Global Landscape of
Climate Finance
A Decade of Data: 2011-2020
SUPPORTED BY:

Authors: Baysa Naran, Jake Connolly, Paul Rosane, Dharshan Wignarajah, Githungo Wakaba. This work was led under theguidance of Dr. Barbara Buchner.
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Convergence, Climate Bonds Initiative, and the International Energy Agency forsharing valuable data contained in the report. Finally, the authors would like to thank and acknowledge contributions from
Caroline Dreyer, Rob Kahn, and Valerio Micale for advice, editing, and internal review, and Elana Fortin, Josh Wheeling,and Angela Woodall for layout and graphic design.

The authors appreciate the review and guidance from the following experts outside CPI (in alphabetical order): Alexis
Bonnel (AFD), Renee Livesey (BEIS), Michael König (FS-UNEP Centre), Padraig Oliver (UNFCCC), Jens Sedemund (OECD),Charlene Watson (ODI) and many other contributors from CPI convened Climate-aligned Finance Tracking Group.
Recommended citation: Climate Policy Initiative [B.Naran, J.Connolly, P.Rosane, D.Wignarajah, E.Wakaba, B.Buchner]. 2022.
Global Landscape of Climate Finance: A Decade of Data 2011-2020.
Related CPI reports:
Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021
Private Financial Institutions’ Commitments to Paris Agreement
Landscape of Climate Finance in Africa
The Landscape of Methane Abatement Finance
Net Zero Finance Tracker
Contact: Baysa Naran baysa.naran@cpiglobal.org
Media contact: Caroline Dreyer caroline.dreyer@cpiglobal.org

1

Copyright © 2022 Climate Policy Initiative climatepolicyinitiative.org. All rights reserved. CPI welcomes the use of its material for noncommercial purposes, such as policy
discussions or educational activities, under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) License. For commercial use,please contact adminsf@cpiglobal.org

Context
It has been more than a decade since CPI started comprehensively assessing global climate
finance flows through the Global Landscape of Climate Finance (the Landscape). It monitors
global primary investment by public and private actors in activities that reduce emissions andimprove adaptation and resilience to climate change.
By setting this baseline, we aim to provide a snapshot of where and how climate mitigation andadaptation finance is flowing globally, based on consistently reported and collected data over
the years.

The past decade saw growing momentum, where public and private climate finance almost
doubled between 2011 and 2020. However, reaching climate objectives will require climate
investment to increase at least seven times by the end of this decade as well as the alignmentof all other financial flows with the objectives of the Paris Agreement.
Climate-focused investment in the real economy is more important than ever. Our window ofopportunity to limit global temperature rise by 1.5C is rapidly running out.

2

Introduction
Reflecting on the past ten years of tracking global climate finance flows, this report presents seven key
observations on climate finance in 2011 – 2020 and concludes with key actions to rapidly scale climate
finance to the trillions.
The report provides a brief overview of sources, instruments, uses, and geographies in the past decade,as well as climate finance needs in the coming years by sectors and geographies. It also offers apreliminary estimate for climate finance in 2021, drawing on data published in 2022.
To inform the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) fifth Biennial
Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows, we leveraged new data to update climate
finance flow estimates for the years 2019 and 2020, as previously reported in our 2021 Landscape.
The Landscape goes beyond the developed countries’ commitment to a collective goal of mobilizing
USD 100 billion per year by 2020 for climate action in developing economies. It analyzes all climate
mitigation and adaptation investment mobilized internationally and domestically, to assess global
progress 1.

While tracking primary investment in climate mitigation and adaptation is important, we acknowledge
that this is a means and not an end to meeting the challenge of aligning the global financial systemwith the climate goals of the Paris Agreement. There are still a lot of unknowns and data gaps inclimate finance. The following observations are limited to what is known and tracked.
3

1 Further information on the definition and scope of the Global Landscape of Climate Finance is available here.

Key observations: The need for scale

4

1.

Global climate finance almost doubled in the last decade, with a cumulative USD 4.8 trillion in climate financecommitted between 2011-2020 or USD 480 billion annual average. While climate finance increased at a cumulative
average annual growth rate (CAGR)2 of 7%, the current levels of increase are not on track to meet a 1.5C global
warming scenario. We need at least USD 4.3 trillion in annual finance flows by 2030 (CAGR 21%) to avoid the worst
impacts of climate change. There is enough liquidity in global financial markets (USD 200 trillion held by investors in2020) but barriers impeding deployment exist.

2.

Private sector investment is increasing, but not at the scale and speed necessary for the transition. Private sector actors,
particularly financial institutions with trillions of asset under management, are committing to net zero and sustainablefinance practices. Nonetheless, it is not clear how fast these commitments are translating into changes and investment
on the ground. The growth rate of private climate finance was slower (4.8%) than that of the public sector (9.6%) andmust increase rapidly at scale. The public sector has been vital in channeling finance to hard-to-invest sectors such as
agriculture and adaptation. However, there still is room for public finance to take more risks and a clearer mandate tomobilize both public and private capital, and to create enabling environments necessary for unlocking further pools ofcapital.

3.

Finance towards renewable energy made the most progress, whereas adaptation and resilience finance lagssignificantly. The renewable energy sector was transformed into an established and competitive sector with a 7x higher
return on investment than fossil fuels (IEA & CCFI, 2021). Public sector support was particularly crucial in scaling
renewable energy investment by supporting and enabling technology cost reduction, as well as providing incentives
such as time bound subsidy mechanisms as markets became self-sustaining. Transport is the fastest-growing sector, built
in part by government policy support for the industry. Other critical sectors, including agriculture, forestry, other land use
and fisheries, industry, water and wastewater, all of which have potential to mature, are trailing behind. There is a lackof data on adaptation finance from the private sector. Nevertheless, the quantity and quality of adaptation financefall far short of needs.

2 CAGR refers to the growth rate at an annual compounded rate to show smoothed rate taking into account any fluctuations year on year

Key observations: The finance and data gaps

5

4.

Continued fossil fuel support remains a barrier to achieving global climate goals. For example, the total fossil fuelsubsidies in 51 major countries alone were 40% higher than the total global investment in climate finance between 2011
- 2020. This is alarming as fossil fuel subsidies are only a part of the overall funding in high emitting activities. Immediate
action to remove dependencies on fossil fuel, including subsidies, will free up resources for more sustainable
investments, as well as improve consumer price stability and increase energy independence.

5.

