ECONOMIC RESEARCH CENTERDISCUSSION PAPER
E-Series

No.E14-9

Development of energy conservation technology inJapan, 1920–1970: specific examination of energy
intensive industries and energy conservation policy
bySatoru Kobori

November 2014

ECONOMIC RESEARCH CENTERGRADUATE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICSNAGOYA UNIVERSITY

Development of energy conservation technology in Japan, 1920–1970: specificexamination of energy intensive industries and energy conservation policy*

Satoru Kobori†

Abstract
This paper presents analysis of Japanese energy conservation technology development
during the 1920s–1960s, particularly addressing energy-intensive industries, especiallythe iron and steel industry, and energy conservation policies extending to end-users.
After the end of the 1910s, the Japanese took an increasing interest in energy conservation. Mutual
exchange of energy conservation technologies in iron and steel industries began. Osaka prefecture
started to encourage energy conservation at small factories. These activities, which came to be called
heat management, developed during WWII and bore fruit after the war. The iron and steel industry
exchanged heat management scores of factories and compared good technological practices to facilitate
technological exchange through competition among factories. The heat management policy was
exercised and developed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry and its predecessor to promulgate
advanced energy conservation technology of the iron and steel industry to others. These technologies
and policies emphasized the improvement of worker awareness and skills of heat management rather
than installing new and expensive equipment. The energy efficiencies of Japanese energy-intensive
industries had already reached the highest level in the world in the early 1960s. The law that became thepredecessor of the Energy Conservation Act of 1979 has been enforced since 1951.

*

Research for this article was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science,
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B), 21330084, 2011–2014 and Grant-in-Aid for Scientific
Research on Innovative Areas, 25101005, 2013-2017.
† Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya University
11. Introduction
This paper presents a historical perspective and analysis of the development ofJapanese energy conservation technologies. The energy intensity of Japan in termsof total primary energy supply (TPES) per unit of GDP is well known to have
improved drastically from immediately after the oil crisis to around 1990, reaching
the lowest level among IEA countries (IEA 2008; Sugihara 2009). Although somedebate has arisen about whether Japan’s energy intensity today is still the lowest
or not, even critical observers would agree that such improvement to the lowest
level occurred from the mid-1970s to the beginning of the 1990s (Morotomi andAsaoka 2010).
That decrease of energy intensity of Japan’s economy mainly resulted from
improvement of energy efficiency in manufacturing. This paper emphasizes a
discussion of the following two characteristics related to this improvement. First,
the improvement occurred from the development of energy conservation
technology of energy-intensive industries, for example iron and steel, cement, andthermal power generation, as well as a change of industrial structure which means
the growth of energy-saving and high value-added industries or relatively
labor-intensive segments of capital-intensive industries, especially the machinery
automobile and computer industry (Hashimoto 1991, cha.3; Sugihara 2013). The
basic units for energy of these energy intensive industries represent the bestpractices in the world even today (Oda et al. 2012). Second, these improvements
were achieved without strong regulation or taxation from the government. An
important characteristic of Japan’s energy conservation policy to end-users is
known as voluntary or inductive regulation. Although the government obliges
large energy users to have an energy manager who manages the improvement andsupervision of methods for using energy through the Act on the Rational Use ofEnergy in 1979 (Energy Conservation Act), and although the Energy Conservation
Center of Japan (ECCJ) has made technical guidance for energy use mainly tosmall and medium-sized enterprises, no legal penalty has been applied on amountsof energy consumption (IEA 2008; Kikkawa 2011).
2

These characteristics were nevertheless not generated suddenly after the oilcrises. The energy efficiencies of the Japanese energy intensive industries had
already been leading the world during the first half of the 1960s (Fig.1; Fig.2). The
predecessor of the Energy Conservation Act, the Heat Management Act, hadalready been enacted in 1951, a quarter of a century before the OPEC oil crises(AIST 1971). Moreover, these two characteristics originated, as explained below,
the technical improvements and policies that were undertaken in the 1920s.
Therefore, we should discuss the path from the 1920s to the 1970s when weanalyze, from a historical perspective, why Japan has been able to improve
national energy efficiency radically after the oil crises. Japan’s recent history inthis regard can be separated into four sections: the interwar era, the wartime
period, the reconstruction period and the high-speed era. The discussion addresseschanges of following two points, the energy intensive industry and the energy
conservation policy to the end-user. We regard the iron and steel industry as themost typical case of energy-intensive industries.

2. Energy-saving activities in the interwar era(1) Increasing interest in energy-conservation technology
After the end of the 1910s, Japan took an increasing interest in energy
conservation technology for two reasons. First, industrialization and the increaseof domestic coal production cost during WWI increased the price of coal. The
relative price of coal in terms of the wholesale price index rose from 1.02 in 1913 to1.35 in 1919. Second, the degree of coal self-sufficiency in Japan proper fell below
100%. Japan had been an exporter of coal from the Meiji era but the quantities ofcoal imports exceed exports in 1923, 1924, and continuously after 1927 (Kobori
2010, cha. 1; Kobori 2012).
Therefore, Japanese engineers and bureaucrats took a growing interest in thefollowing two matters. The first was increasing fuel costs. The second was alimitation in domestic coal resources. For example, in 1920, Saishiro Sakikawa, thechief of Mining Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (MAC), was3

worried that Japan would not be able to continue mining domestic coal for many
years and stated that Japan should “save the demands for coal” as well as making
plans to “acquire foreign coal mines” (the Lower house of the Diet 1920). In fact,
the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce established the Fuel Research Institutein 1920 to undertake some studies of effective utilization of resources. Engineers
and researchers interested in combustion engineering furthermore organized agroup called the Fuel Society of Japan, not only to exchange their research results
but also to enlighten ordinary people about the importance of energy conservation(Kobori 2010, cha.1).

