Trust of Nations（Final Manuscript before the publication in “Behaviormetrika.”）
TRUST OF NATIONS:LOOKING FOR MORE UNIVERSAL VALUES FOR INTERPERSONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
Ryozo Yoshino *Abstract
The objective of this study is to review past research on people’s sense of trust as reflected in
the data from longitudinal and cross-national comparative surveys by the Institute of
Statistical Mathematics. First, I explain some history of our survey research. Second, I givea brief review of the studies on sense of trust. Third, I summarize some aspects of thefundamental social values of the Japanese and their sense of interpersonal trust as identified
in our Japanese National Character Survey. Fourth, I present a cross-national comparative
analysis of interpersonal trust and institutional trust, including the Seven Country Survey(Japan, the USA, and five European countries) (1987–1993), Japanese immigrant surveys, theEast Asia Values Survey (2002–2005), the Pacific-Rim Values Survey (2004–2009), and theAsia-Pacific Values Survey (2010–2014). To overcome the limitations of the studies based
mostly on the items of the General Social Survey or the World Values Survey, I explore morebasic social values on human bonds that may underlie people’s sense of trust beyond
differences in countries or time. The final section presents some comments for our future
research.

Key Words and Phrases: cross-national comparison, cultural manifold analysis, family, Japaneseimmigrant, interpersonal relations, Japanese national character, longitudinal survey, social
survey, trust.
This is a revised version of Yoshino (2009, 2014), including updated and augmented survey data
sets.

*Survey Science Center, The Institute of Statistical Mathematics, 10-3 Midori-cho, Tachikawa,Tokyo 190-8562, Japan.

E-mail adress: yoshino@ism. ac. jp

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1. Introduction
The objective of this study is to review past research on people’s sense of trust as reflected in
the data from longitudinal and cross-national comparative surveys by the Institute of Statistical
Mathematics. This includes the Japanese National Character Survey, the Seven Country Survey(Japan, USA, and five European countries) (1987–1993), Japanese immigrant surveys, the East
Asia Values Survey (EAVS) (2002–2005), the Pacific-Rim Values Survey (PRVS) (2004–2009), and
the Asia-Pacific Values Survey (APVS) (2010–2014). Among other issues, I focus on trust systems
to explore what aspects of sense of trust are stable and what aspects are variable longitudinally inaccordance with economic or political conditions. This may eventually lead us to explore more
universal social values beyond differences in countries and time in the study of the stability ofpeoples’ basic social values as reflected in data from our past surveys on national character overthe past six decades. The background and the significance of this study are as follows.
The last three decades has witnessed a rapid global change that has led to the destruction of
the traditional world order and to chaos before the construction of a new order. Japan struggledwith recession in a period called the “lost decade,” which eventually lasted much longer andbecame known as the “lost two decades.” At the same time, several military and political conflicts
have occurred in certain areas. Each nation and race has its own culture, social values, and waysof thinking, which underlie its economic system, politics, social life, etc. I believe that mutual
understanding of these aspects with respect to each nation is the key to the peaceful development
and economic prosperity of the world. We ought to encourage people to adopt social values thatare tolerant of their manifold variety and differences at the global level.
The Institute of Statistical Mathematics (ISM) has been conducting a longitudinal

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nationwide social survey on the Japanese National Character Survey every five years since 1953,
using mostly the same questionnaire items (Hayashi, 1993; Mizuno et al., 1992; Sakamoto et al.,2000). By the term “national character,” we refer to characteristics reflected in people’s response
patterns in questionnaire surveys (cf. Inkeles, 1997). This survey is a type of general social
survey, so the questionnaire covers various aspects of people's opinions about their culture, daily
life, economy, education, environment, interpersonal relationships, politics, religion, security, etc.
(see http://www. ism. ac. jp/ism_info_e/kokuminsei_e. html).
This survey research was closely related to the establishment of a scientific system of public
opinion polling based on a statistical sampling theory for the development of post-World War II
democracy in Japan. The sampling theory itself was invented by the Japanese statistician
Toyojiro Kameda as early as 1924, and it was used to study the damage caused by the Great
Kanto Earthquake of 1923. However, it was never linked to public opinion poll at that time. In
the post-WWII period in Japan, Japanese researchers (e. g., Hiroshi Midzuno, Chikio Hayashi,and Setsuko Takakura of ISM) used some textbooks from the CIE Library of General
Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) to invent a practicalsampling method adapted to Japan. The system of public opinion polling must have been
important during the postwar period, when Japan was expected to change from a military regime
to a democratic country (Yoshino, 1994, 2005a). It is said that, stimulated by this survey, some
now well-known surveys, such as ALLBUS in Germany, CREDOC in France, the European
Values Survey and the Eurobarometer in the EU, and the General Social Survey (GSS) in the
USA have been initiated.
Since 1971, the Japanese National Character Survey has been expanded to cross-national

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surveys for a more advanced understanding of the Japanese national character in the context
of comparative study (Hayashi, 1973; Table 1 of Yoshino et al., 2015, of this issue) (seehttp://www. ism. ac. jp/~yoshino/index_e. html). Selecting items from these nationwide
surveys, we designed our questionnaires to compare peoples’ social values, ways of thinking,and feelings and, more explicitly, their cultural identities, interpersonal relationships,
religious attitudes, and social values with respect to the economy, freedom of speech,
leadership, politics, science and technology, social security, etc. These aspects may create
psychological distance between nations or cultures, which are evidenced in certain response
patterns. Our final goal is to develop a behaviormetric study of civilizations through social
survey data that will give us fundamental information for the peaceful development of theworld.
To be considered a scientific study, a cross-national survey must overcome multi-faceted
methodological problems. First, it is a difficult task scientifically to compare responses collectedunder different conditions, e.g., different languages and different statistical sampling methods.
There is no a priori knowledge regarding how these varying conditions influence peoples’
responses even in cases where there is no substantive difference between the peoples. Thus, an
important problem for our study is the need to investigate those conditions under whichmeaningful cross-national comparability of social survey data is guaranteed. This problem
involves many analytical and methodological sub-problems, including 1) translation (i. e., thesame questionnaire items must be written in different languages), 2) comparison of data setscollected by different sampling procedures used in different countries, 3) characterization of thenations (i.e., in which respects and to what degree certain nations are similar or dissimilar to4Trust of Nations

others), and 4) the description of nations in terms of common logic rather than logic particular to acertain nation. These sub-problems are complementary in the sense that solutions to these
problems are related to each other. Some findings have been reported in our past publications (C.
Hayashi, 1993, 2001a, 2001b; C. Hayashi, et al. , 1998; C. Hayashi & Yoshino, 2002; F. Hayashi& Yamaoka, 2002; Kuroda, 2002; Matsumoto, 2006; Yoshino, 2000, 20001a, 2001c, 2003, 2005a,
2005b, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014d; Yoshino, F. Hayashi & Yamaoka, 2010).
We have taken several steps forward toward a scientific foundation for cross-national
comparison with our established methodologies called Cultural Linkage Analysis (CLA) andCultural Manifold Analysis (CULMAN) (see Yoshino et al. , 2015, of this issue) for the mutual
understanding of peoples all over the world; prediction of the mass behavior of a certain nation in
response to a particular event; prediction of the political determination of a particular nation ininternational relations; scientific understanding of the rise and fall of civilizations; andinvestigation of an ideal condition in Japan and the world for the development and maintenanceof world peace.
The composition of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a minimum
review of past studies on sense of trust. In Section 3, I summarize some aspects of fundamentalsocial values of the Japanese and their sense of interpersonal trust as identified in our Japanese
National Character Survey. In Section 4, I present a cross-national comparative analysis ofinterpersonal trust, institutional trust, and some social values as explored through our past
surveys. Finally, Section 5 presents some suggestions for future research.

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2. Reconstruction of Trust during the Transitional Period
The transition after the end of the Cold War brought domestic and international confusion invarious areas worldwide as well as in various domains of daily life. In addition, there has been arapid transition from the established social system based on traditional industry to a systemfounded on highly advanced information technology in the last quarter-century or so. The global
rise of new social and political movements has also brought confusion into daily life. As a result,
we have faced the collapse of our sense of trust in the traditional world order and in the
traditional systems of education, ethics, family, law, marriage, the work environment, etc. This
does not necessarily mean, however, that each individual has totally lost his or her interpersonal
trust. It may be that people’s sense of trust and energy are wandering and need to be directed
toward the development of a new interpersonal system. Thus, it is important to investigate how
people’s attitudes toward the traditional trust system will change in the near future. Under
these conditions, “trust” has been extensively studied over the past quarter-century (e.g.,
Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1995).
Although there are various possible definitions of “trust,” all of them may be roughly classified
as “trust in transactions” or “trust in normative philosophy,” as summarized in Hosmer (1995).
The study of trust in normative philosophy has a long history, at least since Aristotle in the Westand Buddha and Confucius in the East, but it is rare these days. Uslaner’s (2002, 2010) studies
present an exception. In addition, the study of trust in transactions has been the focus of many
papers published during the recent years of globalization.
Zucker (1986) pointed out three methods for the production of trust: 1) process-based trust tied
to past exchanges; 2) characteristic-based trust tied to personal characteristics, such as family

6Trust of Nations

background and ethnicity; and 3) institution-based trust tied to formal societal structures.
Shapiro (1987) criticized the third category because he believes that trust cannot be
institutionalized. Further, Zucker (1986) claimed that trust is not directly measurable. Thismay have influenced Fukuyama’s (1995) methodology, as he used various datasets concerning“distrust,” such as the crime, divorce, and unemployment rates, rather than a direct measure oftrust through public opinion surveys. My focus in this study is mainly on the second of Zucker’s
three categories of trust, i. e., trust based on personal characteristics, although the three
categories are mutually interrelated.
Banfield (1958) regarded “distrust” as the culture of the poor. This motivated Yoshino (2002)
to investigate the relationships between people’s sense of trust and their economic conditions.
His data showed some cross-national differences in the degree of correlation between people’s
sense of trust and their household income or subjective social class: Americans’ sense of trust may
be closely related to their economic conditions, whereas the Japanese sense of trust seems stable
regardless of their economic condition, although the collapse of the life-long employment system
and almost two decades of economic depression might make the Japanese sense of trust moresensitive to economic conditions.
Derived from G. H. Mead’s approach, Miyamoto, Fugita, and Kashima (2002) developed atheory of interpersonal relations based on balancing direct behavior and deep cognition tofacilitate an understanding of the differences in character between Japanese and Americans.
They indicated, for example, that the Japanese prefer delayed action and pay more attention to
the perceptions of others, of themselves, and of the situation, whereas Americans favor direct
action and pay more attention to their own views. Their theory was originally developed for the7Trust of Nations

study of Americans with Japanese ancestry (or Japanese immigrants in general) and theirtransition of generations from first (“Issei”) to second generation (“Nisei”), and then from second
to third generation (“Sansei”), and so on. This theory may lead to an understanding of theinteraction between racial origins and social environments (see Fugita, Kashima & Miyamoto,2002; Fugita, Miyamoto & Kashima, 2002).
As for measurements of national character, Inkeles (1997) claimed that aspects directly
related to economic or political conditions should not be regarded as part of the “national
character. ” It is reasonable, however, to assume that people of different countries may responddifferently to certain economic or political items on a questionnaire even under the same economic
and political conditions, and that such differences in response patterns may be closely related to“national character. ” For example, in the late 1980s, Brazilians showed a high degree of life
satisfaction and happiness even when their country was experiencing severe conditions regarding
international debt. In contrast, the Japanese did not show a high degree of life satisfaction andhappiness even when their economy was close to being the best-performing one in the world. To
understand phenomena like these, we need to identify general tendencies in different peoples’
manners of responding; therefore, both objective and subjective means of measurement must becomplementarily employed.
Among various efforts to relate trust with social issues in the last two decades, public health
may be one of the most productive fields in the study of social capital (voluntary activity orinterpersonal trust). For example, Kawachi et al. (1997) reported that a greater degree of social
capital was closely linked to better health as measured by medical research experiments andsocial surveys at the individual and state levels in the USA. Their findings have been confirmed

