ISSUE NO. 10 – 2024
Policy Brief – La Trobe Asia

THE LA TROBEASIA BRIEF
ENHANCING GLOBAL AND
REGIONAL MARITIME ORDER
Bec Strating, Nick Bisley, Alessio Patalano, Hillary Briffa, Chisako T. Masao,
Nobuhiro Aizawa, Yoichiro Sato, Kyoko Hatakeyama, Scott Edwards
and Troy Lee-Brown

HOW ASIAN STATES AND
ALLIES CAN STRENGTHENDIALOGUE, INTERACTIONS, AND
COORDINATION TO MAXIMISETHE IMPACT OF THEIR EFFORTS
IN UPHOLDING REGIONAL AND
MARITIME ORDER.

MESSAGE
FROM THE
VICE-CHANCELLORAs La Trobe University’s new Vice-Chancellor, I am
delighted to introduce this issue of the La Trobe Asia
Brief. This is a collaborative edition in which a team ofauthors from Australia, the United Kingdom, and Japanconsider what cooperation and coordination is needed
throughout Asia to uphold regional and maritime order.
Oceans are an important resource for every country
and are essential for travel and trade. Ensuring fair andequitable access through waters across Asia is vital notjust for those who live amongst it, but also for those who
rely on it for trade. This report highlights the challenges
faced in maintaining maritime order for all those that
depend on the ocean.

I would also like to acknowledge the Australia-JapanFoundation of the Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade and the United Kingdom Foreign andCommonwealth Development Office for the funding they
provided to support development of this report. We arevery grateful for funding of research that helps in our
understanding of security affairs.
In the pages that follow, you will find analyses thatprovide important resources for both policymakers andscholars. I hope you enjoy this issue of the La Trobe
Asia Brief.

I would like to thank the academics who have contributed
to this report. They provide thoughtful and timely insights
and demonstrate the ways that security cooperation canbenefit everyone across the region.

Professor Theo Farrell
Vice-Chancellor, La Trobe University

ABOUT THE SERIESEDITORThe La Trobe Asia Brief is a publication from La Trobe Asia, basedat La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia on the traditionallands of the Wurundjeri people. This series provides a platform
for commentary, research and analysis of policy issues that areof key importance in the Asian region. The papers in The La Trobe
Asia Brief series are written for an informed audience. Authors will
be invited by La Trobe Asia to contribute to this series.

Matt Smith

PHOTOS
Front cover: HMAS Sirius conducts a dual Replenishment at
Sea with HMA Ships Arunta and Stuart as they sail home toAustralia across the Java Sea, after completing a North East Asia
Deployment (Photo: ABIS Kayla Hayes / Royal Australian Navy).
Inside issue: Denis Tsarik, Simon Dawson (No 10 Downing Street),
Alice Hodgeson (No 10 Downing Street), Jay Cronan, CPL Robert
Whitmore, LSIS Susan Mossop.

THE LA TROBE ASIA BRIEF #10© 2024 La Trobe Asia. All rights reserved.
La Trobe University does not take institutional positions on public
policy issues. The views represented in this paper are the authorsand do not necessarily represent the views of theUniversity orcollaborating institutions.
This report is the result of a collaborative project between La
Trobe Asia, Kyushu University and King’s College London. It hasreceived grant funding from the Australia-Japan Foundationof the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the United
Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report underscores several critical challenges facing
maritime order in Asia.

This is particularly true in the midst of the continuously
shifting balance of economic and technological power.

First, states hold differing interpretations of maritime
order. While communities of practice within Australia,
Japan, and the United Kingdom share common language
around maritime order, they often have differing ideas
about priorities in terms of content, governance, andstakeholders. Across Asia and the Pacific, maritime stateswith more limited institutional mass in this field also havedifferent priorities and interests in maritime security.
These differences can hinder effective cooperation.

To enhance maritime cooperation, UK-Australia-Japan
should foster cooperation for more efficient maritime
security coordination by:Second, establishing a shared vision of regional maritime
order through consensus-building amidst strategiccompetition is challenging. In this respect, states like
Australia, Japan, and the UK with a leadership potential
in advancing maritime security will need to invest inpromoting interactions among their respective specialist
communities to close conceptual gaps and widen
common ground to articulate and operationalise sharedideas of maritime order.

– Promoting consensus on norms and rules to prevent
maritime tensions while respecting smaller and middle
power states’ concerns.
– Practicing prudent defence diplomacy to avoid
misunderstandings in the region.
– Recognising the interconnectedness of economic
and maritime security in Southeast Asia.
– Addressing duplication and fragmentation incapacity-building efforts.
– Securing continued funding for maritime security
institutions like the Joint Maritime Security Centre(JMSC).
– Supporting ‘quotidian’ or day-to-day patterns oforderly relations at sea.

Third, managing the promotion of cooperation oversecurity issues that matter to maritime order on the
background of widening strategic competition in themaritime domain is becoming more difficult for states
like Australia, Japan and the UK.

