Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

March 21, 2021

Note
This is an earlier manuscript of a chapter published as a book of
Springer: “People and Trust” in “Advanced Studies in Behaviormertrics
and Data Analysis” Essays in Honor of Akinori Okada(T. Imaizumi, A.
Nakayama,and S. Yokoyama[Eds], 2020), pp.453-472.
This manuscript is much longer than the published chapter and has
not yet been proofread by the editors, so it may contain typographicalerrors and omissions. The title of the chapter was also changed from
"Trust and Values" in this draft to "People and Trust" in the publishedchapter.

Ryozo Yoshino1Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

Trust and Values
For Mutual Understanding of Nations based on Longitudinal and Cross-National Surveys
Ryozo Yoshino
The Institute of Statistical Mathematics

Abstract
This chapter introduces a study of peoples’ sense of trust in a paradigm of longitudinal and cross-national
comparative survey, called CULMAN (Cultural Manifold Analysis).

Firstly, I explan a history of the survey

paradigm developed in the Japanese National Character Survey (JNCS) and the related cross-national survey
more than the past six decades. Secondly, I summarize fundamental social values of the Japanese andinterpersonal trust as identified in the JNCS. Thirdly, a cross-national analysis of interpersonal trust andinstitutional trust is presented. Fourthly, I explore more universal values that may underlie people’s sense oftrust beyond differences between the East and the West.

Finally, some comments for future research arepresented. Key words: Cultural Manifold Analysis (CULMAN), Science of Data, Sense of Trust, Japanese
National Character Survey, Asia-Pacific Values Survey-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Address: Graduate School of Culture and Information Science, Doshisha University,
1-3 Tatara-Miyako-dani, Kyoto-Shi, Japan 610-0394 (The author has moved to Doshisha University since October 1st, 2019).
E-mail address: yoshino@ism. ac. jp
This chapter is a version of Yoshino (2015a) adapted for this book, with some updated survey data. See Yoshino (2015a),
Yoshino, Shibai, Nikaido & Fujita (2015) and their references for detailed data and our research paradigm with the following

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websites. http://www.ism.ac.jp/ism_info_e/kokuminsei_e.html(Surveys of the ISM)

http://www.ism.ac.jp/~yoshino/index_e.html (Cross-national Surveys of the ISM)
http://www.ism.ac.jp/editsec/kenripo/contents_e.html (The ISM Survey Research Report)

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1. Introduction: Longitudinal and Cross-National Surveys of National Character by ISM

This chapter introduces a study on longitudinal and cross-national comparative surveys
by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics (ISM) over the past 65 years (see Table 1). The
survey research covers many theoretical and methodological issues. Here I focus on people’s
trust systems to explore people’s sense of trust. Eventually this leads us to more universal
social values, such as the importance of family, beyond differences across countries and time.
Furthermore, it touches fundamental differences on the attitudes towards nature or religion
between the East and the West. The background and the significance of this study are as
follows.
**** Table 1 around here ****The ISM has been conducting a longitudinal nationwide social survey called the Japanese
National Character Survey (JNCS) every five years since 1953 (Mizuno et al., 1992), one year
after when the post-war occupation by the US government was over. By the term “national
character,” we refer to characteristics reflected in people’s response patterns in questionnaire
surveys (cf. Inkeles, 1997). The survey is a type of general social survey, so the questionnaire
covers various aspects of people's opinions about their culture, daily life, economy, education,family, gender, interpersonal relationships, nature, politics, religion, security, workplace, etc.
This research was closely related to the establishment of a scientific system of public opinion
polling based on statistical sampling theory for the development of post-World War II
democracy in Japan, when Japan was expected to change from a military regime to a
democratic country (Yoshino, 2015a, 2015b; Yoshino, Hayashi & Yamaoka, 2010). Stimulatedby this survey, the now well-known surveys such as ALLBUS in Germany, CREDOC in

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France, the European Values Survey and the Eurobarometer in the EU, and the GeneralSocial Survey (GSS) in the USA have been initiated.
Since 1971, the JNCS has been expanded to cross-national surveys for a more advanced
understanding of the Japanese national character in the context of comparative study.
Selecting items from nationwide surveys in several countries, we designed our questionnaires
to compare peoples’ social values, ways of thinking, feelings, etc.

Our final goal is to develop

a statistical study of civilizations through social survey data that will give us fundamental
information for the peaceful development of the world, under the paradigm of “Science ofData” (Hayashi, 1976, 2001b). Here the Science of Data means a data-based exploratory andwholistic approach by which we overview a survey process starting from a survey design,
preliminary survey, data collection based on statistical sampling survey, data analysis, tofinal report for policy-making. And, if necessary, we repeat the process and extend it tolongitudinal survey or cross-national survey. Collecting data, we try to present multifaced
survey data in order to facilitate the understanding of the reality. This is fairly different
from hypothesis-testing approach to focus on a particular issue. And it is closely related
Tukey (1977)'s "Exploratory Data Analysis" or Benzecri (1992)'s "Correspondence Data
Analysis", although these three were independently developed.
Cross-national survey must overcome multi-faceted methodological problems involving,e.g., different languages, different statistical sampling methods, and different peoples’
general response tendencies. There is no a priori knowledge regarding how these varying
conditions influence peoples’ responses even in cases where there is no substantive difference
between the peoples. Thus, an important task for our study is to investigate those conditions

5Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

under which meaningful cross-national comparability of social survey data is guaranteed.
Many findings have been reported in our past publications (C. Hayashi, 1993, 2001; C.
Hayashi, et al., 1998; C. Hayashi & Yoshino, 2002; F. Hayashi & Yamaoka, 2002; Kuroda,
2002; Yamaoka & Yoshino, 2015; Yoshino, 1994, 2000, 2001, 2005a, 2005b, 2008, 2009, 2012,2013, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b; Yoshino, F. Hayashi & Yamaoka, 2010; Yoshino et al., 2015).
In our search for conditions that could assure meaningful cross-national comparability ofsocial survey data, we decided at the onset that a comparison of two nations (or groups) withsome similarities (e.g., the Japanese in Japan and Hawaii residents with Japanese ancestry)would be more meaningful than attempting to compare two totally different nations (or groups).
Some nations (or groups) share certain common features such as race or language. Therefore,
they provide meaningful links for comparison. Extending these links may eventually create achain for global cross-national comparison. By developing the idea of spatial comparison in
relation to temporal and thematic comparisons, we eventually have formulated our methodology
called Cultural Link Analysis (CLA) which incorporates: 1) spatial linkages of cross-national
comparison; 2) temporal linkages inherent in longitudinal analysis; and 3) item-structure
linkages inherent in the commonalities and differences in item response patterns within andacross different cultures (eg. on modernization, religious attitudes, work values, etc.) (SeeFigures 1(a)(b)(c)). With this linkage, we correspond a set of question items to a link (local link,a temporal link, or an item-structure link).
Furthermore, this has been developed as a paradigm of Cultural Manifold Analysis(CULMAN), which introduces hierarchical structures into the three types of linkages within the
CLA framework (Yoshino et al., 2015). For cross-national comparison, a global map consisting of6

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

a set of local charts (corresponding to links of CLA) may be constructed. Each local chart covers
a particular area or region and some of these may partially overlap. The whole set of chartscovers the globe. The set of charts may compose a sort of hierarchical structure, where eachlevel of charts may correspond to a certain expanse of coverage (e.g., Japan, China, Asia,
Eurasia, or the world), and the larger chart corresponds to the higher level. Furthermore, thelarger chart may be associated with the less restricted cross-national scalability. In thisapproach, the concept of a spatial chart can be extended to both the temporal and item-structure
links (See Figures 2(a)(b)(c)).