Concessional finance was 16% of total climate finance, while debt consistently remained the main instrument forclimate finance. Concessional financing is crucial in managing risks and uncertainties related to nascent technologies
and markets. Grant finance is increasing, with volumes almost tripling between 2011-2020. However, their relative sharein total climate finance remains low at less than 5%. The majority of grants were provided by governments in the formsof subsidies or international climate finance. The private sector relied on balance sheet investments (or investments
through its own resources) and the public sector provided concessional or market rate loans. The majority of debt was
raised in East Asia Pacific and Western Europe followed by North America, driven by renewable energy growth in thoseregions.

6.

76% of climate finance was raised domestically, primarily concentrated in East Asia & Pacific (dominated by China),
North America, and Western Europe, confirming the importance of domestic capital pool. Central Asia and Eastern
Europe attracted both domestic and international climate finance. Across all regions, there is a lack of consistently
reported data on domestic public climate finance.

7.

Data on finance flows is improving, but less is known about the impact and outcome of deployed climate finance.
Public international climate finance is advancing on its reporting methodologies, which enables providers to better
understand and prioritize climate investments. However, the same level of sophistication and consistency in reporting islacking from the private sector, as well as in public domestic budgets, which leads to data gaps. More broadly, there
are knowledge gaps in impact, outcome, and outcome levels of climate finance that are important to assess theireffectiveness.

Key insights from our preliminary estimates for 2021

7•

Annual climate finance flows in 2019/20 reached USD 653 billion on average, which was 15% higher than in 2017/18. Our
2019/20 numbers were revised and enhanced following additional data sources on energy efficiency and updated
data from OECD-DAC. Further details in Annex I.

•

Based on currently available information, our preliminary estimates suggest 2021 climate finance flows amount to USD
850 – USD 940 billion, representing a 28% - 42% increase from 2019/20 averages, reaching an all-time high. A more
precise analysis of 2021 climate finance flows will be confirmed in the next Landscape (2023) when more primary data
becomes available.

•

The estimated increase is attributable to a significant increase in the transport sector driven by increased demand forelectric vehicles and related infrastructure. For example, sales of electric vehicles alone doubled in 2021, reaching a
new record.

•

Climate finance continues to be affected by global economic conditions:•Prices for energy, shipping, raw material, and labor are rising throughout the supply chains of various industries,
including renewable energy. Nonetheless, renewable energy competitiveness is high given that natural gas andcoal prices sharply increase(IEA, 2022c).

•

High inflation environment may lead to high borrowing cost for all actors. Debt accounts for more than half ofclimate finance in developing economies, particularly in Africa (CPI, 2022). High debt vulnerability poses risks to
many countries that are also facing food insecurity, and exchange rate vulnerabilities.

•

Climate disasters such as floods and droughts are intensifying and becoming the most frequent reasons forinfrastructure disruptions, costing between USD 391 - 647 billion in low- and middle-income countries annually(Hallegate et al, 2019). Despite this, investment to improve the resilience of infrastructure remains low (Annex 3).

•

Due to the relative change in energy prices, incentives are on the table to build 1.5C compatible portfolios –green investments are more profitable than prior to the current crises (NGFS, 2022).

7 key observations from tracking
global climate finance2011 - 2020

Key observation 1

1. Global climate finance flows almost doubled in the last decade
Figure 1: Global climate finance in 2011- 2021 (USD bn, nominal)* Low bound estimate•

9

Global climate finance flows have been steadily increasing in the past decade. Climate finance increased at 7%(CAGR) on an annual basis reaching USD 665 billion in 2020. This was driven primarily by growth in the renewableenergy and transport sectors. Data on climate finance also improved over the years (p. 20). Despite the increase,current investment levels are still significantly short of the estimated needs (p. 9).

A rapid and sustained increase in climate finance and redirection of highcarbon finance is required to secure a climate resilient, net zero future
Figure 2: Global tracked climate finance flows and the average estimated annual climate investment need* through 2050

10

3 Global total GDP is on average USD 94 trillion per year based on IMF estimations (IMF, 2021)•

At least USD 4.3 trillion in
annual finance flows or a 20%
year-on-year increase by2030 is required to avoid theworst impacts of climatechange.

•Despite the seemingly
dramatic scale of the funding
gap, it represents less than 5%of global GDP.3•

Moreover, this increase would
not be based solely on new,additional sources of finance.

•

Aligning finance with a 1.5C
path would demand to cut
the financing of highemissions activities and someresources to be reallocatedto climate finance.
*Please refer to Annex II for further details

Key observation 2

2. Private actors’ contributions are increasing, but not at thepace necessary considering public sector capacity constraints
Figure 3: Climate Finance by public and private sources in 2011-2020 (USD bn)*

11

Cumulative 2011 - 2020 USD 4.8 trillion•

The public and private sectors provided USD 4.8
trillion in climate finance in total between 2011 2020, with the private sector responsible for about
half.

•

These represent joint efforts of about 20,000 public
and private investors, worldwide, which haveaccumulated knowledge, capacity, andcapabilities in channelling climate finance.

•

Although private sector contributions
are increasing, their CAGR was only 4.3%
compared to 9.1% by the public sector between
2011-2020.

•

Public actors have most recently (2019/20)
provided the majority of climate finance.

•

We anticipate that investment will continue toplay a pivotal role going forward, with efforts topursue decarbonization, climate resilience, andalignment of all finance flows with the Paris
Agreement.

All public sources are increasing finance, but their roles are evolving
Figure 4: Climate finance from different sources within the public sector (USD bn)

12

Cumulative 2011-2020 USD 2.4 trillion•

About 65% of National Development Bank
funding went to renewable energy and energy
efficiency at the beginning of the 2010s. Whilethey continue to support domestic energy sector
projects, the majority is going to transport sector inmost recent years.

•

Bilateral DFIs and Multilateral Climate Funds havemore focus on cross-sectoral projects recently,
instead of renewable energy.

•

Governments have played a prominent role in thetransport sector. In recent years they have been
providing grants and subsidies to increase themarket uptake of lower emission vehicles.

•

Climate Funds channeled about USD 2.5 billion on
average. They play important roles in catalyzing
and coordinating resources for co-financing,including at national levels.

•

54% of total finance by public sector wasprovided through project-level debt and 31% wasconcessional finance in the form of grants andlow cost debt.

Renewable energy and the role of public sector
Figure 5: Wind and solar installed costs and average LCOE

13•

Solar PV costs reduced by 80% in thepast decade, while onshore andoffshore wind costs dropped byalmost 45%.

•

This means more capacity was added
towards the end of the decade perdollar invested (IRENA, 2022).

•

The economics of decarbonizing theworld economy would be
fundamentally different if not for the
rapid decline in the cost of renewable
technologies. This was driven by bold
policy decisions.