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INTRODUCTION
This report presents findings resulting from acollaborative research initiative between King’s College
London, Kyushu University, and La Trobe Asia, generously
funded by the Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade and the United Kingdom’s (UK) Foreign,
Commonwealth and Development Office.

Italy for the development of a sixth-generation fighter
jet. The UK has also significantly upgraded defence
relations with Japan with the signing of and RAA and thewide-reaching Hiroshima Accords in 2022. In this respect,after Australia, the UK became the second nation toformalise an RAA with Japan.

The research trip, conducted in April 2023, encompassed
an academic maritime security trilateral dialogue at
Kyushu University and site visits to the Kure Naval
Base, a visit to the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force
Officers Candidate School in Etajima, the Japanese
Coastguard, and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence
Forces Command and Staff College. Across the visits, theprimary themes of dialogue focused on three topics:

In the maritime domain these three states – what
we call ‘secondary powers’ – share a host ofcommonalities: they are coastal states that depend
on unfettered access to unimpeded sea lanes ofcommunication and unobstructed chokepoints; they
are prominent supporters of international law of thesea underpinned by the United Nations Convention of
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); and they have significant
interests in governance regulating the sustainable
exploitation of fisheries and the management of othermaritime industries.

– Order and the Maritime Geopolitics of Asia
– Maritime Governance and International Law of the Sea– Regional Relationships and Maritime Security
Japan is Australia’s key strategic partner in Asia. Bothcountries have substantially deepened bilateral defence
cooperation, culminating in the 2021 signing of a
Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). Althoughgeographically distant from Asia, the UK is progressively
asserting a more substantial regional role, primarily
through the guiding framework of their ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’introduced by the Integrated Review published in 2021,
through its AUKUS partnership with Australia and theUnited States (US) and, more recently its additional GCAP
(Global Combat Air Programme) signed with Japan and

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Asia’s maritime security order is currently experiencing
heightened ambiguity and contestation. In this context,
this research trip bought together experts from Australia,
Japan, and the UK to explore possibilities among different
communities of practice for initiatives that can leadto enhancing regional maritime order and security.
The central focus revolved around the formulationof this notion of order, examining both its global andregional dimensions, and scrutinizing the roles played
by international law, political economy, institutions, andcooperation in shaping, sustaining, and potentially altering
its character at sea.

This report focuses specifically on the roles played bysecondary powers in the establishment of a maritime
order and pinpoints opportunities for expanded
cooperation on matters of shared interest.
While there is broad agreement about the importance ofthe maritime ‘rules-based order’, the interplay between
the international, regional, and maritime orders, as wellas the underlying processes of ‘ordering’, remain less wellunderstood. The report discerns three primary challenges
affecting regional maritime order.
First, while states may share a common language on
maritime order, they may not necessarily hold congruent
views on its constituent parts. The report probes thenuances of governance and good order at sea from theperspectives of the UK, Japan, and Australia, focusingon pivotal issues within the realm of international lawof the sea. Key questions include the identification ofactors or agencies responsible for such governance, themethods employed for governing the seas, the entities
challenging this governance, and the potential role ofemerging technologies, such as maritime surveillance
capacities and underwater drones, along with theattendant requirements for new laws and norms asthese technologies become increasingly prevalent.

Second, there exists a pressing need for building
consensus around the definition and operationalisationof regional maritime order. For secondary powers
deeply invested in preserving the existing regional
maritime order, such as Australia, Japan, and the UK,a critical question emerges: how can a common groundbe established amid the advent of new powers and thepersistence of existing powers seeking to challenge theestablished political, economic, and normative statusquo concerning each other and other regional states?
Third, the report investigates current limitations
and opportunities for regional cooperation andcoordination across several critical areas of mutual
concern. These include addressing non-traditional
security challenges such as combatting illegal,
unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, counteringpiracy, addressing maritime “grey zone” activities,
rectifying gaps in the law of the sea, and mitigating
environmental degradation. Additionally, the report
explores avenues for collaboration between thesesecondary powers and Southeast Asian and Pacificstates, with an emphasis on developing sovereign
capabilities in response to hybrid and “blue crime”
challenges.
In conclusion, the report provides recommendations on
how communities of practices within these states, alongwith others, can strengthen dialogue, interactions, andcoordination to maximise the impact of their efforts in
upholding regional and maritime order.

