WORLD TRADE G/ADP/N/1/PER/1/Suppl.2
G/SCM/N/1/PER/1/Suppl.2
28August 1997ORGANIZATION(97-3499)
Original: Spanish Committee onAnti-Dumping Practices
Committee onSubsidies andCountervailing Measures
NOTIFICATION OFLAWS AND REGULATIONS UNDER
ARTICLES 18.5AND 32.6OFTHE AGREEMENTS
PERU
Thefollowing communication, dated 16May1997, hasbeenreceived from thePermanent
Mission ofPeru.
_______________
ThePermanentMissionofPerutotheUnitedNationsOfficeandotherInternationalOrganizations
atGeneva presents itscompliments totheSecretariat oftheWorld Trade Organization (WTO) and,
pursuant toArticle 18oftheAgreement onImplementation ofArticle VIoftheGeneral Agreement
onTariffs andTrade 1994, andArticle 32oftheAgreement onSubsidies andCountervailing Measures,
hasthehonour tonotify Supreme Decree No.043-97-EF: "Regulations onDumping andSubsidies"
acopyofwhich isappended hereto.G/ADP/N/1/PER/1/Suppl.2
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ELPERUANO, TUESDAY, 29APRIL 1997, PAGES 148858 -148863
ECONOMY AND FINANCE
REGULATIONS ONDUMPING AND SUBSIDIES
SUPREME DECREE NO.043-97-EF
THE PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC
CONSIDERING:
Thatbyvirtue ofLegislative Decision No.26470, published intheOfficial Journal ElPeruano
on18December 1994andineffect since1January 1995, theDemocratic Constituent Congress approved
theAgreement Establishing theWorld Trade Organization (WTO) andtheMultilateral Agreements
onTrade inGoods contained intheFinal ActoftheUruguay Round signed atMarrakesh, Morocco,
on15April 1994;
Thattheaforementioned Multilateral Agreements onTrade inGoods include theAgreement
onImplementation ofArticle VIoftheGeneral Agreement onTariffs andTrade 1994(Anti-Dumping
Measures),theAgreementonSubsidiesandCountervailingMeasures,andtheAgreementonAgriculture;
Thatpursuant toArticle 18.4oftheAgreement onImplementation ofArticle VIoftheGeneral
AgreementonTariffsandTrade1994andArticle92.5oftheAgreementonSubsidiesandCountervailing
Measures, governments approving theAgreement Establishing theWTO shalltakeallnecessary steps,
ofageneral orparticular character, toensure theconformity oftheirlaws, regulations andadministrative
procedures withtheprovisions oftheaforementioned twoAgreements;
ThatitistheState'sresponsibility tofacilitate andmonitor freecompetition, combating any
restrictive practices, byestablishing basic rules foraction byeconomic agents inorder toguarantee
effective freedom ofcompetition inmarkets;
Thatdumping andsubsidies areunfair practices thatdistort competition inmarkets, which is
guaranteed within themarket social economy provided forinPeru's1993 Political Constitution;
Thatbyvirtue ofDecree LawNo.25868 anditsRegulations, approved bySupreme Decree
No.025-93-ITINCI, theNational Institute fortheDefence ofCompetition andtheProtection of
Intellectual Property hasbeenestablished asthebody responsible forapplying thelegal rules that
guarantee freecompetition;
Inaccordance withtheprovisions ofparagraph 8ofArticle 118ofPeru's1993 Political
Constitution;
DECREES:
Article 1.Thepurpose ofthisSupreme Decree istoestablish regulations fortherules laid
down intheAgreement onImplementation ofArticle VIoftheGeneral Agreement onTariffs andTrade
1994, theAgreement onSubsidies andCountervailing Measures, andtheAgreement onAgriculture,
approvedbytheDemocraticConstituentCongressinLegislativeDecisionNo.26407,inordertoprevent
andremedy distortion ofmarket competition caused bydumping andsubsidies.G/ADP/N/1/PER/1/Suppl.2
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TITLE I
General Provisions
Article 2.Forthepurposes ofthese Regulations, thefollowing definitions apply:
I. Anti-Dumping Agreement: theAgreement onImplementation ofArticle VIofthe
General Agreement onTariffs andTrade 1994, which forms partoftheMultilateral
Agreements onTrade inGoods contained intheFinal ActoftheUruguay Round,
approved bytheDemocratic Constituent Congress inLegislative Decision No.26407.
