RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE WT/REG/M/4
28November 1996
ORGANIZATION(96-5041)
Committee onRegional Trade Agreements
Fourth Session
NOTE ONTHE MEETING OF17-20 SEPTEMBER 1996
Chairman: Mr.JohnWeekes (Canada)
A. Adoption oftheAgenda
1. TheCommittee adopted thefollowing agenda:
A. Adoption oftheAgenda
B. Examination ofRegional Trade Agreements:
I. EFTA-Israel FreeTrade Agreement
II. EFTA-Hungary FreeTrade Agreement
III. EFTA-Poland FreeTrade Agreement
IV. InterimAgreementBetweentheEuropeanCommunitiesandtheCzechRepublic
V. Interim Agreement Between theEuropean Communities andHungary
VI. Interim Agreement Between theEuropean Communities andPoland
VII. InterimAgreementBetweentheEuropeanCommunitiesandtheSlovakRepublic
VIII. Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) Agreement1
C. Procedures toFacilitate andImprove theExamination Process
D. Systemic Implications ofAgreements andInitiatives fortheMultilateral Trading System
andtheRelationship Between Them
E. Reporting ontheOperation ofAgreements
F. Other Business
C. Procedures toFacilitate andImprove theExamination Process
2. TheChairman recalled that,atitsmeeting inJuly, theCommittee tooknoteoftheStandard
Format Information onRegional Trade Agreements (RTAs) dealing withgoods, aspartofthefirst
stageintheexamination ofagreements. Healsorecalled thatduring thatmeeting apaper waspresented
bytheKorean delegation asabasis fordiscussion. TheCommittee hadrequested theSecretariat to
prepare achecklist ofpoints ofrelevance, drawing onsuggestions andsubmissions made bydelegations.
1Therecord ofthispartofthemeeting isnotincluded intheminutes. Itwillbecirculated separately, at
alater stage.WT/REG/M/4
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Thisdocument wassubsequently circulated asdocument WT/REG/W/7 fordiscussion atthecurrent
meeting.
3. TheChairman recalled thatanumber ofdelegations hadrequested theSecretariat toprepare
theservices content oftheStandard Format. TheSecretariat wasintheprocess ofpreparing it,but
questions onagreements dealing withtrade inservices were available foronlyoneregional trade
agreement (RTA), thusnotproviding asufficiently broad basis fordevising aStandard Format for
services. Inthisregard, herecalled thatdelegations hadbeeninvited inAirgram WTO/AIR/390 of
29July1996toforward totheSecretariat questions theywished toposetotheparties totheAgreement
onECEnlargement. Henoted that,although thetime-limit forthesubmission ofquestions onthe
services parthadexpired, notasingle question hadbeenforwarded totheSecretariat. Theexamination
oftheservices component ofthatAgreement wastotakeplace inlessthanfourweeks 'time.
4. TheChairman alsonoted thattheSecretariat hadnotyetreceived replies tothequestions posed
totheNorth American FreeTrade Agreement (NAFTA) parties withrespect totheservices component
oftheiragreement. Herecalled thatthetime-frame fortheconsideration ofthataspect ofNAFTA
wasthesame asthatfortheAgreement onECEnlargement. Healsonoted thattheexaminations of
NAFTA andECEnlargement showed howthedifferent aspects oftheCommittee 'swork were
inter-related. Hetheninvited reactions totheSecretariat 'schecklist ascontained indocument
WT/REG/W/7.
5. Therepresentative ofSwitzerland recalled thattheCommittee hadnotadopted theStandard
Format, butrather hadtaken noteofit,andthatthisdetail, while perhaps minor, wasworth bearing
inmind. There seemed tobedifficulties inhaving asimilar format forservices. Itwastruethatthe
Committee hadverylittletogoon,butsome questions hadbeenasked which would seem toputthe
Committee inaposition towork onsuchaformat. Hewelcomed theefforts tosetmore specific dates
forthenotification oftrade agreements, noting thatsuchtiming hadbeenthesubject ofdebate over
thepast10-15 years. Perhaps itwould bedifficult togoevenfurther andrequire identical treatment
foreachagreement, nottaking intoaccount theparticular features ofagiven agreement. Similarly,
regarding thequestion oftiming ofthesubmission oftheStandard Format, acertain amount ofleeway
needed tobeallowed fortheCommittee ’swork tobeeffective. Finally, hesought clarification of
whatwaslabelled an"early warning system" onthechecklist. Heasked why,iftheCommittee already
hadanotification intheproper form, itwould stillneedanearly warning system, andwhether this
would mean thatthere wasnolonger thepossibility ofcounter-notification. Hesuggested thatthe
Committee study thematter, noting thathisdelegation wasnotagainst theideaofcounter-notification.
6. TheChairman saidthattheideaofanearly warning system derived from informal remarks
made attheprevious meeting. Inessence, theearlywarning system referred simply toanopportunity
fordelegations tobeaware ofwhatwashappening, atanearly stage.
7. Therepresentative oftheEuropean Communities saidthat,withregard tothequestion of
notification, theCommittee hadtheStandard Format asitstood, anditmusttrytoputitintouseand
testit.Theexchange ofviews ontheearlywarning system wassymptomatic ofoneofthewider points
thathisdelegation previously hadsought tomake onthisquestion. Herecalled thattheCommittee
hadafrank exchange ofviews atthelastmeeting onthequestion ofpriornotification. Hisdelegation,
along withanumber ofothers withexperience withnotifying regional agreements, often large and
complex ones, hadbeen oftheview thataspecific obligation concerning prior notification was
unworkable because substantial changes toagreements wereoftenmade atthelastmoment, invalidating
anycompliance thatonemight havesought toachieve withaprior notification obligation. Itwas
important thattheCommittee trytodevelop processes which werelikely topassthetestofactual use.
Hisdelegation would takeanearly warning system tomean transparency through parties 'providingWT/REG/M/4
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other Members withadvanced information astoregional agreements inprospect; inother words, it
would beanexercise ofproviding information asgoodpractice, butnotaspartofaformal obligation.
Inthatsense itmight beworth considering. Hesaidthatthetoughest point intheSecretariat 'slist
ofpoints onnotification seemed tobetherelated question ofhowtodealwithnon-compliance. It
wasaquestion going beyond thework oftheCommittee, asasystemic issuewider thantheexamination
ofregional agreements. Inthatsense, hedoubted whether theCommittee would beabletodevise
asufficient answer onitsown, though hewasinterested inhearing views. Thedifficulty wasthat
non-compliance didnotoften involve thesortofmeasure, orthefailure tocomply withobligations,
which would normally bedealtwiththrough thedispute settlement mechanism, andassuchitpresented
abroader issue. Theissueofprior notification raised thequestion oftheobjective oftheexamination
process. Reconsideration oftheobjectives oftheexamination ofRTAs should precede theCommittee 's
consideration oftheshape ofthereports oftheexamination andvarious questions ofprocess. While
thediscussion ontheobjectives oftheexamination ofRTAs might prove difficult, itwasfundamental.
8. TherepresentativeoftheUnitedStatessaidthat,inconsideringtheprocessfromamoresystemic
angle, theCommittee should takeintoaccount thecomments andquestions thathadbeenraised during
theexamination ofRTAs overtheprevious twodays. These reviews hadshown certain areas where
theCommittee might proceed, andtheyhadhighlighted several additional procedural problems with
thequestion andanswer process, suchasthedifficulty ofconducting useful reviews based onold
information, orwithout information thathadbeenrequested. ForthefirsttimetheCommittee had
hadapractical experience withtheStandard Format asithadbeenusedtoprovide information, and
theCommittee hadthusmade concrete progress. Theprogress could goevenfurther ifparties toother
RTAs emulated theexample oftheEuropean FreeTrade Association (EFTA) parties. TheEFTA
documents wereuseful andcomprehensive andwould provide anexcellent basisforthereview ofeach
individual agreement andforthecomparison ofeachagreement withothers intheregion. Also, the
EFTA documents would allow theCommittee tocompare andanalyze theagreements inlightofthe
Committee 'sbroader mandate andthefunctions oftheWorld Trade Organization (WTO), thustouching
onsystemic concerns. Hisdelegation hoped toseesimilar information onother agreements during
thereview process. Hethenturned tothechecklist ofprocedural issues which heconsidered useful
andwhich deserved theattention ofdelegates. Most ofthecomments sofarinthediscussion seemed
inlinewithhisdelegation 'sgeneral views. Anyprocedural improvements ultimately agreed toby
theCommittee would needtoinclude acertain levelofflexibility, butalsoahighdegree ofcertainty.
Forimprovements tobeofuse,delegations would havetobewilling toparticipate actively inthereview
process. Regarding thespecific points made, hisauthorities wished toreflect further andwould return
totheissue atafuture meeting.
9. Therepresentative ofVenezuela saidthatherdelegation wasnotclearwhatwasmeant inPoint 2
oftheSecretariat 'schecklist, which referred to"specific timing ofthenotification ofRTAs". She
wasoftheviewthatthenotification would always depend onmany things, suchasprocesses ofinternal
ratification bytheparties totheofRTAs. Point 4,concerning development ofanearlywarning system,
seemed related toPoint 2,butitwasdifficult toaddress something thatdidnotyetexist. Asother
delegations hadsaid,theCommittee could notstartanyearly warning system fornotifications before
therelevantinternalprocesseshadbeencompletedincountries.Becausetheseprocessesweresometimes
paralysed foryears, thepoint seemed impractical. Regarding Point 3,"consideration ofhowtodeal
withnon-compliance withWTO notification requirements onRTAs", sheasked forclarification as
towhatwasmeant by"non-compliance"; specifically, ifanotification didnotmeetWTO requirements,
theproblem would seem tofallunder thecompetence ofanother WTO body.
10. TheChairman noted thatnon-compliance referred toasituation inwhich anagreement which
wasclearly inexistence hadnotbeennotified totheWTO. Toaddress theissue ofnon-compliance,
theCommittee might consider options, suchasthecounter-notification procedure suggested bytheWT/REG/M/4
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Swiss delegation. Thechecklist wasdesigned toallow suchconsideration, anditwasareflection of
points raised bydelegations intheCommittee 'searlier discussion.
11. Therepresentative ofKorea saidthathisdelegation found thechecklist comprehensive,
encompassingalltheimportantpointsmadebydelegationsduringtheCommittee'spreviousdiscussions.
Thechecklist demonstrated thatItem1(c),oftheCommittee 'sTerms ofReference involved anumber
ofdifferent issues, andthatperhaps itwould beimportant toidentify afewpriorities. Hisdelegation
attached great importance tothetiming fornotification oftheRTAs, asitwasthefactor triggering
thewhole examination process. Itwasimportant fortheCommittee toagree uponthespecific timing
ofnotification, despite thefactthatthismight bedifficult duetothespecial characteristics ofindividual
RTAs andtheirpolitical implications. Inviewofthecomments fromother delegations, theCommittee
might fixthetiming tonotify anRTA tofallsomewhere between ratification andentry intoforce.