•

Government initiatives in the last decade guaranteed the full electricity price to the investor, or a certificate that could be sold toprovide another income source alongside the wholesale market electricity price.

•

Stable and subsidized markets have helped the private sector embrace the industry and enable mobilization of finance by theprivate sector at attractive returns (IRENA, 2018).

•

The success, mirrored by wind technology, speaks to crucial role government plays in market creation – driving demand andproviding investment to encourage the development of climate solutions. Similar strategies must be applied to other sectors to
reduce the cost of capital and achieve net zero across the economy.

96% of private finance is driven by corporates, commercial financial
institutions, and households
Figure 6: Climate finance by private sector actors between 2011-2020 (USD bn)

14

Cumulative 2011-2020 USD 2.4 trillion•

Corporates representing established energy
utilities, independent power producers, andproject developers specializing in renewableenergy represented the largest single class ofinvestors historically.

•

Their composition is now gradually diversifying
whereby non-energy related corporates andcommercial financial institutions are joining theefforts to combat climate change.

•

Households have been contributing to climate
finance by purchasing low carbon equipment
such as solar water heaters or low carbon
vehicles.

•Direct investment by institutional investors was
USD 3.2 billion annually. Institutional investors
make indirect investments to corporates,
financial institutions, or funds that then invest in
climate action. These may appear as balance
sheet investments by corporates or otherprivate finance institutions which are notcaptured by this analysis.

Key observation 3

3. Adaptation finance is increasing, but is starkly underfunded
Figure 7: Adaptation finance between 2011-2020 (USD bn)

15•

Adaptation finance has been growing faster,with an overall 16.7% CAGR compared to a 6%
CAGR in mitigation finance. However, it remains
severely underfunded.

•

Most adaptation finance was channelled via
public actors such as multilateral and national
development finance institutions.

•

Top sectors included water and waste water
management, AFOLU and other cross sectors.

•

It should be noted that the concept ofadaptation finance and the methodologies of its
tracking are less developed than mitigation
finance.

•

Adaptation finance is usually tracked as anincremental investment over business as usual.
Therefore, adaptation finance is less directlycomparable to mitigation finance.

•

There are significant data gaps on adaptation
finance, particularly from the private sector.

Mitigation finance was dominated by renewable energy in the last 10 years,
accounting for almost 70% of total
Figure 8: Climate mitigation finance by solutions between 2011-2020 (USD bn)

16•

Low carbon transport is now the fastest
growing climate mitigation solution in the mostrecent five years. Transport attracts funding
from a variety of actors due to investment sizeand commercial viability.

•

Other solutions, such as energy efficiency,
agriculture, and other industry-related
investment lack progress due to various
sectoral barriers (examples are in Annex 3).

•

Less than 2% of climate finance tackles
methane emissions, although it is responsible
for half of net global warming to date (CPI,
2022a).

•

The agriculture, forestry, other land use andfisheries (AFOLU) sector attracts considerably
low levels of climate finance, although it is
responsible for almost 20% of emissions.

•

More importantly, there is a lack of climate
investment data on these critical sectors fromthe private sector, making it hard to trackprogress against climate objectives.

End-use sectors and AFOLU show alarming signs of delayed climate action
Although needs figures should be compared to tracked investment with caution, due to coverage discrepancies of tracked
climate finance and the finance needs scenarios, overall trends suggest end-use (Transport, Industry, Buildings) and AFOLU sectors
suffer from dramatic climate underinvestment.
Table 1: Climate finance flows and needs by sector*

17*Not all mitigation and multi-benefit climate finance can be allocated to the sectors shown in the table. The Mitigation & Multiple Objectives and Adaptation categories do not add
up due to rounding. Data and knowledge on climate finance needs are evolving and their assessment will change with the course of actions taken by public and private actors andwith more data becoming available. Adaptation finance needs may be underestimated as the latest available data is from 2016. All references used can be found in Annex II.

Key observation 4

4. Continued fossil fuel support remains a barrier to achieving
global climate goals
Figure 9: Fossil fuel subsidies vs climate finance (USD bn)

Source: Fossil fuel subsidies data by OECD Inventory of Support Measures for Fossil Fuels;
global climate finance data is by CPI•

Fossil fuel subsidies only represent a partial picture of all financial
flows supporting high emissions and business-as-usual finance flows.

•

Even then, subsidies for 51 major economies4 amounted to USD 6.8
trillion between 2011-2020, according to OECD and IEA (2022) –40% more than climate finance.

•

Global fossil fuel subsidies are projected to climb from USD 5.9
trillion (or 6,8% of global GDP in 2020) to 7.4% of global GDP in 2025
(IMF, 2022a), partly due to the current energy crisis.

•

Although short term interventions are understandable (i.e.
providing energy security for the most vulnerable), they delay theenergy transition.

•

Subsidies contribute to climate change by reducing the price offossil fuels, thereby supporting greater production andconsumption.

•

The current energy crisis reinforces the need for a longer term justtransition strategy to decouple dependence on fossil fuel basedenergy systems exposed to high price volatility.

4 These include Australia, Brazil, Canada, the People’s Republic of China, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Indonesia, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russian Federation, Republic of18

Türkiye, United States, South Africa, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Iraq, Iran,Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Trinidad And Tobago, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam

Key observation 5

5. Concessional funding represented about 16% of total
tracked climate finance
Figure 10: Climate finance by instrument (USD bn) between
2011-2020

19•

Concessional financing is crucial in managing risks anduncertainties related to nascent technologies and markets.

•

Concessional funding was primarily led by National and Bilateral
DFIs and governments provided in the forms of debt or grant. For
example, Western Europe received 24% of the concessional
funding through domestic finance in energy efficiency andtransport sectors, whereas Latin America and Caribbean and
Sub-Saharan Africa received 14% each of total concessional
funding through international climate finance.

•

Grant financing has been low but picking up gradually reachingalmost USD 30 billion most recently. Most grant funding is sourced
by governments for agriculture, cross-sectoral, and transport
sector projects.

•

According to Convergence (2021), the use of blended financeas a tool by investors remained limited despite its potential.
Approximately USD 39.1 billion of blended finance from 20152020 was directed towards climate-focused opportunities.

•

80% of climate finance was provided in the form of debt orequity expecting market-rate returns on investment. These weremainly driven by corporates, National DFIs, and households
investing in renewable energy and transport sectors in Western
Europe, North America, and East Asia Pacific.

Key observation 6

6. Most finance is concentrated in only a few regions
Figure 11: Climate finance regional distribution in 2011-2020 (%)

20•

75% of all climate finance was concentrated in North
America, Western Europe, and East Asia & Pacific(primarily led by China). Also, 76% of all climate financeflows were raised and spent domestically.

