JIIA-ECFR Joint Open Seminar on Regional Order and Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific

JIIA-ECFR Joint Open Seminar on
Regional Order and Maritime Security
in the Asia-Pacific

March 2017

The Japan Institute of International Affairs

JIIA-ECFR Joint Open Seminar on
Regional Order and Maritime Security
in the Asia-Pacific

March 2017

PrefaceIn partnership with the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), the Japan
Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) hosted a half-day seminar on “Regional Order andMaritime Security in the Asia-Pacific” in Paris in March 2017.
Tensions are rising in the East and South China Seas over overlapping maritime
claims, disputes over international law, and suspicions caused by rising military
expenditures and geopolitical tensions. Maritime security challenges in Asian waters also
reflect different views about the regional order. For most of the countries in the region,
the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty provides the legal basis for the Asian regional
order—the San Francisco System. As France, the United Kingdom, and some other
European countries participated in the San Francisco Peace Conference, this joint seminarprovided a good opportunity for Asian, European, and American participants to discuss
maritime security issues in the context of maintaining the rules-based regional order inthe Asia-Pacific region.
This report consists of a summary of the discussions among the leading experts
from Japan, Europe, the United States, and Southeast Asia. I hope this report helps readersdeepen their understanding of the maritime security challenges in Asian waters.

March 2017

Yoshiji NOGAMI
President
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Contents
 Program........................................................................................................................................... 1
 List of Participants .......................................................................................................................... 3
 Summary ......................................................................................................................................... 6
Welcoming Remarks......................................................................................................................... 6
Keynote Speech: Asia-Pacific’s Strategic Environment and France ................................................ 7
Session 1: The San Francisco System and Maritime Security Challenges in Asia ........................... 9
Discussion ..................................................................................................................................13
Session 2: Europe’s Roles in Maritime Security in Asia ................................................................ 18
Discussion ..................................................................................................................................23
Closing Remarks ............................................................................................................................ 26
 Presentations.................................................................................................................................. 27
Lan Anh Nguyen ............................................................................................................................ 27
Raul Pedrozo .................................................................................................................................. 36
Renato Cruz De Castro .................................................................................................................. 54
Liselotte Odgaard ........................................................................................................................... 85

Program
JIIA- ECFR Joint Open Seminar on
Regional Order and Maritime Security in the Asia-PacificDate: March 6, 2017
Venue: Maison de la Chimie, Paris, France

13:30-13:45

Welcoming Remarks
François Godement, Director of the Asia Programme and Senior Policy
Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Ambassador Yoshiji Nogami, President, The Japan Institute of International
Affairs (JIIA)

13:45-14:15

Keynote Speech: Asia-Pacific’s Strategic Environment andFranceAmbassador Christian Lechervy, Permanent Secretary for the Asia-Pacific

14:15-16:00

Session 1: The San Francisco System and Maritime Security
Challenges in Asia

Panelists:

Tetsuo Kotani, Senior Fellow, The Japan Institute of International Affairs(JIIA)Lan Anh Nguyen, Vice Dean of the International Law Faculty, Diplomatic
Academy of Vietnam
Valérie Niquet, Head of the Asia Division and Senior Fellow, Fondation
pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS)
Raul Pedrozo, Deputy General Counsel, Defense POW/MIA Accounting
Agency (DPAA)

Chair:

François Godement, Director of the Asia Programme and Senior Policy
Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)

16:00-16:30

Break

16:30-18:15

Session 2: Europe’s Roles in Maritime Security in Asia

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Panelists:Jérôme Chardon, Head of Asia-Pacific Unit, Directorate General forInternational Relations and Strategy (DGRIS)
Renato Cruz De Castro, Professor in the International Studies Department,
De La Salle University
Liselotte Odgaard, Associate Professor, Royal Danish Defence College
Michito Tsuruoka, Senior Fellow, The National Institute for Defense Studies(NIDS)

Chair:

Ambassador Yoshiji Nogami, President, The Japan Institute of International
Affairs (JIIA)

18:15-18:30

Closing Remarks
Ambassador Yoshiji Nogami, President, The Japan Institute of International
Affairs (JIIA)

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List of Participants(in alphabetical order)

Cdr. Jérôme Chardon
Cdr. Jérôme Chardon is an active-duty Navy officer, Head of Asia-Pacific Unit at the Directorate General for International
Relations and Strategy (DGRIS) of the French Ministry of Defence in Paris since September 2014. His career has been balanced
between embarked, staff, intelligence and diplomatic postings. He acquired operational experience from 1998 to 2003, in the
Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and off the western coast of Africa. In addition to various postings in Paris focused on
strategic and military analysis related to East Asia, he was appointed Naval Attaché in China and Non Resident Defence Attaché
for Cambodia from 2008 to 2011. Mr. Chardon graduated from the French Naval Academy and the U.S. Naval Command College.
He awarded a senior military studies degree from the French War College. He also completed a degree in Chinese at the Eastern
Languages and Civilizations National Institute. He was distinguished Knight of the National Order of Merit for his service andreceived various decorations: National Defence Gold Medal, French Commemorative Medal and Nation’s Gratitude Medal (forAfghanistan).

Prof. Renato Cruz De Castro
Renato Cruz De Castro is a Professor (on sabbatical leave) in the International Studies Department, De La Salle University,
Manila, and holds the Charles Lui Chi Keung Professorial Chair in China Studies. He was the U.S.-ASEAN Fulbright Initiative
Researcher from the Philippines and was based in the East-West Center in Washington D.C. from September to December 2016.
In 2009, Dr. De Castro became the U.S. State Department ASEAN Research Fellow from the Philippines and was based in the
Political Science Department of Arizona State University. He earned his Ph.D. from the Government and International Studies
Department of the University of South Carolina as a Fulbright Scholar in 2001. Prof. De Castro has conducted several courses
on International Relations and Security Studies in the National Defense College and Foreign Service Institute. He is also amember of the Board of Trustees of the Albert Del Rosario Institute for Strategic and International Studies, and was a consultant
in the National Security Council of the Philippines during the Aquino Administration. Prof. De Castro’s research interests include
Philippine-U.S. security relations, Philippine defense and foreign policies, U.S. defense and foreign policies in East Asia, andthe international politics of East Asia. He has written 85 articles on international relations and security that have been publishedin a number of scholarly journals and edited works in the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, Canada, Malaysia, France, Singapore,
Taiwan, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the U.S.

Prof. François Godement
Prof. François Godement is director of ECFR’s Asia programme and Senior Policy Fellow at ECFR. He is a non-resident seniorassociate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., and an outside consultant for the Policy
Planning Staff of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2005 he founded Asia Centre as an independent centre for researchon Asian issues as they intersect global debates and he is now research associate. Prof. Godement was a professor of politicalscience at Sciences Po in Paris. He is a graduate of the Ecole Normale Supérieure de la rue d’Ulm (Paris), where he majored inhistory, and he was a postgraduate student at Harvard University. He is the editor of China Analysis, a quarterly analytical surveyof Chinese news and debate published by ECFR. He is a frequent contributor to media and academic debates on Asia. His recent
publications include “Que veut la Chine? De Mao au capitalisme" (2012), “China on Asia’s mind” (2014), and “France’s pivot
to Asia”.

Mr. Tetsuo Kotani
Tetsuo Kotani is a Senior fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and also a lecturer at Hosei University. He
was a visiting scholar at Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) at Vanderbilt University. He
received a security studies fellowship from the RIPS in 2006-2008, and won the 2003 Japanese Defense Minister Prize. Mr
Kotani’s research focus is the US-Japan alliance and maritime security, and he won the 2003 Japanese Defense Minister Prize.
His research interests include: the US-Japan Alliance; Maritime Security; and Geopolitics and Geostrategy. His recent articles,
in both Japanese and English, include ‘US-Japan Joint Maritime Strategy: Balancing the Rise of Maritime China’ CSIS, March2014), and ‘The Senkaku Islands and the US-Japan Alliance’ (Project 2049 Institute, March 2013).

Ambassador Christian Lechervy
Ambassador Christian Lechervy is the Permanent Secretary for the Asia-Pacific. After earning a PhD in Soviet Studies, he started
his career at the Comité catholique contre la faim et pour le développement before joining the Institut des Relations
Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS) as Deputy-Director. He then became Head of the Asia-Pacific Desk for the Strategic Affairs
Delegation and Counsellor of International Affairs for the French Ministry of Defence. After that, he worked for the Ministry ofForeign Affairs as Deputy-Director of the Humanitarian Policy, and Deputy-Director South East Asia Desk. In 2006, he wasappointed Ambassador to Turkmenistan before becoming an Advisor to the President on Asia-Pacific and Strategic Affairs. In
2014, he became Ambassador to the Pacific Community. Ambassador Lechervy has written extensively on South East Asia andhas taught at the INALCO, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Paris 1, as well as in Manila, Bangkok and Phnom Penh.

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Dr. Lan Anh Nguyen
Dr. Lan Anh Nguyen is the Vice Dean of the International Law Faculty, where she has taught since 2000. At the Diplomatic
Academy of Vietnam she teaches courses in Public International Law, International Law of the Sea, WTO Law and International
Dispute Settlement. She is also a member of the research programme of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam on the South China
Sea. Lan Anh received a Bachelor of Arts in Law degree from Hanoi Law University in 1998, a Bachelor of Arts degree inInternational Relations from the Diplomatic Academy of Viet Nam in 1999, and a Master of Arts in International, European andCommercial Law degree from the University of Sheffield in 2004. She obtained a Doctor of Philosophy degree in International
Law from the University of Bristol in 2008 on “The South China Sea Dispute: A Reappraisal in the Light of International Law”.

Dr. Valérie Niquet
Dr. Valérie Niquet is the Head of the Asia Department of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS). Prior to joining the
FRS, she was the Head of the Asia Department of the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), and also worked at
the Institut des Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS). She has also taught in various institutions such as the Institutd’Etudes Politiques de Lille, and the Ecole Militaire. She holds a PhD from Paris 1 Sorbonne and specializes on strategic affairs
in North East Asia. Her recent publications include “Le saut dans l’inconnu : quelles relations entre Pékin et Washington avec
Donald Trump ?" ; “Sécurité maritime en Asie : l’impossible indifférence de l’Europe".

