JIIA-CSIS Joint Open Seminar on Freedom of Navigation and Maritime Capacity Building

JIIA-CSIS Joint Open Seminaron Freedom of Navigation andMaritime Capacity Building

March 2016

The Japan Institute of International Affairs

JIIA-CSIS Joint Open Seminar on Freedom of
Navigation and Maritime Capacity Building

March 2016

PrefaceIn partnership with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of
Indonesia, the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) hosted a half-day seminaron the security challenges in Asian seas in Jakarta in March 2016.
Asia’s dynamism and economic prosperity rely heavily on unimpeded access tothe seas, but different understandings and perceptions of freedom of navigation amongstates pose a great challenge for regional security. Another challenge to regional
maritime security is the different capacities and capabilities among regional states toimplement the rights and obligations defined by the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea. The panelists in this seminar discussed how states can narrow the gap in
understanding the freedom of navigation and jointly develop the capacity for maritime
domain awareness.
This report consists of a summary of discussions among leading experts fromJapan, the US, Vietnam, the Philippines, Australia, and India, and a collection of essays
contributed by those panelists. I hope this report helps readers deepen theirunderstanding of the maritime security challenges in Asian waters.

March 2016

Yoshiji NOGAMI
President
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Contents◆Program◆Summary ........................................................................................................................................... 1
Opening Remarks
Philips J. Vermonte (Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS)).. ....................................................................................................................................... 1
Shingo Yamagami (Acting Director-General, The Japan Institute of International Affairs(JIIA))........................................................................................................................................... 1
Keynote Speech
Jusuf Wanandi (Vice Chair, Board of Trustees, CSIS Foundation).............................................. 1
Discussion ....................................................................................................................................3
Session One: Securing Freedom of Navigation in Asian Waters ...................................................... 4
Discussion ....................................................................................................................................8
Session Two: Maritime Domain Awareness and Capacity Building .............................................. 10
Discussion ..................................................................................................................................15
Closing Remarks ............................................................................................................................ 17◆Essay ............................................................................................................................................... 18
Tetsuo Kotani .................................................................................................................................18
Raul “Pete” Pedrozo.......................................................................................................................21
Christopher B. Roberts ...................................................................................................................24
Rahul Mishra ..................................................................................................................................29
Catherine Panaguiton .....................................................................................................................33
Ha Anh Tuan ..................................................................................................................................37
Hideshi Tokuchi .............................................................................................................................41
John F. Bradford and Gregory R. Adams .......................................................................................46

Program
JIIA-CSIS Joint Open Seminar on
Freedom of Navigation and Maritime Capacity Building
29 March 2016
CSIS Auditorium, Jakarta, Indonesia

13:00

Opening Remarks
Dr. Philips J. Vermonte, Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International
Studies
Ambassador Shingo Yamagami, Acting Director - General, The Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs

13:40

Keynote Speech

Speaker:Mr. Jusuf Wanandi, Vice Chair, Board of Trustees, CSIS Foundation

14:10

Session 1: Securing Freedom of Navigation in Asian Waters
This session discusses legal/military/strategic challenges to freedom of navigation in Asianwaters and provides prospects for regional cooperation

Speakers:

Dr. Tetsuo Kotani, Senior Research Fellow, The Japan Institute of International Affairs
Dr. Christopher Roberts, Associate Professor and Director of Executive Education,
the Australian Defence Force Academy, UNSW, Australia
Dr. Rahul Mishra, Senior Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs

Discussant:Dr. Kuik Cheng-Chwee, Associate Professor, Strategic Studies and International
Relations Programme, National University of Malaysia

Moderator:

Dr. Shafiah Muhibat, Senior Researcher, Centre for Strategic and International Studies

15:40

Break

16:00

Session 2: Maritime Domain Awareness and Capacity Building
Speakers from littoral and user states discuss the needs for maritime domain awareness andcapacity building to establish open and stable seas in Asia.

Speakers:

Ms. Catherine Panaguiton, College of Law, University of the Philippines Diliman
Dr. Ha Anh Tuan, Director, Center for Policy Analysis, Institute for South China Sea
Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
Mr. Hideshi Tokuchi, Former Vice Minister of Defence for International Affairs, andSenior Fellow, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Japan
Commander Gregory Adams, N7 Theater Security Cooperation,
United States 7th Fleet, Task Force 73

Discussant:Dr. Collin Koh Swee Lean, Associate Research Fellow, Maritime Security Programme,
S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore

Moderator:

Ambassador Shingo Yamagami, Acting Director - General, The Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs

17:30

Closing Remarks
Ambassador Shingo Yamagami, Acting Director - General, The Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs

Summary
Opening Remarks
Philips J. Vermonte (Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS)):The issue of the South China Sea (SCS) is our main subject of discussion today. Similar
to our governments, CSIS tries to take a balanced approach to the problem. We are
non-claimants to the SCS and have been engaging with many different stakeholders
from all over the region, including China. As think tanks, it is our duty to promoterational discussion towards achieving at least a short-term solution, if not also a
long-term solution. Our aim is to not escalate the situation and to minimize the tension
in the SCS. Discussing freedom of navigation (FON) and the development of maritime
capability go hand-in-hand with our objectives.
Shingo Yamagami (Acting Director-General, The Japan Institute of International
Affairs (JIIA)):This seminar is timely for two reasons. First, Asian waters, including the SCS and theEast China Sea (ECS), are not necessarily calm. Second, we are expecting to see theruling of the international arbitration court between the Philippines and China soon.
I would also like to pose a few questions as food for thought. First, what is atstake? While the issues in the SCS certainly include bilateral territorial claims, there is abroader issue, which is what kind of regional order we wish to see in Asia. Is this anorder in which disputes are resolved in a peaceful manner, or one in which might isright? Second, have the efforts to halt massive reclamation and militarization of featuresin the SCS been successful? If not, what goals should we aim for? Third, what is neededof coastal states in the region, and what can non-Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) countries do to help them?
Keynote Speech
Jusuf Wanandi (Vice Chair, Board of Trustees, CSIS Foundation):
The main problem in the region is not between ASEAN and China, it is rather theUnited States and China. The problem of militarization is only in the hands of these two
1superpowers. There have been clashes between Chinese and Indonesian ships in the
SCS. However, Indonesia should not over-react. Such clashes are natural in a region
where the rule-based order has not been completely established. Over-reactions only
make the situation worse.
Given that the problem of militarization is in the hands of the United States andChina, they should first solve this problem themselves. The critical issue is the presenceof the United States in the SCS and what that entails in relation to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The basic problem for China is that
supposed spy ships are entering their exclusive economic zone (EEZ). There is noadequately clear provision in UNCLOS to address this. China and the United Statesneed to come to some sort of agreement on this issue. Otherwise, it will remain a boneof contention. Whatever coast guard fleet ASEAN countries have pales in comparison to
the capabilities of the two superpowers.
Of course, China-ASEAN relations are also at stake. The ASEAN consensus is to
not deal with claims and counter claims. That is a matter for individual member
countries. ASEAN is aiming to jointly establish a regional order that maintains peaceand stability, which have been essential for Asia’s rise as an economic power in recent
decades. If they are compromised, not only Asia, but also the world economy will beaffected. I believe this is an outcome that no one, not even the Chinese, wants.
That being said, peace and stability can be overridden by matters of strategic
importance. However, we are not yet facing such a situation. ASEAN is trying to lay
down a rule-based system together with China. In doing so, we must also work together
with Japan and the United States. To that end, ASEAN has been holding bilateral talks
with China over the last two years. However, nothing of significance has been decided
upon.
CSIS is therefore trying to establish the support of at least the ASEAN and
Chinese think tanks in order to accelerate this negotiation process, the implementationof the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC), and the formulation of the (Code of
Conduct). Government officials have participated as well. Some basic principles havebeen agreed upon, as well as commonalities that will serve as principles for the COC.
Final results are expected in July.
CSIS is also holding similar meetings with non-Chinese powers in the region,such as Japan and India. Furthermore, given the complexity of the issue, reaching
agreement among the ASEAN countries themselves is also not straightforward. Thesemeetings also serve to build confidence. Ultimately, if there is not a certain level ofunderstanding among us all, we cannot achieve a regional order. We also hope that our2efforts will help facilitate agreements on the DOC and COC at the governmental level.
Unfortunately, dialogue between the ASEAN and Chinese governments is not currently
progressing.
Discussion
Audience 1:
You stated that the militarization of submerged features in the SCS is a matter for theUnited States and China to resolve. The biggest difference between the ECS and the
SCS is that deterrence is working in the ECS due to Japan’s robust maritime coast guard,
backed up by maritime self-defense forces, backed up by US forces. It is therefore notjust a matter between China and the United States. There is certainly a role to be playedby coastal nations. Where does Indonesia stand on this?
Wanandi:There is definitely a basic difference between the ECS and the SCS. The ECS only
involves two parties, with clear claims and long history. The situation in the SCS ismuch more difficult due to the number of claimants and recent massive reclamation
work. Therefore I do not believe that the approach in the ECS can be adapted to the SCS.
Instead, the stakeholders should all come together and come to some sort of common
agreement.
Audience 2:
Dialogue is positive, but only if it is based on the understanding that the status quo must
be in place. Will Indonesia change its stance on the SCS following the incident on
March 20?
Wanandi:I do not think Indonesia has changed it stance.
Audience 2:
I understand that the CSIS and National Institute for SCS Studies (NISCSS) establisheda joint center for SCS studies. What is the center’s role and who will participate in it?
Wanandi:This is a continuation of existing efforts and related to a variety of matters that have yet
3to be fully worked out. Subjects include general principles of international law, relevant
provisions of UNCLOS and the DOC, the principle of cooperation without prejudice,and recommendations for practical cooperation to be considered by ASEAN and China.
Session One: Securing Freedom of Navigation in Asian Waters
Shafiah Muhibat (Senior Researcher, CSIS/Moderator):
In this session we will discuss the legal, military and strategic challenges to FON in
Asian waters. We will also explore the prospects for cooperation to maintain FON.
Tetsuo Kotani (Senior Research Fellow, JIIA):
Many countries are concerned by China’s actions, which undermine FON. Chinese
officials and academics always answer that there is nothing to fear and that FON offoreign countries is guaranteed. However, the reality is that China has interfered with
FON by foreign countries.
The main issue is China’s selective and arbitrary interpretation of UNCLOS. This
compromises UNCLOS and the foundation of global maritime governance. UNCLOS
defines the rights and obligations of states in the maritime domain. It also provides a
grand bargain between maritime powers and coastal states. If coastal states seek a larger
jurisdiction beyond the UNCLOS scope, it will destabilize the UNCLOS treaty structure.
That is really what is at stake. China’s interpretation of UNCLOS has also compromised
FON. China claims that warships need to seek permission to conduct innocent passage
in Chinese territorial waters, which is obviously an excessive maritime claim. China
also does not allow foreign militaries to conduct surveillance or other actions in the
Chinese EEZ. It also does not recognize the airspace over the Chinese EEZ asinternational airspace. Such actions to increase its jurisdiction challenge UNCLOS andthe FON regime.
China’s claim that it has never interfered with commercial navigation is also false.
Chinese coast guard ships have harassed commercial and other ships of claimant
countries. China’s excessive maritime claims, such as the nine-dash-line claim or low
tide elevations in the high seas, all constitute a violation of UNCLOS. This is why
Manila has launched a case against such Chinese actions.
On the other hand, China has enjoyed FON in global waters, including
surveillance and other military activities in the Japanese and US EEZs. China thus
applies a double standard for maritime navigation. It does not seem that China will
accept the universal principle of FON as its navy expands operations globally. China
4

does not accept the concept of the rule of law. Domestic law is of greater importancethan international law to the Chinese administration. China justifies actions thatinterfere with foreign countries’ activities and navigational rights, using domestic laws.
While China criticizes the United States for violating UNCLOS, it is the United Statesthat endorses UNCLOS regimes in its own domestic law, and China that is challenging
UNCLOS regimes from the inside.
I think it is therefore time for the international community to initiate aninternational version of the FON program in the Chinese near seas. This is to counter
China’s double standard. So far the United States is the only country to have conducted
FON operations in the SCS, which China argues is militarizing the conflict, and which ituses to justify its militarization of reclaimed features as defenses measures.
Participation by Japan, Australia and other maritime countries is needed to reinforce thelegitimacy of FON operations.
Many countries in the region share a similar interpretation of UNCLOS to China
rather than the United States and do not welcome foreign military activities in their EEZ.
However, today EEZs constitute 40% of the world’s waters, and if foreign countries are
not allowed to conduct military activities in EEZs, particularly surveillance, that would
raise the level of unpredictability and ultimately undermine regional and global security.
We must therefore promote universal principles and universal understanding of FON
regionally and globally.
Christopher Roberts (Associate Professor and Director of Executive Education,
the Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales):China has recently increased its island construction activities in the SCS. China is not
the first country to have done so but is doing so at a massive scale. Rather thanworrying about who started what, the consequences of these actions for the region andits stability are much more crucial concerns.
What is motivating China? There are three possible factors, which are energy
insecurity, developmental imbalance domestically, and the “China Dream” vision. These
ideas also tie into concerns by the Chinese administration about its own fragility, whichsometimes results in the administration prioritizing domestic issues at the expense ofinternational ones.
China’s actions in the SCS are surely part of a grand strategy. I personally view
this as a kind of first-level chess game between China and ASEAN. China’s island
construction is a means of achieving de facto control vis-à-vis the militaries and naviesof Southeast Asia, not the United States. One could argue that China’s calculation is that5