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in some countries but not in others. In Japan, no clear relationship had been confirmed, probably
because one difficulty is identifying what spatial unit (prefecture, city, village, etc. ) should be
adopted in attempts to relate health to social capital (sense of trust).
As for the ranking of the interpersonal trust scale of the GSS (see Sec. 3. 2), Yoshino andTsunoda (2010) showed that the Japanese are in the middle and the Italians and the French arein the lower echelons, respectively, but that they all rank higher in life expectancy than countries
that rank higher on interpersonal trust, such as the USA and the UK. This suggests that thepositive response rates of interpersonal trust and peoples’ health (life expectancy) are not related
to each other simply but are intertwined. Thus, we may need to question the universal validity of
the GSS items as a scale of trust in the cross-national comparative context, or it may be necessary
to consider the possibility of a non-linear correlation between health and social capital (cf.
Yoshino, 2002, Fig. 4).
Incidentally, we need to think about the general response tendency of each ethnic group,
nation, or race, such as the Japanese preference for the middle categories, the French preference
for expressing critical attitudes, and the Indian tendency to choose positive categories. It is
important to note regarding the possibilities that these tendencies are closely related to several
factors associated with differences in communication between multiracial countries andmono-racial countries or with degrees of the development of democracy (see Yoshino, 2009, Table
2; Yoshino & Osaki, 2013).
A logistic regression analysis by Tsunoda, Yoshino, and Yokoyama (2008) revealed certain
relationships between two dependent variables on self-rated health and health dissatisfaction
and some independent variables such as religion, social capital, spirituality, superstitions, etc., as

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part of a national character study. For example, in males with negative attitudes on generalizedinterpersonal trust (Q38 of Sec. 3), the number of self-reported symptoms was greater; in females,
negative attitudes on norms of reciprocity (Q36 of Sec. 3) were associated with a greater numberof self-reported symptoms. In both genders, self-reported symptoms and health dissatisfaction
were greater in the presence of anxiety. A larger number of self-reported symptoms wereassociated with adherence to religion and spirituality in males. In females, the degree of healthdissatisfaction was greater in those with low income and concern about superstitions. Thus,
perceived health is susceptible to the influence of personal relationships in females and to distrustin males. In addition, females were influenced by economic status and superstitions, whereas
males were more concerned about religion or the mind in relation to health. This study is
consistent with Maselko and Kubzansky’s (2006) inference that men who begin to feel
psychological distress stop going to religious services, whereas women who begin to feel bad
continue to attend.
Inaba started his study on trust originally as an economist, but now he and his colleagues
have published many books on social capital as a broad interdisciplinary research topic (Inaba[ed.], 2008; Inaba & Fujiwara [eds.], 2013; Inaba et al. [eds.], 2011; Inaba et al. [eds.], 2014].
Sasaki (2014) and Dryakhlov, et al. (2013) discussed recent cross-national studies, including
surveys on Asia-Pacific countries, Eastern and Northern Europe, Turkey, and Russia.
Overall, it is worthwhile to emphasize the importance of a complementary approach using
objective and subjective measures for the scientific scaling of trust in questionnaire surveys(Yoshino, Sec. 2.1 of Inaba et al. , 2014; Yoshino, 2014a).

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3. Interpersonal Trust and Social Values
In this section, I consider certain aspects of “trust” reflected in responses to our Japanese
National Character survey. I also pay attention to the survey data on the variability of people’s
trust systems to explore which aspects of people’s sense of trust are stable over many decades andwhich vary with changes, e. g., in economic and political conditions. As mentioned previously,some researchers say that “trust” is not directly measurable. There may be no universal scale on
sense of trust beyond differences in cultures and time, and, even if there is such a scale, it may not
be linear with respect to various factors (e.g., the non-linear effect of income or social class onsense of trust, as shown in Sec. 2). However, I believe that people’s responses in questionnaire
surveys can reveal certain aspects of their sense of trust if the time series patterns or
cross-national patterns of those responses are adequately analyzed and general response
tendencies of nations and personality types are adequately considered.
Our longitudinal survey shows some stable aspects of the attitudes and social values of theJapanese (Hayashi & Kuroda, 1997; Yoshino, 1994). I briefly explain certain fundamental
dimensions of Japanese social values in Sec. 3.1 and some analyses of the sense of trust among
Japanese along several dimensions with some remarks on scaling in Sec. 3.2.
3. 1 Fundamental Dimensions of Japanese Social Values
Hayashi (1993) identified two important dimensions that underlie the Japanese national
character: 1) the dimension of interpersonal relationships (a Giri-Ninjyo attitude, or a sort ofemotional conflict between the obligation to uphold social duties and warm-heartedness) and 2)
the dimension of contrast between the modern and traditional in their way of thinking.
On one hand, basic Japanese interpersonal attitudes have been stable, at least over the last11

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half-century and probably much longer. (Most likely, the basic aspects of interpersonal attitudes
may be stable in any country over time. However, certain aspects that are sensitive to changes in
economic or political conditions may vary in the short term in most countries. )On the other hand, Japan had strived since the Meiji Restoration in 1868 to overtake Westernscience and technology and develop it into a Japanese adaptation. It is likely that this enduring
effort had underlined the dimension of the traditional versus modern orientation in the Japanese
way of thinking, probably until the early 1970s or so.
However, the Japanese way of thinking has been changing gradually. Our survey of 1978
identified a generation gap between people aged 20–24 years old and those aged 25 years or older(Footnote 1). Since signs of generational changes appeared as early as 1978, the Japanese way of
thinking had become more complicated than ever. Furthermore, the Japanese have been living
in a period of transition from the established social system to a system of a highly advanced
information age in the last two decades or so. This has brought disruption not only to the fields ofscience and technology but also to the fields of economics and politics. In this period of confusion,
the majority of Japanese people have come to distrust traditional systems such as banking andbureaucracy as well as the legislature, police, etc. (Yoshino, 2002). This must be closely related
to the recent changes in governing parties. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governed Japansome four decades (1955–1993) alone and then in a coalition with other parties from 1993 until
2009. This might symbolize the Japanese political attitude that dislikes rapid changes. Underglobalization, however, Japan came under pressure to restructure its social systems, including
business, education, and law in the last quarter- century. This necessitated change in even themost fundamental human relationships, not only in business but also in daily life, eventually12Trust of Nations

sapping the source of national power. Confusion appeared with the switching of the governing
party from the LDP to the Democratic Party in 2009 and then back to the LDP in 2012. The
current Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, forced to resign in 2007 but revived politically in December
2012, is struggling to revive Japanese national power. In people’s attitudes, values, or ways ofthinking, some fundamental interpersonal relationships must be stable to maintain the social
order.
3. 2 Sense of Interpersonal Trust of the Japanese
Psychological studies of measures of interpersonal trust have been developed in recent decades(Rosenberg, 1956; Rotter, 1971). Many of these studies may have some methodologicallimitations because they are based on sample sizes that are too small or not based on statisticallyrandom samples. The significance of such studies, however, may have been justified by astatement made by Rotter (1971, p. 443) during the Cold War: “It seems clear that disarmament
will not proceed without an increase in trust on one or both sides of the iron curtain. ” The ironcurtain was torn down more than a quarter-century ago, but new local conflicts have been
occurring incessantly all over the world. This necessitates the continued study of interpersonaland international trust, and the study of the production of trust necessitates the measurement oftrust.
A set of three items from the GSS has been used to measure people’s sense of trust (seeYoshino & Osaki, 2013, for some history of those items). Although the GSS started as a sort ofAmerican version of our Japanese National Character Survey, we adopted the three items fromtheir questionnaire for our survey in 1978. They are stated as follows (for the Japanese
questionnaire, see Sakamoto et al., 2000, or http://www.ism.ac.jp/kokuminsei/index. html; see also13Trust of Nations

footnote 2).

Q36. Would you say that, most of the time, people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out forthemselves?
1. Try to be helpful,

2. Look out for themselves

Q37. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to
be fair?
1. Take advantage,

2. Try to be fair,

Q38. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful indealing with people?
1. Can be trusted,

2. Can’t be too careful,

Here I discuss the dimensionality and wording of these items. Almond and Verba (1963) usedfactor analysis on a set of student survey data to select several items among hundreds of items ontrust, and the aforementioned three items survived to be included in the GSS and other related
surveys. Thus, the three items were supposed to measure different dimensions of trust: Q36 isrelated to a sort of trust in neighbors (or the norm of reciprocity), Q38 is related to generalinterpersonal trust, and Q37 is concerned with something in between the other two items. Ourdata, however, have repeatedly demonstrated that, among these items, Q37 and Q38 are morecorrelated for the Japanese, whereas Q36 and Q37 are more correlated for Americans. Thus, twoof the three items (Q36 and Q37, or Q37 and Q38) may capture fairly independent aspects, but all
three do not necessarily capture such factors. Therefore, I sometimes use the independent items
Q36 and Q38 when I must reduce the number of items in a questionnaire. Tables 1a, 1b, 1c, and14

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1d give a more recent summary of the data to see the structures of the three pairs of correlations
between the three items. Each country of our APVS corresponds to either the pattern of Japan orthat of the USA; therefore, the independence of dimensionality of these two items always held,with the exception of the India 2008 and 2013 surveys, which showed a higher correlation
between Q36 and Q38 (Yoshino & Osaki, 2013, Yoshino, 2014c). Some countries show more orless stable patterns over years, whereas some other countries, such as South Korea, show somevariability. At this point in the research, I am not sure whether South Korea’s variability iscaused by some essential changes, a slight change in survey item wordings, or changes in survey
conditions.
*** Table 1a,b,c, & d Correlations ***Concerning Q38, some people may suspect that the second response option, “can’t be too
careful,” is not likely to mean distrust but to refer to another positive social value related toself-discipline. This may explain the higher rates of selection for this answer than the first option,“can be trusted,” in many countries (see Table 2 of Yoshino, 2002).
NORC-ROPER (1986) reported comparative survey data with respect to the effect of thesecond option. In the survey, two cases were compared: in Case 1, the same wording as Q38 wasused, and in Case 2, the phrase “can’t be trusted” was used. The second answer was lessfrequently chosen in Case 2 than in Case 1 (i.e., more people answered “can be trusted”). The
same pattern of response change was found in Japanese surveys (compare Sakamoto et al. [2000]
with Osaka Shogyo University & Tokyo University [1999]). Thus, the wording of Q38 may beconsidered a sort of advanced technique to elicit people’s true opinion (honne in Japanese),
reducing the degree of social desirability in responses (tatemae in Japanese).

