RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/REG/W/46
5 April 2002
(02-1776)
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements
COVERAGE, LIBERALIZATION PROCESS AND
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
Background survey by the Secretariat
1. The Chairman of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), in his Guidelines
on "Further Work on Systemic Issues" (document WT/REG/W/38, dated 20 June 2000), proposed that
the Secretariat provide "the Committee with basic material for a detailed horizontal exploration of the
treatment of various policy provisions or measures" in regional trade agreements (RTAs).  The
Guidelines specified that "Secretariat's papers would consist of thematic surveys of RTA provisions,
based on available information", and contained an illustrative list of themes which could be studied.
2. At the 26th Session of the Committee, the Secretariat was instructed to start a horizontal
survey on the internal trade liberalization in RTAs, that is on coverage and exceptions, rules of origin
regime and denial-of-benefits rules, as well as liberalization process and transitional provisions.
3. This document presents the outcome of the survey undertaken on the coverage, liberalization
process and transitional provisions of RTAs in the area of trade in goods.  The survey aimed atpresenting factual information on as wide a range of RTAs as possible; no judgement as to the
consistency of the agreements vis-à-vis WTO rules, or of their implications for the WTO system, have
been considered here.  The survey was based on information available up to August 2001.
_______________WT/REG/W/46
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COVERAGE, LIBERALIZATION PROCESS AND
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
Background survey by the Secretariat
A. P URPOSE AND DEFINITIONS
1. The purpose in this survey is to present the most complete and coherent picture as possible of
the product coverage and of the degree and pace of liberalization in regional trade agreements(RTAs), "so as to enable the Committee to identify patterns and, whenever appropriate, to compare
RTA provisions across the RTA universe and vis-à-vis the relevant multilateral disciplines".
1  Given
the characteristics of the information which such a survey entails,2 a number of working definitions
are needed, at least in a preliminary stage, to restrain the scope of the research.
2. The term coverage is not explicitly contained in any WTO legal text in relation to regional
trade agreements (RTAs) in the area of goods.  In international treaties establishing trade preferential
regimes between countries, the terms "coverage" or "scope" are taken to define to which products
their provisions apply.3  In economic literature, when the aim is to assess the potential impact of intra-
RTA trade liberalization, RTA product coverage is usually understood as referring to the product
scope of tariff concessions among the parties.  This latter, narrower, meaning of "coverage" has been
used throughout this survey.
3. This definition of RTA product coverage (in terms of tariff preferences alone) fixes the limits
of an analysis of the liberalization process triggered by the RTA, since the notion of coverage cannot
be separated from that of liberalization.  While the coverage of an RTA can be thought of as its
breadth, the liberalization is its depth. From an economic viewpoint, the liberalization process results
from the interplay of a number of factors, involving not only import duties dismantlement, but also
the characteristics of the rules of origin applied,4 the liberalization of other border restrictive measures
and the implementation of trade policy disciplines.  Only with the help of sophisticated statistics and
                                                     
1 Document WT/REG/W/38, para. 6.
2 See part B below.
3 Out of which, the subset of provisions governing the granting of preferential concessions on border
restrictive measures between RTA parties.
4 RTA concessions are usually granted to originating pr oducts only.  See in this respect the Secretariat's
survey on "Rules of Origin Regimes in Regional Trade Agreements", document WT/REG/W/45.Highlights of the Survey
1. The survey stresses the fact that the coverage and liberalizat ion of RTAs are twin concepts and yet difficult to grasp
from available data and measurement methods.
2. Information gathered shows considerabl e variations in coverage and liberalization indicators from one RTA to
another.
3. In general, RTAs provide for the elimination of most, if not all, duties on industrial goods either on the date of entry
into force of the agreement or subject to progressive e limination in the course of the transition period of the
agreement.  The goal of free trade in industrial products  appears to be the accepted norm.  The treatment o f
agricultural goods within RTAs is more complex.  A few RTAs have eliminated all duties on agricultural goods, but in
general agricultural trade, even on a preferential basis, re mains subject to exceptions.  Average agricultural
preferential tariffs remain high.
4. The survey also indicates a persistence of tariff pea ks in RTAs, in particular for agricultural products.
5. Finally, the study attempts to identify a few areas of pos sible future research, at a more disaggregated level, in
particular with respect to perceived differences in the gr anting of agricultural conces sions by individual countries
across their RTA partners.WT/REG/W/46
Page 3
econometric tools can such a dynamic and complex mechanism be gauged.  This survey focuses on
the description of the degree of tariff liberalization granted on the goods covered by RTAs.
4. Most RTA provisions are implemented as of the date of entry into force of the agreement.  In
some RTAs, though it is rarely the case, each party grants to each other the full range of their tariff
concessions, on all covered goods, from "day one".  More typically, however, the agreements containtransitional provisions  which govern the period from entry into force to full implementation of the
agreement.  In particular, a transition period is provided for, during which duties are phased in over a
pre-determined tariff elimination or reduction prog ramme.  Within an individual RTA, the length of
this transition period may vary from one product, or product category, to another; it may also vary
from one party to the other(s).  The survey also reports on some of these asymmetries, which shape
the liberalization process itself.
B. M
ETHODOLOGY AND DATA
1. Critical Appraisal of Possible Methods
5. The coverage and liberalization process of an RTA may in theory be measured in different
ways, or looked at from different angles.  One possible method consists of a detailed study of an
RTA's legal texts.  Typically the broad scope of tariff concessions of an agreement is outlined in the
RTA main legal instrument, together with the overall transition period foreseen for full
implementation.  Detailed concessions and implementation schedules, usually on a product-by-
product (tariff-line) basis, are contained in the accompanying annexes and protocols.  Determination
of the coverage of a given RTA on the basis of its legal texts involves recounting the products or tariff
lines which are contained therein under negative and/ or positive lists; and cont rasting them with the
universe of the parties' tradable products.  Another possible way of measuring product coverage ofRTAs is to plunge into country tariff schedules, which outline applied duties for each trading partner
for the whole range of tradable products within th e commodity classification (usually, at the HS tariff
line level).  A third method of determining the coverage of a given RTA is to calculate the percentage
of trade between the parties which is subject to RTA concessions, on the basis of a comparable
breakdown of intra-RTA trade flows and preferential tariffs.
6. None of these methods of gauging RTAs' product coverage and trade liberalization is
altogether satisfactory, either on practical grounds or from an analytical viewpoint, or both; none
yields results which fully fit the comparative aim pursued in this survey, as mentioned in paragraph 1
above.  Nonetheless, taken together, each method allows a certain perspective.
7. The fact that most treaties establishing RTAs are in the public domain points to the legal texts
method as a favourable one.  Annexes and protocols to the treaties, which are vital in such an
exercise, are however not always available or complete.5  Moreover, these instruments generally
contain long lists of products (typically on an HS tariff-line basis) subject to/excluded from
concessions.6  In those lists, concessions are most often expressed in terms of periodic percentage
reductions relative to the (then) prevailing MFN rates, rather than in absolute terms.  In the case of a
plurilateral free trade agreement (FTA) where concessions are typically negotiated on a bilateral basis
between each pair of FTA members, the result is a complex web of criss-crossing tariff reductions.7
                                                     
5 Though the WTO Secretariat has at its disposal the main texts of a number of (recently) notified
RTAs, annexes and protocols are rarely available in electronic form.
6 Each RTA partner grants its own list of concessions and/or identifies its own list of excluded or
sensitive products.
7 For example, the seven members of CEFTA granted tariff concessions applicable between each
CEFTA Member and the other (with the Czech and Slovak Republics negotiating as one).  Likewise, themembers of the EFTA.WT/REG/W/46
Page 4
8. Characterizing the coverage and foreseen liberalization in an individual RTA at the date of
signature clearly requires an in-depth investigation of the relevant legal texts.8  These are also the
inescapable source for the analysis of RTAs' transi tional provisions and for determining whether a
positive or negative list approach has been used for the granting of concessions.  Their value for RTA
comparative purposes is diminished, however, by the fact that extensive manual calculation would beinvolved to scrutinize available data for each single RTA to be included in the comparison.  In
addition, an analysis of the legal texts yields no intrinsic information concerning trade policy
conducted by an RTA party vis-à-vis  other WTO Members.
9. The method based on the analysis of country tariff schedules provides interesting insights into
both the product coverage and the degree of intra-RTA trade liberalization.  It yields information on
applied import duty rates of different countries, at the HS tariff line level, vis-à-vis  various RTA
partners and WTO Members (i.e. MFN tariffs).  On that basis, it is possible to obtain, for a given year,the actual preferential rates granted by a given country to its RTA partner(s), across its entire tariff
schedule.  This method thus allows a comparison of preferential tariff rates vis-à-vis  the MFN rates in
force for a given year, as well as a horizontal comparison of the tariff concessions granted by a single
country to each of its RTA partners.  Raw data can be aggregated by product and tariff-rate groups
and margins of preference can be established for pre-defined groups. Statistical comparisons can thenbe shown as percentages of tariff lines which correspond to various tariff rates.  This method also
permits the analysis of tariff dispersion and average tariff rates for various product categories across
the range of a given country's RTA partners.  A comparison of these measures vis-à-vis  prevailing
MFN rates determine to what extent RTAs have provided a catalyst for the removal of tariff peaks.
10. This method, though it allows a (relatively) simple and comparable data treatment, has its
own deficiencies.  Above all, adequate data on preferential treatment is only available for a limited
number of countries.
9  The diversity of periods for which these country tariff schedules are available
also restricts the use of this method for comparative purposes.  Although comparisons among MFN
and the various preferential tariff treatments are possible for the same year for each surveyed country,
comparisons of mutual preferences between different parties to a given RTA may not always refer tothe same year.  A further complication originates in the fact that the majority of RTAs surveyed came
into force in the 1990s and have not yet completed their transition periods, which may also be
asymmetrical between the parties.  In addition, this analysis is limited to the comparison of
ad valorem  duty rates; specific duty rates, still in common use for agricultural products and in certain
countries, do not lend themselves to systematic comparisons.
10
11. The percentage of trade method has been traditionally favoured as an indication of RTA
coverage in the GATT/WTO context.  In substance, it has been questioned on several grounds, more
recently vented in the "systemic debate" of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements.11  In
particular there is the view that the percentage-of-trade analysis tells us what percentage of actual
trade between RTA partners is duty-free and/or subject to RTA concessions, but does not illuminate
                                                     
8 It is to be noted, however, that while the legal text gives the proposed schedule of tariff elimination, it
does not necessarily reflect the actual concessions made.  The original phase-out schedule may be accelerated(RTAs often contain a provision permitting the acceleration of phase-out calendar); or, alternatively, the RTApartners may not adhere, for one reason or another, to the proposed schedule of liberalization and may delay the
implementation of concessions.  In either case, the original legal texts will no longer reflect an accurate picture
of the actual concessions made.
9 Such data are not widely available, since countries do not always publish consistent and detailed data
on preferential duty rates.  Information at hand is to be found in a few international databases (IDB, TPR,TRAINS and FTAA).
10 A further point to note in this regard is that since the study took account of tariff lines with
ad valorem  duty rates only, those (few) countries with relatively high numbers of lines containing specific duties
(which can account sometimes for as much as 20 per cent of total lines in agriculture), show higher percentagesof duty-free tariff lines (and thus a wider product coverage) than otherwise would be the case.
11 See document WT/REG/W/37, for a summary of the different views in this respect.WT/REG/W/46
Page 5
the potential impact of full intra-RTA liberalization.12  Thus it might be helpful to consider the
percentage-of-trade method as offering insights into parties' traded , as opposed to their tradable ,
goods.  It also has however a serious practical shortcoming:  trade statistics which discriminate import
flows according to their tariff treatment are non-existent in the public domain.  As a proxy, such a
percentage is usually calculated by summing up RTA parties' imports from other RTA parties forthose tariff lines containing concessions; but this may yield biased results, since there is no guarantee
that all imported goods under a preferential tariff line actually benefitted from the preferential
treatment outlined in an agreement.
13
12. Despite their practical and more substantive limitations, each of the three methods outlined
above has its own merits and may offer useful, albeit insufficiently standardized, comparative
information on both RTAs' product coverage, and the degree and speed of liberalization.  A multi-
dimensional approach seems thus the most adequate  response, so as to build upon the advantages of
each method, while drawing attention to the deficiencies or inconsistencies that may arise if relying
upon a mono-dimensional view.
2. Description of Data Collected
13. Data collected under each of the three perspectives yielded their own set of results, which are
contained in annexes to this document .  Annex 1 contains data on the tariff treatment of imports into
parties to selected RTAs; Annex 2 contains data on tariff line treatment obtained from individual
countries' tariff schedules; Annex 3, which is derived from the data obtained in Annex 2, contains data
on tariff dispersion for a number of countries; Annex 4, which is derived from the data presented in
Annexes 1 and 2, contains charts showing duty-free treatment of imports for a number of countries.
Finally Annex 5 contains data on transition periods and calendars of concessions obtained from RTAs'legal sources.  A detailed explanation of each Annex follows.
(a) Percentage of Trade Method
14. Under the percentage of trade method, this study has made use of the trade statistics on trade
volumes presented by RTA parties in the course of the examination of their agreements within the
CRTA.14  These statistics are available for a total of 47 RTAs covering 107 RTA partners.  The data
gathered are set out in Annex 1 ("Tariff Treatment of Imports into Parties to Selected RTAs").  They
are organized on a geographical basis by RTA and show the year for which the data apply, the imports
for that year (in millions of US dollars), togeth er with - when available - the percentage share of
imports at MFN duties, reduced duties and duty-free, and a breakdown into agricultural and industrial
products.
15. The percentages of trade statistics provided by RTA parties are not uniform in nature.  Some
distinguish agricultural products from industrial products, others do not.  Some offer a breakdown oftrade at MFN duty rates, reduced duty rates and duty-free, while others do not.  They refer to different
years.  Most are based on import flows into the preference-granting parties, but a few were calculated
on the basis of export flows.
                                                     