[Footnote 1]*** Figures 1(a)(b)(c)

CLA CULMAN ＊＊＊*** Figures 2(a)(b)(c)

CULMAN ＊＊＊As for the study of trust, although there are various definitions of “trust,” they may be roughlyclassified as “trust in transactions” or “trust in normative philosophy” (Hosmer, 1995). Thesemay be closely related to Uslaner ’s (2011) distinction between “strategic trust” and “moralistic
trust.”

Zucker (1986) points out three methods for the production of trust: 1) process-based

trust tied to past exchanges; 2) characteristic-based trust tied to personal characteristics, suchas family background and ethnicity; and 3) institution-based trust tied to formal societal
structures. Shapiro (1987) criticizes the third category because he believes that trust cannot be
institutionalized. Further, Zucker (1986) claims that trust is not directly measurable.
Although the Zucker’s three categories of trust are mutually interrelated, my focus in thisstudy is mainly on the second, i.e., trust based on personal characteristics. Besides, I pay muchattention to the ways people’s trust appears in social survey data under the influences of culture
and general social values as well as general response tendencies due to gender or ethnic

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differences. (See Sec.2 of Yoshino [2015] for more explanation on background of our research).
The composition of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 gives a summary on
fundamental social values of the Japanese and their interpersonal trust as identified in the
JNCS. Section 3 shows a cross-national analysis of interpersonal trust and institutional trust.
In Sec.4, I show some data on social values, with the aim of exploring more universal values that
may underlie people’s sense of trust beyond the differences between the East and the West.
Finally, in Section 5, I present some comments for future research.

2. Social Values and Interpersonal TrustSome researchers say that “trust” is not directly measurable. Fukuyama (1995), for example,
suggests to use a measure of distrust such as rates of divorce or murderer which are directly
measurable. There may be no universal scale on sense of trust beyond differences in cultures
and time. Or even if there is such a scale, it may not be linear with respect to various factors(e.g., the non-linear effect of income, social class or subjective health on sense of trust [Yoshino,
2002; Yoshino & Tsunoda, 2005]). I believe, however, that people’s responses in questionnaire
surveys can reveal certain aspects of their sense of trust, if we can adequately analyze thefollowings: 1) the time series patterns or cross-national patterns of responses, 2) possibility of
non-linear correlations between “trust” and other social variables (e.g., class, education, income,subjective health, etc.), and 3) general response tendencies associated with genders, nations andpersonality types.
I explain certain fundamental dimensions of Japanese social values and some analyses ofinterpersonal trust among the Japanese as follows.

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2.1 Fundamental Dimensions of Japanese Social Values

Hayashi (1993) and C. Hayashi & F. Hayashi (1995) write that three dimensions underlie theJapanese national character: 1) "Giri-Ninjyo" interpersonal relationship, 2) contrast between themodern versus tradition in their way of thinking, and 3) religious attitudes (or heart/mind).
Here “Giri" represents the obligation to uphold social duties and "Ninjyo” represents the morevisceral warm-heartedness. The Japanese shows a particular attitude distressed in balancing"Giri" and "Ninjyo" on the Gri-Ninjyo continuum in their interpersonal relationships.
Overall, basic Japanese interpersonal attitudes have been stable, at least over the last six
decades, and probably much longer. Most likely, the basic interpersonal attitudes concerning
human bonds, sense of happiness, life satisfaction, optimism, etc., tend to be stable in any
country over time (Yoshino & Osaki, 2013). On the other hand, certain aspects are sensitive tochanges in economic or political conditions and more or less vary in the short term in mostcountries. In the study of JNCS data of 1953-2008, Sakamoto (2010) points out remarkablechanges of the response patterns in the periods of 1973-78, 1988-93, and 1998-2003. In all those
periods, we have seen sudden changes of economic conditions due to, respectively, the oil shock,the collapse of bubbling economy, and the Asia Financial Crisis.
As for the second dimension, the Japanese had long been facing a sort of emotional andinstitutional conflicts between the modernization (effectively Westernization or Americanization)and the maintenance of Japanese tradition since the Meiji Restoration of 1868. In those days,
the Japanese faced a situation necessarily to master Western science and technology and toadapt it into a Japanese style for national survival (security and prosperity). This situation was
called as "Wakon-Yousai" (i.e., Use Western technology with Japanese sprit). This enduring9Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PMeffort had underlined the dimension of the traditional versus modern orientation in theJapanese way of thinking, at least, until the early 1970s or so. The then younger generation
born more than 10 years after the end of World War II started to show some significant changeon the dimension of modern vs tradition. Their response patterns looked conservative on
nature, science and technology, so some people called it “the return to tradition.” The
conservative attitudes looked a reaction to rapid industrial development and environmental
changes in the 1970s or so.
Since signs of generational changes appeared around 1978, the Japanese ways of thinking
became more complicated than ever. Since the early 1990s, Japan has been in a period oftransition from the established social system to a system of a highly advanced information age.
Parallel to the world order change after the end of cold war, this situation brought disruption not
only to the fields of science and technology but also to the fields of economics and politics under
the name of "globalization." In this period of confusion, the majority of Japanese people came to
distrust traditional systems such as banking and bureaucracy as well as the legislature, police,
etc. (Yoshino, 2002).
We saw a confusion also in the changes of governing parties since the 1990s. The Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) governed Japan for some four decades (1955–1993) by itself, whichmight symbolize the Japanese political attitude that dislikes rapid changes. However, the LDP
had to rule in a coalition with other parties from 1993 until 2009.

More broadly, underglobalization Japan came under pressure to restructure its social systems, including business,
education, and law in the last two decades or so. This necessitated change in even fundamental
human relationships, not only in business but also in daily life, eventually sapping the source of

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national strength. Confusion appeared with the switching of the governing party from the LDP
to the Democratic Party in 2009, and then back to the LDP in 2012. The current Prime
Minister, Shinzo Abe, forced to resign in 2007 but revived politically in December 2012, has been
struggling to revive Japanese national strength. But many people consider the past three
decades “lost three decades” as failures of economic and political reformations. Certainly, weneed to change some economic and political institutions in this rapidly changing world. But thefundamental interpersonal relationships must be stable to maintain the social order.
As for religion, about one third of the Japanese have religious faith but most of theJapanese think that religious heart/mind is important (C. Hayashi & F. Hayashi,1995; Yoshino[in Mizuno, et al., 1992, Sect.8]). In the world-wise secularization after the WWII up to the endof cold war, the Japanese is not an exception on this trend, but their religious heart/mind seems
not much changed. For more advanced arguments, we may need to face some significant
differences of religion between the East and the West (See Hayashi & Hayashi, 1995).
2. 2 Interpersonal Trust of the Japanese

The past decades have developed psychological studies of measures of interpersonal trust.
Among others, a set of three items from the GSS has been used to measure people’s sense oftrust (see Uslaner, 2011, 2018; Yoshino & Osaki, 2013, for a history). Although the GSS started
as a sort of American version of the JNCS, we have adopted the three items from the GSS for
our survey since 1978. They are stated as follows (for the Japanese questionnaire, see
http://www.ism.ac.jp/kokuminsei/index.html. See also Footnote 2. )Q36. Would you say that, most of the time, people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for11Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

themselves?

1. Try to be helpful, 2. Look out for themselves

Q37. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try
to be fair?

1. Take advantage, 2. Try to be fair,

Q38. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful indealing with people?

