Marriage Migration to East Asia: A Focus on Gender and Nationality【Special Features】

Marriage Migration to East Asia: A Focus on Gender and Nationality
Susan KNEEBONE*
Contents
I.

Introduction: Marriage Migration and Nationality in Historical Context

II.

Three Generations of Discrimination
1.

First generation discrimination: a married woman’s right to independent nationality

2.

Second generation discrimination: the (in)ability to pass nationality to children

3.

Third generation discrimination: gender inequality and discrimination in naturalisation
procedures

III. Implications of the Research
1.

First generation discrimination on the basis of gender: independent nationality andintersecting ‘constellations of power’

2.

Second generation discrimination: children as pawns of the state

3.

Third generation discrimination: naturalisation procedures

IV.

I.

Conclusions

Introduction: Marriage Migration and Nationality in Historical Context
In this Note I summarise my research which focuses on the impact of gender discriminatory

nationality laws (GDNL) in the context of marriage migration from Southeast to East Asia, specificallyto South Korea (‘the Republic of Korea’ or ‘Korea’) and Taiwan (‘the Republic of China’ or ‘ROC’).
For this purpose, I adapt Knop and Chinkin’s description of three ‘generations’ of discrimination under
1

GDNL as first: a married woman’s right to independent nationality; second: inequality in the ability* Professorial Fellow, Senior Associate Asian Law Centre, Research Affiliate Peter McMullin Centre on Statelessness, Melbourne
Law School. This Note which is an outcome of an Australia Research Council (ARC) funded Discovery Project entitled, ‘Developmentof a Legal Framework for Regulation of International Marriage Migration’ was first presented at …. I thank the organisers for theopportunity to travel to Japan to present. I gratefully acknowledge the support of researchers Thomas Harré, Brandais York, Sarah
Mercer, Subin Cho, Sayomi Ariyawansa, Hannah Gordon and Hansi Lim.
1
Karen Knop and Christine Chinkin, ‘Remembering Chrystal Macmillan: Women’s Equality and Nationality in International Law’(2000-1) 22 Michigan Jo Int L 523, 546-550.

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to pass nationality to children and third: gender inequality and discrimination in naturalisation
procedures. For example, in the cases of both Korea and Taiwan, despite modifications to laws, GDNL
persists in each of these three ‘generations’.
Migration for marriage is not a recent practice as marriages between persons of different
nationalities, which involve one migrating spouse, have occurred over time as Weil noted in his
2historical study of French nationality. It is one of the issues which intersects with migration andcitizenship \ nationality policies, in both destination and emigrant states globally. I argue that marriage
migration from Southeast to East Asia falls between the gaps of related regimes which provide
normative responses and state obligations for labour migration and human trafficking.

3

4

Nationality, gender and the state are inherently connected as I explain in the final section of thisNote (III. Implications of the Research). Laws and policies are an integral part of the control of such
migration. From 1907, when legislation in the United States and the United Kingdom deprived womencitizens of their nationality upon marriage with a foreigner, until the end of World War I (1918), theprinciple that a wife’s nationality depended on that of her husband was more generally recognised thanin any other period.

5

One of the issues which the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions

Relating to The Conflict of Nationality Law (Hague Convention) dealt with was the nationality ofwomen in the context of marriage migration. Ultimately, the 1930 Hague Convention in Chapter III(Nationality of Married Women) reaffirmed the principle of dependent or conditional nationality, bywhich a woman lost her nationality upon marriage to a ‘foreigner’ and took that of her husband. It
6

was not until 1957 that the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women abolished the principleof dependent nationality, in providing that neither celebration nor dissolution of marriage was to affectthe nationality of a married woman (Article 1). It also provided that privileged arrangements fornaturalisation should be available to alien wives at their request (Article 3(1)).

2Patrick Weil, How to be French: Nationality in the Making since 1789 (Translated by Catherine Porter) Duke University Press 2008.
Weil (12) describes how in the period of the ‘Old Regime’, whilst jus soli was the dominant principle, nationality could also be
obtained by establishing ‘qualité de français’ (French identity). See also Candice Lewis Bredbenner, A Nationality of Her Own:
Women, Marriage, and the Law of Citizenship (Uni of Calif Press, 1998) for a discussion of the link between migration, nationality
and gender in the USA.
3
Susan Kneebone, ‘Gender, race, culture and identity at the internal border of marriage migration of Vietnamese women in South
Korea’ in Sriprapha Petcharamesree and Mark Capaldi eds, Migration in Southeast Asia: The Interlocking of Vulnerabilities andResilience (Springer, 2023) Chapter 8.
4Susan Kneebone, ‘Gender, Nationality and Statelessness: Marriage Migration to East Asia’ to be published in the NUS-MLS
Statelessness in Asia Book Project (accepted June 2022).
5
Beroe Bicknell, ‘The Nationality of Married Women’ (1934) 20 Transactions Grotius Soc 106-122, 112.
6
In force 11 August 1958.