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Trust of Nations*** Fig 1. Japan 3 GSS items on trust ***I frequently use the percentage of those who selected positive responses to all three items (“1”for Q36, “2” for Q37, and “1” for Q38) as a trust scale, although other definitions of a trust scale
may be possible based on these three items. The response distribution for the Japanese over the
past two decades (1978-2013) is shown in Fig.1.

These figures show that the Japanese people’s

sense of trust has been fairly stable on this scale from 1983–2008 (Yoshino [2014d] included
incorrect data for 1978 but corrected them in Fig. 1). Fig 2 of Yoshino (2005b, p.151) showed
greater changes of trust on the scale among Americans than among Japanese from 1983–2008. If
we include the data from 1978 and 2013 (Fig.1), however, the Japanese data also show somechanges over the years, although the degree of change may be smaller than that of the USA. Thechanges may be related to the economic change after the oil shock and the Nixon shock around1973 and the disaster of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, respectively.
Yoshino (2009) noted the remarkably low degree of trust among those age 60–64 years in the1998 survey. These people were children during WWII and experienced a drastic social change
from a military regime to a postwar democracy. They had a hard time surviving the time offamine that occurred during and immediately after the war, and they reconstructed the ruins ofJapan to build a highly advanced industrialized country. Under the economic depression, called“the lost decade,” of the 1990s, most people of this generation had retired from the lifelong
employment system, but they did not receive as much pension money as they had expected, andmany had a hard time finding new jobs. The aforementioned data may reflect their distrust
toward the social systems that did not compensate them sufficiently for their lifelong hard work.
Incidentally, this generation forms a particular cohort whose opinions and values are different

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from those of the other generations in many cases (see Mizuno et al., 1992).
In analyzing data from a more recent survey conducted in 2010, I found that, roughly, thecross-tabulation of Q36, Q37, and Q38 with respect to gender, age, and education does not seem toshow any remarkable differences in response patterns. An assessment of the response
distributions of the cross-tabulations more precisely, however, reveals some differences. As forgender, women are more optimistic than men on Q37, but both men and women show the same
response patterns on Q36 and Q38. As for education level by gender on Q37, generally, womenare more positive than men, disregarding their education levels; furthermore, men with higher
education show a higher rate of distrust than men with lower education on Q37. No such trend
was observed for women. On Q38, the higher level of education shows the higher level of trust for
both genders. In the cross-tabulation of gender by age, more women under 35 years of age tended
to choose “can’t be too careful” for Q38 than the other age groups.
Although the Japanese sense of trust may have been more stable with respect to economicchanges than that of Americans, the economic structural reformation of the last two decades
seemed to have damaged the Japanese sense of trust to some extent, as Fig. 1 may suggest. In
the early 1990s, the educational system was changed significantly from a system that imposed
hard work on pupils to a system that gives them more free time, called yutori-kyoiku (“relaxededucation”), despite other countries trying to imitate the hard-work education to catch up to thethen-high economic level of Japan. The new system was expected to produce creative youth withdiverse attitudes and social values, but it simply produced many self-centered persons lacking
basic skills in various fields. In the early 1990s, economic conditions were still fairly good. These
young people enjoyed the ability to move easily from one workplace to another, outside the system

17

Trust of Nationsof traditional life-long employment, trying to find the best place for themselves, as if looking for“the Blue Bird.” However, the system of employment has changed from one of life-longemployment to one in which workers, including those in public sector jobs, can easily be fired.
This has produced distrust between employers and employees: workers are afraid of losing theirjobs, whereas employers are afraid of losing workers soon after they have invested heavily in theirtraining.
Meanwhile, the government has lost people’s trust in the national pension system. Senior
people rely on younger people for future financial support, but the population of younger
generations has been decreasing, and they are less motivated to pay pension costs, inconsideration of the balance between their total payments and their expected return in the future.
These situations have necessarily led to a loss of trust between the young and senior people.
Thus, the difference in trust found in Japanese and American samples may largely come fromthe difference between the employment systems: workers’ salaries may be lower, but workers
could not be fired so easily in the life-long employment system of Japan, at least until recently.
This reminds us of the Chinese proverb of Mengzi: “No stable mind without a stable job. ” Allthose social reforms have been made under globalization. Without consideration of the culture ofeach country, it simply leads to confusion.
Regarding the relationship between crime rates and the sense of interpersonal trust (Q38)from 1983–2003, Inaba (2002, p.72, Fig.1-12) showed a causal relationship between the economy
and trust in Japan: the economic change from prosperity to recession gradually led to an increasein crime and eventually to an increase in people’s sense of distrust with a time lag of some five
years.

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Yoshino (2002) discussed several other aspects of trust, such as trust in politics, science, andtechnology as well as the work ethic of the Japanese, and concluded that some aspects of trust
might be variable according to economic and political conditions, whereas other aspects may be
more stable over time. Generally, the Japanese show stability in interpersonal trust, whereas
their attitudes toward work and their work ethic seem to have been influenced by economic andpolitical conditions, although the Japanese used to have the stereotype of being too-diligent
workers called the “economic animal” in the 1980s. (See Inagaki and Maeda (in press) for the
study of trust using latent structure modelling on the Japanese National Character Survey).
For more careful analysis, we need to consider the effect of longitudinal changes in the rate ofvalid returned questionnaires on the superficial response percentage for a certain item. A
longitudinal survey on the happiness of high school students conducted by the NHK Broadcasting
Culture Research Institute (2013) reported that the number of “happy” high school students had
been rapidly increasing over three decades in Japan and that more than 90 percent of thestudents were ”happy” in the 2010 survey. This was a surprise because it appeared to contradict
the real situations of current Japanese high school students. Yoshino (2014b) showed, however,that the multiplication of the percentage of happy students and the rate of valid returned
questionnaires for each survey turns out to be fairly stable over the three decades. This suggeststhat participation in the survey and the response of happiness may be highly correlated (i. e. ,many “unhappy” students may have been excluded from the surveys).
*** Fig. 2 multiplication ***Concerning our Japanese National Character Survey, Fig.2 shows that the changes in thevalid questionnaire return rate may not have a remarkable effect on the trend of responses

19Trust of Nations

regarding interpersonal generalized trust. However, Yoshino (2014b) showed a constant decreaseof the aforementioned multiplication in the Japan surveys of 2002 (EAVS), 2004 (PRVS), 2010
(APVS), and 2013 (the 13th survey of Japanese national character). Simply because we cannot
estimate the precise distribution of missing data, we need more studies to determine whether itreally reflects a decrease in interpersonal trust in Japan or not (cf. Fushiki & Maeda, 2013;
Tsuchiya, 2010).
Also we must pay attention to general response tendencies that are closely related to degrees
of self-disclosure (Yoshino, Hayashi & Yamaoka, 2010) and the optimistic vs. pessimistic
personalities of individuals and nations. Yoshino (2014a) reviewed past studies on happiness, life
satisfaction, and well-being and concluded that “happiness” shown in survey data is closely
related to the personality of each individual as well as each nation. More explicitly, the long-term
tendency is relatively stable over time regardless of objective economic or political conditions(Hofstead, Hofstead & Minkov, 2010), whereas it significantly changes in the short term, such as
in a day (Kahneman & Krueger, 2006). A similar tendency may be seen in our study on sense oftrust. Thus, although it does not exclude the importance of the measurement of detailed change
in sense of trust, we may need to be careful regarding the distinction between the long-term
tendency and the short-term tendency of peoples’ sense of trust in cross-national comparison.

4. Cross-National Comparison of Interpersonal and Institutional Trust and More Universal
Social Values
In this section, I present an overview of people’s sense of trust as shown in our pastcross-national surveys. I deal with the sense of interpersonal trust in Sec.4.1, institutional trust

20Trust of Nationsin Sec.4.2, and Japanese immigrant surveys in Sec.4.3. In Sec.4.4, I show some data on thefundamental social values, exploring more universal values that may underlie people’s sense oftrust.
4.1 Sense of Interpersonal Trust
Our cross-national surveys also included the three items on interpersonal trust from the GSS
mentioned in the previous section. Tables 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2f and 2g show the response
distributions of the GSS trust scale for most of the countries/areas that we have surveyed over the
past four decades.
*** Table 2 a, b , c, d, (GSS 3 Simple Tabulation) ****** Table 2e, f(GSS 3 Singapore & Japanese Immigrants) ***Miyake presented an analysis of this topic (Hayashi et al., 1998, Ch. 7) as a member of ourSeven Country Survey: Japan, the USA, the UK, West Germany, and France in 1987–1988 and
Italy and the Netherlands in 1992–1993. He concluded that the trust scale had low correlations
with gender and religion but stronger correlations with family income, educational level, andsocial class. These correlations were not strong.
On this scale, West Germany, the UK, and the USA scored higher than Japan and theNetherlands, but the difference was small. The French and Italians clearly scored lower thanthose in other nations. In addition, Miyake found that those who had religious faith gave morepositive responses to item Q36, irrespective of their religious affiliation. Furthermore, he found agender difference in responses to item Q37. Specifically, women gave more optimistic answers
than men, i.e., “they would try to be fair.” As for item Q38, there was a clear difference betweensocial classes in all seven countries: the higher the social class, the more trustful the respondents

21Trust of Nations

were. The difference between classes was remarkably large in France and the USA. Miyake also
observed that a higher level of education was associated with greater trust, and he suspected thatthe association was caused by the correlation between education and social class. (Although
there was a relatively strong correlation between education and social class or between educationand income in the USA, this is not necessarily the case for all other countries.) Using the samedata, Yoshino (2002) showed almost linear correlations between trust and (self-reported) social
class or income in the USA and the UK but non-linear correlations in the other five countries,
including Japan and West Germany.
**** Fig. 3 (Q36 & Q38) ***Fig. 3 shows the percentage in each country of those who gave positive answers to both Q36
and Q38. I frequently use these two items because Q37 was not used in some of our past surveys,
and I have confirmed that the general pattern for that figure was almost the same as for a figure
made using all three items for the countries or areas where all three items were asked. Examples
are the surveys in Japan in 1988, 2002, 2004, and 2010 and those in Beijing and Shanghai in 2002,
2005, and 2011. More precisely, however, we must be careful about the correlations of the two or
three GSS items, as mentioned in Sec.3. We may also need to pay attention to the rapid change inthe percentages of Australia from 2007 to 2012 shown in Fig.3. At this point in the research, it isunclear whether it is an essential change or one caused by some problem involving the survey
conditions. Overall, this index seems useful, at least for obtaining an overview of the general
pattern of many countries/areas.
The percentages of positive responses in the USA and the UK were high, whereas those in
Italy and France were low. This result may be consistent with Fukuyama’s (1995) comparative

22

Trust of Nations

economics theory to contrast Japan, the USA, and Germany as highly trustful countries, with
China and Italy as less trustful countries. A close look at this figure, however, shows a more
complicated reality because the percentages of positive responses in surveys from Mainland
China (Beijing and Shanghai) were higher than might have been expected. As for the data ofChina, there may be several possible explanations. First, the data really do indicate that the
Chinese might have a higher sense of interpersonal trust. Second, the Chinese might have tried
to show a higher sense of interpersonal trust because they were sensitive to their international
reputation, such as that observed by Fukuyama. Third, the questionnaire items wereconstructed as a trust scale for Americans, so they may not be suitable for the measurement oftrust in other nations. Fourth, we must be careful about the semantics of the trust scale. For
example, Dogan (2000, p. 258) states, “Erosion of confidence is first of all a sign of politicalmaturity. It is not so much that democracy has deteriorated, but rather the critical spirit of mostcitizens has improved. ” This suggests that we must always be sensitive to the distinction
between the face value of a scale and its semantics. In this context, trust and distrust may not be
opposites on a uni-dimensional scale but may instead be closely related in one’s mind in a sort ofmultidimensional structure. Furthermore, people may have given the same response fordifferent reasons or different responses for the same reason. Therefore, for a more meaningfulcomparison of countries, it is necessary to consider peoples’ responses with more objective
measures on, e. g., economics and politics, as well as general response tendencies of those people.
In this study, I may give some interpretations of the response patterns on certain items, but theyshould necessarily be considered tentative.
4. 2 Trust of Social Institutions and Systems