Hisdelegation strongly supported theideathatnotifications bemade prior totheentry intoforce of
agreements. Theearly warning system would beveryuseful, andtheCommittee should explore the
ideaeven though there would besome difficulty astoitsmodalities. Thesystem would have a
complementary nature, because currently notifications weresubmitted verylate,ornotatall.Once
theCommittee wasabletoagree upon thespecific timing ofnotifications andsome measures tobe
taken withregard tonon-compliance, theearly warning system would nolonger benecessary. His
delegation wasoftheviewthattheideaofcounter-notification wasworth considering andexploring
asapractical wayofdoing business. There wasroom fortheSecretariat toplayaroleinthatregard.
12. Therepresentative ofAustralia welcomed thefactthattheStandard Format hadbeenfinalized
andactually utilized bysome Members. Ithadbeenachallenge toensure thatparties toRTAs submitted
theinformation required inafullandtransparent manner, andtheStandard Format process hadthe
potential torelieve theCommittee ofthedifficulty ithadhadintrying tounderstand thesubstance
ofvarious largeannexes andprotocols toagreements. Seeing thefirstexample hadbeenveryhelpful.
While itwould enhance theCommittee 'swork tohavetheStandard Format submitted atthesametime
asparties notified anagreement, attheveryleasttheinformation needed tobesubmitted inatimely
manner. Non-compliance withnotification requirements wasanimportant issuewhich theCommittee
needed toconsider anddealwith. TheCommittee should havesome effective means ofdealing with
theissue, andthesuggestion made bythedelegation ofSwitzerland oncounter-notifications deserved
consideration. Onthequestion ofearlywarning, herecalled thatconcerns hadbeenraised byMembers
attheprevious meeting about theinability ofRTAparties tonotify agreements before theirratification.
Intheviewofherdelegation, theearly warning system represented atransparency exercise allowing
theCommittee toknow whatwashappening.
13. Therepresentative ofJapan recalled that,attheCommittee 'sprevious meeting, hisdelegation
hadproposed tosetupaWorking Party todraftguidelines fortheexamination ofRTAs. Thisshould
beincluded intheSecretariat 'schecklist. Hewelcomed thesuggestion inthechecklist todevelop a
Standard Format forservices. Finally, relating totheearly warning system wastheissue ofprior
notification ofanagreement. Heunderstood thatthiscould beproblematic forparties negotiating an
RTA, butitwould beuseful iftheparties would inform other Members ofthebasic aspects ofthe
agreement, suchasitspurpose andnature.
14. Therepresentative ofThailand, speaking onbehalf ofASEAN, saidthatwithregard to
notifications, therewasaneedforbalance among transparency, certainty andflexibility. Apragmatic
approach, taking intoaccount thedifferent nature ofeachagreement andthedifficulties which might
occur inthedomestic processes oftheindividual RTAparties, seemed essential inadetailed discussion
onthespecific time-frame ofthenotification requirement. Theearly warning system waspartofa
proposal foradvance information toincrease transparency during thedevelopment ofRTAs, butitWT/REG/M/4
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should notbeaformal obligation. Theideaofaddressing theissue ofnon-compliance through the
mechanism ofcounter-notification might bediscussed atalaterstage.
15. Therepresentative ofCanada saidthatnotification wascertainly ofcentral importance tothe
work oftheCommittee. Itwastheprocess thattriggered theexamination andwould clearly influence
thedegree ofusefulness oftheexamination. Thedevelopment oftheStandard Format hadclearly
beenastepforward, and,eventhough itwasnotaformal agreement, hisdelegation hoped thatall
future examinations would bebased onthatStandard Format. Withregard totheideainthechecklist
tointroduce specific timing forthenotification ofRTAs, heagreed thattherewasaneedtobepractical,
andthatdeciding specific time-limits might beverydifficult. Henoted thatregional agreements were
usually formed byabasic, four-step process: theconclusion ofthenegotiation, leading totheinitialling
oftheagreement; thesigning oftheagreement attheofficial orpolitical level; theratification; and
theentryintoforce. Itseemed that,within those different steps, therewould beapossibility ofensuring
ahigher degree oftransparency among Members, without necessarily waiting untilthefourstepshad
beencompleted. Considering thenature ofthesystem, theCommittee might bepragmatic andfind
awaytohavethenotification between theinitialling oftheagreement anditsentry intoforce, which
would allow Members toraisequestions andconcerns ifnecessary. TheCommittee might wishto
consider atwo-step notification. Itcould discuss more indepth what sortofinformation would be
required inthefirststep. Thefull-fledged examination could takeplace afterthesecond notification,
oncetheagreement hadbeenfullyratified andentered intoforce. Hesaidthatnon-compliance with
notification requirements wascertainly anissueofconcern tohisdelegation. Given thattheCommittee
didnothavethefulljurisdiction overthenotification obligation, itmight alsoneedtolookatthebroader
issue ofitsmandate. Oneoftheobjectives ofhaving astanding Committee onregional agreements
wastoprovide anopportunity forMembers toraiseaparticular concern atanytime, without necessarily
having towaitfortheformal creation ofaWorking Party. Ifthemandate oftheCommittee wasto
encompass allnotification obligations, itmight enable Members toraiseconcerns about compliance
ornon-compliance withnotification requirements inatimely fashion. Finally, thematter oftiming
forthesubmission ofaStandard Format waslinked tothetiming ofnotification. Atwo-tier notification
presumably would entail theobligation ofsubmitting alltheinformation necessary forafull-fledged
examination, withsubmission ofthesecond-tier information triggering theexamination.
16. Therepresentative ofNorway welcomed theNote bytheChairman ontheStandard Format
asanimportant document. Hisdelegation attached greatimportance tothedevelopment ofaStandard
Format forservices andwould, totheextent possible, contribute tothateffect. OnPoint 2ofthe
Secretariat 'schecklist, thespecific timing ofnotifications, hisdelegation shared theconcern thatit
wasnotrealistic tohave afull-fledged notification before thetimeofratification oftherelevant
agreements. However, hisdelegation viewed theideaofanearlywarning system positively andwould
beconsidering it.Theideaofatwo-step notification process required acloser lookintothescope
andimplications ofthefirststep. With regard tothepoint dealing withnon-compliance withWTO
requirements, hisdelegation alsoviewed theideaofcounter-notification inafavourable light.
17. TherepresentativeofMexicosaidthathisdelegationsupportedtheideaofdevelopingaStandard
Format intheareaofservices, similar totheoneforgoods. Concerning thespecific timing of
notifications, itwould notbepractical toestablish concrete dates forthenotification ofRTAs because
therewasaseries ofstepstobetaken fromaninternal, legalpoint ofviewwhich would haveanimpact
ontherapidity withwhich adocument could beproduced forreview; thedocument didneedtobe
finalforareview. Moreover, theparties ofRTAs would haveaninterest innotifying quickly because
thiswould enable themtoreceive thegreen lightfromthemultilateral system, whereas, without such
review, thesituation asregards theagreement would remain uncertain. Hisdelegation didnotagree
withtheideaofcounter-notifications inPoint 3oftheSecretariat 'schecklist because, while therewere
some multilateral agreements intheWTO which made specific mention ofcounter-notifications, otherWT/REG/M/4
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agreements didnot.Hisdelegation didnotwishtochange indirectly theprovisions ofArticle XXIV.
Inaddition, there wasnoneedforcounter-notifications because anyMember oftheWTO whohad
aninterest inanagreement notyetnotified would beabletoexertpressure atthemeetings ofthebodies
reviewing those agreements. Butthiswasverydifferent from thelegalconsequences thatcounter-
notifications would have. Astotheearly warning system, comments made onnon-compliance were
germane. HisGovernment anditscounterparts inagreements hadtriedtoinform thevarious Councils
oftheprogress oftheverysteps ofnegotiations, which constituted anearly warning, andeveryone
knew whowasnegotiating. Moreover, transparency andinformation existed intheinternational media.
Itwould besurprising ifaregional agreement could beimplemented without theother WTO Members '
knowing about it.Nospecific action wastherefore necessary inthatarea.
18. Therepresentative ofHungary saidthat,regarding thespecific timing ofnotifications, itwould
beunworkable tohavenotification priortotheentry intoforce ofanagreement. Herdelegation would
havedifficulty accepting suchtiming fornotification.
19. Therepresentative ofIsrael saidthatanearlywarning system andthesubmission oftheStandard
Format wererelated tothequestion ofspecific timing fornotification. Warning would beimportant
ifitspurpose wastostoporprevent theconclusion ofagreement, butthatwasnotwhattheMembers
were intending, norwasitwhatthedocument meant toimply. HedidnotseewhattheCommittee
hadtogainfrom accelerating theprocess because thenotification would betheveryfirststep.
20. Therepresentative ofPakistan saidthatthematters oftiming fornotification, anearlywarning
system, andsubmission oftheStandard Format required abalance between flexibility andtransparency.
Bothwereimportant principles, andperhaps theproposal made bythedelegate ofCanada would allow
forsuchbalance. Thefourstages ofRTAs might indeed beconducive toatwo-step notification
procedure, inwhich thefirstnotification would come afterthesignature, andthefullnotification after
theratification. Thefirstnotification could serve asanearly warning andmight notneed tobe
comprehensive; theCommittee could develop atypeofshort format forthatnotification. Itwould
begoodifthesubmission ofinformation intheStandard Format accompanied thecomplete notification,
which could take place sometime after ratification. Point 3oftheSecretariat 'sChecklist,
non-compliance, involved acomplex butrealissue, andtheCommittee needed toexamine itwithan
openmind; inthatrespect, thecounter-notification proposal bythedelegate ofSwitzerland seemed
aconstructive onewhich theCommittee might wishtoconsider instituting.
21. Therepresentative ofIndiawelcomed thedevelopment ofthestandard format andtheinclusion
ofservices, andsaidthere wasaneed tobepractical asfarasthetiming ofthenotification was
concerned. Theissues ofnon-compliance withnotification aswellastheearlywarning system needed
tobediscussed further.
22. TheChairman suggested that,withaviewtofocusing thediscussion, theCommittee should
request theSecretariat toprepare apaper which would setoutthedifferent proposals andoptions as
tohowtheCommittee might move forward. TheCommittee might alsowishtoconsider continuing
itsdiscussion intheCommittee, or,ashadbeensuggested, inaWorking Party. Hethenopened
discussions under theheading "Examination" indocument WT/REG/W/7.