•

Voluntary actions and domestic policies to reduce
emissions in Western Europe, North America, and East
Asia Pacific provided a significant push for theadvancement of climate finance in those regions.

•

For example, China set mandatory targets to reduce its
national energy intensity. The identification of solar as a‘strategic industry’ has led to immense government
investment in manufacturing capability. China’s own
Feed-in Tarif policies have led to a 70x increase of
installed solar capacity there since the beginning of thedecade.

•Regions where the majority of low- and middle-income
countries are located received less than 25% of climate
finance flows.

•

Across all regions, there is a lack of consistently collected
data on domestic climate finance suggesting thatcountries do not systematically monitor climate
expenditure against policy objectives.

Barriers to climate finance in emerging economies
There is enough liquidity in global financial markets (USD 200 trillion held by investors in 2020), but barriers impeding
deployment in many emerging markets persist.

21•

The cost of capital is generally higher in emerging markets compared to advanced economies. Additionally, the cost ofcapital for developing countries is increasing due to climate vulnerability (United Nations Environment Programme, 2018).

•

High up-front costs associated with mitigation and adaptation projects can act as a significant deterrent for private
investment. Up-front capital investment and long time horizons for large infrastructure projects contribute to this (IMF,
2022b).

•

Climate solution projects suffer from regulation uncertainty. Cost overruns, delays, and permit risk limit the supply of highquality climate solution projects.

•

DFI risk mitigation tools are being deployed at too small a scale. Mobilized private finance has been increasing,averaging USD 48.6 billion over 2018-2020 (TOSSD, 2022). However, to meet needs, the public investment and/or the ratioof public to private investment, must further increase.

•

Lack of price signalling, in the form of effective carbon markets (among others) reduces incentives for investors to provide
capital to climate solutions.

•

Scarce public funding is being directed at subsidizing the fossil fuel industry in many emerging economies. In Africa,
annual climate finance over 2019/20 stood at USD 9.4 billion, while government subsidies for fossil fuels was USD 37 billion(CPI, 2022b).

•

Lack of local currency instruments poses risks to foreign currency denominated investment. The current
underdevelopment of domestic financial ecosystems and their ability to raise capital means that this risk is not easily
mitigated.

•

Institutional reform takes time. Many of the underlying risks investors face in developing economies are structural. Risks
and uncertainty surrounding exchange rate fluctuation, regulatory environments, demand volatility, and others require
long term solutions (IMF, 2022b)

Key observation 7

7. Climate finance flows data are improving, but standardized
information on its outcome and impact remain scarce•Landscape analysis has evolved over the years with methodological advancements by reporting institutions and data additions.
Nonetheless, climate finance trends were driven by increases in flows rather than increases in data additions. These helped
improve a more granular understanding of global climate finance flows.

•

Data gaps persist (Annex 3) and more efforts are now required to standardize understanding of climate finance impact and its
outcome to climate goals.
Figure 12: Global Landscape of Climate Finance data and methodology improvements22

4 key climate finance actions forthis decade2022 - onwards

Conclusion
In the last ten years, the world has learned valuable lessons and developed crucial capacity to move fastertowards Paris alignment and net zero goals. Building on this effort, public and private actors must work closer
together to drive technology costs down, lower the cost of capital, scale up investment at pace while
redirecting flows away from high-carbon investments. Climate transition presents tremendous investment
opportunities across a range of sectors and regions.
However, the current rate of increase of climate investment will fail to secure the low carbon and climate
resilient development needed. Only through rapid acceleration—to reach seven times the current level ofinvestment— and alignment of all finance flows with climate goals will we bridge the significant funding
shortfalls. The funding landscape needs to go beyond incremental investment through traditional funding
instruments, such as project-level debt, and increasingly embrace innovative financial instruments that unlock
capital at scale.
Mobilization of private finance is crucial to achieving net zero goals. Historically, the public sector has
facilitated this by funding initial research and development into unproven technologies and creating policy
environments that encourage private investment and domestic public finance to scale up markets.
To minimize disruptions related to the much-needed transition, there is a need for a holistic systems view andan organized climate space, which breaks silos, brings in stakeholders who are not yet actively involved. These
efforts should translate challenges and opportunities into implementable programs at sectoral, subnational,
and national levels to mobilize international and domestic finance.

This final section proposes four key actions that, based on a decade of experience, will mobilize climate
finance at scale to create a significant impact over this decade.
24

Four key actions to scale up climate finance this decade
Climate transition presents tremendous investment opportunities across a range of sectors and regions. However, the current rate ofclimate investment increase will fail to secure the low carbon and climate resilient development needed. To match the 20% yearon-year increase in climate finance needed through 2030, four key actions to focus on in this decade are:1: Adopt holistic sectoral strategies. Current blind spots in our response to climate change must be acknowledged and addressed.

This means building sector-wide decarbonization and resilience strategies that spur systemic transformations - from cradle-to-grave –and ensure implemented solutions are well integrated. It also means leaving no sector behind. From a climate perspective, AFOLU,
buildings, and the industry sectors are particularly underfunded, despite the crucial role they play in our resilience to external shocks,
our health and that of the biosphere, and in allowing a just transition.

2: Shift to a new finance paradigm. To implement holistic sector strategies, further public and private actor coordination is necessary.
Every actor should know which part they can play and who they should be working with. But that alone will not be enough. Investors
also need to look beyond short-term financial returns, use longer-term and multi-factor informed investment strategies, and explore
innovative financial mechanisms that could be deployed at scale. And public financial institutions need clear mandates to mobilize
further public and private finance.

3: Policies to create enabling environments for private finance mobilization. The successes achieved in the energy sector must be
mirrored in other sectors and in emerging economies through a coordinated set of actions and policy decisions around reducing
technology costs, providing incentives and risk sharing to promote innovation in hard-to-abate sectors and to scale proventechnologies, redirecting fossil fuel support, and creating predictable environments that accelerate net zero transition.

4: Make decision-critical data on climate finance flows available: The public and private sectors should collaborate on a common

25definition of climate expenditure. This will help improve disclosure and build a climate investment data platform to channel climate
finance to where it will have the most impact. Each actor has a role to play. Data on the quality of finance flows should improvethrough the development and consolidation of common methods and standards to understand the expected impact and its
outcome level. In addition to regulators, initiatives such as GFANZ and TCFD, could support through detailed guidance on reporting
investment in climate solutions, and a similar initiative should help foster action and knowledge sharing across the public sector.