23

Trust of Nations

The questionnaire of the EAVS (2002-2005), PRVS (2004–2009), and APVS (2010–2014)
included the same set of items on institutional trust as used in the World Values Survey, with anadditional item on trust in science and technology. The items are stated as follows.
Q.52 How much confidence do you have in the following? Are you very confident, somewhat confident, notconfident, or not confident at all?
Not

Very

Somewhat

Not

Confident

Confident

Confident

Religious organizations

1

2

3

4

The law and the legal system

1

2

3

4

The press and television

1

2

3

4

The police

1

2

3

4

National federal bureaucracy

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

Social welfare facilities

1

2

3

4

The United Nations

1

2

3

4

Science and technology

1

2

3

4

National Assembly (Federal
Parliament)
NPO/NGO (non-profit andnon-governmental organization)

Confident at
All*** Table 3a,3b &3c (WVS TRUST of organization) ***To reduce the effects of general response tendencies particular to individuals or countries,
Yoshino (2005b) transformed the response data from the EAVS into standardized scores country
by country. Here, let us use a much easier way to reduce the general response tendencies in24

Trust of Nations

countries (Yoshino, 2009). First, the original response categories are re-categorized to sum up thepercentage of responses to positive categories (“1” and “2”). Second, the percentages of positive
responses are compared item by item in each country. This yields a rank order of items in eachcountry. Third, the rank orders of all countries involved are compared. This procedure results inthe loss of some information from the original data, but it provides more cross-national
comparability. This is a trade-off that we have to make to secure cross-national comparability
beyond a simple comparison of the face values of the original data.
Tables 3a, 3b and 3c show generally consistent patterns in the countries or areas participating
in all three surveys (cf. Yoshino, 2005b), although the response distributions may not be totally
unchanged over time. For example, the item-by-item differences of percentages between theJapan surveys in 2002 (EAVS), 2004 (PRVS), and 2010 (APVS) were almost within the margin of
the sampling error. The maximum difference was about 10%, for example, on NPO/NGO.
Roughly, the stability of the data was confirmed. (The percentage on NPO/NGO changed from
55% in 2002 to 45% in 2004 and then up to 49% in 2010. It might be a result of the fact that
NPO/NGO activities had been increasing and some disguised NPO/NGOs had managed illegal
businesses in the early 2000s, which was one of the reasons that the Japanese laws on registeredorganizations were substantially revised in 2008.)
Except for India, Singapore, Vietnam, the USA and Hong Kong, in all the studied countries
or areas, there was a low degree of confidence in religious organizations. Even in these fivecountries or areas, the relative degrees of confidence were not very high compared with all theother items for each country, except for India. Japan and Mainland China indicated remarkably
negative attitudes toward religious organizations. The percentage of positive responses among25

Trust of Nations

Japanese was lower than among Chinese. However, of the 10 items on Q50, the percentage of
positive responses was the lowest for religious organization among Chinese. It is known thatmost Japanese respect religions or the “religious heart/mind” even when they do not havereligious faith (Hayashi & Nikaido, 2009). However, they may be cautious about “religiousorganizations” because some religious groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo (Aum religious cult) caused
serious problems in the 1990s. In China, the government has been very sensitive toward
religious groups because, in the long history of China, religious groups have frequently
overthrown governments. In some countries, some religious groups are closely linked toterrorism.
The percentages of responses that show confidence in authority such as the “police,”“government,” and “Congress” may represent various patterns of attitudes; these are likely
concerned with democracy. A negative attitude does not necessarily mean the negation of such
authority, and it may reflect a mature democracy in some countries (Dogan, 2000, p.258). The
percentage of positive (or negative) responses, however, may not be proportional to the degree ofpolitical maturity.
Tables 3a, 3b and 3c show, for example, the USA’s lower degrees of confidence in the press
and TV and in Congress. This may be a critical attitude of matured democracy, or it may be areflection of current confusions of democracy.
As for the item on trust in science and technology, all the countries or areas showed a highdegree of confidence. Hayashi (1993) and Zheng and Yoshino (2003) presented cross-national
analyses of data on science and technology from our seven-country survey. Hayashi (1993)
concluded that the Japanese generally had positive attitudes toward science. However, they were26

Trust of Nations

negative regarding scientific approaches toward the understanding of the human heart and mind
(kokoro in Japanese), solving social and economic problems, and the possibility of living in spacestations in the near future (at the time of the survey in 1988). The response pattern of West
Germans in 1987 was similar to that of Japanese in the sense that they were also more negative
about science and technology than those in other Western countries. However, they were not so
negative toward the contributions of science and technology to social problems as well as
psychological problems of individuals as the Japanese were. This might remind us that thetheories of Hegel and Marx and the scientific psychological theories of Freud originated inGermany and Austria.
As for data from the APVS, all of the countries or areas were highly positive toward scienceand technology, with rates of positivity for that item being the highest among all items. In
particular, the rates for Mainland China were remarkably close to 100% in both the PRVS andEAVS, although the rates were slightly down in the APVS. There may be several possible
explanations for this. On the one hand, the high rates may represent the fact that, since the late1970s, China has been emphasizing the scientific reformation of government agencies, militarysystems, and social systems as a priority in their social planning. On the other hand, until
recently, they had not paid much attention to the negative impact of science and technology that
advanced industrial countries have experienced in the past. This is probably because they placed
priority on economic development in the past two decades or so. This may explain the overly
positive attitudes. After the Beijing Olympics in 2008 or even slightly earlier, the Chinese
government started paying attention to the negative side of rapid economic and industrial
development and began planning to improve environmental conditions, including serious air, soil

27

Trust of Nations

and water pollution.

Incidentally, they are also paying attention to political issues, such as thesocial gaps between urban and rural areas. They are struggling to deal with these domestic
problems, but complete solutions seem very far away to many observers’ eyes (Reuters, 2013,2015), despite their rising power in international relationships.
As a final comment in this section, it should be noted that Sasaki and Suzuki (2000, Ch.11)
concluded that “a single scale is not adequate to measure people’s sense of trust in science andtechnology because people’s attitudes differ from one issue to another within the fields of scienceand technology. ” This is probably also the case with our study on people’s sense of trust in
general.

4. 3 Sense of Trust among Japanese Immigrants and Ethnic Differences within a Single Country
In this section, I summarize regional and generational differences of Japanese immigrants
in Hawaii (Yoshino, 2001b), Brazil (Yamamoto et al., 1993), and the U.S. West Coast (Yoshino,
2000, 2001a), as well as ethnic differences (the Chinese, Malays, and Indians) in Singapore andbetween Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders in Taiwan.
Our past surveys have already clarified similarities and dissimilarities between Japaneseliving in Japan and Japanese immigrants abroad. First, regarding the Japanese tendency to
avoid polar categories and to prefer intermediate response categories in a questionnaire survey(Hayashi & Kuroda, 1997; Hayashi et al., 1998, p. 388), there are some variations even in the USA.
This may be a result of the situational differences between the place where they need to maketheir intentions clear to communicate successfully in their host countries (e. g., the mainland
USA) and the place where the Japanese comprise the largest group among the minorities (e. g.,

28

Trust of Nations

Hawaii).
Second, we found that the Japanese style of interpersonal attitudes ( Giri-Ninjyo attitudes)
or religious attitudes (they think that a religious heart/mind is important, regardless of whether
they themselves have religious faith or not) was preserved among the immigrant first and second
generations in the USA. The third and younger generations seem to have become more adapted
to the country where they were born and now live (Hayashi, 1993; Yamaoka, 2000, Fig. 4, Table 3;
Yoshino, 2000, p. 197; 2001b, p. 52; 2002).
Third, Brazilian Japanese (Yamamoto et al., 1993, p.435) showed a much lower degree ofsense of trust for each of the three items (Q36, Q37, and Q38) than most responders in the othercountries (Table 2g). Furthermore, an even lower degree of trust was found in the third or
younger generation than in the first and second generations (see footnote 3). As a whole, thepattern of sense of trust in Brazil appeared close to those of France (1987 survey) and Italy (1992survey). As for the immigrants in Hawaii and on the West Coast (Table 2g), they showed a higher
degree of trust than most responders in the other countries, including Japan and the USA.
(Unfortunately, the survey of the U. S. West Coast Japanese immigrants did not include Q37. )For an understanding of the generations of Japanese immigrants in the USA, there is a frame ofcomparison, as Kitano (1993, Ch.13) showed. Namely, the first generation was called “Japs” andwas discriminated against as immigrants from Japan. The second generation represents
Japanese Americans who have been constantly in search of their own identity between the USA
and Japan (many of them voluntarily fought in WWII as American soldiers, while their parents
were placed in concentration camps by the American government). The third generation or
younger are simply Americans of Japanese descent.

29Trust of Nations

Yoshino (2002, Fig. 8) showed no significant difference between Japanese Americans andnon-Japanese Americans among Honolulu residents with regard to trust (Q36, Q37, and Q38).
(In Hawaii, no ethnic group was the majority, and Japanese Americans comprise the largest group
among the minorities, except whites.) Furthermore, Yoshino (2002, Fig. 9) provided details of thecross-ethnic comparison among Hawaii residents, although we need to be careful regarding theconclusion because the samples for each were too small.

Time series data from the Hawaii Resident Survey showed longitudinal changes among
Japanese residents of Hawaii in terms of trust for each generation (Yoshino, 2002, Fig. 10). There
was no large difference between generations over the two decades, except for some differences
between second and third generations in 1988. This might be explained by the complicatedmixture of ethnicities in Hawaii. In addition, there was little change in the sense of interpersonal
trust in each generation over those two decades.
As for Japanese Americans on the West Coast, the survey questionnaire included only twoitems on trust (Q36 and Q38). Data for the West Coast showed a large difference between
generations: the older generation seemed the more trustful (Yoshino, 2002, Fig. 11), although thiswas not seen in the Hawaii data. We should be very careful when interpreting the data because
there may be several compounding factors (such as age, generation, physical condition, economic
conditions, and residential area). The difference between Japanese Americans in Hawaii andJapanese Americans on the West Coast with regard to generational differences may be related todifferences in their concepts of ethnicity. That is, Japanese Americans on the mainland would
have no problem classifying themselves as Americans of Japanese descent. Conversely, many30

Trust of Nations

Hawaiian residents are of highly mixed ethnicity in this multi-ethnic society, so people’s
perception of ethnicity depends upon how they identify themselves in the ethnic classification –this ought to be no different for the Japanese Hawaiians. In addition, the different conditions ofJapanese Americans in Hawaii and on the West Coast during WWII may have had an effect on
their attitudes and social values (see footnote 4). Next, see Table 2f on the ethnic differences(Chinese, Malays, and Indians) in Singapore. General patterns seem stable over time, although
there may be some changes in the response distributions for the items. Among others, anincrease in the positive response to Q38 among the Indians (generalized interpersonal trust) may
be remarkable: 28% in both 2004 and 2007 and 45% in 2012. This increase might be related tosome changes in Indian immigrants’ status in Singapore caused by India’s rapid development in
the international economics and politics in the last decade. We might need to be careful, however,about the possibility of statistical fluctuation because of the smaller sample size that accompanies
an analysis involving breaking down the sample by ethnicity. This is also the case with the ethnic
differences in Singapore shown in Table 4d.
4. 4 Basic Social Values on Human Bonds
People’s sense of trust does not stand alone. To overcome the limitations of studies mostly
based on the response distributions of the items of the GSS or WVS, it may be important to
explore more basic social values that may underlie people’s sense of trust. Although it is not easy
to identify basic social values in various countries, here I tentatively show some data from the
APVS on Confucianism, various important areas of daily life, and choices of Asian versus Westernvalues.
*** Table 4a,b,c, & d Confucian ***31

Trust of NationsFirst, Tables 4a, 4b, 4c, and 4d show the response distributions with regard to Confucianism
from the APVS and the related surveys. The question asked is as follows.
Q9. How do you feel about each of the following traditional values? The response categories are “strongly agree,”“agree to some extent,” “disagree to some extent,” and “disagree strongly. ”
a.

