Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021
December 2021

AUTHORS
Barbara Buchner, Baysa Naran, Pedro Fernandes, Rajashree Padmanabhi, Paul Rosane,
Matthew Solomon, Sean Stout, Costanza Strinati, Rowena Tolentino, Githungo Wakaba,
Yaxin Zhu, Chavi Meattle, Sandra Guzmán.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank contributions from Angela Falconer, Caroline Dreyer, Daniela
Chiriac, Morgan Richmond, and Rob Kahn for advice, editing, and internal review, and Angela
Woodall, Josh Wheeling, Alice Moi, Julia Janicki, and Elana Fortin, for layout and graphic
design.
The authors also acknowledge contributions from Jake Connolly, Rob Macquarie, Greta
Dobrovich, Oisin Canney, and Priyam Deka for database maintenance, data cleaning,
research, and project support.
Contributing authors on blended finance for climate are Ayesha Bery, Nick Zelenczuk, andAndrew Apampa (Convergence).
The authors appreciate the review and guidance from the following experts outside CPI (inalphabetical order): Amelia Ash (BEIS), Charlene Watson (ODI), Hadrien Hainaut (I4CE),
Jane Ellis (OECD), Joe Thwaites (WRI), and Padraig Oliver (UNFCCC).
Data collaboration: The authors would like to thank Convergence, Climate Bonds Initiative,
and IEA as well as over 40 public development finance institutions for the continued datacollaboration.

ABOUT CPI
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Our mission is to help governments, businesses, and financial institutions drive economic
growth while addressing climate change. C​ PI has six offices around the world in Brazil, India,
Indonesia, Kenya, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Copyright © 2021 Climate Policy Initiative climatepolicyinitiative.org. All rights reserved. CPI welcomes the use of its material for noncommercial
purposes, such as policy discussions or educational activities, under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.
For commercial use, please contact admin@cpisf.org.

﻿​DESCRIPTORSSECTOR
Financial

REGION
GlobalKEYWORDS
Climate finance; adaptation; mitigation; private finance; public finance; renewable energy

RELATED CPI WORKS
Private Financial Institutions’ Commitments to Paris Alignment
Framework for Sustainable Finance Integrity
Net Zero Finance Tracker
Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2019CONTACT
Baysa Naranbaysa.naran@cpiglobal.org

MEDIA CONTACT
Caroline Dreyer
caroline.dreyer@cpiglobal.org

RECOMMENDED CITATION
Climate Policy Initiative. 2021. Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021.

SUPPORTED BY
Federal Ministry
for the Environment, Nature Conservation
and Nuclear Safetyiii

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

Figure 1: Global climate finance flows in 2019/20201

LANDSCAPE OF CLIMATE FINANCE IN 2019/2020

Global climate finance flows along their life cycle in 2019 and 2020. Values are average of two years’ data, in USD billions.

632

BN USD
ANNUALAVERAGESOURCES AND INTERMEDIARIESINSTRUMENTS

USES

SECTORS

Which type of organizations are sources orintermediaries of capital for climate finance?

What mix of financial
instruments are used?

What types ofactivities are financed?

What is thefinance used for?

Grants $36

Adaptation $46

Government Budgets $38
Development Finance Inst.

Infra. & Industry $36

Low-cost
Project Debt $47

National DFIs
$120

Dual Uses $15

NEBilateral DFIs $35

NE

Others &Cross-sectoral $50
Land Use $14

Project-level$232
market rate
debt $232

Multilateral DFIs
$65

Water $22

Multilat. Funds $4
SOEs $13

Transport $175

State-owned FIs$45
Other $6

Project-level
equity $51

Commercial FIs$122

Unknown $5
Debt $105

Funds $5

Households &Individuals $55

Balance Sheet
Financing$260

Corporations
$124

KEY

Mitigation$571

PUBLIC
MONEY

EnergySystems $334

Equity $155

PRIVATE
MONEY

PUBLIC FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIARIESNE
PRIVATE FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIARIES NOT ESTIMATED

Source: Climate Policy Initiative
1

CPI reports two-year averages (2019 and 2020) to smooth out annual fluctuations in data.

1

Executive Summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 2021 edition of the Global Landscape of Climate Finance (the Landscape) provides themost comprehensive overview of global climate-related primary investment (Figure 1).

KEY FINDINGS•

Total climate finance2 has steadily increased over the last decade, reaching USD 632
billion in 2019/2020, but flows have slowed in the last few years. This is a worrying
trend given that COVID-19’s impact on climate finance is yet to be fully observed. The
increase in annual climate finance flows between 2017/2018 and 2019/2020 was only
10% compared to previous periods, when it grew more than 24% (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Global climate finance flows between 2011– 2020, biennial averages(USD billion)
$700

632
574

$600

$500

463

$400 364

365

$300

$200

$100

0

2011/122013/142015/162017/18

2019/20

Note: 2020 investment numbers were based on preliminary estimates. CPI will update the estimates once further primary data on 2020
public international climate finance becomes available in 2022.

•

2

An increase of at least 590% in annual climate finance is required to meetinternationally agreed climate objectives by 2030 and to avoid the most dangerous
impacts of climate change.

The terms climate finance and climate investment are used interchangeably
2Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021•

Adaptation finance continues to lag. Finance for adaptation increased by 53% reaching
USD 46 billion in 2019/2020 compared to USD 30 billion in 2017/2018. Despite thispositive trend, total adaptation finance remains far below the scale necessary to respondto existing and future climate change. UNEP’s Adaptation Gap Report (UNEP, 2021)
estimates that annual adaptation costs in developing economies will be in the rangeof USD 155 to USD 330 billion by 2030. The public sector continues to provide almost
all adaptation financing, with adaptation increasingly being prioritized in development
finance climate portfolios, yet adaptation finance represented just 14% of total publicfinance. Moreover, data on adaptation finance from the private sector is still largely
missing.

SOURCES AND INTERMEDIARIES•

Public climate finance increased by 7% from 2017/2018, remaining largely stable at
51% (USD 321 billion) of the total. Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) continued todeliver the majority of public finance, contributing 68% (USD 219 billion). State-owned
financial institutions’ share increased to 14% in 2019/2020, partly due to improved dataon the flows in East Asia & Pacific, as well as an uptake of renewable energy financing in
the region. Direct finance flows (domestic and international) from governments increased
by 17% in 2019/2020, accounting for 12% of public flows (USD 38 billion) driven by lowcarbon transport and delivered primarily through grants.

•

Private climate investments increased by 13% from 2017/2018, to USD 310 billion.
While corporations accounted for the largest share (40%) of private climate finance,
commercial financial institutions made the biggest stride in growth, increasing their sharefrom 18% to 39% (USD 122 billion). Household spending is the third largest share ofannual private climate finance, driven largely by an annual consumer spending of USD 25
billion on electric vehicles in 2019/2020.

INSTRUMENTS•

The majority of climate finance — 61% (USD 384 billion) — was raised as debt, of which
12% (USD 47 billion) was low-cost or concessional debt. Equity investments, the nextlargest instrument category after debt, came to 33% of total climate finance, up from
29% during the previous period. Grant finance was USD 36 billion or 6% of total flows(compared to 5% in 2017/2018).

SECTORS

3•

Solar PV and onshore wind continued to be the main recipient of renewable energy
finance, attracting over 91% of all mitigation investment. Renewables were primarily
financed through private capital, reflecting the sector’s growing commercial viability.

•

Low-carbon transport is the fastest-growing sector, with an average increase of 23%
compared to 2017/2018. Investment tracked to private road transport (battery electricvehicles and chargers) accounted for 48% of low-carbon transport finance, building on
multiple years of government subsidy policies and falling technology costs.

Executive Summary•

Mitigation investment in hard-to-decarbonize sectors remained low, partly attributed
to limited data availability. Investments in the buildings & infrastructure sector and theindustry sector totaled USD 27.7 billion and USD 6.7 billion on average in 2019/2020,
respectively. Climate finance in industry is particularly hard to track as its processes areprone to confidentiality restrictions.

•

The largest share of adaptation investment went to ‘other & cross-sectoral’ activities,
followed by water & wastewater projects. Given the cross-cutting nature of adaptation
activities, the majority do not fit neatly into a single sectoral category, hence thepredominance of cross-sectoral3 projects reported in 2019/2020 (USD 22 billion, 47%).
Water and wastewater management activities followed at USD 17 billion (37%).

GEOGRAPHIES•

More than 75% of 2019/2020 tracked climate investments flowed domestically. Around
USD 479 billion of climate investments was raised and spent within the same country,
highlighting the continued importance of strengthening national policies, public financesystems, and domestic regulatory frameworks to encourage investments and address risk.
International flows registered an increase of USD 13 billion from 2017/2018 to reach USD
153 billion, primarily driven by increased public investments from DFIs.