(2) Technical guidance for fuel combustion by the Osaka prefecture
It was however not the government, but local authorities that conducted specificpolicies for developing energy conservation technology before WWII. The first andtypical case was the Osaka prefecture, which was often designated as the“Manchester of the Orient” at that time. Osaka prefecture founded the Technical
Guidance Division for Fuel Combustion belonging to the Osaka Prefectural
Institute for Industrial Management (OPIIM) in 1929 and started to guide local
factories to more efficient methods of combustion with a boiler.
The purpose of technical guidance for fuel combustion was not only theindustrial rationalization of small factories clustered in Osaka prefecture but also
decreasing the smoke issuing from them. Because air pollution by smoke in Osaka
became severe after the Industrial Revolution, Osaka prefecture sometimes
exercised campaigns against smoke during the 1900s–1910s. These movements
failed, however, because the Osaka Chamber of Business was opposed to thembecause they sought to enforce economic loads on factories, for example by forcing
the installation of smoke-prevention equipment (Oda 1983, cha. 6). However, in the
campaign against smoke during the 1920s, Osaka prefecture cooperated with theengineers and researchers who joined the Fuel Society of Japan and planned themethods to prevent smoke without extra cost on factories. Therefore, Osaka
prefecture succeeded in gaining entrepreneurs’ consent. What was the method?
4

The Osaka prefecture emphasized that smoke released by imperfect combustion
with a boiler meant not only air pollution but also wastage of fuel because grains ofsmoke were unburned coal that had been released from chimneys. Osaka
prefecture appealed that efficient mode of combustion contributed to the reductionof both production costs and of smoke.
What were the activities of the Technical Guidance Division of Fuel
Combustion? Two main activities existed. First was practical guidance for fuelcombustion at a factory. Second was the boiler men training course accompaniedwith a licensing system. Practical guidance at a factory was exercised for 192
factories during five years. Most trainees were small firms that had only simple
and cheap boilers. The guidance was exercised after the application by the factory,
free of charge from four to seven days at a factory. The guidance policy by Osaka
prefecture was improving the efficiency of combustion without investment in extra
equipment. Osaka prefecture emphasized that it was possible to decrease fuel costsby more than 10% merely by changing their working methods for combustion, forexample, a kind of coal, the method and interval of throwing coal to the boiler andthe way of regulating drafts. Osaka prefecture showed that even if new equipment
were not installed, developing human resources who understood combustion would
contribute considerably to decreasing fuel consumption.
The boiler men training course was the other method of developing humanresources for combustion. To encourage reduction of both smoke releasing and fuelconsumption, Osaka prefecture established a licensing system for boiler men in
1932. Factories using boilers located in Osaka City came to employ boiler men who
had a license. At the same time, OPIIM started the boiler men training course. It
took more than 100 hours to finish a course of lectures and practices, and morethan 4000 students graduated in three years. The training course increased thehuman resources for combustion who were able to pass the boiler man license andmade the boiler man license system more meaningful. Moreover, the training
course and the license system should be evaluated as indirect and enforced
practical guidance for fuel combustion at factories that did not apply it.
5

These practical guidance and training courses showed that even a small factorythat could not install new or expensive equipment would be able to reduce energy
consumption and smoke by improving boiler workers’ skills.
Osaka prefecture’s development of the guidance for fuel combustion was
regarded as an excellent measure for industrial rationalization, and was therefore
emulated during the 1930s by several local governments such as those of Tokyo,
Kyoto, and Dalian. The Ministry of Home Affairs further established the boiler
man license system over the nation in 1935 (Kobori 2010, cha.1).

(3) Development of energy conservation technology of the iron and steel industry
The iron and steel industry, representing a typical case of energy intensive
industry, was also interested in energy conservation technologies. Actually, it wasinterested mainly in German energy conservation technologies. For example,
Kuniichi Tawara, an outstanding engineer of the iron and steel industry, travelled
to Europe and North America during June 1921 – July 1922 and reported, “[the US
iron and steel industry] does not introduce many resource saving facilities because
the US has sufficient resource. …[On the other hand Germany] has few resources,
so the reason for the development of the German iron and steel industry was an
attempt to develop its technology”. He appreciated that Germany had developedenergy-saving and resource-saving technologies aggressively under the constraintsof a resource set that differed from those of the U.S. and U.K. He also said, “Japanis short of resources for iron and steel and its quality is bad, so we have to study
hard like the German engineers” (Tawara 1922, pp.815-16). He thought that theJapanese iron and steel industries were compelled to follow the example not of US
rationalization, which used large amounts of natural gas and heavy oil, but
German rationalization, which tried with great difficulty to conserve coal. He
further emphasized a policy of aggressive technology exchange with Germany,
which promoted technological development.
Heat management, as a representative technology, was investigated andexchanged aggressively. Verein Deutscher Eisenhüttenleute (German Iron and6

