Summary of Country Reports―Current Status of
11 FNCA Member States*―
12th Workshop on Nuclear Security and Safeguards Projectof Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA)

August 2, 2023

Regulatory Authority
Independence of Regulatory Agencies
 Independent: China (CAEA), Indonesia (BAPETEN), Japan (NRA), ROK (NSSC),
Mongolia (Executive office of the NEC and Ministry of Education and Science,
Department of Nuclear and Radiation Inspections) Semi‐Independent*: Bangladesh (BAERA), Kazakhstan (NNC), Malaysia (AELB),
Thailand (OAP), Viet Nam (VARANS)*The regulatory agency is under a governmental body or ministry towhich a nuclear promotion agency belongs
 No Independent: Philippines (PNRI)
Recent Development
Philippines: 1st Reading in the 19th Congress‐Establish an independent regulatory
authority or the PHILIPPINE ATOMIC ENERGY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, instead of“Philippine Nuclear Research Institute”.
* Independent: Australia (ARPANSA, ASNO)

2

Safeguards (1)Implementation of International Treaties and Agreements
 Member of NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty): 12/12 states
 CSA (Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement) in Force: 12/12 states (VOA isin force in China)
 AP (Additional Protocol) in Force: 11/12 states
 IS (Integrated Safeguards): 6/12 states
NPT Member

CSA in Force

AP in Force

Integrated
safeguards

Australia
Bangladesh
China
Indonesia
Japan
Kazakhstan

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
VOA in force✓✓✓

12 Dec.1997
30 Mar. 2001
28 Mar. 2002
29 Sep. 1999
16 Dec. 1999
9 May 2007

✓
✓
n/a
✓
✓
✓

ROK

✓

✓

19 Feb. 2004✓

Malaysia✓✓(Signed: 22 Nov. 2005)

Mongolia
Philippines

✓
✓

✓
✓

12 May 2003
26 Feb. 2010

Thailand✓✓17 Nov. 2017

Viet Nam✓✓

17 Sep. 2012

＊1 Philippines got Broader Conclusion from IAEA in May 2013 and implementing IS in 2017.
＊2 Viet Nam got Broader Conclusion from IAEA in May 2015.

✓＊1

＊2

3

Safeguards (2)Updates on Safeguards Implementation of 2023
 Bangladesh:• Design information verification (DIV) and PIV were conducted by the IAEA at
Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant (RNPP) Unit 1 & 2.
• IAEA Safeguards and SSAC Advisory services (ISSAS) were hosted by Bangladesh
during March 2022.
 China: Submits safeguards reports annually to the IAEA by December each year forthe two civilian nuclear facilities, the Shandong Shidao Bay 200MWe High‐
Temperature Gas‐Cooled Reactor Pebble‐Bed Module Demonstration Power Plant
and Shaanxi Uranium Enrichment Plant that are placed voluntarily under IAEA
safeguards. Routine IAEA inspection to Shidao Bay HTGCR Reactor and Shaanxi
Uranium Enrichment Plant.

4

Safeguards (3)Updates on Safeguards Implementation of 2023
 Indonesia : PIV with IAEA on 12‐16 June 2023 for RI‐C, RI‐G, and RI‐Z; Safeguards
routine inspection two times for each MBA (Pre PIV & PIV), Annual Safeguards
Review Meeting (not yet).
 Japan: As a result of cooperation between the Government of Japan and the IAEA,
the successful implementation of safeguards has brought the broader conclusion for2022, first reached for the 2003; For Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant,
additional safeguards measures such as remote monitoring by surveillance cameras
and radiation monitor have been applied to confirm no undeclared removal of
nuclear material. Since 2022, in order to store spent fuel assemblies (SFAs) at safer
location, the shipment of SFAs from Spent Fuel Pond at Unit‐6 to the Common
Spent Fuel Storage (CSFS) and that from the CSFS to the Temporary Cask Custody
Area (Dry cask storage area) has been performed.

