WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/WGTCP/W/189
21 June 2002
(02-3456)
Working Group on the Interaction
between Trade and Competition PolicyOriginal:  English
COMMUNICATION FROM KOREA
The following is the final text of a paper received from the Permanent Mission of Korea
which was circulated as an advance copy for the Working Group's meeting of 23-24 April 2002.
_______________
THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE OF INTRODUCING AND
ENFORCING COMPETITION LAW
(April 23 - 24, 2002, WTO Trade . Competition Working group)
I. INTRODUCTION
1. In November of last year, the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha proposed
"capacity building" in developing countries through technical assistance programmes as a prerequisite
to the launch of a new round on competition issues.
2. At present, some 80 countries have introduced competition law in their legislations while
around 30 countries are currently preparing to introduce competition laws.  Taking this into
consideration, technical assistance is essential in establishing competition systems and effectively
enforcing competition law in the above countries.
3. In the last two decades, while undergoing the application of competition law, Korea realized
the importance of technical assistance as it was transformed from a recipient to a provider/supplier of
technical support.
4. Due to past government led strategies for economic growth, Korea had experienced difficulty
in grounding a competitive market structure.  Howeve r, Korea was able to secure institutional growth,
as well as political support, as a result of active technical assistance from organizations such as theOECD, WTO and UNCTAD.
5. Therefore, such a case as ours is certain to provide significant illustrations to many
developing countries and those economies in transition who are striving to settle a market economic
order through deregulation and privatization.
6. In its effort to share Korea's valuable experi ence with developing countries, the KFTC has
faithfully worked towards building bridges between developing and developed countries by
implementing international competition policy workshops since 1996 and technical assistance
programmes in diverse forms.
7. Accordingly, by illustrating the contents of Korea's technical assistance programmes for
developing countries and suggesting how to establish components in the process of introducing andWT/WGTCP/W/189
Page 2
enforcing competition law, we hope to contribute to the current discussions in the WTO through the
following presentation.
II. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE KFTC FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
A. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES
1. Seoul Competition Forum
8. Promoting the Seoul Competition Forum for proclaiming the importance of competition and
advancing its competition culture.
9. The First Seoul Competition Forum was held in April 2001 with the theme of "New Tasks
facing Competition Authorities with the coming of Globalization and Informatization".  This was an
event commemorating the 20th year of Korean Fair Trade Law enforcement.
10. Present at this event, were numberous high level officers and competition law experts
including Minister Iliya Yuzhanov of Russia, Vice Council Chairman Frédéric Jenny of France,
Council Chairman Rimantas Stanikunas of Lithuania and Commission Chairperson Tzong-Leh
Hwang of Taiwan.
11. The 2nd Forum is expected to be co-hosted with the UNCTAD in November of this year.
The aim is to discuss the problems faced by developing and transitional economies during the processof introducing and enforcing competition law.
12. As such, the Forum is intended for the participation of high ranking members of competition
authorities from developed countries and commissioner level members from developing and transition
economies.
13. The subject of  discussion is planned to be:  (1) economic growth and its interrelationship with
competition & competition policy, (2) formation of competition policy & strengthening of
enforcement power, (3) competition authorities' ro le of competition advocacy and (4) the future of
Korea's competition policy.
14. The KFTC plans to specialize the Forum for developing and transition countries and develop
it as a hub of discussions on competition policy in North East Asia.
2. International Workshop on Competition Policy
(Appendix : Contents of Technica l Assistance Programme by Year)
15. Since 1996, the KFTC, as a joint host with th e OECD, held the International Workshop on
Competition Policy for competition policy authorities of many developing and transitional countries
to deal with the main issues of competition law such as cartels and M&A.
• From 1996, a total of 22 countries, 122 trainees and 23 foreign lecturers participated
• This Year's Event Period:  Monday 11 November to Thursday 14 November.16. In the beginning, invitations were extended mainly to those countries of APEC.  However, in
recent workshops, regions of invited countries were expanded to include transition countries of theEuropean and  developing countries of other regions.WT/WGTCP/W/189
Page 3
17. Furthermore, the general participants of earlier workshops centered around working level
officials.  However, by broadening the range of general participants to include the leaders of
competition authorities, the workshop has contributed to discussions on competition issues and to
building a network for cooperation among competition authorities.
18. In addition, while the earlier workshops were conducted by holding lectures and question
sessions on the major issues in competition law, later workshops generated greater participation as
attending members were encouraged to introduce and discuss the actual cases of their home countries.
