RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONS/WPGR/M/43
5 September 2003
(03-4643)
Working Party on GATS Rules
REPORT OF THE MEETING OF 2 AND 3 JULY 2003
Note by the Secretariat1
1. The Working Party on GATS Rules opened its forty-third meeting under the chairmanship of
Mr. Santiago Urbina, from Nicaragua.  The age nda for the meeting was contained in WTO/AIR/2128.
It included seven items:  update to the 2002 Annual Report of the Working Party on GATS Rules to
the Council for Trade in Services;  stock-taking of progress made in the negotiations;  subsidies;
emergency safeguard measures;  government procurement;  date of the next meeting;  and otherbusiness.  To assist delegations in the preparation for the meeting, the Chairperson had prepared an
Annotated Agenda contained in JOB(03)/125.  The agenda for the meeting was adopted.
I. UPDATE TO THE ANNUAL REPORT OF 2002 OF THE WORKING PARTY ON
GATS RULES TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES (2003)
2. The Chairperson said that, in view of the Canc ún Ministerial Meeting, a draft update to the
2002 Annual Report of the Working Party to the Counci l for Trade in Services had been circulated on
20 June 2003 as document S/WPGR/W/43.  This report conveyed factual information on the activities
carried out by the Working Party since the 2002 annual report had been issued (S/WPGR/8), and
covered the time-period up to, and including, the la st meeting.  The Working Party was invited to
adopt this report and transmit it to the Council for Trade in Services.
3. Various delegations proposed drafting changes to the draft report.  The delegations of
Argentina;  Brazil;  Canada;  Chile;  China;  Chinese Taipei;  the European Communities;
Hong Kong; China;  India;  Japan;  Pakistan;  Philippines;  Switzerland;  Thailand;  the United States;
and Uruguay participated in the discussion, which started in formal and was continued in informal
mode.  A first revision of the draft report was issued as S/WPGR/W/43/Rev.1.  Following further
drafting changes, the Working Party adopted the Update to the 2002 Annual Report, which was
circulated as document S/WPGR/12.
II. STOCK-TAKING OF PROGRESS MADE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
4. The Chairperson recalled that the work programmes on emergency safeguard measures,
subsidies and government procurement, adopted on 22 July 2002, called for the Working Party "to
prepare for the opportunity provided by the Fifth Ministerial Conference to take stock of progress
made in the negotiations".  On 16 June, the Working Party had had an informal discussion on thepossible form and content of such a stock-taking.  Following that meeting, and after having discussed
informally with a number of delegations, but also taking into account the limited time available, he
had included a specific agenda item for this meeting.  This would give delegations an opportunity
within the framework of the Working Party to take stock of the progress made in the negotiations
under the three agenda items.  He suggested that the Chairperson's reports on emergency safeguardmeasures (S/WPGR/9), subsidies (S/WPGR/10) an d government procurement (S/WPGR/11) be used
as background documents. This stock-taking discussion would be reflected in the minutes of the
                                                     
1 This document has been prepared under the Secretariat's own responsibility and without prejudice to
the positions of Members and to their rights and obligations under the WTO.S/WPGR/M/43
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meeting and referred to in the Chair's oral report to the Special Session.  Delegations would be free to
explain their positions on that occasion as well.
5. The Chairperson briefly introduced the two repo rts on subsidies and government procurement
which had been circulated the previous week.  As indicated at the May meeting, the form of the
reports followed the approach taken in the report on ESM presented in March.  Practically, this meantthat each report consisted of (i) a factual introduction, recalling work done so far under the relevant
agenda item, and (ii) the Chair's assessment of the situation and suggestions for a way forward.  The
reports were circulated on his responsibility and did not prejudge the position of any delegation.
6. The representative of the United States said she wanted to focus first on process and format.
Her delegation appreciated the work put into the reports on subsidies and government procurement,
which had been submitted on the Chairperson's responsibility.  She noted that these reports followed
the format of the Report on emergency safeguar d measures, although the work programmes contained
different mandates.  The work programme on ESM specifically stipulated that the note by the
Chairperson should identify "areas of convergence and divergence among Members, with a view to
providing a basis to facilitate further negotiations".  The work programmes on subsidies and
government procurement only provided for a note "to report on the progress of work", but did not
include any reference to an assessment.  On the positive side, the reports were well-done.  Withrespect to the stock-taking, her delegation had not agreed that the Working Party should produce a
report covering eight years of work.  The work programmes, which had been carefully negotiated in
July 2002, stipulated that the Working Party would "p repare for the opportunity provided by the Fifth
Ministerial Conference to take stock of progress made in the negotiations".  She enquired what an oral
report from the Chair would entail, and noted that the information contained in the update to theannual report might be used for the stock-taking.  The stock-taking should start in July 2002 and cover
the period since.
7. The Chairperson said that it was not the intention that the Working Party produced a stock-
taking report.  As explained in the Annotated Agenda prepared for this meeting, he had decided, after
consulting informally with delegations, to include a specific agenda item so as to allow delegations totake stock of the progress made in the negotiations under the three negotiating mandates.  In this
context, the Chairperson's reports on emergency safeguard measures, subsidies and government
procurement could be used as background documents.  This stock-taking discussion would be
reflected in the minutes of the meeting and referred to in the oral report that he was expected to
present to the Special Session.  Delegations so wi shing would then have opportunity to explain their
positions at the Special Session as well.
8. The representative of the European Commun ities thanked the Chairperson for dedicating a
specific point of the agenda to the stocktaking of progress made in the negotiations on ESM, subsidies
and government procurement in services.  In the EC's view, according to the work programmes
adopted on 22 July 2002, the Fifth Ministerial Conference provided for an opportunity to take stock of
progress.  It was up to Members to decide whether they wanted to make use of that opportunity, and
in this regard, the initiative of the Chairper son was timely and welcomed, because it allowed
Members to express their views on how the negotiations had progressed.  The Report on emergency
safeguard measures by the former Chairperson and the Reports on subsidies and procurement by the
present Chairperson had been submitted on their own responsibilities and could not replace Members'
views.  Nevertheless, the EC could agree with the Chairperson's suggestion to use these reports as
background documents for today's discussion. From a general perspective, the EC wished to underlinea number of elements that, in its view, emerged from the discussion in the WPGR over the past years
and that, to a certain extent, were reflected in the Chairpersons' reports.  First, the mandates on the
three agenda items stemmed from the text of the GATS and should be treated on an equal footing,
regardless of the importance that individual Member s might attach to each of them.  Second, the
discussions on these three issues had been held without prejudice to the outcome of the negotiations.Third, while a great number of contributions on procurement and on emergency safeguard measuresS/WPGR/M/43
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were on the table, it appeared that an important amount of technical work still had to be done on
subsidies.  Fourth, the EC had been the most active participant in the discussions of the three issues.