•

Three-quarters of global climate investments were concentrated in East Asia & Pacific,
Western Europe, and North America, while the remaining regions received less than aquarter. East Asia & Pacific accounted for almost half (USD 292 billion) of 2019/2020
tracked global climate investments, up by USD 43 billion compared to 2017/18. An
estimated 81% of the investments in the East Asia & Pacific region were concentrated in
China.

•

Climate investment in the economically advanced regions of Western Europe, UnitedStates & Canada, and Oceania were primarily funded by private finance, while otherregions sourced their climate investments mostly from public sources.

3 Includes disaster-risk management, and biodiversity, land and marine conservation
4

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

CONCLUSIONS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
Figure 3: Global tracked climate finance flows and the average estimated annual climate investment needthrough 2050
(USD billion)$6,000$5,000$4,000$3,000$2,000$1,0000

2011-2020
2021
2030
2040
Actual climate finance Future climate finance necessary to maintain 1.5°C pathway

2050

1. Climate finance flows are nowhere near estimated needs, conservatively estimatedat USD 4.5 - 5 trillion annually (Figure 3). To achieve the transition to a sustainable,
net zero emissions, and resilient world this decade, climate investment must increase
drastically. High-emissions investments continue to flow in key sectors, curbing theimpact of new finance towards climate mitigation and adaptation. Climate investment
should count in the trillions, whereas fossil fuel investments, which exceed USD
850 billion4 annually, should dramatically decrease in this decade. Climate financecommitments also need to translate into action in the real economy, requiring all public
and private actors to align their investments with Paris goals and net zero, sustainable
pathways.
2. Filling the investment gap for adaptation is critical to achieving the goals of the Paris
Agreement. Finance to adaptation, from both public and private actors, must be scaledby orders of magnitude to respond to current and oncoming climate risks. Information
on investment in adaptation must also improve. The current limitations of adaptation
finance tracking, especially of private sector finance, hinders tracking of progress towards
a critical aspect of the Glasgow Climate Pact: increasing adaptation support for emerging
and developing economies, especially those that are the most vulnerable to the impactsof climate change.

4 Based on average investment numbers on upstream and downstream oil & gas, coal mining and related infrastructure and fossil fuel power
generation in 2019/2020 in IEA’s World Energy Investment 2021 report
5

Executive Summary

3. Improved and standardized definitions, methodologies, and data access are key toinform necessary climate investment decisions. Currently available disclosure initiatives
fall short of providing standardized information on climate investments. In addition,
to information on investment levels in adaptation, data in agriculture, forestry, otherland uses, and fisheries-related (AFOLU), buildings, and industrial sectors are scarce,
particularly from the private sector, and lack science-based standards. More data isalso required at the country level, including domestic public budget expenditures.
This information is essential to measure progress against the need, avoid resource
fragmentation and direct finance where it is needed to be most impactful.
4. We need credible and coordinated monitoring of commitments, with clear transition
plans that include interim goals. Achieving net zero by 2050 will require all public andprivate actors to align not only investment, but also practices, business models, andportfolios with the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C and increasing resilience to achanging climate. To achieve real economy impact, we need better oversight to ensurethat commitments are immediate, credible, and verifiable. As concluded in the Framework
for Sustainable Finance Integrity (CPI, 2021a), coordination across public and private
financial actors is also needed to ensure coherence and impact on resilience, net zero, andsustainability, with support from all sectors and aligned with the science.
5. Wider and better reporting on the interlinkages between climate finance and othersustainable development goals (SDGs) can help facilitate assessments of progress
towards a just and sustainable transition. Climate finance offers synergies for attaining
other SDGs simultaneously, however, currently the data is scarce. More granular reporting
can help assess the landscape of synergistic climate finance, directing attention to the
distribution of benefits across different beneficiaries (women, youth, rural and indigenous
populations) as well as the efficacy of flows.

6

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

CONTENTS

7

Introduction 

81.

Sources and Intermediaries 
1.1 Public Finance
1.2 Private Finance

10
10
12

2.

Instruments
2.1 Debt
2.2 Equity
2.3 Grants

15
15
16
17

3.

Mitigation Sectors
3.1 Energy Supply 
3.2 High Energy Demand Sectors
3.2.1
Transport
3.2.2
Building and Infrastructure
3.2.3
Industry

18
18
22
22
23
24

4.

Adaptation 
4.1 Vulnerabilty and Adaptation Finance
4.2 Sectors and Instruments

25
26
27

5.

Geography 
5.1 Domestic and International Flows
5.2 Origin and Destination of Finance

29
29
30

6.

Interlinkages with Other Sustainable Development Goals
6.1 Gender-tagging in Climate Finance

32
32

7.

Conclusions and Recommendations34

8.

Annex: Data tables

37

9.

References

41

Introduction

INTRODUCTION

While the COVID-19 pandemic was the pressing issue of 2020, it was also one of the threewarmest years on record (WMO, 2021). Economic losses from natural disasters in 2020
alone were estimated at USD 268 billion (AON, 2021). The 2021 IPCC report issued a “codered” for the planet, concluding that human caused global warming is “unequivocal” (IPCC,
2021). As the world navigates through the pandemic, finance is key to drive a sustainable,
net zero recovery and to achieve the goals established by the Paris Agreement.
Recovery programs and stimulus funds offered an opportunity for governments to steer the
direction of economic recovery towards a sustainable and climate-responsive path. However,
the integration of climate and green elements in recovery packages fell short of the need
(CPI and Vivid Economics, 2021). In addition, there are concerns that recovery efforts havechanged investment priorities away from climate action (UNEP, 2021).
However, there has been progress on a political level. The Glasgow Climate Pact, agreed
to at COP26, has underscored the urgency of making financial flows consistent with low
greenhouse gases and resilient development. Yet, the implementation of the Paris Agreement
still needs to be accelerated to avoid a temperature increase of more than 1.5°C. Thisrequires an understanding of where the world stands in terms of climate finance.
The 2021 Global Landscape of Climate Finance analyzes climate finance flows along theirlife cycle. First, we examine the sources and intermediaries of finance, followed by the
instruments used and the purposes and sectors served. We then present the geographic
profile of climate finance flows, before concluding with a discussion of the current outlook for
global climate finance and ways to improve tracking practices in the future.
The Landscape includes primary investment into productive assets at the project level tocapture new money targeting climate-specific outcomes - excluding secondary transactions
that involve money changing hands but no physical impact. This approach seeks to capturea non-double-counted estimate of financial flows. Finance provided through some financial
instruments such as guarantees, insurance, government revenue support schemes, and fiscal
incentives, or “intermediate output” investments in manufacturing or equipment sales, arenot counted due to the potential for double-counting and over-estimating project investment
costs.
While this report presents the most comprehensive information available, methodologicalissues and data limitations persist. Limited data availability prevents a full accountingof domestic government expenditures on climate finance (Box 7), and of private sector
investments in energy efficiency, transport, land use, and adaptation.

8

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

Figure 4: Tracked and untracked climate finance by actors and sectors
EnergySystems

PrivatePublic(International)

Public(Domestic)

Buildings &Infrastructure Transport

Industry

Land Use

Adaptation

Other

224

10

73

?

?

1

2

56

13

84

9

10

26

29

54

5

16

?

?

15

1

TrackedSome Tracking

Limited Tracking

Not Tracked

Note: Numbers in the boxes represent currently tracked annual climate finance flows in each sector (2019/2020 annual average in USD
billion)Box 1: Climate finance vs. Climate-aligned finance
Measuring primary investment in climate mitigation and adaptation is important, but only provides
part of the picture. Achieving net zero will require all public and private actors to set ambitious
science-based climate mitigation and resilience goals and align their practices, operations, andinvestment with the Paris agreement. Therefore, it is critical to track both qualitative and quantitative
data on capital allocation and real economy investment flows under three dimensions of Parisalignment: targets, integration, and flows. Aligning finance with Paris goals require organizations to
set intentions at a strategic level (targets), progressive integration in day-to-day operations and due
diligence (integration), and resulting in allocation into investment flows5.
Climate-Aligned FinanceTargets• Setting Paris-aligned, science based net zero targets• Setting climate mitigation and resilience goals• Targets for credible offsets

Finance flows• Deploying climate mitigation and adaptation finance• Aligning portfolio of financial assets with Paris goals• Financing early retirement of fossil fuel assets

Integration• Operationalizing targets into mandates, governance structures• Leading engagements with counterparties• Proactively engaging on climate policy• Stopping investment in high emissions asset• Screening operations for climate resilience• Disclosing climate risks• Tracking emissions and sustainability investment

5 Net Zero Finance Tracker. 2021. Tracking the private finance response to climate change in the UK. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/
publication/net-zero-finance-tracker/
91.

SOURCES AND INTERMEDIARIES

1.1

PUBLIC FINANCE

Public finance actors and intermediaries6 committed an annual average of
USD 321 billion in climate finance in 2019/2020, slightly more than half oftotal climate finance. This is a 7% increase from 2017/2018.
Figure 5: Climate finance by public sources (USD billion)
$350

$300

$250

$321

Other

$13

SOEs

$35

Bilateral DFIs

$38

Governments$45

State-owned FIs$65

Multilateral DFIs

$134

$120

National DFIs

2017/20182019/2020

$300
$25
$22
$32

$200

$150

$24
$57

$100

$50

0

Note: 2020 investment numbers were based on preliminary estimates. We will update the estimates once further primary data on the 2020
public international climate finance becomes available in 2022.

Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) continued to provide the majority of public finance,
contributing USD 220 billion annually. National DFIs are still the largest source of DFI flows,with the vast majority coming from East Asia & Pacific countries. Compared to 2017/2018
their tracked commitments fell by 10% in 2019/2020, which is partly related to changes in

6 Public finance includes funds provided by governments, their agencies and companies, state-owned entities and financial institutions, climate
funds, and development finance institutions (DFIs).
10

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

climate finance reporting by national DFIs in Western Europe. However, tracked adaptation
flows by national DFIs were up by almost USD 8 billion in 2019/2020.
Climate finance from multilateral DFIs increased by 13% in 2019/2020 and is expected tocontinue increasing as they raise their ambition. For example, many multilateral DFIs arecommitting that up to 50% of their financing will be climate-related by 2025, with additional
goals specifically for adaptation (MDBs, 2021). International Development Finance Club(IDFC) members also committed to collectively provide a cumulative total of more than USD
1 trillion of domestic and international climate finance by 2025 (IDFC, 2020).
State-Owned Financial Institutions7 (SOFIs) have increased their role as providers ofclimate finance, particularly in East Asia & Pacific, while finance flows from State-Owned
Entities (SOEs) have decreased. The increasing share of flows from SOFIs is indicative of
the growing role debt plays in financing the climate transition (Buckley and Trivedi, 2021).
Almost all tracked finance by SOFIs went to energy systems in 2019/2020. As moregovernments publicly commit to net zero transition, climate investment by SOEs and SOFIs
will be a key driver, especially in countries with a high amount of state ownership in power
infrastructure (Benoit, 2019).
Tracked climate finance from government budgets and agencies increased 17% to USD 38
billion in 2019/2020. Sixty percent of government climate finance is domestic, the sameas in 2017/2018. More precise data on international climate finance from governments will
become available in our 2022 update report.
Multilateral Climate Funds (MCFs) increased annual financing to USD 3.5 billion in
2019/2020, up 18% from 2017/2018. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) provided almost halfof the total finance from multilateral climate funds in 2019/2020, followed by the Global
Environment Facility (GEF) with 27% of the total. Forty percent of total MCF flows went
towards AFOLU projects. Forty-seven percent of MCF finance went to projects for adaptation
or with dual benefits, a much higher percentage than overall public finance.

7 In 2020 we changed our methodology to categorize state-owned entities (SOE) and state-owned financial institutions (FI) from private actors topublic actors.
11

1.

Sources and Intermediaries

1.2

PRIVATE FINANCE

Private actors8 provided 49% of total climate finance, an average of USD 310
billion per year during 2019/2020. This was a 13% increase from the USD
274 billion in 2017/2018.
Figure 6: Climate finance by private sources (USD billion)
$350

$310
$300

$250

$274

Other

$55

Households andIndividuals$122

Commercial FIs$124

Corporations

$53

$200

$48
$150

$100

$156
$50

0

2017/20182019/2020

Corporations account for the largest source of private finance representing 40% of private
flows in 2019/2020. However, the amount and share of private investment provided bycorporates has declined due to a drop in debt balance sheet financing for energy systems bycorporations. Greater access to debt financing from banks is allowing corporations to reduce
the amounts financed through balance sheets. Corporates allocated 75% of finance into
renewable energy projects, while low-carbon transport represented 20% in 2019/2020.
Commercial Finance Institutions made the biggest stride in growth, increasing their shareof private climate finance from 18% in 2017/2018 to 39% in 2019/2020. Energy systems
received 82% of banks’ climate finance in 2019/2020. Bank lending trends are starting tomove into clean energy assets (Buckley & Trivedi, 2021), however major banks’ averageannual lending for fossil fuel expansion continues to be very high. The world’s 60 largest
commercial and investment banks have collectively put USD 3.8 trillion into fossil fuels from2016 to 2020 (Rainforest Action Network et al., 2021).

8 We consider five categories of private actors: non-financial corporations, commercial financial institutions (banks), households, institutional
investors (including asset managers, insurance companies, and pension funds), and a mixture of private equity, venture capital, and infrastructure
funds.
12

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

Spending from households increased to USD 55 billion in 2019/2020, up from USD 53
billion in 2017/2018. Households’ annual spending on battery electric vehicles (BEVs) was
USD 25 billion in 2019/2020, down USD 5 billion from 2017/2018. This decrease is due to an
improved assumption and data points on BEV purchases by corporates.9 The deployment ofsmall-scale solar panels reached USD 25 billion, which is led by the United States and China.
Solar water heaters account for the remaining climate finance spent by households.
In 2019/2020, direct climate finance from institutional investors and funds was USD
3.2 billion and USD 5.3 billion, respectively, mostly in renewable energy generation.
Institutional investors tend to refinance or acquire renewable energy projects, which are
excluded in the Landscape to avoid double counting. However, despite their large shareof assets under management, institutional investors’ share of total private climate financeremains marginal, at 1%, due to several barriers such as low risk appetite, a need for larger
project size, and lack of policy incentives. Blended finance has a significant potential in
overcoming these barriers and catalyzing investment at scale.

913

Please refer to the methodology document for further details.

1.

Sources and Intermediaries

Box 2: Blended finance for climate change (by Convergence10)10Blended finance is the use of concessional (priced below market-rate) capital, provided by public orphilanthropic investors, to crowd-in private sector investments towards sustainable development.
Since the launch of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, climate finance has
consistently represented a prominent segment of the blended finance market; between 2015-2020,
nearly half (47%) of closed blended transactions targeted climate-related outcomes (159 deals out of
336 total deals).
Approximately USD 39.1 billion of blended finance from 2015-2020 was directed towards climatefocused investment opportunities. The bulk of these transactions (84%) address climate change
mitigation – this includes transactions with a hybrid mitigation-adaptation or dual benefits mandate.
Meanwhile, 31% of deals had a focus on climate adaptation over that same timespan.
Multilateral DFIs were the most common source of public blended climate finance from 2015-2017(35% of all public blended climate finance commitments), while national/bilateral DFIs became
more active in blended climate finance between 2018-2020 (31% of commitments). Conventional
debt remains the most frequently used investment instrument (40% in 2018-2020), however
Convergence (2021) sees a growing inclination among public institutions to invest through equity(28% in 2018-2020, up from 24% in 2015-2017).
There has been a steady increase in private sector blended finance activity in recent years, which
accounted for 47% of total commitments between 2018 and 2020, compared to 33% between
2015 and 2017. This suggests the market for climate finance is maturing for certain sectors, e.g.
renewables, while it still does not invest in adaptation. Since 2018 institutional investors account for
54% of private sector blended finance commitments. As with public investors, the private sector isincreasingly investing via equity instruments (54% in 2018-2020 vs. 40% in 2015-2017).

Figure 7: Public and private actor shares of blended climate financePublic23%

20%

Private21%

Climate Funds
and Programs

18%

Governments

30%

MDBs

28%

31%

DFIs

32%

15%

8%

Corporates

14%

Asset Managers

54%

Institutional Investors

24%

Financial Institutions

28%

35%

22%
2015–20172018–2020

2015–20172018–2020

Source: Convergence Blended Finance

10 Convergence Blended Finance https://www.convergence.finance/
14

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

2. INSTRUMENTS11

Market rate debt, through project or corporate finance, was the largest
financial instrument used to channel climate finance in 2019/2020, at USD
337 billion per year and accounting for 53% of the total. Equity investments
and grants accounted for 33% and 6% of total climate finance, respectively.
Figure 8: Climate finance by instrument (USD billion)
$632
$574

$36

Unknown
Grant

$384

Debt

$206

Equity

$27

$463

$379
$306

$167

$140

2015/162017/18

2.1

2019/20DEBT

The majority of climate finance was raised as debt, accounting for USD 384 billion in
2019/2020 or 61% of total climate finance. Of the total debt finance, USD 337 billion wasprovided at market rate, representing 53% of total tracked climate finance. Renewableenergy systems received 57% of market-rate debt flows both in 2017/2018 and 2019/2020.
Out of the total market-rate debt, USD 232 billion annually in 2019/2020 was provided
at the project level, while debt issued directly through balance sheets averaged USD
105 billion. Project-level debt was mostly directed to low-transport and renewable energy

11 The Landscape categorizes transactions by the instrument used to structure the provision of finance by one actor to another or to specific climate
projects. It includes both debt and equity instruments, both of which are differentiated between arrangements at the project level (i.e. relying on the
project’s cash flow for repayment) and on balance sheets (i.e. funded by the assets of the recipient institution or entity). Grants, which do not usuallyrequire repayment, are the final category.
15

2.

