©Getty Images | Alexandros Maragos | Patra, Achaia, Greece

Progress Report 2023

Climate Action
Shifting gears: Increasing the pace of progress
towards a green and prosperous future

Climate Action

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Table of Contents
Quote........................................................................................................... 3
Foreword....................................................................................................... 4
Chapter 1: Emission trends & progress in climate action . . ............................................ 5................................................................................................... 5.......................................................... 5. . .............................................................................. 7.................................................................................. 10..................................................................... 11
Chapter 2: The EU emissions trading system............................................................ 18
Key highlights.................................................................................................. 18
Emission trends.................................................................................................. 19
Revenues raised by the EU ETS...................................................................................... 20
Action in aviation and maritime transport.............................................................................. 20
A balanced EU carbon market....................................................................................... 21
Chapter 3: Effort sharing emissions.. ..................................................................... 22
Key highlights.................................................................................................. 22
Results of the Effort Sharing Decision 2013-2020....................................................................... 23
Progress under the Effort Sharing Regulation 2021-2030. . ................................................................ 24
Emission trends by type of gas under the Effort Sharing legislation.......................................................... 25
National policies and measures in the ESR sectors....................................................................... 26
Emission trends and policies in key sectors............................................................................. 27
Chapter 4: Land use, land use change & forestry. . ..................................................... 31
Key highlights.................................................................................................. 31
A greater role for the LULUCF sector to support climate action............................................................. 31
Assessment of progress in the LULUCF sector. . ......................................................................... 32
Action to step up land monitoring.................................................................................... 33
Related initiatives in agriculture and forestry ........................................................................... 33
Access to funding and incentives..................................................................................... 34
Implementation of the EU Adaptation Strategy.......................................................................... 35
Chapter 5: Resilience to climate change................................................................. 35
Key highlights.................................................................................................. 35
Assessment of collective progress of Member States on adaptation.. ........................................................ 36
Chapter 6: Aligning investments with climate neutrality. . ............................................ 38
Key highlights.................................................................................................. 38
Investment needs and trends in the EU................................................................................ 38
Monitoring finance’s alignment with the transition to climate neutrality....................................................... 39
Integrating climate in financial market policy........................................................................... 41
Funding from the EU Emission Trading System.......................................................................... 42
Mainstreaming climate policies in the EU budget........................................................................ 42
Chapter 7: International climate action.................................................................. 46
Key highlights.................................................................................................. 46
Overview and developments........................................................................................ 46
Multilateral and Bilateral engagement. . ............................................................................... 47
Climate Finance and International Cooperation.......................................................................... 48
Technical information - Commission Staff Working Document (SWD)............................... 49
1. Overview of EU climate targets.................................................................................... 50
2. Overview of recently adopted legislation contributing to the climate-neutrality objective....................................... 51
3. EU's greenhouse gas emissions: Trends and projections................................................................. 54
4. Greenhouse gas emissions covered by the UNFCCC, the Kyoto protocol and the Climate and Energy Package. . ...................... 59
6. EU ETS emissions. . ............................................................................................. 67
7. Use of revenues from auctioning of ETS allowances.................................................................... 68
8. Emissions covered by the effort sharing legislation..................................................................... 71
9. LULUCF. . ..................................................................................................... 86
10. Horizontal assessment of collective progress of Member States on climate adaptation ....................................... 91
11 Overview of sustainable finance policies........................................................................... 100
12. Commission's assessment of long-term strategies................................................................... 101
Key highlights
Greenhouse gas emissions and the EU’s international commitments
Towards the climate-neutrality objective
Progress on climate action in the EU
Progress on climate action in the EU Member States

Report on the implementation of the EU strategy on adaptation to climate change Commission Staff Working Document (SWD)........................................................... 106.................................................................................................... 106. . ........................................... 108..................................... 111.................................................... 119.. ........................................................ 129

Introduction
Objective 1: Smarter adaptation: Improving knowledge and managing uncertainty
Objective 2: More systemic adaptation: Support policy development at all levels and sectors
Objective 3: Faster adaptation: Speeding up adaptation across the board
Objective 4: Stepping up international action for climate resilienceC l i m a t e

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3“The past years have been incredibly challenging for Europe, but we have notturned away from our firm belief that the European Green Deal is the answer
to both our energy security and our climate challenges. At COP28, Europe will
have a compelling story to tell. We have made progress on emission reductions,renewable energy deployment, and investing in clean mobility and clean technologies of the future. The EU is proving that climate action and economic growth
go hand-in-hand.
The assessment of progress under the Climate Law, included for the first timein this report, demonstrates that our domestic greenhouse gas emissions are
falling steadily, in line with what is needed to reach our 2030 and 2050 targets.
However, to stay on track, the pace of emissions reduction needs to increase. We
specifically need to make progress in sectors where emissions reductions havebeen sluggish at best: buildings, transport and agriculture. In parallel, we need to
grow our natural carbon sink.
As Member States prepare their updated
National Energy and Climate Plans fornext year, the Commission will look closely
at the speed of implementation of the
adopted Fit for 55 legislation, and ensurethat the necessary policies and investment incentives are in place to deliver on
our climate targets.”

Wopke Hoekstra
Commissioner for Climate Action,
European Commission

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Foreword
Climate change impacts continued to increase this year, inflicting
suffering on many in the EU and around the globe. Global temperaturerecords were again broken in 2023, with July being the hottest monthon record. Catastrophic flooding hit Slovenia and Greece, unprecedented
wildfires raged in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, whilst severe droughts
gripped the western Mediterranean. The UN’s Intergovernmental Panelon Climate Change confirmed in its sixth assessment report that theincreased severity and frequency of such events is the result of anthropogenic climate change, reiterating the need for urgent climate action
to cut global emissions.
In a world characterised by a shifting geopolitical landscape and an
unrivalled pace of technological transformation, uncertainty permeates
our lives. With Russia continuing to wage war in Ukraine, high inflationand high energy prices have impacted individuals within and beyond
the borders of Europe.
This should reinforce Europe’s determination to stay the course inbecoming the first climate neutral continent. Thanks to the ‘Fit for 55’
package of measures and REPowerEU, the EU is reducing reliance on
fossil fuel imports, with a record 60GW of wind and solar installed in the
EU in 2022 and sales of heat pumps reaching new highs. Addressing theimpacts for the most vulnerable remains a priority, as we act to tackle
climate change and increase resilience against fossil fuel price shocks.
The EU is stepping up its action, delivering the European Green Deal fora just transition to climate neutrality and resilience by 2050, promoting
a circular economy, halting biodiversity loss and establishing green
industries and jobs. Over the last year, all climate policy measures underthe ‘Fit for 55’ package have been agreed by Council and Parliament.
The legislation is now in place to deliver the EU’s 2030 target of a net
domestic reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of at least 55% by2030 and could enable the EU and its Member States to overachieve
this target, reaching a net reduction of around 57% in 2030 when fully
implemented.
This report outlines how the EU has progressed during the last year
towards meeting our climate goals and international climate commitments, including, for the first time ever, an assessment of progress
towards the climate neutrality and adaptation objectives, as required
under the European Climate Law. Member States will submit their final
updated National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) in June 2024. Thisis an opportunity to plan additional measures to align their expected
emissions with the EU’s higher level of climate policy ambition.
Greenhouse gas emissions fell by 3% in 2022 as compared to 2021.
This followed an unprecedented decline in 2020 due to the COVID-19
pandemic and an upward rebound in 2021, with the 2022 decline moving
the emission trajectory back in line with the prevailing downward trend
observed since 1990. However, the pace of emission abatement must
increase to meet the 2030 targets.
The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) continues to cap greenhousegas emissions in the energy, manufacturing and aviation sectors,
providing a price signal which incentivises innovation and emission
abatement. Revenues generated by the ETS scheme amounted to almost
EUR 39 billion, an increase of nearly 25% on 2021. These revenues
enable Member States to support climate and energy action whilst also
adding to both the Innovation and Modernisation funds managed by
the European Commission to support the energy and industrial transition. In addition, 2023 saw agreement on the creation of the Emissions
Trading System 2 (ETS2), which will cover fuel combustion in buildings,
road transport and additional sectors.

Emissions from the Effort Sharing (ESR) sectors in 2022 were 3% lower
than in 2021, primarily due to emission reductions in buildings andindustry. Emissions from transport, the largest ESR sector, increasedby over 2% in 2022 as compared to 2021. The analysis highlights thesubstantial gap between the 2030 objectives and projected future
emissions. Member States need to put in place further measures toalign themselves with the agreed higher targets, notably as part of
updated NECPs.
Removal of emissions from the environment increased in 2022, however,further enhancement of carbon sinks is required to stay in line with the
EU 2030 climate objectives, requiring improvements in monitoring andincreased efforts by Member States given the growing importance ofcarbon removals to limit global warming as we look to the future.
The EU and Member States are implementing the 2021 EU Strategy on
Adaptation to Climate Change, which sets out the vision for a climateresilient EU by 2050. Adaptation is rising on the political agenda with
relevant policies being enacted. This growing awareness is an importantbasis for future action to tackle vulnerabilities and boost resilience. This
progress must be sustained to protect us against unavoidable impacts
that are to come, despite all efforts to cut greenhouse gases.
The EU is committed to a fair and just climate transition, ensuring no
person or place is left behind. The implementation of the Just Transition
Mechanism is now well underway, with targeted support of EUR 55 billion
in investments and other measures available between 2021-2027 to EU
territories most affected by the transition. The newly agreed ETS2 will
also fund the new Social Climate Fund to assist vulnerable households
and micro businesses that face the greatest impacts.
We stand on the cusp of enormous opportunity. As the EU and its Member
States work to increase the pace of emission reductions, unparalleledinvestments are being made in the EU - and by our trade partners - inthe technologies, industries and jobs which will form the cornerstoneof our climate-neutral economy. Administered in line with the European
Green Deal principles and guided by the EU’s revised legislative framework, such investments will enable us to deliver agreen and just transition which benefits our energy
security, prosperity, health and well-being.
The EU is in the process of accelerating
towards the achievement of ambitious
targets, setting an important example
for others.
With the first Global Stock Take under
the Paris Agreement taking place inDecember 2023, we are calling on
international major emitters to join us in
taking ambitious action now to keep theParis 1.5°C goal within reach. Only throughambitious and determined global collective
action in this critical decade can a shared,
liveable and prosperous future for all beachieved.

Kurt
Vandenberghe
Director-General
for Climate Action

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Emission trends& progress inclimate action
Key highlights• EU net emissions decreased by 3% in2022 compared to 2021, returning to their
30-year descending trend. This comes after
an unprecedented fall in emissions in 2020
due to the pandemic, followed by a strong
rebound in 2021.

• However, the pace of emissions reduction

must accelerate considerably to combat themore frequent and devastating effects ofclimate change and to meet the EU climate
objectives.

• With the “Fit for 55” package adopted

by co-legislators, Union policies are nowaligned with the updated 2030 target set
in the European Climate Law, but there is
scope to further improve the consistency of
EU policies with climate objectives.

• Overall, progress towards the EU climate

targets appears insufficient. Action is mostneeded in areas where significant emission
reductions are still required and where
progress has been lacking.

• Progress by Member States towards the EU

2050 collective climate neutrality objective still appears insufficient. For someMember States, progress in recent years
is not consistent with the effort required in
the coming decades to meet the long-termclimate targets.

Greenhouse gas emissions and the EU’s
international commitments
In March 2023 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
confirmed that global warming, induced by anthropogenic greenhousegas (GHG) emissions is increasing the frequency and severity of climate
and weather extremes, leading to widespread and adverse impacts on
people and nature across the globe. Every increment of warming will
intensify the impacts, and urgent global climate action is needed to limit
global warming and to adapt to its impacts. Global GHG emissions needto fall by 43% by 2030 and by 84% by 2050 below 2019 levels, while
global net zero CO₂ emissions must be reached in the early 2050s if weare to limit temperature increase to 1.5oC with no or limited overshoot.
Reducing GHG emissions has many co-benefits, including for air quality,
health, biodiversity and energy security1.
Europe has been warming twice as much as the global average since the1980s, with far-reaching impacts on the region’s socio-economic fabricand ecosystems2. The year 2022 saw further devastating impacts associated with a warming climate, with extreme weather events becoming
more and more common. The late spring and summer heatwaves, withrecord-breaking temperatures in many locations, resulted in a record
number of days with very strong heat stress, leading to over 61 000
excess deaths across Europe3. Hot and dry spring and summer conditions,which triggered drought across most of Europe, and fuelled numerous
large wildfires, were followed by heavy precipitation and intense floodingin the autumn, causing dozens of fatalities 4. Overall, summer 2022

1 IPCC, 2023. Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. A Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, H. Lee and J. Romero (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva,
Switzerland, 36 pages. (in press).
2 WMO, State of the climate in Europe 2022. WMO-No. 1320.
3 Heat-related mortality in Europe during the summer of 2022 | Nature Medicine
4 European State of the Climate 2022 by Copernicus: ESOTCsummary2022_final.pdf (copernicus.eu)©Unsplash.com | NASA

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was Europe’s warmest ever recorded5. Temperature records continued to be broken in 2023, confirming the extra-ordinary paceof climate change. July was the hottest month on record with global temperatures 1.5oC warmer than the pre-industrial average.
The rising temperatures and increasing frequency of extreme events contributed to numerous wildfires, and by the end of July
2023, they had affected more than 182 000 hectares across the EU, 40% above the 2003-2022 average6, while unprecedented
floods hit parts of Europe7.
In 2022, global emissions were back to their pre-pandemic increasing trend, reaching 53.8 billion tonnes of CO₂ equivalent (CO₂eq), well above 2019 emissions. Preliminary JRC data8 show that global GHG emissions rose by 1.4% in 2022 compared to 2021
levels, against a 3.4% growth of global GDP over the same period, as the global economy continued rebounding from the pandemic.
Transport was the main driver of increased GHG emissions (+4.7%, or 361 MtCO₂-eq), although still below the pre-pandemic level,
followed by fuel production9 (+2.6%, or 157 MtCO₂-eq) and power (+0.9%, or 136 MtCO₂-eq). Among the larger emitters, the mostsignificant increases were in Indonesia (+10%, or 113 MtCO₂-eq) and India (+5%, or 189 MtCO₂-eq), while China showed a limited
increase (+0.3%, or 52 MtCO₂-eq).
In the EU, provisional data10 for 2022 show that total GHG emissions (excluding land use, land-use change, and forestry, and international aviation) decreased by 2.4% compared to 2021, continuing the 30-years descending trend, whilst EU GDP grew by 3.5%in the year 2022 (Figure 1.a). Emissions covered by the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) fell by 0.2% and non-ETS emissions
decreased by 2.9%.
Figure 1: EU GHG emissions (excluding land use, land-use change and forestry) and by sector11
Figure 1.a

Figure 1.b

Exceptional events over the last 3 to 4 years have made the assessment of GHG emission trends more complex and continue tohave an impact on 2022 emissions. For more clarity, this report therefore assesses the year-on-year change in emissions andcompares to the pre-pandemic level. The COVID-19 lockdowns and restrictions led to an unprecedented but temporary drop in
GHG emissions of 8% in 2020. In 2021, the economic recovery affected regions and sectors differently. Some sectors, such as thetransport sector and travel-related emissions, recovered fully only in 2022. The energy crisis that started in 2021 continued in 2022,
exacerbated by Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine, which drove energy prices to record highs, particularly gas
prices. In addition, decreased level of nuclear12 and low hydro power production13 have led to an increase in the use of coal andlignite for power generation, above the level recorded in 2021. The high energy prices also triggered action to reduce demand forboth industrial and household energy.
5 For key facts on extreme whether events, see EEA Extreme weather: floods, droughts and heatwaves (europa.eu)
6 OBSERVER: Global Wildfire Watch: Copernicus EMS and CAMS Monitor Wildfires in 2023 | Copernicus
7 Copernicus Emergency Management Service
8 EDGAR (Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research) Community GHG Database comprising IEA-EDGAR CO₂, EDGAR CH₄, EDGAR N₂O, EDGAR F-GASES version 8.0, https://edgar.jrc.
ec.europa.eu/report_2023.
9 Fuel production, processing and refining
10 The Governance Regulation ((EU) 2018/1999) requires Member States to report approximated GHG inventories annually by 31 July. Based on this reported data, the EEA compiles a Union
approximated GHG inventory or, if a Member State has not communicated its approximated GHG emissions by that date, on the basis of EEA’s own estimates. This provides an early estimate of
GHG emissions ahead of the full GHG inventory.
11 Based on 2023 GHG inventory and approximated EU GHG inventory for 2022, based on Member States’ submissions, excluding international bunkers. Notes: (1) Energy sector refers toelectricity and heat production and petroleum refining. (2)Industry includes fuel combustion in manufacturing and construction and emissions in industrial processes and product use. (3) Buildings include emissions from energy use in residential andtertiary buildings, and energy use in agriculture and fishery sectors (1.A.4 GHG inventory code).
12 Mainly due to temporary shutdown of several nuclear rectors in France for technical maintenance and/or additional inspections.
13 Partly due to drought and high water temperatures in many parts of the EU.

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EU emissions by sector show these changes (Figure 1.b). Emissions in energy and transport are expected to increase in 2022,
although remaining below 2019 pre-pandemic levels, while significant cuts in emissions are expected in buildings and industry,
mainly because of the continued increase of energy prices. Despite the slight decline in 2022, emissions in agriculture remainbroadly at the same level as ten years ago.
Provisional 2022 data for GHG net removals from the Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector appear to suggest
a break in their recent declining trend, with an expected increase in carbon sinks of 6% compared to 2021, although approximatedemissions remain subject to large revisions. Consequently, in 2022 total net GHG emissions (including LULUCF) decreased by 3.0%
on a yearly basis, a reduction of 32.5% compared to 1990 level.
In the EU, verified emissions from aircraft operators increased significantly, by 75% compared to 2021 as the industry recovers
from the very low levels of activity during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Towards the climate-neutrality objective
In addition to assessing the progress made in climate policy under the Governance Regulation14, for the first time this year thisreport assesses progress under the European Climate Law15, including the collective progress made by Member States towards
the EU’s goal to achieve climate-neutrality by 205016. It looks at progress on several aspects and from several sources and takes
account of the complexity inherent in the many possible paths to achieve a net-zero and resilient economy.
Overall, provisional 2022 data show that the EU’s domestic GHG net emissions (i.e. including LULUCF and excluding internationaltransport) are falling steadily, in line with the linear path to achieve the EU’s 2030 GHG reduction target (i.e. -55%) and the EU’s
2050 climate neutrality objective17. However, the pace of emission reduction needs to pick up, to almost triple the average annual
reduction achieved over the last decade (see Figure 2.a). Relative to past mitigation efforts, the most significant cuts in emissions
are needed in buildings and transport, where the pace of decarbonisation is sluggish or even moving in the opposite direction.
At the same time, action in the LULUCF sector is essential to achieve a significant boost in carbon removals. Although reaching
the emissions cuts required from agriculture looks achievable when looking at progress over the past three decades, the lack of
substantial progress in recent years is a concern, calling for a gear change (Figure 3.b).
Although sizeable, such emission reductions are not unprecedented. In the two years before the pandemic, emissions were downby an annual average of 120 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent, due to progress in energy efficiency and the fast deployment of
renewables. In 2022, all actors in the EU, including energy intensive industry, decreased their demand for energy compared to
pre-pandemic levels, with savings of more than 18% of gas compared to the five years before18.

14 Articles 29 and 35 of the Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action (Reg. (EU) 2018/1999).
15 Articles 6 to 8 of the European Climate Law (EUR-Lex - 32021R1119 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)).
16 The EU climate-neutrality objective, set out in Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1119, is achieved when EU-wide GHG emissions and removals regulated in EU law are balanced within the
EU at the latest by 2050, reducing emissions to net zero. The EU shall aim to achieve negative emissions thereafter.
17 The EU 2030 target as represented in the chart and the related progress assessments does not fully align with the exact legal scope of the 2030 target, which includes all emissions andremovals regulated under EU law. While the EU ETS covers emissions from all flights within the European Economic Area (EEA) and departures to Switzerland and to the UK, these emissions (lessthan 2% of total GHG emissions) are not taken into account in this assessment. More information on ETS aviation emissions in chapter 2.
18 5-year average compared to gas consumption between August 2022 and June 2023 (State of Energy Union Report 2023).

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Figure 2: EU GHG net emissions, targets and aggregated Member States’ projections19
Figure 2.a

Figure 2.b

The energy crisis also sparked unprecedented momentum for renewable energy. In 2022, a record high of around 60 GW of windand solar were installed in the EU20 and heat pump market broke a new record, with around 3 million units (+37%) sold21. Despite
a continued contraction in car markets and higher manufacturing costs, the share of electric cars sold in Europe reached 21.6% in
2022, while the availability of publicly accessible chargers surged by more than 50% compared to 202122.
To hold this course, however, action by EU Member States is essential. On 15 March 2023, Member States updated their GHG
projections and for the first time took stock of the progress achieved towards the objectives, targets and contributions set out intheir initial integrated National Energy and Climate Plans (NECP). The existing NECPs reflect past targets, before the EU raised its
climate ambition under the European Green Deal. This assessment also feeds into the important process of updating the integrated
NECPs by the Member States, which is now underway.

19 Based on the 2023 GHG inventory and approximated EU GHG inventory for 2022, based on Member States’ submissions, excluding international bunkers. Linear trajectories for GHG
emissions and removals are based on legislated EU 2030 targets. The -55% 2030 target (European Climate Law) considers a contribution of removals limited to -225 MtCO₂eq. The national
GHG targets are from Member States’ submissions of NECP progress report (Annex I, Table 1). Any missing data are replaced by other targets or milestones that Member States submitted to theCommission under other reporting exercise (i.e. national long-term strategies, integrated national energy and climate plans, or the 2021 GHG projections). The annual average emission reduction
after 2030 is based on a linear trajectory to EU climate neutrality. This is without prejudice to the pace required by the new 2040 target the Commission will propose in accordance with the
Climate Law.
20 Annual EU solar power growth increased by 47% from 28.1 GW in 2021. The new added capacity of 41.4 GW of solar power in 2022 is equivalent to the power needs of 12.4 million European homes. New report reveals EU solar power soars by almost 50% in 2022 - SolarPower Europe. New wind energy capacity in 2022 amounted to around 16 GW, up 40% on 2021. The EU built
only 16 GW new wind in 2022: must restore investor confidence and ramp up supply chain | WindEurope.
21 European Heat Pump Association, based on 21 markets, the number of heat pumps sold in 2022 replaced roughly 4 bcm of natural gas, avoiding about 8 million tonnes of CO₂ emissions.
Market data – European Heat Pump Association (ehpa.org)
22 Global EV Outlook 2023 (IEA).

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Figure 3: EU GHG emissions and removals by sector, past trends and required reductions23
Figure 3.a

Figure 3.b

In the 2023 NECP progress reports, over half the Member States set the objective to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 or earlier,in line with their national long-term strategies. Most of the Member States have also indicated quantitative national GHG targets
up to 205024. Once aggregated for the EU-27, the national GHG targets reported by Member States at different reporting exercises25
indicate some gaps to the EU legislated objectives (i.e. a gap of around 3% to the -55% net GHG reduction target by 2030 and of
8% to the net-zero GHG emissions by 2050), although they reflect the will to meet the objectives set at EU level (see Figure 2.b)26.
Member States’ GHG emission projections provide additional indications of the expected evolution of EU GHG emissions. The latest
projections submitted in March 2023 give a clearer measure of the risk of the EU missing its climate targets. Taking account ofexisting policy measures, aggregated projections at EU level indicate a gap of 15 percentage points to the EU 2030 GHG reduction
target of 55%, and a narrower gap of 5 percentage points when factoring in additional policy measures (Figure 2.b). EU Member
States still need to take additional mitigation measures to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 to cut around 1 600 million tonnesof CO₂ equivalent (or 34 percentage points).
EU Member States have also reported progress on more than 3000 individual policies and measures (PaMs), the large majority
specifically aiming to reduce GHG emissions and increase carbon removals. Of the measures specifically addressing decarbonisation,around a third are newly implemented (i.e. from 2022 or later). The number of measures for climate mitigation reported in 2023
is 19% higher than in the previous reporting cycle. This is consistent with the EU’s higher climate ambition and reflects the work to
prepare the updated national energy and climate plans, with the final plans due by June 202427.

23 Based on the 2023 GHG inventory and model-based outcomes of core policy scenario supporting the initiatives delivering the European Green Deal. Negative values for the LULUCF sector
indicate an increase of GHG removals. Notes: (1) Energy sector refers to electricity and heat production and petroleum refining. (2) Industry includes fuel combustion in manufacturing andconstruction and emissions in industrial processes and product use. (3) Buildings include emissions from energy use in residential and tertiary buildings. (4) Agriculture includes both non-CO₂
emissions and emissions from the energy use in agriculture and fishery sectors.
24 As reported under Annex I, Table 1 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2299 of 15 November 2022. See SWD on the Assessment of progress towards the objectives of theEnergy Union and Climate Action accompanying the State of the Energy Union 2023.
25 Missing NECPR values were replaced by national GHG targets submitted by Member States to the Commission in the past (e.g. for the 2021 NECP or long-term strategies), when available. As
targets might be expressed in different global warming potential (i.e. AR4 or AR5), these values are indicative only.
26 International maritime and aviation emissions could widen these gaps once included in the scope of EU climate targets.
27 Updated NECPs should reflect necessary increased ambition from the Fit for 55 package, the REPowerEU initiative and energy crisis measures adopted by the EU in the last year, given guidance issued by the European Commission in December 2022 on the update of NECPs, and pending in-depth review of the Governance Regulation.

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Figure 4: Number of single policies and measures (decarbonisation dimension) by affected sector and aggregatedreported expected emission savings and increase net removals28
Figure 4.aFigure 4.b

The sectors with the most measures are transport (23%), energy consumption (22%), and energy supply (21%), partly reflecting
the sectoral challenges and priorities (Figure 4.a). Information on the expected (ex-ante) emissions savings from these measures
is important to assess expected progress from the planned and implemented measures. Unfortunately, in 2023, only 18 Member
States reported quantitative ex ante savings for at least one year and one measure. This is lower than in 2021, making the aggregate assessment particularly difficult (Figure 4.b). It again highlights the need for Member States to step up action to assess theeffects of implemented policies more systematically, both ex ante and ex post.
In conclusion, although GHG emissions continue to fall, as shown by the most recent data, and there are encouraging signs of action
on the ground, progress towards the EU’s climate objectives appears insufficient. Action is most needed in areas where:• emission reductions still required are significant (buildings, transport),• recent progress made is too slow (agriculture),• figures have not evolved in the right direction (land use, land-use change, and forestry).
The assessment shows that to get on a safer – more certain – path towards climate neutrality by 2050, the EU and its Member
States need to significantly increase the pace of change. The Fit-for-55 legislative package must be adopted fully, and all parts
rapidly implemented. More detailed monitoring is needed to assess progress on enabling factors that drive emissions in the different
sectors to better highlight areas where progress is lacking or more action is needed.

Progress on climate action in the EU
The “Fit for 55” package sets the EU on a path to reach its climate targets in a fair, cost-effective and competitive way. Most of
the key proposals in the package have been adopted by co-legislators29 and EU policies are now aligned with the updated 2030
target set in the European Climate Law. Implementing the new legislation under the Fit for 55 package30 will enable the EU and its
Member States to reduce net GHG emissions by at least 55% compared to 1990 levels by 203031 (see Ch. 1 of the staff working
document – Overview of targets).

28 Values based on Annex IX to the NECP progress reports submitted by Member States, as of 31 August 2023. Member States could indicate more than one sector. This explains why the sumof measures across all affected sectors is higher than the current total number of individual measures.
29 This includes the revised EU ETS Directive, a new ETS for buildings, road transport and fuels, the Market Stability Reserve, the Effort Sharing Regulation, CO₂ standards for cars and vans, theLand Use, Land Use Change and Forestry Regulation, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, the establishment of the Social Climate Fund, FuelEU Maritime, the Alternative Fuel Infrastructure
Regulation (AFIR), ReFuel EU Aviation, the Energy Efficiency Directive and the Renewable Energy Directive. Only the proposed revised energy taxation directive is still pending agreement.
30 Cf. Chapter 2 of the annex ‘Technical information’.
31 The legislation as adopted is estimated to result in a net domestic reduction of GHG emissions of 57% by 2030 compared to 1990. An overview of targets is presented in Chapter 1 of theTechnical information annex

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The revised EU ETS Directive increases the level of ambition in the existing system from 43% to 62% emissions reductions by 2030,
compared to 2005 levels and extend the system to also apply to international maritime transport. A separate carbon pricing system
will apply to fuel combustion in road transport and buildings and small-emitting sectors32 (ETS2) with a 42% emission reduction
target compared to 2005 across the sectors covered. The amended Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR) increased, for the sectors thatit covers, the EU-level GHG emission reduction target from 29% to 40% by 2030, compared to 2005, which translates in updated
2030 targets for each Member State. The new LULUCF Regulation sets an overall EU-level objective of 310 Mt CO₂ equivalent of
net removals in the LULUCF sector in 2030.
To ensure a just transition towards climate-neutrality, the EU created a new fund, the Social Climate Fund, to accompany the
new ETS2, which will address the impacts of carbon pricing in new sectors and provide support for vulnerable households, microenterprises and transport users. Together with the Just Transition Fund supporting the territories most affected by the transition (seechapter 6), they will ensure that no-one is left behind. Empowerment of energy consumers is also enhanced by the latest legislative
initiatives related to the electricity market. Under the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA), the Commission will support the setting up of
specialised academies for up-skilling and re-skilling.
In 2022 and 2023, the Commission made additional proposals to speed up the transition to climate neutrality. For example, thelegislators reached a provisional agreement on the revised Fluorinated greenhouse gases (F-gases) Regulation which will further
reduce the emissions from those highly potent GHGs. The Commission proposed more ambitious emissions reductions targets
for heavy-duty vehicles. The Commission also put forward the REPowerEU plan with specific measures to reduce the EU’s energy
dependence on Russian fossil fuels, and to speed up implementation of the European Green Deal with new actions, while building on
the Fit for 55 package. To enhance the competitiveness of Europe’s net-zero industry and to boost innovation, in particular in green
technologies, the Commission put forward a Green Deal Industrial Plan. Chapter 2 of the annex ‘Technical information’ presents
an overview of recently adopted policy contributing to the alignment of EU level policies with climate objectives.
In November 2021, the Commission updated its Better Regulation instruments to ensure that new EU policies are consistent withclimate goals. All proposed EU measures should now be assessed for their consistency with climate objectives- the climate neutrality
objective and the objective to ensure progress on adaptation- as part of the impact assessment process, in line with the European
Climate Law (the climate-consistency check). Good progress has been made in implementing this check. Since the beginning of2022, out of the 27 impact assessments deemed relevant for this assessment (out of 57 impact assessments scrutinised by theRegulatory Scrutiny Board33), 20 were found to have sufficiently assessed consistency of the initiative with climate objectives, while
7 impact assessments did not sufficiently assess climate aspects. This represents almost 75% of relevant cases and reflects thefact that it is a new requirement. With more experience in implementing the climate consistency check, compliance with this new
impact assessment requirement could be further improved.
While good progress has been made to ensure that EU policies put the EU on a path towards a net zero economy, the recent
emissions trends in the transport sector and the very slow pace of emissions reductions in agriculture, along with a decline of the
carbon sink, raise concerns (see Chapters 3 and 4). Despite progress on green finance from private sources, significant additional
investment is needed to finance the green transition. This needs action, in particular to redirect finance to enable the transition of‘brown’ sectors (see Chapter 6).
As required by the European Climate Law, the Commission will publish a communication on the EU’s climate target for 2040 inearly 2024, setting a path from the already-agreed intermediate 2030 target to net-zero emissions by 2050. This will provide theinformation needed to ensure that measures and investments to implement the EU’s 2030 targets are also well aligned with thepathways to climate neutrality by 2050. The 2040 target will provide predictability and keep progress on track to climate neutrality.
Climate change is already impacting nature and people more intensely, more frequently and over a wider geographical area thanpreviously thought 34. Progress is being made in the assessment of climate risks. In spring 2024, the Commission will respond to
the evidence provided in a scientific European Climate Risk Assessment report on the evolution of climate risks and the need forfurther action in a communication on managing EU climate risks. In parallel, wide-ranging action is underway to implement theother aspects of the EU’s 2021 adaptation strategy (see Chapter 5).

Progress on climate action in the EU Member States
The next chapters of the report will assess the progress made by the Member States in specific policy areas. This section gives
32 CO₂ emissions from fuel combustion in industry not covered by the existing EU ETS.
33 Impact assessment submitted for the first time to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board between January 2022 and April 2023 and for which an interservice consultation was launched by
23/05/2023.
34 IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, February 2022.

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a bird’s eye view of GHG emissions trends towards climate mitigation objectives, including the EU’s objective to achieve climate
neutrality by 2050, and builds on the detailed analysis provided in Chapter 5 of the annex ‘Technical information’. Over the last
three decades, the EU has substantially reduced its GHG emissions, overachieving its 2020 commitment under the UNFCCC 35 andits target under the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period in 2013-2020 (KP2)36. Total GHG emissions under the UNFCCC(excluding LULUCF and including international aviation) fell by 34% in the EU-27 + UK compared to 1990. This is a reduction of
1.94 billion tonnes of CO₂-eq by 2020. (For more details see Chapter 4 of the annex ‘Technical information’).
However, in the most recent years, progress across Member States has been mixed. Between 2015 and 2022, net GHG emissions
have been rising in Latvia, Finland, and Lithuania, and, to a lesser extent, in Cyprus, Poland, Malta, Estonia, and Ireland. GHG emissions were reduced but only slowly in Czechia, Italy, Hungary, Croatia, France, and Denmark. The reasons vary by country. In Finland,
Latvia and Estonia the upward emissions trend is mainly related to the sharp decline of the capacity of the land use, land-use
change and forestry sector to act as a carbon sink, while for Lithuania, transport and building also contribute to the increase inemissions. Transport emissions increased in Hungary, Malta and Poland, while in Ireland emissions in agriculture continued to grow.
Since 2005, there has been a clear downward trend in GHG emissions per capita and in the GHG intensity of GDP in all EU Member
States except Latvia (Figure 5). More rapid progress by countries with higher emitting ratios has led to significant convergence
towards the EU average. However, between 2015 and 2022, the downward converging trend seems to have halted for most EU
Member States.
Figure 5: GHG intensity of GDP and GHG emissions per capita by EU Member States

Information on the expected impact of current and additional policies on GHG emissions submitted by Member States can be used
to gain insights into the progress they are making, or are expecting to make, towards the EU’s climate objectives. By 2030, basedon the GHG projections submitted by EU Member States in March 2023, six countries (Poland, Ireland, Estonia, Czechia, Luxembourg,and Latvia) expect emissions per capita to be significantly higher than 5 tonnes of CO₂-eq, which is the average EU GHG per capita
broadly consistent with the EU -55% target 37. On the climate-neutrality objective, all Member States except Finland, Portugal,

35 Under the UNFCCC, the EU and its Member States (including the UK) committed to a joint, economy-wide target to reduce GHG emissions by 20% compared to 1990 levels by 2020 (‘theCancun pledge’).
36 Under the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period in 2013-2020, the EU, its Member States, the UK and Iceland committed jointly to reducing GHG emissions by 20% on average incomparison to 1990.
37 Net GHG emissions consistent with EU 2030 target (around 2100 MtCO₂eq), divided by the latest Eurostat population projections for EU-27 by 2030 (around 550 million EU residents), isequal to 4.7 tonnes of CO₂eq per capita.

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Slovenia and Sweden still project sizeable net GHG emissions in 2050 even taking into account current and additional policies (seeTable 6, in Chapter 5 of the annex ‘Technical information’), despite the fact that almost all have declared a climate-neutrality goalby 2050, or earlier.
Trajectories are also important. Figure 638 compares projected emissions between 2022 and 2050 for each Member State with abenchmark trajectory, built as the median of the seven climate neutrality paths that form the basis of the advice of the European
Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change on the 2040 ambition39. The EU-level emissions of the median path were then distributed across Member States according to the country’s share of EU emissions in the core policy scenario used for the European
Green Deal initiatives 40.
Figure 6: Overshoot of projected GHG emissions against an indicative path to climate neutrality by 2050 (in % ofbenchmark emissions, total emissions excluding LULUCF)

Figure 6 shows stark differences in progress towards climate neutrality across the EU’s members. Factoring in existing measures 41(WEM, the yellow bars), between 2022 and 2050, Slovakia, Poland and Malta expect to emit more than twice the emissions of thebenchmark path to climate neutrality. A further 15 Member States project their cumulative emissions to overshoot the climate-neutrality benchmark by more than 50% without additional policies 42. When factoring in the impact of additional policy measures 43(WAM, the blue bars) the overshoots decrease, although the gaps remain significant (above 50%) for Slovakia, Poland, Croatia,
Romania and Bulgaria44.
Similar results are produced when taking a linear trajectory as the indicative benchmark. Here, the largest overshoots are for Malta,
Italy, Greece, Austria and Hungary under the WEM scenario, and for Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia under both WEM andWAM scenarios (see Table 6, Chapter 5 of the annex ‘Technical information’) 45.
These analyses based on Member States’ GHG emission projections reflect different levels of ambition and implementation, but also
the completeness and quality of data submitted. By the end of April 2023, more than a month after the official deadline, only 20
Member States had submitted their projections via the e-platform. Late submissions undermine the quality control and follow-up

38 Excluding LULUCF emissions and removals.
39 Scientific advice for the determination of an EU-wide 2040 climate target and a GHG budget for 2030–2050 (europa.eu)
40 Policy scenarios for delivering the European Green Deal (europa.eu). After 2030, the distribution key has been kept constant.
41 Projections ‘with existing measures’ (i.e. WEM) encompass the effects, in GHG emissions, of policies and measures adopted and implemented.
42 ES, SL, HR, RO, IT, BG, LU, IE, EL, AT, HU, BE, FR, PT and CY.
43 Projections ‘with additional measures’ (i.e. WAM) encompass the effects, in GHG emission reductions, of policies and measures adopted and implemented, as well as policies and measuresthat are planned (e.g. measures under discussion having a realistic chance of being adopted and implemented after the date of submission of the national plan).
44 Only 18 Member States have submitted their GHG emission projections under the ‘with additional measure’ scenario.
45 The metric compares cumulative projected net GHG emissions (including LULUCF) with cumulative emissions underlying a linear trajectory from the 2021 net GHG emissions levels of each
Member States to climate-neutrality by 2050.

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process of resubmissions. In addition, although not being mandatory, nine Member States46 did not submit projections with additional
measures, which were then gap-filled with projections using the ‘existing measures’ scenario, and for Belgium’s projections thatlacked information beyond 2030, 2021 GHG projections were used. The Commission therefore urges Member States to improvetheir emissions projections and support analytical capacity and tools. Projections are an important guide for decarbonisation, toassess progress towards the climate-neutrality objective and to support sound policy design and decisions.
In 2023, all Member States reported progress on policies and measures. Although the number of measures has increased, there arestill significant differences among Member States in the number of reported measures. Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg, and France
reported the most measures and Bulgaria, Austria, Greece and Malta the least (Figure 7) 47.
Compared to the previous reporting exercise (2021), the greatest increase in reported measures is in Cyprus and Luxembourg,
followed by Spain, Portugal, Finland, Italy, and Estonia. Bulgaria, Austria and Malta reported a significant decrease. At the sametime, more than a third of measures reported by Lithuania, Estonia, Croatia, Ireland, and Bulgaria appear to be new (in place as of2022 or later). In terms of the affected sectors (Figure 7.b), the relative high share of policies and measures affecting agricultureand LULUCF sectors in Latvia and Finland should be noted, given recent trends in these sectors, although the reported expected
emission savings are not significant48.
Figure 7: Number of single policies and measures reported by Member States: status of implementation and affected
sectors 49
Figure 7.a

Figure 7.b

The EU 2030 climate target and the EU climate-neutrality objective by 2050 require ending subsidies for fossil fuels, creating
favourable conditions for energy efficiency and renewable energy and focusing on the needs of the vulnerable for a just energy
transition. Total fossil fuel subsidies had remained stable or slightly decreased for a number of years, reaching EUR 56 billion in
2021, but have surged recently due to measures to cushion the impact of the energy crisis. The Commission estimates that fossil
fuel subsidies in 2022 more than doubled compared to 2021, reaching EUR 122 billion. Member States must accelerate action toend fossil fuel subsidies50.
Overall, the level of progress by Member States in recent years falls significantly short of the effort required over the coming
decades to meet both the medium and the long-term EU climate targets. Member States should rapidly accelerate action by making
tangible progress on planned policies and by taking additional, urgent measures in line with the country-specific recommendations
issued in the European Semester process of economic policy coordination. Several Member States also face sectoral challenges
and weaknesses that need to be remedied without further delay.

46 CY, DK, FR, EL, IT, MT, AT, HU, and SE
47 The number of reported PaMs could reflect the granularity of reported policies and measures. For example, both Belgium and France report their PaMs at a highly disaggregated level (e.g.
many regional policies and measures are reported), while other Member States report their PaMs in a more aggregated level. Values are those available on 31/08/ 2023.
48 Annex IX of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2299 of 15 November 2022). For more, see the SWD on the assessment of progress towards the objectives of the energy Unionand climate action accompanying the State of the Energy Union 2023.
49 Values based on Annex IX of NECP progress reports submitted by Member States, by 15/08/2023. Member States could indicate more than one affected sector, so the sum of PaMs across all
affected sectors can be higher than the total number of single PaMs with a decarbonisation dimension.
50 2023 Report on Energy Subsidies in the EU, annexed to the 2023 State of Energy Union Report.

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In particular based on the available information, the level of progress towards the EU climate-neutrality objective appears insufficient for Poland, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, and Croatia, and, to a lesser extent, for Austria, Estonia, Czechia, Cyprus, Italy and Romania.
However, this current assessment does not reflect the more ambitious climate intentions that Member States should include in
their revised national energy and climate plans (NECPs). By 30 June 2023, Member States had to submit their draft updated NECPs
to the Commission51. The draft NECPs should contain the policies and measures that each Member State envisages to meet theirclimate and energy targets. The Commission is in the process of assessing the draft NECPs and will issue recommendations to theMember States by the end of the year. Member States are encouraged to take these recommendations into account in their final
updated NECPs due by 30 June 2024. The Commission urges Member States to seize the opportunity of updating their NECPs toplan additional measures, to align the expected emissions with the EU’s higher level of ambition on climate policy.
Large-scale, long-term projects need to be supported by reliable strategies. Member States are therefore encouraged to consider
updating and, where needed, to increase both the ambition and the quality of their national long-term strategies. Given the scaleof the challenges ahead, the Commission will consider issuing recommendations under Article 7(2) of the Climate Law, together
with recommendations on the draft NECP updates.

Climate monitoring reports
The monthly climate monitoring reports from the European Union’s Copernicus Climate Change Service, the US National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and NASA confirm the extraordinary pace of climate change because ofheat-trapping greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Global ocean surface temperatures were the highest ever recorded
and expected to further increase due to the El Nino event, leading to more marine heatwaves and devastating impacts
on marine ecosystems, including coral bleaching. Sea ice also reached the lowest coverage ever recorded in July 2023.1

Global surface air temperatures
Source: July 2023 confirmed as hottest month on record |World Meteorological Organization (wmo.int)

Daily Sea surface temperature
Source: July 2023 confirmed as hottest month on record |World Meteorological Organization (wmo.int)

1 World Meteorological Organization. July 2023 confirmed as hottest month on record | World Meteorological Organization (wmo.int): https://public.wmo.int/en/media/news/july2023-confirmed-hottest-month-record

51 By 6 October 2023, 16 Member States had submitted draft updated NECPs. 6 Member States foresee a higher ambition in their draft NECPs compared to their reported projections in March2023.

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EU industry’s lead in the net-zero technology revolution
In February 2023, the European Commission issued its communication “A Green Deal Industrial Plan for the Net ZeroAge” to enhance the competitiveness of the EU’s net zero industry and lead the global transition to climate neutrality. The
Plan is to create a predictable and simplified regulatory environment, enable faster access to sufficient funding, turn skills
into quality jobs, and support open trade for resilient supply. As part of this, the Commission has proposed the Net-Zero
Industrial Act (NZIA), the Critical Raw Material Act, and a reform of the electricity market. The NZIA aims to scale
up net zero technology manufacturing in the EU to provide at least 40% of the EU’s annual deployment needs by 2030
and sets a Union level objective of 50 million tonnes of annual CO₂ storage capacity by 2030.
Hydrogen is one of the key technologies of NZIA. A keyelement in the strategy for industrial decarbonization is
the promotion of renewable hydrogen as a substitute tofossil fuels, for which the Commission has set the targetof 20 million tonnes of supply by 2030. To facilitate its
deployment, in 2023 the Commission created the European
Hydrogen Bank, which will support amongst other things
the creation of a domestic market through the Innovation
Fund (financed with EU ETS revenues) starting with a public
auction in November 2023.
Hydrogen is a clean fuel that will play an important role in the EU’s transition to climate neutrality by 2050, with highrelevance for the decarbonization of the industrial sector. The European Hydrogen Strategy (COM/2020/30) set out the aimof producing 10 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen domestically in the EU, and the REPowerEU plan (COM/2022/230)
complemented this goal by facilitating additional 10 million tonnes in imports by 2030.
The CO₂ncrEAT project is a tangible
example of European lead in innovation. The project, funded by the
Innovation Fund, contributes
to the decarbonisation of theEuropean construction sector,
offering a new line of carbon-negative precast materials, such as
masonry blocks. This project offersa sustainable and environmentallysound alternative to the concrete
manufacturing process that istraditionally used for those blocks.
Instead of the traditional aggregates and binders used in masonry blocks, the new CO₂ncrEAT process will reuse residues from slag recycling centres
and CO₂ captured from the exhaust gases of a lime manufacturing process. The project will lead to a relative greenhousegas emissions avoidance of 176% compared to the reference scenario.