12 What would be missing from a percentage-of-trade analysis is the extent of trade excluded from the
coverage of the agreement and which might take place if concessions were granted on all tariff lines.
13 For instance, if the margin of preference between the prevailing MFN rates and the preferential rates
under an agreement is low but the rules of origin are burdensome, exporters from one RTA party to another maydecide to use the MFN rates rather than satisfy the requirements for the preferential rates.
14 Such information is generally provided in the Standard Format or in the questions and replies by the
parties to a given RTA.  Given that RTAs notified under the Enabling Clause are not (normally) subject toexamination within the CRTA, trade data on those agreements were not generally available for inclusion in thisstudy.WT/REG/W/46
Page 6
16. A point to be recalled when analyzing the data contained in Annex 1 derives from the fact that
these data were submitted by parties to different RTAs in the early stages of the WTO examination of
their agreements, that is at a moment when the RTA had only recently come into force.  Any statistics
on actual intra-RTA trade flows therefore often refer to past, pre-RTA years.  For that reason, the
trade percentage figures were calculated by combin ing the list of liberalized tariff lines under the
agreement with previous (tariff line) bilateral import flows. The circumstances in which such data
were provided also inspired that calculation of the trade percentages be based on the list of all tariff
concessions under the agreement (including those which would only be in force at the end-point of the
liberalization period, i.e. at the end of the transition period). 15   Therefore given that the trade volume
figures show products traded for a given year, while the percentage shares of imports given (at duty-
free, reduced and MFN duties) are based on the situation at end of the transition period, such figures
probably understate the magnitude of actual trade volumes likely to result once full liberalization hastaken place, while overstating the speed of liberalization.
(b) Country Tariff Schedules
17. The data collection phase for the study of country tariff schedules involved the interrogation
of four databases:  in order of preference, the WTO Integrated Database (IDB); a database used for
Trade Policy Reviews (TPR); UNCTAD's TRade Analysis and INformation System (TRAINS); andthe tariff database constructed in the context of the negotiations for the Free Trade of the Americas
Agreement (FTAA).
16  From these four databases, information on applied tariffs, at the tariff-line
level, was collected for 18 reporting countries (i.e. preference-granting countries), covering a total of
105 RTA partners.17  From this primary data collected, simple averages could be computed by product
categories, for all products (HS 1-97), agricult ural products (HS 1-24) and industrial products
(HS 25-97),18 and a few indicators were calculated.
18. Some results of these calculations are presented in Annex 2 ("Indicators of Tariffs Applied by
Selected Countries to MFN Imports and to Imports  from Selected RTA Partners").  Indicators in
Annex 2 are organized alphabetically by reporting country (to which corresponds the basic tariff
schedule).  For each reporting country, different measures are shown in relation to the tariff treatmentit applies to its MFN and selected preferential pa rtners, with a breakdown (when possible) of total,
agricultural and industrial products.  These measures are:  the (overall) average applied tariff, the
average applied tariff on dutiable items, the share of duty-free tariff lines in total tariff lines, and the
relative margin of preference (RMP) ratio.
19  For some countries listed in Annex 2, data on the share
of duty-free tariff lines but not on average tariffs were available.
19. Data derived from some of the country tariff schedules surveyed is also displayed in Annex 3
(Range of Tariffs Applied by Selected Countries to MFN Imports and to Imports from Selected RTAPartners).  They are organized on a geographical basis by country and show for 13 countries the year
                                                     
15 It is assumed that this is the case for the majority of the trade percentage figures presented by RTA
parties.
16 The IDB and TPR databases yielded sound, reliable data (albeit for only a few countries), while the
TRAINS and FTAA databases required more manual manipulation, in part because the TRAINS database, forinstance, often contains only the subset of preferences granted (rather than the entire tariff schedule) for a given
country's RTA partners.  The data collected from the FTAA database had to be scrutinized for anomalies.
17 Typically, data are available at the 8-digit level, though some reporting countries use 10 digits for
preferential partner rates.  The total number of tariff lines used varies by reporter and often by partner as well(usually, from roughly 6,000 to 12,000, tho ugh one country reports on as many as 19, 000 tariff lines).  No
distinction was made between RTAs notified to the WTO and those not (or not yet) notified.
18 Agricultural products under HS 1-24 usually account for between 12 and 20 per cent of a country's
total tariff lines.
19 The RMP ratio is calculated by taking the difference between the average applied tariff and the
average applied MFN rate, divided by the MFN rate.  Th e higher the ratio, the greater is the liberalization
granted to the RTA partner.  An RMP of one indicates full tariff liberalization (to zero).WT/REG/W/46
Page 7
for which the data apply, the tariff ranges applied to agricultural and industrial goods, at MFN rates
and across the selected country's range of trading partners.20  The data provide a snapshot of the
magnitude of existing MFN tariff peaks, as well as an indication of the degree to which they have
been removed across both agricultural and industrial products for selected trading partners. Data
sources for Annexes 2 and 3, together with accompanying notes are detailed at the end of Annex 3.
(c) Legal Texts of RTAs
20. An analysis of the legal texts and corr esponding annexes and protocols of 72 RTAs21 yielded
results on the transitional provisions of the parties to such RTAs.  The results of this analysis are
contained in Annex 5.  They are organized on a ge ographical basis by RTA and show the date of entry
into force22, the general RTA transition period in years, and the calendars of concessions (which
include an indication of whether a positive or negative list approach has been used and the timing and
type of tariff concessions granted) applied by each party to the RTA for both industrial andagricultural goods.  Categorising and summarising th e calendars of concessions and type of reductions
granted by importing parties proved to be a formidable task, given the voluminous and non-uniform
structure of the annexes and protocols which form part of each RTA.  Schedules of concessions are
usually split between industrial and agricultural products with different calendars for reductions.
Some RTAs make a further distinction for textiles and coal and steel products (within industrialgoods) and for agricultural, processed agricultural, and fisheries products (within agricultural goods).
Concessions, which vary considerably even between parties to the same agreement, are typically
granted on a bilateral basis; in the case of a plurilateral agreement this results in a criss-crossing web
of bilateral concessions for each partner.  The schedules for the reduction of duties on industrial
products are often subject to different timetables at differing rates.  Those for agricultural productstend to be even more complex, as they often involve the combination of reductions of customs duties
within increasing tariff quotas for a positive list of products.  A further complication is that additional
protocols, which contain the results of further concessions (particularly in agriculture) which have
been negotiated between parties, have rarely been notified.
21. Another problem identified was that the timetable for the schedule of concessions for some
agreements preceded the official date of entry into force of the agreement.
23  If no reference is made
to a provisional application of the agreement while awaiting ratification, it is unclear whether the
timetable for concessions is adjusted to take into account the (later than expected) date of entry into
force, thus postponing the end-point of the transition period, or whether the latter remains unchanged
and the tariff reduction schedule is accelerated so that the stated transition period is adhered to.24
C. S OME ANALYTICAL POINTERS
22. Data resulting from the multi-dimensional a pproach adopted here in surveying RTAs'
coverage, liberalization process and transitional provisions is presented in the Annexes to this
document.  This base information has been used to respond to questions posed on different issues
related to the subject studied.  The scope of the investigation is obviously circumscribed by the
relatively scarce availability of data, in particular the lack of comparable information on trade
volumes and tariff lines for many RTA parties.  A larger sample of data would certainly yield morediscernible patterns than those which have been observed here.
                                                     
20 Annex 3 shows tariff ranges for 13 of the 18 reporting countries presented in Annex 2.  Tariff ranges
for the preferential partners of the EC, Romania and Switzerland were not available from the databases used;those for Australia and New Zealand were not displayed as all of their mutual trade under the bilateralagreement is duty-free.
21 Including three accessions to existing RTAs.
22 If the agreement's trade provisions were applied provisionally (as is the case for the EC's Europe
agreements), the date of entry into force has been adjusted to take this into account.
23 Such a situation probably arises when the ratification of an agreement takes longer than anticipated.
24 In calculating the calendar of concessions, the latter approach has been adopted.WT/REG/W/46
Page 8
23. Nevertheless, the aim of this section is to explore some of those issues, by posing questions or
hypotheses and determining to what extent the data collected provide supporting answers.  A first sub-
section is devoted to an overview of different aspects related to product coverage and trade
liberalization, from the viewpoint of the information gathered in the present survey.  A distinction is
also made between agricultural and industrial goods as their treatment often differs.  Finally, a sub-section is devoted to RTA transition periods and calendars of concessions to investigate whether
patterns exist across RTAs' transition periods, as well as possible asymmetries in the calendar and
type of concessions made and whether or not provisions exist for an accelerated implementation of
concessions and for the granting of future concessions.
1. Determinants of RTA market openings
24. In this sub-section the data collected are interrogated in search of broad indications of the
breadth (product coverage) and depth of RTA market openings.  RTA product coverage and theliberalization process are intimately linked and together constitute market access in its broadest sense.
Under coverage, the focus is on the extent to which products are included in the ambit of the trade
preferences granted by the parties under the agreement, while under liberalization process the focus is
on tariff reductions granted by the parties and tariffs which remain in place.
25. The starting-point is to offer a picture of market openings in terms of aggregate product
coverage, which have been extended by the universe of bilateral relations surveyed.  Two proxies
have been used here to assess product coverage, both pictured in Chart 1.
Chart 1 - Product Coverage of the Universe of Bilateral Relations Surveyed
26. The first proxy  is the proportion of fully liberalized (zero duty) tariff lines offered by each
country surveyed across its range of RTA partners (thus each spoke of the left-hand pinwheel in
Chart 1 refers to one of the 103 bilateral relationships shown in Annex 2)25; this provides an insight
into preferences granted on tradable  goods .  This measurement admittedly does not catch the whole
                                                     
25 The shaded area of each spoke of the pinwheel gives an indication of the percentage share; the more
the shaded area extends towards the outer rim of the pinw heel, the higher the percentage share; conversely, the
smaller the shaded area, the lower the percentage share.Percentage share of duty-free items P ercentage share of duty-free imports
in total tariff lines in total country imports from partner
10 0
75
255010 0
75
2550
Source:  Annexes 1 and 2.WT/REG/W/46
Page 10
period.  Also perceptible from Chart 2 is confirmation of a by-and-large consistent trend for the trade
shares to "overestimate" product coverage, when compared to tariff-line shares, or vice-versa.27  This
issue deserves further research, based on a larger number of fully comparable observations.  It is also
discussed further when a distinction is made between agricultural versus industrial goods.
30. To facilitate comparisons between different market openings, the analysis above has not taken
into account concessions granted at less-than-MFN-but-greater-than-zero duty rates. Comparative
data on reduced-duty concessions are only available from the import-share information provided by
selected RTA partners, representing the situation at the end of the RTA transition period.  These may
add substantially to the product coverage measured by trade shares, as shown in Chart 3, which is
based on 107 bilateral relations contained in Annex 1.28
Chart 3 - Product Coverage of Selected Bilateral Relations Surveyed:
Import Shares at Duty-Free and Reduced Duties
31. The second dimension considered here, of a more qualitative nature, is the depth of
preferential market access openings, i.e the degree of RTA trade liberalization, in aggregate terms,
extended through the universe of bilateral preferential relations surveyed.  Measuring the degree of
RTA trade liberalization is a less simple operation than it may appear at first sight.  Even when only
dealing with tariff liberalization (as is here the case) , the changes to be grasped are determined by the
combination of increased preferential duty-free tr eatment and/or reduced tariffs on dutiable items.
32. Data on the share of imports, as provided by RTA parties, cannot be used for this purpose.
Import shares of preferential treatment at duty-free and at reduced (lower than MFN) duties may
indicate on how many  traded goods tariff barriers have been  reduced (removed or lowered) between
the parties, but they do not deliver any message on how much  they were reduced (and definitely do
not show how goods not  currently traded are treated).
33. The data collected from a number of reporting countries' tariff schedules (see Annex 2) offers
a basis for estimating the degree of trade liberalization achieved.  Average tariff cuts granted to RTA
partners are contrasted to the prevailing average applied MFN rate.  This is measured by the RMP
ratio, which represents the margin of preference granted by a reporting country to its RTA partners,
                                                     