We should respect our ancestors.

b.

The eldest son should look after his aging parents.

c.

A wife should obey (follow) her husband.

d.

One should not marry someone his/her parents object to.

e.

We should obey (follow) older people.

f.

It is important to have a son to keep the family line going.

g.

Men should work outside the home and women should tend to housekeeping.

The patterns of response distributions have been consistent for the countries or areas
surveyed in the EAVS (Yoshino, 2005b), the PRVS (Yoshino, 2009), and the APVS, although thepercentages may show some changes over time. It may be noted that, for some items, thepercentages of positive choices of the USA are larger than those of the Asian countries. It cannot
be the case that Americans are more influenced by Confucianism than Asians. Overall, the Asian
countries seem to have already departed from the literal teachings of Confucianism (see footnote
5).
More detailed analyses, however, show that there are national differences between, e. g.,
China, Korea, and Japan, as well as gender and age differences (Zheng, 2005). Confucianism
originated in China around the fifth or sixth century B. C., but it has had a greater influence in
Korea than in China since the end of 14th century A. D. However, it had an influence limited tothe dominant class in Japan only during the Edo era (“samurai era” of the 17th to the 19th
centuries). These historical differences may have led to national differences in the response32Trust of Nations

distributions for those items. It is important to note that, under the present conditions, people
cannot follow Confucian teachings literally. For example, the decreasing number of children inalmost all countries in East Asia is a serious problem for the maintenance of national productivity
or social systems concerning health care and financial support for older people. Thus, it is
becoming difficult for elderly parents to be completely taken care of by their children, not tomention by the eldest son alone.
Table 4d also shows a comparison of native Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders in Taiwan.
Almost the same patterns are seen with respect to Confucianism, except on Q9e (obedience toseniority): more positive responses are seen among the native Taiwanese than the Chinese
mainlanders. However, we must be careful regarding the distinction of the categories of native
Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders. Although the categories are important in analyses, theyoccasionally relate to sensitive political matters. The distinction between the two groups is basedon self-reporting, and the sample of valid returned questionnaires in our survey was biased,
resulting in fewer mainlanders than would be expected by census data. There are at least two
possibilities: our sample might have been truly biased, or the mainlanders might have hidden
their identities for political reasons. Therefore, the aforementioned analysis should beconsidered tentative.
In addition, it may be worthwhile to note that the unexpected combination of Confucian
teachings and advanced medical technology caused an ethics crisis in South Korea and Taiwan
several years ago. As seen in the “b” and “f” sentences of Q9, there is a strong social pressure on
women to bear sons under Confucian teaching. Wives had a hard time when they did not bear ason, and in some cases, they adopted a boy from their relatives. However, modern medicine has

33

Trust of Nations

made it possible to bear a child by a surrogate mother. In several cases, however, rich Koreanparents did not honor their responsibility to take care of the babies when they found thatsurrogate mothers (occasionally poor Chinese women) were to give birth to female babies.
Another problem may be an unbalanced ratio of males and females in South Korea. This may be
another piece of evidence against the “utility” of modern medicine without new ethics that aresuitable for modern science. (Incidentally, the adoption of children is different among Japan,
China, and Korea: the Japanese may adopt a child even if there is no blood relationship between
the child and the parents, whereas the Chinese and Koreans adopt a child from among theirrelatives whenever possible. )*** Table 5a,b,c & d (Daily Life 7 point) ***Tables 5a, 5b, 5c and 5d show for each item and each country or area the sum of thepercentages of positive categories 5, 6, and 7 on the response distributions of the importance ofvarious areas in daily life. In all the countries we have surveyed, the degree of importance of“immediate family” was the highest among various aspects of daily life. The degree of importanceof “relatives” was the second highest, but it may show variations compared to those of “immediatefamily”: the percentages of positive categories for relatives were closer to those of “immediatefamily” for Asian people as well as Japanese immigrants than for Western people (except Italians).
These findings may be closely linked to national character. India, Singapore and Vietnam showhigh degree of confidence in religious organizations in the countries of the APVS (Table 3a), but
all the three countries show a higher degree of importance for “family” and “relatives” than for“religions. ” Thus, we confirm that all people think that family and relatives are important among
the aspects of daily life, disregarding differences between East and West, cultures, or religions.

34Trust of Nations

As for the third highest choice, the percentages selecting “career,” “friends,” and “free time”
varied among countries. This seems to be related more to economic conditions than to national
character, so the percentages may vary more over time.
The Seven-Country Survey, the EAVS, the PRVS, and the APVS included the following item,
which asks respondents to choose two response categories from the four presented: two Asian
principles (originally from Confucianism) and two Western principles (originally from “UnitedStates Declaration of Independence” or ”Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen”).
Q34 [SHOW CARD] If you were asked to choose the two most important items listed on the card, which two would
you choose? (Select two. )a. Filial piety/love and respect for parents
b. Repaying people who have helped you in the pastc. Respect for the rights of the individual
d. Respect for the freedom of the individual

Six possible pairs can be selected among the four items. Tables 6a, 6b and 6c show thepercentages of the selection of each possible pair in the surveys (see footnote 6). Some countries,
such as Japan and the USA, were studied in all three surveys. The patterns selected in Japanare fairly consistent, whereas those of the USA differ slightly. (The 1988 Japan survey and the2004 Japan survey used the same sampling methods and fieldwork contractor. The fieldwork
company of the 1988 USA survey was Gallup and that of the 2006 USA survey and the 2010 USA
survey was Kane, Parsons & Associates. Gallup used random-walk sampling, and Kane, Parsons& Associates used quota sampling with respect to age, gender, and race in 2006 and random routesampling with a quota table on age, gender, and race in 2010. )*** Table 6a, b & c Two important ***35

Trust of Nations

In all countries or areas in Asia, the first choice was the pair “a. Filial piety/love and respect
for parents” and “b. Repaying people who have helped you in the past.” In contrast, even inWestern countries, the choice of the pair “c. the rights of individuals” and “d. the right of freedom”
was not a majority choice. Only in France and West Germany (in 1987 before the reunification)
was the rate of selection of that pair higher than those of the other pairs, but at most, it was 30%
or so.
For almost all countries, “a. Filial piety/love and respect for parents” was the single first
choice, i.e., the rate of the selection for each of the possible four choices tallied individually, eventhough Q34 asked the respondents to choose two items, not just one (See footnote 7); this isconsistent with the previous observation from data in Table 5a-d. That is, the degrees ofimportance of immediate family and relatives were the highest and the second highest,
respectively, in all countries or areas. Although the Japanese generally tend to show a preference
for middle answer categories, they also choose the highest degree where the importance of family
is concerned.
It may be interesting to note Todd’s (1983) theory on family structures and political regimes,
which suggests that the political regime is a reflection of family structure in each country.
Throughout human history, “family and relatives” has formed the basis for survival, whereas
human rights, such as the rights of individuals or the right to freedom, appeared only recently,
although no one would deny the importance of human rights. Family and relatives are probably
universally valued in both the East and the West, whereas the rights of individuals and the rightto freedom originated in the “modern West,” so they may be viewed differently in the current
political system of each country. This may mean that each country has its own way of developing

36

Trust of Nations

democracy as well as economic prosperity; therefore, no country should impose its particularversion on other countries but respect the others’ ways.

5. Conclusions
In this study, I have presented people’s sense of trust from our survey data under our
research paradigm, called cultural manifold analysis (CULMAN) (Yoshino et al., 2015). As awhole, this study has shown some differences among countries, races, and generations regarding
senses of interpersonal and institutional trust, as well as some universal social values such as theimportance of family across all the peoples. Furthermore, I have repeatedly emphasized that weneed to be cautious in interpreting the results because survey data on “trust” are often acompound of many variables, including economic and political factors as well as people’s general
response tendencies. In addition, we must consider the utility and limitation of items that areused for measuring trust. Scales may be used to measure some important dimensions related totrust, but there may be other important dimensions of trust. That is, “sense of trust” can beconsidered in various contexts, such as intra-personal or interpersonal relationships, inter-socialgroups, transactions, or moral philosophy. With these comments in mind, I believe that oursurvey data have clarified certain aspects of the differences among several countries or socialgroups in terms of trust. I will provide several comments for our future research as follows.
Some may already have been mentioned, but it may be worthwhile to repeat them here.
First, to facilitate a mutual understanding between East and West, we need to pay muchattention to measurements of social values (Yoshino & Osaki, 2013). Studies on the scale of trust(Yoshino, 2005b, 2006) may caution us on the applicability of a certain “single” scale invented in37

Trust of Nations

Western cultures for Eastern cultures, or vice versa. Gallup (1977, p. 461) reported that, in theirglobal survey, they could not find very poor but still happy people. Later studies, however, havefound examples not consistent with the pattern of Gallup report. For example, Brazilians werevery optimistic even when Brazil was the worst debtor nation in the 1980s (Inkeles, 1997).
Inglehart reported a correlation of . 57 between economic development and life satisfaction forsome 20 countries surveyed in the 1980s (Inkeles, 1997, pp. 366–371). However, life satisfactionin Japan in the 1980s was lower than it was around 2000, although Japan was prosperous in the
1980s but struggled with a recession around 2000. Thus, we need to be careful regarding peoples’
general response tendencies in the measurement of social values.
Second, it is important to note that people’s negative responses may not necessarily meanthat they lack a sense of trust. As Dogan (2000, p.258) mentioned, some people may express
distrust or complaint toward the government or political leaders not because they lack
intra-personal or interpersonal trust but because they know that it is a way to improve their own
country and eventually our world in a democratic way.
Third, a comment is needed regarding the development of the CULMAN framework. The lastcentury was the time of the expansion of Western civilization, and this century is said to be thetime of Asian revival. In this time of globalization, I think that world leaders should beknowledgeable about world geography and history and sensitive to the conditions of all countries
and nations if they wish to take seriously their responsibility to develop and maintain world peace.
Differences between cultures or civilizations occasionally prevent us from deeply understanding
each other. In studying world history as well as the regional histories of different cultures andcivilizations, however, we should remember that there are various methods of successful social