Indeed, it had presented several submissions and, as regards subsidies, was among the few Members
that had exchanged information within the Working Party.  Since the three work programmes had
been adopted, the European Communities and Poland had been the only Members that had putforward submissions.
9. With respect to government procurement, the EC was of the view that technical work was
well advanced thanks to 24 formal contributions by Members, as well as to the notes by the
successive Chairpersons and the WTO Secretariat. Concrete proposals were now on the table and
allowed the WPGR to move forward into a subseque nt stage of the negotiations, provided Members
showed sufficient willingness.  In this context,  the EC was of the opinion that the value of GATS
commitments would be significantly enhanced if th ey were extended to government procurement of
services.  This was the case for many services sectors, and in particular those of specific interest to
developing countries.  Discussion of the EC pr oposals of July 2002 and May 2003 had shown that the
GATS offered a flexible framework that could enable Members to move towards more transparency
and increased competition in government procurement markets, leaving it to individual Members to
open up on a sectoral basis where and when it suited them best.  Based on the discussions, commentsand suggestions of Members, the latest EC communication proposed concrete ways to achieve these
aims.  An Annex to the GATS could be negotiated laying down the conditions under which GATS
provisions would apply to government proc urement. The communication had shown that an
agreement on government procurement of services was feasible and could be easily put in place, so as
to enable the negotiation of commitments on procurement in the framework of the GATS.  Membershad underlined the need to avoid duplication of work with the Working Group on Transparency in
Government Procurement (WGTGP) and to ensure compatibility between the GATS and the
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).  The EC had designed the May 2003 proposal with
these concerns in mind which, hence, provided a good basis for the negotiation of a framework
agreement.  From a technical point of view, the negotiations could and should be completed beforethe end of the negotiations on specific commitments.  This would allow Members wishing to
undertake commitments in respect of government procurement to do so.  Opening government
procurement to international competition had a positive impact on national budgets, on the
development of infrastructure and on economic growth.  The EC was convinced of the WTO
membership's keen interest in more transpar ency and increased competition in government
procurement markets.
10. With respect to emergency safeguard measures, the EC was of the view that the question of
feasibility and desirability of an ESM in services, which had not been solved at the time of concluding
the GATS negotiations, remained unresolved after many years of discussions.  Indeed, the EC had the
feeling that scepticism over the possibility of de veloping an ESM within the GATS had been growing
over time.  In this regard, it could be observed that most of the contributions either directly addressed
feasibility and desirability, or were made without prejudice to the position on these two issues.  TheASEAN proposal to develop an ESM based on the model applying to trade in goods had raised a
number of questions intrinsically related to desirability and feasibility (like the modal application of
an ESM and the protection of acquired rights). No answ er had been provided so far.  In this situation,
many delegations, including the EC, had tried to mo ve forward the work of the WPGR by calling for
a discussion of actual or hypothetical situations where a safeguard action might be needed, and which
form that action could take. However, only one hypothetical example submitted by ASEAN was on
the table and the WPGR was still examining whether it could justify an ESM within the meaning of
Article X.  Many delegations had raised questions that remained unanswered.  It is in this context that
a small number of Members had suggested to enter into negotiation on an agreement even if
fundamental technical issues had not been solved.  However, it was not possible to ignore theproblems encountered in the development of an ESM.  The EC reiterated the assessment made in its
last contribution to the WPGR, which had been supported by several delegations, that an ESM could
not constitute an instrument for introducing new general exceptions to the GATS or alternatives to theS/WPGR/M/43
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situations foreseen in Article XXI. A positive conclusion on the question of an ESM presupposed: (i)
the identification, in case they existed, of concrete examples, whether actual or hypothetical, of
emergency situations in services that were not already addressed by GATS provisions, and (ii) a
demonstration that an ESM would be feasible and desirable to deal with such situations.  It had to be
acknowledged that none of these two conditions had been met so far.
11. Turning to the issue of subsidies, the European Communities shared the views of the Chair
that an important amount of technical work still had to be done.  The exchange of information on
subsidies related to trade in services that should have helped to prepare the negotiation of any
eventual disciplines had practically not taken place.  One of the reasons for the current situation might
be the absence of an agreed definition of subsidies in the services area.  In this regard, the EC wished
to underline the importance of reaching such a defini tion, following an approach closely related to the
GATS framework, as suggested in the recent report of the Chair.  The EC also believed that aconfusion between exchange of information and notification of subsidies had contributed to the small
amount of information submitted.  The EC considered that the GATS did not establish an obligation
to notify subsidies, but only to exchange information.  Indeed, the notification of subsidies could only
result from an obligation that Members might wish to undertake in the framework of the negotiations.
On that basis, the EC had already submitted a co ntribution explaining the Community regime for aid
in the services area (Job No. 4302), and encouraged Members that had not yet provided information to
follow this example in order to move forward the technical work of  the WPGR.  It was important to
underline at this stage that the requirement under Article XV was for Members and, not for third
parties, to exchange information.  In this respect, the EC wished to clarify that the only contribution
expected from UNCTAD was the bibliography of relevant material on subsidies.
12. The representative of the Philippines said that, in his delegation's view, this agenda item
constituted THE stock-taking, and the three Chair reports provided reference material.  In his
understanding, there would not be a stock-taking report after this meeting, but the Chairperson of the
WPGR would present, as usual, an oral report to the Special Session of the Council for Trade in
Services in which he would refer to this discussion.  On that occasion, each delegation would have theopportunity to make additional comments.  With respect to the negotiations on emergency safeguard
measures, he felt there was some confusion among certain Members concerning his delegation's
position.  The Philippines was not opposed to discussing technical issues if this could help to clarify
feasibility of an ESM.  The list of documents  annexed to the Chair's Report showed that many
contributions had already been made on technical issues and that extensive discussions had been held.