Instruments

systems projects (41% andFigure9:by
Debtby(USD
type (USD
billion)Debt
typebillion)
38% of all project level market$384
rate debt, respectively). Public$379
institutions provided 75%
Low-cost project debt
$47
$65
of project-level market-rate
debt in 2019/2020, primarily
Balance sheet financing$105
multilateral and national(debt portion)$94
DFIs. Commercial financial
institutions and SOFIs were
responsible for raising 65%
and 32% of balance sheet
Project-level market
debt, respectively, for direct
$232
$219
rate debt
expenditure in renewableenergy projects. This
represents a change in thetype of institutions responsible
2017/18
2019/20for the majority of debt
balance sheet financing, as in2017/2018 corporates (77%) and SOEs (14%) used this type of instrument the most.
Climate finance provided in the form of low-cost project-level debt reached USD 47 billion
annually in 2019/2020, 94% of which came from DFIs. This represents a decrease from the
USD 65 billion from the 2017/2018 annual average, partially reversing an increase of USD 19
billion in 2015/2016.

2.2

EQUITY

Equity investments increased
its share of total climate
finance flows, at 33% in
2019/2020 compared to 29%
in 2017/2018. While equity
continues to flow mainly torenewable energy systems,
the increase of equity finance
was led by the transport andbuildings & infrastructure
sectors, each having USD 28
billion equity flows increases
when compared to 2017/2018.
Like debt, equity investments
can be at the project levelor can be placed directly on
investors’ balance sheets.

Equitytypeby(USDbillion)Figure10:by
Equitytype (USD
billion)
$206
$167

$51

Project-level equity$155

Balance sheet financing(equity portion)

$45

$122

2017/20182019/2020

In 2019/2020, balance sheet equity investments by private firms and public entities
represented 48% of total equity finance, accounting for USD 100 billion in annual flows.
Including household and individuals’ investment, which the Landscape also classifies as
16

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

balance sheet equity, this figure increased to USD 155 billion, or 75% of total equity finance.
Sixty percent went to energy systems, 31% to low-carbon transport, and 9% to buildings andinfrastructure.
Annual financing through project-level equity, accounting for the remaining 25% of total
equity, increased by USD 6 billion to USD 51 billion in 2019/2020. Seventy-seven percent
went to energy systems, while 13% went to transport.

2.3

GRANTS

FigureGrants typeby provider
type (USD billion)
Grants
by11:
provider(USD billion)

The total amount of grants$36
increased, as public actors seek to
Unknownbuild strong enabling environments
and undertake projects across$27
Domestic$13
a range of sectors. Annual grant
finance averaged USD 36 billion$10(6% of total flows) in 2019/2020
compared to USD 27 billion (5%)
in 2017/2018. Fifty-five percent of
tracked grants in 2019/2020 wereInternational$20$16
made internationally, out of which
Sub-Saharan Africa received thelargest part (28%). For domestic
grants, the largest sector share2017/20182019/2020(37%) went into electrical vehicles.
Increased grant finance reflects
the ongoing need for public flows to reach more challenging sectors and geographies. For
instance, 22% of international grants were in the AFOLU sector, of which 82% went towards
adaptation or projects with dual benefits (adaptation and mitigation objectives).

17

3.

Mitigation Sectors

3. MITIGATION SECTORS

3.1

ENERGY SUPPLY12

Investments in energy supply reached an average USD 334 billion per year in
2019/2020, representing 58% of total mitigation finance and 53% of total
climate finance13.
Figure 12: Energy supply investments by sector and as a share of mitigation finance (2019/2020)
At $334 bn, energy supply
represented 58% of total
mitigation finance in 2019/20

58%

97%

Renewable Energy, $324 bn

Power & Heat
Transmission, $8 bn

2%
Policy support, capacity
building, and Other, $2 bn

RENEWABLE ENERGY
Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the global economy, average annual
renewable energy investments remained stable in 2019/2020 compared to 2017/2018.
Notably, due to dramatic cost reductions in solar and wind technologies (Box 3), the samelevel of investment in 2019/2020 translated into greater capacity additions than it did in
2017/2018. Despite annual fluctuations in renewable energy finance commitments, annual
capacity additions have consistently reached record-high levels, including in 2020 when 260
GW of renewables were added globally, 43% higher than in 2019 (182 GW) and 51% higher
than the average in 2017/2018 (173 GW) (IRENA, 2021a).

12 Energy supply investments include investments in renewable fuel production (i.e., biofuels and biogas), renewable power, and heat generation
assets, transmission and distribution networks, as well as support to policy and national budget and capacity building.
13 The larger volume of renewable energy investment compared to other climate sectors is, at least partially, explained by better data coverage andavailability for this sector as in section 1.3 Data Gaps. As a result, renewables represent a larger proportion of overall tracked climate finance thanthey would if more comprehensive data were available in other sectors.
18

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

Box 3: Renewable energy cost reductions - more with less
The levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) of solar and wind technologies have consistently declined overtime due to competition, innovation, and upscaling of production. Between 2010 and 2020, the global
weighted-average LCOE for utility-scale solar PV and CSP dropped by 85% and 68%, respectively(IRENA, 2021b), while those of onshore and offshore wind projects fell by 56% and 48%, respectively(Figure 13). This downward trend continued in 2020, when the LCOE of newly commissioned onshore
wind projects declined by 13%, compared to 2019, followed by offshore wind (down 9%), and utilityscale solar PV (down by 7%).
Figure 13: Global LCOEs from newly commissioned, utility-scale renewable power generation technologies (2010-2020)
2020
USD/kWh
0.4

95th percentile
0.381
0.340

0.3

0.2

5th percentile
0.162
0.108

0.1
0.076

0.076

0.071

0.049

0

2010

2020

2010

Biomass

2020

Geothermal

0.057

0.044

0.038

2010

2020

Hydro

Fossil fuelcost range

0.089
0.084

2010

2020

Solar
Photovoltaic

0.039

2010

2020

Concentrating
solar power

2010

2020

Offshore
wind

2010

2020

Onshorewind

Source: IRENA 2021b.

In terms of technologies, solar PV and wind (both onshore and offshore) attracted 91%
of renewable energy investments in 2019/2020 (Figure 14). Other technologies, such as
bioenergy, hydropower, solar thermal (including CSP), and geothermal accounted for muchsmaller shares, between 0.3 - 3%.
Figure 14: Renewable energy investments by sector as a share of mitigation finance (2019/2020)
At $324 bn, renewable energy
represented 57% of total
mitigation finance in 2019/20

Solar PV, $137 bn

42%

57%

3%

Other, $10 bn

3%

Bioenergy, $8 bn

2%Hydropower, $8 bn

39%
Onshore wind, $126 bn

1%
10%
19

Solar thermal including
CSP, $2 bn
Offshore wind, $31bn

3.

Mitigation Sectors

Geographic concentration has been a feature of renewable energy investments forsome time now. In line with overall mitigation finance flows, in 2019/2020 the majority of
renewable energy investments were made in the East Asia & Pacific region, mainly China andJapan, followed by Western Europe, and the United States & Canada. Since 2013, these three
regions have consistently attracted 65-75% of global investments, while developing andemerging economies continue to remain underrepresented (IRENA and CPI, 2020).
Compared to other mitigation sectors, renewables attract higher shares of private finance.
Renewables are primarily financed through private capital, which reached USD 222 billion
In 2019/2020, with an additional USD 101 billion coming from public sources (Figure 15).
These shares remained stable compared to 2017/2018, when private finance was 68% of
the total. The need for lower public finance owes to the commercial viability and higher
competitiveness of some renewable energy technologies, which makes them particularly
attractive for private investors, irrespective of public support.
Figure 15: Investment by public/private source: renewables vs. mitigation

All mitigation sectors(USD billion)
$600

$571

$500

$400

$300

46%

Public54%

PrivateRenewables
$324

$324

32%

31%

$200

$100

0

68%

69%

2017/20182019/20202019/2020

Among private investors, commercial financial institutions provided most of the capitalfor renewables in 2019/2020 (USD 104 billion per year), followed by corporations andthen households. Public finance for renewables came in mainly via SOFIs, which provided
USD 45 billion per year, doubling their share in total public finance compared to 2017/2018.
National DFIs (were the second-largest source of public investment in 2019/2020 (USD 28
billion per year), though their average annual commitments were down by 22% compared to
2017/2018.

20

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION
Global tracked investments in transmission and distribution (T&D) reached USD 8 billion
per year in 2019/2020, mostly from the public sector. This USD 3 billion increase from2017/2018 is an encouraging trend. As the share of variable renewable energy (VRE) in
power systems increases, power system flexibility components (such as smart grids, storage
technologies, demand side management, and sector-coupling, among others) will be criticalto advance VRE integration in the grid (IRENA, 2019). SOEs and national DFIs provided
nearly half of the annual investments, followed by multilateral DFIs.
Box 4: Phasing out investment in fossil fuels
While renewable energy investments have increased over time, the current level of investment needs
to at least triple to put the world on a 1.5°C trajectory by 2050).
Figure 16: Annual renewable energy investments (2015-2020) vs average investment needs through 2050
(USD billion)
2,000

1.9 tn/yr

1,800

BNEF Green Scenario

1,600
1,400
1,200

1.2 tn/yr

1,000

1.1 tn/yr

800

831 bn/yr

IEA NZE Scenario
IRENA 1.5C Scenario
BNEF Red Scenario

600
400

295

324

324

2015/162017/18

2019/20

200
0

2021

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

Source: IRENA 2021b.

