WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONG/SG/59
17 January 2003
(03-0244)
Committee on Safeguards
REPORT TO THE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE ON
OUTSTANDING IMPLEMENTATION ISSUE TIRET 84
1. In accordance with paragraph 12 of the Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, and
section 13 of the Ministerial Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns of14 November 2001, the outstanding implementation issues enumerated in document
Job (01)/152/Rev.1 "shall be addressed as a matter of priority" by the relevant WTO bodies, which
must report to the Trade Negotiations Committee "by the end of 2002 for appropriate action".
2. Section 9 of document Job (01)/152/Rev.1 co ntains tiret 84, which is a proposal for the
amendment of Article 9.1 of the Safeguards Agreemen t.  According to tiret 84, "Article 9.1 shall be
amended so that safeguard measures are not applied to imports from developing countries which
individually account for less than 7 per cent of total imports and 15 per cent collectively".
3. The Safeguards Committee considered a proposal by Colombia to amend Article 9.1 at its
regular meetings on 29-30 April 2002, 28 October 2002, and 5 December 2002. Members' statements
are reflected in the minutes of these meetings, contained in documents G/SG/M/19, G/SG/M/20 and
G/SG/M/21.  The relevant paragraphs which reflect the statements made and the discussion at themeetings are contained in Annexes I, II and III.
4. The Safeguards Committee also considered this issue during a half day of informal
consultations on 4 October 2002.
5. In light of the technical discussions outlined in the Annexes of this report, the Committee is
not able to suggest a course of action on this issue due to a lack of consensus.G/SG/59
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ANNEX I
Extract from Minutes of 29-30 April 2002 Regular Committee Meeting (G/SG/M/19)
E. IMPLEMENTATION – TIRET 84
137. The Chairman recalled that, by virtue of paragraph 12 of the Ministerial Declaration of
14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1), and sect ion 13 of the Ministerial Decision on
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns of 14 November 2001, outstanding implementation
issues "shall be addressed as a matter of priority" by the relevant WTO bodies.  A list of these issues
was compiled in document Job (01)/152/Rev.1.  Section 9 of that document set forth tiret 84, which
contained a proposed amendment to Article 9.1 of the Safeguards Agreement "so that safeguardmeasures are not applied to imports from developing countries which individually account for less
than 7 per cent of total imports and 15 per cent collectively".  This amendment was proposed by the
delegation of Colombia.  The Chairman also recalled that, in accordance with paragraph 12 of the
Ministerial Declaration, the Safeguards Committee must report to the Trade Negotiations Committee
on this issue "by the end of 2002 for appropriate action".
138. The Chairman offered the floor to Colombia to explain the basis for its proposed amendment.
139. The delegate of Colombia clarified that a copy of the statement containing the proposal by
Colombia had been circulated to Members. She then proceeded to read the proposal, the text of which
is hereby reproduced:
"Background:  During the preparatory process for the Seattle Ministerial Conference,
Colombia submitted for consideration by Members a proposal to increase the existing
percentages indicated in Article 9 of the Agreement on Safeguards.  Then, in the run-
up to the Doha Ministerial Conference this proposal was fleshed out with the
suggestion that the figures of 3 per cent and 9 per cent in Article 9 in the SG
Agreement should be replaced by 7 per cent and 15 per cent respectively in the caseof safeguards applied by a developed country to a developing country.  This would
increase by 6 percentage points the special and differential treatment provided for the
developing world's trade, with the exception of emergency measures.  It should be
pointed out that under this proposal the present limits in Article 9.1 would be retained
for cases in which a safeguard measure is applied by a developing country, and would
be increased in the case that the Member applying the measure was a developed
country.  This proposal is taken up in general lines in the implementation issues undertiret 84 and has been referred to this Committee for study pursuant to the Ministerial
Decision in paragraph 12 of the Doha Declar ation.  Pursuant to that Declaration, this
Committee is to report to the Trade Negotiations Committee on the results of its
analysis of this implementation-related proposal by the end of this year.