ASEAN had offered answers to virtually all questions.  Some of the answers were obviously not
satisfactory to some delegations, but this did not justify allegations that answers had not beenprovided.  For instance, concerning the issue of acquired rights, ASEAN was not in a position to
dictate a solution, but had offered three options in its draft agreement.  He felt that, in fact, some
delegations had already decided that an ESM was not feasible.  ASEAN had nevertheless continued to
address questions raised by those delegations, for instance by presenting an example of a situation
justifying safeguard action, in order to convince them  that an ESM was feasible.  With respect to the
issue of desirability, his delegation attached great importance to paragraph 31 of the Chair's Report on
ESM:  political will from all Members was necessary in order to solve the issue of desirability and to
finalize negotiations by 15 March 2004.  Should it be impossible to resolve the political dimension in
the Working Party, decisions then needed to be taken at a higher level (CTSSS, TNC or Ministerial
Meeting).  The position of the sceptics was influenced by their domestic constituencies or their ownfears of how an ESM might work.  This was due in part to the fact that the Agreement on Safeguards
had been misused by certain Members.  He noted that the Dispute Settlement Body had never upheld
any safeguard measure applied in the goods area.  It was imperative to get political guidance now,
especially in view of the negotiating deadline.  Subsidies were a difficult issue, in particular when
Members tried to transpose the goods model to services.  There was a "chicken-and-egg" situation andmore information on services subsidies was needed in order to determine what kind of subsidies
should be addressed.  This information should come from Members, but international organizations
should not be precluded.  Article XV clearly mandated that disciplines on subsidies be established.S/WPGR/M/43
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Concerning government procurement, he doubted that the negotiations were at a well-advanced stage,
despite the active role played by the European Communities.  In fact, the Working Party had not
moved beyond a discussion on the scope of the mandate.  Not all delegations accepted that Article
XIII entailed negotiations on  market access and national treatment.  If Article XIII was read in light of
the Vienna Convention, it was clear that the limitation contained in paragraph 1 applied toparagraph 2.  He disagreed with paragraph 13 of the Chair's Report where it stated that Members had
"focused on a Communication from the EC".  Rather, the main focus of discussion had been the scope
of the mandate (paragraph 14).  Moreover, in paragraph 16 of the Report, the main reason why the
issue of government procurement had been "dormant" was due to the doubts regarding the scope of
the mandate.  The Working Party needed to determine the scope of the mandate in the procurement
negotiations, rather than the "degree of ambition" (paragraph 21).
13. The representative of Uruguay, speaking on behalf of Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay
and Uruguay), thanked the former and the current Chairpersons for producing the reports on
emergency safeguard measures, subsidies and government procurement.  With respect to the
negotiations on ESM, and without prejudice to their results, Mercosur was of the view that, should
work continue at the current pace, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to reach a result within
the March 2004 time-frame.  This was a statement of fact.  The Working Party had spent eight yearson this subject and had extended the deadline on four occasions.  Mercosur did not consider that
substantive progress had been made on the issue of subsidies either and wished to recall that,
according to the Negotiating Guidelines, Members "s hall aim to complete negotiations […] prior to
the conclusion of negotiations on specific commitments".
2  Speaking on behalf of Uruguay only, he
wanted to support the statement made by the representative of the Philippines regarding paragraphs 13and 14 of the Chair's report on government procurement:  it should be clarified that the discussion
focussed on the scope of the mandate, and that, in addition, comments were made on the EC proposal.
He acknowledged that the report was made on the Chair's responsibility and remained in his hands.
14. The representative of Switzerland said that there was a problem of balance between the three
reports.  The reports on subsidies and government procurement were not as precise as the report on
ESM, although Articles XV and XIII were as important as Article X.  For instance, the exchange of
information in Article XV should be carried out without preconditions, and this should be mentioned
in the section on "way forward".  Moreover, Article XV mandated negotiations on "necessary
multilateral disciplines" for trade-distorting subsidie s.  Finally, it was not up to the Working Party to
conduct a collective stock-taking, but it was for senior officials in capitals to see whether they wanted
to take this opportunity and in what form.
15. The representative of the United States wished to commend the Chair for the substance of the
reports on subsidies and government procurement.  She recalled that her delegation had problems only
with the interpretation of the mandate contained in  the work programmes.  However, the reports had
been prepared under the responsibility of the Chai rperson and should be put forward without changes.
With respect to the negotiations on ESM, desirability was a question of substance, not of political
will.   Enforcing a safeguard measure was not the same as enforcing limitations contained in specificcommitments.  The "political will" that was missing was a will to provide answers to questions posed
by her delegation.  The problems that the "demandeurs" wanted to address with an ESM needed to be
identified concretely.  The United States wanted to secure liberalization, and not to provide second-
best solutions. "Real" examples of situations in which an ESM might be taken should include precise
indications, including the country involved and the year during which the situation arose.
16. The representative of Thailand supported the statement made by the delegation of the
Philippines regarding emergency safeguard measures and government procurement.  Her delegation
did not want to prejudge the issue of subsidies, on which her government had not yet taken position.
With respect to emergency safeguard measures, she recalled that a great deal of technical work had
                                                     
2 S/L/93.S/WPGR/M/43
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been carried out since 2000.  It was now time to get political guidance.  Her delegation did not accept
the assertion that no answers had been provided to questions posed by other delegations and, in fact,
could produce a big compilation of the answers given to questions concerning the papers presented by
ASEAN.  ASEAN wanted to negotiate, and, theref ore, was ready to be open, reasonable and
constructive.  The Working Party should not go back to the issue of desirability, but discuss technicalissues.  These could be overcome to make an ESM possible.
17. The representative of India wished to associate his delegation with the statement made by the
Philippines regarding government procurement.  The scope of the mandate was a fundamental issue,
and negotiations were not advanced.  The focus of the discussion had been on the scope of the
mandate, not on the EC proposal.  Therefore, his delegation disagreed with paragraphs 13 and 14 of
the Chair's report.  In paragraph 21, it should be indicated that the real issue was the scope of the
mandate.
18. The representative of Hong Kong, China said his delegations appreciated the Chair's efforts to
make the reports factual and balanced.  With respect to emergency safeguard measures, fundamental
questions, such as those referred to in paragra ph 29 of the report, remained to be answered and
technical work had to continue.  The membership as a whole should come to grasp with the fact that
eight years of work had not brought delegations closer to any result.  Members needed to engage intosubstantive discussions with a view to concluding the negotiations, i.e. finding an outcome.
"Demandeurs" and "sceptics" should work together so as to make a conclusion by the deadline
possible.  Hong Kong, China was interested in continuing the discussion on government procurement,
including on the framework proposed by the EC which was the only proposal on the table so far.  He
acknowledged that the scope of the mandate was not settled, but noted that Members had agreed on awork programme which stated that the "undertaking of the individual items of work should be without
prejudice to each other".  The Working Party could, therefore, spend time discussing substantive
issues raised in Members' submissions.