II. SubsidiesAgreement:theAgreementonSubsidiesandCountervailingMeasures,which
forms partoftheMultilateral Agreements onTrade inGoods contained intheFinal
ActoftheUruguay Round, approved bytheDemocratic Constituent Congress in
Legislative Decision 26407.
III. TheCommission: theDumping andSubsidies Commission oftheNational Institute
fortheDefenceofCompetitionandtheProtectionofIntellectualProperty(INDECOPI).
IV. Secretariat: theTechnical Secretariat oftheCommission.
V. Court: theCourt fortheDefence ofCompetition andtheProtection ofIntellectual
property oftheNational Institute fortheDefence ofCompetition andtheProtection
ofIntellectual Property (INDECOPI).
VI. TUPA: thesoletextofadministrative procedures oftheNational Institute forthe
Defence ofCompetition andtheProtection ofIntellectual Property (INDECOPI), the
section corresponding totheDumping andSubsidies Commission.
VII. WTO: theWorld Trade Organization.
Article 3.Adetermination ofdumping orsubsidies, injury orthreat ofinjury andtheircausal
relationship, aswellastheestablishment ofanti-dumping orcountervailing duties, shallbemade through
aninvestigation carried outaccording totheadministrative procedures prescribed intheseRegulations.
TITLE II
Dumping
Article 4.Forthepurposes ofthisSupreme Decree, aproduct shallbeconsidered asbeing
dumped ifitsexport price islessthanitsnormal value orcomparable price, intheordinary course
oftrade, foralikeproduct when destined forconsumption intheexporting country.
Theexportprice,thenormalvalueorthecomparablepricereferredtointheprecedingparagraph
shallbedetermined inconformity withArticle 2oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement.
Article 5.Aparticular market situation inthesense ofArticle 2.2oftheAnti-Dumping
Agreement shallmean thefollowing situations:G/ADP/N/1/PER/1/Suppl.2
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I. Where thelevelofopenness inthecountry oforigin resulting fromtarifforpara-tariff
barriers doesnotpermit aproper comparison because itcauses distortion ofdomestic
prices.
II. Where otherspecial factors existinthedomestic market ofthecountry oforigin which,
intheopinion oftheCommission, donotpermit aproper comparison because they
cause distortion ofdomestic prices.
Article 6.Where imports come fromororiginate incountries where there aredistortions in
theeconomy thatdonotpermit them tobeconsidered market economy countries, thenormal value
shallbedetermined onthebasis ofthecomparable price intheordinary course oftrade atwhich the
likeproduct isactually soldinathirdcountry withamarket economy fordomestic consumption, or,
failing that,forexport, oronthebasis ofanyother method deemed appropriate bytheCommission.
Forthepurpose ofdetermining thenormal value, theCommission shalltakeintoaccount the
following criteria interalia:
I. Theproduction processes inthecountry withafreemarket economy andthecountry
whose economy hasdistortions.
II. Scale ofproduction.
III. Quality oftheproducts.
Bearing inmind theforegoing factors, thechoice ofthecountry mustnotentail disadvantages
fortheproducer orexporter inthecountry oforigin.
TITLE III
Subsidies
Article 7.Forthepurposes oftheSubsidies Agreement, asubsidy shallbedeemed toexistif:
1. There isafinancial contribution byagovernment oranypublic bodywithin theterritory
ofaMember, which involves adirect transfer offunds, potential direct transfer of
funds orliabilities or,when government revenue thatisotherwise dueisforegone or
notcollected, orifagovernment provides goods orservices -other thangeneral
infrastructure -orpurchases goods atprices higher thanthemarket price, orifthe
government makes payments toafunding mechanism, orentrusts ordirects aprivate
body tocarry outoneormore ofthetypeoffunctions illustrated above which would
normally bevested inthegovernment andthepractice, innorealsense, differs from
practices normally followed bygovernments andbenefit isthereby conferred.
2. There isanyformofincome orpricesupport inthesense ofArticle XVIoftheGeneral
Agreement onTariffs andTrade 1994 andabenefit isthereby conferred.
Article 8.Asubsidy asdefined inthepreceding Article maybespecific ornon-specific.
Aspecificsubsidyshallbeasubsidythatbenefitsanenterpriseorindustryorgroupofenterprises
orindustries. Asubsidy which benefits certain enterprises located within adesignated geographical
region within thejurisdiction ofthegranting government shallbespecific.G/ADP/N/1/PER/1/Suppl.2
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Asubsidy thatbenefits allindustries ingeneral shallbenon-specific.