27 This is to a certain extent a reflection of the fact that the import-share view relates only to the goods
currently traded by the parties, which may, or may not, represent the universe of possible tradable goods.
28 In some cases, concessions appear in Chart 3 as if solely granted at reduced rates, though in fact they
reflect the lack of separate data for duty-free and duty-reduced concessions, e.g., as presented in the EFTAagreements (see Annex 1).020406080100
Share of duty-free im ports Share of imports at reduced duties%
Source:  Annex 1.WT/REG/W/46
Page 11
relative to its MFN rate.29  The RMP ratio may vary from zero (no tariff cuts) to one (full tariff
liberalization).
34. The RMP ratio provides an aggregate yardstick of the degree of trade liberalization,
representing both the elimination and reduction of duties which are present in the preferential relation
(while encompassing those which remain unchanged at MFN rates), but it does not highlight how
such liberalization was achieved through the two main liberalization moves at work in the framework
of RTA tariff preferences, that is the complete removal of import duties and/or their reduction.30
35. The degree of liberalization for 15 countries' relations with a total of 69 RTA partners,
measured by the corresponding RMP ratios (for all products), is illustrated in Chart 4, which - again -
does not discriminate reporters or preferential partners but offers an overall image of available data.
Chart 4 - Depth of Liberalization of Selected Bilateral Preferential Relations Surveyed
36. As can be seen in Chart 4, some countries have achieved full, or almost full, liberalization of
tariffs (as demonstrated by RMP ratios approaching 1.0).  The majority fall in the 0.50 to 0.75 range
(which indicates that the margin of preference offered to their bilateral partners varies from 50 to
75 per cent).  A few fall below the 0.50 mark.
37. On the basis of the data gathered from country tariff schedules, it is possible to draw
comparisons between the level of the RMP ratio and the share of duty-free tariff lines (relative to the
MFN share) corresponding to each preferential bilateral relation surveyed.  The share of duty-freetariff lines gives an indication of the extent of concessions made vis-à-vis  the universe of possible
traded goods, while the RMP ratio shows the overall margin of preference relative to MFN rates.  This
offers some insight into how liberalization was made.  It would be expected that the higher the
difference between the preferential versus MFN share of duty-free lines, the higher would be the
value of the corresponding RMP ratio.  Obviously if a country grants 100 per cent duty-free treatmentto an RTA partner across its entire tariff schedule, its average tariff will be zero and the corresponding
RMP will be one.  This occurs, though rarely.
                                                     
29 For an explanation of how the RMP is calculated, see footnote 19.
30 A further point to note is that the average applied tariff (on which the RMP is based) is a function of
three elements: zero duties, reduced duties and duties remaining at MFN rates.  Thus, if a country grants duty-free treatment on the vast majority of its tariff lines, but retains a number of high MFN tariff rates, this willadversely affect the RMP.0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00RMP r at i o
Depth of liberalization
Source:  Annex 2WT/REG/W/46
Page 12
38. An examination of the data in Annex 2 demonstrates that the measures of product coverage
(i.e. the share of duty-free lines) and depth of liberalization (i.e. the RMP ratio) are linked, but not
necessarily substitutes for each other.  Some of the discrepancies to the pattern observed in Annex 2
are traceable to a few "extreme" cases, with either very low or very high shares of duty-free tariff
lines at MFN.
39. One factor which also contributes in determining the level of the RMP ratio is the nature and
importance of preferential tariff reductions (i.e. less-than-MFN duty concessions) and of exclusions
from preferential treatment (i.e. products which continue to be treated at MFN rates).  The measure
used here to determine coverage (share of duty-free tariff lines) does not capture these reductions.31
This issue may be a promising area for research at a more disaggregated level, and for individual RTAparties.
40. Another related point of analysis is tariff dispersion.  Tariff peaks applied at MFN rates are
generally attached to those products deemed to be the most "sensitive" ones to individual countries.  It
is interesting to investigate whether tariff peaks re main across the range of a country's trading partners
(relative to MFN), or whether RTAs have acted as a catalyst to their reduction or elimination.  This
issue is considered with some detail in sub-section 2 below.
41. The data gathered in this survey can also  throw some light on the relatively recent
phenomenon of overlapping RTA membership.  In a world where many countries are linked to several
partners through bilateral or plurilateral RTAs, analysts often characterize the potential impact of this
phenomenon in terms of increased complexity of trade policy management; its possible
economic/trade effects have however attracted little detailed research yet.
42. Traditionally, trade discrimination through RTAs has been defined through analyses of the
level and structure of protection of the parties to an RTA vis-à-vis  third countries, usually in terms of
their MFN import treatment.  In a context of overlapping membership, the coherence (or lack of
coherence) among RTA concessions becomes an interesting research avenue.  The basic issue is
whether a given country pursues analogous preferential market access policies vis-à-vis  its different
RTA partners, or whether there are cases of "discriminatory discrimination".  More specifically, itmay be asked to what extent parties to plurilateral RTAs harmonize their tariff concessions among
themselves, or vis-à-vis  other common preferential partners.
43. These interrogations about preferential trade policy coherence should a priori  be more
perceptible at a disaggregated product level.  In sub-section 2, the issue will be investigated for the
broad product groups for which information has been gathered in this survey.
2. Treatment of Industrial versus  Agricultural Products in RTA Preferential Relations
44. This sub-section analyses, more specifically, the treatment of industrial versus agricultural
products.  There is a widespread view that the product coverage and depth of liberalization of
agricultural goods in some RTAs is less than that envisaged for industrial products, and indeed may
fall considerably short of the ambition of full liberalization.  Our goal here is to explore whether the
data gathered support that view.  It has been observed that for many agreements, the strategy used for
granting concessions on industrial versus agricultural products is different.  For industrial products,most, if not all RTA parties grant concessions on the basis of a negative list, i.e. they start out with the
                                                     
31 On these, tariff-line data gathered gives only oblique indications, under the form of average applied
tariffs on dutiable items, or on the share of non-duty-free items in the total. It should also be recalled that tariff
schedule information surveyed do not always reflect the situation which might prevail at the end of the
corresponding RTAs' transition period.  Some of the underlying "reduced-tariff" or " non-duty-free" information
may only reflect the situation at a given point in time during phase-out.  Average tariffs on dutiables tend tomove in the same direction as the share of duty-free items.WT/REG/W/46
Page 13
goal of full product coverage and remove or give extended transition periods to their most sensitive
products.  In contrast, many countries use a positive list approach to grant concessions in agriculture,
i.e. concessions are granted only on certain traded products, excluding the rest.  These different
strategies are in part a reflection of the evolution of global trade.  Agriculture remains for many
countries their most protected sector with the strongest and most concentrated domestic lobbies.  It isimportant to bear these differences in mind when  interpreting the results of the analysis below.
45. A glimpse into the universe of data collected, from the angle of the two broad categories of
products, is offered in Chart 5, which was built in a similar way as Chart 1 (all products).
32  The top
two pinwheels of Chart 5 show the percentage shares  of duty-free imports in total bilateral imports of
agricultural  and industrial products for a total of 70 bilateral relations as available in Annex 1.33  The
bottom two pinwheels show the percentage share of duty-free items in total tariff lines for a total of
103 bilateral relations surveyed in Annex 2.
Chart 5 - Product Coverage of Agricultural and Industrial Products
                                                     
32 As in Chart 1, the shaded area of each spoke of the pinwheel indicates the percentage share (in total
imports or tariff lines).  The greater the shaded area of a given spoke, the greater the percentage share and vice-versa.Percentage share of duty-free imports in total country imports from partne r
Agricultural products Industrial products
0255075100
0255075100
Percentage share of duty-free items in total tariff lines
Agricultural products Industrial products
0255075100
0255075100
Sources:  Annexes 1 and 2.WT/REG/W/46
Page 14
020406080100
Share of imports at reduced duties
Share of duty-free imports%
Bilateral relations for which no distinction between reduced-duty 
and duty-free concessions is available.
Source:  Annex 1.46. At first glance it is apparent that the product coverage of agriculture is considerably less than
that of industrial products, both in terms of import share and duty-free tariff lines.  The result given
for the coverage of agricultural products in terms of the percentage share of duty-free lines is probably
a reflection of the positive list approach adopted by a number of countries.  More than three quarters
of the bilateral relationships explored in the bottom left hand pinwheel of Chart 5 show a percentageshare of less than 50 per cent of tariff lines at zero duty rates.  Thus the statistics confirm that the
coverage of agricultural goods in terms of both traded and tradable  goods is significantly less for
agricultural products than for industrial goods.  However, the above account of product coverage
shows only part of the picture, in so far as it is solely based on duty-free import and tariff-line shares.
This is particularly true for RTA concessions on agricultural goods.  As noted before, RTAs are often
negotiated differently for industrial products (through negative lists of a few exceptions) and
agricultural products (through positive lists of concessions).  Traditionally, RTAs were primarilyconcerned with free trade in industrial products.  In modern RTA negotiations, agricultural
concessions have been added, though parsimoniously on two accounts:  concessions tend to consist of
duty reductions (instead of zero-duty concessions); and there is a higher tendency to exclude traded or
tradable products from preferential treatment.  While a small minority of RTAs offer duty-free
treatment on both industrial and agricultural goods, the majority offer duty-free (or near duty-free)treatment on industrial goods and duty reductions on selected agricultural goods.
47. An alternative view of product coverage is offered in Chart 6, on the basis of the information
collected on import shares.
Chart 6 - Coverage of Agricultural Pro ducts in Selected Bilateral Relations:
Import Shares at Duty-Free and Reduced Duties
48. The inclusion of reduced-duty concessions increases very substantially the corresponding
magnitudes which appeared in Chart 5 (top left-hand pinwheel).  Nevertheless, the picture still points
at relatively low levels of "coverage" for agricultural products:  out of 82 bilateral concessionsrepresented in Chart 6, as many as 27 show import shares below 50 per cent, sometimes as low as
                                                                                                                                                                    
33 Only 61 bilateral relations for import shares of agricultural products.WT/REG/W/46
Page 15
zero.  This is in sharp contrast with the situation with respect to industrial products.  Virtually all
bilateral concessions reported in Annex 1 show, for industrial products, shares of duty-free plus
reduced-duty imports of 100 per cent.
49. A comparison of the depth of liberalization for agricultural and industrial goods separately, as
represented by the corresponding RMP ratios offers yet another area of contrast.  Chart 7, which is
based on a total of 70 bilateral relations for both types of products, highlights the fact that the depth of
tariff reductions offered in RTAs on agricultural goods is considerably less than concessions on
industrial goods, with only a very few reporting countries offering full tariff liberalization across all
traded agricultural products.  Given that the average applied tariff is a function of zero duty rates,
reduced duty rates and remaining MFN duties, it is obvious that if a positive list approach is used and
only a few concessions are granted, the average applied tariff will remain closer to the prevailing
MFN rate, resulting in a lower RMP.
Chart 7 - Depth of Liberalization for Agricultural and Industrial Products
50. The question of the coherence among RTA concessions, which relates to both coverage and
the liberalization process, sparks from the pheno menon of overlapping RTA membership.  Of the two
broad product groups identified in this survey, RTA treatment of agricultural goods offers the mostpromising perspective for approaching that question.  When RTAs aim at complete elimination of
duties on the full range of products, there is automatic harmonization of treatment for all RTA
partners.  Though this seems to be the case for industrial products in the majority of RTAs,
harmonization of concessions is less obvious for agricultural products, due to the (already noted)
parsimonious nature of RTA agricultural concessions.
34  The question is to what extent such factors as
the need for reciprocity (or accepted non-reciprocity), or non-trade concerns, play a more important
role in shaping the final concessions within an individual RTA than the elementary aim of achieving
harmony in the multi-tier trade regimes resulting from overlapping RTA membership.
51. The information gathered in this survey is admittedly both too limited and too aggregated to
allow a thorough analysis of the issue of coherence.  As an initial fact-finding exercise, however,
Table 1 attempts to offer a few analytical markers on the spread of various indicators on tariff
treatment of agricultural products in RTA bilateral relations, based on that information.  The statistical
                                                     
34 Given the positive-list negotiating strategies used for agriculture in most RTAs, preference-granting
countries have some leeway to differentiate agricultural concessions, within their own national interests,according to their partners' characteristics and to the dyna mics of the process (e.g., reciprocity considerations).0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1RMP rat io
Agricultural 
products
Industrial products
Source:  Annex 2WT/REG/W/46
Page 16
tool used to assess the spread (or variability) of the indicators is the coefficient of variation (CV).35
Table 1 shows CVs corresponding to five indicators for agricultural products:  the shares of duty-free
imports, and of imports at both duty-free and reduced duty rates; the shares of duty-free tariff lines;
and unweighted averages for applied tariffs on all items (i.e. including duty-free items) and on
dutiable items alone.  CVs were calculated for 16 reporters for which data on any of the aboveindicators were available for its RTA relations with at least four different partners.
Table 1 - Coefficients of Variation on Indicators of Bilateral Tariff Treatment
of Selected Reporters:  Agricultural Products
Import shares Average tariffs
ReporterDuty-freeZero and reduced
dutiesTariff-line duty-
free
sharesOn all itemsOn dutiable items
only
Bulgaria … … 0.7 0.4 0.1
Canada … … 0.2 0.7 1.3
Czech Rep. 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
EC …… 0 . 4 … …
Estonia 0.0 0.0 … … …
Hungary 2.0 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.1
Israel 0.7 0.5 … … …
Latvia 1.6 0.9 … … …
Lithuania 0.8 0.6 … … …
Norway … … 0.0 0.1 0.1
Poland 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.1
Romania …… 0 . 6 … …
Slovak Rep. 0.3 0.3 … … …
Slovenia 1.5 0.8 … … …
Switzerland …… 0 . 3 … …
Turkey 1.4 0.7 … … …
Sources:  Annexes 1 and 2.
52. The above statistics are an indication, for any given reporter, of the degree of differentiation
of the concessions it granted to its different partners:  the higher CVs on the various indicators are, the
lower the coherence of its RTA concessions will be; relatively low values for CVs will point at a
higher level of harmonization of its agricultural concessions.  Despite all the limitations of the data on
which CVs are based, a few general observations can be drawn from such synthetic statistics:
• The variation of average preferential tariffs across RTA partners, in particular of those on
dutiables only, does not appear to be directly linked to the corresponding spread of other
indicators, except in a few exceptional cases.
• For the three reporters for which CVs are available on both import and tariff-line duty-free
shares, relatively similar variations are shown for the two indicators.
• The spread of import shares across (the same) RTA partners for each individual reporter is
consistently lower when reduced-duty shares are added to duty-free shares.
• More specifically, the comparison of CVs in Table 1 across available reporters shows that the
Czech Republic and, to a certain extent, Poland and the Slovak Republic demonstrate a
relatively more harmonious pattern of RTA agricultural concessions among CEFTA
                                                     