countries such as Japan, the United States and Australia can only go so far in their
response and it would not be enough to deter China from its current strategy.
There is also a second-tier challenge that emerges from this, which is that China’s
calculation leads to a potential dent in the US security umbrella and those of its allies.
Furthermore, there is the third component of China’s extensive measures, such as the
One Belt, One Road strategy.
Another point worth considering is who is reacting to whom? The initial reactionof the United States to the mutual defense treaty being raised by the Philippines was oneof hesitance and embarrassment. The United States did not wish to be inadvertently
drawn into conflict and treaty obligations over territorial disputes. In addition, China
also talks about the submission by Malaysia and Vietnam to the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf. This is also done as part of due process underinternational law and treaty obligations. If China disagrees with this, it can act as aconstructive international citizen and actually make that case under international law to
the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
In terms of implications and way forward, we do not have enough common
interest in the ASEAN community to be able to meaningfully respond to countries that
adopt the tactics China has. For ASEAN to move forward, it must have a core group ofcountries that can actually work together and share common interests. Furthermore,
ASEAN must not let the interests of the group as a whole be compromised by any one
member country. To that end an ASEAN Minus X framework may be useful. The resultof the Philippines’ arbitration case may also encourage other ASEAN claimants tosubmit their own cases, or at least use their willingness as leverage. However, this alone
will not solve the dispute and broader support from regional stakeholders is also needed.
Rahul Mishra (Senior Fellow, Indian Council of World Affairs):
If, as has been argued, deterrence will not work in the SCS, has cooperation worked? Is
China ready to bilaterally resolve one of the disputes with one of the Southeast Asian
countries? My answer is no. In any case, I do not believe that deterrence is the answer inthe ECS either.
The situation in the SCS is the single greatest challenge to the idea of FON. It isan exception rather than the norm. To understand it, there are three salient points wemust keep in mind. First, in the past 10-15 years, there has been a shift in the focus ofinternational politics to the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region and the emergence of avery fragile regional maritime equilibrium. Second is the simultaneous rise of several
Asian countries and the reemergence of Japan as a normal country, all of whom are6

increasingly assertive. Third is that at the institutional level, we are marred by the
problems of weak organizations for dealing with the situation and weak commitment
among member countries. Furthermore, such organizations often leave at least one of
the major powers out of the group.
Regarding the legal challenges for FON, not all stakeholders are fully committed
to international laws and UNCLOS. China has seen the United States’ non-commitment
to UNCLOS and come up with its own set of interpretations, which is reasonable froman international law perspective. The challenge is therefore to determine the universal
rules of FON that are complied with by each and every country of the world. The otherchallenges, such as the nine-dash line, island building, and so forth, stem from this core
issue. Furthermore, how do you deal with one country, in this case China, saying that it
does not believe in UNCLOS?
The second set of challenges are military. Militarization of the SCS is one of thelatest trends. It is not healthy and risks upsetting the regional maritime equilibrium. It is
not just the Chinese and ASEAN countries flexing their muscles. Countries on thesidelines, such as India, are being brought into the issue, for example via requests for
defense exports and so forth.
There are two major trends at the geopolitical level. One is China’s unprecedented
rise and ever-increasing assertiveness. The second trend is rising polarization in the
Asia-Pacific region. Recently, we have seen countries such as India and Indonesia being
shaken out of their traditional non-alignment. FON in the SCS is the key challenge andrather than collective defense, I would advocate collective pressure to encourage China
to engage in a step-by-step discussion and implementation of a peaceful solution agenda.
To that end, discussions for a quadrilateral and quadrilateral plus framework are back on
the table. Finally, the onus is on China, as the world’s second largest power, to ensurethat the region remains peaceful.
Kuik Cheng-Chwee (Associate Professor, Strategic Studies and International
Relations Programme, National University of Malaysia):
I would like to highlight three major issues that are consistent and clear. First is the legal
dimension and the importance of a rule-based order that would affect FON. Second is
the emphasis on the elaboration of China’s maritime action and how it affects regional
security and issues. Third is the need for international action.
These three themes highlight the desirability of a certain action given the growing
tension in the SCS. However, desirability does not immediately translate into feasibility.
This is important when thinking about the prospect for regional cooperation.
7

Furthermore on the subject of regional cooperation in the SCS, there are three
dimensions that we must ask ourselves. First, cooperation among whom? Second, whatform of cooperation, to what extent and in what way? Third, to what extent could andshould any eventual cooperation be done without creating any regional polarization andtension escalation? I believe these questions are reflected in the responses of ASEAN
countries over the last few years.
Finally, we must bear in mind the three logics of action to identify and make senseof different countries’ responses to the SCS and why the ASEAN countries have until
today decided to stay clear of the issue, despite rising tensions in the SCS. These are
security, economic, and political logic. By focusing excessively on the SCS issue, weare prioritizing the security logic at the expense of the economic and political logic,
which is not realistic. Therefore, I would argue against those who say that ASEAN issitting on the fence or sending mixed messages.
Discussion
Audience 1:
First, how will the recent slowdown of the Chinese economy affect China’s external
behavior? Second, why does ASEAN not support the Philippines’ arbitration case,which represents a peaceful means of dispute settlement, and relatedly, if it were ruledthat the nine-dash line is not valid, would it give ASEAN the opportunity to speak with
one voice?
Audience 3:First, even if China claims that it has not interfered with the FON of commercial ships,
if these ships already feel that their FON will be undermined, the feeling itself is aserious issue. Second, what is the ultimate purpose of raising the issue of FON ininternational fora?
Audience 4:
The concept of greater international participation in FON operations is worth
considering. First, how can we include European countries in these efforts? Second,
what is the role of Taiwan?
Kotani:
The purpose of an international FON program is not to contain China, but to safeguard8the universal principle of FON. We are all beneficiaries of the FON concept. If FON iscompromised, we will all lose. I am also not proposing merely operations but a programthat also includes diplomacy. China will of course not respond well to this, butconversely, if we do nothing, the SCS will become a Chinese lake.
I would also encourage participation by European countries. The issues in the SCS
are significant not only because of its importance as a shipping lane, but also for what
the issue represents for the international community. However, it is not clear if
European countries can participate.
Roberts:
I think it is important to highlight that we have seen, witnessed, and heard talk about theengagement of China and various statements by various leaders that positive
achievements have been made. However, China’s recent actions show that it is not in
harmony with the ASEAN way. My concern now is that whatever is done will be too
little too late. The region is already polarized, as evidenced by Cambodia. We cannot let
the future of ASEAN cohesion be hijacked by a single issue, and to that end an ASEAN
Minus X framework would be useful.
Regarding China’s economic downturn, I believe that the weaker its economy, theweaker its bargaining position to come to a reasonable compromise, for fear of abacklash from its citizens. That is also very troubling.
In terms of cooperation, Indo-Pacific cooperation as described by Dr. Kotani
should be designed as a comprehensive, multi-layered and multi-tiered package thatchanges the cost-benefit analysis that is currently being maintained within Beijing.
China needs the world as much as we need China. We need to act with absolute unity tomake it clear that China’s behavior is absolutely not tolerable. It cannot punish theworld.
Mishra:I think containment of China, militarily or economically, is out of the question. I believe
collective pressure rather than collective defense is what we need. We cannot isolate
China on the military or economic front. We have to keep telling China that its actions
are not acceptable. Internationally, China is an asocial country and takes time tosocialize in international organizations and multilateral fora. We should focus our efforts
on bringing China into a world where international norms and rules are respected.
China’s economic woes will encourage it to focus more on nationalistic andexternal actions. This is a standard pattern of behavior among countries.
9Involving European countries is a fascinating idea. It will contribute to applying
collective pressure on China.
Kuik:
I agree about the value and importance of international law as a means of peacefully
managing territorial disputes. However, it is not clear if other ASEAN countries will
follow the Philippines’ example or make an open statement of support for thePhilippines’ case. Though not impossible, it is unlikely to happen at this point in time,firstly because other ASEAN countries do not share the same level of security concern
about the SCS, and secondly, because ASEAN’s preferred approach is not directconfrontation, but indirect, low-profile action.
Session Two: Maritime Domain Awareness and Capacity Building
Shingo Yamagami (JIIA/Moderator):
This session will cover maritime domain awareness and capacity building. Referring
back to Mr. Wanandi’s earlier comments, he raised two points that are highly pertinent
to this session. First, should we juxtapose China and the United States? Second, what is
the merit of capacity building in terms of coast guard or naval forces?
Catherine Panaguiton (College of Law, University of the Philippines Diliman):In the Philippines many governmental structures already existed for addressing specificmaritime issues. However, what was lacking was some kind of one-stop office that
could coordinate all these different structures. To that end the National Coast Watch
system was established in 2011. This has been very important for the country’s maritime
domain awareness and capacity building in terms of avoiding duplication of efforts andmaximizing resources.
Another issue faced by the Philippines is the emphasis on maritime security alone.
Maritime security must also be combined with maritime safety, development of themaritime economy, and so forth. The National Coast Watch system also tries to balancethese different interests.
Furthermore, the Philippines cannot consider only its own interests, but must also
bear in mind those of the international community and international law. It therefore
conducts joint activities with other countries. This too must be carefully coordinated, forexample to avoid conflicts of interest, and the National Coast Watch system acts as theinter-agency body that promotes the interests of the Philippines, while also flexibly
10catering for the partner country’s interests.
Maritime domain awareness and capacity building is not reliant only on one
country’s efforts. Many stakeholders and interests are always involved. Therefore,
cooperation is essential for these types of projects. Predetermining goals and being
flexible is also important. Finally, we must ensure that everything is coherent, allresources are maximized, and all the information that is gathered is utilized to come up
with the best possible solution to a particular issue.
Ha Anh Tuan (Director, Center for Policy Analysis, Institute for South China Sea
Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam):
The key question we need to answer is what we can do to ensure FON and enhancemaritime domain awareness in the SCS. Furthermore, how can we cooperate in regional
capacity building to promote FON and maritime domain awareness? To that end, there
are three smaller questions that we need to answer. First, why is capacity building
important? Second, what are the challenges for capacity building and cooperation forcapacity building? What are the opportunities for regional countries and extra-regionalcountries?
Capacity building is needed in this region to detect incidents and intervene in such
incidents. At a higher level we need capacity building to maintain regional peace andsecurity. Furthermore, at the highest level, we need capacity to develop the region in asustainable way. Unfortunately, the region lacks the equipment and human resources
needed for these goals. An information-sharing network is also required.
However, many problems stand in the way of regional cooperation for capacity
building. The three key challenges are the conceptual challenges, practical challenges,
and legal and political implications. Regarding the first challenge, capacity building
focuses only on the subject, and not the performance and objective of the institutions.
This becomes a problem in the case of disputes, where, in a zero sum game, one
institution performs better to the detriment of another institution.
In terms of practical challenges, there are many issues to be resolved in the SCS,
and many different institutions and people involved. It is therefore difficult for all
stakeholders to agree on how best to balance capacity building for human resources,
technological equipment, and cooperative mechanisms. Even within these three types ofcapacity building, it is difficult to agree on which segment to focus on.
We must also ensure that capacity building is cooperative and not confrontational.
It is clear that China’s capacity exceeds that of ASEAN. China has already used thisadvantage to pursue its own interests at the expense of others in the region. This unequal11capacity could impede regional cooperation.
With regard to the legal and political implications of capacity building, twoquestions are raised. First, will the cooperation for capacity building be conductedwithout prejudice? Second, can cooperation be conducted without impeding existingmechanisms, particularly the role of ASEAN?
As for opportunities for promoting cooperation in capacity, I already mentioned
the three major areas of human resources, technological equipment, and cooperative
mechanisms. For human resources, it is better to focus on policymakers rather thanpractitioners, because policymakers play a more important role in disputes. In thetechnological equipment field, maritime domain awareness requires vessels,
information sharing, and joint programs. For cooperative mechanisms, ASEAN Plus and
ASEAN Minus on a voluntary basis are very useful frameworks.
Finally, I would like to make two major suggestions. First, we should conduct
more joint programs to monitor the SCS using different means, such as satellite imagery
and unmanned aircraft, and share said information. This will let us detect and prevent
potential incidents, while also collecting objective evidence should an incident actuallyoccur. Second, we should improve the capacity of weaker littoral states by improving
their equipment and technology, and training their staff.
Hideshi Tokuchi (Former Vice Minister of Defence for International Affairs, andSenior Fellow, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies):
Free security access underwrites free economic and political access. Balance of power
at sea must be restored in our favor in order to ensure free access in the face of a land
power dominating the region. The SCS is important not only in terms of regional
strategy, but also as the second largest seas in the world and the source of 10% of the
global catch.
Capacity building in the region has been conducted on a request basis. A more
holistic approach is necessary, particularly in maritime security. We must work together
to address the current security concerns in the SCS and appropriately position capacity
building and maritime domain awareness in these efforts. I would like to raise threepoints regarding regional cooperation for maritime security, which are the principles ofcooperation, maritime security capacity building, and maritime domain awareness.
Regarding the first point, we must bear in mind the following four principles. First,
we must respect and support the unity of ASEAN, which guarantees the power of
ASEAN and contributes to the security of the greater region. Second, unity of efforts on
the part of supporters is necessary, including not only Japan and the United States, but
12also NATO and others. Third, a whole-of-government approach is a must. Fourth, thedomestic stability of the regional countries and international cooperation for achieving
this are essential.
Concerning maritime security capacity building, in the long-term we need toenhance the maritime security capacity of the littoral states. Before that, the littoral
states must establish their own concepts, goals and so forth of their force developments,and share this basic information with assistance providers, to ensure relevant andeffective cooperative capacity building. To date, littoral states have tended to focus on
specific items of cooperation, without a broader picture of the future orientation of theirdefense programs.
Regarding maritime domain awareness, expanding regional transparency can
impose costs on coercion, while incomplete domain awareness enables coercion. There
are three main points. First, the format of maritime domain awareness must be crafted
through multilateral governmental efforts, projects initiated by private organizations, orthe initiatives of a core country. Second, the purpose of such efforts and the priority
level of different objectives must be clearly defined. Third, scientific researchcooperation for the maritime environment should be included in overall maritime
domain awareness efforts, not only for ensuring food and environmental security, butalso to gain international public support.
To conclude, for the long-term stability of Southeast Asia, capacity building
support must be accelerated. Further cooperation among like-minded countries is a mustto generate synergy and reinforce the rule-based international order.
Gregory Adams (N7 Theater Security Cooperation, United States 7th Fleet, Task
Force 73):
The United States is undertaking a number of practical measures to address the issues in
the SCS through multilateralism. Some countries are participating in these measures sothey can be seen as collaborating against China. However, this sometimes hampers theinitiative, because other countries do not want to be seen as ganging up against China.
Multilateralism is a key facet of US strategy. The United States conducts manybilateral military exercises with partners in the region. However, more multilateral
exercises are needed. In the last 20 years or more, any response to a crisis has always
been multilateral, never only bilateral. That is why the United States is trying to conduct
more targeted multilateral initiatives.
However, trying to make bilateral exercises multilateral is easier said than done.
There are a variety of political and other challenges. Furthermore, the tensions in the13