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ORDER AND THE MARITIMEGEOPOLITICS OF ASIAIn Asia, the pursuit of order is most acute within themaritime domain. Conceptualisations of regional
order have received relatively less analytical attention
compared to international order. This oversight can be
attributed in part to the overall stability of the region thatprevailed since the normalization of diplomatic relations
between the United States and China from the 1970s into
the 1990s. The stability of East Asia during this period
rested on four key pillars: amicable relations amongmajor powers, the primacy of the United States and its
general acceptance, the prioritization of nation-building
over international politics by many states, and a focus
on domestic affairs. However, the breakdown of thisamicable atmosphere has had a profound impact.
The intensification of strategic competition between the
United States and China has imposed significant stresson Asia’s regional security order, notably in disputed
maritime regions like the South and East China Seas. In
the 1980s, U.S. predominance contributed to depoliticizing order at sea, as there was limited room for strategic
rivalry on the oceans. However, contemporary dynamics
have transformed the maritime domain into a theatreof strategic and normative contention, particularly in
relation to fundamental principles such as ‘the free seas’,with implications for regional and international ordermore broadly conceived.
The concept of ‘order’ encompasses various definitions,serving as a description of the existing state of affairs,
a mechanism for addressing problems, disputes, orshared challenges, or a framework for finding solutions.
Sociological definitions portray order as a stable andpredictable set of relationships grounded in power

dynamics, rules, institutions, legitimacy, and consent.
Normative definitions, on the other hand, emphasize therole of norms and values, whether implicit or explicit, inshaping order.
Key questions surrounding order include:– How states and other relevant actors view its function,utility, and purpose– Whether it is universal or limited in scope– The degree to which rules are institutionalised and/or
grounded in practice and behaviour– The distribution of power within the order.
Presently, we find ourselves in an era marked by thecontest between might and right, particularly evident
in the waters of East Asia which are subject to a rangeof territorial and maritime disputes. This necessitates
a deeper understanding of how power dynamics
intersect with rules and other mechanisms of global
governance within the context of order, and specificallymaritime order.
As its own distinctive concept, maritime order may
be conceptualised as the configuration of forces that
establishes stable relations within a maritime system.
The concept of ‘good order at sea’ is predicated on thestability, predictability, and adherence to establishedrules, norms, and principles, which could be considereda type of ‘quotidian’ order produced by the daily
behaviours and interactions of those who regularly
use the seas, either as a mode of transport, exchange,
exploitation, or control. Yet it is essential to note that‘order at sea’, as a notion, stands for more than themechanics of interaction at sea. It is intricately tied
to broader discussions about how the use of the sea
underwrites changes in normative and power relations.
These, in turn, have an impact on the general regionalarchitecture and power balance. At sea, the questionof order links governance to power structures and, as aresult, one cannot disentangle might from right.
Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China has increasingly
challenged the UNCLOS-centred maritime order in East
Asia. Its naval expansion, bolstered by growing militaryand ship building capabilities, utilisation of non-naval
assets like coastguards for strategic purposes, and therise of China-centric economic institutions, has led toa more contested regional environment, putting theregion’s maritime order to the test. Beijing’s assertionof the nine-dash line, despite being invalidated by the2016 South China Sea arbitral tribunal ruling, has raised
concerns among states regarding the erosion ofinternational law of the sea and the legitimacy of UNCLOS,
which underscores the sovereign rights of coastal statesacross different maritime zones.
For its part, the United States has not ratified UNCLOS.
While it observes many of the principles enshrinedin UNCLOS as customary law, this failure to ratify has
allowed China to effectively weaponise a strategic
narrative that the US does not support the maritime‘rules-based order’.
While the prospect of China and the United Statesfinding consensus on these issues remains elusive, it isimportant to acknowledge that regional order extends
beyond this binary rivalry. A crucial question is how allstates can work to construct a stable and substantive
regional order within the diverse landscape of ideas
concerning the rules, institutions, laws, and norms
governing maritime relations between states. Within theintellectual communities of practice there is an increasing
acceptance that a measure of stability in regional ordershould and can be achieved notwithstanding structural
tensions among major powers.
This leads to an additional observation. There aredifferences in the ways states and scholars conceptualise
and operationalise maritime order. First, there is such a
broad range of challenges that fall under the ‘maritime
security’ umbrella – from national security, to economic,
environmental and human security. In this respect, themeaning of maritime order depends upon whether theemphasis is on naval or national security viewpoints, orcivil and governance standpoints that centre on (oftentransnational) crimes at sea and other non-militarydrivers of maritime disorder. The academic literatureremains largely split between national security andcivil conceptions of maritime security – but this is also
replicated in state policy.
Is such a civil-military split approach suitable to a region
where grey zone threats are prominent? Many states do
not have definitions of maritime security, but across the
Indo-Pacific it is evident that coastal states have different
priorities and policies depending on a range of factors,
including political and strategic culture, geography,
marine resources, and capabilities.