35 Because the CV (i.e. the standard deviation divided by the mean) is a unitless ratio, it permits the
comparison of magnitudes expressed in different units.  That statistic is readily conceptualized as a standard
distance along the scale of measurement:  the larger the differences between a series of data, the higher the CVwill be; the more data are similar, the lower the CV.WT/REG/W/46
Page 17
members, as does Estonia, among the Baltic countries; and Norway, rather than Switzerland,
in EFTA.  Also perceptible are low levels of harmonization for Israel and Turkey (import
shares), and for the EC (tariff-line shares).  Detailed, per partner, charts, presented in
Annex 4, highlight the origin of the observed variability of the agricultural concessions,
though only in relation to the duty-free-share indicators.  It is, for example, worth noting thatthe source of the generally high CVs for CEFTA countries, as shown in Table 1, does not
seem related to a lack of coherence on intra-CEFTA concessions.
53. The few points sketched above corroborate the earlier assumption that there might be a
certain number of cases of inharmonious RTA agriculture concessions, with unpredictable
consequences on the conduct of trade and on trade policy.  This question seems therefore worth of a
more detailed investigation.
54. Chart 8 addresses the issue of tariff dispersion by contrasting tariff peaks applied to
agricultural and industrial products.  Based on Annex 3 information, it presents maximum tariffs
applied by 13 countries both to MFN partners and in a total of 68 bilateral RTA relationships.36
Chart 8 - Highest Applied MFN and Preferential RTA Tariffs
in Selected Bilateral Relations
                                                     
36 The two parts of Chart 8 picture RTA bilateral relationships of each of the 13 countries grouped
together by country (separated by a space).  Tariff p eaks on agricultural and industrial products for a given
country's cluster of RTAs appear on the same location in the horizontal axis of each sub-chart.0100200300400500600Maxi mum MFN dut ies
Max imum RTA partners' duties
Agricultural products%
0100200300400500600Industrial products%
Source:  Annex 3.WT/REG/W/46
Page 18
55. A perusal of the data plotted in Chart 8 indicates that for industrial products not only are
existing MFN tariff peaks and corresponding RTA partner rates considerably lower than those applied
to agricultural products, but tariff peaks applicable to RTA partners' industrial products have often,
though not always, been reduced.  The same cannot be said for agricultural products, where the
majority of bilateral relations surveyed show that MFN peak tariffs remain.  However, given that tariffpeaks represent the most sensitive products which are often granted the longest transition periods,
available data may not catch their possible removal or reduction once the RTA is fully implemented.
3. Transitional Provisions in RTAs
56. The final sub-section concentrates on the transitional provisions and calendars of concessions
applied in the RTAs surveyed (see Annex 5).  As mentioned above, the categorization and
summarization of the calendars of concessions on imports
37 was a difficult task, principally due to the
diversity of the data encountered and the convoluted manner in which some of the annexes and
protocols are presented.  In general, the goal is to provide an overview of the transition periods
applied in RTAs and the concessions granted by each RTA party to determine to what extent, if any,
asymmetries exist.  As regards the transition period, one point to note is that the general transition
period (which applies to the RTA as a whole) does not necessarily correspond to the calendar ofconcessions.  In some RTAs the calendar of concessions is shorter than the transition period; in others
the calendar of concessions exceeds the stated transition period.  One trend discernible from the data
surveyed is that transition periods have become shorter; many RTAs, particularly those which entered
into force in the latter half of the 1990s, report transition periods of less than four years, compared
with the ten years which was the norm for RTAs signed earlier in that decade.  A few recent RTAshave no transition period at all; only in rare cases do transition periods exceed ten years.
57. For industrial products, while a negative list approach is used for the granting of concessions
in the vast majority of RTAs surveyed, a few RTAs, which were signed in the early 1990s, use a
positive list approach (sometimes one party uses a negative list, while its partner uses a positive list).
In the more recent RTAs, the negative list approach is clearly the norm for industrial goods.  Alsoapparent in the more recent RTAs is a tendency towards simpler, more clear-cut RTAs, with fewer
exceptions.  Indeed, a few RTAs grant duty-free treatment across all goods on date of entry into force.
This trend is not universal however; some recent RTAs, particularly those signed between developed
and developing countries maintain long transition periods for the latter and contain voluminous
schedules of concessions.
58. As regards the structure of concessions in industrial goods, Annex 5 shows that certain
asymmetries do exist between partners to the same RTA, both in terms of timing (often one partner isgranted longer to phase out its exceptions) and in the nature of tariff concessions granted.  Most RTAs
provide for zero duties to be accorded on certain goods as of the date of entry into force of the
agreement, with the remaining duties subject to progressive elimination over various timetables.  An
important point to note is that while Annex 5 provides an overview of the asymmetries which exist in
terms of timing, it does not attempt to quantify the number of products contained in a givenschedule.
38
59. As has been noted elsewhere in this study, the treatment accorded to agricultural products
within RTAs is considerably more complex than that  applied to industrial products.  First, some RTAs
distinguish between agricultural, processed agricultural and fisheries products, while others use
Chapters 1-24 of the Harmonised System.  Second, the positive list approach is the norm foragricultural goods, with only very few countries granting concessions on the basis of a negative list.
Often, the positive lists contain very few products.  Third, concessions tend to consist of duty
reductions (often within increasing tariff quotas), sometimes with the goal of zero duties, but often
                                                     
37 A few RTAs maintain export restrictions, but these were not analysed in this study.
38 These vary considerably from one RTA to another.WT/REG/W/46
Page 19
without.  While some RTAs contain a provision for the negotiation of further concessions in
agriculture, very few have the goal of free trade in agricultural goods.39  Finally, asymmetries in the
granting of calendars of concessions for agricultural are less apparent than those for industrial
products, principally because concessions accorded to agricultural goods tend to consist of a specific
reductions on the date of entry into force with no further timetable foreseen for further reductions.Given the above, it is apparent that the treatment of agricultural products in RTAs remains a complex
issue which may be worthy of further research..
                                                     