1. Can be trusted, 2. Can’t be too careful

The source of these items was obtained by Rosenberg (1956) selecting five items among
hundreds of items when he constructed a Guttmann scale called "Faith-in-People Scale" with aregeneration rate of 92% in a student survey. The items were on trustworthiness, honesty,
goodness, genericity, and brotherliness. These items were used for research by Almond & Verba(1963) and others, and then the ISR survey (the Survey Research Center, the University ofMichigan) and the GSS (NORC, the University of Chicago). In the process, those items havebeen gradually modified and the above-mentioned three items with binary response scales are
survived (Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsman, 1991; Uslaner,2018).
Each of the three items is supposed to capture somewhat different aspects of trust. That is,
Q36 is related to trust in neighbors (or the norm of reciprocity), Q38 is related to generalinterpersonal trust, and Q37 is concerned with something in between the other two items. Ourdata repeatedly demonstrates that Q37 and Q38 are more correlated for the Japanese, whereas
Q36 and Q37 are more correlated for Americans. Some countries such as India may
consistently show unique patterns of correlations, whereas other countries such as South Korea
may show less-stable patterns over years. Yoshino (2015a, Tables 1a, 1b, 1c & 1d) gives moredetails of cross-national differences on the three pairs of correlations between the three items.

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Concerning Q38, some people may suspect that the second response option, “can’t be too
careful,” is not likely to mean distrust but to refer to another positive social value related to selfdiscipline.

This may explain the higher rates of selection for this answer than the first option“can be trusted” in many countries (Yoshino, 2002, Table 2; Yoshino, Shibai, & Nikaido, 2015,
pp.134-135). NORC-ROPER (1986) has reported comparative survey data with respect to theeffect of the second option. The survey compared two cases: in Case 1, the same wording as Q38
was used, and in Case 2, the phrase “can’t be trusted” was used.

The second option was lessfrequently chosen in Case 2 than in Case 1 (i.e., more people answered “can be trusted”). The
same pattern of response difference has been found in Japanese surveys (Nakamura et al. [2017]with Osaka Shogyo University & Tokyo University [1999]).

Thus, the wording of Q38 may beconsidered a sort of advanced technique to elicit people’s true opinion ("honne" in Japanese),
reducing the degree of social desirability in responses ("tatemae" in Japanese). (cf. Uslaner [2011]
argues to justify the single item Q.38 as a standard scale of trust.)*** Fig 3a Fig 3b Time series of GSS 3 items on trust in Japan & USA ***The response distribution for the Japanese over the past decades (1978-2013) is shown in
Fig.1a.

As a measure on a sort of “total interpersonal trust,” I often use the percentage of those

who choose positive categories to all of Q36, Q37 and Q38. (Because Q36 was missing in some ofour past surveys, I sometimes use also the percentage of those who gave positive answers to both
Q36 and Q38. The rankings on the two items and on the three items are mostly consistent overthe countries/areas where the three items were used. See Fig.2.)***** Fig. 4 Cross-national Trust *****************On the measure of “total interpersonal trust,” both the Japanese and Americans have been

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fairly stable but the Japanese may be more stable than Americans, at least during 1983–2008.
We need to pay attention to the changes in 1978 and in 2013. The Japanese experienced anationwide panic trying to hoard necessities for their daily lives after the oil crisis and the Nixon
shock (i.e., the unilateral cancellation of the direct international convertibility of the US dollar
to gold) around 1973.

Necessarily, this would have downgraded mutual trust. On the other

hand, in the disaster of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, people run to the devastatedarea from all over Japan to help the suffered people. Still under the lasting economic
depression, many people considered how they could contribute to recovery of the area.
Comparing to those suffered in the great disaster of earthquake and the succeeding nuclear
plant accidents, all the Japanese must have felt that they must be satisfied with their lives andhave to appreciate mutual assistances. Naturally, this would have raised mutual trust.
(Footnote 3).
If Q36, Q37 and Q38 are separately studied, the Japanese data also show more changes
over the years. The changes may confirm that the economic and political structural reformation
damaged the Japanese sense of trust, roughly, during 1993–2008.
Yoshino (2009) noted the remarkably low degree of trust among those aged 60–64 years oldin the 1998 survey. This generation forms a particular cohort whose opinions and values are
fairly different from those of the other generations in many aspects, because they were children
during WWII and experienced a drastic social change from a military regime to a postwar
democracy (Mizuno et al., 1992). Surviving the hard time of famine during and immediately
after the war, they reconstructed the ruins of Japan to build a highly advanced industrial
country. Under the economic depression of the 1990s, many people of this generation were14

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PMforced to take an early retirement as companies lost strength to support the lifelong employment
system. They did not receive as much pension money as they had expected, and many had a
hard time finding new jobs. The aforementioned data may reflect their distrust toward thesocial systems that did not compensate them sufficiently for their lifelong hard work.
Since the postwar time of WWII, the life-long employment system of Japan provided forbetter job security – workers’ salaries may become lower, but they can’t be so easily fired. This
may explain the higher levels of trust (i.e., the relative stability of response patterns on Q36, 37& 38) found in the Japanese samples than among the American ones, at least during 1983-2008.
But, in the early 1990s , the reformation under “globalization” started to force the Japanese tochange economic, political and social systems, looking for efficiency or internationalization
disregarding of the Japanese structures rooted in historical background or culture. The changeof the social systems attacked even interpersonal systems of family, school and work place,disturbing people’s heart and mind.

The “lost two decades” since the collapse of bubbling

economy around 1991, after all, resulted in confusions and failures not only in the Japanesesystems but also in foreign banks and commercial companies which attempted to takeadvantage of the opportunities in Japan.
Meanwhile, the government has lost people's trust in the national pension system. Senior
people rely on younger people for future financial support, but the population of younger
generations has been decreasing, and the younger are less motivated to pay pension costs, inconsideration of the balance. These situations, originally due to distrust on governmental
institution, have necessarily led to a gap of consciousness on social institutions between theyoung and the senior people.

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Incidentally, the new graduates during, roughly, 1993-2004 are called "Syusyoku Hyoga-ki
Sedai" (Ice Age Generation of Job Market) or “lost generation” because they faced remarkabledifficulties to get regular job positions under the rapid recession.

They are now in their 30s or

40s, but still face difficulties of getting positions of regular employees, in spite of recent economic
recovery. Because Japanese job market is mainly for new graduates, those of Ice Age Generation
meet much more disadvantages than younger graduates. At last the government started
amending the situation, demanding the Japanese business world to employ them as regular
employees.
Looking back over the last 30 years, during the prosperity of the 1980s, there was a shift ofyoung men's social values towards individualism and then personal preference (give priority on
personal matters). But the structural reforms of the 1990s led to the economic recession and thedeparture from lifetime employment. As a reaction, human relationships in the work place seemreconsidered (regression to tradition), among others, in young people.
Yoshino (2002) discussed several aspects of trust, such as trust in politics, science, andtechnology, as well as the work ethic of the Japanese. He concluded that some aspects of trust
may be variable according to economic and political conditions, whereas some other may be morestable.

Although the world used to have a stereotype of the Japanese workers called the“economic animal” in the 1980s, their attitudes and ethic toward work seem to be influenced byeconomic and political conditions. (See Inagaki & Maeda [2015] for the study of trust using
latent structure modelling on the JNCS.)
Lastly, I note on the general response tendencies (Yoshino, Hayashi & Yamaoka, 2010).
Yoshino and Osaki (2013) and Yoshino (2014a) reviewed our past surveys on trust and subjective

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well-beingness, and concluded that the long-term tendency is relatively stable over time
regardless of objective economic or political conditions (cf. Hofstead, Hofstead & Minkov, 2010)
although a serious incident or disaster perturbs the stability.

