RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONG/ADP/Q1/EGY/5
G/SCM/Q1/EGY/5
12 May 1999
(99-1948)
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing MeasuresOriginal:  English
NOTIFICATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS UNDER
ARTICLES 18.5 AND 32.6 OF THE AGREEMENTS
Replies to Questions Posed by the EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,1
ROMANIA2 and the UNITED STATES3 Regarding the
Notification of EGYPT4
The following communication, has been received on 6 May 1999, from the Permanent
Mission of Egypt.
_______________
Upon the Egyptian Parliament's ratification of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the
WTO, this Agreement along with all the Agreements embodied in the Legal Text, including of course
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, have been adopted in to tal as an integral part of the Egyptian domestic
law.
The Egyptian Government thus issued the law No. 161 in May 1998 concerning the national
protection of national economy from injurious effects of unfair practices in international trade, and
was shortly followed by the issuance of its executive regulation on 24 October of the same year.  Thelaw and regulation were both advised to the WTO and are enjoying primacy in accordance with the
Egyptian legal system.
Basically, the said law and its regulation set out the system and defines the authorities of the
persons and administrative bodies in Egypt who are responsible for carrying out the country'smultilateral trade responsibilities for the three trade remedies agreements "safeguards, Anti-dumping
and subsidies and countervailing measures".
The said regulation is composed of six parts, part three of which deals with anti-dumping,
which defines in its four sections (Art. 32-56):1. The dumping calculations
Where dumping, export price and normal value are clearly defined, means of evaluating the
dumping margin is clarified, and the basis upon which the Investigating Authority prepares its reportto recommend the termination of the investigation is illustrated.
                                                     
1 G/ADP/Q1/EGY/2-G/SCM/Q1/EGY/2
2 G/ADP/Q1/EGY/3-G/SCM/Q1/EGY/3
3 G/ADP/Q1/EGY/4-G/SCM/Q1/EGY/4
4 G/ADP/N/1/EGY/2-G/SCM/N/1/EGY/2 + Rev.1G/ADP/Q1/EGY/5
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2. Determination of injury:
Where the Investigating Authority tends to veri fy that the threat of injury is clear and
imminent and is caused by the dumped imports and not due to any other causes.
3. Provisional measures:
Where the form, duration of such measures is defined.
4. Definitive anti-dumping duties:
Where the regulation states clearly the task of the Investigating Authority in determining the
amount of such duties, the case where it should be imposed, its duration and the review, the said
authority should tackle for the purpose of determining individual margins of dumping.
5. Undertakings:
Where the regulation defines certain aspects that should be taken into consideration by the
Investigating Authority upon accepting, rejecting or amending undertakings.
The reasonable duration throughout which the price undertakings shall be maintained as well
as the right of the Investigating Authority to impose a provisional or definitive duty in case of an
undertaking violation.
6. Retroactivity:
Where anti-dumping duties may be levied retroactively – in the case of a final determination
of injury or of threat thereof during the period throughout which provisional measures have been
applied and the duration of this duty imposition.
7. The review of definitive and anti-dumping duties:
Where the mandate is given to the Investigating Authority to review after one year of the
definitive anti-dumping measures imposition, the need for continuing such imposition.
The regulation states in its final provisions part No. 6, 11 articles of a general nature that
applies to the three remedies agreements, such as acknowledgement of the right of the Member States
and parties concerned to have full opportunity in concluding consultations in consistency with theprovision of the Agreement  referred to, the impos ition of only one duty where anti-dumping and
subsidy investigations for the same product are involved simultaneously, the endeavour of the
Investigating Authority to give regard to the sp ecial situation of the developing countries, and
acknowledgement as well of any decision taken by the dispute settlement panels of the WTO or the
appellate body to terminate any measure taken in accordance with the provisions of this regulation,where the Minister of Trade and Supply accordingly may terminate these measures in the light of the
recommendations adopted by the DSB in this concern or give directions to the Investigating Authority
to reconsider these measures in the light of such recommendations.G/ADP/Q1/EGY/5
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General Introduction
Under Egyptian Law, the WTO Agreements on Anti-Dumping, the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures and the Safeguards Agreement have been adopted in total and are a partof domestic law in the country.  This is set out in Law No. 161/1998 and its executive regulations.
This has been advised to the WTO.  Under the Egyptian legal system, this law has primacy.
Basically the said law and its regulations set out the system and authorities of the persons and
administrative bodies in Egypt who are responsible for carrying out the country's multilateral trade
responsibilities for the three trade remedies Agreements.