Ambassador Yoshiji Nogami
Ambassador Yoshiji Nogami is former Japanese Ambassador to the United Kingdom, and currently serves as President of the
JIIA. He has held numerous senior positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), including serving as the Vice-Ministerof MOFA from 2001 to 2002, Deputy Minister of MOFA from 1999 to 2001, Director-General of MOFA’s Economic Affairs
Bureau from 1996 to 1997, and Deputy Director-General of the Foreign Policy Bureau from 1993 to 1994. Ambassador Nogami
was a Senior Visiting Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs from 2002 to 2004. He also served as Ambassador,
Permanent Delegation of Japan to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris from 1997 to 1999 andas Consul-General of Japan to Hong Kong from 1994 to 1996. Ambassador Nogami graduated from the University of Tokyo
with a B.A. in American Studies (March 1966) and first joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 1966.

Prof. Liselotte Odgaard
Prof. Liselotte Odgaard is an Associate Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College. She has published numerous articles andbooks on Asia-Pacific security and China’s foreign and security policy. Her latest monograph is “China and Coexistence:
Beijing’s National Security Strategy for the 21st Century” (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins
University Press 2012). Her latest edited book is “The BRICS and Coexistence: An Alternative Vision of World Order” (edited
volume), Abingdon: Routledge, 2014, co-edited with Cedric de Koning and Thomas Mandrup. Her latest peer-reviewed article
is ‘Maritime Security in East Asia: Peaceful Coexistence and Active Defense in China’s Diaoyu/Senkaku Policy’, Journal ofContemporary China, 26:103, January 2017, pp. 118-133. She has been a visiting professor at institutions such as Harvard
University, the Norwegian Nobel Institute and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Liselotte Odgaard is aregular contributor to the PLA's annual dialogue with other countries, the Xiangshan Forum.

Captain Raul (Pete) Pedrozo
Captain Raul (Pete) Pedrozo (USN, Ret.) is a Deputy General Counsel, Department of Defense, and non-resident Research
Fellow at the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law, Naval War College (NWC). He previously served as Special
Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, senior legal advisor to Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, and professorof international law at the NWC. He has lectured extensively at military and civilian academic institutions and participated innumerous multilateral and bilateral negotiations, including the International Maritime Organization. Capt. Pedrozo has written
extensively on maritime security issues and is the co-author to International Maritime Security Law (Brill/Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2013). He has an LLM (International & Comparative Law), Georgetown University Law Center and JD (Law), The
Ohio State University College of Law.

Dr. Michito Tsuruoka
Dr. Michito Tsuruoka is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Ministry of Defense, Japan. He isconcurrently a Research Fellow (non-resident) at The Tokyo Foundation. Before joining the NIDS in 2009, he was a Resident
Fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and served as a Special Adviser for NATO at the Embassy ofJapan in Belgium from 2005 to 2008. From 2012 to 2013, Dr. Tsuruoka was seconded to the Ministry of Defense as a Deputy
Director of the International Policy Division, Bureau of Defense Policy, where he was in charge of ASEAN-led multilateral
security and defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2013 and 2014, he spent one year as a Visiting Fellow at the Royal
United Services Institute (RUSI) in London. Dr. Tsuruoka studied politics and international relations at Keio University, Tokyo,
and Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. and received a PhD in War Studies from King’s College London. He has publishedextensively on European security, NATO, European foreign policy (particularly Europe-Japan/Asia relations), defense
diplomacy, nuclear policy and Japan’s foreign, security and defense policy.

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5

Summary
Welcoming Remarks
Professor François Godement, Director of the Asia Programme and Senior Policy Fellow,
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR):
The Asia-Pacific region and maritime security is a global concern for a number of reasons
including the issue and applicability of international law. With regard to armament trends,
the Asia-Pacific is a region of significant focus. Twenty years ago, European policy wasbehind in every aspect. However, recently, the EU has been in a stage of advancement.
Europe has been more engaged and more involved in the region. Some member states are
way ahead in security cooperation in the region including France. We should not give up
on the idea that Europe as a whole can progress with regard to its capacity to commit andto act in Asia. Therefore, throughout 2017, it's important for Europe to learn from lessons
and policies in order to emerge as a significant actor on those issues.
Ambassador Yoshiji Nogami, President, The Japan Institute of International Affairs(JIIA):The regional Asia-Pacific security landscape is rapidly changing in the maritime context.
The area surrounding the South China Sea (SCS) and the East China Sea (ECS) are criticalpoints. In this seminar, we want to stress that Japan and Europe, particularly France, hasa joint responsibility to uphold the rules-based international order. This is becoming
important because the political situation in the US is rapidly changing with the new Trumpadministration. Also, the Chinese government recently increased the maritime budget in
its new defense budget.

6Keynote Speech: Asia-Pacific’s Strategic Environment and France
Ambassador Christian Lechervy, Permanent Secretary for the Asia-Pacific:
French diplomacy regarding the Indo-Pacific region is primarily the result of its
territoriality in the Indian and Pacific Ocean. The maritimity of France is a result of thesize of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). It has the second largest EEZ in the world
with about 60% located in the Pacific. This reality allows Paris to make Pacific issues apart of its multilateral diplomacy and its foreign policy oriented towards the states andterritories of the Asia-Pacific regions.
The heart of the French maritimity beats in Polynesia since Wallis and Futuna andFrench Polynesia accounts for 50% of the French economic zone. In the Pacific, France’s
maritime interests are concentrated in the South Pacific because it represents around 93%of the economic zone.
The maritime areas contiguous to the French territories make it possible to maintaindirect neighboring relations with nine sovereign states. Four of the six constituent
members of the Polynesian Triangle group are direct neighbors of Wallis and Futuna. In
the Melanesian world, three of the four member states of the Melanesian Spearhead
Group are bordering New Caledonia. The French Republic has adopted a quasidecentralized foreign policy in the Pacific.
France is the most surrounded state in the Pacific. Its future in the Pacific is oriented
towards the management of the maritime challenge of the regions. Our militarycapabilities are not those of Washington. However, even with limited means, it is possible
to act.
At the present time, if we want to reinforce this maritime cooperation, we need tostrengthen multilateral approaches to better share information of maritime interest and tohave a crisis response system based on responsiveness. But we need to recognize that
Oceania lacks the means for maritime surveillance. The inadequacy of the available
means is conducive to the development of illicit trafficking, particularly narcotics, which
is located in the maritime space of French Polynesia and New Caledonia. Unfortunately,
there is no common platform for cooperation between the Pacific island states and thecountries of Southeast Asia.
The new challenge in international coordination creates a federative dynamic. It
opens significant prospects for new cooperation, particularly in fighting against illegal
fishing, and benefits technical cooperation agencies in the regions like the FFA and SPC.
The degradation of the maritime environment in Southeast Asia, namely on the coast of
Oceania and the fishing zone, also merits consideration.

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Also, the way China acts militarily in the SCS is directly affecting our interests, ourterritories, and those of our immediate neighbors. This development underscores theurgent need for the international community to seek the establishment of a regional
fishery management organization for the South Pacific but also in Southeast Asia.
The development of the cruise tourist industry leads us to renew our focus andconsideration in the field of mass rescue at sea, and the possibility of large-scale pollution.
In this perspective, the tourist threat must be taken into account. France is vigilant to thefragility of its island neighbors. The prospect of a failed state near its borders would
inevitably damage its interests and its security.
At the international level, a consultation procedure has been put in place to reachan international agreement that would protect the marine environment and biodiversity inthe high seas. Negotiation should lead to the adoption of the implementation agreementof the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
This cooperation will pass through three major instruments: first, enhancing
political and strategic dialogue on the challenges of the Pacific; second, creating synergy
in a regional cooperation forum aimed at strengthening environmental resilience of small
island countries and protecting biodiversity of the Pacific Ocean; and third, increasing
substantial participation of the Japanese navy in regular exercises in the Pacific region.

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Session 1: The San Francisco System and Maritime Security
Challenges in Asia
Mr. Tetsuo Kotani, Senior Fellow, The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA):
Until the mid-19th century, there was a China-centric regional order in Asia in which
China and neighboring states maintained trade and diplomatic relations. There was arules-based liberal international order existing before World War II in Asia, called the
Washington System. It consisted of three major treaties: the Washington Naval Treaty, theFour-Party Treaty, and the Nine-Party Treaty.
This Washington System had certain shortcomings. Most importantly, it didn't
include the Soviet Union. Under this system, nationalism rose in China, and technologicaladvancement made the Naval Treaty obsolete. As a result, Japan decided to leave thisWashington System and tried to establish its own regional order called the Great East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, but this attempt failed.
After World War II, a new rules-based liberal international order was observed andthis was called the San Francisco System. This system was based on the 1951 San
Francisco Peace Treaty, and is still the key to the regional system in the Asia-Pacific today.
This system also has certain shortcomings. Firstly, it doesn't include major powers suchas Russia, China, and Korea. This is one of the reasons for the territorial disputes in theWestern Pacific. Secondly, the San Francisco Peace Treaty is not clear about the
attribution of the territory Japan gave up under the treaty. This has resulted in high tension
in the SCS.
Until recently, US dominance managed the shortcomings of the San Francisco
System, but now China is pressuring this system. Chinese pressure is seen in the ECS
where China is challenging the Japanese administration of the Senkaku Islands bycreating a “gray zone” situation. In the SCS, China is building up artificial islands andmilitarizing them. China is always seeking to fill a power vacuum. However, the Chinese
seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012 was different.
The present problem is how to maintain the existing liberal international order in
Asia and the regional system. China's gray zone coercion is the biggest challenge to theexisting system. First, we have to acknowledge that the regional system and the liberalinternational order are under pressure. We also have to define our own core interest
because China has unilaterally declared its own core interest and are asking the US andother countries to respect its interest. Next, we have to consider how much risk we shouldtake to defend our core interest.