Taking this background into account, and with a view to promoting a broad debate on
this proposal, I shall now explain the reasons that prompted Colombia to propose
raising the figures in Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.  I shall then go on
to identify the elements that were take n into account for specifically suggesting
particular figures for this amendment of Article 9.1 of the Agreement and conclude
by mentioning some other elements in addition to the percentage issue which webelieve could also be analysed in greater depth.G/SG/59
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So, the reasons for the proposal:  Colombia believes that there are legitimate reasons
that may force a WTO Member to suspend its multilateral commitments as a result of
disorderly domestic market conditions.  I therefore wish to reiterate that we consider
the safeguard instrument to be both legitimate and important.  Under Article 19 of the
General Agreement, two conditions are required for imports into a specific market togive rise to the application of a safeguard measure.  These requirements refer to the
quantity of imports and the conditions under which they are taking place.  As we
understand it, the thinking behind this requirement is simply recognition of an
economic reality that the introduction of small quantities in the market cannot have
the power to modify conditions on that market and therefore cannot effect the
domestic industry.  However, there can be no question that the provision with which
we are concerned in Article 9.1 is a development of the principle of special anddifferential treatment and is aimed at maintaining access conditions for developing
countries in the event that an emergency measure is adopted.  Accordingly, the
increase in the figures set out in Article 9.1, as proposed by Colombia, would simply
have the result of ensuring that if the developing countries have penetrated a specific
market where a disorderly situation arises as a result of imports from developedcountries this circumstance will not punish the developing country's export industry,
in so far as their individual share does not exceed 7 per cent of total imports of the
product covered by the investigation.
Colombia has occasionally been excluded from the application of safeguard measures
because it has fallen within the limits established in Article 9.1, and that is why weattach great importance to this provision.  We clearly appreciate its benefits and are
therefore aware that increasing the imports' share margin will have real significance
as regards market access.
The recent rise in the use of safeguards and the negotiations on market access for
non-agricultural products are circumstances which we believe make it even moredesirable to analyse this proposal.  We should point out that, despite Colombia's small
share of the world export market, in recent years our exports have been at the
receiving end of safeguard measures.  This experience has shown us that there is what
might be called a "perverse incentive" in the multilateral rules, which favours the
application of safeguards for relatively short periods – less than 3 years – since,
pursuant to Article 8.3 of the Agreement on Safeguards, compensation is allowed
only after the third year that a measure is enforced.  Now, although in cases where themeasure is not the result of an increase in imports in absolute terms, or its application
is not consistent with the Agreement, the latter allows the suspension of some
concessions.  It is not easy to avail oneself of this provision especially in the case of
developing countries.
The alternative of the dispute settlement mechanism as a way of addressing the
negative effect of a safeguard measure may also present some drawbacks because, in
a way, the delay in obtaining a final decision, in most cases on appeal, implicitly
allows a grace period during which the domestic industry may be protected at
immense cost for the exporting firms which are displaced from a given market.  In
these circumstances, during the preparatory work for the Doha MinisterialConference, Colombia submitted the implementation proposal to which we have
referred and also suggested that negotiations be held on safeguards in order to address
these and other important issues, as well as to improve special and differential
treatment for developing countries.G/SG/59
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I will now turn to elements of setting the limits in the proposal.  In the circumstances
described above, and in response to the question of what the limits should be for
excluding a developing country from the application of a safeguard measure, the
reference in Article 12.3 of the Agreement to "substantial interest" provides an
interesting element for this discussion.  Ac cording to the multilateral practice, it is
certainly recognised that a country has a substantial interest when its share of imports
is around 10 per cent.  Along these lines, any developed or developing Member
country with a share of less than 10 per cent would not be allowed to participate in
consultations under Article 12.3 of the SG Agreement, and this led us to consider a
share of 10 per cent as an implicit limit for a developing country share below which a
provision would be needed recognizing the marginal nature of imports at such levels
and, hence, ensuring that they be excluded from the application of any type ofmeasure.  In other words, the figure of 3 per cent could be appropriate for trade
among developing countries, but in the case of access to developed country markets it
would be more logical to raise it to a figure of around 10 per cent as the limit below
which imports would not be subject to safeguard measures.
