SIGAR

Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction

QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSOCT 302022

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110181) established the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR).
SIGAR’s oversight mission, as defined by the legislation, is to provide for the
independent and objective• conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs
and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available
for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
• leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed
to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of the
programs and operations, and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abusein such programs and operations.
• means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully
and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to theadministration of such programs and operation and the necessity for andprogress on corrective action.
Afghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement,or other funding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the
U.S. government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise madeavailable for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018 (Pub. L. No.
115-91), this quarterly report has been prepared in accordance with the Quality
Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency.
Source: Pub. L. No. 110-181, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008, 1/28/2008; Pub. L. No. 115-91,
National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018, 12/12/2017.

(For a list of the Congressionally mandated contents of this report, see Appendix A.)

Cover Photo:
Taliban fighters in Kabul ride on a Humvee on August 15, 2022, while celebrating the one-year anniversaryof their takeover of the country. (AFP photo by Wakil Kohsar)

PUBLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CIGIE QUALITY STANDARDS FOR INSPECTION AND EVALUATION.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

To Congress, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the American people,
I am pleased to submit SIGAR’s 57th quarterly report on the status of reconstructionin Afghanistan.
The United States remains Afghanistan’s single largest donor, having provided more than $1.1 billion in assistance to support the Afghan people since
the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021. However, SIGAR, for the first time in its history, is unable this quarter to provide Congress and the American people with a fullaccounting of this U.S. government spending due to the noncooperation of several
U.S. government agencies. The United States Agency for International Development(USAID), which administers the majority of U.S. government spending for
Afghanistan, and the Treasury Department refused to cooperate with SIGAR in any
capacity, while the State Department was selective in the information it provided
pursuant to SIGAR’s audit and quarterly data requests, sharing high-level funding
data but not details of agency-supported programs in Afghanistan. This is in direct
violation of Section 1229(h)(5)(A) of the NDAA for FY 2008 (requiring the agencies
to provide information and assistance upon request) and Section 6(c)(1) of theInspector General Act of 1978, as amended.
SIGAR has notified Congress of this matter.
Section One of this report contains an essay on the stifling of one of the mostremarkable achievements of reconstruction in Afghanistan: the development of an
independent Afghan media. Since August 2021, the Afghan media sector has mostly
collapsed under the weight of the Taliban’s restrictions and censorship. The essay
concludes that, without long-term, institutional support to independent journalists
inside and outside of the country, Afghanistan’s media may not be able to withstandthe Taliban’s efforts to totally control the flow of information about the country.
SIGAR issued two performance audit reports and two evaluations this quarter.
The first report found that State did not complete required oversight and evaluationof its Antiterrorism Assistance Program in Afghanistan. The second report foundthat USAID generally met federal and internal requirements for noncompetitive
awards, but did not maintain some of the required documents resulting in a lackof complete and accurate records for all award activities.
The first evaluation finalized a review about the validity of allegations that senior
Afghan officials stole funds as the government collapsed. Although SIGAR foundthat some cash was taken from the grounds of the presidential palace and loaded
onto helicopters, evidence indicates that the amount did not exceed $1 million
and may have been closer to $500,000. Most of this money was believed to havecome from several Afghan government operating budgets normally managed at
the palace.
The second evaluation, undertaken at the request of Congress, assessed therisks to the Afghan people and civil society organizations resulting from the
Taliban’s takeover. SIGAR found that women and girls now face significant risks

2530 CRYSTAL DRIVE ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202

including reduced access to education and healthcare; loss of empowerment,
including the ability to be economically and otherwise independent; and heightened personal safety and security risks. The media, healthcare, and education
sectors also face acute risk under Taliban rule. SIGAR concluded that current
conditions are similar to those under the Taliban in the 1990s.
SIGAR completed six financial audits of U.S.-funded projects to rebuild
Afghanistan that identified $10,668,026 in questioned costs as a result of internalcontrol deficiencies and noncompliance issues. These financial audits identified
a range of deficiencies by U.S. government contractors including Raytheon
Company, International Legal Foundation, Albany Associates, Amentum Services
Inc., and FHI 360. An additional audit of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University did not find any material weaknesses or internal control deficiencies.
These reviews are required by SIGAR’s authorizing statute. Completing them,
despite the fall of the internationally supported Afghan government in August 2021,
will yield information about the use of funds, agency performance, and reconstruction effectiveness. This information can improve accountability and transparency,
suggest process improvements, and generate lessons learned for other current
and future overseas reconstruction and development efforts. Moreover, the U.S.
government can still recover monies from the questioned costs revealed by thesefinancial audits.
During the reporting period, SIGAR’s criminal investigations resulted in two
criminal informations, two guilty pleas, five sentencings, and over $10.3 million incriminal restitutions and forfeitures, bringing the total number of ongoing investigations to 35.
SIGAR also continued conducting interviews and analysis in support ofCongressionally requested assessments including reviewing the factors that
led to the collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces andthe Afghan government.
With the support of Congress and the Administration, my colleagues and I at
SIGAR will endeavor to keep fighting the waste, fraud, and abuse of U.S. taxpayer
funds in Afghanistan.
Respectfully,

John F. Sopko

2530 CRYSTAL DRIVE ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202

(I\._,I/
V/
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,·
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~~A;LiEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report summarizes SIGAR’s oversight work and updates developments in four major areasof reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan from July 1–September 30, 2022.*
During this reporting period, SIGAR issued 11 audits, evaluations, and other products assessing
U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Criminal investigations resulted in two criminal
informations (a prosecutor’s allegation of a crime, as distinct from a grand-jury indictment), twoguilty pleas, five sentencings, and over $10.3 million in criminal restitutions and forfeitures.

SIGAR OVERVIEW
AUDITS AND INSPECTIONSThis quarter, SIGAR issued two performance audit
reports, two evaluations, and six financial audit reports.
• The first performance audit report found that the
U.S. Department of State did not complete required
oversight and evaluation of its Antiterrorism
Assistance Program in Afghanistan.
• The second report found that the U.S. Agency forInternational Development generally met federal andinternal requirements for noncompetitive awards,
but did not maintain some of the required documents
resulting in a lack of complete and accurate records
for all award activities.
• The first evaluation analyzed the allegations oftheft of funds against President Ghani and otherAfghan officials during the August 2021 government
collapse. SIGAR determined the total funds taken
did not exceed $1 million.
• The second evaluation assessed the risks to Afghan
civil society following the Taliban takeover in August2021. SIGAR found a return to a life similar to that
under the Taliban in the 1990s—women and girls
face significant risks including reduced access to
education and healthcare; loss of empowerment,
including the ability to be professionally, socially,and economically independent; and heightened
personal safety and security risks. The media
and its members also face acute risk of violence
and censorship.

KEY EVENTS, JULY–SEPTEMBER 2022
July 6: President Biden notified
Congress of his intent to rescind
the U.S. designation of Afghanistan
as a major non-NATO ally.

Jul

July 26: U.S. and Taliban representatives met in Uzbekistan
and discussed Afghanistan’s humanitarian and economic crises,
human rights, and the Taliban’s desire for political recognition
and greater economic development support, among other issues.

I.

July 8: The UN Human Rights Council
passed a resolution seeking reversal of
Taliban policies restricting women’s rights.

iv

August: Severe flooding killed at least 256 people
and destroyed 5,600 homes throughout Afghanistan.

.'

CL

Aug

July 31: The United States killed
0,al‑Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiriin Kabul with a drone strike.

I :rAugust 12: USAID announced $150 million

I for United Nations programs in Afghanistan to

improve food security and nutrition, education,
gender equality, and women’s empowerment.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The six financial audit reports identified $10,668,026
in questioned costs as a result of internal control deficiencies and noncompliance issues.

INVESTIGATIONS

During the reporting period, SIGAR’s criminal investigations resulted in two criminal informations, two guilty
pleas, five sentencings, and over $10.3 million in criminal
restitutions and forfeitures. SIGAR initiated one caseand closed five, bringing the total number of ongoinginvestigations to 35.
Investigations highlights include the sentencing
of Naim Ismail, an investment bank vice president, to
70 months of incarceration for his participation in various investment schemes that defrauded victims of over
$15 million. Ismail has been ordered to pay a forfeitureof $10.2 million to his victims. SIGAR and Homeland
Security Investigations (HSI) jointly conducted
the investigation.
A second investigation resulted in a guilty plea
by Zachary A. Friedman to charges of tax evasion.

Friedman worked as a senior executive for [redacted],a U.S. Department of Defense fuel supply contractor.
From 2013 until 2015, Friedman evaded taxes he owed
to the IRS, concealing approximately $530,000 of income
and causing a tax loss to the U.S. government of morethan $207,000. Friedman is the fourth defendant associated with [redacted] to plead guilty.

LESSONS LEARNEDSIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program was created to identify lessons and make recommendations to Congressand executive branch agencies on ways to improve current and future reconstruction efforts. The program has
issued 12 lessons learned reports to date.

RESEARCH AND ANALYSISSIGAR’s Research and Analysis Directorate issued its
57th Quarterly Report to the United States Congress.

* As provided in its authorizing statute, SIGAR may also report on products and events issued or occurring
after September 30, 2022, up to the publication date of this report.
Note: The United States has not yet made a decision whether to recognize the Taliban or any other entity as the government of Afghanistan or as
part of such a government. Accordingly, references in this report to a “Taliban-controlled government,” “interim government,” Taliban “governance,”“Taliban regime,” a “former Afghan government,” or similar phrases are not intended to prejudge or convey any U.S. government view or decision
on recognition of the Taliban or any other entity as the government of Afghanistan.
Source: State, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/22/2022.

August 15: The Taliban designated theanniversary of the Islamic Republic’s falla national holiday.

September 19: The United States
secured the release of U.S. engineer
and Taliban hostage Mark Frerichs.

September 20: Taliban supreme leader Haibatullah
Akhundzada appointed Habibullah Agha, a memberof his inner circle, as the new minister of education.

Sep
September 14: Treasury and State announced the establishment of an “Afghan Fund” to provide $3.5 billion in Afghan
central bank assets to benefit the people of Afghanistan.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

September 27: The Taliban announced a provisional deal
with Russia to import one million tons of gasoline, one
million tons of diesel, 500,000 tons of liquefied petroleum
gas, and two million tons of wheat to Afghanistan annually.

v

SIGAR has conducted or commissioned audit, inspection, special project, and/or investigation work in 30 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces
as of September 30, 2022. (SIGAR image)TABLE OF CONTENTSSECTION 1

3 THE STIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIA

5 Early Development of the Media Sector
7 Later Stages of Media Development
8 Challenges Under the Islamic Republic
9 Media Under Taliban Rule
13 Responses to Taliban Media Repression
15 Contradictions
16 Looking Forward

SECTION 2

21 SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

26 Audits and Evaluations
33 Lessons Learned
34 Investigations
35 Congressionally Directed Assessments
38 Other SIGAR Oversight Activities
38 SIGAR Budget
38 SIGAR Staff

SECTION 3

41 RECONSTRUCTION UPDATE

43 Reconstruction In Brief
45 Status of Funds
73 Security and Governance
97 Economic and Social Development

SECTION 4

133 OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT
136 Completed Oversight Activities
138 Ongoing Oversight Activities

APPENDICES

144 Appendix A: Cross-Reference of Report to Statute
148 Appendix B: U.S. Funds for Afghanistan Reconstruction
150 Appendix C: SIGAR Written Products
154 Appendix D: SIGAR Investigations and Hotline
162 Appendix E: Abbreviations and Acronyms

STIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIASECURITYAND
GOVERNANCE“Attacks
againsthuman
rightsCONTENTS
defenders,journalists, and media
workers combined with the impact
KEY ISSUES & EVENTS (H4 TOC)3
of broader policy measures takenby the de facto authorities have hada chilling effect on freedom of themedia and civic activism.”—Markus Potzel, UN Deputy Special
Representative of the Secretary-General

Source: UNAMA, “Briefing by Acting Head of UNAMA Markus Potzel to the Security Council,” 8/29/2022.

2

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

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REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSSTIFLING OF THE
AFGHAN MEDIAI OCTOBER 30, 2022

3

STIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIAESSAY CONTENTS
SECURITYAND GOVERNANCE
CONTENTS
Early Development of the Media Sector

5

Later
Stages&ofEVENTSMedia Development
KEY ISSUES(H4 TOC)

7
3

Challenges Under the Islamic Republic

8

Media Under Taliban Rule9

Responses to Taliban Media Repression

13

Contradictions

15

Looking Forward

16

Essay Endnotes

17

Photo on previous page
Cameramen cover a Taliban Ministry of Interior event. (Taliban regime photo)

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIA- - - - - - -THE STIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIAIn 2018, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction John
F. Sopko recognized the independent Afghan press as a beacon of democracy, noting the exceptional bravery from a diverse set of journalistic
voices in the country.1 In a region rife with censorship, the growth ofAfghanistan’s independent press after 2001 was an uncommon feat, withstrong legal protections enshrined in the constitution allowing radio
and television programming to flourish.2 While journalists faced security
threats and government corruption, they sought to hold the state moreaccountable by providing the public a free flow of information for the firsttime in the country’s history.3
The fall of the Islamic Republic to the Taliban in August 2021 has dramatically altered that media landscape. Taliban restrictions, combinedwith a dire economic crisis, pushed the Afghan media sector to near collapse.4 Reporters Without Borders said in August that Afghanistan has
lost almost 40% of its media outlets and 60% of its journalists since the
Taliban takeover.5 Afghanistan’s remaining media professionals face a far
more constricted environment.6 In response, journalists have fled or goneunderground. News outlets that continue to operate are controlled tightly
and threatened for any disobedience. Despite the new circumstances,Afghan journalists have continued to advocate for their freedom of speech
and to persevere in their mission to inform and educate the public. But,
without long-term, institutional support to independent journalists insideand outside of the country, it is not clear that Afghanistan’s media will
be able to withstand the Taliban’s efforts to totally control information
about Afghanistan.7

EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEDIA SECTOR

Historically, the Afghan media has developed in fits and starts, thriving
during periods of openness, only to be stifled during periods of repression.8 The first radio station in Afghanistan, state-owned Radio Kabul,
was established in 1925.9 The country’s 1964 constitution established freespeech as a right.10 In 1978, the state-owned Radio Television Afghanistan
was created.11 Then, throughout the 1980s, the pro-Soviet government
aimed to limit outside influence by prohibiting the populace from listening

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STIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIA

to the British Broadcasting Corporation or Voice of America.12 In the late
20th century, media advances were further reversed when the Taliban
banned all forms of independent media during their rule from 1996 to
2001. At the time, Radio Kabul was converted to the religious station Voiceof Sharia.13
Following the ousting of the Taliban, Afghanistan looked to the norms
established in its 1964 constitution when formulating the new constitution
in 2004.14 The new constitution defined freedom of expression as “inviolable,” whether in speech, writing, illustration, or other means. In addition,
the constitution prohibited a priori government approval of printed andpublished materials.15 These legal parameters aligned Afghanistan withinternational norms as delineated in Article 19 of the United Nations’
Universal Declaration of Human Rights on freedom of speech and information.16 Afghanistan’s elected government further codified internationallyrecognized standards for freedom of speech with the passage of various
laws. For example, the 2009 Mass Media law promoted freedom of speech
and the rights of journalists.17
U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan’s media sector grew outof USAID’s policy, in practice since the early 1980s, of seeking to develop
independent media overseas as a tool to promote democracy.18 Early
U.S. interventions prior to 2004 aimed to build the media sector in
Afghanistan’s previously closed society through support for nascent civilsociety groups, training programs to teach technical skills, and overseas
fellowships for journalists.19 According to a USAID fact sheet on media in
Afghanistan, agency goals included promoting “the free exchange of information and ideas vital to the democratic process and development of civilsociety,” through “technical support, equipment upgrade, hands-on training in balanced and accurate reporting, and development of an Afghan
media and policy regulatory framework.”20 By 2006, USAID had supported
31 community-based, independent radio stations across the country, established radio monitoring and reporting in seven provinces, trained 2,000
media professionals, updated the curriculum at six universities, provided
training for 400 novice reporters at university media centers, and distributed 40,000 radios to vulnerable populations.21
Subsequent reconstruction efforts focused on building Afghan media
through short-and long-term training of local journalists, the privatization of broadcast and print media, direct and indirect assistance tomedia firms, promotion of media associations, and support for legal andregulatory reforms.22 In total, USAID has spent at least $220 million on
media-and civil-society-focused programs since 2001.23

6

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIA- - - - - - -LATER STAGES OF MEDIA DEVELOPMENT

As part of USAID’s development strategy for Afghanistan, the agency ran
the $9 million Rasana Program from 2017 to 2020.24 Rasana supported
independent Afghan media in an effort to provide reliable and balanced
information to the public through four primary avenues: supporting andtraining women journalists; promoting investigative journalism; strengthening advocacy and training to protect journalists; and awarding small grants
to expand media outreach to underserved communities.25 In addition,
USAID advocated for implementing government commitments to protect
journalists.26 Program accomplishments included the training of 1,200
women and girls in critical journalism skills, the production of 2,235 radio
packages, and the award of 18 small grants to 14 different media outlets
focused on promoting women’s voices in the media.27
In 2018, USAID released its 2019–2023 country development cooperation strategy for Afghanistan, outlining a goal to support greater citizen
participation in decision-making by increasing Afghans’ access to credible
public information through the strengthening of relationships between
the media and civil society.28 USAID predicted that access to free and fair
information, allowing for an informed citizenry, would contribute to aself-reliant Afghanistan.29
The independent media’s success in the first decade of the Islamic
Republic is illustrated by the impressive growth of the radio industry.
Starting with state-owned Radio Kabul in 2001, the industry grew to
174 operating radio stations by 2015.30 Due to extremely low literacy rates
in Afghanistan, radio and television programs, including news, cultural, andpolitical programs, became widely popular. The United States and its international partners also used radio and TV to spread messages of politicalcohesion and progression. According to the United States Institute of Peace(USIP), as many as 77% of Afghans relied on the radio as their primarysource of information by 2014.31 With funding from USAID, USIP developed
a radio drama titled “One Village, A Thousand Voices” that showcased
young Afghans who were progressive voices in their family and community
affairs.32 In 2012, the BBC founded “Open Jirga,” a program that brought
Afghan citizens together with policymakers to discuss public issues andmodel government accountability and integrity.33
International donors provided initial support, but Afghan businesspeople
and journalists drove the media’s growth. The country’s first private radio
station was founded in 2003 by the Moby Group with financial support frominternational donors, including $2.2 million in seed funding from USAID.34
Within a decade the Moby Group grew to represent 16 businesses across
six markets, with a reach of 300 million people.35 Today, Moby Group, led
by CEO and founder Saad Mohseni, operates Afghanistan’s biggest networks, TOLOnews and TOLO TV.36 In an interview with the Committee

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STIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIA

to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Moheseni said of building an independent news
outlet: “You have to be focused on reporting facts. It’s totally unvarnishedand totally uncensored. And it has to be balanced and non-emotional. Newstakes a long time, but once you have people’s trust, people stick with you
through thick and thin… it’s one of Afghanistan’s great success stories.”37

CHALLENGES UNDER THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICIn the words of USAID, the independent media was one of the “mostremarkable achievements” of the U.S.-funded reconstruction effort in
Afghanistan.38 But despite its successes, the sector has faced various challenges over the past two decades, including factionalism, corruption,
terrorist threats, and changing legal protections.39 Following the country’s
2004 elections, there was a rise in “warlord media,” television and radio programs founded by military and political leaders and mujahideen.40 Outlets
such as Ayna TV, Arzu TV and radio, and Noor TV promoted ethnic andpolitical agendas that some critics saw as divisive.41
Incidents of violence against journalists spiked in 2014 with 125 cases
recorded, including the murder and abuse of journalists investigating
corruption in local governance.42 The Taliban also issued a fatwa in 2014
against media outlets and promised to destroy the Western-supported
independent media.43 USAID acknowledged the significant threats to themedia sector in their 2019–2023 Country Cooperation Strategy, includingharassment, violence against journalists, and death threats for reportingon sensitive subjects. While most threats were attributed to Islamic StateKhorasan Province (IS-K) and the Taliban, USAID also recognized someoriginating from within the Afghan government.44
In 2014, President Ashraf Ghani signed the Access to Information law,wherein Article 15 prohibited content that “endangers independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, national security, and national interests,” or“violates the privacy of a person.” Media groups argued that the law should
be amended to allow for the disclosure of information on corruption, crime,
human rights violations, and dangers to public security, if the disclosures
were in the public interest.45 By 2015, USIP reported that the most serious
threat against journalists came from government officials, law enforcement,
and local power brokers.46 The same year, Afghanistan’s National Security
Council and Ministry of Interior issued an official order prohibiting media
professionals from questioning officials about security-related issues.47
Due to the ongoing climate of insecurity and threats to journalists, by April
2021 Afghanistan was ranked 122nd out of 180 countries in the World Press
Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders.48
According to Afghan journalist Lotfullah Najafizada, politicians in power
were threatened by truthful reporting on their shortcomings.49 In an interview with SIGAR, Najafizada described the paradox created by free8

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIA

Afghan media at the Taliban Ministry of Interior. (Taliban regime photo)reporting in a developing democracy: while his family members were eager
to vote in 2004, for example, by 2019 they had become indifferent to politics
because of the widespread coverage of government corruption.50

MEDIA UNDER TALIBAN RULE

Following the collapse of the Afghan government in August 2021, it was
not clear whether Afghanistan’s independent media would survive under
Taliban rule. The group’s censorship practices in the 1990s suggested astrong antagonism towards independent reporting.51 On September 19,
2021, Taliban interim director of the Government and Media Information
Center Qari Mohammad Yousuf Ahmadi announced in a press conference
that 11 new rules would be implemented regarding journalism.52 The rules
forbid journalists from broadcasting or publishing stories that are “contrary to Islam,” “insult national figures,” and “violate privacy.” Journalists
must not “try to distort news content,” “respect journalistic principles,” and“ensure their reporting is balanced.” The regulations further stipulate that,“matters that have not been confirmed by officials at the time of broadcasting or publication should be treated with care,” and “matters that could
have a negative impact on the public’s attitude or affect morale should
be handled carefully when being broadcast or published.”53 Journalists
were ordered to “adhere to the principle of neutrality,” “only publish thetruth,” and follow a specific form of reporting in accordance with Afghan
Government Media and Information Center regulations.54
Reporters Without Borders immediately raised concerns about the
Taliban’s failure to adhere to international journalistic standards, the vagueness of the rules regarding what constitutes the truth, and the lack of clarity
on what subject matter is contrary to Islam or insults national figures.55
Human Rights Watch commented that the Taliban’s rules are “so broad and

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STIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIA“These new rules are
spine-chilling becauseof the coercive use thatcan be made of them,and they bode ill for the
future of journalistic
independence andpluralism in Afghanistan.”
Reporters Without Borders
Secretary-General
Christophe Deloire

Source: Reporters Without Borders, “Afghanistan: 11 ‘journalism rules’ imposed by Taliban open way to censorship andarbitrary decisions, RSF warns,” 9/22/2021.

vague as to prohibit virtually any critical reporting about the Taliban.”56
After publication of the initial media rules, the Taliban announced additional restrictions. In November 2021, the Taliban issued one mandatebanning all foreign productions that they deem contrary to their interpretation of Sharia and another requiring women journalists to wear headscarves
on camera.57 In May 2022, the Taliban expanded the mandate to require
women newscasters to cover their faces while appearing on-air.58 Reporters
Without Borders Secretary-General Christophe Deloire said of the Taliban’s
actions, “These new rules are spine-chilling because of the coercive use thatcan be made of them, and they bode ill for the future of journalistic independence and pluralism in Afghanistan.”59
According to Reporters Without Borders, 231 media outlets have closed
in Afghanistan since August 2021, and 60% of journalists have lost their jobs
(around 6,400 people), including 84% of women journalists.60 On the situation, Human Rights Watch Asia Director Patricia Grossman said, “Despite
the Taliban’s promises to allow media that ‘respected Islamic values tofunction,’ the new rules are suffocating media freedom in the country.
The Taliban regulations are so sweeping that journalists are self-censoring
and fear ending up in prison.”61
Despite the criticism from human rights groups, the Taliban maintain that there is press freedom in Afghanistan.62 Taliban spokesperson
Zabihullah Mujahid said at a press conference, “Reporters can write andpublish anything that is factual and not a mere accusation. We don’t haveany problem with them.”63 The Taliban further assert that privately-owned
media companies have not been forced to close and there are no mandates
for outright censorship.64
Yet a widening gap exists between official Taliban statements on freedom of speech and the experiences of media professionals.65 Reports havecirculated about Taliban security forces arbitrarily detaining and beating
journalists.66 Between August and October 2021, 32 journalists were taken
into Taliban custody.67 Arrests continued with the detention of three journalists in January 2022 for covering protests against the Taliban in Panjshir
Province.68 The Taliban also detained freelance journalist Murtaza Samadi
in Herat on September 6, 2022, for filming a protest.69 Samadi was held forthree weeks and accused of organizing the protest and having “connections
with foreigners.”70
In addition to the 11 new media rules, the Taliban now require thoseworking in the media to carry letters of accreditation identifying them asjournalists and naming the outlet they work for.71 One Kabul-based female
journalist, who spoke with SIGAR on the condition of anonymity for fearof Taliban reprisal, described how she had been arbitrarily detained bymembers of the Taliban security forces because they could not read her
accreditation letter, which was written in English.72 According to this journalist, the Taliban threatened her at gunpoint, destroyed her phone, and

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIANew UNAMA head Roza Otunbayeva meets with Taliban deputy prime minister Abdul Kabirin Kabul to discuss media rights and other issues. (UNAMA News photo)

held her in detention for four hours.73 CPJ reported in August 2022 thatthree more journalists had contacted them about being detained, physicallyabused, and interrogated despite having the required documents.74
According to reports, abuses against media members are especially common in the provinces outside Kabul where local Taliban associates havebeen placed as overseers of departments of information and culture andtasked with regulating local media content.75 Journalists speaking to Voiceof America on the condition of anonymity recounted new requirements tosubmit stories to their local media director for pre-approval, a ban on covering protests, and censorship on the question of girls attending secondary
school.76 Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid denied that journalists
require explicit approval to report certain stories; instead he said that somelocal media directors lack experience and training.77
Although the Taliban have attempted to project a more press-friendly
image than they were known for in the 1990s, numerous Afghan journalists have left the country after being directly threatened by the group.78
Women’s right activist and reporter Farida Nekzad described to SIGAR her
initial hope during the Islamic Republic-Taliban peace talks that the Taliban
had changed their attitude toward the media.79 However, Nekzad realized
the group had not changed after learning the Taliban had beaten journalists for covering a protest.80 Facing threats against her life, Nekzad decided
to leave Afghanistan with her daughter. Now a journalist in residence at
Carleton University in Canada, Nekzad said her safety is only a temporary
personal solution to the ongoing “struggles and dire humanitarian situation”
in Afghanistan; she said she feels “helpless knowing there are still girls and

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STIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIA“What I found was aviolent peace. People
are arbitrarily detained,
disappeared, interrogated,beaten, and killed.”
Reporter Lynne O’Donnell

Source: Lynne O’Donnell, “The Taliban Detained Me for DoingMy Job. I Can Never Go Back,” Foreign Policy, 7/20/2022.

Lynne O’Donnell conducts an interview
in Afghanistan. (Lynne O’Donnell photo)

women suffering [there].”81 In her view, international community efforts toprotect a few independent journalists will not be enough to save the institution of an independent Afghan press.82
Few Afghan journalists have had the opportunity to gain legal residence—and safe harbor—in other countries. Following the collapse of thegovernment, Pakistan issued temporary work visas allowing Afghan journalists to enter the country. These have now expired,83 and, according to reports,
approximately 200 Afghan journalists currently in Pakistan are awaiting visa
renewals.84 SIGAR interviewed one such journalist, Voice of America reporter
Kalimullah Hamsukhan, who entered Pakistan on a now-expired tourist visa
following the fall of the Islamic Republic. Hamsukhan had been an outspoken
critic of the Taliban for many years and feared for his safety in Afghanistan.85
Although he considers the government and people of Pakistan welcoming to
Afghan refugees, Hamsukhan noted the difficulty many journalists are havingwith their visas, preventing them from working or finding accommodation.86
Despite the myriad challenges journalists face in Pakistan, Hamsukhan
described the media environment as an improvement over Afghanistan,where pluralism, democracy, and liberalism have been crushed.87 In his view,
the Taliban have “changed the philosophy of the [Afghan] media” due to theirlack of respect for independent thought and free speech.88
In addition to the abuses suffered by Afghan reporters, several foreign
journalists have detailed mistreatment at Taliban hands. CPJ reports that
Iranian freelance journalist Ibrahim Alipoor was arbitrarily detained in
Kabul in November 2021 despite entering the country with the requisite
permission letters.89 Alipoor was handcuffed and blindfolded for three days
and described facing verbal harassment from Taliban members.90 Pakistanbased 92News journalist Abdul Qayum Zahid Samadzai was similarly
detained for three days in February 2022 and accused of spying for a foreign government.91 In July, Foreign Policy reporter and former AssociatedPress Kabul bureau chief Lynne O’Donnell was detained, abused, andthreatened by Taliban intelligence agents after she entered Afghanistan toreport on conditions a year after the collapse of the Republic.92 O’Donnell
was released only after she agreed to issue a retraction of her previous
reporting about Afghanistan via her professional Twitter account.93 Taliban
intelligence accused her of spying for a foreign government and refused totell her which laws she had broken preceding her detention.94
Reflecting on her recent experience in Afghanistan, O’Donnell said,“What I found was a violent peace. People are arbitrarily detained, disappeared, interrogated, beaten, and killed. It could be for any reason or
no reason they will ever know. The Taliban are pitting neighbor againstneighbor, encouraging people to spy on and report each other. Fear is digging in, and it’s here for the long haul.”95 These sentiments were echoedby fellow Foreign Policy journalist Stefanie Glinski in a Twitter thread on
October 10, 2022.96 After working for four years in Afghanistan, Glinski was

12

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIA- - - - - - -interrogated by the Taliban about the identities of her sources and informedthat she would be held legally accountable if she was unable to substantiate
reports.97 Glinski has left the country and said she will not be returning due
to the safety risk.98
In August 2022, Taliban authorities detained American journalist andindependent filmmaker Ivor Shearer and his Afghan producer Faizullah
Faizbakhsh, despite their work permits to film in Afghanistan.99 They werequestioned by security guards while filming in Kabul and were later handed
over to Taliban intelligence.100 In a statement in late August, CPJ demanded
their release, calling the Taliban’s actions demonstrative of “an utter lackof commitment to the principle of freedom of press in Afghanistan.”101
While senior Biden Administration officials acknowledged the incident
during a September 19 press briefing, as this report went to press, they
have not publicly commented on the whereabouts and status of Shearer
and Faizbakhsh.102

RESPONSES TO TALIBAN MEDIA REPRESSION

Afghanistan’s media industry has shrunk considerably in the past year.103
Journalists fled Afghanistan as the Republic collapsed due to fear of Taliban
retaliation, and more still have stopped reporting in fear for their personalsafety.104 Nevertheless, independent Afghan media has not disappeared,
but rather changed form in response to Taliban censorship. In interviews
with SIGAR, media professionals described how the independent press
has managed to survive, through advocacy and reporting from outsideof Afghanistan, or through clandestine operations in Afghanistan.
In March 2022, Voice of America, the U.S. government-funded independent news agency, launched 24/7 direct-to-home satellite television in
Dari and Pashto for its audience in Afghanistan.105 Despite restrictions on
foreign-affiliated news outlets, Afghans can access uncensored newscasts
including “TV Ashna” and Radio Free Europe programming through Voiceof America’s satellite channel. According to the U.S. Agency for Global
Media (USAGM), Voice of America reporters currently work remotely fromtheir homes due to security concerns.106 Despite this precaution, journalists
have been contacted by the Taliban authorities and questioned about theirreporting. While USAGM said this has not led to self-censorship, the agency
does acknowledge that access to information has become more limited
overall due to Taliban restrictions.107
A hybrid model of press operations is highlighted in the case of Amu TV,
a new independent media network founded by Lotfullah Najafizada andSami Mahdi.108 Prior to the collapse of the Afghan Republic in August 2021,
Najafizada was working as the director of TOLOnews, the largest news operation in Afghanistan.109 He was considered an industry leader and received
widespread recognition for his efforts to promote independent media in

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

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STIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIA

Markus Potzel, UN Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, discusses
protecting media freedoms with 1TV News in Kabul. (UNAMA News photo)

Afghanistan.110 After the Taliban came to power, Najafizada relocated to
Canada for his safety. Between August 2021 and August 2022, he and Mahdi
developed and launched an independent Afghan media company run outside
Afghanistan, with information sourced from journalists on the ground.111
Amu TV was launched with seed funding from international NGOs, operating on a hybrid model where editors and producers work from outside ofAfghanistan in order to be free from Taliban pressure.112 Journalists report
information from within Afghanistan to their editors outside the country.
The news is then shared through a globally available website.113
Najafizada described his company as an answer to the current media
situation, which he sees as highly polarized. On one side, outlets in
Afghanistan are under complete Taliban influence. On the other, journalists
outside of Afghanistan are reporting very personal and political content
against the Taliban. He told SIGAR he hoped to offer a third way—providing nonpartisan information to the public.114 Najafizada acknowledgedthat this mission is not without hazard, as many reporters still working in
Afghanistan have been detained by the Taliban. In conversation he seemed
to grapple with the contradictions in his aim to present information to the
public without engaging in politics.115 Given Afghanistan’s current environment, any independent reporting may be seen by the Taliban and others
as inherently political and adversarial.
Other journalists seek to bring awareness of the situation in Afghanistan
and Taliban censorship using their media skills. Wahida Faizi, a prizewinning journalist who formerly worked for the Afghan Journalists Safety
Committee, fled Afghanistan for her safety in 2021.116 Now settled in
Denmark, Faizi aims to create new initiatives that promote Afghan womenjournalists. In an interview with International Media Support, Faizi said,

14

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIA- - - - - - -“I am pleased that I can continue my journalism in a new setting as manyother fleeing Afghan journalists have not been that fortunate. I feel anobligation to continue this course and to be vocal about the situationof Afghanistan’s journalists.”117
Journalists have also taken to the internet to publish accounts of
their experiences before, during, and after the Taliban takeover. Somaia
Valizadeh, an award-winning woman journalist from Herat, recently documented her story for London-based policy institute Chatham House.118
Valizadeh said she hid from the Taliban for months before gaining ascholarship for a master’s degree in Istanbul.119 She had originally hoped
to continue working as an investigative reporter and journalism teacher,but now wants to educate young girls on human rights and journalism.120
In the meantime while in graduate school, Valizadeh will continue to write
about Afghanistan. She said, “My future depends on it. I feel it is my primary
responsibility to give the Afghan people a voice and share their stories withthe world.”121

CONTRADICTIONS

According to the Taliban’s supreme leader Haibatullah Akhundzada,“the Islamic Emirate is committed to freedom of expression in accordancewith Islamic and Shariah principles and within the framework of thecountry’s national interests.”122 Approximately 40% of news outlets have
deemed these restrictions too constraining, or otherwise faced financial
crisis or forced closure since the Taliban came to power in August 2021.123
For example, on October 3, Hasth-e Subh Daily [8am Media] announced on
Twitter that the Taliban had suspended their website after reporting on an
attack against the Hazara population and on subsequent protests in Kabul.124
Others, like TOLOnews, have decided to stay and try to operate within thebounds defined by the Taliban. Moby Group CEO Mohseni told CPJ, “We’rescared… we have suffered because of the 70 or 80 people we’ve lost [whohave fled],” but TOLO continues to operate now without music shows orsoap operas.125 According to Mohseni, the station will stay in business in
Afghanistan unless women are banned from reporting on air.126
The decision to continue media operations is complicated by the
economic situation in Afghanistan. While news outlets face new restrictions limiting criticism of the Taliban regime or covering political topics
like protests, to close entirely in protest would cost thousands of people
their jobs in a time of economic crisis.127 The director of the Afghan
Independent Journalists Union, Hujatullah Mujadidi, said he felt a senseof responsibility to stay and continue advocating for the jobs of journalists
and the longevity of the independent media. In an interview with Voice ofAmerica, Mujadidi said, “After the fall of Kabul, press freedom advocatesin Afghanistan went quiet… I decided to fill the void.”128 Mujadidi contacted

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STIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIA

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid to express his concerns, and amedia advisory committee was formed in response.129 Although Mujadidi’s
power as an independent journalism advocate is limited due to the Taliban’s
media regulations, he told SIGAR that the committee “addressed theplight of many journalists,” and had helped free 13 journalists who werearrested for covering a women’s rights protest.130 Mujadidi also expressed
his confidence that the Taliban have not killed any journalists since taking
power, choosing instead to detain them.131 He contrasted this record withthe 110 journalists whom he said were killed in the 20 years of the Islamic
Republic.132 While records on the exact number of journalists killed during this period in Afghanistan vary, evidence suggests the majority of thesehomicides were perpetrated by the Taliban and IS-K.133
In interviews, several Afghan journalists brought up the distinction
between physical and legal security. While the Taliban boast that no journalists have been killed since August 2021, the journalists SIGAR interviewed
commented on the stark difference in journalistic freedom before the
Taliban and after. Reporter Kalimullah Hamsukhan described the current
situation under the Taliban as one of increased physical security, but profound mental insecurity due to the evaporation of legal protections for freespeech.134 Although journalists faced threats from terrorist groups, corruption, and an occasionally hostile government under the Islamic Republic,
journalists nevertheless believed that as reporters, they had “power.”135
The media’s independence was enshrined in the constitution and thisgranted journalists the freedom to demand accountability.136 As TOLOnews
and others navigate the new media landscape, they must weigh the costs
and benefits of speaking out while acknowledging the relative consequences for their employees and Afghan society.137 Under the Taliban,
journalists may have an income and the knowledge that no journalists havebeen murdered in the past year, but they must also work without legal protections, in a climate marked by fear and intimidation.138

LOOKING FORWARD

Afghanistan’s independent press under the Islamic Republic was botha unique success of U.S.-funded reconstruction and an impressive organic
phenomenon that reflected the Afghan people’s desire for information.139
Although the Ghani and Karzai administrations resisted media criticism,
there were few doubts at the time that independent journalism was a newpillar of Afghan society, and a powerful tool in promoting democracy.140
Today, Afghanistan’s independent media is struggling to carry on without
the Republic or its legal protections. It remains to be seen whether the international community will continue to support its operations outside or inside
the country, on what scale, or whether yet another product of Afghanistan
reconstruction will be suffocated by the Taliban.

16

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIA- - - - - - -ESSAY ENDNOTES   1 SIGAR, Prepared Remarks of John F. Sopko, “Promoting the
Culture of Integrity in Afghanistan,” 2nd Integrity Volunteers
Conference, Kabul, Afghanistan, 6/30/2018.
   2 Radio Free Europe, “Afghanistan: The Brief History of Media
Freedom,” 4/28/2006.
   3 Lotfullah Najafizada, interview with SIGAR, 9/23/2022.
   4 International Media Support, “With the Fall of Kabul, the Fallof Afghan Media,” 6/20/2022; Reporters Without Borders,“Afghanistan has lost almost 60% of its journalists since the fallof Kabul,” 10/8/2022.
   5 Reporters Without Borders, “Afghanistan has lost almost 60%
of its journalists since the fall of Kabul,” 8/1/2022.
   6 International Media Support, “With the Fall of Kabul, the Fallof Afghan Media,” 6/20/2022.
   7 The Committee to Protect Journalists, “As staff flee, TOLOnews
vows to keep broadcasting from Afghanistan—for now,”
9/1/2021; Farida Nekzad, interview with SIGAR, 9/21/2022.
   8 Radio Free Europe, “Afghanistan: The Brief History of Media
Freedom,” 4/28/2006.
   9 United States Institute of Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate:
Independent Media,” 8/10/2015.
10 United States Institute of Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate:
Independent Media,” 8/10/2015.
11 The Kabul Times, “Taraki opens Afghanistan’s TV station,”
8/20/1978, accessed 9/20/2022, Library of Congress.
12 The Diplomat, “The Evolution of the Media in Afghanistan,”
08/05/206.
13 United States Institute of Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate:
Independent Media,” 8/10/2015.
14 Radio Free Europe, “Afghanistan: The Brief History of Media
Freedom,” 4/28/2006.
15 Radio Free Europe, “Afghanistan: The Brief History of Media
Freedom,” 4/28/2006.
16 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
12/10/1948, Accessed 9/18/2022.
17 United States Institute of Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate:
Independent Media,” 8/10/2015.
18 USAID, USAID’s Media Assistance: Policy and Programming
Lessons, PPC Evaluation Working Paper No. 16, 1/2004, ix.
19 USAID, USAID’s Media Assistance: Policy and Programming
Lessons, PPC Evaluation Working Paper No. 16, 1/2004, p. 14.
20 USAID, Afghanistan: Media Fact Sheet, 1/27/2006.
21 USAID, Afghanistan: Media Fact Sheet, 1/27/2006.
22 USAID, USAID’s Media Assistance: Policy and Programming
Lessons, PPC Evaluation Working Paper No. 16, 1/2004.,
pp. 14–15.
23 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
1/30/2021, p. 84.
24 USAID, RASANA (MEDIA), 7/2021, p. 1.
25 USAID, RASANA (MEDIA), 7/2021, p. 1.
26 USAID, RASANA (MEDIA), 7/2021, p. 2.
27 USAID, RASANA (MEDIA), 7/2021, p. 2.
28 USAID, Country Development Cooperation Strategy:
Afghanistan, FY2019–2013, 9/2018, p. 23.
29 USAID, RASANA (MEDIA), 7/2021, p. 2.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

30 United States Institute of Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate:
Independent Media,” 8/10/2015.
31 United States Institute of Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate:
Independent Media,” 8/10/2015.
32 United States Institute of Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate:
Independent Media,” 8/10/2015.
33 United States Institute of Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate:
Independent Media,” 8/10/2015.
34 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
1/30/2021, p. 84.
35 United States Institute of Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate:
Independent Media,” 8/10/2015.
36 The Committee to Protect Journalists, “As staff flee, TOLO Newsvows to keep broadcasting in Afghanistan—for now,” 9/21/2021.
37 The Committee to Protect Journalists, “As staff flee, TOLO Newsvows to keep broadcasting in Afghanistan—for now,” 9/21/2021.
38 USAID, 2019–2023 Country Development Cooperation Strategy
for Afghanistan, 2018, p. 48; Wall Street Journal, “Afghanistan’s
Independent Media is Fading Away,” 7/7/2022.
39 USAID, Country Development Cooperation Strategy:
Afghanistan, FY2019– 2023, 9/2018, p. 48; United States Instituteof Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate: Independent Media,”
08/10/2015.
40 United States Institute of Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate:
Independent Media,” 08/10/2015.
41 United States Institute of Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate:
Independent Media,” 08/10/2015.
42 United States Institute of Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate:
Independent Media,” 8/10/2015.
43 United States Institute of Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate:
Independent Media,” 8/10/2015.
44 USAID, Country Development Cooperation Strategy:
Afghanistan, FY2019–2023, 9/2018, p. 48.
45 United States Institute of Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate:
Independent Media,” 8/10/2015.
46 United States Institute of Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate:
Independent Media,” 0/10/2015.
47 United States Institute of Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate:
Independent Media,” 8/10/2015.
48 Reporters Without Borders, Press Freedom Index Map, 2021,
https://rsf.org/en/index?year=2021.
49 Lotfullah Najafizada, interview with SIGAR, 9/23/2022.
50 Lotfullah Najafizada, interview with SIGAR, 9/23/2022.
51 United States Institute of Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate:
Independent Media,” 08/10/2015.
52 Reporters Without Borders, “Afghanistan: 11 ‘journalism rules’
imposed by Taliban open way to censorship and arbitrary decisions, RSF warns,” 9/22/2021.
53 Reporters Without Borders, “Afghanistan: 11 ‘journalism rules’
imposed by Taliban open way to censorship and arbitrary decisions, RSF warns,” 9/22/2021.
54 Reporters Without Borders, “Afghanistan: 11 ‘journalism rules’
imposed by Taliban open way to censorship and arbitrary decisions, RSF warns,” 9/22/2021.

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STIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIA

55 Reporters Without Borders, “Afghanistan: 11 ‘journalism rules’
imposed by Taliban open way to censorship and arbitrary decisions, RSF warns,” 9/22/2021.
56 Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Taliban Severely Restrict
Media, 10/1/2021.
57 BBC, “Afghanistan: Taliban unveil new rules banning womenin TV dramas,” 11/21/2021.
58 NPR, “The Taliban say Afghan female TV anchors must cover
their faces on air,” 5/20/2022.
59 Reporters Without Borders, “Afghanistan: 11 ‘journalism rules’
imposed by Taliban open way to censorship and arbitrary decisions, RSF warns,” 9/22/2021.
60 Reporters Without Borders, Afghanistan, “Since the Taliban
takeover, 40% of Afghan media have closed, 80% of women journalists have lost their jobs,” 12/21/2021.
61 Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Taliban Severely Restrict
Media,” 10/1/2021.
62 VOA, “How the Taliban Control Afghan Media,” 10/12/2021.
63 VOA, “How the Taliban Control Afghan Media,” 10/12/2021.
64 VOA, “How the Taliban Control Afghan Media,” 10/12/2021.
65 The Committee to Protect Journalists, “Afghanistan’s intelligence agency emerges as new threat to independent media,”
3/2/2022; VOA, “How the Taliban Control Afghan Media,”
10/12/2021.
66 Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Taliban Severely Restrict
Media,” 10/1/2021.
67 United States Institute of Peace, “Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate:
Independent Media,” 08/10/2015.
68 VOA, “Afghan Journalists ‘Very Afraid’ Amid Rising Violence,”
1/26/2022.
69 Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Taliban Severely Restrict
Media,” 10/1/2021.
70 Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Taliban Severely Restrict
Media,” 10/1/2021.
71 The Committee to Protect Journalists, “Afghanistan’s intelligence agency emerges as new threat to independent media,”
3/2/2022.
72 Informant 132, interview with SIGAR, 9/20/2022.
73 Informant 132, interview with SIGAR, 9/20/2022.
74 The Committee to Protect Journalists, “Afghanistan’s intelligence agency emerges as new threat to independent media,”
3/2/2022.
75 VOA, “How the Taliban Control Afghan Media,” 10/12/2021;
Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Taliban Threatening
Provincial Media,” 3/7/2022.
76 VOA, “How the Taliban Control Afghan Media,” 10/12/2021.
77 VOA, “How the Taliban Control Afghan Media,” 10/12/2021.
78 Wall Street Journal, “Afghanistan’s Independent Media is Fading
Away, but a Few Hold Out,” 7/7/2022.
79 Farida Nekzad, interview with SIGAR, 9/21/2022.
80 Farida Nekzad, interview with SIGAR, 9/21/2022.
81 Farida Nekzad, interview with SIGAR, 9/21/2022.
82 Farida Nekzad, interview with SIGAR, 9/21/2022.
83 The Hindu, “Fled Afghan journalists face an uncertain future
in Pakistan,” 9/9/2022.
84 The Hindu, “Fled Afghan journalists face an uncertain future
in Pakistan,” 9/9/2022.