SCS make this particularly difficult.
The United States has chosen this timing in light of the increasing emergence ofmultilateral fora such as ADMM Plus or ARF, which include their own multilateral
maritime exercise components. ASEAN has in fact paved the way for such
multilateralism, while also supported by the long-standing bilateral engagements in theregion. The United States acknowledges and wishes to support ASEAN’s leadership in
this regard.
Collin Koh Swee Lean (Associate Research Fellow, Maritime Security
Programme, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies):
Maritime domain awareness is a central theme in our discussions and I would like toexplore the different perspectives in which it has been addressed. First, the UnitedStates has the strongest maritime capacity in the region and has served a long-standingrole as an offshore stabilizing power. Japan, meanwhile, is aspiring to become a more
active contributor to security in Southeast Asia.
We also heard from speakers from two different Southeast Asian countries, thePhilippines and Vietnam. These two countries share commonalities, in that they are bothparties to the SCS disputes and are obviously members of Southeast Asia. However,there are also key differences. Maritime domain awareness extends beyond the SCS
disputes and refers also to myriad other challenges. The point is that there are two setsof actors, those that provide the aid, and those that receive the aid. However, evenamong recipients there are diverse interests and motivations for receiving aid, as well as
the ability to absorb the aid and to put them into action.
In addition, when talking about maritime domain awareness capability, it is notenough to collect and analyze raw information, rather it is necessary to produce timely,
accurate, and actionable data. Moreover, there is no point acquiring the capability todetect and classify incidents, without then being able to act on it and enforce
sovereignty.
Both Southeast Asian panelists discussed challenges in relation to the division ofroles and limited budgets. I wonder if this is due to a lack of holistic policy or maritime
strategy at the national level that can set a direction for the role and responsibilities ofeach agency in each country and how they should work with one another. Perhaps thatis something we must address before we can effectively engage in capacity building.
Another point worth exploring further is how to manage the geopolitical risk ofcapacity building, such as cooperative versus confrontational capacity building, and theissues posed by excessive capacity and militarization. This also pertains to questions
14

about arms control and what constitutes legitimate build-up of capabilities and thosethat are not. Furthermore, capacity building that is considered defensive by one party,
may be perceived as offensive by another.
Another issue we must address is that while ASEAN member countries pay lip
service to regional cooperation, their actions have often been lukewarm. For example,
the ASEAN Information-Sharing Portal, which was launched to share maritime
information among ASEAN countries, has largely fallen into disuse. There has also
been lackluster support for joint operations, such as joint patrols in the SCS in areas
outside the disputed waters. The question is how to acquire buy-in from all countries toseparate the SCS disputes from the more common functional challenges that they face.
The idea of European participation in capacity building in Southeast Asia is also
intriguing. In fact, it is already occurring, albeit mainly in soft capacity areas. Thatbeing said, it is questionable how much capacity European countries really have tofocus on Southeast Asia, given the issues they face at home. Perhaps we also need tothink carefully about how best to synchronize the involvement of such extra-regional
partners to avoid duplication, and skepticism on the part of recipients.
Regarding multilateral exercises, these are more than just simple exercises ofpartnership dealing with common security issues. Such cooperative capacity building
efforts may actually touch on unresolved sovereignty and jurisdictional issues. As aresult, what was meant to be cooperative may potentially be perceived as controversial.
Discussion
Panaguiton:
The establishment of an interagency mechanism within the Philippines for resolving all
maritime issues in a streamline manner has been revolutionary. Until now, different
positions within the government had caused much fragmentation and delayed
decision-making.
Ha:
Vietnam does indeed lack the capacity to build up and implement a maritime strategy.
Capacity building can lead to a capacity arms race, so we must focus on cooperation.
Furthermore, any cooperation must be premised on respect for the status quo.
Tokuchi:European involvement is essential because European countries tend to view China as an
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economic partner alone, and not in international security terms. Additionally, theinternational rules that govern the European theater are exactly the same as those in thisregion. If Europe opposes Russia’s activities in Ukraine, it must also oppose China’s
actions in the SCS.
Another point is that to make capacity building more effective, littoral states must
be more candid about the weaknesses in their security capabilities. We respect theirnational pride, but pride can also obstruct candidness.
Adams:The United States hopes to act as a stabilizer in the region and the move to more
multilateral efforts is an investment in trust and confidence building.
Regarding overall maritime policy and capacity building, I believe both need to beaddressed concurrently.
I believe the ASEAN Information-Sharing Portal failed because it was notinclusive enough. For example, it does not include the United States.
Audience 5:
The solution in the SCS is cooperation. Cooperation in politics and economics is not a
problem. However, cooperation in defense is problematic because of the national
interests involved. Also, how can we build maritime capacity if not all countries in theworld have ratified UNCLOS?
Audience 6:
I would like to hear more details about the US initiative Cmdr. Adams mentioned andhow many countries openly support it.
Audience 7:
If China conducts land reclamation in the Scarborough Shoal, how will the Philippines
respond and how can the international community assist?
Adams:We have had some success gaining observers for our exercises. We have also held
concurrent training activities. We are trying to bring intra-regional partners together to
conduct multilateral exercises while also looking for extra-regional partners. The
fundamental capacities we are trying to build are multilateral communication,
information sharing, and planning.
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Tokuchi:Japan can cooperate with ASEAN in military equipment, albeit with some restrictions.
However, before talking about specific equipment, we need to talk about the orientationof each ASEAN country’s security efforts.
Regarding the Scarborough Shoal, there will be no quick fix. Therefore, strong
unity on our side is necessary. All ASEAN countries probably benefit from the current
order and so we are in a position to reinforce the current order. If China is dissatisfied
with this it must respond in a peaceful manner.
Ha:
With regard to the Scarborough Shoal, looking more broadly, maybe the next area may
be the South Luconia Shoals of Malaysia or the Natuna Islands of Indonesia.
Panaguiton:
The Philippine position has always been to respect international law and resolve
disputes peacefully. The situation seems to be heating up rather than cooling down. The
Philippine government is trying to increase surveillance and maritime presence in thearea, and lobbying partners for support.
Closing Remarks
Shingo Yamagami (JIIA/Moderator):
Perhaps the ASEAN countries, like Japan, are understated, and are not successful ingetting our messages across on the global stage. In spite of that, the attention of theinternational community is on the issue of the SCS, because the facts speak forthemselves.
I also raised the question this morning of what kind of regional order we wish to see.
Perhaps what we would like to see is not a totem pole with one particular country on thetop, rather it is a regional order based on equal partnership. My final point is that in the
SCS issue, the very unity of ASEAN is at stake.

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EssayTetsuo Kotani
Freedom of Navigation and Good Order at Sea
Freedom of navigation has become a key phrase in Asian security issues. Theinternational community expresses great concern about China’s attempt to undermine
freedom of navigation in Asian waters, while Chinese officials and experts respond byarguing that freedom of navigation is guaranteed as China has not interfered withcommercial ships transiting the Asian seas. In reality, China’s excessive regulations
against maritime navigation endanger sea lines of communication and interfere withfreedom of navigation and free flow of commerce. China’s selective and arbitrary
interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) poses a serious
challenge to freedom of navigation as the customary international law, and good orderat sea as envisioned in the UNCLOS.
By defining states’ rights and obligations in the maritime domain, the UNCLOS
maintains a grand bargain between the rights of maritime powers that seek unimpedednavigation in world waters and the interests of coastal states that demand broader
jurisdiction over their waters. UNCLOS provides a legal basis for good order at sea that
ensures the safety and security of shipping and permits countries to pursue theirmaritime interests in accordance with agreed principles of freedom of navigation. As
Ambassador Tommy Koh, who chaired the conference that negotiated UNCLOS stated,
the world community’s interest in the freedom of navigation is facilitated by thecompromises on the status of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), by the regime ofinnocent passage through the territorial sea, by the regime of transit passage throughstraits used for international navigation and by the regime of archipelagic sea lanes
passage.
In other words, any efforts to reshape the navigational regimes in UNCLOS
destabilize the entire treaty structure and weaken good order at sea. Coastal states often
strive to expand their jurisdiction beyond their territorial waters. China, in particular,
persists in making a series of excessive maritime claims as part of a sea denial strategy.
An example is China’s claim that foreign warships must notify Beijing and obtain
Chinese permission to undertake innocent passage through its territorial waters. China

18

also prohibits foreign military activities, including surveillance and exercises, in its
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and fails to recognize the airspace above the EEZ asinternational airspace. Base on its domestic regulations, China has interrupted foreign
militaries’ legitimate navigation and activities as seen in the 2001 EP-3 incident, 2009
Impeccable incident, and 2013 Cowpens incident. China has disturbed Japan’s lawful
surveillance activities in the East China Sea as well.
China’s claim that it guarantees freedom of navigation for commercial ships isfalse. China’s excessive maritime claims based on the strait baseline from the contested
Paracel Islands and the ambitious but ambiguous nine-dash line in the South China Sea,
territorial claims of low-tide elevations and artificial island building in the disputed
Spratly Islands, use of force in the disputed areas, and infringement of foreign territories
such as the Senkaku Islands and Natuna Islands—all threaten the safety and security ofshipping and other countries’ pursuit of their maritime interests. For instance, in thearbitration case, Manila is making claims against China’s obstruction of the Philippines’
navigational rights and lawful exploitation of living and non-living natural resources.
On the other hand, China enjoys freedom of navigation in the world’s waters.
China conducted innocent passage in US territorial waters without getting US
permission. China conducts military surveillance and exercised in Japanese and US
EEZs. China has conducted military operations in the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean,
and the Caribbean. China thus applies a double standard for freedom of navigation.
The question is whether China can accept the universal principle of freedom ofnavigation as its navy operates more globally. As China does not recognize the conceptof the rule of law, the chance is not so high. Chinese Communist Party rules the country
by law and domestic regulations have more power than international law. China willcontinue to restrict navigational rights for foreign ships in its “near seas,” while
enjoying the universal principle of freedom of navigation in global waters.
Therefore it is time to initiate an international freedom of navigation program in
China’s “near seas.” The United States has resumed freedom of navigation operation in
the South China Sea to counter restrictions on navigational rights. However, China
criticizes US operations for “militarizing” the South China Sea, while justifying its
militarization as “self defense.” To make US operation more legitimate, Japan, Australia,
and other like-minded maritime nations should join the United States to safeguard
freedom of navigation from China’s excessive maritime claims and to maintain goodorder at sea.
Nevertheless, many Asian littoral states share in the Chinese interpretation of thelaw of the sea and do not welcome foreign military surveillance activities in their EEZs.