39 It is difficult to know to what extent negotiations between RTA parties have led to further
concessions being granted, given that they are rarely notified.  Biennial reports on the operation of agreements,which would illuminate such developments, are presently only required only for those RTAs for which anexamination report has been adopted.WT/REG/W/46
Page 20
Annex 1
Tariff Treatment of Imports into Parties to Selected RTAs
ALL PRODUCTS Agricultural products Industrial products
ImportsMFN
dutiesReduced
dutiesDuty
freeImportsMFN
dutiesReduced
dutiesDuty free ImportsMFN
dutiesReduced
dutiesDuty
freeImporting
party or
partiesOrigin Year
($m) (% share in imports) ($m) (% share in imports) ($m) (% share in imports)
RTAs among Central European countries
Bulgaria CEFTA 1997 n.a. 27 9 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Czech R. CEFTA 1997 3,646 28 9 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Czech R. Slovak R. 2,272 00 1 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Slovak R. Czech R.19972,374 00 1 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Hungary CEFTA 1997 1,534 21 3 8 5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Poland CEFTA 1997 2,652 11 8 8 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Romania CEFTA 1997 642 48 8 8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Slovak R. CEFTA 1997 2,967 36 9 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Slovenia CEFTA 1997 705 91 3 7 8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
RTAs between Central European countries and EFTA States
EFTA Bulgaria 24 49 6 8.7 10 90 15.7 01 0 0
Bulgaria EFTA199598 69 4 8.5 65 35 89.1 01 0 0
EFTA Hungary 231 99 1 74.0 27 73 157.4 01 0 0
Hungary EFTA1995330 39 7 13.8 71 29 316.3 01 0 0
EFTA Poland 338 29 8 34.2 21 79 303.6 01 0 0
Poland EFTA1995816 39 7 96.8 21 79 718.9 01 0 0
EFTA Romania 54 29 8 6.5 19 81 47.5 01 0 0
Romania EFTA1995175 21 79 43.7 83 17 131.7 01 0 0
EFTA Slovenia 100 19 9 2.7 51 49 96.8 01 0 0
Slovenia EFTA1995171 13 87 25.6 86 14 145.2 01 0 0
RTAs between Central European and Baltic countries
Czech R. Estonia 4 00 1 0 0 1.8 00 1 0 0 2.1 00 1 0 0
Estonia Czech R.199825 00 1 0 0 0.1 00 1 0 0 24.9 00 1 0 0
Czech R. Latvia 6 00 1 0 0 1.1 309 7 5.0 00 1 0 0
Latvia Czech R.199843 81 9 1 4.1 86 7 7 39.1 00 1 0 0
Czech R. Lithuania 9 50 9 5 1.1 41 0 59 8.2 00 1 0 0
Lithuania Czech R.1998
98 41 9 5 8.4 46 11 43 89.3 00 1 0 0
Hungary Latvia 2 01 4 8 6 0.3 29 8 0 1.8 00 1 0 0
Latvia Hungary199927 19 13 68 8.8 59 41 0 18.6 00 1 0 0
Hungary Lithuania 5 14 9 5 0.3 17 83 0 4.4 00 1 0 0
Lithuania Hungary199957 14 45 41 33.1 24 76 0 23.4 00 1 0 0
Poland Latvia 29 22 5 7 2 3.8 16 60 24 25.1 02 0 8 0
Latvia Poland199930 57 8 8 4.5 36 47 17 25.6 00 1 0 0
Poland Lithuania 139 15 9 4 9.8 96 62 5 129.3 00 1 0 0
Lithuania Poland1998429 55 9 0 73.3 28 29 43 356.0 00 1 0 0
Slovak R. Estonia 1 00 1 0 0 0.2 00 1 0 0 0.8 00 1 0 0
Estonia Slovak R.19987 00 1 0 0 0.0 00 1 0 0 7.0 00 1 0 0
Slovak R. Latvia 3 00 1 0 0 0.3 00 1 0 0 3.2 00 1 0 0
Latvia Slovak R.199812 01 9 9 0.3 52 17 4 11.8 00 1 0 0
Slovak R. Lithuania 3 00 1 0 0 0.1 00 1 0 0 2.6 00 1 0 0
Lithuania Slovak R.199824 12 9 7 0.9 27 52 21 23.1 00 1 0 0
Slovenia Estonia 1 00 1 0 0 0.0 109 9 0.9 00 1 0 0
Estonia Slovenia19973 00 1 0 0 0.9 00 1 0 0 2.8 00 1 0 0
Slovenia Latvia 3 30 9 7 0.1 100 0 0 3.0 00 1 0 0
Latvia Slovenia19973 30 9 7 0.1 100 0 0 3.1 00 1 0 0
Slovenia Lithuania 1 14 9 5 0.0 100 0 0 1.4 04 9 6
Lithuania Slovenia199715 10 9 9 0.6 100 0 0 14.7 00 1 0 0WT/REG/W/46
Page 21
ALL PRODUCTS Agricultural products Industrial products
ImportsMFN
dutiesReduced
dutiesDuty
freeImportsMFN
dutiesReduced
dutiesDuty free ImportsMFN
dutiesReduced
dutiesDuty
freeImporting
party or
partiesOrigin Year
($m) (% share in imports) ($m) (% share in imports) ($m) (% share in imports)
RTAs between Central European and Mediterranean countries
Czech R. Israel 47 11 9 8 3.5 12 2 86 43.2 01 9 9
Israel Czech R.199743 20 9 8 1.0 63 1 36 41.7 00 1 0 0
Israel Hungary 12 72 9 1 5.1 18 4 78 6.9 00 1 0 0
Hungary Israel199744 58 8 7 6.6 35 65 0 38.7 00 1 0 0
Israel Poland 29 21 9 7 4.7 10 4 86 24.5 00 1 0 0
Poland Israel1998140 28 9 0 31.7 11 35 54 108.5 00 1 0 0
Slovak R. Israel 30 10 9 9 0.6 41 2 57 29.1 00 1 0 0
Israel Slovak R.19977 11 9 8 0.1 57 43 0 7.3 00 1 0 0
Israel Slovenia 10 10 9 9 0.1 60 0 40 9.7 00 1 0 0
Slovenia Israel199836 02 9 8 0.8 79 3 0 34.8 00 1 0 0
Bulgaria Turkey 132 94 3 4 8 15.7 76 24 0 115.8 04 5 5 5
Turkey Bulgaria1998367 71 5 7 8 52.9 48 49 0 314.5 08 9 2
Turkey Czech R. 0 12 7 7 2 0.0 69 20 10 0.1 02 8 7 2
Czech R. Turkey199995 44 6 5 0 24.6 15 36 49 70.0 05 0 5 0
Hungary Turkey 69 13 10 77 16.4 57 40 3 52.5 00 1 0 0
Turkey Hungary1997107 62 9 2 11.7 55 1 44 94.9 02 9 8
Romania Turkey 213 95 8 7 39.7 46 25 29 173.1 00 1 0 0
Turkey Romania1997394 10 0 90 72.0 55 0 45 322.1 00 1 0 0
Turkey Slovak R. 46 14 9 5 0.4 98 0 2 45.3 04 9 6
Slovak R. Turkey199925 13 39 48 6.3 51 5 44 18.6 05 1 4 9
Other RTAs of Central European countries
Romania Moldova 80 00 1 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Moldova Romania199697 00 1 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Slovenia Croatia 444 32 2 7 5 52.1 28 72 0 391.9 01 6 8 4
Croatia Slovenia1999616 23 6 6 2 72.6 18 82 0 543.6 02 9 7 1
Slovenia FYROM 47 10 9 9 11.3 409 6 35.7 00 1 0 0
FYROM Slovenia1998161 81 3 7 9 28.8 44 0 56 131.9 01 6 8 4
RTAs among Baltic countries
Estonia Latvia 97 00 1 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Latvia Estonia1998212 00 1 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Estonia Lithuania 78 00 1 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Lithuania Estonia1998159 00 1 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Latvia Lithuania 201 00 1 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Lithuania Latvia1998227 00 1 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
RTAs between Baltic countries and EFTA States
EFTA Estonia 56 29 8 3.1 32 68 53.0 01 0 0
Estonia EFTA199533 19 9 7.6 69 4 25.7 01 0 0
EFTA Latvia 84 01 0 0 0.4 01 0 0 84.1 01 0 0
Latvia EFTA199539 29 8 21.5 49 6 17.1 01 0 0
EFTA Lithuania 38 01 0 0 2.6 49 6 35.1 01 0 0
Lithuania EFTA199566 26 74 38.3 45 55 27.8 01 0 0
RTAs between Baltic and Mediterranean countries
Turkey Estonia 0 10 9 9 0.0 909 1 0.0 00 1 0 0
Estonia Turkey199913 00 1 0 0 2.2 00 1 0 0 10.5 00 1 0 0
Turkey Lithuania 39 20 9 8 0.6 100 0 0 38.6 00 1 0 0
Lithuania Turkey199717 15 0 85 1.2 65 0 35 15.8 11 0 89
Other RTAs of Mediterranean countries
Turkey Israel 193 34 9 3 13.0 50 50 0 179.6 00 1 0 0
Israel Turkey1996288 41 9 6 55.6 19 3 78 232.4 00 1 0 0
Canada Israel 193 20 9 8 9.0 36 0 64 184.0 00 1 0 0
Israel Canada1996247 60 9 3 15.2 90 0 10 227.8 00 1 0 0WT/REG/W/46
Page 22
ALL PRODUCTS Agricultural products Industrial products
ImportsMFN
dutiesReduced
dutiesDuty
freeImportsMFN
dutiesReduced
dutiesDuty free ImportsMFN
dutiesReduced
dutiesDuty
freeImporting
party or
partiesOrigin Year
($m) (% share in imports) ($m) (% share in imports) ($m) (% share in imports)
Other RTAs of Mediterranean countries (continued)
EFTA Israel 335 69 4 53.7 35 65 280.9 01 0 0
Israel EFTA1995947 19 9 24.8 29 71 922.3 01 0 0
EFTA Morocco 76 01 0 0 31.7 01 0 0 44.5 01 0 0
Morocco EFTA199798 19 9 2.2 20 80 95.3 01 0 0
EC Tunisia 3,974 00 1 0 0 497.0 52 47 1 3,477.0 00 1 0 0
Tunisia EC19975,248 59 5 460.0 62 38 4,788.0 10 9 9
RTAs between countries of the Americas
US Canada 129,000 10 9 9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Canada US1994101,331 10 9 9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
US Mexico 49,500 10 9 9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mexico US199454,791 10 9 9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Canada Mexico 3,295 10 9 9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mexico Canada19941,621 00 1 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Canada Chile 238 00 1 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Chile Canada1996433 10 9 9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other RTAs
Australia N. Zealand 2,523 00 1 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
N. Zealand Australia19993,465 00 1 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sources: WT/REG/GEN /2, WT/REG11/9/Add.3, WT/REG12/2, WT/REG 13/3, WT/REG14/2,
WT/REG15/2, WT/REG16/ 2, WT/REG20/2, WT/REG 31/4/Add.1, WT/REG31/5,
WT/REG32/6, WT/REG33/ 2, WT/REG33/4, WT/REG 33/4/Add.1, WT/REG34/3,
WT/REG35/3, WT/REG36/2/Re v.1, WT/REG36/4/Add.1, WT/REG37/3, WT/REG38/4,
WT/REG4/1, WT/REG41/4/A dd.1, WT/REG42/4/Add.1, WT/R EG44/2, WT/REG45/3,
WT/REG45/4, WT/REG47/ 3, WT/REG47/4, WT/REG 49/4/Add.1, WT/REG54/4,
WT/REG55/4/Add.1, WT/REG 56/5, WT/REG57/5, WT/R EG58/4, WT/REG59/4,
WT/REG60/4, WT/REG61/ 4, WT/REG65/4, WT/REG 66/4, WT/REG67/4,
WT/REG67/4/Add.1, WT /REG68/4, WT/REG68/ 4/Add.1, WT/REG69,
WT/REG69/4/Add.2, WT/R EG70/4, WT/REG70/4/ Add.1, WT/REG72/4,
WT/REG72/4/Add.1, WT/REG 77/3, WT/REG80/4, WT/REG 84/3, WT/REG89/R/B/1,
WT/REG91/3/Rev.1, WT/REG 108/3, WT/REG111/R/B/1WT/REG/W/46
Page 23
Annex 2
Indicators of Tariffs Applied by Selected Countries to MFN Imports
and to Imports from Selected RTA partners
ALL PRODUCTS Agricultural products Industrial products
Average
applied
tariffAverage
applied
tariff on
dutiable
itemsShare of
duty-free
tariff linesAverage
applied
tariffAverage
applied
tariff on
dutiable
itemsShare of
duty-free
tariff linesAverage
applied
tariffAverage
applied
tariff on
dutiable
itemsShare of
duty-free
tariff linesReporting
country
(Year of
tariff
schedule)Origin of
goods
(% duty)(% of total
tariff lines)RMP
ratio
(% duty)(% of total
tariff lines)RMP
ratio
(% duty)(% of total
tariff lines)RMP
ratio
MFN 5.0 8.8 43 1.2 4.9 75 5.5 9.1 39 Australia
(1999)New
Zealand0.0 0.0 100 1.00 0.0 0.0 100 1.00 0.0 0.0 100 1.00
MFN 14.8 16.7 11 23.6 24.3 3 12.6 14.5 14
EC 7.3 12.8 43 0.51 21.4 22.3 4 0.09 3.5 7.6 54 0.72
EFTA 6.9 13.0 47 0.53 20.2 25.5 21 0.36 3.5 7.6 53 0.76
Hungary 4.0 10.2 61 0.73 10.9 21.8 50 0.27 2.0 5.5 64 0.86
Poland 2.0 17.0 88 0.86 8.8 17.8 50 0.41 0.1 9.6 99 0.99
Romania 3.2 9.7 67 0.79 10.0 20.6 52 0.33 1.3 4.7 72 0.91
Slovenia 2.6 6.7 60 0.82 9.9 20.5 52 0.33 0.7 1.8 63 0.95Bulgaria
(1999)
Turkey 7.2 14.2 49 0.51 22.4 23.1 4 0.52 3.3 8.4 61 0.78
MFN 4.4 8.7 49 4.3 9.4 55 4.4 8.6 48
Mexico 0.8 5.4 86 0.83 1.1 15.3 93 0.75 0.7 4.6 84 0.84
United
States0.1 114.1 100 0.97 0.7 114.1 99 0.83 0.0 0.0 100 1.00
Chile 0.7 6.9 90 0.85 1.2 13.9 91 0.72 0.6 5.8 90 0.87Canada
(2000)
Israel 0.4 9.5 95 0.90 3.1 9.6 68 0.28 0.0 5.1 100 1.00
MFN 7.2 13.9 49 16.8 19.7 15 5.4 11.9 55
CACM 0.0 12.0 100 0.99 0.1 13.9 99 0.99 0.0 11.1 100 0.99Costa Rica
(1999)
Mexico 2.1 15.0 86 0.70 9.0 25.1 64 0.46 0.8 8.3 90 0.84
MFN 8.4 10.4 19 26.1 45.4 42 4.8 5.6 14 Cyprus
(1998)
EC 2.6 32.9 92 0.69 14.3 34.2 58 0.45 0.1 15.8 99 0.98
MFN 6.7 8.2 18 13.4 20.0 33 4.5 5.2 14
EC 3.4 11.8 72 0.49 11.2 19.0 41 0.16 0.6 3.4 82 0.87
EFTA 3.5 11.9 70 0.48 12.5 18.7 33 0.07 0.6 3.4 82 0.87
Bulgaria 2.8 18.7 85 0.58 10.8 18.7 42 0.19 0.0 0.0 100 1.00
Hungary 2.6 19.0 86 0.61 10.3 19.0 46 0.23 0.0 0.0 100 1.00
Poland 2.5 18.3 86 0.63 10.0 19.3 48 0.25 0.0 1.3 99 1.00
Romania 2.6 18.9 86 0.61 10.6 19.0 44 0.21 0.0 6.8 100 1.00
Slovenia 2.7 19.4 86 0.60 10.8 19.4 45 0.19 0.0 4.0 100 1.00
Estonia 3.1 23.4 87 0.54 12.7 23.4 46 0.05 0.0 0.0 87 1.00
Latvia 3.0 20.5 86 0.55 11.9 20.5 42 0.11 0.0 0.0 100 1.00
Lithuania 2.9 21.6 86 0.57 11.9 21.6 45 0.11 0.0 0.0 100 1.00
Israel 3.3 19.7 83 0.51 13.1 19.8 34 0.02 0.1 13.5 100 0.98Czech
Republic
(2000)
Turkey 3.7 11.9 69 0.45 12.9 19.4 34 0.04 0.5 2.8 81 0.89WT/REG/W/46
Page 24
ALL PRODUCTS Agricultural products Industrial products
Average
applied
tariffAverage
applied
tariff on
dutiable
itemsShare of
duty-free
tariff linesAverage
applied
tariffAverage
applied
tariff on
dutiable
itemsShare of
duty-free
tariff linesAverage
applied
tariffAverage
applied
tariff on
dutiable
itemsShare of
duty-free
tariff linesReporting
country
(Year of
tariff
schedule)Origin of
goods
(% duty)(% of total
tariff lines)RMP
ratio
(% duty)(% of total
tariff lines)RMP
ratio
(% duty)(% of total
tariff lines)RMP
ratio
MFN 5.5 6.7 19 10.1 12.7 20 4.5 5.5 19
Czech R. n.a. n.a. 88 n.a. n.a. n.a. 32 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Hungary n.a. n.a. 89 n.a. n.a. n.a. 35 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Poland n.a. n.a. 87 n.a. n.a. n.a. 27 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Israel n.a. n.a. 89 n.a. n.a. n.a. 33 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Jordan n.a. n.a. 87 n.a. n.a. n.a. 26 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Syria n.a. n.a. 87 n.a. n.a. n.a. 24 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Algeria n.a. n.a. 93 n.a. n.a. n.a. 57 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Morocco n.a. n.a. 95 n.a. n.a. n.a. 68 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Tunisia n.a. n.a. 93 n.a. n.a. n.a. 59 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.EC
(2000)
EC (cont.)
(2000)
S. Africa n.a. n.a. 55 n.a. n.a. n.a. 27 n.a. n.a. n.a. 61 n.a.
MFN 12.4 13.7 9 32.2 33.6 4 7.4 8.3 11
EC 7.2 15.6 54 0.42 32.2 33.8 5 0.00 0.9 2.8 66 0.87
EFTA 7.0 15.2 54 0.44 30.9 33.1 7 0.04 0.9 2.8 66 0.87
Bulgaria 4.3 11.4 62 0.65 17.6 33.8 48 0.45 0.9 2.7 66 0.87
Czech R. 3.7 18.1 80 0.70 16.6 32.0 48 0.49 0.4 3.4 88 0.94
Slovak R. 3.7 18.1 80 0.70 16.6 32.0 48 0.49 0.4 3.4 88 0.94
Poland 3.5 16.9 79 0.72 15.8 30.7 49 0.51 0.4 3.2 87 0.94
Romania 4.0 16.5 76 0.67 17.9 34.3 48 0.44 0.5 3.1 82 0.93
Slovenia 4.5 17.7 75 0.64 20.0 37.7 47 0.38 0.6 3.0 82 0.93