Steel Institute) established Hauptwärmestelle (Central Heat Management Office)in Dusseldorf to promote energy conservation. The tasks of Hauptwärmestelle
were not only research of heat management but also of training engineers,
exchanging technology among iron and steel mills, advertising of heat
management, and so on. Each iron and steel facility also established aWärmestelle (heat management center) and used Wärme Ingenieur (heatengineers) to improve heat management not by a skilled worker’s intuition but by
an engineer’s instrumentation.
Some iron and steel works emulated German heat management technology,
presenting two outstanding cases: the Yawata Iron and Steel Works in North of
Kyushu district and Showa Steel Works (SSW) in Manchuria3. The Yawata Iron
and Steel Works started to reuse surplus energy, especially blast furnace gas andcoke oven gas, for other iron and steel making process. The per-steel-product-ton
consumption of coal was reduced by half from the 1920s through the early 1930s(Fig. 3).
Yawata, however, established no department such as a heat management center,
which investigates and guides the heat economy of all plants of a factory. A factorythat had fully installed German heat management technology was SSW. It started
the integrated iron and steel works in April 1935, and “was stimulated by German
technology at that time and felt the importance of heat management strongly.”
SSW planned heat management “as the first trial in the East” (SSW 1940, p.235).
SSW founded a heat management center in 1934 and the center undertook full
activity in the second half of the 1930s, for example repair and control of
instruments, R&D with some plants, and guidance to the job sites. More than 100
staff members worked at the heat management center, and the varieties andquantities of instruments increased. Recording of combustion was exercised
automatically. In the second half of the 1930s, SSW installed and expanded
3

Yawata was established in 1902, controlled by the government until 1934, semi-governmental until
1950, the ancestor of the present Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal Co. SSW was established in 1918 asa subsidiary of the South Manchurian Railway Co., named Anshan Iron Works until 1933 and abolishedat the Japanese defeat of the war in 1945.

7

German heat management technology more rapidly than Yawata did (Kobori2012).
Heat management at SSW was recognized gradually in the Japanese homeland.
Its formal stage was presented by the Iron and Steel Institute of Japan (ISIJ),
which consisted of company engineers as well as academic researchers. From 1926,
ISIJ held research meetings once or twice a year “in order to promote the growth of
the Japanese iron and steel industry and of the technology at the job site” (ISIJ
1945) and exercised presentations and discussions related to some themes such asiron, steel, and steel products. During the late 1930s, each division started to placeenergy conservation on the agenda and the Fuel Economy Division started in 1938.
The first meeting programmed “real scenes filmed for heat management at blast
furnaces, open hearth furnaces and a control room presented by Showa SteelWorks” (ISIJ 1941). Masao Shidara, who was involved in heat management at
Yawata during wartime and who served a Chief of the Heat Management Section
after the war, recalled that the heat management of SSW had been superior to thatat Yawata (Shidara 2007).

3. Energy conservation activities during WWII
(1) Energy conservation policy during WWII
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI, the successor of MAC) also
started technical guidance for fuel combustion in 1938 as the Sino–Japanese war
exacerbated the tight coal supply situation. The engineers who had guided fuelcombustion measures in Osaka were used by MCI to spread the principles andpractices of guidance.
It is noteworthy that the targets of the guidance, which had been restricted to
combustion with boilers of small firms, also expanded. As the coal supply situation
became tighter and tighter, fuel conservation became necessary even at large
factories that were not the targets of guidance during interwar era. Fuel engineers
realized that many points aside from the mode of fuel combustion should be
improved to reduce energy consumption further. They explained that it was8necessary to improve combustion with a furnace, conserving fuel, controlling steam
and keeping insulation as well as combustion with a boiler. They also emphasized
that, to accomplish these improvements, it was necessary for any big or small factory
to install instrumentation engineering for research or study using exact instruments
and to employ full-time workers responsible for energy.

At the same time, the policy name changed from guidance for fuel combustion toheat management. The designation of heat management used by iron and steel
engineers, especially by SSW, changed to have a general meaning of energy
conservation at a factory or energy conservation policy. Heat management by SSW
became famous not only among domestic iron and steel engineers through ISIJ, as
described above, but also in the engineers who guided fuel combustion at Osaka
prefecture or MCI. They sometimes visited and devoted attention to the heat
management center of SSW and introduced it through speeches or articles toengineers who worked at other industries. The government exercised inspection
and held heat management campaign during winter to enlighten and improve heat
management (Kobori 2010, cha.2).

(2) Iron and steel industry
After the start of the Sino–Japanese War, several iron and steel factories inJapan also earnestly began to imitate heat management by SSW. Yawata, fromMay 1937, immediately before the start of the Sino–Japanese war, established theFuel Division under the Iron Department to centralize the control of blast-furnaceand coke-oven gas, which had been controlled separately until then. The Fuel
Division was placed directly under the Head of Engineering in March 1942 andwas changed to the Heat-Management Division in 1944. Tasks of theHeat-Management Division were added as “matters on heat management”, as wellas control of gas and fuels. An Engineering Subsection, which dealt with“enlightening and advertising concepts of heat management engineering”, e.g.
guidance of combustion at furnaces, measurements, and consulting about heateconomy, in addition to analysis of gas. The status of the Heat-Management
9Division was higher than that of Fuel Division in 1937, indicating a broader scopeof the factory. Its tasks became to contain the guidance in improvement of the basic
unit for fuel at each piece of equipment.
During wartime, the following three matters were tried: (1) a heat-control
campaign to grow interest in heat management at a job site and to improve basic
unit, (2) organization of a heat management committee to discuss heat
management at each factory, and (3) improvement of instrumentation engineering(Kobori 2012).