These bodies still have to observe the requirements of Law 161/1998.  The replies given
below refer to the regulation issued under Ministerial Decree No. 549/1998.  It would have been
possible to repeat the exact WTO provision incorporated into Egyptian law in reply to the questions
raised by Members.
It must be remembered that this is the position in Egypt, but to help other Members, Egypt
has given substantive replies to show that regulations have been framed to carry out the obligations it
has under the WTO Agreements covered by the law and regulation.
Questions from the European Community
Article 1
Q1. Does the second sentence of the indent concerning the "independent buyer" define the
instances whereby the buyer is considered as inde pendent to the importer in an exhaustive or
indicative way?
Reply
The first sentence defines the relationship in an exhaustive manner.  The second sentence, on
which comment is requested, gives a specific description, which is included in the primary definition
of sentence 1.  The answer is that the second sentence, which is a part of the definition, could bedescribed as indicative.
Article 15
Q2. This Article lists the information to be provided by the applicant when alleging material
retardation in the establishment of a new indust ry.  Are the conditions of Article 15 an addition
to those laid down in Article 14, second paragraph, or are they the only conditions to be fulfilled
in case a material retardation of such industry is claimed?  In particular, what information
would be used to show that the dumped import s materially retarded the establishment of a
domestic industry?
Reply
The provisions of Article 15 are additional to those of Article 14.  Therefore the evidence of
dumping, subsidy are required in a written application.  Where material retardation is claimed in anapplication, then the further information in Article 15 is required.G/ADP/Q1/EGY/5
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Article 20
Q3. What "special circumstances" (Article 5(6) of the WTO Anti-Dumping Code) are
necessary before the Investigating Author ity can self-initiate an investigation?
Reply
The clause gave authority to the Minister to initiate where unusual circumstances warrant it.
The WTO Agreement does not set out details of these circumstances.
As there is no definitive list of the term special circumstances, this would be treated on a
case-by case basis.  However, we would note that Egypt believes that the use of this provision could
be very rare and believes that the majority of cases would be initiated on a basis of properly
documented applications meeting the requirement of Article 13 in the Egyptian Regulation.
Article 21
Q4. "The Investigation Authority shall notify  the governments of the countries concerned
with the applications already accepted before proc eeding to initiate an investigation".  In this
context, how does Egypt ensure compliance with the rules set out in Article 5(5) of the WTO
Anti-Dumping Code?  Furthermore, what obligations/precautions exist to prevent anypublicizing of the application to any other party before a decision is taken to initiate an
investigation?
Reply
The notification to the governments on acceptance includes advice that the acceptance is
confidential.  The government is asked to observe this requirement.
Article 34
Q5. To what extent must domestic sales be made at a loss before a constructed normal value
can be used?
Reply
The extent of domestic sales made at a loss would be decided in terms of Article 2.2.1 of the
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement including footnote 5.  The relevant provision is Article 94.
Article 42
Q6. Will applications alleging material retardation in the establishment of a new industry
lead  to an actual investigation, or simply an  evaluation of the contents of the application?
Reply
The application alleging material retardation will be evaluated to see if it meets the
requirements for the application.  If accepted it will then be examined to see if the evidence in the
application is sufficient to justify initiation of an investigation.  No report can be prepared until an
application is accepted and registered (see Articles 16 and 17).G/ADP/Q1/EGY/5
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Article 47
Q7. Will newcomer reviews be carried out on an accelerated basis?
Reply
Yes.  The newcomers' review shall be carried out on an accelerated basis.
Hence the phrase "the authority should promptly carry out a review for the purpose of
determining individual margin of dumping for each …" is used in this Article.
Article 49/56
Q8. "Price undertakings shall be maintained for a reasonable period of time".  What is
meant by "a reasonable period of time"?  Wi ll Egypt ensure compliance with Article 11(5) of
the WTO Anti-Dumping Code, i.e. that undertakings should also be subject to sunset reviews?
Reply
In compliance with WTO A-D Agreement Article  11(5) and sunset reviews, the Egyptian
procedures on review set out that a review must be carried out within 5 years (Article 56).  This
procedure meets the requirements in the code.  It is not clear that undertakings are included because
the translation is not clear.
Thus the phrase "the date of imposition of definitive measures …" replaces the phrase "the
date of imposition of definitive duties …".
Egypt notes this point for clarification, so that beyond all doubt, duties and undertakings are
covered by the review provisions.
Article 51
Q9. How does the unconditional inclusion of a threat of material injury as justification for
retroactive application of measures accord with  Article 10(2) of the WTO Anti-Dumping Code?
Reply
Article 51 is not obligatory, but discretionary.  It states "Anti-dumping duties may be levied
…".