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Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition
In 2020, a Commission study found that 53.3% of examined environmental claims in the EU were vague, misleading or
unfounded, and 40% unsubstantiated. To address this, the Commission proposed an EU Green Claims Directive underwhich companies will be required to substantiate the claims they make and obtain ex-ante independent verification1. The
proposal also includes regulating environmental labels, of which there are currently at least 230, contributing to confusion.
In September 2023, the European Parliament and Council reached agreement on the Empowering Consumers for theGreen Transition Directive, proposed by the Commission in March 2022. Among its aims is to integrate environmentand climate into the EU’s general consumer protection safety net, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. Part of theagreement is to add to the list of banned unfair practices claiming, based on emissions offsetting, that a good or service
has a reduced, neutral or positive climate impact 2.
Complementary to combating greenwashing, consumerawareness is a prerequisite to support consumers in
the transition to a net-zero emission economy. To thisend, the LIFE - Doppel Plus project encouraged changes
in the everyday behaviour of low-income households
in Austria. In the Austrian State of Tyrol, approximately
100 000 people are threatened by poverty and an estimated 10 000 households are affected by energy poverty.
Between 2016 and 2021, the LIFE project Doppel Plus
trained 91 energy and climate coaches, who provided
advising sessions to 806 Tyrolean low-income household(mainly single parents, asylum seekers, long-term unemployed, migrants and retirees). The target group received freeadvice on how to minimise energy costs and adopt a more climate-friendly approach to everyday life. Through individual
coaching sessions on matters related to heating, cooling and ventilation, but also mobility and nutrition, and the distribution of “starter packages” (led lamps, aerators for taps and other practical items), each household was able to save
an average of 2091 kWh of household energy per year, corresponding to a reduction of 667 kg CO₂-eq and EUR 200
in savings. In addition, stakeholders such as electricity utility companies, transport companies and public bodies wereaddressed through lectures, workshops, and train-the-trainer programmes to build up a broad network and integrate thesustainability goals and offers of the project into various sectors. Today, the activities of Doppel Plus are being continued
by the project partners with the support of the State of Tyrol as part of the Tirol 2050 energie autonom energy strategy.
Consumers are also at the centre of the food system. In the EU, the food we produce, consume and waste has a significant impact on climate and environment, accounting for
30% of all EU GHG emissions and polluting land and water
resources. Between 2018 and 2022, the project LIFE-SU
EATABLE, coordinated by the Barilla Foundation, carriedout a series of pilot engagement activities at university
and company canteens in Italy and UK to promote theadoption of a sustainable and healthy diet. Combining
educational and informative campaigns with a sustainable
food offering and the use of a dedicated digital platform,
the project involved 17 partners (companies, universities
and caterers) and 6557 people, leading to an estimatedsaving of about 1.7 kg of CO₂-eq. and 1.67 litres of water
per person per day, compared to the daily average impactof an EU citizen. Furthermore, SU-Eatable has encouraged
the replication of its solutions through communication
activities, scientific publications, implementation guidelines© LIFE16 GIC/IT/000038. All rights are reserved. Licensed to the European Unionand replication toolkits.
under conditions

1
2

EUR-Lex - 52023PC0166 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)
EU to ban greenwashing and improve consumer information on product durability | News | European Parliament (europa.eu)

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CHAPTER2©Unsplash.com | Marek Piwnick

The EU emissions
trading system
Key highlights• Emissions from stationary installationsin the EU ETS decreased slightly in 2022
compared to 2021, with sectoral trends
shaped by the impacts of the energy crisis
in Europe. In the energy sector, emissions
went up slightly for a second consecutive year due to an increased use of coalin electricity generation. Emissions fromindustrial production went down becauseof an increase in energy prices and thesubsequent reduction in industrial demand.

• With a robust carbon price, the EU ETS
raised some EUR 38.8 billion in auction
revenue in 2022, mostly directly to national
budgets. Member States used on average
76% of the ETS revenue to support climate
and energy projects including social measures in response to the energy crisis. Halfof the Member States also used revenues
to compensate industries’ indirect carbon
costs.

• On 10 May 2023, the European Parliamentand Member States in the Council of the EU
adopted the revised EU ETS Directive, now
in force, with most changes taking effectfrom 1 January 2024. Work on the implementing legislation is ongoing.

The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is a cornerstone of EU’s
climate action. It covers around 36% of EU’s total GHG emissions, fromthe electricity and heat generation, manufacturing industry and aviation
within Europe52. By setting a cap on the total emissions, the system
ensures that these emissions decrease over time. Within the cap, allowances are distributed primarily via auctioning, which raises revenues for
Member States’ budgets to support climate action and energy transformation. With the allowance price determined by the market, the ETS
incentivises cost-effective emission reductions.
By 2022, the EU ETS had helped drive down emissions from power
and industry installations by 37.3% compared to 2005 levels. Theseemission reductions have been largely driven by the energy sector - aswitch from coal to gas and an increased deployment of renewableenergy sources. Latest emission trends in the EU ETS, however, also
reflect the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the energy crisis(see Emission Trends).
In parallel, the EU ETS has raised over EUR 152 billion in auction revenues
that Member States have largely used to support projects in renewableenergy, energy efficiency and low-emission transport. In the wake ofthe energy crisis, Member States have also used their ETS revenues toaddress negative impacts on consumers and industries.
The revision of the EU ETS under the Fit for 55 package will help
bring down emissions faster and across more sectors. The European
Parliament and Member States in the Council agreed to tighten the cap
on emissions whilst extending the system to emissions from maritime
transport (see Action in aviation and maritime transport). A reduction
in free allocation will help step up emission reductions across manufacturing industry and aviation. At the same time, more resources are

52 Including departing flights to Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

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leveraged to support decarbonisation in ETS sectors. The revision commits Member States to using all ETS revenues (or an equivalent
thereof) for climate action, energy transformation and addressing social challenges of carbon pricing, and also increases the sizesof the Innovation and Modernisation Funds (see Ch. 2 of the annex ‘Technical information’ for more details).
The revision of the EU ETS entered into force on 5 June 2023 with most changes taking effect from 1 January 2024. Work on theimplementing legislation is ongoing. More on the functioning of the EU ETS in 2022 is available in the Carbon Market Report 2023.

Emission trends
In 2022, overall EU ETS emissions decreased by 0.2% compared to the previous year53. This reflects a slight decrease in emissions
from power and industry installations and a continued rebound in emissions from aviation after the COVID-19 pandemic. Looking
to before COVID-19, however, emissions have remained on the decline. In 2022, emissions were around 8% lower than in 2019.
The EU’s economic recovery continued in 2022, with GDP growing 3.5%. Even so, emissions from the energy sector and manufacturing
decreased slightly by 1.8% compared to 2021. This is in part due to the energy crisis and its impacts. On the one hand, natural gas
supply became restricted, and higher natural gas prices caused an increase in coal use for power generation.
On the other hand, the energy crisis contributed to an increase in inflation and a reduction in industrial demand.
Electricity and heat generation – a slight increase in emissions
Emissions from electricity and heat generation in 2022 rose by 2.4% compared to 2021. Although electricity and heat demanddecreased due to higher energy prices and milder weather, sectoral emissions increased due to a switch back from gas to coalfor energy generation. The switch was prompted by both high prices of natural gas, and droughts in many parts of the EU which
reduced output of nuclear and hydro power.
Industry – a net decline in emissions
Manufacturing industry saw a reduction of emissions of 6.5% in 2022 compared to 2021. With higher energy prices leading to
reduced output, sectors such as cement, iron and steel and chemicals reported significant emissions reductions in 2022. At the sametime, emissions in the oil and gas-producing sectors rose, as refineries increased output to profit from increased fossil fuel prices.
Aviation – emissions continue to reboundIn the EU, verified emissions from aircraft operators increased significantly, by 75% compared to 2021. This reflects a continued
rebound of air traffic from the COVID-19 pandemic but is still almost 27% lower than in 2019.
Figure 8: Verified ETS emissions 2005-2022, Member States projections with existing measures 2021-2030, ETS cap
phases 2, 3 and 4, and accumulated surplus of ETS allowances 2008-2021 including UK (Northern Ireland), Norway
and Iceland NB: adjust for cap phase 4 54 .

53 Based on data from the EU Registry as of 30 June 2023.
54 Emissions cap in the EU ETS (considering the 2023 revision of the ETS Directive, i.e. rebasing in 2024 and 2026, inclusion of the maritime transport sector in 2024, and the linear reduction
factor of 4.3% in 2024-27 and of 4.4% from 2028), compared with verified emissions. Aviation is not included. Due to scope changes, 2005-7 figures are not directly comparable to the latest.
Legend: bars (cap), light shade bars in 2014-16 (allowances backloaded in phase 3), light shade bars since 2019 (feeds of allowances to the Market Stability Reserve), dash line (verified emissions).

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Revenues raised by the EU ETSThe EU ETS generates substantial revenues from the sale of allowances that can be used for climate action (see Chapter 6).
As the carbon price increased during 2022, so did ETS auction revenue, amounting to some EUR 38.8 billion in total, 7.7 billion
more than in 2021 (Figure 9)55. Of these EUR 38.8 billion, EUR 29.7 billion went directly to the 27 Member States. They reported
that in 2022 an average of 76% of revenues was spent for climate and energy purposes56, the same as in 2021 and in line with anaverage of 75% over the 2013-2020 period. About 25% of Member State revenues are earmarked for specific climate and energy
actions, 27% went into dedicated environmental funds and 48% went to national budgets. More information can be found in theannex ‘Technical information’.
Figure 9: Auctioning revenues received by EU Member States and report usage (2013-2022)

Since 2021 several Member States use part of their auction revenue to cushion the social impact of the energy price crisis.

Action in aviation and maritime transport
Maritime
Maritime transport is a substantial CO₂ emitter, generating around 3-4% of total EU CO₂ emissions. In 2022, emissions, as collectedunder the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification Regulation57, increased by 7% compared to the previous year, as the sector recovered from the COVID-19 pandemic downturn. In May 2023, as part of the revised EU ETS Directive, the EU Maritime MRV Regulation
was amended to extend its scope to cover non-CO₂ emissions (CH₄ and N₂O) as well as new ship types and sizes. The EU ETS will
therefore cover CO₂ emissions from large ships calling at EU ports as of 2024 and non-CO₂ emissions as of 2026. At international
level, the EU successfully supported the increase in ambition of the 2018 International Maritime Organization greenhouse gas
reduction strategy. The revised strategy, agreed in July 2023, sets a goal of net zero emissions from ships “by or around, i.e. close
to, 2050” and indicative checkpoints set at reducing GHG emissions from ships by at least 20% - striving for 30% - in 2030 and at
least 70% - striving for 80% - in 2040, both in comparison to 2008 levels.
Aviation
The overall climate impact of aviation is currently two to four times higher than the effect of its past CO₂ emissions alone, with
non-CO₂ accounting for 66% of the aviation climate impact. There is no monitoring yet by Member States of aviation non-CO₂
emissions. From 1st January 2025, the revised ETS Directive tasks aircraft operators to monitor and report the non-CO₂ effects per
flight on a yearly basis. By 31 December 2027, based on the results of the application of the MRV framework of non-CO₂ aviation
effects, the Commission will submit a report and, where appropriate, a legislative proposal to mitigate the non-CO₂ effects by
expanding the scope of the ETS to include them.

55
56
57

EU-27 + EEA countries + Northern Ireland + Innovation Fund + Modernisation Fund.
The remaining 24% is not necessarily spent on other purposes. Part will be spent in later years or go to general budget used for multiple purposes, including climate change and energy.
Regulation (EU) 2015/757.

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A balanced EU carbon market
Since 2019, the EU ETS functions with the Market Stability Reserve, which addresses the historical surplus of allowances built up in
the system and improves resilience of EU carbon market to demand shocks. Based on the total number of allowances in circulation
every year, the Reserve either withdraws or releases allowances, managing their supply to future auctions. This helps maintain arobust price signal in the ETS, to incentivise emission reductions and be factored into investment appraisal.
In 2022, the surplus of allowances in the EU ETS was just over 1.1 billion allowances. With this, the Reserve continues to withdraw
allowances from the EU carbon market in 2023. From 2023 onward, allowances held in the Reserve above a certain threshold
lose their validity. This means they can no longer be released to the market. On 1 January 2023, a little over 2.5 billion allowances
became invalid. This is more than all the international credits used for compliance in the EU ETS to date. Thanks to the Market
Stability Reserve and an ambitious long-term climate policy outlook of the European Green Deal, the price signal in the EU ETS
remained robust in 2022 with only a short period of market volatility in March, triggered by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

Plastics recycling: Project Plastics2Olefins
Project Plastics2Olefins1 under the Processes4Planet
Partnership in Horizon Europe Cluster 4 started in June
2022 and will demonstrate a novel plastics recycling
process based on high-temperature pyrolysis, as themain product will be a gas stream instead of a liquid, so
it will reduce the lifecycle GHG emissions by more than
70% compared to existing plastics recycling processes
for unsorted plastic waste. The project will realise thisin a two-step approach: first by adapting and testing ascaled pilot plant to optimise the components and process
conditions and finally, a pioneering full-scale industrial
demonstration plant at Repsol's petrochemical site.
1

Recycling plastic waste into high-value materials- Closing the Loop | Plastics2Olefins | Project | Fact sheet | HORIZON | CORDIS | European Commission (europa.eu)

Agrivoltaic canopy: The Brouchy Agrivoltaic Canopy
Funded by the Innovation Fund, the Brouchy Project(France) will be an innovative agrivoltaic canopy to answer
the critical dual need of the agricultural and energy sectors.
The project aims to enhance agricultural production anddevelop new renewable energy capacities. Its breakthroughtechnology features a 5-metre-high shade house structure on steel cables, held in place by poles with a widthof 27 metres, making it suitable for large field crops. The
canopy’s versatility will expand the market potential ofagrivoltaics at a large scale, contributing to the decarbonisation of the energy mix and improving food security as it
delivers 100% relative greenhouse gas emission reduction
compared to the reference scenario.

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3Effort sharing
emissions
Key highlights• After an upward rebound in 2021, emissions
from the effort sharing sectors fell by 3% in2022 compared to 2021.

• The emission reductions were driven by thebuildings sector and small industry, which
achieved a decrease in emissions of morethan 9% and almost 6% compared to 2021,
respectively.

• The transport sector, the largest sector

under the ESR, recorded an increase inemissions of over 2% from 2021 to 2022,
the only effort sharing sector with anincrease.

• All sectors have reduced non-CO₂ emis-

sions between 2005 and 2021. The mostsignificant reductions were in the non-ETS
energy and waste sectors, while non-CO₂
emissions from agriculture and buildings
have remained relatively stable.

• Aggregated projected ESR emissions are

expected to fall by 32% in 2030 compared
to 2005 levels, when planned additional
measures are taken into account. This falls
short of the new EU-wide ESR target for2030 of a 40% reduction in emissions
compared to 2005 levels.

The Effort Sharing legislation covers GHG emissions from domestictransport (excluding CO₂ emissions from aviation), buildings, agriculture,small industry and waste. They account for around 60% of the EU’s
domestic emissions. The Effort Sharing legislation sets binding nationaltargets to reduce emissions in these sectors compared to 2005 levels,
under the Effort Sharing Decision58 (ESD) for the period 2013-2020 andunder the Effort Sharing Regulation59 (ESR) for the period 2021-2030.
Based on approximated data, emissions from the effort sharing sectors
in 2022 were 3% lower than in 2021. It followed the rebound of emissions in 2021, after the pandemic. The reduction in emissions resulted inparticular from the buildings sector which showed an emission decreaseof more than 9% compared to 2021. Small industry showed the second
largest emission reduction with a decrease of almost 6% compared
to 2021. The transport sector is the largest sector under the ESR,
accounting for over one third of total effort sharing emissions, and theonly one that saw its emissions increase, by over 2% from 2021 to 2022.
58 Decision No 406/2009/EC of 23 April 2009.
59 Regulation (EU) 2018/842 of 30 May 2018, as amended by Regulation (EU) 2023/857 of 19 April
2023.

©Unsplash.com | Patrick C. Freyer

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Figure 10: Emissions in sectors covered by effort sharing legislation 2005-2030 and annual emission allocations,EU-27 60

Results of the Effort Sharing Decision 2013-2020
In the period 2013 to 2020 all Member States met their effort sharing obligations under the ESD in every year. The EU
overachieved its 2020 emission reductions target by more than six percentage points. EU-27 emissions covered by the ESD were
16.3% lower in 2020 than they were in 2005. Compared to 2013, the EU-27 emissions were 7.2% lower in 2020. 2020 was the lastyear covered by the ESD. Member States could not carry-over (bank) AEAs for use in future years under the ESR.
However, in 2020, emissions from four Member States exceeded their annual emissions allocations (AEAs)61. Cyprus used surplus
AEAs from previous years (banking) to cover their excess emissions. Malta and Germany covered their excess emissions by buying
AEAs. Malta bought them from Bulgaria and Germany from three different countries (Bulgaria, Czechia and Hungary). Ireland usedinternational credits from the Clean Development Mechanism62 and bought AEAs from Slovakia to meet its obligations under the ESD.
Figure 11: Change in ESD emissions between 2013 and 2020, against 2020 annual emission allocations 63

60 From inventory data for the years 2005-2022, and from projections for the years 2023-2030 as reported by Member States under Regulation (EU) 2018/1999, compiled and checked by the
EEA. The ESD AEAs are expressed in GWP AR4, all other numbers are in GWP AR5. Figures include EU-27 only.
61 Annual emission allocations are annual emission limits for GHG emissions in the effort sharing sectors for each Member State.
62 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, allows a country with an emission-reduction or emission-limitation commitment (Annex B Party) toimplement an emission-reduction project in developing countries.
63 The graph shows Member States ESD emissions in 2013 (yellow bar) and 2020 (orange bar), compared to its AEAs for 2020 (green line) before the use of any flexibilities under the ESD.

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Progress under the Effort Sharing Regulation 2021-2030
In April 2023, the ESR was amended to deliver a higher ambition for 2030. This increased the ESR EU-wide target to reduce
emissions from 29% (for EU-27) to 40% by 2030 compared to 2005 levels. The overall ESR target was translated into increased
national GHG emission reduction targets by 2030 and more ambitious GHG emissions limits for 2023 - 2030. The amendment alsochanged some of the flexibilities that are available for Member States to comply with their annual GHG emission limits and targets
and strengthened other provisions (for more details see Chapter 2 of the annex ‘Technical information’). Iceland and Norway also
implement the Effort Sharing Regulation, but the trend in (projected) emissions is only made for the EU Member States below64.
In 2021, EU-wide emissions in the ESR sectors remained 3.3% below the aggregated emissions limit, with emissions exceeding
AEAs in five Member States65. Based on approximated data, EU-wide ESR emissions in 2022 are estimated to be 2% below heaggregated emissions limit. In 2022, nine Member States are expected to generate emissions that exceed their AEAs66. The final
ESR emissions for 2021 and 2022 will only be determined after a comprehensive review in 2027, when the compliance cycle foreach of the years 2021 to 2025 will take place. Member States can then use the flexibilities available under the ESR to comply with
their annual emission limits. However, the emission projections that Member States submitted in March 2023 can be used at thisstage to gain insights on progress towards ESR targets. Aggregated projections show that EU-wide ESR emissions are expected tofall by 32% in 2030 compared to 2005 levels including planned measures (see Figure 12). This is less than the EU-wide ESR target
to reduce emissions in 2030 by 40% compared to 2005 levels.
Based on Member States’ latest emission projections, the Commission also assessed Member States’ progress towards their annual
emission limits over the period 2021-2030, taking into account the flexibilities available under the ESR67. Based on the assumptionthat Member States would use saved AEAs from previous years (banking) and/or the existing ETS flexibility to cover excess ESR
emissions, 19 Member States would still have excess emissions in at least one year over the 2021-2030 period 68. Eight Member
States already have excess emissions in the first compliance period (2021 to 2025), which poses a bigger challenge as there is lesstime to develop additional policies to drive down emissions69. In particular Cyprus, Italy, and Romania would already have excess
emissions in the period 2021- 2023, as well as Croatia but to a lesser extent70.
Under Article 9(2) of the ESR, any debit (i.e., excess emissions) under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021 to 2025 is automatically deducted from Member States’ AEAs under the ESR first compliance period. Based on available estimated LULUCF emission
data for 2021 - 2025, trends in Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Portugal, and Slovenia are concerning (see Chapter 4). If these
LULUCF trends are confirmed, it may be challenging for those countries to achieve their LULUCF targets and also lead to challenges
in achieving their ESR targets each year in the first compliance period71.
To comply with their ESR emission limits, some Member States can increase their amounts of ETS flexibility72. Member States that
perform well under the LULUCF Regulation can use such overachievement, up to a limit, to cover any excess emissions in ESR.
Member States can also transfer AEAs among each other to match emissions with AEAs73. However, based on current projections,
there may only be a limited amount of AEAs available for purchase.
In conclusion, based on the information available at this stage and taken account of the substantial gap highlighted by the analysis
above, Member States are encouraged to reflect on additional measures to reduce their emissions under the ESR, in particular aspart of the ongoing NECP update process. Some Member States have planned higher ambition for emissions covered by the ESR in
their draft NECPs. Therefore, a more complete overview will be available in the Commission’s assessment of draft updated NECPs
due by the end of this year. After the submission of the final updated NECPs by Member States, the Commission will come back to
the assessment of whether Member States are making sufficient progress. Insufficient progress may trigger the need for a corrective action plan under Article 8 of the ESR.

64 The developments in Iceland and Norway are reflected in the annual Climate Progress Report prepared by the EFTA Surveillance Authority.
65 Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland and Italy. Denmark already indicated the intention to use the flexibility with the LULUCF Regulation to cover the excess emissions in 2021, if confirmed in
2027 after the comprehensive review of the ESR emissions.
66 The 2021 ESR emissions are based on final inventory data and 2022 ESR emissions are based on approximated inventory data, both reported in 2023.
67 Article 8 of the ESR provides that in case the Commission finds that there is not sufficient progress, Member States must prepare a corrective action plan.
68 AT, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, FR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LV, MT, NL, PL, RO, SK.
69 CY, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, MT, RO.
70 Available historical and approximated data is used for Member States’ ESR emissions in 2021 and 2022 and projections for other years; Final ESR emissions will only be established following
a comprehensive review in 2027 (for 2021-2025) and 2032 (for 2026-2030). The AEAs for 2026-2030 are estimated as they will only be set after a comprehensive review in 2025. For moredetails, see Chapter 2 of the annex ‘Technical information’.
71 For the purposes of this assessment, the excess emissions under LULUCF in the period 2021 – 2025 are equally distributed over the years 2021 to 2025 for calculating the reduction in AEAs
under the ESR. Flexibilities under the LULUCF Regulation are not taken into account.
72 Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Malta. ETS flexibility allows a Member State to notify to the Commission an amount of EU ETS allowances to be available for ESR compliance. The EU
ETS allowances are deducted from the amounts that would normally be auctioned under the EU ETS.
73 Iceland and Norway can also buy AEAs from and sell AEAs to Member States.

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Figure 12: Gap between ESR 2030 targets and projected GHG emissions

Emission trends by type of gas under the Effort Sharing legislation
Around two thirds of total emissions from the effort sharing sectors are CO₂ emissions, the remaining third are non-CO₂ emissions.
Non-CO₂ greenhouse gases include methane (CH ₄), nitrous oxide (N₂O), and fluorinated gases (NF₃, HFCs, PFCs, SF₆ , HFCs). Whilemost of the emissions in the energy sector are covered by the EU ETS, methane emissions in this sector fall under the ESR. These
non-CO₂ gases are emitted from a range of sectors and processes, and all have much higher global warming potentials than CO₂
by degrees of tens to tens of thousands depending on the gas. As a result, non-CO₂ emissions have an important impact on climatechange and are key sources of potential emission reductions in several sectors. Mitigating non-CO₂ emissions can lessen global
temperature increases rapidly. Reducing non-CO₂ emissions is also important to achieve our targets under the ESR. Around half ofthe non-CO₂ emissions come from the agriculture sector. All sectors have reduced non-CO₂ emissions from 2005 to 2021 but themost significant reductions were made in the non-ETS energy (‘other energy’) and the waste sector. Over the same period, non-CO₂
emissions from agriculture and buildings have remained relatively stable. Most emission reductions were nitrous oxide emissions
from non-ETS industry and the waste sector, and methane in the waste sector, while the level of F-gas emissions has remained
relatively stable. The EU methane strategy aims to reduce methane emissions in the energy, as well as in the agriculture and waste
sectors, and thus also supports the achievement of the ESR targets.

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Figure 13: Non-CO₂ emissions under the ESR in 2005 and 2021, by sector and by gas type.

F-gases
Fluorinated gases (‘F-gases’) have a global warming effect up to 25 000 times greater than CO₂. F-gas emissions in the EU amountto 2.5 % of the EU’s total GHG emissions. Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) are the most important F-gases. Regulating F-gases at the
EU level has been rather effective. After 2014, a decade-long trend of rising emissions of F-gases was reversed due to the current
F-gas Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 517/2014). EU-27 emissions fell by slightly over 20% from 2014 to 2021 and the supply ofhydrofluorocarbon (HFC) gas to the market fell by 47% in CO₂-eq between 2015 and 2019, notably due to refrigeration shifting tomore climate-friendly alternatives. The EU Regulation was also successful in terms of facilitating the global agreement reached in2016 to phase down HFCs under the Montreal Protocol (“Kigali Amendment”) which is estimated to prevent around 0.3-0.5 degrees
Celsius of global warming by 2100. A political agreement has been reached on the Commission’s proposal of April 2022 for a new
F-gas Regulation for additional emission savings by 2050; formal adoption is expected by the end of 2023. The amount of HFCs
must be reduced by around 95% in 2030 and 100% in 2050 compared to 201574. These saved F-gas emissions will support Member
States’ efforts to reach their target under the Effort Sharing Regulation.

National policies and measures in the ESR sectors
EU legislation supports Member States to meet their targets under the ESR. Some policies in key sectors of the ESR are describedin the next section.
In the 2023 integrated national energy and climate progress reports (NECPRs), Member States reported policies and measures (PaMs)
that they have implemented or plan to implement to reduce GHG emissions and to achieve their current 2030 targets under the ESR.
Member States have reported 1900 single measures related to the ESR, 10% more compared to the previous reporting round75.
Figure 14: Number of single policies and measures reported by Member States for the ESR sector 76

74 For the quota system when measured in terms of the climate impact (CO₂eq).
75 Compared to EEA database on greenhouse gas policies and measures in Europe. This includes all PaMs, expired, adopted, implemented, and planned.
76 The number of PaMs has been established based on PaMs as reported by Member States with an explicit reference to the ESR as an objective. This is likely to underestimate the numberof ESR PaMs, as not all PaMs with a sectoral policy objective that is closely linked to reducing emissions in the ESR (e.g., the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive) are qualified by Member
States as ESR PaMs.

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Emission trends and policies in key sectors
Buildings
Buildings account for 40% of energy consumed and 36% of energy-related direct and indirect GHG emissions in the EU. Heating,cooling and hot water account for 80% of the energy that households consume. To achieve the 55% emission reduction target, by
2030 the EU should reduce buildings’ GHG emissions by 60%, their final energy consumption by 14% and energy consumption forheating and cooling by 18%.77 The Recovery and Resilience Facility78 and Cohesion Policy allocate a significant portion of funds toimprove energy efficiency in buildings (see Chapter 6).
The Report on renovation of the national stock of residential and non-residential buildings and on nearly-zero energy buildings
provides a first assessment of the implementation and progress of the 2020 national Long Term Renovation Strategies (LTRSs),
based on the 2023 integrated NECP progress reports. It shows the level of ambition of LTRSs is not always in line with climate
neutrality in 2050, with some progress observed in the NECPRs, e.g., towards GHG emission reduction targets in many countries,
but without revisions of ambition. It also highlights the need to improve tracking of the evolution of the building stock in Member
States and the streamlining and harmonisation of indicators and definitions.
The proposed revision of the Energy performance of buildings directive aims to enhance long-term renovation strategies (renamed
national Building Renovation Plans) with a clear roadmap for a highly energy efficient and decarbonised building stock by 2050 (cf.
Ch. 2 of annex ‘Technical information’).
Agriculture
EU agricultural emissions represent around one-tenth of the overall GHG emissions, of which roughly two-thirds come from livestock.
Since 2005, emissions have stagnated- inventory data show a slow annual decrease of 0.7 MtCO₂-eq between 2005 and 2021.
The latest GHG projections from Member States indicate that under existing measures the pace of emission cuts will not change by2030 (1% compared to 2021, or an annual average reduction of 0.6 MtCO₂-eq). However, with additional measures, aggregatedprojected emissions from agriculture point to a visible decline by 2030 (5%, or 2.2 MtCO₂-eq annual average reduction). It is clearthat more effort is needed to implement mitigation measures in the agricultural sector (Figure 15.a).
Figure 15: GHG emissions in the agriculture sector (EU, 2005-2021) and 2023 reported policies and measures forthe agriculture sector (by objectives)
Figure 15.aFigure 15.b

In 2023, Member States reported more than 300 measures aimed at reducing emissions in the agriculture sector, equal to 13% of
total reported measures with decarbonisation dimension (see Figure 15.b), mainly to reduce fertilisers and manure use on cropland (22%) and to improve livestock management (16%). Many of these measures are supported through funding under the new
Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), some others through national financing (State aid).

77
78

Compared to 2015 levels, See SWD(2020) 176 final.
Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (europa.eu)

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Transport
Transport emissions represent more than one-fifth of the overall EU domestic GHG emissions, of which the large majority from roadtransport (i.e. around 95%, or 75% when international bunkers are included). Since 2005, emissions have only slightly decreased.
Inventory data show an annual decrease of 4 MtCO₂-eq between 2005 and 2021, a pace clearly insufficient to meet the EU 2030
target as outlined in the Commission’s analysis79.
Passenger cars and vans generate more than 70% of all road transport CO₂ emissions in the EU. CO₂ emission standards for newcars and vans and for heavy-duty vehicles are key drivers for reducing road transport GHG emissions. According to provisional
monitoring data for vehicles registered in the EU, Iceland, and Norway in 202280, the average Worldwide harmonised Light vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP)81 CO₂ emissions from new cars and new vans continued to decrease, to 108.2 CO₂/km from 114.1
g CO₂/km in 2021 for cars and to 185.3 g CO₂/km from 193.3 g CO₂/km in 2021 for vans. This continues the steep downward
trend in CO₂ emissions triggered by the stricter targets that apply since 2020. By 2022, emissions from new cars and vans had
decreased by 27% and 9%, respectively, compared to 2019 levels (Figure 16). The sharp decrease is due to the surge in the shareof zero-emission vehicle registrations. In 2022, 13.4% of new cars and 5.9% of new vans had no tailpipe emissions (up from 2.2%
and 1.4% in 2019, respectively). The recently adopted revised CO₂ standards require a further decrease in emissions. As of 2030,
and compared to the 2021 baseline, emissions need to be reduced by 55% for new cars and 50% for new vans. By 2035, all newcars and vans should be zero-emission.
Figure 16: Average CO₂ emissions (dots) and EU fleet-wide targets (lines) for new cars (left) and vans (right)
Figure 16.a New cars

Figure 16.b New vans

Heavy-duty vehicles (HDV), such as lorries, buses, and coaches, generate almost 30% of all CO₂ emissions from road transport.
Existing legislation requires manufacturers to reduce emissions of certain lorries by 15% by 2025 and 30% by 2030 compared to2019 levels. In 2023, the Commission proposed revised CO₂ standards for HDV further tightening existing standards and extending
the scope to smaller lorries, buses, coaches and trailers. The proposed Regulation requires CO₂ emissions reductions of 45% from2030, 65% from 2035, and 90% from 2040 onwards compared to 2019 baseline. It also sets a 100% zero-emission target for
new urban buses from 2030.
The Fuel Quality Directive also contributes to reducing transport emissions; it requires the life-cycle GHG emission intensity offuels to be reduced by 6% by 2020 compared to 2010 levels. The average GHG intensity of fuels supplied in 2021 was 5.5% lower
than in 2010. The progress by EU fuel suppliers varies greatly across Member States (Figure 17).

79 Based on modelling outcomes of the core policy scenario supporting the initiatives delivering the European Green Deal, between 2022 and 2030 the annual average emission reduction in
the transport sector should be around 22 MtCO₂/eq. https://energy.ec.europa.eu/data-and-analysis/energy-modelling/policy-scenarios-delivering-european-green-deal_en.
80 Monitoring of CO₂ emissions from passenger cars and vans – Regulation (EU) 2019/631; published by the EEA.
81 Determined during type-approval using the Worldwide harmonised Light vehicles Test Procedure.

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Figure 17: Reductions in GHG intensity of fuels achieved by EU fuel suppliers in EU-27, 2010-2020 and 2010-2021(Source: EEA)

Belgium Renovates for Energy Efficient Living
The energy use of Belgian houses is 70% higher than theEuropean average, showing the enormous potential forenergy saving and greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions. The LIFE BE REEL project, started in 2018 under
the coordination of the Flemish Energy and Climate Agency,
is supporting the full implementation of the renovation
strategies of the Flemish and Wallonia regions, targetingover 4.1 million homes and representing 14% of the total
GHG emissions for Belgium in 2015. BE REEL is developing
and demonstrating structural measures to increase therenovation rates and improve the energy performanceof buildings. The demonstration includes the design andimplementation of innovative technical concepts and tools,
along with financial instruments, communication activities
and actions to build capacity and enhance cooperation
among public administrations, citizens, NGOs, contractors, renovation professionals, federations and other relevant
stakeholders. The pilot projects of BE REEL will lead to 8,585 renovated dwellings, generating over 18,600 tonnes of CO₂
emission reductions per year. The innovative solutions of BE REEL will create the conditions for the full implementation of
the regional renovation strategies, which aim at renovating all existing housing and achieving a reduction of 75-80% of
CO₂ emissions and energy use by 2050.

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Renewable bio-hydrogen production technologies
Vast amounts of rice straw are burned annually in the rice
fields near Albufera Natural Park (Province of Valencia,
Spain), emitting greenhouse gases and particulatematter, affecting the environment and the quality of lifeof surrounding populations. When techniques other thanburning or burying are used, the management of thisbio-waste is expensive for farmers.
The LIFE REPTES project, started in 2022 under thecoordination of Depuración de Aguas del Mediterráneo(DAM), will demonstrate a new circular model that willallow rice straw from fields to be disposed of, while also
reducing greenhouse gas and particulate emissions. LIFE REPTES will design, build and implement a demonstration plantat the Pinedo wastewater treatment plant. Using an innovative dark fermentation process, the project will integrate theproduction of biohydrogen from pre-treated lignocellulosic crop by-products and the sludge produced in wastewater
treatment plants. The resulting fermented liquid stream will be used as an anaerobic digestion co-substrate to produce
biogas. In addition to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving air quality in the region, the project will provide
local authorities with new tools to achieve a climate neutral economy by increasing the generation and use of renewableenergy and improving energy efficiency.

A result-based funding mechanism for carbon farming in EU mixed crop livestock
systems
The project LIFE CARBON FARMING, coordinated by
Institut de l'Elevage, will bring together actors involvedin agriculture and other economic sectors (public bodies,industrial companies and banks) to implement carbon
finance mechanisms in six European countries. Between
2021 and 2027, the project will support Carbon Farming
Projects in 700 farms in Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Spain to help farmers reduce the carbon footprintof their farms and measure the progress achieved. LIFE
CARBON FARMING will develop and disseminate a harmo© Unsplash.com l Daniel Quiceno M
nised sustainability assessment methodology and acommon process for monitoring, reporting and verifying
carbon removals. Moreover, the project will implement voluntary carbon markets that will provide EUR 6.34 million inestimated revenues from carbon credits. A European network of farmers and partners involved in Carbon Farming Projects
will share knowledge and replicate the project results and tools. The farmers involved are expected to reduce the carbon
footprint of agricultural products by 15% within six years, using result-based funding.

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4Land use,land use change& forestry
Key highlights• 244 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent were

removed from the atmosphere in the EU in
2022 based on approximated data, up from
230 million tonnes removed in 2021.

• However, based on Member States' projec-

tions, the EU is currently not on track toreach its 2030 objective of net removals of
310 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent, andmore action is required by Member States• While the EU met its objective under the

LULUCF Regulation in 2021, nine Member
States show debits under the applicableaccounting rules.

• To accurately assess the EU's progress

toward its climate goals and take effective
action, monitoring must be improved andbroadened.

The land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) sector
plays a significant role in achieving the EU’s climate neutrality goal. In
the EU, the LULUCF sector absorbs more GHGes than it emits, removing
significant volumes of carbon from the atmosphere. The sector also
provides biomaterials that substitute fossil or carbon intensive materials, which is equally important in the transition to a climate-neutral
economy. However, carbon removals have declined at a worrying
speed in recent years.
This trend is mostly due to a decrease in forest related removals,
triggered mainly by an increase in harvesting. To a lesser extent,
it is also caused by reduced carbon sequestration in ageing forests incertain Member States, due to lower growth rates. Climate change itself
is having an increasing impact too. The growing frequency and severityof disturbances such as wind throw, insect, and fungus outbreaks, forest
fires, and droughts is undermining the role of forests as a carbon sinkand has in some cases turned them temporarily into carbon sources.
There are many indications that, because of climate change, the futurerobustness of Europe’s forest sinks is far from guaranteed. The slowingof forest area expansion has also contributed to the fall in removals, butwith a smaller impact. At EU level, cropland, grassland, wetlands, andsettlements are mainly sources of LULUCF emissions, with managed
organic soils generating particularly high emissions.

A greater role for the LULUCF sector to support
climate action
The revised LULUCF Regulation82 sets out how the sources of emissions
and removals in the land use sector contribute to EU climate goals, witha target to achieve land-based net carbon removals of -310 million
82 Regulation (EU) 2018/841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on the inclusion of GHG emissions and removals from land use, land use change and forestry in the 2030 climate
and energy framework and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 and Decision No 529/2013/EU (OJ L
156, 19.6.2018, p. 1).

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tonnes of CO₂ equivalent by 2030 83. To reach this, targets are allocated to Member States based on the total managed land area in
their territory. The 2030 target of each Member State requires them to increase their climate ambition for their land-use policies.
The revised regulation sets two compliance periods:• From 2021 to 2025: the assessment of Member States’ progress is based on benchmarks for land use activities, such as Forest

Reference Levels84 for sustainable forest management. Across all land categories, a Member State has to fulfil the ‘no-debit’ rule,
i.e. the credits or debits generated in individual land categories must to sum up to at least zero. If the ‘no-debit’ rule is not met
and a Member State has a net debit, it will be able to use a number of flexibilities to compensate the net debit (e.g. by purchasing
credits from other Member States). If a net debit remains from the first compliance period, even after using all flexibilities, thisnet-debit will be moved to the ESR account of the Member State.

• From 2026 to 2030: each Member State must meet a binding national target in 2030 based on the sum of reported emissions
and removals in all land categories. Benchmarks no longer apply for individual land categories. A ‘net removal budget’ will becreated for the period 2026-2029 to check the performance of each Member State. Any debit in this period will be carried forward
to the final compliance assessment for the 2030 target.

Assessment of progress in the LULUCF sector
In 2021, the EU’s carbon sink achieved a net removal of -230 Mt CO₂-eq85. The trend seen in recent years persists, and the size ofthe carbon sink is continuing to decrease, even though, based on approximated data, the sink is estimated to have increased to-244 Mt CO₂-eq in 2022.
With current LULUCF accounting rules – with a limited scope – applicable to the period 2021 to 2025, the provisional ‘accounted’balance for 2021 using the 2023 GHG inventory submission produced a slight accounted credit of -14 Mt CO₂-eq. As such, the EU
as a whole meets the ‘no-debit’ rule of compliance for the first year of the compliance period 2021-2025. Based upon estimatesusing approximated data, 2022 would also produce a small accounted credit.
Even so, based upon a single year of the compliance period, and excluding the other flexibilities available to Member States at theend of the compliance period, nine Member States showed potential accounting debits86, with France, Finland and Czechia showing
the biggest debit. 18 Member States had potential accounting credits87 with Spain, Germany and Romania having the largest net
credit in the EU.
Based on approximated data for 202288, with accounting rules applied, 16 Member States had potential credits89 and ten Member
States showed potential debits90. Czechia and Finland show a decrease in debit while Latvia moves from having a credit to a debit.
Italy and Romania show increase in credits. Five Member States submitted 2021 inventory data as approximated data for 202291.
(for more details see Chapter 9 of the annex ‘Technical information).
In line with the reporting obligations, Member States reported their projected total LULUCF accounted credit or debit for the period
2021 to 202592. From this, 16 Member States reported projections with existing measures93 (WEM), and 10 Member States reported
projections with additional measures94 (WAM). After calculations95, some Member States show debit accounted emissions per year
for each year 2021-202596. This raises reason for concern as there is limited time to develop policies and implement measures toreverse the trend.

83 Regulation (EU) 2023/839 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 April 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/841 as regards the scope, simplifying the reporting and compliance rules, and setting out the targets of the Member States for 2030, and Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 as regards improvement in monitoring, reporting, tracking of progress and review (OJ L 107,
21.4.2023, p. 1).
84 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/268 of 28 October 2020 amending Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2018/841 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the forest
reference levels to be applied by the Member States for the period 2021-2025.
85 2023 Submission GHGI reported data on LULUCF, as reported for the entire sector scope.
86 In decreasing order of magnitude: France, Finland, Czechia, Portugal, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, Belgium and Cyprus show net LULUCF debits.
87 In increasing order of magnitude: Malta, Luxembourg, Latvia, Netherlands, Croatia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Greece, Ireland, Austria, Lithuania, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, Spain, Germany,and Romania show net LULUCF credits.
88 Reported approximated data by Member States for 2022, on LULUCF carries uncertainties and it is therefore important to exercise caution drawing conclusions from this data. Seven Member
States report 2021 data as approximated data for 2022.
89 Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden.
90 Belgium, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia.
91 Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia submitted same data as reported under 2023 GHGI submission as 2022 approximated data for LULUCF.
92 Total cumulative emissions/removals (kt CO₂-eq) for LULUCF by land category in the period 2021-2025, reported by Member States under Table 5b: Projections of accounted emissions andremovals from the LULUCF sector in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/841
93 Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Sweden.
94 Belgium, Croatia, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.
95 Total cumulative emissions and removals (kt CO₂ -eq) calculated average per year over the five-year period by using WAM per land category, if WAM not available, WEM is used. LULUCF
managed forest land, including Harvested Wood Products assuming instantaneous oxidation where available
96 Belgium, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia.

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Projections on reported emissions and removals, delivered by Member States in March 2023, have been assessed for LULUCF
progress towards the 2030 targets. Projections with existing measures show EU total net removals of -239 Mt CO₂-eq for 2030
and -260 Mt CO₂-eq with additional measures, leaving a gap of around 50-70 Mt CO₂-eq to meet the 2030 target. This means that,
according to projections, the EU is not on track to meet the 2030 net removal target of -310 Mt CO₂-eq.
Figure 18: Land sector emissions and removals in the EU, by main land use category97

In conclusion, based on the limited data and information currently available, Member States are encouraged in the context of theongoing NECP update process to reflect further on how to increase ambition and action on their territory. Following submission of
the final updated NECPs in 2024, the Commission will return to the assessment of whether Member States are making sufficient
progress. Insufficient progress may trigger the need for a corrective action plan under Article 13(d) of the LULUCF Regulation.

Action to step up land monitoring
The proposal for a directive on soil monitoring and resilience98 and the revised LULUCF Regulation99 will be mutually reinforcing: healthy soils sequester more carbon and the LULUCF objectives promote the sustainable management of soils. The LULUCF
regulation requires that all Member States set up systems to monitor, inter alia, soil carbon stocks100.
Better land and soil monitoring will help target action on measures that unlock the highest climate benefits. Member States GHG
inventories underpin climate action and are also continuously developing. Recalculations based on better data and methods are
expected in response to new requirements on quality statistics in the revised LULUCF Regulation. Improved greenhouse gas inventories, based on harmonised and refined activity data and removal/emissions factors will be critical to facilitate action. Better, more
timely and mapped data will help track national and collective EU progress towards climate objectives, and guide informed andaccurate action and further measures. Over the past years, Member States made progress in their inventory reporting. For example,
in their coverage of carbon pools and the quality of submitted data and methodological information. Advanced technologies, suchas those available under EU programmes provide digital maps updated with high relevant satellite and ground observations. New
steps are being undertaken to integrate data from the Copernicus satellite services and data sets such as those utilised for the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

Related initiatives in agriculture and forestry
Member States need to reflect on the role of the land use sector when updating their national energy and climate plans (NECPs)
for the 2021-2030 period. This update is key to enable Member States to track progress against the targets and the EU to ensure
increased ambition. Member States must also assess by 16 November 2023 whether their CAP strategic plans are in line with the
new targets under the revised LULUCF Regulation and ESR and amend their plans as necessary.

97 The figure shows net reported removals by land use category for each Member State in 2021. Net removals are expressed as negative figures and net emissions as positive figures.
98 Proposal for a Directive on Soil Monitoring and Resilience (europa.eu)
99 Regulation (EU) 2023/839
100 Through an amendment to Annex V Part 3 (e) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999,

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Access to funding and incentives
Many funding mechanisms and incentives are available or being developed to encourage carbon removals, through public or privatesector sources. The EU provides funding under the CAP, other EU programmes such as LIFE, Horizon Europe (in particular the Soil
Mission), and the Cohesion Policy funds. In 2023, the Commission adopted guidance on EU funding opportunities for healthy soils101.
Member States can also support the uptake of sustainable management practices under State aid rules, which have been revised
and allow for the provision of forest ecosystem services such as climate regulation and biodiversity restoration. The Commission
guidance on payment schemes for forest ecosystem services102 provides further information for actors. The CAP and State aid
cover funding for investments and measures such as training, advice or cooperation, that help maximise effects. Private initiatives
linked to voluntary carbon markets or a combination of different funding options can supplement and further promote large-scale
deployment of carbon farming.
To ensure high-quality EU-certified carbon removals, the Commission has proposed a regulatory EU framework for the certification of carbon removals103 providing Member States with a toolbox to increase carbon removals. The certification framework
will help ensure the transparent identification, through standardised methodologies, of carbon farming and industrial solutions
that remove CO₂ from the atmosphere and store it long-term. Carbon removal certificates can also help organisations back credible
carbon removal claims and meet stakeholders' expectations that carbon removals should not be used for greenwashing, in linewith the Corporate Sustainability Reporting directive104 and the proposed directive on green claims105. To facilitate future work
under this initiative, the Commission has set up an Expert Group on carbon removals106.

Reduction of Agricultural Greenhouse gas Emissions Through Innovative Cropping
systems
Significant potential exists in Europe to decrease the fluxof carbon to the atmosphere from croplands, and forcropland management to sequester soil carbon, linked tothe amount of carbon stored in cropland soils. The LIFEAGRESTIC project, implemented between 2019 and 2023
in Emilia Romagna, Tuscany and Puglia (Italy), focused on
the inclusion of legumes and catch crops in the rotationsof cereals and industrial crops (tomato and sunflower) in
three demonstration sites in order to reduce greenhousegas emissions, increase the carbon sequestration and theavailability of organic nitrogen. The project developed an
innovative decision support tool for efficient managementof the multi-year crop rotation system, rationalizing the useof external inputs (nitrogenous fertilizers, pesticides, etc.)
and non-renewable resources (soil and fuels) and maintaining, or even increasing, quantity, quality and safety ofthe products. The project also developed a prototype for the automated and continuous monitoring of soil GHG fluxes, aquality label for products based on carbon footprint and schemes for the payment of Ecosystem Services.