3. Establishment of New Course on Competition Law & Policy for Market Economy
19. Beginning this year, a new course lecturing the experience of implementing fair trade law and
enforcing policy was introduced into the Korea In ternational Cooperation Agency's (KOICA) training
course for developing countries.  The course is aimed at explaining and illustrating the Korean system
of fair trade law.
20. With the increase in demand for technical assistance and the changed characteristics of the
international workshop on competition policy the necessity of technical assistance is becoming a
greater priority.
• Invited Persons:  Working level officials of competition policy in developing and transition
countries.
• Invited Countries include:  Bulgaria, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Latvia, Pakistan, Peru, Romania,
Russia, Morocco, South Africa, Thailand, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Zambia.
• Speakers:  Competition law experts from the Korea Fair Trade Commission.
4. Establishment of New Course on "Assistance to Chinese Introduction of Competition
Law"
21. Since China's joining of the WTO, a new course was set up in KOICA's training programme
for China, in order to contribute to the Chines e groundwork for the market economy system and the
promotion of their competition policies by assisting their introduction of competition law.
22. The implementation of this new course is in recognition of the fact that, with China's
increasing presence in the international economy, China's adoption of competition law will contributegreatly to enhanced efficiency in the international economy.
- Invited Persons:  15 working level officials of the Chinese competition authorities
- Programme Date:  Thursday 18 - Wednesday 31 July 2002.
E. The Knowledge Partnership Programme in Competition Policy
23. With the purpose of sharing Korea's experience and knowledge of economic development and
overcoming economic crisis, and in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding between the
Korean Government and the World Bank, the Knowledge Partnership Programme was held jointly by
the KFTC, KDI and KOICA.
24. Korea dispatched 4 competition policy experts from the KFTC & the KDI to Indonesia.
During this short-term visit, the representatives organized workshops for local authorities and experts.
The workshop lasted from the 12th to the 13th of March this year.WT/WGTCP/W/189
Page 4
B. FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME
25. Since technical assistance carries various financial costs, there are limits constraining their
quantitative supply.  Therefore, we require careful effort in supplying the most suitable technical
assistance to developing countries within the limits of the resources given.
26. For this, the KFTC must strengthen its ties with international organizations and provide plans
for the efficient administration of technical assistance programmes.
27. Firstly, we much seek a change in perspective from the "provider-centered" to "recipient-
centered" technical assistance programme.  That is, we plan to proceed by unearthing demand
consistent with the stage of economic development and characteristics of economic structure of the
recipients of technical assistance.
28. This means that we will actively accommodate the requests of the recipient country and will
not be confined to a case analysis of the provider country, but also carry out joint analysis work oncurrent cases in the recipient country.
29. Secondly, existing technical assistance programmes plan to be diversified beyond previous
workshops and symposiums and include long or sh ort-term training programmes organized by KFTC
staff who will be dispatched directly to the recipient countries.
30. Thirdly, there also needs to be a diversification in the range of countries to which the
programme is available.  In the past, the KFTC technical assistance programme was limited to Asia's
developing countries and those transition economies in Eastern Europe.  However, in future, these
programmes will also be extended to regions of Africa and South America.
31. Finally, technical assistance will be strengthened through cooperation with international
organizations.  By working in close cooperation wi th organizations such as the WTO and the OECD,
we will be able to invite and build an international network among experts of competition law.
III. THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPETITION LAW AND CONTENTS OF
COMPETITION POLICY
A. P
OSITION OF THE COMPETITION AUTHORITY WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT
32. The position of the competition authority within the Government - degree of autonomy &
relationship with other government agencies - grea tly influences the competition authority' s role of
competition advocacy and its capacity to make effective and independent decisions.
33. In order to maintain this autonomy, most governments choose to either place an independent
committee, external to other government agencies, or position it within an administrative body while
enabling it to conduct independent activities.
34. Since Korea legislated the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) in 1981 and
established the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) under the jurisdiction of one of the most
powerful government agencies in Korea, namely the Economic Planning Board (EPB), the KFTC has
been able to ground competition policies in a relatively short period of time.
35. Through the 10 or so years of implementing the MRFTA, the fair trade system and authority
was able to find somewhat secure its place.  Consequently, through the Amendment of 1990, theKFTC was granted the autonomy to pursue its own polic ies, if only as a sub-organization of the EPB.WT/WGTCP/W/189
Page 5
In December of 1994, after the 4th Amendment to the MRFTA, the KFTC was elevated to an
independent central administrative body under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister where it remains
at present, free from the intervention of other governmental bodies in its activities.
