FACING NUCLEAR DANGERS:AN ACTION PLAN FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
The Report of the Tokyo Forumfor Nuclear Non-Proliferation and DisarmamentTokyo
25 July 1999
Japan Institute of International Affairs
Hiroshima Peace Institute-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Contents
Preface
Members of the Tokyo Forum
I. The New Nuclear Dangers
II. Mending Strategic Relations to Reduce Nuclear Dangers
III.Stopping and Reversing Nuclear Proliferation
IV.Achieving Nuclear Disarmament
V.Key Recommendations
Glossary
Profiles of the Member-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Preface
The Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament was organised at theinitiative of the then Prime Minister of Japan, Mr Ryutaro Hashimoto, in August 1998.
The initiative was taken up by the then Foreign Minister and current Prime Minister ofJapan, Mr Keizo Obuchi. It was co-chaired by former Ambassador Mr Nobuo Matsunagaof the Japan Institute of International Affairs and former UN Under-Secretary-Generaland former President of the Hiroshima Peace Institute Mr Yasushi Akashi. The Forummet four times: in August 1998, in Tokyo; in December 1998, in Hiroshima; in April
1999, at Pocantico, New York; and in July 1999, in Tokyo.
The following report and its recommendations are the result of discussions in thosemeetings. The members of the Tokyo Forum subscribe to the general thrust of the report
but not every member may agree to every point in the report. They have participated intheir personal capacities, thus the views expressed in the report do not necessarilyreflect the views of the governments or organisations to which they belong. Special
acknowledgement is given to the valuable contributions made by Ambassador Qian
Jiadong of China, who attended the first, second and third meetings of the Forum andwas succeeded by Mr Hu Xiaodi*, who, in the end, had dissenting views on somesignificant points in the report. Acknowledgement is also given to the valuable
contributions made by Mr Jasjit Singh of India who attended the first and second
meetings of the Forum. While the Forum was initiated by the Japanese Government,
the views in this report are those of the Forum, an independent panel of experts, andshould not be understood as necessarily reflecting policies of the Japanese Government.
The Forum received many proposals from concerned non-government organisations andcitizens. The Forum welcomed these proposals, and considered them carefully in
preparing its report.
The Forum was supported by a Secretariat constituted from the Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs, the Hiroshima Peace Institute, and the Japanese Ministry ofForeign Affairs (Arms Control and Scientific Affairs Bureau). The Secretariat notes thecontribution to its work made by Mr Rory Medcalf, seconded in a personal capacity fromthe Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
* Mr Hu Xiaodi has disagreement over, inter alia, issues of MTCR, missile defences,fissile material moratorium, transparency, Korea, paragraphs 30 and 39 of Part 2 of thereport, and the fourth key recommendation.
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Members of the Tokyo Forum
Lt. Gen. Nishat AHMAD
Former President of the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad
Mr Yasushi AKASHI
Former President of Hiroshima Peace InstituteAmb. Marcos Castrioto DE AZAMBUJA
Ambassador of Brazil to France
Prof. Sergei Yevgenevich BLAGOVOLIN
Deputy Director, World Economy and International Relations Institute (IMEMO),
Moscow
Amb. Emilio Jorge CARDENAS
Executive Director, HSBC Argentine S.A.
Former Ambassador of Argentina to the United Nations
Dr Therese DELPECH
Director, Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), Paris
Amb. Rolf EKEUS
Ambassador of Sweden to the United States
Dr Robert GALLUCCI
Dean, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Prof. HAN Sung-Joo
Professor of Korea University
Mr HU Xiaodi
Deputy Director-General, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry ofForeign Affairs, China
Amb. Ryukichi IMAIDistinguished Fellow, Institute for International Policy Studies, Tokyo
Dr Joachim KRAUSE
Deputy Director, Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs (DGAP),
BerlinMr Michael KREPON
President, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington D.C.
Mr Pierre LELLOUCHEMember of the Council, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London
Dr Patricia M. LEWIS
Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament (UNIDIR), Geneva
Amb. Margaret MASON
Director of Council Development, Canadian Council for International Peace andSecurity, Ottawa
Mr Nobuo MATSUNAGA
Vice-Chairman, Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo
Dr Joseph S. NYE, Jr.
Dean, JFK School of Government, Harvard University, Boston
Prof. Robert O'NEILL
Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, University of Oxford
Dr Abdel Monem SAID Aly
Director, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo
Prof. John SIMPSON
Director, Mountbatten Center for International Studies, Department of Politics,

University of Southampton
Amb. Hennadiy UDOVENKO
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs
President of 52nd Session of the UN General AssemblyProf. ZAKARIA Haji Ahamad
Dean, Faculty of Social Science and Humanities, National University of Malaysia
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I. THE NEW NUCLEAR DANGERS

1. A decade after the end of the Cold War, at the threshold of the 21st century, the fabricof international security is showing signs of unraveling. Relations among major powers
are deteriorating. The United Nations is in political and financial crisis. The global
regimes to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) are under siege. Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan have shownthat not all countries share the view that the usefulness of nuclear weapons is declining.
Years of relentless effort have not eliminated the clandestine WMD programs of themost determined proliferators. The US-Russia nuclear disarmament process is stalled,with adverse consequences for the global disarmament agenda. The situation in Asia isparticularly fluid, portending negative changes for disarmament and non-proliferationin coming years. Political violence is taking an increasingly worrisome turn, with thepossible advent of sub-state terrorist groups armed with weapons of mass destruction.
Andeconomiccrises,sweeping

overcontinents,

generate

instability

andunpredictability well beyond the markets.
2. Relations among major powers, a primary factor in world order, are crucial to thefuture of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Following a short rapprochement,
relations between the United States and Russia have deteriorated. The United States
no longer has a matching rival, and is perceived as a sole military superpower. Russia,
concerned about its status, has revalued nuclear weapons, especially for "tactical" use.
Misunderstanding on both sides is made worse by crises over issues such as
enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United Nations Special
Commission on Iraq, missile defences and Kosovo. Russia's growing irritation at US
initiatives, which frequently ignore its views, has clear consequences for disarmament:
ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II in the Russian Duma isrepeatedly held hostage to bilateral disagreements. Relations are also troubled between
the United States and China. These two countries not only differ in their approaches tosuchfundamental

issuesashumanrights,missiledefences,

Taiwanandnon-proliferation but also have potentially conflicting visions of their roles in Asia which
could intensify in the next century. Europe, meanwhile, still lacks the sway it could holdin world politics. The European Union is going through further integration andenlargement, and is taking active steps to strengthen the implementation of its common
foreign and security policies. At this stage, however, it is still punching below its weighton the world stage. Europe has a limited role even on such matters of vital interest as
the former Soviet Union's WMD legacy, especially when compared with the US
cooperative threat-reduction programs. Finally, the cast of major powers on the worldstage is changing, with more states aspiring to play a larger role.
3. Without a strong, effective United Nations, nuclear non-proliferation anddisarmament efforts will fall short. But the UN system is adrift, financiallycompromised, and playing a limited role in international relations, sometimes
performing vital services but sometimes bypassed entirely. The UN system reflects
power relations and has suffered from deteriorating relations among major powers. This
has left the United Nations Organization poorly equipped to face complexities arisingfrom the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the growing importance of
non-state actors ignoring basic international law, and new forms of violence involving
mass civilian casualties. Unable to respond to some of the dramatic changes in theworld in the 50 years since its creation, its effectiveness and to some extent its authority
have been undermined. The divergent views on a UN standing military force, and on
the new permanent membership of the Security Council, for example, illustrate theUnited Nations' problems. The United Nations, however, remains an essential
institution for moving international relations towards cooperative security. Its

operational capabilities must be strengthened. To deal effectively with international
security problems in the next century, Security Council reform, new normative
principles, operational arrangements, financial compliance and new sources offinancing are urgently needed.
4. Recent advances in science and technology have made chemical and biologicalweapons more accessible. Furthermore, the bio-science revolution has opened
possibilities for the making of a new generation of biological weapons which are moredangerous and difficult to protect against. Some of this activity is difficult to distinguishfrom legitimate civilian research, which makes proliferation harder to prevent. In the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, increasingly
complex methods of concealment and sources of supply are used. Delivery systems arealso giving rise to increased concern, as missiles with extended ranges and increased
launch readiness become more accessible. The uses proposed for nuclear weapons by the
new nuclear-armed states are unclear; those of potential proliferators of biologicalweapons even more so. As a consequence, profound questions must now be raised
concerning the new WMD arsenals. Are they intended as weapons of last resort? Arethey seen as decisive weapons for use against countries armed with advanced
conventional capabilities? Are they for the ultimate protection of authoritarian regimes?
Or are they seen as instruments of regional domination?
5. At stages during the Cold War, the common interests of the superpowers to avoid
nuclear conflict were strong enough to moderate hostile behaviour and create, throughdialogue and confidence-building measures, some level of trust. Nothing of the like
exists among the new proliferators and some of their neighbours. The world must now
contemplate new and dangerous patterns of behaviour. The risks of cataclysmic war
between major powers have subsided, but those of regional aggression with weapons ofmass destruction have increased. Warnings have been sounded, including in Kashmir,
the Persian Gulf and the Korean Peninsula. Non-proliferation and disarmament
treaties have been used as smokescreens for clandestine weapon programs. Concerns
over WMD programs in North Korea and Iraq, in two unstable regions, have proved
strikingly difficult to resolve, either through cooperation or pressure. In both cases,
1998 and 1999 have been years of reassessment and latent crisis.
6. The May 1998 tests in India and Pakistan have significantly changed the global
non-proliferation and disarmament picture. Their message runs counter to wide

expectations and hopes that the end of the Cold War would make nuclear weapons relicsof the past. Instead, the tests signal that nuclear weapons could be a growing part of thestrategic landscape of the future. They raise doubts about the extent to which nuclear
weapons were linked only to the singular historical circumstances of the Cold War. They
also pose a fundamental problem for the regime based on the 1968 Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by creating two states with demonstrated
nuclear weapon capabilities but no recognised status. Achieving NPT universality
under these circumstances is extremely difficult. Many countries that acceded to the
NPT assuming there would be only five nuclear-weapon states (NWS) resent India's andPakistan's tests as a challenge to their own policies of restraint. These tests, as well ascomplementary missile flight tests, greatly increase nuclear dangers in an area wherefour major conflicts between India and Pakistan, and one between India and China,
have been fought since 1947. A capacity for mutual destruction does not ensure
restraint. In the Middle East, where several armed conflicts have taken place sinceWorld War II, there is also the genuine possibility that further wars may involve
weapons of mass destruction. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war there were reports that
Israel had contemplated using nuclear weapons; and even the United States ordered anuclear alert. Chemical weapons were used in the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. And the1991 Gulf War raised fears about the use of chemical and biological weapons.
7. Implementation of the bilateral US-Russia disarmament agenda is stalled, withmajor repercussions for global disarmament and non-proliferation. The Russian Duma
will have difficulty ratifying START II in the near future; START III may remain an
unrealised treaty unless new efforts are made to reaffirm the START process. It would
be a major setback if the two major nuclear powers abandoned their joint efforts instrategic reductions. It is too early to tell if the US-Russian Joint Statement of 20 June
1999 can revive START.
8. Tactical nuclear arsenals are also of increasing concern. Despite accounting for morethan half of the global stockpile of nuclear warheads, they are not covered by any
agreement. Both the United States and Russia maintain high alert rates for large
numbers of nuclear weapons, based on plans of massive attack which have lost their
meaning. Such plans are especially dangerous when Russia's early warning andcommand and control systems are weakened and its political structure is unstable.
9. The issue of fissile material control has become critical. Large stockpiles have been

produced since the 1940s, and now plutonium and highly enriched uranium are being
extracted from thousands of dismantled nuclear warheads. Despite international
cooperation to strengthen Russia's capacity to control its fissile material, much remains
to be accomplished; concerns persist that its fissile material may disseminate beyond its
borders. Four nuclear-weapon states (the United States, Russia, France and the United
Kingdom) have announced moratoria on producing fissile materials for weapons. It is
hoped that China, India, Israel and Pakistan will also declare moratoria and adhere tothem.
10. The US-China relationship has been deteriorating and is very unstable, withadverse consequences for disarmament. The United States is concerned about China's
possible cooperation with Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes and China's
development of its nuclear arsenal. China has already undertaken certain
commitments: the unconditional no first use of nuclear weapons, no-use or threat of useof nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states, and the policy of no deploymentof nuclear weapons outside its borders. China, however, has put in place few
transparency measures. The implementation of further transparency measures would
help dispel regional concerns and would support global nuclear disarmament efforts.
For its part, China is concerned over aspects of US nuclear deterrence doctrine and thedevelopment of ballistic missile defences. The United States has put in place manytransparency measures concerning its doctrines, deployments, fissile materials andtechnical developments. Further information, however, on reserve stocks would have apositive impact on steps towards nuclear disarmament.
11. Relationships between China and Russia, marked by China's new strength andRussia's present weakness, will be equally important in shaping the emerging
international system. Reports about the development of a new missile by Russia, andabout changes in Russian operational doctrine that could make nuclear weapons more
readily useable, could over time raise concerns in China. On the other hand, China is
not constrained by strategic arms reduction treaties while Moscow has agreed to forego
land-based multiple warhead missiles and current Russian nuclear forces face block
obsolescence. This juxtaposition of factors could cause increased concern in Russia.
12. Terrorism using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons has been possible for sometime, but serious policymakers have traditionally seen other threats as more pressing.
This perception has been changing since the early 1990s. The probability of WMD

terrorism may still be relatively low, but it is growing with the ability of sub-state
terrorist groups to master the technical challenges of developing and using theseweapons, and their growing access to the very significant monies obtained from thetraffic in illicit drugs. National controls on weapons-grade fissile materials were tightduring the Cold War; now it is increasingly possible that non-state actors might obtainthem. The prospect of WMD terrorism is particularly alarming because it would be hardto prevent and the perpetrators hard to identify. The effects of WMD terrorism could be
so severe that it must be regarded as a serious security challenge for the coming decades.
Trends in political violence and a propensity towards inflicting mass casualties appear
to be rising in recent years. Chemical weapons have already been used against civilian
populations in internal conflicts, setting a dangerous precedent, especially when civilian
casualties and displacement are war aims in some ethno-nationalist conflicts.
13. Maintaining and reinforcing the WMD non-proliferation regimes is vital to global
peace and security. Despite increased membership, key states remain outside the NPT,the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention(BWC). Implementation decisions have weakened verification of the CWC, and the
BWC verification protocol remains distant. Compliance challenges generate increasing
concern, and there are no accepted multilateral processes for assessing and enforcing
compliance, despite an array of non-proliferation norms, treaties and institutions.
Political issues also divide the parties, including the pace of disarmament,
commitments to peaceful cooperation, and the specific regional challenges of
implementing a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.
14. Prospective missile defence deployments complicate the picture and are causingmuch debate. Proliferation may increase the perceived need for missile defences: thedramatic changes in threat assessment caused by the emergence of Iranian, Israeli,
North Korean, Indian and Pakistani medium-range missile systems contributed to the
new interest in missile defences. Alternatively, defences could, among other things, also
increase and diversify the threat of WMD proliferation, as some states, including someof the five nuclear-weapon states, may try to compensate for defensive deployments.
The question of missile defences should take into account all these implications, so as tohave the net effect of reducing, not increasing, nuclear dangers, and avoiding further
destabilisation of the international security system. The 1997 Protocol to theAnti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty governing advanced missile defences does notfundamentally affect the ABM Treaty or undermine the mutual deterrence model.