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But EEZs now account for 40 percent of world’s waters, and if military activities inthose EEZs were restricted, that would lead to an increased level of unpredictability anduncertainty and, as a result, would destabilize regional and global security. In order topromote a universal interpretation of freedom of navigation, the international
community should prioritize maritime issues in multilateral forums such as G-7 and theEast Asia Summit. This would entail working to convince countries in the region of thebenefits of freedom of navigation as a community right while emphasizing respect forsovereign rights of littoral states over maritime resources.
The Pacific War thus clearly showed that impediments to free navigation can
result in human tragedy. Imperial Japan sought regional dominance, endangering thefreedom of navigation in the western Pacific and opening up hostilities with the UnitedStates and others. The United States conducted commercial raids by sinking Japanesemerchant ships to defeat Japan. Today, freedom of navigation is not only a foundationof regional security, but also a core value of the liberal international system. In order toavoid another human catastrophe, the international community should address the threatof excessive maritime claims by pursuing greater coordination in their policies on freenavigation and by jointly promoting the concept of free navigation in the region.

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Raul “Pete” Pedrozo*1
Overcoming Challenges to Freedom of Navigation in Asian Waters
All nations have a right to enjoy freedom of navigation and overflight in and over theworld’s oceans. However, if left unused, these inherent rights atrophy over time,
particularly in the face of illegal maritime claims. That is why, since 1979, the UnitedStates has maintained a robust freedom of navigation (FON) program that exercises U.S.
navigational rights and freedoms and demonstrates non-acquiescence in unlawful claims
that purport to restrict use of the world’s oceans. The program is principle-based andcomprehensive in scope, challenging excessive claims not only of potential adversaries
and competitors, but also allies and partners, in every region in the world.
Asia-Pacific is home to some of the world’s most strategic sea lines ofcommunication (SLOC). Almost 30 percent of global maritime trade transits the South
China Sea (SCS) annually, including $1.2 trillion in ship-borne trade bound for U.S.
ports. U.S. national security and economic well-being are dependent on unfetteredaccess to these SLOCs. Unfortunately, the number of challenges to freedom ofnavigation in Asian waters is significant and the prospect is dim for resolving thesechallenges through regional cooperation.
Unlawful Maritime Claims
Asian waters are replete with unlawful maritime claims that purport to limit freedom of
movement and other lawful uses of the seas. With the exception of Singapore andBrunei, every Asian nation asserts claims that are inconsistent with international law.
Most problematic are the numerous excessive straight baseline claims and purported
restrictions on military activities in the exclusive economic zone. China’s 9-dash line
claim in the SCS is also highly problematic. Left unchallenged, these claims could
become the new norm, not only in Asia-Pacific, but globally, thereby restricting
navigational rights and freedoms, and other lawful uses of the seas, vital to U.S. national
security and economic interests.

* Captain Pedrozo (U.S. Navy, Ret.) is the Deputy General Counsel for the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency.
Previously he was a Professor of International Law in the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at the U.S.
Naval War College, where he now serves as a Non-Resident Scholar.
* Captain Pedrozo could not participate in the seminar due to flight cancellation.

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Land Reclamation
Land reclamation projects by the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan have beenongoing in the SCS since the 1970s. These efforts—a little over 170 acres—however,pale in comparison to the more than 2,900 acres of land China has reclaimed on sevenof the eight features it occupies in the Spratlys since 2013. Many of China’s reclamation
efforts have occurred on low-tide elevations that cannot generate maritime zones. At
best, China can establish 500-meter safety zones around these artificial islands, yet
China appears to impermissibly claim the full panoply of maritime zones around thesefeatures. The creation of these artificial islands hampers regional efforts to resolve theunderlying territorial and maritime disputes peacefully by permanently changing thestatus quo in the SCS.
Militarization
China is improving its naval and air capabilities, including new generation platforms
and advanced weapons systems, in order to intimidate its neighbors and displace theUnited States as the leading naval power in Asia-Pacific. It has also enhanced its
maritime law enforcement capabilities to aggressively advance its claims—use of law
enforcement platforms reduces the likelihood of a military response by the otherclaimants and provides the PLA with a force multiplier in the event of an armed conflict.
China additionally has built airstrips on disputed features in the SCS capable ofaccommodating virtually every aircraft in the PLA inventory, constructed military
installations on these features to enhance it maritime domain awareness, and deployedsurface-to-air missiles to the Paracel Islands, thereby expanding its anti-access/area
denial capabilities into the SCS. China’s militarization of the region is destabilizing andviolates its commitment to abide by the 2002 ASEAN Declaration of the Conduct of theParties on the South China Sea.
South China Sea Arbitration
Beijing summarily rejected efforts by the Philippines to apply the rule of law to the SCS
dispute. In January 2013, the Philippines initiated arbitral proceedings against China
under UNCLOS, challenging the legality of China’s claims and actions in the SCS.
China refused to participate in the mandatory proceedings. In October 2015, theTribunal concluded that it had jurisdiction over seven of the Philippines’ submissions
and would determine jurisdiction over the other eight submissions during the merits
phase. China replied that the decision was “null and void” and was not binding on China.
On November 30, the Tribunal concluded its hearing on the merits and remaining issues

22

of jurisdiction; a final decision is due by June. As a party to UNCLOS, China is legallybound to comply with the ruling of the Tribunal. If it fails to do so, the status of
UNCLOS as the “constitution for the world’s oceans” will be irreparably harmed.
Prospects for Regional Cooperation
For decades, the United States has called on other maritime nations to conduct their own
FON programs. Those pleas have fallen on deaf ears, most states preferring to let theUnited States do the heavy lifting to preserve their navigational rights and freedoms.
Although ASEAN has expressed “serious concern over recent and ongoingdevelopments” in the SCS, it lacks the unity and conviction to confront China as anorganization, preferring instead to pursue the ever-elusive binding Code of Conduct for
the SCS. The United States is encouraging other regional states, including Australia,
India, Japan and the Philippines, to conduct combined patrols in the SCS, but firm plans
have yet to be developed.
The challenges to navigational freedoms in Asia-Pacific are substantial, but notinsurmountable. Although successfully confronting these challenges is best achieved
through a united coalition of interested states, for the reasons indicated above,
preserving freedom of access to Asian waters will continue to be primarily a U.S.-only
effort, with sporadic support from regional friends and allies if they deem it in theirnational interests to provide such assistance. America’s commitment to maintain peaceand stability and economic well-being in Asia-Pacific by facilitating the free flow ofcommerce and promoting compliance with the international law, however, isclear—U.S. ships and aircraft will “fly, sail, and operate wherever international law
allows, as we do around the world,” and the SCS will not be an exception.

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Christopher B. Roberts
Strategic, Political and Economic Challenges to Security and Cooperationin the South China Sea
U.S.$5.3 trillion in trade passes through the South China Sea every year and thisrepresents approximately 50% of global trade. Moreover, by 2035, an estimated 90% of
fossil fuel exports will be absorbed by Asia. However, more critical for China andTaiwan, together with the five ASEAN claimant states (if Indonesia is included as a defacto claimant state), are the potential hydrocarbon resources within the maritime
subregion together with the level fish stocks representing a crucial component of foodsecurity. While China’s ‘Land and Resources Ministry’ has publically declared that
there are an estimated 55 billion tons of oil and 20 trillion cubic meters of gas, thispotentially exaggerated estimate by Chinese authorities dramatizes and reinforces
hyper-nationalistic sentiments. The reality is that it is not possible to reliably estimate
figures about the potential hydrocarbon reserves of the subregion until there is anagreement between the claimant countries, or between the claimant countries for aninternational consortium, to undertake a multilateral seismic survey of the sub-region.
Moreover, international analysis all too often undervalues the strategic and politicalimportance of regional fish stocks that represent 25% of Southeast Asia’s protein needs
and 10% of the global fisheries catch.
The current phase in the escalation of tensions over the South China Sea started in
2007, rather than the more common emphasis on 2009, when Chinese paramilitary
vessels drove away Vietnamese fishing vessels from the Spratly islands, sinking three in
July 2007, and China ‘forced a British-American-Vietnam oil consortium to abandon
development of a gas field off southern Vietnam’. Nonetheless, while the 2009
submissions of Malaysia and Vietnam to the United Nations Commission on the Limitsof the Continental Shelf (CLCS) have provided some clarification to the claims of these
two states, many Chinese interlocutors from Beijing have unreasonably argued that thefulfilment of this obligation under international law has justified China’s
disproportionate response during the seven years that have followed.
While Beijing has, for example, sought to unilaterally impose a fishing ban inlegally disputed territories since 2009, Beijing has more recently sought to tender oil
and gas blocks in disputed territory, twice cut Vietnamese exploration cables (within
what is on the balance of law Vietnam’s Executive Economic Zone), designated Woody

24

Island (disputed by Vietnam) as part of the Sansha prefecture, and then established amilitary garrison and most recently placed missile launchers at the island. Between May
and September 2014, Beijing also situated a deep sea oil rig (the HD-981), arguably
within the EEZ of Vietnam. China has undertaken coercive actions involving
paramilitary and People’s Liberation Army assets, inter alia, in an attempt to force otherclaimant states from their control of disputed maritime features (e.g. the ScarboroughShoal). Moreover, Beijing has undertaken one of the greatest engineering feats inmodern history through the rapid construction of artificial islands equating to more than
3,000 acres of new land across six maritime features within approximately 15 months.
So what is motivating Beijing? In a paper presented to a 2015 workshop on theSouth China Sea at the Australian National University, Evelyn Goh argued that ‘China’s
geostrategic enterprise is prompted by a number of factors: its energy insecurity,
developmental imbalance between the poorer mountainous east and prosperous Western
coast of China, and the “China dream” of re-emerging as the dominant power in Greater
Asia – i.e. the “Middle Kingdom”.’ Some analysis claims that the issue of energy
insecurity is not just confined to the need to access hydrocarbon reserves in the South
China Sea for the purpose of economic growth, but that it is also related to the‘so-called Malacca Straits’ dilemma where Beijing fears that some foreign powers (e.g.
the U.S.) may block the aforementioned flow of trade that is of critical importance toChina’s national security. However, as stated by Rear Admiral James Goldrick(Australia, Rtd), the Malacca Straights is not a true ‘choke point’ as there are alternativeroutes such as the Sunda and Lombok Straits that, while slightly costlier in terms oftransportation, will and do provide alternative options.
Given the developments of the past decade, it is increasingly hard to deny that
Beijing is acting on the basis of a grand strategy: not only regarding the South China
Sea but also in relation to the broader Indo-Pacific. Here, some of the key achievements
to date include the near de facto exercise of control of the South China, within a mere
two years, vis-à-vis the Southeast Asian claimant states. This has, in turn, presented achallenge to the level of confidence in the San Francisco system (i.e. hub and spokes
alliance network) provided by the U.S. Also, there is increasing evidence that thissecond component is another pillar of Beijing’s grand strategy. Beijing’s calculus is that
Western countries – most notably the U.S. – can’t economically afford to respond to its
provocations in the South China Sea, particularly with regard to non-ally claimant statessuch as Vietnam. However, even with treaty allies, the hesitance of the U.S. to be
forcibly drawn into the dispute was evident when the Philippines explicitly raised the‘treaty provisions’ with the U.S. and the latter awkwardly responded that ‘the treaty