23. Therepresentative ofSwitzerland stated that,regarding the"reconsideration oftheobjectives
oftheexamination ofRTAs", hisdelegation wasnotprepared, atthisstage, toreopen thislong-standing
matter. Hisdelegation could agree totheitemon"development ofguidelines fortheprocess ofthe
examination ofRTAs" provided thatthedevelopment ofguidelines fortheprocess washandled purely
asaprocedural matter. If,however, itimplied anychange inthesubstance oftheexamination, his
delegation could notagree withit.Regarding theroleoftheSecretariat, hesaidthattheSecretariatWT/REG/M/4
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should playarole, inparticular, byproviding assistance. Thisrole, especially withregard tothe
notification, theformat, andreplies toquestions waswelcomed bytheparties totheagreements.
However, hisdelegation didnotwanttheSecretariat toreplace thedelegations intheirworkofproviding
thenecessary information, andhehoped thattheCommittee agreed thattheparties toaregional
agreement should havethefinalsayindrafting theStandard Format forinformation ontheiragreements.
24. Therepresentative ofCanada saidthatthesection onexamination encompassed suchabroad
range ofissues thatitwasdifficult tocome upwithpoints tohelpshape thefuture direction ofthe
Committee. Regarding theitem"reconsideration oftheobjectives oftheexamination ofRTAs", his
delegation wasoftheviewthatsome might interpret thattomean areview ofthesubstantive standards
ofArticle XXIV. What wascalled foratthepresent stagewasidentification ofthepositive andnegative
points oftheexamination process, instead ofjumping immediately toconclusions. TheCommittee
might therefore wishtokeepthequestion ofreconsideration open. Once theCommittee hadreviewed
thevarious examinations which constituted thebacklog, itmight havesome ideas onhowtoimprove
thesystem. Many procedural elements werebeing flagged, forwhich pastexperience wasrelevant,
andtheCommittee could already startreflecting onpossible improvements. HesaidthattheCommittee
shouldexaminewaysofexpeditingtheprocedurefortheexaminationofagreementsthatwereofminimal
impact onthird countries. Thatcould helptheexamination process because itwould prevent the
Committee frombeing overloaded, while ensuring thatitfocused ontheagreements ofgreater effect.
Theproblemsofdocumentationandtimingofthesubmissionofinformationwererecurring.Headmitted
thattheRTAs hiscountry wasparty towerenotabove criticism. Iffirmer rulesexisted, itmight help
hisdelegation toconvince thevarious departments andMinistries inhishome country oftheimportance
ofpreparing replies fortheexamination process, andhence ensure amore timely submission of
information. Hisdelegation would indeed beinfavour ofconsidering amore precise time-frame for
submitting questions andreplies andcirculating documentation inadvance ofmeetings. Regarding
theitem"role oftheSecretariat", hesaidthatfurther information onwhatwasreally envisaged would
behelpful. TheStandard Format hadbeendeveloped withgreat helpfrom theSecretariat. Itwas
notclear whether itwasintended thatsome elements ofthereplies aswellwould becompleted by
theSecretariat. Thatmight bepossible since much oftheinformation wasbelieved tobeinthepublic
domain, butfurther clarification wasdesired onthispoint. Hewasalsooftheopinion thattherole
oftheSecretariat interms ofpreparing thereport might needtobelooked at,withaview, again, of
ensuring thattheprocess moved along inasmooth andtimely fashion. Hefinally referred totheissue
of"ensuring themaximum effectiveness intheprocess oftheexamination ofRTAs dealing withboth
goods andservices", noting thatthepoint deserved consideration. Ensuring atimely examination of
boththegoods andtheservices element was,again, something thatwould havetobeworked outin
practice, rather thanthrough developing firmer rules onit.Oneconsideration wasthataddressing
thegoods partandtheservices partmight notrequire thesame expert, andsometimes thetime-frame
ofimplementation ofthese agreements would notbethesame. There might beother considerations,
however, thiswasasortof"best endeavour" commitment fromtheCommittee which hisdelegation
would fullyendorse.
25. TheChairman saidthat,whatwasintended byitem"consideration oftheroleoftheSecretariat
intheexamination process", wasperhaps nottheideathattheSecretariat would filloutthequestionnaire,
butrather thattheSecretariat would advise delegations onthesortsofreplies thatother delegations
hadusedinsimilar situations, andonwhatwould normally becovered under aparticular heading of
thequestionnaire. Itdidnotintend tosuggest thattherightful roleofdelegations indescribing the
agreements towhich theywereparties should betaken awayfromthem. Secondly, fairly regular contact
between theSecretariat andthedelegations infilling outofthequestionnaire would initself serve as
areminder andwould perhaps encourage amore expedited completion ofthequestionnaire.WT/REG/M/4
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26. Therepresentative ofJapan responded toSwitzerland 'sobservation withregard totheitem
"development ofguidelines fortheprocess oftheexamination ofRTAs". What hisdelegation had
proposed wastodevelop guidelines fortheexamination process itself. Hewould alsoliketohear
reactions onhisdelegation 'sproposal ofsetting upaWorking Party todevelop examination guidelines.
Regarding item"reconsideration oftheobjectives oftheexamination ofRTAs" itwasalways important
tokeepinmind whattheobjectives oftheexamination were, butatthesame time, iftheCommittee
weretotreatthisparticular topic, itmight question itsownexistence. Itwastherefore notproductive
toreopen discussions ofthatsort. Some flexibility would alsobeneeded regarding the"consideration
oftheduration oftheexamination process forindividual RTAs". Inthepast, delegations ineffect
hadagreed thatthereweredifferent types ofagreements, some ofwhich weredeemed veryimportant,
andothers which wereconsidered tohavelessimpact onthirdparties. More timemight beneeded
forexaminations ofimportant RTAs, asforexample, fortheexamination oftheEnlargement ofthe
European Communities andfortheexamination ofNAFTA. Hisdelegation wasverymuch infavour
ofdeveloping anexpedited procedure fortheexaminations ofRTAs which hadminimal effects on
other Members. Regarding theitem"establishment oftime-frames foreachstepoftheexamination
process andfortheexamination asawhole", hisdelegation agreed withtheCanadian delegation that
deadlines could behelpful forcolleagues athome but,atthesame time, some flexibility wasneeded.
Binding guidelines werenotnecessary. Ontheissueofestablishing amaximum number ofmeetings
fortheexamination, herealized thattheparties toRTAs might wishtocomplete theexamination process
asquicklyaspossible.If,however,delegationshadmanyquestions,onemeetingmightnotbesufficient;
inthatcase, some flexibility would beneeded. Thequestion of"time-frames forthesubmission of
questions andthereceipt ofreplies" wasanimportant one,andheregretted thatnoquestions onservices
hadbeenposed ontheEnlargement oftheEuropean Communities, eventhough hisdelegation was
toblame aswell. Hehoped thatdelegations would stillhavetherighttoaskquestions attheactual
timeofexamination. Withregard totheissueofthesubmission ofreplies, hedrew theCommittee 's
attention oftothefactthatthereplies toquestions tended tobegiven onlyafewweeks before the
actual examinations. Thatprevented theCommittee fromhaving asatisfactory discussion onthecontent
ofeachagreement and,therefore, aguideline dateforthesubmission ofreplies wasnecessary. His
delegation didnotseeanydifficulty indealing withbothgoods andservices back-to-back, aslong
asrelevant information wasavailable.
27. Therepresentative oftheUnited States, whospoke withreference tothe"Reconsideration of
objectives oftheexamination", wasoftheviewthatbykeeping theprinciples offlexibility, pragmatism,
responsiveness andtransparency inmind, agooddealcould beaccomplished withtheStandard Format
thattheCommittee already had,andwiththerulesthatalldelegations attempted toadhere toasWTO
Members. TheCommittee should bepragmatic inprocedures, asthedelegations ofJapan andCanada
hadadvocated, andinparticular initsexpectations, inthatproblems athandwere dealtwithrather
thanfirstseekprinciples orultimate ends.
28. Therepresentative ofPakistan wondered whattime-frame would berelevant forthesubmission
ofquestions andreplies inthecaseoftheexpedited procedure forRTAs having minimal effect. His
delegation wasoftheviewthatthere should beanidentical time-frame toallRTAs. Ifthatwasthe
case, theCommittee could consider combining theissues relating tothe"duration oftheexamination
process forindividual RTAs", the"establishment oftime-frames foreachstepoftheexamination
process", "thepossibility toestablish amaximum number ofmeetings" andthe"agreement on
time-frames forthesubmission ofquestions andthereceipt ofreplies" togetamore focused discussion,
asallthese points dealt withtheissue ofthetotaltime-frame fortheexamination ofRTAs. His
delegation wasstrongly infavour ofhaving some time-frames, andthere were twoways ofdealing
withthisissuewhen allthefourpoints werecombined. Onewaywould betoconsider theCommittee 's
totaldeliberation andthentospecify timeforeachstep; theother way,which hisdelegation favoured,
would betospecify thetimeandthenumber ofmeetings, etc.,foreachstep,andthusthetime-frameWT/REG/M/4
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forthecomplete examination. Inthisrespect, thepoint made bytheJapanese delegate ontheconcern
forflexibility wasveryimportant andcould, perhaps, beaddressed bydeciding onatimerange, for
example, 18-24 months, rather thanafixed point intime. Hisdelegation alsonoted withinterest the
Japanese proposal toestablish aWorking Party andwould welcome more information onit.
29. Therepresentative ofMexico saidthatreconsideration oftheobjectives oftheexamination
ofRTAs wasoutside theTerms ofReference oftheCommittee. Hisdelegation would liketowork,
aswasstated initem1(c)oftheCommittee 'sTerms ofReference, "todevelop, asappropriate,
procedures tofacilitate andimprove theexamination process". Reconsideration oftheobjectives would
notonlybepointless, butwould alsonotbejustified. Although hisdelegation wasinfavour ofdrawing
upguidelines which could facilitate theprocess, therewasaneedtobecautious: developing guidelines
asameans tointroduce some order while preserving anappropriate degree offlexibility wasadelicate
task. IftheCommittee would fixacertain number ofmeetings, andallow thenumber ofmeetings
tomultiply indefinitely, theguidelines withrespect tothetiming ofmeetings would notbeofanyuse.
Thecorrect balance needed tobefound. Hisdelegation wasalsoinfavour ofconsidering thetotal
duration oftheexamination process. Hereferred tothepossibility ofdeveloping anexpedited procedure
fortheexamination ofRTAs which hadminimal effects onthirdparties. Hecautioned thattheterm
"expedited" procedure might leadpeople tothink thattherewastimepressure onthirdparties. Rather,
theCommitteeshouldbeconsideringa"simplified"procedureforthoseagreementswithminimalimpact
onotherMembers oftheWTO. Hesuggested togroup theagreements ofminimal impact inonemeeting
inorder toenable theCommittee toexperiment withdifferent formats. Theprocedure proposed for
RTAs ofminimal effect should notonlybeaccelerated, butalsosimplified. Inaddition, thepossibility
foraMember toobject tothissimplified procedure should beretained, asagreements which, atthe
global level, might nothavealargeimpact onmostMembers, could stillhaveasignificant tradeeffect
foroneparticular Member. Hewasalsooftheviewthattime-frames foreachstepintheexamination
process werenecessary andthattheCommittee should continue towork ontheissue. Regarding the
establishmentofamaximumnumberofmeetings,hisdelegationwasinterestedindrawingupguidelines.