36. As such, the autonomous position of the KFTC has become a source of very effective means
in reflecting the importance of the competition principle upon the decision making process ofgovernment.
37. First, under Article 63 of the MRFTA stating the need for prior consultation with the KFTC,
the Minister of the related administrative body must consult the KFTC Chairman when establishing or
amending a competition restraining legislation or  when approving other measures of which the
content is competition restrictive.
38. Second, the Chairman of the KFTC has the authority to attend or take the floor in a Cabinet
meeting while the Vice Chairman holds the authority to attend or take the floor at a Vice Ministers'meeting.  Despite arguments that the KFTC Chairman should not attend Cabinet meetings in order to
maintain the independence of the KFTC, due to the serious difficulty of amending a government
policy once it has been established and the Korean characteristic of difficulty in accessing crucial
information unless present at the event, the said aut hority is playing a very effective role in spreading
the competition principle in government.
39. The KFTC is simultaneously securing cooperation between government agencies during
policy consideration and autonomy during competiti on law enforcement through such organizational
independence, obligation of consultation prior to legislation and authority to attend and speak before
the Cabinet.
B. S
HIFTING TRENDS IN MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY & INTRODUCTION OF COMPETITION
LAW
40. The period from the 1960s to the 1970s was a time when under the direct/indirect
intervention, protection and support of the government, Korea was driven only by the pursuit of
growth.  Based on cheap, but high quality labor, insufficient capital was brought in from abroad to
develop particular strategic industries, after which the input of productive factors was increased andthe products were exported.
41. Such growth strategies were nearly inevitable under the economic conditions of the times, and
in fact, yielded the major achievement of rapid "quantitative" growth of the economy.
• Achievements of the growth strategies between the 1960s & 1980s:
GNP USD 2.1 billion /g213 USD 60.6 billion (30 fold),
National income per person USD 82 /g213 USD 1,597 (20 fold),
Exports 4.1 million /g213 USD 17.5 billion ( 440 fold)
42. However, viewed from the perspective of "market competition", it was a period when internal
& external competition was excluded.
43. As a result of strict entry regulations, there was very little domestic competition and nor was
there any strong foreign competitor on a par with Korea.  Since imports from abroad were strictlycontrolled while exports were unlimited, profitability was a certainty once one attained business
rights.WT/WGTCP/W/189
Page 6
44. The monopolistic market structure, concentration of economic power, and distortion of the
market function, all resulting from the lack of competition, later acted as factors restraining our
economy's qualitative development.
45. As international trade pressures became greater and the scale of the domestic economy
expanded during the 1980s, Korea attempted policy transitions towards strengthening the marketfunction and opening the market.  A fundamental shift in awareness and paradigm was sought such as
the attempt to shift policy trends, under the three banners of self-regulation, stability and open-
economy, away from those growth centered policies  of the past.  The MRFTA was also introduced
and enacted in 1981 with rising agreement on changes in such policy trends and general aspects of the
market economy.
46. In a word, the introduction of competition law in Korea can be considered an "ideological
transition" fulfilling the task of our times, to alleviate the adverse effects that accumulated duringyears of government-led growth strategies.
C. T
HE LEVEL OF MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS IN COMPETITION LAW
1. Prohibition of Hard Core Cartels
47. "Hard core" cartel activities such as price fixing, market segmentation, customer division and
bid rigging are declared illegal in most competition laws.  Cartels are illegal under the competitionlaws of major countries since their anti-competitive effects are clear and their enforcement relatively
simple.  Even in international organizations such as the OECD and the WTO, cartels are one of the
first areas of discussion for international cooperation in competition law and policy.
48. There are instances where cartels are permitted as a way to help overcome economic
recession and rationalize industries, but the conditions of permission are very strict.  Thus, permissionis very rarely granted and only temporary even when done so.
2. Prohibition of Vertical Restraints
49. Vertical restraints are those restraints, of contracts and business dealings, imposed by a
business at a higher level of the industry chain on a business at a lower level such as resale price
maintenance.
50. Vertical restraints are not only effective in excluding competitors and building barriers, but
can also increase distribution efficiency by solving distribution problems (e.g. general free-riding,
opportunistic activity, etc.) and have pro-competitive effects.  Accordingly, the majority of countries
apply the "rational principle" on vertical restraints other than resale price maintenance.