25

does not require the U.S. to intervene on behalf of the Philippines over reefs’. While theU.S. has since toughened its position, this has been ‘forced’ by the continued
provocations of Beijing. It is hard to deny that the U.S. has been anything other than ahesitant but responsible actor in the face of Chinese aggression.
Nonetheless, it is apparent that Beijing believes that it needs to reinforce its grandstrategy via a second track approach utilising hard power and a range of associatedmilitary contingencies are evident by continued increases in military expenditure andassociated military procurements. Such an approach is likely based on a calculation thatneither the U.S. or any of its allies, such as Japan and Australia, can afford to interfere
in Beijing’s strategy due to their economic dependence on China and the cost of suchinterference to their own economises as well as the global economy. If so, there aresome risks to this calculation, not least of which could be an underestimation of theimportance that the U.S. places on confidence in its alliance network and its perceived
role as a guarantor of regional peace and security. However, the limited response of the
U.S. to date, through its ‘freedom of navigation exercises’, together with the hesitanceof other countries like Australia in joining such U.S. actions, reinforces the validity ofBeijing’s calculation. Moreover, a recent attempt by the U.S. to build a coalition of thewilling that would include other democratic states, such as India, in enforcing the rightto freedom of negotiation, also failed. More importantly, the issue of freedom ofnavigation is a fallacy as it is not in Beijing’s interests to challenge the innocent passageof trade and Beijing could argue that its de facto control of the South China Sea will infact enhance such freedom of navigation through a guarantee that it can protect thesevessels from threats such as piracy.
The third prong to Beijing’s strategy concerns a broad array of initiatives designed
to enhance Beijing’s soft power by increasing the level of economic influence anddependence on Beijing. Broader initiatives for this purpose include: (1) the One Belt
One Road (OBOR); (2) the Maritime Silk Road (3); the Asian Infrastructure andInvestment Bank; (4) the establishment of a Chinese version of the Free Trade Area of
the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP); and (5) an escalation of efforts to secure new bilateral
partnerships with neighbouring countries. Already, significant trade, aid, and investment
policies have weakened ASEAN unity with the most notable example being the failureof the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM) to reach a consensus over the Phnom
Penh Joint Communique in 2012 leading to the intervention by Indonesia and its former
Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, and the ‘face saving’ solution for a ‘Six Point
Plan’. China now represents 32.6% of imports to Cambodia and in 2012 Chinese loans
and investments in the country represented U.S.$2.7 billion while investments to the26country, between 1994 and 2012, represented U.S.$9.17 billion (Cambodia’s GDP in2012 was just U.S.$14.1 billion).
Since the time of the 2012 Joint Communique incident, ASEAN has managed torespond to recent developments through a number of collective statements following the
Chairmanship of Myanmar in 2014 but, despite protests by Beijing to one of the latest
statements in 2015, these statements represent ‘too little, too late’ and have not managed
to stall the advancement of China’s grand strategy for the region. ASEAN’s capacity toprovide a collective ‘diplomatic voice’ on the South China Sea, let alone negotiate ameaningful Code of Conduct, is also hamstrung by broader intra-mural divisions.
In the context of such divisions and during a pilot survey undertaken by the author,
100 ASEAN elite from all ten of the ASEAN nations indicated that 60 percent did nottrust their ASEAN Neighbours to be good neighbours. In a separate survey of every
ASEAN nation at the grass roots level (provided in seven languages and involving 819
participants), only 15% of Burmese, 22% of Singaporeans, 25% of Thais, 26% ofIndonesians and 29% of Cambodians trusted their ASEAN neighbours to be ‘goodneighbours’. Moreover, 47% of the Singaporean elite and 45% of Thai elite believedthat armed conflict between ASEAN members states was foreseeable within the next
twenty years (a year later armed conflict over the Preah Vihear Temple occurred). For
the purpose of China’s strategy, it is also important to highlight that that three of theASEAN countries from this sample listed China as one of their most important‘strategic allies’ while another four listed the United States – for the foreseeable future,
ASEAN wide unity will remain extremely difficult under such circumstances .
Regarding the ways forward, a senior member of Malaysia’s Institute of Strategic
and International Studies (ISIS) argued in 2015, in the wake of the annual Asia-PacificRoundtable, ‘that we can’t afford to offend the Chinese as we need to engage them forthe purpose of a peaceful outcome around ten years from now’. I replied that ASEAN
and the broader Indo-Pacific do not have ten years, in fact it may already be too late.
Thus, if the finalisation of a Code of Conduct by ASEAN is to be meaningful then,given recent developments, the goal should be for a conclusion by no later than 2017.
Moreover, this may require new approaches and a revision of ASEAN’s modus
operandi including (a) an ASEAN-X approach which would avoid countries such as
Cambodia hijacking an optimal document (i.e. an aversion of a ‘lowest common
denominator outcome); and (b) there may also be a need to conclude this Code of
Conduct within ASEAN and then offer it to Beijing as a fait accompli for ratification.
In the case of the latter and more forceful option, the COC should be designed as
an instrument that can also be ratified by all of ASEAN’s dialogue partners including27

Japan, the U.S. and Australia. Should the forthcoming ruling by the Permanent Court of
Arbitration in The Hague be in favour of the Philippines, then the ASEAN states withclaims to the South China Sea should also seek recourse to the PCA, or at least threatensuch recourse as a means to maximise their bargaining position vis-à-vis the South
China Sea. In turn, Western countries such as the U.S. and Japan should reduce thedependence of countries such as Laos and Cambodia on China through aid, trade, andinvestment and recent developments indicate that they are already well on track withthis path.
Beyond this, and in the context of the broader Indo-Pacific, there is a strategicneed for greater state-led economic governance in order to divert trade, aid, andinvestment dependence away from China. This strategy applies not only to the ASEAN
nations but also other countries such as Australia where, in the 2014 financial year,
trade with China represented 34% of Australia’s total merchandise trade and 40.4% of
merchandise exports. The continuation of such trade dependence is untenable given the
recent behaviour of Beijing, including its challenge to the role of the United States asAustralia’s key security ally. Therefore, key Indo-Pacific governments should take aproactive approach by strategically directing investments toward alternative ASEAN
economies as well as India, Japan and South Korea.
Such polices should also include greater state regulation concerning foreign
investments and ownership (e.g. vis-à-vis natural resources). Thus, economic modellingshould dismiss the current mantra against the continuation of state owned enterprises
and the manner by which these can be managed profitably can be modelled on the
Singapore and Norwegian models. In the case of the latter, state ownership of natural
resources has enabled the establishment of large scale future funds that have secured thelong-term sustainability of critical needs such as health care, education, and pensions.
The need for such strategic direction has been made all the more apparent by
increased evidence concerning the structural, demographic, and environmental
constraints to China’s economy. Given that China remains an authoritarian state, therisks to the regional and global economies are all the more dire as history reveals thatsuch states will seek recourse to desperate measures including the exploitation ofinternational disputes to manipulate domestic regime legitimacy (i.e. the exploitation of
hyper-nationalism). In this sense, a militarily powerful but domestically weak China is
to be feared far more than the rapidly developing model of the past three decades.

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Rahul Mishra
Challenges to the Freedom of Navigation in Asian Waters
Introduction
Freedom of navigation has become one of the most debated and contentious issues inmodern Asian politics. Majority of Asia’s trade is seaborne and with the increase ininternational trade, securing sea-lanes of communication (SLOC) and ensuring freedomof navigation have become key priorities for a large number of countries. Asia is also ahome to two most important oil transit chokepoints, Strait of Malacca and Strait of
Hormuz and the disruption of these chokepoints may fuel energy crisis in the world
Until recently, maritime disputes were not at the forefront of big Asian power’s
foreign policy. However, the territorial tension in the East and Southeast Asian region
have become a cause of international concern in the recent years, attention has beendrawn towards a bigger problem, i.e., securing the freedom of navigation in the Asian
Waters so much so that the it has become a catchphrase and one of the most debated
topics in the Asian security architecture. However, to grasp a holistic andcomprehensive picture of the issue of freedom of navigation, it is essential to bear inmind the three major emerging trends in Asia that have been shaping thepolitico-strategic and economic architecture of the Asia-Pacific region as also thedebates pertaining to the issue of freedom of navigation.
First, as the focus of international politics is shifting towards the Asia, weaknessesof the regional maritime security equilibrium are being exposed. It is now evident thatthe regional strategic equilibrium is fragile and is faced with structural tensions.
Second, simultaneous rise of several Asia-Pacific countries is now leading tomore assertive behaviour on their part. They are recalibrating their strategies on all
fronts to protect and advance their national interests. This applies not just to China, butalso to India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and other countries of the region.
Third, at the institutional level, the region is marred by twin problems- weakregional mechanisms, and weak commitment of the members of existent regionalorganisations. Moreover, most of the Asia-Pacific regional groupings have left one or
the other major power out of the system. East Asia Summit (EAS) is one promisingregional grouping, which not only involves all the regional players but also theinternational actors such as the US, Japan, Russia and China. However, EAS is still29

evolving, and has a long way to go before it proves itself akin to the ‘Asian Security
Council’.
Legal Challenges
So far as the legal challenges are concerned, the first and foremost is- the issue ofcommitment of the major stake holders in Asia; the question whether they really believein the international laws and the UN Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS). The
answer perhaps is not a complete ‘Yes’, if not a Complete NO!
This is because of the fact that while the US has not ratified the UNCLOS, China
has come up with its own set of interpretations in the light of the Philippine case at thePermanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. With the two major powers not fullycommitting themselves to the UNCLOS, the situation becomes difficult for UNCLOS
credibility.
For example, on the Philippines case at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, thePhilippines has taken up the case to question the very basis of the Chinese claims in theSouth China Sea. However, China argues that the matter should be resolved bilaterally,
between China and the Philippines, through diplomatic means; more importantly it
should be in conformity with China’s own 1992 territorial law.
It has also been reported that China wants an alternative forum to discuss theseissues, if at all. Thus, the biggest challenge is to determine what are the universally
acceptable rules of freedom of navigation. And whether we can ensure compliance of all
the countries of the region. Further, what steps could be taken if a particular country
does not follow the rules. Other challenges emanate from this. The ADIZ (Air Defence
Identification Zone), the legal basis of the ‘nine-dash line’, the issue of Artificial Islandbuilding/ Land Reclamation are cases in point.
As the Philippine case at The Hague goes forward this question will become evenmore relevant because this is not only going to encourage the Southeast Asian claimants
to the dispute, but also force China rethink its policy on the South China Sea andfreedom of navigation.
Military Challenges
The second set of challenges are the ones in the military domain. On the count, it may
be argued that the ‘creeping militarisation’ of the South China Sea is not a healthy trend
and has the potential to offset the strategic equilibrium.
Military muscle flexing between the US and China; Japan and China; and China
and its Southeast Asian neighbours has posed challenge to the regional order. Recent

30

trends strongly indicate that this might also lead to an Asian arms race. The US responseto the China’s island militarisation activities so far includes conducting the Freedom of
Navigation Operations (FONOPs). The recent US moves include the visit of USS
Lassen and USS Curtis Wilbur in October 2015 and January 2016 respectively, closer tothe reef constructed by China in the spratly islands. On the other hand, in February 2016,
according to satellite images, China deployed two batteries of 8 HQ-9 surface to air
missiles launchers on Woody Island in the Paracel islands. Clearly, the objective was togain anti-access area denial in the region. To keep a close eye on the US naval
movements in South China Sea, China also launched the Gaofen-4 geosynchronous
satellite, which arguably is one of the highest-resolution satellites in the geosynchronous
orbit.
Geopolitical Challenges
At the geopolitical level, there are two major trends:• China’s unprecedented military rise and its ever-increasing assertive postures arealarming for the neighbouring countries. Also, the implications of China’s ‘One
Belt One Road’ (OBOR) initiative are likely to be far reaching for countries near•and far.
The rising polarisation in the region, which is because of the willingness of theSoutheast Asian countries to stand up to the Chinese assertions. Today, its not justVietnam and Philippines, but also Malaysia and Indonesia, which have been
opposing the Chinese activities in the South China Sea and East China Sea waters.
For instance, while Indonesia is keen to work with China on infrastructure building,
trade and commerce, it has been assertive in responding to illegal fishing activities
from the Chinese side. This is a new trend rather this is gaining more and more
prominence across the region.

Concluding Observations
1. The recent developments have the potential to turn this into a violent conflict.
2. ‘Collective Pressure’ should replace ‘Collective Defence’, which should guidepolicies of the US, Japan, Australia and the countries of Southeast Asian region in
dealing with China’s rising territorial and maritime assertions. Pressurising China
for a step-by-step discussion, consensus and implementation of a peaceful solution
agenda should be a priority.
3. The discussion on a binding Code of Conduct (CoC) should be efficiently pursued
not only through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) but also31through ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting (ADMM) Plus and EAS. The othercountries of EAS may perhaps consider signing the CoC and try to put morepressure on China.
4. Putting pressure on China jointly to halt military activities in and around Asianwaters seems to be a viable option to ensure the freedom of navigation. In thisdirection, steps such as joint naval patrols between countries and issuing statements
calling for freedom of navigation may be taken.
5. For China, if it wants its OBOR initiative to gain credibility, it needs to prove its
capability as a responsible stakeholder, both at regional and global levels. First stepin this direction will be to ensure the freedom of navigation, only then OBOR'smaritime arm, Maritime Silk Road can be kick started smoothly.
6. Finally, the onus lies on China in ensuring that the region remains peaceful.
Pressing its own agenda unilaterally, making claims without understanding other’s
point of view, and disregarding UN and other bodies on South China Sea are
detrimental to the Chinese interests in the region.