9

In the past, European countries were deeply involved in regional order-making.
Today, the universal rules and principles are at stake, and, therefore, we need proactive
European engagement in our effort to preserve this rules-based international order.
Dr. Lan Anh Nguyen, Vice Dean of the International Law Faculty, Diplomatic Academyof Vietnam:
The main treaties that constitute San Francisco System are the Peace Treaty and otherminor treaties such as the 1951 US-Japan Security Treaty, 1965 Japan-ROK Treaty, and1972 Japan-China Joint Statement. All of these treaties are for the purpose of restoring
peace and for maintaining a balance of power in the region.
From the texts of the San Francisco System, there are at least four territorial disputes
left unresolved due to ambiguous text: Paracels and Spratlys, Senkaku/Diaoyu, Northern
Territories (Hokkaido) and Southern Kurile Islands, and Takeshima/Dokdo. Although theofficial text is ambiguous, later on, practice and statements made by relevant parties
indicate a clear picture. Unfortunately, these clear positions haven't been included
intentionally in the final texts. Therefore, no mutual recognition was reached due todifferent interests by different parties including the US and some European countries.
The San Francisco System’s balance of power was based on US leadership. The
situation has changed with the rise of China and the declined capacity of the US as wellas commitments to its regional allies. This creates a vacuum of power resulting in thelikelihood of some serious occurrences. In this context, China will either comply withinternational law and norms, which is a naïve conclusion, or it will try to pursue the wayof a revisionist power and try to create new rules, which is dangerous. The US also has
two options. Traditionally, it maintained a high interest in the region in order to secure
the status quo. However, with the new administration in place, a second possibility is the
US will become a declining power confined to its narrow US national interest.
Because of the two main players, there are three choices for the countries in theregion. The first option is the countries will just serve the one who has the power so they
will get closer to China. The second option is they will pivot against China by aligningwith an extra-regional power to try to reach a balance. The last one is a dual dependency
strategy. Most of the countries in the region are struggling at the moment.
Therefore, for the territorial issue, the text, as well as the context, leading to theissue may be open for new research. European countries can make some contribution,either by legal or practice basis. In the context of the balance of power, it is not the time
to build up a new order, but to enhance regional security structures. Therefore, Europe
must find a way to work together to uphold rules and norms and to create a better10cooperation mechanism.
One possible solution is that the role and the presence of the US in the region is still
desirable, and, therefore, regional allies and partners must play an active role to strengthen
the US. Lastly, we need to find a way to get China involved in the system. Otherwise,
there is no way for China to understand the true international rules and norms that we aretrying to protect at the moment.
Dr. Valérie Niquet, Head of the Asia Division and Senior Fellow, Fondation pour la
Recherche Stratégique (FRS):The San Francisco System finds its origins in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. On
the same day of the Peace Treaty, the US-Japan Security Treaty was also signed laying
the foundation for the Japan-US alliance. There was dual logic behind the San Francisco
Conference and the series of treaties which were signed in 1951. The first point was torein in the possible renaissance of the Japanese military in the region. The Treaty also
opened a way for the reintegration of Japan as a democratic power to the UN.
The second point is that the San Francisco System and the San Francisco
Conference was related to the emerging Cold War within Asia. This second element
became the principle motivation for the building of the web of US-led bilateral alliancesin Asia.
In this context, China's position is a paradox, both in the San Francisco Treaty andthe San Francisco System. First, China rejects the validity and legitimacy of the San
Francisco Treaty in principle because the China was not part of the San Francisco
Conference at the time. China also rejected the validity of the San Francisco System withthe argument that this US-led system has no relevance after the end of the Cold War. On
the contrary, China tries to impose the idea of a new Asian-led security framework withno role for outside powers.
However, the new reality involves China's more assertive posture to challenge orchange that system. One reason for this new ambition is this is a part of a more assertive
foreign strategy for internal legitimacy reasons in China. Additionally, China thinks thatit may now have the capability to fill the vacuum and to challenge the status quo both in
the SCS and the ECS represented by the San Francisco System. China is now a quasisuperpower to create the condition of the famous “China dream” of rejuvenation of theChinese nation through the re-creation of the Sino-centric hierarchical system in East Asia.
Paradoxically, this assertive policy of China has reinforced and not weakened the
San Francisco System. Regional powers are eager to achieve a balance of power against
China's ambition by accepting the concept of the San Francisco System and the role11

played by the US or Japan. In terms of relevance, the San Francisco System is still relevant
as it still constitutes the only basis for stability in Asia. The system is evolving in termsof its objectives from containment of Japan and communism to now dissuasion against
more assertive and disruptive Chinese power.
The San Francisco System could be threatened by at least three interconnected
elements. The first one would be a rapprochement between Japan, South Korea, andChina. Second is the possible success of China's seduction policy through investments.
The third element is the possible risk of US-China condominium. This is where the futureof Sino-US relations under Donald Trump is extremely significant for the stability of theregion.
Captain Raul Pedrozo, Deputy General Counsel, Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency(DPAA):We have five territorial disputes following the San Francisco Treaty including theNorthern Territories, Takeshima, and Senkaku Islands. Although Japan renounced the title
for sovereignty to these various possessions, there were no specific successor states
named in the Treaty.
The history of the disputes of the Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories dates backto 1855 where the initial boundary was established between Russia and Japan. The
Soviets then came in at the end of WWII and occupied the Southern Kuriles/Northern
Territories. The Russian position is that the Yalta Conference controls this issue, but Japanwas not a party to the Yalta Conference and therefore is not legally bound by its provisions.
The US position from 1956 to the present is that the Northern Territories have always
been part of Japan. Since 1973, there have been a number of efforts on both the Russianand Japanese sides, but with no resolution of the issue to date.
Next, the Takeshima/Dokdo islands are claimed by both Japan and the Republic ofKorea. It has been occupied by Korea since 1954. During the negotiations on the Treatyof Peace with Japan in 1951, Takeshima was discussed, but the Treaty fell silent on theissue. SCAPIN directive from 1946 says that the Liancourt Rocks, which is
Takeshima/Dokdo, were specifically areas where Japanese government was not toexercise its sovereignty following WWII. However, SCAPIN also says that nothing in the
directive would be construed relating to the ultimate sovereignty of those islands.
Additionally, in 1951, a classified diplomatic note by the US State Department told
the Korean Government that the US did not believe that Dokdo/Takeshima had ever been
under the jurisdiction of Korea and would not support such a position. The official
position publicly made by the US from 1953 to the present is that it does not take a

12position on the sovereignty of Takeshima whether it's Japanese territory or Korean
territory. However, if the Koreans could not accept that, they should take this matter tothird-party arbitration, which has not taken place. Therefore, the matter remains
unresolved.
Finally, the Senkakus are strategically located and offer a significant militaryadvantage from a surveillance standpoint. It’s claimed by China, Taiwan, and Japan but
is administered by Japan. Historically, Japan exercised administrative control over the
Senkakus from 1895 to the present. Under Article 3 of the San Francisco Treaty, theRyukyu Islands were placed under the administrative control of the US after World War
II. John Foster Dulles at the conclusion of the Peace Treaty specifically mentioned thatJapan was to retain residual sovereignty over the islands and the US would be theadministrating authority. That position changed in 1972 during the negotiations of the
Okinawa Reversion Treaty. The Nixon administration said it would only return
administrative rights of the Senkaku Islands to the Japanese. This change in the US
position was to appease Taiwan because Taiwan had lost its seat in the UN to China during
this timeframe. Additionally, the US was engaged in textile negotiations with Taiwan at
the time.
Since then, the US has taken the position the Senkaku Islands fall under Article 5of the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. However, there's a slightnuance by the Trump administration in the application of the US-Japan Treaty to the
Senkakus. The recent joint statement signed by President Trump and Prime Minister Abe
did not say that the United States does not take any position on the sovereignty over the
Senkaku Islands.
The underlying cause of the Senkaku issue is the indication of oil and gas reservein the region which piqued the interest of China and Taiwan on acquiring the title over
the Senkakus. In 2013, the Chinese mentioned that the Senkakus were now a core interest.
Subsequently, in 2013, China declared its air defense identification zone (ADIZ) overdisputed areas, including the contested Senkaku Islands.
Discussion
Audience 1:
Can we consider that China is opportunistic and will seek any justification for doing what
it does, or should we pay attention to the fact that in China, the rulers are afraid to appear
incompetent in front of their nationalistic audience?