19. Subsidies were a systemic issue causing great concern to his delegation.  A number of
documents were on the table and could serve as a basis for continuing discussions.  He wonderedwhy, in paragraph 15, the Chair's report characterized the discussion on subsidies as having been
"restricted".  The information exchange was an important component of the mandate in Article XV
and concerned all subsidies that Members provided to their service suppliers.  Except for a few
delegations, it had not been carried out although it was clearly compulsory (" … shall exchange
information … ").  Two reasons had been given:  the lack of a definition for subsidies and the fact that
the amount of information to be submitted might be too burdensome.  Did that imply that there were
too many services subsidies?  Recent discussions on definitional issues had been interesting.  If theChair's report considered discussions on government  procurement in a positive light, the same could
be said about subsidies:  the discussions on a definition had been substantive, although engagement
from some Members was still lacking.  Concerning the perceived abundance of information, his
delegation would be pleased to consider ways of organizing the exchange of information.  However,
capacity should not be a problem for those Members that had been able to prepare comprehensiverequests for almost all WTO Members.  He acknowledged that there was a "chicken-and-egg"
dilemma and could agree that limited progress had been made on technical issues.  Members should
engage actively in these negotiations, including on the information exchange, which did not
necessarily depend of a common definition of services subsidies.  The absence of an agreed definition
might affect the information exchange, but not impede it.  In fact, work on the two issues shouldproceed in parallel and his delegation intended to make some suggestions in this regard.  The purpose
of an information exchange was to gather informa tion on subsidies, which would provide the basis for
evaluating and developing possible disciplines.  Various sources could be used, and UNCTAD was
doing interesting work in this regard.
20. The representative of Indonesia said that he supported the statement by the Philippines and
Thailand regarding emergency safeguard measures.  His delegation was deeply concerned about theS/WPGR/M/43
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lack of substantial progress since the ASEAN Member had presented a draft text, nearly three years
ago.  The Working Party should carefully consider whether the current mode of negotiations should
be maintained or whether changes might be needed to speed up the process.  Substantial progress
should have been made before the Cancún Ministerial Meeting.  ASEAN had tried to accommodate
the needs of developed and developing countries.  For instance, with respect to the issue of acquiredrights, ASEAN had proposed a very moderate alternative compared to its original proposal.  The
current ASEAN draft text provided adequate solutions for substantive and procedural issues.  Trade in
services presupposed that burdens were shared, not only benefits.  An ESM should be seen as a
mechanism for burden sharing when the domestic industry was harmed by another country's policy.
Members should try to overcome the remaining issues in good faith.  Indonesia could understand the
benefits of examining real examples of situations in which an ESM could be used.  However, this was
not necessarily a good way of proving feasibility, considering that the level of specific commitmentswas low and that services data were underdeveloped.  Case law might also help to strengthen the
rules, should actual situations arise.  He shared the view by India and others that, contrary to what was
indicated in the Chairperson's report, the focus of the discussions on government procurement had
been on the scope of the mandate, not on the EC proposal.
21. The representative of Cuba supported the statements by the Philippines and Thailand
regarding the state of the negotiations on emergency safeguard measures and shared the concerns
about the current stalemate.  There were sufficient elements on the table to indicate to Ministers that a
number of delegations attached importance to this issue and wanted to work on technical questions.
Political will was needed in order to make progress; and there was a link with the negotiations on
market access.  With respect to subsidies, Cuba wished to continue working on the definition and
categorization of subsidies that might have distortive effects on trade, taking into account "the role of
subsidies in relation to the development programmes of developing countries", and the necessary
flexibility for developing and least-developed country Members to implement national policies.  Cuba
shared the view that the negotiations on government procurement had focused on the scope of the
mandate in Article XIII.  Some proposals on the table exceeded this mandate which clearly excluded
issues related to market access and national treatment.  Finally, as a general comment, she said that
imbalances in negotiations were frequent.  Ministers would not be able to find their way through a
great deal of factual information and would need recommendations.  There was the risk that last-
minute "recommendations" could lead to further unbalanced results.  The negotiating process should
be transparent, and a stock-taking should result in recommendations to Ministers and indicate the way
forward.
22. The representative of Colombia welcomed the Chairperson's initiative to devote a specific
item to a stock-taking discussion.  Her delegation was concerned by the lack of progress in this
Working Party, which cast doubts on its ability to comply with the agreed deadlines.  Colombia was
not a "demandeur" for an ESM, but was nevertheless ready to work in a constructive manner in order
to achieve a result.  As the deadline was drawing closer, delegations should focus on technical issues
and work on the elements which might be included in an ESM.  Colombia attached importance to theissue of subsidies and was disappointed by the limited progress in this area.  Article XV contained a
mandate to exchange information concerning all subs idies related to trade in services that Members
provided to their domestic service suppliers.  Nevertheless, very little information had been submitted
so far, which complicated technical discussions.  More information, in particular from those Members
which had many subsidy programmes in place, could help promote the negotiations.  Initial offerscontained references to subsidy programmes.  Moreover, Colombia understood that UNCTAD was
collecting information on support programmes in services, independently of a possible definition and
without prejudice to their impact on trade.  This initiative could play a useful role in this Working
Party.  Concerning government procurement, Colo mbia was still analysing the last EC contribution
and was of the view that the scope of the mandate should also be discussed.
23. The representative of Chile said there was a need to make progress on all issues and called on
all delegations to be flexible.  Discussions could not advance if delegations had already decided onS/WPGR/M/43
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their final positions.  Technical work should help to determine how best to solve relevant issues.
Progress in this Working Party and in the market access negotiations were linked.  He acknowledged
there was a problem with the mandate on government procurement.  Although there were no
uncertainties regarding the mandate in Article XV, and in particular the fact that the information
exchange concerned all subsidies, no progress had been made.  One solution might be to concentrateon sectors.  The lack of a definition of services subsidies was not an excuse for not progressing;
delegations could use alternative definitions.  Notification and exchange of information were two
different issues and priority should be given to the latter.  The information exchange should take
advantage of all possible sources and, in this respect, a contribution from UNCTAD would be
welcome.
24. The representative of Canada said that Canada remained unconvinced of the desirability and
feasibility of an ESM, but was willing to continue working constructively on this issue.  He recalled
that, in June 2001, his delegation had submitted a written proposal for a multilateral surveillance
procedure.  With respect to government procurement, he considered that the scope of the mandate in
Article XIII was broader than some delegations implied.
25. The representative of Egypt supported the statement made by the Philippines regarding
government procurement, and the fact that the issues raised by some delegations were outside the
scope of the mandate.