32

Catherine Panaguiton
Maritime Domain Awareness and Capacity Building:
Not Just about Maritime Security
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is defined by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) as the effective understanding of anything associated with themaritime domain1 that could impact security, safety, economy, or environment.2
On the other hand, literature provides the following definition of Maritime
Capacity Building (MCB)3:“activities which are directed at the empowerment of governments and coastal
communities to efficiently and efficaciously govern and sustainably exploit themaritime domain, including territorial waters and exclusive economic zones.”
MCB definition centred on empowerment stresses the importance of the transfer
of knowledge, skills and technology and the establishment of routines, procedures andinstitutions that improve governance and exploitation. It is a broad definition thatemphasises that maritime security implies working governance structures and has an
1

The maritime domain is defined as all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean,or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and otherconveyances. See Amendments to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual<http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=29093&filename=1367.pdf>
2
See Amendments to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual<http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=29093&filename=1367.pdf>
3
The definition of Maritime Capacity Building (MCB), on the other hand, is not as singular as MDA. For advocates of anarrow understanding capacity building only concerns the training of security forces and the police. Those drawing on abroad understanding include various aspects of ocean governance, the blue economy or the resilience of coastal populations.
The argument of the advocates of a broad understanding is that capacity building is useless if it does not address the broader
causes of piracy and the interlinked maritime insecurities. A further source of contestation is whether capacity building
should include more than the transfer of knowledge and skills (software), and should also entail the delivery of equipment
and tools, ranging from training facilities to naval and patrol vessels (hardware).
Moreover, actors involved in capacity building work within very different temporalities. Naval missions, for instance,
primarily conduct very short term and ad hoc training as part of their port visits. They focus on the transfer of skills largely
through demonstration. Capacity building projects, such as the IMO led Djibouti Code of Conduct process (DCoC), the
UNODC’s Counter Piracy Program, or the EU’s capacity building mission EUCAP Nestor work in a short tomid-term
timeline of six months to two years. Here the focus is on the delivery of some equipment and the provision of intensive(usually one week) training courses
for selected specialists. Long term perspectives which focus on the setting up of training infrastructure, education – such asprofessional courses or executive masters – are an important dimension to make capacity building sustainable. They have so
far rarely been part of the programmes. Overall a short to mid-term logic dominates that focuses on projects withdeliverables and measurable outcomes. This ‘projectisation’ is to some degree paradoxical, since much of the impact of
capacity building will be on a less tangible level. See Christian Bueger, “Counter-Piracy and Maritime Capacity Building:
Fallacies Of A Debate”<http://www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2014/10/Bueger-Lessons-for-Maritime-Capacity-Building.pdf>

33

intrinsic link to the blue economy. It hence includes measures directed at illicit activities
and maritime crime, such as piracy, or the trafficking of people, weapons, or other illicit
goods as well as the regulation of the blue economy, including fisheries, tourism or
natural resources.4
Issues on MDA and Capacity Building
As it is fairly obvious in the foregoing, Maritime Domain Awareness and what I would
like to call its enabling mechanism, Maritime Capacity Building, are not only concernedwith Maritime Security. This would be the common misconception when these terms
are heard especially with the brewing tensions in the disputed areas in the South China
Sea and the West Philippine Sea. However, such must be corrected. Ensuring Maritime
safety and the sustainable development of the marine economy are as equally importantas safeguarding territory. This is in order to set goals and implement steps in pursuit ofsaid goals, to ultimately realise true MDA, by way of MCB. It is indisputable thoughthat trying to find a solution to balance all these concerns in the formulation andimplementation of plans for MDA and MCB is not an easy feat.
Further in the above, MDA and MCB within a particular State for example, is notas simple as figuring out said State’s gains and the satisfaction of its own interests.
Regional interests and the international community as a whole cannot be dispensed frombeing factored into the situation.
Relatedly, it must be noted that a lot of the projects for MDA and MCB of aparticular State’s success lies not only with the sole involvement of said State, but
through cooperative efforts with other States. Further, MDA likewise ‘includes theability to monitor activities in such a way that trends and anomalies can be identified
early to facilitate decision-makers’ responses. Data alone is insufficient; informationmust be collected, fused, analysed, protected and disseminated so that decision-makers
are able to anticipate potential threats and take effective and appropriate action.’5 For
example, MDA entails a collaborative effort not only between a Main Centre and theRegional Operating Centres (ROCs) of a particular State, but with a number of otherStates as well to ensure the best possible data available to be used for decision-making.
As gleaned from above, multiple interests surround MDAs and MCB. In MCB,
fully understanding how these multiple interests come into play involves venturing on
the concept of ‘ownership’ of a MCB project. As Bruen notes,

4

Ibid, 8.
US White House website. “National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan For the National Strategy for Maritime Security”,
December 2013 <https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/national_maritime_domain_awareness_plan.pdf>
534

“Ownership refers to different aspects of planning and implementing
reconstruction and development projects. It refers to who sets the agenda andidentifies priorities, but also who manages resources, implements and evaluates
projects. If capacity building is defined in terms of empowerment then ownershipis an absolute necessity.”
Ensuring participation and moving regional organisations and governments into
leadership positions are important first steps towards ownership. There are however,major tensions that hamper ownership in practice. Firstly, there is often a mismatch ofinterests of the international community and the countries that are supposed to own theprocess.6
Another concern as well is that international and local actors moreover tend towork within different values and often have conflicting understanding of how planning,
implementation and evaluation should be carried out.7 In working together, these actors
must be prepared to be flexible in their terms and positions so as to come up with aworkable arrangement. And finally, a third tension is related to the identification ofneeds vis-à-vis the available data resources to make such an identification. As Bueger
emphasises, ‘to be able to identify needs, one requires knowledge (and often research)about what one is actually needed. If would not be only against the principle ofownership if international actors provide this knowledge, for instance through needassessments that draw on Western standards and are carried out by international experts.
It also creates the danger that regional actors produce a show for the international
community in order to access resource. The only alternative is then that countries will
have to learn to conduct their own assessments in relying on experts from the region or
their own countries. This in turn highlights the importance of research and education,and to work with ‘soft’ forms of capacity building, such as embedded advisors, which
do not devise what a country needs but assist in the formulation of such needs.
Conclusion
It is beyond cavil that MDA and MCB are integral parts in the realisation of a Maritime
Nation that at the same time respects international law. As shown in the previous
6

While the primary interest of the international community may be maritime security, for many other countries, the primaryinterest is in the efficient and sustainable management of the blue economy. This by nature leads to different priorities. If theinternational community’s priority is in policing the sea, regional states foreground measures that have long term economic
benefits, including the building of better infrastructures, such as port facilities, or roads, or maritime research and education.
Ownership then implies respect of these different priorities and to pay careful attention to potential clashes of interest. See
Bueger note n 3 at 10.
7
Ibid.

35

discussion though, many factors ought to be considered in undertaking steps and projects
to achieve the same. Cooperative effort with key players8 is key in coming up with aworkable solution. The way ahead to these must be carefully studied to ensure
realisation of goals and maximisation of resources in projects that promote MDA andseek to undertake MCB.

8

May be states, international organisations, expert individuals in the industry, et al.

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Ha Anh Tuan
Maritime Domain Awareness and Capacity Building in the South China Sea
In the past few years, the situation in the South China Sea (SCS) has escalated,threatening regional peace, stability, and the rule of law in the maritime domain. A
common view is that a threat of a total inter-state war is still remote. However, risks oflocal conflicts have increased because of more frequent interactions between different
actors in this region.
In order to properly manage disputes and avoid serious incident which could easilytransform into a conflict, many things need to be done to halt this trend. One importantarea is to promote cooperation in capacity building, enabling actors to share similar viewson the regional situation, which will serve as a solid foundation to build confidence
between parties in the SCS.
Defining Capacity Building
We have, for many times, conveniently mentioned about "capacity building" when we
discuss about maritime security managements in the SCS. However, we have not pay
proper attention to the meaning of the term "capacity building" itself.
Capacity was defined by the United Nations Development Program as "the abilityof people, institutions and societies to perform functions, solve problems and set andachieve objectives." 1 Capacity building is “the process of institution building or
training at individual, institutional and systemic levels.”2
The main focus, therefore, is on training individuals and providing knowledge,
equipments, and other necessary means for institutions to function better. One important
aspect has been neglected in these definitions: institutions’ ability to set and achieve
their objectives. In any circumstance, the performance of individuals and institutions are
generally evaluated by their capacity to fulfill the given objectives. In the case ofmanaging disputes, performance improvements of an institution in one country may not
be of interest of other institutions (in other countries). In other words, capacity building
may be conflictual by nature.

1

Lopes, Carlos and Thomas Theisohn Ownership, Leadership and Transformation. Can We Do Better for Capacity
Development?. UNDP/Earthscan, New York, 2003, p.1
2
Binger, Al et al, Capacity 21: Evaluation Report 1993-2001. UNDP. 2002, p.3.

37

Issues in Capacity Building Cooperation in the SCS
In the particular case of cooperation for capacity building in the SCS, several key
questions need to be addressed:
i. Capacity building for whom?
There are different institutions in different countries taking part in the managementof the SCS: The navies, law enforcement agencies, policy makers at provincial andministerial levels, fishers, and so on. Both institutions (at unit level) and individuals cangenerally be categorised as “policy makers” and “practitioners”. Given our limited
resoures for capacity building cooperation, who should be the key target?
ii. What capacity?
Many institutions and individuals need further advance their capacities. English
training for individuals to better communicate with others from other countries isimportant. But more policy-oriented and technical knowledge could be more importantbecause it directly helps parties to build common knowledge and understanding of the
disputes and therefore provides foundation for addressing the disputes. Some key
capacities could be:- Monitoring the coastal areas of states (both equipments and ability to operate
equipments).
- Properly understanding international laws and principles concerning the disputes.
- Understanding the historical context of the disputes.
- Searching and rescuing people in needs at sea.
iii. Nature of capacity building:
As previously discussed, when refering to a dispute, capacity building could becooperative or confrontational in nature. For example, building capacities for all parties
to communicate with one another is cooperative. But capacity building to dominate otherdisputants, or even to protect illegal activities is definitely confrontational. One latest
development: On March 19, 2016, an Indonesian law enforcement ship was interceptedby a Chinese coast guard vessel when it was towing an illegal fishing ship in Natuna
water.3 The modernisation and expansion of Chinese LEAs has allowed these agencies todominate other regional force, therefore, must be differentiated from the efforts of someregional countries to enhance their ability to monitor their coastal areas. Areas could beseen as cooperative capacity building:- English training for all levels.
- Information sharing between stakeholders (many ways to share information).
- Building capacity for litoral states with weak capacity to monitor their coastal areas.
3

http://m.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/21/ri-confronts-china-fishing.html

38

Areas could be seen as confrontational capacity building:- Building excessive capability to monitor and intercept other activities in disputed
areas.
- Militarisation and para-militarisation of the disputed areas aiming at changing ofstatus quo.
Promoting Cooperative Capacity Building to Better Monitor Disputes in the SCS
In the past few years, extra-regional powers, especially the US and Japan, havecontributed to promote capacity building to better monitor the situation in the SCS.
These activities have been conducted at both national and regional level.
At national level:- Countries may focus on abilities to monitor coastal areas through enhancing
technological and equipment supports. At the same time, we must differentiate thiswith excessive advancement of LEAs to the disputed waters.
- Countries may also renovate/restructure their decision making mechanism to better
coordinate agencies, especially to avoid unplanned or unintended incidents at sea.
- Promoting the principle of law and legal procedure in monitoring maritime domain
by conducting training programs for staff at all levels.
At regional level:
Many ways to promote regional cooperation for capacity building, which would
serve promoting regional peace and stability.
- Strengthening institutional cooperations:o Enhancing the role of ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms in monitoring theSCS.
o Fostering joint measures to enhance maritime domain awareness.
o Creating a professional network among acencies of states for better coordinationand cooperation to preven disputes from escalating to conflict and prevent
conflict from spreading out.
- Enhancing political and legal framework:o Negotiating and applying interim measures for dispute settlement while awaiting
for COC.
- Promoting information sharing:o Information sharing is one important measure to promote greater transparency
and cooperation at sea. Several efforts on information sharing have been
discussed in the past few years and this approach should be supported.

39

o Each country can voluntarily provide their military exercises in the SCS, major
LEAs ships plans, and other information.
o Using different technologies to better monitor the SCS: Sattellite, GPS,
Unmanned aircrafts, etc...

40

Hideshi Tokuchi
Maritime Domain Awareness and Capacity Building in Southeast Asia
Last year Japan achieved some significant developments in its national security policy.
There was a lot of public attention on the issue of collective self-defense and the
security legislation, but such new initiatives are just another expression of “Proactive
Contribution to Peace,” one of the basic principles behind Japan’s National Security
Strategy and National Defense Program Guidelines of 2013.
Capacity building support is one of the key instruments in the implementation of“Proactive Contribution to Peace.” The Ministry of Defense of Japan has been engaged
in this activity, focused on Southeast Asia. As this business is in its early stage, there is
wide room for further development and sophistication.
So far, those efforts are made on the basis of request from the assistance recipients,
and thus a more holistic approach is necessary. Particularly, maritime security is one of
the most urgent issues in Southeast Asia. From this point of view, this paper focuses on
capacity building support for Southeast Asian maritime security.
Importance of Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia is much relevant to the peace and prosperity of Japan.
First, Southeast Asia, which was known for its poverty in the twentieth century, isa great engine of economic growth in today’s world. Prosperity of the region is criticallyimportant for that of Japan.
Second, Japan and the regional countries share common security interests in awide range of issues including natural disaster management and stable and rules-based
maritime order.
Third, the ASEAN members are building their mutual relationship upon thecommon values such as democracy, human rights and rule of law. They and Japan sharethese values and can strengthen their relationship, capitalizing on these values1.
Fourth, diversity certainly features in Southeast Asia. The region is diverse inmany senses. This unique nature of this region makes a difference in forging energy
necessary to survive and prosper in today’s world. Japan has much to learn from thispoint.