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Valérie Niquet:
The Chinese regime might feel threatened after the pivot to Asia by the Obamaadministration, but China would still have pursued that assertive strategy in Asia. This is
not only related to foreign threats, but also to internal threats on the necessity to establish
its legitimacy based on a nationalistic discourse seen in China.
Raul Pedrozo:
China’s claims that it is threatened are exaggerated because the only country in AsiaPacific that has taken aggressive measures in the SCS has been China when it invaded
the Paracels in 1974, took actions at Johnson South Reef, attempted seizure and blockagesof Filipino fisherman at Scarborough Shoal, and so on.
Lan Anh Nguyen:
During the Opium War, China declared war with the world. That's why all the countries
came over to China. But it also serves as Chinese propaganda to claim that China was ahumiliated and bullied by other countries. That explains the different ways of interpreting
facts in China.
Tetsuo Kotani:
Security dilemmas occur among states that have a defensive mindset, but Chinese
behavior in Asia is driven more by an assertive mindset. In that sense, no security
dilemma exists, and the reality is that we are responding to Chinese assertiveness.
Audience 2:
The San Francisco System is about 67 years old. From a geopolitical standpoint, China isrising, so we have to adapt to that situation. Do you think that Europe could mobilize
public opinion and the UN in finding a collective security system for the Asia-Pacific?
Lan Anh Nguyen:
Yes, Europe could mobilize public opinion at the UN to build a new security architecturein Asia, because international law was created here, and in comparison to China and theUS, Europe has a more neutral role as well as legitimacy.
François Godement:
There are two answers to that question. There is a pragmatic answer given to me byRichard holbrooke in 1988 when the Soviets were recreating a kind of Washington

14System of power balance. He said that “we're not in the business to seize superiority when
we have it.” The other answer is that you cannot claim legality, parity, justice, fairness
and balance when at the same time you do not recognize international law in adjudicatingclaims. It has to be either/or. That's the situation that the neighbors in the Asia-Pacific are
currently facing.
Audience 3:
What is your stance on the arbitration award of July 12, specifically its interpretation of
Article 121 regarding the Spratly Islands? Also, how has Vietnam upheld French claimsin the present situation?
Lan Anh Nguyen:
What the Tribunal concludes, in this case, creates binding effects for China and thePhilippines. However, a certain part of the award provided the first ever interpretation of
Article 121. The interpretation did not please anyone. In international law, there is a ruleof no precedence. Therefore, what has been interpreted by the arbitration can
automatically be binding upon all the other countries in the world. But Vietnam
understands that the French practice in the SCS constitutes an important practice for its
sovereign claim in the SCS.
Tetsuo Kotani:
Regarding Article 121, if you read the ruling, any remote islands which don't have acivilian population will become a rock, but I wonder whether this was really the intentionof the drafter of UNCLOS. We need further interpretations of Article 121 to have auniversal understanding of it.
François Godement:
UNCLOS III has opened a Pandora's Box by opening up the possibility of a very large
claim for the extension of sovereignty to EEZ. The July ruling has not directly addressedsovereignty issues which are the ones in which China made its reservations for arbitration,
but has addressed the technical criteria that may lead the way to sovereignty claims byother nations. That is not something that China has made a reservation about when it
signed and ratified UNCLOS.
Raul Pedrozo:
I strongly disagree with the position that the Tribunal took with regard to what is an island,

15and such decisions prevent the US from becoming a party to UNCLOS because theopponents to the Convention will seize on a decision like this. To a certain extent, there
is precedent in what the Tribunal has said, and there is danger in that.
Lan Anh Nguyen:
Regarding Article 121, the Tribunal conclusion may be open to controversy, but in the
SCS context, if the Tribunal would have made a different conclusion, then China would
have a legal basis to claim the whole SCS. Another method in international law ismaritime delimitation. In maritime delimitation, a small feature cannot have full effect,
but unfortunately, under UNCLOS, the Tribunal can never have jurisdiction.
Audience 4:
Would you please introduce how many islands Vietnam started to build?
Lan Anh Nguyen:
There is a sharp distinction between the building of islands by Vietnam and China. First,
Vietnam built on the feature that is already an island according to Article 121, a high tidefeature. China built upon a low tide or submerged feature. Second, Vietnam built thefeature to build shelter for soldiers to increase its defense capability. China built using the
dragging technique destroying coral reef and changing the maritime features in the SCS.
Later on, it militarized them.
Audience 5:
The whole point about the pivot was that it had two sides – a military side, and an
economic side. To what extent has Trump’s decision to not ratify the treaty weakened thestrategic security framework for the US in the Asia-Pacific?
Lan Anh Nguyen:
We all know that TPP is not just economic integration, but has its own strategic meaning,and President Trump did not see its strategic value. Vietnam believes that it benefits from
TPP because of economic integration and because of the standard that it is based on toreform the economy. For strategic value, other TPP members apart from the US still
uphold the integration. We hope to still build a stronger cooperation in our region.
Audience 6:
What are the prospects of TPP minus one?

16

Yoshiji Nogami:
For TPP 11, we have to get approval from the US to be excluded from the agreement.
Otherwise, it won’t go into effect. At the moment, many countries are sitting on the fence.
Those who were against TPP during the presidential campaign have never read TPP.
Raul Pedrozo:
I didn't mean that the US should withdraw militarily from the Western Pacific, but that
the Chinese resent the publicity. The US said that the two parties to the judgment should
abide by the ruling of the Tribunal because it's a bilateral arrangement knowing that it is
not binding on anyone else. Many people in the US do not agree with everything that the
Tribunal decided from a legal standpoint, particularly that the Article 121 issue is notbased on an accurate reading of international law.
Audience 7:
What would be your advice to try to improve the situation and find a perennial decisionon this very sensitive issue?
François Godement:
My personal advice would be quite simply not to put in question the rulings by The Hague
because that's a very dangerous course, whatever the good reasons we may have.

17Session 2: Europe’s Roles in Maritime Security in Asia
Cdr. Jérôme Chardon, Head of Asia-Pacific Unit, Directorate General for International
Relations and Strategy (DGRIS):The Paracels are 100% controlled by China while in the Spratlys, China only occupies
some islets. However, China in the Spratly Islands has a strong political will. The
evolving balance is also growing in favor of China. This evolution is about AntiAccess/Area Denial trend (A2/AD), which is getting stronger in the Spratly Islands. Also
in Beijing, a lot of work is being done to have a national law applicable to the SCS to
explicitly control the access of the China Seas. Additionally, the PLA is being reformed
to adapt to the situation in the SCS. The PLA has a mission of deterrence, surveillance,and of tracking foreign navies. This tracking is presently loosely controlled. China doesn’twant other countries to have a clear vision of how China wants to control the sea and also
because they are not 100% ready.
The coast guards are central to China’s SCS policy. They are in charge of law
enforcement on the so-called sovereign rights of China. They also have a mission ofprotection of the Chinese fishermen, as well as maritime militias. The maritime militia,
which exclusively consists of fishing vessels, is involved in intelligence collection and inharassment activities of foreign fishermen or of foreign state’s vessels. The Chinese
asymmetric approach in order to control any escalation and to reach the best position is
to intimidate the opponent into making mistakes.
The EU wants to show that it is committed to maintaining a legal order for the seasand oceans based on the principles of UNCLOS. When specific challenges arise, the EU
acts through statements and also through its member states. France is the more active
member state in this area. France thinks that there is a need for a collective EU response.
In this context, the first step by France was in spring 2016 during the G7 summit when astrong statement was made regarding maritime security, focusing on the SCS. The othercollective response was expressed by the French Minister of Defense at the Shangri-La
Dialogue in June 2016 when he said to continue to contain the risk of conflict, we must
defend law and defend ourselves by means of law.
Additionally, France took significant action in 2016 by deploying four vessels in
the SCS including the Spratly Archipelago. The first vessel is the Jeanne d’Arc Mission
which has been deployed for four months in Asia-Pacific. With this deployment, France
is also boosting the European naval presence in the maritime rules of Asia. Jeanne d’Arc
Naval Group will have two helicopters and 60 sailors from the Royal Navy. The Frenchand UK Ministry of Defense identify this deployment as an opportunity to demonstrate18

their strong cooperation as embodied by the Lancaster House treaties.
There will be two specific port calls in Vietnam and Japan. In Vietnam, there will
be a specific conference on environmental security since the situation in Southeast Asia
is also about finding solutions together, including with China, for sustainable
development issues. There is also an important role of ASEAN as a fledgling architectureof defense and security, specifically the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM)
and ADMM Plus. The next port call will be in Japan. With the UK, Japan, and the US,
France will embark on an amphibious exercise in Guam. So, this deployment will havemeaningful operational cooperation in Far East Asia.
Prof. Renato Cruz De Castro, Professor in the International Studies Department, De La
Salle University:
There are several East Asian Westphalian states locked in territorial disputes. Recently,
these have become maritime flash points which have the potential to trigger a major
systemic conflict when one of the competing states feel that it is in a position to resolve
the issue through military means.
All of these are happening at the time when two regional powers, Russia and China,
are bent on ending the unipolar movement that began after the end of the Cold War. Russia
and China are fielding advanced weapon system to prevent US forces from operating intheir respective spheres of influence. Also, Chinese leaders believe that their country now
has comprehensive power in light of the financial crisis of 2008 in the US, and policy ofretrenchment in the light of the economic meltdown by President Obama.
But there is also the pushback in terms of the rules and regimes designed by the US
post-1945. East Asia is trying to prevent regional powers from damaging the international
political economic system. Another pushback is from the Trump administration with its“Peace Through Strength” that plans to increase the Navy fleet from 275 to 350.
The first flash point is the SCS dispute. It is becoming a focal point of evolving
strategic rivalry with the US. The Chinese buildup began in the aftermath of the Taiwan
Strait Crisis in March 1996. The US has shown interest in the dispute since 2010 andrecently, Japan has played an active role providing assistance to Vietnam, the Philippines,
and Malaysia to help withstand the growing Chinese naval pressure in their respective
EEZs. From Japan's point of view, China's buildup of its multiple maritime platforms is
an attempt to set up a new status quo in the ECS, which would lead to China's control of
the First Island Chain.
In reaction to increased Chinese activities in Senkaku, Japan has increased its
defense budget and enhanced greater security cooperation with the US. It also wants to19

develop a de facto coalition of like-minded countries in maintaining stability in themaritime environment of East Asia. The most recent flash point is what's happening in
the Taiwan Strait. In 2016, the victory of the Democratic Progressive Party renewed
tension in the Taiwan Strait as China became suspicious of the motives of the new
Taiwanese government.
A few possible strategic scenarios could happen now. There is a regional balance ofpower marked by constant interstate competition and rivalry between two great powers.
The other possibility is a grand bargain between the US and China where the US would
give up Taiwan and would resolve other issues with China. In 2013, President Xi Jinping
made a proposal to the US that the Pacific is big enough for the two powers and theyshould draw up a line. This is a nightmare for the middle and small powers in the region.
Regarding Europe’s role in maritime security in the region, we realize that China's
recent escalatory action in both the SCS and the ECS are causing actors to engage directlyin East Asia. Also, China's naval buildup and consequent territorial expansion generatebilateral transatlantic global issues that would affect the EU’s common foreign andsecurity policies. Some of the technologies that China buys/steals from Europe are being
used to intimidate its neighboring states. This will affect Europe's perception as a civilian
power. Also the joint naval exercise between China and Russia last year showedreinvigoration of the strategic alignment between the two countries.
China has applied a sophisticated form of economic statecraft to influence regionalcountries in maritime disputes. By undermining ASEAN, China is also undermining theEuropean Union and its multilateralism. China's naval buildup is increasing its
assertiveness and developing extensive A2/AD capabilities in the First Island Chain tochallenge the US role as the strategic offshore balancer.
Therefore, to enhance strategic dialogue with the US and the Asia-Pacific allies, theEU should develop a shared outlook on regional trends with like-minded states in theregion, strengthen naval partnership and cooperation with regional states on maritime
security that focuses on protecting East Asia’s maritime commons.
Prof. Liselotte Odgaard, Associate Professor, Royal Danish Defence College:
Both China and the US are revisionists. They are not trying to create a completely newworld order, but are trying to adjust the existing order to better suit their interests. China
is trying to increase its strategic presence, while the US has given up on the TPP and is
upgrading and revising its alliance system. Both the US and China in the SCS try to deter
the other from pursuing their core interests. Therefore, to create reassurance, both sides
would have to convince the other side that it is not going to damage the core interests of20