26. The representative of Australia understood that there would be no agreed stock-taking report
by the Working Party, but that the Chair would refer to this discussion in his oral report to the Special
Session.  With respect to the negotiations on emergency safeguard measures, he said that very little
progress had been made towards common ground and Members were still far apart.  TheChairperson's report contained an accurate summary of the various options and a realistic assessment
of the situation.  It was not clear how the current discussion would lead to a result by the agreed
March 2004 deadline, but an outcome had to be found.  With respect to government procurement, he
noted the Chair's comment, in paragraph 16 of the report, that this issue was important for some
Members, but less so for others.  Australia was not a signatory of the GPA and probably belonged tothe second category.  However, his delegation did not consider that the mandate was as restricted as
some suggested;  Article XIII would allow Members to make voluntary commitments in relation to
government procurement.  Duplication of work shoul d be avoided and priority should rest with the
WGTGP.
27. The representative of Japan reiterated the views expressed at the last meeting regarding
emergency safeguard measures.  The Working Party had had useful substantive discussions, but
needed to advance its understanding of the issues at stake.  His delegation welcomed the EC proposalon government procurement, which was fully within the Article XIII mandate.  The Working Party
should determine its level of ambition and proceed with substantive discussions based on Members'
contributions.  An important amount of technical work remained to be done on subsidies, and he
agreed with the Chair that there was a "chicken-and-egg" situation.  Japan took note of the comments
by "demandeurs" that the information exchange s hould be carried out to provide the Working Party
with relevant information.  Based on the understa nding that the reports on government procurement
and subsidies had been issued under the Chair's responsibility, Japan did not propose changes or
amendments.  With respect to the stock-taking, his delegation understood, like others, that the
Working Party would not issue a report.  It was up to  each Member to make its own assessment, based
on the material available.
28. The representative of the People's Republic of China said that her delegation had not been
consulted concerning the form of the stock-taking.  At the informal meeting on 16 June, China was in
favour of a collective stock-taking for three reasons:  (i)  the stock-taking was different from the
Chair's reports;  (ii) an objective and factual report prepared and adopted by the Working Party would
have been a positive signal;  and (iii) it would have helped Ministers to assess the situation, inS/WPGR/M/43
Page 9
particular on ESM.  Nevertheless, China was ready to follow the suggestion made by the Chairperson
in his Annotated Agenda.  Her delegation was concerned about the slowness of the negotiations on
ESM.  The fact that these negotiations had not led to any achievement after eight years was
regrettable.  Moreover, at the current pace, there would not be any result by the deadline, and this
might affect the market access negotiations.  The stumbling-block was that some Members, which hadsuch a mechanism in their own schedule or in bilate ral agreements, did not find it desirable for other
Members.  She disagreed with the argument that liberalization under GATS was less deep than under
bilateral agreements, because, in some sectors, Members had undertaken full commitments.  What
could they do if, in the future, an emergency situati on arose in one of these sectors?  There was clearly
a need for an ESM and it would be too late to start negotiating it once an emergency situation had
arisen.  With respect to the issue of feasibility, she noted that Brazil had made a useful proposal;
Members having a safeguard mechanism, in their schedule or in bilateral agreements, should explainto the Working Party how they implemented it conc retely.  Creative solutions should be found to take
into account the specificities of services trade.  There was a need for political will from all Members.
Finally, her delegation shared the view expressed by the Philippines regarding the negotiations on
government procurement:  market access and national treatment were outside the scope of the
mandate.
29. The representative of Venezuela said that the negotiations on subsidies had to continue. There
was abundant subsidy-related information available outside this organization, which could be
compiled and analysed.  He agreed with Chile that information should be exchanged on a sector basis,
for instance on environmental services.  UNCTAD had experts in this area who could offer
considerable contributions.  With respect to government procurement, he supported the statement bythe Philippines regarding paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Chairperson's report.  The scope of the mandate
was in fact the main focus of the discussion under this agenda item.  At some point, Members should
also consider more closely the issue of duplication:  government procurement of services should be
discussed in this Working Party, not in the WGTGP.  He would revert later to the issue of emergency
safeguard measures.
30. The representative of Norway said it was worrying that the scope of the mandate would be
considered as the only issue in the discussion on government procurement.  Several contributions had
been made, in particular from the EC, which had presented a useful document.  Government
procurement was an important part of services markets and the EC proposal could allow to develop a
flexible tool to gradually open markets according to each Member's particular situation.  The
Chairperson's report on government procurement was well conceived.
31. The representative of the United States thanked for the clarifications given with regard to the
stock-taking.  She noted that the Chairperson had no mandate to make any type of recommendation.
The Working Party should abide by its work programme concerning the stock-taking and, in
particular, the three negotiating issues should be treated equally.
32. The Chairperson said he would make a factual presentation to the Special Session of the
Council for Trade in Services, which would not contain any recommendations.
33. The representative of Chinese Taipei said that the existence of an ESM could favour
domestic industry's support for trade liberalization.  It was time to enter into substantive discussions
on the basis of the ASEAN draft agreement.  With  respect to government procurement, the GATS
mandate allowed to discuss any issue.  On subsidies, the lack of definition should not impede other
work, for instance on categorization.  Discussions on trade-distorting subsidies should be based oninformation provided by Members.
34. The representative of Brazil said that the concerns of his delegation were reflected in the
intervention made by Uruguay.  He also shared the views expressed by the Philippines.  Uncertainty
in the rules area would lead to limited market-access commitments and expectations regarding newS/WPGR/M/43
Page 10
commitments might not be fulfilled.  Brazil wanted to engage constructively on the issues of
emergency safeguard measures and subsidies, so as to avoid that some Members be tempted to craft
their own solutions.  The Working Party should provide solutions available to all, which would then
be put under the supervision of the whole membership.  Similarly to what had been done with
Article XXI, Members could take a pragmatic approach, design an initial safeguard mechanism, buildon it and adjust it, if necessary, in the light of experience.  The Chairpersons' reports were good, but
should contain initiatives in terms of procedure.  This Working Party should look at other WTO
negotiating bodies in order to borrow some of their methods to fasten discussions.  The Chairperson
should take a more proactive role in presenting alternatives, drafting initial suggestions, etc.  There
was a lack of political will and some delegations clearly applied a double standard in this respect.
They did not want to clarify certain issues which were not in their interest, but insisted on including in
the WTO agenda other questions they considered necessary to be solved.  Should the same approachprevail in other areas, very little could be achieved in the WTO.
35. The representative of Malaysia said that the stock-taking exercise was important because it
allowed to determine where the Working Party stood.  The negotiations on rules were a
complementary facet of the market access negotiations.  The rules negotiations had started in 1995
and one of the mandates was still not clearly identified.  A great deal of discussions had taken placeon emergency safeguard measures and several deadlines had not been met.  The March 2004 deadline
was drawing closer and, although it was supposed to be the last extension, there were already talks
that it might be extended again.  Hence, Ministers could not be told that everything was going well.