(3) Achievements and issues of heat management during the war
Did these efforts by the government and iron and steel industry bear fruit atthat time? To begin from the conclusion, basic data for fuels became much worse
during the wartime era for four reasons.
The first reason was the worsening coal quality, which posed a general
limitation on the Japanese wartime economy.
Second was a lack of instruments. After 1937, it became much more difficult toimport instruments from abroad. The supply of industrial instruments for heat
management stagnated because domestic production of instruments emphasizedaircraft instruments and instruments for oil refining. Although the steel industry
attempted to repair instruments through its own efforts, it was insufficientbecause of the lack of spare parts.
Third, the engineering level could not help being worse than during theinterwar era because many skilled workers were drafted into the armed forces.
Many unskilled workers were employed to increase output. The proportion ofdrafted workers to all employees at Yawata increased from 10.0% at the end of1937 to 14.5% at the end of 1941. The length of a worker’s continuous employment
decreased from 11 years and 10 months in 1934 to 7 years and 3 months in 1940.
After the start of the Asia–Pacific War, “special workers” such as students, Koreans,prisoners, and corps of women volunteer workers increased. They were required toperform tasks not only as assistants but also as regular workers. It is not difficult10

to imagine that these conditions lowered the engineering level at a job site that
relied heavily on the experience and skill of long-term employees.
Fourth, even at factories where there remained numerous skilled workers, theyoften persisted in using conventional and intuitional practices. Some engineersreported that many skilled workers did not use the instruments for heat
management even if they were installed. During the war period, it was too difficultfor heat management officers or engineers to reeducate skilled workers patiently(Kobori 2010, cha.2; Kobori 2012).
Under these circumstances, the officers and engineers reported lack of“enthusiasm” of the heat management of the workers or managers (Nenryo oyobi
Nenshosha Co., 1944). It was symbolic that the name of heat management
campaign in 1945 was “Heat Management Suicide Attack Monthly”. It isnoteworthy that “lack of enthusiasm” was not only a spiritual instruction but also
accompanied the indication of concrete problems, for example, leakage of steam orheat, lack of proper fuel keeping place, utilization of instruments. These points,
which had not been recognized as problems during the 1930s, became recognizedas problems during the wartime period by the Japanese themselves before US
technology was installed after WWII. The war fostered interest in energy
conservation technology. The officers and engineers who engaged in heat
management after the war came to be recognized as problems for heat
management during the war (Kobori 2010, cha. 2).

4. Heat management during Reconstruction(1) Establishing the Heat Management Act
Japan lost its colonies. Many Korean miners disappeared from coal mines after
Japan’s defeat. Therefore, energy restrictions on Japan after the war became
tighter than they had been during the war.
When the lack of coal became dire in December 1946, the Japanese government
adopted the “Fundamental Policy for Strengthening Heat Management to Breakthe Coal Crisis” at a cabinet meeting. The government aimed to strengthen heat11

management as an “increase of coal output on the consumption side” in concert
with a policy for increasing coal output. The Japanese energy policy at that time
was the priority production system in the supply side and heat management on the
demand side.
Japan however had the good circumstances that were not apparent during
wartime; demobilization and disarmament of the Japanese armed force. Because ofdemobilization, skilled workers were not being drafted into the armed forces. This
created the essential conditions under which post war Japan were able to develop
engineering at the job site. Disarmament caused the loss of military demand,
which compelled Japanese manufacturers to look for new civilian demand; one wastools for heat management, for example instruments and steam traps. In thecontext of these circumstances during reconstruction, the problems that had been
acknowledged during wartime by officers and engineers began to be solved
gradually.
The actors promoting heat management policies after the war were the HeatManagement Division at the government and the heat management associations.
The Heat Management Division was established at the National Coal Board in1947 and moved to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, thesuccessor of MCI)-affiliated Agency of Industrial Science and Technology (AIST).
The heat management associations were private institutions established by heat
management engineers. They exercised research exchange and advertising heat
management. There were also the eight local heat management associations andthe Central Association for Heat Management (CAHM) which coordinated them.
Major policy initiatives exercised by these actors were industry-specificinspections of heat management, in addition to heat manager systems. The
industry-classified inspection was exercised during 1948–1952. This inspection
was exercised to 16 industries and 1204 factories, which were three fourths of the
Designated Heat Management Factories (see the next paragraph). This inspection
contained many detailed checkpoints which covered not only combustion but thewhole field of heat management (Table 1). The results of the inspection were12

reported to each factory and good practices were commended at each inspection.
Besides, some of them were opened on the bulletin or magazine issued by the heat
management associations at any time. The opened information was not only about
the general situation but also about the detailed introduction of good or bad case.
Scores of all inspected factories were opened in some industries. Opening thecharacteristics or scores in each industry would contribute to develop andadvertiseheatmanagement

engineering.