Article 53 sets out the obligatory requirements on determination of threat of injury.  If no
injury has occurred, retroactive measures cannot be imposed.  In its entirety, Section 6 meets the
requirements of Article 10(2) of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Questions from Romania
Definition – general question.  In Egyptian Law No. 161 and in IR, Article 1 which states
that "Injurious Practices" means, among other factors, the "unjustifiable increase of imports
which causes serious injury to the domestic industry …".
Q1. What is the meaning of the term "unjustifiable"?  How does this comply with
determination of injury under the WTO Agreements?G/ADP/Q1/EGY/5
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Reply
The Romanian question refers to the definition of "injurious practices" in Article 1 of the
Regulation.  This definition covers the requirements of dumping or subsidization and also the
requirements of the Safeguards Agreement.  The increases in the imports are unjustifiable if they meet
the requirements of Article 2 of the Safeguards Agreement.  That is, the product has to be imported
"… in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry …".  This
requirement is in the Egyptian Law.  To be "unjustifiable" the imports would have to meet these
criteria.  This complies with the requirements of the Agreement on Safeguards.
Application requirements.  The Egyptian IR is silent on the information needed to be
contained in an application.  Articles 13 and 14 indicate only the requirement of "written
application" which shall include the "evidence", the "injury" and the "causal link" between
each.
Q2. Has Egypt promulgated another regul ation determining the "form" of the
application for initiation of an A-D inve stigation?  If yes, could Egypt provide
this regulation?  If not, how will Egypt ensure that the application complies with
the requirements of Article 5.2 of the A-D Agreement?
Reply
The detailed information required in an application from an industry is set out in the
Regulation Articles 13 and 14.  The form includes the required information.
Volume of imports.  In examining the impo rts that are either dumped or subsidized,
Article 1 of the Egyptian IR states that injuri ous practice will be considered under "the increase
of imports as a result of dumping …" and Article 39 requires the "existence of significant
increase in dumped imports".
Q3. Do the Egyptian authorit ies consider that these pr ovisions are in accordance
with Article 3.2 of the A-D Agreement, which requires the examination of the
volume of dumped imports?
Reply
Yes, the wording in the Regulation is in accordance with Article 3.2 of the A-D Agreement.
The reference in Article 1 is a definition of words used in the Regulation.  It covers the increased
volume caused by dumping as a part of the definition of "injurious practices".  Article 39 of the
Regulation refers to the evidence required to determ ine material injury.  This includes "… Existence
of a significant increase in dumped imports …".  This wording which states how the injury is to beanalysed, exactly reproduces the requirements of the WTO requirement in the A-D Agreement in
Article 3.2.  If it is determined that the dumping caused injury, then it is defined as an "injurious
practice".
Determination of injury.  Upon provisions of Article 41, the Investigating Authority
shall verify that the injury suffered by the i ndustry is caused by the dumped imports and not
due to "any other factors".G/ADP/Q1/EGY/5
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Q4. What are the "other factors" to be taken into consideration when determining
the source of the injury?
Reply
Regulation Article 41 requires the Authority to examine whether the injury is from any other
cause as required under Article 3.5 of the A-D Agreement.  Examples of other causes are listed in
Article 3.5, and include, inter alia , the volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices,
contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and
competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in technology and the export
performance and productivity of the domestic industry.  These are examples of other factors whichEgypt would take into consideration, as appropriate.
Article 22(2) states that the notice of the in itiation of an investigation published by the
Investigating Authority shall also include "a description of the product in question".  This is the
single reference, in the entire Egyptian IR , on the description of the product under
investigation.
Q5. Do the Egyptian authoritie s consider that only the description of the product is
according to the provisions of Article 2.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement?  If
yes, please explain, in the framewor k of the above-mentioned WTO Agreement,
at what level of description will the Egyp tian authority interpret "like product".
Reply
The reference to the description of the product in the Regulation in Article 22 refers to the
information required in the public notice of initiation.  The question of "like product" is covered in
Article 94 of the Regulation.  This is in accordance with Article 2.6 of the A-D Agreement.
Also, Article 38 states the cases in which the Investigating Authority shall prepare a
report to recommend the termination of the inve stigation.  Under Article 5.8 of the A-D
Agreement, an application shall be rejected  and an investigation  shall be terminated promptly
when there is not sufficient evidence of either dumping or injury … .
Q6. Is Article 38 of the Egyptian IR refe rring only to those special circumstances
when an investigation is initiated without receiving a written application?  If not,
please explain where is the consistency of Article 38 with the provisions of the A-
D Agreement?