To conclude, one or two other issues which will be analysed in connection with
implementation of Article 9.1.  We should also like to draw Member's attention to the
fact that there are other elements concerning implementation of Article 9.1 that could
be the subject of an interpretive decision within the meaning of Article IX of the
Agreement establishing the WTO, such as the definition of the time-period to be used
for calculating developing countries' shares and also the methodology to be used forcalculating the limits in the abovementioned Article."
140. The delegate of Brazil stressed the importance of expediting the discussion of this issue in
order that the deadline contained in paragraph 12 of the Doha Declaration would be met.
141. The delegate of the United States made some  preliminary comments and formulated some
questions regarding Colombia's proposal.  First, he mentioned that in terms of the mandate of the
Committee the United States noted that much of Colombia's proposal goes beyond the objective of
tiret 84.  As an example, the United States noted that the last paragraph of the proposal raised a
number of issues that seemed to go far beyond tiret 84.  The United States also noted that the proposal
itself drew a distinction between developed and developing country importing Members that was not
in Article 9 or in tiret 84.  Therefore, the United States questioned what was the basis for that
distinction and why this proposal should not apply to  developing country importing countries as well.
142. The representative of Venezuela stated that the ideas contained in Colombia's proposal were a
good point of departure for clarifying norms and disciplines in the Agreement, especially the
development and application of special and differential treatment under Article 9.1, which seeks to
maintain good access conditions for developing countries when safeguard measures are adopted.  The
delegation of Venezuela believed that the proposal from Colombia was a significant and timely
contribution to the maintenance of market access conditions for developing countries at a time whenthere appeared to be a significant increase in the use of safeguard measures.
143. The delegate of the European Communities noted that this was an issue of considerable
practical importance as experience had shown that Article 9 was often applied when safeguard
measures were imposed.  It was clear to the European Communities that Colombia's proposal would
substantially alter Article 9 since it more than doubled the de minimis  threshold for mandatory
exemption of individual developing country imports.
144. The European Communities brought to the atten tion of the Committee three main concerns of
that delegation.  The first one was that Colombia's proposal would result in a substantive extension ofG/SG/59
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a narrow exception to the general principle of erga omnes  application of safeguard measures.
Secondly, the exclusion of a substantial portion of imports from measures – according to the proposal
up to 15 per cent, which referred to imports which might be causing serious injury – could diminish
the efficiency of the instrument.  Finally, and most importantly, the European Communities
understood the proposal to apply only to safeguard measures applied by developed WTO Members.Developing countries using the instrument would enjoy lower thresholds.  In the view of the European
Communities, this would be a paradigm change unknown to current rules on trade defence
instruments in general as it would create two different categories of users of trade defence
instruments. The European Communities expressed serious concerns about this approach and did not
believe that this was a desirable way to move forward.
145. The European Communities noted that the statemen t of Colombia also referred to interesting
issues such as the determination of the reference period for thresholds under Article 9.1.  TheEuropean Communities believed that there was scope for further fruitful exchange of views on this
and expressed that it would be open to engage on a discussion of such issues.
146. The delegate of Canada formulated two preliminary questions, pending further review of
Colombia's proposal.  The first one referred to the initial proposal by Colombia which suggested
changing the figures in Article 9.1 from 3 and 9 per cent and raising them to 7 and 15 per centrespectively.  However, in the paper Colombia was noting a figure of 10 per cent.  Therefore, Canada
asked what the current position of Colombia was with regards to the figures that were currently in
Article 9.1, and whether the change in figures const ituted a revision of Colombia's original proposal.
147. In its second question Canada noted that one of the rationales put forward by Colombia for
the proposal to increase the levels set out in Article 9.1 was based upon delays associated with takinga case to dispute settlement.  Canada requested Colombia to expand upon this idea as it seemed that
Colombia was pointing to issues relating to the implementation of Article 9.1, and not the actual
levels contained in that provision.
148. The delegate of Egypt reserved the right to comment at a later stage.
149. The delegate of Japan commented that the figure proposed by Colombia was too big in the
sense that it would diminish the effectiveness of the safeguard measure, and the spirit of the
Agreement itself.  Secondly, the delegate of Japan expressed doubts as to whether Colombia's
proposal might not lead to a two-tiered system within the Agreement.  Japan understood the
obligation of special and differential (S&D) treatment, or the existence and spirit of  S&D treatment,
and was willing to do the maximum possible to obtai n rules for  S&D treatment.  However, Japan was
of the view that respecting S&D treatment and having a two-tiered system in the Rules area, including
safeguards, was a different story.  Japan expressed doubts as to whether this course of action wouldlead to a two-tiered system in the Agreement, meaning a distinction between developing countries and
developed countries.