Even

after

the

end

of

the

industry-classified inspection, some heat management associations and publicresearch organizations consulted for heat management.
The heat manager system was started by the Rule of Heat Management in 1947
and became firm by the Heat Management Act in 1951. The Heat Management Act
was aimed at preserving fuel resources and rationalizing firms through more
efficient use of heat energy. The Act designated factories using more fuel than
1,000 ton of coals (6,000 kcal/kg) annually as the Designated Heat Management
Factories, which were obliged to select a Heat Manager, who was obligated to pass
the national examination and become a Qualified Person for Heat Management.
The manager of the Designated Heat Management Factories was obligated torespect the Heat Managers’ opinion. Training and lessons for becoming a Qualified
Person for Heat Management were often held. The Heat Management Act was
unique because it tried to increase the skill and status of the heat management
engineer to improve fuel efficiency; in fact the Japanese officer reported that such alaw was not apparent in any other country, even in Germany.
Making and exercising these policies, the government officers requested the ironand steel engineers to make lectures or write papers on magazines for engineers ofother industries. Tight public–private partnership contributed on the spillover ofheat management engineering from advanced industries to others (Kobori 2010,
cha.2).

(2) Iron and steel industry: developing to the best level in the world
The energy conservation of the postwar iron and steel industry was promoted by13

oxygen steelmaking as well as heat management. When we discuss these twotechnologies, it is impossible to ignore technology imports from the US. Technicalguidance on heat management by American engineers exercised in 1949, and fullscale use of oxygen to open hearth furnaces (OHF) started after WWII throughout
the world, especially in the US, to decrease fuel consumption and to shorten
working hours.
Nevertheless, the Japanese energy conservation technology developed after the
war was not an exact copy of the U.S. technology. Japanese heat management
technology after the war was much different from the U.S. efforts in its objectives
and contents. Takami Ota, the chief of No. 1 Steelmaking Division of Yawata Iron
and Steel Works and inspected an overseas in 1954, reported that the basic unit for
fuels of the U.S. steel industry was inferior to that of Japan and analyzed thereasons (Ota 1954, p.770).

“I intuited that Yawata and the other Japanese steel plants installed as
high-level instruments and automatic managers as the U.S. highest classplants… a job sites of the U.S. OHF operators were not necessarily interested inresearch or improvements for burning at OHF or in checking burning scores ofdaily work…The reason why basic unit for fuels is not necessarily superior wasthat they attach the greatest importance to the efficiency of steelmaking (t/hr)…”

Ota recognized the most important objective of the formation of technology in the
U.S. as the efficiency of steelmaking (t/h), and that the most important objective inJapan was the basic unit for fuels (cal/t). He also noted that the difference in theformation of technology influenced the difference in daily work between the U.S
and Japan. We shall fail in grasping the characteristics of the post-war Japaneseiron and steel industry if notice only the introduction of U.S. technology and ignore
the history of energy conservation activities, which bore fruit after the war.
Moreover, the introduction of oxygen steelmaking was regarded as negative by theAmerican steel engineer who guided heat management during the reconstruction
14

period. The process of introducing oxygen steelmaking was extremely independentand the amount and degree of oxygen use in Japan became much higher among all
countries of the world during the 1950s. As a result of these feats of technicalprogress, the basic unit for fuel at OHF was already better than that of any othercountry by the early 1950s when old-type furnaces were still used to a considerable
degree (Fig. 4).
What was the background of such rapid development of the Japanese energy
conservation technology? We should specifically examine technology exchange andimprovement at a job site.
The ISIJ played an important role in technology exchange. The Liaison
Conference for Research of Iron and Steel Technology was held in July 1948 by
ISIJ, the Japan Iron and Steel Association (called The Japan Iron and SteelFederation from November 1948, JISF), and the Steel Bureau of Ministry ofCommerce and Industry. They sought to make the divisions of ISIJ active. Then
ISIJ established eight divisions such as pig iron, steel-making, and steel products,
and some divisions placed heat management as a research subjects. In the OHF
division, each attending company announced and criticized technology (e.g. aburner blueprint) mutual to encourage standardization of technology. The OHF
division also researched oil-burning, furnace structure, and oxygen steelmaking.
This example illustrates that, by restoring research divisions in the 1920s–1930s,
technology exchange was already started before technical guidance from U.S.
engineers began.
These exchange relations enabled the contents of the U.S. engineers’ guidance
to be closely shared among the Japanese steel companies. For example, when theengineers visited Yawata, some heat management engineers belonging to otherJapanese steel companies such as NKK and Sumitomo came along and watched
their guidance at Yawata. Their guidance report was later published and sold. A
division responsible for instrumentation and heat management technology, theHeat Economy Division, was established in ISIJ and some designs of furnaces andinstrumentation which were best to progress heat management were standardized
15

by the Division. In addition, the experimentation of oxygen steelmaking was
exercised through cooperation with eight steel companies that belonged to JISF.
Moreover scores of the heat management were presented to ISIJ every month byeach factory to be mutually exchanged. Some good practices were also exchanged
and discussed. According to Shidara, factories did not hide work efficiency andknew each other’s scores. During reconstruction, technology exchange through
ISIJ, which started in the interwar period, was sufficiently displayed. Iron andsteel factories mutually cooperated and competed for the development of heat
management technology.
These exchanged figures and practices were reported to engineers and workers
at job sites through heat management committee of each factory to stimulate theimprovement of energy conservation technologies. Steel Plant No. 3, Yawata Iron
and Steel Works, which was the first steel-making plant for which the basic unit
for fuels became less than 1,000 kcal/t in Japan, was the typical case. The
engineers of Steel Plant No. 3 tried various methods to interest workers in
instrumentation and heat management and thereby improve basic units for fuel,such as adjustment of the arrangement of staff members to arouse competitive
spirit related to heat management, making workers calculate the basic unit for
fuels for themselves at every tapping and compare the scores with those of otherfactories or those in foreign countries, trying special programs to get the president
prize of Heat Management Month, and instilling confidence of workers in theirheat management. Such steady activities reformed minds of workers who had
relied not on instruments but on their own appreciation.
Kiyoshi Sugita recalled the chief of Steel Plant No. 3 as the person who was very
keen on heat management and said about the heat management in the 1950s as
follows. “Unexpectedly, many men got promoted because they were deeply engaged
in heat management. [The man who succeeded in heat management was]remarkable. It was a little different from general improvements on output” (Sugita2008). Through the active exchange of technology and scores beyond the factory,
the Japanese iron and steel industry had created a system under which an16

engineer or worker who was keen on energy conservation was rewarded (Kobori2012).