In contrast, it significantly

changes in the short term, such as in a day (Kahneman & Krueger, 2006). Thus, we need to becareful regarding the distinction between the long-term tendency and the short-term tendency ofpeople’s sense of trust in cross-national comparison.
As for the general response tendency of each nation, for example, the Japanese tend to avoid
polar answers and prefer intermediate response categories (or "Don't Know"), the French tend tochoose critical categories, and the Indians tend to choose optimistic categories.

Furthermore,as to gender differences, women show stronger self-disclosure than men (Yoshino, 2009, Sec.2;
Yoshino, Hayashi, & Yamaoka, 2010, pp.109-111). This may lead a superficial contradiction, e.g.,
the women show higher sense of satisfaction when asked about their satisfaction whereas theyshow higher sense of dissatisfaction when asked about their dissatisfaction.

3. Cross-national Surveys on Trust
3.1 Sense of Interpersonal Trust

Our cross-national surveys also included the three items on interpersonal trust from the
GSS.

Table 2 is the data from the Asia-Pacific Values Survey (APVS) (2010–2014). (Yoshino[2019, Tables 2a, 2b, 2c & 2d] show the response distributions for most of the countries/areasthat we have surveyed over the past four decades.) See Fig. 3a & 3b also.
*** Table 2 (GSS 3 Simple Tabulation

APVS) ***

Miyake (Hayashi et al., 1998, Ch. 7) presented an analysis on our Seven Country Survey:

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Japan, the USA, the UK, West Germany, and France in 1987–1988 and Italy and theNetherlands in 1992–1993. He concluded that the trust scale had correlations with gender andreligion but stronger correlations with family income, educational level, and social class. But
these correlations were not so strong. On this scale, West Germany, the UK, and the USA
scored higher than Japan and the Netherlands, but the difference was small. The French and
Italians clearly scored lower than in other nations. In addition, those who had religious faithgave more positive responses to item Q36, irrespective of their religious affiliation. For Q37,
women gave more optimistic answers (“they would try to be fair”) than men. As for item Q38,
there was a clear difference between social classes in all seven countries. That is, the higher thesocial class, the more trustful the respondents were. The difference between classes was
remarkably large in France and the USA. Observing that the higher level of education was
associated with the greater trust, Miyake suspected that the association was caused by thecorrelation between education and social class. (Although there was a relatively strong
correlation between education and social class, and between education and income in the USA,
this was not necessarily the case for other countries.) Using the same data, Yoshino (2002)
showed correlations between trust and social class or income in the USA and the UK but nonlinear correlations in the other five countries, including Japan and West Germany. Incidentally
Yoshino & Tsunoda [2005] suggested non-linear relationship between subjective health andsense of trust.
**** Fig. 4 ( Q38) ***Fig. 4 shows the ranking of the percentages in each country of those who gave positive
answers to both Q36 and Q38. The measure seems fairly stable within the countries/ areas when18

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

repeatedly surveyed over years. Interestingly, the Japanese immigrants in the USA and Brazil
are ranked, respectively, as the highest and the lowest. That is, JAWCS (Japanese Americans on
the West Coast) is higher than the general Americans whereas JB (Japanese Brazilian) is lower
than the Latin countries (France and Italy). The percentages of positive response in the USA
and the UK were high, whereas those in Italy and France were low.

This may be consistent

with Fukuyama’s (1995) theory contrasting Japan, the USA, and Germany as highly trustfulcountries with China and Italy as less trustful countries. His arguments are based on theassumption that the former countries have well-developed intermediate civic organizations
between the government and families whereas the latter have established atmosphere of strict
political centralization in the past long histories.
A close look at this figure, however, shows a more complicated reality because thepercentages of positive responses of Mainland China (Beijing and Shanghai) were higher thanmight have been expected by the Fukuyama’s argument. There may be several possible
explanations for this. First, the data really do indicate that the Chinese have a higher sense ofinterpersonal trust. (Probably they may be focusing on in-group relationships when responding
to those items). Second, the Chinese respondents might have tried to show a higher sense ofinterpersonal trust because they were sensitive to their international reputation, such as that
insisted by Fukuyama. Third, the questionnaire items were constructed as a trust scale for
Americans, so they may not be suitable for the measurement of trust in other nations. Fourth,
we need to be careful about the political and sociological implications of the trust scale. For
example, Dogan (2000, p.258) states, “Erosion of confidence is first of all a sign of politicalmaturity. It is not so much that democracy has deteriorated, but rather the critical spirit of19Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

most citizens has improved.” This suggests that we need to distinguish between the face valueof a scale and its implications. In this context, trust and distrust may not be opposites on a unidimensional scale but instead may be closely related in a sort of multidimensional mind
structure. Furthermore, people may give the same response for different reasons or different
responses for the same reason. Therefore, for a more meaningful comparison of countries, it isnecessary to consider peoples’ responses with objective measures on, e. g., economics and politics,
as well as general response tendencies of those peoples. As such, I may in this study give someinterpretations of response patterns on certain items, but they should necessarily be considered
tentative.

3. 2. Trust of Social Institutions and Systems

The questionnaires of the APVS included the same items on institutional trust used in theWorld Values Survey, with an additional item on trust in science and technology. The items arestated as follows.

Q.52. How much confidence do you have in the following? Are you very confident, somewhat confident, notconfident, or not confident at all?

Very

Somewhat

Not

Not Confident

Confident

Confident

Confident

at Alla. Religious organizations

1

2

3

4

b. The law and the legal system

1

2

3

4

c. The press and television

1

2

3

4

d. The police

1

2

3

4

20

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

e. National federal bureaucracy

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

h. Social welfare facilities

1

2

3

4

i. The United Nations

1

2

3

4

j. Science and technology

1

2

3

4

f. National Assembly (Federal
Parliament)
g. NPO/NGO (non-profit and nongovernmental organization)*** Table 3 (WVS TRUST of organizations) ***Table 3 shows the response distribution of the APVS. (Yoshino [2015a, Table 3a, 3b & 3c]show all data from most of countries that we surveyed, which would be helpful to read thefollowing explanation with them.)
To reduce the effects of general response tendencies particular to individuals or countries,
Yoshino (2005b) transformed the response data from the East Asia Values Survey (EAVS)(20022005) into standardized scores country by country. Here “general response tendencies" mean,e.g., the Japanese tend to avoid polar responses than the Americans (a sort of variances of therange of responses). But let us use an easier way that Yoshino (2009) used for the Pacific-Rim
Values Survey (PRVS)(2004-2009) . First, the original response categories are re-categorized tosum up the percentage of responses to positive categories (“1” and “2”). Second, the percentagesof positive responses are compared item by item within each country. This yields a rank orderof items in each country. Third, the rank orders of all countries involved are compared. This
procedure results in the loss of some information from the original data, but it may provide morestable cross-national comparability (unless the rank orders are unstable).
Yoshino (2015a, Table 3a, b, & c) confirms the generally consistent patterns in the countries

21Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

or areas participating in all three surveys of APVS, PRVS and EAVS, For example, the item-byitem differences of percentages between the Japan surveys in 2002 (EAVS), 2004 (PRVS), and2010 (APVS) were almost within the margin of the sampling error. The maximum difference
was about 10%, for example, on NPO/NGO (Nonprofit Organization/Nongovernmental
Organization). (The percentage on NPO/NGO changed from 55% in 2002 to 45% in 2004 andthen up to 49% in 2010. NPO/NGO activities had been increasing and some disguised
NPO/NGOs had managed illegal businesses in the early 2000s. This was one of the reasons that
the Japanese laws on registered organizations were substantially revised in 2008.)
In Table 3, except for India, Singapore, Vietnam, the USA and Hong Kong, in all thestudied countries or areas, there was a low degree of confidence in religious organizations.
Even in these five countries or area, the relative degrees of confidence were not very highcompared with all the other items for each country, except for India. Japan and Mainland
China indicated remarkably negative attitudes toward religious organizations. The percentage
of positive responses among the Japanese was lower than among the Chinese. However, of the
10 items on Q50, the percentage of positive responses was the lowest for religious organization
among Chinese. As already mentioned, most of the Japanese respect religions or the “religious
heart/mind” even when they do not have religious faith (Hayashi & Nikaido, 2009). However,they may keep cautious about “religious organizations” because some religious groups, such as
the “Aum Shinrikyo” (a religious cult) caused disasters in the 1990s. In China, the government
is very sensitive toward religious groups because, in the long history of China, religious groups
frequently overthrew governments. In some countries, some religious groups are closely linked
to terrorism.

22Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

The percentages of responses that show confidence in authority such as the “police,”“government,” and “Congress” may represent various patterns of attitudes; these are likely
concerned with democracy. Because free criticism is allowed in democracy, a negative attitude
does not necessarily mean the negation of such authority, and it may reflect a mature democracy
in some countries (Dogan, 2000, p.258). Thus, the percentage of positive (or negative) responses
may not be linearly proportional to the degree of political maturity. Table 3 shows for example,
the USA’s lower degrees of confidence in the press and TV and in Congress. This may be a
critical attitude of matured democracy, or it may be a reflection of current confusions ofdemocracy, or both.
As for science and technology, all the countries or areas showed a high degree of confidence.
Hayashi (1993) and Zheng and Yoshino (2003) presented cross-national analyses of data on
science and technology from our seven-country survey. Hayashi (1993) concluded that theJapanese generally have positive attitudes toward science. They were, however, negative
regarding scientific approaches toward the understanding of the human heart and mind(“kokoro” in Japanese), solving social and economic problems, and the possibility of living inspace stations in the near future (at the time of the survey in 1988). The response pattern ofWest Germans in 1987 was similar to that of Japanese in the sense that they were also morenegative about science and technology than those in other Western countries. However, they
were not so negative toward the applications of science and technology to social problems as well
as psychological problems of individuals as the Japanese were. This might be related to thatthe theories of Hegel and Marx and the psychological theories of Freud originated in the German
culture area.

23

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

As for data from the APVS, all of the countries or areas were highly positive toward scienceand technology, with rates of positivity for that item being the highest among all items. In
particular, the rates for Mainland China were remarkably close to 100% in both the PRVS andthe EAVS, although the rates were slightly down in the APVS. There may be several possible
explanations for this. On the one hand, the high rates may represent the fact that, since thelate 1970s, China has been emphasizing the scientific reformation of government agencies,
military systems, and social systems as a priority in their social planning. On the other hand,
until recently, they had placed priority on economic development and they had not paid muchattention to the negative impact of science and technology that advanced industrial countries
have experienced in the past. After the Beijing Olympics in 2008 or even slightly earlier, theChinese government started paying attention to the negative side of rapid economic andindustrial development and began planning to improve environmental conditions, including
serious air, soil and water pollution. Incidentally, they started also paying attention to politicalissues, such as the social inequality between urban and rural areas. They are struggling to deal
with these domestic problems, but complete solutions seem still far away to many observers’eyes (Reuters, 2013, 2015), despite their rising power in international politics. Furthermore,
under the recent slowdown of economic development, environmental improvement may not be on
the government top priority. And serious pollutions in the urban areas sometimes go over to theneighboring areas and countries.
As a final comment in this section, it should be noted that Sasaki and Suzuki (2000, Ch.11)
concluded that “a single scale is not adequate to measure people’s sense of trust in science andtechnology because people’s attitudes differ from one issue to another within the fields of science24

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

and technology.” This is also the case with our study on people’s sense of trust. Note that wehave Japanese Nobel Prize Laureates in the 1990s-2010s more than the past. The JNCS
(Nakamura, et. al, 2017, pp.15), however, shows a clear decrease of self-confidence in science andtechnology during “the lost decade (1993-2003 or so).” Thus some aspects of confidence are morevariable due to economic or political conditions whereas generalized interpersonal trust is morestable.
Incidentally, Yoshino (2015a, Sec. 4.3) gives a summary on regional and generational
differences among Japanese immigrants in Hawaii (Yoshino, 2001b), Brazil (Yamamoto et al.,1993) and the U.S. West Coast (Yoshino, 2000, 2001). It touches also ethnic differences(Chinese, Malays, and Indians) in Singapore, and between indigenous Taiwanese and Chinese
mainlanders in Taiwan. Domestic ethnic differences on trust are often linked with domestic
and international political issues. Mutual trust is a key for peace.

4. Basic Social Values on Human Bonds

People’s sense of trust does not come in a vacuum. To overcome the limitations of studies
mostly based on response distributions of the items of the GSS or WVS, it may be important to
explore more basic social values that may underlie people’s sense of trust. Although it is noteasy to identify basic social values in various countries, here I tentatively show some data fromthe APVS on Confucian teachings, various important areas of daily life, and choices of Asian
versus Western values as follows.
Very strictly, one need to distinguish between Confucian teachings and Confucianism. The
former was preached by Confucius around the sixth Century B.C. for people’s daily life, whereas

25Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

the latter has been organized by scholars much later after his death for maintenance of order ofcentralization of governmental politics (Seki, 2019). Although Confucius teachings or
Confucianism is fairly different from Christianism or Islam, it effectively worked as a sort ofreligion to maintain people’s daily lives and social order, at least for some places and some time.
Therefore, it would be worthwhile to investigate it for our study of trust. Here, not necessarily
sticking to the above-mentioned historical distinction, I deal with some items for people’s daily
life regarded as basic Confucius teachings. The items are originally from a comparative surveyof Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing as an international collaboration of Mainichi Newspaper July 1997.
*** Table 4 Confucianism ***First, Tables 4 shows the response distributions with regard to the following Q9 of the
APVS (Yoshino [2015 a, Table 4 a, b &c] shows all data from the EAVS, the PRVS & the APVS).

Q9. How do you feel about each of the following traditional values? The response categories are “strongly
agree,” “agree to some extent,” “disagree to some extent,” and “disagree strongly. ”
a.

We should respect our ancestors.

b.

The eldest son should look after his aging parents.

c.

A wife should obey (follow) her husband.

d.

One should not marry someone his/her parents object to.

e.

We should obey (follow) older people.

f.

It is important to have a son to keep the family line going.

g.

Men should work outside the home and women should tend to housekeeping.

The overall patterns of response distributions have been consistent for the countries orareas repeatedly surveyed in the series of surveys: EAVS (Yoshino, 2005b), the PRVS (Yoshino,2009), and the APVS (Yoshino, Shibai & Nikaido, 2015). For some items, the percentages of26

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

positive choices of the USA are larger than those of the Asian countries. Of course, it couldn’t be
the case that Americans are more influenced by Confucianism than Asians.

Thus, the kinds ofideas espoused by Confucius teachings are not necessarily particular to Asian people. On theother hand, the Asian countries seem to have already departed more or less from the literal
Confucius teachings.
More detailed analyses, however, show some differences between China, Korea, and Japan,
as well as gender and age differences (cf. Zheng, 2005). Historically, Confucius teachings
originated around the sixth century B.C., whereas Confucianism was organized around thesecond century B.C., and it was revised as “Zhu Zixue” (Lion Science) in China around the latterof the 14th century. Interestingly, it has had a greater influence in Korea than in China since
the end of 14th century A.D. Nowadays a majority of the South Korean are Christians, but they
still behave according to Confucian teachings in their daily lives, for example, on ancestral
worship, and strict ordering on class, gender and seniority.
Confucianism had certain influence on Japan also, however, it was limited influence. The
Japanese governmental and civic scholars critically studied it and eventually adapted it into aJapanese style in the Edo era (“samurai era” of the 17th to the 19th centuries). After all, theJapanese accepted the Confucius teachings such as diligence, kindness, and promise in both
dominance class and ordinary people because these were consistent with traditional Japaneseprinciples. The Japanese also respect ancestral worship and the order on seniority. But they arenever so severe as the Koreans are, among others, on discriminations on class, gender or
seniority. These historical differences lead to national differences in the response distributions
for those question items.

27Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

Under Confucius teachings, the Chinese maintain family bond, and develop social bonds basedon “Zōngzú”(clan) and “Bāng” (solidly bonding group). This is closely related to some issues on
ingroup trust and out group trust. Excessive emphasis of ingroup bonding frequently lead tounjust exclusion of outgroups. It may link to some troublesome not only in a business with othercountries but also international politics. In this time of globalization, the Chinese governmentand companies are struggling to get along with global rules in business and politics.
Additionally, the style of adoption of children is different among Japan, China, and Korea.
The Japanese adopts a child even if there is no blood relationship between the child and theadopting parents, but the Chinese or Koreans adopts a child from among their relatives (clan).
This difference is due to their differences on degrees of sticking to real blood relationship, and it
would be closely linked to differences of ways to develop social trust as a sort of extension offamily bond.
It is important to note that, under the present conditions, people cannot necessarily follow all
Confucian teachings literally. For example, the decreasing children in almost all countries in
East Asia is a serious problem for the maintenance of national productivity and social systems
concerning health care and financial support for older people. Thus, it is becoming difficult for
elderly parents to be completely taken care of by their children, not to mention by "the eldestson" alone (Q9c). This means that the Confucius teaching used to work for a social system onsocial security and health care in a family, but it is no longer valid and it is urgent to develop apublic system to complement it in China. Although Japan has already established such a public
system many decades before, the related serious financial issues are inevitable. Thesesituations could influence on people's trust between family members and towards government.

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Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

Next, the Seven-Country Survey, the EAVS, the PRVS, and the APVS included the following
item, which asks respondents to choose two response categories from the four presented.
Two categories are usually considered Asian principles (originally from Confucius teachings) andthe other two are considered Western principles (closely related to “United States Declaration of
Independence”, or ”Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen”).
Q34 [SHOW CARD] If you were asked to choose the two most important items listed on the card, which twowould you choose? (Select two.)a. Filial piety/love and respect for parents
b. Repaying people who have helped you in the pastc. Respect for the rights of the individual
d. Respect for the freedom of the individual

Six possible pairs can be selected from the four items. Table 5 shows the percentages of theselection of each possible pair in the surveys from the APVS and the Seven country survey(Yoshino [2015a, Table 5a, 5b, 5c & 5d] for more data. And see Footnote 4 also). Somecountries, such as Japan and the USA, were studied in all three surveys. The response patternsof Japan are fairly consistent, whereas those of the USA differ slightly.

The 1988 Japan survey

and the 2004 Japan survey used the same sampling methods and fieldwork contractor. The
fieldwork company of the 1988 USA survey was Gallup and that of the 2006 USA survey and the2010 USA survey was Kane, Parsons & Associates. Gallup used random-walk sampling, andKane, Parsons & Associates used quota sampling with respect to age, gender, and race in 2006
and random route sampling with a quota table of age, gender, and ethnicity in 2010. Thisdifference might have yielded some differences of response data, among others, because quota
sampling may be relatively less reliable (statistically unstable).

29

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM*** Table 5 Two important Principles ***For the purpose of extending cross-national comparability, tentatively, let us assume that the
response patterns are relatively stable over years. This is an idea of CULMAN to connect “local
charts” [sets of countries] to make a larger chart by regarding a certain country as the“connector” (in this case, Japan1988 & 2004). One could find examples to extend cross-national
comparability on general response tendency, religion, or international relationships in Yoshino(2015b) or Yoshino, et al. (2015, Sec.3).
In all countries or areas in Asia, the first pair choice was “a. Filial piety/love and respect forparents” and “b. Repaying people who have helped you in the past.” Interestingly, even inWestern countries, the pair “c. the rights of individuals” and “d. the right of freedom” was not amajority choice. Only in France and West Germany (in 1987 before the reunification), the rateof choice of that pair was higher than in the other countries, but at most, it was 30% or so.
For almost all countries, “a. Filial piety/love and respect for parents”was the single first
choice, if the rate of the selection for each of the possible four choices was tallied individually(Footnote 5).

This is consistent with Yoshino (2015a, Table 5a-d) on the importance of family.

That is, the modal degrees of importance of immediate family, and of relatives, were respectively
the highest and the second highest on the seven-point scale in all countries or areas. Although
the style of family may be various depending on places or times, the importance of family seems
universal. (It may not be a surprise that both Confucius teachings and the Ten Commandmentsof Moses include “respect for parents.”) The Japanese generally tend to show a preference for
middle answer categories, but they show the highest degree as to importance of family. A family
is a basis of extending interpersonal trust. Each country/area at each time, however, may form a30

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

particular style of family. As previously mentioned, this also would be closely related todifferences in extending trust towards others beyond one's family. Incidentally, Todd (1983)
claims that the political regime is a reflection of family structure in each country.
No one would deny the importance of human rights in modern societies, but human rights,
such as the rights of individuals or the freedom of the individuals, appeared only recently.
Throughout human history, however, family, relatives and friends have formed the basis forsurvival. Therefore, these are universally valued in both the East and the West. The rights ofindividuals and the freedom of the individuals originated in the modern West, so they may beviewed differently within the current political system of each country. Thus, each country has
its own way of developing democracy based on trust of each other members as well as economic
prosperity.

No country should impose its particular version on other countries but respect theothers’ styles or ways, if one would like to develop a steady international trust.

4. For Future ResearchThis chapter has shown a longitudinal and cross-national study of peoples’ sense of trust. It
also touched some universal social values such as the importance of family. As I repeatedlyemphasized, however, we need to be cautious in interpreting the results because survey data on
trust are often a compound of many variables, including general response tendencies andrespondent biases on participation of survey (Footnote 3). Issues on cross-national
comparability might never be completely solved because of significant differences ofinfrastructures on survey conditions unique to each country. But I believe that elucidations of
those differences themselves reveal each country’s situation on economy, politics, and social

31

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

conditions, beyond superficial comparison of survey data. I will provide several comments for
our future research as follows.
First, for mutual understanding between East and West, we need to pay much attention tomethodological issues in measuring social values (Yoshino & Osaki, 2013). Scaling of trust may
caution us on the applicability of a certain “single” scale invented in Western cultures forEastern cultures, or vice versa (Yoshino, 2005b, 2006). Gallup (1977, p. 461) reported that, in
their global survey, they could not find a very poor but still happy people. Later studies,
however, have found examples not consistent with the pattern of Gallup report. For example,
Brazilians were very optimistic even when Brazil was the worst debtor nation in the 1980s(Inkeles, 1997). Inglehart reported a correlation of 0. 57 between economic development andlife satisfaction for some 20 countries in the 1980s (Inkeles, 1997, pp.366–371). However, life
satisfaction of Japan in the 1980s was lower than it was in 2003 or in 2018, although Japan wasprosperous in the 1980s but struggled with a recession in the 2000s-2010s. Thus, we need to becareful regarding peoples’ general response tendencies in the measurement of social values(Yoshino, 2014a).
Second, people’s negative responses may not necessarily mean a lack of a sense of trust. As
Dogan (2000, p.258) suggested, some people express distrust or complaint toward thegovernment or political leaders, not because they lack trust, but because they know that it is a
way to improve their own country and eventually our world in a democratic way.
Third, a comment is needed regarding the development of the CULMAN framework. The
last century was the time of the expansion of Western civilization, and this century is said to be
the time of Asian revival. Differences between cultures or civilizations occasionally prevent us

32

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PMfrom deeply understanding each other. In this time of globalization, world leaders should beknowledgeable about world geography and history, and sensitive to peoples’ social values if theywish to take seriously their responsibility to develop and maintain world peace.