Reply
No, the provisions of Article 38 cover both case s of self-initiation and receipt of a written
application.  It does not refer to the circumstances where an  investigation is initiated withoutreceiving a written application.  Article 38 defines the procedure followed by Egypt where any
termination is made once an  investigation is commenced.  A report has to be sent to the Advisory
Committee for this to be carried out lawfully.  This only applies to cases where an investigation has
commenced.  The requirement to reject an application where there is not sufficient evidence of either
dumping or injury is addressed in Articles 14 and 17 of the Regulation.  The same requirementapplies, should an investigation be considered without formal application being received.  These two
matters are addressed separately in the Regulation, and meet the WTO A-D Agreement requirements.G/ADP/Q1/EGY/5
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Confidential information.  In Article 8 of the Egyptian IR it is mentioned that the non-
confidential summaries shall be in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the
substance of the information submitted in confidence.
Q7. What are, in the view of the Egyptian  authorities, the limits of a reasonable
understanding?  Could, for example, a request for confidentiality of production,
consumption or stocks, be accepted as such by Egypt.
Reply
All information that is not confidential is available to the parties and they are advised of this,
during the investigation, in the essential facts report and in the final report.  A reasonable
understanding is possible without access to the confidential data.  Egypt, as with most authorities,
indicates to the parties by giving trends and an idea of the scale and the effects in respect to dumping
or subsidy and to material injury.
The answer to the question on access to confidential information is decided in Egypt's view
on the provisions of Article 6.5 of the A-D Agreement.  If the information cannot be released under
the detailed provisions of Article 6.5, then Egypt will release it.  If it cannot, the information will not
be released.  (See A-D Agreement Article 6.5 last sentence).  The release of information of
production, consumption and stocks will be decided on this basis.
Q8. How do the Egyptian authorities ve rify the accuracy of the information
presented by all parties involved?
Reply
The information is verified by on-the-spot investigations or from other appropriate sources
such as official statistics, customs information, etc., which is available.  All information obtained
during an investigation is available for use by the Authority and it can come from many sources.
Article 9 of the Egyptian IR requires, for all persons and bodies, "the protection of
confidentiality of information and data in ca ses where it is necessary for the purpose of
investigation or appeal, to have access to such information".  Meanwhile:
- Article 29 states that "subject to the requirement to protect confidential
information" the Investigating Authority "shall make available all information
and data,  relevant to the investigation, to all parties concerned " and "shall
disclose the confidential information to  the court or the expert it appoints " with
the "written permission" from the submitting party;
- According to Article 23, the representatives of the exporting country will get
only a copy of the non-confidential version of the application;
- Article 6 of Law 161 prohibits the disclosure of confidential data and
information without an explicit written permission of the submitting party and
Article 7 states penalties for violating the prohibition, "without prejudice to
more stringent penalties prescribed by law".
Q9. Under what circumstances does Egypt consider that it would be "necessary to
have access to such information"?G/ADP/Q1/EGY/5
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Reply
Regulation Article 9 to which Romania refers, sets out the limits of the powers of the courts
and other parties to obtain confidential information provided by parties under the WTO Agreements.The plaintiff may seek confidential information but the Egyptian Investigating Authority must protect
confidential information provided to it.  However a party may give permission for its own confidential
information to be disclosed to the court or other parties.
This is in accordance with the WTO provisions on the preservation of confidential
information.  In no circumstances can confidential information be given without the parties' approval.
As a general comment on access to information:  all information that is not confidential is
available to the parties and they are advised of this  during the investigation in the essential fact report
and in the final report.  A reasonable understanding is possible without access to the confidential data.
Egypt, as with most authorities, indicates to the parties the effects in respect to dumping or subsidy
and to material injury.  This is done by advising of trends and indicating the scale or significance ofthe data involved.  It is based on precise figures but  only indications can be given publicly in many
circumstances.  The protection of confidential information cuts both ways.  Is Romania advocating
that confidential information of the costs of its industry should be made available on demand to other
parties?
Q10. Could Egypt please explain what information and data are relevant to the
investigation?  Are these assimilated wi th the non-confidential version of the
application?  If yes, is the Egyptian IR a tool for the Egyptian authorities to have
a national protective system?  If not, please explain, under the Egyptian IR
provisions, what are the details of the non-confidential version permitting a
reasonable understanding of the info rmation submitted in confidence?
Reply
The information relevant to the investigation is contained in the application, the questionnaire
and the response to it, the verification process and the results of that and the correspondence and
meetings held with the parties.  In short, all th e information held on the file is used.  From this
information the essential facts and conclusions are written in the final report, both of which are
circulated to parties.