There wasatimeinanyexamination when theinterested parties hadalready saidwhattheyhadto
say,while stillnoagreement hadbeen reached astothecompatibility oftheagreement with
Article XXIV. Further meetings would notnecessarily allow theCommittee toreach agreement. It
wasimportant togivetheopportunity toparties totheagreement andtoothers toclearly statetheir
positions.ConfirmingthatMembershadthepossibilitytosubmitwrittenquestionsduringanexamination
wasuseful, andagreeing onatime-frame forthesubmission ofquestions andthereceipt ofreplies
wasalogical consequence ofhaving amaximum duration fortheexamination andtime-frames for
thevarious different stepsintheprocess. TheCommittee should continuously assess thesetime-frames.
Hisdelegation hadnotunderstood thepurpose oftheparagraph intheSecretariat 'sChecklist regarding
theroleoftheSecretariat. Ifthewording meant thattheSecretariat could assist theMembers inthis
typeofexercise, thebestthing todowould benottoestablish anything inwriting. Hesupported what
theSwiss delegation hadsaidregarding theroleoftheSecretariat. Hisdelegation continued tosupport
theideaofexamining RTAs dealing withbothgoods andservices "back-to-back". Thiswasclosely
connected withthenumber ofmeetings andwiththeefficiency oftheprocess. IftheCommittee had
twoexaminations thatwerenotsimultaneous, itwould draw outtheexamination process asawhole,
andhefeltthatthatwould notbesound practice astheCommittee thenwould havetospend more
resources, bothhuman andfinancial.
30. TheChairman saidthattheMexican intervention regarding theexpedited procedure was
particularly helpful asthechecklist really intended tocapture thenotion ofasimplified procedure.
Theemphasis should beonsimplifying, rather thanonexpediting, although, iftheexamination process
wassimplified, itmight alsobeexpedited.WT/REG/M/4
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31. Therepresentative oftheEuropean Communities, speaking onobjectives, saidthatitwas
important tonotethatwhathisdelegation hadinmind wasthequestion oftheobjectives inlightof
theWTO rules, notsimply inlightoftheestablishment oftheCommittee. Inthatregard hehadnoted
withinterest thattheJapanese delegation hadagain referred totheirnon-paper of3July,which suggested
guidelines forareview orareconsideration oftheobjectives. Perhaps theunderlying linesweresimilar.
However, hisdelegation would wanttostartbyreviewing therules themselves. Onthequestion of
thevarious procedural suggestions contained intheSecretariat 'sChecklist onexaminations, some sort
ofgeneral guidance would clearly bedesirable. Hisdelegation supported boththedevelopment of
asimplified procedure fortheexamination ofagreements withminimal effects onother Members,
aswellasagreater rolefortheSecretariat. Hisdelegation would regret iftheSecretariat would not
beputinaposition tobeabletocomplete notification forms fordelegations. Hesaidthatsome
flexibility would benecessary regarding time-frames andthemaximum number ofmeetings. Any
Committee 'sdecision toestablish asimplified procedure forlesssignificant agreements would suggest
amore complex procedure formore significant agreements which might require more timetobe
examined. Thewhole concept ofguidance needed tobeseenintheterms ofguidance, rather than
thedevelopment ofwhat might become aprocedural requirement. Against thatbackground, many
ofthesuggestions presented should beexplored. Henoted theChairman 'ssuggestion thattheconclusion
might bethatsome oftheideas discussed should bedeveloped toseewhattheywould looklikein
practice. Hefeared thattheideaofamaximum number ofmeetings would notprove aspractical as
theCommittee might hope. Asregards thelinking ofgoods andservices discussions, hisdelegation
wasoftheopinion thatthiswassimply amatter ofconvenience interms oftheparticular processes
undergone, andhedoubted thataneffective general rulecould beputinplace inthatrespect.
32. TheChairman noted thattheCommittee hadapragmatic approach totheexamination process,
atleastwithrespect tothose agreements which hadalready beenexamined. Hesuspected thatthe
demand forhaving alarge number ofmeetings intheCommittee would besmaller thanithadbeen
inthecontext oftheoldworking parties. Thatwasinparttheresult ofthesynergies theCommittee
hadcreated byputting thedifferent elements oftheTerms ofReference together. Delegations now
realized that,incasetherewasadisagreement intheexamination ofaparticular agreement, concluding
thatexamination didnotmean theendoftheissue. Itwassimply transferred over, either tothe
discussion onimproving procedures, ortothediscussion onsystemic matters. Hewashopeful that
theCommittee would dosome self-reform inthisrespect, aswellasreform articulated through new
procedures orrules.
33. Therepresentative ofVenezuela stressed theneedtocarefully consider howtoaddress Point 6,
oftheSecretariat 'schecklist onthe"reconsideration oftheobjectives oftheexamination", inorder
nottoreopen adifficult discussion already heldbefore theestablishment oftheCommittee. Flexibility
wasneeded regarding theitems "theduration oftheexamination process" and"theexpedited procedure
fortheexamination ofRTAs ofminimal effect". Theduration depended ontheinterests which Members
hadintheprocess, andeachRTAshould bereviewed untilallissues relating toithadbeenexhausted.
There wasnoproblem regarding Point 14,"theroleoftheSecretariat" withrespect tothecompletion
oftheStandard Format. TheSecretariat could indicate inwhatwayfrequent points andquestions were
dealtwith. More information andreflection wasneeded inorder toconsider whatthefunction ofthe
Secretariat inthereview process should be.Theideaofback-to-back examination ofRTAs dealing
withbothgoods andservices wasuseful asitwould make iteasier forsmaller delegations toparticipate.
34. Therepresentative ofNorway saidthattheCommittee wasinaperiod where itwastrying
toformitsownidentity. TheCommittee should bekeptasslimaspossible andshould notduplicate
whatother committees werealready doing. Neither theCommittee nordelegations ortheSecretariat
should beover-burdened. Itwastherefore worthwhile toconsider anexpedited procedure forthe
examination ofthese RTAs which hadminimal effects onthirdparties. TheCommittee should alsoWT/REG/M/4
Page11
becareful about establishing amaximum number ofmeetings fortheexamination ofeachRTA. The
Committee 'smandate should notinclude unnecessary requirements, which would encumber thewhole
process. Point 6oftheSecretariat 'schecklist, "thereconsideration oftheobjectives oftheexamination"
should beconsidered inthecontext ofthediscussions onsystemic issues. Bothstringency andflexibility
needed tobetaken intoconsideration when setting upguidelines.
35. Therepresentative ofAustralia recalled herdelegation 'spositions assetoutinthejointpaper
ithadsubmitted incollaboration withthedelegations ofKorea andHong Kong onproposed guidelines
tofacilitate theexamination process. Regarding theissue ofthereconsideration oftheobjectives of
theexamination, herdelegation heldviews similar tothose ofCanada, inparticular thattheCommittee
could keeptheissueopenandperhaps getideas onhowtoimprove thesystem asitproceeded through
theexamination process. Having back-to-back meetings ongoods andservices wasaveryuseful idea.
Toensure predictability andtofacilitate theprocess byestablishing guidelines hadbeentheideabehind
theoriginal proposals. However, flexibility intheexamination process needed tobeassured.
36. Therepresentative ofKorea saidthatitwashisunderstanding thattheChairman would propose
torequest theSecretariat toputalltheconcrete suggestions intooneformat, under different headings,
sothattheCommittee could discuss those options orelements inthefuture. Inthatcasehewould
suggest toinclude thoseelements which hadbeenpresented inthejointpaper submitted byhisdelegation
andthoseofAustralia andHong Kong. Hisdelegation hadastrong preference fortheideaofdeveloping
guidelines fortheexamination process. Thedevelopment ofguidelines would ensure predictability
andfacilitate theprocess. There was,however, needforsome flexibility, asexpressed bythedelegates
ofJapan andCanada. There wasmerit indeveloping asimplified procedure fortheexamination of
RTAs which hadminimal effects. There wasnoneed toreconfirm Point 12oftheSecretariat 's
Checklist, i.e.thatMembers hadthepossibility tosubmit written questions toparties toRTAs.
Regarding thetiming ofthequestions andreplies, hisdelegation proposed thatthequestions could
beputforward afterthefirstexamination meeting. Thatwould facilitate theexamination process as
theStandard Format would constitute thebasisofthefirstexamination anyway. Itwashisdelegation 's
understanding thatalmost alldelegations were oftheview thattheStandard Format wasvery
comprehensive. Itwasnotcleartohisdelegation where thediscussion onPoint 6,the"reconsideration
oftheobjectives oftheexamination" would fitin.Hisdelegation agreed withtheMexican delegation,
thatthisitem, ifnecessary, could bediscussed inthecontext ofthedebate onsystemic implications.
37. Therepresentative ofTurkey saidthattherevised Standard Format, being partoftheguidelines
andnon-binding innature, would enable toexpedite theexamination process, andwould benefit both
theparties totheRTAandtheCommittee. TheStandard Format would provide necessary information
onissues relevant totheagreement under review, andwould increase transparency. Although itwas
necessity tofixtime-frames forthenotification andforeachsuccessive stepoftheexamination process,
acertain degree offlexibility wasneeded inorder toavoid difficulties forthedelegations. Time-frames
should depend ontheinterest oftheMembers. There should beabalance between transparency and
thelevelofobligations oftheparties. TheSecretariat could playapro-active roleintheexamination
process inthisregard. Concerning Point 12oftheChecklist, Members should havetheopportunity
tosubmitquestions,whichwerenotincludedintheStandardFormat,totheRTAsparties.Anagreement
should bereached onthetime-frame forthesubmission ofquestions andthereceipt ofreplies. This
could bedoneonthebasisofguidelines, which could beprepared bytheSecretariat, taking intoaccount
thedifferences between theRTAs.
38. Therepresentative ofThailand, speaking onbehalf ofASEAN, reiterated thestatement made
earlier thattofacilitate andimprove theexamination process, abalance between transparency, certainty
andflexibility wasneeded. ASEAN supported thesimplification procedure thatwould expedite the
process oftheexamination. Ontheestablishment ofatime-frame, herviewwasthatgeneral guidelinesWT/REG/M/4
Page12
might bemorepractical thanabinding time-frame. Atimerange waspreferable tospecific time-frames.
OnPoint 14oftheChecklist, concerning "theroleoftheSecretariat", herdelegation supported the
ideaofamore active roleandconfirmed thattechnical assistance from theSecretariat wasessential
forthedeveloping countries.