38

Trust of Nations

development.
Some institutional systems or customs are changing, converging toward more universal ones
under the influence of transnational exchange or trade. Other systems are, however, becoming
more sensitive to cultural differences as a reaction to globalization. The last quarter-century has
shown that, at least for the foreseeable future, globalization will not lead us to a single unified
global culture or a “superculture” on the earth (cf. Yoshino, 1992; see footnote 7). I think it ispossible to use CULMAN to develop a framework of policymaking to bring about the gradualdevelopment of, so to speak, a global cultural manifold (GCM) (Fujita & Yoshino, 2009; Yoshino,
2008; Yoshino, Nikaido & Fujita, 2009, p.107; see Fig.4).
*** Fig. 4. Manifold of Communities ***The GCM is a set of hierarchical overlapping local charts, and each chart covers a certain
area (region, country, national groups, civilization, etc.). In each chart, we may assume thatpeople share a certain culture or social values; a larger chart corresponds to a less restrictive but
more universal culture or social values. Together, the charts may comprise a sort of hierarchy.
Thus, according to the size of the chart (area, region, or social group), people may be able toconsider the degree of rigidity in decision-making or the extent of regulations concerning various
types of exchanges (e.g., contracts in transnational business or international trade within themembers of the region). GCM charts must be dynamic, so each chart may be enlarged, be shrunk,or disappear over time. Two overlapping charts may be assimilated to make a larger chart. In
addition, a new chart may appear. The EU may exemplify the concept of GCM. Currently, East
Asia and the Asia-Pacific area are presenting other examples, although many people once doubted
such unification because of their complicated diversity of races, languages, religions, and political39

Trust of Nations

systems.
Weber (1904–05) argued in his theory on religion and capitalism that Asian countries would
not be able to develop capitalism. Now we know of many counter-examples (such as Japan, South
Korea, NIES, and China) that go against his argument. Some have argued that the Japanese
adaptation of Confucianism functioned as a substitute for the Protestant ethic and led Japan tosuccessfully develop capitalism (Morishima, 1984). However, recent decades have seen many
examples indicating that economic success is not necessarily linked to a particular ethic, ideology,
or religion. Now we have more data to consider the relationships among economic development,social systems, and social values. In this time of globalization, I would like to emphasize again
the fact that there are various ways to achieve successful social development, so we should not
impose our own social values on any other country if we intend to develop a peaceful world.
The Japanese mind is the world of an ambiguous self, multiple realities, and multi-valued
attitudes (Hayashi & Kuroda, 1997). Occasionally, Japan is considered a homogeneous society
with respect to individual opinions, but this is not the case in reality. Simply because theJapanese tend to refrain from making definitive commitments to avoid possible conflicts, theyoften appear to be ambiguous and homogeneous. A positive side of ambiguity may lead us togenerosity in accepting different social values, whereas a negative side may lead us to confusion
or irresponsibility.
A new style of society demands a new type of social system. Bringing this about would firstnecessitate the destruction of a traditional system. A leader in Japan would have to think about
the balance between the conservation of fundamental human relational systems and the quick
destruction of obsolete social systems in the transitional age, as would leaders all over the world.

40

Trust of Nations

The last two decades, however, have seen that such destruction has gone too far even in areas that
we need to conserve, such as in the realm of maintaining trustful human relationships, under the
misguided globalization.
On March 11, 2011, the Great East Japan earthquake caused a huge tsunami and resulted in
the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster.

These brought seemingly insurmountabledifficulties that Japan is still struggling to recover from. The world media, however, reported thecalm attitudes of the Japanese even in the tragedy: the devastated yet surviving Japanese kept
order in front of grocery stores to buy food, which may look remarkable to people of othercountries where even a natural disaster can frequently lead to a riot. On the other hand, many
Japanese have had a chance to reconsider the value of their own lives and work and to think ofvarious ways of contributing to the people and area damaged by the quake. Many news stories
and surveys have repeatedly reported on the human bond and the importance of family, relatives,and friends, not only on a domestic but also a worldwide scale. We have confirmed that thedifferences in ideology or religions are minor compared to the universal importance of family,
relatives, and friends, i.e., human bonds and trust between peoples.
It is my sincere hope that mutual understanding among the various cultures andcivilizations will prevent serious conflicts between nations and cultures and will lead us to apeaceful and prosperous world in the 21st century.

Acknowledgments
This study was supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science &Technology Grant in Scientific Research A (2) No.14252013 (2002–2005 fiscal years), A (2) No.

41

Trust of Nations

18252001 (2006–2009 fiscal years), and S No. 22223006 (2010–2014 fiscal years). I am very
grateful to the late Prof. Chikio Hayashi (Former Director, ISM), the late Prof. Frank Shotaro
Miyamoto (University of Washington), Prof. Tetsuden Kashima (University of Washington), Prof.
Stephan S. Fugita (Santa Clara University), Prof. Emeritus Yasumasa Kuroda (University of
Hawaii), Prof. Emeritus Fumi Hayashi (Toyo-Eiaw Women’s University), Prof. Emeritus
Masamichi Sasaki (Hyogo-Kyoiku Universituy), Prof. Kazue Yamaoka (Teikyo University), Prof.
Yuejung Zheng (Doshisha University), Prof. Wataru Matsumoto (Kansai University), and Prof.
Takahiro Hoshino (Keio University). We could not have carried out our long-term cross-national
surveys without them. In addition, I am grateful to Prof. Nicolaos Synodinos (University of
Hawaii) for his valuable comments on my early draft of this paper and to Prof. Takahiro Hoshino
and two anonymous referees for their painstaking editorial work on this paper.

42

Trust of Nations

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FOOTNOTES
p. 12. Footnote 1. Note that the younger generation was born more than 10 years after theend of World War II. In 1956, an economic white paper declared, “Japan is no longer in the
post-war condition,” and this symbolized the start of the high-speed development of industry
and economy. However, Japan had to face pollution problems as a result of the high-speed
industrialization around 1970.
p. 13. Footnote 2. Throughout this paper, codes such as Q36 correspond to the common item
code of the APVS questionnaire. In most cases, I leave the exact wording of items and theprecise data on response rates to the series of ISM Survey Research Reports(http://www.ism.ac.jp/editsec/kenripo/contents_e.html) or the website for ISM surveys(http://www.ism.ac.jp/ism_info_e/kokuminsei_e. html).
As for Q38, there are slight differences in wording between our cross-national Japan survey
and the Japanese National Character Survey. In the process of a translation andback-translation check to make a cross-national version of the Japan survey questionnaire, we
obtained these two versions. We have confirmed that this difference may produce somepercentage differences in the response distributions, but the overall pattern is stable.
p. 29. Footnote 3. We should keep in mind that the economic condition of Brazil was bad in
the year of the survey.
p. 30. Footnote 4. It is said that Japanese American Nisei soldiers did not have as muchemotional conflict with their Japanese parents in Hawaii. For more details, see Dowds (1986),
Kashima (2003), Fugita and Fernandez (2004), and Miyamoto (1984, 1986).
p. 32. Footnote 5. A mistranslation was introduced by the survey agent in the USA. : “obey”
should have been used in “c “and “e” where “follow” was used. However, this mistake itself
may show a lack of understanding concerning Confucian teachings in the USA. The
mistranslation was left in the USA 2006 survey and in the Singapore 2007 survey but wascorrected in the surveys of Australia 2007 and India 2008, and the corrected version was usedin the APVS.
p. 35. Footnote 6. The response patterns for EAVS, PRVS, and APVS are almost the samefor the countries or areas surveyed in all of these surveys. (The results of EAVS were omitted
here.) See Yoshino (2005b) for further information. (One needs to be careful of the wording of
category “a. filial piety”. The category is originally from Confucius teachings, and theEnglish translation may not completely express its meaning and nuance, because the original
word implies not only love and respect to one’s parents but a sort of behavioral obligation. )Footnote 7. Exceptions are the surveys if W. Germany 1987, Hawaii and non-Japanese 1988
and 1999, where “c. the right of individuals” and “a. filial piety” showed the highest and thesecond highest rates, respectively, although the differences are not large.
p. 38. Footnote 8. For a detailed review of the literature on “globalization” and cultures, see
Guillen, 2001, pp. 252–254.

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Table 1a.

Asia-Pacific Values Survey: Spearman’s Correlations between Pairs of

Items Q36, Q37, and Q38 of Sense of Trust from the GSS.
It would be more meaningful cross-nationally to compare the relative patterns of correlations
country by country rather than to compare the magnitudes of correlations cross-nationally.
Most countries show roughly stable patterns (e.g., the pairs of highest correlations) over time,
but some countries, such as South Korea, show variability. The variability might be caused bya slight change in wording or sampling methods. (See this table together with Table 1b, 1c, &
1d.)
Year

2010 2010 2011
Japan USA

2011

2011

2011

2012

2012

2013 2013

Beijing Shanghai Hong Kong Taiwan South Korea Singapore Australia India Vietnam

Q36×Q37 0. 14 0. 49 0. 19 0. 26
Q36×Q39 0. 24 0. 44 0. 21 0. 21
Q37×Q39 0. 28 0. 39 0. 21 0. 24

Table 1b.

2011

0. 31
0. 28
0. 26

0. 28 0. 00
0. 27 0. 23
0. 22 0. 02

0. 31
0. 29
0. 32

0. 43
0. 36
0. 35

0. 04 0. 10
0. 25 0. 21
0. 01 0. 35

Pacific-Rim Values Survey: Spearman’s Correlations between Pairs of

Items Q36, Q37, and Q38 of Sense of Trust from the GSS.
Year

2004 2006 2005
Japan USA

2005

2005

2006

2007

2007

2008

Beijing Shanghai Hong Kong Taiwan South Korea Singapore Australia India

Q36×Q37 0. 20 0. 53 0. 21 0. 24
Q36×Q39 0. 30 0. 36 0. 23 0. 21
Q37×Q39 0. 31 0. 37 0. 15 0. 22

Table 1c.

2006

0. 18
0. 19
0. 22

0. 20 0. 10
0. 22 0. 24
0. 12 0. 26

0. 32
0. 32
0. 21

0. 44
0. 38
0. 32

0. 05
0. 35
0. 00

East Asia Values Survey: Spearman’s Correlations between Pairs of

Items Q36, Q37, and Q38 of Sense of Trust from the GSS.
Year

2002 2002

2002

2002

2003

2003

2004

2003

2002

Japan Beijing Shanghai Hong Kong Taiwan South Korea Singapore Kunming Hangzhou

Q36×Q37 0. 23 0. 21 0. 33
Q36×Q39 0. 32 0. 28 0. 33
Q37×Q39 0. 37 0. 13 0. 24

Table 1d.