3. Restraints on Abuse of Dominant Market Position
51. The majority of the world's countries administer a control system against abuse of market
dominance in order to prevent corporations' abuse of a dominant position in the market.  In theimproper use of corporations' dominant position in the market, there are 5 types of activities which
effectively restrain competition, (1) price abuse practices, (2) delivery manipulation practices,
(3) business obstruction practices, (4) restraints on entry into new business sites, (5) and other anti-
competitive activities.
52. The KFTC achieved the result of preventing the occurrence of abusive practices by
implementing a system which designates and proclaims a dominant business as a market dominating
business.WT/WGTCP/W/189
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4. Prohibition of Mergers & Acquisitions through the Competition System
53. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) can have the effect of generating and enhancing efficiency,
but can also be a method of securing monopoly power.  In most countries, therefore, competition laws
include regulations anti-competitive M&A, for the prevention of centralized Market.  They do so
because M&A can bring about reduced competition or the appearance of market dominatingbusinesses.
54. That is, the greater the degree of market concentration, the greater the possibility of
exercising monopoly power and of collaboration am ong businesses.  This is why M&A, which may
result in market concentration, are selectively controlled.
55. Regulations on M&A include guidelines on methods of defining related markets, monopoly
power evaluation standards and the time periods, process, content and form of M&A notification.
56. For the purposes of reducing the burden of excess cost born by businesses as a consequence
of varying regulations in different countries, the OECD is promoting the international convergence of
review processes, reporting periods, and form.  It is also extending efforts to promote the exchange of
information among competition authorities.
5. Competition Advocacy System
57. Competition advocacy refers to all those activities which reduce government intervention in
the market, increase the efficiency of the market mechanism and, as a result, enhance the welfare of
consumers and citizens.  Because it costs a great deal of time and money to amend anti-competitive
laws or systems once they have been put in place, the function of competition advocacy is necessary
for the purposes of prior prevention.
58. In the interest of efficiently carrying out the role of competition advocacy, the competition
authority should be given sufficient authority and, at the same time, be independent of regulating
bodies trying to maintain regulatory power.  Furthermore, it is necessary to develop a logic of
regulation reform in the competition authority in or der to fulfill the role of competition advocacy and
it is also necessary to establish an agency in sole charge of competition advocacy.
6. Competition Regulations and Exemptions
59. Each country, for various reasons, maintains articles of law completely or partially exempting
certain industries or sectors from the application of competition law.  Exemplars of this are utility
industries such as telecommunications and electricity which had been excluded or exempt from
competition law application because it was subject to direct government participation (such as state-
owned enterprises) or regulation under the belief that utility industries have a natural monopolistic
aspect.
60. However, the range of exemptions from competition law is gradually being reduced because
competition has become possible through alleviation of regulations and technological developments in
areas where corporations had previously enjoyed a monopoly position.
7. Rules of Process for Enforcing Competition Law
61. For the effective enforcement of competition law, it must include regulations on the
competition authority's organization, function and pow er, sanctions, procedure of appeal and process
of claiming liabilities.WT/WGTCP/W/189
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IV. THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPETITION LAW AND COMPETITION POLICY
A. SYSTEM OF INTRODUCING COMPETITION LAW
62. The general procedure for processing cases is composed of the following stages:  (1) report
the commencement of a case review, (2) review of facts, (3) committee adjudication, (4) formal
appeal and administrative litigation.
(1) Reporting the Commencement of Review
• When a law violation is either reported or authority recognized, an investigator will determine
whether the content is subject to the law and, if it is subject to the law, investigations and reviewprocesses get under way after the commencing of review is reported.
(2)  Review of Facts
• The content of notification and documentary evidence is reviewed and, when deemed necessary, a
field investigation like that of work sites takes place.
• If, as a result of reviewing the case, the reviewer finds:
- practices in violation of the law and decides on the need for corrective measures, a
review report is composed and the case is introduced before the Committee and aruling is requested.
- When practices are determined as legal, the reviewees are declared free from
suspicion.
(3) Committee Adjudication
• After the Committee deliberations on the case, if a legal violation is recognized, a ruling is made
for corrective measures of the degree and content corresponding to the seriousness of the violation
- The content of corrective measures include corrective orders, penalty fines and
prosecutions.
(4) Formal Appeal and Administrative Litigation
- Should the reviewee fail to comply with the measures imposed by the Committee, the
reviewee may call for an appeal or request an administrative litigation, within 30 days
of receiving the notice penalty.
