Contributed Paper

Motivating landowners to recruit neighbors forprivate land conservation
R. M. Niemiec,1 ∗ R. Willer,2 N. M. Ardoin,3 and F. K. Brewer4

1

Emmett Interdisciplinary Program in Environment and Resources, Stanford University, 473 Via Ortega Way, Suite 226, Stanford, CA,94305, U.S.A.
2
Department of Sociology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 94305, U.S.A.
3
Graduate School of Education & Woods Institute for the Environment, Stanford University, 485 Lausen Mall, Stanford, CA, 94305,
U.S.A.
4
Big Island Invasive Species Committee, Pacific Cooperative Studies Unit, University of Hawaii–Manoa, 23 E Kawili Street, Hilo, HI,
96720, U.S.A.

Abstract: Encouraging motivated landowners to not only engage in conservation action on their own
property but also to recruit others may enhance effectiveness of conservation on private lands. Landowners
may only engage in such recruitment if they believe their neighbors care about the conservation issue, will
positively respond to their conservation efforts, and are likely to take action for the conservation cause. We
designed a series of microinterventions that can be added to community meetings to change these beliefs
to encourage landowner engagement in recruitment of others. The microinterventions included neighbordiscussion, public commitment making, collective goal setting, and increased observability of contributions
to the conservation cause. In a field experiment, we tested whether adding microinterventions to traditional
knowledge-transfer outreach meetings changed those beliefs so as to encourage landowners in Hawaii torecruit their neighbors for private lands conservation. We delivered a traditional outreach meeting about
managing the invasive little fire ant (Wasmannia auropunctata) to 5 communities and a traditional outreachapproach with added microinterventions to 5 other communities. Analysis of pre- and post-surveys of residents
showed that compared with the traditional conservation outreach approach, the microinterventions altered asubset of beliefs that landowners had about others. These microinterventions motivated reputationally mindedlandowners to recruit and coordinate with other residents to control the invasive fire ant across property
boundaries. Our results suggest integration of these microinterventions into existing outreach approaches willencourage some landowners to facilitate collective conservation action across property boundaries.

Keywords: collective action, conservation behavior, Hawaii, invasive, norms, psychology
Motivaciones para que los Terratenientes Recluten a sus Vecinos para la Conservación Privada de Tierras

Resumen: Si se alienta a los propietarios motivados a no sólo participar con acciones de conservación en
sus propiedades sino también a reclutar a otros, se podrı́a mejorar la efectividad de la conservación en las
propiedades privadas. Puede que los propietarios sólo se comprometan con el reclutamiento si consideran
que a sus vecinos les importan los temas de conservación, si responderán positivamente a sus esfuerzos deconservación, y si tienen probabilidad de tomar acción por la causa de conservación. Diseñamos una seriede microintervenciones que pueden añadirse a las juntas comunitarias para cambiar estas creencias y ası́
promover la participación de los propietarios en el reclutamiento de otros propietarios. Las microintervenciones incluyeron discusiones entre vecinos, firmas públicas de compromisos, el establecimiento de objetivos
colectivos, y una observación incrementada de las contribuciones a la causa de la conservación. En un experimento de campo probamos si la suma de estas microintervenciones a las tradicionales juntas de participacióncon transferencia de conocimiento cambó dichas creencias de tal manera que alentara a los terratenientes en∗ Current address: Human Dimensions of Natural Resources Department, Colorado State University, 1401 Campus Delivery, Fort Collins, CO

80523, U.S.A., email rebecca.niemiec@colostate.edu
Article impact statement: Social psychology theory can inform outreach that encourages landowners to influence neighbors to participate inconservation.
Paper submitted March 19, 2018; revised manuscript accepted December 2, 2018.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

1
Conservation Biology, Volume 00, No. 0, 1–12
C 2019 The Authors. Conservation Biology published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Society for Conservation Biology.
DOI: 10.1111/cobi.13294

Motivating Recruitment and Coordination

2

Hawái a reclutar a sus vecinos para la conservación de terrenos privados. Realizamos una junta tradicionalde participación sobre el manejo de la hormiga de fuego (Wasmannia auropunctata), una especie invasora,para cinco comunidades y una estrategia tradicional de participación con la suma de microintervenciones
para otras cinco comunidades. El análisis previo y posterior a las encuestas realizadas a los residentes mostróque, si se comparan con la estrategia tradicional de participación, las microintervenciones alteraron a un
subconjunto de creencias que los propietarios tenı́an sobre los demás propietarios. Estas microintervenciones
motivaron a los propietarios con una reputación de estar dispuestos a conservar a reclutar y coordinarse con
otros residentes para controlar a la hormiga invasora atravesando los lı́mites de las propiedades. Nuestrosresultados sugieren que la integración de estas microintervenciones dentro de las estrategias existentes departicipación alentará a algunos propietarios a facilitar las acciones de conservación colectiva a través delos lı́mites de las propiedades.