The question concerning the Egyptian Regulation as a national protective measure is only
reasonable if Romania is claiming that the WTO Agreements are protective measures.  Egypt iscarrying out the terms of these Agreements.  The question can be addressed to all members of the
WTO which exercise the rights they have under these Agreements in a proper and responsible
manner, observing the rules set out within.
On the question regarding the details of the non-confidential version permitting a reasonable
understanding of the information, the WTO requirement in Article 6.5.2 clearly states that the
responsibility to provide this lies upon the interested parties, not upon the Authority.  This provision
gives the Authority the discretion to disregard the information if this is not done.  There may be some
misunderstanding.  It is not incumbent on the Egyptian Authority to provide this information, as it is
for the interested parties to do so.
Please also note the reply to Q9 above.G/ADP/Q1/EGY/5
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According to the WTO Agreement on A-D:  any information which is by nature confidential
because its disclosure would be a significant competitive advantage,  or because its disclosure would
have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the information, or upon a person from
whom that information is acquired, should be submitted in a non-confidential version encompassingthe same confidential data after eliminating the real figures, which would be replaced by a  percentage
or by mathematical signs permitting in turn the reasonable understanding of the substance of the
information submitted in confidence.
Q11. What are the more stringent prejudices prescribed by Law 161?
Reply
The question is not understood.  If Romania can clarify the question in writing it may be
possible to answer it.
Selection of Normal Value (NV).  Article 34 of Egyptian IR specifies that the NV shall be
constructed according to the "cost of production in the country of origin plus an appropriate
amount for selling, general and administrative costs and a reasonable margin of profit" and
when the NV cannot thus be determ ined, it "shall be constructed according to the export price
of the goods to a third country" in case "the domestic sales of subject goods account for less
than 5 per cent of the export sales to Egypt".
Q12. Do the Egyptian authorities consid er that the WTO Agreement's emphasis on
"sufficient magnitude" of sales less than 5 per cent of the volume of the domestic
sales will provide always a proper comparison?
Reply
The application of footnote 2 to Article 2.2 of the A-D Agreement will vary according to the
circumstances.  The choice of sales of less than 5 per cent will be acceptable to Egypt where the
evidence demonstrates that the domestic sales at a lower ratio are nevertheless of sufficient magnitude
to provide for a proper comparison between exports and domestic sales.
Facts available.  The stipulations of Arti cle 24 of the Egyptian IR allows the
Investigating Authority "to limit the investigation to a representative sample of parties or types
of products involved" if the numbers of exporters  is too large.  Article 37 states that "the
highest dumping margin shall be applied to the unknown or non-cooperative exporters".
Q13. Do the Egyptian authorities intend to se lect the representative sample according
to the provisions of Article 6.10.1 of the same WTO Agreement, in which it is
mentioned that, when choosing exporters, producers or importers concerned, it
is preferable to make consultation with th em and to have their consent?  If these
provisions are not going to be followed, on what other basis is the authoritygoing to select the sample?
Reply
Egypt believes that it is preferable for any selection of a representative sample to be made in
consultation with the importers and producers and exporters.  However, the selection must be
statistically valid or cover the largest volume of imports, so this may affect the selection of the sample
and limit the ability of the selection to be in accordance with the wishes of importers, exporters and
producers.  In this case a representative sample would be chosen.  Articles 6.10 and 6.10.1 of the A-DG/ADP/Q1/EGY/5
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Agreement address this issue.  If the information is limited because of non-cooperation the best
information available will be used.
Q14. How does Egypt intend to respond if it finds that a party has only partially
cooperated?
Reply
If a party has only partially responded to questions, then the information received would be
considered under the provisions of Annex II of the Dumping Agreement.  Egypt will not allow a part
response or non-response to impede the investigation, but is willing to consider any reasonablerequest for additional time for a response to a request for information where this is warranted by the
difficulties of producing information or responding in time.
Provisional measures
Q15. Are the conditions from Article 44 the only requirements for applying the
provisional measures by Egypt?  If not, is Egypt going to complete the regulation
in respect of Article 7.1 of the A-D Agreement?
Reply
No.  This is also covered in Regulation No. 549 Articles 66, 82, 83, 53 and 94.  Egypt is not
considering any further regulation as Article 7.1 of the Agreement is already properly covered.
Administrative process.  In outlining Egyp tian A-D methodology, IR refers variously to
the export appointed, list of experts, Investigating Authority, Advisory Committee,
Administrative Court, Minister of Trade and Supply.  For example, Article 3 of the IR suggests
that the "Advisory Committee" will consider  the results concluded by the "Investigating
Authority" and also can make recommendations to the Minister of Trade and Supply for the
extension of the investigating pe riod (Article 11 of the IR).