Prospective US-Russia discussions on the ABM Treaty should also meet these criteria.
15. A realistic dialogue on the most effective means to address underlying security
concerns must replace outdated nuclear doctrines on the one hand and artificial
disarmament deadlines on the other. The international community must find new
approaches to reduce nuclear dangers in these troubled times. Non-proliferation norms
will need to be strengthened if the regime is to be kept alive in the next century. Not
only regional but also global security is at stake. The 1991 Gulf War showed how aregional conflict could have global implications. Nuclear non-proliferation anddisarmament are not the preserve of the nuclear-weapon states or powers in troubled
regions. The NPT is based on a contract involving all parties. While the nuclear-weapon
states have to fulfil their Article I, IV and VI obligations and pursue nuclear
disarmament, the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) need to firmly support effective
action in the most difficult cases of non-compliance. Concerted action by both camps isthe only way to renew the partnership to reduce nuclear dangers. New approaches in
US-Russia bilateral nuclear reductions and steps by China to cap its arsenal and fissile
material stocks could assist progress towards multilateral negotiations on nuclear
disarmament. At the same time, regional security threats in the Middle East andNortheast Asia need close attention, as do the security problems among India, Pakistan
and China. These three areas are potential flashpoints where use of weapons of mass
destruction cannot be dismissed.
16. It will be hard to maintain stability and nuclear security under these circumstances.
It will require a vision and a roadmap of how these complex issues can be solved. It will
also require, at the global and regional level, new initiatives to stop the spread of
nuclear weapons and new spheres of strategic cooperation among major powers. The
world has witnessed a decade of unexpected challenges and disturbances since the endof the Cold War. As a new century begins, there is a strong risk that the world will
become more chaotic and troubled, threatening the security of all, unless work begins
now to turn recent setbacks into potential solutions. This calls for understanding thestakes, and putting in place new means of maintaining stability, reducing WMD threats
and increasing transparency.
17. Much has therefore changed since the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of
Nuclear Weapons issued its important report in 1996. Troubling signs are now evident
on many fronts. The report and recommendations of the Tokyo Forum are aimed at

clarifying the alarming nature of recent developments and the urgent need for steps tostop the decline in regional and international security. We call on the international
community to meet the challenges posed by proliferation and increasing nuclear
dangers. In the body of its report, the Tokyo Forum will identify how these challenges
can be addressed in three mutually-reinforcing ways: mending strategic relations to
reduce nuclear dangers, both among major powers and at a regional level; stopping andreversing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and developing the architecture of, andtaking new initiatives for, nuclear disarmament.
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II. MENDING STRATEGIC RELATIONSTO REDUCE NUCLEAR DANGERS

1. Suspicion and rivalry between existing or potential nuclear-armed states bode ill for
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. This problem must be addressed both
among major powers---the United States, Russia and China---and in thoseconflict-prone regions where nuclear confrontation is most likely---South Asia, theMiddle East and Northeast Asia. Mending relations and reducing mistrust amongmajor powers will significantly improve the conditions for progress on non-proliferationand disarmament in all three regions. At the same time, important steps can and should
be taken by states in the regions regardless of the state of major power relations.

MENDING RELATIONS BETWEEN MAJOR POWERS
2. Success in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament requires cooperation in all
bilateral relationships among the United States, Russia and China. The US-Russia and
US-China relationships have deteriorated badly in recent years. Unless and until theyare repaired, nuclear dangers will increase.
Repairing US-Russia Relations
3. Since the release of the Canberra Commission report in 1996, US-Russian relations
have been marked by greater imbalances in economic and military power, greater
divisiveness and partisanship in the domestic politics in both countries, and a retreat
from cooperation towards unilateralism. As a result, collaborative efforts in
non-proliferation and new disarmament initiatives have been sorely lacking. The
common wish to avoid unpredictability that marked US-Russian relations in the Cold
War--- including agreed parameters of arms control, reduction, and ballistic missile
defence treaties---is now dangerously lacking.
4. A partnership forged with great effort as the Cold War waned, producing
extraordinary strategic arms reduction treaties and cooperation in the Gulf War, isbreaking down. The causes include domestic political divisions, deep differences overforeign policy issues, and the absence of the concerted leadership necessary to regain
common ground. To understand the current state of the relationship, it is useful toassess what was achieved before recent strains, including events in Yugoslavia in 1999,
emerged. The euphoria of the first years after the end of the Cold War has ended. Somepositive trends continue, but difficulties have increased.

5. In the years immediately before and after the end of the Cold War, serious progress
was made in furthering arms control and improving strategic stability. Substantial
reductions were made in strategic nuclear arsenals and efforts were pursued towards
ensuring the inviolability of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Under START II,
United States and Russia promised to reduce their deployed strategic arsenals to
3,000-3,500 warheads each. Agreement was reached to begin talks for further strategic
reductions (START III) as soon as Russia ratified START II, so as to reduce strategic
arsenals to 2,000-2,500 warheads each.
6. The most significant achievement of US-Russian interaction in this period was far
greater predictability in the behaviour of each state. Progress was made incomprehending the new shape of international relations, distinguishing genuine fromimagined problems, and developing common understandings of the changed characterof threats to their security, globally and regionally. They seemed to share concerns about
regional conflicts including ethno-nationalist wars, international terrorism, illegal
trade in conventional arms, and global economic crises. This consensus was reflected in
the Joint Statement on Common Challenges to Security on the Threshold of the 21stCentury, signed by Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton in September 1998. The UnitedStates and Russia have repeatedly demonstrated that dialogue and compromise
between them have eased international tensions, for example over Iraq and, at somestages, the former Yugoslavia. But this pattern has deteriorated badly. The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization's action in Yugoslavia in 1999 has widened the gulf
between Washington and Moscow.
7. This deterioration stands in marked contrast to the early 1990s, when the UnitedStates and Russia appeared increasingly tolerant of policy differences. During thisperiod, divergent views did not lead to confrontation; some differences based on national
interests were perceived as natural, and tolerance of them helped maintain the
US-Russian partnership. Now these differences are widening, particularly overunilateral and multilateral responses to international problems. Russia states thatmultilateral actions, under the UN flag, should take precedence, and considers theUnited States too prone to unilateral action and military measures, particularly inaddressing conflicts. The United States and Western Europe, while wanting successful
outcomes from multilateral efforts, have been unwilling to accept Russian vetoes in the
UN Security Council that could disallow multilateral action to counter perceived crimes
against humanity or violations of WMD treaty commitments.
8. When the US-Russian relationship is troubled, nuclear risk-reduction efforts suffer
profoundly. Cooperation between the two powers is needed to dramatically reduce andeliminate their Cold War nuclear arsenals---deployed and non-deployed---in verifiable,
reassuring and irreversible ways. Cooperative US-Russian efforts are also needed todispose safely of Soviet-era nuclear weapons holdings. Considering Russia's difficult
economic situation, it is unlikely to dedicate enough financial and other resources tothis complex of problems. Outside assistance is crucial to minimise the possibility of
nuclear bomb-making materials falling into the hands of states of proliferation concern
or non-state or terrorist entities. Russian cooperation is also needed for resolving themostdifficultregional

consequences are greatest.

security

problems,

whereproliferation

concerns

and9. Unless political leaders in the United States and Russia take urgent action to restore
constructive relations, there is a grave risk of negative consequences for nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. At the very least, START II ratification
would be delayed further and prospects for additional bilateral strategic arms reduction
treaties would become remote. Russia would try harder to maintain its strategic nuclear
forces beyond their service life and would place increasing importance on tactical
nuclear weapons in its force postures and doctrines. Russia would try to build up its
general-purpose military forces. There would be strong pressures in Belarus, andprobably in Ukraine, to reassess their non-nuclear status, depending on politicaldevelopments in these states and in Russia. And in the new geopolitical environment,
Russia might widen its military and technological cooperation with countries ofproliferation concern to others, but which it might consider strategic partners.
10. There would also be profoundly damaging global repercussions for nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament. Progress in US and Russian reductions is needed tolead the way for disarmament by all other nuclear-armed states, but it will be difficult
to reaffirm a cooperative US-Russian relationship to reduce nuclear dangers. In
addition to NATO action in Yugoslavia, prospective US national missile defences andNATO expansion are particularly contentious issues. The weakness of the Russian
economy and the problems of creating a stable and democratic state haveunderstandably generated resentment among the Russian people. The rhetoric ofnationalism and strategic competition has re-emerged. Divisions between Moscow andWashington are widening on regional proliferation issues, particularly the control ofsensitive exports to Iraq, Iran and India. Work needs to be done to reconcile US andRussian approaches on the urgent need to control the export of materials andtechnology that might be used for WMD programs.
11. The pace of the START process now lags far behind the rate of increase in new
nuclear dangers. Ratification delays have lasted longer than the time spent to negotiate
the agreements. Even when ratification is belatedly approved, legislators attach
conditions that impose further delays or complications for implementing treaty
provisions. The formal process of US-Russian strategic nuclear arms reduction, which
played an essential role in reducing Cold War arsenals, remains helpful but is now
clearly insufficient to deal with contemporary and future challenges.
12. Difficulties in the arms reduction process reflect larger political differences between

Moscow and Washington It is wrong to place upon arms control the burden of fixing
overarching political problems. The reverse is true: the resumption of progress in
reducing nuclear dangers requires the repair of major political differences, including
those related to regional proliferation and security. Arms control arrangements can,however, help facilitate and reinforce concerted efforts by US and Russian leaders toreforge larger patterns of cooperation.
13. The degree of difficulty involved in reaffirming US-Russian cooperation might leadsome to suggest that such efforts be postponed until new political leaders take theirplaces after national elections in both countries in 2000. But nuclear dangers do notconform to election cycles, and keep growing. The Tokyo Forum strongly urges politicalleaders in the United States and Russia to take steps now to mend the bilateralrelationship. Failure to do so will compound trends that threaten regional and global
security.
14. The Forum welcomes the US-Russia Joint Statement of 20 June 1999, and theprogress made at the Cologne meeting on that day, in which Presidents Clinton andYeltsin agreed to try to facilitate the ratification of the START II accord while
discussing changes in the ABM Treaty. The Joint Statement also noted that discussions
on START III would begin without prior ratification of START II. But it is too early totell if the 20 June meeting will lead to a sustained and effective revival of the bilateralarms reduction process. There are many obstacles ahead and, accordingly, pressuremust be maintained on the two states to build on the progress made at Cologne.
15. The depths of the estrangement in US-Russian relations have the most serious
consequences for initiatives to reduce nuclear dangers, and leaders in both countries
need to place a high priority on repairing this relationship. To assist in this effort, theTokyo Forum offers ideas on how dialogue on nuclear issues can help improve thesebilateral ties, rather than exacerbate them, as has increasingly become the case. These
ideas are set out in detail in the section of this report dealing with nuclear
disarmament.
Repairing US-China Relations
16. To reduce nuclear dangers, a new partnership must also be forged between the
United States and China. High-level visits in recent years have been helpful but havenot reconciled differences in this complex relationship. Whatever the differences
between the two countries, cooperation between them is needed to help reduce nuclear
proliferation concerns. Enhanced dialogue would help promote greater transparency
about nuclear weapons and intentions, and could further consolidate the engagement ofboth countries in the range of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament instruments,
including the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and export controls. It
would also begin to address Chinese concerns on missile defences, and so help preventthat issue from complicating regional and global security.
17. China did not play a central role during the Cold War, but is likely to be a more
important power in the next century. How Beijing exercises its growing power will havea direct bearing on the US presence in East Asia. On the other hand, the role of theUnited States in East Asia and the West Pacific will be a crucial determinant of China's
security policies. In particular, it will be essential for the United States to show regard
for China's security concerns in the way in which it conducts its security relationships
in the region. Both policies will affect efforts to reduce nuclear dangers.
18. The possible introduction of theatre missile defence (TMD) systems in East Asia is amajor subject of controversy between the United States and China. China argues that
TMD systems in East Asia would have destabilising effects. As well, after having been
ignored in most analyses of the future of nuclear weapons, China's reported
development of two new types of solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles---perhaps
with multiple warheads---is becoming a major international concern.
19. Efforts to address perceived strategic and nuclear proliferation problems involving
China and the United States need to be cooperative and constructive. The alarmist
approaches of some elements of the US media and polity are not helpful in this regard.
Perceptions of China's increasing military strength create unease among its neighbours
and beyond. In explaining its nuclear weapons policies, and in further clarifying its
non-proliferation policies, China like all nuclear-weapon states has an opportunity toreassure the international community.
20. Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, all nuclear-weapon
states have an obligation to take concrete steps to reduce, and eventually eliminate,
their nuclear weapons. While Russia and the United States have sought to reduce theirarsenals since the early 1990s, and France and the United Kingdom have cut their

nuclear forces, China has yet to begin similar steps. The Tokyo Forum therefore calls on
the United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom to continue the ongoingsteps to reduce their nuclear arsenals. The Forum further calls on China to join theother nuclear-weapon states in taking concrete steps to reduce numbers of nuclear
weapons, through negotiations or otherwise. In addition, the five nuclear-weapon states
could begin a process of confidence-building and transparency in the nuclear-weapons
arena. In this connection, all the nuclear-weapon states could confirm that there will be
no increase in their nuclear arsenals.
Reinforcing Confidence between Russia and China
21. Good relations between Russia and China are of importance, not only to both thesecountries, but also to the rest of the world. Relations between the two countries have
improved in the past years, and a breakthrough in talks mapped out their common
borders in April 1999. Friendly relations will be essential in the coming decades.
22. Although Russia and China are on the threshold of a new era, the nature of their
future relationship is difficult to foretell. China's growing strength, Russia's current
weakness, and both countries' increased friction with the United States are the main
new factors. The asymmetries between the two countries may grow. With the demise of
the Soviet Union, Russia retains huge territory, sparsely populated and underdeveloped,
east of the Urals in Asia. This has a direct bearing on Sino-Russian relations. Increased
military capabilities on either side could adversely affect bilateral relations. Russia andChina could approach near-parity in nuclear forces at some point. Nuclear restraint on
both sides would be an important confidence-building measure between the twocountries.
STOPPING AND REVERSING REGIONAL PROLIFERATION
23. The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 awoke the world to the realitythat the spread of nuclear weapons had reached a dangerous new phase. Two regional
powers with unresolved antagonisms had made their nuclear ambitions overt. The tests
reflected the failure of global non-proliferation norms to prevail over regional security
imperatives, and increased fears that regional conflicts could turn into real nuclearwars.