B. T
HE COMPETITION AUTHORITY 'S ROLE OF COMPETITION ADVOCACY
1. The Concept and Importance of Competition Advocacy
63. Competition advocacy refers to the various efforts towards improving utilization of
competition principles and means available in the market economy during the policy decision-making
and regulation process of the government.  In other words, the government's urging of companies
subject to privatization towards structural changes promoting competition, and their efforts to find and
abolish the economic regulations reducing consumer welfare, can be included in what is viewed as
competition advocacy.WT/WGTCP/W/189
Page 9
64. Once an anti -competitive law or system is put in place, and no matter how negative the
effects, it will usually cost a great deal of time and money to amend them and it is, therefore,
necessary to carefully control the establishment of such a system in advance.
2. Systemic Mechanisms for Competition Advocacy
65. To ensure the effectiveness of competition advocacy, the competition authority must be
equipped with the appropriate powers and resources.  Furthermore, the capacity to participate in the
government decision-making process at opportune moments should also be ensured.
66. The KFTC performs the competition advocacy role through the ex ante  competition advocacy
system (through consultation prior to legislation of competition restraining laws and attending and
speaking before the Cabinet), ex post facto  competition advocacy system (Regulation Reform
Committee activities) and the establishment and administration of an agency in sole charge of
competition advocacy.
The ex ante  competition advocacy system:  a system for preventing the establishment of an anti-
competitive system
(1) Consultation Prior to Legislation of Competition Restraining Laws.
- Under Article 63 of the MRFTA, when the head of any pertinent administrative
agency pursues legislation or enforces policies that impose competition restraints, the
head is required to consult with the KFTC.
(2) Attending and speaking before the Cabinet
- The Cabinet meeting acts as an important channel of communication through which
the KFTC can raise greater awareness of competition principles among the highest
officials.  As heads in charge of the different ministries, these officials attempt to
intervene in various ways whenever a socio-economic problem arises.
Ex post facto  competition advocacy system:  activities attempting to reform the existing anti-
competitive system into one more competition-friendly
- The "Economic Regulation Reform Committee", which was previously run by the
KFTC, was put under the authority of the President as of April 1998 by merging it
into the government-wide "Regulation Reform Committee", held jointly by bothcivilian and government participants.  This committee exercises direct power in
considering and adjusting regulation policy and carries out reviews or makes
decisions on new or reinforced government regulations.
Operation of Agency in Sole Charge of Competition Advocacy
- The KFTC carries out its role of competition advocacy by managing agencies,
organized in units of divisions (Competition & Deregulation Division), that are
entrusted with the function of competition advocacy.
- However, it can be said, that not only the Competition and Deregulation Division, but
all other departments of the KFTC exercise the power of prior consultation and
undertake market structure analysis in their respective fields while conducting
activities of competition advocacy.WT/WGTCP/W/189
Page 10
3. Achievements of Competition Advocacy
67. As a neutral organization unrelated to any particular industry and taking initiative by utilizing
expert knowledge and experience of the market, the KTFC's intervention in regulation reform has
produced successful results in many areas.  The most prominent among those achievements is the
high rate of opinions reflected in the prior consultation system,. the "Omnibus Cartel Repeal Act",which was put into effect in February of 1999, and the "Clean Market Project" which was initiated
last year.
(1) The High Rate of Opinions Reflected in the Prior Consultation System
• In relation to opinions on whether competition restraints exist, the proportion of KFTC
recommendations reflected through the prior consultation system remains relatively high. Thecauses for this can be found in agencies' respect towards the KFTC and the proliferation of the
competition mentality in the whole of society.
Table 1:  Recommendations provided and re flected in the prior consultation system
Outcome
YearTotal Number
of
ConsultationsNumber of
Opinion
RecommendationReflected Not Reflected
2000 481 60(12.5%) 51(85.0%) 9(15.0%)
1999 561 72(12.0%) 64(88.0%) 8(12.0%)
1998 563 173(30.7%) 127(73.4%) 46(26.6%)
1997 408 139(34.1%) 106(76.3%) 33(23.7%)
• Standards Determining Competition Restraints
- A standard used to determine the existence of  competition restraints is the suitability of
regulatory means such as various governmental approval, permission, registration and
notification.  The appropriateness of guidelines (such as qualifications) in administering the
system is also an index used to determine competition restraint.
- Anti-competitive practices running contrary to  the ideology of competition policy, such as
cartels, clearly indicate competition restraints.
- The presence of competition restraints can also be determined by examining the transparency
of regulations and thus detecting regulations with no legal grounds or with regulatory
guidelines stated only by sub-rules.