101
102
103
104
105
106

SWD(2023) 423 final
Guidance on the Development of Public and Private Payment Schemes for Forest Ecosystem Services (SWD(2023)285 final).
Proposal_for_a_Regulation_establishing_a_Union_certification_framework_for_carbon_removals.pdf (europa.eu)
Corporate Social Responsibility Directive and the related Sustainability Reporting Standards
Proposal for a Directive on green claims (europa.eu)
Expert group on carbon removals (europa.eu)

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5Resilience to climatechangeKey highlights• The 2021 EU Strategy on Adaptation to

Climate Change sets out the vision forclimate-resilient EU by 2050, fully adapted
to the unavoidable impacts of climatechange. Implementation requires anall-of-society, all-of government effort.

• At EU level, an exceptionally broad rangeof policies have been involved to date. In
some areas, such as health policy, adaptation is being mainstreamed at a rapid rate.
In others, awareness of climate impacts has
increased, providing a good basis for the
progress that is needed for ensuring that allpolicies exposed to climate risks adequatelyreflect this.

• There has been collective progress among

Member States, in particular with adaptation present and rising on political agenda,
in planning and governance. Yet, the evaluation of adaptation policies at national level
and their effectiveness in building resilienceof communities, economic assets andnature to the increased impacts remains
patchy.

• Science and Member States’ own reporting

identify significant and growing vulnerabilities. However, this growing awarenessis itself an important enabler of further
progress.

The losses from weather and climate related disasters are significant.
The heatwaves of summer 2022 are estimated to have caused over
61000 excess deaths in Europe107. Extreme flash floods in summer 2021
caused EUR 46 billion of economic damage108. Climate risks will continue
to intensify, with the IPCC assessing the window of opportunity to avert
the worst consequences to be “brief and rapidly closing”.109
The EU has an obligation under the European Climate Law to ensure
continuous progress in building its capacity to adapt to the effects ofclimate change, boost its resilience and reduce vulnerability to climatechange. The next section provides a high-level assessment of that
progress at the level of EU policy. This is followed by an assessment ofcollective progress by all Member States. Further information is foundin chapters 7 and 10 of the staff working document accompanying thisreport. There is also a separate report on the implementation of the
EU’s adaptation strategy.

Implementation of the EU Adaptation Strategy
The EU updated its adaptation strategy in 2021.The strategy contains
49 actions to which the Commission has committed, spread across four
objectives: smarter, more systemic, faster, and international
adaptation to climate change. The actions were designed to cover large
ground in terms of policies and often require a careful sequencing of
measures.
To improve knowledge and manage uncertainty, the Commission,
together with the EEA, has expanded the content and partners of theEuropean Climate and Health Observatory110 to help build resilience

107
108
109
110

Heat-related mortality in Europe during the summer of 2022 | Nature Medicine
Economic losses from climate-related extremes in Europe (8th EAP) (europa.eu)
Sixth Assessment Report — IPCC
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to climate change impacts on human health. It published new calls for projects under Horizon Europe to close knowledge gaps
on climate impacts and resilience and is developing the Risk Data Hub111. The Commission is working to expand the content andimpact of the Climate-ADAPT knowledge exchange platform.
The first ever European Climate Risk Assessment is due to be published in Spring 2024. The Climate Resilience Dialogues112
have brought together policymakers, insurers, risk managers, consumers, city associations and other stakeholders to discuss andidentify possible actions, on insurance and investment in adaptation to help narrow the climate protection gap.
The European Drought Observatory promotes the sustainable use of freshwater by providing knowledge. To address water
scarcity, six times more water could be reused than current levels, facilitated by the Water Re-use Regulation that entered into
force in 2023. 113
The Commission has stepped up the systematic integration of adaptation action in sectoral strategies and plans, with updated
guidelines on Member State adaptation strategies and plans and complementary support from the Commission’s Technical Support
Instrument, including under its 2023 flagship project on adaptation. In 2021, the Commission published technical guidance on
the climate proofing of infrastructure projects and, in 2023, on enhancing the climate resilience of buildings. Climate
proofing applies to infrastructure and buildings funded by the EU budget. The European Climate Pact114, a stakeholder platform launched by the Commission to empower citizen to act and advocate on climate matters, continues to run adaptation andmitigation activities. The Policy Support Facility under the EU Covenant of Mayors has involved over a thousand people overthe past year and a half, including 350 municipalities, in national workshops, with eight cities developing peer-to-peer exchanges
on climate action and 37 adaptation measures being implemented.
Good progress has been made in implementing the EU Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change115, designed to speed up
innovative adaptation action at local and regional levels. Over 300 regions and communities, covering some 40% of the EU, havesigned up to the Mission Charter and committed to work together to accelerate their transformation to climate resilience; theAdaptation Community of Practice is live, and the Mission technical support facility is operational.
Climate resilience as an issue is now far more visible across EU policies than a few years ago. There have been efforts to support
adaptation objectives in legislative proposals where resilience to climate change (or risks interacting with climate impacts) were
not the primary objectives. For example, the proposal to amend the Budgetary Framework Directive, in the context of the economic
governance review, includes reporting requirements for Member States on macro-fiscal risks from climate change and on disasterand climate related contingent liabilities.
Similarly, the proposed revision of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive included measures to tackle the overflow ofsewage systems caused by flash floods, likely to become more intense and frequent across Europe due to the changing climate.
Implementation will need to continue, building on measures initiated under the adaptation strategy. The Commission also now
requires a consistency check with adaptation objectives in its own impact assessments (see Chapter 1 for an assessment of theconsistency check), which should be done in a systematic way, covering both emission reduction and adaptation objectives

Assessment of collective progress of Member States on adaptation
Article 6.1b of the European Climate Law requires the Commission to assess the collective progress made by all Member States
on climate adaptation. For the first time, this section assesses the progress they reported and have made in enhancing adaptive
capacity, strengthening resilience, and reducing vulnerability to climate change.
Member States report that currently the most observed acute climate hazards in Europe are heatwaves, droughts, floods, heavy
rainfall, and wildfires. They cite the changing temperature, changing rainfall patterns, sea level rise and hydrological variability
as the most frequent chronic climate hazards. They anticipate that future hazards will be the same as those currently observed,
except for water scarcity, which seven countries anticipate being an additional future key hazard.
Health, agriculture, forestry, biodiversity, energy, and water management are the areas reported as the most affected by climate
threats in Europe.

111
112
113
114
115

DRMKC Risk Data Hub (europa.eu)
Climate Resilience Dialogue (europa.eu)
Water Reuse (europa.eu)
European Climate Pact (europa.eu)
EU Mission: Adaptation to Climate Change (europa.eu)

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Almost all Member States have carried out climate risk assessments, 14 of these assessments have been updated recently,
with the rest scheduled for updates soon.
All Member States have national adaptation strategies and/or national adaptation plans in place. A considerable part ofthese strategies and plans have recently been renewed or are under revision and will be renewed over the coming years. Morenational sectoral adaptation plans have been adopted. The policy landscape is varied. On the one hand there is continuity in longterm priorities, increasing alignment with European frameworks, evolving legislative instruments, and incremental shifts in policy
focus. On the other hand, there are challenges, gaps, and barriers to the governance of adaptation action.
National and subnational governance structures and mechanisms for horizontal policy integration and multi-level (vertical)
coordination have been developed and are mainly now in place. The mandates and operational features of these structures vary
greatly. Eight Member States report having embedded elements of their adaptation policy systems in binding legal frameworks.
However, most Member States use soft and collaboration-based forms of vertical and horizontal governance.
Progress on international and transnational cooperation on adaptation has been made in two-thirds of the Member States.
Factoring in social justice and equity into adaptation measures is still at an early stage in many countries, highlighting a key areafor future focus, to tackle the disproportionate impacts of climate change on vulnerable groups. Two-thirds of Member States madeprogress in adaptation policy-related stakeholder engagement.
Member States are also making progress on implementing adaptation measures, including mainstreaming adaptation in sectoral
policies and plans. They have made significant progress on integrating climate change impacts into national disaster risk management frameworks and sectoral planning. Assessing the costs of adaptation remains a challenge for many Member States andis often only done partially. National adaptation plans and strategies often lack dedicated budgets or financing streams for theirimplementation, and most countries lack the budget needed to finance adaptation action.
Half the Member States reported an increase in monitoring, reporting and evaluation activities since 2021, at national, regional
and local level.

Achieving Resilience by Triggering Implementation of nature-based Solutions forclimate Adaptation at National scale
The LIFE IP ARTISAN project is providing support to
the French strategy for climate change adaptation, reinforcing the resilience of the country to climate change.
In particular, it aims at mainstreaming biodiversity into
climate adaptation by developing and promoting the use of
Nature-Based Solutions. The project, launched in 2019, is
implementing ten pilot demonstration projects on NatureBased Solutions and setting up a network of at least 200
local advisers and 13 regional networks cooperating on
ecosystem-based adaptation. LIFE IP ARTSAN is creatinga favourable framework for new local projects by building
capacity, mainstreaming good practices and improving the coordination among climate change and biodiversity policies
and funding parties. For example, the local advisors created an online database gathering information on public andprivate funding for climate adaptation activities that use Nature-Based Solutions. In particular, the project will also
facilitate the coordinated use of EUR 3.8 billion of complementary funding from the European Regional Development
Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and other national funds, especially from water agencies,
to support nature-based adaptation solutions. Furthermore, the project team is involved in the development of the newFrench strategy on climate adaptation.

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CHAPTER

6©Unsplash.com | Nuno Marques

Aligning investmentswith climate neutrality
Key highlights• Achieving climate neutrality in the EU by

2050 requires very substantial amountsof finance. Between 2021 and 2030, additional public and private investment inexcess of EUR 477 billion per annum will beneeded to fund the green transition.

• Initial quantifications show that financelabelled as green is increasing, also as
an effect of the EU sustainable financeregulatory framework. However, there areconcerns whether all such private capital
flows are in line with the EU’s climate objectives. While it is still difficult to quantify thegenuine reorientation of capital flows, it isclear that green finance remains far fromthe levels needed to finance the transition
to a climate neutral and climate resilient
economy. Going forward, EU policy willneed to focus on financing for the transition, ensuring alignment with long-termclimate goals.

• The Innovation and Modernisation Funds

will allow for investment in EU climate
action of around EUR 100 billion between
2020 and 2030, under current carbon priceestimates.

Investment needs and trends in the EU
Bridging the investment gap for the transition to climate neutrality by
2050 will require substantial amounts of finance. Commission analyses116 estimate the additional private and public investment needs
for the green transition at EUR 477 billion per year between 2021 and2030117, and delivering the REPowerEU objectives requires an estimatedadditional investment of up to EUR 35 billion per annum between 2022
and 2027118. Meanwhile, boosting EU manufacturing capacity for strategic net-zero technologies, as set out in the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA),
will require investment amounting to around EUR 92 billion, cumulated
over the period 2023-2030, compared to EUR 52 billion under a status
quo scenario. Closing the investment gaps for other environmental
objectives (circular economy, pollution, water, biodiversity) for the green
transition will require an estimated EUR 110 billion per year between
2021-2030,106 with climate action co-benefits (e.g. carbon removal,storage). While these figures should not be added up given their different
scope, timeframe and estimation method, they convey the magnitudeof the challenge.
Data show that in recent years, financial markets have begun to enable
the transition too, an important development given the limits to publicfinance. This is driven by growing awareness of the financial impactsof climate change’s physical and transition risks119 and a fast-evolving
sustainable finance policy framework with increasing investor demand
for genuinely sustainable investments.

• The EU budget 2021-2027 – the ‘multian-nual financial framework’ and the
NextGenerationEU instrument – is currently
projected to contribute EUR 578 billion toclimate action, exceeding its 30% climate
spending target.

116 SWD(2023) 68 final. Values in EUR 2022.
117 Investments in the transport sector are included in this figure, albeit not road or railway infrastructure investments.
118 COM(2022) 230 final, p. 12.
119 Transition risks are defined as financially-material risks related to changes in regulatory environment, technological development or consumer behaviour. Physical risks are financially-material risks
related to impacts of climate change on an undertaking.

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Monitoring finance’s alignment with the transition to climate neutrality
Monitoring investment trends in climate and other green finance is still challenging, especially due to data gaps and limited standardisation of data categories. Disclosures mandated under the EU’s sustainable finance regulatory framework are expected tofacilitate monitoring once implemented. A series of indicators can already be used to measure stocks and flows of finance conducive
to reaching the EU’s climate objectives.
Sufficiently robust data is available on green bond markets, which have soared in recent years. Cumulative issuances of bonds
aligned with the International Capital Market Association’s (ICMA) Green Bond Principles120 will very likely pass the EUR 1 trillion
mark in 2023 (see Figure 19).
Figure 19: Issuance of Green Bonds in the EU aligned with ICMA’s green principles (volumes)121

This increase in absolute green bond issuances is reflected in green bonds’ share of the corresponding bond market (seeFigure 20). For EU and non-EU issuers, the share in the EU27 remained lower than 1% until 2013, but has significantly increased
since, even more markedly from 2016, on the back of strong growth of the green segment. In 2022, green bonds accounted for
16% of all newly issued bonds in the EU27, but only 2% of overall issuance in non-EU markets, confirming Europe’s leading role inthe sustainable debt capital market.
Figure 20: Green Bond Share in Total New Issuance for EU and Non-EU (until 30 June 2023)122

120
121
122

https://www.icmagroup.org/sustainable-finance/the-principles-guidelines-and-handbooks/green-bond-principles-gbp/
Source: Dealogic DCM and JRC calculations. Data as of 30 June 2023.
Sources: Dealogic DCM, JRC calculation.

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Sustainability-linked bonds emerged in 2019 as a new financial instrument, incentivising the transition with contractual sustainability targets. Their uptake is still limited compared to green bonds, having peaked in 2021 at EUR 51.8 billion, given the more
recent development of this new type of assets.
However, the “green-ness” of green bonds and sustainability-linked bonds remains a cause for concern due to the risk of greenwashing despite the emergence of standards and principles that require third-party certification and adequate reporting. Politicalagreement was reached in early 2023 on the voluntary EU Green Bond Standard, which will rely on the EU Taxonomy andindependent reviewers to provide guarantees with a high degree of confidence that financing raised compliant with this standard
is genuinely ‘green’.123
While bonds are traded publicly, in the loan market, lending normally takes place based on private information. The loan market has
only recently seen the introduction of codified principles to facilitate and support environmentally sustainable economic activity.
All loans that follow ICMA’s Green loans principles are labelled as green124. Green loan volumes have been steadily increasing in theEU since 2016, reaching almost EUR 60 billion in 2022 (see Figure 21, below).
Figure 21: Yearly Issuance of Green Loans in the EU (until 30 June 2023)125

For investment funds, the entry into force of the Sustainable Finance Disclosures Regulation (SFDR) shed light on financiers’
sustainability claims. Since 2022, financial market participants are required to disclose information on their financial productswith purported Environmental, Social, Governance (ESG) benefits. Figure 22 below shows that total assets under management
for products with ESG characteristics and products with a sustainability objective has for a time represented over half the market
before stabilising at around 50% of all assets under management.
Figure 22: Assets Under Management by SFDR Classification126

123 European green bond standard (europa.eu)
124 https://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Regulatory/Green-Bonds/LMA_Green_Loan_Principles_Booklet-220318.pdf
125 The chart includes three types of loans: club deals, syndication transactions, bilateral transactions. Source: Refinitiv, JRC calculations.
126 Article 6 = funds without a sustainability scope; Article 8 = funds that promote environmental or social characteristics; Article 9 = funds that have sustainable investment as their objective.
Source: MorningStar, JRC Calculation

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However, SFDR-based classifications have not always been a reliable measure of the sustainability of funds, as the Regulation
gives market participants considerable leeway to define sustainability. For example, while funds tracking the EU Paris-Aligned
or Climate Transition Benchmarks127, can be considered sustainable, other products still have considerable exposures to thefossil fuel sector.128
Figure 23: EU market capitalization by greenness, 2021129

Green finance can also be measured through green market capitalisation (equity investments) of EU-domiciled companies,
defining green firms as those in the lowest 10th percentile for both total GHG emissions (scope 1 and scope 2) levels and intensities.
Green companies represent a very small share of overall market capitalisations (see Figure 23, for 2021).
The gold standard for defining green economic activities is the EU Taxonomy, a cornerstone of the EU’s Sustainable Financeframework. The mandatory Taxonomy-alignment disclosures on Capex, OpEx and revenue for companies under the scope of the
Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) will allow reliable quantification of finance aligned with a net zero trajectoryby 2050 (and other environmental objectives). With first reporting on taxonomy-alignment mandated for 2023, it will be possible
to start aggregating these data from 2024 onwards.

Integrating climate in financial market policy
Green finance is increasing and the sustainable finance regulatory framework that the EU has put in place since 2018 has been
instrumental in driving the reorientation of private capital flows, but green finance remains far from the levels needed to finance thetransition to a climate neutral and climate resilient economy. Policy needs to re-focus financing for the transition of “brown” sectors
towards “green”, while avoiding lock-ins that undermine long-term goals. The 2023 Commission Recommendation on Transition
Finance outlines how the EU’s existing toolbox can already be used130 and provides a starting point for the upcoming revisions ofexisting financial market policies, including identification of new policies to ensure a comprehensive framework to enable the EU
to achieve its climate targets. The Commission’s commitment in the Renewed Sustainable Finance Strategy of 2021 to report on
its implementation by the end of 2023 will be an opportunity to assess needs to be addressed going forward.

127 EUR-Lex - 32019R2089 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)
128 Commission Staff Working Document on Enhancing the Usability of the EU Taxonomy and the overall EU Sustainable Finance Framework https://impact-investor.com/article-9-funds-underreporting-exposure-to-fossil-fuels-research/
129 Green = top 10% of companies, i.e. below the 10th percentile threshold in both absolute emissions & emissions intensity rankings; Brown = companies ranking above the specified thresholdfor both absolute emissions & emissions intensity rankings; Grey intensity = companies like green ones regarding absolute emissions, but like brown ones for emissions intensity; Grey absolute =companies like green ones regarding emissions intensity, but like brown ones for absolute emissions. Source: JRC calculation based on MSCI emissions data (ranking based on global MSCI dataset;
totalled figures by category referring to EU-domiciled companies sub-set)
130 EUR-Lex - 32023H1425 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)

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Funding from the EU Emission Trading System
The Innovation Fund is one of the key instruments at EU level to bring solutions to the market to decarbonise the European economy,
supporting its transition to climate neutrality while fostering its competitiveness. It is Europe’s key instrument to gear up the EU
green industrial strategy while preserving cohesion objectives. Following the ETS Directive revision the Innovation Fund131 will:
1. grow from 450 million to approximately 530 million ETS allowances;
2. have a bigger scope in terms of sectors (maritime, aviation, buildings, road transport), size of grant (introducing a category of
medium-scale projects, with total investment costs of EUR 20 million to EUR 100 million) and in terms of level of innovation,
allowing support for upscaling innovative technologies;
3. be able to introduce new financing mechanisms, with projects selected through auctions (competitive bidding) and supported
through fixed premium contracts, contracts for difference or carbon contracts for difference.
The Innovation Fund portfolio has continued to increase. A total of 23 large-scale projects (total investment costs above EUR 7.5
million) and 46 small-scale projects (total investments costs below EUR 7.5 million) are under implementation, with a total EU
contribution amounting to EUR 3.1 billion. The investment mobilised by these grant contributions amounts to more than EUR 13
billion (estimated aggregate capital costs for the 69 projects). Following the publication of results from the third call for largescale projects, another 41 projects with total grants amounting to EUR 3.6 bn are currently preparing their grant agreements with
CINEA. In parallel, a total of 43 projects were awarded project development assistance by mid-2023. The third call for small scale
projects closed in September 2023; 72 applications were received, asking for EUR 289 million, 2.9 times more than the call budgetof EUR 100 million. The launch of a new call for proposals is planned by end 2023, with a total budget of EUR 4 billion, covering
small, medium and large-scale projects.
In addition, following the introduction of the competitive bidding mechanism in the revised ETS Directive, the first auction organised
at EU level under the Innovation Fund, on renewable hydrogen, is planned to be launched by the end of the year, with a budget of
EUR 800 million, to respond to the priorities put forward in the Hydrogen Bank Communication132, the Green Deal Industrial Plan133
and the Net-Zero Industry Act134.
The Modernisation Fund supports lower-income Member States with financial assistance, generated through the ETS, to modernise
their energy systems and improve energy efficiency. Up to 2030, over 750 million allowances will be auctioned to support these
Member States, an increase by 110 million allowances (representing around EUR 60 billion), thanks to the revision of the ETS Directive.
In the latest disbursement cycle, the EU allocated EUR 2.4 billion to 31 projects across seven beneficiary countries. Additional
investments were made in Romania (EUR 1.1 billion), Czechia (EUR 1 billion), Bulgaria (EUR 197 million), Poland (EUR 47 million),
Croatia (EUR 88 million), Latvia (EUR 5 million), and Lithuania (EUR 1 million). The Modernisation Fund has now distributed a totalof around EUR 7.5 billion since January 2021, benefiting ten eligible Member States. Under the revised EU ETS, Greece, Portugal
and Slovenia will also become beneficiaries of the Modernisation Fund.

Mainstreaming climate policies in the EU budget
The EU budget 2021-2027 – both the ‘multiannual financial framework’ and the NextGenerationEU instrument – is an
important enabler of the green transition. It is currently projected that in the period up to 2027 it will contribute EUR 578 billion
to climate action. This represents 32.6% of the EU’s total budget135 and exceeds its 30% climate spending target. This target
is underpinned by programme-specific spending targets, for instance in the European Regional Development Fund (30%), theNeighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (30%), Horizon Europe (35%), the Cohesion Fund (37%),
the Common Agricultural Policy (40%), the Connecting Europe Facility (60%), and the LIFE programme (61%).
The EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility – the centrepiece of NextGenerationEU, the EU’s recovery instrument – has a value ofup to EUR 723.8 billion and enables Member States to significantly increase climate investments. To qualify for the Facility’s grants(EUR 338 billion) and loans (EUR 385.8 billion), Member States have prepared recovery and resilience plans setting out investments
and policy reforms that contribute to the Facility’s six policy objectives including the green transition. Each national plan must
spend a minimum of 37% of its total allocation on measures contributing to climate objectives (such as initiatives promote energy
efficiency, sustainable mobility and renewable energy). Every measure must also comply with the ‘do-no-significant-harm’ principle.
All 27 Member State plans exceed the 37% benchmark, with some Member States spending well over half of their allocation to fund

131 See delegated regulation on the Innovation Fund (Regulation (EU) 2019/856)
132 COM/2023/156
133 COM/2023/62
134 COM/2023/161
135 European Commission’s ‘statement of estimates’ published in preparation of the draft budget 2024. The projected amount reflects loans currently requested in the RRF and excludes theInnovation and Modernisation Funds.

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climate policy. Collectively Member States dedicate 40% of their allocations to climate objectives (EUR 203 billion)136.
In addition, during 2023, Member States were (or still are) complementing their recovery and resilience plans with new chapters
on REPowerEU , a joint response to the energy crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. New or scaled-up reforms and investments in Members States to help phase out the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels and accelerate the clean energy transition
will be supported by additional financial firepower (EUR 20 billion of new grants, transfers from other funds and use of remaining
NGEU loans).
At the same time, the EU budget is enhancing its focus on the results of the measures that it finances. By way of example, by 2022:• 459 362 households had improved their energy classification through the regional funds;• Annual energy consumption had been reduced by nearly 14.2 terawatt thanks to the Recovery and Resilience Facility;• 3 640 gigawatts of additional renewable energy had been financed by the regional funds.
InvestEU
At least 30% of the InvestEU programme’s target of EUR 372 billion for mobilising additional investment over the period 2021-27
should contribute to meet the EU climate objectives. Under the Sustainable Infrastructure Window, 60% of the funding must be
spent on climate and environment. Investments above EUR 10 million are subject to sustainability proofing (identify, assess andmitigate climate, environment or social risks). All InvestEU supported investment will be climate and environmentally tracked
against the methodology issued by the Commission. Besides the EIB, 18 institutions have been selected to start negotiating
Guarantee Agreements for them to become Implementing Partners, with Guarantee Agreements signed with the European Bankfor Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), Nordic Investment Bank (NIB), CDP
Equity (CDPE), Caisse des Dépôts (CDC) in 2022. Financial products foreseen will help address market failures in providing accessto finance projects in a broad area of policy priorities from transport, smart mobility, clean energy, digital connectivity, as well as
energy efficiency, decarbonisation of industry, renewable energy, circular economy and other fields.
European Regional Development Fund and Cohesion Fund
Member States’ planned allocations under Cohesion policy programmes for the period 2021-2027 exceed the climate expendituretargets of both the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) (30.0%) and the Cohesion Fund (CF) (37.0%). EUR 92 billion(36.3%) of the EUR 253.3 billion of ERDF and CF funds financed by the EU under the current multiannual financial framework are
expected to fund climate change mitigation and adaptation measures. In addition, about 24.9% of the EUR 10.2 billion of Interreg
funds financed by the EU are expected to fund climate relevant measures. Figure 24 shows the funding allocated to climate relevant
policy areas as a share of total ERDF, CF, and Interreg climate expenditure.

136

Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (europa.eu)

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Figure 24: ERDF, CF and Interreg EU climate amounts by policy area137

Research and Innovation Framework Programmes (Horizon Europe and Horizon 2020) Investments in research and innovation are essential for generating knowledge and solutions for the transition towards climate neutrality and resilience. Overall, Horizon
Europe will contribute at least 35% of its EUR 95.5 billion budget to climate objectives. By end of 2022, over EUR 8.5 billion havealready been earmarked to R&I supporting climate action138. A broad portfolio of ambitious European private-public partnerships
is mobilising resources and developing solutions necessary to deliver on the EU’s climate agenda across key economic sectors suchas steel, process industries, hydrogen, batteries, bioeconomy, aviation, road and waterborne transport, buildings, water and more.
Just Transition Fund
The Just Transition Fund (JTF) -related cohesion policy programmes adopted make EUR 18.5 billion of EU investments available
to help the people and places that suffer the most from the transition to climate neutrality. In addition to JTF, the other 2 pillars of
the Just Transition Mechanism will mobilise EUR 28 billion from public and private investments to address the social and economic
effects of the transition. The Commission has approved 67 Territorial Just Transition Plans, covering a total of 93 territories, including
coal regions and carbon intensive regions. Almost half of JTF investments will support diversification of the local economy, sothat they don’t depend on a single polluting sector, and help people acquire new skills. The first JTF projects are being selected in
Estonia and Netherlands.
European Social Fund (ESF+)
For the period 2021-2027, Member States programmed almost 6 billion or 6% of total ESF+ allocations139 for green skills andgreen jobs, considerably more than in the previous programming period. Finland, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Denmark allocated the highest shares to green jobs and skills (between 12% and 31%) while in several individual programmes from Belgium,
Denmark, Italy, France, Germany, Portugal and Spanish programmes this share is 20% and above. In terms of actual investments,
three individual programmes from Italy, Portugal and Greece alone contribute to some 30% of total EU climate expenditure forgreen jobs and skills. Overall, a third of climate expenditure has been allocated to access to employment and activation measures.
Technical Support Instrument
This year the Technical Support Instrument is financing several projects on adaptation, do-no-significant-harm, faster permitting,industrial eco-systems and skills, building renovation but also capacity building. A Flagship on preparation of the Social Climate
Fund and the new ETS has been developed to help Member States implement the “Fit For 55” package.
137 Totals may not add up due to rounding. The data shown were taken on 25/09/2023 from the Open Data Portal for the European Structural Investment Funds - European Commission | Data
| European Structural and Investment Funds (europa.eu), which contains more detailed information including climate spending by programme. Data shown are from the latest adopted versions ofprogrammes. These figures are subject to change as Member States may amend their programmes during the programming period. The methodology for climate tracking under the Recovery and
Resilience Facility (RRF) has been used as a basis for categorizing climate expenditure by policy category.
138 Preliminary figures
139 EU’s main tool for investing in skills and for supporting labour market transitions with a total budget of almost EUR 99.3 billion for the period 2021-2027.

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LIFE programme
LIFE is the EU’s funding instrument for the environment and climate action. In 2022, more than EUR 600 million were awarded
to 200 projects supporting the Green Deal, including projects developing innovative solutions and sharing best practice to reduce
GHG emissions, increase resilience to climate change and contribute to clean energy transition. In 2023, over EUR 600 million
will be awarded to projects supporting environment, climate action and the clean energy transition, including contributing to theobjectives of REPowerEU and the Green Industrial Plan. In the last year Moldova and North Macedonia joined Iceland and Ukraine
in the list of third countries participating in LIFE.

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CHAPTER

7©Getty Images | Alistair Berg

International
climate action
Key highlights• The first Global Stocktake (GST) under theParis agreement in December 2023 is theopportunity to chart the course of international climate action for the coming
decades.

• EU climate policy continues to set an
example for ambitious action. The EU’s
extensive Climate Diplomacy is working toraise global efforts to tackle climate change
through multilateral negotiations and bilateral dialogues.

• International Cooperation remains at
the heart of multiplying the effect of theEuropean Green Deal.

• The EU and its Member States remain thelargest donor of international climate action
and continue to increase support for climate
action in developing countries.

Overview and developments
The past year has seen productive international exchanges including
the Ministerial on Climate Action, the Major Economies Forum, thePetersberg Climate Dialogue, the Africa Climate Summit, the Cartagena
Dialogue and the 27th Conference of the Parties in Sharm el Sheik, Egypt.
The EU is pushing for an ambitious Mitigation Work Programme, andfocusing on delivering concrete solutions to close the ambition andimplementation gap and to create incentives to set a high level ofambition.
The EU is seeking an ambitious outcome on the first Global Stocktake
to set the course to achieve the Paris Agreement goals and to get on
track to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, and concrete recommendations for enhanced, immediate and ambitious mitigation action
pre- and post-2030. The EU is also wants action on climate adaptationand means of implementation and support, including aligning global
finance flows with these goals.

On Loss and Damage discussed at COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, a fundto assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to theadverse effects of climate change will be set up, and the EU is engaging in the work of the Transitional Committee to develop
recommendations for the operationalisation of the new funding arrangements.
The EU has been active in scaling up international finance for adaptation. The EU and its Member States are the largest donors offunding for adaptation, contributing more than EUR 12 billion per year to climate adaptation or actions that combine adaptationand mitigation. At COP27, and in the follow-up intersessional Conference 58 in Bonn, the Parties agreed on the possible structural
aspects of a Global Goal on Adaptation Framework for consideration and adoption at COP28.
The EU has also joined and/or further developed initiatives such as Adaptation Without Borders, the Africa Adaptation and Innovation
Initiative, the International Coral Reef Initiative, and the All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance.

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The EU is helping to advance plurilateral initiatives, including the announcement of a global pledge for doubling energy efficiency
and tripling renewable energy by 2030. The 2021 Global Methane Pledge, co-led with the United States of America, now has over
150 participants and a dedicated secretariat. The EU has provided EUR 10 million to support the work and is preparing development
finance for implementation projects. The EU is also launching the MARS initiative (Methane Alert and Response System) to support
ongoing work in this area.

Multilateral and Bilateral engagement
Significant progress was made with multilateral and bilateral partners to convince and support other countries, in particular major
emitters, to increase their climate ambition. The EU strengthened its green deal diplomacy efforts by increasing engagement withthird countries and regions.
Following the adoption of the Green Alliance with Japan in 2021, the EU launched further green alliances and partnerships with
Morocco (October 2022), Norway (April 2023) and the Republic of Korea (May 2023), bilateral frameworks for closer dialogue
and cooperation on climate action, environmental protection and the clean energy transition.
Regular exchanges took place with the United States, including under the High-Level Climate Action Group set-up by the 2021
EU-US Summit. The EU also engaged in high level dialogues with China and Canada underlining that cooperation on climate forlarge emitters is central to building global consensus for increasing climate ambition aligned with the 1.5 °C degree temperature
limit, and to ensuring that existing commitments are implemented.
The EU together with other members of the International Partners Group set up a Just Energy Transition Investment Partnershipworth over USD 8.5 billion with South Africa in 2021 and signed three more since with Indonesia (2022), Vietnam (2022) and
Senegal (2023) providing USD 20 billion, USD 15.5 billion and EUR 2.5 billion respectively in new public and private financing. The
partnerships are a model of how the international community can work with partner countries to commit to sustainable development and jointly implement a clean and just energy transition.
The Political Declaration signed with Indonesia includes an accelerated path to reducing power sector emissions to net zero by2050 and a strategy based on the expansion of renewables so that renewable energy comprises at least 34% of all power generation by 2030, the phase down of on- and off-grid coal-fired electricity generation, and further commitments to regulatory reforms
and energy efficiency.
The Partnership with Vietnam, led by the EU and UK as co-leads of the International Partners Group, also sets ambitious new
targets such as advancing the projected date for all GHG emissions to peak from 2035 to 2030, limiting Vietnam’s peak coalcapacity to 30.2 GWT (down from the current 37 GWT) and accelerating the adoption of renewables to reach at least 47% ofelectricity generation by 2030.
The Partnership with Senegal seeks to strengthen the development of renewable energy and infrastructure and technologies toaccelerate deployment and use. Senegal aims to reach a share of 40% renewable energy in its installed generation capacity by 2030.
Through the Global Gateway strategy, the European Commission and the EU High Representative have set out to boost smart,clean and secure links in digital, energy and transport sectors and to strengthen health, education and research systems across theworld. Between 2021 and 2027, the EU institutions and EU Member States jointly will mobilise up to EUR 300 billion of investment
for sustainable, high-quality projects, considering the needs of partner countries and ensuring lasting benefits for local communities.
The EU also worked with the Contracting Parties of the Energy Community to adopt the 2030 energy and climate targets to
reduce primary and final energy consumption, accelerate the uptake of renewables and reduce GHG emissions to achieve climate
neutrality by 2050. They also agreed to adopt monitoring and reporting of GHG emissions and associated legal acts.

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Climate Finance and International Cooperation
International public climate finance plays an important role in helping developing countries to implement the Paris Agreement,
together with climate finance from private sources.
The Commission continues to support partner countries through its financing instruments. Under the Neighbourhood, Development
and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe, with at least 30% to be dedicated to climate action.
The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III) also sets a climate change spending target of 18%, rising to 20% by 2027.
The principle of ‘do not harm’ is enshrined in both regulations. The Commission has committed an additional EUR 4 billion forclimate finance by 2027 on top of these climate change spending targets, which equates to a 35% climate finance target. This isan unprecedented investment by the EU in reducing emissions and in helping developing countries build resilience to the effects
of climate change.
The EU, its Member States and financial institutions, collectively known as Team Europe, are the leading contributor of development
assistance and the world’s biggest climate finance contributor, accounting for about a third of the global public climate finance. In
2021, the European Union and its 27 Member States committed over EUR 23 billion in climate finance from public funds to support
developing countries in reducing their GHG emissions and in adapting to the impacts of climate change.
Over 54% of overall Team Europe finance was allocated to either climate adaptation or to actions involving both mitigation andadaptation. Almost half of the total funding was committed in the form of grants.
Efforts are underway to promote the involvement of the private sector in climate action through the European Fund for
Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) guarantees and blending.

Team Europe Initiative on Adaptation and Resilience in Africa
African countries have suffered unprecedented climate
events. By 2050, climate impacts could cost USD 50 billion
annually. The EU-AU Summit in 2022 increased efforts on
climate resilience through the EU-Africa Global Gateway
Investment Package. This package supports a strong, inclusive, green and digital recovery for Africa with investmentsof EUR 150 billion from the EU, Member States, financial
institutions and the private sector.
At COP27, the EU and its Member States launched the Team
Europe Initiative on Climate Change Adaptation andResilience in Africa. It aims at providing a coordinatedEuropean response on adaptation, including to enhanceaccess by African partners to climate adaptation finance. It brings together existing and new adaptation programmesof over EUR 1.4 billion from the Commission and several Member States (CZ, DE, DK, FR, and NL to date). There are fourpillars of action:• Reinforcing early warning systems at regional and national level• Developing and implementing Climate and Disaster Risk Finance and Insurance (CDRFI) tools and mechanisms• Increasing public sector readiness and supporting mechanisms to mobilise international climate finance on adaptation, including from the private sector• Supporting climate risk data collection and analysis to improve decision-making processes
This Team Europe Initiative is part of the broader support to adaptation to climate change that the EU and EU Member
States are delivering in Africa.

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Technical information

Contents
1. OVERVIEW OF EU CLIMATE TARGETS............................................................................................ 50
2. OVERVIEW OF RECENTLY ADOPTED LEGISLATION CONTRIBUTING TO THE
CLIMATE-NEUTRALITY OBJECTIVE................................................................................................ 51
2.1 Fit-for-55 package.......................................................................................................................... 51
2.2 Additional policy contributing towards the achievement of the EU’s climate targets.. ......................... 52
3. EU’s GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS............................................... 54
3.1 EU greenhouse gas emissions and removals: recent developments. . .................................................. 54
3.2 Drivers of greenhouse gas emission reduction since 1990................................................................ 57
4. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS COVERED BY THE UNFCCC,
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE CLIMATE AND ENERGY PACKAGE............................................. 59
5. PROGRESS TOWARDS CLIMATE NEUTRALITY: ADDITIONAL INDICATORS..................................... 61
5.1 Greenhouse gas emissions: recent developments in EU Member States............................................. 61
5.2 Greenhouse gas emissions projections: progress towards targets...................................................... 61
5.3 Additional greenhouse gases Indicators.. .......................................................................................... 64
6. EU ETS EMISSIONS.. ....................................................................................................................... 67
7. USE OF REVENUES FROM AUCTIONING OF ETS ALLOWANCES..................................................... 68
8. EMISSIONS COVERED BY THE EFFORT SHARING LEGISLATION.................................................... 74
9. LULUCF. . ......................................................................................................................................... 86
10. HORIZONTAL ASSESSMENT OF COLLECTIVE PROGRESS OF
MEMBER STATES ON CLIMATE ADAPTATION............................................................................... 91
10.1 Climate-related hazards, vulnerabilities, and risk............................................................................ 91
10.2 Climate risk assessments.............................................................................................................. 92
10.3 Adaptation policies and priorities................................................................................................... 93
10.4 Adaptation policy governance........................................................................................................ 94
10.5 Implementation and financing....................................................................................................... 95
10.6 Monitoring, reporting, and evaluation............................................................................................. 96
10.7 Conclusions.................................................................................................................................. 96
11. OVERVIEW OF SUSTAINABLE FINANCE POLICIES..................................................................... 100
12. COMMISSION’S ASSESSMENT OF LONG-TERM STRATEGIES. . ................................................... 101©Getty Images | Andriy Onufriyenko

Commission Staff Working Document (SWD)

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1. Overview of EU climate targets
Table 1: Overview of new climate targets as adopted under the Fit for 55 package
1. Surrendering of allowances
under the new ETS 2 will startin 2027.
2. For the CP2 it refers to carryover from CP1. For the ETS
it refers to carry-over fromprevious trading period under
the scheme itself. For the effort
sharing legislation it refers tocarry over from ESD to ESR. For
LULUCF it refers to carry-overfrom Kyoto Protocol period.
3. HFCs are also covered by
the Kigali Amendment to
the Montreal Protocol, which
entered into force on the 1st ofJanuary 2019.
4. Emissions from flights between
EEA airports as well as flights
departing to airports in Switzerland and in the UK.
5. Emissions from all large ships
entering EU ports in respectof 50% of emissions fromvoyages starting or ending
outside of the EU and 100% ofemissions that occur between
two EU ports and when ships
are within EU ports.
6. In addition to the 27 Member
States, Northern Ireland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway
are also covered under the
EU-ETS. The UK was initiallyalso covered by the ESD.
7. In addition to the 27 Member
States, Northern Ireland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway
are also covered under the EUETS. Norway and Iceland havealso incorporated the ESR.
8. Within the Agreement on theEuropean Economic Area,
Iceland and Norway cooperatewith the EU-27 towards
achieving the 2030 targets in
the LULUCF and Effort Sharing
sectors.

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2. Overview of recently adopted legislation contributing to the climate-neutrality
objective
2.1 Fit-For-55 Package
The European Climate Law lays down a binding EU target to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared
to 1990 levels and to achieve climate neutrality at the latest by 2050. In July 2021, the Commission proposed the Fit-for-55
package, containing the legislative proposals needed to reach those targets, including revision of existing legislation and newmeasures. In September 2023, nearly all proposals under this package were adopted (or close to adoption) by co-legislators, withseveral measures already in force1. Key elements of those proposals are summarised below.
EU Emissions Trading System• Revision of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS)2 to increase the system’s ambition to 62% emissions reductions by 2030,
compared to 2005 levels.

• Extension of ETS to maritime transport, covering carbon dioxide (from 2024), methane and nitrous oxide emissions (from 2026)

from ships above 5 000 gross tonnage in respect of all emissions from voyages within the EU and emissions from ships within
EU ports and of 50% of emissions from international voyages starting or ending in the EU. The obligations for shipping companies to surrender allowances is introduced gradually: 40% of emissions reported for 2024, 70% for 2025 and 100% for 2026.

• Increasing the aviation sector’s contribution to emission reductions through a strengthening of the EU ETS for aviation andimplementing the global market-based measure CORSIA (Carbon Offset and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation)3.

• The Market Stability Reserve, which stabilises the carbon market by removing surplus allowances, is strengthened.
• Free emission allowances to certain industry sectors gradually phased out as a new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism(CBAM) 4 will be phased in between 2026 and 2034. CBAM puts a carbon price on imports of products in the covered sectors
to avoid ‘carbon leakage'.

• The size of the Innovation Fund and the Modernisation Fund funded from revenues of the EU ETS, is increased. Additional
resources of the Modernisation Fund are supporting three more Member States with their transition. The Innovation Fund, whichfunds the demonstration of innovative low-carbon technologies, is expanded to new sectors, including maritime transport.

• A new separate emissions trading system for buildings, road transport and small emitting sectors (ETS2) is established, with compliance starting in 2027. It is complementing Member States’ emission reduction targets under the Effort
Sharing Regulation. The ETS 2 is contributing to 42% emission reductions compared to 2005 in the sectors covered.

• The new Social Climate Fund5 is introduced together with the ETS 2 to mitigate any social effects of carbon pricing in the

covered sectors. It will pool revenues from the new system to provide dedicated financial support to Member States to help
vulnerable citizens and micro-enterprises with investments in energy efficiency (such as home insulation, heat pumps, solar
panels), and low- and zero-emissions mobility. Member States will also be able to provide direct income support to households
up to 37.5% of the total cost of their Social Climate Plans. The Fund will be launched in 2026, a year before ETS 2. In 2026-32, itis expected to mobilise EUR 86.7 billion – directly from ETS 2 revenues and co-financing by Member States. As a result, energy
costs for vulnerable households, micro-enterprises and transport users will be reduced.

Effort Sharing Regulation
Increased ambition of the EU’s Effort Sharing Regulation 6 to a -40% reduction of emissions in domestic transport, buildings, agriculture, waste and small industrial installations by 2030 compared to 2005 levels (from -29% for EU-27 in 2018). The updated
emission reduction targets for Member States range from –10% to -50%.

1 Nearly all acts under the Fit-for-55 package were adopted by the Parliament and the Council, with the exception of the Renewable Energy Directive, the ReFuel EU Aviation Regulation (bothprovisionally agreed, pending final vote) and the Energy Taxation Directive (negotiations still ongoing).
2 Directive (EU) 2023/959 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading
within the Union and Decision (EU) 2015/1814 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading system.
3 Decision (EU) 2023/136 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 January 2023 amending Directive 2003/87/EC as regards the notification of offsetting in respect of a global
market-based measure for aircraft operators based in the Union
4 Regulation (EU) 2023/956 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism
5 Regulation (EU) 2023/955 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 establishing a Social Climate Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1060.
6 Regulation (EU) 2023/857 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 April 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/842 on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by
Member States from 2021 to 2030 contributing to climate action to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement, and Regulation (EU) 2018/1999.

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Land use, land use change and forestry
Introduction of an EU target for net greenhouse gas removals by natural sinks of 310 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent by 2030
and setting ambitious and fair targets for each Member State to reverse the decreasing trend of the EU's carbon sink7. For theperiod from 2026-2030, each Member State will have a binding national target for 2030, which together will deliver the collective
EU target of 310 Mt. In addition, the Regulation sets a commitment for each Member State to achieve a sum of net greenhousegas emissions and removals for the period from 2026 to 2029 (‘the budget 2026-2029’).
Standards for new cars and vansMore ambitious targets for reducing CO₂ emissions of new cars and vans with the adoption of the regulation on emission
performance standards for new cars and vans 8, to reduce 55% of CO₂ emissions for new cars and 50% for new vans from2030 until 2034, and for 100% CO₂ emissions reductions from 2035 for new cars and vans.
Other acts under the Fit-for-55 package• Ambitious targets for improving energy efficiency9 and for increasing renewables10 in the EU energy mix have been agreed.

In line with the European Commission’s plan to make Europe independent from Russian fossil fuels well before 2030 (RePowerEU),
the EU has agreed to increase ambition on energy savings through an enhanced target to reduce final energy consumption at EU
level by 11,7% in 2030, compared to projections made in 2020, and a new target for increasing renewable energy in final
energy consumption of at least 42,5% by 2030, with an additional 2,5% indicative top up that would allow to reach 45%.

• The ReFuelEU Aviation Regulation11 will increase the uptake of sustainable fuels, such as advanced biofuels or hydrogen, in

the aviation sector. It obliges EU airports and fuel suppliers to ensure that, starting from 2025, at least 2% of aviation fuels will
be green, with this share increasing every five years and reaching 70% in 2050.

• The FuelEU Maritime Regulation12 will ensure that the greenhouse gas intensity of fuels used by the shipping sector gradually decreases over time, by 2% in 2025 and 6% in 2030 to as much as 80% by 2050. It promotes sustainable alternative
fuels in shipping and at European ports by limiting the greenhouse gas intensity of the energy used on-board large ships andby mandating the use of onshore power supply for certain ship types.