Estonia 6.9 15.7 56 0.44 31.0 33.4 7 0.04 0.9 2.8 68 0.88
Israel 7.2 15.6 53 0.42 32.2 33.7 4 0.00 0.9 2.8 66 0.87Hungary
(1999)
Turkey 7.2 15.6 53 0.42 32.2 33.6 4 0.00 0.9 2.8 66 0.87
MFN 4.0 14.3 72 9.3 27.7 66 2.5 9.5 73 Iceland
(1999)
EEA 1.8 32.0 94 0.55 8.2 32.0 74 0.12 0.0 0.0 100 1.00
MFN 8.3 14.9 44 6.9 14.9 53 8.5 14.9 43
EC 0.6 15.5 96 0.92 5.2 15.0 66 0.26 0.0 48.3 100 1.00Israel
(1993)
United
States0.7 110.0 94 0.21 0.0 0.0 100 1.00 7.4 110.0 93 0.13
MFN 15.5 15.5 0 24.3 24.3 0 14.6 14.6 0
Canada 4.0 7.6 48 0.74 6.0 13.1 54 0.75 3.8 7.2 48 0.74Mexico
(1997)
United
States3.9 7.6 49 0.75 10.0 18.5 46 0.59 3.2 6.5 50 0.78
MFN 3.7 8.4 43 2.0 6.0 75 4.0 8.7 39 New
Zealand
(1999) Australia 0.0 0.0 100 1.00 0.0 0.0 100 1.00 0.0 0.0 100 1.00WT/REG/W/46
Page 25
ALL PRODUCTS Agricultural products Industrial products
Average
applied
tariffAverage
applied
tariff on
dutiable
itemsShare of
duty-free
tariff linesAverage
applied
tariffAverage
applied
tariff on
dutiable
itemsShare of
duty-free
tariff linesAverage
applied
tariffAverage
applied
tariff on
dutiable
itemsShare of
duty-free
tariff linesReporting
country
(Year of
tariff
schedule)Origin of
goods
(% duty)(% of total
tariff lines)RMP
ratio
(% duty)(% of total
tariff lines)RMP
ratio
(% duty)(% of total
tariff lines)RMP
ratio
MFN 3.4 12.0 72 10.5 54.2 81 2.6 8.8 71
EFTA 1.1 61.0 98 0.68 10.1 58.2 86 0.04 0.1 163.1 100 0.96
EC 1.1 71.8 99 0.68 8.6 69.1 88 0.18 0.1 190.0 100 0.96
Faroe Isl. 1.1 56.4 98 0.68 10.1 55.5 82 0.04 0.1 69.8 100 0.96
Czech &
Slovak Rs.1.1 61.1 98 0.68 9.3 59.2 84 0.11 0.1 127.7 100 0.96
Hungary 1.1 71.7 98 0.68 9.0 67.8 87 0.14 0.1 250.0 100 0.96
Poland 1.0 61.1 98 0.71 7.9 57.7 86 0.25 0.1 167.7 100 0.96
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania1.1 77.3 99 0.68 9.1 75.5 88 0.13 0.1 127.7 100 0.96Norway
(1999)
EEA 1.1 61.0 98 0.68 10.1 58.2 83 0.04 0.1 163.1 100 0.96
MFN 12.7 13.1 3 23.0 23.1 0 10.7 11.0 3
EC 3.9 17.5 78 0.69 21.3 21.9 3 0.07 0.3 4.2 93 0.97
EFTA 3.2 17.8 82 0.75 17.8 23.8 25 0.23 0.3 4.2 93 0.97
Faroe Isl. 3.8 17.3 78 0.70 20.3 21.9 8 0.12 0.4 5.5 92 0.96
Bulgaria 2.3 16.4 86 0.82 9.3 22.2 58 0.60 0.5 7.7 93 0.95
Czech &
Slovak Rs.1.5 11.3 87 0.88 6.0 15.5 62 0.74 0.3 4.4 94 0.97
Hungary 2.6 12.5 79 0.80 9.5 20.6 54 0.59 0.7 5.3 86 0.93
Romania 2.3 15.4 85 0.82 9.1 21.5 58 0.60 0.6 7.3 92 0.94
Slovenia 2.3 16.8 86 0.82 10.4 24.7 58 0.55 0.3 4.7 93 0.97
Estonia 3.7 18.8 81 0.71 18.8 24.1 22 0.18 0.6 8.1 92 0.94
Latvia 2.4 16.2 85 0.81 10.0 20.7 52 0.57 0.5 7.5 93 0.95
Lithuania 2.9 14.5 80 0.77 10.8 24.3 55 0.53 1.1 7.4 86 0.90Poland
(1999)
Israel 5.1 16.2 69 0.60 22.8 23.0 1 0.01 1.5 8.5 82 0.86
MFN 19.5 20.6 6 32.3 33.9 5 15.7 16.7 6
EC n.a. n.a. 27 n.a. n.a. n.a. 7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 32 n.a.
EFTA n.a. n.a. 31 n.a. n.a. n.a. 28 n.a. n.a. n.a. 32 n.a.
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. 81 n.a. n.a. n.a. 66 n.a. n.a. n.a. 84 n.a.
Czech R. n.a. n.a. 94 n.a. n.a. n.a. 69 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Slovak R. n.a. n.a. 94 n.a. n.a. n.a. 69 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Hungary n.a. n.a. 80 n.a. n.a. n.a. 64 n.a. n.a. n.a. 84 n.a.
Poland n.a. n.a. 88 n.a. n.a. n.a. 67 n.a. n.a. n.a. 93 n.a.
Slovenia n.a. n.a. 86 n.a. n.a. n.a. 70 n.a. n.a. n.a. 89 n.a.Romania
(1999)
Turkey n.a. n.a. 26 n.a. n.a. n.a. 7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 31 n.a.WT/REG/W/46
Page 26
ALL PRODUCTS Agricultural products Industrial products
Average
applied
tariffAverage
applied
tariff on
dutiable
itemsShare of
duty-free
tariff linesAverage
applied
tariffAverage
applied
tariff on
dutiable
itemsShare of
duty-free
tariff linesAverage
applied
tariffAverage
applied
tariff on
dutiable
itemsShare of
duty-free
tariff linesReporting
country
(Year of
tariff
schedule)Origin of
goods
(% duty)(% of total
tariff lines)RMP
ratio
(% duty)(% of total
tariff lines)RMP
ratio
(% duty)(% of total
tariff lines)RMP
ratio
MFN n.a. n.a. 13 n.a. n.a. 9 n.a. n.a. 14
EFTA n.a. n.a. 78 n.a. n.a. n.a. 19 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
EC n.a. n.a. 76 n.a. n.a. n.a. 11 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Faroe Isl. n.a. n.a. 76 n.a. n.a. n.a. 11 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. 77 n.a. n.a. n.a. 16 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Czech R. n.a. n.a. 76 n.a. n.a. n.a. 12 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Slovak R. n.a. n.a. 76 n.a. n.a. n.a. 12 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Hungary n.a. n.a. 77 n.a. n.a. n.a. 15 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Poland n.a. n.a. 78 n.a. n.a. n.a. 20 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Romania n.a. n.a. 77 n.a. n.a. n.a. 16 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Slovenia n.a. n.a. 76 n.a. n.a. n.a. 12 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Estonia n.a. n.a. 77 n.a. n.a. n.a. 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Latvia n.a. n.a. 77 n.a. n.a. n.a. 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Lithuania n.a. n.a. 77 n.a. n.a. n.a. 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
Israel n.a. n.a. 79 n.a. n.a. n.a. 23 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.Switzerland
(1999)
Turkey n.a. n.a. 79 n.a. n.a. n.a. 23 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 n.a.
MFN 12.3 14.3 14 46.5 49.4 6 5.5 6.5 16
EC 7.2 46.0 84 0.42 42.5 48.2 12 0.09 0.0 4.9 99 0.99Turkey
(1998)
EFTA 6.7 51.3 87 0.46 39.3 54.4 28 0.15 0.0 4.9 99 0.99
MFN 4.6 7.1 35 8.3 13.8 40 4.1 6.3 35
Canada 0.1 28.1 100 0.98 0.7 28.1 98 0.92 0.0 0.0 100 1.00
Mexico 0.4 4.6 90 0.91 1.2 9.3 87 0.85 0.3 3.4 91 0.93United
States
(2000)
Israel 0.1 28.1 100 0.97 0.7 28.1 98 0.92 0.0 0.0 100 1.00
Note: "n.a." = not available.
Sources: See page 29.WT/REG/W/46
Page 27Annex 3
Range of Tariffs Applied by Selected Countries to MFN Imports
and to Imports from Selected RTA partners
RTA Partner
ImporterMFN EC EFTA EEAFaroe
Isl.Bulgaria Hungary PolandCzech
&
Slovak
R.Romania Slovenia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Israel Turkey CACM Canada MexicoUnited
StatesChile
Bulgaria (1999)
AGRI-Min 3 33 32 . 5 3 3 3
AGRI-Max 74 70 74 74 74 74 74 74
IND-Min 2 0.9 0.9 0.6 2 0.5 0.2 0.9
IND-Max 39 20 20 20 20 20 20 25
Canada (2000)
AGRI-Min 2 22 5 2
AGRI-Max 238 238 238 238 238
IND-Min 2 3 0.7 0 1.5
IND-Max 25 99 0 1 2
Costa Rica (1999)
AGRI-Min 4 73
AGRI-Max 253 16 253
IND-Min 1.5 52
IND-Max 100 16 20
Cyprus (1998)
AGRI-Min 0.5 2.6
AGRI-Max 292 233.6
IND-Min 0.3 3.3
IND-Max 80 26
Czech Rep. (2000)
AGRI-Min 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 2 1 1 1 0.9 1.7 0.5 0.5
AGRI-Max 125 125 125 100 100 80 100 100 125 125 100 125 125
IND-Min 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0 0.4 6.8 1 0 0 0 1 0.6
IND-Max 89 13 13 0 0 2.6 6.8 10 0 0 0 89 89
Hungary  (1999)
AGRI-Min 1.8 1.8 1.8 3.5 2.5 4 2.7 3.5 1.8 1.8 1.8
AGRI-Max 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
IND-Min 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2
IND-Max 78 70 70 23 23 23 47 23 23 70 70
Iceland (1999)
AGRI-Min 5 5
AGRI-Max 78 78
IND-Min 4 0
IND-Max 20 0
WT/REG/W/46
Page 28RTA Partner
ImporterMFN EC EFTA EEAFaroe
Isl.Bulgaria Hungary PolandCzech
&
Slovak
R.Romania Slovenia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Israel Turkey CACM Canada MexicoUnited
StatesChile
Israel (1993)
AGRI-Min 2 2 0
AGRI-Max 52 52 0
IND-Min 2 6 110
IND-Max 100 100 110
Mexico (1998)
AGRI-Min 10 22
AGRI-Max 260 237 237
IND-Min 5 1.6 1.9
IND-Max 35 12 20
Norway (1999)
AGRI-Min 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5
AGRI-Max 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550
IND-Min 0.6 170 170 21.2 3 250 3 3 3 3 3
IND-Max 259 210 210 258 258.5 250 250 210 210 210 210
Poland (1999)
AGRI-Min 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 4 4 4 4 4 0.8 3.5 2.5 0.8
AGRI-Max 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252 252
IND-Min 0.2 3 3 0.2 3 2.1 3 3 3 0.2 3 3 3
IND-Max 42 15 15 42 20 15 15 20 20 41.7 20 15 42
Turkey (1998)
AGRI-Min 0.5 12 . 4
AGRI-Max 240 240 240
IND-Min 0.3 1.4 1.4
IND-Max 32 18 18
United States (2000)
AGRI-Min 0.5 3.5 3.5 0.9
AGRI-Max 350 164 164 25
IND-Min 0.1 00 0 . 1
IND-Max 48 00 2 6
WT/REG/W/46
Page 29
Notes:
1. Bulgaria's submission to the IDB (1999) contains preferences for the Czech and Slovak
Republics which were not included in the study as they were so much at variance from
Bulgaria's other CEFTA partners.
2. The information on preferential partners contained in the EC's 1999 submission to the
TPR database was not used in this study, due to technical restraints.
3. Israel's submission to the TRAINS database ( 1993) shows tariff rates of 110 per cent for
587 lines of imports of agricultural goods from the United States (the peak MFN rate for
that year was 100 per cent).
4. For Switzerland, it was only possible to obtain information on duty-free tariff lines from
the IDB submission.
5. The data obtained from the TRAINS database often gives preferences only where
granted (i.e. the entire schedule for a reporter is not reproduced for each preferential
partner).  It was possible to obtain a picture of duty-free treatment in such cases, but not
to provide reduced duties.
6. For details on the choice of data sources, see paragraph 17 of the text.
Sources (for Annexes 2 & 3):
Australia (IDB); Bulgaria (IDB); Canada (IDB); Costa Rica (IDB); Cyprus (IDB); Czech
Republic (TPR); EC (TRAINS); Hungary (IDB); Iceland (TPR ); Israel (TRAINS); Mexico
(FTAA); New Zealand (IDB); Norway (TPR); Poland (TPR); Romania (TRAINS);
Switzerland (IDB); Turkey (I DB); United States (IDB)WT/REG/W/46
Page 30
Annex 4
Variation of Selected Reporters' Duty-Free Shares for Agricultural Products
vis-à-vis  their RTA Partners
0255075100
POLAND
0255075100
ROMANIA025507510 0
BULGARIA025507510 0
CZECH REPUBLIC
025507510 0
HUNGARY
025507510 0
SLOVAK REPUBLIC
025507510 0
SLOVENIA
Tariff-line duty-free shar es Import duty-free sharesWT/REG/W/46
Page 31
Sources Annexes 1 and 2.025507510 0
TURKEY
025507510 0
ISRAEL
025507510 0
LATVIA025507510 0
EC
025507510 0
NORWAY
025507510 0
EST ONIA
025507510 0
LITHUANIA
025507510 0
SWITZERLAND
Tariff-line duty-free shar es Import duty-free sharesWT/REG/W/46
Page 32
Annex 5
Transition Periods and Schedules of Concessions for Selected RTAs
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
EC Algeria ND E F • zero duties
(with
exceptions)PD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
Algeria EC01/07/1976 none
• no concessions granted
EC Andorra ND E F • zero duties
(with
exceptions)no
exceptionDEF • zero duties
Andorra EC01/07/1991 none
ND E F • zero duties
(with
exceptions)• no concessions granted
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties
(sometimes within TQs)
(agriculture)
EC Bulgaria N
1, 4, 5
years• progressive
elimination
(sometimeswithin TQs)P
5 years
• progressive reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Bulgaria EC31/12/1993 10
N
5, 9
years• progressive
eliminationP 5 years • progressive reductions
within TQs
EC Cyprus ND E F • specific
reductions
(sometimeswithin TQs)PD E F
• zero duties,
• specific  reductions
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
DEF • specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Cyprus EC01/06/1973 4+5
N 4 years • progressive
reductionsP
4 years • progressive reductions
(agriculture)
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties (fish)
• specific  reductions
(agriculture)
EC Czech Rep. N
2, 3, 5,
6 years• progressive
eliminationP
4, 5
years• progressive reductions
within TQs (agriculture,
processed agr.)
DEF • zero duties
 Czech Rep. EC01/03/1992 10
P
5, 9, 10
years• progressive
eliminationP3 ,  5
years• progressive reductions
within TQs (agriculture,
processed agr.)
WT/REG/W/46
Page 33
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
EEC Egypt ND E F • zero duties
• specific
reductions
within TQsPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • specific
reductions
Egypt EEC01/11/1973 none
P
1 year • progressive
reductions• no concessions granted
DEF • specific  reductions
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
within TQs (fish)
EC Estonia ND E F • zero duties
(exceptions for
textiles)P
1, 3
years• progressive reductions
within TQs (processed
agr.)
• progressive reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
Estonia EC01/01/1995 none
no
exceptionDEF • zero duties P 3 years • progressive reductions
EC Faroe
Islandsno
exceptionDEF • zero duties PD E F • zero duties within TQs
(fish)
• zero duties within TQs
(agriculture)
• zero duties within TQs
(processed agr.)
Faroe
IslandsEC01/01/1997 none
no
exceptionDEF • zero duties PD E F • zero duties (fish)
• zero duties
(agriculture)
• zero duties (with
exceptions) (processed
agr.)
DEF • zero duties DEF • specific  reductions
(agriculture)
EC Hungary N
1, 4, 5,
6 years• progressive
elimination
(sometimeswithin TQs)P
4, 5
years • progressive reductions
within TQs (processed
agr.)
• progressive reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
Hungary EC01/03/1992 10
N 2, 5, 9
years• progressive
eliminationP 5 years • progressive reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
• progressive reductions
within TQs (processed
agr.)
EC Latvia no
exceptionDEF • zero duties annexes missing
DEF • zero duties
 Latvia EC01/01/1995 4
N
2, 4
years• progressive
eliminationannexes missing
WT/REG/W/46
Page 34
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
DEF • specific  reductions
within TQs (fish)
EC Lithuania ND E F • zero duties