5

Safeguards (4)Updates on Safeguards Implementation of 2023
 Kazakhstan: Technical meeting with participation of leading experts of the CTBTO
Preparatory Commission Working Group B took place, INIR IAEA mission was
accomplished to solve issues on nuclear power infrastructure development in
Kazakhstan, Country Programme Framework was signed between Kazakhstan and
IAEA Agency for 2023‐2028.
 ROK: IAEA conducted a total of 112 inspections in 37 of the 47 MBAs in 2022, witha total of 326 PDI. Out of these, 9 inspections with 18 PDI were verification
activities for domestic undeclared nuclear activities through the Complementary
Accesses (CAs) pursuant to the Additional Protocol (AP). The COVID‐19 pandemic,
which has been ongoing since 2020, could have limited IAEA inspections in 2022,
but the ROK government and nuclear facilities extended full support to the IAEA
inspections by promptly providing necessary information and coordinating facility
verification schedule to ensure the smooth execution of inspections. As a result,
IAEA has made “satisfactory” safeguards conclusions for all the times and drawn“Broader Conclusion (BC)” for the ROK in 2022.
6

Safeguards (5)Updates on Safeguards Implementation of 2023
 Malaysia:• The IAEA Comprehensive Capacity‐Building Initiative for SSACs and SRAs
(COMPASS) achievement had exceeded expectation & Malaysia succeed inachieving the target that has been planned and agreed in COMPASS Workplan
2021 – 2022. COMPASS Closing Meeting: Malaysia final webinar was successfully
held on 6 March 2023, & COMPASS celebratory event (formal conclusion of thepilot phase and the launch of COMPASS implementation) was held on 2 June 2023.
• Malaysia had received IAEA Safeguards Annual Inspection (MYA & MYZ) on the
October 11 – 12, 2022.
• Malaysia also received a visit led by Dr. Craig Everton, Assistant Secretary of theAustralian Safeguards and Non‐Proliferation Office (ASNO), on 1 June 2023.
Malaysia applauds ASNO, for their continuous dedication and leadership in the
Asia‐Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) Working Group 1. This working groupfocuses on Safeguards Infrastructure, Implementation, and Awareness‐Raising.
7

Safeguards (6)Updates on Safeguards Implementation of 2023
 Malaysia (cont.):• The Department of Atomic Energy Malaysia (Atom Malaysia) with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has provided Qatar with equipment to support thecountry’s efforts to prevent a nuclear security incident during the 2022 World Cup
Championship under the Practical Arrangement on the establishment of a Loaner
Pool for Radiation Detection Equipment (Loaner Pool).
• Table below is the international programme conducted under NSSC Malaysia.
Num.

Programme Conduct Under NSSC Malaysia

1International Training Course (ITC) on Security of Radioactive Material in Transport

2

Technical Visit from Nigeria to the Nuclear Security Support Centre in Malaysia

3

Regional Training Course (RTC) on Authorization & Inspection for the Security of Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities

4

ASEANTOM Technical Visit on Authorization & Inspection for the Security of Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities

5

Kuwait Technical Visit on the Development and Sustainability of a National Nuclear Security Regime in Malaysia

6

Cambodia Technical Visit to Observe the Establishment of National Detection and Expert Support Capability in Malaysia

8Safeguards (7)Updates on Safeguards Implementation of 2023
 Mongolia:• AP declarations are submitted in a timely manner. According to the AP declaration
submitted to the IAEA, the Executive Office of the NEC is cooperating with theagency's inspectors in the activities of access and verification of locations with
nuclear materials. CA in Uranium mining company Badrakh Energy LLC on May
2023. Organized National Safeguards Training Course on May 2023 in Ulaanbaatar,
Mongolia under the support of the International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement
Program (INSEP), National Nuclear Security Administration U.S. Department ofEnergy.
• IAEA Legislative Assistance Mission on Relevant International Nuclear Legal
Instruments for Mongolia was held on June 2023 in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. This
activity consists of 5 parts including High‐level Bilateral Meetings, High‐Level
Conference for Decision‐Making Officials, National consultations withgovernmental organizations and NGOs, and Discussions with the Drafting Team OF
Nuclear Comprehensive Law.
9