(2) Establishment of the "Omnibus Cartel Repeal Act"
• Due to the extent of their restraints on competition, 20 cartels were abolished under 18 Acts of
legislation, because they were considered to be negative elements impeding economic
development or viewed as irrational and unjustified by international standards.
- The said cartels had been tolerated or legally ensured by the government for reasons of
protection, development, export assistance or prevention of excess competition, as necessary
factors for rapid economic development.WT/WGTCP/W/189
Page 11
- After the liberalization of professional service fees, previously determined by Trade
associations such as the Korean Bar Association and Korea Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, service fees were reduced and the differentiation of professional services was
brought about.
(3) In 2001, the KFTC promoted the "Clean Market Project" as the central activity of the
organization and this was a task of simultaneously pursuing not only investigations into
possible violations of competition law, but also regulation reform and market structure
improvements.
- Based on the realization that it would be difficult to make fundamental improvements in
market structure and customary corporate practices simply through punishing violations ofcompetition law, the project has been a paralleled task of making in-depth inquiries and
regulation reviews in six market areas including the school uniform market, a market closely
related to consumers' lives.
- As a result of comprehensive improvements in market structure in the school uniform market,
deep-seated practices of horizontal and vertical cartels were broken down and ways of
improving collective purchase were sought thereby promoting collective purchasing and
reducing the consumer burden by approximately 50 billion won.
C. P
ERSONNEL ORGANIZATION IN COMPETITION AUTHORITIES AND PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVING
WORK PERFORMANCE
A. Personnel Organization in the KFTC
68. As the relative importance of competition policy increased during the 1990s, employee
numbers and budget size also continued to rise.  There are 444 employees currently working in theKFTC, 95(21%) of which have master's degrees.
Table 2:  The Number of Employees and Amount of Budget Spending in the KFTC
Employees Budget Spending (100 million won)
2000 444 193
1999 402 172
1995 341 105
1991 221 42
1990 221 4.5
1988 94 3
1981 75 2.6
69. Examined in terms of degree specialty, 81 (18%) have degrees in economics, 51 (11%) ln
law, 40 (9%) in business administration/management and 87 (20%) in public administration.  This
indicates a relative shortage of economics and law graduates.
70. Further recruitment of economics and law graduates, as well as economic analysts, is
necessary for the greater in-depth economic and legal analysis required during case processing.WT/WGTCP/W/189
Page 12
2. Educational Training Programmes for Improvements in Work Performance
(1) Educational Training on Competition Law and Policy
71. The KFTC is running various training programmes on competition law and policy according
to the different educational needs, content, targets, and methods suitable to its employees, in order toimprove their work performance.
(a) First of all, the KFTC organizes professional courses on laws relevant to the MRFTA.
This course is open to all employees and educates them in the kind of legal
knowledge such as civil, commercial and corporate law which is needed in enforcing
competition law  The purpose of these courses is to enable the effective enforcement
of competition law based on the knowledge of closely related basic laws.Furthermore, through intensive education of newly transferred employees in the
MRFTA, the course encourages the sharing of long-term visions and creates an
atmosphere of common understanding.
(b) Second, a weekly "Thursday Competition Forum" is held by inviting domestic and
international competition policy experts and private business people.  It is organized
for employees who show an interest in discussions on competition policy overall.
Considerable effects which generate policy centered thought processes among
employees can be generated through discussions on policy and by learning to deal
with the dynamic environment in, which competition policies are implemented.  Bycommunicating with business people in the private sector, they have the opportunity
to hear about the real difficulties entrepreneurs face in the private sector and use them
as reference to establish more realistic policy proposals.
(c) Finally, actual representative cases are selected in each field, such as cartels, M&A,
abuse of market domination and wrongful advertisement, to be introduced directly by
the official in charge of the case at the "Review Case Research Presentations".  Since
the KFTC organization is not structured according to industry but according to
function, it has been pointed out that employees of one field have little expertise in
other fields, but the said programmes are contributing greatly to improve that matter.
(2) Education for Improvements in Analysis & Review
72. The employee education courses on the above mentioned substantive matters focus on
developing employee understanding of applying legal principles and on the substantive contents of
competition law.  In reality, however, a competition authority can raise the effectiveness of
competition law enforcement mainly by conducting in vestigations on anti-competitive activities with
more efficacy.  As such, the KFTC is consistently running training programmes on technique relatedsubjects such as investigation methods and accounting know-how.