18

85
86
87
88
89

90

91

92
93
94
95
96

97

98

99

100

101

102

103
104

Kalimullah Hamsukhan, interview with SIGAR, 9/22/2022.
Kalimullah Hamsukhan, interview with SIGAR, 9/22/2022.
Kalimullah Hamsukhan, interview with SIGAR, 9/22/2022.
Kalimullah Hamsukhan, interview with SIGAR, 9/22/2022.
The Committee to Protect Journalists, “Afghanistan’s intelligence agency emerges as new threat to independent media,”
3/2/2022.
The Committee to Protect Journalists, “Afghanistan’s intelligence agency emerges as new threat to independent media,”
3/2/2022.
The Committee to Protect Journalists, “Afghanistan’s intelligence agency emerges as new threat to independent media,”
3/2/2022.
Lynne O’Donnell, “The Taliban Detained Me for Doing My Job.
I Can Never Go Back,” Foreign Policy, 7/20/2022.
Lynne O’Donnell, “The Taliban Detained Me for Doing My Job.
I Can Never Go Back,” Foreign Policy, 7/20/2022.
Lynne O’Donnell, “The Taliban Detained Me for Doing My Job.
I Can Never Go Back,” Foreign Policy, 7/20/2022.
Lynne O’Donnell, “The Taliban Detained Me for Doing My Job.
I Can Never Go Back,” Foreign Policy, 7/20/2022.
Stefanie Glinski (@stephglinski). 2022. “THREAD: 1/10 I lived& worked in #Afghanistan for 4 years. I travelled to most provinces; made dear friends; learned the language. Right now, I
can’t go back. Here’s why: Over the past years, journos working
in AF have largely been operating freely. This has drasticallychanged.” 10/10/2022, 9:47am.
Stefanie Glinski (@stephglinski). 2022. “They told me that ‘thegovernment [Taliban] will be holding all sides accountable fromnow onwards, and anyone found breaking the law or unable
to substantiate reports […] will be dealt with according to
the law, which includes cancellation of visas & non-entry to#Afghanistan.’” Twitter, 10/10/2022, 9:47am.
Stefanie Glinski (@stephglinski). 2022. “THREAD: 1/10 I lived& worked in #Afghanistan for 4 years. I travelled to most provinces; made dear friends; learned the language. Right now, I
can’t go back. Here’s why: Over the past years, journos working
in AF have largely been operating freely. This has drasticallychanged.” 10/10/2022, 9:47am.
Committee to Protect Journalists, “Taliban intelligence agentsdetain American filmmaker Ivor Shearer, Afghan producer
Faizullah Faizbakhsh in Kabul,” 8/19/2022.
Committee to Protect Journalists, “Taliban intelligence agentsdetain American filmmaker Ivor Shearer, Afghan producer
Faizullah Faizbakhsh in Kabul,” 8/19/2022.
Committee to Protect Journalists, “Taliban intelligence agentsdetain American filmmaker Ivor Shearer, Afghan producer
Faizullah Faizbakhsh in Kabul,” 8/19/2022.
White House Press Briefing, “Background Press Call by Senior
Administration Officials on the Release of Mark Frerichs,”
9/19/2022.
Reporters Without Borders, “Afghanistan has lost almost 60%
of its journalists since the fall of Kabul,” 8/1/2022.
Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Taliban Severely Restrict
Media,” 10/1/2021; VOA, “How the Taliban Control Afghan
Media,” 10/12/2021.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTIFLING OF THE AFGHAN MEDIA- - - - - - -105 VOA, “VOA officially launches Afghan satellite TV channel,”
3/29/2022.
106 USAGM, Response to SIGAR Data Call, 10/4/2022.
107 USAGM, Response to SIGAR Data Call, 10/4/2022.
108 Atlantic Council, Lotfullah Najafizada biography, accessed
9/26/2022.
109 Atlantic Council, Lotfullah Najafizada biography, accessed
9/26/2022.
110 Atlantic Council, Lotfullah Najafizada biography, accessed
9/26/2022.
111 Toronto Star, “Exiled Afghan journalists living in Toronto andVirginia launch independent news platform Amu TV,” 8/1/2022.
112 Lotfullah Najafizada, interview with SIGAR, 9/23/2022.
113 Toronto Star, “Exiled Afghan journalists living in Toronto andVirginia launch independent news platform Amu TV,” 8/1/2022.
114 Lotfullah Najafizada, interview with SIGAR, 9/23/2022.
115 Lotfullah Najafizada, interview with SIGAR, 9/23/2022.
116 International Media Support, “With the Fall of Kabul, the Fallof Afghan Media,” 6/20/2022.
117 International Media Support, “With the Fall of Kabul, the Fallof Afghan Media,” 6/20/2022.
118 Somaia Valizadeh, “Postcard from Istanbul: Why I had to flee
Afghanistan,” Chatham House, 9/30/2022.
119 Somaia Valizadeh, “Postcard from Istanbul: Why I had to flee
Afghanistan,” Chatham House, 9/30/2022.
120 Somaia Valizadeh, “Postcard from Istanbul: Why I had to flee
Afghanistan,” Chatham House, 9/30/2022.
121 Somaia Valizadeh, “Postcard from Istanbul: Why I had to flee
Afghanistan,” Chatham House, 9/30/2022.
122 Wall Street Journal, “Afghanistan’s Independent Media Is Fading
Away, but a Few Hold Out,” 7/7/2022.
123 Wall Street Journal, “Afghanistan’s Independent Media Is Fading
Away, but a Few Hold Out,” 7/7/2022.
124 Amnesty International, “Afghanistan: The Taliban’s continued
attacks on free media, freedom of expression and assembly arefurther evidence of its crackdown on dissent. According to@HashteSubhDaily the Taliban have suspended its website
yesterday due to political reasons,” via Twitter, 10/3/2022.
125 Committee to Protect Journalists, “As staff flee, TOLOnews
vows to keep broadcasting from Afghanistan—for now,”
9/1/2021.
126 Committee to Protect Journalists, “As staff flee, TOLOnews
vows to keep broadcasting from Afghanistan—for now,”
9/1/2021.
127 Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Economic Crisis Underlies
Mass Hunger,” 8/4/2022.
128 Hujatullah Mujadidi, “I could not leave my colleagues behind,”
VOA, 4/14/2022.
129 Hujatullah Mujadidi, interview with SIGAR, 9/21/2022.
130 Hujatullah Mujadidi, interview with SIGAR, 9/21/2022.
131 Hujatullah Mujadidi, interview with SIGAR, 9/21/2022.
132 Hujatullah Mujadidi, interview with SIGAR, 9/21/2022.
133 Afghan Journalists Safety Committee, Violence Data Map
2013–2020, 2020, Accessed 10/13/2022; Committee to Protect
Journalists, “76 Journalists and Media Workers Killed in
Afghanistan,” 2022, Accessed 10/13/2022.
134 Kalimullah Hamsukhan, interview with SIGAR, 9/22/2022.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

135 Lotfullah Najafizada, interview with SIGAR, 9/23/2022.
136 Lotfullah Najafizada, interview with SIGAR, 9/23/2022.
137 Wall Street Journal. “Afghanistan’s Independent Media is Fading
Away, but a Few Hold Out,” 7/7/2002.
138 Kalimullah Hamsukhan, interview with SIGAR, 9/22/2022.
139 USAID, 2019–2023 Country Development Cooperation Strategy
for Afghanistan, 2018, p. 48; United States Institute of Peace,“Afghanistan’s Fourth Estate: Independent Media,” 8/10/2015.
140 Hujatullah Mujadidi, interview with SIGAR, 9/21/2022.

19

“The United States is the world’s leading
donor in Afghanistan. This last year
alone, we have provided more than
$775 million dollars in humanitarianassistance directly to the Afghan people
and Afghans in the region. And we areproud to be the largest funder of UN
operations in Afghanistan.”— U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield

Source: United States Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security
Council Briefing on Afghanistan,” 8/29/2022.

Photo on next page
An Afghan man collects food for his family in the Almar District, Faryab Province. (WFP Afghanistan photo)

2

SIGAR
OVERSIGHT

21

SPECIAL HIGHLIGHT

U.S. AGENCIES REFUSE TO ANSWER SIGAR’S DATAREQUESTS REGARDING U.S. SPENDING FOR AFGHANISTANThe United States remains Afghanistan’s single
largest donor, providing more than $1.1 billion inassistance to support the Afghan people since the
Taliban takeover in August 2021. However, SIGAR,
for the first time in its history, is unable this quarterto provide Congress and the American people with afull accounting of this U.S. government spending due
to the non-cooperation of U.S. agencies.
The United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), which administers the vast
majority of current U.S. funding for Afghanistan, andthe Treasury Department, refused to cooperate with
SIGAR in any capacity, while the State Department
was selective in the information it provided pursuant
to SIGAR’s quarterly data requests, sharing funding
data but not details of agency-supported programsin Afghanistan.* This in direct violation of Section
1229(h)(5)(A) of the NDAA for FY 2008 (requiring theagencies to provide information and assistance uponrequest) and Section 6(c)(1) of the Inspector General
Act of 1978, as amended.
Additionally, after more than a decade of cooperation, State, and USAID have for months now refused
to provide SIGAR with information and assistanceneeded for several audits and Congressionally mandated reviews including those pertaining to:
1. the collapse of the U.S.‐backed governmentin Afghanistan;
2. risks to the Afghan people;
3. State and USAID compliance with laws andregulations prohibiting the transfer of funds
to the Taliban; and4. ongoing humanitarian and development
programs supporting the Afghan people.

22

In response to SIGAR data requests, State and
USAID challenged SIGAR’s jurisdiction, claiming
without basis that U.S. programming in Afghanistan
is unrelated to reconstruction activities, and is instead“humanitarian and development assistance.” SIGAR
rejects this claim, noting that there is little to no substantive difference between assistance referred to as“reconstruction” and assistance referred to as “development” or “humanitarian.” Most of the State and
USAID programs outlined in this quarterly report arecontinuations of activities performed prior to August
2021, and State and USAID have not articulated how
these programs have changed in practice.
Congress was clear when it granted SIGAR
jurisdiction in its 2008 enabling legislation over allreconstruction spending in Afghanistan, including
development and humanitarian aid. In the context
of this legislation, reconstruction assistance is thebroadest term, subsuming both development andhumanitarian assistance. In letters sent on May 6
and June 22, 2022, SIGAR’s Office of General Counsel
reminded State and USAID of the broad scope of
SIGAR’s existing jurisdiction as stated in both theplain text of SIGAR’s authorizing statute and its legislative history. Per the National Defense Authorization
Act for FY 2008, § 1229(i)(2), SIGAR’s authorizing
statute provides that SIGAR has jurisdiction to audit,
investigate, and report on projects and programs
using: “any . . . funding mechanism” that supports“any of the following purposes:(A) To build or rebuild physical infrastructureof Afghanistan.
(B) To establish or reestablish a political or societal institution of Afghanistan. [and](C) To provide products or services to the peopleof Afghanistan.”

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

SPECIAL HIGHLIGHT

Congress was also clear when it required Stateand USAID to provide SIGAR with information andassistance upon request, and when it unambiguously
prohibited agency officials from refusing to cooperate with SIGAR’s work.
SIGAR’s authorizing statute provides that, “Uponrequest of the Inspector General for information or
assistance from any department, agency, or otherentity of the Federal Government, the head of such
entity shall, insofar as is practicable and not incontravention of any existing law, furnish such information or assistance to the Inspector General, or an
authorized designee.”
SIGAR also notes that State and USAID’s failure toprovide information and assistance to SIGAR violates
the December 3, 2021, guidance from the Office ofManagement and Budget regarding cooperation withfederal inspectors general, which states that, “It is the
President’s expectation that executive departments
and agencies will restore and respect the integrity
and independence of their respective agency inspectors general (IGs) and work with the Congress toensure that IG offices can exercise their vital oversight role.”
A State official has informed SIGAR that department staff have received internal direction to not
engage with or speak to SIGAR without prior clearance from State legal counsel. This direction is at
odds with Section 7 of the Inspector General Act
and other legal protections related to whistleblowers,
as well as SIGAR’s authorizing statue, which states
that, “no officer of the Department of Defense, theDepartment of State, or the United States Agency forInternational Development shall prevent or prohibit

the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out,or completing any audit or investigation related toamounts appropriated or otherwise made available
for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.”
Consistent with the plain text of SIGAR’s authorizing legislation, SIGAR has reported on humanitarianand development assistance programs in Afghanistan
since 2008. For example, all 57 of SIGAR’s quarterly reports to the United States Congress discuss
humanitarian and development assistance within
the broader context of Afghanistan reconstruction.
No federal agency has challenged SIGAR’s authority to conduct oversight of such programs until
now. USAID and State legal counsels’ claim that
SIGAR’s jurisdiction does not include such matters
is not only contrary to the law, but a gross deviation from over 14 years of precedent set by threeprior Administrations.

*State cooperated with data call responses related to appropriation, obligation, and disbursement information on all accounts that fund, or funded, Afghanistan reconstruction, as arereported in the Status of Funds section of this report. SIGAR’s legislative mandate, Pub. L. No. 110-181, as amended, requires the production of Quarterly Reports that present obligations and expenditures of appropriated funds for Afghanistan reconstruction under Section 1229 (i)(1)(A).
Source: USAID press release, “The United States has provided more than $1.1 billion to respond to humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan since August 2021,” 9/23/2022; State
Department/Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, response to SIGAR data call, 9/20/2022; State Department/Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, response to SIGAR
data call, 9/20/2022; USAID/Afghanistan, response to SIGAR data call, 9/2/2022; USAID/Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance, response to SIGAR data call, 9/1/2022; Joint letterfrom the State and USAID Offices of General Counsel to SIGAR’s Office of General Counsel, 4/25/2022; Letter from the SIGAR Office of General Counsel to the State and USAID Officesof General Counsel, 5/6/2022; Joint letter from the State and USAID Offices of General Counsel to SIGAR’s Office of General Counsel, 7/8/2022; SIGAR letter to Secretary of State
Antony Blinken, 6/22/2022; SIGAR letter to Congress, Department of State, and USAID on State’s and USAID’s refusal to provide information and assistance requested by SIGAR,
6/22/2022.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

23

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIESGOVERNANCEOVERSIGHT
CONTENTSCONTENTSKEY ISSUES
Auditsand Evaluations& EVENTS (H4 TOC)

26
3

Lessons Learned

33

Investigations

34

Congressionally Directed Assessments

35

Other SIGAR Oversight Activities

38

SIGAR Budget

38

SIGAR Staff

38

24

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES- - - - - - -SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIESThis quarter, SIGAR issued 11 products, including this quarterly report.
SIGAR work to date has identified approximately $3.96 billion in savingsfor the U.S. taxpayer.
SIGAR issued two performance audit reports and two evaluations thisquarter. The first report found that the U.S. Department of State did notcomplete required oversight and evaluation of its Antiterrorism Assistance
Program in Afghanistan. The second report found that the U.S. Agency forInternational Development generally met federal and internal requirements
for noncompetitive awards, but did not maintain some of the required
documents resulting in a lack of complete and accurate records for allaward activities.
The first evaluation reviewed the validity of allegations that senior
Afghan officials stole funds as the government collapsed. Although SIGAR
found that some cash was taken from the grounds of the presidential palaceand loaded onto helicopters, evidence indicates that the amount did notexceed $1 million and may have been closer to $500,000. Most of this money
was believed to have come from several Afghan government operating budgets normally managed at the palace.
A second, Congressionally requested evaluation assessed the risks to theAfghan people and civil society organizations resulting from the Taliban’s
takeover. SIGAR found that women and girls now face significant risks
including reduced access to education and healthcare; loss of empowerment, including the ability to be economically and otherwise independent;
and heightened personal safety and security risks. The media, healthcare,and education sectors have also faced acute risk under Taliban rule. SIGAR
concluded that the current conditions Afghans face are similar to thoseunder the Taliban in the 1990s.
SIGAR completed six financial audits of U.S.-funded projects to rebuild
Afghanistan that identified $10,668,026 in questioned costs as a result ofinternal-control deficiencies and noncompliance issues. These financial
audits identified a range of deficiencies by U.S. government contractors
including Raytheon Company, International Legal Foundation, Albany
Associates, Amentum Services Inc., and FHI 360. An additional audit of
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University did not find any material
weaknesses or internal deficiencies.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

25

PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORTS ISSUED• SIGAR 23-01-AR: Department of State
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Programin Afghanistan: Security Concerns
Prevented State from Fully Monitoringand Evaluating the Program, and Up
to $32 Million in Assets May Be in the
Taliban’s Possession• SIGAR 22-41-AR: Contracting in
Afghanistan: USAID Generally Met
Requirements for Noncompetitive
Awards, But Did Not Complete or
Did Not Maintain Some Required
Documents

EVALUATION REPORTS ISSUED• SIGAR 23-02-IP: Afghan Civil
Society: The Taliban’s Takeover Risks
Undoing 20 Years of Reconstruction
Accomplishments• SIGAR 22-35-IP: Theft of Funds
from Afghanistan: An Assessment ofAllegations Concerning President Ghani
and Former Senior Afghan Officials
Continued on the next page

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIESFINANCIAL AUDIT REPORTS ISSUED• Financial Audit SIGAR-22-42-FA: Audit of
Costs Incurred by Amentum Services Inc.
• Financial Audit SIGAR-22-40-FA: Audit of
Costs Incurred by FHI 360• Financial Audit SIGAR-22-39-FA: Audit of
Costs Incurred by Raytheon Company• Financial Audit SIGAR-22-38-FA: Auditof Costs Incurred by International Legal
Foundation• Financial Audit SIGAR-22-37-FA: Auditof Costs Incurred by Albany Associates
International Ltd.
• Financial Audit SIGAR-22-36-FA: Auditof Costs Incurred by Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University.

QUARTERLY REPORT ISSUED• 2022-QR-4: Quarterly Report to theUnited States Congress

During the reporting period, SIGAR’s criminal investigations resulted
in two criminal informations, two guilty pleas, five sentencings, and over
$10.3 million in criminal restitutions and forfeitures. SIGAR initiated one
case and closed five, bringing the total number of ongoing investigations
to 35.
SIGAR also continued conducting interviews and analysis in supportof Congressionally requested assessments including reviewing the factorsthat led to the collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces(ANDSF) and the Afghan government, and the status of on-budget U.S.
assistance. SIGAR also initiated an additional evaluation of the education
sector in Afghanistan this quarter.

AUDITS AND EVALUATIONSSIGAR conducts performance and financial audits of programs and projects connected to the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. This quarter,
SIGAR has 10 ongoing performance audits and evaluations, and 47 ongoing
financial audits. These reviews are required by SIGAR’s authorizing statute;completing them, despite the fall of the internationally supported Afghan
government in August 2021, will yield information about use of funds,
agency performance, and reconstruction effectiveness. This information
can improve accountability and transparency, suggest process improvements, and generate lessons learned for other current and future overseas
reconstruction and development efforts.

Performance Audit Reports Issued

This quarter, SIGAR issued two performance-audit reports. A list of completed and ongoing performance audits can be found in Appendix C of thisquarterly report.

Performance Audit 23-01-AR: Department of State AntiTerrorism Assistance Program in Afghanistan
Security Concerns Prevented State from Fully Monitoring and Evaluating the Program,and Up to $32 Million in Assets May Be in the Taliban’s Possession
SIGAR issued an audit of the U.S. Department of State’s (State)
Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program in Afghanistan, which spent$95.5 million in U.S. taxpayer funds from January 2018 to August 2021.
The objectives of this audit were to (1) assess the extent to which State
conducted required oversight of ATA activities in Afghanistan and measured
progress in meeting program goals and objectives; (2) identify the extent towhich State designed and made adjustments to the program, when necessary, based on challenges, if any, it faced in implementing and sustaining
the program in Afghanistan; and (3) assess the extent to which State has
accounted for undisbursed program funding or assets in Afghanistan at thetime of the U.S. government’s withdrawal.

26

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES- - - - - - -SIGAR found that State did not complete all the required oversight andevaluation of the ATA program, including measuring its performance andimpact. For example, State produced a strategy for the Afghanistan ATA
program, but did not collect all required monitoring and performance information necessary to determine the extent to which the ATA program met
performance indicators and fulfilled strategic goals. SIGAR also found thatprior to the Taliban takeover of Kabul in August 2021, State transferredan estimated $28–32 million in program assets to Afghan government
partners. However, State has not provided a full accounting for all the transferred assets, and cannot confirm the current custodian of these assets,
which is presumed to be the Taliban regime. Finally, State estimated that
$11.3 million of the obligated funds remained undisbursed at the time ofthe program’s closure in August 2021. State officials said that contractors
were reviewing and preparing requests for either claims of lost items or
expenses, so the amount of unspent funding may change. The remaining
funding will then be reprogrammed.
SIGAR is not making any recommendations in this report because Stateterminated Afghanistan’s ATA program following the August 2021 collapseof the former Afghan government and the U.S. government’s withdrawal
from the country. However, the findings of this report may be useful to Stateas it implements the ATA program in other high-risk and strategically important countries.

Performance Audit 22-41-AR: Contracting in Afghanistan
USAID Generally Met Requirements for Noncompetitive Awards, But Did Not Complete
or Did Not Maintain Some Required Documents
From February 2002 through April 2022, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) obligated $21.16 billion to support Afghanistan’sreconstruction through various award types, including contracts, grants,
cooperative agreements, and interagency agreements. This audit examinedthe extent to which USAID, from January 1, 2017, through December 31,
2020, followed applicable federal and internal guidance when awarding noncompetitive contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, and other assistanceagreements for Afghanistan reconstruction.
SIGAR found that USAID complied with the Federal Acquisition
Regulation data element publishing requirements for each of four noncompetitive contracts. SIGAR found that, as required, USAID accurately
logged each contract into the Federal Procurement Data System–Next
Generation, a computer-based system for collecting and disseminatingprocurement data.
USAID and Office of Management and Budget policies also require
USAID to synopsize and post grants and cooperative agreements
opportunities on the Grants.gov website. In addition to the synopsis,
USAID is required to publish information on the amount of funding

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

27

PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORTS ISSUED• SIGAR 23-01-AR: Department of State
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Programin Afghanistan: Security Concerns
Prevented State from Fully Monitoringand Evaluating the Program, and Up
to $32 Million in Assets May Be in the
Taliban’s Possession• SIGAR 22-41-AR: Contracting in
Afghanistan: USAID Generally Met
Requirements for Noncompetitive
Awards, But Did Not Complete or
Did Not Maintain Some Required
Documents

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

available, expected number of awards, eligibility criteria, and other data
points. SIGAR found that USAID met these requirements. However,
USAID either did not complete or did not properly maintain all required
documentation for the awards it made without full and open competition.
For example, USAID did not complete or properly maintain the documents
required to justify the decision not to compete two of the awards, the action
memorandum for one interagency agreement, transmittal letters for threeinteragency agreements, and selection instrument justifications for one
contract and one cooperative agreement.
As a result of incomplete or missing documents, USAID does not havecomplete and accurate records for all its award activities. Adhering tofederal regulations and internal guidance for providing award documents
is important because without those documents, USAID is not certain that
it is obtaining the necessary commodities and services at the lowest possible price or at the best value to the government. SIGAR is not making any
recommendations in this report because in response to a May 2022 SIGAR
report, USAID issued an administrative notice to address the documentation completion and retention issues identified in this report.

Evaluation Reports Issued
EVALUATION REPORTS ISSUED• SIGAR 23-02-IP: Afghan Civil
Society: The Taliban’s Takeover Risks
Undoing 20 Years of Reconstruction
Accomplishments• SIGAR 22-35-IP: Theft of Funds
from Afghanistan: An Assessment ofAllegations Concerning President Ghani
and Former Senior Afghan Officials

This quarter, SIGAR issued two evaluation reports. The first evaluation
reviewed the allegations of theft of funds from Afghanistan by former senior
Afghan officials. The second assessed the risks to Afghan civil society fromthe Taliban takeover in August 2021.

Evaluation 22-35-IP: Theft of Funds from Afghanistan
An Assessment of Allegations Concerning President Ghani and Former Senior
Afghan Officials
In response to directives from the House Armed Services Committeeand House Committee on Oversight and Reform and its Subcommittee
on National Security, SIGAR issued Theft of Funds from Afghanistan:
An Assessment of Allegations Concerning President Ghani and Former
Senior Afghan Officials. This evaluation assessed the validity of allegations that senior Afghan officials stole funds as the government collapsed.
Although SIGAR found that some cash was taken from the grounds of thepresidential palace and loaded onto helicopters, evidence indicates that theamount did not exceed $1 million and may have been closer to $500,000.
Most of this money was believed to have come from several Afghan government operating budgets normally managed at the palace.
SIGAR also identified suspicious circumstances in which approximately$5 million in cash was allegedly left behind at the presidential palace.
The origins and purposes of this money are disputed, but it was supposedly
divided by members of the Presidential Protective Service after the helicopters departed and before the Taliban captured the palace. SIGAR examined

28

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES- - - - - - -other examples of alleged theft by senior Afghan officials as the government
collapsed, including tens of millions of dollars from the operating budget of
the National Directorate of Security. More broadly, although there appears
to have been ample opportunity and effort to plunder Afghan government
coffers, at this time SIGAR does not have sufficient evidence to determinewith certainty whether hundreds of millions of dollars were removed fromthe country by Afghan officials as the government collapsed or whether any
stolen money was provided by the United States.

Evaluation 23-02-IP: Afghan Civil Society
The Taliban’s Takeover Risks Undoing 20 Years of Reconstruction Accomplishments
In response to directives from the House Armed Services Committeeand House Committee on Oversight and Reform and its Subcommittee
on National Security, SIGAR issued Afghan Civil Society: The Taliban’s
Takeover Risks Undoing 20 Years of Reconstruction Accomplishmentsin October 2022. In this report SIGAR (1) identified the risks to the Afghan
people and civil society organizations, including Afghan women and girls,
journalists, educational institutions, healthcare operations, and NGOs
resulting from the Taliban’s takeover; and (2) assessed the extent to which
the U.S. government is mitigating these risks and the impact they may haveon future U.S. assistance.
SIGAR found women and girls now again face significant risks including
reduced access to education and healthcare; loss of empowerment, including the ability to be professionally, socially, and economically independent;
and heightened personal safety and security risks—a return to a life similar
to that under the Taliban in the 1990s. The Taliban takeover also placed the
media and its members at acute risk of violence and censorship, as was thecase under 1990s Taliban rule. In addition, the Taliban have issued new education policies restricting who can attend school and what can be studied.
Afghanistan’s healthcare system has also faced crisis due to a significant
reduction in financial, human, and physical resources; collapsing infrastructure; concerns about personal safety; and an increase in healthcare demand,
including the prevalence of communicable diseases. Moreover, the NGO
community has significantly shrunk because of security concerns, lack offunding, and Taliban policies.

Financial Audits

SIGAR launched its financial-audit program in 2012, after Congress and theoversight community expressed concerns about oversight gaps and thegrowing backlog of incurred-cost audits for contracts and grants awardedin support of overseas contingency operations. SIGAR competitively
selects independent accounting firms to conduct the financial audits andensures that the audit work is performed in accordance with U.S. government auditing standards. Financial audits are coordinated with the federal

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

29

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIESTABLE 2.1

SIGAR’S FINANCIAL AUDIT
COVERAGE ($ BILLIONS)
222 completed audits$9.22

47 ongoing audits
Total

.59
$9.81

Note: Numbers have been rounded. Coverage includes
auditable costs incurred by implementers through U.S.funded Afghanistan reconstruction contracts, grants, andcooperative agreements.
Source: SIGAR Audits and Inspections Directorate.

Questioned amounts: the sum of potentiallyunallowable questioned costs and unpaid
interest on advanced federal funds or otherrevenue amounts payable to the government.
Questioned costs: costs determined to bepotentially unallowable. The two types ofquestioned costs are (1) ineligible costs(violation of a law, regulation, contract, grant,cooperative agreement, etc. or an unnecessaryor unreasonable expenditure of funds); and(2) unsupported costs (those not supported
by adequate documentation or proper approvals
at the time of an audit).

inspector-general community to maximize financial-audit coverage andavoid duplicative efforts.
This quarter, SIGAR completed six financial audits of U.S.-funded projects to rebuild Afghanistan. An additional 47 ongoing financial audits arereviewing $586 million in auditable costs, as shown in Table 2.1. A list ofcompleted and ongoing financial audits can be found in Appendix C of thisquarterly report.
SIGAR issues each financial-audit report to the funding agency thatmade the award(s). The funding agency is responsible for making thefinal determination on questioned amounts identified in the report’s audit
findings. Since the program’s inception, SIGAR’s financial audits have identified $532 million in questioned costs and $366,718 in unpaid interest on
advanced federal funds or other revenue amounts owed to the government.
As of September 30, 2022, funding agencies had disallowed almost $30 million in questioned amounts, which are thereby subject to collection. It takes
time for funding agencies to carefully consider audit findings and recommendations. As a result, final disallowed-cost determinations remain to bemade for several of SIGAR’s issued financial audits. SIGAR’s financial audits
also have identified and reported 677 compliance findings and 744 internalcontrol findings to the auditees and funding agencies.

Financial Audit Reports Issued

The six financial audits completed this quarter identified $10,668,026 inquestioned costs as a result of internal-control deficiencies and noncompliance issues.

Financial Audit 22-39-FA: Department of the Army’s
Afghanistan Air Force Aircraft Maintenance Training Program
Audit of Costs Incurred by Raytheon Company
On July 10, 2019, the Army Contracting Command (ACC) awarded a threeyear, $31,704,840 combination cost-reimbursement and firm-fixed pricetask order under the Enterprise Training Services Contract to Raytheon
Company in support of the Afghanistan Air Force Aircraft MaintenanceTraining program. The objectives of the program were to, among otherthings, provide fixed and rotary wing maintenance training and English
language lessons. ACC modified the contract 13 times, increasing the total
award amount to $45,543,462. ACC terminated the contract for convenience, reducing the period of performance end date from July 9, 2022,
to October 29, 2021. SIGAR’s financial audit, performed by Conrad LLP(Conrad) reviewed $40,726,261 in costs charged to the contract from
July 10, 2019, through July 9, 2021. Conrad identified three deficiencies inRaytheon’s internal controls, including one significant deficiency and one
material weakness. Conrad also identified three instances of noncompliance with the terms of the contract. Because of these issues, the auditors
identified $10,275,498 in total questioned costs.

30

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES- - - - - - -Financial Audit 22-37-FA: State’s Support of Strategic
Communications of the National Unity Governmentof Afghanistan

FINANCIAL AUDIT REPORTS ISSUED

Audit of Costs Incurred by Albany Associates International Ltd.
On September 22, 2017, the U.S. Department of State awarded a $1,176,958
grant agreement to Albany Associates International Ltd. (Albany) to develop
the capacity of the Afghan National Unity Government’s strategic communications. The objective of the agreement was to, among other activities,
support reform and capacity building in Afghan government institutions,so that they could communicate in a more effective, transparent, and coherent way with the Afghan people. State modified the contract four times,
increasing the total award amount to $3,375,365 and extending the periodof performance from September 30, 2018, through December 31, 2020.
SIGAR’s financial audit, performed by Crowe LLP (Crowe), reviewed$3,365,165 in costs charged to the agreement from October 1, 2017, throughDecember 31, 2020. Crowe identified eight deficiencies in Albany’s internal
controls and seven instances of noncompliance with the terms of the grant
agreement. Because of these issues, Crowe identified a total of $363,658 inquestioned costs.

Financial Audit 22-38-FA: State’s Access to Justice throughLegal Aid Program in Five Provinces of Afghanistan
Audit of Costs Incurred by International Legal Foundation
On September 25, 2017, the U.S. Department of State awarded a $1,340,000
grant agreement to International Legal Foundation (ILF) to improve accessto justice by providing legal aid in five Afghan provinces. The purpose of
the agreement, among other program goals, was to support strategic litigation and out-of-court advocacy to achieve systemic change and strengthen
the rule of law. State modified the contract three times, increasing the total
award amount to $5,350,000 and extending the period of performance from
September 25, 2019, to September 30, 2022.
SIGAR’s financial audit, performed by Crowe LLP, reviewed $2,905,908 in
costs charged to the agreement from September 25, 2017, through February
28, 2021. Crowe identified three significant deficiencies in ILF’s internal
controls and three instances of noncompliance with the terms of the agreement. Because of these issues, the auditors identified a total of $27,930 inquestioned costs.

Financial Audit 22-42-FA: Department of the Army’s Security
Ministries of Afghanistan Advisory Program
Audit of Costs Incurred by Amentum Services Inc.
On August 21, 2019, the Army Contracting Command (ACC) awarded afour-year, $32,753,836 combination type contract to DynCorp International
to implement the Security Ministries of Afghanistan Advisory program.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

31

• Financial Audit SIGAR-22-42-FA: Audit of
Costs Incurred by Amentum Services Inc.
• Financial Audit SIGAR-22-40-FA: Audit of
Costs Incurred by FHI 360• Financial Audit SIGAR-22-39-FA: Audit of
Costs Incurred by Raytheon Company• Financial Audit SIGAR-22-38-FA: Auditof Costs Incurred by International Legal
Foundation• Financial Audit SIGAR-22-37-FA: Auditof Costs Incurred by Albany Associates
International Ltd.
• Financial Audit SIGAR-22-36-FA: Auditof Costs Incurred by Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIESThe objective of the program was to help the Afghan Ministries of Interiorand Defense assume full responsibility for Afghanistan’s self-sustainablesecurity needs through training, advice, and assistance. ACC modified thecontract 28 times, including the acknowledgement of Amentum’s acquisition of DynCorp and revision of the start date to December 19, 2019. The
total award amount was increased to $43,580,655. ACC terminated the contract for the convenience of the government effective August 31, 2021.
SIGAR’s financial audit, performed by Conrad LLP, reviewed $17,797,470
in costs charged to the contract from December 19, 2019, through August
31, 2021. Conrad identified one deficiency in Amentum’s internal controls,
and one instance of noncompliance with the terms of the contract. Becauseof these issues, the auditors identified $940 in total questioned costs.

Financial Audit 22-36-FA: USAID’s Catalyzing Afghan
Agricultural Innovation Program
Audit of Costs Incurred by Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
On May 20, 2018, USAID’s Mission to Afghanistan awarded a five-year,
associate cooperative agreement worth $8,000,000 to Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University (VA Tech) to implement the Catalyzing Afghan
Agricultural Innovation program. The objective of the program was, among
other activities, to improve capacity in agricultural education and promote
new roles for educators and researchers by building their relationships withthe private sector. The agreement had a period of performance from May
18, 2018, through May 27, 2023. USAID modified the agreement seven times,
reducing the period of performance to February 28, 2022. The total award
amount of the agreement remained unchanged.
SIGAR’s financial audit, performed by Castro & Company (Castro),
reviewed $1,787,503 in costs incurred under the agreement from January
1, 2020, through May 27, 2021. Castro did not find any material weaknesses
or significant deficiencies in VA Tech’s internal controls, or any instancesof noncompliance with the terms and conditions of the agreement.
Accordingly, the auditors did not report any questioned costs.

Financial Audit 22-40-FA: USAID’s Goldozi Project
Audit of Costs Incurred by FHI 360
On April 5, 2018, the U.S. Agency for International Development awarded
a four-year, $9,718,763 cooperative agreement to FHI 360 in support of its
Goldozi Project. The purpose of the project was to help Afghan women generate revenue and sustainable jobs by increasing the commercial potentialof embroidered products. USAID modified the agreement five times. The
total award amount remained unchanged, but the period of performanceend date was reduced from April 4, 2022, to January 31, 2022.
SIGAR’s financial audit, performed by Castro & Company LLC, reviewed$1,950,949 in costs incurred under the agreement from October 1, 2020,

32

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES- - - - - - -through September 30, 2021. Castro did not find any material weaknesses
or significant deficiencies in FHI 360’s internal controls, or any instancesof noncompliance with the terms and conditions of the agreement.
Accordingly, the auditors did not report any questioned costs.

Status of SIGAR Recommendations

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, requires SIGAR to reporton the status of its recommendations. This quarter, SIGAR closed 18
recommendations contained in 8 performance-audit, inspection, and financial-audit reports.
From 2009 through October 2022, SIGAR issued 451 audits, alert letters,
and inspection reports, and made 1,268 recommendations to recover funds,
improve agency oversight, and increase program effectiveness.
SIGAR has closed 1,155 of these recommendations, about 91%. Closing
a recommendation generally indicates SIGAR’s assessment that the audited
agency either has implemented the recommendation or has otherwise
appropriately addressed the issue. In some cases, where the agency has
failed to act, SIGAR will close the recommendation as “Not Implemented”;
SIGAR closed a total of 243 recommendations in this manner. In somecases, these recommendations will be the subject of follow-up audit orinspection work.
SIGAR is also required to report on any significant recommendations
from prior reports on which corrective action has not been completed.
This quarter, SIGAR continued to monitor agency actions on 113 open recommendations. Of these recommendations, 59 have been open for morethan 12 months because the agency involved has not yet produced a corrective-action plan that SIGAR believes would resolve the identified problem or
has otherwise failed to appropriately respond to the recommendation(s).
For a complete list of open recommendations, see www.sigar.mil.

LESSONS LEARNEDSIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program was created to identify lessons andmake recommendations to Congress and executive branch agencies onways to improve current and future reconstruction efforts. The program
has issued 12 lessons learned reports to date.

Lessons Learned Program Activities
Association of Government Accountants Panel
On September 21, LLP team lead David Young spoke on a panel at the annual
Association of Government Accountants titled, “Fraud and Corruption inInternational Development: Lessons from Abroad.”

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

33

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Irregular Warfare Podcast Discussion
On September 12, LLP team lead James Cunningham appeared on the“Irregular Warfare” podcast, a collaboration between the Modern War
Institute at West Point and Princeton’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project.
He discussed whether, in the year following the U.S. withdrawal, the UnitedStates and its allies had sufficiently reflected on lessons learned from the war.

INVESTIGATIONSFIGURE 2.1

SIGAR INVESTIGATIONS:NUMBER OF OPEN INVESTIGATIONS
Total: 35
Corruption
and Bribery
3

Procurement
Other/and Contract Miscellaneous
Fraud
15
14

Money
Laundering
2

Theft
1

Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 10/05/2022.

During the reporting period, SIGAR’s criminal investigations resulted in two
criminal informations, two guilty pleas, five sentencings and over $10.3 million in criminal restitutions and forfeitures. SIGAR initiated one case andclosed five, bringing the total number of ongoing investigations to 35.
To date, SIGAR investigations have resulted in a cumulative total of 167
criminal convictions. Criminal fines, restitutions, forfeitures, civil settlements, and U.S. government cost savings and recoveries total approximately$1.66 billion.

Investment Firm Vice President Sentenced for Running
Multimillion-Dollar Ponzi Scheme
On July 27, 2022, in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, Naim Ismail was sentenced to 70 months of incarceration with credit for time served domestically. Credit was not granted fortime served while detained in the United Arab Emirates. Additionally, Ismail
was ordered to pay a forfeiture to his victims in the amount of $10.2 million.
Ismail participated in various investment schemes that defrauded victimsof over $15 million. From February 2007 through July 2016, he fraudulently
induced individual and corporate victims—including the New York-based
subsidiary of an Afghanistan-based bank—to loan large sums of money toentities operated by Ismail and others. Ismail did so by claiming that thesefunds would be used in an investment strategy and in several real estatedevelopment projects. He offered investors a generous fixed annual rateof return and promised to return the investors’ principal on a specified timeline. Ismail and his companies did not invest these funds as promised, nor
did he repay many of his victims. Instead, he used investor funds to pay theso-called interest payments due to earlier investors in the scheme, as well
as for his own personal expenses and investments.
SIGAR and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) jointly conducted
the investigation.

34

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIESCONGRESSIONALLY DIRECTED ASSESSMENTS
This quarter, SIGAR continued work on three evaluations directed by Congress to assess what led to the Taliban takeoverin Afghanistan and its repercussions.

1

Collapse of the Afghan Government

2Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces

3

On-Budget U.S. Assistance

SIGAR is evaluating the factors that contributed to the collapse of the
Afghan government in August 2021, including chronic challenges to Afghanstate authority and legitimacy since 2002, and the relative success or failureof U.S. reconstruction efforts to build and sustain Afghan governing institutions. SIGAR has collected testimony from a diverse assortment of Afghan,American, and international interviewees who shared their insight on thedownfall of the previous Afghan government.

SIGAR is identifying the factors that contributed to the collapse of the
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces in August 2021. SIGAR
is accomplishing this task by assessing the ANDSF’s performance fromFebruary 2020 to August 2021, as well as the factors that contributed to
the ANDSF’s rapid dissolution. SIGAR is also documenting the underlying causes that contributed to the underdevelopment of important ANDSF
capabilities over the 20-year security assistance mission and providing an
accounting—where possible—of the status of U.S.-supplied equipment and
U.S.-trained ANDSF personnel. SIGAR has conducted numerous interviews
with senior Afghan and U.S. officials to gain insights into ANDSF weaknesses and to learn about what unfolded during the last 18 months of the
U.S. mission in Afghanistan. In May 2022, SIGAR issued an interim reportconcluding the U.S. military withdrawal was an important factor in the collapse of the ANDSF as the decision to withdrawal changed the calculus andbehaviors of the United States, Afghan government, and the Taliban. A final
report will be issued by the end of this year.

SIGAR is performing fieldwork to evaluate the extent to which the Taliban
has access to U.S. on-budget assistance; U.S. equipment, vehicles, property, and assets abandoned in Afghanistan; and U.S.-funded equipment anddefense articles previously provided to the Afghan government and the
ANDSF. This assessment also seeks to evaluate any mechanisms the U.S.
government is using to recoup or recapture this funding and equipment.
The scope of this assessment covers February 2020—the start of a signed
commitment between the U.S. government and the Taliban—to the present.
SIGAR has submitted requests for information to DOD, State, and USAID,
and has interviewed Afghan and U.S. government officials knowledgeable of the events surrounding the U.S. withdrawal and the collapse of the
Afghan government.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

35

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIESFormer U.S. Defense Contractor Executive Pleads Guilty
to Charges of Tax Evasion
On August 25, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
Zachary A. Friedman pleaded guilty to tax evasion. A criminal information
was filed against Friedman on August 1, 2022.
Friedman worked in the United Arab Emirates as a senior executive
for [redacted], a U.S. Department of Defense fuel supply contractor basedin Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Dubai. From 2013 until 2015, Friedman
evaded taxes he owed to the IRS by providing false information to his tax
preparer, thereby underreporting the income he earned for each of the three
years. In total, Friedman concealed approximately $530,000 of income, causing a tax loss to the U.S. government of more than $207,000.
Friedman is the fourth defendant associated with [redacted] to plead
guilty. He faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison, a period ofsupervised release, and monetary penalties. SIGAR initiated the investigation at the request of the Department of Justice Tax Division and worked
concurrently with the IRS-CI International Tax and Financial Crimes Group.
The Joint Chiefs of Global Tax Enforcement (J5)—comprising the taxing
authorities of Australia, Canada, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and theUnited States—assisted.

Two Former Company Executive Officers Sentenced for Fraud
On July 29, 2022, in the Northern District of Alabama, Paul Daigle was sentenced to three years of probation with six months of home confinement andwas ordered to pay $52,968 in restitution. On July 29, 2022, Daigle’s co-conspirator, Keith Woolford, was also sentenced to three years’ probation withsix months’ home confinement and was ordered to pay $52,968 in restitution.
Daigle and Woolford were executives for AAL USA, a Department of
Defense subcontractor engaged in the repair and maintenance of aircraftin Afghanistan under contracts issued from Red Stone Arsenal in Huntsville,
Alabama. Chief Executive Officer Daigle and Chief Financial Officer
Woolford perpetrated a scheme to fill contract labor positions with employees who did not meet the education requirements, and in some cases, with
employees who were not actually assigned work on the contract. As partof the fraud, they instructed employees to obtain fake college degrees froman online diploma mill in order to satisfy the requirements of the labor categories contained in the statement of work for a U.S. government contract.
As a result of the scheme, false invoices were created and passed to theprime contractor and then on to the U.S. government for payment.
The investigation was conducted by SIGAR, Defense Criminal
Investigative Service (DCIS), and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation
Division (CID)-Major Procurement Fraud Unit.

36

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES- - - - - - -Former U.S. Military Member Forfeits $52,000
to U.S. Government
On September 9, 2022, former U.S. Army Warrant Officer Barrington
Bernard and his counsel signed a SIGAR letter indicating Bernard’s intent
to forfeit $52,000 to the U.S. government via the Defense Finance andAccounting Service (DFAS). Bernard received bribe payments in theamount of $52,000 from an Afghan trucking company from 2007 to 2009,
while he was assigned to Bagram Air Force Base, Afghanistan.
A joint investigation was initiated by SIGAR and the U.S. Army CID after
a witness reported allegations of bribery involving Bernard. In a subsequentinterview, Bernard admitted to having received approximately $52,000 inbribe money and he voluntarily agreed to forfeit the money as allowed bylaw and regulation. SIGAR and CID referred the matter to the DFAS to facilitate disposal of the funds to the U.S. Treasury.

Former Employees of U.S. Government Contractor Sentenced
for Fraud Scheme
On July 20, 2022, in U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, Mustafa
Neghat was sentenced to 12 months of supervised probation after pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit offenses against theUnited States.
On September 22, 2022, in the U.S. District Court, District of Columbia,
Abdul A. Qurashi was sentenced to 12 months of unsupervised probation
after pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit offenses against
the United States.
Neghat and Qurashi were employed by a U.S. government contractor to
recruit candidates for positions as language interpreters working with the
U.S. military. They circumvented procedures designed to ensure candidates
met minimum proficiency standards, which resulted in unqualified language
interpreters being hired and later deployed alongside U.S. combat forces in
Afghanistan. To carry out this scheme, they conspired with others to commit wire fraud and major fraud against the United States. Both obtained
financial bonuses from their employer based on the number of candidates
hired through their efforts.
To date, five co-conspirators have pleaded guilty as a result of the SIGARled investigation.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

37

SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIESOTHER SIGAR OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIESIG Sopko Speaks at Joint SIGAR-NATO Conference
On October 20, 2022, Special Inspector General Sopko gave the keynote
address at an event entitled “Police in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S.
Experience in Afghanistan.” The conference, co-hosted by SIGAR and theNATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence was held at the Carabinieri
Officer School in Rome, Italy. The conference was held to discuss lessons
identified in SIGAR’s “Police in Conflict” lessons learned report, publishedin June 2022. Inspector General Sopko’s remarks focused on the importanceof understanding the history of policing in a country where international
donors are trying to rebuild a police force; the need for donors to maintaina deployable police assistance unit that has both the required resources andrequired specialized expertise; the dangers of militarizing the nascent police
force if soldiers, rather than civilians, are responsible for building the newpolice force; and ultimately, how the failure to build a credible Afghan civilian
police force, free from corruption, undermined the legitimacy of the Afghan
government and was a factor in the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021.
The jointly-sponsored conference builds on over five years of collaboration
between SIGAR and NATO’s Stability Policing Center of Excellence.

SIGAR Social Media Impact
Using traditional and social media, SIGAR continues to update and informthe public on events leading up to the collapse of the ANDSF and Afghan
government, the aftermath of the collapse, and the current situation on
the ground in Afghanistan. Since last August, SIGAR’s Twitter account has
grown to over 150,000 followers, underscoring the fact that the American
people, as well as individuals around the globe, are looking for answers andexplanations about the U.S. experience in Afghanistan.

SIGAR BUDGETSIGAR is currently funded under H.R. 6833, the fiscal year 2023 Continuing
Appropriations and Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, that was
signed into law on September 30, 2022. SIGAR was previously funded under
H.R. 2471, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, which provided$40 million to support SIGAR’s oversight activities and products by funding
SIGAR’s Audit and Inspections, Investigations, Management and Support,
Research and Analysis Directorates, and the Lessons Learned Program.

SIGAR STAFF

With 139 employees on board at the end of the quarter, SIGAR had ten fewer
staff members than at the time of the last quarterly report to Congress. There
were no SIGAR employees in Afghanistan during this reporting period.

38

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

“Let me be clear that the UnitedStates has not turned our backs on
Afghanistan… we have continued
to provide essential assistance to
the Afghan people, and we areworking closely with the international
community, with partners to support
the establishment of mechanisms thatwill protect, preserve, and disburse on alimited basis Afghan central bank assets
for the benefit of the Afghan people.”—U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield

Source: United States Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security
Council Briefing on Afghanistan,” 8/29/2022.

3

RECONSTRUCTION
UPDATE41

GOVERNANCE

GOVERNANCE CONTENTS
RECONSTRUCTION
UPDATE CONTENTS
KEY ISSUES & EVENTS
Reconstructionin Brief (H4 TOC)

43
3

Status of Funds

45

Security and Governance73

Economic and Social Development

97

Photo on previous pageThe family of a woman killed in a September 30 suicide bombing at an education center in Kabul mourn her death.
(AP photo by Ebrahim Noroozi)

42

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

RECONSTRUCTION IN BRIEF
Section 3 of this quarterly report summarizes the key events of thereporting period as well as the programs and projects concerning
Afghanistan reconstruction in: Funding, Security and Governance,and Economic and Social Development.

Taliban Stifle Afghan Media• Afghanistan has lost 40% of its media outlets
and 60% of practicing journalists, including 84%
of women journalists, since August 2021.
• In September 2021, the Taliban issued 11 rules
regulating media practices while detaining andabusing Afghan and foreign journalists.

U.S. Drone Kills al-Qaeda Leader• On July 31, the United States killed al-Qaeda leader
Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul with a drone strike.
• The Taliban designated August 15—the anniversaryof the Islamic Republic’s fall—a national holiday.
• U.S. engineer and Taliban hostage Mark Frerichs, acontractor captured in January 2020, was released in
exchange for Haji Bashir Noorzai, a Taliban ally andheroin trafficker serving a life sentence in New York.
• On October 11, the State Department announced
visa restrictions for current or former Taliban
members, members of non-state security groups,
and individuals responsible for, or complicit in, therepression of and violence against Afghan womenand girls.

Afghan Fund Established• On September 27, the Taliban announced aprovisional deal with Russia to import one million
tons of gasoline, one million tons of diesel, 500,000
tons of liquefied petroleum gas, and two million tons
wheat to Afghanistan annually.
• On September 14, the U.S. Treasury and State
Departments announced the establishment of an“Afghan Fund” to provide $3.5 billion in Afghan central
bank assets to benefit the people of Afghanistan.
• USAID announced on August 12, $150 million in
additional assistance for United Nations programsin Afghanistan, including $80 million to improve foodsecurity and nutrition, $40 million for education,
and $30 million to support gender equality andwomen’s empowerment.

• Severe flooding in August killed at least 256 people
and destroyed 5,600 homes throughout Afghanistan,according to the Taliban.

U.S. Reconstruction Funding• This quarter, USAID refused to report its accountbalances to SIGAR. Therefore, SIGAR is making
the qualified statement that the United States
government had appropriated or otherwise madeavailable approximately $146.55 billion in funds forreconstruction and related activities in Afghanistan
since FY 2002, based on USAID reporting on its
accounts through June 30, 2022, and all other U.S.
government agencies’ reporting on their accounts
through September 30, 2022.
• Of the $112.10 billion (76% of total), appropriatedto the six largest active reconstruction funds, about$2.09 billion remained for possible disbursement.
This amount reflects USAID account balances only
through June 30, 2022.
• The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs reported that donors contributed $2.33 billion
for Afghanistan humanitarian assistance programs in
the first nine months of 2022, surpassing the previous
annual record of $2.23 billion for 2021. The UnitedStates was the largest donor over these two periods,
contributing $0.52 billion and $0.44 billion, respectively.
• The DOD’s Cost of War Report, dated September 30,
2021, said its cumulative obligations for Afghanistan,
including U.S. warfighting and reconstruction, hadreached $849.7 billion. A newer report has not yet
been issued. Cumulative Afghanistan reconstruction
and related obligations reported by State, USAID,
and other civilian agencies reached $50.3 billion
at September 30, 2022.
• The Costs of War Project at Brown University’s
Watson Institute estimated Afghanistan war costs
at $2.26 trillion—far higher than DOD’s estimate—using a broader definition of costs.

OCTOBER 30, 2022 | SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION | RECONSTRUCTION UPDATESTATUS OF FUNDSSTATUS OF FUNDS CONTENTS
U.S. Reconstruction Funding for Afghanistan

GOVERNANCE CONTENTS

46

U.S. Cost of War and Reconstructionin Afghanistan
KEY ISSUES & EVENTS (H4 TOC)
Afghanistan Reconstruction Funding Pipeline

48
3
50

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

52

Military Base and Equipment Transfers
to ANDSF

55

Economic Support Fund

56

International Disaster Assistance

57

International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement

58

Migration and Refugee Assistance

59

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining,
and Related Programs

60

International Reconstruction Funding
for Afghanistan

61

Status of Funds Endnotes

69

44

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTATUS OF FUNDS- - - - - - -STATUS OF FUNDS
In accord with SIGAR’s legislative mandate, this section details, based on themost recent data available, the status of U.S. funds appropriated, obligated,and disbursed for Afghanistan reconstruction. This quarter, USAID refused
to report its account balances to SIGAR. Therefore, SIGAR is making thequalified statement that the United States government had appropriated or otherwise made available approximately $146.55 billion in funds for reconstruction
and related activities in Afghanistan since FY 2002, based on USAID reportingon its accounts through June 30, 2022, and all other U.S. government agencies’
reporting on their accounts through September 30, 2022. USAID’s refusal toreport to SIGAR its account balances this quarter undermines SIGAR’s ability
to properly fulfill its legislative mandate as well as the usefulness of the information that SIGAR provides to the U.S. Congress and other readers.
Total Afghanistan reconstruction funding has been allocated as follows:• $88.85 billion for security (including $4.60 billion for counternarcotics
initiatives)• $36.26 billion for governance and development (including $4.22 billion
for additional counternarcotics initiatives)• $5.26 billion for humanitarian aid• $16.18 billion for agency operations
Figure F.1 shows the six largest active U.S. funds that contribute to these
efforts. U.S. government agencies have reported FY 2022 activity to SIGAR
in 18 accounts affecting current or prior year appropriations, obligations, or
disbursements for Afghanistan reconstruction.1 Appendix B to this reportprovides a comprehensive accounting of the annual appropriations madefor Afghanistan reconstruction from FY 2002 to FY 2022.