5. During high-speed growth(1) Stagnation of energy efficiency improvement
Given the background of severe energy restriction, Japan tried to resolve it byimproving energy efficiency. The basic-unit-for-fuel index of the Designated HeatManagement Factories improved rapidly from 100.0 in 1948 to 89.0 in 1950, 69.7
in 1955, and 60.4 in 1960 (AIST 1971, p.9).
Anxiety about energy restriction, however, gradually calmed down in the second
half of the 1950s because they estimated that crude oil production in Middle East
would continue stably and that the increase of Japan’s exports would enable theimport of more energy. Furthermore, then, the energy revolution, the switching ofenergy resources from domestic coal and water to foreign petroleum progressed.
The energy revolution in Japan was more rapid than in West Europe or the US(Table 2). Japan succeeded in importing oil at a lower price than those countries(Fig. 5). Japan created deeper ports and coastal industrial zones, especially along
the Pacific coast, to accommodate the largest tankers in the world (Fig.6), which
contributed to the cutting of crude oil transportation costs. Japan, which has a longcoastline, was favorable for importing foreign energy and resources to Westerncountries, which had their industrial zones located inland. During high-speed
growth, Japan did not avoid increasing the import of energy but tried to importenergy as economically as possible. The rapid drop in the energy sufficiency rate
was the consequence (Kobori 2010, part III).
Because of these changes, the progress of the heat management was weakened
during the 1960s. The basic-unit-for-fuel index of the Designated HeatManagement Factories (100 in 1948) was 60.4 in 1960, 55.8 in 1965 and 55.8 in
1969 (AIST 1971, p.9). The improving rate of basic-unit-for-fuel at aniron-and-steelmaking plant that belonged to Nippon Steel Corp. was 79.6% during
1953–58, 89.0% during 1958–63, 94.7% during 1963–68, and 95.7 1968–73 (Toyoda
171982, p.1677).
In fact, the Heat Management Division at the government was abolished in
1962. The heat management policy was exercised as one policy means for small
firms because the government judged that the energy efficiency of energy intensive
industries such as iron and steel, cement and electricity had reached the best levelin the world (AIST 1964, pp.366-67). In addition, abolishment of the HeatManagement Act was sometimes rumored in the mid-1960s (Yokoyama 1964, p.2;
Komatsu 1966 p.47). The activity of the Heat Economy Division of ISIJ during thehigh-speed growth era was also seen as less dull than that during thereconstruction period (ISIJ 1982, p.25).
The following two points are also noteworthy. First, the energy efficiency of theJapanese energy intensive industries, for example iron and steel industry or
thermal power generation, continued to be best in the world during the 1960s. How
should we evaluate it? Secondly, the system of heat manager or technical exchange
was not fully abolished. The Heat Management Act was not abolished and theHeat Economy Division and the heat management movement at each factory werealso sustained. How did these institutions survive?

(2) Technological development during 1960s and heat management during the
1950s
Regarding the point of the aim of technology, the improvement of energy
efficiency during the 1960 was secondary. The iron and steel industry during the
1960s regarded not heat management but mass-production or quality control asmost important. Kiyoshi Sugita stated that the turning point occurred in about
1960. Creation of new plants or new processes came to be regarded as “positive”
technology, but heat management came to be regarded as “rather conservative”(Sugita 2008). The role of energy conservation technology declined and heat
management movements that had continued until WWII became obsolete. For
example, the increasing size of a blast furnace contributed to improved energy
efficiency but its first aim was mass production. Although the progress of LD
18

converter, continuous casting or QC circle, which contributed greatly to energy
conservation after the oil crisis started in the 1960s, the aim of these developments
during the 1960s was not energy conservation either. The aim of the LD converter
was mass production and reducing scrap iron consumption; that of continuous
casting was the improvement of yield rate in special-steel making. In addition, theQC circle, which was exercised in close cooperation with engineers and workers at
job sites, was of course intended for quality control (Sugita 2007 pp.113-14; Kajiki2010 cha. 1).
Nevertheless, it is a mistake to think that such technology progress had no
relation with the energy conservation technology at all during the reconstruction
period. To realize the increasing size of a blast furnace, improving technology of
instrumentation and furnace construction was necessary they were started todevelop in the reconstruction period to improve heat management. The
development of oxygen generators for oxygen steelmaking during the 1950s, which
aimed the improvement of the basic unit for fuel at OHF, was one condition thatenabled the development of LD converter during the 1960s. The activities for heat
management at workshops by engineers and workers such as at Steel plant No. 3,
Yawata, during the 1950s formed part of the foundation of QC circles (Kobori2011).
As a result, although the aim of technology development in the high-speed
growth era differed from that in the reconstruction period, the technologies which
had developed through the heat management in the reconstruction period were
inherited for the different purposes. Moreover, these inherited technologies
contributed to sustain and improve the energy efficiency ofJapanese

energy-intensive industries at best level in the world as the secondary consequencein the high-speed growth era and the intended consequences after the oil crisis.

