RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/RL/M/17 
31 August 2004 
 (04-3608) 
Negotiating Group on Rules  
  
 
SUMMARY REPORT OF THE MEETING 
HELD ON 7 & 8 JUNE 2004 
 
Note by the Secretariat
 
 
 
1. The Negotiating Group on Rules ("the Group") held a formal meeting on 7 & 8 June 2004. 
A. ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA  
2. The Group adopted the following agenda: 
 A. ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA 
 B. ANTI-DUMPING 
 C. SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES, INCLUDING FISHERIES 
SUBSIDIES  
 D. OTHER BUSINESS 
- Statement by one Participant relating to the joint statement 
 issued by African Trade, Customs and Immigration 
 Ministers- African Union Ministerial Conference in Kigali, 
 Rwanda on 27-28 May 2004. 
-  Date of the next meeting of the Group. 
B. ANTI -DUMPING  
3. The Group discussed one new submission, entitled "Proposals on Fair Comparison"  
(TN/RL/W/158) and sponsored by 10 Participants. A co-sponsor explained that the ADA needed to be 
clarified and improved because it allowed authori ties to make unfair comparisons.  The proposal 
consisted of four elements.  The first was to clar ify that the authorities are required to adjust selling 
expenses and profits for export sales and normal value symmetrically  to ensure a comparison at the 
same level of trade. Due to ambiguities in Article 2.4 of the ADA, some authorities tended to compare export price and normal value at different levels of trade, typically by deducting some items of sales 
expenses or profits only from export sales to inflate or create dumping margins. The proposal would 
require the authorities to deduct selling expenses a nd profits symmetrically from both export price and 
normal value.  The second element was the exclusi on of certain sales from the calculation of export 
price . Although the ADA provided for the exclusion of sales not in the ordinary course of trade from 
the calculation of normal value, there was no specific provision about exclusion of these sales from 
the calculation of export price. Excluding these sales from the calculation of both export price and 
normal value was necessary to ensure an "apples to  apples" comparison.  The third element was the 
abolition of the last two methodologies in Article 2.4.2 of the ADA,  i.e., the transaction to transaction TN/RL/M/17 
Page 2  
 
 average to transaction methodologies, in all AD  proceedings. The transaction to transaction 
methodology had the risk that the authorities abuse their broad discretion to choose individual home 
market transactions that are to be compared to  individual export sales. The average to transaction 
methodology had become an excuse for practicing zeroing, which breached the obligation of fair 
comparison under Article 2.4 of the ADA.  The fourth element related to model matching
. The ADA 
did not provide any guidance for id entifying identical or most closely resembling models to be 
compared with the models of exported products. Th e proposal would  require authorities to use all 
characteristics that had a significant effect on the commercial value of the model and to provide respondents with an adequate opportunity  to propose these characteristics.  
4. A number of co-sponsors supported this propo sal.  One co-sponsor indicated that the 
symmetry and averaging issues were especially impor tant, while another indicated that averaging was 
its main concern.  Several co-sponsors noted that the averaging issue was related to the proposal on 
zeroing.  It was observed that this submission co mpleted the first round of comprehensive proposals 
on Article 2 of the ADA by the Friends of AD Negotiations.       
5. Regarding level of trade/symmetrical adjustments
, some Participants agreed on the need to 
clarify and improve the ADA.  However, one Partic ipant warned against robotic symmetry.  As export 
and home market sales were not symmetrical, some di scretion had to given to the administrators to 
deal with the complex facts and differences in expenses which necessarily arose in comparing 
business transactions in two different markets.  Furt her, while the ultimate responsibility for ensuring 
that AD calculations were in accordan ce with the rules rested with the administering authority, a party 
asserting that an adjustment was necessary, if in possession of facts necessary to establish the truth of 
that assertion, had a responsibility to produce those f acts.  The last sentence of Article 2.4 recognized 
this balance.  Several other Participants shared these views.  Regarding clarification of the first 
sentence of Article 2.4 by incorporating the clause  "with symmetrical adjustments", one Participant 
believed that this could lead to arbitrary allowances.  Another Part icipant supported the objective of 
ensuring that level of trade adjustments be made, wh enever applicable, but needed to further reflect on 
the proposal as it raised significant issues.  Finally, one Participant noted that there were two distinct 
elements: establishing the export price, and making necessary adjustments to that price.  The fourth sentence of Article 2.4 already spoke  to the situation where the constr ucted export price was not at the 
same level of trade as the normal value.            
6. Regarding the exclusion of sales not in the or dinary course of trade from the calculation of 
export price , several Participants agreed that there was need for clarification.  However, another 
Participant observed that the proponents had ignored  a fundamental difference between home market 
and export sales in the dumping analysis. In its vi ew, the ADA provided sufficient flexibility to deal 
with extreme situations. For example, a free sample of merchandise to a potential customer would not fall within the meaning of the word "sale". On th e other hand, experience proved that exporters could 
manipulate the dumping calculation by arbitrarily designating a large number of low-priced sales as 
samples.  Another Participant considered that th e objective of an AD investigation was to determine 
whether export sales were dumped and causing injury.  Restricting the investigation to export sales in 
the ordinary course of trade would unduly narrow th e scope of the investigation.  Regarding non-
commercial sales, one Participant agreed that samp les sent to a potential buyer should not be regarded 
as an export sale.  However, it inquired about the concept of  sales to employees and requested more 
explanation. Regarding so-called "barter trade", this  situation was sometimes faced inside markets in 
transition, but it hadn’t encountered a barter trade export transaction so far and there might not be an 
urgent need to regulate this issue. 
7. Regarding comparison methodologies
, one Participant noted that the idea of targeted dumping 
lacked any basis and that its law therefore onl y provided for average to average comparisons.  
Another Participant noted that the average to average methodology was often the fairest, but that the 
idea of eliminating the other two methodologies requir ed further discussion; this Participant favoured  TN/RL/M/17 
 Page 3 
 