39. Therepresentative ofHungary saidthatitwould notbeproductive toreopen thediscussion
ontheobjectives oftheexamination. Flexibility wasneeded when considering theduration ofthe
examinationprocess.HerdelegationsupportedtheideaofasimplifiedprocedureforRTAswithminimal
effects forthirdparties.
40. TheChairman thenturned tothequestion ofreports oftheexamination ofanRTA, contained
inPoint 16and17oftheSecretariats 'schecklist. Itwould beuseful ifdelegations reflected onwhether
theywere prepared toconsider some change inthewaytheCommittee approached thereporting
requirement ontheexamination ofRTAs. Under theoldprocedure intheWorking Parties, upon
completion ofanexamination, adraftreport wasprepared bytheSecretariat which contained both
arecord ofthediscussion andthepoints raised bydelegations, plusdraftconclusions. Thewhole
report wasthen, ineffect, negotiated intheWorking Party. Thisprocedure made sense inthecontext
ofaWorking Party since theissues which hadbeenraised inthecourse oftheexamination hadto
beresolved inthecourse oftheduration ofthatWorking Party. Hedidnotsense thesame attitude
inthisCommittee, asdelegations feltthattheycould takeissues from theexamination process and
dealwiththem inthecontext ofthe"systemic" discussion orinthecontext ofanother examination.
Thepossibility would beopenfordelegations togobackandrefertosome earlier partsofthework
intheCommittee. TheCommittee 'slifecontinued aftereachparticular examination. Hesuggested
tofacilitate thepreparation ofthereports bydividing theprocess intotwosteps. Thefirstwould be
asimple record ofthediscussion intheCommittee, adocument containing whatdifferent delegations
said. Thisdocument would beprepared bytheSecretariat, astheSecretariat haddone forearlier
meetings. Thesecond stepconcerned theconclusions. Hesuggested thattheCommittee continue
discussing andnegotiating theconclusions, onthebasis ofadraft. TheCommittee 'snegotiated
conclusions would stillbearequirement, sincetheCommittee hadtoreach anagreed setofconclusions
withrespect toeachparticular examination.
41. Therepresentative oftheSecretariat added that,inpastpractice, thereports were made up
oftwoparts, thefactual component andtheconclusions heavily negotiated. Thepurpose wastoreach
agreement onthetotality ofthereport. Theentire report wasdistributed forcomments. What often
happened wasthatthefactual partitselfwasthesubject ofnegotiation when, infact,itonlydescribed
thediscussion thathadtaken place. Ifthatwasaproblem inthepast,itwasgoing tobegreater in
thefuture, given thenumber ofagreements thattheCommittee hadtodealwith. When theCommittee
wasdealing withninedifferent agreements inthecourse ofafewdays, itwashardtoimagine how
ninesetsofsummary records would beexchanged between theSecretariat anddelegations, withaview
toaccommodating comments andlooking forapproval onthetwopartsofthereport. Itwould certainly
simplify theprocess fortheSecretariat iftheCommittee weretoadopt theChairman 'sproposal that
thefactual partofthereport would beprepared bytheSecretariat, along thelinesofwhatcould be
called summary records. TheSecretariat wasconcerned that,withthenumber ofagreements which
weresimultaneously dealtwithatonepoint oftime, itwould bedifficult fortheSecretariat tomonitor
andcontrol theprocess ifthere wasnomodification intheprocess ofadopting reports.
42. Therepresentative ofCanada saidthattheChairman 'ssuggestion merited consideration more
closely because itcould saveagooddealoftimeandeffort. Itwould turnthefocus totheconclusions,
which wastheimportant element. AstheTerms ofReference fortheCommittee stipulated thatreports
hadtobeforwarded totherespective bodies oftheWTO, hewondered whether onlytheconclusion,
ortheconclusion combined withthecomplete record ofthediscussion, would beforwarded underWT/REG/M/4
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theproposal. Hepresumed thattheconclusion, oraninitial draft, would beprepared bytheSecretariat,
inconsultation withtheparties totheagreement being examined, andthencirculated totheMembers.
43. Therepresentative oftheSecretariat clarified thattheonlydifference frompastpractice would
bethefactual partofthereport, which would procedurally bedealtwithlikesummary records, rather
thanastexttobediscussed intensively withgovernments. Theconclusions would bedealtwithin
exactly thesame wayasinthepast,where, inconsultation withtheinterested parties, theSecretariat
drew upadraftforconsideration, andthen, onthebasis ofthat,discussions werecarried outwithin
theCommittee, inaninformal setting, withaviewtoagreeing ontheconclusions.
44. Therepresentative ofSwitzerland saidthatitwould beuseful iftheCommittee could reduce
thereporting procedure toaminimum andtheChairman 'sproposal wentinthatdirection. However,
itwasalsonecessary toensure thatthereport onwhether ornotanagreement wascompatible with
WTO rulesgavearepresentative picture ofwhathadhappened during themeeting. Itwasparticularly
importantthatthereportconstitutedafaithfulrepresentationoftheinterestsandabalancedrepresentation
ofthepositions which hadbeenputforward atthemeeting. Itwastherefore stillnecessary forthe
Members oftheCommittee tohavetheopportunity toconfirm thatthewhole report wasanaccurate
reflection oftheirpositions. Itwashisunderstanding thatMembers would begiven theopportunity
tocomment onthefactual part,butthattheprocedure would inpractice leadtoveryfewamendments.
Duringdebatesinthepast,eitherthepartiestotheagreementsorthirdpartieshadmadevaluejudgements
ontheinformation thathadbeensubmitted during theexamination. Such judgements constituted an
important partofthereport astheyreflected theviews ofparticipants onthedatapresented. Parties
should therefore begiven thepossibility ofexamining indepth thewayinwhich these matters were
described inthereport. Hesaidthat,inthepast,thedrafting oftheconclusions hadnotbeentoodifficult
astheconclusions werefairly short, given thattherehadbeennoconsensus onthecompatibility. The
personal views, orthejudgements onthefactual part,wereoften discussed byparticipants. Perhaps
there wasadifferent wayofsolving theproblem; theprocedure reaching from theprovision ofthe
firstdraftbytheSecretariat uptotheadoption ofthefinalreport bytheCommittee could besimplified,
shortened, andmade asinformal aspossible, sothatparticipants could tryandfindaconsensus, in
acontext which would belessformal thanthatoftheCommittee.
45. TheChairman pointed outthatinthecontext ofthisCommittee, itwasopentoanydelegation
tocome backandoffercomments ontherecord oftheCommittee 'sprevious discussion atasubsequent
meeting. Ifadelegation considered thatitsviews hadbeenmisrepresented orthatadequate weight
towhatithadsaidhadnotbeenputinthereport, theproblem could becorrected byalaterintervention.
46. Therepresentative ofKorea saidthattheChairman 'ssuggestion concerning theformat ofthe
proposed report sounded interesting tohisdelegation andcarried anumber ofadvantages. Firstof
all,delegations would havethefactual partofthereport wellinadvance ofwhatwould otherwise have
beenpossible. Inthisregard, Members would benefit from thewritten form ofthefactual partof
theexamination process. Afurther advantage wasthatthediscussion would bemore limited andthus
savetimefortheCommittee asawhole. Healsowondered whether thereport andthefactual part
should remain undivided sothatitwould bepossible torefertothefactual partintheconcluding part.
There could besome differences inthelegalimplications when having thefactual partseparated from
thereport, given thatthesummary records ofthediscussion would notbesubject toadoption bythe
Committee. Healsopointed outthatthecurrent Rules ofProcedure hadtobeamended iftheCommittee
adopted adifferent format forthereport.
47. Therepresentative ofMexico saidthatheagreed inprinciple withwhatother delegations had
said,inparticular withtheKorean delegation, about visualizing thewhole ofthereport, because if
thefactual partwastobedrawn upbytheSecretariat without theMembers concerned being abletoWT/REG/M/4
Page14
givetheirviews onthesubject, thelogical conclusion would bethatthefactual partwaspurely the
responsibility oftheSecretariat; thatwould notnecessarily mean thattheMembers hadaccepted it,
astheyhadnothadanyopportunity togivetheirviews onit.Itwould beakindofrecord, which,
duetoitsverynature, would notbeadopted bytheMembers. TheMembers would negotiate and
beinagreement orjointly responsible onlyfortheconclusions. Hisdelegation realized thattheproposal
didhave advantages from apractical point ofview. TheCommittee hadtoweigh these two
considerations against oneanother.
48. Therepresentative ofHungary supported thestatement made bytheSwiss delegation, especially
ontheneedforabalanced representation ofpositions inthereport.
49. TherepresentativeoftheEuropeanCommunitiessaidthatthesuggestionsmadebytheChairman
weresensible andshould betried. IftheCommittee needed toreturn toformer procedures, itcould
doso.Hedidnotseehidden trapsintheproposal, andhesuggested theproposal begiven some sort
ofpractical trial.
50. TheChairman suggested thefollowing modification totheproposal: tohavetheCommittee
takenoteoffactual partofthereport, andthenadopt theconclusions oftheexamination, sothatthe
twoparts would beofdifferent legalstatus.
51. Therepresentative ofNorway saidthathisdelegation sawmerit intheproposal andwould
giveitdueconsideration. Hewanted toflagthesame areas forcaution astheSwiss delegation had
done, inparticular concerning theneedforabalanced representation andtheneedtolookcloser into
therelationship between thepurely descriptive partofthefactual report, andthemore judgemental
partofthefactual report. Inrelation toPoint 16ofthechecklist, "theagreement onthenature and
content ofthereports oftheexamination oftheRTA", hesuggested thatitmight beuseful tostructure
thereport along thelinesoftheStandard Format.
52. TheChairman proposed thattheCommittee request theSecretariat toprepare anote, with
headings similar totheonesdiscussed during themeeting, butwithchanges totakeaccount ofsome
ofthesuggestions which hadbeenmade during thediscussion. Under those headings, theSecretariat
should trytoprovide theCommittee withoptions astohowtheCommittee could make some ofthe
ideasoperational. Hesuggested thattheSecretariat begin onthebasisofideaswhich hadbeenexpressed
inmeetings intheCommittee, andwhich hadbeensetoutinpapers submitted bydelegations.
53. TheCommittee tooknoteofthestatement 'smade andagreed totheChairman 'sproposal.
D. Systemic implications ofAgreements andInitiatives fortheMultilateral Trading System
andtheRelationship Between Them
54. TheChairman recalled thatwithaview toenhancing itsunderstanding ofthesystemic
implications, theCommittee, atitsSecond Session, hadagreed toinitiate ahorizontal review ofcertain
provisions which cutacross RTAs, regional trade initiatives andthemultilateral trading system, as
embodied intheWTO Agreement. Tothatend,theCommittee hadadopted aChairman 'sproposal
tofocus work initially ontechnical barriers totrade (TBT) andsanitary andphytosanitary measures
(SPS), andhadrequested theSecretariat toprepare astudy onthatbasis. Based ontheoutcome of
thatstudy, theCommittee would consider reviewing other provisions. Inthiscontext, theCommittee
hadinvited Members tosubmit anyrelevant information which could assist theCommittee inthiswork.