Key Action 1: Adopt holistic sectoral strategies
With climate finance concentrated in just a handful of technologies, clear gaps appear within sectors. This demonstrates a
disconnect between our current scattered response and the real-world necessities that we face.

Current blind spots in our response to climate change must be acknowledged and addressed:
▪

▪

26

Build sector-wide decarbonization and resilience strategies. Narrow approaches to climate action reduce the effectivenessof implemented solutions. This calls for:▪

Cradle-to-grave assessments: Policy and investment should span the entire value chain to avoid loopholes that hinder
both mitigation potential, adoption, and resilience, e.g., embodied carbon in new building construction.

▪

Integrated solutions: Deployment of solutions should incorporate local needs and complementary, functioning systems
in order to deliver the intended impact, e.g., EVs and public charging infrastructure; renewable energy and grid
integration solutions (e.g., storage); to fully displace the use of fossil fuels.

Leave no sector behind: AFOLU, buildings, and industry need to be taken just as seriously. These three pillars to local
economies are severely underfunded in comparison to transportation and energy. Beyond their mitigation potential, solutionsin these sectors contribute to:▪

Building resilience to external shocks: Local food systems become less vulnerable to droughts and floods; low-energy
buildings significantly reduce energy demand; households become less impacted by energy prices, energy-efficientand locally-robust industries minimize supply chain disruptions.

▪

Delivering impact across the board: from improved biodiversity (e.g., agroforestry), to job creation (e.g., building
refurbishments, emerging industries), and health benefits (e.g., clean cooking, food security and quality).

▪

Enabling a just transition: Holistic strategies include planning for job loss, revenue redistribution, and other just transitionneeds and impacts that may create implementation and adoption barriers if not proactively addressed across all
sectors. A people-centered approach is needed.

Key Action 2: Shift to a new finance paradigm
To implement holistic sector strategies and reach the 20% year-on-year increase needed in climate finance through 2030, further
public and private actor coordination is necessary. This includes innovative ways of doing finance.
▪

▪

27

To achieve scale, all actors should know which part they can play and who they should be working with:▪

Through collaboration across value chains and across the public and private ecosystems, funders and investors shouldseek to build coherent and complementary portfolios of climate solutions that create credible transition pathways tofunctioning, low-carbon, and climate resilient systems.

▪

In segments with significant technology, adoption and/or scale barriers, such as energy storage or industries withsignificant process emissions (e.g., cement, steel), concessional finance and other risk balancing mechanisms can spur
innovation and cover high upfront costs.

▪

All actors should be engaged proactively in the phase out of fossil fuels and other high emission assets to reach overallalignment of portfolios and policies, and urge peers, suppliers, and intermediaries to strive for the same goal.

Investors need to look beyond short-term financial returns. Scaling climate finance will require renewed investment practices
from both public and private actors. This includes:▪

Adopt longer-term and multi-factor informed investment strategies that incorporate the broader economic cost ofcontinuing business-as-usual as well as the economic value of transforming systems towards decarbonization andclimate resilience, e.g, finance effectiveness assessments, environmental valuation (biodiversity, ecosystem services,carbon and methane pricing).

▪

Develop large-scale financial innovation mechanisms and platforms led by public and private sectors, such as the
Global Innovation Lab for Climate Finance5, that enable the replication of successful business models to unlock private
investment.

5 https://www.climatefinancelab.org

Key Action 3: Expand enabling environments through policies
that mobilize private finance28

The success achieved in the energy sector must be mirrored in other sectors and in emerging
economies through a coordinated set of actions and policy decisions such as:• Grant funding in novel technologies with a particular focus on reducing technology costs andinnovating in hard-to-abate sectors such as aviation, steel, and cement.
• Provide abundant, well-timed subsidies and public investment to proven technologies that needscaling. This approach has helped novel technologies to become commercially viable andattractive to private capital (e.g., offshore wind, solar PV, batteries).
• Reduce cost of finance through risk distribution. Countries and development finance institutions
with lower borrowing costs could underwrite some of the transition costs, particularly where
higher risks make private capital unable or unwilling to invest, e.g., emerging markets andnascent technologies. Such risk sharing and management could come in the forms ofguarantees, blended finance arrangements, and innovative financial mechanisms such ascarbon markets.
• For low and middle-income countries, general capacity building is essential. While climate
solutions can face specific issues, many underlying barriers to investment are present acrossdevelopment finance. Technical assistance and capacity building in these countries is key toproviding a steady pipeline of climate projects suitable for investment.
• Redirect Fossil Fuel support. Long-term dependencies and investment on fossil fuel, such as
subsidies or issuance of new licenses for exploration, should be redirected to low-emission
alternatives to accelerate the transition to net zero. These long-term dependencies impede thedevelopment of low-emission technologies and lock in fossil fuel extraction and use for decades.
• Create regulatory targets and a predictable environment that accelerate the net zero transition.
Legally binding national emission reduction targets, sectoral policies, and phasing out of highemission technologies (such ICE vehicles and gas fired heating systems) provide clear signals
and a stable environment to the private sector that encourages investment in low-emission
alternatives.

R&D in novel
technologies

Revenueincentives/risk sharing
to create markets forclimate solutions

Redirect fossil fuelsupportRobust and consistentlong-term policy
environment to
attract private capitalKey Action 4: Make decision-critical data on climate financeflows available
Understand current
investment levels

Assess its impact andcompare against
policy/needs

Identify financing
gaps

Revise investment
goals aligned withclimate objectives
29

The public and private sectors should collaborate on a common definition of climate
investment, including also considerations on the impact and quality. This will help improveconsistent and comparable disclosure and build a climate investment data platform forinvestors to channel climate finance to where it will have the most impact. By building on
existing and emerging best practices and taxonomies, each actor has a role to play:
International public climate finance providers (including development finance institutions,multilateral climate funds and governments): Data on the quality of finance flows including
impact and outcome level should improve through the development and consolidation ofcommon methods and standards. These actors should encourage reporting of climate
investment by their intermediaries and contribute to the development of common approaches,standards, or norms to enhance coherence of action.
Public domestic actors (including governments, ministries and subnational governments):
Regularly monitor climate expenditure to compare against country-specific climate objectives.
By harnessing already existing green budgeting tools, such as climate public expenditure andinstitutional review, national climate finance tracking and emerging best practices in climate
taxonomies, public domestic actors can and should track country level data. This vital
information will help build a baseline of climate finance and identify key sectors and sub-regionsthat need the most funding and coordinate with private sector and international public climate
finance providers to increase efficiency of flows.
Private sector: Whether through mandates, incentives, or guidance by regulatory bodies, or
through voluntary initiatives, detailed climate investment reporting will increasingly become
industry standard for the private sector. Private actors should invest in building capacity toreport on climate expenditure. In addition to regulators, initiatives such as GFANZ and TCFD, forexample, could support through detailed guidance on reporting investment in climate solutions.