one another.
In terms of the legal gray zones, after the Arbitral Award, China has been applying
historical entitlement arguments. However, the main legal problem with China is that it
hasn't clarified what maritime zones it claims. That forces the US and its allies to defend
their FON and overflight rights.
China, on the one hand, says that it advocates peace and stability. On the other hand,it says it will react to challenges to its territory and maritime zone claims. The US statesthat it will prioritize FON based on international law, but it also defends these principles
in areas where the legal status is not clear, with the example of EEZs. From a Chinesepoint of view, it puts the question mark behind the US claim to be following internationallaw as it is interpreted universally. Furthermore, it's a problem that the US has not ratified
UNCLOS.
China and the US apply different understandings of deterrence and sometimes
misread each other's signaling. For China, its understanding of deterrence can include
offensive behavior. For China, deterrence includes a wide range of political, diplomatic,and economic instruments, as well as military force, if necessary, to counter provocation.
The US keeps deterrence in the form of a forward military presence. For the US, a coreinterest is to preserve the US alliance system. China would have to convince the US thatit doesn't seek to undermine the system. It means that China would have to refrain fromusing aggression against other claimants. Also, it would have to refrain from imposing
restrictions on US military navigation and overflight in these gray zones. Unfortunately,
it is not on top of the priority list for China to lower tensions. Its priority is to increase its
strategic space and to defend what is sees as its rightful claims in the SCS.
Next, the US would have to convince China that it is not trying to prevent China
from establishing a permanent presence alongside the other powers. That would requirethat the US refrains from close surveillance of China. It would also require that it refrainfrom military activities in legal gray zones and doing operations in disputed areas. This
is not a very likely case. However, the Chinese should make the first move because they
are not willing to clarify their maritime zone claims.
In this context, Europe can push China strategically. China is undergoing militaryreforms and is still militarily weaker than the US. It cannot afford to risk a war with the
US or its neighbors. Therefore, it's in the interest of the US and European countries to say
to China that this is something we are willing to go quite far to protect.
At the same time, it is dangerous to alienate China too much. One way of improvingthat would be to support more peaceful operations by establishing some cooperation with
China in the area of protecting marine diversity, conducting search and rescue operations,21

and so on. In this regard, Europe is in a better position than the US to be a bridge builder
by engaging China in these activities.
Dr. Michito Tsuruoka, Senior Fellow, The National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS):
Many Europeans do not want to be drawn into a Sino-Japanese conflict in the ECS or the
SCS. However, Europe’s engagement in Asia is about protecting its own interests.
However, the economic relations between China and Japan are still huge and deep. Whiledefense and foreign policy officials talk about the security issues in the ECS, the business
community doesn’t want to be bothered by political and security tensions. Therefore, weneed to be concerned about the growing risk of unintended escalation of the situation,
particularly in the ECS.
On Europe’s role in Asian security, particularly maritime security, firstly, one needs
to remember that Europe is affected by what takes place in Asia. Europe's economic
interest is influenced by Asia’s security situation, even Europe’s security is affected by
the security situation in Asia. France understands that its interests in Asia are much morethan just economic issues. How other European countries can follow France’s lead is stilla huge challenge.
Secondly, Europe should not underestimate the value of strategic messaging andpolitical declarations because it is not fighting a war in Asia. China still cares about othercountries’ opinion. But the unfortunate reality is that Chinese underestimates what Europe
could do. Many believe that China can silence European oppositional voices about what
China is doing in Asia. Therefore, to what extent can Europe remain true to its values?
For example, the EU Global Strategy statement that it will uphold FON and stand firm in
respect for international law, including UNCLOS and its arbitration procedures, is astrong statement.
Thirdly, regarding naval presence in the region, many Europeans say that because
they don’t have ships to send to Asia. There are still other things that Europe can do suchas coordinating with other countries. If Europe could send ships to Asia, that is always
welcome. There are two important aspects of seeing more European ships in Asia. One isthat it's important to demonstrate to China that there are many countries onboard on theissues of the SCS. Also, China always tries to portray the situation as a hegemoniccompetition between China and the US, but that's not the case. However, what is at stakeis rules-based international order. Therefore, it's important to get as many Europeans
onboard.
It's encouraging to see that France is more involved in the Asia-Pacific region, but
for many countries in Europe, the SCS is too far away. Still, we can do more things in the22Indian Ocean as well. The Indian Ocean is something that Japan and other countries inSoutheast Asia are interested in. So, the other possibility is to think what Europe could
do in the Indian Ocean region.
Discussion
Yoshiji Nogami:
What sort of reaction did China give to France’s defense secretary’s speech or the actual
deployment of naval assets?
Jerome Chardon:
The reaction from China was more about clarification on the meaning of the speech. It
was understood by Beijing that the issue is not about being for or against China. Eachtime the international law is challenged, then the firmness of the international community
has to be expressed. The second point regarding the defense secretary’s speech was to say
it's not only about economic or strategic interests. There are many other issues such as
global trafficking that funds international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and their means of delivery.
Audience 1:
Do you think your formula is applicable to the ECS?
Liselotte Odgaard:
What I said could be expanded to the situation between the US and China in all of the
Asia-Pacific. I agree that China and Russia have the same problem, but they have realized
how important it is for them to have stability between them so that they can pursue theirdifferent geopolitical agenda. China is playing hardball, but China remains quite weak.
The domestic threats against the survival of the regime and the Party are a bigger problem
in China than external security threats. However, if we continue to demonstrate that weare defending the principles of the alliance system it can be an important signal to send
to China. But it has to be combined with cooperation in other areas which the countries
in the region and in Europe are well positioned to do.
Yoshiji Nogami:
I am not sure this conciliatory approach would work because the Chinese narrative toJapan is very simple, the Chinese economy is three times bigger, and defense spending is23about four times bigger than Japan’s. The Chinese worldview is very vertical, and they
worry about the pecking order.
Liselotte Odgaard:
Strategically, China can be pushed. Economically, the Trump administration can push
China, but that doesn't mean you should do it in all issue areas. In the ECS, there havebeen many small-scale cooperative activities between China and Japan in the past. If we
could get back to that point, that would help lower tension in the region.
Audience 2:
There are also other ways to contribute to Asian security by European countries. One isby participating in a multilateral forum dedicated to maritime security which would help
develop transparency, particularly in Southeast Asia. European countries are also
exporting military equipment along with military know-how training. This is particularly
helping Southeast Asia to develop its own capabilities, and we need it to be moreautonomous. Do you think we could propose something to China which could help it to
get out of the claims ambiguity?
Liselotte Odgaard:
The Chinese military says that due to domestic opinion, it cannot clarify its claims. It is
not willing to disclose that it is the weaker power, which gives it the advantage to be
ambiguous. I am not sure how to go about getting the Chinese to move on that. It's worth
to keep talking with the Chinese about it to see if they can be moved. They are also too
alienated. Sometimes they have to feel that there are some cooperative mechanisms thatcan work to their advantage.
Audience 3:
The general and the headquarters of PLA are not ready to make foreign adventures. The
military capabilities of PLA are 10 to 15 years behind the Americans, Russians, and theFrench. Also, I disagree that there is no common strategy between Russia and China.
China is a threat against Russia because of its economic influence. They are not able tostop it because economically Russia is weaker.
Liselotte Odgaard:
Your arguments are outdated. The fear of Chinese migration to Russia is not as big as it
used to be because the Chinese are not likely to settle and overtake Russia. If Russia wants24

to push back on the US alliance system, it needs to be closer to China.
Yoshiji Nogami:
The economic situation facing Russia in the three provinces is not very adequate. So,
there is a very strong pressure to go northward. Also, there's a huge population difference:
6 million in the Russian maritime and 120 million in the three provinces.
Jerome Chardon:
Regarding the asymmetry in Chinese and US military capabilities, from the Chineseperspective, it doesn't matter. They are preparing for asymmetric warfare against theSeventh Fleet. From a Chinese perspective, it’s the people that matter, not the materials.
The Chinese are stepping up quickly. Xi Jinping is rejuvenating the PLA by sending
younger officers from the highest postings, and if his bet is won, then the PLA may beready by 2030s, even for asymmetry and hard power. Also, its new aircraft carriers are
already under construction.
Michito Tsuruoka:
In regards to the Chinese military, what is more problematic is the lack of discipline andpredictability. Another point that matters is how willing you are to use force. Russia andChina seem more willing to use force. The final point that matters is the quantity.
Yoshiji Nogami:
I've never heard of seamanship education in Chinese PLA navy. There is a difference in
cultures.
Audience 4:
The Chinese have conducted long-distance voyages for quite a long time, and they haveeven deployed some of their vessels to European ports without making port calls on theway just to demonstrate their capability to do so.

25

Closing Remarks
Ambassador Yoshiji Nogami, President, The Japan Institute of International Affairs(JIIA):
I would like to conclude this session now, and I would like to thank the panelists formaking excellent contributions. Also, I would like to thank the audience for participatingin the seminar. Thank you very much.