TheNoteprepared bytheSecretariat hadbeencirculated asdocument WT/REG/W/8. Itsetoutthe
most relevant provisions oftheTBTandSPSAgreements oftheWTO andlisted thecomparableWT/REG/M/4
Page15
provisions inthose RTAs which hadbeennotified andwerecurrently subject toexamination bythe
Committee. Thestudy should beviewed asapilot study only, asitwasnotintended tobe
comprehensive. Further, attheCommittee 'slastmeeting, delegations hadrequested theSecretariat
toprepare achecklist ofpoints raised bydelegations inthecontext oftheexamination oftheNAFTA
andtheAgreement ontheEnlargement oftheEuropean Communities, which were ofrelevance to
thediscussion onsystemic issues. Thisinformal checklist hadbeenforwarded todelegations before
themeeting.
55. Therepresentative ofKorea recalled thattheChairman hadstated thataconsensus existed to
submit arecommendation toMinisters attheSingapore Conference withregard totheCommittee 's
future work. Itwasessential thatMinisters atSingapore givethisCommittee guidance onitsfuture
work programme onsystemic issues. Inaneffort tofacilitate theCommittee 'spreparation ofitsreport
totheMinisterial Conference, hisdelegation would submit adraft decision fortheCommittee 's
consideration which contained theelements included inKorea 'sdocument distributed asWT/REG/W/4.
Hewelcomed theinformal consultations theChairman hadthusfarconducted, andencouraged the
Chairman tocontinue thesewithaviewtodrawing upaconsensus ontherecommendation tobeincluded
intheCommittee 'sreport.
56. Therepresentative ofUnited States saidthattheactivities oftheCommittee provided agood
basis fordiscussing systemic effects ofregional agreements onthesystem asawhole, atopic which
was,andshould be,difficult toseparate fromtheexamination andreview process ofindividual RTAs.
Thishadbeenconfirmed bytheCommittee 'sfirstfourdaysofreview. Inthepastreview ofindividual
agreements, Working Parties hadbeenisolated andhadprovided littlebasis forcomparison among
agreements. Hisdelegation andothers hadatvarious occasions maintained thatexperience would be
gained through theexamination ofRTAs intheonesingle forum andthatthiswould beimportant to
determiningfurtherworkonregionalism.TheCommitteehadalreadyreviewedanumberofagreements,
some withsimilar features andothers withdifferent ones, andithadidentified arange ofsystemic
issues ineachreview. Hisdelegation considered theinformal checklist circulated bytheSecretariat
bothuseful andilluminating, butfarfrom complete. Itwasnotpossible tohaveafull,systematic
discussion, when thelistofsystemic issues wasstillrelatively sparse, andbased ononlytworeviews.
Noaccurate assessment ofthesystemic effects ofregionalism onthesystem, orconsideration ofrelated
measures waspossible without agoodpicture ofalltheagreements inthesystem, particularly inview
ofthebreadth andthevariety ofagreements thatexisted. Many ofthepreferential agreements between
WTO Members hadnever been notified, andhehoped thatother delegations would notify their
agreements assoonaspossible, sothattheycould beincluded intheCommittee 'sdiscussions and
contribute toitsconsideration ofsystemic issues. Hisdelegation encouraged theSecretariat toupdate
thechecklist andsuggested thattheCommittee planadiscussion oftheseissues forasubsequent meeting.
Hisdelegation alsoplanned tocompile alistofsystemic issues, which ithadidentified while preparing
forthereviews, forsubmission totheSecretariat forinclusion inthechecklist. Initsreport tothe
General Council, theCommittee should reflect onitspost-Singapore Work Programme, which could
include anumber ofgeneral points ontherelevance oftheCommittee 'swork anditsmandate. A
balanced, objective approach totheCommittee 'sreview ofregionalism hadtobetaken. Inthatcontext,
hesuggested thattheCommittee consider including theuniverse ofregional agreements covered by
theCommittee 'smandate; alloftheelements oftheCommittee 'smandate andtheirlinkages, which
parts ofthesystem hadworked inthepastandwhich hadnot; andhowregional agreements had
complemented thesystem andhowtheyhadnot.
57. Therepresentative oftheEuropean Communities saidthatthepapers distributed onsystemic
issues wereuseful. Theinformal checklist wasagoodstartandcould beexpanded totakeintoaccount
anumber ofother issues related totheassessment oftheconformity ofregional trading agreements
withtherulesofthemultilateralsystem.BasedonexperiencegainedfromtheCommittee'sexaminationsWT/REG/M/4
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itwould bepossible toaddanumber ofquestions tothatlistontherelationship between Article XXIV:4
oftheGATT andother provisions oftheGeneral Agreement. Document WT/REG/W/8 wasagood
example ofthatasitaddressed twoparticular setsofrules intheareas ofTBTandSPSwhich did
nothaveanimmediate linkbetween theexisting WTO rulesandtheruleswritten onthebasisofArticle
XXIV, butwhich theCommittee might, nevertheless, wishtoconsider. Thiswasanissuewhich could
immediately beadded tothelistofsystemic issues. Itwasalsopossible toaddtothatlistsome of
theotherquestions which hadexisted formany years about theoperation ofArticle XXIV, inparticular,
questions about themeaning ofvarious phrases, suchas"substantially allthetrade", and"duties and
otherrestrictiveregulationsofcommerce".Thesewerelong-standingquestionsofunclearinterpretation,
andtheywerebydefinition systemic issues. Theytherefore needed tobeseenaspartoftheCommittee 's
universe ofquestions, ifnotitsuniverse ofagreements. Hefurthermore saidthatthere were also
questions ofprocedure which arose assystemic issues. There were, forexample, questions ofthe
evaluation ofthegeneral incidence ofduties andother restrictive regulations ofcommerce before and
aftertheformation ofaregional grouping; alsothemeaning oftheplanandschedule thatmight be
attached toaninterim agreement. Turning tothestatement made bytherepresentative ofKorea on
theCommittee 'sreport, hewasoftheviewthat,atthepresent stage, thereport would needtofocus
onwork inprogress rather thanonitsfuture work. Hisdelegation would counsel infavour ofasober
appreciation ofthescope ofthetasks thattheCommittee faced.
58. Therepresentative ofThailand, speaking onbehalf ofASEAN, saidthatshereserved her
delegation 'srighttocome backtotheSecretariat 'spaper atalaterstage. Asapreliminary comment
shesaidthatincluding extensive technical analysis onotherissues, suchasagriculture, textiles, clothing,
anti-dumping andrulesoforigin might beneeded. Thestudy wasnotexhaustive andtheexercise should
notprejudice anyconclusions. AstotheTerms ofReference oftheCommittee, iftheCommittee should
renegotiate orreinterpret theprovisions ofArticle XXIV, itwould mean changing Article XXIV, and
would necessarily involve negotiations between Members. Thiswasamajor exercise andwould also
havesystemiceffectsvis-à-visthewholeWTOsystem.ThiswasanimportantissuewhichtheCommittee
hadtoconsider verycarefully. Shetherefore suggested thatasubstantial discussion ontechnical analysis
onthisissue should takeplace aftertheSingapore Ministerial Conference. Sheunderlined thatsuch
anexercise should notprejudice theconsideration given totheRTAs ofdeveloping countries notified
under theEnabling Clause.
59. Therepresentative ofJapan saidthathisdelegation would liketoseetheMinisters atthe
Ministerial Meeting inSingapore sendthepolitical message thatregional integration should supplement
andstrengthen themultilateral freetradesystem. TheMinisters should welcome some oftheconcrete
progress thathadbeenmade during thedeliberations intheCommittee. Hisdelegation would also
liketoseetheMinisters attheSingapore Meeting asktheCommittee todesign work programmes to
review some aspects oftheGATT 'slegal framework which concerned regional integration. Inthe
declaration oftheMinisterial Meeting, hisdelegation would liketoseeacallforclarification ofthe
existing legalframework under theGATT concerning regional integration. Regarding theinformal
checklist, there didnotseem tobeaclear definition ofasystemic issue. Hesupported theviews
expressed bytheEuropean Communities thattheissues onwhich Members haddifferent interpretations
should beincluded inthelistofthesystemic issues. Infact,those were issues overwhich the
examinationprocesstendedtofalter.Whathisdelegationmeantbyproposingtheexaminationguidelines
wasthat,unless theCommittee agreed ontheinterpretation ofthose issues, itcould nothaveaneffective
examination onindividual agreements. Asanexample, hementioned hisdelegation 'sarguments on
theautomatic extension ofanti-dumping measures tonewMembers made during theCommittee 's
examination oftheECEnlargement. When NAFTA hadbeenexamined, hisdelegation hadhad
comments onthepreferential rules oforigin, andwhen theCommittee examined theFreeTrade
Agreement between theEuropean Union andPoland, hisdelegation hadmade astatement about the
newtariff taken byPoland onnewautomobiles. Hefurthermore raised theissue oftheexclusion ofWT/REG/M/4
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agriculture fromanumber ofRTAs andthelinked issueoftheinterpretation of"substantially alltrade".
Hisdelegation would liketoaskthequestion ofthestatus oftheFreeTrade Areas (FTAs) under the
Enabling Clause, asraised bythedelegate ofThailand. Also, there hadbeenthequestion ofwhether
accession would beopentoMembers whowished tojointheFTAs. Allthose issues onwhich members
oftheCommittee haddifferent interpretations needed tobeincluded inthechecklist ofthesystemic
issues. Asforthepilotstudies, hisdelegation would welcome reactions fromother Members onthe
proposaltoextendtheexercisetoincludesomecontroversialissues,suchasanti-dumpingandpreferential
rules oforigin.
60. Therepresentative ofPakistan saidthattheinformal checklist wasquite useful forinitiating
thediscussion. However, aspointed outbyother delegates, theCommittee might needtoexpand the
listasitmoved forward inthediscussion. Thefundamental issue wastheimpact ofArticle XXIV
onthebalance ofrights andobligations created byother provisions oftheGATT, most notably the
most-favoured-nation (m.f.n.). RTAs werebasically anexception tothem.f.n. principle. Theincrease
inthenumber andscope ofRTAs was,therefore, acause ofconcern. Moreover, thetrend towards
theemergence ofmegablocs wasanother matter ofserious concern. Hisdelegation feltthatthesituation
might leadtoarrangements between megablocs, which would bypass thefundamental principle ofm.f.n.