Higher renewable energy investments need to be urgently coupled with lower investments in fossil
fuel. In 2020, 58% of utility-scale electricity generated globally still came from fossil fuels (IEA,
2021). This needs to dramatically change if the world is to achieve the international objectives agreed
under the Paris Agreement and reiterated in Glasgow at COP26. Over the past decade, renewableenergy assets and portfolios have shown better financial performances than fossil fuels and, more
recently, have demonstrated stronger resilience during the COVID-19 pandemic (Imperial College
Business School and IEA, 2021; IRENA, 2021c).
Moving forward, fossil fuel projects will become riskier, and more difficult to finance as governments
and financial institutions (public and private) commit to phasing out fossil fuel investments.
Green recovery plans and net zero strategies approved by governments, particularly in developed
economies, suggest that future policies and measures will favor clean energy over fossil fuels, further
increasing the risk and costs of investments in conventional assets. This might include, for example,
lower or no subsidies for fossil fuels and/or clean energy mandates or quotas. For example, at COP26,
39 countries and financial institutions pledged to end international public finance for fossil fuels by
202214.

14 Available at: https://ukcop26.org/statement-on-international-public-support-for-the-clean-energy-transition/
21

3.

Mitigation Sectors

3.2

HIGH ENERGY DEMAND SECTORS

Together, the transport, buildings, and industry sectors have been driving global energy
demand for years. Decarbonization therefore relies on their transformation. Despite deepand complex transition issues for these sectors, their GHG emissions mitigation strategies
share three pillars: energy sobriety, energy efficiency, and low-carbon energy sources.

3.2.1

TRANSPORT

Low-carbon transport15 finance reached an all-time high of USD 173 billion per year,
accounting for 31% of all mitigation climate finance. The transport sector, the second largest
after energy systems, was the fastest-growing sector reporting an average increase of 23%
compared to 2017/2018. While a large share of the flows (43%) is difficult to categorize
further due to reporting limitations, some sub-sectors stand out.

Figure 17: Investments in low-carbon transport as a share of total mitigation finance (left) and by sub-sector(right)At $173 bn, low-carbon
transport represented 31%
of total mitigation financein 2019/20

Private Road Transport,$82.5 bn47%

31%

Rail & Public Transport$13.4 bn

9%
Other / Unspecified,$75.4 bn

43%
1%

Various, $1.8 bn

Investment tracked to private road transport—BEVs and EV chargers—accounted for
48% of low-carbon transport finance. In 2020, global BEV sales growth accelerated +31%
y-o-y, driven by surging sales in Europe (+108%), in spite of the pandemic and an overall
global vehicle market drop of 16% compared to 2019 (IEA, 2021b). This market expansion
resulted in a record high USD 78 billion of investments in BEVs in 2019/2020, 28% above
2017/2018 levels. In recent years, falling battery costs and subsidy policies have been making
BEVs cheaper over time, contributing to their popularity. Although investments in BEVs are
growing fast, they still represented only a fraction (4%) of the USD 2 trillion global LDV(light-duty vehicle) market (AutoMobilSport, 2019 & 2020). According to a selection of
scenarios aligned with the Paris Agreement, annual spending in BEVs and EV chargers should
sit between USD 543 billion and USD 765 billion through 2030 (BNEF, 2021; IRENA, 2021a;
IEA, 2021a), whereas current investment is USD 82.5 billion.

15 Tracked mitigation solutions in the transport sector include electrification, modal shifts, and energy efficiency. They range across alltransportation modes: road, rail, waterway, and aviation. Data quality and coverage varies from one mitigation solution to the other.
22

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

With expiring subsidy policies, private actors play an increasing role in BEV finance.
Government incentives covered 24% of BEV price in 2019, which decreased to only 10% in
2020. In 2019/2020, household down payments accounted for 32% of BEV expenditures,
while investment for corporation fleet additions reached 26%. The remaining 27% of private
financing were auto loans from commercial banks.16
Investment in EV chargers remained steady between 2019 and 2020 at around USD 4.3
billion per annum. Investment was led by government and corporate spending on publicchargers (84%) and was concentrated in East Asia & Pacific (61%). However, charging
infrastructure is lagging given the current electric vehicle deployment rates17.
Investment levels in the low-carbon rail & public transport sub-sector remains insufficient,
especially when compared to road transport. In 2019/2020, USD 13.4 billion was invested
annually in low-carbon rail & public transport18. Finance tracked primarily came from public
investors (69%), with bilateral DFIs leading the way (25%). Governments and multilateral
DFIs followed at around 19% each. Estimating the need remains a challenge as several
reports provide accounts for total rail project financing while we only track projects with clear
mitigation objectives. In its ‘High Rail Scenario,’ the IEA (2019) estimates that the averageannual investment need through 2050 is USD 770 billion, while annual investment in railtransport infrastructure in 35 major countries averaged USD 187 billion between 2015 and2017 (OECD, 2021(1)).

3.2.2 BUILDING AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Tracked finance in low-carbon buildings & infrastructure19 totaled USD 27.7 billion in
2019/2020. Limited data availability – especially in the private sector – means the tracked
finance in building and infrastructure represents only a partial view of mitigation investment.
However, some sub-sectors and solutions offer better data quality and coverage. Investment
in distributed solar thermal water heaters reached USD 14 billion in 2019/2020 and wereconcentrated in East Asia & Pacific (65%), and Western Europe (12%). DFI finance forenergy efficiency in buildings averaged USD 13 billion in 2019/2020, with an almost even
distribution between bilateral and multilateral DFIs. These figures cover investment in both
new green buildings and energy efficiency retrofits.20
In scenarios aligned with Paris goals, annual investment in buildings’ energy efficiency
and electrification, district heat, and renewable direct use need to reach between USD
480 billion and USD 1.1 trillion over the 2021-2050 period (IEA, 2021a; IRENA, 2021a).
Even when using top-down estimates of current investment levels in these activities (USD
182 billion per year in 2019/2020; IEA, 2021c; IRENA, 2021a), these need figures would still
represent a great and rapid increase.

16 These are estimates calculated using our updated methodology to break down BEV expenditures, using IEA aggregated data.
17 In the EU, most countries failed to meet their publicly accessible charger to EV ratio targets in 2020 (IEA, 2021b; EU, 2014).
18 Mitigation solutions in this sub-sector include the deployment of efficient fleets (new or retrofits) and rail infrastructure with demonstrated
mitigation potentials
19 Mitigation finance in the building sector combines solutions that improve energy performance of buildings and certain renewable technologies
with direct onsite production and use.
20 Together with this report, CPI publishes a methodological brief to improve the tracking of energy efficiency investment in buildings, using new
data from certified green buildings. Available at: https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/incremental-investments-in-energy-efficiencyin-green-buildings/
23

3.

Mitigation Sectors

3.2.3 INDUSTRY
Tracking mitigation finance in the industry sector comes with a series of challenges,
ranging from data availability to methodological issues on what activities and solutions
should be accounted for. In 2019/2020 tracked mitigation investments flowing to theindustrial sector remained low, averaging USD 7 billion per year. All tracked mitigation
investments came from public entities, mostly from bilateral and multilateral DFIs (96% of
the total flows) and mainly from Western Europe DFIs. The IEA, however, estimates thatindustry investment in energy efficiency alone reached USD 45 billion in 2019 (2020 (3)).
The disparity with CPI levels of tracked finance could come from confidentiality restrictions
that many industrial processes are prone to, making project-level tracking approaches lessrepresentative of current investment levels than the IEA’s top-down estimates.
In many low-carbon scenarios, emissions cuts in the industry sector rely on the emergenceand mainstreaming of carbon capture technologies (CCUS). Excluding CCUS innovations,decarbonizing industry to levels compatible with the Paris Agreement would require averageannual investment between USD 280 billion and USD 448 billion through 2050(IEA, 2021a;
IRENA, 2021a).

Box 5: Land use and other mitigation finance
Mitigation finance in AFOLU reached USD 8.1 billion on average in 2019/2020. Tracking thesefinancial flows is difficult as data reporting from private actors is scarce (close to all tracked financecame from public sources, 84% from multilateral and national DFIs alone) and many reported
investments lack transparency on the uses of finance (43% are defined as general mitigation in
AFOLU). However, workable data shows at least USD 3.4 billion helped finance forestry projects,
and at least USD 2.3 billion went to agriculture, more than half of which was clearly directed towards
sustainable crops, agro-forestry, and livestock production.
However, with COP26’s Global Methane Pledge (2021) and countless net zero commitments
announced this year (CPI, 2021d), mitigation finance in the AFOLU sector has a much greater role toplay than what current finance levels suggest. Indeed, agriculture alone accounts for 40% of global
methane emissions (Climate & Clean Air Coalition, 2021), and multiplying net zero pledges call for an
increased use of carbon offsets such as natural carbon sinks.