 
 maintaining the alternative methodologies while devel oping parameters for their use.  Another noted 
that, where export prices differed significantly with respect to purchaser or region, an individual to 
average methodology was appropriate. An average to average comparison might not always give fair results, especially when the exporter had dumped at cer tain points of time or in certain regions, or had 
significantly lowered prices and caused injury.  As  for the transaction to transaction methodology, it 
was rarely used but was appropriate in some cas es. Thus all three methodologies in Article 2.4.2 
should be available.  Another Participant noted th at it used the transaction to transaction methodology 
in 90% of its cases. The proposal to abolish this  methodology was impractical, especially for small 
economies and new users. The fairness of its use of  this methodology had never been challenged, and 
most exporters liked it.  Rules on how to use this methodology might however be an option.  It noted 
that the average to average methodology could r esult in non-dumped goods facing a margin.  Serious 
research should be done before suggesting a bla nket ban on a methodology negotiated in the Uruguay 
Round.  One Participant supported the proposal to ban zeroing, but opposed eliminating the alternative comparison methodologies.  Another Par ticipant was not sure that zeroing was prohibited 
under the individual to individual methodology.  It noted that the individual to average methodology 
was an exception to the average to  average methodology.  If zeroing were prohibited in the context of 
the individual to average (targeted dumping) met hodology, then that methodology would generate the 
same result as the average to average methodolog y, and the exception would thereby be rendered 
useless.  Thus, it seemed that the proposal to elim inate the two alternative methodologies was another 
way to try to eliminate zeroing, with the users of the individual to individual comparison methodology 
caught in the middle.  As regards time-periods, one Participant considered  it necessary to establish 
guidelines to be used in determining the period of  data collection in cases of cyclical markets 
involving seasonal or agricultural products.  It requ ested Participants who had faced cyclical market 
cases in carrying out investigations to share thei r experiences, views and approaches with the Group.                            
8. Regarding model matching
, one Participant agreed that the authorities should use all 
characteristics that significantly effect commercia l value or end-use of the product, including 
technical specifications.  However, model-matching should be based on international standards rather 
than on product coding used by respondents or standards used in the country of export.  Another Participant agreed with the sponsors on model matchi ng, but was sceptical that it would be possible to 
develop an objective definition of the phrase "clo sely resembling". It noted that model matching had 
to be resolved early in the investigation in orde r to avoid going back to e xporters with supplemental 
questionnaires for information.  Another Participan t noted that model-matching was often the best 
way to ensure that physical char acteristics that affect price are ta ken into account and thus a clear 
procedure in the Agreement would be welcome.  It agreed that when home market and export models 
were not identical, model-matching had to be supp lemented by appropriate adjustments, but inquired 
about the rationale for proposing that adjustments be based on variable costs only.  The ADA focused 
on price comparability, and there could be cases of  differences in production costs which had no 
effect on price comparability or where differences in production costs had no effect on price 
comparability.  Another Participant pointed out that not every difference in physical characteristics 
resulted in a difference in costs; due allowanc e should be made for differences in physical 
characteristics that led to differences in costs.  Fu rthermore, it would be usef ul to provide respondents 
an opportunity to express their views on allowances in such cases, and to comment on model-matching since the respondents were the expe rts in the model they produce and export. 
9. A co-sponsor responded that the sponsor's inten tion was to avoid artificial creation of anti-
dumping margins and ensure predictability in anti- dumping investigations through the introduction of 
symmetrical comparison at the same level of trade.  It submitted that comparison based on normal business practices is the best option.  As regards model-matching, it hoped to continue to work with 
other Members in this regard. TN/RL/M/17 
Page 4  
 