In studying

world history, we should remember that there are various ways of successful social development.
Some institutional systems or customs are changing, converging toward more universal ones
under the influence of transnational exchange or trade. Other systems are, however, becoming
more sensitive to cultural differences as a reaction to globalization. The last three decades has
shown that, at least for the foreseeable future, globalization will not lead us to a single unified
global culture or a “superculture” on the earth (cf. Yoshino, 1992).

This is consistent with atheory of Cultural Evolution that more variations enhance chance of survival. (cf. Inglehart[2018, p.42] presents a theory of cultural evolution that the value systems of different cultures
may not be converging but changing in the same direction on “self-expressive values.”)I think

CULMAN can be utilized to develop a framework of policymaking for the gradual developmentof, so to speak, a global cultural manifold (GCM) (Fujita, 2016; Fujita & Yoshino, 2009; Yoshino,
2008, 2015a, 2015b; Yoshino et al, 2015, Sec.3) (See Fig. 3).
*** Fig. 5. Manifold of Communities ***The GCM is a set of hierarchical overlapping local charts, and each chart covers a certain
area (region, country, national groups, civilization, etc.). In each chart, we may assume thatpeople share a certain culture or social values; the larger chart corresponds to the less restrictive
but more universal culture or social values. Together, the charts may comprise a sort ofhierarchy. According to the size of the chart (area, region, or social group), people may be able
to assess the degree to which decision-making or the extent of regulations concerning various

33

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

types of exchanges (e.g., international trade within the members of the region) ought to be
rigidly enforced. GCM charts are dynamic, so each chart may be enlarged, be shrunk, be split
into two, or disappear over time. Some overlapping charts may be assimilated to make a larger
chart. And a new chart may appear. For peaceful and steady integration and expansion ofcharts, a set of soft local rules to connect neighboring charts successively would be more
effective, rather than a single strict global regulation. The set of local rules may make ahierarchical structure with respect to its coverage and strictness.
The history of the EU may exemplify the concept of GCM. Currently, the East Asia andthe Asia-Pacific area are presenting other examples. More than two decades ago, many people
doubted such a unification in the East Asia as in the EU because the East Asia is toocomplicated on races, languages, religions, and political systems even in a country.

Now, one

could see a slow but a steady unification such as ASEAN, contrasted with the current confusionin the EU. There must be various ways to achieve successful developments.
On March 11, 2011, the Great East Japan earthquake caused a huge tsunami and resulted in
the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster.

The world media, however, reported the calm

attitudes of the Japanese even in the tragedy. The devastated yet surviving Japanese kept anorderly line in front of grocery stores waiting to buy food. Many Japanese had a chance toreconsider the value of their own lives and works and to think of various ways of contributing to
the people and area damaged by the quake. Many news stories and surveys reported on thehuman bond and the importance of family, relatives, and friends, not only on a domestic but alsoa worldwide scale. We have confirmed that the differences in ideology or religions are minor
compared to the universal importance of family, relatives, and friends, i.e., human bonds and34

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

trust between peoples.
It is my sincere hope that mutual understanding among the various cultures andcivilizations will prevent serious conflicts between nations and cultures and will lead us to apeaceful and prosperous world in the 21st century.

35

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

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39

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM
FOOTNOTES
p.6 Footnote 1. This approach may be contrasted to Inglehart’s World Values Survey that covers culturally diverse
countries worldwide, using a single set of question items. There are some significant differences between his model and
CULMAN. For example, 1) Inglehart’s cultural map classifies the world by a set of clearly classified cultural zones withdefinite boundaries, but a cultural manifold may consist of overlapping charts with a hierarchical structure and eachchart may expand or shrink or merged with the others over time.
p.10 Footnote 2. Throughout this paper, codes such as Q36 correspond to the common item code of the APVS
questionnaire. For the exact wording of items and the precise data, see
http://www.ism.ac.jp/editsec/kenripo/contents_e.html or http://www.ism.ac.jp/ism_info_e/kokuminsei_e. html.
As for Q38, there are slight differences in wording between our cross-national Japan survey and the Japanese National
Character Survey. In the process of translation and back-translation check to make a Japanese version of the crossnational survey questionnaire, we ended up with these two versions. This difference may produce some percentage
differences in the response distributions, but the overall pattern is stable.
p.13 Footnote 3. For the study of longitudinal survey data, as well as cross-national surveys, we need to be careful ofchanges of valid questionnaire returns over decades. Generally, respondents who participated in a survey might be biased
to be more trustful than refusers. Thus, we tend to get more trustful respondents in surveys of the lower response rates.
For the change of response rates of the JNCS over six decades, see:https://www.ism.ac.jp/kokuminsei/en/page9/page13/index.html Also see Yoshino (2015b) for possible misunderstanding of
longitudinal data on Japanese high school students’ happiness.
p.28 Footnote 4. One needs to be careful of the wording of category “a. filial piety”.

The category is originally from

Confucius teachings, and the English translation may not completely express its meaning and nuance, because theoriginal word implies not only love and respect for one’s parents but a sort of behavioral obligation.
p.29 Footnote 5.

Exceptions are the surveys of W.Germany 1987, Hawaii non-Japanese 1988 and 1999, where “c. theright of individuals” and “a. filial piety” showed the highest and the second highest rates, respectively, although thedifferences of percentages are not large.

40Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

Table 1: List of Main Surveys on National Character Conducted by ISM―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――
1953-present
1971
1978
1983
1988

Japanese National Character Survey (every 5 years)(The most recent survey has been conducted in 2018.)
Japanese Americans in Hawaii
Honolulu residents and mainland Americans
Honolulu residents
Honolulu residents

1987–1993
Seven Country Survey
UK, FRG (West Germany) & France (1987), USA & Japan (1988), Italy (1992) and The Netherlands (1993)
1991
1998
1999

Overseas Japanese Surveys
Japanese Brazilians in Brazil
Americans of Japanese ancestry on the US West Coast (Seattle and Sant Clara).
Honolulu Residents in Hawaii

2002–2005
East Asia Values Survey (EAVS)Japan, China (Beijing and Shanghai) & Hong Kong (2002), Taiwan & South Korea (2003), and Singapore (2004)
2004–2009
Pacific Rim Values Survey (PRVS)Japan, China (Beijing and Shanghai) & Hong Kong (2005), Taiwan & South Korea & USA (2006), Singapore &Australia (2007), and India (2008)
2010–2014
Asia-Pacific Values Survey (APVS)Japan & USA (2010), China (Beijing, Shanghai], Hong Kong & Taiwan (2011), South Korea, Singapore & Australia(2012), and India & Vietnam (2013)――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――( See http://www.ism.ac.jp/ism_info_e/kokuminsei_e.html for the ISM Surveys.)41

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM
Table 2. Percentages of Positive Responses to Three GSS Items on Trust in the Asia-Pacific
Values Survey (APVS)
Q36"People are always trying to be helpful to others. "Q37"People are trying to be fair. "Q38"People can be trusted"

Year

2011

2011

2011

2011

2012

2012

2013

2012

2010

2010

2013

BeijingShanghai

Hong
Kong

Taiwan

South
Korea

Singapore

India

Australia

USA.