Annexes

Annex 1: Updated view on Global Climate Finance Flows in
2019/2031•

Total climate finance flows were USD 653 billion annual average for 2019/2020•

The numbers were updated following Rio marked climate related development finance data released
by OECD DAC in June 2022.

•

The CPI database was also updated through adding data points on energy efficiency in buildings byreviewing buildings level data per green building certificates•

Key impacts were as follows:•

Public climate finance up from USD 321 billion to USD 335 billion•

Private climate finance up from USD 310 billion to USD 318 billion•

Adaptation climate finance up from USD 46 to USD 49 billion•

Mitigation climate finance up from USD 571 to USD 586•

Cross sectoral climate finance up from USD 15 to USD 17

Updated data tables for Global Climate Finance Flows in 2019/20
Table A.1: Breakdown of global climate finance by public and private actors (USD billion)

32

Actor

2019

20202019/2020 Average

PrivateCommercial FI
Corporation

303

333

318

116

128

122

118

132

125

Funds

8

3

5

Households/Individuals

51

59

55

Institutional Investors

3

5

4

Unknown

77

7.0

PublicBilateral DFI

337

332

334

23

25

24

Export Credit Agency (ECA)

1

1

1

Government

35

30

32

Multilateral Climate Funds
Multilateral DFI

4

4

4

62

75

68

National DFI

160

130

145

Public Fund

2

2

2

SOE

12

13

13

State-owned FI

38

52

45

Total

640

665

653

Table A.2: Breakdown of global climate finance by use and sector (USD billion)
SectorMitigation

2019
582

20202019/2020 Average
589

586

Agriculture, Forestry, Other land uses and Fisheries

7
33
316
2

9
57
345
5

8
45
330
3

0
60
163
0
1
1
42

0
15
153
1
2
1
56

0
37
158
1
2
1
49

4
1
1
0

6
1
1
0

5
1
1
0

0
20
2
0
0
14
16

0
21
7
0
0
20
19

0
21
4
0
0
17
18

2
0
2
0

2
0
1
0

2
0
2
0

0
9
1
0
0
1
640

0
7
1
6
0
3
665

0
8
1
3
0
2
653

Buildings & Infrastructure
Energy Systems
Industry
Information and Communications Technology
Others & Cross-sectoral
Transport
Unknown
Waste
Water & Wastewater
Adaptation

Agriculture, Forestry, Other land uses and Fisheries
Buildings & Infrastructure
Energy Systems
Industry
Information and Communications Technology
Others & Cross-sectoral
Transport
Unknown
Waste
Water & Wastewater
Multiple Objectives
Agriculture, Forestry, Other land uses and Fisheries
Buildings & Infrastructure
Energy Systems
Industry
Information and Communications Technology

33

Others & Cross-sectoral
Transport
Unknown
Waste
Water & Wastewater
Total

Table A.3: Breakdown of global climate finance by instruments (USD billion)

Instrument

2019

2020

2019/2020 Average

Balance sheet financing (debt portion)

104

119

112

Balance sheet financing (equity portion)

142

170

156

Grant

31

29

30

Low-cost project debt

55

66

61

Project-level equity

56

46

51

Project-level market rate debt

246

225

236

6

10

8

640

665

653

Unknown
Total

Table A.4: Breakdown of global climate finance by public and private recipients (USD billion)

34

Recipient

2019

2020

2019/2020 Average

Private

327

371

349

Public

101

125

113

Public-Private

24

25

24

Unknown

188

144

166

Total

640

665

653

Table A.5: Breakdown of climate finance by OECD membership and region (USD billion)

Regionnon-OECD
Central Asia and Eastern Europe

2019
386
26

14

20

East Asia and Pacific

263

274

268

Latin America & Caribbean

22

22

22

Middle East and North Africa

15

15

15

South Asia

0

33

0

Sub-Saharan Africa

21

22

22

Transregional

9

12

10

OECD
Central Asia and Eastern Europe

244

266

255

8

12

10

East Asia and Pacific

13

10

11

Latin America & Caribbean

12

11

12

Middle East and North Africa

1

2

1

Other Oceania

0

8

4

US & Canada

90

74

82

Western Europe

110

150

130

Transregional
East Asia and Pacific

10

7

8

3

1

2

Latin America & Caribbean

4

0

2

Transregional

4

5

5

640

665

653

Total

35

20202019/2020 Average
392

389

Table A.6: International and domestic climate finance flows (USD billion)

Region201920202019/2020 Average

Domestic

495

494

494

non-OECD

297

282

290

Transregional

0

0

0

OECD

197

211

204

International

146

171

158

From Non-OECD to OECD

3

4

4

From Non-OECD to Transregional

3

3

3

From Non-OECD to Other Non-OECD

16

28

22

From OECD to Other OECD

44

51

47

From OECD to Transregional

7

4

5

From OECD to non-OECD

72

81

76

From Transregional to OECD

0

0

0

From Transregional to non-OECD

1

0

1

640

665

653

Total

36

Annex 2: Climate Finance Needs assessment
The studies on climate finance needs are relatively new and are continuously evolving. CPI built its assessment on climate financeflows based on the best publicly available resources that are comparable to the current climate finance flows tracked under the
Global Landscape of Climate Finance. As more literature and knowledge build up and depending on the course of economic
development (e.g. high inflation environment) and climate investment decisions made in the future, our climate needs
assessment may change. The literature used to build the climate finance needs assessment in this study are as follows:
Table A.7: Literature review on climate finance needs assessment
Reference

Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), 2021. New Energy Outlook 2021.
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), 2022. Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022.
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2020. Global EV Outlook 2020.
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2019. The Future of Rail.
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2021. Net Zero by 2050 A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector.

International Energy Agency (IEA), 2020. Outlook for biogas and biomethane.
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), 2021. World Energy Transition Outlook. Abu Dhabi.

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), World Economic Forum (WEF), and The Economics ofLand Degradation (ELD), 2021. State of Finance for Nature.
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2018. “The Adaptation Gap Report 2018.” Nairobi.
Harmsen, J. H. M., D. P. van Vuuren, D. R. Nayak, A. F. Hof, L. Höglund-Isaksson, P. L. Lucas, J. B. Nielsen,
P. Smith, and E. Stehfest. 2019. Long-term marginal abatement cost curves of non-CO2 greenhouse
gases

37

Scope/coverage
Renewable power, Power T&D, CCUS, Integration solutions (Hydrogen,
Pumped Hydro, Storage).