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Second, conscious ambiguity in interpreting normative
frameworks and behaviour at sea play a pivotal role in
the persistence of these divergences around perceptionsof order. Grey areas within UNCLOS have led to disputes
and differences in interpretation among states acrossa wide range of areas. These include where and how
baselines should be drawn for the purposes of measuring
maritime jurisdiction, appropriate principles for delimiting
EEZs and continental shelves in cases where they overlap,
and the extent of coastal state rights in governing militaryactivities or marine research conducted in their EEZs.
These lead to disputes over common principles, divergent
interpretations of international law, and the existence ofshared language without necessarily shared ideas.
One central divergence revolves around the extent towhich the seas should be considered ‘open’ or ‘closed’,and how far sovereignty may extend into maritime
regions. For example, UNCLOS defines the concept of‘innocent passage’ through a coastal state’s 12 nauticalmile territorial sea, however it does not specify whether
warships possessed this right. While the US supports
maximum freedom, China occupies a more restrictive
interpretation of innocent passage for warships inmaritime areas it asserts claims over. It nonethelesselects to adopt other states’ interpretations of passage
rights when in the territorial seas of other coastal states.
A second divergence is how states conceptualise therelationships between civil and military domains andassets. The use of so-called ‘grey zone’ tactics reflect
this ambiguity, and present legal complications in how
states respond. With the build-up of China’s Coast
Guard fleet, China is logging more hours of patrol andcreating new domestic laws, such as the 2021 Coast
Guard Law (and amendments) to support its jurisdictional
claims over the contested waters in the East and South
China Sea. This fusion is reflected in new administrative
naming systems, the use of legally dubious terms such as‘jurisdictional waters’ and artificial island building, which,according to UNCLOS, cannot legitimately generate
maritime zones. Nevertheless, the rebuilt land has been
inhabited, developed with infrastructure, and fortified(by China and other claimants), and the risk is that thisterritorialisation could generate new customary law on
the relationship between ‘natural’ islands and maritime
zones. Global maritime technologies are also part of thepicture, as China employs a new governance system over6

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the sea through communication satellites, underwater
surveillance, and drones. China’s overarching maritime
power increasingly stems from this broader ‘civil andmilitary fusion’.
Regional states do not always know how to counter
these tactics, nor do they necessarily share common
approaches or resources. Japan provides an interestingmodel. Inside the territorial waters and contiguous zone
claimed by Japan around the Senkaku Islands (what
China refers to as Diaoyu Islands), China’s Coast Guard
regularly approach Japanese fishing vessels. Japan’s
Coast Guard records the number of Chinese vessels
within its claimed Senkaku territorial and contiguous
zone. In 2022/2023, it recorded between 4-16 Chinese
vessels sighted within its claimed territorial sea permonth, and between 75-121 sightings/interactions in thecontiguous zone per month. While sovereignty of theseislands is contested, Japan views these assertions as
a violation of international law. In response, Japanesepatrol vessels demand the Coast Guard leave, withindications that these now-routinised, daily interactions
between Japanese and Chinese vessels are generally
polite but firm, and the Japanese Government lodges a‘strong protest against the Chinese Government throughdiplomatic channels’.
The growing projection of national power over oceans
has resulted in increased ‘territorialisation’, wherein statestreat maritime waters as extensions of their territory,
to be controlled like they would land. This is a type of‘soft expansionism’. This approach contrasts with thetraditional European public international law perspectivethat views the seas as ‘free’ or ‘res communis’, not subject
to sovereign ownership. Territorialisation provides greater
opportunities for control and absolute jurisdiction,
challenging the prevailing maritime order based on freesea principles. It is often facilitated through the linkage
of nationalism and sovereignty, often involving themobilisation of maritime boundaries and territorial claims
in national discourse and popular culture. Ultimately,
territorialisation points to one of the subtle differencesthat states conceptualise and operationalise
maritime order.

CONSENSUS BUILDING
Secondary, middle, and smaller power states acrossdifferent maritime areas face common and differentiatedchallenges. One of the main shared problems is copingwith great power competition and developing strategies
for dealing with rivalries, particularly as China’s heightened
presence and maritime assertions creates uncertainty
and unease across the maritime domains of East Asia.
While states such as Australia, Japan and the UK areformal allies with the United States, other states in andbeyond East Asia, including the Pacific and Indian Oceans,share apprehensions about the dynamics of great powercompetition unfolding in the area.
While they may not be able to avoid strategic competition,
many of these states are unwilling to ‘pick sides’ and/or are
hoping to leverage rivalry for their advantage. Many seek toavoid becoming ‘entrapped’, so are searching for ways bywhich to expand their strategic options, in and beyond themaritime theatre.
An example is the Maldives, which retains India as its key
defence partner, whilst continuing to strengthen economic
ties with China.

Another is landlocked Laos, which has deepened its
relationship with China in the bid to off-set the dominanceof its neighbours Thailand and Vietnam, including refusing toaccept the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on China’s
sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. Yet, Laos is also
hedging against over-dependency on China by deepening
economics relations with Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan.
In each of these cases, these small powers are actively
pursuing their strategies through multilateral fora andstriving to strengthen the institutional framework andlegitimacy of ASEAN, in particular.
For regional states, there is also a broader question of what
constitutes ‘good order’ – and for whom – that remains
significant. Addressing non-traditional security challenges,
such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing,environmental degradation, and humanitarian and natural
disasters, extends beyond concerns related solely torising powers or hard power/military concerns. In light ofchallenges posed by climate change and issues like global
health pandemics and human trafficking, the adequacy ofthe current rules-based order (RBO) is also under scrutiny.