His delegation was pressured to accept that some issues, the desirability of which had never been
discussed, be put on the WTO agenda at Cancún.  For Malaysia, an ESM was desirable because itwould give the necessary confidence to liberalize services.  Malaysia had not tabled yet its initial offer
because the private sector did not find it desirable to open the market.  The Shangri La example
reflected some of the problems faced by ASEAN countries.  Moreover, during the 1997 financial
crisis, money flowing out of Malaysia had caused an emergency situation, which had led the
government to freeze all grants to students wanting to study abroad.  This showed that an ESM wasfeasible.  Ministers should be aware of the lack of progress in the rules negotiations.  Further guidance
was needed and Malaysia hoped that they would agree that there was a political need for an ESM.
Progress in the market access negotiations was also limited, as evidenced by the statements made at
the last meeting of the Special Session by developing countries complaining about the lack of mode 4
commitments.  With respect to subsidies, there was a clear mandate to negotiate, and more efforts
should be devoted to information gathering.  Concerning government procurement, his delegation
supported the statement by the Philippines.  The Chairperson's report could be more balanced.  Hisdelegation was of the view that there was no progress on government procurement;  the only relevant
contributions concerned the scope of the mandate .  Discussions on government procurement were
short and totally lacked momentum.
36.  The representative of Singapore agreed with Australia and Canada that the mandate in
Article XIII allowed Members to raise any issue.  His delegation was carefully studying the last EC
contribution on this matter.  With respect to emergency safeguard measures, his delegation's position
was guided by the precedents of Singapore's recent free trade agreements with Members like the
United States, Australia, New Zealand and EFTA.  On subsidies, Singapore was examining the
contribution by Poland as well as the revised Checklist.
37. The representative of the Republic of Korea supported a factual report by the Chairperson to
the Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, reflecting the stock-taking discussion.  She
trusted that the report would be objective.  Her delegation was concerned about the lack of progress
on the three agenda items.  On emergency safeguard measures, "demandeurs" and "sceptics" should
come to a compromise on how to approach this issue.   An ESM should not be open to abuse, but if it
contributed to further liberalization, Korea was willing to engage constructively.  Concerningsubsidies, she supported other delegations that had emphasized the need to continue the information
exchange, taking advantage of various sources of information, including UNCTAD.  NegotiationsS/WPGR/M/43
Page 11
were in a stalemate because many delegations had already decided on their final position.  Rule-
making was an important part of the services negotiations.  This included government procurement
where the discussion on the scope of the mandate had a flavour of déjà-vu .
38. The representative of New Zealand said that very limited progress had been achieved on
emergency safeguard measures considering the time spent on this issue.  A considerable amount of
work remained to be done in order to conclude the negotiations within the deadline and her delegation
was ready to continue to actively engage in this area.  The Chairperson's report on subsidies contained
an accurate summary of the discussions.  She noted the binding nature of the requirement to provide
information on all subsidies related to trade in services and recalled that her country was one of the
four Members to have submitted such information.  The absence of an agreed definition had not
prevented them from responding to the questionnaire;  it was not a prerequisite for submitting such
information.  Nevertheless, further technical work woul d facilitate discussions and, in this respect, the
paper from Poland was a useful contribution.
39. The representative of the United States thanked the delegation of Malaysia for its frank
statement.  Her delegation was among those that continued asking questions which, in turn, were also
raised by people giving political guidance in capitals.  Answers were needed in order to have a proper
definition of what was being negotiated since these could be no blank cheque.  The reference to the1997 financial crisis was helpful since it helped to understand what this Working Party was talking
about.  For any example, it would be useful to know  where and when a situation justifying a safeguard
action had occurred.  One should also keep in mind that some emergency situations could be
addressed through Article XII or XIV, for instan ce.  She welcomed Brazil's comment that an ESM
was needed in order to help promote liberalizatio n.  She enquired whether, in the view of the
"demandeurs", an ESM should apply only to new market-access commitments.  The matrix presented
informally by New Zealand at a previous meeting c ould be helpful and should be used in future.  It
would facilitate discussion on modal application, whether with specific or hypothetical examples.
The negotiations on emergency safeguard measures should be as specific as the market access
negotiations.
40. The representative of the European Communities noted that the Chairperson's report on
emergency safeguard measures referred to political will without prejudice to the outcome of the
negotiations.  In his view, all delegations had political will, but no common view on the outcome.  It
should be kept in mind that all three negotiating mandates were related to trade liberalization.
Concerning the interpretations of treaties, he noted that, in addition to textual interpretation,
contextual and teleological interpretations were also relevant.  A textual interpretation of Article XIII
led to the conclusion that there was a mandate to negotiate on market access and national treatment,otherwise paragraphs 1 and 2 would have been put in reverse order.  A teleological interpretation led
to the same result because one of the objectives of GATS was progressive liberalization of services.
41. The representative of Peru welcomed the comments by the Unites States because they showed
interest in other delegations' position.  Flexibility and political will were key to successfully conclude
the negotiations. As his delegation had indicated on several occasions, the mandate in Article XIII didnot cover market access and national treatment.  Moreover, it did not contain a deadline, and
discussions under this agenda item were most of the time short and not substantive.  The comments by
the European Communities did not help to bring positions closer.  Emergency safeguard measures and
subsidies had clear mandates. Progress in these negotiations did not only entail progressive
liberalization, but promote the participation of develo ping countries as stipulated in Article IV.  Rule-
making was an essential aspect of the services negotiations.  For instance, developing countries could
not open their market without knowing what kind of  subsidies were granted to competitors in other
markets.  He supported Brazil's intervention rega rding consistency between the procedures applied in
this Working Party and other WTO bodies.S/WPGR/M/43
Page 12
42. The representative of the Philippines said that the United States had raised some key technical
issues that the Working Party was trying to address.  ASEAN had prepared answers to some of the
questions posed to them at the last meeting and hoped that they would also help to solve the issues
raised by the United States.  Concerning the EC's comment on the Article XIII mandate, he recalled
that the Appellate Body favoured a literal interpretation of WTO provisions.  With respect to the viewthat a teleological interpretation of Article XIII was consistent with the objective of progressive
liberalization, he noted that some WTO agreements, such as the TRIPs agreement, pointed in an
opposite direction.
43. The Chairperson thanked delegations and took note of their statements.  As indicated at the
beginning of the meeting, he intended to refer to this discussion in a factual manner in his oral report
to the Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services.