Safeguards (8)Updates on Safeguards Implementation of 2023
 Philippines: PRR1 and PRR1‐SATER’s Nuclear Material Accounting reports and AP
declarations are submitted annually through the Secure Communication.
Integration of Safeguards to the Regulatory Process (i.e. Licensing, Enforcement)
and development of regulations for Safeguards . Import/Export Control of dual use
items in the NSG list are monitored by the Dept of Trade and Industry‐ Strategic
Trade Management Office and coordinates with PNRI in the AP DECLARATION.
Active participation in the Nuclear Energy Power‐Inter Agency Committee (Sub‐
Committee 2 – Nuclear Safety, Safeguards, Security and Radiation Protection)
alongside with Philippine Dept of Energy.
 Thailand: Annual activity requirements for CSA/AP obligations are PhysicalInventory Verification, Design Information Verification, and Nuclear Materials
Accountancy Reports. The AP declarations have been updated, which arecomposed of fifteen declarations and four quarterly declarations. OAP, theDepartment of Foreign Trade and Thai Customs cooperate on information sharing
regarding commodities required to be declared.
10

Safeguards (9)Updates on Safeguards Implementation of 2023
 Viet Nam: In 2022, IAEA performed 2 PIV/DIV activities at nuclear facility. Also aComplementary access has been conducted in declared location in Vietnam.
Under safeguards reporting obligations, Vietnam has updated with 134 reports ofnuclear facilities, 108 LOF reports under CSA (2022); and 183 declarations underAP (2023). Up to 2023, the IAEA and RSA have been actively communicated for
information and clarification under AP related activities. Continuous NNSA
Webinars for International Safeguards Professionals (WISP) (2023); IAEA Webinar
on safeguards assistance for states (SSAC, COMPASS); Acted as Chair of Asia‐PacificSafeguards Network (APSN) from 2021‐2022 and co‐hosted IAEA‐APSN Workshop
on Nuclear Safeguards (December 2022 in Hanoi, Viet Nam).

11

Nuclear Security (1)Implementation of International Treaties and Conventions
 CPPNM (Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material): 11/12 states
 CPPNM Amendment*: 9/12 states*IAEA Recommendation INFCIRC 225/Rev5 consistent with the Amendment
 Nuclear Terrorism Convention (International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism):
Ratification: 6 states, Accession: 2 state, Acceptance: 1 state, Signature: 3 states
CPPNM