USAID Accounts Not Updated
This quarter, USAID refused to report to
SIGAR on the 10 accounts whose balances
it had routinely provided in past quarters,
including the Economic Support Fund (ESF)and the International Disaster Assistance(IDA) account, two of the largest active
reconstruction accounts. All USAID accounts
are presented in Status of Funds this quarterwith balances through June 30, 2022, while
all other accounts are presented throughSeptember 30, 2022.

ASFF: Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
ESF: Economic Support Fund
IDA: International Disaster Assistance
INCLE: International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement
MRA: Migration and Refugee Assistance
NADR: Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs

FIGURE F.1

U.S. APPROPRIATIONS SUPPORTING AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION, FY 2002 TO FY 2022 Q4 ($ BILLIONS)SIX LARGEST ACTIVE RECONSTRUCTION ACCOUNTS – $112.10 BILLION
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASFF$80.74

USAID & OTHER AGENCIES
ESF$21.43

IDA$1.86

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCLE
$5.15

MRA
$1.97

NADR
$0.94

OTHER RECONSTRUCTION ACCOUNTS – $18.27 BILLION$12.48

$3.97

$1.82

AGENCY OPERATIONS – $16.18 BILLION
N/A*

$2.49

$13.70TOTAL AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION – $146.55 BILLION$93.22$29.74$23.59*The Department of Defense and its Office of Inspector General have not provided Agency Operations costs as described in the section “DOD Says It Is Unable to Report Reconstruction Costs”
in Status of Funds.
Note: Numbers have been rounded. USAID has not provided updates for its accounts for FY22Q4.
Source: Details of accounts, including sources of data, are provided in Appendix B to this report.

STATUS OF FUNDS

U.S. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING FOR AFGHANISTAN

ESF

ASFF

INCLE

IDA

USAID & OTHER

DOD

MRA

NADR

STATE

The amount provided to the six largest active U.S. funds represents more than 76.5%(more than $112.10 billion) of total reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan since
ASFF
FY 2002.
Of this amount, more than 93.2%(more than $104.47 billion) has been
obligated, and more than 91.4% (nearly
DOD$102.51
billion) has been disbursed. An
estimated $7.26 billion of the amount appropriated for these funds has expired andwill therefore not be disbursed.
ASFF

DOD

As of September 30, 2022, cumulative appropriations for reconstruction
and related activities in Afghanistan totaled approximately $146.55 billion, as shown in Figure F.2. This total comprises four major categories ofreconstruction and related funding: security, governance and development,
humanitarian, and agency operations. Approximately $8.82 billion of thesefunds supported counternarcotics initiatives that crosscut the categories
of security ($4.60 billion) and governance and development ($4.22 billion).
Following the collapse of the former Afghan government on August 15,
2021, the U.S. government took several steps in September 2021 to reallocate
funds previously made available for Afghanistan reconstruction. These steps
included DOD reprogramming nearly $1.46 billion from the Afghanistan
Security Forces Fund (ASFF) for other DOD purposes, State de-allotting
nearly $93.03 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement(INCLE) funds, and USAID rescinding more than $73.07 million in Economic
Support Funds (ESF) funds in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2021 (FY21Q4).2
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, enacted on March 15, 2022,
mandated rescissions of ASFF FY 2021 appropriations of $700.00 million
and unspecified ESF and INCLE funds allocated to Afghanistan totaling $855.64 million and $105.00 million, respectively, in FY 2022.3 These
rescissions were completed by September 30, 2022, and State went further
by de-allotting nearly $166.38 million in additional INCLE funds during
FY 2022.4 It is not known if USAID took any similar actions in FY22Q4.
The Continuing Appropriations and Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations
Act, 2023, enacted September 30, 2022, mandated an additional rescission

FIGURE F.2

CUMULATIVE APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2022 ($ BILLIONS)USAID & OTHER
$150

120

$117.99$124.49$141.00$136.54$131.08$144.66$146.10$146.68

FY 2022

FY 2023

IDA

90
USAID & OTHER
60

30

0

INCLE

FY 2016

FY 2017 STATE
Security

FY 2018

FY 2019

Governance/Development

FY 2020
Humanitarian

FY 2021
Agency Operations

Total

Note: Numbers have been rounded.
Source: Details of accounts, including sources of data, are provided in Appendix B to this report.

DOD

46

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTATUS OF FUNDS

of $100.00 million in ASFF FY 2021 appropriations and at the same time
appropriated $100.00 million to ASFF for obligation in the FY 2022 to
FY 2025 period to facilitate ASFF contract close-out activities.5
A final noteworthy development this quarter consisted of State andCongress agreeing on the FY 2022 Section 653(a) allocation of ESF, INCLE,
Global Health Programs (GHP), and the Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) funds for Afghanistan.6 The allocations to the USAID-managed ESF and GHP accounts, amounting to morethan $122.88 million and $12.00 million, respectively, are not included in
FY 2022 appropriations of $1.07 billion as shown in Figure F.3, whereas the
allocations to the State-managed INCLE and NADR accounts, amounting
to $6.00 million and $15.00 million, respectively, are included in this amount.
SIGAR has not updated USAID account balances for FY 2022 because it
does not have a comprehensive understanding of USAID FY22Q4 accountactivity due to USAID’s intransigence, and has instead uniformly presented
June 30, 2022, balances for all USAID accounts.
The United States provided more than $17.31 billion in on-budget assistance to the government of Afghanistan from 2002 through the August 2021
fall of the Afghan government. This included nearly $11.36 billion provided to
Afghan government ministries and institutions, and nearly $5.96 billion provided to three multilateral trust funds: the World Bank-managed Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the United Nations Development
Programme-managed Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA),
and the Asian Development Bank-managed Afghanistan Infrastructure TrustFund (AITF), as shown on Table F.1 on the following page.

Rescission: Legislation enacted by Congressthat cancels the availability of budget authority
previously enacted before the authority would
otherwise expire.

Reprogramming: Shifting funds within an
appropriation or fund to use them for purposes
other than those contemplated at the time of
appropriation.

De-allotment: Returning allotted funds toa central budget authority who may then reallot or use those funds for other purposes(e.g., rescission or reprogramming).
Source: GAO, Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget
Process, 9/2005; State response to SIGAR data call,
7/26/2022.

FIGURE F.3

ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY ($ BILLIONS)
$8.0
7.20
6.76

6.64

6.0

5.78

5.75

4.56

4.0

3.77

2.0
1.07

0.0

FY 2015

FY 2016■ Security

FY 2017

FY 2018■ Governance/Development

FY 2019■ Humanitarian

FY 2020

FY 2021■ Agency Operations■ TotalNote: Numbers have been rounded. USAID has not provided updates for its accounts for FY22Q4.
Source: Details of accounts, including sources of data, are provided in Appendix B to this report.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

47

FY 2022

STATUS OF FUNDSTABLE F.1

U.S. COST OF WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
IN AFGHANISTAN

U.S. ON-BUDGET ASSISTANCE
TO AFGHANISTAN(2002–AUGUST 2021) ($ MILLIONS)
Disbursements
Total On-Budget Assistance
Government-to-Government$17,312.20
11,355.23

DOD

10,493.25

USAID

776.79State
Multilateral Trust Funds

85.19
5,956.96

ARTF

4,127.68

LOTFA

1,675.61

AITF

153.67

Note: Numbers have been rounded. LOTFA disbursements
reflect refunds in 2022.
Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/19/2022;
State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/18/2018; DOD,
response to SIGAR data call, 10/21/2021; World Bank, ARTF:
Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of July 22, 2022
(end of 7th period of FY 1401), accessed 10/9/2022 atwww.wb-artf.org; UNDP, LOTFA Receipts and Refunds 2002–
2022 (Combined Bilateral and MPTF Mechanisms), updated
6/30/2022, and email identifying refunds in FY22Q4, in
response to SIGAR data call, 10/12/2022 and 7/20/2022.

DOD’s latest Cost of War Report, dated September 30, 2021, said its cumulative obligations for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Freedom’s
Sentinel in Afghanistan, including U.S. warfighting and DOD reconstruction
programs, had reached $849.7 billion.7 DOD and SIGAR both provide oversight for security-related reconstruction funding accounting for $86.8 billionof this amount. State, USAID, and other civilian agencies report cumulative
obligations of $50.1 billion for Afghanistan reconstruction, which when
added to the DOD amount results in $136.9 billion obligated for Afghanistan
reconstruction through that date, as shown in Figure F.4 on the following
page.8 This cost of reconstruction equals 15% of the $899.7 billion obligatedby all U.S. government agencies in Afghanistan.

DOD Says It Is Unable to Report Reconstruction Costs

Because DOD has not provided information to SIGAR pursuant to requests
made under statutory requirement, SIGAR has been unable to report onsome Afghan reconstruction costs, principally those relating to the DOD’s
Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) mission under Operation Freedom’s
Sentinel that are not paid for by the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund(ASFF). ASFF pays only for contractors and not for DOD military and civilian employees who trained, advised, and supported the Afghan National
Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).
Therefore, SIGAR reporting does not include costs of (1) training andadvising programs such as the Train Advise Assist Commands (TAACs),
the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), the Ministry of Defense
Advisors (MODA) program, the Afghanistan Hands Program (AHP), andthe DOD Expeditionary Civilian (DOD-EC) program; (2) support provided to members of the NATO Resolute Support Mission; and (3) certain
advisory and support costs of the Combined Security Transition CommandAfghanistan (CSTC-A) and its successor, the Defense Security Cooperation
Management Office-Afghanistan (DSCMO-A).
Similarly, DOD says it is unable to report on the operating expenses of
CSTC-A and its successor DSCMO-A, and program offices that supported
ASFF procurement.
SIGAR is mandated by federal statute to report on amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
Statutory references to reconstruction include funding for efforts “to establish or reestablish a political or societal institution of Afghanistan,” such as
the ANDSF. The mandate also requires reporting on “operating expensesof agencies or entities receiving amounts appropriated or otherwise madeavailable for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.”9
SIGAR has made repeated requests to DOD since 2018 for an accounting or estimates of these costs, but none have been provided.10 DOD

48

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTATUS OF FUNDS

FIGURE F.4

AFGHANISTAN COST OF WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION, ANNUAL AND CUMULATIVE OBLIGATIONS FY 2002 TO FY 2021 Q4 ($ BILLIONS)

$100

96.6

97.5

CUMULATIVE OBLIGATIONSTHROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2021
80

■ COST OF WAR$849.7■ COST OF RECONSTRUCTION$136.9Department of Defense*
USAID
Department of State
Other Agencies

60

77.7

77.0

Department of Defense*

86.8
25.4
23.0
1.7

59.5

47.3

46.7

*DOD's Cost of Reconstruction amountis also included in its total Cost of War.

40

37.8

40.6
36.0

38.4

39.7
34.1

32.0

20

20.1

19.9
12.3

1.0

1.1

10.3
2.5

11.6
4.7

15.2

14.2
10.2

9.8
3.3

6.0

15.2

13.4
9.6

6.6

6.9

5.7

6.5

6.7

5.4

4.0

3.3

0
FY 02 FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 FY 09 FY 10 FY 11 FY 12 FY 13 FY 14 FY 15 FY 16 FY 17 FY 18 FY 19 FY 20 FY 21
Note: Numbers have been rounded. Cumulative obligations reported by DOD for the Cost of War through September 30, 2021, differ markedly from cumulative appropriations throughMarch 31, 2022, as presented elsewhere in the Status of Funds section, because the former figures do not include unobligated appropriations and DOD Cost of War reporting currently
lags by two quarters.
Source: DOD, Cost of War Monthly Report, Total War-related Obligations by Year Incurred, data as of September 30, 2021. Obligation data shown against year funds obligated. SIGAR
analysis of annual obligation of reconstruction accounts as presented in SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 10/30/2021. Obligation data shown against year
funds appropriated.

representatives replied that the Department’s financial reports do notprovide costs for individual commands previously located in Afghanistan.
These costs are distributed in multiple, disaggregated line items acrossthe services and component commands.11 In addition, DOD’s existing reports on Afghanistan costs, such as its Cost of War Report, do notinclude the base pay and certain benefits of military personnel deployed
to Afghanistan, since these costs are generally reported by units basedoutside of Afghanistan. This method of reporting costs is inconsistent
with SIGAR’s mandate to report on all costs associated with military organizations involved in Afghanistan reconstruction, regardless of whether
they are staffed with DOD military personnel, DOD civilian personnel,
or DOD-paid contractors.
DOD’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) received a data call requestfrom SIGAR in November 2021 seeking information on its costs in providing

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

49

STATUS OF FUNDS

oversight of Afghanistan reconstruction, referencing the statutory reporting mandates noted above, and including a listing of 55 DOD OIG audit
and evaluation reports examining various topics related to DOD supportof the ANDSF issued from 2009 to 2020. The DOD OIG replied to SIGAR
that it had “no operating expenses to support reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan,” nor had it conducted “activities under programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available forthe reconstruction of Afghanistan.”12

Costs of War Project Sees Higher Costs than DOD

A nongovernmental estimate of U.S. costs for the 20-year war in
Afghanistan stands at more than double DOD’s calculation.
The Costs of War Project sponsored by the Watson Institute at Brown
University issued a report, U.S. Costs to Date for the War in Afghanistan,
2001–2021, putting total costs at $2.26 trillion.13
The Watson Institute’s independently produced report builds on DOD’s$933 billion Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budgets and State’s$59 billion OCO budgets for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Unlike the DOD Costof War Report, the Watson report adds what it considers to be Afghanistanrelated costs of $433 billion above DOD baseline costs, $296 billion in
medical and disability costs for veterans, and $530 billion in interest costs
on related Treasury borrowing.
SIGAR takes no position on the reasonableness on the Watson report’s
assumptions or the accuracy of its calculations.

AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING PIPELINE

Since 2002, Congress has appropriated more than $146.55 billion forreconstruction and related activities in Afghanistan, of which more than
$112.10 billion was appropriated to the six largest active reconstruction
accounts. As of September 30, 2022, SIGAR calculates that approximately$2.09 billion of the amount appropriated to the six largest active reconstruction accounts remained available for possible disbursement, as shown in
Table F.2 and Figure F.5 on the following page, although this calculation isbased, in large part and by necessity, on out-of-date information. This quarter, USAID refused to report to SIGAR on the 10 accounts whose balances
it had routinely provided in past quarters, including the Economic Support
Fund (ESF) and the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account, twoof the six largest active reconstruction accounts. SIGAR has consequently
based its Funds Remaining for Possible Disbursement calculation on ESF
and IDA account balances as of June 30, 2022. Without updated USAID data,
SIGAR has no basis for estimating whether ESF and IDA funds remaining for possible disbursement rose or fell between June 30, 2022, andSeptember 30, 2022.

50

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTATUS OF FUNDSTABLE F.2

FIGURE F.5

CUMULATIVE AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED, OBLIGATED, DISBURSED,AND REMAINING FOR POSSIBLE DISBURSEMENTFY 2002 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2022 ($ BILLIONS)STATUS OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS,
SIX LARGEST ACTIVE ACCOUNTS,
AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2022 ($ BILLIONS)AppropriatedObligated

Disbursed

Remaining

Total Appropriated: $112.10 Billion

DOD and State Accounts Through September 30, 2022
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)$80.74$75.51$74.93$0.68

International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE)

5.15

4.85

4.79

0.02

Remaining$2.09

Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)

1.97

1.96

1.86

0.09

Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining,
and Related Programs (NADR)

0.94

0.94

0.94

0.00

Expired
$7.26

21.43

19.48

18.63

1.11

USAID Accounts Through June 30, 2022
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
Additional Actions Required to
Meet ESF Rescission Mandate(0.24)

International Disaster Assistance (IDA)

1.86

1.73

1.36

0.43

Six Largest Active Accounts, Total

112.10104.47102.51

2.09

Other Reconstruction Funds
Agency Operations
Total

18.27
16.18
$146.55

Note: Numbers have been rounded. USAID has not provided updates to the ESF and IDA accounts for the quarter ending
September 30, 2022, so ESF and IDA account balances are shown as presented at June 30, 2022. Funds remaining available
for possible disbursement from ASFF consist of $582.96 million in undisbursed obligations on ASFF contracts on or around
August 31, 2022 (the most recent date this data is available), as presented in Table S.1 Summary Status of ASFF ObligatedContracts on page 84, and $100.00 million appropriated to ASFF for obligation during the FY 2022 through FY 2025 period
under Pub. L. No. 117-180 enacted September 30, 2022. Since the $582.96 million in undisbursed obligations on ASFF
contracts noted above exceeds the $170.31 million in ASFF undisbursed obligations reported by DFAS on page 52, the$412.65 million excess is subtracted from DFAS-reported ASFF disbursements of $75.34 billion in the analysis above. Funds
that remained available for possible disbursement from ESF at June 30, 2022, consisted of FY 2020 and FY 2021 funds
totalling $309.67 million that had been allocated but not disbursed; and FY 2012 to FY 2019 funds totalling $799.62 million
that had been obligated but not disbursed. USAID de-obligated $617.27 million in ESF balances as a first step in implementing
the $855.64 million ESF rescission mandated under Pub. L. No. 117-103 in FY22Q3, and it planned to reduce these balancesby an additional $238.38 million in FY22Q4 to satisfy the rescission requirement. The ESF balance presented above does notreflect the FY 2022 Section 653(a) allocation of $122.88 million in ESF funds to Afghanistan in FY22Q4.
Funds remaining available for possible disbursement consist of (1) annual appropriations/allocations minus associatedliquidated obligations during the period of availability for obligation (e.g., two years for ASFF, ESF, and INCLE, extendable to six
years for ESF), and (2) annual obligations minus associated disbursements for the five years after the period of availability for
obligation has expired. Expired funds consist of (1) annual appropriations/allocations that are not obligated during the periodof availability for obligation, and (2) obligated funds that are not liquidated during the period of availability for disbursement.
The agencies do not report the full set of annual allocation, obligation, and disbursement data for some accounts, and inthese cases, SIGAR does not assume that any funds remain available for possible disbursement. The amount remaining forpotential disbursement for Other Reconstruction Funds, excluding those accounts with incomplete data, is currently less than
$50.00 million at the average quarter-end.
Source: SIGAR analysis of appropriation laws and obligation and disbursement data provided by DOD, State, USAID, USAGM,
and DFC, 10/22/2022.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

51

Rescinded$0.24

Disbursed$102.51

ASFF

ESF

IDA

INCLE

MRA

NADR

STATUS OF FUNDS
DOD

USAID & OTHER

STATE•• •••ASFF

DOD

ASFF FUNDS TERMINOLOGYAppropriations: Total monies available
for commitments
ASFF

Obligations: Commitments to pay monies
Disbursements: Monies that havebeen expended
DOD

USAID & OTHER

AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND

Congress created the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to provide
the ANDSF with equipment, supplies, services, training, and funding forsalaries, as well as for facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, andconstruction. The primary organization responsible for building the ANDSF
was the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A),
which was succeeded by CENTCOM command and the Qatar-based
Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan (DSCMO-A).
Following the collapse of the Afghan government on August 15, 2021,
Congress and DOD have taken a series of steps to rescind and reallocate
ASFF funds no longer required to support the ANDSF. DOD reprogrammed
nearly $1.46 billion from its ASFF FY 2020 and FY 2021 accounts in
FY21Q4, and rescinded $700.00 million from its ASFF FY 2021 account in
FY22Q3 as mandated under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022.14
The Continuing Appropriations and Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations
Act, 2023, enacted September 30, 2022, mandated an additional rescission of ASFF FY 2021 appropriations of $100.00 million and at the sametime appropriated $100.00 million to ASFF for obligation in the FY 2022 to
FY 2025 period to facilitate ASFF contract close-out activities.15 This final
action reduced the ASFF FY 2021 appropriation from nearly $1.04 billion
to nearly $0.94 billion, introduced a new ASFF FY 2022/25 appropriation
FIGURE F.6

FIGURE F.7

ASFF APPROPRIATED FUNDS BY FISCAL YEAR ASFF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON

IDA

Notes on ASFF Reporting
The findings of an ongoing DOD OIG audit
of DOD’s financial management of ASFF may
USAID & OTHER
impact previously reported ASFF obligations
and disbursements. These findings and
DOD comments thereon are expected to
be available in December 2022.

($ BILLIONS)($ BILLIONS)

12

$100

Appropriated$80.74

Appropriated$80.74
Obligated$75.51
Disbursed$75.34As of Jun 30, 2022

As of Sep 30, 2022

80

9

INCLE

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call,
10/24/2022

60...............LJ ...

6

STATE

40
3

0

20

04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 220

DOD
Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data reflects reprogramming actions and rescissions. DOD reprogrammed $290 million fromFY 2005 ASFF, $1 billion from FY 2011 ASFF, $1 billion from FY 2012 ASFF, $178 million from FY 2013 ASFF, $604 million fromFY 2019 ASFF, $146 million from ASFF FY 2020, and $1.31 billion from ASFF FY 2021 to fund other DOD requirements, and DOD
reprogrammed $230 million into FY 2015 ASFF from another source of funds. ASFF data reflect the following rescissions: $1 billion
from FY 2012 in Pub. L. No. 113-6, $764.38 million from FY 2014 in Pub. L. No. 113-235, $400 million from FY 2015 in Pub. L.
No. 114-113, $150 million from FY 2016 in Pub. L. No. 115-31, $100 million from FY 2017 in Pub. L. No. 115-141, $396 million
from FY 2019 in Pub. L. No. 116-93, $1.10 billion from FY 2020 in Pub. L. No. 116-260, $700 million from FY 2021 in Pub. L. No.
117-103, and $100 million from FY 2021 in Pub. L. No. 117-180.

ESF

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/20/2022; DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts (Cumulative) September 2022 Certified,” accessed at dfas.mil/dodbudgetaccountreports/ on 10/20/2022. The AR(M)1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts (Cumulative) June 2022 Certified report was not properly finalized.

USAID & OTHER

52
MRA

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTATUS OF FUNDS

of $0.10 billion, and left cumulative ASFF appropriations unchanged
at more than $80.74 billion, as shown in Figure F.6 and Figure F.7.16

ASFF Budget Categories

DOD budgeted and reported on ASFF by three budget activity groups (BAGs)
through the FY 2018 appropriation. These BAGs consisted of Defense Forces(Afghan National Army, ANA), Interior Forces (Afghan National Police, ANP),
and Related Activities (primarily Detainee Operations).
DOD revised its budgeting and reporting framework for ASFF FY 2019.
The new framework restructured the ANA and ANP BAGs to better reflect
the ANDSF force structure and new budget priorities. In FY 2018 and previous years, all costs associated with the Afghan Air Force (AAF) fell underthe ANA BAG and costs for the Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF)
were split between the ANA and ANP BAGs. Beginning with the ASFF
FY 2019 appropriation, the ANDSF consisted of the ANA, ANP, AAF, andASSF BAGs. As shown in Figure F.8, ASFF disbursements for the new AAF
and ASSF BAGs, amounting to $1.67 billion and $1.04 billion, respectively,
over the FY 2019 to FY 2022 period, together accounted for $2.71 billion or
45% of total disbursements of $6.00 billion over this period.
Funds for each BAG were further allocated to four subactivity groups(SAGs): Sustainment, Infrastructure, Equipment and Transportation, andTraining and Operations. As shown in Figure F.9, ASFF disbursements of$38.03 billion for ANDSF Sustainment constituted 51% of total cumulative
ASFF expenditures of $74.85 billion through September 30, 2022.

ASFF Budgeting Requirements

The annual DOD appropriation act set forth a number of ASFF budgeting
requirements. Prior to the obligation of newly appropriated funds for ASFF,
FIGURE F.8

FIGURE F.9

ASFF DISBURSEMENTS BY BUDGET ACTIVITYGROUP, OLD (FY 2005–2018) AND NEW(FY 2019–2021), THROUGH FY 22Q4 ($ BILLIONS)ASFF DISBURSEMENTS BY SUBACTIVITYGROUP, FY 2005–2021, THROUGH FY 22Q4($ BILLIONS)

Total: $74.85 Billion
Infrastructure$9.13

Equipment andTransportation$18.66

Old ANP$21.54
Old ANA$47.31

New ANA
New ANP
New AAF
New ASSF

$2.44
$0.85
$1.67
$1.04

Training andOperations$9.03

Sustainment$38.03

Note: Numbers have been rounded. ASFF Disbursements by Budget Activity Group and Subactivity Group both exclude
disbursements for Related Activities and undistributed disbursements, amounting to $0.50 billion, that are included in total
ASFF disbursements of $75.34 billion as presented in Figure F.7.
Source: DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts (Cumulative) September 2022 Certified,”
accessed at dfas.mil/dodbudgetaccountreports/ on 10/20/2022.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

53

Budget Activity Groups: Categories withineach appropriation or fund account that identify
the purposes, projects, or types of activities
financed by the appropriation or fund.

Subactivity Groups: Accounting groups thatbreak down the command’s disbursements intofunctional areas.
Source: DOD, Manual 7110.1-M Department of Defense
Budget Guidance Manual, accessed 9/28/2009; Departmentof the Navy, Medical Facility Manager Handbook, p. 5,
accessed 10/2/2009.

STATUS OF FUNDSTABLE F.3

ASFF FY 2020 AND ASFF FY 2021 BUDGET EXECUTION THROUGHSEPTEMBER 30, 2022 ($ MILLIONS)ASFF FY 2020

ASFF FY 2021

Budget Activity Groups

Approved
Program Obligations

Disbursements

Approved
Program Obligations

Disbursements

Afghan National Army

$1,130.99$873.60$849.95$276.37$186.85

Afghan National Police

419.25

303.56278.99101.25

61.28

54.09

Afghan Air Force

988.83669.98660.46239.92146.06125.99Afghan Spec. Sec. Forces

414.73240.74228.68320.75229.87215.89(0.70)(1.39)$938.28$639.46$589.47

Undistributed
Total$2,953.79$2,087.18 $2,016.69$202.26

6.65

Note: Numbers have been rounded. The ASFF FY 2020 budget reflects the $4.20 billion appropriation less the $1.10 billion
rescission mandated in Pub. L. No. 116-260 and implemented in FY21Q1, and reprogramming actions authorized in FY21Q4
that reduced available balances by $146.19 million. The ASFF FY 2021 budget reflects the $3.05 billion appropriation lessreprogramming actions authorized in FY21Q4 that reduced available balances by $1.31 billion, the $700.00 million rescission
mandated in Pub. L. No. 117-103 and implemented in FY22Q3, and the $100.00 million rescission mandated under Pub. L.
No. 117-180 and implemented in FY22Q4.
Source: DFAS, “AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts (Cumulative) September 2022 Certified,”
accessed at dfas.mil/dodbudgetaccountreports/ on 10/20/2022.

Financial and Activity Plan: DOD notification
to Congress of its plan for obligating the ASFF
appropriation, as well as updates to that plan
involving any proposed new projects or transfer
of funds between budget subactivity groups inexcess of $20 million, as required by the annual
DOD appropriation act.
Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/23/2020.

a Financial and Activity Plan (FAP) with details of proposed obligations
required approval from the DOD Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council(AROC), concurrence by the Department of State, and notification to theCongressional defense committees. Thereafter, the AROC had to approve
the requirement and acquisition plan for any service requirements in excess
of $50 million annually and for any nonstandard equipment requirement inexcess of $100 million. In addition, DOD was required to notify Congressprior to obligating funds for any new projects or transfer of funds in excess
of $20 million between budget subactivity groups.17
DOD notified Congress of its initial budget for the ASFF FY 2021
appropriation with FAP 21-1 in January 2021 and notified Congress of its
proposed plans to modify the budget for the ASFF FY 2020 appropriation
with FAP 20-3 in March 2021. These budgets were further modified with thereprogramming actions taken in FY21Q4 and the rescissions executed in
FY21Q3 and FY21Q4. DOD’s execution of its spending plans for the ASFF
FY 2020 and ASFF FY 2021 appropriations is presented above in Table F.3.

NATO ANA Trust Fund Contributions to ASFF

The NATO-managed Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund (NATF) contributed nearly $1.70 billion to ASFF for specific projects funded by donor
nations through September 30, 2022; ASFF returned more than $529.08 million following the cancellation or completion of these projects. DOD
disbursed nearly $1.04 billion of NATF-contributed funds through ASFF
through September 30, 2022.18 These amounts are not reflected in the U.S.
government-funded ASFF obligation and disbursement numbers presented
in Figures F.6 and F.7.

54

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTATUS OF FUNDSMILITARY BASE AND EQUIPMENT TRANSFERS TO ANDSF

The Department of Defense manages the transfer of military bases andequipment principally through procedures designed for three types ofassets, Foreign Excess Real Property (FERP), Foreign Excess Personal
Property (FEPP), and Excess Defense Articles (EDA).
U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) defined FERP as any U.S.-owned
real property located outside the United States and its territories that isunder the control of a federal agency, but which the head of the agency
deemed it unnecessary to meet the agency’s needs or responsibilities.
Before disposing of FERP in Afghanistan, the donor agency must declare
the property excess and ensure that another department or agency of the
U.S. government does not require it to fulfill U.S. government objectives.
The DOD Base Closure and Transfer Policy Standard Operating Procedures
guide sets forth the conditions of transfer.19 The FEPP and EDA programs
have similar transfer frameworks.
USFOR-A reported FERP and FEPP transfers at depreciated transfer
values of nearly $1.77 billion and $462.26 million, respectively, over the
FY 2012 to FY 2021 period. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency(DSCA) separately reported EDA transfers at a depreciated transfer valueof $108.49 million over the FY 2010 to FY 2021 period. The peak transfer
years of FY 2015 and FY 2021 had transfers valued at $584.02 million andnearly $1.30 billion, as shown in Figure F.10. Cumulative FERP, FEPP, and
EDA transfers are valued at nearly $2.34 billion, as shown in Figure F.11.20
FIGURE F.10

FIGURE F.11

FERP, FEPP, & EDA BY FISCAL YEAR

FERP, FEPP, & EDA, CUMULATIVE$1,400$2.5(TRANSFERS, DEPRECIATED VALUES, $ MILLIONS)(TRANSFERS, DEPRECIATED VALUES, $ BILLIONS)

1,200

Transferredto the ANDSF
$2.34

2.0
1,000
1.5

800
600

1.0

400
0.5
200
0

04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22

0

As of Aug 15, 2021

Note: Numbers have been rounded. The value of property transfered to the ANDSF in FY 2019 includes $1.85 million
transfered through the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) program.
Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/20/2022, 2/18/2022, and 9/14/2021; SIGAR, Department of Defense Base
Closures and Transfers in Afghanistan: The U.S. Has Disposed of $907 Million in Foreign Excess Real Property, SIGAR
16-23-SP, 3/2016.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

55

Authorities for Transferring DOD Property
FERP: Foreign Excess Real Property
FEPP: Foreign Excess Personal Property
EDA: Excess Defense Articles

Largest Base Transfers to the ANDSF
Based on Depreciated Transfer Value
Bagram Airfield, Parwan Province$565.84 million, July 2021
Kandahar Airfield, Kandahar Province$130.19 million, May 2021
Shindand Airfield, Herat Province$297.73 million, November 2014
Camp Leatherneck, Helmand Province$236.00 million, October 2014
Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/20/2022,
7/9/2021, and 6/22/2021; SIGAR, Department of
Defense Base Closures and Transfers in Afghanistan:
The U.S. Has Disposed of $907 Million in Foreign
Excess Real Property, SIGAR 16-23-SP, 3/2016.

STATESTATUS OF FUNDS
DODI

USAID & OTHERI

ESF FUNDS TERMINOLOGYAppropriations: Total monies available
MRA
for commitments
Obligations: Commitments to pay monies
Disbursements: Monies that have STATE
been expended

NADR

STATE

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND

Economic Support Fund (ESF) programs are intended to advance U.S. interests by helping countries meet short- and long-term political, economic, andsecurity needs. ESF programs support counterterrorism; bolster national
economies; and assist in the development of effective, accessible, and independent legal systems for a more transparent and accountable government.21
The ESF was allocated $136.45 million for Afghanistan for FY 2021
through the Section 653(a) consultation process concluded between Stateand the U.S. Congress in FY21Q3. An additional FY 2021 ESF allocationof $98.50 million was received in FY21Q4 and FY22Q2.22 Also in FY21Q4,$73.07 million of the $200.00 million FY 2020 ESF allocation was rescinded
as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021-mandated ESF rescission.23 USAID de-obligated nearly $617.27 million in ESF FY 2017, FY 2018,
and FY 2019 funds in FY22Q3. Some portion or all of these de-obligations
was expected to be applied to the more than $855.64 million rescission of
ESF funds mandated in Pub. L. No. 117-103 in FY22Q4.24
USAID refused to provide ESF account information to SIGAR for FY22Q4.
The FY 2022 Section 653(a) process concluded in FY22Q4 with an allocation of more than $122.88 million in ESF funds to Afghanistan, but neither
this new funding nor any other activity for FY22Q4 is reflected in Figure F.12
or Figure F.13.25
FIGURE F.12

FIGURE F.13

ESF APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEARESF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON

$4

$24

($ BILLIONS)

3

2

1

0

($ BILLIONS)FINAL FY 2022 ALLOCATIONS NOT PROVIDED BY USAID•· ...
ESF

02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22

Appropriated$21.43Obligated$19.48Disbursed$18.6318

12

6DATA NOTPROVIDED0

As of Jun 30, 2022 As of Sep 30, 2022

Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data reflects transfers from AIF to the ESF of $101.00 million for FY 2011, $179.50 million
for FY 2013, and $55.00 million for FY 2014; and transfers from ESF to the Green Climate Fund of $179.00 million for FY 2016.
Data also reflect the rescission of unobligated FY 2020 ESF balances of $73.07 million as part of rescission mandated by Section
7071(a) in Pub. L. No. 116-260, and the de-obligation of FY 2017, FY 2018, and FY 2019 ESF balances of $617.27 million as astep toward the $855.64 million rescission mandated in Pub. L. No. 117-103 enacted March 15, 2022.
Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/20/2022, 7/9/2022 and 4/19/2022; State, response to SIGAR data call,
7/21/2022, 4/8/2022, 10/19/2021, 7/2/2021, 7/13/2020, 1/3/2020, 10/5/2018, 10/11/2017, 5/4/2016,10/20/2015, 4/15/2015, and 4/15/2014.

56

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTATUS OF FUNDS
USAID & OTHER·• ...

INTERNATIONAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE

USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), created through the
combination of its Offices of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance and Food forPeace in June 2020, administers International Disaster Assistance (IDA)
funds. BHA is responsible for leading and coordinating the U.S. government
response to disasters overseas and obligates funding for emergency foodassistance projects when there is an identified need and local authorities
lack the capacity to respond. BHA works closely with international partners
such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN’s World
Food Programme (WFP), and the UN’s World Health Organization (WHO)to deliver goods and services to assist conflict- and disaster-affected populations in Afghanistan.26
USAID refused to provide IDA account information to SIGAR for
FY22Q4. Last quarter, USAID reported to SIGAR that nearly $1.86 billion
in IDA funds had been allocated to Afghanistan from 2002 through June30, 2022, with obligations of more than $1.73 billion and disbursements
of more than $1.36 billion reported as of that date as shown in Figure F.15.
USAID allocated $219.60 million in IDA funds in FY 2021, as shown in
Figure F.14, and has allocated $451.18 million in FY 2022 through June 30,
2022, setting new annual records for IDA assistance.27 A portion of thesefunds were allocated from the IDA appropriation found in the Extending
Government Funding and Delivering Emergency Assistance Act, Division
C—Afghanistan Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022.28

I

USAID & OTHERII

IDA FUNDS TERMINOLOGYAppropriations: Total monies available
INCLE
for commitments
Obligations: Commitments to pay monies
Disbursements: Monies that have STATE
been expended

DOD

ESF

USAID & OTHER

FIGURE F.14

FIGURE F.15

IDA APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEARIDA FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON

$250

$2.0

($ MILLIONS)IDA($ BILLIONS)FINAL FY 2022 ALLOCATIONS NOT PROVIDED BY USAID

MRA

200

150

100

50

0

02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22

Appropriated
$1.86

1.5

STATE

Obligated$1.73
Disbursed
$1.36

NADR

1.0

STATE

0.5
DATA NOTPROVIDED

0.0

As of Jun 30, 2022 As of Sep 30, 2022

Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include interagency transfers.
Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2022 and 4/19/2022.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

57

USAID & OTHER

STATUS OF FUNDS

IDA

USAID & OTHER.. • ··
INCLE

I

STATE

INCLE FUNDS TERMINOLOGYAppropriations: Total monies available
for commitments
Obligations: Commitments to pay monies
DOD

Disbursements: Monies that havebeen expended
ESF

USAID & OTHER

MRA

STATE

NADR

STATE

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND LAW
ENFORCEMENTThe Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL) manages the International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, which funds projects and programs for advancing the rule of law and combating narcotics production
and trafficking. INCLE supports several INL program groups, including
police, counternarcotics, and rule of law and justice.29
The INCLE account was allocated $82.20 million for Afghanistan for
FY 2021 through the Section 653(a) process that was concluded between Stateand the U.S. Congress in FY21Q3. Following the collapse of the former Afghan
government in August 2021, State de-allotted nearly $93.03 million in INCLE
FY 2016 and FY 2020 balances in FY21Q4, de-allotted nearly $84.95 million
in INCLE FY 2017, FY 2018, and FY 2021 balances in FY22Q2, and de-allottedmore than $186.43 million in INCLE FY 2017, FY 2018, FY 2019, and FY 2021
balances in FY22Q3. A portion of these de-allotments were applied to the$105.00 million rescission of INCLE funds mandated in Pub. L. No. 117-103
that was executed in FY22Q4. The FY 2022 Section 653(a) process also concluded in FY22Q4, with $6.00 million in INCLE funds allocated to Afghanistan,
exactly equal to the FY 2022 allotment previously recorded.
Cumulative appropriations for INCLE remained unchanged at $5.15 billion between June 30, 2022, and September 30, 2022. FY 2022 appropriations
remained unchanged at $6.00 million between these dates, as reflected in
Figure F.16 and Figure F.17.30
FIGURE F.16

FIGURE F.17

INCLE APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR

INCLE FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON

$800

$6

($ MILLIONS)

700($ BILLIONS)

5

600
4

500

F7l

Appropriated$5.15

Obligated$4.88
Disbursed$4.78·-· . . . . .j[

Appropriated$5.15
Obligated$4.85
Disbursed$4.79

r=====Til. . . . . . . .I[

..

3

400
300

2 ........... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. . ...... ... .. .... .. .... .. .. .. .

200
1

100
0

02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22

0

As of Jun 30, 2022

As of Sep 30, 2022

Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data reflect de-allotments of $93.03 million of prior-year funding in FY 2021 and$271.38 million of prior-year funding in FY 2022; the rescission of $105.00 million of these funds in FY22Q4; and theSection 653(a) allocation of $6.00 million in INCLE funds to Afghanistan in FY22Q4. Data may reflect interagency transfers.
Source: State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/12/2022, 10/11/2022, and 7/13/2022

58

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONDODSTATUS OF FUNDS
ESF

USAID & OTHERMIGRATION AND REFUGEE ASSISTANCEThe Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration(PRM) administers the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) accountthat funds programs to protect and assist refugees, conflict victims,
internally displaced persons, stateless persons, and vulnerable migrants.
Through MRA, PRM supports the work of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), other international organizations, and various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Afghanistan to assist Afghan refugees
throughout the region and upon their return to Afghanistan.31
The MRA allocation for Afghan refugees, internally displaced persons,and returnees has been at historically high levels for the past three fiscal years, at $150.41 million in FY 2020, $143.71 million in FY 2021, and$218.22 million for FY 2022, as shown in Figure F.18. The FY 2021 allocation
includes $25.69 million in funds obligated from the American Rescue Plan
Act, 2021, appropriated to supplement MRA funds. PRM reported that it has
also obligated MRA funds made available through the Emergency Security
Supplemental Appropriation Act, 2021, for use in Afghanistan and neighboring countries, but that it did not obligate funds from the Emergency
Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund (ERMA) made available throughthe Act for these purposes.32 Cumulative appropriations since FY 2002 havetotaled more than $1.97 billion through September 30, 2022, with cumulative obligations and disbursements reaching nearly $1.96 billion and morethan $1.86 billion, respectively, on that date, as shown in Figure F.19.33
FIGURE F.18

FIGURE F.19

MRA APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEARMRA FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON

$240

$2.0

($ MILLIONS)($ BILLIONS)Appropriated$1.88
Obligated$1.87
Disbursed
$1.81

200
1.5
160

Appropriated$1.97
Obligated$1.96
Disbursed
$1.86

1.0

120
80

0.5
40
0

02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22

0.0

As of Jun 30, 2022

As of Sep 30, 2022

Note: Numbers have been rounded. Data may include interagency transfers. MRA balances include funds provided fromthe Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund (ERMA) of $25.00 million in FY 2002 and $0.20 million in FY 2009
(obligated and disbursed), and funds from the American Rescue Plan Act, 2021, appropriated to supplement MRA funds,of $25.69 million obligated and $22.51 million disbursed through September 30, 2022. All other MRA balances shown havebeen allocated from the annual Migration and Refugee Assistance appropriation.
Source: State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2022 and 7/15/2022.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 202259.. ·•·
I
MRA

STATE

MRA FUNDS TERMINOLOGYAppropriations: Total monies available
NADR
for commitments
Obligations: Commitments to pay monies
Disbursements: Monies that have STATE
been expended

USAID & OTHER

STATUS OF FUNDS
MRA

STATE

.. ··•
NADR

I

STATE

NADR FUNDS TERMINOLOGYAppropriations: Total monies available
for commitments
Obligations: Commitments to pay monies
Disbursements: Monies that havebeen expended

NONPROLIFERATION, ANTITERRORISM, DEMINING,
AND RELATED PROGRAMSThe Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs(NADR) account played a critical role in improving the Afghan government’s capacity to address terrorist threats, protect its borders, and remove
dangerous explosive remnants of war.34 The majority of NADR funding
for Afghanistan was funneled through two subaccounts—Antiterrorist
Assistance (ATA) and Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD)—withadditional funds going to Export Control and Related Border Security(EXBS) and Counterterrorism Financing (CTF). The Office of Foreign
Assistance Resources made allocated funding available to relevant bureaus
and offices that obligate and disburse these funds.35
The NADR account was allocated $45.80 million for Afghanistan for
FY 2021 through the Section 653(a) consultation process concluded between
State and the U.S. Congress in the quarter ending June 30, 2021. The FY 2022
Section 653(a) process concluded in the quarter ending September 30, 2022,
and the NADR account was allocated $15.00 million for Afghanistan for the
FY 2022, as shown in Figure F.20. Cumulative appropriations of NADR funds
have increased from more than 927.14 million at June 30, 2022, to more than
$942.14 million at September 30, 2022, as shown in Figure F.21.36
FIGURE F.20

FIGURE F.21

NADR APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR

NADR FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON$100$1,000($ MILLIONS)($ MILLIONS)

80

800

60

600

40

400

20

200

0

02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20 22

0

AppropriatedandTransferreda$927.14

AppropriatedandTransferreda$942.14

As of Jun 30, 2022

As of Sep 30, 2022

Note: Numbers have been rounded.

a State and Congress agree on the country-by-country allocation of annual appropriations for the foreign assistance accounts,

including NADR, through the Section 653(a) process. The Office of Foreign Assistance Resources makes allocated funding
available to relevant bureaus at State that obligate and disburse these funds.
Source: State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/12/2022 and 7/2/2021.

60

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTATUS OF FUNDSINTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING
FOR AFGHANISTAN

The international community has provided significant funding to support
Afghanistan relief and reconstruction efforts through multilateral institutions. These institutions include multilateral trust funds; United Nations
and nongovernmental humanitarian assistance organizations; two multilateral development finance institutions, the World Bank Group and the AsianDevelopment Bank (ADB); two special-purpose United Nations organizations, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the UN
Development Programme (UNDP); and the NATO Resolute Support Mission.
The four main multilateral trust funds have been the World Bank-managed
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the UNDP-managed
Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), the NATO-managed
Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund (NATF), and the ADB-managed
Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF).
These four multilateral trust funds, as well as the humanitarian-assistance organizations reported by the UN’s Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), the NATO Resolute Support Mission,and UNAMA all report donor or member contributions for their Afghanistan
programs, as shown in Figure F.22.
FIGURE F.22

CUMULATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS BY 10 LARGEST DONORS AND OTHERS TO MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN(UN OCHA-REPORTED PROGRAMS, ARTF, LOTFA, NATO ANATF, NATO RSM, UNAMA, AND AITF) SINCE 2002 ($ BILLIONS)
United States

3.85

United Kingdom

1.29

Germany

0.99

Japan

1.25

European Union

1.55

Canada0.51

Australia

4.13
2.17

0.50

Italy
0.61
0.41

All Others

4.21

$0

0.60

3.44

2.06

1.54

0.68
0.64

Norway0.42 3.90
0.72

0.35

■
■
■
■
■

3.99

1.04

1.68
1.17

0.47

Netherlands

0.65

0.38 0.71

10.74

4.38

0.40

1.11

0.89

1.68

1.42
1.35

UN OCHA - $14.89 Billion
as of Sep. 30, 2022

ARTF - $13.12 Billion
as of Jul. 22, 2022

LOTFA - $6.25 Billion
as of Sep. 30, 2022

NATO - $5.00 Billion
Various Dates

Other - $3.11 Billion
Various Dates

Total - $42.36 Billion

1.28
1.29

$2

$4

1.22

8.25

1.25

$8

$6

$10

Note: Amounts under $350 million are not labeled. Numbers may not add due to rounding. “NATO” consists of NATO ANA Trust Fund (NATF) contributions of $3.45 billion through January
11, 2022, and NATO member assessments for Resolute Support Mission costs of $1.55 billlion for 2015–2020 (2021 remains unaudited). “Other” consists of UN member assessmentsfor UNAMA costs of $2.52 billion for 2007–2021, and AITF contributions (excluding those by NATF) of $0.59 billion at 8/14/2021.
Source: World Bank, ARTF: Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of July 22, 2022 (end of 7th month of FY 1401), at www.wb-artf.org, accessed 10/9/2022; UN OCHA, Financial
Tracking Service at https://fts.unocha.org, accessed 9/30/2022; UNDP, LOTFA Receipts and Refunds 2002–2022, 6/30/2022, and LOTFA Refunds Q3 2022, in response to SIGAR data
calls, 7/20/2022 and 10/12/2022; NATO, Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund, Status of Contributions Made as of May 31, 2021, at www.nato.int, accessed 10/10/2021, andconfirmation that these gross receipt amounts remained unchanged, 1/11/2022; NATO, IBAN Audits of Allied Command Operations and Cost Share Arrangements for Military Budgets,
at www.nato.int, accessed 7/6/2022 and 4/28/2021; ADB, AITF Progress Report 1 April–31 December 2021, response to SIGAR data call, 4/11/2022; State, UNAMA approved budgets
and notified funding plans, in response to SIGAR data calls, 7/13/2022, 2/19/2021, and 7/13/2020; UN, Country Assessments, at www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/scale, accessed
10/9/2020.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

61

STATUS OF FUNDS

FIGURE F.23

UN OCHA-COORDINATED CONTRIBUTIONSBY DONOR, JAN. 1–DEC. 31, 2021 (PERCENT)
Total Paid In: $2.23 Billion

Denmark4%
UN CERP
4%
UnitedKingdom
7%

Others31%
United States
20%
EU
16%

Germany
18%

Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.
“Others” includes 35 national governments and 17 otherentities. UN CERP refers to the the UN’s Central Emergency
Response Fund. Total contributions revised downwards from
$2.25 billion reported in SIGAR Quarterly Report, 7/2022.
Source: UN OCHA, Financial Tracking Service at
https://fts.unocha.org, accessed 9/30/2022.

FIGURE F.24

UN OCHA-COORDINATED CONTRIBUTIONSBY DONOR, JAN. 1–SEP. 30, 2022 (PERCENT)
Total Paid In: $2.33 Billion

Canada4%

Others
23%

WBG
7%
EU
10%

ADB
16%

United States
22%
UK
18%

Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.
“Others” includes 26 national governments, 18 United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) national organizations, and14 other entities. ADB refers to the Asian Development Bankand WBG refers to the World Bank Group.
Source: UN OCHA, Financial Tracking Service at
https://fts.unocha.org, accessed 9/30/2022.

Cumulative contributions to these seven organizations since 2002 haveamounted to $42.36 billion, with the United States contributing $10.74 billion of this amount, through recent reporting dates. The World Bank Groupand the ADB are funded through general member assessments that cannot
be readily identified as allocated to Afghanistan. These two institutions havecollectively made financial commitments of $12.66 billion to Afghanistan
since 2002, as discussed in the sections on the World Bank Group and the
ADB that follow.