Palabras Clave: acción colectiva, comportamiento de conservación, Hawái, normas, psicologı́a: , , 
,   ,  ,    , ,   
,  ,    
 ,     (Wasmannia auropunctata) ,  ,  , ,     ,  , , 
: ; : : , , , , , Introduction
Achieving conservation objectives across private lands
requires that residents engage in conservation actions(Moon & Cocklin 2011). Programs to motivate such actions provide landowners with education, technical assistance, management supplies, financial incentives, andcertifications (Moon & Cocklin 2011; Ma et al. 2012).
To recruit landowners for these programs, organizations
typically teach landowners about the economic and ecological benefits of the program and how to participate(knowledge-transfer approach) (Ma et al. 2012). Such approaches often do not motivate widespread engagement
in conservation activities on private land (Ma et al. 2012).
Despite decades of outreach, only 2% of U.S. family–
forest owners have an easement on their land, 6% participate in cost-share programs, and 1% participate in forest
certification programs (Butler 2008). Outreach focusedon invasive species management on private lands has
not motivated widespread landowner action in Australia(Graham 2013) or the United States (Ma et al. 2018).
Such efforts often motivate only private landowners who
are already generally committed to active management,
have participated in extension events, and have adopted
conservation practices (Langer 2008; Ma et al. 2012).
These motivated individuals are referred to as “model
landowners” (Langer 2008).
The body of research on how to expand private lands
conservation (Snyder & Broderick 1992; Ma et al. 2012)

Conservation Biology
Volume 00, No. 0, 2019suggests peer-learning approaches are an effective strategy; model landowners teach other community members about the conservation program and encouragethem to participate (Snyder & Broderick 1992; Kueper
et al. 2013). Motivating model landowners to communicate with others in their community may increase thereach of conservation programs. Peer interactions may
create community social norms around a conservation
behavior (McKiernan 2017), which could facilitate conservation action over time (Cialdini et al. 2003; Niemiec
et al. 2016). They may enhance landowner feelings ofefficacy and reduce concerns about the program, encouraging widespread participation (Snyder & Broderick
1992; Bandura 1998). Model landowners may be more
successful than program staff at convincing others toparticipate in a conservation program because they may
be more trustworthy and credible due to shared experiences and values (Rogers 2003; Gootee et al. 2010).
Additionally, achieving conservation objectives often requires landowners to coordinate across property boundaries (Graham & Rogers 2017; Ma et al. 2018). Reducing
the spread of invasive species, for example, may requirelandowners to simultaneously apply control tactics acrossproperties (Graham & Rogers 2017). Enhancing habitat
connectivity may require that landowners work together
to ensure a sufficient corridor of habitat across multiple
properties.
Together, this literature suggests that to enhance thereach and effectiveness of private lands conservation,

Niemiec et al.

outreach programs should encourage model landowners
to share information, recruit, and facilitate coordinatedefforts with their neighbors. However, researchers know
little about how to motivate model landowner engagement in such collective practices. Few model landowners
teach, recruit, or coordinate with their neighbors for conservation purposes (Niemiec et al. 2016; Ma et al. 2018;
Niemiec et al. 2018), and people appear unwilling todiscuss environmental issues, even with close friends orfamily (Geiger & Swim 2016). It remains unclear how to
encourage model landowners to move beyond focusing
on their own property to reaching out to their neighbors
to further conservation causes.
The behavioral-science literature suggests that whensharing information, recruiting, or coordinating withothers for collective action, people may be influenced
by the perceived actions and beliefs of relevant others (Simpson & Willer 2015). Individuals appear more
willing to recruit and work with others to achieve acollective goal when social norms support the behavior (Niemiec et al. 2016), when individuals believe others will also take action (Simon et al. 1998; Niemiec
et al. 2016), and when individuals believe they canreceive social or reputational rewards by engaging incollective action (Simon et al. 1998). Changing perceptions of others’ beliefs can encourage discussion of environmental issues with others (Geiger & Swim 2016).
Supplementing current outreach approaches with interventions that alter such beliefs about others may motivate model landowners to communicate with theirneighbors.
From the literature, we identified microinterventions
focused on altering beliefs about others to enhance model
landowner engagement in collective action. We call themmicrointerventions because they are simple, low-cost additions to existing outreach and educational programs(in this case community meetings). The first hypothesis
we tested is that adding social-psychologically based microinterventions to traditional outreach approaches (i.e.,knowledge transfer) more effectively brings about positive change in model landowners’ beliefs about others’
attitudes and actions toward the conservation behavior.
The second hypothesis we tested is that adding microinterventions to traditional outreach approaches increases
model landowners’ engagement in peer sharing, recruitment, and coordination with their neighbors (hereafter,
recruitment and coordination behavior) for private lands
conservation.
We also examined how the microinterventions might
influence within-property conservation behaviors. Studies show mixed results on whether perceptions of others
may influence personal conservation behaviors (e.g., Cialdini et al. 2003; Niemiec et al. 2018). Further, a trade-off
may exist between encouraging recruitment and coordination and encouraging property-level contributions if
landowners have limited time and resources. We there-

3

fore also examined whether our microinterventions may
influence property-level conservation action.