Japan

Vietnam

Q36

72

66

43

46

52

50

55

59

51

41

70

Q37

57

58

40

53

53

49

34

63

53

57

21

Q38

42

36

21

21

32

34

45

45

31

44

23

42

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM!"#$%&'(&&&)*+,-.-,/*"$&!0.+-&/1&234&)-%5+!6%&1,7.0%+&+6/8&9%0:%*-"7%+&/1&+.5&/1&9/+,-,;%&:"-%7/0,%+&&<=(;%0>&5.:6&:/*1,?%*-<&"*?&<&@<:/*1,?%*-&+/5%&86"-<(
AB34
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)-%5

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6",

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VQ
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QV
UW

PQ@" &D%$,7,/.+&/07"*,R"-,/*
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PQ@1 &Y/*70%++&Z&?,%PQ@7 &XB[&Z&X\[
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TW
T=
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Q=
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ST

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TU
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@H=@

U@
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SU
W@
UW
UU
UH
U'
U@
W=

@H=@

VV
SU
''
UW
VS
VT
SV
SW
T'
W@

US
SU
SH
QW
VW
QQ
T=
SQ
TH
WH

='
S@
SH
SH
'U
@Q
VW
S=
QW
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3,%-K
*"5

SW
WV
UH
UQ
W'
WQ
UT
UU
WH
WQ

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

Table 4. Confucian Teachings of the Asia-Pacific Values Survey（2010-14）
The figures show percentages of sum of positive categories "1.strongly agree" &"2.agree to some extent".

%&'(

!"##

!"##

!"##

!"##

!"#!

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KM
KK
M8
M'
T
MW

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ML
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TU
M'
MK
K
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'U
MV
MK
7
7
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88
M'
KK
'
T
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'8
MU
M7
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87
M8
MU
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8V
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7W
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KK
8
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MWVV
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MWVV

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KL
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K8
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KT
8
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M8

KL
M8
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KU

X:Y%)2"B> !(%& Z %*(%)$ " BD+

W
KV
MW
8
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MK
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KT
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Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

One-dimensional linkage of comparison

Hawaii Residents

Americans on

the mainland

Americansborn on themainland

Non-

Japanese

Americansof JapaneseAncestry

JapaneseExtension of comparisons of local pairs will lead to a global comparison.

Eachneighboring(overlapping) pair of charts may correspond to a certain questionnaire (a set ofquestion items).
Figure 1a: An example of spatial linkage

46

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

Figure 1b: An example of temporal linkage
Each temporal chart covers a particular time, and all of the charts collectively constitute longitudinal linkage of atime series comparison. Each chart may correspond to a certain questionnaire (a set of question items to study).

Longitudinal Survey: Japanese National Character Survey(JNCS)(“Nihon-jin no Kokkumin-sei Chosa”)

14th

First

SecondThird

JNCS 1

JNCS2

JNCS3

(1953)(1958)(1963)

•

47

•

•

JNCS14(2018)

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

Figure 1c: An example of an item-structure linkage
Relationships of similarity (commonalities) and dissimilarity are multidimensional. The diagram may show acommon feature which Countries A and B share (eg. on religious attitudes, modernization, religious attitudes,
work values, etc.) and non-common features between them. Each chart of countries or regions may correspondto a certain questionnaire (a set of question items or a set of topics under study.

B

A

C
V

48

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

Figure 2: Illustration of a hierarchy of charts (links) of a cultural manifold
Some charts may overlap within a hierarchy, and the structure may show dynamic changes over many decades: acertain chart may expand, shrink, disappear, or merge with another chart to make a larger chart. Here a spatial
chart may be a geographic unit, a political unit, or a unit of economic cooperation.

The World

Asia

EuropeEast Asia•••

China Japan •••AmericaWest •••East

BritainGermanyUSA

Africa

•••

•••

•••

Figure 2 (a): A hierarchy of spatial charts

Post-WWII

Showa Era (1926–1988)

Heisei Era (1989–April 2019)

Confusion during

Rapid

Economic

the postwar

industrial

bubbleperioddevelopment

Collapseof theeconomic
bubbleeconomyReiwa Era (May2019-present)•••

Figure 2 (b): A hierarchy of temporal charts

49Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

General Daily Life

CultureEconomyPolitics

Hospital Management

Medical care

Religions…

Fine Arts

Domestic Industry

Domestic Politics

International Politics…

•••

Medicine

Figure 2 (c): A hierarchy of charts of item (topic) to study50

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

Figure 3a. Percentages of Positive Responses of GSS Trust Items (Q36, Q37 & Q38)
& Percentage of Positive Response to ALL the 3 Items in Japan.
The data are from the Japanese National Character Survey, except the 1988 data from the Seven Country Survey.

80
70

65

62

60
50

53

40
30

26

0

31

53
39

38

31

20
10

61

59

19

5
1978

29

24

33

33

30

30

45

44

36

31

17

17

2013

2018

34
30

12

15

13

14

13

1983

1988

1993

1998

2003

2008

Fair(Q37)

61

61

13

Helpful(Q36)

67

Generalized Trust (Q38)

All3(Japan)

Note: Some papers, such as Yoshino (2009, Fig. 1) & Yoshino (2014b, Fig. 7-3),
included an error in the 1978 data, but it has been corrected here.

51

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

Figure 3b. Percentages of Positive Responses of GSS Trust Items (Q36, Q37 &Q38) and Percentage of Positive Response to All the 3 Items in USA.
The data are from the SPSS format of GSS (downloaded from the website on May 23, 2019).

60%
52%
50%

47%
46%

44%
43%

40%

49%

50%

44%
48%

46%

39%

35%
30%

34%

27%
20%

36%

26%

50%

49%

35%

29%

34%

39%
37%

46%

43%
34%

39%
35%

17%

41%

42%

41%

32%

32%

40%
36%

33%

1984

Helpful(Q36)

1988

1991

Fair(Q37)

52

1996

15%

14%

14%

14%
7%

0%
1980

47%

17%
13%

1976

47%

30%

10%

1972

46%

2000

Trust(Q38)

2004

2008

2012

GSSALL3(USA)2016Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

Figure 4. The Percentages of Positive Resonses to Both Q36& Q38 (GSS)
60
50
40
30

49
41 41 41
36 35

32 32 3130 29

28 28 27 27

26

24 24 24 23

22 22 22 2220

20 20 19 19

17 16

14 14 1310

11 10 9

7 5

4

JAWC
Hw(NJ)Hw(J)
India08
Australia12
Beijing11
Australia07
USA06
India13
Beijing05
Shanghai11
Shanghai05
Beijing02
Shanghai02
USA88
USA10
Singapore12
UK87
Singapore04
Japan10
S Korea06
Japan02
S Korea12
W.Germany87
Vietnam13
Japan04A
Singapore07
S Korea03
Netherlands93
Japan04B
Taiwan11
HongKong11
Taiwan06
HongKong05
HongKong02
Taiwan03
France87
Italy92
Brazil(JB)0Abbreviation
JAWCS: Japanese Americans on the West Coast (USA)
HW(J) or (J): Hawaii Residents (Japanese) or (Non-Japanese)
Brazil(JB): Japanese Brazilian in Brazil
Numbers (e.g., 88 or 03) show the survey years (e.g., 1988 or 2003).
Note: Fig.２ of Yoshino (2015) included an error of Australia2012, but correctedin the figure above.

53

Trust and Values 6/11/2019 5:21 PM

Figure 5. A Manifold of Communities in the World
In order to have a steady, peaceful and prosperous development, we
may need a set of “soft” regulations to connect pairs of communities
rather than a single restrictive global standard.

54