150. The delegate of China expressed his willingness to give a positive consideration to
Colombia's proposal.
151. The delegate of Malaysia expressed the view that since the issue was one of implementation it
was certainly incumbent upon the Committee to discuss the proposal made by Colombia.  The
Committee had a mandate to report back to the TNC and certainly it would be useful to continue the
discussion on Colombia's proposal.  Malaysia noted that Colombia had raised a number of points to
support its proposal regarding market access of developing countries in the face of safeguard
measures and the difficulty of recourse to dispute settlement by developing countries in the event ofdisputes.  Malaysia believed that Colombia had mentioned a number of points that would be useful forG/SG/59
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further discussion and therefore that it would be useful for the Committee to continue its discussions
at the next meeting or in an informal session.
152. The delegate of the United States, in light of the intervention by Malaysia, questioned
whether or not the proposal conforms with the mandate for the Committee as decided in the Doha
Ministerial Conference.  To the United States it seemed that Colombia's proposal incorporated
elements which reached far beyond what the Ministers contemplated when they approved the
implementation process.  Therefore, as a preliminary matter, the Committee should make a
determination as to whether or not this particular proposal fits within the mandate.  The United States
was willing to engage on informal consultations on that point.
153. The Chairman proposed to organize informal consultations on all issues raised regarding
Colombia's proposal before the next regular meeting of the Committee, where all issues regarding
consultations would be taken up including those raised by the United States.  He also proposed that, inorder to facilitate the exchange of views, Members could submit their views and questions on this
issue in writing.
154. The delegate of Colombia answered some of the questions that had been raised by Members.
Regarding whether the proposal was the same as that  which was in the list of outstanding issues on
implementation, in Colombia's view this was the proposal made for informal consultations. Colombia
believed that S&D treatment was fundamental to market access and therefore attached great
importance to raising the figures in Article 9.
155. Regarding the creation of two systems or a two- tiered system of obligations, Colombia was of
the view that this situation already exists as Ar ticle 9.1 establishes two types of treatment depending
upon whether the country is developing or not.  Colombia thought that there was a need to recognisegreater space for developing countries and this wo uld not in principle change anything but would
increase S&D treatment.
156. Regarding the 10 per cent threshold, Colombia remarked that it had not changed its proposal.
Colombia had simply referred to the idea that around 10 per cent constitutes a substantial trade
interest in this Organization.  Colombia hoped that  the discussion would be substantially broadened in
the proposed informal consultations.
157. The Committee decided to hold informal consul tations on the implementation issue raised by
Colombia regarding Article 9 special and differential treatment.G/SG/59
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ANNEX II
Extract from Minutes of 28 October 2002 Regular Committee Meeting (G/SG/M/20)
1. The representative of the European Communities stated that while the EC continued to have
concerns with regard to the proposal in its current form, it was prepared to look into the proposal with
an open mind.  Certain issues would, however, require clarification.  These open questions were as
follows:  Was there actual evidence of the difficulties caused by the de minimis  t h resh old s a t th ei r
current level?  What was the rationale for the proposed thresholds, which appeared in its current form
rather unrealistic?  Whether the cumulative threshold would remain as an essential feature?  What was
the rationale for having the higher thresholds applied only in investigations conducted by developedcountry users, which was, in that Member's view, not sustainable?
2. The representative of Thailand stated that, at the last informal consultations of the Committee
on Safeguards, his delegation took the floor to pledge support to Colombia for its proposed
amendment to Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.  Thailand reaffirmed its full support to
Colombia on its proposal.  Furthermore, Thailand emphasized the importance of Members adhering tothe mandated deadline for concluding negotiations.  Bearing this in mind, Thailand called on
Members to be more flexible and to engage constructively in the ongoing discussion, which is one
that is of great significance to developing countries.