Methods
Microinterventions and Targeted Beliefs
The microinterventions focused on changing perceived
descriptive and injunctive norms, reputational incentives, expected reciprocity, and collective efficacy(Table 1) by facilitating increased communication amongmodel landowners attending an outreach meeting about
their experiences with the conservation challenge(Lewin 1947); encouraging model landowners attending an outreach meeting to publicly commit to recruit and coordinate with others (Lewin 1947; Lokhorst
et al. 2013); facilitating model landowner developmentof community-specific collective goals related to conservation (Bandura & Schunk 1981; Mitkidis et al. 2013); andincreasing visibility of model landowners’ contributions
to conservation after the outreach meetings (Simpson& Willer 2008; Yoeli et al. 2013). We chose these microinterventions because of their demonstrated impact
on beliefs about others and the ease with which they canbe integrated into an outreach meeting structure.
We based the microinterventions on research on injunctive and descriptive social norms. Injunctive social
norms refer to perceived social approval or disapprovalassociated with a behavior, whereas descriptive social
norms refer to perceptions of how commonly others
practice a behavior (Cialdini et al. 2003). Such normative beliefs may influence recruitment and coordination
behavior. Individuals appear more willing to reach out toothers when they believe others are also concerned about
the issue (i.e., there are strong “injunctive norms” aroundthe issue) (Geiger & Swim 2016; Niemiec et al. 2016). Interventions demonstrating that others are also concerned
increase people’s willingness to approach others aboutclimate change (Geiger & Swim 2016).
We also drew on research suggesting that individuals
with high levels of efficacy are more likely to engage andpersist in undertaking collective action (Bandura 1998;
Geiger et al. 2017). Two types of efficacy are particularly
relevant for recruitment and coordination. Expected reciprocity suggests individuals are more likely to approachothers when they believe their actions will inspire others
to contribute (Lubell et al. 2007; Niemiec et al. 2016;
Geiger et al. 2017). Collective efficacy suggests people
are more likely to work with others when they perceivea group has the capacity to work together to achieve acollective goal (Bandura 1998).
The microinterventions were also drawn from the roleof reputational incentives in influencing collective action(Simpson & Willer 2008). The desire to be viewed positively by others and avoid others’ negative perceptions isConservation Biology
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By learning that others care about
the conservation problem
through discussion, model
landowners may come tobelieve that others will respondpositively to their recruitment
efforts and that enough others
will contribute to achieve acollective goal.

Neighborhood discussion may
enhance belief that othercommunity members careabout the conservation cause
and are engaging in collective
conservation efforts; thisenhanced descriptive andinjunctive norm may makemodel landowners more
comfortable approachingothers about the issue (Geiger& Swim 2016).

Neighborhood discussion canhighlight how much otherlandowners care about whether
one engages in recruitment andcoordination for theconservation cause; it can leadto the perception that model
landowners are likely to get
rewards (or sanctions) fromothers for engaging (or not) inrecruitment and coordination
behavior.

Social Perception
Expected
reciprocity andcollective efficacy

Descriptive andinjunctive norms

Reputational rewards
or sanctions

Enhanced communication
among neighbors at community
meeting about conservation
problemCollective goal setting canhighlight how much otherlandowners care about whether
one engages in recruitment andcoordination for theconservation cause; it can leadto the perception that model
landowners are likely to get
rewards (or sanctions) fromothers for engaging (or not) inrecruitment and coordination
behavior.

Ascribing and then achieving
proximal goals can enhance
efficacy beliefs; developing,visualizing, and achieving
specific proximal collective
goals related to theconservation problem mayenhance model landowners’
collective efficacy beliefs
related to the conservation
cause (Bandura & Schunk1981).
Collective goal setting may help
develop shared understandingsthat engaging in recruitment
and coordination behavior isimportant and valued toachieving an agreed-uponcollective goal; these sharedunderstandings (i.e., injunctive
norms) may make model
landowners more comfortableapproaching others (Geiger &Swim 2016).

Collective goal setting at meeting

Table 1. How microinterventions may influence model landowners’ beliefs about others. Microinterventions.

Enhancing the visibility ofpeople’s potential actions caneffectively invoke the power of
reputational incentives(Simpson & Willer 2008; Yoeli
et al. 2013). Making model
landowner’s contributions tothe collective conservation
problem visible allows formodel landowners topotentially obtain reputational
rewards for contributing to theconservation cause.

Viewing others’ positive efforts
can lead to a new community
norm that people are engaging
in and care about the desiredconservation behavior, which
may make model landowners
more comfortable approachingothers (Hopper & Nielsen1991).

Seeing others start to contributeto the conservation problem
may help convince model
landowners they are not alone
in their actions; rather, model
landowners may start to believethat enough others can beinspired to contribute toachieve a collective goal.

Viewing others’ public
commitments to theconservation cause may
convince model landowners
others will take action to fulfill
their commitments. They may
start to believe enough others
can be inspired to contribute toachieve a collective
conservation goal.
Seeing others’ public
commitments may enhance
belief that others in thecommunity care about theconservation cause and areengaging in collective
conservation efforts; thisenhanced descriptive andinjunctive norm may makemodel landowners more
comfortable approachingothers about the issue (Geiger& Swim 2016).
Public commitments motivate
behavior in part by creatingsocial pressure to uphold one’s
public image (Lokhorst et al.
2013). Model landowners who
publicly commit to recruitment
and coordination may feelpressure to engage in such
behavior to uphold theirreputation.

Enhanced visibility ofcontributions after meetingthrough yard signs and postcards

Public commitment making at
community meeting

4
Motivating Recruitment and Coordination

Niemiec et al.