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These issues reflect the multifaceted concerns of regional
states, especially smaller and middle-power nations, as
they navigate complex maritime dynamics and strive tosecure their interests in an evolving geopolitical landscape.
Different views and perspectives on the key issues, rules,
institutions, and approaches that underpin regional andmaritime order makes consensus-building a necessary aimof enhancing cooperation.
One area that is of particular importance for Southeast
Asian states is ‘Marves’: maritime investment. Navies
have tended to remain weak in Southeast Asia, including
politically, compared with armies. This presents difficulties
in terms of defence cooperation in the maritime realm.
Domestic politics in Southeast Asian states also tend tobe centred around economic interests, including aroundenergy, as ‘blue carbon’ negotiators are playing importantroles in Southeast Asian states such as Vietnam, Philippines,
and Malaysia. This means for states like Australia, UK
and Japan, the economic and infrastructure priorities ofSoutheast Asian are crucial for understanding the limits andpossibilities of maritime cooperation.
Economic priorities also feed into the broader tensions
between territorialisation and freedom of the seas. In trade,maritime economic freedom matters. But in controlling
maritime industries such as fisheries or oil and gas offshoredevelopments, there may be a strong impetus towards‘territorialisation’ – that is, expanding governmental control
over the seas. In energy, for example, territorialisation (orcontrol) and free seas are both necessary for exploiting
and importing marine resources. In the domestic politics ofSoutheast Asian states, this requires identifying which partof the economic business group are dominating the agenda.
In the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), the Indo-Pacific framingof order competes with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Northeast Asian states favour the Indo-Pacific concept
as they rely upon energy supply routes through the Indian
Ocean. Yet, the narratives of IOR states are often framedaround ‘blue economy’ rather than geopolitics. Like
Southeast Asia, IOR states do not tend to be advanced
naval powers. The region has also experienced maritime
disputes such as over ownership over Chagos Archipelago
between the UK and Mauritius. Resolving this dispute will
be important for the UK’s reputation as a supporter of the‘rules-based order’.
Across Southeast Asia and the IOR, IUU fishing is a challengethat is compounded by limited maritime domain awareness,such as the radars necessary for policing and governing
EEZs. There is a need to be careful about distinguishing thedifferent types of actors that are engaged in IUU fishing:while the focus is now often on the so-called ‘maritime
militia’ supported by China (primarily but not solely) in theSouth China Sea, IUU crimes may be committed by local
fishers who have been pushed out of traditional fishing areasor who are unaware of jurisdictional rules and boundaries,
or by transnational crime syndicates – the ‘maritime
mafia’. The point here is that not all IUU fishing is linked withstrategic competition. The Pacific Island Countries (PICs)
are also dealing with these kind of non-traditional maritime
security challenges, particularly given the importance offishing industries for the economies of these ‘vast ocean’states. For smaller states, maritime security is often about
sustenance and threat: while EEZ are a source of fish stocks
and livelihoods, and continental shelves are a source ofenergy resources, their vast size can make it difficult interms of poor regulations and practices.

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Across all three maritime regions, climate change andnatural and humanitarian disasters are likely to present
problems in the future. Sea levels rise is likely to affect themaritime claims of low-lying coastal states. Leaders of PICs
such as Vanuatu have been instrumental in engaging incollective ocean diplomacy on critical issues of who shouldbe held responsible for climate change and how to preserve
maritime boundaries as land territory erodes in the face ofclimate change, including pushing for permanent EEZs at theUnited Nations.
These states are not just the subject of the strategy ofothers – or pawns in great power competition – but havetheir own strategies.
For example, a maritime boundary in the northern partof Borneo is presently being claimed by China, yet Brunei
has thus far been cautious about its EEZ claims where
they conflict with China’s nine-dash line and has insteadprioritised sustaining cordial relations that have resulted in
the integration of its “Wawasan Brunei 2035” development
strategy into the Chinese Belt and Road initiative. Economic,
trade and infrastructural development are being prioritisedover maritime disputes. Likewise, many other small
powers in the region are not always interested in directly
challenging China, particularly given the economic interests
at stake and the necessity for cooperation in confronting
the climate emergency, which is given precedence by
the PICs.
In areas where consensus-building is less possible or likely,
cooperation ultimately requires thinking broadly aboutmaritime security, and focusing on the less contentious
issues – particularly in the civil maritime security space –that provide best opportunity for advancing cooperationin the pursuit of regional maritime order.