CPPNM Amendment

Nuclear Terrorism Convention

Australia

22 Oct 1987 in force

Ratification 16 Mar 2012

Bangladesh

10 Jun 2005 in force

Ratification 17 Jul 2008
Entry into force
since 04 Jul 2017

China

09 Feb 1989 in force

Ratification 14 Se. 2009

Ratification 08 Nov 2010

Indonesia

08 Feb 1987 in force

Ratification 27 May 2010

Ratification 19 March 2014

Japan

27 Nov 1988 in force

Ratification 17 Jun 2014

Acceptance 02 Oct 2007

Kazakhstan

02 Oct 2005 in force

Ratification 26 Apr 2011

Ratification 31 Jul 2008

ROK

08 Feb 1987 in force

Ratification 29 May 2014

Ratification 29 May 2014

Malaysia

Accession 07 Jul 2007

Signature 16 Sep 2005

Mongolia

08 Feb 1987 in force

Preparing to join

Ratification 06 Oct 2006

Philippines

08 Feb 1987 in force

Ratified 16 June 2021

Signature 15 Sep 2005

Thailand

27 Mar 2018 in Force

Ratification 27 Mar 2018

Signature 14 Sep 2005

Viet Nam

03 Nov 2012 in force

Ratification 03 Nov 2012

Accession Sept 201612

Nuclear Security (2)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2023
 Bangladesh:• Bangladesh hosted an Expert Mission on Nuclear Security Detection Architecture
in Dhaka from 24‐27 February 2020. This event was organized as a part ofscheduled activities under the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP)
for Bangladesh. IAEA expert as well as representatives from different organizations
relevant to the implementation of nuclear security activities in the country such as
Ministry of Science and Technology, Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory
Authority, Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission, Nuclear Security and PhysicalProtection System Cell, Border Guards Bangladesh, Bangladesh Cost Guard,
Bangladesh Customs, Nuclear Power Plant Company Bangladesh Limited,
Bangladesh Police, Intelligent Agencies, etc. participated in the expert mission.
• ‘National Nuclear Security Policy’ is now on the approval process.
• Bangladesh is preparing to request for the International Physical Protection
Advisory Service (IPPAS).
• The International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) National workshop
and IPPAS preparatory meeting were held during August 2022.

13

Nuclear Security (3)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2023
 Bangladesh(cont.):• A research project, 'Factors that can influence culture for safety, organizational
culture and human performance at nuclear and other facilities in Bangladesh' isongoing under the IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) ‘I22004’ entitled‘Organizational Culture Basis for Successful Performance in Nuclear Power Plants’.
Actively participated all the RCM of this CRP. It is expected that the outcomes ofthis project will help to enhance the understanding of parameters related to andneeded for improvement of organizational factors and human factors in theorganization's culture for safety and security in Bangladesh.

14

Nuclear Security (4)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2023
 China : Cyber Security Law released in Nov 2016; Nuclear Safety Law released in Aug
2017; Atomic Energy Law (draft) as a direct upper‐level legislation of nuclear security,
is in the process of review and approval; Regulations on Nuclear Security underdevelopment; Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security (COE) came into operation in
Mar 2016, to provide all‐around support to the nuclear security governmental
management and capacity building in China; successful completion of he Ghana MNSR
HEU conversion Project in Aug. 2017; Completed IAEA IPPAS mission in Sep. 2017;
Signing the Agreement between the IAEA and CAEA concerning the designation of the
CAEA as an IAEA collaborating Center in 2019. Cyber Security Guidance for Nuclear
Facility released in 2019;Practicl arrangement on cooperation on nuclear forensic with
IAEA signed in 2020;Practicl arrangement on cooperation on Nuclear Security of Major
Public Event with IAEA signed in 2021;The Seminar on Building a Peaceful Home
Together: Nuclear Technology Application in Pulbic Secuirty was held during the first
China‐ASEAN Forum on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology in 2022.
15

Nuclear Security (5)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2023
 Indonesia:• BAPETEN Physical Protection regulation is under revision to comply withINFCIRC/225/Rev.5),• BAPETEN, DPFK‐BRIN and security authorities conducted. Performance Testing Course(blended training face to face and virtually) to evaluate PPS implementation in Serpong
Nuclear Research Center 2022 ; number of trainings completed and planned.
• DPFK and ORTN‐BRIN conducted Security Risk Assessment, Performance Testing andContingency Plan in 2022 as required by BAPETEN Chairman Regulation as well as
BATAN Standard.
• In 2021 ORTN‐BRIN and BAPETEN conducted cyber security WS supported by U.S.DOE.
In 2022, ORTN‐BRIN continued to conduct Physical Protection training course at
Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) in Serpong site. BATAN’s / DPK’s – BRIN NSSC in
collaboration with NNSA/INS/U.S. DOE conducted National Nuclear Security Training
Course virtually in 2022. Nuclear Technology and Research Organization (ORTN) ‐ under
the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN). ORTN‐BRIN’s NSSC in
16
collaboration with NNSA/INS/U.S.