Article 30 stipulates that the investigation shall be terminated "if the Investigating
Authority finds insufficient ev idence …" while Article 38 st ates that the "Investigating
Authority shall prepare a report to recommen d the termination of the investigation …".
According to Article 87, the Minister of Trade and Supply may impose additional duties
or any other restrictions on imports, in accordance with WTO rules.
Regarding the provisions of Article 95, it appears that the Egypti an IR gives to the
Administrative Court jurisdiction over A-D matters.
Q16. How is the responsibility for administra ting the Egyptian IR divided between the
above-mentioned entities?  Which of these entities has actual responsibility for
rendering final determination in an A-D investigation?
Reply
According to the Egyptian system the Investigat ing Authority is responsible for implementing
the provisions of Law 161/1998 and carry out the investigations.  Regulation Article 2 refers to this.
Under the Regulation, where a decision has to be made, for example when an application is rejected,
initiated or terminated, or undertakings accepted or provisional or final measures are imposed, theG/ADP/Q1/EGY/5
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Minister of Trade and Supply is empowered to ta ke such decisions on the recommendation of the
Advisory Committee.  Regulation Articles 10 and 11 refer to that.  The Investigating Authority reports
to the Advisory Committee, which in turn reports to the Minister (Article 3 refers).
Reviews may be carried out by the Investigating Authority on its own initiative, Regulation
Articles 55, 47, 69, 77, 78 and 85 refer.
All administrative decisions of the Government  are subject to review in the courts under
separate laws.  A decision by the Minister of  Trade and Supply under Law 161/1998 is no exception.
Regulation Article 5 sets out the conditions where a competent expert is appointed to help the Court
conduct its hearing.  The appointment is a matter for the Court under separate law.
Q17. What are the duties and responsibilities of the Advisory Committee?  Please
explain the competencies, rules and work-systems set out by the decree
mentioned in Article 3.  Is the organization and membership different from case
to case?
Reply
The Advisory Committee is appointed by the Minister under Article 3 of the Regulation.  The
present members are senior government representatives of the Ministries dealing with Trade Policy,Agriculture, Economy, Public Enterprises, Finance, Customs and Industry.  The Chairman is
appointed in his own capacity.  His task is to revi ew the reports of the Investigating Authority and
make recommendations to the Minister of Trade and Supply.  The membership is stable.
Q18. Does the Minister of Trade and Supply have any attributes differing from A-D
matters in applying countervailing matters, as stated in Article 85?  Please also
explain what additional duties and what other restriction on imports the
Egyptian Minister of Trade and Supply may impose, according to WTO
Agreements.
Reply
The Minister may only apply measures on anti-d umping or subsidy or safeguard matters in
accordance with Law 161/1998 and the Regulation.  Each of the relevant WTO Agreements has its
separate measures, which the Minister may apply if warranted.  Regulation 85 gives the Minister the
authority not to apply remedies in accordance with the respective WTO Agreement under which
action has been taken.  It is not compulsory under these agreements to take action, but if action istaken Egypt will do so in accordance with its obligations.
It is not practical to list every measure in the WTO Agreements where restrictions may be
warranted.  In case of dumping, safeguard and subsidy, any restriction is circumscribed by the terms
of the relevant agreement.
Q19. Could Egypt indicate whether the Administrative Court considers appeals
relating to A-D measures and decisions?  What are the relevant rules and
procedures in the framework of Article 95?  Is the final judgement  given by the
Administrative Court, which allows the Minister of Trade and Supply toterminate or reconsider the A-D measures?G/ADP/Q1/EGY/5
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Reply
Yes.  Any appeal of a decision involving dumpi ng, safeguards or countervailing measures as
Article 95 will be referred to the Administrative Court (Conseil d'Etat).  This Court is competent toreview any administrative decision of any administrative authority.  The judgements issued by the
Administrative Court may be subject to appe al before the High Administrative Court.
The procedures for an appeal are as follows:  once the decision is published in the Official
Gazette, the interested person or entity may apply to the Administrative Court for an appeal within 60
days of the date of publication.  The plaintiff in the case shall notify the administrative authority.  The
Court shall decide the date of the hearing and entitle both parties to submit written and oral pleas.Having heard the parties, the Court will issue its judgement.  A judgement is binding to the Minister
and Authority.
Q20. Will Egypt reconsider the A-D matters only in the light of dispute settlement
panels in WTO?  What about the Reco mmendation adopted by the Committee
on Anti-Dumping Practices?