Battery electric vehicles.
Battery electric vehicles.
Rail transport.

Renewable power, Power T&D, Biofuels, CCUS, Integration solutions,
Transport, Industry, Buildings, Distributed Renewables.
Biofuels.
Renewable power, Power T&D, Biofuels, CCUS, Integration solutions,
Transport, Industry, Buildings, Distributed Renewables.

Re/Afforestation, Sylvopasture, Mangrove and Peatland restoration.
Adaptation.

Methane abatement.
Kreibiehl, Silvie; König, Michael; Moon, Jongwoo (2022): Data for Figure TS.25 - Technical Summary of theWorking Group III Contribution to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report. MetadataWorks, 04 April 2022. DOI:
10.48490/dw6j-ef56
Regional split of climate investment needs

Annual investment needs through 2030 to decarbonize economies
Figure A1: Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2019/2020

38

Regional needs figures adapted from: Kreibiehl, Silvie; König, Michael; Moon, Jongwoo (2022): Data for Figure TS.25 - Technical Summary of
the Working Group III Contribution to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report. MetadataWorks, 04 April 2022. DOI: 10.48490/dw6j-ef56

Annex 3 – Methodological notes and additional information
Historical data
Data between 2011-2020 were based on previously published CPI reports from the Global Landscape of Climate Finance series.
Data collection methodologies incrementally changed over the years. For this analysis, CPI backtracked the methodologicalchanges based on the available data.
Climate Resilient Infrastructure Data
CPI undertook a study in 2022 (to be published in late 2022) to propose a new approach for tracking climate resilient
infrastructure investments which looks at the full cost of the project rather than the incremental investment in resilience. This view
enables an understanding of the share of investment in infrastructure that takes into account climate resilience in an attempt tobridge the knowledge gap on public and private sector investment in climate resilient infrastructure. The full cost data is slightly
more accessible when attempting to fill in the private finance data gaps in climate resilience. Based on this analysis, CPI
estimated that investment to improve the resilience of infrastructure remains low at only USD 31.3 billion annual average in
2019/2020. This includes USD 18 billion in CPI’s tracked climate finance of which 64% were adaptation finance, 16% mitigation and
20% dual benefits finance. In addition, it includes USD 5 billion of newly tracked investments that undertook full or partial
adaptation solutions. Water and wastewater sector received the largest share (42%, USD 13.1 billion) followed by agriculture,
forestry and other land use (20%, USD 6.4 billion), transport (9%, USD 2.9 billion), energy systems (3%, USD 867 billion) while othercross-sectoral projects received 26% (USD 8 billion).

39

The approach used a broad definition of critical infrastructure to select 4 sectors namely water and wastewater, agriculture,
forestry and other land use, transport and energy. A taxonomy of keywords was used to sift through previously tracked climate
finance by CPI as well as other data sources including Global Water Intelligence and World Bank PPI to identify climate resilient
infrastructure projects that undertook full or partial adaptation solutions. The keywords followed a broad typology of climate
resilient infrastructure to tag projects as grey, green or blue infrastructure, building resilience of or through projects and doing
hard or soft interventions. To calculate full cost of the project by multilateral development banks which report incremental
adaptation investment, a resilience multiplier was used to calculate the full cost of the project. The resilience multiplier refers to
the share of adaptation finance in the total project commitment made by multilateral development banks as reported in theactivity level OECD-DAC database on climate-related development finance.

Common barriers in scaling climate finance in key sectors
Table A8: Examples of barriers in scaling climate finance in key sectors

40

SectorTechnical barriers

Commercial barriers

Other governance barriers

AFOLU

Informational barriers on climate solutions
High technology costs in certain solutions

Limited access to insurance andguarantee schemes to cover default risk
High transaction costs due small-scaleand dispersed customers

Small scale agriculture: limited formal
property rights limiting the ability offarmers to provide collateral to accessfinance

Adaptation &resilientinfrastructure

Information asymmetries and knowledge gaps: lack of information
on private sector investment
Lack of climate data: limited information on location specificclimate risk and vulnerability.

Insufficient capacity in financial
structuring and metrics development
Potential large upfront cost set against
long payback times

Limited progress in investment readynational adaptation plans
Inability to recognise environmental
and social benefits of adaptation

Buildings

New low-carbon buildings: limited supply of technical skills and lowcarbon construction materials.
Deep retrofits: Lack of baseline performance data;

New low-carbon buildings: Highinvestment costs compared toalternatives; Limited supply of dedicatedfinancing instruments
Deep retrofits: Lack of awareness offunding options; inability to pay for upfront
costs; Split incentive between landlords
and tenants

New low-carbon buildings and deep
retrofits: lack of building regulation
support; Lack of information standards
and labelling

EnergyRenewable power: Difficult integration of variable renewableenergy (VRE) in power grids due to lack of storage, transmission,and demand-side management capacity.
Biofuels & Biomethane: Energy crops can compete with otheragricultural land uses: food crops, livestock, textiles, etc.

Competition from the fossil fuel industry as
they remain dominant players in theenergy sector.
Subsidies provided to conventionalenergy is much higher than that ofrenewable energy

Biofuels & Biomethane: Lack ofregulation support on energy crops.

Industry

Process emissions from the manufacturing of key materials are hard
to abate (cement, steel, iron, aluminum, etc.)

Lack of green solutions (e.g. greenhydrogen) at the industrial scale

Strong regulatory framework face riskof relocation of production and carbon
loopholes

Transport

Electrification of road transport - Passenger: The current availabilityof public charging infrastructure can slow deployment of Battery
Electric Vehicles. Freight: long-distance heavy-road transport faces
battery duration limitations.
Modal switch to rail transport – Passenger: Suited to high activity
areas. Freight: Suited to high freight volumes only need of multimodal logistics to transport goods from terminals to final destination.

Modal switch to rail transport - Passenger:
Urban rail infrastructure has expensive
capital costs.

Modal switch to rail transport –Passenger & Freight: Cross-jurisdiction
projects require central/national
planning.