• With the new Regulation for the deployment of an alternative fuels infrastructure (AFIR)13, more recharging and refuelling stations for alternative fuels will be deployed in the coming years across Europe. It will ensure minimum infrastructure
to support the required uptake of alternative fuel vehicles across all transport modes and in all EU Member States, ensure fullinteroperability of the infrastructure and comprehensive user information and adequate payment options at alternative fuels
infrastructure. It sets mandatory national targets for the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure in the EU, for roadvehicles, vessels and stationary aircraft.

• The proposal for a revised Energy Taxation Directive14 aims to align the taxation of energy products with EU energy andclimate policies, promote clean technologies and remove outdated exemptions and reduced rates that currently encourage theuse of fossil fuels (legislative procedure ongoing)

2.2 Additional policy contributing towards the achievement of the EU's climate targets
The proposals to revise the fluorinated greenhouse gases (F-gases) Regulation15 and the Ozone Regulation16 will further
reduce emissions from those highly potent, human-made greenhouse gases which are often several thousand times stronger
than carbon dioxide (CO₂). In particular, the current HFCs phase-down, which is gradually reducing the volume of hydrofluorocarbons placed on the EU market, will become steeper. The Commission also proposed more ambitious emission-reduction targets
for heavy-duty vehicles17 to ensure that this segment of the road transport sector contributes to the EU's climate and zero

7 Regulation (EU) 2023/839 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 April 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/841 as regards the scope, simplifying the reporting and compliancerules, and setting out the targets of the Member States for 2030, and Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 as regards improvement in monitoring, reporting, tracking of progress and review.
8 Regulation (EU) 2023/851 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 April 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2019/631 as regards strengthening the CO₂ emission performancestandards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles in line with the Union’s increased climate ambition.
9 Directive (EU) 2023/1791 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on energy efficiency and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955.
10 Proposal for an amendment to the Renewable Energy Directive to implement the ambition of the new 2030 climate target (COM/2021/557).
11 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on ensuring a level playing field for sustainable air transport (COM/2021/561 final).
12 Regulation (EU) 2023/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on the use of renewable and low-carbon fuels in maritime transport, and amending
Directive 2009/16/EC.
13 Regulation (EU) 2023/1804 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure, and repealing Directive 2014/94/EU.
14 Proposal for a Council Directive restructuring the Union framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (COM/2021/563 final).
15 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on fluorinated greenhouse gases, amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 517/2014,(COM/2022/150 final).
16 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on substances that deplete the ozone layer and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1005/2009, (COM/2022/151 final).
17 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 as regards strengthening the CO₂ emission performance standards for new
heavy-duty vehicles and integrating reporting obligations, and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/956, (COM/2023/88 final).

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pollution objectives. The proposed revision of the TEN T Regulation18 and the Greening freight package19 will further support the
decarbonisation of the transport sector. These saved emissions will support Member States’ efforts to reach their target under the
Effort Sharing Regulation. The hydrogen and gas markets decarbonisation package20 will decarbonise the EU gas market byfacilitating the uptake of renewable and low carbon gases, including hydrogen and will ensure energy security for all citizens in
Europe. New rules on methane emissions21 in the energy sector will increase understanding of where methane emissions comefrom and will contribute to reduce those emissions. The revised Energy performance of buildings Directive22 will contributeto achieving a zero-emission and largely decarbonised building stock by 2050. The proposed EU-wide voluntary framework to reliably certify high-quality carbon removals23 will boost innovative carbon removal technologies and carbon farming solutions.
Tackling climate change and ensuring healthy and biodiverse ecosystems are intrinsically linked. Natural carbon sinks are of
crucial importance to sequester carbon. The new proposals to conserve and restore ecosystems such as wetlands and forests. The
Nature Restoration Law24, Soil Monitoring Law25 and the upcoming framework for resilient European forests26 will also
make a significant contribution to maintaining, managing and enhancing natural carbon sinks and to increasing biodiversity while
fighting climate change.
By promoting energy and material efficiency, and reducing the amount of waste produced, circularity has the potential to cut global
emissions. The Commission adopted the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation27 to ensure products are built tobe sustainable and recyclable and to extend their lifetime. The initiative on the Right to Repair 28 makes repair easier and more
attractive for consumers. The Commission proposed several measures to reduce waste such as a targeted revision of the Waste
Framework Directive (WFD)29 or the EU rules on Packaging and Packaging Waste30. Consumers in the EU indicated lacking
reliable information about the sustainability of products and facing misleading commercial practices, such as greenwashingand early obsolescence practices. To address this, the Commission proposed a Directive on Empowering Consumers for theGreen Transition31 to ensure better information is provided to consumers on durability and reparability, and to strengthen thefight against misleading practices linked to sustainability. The Commission also proposed an EU Green Claims Directive32 underwhich companies will be required to substantiate the claims they make.
In February 2023, the Commission adopted “a Green Deal Industrial plan for the net zero age33” to enhance the competitiveness of the EU’s net zero industry and leading globally the transition to climate neutrality. The plan aims at creating a predictable
and simplified regulatory environment, enabling faster access to sufficient funding, turning skills into quality jobs, and supporting
open trade for resilient supply. As part of this, the Commission has proposed the net-zero industrial act (NZIA)34, the criticalraw material act 35, and a reform of the electricity market 36. The NZIA aims to scale up net zero technology manufacturing in
the EU to provide at least 40% of the EU’s annual deployment needs by 2030 and sets a union level objective of 50 million tonnesof annual CO₂ storage capacity by 2030. A key element in the strategy is the promotion of renewable hydrogen as a substitute tofossil fuels, for which the Commission has set the target of 20 million tonnes of supply by 2030. To facilitate its deployment, in
2023 the Commission created the European hydrogen bank, which will support amongst other things the creation of a domestic
market with funds from the ETS innovation fund, starting with a public auction by the end of 2023.
The availability of relevant skills is a precondition for a successful transition towards climate neutrality. With the necessary
skills in place, significant jobs creation on the 2030 time horizon will take place not only within the clean energy sector, but

18 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulation (EU)2021/1153 and Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) 1315/2013, (COM(2021)812 final).
19 Proposal for a Regulation on the use of railway infrastructure capacity in the single European railway area (COM(2023)443), Proposal for a Revision of the Weights and Dimensions Directive(COM(2023)445), Proposal for a Regulation on the accounting of greenhouse gas emissions of transport services (COM(2023)441).
20 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal markets in renewable and natural gases and in hydrogen (COM(2021)803 final) andproposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the internal markets for renewable and natural gases and for hydrogen (COM(2021)804 final).
21 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942 (COM(2021)805 final)
22 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the energy performance of buildings, (COM/2021/802 final).
23 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Union certification framework for carbon removals, (COM(2022) 672 final).
24 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on nature restoration, (COM/2022/304 final).
25 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Soil Monitoring and Resilience (Soil Monitoring Law), (COM(2023) 416 final).
26 Under preparation, see EU forests – new EU Framework for Forest Monitoring and Strategic Plans (europa.eu)
27 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for setting ecodesign requirements for sustainable products and repealing Directive
2009/125/EC, (COM/2022/142 final).
28 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules promoting the repair of goods and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394, Directives (EU) 2019/771
and (EU) 2020/1828, COM/2023/155 final.
29 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2008/98/EC on waste, (COM/2023/420 final).
30 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on packaging and packaging waste, amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2019/904, and repealing Directive 94/62/EC, (COM/2022/677 final).
31 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU as regards empowering consumers for the green transition throughbetter protection against unfair practices and better information, (COM/2022/143 final).
32 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on substantiation and communication of explicit environmental claims (Green Claims Directive), (COM/2023/166 final).
33 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A
Green Deal Industrial Plan for the Net-Zero Age, (COM/2023/62 final).
34 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology products manufacturing
ecosystem (Net Zero Industry Act), (COM(2023)161).
35 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/102, (COM(2023)160).
36 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) 2019/942 as well as Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944
to improve the Union’s electricity market design, (COM/2023/148 final).

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also in manufacture, construction transportation, and services linked to boosted manufacturing and deployment of thesetechnologies. Under the Net Zero Industry Act, the Commission will support the setting up of specialised European Net-Zero
Industry Academies, each focusing on a net-zero technology to provide up-skilling and re-skilling programmes. With the Council
Recommendation on ensuring a fair transition towards climate neutrality37, Member States have committed to devise andimplement measures to address the employment and social aspects of the transition, including in the energy sector. It specificallyasks Member States to consider the guidance provided in the Recommendation as part of their assessments during the update of
the National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs).
Future EU spending will also be directed to action on the green and just transition. To meet the need to boost investment incritical technologies in Europe, the Commission proposed the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform38 . It will supplement
and leverage existing EU instruments to swiftly channel financial support to clean technologies, deep and digital technologies, andbiotechnologies. In addition, the proposal for a revised Financial Regulation39 includes the do-no-significant-harm principle toensure that the EU budget is implemented without doing significant harm to the environmental objectives, including climate change
mitigation and adaptation.
The Joint Communication on the Climate and Security Nexus 40 mainstreams climate and environmental considerations into EU
external action and takes steps to make Member States’ security and defence actors more climate-proof. This will enhance theircontribution to the EU climate, energy and environmental objectives and policies, while respecting its specificities and preserving
their operational effectiveness in rapidly changing strategic context.

3. EU's greenhouse gas emissions: Trends and projections
3.1 EU greenhouse gas emissions and removals: Recent developments
After the 2021 strong rebound in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions following the unprecedented fall in 2020 due to the COVID-19
pandemic, EU emissions in 2022 are expected to bounce back to the 30-years descending trend (Figure 1). According to provisionaldata, total EU domestic GHG emissions (i.e. excluding LULUCF and international aviation) decreased by 2.4% in 2022 compared
to 2021, whilst EU GDP grew by 3.5% in the same year. This translates into a reduction in GHG emissions of 30.4% compared to
the 1990 base year (or 29% when international aviation is included). Over the same period, there is an approximated increase inreported GHG net removals from land use, land use change, and forestry (LULUCF) of 14 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent compared
to 202141. As a result, net GHG emissions for 2022 (i.e. including LULUCF) are expected to be 32.5% below the 1990 level (or 31.1%
when international aviation is included).

37 Proposal for a Council recommendation on ensuring a fair transition towards climate neutrality, (COM(2021) 801 final).
38 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (‘STEP’) and amending Directive 2003/87/EC, Regulations(EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241, (COM(2023) 335
final).
39 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, (COM(2022) 223 final).
40 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, A new outlook on the climate and security nexus: Addressing the impact of climate change and environmental degradationon peace, security and defence (JOIN(2023) 19 final).
41 Approximated 2022 data could suggest a break to the declining trend in the LULUCF sink observed in recent years. However, the assessment takes into consideration the large uncertainty ofthese data and as it will possibly be subject to larger revisions.

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Figure 1: Total EU GHG emissions (excluding international aviation) and removals (1990-2022), linear trajectories
to EU targets, and Member States’ latest GHG emissions projections (2022–2050). 42

This is also evidenced by the continued relative decoupling between emissions and economic growth with the GHG emission
intensity of the economy, defined as the ratio between emissions and GDP, falling to 229 gCO₂-eq/EUR in 2022, less than half the1990 level. As shown in Figure 2.a, the steady decline in the GHG emission intensity was accompanied by a convergence among
Member States. The similar pattern is shown by the GHG emissions per capita, although the decline seems have plateaued in themost recent years (Figure 2.b).
Figure 2: GHG emission intensity of GDP and GHG emissions per capita (1995-2022) 43
Figure 2.a

Figure 2.b

42 Notes: (1) Historical GHG emissions and removals (1990-2022) are based on European Environment Agency’s 2023 GHG Inventory and Approximated emissions and removals. (2) Linear
trajectories for GHG emissions and removals (2022-2050) are based on the legislated EU 2030 targets, while emissions and removals by 2050 reflect estimates from the different model-based
analyses supporting the “Delivering the European Green Deal”. (3) The -55% 2030 target (EU Climate Law) considers a contribution of removals of -225 MtCO₂eq.
43 Sources: EU greenhouse gas inventory 1990-2021. Real GDP in 2015 prices, data from AMECO database (European Commission, DG ECFIN). For GHG intensity of GDP, first available data are:
BG and LT 1997; EE and SK 1993; HR 1995; LV 1992; HU, SI, MT 1991; and RO 1999.

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However, more effort is needed in the next years and decades to reach the EU’s long-term climate targets. The annual average
reduction in domestic GHG net emissions observed over the last decade (i.e. around 53 MtCO₂-eq or 1 ½ percentage point) has
almost to triple in order to achieve the 2030 target of -55% and keep up the pace beyond 2030 to reach climate neutrality by
2050 (see Table 2).44
In terms of sectors, emission reductions in the last three decades were significant in the energy industry (e.g. electricity and heatproduction, -42%), in the fuel combustion in the manufacturing industry and construction (e.g. iron and steel production, -48%) andin the industrial processes and product use industries (e.g. chemical industry, -65%; metal industry, -44%). Conversely, emissions
in the transport sector have increased, especially in road transportation (+16%) although they have been slightly decreasing in
the last ten years. Emission reduction in the agriculture sector (excluding fuel combustion) has somewhat halted at the half-way,
showing even a moderate increase since 2010 45. Finally, the traditional role of natural sink of CO₂ of the LULUCF sector, declined
at a worrying speed in the last decade.
Table 2: Change in EU’s GHG emissions over 1990-2021 and expected change by 2030: a sectoral perspective46

EU-27
1 - Energy

1.A.1 - Energy Industriesof which:
1.A.1.a - Public Electricity and Heat Production
1.A.2 - Manufacturing Industries and Constructionof which:
1.A.2.a - Iron and Steel
1.A.2.c - Chemicals

1.A.2.f - Non-metallic minerals
1.A.3 - Transportof which:
1.A.3.b - Road Transportation
1.A.4 - Other Sectors
1.A.4.a - Commercial/Institutional
1.A.4.b - Residential

2010

1990

2021

compared to 1990
annual μΔ%Δ
MtCO2eq

MtCO2eq

2030

compared to 1990
annual μΔ%Δ
MtCO2eqcompared to 2010
annual μΔ%Δ
MtCO2eq

MtCO2eqcompared to 1990
annual μΔ%Δ
MtCO2eqcompared to 2021
annual μΔ%Δ

MtCO2eq

MtCO2eq

3747
1442

3305
1254

-12%
-13%

-22.1
-9.4

2663
840

-29%
-42%

-35.0
-19.4

-19%
-33%

-58.4
-37.6

1561
489

-58%
-66%

-54.7
-23.8

-41%
-42%

-122.4
-39.0

1233
729

1083
481

-12%
-34%

-7.5
-12.4

717
440

-42%
-40%

-16.6
-9.3

-34%
-9%

-33.3
-3.7

238

-67%

-12.3

-46%

-22.4

152

93

-39%

-2.9

80

-48%

-2.3

-15%

-1.2

102

76

-25%

-1.3

72

-30%

-1.0

-6%

-0.4

129
672

100
818

-22%
22%

-1.4
7.3

84
782

-34%
16%

-1.4
3.5

-16%
-4%

-1.4
-3.2

583

-13%

-2.2

-25%

-22.1

620
713

771
656

24%
-8%

7.6
-2.8

748
533

21%
-25%

4.1
-5.8

-3%
-19%

-2.1
-11.2

250

-65%

-11.6

-53%

-31.4

172

163

-5%

-0.4

130

-25%

-1.4

-20%

-3.0

450

MtCO2eq

413

-8%

-1.8

325

-28%

-4.0

-21%

-8.0

1.A.4.c - Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing

91

80

-12%

-0.5

78

-14%

-0.4

-2%

-0.2

2 - Industrial Processes and Product Use

445
134
154
134
22

358
110
68
78
102

-19%
-18%
-56%
-42%
358%

-4.3
-1.2
-4.3
-2.8
4.0

318
104
52
75
87

-29%
-22%
-66%
-44%
292%

-4.1
-1.0
-3.3
-1.9
2.1

-11%
-6%
-24%
-4%
-14%

-3.7
-0.6
-1.5
-0.3
-1.3

259

-42%

-4.7

-19%

-6.6

485

376

-22%

-5.4

378

-22%

-3.4

1%

0.2

361

-26%

-3.1

-5%

-2.0

317

249

-21%

-3.4

245

-23%

-2.3

-1%

-0.3

2.A - Mineral Industry
2.B - Chemical Industry
2.C - Metal Industry
2.D,E,F,G,H - Other production

3 - Agricultureof which:
3.1 - Livestock

4 - Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry
5 - Waste management
Total emissions (UNFCCC)
Total emissions with international aviation (EU 2020)
Total net emissions (UNFCCC)
Total net emissions with international aviation (EU NDC)

-310

48%

-2.5

35%

184

137

-26%

-2.4

109

-41%

-2.4

-20%

-2.5

91

-51%

-2.3

-17%

-2.0

4867

-209

4181

-353

-14%

69%

-34.3

-7.2

3472

-230

-29%

10%

-45.0

-0.7

-17%

-35%

-64.5

11.1

2262

-54%

-65.1

-35%

-134.4

-8.9

4921

4281

-13%

-32.0

3541

-28%

-44.5

-17%

-67.2

2376

-52%

-63.6

-33%

-129.5

4658

3828

-18%

-41.5

3242

-30%

-45.7

-15%

-53.3

1952

-58%

-67.6

-40%

-143.3

4712

3929

-17%

-39.2

3311

-30%

-45.2

-16%

-56.1

2066

-56%

-66.2

-38%

-138.4

Looking forward (Figure 3), based on the analysis supporting the “Delivering the European Green Deal”, the speed of reductionneeds to significantly accelerate almost in all sectors, particularly in transport (i.e. from an average reduction of 3 to 22 MtCO₂eq),
manufacturing (i.e. from 4 to 22 MtCO₂eq), and residential emissions (from 11 to 31 MtCO₂eq), while agriculture and LULUCF needto reverse the last decade’s trend in order to meet the EU -55% reduction target by 2030.

44 These figures assume a quite significant improvement of LULUCF in absorbing the remaining emissions, therefore clear actions are expected for the sector to revert recent trends.
45 https://www.eea.europa.eu/ims/greenhouse-gas-emissions-from-agriculture
46 Based on the 2023 GHG inventory data submitted by Member States. Ending values for 2030 based on the model results under the MIX policy scenarios for delivering the European Green
Deal https://energy.ec.europa.eu/data-and-analysis/energy-modelling/policy-scenarios-delivering-european-green-deal_en

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Figure 3: Annual average change (1990-2010, 2010-2021, 2021-2030) in EU GHG emissions (MtCO₂eq)

3.2 Drivers of greenhouse gas emission reduction since 1990
A combination of factors has helped the EU to reduce total greenhouse gas emissions (excluding the LULUCF sector) by about 29%
over the past three decades. Figure 4 shows an annual breakdown of this trend into factors using a decomposition analysis withan extended Kaya identity. The underlying methodology follows that of earlier studies, e.g. by the European Environment Agency.47
As with all methods of this style, the effects should not be understood as an actual causality but rather a useful indication of thedrivers’ contribution.
Without technological advances in energy efficiency and carbon intensity, i.e. holding all other factors at 1990 level, the growth
in GDP and population would have led to a substantial increase in GHG emissions (income and population effect). However, justthe emission reduction from the decrease in primary energy use per unit of output generated (energy intensity effect) more thancompensated this. Compared to 1990, 41% less energy was needed to produce a unit of GDP in 2021. Better energy transformation
processes, for example through electrification, as well as a general shift to the less energy-hungry service sector can be identified
as the main reasons behind this efficiency gain.

47 The methodology of the Logarithm Mean Divisia Index (LMDI) method and the formula itself can be found in the EEA report No 03/2020 on trends and drivers of EU greenhouse gas emissions.

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Figure 4: Drivers of total GHG emissions cumulated over 1990-202148

In addition to using less energy to produce the same value of output, this energy also got cleaner over the years, which further
reduced emissions. Energy-related emissions per Terajoule of primary energy were 26% lower in 2021 than three decades before.
In the 1990s and early 2000s this drop was mainly caused by a switch from coal to gas which emits substantially less carbon
dioxide to deliver the same amount of energy. Thus, the carbon intensity of all fossil fuels sank by 12% in the time period. Since
the beginning of the millenium also renewable energy sources have been picking up speed. This decreased the share of fossil fuelsin primary energy consumption by 15% and brought down emissions further.
Energy-related emissions made up about three quarters of total GHG emissions excluding the LULUCF sector in 1990. The remaining
quarter came from other sources, such as industrial processes, agriculture or waste management. Over the past three decades
this share has not changed much and remained at a ratio of 3:1. Thus, the non-energy effect expressing this relationship (total vs.
energy-related emissions) is zero as non-energy emissions have been mitigated at the same pace as energy-related ones.

48

Data sources: EU inventories to the UNFCC, AMECO, Eurostat energy balances.

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Figure 5: Effects on total GHG emissions between 1990-2021 and 2021-2030 based on the modelling for the 2030
target (in % of 1990 emissions) 49

To set these achievements into perspective, Figure 5 combines this assessment of past emission trends with a glance into the future.
Based on the European Commission’s central scenario supporting the Fit for 55 legislative package50, a faster pace is needed inthis decade to achieve the EU 2030 target. To reach it, emissions have to fall by roughly 134 MtCO₂eq or 2.8% of 1990 emissions
annually until 2030 compared to the historical annual mitigation of 45 MtCO₂eq or 0.9% of 1990 emissions in 1990-2021, i.e. thepace of reduction has to more than triple. As in the last three decades the modelling suggests the largest emission reductions
coming from a substantially lower energy intensity (-30% versus 2021) and a less carbon-intense primary energy consumption(-19%). Overall, energy-related emissions are expected to decrease at a faster pace than those from other sources as implied by
the slightly positive non-energy effect.

4. Greenhouse gas emissions covered by the UNFCCC, the Kyoto protocol and the
Climate and Energy Package
Under the UNFCCC, the EU and its Member States committed to achieving a joint quantified economy wide greenhouse gas emission
reduction target of 20 % below the 1990 level by 2020 (‘the Cancun pledge’). The United Kingdom remains part of this joint EU
2020 target under the Convention along with the 27 Member States. The scope of GHG emissions excludes LULUCF and includes
international aviation.
The EU has implemented its UNFCCC target through EU legislation in the 2020 Climate and Energy Package that was adopted
in 2009. The package stipulates that the target will be met jointly by the EU and its Member States through a 21% reduction below
the 2005 level in GHG emissions from installations under the EU Emissions Trading System, and a 10% reduction below the 2005
level of emissions from sectors covered under the Effort Sharing Decision.
The EU’s greenhouse gas inventory report for EU-27 + UK submitted under the Convention in 2022 together with its submissionof the fifth Biennial Report later the same year were the basis for assessing the EU target achievement of the Cancun pledge. Thistarget has been overachieved. Total emissions in 2020 were 34 % lower than 1990 emissions for EU-27 and the United Kingdom(Table 3)51.

49 The remaining total emissions excluding LULUCF as shown in the chart is in line with EU’s net emissions target of 57% mitigation.
50 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/data-and-analysis/energy-modelling/policy-scenarios-delivering-european-green-deal_en
51 For the EU-27, GHG emissions in 2020 were 32 % below 1990 emissions.

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Table 3: Emissions covered by the Cancun pledge under the UNFCCC and the EU Climate and Energy Package in 1990
and 2020 (Mt CO₂-eq. and % change from base year emissions)

Under the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period in 2013-2020 (KP2), the EU, its Member States, the UK and Icelandcommitted jointly to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% on average in comparison to 1990, the base year.52 Under thisframework, the EU, its Member States, the UK and Iceland were given a joint emission budget, a so-called joint assigned amount,for the second commitment period, equal to 80 per cent of their emissions in the base year times 8. This amount corresponds to
37 604 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent for the whole commitment period (Table 4).
The geographical scope of KP2 includes the EU, Iceland, the UK and certain of its overseas regions not included in the Climate andEnergy Package. Emissions from international aviation are excluded under KP2.
Under KP2, Member States had to account for emissions and removals from certain activities of land use, land use change andforestry (LULUCF) by applying the accounting rules of the Kyoto Protocol. For the EU, the LULUCF sector was an accounted net sinkin 2013-2020, thereby contributing to achieving the EU’s joint commitment.
The EU’s greenhouse gas inventory report submitted in 2022 (for EU-27 + UK and Iceland)53 and reviewed by the UNFCCC in December
2022 is the basis for assessing whether the EU, its Member States, the UK and Iceland comply with their joint commitment under
KP2. The inventory report shows that the EU, its Member States, the UK and Iceland overachieved their joint KP2 reduction target
by reducing emissions by 28% (Table 4).
The UNFCCC will also review the EU’s so-called true-up period report to check that the EU and the other parties to the joint fulfilment agreement (Member States, UK and Iceland) have retired sufficient assigned amount units and any other Kyoto units in their
Kyoto retirement accounts. This final step of KP compliance is expected to be concluded in 2024, after the review of the true-up
period reports have been finalised.
Table 4: Emissions covered by the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period (Mt CO₂-eq. and % change from baseyear emissions)

52 Base year refers to the base year under the Kyoto Protocol, which is 1990 for CO₂, CH₄ and N₂O for all Member States except Bulgaria (1988), Hungary (1985–1987), Poland (1988), Romania (1989) and Slovenia (1986), and 1995 for HFCs, PFCs and SF₆ for all Member States except Austria, Croatia, France, Italy, Malta and Slovakia (1990), Romania (1989), and Iceland (1990), and1995 for NF₃ for all Member States except Austria, Croatia, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia (2000).
53 As part of the yearly official EU GHG inventory submission to UNFCCC, the EU prepared and submitted two sets of inventory tables corresponding to the EU’s geographical scopes under theConvention and under the second Kyoto Protocol (KP2), respectively. The scope under the Convention is consistent with the European Union territorial boundaries, which, in addition to the 27
Member States, included the EU-territory of the United Kingdom until 2020 (England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and Gibraltar). The scope of the EU’s submission under KP2 included theEU-27 Member States, Iceland, and the EU-territory of the United Kingdom together with its Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories that ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The final emissions andremovals of the European Union were confirmed in the last UNFCCC inventory review under the Kyoto Protocol that took place in December 2022.

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5. Progress towards climate neutrality: Additional indicators
In this decisive decade for climate action, a thorough understanding of progress is needed to ensure that we are on track to achieve
our common climate objectives, including of reaching net-zero emissions by 2050. The transition to climate neutrality is an unprecedented and far-reaching socio-economic project, which implies transformation across all sectors. Therefore, different source ofdata and indicators are needed to carry out a comprehensive analysis. Table 5 provides an overview of past and more recent GHG
emission trends, across countries and sectors, while Table 6 looks at emission projections and the climate targets in the years ahead.
5.1 Greenhouse gas emissions: recent developments in EU Member States
Historical data show that for some EU Member States, i.e. Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and, to a lesser extent, Cyprus, Poland, Malta,
Estonia, and Ireland, GHG net emissions have been rising in recent years (i.e. between 2015 and 2022). Drivers varied among thesecountries. In the case of Finland, Latvia and Estonia, the upward trend was mainly related to the strong declining of removals by
the land use, land use change and forestry sector (LULUCF, cf. Chapter 4 of the Climate Action Progress Report), while for Lithuania,
transport and building also contribute to the increase in GHG emissions. Transport emissions increased in Hungary, Malta and Poland,
while in Ireland emissions in agriculture continued to grow. For Latvia and Finland, the increased emissions, due to a decrease of net
removals in the LULUCF sector, had an impact on both the GHG intensity of GDP and on GHG emissions per capita, which increased
between 2015 and 2022 (see Table 5).
Reductions in GHG emissions were achieved, but were at a slow pace (i.e. below the EU average) for another group of countries,
namely Czechia, Italy, Hungary, Croatia, France, and Denmark. In the case of Italy, approximated GHG net emissions in 2022 are
expected to be 2% higher than the pre-pandemic level. Overall, the slow progress in these countries appears to be related to a lackof significant emission cuts in the energy production (Italy, France), increased emissions in transport (Hungary, Czechia), in LULUCF(Denmark), or even a change from net removals to net emissions in LULUCF (i.e. Czechia).
5.2 Greenhouse gas emissions projections: expected trends in EU Member States
Table 6 looks at the challenges ahead. By 2030, based on the GHG projections submitted by EU Member States in March 2023, six
countries (i.e. Poland, Ireland, Estonia, Czechia, Luxembourg, Latvia) expect emissions per capita to be significantly higher than 5
tonnes of CO₂-eq, which represents the EU average GHG net emissions per capita by 2030 broadly consistent with the EU -55%
target 54. Projected emission reductions in the years to 2030 are, in certain cases (i.e. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Denmark, Ireland,
Czechia, Lithuania, and Germany) significantly higher (i.e. more than 25 ppt.) than the emission reductions shown between 20152022. Most of the contribution to emission savings is expected from the power sector, with shares ranging between 20 and 30
percent, while transport is expected to contribute significantly to the decarbonisation in Lithuania.

54 Five tonnes of CO₂-eq GHG emissions are roughly equivalent to 27.000 km with a medium-sized petrol car, or 20 round-trip flights Brussels to Rome in economy class, or again 2 beef-based
meals per day in a year, of course without any other human activity generating direct or indirect GHG emissions. The net GHG emissions consistent with the EU 2030 target are around 2100
MtCO₂eq (including the contribution of 225 MtCO₂eq of net removals from LULUCF). Divided by the latest Eurostat population projections for the EU-27 by 2030 (around 550 million EU residents),
is equal to 4.7 tonnes of CO₂eq per capita.

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Table 5: GHG emission dashboard indicators (historical data) 55

Historic data(1)Total net GHG emissions (% change)

2022-1990

2022-2021

2022-20192022-2015

Power

Industry

Transport

Buildings(2)Agriculture

Waste

LULUCFGHG intensity of GDP(2022)

GHG intensity of GDP(2022-2015, % change)

GHG emissions per capita(2022)

GHG emissions per capita(2022-2015, % change)

Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
CyprusCzechia
Denmark
Estonia
FinlandFranceGermany
GreeceHungary
IrelandItaly
LatviaLithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
PolandPortugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
SwedenEU27

GHG intensity and GDP per capita (3)Sector performance (2022-2015, contribution to change)

-7%
-26%
-43%
-30%
54%
-37%
-42%
-53%
-1%
-26%
-42%
-30%
-42%
10%
-25%
4%
-69%
-41%
-17%
-31%
-18%
-24%
-75%
-54%
-8%
-2%
-86%
-32%

-7%
-4%
6%
-5%
-1%
-5%
-1%
11%
-7%
-3%
-3%
0%
-7%
-2%
-1%
8%
-7%
-15%
2%
-8%
-4%
1%
-14%
-11%
2%
2%
-42%
-3%

-24%
-8%
6%
-7%
-2%
-8%
-5%
10%
-3%
-6%
-6%
-11%
-11%
0%
2%
61%
-9%
-28%
1%
-15%
-1%
-15%
-16%
-13%
-4%
-6%
-71%
-6%

-14%
-10%
-10%
-7%
4%
-1%
-9%
0%
17%
-7%
-16%
-22%
-6%
0%
-4%
30%
7%
-25%
2%
-21%
3%
-21%
-15%
-15%
-25%
-14%
-51%
-10%

-3%
-2%
-7%
-6%
1%
-10%
-10%
-19%
-11%
-1%
-10%
-18%
-6%
-3%
-3%
-7%
-5%
-3%
-3%
-12%
-3%
-16%
-16%
-4%
-7%
-10%
-12%
-7%

-1%
-4%
0%
1%
1%
0%
0%
-2%
-6%
-4%
-2%
-4%
-2%
0%
-2%
0%
-7%
-3%
-1%
-2%
0%
-2%
-1%
-5%
0%
-3%
-18%
-2%

-3%
-2%
2%
0%
2%
2%
-1%
0%
-2%
-2%
-2%
2%
5%
0%
1%
0%
8%
-14%
3%
-2%
6%
1%
4%
1%
4%
2%
-68%
0%

-1%
-2%
0%
1%
-1%
-1%
-2%
0%
-3%
-4%
-1%
-1%
-1%
-1%
-2%
1%
2%
-2%
0%
-4%
-1%
-1%
1%
0%
-2%
-1%
-7%
-2%

0%
0%
0%
-1%
1%
0%
0%
1%
0%
-1%
-1%
0%
-1%
3%
0%
1%
-1%
0%
-1%
-1%
0%
0%
-2%
0%
-1%
0%
-1%
0%

-1%
0%
-1%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
-2%
0%
0%
1%
0%
0%
0%
-1%
-2%
0%
3%
-1%
0%
-1%
0%
0%
-1%
-1%
-8%
0%

-5%
0%
-3%
-1%
1%
10%
3%
21%
41%
5%
1%
-1%
-2%
2%
3%
37%
15%
-4%
0%
-1%
2%
-4%
0%
-6%
-20%
0%
66%
2%

162
229
857
308
349
561
143
671
190
162
228
373
472
151
222
491
280
118
153
199
720
246
301
323
268
212
8
229

-23%
-19%
-26%
-26%
-23%
-22%
-23%
-19%
5%
-15%
-22%
-28%
-6%
-42%
-9%
10%
-14%
-36%
-28%
-31%
-13%
-32%
-28%
-26%
-41%
-21%
-51%
-20%

6.9
9.1
6.9
4.6
9.4
11.5
7.8
12.9
8.1
5.7
8.9
6.9
5.5
13.5
6.5
7.6
4.7
11.6
4.2
9.0
9.7
4.9
3.0
5.5
6.3
5.3
0.3
7.0

-18%
-13%
-5%
2%
-2%
-1%
-13%
-1%
15%
-9%
-18%
-19%
-4%
-7%
-1%
38%
12%
-35%
-14%
-24%
4%
-21%
-11%
-15%
-27%
-16%
-54%
-11%

Notes: (1) Historical GHG emissions and removals (1990-2022) are based on European Environment Agency’s 2023 GHG Inventory and Approximated emissions and removals. (2) Including
agriculture CO₂ emissions. (3) GHG emission projections are based on the projections submitted in 2023 by Member States under Art. 18 of the Governance Regulation taking into accountadditional measures (WAM). EU Population in 2050 is based on the latest Eurostat population projections. Agricolture and forest land are based on the Eurostat land use statistics. (4) note
explaining the Overshoot and the link to the climate neutrality tracker.

An assessment of EU Member States’ progress towards the respective targets set in the Effort Sharing (ESR) and LULUCF regulations
has been provided in Chapter 3 and 4 of the main report, showing that more efforts are needed to reach the EU targets. Table 6
only provides an indication of the projected emissions compared to the targets in 2030 based on estimated emission allocations
under the ESR and estimated GHG net removals target under the LULUCF regulation but does not reflect Member States’ progress
towards their 2030 targets. For example, the table does not take into account the flexibilities that are available for Member States
under these legislations which are part of Member States progress to their ESR and LULUCF targets. Based on Member States’
projections, also shown by Table 12 of the main report, five countries (i.e. Malta, Cyprus, Austria, Romania and Italy) expect significantly higher emissions compared to their ESR 2030 target (above 15 ppt.).56 Five Member States are expected to fall significantly
behind their LULUCF targeted values (i.e. Poland, Estonia, Croatia, Ireland and Latvia) relative to the available lands (agriculture
plus forest areas)57.

55 Note to the table: (1) Historical GHG emissions and removals (1990-2022) are based on EEA’s 2023 GHG Inventory and Approximated emissions and removals. (2) Including agriculture CO₂
emissions. (3) GHG intensity of GDP (gCO₂-eq/EUR2015) and GHG per capita (tCO₂-eq) use net GHG emissions (i.e. including LULUCF and excluding international aviation). Real GDP and population
data from Eurostat.
56 While the NECP process is ongoing and pending the use of flexibilities the Commission will come back to the assessment of progress towards the ESR targets.
57 LULUCF projections compared to the estimated LULUCF targeted values in relation to the available lands (agriculture plus forest areas). A significant gap to the LULUCF targets by 2030 isassumed here if higher than 50 tonnes of CO₂ equivalent per square kilometre of available land (agriculture plus forest land. Source: Eurostat “land use overview by NUTS 2 regions” dataset).

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When it comes to the climate neutrality target, ten Member States (i.e. Poland, Latvia, Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Netherlands and Malta) project net GHG emissions in 2050 higher than the EU-average projections of 3.6 tonnes of CO₂
equivalent per capita, obtained by aggregating Member States’ projections. Of notice, the EU aggregated value falls short of the
EU collective objective of climate neutrality (i.e. zero net emissions).
Trajectories are also relevant. Table 6 provides two similar metrics, which compare for each Member States the cumulative projected
emissions between 2022 and 2050 with a linear trajectory and, alternatively, with an indicative benchmark trajectory, built as
the median pathway of the seven climate neutrality scenarios that were proposed by the European Scientific Advisory Board58 (cf.
Chapter 1 of the main report). Malta, Romania, Croatia, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Italy, and Greece are among the top ten overshootsaccording to both metrics. Moreover, as of today, Ireland, Poland and Romania have still to officially submit to the Commission theirnational long-term strategies, due by January 2020, and some other countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia and Malta) have
not yet reported a clear (e.g. legally binding) climate neutrality objective.
Overall, based on the available information, progress by Member States towards the EU climate neutrality objective appear insufficient for Poland, Ireland, Latvia, Malta and Croatia, and, to a lesser extent, for Austria, Estonia, Czechia, Cyprus, Italy and Romania.
Lack of significant progress in the most recent years is not consistent with the effort required in the next decades to meet boththe medium- and the long-term climate targets. Latest GHG projections submitted by those Member States show significant gaps
to specific sector targets by 2030 and to the EU climate neutrality objective by 2050. Without additional efforts from all Member
States, the EU will miss the collective climate objectives.

58 Scientific advice for the determination of an EU-wide 2040 climate target and a greenhouse gas budget for 2030–2050 (europa.eu). The EU-level emissions of this median pathway werethen distributed across Member States according to the country’s share of EU emissions in the core policy scenario supporting the initiatives delivering the European Green Deal.

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Table 6: GHG emission dashboard indicators (projected data) 59
GHG emission projections and future challenges(4)Transport

Buildings

Agriculture

Waste

MS projected net GHG by 2050
(tonnes of CO2 eq. per capita)

Overshoot vs. linear trajectory
net GHG emissions 2022-2050

Overshoot vs. Benchmark
Total GHG emissions 2022-2050

Target year for climate neutrality (NECPR,
nLTS or other sources)

-3%
-1%
-16%
-2%
-14%
-20%
-20%
-33%
-25%
-3%
-24%
-18%
-6%
-10%
-8%
3%
-1%
-1%
12%
-18%
-5%
-9%
-12%
-8%
-3%
-13%
-2%
-12%

1%
-5%
2%
-1%
0%
-1%
-7%
0%
-4%
-3%
-6%
0%
9%
-1%
-2%
-2%
-1%
0%
3%
-2%
-3%
-7%
0%
-2%
-3%
-4%
-9%
-3%

-2%
-8%
-1%
0%
-5%
-8%
-5%
-3%
-8%
-6%
-5%
-2%
-6%
-7%
-4%
0%
-12%
-24%
-1%
-1%
-1%
-11%
5%
2%
-7%
-10%
-17%
-5%

-2%
-5%
-1%
-2%
1%
0%
-6%
1%
-4%
-2%
-6%
-2%
-3%
-5%
-1%
-2%
-1%
-6%
0%
-1%
-3%
0%
1%
-2%
-4%
-4%
-3%
-3%

-1%
-2%
1%
-1%
1%
0%
-4%
0%
-2%
1%
-1%
1%
1%
-7%
0%
-2%
-4%
-2%
0%
0%
1%
-1%
3%
0%
0%
-1%
-1%
0%

0%
0%
-1%
-2%
-3%
-1%
-1%
0%
-1%
0%
0%
-1%
-1%
0%
-1%
-1%
-2%
0%
3%
-1%
1%
-2%
-4%
-2%
-1%
-1%
0%
0%

5.6
5.2
3.7
3.4
3.5
4.4
3.7
3.6
-2.4
3.7
1.7
5.3
4.4
6.0
4.6
7.9
3.5
1.3
4.4
4.9
8.1
0.3
3.7
3.8
0.0
2.9
-2.0
3.6

79%
49%
40%
83%
33%
10%
26%
15%
-98%
56%
-9%
58%
74%
44%
60%
74%
29%
-12%
155%
43%
68%
-13%
95%
63%
21%
34%
-582%
34%

61%
21%
60%
64%
51%
29%
3%
30%
-10%
57%
-1%
63%
59%
32%
76%
26%
32%
-2%
100%
34%
71%
20%
69%
56%
9%
42%
13%
40%

2050

(based on https://zerotracker.net/)

Industry

-7%
-22%
-15%
-8%
-20%
-31%
-43%
-36%
-44%
-14%
-41%
-21%
-7%
-30%
-16%
-5%
-20%
-33%
17%
-22%
-10%
-31%
-7%
-12%
-17%
-34%
-32%
-24%

Legal Status of long term target

Power

6
-4
-3
-92
41
-32
39
-108
13
-25
-35
5
-27
-70
-4
-61
36
12
-46
37
-118
139
62
-42
117
-15
-15
-16

LULUCF target vs MS projections(to 2005 level, ppt)

ESR target vs MS projections

-21
-4
-12
0
-23
-6
-10
-13
-4
-14
-10
13
-6
-13
-15
-9
0
8
-65
-9
-11
13
-17
-11
-1
7
12
-8

Climate Neutrality

Total emissions (excl. LULUCF)(% change)

6.8
7.0
6.0
5.0
6.7
7.6
4.9
8.1
0.9
4.7
5.0
5.4
5.4
9.0
5.3
7.1
3.4
7.3
4.3
6.9
9.2
2.9
3.4
5.2
5.2
3.2
-1.1
5.1

(5)

Projected contributions by sector (2030 vs. 2022)(tCO2eq/Km2 of land)

Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
CyprusCzechia
Denmark
Estonia
FinlandFranceGermany
GreeceHungary
IrelandItaly
LatviaLithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
PolandPortugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
SwedenEU27 (MS aggr. proj.)(tonnes of CO2 eq. per capita)

MS projected net GHG by 2030

2030 target

In law

2050

In policy document

2050

Proposed / in discussion

2050

In policy document

2050

In policy document

2050

Proposed / in discussion

2050

In law

2050

Declaration / pledge2035

In law

2050

In law

2045

In law

2050

In law

2050

In law

2050

In law

2050

In policy document

2050

In policy document

2050

In policy document

2050

In law

2050

In policy document

2050

In law--

2050

In law

2050

In policy document

2050

In policy document

2050

In policy document

2050

In law

2045

In law
In law

Notes: (1) Historical GHG emissions and removals (1990-2022) are based on European Environment Agency’s 2023 GHG Inventory and Approximated emissions and removals. (2) Including
agriculture CO₂ emissions. (3) GHG emission projections are based on the projections submitted in 2023 by Member States under Art. 18 of the Governance Regulation taking into accountadditional measures (WAM). EU Population in 2050 is based on the latest Eurostat population projections. Agricolture and forest land are based on the Eurostat land use statistics. (4) note
explaining the Overshoot and the link to the climate neutrality tracker.

5.3 Additional Greenhouse Gases Indicators
Since 2005, there has been a clear downward trend in net GHG emissions per capita and GHG intensity of GDP for all EU Member
States, except Latvia (Figure 6).60
More rapid progress by countries with higher emission ratios (i.e. Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Czechia, Luxembourg and Ireland)
led to significant convergence towards the EU average. However, between 2015 and 2022, the downward converging trend seems
to have halted for most Member States. In 2022, Latvia and Finland exceeded the 2015 levels for both indicators61, while GHG
emissions per capita in Lithuania, Poland and Croatia were above the respective 2015 levels. Nonetheless, in 2022, Estonia, Cyprus,
Czechia, and Poland ranked among the top five for the two indicators, while Bulgaria showed the highest GHG intensity of GDP(above 850 tonnes of CO₂ equivalent per Euro of GDP), and Ireland was the highest per capita emitter among the EU Member States(above 13 tonnes per capita).

59 Note to table: (4) GHG emission projections submitted in 2023 by Member States under Art. 18 of the Governance Regulation considering additional measures (WAM). EU Population in 2050
is based on the latest Eurostat population projections. Agriculture and forest land are based on the Eurostat land use statistics. (5) The overshoot vs. a linear trajectory compares, for each Member
State, the cumulative projected net GHG emissions (including LULUCF) between 2022 and 2050 with a linear trajectory starting from the 2021 emission level to zero by 2050. The overshootagainst an indicative benchmark compares the cumulative projected GHG emissions (excluding LULUCF) with an indicative pathway to climate neutrality based on the scenarios proposed by theEuropean Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change, and then distributed across Member States according to the country’s share of EU emissions in the core policy scenario supporting theinitiatives delivering the European Green Deal. Target dates to achieve climate neutrality as for the NECP progress reports or, in grey, from other unofficial sources (Net Zero Tracker).
60 Figures use net GHG emissions, including LULUCF and excluding international transport emissions.
61 Due to a declining LULUCF sink.

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Figure 6: Greenhouse gas emissions intensity (i.e. the ratio between GHG emissions and GDP, g CO₂-eq./ EUR2015)
and greenhouse gas emissions per capita in the EU and its Member States 1990, 2005 and 2022. 62

In terms of GHG emissions by sector, in 2022, energy supply was still the largest contributor to GHG emissions (26%), closely
followed by the transport sector (23%) (Figure 7). With 11% and 14%, respectively, energy use in manufacturing industries andother energy use were also important contributors.
Among all the EU Member States, in 2021, GHG emissions from the power sector were highest in Estonia (56%), followed withsome distance by Poland (43%) and Bulgaria (42%) (Figure 8). Emissions from industry were relatively high in Slovakia (41%) andAustria (36%). The transport sector’s contribution to GHG emissions stood out in Luxembourg (53%). Ireland and Denmark had thehighest shares of GHG emissions from agriculture among all Member States (37% and 28%, respectively), followed by Lithuania(22%) and Latvia (21%). For Sweden, and with some distance also for Romania, the LULUCF sink was significant in relation to thecountries’ respective GHG emissions.
Figure 7: EU-27 greenhouse gas emissions by sector 2022 (in % of total emissions, excluding LULUCF) 63

62 Sources: EU greenhouse gas inventory 1990-2021, EU approximated greenhouse gas inventory 2022 (EEA). Real GDP in 2015-prices, data from AMECO database (European Commission, DG
ECFIN).
63 The sectors used correspond to the following IPCC sectors: Energy supply: 1.A.1, 1.B and 1.C; Energy use in manufacturing industries: 1.A.2: Industrial processes and product use: 2; Transport(includes domestic aviation): 1.A.3; Other energy use: 1.A.4, 1.A.5 and 6, Agriculture: 3, Waste: 5, International aviation: 1.D.1.A.