26

Japan Institute for International Relations & European Council for Foreign Relations

Asia Pacific Regional Order and Maritime Security
Paris, 6 March 2017

The San Francisco System
and Maritime Security
Challenges in AsiaNGUYEN Thi Lan Anh
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam27

 Main contents
 The San Francisco System
 Historical causes to maritime security
challenges
 Geostrategic causes to maritime security
challenges
 Possible solutions?

The San Francisco System 1951 Treaty of Peace 1951 US-Japan Security Treaty
 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan andROK 1972 Joint Comuniqué between Japan and PRC
 1945 Potsdam Declaration
 1943 Cairo Declaration

Restore Peace

28

The San Francisco System
 North – South Korea
 North – South Vietnam
 PRC – Taiwan
 Presence of the US at Okinawa
 Other allies: Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New
ZealandMaintain Balance of Powers

Historical causes to Maritime Security
Challenges
4 territorial disputes left unsolved by ambiguous text

 Paracels and Spratlys: Japan renounces all right, title andclaim to Formosa and the Pescadores; Japan renounces allright, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel
Islands (Art.2)
 Senkaku/ Diaoyu: The US will have the right to exercise all
and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction
over the territory and inhabitants over the Nansei Shoto southof twenty-nine degrees north latitude, which included the
Ryukyu and Daito Islands (Art.3)
 Northern Territories (Hokkaido)/ Southern Kurile
Islands: ”Japan renounced all right, title and claim to the
Kurile Islands” (Art.2)
 Takeshima/Dokdo: Not mentioned in 1965 Treaty

29 US’s position in 1951 regarding Takeshima belonging
to Japan and the B-29s operating at Takeshima from1948-1952
 A State Department memorandum on the Ryukyu in
1965:
We recognize that Japan maintains residual
sovereignty over the [Ryukyu] islands, and haveagreed to return them to full Japanese control
as soon as Free World security interests permit.
 46/52 against the recommendation to give theParacels and Spratlys to China in the San Francisco
Conference

Clear implications but no mutual recognition
Hibernated issues

Geostrategic causes to Maritime Security
Challenges

Power shift  Vacuum of power The rise of China
 The declined capacity of the US andcommitments to its regional allies?

30

What China will be?

Revisionist
power
Bypassing current
rules &Create new rules
for its own
interests

Status quo power
Respect andcomply withinternational law &norms

What the US will be?

Status quo power
Take the global
leadership andresponsibilities inmaintaining
international law &norms

Declining power
Confined withnarrow US’s
national interests
within the US

31

Choice for countries in theregion?

Closer to China
Enjoy its charm offensive
Hedge against China
Align with extra regional power

Dual dependency strategy

By way of conclusion
Territorial
issuesPossibility to interpret history inmultilateral projects?

PowerbalanceEnhance Regional Security
Structure

Rules and norms
Cooperation mechanisms

32

Possible solutions?
 The role and presence of the US still desirable
 The need to strengthen the US’s regional allies andpartners
 The involvement of China

Thank you for your attention!

33 Cario Declaration 1943

All the islands in the Pacific which she seized or
occupied since the beginning of the First World
War in 1914, and that all the territories that Japan
had stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria,
Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to
the Republic of China

 Potsdam Declaration 1945
The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be
carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall belimited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido,
Kyushsu, Shikoku and such minor islands as
we determine (Para: 8)

34

 Joint Communiqué between China and Japan 1972

The Government of the People's Republic of China
reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of theterritory of the People's Republic of China. The
Government of Japan fully understands and respects
this stand of the Government of the People's Republicof China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article
8 of the Postsdam Proclamation

35

The San Francisco System andMaritime Security Challenges in Asia:
Japan’s Island Disputes Post-1951

Captain Pete Pedrozo, USN (Ret.)
Asia’s Regional Order and Maritime Security
Paris, March 6, 2017

Treaty of Peace with Japan
8 September 1951
• Signed by 48 nations– USSR, Poland, Yugoslavia did not sign

• Missing from negotiations– PRC, Taiwan, ROK, DPRK

36

Treaty of Peace with Japan
8 September 1951•

Article 2(a) Japan recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including
the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.
(b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.
(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and theislands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty ofPortsmouth of 5 September 1905.
(d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations Mandate System,
and accepts the action of the United Nations Security Council of 2 April 1947, extending the trusteeshipsystem to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan.
(e) Japan renounces all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic
area, whether deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals or otherwise.
(f) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.

•

Article 3
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeshipsystem, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29deg. northlatitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including
the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending themaking of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise
all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants ofthese islands, including their territorial waters.

Territorial Dispute Post-1951

37

Southern Kurils/Northern Territories•

Treaty of Shimoda (1855)•

Treaty of Saint Petersburg (1875)•

Treaty of Portsmouth (1905)•

Diplomatic Relations between Japan andRussia (1925)••

WWII - Soviet forces occupy Kurils (1945)
Treaty of Peace with Japan (1951)•

Japan/USSR Joint Declaration (1956)– Japan/Russia boundary established between
Etorofu and Urup Islands– Japan renounces claim to Sakhalin in exchange
for title to the Kurils north of Urup
– Russia cedes southern part of Sakhalin toJapan– Treaty of Portsmouth remains in force– Japan renounces title to Kurils and southern
Sakhalin (Russia did not sign)– Ended state of war; USSR agreed to returnHabomai and Shikotan Islands after peace
treaty was concluded

Southern Kurils/Northern Territories
The Yalta Conference (Feb 11, 1945)•

Russia position - The Yalta Conference controls– Agreement Regarding Japan• The leaders of the…USSR, USA and UK have agreed
that…the USSR shall enter into war against Japan on theside of the Allies on condition that:•***
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous
attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:(a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands
adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union;***
3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

Japan position (concurred by US)– Yalta Conference not a final determination ontransfer of territory– Japan not a party, therefore, not legally bound38

Southern Kurils/Northern Territories
U.S. Position (1956-present)• “…the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri (alongwith the Habomai Islands and Shikotan which
are a part of Hokkaido) have always been partof Japan proper and should in justice beacknowledged as under Japanese sovereignty”

Southern Kurils/Northern Territories
Ongoing Dispute• 1973 – Japan-USSR Joint Communiqué– “Both sides agreed to continue negotiations on the
conclusion of a peace treaty between the two countries at
an appropriate time in 1974.”• 1991 – Japan-USSR Joint Communiqué– PM Kaifu and Pres. Gorbachev held negotiations on a range
of issues relating to the conclusion of a peace treaty,“including the issue of territorial demarcation, taking into
consideration the positions of both sides on the attributionof the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, andEtorofu.”39

Southern Kurils/Northern Territories
Ongoing Dispute•1991 – Pres. Yeltsin letter to Russian People•

1993 – Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations•

1998 - Moscow Declaration on Establishing a Creative Partnership
between Japan and the Russian Federation•– “One of the problems we will have to resolve . . . is reaching a final post-War
settlement in our relations with Japan. . . . [T]he main obstacle to theconclusion of this treaty is the issue of the demarcation of borders between
Russia and Japan. . . .”– PM and Russian Pres. “have undertaken serious negotiations on the issue of
where Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomai Islands belong. They
agree that negotiations towards an early conclusion of a peace treaty should
continue.”– PM and Russian Pres., “ taking into consideration . . . the proposal regarding asolution to the issue of the attribution of the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri,
Shikotan and Habomai made by the Japanese side at the Summit Meeting in
Kawana . . . , instruct their Governments to accelerate negotiations on the
conclusion of a peace treaty on the basis of the Tokyo Declaration. . . . The two
leaders reaffirm their resolve to make their utmost efforts to conclude a peace
treaty by the year 2000. . . .”NO RESOLUTION TO DATE

Takeshima/Dokdo• Claimed by Japan and ROK• Occupied by ROK since 1954

40

Takeshima/Dokdo• fg

Takeshima/Dokdo
Treaty of Peace with Japan (1951)• Drafts 1-5 and 7 islets
returned to ROK– UK, NZ and Canada proposed
maritime boundary that placed
Dokdo on ROK side (May 1951)• Drafts 6, 8, 9 and 14 islets
Japanese territory• Drafts 10-13, 15-18 and final– silent on issue

41

Takeshima/Dokdo
ROK Unilateral Action• Syngman Rhee Line (1952)• ROK occupation (1954)

Takeshima/Dokdo
SCAPIN 677 (1946)42

SCAPIN 677• SCAPIN refers to Take Island not Dokdo• Why carve out Korea separately if Dokdo/Takeshima
was part of Korea?
– 4. Further areas specifically excluded from thegovernmental and administrative jurisdiction of theImperial Japanese Government are the following: …(c)Korea….

• SCAPIN specifically did not affect ultimate
determination of sovereignty over Dokdo/Takeshima– 6. Nothing in this directive shall be construed as anindication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate
determination of the minor islands referred to in Article 8of the Potsdam Declaration.
• Ryukyu Islands subsequently returned to Japan (1971)• Ulleungdo and Cheju granted to Korea (1951)

Takeshima/Dokdo
Rusk Note (1951)• With respect to request of the Korean Government that Article 2(a)of the draft be revised to provide that Japan "confirms that itrenounced on August 9, 1945, all right, title and claim to Korea andthe islands which were part of Korea prior to its annexation by
Japan, including the islands Quelpart, Port Hamilton, Dagelet,
Dokdo and Parangdo," the United States Government regrets that it
is unable to concur in this proposed amendment. The United States
Government does not feel that the Treaty should adopt the theory
that Japan's acceptance of the Postdam Declaration on August 9,1945 constituted a formal or final renunciation of sovereignty by
Japan over the areas dealt with in the Declaration. As regards theisland of Dokdo, otherwise known as Takeshima or Liancourt Rocks,
this normally uninhabited rock formation was according to our
information never treated as part of Korea and, since about 1905,
has been under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of
Shimane Prefecture of Japan. The island does not appear everbefore to have been claimed by Korea.