(exceptions for
textiles)P
1, 3, 6
years• progressive reductions
within TQs (processed
agr.)
• specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
DEF • zero duties
 Lithuania EC01/01/1995 6
N
2, 6
years• progressive
eliminationP6 ,  7
years• progressive reduction
(fish)
• progressive reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
• progressive reductions
within TQs (processed
agr.)
EC Malta ND E F • specific
reductions
(sometimeswithin TQs)PD E F
• specific  reductions
Malta EC01/04/1971 10
N 4 years • progressive
reductionN 4 years • progressive reduction
DEF • zero duties (fish)
• specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
EC Morocco no
exceptionDEF • zero duties P
3 years • progressive
elimination within TQs
(fish)
DEF • zero duties
 Morocco EC01/03/2000 12
N
3, 12
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
EC PLO no
exceptionDEF • zero duties PD E F • zero duties (some
within TQs)
DEF • zero duties
 PLO EC01/07/1997 4.5
N
5 years • progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties (some
within TQs)
DEF • zero duties DEF • specific  reduction
(agriculture)
EC Poland N
1, 4, 5,
7 years• progressive
elimination
(sometimeswithin TQs)P
1, 4, 5
years • progressive
elimination (processed
agr.)
• progressive reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
DEF • zero duties
 Poland EC01/03/1992 10
N
7, 10 • progressive
eliminationP 5 years • progressive reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
WT/REG/W/46
Page 35
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
DEF • zero duties DEF • specific  reductions
(fish)
• specific  reductions
(agriculture)
EC Romania N
1, 4, 5,
6 years• progressive
elimination
(sometimeswithin TQs)P
4, 5
years • progressive reductions
within TQs (processed
agr.)
• progressive reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
DEF • zero duties DEF • specific  reductions
(fish)
Romania EC01/05/1993 10
N
5, 9
years• progressive
eliminationP
5, 8
years• progressive reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
• progressive reductions
(processed agr.)
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties (fish)
• specific  reductions
(agriculture)
EC Slovak Rep. N
2, 3, 5,
6 years• progressive
elimination
(sometimeswithin TQs)P
4, 5
years • progressive reductions
within TQs (processed
agr.)
• progressive reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
DEF • zero duties
 Slovak Rep. EC01/03/1992 10
P
5, 9, 10
years• progressive
eliminationP3 ,  5
years• progressive reductions
within TQs (processed
agr.)
• progressive reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
DEF • zero duties DEF • specific  reductions
within TQs (fish)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
EC Slovenia N
2, 3
years• progressive
elimination
within TQsP
6 years • progressive reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
DEF • zero duties
 Slovenia EC01/01/1997 6
N
3, 4
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs (fish)
• specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
WT/REG/W/46
Page 36
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties
(agriculture)
EC South
Africa10 N
3, 4, 6,
10 years• progressive
elimination
• specific
reductionsP
3, 10
years• progressive
elimination (agriculture)
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties
(agriculture)
South Africa EC01/01/2000
12 N
3, 5, 12
years• progressive
eliminationP
3, 5, 12
years• progressive
elimination
EC Tunisia no
exceptionDEF • zero duties PD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture
and fish)
DEF • zero duties
 Tunisia EC01/03/1998 12
N
5, 12
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs  (agriculture
and fish)
EFTA Bulgaria ND E F • zero duties
(individual
EFTA
exceptions
below)
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties
 Bulgaria EFTA N
4.5, 8.5
years• progressive
eliminationP
8 years • progressive reductions
(processed agr.)
Iceland Bulgaria P DEF • zero duties (fish)
• zero duties
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Norway Bulgaria N 5.5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties (fish)
• specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Switzerland Bulgaria01/07/1993 9.5
PD E F • zero duties (fish)
• zero duties  and •
specific  reductions
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
WT/REG/W/46
Page 37
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
EFTA Czech Rep. ND E F • zero duties
(individual
EFTA
exceptions
below)
DEF • zero duties
 Czech Rep. EFTA N
4.5, 8.5
years• progressive
eliminationannexes missing
Iceland Czech Rep. annexes missing
Norway Czech Rep. 3.5, 5.5
years• progressive
eliminationannexes missing
Switzerland Czech Rep.01/07/1992 10
annexes missing
EFTA Estonia no
exceptionDEF • zero duties
Estonia
(prov. appl.)EFTA no
exceptionDEF • zero duties PD E F • aid measures (fish)
• concessions same as
granted to the EC
(processed agr.)
Iceland Estonia P DEF • aid measures (fish)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Norway Estonia P DEF • aid measures (fish)
• specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Swittzerland Estonia P DEF • aid measures (fish)
• specific  reductions
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Estonia Switzerland01/06/1996 none
PD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
EFTA Hungary 01/10/1993 10 N DEF • zero duties
(individual
EFTA
exceptions
below)
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties (fish)
 Hungary EFTA N
0.5, 3.5,
7.5
years• progressive
eliminationP
3.5
years• progressive reductions
Iceland Hungary P DEF • zero duties (fish)
• zero duties
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
WT/REG/W/46
Page 38
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
Norway Hungary N 2.5, 4.5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties (fish)
• specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Switzerland Hungary P DEF • zero duties (fish)
• zero duties and •
specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
EFTA Israel ND E F • zero duties
(individual
EFTA
exceptions
below)
Israel EFTA no
exceptionDEF • zero duties PD E F • progressive
elimination (fish)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Iceland Israel • may maintain QRs on certain
productsPD E F • progressive
elimination (fish)
• specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Norway Israel P DEF • progressive
elimination (fish)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Switzerland Israel01/01/1993 none
PD E F • progressive
elimination (fish)
• specific  reductions
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
EFTA Latvia 01/06/1996 none no
exceptionDEF • zero duties
DEF • zero duties (fish)
• concessions same as
granted to the EC
(processed agr.)
Latvia EFTA no
exceptionDEF • zero duties P
4 years • progressive
eliminations (fish)
DEF • zero duties (fish)
• zero duties (processed
agr.)
Iceland Latvia P
4 years • progressive
elimination (fish)
WT/REG/W/46
Page 39
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
Norway Latvia P DEF • zero duties (fish)
• specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Switzerland Latvia P DEF • zero duties (fish)
• specific  reductions
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
EFTA Lithuania no
exceptionDEF • zero duties
Lithuania
(prov. appl.)EFTA N 0.5, 4.5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties (fish)
concessions same as
granted to the EC(processed agr.)
Norway Lithuania P DEF • zero duties (fish)
• specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Iceland Lithuania P DEF • zero duties (fish)
• zero duties
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Switzerland Lithuania P DEF • zero duties (fish)
• specific  reductions
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Lithuania Switzerland01/08/1996 4.5
PD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
EFTA Morocco 01/12/1999 none no
exceptionDEF • zero duties
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties (fish)
• concessions same as
granted to the EC
(processed agr.)
Morocco EFTA N
3, 12
years• progressive
eliminationP
various • progressive
elimination (fish)
WT/REG/W/46
Page 40
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
Iceland Morocco P DEF • zero duties (fish)
• zero duties
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Norway Morocco P DEF • zero duties (fish)
• zero duties
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
within TQs (processed
agr.)
Switzerland Morocco P DEF • zero duties (fish)
• zero duties
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Morocco Switzerland P DEF • specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
EFTA Poland ND E F • zero duties
(individual
EFTA
exceptions
below)
DEF • zero duties 5 years • progressive reductions
(processed agr.)
Poland EFTA N
(timetable not available -
annex missing)P
6 years • progressive reductions
(fish)
Iceland Poland P DEF • zero duties (fish)
• zero duties
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Norway Poland15/11/1993 8
N2 ,  4
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties (fish)
• specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Switzerland Poland P DEF • zero duties (fish)
• zero duties and •
specific  reductions
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
WT/REG/W/46
Page 41
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
EFTA Romania ND E F • zero duties
(individual
EFTA
exceptions
below)
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties (fish)
 Romania EFTA N
4.5, 8.5
years• progressive
eliminationP
6.5
years• progressive reductions
(processed agr.)
Iceland Romania P DEF • zero duties (fish)
• zero duties
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Norway Romania N 5.5 • progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties (fish)
• specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Switzerland Romania01/05/1993 9.5
PD E F • zero duties (fish)
• zero duties and •
specific  reductions
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
EFTA Slovak Rep. ND E F • zero duties
(individual
EFTA
exceptions
below)
DEF • zero duties
 Slovak Rep. EFTA N
4.5, 8.5
years• progressive
eliminationannexes missing
Iceland Slovak Rep. annexes missing
Norway Slovak Rep. 3.5, 5.5
years• progressive
eliminationannexes missing
Switzerland Slovak Rep.01/07/1992 10
annexes missing
EFTA Slovenia 01/07/1995
.6.5 N DEF • zero duties
(individual
EFTA
exceptions
below)
ND E F • zero duties
 Slovenia
(prov. appl.)EFTA
N 1.5, 4.5,
6.5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties (fish)
• concessions same as
granted to the EC
(processed agr.)
Iceland Slovenia allowed to maintain QRs on certain
products (brooms)PD E F • zero duties (fish)
• specific  reductions
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
WT/REG/W/46
Page 42
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
Norway Slovenia N 3.5
years• progressive
elimination
(textiles)PD E F • zero duties (fish)
• specific  reductions
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
within TQs (processed
agr.)
Switzerland Slovenia P DEF • zero duties (fish)
• specific  reductions
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Slovenia Switzerland P DEF • specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
EFTA Turkey ND E F • zero duties
(individual
EFTA
exceptions
below)
DEF • zero duties
 Turkey EFTA N
4 years • progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
(fish)
Iceland Turkey P DEF • zero duties
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Norway Turkey N 4 years • progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties
(agriculture)
concessions same asgranted to the EC(processed agr.)
Switzerland Turkey01/04/1992 8
N 4 years • progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties and •
specific  reductions
(agriculture)
• concessions same as
granted to the EC
(processed agr.)
BAFTA DEF for FTA in agricultural products is 1/1/1997
Estonia Latvia no
exceptionDEF • zero duties no
exceptionDEF • zero duties
Latvia Estonia no
exceptionDEF • zero duties no
exceptionDEF • zero duties
Estonia Lithuania no
exceptionDEF • zero duties no
exceptionDEF • zero duties
Lithuania Estonia no
exceptionDEF • zero duties no
exceptionDEF • zero duties
Latvia Lithuania no
exceptionDEF • zero duties no
exceptionDEF • zero duties
Lithuania Latvia01/04/1994 none
no
exceptionDEF • zero duties no
exceptionDEF • zero duties
WT/REG/W/46
Page 43
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
CEFTA DEF for industrial products is 1/1/1996
(Additional Protocol 2)DEF for agricultural products is 1/1/1996
(Additional Protocol 3)
DEF • zero duties
 Czech Rep.Slovak Rep.Hungary P
1, 4
years • progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
DEF • zero duties
 Hungary Czech Rep.
Slovak Rep.P
1, 4
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties  • specific
reductions
DEF • zero duties
 Czech Rep.
Slovak Rep.Poland P
1, 5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
DEF • zero duties
 Poland Czech Rep.
Slovak Rep.P
1, 6
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
DEF • zero duties
 Hungary Poland P
1, 4, 5
years• progressive
elimination
(some TQs)PD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
DEF • zero duties
 Poland Hungary01/03/1993 8
P
1, 4, 6
years• progressive
elimination
(some TQs)PD E F • specific  reductions
CEFTA (Accession of Slovenia)
DEF • specific  reductions
within TQs
Czech Rep.
Slovak Rep.Slovenia no
exceptionDEF • zero duties P