Contributions to UN OCHA-Coordinated Humanitarian
Assistance Programs

The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) leads
emergency appeals and annual or multiyear humanitarian-response plansfor Afghanistan, and provides timely reporting of humanitarian assistanceprovided by donors to facilitate funding of targeted needs. Donors have contributed nearly $14.89 billion to humanitarian-assistance organizations from2002 through September 30, 2022, as reported by OCHA. OCHA-led annual
humanitarian-response plans and emergency appeals for Afghanistan
accounted for nearly $10.83 billion, or 72.7% of these contributions.
The United States, the European Union, and the UK have been the largest contributors to humanitarian assistance organizations in Afghanistan
since 2002, as shown in Figure F.22. Contributions for calendar year 2021
of more than $2.23 billion, led by the United States, Germany, and theEuropean Union as the largest contributors, were the highest annual total
ever recorded, as shown in Figure F.23. Contributions for the nine months
ending September 30, 2022, of more than $2.33 billion, led by the U.S., UK,
and Asian Development Bank, have already surpassed that annual mark, asshown in Figure F.24. The UN World Food Programme (WFP), the UN HighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF),
the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) have been the largest recipients ofhumanitarian assistance in Afghanistan, as shown in Table F.4.37

Contributions to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust FundThe largest share of international contributions to the Afghan government’s
operational and development budgets has come through the ARTF. From2002 to July 22, 2022, the World Bank reported that 34 donors had paidin nearly $13.12 billion. Figure F.22 shows the three largest donors overthis period as the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European
Union. Figure F.25 shows that Germany, Canada, and the European Union
were the largest donors to the ARTF for the 12 months of Afghan FY 1400
(through December 21, 2021), when the ARTF received contributionsof $248.41 million.38 ARTF reported to SIGAR that USAID contributed$53.71 million to the ARTF in September 2022, representing the first and62

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTATUS OF FUNDSTABLE F.4

FIGURE F.25

LARGEST RECIPIENTS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR AFGHANISTANUN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (OCHA)CUMULATIVE RECEIPTS, 2002 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2022 ($ MILLIONS)
Largest Recipients

ARTF CONTRIBUTIONS BY DONOR,
AFGHAN FY 1400 (DEC. 21, 2020–
DEC. 21, 2021) (PERCENT)

Receipts

Total Paid In:$248.41 Million

United Nations Organizations
World Food Programme (WFP)$4,641.75

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

1,530.19

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

1,325.84

International Organization for Migration (IOM)

438.39

Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)

389.02

World Health Organization (WHO)354.71

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

350.58Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund (sponsored by UN OCHA)

289.68

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)

152.80Nongovernmental Organizations
International Committee of the Red Cross

870.76

Norwegian Refugee Council

222.58

Save the Children

144.46

HALO Trust

125.46

International Rescue Committee

113.05Danish Refugee Council

112.06

ACTED (formerly Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development)

111.84

Action Contre la Faim

102.03All Other and Unallocated3,614.73

Total Humanitarian Assistance Reported by OCHA

$14,889.92

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.
Source: UN OCHA, Financial Tracking Service at https://fts.unocha.org, accessed 9/30/2022.

only contribution to the Fund since August 2021. The contribution is proposed to be used toward basic service delivery, livelihood, and private
sector support projects.39
Contributions to the ARTF had been divided into two funding channels,
the Recurrent Cost Window (RCW) and the Investment Window. As ofJanuary 20, 2022, according to the World Bank, more than $6.05 billion of
ARTF funds had been disbursed to the former Afghan government throughthe RCW, including the Recurrent and Capital Cost Component and the
Incentive Program Development Policy Grant, to assist with recurrent costs
such as civil servants’ salaries.40
The Investment Window supported development programs. As ofJanuary 20, 2022, according to the World Bank, more than $6.18 billion had
been committed through the Investment Window, and nearly $5.31 billion
had been disbursed. The Bank reported 33 active projects with a combined

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

63

Germany
47%
Others
12%

-•

Japan
5%

Italy _J
6%

Canada14%
EU
7%

L Denmark9%

Note: Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.
“Others” includes eight national government donors.
Source: World Bank, ARTF: Administrator’s Report on
Financial Status as of July 22, 2022 (end of 7th periodof FY 1401) at www.wb-artf.org, accessed 10/9/2022.

STATUS OF FUNDS

FIGURE F.26

LOTFA CONTRIBUTIONS BY DONOR,
JAN. 1–DEC. 31, 2021 (PERCENT)
Total Paid In: $142.75 Million

UK
6%
U.S.
8%

Japan
52%

Norway8%

Canada18%

Denmark
9%
Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. Japanand the United States contributed through the LOTFA
Bilateral Mechanism and Canada, Denmark, Norway,
and the United Kingdom contributed through the LOTFAMPTF Mechanism. The numbers do not reflect refunds
made to donors in 2021 and 2022 totaling $134.41
million through September 30, 2022.
Source: UNDP, LOTFA Receipts 2002–2022 (Combined
Bilateral and MPTF), updated 3/31/2022, LOTFA
Refunds 2021-2022, updated 6/30/2022, and LOTFA
Refunds, Q3 2022, in response to SIGAR data calls,
4/13/2022, 7/20/2022, and 10/12/2022, respectively.

commitment value of more than $2.51 billion, of which more than $1.63 billion had been disbursed.41
The ARTF’s Investment Window projects were cancelled in April 2022
and undisbursed grants in the project portfolio of nearly $1.22 billion weremade available to UN agencies, and potentially to nongovernmental agencies (NGOs) in the future, to support operations focused on basic services
delivery. Four basic services projects, addressing health, food security, livelihoods, and education, and one cross-sector local NGO capacity assistanceproject, with a total value of $913.00 million have been approved. Grant
agreements for First Tranche commitments totaling $539.00 million for thefive projects have been signed, and disbursements of $260.40 million on
the health, food security, and livelihoods projects have been made throughSeptember 30, 2022.42

Contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fundfor Afghanistan

The UNDP historically administered the LOTFA to pay ANP salaries andbuild the capacity of the Ministry of Interior (MOI).43
Donors paid in more than $6.38 billion to the two LOTFA funds from2002 through September 30, 2021; this level of contributions has remained
unchanged through September 30, 2022. UNDP has made refunds to
LOTFA donors over the October 1, 2021, through September 30, 2022,
period aggregating more than $134.41 million. Donor contributions, net ofrefunds, to the two LOTFA funds stood at nearly $6.25 billion at September
30, 2022, as shown in Figure F.22. The largest donors to the two LOTFA
funds, cumulatively and net of refunds, were the United States and Japan.
Figure F.26 shows Japan and Canada were the largest donors to the two
LOTFA funds for the calendar year ending December 31, 2021, without
considering refunds, with the United States the fifth-largest donor witha $10.84 million contribution.44

Contributions to the NATO Resolute Support Mission

NATO members are assessed annual contributions for the NATO Civil
Budget, Military Budget, and Security Investment Program based on audited
program costs and agreed annual cost-sharing formulas. The NATO Military
Budget includes Allied Command Operations (ACO) whose largest cost
component was the NATO Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan.
NATO had assessed member contributions of nearly $1.55 billion for costsof the Resolute Support Mission from 2015, the first year of the mission,
through 2020, the most recent year for which ACO audited statements
detailing RSM costs have been made publicly available. The United States’
share of commonly funded budgets has ranged from 22.20% to 22.13%
over the 2015–2020 period, resulting in contributions of $342.65 million.
The United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom were the largest

64

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTATUS OF FUNDS- - - - - - -contributors to the costs of the NATO Resolute Support Mission; their contributions are reflected in Figure F.24.45 The Resolute Support Mission was
terminated in September 2021.46

Contributions to the NATO ANA Trust Fund

The NATO-managed Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund (NATF)
supported the Afghan National Army and other elements of the Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces through procurements by theAfghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and the NATO Support andProcurement Agency (NSPA).47 NATO’s most recent financial report discloses that the fund received contributions from 25 of the 30 current
NATO members, including the United States, and from 12 other Coalition
partners totaling nearly $3.45 billion through May 31, 2021. NATO confirms that contribution levels remain substantially unchanged throughDecember 31, 2021.48 Germany, Australia, and Italy were the three largest
contributors to the fund, as shown in Figure 2.24. The United States madeits first contribution in FY 2018 to support two projects under an existingprocurement contract.49
NATO reports the NATF is being closed, and unexpended donor contributions are being returned to donors.50

World Bank Group in Afghanistan

The World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) committed
over $5.42 billion for development, emergency reconstruction projects, andnine budget support operations in Afghanistan between 2002 and August
15, 2021. This support consisted of $4.98 billion in grants and $0.44 billion
in no-interest loans known as “credits.” In line with its policies, the WorldBank paused all disbursements in its Afghanistan portfolio following thecollapse of the Afghan government on August 15, 2021. As of January 17,
2022, the paused portfolio consists of 23 IDA projects (eight IDA-only projects and 15 projects with joint financing from IDA, ARTF, and other World
Bank-administered trust funds) of which two are guarantees, one budget
support operation, and 20 investment projects.51
In addition, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) invested morethan $300 million in Afghanistan between 2002 and August 15, 2021, mainlyin the telecom and financial sectors; its committed portfolio stood at$46 million. Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) has a modest exposure on a single project in Afghanistan.52
The United States is the World Bank Group’s largest shareholder, withownership stakes of 10–25% of shares in the IDA, IBRD, MIGA, and IFC.53

Asian Development Bank in Afghanistan

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has committed over $6.41 billion for
168 development projects and technical-assistance programs in Afghanistan

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

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STATUS OF FUNDS

from 2002 through June 2021. This support has consisted of $5.43 billion in
grants (of which the Asian Development Fund (ADF) provided $4.33 billion,
and the ADB provided $1.10 billion in co-financing), $0.87 billion in concessional loans, and $111.2 million in technical assistance. ADB has provided$2.67 billion for 20 key road projects, $2.12 billion to support energy infrastructure, $1.08 billion for irrigation and agricultural infrastructure projects,
and $190 million for the health sector and public sector management. The
United States and Japan are the largest shareholders of the ADB, with eachcountry holding 15.57% of total shares.54
In 2022, ADB approved $405 million in grants to support food security
and help sustain the delivery of essential health and education services to
the Afghan people. Under its Sustaining Essential Services Delivery Project(Support for Afghan People), ADB provides direct financing to four United
Nations agencies. The support is implemented without any engagement
with, or payments to, the Taliban regime and in line with ADB’s Fragile andConflict Affected Situations and Small Island Developing States Approach.55
The ADB manages the Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF),
a multidonor platform that provides on-budget financing for technicalassistance and investment, principally in the transport, energy, and water
management sectors. The AITF has received contributions of $637.0 million from the NATO ANA Trust Fund, Canada, Germany, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, and had disbursed $339.0 million throughJune 30, 2022.56

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is a UN
political mission that was established at the request of the previous government of Afghanistan. The UN Security Council voted on March 17, 2022, toextend UNAMA’s mandate through March 17, 2023.57 UNAMA maintains its
headquarters in Kabul with an extensive field presence across Afghanistan,and is organized around its development and political affairs pillars. The
State Department has notified the U.S. Congress of its annual plan to fund
UNAMA along with other UN political missions based on mission budgets
since FY 2008. The U.S. contribution to UNAMA, based on its fixed 22.0%
share of UN budgets and funded through the Contribution to International
Organizations (CIO) account, has totaled $553.57 million from FY 2008
through FY 2022. Other UN member governments have funded the remainder of UNAMA’s budget of $2.52 billion over this period.58

66

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTATUS OF FUNDS- - - - - - -Share of U.S. Civilian Assistance Provided
to Multilateral Institutions

The United States provides significant financial support to the numerous
multilateral institutions that are active in the civilian sector in Afghanistan.
As the international donor community, including the United States, reduced
its physical presence in Afghanistan, the relative importance of these multilateral institutions increased compared to individual donors’ bilateralassistance programs. Table F.5 presents disbursements from the principal
State and USAID civilian sector assistance accounts, and contributions
from these accounts to the principal civilian sector multilateral institutions.
The share of U.S. civilian assistance contributed to these multilateral institutions was over 80% in the first six months of 2022, as reported in SIGAR’s
July 2022 quarterly report. Table F.6 provides additional details on thesources of U.S. funding for the multilateral assistance programs and organizations active in Afghanistan.
TABLE F.5

SHARE OF U.S. CIVILIAN ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS, 2016 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2022 ($ MILLIONS)
2021

Nine Months
2022

-

$

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)$261.03$185.40$400.00$240.00$360.00$

UN OCHA-Reported Programs (UN OCHA)

149.72113.51190.90212.44244.23442.25

U.S. Contributions to Civilian Sector Multilateral Institutions

UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and AITF
Total

-

515.85

49.35

80.98

36.12

32.72

30.28

29.64

30.11

$460.10$379.89$627.02$485.16$634.51$472.09$545.96$265.28$232.94$147.07$196.76$148.27$154.87$42.3590.35

119.20

82.97

84.47

96.89

167.68198.43

Disbursements from the Principal U.S. Civilian Sector Assistance Accounts
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)
Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related (NADR)

37.96

37.00

35.60

38.30

38.50

45.80

15.00

Contributions to International Organizations (CIO)

41.35

40.31

36.12

32.72

30.28

29.64

30.11

1,091.06

878.51555.491,118.59

631.20504.67

USAID Did

63.81

49.88

102.09100.32

170.43178.25

Not Report$1,589.81$1,357.84$959.34$1,571.16$1,115.57$1,080.91

N.M.

28.9%

28.0%

65.4%

30.9%

56.9%

43.7%

N.M.

Economic Support Fund (ESF)International Disaster Assistance (IDA) and Title II
Total
U.S. Civilian Assistance Provided to Multilateral Institutions/
Total Disbursements from U.S. Civilian Assistance Accounts

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. USAID did not provide data for ESF and IDA for FY22Q4 and consequently the total for the Nine Months of 2022 is not meaningful, or “N.M.” Calendar
year reporting is used for UN OCHA, UNAMA, AITF, ESF, IDA, MRA, and CIO; ARTF reports on an Afghan fiscal year basis and SIGAR is reporting based on their July 22, 2022 report; and U.S. fiscal
year reporting is used for Title II and NADR. Annual allocation and not disbursement data is used for CIO and NADR. The Principal U.S. Civilian Sector Assistance Accounts presented above
exclude DOD civilian sector accounts (CERP, AIF, and TFBSO) and a group of civilian agency accounts (IMET, DA, GHP, CCC, USAID-Other, HRDF, ECE, DFC, USAGM, DEA, and TI) that were activein the FY 2015 to FY 2021 period but whose combined annual appropriations averaged approximately $50.00 million per year. (See Appendix B to this report for additional information.)
Source: SIGAR analysis of the SIGAR Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 10/30/2022, 1/30/2022, 1/30/2021, 1/30/2020, 1/30/2019, 1/30/2018, 1/30/2017,
1/30/2016, and 1/30/2015.

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STATUS OF FUNDSTABLE F.6

ASFF

DOD

••
•••
I
I
ESF

IDA

INCLE

USAID & OTHER

MRA

STATE

NADR

SOURCES OF U.S. FUNDING FOR MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMSAND ORGANIZATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
Multilateral Assistance Programs and Organizations

Sources of U.S. Funding

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)

ESF

Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA)ASFF and INCLE

Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund (NATF)

ASFF

Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF)

ESF

UN OCHA Coordinated Programs
ASFF

DOD

ASFF

DOD

UN World Food Programme (WFP)

IDA and Title II

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)MRAUN Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

GHP, IDA, MRA, and Title II

UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

ESF and NADRInternational Organization for Migration (IOM)

ESF, IDA, and MRA

UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

ESF and IDA

UN World Health Organization (WHO)

GHP, ESF, and IDA

UN OCHA and its Afghanistan Humanitarian FundIDA

UN Development Programme (UNDP)

ESF and INCLE

Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)a

ESF, IDA, MRA, and NADR

NATO Resolute Support Mission (RSM)

Army O&Mb

The Asia Foundation (TAF)

SFOPS TAFb, ESF, and INCLE

UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

CIOb

World Bank Group (IBRD, IDA, IFC, and MIGA)

Treasury IPb

Asian Development Bank (ADB and ADF)

Treasury IPbaState and USAID have requested that SIGAR not disclose the names of NGOs with whom they contract in Afghanistan, andhave cited various authorities that underlie their requests. State has cited OMB Bulletin 12-01, Collection of U.S. Foreign
Assistance Data (2012), which provides an exemption to federal agency foreign assistance reporting requirements “when public
disclosure is likely to jeopardize the personal safety of U.S. personnel or recipients of U.S. resources.” USAID has cited theFederal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA) of 2006, (Pub. L. No. 109-282), which provides a waiver to federal
agency contractor and grantee reporting requirements when necessary “to avoid jeopardizing the personal safety of the applicant or recipient’s staff or clients.” The so-called FFATA “masking waiver” is not available for Public International Organizations(PIOs). Both State and USAID provide “branding waivers” to NGOs with whom they contract in Afghanistan.

USAID & OTHERb
The Army O&M, SFOPS TAF, CIO, and Treasury IP accounts provide funding to organizations that are active in Afghanistan.
All other accounts provide programmatic funding to organizations that are active in Afghanistan.

Note: Army O&M refers to the Support of Other Nations subaccount in the Operation & Maintenance, Army account in the
Department of Defense appropriation; SFOPS TAF refers to The Asia Foundation account in the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriation; and Treasury IP refers to the International Programs account in the
Department of the Treasury appropriation.

IDA

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/18/2019; State, response to SIGAR data call, 7/14/2021, 1/13/2021,
4/17/2020, 4/9/2020, and 8/21/2019; Department of Defense, FY 2022 President’s Budget, Exhibit O-1, at https://comptroller.defense.gov, accessed 7/17/2021; SFOPS Congressional Budget Justification, FY 2021, at www.state.gov/cj, accessed
1/15/2021; Treasury, response to SIGAR data call, 4/20/2020; UNDP, response to SIGAR data call, 4/5/2020; USAID,
response to SIGAR data call, 1/10/2021, 4/3/2020, and 1/13/2020; and USAID, Afghanistan-Complex Emergency Fact Sheet#4 FY 2017 at www.usaid.gov, accessed 4/9/2020.

USAID & OTHER

INCLE

STATE

DOD

68

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSTATUS OF FUNDS- - - - - - -STATUS OF FUNDS ENDNOTES
1 SIGAR analysis of agency data call responses and open-source
material. Account activity noted for ASFF, NATO RSM, ESF, GHP,
USAID-Other, NADR, INCLE, HRDF, ECE, CIO, USAGM, IDA,
MRA, DP, USAID-OE, USAID IG, State IG, and SIGAR in FY 2022.
Account names appear next to account abbreviations in Appendix
B to this report.
2 DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/19/2021; State/INL, response
to SIGAR data call, 7/19/2022; State/F, response to SIGAR data call,
10/19/2021.
3 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103,
3/15/2022.
4 State/INL, response to SIGAR data call, 10/19/2022; and State/F,
response to SIGAR data call, 10/12/2022.
5 Continuing Appropriations and Ukraine Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-180, Section 124,
9/30/2022.
6 State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/12/2022.
7 DOD, Cost of War Monthly Report, Data as of September 30, 2021,
response to SIGAR data call, 4/5/2022.
8 SIGAR analysis of annual obligation of reconstruction accounts
as presented in SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States
Congress, 10/30/2021.
9 See Appendix A, Cross-Reference of Report to Statutory
Requirements, at paragraph (2) of Section 1229(i) and Section
1229(i)(1)(F) of Pub. L. No. 110-181, respectively.
10 SIGAR data call requests to DOD, including, but not limited to,those dated 11/21/2018, 11/20/2019, 11/18/2020, and 8/18/2021.
11 DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/18/2022.
12 SIGAR, email to DOD OIG introducing upcoming data call request
with attachment listing selected DOD OIG oversight reports,
11/1/2021; DOD OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 1/8/2022.
13 Costs of War Project, Watson Institute, Brown University, at
https://watson.brown.edu/costofwar/figures/2021/us-costs-datewar-afghanistan-2001-2021, accessed 4/15/2021.
14 DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/22/2022 and 10/19/2021;
DFAS, AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by Fiscal Year Programand Subaccounts March 2022 Final, 4/16/2022; DFAS, AR(M) 1002
Appropriation Status by Fiscal Year Program and Subaccounts
June 2022 Revised, 7/21/2022.
15 Continuing Appropriations and Ukraine Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-180, Section 124,
9/30/2022.
16 DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/20/2022; DFAS, AR(M) 1002
Appropriation Status by Fiscal Year Program and Subaccounts(Cumulative) September 2022 Certified, accessed at dfas.mil/dodbudgetaccountreports/ on 10/20/2022.
17 Pub. L. No. 116-260, 12/27/2020.
18 DOD, response to SIGAR data call on 10/21/2022 and 7/22/2022;
AR(M) 1002 Appropriation Status by FY Program and Subaccounts(Cumulative) September 2022 Certified, accessed at www.dfas.mil/
dodbudgetaccountreports/ on 10/20/2022.
19 SIGAR, Office of Special Projects, DOD Base Closures andTransfers in Afghanistan: The U.S. Has Disposed of $907 Million
in Foreign Excess Real Property, 3/2016.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

20 DOD, response to SIGAR data calls, 7/20/2022, 2/18/2022, and9/14/2021; SIGAR, Department of Defense Base Closures andTransfers in Afghanistan: The U.S. Has Disposed of $907 Million
in Foreign Excess Real Property, SIGAR 16-23-SP, 3/2016.
21 USAID, U.S. Foreign Assistance Reference Guide, 1/2005, p. 6.
22 USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/20/2022.
23 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260,
12/27/2020, and its Section 7071(a) Overseas Contingency
Operations Rescissions.
24 USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/20/2022.
25 USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2022 and 4/19/2022; State,
response to SIGAR data call, 7/21/2022 and 7/11/2022.
26 USAID, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, “AfghanistanComplex Emergency, Fact Sheet #4, FY 2017,” at www.usaid.gov,
accessed 4/9/2020.
27 USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2022 and 4/19/2022.
28 USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 4/22/2022.
29 State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/13/2009.
30 State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/19/2022, 10/11/2022,
7/13/2022, and 7/2/2021.
31 Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign
Operations, Appendix 2, FY 2019, Released February 12, 2018,
pp. 44–52; State, response to SIGAR data call, 4/17/2019.
32 State, response to SIGAR data call, 4/22/2022, 4/19/2022, 1/21/2022,
and 10/18/2021.
33 State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/17/2022 and 7/15/2022.
34 Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign
Operations, Appendix 2, FY 2019, Released February 12, 2018,
p. 423.
35 State, response to SIGAR data call 3/29/2013.
36 State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/12/2022 and 7/2/2021.
37 UN OCHA, Financial Tracking Service, https://fts.unocha.org,
accessed 9/30/2022.
38 World Bank, ARTF: Administrator’s Report on Financial Status asof July 22, 2022 (end of 7th period in FY 1401) at www.wb-artf.org,
accessed 10/9/2022, p. 3.
39 World Bank, response to SIGAR data call, 10/20/2022.
40 World Bank, ARTF: Administrator’s Report on Financial Status asof January 20, 2022 (end of 1st month of FY 1401) at www.artf.af,
accessed 4/15/2022, pp. 6, 8.
41 World Bank, ARTF: Administrator’s Report on Financial Status asof January 20, 2022 (end of 1st month of FY 1401) at www.artf.af,
accessed 4/15/2022, pp. 6–7.
42 World Bank, response to SIGAR data call, 10/13/2022.
43 EC, “Afghanistan: State of Play, January 2011,” 3/31/2011, p. 7.
44 UNDP, LOTFA Receipts 2002–2022 (Combined Bilateral and MPTF
Mechanisms), updated through 6/30/2022, with refunds 2021/2022,
and LOTFA Refunds Q3 2022, in response to SIGAR data call,
10/12/2022 and 7/20/2022.
45 NATO, IBAN audits of Allied Command Operations and Cost Share
Arrangements for Military Budgets, at www.nato.int and web.
archive.org/web/20150910123523/http://nato.int, accessed 7/6/2022;
U.S. dollar-to-Eurozone euro exchange rates at www.fiscal.treasury.gov, accessed 7/6/2021.

69

STATUS OF FUNDS

46 NATO and Afghanistan, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm, accessed 10/20/2021.
47 DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/12/2018.
48 NATO, Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund, Status ofContributions Made as of 31 May 2021, www.nato.int, accessed
7/10/2021; NATO Member Countries, Last Updated 31 Aug 2020,www.nato.int, accessed 10/18/2020; NATO, response to SIGAR
information request, 1/11/2022.
49 DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/18/2019.
50 NATO, response to SIGAR information request, 1/11/2022.
51 The World Bank Group, response to SIGAR information request,
10/13/2022 and 1/21/2022.
52 The World Bank Group, response to SIGAR information request,
10/13/2022 and 10/20/2021.
53 The World Bank Group, United States, Shares and Voting Power,
https://www.worldbank.org/, accessed 4/21/2020.
54 Asian Development Bank, response to SIGAR data call, 10/20/2022
and 1/12/2022.
55 Asian Development Bank, response to SIGAR data call, 10/20/2022
and 4/13/2022.
56 Asian Development Bank, excerpts from AITF Progress Report
as of 30 June 2022, response to SIGAR data call, 10/24/2022.
57 UNAMA, “UN Political Mission Mandate Renewal to 17 March
2023,” 3/17/2022, at https:// https://unama.unmissions.org/unamapolitical-mission-mandate-renewal-17-march-2023, accessed on
4/22/2022.
58 State, response to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2022 and 1/10/2022.

70

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

SECURITY AND GOVERNANCESECURITY AND GOVERNANCE
CONTENTS
Key Issues & Events73

Security Situation in Afghanistan

73

Taliban Security Forces

77

Ongoing Security Efforts in Afghanistan

78

Counternarcotics

81

Taliban Subnational Coordination Expanding

81

U.S. Support for Governance and the Former
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces

82

USAID’s Democracy, Gender, and Rights
Programs Continue to Face Challenges

84

Refugees and Internal Displacement

90

Security and Governance Endnotes

92

72

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSECURITY AND GOVERNANCESECURITY AND GOVERNANCE
On July 31, the United States killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul with a drone strike.

KEY ISSUES& EVENTSThe Taliban designated August 15—the anniversary of the Islamic Republic’s fall—a national holiday.

U.S. engineer and Taliban hostage Mark Frerichs, a contractor captured in January 2020, was released in exchange
for Haji Bashir Noorzai, a Taliban ally and heroin trafficker serving a life sentence in New York.
■ ..____ __On October 11, the State Department announced visa restrictions for current or former Taliban members, membersof non-state security groups, and other individuals believed to be responsible for the repression of and violenceagainst Afghan women and girls.
U.S. and Taliban representatives met at an international conference in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Discussions ranged fromAfghanistan’s humanitarian and economic crises, and human rights, to the Taliban’s desire for political recognition
and greater economic development support.

SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTANOn July 31, the United States killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri witha missile fired from a drone while al-Zawahiri was on the balcony of a Kabul
residence.1 It was the first reported U.S. drone strike in Afghanistan sinceAugust 29, 2021. The Taliban condemned the operation as a violation of“international principles” and of the 2020 Doha Agreement, but were ambiguous on key details, such as how much they knew about al-Zawahiri and his
presence in Kabul.2
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the Taliban had “grossly
violated” the Doha Agreement by sheltering al-Zawahiri.3 State Department
spokesman Ned Price later said that al-Zawahiri’s presence “on Afghan soil
with the knowledge of senior members of the Haqqani-Taliban network only
reinforces the deep concerns that we have regarding the potential diversionof [$3.5 billion in preserved Afghan central bank] funds to terrorist groups.”4

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73

SECURITY AND GOVERNANCEt

A Taliban military parade at Bagram Airfield commemorating the first anniversary of the
U.S. withdrawal. (Taliban regime photo)

Reuters reported that U.S. officials continued talks with the Taliban on
the status of $3.5 billion in Afghanistan’s U.S.-held assets even after al-Zawahiri was killed in Kabul.5
Meanwhile, in mid-August, acting Taliban minister of interior Sirajuddin
Haqqani, whose relative allegedly owned the house where al-Zawahiri
was killed, returned to Kabul for the first time since the strike. Haqqani
was accompanied by Timothy Weeks, a former professor at the American
University of Afghanistan in Kabul. Weeks, along with a fellow professor,
was captured in 2016 and held hostage by the Taliban for three years until
he was released in a prisoner exchange that freed Sirajuddin Haqqani.6
Weeks, who had converted to Islam in captivity, said he was in Afghanistan
to celebrate the upcoming one-year anniversary of Taliban rule.7
Days later, the Taliban Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs declared
August 15, the anniversary of the day the Taliban captured Kabul, a public
holiday. A brief Taliban announcement said, “August 15 is a national holiday in the country to mark the first anniversary of the victory of the Afghan
jihad against America and its allies’ occupation.”8 According to the United
Nations, the Taliban had consolidated their administrative control over thecountry by the one year anniversary of the takeover.9
On August 19, the Taliban marked 103 years of Afghan independence
from the United Kingdom. Various Taliban leaders and mid-level officials
spoke at the celebration. Farooq Azam, an adviser for the Ministry ofEnergy and Water said, “One issue they [the West] are insisting on is, andwhich people also want, is girls’ education. As an elder, I ask the Emirate
to resolve the issue, otherwise the Western world will not recognize theEmirate, not even in 20 years.”10 Media outlets continue to report some support among Taliban leaders for girls’ education, yet the Taliban as a wholecontinue to stubbornly resist universal secondary education.11

74

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE- - - - - - -In late August, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) ended theexemption from its travel ban that had allowed some Taliban leaders totravel abroad. Under a 2011 UNSC Resolution, 135 Taliban leaders are subject to a sanctions regime that includes asset freezes and travel bans. Since
April 2019, 13 of these leaders had benefited from a travel ban exemption
so that they could meet officials from other countries abroad. The specificreasons for rescinding the exemption are unclear.12
On September 19, the United States secured the release of U.S. engineer
and Taliban hostage Mark Frerichs, a contractor captured in January 2020,
in exchange for Haji Bashir Noorzai, a Taliban ally and heroin trafficker
sentenced to life in prison by a U.S. court in April 2009. President Joseph
R. Biden said that “bringing the negotiations that led to Mark’s freedom
to a successful resolution required difficult decisions, which I did not takelightly;” a resolution that reportedly came after months of intense negotiations between the United States and the Taliban.13

U.S. Engagement with the Taliban Continues Despite Hurdles
To date, no country has officially recognized the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan after the group seized control of the country in August2021. However, several countries, including China, Pakistan, Russia, andTurkmenistan, have allowed Taliban-appointed diplomats to take up residence at the their respective Afghan embassies.14 While the United States
has not yet decided to recognize the Taliban—or any other entity—as
the official government of Afghanistan, U.S. officials have continued toengage with Taliban representatives on a wide range of issues relevant
to U.S. national-security interests and closely observe Taliban actions ina number of areas.15 The United States also remains the largest donor to
Afghanistan, having provided more than $1.1 billion to Afghanistan since
the Taliban takeover.16
According to State, U.S. policy priorities in Afghanistan include:17• the welfare and safety of U.S. citizens abroad• addressing the humanitarian and economic crises in the country• ensuring the Taliban abide by commitments to permit the departurefrom Afghanistan of U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, Special
Immigrant Visa holders, and Afghans of special interest to the UnitedStates• supporting the formation of an inclusive government that reflects thecountry’s diversity• ensuring the Taliban uphold their counterterrorism commitments,
including those stated in the February 29, 2020, U.S.-Taliban agreement• encouraging the Taliban to uphold the human rights of all Afghans

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75

SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE

U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Thomas West meets with Afghan refugees
in Pakistan. (U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan photo)

Meeting with Taliban representatives in Doha and in multilateral settings,
U.S. officials continued to emphasize the importance of the Taliban adhering to counterterrorism commitments, protecting the rights of all Afghans,
including the rights of women and girls (especially girls’ access to secondary education), religious minorities, and ethnic minorities, and allowing
Afghans to freely depart the country.18
In late July, Uzbekistan convened an international conference on
Afghanistan with representatives from the Taliban and nearly 30 countries,
including representatives of the United States who continued to push forthe protection of human and civil rights and an inclusive political process.
During the conference, Uzbekistan highlighted several planned development projects in Afghanistan, such as a proposed trans-Afghan railway
running from Termez on the Uzbek-Afghan border through Mazar-e Sharif
and Kabul to Peshawar in northern Pakistan, and a new power transmission line connecting Uzbekistan power plants to north-central Afghanistan.
The Taliban delegation led by acting foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi
reiterated calls for the release of all frozen assets held in U.S. financial
institutions and expressed their desire for increased foreign investment
in Afghanistan.19
In September, the State and Treasury Departments announced theformation of the Afghan Fund, a financial mechanism for the protection,
preservation, and targeted disbursement of $3.5 billion from the frozen
Afghan central bank assets held in U.S. financial institutions to support
economic stability in Afghanistan.20 See page 112 for more details on the
Afghan Fund and how it will operate.

76

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE- - - - - - -On September 15, the U.S.-Europe Group on Afghanistan, comprising
representatives of the United States, European Union, France, Germany,
Italy, Norway, and the United Kingdom along with observers fromJapan, Qatar, Switzerland, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA), met in Washington, DC. Participants expressed
their “grave concerns” with the Taliban’s continuing human rights abuses,
including against Afghan women and girls; continuing restrictions on the
media; the continuing presence of terrorist groups within Afghanistan;
the Taliban’s abdication of their counterterrorism commitments; and the
Taliban’s failure to pursue a credible and inclusive system of governance.
They further stressed that international assistance provided to Afghanistan
is “for the benefit of the Afghan people and not a sign of progress towardnormalization of relations with the Taliban.”21
While the Taliban have expressed their desire to improve relations with
the international community and attract increased international assistanceto Afghanistan, U.S. officials have further “made clear to the Taliban that theonus is on them to make key reforms which we have outlined repeatedly.”22
Following the late July U.S. strike against al-Qaeda leader Ayman alZawahiri in Kabul, for instance, State Department spokesperson Ned Pricestated that the Taliban’s counterterrorism commitments under the Doha
Agreement “clearly were not honored in the instance of Ayman al-Zawahiri,
the now late al-Qaeda leader living in Kabul.”23
On October 11, the State Department announced visa restrictions for current or former Taliban members, members of non-state security groups, andother individuals believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, the repression of and violence against Afghan women and girls.24
Former Kyrgyzstan President
Appointed New UNAMA HeadTALIBAN SECURITY FORCES
Taliban Security Personnel and Recruitment

According to the UN, the Taliban is making efforts to professionalize its
security forces, and the Taliban Ministry of Defense announced that recruitment for the 130,000 personnel of the new national army was complete.
These personnel are organized into eight regional corps, plus a central
corps in Kabul.25 This strength approaches the 182,071 reported strengthof the former Afghan National Army in spring 2021.26 Taliban defense
spokesman Enayatullah Kharazami said in late August that the Taliban can
increase its army to 200,000 personnel, if necessary.27 The UN reported thatin mid-June the Taliban Ministry of Interior said some 35,000 personnel had
been trained and that the ministry began distributing police uniforms, starting in Kabul and Kandahar.28 It is unclear at what level these 35,000 recruits
or other personnel have been trained or if they are prepared to conduct
military operations.

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77

On September 2, 2022, former President of
Kyrgyzstan Roza Otunbayeva, who served inthat role from 2010–2011, was appointed
by UN Secretary-General António Guterresas his new Special Representative for
Afghanistan and head of the UN Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan, replacing Canadian
diplomat Deborah Lyons. As UNAMA head,
she will oversee the UN’s humanitarian
operations in Afghanistan and engagementwith the Taliban.
Source: Associated Press, “UN chief: former Kyrgyzstan
president to head Afghan mission,” 9/3/2022; United
Nations, “Ms. Roza Otunbayeva of Kyrgyzstan - Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Head of theUnited Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan,”
9/2/2022.

SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE

Taliban representatives attend the Uzbek-hosted Tashkent Conference on Afghanistan
in late July. (Uzbek Ministry of Investments and Foreign Trade photo)

The majority of security personnel from the former Afghan National
Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have been dismissed or fled.
According to the UN, some technical and specialized military personnel
remain from the former Afghan army, but nearly all women have been
dismissed, except for those needed for specialized service at detention
facilities or for female body searches.29 According to Taliban Defense
Ministry Spokesman, Inayatulah Khwarazami, female employees of theformer Afghan Ministry of Defense are still working and being paid, but
are working in areas such as ministry health care.30

ONGOING SECURITY EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN
Taliban Security Operations

The UN is aware of “at least 22 [armed] groups claiming to operate in atleast 26 provinces, none having taken control of significant territory.” Themost prominent of these groups are the National Resistance Front (NRF)
and National Liberation Front (NLF).31
According to Afghan news sources, the Taliban sent additional forces
into the northern Panjshir valley in late August, prompting the displacement of some villages’ populations in anticipation of a military operation.32
Armed opposition to the Taliban appears to be escalating with attacks on
Taliban outposts in Panjshir. Underscoring the seriousness of the operation,
on August 21, Mullah Abdul Zakir was appointed the Taliban’s overall commander for Panjshir Province and Andarab District, Baghlan Province. Zakir
is one of the Taliban’s top military commanders and a former Guantanamo
Bay detainee.33

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE- - - - - - -Collapse of the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces
An Assessment of Factors That Led to Its Demise
In response to directives from the House Armed Services Committeeand House Committee on Oversight and Reform and its Subcommittee
on National Security, SIGAR issued Collapse of the Afghan National
Defense and Security Forces: An Assessment of the Factors That Led toIts Demise as an interim report in May. The objectives of this evaluation
were to (1) determine the factors that contributed to the ANDSF’s
collapse; (2) assess any underlying factors over the 20-year security
sector assistance mission that contributed to the underdevelopmentof important ANDSF capabilities and readiness; and (3) account for
all U.S.-provided ANDSF equipment and U.S.-trained personnel, where
possible. SIGAR plans to issue a final report in 2022, which will include
an assessment of the relative successes and failures of the U.S. mission
to reconstruct the ANDSF.

SIGAR found six factors that accelerated the ANDSF’s collapse in August2021. The single most important near-term factor in the ANDSF’s
collapse was the U.S. decision to withdraw the U.S. military and its
contractors from Afghanistan as called for in the February 2020 U.S.Taliban agreement, signed under the Trump Administration and confirmed
by President Biden in an April 2021 address to the nation. Many Afghans
thought the U.S.-Taliban agreement was an act of bad faith and a signalthat the U.S. was handing over Afghanistan to the enemy as it rushed
to exit the country; its immediate effect was a dramatic fall in ANDSF
morale. Other factors contributing to the ANDSF’s collapse included
the change in the U.S. military’s level of support to the ANDSF, theANDSF never achieving self-sustainment, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani
frequently changing ANDSF leaders and appointing loyalists, the Afghan
government’s failing to take responsibility for Afghan security through an
implementation of a national security strategy, and the Taliban’s military
campaign effectively exploiting ANDSF weaknesses. These six intertwined
factors worked together, ending with the ANDSF’s collapse.

Source: SIGAR, Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: An Assessment of the Factors That Led to its Demise, SIGAR-22-22-IP, 5/2022.

In June, Taliban forces in the north also moved against rebels in coal-richBalkhab District, Sar-e Pul Province.34 The rebels appeared to be under thecommand of Malawi Mehdi, an ethnic Hazara who left the Afghan government after he was accused of stealing coal mining revenues. Mehdi thenjoined the Taliban in 2019 as the shadow governor of Balkhab District. In
April 2022 the Taliban also accused Mehdi of stealing coal mining revenues
and when he refused to demobilize his forces, the Taliban launched a major
military operation against him.35 The conflict expanded quickly and at least
27,000 civilians fled into neighboring provinces as Taliban forces flooded thearea.36 According to the UN, Mehdi escaped, only to be subsequently killed by
the Taliban on the border of western Herat Province and Iran on August 17.37

Political Violence Decreases While Protests Increase

According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED),
political violence and protest incidents in Afghanistan (July–September2022) decreased by 22% compared to total incidents last quarter (April–June 2022).38 The NRF was involved in 19% of political violence incidents
this quarter, followed by the Islamic State-Khorasan (7%) and anotheranti-Taliban group, the Afghanistan Freedom Front (2%). Protest incidents
accounted for over 5% of all incidents this quarter, up from 2% last quarter.39
Kabul saw the most incidents since January (12%) followed by northern
Panjshir (12%) and Baghlan (9%) Provinces.40
The UN said that crime-related security incidents remain nearly ashigh as last year, due to deteriorating economic and humanitarian conditions. Herat, Nangarhar, Kabul, and Kandahar Provinces are most affectedby criminal activity.41

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79

Political violence: The use of force by a groupwith a political purpose or motivation. Politicalviolence is a component of political disorder, asocial phenomenon that also includes precursor
events, or critical junctures, that often precede
violent conflicts, including demonstrations,protests, and riots. Political disorder does
not include general criminal conduct.
Source: ACLED, “Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
Project (ACLED) Codebook,” 2019, p. 7, www.acleddata.com,
accessed 7/7/2022.

SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE

Female students in Herat protest for Afghan girls’ right to education. (AFP photoby Mohsen Karimi)

Although the Taliban continued their efforts to outlaw some civic freedoms, protests increased slightly this quarter, as seen in Figure S.1. Since
January, women’s protests have accounted for 36% of all protests, followed
by labor (18%), and students and teachers (6%).42
ACLED is a nonprofit organization funded in part by the State
Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. Its purpose
is to collect and publish publicly available data on all reported political violence and protest events around the world.43 ACLED notes that Afghanistan
has always been a unique data challenge due to its largely rural character
FIGURE S.1

PROTEST INCIDENTS BY TYPE, APRIL–SEPTEMBER 2022
50

All
Unknown
Women’s rights
Labor rights
Student’s and Teacher’s rights

40
30
20
10
0

Apr 2022

May 2022

Jun 2022

Jul 2022

Aug 2022

Sep 2022

Source: ACLED, “Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); www.acleddata.com,” accessed 10/7/2022; SIGAR
analysis of ACLED data, 10/2022.

80

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE

and reporting biases that stem from intimidation by militant and state
forces, a situation that has not changed under the Taliban.44

COUNTERNARCOTICSThe Taliban and Opium Poppy Cultivation

Recently, farmers in southern provinces have reported that the Taliban
are not interfering with the fall opium-poppy planting. Earlier in June the
Taliban appeared to be actively enforcing a ban when State reported that
the Taliban had begun destroying poppy fields to enforce the Taliban’s April
3 ban on narcotics.45 According to the UN, the Taliban Ministry of Interior
permitted a two-month grace period to enable farmers to complete thespring harvest and sell their opium gum, although heroin and synthetic
drugs remain prohibited.46

Status of the State Department’s Counternarcotics Programs

The State Department’s current policy prohibits direct assistance to the
Taliban.47 While some programs remain active—administered throughimplementing partners such as NGOs—other programs have been terminated or paused following the Taliban takeover in August 2021.48
According to the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the “Taliban has not impacted theability for alternative development partners to implement projects,” citing
ongoing activities by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and drug demand
reduction programs through the Colombo Plan. INL continues to fund oversight efforts such as the Afghanistan Opium Survey and its Afghan Opiate
Trade Project (AOTP) through UNODC.
INL has disbursed $24.2 million since 2006 for Afghanistan Opium
Surveys.49 The AOTP publishes occasional reports on trends in the global
Afghan opiate trade to support international counternarcotics efforts. INL
has obligated and disbursed $10.3 million for AOTP since 2011.50 INL continues to fund counternarcotics outreach through its interagency partner, theU.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM).51

TALIBAN SUBNATIONAL COORDINATION EXPANDING

The UN said that Taliban leaders continue to restructure state institutions and replace former government personnel with Taliban affiliates,
often to help address internal tensions.52 In March, the Taliban terminatedelected provincial councils which had been a feature of the former Afghan
government. In their place the Taliban are using ulema shuras to reestablish subnational governance; shuras are traditionally defined as bodies of

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

81

Lessons Learned Reporton Counternarcotics
SIGAR’s 2018 Lessons Learned report,
Counternarcotics: Lessons from the U.S.
Experience in Afghanistan, examined
U.S. counternarcotics efforts from 2002
through 2017. It found that despite theU.S. spending $8.62 billion in that time,
Afghanistan remained the world’s largest
opium producer, and that opium poppy
was Afghanistan’s largest cash crop.

Counternarcotics Lessons Learned
Program report cover.

SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE

learned men who hold government appointments in a Muslim state. Theseshuras are intended to implement Sharia law and oversee the activities
of provincial administrations, under the guidance of the Taliban Ministryof Hajj and Religious Affairs.53 The UN reported that as of July 2022, 14 ofthese provincial shuras were active out of a total of 34 provinces (includingin Badghis, Farah, Ghazni, Ghor, Herat, Kandahar, Khost, Nimroz, Paktiya,
Paktika, Panjshir, Samangan, Uruzgan, and Zabul Provinces). Women are
excluded from these shuras.54
SIGAR collected a small sample of 13 NGOs in 13 provinces on their feelings of “trust” towards local institutions, measured on a scale of 1–5. One or
two Afghan employees provided a response per NGO. As seen in Figure S.2,
most interviewees placed their trust in village elders and local legal systems.55
FIGURE S.2

AVERAGE RATED TRUST IN LOCAL INSTITUTIONS, 1–5

5
4
3
2
1
Village elders

District andvillage legal
systemTalibanintelligence
forcesTalibanpolice forces

Other
Non-Taliban
Talibangovernment or anti-Taliban military or
officials
militants
army forces

Note: Interviewees were asked to rank the level of trust that they had for each of the respective institutions on a scale from
1 to 5, with 5 being the greatest amount of trust.
Source: “Survey Questionnaire for NGO Operation, Security, and Government Services,” 8/2022; SIGAR analysis of SIGARcommissioned data, 10/2022.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR GOVERNANCE AND THE FORMERAFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES
Governance Support

The State Department and USAID refused to answer nearly all of
SIGAR’s quarterly data requests regarding agency-supported programsin Afghanistan this quarter. State and USAID claimed without basis that
U.S. programming in Afghanistan is unrelated to reconstruction activities.56

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE- - - - - - -Nonetheless, most of the State and USAID programs reported in this quarterly report are continuations of activities performed prior to August 2021.
State and USAID have not articulated how these programs have changed
in practice.
The United States has provided more than $36.26 billion to support governance and economic development in Afghanistan. All agency
funds reporting is as of September 30, 2022, except for U.S. Agency forInternational Development (USAID) reporting, which is as of June 30, 2022.
Most of this funding, more than $21.43 billion, was appropriated to the
Economic Support Fund (ESF), which is managed and reported by USAID.57
During August and September 2021, the U.S. government reviewed all
non-humanitarian assistance programs in Afghanistan. After the review,
State and USAID paused the majority of development-assistance programs
to assess the situation, including the safety and ability of implementing partners to operate. Since then, more than a dozen State and USAID programsin Afghanistan have restarted with a focus on addressing critical needsof the Afghan people in several key sectors—health, education, agriculture,
food security, and livelihoods—as well as supporting civil society, witha focus on women, girls, and human rights protection more broadly.58

SIGAR Assessed Risks to Afghan
Civil Society
As part of its Congressionally directedassessments of the causes and repercussionof the Taliban takeover, SIGAR issued
Afghan Civil Society: The Taliban’s Takeover
Risks Undoing 20 Years of Reconstruction
Accomplishments in October 2022. SIGAR
identified the risks to the Afghan people andcivil society organizations, including Afghan
women and girls, journalists, educational
institutions, healthcare operations, andNGOs; and assessed the extent to which the
U.S. government is mitigating these risks aswell as the impact the risks may have on
future U.S. assistance. For more information,see Section 2.

Security Support to Former ANDSF

The ANDSF dissolved and U.S. funding obligations for them ceased, but
disbursements to contractors will continue, as necessary, until all Afghan
Security Forces Fund (ASFF) obligations are liquidated, DOD told SIGAR.59
According to DOD, resolving ASFF-funded contracts is an ongoing,
contract-by-contract matter between contractors and the contracting
offices in the military departments (Army, Air Force, and Navy). Whether
the contracts were awarded using ASFF funds, for which the Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan received obligation authority
from the DOD Comptroller, or using ASFF funds for which the Defense
Security Cooperation Agency received obligation authority and then passed
it through to the military departments to implement using pseudo-Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) cases, all contracts being closed out were awarded
by a contracting entity within one of the military departments.60
Contract vendors must submit claims to begin the close-out process.
Vendors typically have a five-year window before expired funds arecancelled by DOD, and DOD cannot force vendors to accelerate their submission of invoices for payment. For these reasons, DOD cannot at thistime provide complete information on contract closing dates, the amountof funds available to be recouped, or the approximate costs of terminatingeach contract.61
Congress has appropriated nearly $88.8 billion to help the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan provide security in Afghanistan, as of September
30, 2022. This accounts for nearly 61% of all U.S. reconstruction funding

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83

Foreign Military Sales: The portion of U.S.
security assistance for sales programs that
require agreements or contracts between
the United States and an authorized recipient
government or international organization for
defense articles and services to be provided
to the recipient for current stocks or new
procurements under DOD-managed contracts,
regardless of the source of financing. In contrast
to regular FMS cases, pseudo-FMS cases areadministered through the FMS infrastructure, but
a “pseudo-Letter of Offer and Acceptance” (LOA)
is generated to document the transfer of articles
or services, but the partner nation receiving thearticles or services does not sign the pseudoLOA and does not enter into an agreement
or contract to receive the materials or services.
Source: DOD, “DOD Dictionary of Military and AssociatedTerms,” 11/2021, p. 87; DSCA, “Security AssistanceManagement Manual, Chapter 15,” available at https://samm.
dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-15.

SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE

TABLE S.1

SUMMARY STATUS OF ASFF OBLIGATED CONTRACTS
Cumulative
Obligations

Cumulative
Expenditures

Unliquidated
Obligation (ULO)a

ULO as of:$333,534,263.83$203,428,180.76$130,106,083.07

9/20/2022

A-29$1,032,363,000$990,808,000$41,555,000

8/24/2022

C-130

153,230,000.00

103,440,000.00

49,788,000.00

8/31/2022

PC-12

44,260,000.00

16,416,000.00

32,252,000.00

8/29/2022

C-208

120,903,024.00

115,620,239.00

5,273,857.00

8/31/2022

Munitions

29,213,000.00

6,727,000.00

22,840,000.00

8/24/2022

ASFF$1,057,391,726.88$958,268,382.17$100,730,013.61

8/30/2022

UH-60

435,100,689.00

409,546,082.00

25,554,803.00

8/30/2022

ASFF ammunition

61,180,123.69

27,740,602.90

33,439,520.79

8/30/2022

PEO STRI (simulation, training, and instrumentation)

547,311,133.00

438,441,122.00

108,970,011.00

8/30/2022
8/31/2022

Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan Obligations
Contracts
Department of the Air Force Obligated Contracts

Department of the Army Obligated Contracts

Department of the Navy Obligated Contracts
ContractsTotal
a$50,312,826.30$17,859,322.17$32,453,504.13$3,864,799,786.70$3,288,294,931.00$582,962,792.60

Unliquidated Obligations (ULOs) are equal to undisbursed obligations minus open expenses.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 9/25/2022; DOD, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” 11/2021, p. 295.

for Afghanistan since fiscal year (FY) 2002. As seen in Table S.1, ASFF
funds that were obligated by Combined Security Transition CommandAfghanistan or its successor, the Defense Security Management
Office-Afghanistan (which was disbanded on June 1, 2022) for use on newcontracts awarded locally by Army Contract Command-Afghanistan or as
military interdepartmental purchase requests (MIPRs) to leverage alreadyawarded contracts, have total remaining unliquidated ASFF obligations of$130.1 million. Contracts, used to support pseudo-FMS cases managed by
the Departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy have total unliquidated
ASFF obligations of remaining value of $452.9 million.62

USAID’S DEMOCRACY, GENDER, AND RIGHTSPROGRAMS CONTINUE TO FACE CHALLENGES

This quarter, USAID refused to provide SIGAR with financial data for its
ongoing democracy, gender, and rights programs in Afghanistan. As seenin Table S.2 on the following page, USAID continues to manage democracy,
gender, and rights programs in Afghanistan. The following updates are
based on third-party program implementer reports, which often lag one
quarter, and from public reporting.