5strongly motivating. In situations where others can notice
an individual’s collective contributions, those individuals may be more likely to contribute (Yoeli et al. 2013;
Simpson & Willer 2015).
Building on Lewin (1947), we incorporated increased
communication and public commitment making as microinterventions to change normative perceptions about
which others care about and are engaging in conservation
action. By learning that others care about the conservation cause through these strategies, community members
may come to believe that others will respond positively
to their recruitment efforts (i.e., have greater expected
reciprocity), that the group might achieve a collective
goal (i.e., have greater collective efficacy), and that others would react with reputational rewards (or sanctions)
if residents did (or did not) engage in recruitment andcoordination behavior.
We incorporated community-specific collective goals
at outreach meetings to increase perceived efficacy,building on social psychology research demonstrating
the role of goal setting in enhancing efficacy and cooperation (Bandura & Schunk 1981; Mitkidis et al. 2013).
We included increased visibility of contributions throughyard signs and postcards to create the possibility for reputational rewards by making visible residents’ collective
contributions after meetings. The yard signs were alsomeant to develop a descriptive norm signaling that others
are engaging in the conservation cause, while the enhanced neighbor-to-neighbor communication as a resultof the yard signs and postcards was meant to enhance
injunctive norms, suggesting that others care about theconservation cause (Hopper & Nielsen 1991).

infestation (Vanderwoude et al. 2010), residents use a
peanut butter bait. If LFA is present, residents repeat
baiting-and-barrier treatments every 4–6 weeks for up
to 1 year. The LFA may move among properties, so
coordinating with neighbors to apply the same treatments over multiple properties can enhance treatment
effectiveness.
Because of the growing threat of LFA, in 2016, prior to
our experiment, the Big Island Invasive Species Committee (BIISC) planned an outreach campaign to motivate
residents to manage LFA. The BIISC is a project of the
University of Hawaii Pacific Cooperative Studies Unit andrepresents a voluntary partnership among government,
private, and nonprofit organizations. For several years
prior to our experiment, BIISC conducted community
outreach meetings to encourage private landowners tomanage invasive species on their properties. The outreach efforts of BIISC focused on providing technicalsupport, subsidized control supplies, and information on
the conservation problem and targeted conservation actions. Residents attending BIISC’s meetings usually werealready concerned about the problem and engaging inconservation action on their property (Niemiec et al.
2018). The BIISC found it difficult to reach uninvolved
community members, and model landowners rarely recruited and coordinated with their neighbors, despite theneed for widespread landowner participation (Niemiec
et al. 2016; Niemiec et al. 2018). We tested whether
microinterventions could motivate model landowners toengage in more recruitment and coordination behaviors, thereby enhancing their conservation achievements
across private lands.

Study Context

Experimental Design

We tested our microinterventions where a growing conservation threat required widespread landowner action
and coordination, a conservation organization wanted to
expand outreach beyond model landowners to facilitate
widespread engagement, and model landowner engagement in recruitment and coordination with neighbors
for conservation was uncommon. We focused on the
management of the invasive little fire ant (LFA) (Wasmannia auropunctata) across private lands on Hawaii.
This species has also invaded Melanesia, Galapagos Islands, Florida, and possibly California (U.S.A.), Bahamas,
Bermuda, and parts of West Africa (Wetterer & Porter2003). In Hawaii, residents and entomologists first detected LFA in 1999. It is now widespread along the island’s eastern coast. Little fire ant can displace native ant
populations, interfere with bird nesting, cause blindness
in animals, and facilitate growth of agricultural-pest populations (Wetterer & Porter 2003).
Widespread, coordinated resident actions are essential
to limit further spread and reduce current levels of LFA
in Hawaii (Lee et al. 2015). To check their property for

We used a cluster-randomized control trial to compare
effectiveness of a community workshop with added microinterventions (delivered in 5 intervention communities) to a traditional workshop focused on knowledgetransfer (delivered in 5 control communities). In collaboration with BIISC in 2016, we advertised an outreachprogram to LFA-infested communities via emails to community leaders, an article in the local newspaper, and BIISC’s website. For program enrollment, a self-designatedcommunity leader worked with BIISC to organize a location and date for a community meeting. By the specified
deadline, 12 communities had signed up for the program.
In 2 communities, we tested and refined various microinterventions. The experiment (including intervention andcontrol groups) focused on individuals in the remaining
10 communities.
To ensure covariate balance between control and intervention communities, we divided the 10 communities
into matched pairs based on key characteristics (e.g.,
median income, percentage of residents over the ageof 65, presence or absence of a community association,

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Motivating Recruitment and Coordination

6and level of urbanity) (matching variables described in
Supporting Information). Within each matched pair, we
randomly assigned 1 community to receive the intervention and 1 to receive the control treatment. The matching
and randomization led to overall balance in key covariates
between control and intervention groups (Supporting Information).
The BIISC delivered a primarily informational lecture
about LFA, including management tactics, at a meeting inall 10 communities. In the 5 intervention communities,
we added activities related to the 4 microinterventions(Table 1 & Supporting Information). In total, 211 individuals attended the 10 meetings (range 11–37/meeting).
We conducted 3 surveys to assess impacts. At themeeting, before sharing content, we administered a preprogram survey; 2 and 7 months after the meeting, we
administered follow-up surveys. In the preprogram and2-month follow-up surveys, we included 7 items to assess participants’ perceived social norms, reputational
rewards or sanctions, expected reciprocity, and collective efficacy (Supporting Information). In the preprogramand both follow-up surveys, we included items related tomodel landowners’ self-reported engagement in recruitment and coordination and their personal, on-property
conservation efforts. We measured recruitment and coordination behaviors as the sum of the number of times
individuals taught others how to control LFA, tried toconvince others to control LFA, or organized efforts withneighbors to control LFA. We measured property-level
conservation efforts as the sum of the number of times
individuals surveyed their property for LFA, applied commercial or noncommercial products to control LFA on
their property, or hired someone to control LFA on theirproperty (Supporting Information).
Surveys also included items about demographics andadditional perceptions that could influence contributions
to LFA management (e.g., knowledge and risk perceptions) (Supporting Information). To determine whether
the microinterventions influenced some residents morethan others, we measured self-reported value orientationsin the presurvey (Supporting Information). We measured
participant’s egoistic, altruistic, and biospheric values
and their desired respect from others. Beliefs about others
may have a greater impact on more egoistic individuals (i.e., those who lack the strong intrinsic motivationof altruists to contribute to the collective and define
their reputation by or in relation to others) (Simpson &Willer 2008). We therefore hypothesized that individuals
with high reputational concern and more egoistic values
would be more heavily influenced by the microinterventions (Supporting Information).
We used ordinal logistic regression to model the intervention effects on beliefs about others because we measured those beliefs as ordinal Likert-type survey items;
thus, they were not continuous variables. We examined
results of linear regression models to assess the sensitivity