TheSubsidies Agreement establishes thecriteria onwhich todetermine whether asubsidy is
specific ornot.
Article 9.Subsidies maybeprohibited, actionable ornon-actionable.
Prohibited subsidies shallbesubsidies contingent, inlaworinfact,uponexport performance,
including those illustrated inAnnex ItotheSubsidies Agreement; orthose contingent upon theuse
ofdomestic over-imported goods. Allprohibited subsidies shallbedeemed specific.
Actionable subsidies shallbesubsidies which cause injury tothedomestic industry, nullify
orimpair benefits accruing directly orindirectly fromtheWTO Agreements, orcause serious prejudice
orthreat ofprejudice totheinterests ofdomestic producers.
Non-actionablesubsidiesshallbesubsidieswhicharenotspecificwithinthemeaningofArticle8
ofthese Regulations andsubsidies which arespecific, havebeenestablished toprovide assistance for
industrialresearchactivities,pre-competitivedevelopment,assistancetodisadvantagedregionsorcertain
typesofassistancetopromoteadaptationofexistingfacilitiestonewenvironmentalrequirementsimposed
bylawand/or regulations.
Prohibited, actionable andnon-actionable subsidies shallbesubject totheprocedures established
intheWTO 'sSubsidies Agreement.
Article10.Systemsforthereductionofindirecttaxesontheproductionofexportsanddrawback
systems forcharges ontheimport ofproducts consumed orutilized intheproduction ofexports shall
onlybedeemed specific subsidies iftheamount ofthereduction ordrawback exceeds theamount of
theindirect taxes andimport charges actually paidintheproduction process.
TheSubsidiesAgreementlaysdowntheprocedurefordeterminingwhetherindirecttaxreduction
schemes anddrawback schemes forimport charges constitute subsidies.
Article 11.TheCommission mayimpose aprovisional countervailing dutyontheimport of
aforeign product thatbenefits fromaprohibited oractionable subsidy. Insuchcases, thecountervailing
dutyshallonlybeestablished ifthereisreason tobelieve thatthesubsidy maycause injury todomestic
production, nullify orimpair theadvantages directly orindirectly resulting fromtheWTO Agreements,
orseriously prejudice orthreaten toprejudice theinterests ofPeru.
TITLE IV
Determination ofInjury orThreat ofInjury
Article 12.TheCommission shalldetermine injury, threat ofinjury, ormaterial retardation
oftheestablishment ofadomestic industry caused bydumped orsubsidized imports. Inthecaseof
actionable subsidies, theCommission mayassume thatthereisinjury todomestic industry inconformity
withthecriteria laiddown inArticle 6oftheSubsidies Agreement.
Article 13.Adetermination ofinjury shallbebased onevidence andinvolve anobjective
examination of:G/ADP/N/1/PER/1/Suppl.2
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(a) Thevolume ofthedumped orsubsidized imports andtheireffect onprices inthe
domestic market forlikeproducts; and
(b) theconsequent impact ofthese imports ondomestic producers ofsuchproducts.
Article 14.Forthepurposes ofthepreceding Article, theCommission shalltakeintoaccount
thefollowing criteria:
I. (a) Withregard tothevolume ofthedumped orsubsidized imports: asignificant
increase inthevolume ofdumped imports inabsolute terms orrelative to
production, salesorconsumption.
Inconsidering whether thedumped orsubsidized imports have increased
significantly, theCommission shalltakeintoaccount thefollowing criteria inter
alia:
- Whether therateofincrease ofthedumped orsubsidized imports has
meant thatthese imports arenotnegligible incomparison withtotal
imports during theperiod oftheinvestigation, inconformity with
Article 38ofthese Regulations;
- whether therateorgrowth ofthedumped orsubsidized imports has
meant thatthese imports came torepresent animportant proportion
compared toproduction, sales orconsumption during theperiod of
theinvestigation.
(b) Theeffect thatiscaused ormaybecaused bytheimport ofgoods atdumped
orsubsidized prices ontheprices oflikedomestic goods onthedomestic
market, considering whether theimported product issoldonthedomestic
market ataprice considerably lower thanthatforlikedomestic products, or
whether theeffect ofsuchimports isotherwise todepress prices toasignificant
degree orprevent price increases which otherwise would haveoccurred, to
asignificant degree.