3. In a parallel development, Thailand had expressed concerns over a number of issues that were
related to implementation of the Safeguards Agreement.  Thailand believed the arguments for thoserelated elements were legitimate in the face of the recent increased use of safeguard measures by
developed country Members.  In a number of instances, several developing countries, Thailand
included, could have benefited from the provision of Article 9.1 had appropriate time-period for
determining ‘de minimis’ shares of imports been utilised.  In the context of that article, the benefits
due to developing country Members would be nullified if imprudent or arbitrary selection of time-period were used in making a determination of ‘de minimis’ shares of imports.  In this regard,
Thailand wished to echo the concern on this issue, which was raised by Colombia.  However, owing
to the time constraint, Thailand refrained from making any attempt at this stage to introduce any
further this as well as other issues that were of concern to it, since Thailand did not want to create
complications which might slow down the pace of di scussions.   Thailand did not, however, rule out
the possibility of coming back to all those issues should an appropriate opportunity arise in the future.
Having said that, Thailand reiterated the importance of respecting the mandated deadline, which wasvery critical to the credibility of this Organization as well as the overall balance of the negotiations.G/SG/59
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ANNEX III
Extract from Minutes of 5 December 2002 Regular Committee Meeting (G/SG/M/21)
1. The representative of Colombia recalled that before the formal Committee meeting in
April 2002 Colombia had submitted a document which, besides including certain details fleshing out
its proposal, explained the reasons that had brought Colombia to improve market access through an
improvement in Article 9.1 of the Safeguards Agreement, which was a special provision on special
and differential treatment.
2. Colombia noted that it had gained support for its proposal from a large number of developing
countries.  Colombia highlighted among those comments the emphasis that was placed on the fact thatsafeguards was a remedy that was applied on fair trade, and in respect of which developing countries
should be given more flexibility.  Likewise, emphasis was placed on the appropriateness of this
proposal in the current context of the negotiations  and specifically with regard to the mandate on
industrial goods.
3. Colombia thanked the Committee for the interest in its proposal.  Colombia considered most
valuable the discussions that were held in April and October 2002, in both formal and informal
meetings.  Colombia expressed gratitude for the questions that were raised and that it replied to during
the meetings.  Colombia emphasised some of the replies it provided with regard to the current limits
contained in Article 9.1.  With regard to the reason for proposing increases in the Article 9.1
thresholds, Colombia had stated that the figures th at were currently in the Agreement were low and
that the safeguard mechanism, it believed, could be improved in order to foster better access without
prejudicing the domestic industry of developed countries.  In replying on the rationale of the limits
proposed, 7 and 15 per cent, Colombia had indicated that those figures had been established taking
account of other factors including inter alia  the concept of "substantial interest" referred to in
Article 12.3.
4. With regard to the rationale for having esta blished the fact that the increment in the
percentages would be applied solely by developed countries, Colombia had stated that during the
preparatory phase for Doha it had exchanged views with a large number of developing countries.
Those developing countries indicated that they would consider favourably this proposal for
implementation if the increases were confined to the developed world.
5. With regard to the coverage of the proposal, Colombia noted that this was a procedural issue
that was raised by some Members.  Colombia expressed its concern on the amount of time that wasdevoted to discussing this type of question, which meant that there was less time devoted to
discussing issues of substance which were in the interest of developing countries.  Colombia viewed
with concern the suggestion that a country does not have a possibility of adjusting proposals to reflect
the results of the implementation process.  Colombia had suggested making its proposal more specific
in this regard at informal consultations prior to  the Doha Ministerial Conference.  The fact that
Colombia's suggestion was not reflected in document Job (01)/152/Rev.1 should not be considered as
an obstacle for considering the concerns of developing countries.
6. With regard to the action to be taken, Colo mbia considered that the Trade Negotiations
Committee should instruct the Safeguards Committee to  revert to the subject insofar as it was raised
by Members.  Elements should be worked on in or der to attain consensus strengthening special and
differential treatment in the Safeguards Agreement.
7. The representative of China expressed full support for Colombia's proposal.  China
considered that developing countries had for a long time been at a disadvantage in respect of basicG/SG/59
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infrastructure, production resources and management experiences and therefore their share in the
world trade had been relatively small.  In order to ensure that developing countries secured a share in
the growth in international trade commensurate with  the needs of their economic development, special
and differential treatment for developing countries was provided in various WTO Agreements.