Reply
No.  As stated in Article 88 "where a decision by the dispute settlement panels of the WTO or
a final judgement is issued for termination of any m easures taken in accordance with the provisions of
this Regulation, the Ministry of Trade and Supply may terminate these measures against the injurious
practices of these countries in internationa l trade for the purposes of Egypt's interest".
Recommendations by the WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices do not replace the
terms of the Agreement.  In its administration of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Egypt appreciates the
work of this Committee, refers to it and uses its recommendations, but as such recommendations
involve technical issues, it does not propose to include them in its Law or Regulation.
Questions from the United States
Q1. Is the definition of “Domestic Industry” in Article 1 of the Egyptian Regulations
consistent with Article 4.1 of the A-D Agreement and Article 16 of the SCM Agreement?  The
A-D and SCM Agreements provide that “‘domestic industry’ shall be interpreted as referring to
the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective
output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those
products.” (emphasis added). The Egyptian Regulations define “Domestic Industry” as “theEgyptian producers of the like product whose co llective output represents a major proportion of
the domestic production of that product.”  Th e Egyptian Regulations omit the reference to the
“domestic producers as a whole.”
Reply
On the definition of "domestic industry" in Article 1 of the Egyptian Regulations, it is correct
that Egypt follows the WTO definition.
Domestic industry according to the said Article means "the Egyptian producers of the like
product whose collective output represents a major proportion of the domestic production of that
product.  This definition is applicable to industrial and agricultural production.G/ADP/Q1/EGY/5
G/SCM/Q1/EGY/5
Page 14
The WTO wording also refers to "domestic producers as a whole of the like products, or …".
Thus it gives alternatives.  In Egypt's view, if the lesser test of "a major proportion of the domestic
production …" is required, then the test of "… producers as a whole …" will be met.  The requirement
in the Egyptian regulation meets the WTO requirements and is consistent with it.
Q2. Is there any provision in the Egyptian Regu lations for excluding “related parties” from
the definition of the domestic industry?  See A-D Agreement Article 4.1(i) and SCM Agreement
Article 16.1.  If so, under what circumstances may they be excluded?
Reply
The relevant Article is Article 94.  However, the WTO provisions in A-D Agreement,
Article 4.1(c) and SCM Article 16.1 are discretionary.  They "may" be excluded.  If the industry or a
related party to the industry is importing the goods, then these imports may be excluded from the
material injury analysis.  Alternatively, if the exporter or foreign producer is related to the industry
then they would be subject to the "independent buyer" test set out in Article 1 of the EgyptianRegulations.  This would be necessary where an industry is the sole importer.
Q3. Articles 39(1)(c) and 61(1)(c) of the Egypti an Regulations specify that the Investigating
Authority shall consider whether the effect of  imports “is to prevent price increases which
otherwise would have occurred.”  Article 39(1)(c) does not specify that price suppression befound to be occurring "to a significant degree" -- as required by Article 3.2 of the A-D
Agreement and Article 15.2 of the SCM Agreement.  How does Article 39 of the Egyptian
Regulations include this requirement of the A-D and SCM Agreements?
Reply
The comment by the United States is right, and the English version should be amended by
adding the phrase " … to a significant degree" to correct it.
Q4. Articles 40(4) and 62(4) of the Egyptian Re gulations instruct the Investigating Authority
to consider (in connection with determining whet her there is a threat of injury) the “existence of
significant export capacity . . . of the pro duct in question in the exporting companies.”
Article 3.7(ii) of the A-D Agreement and Article 15.7(iii) of the SCM Agreement specify that
Members should, when considering excess capacity, “[take] into account the availability of other
export markets to absorb any additional export s.”  Do Articles 40(4) and 62(4) contemplate a
consideration of the availability of other export markets, and if not, how are they consistent
with the A-D and SCM Agreements in this regard?
Reply
The Egyptian Regulation's Articles 40.4 and 62.4 cover the issue raised on the availability of
other export markets to absorb additional imports as required by Article 3.7(ii) of the A-D Agreementand SCM Article 15.7(iii) by requiring the investigating authority to verify that the threat of injury is
clear and imminent.  (See Egyptian Regulations Articles 40 and 62.)  If it were shown on verification
that the capacity available or inventory would be ab sorbed by other markets, then the threat would not
be considered clear or imminent.  Egyptian regulations would require a convincing demonstration of
the connection between the inventory or capacity and export to Egypt before threat of injury would be
found.