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Marriage Migration to East Asia: A Focus on Gender and Nationality

The 1957 Convention was overtaken by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimination against Women (CEDAW) 1979, Article 9(1), which requires State Parties to grant
women equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain their nationality. State Parties are to ensurethat marriage to an alien shall not ‘automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her statelessor force upon her the nationality of the husband’. Nevertheless, GDNL persist in many jurisdictions
7

globally. The regions with the largest concentration of countries with GDNL are Middle East-North
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by the Asia-Pacific.
First, I describe the persisting three ‘generations’ of discrimination under GDNL in Korea andTaiwan. I then briefly summarise the underlying norms of GDNL and the implications of my research
for marriage migration to East Asia.

II. Three Generations of Discrimination
1.

First generation discrimination: a married woman’s right to independent nationality

In both Korea and Taiwan, marriage migration assumed the proportions of a ‘phenomenon’ in
the 1980s in response to demographic changes and economic growth in the destination states. Despite
8

the fact that Taiwan (ROC) was a signatory to the 1957 Convention, automatic loss of nationality offoreign women marrying a Taiwanese national occurred until 2000 when the Nationality Act
incorporated naturalisation procedures. Similarly, from the establishment of the state of South Korea
in 1948 until 1997, marriage of a foreign woman to a Korean husband resulted in automatic ‘spousal
9transfer of citizenship’. Yet the Republic of Korea had ratified CEDAW in December 1984.

10

In

1997 the Korean Nationality Act was amended to provide a simplified process of naturalisation for a
foreign wife on proof of two years of conjugal life in Korea. Whereas the Korean legislation required
the foreign wife to relinquish her nationality of origin within 6 months of receiving Korean nationality(Article 3(1)), the Taiwanese Nationality Act of 2000 was distinctive in that it required an applicant
for naturalisation to renounce their original nationality before the application would be approved.
7

Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights: Global Overview https://equalnationalityrights.org/countries/global-overview.
After the conclusion of World War II the Kuomintang took over control of Taiwan (formerly Formosa and a Japanese colony 18951945). At this point until 1971 the Republic of China (Taiwan) was a member of the UN.
9Younghee Cho and Dong Bun Im, ‘Analysis of Social Issues and Legislation of International Marriages in Korea: Focusing on
Establishment and Dissolution of Marriages’ in Younghee Cho et al, Legal Systems related to International Marriage in Asia: South
Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, Vietnam and Cambodia (IOM Migration Research and Training Centre 2013) 1-46 at 31; Nora
Hui-Jung Kim, (2013) 18(1) The Journal of Korean Studies 7-28, 11; Chulwoo Lee, Report on Citizenship Law: The Republic ofKorea (Country Report 2017\06, February 2017) EUI RSCAS 3.
10
Note: Korea had entered a reservation on Art 9 at the time, which was withdrawn on 24 August 1999 to coincide with the change in
the Nationality Law 1997.
8

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Although the laws have been modified in each country in response to evidence of hardshipincluding domestic violence, and as a result of strong advocacy on the part of the non-governmental
sector, discriminatory factors which affect marriage migrants persist. For example, although since2010 Korea’s laws now allow dual nationality for a marriage migrant in a ‘normal’ marital
relationship, or who is separated or divorced but has the care of a minor child born to the marriage,
the divorced marriage migrant without a child is vulnerable if she has renounced her original
nationality under the naturalisation process (see 3 ‘Third generation discrimination’ below).

Bycontrast, in Taiwan the marriage migrant is effectively excluded from acquiring dual nationality
through the stringent requirements for this status, which favour ‘high-skilled’ migrants.

11

Howeverher immigration status may change if she is caring for a minor child; she may be allowed to remain in
Taiwan to care for the child until the child turns 20 years.
2.