Conservation Biology
Volume 00, No. 0, 2019of results to use of qualitatively different models (Supporting Information). We used a Poisson regression to model
the intervention effects on behavioral outcomes because
it had the lowest cross-validation mean squared error of
all possible models for count data. We determined theresults for negative binomial models to assess the sensitivity of the study results to the use of qualitatively different models (Supporting Information). We conducted amoderation analysis to examine whether the intervention
effects differed based on respondents’ value orientations.
In all regression analyses, we controlled for preprogram
perceptions or behaviors, which varied slightly between
intervention and control groups (Table 2), and used robust SEs clustered at the community level (Supporting
Information).

Results
Of the 211 community members who attended the 10
experimental community meetings, we received the following number of completed surveys: 162 preprogram,89 2-month follow-up, and 86 7-month follow-up. Preprogram behaviors, beliefs about others, and demographics
were similar among intervention and control groups, suggesting randomization achieved relative balance acrossgroups (Table 2). Attrition rates were high, especiallybetween the preprogram and 2-month follow-up surveys(Supporting Information). However, on examination ofmean baseline characteristics between intervention andcontrol groups (Supporting Information), attrition did notappear to cause differential loss to follow-up. There wereno significant differences in preprogram recruitment andcoordination between those who dropped out after thepresurvey and those who remained in the study to complete the 2- and 7-month follow-ups in the intervention
and control groups (Supporting Information). We therefore used complete cases for our analysis (89 participants
who completed preprogram and 2-month follow-up surveys; 76 participants who completed all surveys to examine longer-term behavioral trends).
Surveyed individuals were highly involved in LFA management on their property and concerned about LFA before the meeting (Table 2). Most individuals in the control(74.7%) and intervention (77.8%) communities reported
engaging in ࣙ3 LFA control actions on their property inthe 6 months prior to attending the meeting. Individuals
engaged in recruitment and coordination behaviors lessoften (20.3% of control residents and 19.8% of intervention residents engaged in such behaviors ࣙ3 times in thesame period). Our sample therefore represented model
landowners (Ma et al. 2012) who were highly concerned
about LFA and had attempted to manage LFA on theirproperty but rarely communicated with their neighbors
to manage LFA across property boundaries.

Niemiec et al.

7

Table 2. Descriptive statistics from the intervention and control communities before the program survey (n = 162a ).
Control mean(n = 79)

Control SD

Intervention
mean (n = 83)

InterventionSD

sum of 3 behaviors, withmaximum of 18 possible
sum of 3 behaviors, withmaximum of 18 possible

1.84

3.44

1.59

3.06

6.77

5.12

7.65

6.08

7-point Likert
7-point Likert

5.00
4.90

1.24
1.31

5.36
5.03

1.16
1.26

7-point Likert

5.28

1.34

5.20

1.35

7-point Likert

5.09

1.33

5.28

1.35

6-point scale, ranging from
0–100%

2.91

1.14

2.71

1.35

7-point scale ranging from
–3 (negative reaction) to
3 (positive reaction)
7-point scale ranging from
–3 (negative reaction) to
3 (positive reaction)

5.49

1.29

5.62

1.22

3.39

1.05

3.48

1.10

1.14
2.93
3.05
3.42
57.02

0.344
1.43
6.39
1.24
14.82

1.15
2.98
2.44
3.49
62.08

0.356
1.38
4.05
1.26
13.30

4.06
3.59

0.724
1.98

4.07
3.59

0.870
2.05

Variable
Preprogram behaviorsb
recruitment andcoordination behavior
property-level behavior
Preprogram beliefs aboutothersexpected reciprocity
collective efficacy 1.
sufficient numbers ofresidents can bemobilized
collective efficacy 2.
together, residents canachieve a collective
goal
injunctive norms
prevalence of LFA
concern
descriptive norms
prevalence of LFA
control behavior
potential for reputational
rewards
potential for reputationalsanctions
Demographics
property ownershipincomeproperty size (ac)c
education
Age
Preprogram perceptual
covariates
threat perceptions
knowledge of control
tactics

Metric

1 = yes, 2 = no5-point interval scale
5-point interval scale

5-point scale
7-point Likert

a Mean number of people attending outreach meetings in the control communities was 22, and mean number of people attending outreachmeetings in the intervention communities was 20.
b Survey gave residents the option of indicating they had engaged in the behavior 0–6 times; numbers greater than 6 were counted as 6 in theanalyses.
c Abbreviation: ac, acres.