24. South Asia is not the only region where these fears are growing. There is a pressing
need for measures to stop and reverse nuclear proliferation in the Middle East andNortheast Asia as well. In all three regions, national rivalries are combining with
nuclear weapons ambitions to create new and potentially catastrophic nuclear dangers
which carry long-term repercussions. Some recent developments offer opportunities forarresting and reversing regional nuclear proliferation. These must be seized. The
positive Brazil-Argentina experience of abandoning nuclear weapons programs showsthat regional nuclear ambitions can be prevented through similar regional and bilateralconfidence-building

andcooperative

arrangements

to

those

found

in

the

Brazil-Argentina Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABAAC).
25. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was supposed to pave the way for further progress in nuclear
disarmament and to make the Treaty as universal as possible. Apart from the fact thatthe nuclear-weapon states were not ready to commit to the elimination of nuclear
weapons within a given time frame, most controversies at the conference arose fromregional security problems such as those in the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast
Asia. These regional security issues have to be taken seriously. They cannot be solved
simply by admonishing the conflicting parties or demanding that they restrain from
nuclear activities without any consideration of wider security concerns.
26. Nuclear dangers have different characteristics and causes in each of the three
regions. What these cases have in common is the potential not only to thwart any
further progress in nuclear disarmament, but also to result in a world in which nuclear
weapons proliferation might become the norm. The international community must
tailor its responses to each situation, as each of these proliferation cases is different.
South Asia
27. Nuclear testing and weapons proliferation in South Asia have been driven by India's
ambition to be treated equally to the five nuclear-weapon states, domestic politicalfactors, and security concerns, including perceptions of China. India considers thepossession of nuclear weapons an attribute of great power status, and feels squeezed out
by the distinction between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon statesembedded in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968.

28. For decades, India was an advocate of complete nuclear disarmament. Today,
representatives of its political and intellectual elite argue that it was the rejection ofthis call for nuclear disarmament that brought India to seek nuclear weapons. Whatlends this contention little credibility, however, is that India's shift to an open nuclear
weapons posture came at the very time that the United States and Russia were making
deep cuts to their nuclear arsenals. The timing of India's action greatly compounds
other nuclear dangers and makes nuclear disarmament harder to achieve.
29. Another motive for India's nuclear program relates to China. Some in India areconcerned by Chinese long-range ballistic missiles, and by the short-range missiles it
has allegedly stationed in Tibet. Now that India is developing long-range missiles
capable of reaching much of China, Chinese perceptions of a threat from India may grow,increasing pressure on Beijing to harden its nuclear posture.
30. This emerging nuclear arms competition in South Asia is peculiarly dangerous
because of its complexity, involving Pakistan as well as India and China. Except for its
nuclear capability, Pakistan constitutes only a limited military threat to India. The
dynamic of the Indian-Pakistani arms race is embedded in the division of thesubcontinent in 1947 and the many conflicts and crises since then. Since Pakistan
cannot compete with India in conventional military power, it seeks to equalise India's
advantage with nuclear weapons. This has not produced a more peaceful situation in
Kashmir.
31. As India's nuclear capabilities grow, there is no assurance that China would standstill. The resulting friction would weaken their security and further endanger southern
Asia. Political crises between India and Pakistan are recurring phenomena, and havebecome more heated with overt nuclear weapons capabilities. Many strategists in India
and Pakistan believe that making capabilities overt will increase strategic stability. But
this is a far from automatic process; both countries have yet to put in place significant
risk-reduction and stabilising measures. India and Pakistan have demonstrated theirability to flight test ballistic missiles that can be readily deployed. As a result, the time
between the order to fire nuclear-capable missiles and its execution could be extremely
short. Geographical factors also could increase instability in a crisis: Pakistan may feelcompelled to maintain nuclear weapons at high alert, because it does not have strategic
depth. Given the extremely short distances and flight times involved, decisions in acrisis might have to be made in a matter of minutes, raising the likelihood ofcatastrophic miscalculation. There is also the risk of unauthorised or accidental launchof nuclear-armed missiles.
32. In the absence of stabilising measures another crisis has already erupted in South
Asia. Overt nuclear capabilities have not produced stability and security for India andPakistan. If the repercussions now evident on the subcontinent in the 1999 Kashmircrisis are not stopped, more crises will follow. The decisions by these countries to test
nuclear weapons and flight-test nuclear-capable missiles could also have cascading
effects. More states might reconsider their non-nuclear status, especially as regional
security uncertainties arise elsewhere. The link between nuclear non-proliferation andnuclear arms reductions with the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament would be
weakened.
33. The Tokyo Forum therefore reaffirms the "benchmarks" for India and Pakistan
articulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1172 and the G8 Foreign Ministers'
communique of June 1998. The Forum calls on the international community to continue
to urge India and Pakistan to implement all requirements in UN Security Council
Resolution 1172, including: adherence to the CTBT without delay or conditions;
immediate cessation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development programs,
including refraining from weaponisation; cessation of production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons purposes; and restraint from export of equipment, materials andtechnology that can contribute to the development of WMD or missiles capable ofdelivering them. The Tokyo Forum calls on India and Pakistan to maintain moratoria
on nuclear testing.
34. The Tokyo Forum believes that international efforts to secure India's and Pakistan's
acceptance of international norms must be sustained. Ultimately the goal is to persuade
India and Pakistan to renounce nuclear weapons and to adhere to the NPT as
non-nuclear-weapon states. The latter could only be achieved in connection withreconciliation on the subcontinent, a continued and revitalised US-Russia process of
nuclear arms reductions and the widening of this process at a suitable stage to include
China, France and the United Kingdom.
35. The Forum calls for India and Pakistan to each announce a national moratorium on
the production of fissile material for weapons purposes until the Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty negotiations are concluded, and to contribute constructively to those negotiations.

In this context, and taking into account China's wish to be a stabilising force ininternational affairs, a declared Chinese moratorium on the production of fissile
material for weapons purposes would encourage India and Pakistan to follow.
36. The Forum considers that India and Pakistan should acquire no special statusunder the NPT, let alone legal status as nuclear-weapon states, nor be rewarded withany other additional status as a result of their nuclear testing. As long as their actions
continue to damage the global non-proliferation norms that are fundamental tointernational peace and security, it is difficult to envisage either country taking apermanent seat on the UN Security Council. The link between nuclear capability andthe prestige and influence of a great power, including permanent membership of the UN
Security Council, needs to be broken. Four of the P5 gained their permanent seats wellbefore acquiring nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom and France owe much of theirpresent-day status simply to the breadth of their engagement in world affairs, and havesuffered no loss of status from major unilateral cuts to their nuclear forces. Germany
and Japan have achieved their standing through economic development.
37. The Tokyo Forum calls on India and Pakistan to take concrete and verifiable steps toreduce nuclear dangers. The Lahore Declaration of February 1999 includes aconstructive workplan in this direction, but this plan has been derailed by politicalturbulence in India and unwise initiatives by Pakistan in divided Kashmir. It isimperative that India and Pakistan finalise nuclear risk-reduction measures agreed toin the Lahore Declaration. Improved, reliable communication channels need to beestablished between both countries. Reassurance measures are needed so that
nuclear-capable forces are not placed on alert or moved during crises. Prior notificationof missile flight-tests and conventional force exercises in sensitive areas are essential.
The Tokyo Forum strongly supports the process begun at Lahore and rejects any efforts
to resolve differences by force. The Tokyo Forum calls on the Permanent Members of the
UN Security Council and other nations to support the Lahore Declaration, and to offer
to help implement any agreements reached in bilateral negotiations aimed at resolving
the Kashmir dispute. New initiatives on Kashmir are especially needed in the wake ofthe 1999 conflict.
38. While China's nuclear posture towards South Asia has been restrained, additional
steps of reassurance by both India and China would help greatly in reducing mutual
threat perceptions. The elimination of Chinese nuclear weapons is imaginable only inconnection with the elimination of US and Russian nuclear weapons, an unrealistic
proposition for the near term. Once lower US-Russian ceilings are approached, however,China should play its part in the worldwide nuclear arms reduction process. As thestrongest regional power, China's standing would be greatly enhanced if it took the leadin creating confidence in its immediate neighbourhood and reducing threat perceptions
held, accurately or not, by adjacent states.
39. The Tokyo Forum calls on China and India to freeze or forgo nuclear deployments oflong-range ballistic missiles in combination with a verifiable pledge not to station
short-range missiles close to their common border. Furthermore, both China and India
could announce that they consider themselves bound by the substantive provisions of
the 1987 US-Soviet Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces (INF),
and renounce possession of all land-based ballistic missiles with ranges between 500
and 5,500 km. Such a measure would be consistent with disarmament steps by Russia
and the United States. It is reasonable to imagine that China would agree to such a
proposal if the nuclear arms reduction process between Russia and the United States
were to continue with renewed momentum, either by the START process or by parallel,
reciprocal and verifiable reductions, as endorsed in this report.
The Middle East
40. The Middle East is a highly unstable and conflict-ridden region. It has suffered
several major conflicts since 1945: the Arab-Israeli wars, the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s,
and the 1991 Gulf War. It is a region marked by the mutually-reinforcing combination ofshifting power balances, unresolved antagonisms and active programs to develop
weapons of mass destruction.
41. The first state to develop nuclear weapons in the Middle East was Israel which,unlike its neighbours, is not a member of the NPT. Israel's nuclear rationale has to beunderstood against the backdrop of perceptions of its strategic situation. While Israel
neither confirms nor denies possessing nuclear weapons, it is widely believed to have asophisticated nuclear arsenal ready to be deployed on aircraft and medium-range
missiles. Israel sees itself in the midst of states unreconciled to its existence. Although
Israel holds a conventional military edge against its neighbours it perceives itself asheavily outnumbered, in population, economic power and, eventually, in military might.
Thus Israel sees nuclear weapons as a tool of existential deterrence, indispensable forits very survival, in the absence of the encompassing peace involving Israel and its
neighbouring states that would allow for a reappraisal.
42. From the perspective of Arab states the situation looks very different. While themajority of such states are ready to accept the existence of Israel, they do not accept
Israel's position of not joining the NPT, its denial of statehood for the Palestinians, its
continued occupation of Arab territories nor its policy of enhancing its missile andconventional capabilities. There are also concerns within the Arab world about Israel's
chemical and biological warfare capabilities. Its Arab neighbours are also critical of thecontinuing technological support given by the United States to assist Israel indeveloping and deploying anti-missile missile systems (Arrow) and intelligencesatellites. Israel's nuclear capabilities are also generating deeply-felt threat perceptions
among its Arab and Islamic neighbours, and this continues to erode support for the NPT,
as was especially evident during the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.
43. The launch of the peace process and the achievement of agreements may open apath towards peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours, including a solution to the
nuclear problem. Only with a successful peace process as envisaged by the
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, the Madrid Conference, the Oslo accords and theIsrael-Jordanian Peace Treaty is it imaginable that the nuclear issue will be less salientand Israel's ultimate renunciation of nuclear weapons made possible. Israeli policies
from 1996 to 1999 left the peace process in limbo. The revitalisation of this process is
now underway. The Tokyo Forum therefore stresses the crucial importance of an
Arab-Israeli peace process for the stability of the region and for the future of nuclear
non- proliferation. A successful peace process would also permit progress in removing
nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East in themedium and long-term period. Indeed, the processes of peace and WMD disarmamentshould proceed in parallel.
44. There are other proliferation risks in the region. Iraq and Iran constitute serious
security concerns for Israel, as they do for other states in the region. Iraq has pursued asecret nuclear weapons program, and the US Administration has alleged that Iran isseeking to build nuclear weapons. The latter has recently tested a ballistic missile witha range of 1,500 km, while inspections of Iraq by the United Nations Special
Commission (UNSCOM) have been in abeyance and may not be adequately
reconstituted. If either or both states were to possess nuclear warheads onmedium-range ballistic missiles, in addition to Israel's nuclear arsenal, this would
further destabilise the region. Differences in the size and strategic vulnerability of thesestates would create a fluid and dangerous dynamic, possibly with catastrophic
consequences.
45. Imports of ballistic missiles and their technology are posing a special threat to thestability of the Middle East, giving the problem extra-regional dimensions. In the
short-term the Tokyo Forum urgently appeals to all states in the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) as well as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) export control
arrangements---especially Russia---to do their utmost to avoid any relevant transfers,
including both technology and expertise, to the Middle East. The Forum also strongly
endorses efforts to persuade North Korea, and other states non-members of the MTCR,
to refrain from any transfers of sensitive missile technology to the region.
46. Another source of concern is that would-be nuclear proliferators in the region might
be tempted to seek nuclear-weapons material stored insecurely elsewhere, such as in
Russia and Kazakhstan. The international community should make every effort tocooperate with Russia and Kazakhstan to ensure that this material is stored securely.
47. The Tokyo Forum calls on the UN Security Council, especially its five Permanent
Members, to do its utmost to establish as soon as possible a long-term WMD control
regime for Iraq based on the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and on thelong-term monitoring plans approved by it in 1991. The Forum calls on Iraq to comply
with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and strongly urges the council's
Permanent Members to give priority to non-proliferation issues in their dealings withall states of the region.
48. The Tokyo Forum urges all states in the region to take unilateral steps to create
confidence and reassurance. We call on all states in the region to: join the NPT; ratify
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; accept International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards on all nuclear materials under their jurisdiction, including thosecontained in the recent Additional Protocol; sign and ratify the Chemical Weapons
Convention; and take further measures to clarify beyond doubt their compliance with
the NPT. We call on Israel to shut down its unsafeguarded nuclear reactor at Dimona or
immediately subject it to international safeguards. All states in the region should
suspend missile flight tests and restrain missile programs. Negotiations should beinitiated towards a regional agreement to limit missile proliferation, that could usefully
draw upon the provisions of the 1987 US-Soviet INF Treaty.
49. The Tokyo Forum believes that the multilateral Arab-Israeli negotiation process
would be advanced by the rejuvenation of the Arms Control and Regional Security(ACRS) process. It strongly recommends serious work to develop a zone free of weaponsof mass destruction (WMDFZ) in the Middle East. Such a zone would only be possible inparallel with the successful conclusion of the Arab-Israeli peace process and substantialchanges in the policies of Iran and Iraq. We urge both states to join the Arab-Israeli
peace process including the ACRS process.
50. Within this WMDFZ, possession of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons would beprohibited. This zone would need much tighter and more intrusive verification
arrangements than the improved IAEA safeguards regime, including challenge
inspections. Monitoring would require external support by international organisations,individual states or combinations of the two. The Permanent Members of the Security
Council would need to play special roles within the instrument creating the zone,
including providing guarantees to underpin it and assistance in its implementation.
Northeast Asia
51. The most immediate and worrisome WMD and missile proliferation threat inNortheast Asia is posed by North Korea. Success in stopping and reversing thesedestabilising WMD and missile programs, combined with global non-proliferation
efforts, will help prevent the emergence of other possible proliferation pressures in theregion. In Northeast Asia, as in other regions of concern, proliferation risks will beminimised to the extent that the security concerns of all actors are allayed. The North
Korean proliferation problems are linked with the troubles of that country's ailing
totalitarian regime. The state has suffered from the regime and from the international
isolation it has embraced. Famine and poverty have become widespread and theeconomy has come close to breakdown. The bellicose behaviour of the North Koreanleadership seems part of an attempt to cling to power as long as possible. How long theregime will survive, how it eventually will relinquish power, and whether it might seek
war as a solution, still remain open questions.
52. The North Korean nuclear program raised international concern in the early 1990s