 C. 
SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES , INCLUDING FISHERIES SUBSIDIES  
10. Three papers were discussed under the agenda sub-item of "Fisheries Subsidies". The first 
was entitled "Fisheries Subsidies: Proposed Structure of the Discussion"  (TN/RL/W/159). Its 
sponsor explained that the paper suggested a frame work for negotiations as an  alternative to that 
proposed by another Participant in TN/RL/W/154 wh ere a blanket prohibition of subsidies had been 
proposed, with the use of a negative list for excep tions. Such a proposal was not the best way to 
proceed, especially as the Group had not yet discussed th e role and impact of fisheries subsidies to 
decide the appropriate level of regulation needed. Th e sponsor considered that an alternative "bottom-
up" approach was desirable to reach  consensus in the Group.  The ba lance of the elements shown in 
the Doha Declaration, in particular the element of sustainable development, should be taken into 
account.  Also, because the definition of fisheries su bsidies had yet to be established, it was unclear 
which subsidies would be subject to the proposed  broad ban. Finally, the sponsor had provided 
information on fisheries subsidies it grants as well as its  current status of fisheries as an annex to the 
paper.  Many participants argued th at eliminating subsidies could lead  to better resource conservation, 
so it had decided to provide actual data indicating th at the existence of such subsidies does not result 
in an increase of fishing capacity or fishing pr oduction.  The appendix was purely for reference 
purposes; other Participants were urged to provide similar information.  
11. The proponent of  TN/RL/W/154 noted that the sponsor of TN/RL/W/159 took issue with its 
approach on the basis of two arguments: that there wa s no agreed definition of fisheries subsidies, and 
that the proposal lacked balance.  On the definitional issue, there was a definition of a subsidy in 
Article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and C ountervailing Measures (ASCM) and it saw no reason 
why it shouldn’t use that as the basis for discu ssion, although it might prove necessary to define 
subsidies that benefit the fisheries sector.  There was experience in the WTO on this, such as Annex I 
of the Agreement on Agriculture, which defined certain economic activities on the basis of the 
harmonized system.  On the second issue, it comme nded the sponsor for identifying two types of 
subsidies, those relating to overcapacity and IUU fishi ng, that should be  prohibited.  It observed that 
overall balance could be found through the discussi on of exceptions and transitional arrangements, 
including special and differential provisions for deve loping countries; subsidies that played a crucial 
role for sustainable development should not be pr ohibited.  Nevertheless, it had serious concerns 
about focusing on capacity as a starting point as this would exclude from the outset a number of subsidies that unquestionably enhance fishing effort.  For example, subsidies for operating costs were 
described at a UNEP meeting as among the most harmful. Other effort-enhancing subsidies that 
would seem to be excluded under the sponsor's proposal included price support subsidies and 
subsidies to infrastructure, to income, and for access to  foreign fisheries.  Indeed, the appendix to the 
sponsor's submission provided a graphic illustration w hy an approach that used as its starting point 
capacity only was unlikely to provide an effective outcome.  As per that annex, over 96% of the 
sponsor's $2 billion worth of annual subsidies would not be prohibited 
12. One participant believed that subsidies that ha d a cost or revenue impact were problematic 
because they distorted trade and led to increased capac ity that was not economically viable.  It shared 
the view of the sponsor that some governmental activities, including in management, were necessary and should not be considered subsidies to the sector .  The aim should be to prohibit subsidies that 
distorted trade, as rules on capacity per se  were not within the mandate.  If trade-distorting subsidies 
were prohibited, then the incentive for the fisheries sector to invest in overcapacity would no longer 
exist. 
13. Another Participant believed that regardless of  the precise structure of the disciplines, the 
issues of defining which kinds of measures were subsidies and whether they should be permitted or 
banned would be central.  It agreed that it would be useful to study the effects of different forms of 
subsidies, taking into consideration work done in other organizations such as the OECD and the FAO, 
including work done on identification and categor ization, and referred to the ideas presented in  TN/RL/M/17 
 Page 5 
 