24

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

4. ADAPTATION

Adaptation finance gained momentum in 2019/2020, increasing 53% to anannual average of USD 46 billion from USD 30 billion in 2017/2018; however,adaptation still accounts for just 7% of total climate finance based on
available data.21
Adaptation finance increased across public actors but remains well short of estimatedcosts for 2020-2030. This increase reflects a broader positive trend where public actors arerecognizing the importance of climate-resilient development and building the capacity torespond to the physical risks of climate change. Despite the increase in adaptation finance,
total volumes continue to fall far short of the estimated annual USD 180 billion that could
generate USD 7.1 trillion in total net benefits over the 10 years from 2020-2030 (GCA,2021).22 The UNEP Adaptation Gap Report (UNEP, 2021) also estimates that overall annual
adaptation costs in developing economies alone could reach between USD 155 to USD 330
billion by 2030 and USD 310 to USD 555 billion by 2050.23 The 2021 Adaptation Gap Reportnotes that the actual costs are likely towards the upper end of these ranges, estimated in2016, particularly if Paris goals are not met.24
Almost all adaptation finance tracked in the Landscape was funded by public actors.
Adaptation finance accounted for 14% of total public finance flows, a slight increase from
12% in 2017/2018. Multilateral DFIs accounted for the largest share of adaptation finance(USD 16.1 billion) closely followed by National DFIs (15.4 billion). Commitments from all DFIs
together accounted for 80% of total adaptation financing (USD 36.8 billion), with adaptation
increasingly being prioritised in development finance climate portfolios.

21 Conclusions regarding the level of private adaptation finance are likely to be less robust than those pertaining to public sector commitments,
given conceptual and methodological difficulties involved with tracking private sector adaptation investment.
22 Globally, in five key areas: early warning systems; climate-resilient infrastructure; improved dryland agriculture crop production; global mangrove
protection; and resilient water resources.
23 Adaptation costs are generally used as the basis for discussions regarding investment needs (see Parry et al., 2009)24 The UNEP Adaptation Gap Report (UNEP, 2021) also notes that a more detailed and systemic stocktake of the costs of adaptation and financeneeds would be a significant analytical value-add.
25

4.

Adaptation

Figure 18: Sources of adaptation finance

Multilateral DFI,
$16.1 bn
National DFIs,$15.4 bn

35%

Government, $6.5 bn
Bilateral DFI, $5.4 bn

PublicMultilateral Climate
Funds, $0.6 bn

34%

Public Funds, $0.6 bn
Other, $0.3 bn

14%
12%

Corporations, $0.5 bn
Institutional
Investors, $0.5 bn

PrivateThe minimal amount of tracked private adaptation finance is due to a confluence ofchallenges: there are both barriers to mobilizing private sector investment in adaptationand limitations on tracking the private sector adaptation investment that does occur.
Barriers to private sector investment in adaptation include concerns from private sector
actors about the bankability of adaptation activities and limited internal capacity toidentify and develop adaptation project pipeline. Alongside investment barriers, tracking
the adaptation finance that is flowing is difficult due to challenges associated with context
dependency, confidentiality restrictions, uncertain causality, and a lack of agreed-upon
impact metrics (Richmond & Hallmeyer, 2019). Despite the low level of tracked private
adaptation finance, the WBG (2021) concludes that it is “mission possible” to unlock private
sector investment in adaptation and resilience, provided a complementary set of policies
and incentives are in place. Private sector participation is essential in order to close theadaptation gap.

4.1

VULNERABILTY AND ADAPTATION FINANCE

The largest recipient of international adaptation finance is Sub-Saharan Africa, which
received the greatest share (25%) of international adaptation flows in 2019/2020.
Recognizing that vulnerability indices differ, according to ND-GAIN (2021) the mostvulnerable countries to the impact of climate change are in Sub-Saharan Africa. While
the positive correlation between vulnerability and international adaptation investment isencouraging, investment levels still fall magnitudes short of the region’s needs. It is estimatedthat the adaptation financing gap in Sub-Saharan Africa is USD 12.4-13.1 billion (CIF, 2016),
almost double the tracked investments.

26

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

Figure 19: Adaptation finance by region (USD billion)
US & Canada
Western Europe

Domestic$0.3$1.1 $2

Middle East & North Africa

$2

$2.5

Central Asia & Eastern Europe

$2.5

$2.5

Transregional

$2.7

$2.7

South Asia

$4.2

$4.3

Latin America & Caribbean

$4.3

$4.6

Sub-Saharan Africa

International

$7.3

$7.3

East Asia and Pacific

$14.7

$4.8

$19.5

4.2 SECTORS AND INSTRUMENTS
The largest share of adaptation investment went to ‘other & cross-sectoral’ activities,
followed by water & wastewater projects. Given the cross-cutting nature of adaptation
activities, the majority do not fit neatly into a single sectoral category, hence thepredominance of cross-sectoral25 projects reported in 2019/2020 (USD 22 billion, 47%).
Water and wastewater management activities followed at USD 17 billion (37%).
Figure 20: Adaptation finance by source and instrument
I NSTR UMEN TS
Grant
Low-cost
Project Debt

$9.6 bn, 21% of adaptation finance$11.4 bn, 25,$21.6 bn

%

47%

U SES
Adaptation$46
Dual Uses $15

Unknown47%

b n , 10%
$1. 2
bn, 3%

Others &Cross-sectoral
Land Use

Transport$1.5 bn, 3b$ 1 .7n,%

4%

Mitigation$571

Balance Sheet
Financing

25 Includes disaster-risk management and biodiversity, land and marine conservation
27

SECTORS
Water
Infra. & Industry$21.7,$ 4 .4

Project-level$232
market rate
debt

Project-level
equity$17 bn, 37% of adaptation finance

EnergySystems

4.

Adaptation

Across all sectors, project-level market rate debt was the most common financing
instrument, followed by a more even split between low-cost project debt and grants. Oxfam(2020) cautions against an international climate finance architecture overwhelmingly built
upon non-concessional loans, the result of which could be rising, and in some cases,
unsustainable debt among the world’s poorest countries. Vulnerable small island developing
states (SIDS) already face high debt burdens, particularly since the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic, and could, therefore, benefit from so-called debt-for-climate swaps (Thomas &Theokritoff, 2021).
Box 6: Dual benefits finance
USD 14.8 billion (2% of total global climate finance) flowed to projects that reduce both climate
vulnerability and GHG emissions. Out of this, 86% (or USD 12.7 billion) was from public actors. A
majority (USD 9 billion) of dual benefit climate finance went into ‘others & cross sectoral’ projects
followed by AFOLU, and water & waste sector. The largest recipients of dual benefits climate
finance were Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America & Caribbean, and East Asia & Pacific. Bilateral DFIs,
government, and multilateral DFIs were the largest source of dual benefit climate finance, totaling
USD 11.6 billion. Grants were the most popular financing instrument totaling USD 6.7 billion or 45% of
public dual benefit climate finance.

Figure 21: Dual benefits finance
INSTRUMENTS
Grant
Low-cost
Project Debt

$6.9 bn, 46% of$ 2 . 3 b n, 16%

dua

l us

es fi

nanc
e

USES
Adaptation
$46
$1.8

Dual Uses $15$ 2 . 3 b n, 1 6%

2%
bn, 1

of d

ua l

a n ceuses fin

Infra. & Industry$9 bn, 61%$1.8 bn,

13%

Project-level$232
market rate
debt

Project-level
equityUnknown

Balance Sheet
Financing

SECTORS
Water

Others &Cross-sectoral
Land Use

Transport
$3 bn

, 20

%

$1

.5

bn,

11%

Mitigation

EnergySystems

28

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

5. GEOGRAPHY

This section presents the domestic and international flows of tracked climate finance. It
profiles regional flows of investments in terms of origin, destination, uses, private and public
sources, and instruments.