84

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE- - - - - - -TABLE S.2

USAID REMAINING DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE AND GENDER PROGRAMS, AS OF THE MOST RECENT DATAPROVIDED ON JULY 9, 2022

Project Title
Women’s Scholarship Endowment
Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC)
Supporting Transformation for Afghanistan’s Recovery (STAR)

Start Date
9/27/2018
3/12/2018
2/18/2021

End Date
9/26/2023
3/11/2023
2/17/2023

Strengthening Peace Building, Conflict Resolution, and Governance in Afghanistan
Survey of the Afghan People
Total

7/1/2015
10/11/2012

3/31/2023
10/10/2022

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2022.

Following the issuance of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control(OFAC) licenses in November 2021 authorizing the delivery of assistanceto Afghanistan, State and USAID restarted several programs in Afghanistan
focusing on providing products and services to the Afghan people in several
key sectors. However, they have continued to face various challenges associated with Taliban governing practices.63

Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC)
COMAC is a five-year, $40 million, nationwide program that began in
2018. It was established to provide assistance to Afghan civilians and theirdependent family members who experienced loss of life, injury, or lack of
economic livelihood due to military operations, insurgent attacks, unexploded ordnance such as landmines, improvised explosive devices, orcross-border shelling. COMAC’s support activities include tailored assistance(TA), including physical rehabilitation, counseling, economic reintegration,
medical referrals, and immediate assistance (IA) in the form of in-kind goods,
such as essential food and household sanitary items for up to 60 days.64
According to COMAC’s most recent quarterly report (covering April
1 to June 30, 2022), the project provided 1,263 TA packages and 2,565 IA
packages during the third quarter of FY 2022, with 1,865 IA packages (73%)
distributed to backlogged cases for incidents that occurred in previous
quarters, including from before the Taliban takeover in August 2021. The
accumulation of backlogged cases was caused primarily by insecurity anda suspension of project activities from August to November 2021 following
the collapse of the Afghan government, and challenges in procurement due
to inflation and depreciation of the afghani. During the most recent reporting period, COMAC delivered most IA packages in the north region (699),
with the west region having the least delivered (274). In addition, COMAC
conducted 12 training courses and 20 coaching sessions for their staff toincrease their capacity and held three stakeholder coordination meetings
with national and international NGOs operating in the east, west, and northregions of the country.65

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85

Total
Estimated Cost
$50,000,000
49,999,873
19,997,965

Cumulative
Disbursements,
as of 7/6/2022$50,000,000
35,936,156
4,520,504

16,047,117
7,694,206$143,739,161

14,791,244
6,225,021$111,472,924

SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE

COMAC staff meet with female teachers and students on how to access resources
to help families recover from conflict. (U.S. Embassy Kabul photo)

COMAC staff also reported that they were able to access areas that werepreviously inaccessible due to insecurity, such as Arghandab District inZabul Province and Kajaki District in Helmand. USAID also instructed its
implementing partners to stop traveling to Panjshir Province due to violence stemming from the presence of anti-Taliban groups.66
COMAC staff also have continued to report several ongoing challenges
to operating under Taliban rule. They noted that Taliban authorities werereluctant to allow the return of female staff to its Kabul office, thoughfemale staff working for COMAC’s regional offices have been able to work.
Taliban authorities also seized COMAC equipment after asking COMAC
staff to leave its embedded office at the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled
Affairs (MoMDA) compound, in addition to the MoMDA barring the program from distributing assistance packages from its compound.67

Supporting Transformation for Afghanistan’s Recovery (STAR)
USAID’s STAR program is a two-year, $20 million program launched in
February 2021. It provides assistance for livelihoods such as cash for work
programs, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) support to help
households become more resilient to external shocks and to help fostera sustained increase in agricultural productivity and income. It is implemented in 28 districts across nine provinces, focusing on some of the mostmarginalized and vulnerable parts of Afghanistan.68 According to the mostrecent quarterly report (covering April 1 to June 30, 2022), a total of 10,631
beneficiaries were directly served by livelihood activities in 227 communities during the reporting period.69

86

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE- - - - - - -According to the implementing partner’s most recent quarterly report,
STAR project staff have been able to engage in field activities except for
WASH programs in Nangarhar and Kunar Provinces as Taliban representatives there failed to approve program activities to continue. USAID has
directed implementing partners to not enter into memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with the Taliban as the United States does not currently
recognize a government of Afghanistan, and USAID officials would not beable to witness the document signing, as required by USAID grant agreements. STAR project staff reported that the “inability to sign MOUs withde-facto authorities remains the biggest obstacle for STAR implementationand threatens to cause further delays without a compromise by USAID or
the de-facto authorities.”70
STAR implementing partners have also pointed to several other challenges
and delays associated with Taliban governance, such as inactive community
development councils and centralized authority with a presiding mullah,
who is often not present in villages during training events, resulting in delays
in signing project support documents and in project activities. Moreover,personnel changes at the district level result in further delays as previously
resolved issues, such as community and beneficiary selections, have to be
re-discussed and resolved with new Taliban officials, causing implementing
partners to continuously contend with new local authority structures.71
Project staff have also observed challenges faced specifically byfemale beneficiaries, given new Taliban rules restricting the movementof women, including requirements that they be accompanied by a male
relative, which has limited their ability to participate in and benefit fromSTAR programming.72
Additionally, STAR staff noted an increasing lag in USAID vetting ofapproved vendors, a process that has expanded from around three weeks
to up to 10 weeks, causing delays with WASH and livelihood construction
projects and procurement of agriculture inputs that are needed for seasonal
farmer and livestock production.73
According to implementing partner weekly status reports, during thefourth quarter of FY 2022, Taliban authorities have continued to pressure
STAR staff to sign MOUs, requested various project documents including
lists of beneficiaries, forced their way into project offices for “monitoring” activities such as ensuring the separation of male and female staff
and enforcing the wearing of hijab, and advised project staff that all female
employees must be accompanied by a male relative, known as a mahram.74

Women’s Scholarship Endowment (WSE)
USAID’s WSE, a five-year, $50 million program started in 2018, continued
activities in support of Afghan women pursuing higher education in science,technology, engineering, or mathematics (STEM) fields. According to WSE’s
most recent implementing partner quarterly report (covering April 1 toJune 30, 2022), the program continued to manage two students in Cohort 1,

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87

SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE

Female students commute to their university classes in central Afghanistan.
(UNICEF Afghanistan photo)

40 students in Cohort 2, and 89 students in Cohort 3, who are attending 15
private and seven public universities in Afghanistan. During the spring 2022
semester, 13 beneficiaries paused their studies due to family and healthissues. In three cases, the students’ university no longer offered classes forfemales. The program has received 669 complete applications for its Cohort
4 scholarship awards. WSE anticipates awarding 80–100 scholarships tobegin study in Fall 2022.75
Officials from two private universities in Afghanistan raised concernswith WSE program staff over the loss of students due to financial instability,
constant fluctuation of Taliban policies, and limited outside support. Several
universities noted that women are dropping out at a far higher rate than men.
As a result, their universities have shifted to “survival” mode and are trying
to determine what to prioritize to ensure their institutions endure throughthe current hardships, including leveraging the necessary resources to allow
women to continue their education. They noted that without additional support, they are not sure how long their institutions will continue to operate.76
WSE program staff noted that for a majority of the female students, theirmotivation is “very low,” and they feel “a sense of hopelessness about their
future” given Taliban restrictions on women’s rights. A number of young
women reported feeling “less able or willing to prioritize university studies
in the face of Taliban bans on most paid employment for women” and areconcerned about the potential closure of universities due to the financial
crisis, according to the most recent implementing partner quarterly report.77
For more information on the status of girls’ education in Afghanistan, seepage 120.

88

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE- - - - - - -USAID Announces New Funding for Gender Equality
and Women’s Empowerment in Afghanistan

On August 12, USAID announced $30 million in development assistance tosupport gender equality and women’s empowerment in Afghanistan. These
new funds, programmed through UN Women, will support the “Enabling
Essential Services for Afghan Women and Girls” activity, aiming to increase
Afghan women and girls’ access to protection services; provide resources
and support directly to women-led civil society organizations working toadvance women’s rights in Afghanistan; and increase women’s economic
empowerment through skills and business development training and entrepreneurship support.78

State Department Launches New Public-Private Partnershipto Support Afghan Women

On September 20, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken announced the formation of the Alliance for Afghan Women’s Economic Resilience (AWER),
a public-private partnership between the State Department and Boston
University that is intended to foster business, philanthropic, and civil society
efforts to advance entrepreneurship, employment, and educational opportunities to promote the economic status and economic contributions of
Afghan women in Afghanistan and third countries. The State Department
is providing $1.5 million to support this effort, including funds from the
Gender Equity and Equality Action Fund.79
Secretary Blinken stressed that humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan
is “necessary, but it’s not enough,” with the United States expanding its
efforts to help create “basic economic stability” to ensure that Afghans “donot suffer even more in the very difficult circumstances that they’re living.”80
AWER’s first initiative will be the Million Women Mentors Initiative for
Afghan Women and Girls with the purpose of accelerating private sector
and civil society commitments to mentor one million women and girls overthe next five years to foster new economic opportunities.81

Removing Unexploded OrdnanceAccording to the United Nations Security Council, the “Afghan population
continues to experience significant levels of harm as a result of improvised
explosive device attacks and explosive remnants of war, the latter disproportionately affecting children.” The UN concluded that mine clearance
and awareness must therefore be a priority to ensure civilian safety.82
The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) in State’s
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs manages the conventional-weapons
destruction program in Afghanistan to protect victims of conflict, provide
life-saving humanitarian assistance, and enhance the security and safetyof the Afghan people.83 Although direct assistance to the former Afghan
Directorate for Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) was canceled on

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

89

SIGAR AUDITSIGAR initiates audit of State and
USAID programs and activities addressing gender-based violenceThis quarter, SIGAR initiated an audit
of ongoing State and USAID programs
and activities addressing gender-based
violence (GBV) in Afghanistan. Specifically, this audit will identify State and
USAID’s strategic objectives, assess
the extent to which the programs andactivities are achieving their goals andstrategic objectives, and determine theextent to which GBV activities are coordinated to achieve U.S. governmentwide goals.

SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE

September 9, 2021, remaining mine-action projects and implementing partners have continued on-the-ground mine and explosive-remnants of war(ERW) clearance activities.84 PM/WRA is one of the few State-funded programs authorized to continue operations in Afghanistan.85
PM/WRA currently supports six Afghan nongovernmental organizations, one public international organization (United Nations Mine Action
Service), and four international NGOs to help clear areas in Afghanistan
contaminated by ERW and conventional weapons (e.g., unexploded mortar
rounds).86 From June 16 through September 8, 2022, these organizations
helped clear 6 million square meters of minefields by removing 667 antitank
and antipersonnel mines and 285 items of unexploded ordnance.87
Since FY 2002, State has allocated $460 million in weapons-destruction
and mine-action assistance to Afghanistan (an additional $11.6 million was
obligated between 1997 and 2001 before the start of the U.S. reconstruction
effort). The current situation in Afghanistan has delayed the usual funding
approval process. As of September 8, 2022, PM/WRA had released $20 million of FY 2021 funds for Afghanistan.88

REFUGEES AND INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

On September 23, 2022, the U.S. government announced nearly $327 million in additional assistance to Afghanistan, including nearly $119 million
through State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM).
According to State, this assistance will support the scaled-up humanitarian
response in Afghanistan and neighboring countries through independent,
international humanitarian organizations, such as the United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA), and the International Organization for
Migration (IOM), among others. State said this assistance would provide“emergency cash, shelter, healthcare, and reintegration assistance to internally displaced persons and returnees; as well as protection, life-saving
reproductive and maternal health, and gender-based violence prevention
and response services.” Funding will also support multisectoral assistanceto Afghan refugees in neighboring countries to include COVID-19 screening
and vaccine services as well as health nutrition services.89
This quarter, State PRM and USAID also continued to implement theassistance provided in FY 2022 to support Afghan refugees and IDPs.
This funding includes:90• More than $80 million from State PRM to the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) in Afghanistan, as well as $32 million to support
UNHCR operations in Pakistan and $3.9 million to other regional countries.
• Roughly $2.3 million from USAID and $52 million from State PRM to
the UNFPA to support health and protection programs in Afghanistan
and Pakistan.

90

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE•

Roughly $63 million from USAID and nearly $11 million from StatePRM to the IOM to support health, shelter and settlement, and water,
sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) programs.

Afghan Refugees

As of June 30, 2022, UNHCR reported roughly 2.1 million registered Afghan
refugees living in Afghanistan’s neighboring countries, the majority of themlocated in Iran and Pakistan.91 Additionally, between January 1, 2021, andAugust 31, 2022, UNHCR reported 186,680 newly arrived Afghans in neighboring countries in need of international protection.92
In addition to these registered refugees, there are reportedly millionsof undocumented displaced Afghans, including 2.1 million in Iran alone.93
Iran’s ambassador to Afghanistan claimed in September that around 3,000
Afghans were illegally crossing into Iran per day.94 Between August and
September, Iran deported over 50,000 Afghans, and Amnesty International
reported that Iranian security forces opened fire on Afghans trying to crossthe border.95
While Afghans continued to migrate abroad, many other Afghans decided
to return to Afghanistan this past year. UNHCR recorded about 597,000
returnees from Iran and 60,000 from Pakistan. Of the returnees from Iran,
43% were adult males, 14% were adult females, and 43% were children under
18. Of the returnees from Pakistan, 20% were adult males, 26% were adultfemales, and 54% were children under 18.96
In a survey of Afghan returnees from Turkey and the European Union
conducted by the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), respondents
noted that their economic prospects remained poor following their returnto Afghanistan. Some 88% of respondents said their economic situation had
worsened in the last six months. Further, 59% reported that they felt they
were able to stay and live in Afghanistan, 37% responded they were looking to re-emigrate in the next six months. Of those looking to re-emigrate,
73% cited a lack of employment as their primary reason for return, while
16% noted a lack of security.97

Internal Displacement

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported morethan 30,000 newly displaced people in Afghanistan in 2022. Some 21% of
these internally displaced people (IDPs) were adult males, 21% were adultfemales, and 58% were children under 18.98 However, UNHCR reported highreturns of IDPs as the security situation has improved in many parts of
Afghanistan. Since mid-2021, more than a million IDPs have returned home.
UNHCR is planning to reach 620,000 returnees this year with assistance andreintegration support. A recent UNHCR survey found that 40% of IDPs want
to return as soon as possible.99

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

91

UNHCR solar kits being distributed torecently returned refugees and IDPs in
Kandahar Province. (UNHCR Afghanistan
photo)

SECURITY AND GOVERNANCESECURITY AND GOVERNANCE ENDNOTES   1 Politico, “U.S. kills al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri in drone
strike,” 8/1/2022; Reuters, “Al-Qaeda leader Zawahri Killed in
CIA drone strike, U.S. Officials Say” 8/1/2022.
   2 Politico, “U.S. kills al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri in drone
strike,” 8/1/2022; Reuters, “Al-Qaeda leader Zawahri Killed in
CIA drone strike, U.S. Officials Say,” 8/1/2022.
   3 State, Press Statement, “The Death of Ayman al-Zawahiri,”
8/1/2022.
   4 CQ Newsmaker Transcripts, “State Department Holds News
Briefing,” 8/15/2022; CNN, “New US Intelligence Assessment
Finds al-Qaeda ‘Has Not Reconstituted Its Presence inAfghanistan,’” 8/14/2022.
   5 Treasury, “Joint Statement by U.S. Treasury and State
Department: The United States and Partners Announce
Establishment of Fund for the People of Afghanistan,” 9/14/2022;
Reuters, “Exclusive: U.S. Commits to Afghan Asset Talks
Despite Frustration with Taliban,” 8/22/2022.
   6 Khaama, “Haqqani Returns to Afghan Capital to Inaugurate
Mosque after Al-Qaeda Leader Death,” 8/14/2022.
   7 Washington Post, “Australian Ex-Hostage Returns to Kabul
to ‘Celebrate’ Taliban Rule,” 8/13/2022.
   8 Khaama, “Taliban Declares Public Holiday Marking First
Anniversary of Taliban Rule,” 8/14/2022; VOA, “Taliban
Announce Public Holiday in Afghanistan to Mark Retakingof Power,” 8/14/2022.
   9 UN, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” 9/14/2022.
10 Ariana News, “IEA Marks Afghanistan’s Independence Day,”
8/19/2022.
11 Der Spiegel, “Millions of People Are Leaving the Country,”
8/8/2022.
12 AFP, “UN Security Council Members Split Over Ban on Taliban
Officials’ Travel,” 8/22/2022; VOA, “UN Allows Senior Taliban
Leaders to Travel for Peace Talks,” 4/12/2019; VOA, “UN Security
Council Stumbles on Taliban Travel Waiver,” 8/25/2022.
13 DOJ, “Top Taliban Associate and Former Mujahideen Warlord
Sentenced to Life in Prison on Heroin Trafficking Charges,”
4/30/2009; New York Times, “U.S. Hostage Exchanged for Afghan
Drug Lord in Prisoner Swap,” 9/19/2022.
14 VOA, “Future of Taliban’s International Standing Seems
Uncertain as Challenges Loom,” 8/11/2022; VOA, “Russia Latest
Country to Establish Diplomatic Ties with Taliban,” 4/9/2022.
15 State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 6/15/2022.
16 USAID, “Afghanistan – Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #9,
Fiscal Year 2022, 9/23/2022; USAID, “The United States has provided more than $1.1 billion to respond to humanitarian crisis in
Afghanistan since August 2021,” press release, 9/23/2022; State,
Department Press Briefing – September 14, 2022, 9/14/2022.
17 State, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/12/2022; State, SCA,
response to SIGAR data call, 3/16/2022.
18 State, Department Press Briefing – September 14, 2022,
9/14/2022.
19 VOA, “Nearly 30 Nations Engage with Taliban at Tashkent
Conference,” 7/27/2022.

92

20 Treasury, Joint Statement by U.S. Treasury and State
Department: United States and Partners Announce
Establishment of Fund for the People of Afghanistan, 9/14/2022.
21 State, Communique of the U.S.-Europe Group on Afghanistan,
9/22/2022.
22 State, Department Press Briefing – September 14, 2022,
9/14/2022.
23 State, Department Press Briefing – September 14, 2022,
9/14/2022.
24 State, Announcement of Visa Restrictions in Response to theRepression of Women and Girls in Afghanistan, 10/11/2022.
25 UN, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” 9/14/2022, p. 3 and 6/15/2022, p. 3.
26 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
7/30/2021, p. 63.
27 Afghanistan International, “Taliban: Army May Enlarge Up to200k Troops,” 8/23/2022.
28 UN, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” 9/14/2022, p. 3 and 6/15/2022, p. 3.
29 UN, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” 6/15/2022, p. 3.
30 TOLOnews, “Islamic Emirate: Over 130,000 Soldiers Recruited,”
5/15/2022; State, SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 6/15/2022.
31 UN, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” 9/14/2022, p. 4.
32 Daily Etilaatroz, “Taliban Have Forcibly Moved Several Families
in Panjshir,” 8/23/2022.
33 State, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/12/2022; Khaama, “Taliban
Supreme Leader Appoints Special Military Commander for
Panjshir Province,” 8/21/2022; Long War Journal, “Taliban
Appoints Former Guantanamo Bay Detainee to Lead Fight inPanjshir,” 8/21/2022.
34 Foreign Policy, “Taliban Wage War Over Coal in Northern
Afghanistan,” 7/5/2022; Exovera, “Over-The-Horizon Counter
Terrorism Morning News Report,” 6/26/2022, p. 21.
35 Foreign Policy, “Taliban Wage War Over Coal in Northern
Afghanistan,” 7/5/2022.
36 Foreign Policy, “Taliban Wage War Over Coal in Northern
Afghanistan,” 7/5/2022; Exovera, “Over-The-Horizon Counter
Terrorism Morning News Report,” 6/26/2022, p. 21; ACLED,“Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); www.
acleddata.com,” accessed 7/7/2022; SIGAR analysis of ACLED
data, 7/2022.
37 UN, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” 9/14/2022, p. 5.
38 ACLED, “Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project(ACLED); www.acleddata.com,” accessed 10/7/2022; SIGAR
analysis of ACLED data, 10/2022.
39 ACLED, “Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project(ACLED); www.acleddata.com,” accessed 10/7/2022; SIGAR
analysis of ACLED data, 10/2022.
40 ACLED, “Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project(ACLED); www.acleddata.com,” accessed 10/7/2022; SIGAR
analysis of ACLED data, 10/2022.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONSECURITY AND GOVERNANCE- - - - - - -41 UN, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” 6/15/2022, p. 4.
42 ACLED, “Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project(ACLED); www.acleddata.com,” accessed 10/7/2022; SIGAR
analysis of ACLED data, 10/2022.
43 ACLED, “About ACLED,” accessed 4/2022.
44 ACLED, “ACLED Methodology and Coding Decisions around theConflict in Afghanistan, version 4 (9.2021),” accessed 4/2022.
45 State, response to SIGAR data call, 6/15/2022; Gandhara,“Taliban Turns Blind Eye to Opium Production, Despite Official
Ban,” 10/18/2022.
46 UN, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” 6/15/2022, p. 13; UN, “The situationin Afghanistan and its implications for international peace andsecurity,” 9/14/2022, p. 13; State, response to SIGAR vetting,
7/12/2022.
47 State, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 6/15/2022; State,
response to SIGAR vetting, 4/13/2022 and 7/11/2022.
48 State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2021; State,
response to SIGAR vetting, 7/11/2022.
49 State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 12/20/2021 and9/15/2022; State, response to SIGAR vetting, 7/11/2022.
50 UNODC, “The Afghan Opiate Trade Project (AOTP),” accessed
1/10/2022; State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 9/15/2022.
51 State, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/12/2022.
52 UN, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” 6/15/2022, p. 2.
53 Britannica, “Ulama,” accessed 7/2022 at https://www.britannica.
com/topic/ulama; UN, “The situation in Afghanistan and its
implications for international peace and security,” 6/15/2022,
p. 3; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
10/30/2018, p. 109.
54 UN, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” 9/14/2022, p. 3.
55 “Survey Questionnaire for NGO Operation, Security, andGovernment Services,” 8/2022; SIGAR analysis of SIGARcommissioned data, 10/2022.
56 Letter from the SIGAR Office of General Counsel to the Stateand USAID Offices of General Counsel, 5/6/2022; SIGAR letterto Congress, Department of State, and USAID on State’s and
USAID’s refusal to provide information and assistance requested
by SIGAR, 6/22/2022.
57 See Appendix B.
58 State SCA, response to SIGAR data call, 3/16/2022; State SCA,
response to SIGAR vetting, 4/13/2022.
59 OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2022; DSCMO-A
response to SIGAR vetting, 1/18/2021.
60 OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2022.
61 OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2022; DOD, OUSD-P,
correspondence with SIGAR, 9/25/2022.
62 OUSD-P, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/11/2022; DOD, OUSD-P,
correspondence with SIGAR, 9/25/2022; DOD, response to
SIGAR data call, 9/15/2022.
63 State, SCA, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/13/2022.
64 Blumont Global Development, Conflict Mitigation Assistance for
Civilians (COMAC) Quarterly Report Fiscal Year 2022 Quarter 3:
April 1 to June 30, 2022, 7/31/2022, p. 5.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

65 Blumont Global Development, Conflict Mitigation Assistance for
Civilians (COMAC) Quarterly Report Fiscal Year 2022 Quarter 3:
April 1 to June 30, 2022, 7/31/2022, pp. 6, 14–15, 17.
66 Blumont Global Development, Conflict Mitigation Assistance for
Civilians (COMAC) Quarterly Report Fiscal Year 2022 Quarter 3:
April 1 to June 30, 2022, 7/31/2022, p. 29.
67 Blumont Global Development, Conflict Mitigation Assistance for
Civilians (COMAC) Quarterly Report Fiscal Year 2022 Quarter 3:
April 1 to June 30, 2022, 7/31/2022, pp. 8, 28.
68 Catholic Relief Services, Supporting Transformation for
Afghanistan’s Recovery (STAR) Activity, Monitoring,
Evaluation and Learning Plan, February 18, 2021, to February
17, 2023, 7/28/2022, p. 5; Catholic Relief Services, Supporting
Transformation for Afghanistan’s Recovery (STAR) Quarterly
Report FY22 Q3, April 1 to June 30, 2022, 8/1/2022, p. 4.
69 Catholic Relief Services, Supporting Transformation for
Afghanistan’s Recovery (STAR) Quarterly Report FY22 Q3, April
1 to June 30, 2022, 8/1/2022, pp. 5–6.
70 Catholic Relief Services, Supporting Transformation for
Afghanistan’s Recovery (STAR) Quarterly Report FY22 Q3, April
1 to June 30, 2022, 8/1/2022, pp. 5–6.
71 Catholic Relief Services, Supporting Transformation for
Afghanistan’s Recovery (STAR) Quarterly Report FY22 Q3, April
1 to June 30, 2022, 8/1/2022, pp. 36–37.
72 Catholic Relief Services, Supporting Transformation for
Afghanistan’s Recovery (STAR) Quarterly Report FY22 Q3, April
1 to June 30, 2022, 8/1/2022, pp. 38–39.
73 Catholic Relief Services, Supporting Transformation for
Afghanistan’s Recovery (STAR) Quarterly Report FY22 Q3, April
1 to June 30, 2022, 8/1/2022, p. 36.
74 Catholic Relief Services, Catholic Relief Services, Supporting
Transformation for Afghanistan’s Recovery (STAR), STAR
Activity Update: August 7–11, 2022, 8/11/2022, pp. 22–23;
Catholic Relief Services, Catholic Relief Services, Supporting
Transformation for Afghanistan’s Recovery (STAR), STAR
Activity Update: July 3–14, 2022, 7/14/2022, pp. 13–14;
Catholic Relief Services, Catholic Relief Services, Supporting
Transformation for Afghanistan’s Recovery (STAR), STAR
Activity Update: July 31-August 4, 2022, 8/4/2022, p. 21.
75 The Borlaug Institute of International Agriculture at Texas A&M
AgriLife Research, Women’s Scholarship Endowment Quarterly
Report FY2022 Q3, 7/2022, pp. 3–5.
76 The Borlaug Institute of International Agriculture at Texas A&M
AgriLife Research, Women’s Scholarship Endowment Quarterly
Report FY2022 Q3, 7/2022, p. 7.
77 The Borlaug Institute of International Agriculture at Texas A&M
AgriLife Research, Women’s Scholarship Endowment Quarterly
Report FY2022 Q3, 7/2022, p. 4.
78 USAID, “United States Announces $30 Million Commitment toAdvance Women and Girls’ Rights in Afghanistan,” 8/12/2022;
State, “Secretary Blinken at the Launch of the Alliance for
Afghan Women’s Economic Resilience,” 9/20/2022.
79 State, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/12/2022; State, “Secretary ofState Blinken Launches Alliance for Afghan Women’s Economic
Resilience,” 9/20/2022.
80 State, “Secretary Blinken at the Launch of the Alliance for
Afghan Women’s Economic Resilience,” 9/20/2022.

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SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE

81 State, “Secretary of State Blinken Launches Alliance for Afghan
Women’s Economic Resilience,” 9/20/2022.
82 UN, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications
for international peace and security,” 9/14/2022, pp. 14–15.
83 State, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/15/2022.
84 State, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 10/8/2021.
85 State, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/10/2022.
86 State, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/15/2022.
87 State, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/15/2022.
88 State, PM/WRA, response to SIGAR data call, 9/15/2022; State,
PM/WRA, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/10/2021; State, response
to SIGAR vetting, 4/13/2022.
89 State, “United States Announces Humanitarian Assistancefor Afghanistan,” 9/23/2022.
90 USAID, “Afghanistan – Complex Emergency,” Fact Sheet #9,
Fiscal Year 2022, 9/23/2022; USAID, “The United States has provided more than $1.1 billion to respond to humanitarian crisis in
Afghanistan since August 2021,” press release, 9/23/2022.
91 UNHCR, Operational Data Portal, Refugee Situations:
Afghanistan, 9/28/2022.
92 UNHCR, “Afghanistan Situation,” 9/18/2022.
93 UNHCR, “Iran at a Glance,” 9/18/2022.
94 TOLOnews, “Officials: Over 50,000 Afghans Deported from Iranin Past Month,” 9/16/2022.
95 TOLOnews, “Officials: Over 50,000 Afghans Deported from Iranin Past Month,” 9/16/2022; Amnesty International, “Iran/Turkey:
Fleeing Afghans Unlawfully Returned After Coming Under Fireat Border,” 8/31/2022.
96 OCHA, “Afghanistan: Snapshot of Population Movements,”
9/22/2022.
97 DTM, “DTM Afghanistan Returnee Longitudinal Survey (RLS),”
7/16/2022.
98 OCHA, “Afghanistan: Snapshot of Population Movements,”
9/22/2022.
99 UNHCR, “UNHCR Rushes Aid by Air and Road after Pakistan
Floods; Steps Up Afghanistan Relief,” 9/6/2022.

94

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC AND SOCIALDEVELOPMENT CONTENTS
Key Issues & Events

97

Humanitarian Crisis Update

99

International Assistance to Afghanistan

104

Afghanistan’s Economic Outlook

108

The Afghan Fund: Quarterly Highlight112

Education

120

Public Health124

Economic and Social Development Endnotes

128

96

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTThe Taliban announced a provisional deal with Russia to import one million tons of gasoline, one million tonsof diesel, 500,000 tons of liquefied petroleum gas, and two million tons of wheat to Afghanistan annually.

KEY ISSUES& EVENTSThe U.S. Treasury and State Departments announced the establishment of an “Afghan Fund” to provide $3.5 billion
in Afghan central bank assets to benefit the people of Afghanistan, with support from the Swiss government andindependent Afghan economic experts.
USAID announced $150 million in additional assistance for United Nations programs in Afghanistan, including$80 million to improve food security and nutrition, $40 million for education, and $30 million to support genderequality and women’s empowerment.

ailflfBJ~::::il-1111:~~L=======

Severe flooding in August killed at least 256 people and destroyed 5,600 homes throughout Afghanistan, according
to the Taliban.

The Taliban blocked women from taking college entrance exams for a wide range of subjects, including engineering,
economics, veterinary medicine, agriculture, geology, and journalism.

U.S. Support for Economic and Social Development

The United States has provided more than $36.26 billion to support governance and economic development in Afghanistan. All agency funds reportingis as of September 30, 2022, except for U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) reporting, which is as of June 30, 2022. See page 22
for more details about USAID’s non-response to SIGAR requests for funding
data. More than $21.43 billion of the total amount of U.S. support provided
to Afghanistan was appropriated to the Economic Support Fund (ESF),
which is managed and reported by USAID.1
In August and September 2021, following the Taliban takeover, the U.S. government reviewed all non-humanitarian assistance programs in Afghanistan.
During this time, in accordance with the interagency review, the State
Department (State) and USAID paused most development-assistance programs to assess the situation in Afghanistan, including their implementing
partners’ safety and ability to operate there. Since then, more than a dozen

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

State and USAID programs in Afghanistan have restarted to help addresscritical needs of the Afghan people in several key sectors—health, education,
agriculture, food security, and livelihoods—as well as support civil society,particularly women, girls, and human rights. State said these efforts are being
implemented through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international
USAID and State refuse to answer SIGAR’s data requests
regarding ongoing programs to support governance andeconomic development in Afghanistan
The United States remains Afghanistan’s single largest donor, providing
more than $1.1 billion in assistance since August 2021. However, SIGAR,
for the first time in its history, is unable this quarter to provide to Congress
and the American people with a full accounting of U.S. government
programming due to the non-cooperation of U.S. agencies. The UnitedStates Agency for International Development (USAID), which administers
the vast majority of current U.S. support to Afghanistan, refused to cooperatewith SIGAR in any capacity, while the State Department was selectivein the information it provided pursuant to SIGAR’s audit and quarterly
data requests, sharing funding data but not details of agency-supported

programs in Afghanistan. Additionally, the Treasury Department did notprovide responses to a request for information regarding the transfer
of Afghan central bank reserves to a fund for the benefit of the Afghan
people. This in direct violation of Section 1229(h)(5)(A) of the NDAA for
FY 2008 (requiring the agencies to provide information and assistanceupon request) and Section 6(c)(1) of the Inspector General Act of 1978,
as amended. See page 22 for more details on USAID, State, and Treasury’srefusal to cooperate with SIGAR requests for information.
This section reports on USAID programs and funding levels according to
the most recent USAID data provided to SIGAR in July 2022 and publicly
available information. Most USAID programs referenced in this section are
also continuations of activities performed prior to August 2021. USAID
cumulative assistance by sector is shown in Figure E.1.

FIGURE E.1

USAID DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS, AS OF JULY 6, 2022 ($ MILLIONS)
Infrastructure

4,650

Governance

3,651

Stabilization

2,432

Agriculture

2,401

Health

1,446

Education

1,304

Unpreferenced*

1,294

Economic Growth

1,283

Program Support

472

Gender270$0$1,000$2,000$3,000$4,000$5,000*Unpreferenced funds are U.S. contributions to the ARTF that can be used for any ARTF-supported initiatives.
Note: USAID Mission-managed funds. Numbers are rounded. USAID gender programs managed by the agency’s Office of Gender are presented as a separate category. Agriculture programs include
Alternative Development. Infrastructure programs include power, roads, extractives, and programs that build health and education facilities. OFM activities (e.g. audits and pre-award assessments)
included under Program Support funds.
Source: SIGAR analysis of USAID response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2022; SIGAR analysis of World Bank, ARTF, Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of January 20, 2022, 4/18/2022.

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

An Afghan boy sits by his home in Jalalabad that was destroyed by a flash flood.
(UNICEF Afghanistan photo)organizations, and other third parties, minimizing benefits to the Taliban
to the extent possible.2

HUMANITARIAN CRISIS UPDATEThe humanitarian situation in Afghanistan remained dire this quarter, withover half of the population (an estimated 24.4 million Afghans) in needof assistance. Since August 2021, the combined effects of a prolonged
drought, soaring food prices, a paralyzed banking system, lack of liquidity,lack of job opportunities and household incomes, and the consequences of
decades of war, continue to impact the ability of Afghan families to provide
for and meet their basic needs. International donors have not fully met
UN-requested aid funding appeals, and spillover effects from the war in
Ukraine—including a surge in food and fuel prices—have created further
challenges to delivering aid into the country.3
For 10 consecutive months, more than 90% of the population has experienced insufficient food consumption, according to a June World Food
Programme (WFP) report. Household incomes continued to shrink whilehousehold food expenditure shares increased amid rising inflation and a
global surge in food prices. Per WFP’s most recent reporting, household
food expenditure shares reached 91% in July, compared to 80% in January.4
Nearly half the Afghan population continues to employ crisis coping
strategies, such as rationing out food or skipping meals, to meet their basic
needs. Households headed by women remain especially vulnerable, with anestimated 96% facing insufficient food consumption amid Taliban restrictions on the movements of women and girls. Women are twice as likely as
men to sacrifice their own meals so their families can eat, WFP reported.5

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTTABLE E.1

INTEGRATED FOOD SECURITY PHASE CLASSIFICATION (IPC) PHASE DESCRIPTION AND RESPONSE OBJECTIVES
Food Insecurity Phase

Technical Description

Priority Response Objective

1 – None/Minimal

Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypicaland unsustainable strategies to access food and income.

Resilience building and disaster risk
reduction

2 – StressedHouseholds have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential
non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.

Disaster risk reduction andprotection of livelihoods

3 – Crisis

Households either:• Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; OR• Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs, but only by depleting essential livelihood assets
or through crisis-coping strategies.

URGENT ACTION REQUIRED
to protect livelihoods and reducefood consumption gaps

4 – Emergency

Some households either:• Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess
mortality; OR• Are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps, but only by employing emergency livelihood
strategies and asset liquidation.

URGENT ACTION REQUIRED
to save lives and livelihoods

5 – Catastrophe/
Famine*Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution, and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident.
(For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.)

URGENT ACTION REQUIRED
to revert/prevent widespread deathand total collapse of livelihoods* Some households can be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) even if areas are not classified as Famine (IPC Phase 5). In order for an area to be classified Famine, at least 20% of households should
be in IPC Phase 5.
Source: FAO and WFP, Hunger Hotspots FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity – June to September 2022 Outlook, 6/6/2022, p. 7.

Food insecurity: The disruption of food intake
or eating patterns due to unavailability of foodand/or lack of resources to obtain food.
Acute malnutrition: The insufficient intake
of essential nutrients resulting from sudden
reductions in food intake or diet quality; also
known as “wasting.” Acute malnutrition has
serious physiological consequences andincreases the risk of death.

Famine: An extreme deprivation of food.
Starvation, death, destitution, and extremely
critical levels of acute malnutrition are or will
likely be evident.
Source: Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, “Famine
Facts,” accessed 3/31/2022; FAO, “Hunger and food insecurity,” accessed 6/28/2022, https://www.fao.org/hunger/
en/; Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, “FoodInsecurity,” accessed 6/28/2022, https://www.healthypeople.
gov/2020/topics-objectives/topic/social-determinantshealth/interventions-resources/food-insecurity; Lenters L.,
Wazny K., Bhutta Z.A. “Management of Severe and Moderate
Acute Malnutrition in Children,” in Black RE, Laxminarayan
R, Temmerman M, et al., editors. Reproductive, Maternal,
Newborn, and Child Health: Disease Control Priorities, Third
Edition, vol.2, Washington DC, 2016: The International Bankfor Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank; 2016
Apr 5, chapter 11.

In total, an estimated 18.9 million Afghans face potentially life-threatening levels of hunger—including nearly six million facing near-famineconditions—from June to November 2022. Citing the most recent Integrated
Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) study, WFP reported in Septemberthat 4.7 million children and pregnant and lactating women are at risk ofacute malnutrition in 2022, and 3.9 million children are acutely malnourished. According to these reports, nearly half of the population suffersfrom high levels of acute food insecurity—food insecurity at the Crisis,
Emergency, or Catastrophe (famine) levels—requiring urgent action tosave their lives, reduce food gaps, and protect livelihoods. All 34 provincesin Afghanistan are facing crisis or emergency levels of acute food insecurity. Table E.1 provides more details on how the IPC classifies levels offood insecurity.6
The United Nations has led the effort to deliver humanitarian assistanceincluding food, shelter, cash, and household supplies to nearly 23 million
people over the past year, saying these efforts helped to avoid a famine
last winter.7 With aid from the United States and other donors,8 UN agencies remained at the forefront of providing humanitarian food assistanceto Afghanistan this quarter. WFP reported plans to distribute food, nutrition,and resilience support to 12.4 million Afghans in September. UNICEF and
its implementing partners reported providing lifesaving nutrition treatment
to 68,609 children in August alone. With winter’s freezing temperatures only
a few months away, the UN also warned that humanitarian needs will continue to grow.9

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

UNICEF-provided aid, including hygiene kits, blankets, and tents, being unloadedin Ghazni Province. (UNICEF Afghanistan photo)“Today, the tragic reality is that the scale of needs in Afghanistan far
outstrips the response capacity of humanitarian actors to meet them,” said
Dr. Ramiz Alakbarov, UN Deputy Special Representative in Afghanistan
and Humanitarian Coordinator for Afghanistan. To achieve sustainable outcomes, he described the need for programming beyond humanitarian relief:
It will simply not be possible to move the population from amode of surviving to thriving unless a functioning economy andbanking system is restored; longer-term, more sustainable interventions are resumed; line ministries are technically capacitated;
girls are officially able to return to school; and women and girls
can participate meaningfully and safely in all aspects of social,political, and economic life, including humanitarian work.10

Martin Griffiths, the UN’s Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian
Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, stressed that preserving basic
service delivery alongside humanitarian assistance “remains the only way
to prevent a catastrophe even greater than what we have seen these many
months.” He argued that “some development support needs to be restarted”
since the de facto authorities lack the capacity to address deepening
poverty. At the same time, Griffiths acknowledged that aid workers are confronting an “exceptionally challenging” operating environment, describing
engagement with the Taliban as “labor intensive.”11
In August, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs(UNOCHA) reported worsening access challenges for aid workers,
including interference in humanitarian activities and violence against
humanitarian personnel, assets, and facilities. The majority of these incidents (87%) involved “interference in the implementation of humanitarian

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

activities” (58 reports), followed by “violence against humanitarian personnel, assets and facilities” (31 reports) and the challenges of the “physicalenvironment” (23 reports) across the country. UNOCHA attributed 70% ofincidents of interference and violence to the Taliban and its armed forces.
UNICEF also reported that worsening bureaucratic impediments in August
were affecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance.12

Aid Organizations Warn of Funding Shortfalls
as Winter Approaches“The situation canbe best described asa pure catastrophe....
You’ve seen people sellingorgans, you’ve seen people
selling children.”
UN Deputy Special Representative
Dr. Ramiz Alakbarov
Source: UN News, “Humanitarian funding still needed for ‘purecatastrophe’ situation in Afghanistan,” 8/15/2022.

This quarter, UN and NGO officials sought new funding for their operationsin Afghanistan, warning of major shortfalls in the coming winter months.
On August 29, Martin Griffiths told the UN Security Council that the $4.4 billion Humanitarian Response Plan for Afghanistan “has a gap of $3.14 billion,
with over $600 million urgently required to support priority winter preparation, such as upgrades and repairs to shelter, warm clothes, blankets and soforth. But we are up against time. These particular contributions are needed
within the next three months.”13
On September 15, the WFP reported needing $1.14 billion in additional
funding to sustain its operations over the next six months (October 2022–
March 2023),14 in addition to $172 million to preposition food in rugged andremote areas before winter sets in.15 For the first time since IPC analysis
work began in 2011, 20,000 people in a remote district in Ghor Province
faced famine conditions due to impassible roads preventing the deliveryof lifesaving food aid in Afghanistan earlier this year.16
UNICEF’s $2 billion Afghanistan Humanitarian Action for Children
appeal for 2022, the largest single-country appeal in the history of theorganization, is currently around 40% funded. UNICEF also developed anddisseminated a winter strategy, seeking $75 million for key winter activities
and funding needs ahead of the onset of the harsh winter season.17
Other UN agencies reported similar shortfalls this quarter. The UN
International Organization for Migration’s revised Comprehensive Action
Plan (CAP) for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, targeting support to 3.6 million people, was only 34% funded in August.18 The UN HighCommissioner for Refugees reported needing an additional $229.7 million
to carry out its work in Afghanistan and for Afghan refugees in neighboring
countries.19 In August, UNOCHA also requested additional funding for its
continuing response efforts to the June 2022 earthquake, stating that it had
only received $44 million of the $110 million needed.20“Winter is coming, and we are worried that lives could be lost if we
do not act early enough to alleviate conditions for people whose coping
capacities are weakened by multiple shocks,” said Mawlawi Mutiul Haq
Khales, acting president of the Afghan Red Crescent, the Afghan affiliateof the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
The Afghan Red Crescent identified high-altitude areas where temperatures

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

are very likely to drop below freezing as their greatest concern, and emphasized the need to procure winter clothing, winter boots, thermal blankets,heating stoves, and other essentials in preparation.21“The situation can be best described as a pure catastrophe,” said UN
Deputy Special Representative Dr. Ramiz Alakbarov, in reference to thehumanitarian environment over the past year. When asked by reporters what
would happen if additional funding did not materialize, he warned of direconsequences as winter approaches. “You’ve seen people selling organs,you’ve seen people selling children. This has been widely covered in the
media, and this is what we will be seeing again if support is not provided.”22

Severe Flooding Destroys Thousands of Homes
Across Afghanistan

Exacerbating the humanitarian crisis, severe flash flooding struck central,southern, and eastern Afghanistan in late August, impacting a UN-estimated
15,875 people, with 256 people killed and over 5,600 houses destroyed ordamaged. The UN also said floods damaged 34,000 hectares of agriculturalland and killed 7,500 livestock, impacting the livelihoods of thousands offarmers in the middle of the summer harvest season.23
UNOCHA Deputy Head Katherine Carey told reporters that with 75%
of Afghanistan’s rural population dependent on agriculture, the loss offarmland, crops, and livestock will have a lasting economic impact on
livelihoods. Damage to critical civilian infrastructure, including roads andbridges, may also cut off communities from food aid distribution efforts andrestrict access to markets. Carey also noted that Afghanistan is one of theworld’s most vulnerable countries to the impacts of climate change andneeds longer-term development support.24
The Taliban have requested international assistance to help with disaster
relief efforts, stating that they cannot manage the floods alone. Mawlawi
Sharafuddin Muslim, the Taliban’s deputy minister of disaster management,
also warned that flood-affected areas face greater risk of a humanitarian catastrophe in the coming months. “Winter is arriving soon and these
affected families that include women and children do not have shelter tolive under. All their agricultural farms and orchards have either been completely destroyed or their harvest has been damaged,” Muslim said.25 Taliban
officials estimate that natural disasters this summer, including flooding andearthquakes, have killed at least 1,570 people, injured almost 6,000, andcaused $2 billion in damages to infrastructure and property.26
According to UNOCHA, the UN’s 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan
(HRP) for Afghanistan had already accounted for a proportion of the population to be affected by sudden-onset emergencies throughout the year.
As of August 31, the provision of emergency assistance for flash flooding
remains part of ongoing response activities prepared for under the 2022

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Construction crews work to clear the
Parwan-Bamyan road after August flooding.
(Taliban regime photo)ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

HRP. UN partners were already delivering humanitarian assistance in floodaffected areas and have been able to use existing supply stocks and services
to reach impacted communities.27
UNOCHA reports that while supplies for short-term emergency assistance are mostly available, gaps remain in complementary development
support. Such support to rebuild destroyed houses and service infrastructure; restore livelihoods through livestock and grain replenishment; andput in place preventive investments (for example, the building of dams or
establishment of early warning systems) would help mitigate prolonged suffering and avert further risks of double exposure to natural disasters andclimate-related shocks.28
Communities in eastern Afghanistan are also still recovering from thedevastating June 22 earthquake that killed over 1,000 people, injured 3,000,
and destroyed 10,000 homes.29 By August 26, humanitarian response efforts
reached over 376,000 impacted people with at least one form of assistance,
including 124,000 with food and agricultural support, 93,000 with emergency shelter and non-food items, 66,000 with protection, and 90,000 withcash assistance. UNOCHA estimated that 100,000 people needed additional
humanitarian assistance, including aid that goes beyond immediate disaster
relief, such as repairing earthquake sensitive shelters.30

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTANUSAID Announces New Assistance This Quarter

WFP food aid delivered to Afghans inneed in Faryab, Jowzjan, Badghis, andGhor Provinces (from top to bottom).
(WFP Afghanistan photos)

The United States remains Afghanistan’s single largest donor, having
provided $1.1 billion in assistance since August 2021, comprisingnearly $812 million from USAID and nearly $320 million from the State
Department. This includes more than $326.7 million in additional funding
announced on September 23, comprising nearly $208 million from USAID’s
Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance and nearly $118.8 million from theState Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration.31
On August 12, USAID announced $150 million for UN programs, including $80 million to improve food security and nutrition, $40 million to aid theeducation of Afghan children, and $30 million to support gender equality
and women’s empowerment.32 It is unclear if USAID reported this as part of,or in addition to, the $1.1 billion.
USAID’s $80 million commitment for food security and nutrition programs will support United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO) efforts to assist Afghans experiencing severe food insecurity,
including women, women-headed households, and smallholder farmers
and herders. These UN activities aim to help Afghan farmers increase theproduction of nutritious food using environmentally sustainable practices

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT- - - - - - -as well as increase the availability of quality seeds and other agricultural
inputs. They also seek to improve smallholder farmers’ resilience toclimate and economic shocks through crop diversification and by promoting agricultural best practices. This funding is also meant to benefit
small-scale Afghan agribusinesses, helping to ensure sustainable food production systems and improve the food security and nutrition of vulnerable
Afghan families.33
USAID’s $30 million commitment to support gender equality and women’s
empowerment in Afghanistan will be programmed through the United Nations
Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women).
The “Enabling Essential Services for Afghan Women and Girls” activity aims
to increase Afghan women and girls’ access to social protection services; provide resources and support for women-led civil society organizations working
to advance women’s rights in Afghanistan; and increase women’s economic
empowerment through skills and business development training and entrepreneurship support. Funding will provide Afghan women and girl survivors ofviolence access to free and safe accommodation, legal aid and healthcare, psycho-social support, counseling, and vocational training; respond to their urgent
and immediate livelihoods needs; and help build income security throughprivate sector partnerships that will create job opportunities and help Afghan
women launch or rebuild their micro-, small- or medium-sized businesses.34
USAID’s $40 million agreement with the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) aims to increase international support for Afghan children, particularly adolescent girls, to realize their right to education. According to USAID’spress statement, this funding ensures that UNICEF will have the resources
to provide hundreds of thousands of vulnerable Afghans with desperately
needed cash assistance to keep their children in school; children who would
otherwise not attend or drop-out of school due to ongoing humanitarian,
economic, and political crises. This assistance is said to build on USAID’s
partnerships with the Afghan people and UNICEF, ensuring students have theresources to learn foundational skills, such as reading, writing, and math.35

World Bank Expands Support to Five ARTF-Funded Projects

As of September 9, the World Bank and donors approved two new Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)-funded projects: Emergency Education
Response in Afghanistan and nongovernmental organizations/civil society
organizations (NGO/CSO) Capacity Support. This brings the total to fiveongoing ARTF projects, worth $893 million, providing urgent and essential
food, livelihood, health, and education services to the people of Afghanistan.
All five projects will be implemented off-budget—out of the Taliban regime’s
control—through United Nations agencies and NGOs and coordinated withother multilateral and bilateral funding pledges for Afghanistan. Each hasfeatures specifically designed to benefit women and girls.36

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Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
(ARTF): A World Bank-administered multidonor
trust fund that coordinated international
assistance to support the former Afghan
government’s operating and development costs,
financing up to 30% of its civilian budget.
From 2002 to July 22, 2022, the World Bank
reported that 34 donors had paid in nearly$13.12 billion, with the three largest donors
over this period being the United States, theUnited Kingdom, and the European Union.
This quarter, ARTF reported to SIGAR that USAID
contributed $53.71 million to the ARTF in
September 2022, representing the first and only
U.S. contribution to the Fund since August 2021.
The contribution is pro­posed to be used toward
basic service delivery, livelihood, and private
sector support projects.
Source: ARTF, “Who We Are,” 2021; ARTF Administrator’sReport on Financial Status, as of January 20, 2022, (end of
1st month of FY1401); SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the UnitedStates Congress, 7/30/2022, p. 50; SIGAR, Quarterly Reportto the United States Congress, 7/30/2021, p. 42.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Afghanistan Emergency Food Security ProjectThis $195 million program will help in the production of food crops forsmallholder Afghan farmers and prevent the further deterioration of foodsecurity. The UN FAO-implemented project aims to:37• focus on wheat production, supporting about 300,000 households in theNovember 2022 planting season and another 300,000 households in the
March–November 2023 planting season;• support the nutritional needs of children, people with disabilities orchronic illness, and support households headed by women by providing
seeds, basic tools for backyard kitchen gardening, and technical training
on improved nutrition and climate-smart production practices;• train about 150,000 women in cultivation and nutrition;• enhance linkages for both farmers and women involved in gardening
with local markets to facilitate the sale of marketable surpluses ofwheat, vegetables, and legumes; and• increase access to irrigation water, improve soil and water
conservation, and build climate resilience by rehabilitating andimproving selected irrigation and watershed management systems
over 137,000 hectares of land.