III. NEGOTIATIONS ON SUBSIDIES  (GATS ARTICLE XV)
44. The Chairperson suggested to address the issue of subsidies first, since it had not been
addressed at the last meeting due to lack of time.  He recalled that, on 17 March 2003, his predecessor
had circulated a revised Checklist on Subsidies (JOB(03)/57), as agreed at the February meeting.  The
initial Checklist had been circulated on 17 July 2000 under the then Chairperson's responsibility.3  It
was meant to be used as a tool to help Members to address in a systematic manner issues which hadbeen raised in the negotiations under Article XV.  The revision, prepared under the responsibility of
the Chairperson, included two changes.  First, the question of categorization of subsidies was
explicitly spelled out under the first point, i.e. definition of a subsidy in trade in services.  Second, a
new issue had been added, relating to concepts relevant to what should be regarded as trade-distortive
subsidies.  The Checklist  was without prejudice to the position of any Member.  At the February
meeting, delegations had had an interesting exchange on the definition of subsidies in services, based
in particular on an informal submission by the delegation of Poland (JOB(02)/207).  Two issues had
dominated the discussion: (i) the generic definition of subsidies in the services context, including the
relevance of the definition contained in the SCM Agreement; and (ii) the meaning of the concept of
trade-distortive or "actionable" subsidies.  With respect to the latter, Poland and other delegations hadreferred to concepts such as specificity, public policy objectives, nature of the subsidies, permissible
or non-actionable subsidies, etc.  He recalled that Article XV stipulated that, for the purpose of the
negotiations, "Members shall exchange informatio n concerning all subsidies related to trade in
services that they provide to their domestic services suppliers."  The Working Party had not made real
progress on this information exchange recently and he encouraged delegations' suggestions on this
point too.  It was difficult to understand why Members should not be able to submit domestically
available information to this Working Party.
45. The representative of Hong Kong, China recalled that the negotiation on subsidies was
important for his delegation.  Services subsidies could have the same trade distortive effects as goods
subsidies.  Subsidies were not equally available to all Members, and multilateral disciplines would be
useful to ensure a level-playing field.  His delegation also recognized the value of subsidies to achieve
certain policy objectives, including development;  hence, the distinction between non-actionable andtrade-distortive subsidies should also be discussed.  His delegation had three suggestions to make.
First, the information exchange should continue since it had not been fulfilled in spite of being
mandatory.  Members could submit information based on their own definition of "subsidy".  It would
be useful, but not strictly necessary, if, in addition, they would provide their working definition
because it would contribute to developing a general definition for services subsidies.  Secondly, theconcept of subsidy was not alien to Members since a number of them had entered relevant limitations
in their schedules.  The Secretariat had compiled information in that regard in S/WPGR/W/13 and
Add.1.  Members having subsidy-related limitations in their schedules and/or in their initial offers
could share their views on what the scope was for such subsidies.  Thirdly, in order to address the
                                                     
3 Job No. 4519, 17 July 2000.S/WPGR/M/43
Page 13
concerns of those delegations which felt that the amount of information might be too significant for
one exchange, Members could consider providing as an initial step only certain elements.  For
instance, they could submit information that was readily available to them.  In that context, Members
should be aware of the ongoing work in UNCTAD, so that information related to subsidies could be
shared with this Working Party.  Concerning the definition of subsidies, he noted that variousMembers had submitted written contributions on this issue.  These papers could be re-circulated (by
e-mail or as room documents), which could help focus the discussion.  The issue of categorization of
subsidies should also be given further thought.  His delegation was open-minded and had no
preconceived idea.
46. The representative of Colombia said that the negotiation on subsidies was fundamental in the
perspective of progressive liberalization contemplated in Article XIX.  The private sector in Colombia
had expressed concerns at the prospect of liberalizing sectors which could be subsidized abroad.  Theinformation exchange should be carried out, and the suggestions just made by Hong Kong, China
were interesting.  Discussing subsidy-related limitations in schedules and initial offers was an
interesting starting-point and the Members concerned should provide relevant information.
47. The representative of Chile agreed with the representative of Colombia and Hong Kong,
China.  The Working Party should ensure that all themes be discussed at the next meeting.  He called
for flexibility from those Members which were reluctant to seek information from UNCTAD.
Article XV did not limit the sources of information that could be used.  He supported Hong Kong,
China's proposal that, as an initial step, Members submit information on some sectors only.  His
delegation would make comments on the definition of subsidies at the next meeting.
48. The representative of the United States said that her delegation did not oppose a presentation
from UNCTAD or any other organisation, but wanted to know what kind of information would be
submitted.  Her delegation also needed to reflect on how the Chair should best liase with UNCTAD.
Moreover, any Member aware of the information available at UNCTAD could bring it to the attention
of the Working Party without prior approval.
49. The representative of Brazil said that his delegation attached importance to that part of the
GATS package.  It was difficult to understand why a contribution from UNCTAD was so
problematic, since it would not be the first time that an intergovernmental institution would make a
contribution to a WTO body.  It was important to know what UNCTAD was doing and to get such
information first hand.  Advance information on the content of the presentation should not be a
precondition for UNCTAD's contribution.
50. The representative of the European Communitie s recalled that the Working Party had agreed
at the last meeting that UNCTAD would provide a bibliography, which would have allowed Members
to consult themselves the documents concerned.  However, the bibliography had not been submitted.
She considered that it was important for the Working Party to agree on a common definition of
services subsidies, although it was not necessarily a prerequisite to exchange information.  She
stressed that exchange of information did not mean notification of all subsidies and recalled that the
European Communities had submitted general information on its subsidy regime.
51. The representative of the United States said that her delegation had always maintained the
position that, should other organizations be present, an understanding was needed as to what exactly
they would present.  The United States did not have any problem with UNCTAD making a
presentation, but needed to understand what this would entail.  As an observer, UNCTAD could
intervene when something was raised concerning their work or one of their documents.  Moreover,Members could consult the documents concerned, raise relevant points and then request comments
from UNCTAD.  She noted that the bibliography proposed at the last meeting had not been submitted.S/WPGR/M/43
Page 14
52. The representative of Thailand said that her delegation wanted to participate constructively in
this discussion.  Members should have a common understanding on some key concepts in Article XV.
Ignorance about services subsidies explained why it was difficult to provide information.  Her
delegation was nevertheless ready to participate constructively in this negotiation and did not oppose
information being submitted by other international organizations.
53. The representative of Hong Kong, China  said that there was a chicken-and-egg problem
which had to be solved.  The information exchange depended on a definition of subsidy and vice-
versa.  Delegations should address these issues in a constructive manner.  He took note of the previous
exchange regarding a contribution from UNCTAD, whereby the Working Party would obtain
preliminary indications from UNCTAD as to whether and what sort of relevant information they
could present.  Other delegations should be flexible and open-minded on this matter.