Nuclear Security (6)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2023
 Indonesia (cont.):• DOE is planning to conduct National Nuclear Security Training Course in person andvirtually in 2023. INS/NNSA/U.S.DOE have sent formal letter in 2022 that wasaddressed to Chairman of BRIN regarding the possibility to continue Capacity Buildingon Nuclear Security Program for USA 2023 Fiscal Year.
• Physical protection routine inspection one time in a year for each nuclear facility (Mei‐June & September 2023);• BAPETEN in progress of conducting threat assessment and updating DBT in 2023
• BRIN’s expert was invited by Interpol Head Quarter through Interpol NCB (National
Central Bureau) to speak about case study of insider threat in Indonesia at Geiger
Global Conference, Istanbul, Turkiye, 5 – 8 December 2022.
• BAPETEN and BRIN conducted FGD on Nuclear Installation Security on May 2022, it
was attended by respective institution related to Nuclear Security such as National
Intelligent Agency (BIN), National Police.
• NNSA/U.S.DOE has planned to visit Indonesia in December 2023 in regard to extend
the cooperation through Directorate of Human Resource Development ‐ BRIN

17

Nuclear Security (7)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2023
 Indonesia (cont.):• BRIN conducted Training Course on Security of Radioactive in 2023: 1) 2‐9 March 2023
8‐15 June 2023 is located at Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) – BRIN Serpong.
 Japan: The new performance‐based inspection system started in April 2020 in which
security inspections are more focused on activities with higher security risks. This new
inspection system allows for comprehensive oversight of licensees’ nuclear security
practices. Under this inspection system violations of the security plan of Kashiwazaki‐
Kariwa Nuclear Power Station were identified. Currently, supplemental inspections areunderway to address these violations. Regarding RI security, Act on the Regulation ofRadioisotopes, etc., and Enforcement Regulation of the Act which took effect in
September 2019, established a national framework in Japan for RI security. ISCN
organized the Regional Training Course on Nuclear Forensics in Bangkok, July 2023,
with the cooperation of OAP, Thailand.

18

Nuclear Security (8)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2023
 Kazakhstan: NPP construction preparation – potential suppliers were determined forequipment, “National Training Course on Introduction to Nuclear Forensics” wascarried out in collaboration with IAEA in the Nuclear Security Training Center (INP),
Physical Protection System preparation was made for upgrade at radionuclide source
storage facility in INP, Physical protection system upgrade was completed at RRC“Baikal‐1” and IGR (NNC RK), IVG.1M reactor operation on LEU‐fuel was started in May.
 ROK: ROK has steadily improved its Regulatory Standards and systems to enhance thecompleteness of physical protection regulations for nuclear facilities. In 2022, a total offour KINAC Regulatory Standards were revised to reflect the results of research on theinsider threat response methodology as well as regulatory experience, relevant laws
and regulations and overseas standards to strengthen countermeasures against insider
threat and to respond to current issues such as international transport protection andaccess violations. ROK has been making efforts to respond to UAV threats since 2021,
and in 2022, it introduced various equipment to counter UAVs and conducted reviews
and inspections. These efforts will continue into 2023.
19

Nuclear Security (9)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2023
 Malaysia: Conducted training on Strategic Trade Act 2010 for front line officers.
Accepted technical visit from Nigeria to the Nuclear Security Support Centers.
Accepted technical visit from Cambodia on establishing expert support capability.
 Mongolia: A Working Group was established to ensure the implementation of the
program and plan for the implementation of the “Integrated Nuclear Security
Support Plan” under discussion and meeting of the NEC meeting on March 2023.
According to the decision of the meeting, additional corrections were made andprepared for the opinions of relevant ministries.