 
 document TN/RL/W/78 regarding categorization.  Another Participant inquired about the scope, 
nature and extent of the proposed co-operati on with other international organizations.  
14.  One Participant supported the recognition that a broad prohibition would ha ve to be balanced 
by exceptions and transitional provisions, includi ng S&D provisions.  In small economies, subsidies 
to reduce costs did not for the most part resu lt in over-fishing and overcapacity.  Rather these 
programmes sought to broaden the market and ensure  a degree of independence and food security for 
the economy.  It was important to look at the intent and impact of a programme rather than simply its 
characteristics.  The need to minimize circumventi on had to be balanced with a need to facilitate 
policy flexibility for developing countries.  Another Participant considered that for many developing 
countries rural development and food security needs were paramount in considering issues in the 
fisheries sector, while attention should also be given to the development of the fishing sector itself.  In 
many developing countries this sector had yet to  develop and overcapacity and over-fishing did not 
come into the picture.     
15. One Participant requested further clarification regards the sponsor's re ference in paragraph 8 
to subsidies that were "problematic" in terms of overcapacity and IUU fishing.  It was concerned 
about the failure to mention the trade distorting effe cts of fisheries subsidies.  Regarding the question 
of how to define different types of subsidies, such  as those for infrastructure, construction and general 
services, the ASCM contained a definition which could form the basis of work.  Another Participant shared the concern about infrastructure subsid ies, which could contribute to over-capacity.  
16. One Participant welcomed the recognition that there should be a red category for subsidies 
that gave rise to overcapacity, but considered th at the prohibited category should not be limited to 
such subsidies. This Participant considered that  WTO disciplines on harmful fisheries needed to be 
both strong and simple to be applied and enforced.   
17. A Participant referred to the WSSD implemen tation plan, and noted that the nature of 
discussions under WSSD was different from the mandate  of the Group.  While the WSSD for instance 
might properly focus on subsidies that contribute to  illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and 
overcapacity, the focus of this Group should be on trade-distorting subsidies 
18. Another Participant reiterated the importance of  identifying which types of subsidies had a 
negative impact on resources before establishing new rul es. It was ready to agree to the elimination of 
subsidies which contribute to IUU fishing.  Also , given that overcapacity was one of the most 
important factors that contribute to the depletio n of fisheries resources, stringent regulations on 
subsidies responsible for overcapacity would  he lp limit over-fishing.  It strongly supported the 
creation of fisheries-specific green light subsidies wh ich would contribute to sustainable fisheries.  It 
believed that any trade effects of subsidies shoul d be disciplined by the existing ASCM, and that 
fisheries should not be treated differently from other manufactured goods. 
19. A Participant believed in the importance of  a voiding the use or misuse of subsidies that 
contribute to illegal, unreported or unregulated fishing and overcapacity. It proposed that the 
discussions be directed to all elements of fisheries s ubsidies in an effort to further improve and clarify 
the ASCM.  It saw merit in determining the sco pe of the discussion rather than in discussing 
substantive elements sporadically.  It consider ed the bottom-up approach as the first alternative 
approach.  As the ASCM had its own subsidies cat egorizations, it proposed that subsidies given to 
fisheries can be identified or specified based on categorization methods to specify all subsidies provided for the fisheries sector.  With respect to S&D, it suggested that the sponsor did not touch 
upon the interest of various developing countri es both as exporting and non-exporting countries.   
20.
 One Participant considered that overcapacity  and over-fishing were a matter of resource 
management and there was not necessarily a causal link between fisheries subsidies and overcapacity TN/RL/M/17 
Page 6  
 
