representation ofOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data on gender equality, see The Economist“Glass Ceiling Index” at http://www.economist.com/news/business/21598669-bestand-worstplaces-be-workingwoman-glass-ceiling-index.
7 Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan-ROK Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century,
October 8, 1998; http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html.

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