Intervention Effects on Beliefs of Others
Of the 7 social perceptions examined, the intervention
significantly and positively (p < 0.05) predicted expected
reciprocity. The relationship between the intervention
and perceived possibility for reputational sanctions, collective efficacy, and descriptive norms was nearly significant when controlling for preprogram perceptions(Table 3). The intervention did not significantly predictthe remaining 3 social perceptions examined. However,the coefficients associated with the intervention werein the direction hypothesized (Table 3). The adjusted
estimated effect of the intervention on perceptions of
expected reciprocity at the 2-month follow-up was 0.72
scale points (Table 3). The intervention also significantly

and positively predicted self-reported knowledge of effective control tactics (Table 3). We obtained similar
results for all perceptions with linear regression (Supporting Information). Regression analysis indicated thatseveral of these altered perceptions, including expected
reciprocity, predicted recruitment and coordination behavior reported in 2- and 7-month follow-up surveys (Supporting Information).

Intervention Effects on Recruitment and Coordination
Behavior
The intervention did not significantly affect recruitment
and coordination behavior reported at the 2- and 7-monthConservation Biology
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8

Table 3. Results of ordinal logistic regressions used to analyze the effect of microinterventions (0, control; 1, intervention) on beliefsa about others
during 2-month follow-up surveys when adjusting for preprogram beliefs.b

Intervention
Preprogram
beliefn
R2
Log
likelihood

Expected
reciprocity

Collective
efficacy 1

Collective
efficacy 2

Injunctive
norms

Descriptive
norms

Perceived
potential
for reputational
rewards

0.722(0.344)∗0.328(0.255)86
0.031–136.72

0.526(0.274)†0.351(0.197)†840.022–152.57

0.442(0.322)0.501(0.180)∗∗84
0.045–139.830.478(0.395)0.754(0.187)∗∗85
0.083–126.30

0.587(0.397)†0.790(0.277)∗∗82
0.086–121.73

0.329(0.310)0.307(0.145)∗85
0.019–120.95

Perceived
potential
for reputationalsanctions

Knowledgeof control
tactics

0.952(0.580)†0.648(0.236)∗∗85
0.073–84.510.851(0.333)∗0.363(0.104)∗∗84
0.065–119.07

a For each belief, we included the preprogram belief as a covariate in case matching and randomization in our experiment did not lead tobalancing in the covariate.
b Significance: ∗ ∗ p ࣘ 0.01; ∗ p ࣘ 0.05; † p ࣘ 0.10.

Preprogram

2-monthFollow-up

7-monthFollow-up

Preprogram

2-monthFollow-up

follow-up (Table 4, Fig. 1 & Supporting Information). The
estimated rate of recruitment and coordination behavior
in the intervention was 1.424 times the rate of the control
at 2 months (95% CI 0.90–2.25, p = 0.13) and 1.428 times
the rate of the control at 7 months (95% CI 0.93–2.21,
p = 0.11) in the adjusted Poisson analysis. A subsample
analysis may explain the lack of a significant difference(Fig. 2).
Including desire for respect by others as an interaction
term with the intervention indicated a significant interaction effect on 2-month recruitment and coordination
behavior (β = 0.45 [SE 0.22], p = 0.04). For the subsample of those who highly desired respect from others(i.e., answered that they thought being respected was“very” or “moderately” important, hereby referred to as“reputationally oriented landowners; n = 33), the rate ofrecruitment and coordination behavior reported in theintervention group was 2.28 times the rate of the control
group at 2 months and 2.01 times the rate at 7 months(2-month incidence rate ratio: 2.28, 95% CI 1.79–2.90,
p < 0.01; 7-month incidence rate ratio: 2.01, 95% CI
1.26–3.21, p < 0.01) in the adjusted analysis (Table 4).
We obtained similar results with negative binomial regres-Conservation Biology
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7-monthFollow-up

Figure 1. Mean (95% CI) reported
number of recruitment and coordination
and within-property behaviors per monthin intervention and control communities
among those who completed thepreprogram survey (n = 89), the 2-monthfollow-up (n = 89), and the 7-monthfollow-up (n = 76).

sion (Supporting Information). Among reputationally oriented landowners, perceived possibility for reputationalsanctions at the 2-month follow-up significantly predicted
2-month recruitment and coordination behavior (β =–0.428 [SE = 0.143], p < 0.01; more negative means
more sanctions).
Intervention Effects on Conservation Action on Property
Intervention participants engaged in fewer withinproperty actions at 2 months and a similar amount at
7 months after meetings than the control group (Fig. 1).
The intervention significantly and negatively predictedwithin-property behavior at 2 months (Table 4). For each
within-property behavior in the control group, there
were 0.681 behaviors in the intervention group (incidence rate ratio: 0.681, 95% CI 0.483–0.960, p = 0.03).
With the negative binomial model, the intervention did
not significantly predict 2-month within-property behavior (Supporting Information). The intervention was nota significant predictor of within-property behavior at 7
months with the Poisson (Table 4) and negative binomial models (Supporting Information). The increase inNiemiec et al.

Preprogram

92-monthFollow-up

7-monthFollow-up

Preprogram

2-monthFollow-up

within-property contributions among those in the control group relative to those in the intervention group was
driven primarily by the control group’s more frequent useof commercial products to control LFA on their property
at the 2-month follow-up (Supporting Information). At
this follow-up, those in both the intervention and control
groups were, on average, exceeding the recommended
use of a commercial product of once every 4–6 weeks(Supporting Information).