Afghanistan Community Resilience and Livelihoods ProjectThis $265 million program will help provide short-term livelihood opportunities and deliver urgent essential services in rural and urban areas, incoordination with UNDP’s ABADEI program. The UN Office for Project
Services-implemented project aims to:38• provide livelihood and income opportunities for one million households
in 6,450 rural communities across Afghanistan and in the cities of Bamyan,
Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, Kunduz, and Mazar-e Sharif;• improve basic utilities and services, such as clean water, sanitation,and road rehabilitation, for an additional 9.3 million Afghans in thesesame areas;• deliver special assistance to women and vulnerable groups, including
persons with disabilities and internally displaced people;• utilize a bottom-up approach through the Community Development
Councils that have provided services to communities for over 18 years; and• engage local private sector contractors to help preserve the local civil
works implementation capacity that has been gradually developed overthe past two decades.

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT- - - - - - -Afghanistan Health Emergency Response ProjectThis $333 million program will increase the utilization and quality of essential
health services in Afghanistan. The UNICEF-implemented project aims to:39• deliver basic health, nutrition, and COVID-19 services in partnershipwith national and international service providers, in more than 2,300
health facilities nationwide;• help to fully immunize two million children;• ensure care is available for 1.2 million women giving birth at healthfacilities;• further enhance nutrition services at both community and healthfacilities;• help strengthen the capacity of the health system to prevent andrespond to infectious disease outbreaks, and to contribute to the Global
Initiative Polio Eradication efforts in the country; and• support women’s and children’s continued access to basic health services.

Emergency Education Response in Afghanistan ProjectThis $100 million program will increase girls’ and boys’ access to educationand improve learning conditions throughout Afghanistan. The UNICEFimplemented project aims to:40• support teachers and school-based staff in public primary andsecondary schools based on integration of districts to (1) maintaincontinuous access to basic education for all children in public
primary and secondary schools; (2) provide renewed access to girls
in secondary schools; (3) decrease overall teacher absenteeism; and(4) lead to the reopening of closed schools;• support community-based education to maintain access to basic
education for all children, with a special focus on girls and out-ofschool children;• implement gender-focused rehabilitation of school infrastructure
to provide safe and inclusive learning spaces for all children inapproximately 193 project-supported schools; and• strengthen monitoring and accountability to ensure continued accessto general education services for target children.

NGO/CSO Capacity Support ProjectThis $20 million UNDP-implemented program recognizes the importantcross-cutting role that non-governmental and civil society organizations(NGOs and CSOs) undertake to deliver basic services across Afghanistan,
and works to enhance the capacities of select registered organizations toimprove their performance and effectiveness.41

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Afghan laborers provided with temporary jobs work for food. (Taliban regime photo)

AFGHANISTAN’S ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
Economic Forecast Remains Bleak

Despite extensive international humanitarian support since the Afghan
government collapsed in August 2021, economic conditions in Afghanistan
remain dismal this quarter. According to the UN, the Afghan economy stabilized after the initial months of free fall that followed the Taliban takeover,but it has since been functioning at a much lower equilibrium. The economy
contracted by an estimated 20% since August 2021, while potentially having
lost as many as 700,000 jobs. Some 25 million Afghans are now impoverished, with the overall population poorer and more vulnerable to privation,
hunger, and disease. A U.S. Institute for Peace analyst warned, there is “noprospect for the economy to resume high growth let alone recover to pre2021 levels in the foreseeable future.”42
The World Bank reported that labor demand remained relatively stagnant
this quarter with some regional variations, and that employment opportunities remain mostly seasonal and agriculture-related. Work availability forskilled workers (such as carpenters, electricians, masons, painters, plumbers, and tile workers) increased marginally in July. For unskilled workers,
it declined slightly from its peak in May 2022 due the end of the harvest
season in most of the country. While labor demand declined in some provinces—including Badakhshan, Balkh, Farah, Herat, and Khost—it increased
in some central-northern provinces. Nominal wages are slowly recovering,
but remain lower than pre-August 2021 levels. Real wages, however, aredeclining due to high inflation, thereby decreasing the affordability of basic
household consumer goods.43

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT- - - - - - -Rising global food and energy prices, and the impact of the ongoingdrought on agricultural production, continue to drive inflation. According
to the World Bank, year-on-year (Y-O-Y) price increases include: a 55%
cost increase for diesel; a 33% increase for high-quality rice; a 31% increase
for sugar; a 42% increase for wheat; a 16% increase for pulses; and a 28%
increase in the cost of bread. Overall inflation for basic household goods,
including food and fuel items, rose by 31.5% Y-O-Y in August, a drop from
43% Y-O-Y in July 2022. Recent price statistics published by Afghanistan’s
National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA) for July 2022 show
headline consumer price index inflation at 18.3%, mainly driven by 25%
Y-O-Y inflation in the food segment. Non-food segment Y-O-Y inflation for
June 2022 was recorded at 11.6%. While prices are constraining household
consumption rates, survey data show a general availability of basic foodand non-food items in the markets.44
The value of Afghanistan’s currency, the afghani (AFN), remained relatively stable this quarter. Data issued by Afghanistan’s central bank, Da
Afghanistan Bank (DAB), show that, between the end of June and mid-September, the AFN depreciated 0.6% against the U.S. dollar (USD) and 1.9%
against the Chinese yuan, but appreciated by 6.1% against the euro, 11.6%
against the Pakistani rupee, and 0.2% against the Indian rupee.45
However, in the absence of central bank liquidity management, informal
money service providers continue to report some foreign exchange shortages in the open market, according to the World Bank. The last USD auction
by DAB was held on March 23, 2022. Still, they report that the availabilityof USD and Pakistani rupees improved slightly in August 2022. The Taliban
continue to exert more robust controls in the foreign exchange market,
including regulating money service providers and prohibiting foreign currency-denominated domestic transactions.46
According to media reports, a lack of new banknotes entering circulation is also contributing to the physical quality of individual bills worsening
beyond use, with afghani banknotes literally falling apart and being rejectedin transactions. In previous years, DAB would withdraw 3–4 billion afghanis’
worth (about $33–45 million) of decrepit banknotes and substitute themwith new ones printed abroad. Afghanistan lacks the domestic capacity toprint currency and has struggled to restore international arrangements forsuch services since the Taliban seized power.47
Households and firms throughout Afghanistan continue to face significant
liquidity constraints. Individuals and businesses reported limited access toboth USD and AFN, with most cash withdrawals below statutory limits.48
The Taliban also enforced a nationwide ban on cryptocurrencies thisquarter, arresting 13 crypto token dealers and shutting down at least
20 crypto-related businesses in Herat alone. Alongside hawalas, crypto
exchanges had become a popular means for some Afghans to move money
in and out of the country.49

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Liquidity: The efficiency or ease with which an
asset or security can be converted into readycash without affecting its market price. The mostliquid asset of all is cash itself.
Source: Investopedia, “Liquidity,” 8/29/2021.

Hawala: Informal money transmission networks
that arrange for the transfer and receipt of funds
or assets of equivalent value, and settle theiraccounts through trade and cash.
Source: Treasury, “Hawala: The Hawala Alternative Remittance
System and its Role in Money Laundering,” 2003, p. 5

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Tomato harvest collected in Baghlan Province. (Taliban regime photo)

Liquidity crisis at core of humanitarian crisis
Liquidity crisis: A financial situation
characterized by a lack of cash or easily
convertible-to-cash assets on hand across
many businesses or financial institutions
simultaneously. In a liquidity crisis, liquidity
problems at individual institutions lead toan acute increase in demand and decreasein supply of liquidity, and the resulting lackof available liquidity can lead to widespreaddefaults and even bankruptcies. The economies
of entire countries can become engulfed inthis situation. For the economy as a whole, aliquidity crisis means that the two main sourcesof liquidity in the economy—banks loans and thecommercial paper market—become suddenly
scarce. Banks reduce the number of loans they
make or stop making loans altogether.
Source: Investopedia, “Liquidity Crisis,” 12/6/2020.

The severe liquidity crisis remains the crux of Afghanistan’s humanitarian crisis. While the revocation of DAB’s credentials to interact with theinternational banking system in the wake of the Taliban takeover halted
basic banking transactions,50 wide-ranging sanctions and lost confidence
in Afghanistan’s domestic banking sector limited the country’s cash flow
to the point of crisis. Afghan businesses that previously paid for imports
through bank transfers have since been forced to rely on more expensive
and less reliable hawala networks, driving up the cost of importing goods.
With rising prices, falling incomes, and diminished access to cash, mostAfghan families are struggling to purchase food and household goods,
despite their availability on the open market.51 Most of the sanctions’restrictions constraining international aid were lifted earlier this year when
the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
issued several licenses, yet international transactions have not fully been
restored, in part due to continued risk aversion by banks.52
In his August briefing to the UN Security Council, Under-SecretaryGeneral for Humanitarian Affairs Martin Griffiths, said that “international
financial transactions are extremely hard due to de-risking and overcompliance of global banks [toward international sanctions] … the liquidity andbanking crisis continues to impact the delivery of assistance and on thedaily lives of Afghans.”53
The International Committee of the Red Cross likewise reported inAugust that the banking and liquidity crises are having a “direct and huge”
impact on the health system, with thousands of health facilities continuing

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT- - - - - - -to struggle with limited funding and resources.54 The breakdown in international bank transfers has made it difficult for NGOs to send funds to victimsof recent natural disasters and constrained the ability of pharmacies to pay
for medicine imports. One Kabul pharmacy reported rationing the sale ofsome drugs due to supply shortages, and that some drugs for treating cancer and diabetes can no longer be found in Afghanistan.55
Since February, the UN has been attempting to establish a humanitarian exchange facility that could temporarily and partially alleviateliquidity constraints. Such proposals have so far failed, reportedly due
to Taliban intransigence.56
Throughout this time, UN agencies have been indirectly injecting muchneeded liquidity into the economy through emergency cash assistance fora range of specific needs—from food, shelter, water and sanitation, andhealth, to cash for work and livelihoods support. Similarly, UN cash shipments totaling $1 billion have also helped meet their partners’ humanitarianfund transfer needs amid ongoing challenges with the formal banking andfinancial sectors. UNOCHA describes this effort as an invaluable lifeline
for humanitarian actors, ensuring that time-critical programs can continue
uninterrupted, while also yielding some positive macro-economic effects
such as currency stabilization.57
However, to truly address the liquidity crisis, economists and aid groups
argue that Afghanistan needs a functioning central bank. The Norwegian
Refugee Council has called for the United States and international community to take steps to secure mechanisms for providing technical assistanceto Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB). They argue that building DAB’s capacity
and independence is a necessary step toward restoring the commercial
banking sector and reconnecting Afghanistan to the global economy, maintaining macroeconomic stability, and restoring confidence in Afghanistan’sbanking system.58 Many economists and aid groups have also called for theUnited States to restore access to billions of dollars in frozen Afghan central bank reserves held overseas, arguing that the central bank cannot carryout its normal, essential functions without them.59

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Humanitarian exchange facility: Allows
the UN and aid groups to swap millions in
U.S. dollar-denominated aid for afghanis heldin the country by private businesses, to act asa stopgap measure until the Afghan central
bank is able to operate independently. In theexchange, the UN would use aid dollars to pay
off the foreign creditors of Afghan businesses asa means of bolstering private-sector activity. The
exchange would be structured so that the funds
entirely bypass Taliban authorities, although thefacility would require the approval of the Talibanrun central bank before it could operate.
Source: Reuters, “EXCLUSIVE U.N. aims to launch new
Afghanistan cash route in February: U.N. note,” 2/11/2022.

QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT

THE AFGHAN FUND: NEW MECHANISM ESTABLISHED TO
DELIVER $3.5 BILLION IN DA AFGHANISTAN BANK ASSETSFOR THE BENEFIT OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE“When it comes to thefungibility of money, thisfund is for Afghanistan’s
macroeconomic
stability. Afghanistan’s
macroeconomic stability
is in the interests of thepeople of Afghanistan.
It’s in the interests ofthe broader region. It’sin the interests of theinternational community.
What is important is that
the Taliban does not haveaccess to these funds. The
Taliban will not be able
to pull the levers of thesefunds, to direct thesefunds to specific entities.”
Ned Price, State Department
Press Secretary
Source: State, “Department Press Briefing – September 14,
2022,” 9/14/2022.

On September 14, the U.S. Departments of Treasury and State jointly
announced the establishment of the Fund for the Afghan People—also
known as “The Afghan Fund”—to provide $3.5 billion in frozen Afghan central bank assets for the benefit of the Afghan people. The Afghan Fund aims
to protect, preserve, and make targeted disbursements of this $3.5 billion
to help provide greater stability to the Afghan economy and ultimately work
to alleviate the worst effects of the humanitarian crisis.60 According to State,
the Fund is “explicitly not intended to make humanitarian disbursements.”61
The $3.5 billion is part of $7 billion in assets that Da Afghanistan Bank
(DAB), the Afghan central bank, had deposited in the United States prior
to the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021. On February 11,2022, President Joseph R. Biden acted to block the DAB assets in response
to a writ of execution issued on September 13, 2021, by victims of the
9/11 attacks who had earlier won a judgment against the Taliban for morethan $7 billion. The writ of execution was issued in an attempt to seize theassets, most of which were on deposit with the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York. The effect of Executive Order (E.O.) 14064 was to preserve the
DAB assets until several complex legal issues could be resolved in court.
In a Statement of Interest filed in court on the same day the President
signed E.O. 14064, the United States stated that it intended to use $3.5 billion of the $7 billion to address the economic and humanitarian crisis in
Afghanistan and would leave it to the court to decide whether the other$3.5 billion could be used to compensate 9/11 victims. However, the ultimate disposition of these assets remains subject to court decision.62
Another approximately $2 billion in Afghan central bank assets heldin Europe and the United Arab Emirates may also end up in the Fund.63“The Taliban’s repression and economic mismanagement have exacerbated longstanding economic challenges for Afghanistan, including throughactions that have diminished the capacity of key Afghan economic institutions and made the return of these funds to Afghanistan untenable,” said
Wally Adeyemo, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury. He added, “through thisFund, the United States will work closely with our international partners
to facilitate use of these assets to improve the lives of ordinary people
in Afghanistan.”64
The Afghan Fund will maintain its account with the Bank forInternational Settlements (BIS) in Switzerland and be governed by a
Board of Trustees. According to the press announcement and registration

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documents with the government of the Canton of Geneva, Switzerland, theBoard currently consists of the U.S. ambassador to Switzerland, a Swissgovernment representative, and two Afghan economic experts with relevant
macroeconomic and monetary policy experience.65
The Taliban are not involved in the Afghan Fund or the managementof its assets and are protesting the decision, claiming the transfer of DAB
assets is illegal and a violation of international norms. Taliban spokesperson Abdul Qahar Balkhi tweeted on September 15 that the Taliban would
impose penalties on entities facilitating the disbursement of such funds
in Afghanistan: “If the reserves are disbursed without taking into consideration legitimate demands of the Afghans, [the Taliban] will be forced to
impose fines against, and ban activities of, all individuals, institutions andcompanies that facilitate this illegal venture & seek to misuse DAB reserves
for humanitarian & other purposes.”66
The Taliban want the frozen central bank reserves to be returned torecapitalize DAB. During bilateral talks with the United States, the Taliban
claimed to have proven “the independence and professionalism of theCentral Bank, and openness to third party monitoring of [anti-money laundering and countering-the-financing-of-terrorism] AML/CFT regime… bothin words and deeds.” However, according to the State Department, “theTaliban has not provided any solace or reassurance that funds would not
be diverted for nefarious or otherwise malign purposes.”67
Fund for the Afghan People Board of Trustees
The Fund for the Afghan People’s initial Board of Trustees consists of four individuals appointed for a term of two years:
Dr. Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, a U.S.-based Afghan economic expert, served as the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s Ministerof Finance 2005—2009 and as head of Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), Afghanistan’s central bank, 2002—2004. Dr. Ahady
has also served as Afghanistan’s Minister of Commerce and Industry and Minister of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock.
Dr. Shah Mohammad Mehrabi, a U.S.-based Afghan economic expert, is a board member on the Supreme Council of DAB
and a professor of economics at Montgomery College, Maryland. Dr. Mehrabi has been serving on DAB’s governing board
since 2003 and has previously served as an economic advisor to multiple Afghan ministers of finance.
Ambassador Scott Charles Miller, the U.S. representative to the Afghan Fund, was sworn in as the U.S. Ambassador to the Swiss
Confederation and to the Principality of Liechtenstein, on December 21, 2021. Ambassador Miller is a former account vicepresident for the Swiss-based firm UBS Wealth Management, a philanthropist, and an LGTBQ rights activist.
Ambassador Alexandra Elena Baumann, the Swiss representative to the Afghan Fund, is a foreign ministry official who has served
as the head of the Prosperity and Sustainability Division at the State Secretariat since September 2022. For the previous 3.5
years, she was a diplomatic advisor in the Swiss Federal Department of Finance.
Source: Site officiel de la République et canton de Genève, “Fund for the Afghan People – Fondation”, 9/5/2022; Fund for the Afghan People, Statutes of September
2, 2022, Art. 12, English translation, 9/2/2022; SWI (Swiss Broadcasting Corporation), “U.S. to move $3.5 billion in Afghan central bank assets to Swiss based
trust,” 9/14/2022; U.S. Embassy in Switzerland and Liechtenstein website, “Ambassador Scott C. Miller,” accessed 10/13/2022; Polar Journal, “New ambassador
represents Swiss Arctic policy,” 9/1/2022; Montgomery College Maryland website, “Faculty and Staff – Business and Economics Department – Rockville Campus,”accessed 10/13/2022; Afghan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock website, “Minister’s Biography - Brief Biography of Dr. Anwar-ul Haq Ahady,” accessed
10/13/2022; SIGAR, interview with Dr. Shah Mehrabi, 10/4/2022.

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QUARTERLY HIGHLIGHT

Cash delivered to a commercial bank in Kabul for humanitarian assistance in October.
(Da Afghanistan Bank photo)

There are concerns about potential Taliban misuse of the funds giventhat the Taliban rejected the constitution of the former Afghan government
under which the banking law—and DAB’s statutory independence—was
established. The Taliban have also appointed loyalists to senior roles at
DAB, including a deputy governor sanctioned by the United Nations forhis role as a Taliban militant leader.68
According to the joint Treasury-State press announcement, safeguards
are in place to prevent the Afghan Fund from being used for illicit activity
by the Taliban or other malign actors.69
In the short term, the Afghan Fund’s Board of Trustees will be able toauthorize targeted disbursements to promote monetary and macroeconomic stability and benefit the Afghan people. This could include paying forcritical imports like electricity, paying Afghanistan’s arrears at international
financial institutions to preserve their eligibility for financial support, andpaying for essential central banking services like SWIFT.70
Long term, the goal is for those funds not used for these limited purposes
to be preserved for eventual return to DAB. Treasury and State have said
that the United States will not support the return of these funds until DAB(1) demonstrates its independence from political influence and interference; (2) demonstrates it has instituted adequate AML/CFT controls; and(3) completes a third-party needs assessment and onboards a reputable
third-party monitor.71
Prior to the announcement of the Afghan Fund, Paul Fishstein of NYU’s
Center on International Cooperation, argued that an external trust fund that
establishes a parallel central bank functionality may be the only option forproviding needed economic management until the Taliban show themselves
to be both willing and capable of ensuring that DAB uses the reserves as

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intended. He added that “there is general moral agreement that the frozen
reserves belong to the Afghan people and therefore should be used for theirbenefit. There is no agreement, however, that the Taliban represent theAfghan people and can be trusted to act in the greater national interest.”72
According to Fishstein, rebuilding the capacity and independence of
DAB, along with international oversight and third-party monitoring, areessential for both the functioning of the bank and creating international
confidence in the long term. This would, he said, require DAB to rehire technical staff and replace Taliban loyalists currently in senior positions withqualified, non-political officials.73
Shah Mehrabi, an Afghan economist on the Fund’s Board of Trustees,
described the new mechanism as a very important first step to aiding
Afghanistan’s economic recovery. He said, “Afghans will always continue
to say the $7 billion needs to be given back to the Bank of Afghanistan,and that should happen when [it] is able to address some of the concerns.”74
Mehrabi emphasized that these assets will be critical to combating inflation and called for $150 million in assets to be delivered to the Afghancurrency markets monthly. “The use of this fund should be done for the sole
purpose of price stability to defend the value of afghani… This process canbe independently monitored and audited with an option to terminate in theevent of misuse. Through this process, purchasing afghani will increase,”
he said.75
Similarly, William Byrd of the U.S. Institute of Peace wrote earlier thisyear that even if only half of DAB’s total reserves were devoted to support
its basic activities as a central bank, it would “provide an opportunity tomake a start toward stabilizing the economy and private sector.”76
On August 26 a federal magistrate judge issued a 43-page report recommending rejecting efforts by plaintiffs seeking turnover of the Afghan
central bank funds remaining at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
The legal analysis states that (1) the court lacks jurisdiction over the Afghan
central bank; (2) such a ruling would effectively recognize the Taliban as
the legitimate government of Afghanistan, something the courts lack theauthority to do on their own; and (3) the bank does not count as an “agency
or instrumentality” of the Taliban since it had been taken over by force.77
The federal district court judge supervising the case has not yet issued
a final ruling.78

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

A truckload of straw, commonly used for heating, animal feed, and thatching roofs,
in Taloqan City, Takhar Province. (UNAMA photo by Shamsuddin Hamedi)

Taliban Budget and Revenue

The Taliban’s national budget for Afghan fiscal year 1401 (2022–2023)
totaled 231.4 billion AFN ($2.65 billion), including 203.4 billion AFN($2.33 billion) designated for operations and 27.9 billion AFN ($302 million)
for development. By contrast, the Afghan government’s national budget for
Afghan fiscal year 1399 (2020–2021), funded significantly by foreign donors,
was 473.1 billion AFN (around $6.1 billion at the exchange rate then) andincluded 288.1 billion AFN ($3.7 billion) for operations and 185 billion AFN($2.4 billion) for development. The UN Development Programme (UNDP)
reports that the Taliban budget in its present size has limited capacity todirect and stimulate growth in the country.79
According to the World Bank, the Taliban collected an estimated 104
billion AFN (around $1.2 billion) in total revenue between December 22,
2021, and end-August 2022, marginally surpassing the Afghan government’s
collections over the same period in 2020 and 2021.80 Taxes at the borders
comprised 57% of the total revenue collected up to August 2022, with revenue from inland sources accounting for the remaining 43%. Non-tax sources
accounted for 54% of total inland revenues, mainly from ministries collecting administration fees and royalties. By comparison, these sources madeup only 30% of government inland revenues in 2021. The World Bank said
the increase in ministries’ revenue is likely driven by a rise in coal mining
royalties and fees.81
Between June and July 2022, the Taliban tripled prices on coal exports
to raise revenue from its mining sector amid booming coal exports toneighboring Pakistan. On June 28, coal prices increased from $90 per ton

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT- - - - - - -to $200 per ton; and, on July 16, they were increased further to $280 per
ton. Customs duties also grew by 10%, totaling 30% on each ton, although
Afghan coal is still comparatively cheap at about 40% of the international
market value.82

International Trade

Afghanistan registered a merchandise trade surplus of $79 million withneighboring Pakistan, one of Afghanistan’s largest trading partners, from
July 2021 to June 2022, according to the most recent trade data collectedby the World Bank. During this time frame, total exports to Pakistanfrom Afghanistan were worth $796.4 million, compared to $717 million in
Pakistani exports to Afghanistan. Afghan exports are driven by mineralfuel, oils, and products, including the recent surge in coal exports. Other
Afghan export items are textile and food items such as fruits and vegetables. Afghanistan’s main imports from Pakistan are food products, followedby pharmaceutical products and wood.83
Afghanistan is exporting about 10,000 tons of coal a day to Pakistan,according to a spokesperson for the Taliban’s Ministry of Mines andPetroleum. Coal is transported by hundreds of trucks daily across three
dedicated border crossings into Pakistan, and both sides are reportedly planning to add more space for additional trucks and open customs
facilities for additional operational hours per day, instead of the current
12 hours.84
On September 27, the Taliban announced they had signed a provisional
deal with Russia to import one million tons of gasoline, one million tons ofdiesel, 500,000 tons of liquefied petroleum gas, and two million tons wheat
to Afghanistan annually. A Taliban official states that the arrangement will
run for an unspecified trial period, after which both sides are expected tosign a longer-term deal if they are content with the arrangement. This is the
Taliban’s first known major international economic deal since they seized
power. A Taliban official said they seek to diversify the country’s trading
partners and that Russia had offered them a discount to average global
commodity prices.85
Earlier this quarter, a Taliban delegation traveled to Russia to discussa barter arrangement trading Russian crude oil products for Afghan produce. Nuriddin Azizi, the Taliban’s minister of industry and trade, told
Russian state media in August that “since Russia is a friendly country
to us, we have come to reach an agreement on the import of Russian oil
and oil products.”86
Despite its significant coal export industry, Afghanistan depends
mainly on electricity imported from four of its neighboring countries(Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan) which accounts for
70% of its energy supply.87

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Liquefied petroleum gas: A group ofhydrocarbon gases, primarily propane, normal
butane, and isobutane, derived from crude oil
refining or natural gas processing. They canbe liquefied through pressurization (without
requiring cryogenic refrigeration) for convenienttransport or storage.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Glossary –Liquefied Petroleum Gas,” accessed 10/4/2022.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Kabul International Airport. (Taliban regime photo)

Civil Aviation
Taliban Sign Deal with UAE Aviation Company to Manage
Airspace Control at Afghan Airports
On September 8, the Taliban announced they would sign a 10-year contract with Abu Dhabi-based GAAC Holding to manage airspace control
at Afghanistan’s international airports. This is the third and final major
contract for running Afghanistan’s airports, the Taliban having previously
awarded GAAC ground-handling and security services contracts in May.88
Ibrahim Moarafi, GAAC’s General Manager and Regional Director, told
reporters in Kabul that this move would encourage major international airlines to return to Afghanistan, claiming that it “is a significant development
as it will bring economic benefits in terms of job creation.”89
Further information on the status of civil aviation in Afghanistan appears
in the Classified Supplement to this report.

Economic Growth Portfolio

USAID refused to provide SIGAR with financial or programmatic data thisquarter for its ongoing economic growth programs in Afghanistan. As ofthe latest data USAID provided in July 2022, USAID continued to implement
five economic growth programs worth a total of $156,681,787, as seen in
Table E.3 on the following page.90
USAID also did not provide SIGAR with information regarding its
recently announced $30 million contribution towards gender equality andwomen’s empowerment in Afghanistan, which includes economic opportunity support for Afghan women. In its press release regarding the newagreement with UN Women, USAID said part of this funding would “helprespond to the urgent and immediate livelihoods needs of Afghan women

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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT- - - - - - -TABLE E.3

USAID REMAINING ECONOMIC-GROWTH PROGRAMS, AS OF THE MOST RECENT DATA PROVIDED ON JULY 9, 2022
Cumulative
Disbursements,
as of 7/6/2022

Project Title

Start Date

End Date

Total
Estimated Cost

Afghanistan Competitiveness of Export-Oriented Businesses Activity (ACEBA)

1/28/2020

1/27/2025$105,722,822$22,917,660

Extractive Technical Assistance by USGS

1/1/2018

12/31/2022

18,226,206

12,695,315

Livelihood Advancement for Marginalized Population (LAMP)

8/1/2018

7/31/2022

9,491,153

7,832,294

Afghanistan Investment Climate Reform Program (AICR)

3/27/2015

3/31/2023

13,300,000

7,825,276

Carpet and Jewelry Value Chains

1/31/2019

4/30/2023

Total

9,941,606

6,818,678$156,681,787$58,089,222

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2022.

and help them build income security through private sector partnershipsthat will create job opportunities and help Afghan women launch or rebuild
their micro, small or medium businesses.”91

Agriculture

USAID refused to provide SIGAR with financial or programmatic data for
its ongoing agriculture programs in Afghanistan. As of the latest data USAID
provided in July 2022, USAID continued to implement five agriculture programs worth a total of $172,698,834, as seen in Table E.4.92
USAID also did not provide SIGAR with information regarding its
recently announced $80 million contribution towards agriculture production in Afghanistan. In its press release regarding this new agreementwith the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), USAID said thisfunding builds upon “more than $775 million in humanitarian assistancethat the United States has provided to support the people of Afghanistan
since [August 2021]. Despite the Taliban takeover, USAID’s agricultural programs have continued to benefit thousands of Afghan farmers,
including women, in 227 communities in Sar-e Pul, Jowzjan, Khost, andNangarhar Provinces.”93
TABLE E.4

USAID REMAINING AGRICULTURE PROGRAMS, AS OF THE MOST RECENT DATA PROVIDED ON JULY 9, 2022
Cumulative
Disbursements,
as of 7/6/2022$33,230,520
31,499,846

Project Title
Afghanistan Value Chains - Livestock
Afghanistan Value Chains - High Value Crops

Start Date
6/9/2018
8/2/2018

End Date
6/8/2023
8/1/2023

Total
Estimated Cost
$55,672,170
54,958,860

Grain Research and Innovation (GRAIN)

11/8/2012

9/30/2022

19,500,000

14,471,563

Agricultural Marketing Program (AMP)
USDA PAPA
Total

1/28/2020
9/30/2016

1/27/2023
9/29/2022

30,000,000
12,567,804$172,698,834

13,802,806
1,152,417$94,157,153

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2022.

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTEDUCATION

USAID refused to provide SIGAR with financial or programmatic data for
its ongoing education programs in Afghanistan this quarter. As of the latest
data USAID provided in July 2022, USAID continued to implement threeeducation programs worth a total of $97,776,091, as seen in Table E.5.94
USAID also did not provide SIGAR with information regarding its
recently announced $40 million contribution towards girls’ educationin Afghanistan. In its press release regarding this new agreement with
UNICEF, USAID described its robust support to the education sector,
including relevant training for female teachers, delivering textbooks, andproviding direct support to families with school-aged and adolescent girls.
USAID said this award aims to create the conditions needed to retain askilled female teacher workforce and keep girls learning across the primaryand secondary levels.95
TABLE E.5

USAID REMAINING EDUCATION PROGRAMS, AS OF THE MOST RECENT DATA PROVIDED ON JULY 9, 2022
Cumulative
Disbursements,
as of 7/6/2022

Project Title

Start Date

End Date

Total
Estimated Cost

Strengthening Education in Afghanistan (SEA II)

5/19/201412/31/2023$49,828,942$45,825,719

Let Girls Learn Initiative and Girls’ Education Challenge Programme (GEC)

6/29/2016

9/30/2022

29,000,000

25,000,000

Technical Capacity Building for AUAF

2/1/2021

5/31/2022

18,947,149

11,601,581$97,776,091$82,427,300

Total
Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2022.

The Taliban’s Continuing—and Costly—Ban on Girls’
Secondary Education
The Taliban have not permitted girls to attend school between the sixthand twelfth grades since they took power in August 2021. On September 18,
2022, the first anniversary of the reopening of boys’ high schools, the United
Nations again called on the Taliban to allow girls to return to high schools,
noting that the denial of education violates the most fundamental rights ofwomen and girls, and increases the risk of marginalization, violence, exploitation, and abuse.96“This is a tragic, shameful, and entirely avoidable anniversary,” saidMarkus Potzel, UN Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan.
“The ongoing exclusion of girls from high school has no credible justification and has no parallel anywhere in the world. It is profoundly damaging
to a generation of girls and to the future of Afghanistan itself.”97
On September 20, Taliban supreme leader Haibatullah Akhundzada
appointed Habibullah Agha, a member of his inner circle, as the new

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Primary school-aged girls in grades 1–3 attend classes in Herat. (UNICEF photoby Sayed Bidel)

minister of education. Agha was previously the head of Kandahar Provincial
Council, as well as a judge during the Taliban’s 1996–2001 regime. While
Agha has not made any announcements on the future of girls’ education,
his appointment has raised concerns. “The appointment of Habibullah
Agha... indicates the Taliban are elevating loyalists who reject the reopeningof girls’ schools,” said Nishank Motwani, an Afghan specialist and fellow at
Harvard University’s Kennedy School.98
On September 27, a senior Taliban official made a rare statement onbehalf of restoring girls’ access to education. Taliban deputy minister of foreign affairs Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai said at a Taliban gathering in
Kabul that “it is very important that education must be provided to all, without any discrimination… Women must get an education, there is no Islamicprohibition for girls’ education.” Stanikzai added, “Let’s not provide opportunities for others to create a gap between the government and people… if
there are technical issues, that needs to be resolved, and schools for girls
must be opened.”99
While the Taliban claim they are working on a plan to reopen girls’
secondary schools for girls, they have given no timeframe. Previously, theTaliban education ministry had announced that girls could return to secondary and upper secondary schools on March 23, the start of the current
school year. However, that promise was broken on the morning of March
23, when the ministry renewed the ban. The sudden policy reversal reportedly even took some Taliban members by surprise.100
Despite the official Taliban ban, UNICEF reported this quarter
that “secondary schools remained open for girls in 11 provinces, withsecondary schools fully open in five provinces and partially open in
six provinces.”101 A small number of schools reviewed during a SIGAR-REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

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sponsored survey this summer also reported girls being allowed to attend
higher secondary education.102
Still, UNICEF estimates that over three million girls who previously
attended secondary school have been denied their right to education in theyear since the Taliban took power. Close to half, they said, are unlikely toreturn should schools reopen. In 2019, girls made up 38% of the estimated
9.2 million Afghan students. Even before the political transition, 4.2 million
children were out of school, 60% of them girls.103
Restrictions on girls’ education have economic costs, too, and are likely
to deepen Afghanistan’s economic crisis and lead to greater insecurity,
poverty, and isolation, according to the UN.104 An educated labor force
contributes more to the national economy with higher levels of productivity, while earning higher wages. Though potential costs from lost education
are high for both boys and girls in terms of lost earnings, a failure to educate girls has further costs in part because of the relationships between
educational attainment, child marriage, and early childbearing.105
Without female education and economic participation, Afghanistan’s real
gross domestic product (GDP) will remain only a fraction of its true potential. UNICEF estimates that the Taliban ban on girls’ secondary education
may end up costing the Afghan economy up to $5.4 billion in lifetime earnings potential. In an August 2022 report, UNICEF noted:
This loss can be minimized to only $500 million [2.5% of
Afghanistan’s 2020 GDP] should the authorities decide notto prolong the return of secondary education and economic
participation of girls and women. This should howeverbe accompanied by concerted efforts to return all girls toschool. The costs of this interruption alone could be as highas $3.7 billion if 65% of the girls previously enrolled fail toreturn and complete secondary school.106

These estimates do not account for the losses from policy knock-on
effects from reduced enthusiasm for primary education, nor the loss ofaccess to university education, nor the negative impacts from a lack of
education toward health and family planning.107
According to a survey study released by Save the Children this quarter,
students in primary and secondary schools also noted a declining quality ofteaching, “citing a lack of motivation from teachers, a lack of qualifications
for certain subjects, and the fact that to fill gaps, older students are teaching
younger children.”108
While access and quality were major issues related to children’s education before August 2021, Save the Children reported that in the past schools
were open, school materials were available, and both boys and girls were
happy they could attend classes. Some children told the NGO that while
COVID-19 had prevented them from going to school the previous year, they
had kept studying and, in some cases, continued to follow classes online.109

122

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT- - - - - - --A 16-year old girl unable to start 11th grade in Kabul, Afghanistan. (UNICEF photoby Mohammad Haya Burhan)

Many teachers also continue to report missing or delayed salary payments, as corroborated by a SIGAR-sponsored survey of 122 schools across
10 Afghan provinces.110

Taliban Tighten Restrictions on Women’s Accessto Higher Education
At the higher education level, public and private universities remain open.
Female students and faculty continue to face restrictions, including separate participation days and strict uniform guidelines. Women attending
university also experience significant harassment, according to USAID.111
Women are also reportedly dropping out of university at a far higher rate
than men.112
A lack of female teachers and facilities also complicates women’s accessto higher education, since the Taliban mandate that female students betaught only by female teachers.113
According to media reports in October, the Taliban have also blocked
women from taking college entrance exams for a wide range of subjects,
including engineering, economics, veterinary medicine, agriculture, geology,
and journalism. According to one student interviewed, the Taliban deemed
those topics “too difficult for women to handle.”114
In a statement to BBC News, a Taliban official tried to downplay theserestrictions, claiming that they “need to provide separate classes for
women. In some areas the number of female candidates are low. So weare not allowing women to apply for certain courses.”115
Additionally, even though female students are allowed to attend somehigher education institutions, their inability to attend secondary schools
will effectively bar them from advancing to the university level.116

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The number of female students applying to university has already fallen
compared to previous years. For example, in Laghman Province only 182
girls took college entrance exams this year, compared to 1,200 last year.117

PUBLIC HEALTH

USAID refused to provide SIGAR with financial or programmatic data for its
ongoing public health initiatives in Afghanistan this quarter. As of the latest
data USAID provided in July 2022, USAID continued to implement 11 publichealth programs worth a total of $307,600,139, as seen in Table E.6.118
TABLE E.6

USAID REMAINING HEALTH PROGRAMS, AS OF THE MOST RECENT DATA PROVIDED ON JULY 9, 2022
Cumulative
Disbursements,
as of 7/6/2022

Start Date

End Date

Total
Estimated Cost

DEWS Plus

7/1/2014

6/30/2022$54,288,615$41,588,740

Assistance for Families and Indigent Afghans to Thrive (AFIAT)

7/10/2020

7/9/2025

117,000,000

20,413,201

Urban Health Initiative (UHI) Program

10/14/2020

10/13/2025

104,000,000

20,251,698

SHOPS Plus

10/1/2015

9/30/2022

13,886,000

13,162,480

Afghanistan Demographic and Health Survey (ADHS) Follow-On

10/9/2018

9/9/2023

10,500,000

5,548,814

Central Contraceptive Procurement (CCP)

4/20/201511/28/2023

3,599,998

3,122,674

Sustaining Technical and Analytic Resources (STAR)

5/1/2018

9/30/2023

2,186,357

1,274,223

TB Data, Impact Assessment and Communications Hub (TB DIAH)

9/24/20189/24/2023

600,000

600,000

Meeting Targets and Maintaining Epidemic Control

4/15/2019

4/14/2024

270,000

270,000

Global Health Supply Chain Management (GHSCM-PSM)

4/20/201511/28/2023

176,568

176,568

Modeling American Healthcare, Standards & Values in Afghanistan

10/1/2020

9/30/2022

1,092,601

0$307,600,139$106,408,398

Project Title

Total
Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2022.

Access to Health Care Services Remains Strained
Access to health care remains a major concern for communities acrossAfghanistan, according to the World Health Organization (WHO) and publichealth NGOs. Thousands of health facilities continue to struggle with limited
funding and resources, while health care needs grow in the midst of a “cocktail of disasters and crises,” including persistent hunger and economic crises,
a series of natural disasters, and multiple outbreaks of COVID-19, measles,
and acute watery diarrhea. Public facilities face shortages in staff, training,
medicine, and equipment, and the few private clinics that are able to run areunaffordable for many, causing poorer patients to delay seeking health care.119

124

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT•n•••==• -..,

Student midwives in UNHCR’s two-year training program in Daykundi Province.
(UNHCR Afghanistan photo)

International donor funding has been pivotal in preventing a collapse of
the health sector by ensuring essential staff continue to be paid. UNOCHA
reported that the Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund and Central Emergency
Reserve Fund helped ensure that some 7.7 million people received sustained health services in 2022, including three million women and girls who
received primary, reproductive, and maternal health support, contributing
to reduced excess maternal, neonatal, and child deaths.120
Many health facilities reported their staff received salaries on time during the last 10 months according to data collected in a SIGAR-sponsoredsurvey of 120 health facilities across 10 Afghan provinces.121
While humanitarian actors have kept Afghanistan’s fragile health caresystem afloat, UN and NGO reports note that this cannot be not a longterm solution. “Humanitarian organizations and funding mechanisms will
never be a substitute for a well-functioning public health system. Afghans
urgently need a health care system that meets their needs,” wrote Médecins
Sans Frontières.122
WHO estimated 18.1 million Afghans needed health services in August
2022, including 3.2 million children under five years old and 348,621 pregnant women. Afghanistan continues to have some of the highest maternal
and infant mortality rates in the world, with a projected maternal mortality
rate of 638 deaths per 100,000 births and an infant mortality rate estimatedto be 46.5 per 1,000 live births, this quarter. WHO reported that pregnant
women are in dire need of pre- and post-natal care, as well as access to

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125

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Women health workers train on basic emergency care. (UNHCR Afghanistan photo)skilled birth attendants. An estimated 20% of deliveries and 20% of newborns will require life-saving emergency interventions.123
Since August 2021, women in Afghanistan have been disproportionately impacted by barriers to basic health care services, facing restricted
decision-making and mobility, as well as gender norms that prohibit themfrom interacting with anyone outside of their family. Many women suffer
in silence from various diseases while being prevented from seeking necessary medical support, according to the UN.124
Children in Afghanistan also face significant health risks from the combined effects of severe hunger and a lack of safe drinking water. According
to Médecins Sans Frontières, “children are more vulnerable to severe illness
from malnutrition if they are also fighting other diseases such as measles,
malaria, pneumonia, and gastrointestinal infections. They are also more
susceptible to these diseases if they are malnourished, as their immune systems are weakened. It’s a vicious cycle. Acute watery diarrhea, which peaks
in summer, is particularly dangerous for malnourished children and is oneof the leading causes of death in children in Afghanistan.”125
The departure of development agencies from Afghanistan after the
Taliban takeover in August 2021 led to the suspension or termination ofmany major infrastructure projects, including those meant to bolster thecountry’s overstretched water supply infrastructure. According to theInternational Committee of the Red Cross, the lack of safe drinking water
for millions of people increases their risk of contracting waterborne diseases such as acute watery diarrhea, thus further straining the healthsector.126 In August, UNICEF reported a 25% increase in admitted severe

126

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

acute malnutrition cases, particularly in Helmand and Kandahar due
to the ongoing effects of drought and acute watery diarrhea.127
Last quarter, USAID reported supporting one project to address
Afghanistan’s water supply challenges: UNICEF’s $35 million Rural Water
Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene (Ru-WASH) program, funded through afive-year grant agreement awarded on June 24, 2020.128 Ru-WASH projects
aim to address acute water and sanitation needs in underserved rural
areas in Afghanistan, and promote efforts to improve basic drinking-watersupply sources and expand access to sanitation facilities for children atschools. These activities were being conducted in Khost, Maydan Wardak,
Paktika, Panjshir, Paktiya, Kabul, Laghman, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Sar-e Pul,
Samangan, and Jowzjan Provinces.129 USAID refused to provide SIGAR withan update on their ongoing infrastructure projects, including Ru-WASH, forthis quarterly report.

Vaccination Programs
The international community continues to support surveillance efforts andvaccination campaigns for COVID-19, measles, and polio in Afghanistan.
WHO and UNICEF supported a national COVID-19 vaccination campaign
conducted from July 16 to August 14, 2022, reaching 4.4 million individuals in 34 provinces. Some 194,241 COVID-19 cases have been reported in
Afghanistan since the start of the pandemic in February 2020, alongside
a total of 7,782 deaths.130 Public-health officials and experts have long cautioned that the number of confirmed cases vastly undercounts the true
spread and impact of the disease because of Afghanistan’s low testing
capacity and the limited reach of its public-health system.131
UNICEF reported vaccinating over 170,000 children under-fiveagainst measles through routine immunization programs in August,with planned measles campaigns for 85 new high-risk districts in 25 provinces in September. Between January and the end of May 2022, there
were 65,470 suspected cases of measles and 367 related deaths reported
in Afghanistan.132
In July, the WHO conducted their largest review to date of Afghanistan’s
polio surveillance system. Reviewers visited 152 health facilities in 76
districts across 25 provinces, interviewing 899 people from a community
surveillance network that makes up over 46,000 people, including pharmacists, community health workers, faith healers, nurses, imams, and bone
fixers. The review determined that Afghanistan’s polio surveillance system
is functioning well and that the likelihood of undetected poliovirus transmission is low.133
Afghanistan remains one of the last countries where polio is endemic,
though the number of cases has dropped in recent years. So far in 2022,
only two children have been paralyzed by wild poliovirus, compared tofour in 2021, and 56 in 2020.134

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127

A 3-year-old Afghan boy receiving his polio
vaccine on the first day of the September
vaccination campaign in Mazar-e Sharif.
(UNICEF Afghanistan photo)ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ENDNOTES   1 See Appendix B.
   2 State SCA, response to SIGAR vetting, 4/13/2022.
   3 UNHCR, “Five things you should know about Afghanistan,”
8/15/2022; ICRC, “Afghanistan: Millions affected by growing
humanitarian needs,” 8/15/2022; Médecins Sans Frontières,“Afghanistan: One year after US withdrawal, massive humanitarian needs remain,” 8/15/2022; Refugees International, “Fitfor Purpose: Getting Humanitarian Aid Right in Afghanistan
One Year after the Taliban Takeover,” August 2022, p. 4; SIGAR,
Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/30/2022,
pp. 99, 104   4 WFP, Afghanistan Food Security Update – Round 10: June 2022,
6/10/2022; UNICEF, Afghanistan Humanitarian Situation Report# 9, 1 – 31 August 2022,” 9/17/2022; WFP, WFP Afghanistan
Situation Report, 9/15/2022.
   5 WFP, WFP Afghanistan Situation Report, 9/15/2022; WFP,
Afghanistan Food Security Update – Round 10: June 2022,
6/10/2022.
   6 IPC, Afghanistan Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, March 2022–
May 2022, 5/9/2022; WFP, WFP Afghanistan Situation Report,
9/15/2022.
   7 UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Coordinator Reaffirms Commitment
to Meeting Life-Saving Needs and Supporting Vulnerable
Communities Across Afghanistan,” 8/11/2022.
   8 UNOCHA, Financial Tracking Service – Afghanistan 2022,
accessed 10/4/2022.
   9 UNHCR, “Five things you should know about Afghanistan,”
8/15/2022; WFP, WFP Afghanistan Situation Report, 9/15/2022;
UNICEF, Afghanistan Humanitarian Situation Report # 9, 1 – 31
August 2022,” 9/17/2022.
10 UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Coordinator Reaffirms Commitment
to Meeting Life-Saving Needs and Supporting Vulnerable
Communities Across Afghanistan,” 8/11/2022.
11 UN News, “UN relief chief stresses need to stay and deliver
for all Afghans,” 8/29/2022; UNOCHA, Under-Secretary-Generalfor Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator
Martin Griffiths Remarks to the UN Security Council on the
Humanitarian Situation in Afghanistan, 8/29/2022.
12 UNOCHA, Afghanistan Humanitarian Access Snapshot,
9/13/2022; UNICEF, Afghanistan Humanitarian Situation Report# 9, 1 – 31 August 2022,” 9/17/2022.
13 UNOCHA, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
and Emergency Relief Coordinator Martin Griffiths Remarks
to the UN Security Council on the Humanitarian Situation in
Afghanistan, 8/29/2022; UN News, “UN relief chief stresses needto stay and deliver for all Afghans,” 8/29/2022.
14 WFP, WFP Afghanistan Situation Report, 9/15/2022.
15 Gandhara (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), “‘We Are
Left with Nothing’: Deadly Floods Aggravate Afghanistan’s
Economic, Humanitarian Crisis,” 8/31/2022.
16 FAO and WFP, Hunger Hotspots FAO-WFP early warnings
on acute food insecurity – June to September 2022 Outlook,
6/6/2022, pp. 5, 7; IPC, Afghanistan Acute Food Insecurity
Analysis, March 2022–May 2022, 5/9/2022.