Second generation discrimination: the (in)ability to pass nationality to children

In Korea, as a result of the automatic conferment of Korean nationality on the ‘foreign bride’
until 1997, patrilineal jus sanguinis was ensured. Thus children of the ‘mixed’ marriage acquired
Korean nationality. This discriminated against foreign wives on the basis of both nationality andethnicity (generally, as from the 1990s most marriage migrants originated from Southeast Asia) andgender as from 1948 a foreign husband (married to a Korean woman) could apply for facilitatednaturalization, from which any child of the marriage obtained the father’s acquired Korean nationality.
In 1997 a second important change was made to the 1976 Nationality Law. This was to weaken
the presumption of patrilineal jus sanguinis as an amendment provided that a Korean woman could
pass on her nationality to her child.

12

Thus a Korean woman married to a foreign man could pass onher nationality to her child but a foreign wife married to a Korean man could pass on her nationality
only though the laws of her original state.

13

As I explain below, this can lead to the vulnerability of

the child if the marriage fails, and the child returns to the mother’s country and the laws of that country
do not cover this situation.

11

Chen Yu-fu and Jonathan Chin, ‘Some immigrants no longer need to give up citizenship’, 24 March 2017, Taipei Times (online) http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2017/03/24/2003667366.
12
EA Chung and D Kim, ‘Citizenship and Marriage in a Globalising World: Multicultural Families and Monocultural Nationality
Laws in Korea and Japan’ (2012) 19 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 195, 214.
13
Junmo Kim, Seung-Mum Yang, Ado Torneo, ‘Marriage Immigration and Multicultural Families: Public Policies and their
Implications for the Philippines and South Korea’ (2014) 6(1) Asian Politics and Policy 97-119 at 120.

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Marriage Migration to East Asia: A Focus on Gender and Nationality

Like Korea, Taiwan inherited the patrilineal notion of jus sanguinis. A similar situation to Korea
prevails in Taiwan, as a 2000 amendment to the Nationality Act 1929 permits both Taiwanese parents
to pass on their nationality to their child, but the foreign bride cannot.
This situation can lead to vulnerability not only of the children of the marriage but also of theforeign wife. My research revealed that each year many Vietnamese women repatriate back home
after divorce and/or separation from their Taiwanese or Korean husbands.

14

In recent years, thewomen have returned home increasingly accompanied by children born from these marriages. The
children born in Taiwan, Korea and (more recently) China receive nationality through the jus sanguinis
laws of their countries of birth. However, due to difficulties in formalising legal arrangements for
15

divorce and custody, many of these children travel to Vietnam without valid legal paperwork or
documentation, and without parental understanding of the legal requirements for their migration. As
a result, many of the children have precarious legal status and are in danger of facing a life on thefringes of society.

16

A study that I conducted with others found that many of these children can considered to be defacto stateless (that is, ‘in fact’ as they hold a formal nationality, namely that of their father).

17

In thesummary of our study, we described their lack of ‘effective nationality’ in Vietnam. While thechildren, ethnically, are ‘half Vietnamese’ their legal status is often precarious in Vietnam because of
their foreign nationality. Through a close analysis of Vietnam’s laws and policies, we found that theyfell into gaps in the laws and policies. We recommended changes to the Vietnamese 2008 Nationality
Law to specifically address the situation of children of returned marriage migrants, and which provides
for a mother to unilaterally register her child as a Vietnamese citizen (as Vietnam has a more liberalpolicy on dual nationality).
3.

Third generation discrimination: gender inequality and discrimination in naturalisation
procedures
In both Korea and Taiwan, some laws and policies preclude marriage migrant women fromaccessing or completing naturalisation processes. In Korea, under the 1997 Nationality Law a
14

In both Korea and Taiwan, the nationality and immigration laws have responded to problems caused by high divorce rates and‘domestic violence’ in international marriages, which are well documented: Susan Kneebone, ‘Transnational marriage migrants andnationality: the cases of South Korea and Taiwan’ (International Academic Conference, Seoul, November 2017).
15
Ibid. See also: Hyun Mee Kim, Shinhye Park and Ariun Shukhertei, ‘Returning Home: Marriage Migrants’ Legal Precarity and theExperience of Divorce’ (2017) 49(1) Critical Asian Studies 38.
16
Susan Kneebone, Brandais York and Sayomi Ariyawansa, ‘Degrees of Statelessness: Children of Returned Marriage Migrants in
Can Tho, Vietnam’, (2019) 1(1) Statelessness & Citizenship Review 69-94, 71.
17
Kneebone, York and Ariyawansa, (2019).