(3) Survival of heat management policy and engineers
Why did the heat management engineers survive? Worsening environmental
pollution in Japan became increasingly severe during the 1960s. It came to be said
19

that “Preventing smoke at a firm was often exercised by the person in charge of theheat management” (Saito 1965 p.10, see also Shidara et.al 1973 p.12). From thefirst half of the 1960s, some famous heat management engineers insisted, on themagazine published by the Central Association for Heat Management, HeatManagement, that heat management engineers should devote attention to theprevention of air pollution (Kurokawa 1962 p.2; Yokoyama 1964 p.2). In fact, theprevention of smoke became one purpose of the heat management policy from 1963
(AIST 1962 p.56; AIST 1963, p.49). The subtitle Energy and Pollution Control was
attached on Heat Management from 1968 and the theme of more articles on thismagazine became the technology of air pollution (Tanishita 1969, p.8). Additionally,
its title was changed to Heat Management and Pollution Control in 1971.
In the case of Nippon Steel Corp., the prevention of air pollution became one
task on heat management (Maeda 1972 p.3). Masao Shidara, the chief of theHeat-Management Division at Yawata during the 1950s, became chairman of thecommittee on the prevention of smoke held by JISF in 1962. He thereafter became
concerned with setting up of the national qualification, Pollution Control Manager,in 1971 and wrote a textbook for its examination (Shidara 1984).
After the oil crisis, these surviving institutions were used for energy
conservation again. Most themes of articles on Heat Management and Pollution

Control got back to energy conservation. The title was changed to Energy
Conservation in 1978. The Heat Control Act and the system of Heat Manger
developed to the Energy Conservation Act and the system of Energy Manager
which contained the conservation of electricity as well as fuel. The Central
Association for Heat Management was renamed ECCJ in 1978. It has continued toserve as technical guidance for energy conservation and the operation of national
examination for the qualified energy manager to the present day.
Regarding technical exchange among iron and steel factories, a head ofEnergy-Management Department of Sumitomo Metal Co. said, “The reason the ironand steel industry progressed energy conservation promptly after the oil crisis wasthat …the heat economy engineers attended the Heat Management Division of ISIJ to
20

get information of each firm and discussed this information with their own colleagues”(ISIJ 1982, p.24). The institutions developed during the 1940s–1950s became lesseffective during the 1960s but became active during the 1970s.

6. Conclusion
The eras during which basic unit for energy in Japan improved were thereconstruction period and the oil crisis onward. The common background of botheras was their severe energy deprivation. We must make a sharp distinction,
however, between the “possibilities” of the development of energy-saving
technology in the context of limited energy supplies and their “realization.” Why
did the Japanese energy intensive industries not decline given the background ofenergy supply limitations during reconstruction? Why did some of them such asiron and steel, cement or thermal power station sustain the best practices of thebasic unit for energy in the world, and maintain them even today? How and why
did energy-intensive industries achieve the development of energy conservation
technology to survive and grow?
This paper particularly described the iron and steel industries, which mutually
exchanged energy conservation technologies, and described some policies which
encouraged energy conservation. After WWI, Japanese engineers and bureaucrats
took a growing interest in coal supply and started to take some measures. The ironand steel industry noticed German heat economy technologies, and emulated them.
Some good practices they used, especially imported by SSW, were introduced toother factories through ISIJ. At the same time, Osaka prefecture started technicalguidance for fuel combustion by small firms to reduce smoke and to rationalize
their businesses; the guidance was imitated by some other local authorities.
These activities developed during WWII bore fruit during the reconstruction
period. Heat management of SSW was imitated by other iron and steel factories,
which established Heat-Management Divisions and hold heat management
movement to try heat management by the instrumentation. In the reconstruction
period, the scores of each factory as well as good practices were exchanged through21

ISIJ; the technology exchange among factories was consistent with competition
among them. Technical guidance of fuel combustion was exercised by Ministry ofCommerce and Industry and changed to the guidance for heat management whichmeant the total fuel conservation technologies. This was influenced by the heat
management of the iron and steel industry, especially SSW. The engineers who
exercised the technical guidance contributed to the spread of advanced
technologies of the iron and steel industry to other ordinary industries.
The heat management policy emphasized improvement of managers’, engineers’
and workers’ awareness, information or skill of heat management through theguidance, license system by law or movement, rather than installing new and
expensive equipment. Reforming workers’ minds on the heat management was also
an important method to improve the basic unit for fuel of the iron and steel
industry. The policy and activity seems the skill-and-labor intensive developmentof energy conservation technology. Although this development became stagnant
during the high-speed growth era, the innovation which secondly contributed
energy conservation and rooted the improvement of the heat management during
the 1950s started. The institutions related to heat management were not abolishedbecause the heat management engineers emphasized the relation between theheat management and the reduction of air pollution. Results show that, after theoil crisis, these technologies developed still more to improve energy efficiency. The
institutions which were not fully abolished in the 1960s contributed to theirdevelopment and diffusion.
We note two research tasks. First is the relation between the development of theenergy conservation technology and environmental technology. Although thedevelopment of fuel combustion or heat management contributes directly to the
reduction of smoke, it did not contribute directly to the reduction of other air
pollutants such as SOx (Tanaka 1972, p.27). Although the fact that perfectcombustion was insufficient to reduce the discharge of SOx had already been
known in the 1920s, the technical guidance for fuel combustion ignored thisproblem (Kobori 2010, cha. 1). A more severe case was the energy conservation
22