8. According to China, however, with the development of international trade and the enhanced
export of developing countries, the current 3 per cent and 9 per cent exemption as contained in
Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards no longer reflected the current situation of international
trade and no longer provided meaningful and effective special and differential treatment for
developing countries.  Therefore, as instructed by the Doha Ministerial Declaration, Members should
review this Article with a view to strengthening it and making it more precise, effective and
operational.  China was of the view that the 7 per cent and 15 per cent exemption criteria was a
meaningful and reasonable proposal worthy of cons ideration by Members to fulfill the Doha mandate.
9. The representative of Australia asserted that a country like Australia, which was now totally
dependent on tariffs for protection, needed to rely on WTO instruments such as the Safeguards
Agreement to deal with market disruptions on imports.  To its mind, Colombia's proposal would
undermine the effectiveness of safeguard action.
10. Australia considered that excluding such a substantial level of imports from developing
countries from the application of safeguard measures, particularly where they may have a significant
share of world export trade in the product to be subject to safeguard action, would significantly alter
the balance of rights and obligations under the Safeguards Agreement.
11. The Safeguards Agreement already recognized and provided special and differential treatment
for developing countries.  Further, one had only to look at the countries which were taking safeguardaction, to realize that it would not be fair to say that recourse to such a trade remedy was reserved for
developed countries.  Excluding developing countr y imports from the application of safeguard actions
would seriously undermine recourse to such a trade remedy.
12. Australia recalled that at the April meeting the European Communities said that Article 9 was
often invoked in favour of developing countries.  Australia shared the EC's concern that the change toArticle 9 would substantially alter the exception for developing countries so that there would be
substantial imports from developing countries causing injury.  Australia agreed with the EC's
assessment that applying Article 9.1 only to developed country measures would create two different
categories of defence instruments.
13. The representative of Thailand thanked fellow Members for their participation in the process
in a constructive and flexible manner.  Although the basis on which to report may not have been one
which was first-best and the report itself lacked consensus, Thailand believed the discussions were
thought-provoking and useful for exchanging views on the issues.  More importantly, Thailand
particularly commended the Chairman for having recourse to an appropriate and acceptable approach
to reporting.  To Thailand the approach taken by the Chairman was positive and rightful in that it was
clear of doubts that it may have set a bad precedent for future actions.  Thailand was pleased that dueconcerns expressed by Members were taken into account.
14. With regard to other issues in connection with the implementation of the Safeguards
Agreement, Thailand urged Members to engage as constructively as they did in the discussions on the
tiret 84 proposal.  Thailand looked forward to participating positively in future discussions on these
issues.
15. The representative of Korea shared the concerns of Colombia that the recent rise in the use of
safeguard measures could undermine the results of successive market access negotiations.  Korea alsoG/SG/59
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agreed that developing country Members could be more vulnerable to these measures, and the
proposed increase in the Article 9.1 thresholds had merits the Committee should consider thoroughly.
However, Korea was concerned that the proposal would be practically difficult as it required the
amendment of the Agreement, and certain parts of the proposal seemed to be beyond the mandate.
Korea also had some doubts whether the necessary creation of a two-tiered system in the proposal wasdesirable.  In addition to that, Korea wanted to point out that a clear explanation was not followed
with regards to the changes in proposed thresholds.
16. The representative of Japan stated that safeguard measures were based on the principle of
non-discrimination set forth in Article 2.2 of the Safeguard Agreement.  Article 9.1 was a form of
exception to the principle of non-discrimination, to guarantee some market access for developing
countries whose volume of imports in relative terms was very small.  If the Article 9.1 thresholds
were raised to the level proposed by Columbia, there was a possibility that even imports fromdeveloping countries which have potential large export ability would be excluded from safeguard
measures, so that the effectiveness of the safeguard measures would be undermined in a way that even
if there were substantial injury or threat of injury to the domestic industry, a significant part of these
imports would be excluded from the safeguard measure.  In addition, there was no legitimate basis for
making a distinction between measures imposed by developing countries and measures imposed bydeveloped countries, so also for this reason, signif icant rationality could not be identified in the
Colombian proposal.