 and over-fishing through so-called cost/revenue impa ct analysis. In order to accomplish the common 
goal of sustainable fisheries through proper res ource management and prevention of overcapacity and 
over-fishing and IUU activities, it supported discussing fi sheries subsidies disciplines in this regard.  
However, it urged the Group to undertake a bottom- up approach through which Participants could 
identify which categories of subsidies would lead to overcapacity and over-fishing or promote IUU 
activities and thus be prohibited.  At the same time , subsidies that were not trade distorting could be 
recognized as non-actionable. The definition of fisher ies subsidies should be consistent with Articles 
1 and 2 of the ASCM.  While the scope of fisherie s subsidies negotiated shou ld be limited to those 
related to fisheries resource management, it was imperative to target the trade-distorting aspect of all subsidies and strengthen the rules and disciplines of  the ASCM across all the non-agricultural sectors; 
there was no merit in establishing a separate set of disciplines for fisheries subsidies.  In accordance 
with Article 1 of the ASCM, the provision of goods  and services for general infrastructure should not 
be considered subsidies. 
21. The sponsor explained that it had not provided a concrete proposal on which subsidies should 
be classified as green or red, but had rather propo sed a direction for the discussion. As regards trade 
distortion, this issue was not unique to fisheri es and could be considered within a comprehensive 
horizontal review of the ASCM.  As regards infrast ructure, its fisheries management authority and 
fisheries port construction department were within  the same government agency so it was easy to 
comprehend the activities of the infrastructure funding of the government. It believed that  the IUU and the overcapacity issue were a good starting point  for discussion.  As regards the definition of 
subsidy, the ASCM did not provide clarity on fish eries subsidies relating to fisheries activities per se  
and there were several grey areas in this respect.   
22. The second paper discussed was entitled " Questions and Comments from Korea on New 
Zealand's Communication on Fisheries Subsidies  (TN/RL/W/154)" - (TN/RL/W/160).  The 
sponsor explained that the paper is composed of tw o parts.  The first part contained questions on the 
proposals in document TN/RL/W/154. First, was th ere any causal link between the cost/revenue 
impacts of subsidies and overcapacity or over-fishing?  It had analysed various types of subsidies to 
identify a possible correlation between the cost/rev enue impact and overcap acity/fishing and, as 
shown on page 2 of its paper, only a few of th e subsidies showed a possible causal link with 
overcapacity or over-fishing.  It was thus risky to  assume causality between co st/revenue impacts and 
overcapacity or over-fishing.  Empirical evidence al so supported this view.  In 1997, 77 per cent of 
fisheries subsidies in OECD countries were spent on  infrastructure and on general services, such as 
research, management and enforcement that were essen tial for sustainable fisheries.  Accordingly, it 
would be problematic to use a cost/revenue test as a b asic test for the resource impact of subsidies.  It 
requested the sponsor of TN/RL/W/154 to further ex plain the alleged causality between cost/revenue 
impacts and overcapacity/over-fishing.  
23. The next set of questions related to the scope of subsidies subject to the new rules.  Would 
subsidies that had cost/revenue impacts but were provided to under-exploited fisheries be prohibited 
on the basis of the cost/revenue test? Would subsidi es for fishing households with low income levels 
and for small-scale fisheries also be prohibited just  because they had cost/revenue impacts?   How 
would subsidies for aquaculture a nd processing industries, which did not affect overcapacity or over-
fishing but could cause trade distortions, be treated?  It also inquired about the relationship between “cost/revenue impacts” test and the benefit test of the ASCM.  All subsidies under the ASCM had a 
direct or indirect cost/revenue impact on the recipients and therefore it was difficult to discern any 
difference between the proposed cost/revenue impacts test and the benefit test of the ASCM.  Thus, 
the proposal of TN/RL/W/154 could be presumed to prohibit fisheries subsidies without any test on questions such as overcapacity or over-fishing.  The Participant believed that new disciplines on 
fisheries subsidies should be based on the harmful impact on fisheries resources.  Large differences 
existed among the world’s fisheries, compared with the manufacturing sectors.  Small-scale 
subsistence fisheries coexisted side by side w ith large-scale commercial fi sheries, and traditional  TN/RL/M/17 
 Page 7 
 