0. 18
0. 19
0. 16

0. 26 0. 05
0. 26 0. 13
0. 15 0. 24

0. 32
0. 31
0. 22

0. 37
0. 33
0. 31

0. 27
0. 21
0. 25

Seven Country Survey: Spearman’s Correlations between Pairs of

Items Q36, Q37, and Q38 of Sense of Trust from the GSS.
Year

1988

1988

1987

1987

1992

1993

Country

Japan

USA

FranceUK

Italy

Netherlands West Germany

Q36×Q37
Q36×Q39
Q37×Q39

0. 14
0. 24
0. 29

0. 45
0. 37
0. 44

0. 32
0. 21
0. 38

0. 44
0. 35
0. 36

49

0. 40
0. 30
0. 34

0. 36
0. 29
0. 32

1987
0. 36
0. 49
0. 34

Trust of Nations

Table 2a. Percentages of Positive Responses to Three GSS Items on Trust in the Asia-Pacific Values Survey (APV
Q36
"People are always trying to be helpful to others. "Q37"People are trying to be fair. "Q38"People can be trusted"(Note: Table 7-2 of Yoshino [2014d] included some errors of Japan 2002 data but corrected in the table below. )
Year

2011

2011

APVS

BeijingShanghai

Q36

72
57
42

66
58
36

Q37
Q38

2011

2011

Hong
Kong

2012

Taiwan

43
40
21

2012
Singapor
e

South
Korea

46
53
21

52
53
32

2013
Indi
a

50
49
34

2012

2010

2010

Australia

USA

Japan

59
63
45

51
53
31

41
57
44

55
34
45

2010
Vietnam

70
21
23

Table 2b. Percentages of Positive Responses to Three GSS Items on Trust in the Pacific-Rim Values Survey (PRSurvey
Year

2005

2005

PRVS

BeijingShanghai

Q36

67
51
37

65
53
34

Q37
Q38

2005

Hong
Kong

2006

2006

South
Korea

Taiwan

41
42
19

46
61
19

2007

2008

2007

2006

Singapore

India

Australia

USA

50
51
26

61
29
52

54
59
43

56
56
41

57
45
30

2004
Japan
A

35
59
37

2004
Japan
B

37
－
39

Table 2c. Percentages of Positive Responses to Three GSS Items on Trust in the East Asia Values Survey (PRVS
Survey
Year

2002

2002

2003

2002

EAVS

BeijingShanghai

KunmingHangzhou

Q36

62
53
36

59
65
33

48
41
32

61
55
39

Q37
Q38

2002
Hong
Kong

2003
Taiwan

36
46
19

38
58
14

2003
South
Korea

58
45
28

2004
Singapore

51
52
33

Table 2d. Percentages of Positive Responses to Three GSS Items on Trust in the Japanese Survey(KS: the Japanese National Character Survey)
Survey
Year
KS
Q36
Q37
Q38

1978
KS6

1983
KS7

1988
KS8

1993
KS9

1998
KS10

2003
KS11

2008
KS12

2013
KS13

19
53
26

24
59
31

－
－
－

29
65
38

30
61
33

34
62
33

36
62
30

45
67
36

Table 2e. Percentages of Positive Responses to Three GSS Items on Trust in Seven Country Survey
Survey
Year

Q36
Q37
Q38

1988

1987

1987

1987

1992

USA

France

UK

W.Ger
many

Italy

54
56
42

19
36
23

53
58
36

43
55
38

21
30
14

50

1993
The
Netherla
nds

32
48
48

1988

1988

JapanA

JapanB

31
53
39

29
56
34

Trust of Nations

Table 2f. Percentage of Positive Response to Three GSS Items on Trust:
Breakdown by Ethnicity for Singapore Surveys in 2004, 2007 & 2012.
Survey year
Q36
Q37
Q38

2004

2007

2012

ChineseMalay

IndianChineseMalay

IndianChineseMalay

Indian

50
53
33

54
50
37

55
53
28

50
50
25

57
53
25

43
50
28

48
48
33

58
55
33

53
48
45

Table 2g. Percentage of Positive Response to Three GSS Items on Trust:Comparison of Japanese immigrant surveys.
Survey year
Q36
Q37

1988
Hawaii
JA

58
68
60

Hawaii
Non-J

66
66
46

1999
Hawaii
JA

68－
56

Hawaii
Non-J

65
－
59

1998

1991

JAWCS

BRZ JB

66
－
61

41
－
6

Q38
JA: Japanese Americans; JAWCS: JA on the West Coast; Non-J: non-Japanese;
BRZ JB: Japanese Brazilian in Brazil

51

Trust of Nations

Table 3a. Insitutional Trust of WVS Items in the Asia-Pacific Values Survey (APVS)
The figures show percentages of sum of positive categories "1.very much confident"
and " 2"confident some what".
survey year
Item2011 2011 2011 2010 2012 201220122013 2010 2010
Sh an g- Ho n g T aiwa
So u t h Singa- Au st r ali
VietIndia Japan
Be ijin gUSA
h ai
Ko n g n
Ko r e a pore
a
nam
2011

Q52a Religious organization
Q52b The law and the legal system
Q52c The press and television
Q52d The police
Q52e Nat io n al go ve r n m e n t bu r e au c r ac y
Q52f Congress / Diet
Q52g NPO / NGO
Q52h Social welfare facilities
Q52i The United Nations
Q52j Science and technology

27
85
68
75
83
83
41
78
59
95

36
82
64
72
77
75
45
70
54
89

58
86
56
69
50
53
64
81
70
85

75
53
44
59
46
38
56
69
61
86

58
56
21
65
26
22
51
48
40
76

41
51
63
46
34
17
42
59
68
75

82
83
78
92
89
88
80
83
82
91

44
78
33
89
47
46
74
79
63
92

87
78
70
59
49
55
61
75
60
90

13
72
70
70
38
25
49
71
59
83

79
94
80
85
93
95
86
88
90
95

Table 3b. Insitutional Trust of WVS Items in the Asia-Pacific Values Survey (APVS)
The figures show percentages of sum of positive categories "1.very much confident"
and " 2"confident some what".
survey year
Item

2005
Be ijin g

Q50a Religious organization
Q50b The law and the legal system
Q50c The press and television
Q50d The police
Q50e Nat io n al go ve r n m e n t bu r e au c r ac y
Q50f Congress / Diet
Q50g NPO / NGO
Q50h Social welfare facilities
Q50i The United Nations
Q50j Science and technology

24
84
61
72
81
82
40
73
59
96

Sh an g- Ho n g T aiwa
So u t h Singa- Au st r ali
USA
India
h ai
Ko n g n
Ko r e a pore
a

2004
Japan
A

90
90
82
64
58
64
69
83
75
93

15
79
74
69
41
32
45
70
56
76

2005

32
86
66
77
85
86
46
74
59
94

2005 2006 2006 2006

60
87
46
78
63
61
64
81
65
88

66
63
32
57
42
25
40
56
46
73

69
79
44
80
45
51
65
62
55
87

46
57
59
50
29
11
31
59
58
75

2007

84
96
81
95
92
90
70
78
74
93

2007

48
72
32
83
46
51
74
74
59
88

2008

Table 3c. Insitutional Trust of WVS Items in the East Asia Values Survey (EAVS)
The figures show percentages of sum of positive categories "1.very much confident"
and " 2"confident some what".
survey year
Item

2002
Japan

Q50a Religious organization
Q50b The law and the legal system
Q50c The press and television
Q50d The police
Q50e Nat io n al go ve r n m e n t bu r e au c r ac y
Q50f Congress / Diet
Q50g NPO / NGO
Q50h Social welfare facilities
Q50i The United Nations
Q50j Science and technology

12
74
74
64
41
34
55
68
62
73

2002

2002 2003 #### 2002 2003
2003
Han g
Sh an Ku n m i
Ho n gSo u t h
Be ijin g
T aiwang- h ai n g
Ko n g
Ko r e azh o u

20
82
57
71
84
85
36
70
59
97

29
92
71
74
88
87
53
80
62
97

52

24
78
55
64
71
72
39
61
45
95

24
80
60
73
81
82
48
69
56
90

59
86
41
75
56
55
59
77
63
84

64
65
37
50
42
30
38
52
50
76

49
59
60
49
30
14
41
62
50
78

2004
Sin gapo r e

82
93
82
93
89
86
76
84
71
87

Trust of Nations

Table 4a. Confucian Teachings of the Asia-Pacific Values Survey （2010-14）
The figures show percentages of sum of positive categories "1.strongly agree" & "2.agree to some extent".
]
Ite m
Q9 a We sh ou ld re spe c t ou r an c e stors
Q9 b Th e e lde st son sh ou ld look afte r h is agin g pare n ts
Q9 c A wife sh ou ld obe y(follow) h e r h u sban d
Q9 d Not to marry some on e wh om you r pare n ts obje c t toQ9 e We sh ou ld obe y (follow) olde r pe ople
Q9 f It is importan t to h ave a son to ke e p th e family lin e goin g
Q9 g Me n sh ou ld work ou tside an d woman sh ou ld te n d to h ou s

2011

2011

2011

2011

2012

Be ijin g

Sh an gh ai

Ho n g
Ko n gT aiwanSo u t h
Ko r e a

2012
Singapor
e

99
77
33
11
61
31
30

97
74
27
16
58
27
28

95
79
44
10
61
31
30

99
68
43
14
61
38
31

82
27
49
49
60
36
32

96
55
66
40
82
47
29

2010

2012

2012

2013

2013

Japan

Au st r alia

USA

India

Vietnam

92
37
34
27
56
33
24

95
39
26
19
54
29
13

97
54
41
34
62
51
22

95
86
86
86
96
74
66

100
77
77
43
94
73
44

Table 4b. Confucian Teachings of the Pacific-Rim Values Survey(PRVS)（2004-09）
The figures show percentages of sum of positive categories "1.strongly agree" & "2.agree to some extent".
(Note 1: In USA 2006 & Singapore 2007 surveys, the word "follow" was used in Q9c & Q9e by mistranslation.)(Note 2: This table gives a comparison of chinese mainlander and nativeTaiwanese in 2006, but it is becoming diffficult to ask about this distinction these days.)
PRVS Su rve y Ye ar
Ite m
Q9 a We sh ou ld re spe c t ou r an c e stors
Q9 b Th e e lde st son sh ou ld look afte r h is agin g pare n ts
Q9 c A wife sh ou ld obe y(follow) h e r h u sban d
Q9 d Not to marry some on e wh om you r pare n ts obje c t toQ9 e We sh ou ld obe y (follow) olde r pe ople
Q9 f It is importan t to h ave a son to ke e p th e family lin e goin g
Q9 g Me n sh ou ld work ou tside an d woman sh ou ld te n d to h ou s

2005

2005

2005

2006

2006

Be ijin g

Sh an gh ai

Ho n g
Ko n gT aiwanSo u t h
Ko r e a

2007
Singapor
e

96
70
21
7
43
21
21

97
61
20
12
50
25
20

99
76
41
7
54
34
29

98
66
45
11
66
39
40

84
45
60
44
72
34
26

96
55
60
28
51
43
28

2004

2007

2006

2008

Japan

Au st r alia

USA

India

91
32
36
27
54
30
26

96
44
29
18
44
35
15

96
45
52
37
56
45
17

100
77
82
76
96
74
56

Table 4c. Confucian Teachings of the East Asia Values Survey(EAVS)（2002-05）
The figures show percentages of sum of positive categories "1.strongly agree" & "2.agree to some extent".
EAVS Su rve y Ye ar
Ite m

2002

2002

Be ijin g

Sh an gh ai

96
50
12
3
37
15
12

97
51
11
6
40
11
14

Q9 a We sh ou ld re spe c t ou r an c e stors
Q9 b Th e e lde st son sh ou ld look afte r h is agin g pare n ts
Q9 c A wife sh ou ld obe y(follow) h e r h u sban d
Q9 d Not to marry some on e wh om you r pare n ts obje c t toQ9 e We sh ou ld obe y (follow) olde r pe ople
Q9 f It is importan t to h ave a son to ke e p th e family lin e goin g
Q9 g Me n sh ou ld work ou tside an d woman sh ou ld te n d to h ou s