Discussion
Existing private lands conservation programs often reach
only a limited subset of highly motivated model landowners already interested in and contributing to conservation.
To reach other landowners and enhance effectivenessof highly motivated individuals, conservation outreach
could leverage those model landowners’ efforts. Alreadyinvested in conservation, model landowners could further share information, recruit, and coordinate with community members, facilitating collective and persistent engagement (Snyder & Broderick 1992; Ma et al. 2012; Graham & Rogers 2017). Motivating such collective actions
may require changing those landowners’ beliefs about
what others think or do in their community regarding a
conservation behavior (Geiger & Swim 2016). We foundmeasurable effects of a series of microinterventions,which can be integrated into existing outreach initiatives.
The microinterventions significantly influenced model
landowners’ expected reciprocity beliefs, and among a
subsample of model landowners concerned with theirreputations, they led to approximately twice the rate ofrecruitment and coordination behavior compared with aknowledge-transfer approach.
Although our effect sizes were moderate and did notdemonstrate significant effects of the intervention on
recruitment and coordination for our full sample, ourfindings have conservation implications. When model
landowners are particularly driven by reputational in-

7-monthFollow-up

Figure 2. Mean (95% CI) reported
number of recruitment and coordination
behaviors per month in intervention andcontrol communities in the preprogram
surveys and the 2- and 7-month follow-up
surveys by respondent reported desire(high and low) to be respected. Those who
more highly desired being respected
answered that being respected or held inhigh regard by others was moderately orvery important to them (n = 33), andthose who did not highly desire being
respected answered that being respected
was somewhat or not at all important tothem (n = 53).

fluences, microinterventions may effectively encourage
landowners to recruit and coordinate with others intheir community. In turn, those collective behaviors may
enhance the conservation program’s overall impact (Maet al. 2012). Our findings suggest social perceptions, especially expected reciprocity, may be important for understanding recruitment and coordination behavior andbe altered through interventions that can be easily incorporated into conservation programs. These findings
are consistent with Geiger and Swim (2016), who foundthat altering social perceptions can encourage people todiscuss climate change with others.
Our finding regarding the importance and malleabilityof expected reciprocity is consistent with studies linking
perceptions of expected reciprocity to collective environmental behavior (Lubell et al. 2007), environmental
policy support (Lubell et al. 2006), and residents’ invasive
species control efforts in Hawaii (Niemiec et al. 2016),
Australia (Marshall et al. 2016), and Montana (Lubeck2018). We could not determine whether reciprocity significantly mediated the intervention effects on behavior
because of our small sample size. The intervention predicted expected reciprocity at the 2-month follow-up,
and expected reciprocity at 2 months predicted recruitment and coordination behavior at the 2- and 7-monthfollow-ups. Thus, a potentially promising line of inquiry
may be to explore whether expected reciprocity mediates the impacts of microinterventions on recruitment
and coordination behavior.
Further research is needed on how changing social perceptions motivates recruitment and coordination behavior; our estimates of the power of the microinterventions
at changing those behaviors may be conservative. We
did not include a true control (i.e., no meeting). Moreover, the knowledge-transfer (control) meetings were relatively effective at increasing recruitment and coordination behavior. One of the reasons the knowledge-transfer
control meetings may have been so effective was that
residents in both meetings were offered an incentive forrecruiting and coordinating with neighbors (i.e., BIISC

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Table 4. Coefficients and cluster robust standard errors (in parentheses) from Poisson regression models analyzing effects of the microinterventions (0, control; 1, intervention) on property level
and recruitment and coordination behavior for invasive species management when adjusting for preprogram behavior.a

staff would help residents apply a free application ofpesticide if they recruited enough neighbors). Anotherreason our estimates of the power of the microinterventions at changing recruitment and coordination behaviors may be conservative is that before initiation of
the outreach programs, self-reported social perceptions
were relatively high and knowledge was relatively low.
In situations where knowledge is high but perceived
norms, reciprocity, and reputational incentives are low,
the microinterventions may have larger effect sizes thanknowledge-transfer approaches.
Our finding that reputational concern moderated theintervention effects is consistent with studies suggestingthat some individuals may be more reputationallydriven than others (Simpson & Willer 2008). For thoseindividuals, enhancing the visibility of contributions
appeals to their reputational concerns and thus increases
their contributions to public goods (Simpson & Willer2008). Our results highlight the importance of examining
the interactions between conservation-behavior-related
interventions and individual values and characteristics(Simpson & Willer 2015). Investigating such interaction
effects may help organizations deliver different interventions depending on community context to more effectively target populations based on their characteristics.
Model landowners given the intervention engaged inslightly fewer within-property conservation behaviors at
2 months than those in the control group. However, atthat time, model landowners in both control and intervention communities were, on average, exceeding therecommended frequency of commercial pesticide application. One likely explanation for this is that after meetings, those in the intervention redirected their efforts
away from excessive use of pesticide on their property
toward recruiting neighbors to coordinate their efforts inmonthly applications, which the BIISC outreach coordinator emphasized was a more effective strategy. Thosefrom control communities may have felt motivated to
do more to control LFA but did not feel comfortable approaching neighbors. Instead, they increased their use of
a commercial pesticide on their property right after the
meeting without trying to coordinate with neighbors.
This explanation is consistent with the spike in withinproperty contributions occurring primarily as a result ofa difference in use of a commercial product, which BIISC
emphasized residents should apply once a month at thesame time as neighbors to be most effective. The BIISC
found that in the year following intervention and control
outreach programs, more neighborhood groups from intervention communities contacted them asking for help
running coordinated neighborhood-scale pesticide application for LFA.
Another potential explanation for the temporary spikein within-property contributions among the control
relative to the intervention is that the model landowners
receiving the intervention felt they had fulfilled theira p ࣘ 0.01.
b p ࣘ 0.05.