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divorced woman lost her right to acquire nationality through naturalisation (Article 12(3)), and wasdeportable, often leaving children behind, or alternatively taking them illegally to her home country(see above). The 1997 Nationality Law also made a foreign wife vulnerable to statelessness in cases
where she had relinquished her original nationality before completing the naturalisation procedure andher country of origin had not established a procedure for restoration of nationality (as was the case in
Vietnam at this time).

18

As noted above, in Taiwan until 2016, Article 9 of the Nationality Act required applicants fornaturalisation to first renounce their previous nationality or allegiance before naturalisation would beapproved. This requirement caused some marriage migrant women to become stateless, as there wasno guarantee that after renouncing their original nationality, that they would gain Taiwanesenationality.

19

Although the 2016 amendment required foreign brides to present evidence ofrenunciation within a year of receiving Taiwanese citizenship, the grant of citizenship is conditionalfor 5 years during which time marriage migrants must have ‘no bad conduct’. Some NGOs havereported that this leaves the marriage migrant vulnerable to false or exaggerated complaints by adisgruntled husband.
However, in both Korea and Taiwan the biggest obstacle that marriage migrants face tonaturalisation is that they must establish an ongoing and stable marriage relationship. In Korea the1997 naturalisation process requires the support of the husband and his family, which often means thata woman remains in an abusive relationship to secure naturalisation.
the wife through the household registration system.

20

In Taiwan the husband controls

In addition to onerous prerequisites fornaturalization, must show that she is in a continuing marriage relationship, or has a ‘citizen child’; thatis, she must show a ‘kin-dependency relationship’. 21
In the case of Korea, the NGO Report to CEDAW July 2011 noted:
There are many cases where foreign spouses experience frustration as the Korean husband, whofears that they would run away after receiving citizenship, refuses visa extension or won't cooperatewith the nationality application process. There are numerous complaints from women about how thehusband controls the finances even when the women financially support the family. Some are even18

In 2011 the period of renunciation was increased from 6 months to one year and a pledge of renouncement replaced the process –see Chulwoo Lee, Report on Citizenship Law: The Republic of Korea (Country Report 2017\06, February 2017) EUI RSCAS, 4.
19
Kitty McKinsey, Divorce Leaves Some Vietnamese Women Broken-Hearted and Stateless (14 February 2007) accessed at
http://www.unhcr.org/45d324428.html.
20
NGO Report to CEDAW July 2011 6; CEDAW, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women: Republic of Korea UN Doc CEDAW/C/KOR/CO/7 (1 August 2011) para 26.
21
Sara Friedman, ‘Adjudicating the Intersection of Marital Immigration, Domestic Violence, and Spousal Murder: China-Taiwan
Marriages and Competing Legal Domains’ (2012) 19(1) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 221.

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Marriage Migration to East Asia: A Focus on Gender and Nationality

terrified that they would be forced to leave the country if they divorce a violent spouse with nocitizenship.
22

In response to the 2011 CEDAW Committee’s concerns and following a recommendation that
Korea ‘revise its legislation governing nationality with a view to removing all discriminatory
23

provisions relating to the requirements for acquiring Korean nationality’, the requirement for thehusband’s support was changed. But in 2018, the CEDAW Committee found that in practice,immigration officers might still require migrant female applicants to furnish a sponsorship letter
despite the enactment of a legal amendment in 2012 removing such a requirement.

24

In 2004, in response to extensive reports of domestic violence and increasing numbers of divorces
between marriage migrants and Korean men, the legislation was revised to provide that a foreign wife
could apply for naturalisation in her own right if she could prove that she was a victim of domestic
25

violence. This exceptional measure replicates those used in other countries such as Australia, but
for the foreign bride in Korea it is very hard to negotiate the legal system with limited language andtechnical skills.
The naturalisation procedure is thus fraught with many obstacles for marriage migrants in both
Taiwan and Korea. In Taiwan many marriage migrants only ever obtain residency or ‘partial
26

One study found that over a period of 15 years, only 18.3% of women obtained

27

Unlike Korea there is no special naturalisation procedure for victims of domestic

citizenship’.
citizenship.
violence.