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Figure 8: EU Member States greenhouse gas emissions by sector 2021 (in % of total emissions, excluding LULUCF) 64

Table 7: Total GHG emission per Member States (including and excluding LULUCF and international aviation)
Total emissions (UNFCCC)

Total net emissions (UNFCCC)
To t a l n e t GHG e m issio n s, in cl. LULUCF, e xcl. in t e rn a t io n a la via t io n

To t a l n e t GHG e m issio n s, in cl. LULUCF, in cl. in t e rn a t io n a la via t io n

1990

2005

2015

2022

2 0 2 2 -1 9 9 0

1990

2005

2015

2022

2 0 2 2 -1 9 9 0

1990

2005

2015

2022

2 0 2 2 -1 9 9 0

146
99
201
72
1251
40
56
104
288
539
31
521
6
26
48
13
95
3
223
79
475
60
257
19
74
71
71
4867

145
62
150
68
985
19
72
137
439
550
30
594
9
11
22
13
77
3
215
93
401
87
151
21
51
70
67
4542

119
60
129
50
897
18
62
96
334
454
25
446
8
11
20
10
62
2
194
79
384
68
117
17
41
55
54
3812

106
57
116
43
746
14
61
77
294
404
23
418
9
10
19
8
60
2
154
73
385
57
107
16
38
46
45
3389

-27%
-43%
-42%
-39%
-40%
-64%
9%
-26%
2%
-25%
-25%
-20%
54%
-61%
-60%
-35%
-37%
-17%
-31%
-8%
-19%
-4%
-58%
-15%
-49%
-36%
-37%
-3 0 %

143
83
192
78
1287
37
62
102
254
522
25
518
5
14
43
13
92
3
229
67
446
67
229
14
64
45
25
4658

144
46
142
73
993
16
79
133
394
500
22
559
9
5
18
12
71
3
221
74
353
90
118
13
46
41
23
4200

118
53
122
51
885
17
68
92
289
417
19
402
8
11
12
10
57
2
200
72
355
65
67
18
35
38
7
3490

106
47
121
46
744
17
68
72
249
387
18
387
8
14
13
7
53
2
158
62
365
51
57
13
30
45
4
3145

-26%
-43%
-37%
-42%
-42%
-53%
10%
-30%
-2%
-26%
-30%
-25%
54%
4%
-69%
-41%
-42%
-17%
-31%
-7%
-18%
-24%
-75%
-8%
-54%
-1%
-86%
-3 2 %

146
83
193
80
1299
37
63
104
259
531
26
522
6
14
43
13
92
3
234
68
447
68
229
14
65
46
26
4712

147
47
143
76
1016
17
82
136
406
516
22
567
10
5
18
14
72
3
232
76
354
92
118
13
46
43
25
4296

123
53
123
53
910
17
71
95
304
435
19
411
9
11
12
11
57
2
211
74
357
68
68
18
35
40
9
3599

111
48
122
48
771
17
71
75
264
399
18
396
9
15
13
9
54
3
168
63
366
55
57
13
30
46
5
3247

-24%
-42%
-37%
-40%
-41%
-53%
13%
-28%
2%
-25%
-30%
-24%
45%
6%
-69%
-28%
-41%
-9%
-28%
-6%
-18%
-20%
-75%
-8%
-53%
0%
-80%
-3 1 %

To t a l GHG e m issio n s, e xcl. LULUCF, e xcl. in t e rn a t io n a l a via t io n

BE
BG
CZ
DK
DE
EE
IE
EL
ES
FR
HR
IT
CY
LV
LT
LU
HU
MT
NL
AT
PL
PT
RO
SI
SK
FI
SE
EU

64

Be lg iu m
Bu lg a ria
Cze ch ia
De n m a rk
Ge rm a n y
Esto n ia
Ire la n d
Gre e ce
Sp a inFra n ce
Cro a tia
Ita lyCyp ru s
La tvia
Lith u a n ia
Lu xe m b o u rg
Hu n g a ry
Ma ltaNe th e rla n d s
Au stria
Po la n d
Po rtu g a l
Ro m a n ia
Slo ve n ia
Slo va k ia
Fin la n d
Sw e d e n
EU-2 7

Total net emissions with international aviation (EU NDC)

Industry includes both the Energy use in manufacturing industries: 1.A.2 and Industrial processes and product use: 2; Buildings includes CO₂ emissions in agriculture.

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6. EU ETS emissions
Table 8: EU ETS verified emissions from power and industry installations and from aircraft operators since 2019.

Verifiedemissionsfromfrom
power
and industry
installations 65
Verifiedemissions
power
and industry
installations 65
Verified emissions from electricity and heat generation 66
Change year-on-year
Verified emissions from industrial production
Verified emissions from electricity and heat

2019

2020

2021

2022

1 530

1 356

1 337

1 313

-9.1%

-11.4%

6.6%

-1.8%

822

696

708

725

-14.7%-15.3%

8.4%

2.4%

708

660

629

588

-1.6%

-6.9%

4.6%

-6.5%

68.2

25.2

27.9

49.1

1%

-63%

30%

75%

67

generation 66
Change year-on-year 68
Change year-on-year
Verified emissions from industrial
production 67
Change year-on-year
Verified emissions from aircraft operators(million tonnes CO₂eq)
Change year-on-year68

65 From 2021, the EU ETS no longer includes emissions from the UK, only emissions from electricity generators in Northern Ireland are included. 2021 emissions are compared with an adjusted
value of 2020 emissions – without the UK data, only Northern Ireland from electricity generation.
66 From 2021, the EU ETS no longer includes emissions from the UK, only emissions from electricity generators in Northern Ireland are included. 2021 emissions are compared with an adjusted
value of 2020 emissions – without the UK data, only Northern Ireland from electricity generation.
67 From 2021, the EU ETS no longer includes emissions from the UK. 2021 emissions are compared with an adjusted value of 2020 emissions – without the UK data.
68 Considering the updated EU ETS aviation scope (without the flights incoming from the UK). Switzerland is included in 2020, 2021 and 2022 data only.

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7. Use of revenues from auctioning of ETS allowances
The vast majority of revenue from auctioning ETS allowances accrue to Member States, who should spend at least 50% on climate
and energy purposes.
Figure 9 shows the primary69 type of purpose reported for spending of 2013-2021 and 2022 auction revenues and indicates that
renewables support, decarbonisation of transport and other GHG reduction were the areas where most of the revenues were spent.
Compared to previous years, the increasing share of “other” spending appears partly linked to new national measures using ETS
revenues to compensate for rising energy prices and mitigate their social impacts70.
Figure 9: Reported spending of auction revenues, categorised, 2013-2021 and 2022, EU-27

Auctions of EU ETS emission allowances for both stationary installations and aircraft operators have provided the EU-27 countries
with revenues listed in the Table 971. Member States report annually on the use of auctioning revenues for climate change andenergy purposes72. It should be noted that annual reporting does not necessarily cover how the revenues of that year are spent, but
the spending of revenues during that year, i.e. it can include revenues from earlier years. Member States only report on spending
for the purposes of addressing climate change and energy, but this does not mean that the amount not covered in the report isnecessarily spent for other purposes: it is also possible that revenues are spent later, or used to fund many projects/purpopses
of which only parts are linked to climate change and energy, or that a certain amount has been set aside for climate and energy
purposes but not all of it has yet been formally attributed to specific projects.
In the latter case, and when Member States have reported having a national minimum set aside for climate and energy, this has
been reflected in the % spent on climate and energy row73 . Additionally, several Member States do not earmark their auction revenues for a specific purpose, but instead attribute part or all of their revenues to a broad budget such as the general budget, thatis funded by more than just auctioning revenues, and can be spent on both climate change and energy and many other purposes.
Often, in such cases example projects funded by the broad budget are reported, but a direct link to auctioning revenues cannot be
made. Such country specific contexts are described below. Reported spending can also be higher than the revenues of that year, ifeither it includes spending of previous years’ revenues or if the reported projects were co-funded with other funds74.

69 In their reports, Member States can indicate multiple types, in such case the first category is used for this figure.
70 For instance, between late-2021 and mid-2022, Spain, Italy, Greece, Germany and Estonia announced the direct or indirect use of ETS revenues for such purposes.
71 The table lists annual total revenues of the auctioned allowances on the EEX platform
72 Article 5 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2020/1208.
73 Where relevant, the amount resulting from the % spent on climate and energy row that is not covered in the row Reported as spent on climate etc. has been included in Figure 9 of the
Climate Action Progress Report as Used for climate change and energy, (unspecified).
74 For the purposes of Figure 9 of the Climate Action Progress Report and the estimated shares spent on climate and energy, the annual shares have been capped at 100% in order to avoid
distortion of the figures.

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Table 9: Member States' revenues from auctioning of ETS allowances (EUR million), amounts spent on climate andenergy purposes (EUR million) and share of the revenues spent on climate and energy purposes (%), 2013-2022.75

Austria

20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

247.5

79.4

210.4

183.8

184.2

311.0

381.7

Reported as spent on climate etc.

231.4

79.2

0

0

986.4

311.0

381.7

% spent on climate and energy

>100%

>100%

>100%

>100%

>100%

>100%

>100%

Revenues are not earmarked. National spending on climate and energy purposes is >100% of auctioning revenues. In several
years, climate and energy projects financed from the national budget were reported, even though their funding cannot bedirectly linked to the auctioning revenues.
Belgium

20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

461.6

144.3

381.5

356.8

356.1

533.2

657.7

Reported as spent on climate etc.

37.5

133.1

213.7

357.8

162.6

76.1

103.0

% spent on climate and energy

8%

92%

56%

99%

46%

14%

16%

The policy is that 100% of auction revenues are spent on energy and climate purposes and on the compensation of indirect
carbon costs. For 2021 onwards the direct spending of auction revenues is on hold pending a legal decision on the regions andfederal shares, revenues are carried over to future years. The amount reported as spent in 2022 cover only direct revenue
spent, Belgium also mentioned from the general budget to support climate- and energy-related actions in 2022.
Bulgaria

20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

296.1

130.4

368.2

440.3

448.6

832.9

1094.2

Reported as spent on climate etc.

285.1

138.2

368.2

440.3

448.6

832.9

1094.2% spent on climate and energy

96%

>100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

All auction revenues are earmarked for climate and energy purposes. Unspent revenues are carried over to later years, therefore in some years spending is higher than the revenues.
Croatia

20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

107.2

27.2

71.5

72.7

72.2

112.2

143.4

Reported as spent on climate etc.

123.6

18.9

29

13.4

44

12.3

193.9

% spent on climate and energy

>100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

According to the law, 100% of the auctioning revenues are spent on climate and energy purposes. This table lists the amountspent during the same year as the revenue earnt. The remainder is carried over to the next years.
20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

2.8

6.6

26

26.1

40.1

78.4

102.9

Reported as spent on climate etc.

5.7

0.8

6.4

57.5

57.6

75.3

160.1

% spent on climate and energy

>100%

100%

100%

>100%

>100%

>100%

>100%

Cyprus(*)

The auctioning revenues go to a fund, which different ministries can use for climate and energy purposes. This fund also
receives money from the general budget, so in practice a higher amount than 100% of revenues is spent on climate andenergy overall.

75 Data in this table is based on the annual reporting by the Member States with some modifications made to ensure consistency across all Member States and over the reporting period. In
2020-2022 the harmonisation, methodology and analysis were conducted by SQ Consult in a study for the European Commission. Proposed modifications have been discussed with the Member
States as part of the quality checks. Notes: “N/A” = Not available, “*” = Member States that do not earmark auction revenues, “(*)” = Member States that partially earmark auction revenues.

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Czechia *20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

365.9

199.8

584.4

630.4

719.4

604.0

673.6

Reported as spent on climate etc.

329.6

199.8

367.3

408.4

309.7

208.6

181.9

% spent on climate and energy

90%

100%

63%

65%

43%

35%

27%

Revenues are not earmarked. Reported spending represents the amounts committed for climate change and energy purposesin the general state budget of each year. The remaining revenues go to the general budget.
Denmark *20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

229.2

71.7

189.8

166.1

166.5

292.9

362.2

Reported as spent on climate etc.

229.1

71.7

189.8

166.1

166.5

292.9

362.2

% spent on climate and energy

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

Revenues are not earmarked, example projects have been reported up to 100% of revenues each year.
Estonia (*)

20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

70.4

39.4

140

142.8

142.4

248.6

334.0

Reported as spent on climate etc.

34.3

15.9

53.3

64.5

30

43.6

307.7

% spent on climate and energy

49%

40%

38%

45%

≥50%

≥50%

≥50%

50% of the auctioning revenues are earmarked and directed through the four-year State Budget Strategy and spent on
climate and energy purposes, which may take multiple years. Unspent revenues are carried over to later years and always
used for climate and energy projects. The remaining 50% goes to the general budget, which, among others, covers climate
and energy investment (not included here).
Finland *20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

295.5

95.3

251.8

219.9

220.6

409.0

511.1

Reported as spent on climate etc.

198.1

9.5

251.8

219.9

220.6

409.0

511.1

% spent on climate and energy

67%

10%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

Revenues are not earmarked. National spending on climate and energy is >100% of auctioning revenues. Only a part of actual
spending has been reported, in some years covering specific projects, in other years up to 100% of revenues, even though thisfunding cannot be directly linked to the auctioning revenues.
France (*)

20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

981.3

313.4

829.6

726.5

728.1

1469.1

1868.3

Reported as spent on climate etc.

981.3

313.4

550

420

728.1

1469.1

1854.1% spent on climate and energy

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

99%

The auctioning revenues co-fund energy efficiency improvements of low-income housing, up to a ceiling of EUR 420 million
per year. The remainder is not earmarked but goes to the general budget, which, among others, covers climate and energy
investments.
Germany

20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

3501.91146.82581.73164

2662.45306.26812.6

Reported as spent on climate etc.

3496.71130.82563

3147.22662.45306.26812.6% spent on climate and energy

100%

99%

99%

99%

100%

100%

100%

100% of revenues is spent on energy and climate projects. All revenues go to a fund for climate and energy projects, which isadditionally co-funded from the general budget.

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2 0 2 3

71

Greece20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

622

198

523.5

509.5

506.7

1014.61329.5

Reported as spent on climate etc.

622

198

523.5

509.5

506.7

1014.61329.5% spent on climate and energy

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

Revenues are earmarked and fully spent on domestic climate change and energy purposes.
Hungary (*)

20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

238.1

85.2

225.4

228

226.3

288.2

464.9

Reported as spent on climate etc.

81.7

68.7

65.9

74

71.8

232.9

233.5

% spent on climate and energy

34%

81%

50%

50%

50%

81%

50%

50% of the revenues are spent on climate and energy (any revenues not spent are carried over to future years) and theremainder goes to the national general budget. Amounts included in the latter can be spent on climate change and energy are
not covered here.
Ireland *20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

171.3

53.6

142.1

124.3

124.5

149.2

215.7

Reported as spent on climate etc.

171.3

53.6

142.1

124.3

124.5

149.2

215.7

% spent on climate and energy

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

While ETS auction revenues are not earmarked for specific purposes, amounts spent are equivalent to 100% of these revenue(less ETS administration costs for the Environmental Protection Agency) and are attributed to emission reduction activities inline with the purposes specified in the ETS Directive.
Italy (*)

20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

1706.1549.7

1453.31289

1290.52520.93202.7

Reported as spent on climate etc.

548.6

383.7

148.4

148.1

506.6

1260.51601.3% spent on climate and energy

32%

70%

50%

50%

50%

50%

50%

Italian law guarantees that 50% of the revenues are used for climate and energy purposes but only after the year has ended,
which can cause underreported spending. The remaining 50% was initially used to compensate for the depleted phase 2 of
the New Entrants Reserve, and later it was allocated to the general budget, which funds, among others, climate and energy
projects (not included here).
Latvia20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

47.8

15.4

40.7

42.6

42.3

62.4

84.2

Reported as spent on climate etc.

7.6

3.8

12.3

11.4

5.8

62.4

84.2

% spent on climate and energy

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100% of revenues go to the EAAI, a national green investment scheme aimed at tackling global climate change. Reported
spending shows actually disbursed amounts per year, all leftovers are carried over to future years.
Lithuania

20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

86.5

31.5

80.4

84

86.6

86.2

103.7

Reported as spent on climate etc.

86.5

31.5

80.4

83.7

86.6

86.2

110.0

% spent on climate and energy

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

>100%

Revenues are put in a Climate Change fund that is only funded by auctioning revenues, and spent on climate and energy
purposes.

C l i m a t e

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R e p o r t-

2 0 2 3

72

Luxembourg *20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

22.1

6.9

18.3

17.1

17

8.1

30.7

Reported as spent on climate etc.

11.5

3.5

9.2

17.1

17

8.1

5.7

% spent on climate and energy

52%

50%

51%

100%

100%

100%

19%

Revenues are not earmarked, example projects have been reported up to 100% of revenues each year.
Malta *

20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

19.1

6

15.7

15.9

15.8

30.7

40.1

Reported as spent on climate etc.

30.3

6.9

4.9

9.1

47.2

30.7

40.1

% spent on climate and energy

>100%

>100%

100%

100%

>100%

100%

100%

All revenues go to a fund for climate and energy projects, which is additionally co-funded from the general budget.
Netherlands *20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

595.2

190.7

504.2

440.1

441.4

894.0

1135.9

Reported as spent on climate etc.

595.2

190.7

504.2

440.1

441.4

0.0

0.0

% spent on climate and energy

>100%

>100%

>100%

>100%

>100%

>100%

>100%

Auctioning revenues go to the national general budget which is used to, among others, finance climate and energy purposes.
Amounts spent are higher than 100% of revenues, but it is not possible to link auctioning revenues to specific projects funded.
Poland*20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

590.9

506

1211.62548.83157.65593.64976.0

Reported as spent on climate etc.

304.3

290.4

609.9

1274.41564

2768.32550.2% spent on climate and energy

51%

57%

50%

50%

50%

49%

51%

Revenues are not earmarked, example projects have been reported for around 50% of revenues each year.
Portugal

20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

314.2

100.3

265.6

257.1

255.8

513.9

673.2

Reported as spent on climate etc.

292.7

95.1

201.2

235.3

251.3

513.9

673.2

% spent on climate and energy

93%

95%

76%

92%

98%

100%

100%

All revenues from auctioning are channelled to the Environment Fund (alongside other revenues) which is financing environmental projects that may or may not be directly related to climate objectives. The amounts reported as spent represent
climate change and energy projects paid by the Environmental Fund.
Romania (*)

20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

609.8

260.8

719.1

749.8

803.1

483.9

488.0

Reported as spent on climate etc.

578.3

0

160

42.7

165.9

226.6

277.7

% spent on climate and energy

95%

0%

22%

6%

17%

47%

57%

50% of revenues is earmarked for climate change and energy purposes and an additional 6% is earmarked for GHG reduction
projects (and 15% goes to indirect carbon cost compensation and 29% to the general budget). Part of unspent revenues arecarried over to later years.

C l i m a t e

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2 0 2 373

Slovakia

20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

268.8

87.1

229.9

244.7

242.1

276.2

342.9

Reported as spent on climate etc.

80.8

40.9

55.6

44.6

27.4

50.9

54.5

% spent on climate and energy

30%

47%

24%

18%

11%

18%

16%

All auctioning revenues are earmarked and go to the Environmental Fund, which also receives money from other sources. The
values reported as spent represent the funding of climate change and energy projects known at the time of reporting. Part ofunspent revenues are carried over to later years.
Slovenia

20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

77.4

25.1

66.3

65.3

65.0

130.1

170.8

Reported as spent on climate etc.

46.4

5.4

14.2

40.8

40.4

79.9

182.3

% spent on climate and energy

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100% of the auctioning revenues are used for climate and energy projects. Some projects receive funding later than in theyear in which the auctioning revenues were generated. About EUR 174 million in already received auction revenues will still bespent on climate and energy.
Spain (*)

20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

1535.2

493.6

1306

1245.21240.32482.93231.2

Reported as spent on climate etc.

1494.9

445.5

788.6

1054.11081.52035.02019.7% spent on climate and energy

97%

90%

60%

85%

87%

82%

63%

Estimated revenues are earmarked for energy and climate purposes ahead of each year, so actual revenues may differ fromthe allocated estimate. All estimated revenues that don’t go to indirect cost compensation (maximum of 25%, 5.6% in 2022,
not included as spent here) are used for climate and energy purposes. Current legislation includes a minimum 450 M€ forrenewable energy production support plus a maximum of 30% for energy transition. Revenues higher than estimated go to
the general budget, without a predefined purpose.
Sweden *20132016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Revenues from auctioning

161.1

51.5

136.3

128.5

127.9

222.2

283.1

Reported as spent on climate etc.

128.7

28.8

76.5

73.9

65

222.2

283.1

% spent on climate and energy

80%

56%

56%

58%

51%

100%

100%

Revenues are not earmarked, example projects have been reported for at least the minimum required spending on energy andclimate purposes.

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8. Emissions covered by the effort sharing legislation
By 30 June 2023, Member States had to report their draft updated integrated National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) to theCommission76. The draft NECPs should contain the policies and measures that a Member State envisages to meet their climate
and energy targets. The draft NECPs are currently being assessed by the Commission, which will address recommendations to
the Member States by the end of the year. Member States are encouraged to take these recommendations into account in their
final updated NECPs which are to be submitted by 30 June 2024. The Commission already notes that some Member States haveplanned higher ambition for their ESR emissions in their draft NECPs. Therefore, a more complete overview will be available in theCommissions assessment of draft NECPs due by the end of this year. After the submission of the final updated NECPs by Member
States, the Commission will come back to the assessment of whether Member States are making sufficient progress.
Table 10: Member States targets, historical and projected emissions under the effort-sharing legislation and distanceto targets in percentage change from 2005 base year emissions.77

2021
Austria
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (percentage point)
Belgium
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)Bulgaria
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)Croatia
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)CyprusTargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)Czechia
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)DenmarkTargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)Estonia
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)

2030

2022

2030

(projections WEM)

(projections WAM)

-14%
-14%
0%

-17%
-19%
3%

-48%
-27%
-21%

-48%
-27%
-21%

-13%
-15%
2%

-15%
-18%
3%

-47%
-22%
-25%

-47%
-43%
-4%

21%
12%
9%

13%
2%
11%

-10%
4%
-14%

-10%
2%
-12%

-2%
-3%
1%

-8%
-6%
-2%

-17%
-11%
-6%

-17%
-17%
0%

-5%
4%
-8%

-7%
2%
-9%

-32%
-9%
-23%

-32%
-9%
-23%

2%
-6%
7%

-6%
-9%
3%

-26%
-16%
-10%

-26%
-20%
-6%

-20%
-20%
0%

-22%
-21%
-2%

-50%
-40%
-10%

-50%
-40%
-10%

0%
-7%
7%

-3%
-4%
1%

-24%
-10%
-14%

-24%
-11%
-13%

76 By 6 October 2023, 16 Member States have submitted their draft updated NECPs. 6 Member States foresee a higher ambition in their draft NECPs compared to their reported projectionsin Table 10, i.e. Croatia reports a WAM projection of -17.1%, Cyprus reports a WAM projection of -23.1%, Hungary reports an improved WEM of -15.1% and WAM of -23.8%, Italy reports a WAM
projection in the range of -35.3% to -37.1%, Slovakia reports a WAM projection of -20%, Slovenia reports a WAM projection of -28.8%.
77 2021 emissions are based on the final inventory reports, 2022 emissions are based on approximated inventory reports and EEA’s calculation of ESR emissions. This includes ETS emissions
taken from EEA’s EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) data viewer — European Environment Agency (europa.eu) to ensure consistency between Member States. The approximated emissions
can therefore deviate from Member States’ reported emissions. ESR base year emissions and targets are in GWP AR5. Positive values indicate projected overachievement while negative values
indicate projected underachievement. WEM = with existing measures, WAM = with additional measures. Targets for 2030 are based on Member States’ estimated AEAs for 2030. Any apparent
miscalculations for percentage point distance to targets is due to rounding of the percentage targets and emissions (e.g. distance to target (pp) for CY an CZ).

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2 0 2 375

Finland
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)FranceTargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)Germany
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)GreeceTargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)
Hungary
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)Ireland
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)ItalyTargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)LatviaTargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)Lithuania
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)Luxembourg
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)Malta
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)Netherlands
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)PolandTargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)Portugal
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)

-16%
-20%
4%

-19%
-23%
4%

-50%
-44%
-6%

-50%
-46%
-4%

-16%
-19%
3%

-19%
-22%
3%

-47%
-34%
-14%

-47%
-34%
-14%

-12%
-17%
5%

-15%
-19%
5%

-50%
-35%
-15%

-50%
-40%
-10%

-27%
-30%
4%

-25%
-29%
3%

-23%
-36%
13%

-23%
-36%
13%

4%
-3%
7%

-9%
-8%
-2%

-19%
-12%
-6%

-19%
-12%
-6%

-9%
-2%
-7%

-11%
-3%
-8%

-42%
-10%
-32%

-42%
-29%
-13%

-20%
-17%
-3%

-22%
-18%
-3%

-43%
-28%
-15%

-43%
-28%
-15%

24%
1%
23%

3%
-3%
6%

-17%
-7%
-10%

-17%
-8%
-9%

23%
10%
14%

5%
9%
-4%

-21%
-15%
-6%

-21%
-21%
0%

-17%
-20%
3%

-19%
-30%
11%

-50%
-35%
-15%

-50%
-58%
8%

102%
33%
69%

21%
35%
-14%

-19%
46%
-65%

-19%
46%
-65%

-23%
-27%
4%

-25%
-33%
9%

-48%
-38%
-10%

-48%
-39%
-9%

12%
8%
4%

6%
4%
2%

-18%
4%
-22%

-18%
-7%
-11%

-13%
-17%
5%

-16%
-17%
1%

-29%
-39%
10%

-29%
-42%
13%

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2 0 2 376

Romania
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)
Slovakia
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)Slovenia
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)Spain
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)SwedenTargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)EU 27
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)
Iceland
TargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)NorwayTargetEmissionsDistance to target (pp)

12%
6%
6%

-2%
1%
-3%

-13%
7%
-20%

-13%
4%
-17%

1%
-12%
13%

-9%
-12%
4%

-23%
-1%
-21%

-23%
-12%
-11%

-4%
-12%
8%

-6%
-6%
0%

-26%
-9%
-17%

-26%
-26%
-1%

-17%
-19%
2%

-18%
-20%
2%

-37%
-29%
-8%

-37%
-45%
7%

-28%
-33%
5%

-29%
-36%
8%

-50%
-62%
12%

-50%
-62%
12%

-12%
-14%
3%

-15%
-17%
2%

-40%
-27%
-13%

-40%
-32%
-8%

-7%
-10%
3%

-10%
-10%
0%

-29%
-24%
-4%

-29%
-26%
-3%

-13%
-13%
0%

-16%
-12%
-4%

-40%
-32%
-8%

-40%
-32%
-8%

C l i m a t e

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2 0 2 377

Table 11: Annual emissions allocations, historical and projected emissions, and distance to targets under the Effort
Sharing Regulation (Mt. CO₂-eq.) covering the period 2021 - 2030. Positive values indicate overachievement, negativevalues indicate underachievement.78

Member StateETS and2005
LULUCF base year
flexibility emissions

2021

2022

(approximated)

2023

48,8

47,4

45,2

48,8

45,9

47,2

(finalinventory)

2024

2025

2026

2027

2028

2029

2030

43,0

40,7

46,8

46,0

40,9

38,1

35,3

32,5

29,6

45,3

44,5

43,5

42,6

41,7

Austria
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

57,0

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

0,0

1,5

-2,0

-3,8

-5,2

-4,4

-6,4

-8,2

-10,1

-12,0

Cumulative balance of AEAs

0,0

1,5

-0,6

-4,4

-9,6

-14,0

-20,4

-28,6

-38,7

-50,8

ETS flexibility

11,4

Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

2,5

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

Belgium
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

81,6

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

71,1

69,1

65,9

62,7

59,4

58,8

54,9

51,0

47,1

43,3

69,5

66,8

66,1

64,4

62,7

59,6

56,4

53,2

50,0

46,8

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

1,6

2,4

-0,2

-1,8

-3,3

-0,8

-1,5

-2,2

-2,9

-3,6

Cumulative balance of AEAs

1,6

4,0

3,7

1,9

-1,4

-2,2

-3,7

-5,8

-8,7

-12,3

ETS flexibility

15,4

Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

3,8

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

Bulgaria
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

22,3

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

27,1

25,2

24,5

23,9

23,3

22,5

21,9

21,3

20,7

20,1

25,0

22,7

23,6

23,6

23,6

23,4

23,3

23,1

23,0

22,8

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

2,1

2,4

1,0

0,3

-0,3

-1,0

-1,4

-1,8

-2,3

-2,7

Cumulative balance of AEAs

2,1

4,5

5,4

5,8

5,5

4,5

3,1

1,3

-1,0

-3,7

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

4,1

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

Croatia
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

18,1

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

17,7

16,5

16,4

16,2

16,0

16,2

15,9

15,6

15,3

15,0

17,4

17,0

16,2

16,1

15,9

15,8

15,6

15,4

15,2

15,0

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target
Cumulative balance of AEAs

0,2

-0,4

0,2

0,1

0,0

0,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

0,0

0,2

-0,2

0,0

0,1

0,1

0,6

0,9

1,1

1,3

1,3

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

0,9

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

78 AEAs for the years 2021-2025 are established in Implementing Decision (EU) 2020/2126. AEAs for the years 2026-2030 are estimated based on the trajectory defined in Article 4 ESR andadjusted as provided for under Article 10(1)c ESR. To estimate the trajectory for 2026-2030, the estimated ESR emissions for the years 2021 to 2023 are used, after a reduction by the Article
10(1)c ESR adjustment included in the AEAs for 2021-2023. The trajectory values are adjusted based on Article 10(1)c on the basis of the assumption that the methodology applied to the AEAs
for 2021 to 2025 is continued unchanged for the years 2026-2030, and no further adjustments for changes to EU ETS are required. The final AEAs for these years will be established after thecomprehensive review in 2025 pursuant to Article 38(1a) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999. The values of ‘cumulative surplus of AEAs’ are the cumulative annual distances to target and do nottake into account cancellations and transfers. 2021 emissions are based on the final inventory reports, 2022 emissions are based on approximated inventory reports and EEA’s calculation of ESR
emissions. This includes ETS emissions taken from EEA’s EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) data viewer — European Environment Agency (europa.eu) to ensure consistency between Member
States. 2023 – 2030 emissions are based on the most recent WAM emissions projections reports, or in the absence of WAM projections the WEM projections. First compliance check will take placein 2027.

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2 0 2 378

CyprusEstimated AEAs
Emissions

4,3

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

4,1

4,0

3,8

3,7

3,6

3,8

3,6

3,4

3,1

2,9

4,4

4,4

4,3

4,3

4,3

4,3

4,2

4,1

4,0

3,9

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target
Cumulative balance of AEAs

-0,4

-0,4

-0,5

-0,6

-0,7

-0,5

-0,6

-0,8

-0,9

-1,0

-0,4

-0,7

-1,2

-1,8

-2,6

-3,0

-3,7

-4,4

-5,3

-6,3

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

0,6

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

Czechia
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

65,0

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

66,0

60,9

59,3

57,7

56,1

55,1

53,3

51,6

49,8

48,1

61,2

59,2

56,7

56,7

56,6

55,7

54,7

53,8

52,8

51,9

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

4,8

1,7

2,6

1,0

-0,5

-0,6

-1,4

-2,2

-3,0

-3,8

Cumulative balance of AEAs

4,8

6,5

9,1

10,2

9,6

9,0

7,6

5,4

2,4

-1,4

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

2,6

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

Denmark
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

40,4

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

32,1

31,3

29,9

28,5

27,1

27,5

25,7

23,8

22,0

20,2

32,1

32,0

30,8

29,7

28,8

28,1

27,1

26,2

25,3

24,4

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

0,0

-0,7

-0,9

-1,2

-1,6

-0,6

-1,4

-2,3

-3,3

-4,2

Cumulative balance of AEAs

0,0

-0,7

-1,6

-2,7

-4,4

-4,9

-6,4

-8,7

-12,0

-16,2

ETS flexibility

8,1

Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

14,6

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

Estonia
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

6,2

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

6,2

6,0

5,8

5,7

5,5

5,4

5,3

5,1

4,9

4,7

5,8

6,0

5,8

5,8

5,8

5,8

5,7

5,7

5,6

5,5

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

0,5

0,0

0,0

-0,2

-0,3

-0,3

-0,5

-0,6

-0,7

-0,8

Cumulative balance of AEAs

0,5

0,5

0,5

0,4

0,1

-0,3

-0,8

-1,4

-2,1

-2,9

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

0,9

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

Finland
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

34,4

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

28,8

28,0

26,6

25,3

23,9

23,2

21,7

20,2

18,7

17,2

27,5

26,7

25,5

23,1

22,2

21,6

20,8

20,0

19,3

18,5

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

1,4

1,3

1,2

2,2

1,7

1,6

0,9

0,2

-0,6

-1,2

Cumulative balance of AEAs

1,4

2,7

3,8

6,0

7,8

9,4

10,2

10,4

9,9

8,6

ETS flexibility

6,9

Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

4,5

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

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79

FranceEstimated AEAs
Emissions

401,1

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

335,7

326,5

312,0

297,5

283,0

276,4

259,9

243,5

227,1

210,6

323,4

314,6

302,1

299,6

297,1

291,0

285,0

278,9

272,8

266,7

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target
Cumulative balance of AEAs

12,3

12,0

9,9

-2,1

-14,1

-14,7

-25,0

-35,4

-45,7

-56,1

12,3

24,3

34,1

32,0

18,0

3,3

-21,7

-57,1

-102,8-158,9ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

58,2

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

Germany
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

484,7

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

427,3

413,2

391,9

370,5

349,2

340,3

315,8

291,3

266,9

242,4

404,5

390,5

391,0

384,2

369,8

357,4

343,3

326,4

309,5

290,5

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

22,8

22,7

0,9

-13,7

-20,7

-17,1

-27,5

-35,1

-42,6

-48,1

Cumulative balance of AEAs

22,8

45,5

46,3

32,6

11,9

-5,2

-32,6

-67,7

-110,3-158,5

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

22,3

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

GreeceEstimated AEAs
Emissions

63,0

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

46,2

47,0

47,2

47,4

47,6

45,7

46,4

47,2

47,9

48,7

43,9

45,0

43,1

43,1

43,0

42,5

42,0

41,6

41,1

40,6

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

2,3

2,0

4,1

4,3

4,6

3,2

4,4

5,6

6,8

8,1

Cumulative balance of AEAs

2,3

4,3

8,4

12,7

17,4

20,5

25,0

30,6

37,4

45,5

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

6,7

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

Hungary
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

47,8

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

49,9

43,3

42,8

42,2

41,7

42,7

41,7

40,8

39,8

38,9

46,6

44,2

43,5

43,5

43,4

43,1

42,8

42,5

42,2

41,9

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

3,3

-0,9

-0,7

-1,2

-1,8

-0,5

-1,1

-1,7

-2,4

-3,0

Cumulative balance of AEAs

3,3

2,4

1,7

0,5

-1,3

-1,8

-2,9

-4,6

-7,0

-10,0

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

2,1

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

Ireland
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

47,7

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

43,5

42,4

40,5

38,7

36,8

39,1

36,2

33,4

30,5

27,7

46,8

46,1

43,8

43,2

42,1

40,8

39,3

37,8

36,1

33,9

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

-3,3

-3,7

-3,3

-4,5

-5,3

-1,7

-3,1

-4,4

-5,6

-6,2

Cumulative balance of AEAs

-3,3

-7,0

-10,3

-14,8

-20,0

-21,7

-24,8

-29,2

-34,7

-40,9

ETS flexibility

19,1

Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

26,8

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

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2 0 2 380

Italy
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

343,1

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

273,5

268,8

259,4

250,1

240,7

248,2

234,6

221,0

207,5

193,9

284,4

279,6

272,3

266,2

260,1

257,3

254,4

251,6

248,8

246,0

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target
Cumulative balance of AEAs

-10,9

-10,9

-12,8

-16,1

-19,4

-9,1

-19,8

-30,6

-41,3

-52,1

-10,9

-21,8

-34,6

-50,7

-70,1

-79,2

-99,0

-129,6-170,9-223,0

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

11,5

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

LatviaEstimated AEAs
Emissions

8,6

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

10,6

8,9

8,6

8,4

8,2

8,0

7,8

7,6

7,4

7,1

8,7

8,4

8,6

8,6

8,4

8,4

8,3

8,3

8,1

7,9

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

2,0

0,5

0,0

-0,2

-0,2

-0,3

-0,5

-0,7

-0,8

-0,7

Cumulative balance of AEAs

2,0

2,5

2,5

2,3

2,1

1,8

1,3

0,6

-0,2

-0,9

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

3,1

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

Lithuania
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

13,1

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

16,1

13,7

13,3

12,9

12,4

12,9

12,2

11,6

11,0

10,3

14,3

14,2

14,4

13,9

13,4

12,8

12,1

11,5

10,9

10,3

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

1,8

-0,5

-1,1

-1,0

-0,9

0,1

0,2

0,1

0,0

0,0

Cumulative balance of AEAs

1,8

1,3

0,2

-0,9

-1,8

-1,7

-1,5

-1,4

-1,4

-1,4

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

6,5

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

Luxembourg
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

10,1

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

8,4

8,1

7,8

7,4

7,0

6,6

6,2

5,8

5,5

5,1

8,1

7,1

7,4

7,2

6,8

6,3

5,7

5,2

4,7

4,3

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

0,3

1,1

0,3

0,2

0,2

0,4

0,6

0,7

0,7

0,8

Cumulative balance of AEAs

0,3

1,4

1,7

1,9

2,1

2,5

3,0

3,7

4,4

5,2

ETS flexibility

4,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

0,3

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

Malta
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

1,0

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

2,1

1,2

1,2

1,1

1,1

1,2

1,1

1,0

0,9

0,8

1,4

1,4

1,5

1,5

1,5

1,5

1,5

1,5

1,5

1,5

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

0,7

-0,1

-0,3

-0,3

-0,4

-0,3

-0,4

-0,5

-0,6

-0,7

Cumulative balance of AEAs

0,7

0,6

0,3

0,0

-0,4

-0,7

-1,0

-1,5

-2,1

-2,7

ETS flexibility

0,2Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

0,0

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

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81

Netherlands
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

128,1

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

98,5

96,7

92,9

89,2

85,4

81,2

77,5

73,9

70,3

66,6

93,5

85,5

89,1

88,3

87,6

85,8

84,0

82,2

80,4

78,6

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target
Cumulative balance of AEAs

5,0

11,2

3,8

0,8

-2,2

-4,6

-6,4

-8,3

-10,1

-12,0

5,0

16,2

20,0

20,9

18,7

14,1

7,7

-0,6

-10,8

-22,7

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

13,4

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

PolandEstimated AEAs
Emissions

192,5

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

215,0

204,4

198,6

192,9

187,1

185,9

179,0

172,2

165,3

158,4

207,9

200,6

195,7

191,9

188,2

186,3

184,4

182,5

180,6

178,7

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

7,2

3,8

2,9

1,0

-1,0

-0,4

-5,3

-10,3

-15,3

-20,3

Cumulative balance of AEAs

7,2

10,9

13,9

14,9

13,8

13,5

8,1

-2,2

-17,5

-37,8

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

21,7

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

Portugal
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

48,6

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

42,5

40,8

40,1

39,3

38,5

37,6

36,9

36,2

35,4

34,7

40,1

40,5

37,1

36,9

36,6

34,9

33,3

31,6

29,9

28,2

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

2,4

0,3

2,9

2,4

1,9

2,7

3,6

4,6

5,6

6,5

Cumulative balance of AEAs

2,4

2,7

5,7

8,1

10,0

12,7

16,3

20,9

26,5

33,0

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

5,2

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

Romania
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

78,2

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

87,9

76,9

75,8

74,8

73,7

76,2

74,3

72,3

70,3

68,3

83,0

79,0

80,2

80,4

80,7

80,9

81,1

81,3

81,5

81,7

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

4,9

-2,1

-4,3

-5,7

-7,0

-4,6

-6,8

-9,0

-11,2

-13,4

Cumulative balance of AEAs

4,9

2,8

-1,5

-7,1

-14,1

-18,8

-25,6

-34,6

-45,8

-59,2

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

13,2

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

Slovakia
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

23,1

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

23,4

21,2

20,7

20,3

19,9

19,6

19,1

18,7

18,3

17,9

20,4

20,3

20,8

20,7

20,2

20,4

20,5

20,6

20,4

20,5

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

3,0

0,8

-0,1

-0,4

-0,3

-0,8

-1,3

-1,8

-2,1

-2,6

Cumulative balance of AEAs

3,0

3,9

3,8

3,4

3,2

2,3

1,0

-0,8

-3,0

-5,5

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

1,2

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

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Slovenia
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

11,8

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

11,4

11,1

10,8

10,5

10,2

9,9

9,6

9,3

9,0

8,7

10,4

11,1

10,4

10,2

10,1

9,9

9,6

9,4

9,1

8,8

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target
Cumulative balance of AEAs

1,0

0,0

0,4

0,3

0,1

0,1

0,0

0,0

-0,1

-0,1

1,0

1,0

1,4

1,7

1,8

1,9

1,9

1,8

1,8

1,7

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

1,3

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

Spain
Estimated AEAs
Emissions

242,0

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

201,0

198,7

192,8

186,9

181,0

176,2

170,1

163,9

157,7

151,5

195,0

194,4

181,3

175,9

171,0

163,6

156,2

148,7

141,2

133,8

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

6,0

4,3

11,5

11,0

10,0

12,6

13,9

15,1

16,4

17,7

Cumulative balance of AEAs

6,0

10,3

21,8

32,7

42,7

55,4

69,3

84,4

100,9

118,6

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

29,1

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

SwedenEstimated AEAs
Emissions

43,2

LULUCF debit (2021-2025)

31,3

30,7

29,6

28,5

27,3

25,3

24,4

23,5

22,5

21,6

29,2

27,5

25,6

24,4

23,2

21,8

20,5

19,1

17,8

16,5

Pursuant to Art 9(2) ESR, AEAs are reduced by the debit generated under the LULUCF Regulation in the period 2021-2025. See chapter
4 of the main report.

Distance to target

2,2

3,3

4,0

4,1

4,2

3,5

3,9

4,3

4,7

5,2

Cumulative balance of AEAs

2,2

5,4

9,4

13,5

17,6

21,1

25,1

29,4

34,1

39,3

ETS flexibility

0,0Amount of ETS flexibility as per Commission Implementing Decision 2020/2126 and available over the 10-year period2021-2030.

Maximum LULUCF flexibility

4,9

The availability of LULUCF flexibility depends on the amount of LULUCF credits generated under the LULUCF
Regulation. The use of the available LULUCF flexibility is limited to 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility
in the period 2021-2025 and 50% of the maximum amount of LULUCF flexibility in the period 2026-2030.

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Table 12: Annual emissions allocations, historical emissions, and distance to targets under the Effort Sharing Decision(Mt. CO₂-eq.) covering the period 2013 - 2020.79

Member State2005
base year
emissions

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Austria
AEA
Emissions

56.8

52.6

52.1

51.5

51.0

49.5

48.9

48.3

47.8

50.1

48.2

49.3

50.6

51.7

50.3

50.2

46.5

Distance to target

2.5

3.9

2.2

0.4

-2.1

-1.4

-1.9

1.2

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

2.5

6.4

8.7

9.0

6.9

5.5

3.6

4.8

78.4

76.9

75.3

73.8

72.5

71.1

69.7

68.2

74.3

70.1

72.7

74.1

70.8

74.3

72.0

64.9

Distance to target

4.1

6.8

2.6

-0.3

1.7

-3.2

-2.4

1.7

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

4.1

10.9

13.5

13.2

14.9

11.7

9.4

11.1

Belgium
AEA
Emissions

80.3

Bulgaria
AEA

26.9

27.2

27.5

27.7

25.9

26.1

26.3

26.5

22.2

22.9

25.4

25.6

26.5

26.3

25.8

25.7

Distance to target

4.7

4.3

2.1

2.1

-0.6

-0.2

0.5

0.8

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

4.7

9.0

11.1

13.3

12.6

12.4

12.9

13.7

19.6

19.8

20.0

20.2

18.7

18.9

19.1

19.3

15.1

14.7

15.6

16.0

16.7

16.2

16.1

16.5

Emissions

22.1

Croatia
AEA
Emissions

17.4

Distance to target

4.5

5.1

4.4

4.2

2.0

2.7

3.0

2.8

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

4.5

9.6

14.1

18.2

20.3

22.9

26.0

28.8

Cyprus
AEA

5.9

5.9

5.9

5.9

4.2

4.1

4.0

4.0

3.9

3.9

4.1

4.1

4.3

4.2

4.4

4.2

Distance to target

2.0

2.0

1.9

1.8

-0.1

0.0

-0.3

-0.3

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

2.0

4.0

5.8

7.7

7.6

7.5

7.2

7.0

62.5

63.2

64.0

64.7

65.2

65.9

66.5

67.2

61.5

57.6

61.3

62.8

62.4

60.6

60.5

58.7

Emissions

4.2

Czechia
AEA
Emissions

61.7

Distance to target

1.0

5.6

2.7

1.9

2.8

5.3

6.0

8.6

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

1.0

6.6

9.3

11.2

14.0

19.2

25.2

33.8

Denmark
AEA

36.8

35.9

35.0

34.1

34.8

33.9

33.0

32.1

33.7

32.6

32.5

33.1

32.7

33.1

32.1

30.8

Distance to target

3.1

3.3

2.5

1.0

2.1

0.7

0.9

1.2

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

3.1

6.4

8.9

9.9

12.0

12.7

13.6

14.9

6.3

6.3

6.3

6.4

5.9

6.0

6.0

6.0

5.8

6.1

6.1

6.2

6.2

6.1

6.2

5.9

Distance to target

0.5

0.2

0.2

0.2

-0.3

-0.2

-0.2

0.1

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

0.5

0.8

1.0

1.1

0.9

0.7

0.5

0.6

31.8

31.3

30.8

30.3

30.2

29.6

29.1

28.5

Emissions40.1

Estonia
AEA
Emissions

5.4

Finland
AEA

31.6

30.1

29.9

31.4

30.1

29.9

29.6

28.1

Distance to target

Emissions

33.9

0.2

1.1

0.9

-1.0

0.1

-0.3

-0.6

0.4

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

0.2

1.3

2.2

1.2

1.3

1.0

0.4

0.8

79 Positive values indicate overachievement, negative values indicate underachievement. AEAs for the years 2017-2020 were revised in 2017 for all Member States to reflect updates inmethodologies for reporting of GHG inventories. This recalculation ensures maintaining the originally intended effort of each Member State (in % of 2005 emissions). The values of ‘cumulative
surplus of AEAs’ are the cumulative annual distances to target and do not take into account cancellations and transfers. 2020 ESD emissions are based on the ‘Final Review Reports’ from the2022 annual ESD review. The UK’s 2020 Final Review Report was corrected in 2023. For compliance in 2019, Germany used the flexibility to carry forward part of the AEAs allocated for 2020. As
a result, Germany’s AEAs available for compliance in 2020 are below the allocation set by the legislation.