43

Takeshima/Dokdo
U.S. Position (1953-present)• “U.S. policy on the Dokdo/Takeshima issue has
been and continues to be that the UnitedStates does not take a position on either
Korea’s claim or Japan’s claim to the island ….”– Current U.S. position understandable given U.S.
defense alliances with both Japan and ROK– ROK reminded in 1953 that if it cannot accept theviews expressed in the Rusk note, it should takesteps toward arbitration or appeal the matter tothe ICJ• ROK has refused 3d party involvement/intervention

Takeshima/Dokdo
Japanese Administrative Control•

Japan acquired title to Takeshima by virtue of its continuous, peaceful possession
and administration of the islets.
– Beginning in the 17th Century, Japan took concrete actions – administrative, legislative andquasi-judicial – to assert its sovereignty over Takeshima•

Korea did not object to these actions until after WWII ended in 1945.

••

Takeshima was used by these merchants to dock their ships and engage in fishing.
Other business activities flourished on Takeshima over the next 70 years, including harvesting abalone,hunting sea lions and cutting down bamboo and other trees.
1883 - Japanese police remained the only permanent authority in the area because the Korean
Government refused to maintain a police presence on Ulleungdo.

– The Shogunate authorized Japanese merchants to travel and engage in commercial activities
on Ulleungdo in 1618.

•– Japan incorporated Takeshima into the territory of Japan in 1905••••

Cabinet Decision published in February 1905
Shimane Prefecture registered Takeshima in State Land Registry.
Japanese government established a licensing system to regulate the hunting of sea lions.
Takeshima served as a communications and surveillance facility during the Russo-Japanese War.

•

Although Japan’s activities on the islets may have been modest in number, they were diverse incharacter and included legislative, administrative and quasi-judicial acts.
Japanese activities cover a considerable period of time and show a pattern of intent to exercise State
functions in respect to Takeshima.

– The measures taken by Japan to regulate and control the exploitation of resources on andaround the Liancourt Rocks are clearly regulatory and administrative assertions of authority
over territory.
•

44

Senkakus/Diaoyus

Strategically Located• Straddle important sea Lines of Communication• Military significance– First Island Chain– Surveillance advantage• Traditional fishing grounds• Potential oil and gas

45

Senkakus/Diaoyus• Claimed by PRC,
ROC, Japan• Administered by
Japan

Japanese Claims• Discovered by Japanese explorer
Tatsushiro Koga (1884)– Granted 30-year lease by Central
Gov’t in 1896
– Developed islands from 1897-1915– 248 workers/99 houses by 1908
– Zenji Koga continued businesses
after his father died in 1918
– All activities ceased during WWII
– Islands rented to US Navy and US Air
Force after war

46

Japanese Claims• Incorporated into the territory of Japan in Jan 1895 as
terra nullius– 4 months before Treaty of Shimonoseki ended the SinoJapanese War (Apr. 17, 1895)• Recognized independence of Korea• Ceded Liaodong Peninsula and the islands of Taiwan and Penghu to
Japan

PRC/Japan
Pinnacle Islands• Japan exercised effective administration andcontrol from 1895 to 1951
• Islands placed under US administration from 19511972 after WWII

47

Senkakus/Diaoyus
Treaty of Peace with Japan• Article 3
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to theUnited Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with
the United States as the sole administering authority,
Nansei Shoto south of 29deg. north latitude (including the
Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto southof Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island andthe Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island.
Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative
action thereon, the United States will have the right toexercise all and any powers of administration, legislationand jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of theseislands, including their territorial waters.

Senkakus/Diaoyus
Dulles Speech SF Peace Conference• “…Article 3 deals with the Ryukyus and other islands tothe south and southeast of Japan. These, since thesurrender, have been under the sole administration of
the United States. Several of the Allied Powers urgedthat the treaty should require Japan to renounce its
sovereignty over these islands in favor of United States
sovereignty. Others suggested that these islands should
be restored completely to Japan. In the face of thisdivision of Allied opinion, the United States felt thatthe best formula would be to permit Japan to retain
residual sovereignty, while making it possible for theseislands to he brought into the United Nations
trusteeship system, with the United States asadministering authority.

48

Senkakus/Diaoyus
Original U.S. Position (1951-1972)• Joint Communiqué of PM Kishi & Pres. Eisenhower (1957)– The PM “emphasized the strong desire of the Japanese people for the
return of administrative control over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands toJapan.” In response, President Eisenhower reaffirmed the U.S. position that
“Japan possesses residual sovereignty over these islands.”• Statement by Pres. Kennedy on Signing Order relating to Ryukyus (1962)– “I recognize the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese homeland and lookforward to the day when the security interests of the free World will
permit their restoration to full Japanese sovereignty.”• US-Japan Joint Communiqué (1965)– President Johnson “reaffirmed Japan’s residual sovereignty over theislands….”• “Residual sovereignty” defined in 1969 to mean that “the United States
would not transfer its sovereignty powers [administrative, legislativeand judicial] over the Ryukyu Islands to any nation other than Japan.”

Senkakus/Diaoyus
Change in U.S. Position• Submission of Okinawa Reversion Treaty to the Senate
for advice and consent - Memo From President’s
Assistant for International Economic Affairs (1971) –– The…the Republic of China and Japan are in disagreement as
to sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. …[T]he People’s
Republic of China has also claimed sovereignty over theislands. The United States believes that a return ofadministrative rights over those islands to Japan, from which
the rights were received, can in no way prejudice any
underlying claims. The United States cannot add to the legal
rights Japan possessed before it transferred administration of
the islands to us, nor can the United States, by giving backwhat it received, diminish the rights of other claimants. The
United States…considers that any conflicting claims to theislands are a matter for resolution by the parties concerned.

49

Senkakus/Diaoyus
Change in U.S. Position• Why the change?
– Appease Taiwan for losing its
seat at the UN and break theimpasse of the ongoing textile
negotiations with Taiwan– Influenced by U.S. overtures toChina, culminating in the Nixon
visit to China.

Senkakus/Diaoyus
Neutral, But Defense Treaty Applies• “The U.S. position on this issue is longstanding
and has not changed. The United States does nottake a position on the question of the ultimate
sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands. We expect
the claimants to resolve this issue throughpeaceful means among themselves. But Article 5of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security states that the treaty
applies to the territories under theadministration of Japan….”• U.S. has repeatedly reaffirmed U.S. defense
obligations under Article 5 of the MDT (2004,
2010, 2013, 2014, 2017).

50

US Defense Obligations• Art. V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperationand Security between Japan and US provides:
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the
territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its
own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet thecommon danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions andprocesses. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result
thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of theUnited Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of theCharter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international
peace and security.

• Senkakus are under the administrative
control of Japan and are therefore covered byArt. V of the mutual defense treaty

Senkakus/Diaoyus
Trump-Abe Joint Statement (2017)• “The two leaders affirmed that Article V of the
U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security covers the Senkaku Islands. They oppose
any unilateral action that seeks to undermine
Japan’s administration of these islands….”

51

Underlying Cause
Oil and Gas• UN ECAFE Survey (1969)– “a high probability exists that the continental shelf
between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the mostprolific oil reservoirs in the world”• US EIA (2013)– “the East China Sea has between 60 and 100 million
barrels of oil in proven and probable reserves” and“between 1 and 2 trillion cubic feet in proven andprobably natural gas reserves”

China’s Straight Baseline Claim• 10 Sep 2012—Japanese Cabinet
approves purchase of
Uotsurishima, Kita-Kojima andMinami-Kojima from Kiruharafamily for ¥2.05 billion• 13 Sep 2012–PRC files map with
UN claiming archipelagic straightbaselines around the Senkakus• 7 Mar 2013–US diplomaticallyprotests China’s straight baselineclaim• 27 Apr 2013—PRC identifies
Diaoyus as a “ core Interest” of
China
34

52

PRC ADIZ Declaration- Nov 23, 2013

QUESTIONS/COMMENTS

53

Public Seminary on “Asia’s Regional Order andMaritime Security” 2nd Floor, Room 269, Maisonde la Chimie, Paris, France, 6 March 2017

Professor Aaron
Friedberg’s 1994
prediction that
Asia is Ripe for
Rivalry given therampant
territorial disputein the region.

54

East Asia is madeup of several
Westphalianstates that are
fixated with thenotion ofterritoriality andsovereignty.

• East Asian states
are Westphalian
territorial statesthat are locked in
the logic ofinternational
anarchy.

55

• According to Friedberg, “these states willfight for territory…for symbolic or
strategic values.”• Currently, several
East Asian
Westphalianstates are
currently lockedin three territorial
disputes in theregion:56

• China versus
Vietnam,Philippines,
Malaysia andBrunei in the South
China Sea;

• Asia—China
versus Japan in
the East China
Sea.

57

• Taiwan and
China over the
TaiwanStraits;

These disputes are frozen
contentions that have thepotential to escalate into
militarized conflicts. These
maritime tensions are crises
or confrontations that makecompeting states feel thatforce is the only way toresolve the issue at hand,
and that existing military
preparations make this aviable option for at least for
one side.

58

These disputes aregeopolitical flashpoints thatare occurring amidst amajor systemic change inthe 21st century. In thesecond decade of the 21st
century, the unipolar
movement of the U.S. is
strategically being
challenged by two great
regional powers—Russia
and China.

• China and Russia are
fielding advanced weapon
system including longrange radars, air defense
systems, satellite-based
sensors, and long-range
cruise and ballistic
missiles to prevent ordelay U.S. forward
deployed forces fromintervening in theirrespective regions.

59

By developing their respective
anti-access area-denial
capabilities, Russia and China
are relying on asymmetricaltactics below the threshold ofactual conflict or grey zone
tactics. Adoption of these tactics
represent an attempt by bothregional powers to pursue theirgeo-strategic interests in the nearterm without triggering a fullscale military response by theUnited States and its allies.