REGIONAL COOPERATIONIn the context of Asia’s increasingly contested regional
maritime order, regional and extra-regional states such
as Japan, UK and Australia have sought to increase theirdefence engagements and cooperation to maintain as muchof the ‘status quo’ order as they can, as a form of ‘defence
diplomacy’, reflecting their interests as regional maritime
powers. Such defence diplomacy can signal their sharedintent to deter actions that are likely to alter the status quo,
and includes:

These states, however, need to be alert to the risks ofdefence diplomacy, especially the use of the defence
assets for signalling and symbolic intent. It is not always
clear what states are attempting to achieve with increasing
naval deployments, particularly extra-regional states. Rather
than viewed as defensive or a deterrent, such actions may
be interpreted by regional states as destabilising – one
person’s ‘defence diplomacy’ may be another person’s‘gunboat diplomacy’.

– Using military assets to collectively reaffirm freedomsof navigation as well as the respect of core principles
of sovereignty at sea as enshrined in UNCLOSUS Freedom of Navigation Operations are a good exampleof this. While they are used by the US to uphold its
interpretation of international law and to protest what it
views as ‘excessive maritime claims’, they can also cause
anxiety within Asian states. Despite this potential foranxiety, it is often these signals which are amplified themost in messaging – including the messaging from thesesecondary powers. The deployment of the UK’s Carrier
Strike Group to the region was heavily publicised, as was thesubsequent announcement that the UK and France would
coordinate deployments of aircraft carriers to the region
for a more persistent presence. In contrast, - and barringsome examples like the amplification of the HMS Tamar’s
and Spey’s activities - defence activities that contribute toregional order through the reinforcement of collective good
often go unpublicised.

– Supporting the capabilities of other states in defence
through capacity-building– Enhancing security relationships with each other,through activities such as joint training – in otherwords, developing greater ‘spoke-on-spoke
relationship’ in a structure of networked alliances,such as through Reciprocal Access Agreements– Engaging in strategic minilateralism. Japan andAustralia are both part of Quad, and Australia andUK are part of AUKUS, helping each other to build
up defence capabilities in the maritime domain

The La Trobe Asia Brief – Issue 10 |9An example is the UK Ministry of Defence’s efforts toenhance Indonesia’s, Malaysia’s, and the Philippines’
anti-terrorism cooperation (including sea-borne terrorism)
through increased dialogue.
With the Straits of Malacca projected to reach its carrying
capacity in 2024, there is a desirable effort to enhance thecoordination of the number of warships and other vessels
in the seas of East Asia to avoid unnecessary duplications
and avoid congestions in choke points area. This could be
worsened by the fact that military vessels come into close
proximity of one another during Humanitarian Assistance/
Disaster Relief (HADR) operations assistance. In responseto the Tonga earthquake, for example, China, the UK, andAustralia all sent naval vessels to deliver aid and goods.
The militarization of regional seas with few fora for dialogue
including all states involved has potential implications forsafety at sea and/or unintended conflict.
In Southeast Asia, the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) consistently
conducts training across the region on topics as broad as
forensics and diving through the Mobile Cooperation Teamand has coast guard liaisons posted across the region.
A key lesson drawn from the time we spent with Japan’s
Coast Guard centred on the importance of communication,
polite exchanges, open channels of communication, andthe day to-day routine of interaction – the basis of what we
describe here as ‘quotidian’ order – and may offer lessons
for other potential states dealing with the daily realities ofgrey zone threats, particularly for Southeast Asian littorals.
Australia’s Border Force (ABF) (its de facto coastguard)
also runs a Maritime Security Desktop Exercise with anumber of regional states, posts their own liaisons in key
countries, conducts capacity building in Indonesia, anddelivers a joint border protection operation (Operation
Redback) with Malaysia.
The UK deploys a (reflexively) ‘whole-of-system’ approachto capacity building in the region. Much of the work isundertaken by personnel from the Ministry of Defence(often seconded to the FCDO), with different departments
and agencies supporting specific areas of maritime order.
The Department for Transport (Dft), for example, has aliaison in the region focused on Port State Measures, andthe UK’s Coastguard works on Search and Rescue and oil
spill response.
While these efforts to improve capacity-building amongstates contribute to regional maritime order, it is anincreasingly crowded space and states needed to avoid
duplication and the downsides of fragmentation. There are
expanding efforts of coordination. The UK’s Coast Guardand the Japan Coast Guard, for example, have begun toengage in joint capacity building around oil spill response,
and the UK’s FCDO delivered an EEZ management course
at the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation –a centre founded between Australia and Indonesia. Thereis no structure for coordination, however, and these are
relatively ad hoc. The ongoing use of (often-duplicated)“one-shot” workshops and seminars around issues suchas non-proprietary information highlight the need for
greater coordination, as well as hinder the type ofsustained interaction that allows partnerships toflourish and interactive dialogue around capacitybuilding targeting to occur.