when it became known that the country had embarked on a nuclear program based on areactor type suited to a nuclear weapons program---a reactor that produced a relatively
high percentage of weapons-grade plutonium. The US-North Korean Agreed
Framework of October 1994 provided for this type to be replaced with light water
reactors, and for an end to all dubious activities. Although the implementation of thisagreement has been progressing, doubts have persisted over the North Koreanleadership's readiness to faithfully pursue the agreement. The May 1999 visit by US
representatives to an underground site suspected of being intended for a nuclear
weapon program produced no evidence to support such allegations. This was a positive
development, but it is too early for a considered judgement.
53. In August 1998 North Korea proved its ability to launch long-range missiles. This
was an extraordinary development for a country with generally low levels of technology
and industrialisation and a stricken economy. It is suspected that missile technology
and foreign experts have played a role in the North Korean program. This program has
not only given North Korea dramatically improved offensive capacities, but has helped
fuel arms races elsewhere. The Pakistani Ghauri missile and the Iranian Shehab
missile appear virtually identical to a North Korean prototype.
54. The Tokyo Forum calls on the international community to do its utmost to achieve
early realisation of the goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. It urges North Korea
to stop all nuclear weapon and missile related activities, and to bring about the full
implementation of the 1994 US-North Korean Agreed Framework. The financial andtechnical implications of the Agreed Framework are extremely complicated and need
continuous support from many states, including Japan, South Korea, the United States
and the European Union. This support is likely to dry up if North Korea continues toflight test nuclear-capable missiles and make other threatening gestures. The Tokyo
Forum calls on the international community to press North Korea to sign and ratify the
CTBT as soon as possible; to implement its NPT/IAEA fullscope safeguards agreement;
and to accept the new Additional Protocol to that agreement. Strict, verifiable
implementation of these safeguards is the only way to resolve the continuing
uncertainties over the North Korea nuclear program and prevent a new crisis.
55. In the context of Northeast Asia, the Tokyo Forum underscores the need for thestrict implementation of export controls in accordance with the MTCR guidelines, andcalls for more rigorous controls on nuclear weapons technology and materials. The

Forum stresses the necessity for the international community to closely cooperate in
keeping nuclear weapons materials and missile technology, as well as precursors forother weapons of mass destruction, away from North Korea.
56. The Forum also sees an urgent need for measures to prevent North Korea fromcontinuing to be a source of missile or nuclear weapons proliferation to other regions.
Given the threat that such proliferation could pose to international peace and security,
these measures might range from bilateral or multilateral talks involving the North
Korean authorities, through international economic sanctions to more forceful actions
under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Such sanctions might be applied both to North
Korea and states buying its missiles and related items. These measures will not benecessary, however, if North Korea takes meaningful steps to reassure its neighbours
and conforms fully to relevant international non-proliferation norms. The Tokyo Forumstrongly recommends that all states strive to engage North Korea in a constructive
dialogue on these matters.
PageTOP--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. STOPPING AND REVERSINGNUCLEAR PROLIFERATIONPROLIFERATION CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY
1. To stop and reverse the global spread of nuclear weapons, the international
community needs to recognise the magnitude of proliferation dangers and takecorrective

action

based

on

a

comprehensive

strategy.

The

Treatyonthe

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides the basis for concerted action, butneither the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) nor the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS)
are doing enough to reverse the unraveling of its regime. The Treaty must be reaffirmed

and revitalised.
2. A comprehensive strategy would also utilise regional and other global
non-proliferation instruments and arrangements, including nuclear-weapon-free zones(NWFZ) and effective but fair export controls. Tightened controls on the world's vastquantity of nuclear weapons-grade fissile materials, together with extensive
transparency and monitoring, are essential to stop nuclear weapons spreading further.
Ballistic missiles compound the dangers of nuclear proliferation, so any comprehensive
non-proliferation strategy must also seek to limit their spread.
3. At the turn of the 21st century, the momentum towards a universal and effective
global nuclear non-proliferation regime generated by the close of the Cold War is indanger of being lost. The new nuclear proliferation challenges come from many
directions. Poorly-secured materials, technology or weapons may leak across borders.
States claiming to adhere to the NPT or regional agreements may maintain clandestine
programs. Terrorists may acquire nuclear technology and materials. Components fornuclear weapons may become cheaper and simpler to get. The perception of theconventional military superiority of technologically advanced states may lead someother states to see greater value in weapons of mass destruction. And proliferation in
one state or region may trigger it in others. What then can be done to address thesechallenges?
STRENGTHENING THE NPT
4. The NPT is the lynchpin of global nuclear non-proliferation. It rests on a core
partnership between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states and theirsolemn pact to eschew and eliminate nuclear weapons. This partnership must be
reaffirmed if the Treaty is to survive and deal effectively with new proliferation threats.
The NPT was aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation beyond the five nuclear-weapon
states, defined as states which exploded nuclear devices before January 1, 1967. As aconsequence, to recognise India and Pakistan as nuclear-weapon states after their May
1998 nuclear tests would set a dangerous precedent of legitimising nuclear proliferation.
Alternately, to simply ignore their actions and capabilities might increase the likelihoodof arms races and nuclear crises in the region, and leave open the possibility of
nuclear-weapon technologies being transferred from that region to aspiring
proliferators. Thus NPT parties face crucial questions of how to secure Indian andPakistani cooperation with global non-proliferation efforts without condoning or
rewarding nuclear proliferation.
5. The way out of this dilemma is not to bow to proliferation but to fulfil the basic
bargain of the NPT by strengthening non-proliferation measures and by reducing
progressively and eliminating nuclear weapons. An immediate step towards the former
is to expedite acceptance and implementation of the International Atomic Energy
Agency Additional Protocol to NPT safeguards agreements, making it a new
non-proliferation standard. The latter requires reducing the numbers and salience of
nuclear weapons, and making weapon inventories and national stocks of fissile materialtransparent. The discriminatory basis of the NPT regime need not constitute a moral
and practical flaw in the Treaty provided that the nuclear-weapon states and thenon-nuclear-weapon states keep their parts of the bargain. If they do not, however, thenthe regime will certainly continue to unravel, and those parties that maintain good faithwill be less and less able to strengthen or even preserve it.
6. The package of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful nuclear energy
provisions in the Treaty has led to tensions---exposed frequently at NPT review
conferences---over which of its objectives should take precedence. The 1995 indefinite
extension of the Treaty, achieved in the context of decision documents on Strengthening
the Review Process and Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation andDisarmament, as well as a Resolution on the Middle East, included a revised review
process. It authorised a Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) to discuss substantive
matters in the period leading up to the Review Conference in 2000. The implementationof this strengthened process has been impeded by the parties' long-standing tensions
and a lack of consensus on its modalities. Some states argue that because PrepComsessions are not meetings of the parties, but subordinate bodies of Review Conferences,
they cannot act as functional substitutes for a standing executive body or otherpermanent organ. The NPT contains no provisions for permanent institutions or
executive bodies, other than the now mandatory requirement to hold a conference every
five years to review the Treaty's operation. Moreover, the Treaty has no mechanism toauthorise action against non-compliance.
7. The Tokyo Forum is convinced that steps must be taken to increase the ability of NPT
parties to prevent, and react effectively to, cases of proliferation. It calls for the creationof a permanent secretariat and consultative commission for the Treaty. This would be aguardianship organisation, charged with serving the objectives of all Treaty parties inpursuing non-proliferation and disarmament. Consideration of options for such an
executive body should begin urgently. In addition, the Forum stresses the importance ofthe 2000 NPT Review Conference for the preservation and strengthening of the Treaty
regime, and the need for all participants to adopt constructive approaches and focus on
their common interest in strengthening it.
STRENGTHENING OTHER MULTILATERALNON-PROLIFERATION INSTRUMENTS
8. To further reinforce the effectiveness of the NPT, other multilateral instruments inthe non-proliferation regime must be strengthened. These include regional elements,
notably nuclear-weapon-free zones, and security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon
states.
Strengthening the CWC and BWC
9. The verification arrangements of the Chemical Weapons Convention have beeneroded by implementation decisions, making it more difficult to detect non-compliance.
In addition, at a time when biological weapons capabilities are growing and newscientific advances suggest increased availability of biological weapons in the future,negotiations on a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention are still
problematic. Moreover, the international community has found no successful way todeal with proven cases of material breaches or other non-compliance in the context ofthe 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological
Weapons Convention. Unless the international community adopts strengthening
verification measures for these accords and effective measures to deal with
non-compliance, chemical and biological threats could become a significant concern forinternational security.
Strengthening Regional Instruments
10. The geographical coverage and non-proliferation significance of nuclear-weapon-freezones have become more salient as nuclear dangers have grown. The key commitment of
NWFZ treaties is that states parties will not acquire nuclear weapons nor allow them to
be stationed on their territories. They require nuclear-weapon states to make anunconditional commitment, known as a negative security assurance, that they will notthreaten or use nuclear weapons against NWFZ states parties. The unconditional
negative security assurances and the commitments by NWFZ states parties go wellbeyond those in the global non-proliferation agreements.
11. These regional compacts are now setting more far-reaching non-proliferation anddisarmament goals than the global regimes. Part of their special value is that they
demonstrate the commitments of many states---particularly in the developing world---todisarmament and non-proliferation. The regional nuclear-weapon-free zones can build
high levels of confidence among various neighbouring states. At the same time, regional
nuclear-weapon-free zones are not substitutes for effective global regimes; eachcomplements the other.
12. Treaties to create nuclear-weapon-free zones were signed in Latin America in 1967,
the South Pacific in 1985, Southeast Asia in 1995 and Africa in 1996. All ban nuclear
weapons within a specified territory, task the International Atomic Energy Agency withverification responsibilities, and establish permanent treaty organs. The 1995 Treaty of
Bangkok has a system for dealing with allegations of non-compliance which involves
requests for clarification, requests for a fact-finding mission and procedures for
remedial action. The 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba contains compliance provisions,mechanisms for the destruction of existing nuclear devices, commitments on conditions
for exports to non-nuclear-weapon states, physical protection requirements, andprohibition of attacks on peaceful nuclear installations in the zone.
13. Another agreement aimed at keeping nuclear weapons out of specific territory is the
Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula signed in 1991 by
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK).
This was followed in 1992 by an Agreement on the Formation and Operation of theNorth-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee. The 1994 Agreed Framework between
the United States and the DPRK reiterated the goal of a denuclearised Korean
Peninsula.
14. Work is well advanced on creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia,
where five states have agreed on a draft treaty and are now discussing it with the fivenuclear-weapon states. The creation of such a zone is becoming increasingly important
to global non-proliferation goals. Aspirations have also existed for many years to createzones in the Middle East, Central Europe and South Asia. Proposals have been made toformalise links between Southern Hemisphere zones. This would highlight that almost
all states in that hemisphere were within such zones and that more than 100 states
were potentially in receipt of unconditional negative security assurances from thenuclear-weapon states.
15. The Tokyo Forum urges all parties concerned to redouble their efforts to achieve thegoal of a denuclearised Korean Peninsula as soon as possible. Major efforts also should
be made to bring fully into force the Treaties of Bangkok and Pelindaba, and their
protocols, as well as establishing their regional institutions. In addition, the Tokyo
Forum strongly supports the rapid conclusion and early entry into force of a treaty tocreate a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone. Efforts should be made to promote thecreation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones and to link those that exist.
Strengthening Security Assurances
16. Assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against a non-nuclear-weapon
state give many such states a strong security incentive to maintain and increase theirsupport for the global non-proliferation regime. The five nuclear-weapon states,
however, have not agreed on a common formula to codify their unilateral negative
security assurances, without which the assurances cannot be brought together in a
multilateral legal form. At contention are the differing conditions which thenuclear-weapon states attach to the implementation of their negative security
assurances; whether such assurances should only be given to NNWS parties of the NPTor be of universal application; and whether they should be negotiated in an NPT forumor the Conference on Disarmament. The Tokyo Forum calls on the five NWSs to actively
seek agreement on a common formula for negative security assurances to NNWS
parties to the NPT, and explore the possibility of negotiating a legally-binding
agreement.
17. The Forum also notes that positive security assurances---including guarantees ofassistance to states threatened or attacked by nuclear weapons---can be a further
incentive for non-nuclear-weapon states to support non-proliferation.
18. In January 1992, the President of the United Nations Security Council declared onbehalf of the members of the Security Council that the proliferation of all weapons ofmass destruction constituted a threat to the maintenance of international peace andsecurity. The Tokyo Forum urges the international community to seek to reconfirm thisstatement as a Security Council resolution. If proliferation were to be defined thus,
sanctions against a proliferating state could flow more easily through the Security
Council. The Tokyo Forum also calls on Permanent Members of the UN Security Council
to announce that they would refrain from exercising their vetoes against efforts to assist
or defend UN member states which are subject to the use or the threat of use of weaponsof mass destruction. The Tokyo Forum considers that all current and prospective
Permanent