• With China joining theranks of the great
powers, the Chinese
leaders increasingly
believe that their country
has the preponderance ofmilitary and economic
power to revise the rules,
norms, and institutions
that govern the worldorder to suit theirinterests.

60• China’s and Russia’s
resort to gray-area orasymmetrical tactic toundermine U.S. strategic
dominance represent a
recognition that asystemic change in theinternational system
could trigger a major
great power conflict inthe second decade of the
21st century.

On its part, the UnitedStates designed the rules,
regimes, and institution of
the post-1945 international
system. American leadershipin global affairs is the sourcefrom which America draws
its capabilities, influence,and power to defend theAmerican way of life and theWestern Alliance.

61• As the foremost status quo
power and East Asia’s
strategic offshore balancer,
the U.S. will try to preventthese regional powers fromdamaging, undermining, andunravelling the current
international political andeconomic system. This is, inturn, creates the prospect ofa systemic or a great power
conflict in the second decadeof the 21st century.

A major systemic war
would not only cost
significant loss of lifeand properties, but
could also bringabout the collapse of
the post-Second
World War global
order.

62

• South China
Sea is a semienclosed sea
surrounded by
China and six
smallerSoutheast Asianstates.

63• China poses as the largest challenge in both
efforts either to resolve/ manage or escalate
the maritime and territorial disputes in theSouth China Sea.

China believes that
the South China Sea
has a vital strategic
significance as it is
becoming a focal
point of its evolving
strategic rivalry
with the UnitedStates.

64

• Maritime tension flared up in 2009 as
China assumed a more assertive postureand began consolidating its expansive
claim.

65

China has been
Deterringsmaller claimant
states fromstrengthening
their claims.

• The threat offorce toresolve thedisputeunilaterally
has become
apparent.

66

• As the region’s offshore strategicbalancer, the UnitedStates has shown
interest in thedispute since 2010,
and in 2011,
announced astrategic rebalancing
to Asia.

• Japan has growinginterest in the disputeto balance its geostrategic rival in Asia-China. Japan has
assisted thePhilippines andVietnam in enhancing
their maritime
security.

67

The South China Sea is now one of
the four geo-Strategic flashpoints
in East Asia.

South China Sea is
now the future ofconflict where
navies jockey for
positions with
their warships on
the high seas.

68China has also been very
active in effecting its
maritime expansion in the
East China Sea. It has
focused its attention on
developing natural gas
field in its East China Sea
waters that is very close to
the equidistance line
between China and Japan.

69

Since June 2013, China has
unilaterally and rapidly
built several new oil andnatural gas platforms near
the median line between
China and Japan.
Consequently, Japan has
repeatedly stated its
objections to China’s
ongoing unilateraldevelopments of oil andnatural gas in the East
China Sea.

From Japan’s point ofview, China’s build-up ofmultiple maritime
platforms is an attempt
to set in place a new
status quo in the East
China Sea, an approachthat has similarities with
Chinese reclamation
activities in the South
China Sea.

70

• Chinese maritime law
enforcement agencies(CMLEA) vessels havealso intensified theiractivities around the
Senkaku islands forseveral days in August
2016. This was thestrongest and most
massive operation of the
CMLEA in the waters
around Senkaku.

• To effect a unilateralchange in the territorial
status quo in the East
China Sea, China has
increased its air andmaritime activities in the
East China Sea as it sent
PLAAF aircraft over the
Tsushima Straits, between
Okinawa and Miyakojima
Islands. PLAN ships havealso started operating in
the Southern waters of the
Senkaku/Diayo Islands.

71• Prime Minister Shintaro Abe’s
policy of continuing his
predecessor’s stand of notadmitting the existence of the
dispute in the Senkaku.
• Prime Minister Abe’s
pronouncements that China’s
assertive behavior in East Asia isa source of grave security
concern for Japan.

• Prime Minister Abe’sannounced increase in
defense budget and areview of the 2010
National Defense
Program Guidelines.

72• Review of the 1997
Guidelines for U.S.Japan Defense
Cooperation.
• Japan’s launching ofmulti-layered security
with like-mindedcountries on a regionaland global scale.

73• The year 2015 was seenas the year when both
Chinese and Taiwaneseleaders exerted major
efforts toward a gradualnormalization of ChinaROC relations. Since
2008, both sides had
agreed on deepening thecross-straits relations,particularly, economic
ties.

• In January 2016, Miss
Tsai Ing-wen of the
Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP) won thepresidency. This led toan renewed tension in
the Taiwan Straits as
China is very suspiciousof her motives withregard to Taiwanese
independence.

74

Suspicious of possible
secession of Taiwan
under the DPP
Administration, China iscurrently developing themilitary capability not
only to invade Taiwan
but to deter the U.S. fromintervening militarily incase of a Chinese
invasion of Taiwan.

• The PLA is seeking tobolster its strategic
capabilities by
increasing the numberof short-range ballistic
missiles and cruise
missiles supposedly
aimed not only at
Taiwan but also against
the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

75

The existence of thesemaritime tensions
amidst a evolving
systemic change in
East Asia generate astrategic impasse
wherein any error or
miscalculation of any
the major powers cantrigger a major
conflict.

76• The impasse in East Asia is generated by the thesemaritime tension could lead to three possible strategic
scenarios• A regional balanceof power marked
by constant interstate competition
and rivalry
between the two
great powers andtheir allies;77•A U.S.China
condominiu
m in theAsiaPacific.

• The Thucydides
Trap and theconsequent outbreakof a systemic war
between an
emerging power
versus a status quo
power and its allies
in East Asia.

78

China’s recent escalatory
actions and assertive behavior
in both the South and East
China Seas are causing more
actors to engage directly on
East Asia’s maritime security
issues both in the diplomaticand in the strategic realm.
Going forward these nonclaimant parties will likely
play a greater role in
influencing developments in
the region’s maritime domain.

79Despite their geographic,
political, diplomatic, andeconomic differences, it
is apparent that very realgeo-strategic interests
draw all the nonclaimant actors when it
comes to the significant
developments in East
Asia’s maritime security
issues.

Thus, the non-claimant
actors’ usual attention on
their dependence on thecritical sea lines ofcommunication for shipping,fundamental interests inmaintaining the freedom ofnavigation, the rights ofpassage and overflights on
the disputed waters, anddefending a global order
based on the rule of law
should be complemented withclear-cut and articulated geostrategic concerns.

80China’s naval build-up
and consequent expansive
maritime expansion
generate bilateral, transAtlantic, and global issues
that would affect the EU’s
nascent common foreignand security policies, andthe EU’s role as theforemost global Civilian
Power.

Since 2016, Russia has taken amore active role in East Asia as it
began criticizing the position androle of the U.S. in the maritime
dispute and conducting naval
exercises with China in the Southand East China Seas. The SinoRussian relations most sensitiveelement, security, has become
increasingly important as the twocountries have increased
cooperation through regular largescale joint exercises in East Asia,
arms sales, and informationexchange.

81With its growing wealth, China
has applied a sophisticated form of
economic statecraft to influence
the views of regional states on themaritime disputes. Most East
Asian states now weigh their geostrategic interests and politicaldecisions in the context of their
alliance and security partnershipwith the U.S. and Japan with theirextensive economic relations with
China. This causes claimant andnon-claimant actors to adopt a
delicate balancing act with regard
to their respective positions on themaritime issues in East Asia.

China’s naval build-up,
increasing assertiveness, anddevelopment of its extensive
anti-access/area denial
capabilities in the FirstIsland chain are designed tochallenge the U.S. role as
East Asia strategic off-shorebalancer in particular, andthe U.S.-led international
order that was established in
the end of the Second World
War.

82

These geo-strategic issues related withthe maritime disputes in East Asia
should make Europe ponder on its
limited security role in the region.
Europe might consider expanding its
current policy instruments of annual
issuance of statements, ban oncommercial arms sales in China, andnascent freedom of navigation
operations (by France) with new
initiatives such as enhanced strategic
dialogue with the U.S. and its AsiaPacific allies, the development of shared
outlook on regional trends with likeminded states in the region,
strengthening NATO’s partnerships in
the region, and cooperation with
regional states on maritime security
focused on protecting East Asia’s
maritime commons.

While it is true that
Europe does not have astrategic presence andclout in the region, thisshould not mean that
Europe is incapable ofplaying a constructive
security role in East
Asia’s maritime affairs.

83•WillEurope’s
Past beAsia’sFuture?

84

JIIA-ECFR Joint Open Seminar on Asia-PacificRegional Order and Maritime Security

How to defuse Sino-US
tensions in the South China
Sea?

Liselotte Odgaard
Royal Danish Defence College
6 March 2017

1
[AFD og dato]

Argument
Both China and the U.S. areconditional revisionists=> Deterrence with credible
reassurance to lower tensions

285

Legal grey zones• China’s claim and entitlement to territorial
sovereignty and maritime zones• History and effective control• Military activities within maritime zones=> China and the U.S. manifest theirinterpretations of legitimacy

Blurred strategic lines
China:• Advocates peace and stability (not intending to militarize)• Reacts to challenges to its territorial and maritime zone
claims (not willing to give up an inch)
U.S.:• Prioritizes freedom of navigation based on internationallaw• Considers options for flying and sailing near features
whose legal status is not clear

486Different interpretations of deterrence
China: includes the option of using compellence against
offensive behaviour that has not involved the use of deadly
force => maritime military build-up and law enforcement
capabilities to defend sovereignty claims.
U.S.: forward military presence used to manifest thatinternational waters cannot be treated as within thejurisdiction of another state

5

Credible reassurance
China:
Does not seek to undermine the US alliance system: refrainfrom using aggression against other claimants; refrain from
imposing restrictions on US military navigation and overflight;
refrain from establishing presence that threatens the US
presence (fx military installations that threaten navy vessels
and aircraft)
U.S.:
Does not seek to prevent China from establishing apermanent presence: refrain from close-in surveillance ofChina; refrain from military activities in legal grey zones and
FONOPS in disputed areas where legal status is unclear;refrain from challenging current Chinese possessions

687