II. Withregard totheimpact ofthedumped orsubsidized exports onthedomestic industry
concerned, there shallbeanexamination ofallrelevant economic factors andindices
having abearing onthestateoftheindustry, including actual andpotential decline
insales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return oninvestments, orutilization
ofcapacity; factors affecting domestic prices; themagnitude ofthemargin ofdumping;
actual andpotential negative effects oncashflow, inventories, employment, wages,
growth, ability toraisecapital orinvestments.
Inthespecial caseofagricultural subsidies, there shallbeanevaluation ofwhether
thecostofgovernment support programmes hasincreased, inconformity withthe
provisions laiddown intheWTO 'sAgreement onAgriculture.
Nooneorseveral ofthese economic factors andindices shallnecessarily besufficient
toreach adefinitive conclusion ontheexistence ofinjury.G/ADP/N/1/PER/1/Suppl.2
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Article 15.Determination ofthecausal relationship between thedumped orsubsidized imports
andtheinjury tothedomestic industry shallalsotakeintoaccount other factors thanthedumped or
subsidized imports which atthesame timeareaffecting domestic industry.
Article 16.Adetermination ofathreat ofinjury shallbebased onfactsandnotonallegation,
conjecture orremote possibility. Inmaking adetermination regarding theexistence ofathreat ofinjury
thefactors mentioned inArticles 3.7and15.7oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement andtheSubsidies
Agreement respectively shallbetaken intoaccount interalia.
TITLE V
Definition ofDomestic Industry
Article 17.Forthepurposes ofthese Regulations, theterm"domestic industry" shallinclude
domestic producers asawhole ofthelikeproducts orthose ofthemwhose collective output constitutes
amajor proportion oftotaldomestic production oftheseproducts. Indetermining adomestic producer,
theCommission shalltakeintoaccount thefollowing criteria interalia:
- Whether theproducers arerelated totheexporters oftheallegedly dumped orsubsidized
product;
- whether theproducers arethemselves acting asimporters ofthedumped orsubsidized
product;
- theorigin andcharacteristics oftheinputs usedinlikegoods, together withthevalue-
added fortheproduction process.
TITLE VI
Administrative Investigation Procedure
CHAPTER I
Application andInitiation oftheInvestigation
Article 18.Except asprovided forinthefollowing Article, aninvestigation todetermine the
existence ofimports atdumped orsubsidized prices, andtheeffects ofthese unfair international trade
practices, shallbeinitiated upon awritten application addressed totheCommission byanenterprise
orgroup ofenterprises accounting foratleast25percentoftotaldomestic production oftheproduct
concerned, without prejudice toArticles 4and16oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement andtheSubsidies
Agreement respectively.
Theapplication shallinclude evidence ofthefollowing:
(a) Thedumping oractionable orprohibited subsidy according tothedefinitions inthe
Agreement, asappropriate;
(b) injury within themeaning oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement ortheSubsidies Agreement
whichever isappropriate;G/ADP/N/1/PER/1/Suppl.2
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(c) acausal linkbetween thedumped orsubsidized imports andthealleged injury orthreat
ofinjury.
Theapplication shallcontain theinformation requested inthequestionnaires fromtheTUPA.
Article 19.Inspecial circumstances, theCommission maydecide toinitiate aninvestigation
exofficio, provided thatitisinthenational interest andintheopinion oftheCommission thedomestic
industry affected ismaterially notabletosubmit thenecessary application andthere areindications
ofdumping orsubsidies, injury andacausal relationship which justify theinitiation oftheinvestigation.
Article 20.Inthespecial caseofanapplication toapply countervailing duties, afterreceiving
theapplication, providing thattherequirements laiddown intheTUPA havebeenmet,before initiating
thecorresponding investigation, theCommission shallcommunicate directly withthegovernment of
thecountry oforigin orexport concerned forthepurpose ofholding consultations withaviewtoreaching
amutually satisfactory solution regarding theapplication fortheimposition ofduties.
Without prejudice tothepreceding paragraph, theCommission maydecide toinitiate an
investigation orapply provisional ordefinitive duties, pursuant totheprovisions oftheSubsidies
Agreement.
Article 21.Within thirty (30)days from thedateofsubmission oftheapplication, the
Commission may:
(a) Accept theapplication anddecide toinitiate aninvestigation bymeans ofarelevant
decision; or
(b) Allow theapplicant fifteen (15)daysinwhich tomeettherequirements oftheTUPA.