Members

of

the

UN

SecurityCouncilshouldhave

exemplarynon-proliferation credentials.
TIGHTENING CONTROLS ON FISSILE MATERIAL
19. One of the most pressing nuclear proliferation problems facing the world lies in the
sheer amount of stockpiled fissile material for nuclear weapons, and the problems ofkeeping it secure and disposing of it safely and irreversibly. The problem is most acutein Russia and some other parts of the former Soviet Union. About 3,000 tonnes of
plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) exist in the world, of which less than
one percent is under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Two-thirds of the world's plutonium and highly enriched uranium was produced
specifically for military purposes, and two-thirds of this---about 1,300 tonnes---is now
considered surplus to military requirements. The United States and Russia have thelargest stockpiles of fissile materials, with hundreds of tonnes each. France, the United
Kingdom and, reportedly, China each has roughly tens of tonnes, and India, Pakistan
and Israel hundreds of kilograms each. But the size of national stockpiles is not the only
measure of the danger they pose.
Declaring an End to Production
20. France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States have formallyannounced that they are no longer producing fissile material for weapons purposes.
China has also indicated unofficially that it has stopped producing fissile material for
weapons purposes. A public statement from China confirming its private assurances
would greatly aid progress on controlling fissile material. India and Pakistan haveactive production programs; it is likely that their stocks of weapon-grade material are
increasing. It is not clear whether Israel is continuing to produce fissile material forweapons purposes. India, Pakistan and Israel should also declare, as soon as possible
and before conclusion of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, national moratoria on the
production of fissile material for weapons purposes.
Expediting Negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
21. A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) is a precondition for success in nuclear
non-proliferation, as well as a building block for nuclear disarmament. It would help tocurb nuclear proliferation and facilitate efforts to detect and monitor clandestine
production and acquisition. The Tokyo Forum calls on the Conference on Disarmament(CD) to act on the 1995 Shannon Mandate for the negotiation of a FMCT. The
Conference must overcome the political stalemate that delayed the establishment of anegotiating ad hoc committee until August 1998 and has frustrated its re-establishment
in 1999. The treaty needs to be concluded as quickly as possible. However, the issue offissile material stockpiles is important. The Tokyo Forum recommends that the issue offissile material stocks be discussed in parallel with, but outside, the formal FMCT
negotiations in order to speed the process. Verification measures under an FMCT
should augment and not undermine the NPT/IAEA safeguards system including its
Additional Protocol.
Increasing Transparency
22. While the non-nuclear-weapon states are legally obliged under the NPT to place
their fissile materials under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, there is no treaty to control fissile materials in the nuclear-weapon states or the
non-NPT countries. Some of the nuclear-weapon states, however, have taken steps toassist accounting and control. In the nuclear-weapon states and non-NPT states,
military inventories of fissile material are subject to national controls but not to any
external checks. Nor are the responsible bodies always fully accountable to national
legislatures.
23. Countries with nuclear weapon programs have long kept secret the details about
their fissile materials, but since the end of the Cold War some have unilaterally
accepted partial transparency. The United States has begun a process of publishing its
inventories of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. In 1993, it launched the"Openness Initiative" to reveal information on fissile material produced and used formilitary purposes. Details on plutonium were published in June 1994 and February
1996, with details on highly enriched uranium to follow. In 1998 the United Kingdom
announced the size of its military stockpile of fissile material and committed itself topublishing the results of a more wide-ranging audit.
24. The Tokyo Forum urges all states with unsafeguarded fissile materials---thenuclear-weapon states and relevant non-NPT states---to voluntarily increase thetransparency of their fissile material stockpiles. Those that have not already done soshould begin a process of internally auditing their stocks. The results from the internal
audits should be published annually. This transparency measure would have significant
confidence-building effects, and could help expedite FMCT negotiations. Transparency
measures on fissile material, including any at a regional level, should be linked andcoordinated with the International Atomic Energy Agency and structured to ensure fulltransparency on nuclear material accounting.
Preventing Nuclear Terrorism
25. Poorly-secured fissile material is attractive not just to states seeking nuclear
weapons, but also to a new type of potential proliferator: nuclear terrorists. There is
now a real possibility that sub-state forces with hostile aims---political, fanatical or
criminal---may acquire the materials and technology needed for crude nuclear weapons.
An act of nuclear terrorism would be a catastrophe, and no country is safe; indeed, thestrongest states might be the most likely targets. Governments may seek to exchange
information and enhance their detection and response capabilities, but terrorists will
always have the advantage of being difficult to identify and deter. The Tokyo Forumcalls for regional and global cooperative efforts to prevent weapons of mass destruction
from falling into the hands of extremist, fanatical or criminal groups. Efforts to fightnuclear terrorism could be backed by new legal norms, including an international treaty
on nuclear terrorism, advocated by Russia and now being negotiated in the United
Nations. To be useful, this instrument must add materially to existing legal means. Anymeasure that strengthens the international norms and existing legal means is worthy of
support.
Improving Material Protection and Control
26. There is a pressing need to improve international standards for physical protection

aimed at preventing theft or clandestine diversion of fissile materials. The materials
must be adequately contained, in facilities and in transit. This requires trained andarmed personnel with formal policing powers, perimeter fencing and monitoring, special
storage facilities, containers and vehicles. The Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Materials, in force since 1987, must be accepted and fully implemented by all
relevant states. Urgent consideration should be given to widening the scope of theconvention, now concerned mainly with materials in transit. The 1994 Convention on
Nuclear Safety, for safe carriage by sea of irradiated fuel, plutonium and high-level
radioactive waste, and the 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent FuelManagement and Radioactive Waste, can also help stop the theft or diversion of nuclear
materials for use in weapons.
Strengthening Controls and Threat-Reduction Programs in Russia
27. Ever since the demise of the Soviet Union there has been great concern over thephysical security of the large amount of fissile material on its territory. The material
accounting procedures in the USSR were not particularly rigorous, so the precise size ofthe problem is not known. Its scale is clearly vast. Economic difficulties in Russia arecompounding concerns that fissile material, including that from dismantled warheads,
may be removed from storage and transferred illicitly. While important initiatives havebeen undertaken to prevent this, the sheer amount of material necessitates far greater
efforts. Very little has been disposed of, either through storage as waste or burning asfuel. Meanwhile, salaries for guards go unpaid while agents of proliferators may belooking for fissile material, small amounts of which have huge importance in anembryonic weapons program. The Tokyo Forum calls urgently for greater international
cooperation to combat nuclear smuggling, with mutually-supporting roles for police
forces, intelligence and customs agencies, and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
28. Greater international cooperation is required for Russia and other CIS members to
improve nuclear material protection, control and accounting. Since 1994 many countries,
including the United States, Japan and the European Union, have provided financial
contributions and expertise to this end. The United States, under the Nunn-Lugar or
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, has provided about US$1.8 billion for 18
projects. Other G7 members have contributed considerably smaller amounts. Assistanceneeds to be maintained and intensified in, for example, destruction of nuclear weapons,
provision of reinforced containers, storage facilities and transport for fissile materials,

and research on mixed oxide fuel recycling. The International Science and Technology
Center needs support to continue funding civilian projects for former Soviet scientists.
The international community needs to expand threat-reduction programs in Russia as amatter of urgency. The United States recently announced US$4.5 billion for the
Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, to help tackle proliferation threats including
those arising from the loosening of controls on plutonium due to the Russian financial
crisis. The Tokyo Forum urges the other G7 countries to provide additional resources forthreat-reduction programs and calls on other members of the international community
to follow the lead of the United States.
29. The Tokyo Forum is deeply concerned that the pace of establishing control over, anddisposing of, highly enriched uranium and plutonium in Russia and other parts of theformer Soviet Union is too slow and the risk of leakage too high. Greater efforts need tobe made, and by more states, to ensure the physical control and urgent disposal ofplutonium and highly enriched uranium in the former Soviet Union. Disposal programs
should be subject to tighter time schedules, with dates for completion. Excess highly
enriched uranium should be diluted to low-enriched uranium for its introduction to civil
power production as soon as possible. The financial cost of these tasks will be high.
Private as well as government sources of funding should be sought, to ensure that thegreatest possible resources are deployed to address the problem in the shortest possible
time.
Extending Fissile Material Verification and Safeguards
30. The technical barriers to increasing non-proliferation monitoring and controls overall civil and military nuclear material, including developing a register, are notinsurmountable. The civil nuclear industries of the non-nuclear-weapon states havelong been subject to international inspections by the International Atomic Energy
Agency, and the scope of the latter is being extended. It is reasonable to expect that
extensive records have been kept of the production of fissile material---for military andcivilian use---in other states also. International verification is feasible if governments,
especially in the nuclear-weapon states, are prepared to declare their stocks.
31. The verification of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty would be difficult without theestablishment of a reasonable defined data baseline of existing fissile material stocks inthe nuclear-weapon states. The negotiations and conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-off

Treaty can be expected to enhance transparency and availability of data. This would be
an important step towards the goal of universal application of safeguards.
32. The Tokyo Forum calls on all NPT parties that have not yet done so to give theInternational Atomic Energy Agency increased powers to implement safeguards, bybringing into force the Additional Protocol to their existing safeguards agreements. The
Forum also notes that continuing improvements to safeguards will be needed to keep
the system as effective as possible in dealing with deliberate violations. Extra resources
would of course be needed for expanded safeguards inspection activities, but cost
increases could be minimised if political impediments were removed to long-soughtchanges to the methods and procedures of IAEA safeguard inspections.
33. The International Atomic Energy Agency, the United States and Russia launched atrilateral initiative in 1996 to explore the technical, legal and financial issues inbringing surplus fissile material stocks under IAEA verification. Russia and the UnitedStates have announced that they will submit their declared excess materials toverification "as soon as practicable" under their voluntary offer safeguards agreementswith the Agency. The United Kingdom has also declared it has "excess" militarymaterial that will be placed under Euratom safeguards. The Tokyo Forum urges
expansion and acceleration of these initiatives and encourages other NWSs to do thesame. All states with nuclear weapons programs should agree to IAEA safeguards overexcess military fissile materials, including material removed from warheads dismantled
under arms reduction treaties, and their early and irreversible disposal.
34. The Tokyo Forum calls on all those nuclear-weapon states that have not alreadydone so to place all civilian stocks of fissile materials under IAEA safeguards pursuant
to their voluntary offer agreements. Non-NPT states should place part of theirstockpiles under IAEA safeguards at agreed annual rates, and negotiate voluntary offer
agreements with the Agency. All states with civil plutonium and highly enricheduranium should make annual declarations on their holdings.
35. The Tokyo Forum urges states, whether or not they belong to the NPT, to makeunilateral commitments to place under IAEA safeguards facilities previously used to
produce fissile materials for nuclear explosive devices, and to decommission anddismantle facilities they have used previously for that sole purpose.

STRENGTHENING NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS AND
IMPROVING THEIR TRANSPARENCY
36. The national export controls coordinated under the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG)
and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) help retard the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. But the effectiveness and transparency ofthese controls can and should be improved.
37. While participants in export control arrangements firmly argue that their controls
do not impede legitimate trade, the counter-claims that the regimes are exclusive,
discriminatory, and lacking in transparency, persist. Differences between states overexport control regimes could be a major obstacle to strengthening restraints on
proliferation. Participants in export control arrangements face the challenge of
responding constructively to the critics of the regimes, while maintaining theeffectiveness of their controls. The Tokyo Forum calls for greater transparency innuclear-related export controls within a framework of dialogue and cooperation between
members and non-members of the regimes, in the light of the agreement to this end in
the Principles and Objectives decision document associated with the 1995 permanent
extension of the NPT.
38. Some existing or potential suppliers of sensitive items are not members of export
control regimes. The Tokyo Forum calls for expansion of the export control regimes toinclude current non-member suppliers, without jeopardising the effectiveness of export
controls. Some efforts to this end are already underway. The admission of Russia to the
NSG and MTCR was a positive step. It is now especially important to encourage China
to pursue its declared policy of actively considering joining the MTCR. New members
would have to adhere to the strict export control standards of the regimes for theirmembership to have positive esults for non-proliferation.
39. Another way to address the problem of non-member suppliers is to encourage themto adopt export controls as close as possible to the strictness and effectiveness of thoserequired for members of the regimes. This approach can be pursued in parallel withefforts to expand membership. Stronger outreach and transparency efforts by member
states, including bilateral consultations with and technical assistance to non-member
countries, would greatly help concerned non-members establish effective export control
systems.

40. There is an urgent need to strengthen the conditions for the supply of sensitive
nuclear materials and technologies. The Tokyo Forum calls on all supplier countries tostipulate that an IAEA Additional Protocol safeguards agreement between the recipient
country and the IAEA is a new condition for the export of nuclear-related items.
Participants in the NSG, however, would need to be aware that the conclusion of an
Additional Protocol agreement by a destination country would not automatically meanthat all exports of items on the control lists could then automatically flow freely to thatcountry. It would still be the responsibility of each NSG member state to determine
whether a country of destination had dispelled proliferation concerns.
41. The Tokyo Forum calls on those states participating only in the Zangger Committee
to join the Nuclear Suppliers' Group in order to make their nuclear-related export
controls more effective. The Forum also calls for strengthening of the MTCR by
tightening national export licensing procedures.
42. The Tokyo Forum reiterates the need for the strict implementation of MTCR export
guidelines, and calls on Russia to implement more rigorous controls on missile andnuclear weapons technology and materials. In this regard, the Forum stresses thenecessity for the international community to closely cooperate with Russia in denying
nuclear weapons materials and missile technology, as well as precursors for otherweapons of mass destruction, to state or non-state proliferators.
CURBING MISSILE PROLIFERATION
43. A comprehensive response to nuclear proliferation must also address concerns about
the spread of ballistic missiles. While there are treaties prohibiting chemical andbiological weapons, and treaties to stop the proliferation and testing of nuclear weapons,
there is no multilateral treaty specifically regulating missiles. Following flight tests oflong-range missiles by India and Pakistan in April 1999, the UN Secretary-Generalstated that international agreements on norms against the development of ballistic
missiles for military purposes would substantially improve prospects for progress on
disarmament and arms control treaties.
44. Past US-Soviet/Russian efforts and agreements on nuclear arms control such as theStrategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), INF and START controlled, reduced andeliminated ballistic missiles. Thus, for the declared nuclear-weapon states, ballistic
missiles have been closely associated with the carriage of nuclear weapons. For otherstates with nuclear weapons programs or suspected nuclear ambitions, efforts toacquire ballistic missiles will automatically raise suspicion of parallel efforts to acquire
nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. The Tokyo Forum believes thatdevelopment, acquisition, flight-testing, production and deployment of ballistic missiles
can constitute a threat to regional peace and security.
45. The Tokyo Forum urges the international community to seek realistic ways toprevent acquisition and deployment of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. A special
conference of states concerned at transfers of missile technology outside the MTCR
should be convened to deal with the growing problem of missile proliferation. One
possible approach that merits serious consideration is the negotiation of a global
agreement, or regional agreements, that would draw upon the provisions of the 1987
US-Soviet INF Treaty. Multilateralisation of the INF Treaty would have the added
specific benefit of helping reduce threat perceptions in southern Asia without
discriminating against specific countries. Another approach is to work in bilateral orregional frameworks, particularly in the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast Asia.
Proper consideration would need to be given to the security concerns of the countries
involved. Enhanced security dialogues would help create the conditions under which
regional measures against missile proliferation could be envisaged.
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IV. ACHIEVING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

1. The use of nuclear weapons has disastrous and long-lasting consequences. No other
cities must be put through the agony of recovery from their devastating effects endured

by Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The abolition of these weapons of mass destruction is along-cherished goal of the international community. Since the release of the Canberra
Commission report in 1996, prospects for abolition have been weakened by many
developments. The international community has reached a crossroads at which it mustchoose between the assured dangers of proliferation and challenges of disarmament.
There can be no standing still.
2. Progress towards nuclear disarmament is inextricably tied to success in
non-proliferation efforts. Without movement towards nuclear disarmament, the norm of
non-proliferation is weakened. Without success in non-proliferation, the goal of zero
nuclear weapons is unlikely to be achieved. The central compact in the NPT between
nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states must be strengthened. The
alternative is further proliferation and the continued revaluation of nuclear weapons in
the 21st century.
3. The nuclear-weapon states have a solemn treaty obligation to succeed inprogressively reducing and eliminating their nuclear arsenals. At the same time thenon-nuclear-weapon states must also become stronger stakeholders in the NPT. They
can demonstrate their strengthened commitment to the Treaty by taking steps toaccelerate the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, by
moving promptly to conclude the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and by implementing
enhanced IAEA safeguards. In this way, the Tokyo Forum calls on all states parties torededicate themselves to the NPT's fundamental bargain.
4. A core question in the nuclear disarmament debate is whether nuclear deterrence or
the abolition of nuclear weapons offers more national, regional, and global security.
States possessing nuclear weapons continue to claim that they enhance their national
security. But their actions may also have led rivals to acquire weapons of mass
destruction, leading to diminished security for both these states and their non-nuclear
neighbours. National, regional and global security have not been enhanced by thepossession of nuclear weapons.
5. Some advocates of retaining nuclear weapons claim that these weapons enhance
security by deterring nuclear attack, the use of chemical and biological weapons, andlarge-scale conventional aggression. Until they are abolished, the Tokyo Forum believes
that the only function of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of other nuclear weapons.