III. Implications of the Research
1.

First generation discrimination on the basis of gender: independent nationality andintersecting ‘constellations of power’28

22

CEDAW (n 20) para 26.
Ibid para 27.
24
CEDAW, Concluding Observations on the Eighth Periodic Report of the Republic of Korea UN Doc CEDAW/C/KOR/CO/8 (14March 2018) para 34(c).
25Susan Kneebone, ‘Migration Marriage and Gender: A Site for Crimmigration? – An Australian Case Study’ in Peter Billings ed
Crimmigration in Australia (Springer 2019).
26
Yea-Huey Sheu, ‘Full Responsibility with Partial Citizenship: Immigrant Wives in Taiwan’ (2007) 41(2) 179.
27
Ibid. Cf Isabelle Cheng, ‘Living with One China as a Migrant Wife in Taiwan’ https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/portal/en/publicati
ons/living-with-one-china-as-a-migrant-wife-in-taiwan(9cb63bc5-0018-4aff-8b81-2333e9b33c3a).html – she says that from 19872016 more than 234,000 migrant wives have received ROC nationality.
28
Patricia Hill Collins and Valerie Chepp The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics (2018).
23

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Two gender stereotypes which link the notions of nation-state, national identity and national
security have framed the treatment of a married woman’s right to independent nationality. On the one
hand a patriarchal notion of the state is applied to deny the right to married women. On the other, the‘biological role of women and their ability to contribute to the national well-being is valued as a reason
to grant them the gift of their husband’s nationality. Embedded in both stereotypes is an understandingthat women are subservient to their husbands and to the nation; that women are incapable of allegianceor loyalty to the state.
Historically, the denial in international law in 1930 of the right to an independent nationality wasa casualty of a successful campaign by Western-educated suffragettes for the right to vote. As I have
29

shown, it was assumed that the wife owed a ‘subjective’ allegiance to her husband as ‘the state inminiature’.

30

31Knop and Chinkin explain that wives were viewed through a stereotype of devotion to‘preservation and care of life’, and as ‘incapable of love of country’. In the United States a national
woman who married a foreigner lost her nationality under the Expatriation Act 1907 whilst a man did
not; such marriage by a woman was seen as an act of disloyalty.
32

Bredbenner argues that fluctuating policies in the United States on married women’s nationality
reflected shifting ‘anxieties’ over immigration policy and the credentials of foreign wives as themothers of future citizens. Similar concerns dominate debates on immigration of foreign wives in33

many jurisdictions globally. In this context, women are perceived in cultural terms, as both victims
34

of deviant conduct and as agents of change and upholders of cultural norms.

35

In the context of East Asia, marriage migration is seen as a ‘critical project for the nation-state’

36

which feeds anxiety about the motives and impacts of the ‘foreign bride’. Similar concerns led from37

the migration of ‘mail-order brides’ to Australia in the 1980s leading to restrictive responses which
eventually had to be modified to recognize the individual agency of the women and their right to anindependent status.
29

Kneebone 2022, 6.
Helen Irving, Citizenship, Alienage and the Modern Constitutional State: A Gendered History (CUP UK 2016), 217.
31
Knop and Chinkin 2000, 546 citing Enoch Powell’s opinion that the ultimate test of nationality is a man’s duty to fight for his nationin war.
32
Bredbenner 1998, 195-96.
33
Saskia Bonjour and Betty de Hart, ‘A proper wife, a proper marriage: Constructions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in Dutch family migration
policy’ (2013) 20(1) European Jo of Women’s Studies 61-76.
34
Susan Kneebone, ‘Migration Marriage and Gender: A Site for Crimmigration? – An Australian Case Study’ in Peter Billings ed
Crimmigration in Australia (Springer 2019) 223-251.
35
Kneebone, 2023.
36
Mika Toyota, ‘Editorial Introduction: International Marriage, Rights and the State in East and Southeast Asia’ (2008) 12(1)Citizenship Studies 1, 3; Kneebone 2022.
37
Kneebone 2019.
30

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In the context of marriage migration to East Asia from developing countries in Southeast Asia,
Korea and Taiwan need to exercise their structural power towards marriage migrants responsibly
through migration policies that recognize the individual agency of the women and their need and desire
to migrate. In the case of Korea I found that the vulnerability of marriage migrants was exacerbatedby their exclusion from labour migration programs.

38

In Taiwan by contrast the government hascreated more visa pathways for women from Southeast Asia who can fill needs in the care sector.
2.