128

17 UNICEF, Afghanistan Humanitarian Situation Report # 9, 1 – 31
August 2022,” 9/17/2022.
18 UN IOM, “Renewing Our Commitment to the People ofAfghanistan,” 8/15/2022.
19 UNHCR, “Five things you should know about Afghanistan,”
8/15/2022.
20 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Earthquake Response Situation Report
No. 3, 8/26/2022.
21 IFRC, “Afghanistan: Unending crises driving millions to breaking point,” 8/15/2022; IFRC, “National Society directory – Afghan
Red Crescent,” accessed 10/4/2022.
22 UN News, “Humanitarian funding still needed for ‘pure catastrophe’ situation in Afghanistan,” 8/15/2022.
23 UNICEF, Afghanistan Humanitarian Situation Report # 9, 1 – 31
August 2022,” 9/17/2022; Gandhara (Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty), “‘We Are Left With Nothing’: Deadly Floods Aggravate
Afghanistan’s Economic, Humanitarian Crisis,” 8/31/2022;
Reuters, “Death toll from floods in Afghanistan rises above 180 Taliban,” 8/31/2022.
24 Gandhara (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), “‘We Are
Left with Nothing’: Deadly Floods Aggravate Afghanistan’s
Economic, Humanitarian Crisis,” 8/31/2022; UNOCHA,
Afghanistan Humanitarian Access Snapshot, 9/13/2022.
25 CNN, “Nearly 100 dead in Afghanistan floods, officials say,”
8/23/2022; Reuters, “Death toll from floods in Afghanistan rises
above 180 - Taliban,” 8/31/2022.
26 Bloomberg, “Afghanistan Floods, Quakes Kill Over 1,500 People
in Two Months,” 9/3/2022.
27 UNOCHA, Snapshot of Flash Floods in 2022, as of 31 August,
9/1/2022.
28 UNOCHA, Snapshot of Flash Floods in 2022, as of 31 August,
9/1/2022.
29 Reuters, “Afghanistan earthquake survivors unsafe as aftershocks continue, official says,” 6/27/2022; New York Times,“In Afghan Quake: ‘I Did Not Expect to Survive,’” 6/23/2022.
30 UNOCHA, Afghanistan: Earthquake Response Situation Report
No. 3, 8/26/2022.
31 USAID press release, “The United States has provided more than
$1.1 billion to respond to humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan
since August 2021,” 9/23/2022; USAID, “Afghanistan – Complex
Emergency,” Fact Sheet #9 Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, 9/23/2022.
32 USAID press release, “United States announces additional funding commitments to support the Afghan people,” 8/12/2022;
State, response to SIGAR vetting, 10/12/2022.
33 USAID press release, “United States announces $80 million commitment to United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
to improve food security and nutrition for vulnerable Afghans,”
8/12/2022.
34 USAID press release, “United States Announces $30 million
commitment to advance women and girls’ rights in Afghanistan,”
8/12/2022.
35 USAID press release, “USAID announces new $40 million
agreement with UNICEF to increase girls’ and boys’ education
opportunities in Afghanistan,” 8/12/2022.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT- - - - - - -36 World Bank, “Emergency Support for the People ofAfghanistan,” 9/9/2022; USAID, response to SIGAR data call,
6/16/2022.
37 World Bank, “Emergency Support for the People ofAfghanistan,” 9/9/2022; UN FAO, “Afghanistan: FAO and theWorld Bank step up their response to the worsening food security,” 6/13/2022.
38 World Bank, “Emergency Support for the People ofAfghanistan,” 9/9/2022; World Bank, Afghanistan Community
Resilience and Livelihoods Project (P178760) Project
Information Document (PID), 4/22/2022.
39 World Bank, “Emergency Support for the People of Afghanistan,”
9/9/2022; UNICEF, “Afghanistan Health Emergency Response(HER) Project | About,” updated 5/31/2022, accessed 6/20/2022.
40 World Bank, “Emergency Support for the People of Afghanistan,”
9/9/2022; UNICEF, “Emergency Education Response for
Afghanistan (EERA),” updated 8/25/2022, accessed 9/21/2022.
41 World Bank, “Emergency Support for the People of Afghanistan,”
9/9/2022.
42 UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Coordinator Reaffirms Commitment
to Meeting Life-Saving Needs and Supporting Vulnerable
Communities Across Afghanistan,” 8/11/2022; USIP, “One Year
Later, Taliban Unable to Reverse Afghanistan’s Economic
Decline,” 8/8/2022; UNDP, One Year in Review: Afghanistan Since
August 2021, A Socio-Economic Snapshot, 10/5/2022, pp. 4, 11.
43 World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 9/23/2022; World
Bank, Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 8/23/2022; World Bank,
Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 7/19/2022.
44 World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 9/23/2022; World
Bank, Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 8/23/2022; World Bank,
Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 7/19/2022; USIP, “A Year into
Taliban Rule, Afghans Face Spiraling Economic, Humanitarian
Crises Humanitarian organizations discuss the dire situation in
the country and how the United States can help,” 8/17/2022.
45 World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 9/23/2022; World
Bank, Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 8/23/2022; World Bank,
Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 7/19/2022.
46 World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 9/23/2022; World
Bank, Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 8/23/2022; World Bank,
Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 7/19/2022; Bloomberg, “Taliban
Declare Online Forex Trading Illegal in Afghanistan,” 6/28/2022.
47 Los Angeles Times, “Afghanistan’s money is crumbling to pieces,
just like its economy,” 9/27/2022.
48 World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 9/23/2022; World
Bank, Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 8/23/2022; World Bank,
Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 7/19/2022.
49 Bloomberg, “Taliban Ban Crypto in Afghanistan, Arrest Dealersof Tokens,” 8/26/2022; Wall Street Journal, “Afghan Economy
Crumbles Since Taliban Takeover,” 7/17/2022; Los Angeles
Times, “Afghanistan’s money is crumbling to pieces, just likeits economy,” 9/27/2022.
50 Human Rights Watch, “Economic Causes of Afghanistan’s
Humanitarian Crisis,” 8/4/2022.
51 UNOCHA, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
and Emergency Relief Coordinator Martin Griffiths Remarks
to the UN Security Council on the Humanitarian Situation in
Afghanistan, 8/29/2022; USIP, “A Year into Taliban Rule, Afghans
Face Spiraling Economic, Humanitarian Crises Humanitarian

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

52

53

54
55
56

57

58

59

60

61

organizations discuss the dire situation in the country and how
the United States can help,” 8/17/2022; Norwegian RefugeeCouncil, Afghanistan at a Precipice: Humanitarian overview one
year since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, 8/10/2022, p. 4;
Wall Street Journal, “Afghan Economy Crumbles Since Taliban
Takeover,” 7/17/2022.
NYU Center on International Cooperation, “The Biden
Administration’s Executive Order and the Economy,” 2/16/2022;
Refugees International, Fit for Purpose: Getting Humanitarian
Aid Right in Afghanistan One Year after the Taliban Takeover,
8/18/2022, pp. 7, 17–18.
UNOCHA, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
and Emergency Relief Coordinator Martin Griffiths Remarks
to the UN Security Council on the Humanitarian Situation in
Afghanistan, 8/29/2022.
ICRC, “Afghanistan: Millions affected by growing humanitarianneeds,” 8/15/2022.
Wall Street Journal, “Afghan Economy Crumbles Since Taliban
Takeover,” 7/17/2022.
Business Standard, “IMF suspends its engagement with
Afghanistan until clarity on Taliban govt,” 9/17/2021; Reuters,“EXCLUSIVE U.N. aims to launch new Afghanistan cash routein February: U.N. note,” 2/11/2022; State SCA, response to
SIGAR data call, 6/16/2022; UNOCHA, Under-Secretary-Generalfor Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator
Martin Griffiths Remarks to the UN Security Council on the
Humanitarian Situation in Afghanistan, 8/29/2022; Refugees
International, Fit for Purpose: Getting Humanitarian Aid Rightin Afghanistan One Year after the Taliban Takeover, 8/18/2022,
p. 18.
UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Coordinator Reaffirms Commitment
to Meeting Life-Saving Needs and Supporting Vulnerable
Communities Across Afghanistan,” 8/11/2022; UNOCHA, UnderSecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency
Relief Coordinator Martin Griffiths Remarks to the UN Security
Council on the Humanitarian Situation in Afghanistan, 8/29/2022.
Norwegian Refugee Council, Afghanistan at a Precipice:
Humanitarian overview one year since the Taliban takeoverof Afghanistan, 8/10/2022, p. 8; USIP, “A Year into Taliban
Rule, Afghans Face Spiraling Economic, Humanitarian Crises
Humanitarian organizations discuss the dire situation in the
country and how the United States can help,” 8/17/2022.
Reuters, “International economists ask Biden to release Afghan
central bank funds,” 8/10/2022; Refugees International, Fit
for Purpose: Getting Humanitarian Aid Right in Afghanistan
One Year after the Taliban Takeover, 8/18/2022, pp. 7, 17–18;
NYU Center on International Cooperation, “The Biden
Administration’s Executive Order and the Economy,” 2/16/2022.
Treasury and State press release, “Joint Statement by U.S.
Treasury and State Department: The United States andPartners Announce Establishment of Fund for the Peopleof Afghanistan,” 9/14/2022; State, “Department Press Briefing– September 14, 2022,” 9/14/2022; CBS News, “U.S. sets up$3.5 billion fund to aid Afghanistan using frozen bank reserves,”
9/15/2022; Washington Post, “U.S. to redirect Afghanistan’s frozen assets after Taliban rejects deal,” 9/20/2022.
State, “Department Press Briefing – September 14, 2022,”
9/14/2022.

129

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

62 New York Times, “Judge Recommends Rejecting Bid by Sept.
11 Families to Seize Frozen Afghan Funds,” 9/20/2022; CBS
News, “U.S. sets up $3.5 billion fund to aid Afghanistan using
frozen bank reserves,” 9/15/2022; See Statement of Interestof the United States of America, Havlish v. Bin-Laden, Doc.
563, Case 1:03-cv-09848-GBD-SN, U.S. Dist. Ct. S.D.N.Y. (filed
2/11/2022); Treasury and State press release, “Joint Statement
by U.S. Treasury and State Department: The United States andPartners Announce Establishment of Fund for the People ofAfghanistan,” 9/14/2022.
63 Fund for the Afghan People, Statutes of September 2, 2022, Art.
8.2, English translation, 9/2/2022; Al Jazeera, “US to move $3.5bn
in Afghan assets to Swiss-based trust,” 9/14/2022.
64 Treasury and State press release, “Joint Statement by
U.S. Treasury and State Department: The United States andPartners Announce Establishment of Fund for the Peopleof Afghanistan,” 9/14/2022.
65 Treasury and State press release, “Joint Statement by
U.S. Treasury and State Department: The United States andPartners Announce Establishment of Fund for the Peopleof Afghanistan,” 9/14/2022; Al Jazeera, “US to move $3.5bn in
Afghan assets to Swiss-based trust,” 9/14/2022; Site officiel de laRépublique et canton de Genève, “Fund for the Afghan People –Fondation,” 9/5/2022.
66 Abdul Qahar Balkhi (@QaharBalkhi), “Statement by MoFA on
DAB reserves...” 9/15/2022, https://twitter.com/qaharbalkhi/statu
s/1570476674202083328?s=21&t=iLKKjwh2m2bUlENWTwqXuQ
172207105?cxt=HHwWgoC5ueP00_YpAAAA; State, “Department
Press Briefing – September 14, 2022,” 9/14/2022; CBS News, “U.S.
sets up $3.5 billion fund to aid Afghanistan using frozen bankreserves,” 9/15/2022.
67 Abdul Qahar Balkhi (@QaharBalkhi), “Statement by MoFA on
DAB reserves...” 9/15/2022, https://twitter.com/qaharbalkhi/statu
s/1570476674202083328?s=21&t=iLKKjwh2m2bUlENWTwqXuQ
172207105?cxt=HHwWgoC5ueP00_YpAAAA; State, “Department
Press Briefing – September 14, 2022,” 9/14/2022.
68 NYU Center on International Cooperation, “The Biden
Administration’s Executive Order and the Economy,” 2/16/2022;
SIGAR, April 2022 Quarterly Report to the United States
Congress, 4/30/2022.
69 State, “Department Press Briefing – September 14, 2022,”
9/14/2022; Treasury and State press release, “Joint Statement
by U.S. Treasury and State Department: The United States andPartners Announce Establishment of Fund for the People ofAfghanistan,” 9/14/2022.
70 Treasury and State press release, “Joint Statement by
U.S. Treasury and State Department: The United States andPartners Announce Establishment of Fund for the Peopleof Afghanistan,” 9/14/2022.
71 Treasury and State press release, “Joint Statement by U.S.
Treasury and State Department: The United States andPartners Announce Establishment of Fund for the Peopleof Afghanistan,” 9/14/2022.
72 NYU Center on International Cooperation, “The Biden
Administration’s Executive Order and the Economy,” 2/16/2022.
73 NYU Center on International Cooperation, “The Biden
Administration’s Executive Order and the Economy,” 2/16/2022.

130

74 Washington Post, “U.S. to redirect Afghanistan’s frozen assets
after Taliban rejects deal,” 9/20/2022.
75 TOLOnews, “$150M Must Be Delivered to Afghan Market toStabilize Currency: Mehrabi,” 9/18/2022; Al Jazeera, “US to move
$3.5bn in Afghan assets to Swiss-based trust,” 9/14/2022.
76 USIP, “Afghanistan’s Frozen Foreign Exchange Reserves: What
Happened, What’s Next,” 3/1/2022.
77 United States District Court Southern District of New York,In re: Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001; Report andRecommendation by Sarah Netburn, United States Magistrate
Judge, 03-MD-01570 (GBD)(SN), Case 1:03-cv-09848-GBD-SN
Document 652, Filed 08/26/22, accessed 9/21/2022 via link; NewYork Times, “Judge Recommends Rejecting Bid by Sept. 11
Families to Seize Frozen Afghan Funds,” 9/20/2022.
78 New York Times, “Judge Recommends Rejecting Bid by Sept. 11
Families to Seize Frozen Afghan Funds,” 9/20/2022.
79 UNDP, One Year in Review: Afghanistan Since August 2021, A
Socio-Economic Snapshot, 10/5/2022, pp. 12, 13; Ministry of
Finance (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan), 1st Quarterly Fiscal
Bulletin FY1399, 4/2020, pp. 3, 7.
80 World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 9/23/2022.
81 World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 9/23/2022.
82 Voice of America, “Taliban Again Raise Coal Prices Amid
Booming Exports to Pakistan,” 7/16/2022.
83 World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Monitor, 8/23/2022; World
Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution – Afghanistan Trade,
accessed 9/29/2022.
84 Voice of America, “Taliban Again Raise Coal Prices Amid
Booming Exports to Pakistan,” 7/16/2022.
85 Reuters, “EXCLUSIVE Afghan Taliban sign deal for Russian oil
products, gas and wheat,” 9/27/2022.
86 Business Insider, “The Taliban wants to import oil from Russia
in exchange for minerals and medicinal herbs. It’s not the firstto discuss a barter system with the energy giant,” 8/23/2022;
Reuters, “Taliban officials nearing contract for purchase of gasoline from Russia,” 8/29/2022.
87 ICRC, “Afghanistan: Millions affected by growing humanitarianneeds,” 8/15/2022.
88 Reuters, “Taliban to sign contract with UAE’s GAAC Holding
over airspace control at Afghan airports,” 9/8/2022; Voice ofAmerica, “Taliban Allow UAE Company to Run Operations at
Key Afghan Airports,” 5/24/2022.
89 Reuters, “Taliban to sign contract with UAE’s GAAC Holding
over airspace control at Afghan airports,” 9/8/2022.
90 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
7/30/2022, p. 114.
91 USAID press release, “United States Announces $30 million
commitment to advance women and girls’ rights in Afghanistan,”
8/12/2022.
92 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
7/30/2022, p. 115.
93 USAID press release, “United States announces $80 million commitment to United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
to improve food security and nutrition for vulnerable Afghans,”
8/12/2022.
94 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
7/30/2022, p. 120.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT- - - - - - -95 USAID press release, “USAID announces new $40 million
agreement with UNICEF to increase girls’ and boys’ education
opportunities in Afghanistan,” 8/12/2022.
96 UNAMA, “One Year of Girls Being Excluded From High School –Renewed Call That They Be Enabled To Return To Classroom,”
9/18/2022; Washington Post, “Amid UN criticism, Taliban namenew education minister,” 7/17/2022.
97 UNAMA, “One Year of Girls Being Excluded From High School –Renewed Call That They Be Enabled To Return To Classroom,”
9/18/2022.
98 Reuters, “Taliban replaces Afghan acting education ministerin reshuffle,” 9/20/2022; Washington Post, “Amid UN criticism, Taliban name new education minister,” 7/17/2022; Al
Arabiya, “Afghanistan: Taliban appoint new education minister,”
9/20/2022.
99 Al Jazeera, “Taliban official calls for schools to be reopened
for girls,” 9/27/2022.
100 Washington Post, “Amid UN criticism, Taliban name new education minister,” 7/17/2022; Reuters, “Taliban replaces Afghan
acting education minister in reshuffle,” 9/20/2022.
101 UNICEF, Afghanistan Humanitarian Situation Report # 9, 1 – 31
August 2022, 9/17/2022.
102 SIGAR analysis of data collected via surveys in 10 provincesin Afghanistan between May and July 2022.
103 UNICEF, “Cost of Inaction: Girl’s education in Afghanistan,”
8/16/2022.
104 Washington Post, “Amid UN criticism, Taliban name new
education minister,” 7/17/2022.
105 UNICEF, “Cost of Inaction: Girl’s education in Afghanistan,”
8/16/2022.
106 UNICEF, “Cost of Inaction: Girl’s education in Afghanistan,”
8/16/2022.
107 UNICEF, “Cost of Inaction: Girl’s education in Afghanistan,”
8/16/2022.
108 Save the Children, Breaking Point: Children’s Lives One Year
Under Taliban Rule, 8/10/2022, p. 18.
109 Save the Children, Breaking Point: Children’s Lives One Year
Under Taliban Rule, 8/10/2022, p. 16.
110 SIGAR analysis of data collected via surveys in 10 provincesin Afghanistan between May and July 2022.
111 USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 6/16/2022; USAID press
release, “United States Announces $30 million commitment
to advance women and girls’ rights in Afghanistan,” 8/12/2022.
112 The Borlaug Institute of International Agriculture at Texas A&M
AgriLife Research, Women’s Scholarship Endowment Quarterly
Report FY2022 Q3, 7/2022, pp. 3–5, 7.
113 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Taliban Resurrects Gender
Segregation in Public Offices, Transport In Afghanistan,”
3/16/2022; USAID OED, response to SIGAR data call, 3/16/2022.
114 CBS News, “Afghanistan: Taliban ban women from many university subjects,” 10/14/2022; BBC News, “Taliban blocks womenfrom college entrance exams in subjects deemed ‘too difficult’,”
10/14/2022.
115 BBC News, “Taliban blocks women from college entrance
exams in subjects deemed ‘too difficult’,” 10/14/2022.
116 USAID, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/12/2022.
117 BBC News, “Taliban blocks women from college entrance
exams in subjects deemed ‘too difficult’,” 10/14/2022.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

118 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
7/30/2022, p. 124.
119 WHO, Afghanistan Health Cluster Bulletin - August 2022,
9/24/2022; ICRC, “Afghanistan: Millions affected by growing
humanitarian needs,” 8/15/2022; Médecins Sans Frontières,“Afghanistan: One year after US withdrawal, massive humanitarian needs remain,” 8/15/2022; IFRC, “Afghanistan: Unending
crises driving millions to breaking point,” 8/15/2022.
120 UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Coordinator Reaffirms Commitment
to Meeting Life-Saving Needs and Supporting Vulnerable
Communities Across Afghanistan,” 8/11/2022.
121 SIGAR analysis of data collected via surveys in 10 provincesin Afghanistan between May and July 2022.
122 UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Coordinator Reaffirms Commitment
to Meeting Life-Saving Needs and Supporting Vulnerable
Communities Across Afghanistan,” 8/11/2022; Médecins Sans
Frontières, “Afghanistan: One year after US withdrawal, massive
humanitarian needs remain,” 8/15/2022.
123 WHO, Afghanistan Health Cluster Bulletin - August 2022,
9/24/2022; World Bank, “Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births) - Afghanistan”, accessed 10/4/2022;
World Bank, “Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) –Afghanistan,” accessed 10/4/2022.
124 UN IOM, “No Woman Left Behind: Exceptional Efforts Increase
Health Care Access for Afghan Women,” 8/12/2022.
125 Médecins Sans Frontières, “Afghanistan: One year after US withdrawal, massive humanitarian needs remain,” 8/15/2022.
126 ICRC, “Afghanistan: Millions affected by growing humanitarianneeds,” 8/15/2022.
127 UNICEF, Afghanistan Humanitarian Situation Report # 9, 1 – 31
August 2022,” 9/17/2022.
128 USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 6/16/2022.
129 USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 6/16/2022; UNICEF, Rural
Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene (Ru-WASH) Indicator
Update Report, 1/30/2022.
130 WHO, Afghanistan Health Cluster Bulletin - August 2022,
9/24/2022.
131 Reuters, “COVID-19 out of control in Afghanistan as cases up
2,400% in a month,” 6/17/2021.
132 UNICEF, Afghanistan Humanitarian Situation Report # 9, 1 – 31
August 2022,” 9/17/2022; Think Global Health, “Measles is Raging
in Afghanistan,” 9/13/2022.
133 Global Polio Eradication Initiative, “Afghanistan completes
largest ever review of polio surveillance system,” 9/24/2022.
134 Global Polio Eradication Initiative, “Afghanistan completes
largest ever review of polio surveillance system,” 9/24/2022.

131

“Without a serious national political
dialogue about the future of the country
with Afghans who have genuine support
within their communities, I really dofear – and I think this is a consensus –that what we see now is a pause in
44 years of conflict and that we could
see a return to civil war in time.”—U.S. Special Representative
for Afghanistan Thomas West

Source: CSIS, “A Conversation with Thomas West in the Context of Afghanistan One Year Later,” 9/29/2022.

4

OTHER AGENCYOVERSIGHT

133

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

GOVERNANCE
OTHER
AGENCYCONTENTSOVERSIGHT CONTENTS
KEY ISSUESOversightCompleted& EVENTSActivities(H4 TOC)

136
3

Ongoing Oversight Activities

138

Photo on previous page
Taliban foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi speaks to reporters at a conference on Afghanistan in Tashkent, Uzbekistan on July 26, 2022.
(Taliban regime photo)

134

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHTSIGAR’s enabling legislation requires it to keep the Secretary of State andthe Secretary of Defense fully informed about problems relating to theadministration of Afghanistan reconstruction programs, and to submit areport to the Congress on SIGAR’s oversight work and on the status of the
U.S. reconstruction effort no later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal
quarter. The statute also instructs SIGAR to include, to the extent possible,
relevant matters from the end of the quarter up to the submission date ofits report.
Each quarter, SIGAR requests updates from other agencies on completed
and ongoing oversight activities. This section compiles these updates.
Copies of completed reports are posted on the agencies’ respective
public websites.
The descriptions appear as submitted, with minor changes to maintainconsistency with other sections of this report: acronyms and abbreviations
in place of full organizational names; standardized capitalization, punctuation, and preferred spellings; and third-person instead of first-person voice.
These agencies perform oversight activities related to Afghanistan andprovide results to SIGAR:• Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DOD OIG)
• Department of State Office of Inspector General (State OIG)
• Government Accountability Office (GAO)• U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General(USAID OIG)REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

135

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHTCOMPLETED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Table 4.1 lists the five oversight reports related to Afghanistan reconstruction that participating agencies issued this quarter.
TABLE 4.1

RECENTLY ISSUED OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER U.S. AGENCIES, AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2022
AgencyReport Number

Date Issued

Report Title

DOD OIGDOD OIG
State OIG

DODIG-2022-117
DODIG-2022-114
AUD-MER-22-38

8/15/2022
8/5/2022
9/30/2022

USAID OIG

5-306-22-015-N

9/28/2022

USAID OIG

5-306-22-014-N

9/28/2022

Evaluation of the August 29, 2021, Strike in Kabul, Afghanistan
Special Report: Lessons Learned from the Audit of DOD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals
Information Report: Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program Metrics
Financial Audit of Costs Incurred in Afghanistan of the USAID Resources Managed by Texas A&M AgriLife
Research (“AgriLife Research”) Cooperative Agreement No. 72030618CA00009 – Women’s Scholarship
Endowment (“WSE”) Independent Auditor’s Report on the Fund Accountability Statement For the period
September 27, 2018, through December 31, 2020
Closeout Audit of Costs Incurred by The Asia Foundation under the Financial and Business Management Activity
in Afghanistan, Contract AID-306-C-17-00014, April 1, 2020, to March 31, 2021

Source: DOD OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 9/26/2022; State OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 9/26/2022; GAO, response to SIGAR data call, 9/26/2022; USAID OIG, response to SIGAR
data call, 9/19/2022.

U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
During this quarter, DOD OIG issued two Afghanistan-related reports.

Evaluation of the August 29, 2021, Strike in Kabul,
Afghanistan
The DOD OIG evaluated whether the August 29, 2021, strike in Kabul,
Afghanistan, was conducted in accordance with DOD policies and procedures. Specifically, the evaluation reviewed the pre-strike targeting process,damage assessment and civilian casualty review reporting process, andpost-strike reporting of information. The report is classified.

Special Report: Lessons Learned from the Audit of DOD
Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals
The DOD OIG issued this special report as a result of its audit to determine
whether the DOD has adequately planned and provided support for the relocation of Afghan nationals.
The DOD OIG determined that the DOD successfully provided housing
and sustainment, medical care, and security for more than 34,900 Afghans
traveling through two installations in Germany and for more than 73,500
Afghan evacuees at eight U.S. installations. This special report identified
eight lessons learned from 11 management advisories the DOD OIG issued
related to Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome. The lessons learned include establishing agreements between Federal agencies
to define roles and responsibilities, establishing standard accountability
procedures, identifying funding limitations, and reprogramming funds whenpossible to resource mission essential requirements. The DOD OIG did not
make recommendations in this report.

136

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General–Middle
East Regional Operations
State OIG issued one Afghanistan-related report this quarter.

Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program Metrics
In 2009, Congress established a visa program to resettle Afghans who had
worked on behalf of the United States in Afghanistan and as a result, experienced an ongoing and serious threat. The Afghan Allies Protection Act
of 2009 authorized special immigrant visas (SIV) for Afghans who were
employed by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government in Afghanistan, provided
faithful and valuable service to the U.S. government, and experienced or are
experiencing an ongoing serious threat as a consequence of their employment by the U.S. government. In the wake of the August 2021 evacuationand suspension of operations at U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, multiple
congressional committees requested that State OIG review a range of topics
regarding the Afghan SIV program. State OIG is issuing a series of reports in
response to the requests.
This information report responded to specific congressional questions
involving the Afghan SIV process and related data: (1) a description of the
Afghan SIV process and the number of days allotted to complete each step;(2) the number of SIV applications received, approved, and denied annually
since enactment of the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, through calendar year 2021; (3) the number of SIV applications approved from April 2021
through August 2021; (4) the number and status of SIV applicants in eachphase of the SIV process as of May 31, 2022; and (5) the average time taken
to process an SIV application from submission to issuance or denial.
In the report, State OIG provided information and data regarding eachof the congressional questions. However, regarding the average time taken
to process an SIV application from submission to issuance or denial, StateOIG could not independently calculate the overall average SIV processing time because a key data element necessary to calculate a processing
time for the Chief of Mission approval phase was not sufficiently reliable
and application processing systems—State systems and a Department ofHomeland Security system—were not interoperable. Despite these limitations, State OIG was able to reliably calculate the average processing time
for the other two phases in the SIV process—the I-360 petition and the visa
application phase.
The report contained no recommendations.

Government Accountability Office

The GAO issued no Afghanistan-related reports this quarter.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

137

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

U.S. Agency for International Development Officeof Inspector General

This quarter, USAID OIG issued two financial audit reports. Financial auditsof USAID/Afghanistan programs are performed by public accounting firms.
USAID OIG performs desk reviews and random quality control reviewsof the audits, and transmits the reports to USAID/Afghanistan for action.
Summaries of financial audits can be found on the agency’s website.

ONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIESAs of September 30, 2022, the participating agencies reported 19 ongoingoversight activities related to reconstruction in Afghanistan. These activities
are listed in Table 4.2 and described in the following sections by agency.

U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

DOD OIG has 10 ongoing projects this quarter related to reconstruction
or security operations in Afghanistan.

Evaluation of DOD’s Support to Other Agencies Requests
For the Screening of Displaced Persons from Afghanistan
The objective of this evaluation is to determine the extent to which DOD
supported other agencies’ requests for screening Afghan evacuees byreviewing DOD databases.

Summary Evaluation of Security Cooperation Activities
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa
The objective of this evaluation is to summarize previous oversight reports
related to security cooperation activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa.

Audit of the Operation Allies Welcome Contract Oversightat DODThe objective of this audit is to determine whether DOD contracting personnel performed contract administration procedures for supplies andservices supporting the relocation of Afghan evacuees at DOD installations
in support of Operation Allies Welcome in accordance with Federal requirements and DOD regulations.

Audit of DOD Oversight of Air Force Contract Augmentation
Program (AFCAP) Contract Actions Related to the Relocationof Afghan Evacuees
The objective of this audit is to determine whether DOD adequately performed required oversight of contractor performance under the AFCAP
contract during the relocation of evacuees from Afghanistan.

138

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

TABLE 4.2

ONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES OF OTHER U.S. AGENCIES, AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2022
AgencyReport Number

DOD OIG

D2022-DEV0PD-0173.000

9/19/2022

DOD OIG

D2022-DEV0PD-0152.000

6/29/2022

Summary Evaluation of Security Cooperation Activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa

DOD OIG

D2022-D000RJ-0133.000

5/9/2022

Audit of the Operation Allies Welcome Contract Oversight at DOD Installations

DOD OIG

D2022-D000RJ-0133.002

5/9/2022

Audit of DOD Oversight of Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP) Contract Actions Related to
the Relocation of Afghan Evacuees

DOD OIG

D2022-D000RJ-0133.001

5/9/2022

Audit of DOD Oversight of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Contract Actions Related to the
Relocation of Afghan Evacuees

DOD OIG

D2022-D000AX-0138.000

5/5/2022

Audit of DOD Afghanistan Contingency Contracts Closeout

DOD OIG

D2022-DEV0PD-0110.000

3/7/2022

Evaluation of DOD Security and Life Support for Afghan Evacuees at Camp Bondsteel

DOD OIG

D2022-D000FI-0095.000

2/15/2022

Audit of DOD Reporting on Obligations and Expenditures in Support of Operation Allies Welcome

DOD OIG

D2022-D000FV-0091.000

1/28/2022

Audit of the DOD’s Financial Management of the Afghanistan Security Forces FundDOD OIG

D2021-D000RK-0118.00

5/24/2021

Audit of Tracking, Recovery, and Reuse of DOD-Owned Shipping Containers

State OIG

22AUD065

5/19/2022

Audit of the Department of State's Efforts to Identify and Terminate Unneeded Contracts Related to
Afghanistan

State OIG

22ISP045

3/14/2022

Inspection of the Afghanistan Affairs Unit

State OIG

22AUD016

12/30/2021

Review of Emergency Action Planning Guiding the Evacuation and Suspension of Operations at U.S.
Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan

State OIG

22AUD012

12/2/2021

Review of the Department of State Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program

State OIG

22ESP015

10/1/2021

Review of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program and Changes to Accommodate the Admission andResettlement of Afghan Evacuees

9/30/2022

Audit of the Schedule of Expenditures of USAID Award Managed by Chemonics International Inc.
(CHEMONICS) Under Global Health Supply Chain Management (GHSCM) - Population and Reproductive
Health (PRH) Program Contract No. AID-OAA-TO-15-00010 for the period January 1, 2019, to December
31, 2020

USAID OIGUSAID OIG

552F1722

552F1622

Date Initiated9/30/2022

Report Title
Evaluation of DOD’s Support to Other Agencies Requests for the Screening of Displaced Persons fromAfghanistan

Audit of the Schedule of Expenditures of USAID Award Managed by CHECCHI and Company Consulting
Inc. (CHECCHI) Under Assistance for the Development Of Afghan Legal Access and Transparency(ADALAT) Program
Contract No. AID-306-TO-16-00007 for the period July 1, 2020, to April 30, 2021

USAID OIGUSAID OIG

552F1522

552F1322

9/30/2022

9/9/2022

Closeout Audit of Costs Incurred in Afghanistan of the USAID Resources Managed by KNCV Tuberculosis
Foundation (“KNCV”) Cooperative Agreement No. 306-AID-OAA-A-14-00029 – Challenge Tuberculosis For
the period October 1, 2018, through March 31, 2020
Audit of the Schedule of Expenditures of USAID Awards Managed by DAI Global LLC. (DAI) Under Strong
Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience (SHAHAR) Program Contract No. AID-306-C-14-00016 for theperiod December 1, 2019, to March 31, 2021 (CLOSEOUT) andInvest (Afghanistan Buy-In) Program Contract No. AID-OAA-C-17-00090 for the period December 1,
2018, to September 27, 2020 (FINANCIAL)

Source: DOD OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 9/26/2022; State OIG, response to SIGAR data call, 9/26/2022; GAO, response to SIGAR data call, 9/19/2022; USAID OIG, response to SIGAR
data call, 9/19/2022.

Audit of DOD Oversight of Logistics Civil Augmentation
Program (LOGCAP) Contract Actions Related to the
Relocation of Afghan Evacuees
The objective of this audit is to determine whether DOD adequately performed required oversight of contractor performance under the LOGCAP
contract during the relocation of evacuees from Afghanistan.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

139

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

Audit of DOD Afghanistan Contingency Contracts Closeout
The objective of this audit is to determine whether DOD contracting officials closed out contingency contracts supporting Afghanistan operationsin accordance with applicable federal laws and DOD regulations.

Evaluation of DOD Security and Life Support for Afghan
Evacuees at Camp Bondsteel
The objective of this evaluation is to determine the extent to which DOD
has provided adequate lodging, security, and medical care for Afghan evacuees diverted to Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, for further processing.

Audit of DOD Reporting on Obligations and Expendituresin Support of Operation Allies Welcome
The objective of this audit is to determine if DOD funds expended in support of Operation Allies Welcome were reported in accordance with DOD
policy and directives.

Audit of the DOD’s Financial Management of the Afghanistan
Security Forces FundThe objective of this audit is to determine whether DOD managed theAfghanistan Security Forces Fund in accordance with applicable laws
and regulations.

Audit of Tracking, Recovery, and Reuse of DOD-Owned
Shipping Containers
The objective of this audit is to determine to what extent the Army, Navy,and Marine Corps complied with DOD requirements to track, recover, andreuse DOD-owned shipping containers, including those at facilities that support Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, and to include those containers in an
accountable property system of record.

State Office of Inspector General–Middle East Regional
Operations

State OIG has five ongoing projects this quarter related to Afghanistan
reconstruction.

Audit of the Department of State’s Efforts to Identify andTerminate Unneeded Contracts Related to Afghanistan
The primary objective of the audit is to determine whether the State
Department identified and terminated contracts impacted by the withdrawal of U.S. operations in Afghanistan in accordance with federal andDepartment requirements.

140

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONOTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

Inspection of the Afghanistan Affairs Unit
The AAU inspection will evaluate policy implementation, resource management, and management controls for the remote U.S. diplomatic mission to
Afghanistan in Doha, Qatar. The inspection may also consider the effectiveness of the provision of humanitarian assistance, public diplomacy, workwith allies and partners, and engagement and messaging with regional andinternational stakeholders. The inspection team is proceeding with preliminary interviews of State personnel in Washington, DC, but the scope of thereview will expand in the following quarter to include interviews with personnel in Doha.

Review of Emergency Action Planning Guiding the Evacuationand Suspension of Operations at U.S. Embassy Kabul
The audit is reviewing whether U.S. Embassy Kabul followed establishedState Department guidance in preparation for the evacuation of U.S. government personnel, private U.S. citizens, Afghans at risk, and others fromAfghanistan before and after the suspension of operations.

Review of the Department of State Afghan Special Immigrant
Visa ProgramThis review will be issued as a series of reports in response to requests
from multiple congressional committees to review a range of topics regarding the Afghan SIV program.

Review of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program and Changes
to Accommodate the Admission and Resettlement of Afghan
Evacuees
This review will examine the Department of State’s efforts to process,admit, and initially resettle Afghan evacuees in the United States following
the Afghanistan withdrawal.

Government Accountability Office

GAO has no ongoing projects this quarter related to Afghanistan
reconstruction.

U.S. Agency for International Development Officeof Inspector General

USAID OIG has four ongoing financial audits this quarter related to reconstruction in Afghanistan. Summaries for financial audit reports can be foundon the agency’s website.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

141

APPENDICES CONTENTS
Appendix A

144

Appendix B

148

Appendix C

150

Appendix D

154

Appendix E

162

The Official Seal of SIGAR
SIGAR’s official seal reflects the coordinated efforts of the United States and the former
internationally recognized government of Afghanistan to provide accountability and oversightof reconstruction activities. The phrases in Dari (top) and Pashto (bottom) on the seal aretranslations of SIGAR’s name.

APPENDICES143

APPENDICES~ . J - - - - - - - - - - -APPENDIX A
CROSS-REFERENCE OF REPORTTO STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
This appendix cross-references the sections of this report to the quarterly
reporting and related requirements under SIGAR’s enabling legislation,
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-181, § 1229 (Table A.1), to the semiannual reporting requirements prescribed for inspectors general more generally under the Inspector General
Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. 3) (Table A.2), and the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, §1521.
(Table A.3)
TABLE A.1

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229
Public Law Section

SIGAR Enabling Language

SIGAR Action

Report Section

To provide for an independent and objective means of keeping the Secretary ofState and the Secretary of Defense fully and currently informed about problems
and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations
and the necessity for and progress on corrective action

Ongoing; quarterly report

Full report

The Inspector General shall report directly to, and be under the generalsupervision of, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense

Report to the Secretary of Stateand the Secretary of Defense

Full report

OVERSIGHT OF AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION —It shall be the duty of the Inspector General to conduct, supervise, andcoordinate audits and investigations of the treatment, handling, and expenditureof amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of
Afghanistan, and of the programs, operations, and contracts carried out utilizing
such funds, including subsections (A) through (G) below

Review appropriated/available funds

Full report

Section 1229(f)(1)(A)The oversight and accounting of the obligation and expenditure of such funds

Review obligations andexpenditures of appropriated/available funds

SIGAR OversightFunding

Section 1229(f)(1)(B)The monitoring and review of reconstruction activities funded by such funds

Review reconstruction activities
funded by appropriations anddonations

SIGAR Oversight

Section 1229(f)(1)(C)The monitoring and review of contracts funded by such funds

Review contracts using
appropriated and available
funds

Note

Section 1229(f)(1)(D)The monitoring and review of the transfer of such funds and associatedinformation between and among departments, agencies, and entities of theUnited States, and private and nongovernmental entities

Review internal and externaltransfers of appropriated/available funds

Appendix B

Section 1229(f)(1)(E)

The maintenance of records on the use of such funds to facilitate future audits
and investigations of the use of such fund[s]Maintain audit records

SIGAR OversightAppendix C
Appendix D

PurposeSection 1229(a)(3)Supervision
Section 1229(e)(1)DutiesSection 1229(f)(1)

Review programs, operations,contracts using appropriated/available funds

Continued on the next page

144

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONAPPENDICESTABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229
Public Law Section

SIGAR Enabling Language

SIGAR Action

Report Section

Section 1229(f)(1)(F)The monitoring and review of the effectiveness of United States coordination
with the Governments of Afghanistan and other donor countries in theimplementation of the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National
Development Strategy

Monitoring and review
as described

AuditsSection 1229(f)(1)(G)The investigation of overpayments such as duplicate payments or duplicate
billing and any potential unethical or illegal actions of Federal employees,
contractors, or affiliated entities, and the referral of such reports, as necessary,to the Department of Justice to ensure further investigations, prosecutions,recovery of further funds, or other remedies

Conduct and reporting ofinvestigations as described

Investigations

Section 1229(f)(2)

OTHER DUTIES RELATED TO OVERSIGHT —The Inspector General shall establish, maintain, and oversee such systems,
procedures, and controls as the Inspector General considers appropriate todischarge the duties under paragraph (1)Establish, maintain, andoversee systems, procedures,and controls

Full report

Section 1229(f)(3)

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978 —In addition, … the Inspector General shall also have the duties andresponsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978

Duties as specified in Inspector
General Act

Full report

Section 1229(f)(4)

COORDINATION OF EFFORTS —The Inspector General shall coordinate with, and receive the cooperation of,each of the following: (A) the Inspector General of the Department of Defense,(B) the Inspector General of the Department of State, and (C) the Inspector
General of the United States Agency for International Development

Coordination with theinspectors general of
DOD, State, and USAID

Other Agency
Oversight

Federal Support and Other Resources
Section 1229(h)(5)(A)ASSISTANCE FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES —Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance from any
department, agency, or other entity of the Federal Government, the head of such
entity shall, insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing
law, furnish such information or assistance to the Inspector General, or an
authorized designee

Expect support asrequested

Full report

Section 1229(h)(5)(B)

REPORTING OF REFUSED ASSISTANCE —Whenever information or assistance requested by the Inspector General is, inthe judgment of the Inspector General, unreasonably refused or not provided,
the Inspector General shall report the circumstances to the Secretary ofState or the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate, and to the appropriate
congressional committees without delay

Monitor cooperation

Section 2
Section 3
SIGAR notifications
posted in full on
www.sigar.mil.

QUARTERLY REPORTS —Not later than 30 days after the end of each fiscal-year quarter, the Inspector
General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a reportsummarizing, for the period of that quarter and, to the extent possible, theperiod from the end of such quarter to the time of the submission of thereport, the activities during such period of the Inspector General and theactivities under programs and operations funded with amounts appropriatedor otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Each reportshall include, for the period covered by such report, a detailed statement of
all obligations, expenditures, and revenues associated with reconstruction andrehabilitation activities in Afghanistan, including the following –Report – 30 days after theend of each calendar quarter

SIGAR notification to theCongress, Department ofState, and USAID on State’sand USAID’s refusal to provide
information and assistancerequested by SIGAR, dated
June 22, 2022.

Reports
Section 1229(i)(1)

Full report
Appendix B

Summarize activities of theInspector General
Detailed statement of all
obligations, expenditures,and revenues

Continued on the next page

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

145

APPENDICES~ . J - - - - - - - - - - -TABLE A.1 (CONTINUED)CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 110-181, § 1229
Public Law Section

SIGAR Enabling Language

SIGAR Action

Report Section

Section 1229(i)(1)(A)Obligations and expenditures of appropriated/donated funds

Obligations and expendituresof appropriated/donatedfunds

Appendix B

Section 1229(i)(1)(B)

A project-by-project and program-by-program accounting of the costs incurred
to date for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, together with the estimate of
the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the United States
Agency for International Development, as applicable, of the costs to complete
each project and each program

Project-by-project andprogram-by-programaccounting of costs. List
unexpended funds for eachproject or program

Funding
Note

Section 1229(i)(1)(C)

Revenues attributable to or consisting of funds provided by foreign nations
or international organizations to programs and projects funded by any
department or agency of the United States Government, and any obligations
or expenditures of such revenues

Revenues, obligations, andexpenditures of donor funds

Funding

Section 1229(i)(1)(D)

Revenues attributable to or consisting of foreign assets seized or frozen
that contribute to programs and projects funded by any U.S. government
department or agency, and any obligations or expenditures of such revenues

Revenues, obligations, andexpenditures of funds fromseized or frozen assets

Funding

Section 1229(i)(1)(E)

Operating expenses of agencies or entities receiving amounts appropriated orotherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan

Operating expenses ofagencies or any organization
receiving appropriated funds

Funding
Appendix B

Section 1229(i)(1)(F)In the case of any contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism
described in paragraph (2)*—(i) The amount of the contract or other funding mechanism;(ii) A brief discussion of the scope of the contract or other funding
mechanism;(iii) A discussion of how the department or agency of the United States
Government involved in the contract, grant, agreement, or other funding
mechanism identified and solicited offers from potential contractors to
perform the contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism, together
with a list of the potential individuals or entities that were issued solicitations
for the offers; and(iv) The justification and approval documents on which was based thedetermination to use procedures other than procedures that provide for fulland open competition

Describe contract details

Note

Section 1229(i)(3)

PUBLIC AVAILABILITY —The Inspector General shall publish on a publicly available Internet website
each report under paragraph (1) of this subsection in English and otherlanguages that the Inspector General determines are widely used andunderstood in Afghanistan

Publish report as directed atwww.sigar.mil

Full report

Section 1229(i)(4)

FORM —
Each report required under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may include a classified annex if the Inspector General considers it
necessary

Publish report as directed

Full report

Section 1229(j)(1)

Inspector General shall also submit each report required under subsection (i) tothe Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense

Submit quarterly report

Full report

Dari and Pashto translationin process

Note: Although this data is normally made available on SIGAR’s website (www.sigar.mil), the data SIGAR has received is in relatively raw form and is currently being reviewed, analyzed, and organized for future SIGAR use and publication.
* Covered “contracts, grants, agreements, and funding mechanisms” are defined in paragraph (2) of Section 1229(i) of Pub. L. No. 110-181 as being—“any major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism that is entered into by any department or agency of the United States Government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan with any public or private sector entity for any of the following purposes:
To build or rebuild physical infrastructure of Afghanistan.
To establish or reestablish a political or societal institution of Afghanistan.
To provide products or services to the people of Afghanistan.”146

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONAPPENDICESTABLE A.2

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SEMIANNUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDERSECTION 5 OF THE IG ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED (5 U.S.C. APP. 3) (“IG ACT”)
IG Act Section

IG Act Language

SIGAR Action

SectionSection 5(a)(14)(A)An Appendix containing the results of any peer
review conducted by another Office of Inspector
General during the reporting period; or

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) OIG
conducted a peer review of SIGAR for the reporting
period October 1, 2018, to September 30, 2021, to
determine the extent to which SIGAR's system of quality
control was sufficient to adhere to generally accepted
government auditing standards as issued and updated
by the Government Accountability Office

Posted in full at
www.sigar.mil

Section 5(a)(14)(B)

If no peer review was conducted within thatreporting period, a statement identifying the dateof the last peer review conducted by another Officeof Inspector General

SIGAR has posted in full the results of, and reports
from, SIGAR’s peer review by NRC OIG for the period
ending 9/30/2021

Posted in full at
www.sigar.mil

Section 5(a)(15)

A list of any outstanding recommendations fromany peer review conducted by another Officeof Inspector General that have not been fully
implemented, including a statement describing
the status of the implementation and why
implementation is not complete

All peer review recommendations have been
implemented

Recommendations andrelated materials posted
in full at www.sigar.mil

SIGAR received a peer review rating of pass

TABLE A.3

CROSS-REFERENCE TO SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER PUB. L. NO. 115-91, §1521
Public Law Section

NDAA Language

SIGAR Action

Report Section

Section 1521(e)(1)(1) QUALITY STANDARDS FOR IG PRODUCTS—Except asprovided in paragraph (3), each product published or issued
by an Inspector General relating to the oversight of programs
and activities funded under the Afghanistan Security Forces
Fund shall be prepared—(A) in accordance with the Generally Accepted Government
Auditing Standards/Government Auditing Standards(GAGAS/GAS), as issued and updated by the Government
Accountability Office; or(B) if not prepared in accordance with the standards referred
to in subparagraph (A), in accordance with the Quality
Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by theCouncil of the Inspectors General on Integrity andEfficiency (commonly referred to as the ‘‘CIGIE Blue Book’’)

Prepare quarterly report in accordance with
the Quality Standards for Inspection and
Evaluation, issued by the Council of theInspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency(CIGIE), commonly referred to as the “CIGIEBlue Book,” for activities funded under theAfghanistan Security Forces Fund

Section 1
Reconstruction Update

Section 1521(e)(2)(2) SPECIFICATION OF QUALITY STANDARDS FOLLOWED—
Each product published or issued by an Inspector Generalrelating to the oversight of programs and activities funded
under the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund shall cite withinsuch product the quality standards followed in conducting
and reporting the work concerned

Cite within the quarterly report the quality
standards followed in conducting andreporting the work concerned. The required
quality standards are quality control,
planning, data collection and analysis,
evidence, records maintenance, reporting,and follow-up

Inside front coverAppendix A

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

147

APPENDICES~ . J - - - - - - - - - - -APPENDIX B
U.S. FUNDS FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
Table B.1 lists funds appropriated for Afghanistan reconstruction* by agency and fund per year, and Table B.2 lists funds appropriatedfor counternarcotics initiatives, as of September 30, 2022, except for USAID accounts which are updated through June 30, 2022.
TABLE B.2

TABLE B.1

COUNTERNARCOTICS ($ MILLIONS)

U.S. FUNDS FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION ($ MILLIONS)

Fund
ASFF

Cumulative Appropriations
Since FY 2002
$1,311.92

DICDA

3,284.94

ESF

1,455.41

DA

77.72

INCLE

2,188.53

DEAa

500.21

Total$8,818.73

Table B.2 Numbers have been rounded. Counternarcotics funds
cross-cut both the Security and Governance & Development
spending categories; these funds are also captured in thosecategories in Table B.1. Figures represent cumulative amounts
committed to counternarcotics initiatives in Afghanistan since
2002. Initiatives include eradication, interdiction, support to
Afghanistan’s Special Mission Wing (SMW), counternarcoticsrelated capacity building, and alternative agricultural development
efforts. ESF, DA, and INCLE figures show the cumulative amounts
committed for counternarcotics initiatives from those funds.
SIGAR excluded ASFF funding for the SMW after FY 2013 fromthis analysis due to the decreasing number of counternarcotics
missions conducted by the SMW.
DEA receives funding from State’s Diplomatic & Consular
Programs account in addition to DEA’s direct line appropriation
listed in Appendix B.

aTable B.2 Source: SIGAR analysis of counternarcotics funding,
10/18/2022; State, response to SIGAR data call, 10/11/2022;
DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 10/7/2021; USAID, response
to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2022; DEA, response to SIGAR data call,
1/10/2022.
Note: Numbers have been rounded. DOD reprogrammed$1 billion from FY 2011 ASFF, $1 billion from FY 2012 ASFF,$178 million from FY 2013 ASFF, $604 million from FY 2019
ASFF, $146 million from FY 2020 ASFF, and $1.31 billion
from FY 2021 ASFF to fund other DOD requirements. DOD
reprogrammed $230 million into FY 2015 ASFF. ASFF data
reflects the following rescissions: $1 billion from FY 2012 inPub. L. No. 113-6, $764.38 million from FY 2014 in Pub. L. No.
113-235, $400 million from FY 2015 in Pub. L. No. 114-113,$150 million from FY 2016 in Pub. L. No. 115-31, $100 million
from FY 2017 in Pub. L. No. 115-141, $396 million from FY
2019 in Pub. L. No. 116-93, $1.10 billion in FY 2020 in Pub. L.
No. 116-260, $700 million in FY 2021 in Pub. L. No. 117-103,
and $100 million from FY 2021 in Pub. L. No. 117-180. DOD
transferred $101 million from FY 2011 AIF, $179.5 million fromFY 2013 AIF, and $55 million from FY 2014 AIF to the ESF. Statetransferred $179 million from FY 2016 ESF to the Green Climate
Fund, rescinded $73.07 million from FY 2020 ESF under Pub. L.
No. 116-260, and de-allotted $41.94 million of FY 2016 INCLE,$79.47 million of FY 2017 INCLE, $122.99 million of FY 2018
INCLE, $58.30 million of FY2019 INCLE, $51.08 million of
FY 2020 INCLE, and $10.62 million of FY 2021 INCLE.
Source: DOD, responses to SIGAR data calls, 10/20/2022,
10/19/2022, 7/20/2022, 10/19/2021, 10/7/2021,
9/14/2021, 10/12/2017, 10/22/2012, 10/14/2009,
and 10/1/2009; State, responses to SIGAR data calls,
10/17/2022, 10/12/2022, 10/11/2022, 10/5/2022,
10/4/2022, 7/20/2022, 7/13/2022, 1/20/2022, 7/2/2021,
3/29/2021, 10/13/2020, 10/9/2020, 10/8/2020,
7/13/2020, 6/11/2020, 1/30/2020, 10/5/2018, 1/10/2018,10/13/2017, 10/11/2017, 5/4/2016, 10/20/2015,
4/15/2015, 4/15/2014, 6/27/2013, 10/5/2012 and6/27/2012; OMB, responses to SIGAR data calls, 4/16/2015,
and 4/17/2012; USAID, responses to SIGAR data calls,
7/14/2022, 7/9/2022, 10/12/2020, 10/7/2020, 10/8/2018,10/15/2010, 1/15/2010, and 10/9/2009; DOJ, response to
SIGAR data call, 1/10/2022; DFC, response to SIGAR data call,
4/22/2022; USAGM, response to SIGAR data call, 10/4/2022;
USDA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/2009.