Thisperiod shallbecalculated fromthedayfollowing thecorresponding request and
maybeextended forafurther 15days.
After therequirements havebeenmet,theCommission shallhaveaperiod offifteen
(15)daysinwhich totakeadecision, which maybeextended forafurther fifteen (15)
days.
Where thenecessary documents arenotprovided inanappropriate form within the
time-limit, theCommission shalldeclare theapplication inadmissible andshallissue
thecorresponding decision, which shallbenotified totheapplicant.
(c) Reject theapplication because itconsiders thatitisunfounded, issuethecorresponding
decision andnotify thistotheapplicant.
Article 22.Following publication ofthedecision toinitiate aninvestigation intheOfficial
Journal, ElPeruano ,theSecretariat shallnotify theparties citedinthecomplaint sothatwithin thirty
(30)daysfromthedatefollowing thenotification theymaysubmit theiranswers inwriting andreply
tothecorresponding questionnaires.
Thenotification shallbeaccompanied byacopyoftheapplication submitted andoftheannexes
containing non-confidential information or,where appropriate, thedocuments relevant toanexofficio
investigation, together withthequestionnaires concerning theinvestigation.G/ADP/N/1/PER/1/Suppl.2
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Thetime-limits applicable toforeign producers orexporters shallbecounted from thedate
ofreceipt ofthequestionnaire, which shallbedeemed tohavebeenreceived oneweek fromthedate
onwhich itwassenttotherespondent inthecountry oforigin orexport.
TheCommission mayextend theperiod ofthirty (30)daysforparties citedinthecomplaint
which request anextension inorder toprepare theirexplanations. Arequest forextension shallbe
based onreasons orfactsthatjustify itsgranting.
Article 23.TheCommission mayrequire thedataandinformation itdeems relevant toallow
ittofulfilitstaskdirectly fromtheparties citedinthecomplaint, customs agents, surveillance, transport
andother companies andpublic orprivate sector bodies, which mustprovide thisinformation within
thetime-limits fixed, onpainofliability.
Wherethereisnoresponsetotherequestreferredtointheprecedingparagraph,theCommission
shalltakeadecision based ontheinformation available.
Article 24.Allthedocuments submitted totheCommission inthecourse oftheprocedure
shallbeaccompanied bysufficient copies fortheother parties, unless theinformation isconfidential.
Article 25.Theauthorities shallhavenine(9)months toconclude theirinvestigation. This
period shallbecalculated from thedateofpublication oftheCommission 'sdecision toinitiate an
investigation inElPeruano .
Provided thatintheopinion oftheCommission therearegrounds fordoing to,theperiod may
beextended foronefurther period ofthree months.
Article 26.Thedecision toinitiate aninvestigation, thedecisions fixing provisional ordefinitive
anti-dumping orcountervailing duties, decisions lifting ormodifying theduties orterminating or
suspending theinvestigation shallbepublished inElPeruano onceonly.
CHAPTER II
Evidence
Article27.Unlesstheinformationisconfidential,evidencepresentedinwritingbyoneinterested
partyshallbemade available tootherinterested parties participating intheprocedure. TheCommission
shallalsosendcopies toanyperson whosorequests andwhoproves alegitimate interest.
Article 28.TheDumping andSubsidies Commission shallexofficio orattherequest ofa
party decide thatinformation presented bytheparties isbynature confidential.
Article 29.Confidential information presented bytheparties toananti-dumping orsubsidies
investigation shallbeaccompanied byanon-confidential summary thereof and,upongoodcause, shall
betreated assuchbytheauthorities.
Where information isdeemed confidential either byitsnature orattherequest ofoneofthe
partiesandtheinterestedpartyhasnotshowngoodcauseorsubmittedthecorrespondingnon-confidential
summary, theCommission 'sTechnical Secretariat shallrequest ittojustify theconfidential nature of
theinformation andprovide thecorresponding non-confidential summary within three (3)days.G/ADP/N/1/PER/1/Suppl.2
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These summaries should beinsufficient detail topermit areasonable understanding ofthe
substance oftheinformation submitted inconfidence. Inexceptional circumstances, theparties may
indicate thatsuchinformation isnotsusceptible ofsummary, andinsuchcircumstances, astatement
ofthereasons whysummarization isnotpossible must beprovided.