Second generation discrimination: children as pawns of the state39

In an early publication on this issue I drew attention to a gap in discussion about marriage
migration. As explained, the nationality policies of Korea (and Taiwan through its migration laws)
favour the foreign wife who has produced a child for the nation. This is tantamount to regarding thechild as a state asset (and nationality as a reward for the wife). However, the Convention on the Rights
40of the Child 1989 (CRC), Articles 7 and 8, arguably contains provisions which collectively confer
independent rights to nationality and identity upon a child born to an international marriage.
Importantly the CRC has been uniformly ratified in Southeast Asia, except Taiwan, which has enacted
the Enforcement Act of the CRC which effectively transposes the treaty into domestic law.
CRC Article 7.1 creates a right of a child to be registered and named from birth, and the right toacquire a nationality. The objective of this provision as Article 7.2 suggests, is to prevent statelessness,
but Article 7.1 also refers to the ‘right to know and be cared for by his or her parents’ – ‘as far as
possible’. It has been noted that Article 7 is broader than the ICCPR, Article 24.2, to be registered‘immediately after birth’ and to have a name.

41

It has been accepted that the CRC provision isdesigned to promote recognition of a child’s legal personality and identity; that the child should be42respected as a person in their own right. This is consistent with other provisions in the CRC which
provide that the child’s views shall be respected (Articles 12 and 13).

38 Kneebone 2023.
39

Susan Kneebone, ‘Nationality and Identity in Regulation of International Marriage Migration in Southeast and East Asia: Children
As Pawns of the State?’ U of Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper No. 734 (2016) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=2816750.
40
Convention on the Rights of the Child, New York, 20 November 1989, in force 2 September 1990, UN Doc. A/44/49, 44 UN GAOR
Supp. (No. 49) at 167 (‘CRC’).
41
Sharon Detrick, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999),
145.
42
Ineta Ziemele, Article 7: The Right to Birth Registration Name and Nationality and the Right to Know and Be Cared for by Parents(A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Martinus Nijhoff 2007), 1.

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Additionally, CRC Article 8 provides for preservation of the child’s identity.

43

This provision

which was largely inspired by the disappeared children in Argentina is arguably applicable to marriage
migration situations where families become split across states as a result of state policies. Article 8.2
imposes an obligation on states to provide assistance to re-establish the child’s identity where the childhas been deprived of it. It has been said this includes awareness of ancestors, family history, culture
and religion, plus continuity with the past and a consistent biography.

44

Together with the strongemphasis on family unity in Articles 9 and 10, the CRC emphasises the need for a child to grow up
with awareness of the culture of both parents.
Our research in Vietnam indeed showed that in some situations, children who returned to Vietnam
from Korea after a failed ‘mixed marriage’ did maintain contact with their fathers in Korea and wereencouraged by their mothers to maintain their Korean language skills with the possibility of higher
education in Korea in the future, clearly within their sights.

45

But these situations were exceptional.

They also require consistent policies and cooperation between states.
This discussion illustrates the need for states to consider the independent rights of children ofinternational marriages to a nationality and an identity which recognises both parents. States need to
implement child sensitive policies on nationality.
3.

Third generation discrimination: naturalisation procedures

The naturalisation procedures, which implement policies on nationality, often reinforce the powerof the husband over the foreign wife. Moreover, they demonstrate how administrative practices carriedout by officials of the state can frustrate the intention of the policies and breach international law. It
could be said that administrative practices reflect broader community attitudes to marriage migrants.
In my work I have demonstrated that notions of gender, race, culture and national identity shape46

47

responses to marriage migration in Korea and Taiwan leading to negative perceptions of marriage
migrants and their motives for migrating. Such perceptions are amplified by policies regulating
marriage migration which ‘commodify’ and ‘marketise’ the migration.

43

Defined as ‘including nationality, name and family relations as recognised by law without unlawful interference’ (Art 8.1).
Alastair MacDonald, The Rights of the Child: Law and Practice (Jordan Publishing 2011) 397.
45
Kneebone, York and Ariyawansa, (2019).
46
Kneebone 2023.
47
Kneebone 2022, 11.
44

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Marriage Migration to East Asia: A Focus on Gender and Nationality

IV. Conclusions
My Research Note shows that women who migrate for marriage from Southeast to East Asia, toKorea and Taiwan face gender discriminatory responses and risks of statelessness. Although these
responses have been gradually modified over four decades, serious discrimination persists, andextends to the children of a ‘mixed marriage’. As such discrimination links gender stereotypes tonotions of nation-state, national identity and national security, the solution lies in state hands to removeit through laws and policies, including provision of migration pathways. As the Global Compact on
Migration (2018) recognises, states need to provide safe and lawful pathways to reduce thevulnerabilities of international migration. Marriage migration is in large part a de facto labour
migration strategy for women in Southeast Asia and East Asia is a region in need of immigrants.
As my research demonstrates, marriage migration occurs in a regional and transnational context.
There is need for dialogue and discussion between states on this issue.

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28