C l i m a t e

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84

France
AEA

394.1

389.5

384.4

379.4

358.2

352.9

347.7

342.5

366.1

353.5

353.0

351.9

352.8

342.2

336.4

307.8

Distance to target

28.0

35.9

31.4

27.5

5.4

10.7

11.4

34.7

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

28.0

63.9

95.3

122.8

128.2

138.9

150.3

185.0

Emissions

398.2

Germany
AEA

472.5

465.8

459.1

452.4

432.3

425.2

432.9

396.0

460.2

436.8

444.1

454.2

466.9

434.0

444.3

407.4

Distance to target

12.3

29.0

15.1

-1.7

-34.5

-8.8

-11.3

-11.4

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

12.3

41.4

56.4

54.7

20.2

11.3

0.0

-11.4

59.0

59.3

59.6

59.9

59.1

59.4

59.7

60.0
42.9

Emissions

477.8

Greece
AEA

44.2

44.4

45.4

44.9

45.4

44.7

44.7

Distance to target

Emissions

62.6

14.8

14.9

14.2

15.0

13.7

14.7

15.0

17.2

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

14.8

29.6

43.8

58.8

72.5

87.3

102.3

119.4

Hungary
AEA

50.4

51.5

52.6

53.8

50.1

51.0

51.9

52.8

38.4

38.4

41.4

42.1

43.1

43.2

44.9

43.9

Distance to target

12.0

13.1

11.2

11.7

6.9

7.7

7.0

8.9

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

12.0

25.1

36.3

47.9

54.9

62.6

69.6

78.5

46.9

45.8

44.6

43.5

40.9

39.8

38.7

37.7

42.2

41.7

43.0

43.8

43.8

45.4

45.6

44.7

Emissions48

Ireland
AEA
Emissions47.1

Distance to target

4.7

4.1

1.6

-0.3

-2.9

-5.6

-6.9

-7.1

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

4.7

8.8

10.4

10.1

7.1

1.6

-5.3

-12.4

308.2

306.2

304.2

302.3

298.3

295.8

293.4

291.0

273.3

265.3

273.3

270.7

270.1

278.7

274.9

254.0

Distance to target

34.8

40.9

31.0

31.6

28.1

17.1

18.5

37.0

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

34.8

75.7

106.7

138.3

166.4

183.5

202.0

239.0

10.0

Italy
AEA
Emissions334.5

Latvia
AEA

9.3

9.4

9.4

9.5

9.7

9.8

9.9

8.8

9.0

9.0

9.1

9.2

9.1

8.7

8.4

Distance to target

0.5

0.3

0.4

0.4

0.5

0.7

1.3

1.6

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

0.5

0.8

1.3

1.7

2.2

2.9

4.1

5.7

12.9

13.3

13.7

14.0

14.1

14.5

14.9

15.2

12.4

12.9

13.3

13.9

14.1

14.3

14.3

14.0

Distance to target

0.5

0.4

0.4

0.1

0.0

0.2

0.6

1.2

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

0.5

0.9

1.3

1.4

1.4

1.6

2.1

3.3

9.5

9.3

9.1

8.9

8.7

8.5

8.3

8.1

9.4

8.9

8.6

8.5

8.7

9.1

9.2

7.7

Distance to target

0.2

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.0

-0.5

-0.9

0.4

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

0.2

0.7

1.2

1.6

1.6

1.1

0.1

0.6

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.2

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.4

1.4

1.4

1.3

Distance to target

-0.1

-0.1

-0.1

-0.2

-0.3

-0.2

-0.3

-0.1

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

-0.1

-0.2

-0.3

-0.5

-0.8

-1.0

-1.2

-1.4

122.9

120.7

118.4

116.1

114.1

111.8

109.6

107.4

Emissions

8.5

Lithuania
AEA
Emissions

13.3

Luxembourg
AEA
Emissions

10.1

Malta
AEA
Emissions

1.1

Netherlands
AEA
Emissions

108.3

97.9

101.1

101.3

102.3

99.7

97.1

90.2

Distance to target

127.8

14.7

22.8

17.3

14.8

11.7

12.1

12.5

17.2

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

14.7

37.5

54.8

69.6

81.3

93.4

105.9

123.0

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85

Poland
AEA

193.6

194.9

196.1

197.4

200.0

201.7

203.4

205.2

186.1

181.5

186.8

198.7

211.5

213.0

209.1

205.1

Distance to target

7.5

13.3

9.4

-1.3

-11.5

-11.3

-5.6

0.1

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

7.5

20.9

30.2

29.0

17.4

6.1

0.5

0.5

Emissions180

Portugal
AEA

49.3

49.6

49.9

50.1

47.9

48.3

48.7

49.1

38.6

38.8

40.6

41.6

40.2

40.6

41.5

38.5

Distance to target

10.7

10.8

9.2

8.6

7.7

7.7

7.2

10.5

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

10.7

21.5

30.7

39.3

47.0

54.7

61.9

72.4

75.6

77.5

79.3

81.1

84.1

86.0

87.9

89.8

Emissions48.6

Romania
AEA

72.7

72.5

74.6

73.1

75.4

77.6

75.2

77.1

Distance to target

Emissions

75.5

2.9

4.9

4.7

8.0

8.7

8.3

12.7

12.7

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

2.9

7.8

12.5

20.5

29.2

37.5

50.2

62.9

Slovakia
AEA

24.0

24.4

24.7

25.1

25.0

25.3

25.6

25.9

21.1

19.8

20.1

19.8

21.2

21.1

20.1

18.9

Distance to target

2.9

4.6

4.7

5.3

3.8

4.3

5.6

7.1

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

2.9

7.5

12.2

17.5

21.3

25.6

31.2

38.2

12.3

12.4

12.4

12.4

12.2

12.2

12.3

12.3

10.9

10.5

10.7

11.2

10.9

11.0

10.8

9.8

Distance to target

1.4

1.9

1.7

1.2

1.3

1.2

1.5

2.6

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

1.4

3.3

4.9

6.1

7.4

8.6

10.1

12.7

Emissions

23

Slovenia
AEA
Emissions

11.8

Spain
AEA
Emissions

236

227.6

225.6

223.7

221.8

218.3

216.3

214.3

212.4

200.3

199.8

196.2

198.5

201.1

203.0

201.9

184.2

Distance to target

27.3

25.9

27.6

23.3

17.2

13.3

12.5

28.2

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

27.3

53.2

80.8

104.1

121.3

134.5

147.0

175.2

Sweden
AEA

41.7

41.0

40.4

39.8

37.8

37.2

36.7

36.1

35.3

34.5

33.9

32.6

32.5

31.4

31.7

29.4

Distance to target

6.4

6.5

6.5

7.2

5.3

5.8

5.0

6.7

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

6.4

12.9

19.4

26.6

31.9

37.7

42.7

49.4

358.7

354.2

349.7

345.2

360.4

357.2

354.1

350.9

339.5

324.4

326.0

333.9

332.1

329.9

329.1

296.1

Distance to target

19.3

29.8

23.7

11.3

28.4

27.4

25.0

54.8

Cumulative surplus of AEAs

19.3

49.1

72.7

84.0

112.4

139.7

164.7

219.5

Emissions43.5

United Kingdom
AEA
Emissions417.8

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2 0 2 386

9. LULUCF
Table 13 shows the accounted emissions and removals for the land use, land use and change, and forest (LULUCF) sector in 2021
for EU total and for each Member State. Computation of the accounts per land category, applying the standardised rules in theregulation80
Table 13: LULUCF Accounted emissions and removals in 2021 (2023 submission per Member State and land category)81
Member State

Accounted Land category

Accounted emissions and removals (KtCO₂-eq)

Austria

Deforested Land

1244

Afforested Land

-1437

Managed Cropland

393

Managed Grassland-296

Managed Wetland

Belgium

Managed Forest Land-6295

Sum annual-2863

Deforested Land

753

Afforested Land

-302

Managed Cropland

173

Managed Grassland-87

Managed Wetland

Bulgaria

Managed Forest Land-208

Sum annual

329

Deforested Land

84

Afforested Land

-173

Managed Cropland

735

Managed Grassland

1236

Managed Wetland

Croatia

Managed Forest Land-4283

Sum annual-2098

Deforested Land

22

Afforested Land

-266

Managed Cropland-1,478

Managed Grassland-147

Managed Wetland

CyprusManaged Forest Land-1941

Sum annual-1493

Deforested Land

8

Afforested Land

-17

Managed Cropland-4

Managed Grassland

7

Managed Wetland
Managed Forest Land72

Sum annual

66

80 One year (2021) of reported data is used, all Harvested Wood Products (HWP) reporting is included under managed forest, not all land use conversions are yet identified in the GHG inventories, indirect non-CO₂ emissions are sometimes not disaggregated by land category in the GHG inventories, Forest Reference Level (FRL) cap (Art 8(2)) has been manually applied to the following
Member States: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden, possible technical corrections to the forest reference level have not been applied. Possible application of flexibilities and mechanisms on natural disturbances has not been applied.
81 Computation of the accounting status for each Member State and the EU. The method continued the approach applied under the Kyoto Protocol period (2013 to 2020). However, the accounting approach for the period 2021 to 2025 is new and differs from the Kyoto exercise. The accounting follows the specifications laid out in Regulation 2018/841: Article 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 8 and 9. The
input data for this analysis has been extracted from the EU Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report 2023 for 1990-2021 based on final MS' inventory submissions under the EU Governance Regulation(GHGI). The computation of accounting results combines the relevant data from the final GHGI in accordance with the rules laid out in the above articles (Reported data for the years 2005 to2009 and 2021, from Section 4 of the GHGI). This analysis provides an approximate estimate of the status of a Member State’s trend towards compliance with its article 4(1) commitment. It also
provides a collective status of achievement of the article 4 commitment, an element that is needed to determine if the flexibility through article 13 of the regulation is available (See Regulation
2018/841 Art 13(2)(b)). Numbers in table rounded up. Calculations cover emissions and removals of the greenhouse gases listed in Section A of Annex I to Regulation 2018/841.

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Denmark

Deforested Land

153

Afforested Land

-1174

Managed Cropland-1230

Managed Grassland

411

Managed Wetland

Estonia

Managed Forest Land-2708

Sum annual-4547

Deforested Land

397

Afforested Land

-324

Managed Cropland

588

Managed Grassland

81

Managed Wetland

FinlandManaged Forest Land2208

Sum annual

2950

Deforested Land

2979

Afforested Land

-180

Managed Cropland

905

Managed Grassland-101

Managed Wetland
Managed Forest Land

France15146

Sum annual

18749

Deforested Land

11379

Afforested Land-10418

Managed Cropland-7079

Managed Grassland

146

Managed Wetland

Germany

GreeceManaged Forest Land35688

Sum annual

29717

Deforested Land

1735

Afforested Land

153

Managed Cropland

171

Managed Grassland

1474

Managed Wetland

48

Managed Forest Land

-16308Sum annual-12728

Deforested Land
Afforested Land

44
4

Managed Cropland-555

Managed Grassland-1613

Managed Wetland

Hungary

Managed Forest Land-181

Sum annual-2303

Deforested Land

380

Afforested Land

-1148

Managed Cropland

362

Managed Grassland

173

Managed Wetland
Managed Forest Land-6412

Sum annual-4096

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IrelandDeforested Land64

Afforested Land

-3021

Managed Cropland-210

Managed Grassland

235

Managed Wetland-183

Managed Forest Land

Italy

747

Sum annual-2367

Deforested Land

1961

Afforested Land

-4430

Managed Cropland

408,13

Managed Grassland

1390,004

Managed Wetland

LatviaManaged Forest Land-5715

Sum annual-6385

Deforested Land

1084

Afforested Land

-182

Managed Cropland27

Managed Grassland-488

Managed Wetland

Lithuania

Managed Forest Land-1936

Sum annual-471

Deforested Land

143

Afforested Land

-1183

Managed Cropland-2439

Managed Grassland

1014

Managed Wetland

Luxembourg

Managed Forest Land-1755

Sum annual-4152

Deforested Land45

Afforested Land

-13

Managed Cropland-36

Managed Grassland

30

Managed Wetland

Malta

Managed Forest Land-217

Sum annual-2303

Deforested Land

-0,4

Afforested Land

-0,3Managed Cropland-8

Managed Grassland

5

Managed Wetland
Managed Forest Land
Sum annual
Netherlands

0,0-4

Deforested Land

777

Afforested Land

-493

Managed Cropland-811

Managed Grassland-873

Managed Wetland
Managed Forest Land
Sum annual

84
-1316

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89

PolandDeforested Land

336

Afforested Land

-1803

Managed Cropland

736

Managed Grassland-153

Managed Wetland

PortugalManaged Forest Land3085

Sum annual

2202

Deforested Land

743

Afforested Land

-1670

Managed Cropland-817

Managed Grassland-801

Managed Wetland

Romania

Managed Forest Land7725

Sum annual

5180

Deforested Land

1143

Afforested Land

-1582

Managed Cropland-12993

Managed Grassland-3920

Managed Wetland

Slovakia

Managed Forest Land-6828

Sum annual-24180

Deforested Land60

Afforested Land

-344

Managed Cropland-131

Managed Grassland

263

Managed Wetland

Slovenia

Managed Forest Land-1516

Sum annual-1668

Deforested Land

270

Afforested Land

-177

Managed Cropland-30

Managed Grassland

194

Managed Wetland
Managed Forest Land

Spain

309

Sum annual

566

Deforested Land

1366

Afforested Land

-10008

Managed Cropland-3864

Managed Grassland

185

Managed Wetland
Managed Forest Land
Sum annual
Sweden1244-11077

Deforested Land

1780

Afforested Land

-1099

Managed Cropland-845

Managed Grassland

343

Managed Wetland

EU total

Managed Forest Land-6799

Sum annual-6620

Sum annual-14073

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Table 14: LULUCF total final accounted (2021), approximated accounted (2022), and projected accounted (2023-2025)
emissions and removals, as reported by Member States, and average per year over the five year period (2021-2025)(ktCO₂-eq) 82
Accounted

ApproximatedProjection

Scenario

Country

Avg per year

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

Austria-3591,68-2862,96-2862,96-4077,48-4077,48-4077,48

WEM

Belgium

125,68329,33329,33-10,0852-10,09-10,09WAM

Bulgaria-1754,25-2098,08-2140,75-1510,82-1510,82-1510,82

WEM

Croatia-2507,10-1492,88-1492,88-3183,26-3183,26-3183,26

WAM

11690,311690,30

11690,30

WEM
WEM

Cyprus

65,23

65,59

64,87

Czechia

12259,8814727,37

11501,13Denmark-3346,69-4546,77-4546,77-2546,63-2546,63-2546,63

Estonia

2342,85

2950,292945,04

1939,634

1939,63

1939,63 WAM

Finland6551,58

18748,71

17298,99-1096,6-1096,60-1096,60

France18121,4529716,4929852,80

10345,9810345,9810345,98 WEM

Germany-34744,99-12728,04-18542,61-47484,8-47484,80-47484,80 WEM

Greece-1530,51-2302,50-2148,95-1067,03-1067,03-1067,03 WEM

Hungary-3183,58-4870,69-4319,96-2242,42-2242,42-2242,42

WEM

Ireland-1537,66-2367,36-2400,55-973,463-973,46-973,46

WAM

Italy

-15295,83-6384,88-10598,54-19831,9-19831,90

Latvia-128,85-470,80

1324,64-499,36-499,36-499,36

WAM

Lithuania-2067,48-4152,13-4197,62-662,55-662,55-662,55

WAM

Luxembourg-389,40-190,66-331,92-474,81-474,81-474,81 WAM

Malta

WEM

-19831,90 WEM

1,66

-3,72

-3,74

5,25

5,25

Netherlands-1154,88-1316,29-1244,81-1071,11-1071,11-1071,11

5,25 WEM
WEM

Poland-8944,32

2201,78

2011,04-16311,50-16311,50-16311,50

WEM

Portugal

4527,88

5180,34

4912,154182,30

4182,30

4182,30

WEM

Romania-27443,07-24180,13-25436,46-29199,60-29199,60-29199,60

WEM

Slovakia-727,92-1667,97-1883,41-29,41-29,41-29,41 WAM

Slovenia

1185,51565,52

959,851467,40

1467,40

1467,40 WAM

Spain-8344,68-11076,96-11053,71-6530,90-6530,90-6530,90 WAM

Sweden-4397,58-6619,63-6623,85-2914,80-2914,80-2914,80 WEM

82 Values show total accounted cumulative emissions and removals (kt CO₂-eq) (as reported under Annex XXV table 5b Governance Regulation), and the average per year over the five-year
period (2021-2025). 2021 emissions/removals are based on the final accounted value calculated from inventory reports, 2022 emissions/removals are accounted values calculated from approximated inventory reports. For 2023-2025 emissions are based on the most recent WAM emissions projections reports, or in the absence of WAM projections the WEM projections are used. LULUCF
Managed Forest land, including harvested wood products assuming instantaneous oxidation where available is used.

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10. Horizontal assessment of collective progress of Member States on climate
adaptation83(Please insert the image of the infographic / illustration here

In recent year Europe has been confronted with severe climate hazards that have deeply impacted people, ecosystems, and economies. Adapting to the present, andhazard
preparing society for the future, climate hazards is of significant
critical importance.
without sigsignificant trend unce hazard not total

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acute
glacial lake outburst
WaA
0
1
0
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chronic
sea ice cover
WaC
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1
4
2
Achieving a climate resilient
Europechangewith incommunities
equipped to deal
with the unavoidable impactsof climatechangeis attheTemperaturechronic
permafrost thawing
TeC
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heart
of
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climatepolicyandits
European
ClimateLaw.
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this
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obligestherelevant
Union
institutions
andtheSolid mass
chronic
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Member States to ensure
continuous
progressin enhancing adaptive capacity,strengthening resilience,and1 reducing
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adaptation, which is the objective of this report. In this section, we assess the state of our collective efforts, delving into the specifics
Wind
acute
tornado
WiA
1
2
0
11
of the progress made byacute
Member States
healthy, safe, and resilient 3future. 3
Windcyclone and our trajectory towards a WiA
0
10
Water
acute
snow and ice load
WaA
0
1
13
4
Water
chronic
saline intrusion
WaC
8
2
0
8
10.1 Climate-relatedchronic
hazards, vulnerabilities,
and riskWindchanging wind patterns
WiC
3
5
0
11
Solid mass
chronic
coastal erosion
SoC
12
2
0
6
Solid mass Member States reported
acutelandslide
SoA and wildfires as the most
10 observed
50 (i.e., sudden)
6
heatwaves,droughts, floods, heavy precipitation,
acute
Temperature
acute
coldwave, frost
TeA
0
3
15
4
climatehazards
inEurope,whilechanging
averagetemperatures
andvariabilityintemperature,
precipitationandhydrology
remainWater
chronic
sea level rise
WaC
17
2
0
3
observed soil
chronic
With a few region-specificexceptions,
Solid mass the most often reported
chronic
erosion(i.e., persistent) climate hazards.
SoC
12
1
0 there are
10 no
Water
scarcity
WaC
19
1
0
3
significant geographicalchronic
differenceswaterin thereported hazards.
Solid mass
chronic
soil degradation
SoC
9
3
0
11
Wind
acute
storm
WiA
11
6
0
8
Expected future hazards
mirror thecurrent observations,with Member
a4significant
Temperaturechronic
temperature
variability
TeC States’ projections foreseeing
13
0 increase
9 of
Water
chronicheavychanging
precipitation
andtypes theWaCacute hazards and changing
18
30water scarcity,
5
heatwaves, droughts, floods,
precipitation,and patterns
wildfires
amongtemperature,
Water
chronic
precipitation variability
WaC
17
3
0
6
changing precipitation patterns and types, sea level rise, and precipitation and hydrological variability among the chronic hazards.
Temperature
acute
wildfire
TeA
20
2
0
4
Member States reported
that someheavy
hazards
will be less frequent and/or
Water
acute
precipitation
WaAintense in the future, such
22 as cold
2 spells, 0and change
3 insnow and ice load. Withacutea few exceptions,hazards.
Water
flood the hazards reported as expected
WaA future hazards are the23 same as
2 the observed
02
Temperaturechronic
changing
temperature
TeC water scarcity, reported
25 by seven
1 more 0countries1 as a
The biggest difference canbe foundfor thechronic water-related hazard
Water
acute
drought
WaA
25
0
0
2
future key hazard compared to being an observed hazard.
Temperature
acuteheatwave
TeA
26
0
0
1

Figure 10. Key future hazards reported
Key future hazards reported in 2023
source: EEA Briefing 'National adaptation actionsin 2023 - is Europe on track towards climate
resilience?'

heatwavedroughtchanging temperatureflood
heavy precipitation
wildfire
precipitation variabilitychanging precipitation patterns and types
temperature variability
stormsoil degradationwater scarcity
soil erosion
sea level risecoldwave, frost
landslidecoastal erosion
changing wind patterns
saline intrusionsnow and ice load
cyclonetornadoavalancesubsidence
ocean acidification
solifluction
permafrost thawing
change in sea ice coverglacial lake outburst
0

5

10

significantly increasing

without significant change

trend uncertain or uncknown

hazard not of relevance

15

20

25

significantly decreasing

83 This assessment is based on diverse sources, including the reporting of the Member States under art.17 and 19 on the Governance Regulation 2023, the EEA briefing “National adaptation action in 2023 - is Europe on track towards climate resilience?” and the ETC/CA technical report “Is Europe on track with climate resilience? - Status of reported national adaptation actions in 2023” .

25
20
19
18
15
14
14
13
11
9
9
8
7
6
5
5
4
4
4
2
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0

27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27

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Figure 11. Key affected sectors per geographical area
9
3
4
6
6
7
8
9
11
13
14
14
18
19
21
21
22
22
24
25

Key affected sectors per geographical area reported in 2023
source: EEA Briefing 'National adaptation actionsin 2023 - is Europe on track towards climate
resilience?'

healthagriculture and foodbiodiversity (including ecosystembased approaches)
forestrywater management
energytransport
tourism
civil protection and emergency managementbuildings
coastal areas
marine and fisheries
urban
land use planningindustryfinance and insurance
businessrural development
ICT (information and communications technology)
other0Northern Europe

Eastern Europe

510Southern Europe

15

20

25

30

Western Europe

The sectors reported as being the most impacted by climate threats in Europe are health, agriculture, forestry, biodiversity, energy,
and water management. In the future, Member States expect a high risk of being impacted by climate change for 45% of the key
affected sectors, while for 31% of the sectors the future risk is expected as ‘medium’.
In the case of 21 Member States the identification and reporting of relevant vulnerabilities and risks is fully in line with those indicated in the INFORM climate change-tool84 , while the correspondence is partial in the case of five Member States.
The hazards and affected key sectors reported by the Member States stemming from their climate vulnerability and risk assessments are overall in line with their reporting in the field of disaster risk management 85.
10.2 Climate risk assessments
Member States reported further progress in assessing climate-related hazards, vulnerabilities 86 and risks, confirming that enhancement, expansion and deepening of the knowledge base on climate risks is a continuous process in many countries. From 2021
onwards a significant share of Member States (16) updated existing or conducted new climate risk and vulnerability assessments
or obtained new climate risk-related information considered relevant for the national and sub-national policy-making perspective.
Different forms of climate risk assessments (CRA) or related knowledge products can be distinguished: national multi- or cross-sectoral climate risk assessments (or climate change assessments), thematic or sector-specific assessments at national scale, andsub-national climate risk assessments. From 2021 onwards, 14 of the Member States have conducted one or more of these formsof CRA.
The process of conducting CRA is recognized as time and resource-intensive, which might be a reason for the persistent disparities
between countries that are advanced in CRA and those that are still lagging. Only 7 Member States have begun to tackle strategic
knowledge gaps that are crucial to a more systemic adaptation (i.e., cross-border and international climate risks; cross-sectoralinteractions; complex, compound, and cascading risks), however at rather low pace and to a limited extent.
Regarding governance, CRA and their periodic review have been increasingly institutionalized through new or enhanced legal
requirements, often established under national climate laws. However, countries with legal commitments still represent a minority(see below).
84 Analyses based on the INFORM-tool at the Disaster Risk and Knowledge Management Centre of the European Joint Research Centre (JRC).
85 and the Member State’s reports of summary information on national risk assessment under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, article 6 Decision (EU) 1313/2013
86 Vulnerability: the propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected. Vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts and elements, including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lackof capacity to cope and adapt (source: IPCC, Assessment Report 6, WG 2 report, Glossary).

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Two thirds of the countries are either already engaged in ongoing work towards revising and updating their CRA or will report about
respective plans soon.
Only two Member States indicated that they are working towards standardisation of their CRA, and in many countries, CRA andmonitoring, reporting, and evaluation systems appear to be rather separate and parallel processes. Lack of data, knowledge, andinformation remain the most frequently reported barriers to progress in adaptation, including CRA. These gaps include inadequate
identification of climate risks, limited capacity for systemic risk assessments, inadequate identification of climate risks and translation of climate risk information into practical solutions. It is recognized that these barriers hampering progress in CRA appear tostem from limitations in financial and human resources, further emphasizing the resource-intensive nature of CRA.
10.3 Adaptation policies and priorities
Climate change adaptation policies in the European Union are constantly evolving, with five Member States having established
new national adaptation strategies (NAS) and/or national adaptation plans (NAP) since 2021, and 12 Member States being in theprocess of updating their NAS and/or NAP or otherwise re-adjusting the respective policy setting. Compared to 2021, the adaptation
priorities have not changed significantly. About half of the Member States reported their priorities in sectoral terms, the other half
did so in terms of general objectives. As of 2023, the priority sectors most mentioned by Member States are health, biodiversity,
water management, energy, agriculture and food and transport.
Increasingly, national policies are referring to European programs under the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, as wellas the policies that constitute the Green Deal framework.
European legislation, such as the European Climate Law, is inspiring a growing number of countries to enact climate laws. At
least eight Member States have climate laws that include provisions for adaptation, with six countries having newly introduced oramended them since 2021 while two countries are in the process of adopting one. The climate acts comprise of legal mandates
for the NAS and/or NAP, obligatory climate risk assessments, review and revision cycles of policy documents and CRA, political andcoordination policies, horizontal and vertical coordination bodies, scientific advisory bodies, and reporting requirements. Apart fromthe traditional NAS and NAP and climate laws, countries are also enacting additional legislative instruments that complement theadaptation policy framework.
Thirteen Member States were found to clearly link their adaptation plans and strategies to the climate vulnerabilities and risks they
were facing, particularly in key affected sectors.
Two thirds of the Member States responded to new challenges by increasing efforts in their policies, 11 countries also at subnational
level. Priorities for adapting to climate change reported by the countries are overall consistent with those reported in 2021, reflecting
the long-term nature of adaptation policies. However, small shifts have been observed, notably the increased prioritization of theenergy sector and coastal areas. The even distribution of priority areas reported among the four European geographic areas87 as
well as the listing of sectors, both in priority and as key affected sector are consistent with the previous reporting cycle. The healthsector remains both a key affected sector and a priority across all reporting countries.
It is worth noting that the level and manner of integration of adaptation policies vary widely, reflecting differing national circumstances, governance structures, and institutional frameworks. There is a prevalence of soft policies and voluntary cooperation, but
one can detect an increasing trend towards legally binding national climate laws.
Almost all Member States (23) reported challenges, gaps and barriers related to the governance of adaptation. Shortcomings
in organizing and implementing coordination and collaboration across sectors, levels and actors are among the most prevalent
identified issues and appear to hamper implementation progress considerably. Effective adaptation actions appear not only to be
dependent on the existence of coordination bodies, cooperation structures and regulatory frameworks, but also on the existenceof clear responsibilities, awareness, and high political saliency. Insufficient coordination is often a direct consequence of a lack offinancial resources, institutional and administrative capacities, expertise, skills, and training.
In conclusion, the policy landscape is characterized by a combination of continuity in long-term priorities, increasing alignment
with European frameworks, evolving legislative instruments, incremental shifts in policy focus, and grappling with the challenges,
gaps, and barriers to the governance of adaptation.

87 The geographical areas classification of countries encompasses the following: Northern = Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden; Eastern = Bulgaria, Czechia,
Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia; Southern = Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain; and Western = Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and theNetherlands.

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10.4 Adaptation policy governanceInstitutional arrangements at national and subnational levels
Diverse national coordination bodies and mechanisms for horizontal policy integration and multi-level (vertical) coordination havebeen further developed and are now in place in almost all Member States. At the same time, governance systems for climate
adaptation display a large and dynamic diversity, both across and within countries, where developments have taken place sincethe 2021 reporting in two-thirds of the Member States.
Legal requirements to enforce horizontal policy integration and binding vertical governance frameworks are increasing, however,‘soft’ and collaboration-based forms of government still prevail. In at least eight Member States legislation is in place that definesbinding requirements for the planning, implementation, and governance of adaptation to climate change policy.
High-level inter-ministerial or inter-sectoral coordination bodies concerned with developing, steering, monitoring, and reviewing
national adaptation policies are established in 25 Member States. However, the mandates and the operational efficiency of thesebodies vary.
Subnational adaptation policymaking is further progressing in all countries. Two-thirds of Member States reported progress since2021 about cooperation at the subnational level, and about half of Member States indicate progress in reviewing and updating
subnational adaptation policies, strategies, and plans.
Only nine Member States legally oblige regional, and local governments to prepare adaptation strategies and/or plans. ‘Soft’, collaboration-based forms of vertical steering for subnational levels are still more common than top-down regulatory frameworks andobligation for adaptation policymaking at the subnational level.
All Member States have a supportive governance framework for subnational levels in place, comprising policy inputs, capacity
building (knowledge generation and provision, advisory services, and training), cross-level dialogue, support for participation in
networks, as well as funding and financing. The presence of this framework is independent from the type of vertical steering present,
be it either collaboration-based or top-down regulatory frameworks.
Subnational
The number of cities and municipalities with a local adaptation strategy and/or plan is increasing. A number of these local entities
are signatories of the Covenant of Mayors, which offers active support in developing these strategies and plans. Countries also
report the growing involvement of local and regional authorities in the EU Horizon Europe Mission on adaptation to climate change.
Regarding the implementation of adaptation, almost all countries reported substantial barriers, gaps and challenges, in terms of
institutional, financial, technical, and human capacities. More than half of all countries report gaps in coordination, cooperation,and policy coherence, which are often connected to unclear division of responsibilities, lack of awareness and low political attention.
International and transnational cooperation
In most countries, international and transnational cooperation on adaptation issues continues to advance with a large number anddiversity of forms and modes. In Europe, three types of transnational/international cooperation can be distinguished: managing
transboundary climate risks, managing shared cross-border resources (e.g., river basins, maritime and coastal environment, andbiodiversity), and coordinating national adaptation policies and actions across borders. Progress has been made by 19 Member
States on international and transnational cooperation.
Major international conventions and multilateral policy frameworks addressing climate adaptation (e.g., Paris Agreement, UN Sendai
Framework, Sustainable Development Goals) continue to play a crucial role in all countries, facilitating the strengthening of links
between climate adaptation, sustainable development, and disaster risk reduction. One-third of the Member States reported newsynergies in this field since 2021.
EU funding schemes for transnational cooperation (e.g., EU Interreg Programmes) and research (e.g., Horizon Europe, LIFE) continue tobe strong enablers of transnational adaptation efforts for most Member States. These programmes bolster national policy processes
and stimulate the development and implementation of innovative climate resilience measures across borders. Several countries
reported the involvement of regional and local governments in the EU Horizon Europe Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change.

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This Mission focuses on supporting EU regions, cities, and local authorities in their efforts to build resilience against the impactsof climate change. It experiments with innovative solutions and pays specific attention to supporting transnational cooperationand citizens engagement. Over 300 regional and local authorities from 25 EU Member States have signed the Mission Charter 88
Stakeholder engagement
The regular consideration of social justice and equity in adaptation measures is still nascent, highlighting a key area of focus in the
future, to address the disproportionate impacts of climate change on vulnerable groups.
Progress in adaptation policy-related stakeholder engagement was found across 20 Member States. Examples of progress include
the introduction of climate platforms, climate dialogues, and urban adaptation plans.
15 Member states are reporting an increase in attention to vulnerable populations, equality, and fairness, both at the national and thesubnational level since 2021. With a quarter of the Member States reporting that they have made progress in this field since 2021,
they are also stepping up their efforts to involve the private sector in the development and implementation of national adaptation
policies. Various resources are provided to assist the private sector, such as online platforms, climate-related information seminars,
and sector-specific risk assessment tools. Governments also finance adaptation projects to spur innovation in the private sector.
Seven Member States pointed to elements of new ‘good practices and lessons learnt’ such as Portugal’s National Vector Surveillance
Network in the health sector or Austria’s peatland restoration projects.
10.5 Implementation and financing
Mainstreaming – or integrating - climate adaptation into different sectoral policies and plans is a crucial element of climate adaptation policy, and a specific objective of the EU Adaptation Strategy.
Compared to the 2021 reporting cycle, the number of Member States that reported mainstreaming of climate change into sectors or
sectoral policies and plans directly affected by climate change impacts have further increased to 16. Some Member States increased
the number of sectors considered considerably, most commonly transport, infrastructure, health, forestry, and water management.
Significant progress has been made in integrating climate change impacts into national disaster risk management frameworks andsectoral planning, such as national disaster risk management plans, flood risk management plans, and river basin management plans.
Seven countries report NAP and sectorial adaptation plans as key policy instruments that support effective integration (mainstreaming) of adaptation into national and sectoral policies, strategies, and plans.
The environmental impact assessment and especially the strategic environmental assessment are also instrumental in mainstreaming adaptation into sectoral policies and plans. Member states reported further progress in the availability of helping tools
for the application of these instruments, such as online tools, checklists, and guidance.
More than half of Member States reported that since 2021 they have made progress with implementing adaptation measures.
Regarding progress made in meeting adaptation priorities since 2021, more than half of Member States replied positively as well.
Efforts to boost adaptive capacity and reduce vulnerability have become more prevalent, with countries implementing a rangeof activities such as awareness-raising, capacity building, knowledge enhancement, and regional and local support. 16 Member
States reported to have increased their adaptive capacity in 2023 compared to that in 2021. These efforts are further bolsteredby sectoral programs and plans, the strengthening of local activities, like local adaptation strategies and plans and the alignmentof research efforts with national adaptation priorities. As a result, more than half of Member States reported that since 2021 they
have made progress towards reducing their climate impacts, vulnerabilities, and risks as well as increasing their adaptative capacity.
Assessing the investments made in different sectors to make it more resilient to climate threats remains a challenge for many
Member States and is often only done partly (e.g., at national, regional level and/or sectoral level). Challenges are exacerbatedby the absence of a common methodology to assess the investments costs made and to track financing of implementation ofadaptation strategies and plans. Despite these difficulties, all Member States report an increase in investments made in sectors
due to adaptation.
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More information on the EU Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change, including the Mission Charter, can be found on https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/mission/

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Most countries indicate that their NAS, NAP, sectoral adaptation plans, and regional adaptation plans do not have dedicated budgets
or financing streams for their implementation. Also, the majority of countries report that dedicated adaptation funds for financing
adaptation action are lacking, although the number of Member States that have these funds is on the rise.
10.6 Monitoring, reporting and evaluation
For monitoring, 18 Member States reported that they were conducting activities while 5 Member States were developing these
activities (remaining 6 Member States for which there was no clear indication of monitoring activities or was insufficient information available). For reporting, 17 Member States reported conducting activities and 4 developing them (remaining 8 with no clear
indication or insufficient information). And for evaluation, 11 Member States reported activities and 10 reported being developing
them (remaining 8 with no clear indication or insufficient information). Although more countries are conducting or planning evaluations, these are still less commonly reported than monitoring or reporting activities.
Many Member States have incorporated monitoring, reporting, and evaluation in their NAS and NAP. These activities also take placeas part of regional adaptation strategies and plans on a regional and local scale. Overall, half of the Member States reported anincrease in monitoring, reporting and evaluation activities since 2021, at the national, regional, and local level. However, the scaleand depth of monitoring, reporting and evaluation activities for adaptation at subnational level varies. Seven Member States indicatethat the monitoring and evaluation of actions implemented on a subnational scale are conducted in conjunction with the NAP and
NAS, while 13 other Member States state that municipalities and regions are responsible themselves for the implementation andevaluation of their respective strategy or measures at regional and local level. So, in most countries, the subnational monitoringand evaluation process is not formally linked to national level planning.
Over three-quarters of Member States have made progress in reviewing and updating national adaptation policies, strategies, plans
and measures. In some cases, laws have been adopted to ensure NAS are regularly reviewed, often every five years.
Using various methodological approaches and combining quantitative and qualitative data are key to effective monitoring, reportingand evaluation. Several countries highlighted the important role of indicators and reported on the new development of criteria formonitoring reduction of climate impacts, vulnerabilities, and the implementation of adaptation measures. Some countries prioritize
developing multi-purpose indicators, which benefit more than one sector. Also, the development of performing qualitative assessments and evaluations, in close cooperation with stakeholders, was reported. While most of the Member States have implementedchanges to their climate monitoring and modelling framework since 2021, more progress can be expected in the upcoming years.
Monitoring, reporting, and evaluation occurring at national, regional, and local level has the potential to be a powerful instrument
to influence decision-making throughout the adaptation policy cycle.
Still, few Member States explicitly report how monitoring, reporting and evaluation is supposed to feed back into the developmentof adaptation polices or how and by whom the activities are coordinated. When it comes to good practices, most Member Statesthat reported progress imply that the role of a coordinating actor, such as a ministry, governmental agency, or an institute of environmental protection (or such) is often significant when both scaling up the adaptation actions or when evaluating their progress.
10.7 Conclusions
Climate adaptation measures are almost always tailored towards the specific sector and the local conditions. However, the sum of
all the activities defines the resilience of a territory or a country to the unavoidable impacts of climate change. Also, the threats andimpacts of climate change are not restricted to national or regional borders; if a country or region does not take appropriate action,
climate impacts may cascade to neighbouring areas. Through an analysis of the reporting of Member States of their progress in thefield of climate adaptation, it has been possible to pinpoint areas of success, identify potential gaps and shortfalls, and determine
the best practices to be adopted, replicated, and scaled across different regions.
Member States reported heatwaves, droughts, floods, heavy precipitation, and wildfires as the most observed acute climate hazards
in Europe, while changing temperature, changing precipitation patterns, sea level rise and hydrological variability among the mostoften reported observed chronic climate hazards. Anticipated future hazards are the same as the observed hazard, with exception
for water scarcity, reported by seven more countries as a future key hazard compared to being an observed hazard.
Health, agriculture, forestry, biodiversity, energy, and water management are the sectors reported as being the most impacted byclimate threats in Europe.

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Almost all Member State have carried out climate risk assessments, 14 of these have been updated in recent years, and the rest
are scheduled for updates soon.
All Member States have national adaptation strategies (NAS) and/or national adaptation plan (NAP) in place. A considerable part ofthese strategies and plans have recently been renewed or are under revision and will be renewed in the coming years. Also, morenational sectoral adaptation plans have been adopted. The policy landscape is characterized by a combination of continuity inlong-term priorities, increasing alignment with European frameworks, evolving legislative instruments, incremental shifts in policy
focus, and grappling with challenges, gaps, and barriers to the governance of adaptation.
National and subnational governance structures and mechanisms for horizontal policy integration and multi-level (vertical) coordination have been further developed and are now predominantly in place, with regular review cycles. The mandates and operationalfeatures of these bodies vary greatly. Despite the growing number of Member States (specifically, 8 Member States) embedding
vital elements of their adaptation policy systems in binding legal frameworks, soft and collaboration-based forms of vertical andhorizontal governance still predominate. The variety in mandates and operational features is also caused by the difference in governance structures cooperation culture. Some countries have tasked dedicated adaptation working groups (as permanent bodies or
temporary task force-type groups) of coordination at technical and operational level. In some countries, the development of NAS and
NAP is steered by several thematic working groups, while in other countries this competence of the inter-ministerial working group.
On international and transnational cooperation, progress has been made in two-thirds of the countries. The regular considerationof social justice and equity in adaptation measures is still nascent, highlighting a key area of focus in the future, to address thedisproportionate impacts of climate change on vulnerable groups. Progress in adaptation policy-related stakeholder engagement
was found across two-thirds of the Member States.
Member States are progressing in the implementation of adaptation measures, including mainstreaming of adaptation in sectoral
policies and plans. Significant progress has been made in integrating climate change impacts into national disaster risk management frameworks and sectoral planning. Assessing the costs of adaptation remains a challenge for many Member States and isoften only done partially. NAP and NAS often do not have dedicated budgets or financing streams for their implementation, nor domost countries have dedicated adaptation funds for financing adaptation action.
Half of the Member States reported an increase in monitoring, reporting and evaluation activities since 2021, at the national,
regional, and local level.
Understanding our progress towards the climate adaptation objective is not only a mechanic exercise of accountability, but also a
critical step in designing a better future course of action. Together, as the Union and the Member States, we must continuously refine
our approach to climate resilience, enhance cooperation and share good practices. Our path involves amplifying our use of existing
solutions and infusing innovation to bolster systemic climate resilience. In doing so, we aim to protect our communities, safeguard
the environment, and fortify the economic foundations that depend on them, especially in the face of escalating climate challenges.

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Figure 12. Overview of progress made since 2021 for a set of adaptation policy indicators (summary view)

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Table 15 : List of full questions examined for each indicator
Questions

Possible values

SECTION 1.1, 1.2: NATIONAL CIRCUMEMBER STATESTANCES RELEVANT TO ADAPTATION ACTIONS AND CLIMATE MONITORING AND MODELLING
FRAMEWORK
1. Have there been any changes to the climate monitoring and modelling framework since 2021?

Yes – Fully, Yes – Partially, No, Unclear - No Submission, N/A

SECTION 1.3: ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE IMPACTS, VULNERABILITY AND RISKS, INCLUDING ADAPTIVE CAPACITY
2. Has the Member State considered the following sectors as a key affected sector: agriculture
and food, and water management?

Yes – Fully, Yes – Partially. No, Unclear - No Submission

3. Have there been any changes to the reported vulnerabilities and risks since 2021?

Yes , No, Unclear - No Submission, N/A

4. Based on the INFORM climate change tool, have all relevant vulnerabilities and risks been
identified in their 2023 submission?

Yes – Fully, Yes – Partially, No, Unclear - No Submission, N/A

4a. Are heatwaves identified as a future climate hazard by the Member State?

Yes, No, Unclear - No Submission, N/A

SECTION 2: LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
5. Are there relevant national governance structures in place to support adaptation actions?

Yes – Fully, Yes – Partially, No, Unclear - No Submission, N/A

6. Have there been any changes to the national governance structures since 2021?

Yes – Fully, Yes – Partially, No, Unclear - No Submission, N/A

SECTION 3: ADAPTATION STRATEGIES, POLICIES, PLANS AND GOALS
7. Are the adaptation priorities, strategies, policies, plans, and efforts taken by the Member State
correlated with the vulnerabilities and risks identified? Are they well aimed to reduce these?

Yes – Fully, Yes – Partially, No, Unclear - No Submission, N/A

8. Is there a decrease in the 2023 reported challenges, gaps and barriers to adaptation compared
to 2021?

Yes – Fully, Yes – Partially, No, Unclear - No Submission, N/A

9. Are there any new key efforts identified in national strategies, polices and plans? Are these new
efforts in line with any new vulnerabilities and risks identified?

Yes – Fully, Yes – Partially, No, Unclear - No Submission, N/A

10. Are nature-based solutions and ecosystem-based adaptation promoted in national strategies,
policies and plans?

Yes – Fully, Yes – Partially, No, Unclear - No Submission, N/A

11. Has progress been made in integrating climate change adaptation into sectoral policies, plansand prograMember States?

Positive, Neutral (no progress), Negative, Progress is
unclear12. Has progress been made engaging with stakeholders particularly vulnerable to climatechange impacts in relation to adaptation policy?

Positive, Neutral (no progress), Negative, Progress is
unclear13. Has progress been made engaging with private sector stakeholders in relation to adaptation
policy?

Positive, Neutral (no progress), Negative, Progress is
unclear

SECTION 4: MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF ADAPTATION ACTIONS AND PROCESSES
14. Has progress been made in establishing and operationalising monitoring mechanism since2021?

Positive, Neutral (no progress), Negative, Progress is
unclear15. Has progress been made in the implementation of adaptation measures?

Positive, Neutral (no progress), Negative, Progress is
unclear

16. Has progress been made towards reducing climate impacts, vulnerabilities, and risks?

Positive, Neutral (no progress), Negative, Progress is
unclear17. Has progress been made towards increasing adaptive capacity?

Positive, Neutral (no progress), Negative, Progress is
unclear18. Has progress been made in meeting adaptation priorities?

Positive, Neutral (no progress), Negative, Progress is
unclear19. Has progress been made in addressing barriers to adaptation?

Positive, Neutral (no progress), Negative, Progress is
unclear20. Has progress been made in reviewing and updating vulnerability and risk assessments?

Positive, Neutral (no progress), Negative, Progress is
unclear21. Has progress been made in reviewing and updating national adaptation policies, strategies,
plans, and measures?

Positive, Neutral (no progress), Negative, Progress is
unclear

SECTION 5: COOPERATION, GOOD PRACTICES, SYNERGIES, EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS LEARNED IN THE FIELD OF ADAPTATION
22. Are there any new ‘good practices and lessons learnt’ compared to 2021?

Yes – Fully, Yes – Partially, No, Unclear - No Submission, N/A

23. Are there any new synergies identified with other international frameworks and/or conventions compared to 2021?

Yes – Fully, Yes – Partially, No, Unclear - No Submission, N/A

24. Has progress been made with regards to cooperation?

Positive, Neutral (no progress), Negative,

SECTION 6: SUBNATIONAL LEVEL INFORMATION
25.Are relevant subnational governance structures in place to support adaptation actions?