1

See ASEAN Community Vision 2025.

41

Fifth, Southeast Asia is important from the view-point of sea traffic. Ourinternational trade depends much on sea transport and we have key stakes in the peaceand stability of maritime domain particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. Geopoliticalsignificance of the South China Sea as an integral part of world sea transport is clear in
everyone’s eyes, as it occupies the critical location of sea lines of communication fromthe Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean.
Sixth, the depth of the South China Sea, more than 1,000m in average, adds a
strategic importance when we address the issues of Chinese submarine operations. A
Japanese expert draws an analogy between the Sea of Okhotsk in the Cold War era andthe South China Sea in today’s world.
Seventh, a good catch of fishery resources from the South China Sea, which
accounts for around 10% of the world total, is a proof of importance of this area for the
food security of Asia including Japan.
Weakness in Southeast Asian Security
Southeast Asia is so important for Japan as discussed above that Japan has to contributemuch more to the regional peace and stability. In doing so, we must take the following
three points in mind: First, China’s exploitation of power vacuum in the South China
Sea; second, security capability of Southeast Asian countries; and third, tyranny of
distance.
First, history tells us that China often advanced to the South China Sea region,
exploiting power vacuum. China occupied half of the Paracel Islands in the 1950s after
the French withdrawal from Indochina, and occupied the entire Paracels, chasing South
Vietnamese away after the American withdrawal from Vietnam. In the 1980s it
advanced to the Spratly Islands after the former Soviets reducing their military presencein Vietnam, and in the mid-1990s it occupied Mischief Reef after the American
withdrawal from the Philippines.2
Second, Southeast Asian military capabilities are still weak. As for the Philippines,
for example, its last squadron of fighter aircraft was already retired and the mostmodern ships in its navy ae two former US Coast Guard cutters and its other main
combatant is a WWII destroyer escort, one of the world’s oldest serving warships.3
Third, tyranny of distance. The US as the center piece of the regional security
system, i.e. the “hub-&-spokes” system, is geographically remote. The US is a resident
power of the Asia-Pacific, but not a part of Asia. Even in the age of advanced military
2

Ministry of Defense of Japan, “China’s Activities in the South China Sea,” December 22, 2015(www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/surround/pdf/ch_d_act20151222e.pdf)
3
Dakota L. Wood, ed., “2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength” (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2015), p.120.

42

technology, tyranny of distance still remains militarily. Although there are roughly 136
thousand US troops stationed in the Asia-Pacific,4 there is no permanent US militarypresence in Southeast Asia, different from Northeast Asia. The distance between theSouth China Sea and Hawaii, the home of the US Pacific Command, is 5,000NM. It
takes 10 to 13 days by sea.5
Regional Cooperation for Maritime Security
In order to address the security challenges Southeast Asia faces particularly in the South
China Sea area, we need to work together. Capacity building support must be
appropriately placed in a broader picture of such efforts. Otherwise, we may not provide
our support effectively and efficiently.
Here, I discuss the following four points about the regional cooperation formaritime security: First, principles of cooperation; second, balance of power; third,
maritime security capacity building; and fourth, maritime domain awareness.
First, the following four principles must be reminded of. One, we must respectand support the unity of ASEAN, as it is the unity that generates power and strength of
ASEAN and of its members and leads to the stability of the entire region. We must
oppose any attempts to undermine the unity. Two, unity of efforts on the part of
supporters is necessary. Not only Japan and the US but also Australia, New Zealand andSouth Korea must be involved in the effort. Even NATO members such as the UK and
Germany are increasingly interested in this region’s security6. We should involve those
Europeans as well and establish appropriate division of labor. Three, awhole-of-government approach is must. Maritime security especially in “gray zone”
scenarios involves other agencies, law-enforcement in particular. It is important tostrengthen law-enforcement capabilities so that a tension may not easily escalate to an
all-out military contingency. And, four, domestic stability of the regional countries isprerequisite. Those countries which are occupied with their domestic instability cannot
afford energy to address external challenges. Thus, international cooperation to help fix
those internal problems will contribute to their greater attention to maritime security
issues. In this regard, roles of the military of these countries should be reviewed. The

4

Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Bouei Hakusho 2015 [Defense White Paper]”, p.14.
Wood, op.cit., p.121.
6
See Philipp Hammond, “Opinion: Britain in partnership with a secure and prosperous Asia,” The Mainichi, January 7,
2016(mainichi.jp/English/articles/20160107/p2g/00m/0in/086000c), and also Dr. Ursula von der Leyen, “Strengthening Regional
Order in the Asia-Pacific,” Address to 14th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, May 31, 2015(www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri la dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2015-862b/plenary4-68e3/leyen-9690).
5

43military should be able to focus on external challenges much more by delegatinginternal security roles to other agencies.
Second, military presence to restore the balance of power in our favor is necessary
in the short run. From this view-point, US Navy’s FONOPS is much appreciated.
Whether other countries participate in FONOPS or not, they must support the operationand cooperate in filling the vacuum, for example, by increasing exercises in the South
China Sea area.
Third, we need in the long run to enhance maritime security capacity of the littoral
states. Self-help by those littoral states must be encouraged. Maritime domainawareness must be put into this effort appropriately. But first, as the basis of having
security assistance the littoral states must establish their own concepts, philosophies,
goals, priorities and specific plans and programs of their force developments and sharethese basics with us in advance. Otherwise, we will not be certain whether our
assistance is effective and relevant to the situation. We may even have to discuss withthem how to formulate those basics. This is not just a matter of selling a weapon. Entire
capabilities of respective assistance recipients are to be addressed.
For this purpose, we should encourage them enhance transparency in their plans,
programs and in their policy processes. If ASEAN countries become more transparent inthese policy-related matters, it will also have a positive impact to the success of ASEAN
Political-Security Community (APSC) as APSC is based on the principles of democracy,
fundamental freedom and the rule of law. These values cannot be pursued withouttransparency.
Fourth and finally, maritime domain awareness. As some American security
experts say, imposing costs on coercion can best be accomplished not only by ademonstrable presence and a stronger network of durable partners, but also by
expanding regional transparency, and incomplete domain awareness across vast
stretches of sea and sky makes it easy for aggressors in high-friction areas to coerce
while obscuring the line that separates aggressor and defender7. There are three points
here. One, the efforts for common operating picture by maritime domain awareness are
multilateral. Unity of efforts among the relevant parties is indispensable, and that is adifference from other capacity building support, which is usually conducted on abilateral basis. It will need careful and sophisticated coordination. Interoperability andconnectivity is also important. Two, the purpose of such efforts must be clearly definedand fully shared by the participants. Different countries may have different purposes in
7

Shawn Brimly, et al., “IDEAS to ACTION: Suggestions for the 25th Secretary of Defense,” (Washington D.C.: Center fora New American Security, 2015)p.15.

44

mind.8 Although the objective does not have to be necessarily single, there should beclear definition on the purpose. Three, scientific research cooperation for marine
environment should be included in the overall efforts for maritime domain awareness.
Although some Chinese scholars argue that the Chinese government has taken steps toconserve the fishery resources by several measures including imposing a limit on thenumber of fishing vessels, enforcing summer moratorium and building hydrobiologicalreserves 9 , what they have been exactly doing for the conservation of naturalenvironment is not certain, as their reclamation is rapid and massive. Naturalenvironment in the South China Sea is important from the view point of food security as
the sea area accounts for roughly 10% of global catch annually10.
Conclusion
For the long-term stability of Southeast Asia, capacity building support, particularly forthe maritime security capability of the littoral states is needed. There is huge room forcooperation between the US and Japan for this effort, and we must involve otherlike-minded countries to generate synergy and to undergird the rules-based international
order.

8For example, illegal fishing, illegal migration, illegal trade, terrorist movement, piracy, interruption of free flow of oceanic
communication, and artificial island building.
9
Wu Shicun, ed., “What One Needs to Know about the South China Sea, 2nd edition,” (Beijing: Current Affairs Press,
2014)pp.18-19.
10
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012 Report to Congress, pp.229-230.

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John F. Bradford and Gregory R. Adams
The Rising Tide of U.S. Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia
In Southeast Asia, an increasingly complex array of transnational threats posed by bothstate and non-state actors has made multilateral maritime security cooperation a must.
Amidst the growing call for “more multilateral”, this paper describes some of the areasin which the U.S. 7th Fleet is refocusing its maritime security attentions to bolster U.S.
investment in multilateral cooperation. In particular, it outlines the rationales andconsiderations underpinning the introduction of targeted multilateral elements into
Southeast Asia’s previously bilateral cooperative maritime arrangements, with thedesired end-state of increased efficiency and effectiveness of traditionally bilateral
exercises.
Introduction
As the sea ebbs and floods with the phases of the moon, so too do nations’ maritime
security posture as it is pulled by geopolitical currents and the evolving security climate.
It is evident that in the face of today’s complex security environment, no one Navy has
the capacity, or all the answers, to ‘go it alone’. It will take multinational andinteragency cooperation, working together at sea and at home, to outsmart, outmaneuver,and overcome the array of man-made and natural threats to peace and stability inmaritime Southeast Asia. The U.S. 7th Fleet is actively seeking to build stronger
maritime security frameworks by networking existing bilateral alliances and security
partnerships. As a key component of this push, the 7th Fleet is capitalizing on decades ofsuccessful investment in its bilateral relationships with partners and allies, and on themutual trust and confidence that has been built, to introduce new multilateral elements
into previously bilateral events. At the same time, the growth of high-value multilateral
exercises and trade-show commitments in the region are creating similar conversationsin naval headquarters across Southeast Asia – “what can we consolidate or cut to makeroom for the new priorities and increase in requirements?” Unfortunately, simple
consolidation of events would likely yield a loss of training value. When too many
training partners are brought together differences in political sensitivities, policy
limitations, equipment and operational acumen can drive the training scenarios and thecomplexity of the skills exercises to become relatively low value. Therefore, the 7 th
Fleet is working closely with its partners to ensure multilateral elements are introduced,

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deliberately and carefully, to ensure sustainment of the exercise’s level of sophistication,
while making it more effective and more efficient.
Rebalancing: A Larger and More Capable U.S. 7th Fleet
There’s only one way to describe the security landscape in Southeast Asia -- it’scomplex.
Front and center is Chinese military and law enforcement activities in the South
China Sea, including the ongoing island-building campaign taking place ininternationally contested waters. Chinese interference with regional fisherman, keeping
them from their generational sources of sustenance, further threatens regional stability.
The irresponsible actions of the North Korean regime pose another concern in that
instability on the Korean Peninsula has immediate impacts on Southeast Asian trade andcommerce. The 4 March 2016 seizure of a North Korean ship by the Philippines Coast
Guard shows that the regime’s choices are creating resource demands for Southeast
Asian maritime security forces. A resurgence of Russian activity in the Pacific issimilarly concerning when one considers recent Russian military activities in Europe
and the Caucuses. However, it is not only state actions that undermine maritime securityin Southeast Asia.
In the last 15 years, maritime-savvy terrorist groups such as the Abu Sayyaff
Group have been rolled back, but they have not been eliminated. The rise of ISIS, theemergence of its Southeast Asian affiliates, and the return of fighters from the Middle
East threaten a renewal of these groups’ capabilities. Similarly, maritime piracy has
been addressed by states across the region, but has not been eradicated and there has
been a recent rise in the number of reported attacks in the South China Sea. Other
human activities, including Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing are
causing irreversible damage to the maritime environment and, in particular, to coral reef
ecosystems.1 If current activities continue, fisheries will almost certainly collapse. The
resulting food shortages, unemployment and anger of local populations will almost
certainly become a major and immediate source of instability.
Given the mammoth proportions and dire implications of these security threats, itcomes as no surprise that maritime security continues to be a central element of the U.S.
Government’s strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. For the U.S. Navy, the rebalancehas delivered significant expansion of operational capability as the result of
improvements to both the quantity and quality of U.S. forces. The March 2nd arrival of1“A study by the UN Environment Programme in 2004 cited the high concentration of coral reefs in Southeast Asian seas –34% of the world’s coral reefs, despite occupying only 2.5% of the total ocean surface.”
http://www.rappler.com/world/specials/93371-cirss-commentaries-environmental-turn-south-china-sea-disputes