17. The representative of the United States restated his country's concern that much of the
discussion in this Committee as to tiret 84 had addressed issues concerning Article 9.1 of the
Safeguards Agreement that appear to go beyond tiret 84 and perhaps beyond the Committee's mandatefrom the Ministers.  Regardless of these concerns, it had been clear in any event that the Committee
was far from reaching any consensus on tiret 84, and the discussion of possible amendments to
tiret 84 appeared to make consensus even more unlikely.  Accordingly, the Committee must report to
the TNC the lack of a consensus on this tiret.
18. However, the United States noted that the discussion in the Committee had had the beneficial
effect of making clear that many Members had a number of concerns about Article 9.1 beyond the
issues raised by tiret 84.  Given these concerns, th is Committee agreed at the October meeting to place
this broader range of Article 9.1 issues on the agenda for discussion at the next regular meeting in
April, with informal consultations beforehand to define the scope of the issues that Members wish to
have discussed.  The United States welcomed the Committee's decision to discuss these broader issues
as part of its regular work, and looked forward to the discussion at the April 2003 meeting, which the
US hoped would shed light on these issues.
19. The representative of Egypt placed on record his country's deep concern regarding any
proposal on Article 9 that could alter rights and obligations under the Safeguards Agreement.
20. The representative of Brazil stated that it become the rule, and not the exception, for Members
to reach the mandated deadlines for analysis of the implementation issues without results.
Unfortunately, the discussions of the proposal by Colombia, contained in tiret 84, followed the same
pattern. Brazil, from the beginning, supported the idea of Colombia of raising “de minimis” levels in
the case of investigations conducted by developed countries on the exports of developing countries.  If
granted, the proposed special and differential treatment would have provided developing country
exporters with enhanced market access opportunities in the developed countries markets. Given their
structural difficulties to export, once a developing country exporter was ousted from developedcountry markets, it had much more difficulties to recuperate this market.  If Members raised the “de
minimis” levels for developing countries, in the case of investigations by developed countries, they
would be mitigating this effect.  It would be a fair measure and one that would help give some
meaning to the term “Doha Development Round”, in the area of safeguards.  As Members could notG/SG/59
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reach a consensus in the Safeguards Committee, they would have to wait for guidance from the TNC
on this matter.
21. Brazil reiterated its comments on one specific issue that was raised in the course of the
discussions: the fact that it was alleged that the proposal before the Committee was not the original
one presented in the run-up to Doha.  Brazil noted that some Members had stated that the proposal, aspresented, did not imply that the increased “de minimis” levels would be applicable only in
investigations conducted by developed countries.  Br azil re-stated that it totally disagreed with this
claim. As Colombia had stated on previous occasions, it was its declared intention that the proposal
would be applicable only to investigations conducted by developed countries. This was a known fact,
and one that was discussed in informal consultations in the pre-Doha phase. Naturally, when the
implementation “tirets” were compiled, they were presented in a summarized form, otherwise it might
have become unmanageable to deal with all the single aspects of each of the proposals. Unfortunately,in this specific case, this process led to a misinterpretation of the mandate, on the part of some
Members.  Brazil reaffirmed that there was no amendment, whatsoever, to the mandate, but simply
the presentation of the details of the proposal, a ccording to the pre-Doha discussions, something that
the summarized text of the mandate, naturally, did not capture in its entirety.
22. The representative of the European Communities indicated that, despite further reflection on
Colombia's proposal, his delegation's views had not changed significantly on the important proposal
of raising the de minimis levels contained in Article 9.1.  The EC understood that Members were
currently reacting to Colombia's amended proposal, as outlined by Colombia at the Committee's
regular meeting in April.  While the amended proposal only applied to safeguard measures taken by
developed countries, that was not the proposal on which the Committee was formally required toreport on by the end of the year.  The EC did not want to make a procedural point out of this, but just
wanted to be clear about it.  The EC considered that such a change significantly altered the balance of
rights and obligations under the Safeguards Agreement, and such a quantified differentiation of the
levels of importing countries did not seem to the EC to be a development which had obvious
precedent in other trade defence instruments.
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