73. During KFTC field investigations, the director level officials carry out training on
investigative activities with topics such as investigative conditions, face-to-face investigation
methods, techniques in practical investigative affairs and practising investigation confidentiality.WT/WGTCP/W/189
Page 13
(3) Entrusting Education Programmes to External Educational Institutions
74. In instances where the KFTC finds it adequate, the educational programmes for employees
will be entrusted to external educational instit utions and employees will also attend various
international competition policy workshops and symposiums.
75. While there is a diversity of current educational programmes entrusted to external institution,
the most representative courses are;  the Seoul National University course on fair trade law and the
vocational training course on Office of Patent Administration Industrial Property Rights.  These
courses are run in the form of intensive educational programmes lasting 1-2 weeks.  Even in cases
where programmes are entrusted with external institutions, the course or programme fees are covered
by the government.
76. On a government-wide level, the educational programmes dispatching employees to
international organizations and overseas competition authorities, as well as programmes for assistance
in overseas study, are the most significant programmes currently available to employees.
77. By dispatching employees to international organizations, overseas legations and foreign
competition authorities, such programmes provid e valuable educational opportunities to grasp
international discussions and actually experience the best practices of developed countries.
78. In addition to this, 5-10 employees are selected for financial assistance in overseas study
every year.  Consequently, employees are contributing greatly to the establishment and enforcement
of competition law and policy in the KFTC after majoring law or economics according to its
relevance in work affairs.
79. Furthermore, the KFTC is encouraging greater expertise and heightened sense of international
activities by sending employees to the International Workshop on Competition Policy held jointly by
the KFTC and the OECD.
V. CONCLUSION
80. In the above presentation, I have introduced the contents of the technical assistance
programme provided by Korea as a country transformed from a recipient of technical assistance to aprovider.  Korea's experience of introducing and enforcing competition law was also discussed.
81. Korea introduced competition law in order to alleviate the side effects of government led
growth strategies.  By reinforcing the authority of competition law in the application process, a major
contribution was made to economic development and to overcoming the financial crisis.
82. As such, we are confident that Korea's experience will be a good example for those
developing countries wishing to achieve rapid grow th in a short period of time and also for those
transition economies newly introducing the market economy system.
83. At the core of competition law related "capacity building" in developing countries lies, not
only the strengthening of enforcement ability in competition authorities through foreign technical
assistance, but an endeavour to instill in more people the awareness of how beneficial competition
policy can be to economic development and improvements in consumer interests.
84. For this, it is important to ensure that innovative business activities can take place within a
free and fair framework and to exercise competition policies from which consumers can reap the
fruits.  The KTFC has raised political support and awareness regarding the importance of competitionWT/WGTCP/W/189
Page 14
policy among people and other government agencies by resolving problems arising from Korea's
economic situation - e.g. chaebol issues and undue intra-group transactions.
85. Although there are opinions arguing that a competition law system is only appropriate in
developed countries where the market economy is settled and economic development already
achieved, competition law can be a means through which consumer welfare is raised and economicdevelopment is reached by transforming a distorted market structure into a competition system.
Policies aimed at restricting market entry of foreign corporations in order to protect the small - to
medium - sized businesses of their own countries, have the adverse effect of impeding economic
development by weakening the competitiveness of  their own businesses and turning away foreign
corporations who would otherwise genera te investment and generate employment.
86. Therefore, the core policy of competition policy will be the introduction and enforcement of a
competition law which strengthens competitiveness and increases consumer welfare.
87. Korea has held the utmost of confidence in competition policy and, on the grounds of its own
experience, it has actively supported the introduction and enforcement of competition laws in
developing and transition economies.  Thus, it can safely be said that Korea will continue to do so in
the future.WT/WGTCP/W/189
Page 15
 APPENDIX 1:  SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP EVENTS 1 THROUGH 6
Workshop Speakers & Topics
Topics
1st
('96.9.10)
~9.13)1. Deregulation, Trade Liberalization and Competition Policy:  Assessment and Prospects (F.
Jenny, OECD)
2. Notes on Instruments of Competition Policy and Economic Development (S. Khemani
World Bank)
3. Prospects for International Codification of Competition Laws (B. J. Phillips OECD)4. The Role of Competition Policy in Econom ic Reforms in Developing Countries (P.