This core function is provisional, however, and must be accompanied by efforts to"pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear
disarmament" as unanimously affirmed by the International Court of Justice.
Revitalising US-Russian Nuclear Arms Reductions
6. The Tokyo Forum notes with dismay that since 1993, there have been no formal
US-Russian nuclear arms reduction negotiations, and that less formal discussions onthese matters have been limited and episodic. It calls on the United States and Russia
to initiate a new round of regular, comprehensive talks on international security, arms
control, and disarmament. These discussions should include strategic and all othertypes of nuclear arms, missile defences, and other steps that should be taken to reduce
nuclear dangers, such as those discussed below.
7. Creative ways must now be found to revitalise bilateral strategic arms reductions.
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I, ratified by both countries, contains monitoringarrangements that could be applied to deeper reductions. START II, signed in January
1993 more than six years ago, is still not in force. Formal US-Russian negotiations on afollow-on START III agreement have yet to begin, although the outlines of an ambitious
set of negotiating objectives have been sketched, treaty ratification and implementation
have become too weighed down by conditions, complications, and political partisanship.
Even if the Duma consents to ratify START II, Russian implementation might beconditional on the US Senate's reaffirmation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, whichis by no means assured.
8. The more time that passes without ratification of START II, the less relevant thistreaty becomes. Over the next 10 to 15 years, deployed warheads on Russian strategic
nuclear forces are widely estimated to fall, not just below START II levels but perhaps
to half of projected START III levels. Russian nuclear forces produced in large numbersin the 1980s face block obsolescence, and Russia does not have the funds to keep thislarge force in the field. Waiting for ratification and entry-into-force of treaties requiring
reductions well short of those caused by aging, is an inappropriate response to increased
nuclear dangers.
9. The United States and Russia might now usefully consider combining START II andSTART III, and making START III's reductions more ambitious. While awaiting formal

ratification of these treaties, the Tokyo Forum urges the leaders of the United States
and Russia to begin immediate reductions by dismantling deployed nuclear forces
through parallel steps. It proposes that both countries pledge to use this process to
reduce down to 1,000 deployed warheads on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The
formal treaty process can reaffirm such pledges. Treaties that retard much-needed
progress in reducing nuclear dangers are part of the problem, not part of the solution.
The procedure the Forum proposes would remove existing treaty ratification barriers todeeper cuts.
Ending Hair-trigger Alert
10. Much of the doctrinal support for nuclear weapons is outdated and needlessly
worsens nuclear dangers. Despite the end of the Cold War, it is striking that thetargeting doctrines and alert status of US and Russian nuclear forces have changed solittle. Both countries keep hundreds if not thousands of nuclear weapons on high statesof launch readiness, and maintain massive nuclear attack options against a wide rangeof targets. These targeting requirements and this alert status defy satisfactory
explanation, even under the doctrines of nuclear deterrence and extended deterrence,
and are of great concern to the international community.
11. The need for a review of alert status is especially pressing, not only because of the
sheer number of weapons involved, but also because of the likelihood that, due todomestic difficulties, command and control procedures in Russia will come under evengreater strains in the coming years. Given the interconnectedness of US and Russianalert levels, cooperative approaches to adopting safer nuclear postures are needed. The
Tokyo Forum calls on the United States to renew its offer to help Russia with early
warning systems, and calls on Russia to accept this assistance. It also calls on bothcountries to work closely together to reduce dramatically the alert levels of their nuclear
forces.
12. Zero nuclear weapons at immediate readiness for use is an essential step towards
the goal of their complete elimination. Some progress to this end has been made in thepast decade. The United States has taken all bombers off alert, and the United Kingdom
and France each maintains only one ballistic missile-carrying submarine at sea, atlaunch readiness measured in days. China is believed to maintain its nuclear forces at asomewhat lower level. But much more can be done.

13. The United States and Russia have signed START II which would eliminate
land-based missiles with multiple warheads. The Tokyo Forum calls on the leaders ofboth countries to consider and implement ways to stand down these forces as soon as
possible while awaiting this Treaty's entry into force. As such a stand-down based on
START II would fall disproportionately on Russia, the Tokyo Forum calls on the twocountries to complement it by reducing alert levels for sea-based forces, a measure thatwould fall disproportionately on the United States. Verification arrangements for thesestand-downs should be discussed and implemented.
14. To eliminate the terrifying consequences of accidental nuclear launches caused byYear 2000 (Y2K) computer problems, the Forum calls urgently for the removal of all
nuclear weapons from alert for the period in which there are any potential risks fromthis source to the reliability of command, control and warning systems.
No First Use
15. Pledges of No First Use of nuclear weapons can be useful if they reduce the salienceof such weapons, and do not lower the threshold for the use of other weapons of mass
destruction. Negotiating such pledges is complicated by the alliance relationships of theUnited States and by Russia's military difficulties, especially as long as the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia keep First Use options in their military
doctrines. Moreover, in the past some pledges of No First Use were not credible. Withoutchanges in doctrine, reinforced by greater transparency and verifiability to affirm
reduced launch readiness, pledges alone will continue to lack credibility. The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization has just put in place a mechanism to review its First Use
options, and in-depth discussion and further efforts will be needed to bring to fruition
an effective NATO No First Use commitment. The Tokyo Forum commends such efforts.
Other Nuclear Weapons
16. The United Kingdom and France do not maintain stockpiles of non-deployed nuclear
weapons, and information on Chinese stockpiles of non-deployed nuclear weapons is notavailable. They exist in the United States and Russia, however, in large numbers.
Washington explains this vast, parallel arsenal as a "hedge" against a resurgent andadversarial Russia; Moscow explains its enormous holdings of tactical nuclear weapons

as an insurance policy for conventional force weaknesses and against a resurgent NATO.
This maintenance of huge arsenals complementing deployed forces is a relic of the Cold
War. The resulting numbers of nuclear weapons defy coherent, rational explanation.
Even if US-Russian relations were to plummet to the depths of a new Cold War, how
could the two countries expect to use these many thousands of warheads? The Tokyo
Forum calls on the United States and Russia to begin discussions as soon as possible toprogressively reduce and eliminate in verifiable ways their mutual "hedge" arsenals of
non-deployed weapons.
17. The long-neglected issue of tactical nuclear weapons has begun to receive more
attention. At the May 1999 NPT PrepCom, a number of states spoke out about thecompelling need to address tactical nuclear weapons disarmament. This move rightly
suggests that tactical nuclear weapons are a matter of increased concern. They havebeen revalued in Russian military doctrine, as reflected in a number of recent activities,
including the decisions taken at the Russian Security Council meeting of April 29, 1999
and the Russian military exercise known as West 99. China's declaration in July 1999
on its acquisition of a neutron bomb capability is also noted. The unilateral and parallel
reductions announced by Russia and the United States in October 1991 and confirmed
in January 1992 should be implemented in a transparent and irreversible manner.
Further information on Chinese tactical nuclear weapons would be welcomed. Moregenerally, verifiable reductions and elimination should now be extended to tactical
nuclear weapons as soon as possible.
18. The terrorism and proliferation risks associated with tactical nuclear weapons arehigh. They are relatively vulnerable to theft and older models have less stringent
precautions against unauthorised use. More than half the current global nuclear arms
stockpile may consist of tactical nuclear weapons. The process of reducing thesestockpiles has begun with the substantial, but unverified, reductions of US and Russian
tactical weapons. France has also reduced its holdings of tactical nuclear weapons, andthe United Kingdom has decided to eliminate them. The Tokyo Forum believes thaturgent steps should be taken to ensure that the reduction and abolition of tactical
nuclear weapons can and should proceed in parallel with that of strategic weapons.
Multilateralising Nuclear Disarmament
19. Phased, irreversible reductions in US and Russian strategic nuclear forces to 1,000

deployed warheads will take a decade, perhaps longer. The elimination of non-deployed
nuclear arsenals will lengthen this process. While the United States and Russia should
accelerate their bilateral reductions, what responsibilities should fall to other states?
The Tokyo Forum calls on the NNWS parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons to continue to respect their obligations not to acquire nuclear weapons
and to take initiatives to shore up the non-proliferation regime. The three othernuclear-weapon states recognised by the NPT also have important obligations to"pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear
disarmament." As a first step, the Tokyo Forum calls on China, France and the United
Kingdom not to increase their nuclear arsenals while the United States and Russia are
reducing theirs. Israel, India and Pakistan are not recognised as nuclear-weapon states
under the NPT, but they, too, have important obligations to the international
community not to make the phased reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons evenharder by building up their nuclear capabilities.
20. The United Kingdom and France have moved to cut the numbers and reduce thealert status of their nuclear forces. Transparency measures by both countries haveprovided reassurance that announced reductions to their deployed forces have takenplace. According to published sources, these two states have the lowest number ofnuclear weapons of the nuclear-weapon states. China is the least transparent of thenuclear-weapon states, and most information on the status of its nuclear forces comesfrom Western sources. The Tokyo Forum calls on China, as well as the United States,
Russia, the United Kingdom and France, to make transparent their nuclear weapon
policies and doctrines and the size of their arsenals.
21. Many important disarmament studies in recent years have advocated a phased
reduction of nuclear arsenals that moves from a bilateral to a multilateral process at apoint when 1,000 deployed warheads each remain in the US and Russian arsenals. Just
as it will take a great deal of work and resources to build up the nuclear arsenals, so it
will take similar efforts, and in particular a change in approach to the role of nuclear
weapons, to achieve their final elimination. A high level of political cooperation among
the five recognised nuclear-weapon states will clearly be essential for deep nuclear arms
reductions of all kinds. One way to proceed could be for the five to negotiate a treaty
based on the principle of simultaneously halving, or otherwise proportionately reducing,
their numbers of weapons in each step. This principle would be fair in that the process
would not fundamentally alter the relative capability of each party, while all five would

retain a residual arsenal until the last simultaneous step to zero. Another way would beto agree on a minimum number of warheads below which a nuclear force would be
regarded as technically non-viable, and reduce down to this level before all states moved
to zero. A process of verifiable, phased reductions by all nuclear-armed states to one step
short of zero is a goal on which advocates of abolition and deterrence might find common
ground and from which all states would reap shared security gains.
Revitalising Disarmament Efforts
22. The Tokyo Forum calls on all states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a matter of urgency. States whose
ratifications are needed for its entry into force, such as the United States, Russia, China,
India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, have a special obligation to do so quickly. The
moratorium on nuclear testing cannot be presumed to hold until entry into force issecured. New testing by one state could lead to cascading tests by other states, greatly
increasing nuclear dangers. All states must respect a moratorium on nuclear testing.
Pending entry into force of the treaty, the Tokyo Forum calls on all states to fully fundand implement its monitoring arrangements.
23. The Tokyo Forum notes concerns over whether subcritical experiments undermine
the objectives and purposes of the CTBT. Means should be sought to alleviate theseconcerns. One possible interim measure might be the introduction of practicalmonitoring and transparency mechanisms to confirm whether subcritical experiments
are consistent with the treaty's objectives and purposes. This might be achieved
through mutual monitoring among states conducting such tests.
24. A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty has been on the nuclear negotiating agenda sincethe 1950s. Some have questioned the utility of this treaty, believing it to be insufficientfor disarmament and immaterial for non-proliferation. The Tokyo Forum does not share
this scepticism. Progress in nuclear negotiations has always been achieved in a
step-by-step process, and the FMCT is an essential step in dealing with the dangers
posed by fissile materials, as well as one of the basic building blocks for afissile-material led disarmament process. Other, follow-up steps will also be needed tofacilitate the progressive reduction and elimination of fissile material for weapons
purposes. Therefore, the Tokyo Forum strongly urges the prompt conclusion of the
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, as mandated by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension

Conference.
25. There could also be roles for the international community in the development oftransparency measures for nuclear arsenals and fissile material removed fromwarheads. One measure that has been proposed in this context is a verifiable nuclear
arms register. An experts group might be mandated to decide what should be containedin the register, such as the number and types of nuclear weapons, whether on delivery
vehicles or in inventories. Tactical nuclear weapons and warheads held in reserve mightalso be included. The register would establish a baseline against which further
reductions could be counted. As with the UN Conventional Arms Register, thecontributing states might usefully declare annual changes. The Tokyo Forum calls on
the UN General Assembly to empower the Secretary-General to undertake a feasibility
study of such a measure.
26. The Tokyo Forum also believes it is essential to develop a verifiable register of all
nuclear material produced for both civil and military purposes. We urge that all
weapons grade plutonium and uranium from dismantled nuclear warheads be placed
under IAEA safeguards. Effective long-term monitoring of fissile materials is feasible
only if states possessing nuclear weapon capabilities are prepared to declare theirstocks. Effective controls also require that the International Atomic Energy Agency beempowered to carry out thorough inspections to detect systematic and clandestine
violations.
27. With the deterioration of US-Russia and US-China relations, new strains in the NPT,and the ineffectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament since the conclusion of the
CTBT, it is essential for all states to work harder to revitalise non-proliferation anddisarmament efforts. The Tokyo Forum notes with appreciation recent efforts by the
New Agenda Coalition to provide new impetus to multilateral fora that are mired incompeting theologies of nuclear deterrence and time-bound frameworks for nuclear
disarmament. The Tokyo Forum also notes with appreciation the efforts of
non-governmental organisations to promote non-proliferation and disarmament.
Creative coalitions between "middle powers" and non-governmental organisations
might help provide leadership that is currently lacking elsewhere.
28. Non-proliferation and disarmament efforts could benefit greatly from revitalised
multilateral bodies, notably the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The Conference on