5.1

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL FLOWS

Three-quarters of 2019/2020 tracked climate investments (USD 479 billion) flowed
domestically, highlighting the continuing need to strengthen national policies and domestic
regulatory frameworks to encourage domestic investments and address risk. The remaining
USD 153 billion flowed internationally to fund projects across borders. The internationalflows registered an increase of 8% from 2017/2018, primarily driven by the increased public
investments from multilateral and national DFIs.
More than half (58%) of the climate projects funded domestically were from private
sources. The USD 310 billion of private climate finance mainly targeted projects at thedomestic level, with only 11% flowing to international territories. Although the USD 321 billion
tracked public finance was also primarily invested domestically, 37% financed international
projects, making it the principal source (79%) of tracked international investments.
High shares of domestic flows dominated in Western Europe, United States & Canada, andEast Asia & Pacific, accounting for 76% of the global flows. It is estimated that 92% of theclimate finance that went to the United States & Canada, and East Asia & Pacific were raised
and spent domestically, and 71% for Western Europe (Figure 22). Inversely, a higher shareof international finance was observed in the developing regions of Sub-Saharan Africa andSouth Asia, the majority of which were directed towards projects with cross-sectoral impacts
and those related to energy systems and AFOLU and fisheries.
Figure 22: Domestic and international climate finance flows by region of destination (USD billion,
2019/2020 annual average)
Transregional$10

Other Oceania$9Middle East
& North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa$18 $20

Central Asia
& Eastern Europe $17
Latin America& Caribbean $16$31$15 $32$19$35

US & Canada

$76

$83

Western Europe

$74

$31

East Asia & PacificInternational$16

South Asia $11 $19

29

Domestic

$105
$270

$22

$292

5.

Geography

5.2

ORIGIN AND DESTINATION OF FINANCE

A majority of climate finance flowed to East Asia & Pacific, Western Europe, and theUnited States & Canada, while only a quarter went to other regions. East Asia & Pacificremained the primary destination, accounting for 46% of global flows, up by USD 43 billion
from 2017/2018. We estimate that 81% of the investments in the East Asia & Pacific region
were concentrated in China, attributed to strong public spending on climate projects andconducive national policies for domestic investment.
Climate projects in economically advanced regions of Western Europe, United States &Canada, and “other Oceania” were primarily funded by private finance, while the rest of
the regions sourced their climate investments mostly from public sources. The highest
dependency (88%) on public finance was observed in Sub-Saharan Africa, underpinning thecritical role of public institutions and governments in driving climate actions in economicallyconstrained and vulnerable countries, as well as the importance of using public financestrategically to further mobilize private funds towards these territories.
Non-OECD countries were principally funding their own climate needs. Of the total amountof tracked climate investments, 52% were sourced from non-OECD countries, 36% from
OECD countries, and the remaining have unknown sources. Non-OECD countries were theprincipal destination of tracked climate finance, obtaining 64% or USD 401 billion of thetotal global flows. However, 80% of the non-OECD investments came from non-OECD
sources, indicating that non-OECD countries were principally funding their own climate
needs.
Figure 23: Destination region of climate finance, by public/private (USD billion, 2019/2020 annual average)

Western Europe

Eastern Europe & Central Asia

$43 bn$62 bn$20 bn$13 bn$33 bn$105 bn

US & Canada$83 bnPublic $4 bn
Private $79 bn

Middle East & North Africa

$9 bn
$7 bn

Latin America & the Caribbean
Transregional$11 bn$11 bnEast Asia and Pacific$16 bn$35 bn$18 bn$17 bnSub-Saharan Africa$19 bn$17 bn$2 bn$292 bn

South Asia

$30 bn$180 bn$113 bn$19 bn$11 bnOther Oceania

$9 bn
$1 bn
$8 bn

30

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

Support for mitigation remains greater than support for adaptation across regions. Allregions were mainly funding mitigation actions, with 80% of the mitigation investments
concentrated in the high emitting regions of United States & Canada, Western Europe, andEast Asia & Pacific.
Tracked investments towards the categories of policy, national budget support, and capacity
building was USD 17.6 billion in 2019/2020, addressing the need to consider thecircumstances of smaller and vulnerable economies. Also, this allocation of investments
indicates progress related to the need for capacity building and institutional strengthening toenable climate action (see e.g. UNFCC, 2021b).

Box 7: Domestic finance tracking - challenges and opportunities
Domestic finance tracking provides opportunities for countries to better align with global climate
commitments. It helps countries measure and evaluate success in mobilizing investments fromthe deployment of domestic budgetary resources, determining gaps and opportunities, redirecting
investment flows to respond to unique national climate circumstances, and enhancing accountability
among donors and parties of the Paris Agreement (CPI, 2021b; CPI, 2019; GFLAC and UNDP, 2018).
Data availability constraints prevent a comprehensive understanding and, thus, more granular andgeographic-specific climate finance reporting is needed.
Despite the ongoing concerns on definitional issues, data uncertainty, limited institutional capacity,
and a lack of systematized information (UNFCCC, 2020; GFLAC and UNDP, 2018), efforts to fill in theknowledge gap are increasing. It is estimated that USD 86.7 billion of domestic public climate finance
was spent in 2017-2018 annually, as reported in Biennial Update Reports (BURs), Climate Public
Expenditure and Investment Reviews (CPEIRs) and other sources (UNFCCC, 2021). Furthermore,in a sub-national tracking exercise it was estimated that climate finance flows for cities reached an
estimated USD 384 billion annually on average in 2017/2018 (CCFLA et al. 2021).

31

6.

Interlinkages with Other Sustainable Development Goals

6. INTERLINKAGES WITH OTHER SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Climate finance offers synergies for meeting other sustainable development goals (SDGs)
simultaneously, while tagging and tracking such finance can help to measure progress
towards the 2030 SDG agenda and a just and sustainable transition more generally. For
example, climate projects with gender equality objectives embedded into project designand development help raise visibility for and measure progress toward SDG 5 and SDG 13.
Other possibilities include tracking climate finance offering biodiversity co-benefits, in turnmeasuring progress towards SDG 13, 14, and 15. Examples include nature-based solutions
and ecosystem-based adaptation measures. As data availability and granularity increase,
tracking climate and SDG-aligned finance together can better facilitate assessments ofprogress towards attaining the SDGs and efforts to ensure a sustainable post-COVID
recovery and an overall just transition.

6.1

GENDER-TAGGING IN CLIMATE FINANCE

Incorporating a gender lens into tracked climate finance is an emerging activity among
reporting (public) institutions, however, data is scarce. Women’s livelihoods tend to be
more sensitive to climatic changes while their local knowledge, skills, and propensity forcommunity-participation offers a window of opportunity for enhancing synergies between
climate- and gender-based sustainable development (UNDP & GGCA, 2016).
In addition to using the OECD-DAC markers, this edition of the Landscape facilitatedreporting on gender-sensitive climate finance among surveyed public actors. As shown in
Figure 24, adaptation and projects with dual benefits appear to offer the most potential
for incorporating gender-tagging, currently reporting 11% and 27% gender-tagging
respectively. On the other hand, only 0.7% of tracked mitigation projects were gendertagged. Convergence (2021) also found that since 2015, 18% of blended climate financetransactions have been aligned with SDG 5 (Gender Equality). About one-quarter (22%) of
blended climate finance deals had integrated some gender-lens component into the overall
transaction structure, while over 75% of transactions featured no gender-focused elements
at all.

32

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

Figure 24: Gender-tagged climate finance (2019/2020)
Climate Finance and Gender Tagging
Not gender-tagged

Gender-tagged
2019/2020 Total
Climate Finance$619 bn$5 bn

Adaptation$41 bn$567 bn

Mitigation

Multiple
Objectives

$4 bn

0%

10%

$11 bn
20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

To ensure that climate finance is, increasingly, grounded in gender equality and women’s
empowerment, gender-based criteria for project selection and fund disbursement should
become embedded within all climate finance governance structures and procedures, bothex ante and ex post (UNDP & GGCA, 2016). Moving forward, more granular, project-level
reporting by all actors can help to assess the Landscape of gender-sensitive climate financein future tracking exercises, in turn allowing us to measure progress towards attaining SDG 5.

33

7.

7.

Conclusions and Recommendations

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Climate finance must increase in speed and scale this decade for a credible
transition to a sustainable, net zero, and resilient world.
Finance flows are nowhere near the estimated needs, conservatively estimated at USD 4.5- 5 trillion annually. High-emissions investments continue to flow in key sectors, curbing theimpact of new finance in climate mitigation and adaptation. Climate investment should countin the trillions annually, whereas fossil fuel investments should dramatically decrease thisdecade to achieve the transition to a sustainable, net zero emissions, and resilient world.
Climate finance commitments also need to translate into action in the real economy,
requiring all public and private actors to align their investments with Paris goals and net zero,sustainable pathways. This requires coordinated action from all actors:-

Governments should build confidence in key markets with clear policy signals andincentives, with interim goals on net zero, whereas financial regulators should set
standardised rules to enforce the targets.

-

Development banks and international finance institutions can help build strategy, engage
with counterparties, and support policy development, while deploying a wider range
of instruments that take on more risk, helping to catalyze more private investment indeveloping economies.

-

The private sector needs to better appreciate new approaches to collaborating andinvesting, but also needs to mainstream climate considerations by assessing risk andopportunities in a more holistic way.