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USS Barry into the 7th Fleet Area of Responsibility exemplifies both trends. Barrybrings the total number of Aegis-equipped warships permanently assigned to the Fleet’s
Forward Deployment Naval Forces (FDNF) in Yokosuka, Japan to three cruisers andseven destroyers—the highest level it has been in decades. These FDNF ships work
alongside an increasing number of ships deploying to the Western Pacific from their
homeports in Hawaii and the West Coast of the Continental United States. It terms of
quality, Barry carries the most advanced variant of the Aegis combat systems. 2 Theother FDNF cruisers and destroyers are similarly advanced, and all-but-one are capableof ballistic missile defense operations. Beyond the surface fleet, the introduction of the
P-8 maritime patrol aircraft; recent growth in numbers of submarines homeport inGuam; and modernization of the air wing associated with the forward-deployed aircraft
carrier, USS Ronald Reagan demonstrate the holistic improvement in the 7th Fleets
capabilities.
Underpinning the 7th Fleet’s growing capacity to contribute to thewhole-of-government, strategic U.S. rebalance to Asia, is the trust and confidence thatcomes as a by-product of decades of security commitments and naval presence in theWestern Pacific. Since the end of WWII, throughout the Korean and Vietnam Wars, andinto the post-Cold War, the U.S. Navy has consistently plied the waters of Southeast
Asia, maintaining regional security, fostering navy-to-navy relationships and investingin partnerships. It is those long-standing security partnerships and alliances that have
paved the way for a modernization of cooperative defense agreements, such as the
Extended Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the governments of thePhilippines and United States and an agreement with the Government of Singapore to
forward deploy the U.S. Navy’s newest combatant, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to
Changi Naval Base. Through this lens, the U.S. Navy’s contribution to the rebalance canbe regarded as a noteworthy upgrade to a successful and longstanding participation inregional maritime security capacity and capability building.
Supporting Regional Organizations, Growing Demand for Important WorkAs regional security frameworks have developed, so too has the 7th Fleet’s contribution
in support of an increasing number of regional bodies. In recent years, the 7 th Fleet has
actively supported the United States’ enhanced engagement with ASEAN andparticipation in the East Asia Summit, essential features of the U.S. government’s
rebalance to Asia.3 In fact, ASEAN has been given center stage as a key partner23

http://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/010540
Daniel Russel, Assistant Secretary of States, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “ASEAN and America: Partners for48

positioned at “the heart of Asia-Pacific’s architecture” and the 7th Fleet is fully
cognizant that the maritime security agenda is central to developing an ASEAN Security
Community.4 The 7th Fleet has directly supported initiatives by specialized bodies suchas the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) and the ASEAN Defense Ministers
Meeting Plus (ADMM+) Maritime Security Experts Working Group (EWG).
The 7th Fleet has also been strongly supportive of other regional maritime security
multilateral institutions such as ReCAAP and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium(WPNS). While independent from ASEAN-based efforts, these share similar DNA in
terms of membership and organizational cultures-based collaborative approaches andcommitment to non-interference in members’ internal affairs. 7th Fleet units regularly
appear in these organizations’ maritime security exercises and take part in theirconfidence building programs. For example, in 2013 the Aegis cruiser Chosin
participated in ADMM+’s first Maritime Security Field Training Exercise (FTX) 5, andin May of this year the U.S. Navy plans to provide a robust force package to the
ADMM+ Maritime Security/Counter Terrorism FTX.
Considering the complex challenges in the region, and the growing demand forships and aircraft to both operate and conduct these multilateral exercises, the U.S.
Navy--as every Navy in the region--is resource constrained. Even though the total
number of available assets U.S. Navy assets is increasing in the region, so too are theopportunities to engage. Layered on top of operational requirements and maintenanceneeds, the increase in demand for engagement and cooperative training is outpacing theincrease in supply. Carefully targeted multilateral training is a key tool for optimizing
the security value retained on forces invested. Doing so raises the sophistication of theexercise while aligning duplicative efforts and creating synergizes.
Why Multilateral Cooperation at Sea?
Since the dismantling of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), theU.S.'s maritime security engagement in Southeast Asia has been either through existing
multilateral organizations or implemented bilaterally through a ‘hub and spoke' model.
A perfect example of the Cold War-era hub-and-spokes approach is the U.S. led
maritime security exercise series Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT).
Since its inception in 1995, this annual exercise series has built interoperability,
the Future,” remarks, San Francisco, Commonwealth Club, 28 July 2014<http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/07/229872.htm> accessed 6 June 2015.
4
J.N. Mak, “Unilateralism and Regionalism: Working Together and Alone in the Malacca Straits,” in Piracy, Maritime
Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits, p. 134
5Peter WALZ, “CHOSIN UNITES WITH WORLD NAVIES FOR AN INTERNATIONAL EXERCISE,” 3 OCT
2013.<HTTP://WWW.NAVY.MIL/SUBMIT/DISPLAY.ASP?STORY_ID=76942> ACCESSED 6 JUNE 2015.

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capability, and capacity between the U.S. Navy and its regional partners. Over thecourse of its two-decade history, CARAT events have increasingly more sophisticatedand the number of CARAT partners has grown from six to ten. Today CARAT has
rightfully earned its reputation as the premier U.S. maritime security training event inSoutheast Asia. Until 2015, it had also remained strictly bilateral and bilateral training
just simply isn’t good enough anymore.
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 2013 typhoon Haiyan, 2014 disappearance ofMH370 and 2015 crash of AirAsia 8501 all triggered multinational maritime responses.
In all these cases, among the toughest challenges facing the response force was theeffective sharing of information and coordination between the various navies and theirdiverse partner. Looking forward, it is almost impossible to envision a crisis that would
trigger a strictly bilateral response between the United States and Southeast Asianpartners. Therefore, complex coordination required between multilateral forces must bea focus of training. After decades of bilateral exercises and training, we know how tocommunicate one-to-one. However, something happens when you add a third and fourth
partner to the same maritime space that complicates the operation exponentially. Similar
to how you might act when talking with an old friend, versus in the presence of a small
group gathered around a common host – it’s just different.
The 7th Fleet is clearly not alone in this view. Whereas twenty years ago there
were only a few multilateral training events in Southeast Asia’s exercise calendar, todaythat calendar is full with a menagerie of multilateral exercises. As just a few examples,
Australia hosts Kakudu, Indonesia organizes Komodo, the U.S. brings together regionalnavies at Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT), Singapore organizes a
WPNS-sponsored event in conjunction with the International Maritime Defence
Exhibition (IMDEX), and Malaysia sets up an WPNS-sponsored event at the end of
Langkawi International Maritime Aerospace (LIMA). In addition, the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) hosts HADR events that rotate through the region, and ADMM+ will holdits second FTX in May 2016 when multinational ships will sail together as a combined
maritime security task force from Brunei to Singapore. These large multinational
exercises are invaluable as they build trust and confidence, construct norms ofcooperation, establish baseline procedures for interoperability, and lay the foundation
for regional security architectures.
Unfortunately, large multinational exercises also suffer from a number of distinct
drawbacks. As they seek to maximize the number of partners involved, the level oftraining has to be aligned to the lowest level of interoperability. Where the objective is
inclusion, this works, but where the objective is interoperability in a complex operating50

environment, it leaves something to be desired. Further strategic mistrust and policy
limitation between the parties involved can also limit the training to relatively benign
security scenarios that deliver limited enhancements to warfighting skills. As a result,
there is no plan to recreate a “SEATO Redux at Sea” or a “Southeast Asia
RIMPAC,”—as some partners might fear— but instead a shift in mindset in theengagement opportunities we pursue, high-end targeted multilateral cooperation within
the policies directed by respective national leaderships.
Networking Cooperation: Building Efficiency and Effectiveness with the Right
Partners in the Right Places
After careful study of these operational needs, consideration of guidance coming from
U.S. military and civilian leadership, and consulting with its regional partners and allies,
7th Fleet planners have developed a deliberate approach to introduce more multilateralelements into traditionally bilateral activities in Southeast Asia. These approaches havebeen carefully developed by listening to partners, seeking to understand their needs andconcerns, and then finding areas of common benefit. One venue for this discussion was
the first ever Fleet Commander’s Roundtable hosted by Vice Admiral Robert Thomas,
then Commander 7th Fleet, while his command ship was visiting Singapore’s Changi
Naval Base in May 2015.6 Captain Ronald Oswald, the 7th Fleet’s Assistant Chief ofStaff for Theater Security Cooperation explained, “Looking back at [the region], even a
couple of years ago things were different, but recent discussions with our partners about
trilateral and multilateral exercises have been very positive.” The second suchroundtable will be co-hosted by Admiral Thomas’ successor Vice Admiral Joseph
Aucoin and the Republic of Singapore Navy Fleet Commander Rear Admiral Lew
Chuen Hong on 19 March 2016. Similarly, on 5 March 2016, VADM Aucoin hosted thefirst ever trilateral staff talks with Officers from the Philippines Navy and the Japan
Maritime Self Defense Force aboard his flagship USS Blue Ridge while making aroutine port visit to Manila. Admiral Aucoin described these talks as “a tangible
example of the unified commitment of our countries to the stability and security of thisregion.”7
One of the initiatives being pursued is the Targeted Multilateral CARAT Initiative. Thisinitiative will selectively network targeted bilateral relationships into more effective andefficient training. First announced by VADM Thomas at the May 2015 Fleet
Commanders’ roundtable, this initiative guarantees that the premium quality training
6

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XZSOCLHPPFQ andhttp://www.msn.com/en-ph/news/world/phl-japan-us-hold-talks-to-enhance-defense-cooperation/ar-AAgxtSa?li=AA9X5pk
7
http://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/010542

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enjoyed by bilateral CARAT exercises will be retained, while introducing more realistic
and multilateral coordination structures. The types of activities conducted in the 10
separate CARAT events, across the region, from Bangladesh to Malaysia, have very
similar objectives. A typical CARAT exercise begins ashore with symposia and subject
matter expert exchanges, followed by 2 to 7 days at sea conducting everything fromhigh-end Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) to simple communications drills. Targeting
similar activities across two or more CARAT partners and agreeing to conduct thosemultilaterally allows for consolidation of somewhat redundant events. Overlapping
bilateral exercises allows for surface and air assets to be re-invested in much needed
training, certification, and maintenance activities, or re-allocated to meet the growing
demand signal in other regional exercises.
Figure 1: Overlapping traditionally bilateral exercises at the intersection of sharedsecurity concerns, allows for greater efficiency and effectiveness of training.

CARAT third parties are carefully being selected to guarantee that they add value
to the training and strengthen the existing relationships. Those additional partners sharegeography proximity or common training objectives. In some cases, the newmultilateral element may involve existing CARAT partners. For example, one could
envision a future CARAT event involving the United States, Bangladesh and thePhilippines, because both Bangladesh and the Philippines are already cooperatingclosely with the U.S. Navy as they integrate ex-Hamilton-class cutters and AW-109
helicopters into their fleets. Alternately, two neighboring Southeast Asian partners may
find it more effective and efficient to conduct HADR, SAR and anti-piracy training
events trilaterally because they recognize that forces of nature, drifting vessels, lostaircraft, and criminals do not respect political boundaries. In other cases, the multilateral52element may be introduced by bringing in a partner not previously involved in the
CARAT series. These extra-regional players can leverage their high-levels ofinteroperability with the U.S. to “plug in” to CARAT with sophisticated forces and add
immediate training value. The practical benefits of this sort of cooperation are clear.
While talking to reporters on the sidelines of the U.S.-sponsored multilateral Southeast
Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) exercise, Rear Admiral Charlie Williams,
Commander of Task Force 73 located in Singapore explained, “There is a great
opportunity in this region to take advantage of the already-existing individual exercises
between many of the countries, and come together to multilaterally affect betterinteroperability and better training at sea.”8This initiative is well underway, as a number of multilateral elements were
included in CARAT 2015. For example, the Australian Navy observed CARAT
Philippines, UK Royal Marines observed CARAT Indonesia, Portuguese and Australian
Forces had roles in CARAT Timor Leste, and the Philippine Navy observed CARATMalaysia. These events enabled the 7th Fleet and its CARAT partners to learn lessons
about the practical implementation of the Targeted Multilateral CARAT Initiative,
understand the nuanced complexities of adding new partners to longstanding events, andsolicit feedback from CARAT partners. The biggest take away from the 2015
pathfinding experiences was general concurrence regarding the value of this approachand shared assessment that the initiative’s integral flexibility ensures that both value andreturn on investment are assuredly to be approved. As a result, regional maritime
partners look forward to additional and more complex multilateral element in CARAT
2016.
Conclusion
The Targeted Multilateral CARAT Initiative is just one of the fresh new approaches the
7th Fleet is taking to network its cooperative endeavors in Southeast Asia. For example,
Bangladesh, Cambodia, and four national coast guards are expected to be first time
participants in SEACAT 2016 and the maritime components of the 2016 bilateral joint
exercises Cobra Gold and Balikatan in Thailand and the Philippines respectively
include a number of significant “first evers.” However, the advances being made in
CARAT are perhaps the clearest representation of what is truly new. Trust in thestrength of U.S. partnerships, the confidence built over time by regional cooperation,and the shared desire to be more effective and efficient are driving multilateral elements
into previously bilateral operational relationships. The resulting cooperative networks
8

http://www.todayonline.com/world/americas/us-rebalancing-brings-better-training-possibilities53

are fundamentally altering the dynamics of the 7th Fleets’ theater security cooperation inSoutheast Asia.

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