through oxygen steelmaking. It actually worsened air pollution. The developmentof energy conservation by the Japanese iron and steel industry during the 1950s
was encouraged by loose pollution regulations (Kobori 2012). Therefore, therelationthedevelopment

of

both

energyconservation

technology

andenvironmental technology after the oil crisis should be discussed more carefully.
Second was the spread of Japanese energy conservation technology to other
Asian countries. The export of the Japanese heat management technology wasplotted in 1959 and the first observation team from overseas (India) was invited in1966 (CAHM 1966, pp.48-56; Taga 1967, p.3). After the oil crisis, the HeatManagement Act of South Korea ,which was established in 1973, was very similar
to but more forcibly than that of Japan and the guidance for heat management by
the Japanese engineers was exercised in 1975 (Shiozawa 1974 Hino 1975). Today
ECCJ strives to export the Japanese institutions and technology for energy
conservation to Asian countries (Taniguchi 2012). The flying geese pattern of theenergy conservation in eastern and Southeast Asia presents an interesting theme
for future research.

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26

Fig.1 Energy consumption per a ton of steel material in five countries,
1960-78 (Japan in 1973 = 100).
U.K.

USA
West Germany
FranceJapan

Source: Shinoda (1979), p.27.
Notes: 1. Using IISI's figures which are modified by the ratio of iron production to steel
production of Japan in 1973.
2. Cokes : the amount of bought
3. Ferroalloy: exclouded

Fig.2 Average thermal efficiency at thermal power
generations in five countries, 1952-73 (sending end)

%
36
34
32
30
28
26

USA

24

France
Italy
U.K.

22

Japan

20
18
1952

54

56

58

Source ) Kobori (2010) p.21.

60

62

64

66

68

70

72

Fig. 3. Amount of coal consumption per a ton of steel material at Yawata, 1912-57.
5.0

t

4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0

coal consumption per ton of steel material
coaking-coal consumption per ton of steel material

0.5fiscal year

0.0
1912

15

18

Source: Kobori (2010), p. 107.

21

24

27

30

33

36

39

42

45

48

51

54

57

Basic unit for fuels (1,000kcal/MT)

Fig. 4 Basic unit for fuels of OHF in four countries in 1953.

U.K.
USA
West Germany

Japan

Capacity of an open hearth furnace (MT)
Source : Tabata (1956), p. 83.
Notes : 1. U.K. and Japan: all of the basic OHF
2. USA: all of OHF
3. West Germany: all of the tilting OHF

Fig .5. Prices of imported crude oil in five countries, 1951-73
30

$/t

28

26

24

22

20

18

16

U.K.
Japan
Italy
West Germany
France

14

12

10
1951

55

59

Sources ）United Nations (various years).
Note ) Including raw oil.

63

67

71

80,000

D/W

Fig.6. Average size of ocean-going tankaes in the world and six
countries, 1953-70

70,00060,000USA
Liberia
Norway50,000PanamaU.K.
Japan

40,000world average

30,00020,00010,000
1953

55

57

59

61

63

65

67

Sources ） Sun Oil Company (various years).
Notes) 1. As of December 31 every years.
2. Aggregate data of tankers of not less than 2,000 tons gross.

69

Table.1 Check points of the industry-specific inspections of heat management
large classification check points
1 institutions
activities of the heat management committee
status of the Heat Manager
documentationinfluence of the Heat Manager
enthusiasm of a factory manager on heat management
attitude of the factory toward the heat management
2 acceptance androutesmanagement of fuel metods of measuring and calibration of coalmanagement the results of measuring and calibration
3 coal inventory
roof and drainage equipment of coal yard
management
methods of coal blending
preventing from weathering and spontaneous combustion
control of coal issuancecoal type management
4 combustion
training of boiler men and furnace operaters
management
standardization of operation
install and utilization of meters
water supply and treatment
cracksutilization of flue gas
daily jobtime reportcontact method from and to a job siteutilization of low grade coal
5 thermal and heat
piping insulation
utilization
valve management
management
steam leakage
regulation of pressure and temperature
steam traps
6 exhaust heat management
7 basic unit for coal of each industry
source ) Tomimatsu (1949) pp.7-8.

Table 2 Self-sufficiency ratio in TPES of six countries, 1925-1973
West
year
Japan
France
Italy
U.K.
U.S.A
Germany
1925
108.0
64.0
117.4
10.6
135.7
106.7
1938
83.8
62.1
111.3
17.4
117.6
108.4
1950
96.9
67.0
119.9
24.7
98.7
100.4
53
77.6
63.7
109.7
27.8
94.6
100.6
55
75.1
62.6
102.1
27.7
86.9
100.2
57
67.0
54.7
98.2
29.2
86.4
101.4
60
55.0
57.4
90.7
31.8
77.0
95.1
66
31.9
42.7
64.9
24.1
59.5
92.7
73
9.2
20.5
45.0
16.7
49.2
84.0
Sources ) Darmstadter et.al (1971), IEA (1991).