U.S. Funding Sources
AgencySecurity
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)
DOD
Train and Equip (T&E)
DOD
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
StateInternational Military Education and Training (IMET)
State
Voluntary Peacekeeping (PKO)State
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA)
DODDrug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DICDA)
DOD
NATO Resolute Support Mission (RSM)
DOD
Military Base and Equipment Transfers (FERP, FEPP, and EDA)
DOD
Total – Security
Governance & Development
Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP)
DOD
Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF)
DOD
Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO)
DOD
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
USAID
Development Assistance (DA)USAID
Global Health Programs (GHP)
USAID
Commodity Credit Corp (CCC)
USAID
USAID-Other (Other)
USAID
Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related Programs (NADR) State
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
State
Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF)
State
Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE)
State
Contributions to International Organizations (CIO)
State
U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)
DFC
U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM)
USAGM
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
DOJ
Total – Governance & Development
Humanitarian
Pub. L. No. 480 Title II
USAID
International Disaster Assistance (IDA)
USAID
Transition Initiatives (TI)
USAID
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)
State
USDA Programs (Title I, §416(b), FFP, FFE, ET, and PRTA)
USDA
Total – Humanitarian
Agency Operations
Diplomatic Programs, including Worldwide Security Protection (DP)State
Embassy Security, Construction, & Maintenance (ESCM) - Capital Costs State
Embassy Security, Construction, & Maintenance (ESCM) - Operations
State
USAID Operating Expenses (OE)
USAID
Oversight (SIGAR, State OIG, and USAID OIG)
Multiple
Total – Agency Operations
Total Funding

Total

FY 2002–10$80,744.25
440.001,059.13
20.37
69.33
550.003,284.94
342.652,339.14
88,849.82

27,833.24
440.001,059.13
9.17
69.33
550.001,510.50
0.00
10.24
31,481.62

3,711.00
988.50822.8521,430.12
900.93583.2537.93
60.44
942.14
5,151.79
13.49
107.64553.57337.39331.77290.8036,263.63

2,639.00
0.00
73.70
11,202.88
898.53487.0030.27
35.17
419.072,870.14
4.18
42.35
66.39
265.2942.95
146.64
19,223.58

1,095.38
1,859.44
40.20
1,974.04
287.46
5,256.51

722.52374.0635.79
646.52287.46
2,066.35

12,011.15
1,479.71
159.63
1,790.77
743.53
16,184.79$146,554.75

2,340.64
718.966.60
525.2576.40
3,667.86
56,439.40* Table B.1 is not a full accounting of Afghanistan reconstruction. USAID refused to report to SIGAR information on its 10 accounts for the quarter
ending September 30, 2022, so these accounts are now presented through June 30, 2022. DOD has not provided certain costs associated with its
Train, Advise, and Assist mission, and DOD and DOD OIG have not provided their Agency Operations costs for Afghanistan. See pp. 22–23 for details.

148

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONAPPENDICESFY 2011

FY 2012FY 2013

FY 2014

FY 2015

FY 2016

FY 2017

FY 2018

FY 2019

FY 2020

FY 2021

FY 2022

10,619.28
0.00
0.00
1.56
0.00
0.00
379.830.00
33.41
11,034.08

9,200.00
0.00
0.00
1.18
0.00
0.00
472.990.00
43.49
9,717.65

4,946.19
0.00
0.00
1.42
0.00
0.00
255.81
0.00
85.03
5,288.46

3,962.34
0.00
0.00
1.50
0.00
0.00
238.960.00
172.05
4,374.84

3,939.33
0.00
0.00
1.05
0.00
0.00
0.00
63.82
584.02
4,588.22

3,502.26
0.00
0.00
0.86
0.00
0.00
138.7643.05
3.89
3,688.82

4,162.72
0.00
0.00
0.80
0.00
0.00
135.6157.19
0.53
4,356.84

4,666.82
0.00
0.00
0.80
0.00
0.00
118.0158.78
0.00
4,844.40

3,920.00
0.00
0.00
0.43
0.00
0.00
10.18
59.02
34.78
4,024.41

2,953.79
0.00
0.00
0.80
0.00
0.00
24.30
60.79
73.13
3,112.81

938.28
0.00
0.00
0.80
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1,298.58
2,237.67

100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00400.00299.00239.242,168.51
0.00
73.20
3.64
6.26
69.30
400.00
0.00
6.45
49.92
40.25
24.35
18.70
3,798.81

400.00400.00245.76
1,836.76
0.00
0.00
0.55
9.22
65.32
358.75
1.98
8.17
58.73
5.57
21.54
18.70
3,431.05

200.00145.50138.201,802.65
0.35
0.25
0.00
3.93
52.60
593.81
1.63
2.46
53.03
0.00
21.54
17.00
3,032.94

30.00
144.00122.24907.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
1.52
43.20
225.00
0.00
7.28
43.17
10.60
22.11
18.70
1,574.83

10.00
0.00
3.72
900.00
0.95
0.06
0.00
0.82
43.50
250.00
0.99
3.95
41.79
0.00
22.68
9.05
1,287.50

5.00
0.00
0.00
633.27
0.00
0.45
0.00
2.91
37.96
168.06
0.76
2.65
41.35
0.00
23.86
3.31
919.57

5.00
0.00
0.00
767.17
0.00
0.02
1.95
0.29
37.00
105.03
0.25
2.39
40.31
3.60
25.91
11.03
999.96

5.00
0.00
0.00
500.00
0.00
0.01
1.52
0.00
36.60
37.01
0.99
2.33
36.12
11.60
25.74
11.11
668.03

10.00
0.00
0.00
350.00
1.09
0.00
0.00
0.00
38.30
29.50
0.74
7.87
32.72
0.00
25.89
13.01
509.12

5.00
0.00
0.00
126.93
0.00
5.00
0.00
0.34
38.50
36.92
1.98
7.44
30.28
0.00
24.60
12.92
289.89

2.00
0.00
0.00
234.95
0.00
17.25
0.00
0.00
45.80
71.58
0.00
7.60
29.64
0.48
25.60
10.63
445.53

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
15.00
6.00
0.00
6.70
30.11
0.00
25.00
0.00
82.81

112.55
66.74
1.18
65.00
0.00
245.48

59.20
61.41
0.73
99.56
0.00
220.90

46.15
23.73
0.42
76.07
0.00
146.38

65.97
52.68
1.37
107.890.00
227.92

53.73
25.71
0.60
129.270.00
209.31

26.65
39.89
0.05
84.27
0.00
150.87

4.38
93.84
0.00
89.24
0.00
187.46

4.22
119.64
0.00
77.19
0.00
201.040.00
152.35
0.00
86.69
0.00
239.040.00
178.610.00
150.410.00
329.020.00
219.600.04
143.710.00
363.350.00
451.180.00
218.220.00
669.40730.081,126.56
1,500.79
256.64
62.99
79.87
1.63
4.21
3.84
172.20224.37210.15
37.12
53.15
56.63
1,197.68
1,471.28
1,851.28
16,276.04 14,840.88 10,319.05

752.0769.76
8.33
100.8659.39
990.41
7,168.01

822.1974.26
11.68
137.0067.37
1,112.50
7,197.52

743.58
64.13
21.67
95.55
64.25
989.17
5,748.42

843.2073.57
15.28
102.4958.08
1,092.62
6,636.88

858.27
26.12
22.66
77.52
58.01
1,042.57
6,756.05

824.94
23.19
24.13
72.34
58.15
1,002.75
5,775.33

677.76
21.83
20.41
48.68
57.55
826.244,557.96

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

149

619.22171.87
7.27
1.11
19.18
0.00
17.67
6.69
56.92
40.53
720.25220.203,766.80 1,072.41

APPENDICES~ . J - - - - - - - - - - -APPENDIX CSIGAR AUDITS
Performance Audit and Evaluation Reports Issued

SIGAR issued two performance audit reports and two evaluation reports
during this reporting period.
SIGAR PERFORMANCE AUDIT AND EVALUATION REPORTS ISSUED
Report Identifier

Report Title

SIGAR 23-02-IP

Afghan Civil Society: The Taliban’s Takeover Risks Undoing 20 Years ofReconstruction Accomplishments

Date Issued
10/2022

SIGAR 23-01-AR

Department of State Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program in
Afghanistan: Security Concerns Prevented State from Fully Monitoringand Evaluating the Program, And Up to $32 Million in Assets May Be
in the Taliban’s Possession

10/2022

SIGAR 22-41-AR

Contracting in Afghanistan: USAID Generally Met Requirements for
Noncompetitive Awards, But Did Not Complete or Did Not Maintain
Some Required Documents

9/2022SIGAR 22-35-IP

Theft of Funds from Afghanistan: An Assessment of Allegations
Concerning President Ghani and Former Senior Afghan Officials

8/2022

New Performance Audits

SIGAR initiated one performance audit during this reporting period.
NEW SIGAR PERFORMANCE AUDITS
Project Identifier

Project Title

SIGAR 156A

Gender-Based Violence (GBV)

Date Initiated9/2022

Ongoing Performance Audits

SIGAR had five ongoing performance audits during this reporting period.
SIGAR PERFORMANCE AUDITS ONGOING
Project Identifier

Project Title

SIGAR 155A

ACEBA

7/2022SIGAR 154A

Health Care

5/2022SIGAR 153AEFA II

2/2022SIGAR 152A

Contractor Vetting

1/2022SIGAR 151A

Extractives II

8/2021*

Date InitiatedAs provided in its authorizing statute, SIGAR may also report on products andevents occurring after September 30, 2022, up to the publication date of this report.

150

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONAPPENDICESNew Evaluations

SIGAR initiated one evaluation during this reporting period.
SIGAR EVALUATIONS ONGOING
Project Identifier

Project Title

SIGAR-E-18

Education Sector Status

Date Initiated8/2022

Ongoing Evaluations

SIGAR had four ongoing evaluations during this reporting period.
SIGAR EVALUATIONS ONGOING
Project Identifier

Project Title

SIGAR-E-016

Update on Status of U.S. Funding and Program

Date Initiated3/2022SIGAR-E-014

Taliban Access to On-Budget Assistance and U.S.-Funded Equipment
Mandate9/2021SIGAR-E-012

ANDSF Collapse Mandate

9/2021SIGAR-E-011

Afghan Government Collapse Mandate

9/2021

Financial Audit Reports Issued

SIGAR issued six financial audit reports during this reporting period.
SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDIT REPORTS ISSUED
Report Identifier

Report Title

SIGAR 22-42-FA

Audit of Costs Incurred by Amentum Services Inc.

Date Issued
9/2022SIGAR 22-40-FA

Audit of Costs Incurred by FHI 360

9/2022SIGAR 22-39-FA

Audit of Costs Incurred by Raytheon Company

9/2022SIGAR 22-38-FA

Audit of Costs Incurred by International Legal Foundation

9/2022SIGAR 22-37-FA

Audit of Costs Incurred by Albany Associates International Ltd.

8/2022SIGAR 22-36-FA

Audit of Costs Incurred by Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University

8/2022

Ongoing Financial Audits

SIGAR had 47 financial audits in progress during this reporting period.
Due to the current security situation in Afghanistan, including threats fromterrorist groups and criminal elements, the names and other identifying
information of some implementing partners administering humanitarianassistance in Afghanistan have been withheld at the request of the State
Department and the award recipient.
SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDITS ONGOING
Project Identifier

Project Title

SIGAR-F-282

DAI

Date Initiated3/2022SIGAR-F-281

The Asia Foundation

3/2022SIGAR-F-280

DAI

3/2022
Continued on the following page

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

151

APPENDICES~ . J - - - - - - - - - - -SIGAR FINANCIAL AUDITS ONGOING (CONTINUED)
Project Identifier

Project Title

SIGAR-F-279

DAI

Date Initiated3/2022SIGAR-F-278

Blumont Global Development Inc.

3/2022SIGAR-F-277

Roots of Peace

3/2022SIGAR-F-276[Redacted]

3/2022SIGAR-F-275

Michigan State University

3/2022SIGAR-F-274[Redacted]

3/2022SIGAR-F-269

DAI

3/2022SIGAR-F-268[Redacted]

3/2022SIGAR-F-267[Redacted]

3/2022SIGAR-F-266

CARE International

3/2022SIGAR-F-265[Redacted]

3/2022SIGAR-F-264

MSI Inc.

3/2022SIGAR-F-263[Redacted]

3/2022SIGAR-F-262[Redacted]

3/2022SIGAR-F-261

MSI Inc.

3/2022SIGAR-F-260[Redacted]

3/2022SIGAR-F-259

Science and Engineering Services

3/2022SIGAR-F-258

Amentum Services Inc.

4/2022SIGAR-F-257

TigerSwan LLC

4/2022SIGAR-F-256

Alutiiq

3/2022SIGAR-F-255[Redacted]

3/2022SIGAR-F-254[Redacted[]

3/2022SIGAR-F-253[Redacted]

3/2022SIGAR-F-251

Chemonics International Inc.

3/2022SIGAR-F-250

FHI 360

3/2022SIGAR-F-249

Turquoise Mountain Trust

3/2022SIGAR-F-248

Development Alternatives Inc.

3/2022SIGAR-F-247

CAII

3/2022SIGAR-F-246

International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development

3/2022SIGAR-F-245

Tetra Tech Inc.

11/2021

SIGAR-F-244

Checchi & Company Consulting

11/2021

SIGAR-F-243

Management Sciences for Health

11/2021

SIGAR-F-242

AECOM International Development

11/2021

SIGAR-F-240

Jhpiego Corp.

11/2021

SIGAR-F-239

Sierra Nevada Corp.

11/2021

SIGAR-F-238

IAP Worldwide Services

11/2021

SIGAR-F-237

University of Chicago, National Museum of Afghanistan Project

11/2021

SIGAR-F-236

Stanford University ALEP Project

11/2021

SIGAR-F-231

Tetra Tech

6/2021SIGAR-F-230

Save the Children Federation

4/2021SIGAR-F-229

ACTED

4/2021SIGAR-F-228

IRC

4/2021SIGAR-F-223

The Asia Foundation

4/2021SIGAR-F-218

MCPA

11/2020152

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONAPPENDICESSIGAR LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM
Ongoing Lessons Learned Projects

SIGAR has one ongoing lessons learned project this reporting period.
SIGAR LESSONS LEARNED PROJECTS ONGOING
Project Identifier

Project Title

Date Initiated

SIGAR LL-17

Personnel

1/2022SIGAR RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE
Quarterly Report Issued

SIGAR issued one quarterly report during this reporting period.
SIGAR QUARTERLY REPORT ISSUED
Report Identifier

Report Title

SIGAR 2022-QR-4

Quarterly Report to the United States Congress

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

Date Issued

I OCTOBER 30, 2022

10/2022153

APPENDICES~ . J - - - - - - - - - - -APPENDIX DSIGAR INVESTIGATIONS AND HOTLINESIGAR Investigations

This quarter, SIGAR opened one new investigation and closed five, bringing
total ongoing investigations to 35. Three investigations closed as a result of
criminal convictions and two closed as a result of administrative action, as
shown in Figure D.1.
FIGURE D.1

SIGAR’S CLOSED INVESTIGATIONS, JULY 1–SEPTEMBER 30, 2022

Criminal Convictions

Administrative Action
0

1

2

3

Total: 5
Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 10/5/2022.

154

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONAPPENDICESSIGAR Hotline

The SIGAR Hotline (by e-mail: sigar.hotline@mail.mil; web submission:www.sigar.mil/investigations/hotline/report-fraud.aspx; phone: 866-329-8893
in the United States) received 50 complaints this quarter. In addition to
working on new complaints, the Investigations Directorate continued workon complaints received prior to July 1, 2022. The directorate processed 110
complaints this quarter; most are under review or were closed, as shown in
Figure D.2.
FIGURE D.2

STATUS OF SIGAR HOTLINE COMPLAINTS: JULY 1–SEPTEMBER 30, 2022

Complaints Received

50

Complaints (Open)

6

Gen Info File (Closed)

54
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Total: 110
Source: SIGAR Investigations Directorate, 10/3/2022.

SIGAR SUSPENSIONS AND DEBARMENTS

Table D.1 is a comprehensive list of finalized suspensions, debarments, andspecial-entity designations relating to SIGAR’s work in Afghanistan as of
September 30, 2022.
SIGAR lists its suspensions, debarments, and special-entity designations for historical purposes only. For the current status of any individual
or entity listed herein as previously suspended, debarred, or listed as a
special-entity designation, please consult the federal System for AwardManagement, www.sam.gov/SAM/.
Entries appearing in both the suspension and debarment sections are
based upon their placement in suspended status following criminal indictment or determination of non-responsibility by an agency suspension
and debarment official. Final debarment was imposed following criminal
conviction in U.S. Federal District Court and/or final determination by anagency suspension and debarment official regarding term of debarment.

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

155

APPENDICES~ . J - - - - - - - - - - -TABLE D.1

SPECIAL-ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2022
Special Entity Designations
Arvin Kam Construction Company
Arvin Kam Group LLC, d.b.a. “Arvin Kam Group Security,”
d.b.a. “Arvin Kam Group Foundation,” d.b.a. “Arvin Global
Logistics Services Company”
Ayub, Mohammad
Fruzi, Haji Khalil
Muhammad, Haji Amir
Haji Dhost Mohammad Zurmat Construction Company
Jan, Nurullah
Khan, Haji Mohammad Almas

Noh-E Safi Mining Company
Noor Rahman Company
Noor Rahman Construction Company
Nur Rahman Group, d.b.a. “NUCCL Construction
Company,” d.b.a. “RUCCL Rahman Umar Construction
Company,” d.b.a. “Rahman Trading and General Logistics
Company LLC
Rahman, Nur, a.k.a. “Noor Rahman, a.k.a. “Noor
Rahman Safa”
Rhaman, Mohammad

Saadat, Vakil
Triangle Technologies
Wasim, Abdul Wakil
Zaland, Yousef
Zurmat Construction Company
Zurmat Foundation
Zurmat General Trading
Zurmat Group of Companies, d.b.a. “Zurmat LLC”
Zurmat Material Testing Laboratory

Autry, Cleo BrianChamberlain, William Todd
Cook, Jeffrey Arthur
Harper, Deric Tyron
Walls, Barry Lee, Jr.
International Contracting and Development
Sobh, Adeeb Nagib, a.k.a. “Ali Sobh”
Stallion Construction and Engineering Group
Wazne Group Inc., d.b.a. “Wazne Wholesale”
Wazne, Ayman, a.k.a. “Ayman Ibrahim Wazne”
Green, George E.
Tran, Anthony Don
Vergez, Norbert Eugene
Bunch, Donald P.
Kline, David A.

Farouki, Abul Huda*
Farouki, Mazen*
Maarouf, Salah*
ANHAM FZCOANHAM USA
Green, George E.
Tran, Anthony Don
Vergez, Norbert Eugene
Bunch, Donald P.
Kline, David A.
Farouki, Abul Huda*
Farouki, Mazen*
Maarouf, Salah*
ANHAM FZCOANHAM USA

Khalid, Mohammad
Khan, Daro
Mariano, April Anne Perez
McCabe, Elton Maurice
Mihalczo, John
Qasimi, Mohammed Indress
Radhi, Mohammad Khalid
Safi, Fazal Ahmed
Shin Gul Shaheen, a.k.a. “Sheen Gul Shaheen”
Espinoza-Loor, Pedro Alfredo
Campbell, Neil Patrick*Navarro, Wesley
Hazrati, Arash
Midfield International
Moore, Robert G.
Noori, Noor Alam, a.k.a. “Noor Alam”
Northern Reconstruction Organization
Shamal Pamir Building and Road Construction Company
Wade, Desi D.
Blue Planet Logistics Services

Mahmodi, Padres
Mahmodi, Shikab
Saber, Mohammed
Watson, Brian Erik
Abbasi, Shahpoor
Amiri, Waheedullah
Atal, Waheed
Daud, Abdulilah
Dehati, Abdul Majid
Fazli, Qais
Hamdard, Mohammad Yousuf
Kunari, Haji Pir Mohammad
Mushfiq, Muhammad Jaffar
Mutallib, Abdul
Nasrat, SamiNational General Construction Company
Passerly, Ahmaad Saleem
Rabi, Fazal
Rahman, Atta
Rahman, Fazal

Suspensions
Al-Watan Construction Company
Basirat Construction Firm
Naqibullah, Nadeem
Rahman, Obaidur
Robinson, Franz Martin
Aaria Middle East
Aaria Middle East Company LLC
Aftech International
Aftech International Pvt. Ltd.
Albahar Logistics
American Aaria Company LLC
American Aaria LLC
Sharpway Logistics
United States California Logistics Company
Brothers, Richard S.
Rivera-Medina, Franklin Delano

Debarments
Farooqi, Hashmatullah
Hamid Lais Construction Company
Hamid Lais Group
Lodin, Rohullah Farooqi
Bennett & Fouch Associates LLC
Brandon, Gary
K5 Global
Ahmad, Noor
Noor Ahmad Yousufzai Construction Company
Ayeni, Sheryl Adenike
Cannon, Justin
Constantino, April Anne
Constantino, Dee
Constantino, Ramil Palmes
Crilly, Braam
Drotleff, Christopher
Fil-Tech Engineering and Construction Company
Handa, Sdiharth
Jabak, Imad
Jamally, RohullahContinued on the following page
* Indicates that the individual or entity was subject to two final agency actions by an agency suspension and debarment official, resulting in a suspension followed by final debarment following theresolution of a criminal indictment or determination of non-responsibility by agency suspension and debarment official. Entries without an asterisk indicate that the individual was subject to a suspension or debarment, but not both.

156

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONAPPENDICESTABLE D.1 (CONTINUED)

SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2022 (CONTINUED)
Debarments (continued)
Roshandil, Mohammad Ajmal
Saber, Mohammed
Safi, Azizur Rahman
Safi, Matiullah
Sahak, Sher Khan
Shaheed, Murad
Shirzad, Daulet Khan
Uddin, Mehrab
Watson, Brian Erik
Wooten, Philip Steven*
Espinoza, Mauricio*
Alam, Ahmed Farzad*
Greenlight General Trading*
Aaria Middle East Company LLC*
Aaria Middle East Company Ltd. – Herat*
Aaria M.E. General Trading LLC*
Aaria Middle East*
Barakzai, Nangialai*
Formid Supply and Services*
Aaria Supply Services and Consultancy*
Kabul Hackle Logistics Company*
Yousef, Najeebullah*
Aaria Group*
Aaria Group Construction Company*
Aaria Supplies Company LTD*
Rahimi, Mohammad Edris*
All Points International Distributors Inc.*
Hercules Global Logistics*
Schroeder, Robert*
Helmand Twinkle Construction Company
Waziri, Heward Omar
Zadran, Mohammad
Afghan Mercury Construction Company, d.b.a. “Afghan
Mercury Construction & Logistics Co.”
Mirzali Naseeb Construction Company
Montes, Diyana
Naseeb, Mirzali
Martino, Roberto F.
Logiotatos, Peter R.
Glass, Calvin
Singleton, Jacy P.
Robinson, Franz Martin
Smith, Nancy
Sultani, Abdul Anas a.k.a. “Abdul Anas”
Faqiri, Shir
Hosmat, Haji
Jim Black Construction Company
Arya Ariana Aryayee Logistics, d.b.a. “AAA Logistics,” d.b.a.
“Somo Logistics”
Garst, Donald
Mukhtar, Abdul a.k.a. “Abdul Kubar”
Noori Mahgir Construction Company
Noori, Sherin Agha
Long, Tonya*

Isranuddin, Burhanuddin
Matun, Navidullah, a.k.a. “Javid Ahmad”
Matun, Wahidullah
Navid Basir Construction Company
Navid Basir JV Gagar Baba Construction Company
NBCC & GBCC JV
Noori, Navid
Asmatullah, Mahmood, a.k.a. “Mahmood”
Khan, Gul
Khan, Solomon Sherdad, a.k.a. “Solomon”
Mursalin, Ikramullah, a.k.a. “Ikramullah”
Musafer, Naseem, a.k.a. “Naseem”
Ali, Esrar
Gul, Ghanzi
Luqman Engineering Construction Company, d.b.a. “Luqman
Engineering”
Safiullah, a.k.a. “Mr. Safiullah”
Sarfarez, a.k.a. “Mr. Sarfarez”
Wazir, Khan
Akbar, Ali
Crystal Construction Company, d.b.a. “Samitullah Road
Construction Company”
Samitullah (Individual uses only one name)
Ashna, Mohammad Ibrahim, a.k.a. “Ibrahim”
Gurvinder, Singh
Jahan, Shah
Shahim, Zakirullah a.k.a. “Zakrullah Shahim”, a.k.a. “Zikrullah
Shahim”
Alyas, Maiwand Ansunullah a.k.a. “Engineer Maiwand Alyas”
BMCSC
Maiwand Haqmal Construction and Supply Company
New Riders Construction Company, d.b.a. “Riders
Construction Company,” d.b.a. “New Riders Construction andServices Company”
Riders Constructions, Services, Logistics and Transportation
Company
Riders Group of Companies
Domineck, Lavette Kaye*
Markwith, James*
Martinez, Rene
Maroof, Abdul
Qara, Yousef
Royal Palace Construction Company
Bradshaw, Christopher Chase
Zuhra Productions
Zuhra, Niazai
Boulware, Candice a.k.a. “Candice Joy Dawkins”
Dawkins, John
Mesopotamia Group LLC
Nordloh, Geoffrey
Kieffer, JerryJohnson, Angela
CNH Development Company LLC
Johnson, Keith

Military Logistic Support LLC
Eisner, John
Taurus Holdings LLC
Brophy, Kenneth Michael*
Abdul Haq Foundation
Adajar, Adonis
Calhoun, Josh W.
Clark Logistic Services Company, d.b.a. “Clark Construction
Company”
Farkas, Janos
Flordeliz, Alex F.
Knight, Michael T., II
Lozado, Gary
Mijares, Armando N., Jr.
Mullakhiel, Wadir Abdullahmatin
Rainbow Construction Company
Sardar, Hassan, a.k.a. “Hassan Sardar Inqilab”
Shah, Mohammad Nadir, a.k.a. “Nader Shah”
Tito, Regor
Brown, Charles Phillip
Sheren, Fasela, a.k.a. “Sheren Fasela”
Anderson, Jesse Montel
Charboneau, Stephanie, a.k.a. “Stephanie Shankel”
Hightower, Jonathan
Khan, Noor Zali, a.k.a. “Wali Kahn Noor”
Saheed, a.k.a. “Mr. Saheed;” a.k.a. “Sahill;” a.k.a.
“Ghazi-Rahman”
Weaver, Christopher
Al Kaheel Oasis Services
Al Kaheel Technical Service
CLC Construction Company
CLC Consulting LLC
Complete Manpower Solutions
Mohammed, Masiuddin, a.k.a. “Masi Mohammed”
Rhoden, Bradley L., a.k.a. “Brad L. Rhoden”
Rhoden, Lorraine Serena
Royal Super Jet General Trading LLC
Super Jet Construction Company
Super Jet Fuel Services
Super Jet Group
Super Jet Tours LLC, d.b.a. “Super Jet Travel and Holidays LLC”
Super Solutions LLC
Abdullah, Bilal
Farmer, Robert Scott
Mudiyanselage, Oliver
Kelly, Albert, III
Ethridge, James
Fernridge Strategic Partners
AISC LLC*
American International Security Corporation*David A. Young Construction & Renovation Inc.*
Force Direct Solutions LLC*
Harris, Christopher*
Hernando County Holdings LLC*

Continued on the following page

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

157

APPENDICES~ . J - - - - - - - - - - TABLE D.1 (CONTINUED)

SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2022 (CONTINUED)
Debarments (continued)
Hide-A-Wreck LLC*
Panthers LLC*
Paper Mill Village Inc.*
Shroud Line LLC*
Spada, Carol*
Welventure LLC*
World Wide Trainers LLC*
Young, David Andrew*
Woodruff and Company
Borcata, Raul A.*
Close, Jarred Lee*
Logistical Operations Worldwide*
Taylor, Zachery Dustin*
Travis, James Edward*
Khairfullah, Gul Agha
Khalil Rahimi Construction Company
Momand, Jahanzeb, a.k.a. “Engineer Jahanzeb Momand”
Yar-Mohammad, Hazrat Nabi
Walizada, Abdul Masoud, a.k.a. “Masood Walizada”
Alizai, ZarghonaAman, Abdul
Anwari, Laila
Anwari, Mezhgan
Anwari, Rafi
Arghandiwal, Zahra, a.k.a. “Sarah Arghandiwal”
Azizi, Farwad, a.k.a. “Farwad Mohammad Azizi”
Bashizada, Razia
Coates, Kenneth
Gibani, Marika
Haidari, Mahboob
Latifi, Abdul
McCammon, Christina
Mohibzada, Ahmadullah, a.k.a. “Ahmadullah Mohebzada”
Neghat, Mustafa
Qurashi, Abdul
Raouf, Ashmatullah
Shah, David
Touba, Kajim
Zahir, Khalid
Aryubi, Mohammad Raza SamimAtlas Sahil Construction Company
Bab Al Jazeera LLC
Emar-E-Sarey Construction Company
Muhammad, Pianda
Sambros International, d.b.a. “Sambros International LTD,”
d.b.a. “Sambros-UK JV”
Sambros JV Emar-E-Sarey Construction Company, d.b.a.
“Sambros JV ESCC”
Antes, Bradley A.
Lakeshore Engineering & Construction Afghanistan Inc.,
d.b.a. “Lakeshore General Contractors Inc.”
Lakeshore Engineering Services Inc.
Lakeshore Engineering Services/Toltest JV LLC
Lakeshore Toltest – Rentenbach JV LLC

Lakeshore Toltest Corporation, d.b.a. “Lakeshore Group,”
d.b.a. “LTC Newco d.b.a. “LTC CORP Michigan,” d.b.a.
"Lakeshore Toltest KK”
Lakeshore Toltest Guam LLC
Lakeshore Toltest JV LLC
Lakeshore Toltest RRCC JV LLC
Lakeshore/Walsh JV LLC
LakeshoreToltest METAG JV LLC
LTC & Metawater JV LLC
LTC Holdings Inc.
LTC Italia SRL
LTC Tower General Contractors LLC
LTCCORP Commercial LLC
LTCCORP E&C Inc.
LTCCORP Government Services-OH Inc.
LTCCORP Government Services Inc.
LTCCORP Government Services-MI Inc.
LTCCORP O&G LLC
LTCCORP Renewables LLC
LTCCORP Inc.
LTCCORP/Kaya Dijbouti LLC
LTCCORP/Kaya East Africa LLC
LTCCORP/Kaya Romania LLC
LTCCORP/Kaya Rwanda LLC
LTCORP Technology LLC
Toltest Inc., d.b.a. “Wolverine Testing and Engineering,” d.b.a.
“Toledo Testing Laboratory,” d.b.a. “LTC,” d.b.a. “LTC Corp,”
d.b.a. “LTC Corp Ohio,” d.b.a. “LTC Ohio”
Toltest/Desbuild Germany JV LLC
Veterans Construction/Lakeshore JV LLC
Afghan Royal First Logistics, d.b.a. “Afghan Royal”
American Barriers
Arakozia Afghan Advertising
Dubai Armored Cars
Enayatullah, son of Hafizullah
Farhas, Ahmad
Inland Holdings Inc.
Intermaax, FZEIntermaax Inc.
Karkar, Shah Wali
Sandman Security Services
Siddiqi, Atta
Specialty Bunkering
Spidle, Chris Calvin
Vulcan Amps Inc.
Worldwide Cargomasters
Aziz, Haji Abdul, a.k.a. “Abdul Aziz Shah Jan,” a.k.a. “Aziz”
Castillo, Alfredo, Jr.
Abbasi, Asim
Muturi, SamuelMwakio, Shannel
Ahmad, Jaweed
Ahmad, Masood
A & J Total Landscapes

Aryana Green Light Support Services
Mohammad, Sardar, a.k.a. “Sardar Mohammad Barakzai”
Pittman, James C., a.k.a. “Carl Pittman”
Poaipuni, Clayton
Wiley, Patrick
Crystal Island Construction Company
Bertolini, Robert L.*
Kahn, Haroon Shams, a.k.a. “Haroon Shams”*
Shams Constructions Limited*
Shams General Services and Logistics Unlimited*
Shams Group International, d.b.a. “Shams GroupInternational FZE”*
Shams London Academy*
Shams Production*
Shams Welfare Foundation*
Swim, Alexander*
Norris, James Edward
Afghan Columbia Constructon Company
Ahmadi, Mohammad Omid
Dashti, Jamsheed
Hamdard, Eraj
Hamidi, Mahrokh
Raising Wall Construction Company
Artemis Global Inc., d.b.a. “Artemis Global Logistics andSolutions,” d.b.a. “Artemis Global Trucking LLC”
O’Brien, James Michael, a.k.a. “James Michael Wienert”
Tamerlane Global Services Inc., d.b.a. “Tamerlane Global
LLC,” d.b.a. “Tamerlane LLC,” d.b.a. “Tamerlane Technologies
LLC”
Sherzai, Akbar Ahmed*
Jean-Noel, Dimitry
Hampton, Seneca Darnell*
Dennis, Jimmy W.
Timor, Karim
Wardak, Khalid
Rahmat Siddiqi Transportation Company
Siddiqi, Rahmat
Siddiqi, Sayed Attaullah
Umbrella Insurance Limited Company
Taylor, Michael
Gardazi, Syed
Smarasinghage, Sagara
Security Assistance Group LLC
Edmondson, Jeffrey B.*
Montague, Geoffrey K.*
Ciampa, Christopher*
Lugo, Emanuel*
Bailly, Louis Matthew*
Kumar, Krishan
Marshal Afghan American Construction Company
Marshal, Sayed Abbas Shah
Masraq Engineering and Construction Company
Miakhil, Azizullah
Raj, JanakContinued on the following page

158

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONAPPENDICESTABLE D.1 (CONTINUED)

SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2022 (CONTINUED)
Debarments (continued)
Singh, Roop
Stratton, William G
Umeer Star Construction Company
Zahir, Mohammad Ayub
Peace Thru Business*
Pudenz, Adam Jeff Julias*
Green, Robert Warren*
Mayberry, Teresa*
Addas, James*
Advanced Ability for U-PVC*
Al Bait Al Amer*
Al Iraq Al Waed*
Al Quraishi Bureau*
Al Zakoura Company*
Al-Amir Group LLC*
Al-Noor Contracting Company*
Al-Noor Industrial Technologies Company*
California for Project Company*
Civilian Technologies Limited Company*
Industrial Techniques Engineering ElectromechanicallyCompany*
Pena, Ramiro*Pulsars Company*
San Francisco for Housing Company
Sura Al Mustakbal*
Top Techno Concrete Batch*
Albright, Timothy H.*
Insurance Group of Afghanistan
Ratib, Ahmad, a.k.a. “Nazari”
Jamil, Omar K.
Rawat, Ashita
Qadery, Abdul Khalil
Casellas, Luis Ramon*
Saber, Mohammad a.k.a. “Saber,” a.k.a. “Sabir”
Zahir, Shafiullah Mohammad a.k.a. “Shafiullah,” a.k.a.
“Shafie”
Achiever’s International Ministries Inc., d.b.a. “Center for
Achievement and Development LLC”
Bickersteth, Diana
Bonview Consulting Group Inc.
Fagbenro, Oyetayo Ayoola, a.k.a. “Tayo Ayoola Fagbenro”
Global Vision Consulting LLC
HUDA Development Organization
Strategic Impact Consulting, d.b.a. “Strategic Impact KarKon
Afghanistan Material Testing Laboratory”
Davies, Simon
Gannon, Robert, W.
Gillam, RobertMondial Defence Systems Ltd.
Mondial Defense Systems USA LLC
Mondial Logistics
Khan, Adam
Khan, Amir, a.k.a. “Amir Khan Sahel”
Sharq Afghan Logistics Company, d.b.a. “East Afghan
Logistics Company”

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

Hafizullah, Sayed; a.k.a. “Sadat Sayed Hafizullah;” a.k.a.
“Sayed Hafizullah Delsooz”
Sadat Zohori Construction and Road Building Company;
d.b.a. “Sadat Zohori Cons Co.”
Abdullah, Son of Lal Gul
Ahmad, Aziz
Ahmad, Zubir
Aimal, Son of Masom
Ajmal, Son of Mohammad Anwar
Fareed, Son of Shir
Fayaz Afghan Logistics Services
Fayaz, Afghan, a.k.a. “Fayaz Alimi,” a.k.a. “Fayaz, Son ofMohammad”
Gul, Khuja
Habibullah, Son of Ainuddin
Hamidullah, Son of Abdul Rashid
Haq, Fazal
Jahangir, Son of Abdul Qadir
Kaka, Son of Ismail
Khalil, Son of Mohammad Ajan
Khan, Mirullah
Khan, Mukamal
Khoshal, Son of Sayed Hasan
Malang, Son of Qand
Masom, Son of Asad Gul
Mateen, Abdul
Mohammad, Asghar
Mohammad, Baqi
Mohammad, Khial
Mohammad, Sayed
Mujahid, Son of Abdul Qadir
Nangiali, Son of Alem Jan
Nawid, Son of Mashoq
Noorullah, Son of Noor Mohammad
Qayoum, Abdul
Roz, Gul
Shafiq, Mohammad
Shah, Ahmad
Shah, Mohammad
Shah, Rahim
Sharif, Mohammad
Waheedullah, Son of Sardar Mohammad
Wahid, Abdul
Wais, Gul
Wali, Khair
Wali, Sayed
Wali, Taj
Yaseen, Mohammad
Yaseen, Son of Mohammad Aajan
Zakir, Mohammad
Zamir, Son of Kabir
Rogers, Sean
Slade, Justin
Morgan, Sheldon J.*

Dixon, Regionald
Emmons, Larry
Epps, Willis*
Etihad Hamidi Group; d.b.a. “Etihad Hamidi Trading,Transportation, Logistics and Construction Company”
Etihad Hamidi Logistics Company; d.b.a. “Etihad Hamidi
Transportation, Logistic Company Corporation”
Hamidi, Abdul Basit; a.k.a. Basit Hamidi
Kakar, Rohani; a.k.a. “Daro Khan Rohani”
Mohammad, Abdullah Nazar
Nasir, Mohammad
Wali Eshaq Zada Logistics Company; d.b.a. “WaliAshqa Zada Logistics Company”; d.b.a. “Nasert Nawazi
Transportation Company”
Ware, Marvin*
Belgin, Andrew
Afghan Bamdad Construction Company, d.b.a. “Afghan
Bamdad Development Construction Company”
Areeb of East Company for Trade & Farzam Construction
Company JVAreeb of East for Engineering and General Trading
Company Limited, d.b.a. “Areeb of East LLC”
Areeb-BDCC JVAreebel Engineering and Logisitcs - Farzam
Areebel Engineering and Logistics
Areeb-Rixon Construction Company LLC, d.b.a. “AreebREC JV”
Carver, Elizabeth N.
Carver, Paul W.
RAB JV
Ullah, Izat; a.k.a. “Ezatullah”; a.k.a. “Izatullah, son of
Shamsudeen”
Saboor, Baryalai Abdul; a.k.a. “Barry Gafuri”
Stratex Logistic and Support, d.b.a. “Stratex Logistics”
Jahanzeb, Mohammad Nasir
Nasrat, Zaulhaq, a.k.a. “Zia Nasrat”
Blevins, Kenneth Preston*Banks, Michael*Afghan Armor Vehicle Rental Company
Hamdard, Javid
McAlpine, Nebraska
Meli Afghanistan Group
Badgett, Michael J.*
Miller, Mark E.
Anderson, William Paul
Kazemi, Sayed Mustafa, a.k.a. “Said Mustafa Kazemi”
Al Mostahan Construction Company

Nazary, Nasir Ahmad
Nazanin, a.k.a. “Ms. Nazanin”
Ahmadzai, Sajid
Sajid, Amin Gul
Elham, Yaser, a.k.a. “Najibullah Saadullah”*
Everest Faizy Logistics Services*
Faizy Elham Brothers Ltd.*
Continued on the following pageI OCTOBER 30, 2022

159

APPENDICES~ . J - - - - - - - - - - TABLE D.1 (CONTINUED)

SPECIAL ENTITY DESIGNATIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND DEBARMENTS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2022 (CONTINUED)
Debarments (continued)
Faizy, Rohullah*
Hekmat Shadman General Trading LLC*
Hekmat Shadman Ltd., d.b.a. “Hikmat Shadman Ltd.”*
Hikmat Shadman Construction and Supply
Company*
Hikmat Himmat Logistics Services Company*
Hikmat Shadman Logistics Services Company,
d.b.a. “Hikmat Shadman Commerce Constructionand Supply Company,” d.b.a. “Hikmat Shadman
Commerce Construction Services”*
Saif Hikmat Construction Logistic Services andSupply Co.*
Shadman, Hikmatullah, a.k.a. “Hikmat Shadman,”a.k.a. “Haji Hikmatullah Shadman,” a.k.a.
“Hikmatullah Saadulah”*
Omonobi-Newton, Henry
Hele, PaulHighland Al Hujaz Co. Ltd.
Supreme Ideas – Highland Al Hujaz Ltd. Joint
Venture, d.b.a. SI-HLH-JV
BYA International Inc. d.b.a. BYA Inc.
Harper, Deric Tyrone*
Walls, Barry Lee, Jr.*
Cook, Jeffrey Arthur*
McCray, Christopher
Jones, Antonio
Autry, Cleo Brian*
Chamberlain, William Todd*
JS International Inc.
Perry, Jack
Pugh, James
Hall, Alan
Paton, Lynda Anne
Farouki, Abul Huda*
Farouki, Mazen*
Maarouf, Salah*
Unitrans International Inc.
Financial Instrument and Investment Corp., d.b.a.
“FIIC”AIS-Unitrans (OBO) Facilities Inc., d.b.a. “American
International Services”

160

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

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APPENDICES~ . J - - - - - - - - - - -APPENDIX EABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACRONYM ORABBREVIATION

DEFINITIONAAF

Afghan Air ForceABADEI

Area Based Approach to Development Emergency Initiatives

ACC

Army Contracting Command

ACEBA

Afghanistan Competitiveness of Export-Oriented Business Activity

ACLED

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project

ACO

Allied Command Operations

ACTED

Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development

ADB

Asian Development BankADHS

Afghanistan Demographic and Health Survey

ADS

Automative Directives System (USAID)

AFCAP

Airforce Contract Augmentation Program

AFF

Afghanistan Freedom Front

AFN

afghani (currency)

AHP

Afghanistan Hands Program

AICR

Afghanistan Investment Climate Reform Program

AITF

Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund

AMP

Agricultural Marketing Program

ANA

Afghan National Army

ANA-TFANA Trust Fund

ANDSF

Afghan National Defense and Security Forces

ANP

Afghan National Police

AOTP

Afghan Opiate Trade Project

APPS

Afghan Personnel and Pay System

ARCENT

U.S. Army Central Command

AROC

Afghanistan Resources Oversight Council

ARTF

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust FundASFF

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

ASSF

Afghan Special Security Forces

ATA

Antiterrorism Assistance

AUWS

Afghan Urban Water and Sanitation Activity

AWER

Alliance for Afghan Women’s Economic Resilience
Continued on the next page

162

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONAPPENDICESACRONYM ORABBREVIATION

DEFINITION

BAG

Budget Activity GroupBBC

British Broadcast Corporation

BHA

Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (USAID)BIS

Bank for International Settlements

CAP

Comprehensive Action Plan

CastroCastro & Company

CENTCOM

U.S. Central Command

CERF

Central Emergency Response Fund (UN)CFR

Code of Federal Regulation

CIO

Contribution to International Organizations

CIGIE

Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency

COMAC

Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians

CPD

Central Prisons Directorate

CPJ

Committee to Protect Journalists

CRAF

Civil Reserve Air Fleet

CSTC-A

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

CTF

Counterterrorism Financing

CWD

Conventional Weapons Destruction

DAB

Da Afghanistan BankDABS

Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat

DBA

Defense Base Act

DCAA

Defense Contract Audit Agency

DCIS

Defense Criminal Investigative Service

DEA

Drug Enforcement Administration (U.S.)

DEWS

Disease Early Warning System

DFAS

Defense Finance and Accounting Service

DFC

Development Finance Corporation

DIA

Defense Intelligence Agency (U.S.)

DMAC

Directorate for Mine Action Coordination

DOD

Department of Defense (U.S.)

DOD-ECDOD Expeditionary Civilian Program

DOD OIG

Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

DOJ

Department of Justice (U.S.)

DSCA

Defense Security Cooperation Agency

DSCMO-A

Defense Security Cooperation Management Office-Afghanistan

EDA

Excess Defense Articles
Continued on the next page

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

163

APPENDICES~ . J - - - - - - - - - - -ACRONYM ORABBREVIATION

DEFINITION

E.O.

Executive Order

ERMA

Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund

ERW

Explosive remnants of war

ESF

Economic Support FundEU

European Union

EXBS

Export Control and Related Border Security

FAO

Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)FAP

Financial and Activity Plan

FAR

Federal Acquisition Regulation

FEPP

Foreign Excess Personal Property

FERP

Foreign Excess Real Property

FMS

Foreign Millitary Sales

FY

Fiscal year

GAO

Government Accountability Office (U.S.)

GEC

Let Girls Learn Initiative and Girls’ Education Challenge Programme

GHP

Global Health Programs

GHSCM-PSM

Global Health Supply Chain Management

G7Group of 7 nations

HCA

Heads of Contracting Activities

HER

Health Emergency Response Project

HFA

Humanitarian Food AssistanceIA

Immediate assistance

IBRD

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ICRC

International Committee of the Red Cross

IDA

International Development Association

IDP

Internally displaced persons

IFC

International Finance Cooperation

IG

Inspector general

INCLE

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (U.S.)

INL

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (U.S.)

IOM

International Organization for Migration (UN)IPC

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification

IS-K

Islamic State-Khorasan

KBL

Kabul International Airport

LLC

Limited Liability Company

LLP

Lessons Learned Program
Continued on the next page

164

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONAPPENDICESACRONYM ORABBREVIATION

DEFINITION

LOA

Letter of Offer and Acceptance

LOGCAP

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

LOTFA

Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan

MIGA

Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency

MIPR

Military interdepartmental purchase request

MOD

Ministry of Defense (Afghan)

MODA

Ministry of Defense Advisors program

MOE

Minister of Education (Afghan)

MOI

Ministry of Interior (Afghan)

MoMDA

Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled Affairs (Afghan)

MOMP

Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (Afghan)

MOPH

Ministry of Public Health (Afghan)

MOU

Memorandum of Understanding

MPD

MOI and Police Development

MRA

Migration and Refugee Assistance

NADR

Non-Proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs

NATF

NATO ANA Trust Fund

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDAA

National Defense Authorization Act

NEO

Noncombatant Evacuation Operation

NEPS

North East Power System

NGO

Nongovernmental organization

NLF

National Liberation Front

NRF

National Resistance FrontNSIA

National Statistics and Information Authority (Afghan)

NSPA

NATO Support and Procument Agency

OCHA

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OCO

Overseas Contingency Operations

OEG

Office of Economic Growth (USAID)

OFAC

Office of Foreign Assets Control (U.S. Treasury)

OHCHR

United Nations Human Rights Council

OHDACA

Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid

OIC

Organization of Islamic Cooperation

OIG

Office of Inspector General

OUSD-P

Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy

PEPSE

Promoting Excellence in Private Sector Engagement
Continued on the next page

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

165

APPENDICES~ . J - - - - - - - - - - -ACRONYM ORABBREVIATION

DEFINITION

PM/WRA

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (State)

PRM

Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (U.S. State)

RCW

Recurrent cost window

RSM

Resolute Support Mission

Ru-WASH

Rural Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene

SAG

Subactivity GroupSAM

federal System for Award Management

SEA II

Strengthening Education in Afghanistan

SEPS

South East Power System

SFAB

Security Force Assistance Brigade

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIV

Special Immigrant Visa

SMW

Special Mission Wing (Afghan)

SOCOM

U.S. Special Operations Command

SOF

Special operations forces

State

U.S. Department of State

State OIG

Department of State Office of Inspector General

TA

Tailored assistance

TAA

Train, advise, and assist

TAAC

Train, Advise, and Assist Command

UN

United Nations

UNAMA

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNFAO

United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization

UNFPA

United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF

United Nations Children’s Fund

UNMAS

United Nations Mine Action Service

UNODC

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UN Women

United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women

USACE

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

USAID

U.S. Agency for International Development

USAID OIGUSAID Office of Inspector General

USAGM

U.S. Agency for Global Media

USD

U.S. dollar

USFOR-A

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
Continued on the next page

166

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERALI AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTIONAPPENDICESACRONYM ORABBREVIATION

DEFINITION

USIP

United States Institute of Peace

WHO

World Health Organization

WSE

Women’s Scholarship Endowment

WFP

World Food Programme

Y-O-Y

Year-on-year

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSI OCTOBER 30, 2022

167

Shepherds in Kunduz Province take their sheep to pasture. (UNAMA Photo by Shamsuddin Hamedi)

Quarterly Report Staff
Harrison Akins, Security Subject Matter Expert

James Misencik, Security Subject Matter Expert

Michael Bindell, Deputy Director of Research and Analysis Directorate

Nicole Price, Senior Auditor

Theodore Burns, Funding Subject Matter Expert

Deborah Scroggins, Director of Research and Analysis Directorate

Acadia Brooks, Project Coordinator

Omar Sharif, Economic and Social Development Subject Matter Expert

Jason Davis, Senior Visual Information Specialist

Daniel Weggeland, Senior Subject Matter Expert/Editor

Refael Kubersky, Student Trainee

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