Therights ofthirdparties would bejeopardized andthefateofthemultilateral trading system itself
would beindoubt. Hisdelegation therefore strongly supported theexamination oftheexisting legal
framework, withaview toensuring theconformity ofRTAs withtheobjectives ofthemultilateral
trading system. Modalities toimprove themechanism ofexamining RTAs andtocompensate third
parties forinjury caused bythecreation ofRTAs needed tobeconsidered. TheUruguay Round
Understanding ontheInterpretation ofArticle XXIV hadnotchanged thebasic shortcomings ofthe
GATT rules, ithadonlydefined some ofthemwithgreater precision. Firstly, although Article XXIV
concentrated ontariffmeasures, eventheassessment oftheirimpact onthirdparties wasnotcomplete,
asitwasbased ontheaverage tariff reduction. Thatcalculation ignored thefactthatexports ofthird
parties might beconcentrated inafewsectors andaverage tariff reduction wasrather irrelevant in
thatrespect. Indeed, there wasnowayforthatincomplete quantitative assessment tofullycapture
theadverse economic impact onthirdparties. Secondly, theimpact ofmeasures other thantariffs,
suchasanti-dumping, preferential rules oforigin, technical standards, subsidies andcountervailing
measures, wasevenmore difficult toquantify. Atthesame time, thescope andimportance ofthose
measures hadincreased inthepost-Uruguay Round period. Toillustrate this,acomparison of
anti-dumping actions between thethree newECMember States prior totheiraccession andtheEU
showedthat,whiletheEuropeanCommunitieshadappliedanti-dumpingdutiesand/orpriceundertakings
withrespect to57products, Austria andFinland hadapplied price undertakings withrespect toonly
twoandoneproduct, respectively, while Sweden hadtaken nosuchmeasure. Thatexample pointed
totheurgent needforamechanism forqualitative assessment ofsuchmeasures inRTAs. Amore
general issue wasthatoftiming ofnotification totheWTO ofregional trading agreements andtheir
enlargements. While hisdelegation wasaware ofon-going initiatives regarding theFreeTrade Area
fortheAmericas (FTAA) andtheAsia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), nonotification tothe
WTO wasexpected. Examination ofthings thathadalready beendone andsealed hadlittlevalue;
thatwasoneofthereasons whytheGATT procedures hadsofarbeenoflimited effect. Hisdelegation
reminded theCommittee thatonlytwooftheexisting integration groupings hadbeenformally found
tobeincompliance withArticle XXIV. There wasalsoaneedforanassessment ofeffects ofRTA
rules innewareas. Hisdelegation wasparticularly concerned about RTA rules intheareaoftrade
inservices, andabout theintegration oflabour markets. Hehoped tohavetheopportunity todiscuss
those issues attheappropriate time.
61. TherepresentativeofCanadasaidthattheconsiderationofsystemicimplicationswasanimportant
aspect ofthemandate oftheCommittee. TheCommittee, sofar,hadtriedtoprovide some direction
toitswork onthismatter andhadrequested theSecretariat toprepare thepilotstudy onTBTandSPS,WT/REG/M/4
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asawayofexamining issues horizontally. Ahorizontal approach wasawayofaddressing issues that
hadnotinthepastbeenthoroughly assessed intypical Article XXIV reviews. Some ofthesuggestions
hadalready beenmentioned byotherdelegations. Hisdelegation looked forward toreceiving theKorean
paper outlining apossible Ministerial Decision, which would contain aWork Programme forthe
Committee onsystemic issues. Theideaofamore precise Work Programme fortheCommittee was
desirable because itwould pavethewayfortheCommittee todevelop itspriorities andwork after
theSingapore Ministerial Meeting. Theinformal checklist ofsystemic issues wasanother element
oftheWork Programme thatdeserved consideration asitcontained aseries ofissues thatwereconcrete
andreferred specifically tothetypeofproblems thattheCommittee wasconfronted with. Itcould
beexpanded toinclude other ideas thathadbeenputforward. Thereport totheSingapore Ministerial
Conference would focus onwork-in-progress, but,given theimportance oftheworkunder thisparticular
itemoftheCommittee 'smandate, therewasalsoaneedtoprovide some sense ofdirection astowhere
theCommittee should gooverthenextfewyears. Theideas thathadbeenbrought totheattention
totheCommittee inKorea 'sandinJapan'spapers would serve auseful purpose inthatrespect.
62. Therepresentative ofMexico recalled thattheterm"systemic implications" hadbeenthelast
termagreed tointheTerms ofReference oftheCommittee. Ifthese words hadbeenchosen, itwas
forareason. With respect todocument WT/REG/W/8, hisdelegation hoped thatthework would
eventually givetheCommittee aclearer ideaofwhat thesystemic implications ofRTAs forthe
multilateral trade system were, notnecessarily inthecontext oflegal implications. Thedocument
contained ofalistofagreements which contained TBTprovisions relating totherelevant provisions
oftheWTO Agreement onTBT, butnodelegation haddrawn theconclusion thatthisfacthadsystemic
implications. Itwould beinteresting toidentify those. Systemic implications didnotnecessarily mean
legalshortcomings orproblems ofinterpretation, aswasstated inthechecklist. Thedocument was
correctly labelled apilotstudy. Thiswork would onlybecontinued iftheCommittee considered it
useful foritswork ontheissueofsystemic implications. Unlike other delegations, hisdelegation did
notpropose anynewissuetobeincluded under theTerms ofReference. Hethenturned totheinformal
checklist ofsystemic matters andsought clarification ofwhatwasmeant by"systemic implications",
ortitlessuchas"problems ofinterpretation" or"legal shortcomings". Infact,atonepointthechecklist
wenttoofarbecause itwasnotreally clearwhether these wereshortcomings orjustsimply theresults
oftheUruguay Round negotiations. There were areas where hisdelegation sawtheneed for
improvements, andwhich might mean thereopening oftheUruguay Round package. Thechecklist
didnotcontain allopinions. Hisdelegation looked forward toreceiving theKorean proposal fora
draftMinisterial Decision. Hisdelegation wasnotopposed tolegalimprovements toArticle XXIV,
butthereport hadtobeclearonwhathadalready beenagreed upon andonwhatdelegations would
liketheCommittee toagree upon inthefuture, because thatformed partofthenegotiating package.
63. TherepresentativeofIndiasaidthatdocumentWT/REG/W/8setoutthemostrelevantprovisions
oftheWTO Agreements onTBTandSPS,aswellasthecomparable provisions inthose RTAs which
hadbeennotified. Asapreliminary observation itappeared thatprovisions relating toTBTandSPS
measures insome oftheRTAs could affect theinterests ofother WTO Members notparties tothe
relevant RTAs. TheCommittee should discuss thisissue indetail. Hisdelegation reserved theright
torevert totheinformal checklist ofsystemic matters submitted bytheSecretariat.
64. TherepresentativeofKoreasaidthatdocumentWT/REG/W/8lackedanalysissinceitcomprised
onlyanaccumulation ofrelevant provisions appearing sporadically invarious RTAs. Hewasofthe
view thattheCommittee must gofurther, using thedocument asafoundation. Forexample, the
document listed aprovision intheEFTA-Romania FreeTrade Agreement which stipulated thatthe
parties would holdimmediate consultations withregard toanymeasures which might have TBT
implications.OtherprovisionscarryingpossibleimplicationsfortheCommittee'sworkincludedsections
ofNAFTA, which triedtointerpret themeaning ofunnecessary obstacles inthecontext oftheTBTWT/REG/M/4
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application. Turning totheinformal checklist, hesaidthatitwasnotexhaustive andneeded tobe
expanded astheCommittee proceeded withthefurther examination ofRTAs. During theexamination
oftheNAFTA, hisdelegation hadnoticed anaspect ofthecomparisons oftariff andrestrictive
regulations which might constitute asystemic matter interms ofArticle XXIV:5(b): given the
interlocking networks ofvarious RTAs involving Members, theCommittee might havetoconfront
thematter ofoverlapping tariff schedules andrestrictive regulations; inother words, itmight need
toaskwhether thetariff andrestrictive regulations which existed before theestablishment ofanRTA
should beconsidered inthecalculation ofthose comparisons. Thisissue should beincluded inthe
checklist.
65. Therepresentative ofSwitzerland saidthatthepilotstudy prepared bytheSecretariat showed
thatalmost alltheTBTandSPSprovisions inRTAs called forthenegotiated treatment ofproblems
inthatarea. Anobligation tonegotiate orconsult among Members ofregional agreements could not
beasystemic problem. Contrary towhattheKorean delegation expressed, itmight evenstrengthen
themultilateral system because thedebates within aregional agreement might contribute toimproving
thesystem, ortheagreement. Thechange ofalegislative orgovernment practice might bebeneficial
tothewhole system. TheNAFTA contained aslightly different provision, butthere wasnoproblem
regarding thesystemic impact oftheTBTandSPSprovisions. Hesaidthattheprovisions listed by
theSecretariat didnotseemtocontain anysubstantive obligations. Theagreements didnotcontravene
theTBTorSPSprovisions oftheWTO, suchasthestandards defined, andthere wasnothing which
made access bythird-party countries more difficult; rather, thestudy seemed toshow thatinthatarea,
noproblem existed. Thesituation might become alittlemore problematic ifthere wasanagreement
ofmutual recognition between themembers ofaregional agreement, which implied narrower access
foraproduct from athirdparty; inthatcase, theCommittee might wishtoinvoke those provisions
oftheWTO which callforconsultations, inconformity withopenregionalism. Itwasaconcept which
wascontained intheSecretariat 'sstudy onregionalism, andtheCommittee should follow uponthis
inthefuture. Finally, henoted thatthework inthepilotstudy revealed different ways toanalyze
problems: theCommittee could discuss them withrespect totheTBTprovisions, oritcould discuss
them intheexamination ofeachregional agreement. Thepurpose ofthatmeeting wastodiscuss the
systemicimplications;whileitwasagoodexercise,itwasnarrowlylimitedbythetwootherCommittees
thatwerealready carrying outwork toseewhether therewasnon-compliance withaWTO agreement
orprovision.
66. Therepresentative ofAustralia saidthatthediscussion provided aclearer ideaoftheareas
which delegations considered problematic, whether systemic orprocedural. Thepilotstudies onTBT
andSPSissues wereagood startfortheprocess ofassessing theimpact ofRTAs onthemultilateral
trading system. Herdelegation wasalsointerested inhowsuchprovisions played outinpractice, in
terms ofaccess forthirdparties, ascompared tothatformembers ofregional trading agreements.