Article30.Wherethepartieswhichprovidedconfidentialinformationdonotpresenttherelevant
justification orthecorresponding non-confidential summary within thetime-limit fixed, theCommission
maydecide nottotakethisinformation intoaccount, unless itcanbeconvincingly demonstrated by
anappropriate source thattheinformation iscorrect, oritmayorder itsreturn, whichever isappropriate.
Article 31.Attherequest ofoneoftheparties, theCommission shallholdhearings toallow
theparties toexplain theirposition. Noparty shallbeobliged toattend ahearing anditsabsence shall
notbedetrimental toitscause.
TheCommission shallonlytakeintoaccount oralinformation given atthehearings if,within
five(5)daysfollowing thehearing, itispresented inwriting totheCommission.
Article 32.Incases inwhich anyinterested party refuses access to,orotherwise doesnot
provide, necessary information within thetime-limit fixed orsignificantly impedes theinvestigation,
theCommission maydecide toapply provisional ordefinitive duties pursuant toArticle 6.8ofthe
Anti-Dumping Agreement and12.7oftheSubsidies Agreement.
Article 33.Theformandamount oftheprovisional measures shallberegulated bytherelevant
provisions ofthesoleamended textoftheCode ofCivil Procedure.
CHAPTER III
Undertakings
Article34.Where,duringthecourseofaninvestigation,anexporterorgovernmentofacountry
exporting thedumped orsubsidized goods voluntarily undertakes commitments inorder toeliminate
theinjury todomestic industry, theCommission shallrequire theother interested parties totransmit
theircomments onthesubstance oftheundertakings within fifteen (15)days.
Article 35.Where theCommission accepts theundertaking made bytheexporter orgovernment
oftheexporting country, itshallissueadecision declaring theinvestigation suspended orterminated.
Theaforementioned decision shallbebased ontheundertaking made.
Article 36.Fulfilment oftheseundertakings shallbesubject toperiodic review either exofficio
orattherequest ofoneoftheparties. Where theCommission notes inthecourse ofthereview that
theundertaking hasnotbeenrespected orthatthereisunjustified delay intransmitting theinformation
necessarytoverifycompliance,itshallgivetheinterestedpartyfifteen(15)daystopresentitsarguments,
attheexpiry ofwhich theCommission mayimmediately apply therelevant provisional duty, using
thebestinformation available.
Insuchcases, theCommission shallpursue theinvestigation andmaylevydefinitive duties
onproducts entered forconsumption ninety (90)daysbefore theapplication ofprovisional duties, except
thatanysuchretroactive assessment shall notapply toimports entered before theviolation ofthe
undertaking.G/ADP/N/1/PER/1/Suppl.2
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CHAPTER IV
Establishment ofDefinitive Anti-Dumping orCountervailing Duties
Article 37.TheCommission mayonlyestablish ananti-dumping orcountervailing duty,
whichever isappropriate, afterithasverified theexistence ofdumping orasubsidy, injury orthreat
ofinjury andthecausal relationship between thedumped orsubsidized imports andthealleged injury.
Article 38.TheCommission shalldeclare theapplication submitted inadmissible andshall
terminate aninvestigation when itconsiders thatthereisnotsufficient evidence ofdumping orsubsidies
orofinjury orthreat ofinjury tojustify proceeding withthecase.
Where theCommission determines thatthemargin ofdumping ortheamount ofthesubsidy
isdeminimis ,orthattheinjury orthreat ofinjury isnegligible, itshallterminate theinvestigation.
Themargin ofdumping shallbeconsidered tobedeminimis ifitislessthan8percentexpressed
asapercentage oftheexport price. Inthecaseofsubsidies, theamount ofthesubsidy shall be
considered deminimis ifitislessthan3percentoftheadvalorem f.o.b. price.
Thevolume ofdumped imports shallnormally beregarded asnegligible ifthevolume from
aparticular country isfound toaccount forlessthan3percentofimports ofthelikeproduct inthat
country. Thevolume ofdumped imports shallnotbeconsidered negligible when theyareimported
from countries which individually account forlessthan3percentoftheimports ofthelikeproduct
intheimporting country, provided thatthese collectively account formore than7percentofsuch
imports.