 
 coastal fisheries with modernized distant water fish eries.  These were different types of fishing and 
the circumstances surrounding them should be reflected in the negotiations.  It also believed that particular consideration should be given to  the special needs of developing Members. 
24. In reaction, the sponsor of TN/RL/W/154 noted a general acceptance of the need for specific 
disciplines on fisheries subsidies; this was welcome progress. The sponsor of TN/RL/W/160 had 
suggested focusing on the harmful impact on fisheries resources, taking account of resource 
management regimes and le vels of fish stocks. A guiding principle used in developing the proposals 
contained in TN/RL/W/154 was the importance of ensuring that it didn't stray beyond traditional areas of WTO competence.  The arguments in TN/RL/ W160 suggested that the Membership should seek 
judgements from panels and the Appellate Body as to whether pa rticular subsidies had harmful 
impacts and in so doing consider such aspects as th e adequacy of management plans and the level of 
fish stock depletion.  There was a question as to whether the WTO was the appropriate body to make 
these judgements, and that was why the proposals contained in TN/RL/W/154 looked at readily quantifiable economic indicators, such as costs a nd revenues, in defining the new disciplines.  
Another related point was that focusing exclusivel y on harmful effects on fisheries resources ignored 
the trade and market-distorting effects of subsidies.   
25. Turning to the specific questions posed, this  Participant noted that the sponsor of 
TN/RL/W/160 had provided an analysis of what it considered to be the correlation between 
costs/revenues and overcapacity and over-fishing.  This Participant questioned the conclusion that 
some of these subsidies would not contribute to  overcapacity and over-fishing.  For example, 
subsidies for compensation for temporary cessation commonly were provided to compensate for the 
temporary withdrawal of a vessel from active fishing for a given period of time due to stock depletion, 
and thus had direct implica tions for capacity and fishing.  It doub ted that other categories of subsidies, 
such as for fisheries infrastructur e, could not result in overcapacity and over-fishing.  It was doubtful 
that subsidies that, according to OECD statistics, amounted to 70% of fisheries subsidies, did not 
result in a possibility of overcapacity and over-fishing.  With regard to the request for further explain 
the link between cost/revenue impacts and overcapacity  and over-fishing, it had tried to translate the 
notions of overcapacity and over-fish ing into rules that were at once enforceable in the WTO and 
effective at tackling a very real problem.  Subs idies that increase revenues and decrease costs would 
inevitably have an impact on commercial decisions. Subsidies in the sector were very large – 15-20 
billion per year on a conservative estimate which re present 20% of fisheries revenues – and all this 
took place against the backdrop of a resource in crisis. 
26. One Participant agreed that a causal relationship between cost/revenue impacts and over-
capacity and over-fishing was hard to generalize, as the effectiveness of the resource management 
regime and the level of fish stocks  had  to be taken into account.  It also agreed that new disciplines 
on fisheries subsidies should maintain a balance among trade, environment and social issues.   
27. The third and last paper introduced in this context was entitled "Fisheries Subsidies: UNEP 
Workshop of Fisheries Subsidies and Sustainable Management"  (TN/Rl7W/161). The sponsor 
noted that the paper contained a summary of the UNEP workshop held at the end of April.   
28. One Participant noted that the summary containe d some helpful elements that should be taken 
into account in the Group.  The major idea presented at the workshop was that bad subsidies need to 
be disciplined while good subsidies need to be pr otected.  Although subsidies can be harmful to fish 
stocks, their actual impact depends  on several relevant factors including the design of the subsidy, the 
degree of its impact, the management regime an d economic conditions of fish stocks.  Also, 
economic, social and environmental aspects of fish eries subsidies are inextr icably linked.  These 
factors had to be reflected in the new disciplines.  More empirical and analytical work was needed for 
effective rulemaking. TN/RL/M/17 
Page 8  
 
 29. A Participant referred to an event sponsored by the World Wildlife Fund ("WWF") and held 
on 9 June 2004 regarding a study entitled "Healthy Fi sheries, Sustainable Trade – Crafting New Rules 
on Fishing Subsidies in the WTO" released by the WWF.  The WWF analysis was full of stimulating 
ideas and should be a valuable resource for negotiators in the months ahead. 
D. 
OTHER BUSINESS  
30. One Participant informed the Group of the joint statement concerning the WTO Rules 
Negotiations that was issued by African Trade, Customs and Immigration Ministers present at the 
African Union Ministerial Conference held in Kiga li, Rwanda on 27-28 May 2004.  It reads, in its 
relevant part, as follows:  "Most African countri es have only recently implemented the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement and the Subsidies and Countervailing M easures Agreement and are only now starting to 
develop a practice in compliance with those Agreements .  As such, we stress that the introduction of 
more complex rules and disciplines at this poi nt in time would be counterproductive and would 
negatively affect the African countries'  rights under these two Agreements." 
31. The Chairman proposed that the next meeting of  the Group be held at 12-13 July 2004.  After 
discussion, the Chairman indicated that he would hold informal consultations on this issue.  
__________