54. The representative of Uruguay said that UNCTAD should present its work, as it had done on
previous occasions and as other organizations had done  as well.  It would be sad if the Working Party
could not accept a contribution from an organisa tion which had worked closely with the GATT/WTO
for many years.  The update report that the Working Party had just adopted stressed the necessity to
collaborate with other organizations (S/WPGR/12, para. 10). His delegation wished to urge the
Working Party to invite an UNCTAD representative to present the study concerned at the nextmeeting.  Before that, UNCTAD could perhaps circulate a bibliography so that Members would be
well-prepared.  He further noted that not only existing schedules, but also some initial offers
contained limitations relating to subsidies, as referred to in the Chair's report (S/WPGR/10. para. 20).
It would be interesting to k now how the Members having scheduled such limitations, or proposed
them in their offers, defined "domestic supplier".
55. The representative of Chile was in favour of a presentation by UNCTAD.  The organisation
that had prepared a study was in a better position than anybody else to present it.  Since an UNCTAD
representative was in the room, the Working Part y could ask him to provide some information
regarding the status of the study concerned.
56. The representative of Thailand said that Members were clearly mandated to negotiate on
subsidies, but the scope of this negotiation should be determined.  Her capital needed to have a clearer
idea on the scope (for instance, would subsidies for health services for poor people be covered?) and
felt that a definition would help to negotiate disciplines.
57. The representative of the United States said that the Working Party should first be given an
opportunity to consult the bibliography, which had been requested at the last meeting, so as to have an
idea of the kind of information available.  Moreover, the representative of UNCTAD could be asked
now to give delegations some indication regarding the status of work.
58. The representative of Hong Kong, China cons idered that the Working Party had previously
taken note that UNCTAD would be invited to provid e relevant information.  His delegation looked
forward to listening to UNCTAD as to when they  would be able to provide this information.
59. The representative of Uruguay said that UNCTAD was an observer and could present a paper.
It would be useful if UNCTAD could provide such a contribution in advance of the meeting so as to
allow Members to be prepared and make comments.
60. The representative of UNCTAD explained that the work undertaken on subsidies consisted of
a compilation of all available data concerning different types of support programmes and other forms
of governmental intervention.  This work relied on secondary sources, including information from
other intergovernmental organisations, as well as information made public by governments in officialpublications.  UNCTAD avoided to define what a "subsidy" was and did not pass judgement on what
would be trade-distortive and what would not.  The only objective was to provide empirical evidenceS/WPGR/M/43
Page 15
on support programmes and government interventions in the area of services.  A complete first draft
could be available by the time of the next meeting of the Working Party.
61. The representative of Canada took note th at UNCTAD was relying on secondary sources,
such as international organisations and national governments.  He enquired what sources had been
consulted, and whether the information would be presented on a country basis or more generally.
62. The representative of UNCTAD explained that the information used came from the OECD,
regional integration agreements, and national sources.  The compilation attempted to establish a
typology so as to facilitate reading and analysis, but did not try to determine whether there was trade-
distortiveness.  It was a collection of empirical data.
63. The representative of Canada enquired what would happen at the next meeting concerning the
proposed UNCTAD contribution.  The Chairperson recalled that, according to the rules of procedures,
observers needed Members' approval to submit a document.  He enquired whether Members agreed
that UNCTAD would submit a bibliography and then present the study to the Working Party.  The
representative of Brazil said that it would preferable if UNCTAD could present directly the actual
study.  In any case, a decision should be made now to save time.  The Chairperson said that the
bibliography would be the first step;  the compilati on would follow.  The representative of Cuba said
that the provision of information by an intergovernmental organisation was a simple issue and
regretted that UNCTAD be censored.  Moreover, the kind of information used by UNCTAD was not a
secret.  She agreed with Brazil that UNCTAD should present its document at the next meeting.
64. The representative of Chile asked whether the submission of the bibliography and the study
would take place at the same meeting or at two di fferent meetings.  The Chairperson said that one
possibility was for UNCTAD to circulate the bibliography well in advance of the meeting.  Then, at
the meeting itself, the Working Party could focus on substance and look at the compilation.  The
representative of Chile agreed.  The representative of  Peru  said that the Working Party should make a
decision to invite UNCTAD before the end of this meeting.  The representative of the European
Communities said that her delegation was not in a position to agree now to a presentation by
UNCTAD at the next meeting.  The representative of the United States said that her delegation could
agree that UNCTAD present a bibliography, but not to invite a speaker from UNCTAD.  This waspartly a technical and partly a systemic issue for her delegation.  An alternative would be for a
Member to present the UNCTAD document, and then UNCTAD could respond to questions raised.
65. The representative of the Philippines said that, although his delegation did not agree with the
United States' position, he considered that it left room for Members that were interested in an
UNCTAD contribution.  This should, however, not  prejudge in any way the systemic approach
towards the participation of an accredited observer in WTO bodies.
66. The representative of the United States said that her delegation considered that decisions
regarding the submission of material by an observer should be taken on a case-by-case basis.
67. The Chairperson said that Members agreed that UNCTAD would submit a bibliography as a
first step.  He would consult to see whether UNCTAD could make a further presentation, taking into
account the concerns expressed.  At the next meeting, delegations should continue their exchange ofviews on the definition of services subsidies and ca rry on the information exchange.  Considering that
the Working Party had not managed to deal with the remaining agenda items, he intended to convene
an informal meeting to address emergency safeguard measures, government procurement, and, time
permitting, subsidies.
68. The representative of Thailand said that more time should be devoted to the rule-making part
of the services negotiations.S/WPGR/M/43
Page 16
69. The representative of Uruguay reserved his position in the discussion relating to UNCTAD,
which, in his view, raised systemic concerns.  It was a matter of preoccupation that some delegations
wanted to see first a bibliography and the content of a paper before giving the go-ahead.  The
representative of Colombia shared these concerns.
IV. NEGOTIATIONS ON EMERGENCY SAFEGUARD MEASURES  (GATS
ARTICLE X) AND GOVERNMENT PROCURE MENT  (GATS ARTICLE XIII)
70. The Chairperson regretted that, due to lack of time, it was not possible to discuss emergency
safeguard measures and government procurement at that meeting.  He intended to hold an informal
meeting before the next formal meeting to ad vance work on these issues.  Time permitting,
delegations would then also have an opportunity to continue their debate on subsidies.
V. DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING
71. The Chairperson said that the next formal mee ting of the Working Party was expected to take
place during the next cluster of services meetings, which had been tentatively scheduled from
29 September to 10 October 2003.  The Working Party would meet during the first week of the cluster
and the exact date would be communicated to delegations in due time.
VI. OTHER BUSINESS
72. Nothing was raised under this agenda item.
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