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In part, this is a problem that results from the variated way
maritime security governance is structured within the states
themselves. Neither the UK nor Australia have a dedicatedlaw enforcement coast guard. This creates two barriers
to cooperation.
First, much of the maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia is
occurring at a coast guard level and, in contrast to the JCG,
neither the UK nor Australia have an agency that can easilyinterface with these regional coast guards.
Second, intra-state coordination can also suffer as aresult without one agency taking ownership of their state’s
activities. At the 2023 Southeast Asia Cooperation andTraining (SEACAT) exercise, the UK’s whole-of-systemapproach to maritime security was put on display withrepresentatives from the Royal Navy, other Ministry of
Defence services, Joint Maritime Security Centre (JMSC),FCDO, DfT, Department for Food and Agriculture (DEFRA),
and UK CG. Sustained structures for the coordination ofmaritime security activities in-region, however, are lacking.
Institutions such as the JMSC should play important
institutional roles in supporting regional maritime
security through their coordinating function. However,it faces difficulties that may prevent it realising a greaterorder-building role.
A consequence of the JMSC’s independence, for example,
is that it is not ‘owned’ by a single ministry and is therefore
jointly funded. Maintaining (and expanding) the JMSC’s
activities requires political will to ensure the necessary
funding continues past the current short term funding cycle
on which it currently relies. At the same time, the multitudeof agencies and their contestation concerning who takes
leadership of cultivating maritime security relationships
hampers the JMSC’s ability to work strongly within thisspace. A lack of domestic coherency can therefore haveregional implications, undermining cooperative efforts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A major challenge facing Asia is establishing consensus
about maritime regional order and its key rules and norms
in the context of intensifying strategic competition andsignificant military, economic and technological changes.
In order to advance cooperation and consensus, thisreport recommends that the UK, Australia, and Japan in
their cooperation should develop a coordinated groupingon maritime security, at both track 1 and track 1.5 levels.
As there is an over-arching common conceptualisationof maritime order and its underpinnings between thesethree states, this complementarity would make the poolingand streamlining of resources and coordination a more
efficient way of delivering capacity and responding toevolving challenges.
They should also seek to understand the significance ofeconomic security and priorities among Southeast Asianstates and other regional actors. Maritime and economic
security should be viewed as interrelated rather thanseparate domains. Engaging with economic dimensions may
allow states to build more effective partnerships, including
supporting or investing in critical maritime infrastructure,such as port facilities, surveillance systems, andcommunication networks.
States across the region should engage in prudent
defence diplomacy. It is essential that states consider theirmessaging and signalling strategies to ensure that theiractions are not misinterpreted by other states in the region,

preventing misunderstandings and potential escalations inmaritime security. States should also more-strongly amplify
defence activities that contribute to common goods. Thereis also a need for greater recognition that the domestic
coordination of maritime security policy has important
implications for regional cooperation. Where lacking, statesshould develop sustained structures for inter-agency
and inter-departmental coordination of regional maritime
security policy implementation. These structures should
aim to bridge the civil-military divide due to the prominenceof grey zone activities. This could mean ensuring sustained
funding for maritime security institutions who are
well-placed to play this role, such as the JMSC. Political andfunding commitments of such institutions are essential tothe coherency of their policy and as a result ensuring theircontinued contributions to maritime security and order.
And finally, states should encourage the development ofgreater consensus on norms, rules, and procedures forsafe and responsible behaviour at sea. Such a code canhelp reduce tensions, clarify expectations, and prevent
inadvertent escalations in maritime disputes. At the sametime, these states should be mindful of the sensitivities ofsmaller and middle power states across the Indo-Pacificaround becoming a pawn in great power games.
Through these recommendations we hope that states
can support a sustainable Asian maritime order basedon cooperation and commonly understoodand respected rules.

The La Trobe Asia Brief – Issue 10 | 11

CONTRIBUTORS

Bec Strating
Bec Strating is the Director of La Trobe Asia and Professor of International Relations at La Trobe
University. Her research focuses primarily on maritime disputes in Asia and Australian foreign anddefence policy. She is the author of Girt by Sea: Reimagining Australia’s Security (with Joanne Wallis,
La Trobe University Press/Black Inc, 2024) and co-editor of Blue Security: Maritime Strategies in
the Indo-Pacific (Routledge, 2024). Bec leads the DFAT-funded “Blue Security” network focusedon maritime security issues in the Indo-Pacific. She is a non-visiting fellow at the Royal Australian
Navy’s Seapower Centre, a member of the East West Centre Council on Indo-Pacific Relations, anexpert affiliate at the Australian National University’s National Security College, and President of
the Women in International Security-Australia’s steering committee. She was awarded the Bernard
Brodie Prize for best article published in Contemporary Security Policy in 2023.

Nick Bisley
Nick Bisley is the Dean and Head of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences and Professorof International Relations at La Trobe University. Nick is currently the President of the AustralasianCouncil of Deans of Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities and was elected as a Fellow of theAustralian Institute of International Affairs in 2020. He is the author of many works on international
relations, including The Belt and Road Initiative and the Future of Regional Order in the Indo-Pacific(Rowmand and Littlefield, 2020), Issues in 21st Century World Politics, 3rd Edition (Palgrave, 2017),
Great Powers in the Changing International Order (Lynne Rienner, 2012), and Building Asia’s Security(IISS/Routledge, 2009, Adelphi No. 408). He regularly contributes to and is quoted in national andinternational media including The Guardian, The Wall Street Journal, CNN and Time Magazine.