2. Filling the investment gap for adaptation is critical to achieving the goalsof the Paris Agreement.
COP26 elevated the global community’s focus on adaptation finance. New financial
commitments to adaptation were announced in Glasgow, but total commitments remain far
short of the estimated costs through to 2030. Furthermore, information on investment levels
in adaptation remains highly limited, which negatively impacts efficient allocation of climate
finance mandated by the Paris Agreement and reinforced by the Glasgow Climate Pact.
Increasing allocation towards developing economies is critical, particularly countries that
contribute relatively little to climate changing emissions but that are already suffering thenegative impacts of climate change.
To increase adaptation finance, a multifaceted approach is needed:-

Increasing the volume and accessibility of climate information, along with technicalcapacity, with a view towards developing effective adaptation activities.

34

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021-

Articulating investment-ready National Adaptation Plans and mainstreaming climate
resilience in government procurement. Such planning can help identify priority actions
across sectors and indicate areas for private sector participation.

-

Diversifying the portfolio of financial instruments employed to increase investment in
adaptation. Instrument selection should be informed by a variety of factors including thetimeline for implementation, the private investment market environment, sovereign debt
levels, and capacities for monitoring and evaluation.26

Parallel to these actions, policymakers should also prioritize developing frameworks tomeasure global adaptation progress. This step will be especially critical for robust analyses ofinvestment flows and associated gaps to improve resilience outcomes.

3. Public and private actors should improve definitions, methodologies, anddata access to effectively contribute to climate action.
With the rapid proliferation of sustainability, resilience, and net zero announcements,
establishing minimum standards for integrity across all actors and at all stages of action isneeded (CPI27, 2021). Although sustainability and climate reporting are gaining traction in the
public and private sector, currently available disclosure initiatives and taxonomies fall shortof providing standardized information on climate investment levels. Furthermore, definitions
and metrics on climate investment are not standardized. For example:-

Comparable data in the AFOLU, buildings, and industrial sectors are scarce, particularly
from the private sector, and lack science-based standards.

-

Continuously updated data is also required at the country level, including domestic publicbudget expenditures.

Because the public and private sectors do not have commonly accepted definitions,approaches, and taxonomies of climate finance, it is difficult to assess the collective progresson global climate mitigation and adaptation efforts. This information is essential to measureprogress against the need, avoid resource fragmentation, and direct finance where it isneeded to be most impactful.

4. We need credible and coordinated monitoring of commitments, with clear
transition plans that include interim goals.
Achieving net zero by 2050 will require all public and private actors align not only
investment, but also practices, business models, and operations with the collective goal of
limiting global warming to 1.5°C and increasing resilience to the changing climate. To achieve
real economy impact, we need better oversight to ensure that commitments are: immediate,
and establish a solid foundation; credible, to ensure meaningful progress over business as
usual; and, verifiable, to combat greenwashing.

26 https://gca.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/GCA-Adaption-in-Finance-Report.pdf
27 Framework for Sustainable Finance Integrity, https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/framework-for-sustainable-finance-integrity/
35

7.

Conclusions and Recommendations

As concluded in the Framework for Sustainable Finance Integrity (CPI, 2021a), coordination
across public and private financial actors is also needed to ensure coherence and impact onresilience, net zero, and sustainability, in alignment with science and with support from all
sectors.

5. Wider and better programming and reporting on the interlinkages
between climate finance and other sdgs can help facilitate assessments ofprogress towards a just and sustainable transition
Delivering on the goals of the Paris Agreement will involve deep structural changes altering
the nexus between the environment, the economy, and people. Climate finance can beleveraged to ensure a just and sustainable transition, taking into account the needs ofdifferent beneficiaries (e.g., women, youth, rural and indigenous populations). This edition of
the Landscape shows that, for example, incorporating a gender lens into climate finance is an
emerging activity – among public institutions – however, currently the data is scarce. Moregranular reporting across all actors can help to assess the landscape of climate and SDGaligned finance and, therefore, progress towards a just and sustainable transition. Moreover,directing attention to the distribution of climate finance benefits can help to assess theefficacy of capital flows. The quality, as well as quantity, of climate finance is equallyimportant to ensure every dollar counts and investments are reaching those most in need ofit.

36Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

8. ANNEX: DATA TABLES

Table A.1: Breakdown of global climate finance by public and private actors (USD billion)

Actor
PrivateCommercial FI
Corporation
Funds
Households/Individuals
Institutional Investors
PublicBilateral DFI
Export Credit Agency (ECA)
Government
Multilateral Climate Funds
Multilateral DFI
National DFI
Public Fund
SOE
State-owned FI

2019
280
111
111
8
47
3
343
47
1
41
4
62
137
2
12
38

2020
340
134
136
3
64
4
300
23
1
35
3
67
103
2
13
52

2019/2020 Average
310
122
124
5
55
3
321
35
1
38
4
65
120
2
13
45

Total

623

640

632

Table A.2: Financing for adaptation & mitigation split by public and private sources (USD billion)

37

Sources

2019

2020

2019/2020 Average

Private
Adaptation
Mitigation
Multiple objectives
PublicAdaptation
Mitigation
Dual benefits
Total

280
0
279
1
343
42
288
14
623

340
2
335
3
300
48
240
12
640

310
1
307
2
321
45
264
13
632

8.

Annex: Data tables

Table A.3: Breakdown of global climate finance by instruments (USD billion)

Instrument
Balance sheet financing (debt portion)
Balance sheet financing (equity portion)
Grant
Low-cost project debt
Project-level equity
Project-level market rate debt
Unknown
Total

2019
97
131
38
58
56
239
5
623

2020
113
179
34
37
46
226
5
640

2019/2020 Average
105
155
36
47
51
232
5
632

Table A.4: Breakdown of global climate finance by Use and by Sector (USD billion)
Use/Sector

2019

2020

2019/2020 Average

Adaptation

42

49

46

Agriculture, Forestry, Other land uses and Fisheries

5

4

4

Buildings & Infrastructure

1

1

1

Energy Systems

1

0.2

0.3

Industry

0.03

0.01

0.02

Information and Communications Technology

0.25

0.24

0.24

Others & Cross-sectoral

19

25

22

Transport

2

1

1

Waste

0.01

0.02

0.01

Water & Wastewater

15

19

17

Mitigation

566

576

571

Agriculture, Forestry, Other land uses and Fisheries

7

9

8

Buildings & Infrastructure

35

22

28

Energy Systems

321

342

332

Industry

9

5

7

Information and Communications Technology

0.1

0.1

0.1

Others & Cross-sectoral

21

17

19

Transport

169

177

173

Waste

1

3

2

Water & Wastewater

2

1

1

Multiple objectives

15

15

15

Agriculture, Forestry, Other land uses and Fisheries

2

2

2

Energy Systems

2

1

2

Others & Cross-sectoral

9

10

9

Transport

1

0.1

0.4

Water & Wastewater

1

2

2

Total

623

640

632
38

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

Table A.5: Breakdown of Energy System Sector total climate finance by sub-sector (USD billion)

Energy System Sub-sector
Fuel Production
Other/Unspecified
Policy & National Budget Support & Capacity Building
Power & Heat Generation
Power & Heat Transmission & Distribution
Total

2019
1
1
1
313
8
324

2020
1
1
1
332
8
343

2019/2020 Average
1
1
1
322
8
334

Table A.6: Breakdown of Transport Sector total climate finance by sub-sector (USD billion)

Transport Sub-sector
Aviation
Other/Unspecified
Policy & National Budget Support & Capacity Building
Private Road Transport
Rail & Public Transport
Transport-oriented Urban Development and Infrastructure
Waterway
Total

2019
0
92
2
59
17
1
0
171

2020
0
60
0
106
10
1
0
178

2019/2020 Average
0
76
1
82
14
1
0
175

Table A.7: Breakdown of Buildings & Infrastructure Sector total climate finance by sub-sector (USD billion)

Buildings & Infrastructure Sub-sector
Appliances & Lighting
Building & Infrastructure Construction Work
HVAC & Water Heaters
Other/Unspecified
Policy & National Budget Support & Capacity Building
Total

39

2019
0
21
14
0
0
36

2020
0
9
14
0
0
23

2019/2020 Average
0
15
14
0
0
29

8.

Annex: Data tables

Table A.8: International and domestic climate finance flows (USD billion)

OECD/Non-OECD destination

2019

2020

2019-2020 Average

Domestic
non-OECDOECD
Unknown
International
From Non-OECD to OECD
From Non-OECD to Other Non-OECD
From OECD to non-OECD
From OECD to Other OECD
From Transregional to Non-OECD
From Transregional to OECD
Total

478
294
184
0
145
3
19
78
44
1
0
623

479
302
176
0
161
4
29
79
49
1
0
640

479
298
180
0
153
3
24
78
46
1
0
632

Note: International public finance flows with transregional destination are assumed to be directed to non-OECD countries.

Table A.9: Breakdown of global climate finance by region of destination (USD billion)

RegionCentral Asia and Eastern Europe
East Asia and Pacific
Latin America & Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
Other Oceania
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Transregional
US & Canada
Western Europe
Total

2019
35
278
37
16
10
30
19
11
88
100
623

2020
29
305
33
15
8
30
19
10
79
110
640

2019/2020 Average
32
292
35
15
0
0
19
11
84
105
632

40

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021

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