67. Therepresentative ofCanada saidthathisdelegation readthepaper assuggesting thatvarious
regional agreements hadtaken adifferent approach toTBTissues. Forinstance, inNAFTA theissue
ofmutual recognition wasafundamental aspect ofTBTprovisions, whereas insome other agreements,
notably theECAssociation Agreements withvarious EastEuropean countries, there wasatendency
tousetheharmonization approach. Thefactthatagreements tookdifferent approaches toparticular
problem areas, ortoaparticular trade discipline, might point topotential systemic implications, in
particular, totheextent towhich theuseofadifferent approach might facilitate further multilateral
discipline inanarea. Ifthere wereonepartoftheworld using oneapproach andanother partusing
adifferent one,aquestion thatdeserved attention waswhether thetwomight bereconciled laterin
themultilateral context. AstheCommittee examined various regional initiatives, questions ofTBT
orSPSwerealsobeing discussed, and,presumably, different approaches tothesequestions werebeing
explored. Itwould beinteresting toseehowtheyfitwiththeparadigm, notjustonabroad, regionalWT/REG/M/4
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initiative basis, butalsoinregional initiatives atthesectoral level, suchastelecommunications. Those
alsocould reveal ways inwhich initiatives taken bilaterally, plurilaterally orataregional levelmight
fittogether inthemultilateral context. Insum,thehorizontal study asapilotproject hadalready called
attention tohowprovisions intheWTO andinanumber ofregional agreements might interact currently
orinthefuture. Inthatvein, theCommittee could deepen itsanalysis ofTBTcoverage while also
doing asimilar typeofanalysis formany other areas covered bybothWTO andregional disciplines.
68. Therepresentative ofMexico agreed thatthepilotstudy wasuseful inhighlighting thetwo
distinct trends ofmutual recognition andharmonization thatwereemerging. TheCommittee needed
toconsider theimplications forthemultilateral system, going beyond legalanalysis.
69. Therepresentative ofSwitzerland pointed outthattheTBT Agreement provided forboth
harmonization andmutual recognition.
70. TheChairmansaidthatthepilotstudywasnotreallyananalysisbutratheralistingofprovisions,
which leftituptodelegations toanalyze whether thoseprovisions represented anysystemic implications.
Already different viewpoints werebeing expressed. More discussion seemed necessary onthisspecific
pilotstudy,toseewhethertheCommitteemightdrawoutmoreideasandperhapsreachsomeconclusions
ontheutility oftheroute, before itwentontoaddother studies toitswork. Ithadbeensuggested
thattherewereotherareaswhere asimilar approach might beeffective; theCommittee would probably
takethem upbecause there appeared tobesome utility inthatroute. Those delegations whowere
involved inregional initiatives ofvarious sorts might consider assisting theCommittee withthe
development ofthataspect ofitswork. There hadbeenpreliminary discussions about howfarthe
Committee should gointotheanalysis oflegalprovisions asitlooked atsystemic implications. For
thefirsttimetheCommittee wastrying todrawmatters outoftheexamination ofagreements andbring
themintothesystemic discussion. Although timewastooshorttobring analysis toaconclusion before
theSingapore Ministerial, initial work showed thatthere wasconsiderable room foranexpanded and
enlarged exercise ofthissortintheensuing months. Hethenturned totheCommittee 'sreport tothe
General Council andsuggested thatitincorporate threedifferent parts. Thefirstpartwould beaclear,
succinct description ofwhattheCommittee hadaccomplished since itscreation, withreference being
made toafewimportant achievements andpossibly some information ontheimportance ofregionalism
andthenumber ofagreements thatwereoutstanding. Thesecond partwould dealwiththefuture work
programme envisaged bytheCommittee. Theprocess ofdrafting thispartwould berelatively smooth
sincetheCommittee hadseenelements ofitsfuture action witheachsuccessive areaofwork ittackled.
Inthispart,theCommittee could notethatithadmade substantial progress withrespect toboththe
systemic issues andtheexamination procedures, butthatmuch remained tobedoneinsuchareas as
thebiennial reporting requirement andthebacklog ofagreements, which needed tobedealtwithas
apriority.ThereportcouldmentionsomeoftheCommittee'simpressiveaccomplishments,forexample,
thefactthatithadexamined three RTAs inonemorning when some timeagoithadtaken 18months
todothesame thing, andindicate thatithoped tocontinue inthisconstructive manner. Finally, the
thirdpartwould entail apolitical declaration prepared forusebyMinisters inSingapore, withafocus
onrelevant issues arising from Committee work.
71. TheCommittee tooknoteofthestatements made.
E. Reporting ontheOperation ofAgreements
72. TheChairmanrecalledthatdocumentWT/REG/W/3containedachecklistofpointsfordiscussion
onthebiennial reporting requirements. Itseemed thattheStandard Format could provide auseful
basisfordiscussions onthepoints relating tothecontent andnature ofbiennial reports. Forexample,WT/REG/M/4
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theCommittee might wishtoconsider thepossibility ofbiennial reports updating information thatwould
haveinitially beenincluded intheStandard Format.
73. Therepresentative oftheUnited States saidthathisdelegation considered themostimportant
question tobetheobjective ofthebiennial review process. Thebiennial review wasafundamental
partofthesystem asatransparency exercise, anditwasawaytokeeptrack ofalltheagreements
inthesystem. Obviously, themultilateral system hadlosttrack ofmany agreements, notably those
which hadnotbeennotified. Ifthebiennial review process werecarefully designed, itdidnothave
tobeburdensome. Bybuilding upontheinformation provided inthereview process, theCommittee
could avoid creating excessive newwork. Itwould notmean repeating orreopening thereview process,
butsimply updating, asappropriate ornecessary, theinformation thatparties totheRTAhadprovided
intheinitial review process; Members whohadbeengranted waivers forspecific programmes could
berequired toinclude similar updates intheshort, factual annual reports theywererequired tosubmit
totheGeneral Council. Thereport could easily bebriefandinasimple format, replying toquestions
suchaswhatsignificant changes hadtaken place intheagreement; whether thecoverage hadchanged;
whether theagreement hadbeenimplemented according toschedule. TheCommittee could supplement
thatinformation withanupdate ofthetradedata. Thereport needed notentail arepeat oftheinformation
provided intheStandard Format. Hesaidthatitmade sense forthereviews tobeconducted inthe
Committee, withreports being made torelevant bodies. While theCommittee didnotcurrently have
amandate beyond making recommendations, itwasimportant thatthebiennial reporting beconducted
incounsel withother aspects oftheCommittee 'swork. TheCommittee could provide forreports to
besubmitted toitperiodically, withaview toincluding them asanagenda itemtoallow Members
toposequestions. Theopportunity toaskquestions wasanimportant point thatshould notbelimited
tothemoment ofthereview itself. Thisquestioning would notbeareopening oftheoriginal review,
butdelegations would befreetoraiserelevant andimportant issues, withafocus ontransparency and
continued orcloser adherence toWTO obligations. Inhisview, allagreements under theCommittee 's
responsibility should besubject tothatbiennial review process.
74. Therepresentative ofAustralia agreed withtheU.S.suggestions, including proposals fora
simple, standard format forthereports andanopportunity toaskquestions. Perhaps anautomatic
procedure could beadopted sothatthereports might bereferred totheCommittee foritsconsideration
andanyfurther action.
75. Therepresentative oftheEuropean Communities saidthattheCommittee should proceed with
caution, allowing sufficient timetodiscuss thefundamental question offollow-up reporting. Beyond
thequestion oftransparency, there seemed tobenoagreement astowhatreporting ought tobeaimed
at.Hisdelegation would notseeitasareopening ofthequestions raised intheoriginal examination,
anditwould welcome anymoves tomake reporting requirements simple. Emphasis stillneeded to
beplaced onclearing thebacklog which remained, anditwasthuspremature toturnthefocus tobiennial
reports. Hedisagreed withthefinalpointoftheU.S.intervention thatthereporting requirement ought
toapply toallagreements under thepurview oftheCommittee, insofar astheEuropean Communities
wasconcerned, itwasaMember oftheWTO onitsownright, andthusthetrade policy review
machinery served thatpurpose.
76. Therepresentative ofCanada saidthatthebiennial reporting wasanimportant feature ofthe
system, although there hadbeensome implementation problems. Soasnottooverload thesystem,
thebiennial reports should focus onchanges thatwould haveoccurred between, orduring, thereporting
period, andtheobligation should extend toallagreements under theWTO. They would allow the
Committee tohaveacomplete picture ofwhatwashappening.
77. TheCommittee tooknoteofthestatements made.WT/REG/M/4
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F. Other Business
- Observership ofinternational organizations intheCommittee
78. TheCommittee agreed thatthose organizations which hadbeeninvited toattend thatday's
meeting onanadhocbasis would beinvited toattend theCommittee 'snextmeeting.
- Thescheduling ofsome oftheagreements between EFTA andother countries
79. Therepresentative ofSwitzerland saidthattheEFTA States andtheBaltic States hadnotified
theconclusion offreetradeagreements between EFTA andrespectively Estonia, Latvia andLithuania.
Because theagreement superseded thethree bilateral agreements between Switzerland andtheBaltic
States, heproposed thattheCommittee delete those three examinations from itsschedule forearly
November. Since theEFTA-Baltic States Agreements hadbeennotified, theywould beexamined by
theCommittee, thusallowing questions which hadbeenraised concerning theSwiss-Baltics Agreements
tobeaddressed inthatcontext. TheEFTA States andtheirpartners wished toconduct theexamination
asseriously aspossible, andtheyintended toproduce adocument similar instructure andcontent to
theoneEFTA parties hadproduced fortheirfreetradeagreements withcountries ofCentral andEastern
Europe. However, theEFTA-Baltics document wasnotready yet,andtheWTO Members hadnot
hadtimetoaskquestions relating totherecently notified agreements, soitseemed appropriate toconduct
theirexamination lateron,perhaps atthebeginning ofthenextyear. Theparties totheagreement
would work asefficiently andquickly aspossible toprovide thenecessary information forthe
examination. Henoted thattheCommittee 'sschedule forNovember alsoincluded theexamination
offreetradeagreementsconcludedbetweentheEFTAStatesandBulgariaandRomania.TheCommittee
could consider examining theEFTA-Slovenia Agreement atthattimeaswell,sinceithadbeennotified
longagoandinformation onithadbeenincluded inthedocument submitted fortheexamination of
EFTA agreements withcountries ofCentral andEastern Europe. Although noquestions hadbeen
senttotheSecretariat concerning theEFTA-Slovenia Agreement, there wassufficient information in
thedocument submitted toallow theCommittee toproceed toanexamination.
80. TheChairmanproposedthattheCommitteepostponethereviewoftheEFTA-BalticsAgreements
tothebeginning ofthenewyear, delaying ittwomonths butanticipating another properly formatted
presentation fromEFTA States andtheircounterparts. Healsoproposed putting theEFTA-Slovenia
Agreement ontheagenda oftheseries ofmeetings inNovember, togowiththeEFTA-Romania and
theEFTA-Bulgaria Agreements.
81. TheCommittee soagreed.