Inthecaseofsubsidies,thevolumeofsubsidizedimportsshallnormallyberegardedasnegligible
ifthevolume fromaparticular country isfound toaccount forlessthan4percentofimports ofthe
likeproduct intheimporting country. Thevolume ofsubsidized imports shall notbeconsidered
negligible when theyareimported fromcountries which individually account forlessthan4percent
oftheimports ofthelikeproduct intheimporting country, provided thatthese collectively account
formore than9percentofsuchimports.
Article 39.Bothdefinitive anti-dumping andcountervailing duties aredeemed tobefinesand
donotinanywayconstitute atax.
Article 40.Anti-dumping orcountervailing duties shallnotexceed theamount necessary to
remove theinjury orthreat ofinjury determined andshallnotexceed themargin ofdumping oramount
ofthesubsidy established.
Theanti-dumping orcountervailing dutyshallremain inforce aslongasthecauses ofinjury
orthreat ofinjury which ledtotheirimposition persist, butpursuant toArticle 11.3oftheAnti-Dumping
Agreement andArticle 21.3oftheSubsidies Agreement, thisperiod shallnotexceed fiveyears.
Article 41.Where ananti-dumping orcountervailing dutyisimposed inrespect ofanyproduct,
itshallbeimposed intheappropriate amount, irrespective ofthesubsequent importer.
Article 42.TheCommission mayonlyapply provisional duties if:G/ADP/N/1/PER/1/Suppl.2
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(a) Aninvestigation hasbeen initiated inaccordance withthese Regulations andthe
interested parties havebeengiven adequate opportunities tosubmit information and
make comments;
(b) apreliminary affirmative determination hasbeenmade ofdumping orsubsidies, injury
orthreat ofinjury andacausal relationship between thedumped orsubsidized imports
andthealleged injury orthreat ofinjury; and
(c) theCommission judges provisional duties necessary toprevent injury being caused
tothedomestic industry during theinvestigation.
TheapplicationofprovisionaldutiesshallbegovernedbyArticles7and17oftheAnti-Dumping
Agreement andSubsidies Agreement respectively.
Article 43.Where thedefinitive duties arehigher thantheprovisional duties paidorguaranteed,
theamount inexcess shallnotbepayable, except inthecasereferred tointhefollowing Article of
these Regulations. Inthecontrary case, thedifference shallberefunded.
Where definitive duties arenotestablished, theentire amount paidshallberefunded andthe
security given tocover theamount oftheprovisional duties imposed shallberefunded orreleased.
Article 44.Inspecial circumstances, theCommission maylevydefinitive anti-dumping or
countervailing duties onproducts marketed forconsumption 90dayspriortoapplication ofprovisional
duties.
Inthecaseofsubsidies, suchdefinitive duties maybedetermined ifthere isaninjury which
itisdifficult torepair caused bymassive imports inarelatively short period oftimeandwhere the
Commission deems itnecessary, inorder topreclude therecurrence ofsuchinjury, itmayassess
countervailing duties retroactively onthose imports.
Noanti-dumping orcountervailing duties shallbelevied onproducts entered forconsumption
prior tothedateofinitiation oftheinvestigation.
Incaseofviolation ofanundertaking, theCommission maylevyimmediate provisional duties
using theinformation available. Insuchcases, definitive duties maybelevied onproducts entered
forconsumption notmore than90daysbefore theapplication ofsuchprovisional measures, butunder
nocircumstances before violation oftheundertaking.
Article 45.Theanti-dumping andcountervailing duties referred tointhese Regulations are
paidontheinvoiced f.o.b. value, inaccordance withtherules oftheGeneral Customs Lawonthe
payment ofimport duties.
Provisional duties shallbepaidorguaranteed bymeans ofirrevocable, binding, unconditional
andimmediatelycashablesecurityissuedbyabankingorfinancialentityorbyguaranteefunds,expressed
inUnited States dollars, pursuant totherules oftheaforementioned General Customs Law.
Under nocircumstances maytheimport ofthegoods forconsumption behindered bythe
investigation taking place andnoauthority mayhinder theirentry forconsumption.G/ADP/N/1/PER/1/Suppl.2
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Article 46.TheCommission may, attherequest ofoneoftheparties, fixtheadministrative,
procedural andother coststobepaidbytheplaintiff totheimporters and/or exporters iftheapplication
hasbeenrejected.
Article 47.After atleastsixmonths haveelapsed since theconclusion oftheinvestigation,
attherequest ofanyinterested party orexofficio, theCommission mayreview theneedforthe
continued imposition ofthedefinitive anti-dumping orcountervailing duties ineffect. Inconsidering
theapplication,theCommissionshalltakeintoaccountwhetherthereisadequateevidenceofasignificant
change inthesituation thatwarrants areview oftheduties imposed.