20

Nuclear Security (10)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2023
 Philippines: Updated INSSP last June 2022 which includes Nuclear Energy. NEP‐IAC
activities to address the different Milestones for NEP )Sub‐committee 2 on Nuclear
Safety, Safeguards, Security and Radiation Protection. Continue collaboration with
IAEA, US DOE and other organizations for seminars, workshops, etc on Nuclear
Security for Nuclear Material and Radioactive Material including the NSDD program.
PNRI performs Nuclear Security Assessment of Cat 1‐5 facilities and the PhysicalProtection of the PRR1 and PRR‐1 SATER. Inclusion in the PNRI Nuclear Training
Center the Training Course on for the three (3) days training course on Security ofRadioactive Material for Security Officers and Regulatory Personnel as a regular TC,
Deployment of PNRI mobile expert support during the Feast of the Black Nazarene.
Participated in the IAEA CRP on the Advance Maintenance, Repair and Calibrationof Radiation Detection Equipment. Actively participation in the National CBRNTeam and perform coordination with relevant stakeholders in addressing the gaps
and training needs for Nuclear Security on R/N.
21

Nuclear Security (11)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2023
Thailand: Nuclear Security Regime circulated with nuclear security networks and isin the process of finalizing the document for the official issue. The INSSP was
submitted to the IAEA which plans to organize the national meeting for review inJanuary. Thailand arranges national activities in nuclear forensics and nuclear
security transportation. Following the international collaboration, the OAP
cooperated with the NSRA and held the 12th FNCA workshop; co‐hosted with the
IAEA to conduct nuclear security culture self‐assessments; hosted the nuclear
security training and support centers; co‐hosted with the ISCN/ JAEA to arrange a
regional training course on nuclear forensics, and cooperated with the IAEA toorganize train the trainer on radiological crime scene management.

22

Nuclear Security (12)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2023
Viet Nam: 2022: co‐hosted national workshops on transportation security, physicalprotection of nuclear materials; assigned Delegation to the Conference of theParties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material (A/CPPNM) (March 2022 in IAEA headquarter); co‐hosted Regional
Workshop on Univerlisation of CPPNM/A in the Asia‐Pacific (October 2022, in Hanoi,
Viet Nam). 2023: INSSErv Mission was conducted with the IAEA and relevant
authorities. Final reported handed over from the Agency with recommendations
and activities to be implemented in line with updated INSSP (to be revised in late2023); co‐hosted for Regional Review meeting of Radiological Security (Danang);
updated with Security Level A facilities with PPS systems.

23

Nuclear Security Culture (1)Methods and Plans to Foster Nuclear Security Culture Bangladesh: participation of national/international training courses/workshops/
meetings in collaboration with FNCA, IAEA, U.S.DOE, Russia; undertaken nuclear
safety and security culture awareness programs through poster display; participationin IAEA CRPs in safety and security culture.
 China : organize/ participate in the national/regional/international training
courses/workshops in collaboration with IAEA, U.S.DOE; publish magazine titled“China Nuclear Security”; develop curriculums on nuclear security culture to
improve the awareness of nuclear security culture for domestic nuclear‐related
personals; conduct online training and workshop during Covid‐19 pandemic.
product nuclear security science popularizing video.

24

Nuclear Security Culture (2)Methods and Plans to Foster Nuclear Security Culture Indonesia: CSCA/BATAN: conducting self‐assessment on nuclear security culture forradioactive source facility in Pasar Jumat (2018‐2019), final report has completed in 2020;
develop nuclear security culture guidance (in progress), ORTN‐BRIN conducting self‐
assessment on nuclear security culture for entire workforce by using on‐line survey cause of
pandemic COVID‐19; Indonesia shared experience on self assessment of nuclear security
culture at research reactor to IAEA member States through IAEA Workshop on Nuclear
Security Culture and Self‐Assessment such as in Ghana, Zambia and Malaysia. In 2018 thereport submitted to the Draft of IAEA‐TECDOC CRP on nuclear security culture enhancement
solutions. Indonesia accepted the IAEA offered to be the first country to hold a Seminar
Nuclear Security Culture for Senior Managers in 2022. On 29 – 30 June 2022, IAEA supported
DPK’s BRIN in hosting Nuclear Security Culture for Senior Manager workshop attended byrespective institution related to nuclear and nuclear security such as BAPETEN, BRIN (ORTN
and DPFK), Academia (Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia Nuclear Technology Polytechnic(PTNI/STTN), The Republic of Indonesia Defense University (UNHAN), Indonesian National
Police (POLRI). Directorate for Nuclear Facility Management (DPFK‐BRN) is planning toconduct nuclear security culture self‐assessment in Q1 2024. in the planning will cover the
topic of combination of the safety and security culture self‐assessment.
25