2002

2002

2003

2003

2004

2002

Ku n m in Han gzh o
g
u

2003

Ho n g
Ko n gT aiwanSo u t h
Ko r e a

Sin gapo r e

Japan

96
41
65
25
46
42
29

92
31
32
22
43
28
23

93
51
15
5
30
15
16

94
59
14
6
32
17
12

97
64
40
7
49
30
25

100
67
55
18
68
53
46

88
45
64
32
62
41
35

Table 4d. Confucian Teachings of Taiwan 2006 Survey & Singapore 2004, 2007 & 2012: Breakdown by
The figures show percentages of sum of positive categories "1.strongly agree" & "2.agree to some extent".
ethnicity. (Note: This table gives a comparison of chinese mainlander and nativeTaiwanese in 2006, but it is becoming diffficult to ask about this distinction these days.)
Su rve y Year T aiwan
Ite m
Q9 a We sh ou ld re spe c t ou r an c e stors
Q9 b Th e e lde st son sh ou ld look afte r h is agin g pare n ts
Q9 c A wife sh ou ld obe y(follow) h e r h u sban d
Q9 d Not to marry some on e wh om you r pare n ts obje c t toQ9 e We sh ou ld obe y (follow) olde r pe ople
Q9 f It is importan t to h ave a son to ke e p th e family lin e goin g
Q9 g Me n sh ou ld work ou tside an d woman sh ou ld te n d to h ou s

2006

Na t iv e
T a iwa n e s e

C h in e s e
ma in la n d e r

98
65
44
12
67
40
40

96
70
50
9
48
35
37

Sin g a p ore

M alay

94
54
83
44
65
55
39

2004
In dian

98
51
72
49
70
46
24

53

2007
Ot h e r s C h in e se

96
44
63
37
70
48
33

96
51
56
24
45
41
27

2012
M alay

94
66
81
40
69
51
31

In dianOt h e r s

96
80
68
40
69
41
26

94
63
66
28
63
47
28

C h in e se M alay

96
43
61
35
79
47
28

96
65
84
55
88
48
37

In dian

94
59
74
50
92
50
32

Ot h e r s-

Trust of Nations

Table 5a
APVS su rve y ye ar

Q1 8 a Family
Q1 8 b Care e r
Q1 8 c Fre e timeQ1 8 d Frie n ds
Q1 8 e Re lative s
Q1 8 f Re ligion
Q1 8 g Politic s

Table 5b
RPVS su rve y ye ar

Q1 8 a Family
Q1 8 b Care e r
Q1 8 c Fre e timeQ1 8 d Frie n ds
Q1 8 e Re lative s
Q1 8 f Re ligion
Q1 8 g Politic s

Table 5c

The Degrees of Importance of Aspects in Daily Life (the Asia- Pacific Values Survey)
The figures show the sum of percentages of positive categories 5, 6 &7.
2010

2011

2011

2011

2011

2012

2012

2013

2012

2010

2013

Japan

Be ijin g

Sh an gh ai

Ho n g Ko n g

T aiwanSo u t h
Ko r e a

SingaporeIndia

Au st r aliaUSA

Vie t n am

97
89
92
96
96
42
78

98
90
81
91
97
26
60

96
92
86
93
96
42
57

96
90
92
94
95
50
52

98
93
95
95
98
64
38

99
95
98
99
98
65
69

95
93
98
95
99
80
43

97
96
78
92
96
81
38

97
83
93
94
95
48
41

94
86
90
95
95
77
51

98
99
88
84
97
58
60

The Degrees of Importance of Aspects in Daily Life. (The Pacific-Rim Values Survey)
The figures show the sum of percentages of positive categories 5, 6 &7.

Ha wa ii Re s id en t s

2004

2005

2005

2005

2006

2006

2007

2008

2007

2006

Japan ABe ijin g

Sh an gh ai

Ho n g Ko n g

T aiwanSo u t h
Ko r e a

SingaporeIndia

Au st r alia

USA

93
72
70
81
89
21
49

93
77
59
67
89
14
43

92
85
69
80
89
28
51

92
80
73
74
90
31
23

97
89
85
80
95
38
19

97
96
94
91
96
47
43

96
86
87
86
97
69
39

96
93
68
82
93
81
37

92
66
80
83
89
36
29

91
77
82
88
93
68
35

Q1 8 a Family
Q1 8 b Care e r
Q1 8 c Fre e timeQ1 8 d Frie n ds
Q1 8 e Re lative s
Q1 8 f Re ligion
Q1 8 g Politic s

Table 5d

2002

2002

2002

2003

2002

2002

2003

Japan

Be ijin g

Sh an gh ai

Ku n m in g

Han gzh o u

Ho n g Ko n g

T aiwan

94
78
77
85
92
24
48

95
87
68
76
91
11
41

98
91
74
82
94
18
44

93
84
70
77
91
17
46

95
90
78
84
94
24
45

94
81
74
76
92
28
20

97
88
84
76
94
43
22

2003
So u t h
Ko r e a

97
95
93
93
97
49
45

2004
Sin gapo r e

95
81
88
88
97
72
37

The Degrees of Importance of Aspects in Daily Life. (Seven Country Survey)
The figures show the sum of percentages of positive categories 5, 6 &7.

7 c ou n try Su rve y 1 9 8 8
Q1 8 a Family
Q1 8 b Care e r
Q1 8 c Fre e timeQ1 8 d Frie n ds
Q1 8 e Re lative s
Q1 8 f Re ligion
Q1 8 g Politic s

No n Japan e se

95
73
78
87
94
61
39

94
80
75
80
85
58
39

The Degrees of Importance of Aspects in Daily Life. (The East Asia Values Survey , the Japasense overseas surveys in Hawaii, on the West Coast of the USA & Brazil)
The figures show the sum of percentages of positive categories 5, 6 &7.
Hawaii Re side n t Su rve y

EAVS su rve y ye ar

1988
Japan e se
Am e r ic an s

1988

1987

1987

1987

1992

1993

1988

Japan - A

Japan - B

Fr an c eUK

FRG

It alyThe
Ne t h re la n d s

USA

95
85
76
87
91
38
54

94
83
78
85
91
37
53

93
85
73
73
83
35
23

96
57
66
76
83
36
26

87
51
83
84
81
38
40

98
75
70
80
93
64
28

94
62
83
88
86
33
32

98
65
74
83
90
76
46

54

JA on t h e W.C oa s t Ja p a n e s e Bra z ilia n s

1999Japan e se
Am e r ic an s

1998

1991

No n Japan e se

JAW C SBRZ JB

99
66
80
91
97
58
34

94
77
80
83
88
55
31

93
74
83
92
96
47
26

94
95
63
87
96
74
49

Trust of Nations

Table 6a.

The rates of Two Choices from the Four Choices (Q34).(The Asia-Pacific Values Survey)
A (filial piety), B(pay back to a benefactor), C(the right of individuals), & D (the right of freedom)

APVS
survey year 2010
USA

A&B
A&C
A&D
B&C
B&D
C&D
Table 6b.

21
22
14
15
6
19

2010

2011

2011

2011

2011

2012

2012

Japan

Be ijin g

Sh an gh ai

Ho n g Ko n g

TaiwanSo u t h Ko r e a

Sin gapo r e

55
10
13
6
11
5

67
15
12
2
2
2

57
18
12
3
3
3

44
15
22
5
6
7

54
17
13
6
5
5

43
14
17
7
8
10

48
27
10
6
3
7

2013

2012

2013

India Australia Vietnam

39
29
22
4
4
2

18
26
12
11
5
27

37
27
27
4
2
4

The rates of Two Choices from the Four Choices (Q34)(The Pacific-Rim Values Survey)
A (filial piety), B(pay back to a benefactor), C(the right of individuals), & D (the right of freedom)

PRVS
survey year 2005
USA

2004

2011

2011

2011

2011

2012

2012

Japan

Be ijin g

Sh an gh ai

Ho n g Ko n g

TaiwanSo u t h Ko r e a

Sin gapo r e

A&B
A&C
A&D
B&C
B&D
C&D

48
12
15
8
12
8

55
19
13
5
4
5

58
18
12
4
3
4

44
14
26
3
7
7

53
17
12
5
7
6

51
18
15
7
6
4

45
30
12
6
3
4

26
23
11
12
7
22

2013

2012

India Australia

34
23
11
2
2
1

16
31
12
8
4
25

The rates of Two Choices from the Four Choices (Q34)(Seven Country Survey)
A (filial piety), B(pay back to a benefactor), C(the right of individuals), & D (the right of freedom)
Seven Country Survey
su rve y ye ar
1988
1988
1992
1987
1987
1993
1987
Table 6c.

A&B
A&C
A&D
B&C
B&D
C&D

USA

Japan

Italy

20
40
13
6
3
20

47
14
20
5
7
8

24
30
26
4
3
14

France W.Germany T h e Ne t h e rla n d s

20
14
20
8
11
27

9
28
19
4
3
37

12
30
26
3
1
28

55

UK

32
20
13
11
8
16

Trust of Nations

56

Trust of Nations

Figure 1. Interpersonal Trust of Japan: Precentages of Positive Responses to
GSS Items.
%
30

25

20

15

15
13
12

10

5

13

14

13

5

Note: Some papers, such as Yoshino (2009, Fig. 1) & Yoshino (2014d, Fig. 7-3),
included an error in the 1978 data, but it is corrected here.
Figure 1.

（Japanese National Character Survey)

57

Trust of Nations

40

38

35

26

25
20

33

33

31

30

36
30

26
23

21

19

19

15

Trust
16

18

2008

2013

Multiple

10
5
0

1978

Figure 2.

1983

1988

1993

1998

2003

The Japanese positive response rate for Q38 on generalizedinterpersonal trust, and the multiplication of the percentage and the rate of valid
returned questionnaires for each survey
Roughly, the trends of these two lines coincide with each other, but the rate ofvalid returned questionnaires may be closely associated with the attitude ofcooperation of the respondents in the survey. Therefore, it might be necessary to
discount the percentage of trust to estimate the statistics for the general
population.

58

Trust of Nations

Abbreviations
JAWCS: Japanese Americans on the West Coast (USA)HW (NJ) or (J): Hawaii Residents (Non-Japanese) or (Japanese)
Brazil (JB): Japanese Brazilians in Brazil
Numbers (e. g. , 88 or 08) mean the survey years (e. g. , 1988 or 2008).
Note: Figure 3 of Yoshino(2005) included an error of Hong Kong 2002 data, but corrected in the figure above.

59

Trust of Nations

Figure 4. A Manifold of Communities in the World [Adapted from Yoshino et al. (2015), Fig.6.]

The World

SAFTA(South Asia)

APEC (Asia-Pacific)

East Asia Summit
CER
ASEAN

ASEAN

ASEAN

+3

＋６

(Oceania)

NAFTA（North America)

ALADIEC  EU(Latin America)
ECOWAS(West Africa)

EFTA

Some pairs of these communities may overlap with each other, and thetotal set may comprise a sort of hierarchy as a global manifold. Each
chart may be enlarged, be shrunk, or disappear over time. Twooverlapping charts may be assimilated to make a larger chart. In
addition, a new chart may appear. To have steady, peaceful, andprosperous development, we may need a set of “soft” regulations toconnect pairs of communities rather than a single, restrictive global
standard.
60