Disarmament should suspend its operations unless it can revise its procedures, update
its work program, and carry out purposeful work. It adheres to an agenda that has long
been outdated but cannot be changed for lack of a consensus to do so. The consensus
rule, even on minor procedural matters, is now causing perpetual deadlock. Consensus
among CD members should not be necessary to begin or, indeed, conclude a multilateralconvention. If a country does not like a treaty, it does not have to sign it. The structureof the CD's groupings of states, based on outdated Cold War alignments, also needs to bechanged to better reflect the contemporary world.
29. The Tokyo Forum notes the importance some have placed on the immediate
negotiation of a convention pledging the elimination of nuclear weapons. The utility ofsuch a convention would depend on whether the pledges it contained to carry out
nuclear disarmament would accelerate movement in this direction. The NPT contains apledge of nuclear disarmament, but progress to fulfil it has been uneven and, in recent
years, unsatisfactory. At a time of increasing nuclear dangers, the Tokyo Forum believes
that actions are far more important than words and pledges. Thus the Forum would
place primary emphasis at this time on concrete steps to progressively reduce andeliminate nuclear dangers.
Missile Defences
30. Prospective developments of missile defences have important implications fornuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The prospect of missile defences in the
United States is complicating a number of international relationships and arms control
efforts. China and Russia have reacted negatively to prospective missile defences. The
United Kingdom and France view with concern defences that devalue their nuclear
deterrent forces. Indeed, while proliferation may increase the perceived need for missile
defences, and the absence of defences may also lend impetus to proliferation, missile
defences could further increase the risk of proliferation.
31. The Tokyo Forum believes that any future missile defences should be sensitive tothese complications. At the same time, no country with the capacity to use weapons ofmass destruction can be given a veto over another state's inherent right of self-defence.
Moreover, states that have contributed to missile proliferation have diminishedstanding to argue against missile defences. There may be times when missile defences
can play useful roles in countering coercion and strengthening alliance cohesion. At thesame time, the development and possible deployment of missile defences are best
pursued in concert with strategies to progressively reduce the salience of nuclear
weapons.
32. The Tokyo Forum is fully aware that unilateral measures cannot reduce the fullrange of nuclear dangers. A unilateral approach to missile defences in the United States
could convey a "Fortress America" approach, weakening alliance ties. Missile defences
should not be seen as an alternative to the norm of nuclear non-proliferation anddisarmament. Therefore, cooperative threat reduction efforts should always be pursued
vigorously. Successful cooperative threat reduction efforts can progressively reduce theimpetus to develop and deploy offensive missiles and missile defences of all kinds.
Tighter export controls and restraint in missile flight testing and missile deployments
could diminish the perceived need for national missile defences.
33. The dismantling of the North Korean missile programs and cessation of its missile
exports would have salutary effects. Furthermore, insofar as prospective missile
defences are intended to address accidental or unauthorised launches, reduced alert
rates and increased assurance over the command and control of Russian nuclear forces
are not only important in their own right, but would also decrease the perceived needfor national missile defences in the United States.
34. If cooperative threat-reduction efforts do not succeed, and if weapons of mass
destruction carried by ballistic missiles continue to threaten states, missile defences canremain an option. The deployment of missile defences, if it occurs in thesecircumstances, should proceed in a highly cautious fashion, along with other initiatives
to reduce nuclear dangers. Nations would be wise to leave open the possibility that
defensive deployments could be scaled back, or even eliminated, if the sources ofconcern were reduced or removed.
Verification
35. An effective nuclear arms reduction process will require cradle-to-grave monitoring
and transparency for all nuclear weapons. While the United States and Russia havemade significant progress in reducing nuclear arsenals, they have hardly started down
the necessary path of transparency needed for irreversible reductions. The Tokyo Forumcalls on all states possessing nuclear weapon capabilities to be more open to monitoringarrangements, transparency and confidence-building measures. States will not agree todeep reductions in their nuclear forces if they deem their security at risk from otherstates' undetected violations of nuclear arms constraints. This would be even more truein the final phase of an arrangement for the elimination of nuclear weapons.
36. The highly secret nature of many aspects of nuclear weapons programs makes itvery difficult to verify declarations of the size and destruction of arsenals. An effective
verification system must take into account this secrecy as well as the uncertainties
about total amounts of nuclear materials produced for weapons purposes. Taken
together, security concerns, secrecy, and uncertainties mean that the precision ofverification of nuclear reductions and disarmament is a matter of the utmost
seriousness.
37. A verification system with a single or narrow focus is not enough. A comprehensive
verification system is required to provide early warning of breakouts or to detectcheating. The most effective verification system would be one that: combined a variety
of techniques; coordinated in a synergistic way the contributions of international
institutions, national technical means, and transparency and confidence-building
measures; and extended to warheads, delivery systems and fissile materials.
38. While the development of detection and surveillance techniques is improving
monitoring systems, political factors threaten to weaken stringent verification, as is
now evident in relation to the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq or theOrganization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Some implementation
decisions by the United States and other OPCW states parties have weakened theimplementation provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and this is a matter ofconcern for future global disarmament agreements. Strengthened verification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, and of the Biological Weapons Convention, is essential
for global efforts to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction. To detect cheating, andso permit the progressive reduction and elimination of nuclear dangers, monitoring
assets must be harnessed in tandem with political will. Both must be applied in a
coherent way, involving coordination between governments and international
institutions.
39. Bilateral nuclear arms reduction or limitation treaties between the United States
and Russia, and their verification, hold valuable lessons for future verification of

nuclear disarmament. They have shown that credible verification arrangements
covering large numbers of deployed nuclear weapons are feasible, but requireconsiderable political and technical efforts and resources. These arrangements, however,
have focused on delivery systems rather than nuclear warheads.
40. The verification and monitoring arrangements for deployed nuclear weapons must
be extended to controls on nuclear warheads. Nuclear weapons are discrete items of thehighest military and political sensitivity, and it would seem natural to expect
governments to keep a close account of their warhead inventories. There should thus be
no technical obstacles to governments declaring the location and status of all their
nuclear warheads. Nor should there be any insurmountable technical barrier toverifying such declarations. The only fundamental problems are political.
41. Provision for inspections is vital to the verification of any arms control ordisarmament agreement. Compliance with a disarmament treaty may stem from thepolitical will that motivated its signing. But trust alone is not enough. Any major
disarmament agreement requires solid and credible verification arrangements. The
US-Russian nuclear weapons treaties have been verified in a system of bilateralarrangements making heavy use of on-site inspections. Inspection provisions are crucial
to the credibility of the CWC, and are of central concern in negotiations to strengthen
the BWC with a verification protocol. Governments must learn to tolerate inspections,
including surprise or short-notice inspections, for multilateral disarmament to have afuture.
42. The continued improvement of detection and surveillance techniques makes it
possible to raise the quality and capabilities of verification and monitoring systems tolevels unimaginable in the past. With modern technology, such possible signs of aweapons program as suspicious construction projects, bank transactions, import andexport patterns, transport and production are more transparent than ever. Air, soil andwater sampling has been refined and can yield important information. Satellite
photography---government and commercial---is making it harder to hide nuclear
weapons programs. Computer-based data-handling can improve the analysis ofdeclarations and other data obtained in the verification process. All these techniquesshould be employed to verify nuclear disarmament.
43. National technical means are indispensable supporting tools for verification of

nuclear reductions and disarmament. The nature of national technical means is such,
however, that their usefulness can be limited, especially in a multilateral context. To
maximise the chances of detecting cheating, monitoring assets must be applied in a waythat coordinates the efforts of governments and multilateral institutions. A synergistic
approach is needed involving: the work of international institutions, such as theInternational

AtomicEnergyAgencyandComprehensive

Test-Ban-Treaty

Organization; national technical means; and transparency and confidence-building
measures by states. The relevant international institutions should be shaped toincrease the scope for a synergistic approach to verification.
44. If non-compliance with nuclear arms treaties is to be deterred, states must know not
only that cheaters will be caught but that, when this happens, they will face serious
consequences. The international community must be united and unequivocal in its
intended response to would-be violators based on a broad consensus as to means andends, including recourse to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. A strengthened andrevitalised United Nations with a reformed and authoritative Security Council isessential to building and maintaining the support of the international community forthe effective enforcement of compliance. The Tokyo Forum calls on all states seeking topromote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament to actively support thedevelopment of such arrangements.
PageTOP--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

A decade after the end of the Cold War, at the threshold of the 21st century, the fabric ofinternational security is unraveling and nuclear dangers are growing at a disturbing
rate. Relations among major powers are deteriorating. The United Nations is in politicaland financial crisis. The global regimes to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons andother weapons of mass destruction are under siege. Acts of terror are taking an
increasingly worrisome turn, with the possible advent of sub-state groups armed withweapons of mass destruction. Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan have shown that not
all countries share the view that the usefulness of nuclear weapons is declining. Years ofrelentless effort have not eliminated the clandestine weapons of mass destruction
programs of the most determined proliferators. The US-Russia nuclear disarmament
process is stalled, with adverse consequences for the global disarmament agenda. The
situation in Asia is particularly fluid, portending negative changes for disarmament andnon-proliferation in coming years.
Unless concerted action is taken, and taken soon, to reverse these dangerous trends,
non-proliferation and disarmament treaties could become hollow instruments. A
renewed sense of commitment to both non-proliferation and disarmament is urgently
needed. We, the members of the Tokyo Forum, have released this report to draw
attention to growing dangers and to propose remedial actions, both immediate and forthe longer term.
The Forum commends the initiative of the Japanese Government in calling it into being
and sustaining its work. We express the hope and expectation that the Japanese
Government will continue to play a positive role in nuclear non-proliferation anddisarmament.
1. Stop and reverse the unraveling of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime byreaffirming the treaty's central bargain. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) demands both disarmament and non-proliferation. The nuclear-weapon
states must demonstrate tangible progress in nuclear disarmament, while thenon-nuclear-weapon states must rally behind the Treaty and take stronger steps of theirown, such as adopting improved International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. To
support the NPT's core bargain, a permanent secretariat and consultative commission
should be created to deal with questions of compliance and to consider strengthening
measures for the Treaty.
2. Eliminate nuclear weapons through phased reductions. The world faces a choice
between the assured dangers of proliferation or the challenges of disarmament. The
better choice is the progressive reduction and complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
No other cities must be put through the devastation wrought by nuclear weapons andthe agony of recovering from their effects, endured by Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Nuclear-weapon states must reaffirm the goal of elimination and take sustained,
concrete steps towards this end.
3. Bring the nuclear test ban into force. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
must be ratified urgently by those key states still holding out---the United States,
Russia, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel. All states must respect a
moratorium on nuclear testing and pay their fair share of the Treaty's verification costs.
4. Revitalise START and expand the scope of nuclear reductions. The Tokyo Forum callson the United States and Russia to initiate new comprehensive talks on nuclear arms
reduction and security issues, to combine the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties II and
III processes, and to further extend reductions to 1,000 deployed strategic warheads. If
these treaties remain stalled, we call on both countries to pursue parallel and verifiablereductions to that level. Verifiable reductions and elimination should be extended to
non-deployed and non-strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, the Tokyo Forum calls on
China to join the United Kingdom and France in reducing and, in the first instance, notincreasing nuclear weapon inventories.
5. Adopt nuclear transparency measures. Irreversible reductions in nuclear forces
require great transparency. The Tokyo Forum welcomes the transparency measures
undertaken so far by the nuclear-weapon states and calls on them to take steps toincrease transparency further. Recent transparency measures by the United Kingdom
and France have shed considerable light on their nuclear weapons numbers and stocks.
These could be further developed. The United States has put in place manytransparency

measuresconcerningits

doctrines,

deployments

andtechnical

developments. More information on reserve stocks would have a positive impact on
steps towards nuclear disarmament. Russia has declared some aspects of its nuclear
weapons program. Russia could increase the degree of transparency concerning doctrine,
numbers of tactical nuclear weapons and stocks of fissile material. China has put inplace few transparency measures. The implementation of further transparency
measures on the numbers and types of nuclear weapons and on the amounts of fissile
material should be encouraged in view of the favourable regional and global impact.
6. Zero nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. The Tokyo Forum calls for all states with
nuclear weapons to endorse and implement the goal of zero nuclear weapons onhair-trigger alert. To this end, we call on the United States and Russia to immediately
stand down nuclear forces slated for reduction in START II. To eliminate the risk of themillennium computer bug leading to an accidental launch, all nuclear weapons in allstates should be removed from alert for the period of concern.
7. Control fissile material, especially in Russia. We call on the United States to continue
and to increase cooperative threat-reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union. The
world community, especially the G8 states and the European Union, must substantiallyexpand cooperative threat-reduction efforts. We call for the prompt conclusion of a
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. We further call on China, India, Pakistan and Israel todeclare moratoria on producing fissile material for nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon
states should put all excess military stocks of fissile materials and civil fissile materials
under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
8. Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The Tokyo Forum calls for regional andglobal cooperative efforts to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into thehands of extremist, fanatical or criminal groups.
9. Strengthen measures against missile proliferation. The guidelines of the Missile
Technology Control Regime need to be strengthened. We call on all states, particularly
North Korea, to respect these guidelines, and for expanded participation in the MTCR.
The international community should explore realistic ways to control and reverse
missile proliferation, including global or regional agreements drawing upon theprovisions of the 1987 US-Soviet Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter-Range Nuclear
Forces. A special conference of concerned states should be convened to deal with thegrowing problem of missile proliferation.
10. Exercise caution on missile defence deployments. The Tokyo Forum recognises theuncertainties

andcomplications

missiledefencedeployments

could

produce.