Yes – Fully, Yes – Partially, No, Unclear - No Submission, N/A

26. Are there any new key efforts identified in subnational strategies, polices, plans and efforts?

Yes – Fully, Yes – Partially, No, Unclear - No Submission, N/A

27. Has progress been made in engaging with stakeholders in relation to adaptation policy?

Positive, Neutral (no progress), Negative,

28. Has progress been made in reviewing and updating subnational adaptation policies, strategies, plans, and measures?

Positive, Neutral (no progress), Negative,

29. Has progress been made with regards to cooperation at a subnational level?

Positive, Neutral (no progress), Negative,

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11 Overview of sustainable finance policies
Since 2018, the Commission has endeavoured with the Sustainable Finance Action Plan to put in place a comprehensive regulatory framework to enable the reorientation of private capital flows to finance the transition towards a sustainable economy89.
Three core and interdependent objectives underpinned the actions set out in the Action Plan, namely: i) the reorientation of capital
flows towards a more sustainable economy; ii) mainstreaming sustainability into risk management and; iii) fostering transparency
and long termism (in investment decisions). In 2021, the Commission updated its strategy through the Renewed Sustainable
Finance Strategy 90 with a view mainstream transition finance considerations into the current regulatory framework. In that
context, the Commission published in June 2023 a non-binding recommendation on Transition Finance91. This document provides
a strict definition of Transition Finance that is aligned with the 1.5oC target and some recommendations for a wide range of stakeholders including inter alia financiers, non-financial corporates and supervisors to highlight how the various components of the EU
sustainable finance toolbox can be used to foster the raising of transition finance.
This regulatory framework notably centres around the EU Taxonomy, a dynamic tool defining activities that can be consideredenvironmentally sustainable. Most importantly, by defining sustainability at the granular level of economic activities, the Taxonomy
allows to monitor the shares of sustainable expenditures and turnover at company level. This in turn allows to compare the sustainability of different companies and of the portfolios exposed to such companies. The Taxonomy follows an iterative process witha first set of activities centring on the Climate Change mitigation and Adaptation objectives adopted in 2021 and a second set of
activities contributing to the Water, Circular Economy, Pollution and Biodiversity Objectives adopted in 2023. Together with the
Platform on Sustainable Finance, the Commission will keep working on the Taxonomy, to add new activities and to update existing
criteria reflecting technological and regulatory changes.
Relatedly, the Commission put in place the first regulations in the world to require sustainability disclosures for corporates andfinancial market participants. These are respectively the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) - amending
the existing Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD), notably by extending the scope of companies required to disclose on theirsustainability impacts and risks in accordance with the double materiality principle – and the Sustainable Finance Disclosures
Regulation (SFDR). Regarding the CSRD, the Commission adopted in July 2023 the European Sustainability ReportingStandards (ESRS), a comprehensive set of corporate reporting standards covering 12 environmental, social and governancefactors. This set of standards will be complemented in the future with sector-specific reporting standards as well as SME-specificones. Reporting under this directive will be progressive, starting in 2025 for the 2024 financial year for the corporates already inthe scope of the NFRD and rolling out until 2028. Similarly, regarding the SFDR, the Commission adopted in 2022 a set of reporting
standards for financial market participants, requiring investors to explain their sustainability strategies, impacts and risks both atentity-level and at financial product-level92. These standards are currently being revised, in part to make them consistent with theupcoming corporate reporting under the CSRD but also to improve their overall usability. Additionally, the Commission has begun
a comprehensive review of the SFDR to assess whether and how this framework could be improved. A public consultation will belaunched by end 2023.
Relatedly, in August 2022, new requirements on financial advisors and distributors entered into force, providing them to ask forthe sustainability preferences of their clients using the Taxonomy 93. This is an important new development which will only further
underscore the existing demand for sustainable and ESG financial products by making the link from retail investors all the way to
non-financial corporates through asset managers.
While the aforementioned pieces of legislation provide mostly soft incentives to enable the reorientation of capital flows, theCorporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD)94 currently still in the codecision process represents the hardening ofsustainable finance policy. Indeed, while the CSRD only requires corporates to disclose on their material sustainability risks andimpacts, the CSDDD shall require corporates to act on these risks and impacts by implementing adequate mitigation measures anddue diligence. This would be a major step forward in sustainable finance policy and aside from a few isolate cases (e.g France’s Loi
sur le devoir de vigilance), a world’s first, with the potential for the EU to export its environmental and social norms.
In 2023, the Commission adopted a proposal for an ESG Ratings Regulation95, aiming as its name suggests, to regulate ESG ratings
agencies and ESG service providers. Notably, these will have to disclose on the methodologies used to rate entities, explaining what
is rated (risks, impacts or both) and how. Credit ratings are not in the scope of the ESG Ratings Regulation. However, the Commission

89
90
91
92
93
94
95

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0097
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0390
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32023H1425
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02022R1288-20230220
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R1253&from=EN
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022PC0071
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52023PC0314

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mandated the European Securities and Markets Authorities (ESMA) to provide its advice by end 2024 on whether and how credit
ratings could incorporate sustainability factors.
Sustainable Finance policy also aims at making the financial sector more resilient to sustainability risks. For instance, as of 2023,
banks are going to start publishing sustainability disclosures, including on their exposure to climate risks, any mitigating actions,and the degree to which their assets are aligned with the green Taxonomy. Furthermore, the proposed changes to the Capital
Requirements Regulation shall task the European Banking Authority to consider whether ESG elements need to be factored in when
computing bank capital requirements (e.g. the introduction of a green supporting factor or a brown penalizing factor). Finally,
the European Commission asked in 2023 European supervisory authorities to analyze the resilience of the European financial
sector against the EU’s climate targets for 2030.

12. Commission's assessment of long-term strategies
Stable long-term strategies are crucial to help achieve the economic transformation needed and broader sustainable
development goals, as well as move towards the long-term climate goals we committed to globally in the Paris Agreement andwithin the EU with the Climate Law to reach net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Long-term strategies improve
the knowledge of the opportunities for transforming our economy, allow the national discussions to mature, build trust within oursociety and send clear signals to guide investors while raising awareness and ownership of the transformation needed.
The Governance Regulation96 sets out a process for the Member States to prepare, by 1 January 2020, their first long-term
strategies with a perspective of at least 30 years, and new strategies by 1 January 2029 and every 10 years thereafter. Where
necessary, Member States should update those strategies every five years.
In September 2022, in view of the substantial delay of Bulgaria, Ireland, Poland and Romania in notifying their long-term
strategies, the Commission opened formal infringement proceedings and sent letters of formal notice to these countries97. The casehas been closed for Bulgaria, which on 27 October 2022 submitted its strategy, but the other three infringement proceedings are
ongoing. The Commission will consider the next steps according to further developments. Based on the replies to the Commission’s
letters, the remaining strategies are expected to be delivered in the course of 2023, or early 2024, at latest.
Since October 2021, one additional Member States, Bulgaria, has submitted its long-term strategy to the Commission. The strategy,
presents alternative scenarios, including a pathway to approach climate neutrality by 2050, without defining a specific goal.
Overall, by October 2023, 24 Member States98 have submitted their long-term strategies required by the Governance Regulation.
Of these, 14 Member States99 clearly expressed their aim to achieve climate neutrality or carbon neutrality100 by 2050 or before.101
Others aim to be largely climate neutral102 or to achieve reductions of 80-95% by 2050. Only nine Member States, however, havereported legally binding goals or targets.103 Two third of the strategies have been supported by quantitative projections basedon different modelling scenarios. The associated emissions reductions may be consistent with the delivery of the specified goals,
although this is not clearly stated in all cases. Likewise, where a target has been set, it is not always clear if it is legally binding104.
The national long-term strategies also provide useful information at sectoral level, which allow strengths and remaining challenges
to be identified and recognised, although coverage varies significantly across Member States or lack details on the precise scope,
notably the expected role of land use and removals (see Table 16). In this respect, it is worth mentioning that the current land use
and forestry EU regulation provides that Member State may use the managed forest land flexibility only if their long-term strategy
has included ongoing or planned specific measures to ensure the conservation or enhancement of forest sinks and reservoirs105.

96 Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999.
97 On 22 September 2022, the Commission sent letters of formal notice to Bulgaria (INFR(2022)2086), Ireland (INFR(2022)2088), Poland (INFR(2022)2089) and Romania (INFR(2022)2090) for
failing to notify their national long-term strategies under Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action.
98 BE, BG, CZ, DK, DE, EE, EL, ES, FR, HR, IT, CY LV, LT, LU, HU, MT, NL, AT, PT, SI, SK, FI, SE. LT and HU submitted an update of their initial strategies in July and September 2021, respectively.
99 AT, DK, ES, FI, FR, HU, IT, LT, LV, LU, PT, SE, SI, SK
100 While neutrality means by definition that residual emissions are compensated by removals, not all Member States provided the respective share of emission reductions and removals andthe level of ambition for actual reductions varies.
101 FI by 2035 and SE by 2045
102 DE - it should be noted, however, that the German long-term strategy, as submitted to the Commission in January 2020, was prepared in 2016. According to the Climate Change Act, as
amended in July 2021, Germany now aims at achieving climate neutrality by 2045.
103 DK, EE, FR, HU, LU, MT, NL, ES, SE. Beside the information provided in the national long-term strategies, also Germany and Ireland have enshrined climate targets in legislation.
104 Another limitation in the submitted national strategies concerns the scope of GHG covered by modelling results, scenarios and targets. The strategies submitted by 15 Member States (AT,BG, HR, EE, FI, FR, DE, HU, IT, LT, LU, MT, NL, ES, and SE) cover CO₂, CH₄, N₂O and F-gases. For the remaining Member States, the coverage of gases was not always clear.
105 Article 13.2.(a) and 8.1 of the Regulation (EU) 2018/841.

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Table 16: Summary of the national long-term strategies’ main features submitted by the EU Member States

The inclusion of the recommended contents106 also varies across Member States, with gaps in needs for research, development
and innovation, estimated long-term investments, CO₂ intensity of GDP and, to a lesser extent, on the expected contributions ofrenewable energy, energy efficiency, and agriculture-specific emission reductions (see Table 17 for more details). As for their legal
status, less than half of the long-term objectives have been enshrined into national law, according to the information submitted
to the Commission107.
Whereas most of the national strategies received to date reflect the ambition to be climate neutral by 2050, they do not yet allow
to conclude that the long-term strategies are adequate for the collective achievement of the objectives and targets of the Energy
Union. A rough estimate based on the submitted national long-term strategies and, in case of missing data, on other available
information108, points to a reduction of GHG emissions of around 85% by 2050 for the EU as a whole. This means that roughly 700
million tonnes of CO₂ equivalents still need to be cut or absorbed to achieve climate neutrality by 2050109. This amount appears
to be above the CO₂ absorption capacity resulting from the different model-based analyses underpinning EU climate initiatives110.
Providing more detailed information on any remaining collective gap would have required a more complete and detailed set ofstrategies.
Member States are therefore encouraged to consider updating and, where needed, to increase both the ambition and the quality of
their national long-term strategies. This underlines the importance to continue developing policies to increase and meet ambition
over time.

106 See Annex IV of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999.
107 For a more detailed assessment of the long-term strategies submitted by Member States, please refer to the DG CLIMA dedicated website: https://ec.europa.eu/info/energy-climate-change-environment/implementation-eu-countries/energy-and-climate-governance-and-reporting/national-long-term-strategies_en
108 These estimates use, where possible, information from the national long-term strategies with a specific order: first the national targets or, when unavailable or unclear, scenario results (i.e.
in case of range of values, the most ambitious scenario is considered). In case of national binding targets adopted after the submission of the strategy, updated values have been used (e.g. in
the case of Germany). Where data could not be retrieved from their long-term strategies, we used information Member States submitted to the Commission under other reporting exercise (i.e.
integrated National Energy and Climate Plans, 2021 GHG projections). Only when national information were not available, we used, as a last resort, data from the 2020 Reference Scenario EU
Reference Scenario 2020 (europa.eu). Overall, three quarter of the 2020 EU GHG emissions are covered by national sourced information. Unfortunately, the aggregated data and analyses are lessmeaningful when it comes to CO₂ removals and energy data, where lack of data in the national long-term strategies are significant.
109 This does not include the international maritime and international aviation under the EU law.
110 See, for example, Section 4.7.2 of the In depth Analysis in support of the Commission Communication “A Clean Planet for all”, or Figure 11 of SWD(2016)249. Moreover, these estimates do
not include emissions from international maritime and aviation, which could partly be covered by the EU climate neutrality objective.

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Table 17: Overview of the national long-term strategies submitted by the EU Member States

Bulgaria(27/10/2022)

Croatia(24/06/2021)

Cyprus(14/09/2022)

Czechia(20/12/2019)

Climateneutrality(-74%, -84%)

Different
regional
goals(-85%, 87%)
(excluding ETS
sector)Unspecified

Unspecified

Unspecified

Unspecified

Denmark

Climateneutrality

Estoniaquantitative GHG
emission
reduction
target(20/12/2019)(30/12/2019)

Finland

Carbonneutrality by
2035

FranceCarbonneutrality

Germany

Largely
climateneutral(22/04/2020)(12/05/2020)(02/01/2020)(-78%, 84%)(-57%, -73%)(-28%, 100%)

-80%

n.a.

-80%

(-87.5%, -90%)-83%(-80%, -95%)

yes

?

yes

yes

yes

?

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

no

yes

no

yes

no

no

no

no

incl. International maritime and aviation

Belgium(02/03/2020)(% change
compared to1990)

including LULUCF

Austria(27/12/2019)

Overall
LTS goalby 2050all gases emissions

Country(date ofsubmission)

Projected
GHG
emission
reductions
by 2050

yes

no

no

?

?

?

no

no

?

No

No

Share ofrenewableenergy ingross final
energyconsumption by
2050(76%, 93%)n.a.

(61%, 70%)

(53.2%,
65.6%)(51%, 95%)

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

(64%, 80%)

n.a.

n.a.

Projected
final
energyconsumption by2050(% change
compared
to 2005)

Highlights frominvestment needs,
enabling policies
and socio-economic impact

Key reporting gaps(-52%,-38%)

positive impact on GDP
and jobs
natural and technicalsinks needed to reachcarbon neutrality

CO₂ intensity of GDP
investment needssocio-economic impact

n.a.

investment needsin buildings climatechange impact on agriculture address energy
poverty

information at national level
GHG and CO₂ intensity of GDP
emission reductions for ETS and
LULUCF(79, 87 TWh)positive impact on jobs
and wellbeing’s
investment need <15bn
up to 2050
technical sinks to reachcarbon neutrality

GHG and CO₂ intensity of GDP
emission
reductions by sub-sector
socio-economic impact(-25%, -37%)

overall impact on GDP
uncertainaround 40'000 new
green jobs
additional investment
above 1.5% of GDP

reductions and removals in
LULUCFsocio-economic impact
emission reductions industrial
sectors(1996, 1875
Ktoe)

cost of the transition
modest to low
gradual closure ofthermal power plants
natural and tech. sinks
to reach neutrality

GHG and CO₂ intensity of GDP
emission reduction in buildingssocio-economic impact

n.a.

investment peak withexpansion of CCS
strengthen energy
taxation
Increase share of
nuclear in energy mix

GHG and CO₂ intensity of GDP
emission reductions by sector
socio-economic impact

n.a.

targets enshrined in law
doubling organic
farming
increase spending ingreen research

public consultation
emission reductions power &buildings
socio-economic impact

n.a.

targets enshrined in law
large investment
needed in RES
minor impact on GDP
and jobs

CO₂ intensity of GDP
emission reductions in buildings
RES, FEC/PEC targets(-16%, -5%)slightly positive impact
on GDP and jobs
employment sensitive
to arable lands
annual investment ̴ 3%
of GDP

CO₂ intensity of GDP
emission reductions in buildings
strategies for related R&D&I

n.a.

targets enshrined in law
positive impact on GDP
annual investment
̴ 3.5% of GDP

GHG and CO₂ intensity of GDP
reductions and removals in
LULUCF
share of renewable energy in
2050

n.a.

document outdated
compared to recent
review of the country's target aimed
at reaching climate
neutrality by 2045

GHG and CO₂ intensity of GDP
emission reductions by sector
investment & socio-economic
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Greece(08/01/2020)

Unspecified(-83%, -95%)

?

?

?

increase use of heatpumps (buildings) andbiofuel (transport)
investment needs €0.1
to €1.1 bn per year

GHG and CO₂ intensity of GDP
emission reductions agriculture& wastesocio-economic impact

positive impact on GDP
and jobs
annual investment
̴ 4.8% of GDP
avoided damage andbenefits > costs

reductions and removals in
LULUCFemission reductions in buildingsslightly negative impact
on GDP boost sustainable finance focus onadaptation strategies

emission reductions in waste
Investment needs socio-economic
impactpositive impact on GDP
annual investment
̴ 1.4% of GDP creation of
new (green) jobs

CO₂ intensity of GDP
emission reductions in buildings
adaptation policies and measures

final &
primaryenergyintensity 2.4
times lower
than 2017

positive impact on GDP
and jobs 4% of GDP
invested in R&D&I by
2040 focus on adaptation strategies

public consultation
GHG and CO₂ intensity of GDP
emission reductions by sectorn.a.

support sustainablefinanceensure a just transition for citizens andenterprises

emission reductions in 2050 for
all sectors
reductions and removals in
LULUCFestimated investment needs

n.a.

increased job
opportunities
improved air quality
and healthinvestment in renewables > €2bn to 2050

CO₂ intensity of GDP
LULUCF, RES, FEC/PEC targets

n.a.

net-zero requires large
scale CO₂ captureby 2030, limited impact
on GDP and jobs
increase income
disparities

reductions and removals in
LULUCFemission reductions in all sectors
by 2050
investment needs(-36%, -35%)

positive impact on GDP
and jobs
annual investment
̴ 1.2% of GDP
better air quality

GHG and CO₂ intensity of GDP
strategies related to R&D&I
adaptation policies and measuresn.a.

positive impact on GDP
negative impact on jobs
& wagesannual investment
̴ 4.2% of GDP

GHG and CO₂ intensity of GDP
emission reductions in buildings
LULUCF, RES, FEC/PEC targets

at least-33%

positive impact on GDP
and jobs
additional investment
from €66 to €72 bn
focus on a climate
resilient society

97%

-44%

positive impact on GDP
and jobs
negative impact on jobs
& wagesannual investment ̴ 1%
of GDP

CO₂ intensity of GDP
emission reductions agriculture& wasteemission reductions for industrial
sectorsn.a.

final energy
intensity
50% lower
than 2005

limited impact on GDP
and jobs
better air quality
focus on adaptation
strategies

GHG and CO₂ intensity of GDP
share of renewable energy
investment & socio-economic
impact(82%, 114%)

n.a.

Hungary

Climateneutrality

-100%

yes

yes

no

close to 90%(-30%,-37.4%)

Italy

Climateneutrality(-84%, -87%)

yes

no

no

(85%, 90%)

-49%

LatviaClimateneutrality-85% (by 2040)

Lithuania

Climateneutrality-100% (20%reduction from
LULUCF & CCS)

Luxembourg

Climateneutrality-100%(including
LULUCF)(21/09/2021)(11/02/2021)(27/12/2019)(23/07/2021)(04/11/2021)

Malta

Unspecified

Netherlands

Quantitative
GHG
emission
reduction
targetPortugal

Carbonneutrality

Slovakia

Climateneutrality(21/10/2021)(18/12/2019)(15/01/2020)(11/03/2020)

Slovenia(19/07/2021)

Climateneutrality(11/12/2020)

Climateneutrality

SwedenClimateneutrality

Spain(19/12/2019)by 2045 andnegative emissions thereafter(compared to
2017)

-37%

-82%

-95%

(-85%, -90%)-80%(-80%, -90%)-90%-85% (by 2045)

?

yes

yes

yes

yes

?

?

?

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

no

yes

no

no

no

no

no

?

yes

no

no

no

?

?

no

yes

no

n.a.

90%

100%

n.a.

n.a.

(86%, 88%)n.a.

at least
60%(primaryenergyconsumption)

GHG and CO₂ intensity of GDP
emission reductions industrial
sectors

Notes: (1) An "unspecified" goal refers to cases where the goal was not expressed in clear terms (e.g. “to approach”, “to move towards”, etc.). (2) In
the case of Germany, the long-term strategy, as submitted to the Commission in January 2020, reflects the goal of the Climate Action Plan 2050
adopted in November 2016. According to the Climate Change Act, as amended in July 2021, Germany now aims at achieving climate neutrality by
2045. (3) In April 2021, Denmark submitted an update of its LTS under Art. 18(1)(a) and Annex VI(b) of the Governance Regulation, to reflect theC l i m a t e

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Danish Climate Act adopted in June 2020, which sets a near-term target of reducing Denmark's total greenhouse gas emissions by 70% by 2030
compared to the 1990 level and sets a long-term target of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest. (4) In July 2023, with the entry into
force of the Climate Act, Netherlands has a legally binding target to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. (5) Projected GHG emission reductions are
all expressed as percentage change compared to 1990 level (except for BE, PT and SI where reduction rates refer to 2005 GHG emission levels, MT
to 2020 level and FR to 2015 level), as a target or as the extreme values of the projected range. In the case of Denmark, projections in the LTS referto a scenario with existing measures, not in line with the goal, therefore they have not been reported in the table. (6) "?" means that the LTS does
not provide enough or clear information on the exact scope of projected GHG emission reductions. In the case of Spain, only international maritime
emissions were included in the projections. (7) Where feasible, final energy consumption has been expressed as percentage change compared to2005 consumption level. (8) Annual investment needs are generally considered additional to a business as usual (BAU) or with existing measures(WEM) scenarios for the period 2020-2050. (8) Key reporting gaps are meant to provide only a general view of the completeness of the LTS and do
not distinguish between mandatory and non-mandatory elements.

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Commission Staff Working Document (SWD)
Introduction
In February 2021 the European Commission adopted a new EU Strategy on the Adaptation to Climate Change1. The need
to update the previous strategy, which dated to 2013, was apparent: the physical impacts of the climate crisis were intensifying and the need for transformative action to reduce vulnerabilities to those impacts was evident.
The strategy sets out an ambitious path across an exceptionally broad spectrum of policy areas. It is conceived as a decadal
document, outlining clear principles for enhancing resilience to the impacts of climate change and for managing theassociated risks. The path signposted by the strategy is relevant to the EU level and beyond; it notes that adaptation is an
all-of-government, all-of-society effort. Realising the 2050 vision of a climate-resilient EU, fully adapted to the unavoidable
impacts of climate change, requires bold, energetic and joined-up action on adaptation in tandem with reducing global
emissions at a steep pace in compliance with the Paris agreement.
At the EU level, the strategy contains 49 actions to which the Commission has committed, spread across four high-levelobjectives: smarter, more systemic, faster and international adaptation to climate change. The actions were designed
to cover large ground in terms of policies and often involve the sequencing of steps. Some actions were to be completed in
the short term, while others require work over a longer horizon. A rich ecosystem of measures fills this evolving space, andthe current report summarises the most important measures that have been undertaken or are in progress at the EU level.
Increasing resilience to the impacts of the climate crisis requires coordination beyond the ordinary within public administrations, and with/across stakeholders at other societal levels. This is reflected in the Commission’s 2023 update of theguidelines on Member State adaptation strategies and plans, and it is a principle that the Commission has applied as apublic administration itself to the preparation and implementation of the adaptation strategy to date. That process has
also began to improve adaptive capacity at the EU level, with progress in terms of awareness and skills relating to adaptation across departments and the capacity of the Commission to adjust to the changes and uncertainties in the climate.
The current report does not aim to provide an absolute measure of how resilient the EU is to climate impacts. Improving theability to measure adaptation outcomes is work in progress. There is also a deeper layer to the question of what “having
successfully adapted” would mean, which links to societal values that may themselves be shifting. In the case of adaptation
to climate change, these are values that shape understandings of what is the best life that is possible to preserve, restore
or create, against the canvas of dramatic changes that we are driving in the physical conditions of life in our societies.
This report targets a more straightforward task: providing a picture of progress that is underway on improving knowledge
and data; supporting policy development and climate risk management at all levels; and accelerating action to anticipate1

COM(2021) 82 final©Getty Images | Andriy Onufriyenko

Report on the implementationof the EU strategy on
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Contents
Objective 1: Smarter adaptation: Improving knowledge
and managing uncertainty................................................................ 108-110
Pushing the frontiers of knowledge on adaptation............................................................. 108
More and better climate-related risk and losses data........................................................ 109
Making Climate-ADAPT the authoritative European platform for adaptation knowledge....... 110

Objective 2: More systemic adaptation: Support policy
development at all levels and sectors.. .................................. 111-118
Improving adaptation strategies and plans. . ...................................................................... 111
Fostering local, individual, and just resilience.................................................................... 114
Integrating climate resilience in macro-fiscal policy........................................................... 116
Promoting nature-based solutions for adaptation.............................................................. 117

Objective 3: Faster adaptation: Speeding up adaptation
across the board.. ...................................................................................... 119-128
Accelerating the rollout of adaptation solutions. . ............................................................... 119
Reducing climate-related risk........................................................................................... 122
Closing the climate protection gap. . .................................................................................. 124
Ensuring the availability and sustainability of freshwater.................................................. 126

Objective 4: Stepping up international action forclimate resilience.. .................................................................................... 129-133
Increasing support for international climate resilience and preparedness............................ 129
Scaling up international finance to build climate resilience. . ............................................... 130
Strengthen global engagement and exchanges on adaptation. . .......................................... 132

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Objective 1: Smarter adaptation: Improving knowledge and managing uncertainty
Under the banner of ‘smarter adaptation’, the 2021 EU Adaptation Strategy champions the need for robust data and risk assessments to inform all sectors of society on the current and future impacts of climate change. The objective acknowledges andtargets knowledge gaps and uncertainties that persist in our understanding the impacts of climate change on natural and humansystems, and it aims to push these frontiers including through acquiring more and better climate-related data. It also recognises
the increasing demand from society for user-friendly tools that condense complex climate information into actionable knowledge.
Pushing the frontiers of knowledge on adaptation

Action 1: Improve the state of the art on adaptation modelling, risk assessment and management tools –towards “asset-level modelling”
The Commission commissioned a study on climate adaptation modelling, whose main reports were published at the timeof the adoption of the EU Adaptation Strategy1.
The EU’s key funding programme for research and innovation is Horizon Europe. Under its Framework Programme two
topics were published in first half of 2022 calling for projects to improve the state of the art on adaptation modelling andrisk assessment, and one on supporting management tools:• ‘Towards asset level modelling of climate risks and adaptation’;• ‘Development of climate change risk assessments in European regions and communities based on a transparent andharmonised Climate Risk Assessment approach’ and• ‘Better prepared regional and local authorities to adapt to climate change’
Other relevant topics have been published in the Horizon Europe Working Programme 2023-2024, including adaptation
modelling with improved resolution.
The Commission supports the Territorial Risk Assessment of Climate in Europe (TRACE) project undertaken by the Joint
Research Centre, which aims at delivering data, indicators, and information on regional impacts of climate change on awide range of sectors. Results are foreseen in 2024.
Activities are also supported on adaptation modelling for Destination Earth (see under action 2), including by the EEA.
1 European Commission, Directorate-General for Climate Action, Jeuken, A., Bosello, F., Morales Irato, D., et al., Study on adaptation modelling : report on use cases and rapid analysis, Publications Office, 2021, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2834/152735

Action 2: Help to close knowledge gaps on climate impacts and resilience, including on oceans, through Horizon
Europe, Digital Europe, Copernicus, and EMODnet.
The Commission published in 2022 a call for projects on five topics under the Horizon Europe Framework Programme tohelp close knowledge gaps on climate impacts and resilience, including on oceans. In addition to the three mentioned inaction 1, two calls also support Danube river basin lighthouse projects: ‘Restoration of fresh and transitional water ecosystems’ and ‘Protection and restoration of wetlands, flood plains, coastal wetlands and salt marshes and their biodiversity’.
In the Horizon Europe work programme 2023-2024, adopted in November 2022, many calls for projects on climate adaptation and resilience were published, mainly under Pillar II ‘Global Challenges and European Industrial Competitiveness’,
with focus on cluster 5 ‘Climate, Energy and Mobility’ and cluster 6 ‘Food, Bioeconomy, Natural Resources, Agriculture andEnvironment’. In cluster 1 “Health”, several calls are defined in the area of environment and health, with a strong focus
on climate change induced health impacts and how to prevent them. The Horizon Europe Missions (see Action 23), andPartnerships will catalyse action and mobilise research and innovation to address knowledge gaps and roll out innovative...

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solutions for increased climate resilience.
As an example, to reduce the impacts of extreme droughts, research, and innovation on improving water efficiency andon alternative water resources, including supply technologies is of importance. A call on circular economy water related
projects1 was published in December 2022.
In January 2023 the Commission published under the Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change Horizon Europe Work
Programme 2023 three climate adaptation topics calling on testing and demonstrating transformative solutions on a)increasing climate resilience of the agriculture and/or forestry sector, b) to protect critical infrastructure from climatechange, mainstreaming Nature-based Solutions (NbS), and c) to build resilience towards health risks caused by the effectof climate change2.
In addition, several joint calls with other Horizon EU Missions were presented, among others on ‘Integrated planning for
urban greening and re-naturing for urban regeneration, resilience and climate neutrality’, ‘Demonstrate at regional scale
an integrated approach to increasing landscape water retention capacity’, ‘Demonstration of climate mitigation and resilience solutions in cities’ and ‘Urban greening and re-naturing for urban regeneration, resilience and climate neutrality’ .
Several ongoing Horizon 2020 projects contribute to closing knowledge gaps with regard to alternative water resources,
wetland restoration, coastal resilience and new monitoring technologies and other nature-based solutions.
The Commission is advancing the use of digital tools for adaptation through the Digital Europe Programme and Destination
Earth initiatives, including the creation of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enabled local digital twins3.
The Commission is supporting the creation of a European smart communities’ dataspace, as part of the European Strategy
for Data, with 10-12 validation pilots being selected.
Data and knowledge generation is supported through the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions. All grant agreements for
projects selected under the 2021 calls have been signed.
1
2
3

HORIZON-CL6-2023-CircBio-01-3
HORIZON-MISS-2023-CLIMA-01
Destination Earth, see https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/destination-earth

More and better climate-related risk and losses data

Action 3: Promote and support the use of [the] Risk Data Hub to harmonise the recording and collection ofcomprehensive and granular climate-related risk and losses data, and promote national level public-private
partnerships to collect and share such data.
The Commission has developed the Risk Data Hub1, a web-based platform providing at an EU-wide harmonised approachfor multi-hazard risk assessment as well as for recording and managing disaster loss data. The Risk Data Hub has established partnerships with EU agencies (EIOPA, EEA) and institutions (ECB), Member State authorities, and projects under theMission of Adaptation to Climate Change, and publishes regular dashboards on hazards, vulnerability and risk at regional
level. The Commission’s Disaster Risk Management Knowledge Centre2 is a well-recognized platform for promoting further
public and private participation, as well as internal coordinating within the Commission on risk data, including throughits annual seminars.
A dashboard on economic losses and fatalities from weather- and climate-related events3 has been published on the
Climate-ADAPT portal.

1
2
3

Risk Data Hub, see https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/risk-data-hub#/Disaster Risk Management Knowledge Centre, see https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/knowledge/economic-losses/economic-losses-on-weather/...

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The Commission adopted the Data Act4 in 2022 that, amongst other subjects, mandates for allowing public sector bodies
access and use of data held by the private sector that is necessary for exceptional circumstances, particularly in the caseof a public emergency, such as floods and wildfires, or to implement a legal mandate if data are not otherwise available.
The Data Governance Act 5, also published in 2022, is a cross-sectoral instrument that aims to make more data available
by regulating the reuse of publicly/held, protected data. It promotes national level public-private partnerships to collectdata and share such data and will apply as of 24 September 2023.
4
5COM(2022) 68 final
Regulation (EU) 2022/868

Action 4: extend the scope of public access to environmental information in the INSPIRE Directive to include
climate-related risk and losses data
The Commission has implemented public access to climate data through the Implementing Regulation on High-Value
Datasets1 in 2022 under the Open Data Directive. This IR lays down a list of specific high-value datasets and the arrangements for their publication and re-use. Climate data was brought into scope in the annex under the “Earth Observationand Environment” and “Meteorological” data categories. Furthermore, and more specifically on climate-related risk andlosses data, the Commission will explore the possibility to extend the scope of the INSPIRE Directive in the upcoming
impact assessment of the Directive as part of the Green Data for All initiative.
1

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/138

Action 5: explore with EIOPA and industry the best ways to improve the collection of uniform and comprehensive insured loss data and will empower EIOPA as needed.
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) conducted a data collection on the prudential treatmentof climate-related adaptation measures in non-life insurance. In 2023 the EIOPA is working on the development of ways
to improve the collection of uniform and comprehensive insured loss data; finalisation is planned for 2024.

Making Climate-ADAPT the authoritative European platform for adaptation knowledge

Action 6: Establish a European climate and health observatory under Climate-ADAPT.
The Commission launched, together with the EEA, the European Climate and Health Observatory1 in March 2021, and has
been expanding it ever since on content and on partners, collating and developing knowledge on health threats causedby climate change. The main outputs of the observatory in 2022 included an EEA report on ‘Climate change as a threat
to health and well-being in Europe: focus on heat and infectious diseases’2, new map viewers, thematic evidence pages,
indicators, and 11 case studies on response in practice. Furthermore, the partnership agreed on the strategic 2030 objectives for the observatory. It is planned to develop further insights with regard to heat stress, climate-sensitive infectious
diseases and the topic water, climate change and health.

12European Climate and Health Observatory, see https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/observatory/
EEA Report No 7/2022

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Action 7: Update and expand Climate-ADAPT as source of knowledge on climate impacts and adaptation,
including by federating various sources of information, and as monitoring and reporting mechanism
The European Climate Adaptation Platform Climate-ADAPT1 , a collaboration between the European Commission and the
EEA to build and share the European knowledge base on adaptation,, has been updated and expanded by – among others regular integration of EU-funded projects, and regular updates of policy information. This includes new pages on businessand industry, cultural heritage, Information and Communication Technology, mountain areas, land use planning, and tourism
as well as on areas of key EU interest such as nature-based solutions, forestry, and just resilience. Information on national
adaptation policies, based on the governmental reporting2, is regularly published in the Climate-ADAPT country profiles.
Access to Climate-ADAPT is facilitated by the installation of an electronic-translation function into five additional languages(French, German, Italian, Spanish and Polish) in a pilot. If testing is successful, further languages will be added. The EEA
has presented Climate-ADAPT knowledge, tools, and guidance to a broad audience of stakeholders at 12 national andtransnational level events as well as via two regular Climate-ADAPT webinars per year and a quarterly newsletter.
A European Climate Data Explorer has been developed and regularly updated by EEA and the Copernicus Climate Change
Service3 with the main purpose of providing easy access to quality assured information on climate hazards and impacts.
A clear link to the Disaster Risk Management Knowledge Centre has been established, including the Risk Data Hub. A
webpage acting as an entry point to urban and local-level knowledge and a dashboard on economic losses from weather
and climate related events in Europe have also been added. Moreover, the Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change Portal4
was launched in 2023, accessible via Climate-ADAPT, which hosts a regional adaptation support tool and the adaptation
dashboard. It gives access to the Community of Practice managed by the Mission Implementation Platform team.
12
3
4

https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu
Regulation (EU) 2021/1119
implemented by the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF)
EU Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change Portal, see https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/mission

Objective 2: More systemic adaptation: Support policy development at all levels andsectors
The objective of ‘more systemic adaptation’ acknowledges that climate change impacts all societal levels and sectors and reflects
the need for a correspondingly systemic response. This objective emphasises mainstreaming climate resilience considerations
across all policy fields, going beyond the sectors traditionally receiving the most attention in adaptation such as agriculture andinfrastructure. Encompassing 4 fields and 15 actions, it highlights three cross-cutting priorities: integrating climate adaptation
into macro-fiscal policy, fostering nature-based solutions, and bolstering local adaptation action.
Improving adaptation strategies and plans

Action 8: Upgrade adaptation monitoring, reporting and evaluation by using a harmonised framework ofstandards and indicators.
The EEA published a report on advancing towards climate resilience in Europe1, providing an overview of how all EU Member
States and Türkiye were adapting to climate change at that time and were reporting on their adaptation actions in 2021.
The EEA has, in addition to the existing Adaptation Support Tool and the Urban Adaptation Support Tool to assist the policy
cycle on adaptation, also developed a Regional Adaptation Support Tool.
The Commission developed forward-looking resilience dashboards that assess the relative strengths and weaknesses ofcountries and includes adaptation. In the field of disaster risk reduction and Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UPCM), the1

EEA Report No 11/2022...

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Commission received disaster risk management reports from the MS. Under the UCPM, EU MS, participating states andthird countries are offered a peer review opportunity to assess their preparedness for natural and human-made disasters.
In 2023, a targeted Wildfire peer review framework was published, to respond to the increasing trend of wildfires as aclimate related hazard. The five EU disaster resilience goals1 are in the process of implementation following their adoption
at the beginning of 2023. The first three goals (anticipate, prepare and alert) are directly relevant for climate adaptation
policy (see also action 29).
1

OJ C56, 15.2.2023, p.1. COM(2023) 61 final of 8.2.2023

Action 9: Stimulate cooperation regionally and across borders and enhance the guidelines on national adaptation strategies in cooperation with the Member States.
The Commission has published updated and enhanced Guidelines on Member State adaptation strategies and plans,
developed in cooperation with Member States, in 2023.
To foster exchange of best practices and solutions on climate adaptation for the Outermost Regions and their neighbouring
countries, the Commission organised nine workshops concerning the Caribbean-Amazonia Basin, the Southwest Indian
Ocean basin, and the Macaronesia basin, between September 2022 and June 2023. A compendium will be produced in
2023 presenting the results, best practices and solutions that can be reproduced in each basin where the Outermost
Regions are located, and beyond.
The Commission has published in 2022 a toolbox monitoring, evaluation and revision of Maritime Spatial Planning (MSP)1
to provide guidance for Member States in the revision of their MSP-plans.
In marine regions, multiple initiatives aim to safeguard marine ecosystems and habitats against climate change threats.
These include the EU Biodiversity Strategy2, the Action Plan “Protecting and restoring marine ecosystems for sustainable
and resilient fisheries”3 and a proposal for a Nature Restoration Law. Moreover, under the Marine Strategy Framework
Directive 4, measures are being implemented to minimise adverse climate impacts on coastal and offshore seabed habitats
as part of EU MS’ marine strategies.
1 European Commission, European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency, Toolbox for monitoring, evaluation and revision of MSP : final report, Publications
Office of the European Union, 2022, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2926/974797
2 COM(2020) 380 final
3 COM(2023) 102 final
4 Directive 2008/56/EC

Action 10: Update its ‘Better regulation’ guidelines and toolbox to better reflect the principles of climaterisk management policy coherence.
The Commission has revised its ‘Better Regulation’ guidelines1 and toolbox 2 in compliance with the Climate Law, which
obliges the consideration of adaptation progress in impact assessments. Climate impacts have so far been considered
in consistency checks in policy areas of transport, energy, water management, state aid, plant and forest reproductive
material, neighbourhood policy and employment since the adoption of the relevant tool in 2021. In agriculture, the only
relevant initiative since the adoption of the 2021 update of the better regulation toolbox is the revision of EU marketing
standards. The link to climate impacts is not strong but valorising fruits with visual defaults/small size/blemished adds to
the resilience of the sector. The Better Regulation toolbox includes another element related to risk management, which
also deals with climate risks.
1
2

SWD(2021) 305 final‘Better regulation’ toolbox 2021, see https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-02/br_toolbox-nov_2021_en.pdf

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Action 11: Provide ex-ante project assessment tools to better identify co-benefits and positive impacts on
the economy of adaptation and prevention projects.
Funded by the European Commission, a 2021 World Bank study on the Economics of Disaster Prevention and Preparedness
in Europe1, focuses on four key components: support to building physical resilience, supporting climate change adaptation,
support to promoting financial resilience, and support to enabling institutional resilience. A second report will follow in
2024, addressing among other things the cost of adaptation.
1 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank, Economics for Disaster Prevention and Preparedness. Investment in Disaster Risk Management in Europe
Makes Economic Sense Summary Report, 2021, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/european-disaster-risk-management/economics-disaster-prevention-and-preparedness_en

Action 12: Improve EU strategies and plans with regard to adaptation to climate change
The Commission’s proposal for an EU Nature Restoration Law1, adopted in June 2022 and in trilogue at the time of the
publication of this report, has dedicated provisions on climate adaptation requirements. The importance of healthy
ecosystems and their services for climate adaptation – including water absorption and retention, soil retention, cooling,etc. – is highlighted in the impact assessment of this proposal. The Nature Restoration Law’s targets for urban, coastal
wetlands and riverine habitats contribute to disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation, with references tocomplementarity with Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (LULUCF).
The revised EU Pollinator Strategy2 targets the impact of climate change on pollinator decline. By 2030, it aims to identify
the most vulnerable zones for pollinators due to climate change and implement targeted mitigation measures. Member
States are encouraged to consider the impact of climate change on pollinators and on their habitats in their national
climate adaptation strategies.
The new EU Forest Strategy for 20303 emphasises the need for adaptation with specific goals and measures. The roadmap
for planting at least 3 billion additional trees in the EU by 2030 also stresses the importance of making forests moreclimate resilient and of using tree species and provenances which are suitable to future climatic conditions.
Climate change adaptation is also considered in the proposal for a list of surface water and groundwater pollutants, theRevision of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive (see action 39) and the Revision of the Industrial Emission Directive.
In June 2023, the Commission, and the European External Action Service (EEAS) adopted a Joint Communication on a new
outlook on the climate change and security nexus, outlining how the EU plans to tackle the increasing impact of climatechange and environmental degradation on peace, security, and defence. It establishes the EU framework to address thesechallenges, through evidence-based analysis and foresight climate informed planning, decision-making and implementation, to operationalising the nexus in EU external action from climate action and adaptation to and mitigation action toconflict prevention, crisis management and humanitarian action, reinforcing sustainable and climate-resilient security
and defence capabilities and infrastructure and strengthening international cooperation. The Commission, in collaboration with the European Defence Agency (EDA), has analyzed the impact of climate change on EU defence capacities anddefence-related critical energy infrastructure. In collaboration with EEAS and EDA, the Commission has also supported
EU Member States in the development of national strategies to prepare the armed forces for climate change, as called
for in the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence.
The Communication on Strategic Guidelines for a more sustainable and competitive EU Aquaculture for the period 20212030, adopted by the Commission in 2021, outlines the development of sectoral climate adaptation strategies and plans
for aquaculture. Several studies on climate change impacts on fisheries and the post-harvest sector have informed thedevelopment of the Fisheries and Oceans package, adopted in February 2023.

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Adaptation and resilience also play a role in the ‘Sustainable Carbon Cycles’ strategy4 and in the proposal for Regulation
on Carbon Removals Certification, published in December 2022. Adoption by co-legislators is expected in the first quarterof 2024.
Most National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) adopted by the Member States in 2019 refer to national adaptation strategies and plans but provide little detail how they contribute specifically to the success of the Plans. In its 2022 guidance
to Member States on the update of their NECPs, due in June 2023, the Commission encouraged a better considerationof adaptation needs in support of the achievement of the Energy Union objectives in the dimensions of decarbonisation,energy efficiency, energy security and internal energy market.
Result indicator R.12 of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) indicates that, taking together all CAP Strategic Plans of EU
member states, 25% of the EU’s Utilised agricultural area is targeted under supported commitments to improve climate
adaptation, beyond the basic ‘conditionality’ requirements.
However, other requirements and interventions associated to other indicators could also be relevant for adaptation, likefor protection of soil, carbon storage in soil and landscape features. Additionally, a resilience index for the EU farming
sector will be published in the Agri-food Data Portal5 in second half of 2024.
The Marine Strategy Framework Directive (see action 9) is currently under review. The Impact Assessment for a possible
future revision of the Directive, will consider options for strengthening the links between ocean and climate policies.
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Fostering local, individual, and just resilience

Action 13: Step up support to planning and implementation of local adaptation and launch an adaptation
support facility under the EU Covenant of Mayors.
Within the EU Covenant of Mayors, as of June 2023, over 4500 of the 11.700 signatories –representing more than 230
million inhabitants – have made commitments to act on adaptation to climate change.
To support the actions of cities and local governments in the EU, the Commission launched the Policy Support Facility(PSF) during the EU Covenant of Mayors ceremony in October 2021. Over the past one and a half years of the programme
more than 1000+ people have been engaged, including 200+ attendees taking part in interactive sessions, 350+ municipalities in national workshops, 8 cities developing peer-to-peer exchanges on climate action and 37 adaptation measures
advancing toward implementation. A report on the lessons learned from the PSF will be published in the beginning of 2024.
In December 2020, the EU launched the European Climate Pact across all EU Member States. Its goal is to unite EU citizens
and civil society around a common cause, helping the EU become climate-neutral and climate resilient by 2050, by raisingawareness and encouraging action on climate change.
The Pact provides citizens with tools and information to take practical and meaningful steps for a more sustainable lifestyle and inspiring them to lead by example in their communities and offers a platform for sharing experiences and bestpractices. There are now also over 700 Climate Pact Ambassadors all over Europe active in educating, inspiring, connecting
and multiplying action and efforts on the ground.
The Commission has also launched the Sustainable Consumption Pledge, which is inviting companies active in the EU totake a voluntary pledge to support sustainable consumption, beyond what is required by law, thereby complementing
other regulatory actions.
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EU Adaptation Strategy. Under the call for projects for 2021 and 2022 in total 24 climate adaptation projects have been
selected, distributed over the following themes (in decreasing order): agriculture and forestry; water management; cities,
regions, infrastructure and buildings; nature-based solution for land, coasts and marine areas and strategies, plans andstate-of-the-art tools. Several of these projects are Strategic Integrated Projects set up to assist Member States or regional
authorities to Implementation of adaptation strategies or action plans for the transition to a climate resilient society.
The Joint Research Centre of the Commission launched two studies on just resilience, one on heat impact on workers (seealso action 15) and one analysing the current and emerging unequal exposure and impacts from flood risk vulnerability
and underinsurance. The European Environment Agency published briefings on just resilience and climate adaptation1 andcooling buildings sustainably2 in 2022. Moreover, The European Topic Centre on Climate Change impacts, vulnerability
and adaptation published a technical paper on ‘Just transition in the context of adaptation to climate change’ (2021)3 andon measuring progress on just resilience (2023) 4. The EU disaster resilience goals specifically mention the importance ofaddressing the needs of vulnerable groups in disaster risk management.
1 EEA Briefing: Towards ‘just resilience’: leaving no one behind when adapting to climate change, see https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/just-resilience-leaving-no-one-behind
2 EEA Briefing: Cooling buildings sustainably in Europe: exploring the links between climate change mitigation and adaptation, and their social impacts, see https://www.eea.europa.
eu/publications/cooling-buildings-sustainably-in-europe
3 ETC/CCA Technical Paper 2/2021
4 ETC/CA Technical paper 1/23

Action 14: Support the reskilling and requalification of workers for a just and fair resilience with educationand training through ESF+, Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps.
In 2021, The Commission launched the Education for Climate Coalition1, a program aimed at increasing climate literacy
and fostering action to address climate change.
The Commission is actively encouraging local adaptation actions through initiatives such as the online platform Smart
City Marketplace2 .
The Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps programmes consider sustainability and the green dimension as one of theirfour transversal priorities. For Erasmus+, the Commission supports over 1000 projects prioritising the green transition
annually, as the European Green Deal in one of the programme's 2019-2024 priorities. Climate adaptation is included, butthere is no figure available at this point on the number of projects that target or consider climate resilience.
1
2

Education for Climate Coalition, see https://education-for-climate.ec.europa.eu/
Smart Cities Marketplace, see https://smart-cities-marketplace.ec.europa.eu/

Action 15: Continue to ensure the enforcement of existing employment and social legislation, and, where
relevant, consider proposing new initiatives that increase workers’ protection from climate impacts.
The Commission aims to protect workers from the adverse effects of climate change. The research project “Climate change,
adaptation and just resilience: Assessing socio-economic impacts, risks and vulnerabilities” (LABPROD-JR) will strengthen
the evidence base and assess how climate change, in particular heat stress, will affect productivity performance ofEuropean workers, considering different occupational groups and regions. The report is scheduled for completion in 2024.