Thereview procedure shall begoverned bytheprovisions ofArticles 18to53ofthese
Regulations where applicable.
Article48.TheCommissionmayapplyprovisionalordefinitiveanti-dumpingorcountervailing
duties ontheimport ofspare parts orcomponents imported from thecountry oforigin ofthefinal
product subject todefinitive duties ifthereisproof thatsuchgoods arebeing imported forthepurpose
ofcircumventing theapplication ofanti-dumping orcountervailing duties imposed onthefinalproduct.
Forthispurpose, theCommission shalltakethefollowing factors intoaccount, interalia:
(a) Whether theproduct soldinPeruhasbeenassembled orfinished inPeruusing spare
partsorcomponents produced inthecountry oforigin ofthefinalproduct subject to
definitive duties;
(b) whether theproduct soldinPeruhasbeenassembled orfinished inathird country
using spare partsorcomponents produced inthecountry oforigin ofthefinalproduct
subject todefinitive duties;
(c) whether theproduct hasbeenassembled orfinished byaparty related totheexporter
orproducer ofthefinalproduct subject todefinitive duties;
(d) whether theimport ofspare partsorcomponents fortheproduct subject todefinitive
duties andassembly orfinishing ofsuchproducts haveincreased following publication
ofthedecision initiating theinvestigation;
(e) anyother circumstance determining achange inthecharacteristics oftrade forwhich
thereisnoeconomic cause orjustification other thanimposition ofthedutyandifthere
isproof thatpayment ofthedefinitive duties imposed onthefinalproduct isbeing
circumvented.
Thereview procedure shallbegoverned bytheprovisions laiddown inArticles 18to53of
these Regulations, where applicable.
CHAPTER V
Appeal
Article49.Forthepurposeofchallengingafinaldecision,recoursemaybehadtoanapplication
forreconsideration andanappeal.
Theaforementioned appeals mustbemade within 15daysfromthedayfollowing notification
oftheCommission 'sdecision.G/ADP/N/1/PER/1/Suppl.2
G/SCM/N/1/PER/1/Suppl.2
Page14
Article 50.Precautionary decisions establishing provisional anti-dumping orcountervailing
duties ordecisions rejecting applications shallnotbesubject toappeal.
Article 51.TheCommission shalltakeadecision onanapplication forreconsideration within
90daysfrom thedateofitssubmission.
Article 52.Appeals shallautomatically beaccepted bytheCommission andthefiletransmitted
tothecourts within aperiod notexceeding 10days.
Article 53.Thedecision bythecourts exhausts administrative remedies.
Supplementary Provisions
First: ThePeruvian authorities shallapply theprovisions ofSupreme Decree No.133-91-EF,
amended bySupreme Decree No.051-92-EF andsupplemented bythepresent Supreme Decree, to
countries thatarenotmembers oftheWTO.
Second: Without prejudice totheprovisions oftheAnti-Dumping Agreement, theSubsidies
Agreement andthisSupreme Decree, onthebasis oftheprinciple ofreciprocity, Perumayapply to
products exported fromororiginating inother countries thesame treatment given bythese countries
inrelation todumping andsubsidies toproducts exported from ororiginating inPeru.
Third: Forthepurposes ofthisSupreme Decree, theprovisions oftheLawonGeneral Rules
ofAdministrative Procedure alsoapply.
Fourth: Thepenalties provided forinthisSupreme Decree shallbegoverned bytheprovisions
ofparagraph (c)ofArticle 48ofDecree LawNo.25868.
Fifth: ThisSupreme Decree shallbeendorsed bytheMinister fortheEconomy andFinance,
andtheMinister forIndustry, Tourism, Integration andInternational Trade Negotiations, andshall
enter intoforce onthedayfollowing itspublication inElPeruano .
Done atGovernment House, Lima, onthetwenty eighth dayofthemonth ofApril oftheyear
onethousand ninehundred andninety seven.
ALBERTO FUJIMORI FUJIMORI
Constitutional President oftheRepublic
JORGE CAMET DICKMANN
Minister fortheEconomy andFinance
GUSTAVO CAILLAUX ZAZZALI
Minister forIndustry, Tourism, Integration and
International Trade Negotiations