Recognising the security concerns posed by ballistic missiles, we call on all states
contemplating the deployment of advanced missile defences to proceed with caution, inconcert with other initiatives to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons.
11. Stop and reverse proliferation in South Asia. In the near term, the Tokyo Forumcalls on India and Pakistan to: maintain moratoria on nuclear testing; sign and ratify
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; support prompt negotiation of a Fissile

Material Cut-off Treaty; adopt and properly implement nuclear risk-reduction
measures; suspend missile flight tests; confirm pledges to restrain nuclear andmissile-related exports; cease provocative actions; and take steps to resolve the Kashmir
dispute. In the long term, we urge India and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear-weapo states.
12. Eliminate weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The Tokyo Forumrecognises the linkage between the core objectives of a Middle East that is peaceful andone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). We call for: a revitalised Arab-Israeli
peace process; resumption of an effective WMD control regime for Iraq under UN
Security Council auspices; restraint on missile and flight test programs; effective andverifiable implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons
Convention by all states in the region; implementation of strengthened International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; and Israel's accession to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state.
13. Eliminate nuclear and missile dangers on the Korean Peninsula. The Tokyo Forumurges all parties to redouble their efforts to achieve the goal of a denuclearised Korean
Peninsula as soon as possible. We call for coordinated global efforts to maintain North
Korea's freeze on its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and related facilities. All
nuclear weapon and missile-related activities in North Korea must cease, including
production and sale of WMD-capable missile technology. We call for the full andeffective implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea's full compliancewith an International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement, and its adherence
to the agency's strengthened safeguards system.
14. No vetoes in support of proliferation. The Tokyo Forum calls on the UN Security
Council to pass a resolution declaring that the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Permanent
Members of the Security Council have a special responsibility to prevent proliferation.
We call on them to refrain from exercising their vetoes against efforts to assist or defend
UN member states that have become victim to the use or the threat of use of weapons ofmass destruction. All current and prospective Permanent Members of the UN Security
Council should have exemplary non-proliferation credentials.
15. Revitalise the Conference on Disarmament. The Tokyo Forum calls on theConference on Disarmament to revise its procedures, update its work program andcarry out purposeful work, or suspend its operations. The consensus rule is causing
perpetual deadlock. Consensus among members of the Conference on Disarmamentshould not be necessary to begin or conclude negotiations on a multilateral convention.
16. Strengthen verification for disarmament. The Tokyo Forum calls for widespread
adoption of effective verification measures. The scope of verification of nuclear
disarmament should be expanded to non-deployed nuclear weapons and thedismantling of nuclear weapons. An effective verification protocol should be agreed for
the Biological Weapons Convention, and implementation decisions weakening theverification regime of the Chemical Weapons Convention should be stopped andreversed.
17. Create effective non-compliance mechanisms for nuclear non-proliferation anddisarmament. The Tokyo Forum calls on all states seeking nuclear non-proliferationand disarmament to actively support the development of arrangements through whichstates in non-compliance with arms control treaties will know not only that they will becaught, but also that they will face serious consequences. The international community
must be united and unequivocal in its intended response to would-be violators based ona broad consensus, including possible recourse to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. A
revitalised United Nations with a reformed and authoritative Security Council isessential to building and maintaining the support of the international community forthe effective enforcement of compliance.
PageTOP-------------------------------------------------------------------------------GLOSSARY
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
BWC Biological Weapons Convention
CD Conference on Disarmament
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty Organization

CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
HEU highly enriched uranium
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
INF Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces
LEU low-enriched uranium
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NNWS non-nuclear-weapon state(s)NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSG Nuclear Suppliers' GroupNWFZ nuclear-weapon-free zone
NWS nuclear-weapon state(s)OPCW Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
P5 five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council
PrepCom Preparatory Committee (for NPT review conference)
ROK Republic of Korea
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TMD theatre missile defence
UN United Nations
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission on Iraq
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD weapons of mass destruction
PageTOP-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Profiles of the Members
Nishat AHMAD
Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ahmad is the former President of the Institute of Regional

Studies, Islamabad. He served as Additional Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Government of Pakistan. He worked at Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington
D.C., as a visiting fellow. He is a member of the Melbourne Group, a group organised by
Monash University, Australia, which works on peace and security issues in the
Asia-Pacific region. Lieutenant General Ahmad was Commandant of the National
Defence. He was Director General (plans and operations) in Joint Staff Headquarters ofPakistan armed forces. He has represented Pakistan in a number of delegations to
China, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, UK and USA.
Yasushi AKASHI (Co-Chair)
Mr Akashi is the former President of the Hiroshima Peace Institute, Japan. Prior tothat position, he was the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs of the UN
from March 1996 through the end of 1997. He joined the UN and served as, among
others, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for Cambodia, and the Special Representativeof the Secretary-General for the former Yugoslavia. Mr Akashi is the author ofnumerous books and articles, with focus on the United Nations and international affairs.
After graduating from the University of Tokyo, he obtained his Master's from the
University of Virginia and Ph.D. from Ritsumeikan University.
Marcos Castrioto DE AZAMBUJA
Ambassador de Azambuja is Ambassador of Brazil to France. He was the head of theBrazilian Permanent Delegation for Disarmament and Human Rights and Ambassador
to Argentina. He is a career diplomat and has served as, prior to the above-mentioned
posts,

theDirectorofthe

Department

of International

Organizations,theUnder-Secretary-General for Multilateral Affairs, and the Secretary-General for
External Relations. Ambassador de Azambuja studied at the Faculdade Nacional de
Direito, Universidade do Brasil. He also finished his diplomatic studies at the
diplomatic academy Instituto Rio Branco.
Sergei Yevgenevich BLAGOVOLIN
Professor Blagovolin is the Deputy Director of the Institute of World Economy andInternational Relations Institute (IMEMO), Moscow. He is also the President of theInstitute for National Security and Strategic Studies, the Chairman of the Council of
Directors of TV-Capital and a member of the Russian-Japanese Committee 21st Century.
Professor Blagovolin has conducted research on various issues, ranging from national

and international politics to the problems of national security. Professor Blagovolin
served as, among others, a member of the State Council Committee on Military Reform
and a member of the Academy of Military Science. He is a member of the Presidential
Council of Russia. He earned his B.A. and Ph.D. from Moscow State University.
Emilio Jorge CARDENAS
Ambassador Cardenas is presently the Executive Director of HSBC Argentine Holdings
S.A. He is also the Secretary General of the International Bar Association. From 1991 to
1996 he was Argentina's Permanent Representative to the United Nations. As such, he
was a member of the United Nations Security Council from 1994 to 1995. Since October
1998 he has been a member of the International Advisory Group of the HighCommissioner for Refugees of the United Nations. Since February 1999 he has been amember of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Funds Investments Committee. He
has been a law professor at the University of Buenos Aires, the Catholic University ofArgentina, and the University of Illinois (USA). He earned his law degree from the
University of Buenos Aires Law School, and has a Master in Comparative Law degreefrom the University of Michigan Law School.
Therese DELPECHDr Delpech is the Director of Strategic Affairs at the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA),
Paris. She is also a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for International Studies(CERI-Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques). This year she is chairing the UN
Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters. Dr Delpech has been an advisor to French
Prime Minister Alain Juppe for politico-military affairs. Most of her career has been at
the service of the CEA of France, where she functions as the Deputy Director in theInternational Affairs Division and an advisor to the High Commissioner. Dr Delpech
has also been a consultant to the Policy Planning Staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
She has been a member of the PPNN Core Group since 1992.
Rolf EKEUS
Ambassador Ekeus is Ambassador of Sweden to the United States. He has long beenrecognised as the key figure on non-proliferation and disarmament matters. His service
has included such positions as the Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission
for Iraq (UNSCOM), Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sweden to theConference on Disarmament, the Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons,
and the Chief Delegate to a number of Disarmament Review Conferences (including theBiological Weapons Convention and Nuclear Proliferation Treaty). Ambassador Ekeus
was a member of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. He
is a member of the UN Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament and amember of the PPNN Core Group. He has published several articles on
non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control of weapons of mass destruction,
foreign policy, and European security.
Robert Louis GALLUCCIDr Gallucci is the Dean of the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, USA.
Prior to his current position, he served mostly as Ambassador, dealing with the issues ofNorth Korea and Bosnia. After working for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
and the Department of State, he was appointed the Deputy Executive Chairman of the
UNSCOM. Dr Gallucci also served as the Senior Coordinator of the Office of the Deputy
Secretary, responsible for non-proliferation and nuclear safety initiatives in the former
Soviet Union. He was also the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs.
He earned his B.A. degree from the State University of New York at Stony Brook, andan M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics from Brandeis University.
HAN Sung-Joo
Professor Han is a Professor of Political Science and International Relations and the
Director of the Ilmin International Relations Institute at Korea University. Prior to hiscurrent tenure at the university, Professor Han served as the Minister of Foreign Affairsof the Republic of Korea. He was also the UN Special Representative of theSecretary-General for Cyprus. He is currently a member of the UN Inquiry Panel on the1994 Rwanda genocide. Professor Han was elected the co-chairman of the Council for
Security in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) for the 1998-2000 term. Since the late 1970s he hasserved as an advisor to the Korean government in foreign affairs, defence, and national
unification. Professor Han is a graduate of Seoul National University, and received his
Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley.
Ryukichi IMAI
Ambassador Imai is a Distinguished Fellow of the Institute for International Policy
Studies, Tokyo. In addition, he is a Professor of Kyorin University, the Counsellor of theAtomic Energy Commission, Japan, and the Senior Advisor of the Japan Atomic
Industrial Forum. He is the former Ambassador of Japan to Kuwait, Mexico, and theConference on Disarmament. Ambassador Imai was a member of the Canberra

Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. He is a prominent scholar on
nuclear energy, non-proliferation and disarmament, and is the author of various books
and articles particularly on these issues. He earned his Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineeringfrom the University of Tokyo.
Joachim KRAUSEDr Krause is Deputy Director of the Research Institute of the German Society for
Foreign Affairs (DGAP), Berlin, and teaches political science at Bonn University. Prior
to that position, he was a researcher, and then became the Director of Studies at the
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Research Institute for International Affairs, inEbenhausen near Munich. He was a member of the German delegation to theConference on Disarmament during 1988-1989, and a consultant to the UNSCOM in
1991. Dr Krause's

research

focus ison European security, foreign

policy,non-proliferation and disarmament; he has published many books and articles on theseissues. He finished his Ph.D. at the Free University of Berlin, and his Habilitation atBonn University.
Michael KREPONMr Krepon is the President of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington D.C. He was a
Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr Krepon also
worked at the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency where he directed defence
program and policy reviews. He is the author and co-editor of several books, and has
written over 300 articles, especially on confidence-building measures and the arms
control issue. He obtained a B.A. from the Franklin & Marshall College, and an M.A. in
Middle Eastern Studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies.
Pierre LELLOUCHEMr Lellouche is a member of the Council at the International Institute of Strategic
Studies (IISS), London. He was elected a member of the National Assembly in 1993 and1997, where he sits as Secretary of the Defence Committee. He was Diplomatic Advisor
to Mr Jacques Chirac from 1989 to 1995. Prior to entering politics, he was Deputy
Director at the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales (IFRI) and a professor ingeopolitics and strategic affairs. During the same period, he was a columnist for Le
Point, Newsweek and the International Herald Tribune. Mr Lellouche is a graduate of
the University of Paris, where he earned his Master's in Public Law Advanced Studies,and graduated from the Institut d' Etudes Politiques de Paris. He also obtained an LLM
and doctoral degree (SJD) from the Harvard Law School. He is the author of numerous
articles and books. Latest books include Le Nouveau Monde: De l'ordre de Yalta au
desordre des Nations and La Republique Immobile.
Patricia M. LEWISDr Lewis is the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research(UNIDIR), Geneva. She is the former Director of the Verification Technology
Information Centre (VERTIC), London. She was a consultant to the UK Foreign andCommonwealth Office on the verification of conventional force reductions in Europe
during the 1988-1990 CFE treaty negotiations. She was also appointed the British
governmental expert to the UN study on the Role of the UN in Verification between
1989-1990. She headed the VERTIC consultant team to produce a draft verification
protocol for the Amendment Conference of the 1963 PTBT in New York in 1990. In
1983-1986, Dr Lewis was a lecturer at the University of Auckland, working also at theAustralian National University, and in 1989 she was a visiting lecturer at Imperial
College London. Dr Lewis received her B.Sc in Physics from the University ofManchester and her Ph.D. in nuclear physics from the University of Birmingham.
Margaret MASON
Ambassador Mason is the Director of Council Development for the Canadian Council forInternational Peace and Security (CCIPS), an independent policy research institute in
Ottawa, Canada. From 1989 through 1994 she was Canadian Ambassador for
Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, with responsibility, inter alia, for heading theCanadian delegation to such international meetings as the First Committee of the UN
General Assembly, the 1990 NPT Review Conference, the 1991 Partial Test Ban Treaty
Amending Conference, and the 1991 Biological and Toxin Weapons Review Conference.
Ambassador Mason has also been a Member of the UN Secretary-General's Advisory
Board on Disarmament Matters and the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR. A Member of theCouncil for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) since its inception, she isparticularly active in the Expert Working Group on Nuclear Transparency.
Nobuo MATSUNAGA (Co-Chair)
Ambassador Matsunaga is the Vice-Chairman of the Japan Institute of International
Affairs (JIIA), Tokyo, and is an Advisor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He is theformer President and Director of the JIIA. Ambassador Matsunaga joined the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs in 1946; the positions he held within the Ministry include: Director of
the Personnel Division, Director-General of the Treaties Bureau, Deputy Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Ambassador to Mexico, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, andAmbassador to the USA. He was awarded the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising
Sun in 1996 and Commandeur, Ordre National de la Legion D'Honneur in 1999. He
graduated from the Faculty of Law, University of Tokyo.
Joseph S. NYE, Jr.
Dr Nye is the Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
Boston. He has taught one of the largest core curricula in the Harvard Faculty for morethan a decade. Dr Nye also served in government agencies as the Deputy
Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, in the
Department of States, as the Chairman of the National Security Council Group on
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as the Chairman of the National Intelligence
Council, and as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He
has published a number of books and articles on non-proliferation and arms control anddisarmament issues. Dr Nye received a B.A. from Princeton University and a Ph.D. in
Political Science from Harvard University.
Robert O'NEILL
Professor O'Neill is Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, theUniversity of Oxford. He is also the Chairman of the International Institute of Strategic
Studies, and the Chairman of the Imperial War Museum, London. He was the UK
Chairman of the Nuclear History Programme and a member of the International Peaceand Security Committee of the Social Science Research Council, New York. Professor
O'Neill was also part of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons. He is a graduate of the Royal Military College of Australia, and obtained his
Bachelor of Engineering from the University of Melbourne. Professor O'Neill wasawarded a Doctorate of Philosophy for his thesis published in 1966.
Abdel Monem SAID ALY
Dr Said Aly is the Director of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo.
He has worked at the Al-Ahram Center since 1975, and is a senior researcher as well as
the head of the international relations research unit. He was a research fellow at the
Brooking Institute, Washington D.C. Dr Said Aly also served as a political adviser in the
Amiri Diwan of the State of Qatar. He has written various books and articles, both inEnglish and Arabic, on Arab relations with the regional and global orders, European
integration, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Middle East regional security, and Egypt's
political system, national security and arms control policies. He obtained his B.A. from
Cairo University, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from Northern Illinois
University, USA.
John SIMPSON
Professor Simpson is Professor of International Relations and the Director of theMountbatten Centre for International Studies in the Department of Politics at the
University of Southampton, United Kingdom, and the Programme Director of theProgramme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation. He has been a member of the UN
Secretary-General's Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters and the Trustee of
UNIDIR. Professor Simpson is one of the most distinguished scholars on nuclear
non-proliferation, and is the author of various books and articles on nuclear
non-proliferation, arms control, defence procurement and security policy, andinternational relations. He obtained a B.Sc (Econ) and M.Sc (Econ) from London
University and a Ph.D. from the University of Southampton.
Hennadiy UDOVENKO
Ambassador Udovenko is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament. He is a former
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and was the head of the 52nd Session of the UN General
Assembly. Ambassador Udovenko is a career diplomat, who was long engaged in thedomestic service as well as the UN, and served, prior to the above-mentioned posts, as
the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations and Ambassador to
Poland. He has published dozens of articles on international affairs and Ukrainian
foreign policy. He earned an M.A. in International Relations from Kyiv Shevchenko
University.
ZAKARIA Haji Ahmad
Professor Zakaria is the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities,
Universiti Kebangaan Malaysia (National University of Malaysia). He was the Deputy
Director-General at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS),
Malaysia. Professor Zakaria has published books and articles on, among others,
security and foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region, including Southeast Asia. He
obtained his B.A. from the University of Singapore, an M.A. in Political Science from
McMaster University (Canada), and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts

Institute of Technology.