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Integrating climate resilience in macro-fiscal policy

Action 16: Develop ways to measure the potential impact of climate-related risks on public finances, develop
tools and models for climate stress testing, and engage in discussions with Member States to better take
into account climate change in national reporting and fiscal frameworks.
Member States practices’ have been peer-reviewed in October 2022, with several publications done on national budgetary
frameworks. A second discussion paper on disaster risk financing in EU Member States1 was published in December 2022.
The Commission has been raising stakeholders’ awareness on disaster risk management and disaster risk financing strategies through regular interactions with stakeholders. Furthermore, the Commission published the results of a pilot study
to measure the potential impact on public debt sustainability of climate-related risks in the Fiscal Sustainability Report 2
in 2021. The 2021 World Bank report on the Economics of prevention and preparedness, also addresses the macro-fiscal
impacts of disasters.
1 European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Radu, D., Disaster risk financing : limiting the fiscal cost of climate-related disasters, Publications
Office of the European Union, 2023, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2765/270746
2 European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Fiscal sustainability report 2021 . Volume 1, Publications Office of the European Union, 2022,
https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2765/682828

Action 17: Explore with Member States whether and to what extent Stability and Convergence Programmes
could factor in the climate adaptation dimension
The Commission is exploring how to standardise national reporting of climate-related fiscal cost/macro-economic impact
assessments across National Regulatory Authorities, National Energy and Climate Plans and Stability and Convergence
Programmes. The Commission’s proposal1 for a reformed EU fiscal surveillance framework aims to introduce new reporting
requirements concerning macro-fiscal risks from climate change, the socio-economic and environmental impact ofclimate-related policies, as well as climate-related contingent liabilities and related economic losses. Additionally, theproposed Preventive arm Regulation2 plans to replace the Stability and Convergence Programmes with national medium-term fiscal structural plans, which would include information on disaster and climate contingent liabilities. The adoptionof these legal proposals is targeted for the end of 2023 in cooperation with the Member States1
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Action 18: Explore and discuss with Member States actions to dampen the fiscal impact of climate-related
events and reduce fiscal-sustainability risks.
The Commission has launched the Climate Resilience Dialogue in November 2022 (see action 34). The objective of the
Dialogue is to discuss and identify solutions to narrow the climate protection gap and lower the share of uninsured losses
to the economy. A report is foreseen to be published in 2024.

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Action 19: Promote better coordination and complementarity between the post-disaster emergency andrecovery operations supported by the Solidarity Fund and other EU funds to encourage the “build backbetter” principle.
The Commission has included a specific enabling condition 2.4 of promoting climate change adaptation and disaster risk
prevention and resilience in the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)1, which requires Member States to establish
national disaster risk management plans accounting for the impacts of climate change. In the current EU Solidarity Fund
Regulation ‘building-back-better’ is excluded from the eligible operations under this fund.
Furthermore, the Technical Guidance on Climate Proofing (see action 28) is now associated with a provision in the Common
Provision Regulation2 which requires that Member States climate-proof all infrastructure investments projects with aminimum life span of 5 years. There are currently no immediate plans to launch a major revision of the EU Structural
Fund-regulation to directly include the concept of ‘building back better’.
The regulation establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)3 requires all measures in the national Recovery
and Resilience Plans to comply with the Do No Significant Harm principle, including to adaptation. The Commission also
published a technical guidance 4 on the application of this principle in the RRF. Similarly, the regulation establishing theJust Transition Fund5 requires that no significant harm is done to environmental objectives, including climate adaptation.
1 European Regional Development Fund, see https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/european-regional-development-fund-erdf_en
2 Regulation (EU) 2021/1060
3 Regulation (EU) 2021/241
4 Commission Notice Technical guidance on the application of ‘do no significant harm’ under the Recovery and Resilience Facility Regulation 2021/C 58/01 (OJ C, C/58, 18.02.2021,
p. 1, CELEX: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021XC0218(01))
5 Regulation (EU) 2021/1056

Promoting nature-based solutions for adaptation

Action 20: Continue to incentivise and assist Member States to rollout nature-based solutions throughassessments, guidance, capacity building, and EU funding;
The Commission is reviewing the evaluation frameworks for nature-based solutions (NbS) at regional and European levels.
The Commission continues to advocate for NbS in flood risk management. Currently, a review of costs and benefits of NbS
for flood risk management is ongoing with involvement of the EIB. The European Topic Centre on Climate Change impacts,
vulnerability and Adaptation (ETC/CA) published ‘Understanding the scaling potential of Nature-based Solutions’1, an analysis on the scaling potential of nature-based solutions for climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction relevant
to achieving overarching ecosystem restoration targets. Additional work concentrating on socio-economic aspects is being
anticipated for 2023. Also a large number of projects under Horizon Europe and Horizon 2020 address the development,
testing and assessment of NbS.
The Commission adopted the EU Soil Strategy for 20302, which sets the stage for a proposed Soil Health Law, adopted
in July 2023. The proposed law aims to enhance the climate resilience of soils and underscores their significant role inclimate adaptation.
Investments in NbS are supported through EU funding such as the Cohesion Policy funds - which according to current
allocation of the funds by Member States are expected to finance 229,000 hectares of new green infrastructure - theRecovery and Resilience Facility, the European Structural and Investment Funds and Life multiannual work programme.
The proposed recast of the Urban Waste-Water Treatment Directive, requires the prioritisation of green infrastructure inurban areas to control flows and reduce pollution from storm water overflows and runoff (see action 39).
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ETC CA Report 2/22, https://www.eionet.europa.eu/etcs/etc-ca/products/etc-ca-products/etc-ca-report-2-22-understanding-the-scaling-potential-of-nature-based-solutions
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Lastly, a proposal for an EU Nature Restoration Law3 was adopted by the Commission in June of 2022 that, amongst
other goals, aims to restore degraded ecosystems that prevent and reduce the impact of natural disasters (see action 12).
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Action 21: Develop the financial aspects of nature-based solutions and foster the development of financial
approaches and products that also cover nature-based adaptation.
The Commission is exploring insurance products and services to nature-based adaptation efforts. In the Horizon 2020
programme, the financial and economic aspects of NbS were addressed by the NbS project portfolio through a dedicatedtask force, which produced a report on Public Procurement of Nature-based Solutions1 and the nature-based economy.
Under Horizon Europe, a project 2 was started in 2022 which examines the feasibility and performance of solutions built
on a combination of disaster risk financing and Nature-based solutions investments.
The European Investment Bank (EIB) published in June 2023 a study on the assessment of access to finance conditions
for innovative NbS in the EU3.
1 European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Mačiulytė, E., Durieux, E., Public procurement of nature-based solutions : addressing barriers to the
procurement of urban NBS : case studies and recommendations, Publications Office of the European Union, 2020, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/561021
2 Naturance project, see https://www.naturanceproject.eu/project/
3 European Investment Bank, Hudson, G., Hart, S., Verbeek, A., Investing in nature-based solutions : state-of-play and way forward for public and private financial measures in
Europe, European Investment Bank, 2023, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2867/031133

Action 22: Propose nature-based solutions for carbon removals, including accounting and certification in
upcoming carbon farming initiatives.
The Commission adopted the Communication on ‘Sustainable Carbon Cycles’1 in December 2021, which sets out how toincrease durable carbon removals and, to do so, emphasises the need for climate resilient solutions. The Commission
published the Proposal for Regulation on Carbon Removals Certification2 in December 2022, which proposes carbon farming
as one removal option. Its adoption is expected at the beginning of 2024.
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Objective 3: Faster adaptation: Speeding up adaptation across the board
Physical climate has been outpacing the progress in the implementation of climate adaptation measures. To accelerate the implementation of adaptation action, resources are required that are commensurate with the challenge. Under the objective of faster
adaptation 17 actions are presented, divided over four challenges: to develop and roll out solutions, to help reduce climate risk, toincrease climate protection, and to safeguard freshwater access.
Accelerating the rollout of adaptation solutions

Area
Kristianstad Municipality
Malmö
Stockholm County
Administration BoardUmeå Municipality
Värmland County
Västerbotten County

Gjøvik Kommune
Innlandet County Authority
Kristiansand Kommune
Rogaland
Troms & Finnmark County
Tromsø municipality
Vesteraalen
Vestland County

ASSOCIATED COUNTRIES

Action 23: Implement the planned Horizon Europe Mission on ‘Adaptation to Climate Change’ and other adapSIGNATORIES
tation-relevant Missions,
including on soil health, climate-neutral cities, and oceans once these are endorsed.
OF THE MISSIONCHARTER
TURKEYICELAND
Principality of Asturias
Bodrum Municipality
The Icelandic Association ofProvince of Granada
The Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change
has three objectives:prepare Europe to deal
with climate disruptions, by
Bursa Metropolitan
Local Authorities
Región de Murcia
Municipality
Valladolid
facilitating uptake of innovative solutions andbuilding adaptive capacity across stakeholders;
accelerate the transforEskisehir Metropolitan
ISRAEL
Vitoria-Gasteiz
mation to a climate resilient future, supporting at least 150 regions
and
local
authorities
tobecomeclimate resilience
Municipality
Eilat-Eilot
Metropolitan
Sharontriggering
Region
SWEDENby 2030; and build deep resilience by scaling
up actionable solutions
societal İstanbultransformations,aiming at 75
Municipality
Blekinge Region
systemic demonstrations by 2030.
Izmir CityNORWAY
Gothenburg Metropolitan
Izmit Municipality

The implementation of the Horizon Europe Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change is well underway, alongside otheradaptation-relevant Missions on Soils, Oceans and Water, and Cities. The Mission Implementation Platform1, disseminatingknowledge on climate adaptation and providing a technical support facility, is operational since spring 2023. A Communityof Practice has also been launched, offering inter alia opportunities for exchange through events, webinars, and discussions.

MAP OF
EUROPEAN CHARTER
SIGNATORIES

Entire territorial entity signed
One or more entities within
the territory signed© EuroGeographics © UN–FAO © Turkstat Cartography: Eurostat Link

EU Mission on Adaptation
to Climate Change

Madeira (PT)

Canary Islands (ES)05001000 kmFigure 1. Map of European Charter Signatories to the Mission on Adaptation, as of July 2023

1

EU Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change Portal, see https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/mission...

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308 regions, cities, and local communities, covering some 40% of EU territory, have committed themselves to the Mission
Charter and are engaged to work together in accelerating their transformation towards climate resilience. Moreover, 63
private companies, service centres, research networks, and local action groups became Friends of the Mission.
The first 21 projects funded by the Mission have started their activities. They address issues such as citizen engagement,
testing and demonstrating solution for climate resilience, supporting regions in developing climate risk assessment andpathways to climate resilience. Other activities supported under Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe, including other EU
Missions and partnerships, are also developing knowledge and solutions of direct relevance for building climate resilience.
These projects directly involve regions, local authorities, business partners, insurers and private venture capital.
The most advanced projects already started in November 2021 under the Horizon 2020 Green Deal call 2; the following
projects are part of the adaptation portfolio with a total budget of 45 million euros.

• TransformAr: accelerating and upscaling transformational adaptation in Europe3;• IMPETUS: dynamic information management approach for the implementation of climate resilient adaptation packages
in European regions 4;• ARSINOE: climate resilient regions through systemic solutions and innovations5;• REGILIENCE: sharing promising cross-sectoral adaptation solutions6.
The Commission ensures that adaptation-relevant aspects are pursued for mutual benefits across the Horizon Europe
Missions, as seen in joint demonstrations of solutions with joint co-funding of the Mission on Cities, Restore our Oceans andWater, and Soils. These are included in the Missions Horizon Europe Working Programme for 2022 and 2023 (see action 2).
2
3
4
5
6

H2020-LC-GD-2020
TransformAr, see https://doi.org/10.3030/101036683
IMPETUS, see https://doi.org/10.3030/101037084
ARSINOE, see https://doi.org/10.3030/101037424
REGILIENCE, see https://doi.org/10.3030/101036560

Action 24: Support the development of further adaptation solutions, including rapid response decision support
tools to enrich the toolbox for adaptation practitioners.
The Commission is facilitating rapid decision-making and enriching toolboxes for practitioners through Horizon Europe,
supporting the Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change (see Action 23). The following examples of Horizon Europe Mission
topics that serve this objective include:• Better prepared regional and local authorities to adapt to climate change1;• Support to regions in developing pathways towards climate resilience and corresponding innovation agendas2;• Local engagement of citizens in the co-creation of societal transformational change for climate resilience3.
Horizon Europe Mission-funded projects began in January 2023, helping regions and local authorities develop climate
risk and vulnerability assessments and demonstrate innovative solutions. Among these, the CLIMAAX project4, with an
EU budget of EUR 20 million, provides EUR 12 million of financial, analytical, and practical support to 50 regions and local
authorities to improve regional climate and emergency risk management plans, including the conduct of risk assessments.
Another project, Pathways2Resilience5, has an EU budget of EUR 30 million, with EUR 21 million set aside to assist 100
regions and local authorities to design their local adaption plans. Climate-ADAPT provides and further develops a collection of generic adaptation options which aim to address adaptation needs for all climate impacts and sectors, and casestudies which illustrate their implementation 6.
1
2
3
4
5
6

HORIZON-MISS-2021-CLIMA-01-01
HORIZON-MISS-2021-CLIMA-02-02
HORIZON-MISS-2021-CLIMA-02-05
CLIMAAX, see https://www.climaax.eu/
Pathways2Resilience, see https://www.pathways2resilience.eu/
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Action 25: Strengthen its support to protect the potential of genetic resources for adaptation, including by
proposing legislation on the production and marketing of seeds.
The Commission presented legislative proposals in 2023 for the revision of the EU legislation for the marketing of plantand forest reproductive material (PRM and FRM) and for a regulation on the deliberate release and placing on the marketof plants produced by certain new genomic techniques1 (NGTs). The PRM revision sets out a new regulatory frameworkthat will support the use of climate resilient plants in agriculture. The FRM revision will help ensure that the right treeis planted in the right place for forests to thrive also under projected future climatic conditions. It includes provisions
to assess and communicate to end users the resilience-relevant traits of parent trees; to facilitate the conservation ofendangered forest genetic resources; and to draw up national contingency plans to help reforest areas affected by extreme
weather events, fires, pest outbreaks and other disasters. The NGT proposal facilitates the application of innovative plant
breeding to a wide variety of crops, supporting the development of plant varieties with improved tolerance or resistanceto climate change effects. Furthermore, actions 22 and 23 in the Biodiversity Strategy for 20302, adopted in 2021 by theCommission, concern genetic resources in the sense of agricultural seed varieties.
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Action 26: Further develop the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities for climate adaptation.
The Delegated Act on sustainable activities for climate change adaptation and mitigation objectives was published in
December 2021 and came into force on 1 January 2022.

Action 27: Integrate adaptation in the update of Natura 2000 and climate change guidance, and in guidelines
on biodiversity-friendly afforestation and reforestation, and in the forthcoming Forest Strategy.
Published in July 2021, the EU Forest Strategy calls for greater efforts to adapt forests to climate change, emphasising
the use of adaptive forest restoration, ecosystem-based management approaches, and resilience-enhancing forest
management practices. It also commits the Commission to provide guidance and promote knowledge exchanges on goodpractices on climate adaptation and resilience, using the Climate-ADAPT platform, and to supplement the revision of thelegislation on forest reproductive material with measures to promote the production and marketing of forest reproductive
material suitable for future climatic conditions.
The Commission’s Guidelines on Biodiversity-Friendly Afforestation, Reforestation and Tree Planting, adopted in March
2023, also underline the need for adaptation and give relevant guidance.
The update of the Commission guidelines on Natura 2000 and climate change is still a work in progress. The guidelines
can be expected to be finalised by the end of 2023.

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Reducing climate-related risk

Action 28: Enhance climate proofing guidance, and promote its use in Europe and abroad.
The Commission has adopted the technical guidance on the climate proofing of infrastructure 2021-20271 in September
2021 to help infrastructure promoters to make the infrastructure fit for a different climate and extremes. It is mainstreamedwith other programmes to ensure consistency across all EU-funded projects, for example in the project selection criteria
in the implementation phase of the European Regional Development Fund programmes. This guidance, with the climate
proofing pillar of InvestEU Sustainability Proofing (adopted July 2021), is being promoted in various context in Europe
and abroad.
To identify vulnerability hotspots in interconnected infrastructure, the Commission will publish a report on selected crossborder and emerging risks in Europe in 2023. Moreover, the European Climate Risk Assessment will identify key risks bysystems and sectors, including biodiversity and ecosystems (see also action 29).
To address the resilience of entities that are critical for the proper functioning of the internal market, the implementationof the EU directives on the resilience of critical entities2 and on cybersecurity3 and Council Recommendation4 will enhance
the preparedness and the resilience in respect of all hazards, whether natural or man-made, accidental or intentional.
The Commission published the first-ever pan-European wildfire risk assessment 5 in August 2022. In line with this, theCommission published EU-Trees4F6, a dataset on the future distribution of European tree species. The Commission is
promoting wildfire prevention under the remit of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, with actions including peer reviews
and good practice collections on risk awareness raising.
Relevant projects financed under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) covering the period 2021-2027, are subject to climate
proofing, which includes climate adaptation measures. Climate adaptation measures are also eligible for funding under
CEF. Moreover, the Commission proposal for a Revision of the EU’s Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) Regulationfrom 14 December 2021 reinforced climate resilience of infrastructure. In December 2022, the Council General approach
was adopted and in April 2023 the European Parliament’s TRAN Committee approved the report by unanimity. Adoptionof the revised TEN-T Regulation is envisaged by the end of 2023, and entry into force as of January or February 2024.
The Commission, in collaboration with the European Defence Agency (EDA), carried out a study on the climate impacts on
defence-related critical energy infrastructure. It also includes recommendations.
1 Commission Notice — Technical guidance on the climate proofing of infrastructure in the period 2021-2027 (OJ C, C/373, 16.09.2021, p. 1, CELEX: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021XC0916(03))
2 Directive (EU) 2022/2557
3 Directive (EU) 2022/2555
4 OJ C 20, 20.1.2023, p. 1–11
5 European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Oom, D., De Rigo, D., Pfeiffer, H., et al., Pan-European wildfire risk assessment, Publications Office of the European Union, 2022,
https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/9429
6 Mauri, A., Girardello, M., Strona, G., Beck, P., Forzieri, G., Caudullo, G., Manca, F. and Cescatti, A., EU-Trees4F, a dataset on the future distribution of European tree species, SCIENTIFIC DATA, ISSN 2052-4463, 9, 2022, p. 37, JRC127314

Action 29: Develop an EU-wide climate risk assessment and strengthen climate considerations in EU disasterrisk prevention and management.
In May 2022, the Commission and the European Environment Agency initiated the preparation of the first European Climate
Risk Assessment (EUCRA). This independent scientific report will assess current and future climate change impacts andrisks relating to the environment, economy and wider society in Europe. The assessment will also address cross-border,
cascading and compound risks. Publication of the report is foreseen for spring 2024.
The Commission launched in May 2023 a call for tender for a study aiming to identify climate risks on the TEN-T network,
corresponding adaptation measures to address them and the costs/ investment needs associated with these measures.
The first results of the study are expected in April 2024.

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The Commission is improving Member States’ preparedness for climate change impacts on water management, including
flood prevention, dealing with droughts and water quality. This is implemented among others through the Common
Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework Directive and the Flood Directive, and the exchange of information
and best practices. Furthermore, a revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive has been proposed by the Commissionin October 2022 (see action 39).
To increase risk literacy throughout society, the Union disaster resilience goals were adopted at the beginning of 2023
with one goal specifically on increasing risk awareness (see also action 8).

Action 30: Increase cooperation with standardisation organisations to climate-proof standards and to develop
new ones for climate change adaptation solutions.
The Commission adopted the new EU Standardisation Strategy1 and the Annual Union Work Programme on Standardisation2
in February 2022. A contract has been launched to select standards for which adaptation mainstreaming could be requested
from the European Standardisation Organisations (ESOs)3. In parallel, advisory activities within the ESOs will be continued
with financial support from the Commission. Promotion of EU Member States level standardisation as a means for national
adaptation is part of the 2-year Work Plan of the Working Group on Adaptation of the Climate Change Committee.
1 COM (2022) 31 final
2 Commission Notice The 2022 annual Union work programme for European standardisation 2022/C 66/01 (OJ C, C/66, 08.02.2022, p. 1, CELEX: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52022XC0208(01) )3 See Key players in European Standardisation (europa.eu)

Action 31: Support the integration of climate resilience considerations into the criteria applicable to construction and renovation of buildings and critical infrastructure.
The Commission integrated climate resilience in its December 2021 proposal for the revision of the Energy Performanceof Buildings Directive (EPBD), which will make it mandatory for Member States to address climate change adaptation forboth new and existing buildings. The EPBD proposal is now being discussed for final adoption with the Parliament andCouncil under the Spanish Presidency. Moreover, the Commission put forward provisions to inform about the performanceof construction products also under future climate in its March 2022 proposal for the revision of the Construction Products
Regulation through a horizontal requirement applicable across Basic Work Requirements. The Commission is conducting
a study on climate change induced corrosion, estimating the total repair costs of reinforced concrete buildings, which will
be published in 2023. The guidance to enhance the climate resilience of buildings1 was also developed and published in
March 2023. Joint Research Centre pilot studies on the future climatic loading on structures support Member States in
updating their provisions for design and renovation of built environment.
The New European Bauhaus (NEB) Lab Labelling Strategy2 is a Commission-led project that links climate resilience to
NEB, with the NEB Compass guiding decision makers to apply NEB principles and criteria to their activities, and a series ofassessment frameworks developed to create guidance around the three dimensions of the NEB. The Level(s) frameworkfor sustainable buildings includes a macro-objective on adaptation with three indicators (thermal comfort, resistance toextreme weather and sustainable drainage). Also, the revision of the Green Public Procurements Criteria on public buildings(2023) has led to the inclusion of a theme on vulnerability and resilience to climate change, structured around a climate
vulnerability risk assessment.
1 European Commission, Directorate-General for Climate Action, EU-level technical guidance on adapting buildings to climate change, Publications Office of the European Union,
2023, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2834/558395
2 The EU New European Bauhaus Lab Labelling Strategy, see https://new-european-bauhaus.europa.eu/get-inspired/inspiring-projects-and-ideas/neb-lab-labelling-strategy_en...

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Action 32: Address EU-level preparedness and response to climate-related health threats, including throughthe EU Framework on Health Threats and, as relevant, the planned Health Emergency Preparedness andResponse Authority.
The Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA)1 has been launched in September 2021. It is established as a directorate-general of the Commission. It is operational since early 2022.
1 EU Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA), see https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/departments-and-executive-agencies/
health-emergency-preparedness-and-response-authority_en

Closing the climate protection gap

Action 33: Identify and promote best practices in financial instruments for risk management, in close cooperation with EIOPA.
In February 2023, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) published the results of a pilot
exercise with insurance companies on ‘impact underwriting’, a concept which captures the ability of insurance undertakings,
consistently with actuarial risk-based principles, to contribute to the adaptation to climate change by incentivising policyholders in implementing prevention measures to reduce their risk exposures. In this paper, EIOPA outlines examples of goodunderwriting practices observed in the market. The exercise also analyzed whether the current prudential framework forinsurers introduces obstacles to the incorporation of adaptation measures in insurance products. In this regard, the reportconcludes that there are no obstacles in Solvency II that would prevent from reflecting climate change considerations or
climate-related adaptation measures in insurance products. EIOPA is also preparing technical advice to the Commission
on the prudential treatment of sustainability risks. In that context, EIOPA invited stakeholders to provide feedback on a
discussion paper between December 2022 and March 2023. The discussion paper covered among others “Underwriting
and climate change adaptation”. The timeline for EIOPA’s advice depends on the pending outcome of the negotiations on
the Solvency II review. In July of 2023, EIOPA published a study on demand-side drivers of the insurance protection gap
for natural catastrophes. In this staff paper, EIOPA proposes options that could be implemented by insurers to increase
the uptake of natural catastrophe insurance coverage in the pre-purchase and purchase phases.

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The recently published Implementing Technical Standards on reporting will require insurers to report to supervisors
information on the share of investments exposed to climate change-related risks as well as information about exposure
to climate risks via non-life insurance contracts and whether the design of the relevant product makes allowance forrisk-prevention measures. These changes will apply as of year-end 2023, i.e., for the first time for the reporting year 2023
which is due at the beginning of 2024.

Action 34: Strengthen dialogue between insurers, policymakers and other stakeholders.
The Commission launched the Climate Resilience Dialogue in November 2022. The dialogue brings together a wide rangeof stakeholders, like insurers, risk managers, international institutions, etc., to analyse the reasons for the widening of theclimate protection gap, identify solutions to address them, and develop voluntary commitments on actions that would
contribute to reducing the climate protection gap. The finalisation of the common practices, the voluntary commitments,
and the publication of the final report is expected mid-2024.

Action 35: Explore the wider use of financial instruments and innovative solutions to deal with climate-induced risks.
The Commission is revising Green Public Procurement (GPP) criteria for buildings to reflect LEVELS1. Two webinars discussed
this in March and November of 2022. Further research is done on alternative risk-sharing mechanisms through the Mission
on Adaptation projects call for projects on ‘Best practices on and piloting insurance solutions for climate adaptation in EU
regions and communities’2. A draft of a checklist and guidance on investing in public procurement of sustainable infrastructure was delivered at the end of 2022. The documents will be tested through stakeholder engagement.
The Construction Products Regulation will include provisions allowing for the adoption of delegated acts to set mandatory
minimum GPP-requirements or targets, which means that public buyers will be able to report on whether their public
procurement is green and related to climate adaptation.
Under the Common Agriculture Policy Strategic Plans financial instruments can potentially be used also for investments
which contribute to closing the climate protection gap such as for example investments into energy efficiency, water saving
technology. Also InvestEU can potentially support such investments.
1
2

LEVEL(s) European framework for sustainable buildings, see https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/circular-economy/levels_en)
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Action 36: Help to examine natural disaster insurance penetration in Member States, and promote it, forexample through guidelines and invite EIOPA to develop its natural catastrophe dashboard allowing country
level assessments.
A natural catastrophe insurance dashboard1 was published by the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority(EIOPA) in December of 2022, which will be updated regularly.

Figure 3 – Average share of insured economic losses caused by weather-related events
1

EIOPA dashboard on insurance protection gap, see https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/tools-and-data/dashboard-insurance-protection-gap-natural-catastrophes_en)

Ensuring the availability and sustainability of freshwater

Action 37: Help ensure climate-resilient, sustainable use and management of water across sectors andborders by improving coordination of thematic plans and other mechanisms, such as water resource allocation and water permits
The Commission works closely together with the Member States through the Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) of theWater Framework Directive and the Flood Directive. The topic of climate-resilient water management across sectors andborders is well incorporated in the CIS Workplan 2022-2024, which includes relevant activities to address issues on water
resource allocation, water permitting systems, and cost recovery through water pricing. In addition, the Commission and
the Member States are revising the CIS Guidance 24 on River Basin Management in a Changing Climate1, with completion
anticipated in 2024.
1 European Commission, Directorate-General for Environment, River basin management in a changing climate. Guidance document No 24, Publications Office, 2010, https://data.
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An Ad-hoc Task Group on Water Scarcity and Droughts is established, which will deliver several products, including anassessment of Member States’ drought management policies and plans, adaptation measures to drought, a drought risk
assessment methodology, a drought risk atlas and a report on water scarcity and drought management in terms of river
basin planning.
The Commission adopted a Revision of the Industrial Emissions Directive in April 2022, which addresses efficient use ofresources, including water efficiency and water reuse.
Under the Missions Horizon Europe work programme, a call for projects was published for a demonstration of integrated
approaches to increasing the water retention capacity of a designated area (landscape) at regional scale in January 2023.
Within the context of the Horizon Europe Cluster 6 calls, actions to improve the understanding, observation and monitoringof water resources availability in the context of climate change (SOS-WATER, STARS4Water), to develop climate sensitive
water allocation systems and economic instruments (WE-ACT, TRANSCEND) and demonstrate innovative cross-sectoral
water governance systems, associated with economic and financial tools to support EU green deal transition while ensuring
water systems sustainability, have been promoted (InnWater, RETOUCH Nexus, GOVAQUA)
Climate change adaptation is at the centre of the European Partnership Water Security for the Planet (Water4All) established under Horizon Europe. Water4All promotes a holistic approach, addressing all aspects of freshwater resource, uses
and related hazards and connecting the actors from research to decision-making and field implementation, including
citizens. The first Water4All Joint Transnational Call launched in 2022 addressed the management of water resources:
resilience, adaptation and mitigation to hydroclimatic extreme events and management tools.

Action 38: Help to guarantee a stable and secure supply of drinking water, by encouraging the incorporationof the risks of climate change in risk analyses of water management.
Further attention needs to be paid by Member States to how climate change affects their drinking water quality andsources. The recast Drinking Water Directive (DWD) entered into force in January 2021, with Member States had to transpose the Directive into national law and comply with its provisions by January 2023. The Directive includes a risk-based
approach throughout the entire drinking water supply chain. This includes the requirement for the risk assessment andrisk management of catchment areas for abstraction points of drinking water sources, reviewed at least every six years.
Member States' obligations that will need follow-up are in particular: water leakage assessment (by Jan 2026); Catchment
area for abstraction points risk assessment and risk management (by July 2027); Supply system risk assessment and risk
management (by Jan 2029) and Domestic distribution systems risk assessment (by Jan 2029)
To aid Member States, under Horizon Europe in 2022 a call1 was published ‘Securing drinking water quality by protecting
water sources against pollution, providing innovative monitoring and treatment solutions and ensuring safe distribution’.
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Action 39: Help reduce water use by raising the water-saving requirements for products, encouraging water
efficiency and savings, and by promoting the wider use of drought management plans as well as sustainablesoil management and land use
The Commission launched the EDORA1 project in December 2021, with the aim to assess drought management policies
in Member States, including an in-depth assessment of Drought Management Plans. Drought impacts database, drought

1

EDORA - European Drought Observatory for Resilience and Adaptation, see https://edo.jrc.ec.europa.eu/edora/php/index.php?id=201...

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risk atlas and adaptation measures to droughts can be expected in 4th quarter of 2023.
The Water Reuse Regulation will be applied as of 26 June 2023. A Working Group on Water Reuse has been establishedwithin the Common Implementation Strategy. To support the implementation of the Water Reuse Regulation, Water reuse
guidelines were published in August 2022.
The Commission has adopted both the Sustainable Product Policy Framework 2 in March 2022, which includes the proposal
for a Regulation on eco-design for sustainable products and revised the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) in April 2022,
which also addresses water efficiency and water reuse.
The recast Drinking Water Directive (DWD) entered into force in January 2021 (for more information see action 38).
The Commission adopted a proposal for a recast Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive (UWWTD) in October 2022. It
contributes to climate resilience by promoting improved water quality and quantity management in urban areas. The useof freshwater is reduced by making the wastewater treatment sector more circular. The proposal requires that Member
States systematically promote the reuse of treated wastewater from all urban wastewater treatment plants. And it
requires the prioritisation of green infrastructure in urban areas to control flows and reduce pollution from storm water
overflows and runoff.
The Court of Auditors published a special report 3 on sustainable water use in agriculture in September 2021, in which
the Court of Auditors recommended that Member States better justify exemptions to Water Framework Directive implementation in agriculture and that Commission links Common Agriculture Policy payments to environmental standards onsustainable water use. In its reply to the Court of Auditors, the Commission has described the strong link between the Water
Framework Directive (WFD) and the 2023-2027 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), with special attention to the quantitative
aspects of water management. It also committed to ensuring that the CAP Strategic plans consider the analysis, objectives
and targets included in the WFD and the River Basin Management Plans and make an adequate contribution to them.
2 Sustainable product policy & ecodesign, see https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/sustainability/sustainable-product-policy-ecodesign_en
3 European Court of Auditors, Sustainable water use in agriculture : CAP funds more likely to promote greater rather than more efficient water use. Special report No 20, 2021,
Publications Office of the European Union, 2022, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2865/497724...

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Objective 4: Stepping up international action for climate resilience
This objective expands the scope of EU Climate Adaptation Strategy and action to a global stage. Every part of the world will beaffected by climate change. Risks will be borderless, might cascade and will interact with and amplify other risks and impacts,
including the ecological crisis and pollution. Stronger international cooperation to achieve climate resilience is encouraged in the
Adaptation Strategy through three fields and ten actions. Alignment with the adaptation-related requirements and objectives of
the Paris Agreement is an important element. The Strategy further develops the EU’s role in supporting international adaptation,
alongside its global leadership in climate mitigation. It underscores the need for a collaborative, unified response, targeting particularly regions vulnerable to climate impacts. Encapsulating the spirit of global solidarity, the objective outlines the urgent need for
additional international finance and innovation in financial mechanisms to support climate resilience worldwide.
Increasing support for international climate resilience and preparedness

Action 40: Strengthen the support for the development and implementation of Nationally Determined
Contributions and National Adaptation Plans in EU partner countries and mainstream conflict-sensitive,
anticipatory and preventive climate resilience and preparedness in relevant EU policies and instruments forexternal action.
The Commission supports EU Partner Countries as part of its bilateral and regional dialogues and financial programming
exercises, including in their efforts to set up and implement their Nationally Determined Contributions, National Adaptation
Plans, Disaster Risk Reduction Strategies, and reporting on the Sendai Framework indicators, which sets out the overall
objective to substantially reduce disaster risk and losses, including those related to climate.
The Commission’ contributes to the UN Development Program Climate Promise, the Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems(CREWS)1 initiative, the Africa Adaptation Initiative, and Adaptation without Borders. Several Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs)
have been identified across Africa, Asia, the Pacific, Latin America, and the Caribbean to support adaptation actions. TEIs
focus on identifying critical priorities that constrain development in a given country or region, where a coordinated andcoherent effort by European Union, EU Member States - including their implementing agencies and public developmentbanks - as well as the EIB and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). would ensure results witha transformative impact. An example is the TEI on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience in Africa which will consolidate over EUR 1 billion in existing and new climate change adaptation and DRR programmes. Launched at COP27, this1

Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems

Action 41: Intensify and broaden adaptation support to local authorities in EU partner countries and develop
regional programmes, including for countries in the EU Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods, and in candidate countries and potential candidates.
The Commission continues to strengthen the local capacity for disaster preparedness and individual resilience of communities vulnerable to disasters in third countries. Currently, the EU currently holds chairmanship of the Platform on Disaster
Displacement (PDD)1 until December 2023, where it intensifies and broadens adaptation support to local authorities.
The Commission supports the ‘TRATOLOW – Transition towards low emissions and climate resilient economy in theWestern Balkans and Türkiye' project 2. This project is part of the Commission’s efforts to pinpoint and develop measures
for addressing climate change and security hotspots in the EU neighbourhood.
Local authorities in partner countries are supported through the Advancing Climate Adaptation in the Mediterranean(ACAMED) program. It aims to enhance climate governance, policies, and action plans at national level in the Mediterranean
region and to simplify access to climate finance for adaptation. ACAMED is designed to promote the integration of climate
1
2

Plattform on Disaster Displacement (DPP), see https://disasterdisplacement.org/
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change into the planning system at both horizontal and vertical levels.
The project ‘Support to economic diversification of rural areas in Southeast Europe (SEDRA II)’ provides technical assistanceto support the transition of Southern Neighbourhood countries towards sustainable, low-carbon and climate-resilient
development.

Action 42: Include climate change considerations in the future agreement on the conservation and sustainable
use of marine biodiversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction
The Commission is supporting the incorporation of climate change considerations in the activities of the relevant Regional
Fisheries Management Organisations1 and Agreements (RFMO/As). Notably, the Western and Central Pacific FisheriesCommission (WCPFC), North Pacific Fisheries Commission (NPFC), Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), and the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources (CCAMLR) have all adopted Resolutions on climate change in their annual meetings, with the support
from the EU.
Furthermore, the Commission has proposed establishing two new Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in the Southern Ocean
to CCAMLR: one in East Antarctica (since 2013) and another in the Weddell Sea (since 2016). Despite ongoing opposition
from Russia and China, CCALMR held a Special Meeting in Santiago, Chile, from 19-13 June 2023, to explore a way forward,
including developing a roadmap for the creation of a representative system of MPAs around Antarctica.
In alignment with the International Ocean Governance (IOG) agenda, the EU supported the conclusion, in March 2023,of an ambitious legally binding agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on theconservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ). Meanwhile,the EU has signed the BBNJ-agreement in September 2023.
1

Regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) (europa.eu)

Scaling up international finance to build climate resilience

Action 43: Aim to increase international climate finance for adaptation through the EU instruments forexternal action and by leveraging private sector investments.
From 2021, the EU’s external financial assistance is implemented through the Neighborhood, Development and International
Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) - Global Europe. The EU has raised the climate spending target under the NDICI-Global
Europe to 30% for 2021-27, up from the 20% target set for 2014-2020. With an additional commitment of EUR 4 billion
by the Commission President, this means approximately EUR 27.85 billion of the EU’s EUR 79.5 billion external action
budget for 2021-2027 (excluding Member States’ contributions) will be dedicated to climate action.
In 2021, Team Europe Initiatives contributed EUR 23.04 billion in public international climate finance, of which 54% was
allocated to climate change adaptation or actions that target both climate mitigation and adaptation1.
The European Fund for Sustainable Development+ (EFSD+), as part of the NDICI-Global Europe, is the main financial tool tomobilise investments under the Global Gateway – the EU’s strategy to bridge the global investment gap in infrastructure(see also action 46). EFSD+ aims to mobilise up to EUR 135 billion for infrastructure projects by ncentivizing private sector
financing. EFSD+ blending facilities will use grants and loans to support non-bankable investment projects in EU partnercountries while enhancing their sustainability, climate-proofing and development impact.
1

The 2022 figures were not yet available at the time of the writing of this report.

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Action 44: Promote the design and implementation of disaster risk finance strategies to increase
macroeconomic climate resilience in partner countries.
The Commission has increased support to disaster risk transfer mechanisms, including insurance schemes, for example
through initiatives such as the InsuResilience Global Partnership.
The TEI on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience in Africa supports the Global Shield Against Climate Risks, withan initial contribution of EUR 30 million. This initiative aims to provide climate-vulnerable countries with rapid access toinsurance and disaster protection funding after flooding or droughts.
Scaling up of risk-based and anticipatory humanitarian action is on-going, with further recommendations for key actors
expected after the establishment of new funding arrangements at COP27/CMA4 in Egypt. Moreover, a dedicated budget
line for disaster preparedness in the EU humanitarian aid budget (focusing on climate and environmental resilience) has
been added to factor climate and environmental risk considerations consistently into humanitarian operations.

Action 45: Support partner countries in the design of policies and incentives to promote climate resilient
investment, including in nature-based solutions.
The Commission has been pivotal in the EU and Member States’ multilateral outreach, including through the High Ambition
Coalition and the Leaders’ Pledge for Nature, to ensure that the internationally agreed definition of a nature-based solution
is ambitious in terms of climate and biodiversity and is accompanied by robust sustainability safeguards. The Commission
has contributed to achieving acknowledgements at the 5th session of the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA)
under Rio conventions, including the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) through the
Sharm-el-Sheikh Implementation Plan at COP27, and the Convention on Biological Diversity through the Kunming Montréal
global biodiversity framework at COP15.
The Commission supports studies and reports on adaptation, across various sectors and countries, facilitating knowledge
dissemination, Numerous side events organised by the EU on adaptation in Africa took place at COP27 in Egypt. EU international partnerships are mobilising more resources to protect ecosystems, particularly from sectors with significant impacts
on biodiversity and potential benefits for nature. The new NaturAfrica initiative, for example, will provide a framework forinterventions to protect wildlife and ecosystems in Africa while offering local employment opportunities in related sectors.

Action 46: Enhance the climate proofing of all EU external investments and actions
In December 2021, the Commission published the Communication on the Global Gateway, an initiative aiming to mobilise
investments of up to EUR 300 billion between 2021 and 2027 in partner countries. The communication underlines thatthe investments will help developing infrastructures that are clean, climate-resilient and aligned with pathways towards
net zero emissions, with projects that will live up to the European Green Deal oath to ‘do no harm’. In June 2022, theCommission published a Commission Staff working document on Climate Mainstreaming Architecture in the 2021-2027
Multiannual Financial Framework, including the Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument(NDICI, see action 43).
The Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans sets out that significant investment such as transportshould be future-proof and sustainable (through climate-proofing and mainstreaming) in line with the Guidelines for the
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Strengthen global engagement and exchanges on adaptation

Action 47: Submit the EU’s adaptation plans and actions under the Paris Agreement.
In October 2021 the first ever Adaptation Communication of the European Union1 was adopted by the Council and submitted
under the Paris Agreement.
The EU (Commission and EU Member States) is engaged in the UNFCCC negotiations on the Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work
programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). The GGA framework was launched at COP27 with a view to adopt it at
COP28. The framework is considered as a central element to advance climate adaptation action and scale up support at
global level, and as a tool to monitor and review progress, feeding into the periodic Global Stocktakes. The intersessional
UNFCCC Conference organised in Bonn, June 2023, concluded with an agreement among Parties over the structure andmain elements of the GGA framework. Work relates also to identifying high level targets and priority sectors. For thelatter, there are several synergies to be developed with other international processes such as the Sendai Framework for
DRR 2015-2030, the Agenda 2030 with the SDGs, and the Global Biodiversity Framework.
1

Adaptation Communication of the European Union, see https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/20211007_EU_adaptation_comms.pdf

Action 48: Deepen political engagement on climate change adaptation with international and regional partners, and partner countries.
The Commission is committed to include provisions for climate change adaptation in all EU trade agreements. All recently
negotiated Free Trade Agreements include commitments related to the implementation of the Paris agreement and cooperative activities on climate change mitigation and adaptation policies. The review of the Generalised System of Preferences(GSP) Regulation, foreseen by end-2023, should add the Paris Agreement to the list of conventions to the GSP scheme.
At the UN Water Conference in March 2023, sustainable management of water resources was recognised as key to theachievement of all sustainable development goals, including climate resilience.
A Water Action Agenda was adopted, to accelerate the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 6 and other
SDGs, and to drive transformation from a global water crisis to a water-secure world. It also called for the appointment of
a UN Special Envoy on Water, supported by a reformed UN Water. The EU has submitted 33 commitments, including ones
on climate adaptation, such as active diplomatic efforts promoting accession of new countries to the UNECE Convention
on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes. The EU has committed also over €1billion to water management, including working with countries in Africa and Central Asia.
The EU has joined the International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI). Moreover, climate adaptation was an important theme at
the 6th EU-South African Forum on environment, climate change, and sustainable development in October 2022
The EU is also broadening the All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance by including more Atlantic Small Island Developing
States (SIDS), including the Caribbean. In July 2022, the EU, along with Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Cabo Verde, Morocco,
South Africa and the United States of America signed a new All-Atlantic Ocean Research and Innovation Declaration. The
Alliance will be supported by a Coordination and Support Action under Horizon Europe1.
Under the EU Climate Dialogues, a multi-country activity on promoting the effective implementation of the Paris Agreementin the context of economic recovery and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including climate adaptation
practices, among partner countries will be set up in the 2nd half of 2023.
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Action 49: Increase the pool of knowledge and tools on adaptation available to non-EU countries andpromote adaptation in Green Alliances and Partnerships.
The EU discusses climate adaptation in all high-level dialogues with third countries. The Commission is supporting
exchanges on climate change adaptation knowledge and tools such as the development and implementation of National
Adaptation Plans. As part of the project supporting the Africa Adaptation Initiative (AAI) a series of trainings on climate
and disaster risk finance was organised for government officials and decision-makers.
In the EU’s Green Alliances with Japan and Norway, a commitment was taken to support the adaptation capacity of developing countries. The EU also has a Green Partnership with Morocco and signed a Green Partnership with the Republic ofKorea. A Green Alliance is currently being negotiated with Canada. These partnerships pave the way for enhanced cooperation and strategic dialogue in the field of climate adaptation. With the United States of America, regular exchanges
and coordination took place, including under the High-Level Climate Action Group set-up by the 2021 EU-US Summit.
Under Horizon 2020, Horizon Europe, 11th European Development Fund and NDICI-Global Europe funding, several projects(FOCUS-Africa1, DOWN2EARTH2, CONFER 3, HABITABLE4) are supporting the development of better climate intelligenceand services through earth observation and state of art climate science in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean aswell as Southeast Asia.
Supported by the European Environment Agency, the Commission has funded the Knowledge Exchange for Climate
Adaptation Platforms (KE4CAP) initiative for sharing and experience and support global capacity building how to initiate
and maintain online adaptation knowledge platforms. In 2023, Climate-ADAPT became a partner of the Asian-PacificClimate Change Adaptation Information Platform.
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FOCUS-Africa, see https://doi.org/10.3030/869575
DOWN2EARTH, see https://doi.org/10.3030/869550
CONFER, see https://doi.org/10.3030/869730
HABITABLE, see https://doi.org/10.3030/869395