Nuclear Security Culture (3)Methods and Plans to Foster Nuclear Security Culture Japan: NRA Commissioners regularly hold meetings with executives of licensees andconduct interviews to them to communicate the expectation for their leadership innuclear security, and if necessary, directly request them to take the lead in fostering
nuclear security culture.
 Kazakhstan: Nuclear Disarmament Verification Initiative, participation of national
and international training courses in collaboration with IAEA, JAEA, US (DOE and
DoD) and etc.
 ROK: KINAC has developed a questionnaire to measure the nuclear security culture
awareness of nuclear facility workers and has been conducting the annual Nuclear
Security Culture Awareness Survey from 2011. In 2022, score for overall nuclear
security culture awareness was 84.2 (2.2 points increased from the previous year) Malaysia: Conducted nuclear security culture self assessment and Nuclear Security
Culture Campaign on Cyber Security and Physical Security was conducted at
Malaysian Nuclear Agency. Implementation of IAEA Coordinated Research Project ‐Design and development of a Knowledge‐Based Model and Software Module forIntelligent & Integrated Nuclear Security System for Malaysian Nuclear Agency.
26

Nuclear Security Culture (4)Methods and Plans to Foster Nuclear Security Culture Mongolia: IAEA Legislative Assistance Mission on Relevant International Nuclear
Legal Instruments for Mongolia was held on June 2023 in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.
Regarding Mongolia's accession to international agreements and conventions,
Mongolia's decision‐making level officials, government organizations, researchers,
and representatives of civil society organizations were given a unified
understanding of the importance and effects of introducing agreements andconventions and joining them. (A total of 150 representatives from 65
organizations participated in the event) It was an important activity in which
Mongolia contributed one step forward in the process of joining theseinternational agreements and conventions. The event broadcasted live by 7 news
media and social networks, and 5 broadcast TV channels disseminatedinformation to the public.
 Philippines: Incorporated nuclear security culture topic in the Three (3) days
training course. Strengthening nuclear security culture in the workplace.
Inclusion of Security Culture topic in the Nuclear Training Center modules forLicensees.
27

Nuclear Security Culture (5)Methods and Plans to Foster Nuclear Security Culture Thailand: Cooperation with the IAEA to organize the National Workshop on
Conducting Nuclear Security Culture Self‐Assessments. Continuous training,stakeholder communications, and revision of regulations and guidelines under
the Nuclear Energy for Peace Act.
 Viet Nam: Developed and implemented of regulatory documents (Circular
01/May 2019 on security of radioactive sources; and Decree No. 142/2020/ND‐
CP of the Government: Regulations on the conduct of radiation work and service
activities to support the application of atomic energy), continue fostering Nuclear
Security Culture (training workshops). Vietnam is under consideration to
advocate 2nd Guideline on Code of Conduct on safety & security of radioactive
sources.