adjusted R2 = 0.115
89
adjusted R2 = 0.090
76

0.046 (0.012)a
0.059 (0.015)a

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Intervention
Preprogram
engagement inrecruitment andcoordination
behavior
Preprogram
engagement inproperty-level
behavior
Model fitNadjusted R2 = 0.067
89–0.049 (0.151)–0.384 (0.175)b

adjusted R2 = 0.068
76

adjusted R2 = 0.110
33

7-month follow-up,
recruitment andcoordination
behavior
0.700 (0.237)a
0.161 (0.071)b
2-month follow-up,
recruitment andcoordination
behavior
0.822 (0.123)a0.112 (0.093)
7-month follow-up,
within property
behavior
2-month follow-up,
within property
behavior

7-month follow-up,
recruitment-andcoordination
behavior
0.356 (0.222)
0.078 (0.024)a
2-month follow-up,
recruitment andcoordination
behavior
0.354 (0.233)
0.074 (0.031)b

Full sample

adjusted R2 = 0.150
27

Motivating Recruitment and Coordination

Subsample of those who valued being
respected

10

Niemiec et al.

obligation to the collective or used up their time orenergy by recruiting others. They may have not felt
obligated or had the time or energy to invest as much
effort on their property. If true, this may imply a trade-off
between motivating recruitment and coordination andmotivating within-property contributions.
Key limitations of our study were our focus on selfreported behavior and that we did not obtain data on
LFA populations. Many model landowners did not remain enrolled in our experiments over time, which
may have led to less precise estimates. Furthermore, themodel landowners who remained enrolled were slightly
more engaged in property-level action than those who
dropped, suggesting our findings may apply only to moreengaged landowners (Supporting Information). Finally,
we only tracked behavior at 2 and 7 months following
the outreach program. Successful conservation often requires sustained action for a long period (Dayer et al.
2018). Controlling LFA, for example, requires monthly
applications of pesticides for a year and continuous monitoring for LFA in perpetuity. Recruitment and coordination and property-level behaviors were lower at 7 months
than 2 months after the outreach meetings. At 7 months,
property-level behaviors returned to preprogram levels.
The intervention and past behavior explained onlya small portion of the overall variance in recruitment
and coordination behavior at 2- and 7-month follow-ups.
This finding suggests there are additional factors influencing landowners’ willingness to reach out to others that
could inform intervention strategies. For example, somekey barriers preventing landholders from working acrossboundaries for invasive species control may be a cultureof landowner independence and the belief that otherlandowners value invasive species because they provide
services (e.g., privacy) (Ma et al. 2018). Landholders’ unwillingness to work with their neighbors on managementof invasive species may be due to landholder’s beliefs thatcollective action may be ineffective and that others are
too busy, are physically incapable, and prefer to work
alone (Marshall et al. 2016).
Shifting social perceptions regarding LFA management
may be easier than shifting social perceptions regarding controversial conservation problems. For conservation problems in which stakeholders have well-known,
diverse, and opposing perspectives, model landowners
who attend a meeting may assume those at the meeting
do not represent the broader community. The microinterventions under such circumstances might have a lesser
effect or no effect on their social perceptions regarding
the community at large.
In our study, model landowners and others possessed
relatively high levels of knowledge about LFA, there wereeffective, discrete, and time-bound management options,and LFA was causing significant socioeconomic impacts.
In other contexts, our microinterventions may need modification, depending on the conservation problem and11target population. Options include coupling microinterventions with activities such as participatory mapping(Ravnborg & Westermann 2002) or collective learningand experimentation (Graham & Rogers 2017) to ensuremodel landowners have sufficient knowledge of the problem and potential solutions to feel comfortable approaching others (Geiger et al. 2017).
Our study adds to knowledge of the social dimensionsof private lands conservation (e.g., Moon & Cocklin 2011;
Ma et al. 2012; Marshall et al. 2016). In particular, ourresults suggest model landowners who are concerned
about their reputations can be encouraged to recruit andcoordinate with others for conservation causes. Modellandowners recruiting and coordinating with neighbors
could expand the reach, uptake, and effectiveness ofprivate-lands conservation worldwide.

Acknowledgments
We thank S. Kaye, J. Miyashiro, and the BIISC, who
made data collection from the little fire ant communitycontrol program possible. We thank S. Kung and K.
Lopez for their work on this project and the University of
Hawaii at Hilo Pacific Internship Programs for Exploring
Science (PIPES) for supporting them. We thank A. Majchrzak, G. Asner, and P. Vitousek for their support and A.
Mertens for his statistical help. This work was funded by
an NSF Graduate Research Fellowship (DGE-114747) to
R.M.N., an NSF Dissertation Improvement Grant (Award# 1626792) to R.M.N. and N.M.A., and a McGee-Levorson
grant, a Morrison Institution Grant, and a Community
Engagement grant from Stanford University to R.M.N.

Supporting Information
A description of the implementation of intervention components (Appendix S1), the recruitment of study participants (Appendix S2), analysis methods (Appendix S3),
detailed additional results (Appendix S4), additional figures and tables (Appendix S5), and additional literaturecited (Appendix S6) are available online. The authors
are solely responsible for the content and functionalityof these materials. Queries (other than absence of thematerial) should be directed to the corresponding author.

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