Data gaps in climate finance prevent global understanding on progress
Figure A3: Data gaps in Global Landscape of Climate Finance

Data gaps

PrivateTrackedGlobal North-SouthSome
tracking

Public domestic

Limitedtracking

Global South-SouthNo
tracking

•
•

•

41

Legends

Understanding of climate finance flows is improving, but there are persistent data gaps. Without this data, it is difficult tomeasure progress against baseline and identify opportunities for scaling up finance in a more targeted manner.
Public international climate finance has been advancing on its climate finance reporting methodologies which enabledproviders to understand and prioritize their portfolio of climate investment. However, the same level of sophistication andconsistency in reporting is lacking from the private sector as well as in public domestic budgets.
Further effort is now required to understand the impact and outcome level of climate finance, define, report and track
adaptation finance globally, bring private sector and domestic public actors to disclose direct investment in climate
mitigation and adaptation

Annex 5 - References
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), 2021. New Energy Outlook 2021. Available at: https://about.bnef.com/new-energy-outlook/
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), 2022. Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022. Available at: https://about.bnef.com/electric-vehicle-outlook/
Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). 2021. Tracking Incremental Energy Efficiency Investments in Certified Green Buildings.
CPI, 2022a. The Landscape of Methane Abatement Finance, Climate Policy Initiative. Available at: https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/thelandscape-of-methane-abatement-finance/
CPI, 2022b. The Landscape of Climate Finance in Africa, Climate Policy Initiative. Available at: https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wpcontent/uploads/2022/09/Landscape-of-Climate-Finance-in-Africa.pdf
CPI, (Upcoming) 2022. Tracking Investments in Climate Resilient Infrastructure: A Tracking Methodological Brief
Convergence, 2021. The State of Blended Finance 2021. Available at: https://www.convergence.finance/resource/the-state-of-blended-finance2021/view
Hallegatte, Stephane; Rentschler, Jun; Rozenberg, Julie. 2019. Lifelines : The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity. Sustainable Infrastructure;. Washington, DC:
World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/31805
Harmsen, J. H. M., D. P. van Vuuren, D. R. Nayak, A. F. Hof, L. Höglund-Isaksson, P. L. Lucas, J. B. Nielsen, P. Smith, and E. Stehfest. 2019. Long-term marginal
abatement cost curves of non-CO2 greenhouse gases. Environmental Science & Policy 99:136–149. doi: 10.1016/J.ENVSCI.2019.05.013
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 2019 Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks Climate Finance. Available at:https://publications.iadb.org/en/2019-joint-report-on-multilateral-development-banks-climate-financeInternational Energy Agency (IEA), 2019. The Future of Rail. Available at: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/fb7dc9e4-d5ff-4a22-ac07ef3ca73ac680/The_Future_of_Rail.pdf

IEA, 2020a. Global EV Outlook 2020. Available at: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/af46e012-18c2-44d6-becdbad21fa844fd/Global_EV_Outlook_2020.pdf
IEA, 2020b. Outlook for biogas and biomethane. Available at: https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/03aeb10c-c38c-4d10-bcecde92e9ab815f/Outlook_for_biogas_and_biomethane.pdf

42Annex 5 - References
IEA and Centre for Climate Finance and Investment (CCFI), 2021. Clean Energy Investing: Global Comparison of Investment Returns, Available at:https://www.iea.org/reports/clean-energy-investing-global-comparison-of-investment-returns
IEA, 2021b. Net Zero by 2050 A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector. Available at: https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-product/net-zero-by-2050scenario
IEA, 2022a. Financing Clean Energy Transitions in Emerging and Developing Economies. Available at: https://www.iea.org/reports/financing-clean-energytransitions-in-emerging-and-developing-economies
IEA, 2022b. Global EV Outlook 2020. Available at: https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022
IEA, 2022c. Renewable Energy Market Update – May 2022. Available at: https://www.iea.org/reports/renewable-energy-market-update-may-2022
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2021, World Economic Outlook, Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/October
IMF, 2022a. Fossil Fuel Subsidies. IMF. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/climate-change/energy-subsidies.
IMF, 2022b. Mobilizing Private Climate Financing in Emerging Market and Developing Economies. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/staff-climatenotes/Issues/2022/07/26/Mobilizing-Private-Climate-Financing-in-Emerging-Market-and-Developing-Economies-520585
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), 2021. World Energy Transition Outlook. Abu Dhabi. Available at: https://www.irena.org//media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2021/Jun/IRENA_World_Energy_Transitions_Outlook_2021.pdf
IRENA (2022), Renewable Power Generation Costs In 2021. https://irena.org//media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2022/Jul/IRENA_Renewable_Power_Generation_Costs_2021.pdf
IRENA (2018), Renewable Energy Policies in a Time of Transition. https://www.irena.org/publications/2018/apr/renewable-energy-policies-in-a-time-of-transition

IRENA (2015), Renewable Energy Integration in power grids. Available at: https://www.irena.org/publications/2015/Apr/Renewable-energy-integration-in-powergrids
Kreibiehl, Silvie; König, Michael; Moon, Jongwoo (2022): Data for Figure TS.25 - Technical Summary of the Working Group III Contribution to the IPCC Sixth Assessment
Report. MetadataWorks, 04 April 2022. DOI: 10.48490/dw6j-ef56

43

Annex 5 - References
D. Z. Islam, 2014. Barriers to and enablers for European Rail freight transport for integrated door-to-door logistics service. NewRail - Centre for Railway
Research, Newcastle University. Available at: http://transportproblems.polsl.pl/pl/Archiwum/2014/zeszyt3/2014t9z3_05.pdf
Network for Greening the Financial System, 2022. Not too late – Confronting the growing odds of a late and disorderly transition. Available at:https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/media/2022/09/07/not_too_late_-_confronting_the_growing_odds_of_a_late_and_disorderly_transition.pdf
OECD-IEA. 2022. "Support for fossil fuels almost doubled in 2021, slowing progress toward international climate goals, according to new analysis from
OECD and IEA." OECD-IEA. https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/support-for-fossil-fuels-almost-doubled-in-2021-slowing-progress-toward-internationalclimate-goals-according-to-new-analysis-from-oecd-and-iea.htm.
TOSSD, 2022. Available at: https://www.tossd.org/docs/Infographic_Mobilised_Private_Finance_TOSSD.pdf
United Nations Environment Programme, Imperial College Business School, SOAS - University of London, 2019, Climate Change and the Cost of Capitalin Developing Countries: Assessing the Impact of Climate Risks on Sovereign Borrowing Costs. Available at:https://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/26007;jsessionid=B9F791105579889173B442D0018F1AF7
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), World Economic Forum (WEF), and The Economics of Land Degradation (ELD), 2021. State of Financefor Nature. Available at: https://www.unep.org/resources/state-finance-nature
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2018. “The Adaptation Gap Report 2018.” Nairobi. Available at:https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2018#:~:text=This%20is%20the%20fourth%20edition,to%20achieve%20a%20societal%20goal.

44

Contact –CPI: climatepolicyinitiative.org
The Lab: climatefinancelab.org
Global Landscape of Climate Finance:
climatefinancelandscape.org@climatepolicy@climatepolicyinitiative