28

Capacity Building (1)Nuclear Security (and Safeguards) Training Centers
This chart identifies the existing training centers in the FNCA member countries, which provide
trainings to practitioners in the areas of nuclear security and safeguards, and training functions of
the centers. Educational programs are not included on the chart.
Training Topics

Training Center/
Training Provider

Status ofTraining
CenterTargetBangladesh

TBD / BAEC, BAERA

PlannedChina

SNSTC(COE)/
SNSTC(COE)Indonesia*1

BAPETEN ETC,
Directorate ofCompetency
Development (BRIN’s
Training Center/
BAPETEN, BRIN

Cooperation with

Security

SG

OthersInternational/
Domestic✓✓

Border control

IAEA, US/DOE,
Russia, JAEA, FNCA

In operation

International/Do
mestic✓✓Border control

IAEA, US/DOE

In operation

International/
IAEA courses✓✓

IAEA, US/DOE,
APSN, PNTR, JAEA

In operation

International/Domestic/
IAEA courses✓✓

IAEA, US/DOE,
EC/JRCTC of INP and ACTC of
Kazakhstan NG/ TC of INP and In operation
ACTC of NG

International/Domestic/
IAEA courses

Japan

ISCN / ISCN✓

*1 Gajamada University in Indonesia launched master course on nuclear security in 2017.
*2 BAPETEN ETC will be hosted 3rd regional school on nuclear security in October 2018.

✓

Radiation Safety andUS (DOE and DoD),
Radiation MonitoringJapan
Information Security

29

Capacity Building (2)Nuclear Security (and Safeguards) Training Centers
Training Center/
Training
ProviderStatus ofTraining
CenterTargetINSA /INSA

In operation

International/Domestic/
IAEA courses

Malaysia

NSSC / AELB

Training classand Testing Lab
in operation

Mongolia

TBD / NECROK

Philippines

PNRI

Licensee, FLO
NSSC‐ training and othermodules
government
agencies

Thailand

TBD / OAP,
CU*1

Domestic
Under
Consideration Competence
Authorities

Viet Nam

VARANS / TSC

PlannedTraining Topics

Cont.

Cooperation with

Security

SG

Others✓✓Export control

IAEA, US/DOE✓

Border control

IAEA, ANSTO,
US/DOE✓

Border control

US/DOE, INSEP, IAEA,
APSN, FNCA, JAEA✓

Border control

IAEA, US/DOE✓✓

Border control

IAEA, ASNO,
US/DOE, JAEA, EC✓✓

Rad Detection

IAEA, US/DOE, JAEA

*1 Chulalongkorn University in Thailand has master course on nuclear security and safeguards for international/domestic students.

30Capacity Building (3)Nuclear Security (and Safeguards) Training Centers

Cont.

List of the Training Centers
Bangladesh: TBD
China: State Nuclear Security Technology Center (Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security)
China Customs Training Center for Radiation Detection (border control)
Nuclear Safeguards Technical Research Laboratory (Safeguards)
Indonesia: Nuclear Energy Regulatory Authority Education and Training Center (BAPETEN ETC)

Directorate of Human Resource Development and Competency – BRIN, insteadof BATAN‐CET. Both ETC and CET will always work together.
Japan: Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN)
Kazakhstan: INP Nuclear Security Training Center (TC of INP), National Guard of RK Anti‐Crisis
Training Center (ACTC of NG)
ROK: International Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security Academy (INSA)
Malaysia: Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) – accepts technical visits and fellowship.
Also hosting international/regional workshop by IAEA if required.
Mongolia: TBD (Executive Office of the NEC is responsible to strengthening human resourcesin a nuclear and radiation field.)31Capacity Building (4)Nuclear Security (and Safeguards) Training Centers

Cont.

List of the Training Centers
Philippines: Philippine Nuclear Security Support Center is underway. Developed two (2)modules for National Coast Watch Center and for Philippine AirForce on
Awareness and Basic Radiological Detection Workshop.
Thailand: Office of Atoms for Peace (OAP), Chulalongkorn University.
Viet Nam: Technical Support Centre for Radiation & Nuclear Safety and Emergency Response(VARANS/TSC)

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