Alessio Patalano
Alessio Patalano is Professor of War & Strategy in East Asia at the Department of War Studies(DWS), King’s College London (KCL), and the Co-Director of the Centre for Grand Strategy (CGS),
where he leads the newly established Indo-Pacific Programme. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical
Society (FRHistS), a Visiting Professor at the Japan Maritime Command and Staff College (JMCSC),
and an Adjunct Fellow at the Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies, Temple University Japan. He
is the co-author of a forthcoming book, Maritime Security: A Global Primer (Routledge, 2024).

Hillary Briffa
Hillary Briffa is a Lecturer in National Security Studies and the Assistant Director of the Centre for
Defence Studies in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, where she read for her
Ph.D. Beyond academia, she has run award-winning peace-building projects in Eastern and Central
Europe, worked on counter-extremism with the OSCE, worked at the Malta High Commission to the
UK throughout Malta’s tenure as Commonwealth Chair-in-Office, and presently regularly consults
for the British and international governments. Her academic interest in maritime security focuseson the maritime interests of small states (or large ocean territories, as their EEZ would indicate!),climate resilience, and the impact of the UNCLOS on order at sea.

Chisako T. Masao
Chisako T. Masao is a Professor of international relations at the Faculty of Social and Cultural
Studies, Kyushu University and an Adjunct Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs(JIIA). She studies international relations focusing particularly on Chinese foreign and maritime
policies. She was given the Nakasone Yasuhiro Award of Excellence in 2021 for her contribution to
China studies and for the policy discussions regarding China’s Coast Guard Law. She worked forlate Harvard professor Ezra F. Vogel as his research assistant before obtaining the Ph.D. from the
University of Tokyo in 2008. She has written papers and conducted extensive research activities
not only in Japanese, but also in English and Chinese.

Nobuhiro Aizawa
Nobuhiro Aizawa is an Associate Professor in the Department of Cultural Studies at Kyushu
University. He specializes in the fields of Southeast Asian Politics, International Relations, Overseas
Chinese Studies and Comparative Politics. He teaches on the International Program of the Graduate
School of Integrated Sciences for Global Society.

Yoichiro Sato
Yoichiro Sato is a Professor at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University and is the Dean of the Department
and the Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies. His major works include Re-Rising Japan (coedited with Hidekazu Sakai, Peter Lang, 2017), Handbook of Indo-Pacific Studies (co-edited with
Barbara Kratiuk, Jeroen Van den Bosch, and Aleksandra Jaskólska, Routledge, 2023), and Alliancesin Asia and Europe: The Evolving Indo-Pacific Strategic Context and Inter-Regional Alignments(co-edited with Elena Atanassova-Cornelis and Tom Sauer, Routledge, 2023). He holds a BA (Law)from Keio University, MA (International Studies) from University of South Carolina, and Ph.D (Political
Science) from University of Hawaii.

Kyoko Hatakeyama
Kyoko Hatakeyama is a Professor of International Relations at the Graduate School of International
Studies and Regional Development, University of Niigata Prefecture. Prior to this position, she served
as a Research Analyst at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Kansai Gaidai University. Her
research interests include Japan’s foreign and security policy, maritime affairs, and international
relations in the Indo-Pacific region. Her recent publications include “A Middle Power’s Rolesin Shaping the East Asian Security Order: Analysis of Japan’s Engagement from a Normative
Perspective,” Australian Journal of Politics and History Vol. 65, No. 3 2019 and Japan’s Evolving
Security Policy: Militarisation within a Pacifist Tradition, Routledge, 2021.

Scott Edwards
Scott Edwards is a Lecturer at the University of Reading and Research Fellow at the Yokosuka
Council on Asia Pacific Studies (YCAPS). His research interests centre on the regional politics ofSoutheast Asia, with a particular focus on collective efforts combating maritime insecurities. This
work underpins Scott’s current academic projects: the first on the UK-ASEAN capacity-building
relationship; the second on relationships of trust between Southeast Asian states; and the third on
assessing the performance and implications of Southeast Asia’s maritime security coordinationarchitectures. For YCAPS, Scott has worked on relevant areas such as coastguard cooperation andidentifying best practices in maritime security capacity building.

Troy Lee-Brown
Troy Lee-Brown is a Research Fellow with the University of Western Australia’s Defence and Security
Institute with an interest in regional security, maritime security and international relations with afocus on the Indo-Pacific. He is currently the editor of the ‘Black Swan Strategy Paper’ and the
project manager for ‘Blue Security’, a joint DSI-La Trobe Asia-Griffith Asia Institute-UNSW-USSC
project which focuses on issues of maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.

La Trobe Asia
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Melbourne, Victoria 3086
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