Brusick UNCTAD)
5. Elements of a Competition Law for Developing Nations (J. W. Clark, OECD)6. The Effect of Competition Round on the Industries of Developing Nations (Il-chong Nam,
Asia)
7. Basic Korean Fair Trade Policy Directions and What It Suggests (Nam.Kee Lee, KFTC)
8. International Economic Order under the WTO Regime and the Developing Nation's
Reactions (Tae-Ho Park, KIEP)
9. International Cooperation and Coordination of Competition Policy (Kwang-Sik Shin, Asia)10. Trade & Competition Policy and the Expected Role of the WTO (Young-Soo Woo, KIEP)
2nd
('97.8.4
~8.8)1. The Interface between Competition Policy and Trade, Investment and Economic
Development (F. Jenny, OECD)
2. Market Definition and Abuse of Dominant Position (T. Winslow, OECD)3. Competition and Public Utility Industries (M. Gangi, UNCTAD)
4. Types of and Criteria for Cartel (G. Conner, New Zealand)
5. Types of Vertical Restraints and Their Competitive Effects (Kwang-Shik Shin,Asia)
3rd
('98.8.31
~9.3)1. Discussion of Competition Law and Policies on International Fora (F. Jenny, OECD)2. Objectives measures and Effects of Competition Law and Policy (T. Winslow, OECD)3. Monopolization & Mergers (F. Souty, Conseil de la Concurrence)4. Exemption of Competition Law and Policies (J. O'Neil, Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission)
5. Horizontal Agreements (Isao Kasubushi, JFTC)6. The Role of Competition Policy in Developing Countries (Byong-Kyun Kim KFTC)7. The Korean Experience on Role of Competition Law and Policy (Won-Joon Kim, Korean
Delegation to the OECD)
8. Abuse of Dominance and Vertical Restraints (Moon-Ji Rhee, Paijai Univ)
9. Consumer Protection (Jin-Guk Kim, Konyang University)
4th
('99.9.6
~9.10)1. The Role of Competition Policy in a Globalised Economy (F. Jenny, OECD)
2. The Role of Competition Policy in Economic Development (F. Jenny, P. Saba, OECD)3. Natural Monopoly and the Competition Regulatory Interface (S. Copley, Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission)
4. Merger Control and Monopolization (G. Allen, Canadian Bureau of Competition)5. Competition Policy in International Fora (H. Qaqaya, UNCTAD)
6. Abuse of Dominance & Vertical Restraints (Kwang-Shik Shin, Asia)
7. The Role of Competition Policy in Industrial Restructuring and Privatization
(Jin-Gook Kim, Konyang University)
8. Horizontal Agreements (Chol-Soo Han, KFTC)WT/WGTCP/W/189
Page 16
5th
(2000.11.
7~
11.10)1. Privatization and Deregulation of Regulated Industries, and Competition Policy (S. Siclen,
OECD)
2. Ways to Establish International Framework on Competition Law and Policy, including
International Cooperation (F. Souty, Conseil de la Concurrence)
3. E-commerce and Competition Policy (L. Goranson, OECD)
4. Consumer Protection and Competition Policy (Yong-Soo Won, Korean professor)
5. The Korean Experience on the Enforcement of Competition Law (Seon Hur, KFTC)6. In-depth study on Cartels (P. Rudnev, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission)
6th
(2001.11.
11~11.14)1. "The Experience of Countries Introducing and Implementing Competitive Law"
- Experience of Countries Recently Introducing Competition Law:  Thailand, India & thePhilippines- Countries preparing to Introduce Competition Law:  China & Vietnam
- The Application Experience of Economies in Transition:  Russia, Estonia, Slovenia,
Romania, Latvia & Ukraine- The Experience of Countries Currently Implementing Competition Law:  Taiwan etc.
2. Innovation and Competition Policy (by OECD Lecturer)3. The Role of Competition Advocacy after Privatization (by Commission Lecturer)
Participating Countries
Countries
1st
(24 participants from
12 countries)Chinese Taipei, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, China, Indonesia, Vietnam,
Russia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Thailand
2nd
(23 participants from
11 countries)Chinese Taipei, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico,
Chile, Thailand, Philippines, Russia
3rd
(20 participants from
10 countries)Chinese Taipei, Singapore, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand,Philippines, Hong Kong, Russia
4th
(20 participants from
13 countries)Chinese Taipei, Singapore, Thailand, Romania, Turkey, China, Malaysia,Philippines, Vietnam, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea, Russia
5th
(18 participants from
11 countries)Chinese Taipei, Singapore, Thailand, Romania, China, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Vietnam, Sri Lanka, India, Russia
6th
(17 participants from
12 countries)Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Romania, China, Russia, Indonesia, Vietnam,
Latvia, Ukraine, Slovenia, Estonia, Philippines.
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