2 years • progressive reductions
within TQs
Slovenia Czech Rep.
Slovak Rep.ND E F • zero duties PD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
3 years • progressive
eliminationP 2 years • progressive reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Slovenia Poland P
2, 5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Poland Slovenia P
2, 6
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Hungary Slovenia01/01/1996 none
N
1, 5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Slovenia Hungary P
1, 5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
WT/REG/W/46
Page 44
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
CEFTA  (Accession of Romania)
Czech Rep.Slovak Rep.Romania 01/07/1997 none N DEF  • zero duties PD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties
• specific   reductions
within TQs
Romania Czech Rep.
Slovak Rep.N
3.5
years • progressive
eliminationP
1.5
years• specific  reductions
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties
• specific  reductions
Hungary Romania N
2.5, 4.5
years• progressive
eliminationP
1.5
years• specific  reductions
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties
• specific  reductions
Romania Hungary N
2.5, 4.5
years• progressive
eliminationP
1.5
years• specific  reductions
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties
• specific  reductions
within TQs
Poland Romania N
1.5, 2.5,
3.5, 4.5
years• progressive
eliminationP
1.5
years• specific  reductions
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties
• specific  reductions
within TQs
Romania Poland N
1.5, 3.5,
4.5
years• progressive
eliminationP
1.5
years• specific  reductions
DEF zero duties DEF • zero duties
• specific  reductions
within TQs
Slovenia Romania N
2.5, 3.5
years• progressive
eliminationP
1.5
years• specific  reductions
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties
• specific  reductions
within TQs
Romania Slovenia N
2.5, 4.5
years• progressive
eliminationP
1.5
years• specific  reductions
CEFTA (Accession of Bulgaria)
Czech Rep.Slovak Rep.Bulgaria 01/01/1999 none no
exceptionDEF
• zero duties PD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
Bulgaria Czech Rep.
Slovak Rep.no
exceptionDEF • zero duties PD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
DEF • zero duties
 Hungary Bulgaria N
2 years • progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
WT/REG/W/46
Page 45
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
DEF • zero duties
Bulgaria Hungary N
2 years • progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties
• specific  reductions
Bulgaria Poland N
3 years • progressive
eliminationP
2 years • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties
• specific  reductions
within TQs
Poland Bulgaria N
2, 3
years• progressive
eliminationP
2 years • specific  reductions
DEF • zero duties
 Bulgaria Romania N
1,3
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
DEF • zero duties
 Romania Bulgaria N
1,3
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
DEF • zero duties
 Bulgaria Slovenia N
1 year • progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Slovenia Bulgaria N
1 year • progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Czech Rep. Estonia N
4.5
years• QRs to be
abolishedPD E F • zero duties
Estonia Czech Rep.01/07/1996
prov. appl.none
no
exceptionDEF • zero duties no
exceptionDEF • zero duties
DEF • zero duties
 Czech Rep. Latvia N
4.5
years• QRs to be
abolishedPD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
within TQs
Latvia Czech Rep.01/07/1996
prov. appl.none
no
exceptionDEF • zero duties PD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Czech Rep. Lithuania N
0.5, 4.5
years • progressive
elimination
• QRs to be
abolishedPD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
DEF • zero duties
 Lithuania Czech Rep.01/07/1997 0.5
N
0.5, 3.5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
WT/REG/W/46
Page 46
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
Czech Rep. DEF • zero duties
 Israel N
2, 3, 4
years• progressive
elimination
• QRs to be
abolishedPD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Israel Czech Rep.01/01/1997
prov. appl.2
N
2, 3, 4
years• progressive
elimination
• QRs to be
abolishedPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Czech Rep. Turkey N
0.5, 2.5
years• progressive
elimination
• QRs to be
abolishedPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Turkey Czech Rep.01/09/1998 2.5
N
0.5, 2.5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Slovak Rep. Estonia N
4.5
years• QRs to be
abolishedPD E F • zero duties
Estonia
(prov. appl.)Slovak Rep.01/07/1996 none
no
exceptionDEF • zero duties no
exceptionDEF • zero duties
DEF • zero duties
 Slovak Rep. Latvia N
4.5
years• QRs to be
abolishedPD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
within TQs
Latvia
(prov. appl.)Slovak Rep.01/07/1996 2.5
no
exceptionDEF • zero duties PD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Slovak Rep. Lithuania N
0.5, 3.5
years• progressive
elimination
• QRs to be
abolishedPD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
DEF • zero duties
 Lithuania Slovak Rep.01/07/1997 3.5
N
0.5, 3.5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
DEF • zero duties
 Slovak Rep. Israel N
2, 3.5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Israel Slovak Rep.01/01/1997 2
N
2, 3.5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
WT/REG/W/46
Page 47
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
DEF • zero duties
Slovak Rep. Turkey N
0.5, 2.5
years;• progressive
elimination
• QRs to be
abolishedPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Turkey Slovak Rep.01/09/1998 2.5
N
0.5, 2.5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Hungary Latvia N
1 year • progressive
elimination
• QRs to be
abolishedPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Latvia Hungary01/01/2000 1
N
1 year • progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Hungary Lithuania N
1 year • progressive
elimination
• QRs to be
abolishedPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Lithuania Hungary01/03/2000 1
N
1 year • progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Hungary Israel N
3 years • progressive
elimination
• QRs to be
progressively
eliminatedPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Israel Hungary01/02/1998 3
N
1, 3
years• progressive
elimination
• QRs to be
abolishedP • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Hungary Turkey N
3 years • progressive
elimination
• QRs to be
progressively
eliminatedPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Turkey Hungary01/04/1998 3
N
3 years • progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
WT/REG/W/46
Page 48
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
DEF zero duties
 Poland Latvia N
1, 2, 4
years• progressive
elimination
• some QRs
maintained (no
schedule forelimination)PD E F
• zero duties
(annexes incomplete)
DEF • zero duties
 Latvia Poland01/04/1998
prov. appl.3
N
1, 3
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties
(annexes incomplete)
Poland Lithuania * N 1.5, 2.5,
3.5,
years• progressive
elimination
• some QRs
maintained (no
schedule foreliminationPD E F
• specific  reductions
Lithuania Poland01/01/1997 4
N 1.5, 2.5
years• progressive
elimination
• reduction to
zero dutiesPD E F • specific  reductions
DEF • zero duties
 Poland Israel N
1, 2, 3,
4 years;• progressive
elimination
• some QRs
retained  (no
schedule forelimination)PD E F
• specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Israel Poland01/03/1998
prov. appl.3
N
1, 1.5,
2, 3
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Poland Turkey N
0.5, 1.5
years• progressive
elimination
• some QRs
retained (no
schedule forelimination)PD E F
• specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Turkey Poland01/05/2000 1.5
N
1.5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
* An Additional Protocol to the Poland-Lithuania RTA has been applied since 1/7/1998.  The calendar of concessions for industrial  products has been calculated
from this date.WT/REG/W/46
Page 49
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
DEF • zero duties DEF • TQs granted
(agriculture)
• specific  reductions
(processed agr.)
Poland Faroe
IslandsN
0.5, 1.5,
2.5
years• progressive
elimination
• some QRs
retained (no
schedule forelimination)P
3.5
years • progressive
elimination (fish)
Faroe
IslandsPoland01/06/1999 2.5
no
exceptionDEF • zero duties PD E F • specific  reductions
(fish)
• zero duties
(agriculture)
• zero duties (processed
agr.)
DEF • zero duties DEF • specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
Romania Turkey N
4 years • progressive
elimination
(special
provisions for
textiles andsteel)P
3 years
• progressive
elimination within TQs
(same concessions as
granted to the EC)
(processed agr.)
DEF • zero duties
 Turkey Romania01/02/1998 4
P
4 years • progressive
elimination
(specialprovisions fortextiles andsteel)PD E F
• specific  reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
• specific  reductions
within TQs (same
concessions as offered
to EC) (processed agr.)
Slovenia Estonia no
exceptionDEF • zero duties PD E F • zero duties
Estonia Slovenia01/01/1997
prov. appl.none
no
exceptionDEF • zero duties PD E F • zero duties
DEF • zero duties (fish)
 Slovenia Latvia no
exceptionDEF • zero duties P
2 years • progressive reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
DEF • zero duties (fish)
 Latvia Slovenia01/08/1996
prov. appl.2.5
no
exceptionDEF • zero duties P
2 years • progressive reductions
within TQs (agriculture)
DEF • zero duties
 Slovenia Lithuania N
2 years • progressive
eliminationP 5 years • progressive reductions
within TQs  (agriculture)
• specific  reductions
within TQs (fish)
DEF • zero duties
 Lithuania Slovenia01/03/1997
prov. appl.2
N
2, 4
years• progressive
elimination
• single
eliminationP 5 years • progressive reductions
within TQs  (agriculture)
• specific  reductions
within TQs (fish)
WT/REG/W/46
Page 50
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
DEF • zero duties
 Slovenia Israel N
0.5, 2 • progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Israel Slovenia01/09/1998
prov. appl.2
N
0.5, 2,
2.5
years• progressive
elimination
• QRs to be
abolishedPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Slovenia Croatia N
2, 3
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Croatia Slovenia01/01/1998
prov. appl.3
N
2, 3
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
Turkey Estonia no
exceptionDEF • zero duties annexes missing
Estonia Turkey01/07/1998 none
no
exceptionDEF • zero duties annexes missing
Turkey Latvia ND E F • zero duties
(special
provisions fortextiles)PD E F
• specific  reductions
within TQs
Latvia Turkey01/07/2000 none
ND E F • zero duties
(special
provisions fortextiles)PD E F
• specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Turkey Lithuania N
3 years • progressive
elimination
(specialprovisions fortextiles)PD E F
• specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Lithuania Turkey01/03/1998 3
N
3 years • progressive
elimination
(specialprovisions fortextiles)PD E F
• specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Turkey Israel N
0.5, 1.5,
2.5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Israel Turkey01/05/1997 2.5
N
0.5, 1.5,
2.5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • specific  reductions
within TQs
WT/REG/W/46
Page 51
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
Calendar of concessionsImporting
partyExporting
partyDate of
entry into
force of
RTA
(DEF)General
RTA
transition
period
(years)Positive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessionsPositive
(P) or
negative
(N) listsTimingType of tariff
concessions
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties
US Israel ** N
3.5, 9.5
years• progressive
eliminationN
3.5, 9.5
years• progressive
elimination
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties
 Israel US19/08/1985 10
N
3.5, 9.5
years• progressive
eliminationN
3.5, 9.5
years• progressive
elimination
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties
 Canada Chile N
1.5, 3.5,
4.5, 5.5,• progressive
eliminationN
1.5, 3.5,
4.5, 5.5,• progressive
elimination
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties
 Chile Canada05/07/1997 7
N
1.5, 2.5,
3.5, 4.5,5.5, 6.5,
9.5,14.5
15.5,
19.5
years• progressive
eliminationN
1.5, 2.5,
3.5, 4.5,5.5, 6.5,
9.5,14.5
15.5,
19.5
years• progressive
elimination
NAFTA ***
DEF • zero duties
 US P
5, 9, 14
years• progressive
elimination
DEF • zero duties
 Canada P
5, 6, 7,
9, 10
years• progressive
elimination
(sometimeswithin TQs)
Mexico01/01/1994 none
annexes missing
DEF • zero duties
 Canada Israel N
2.5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties (with
exceptions)
• specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties
 Israel Canada01/01/1997 none
N
2.5
years• progressive
eliminationPD E F • zero duties
• specific  reductions
within TQs
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties
 Australia New
ZealandN
5 years • progressive
eliminationN
5 years • progressive
elimination
DEF • zero duties DEF • zero duties
 New
ZealandAustralia01/01/1983 01/07/1990
N
5 years • progressive
eliminationN
5 years • progressive
elimination
** No distinction is made in the Agreement between concessions on agricultural and industrial goods.
*** Additional bilateral schedules of concessions exist, but have not been analyzed in this study.
Sources: Legal texts (including annexes and protocols) submitted to the WTO.
__________