Q5. Article 22 of the Egyptian Regulations omits the date of initiation of the investigation
from the list of information which is to be included in the notice of initiation of an investigationG/ADP/Q1/EGY/5
G/SCM/Q1/EGY/5
Page 15
published in the Official Gazette.  How is this consistent with A-D Agreement Article 12.1.1 and
SCM Agreement Article 22.2?
Reply
The date of initiation is not required to be included because of the way through which the
Egyptian system of legal notices functions.  When a notice is given officially, it has effect from the
day following its publication.  The publication of the date is already in the notice as required in
Article 22, and so the date of initiation is already included.  There is no need under this legal system
to include the date of initiation as it already appears in the notice.  Therefore, the requirements of
Article 22.2 of the SCM Agreement and Article 12.1.1 of the A-D Agreement are met.
Q6. A-D Agreement Article 12.2 and SCM Agreement Article 22.3 require that public notice
be given of preliminary and final determinations, of any decision to accept an undertaking, of
the termination of such an undertaking, and of the termination of a definitive anti-dumping or
countervailing duty.  The A-D and SCM Agreements provisions also specify certain informationwhich such notices should contain.  How do the Egyptian Law and Regulations incorporate
these requirements?
Reply
The Egyptian Regulations in Article 7 require that the specific information must be made
available to all parties.  This covers all the information required in the A-D Agreement Article (12.2)
and the SCM Agreement Article (22.3).  A separate report meets the requirements.
Q7. What type of tribunal will hear the appeals of decisions involving anti-dumping and
countervailing duty decisions? What type of pro cedural mechanisms are in place for an appeal?
Reply
Yes.  Any appeal of a decision involving dum ping, safeguards or countervailing measures
will be referred to the Administrative Court (Conseil d'Etat) Regulation (Article 95 refers to that).
This Court is competent to review any administrative decision taken of any administrative
authority.  The judgements adopted by the Administrative Court may be subject to appeal before the
High Administrative Court.
The procedures for an appeal are as follows:  once the decision is published in the Official
Gazette, the interested person or entity may apply to the Administrative Court for an appeal within
60 days of the date of publication.  The plaintiff in the case shall notify the administrative authority.
The Court shall decide the date of the hearing and entitle both parties to submit written and oral pleas.
Having heard the parties, the Court will issue its judgement.
Q8. Please describe whether and how the appellate tribunal(s) are independent from the
authorities responsible for the anti-dumping or countervailing duty determination or review
that is subject to appeal as required by Article 13 of the A-D Agreement and Article 23 of the
SCM Agreement.
Reply
As set out in the Egyptian Constitution, the judicial authority is an independent entity.  The
Egyptian Constitution states:G/ADP/Q1/EGY/5
G/SCM/Q1/EGY/5
Page 16
Article 165:  The judicial authority shall be independent.
It shall be exercised by Courts of Justice of different sorts and competencies.
They shall issue their judgements in accordance with the law.Article 166:  Judges shall be independent and subject to no other authority but the law.  No
authority may intervene in judiciary cases or in the affairs of justice.
Article 168:  The status of judges shall be irrevocable.
The law shall regulate the discipline action with regard to them.
Q9. The term "interested parties" is defined in A-D Agreement Article 6.11 and SCM
Agreement Article 12.9 to include, inter alia , both (i) foreign producers, and (ii) trade or
business associations, a majority of whose members are producers, exporters or importers of a
product subject to investigation.  The definitions of the terms “concerned parties” and “other
interested parties” in Article 1 of the Egyptian  Regulations do not include references to foreign
producers or such trade or business associations.  How are these definitions consistent with the
requirements of A-D Agreement Article 6.11 and SCM Agreement Article 12.9?
Reply
Referring to the question asked on "interested parties", the definition in the Regulation
includes "… those acting on behalf of …".  This would cover the trade or business associations.Foreign producers are covered as "the domestic industry … of exporting countries" or "exporters …
of foreign countries".
In other words, the word "exporter" covers both the exporters and foreign producers and the
association.  The definitions cover the requirements of A-D Agreement Article 6.11, and SCMAgreement Article 12.9.
Q10. A-D Agreement Article 6.5.2 and SCM Agreement Article 12.4.2 permit authorities to
disregard confidential information submitted by interested parties if the authorities find that
the request for confidentiality is not warran ted and if the supplier of the information is
unwilling to make the information public or to authorize its disclosure in generalized or
summary form.  Article 8 of the Egyptian Regu lations permits the Investigating Authority to
disregard information provided “if confidentiality is not justified or the request for
confidentiality is not warranted.” Do the Egypti an Regulations provide the submitter of such
information the option of making it public or authorizing its disclosure, before the information
is disregarded by the Investigating Authority?
Reply
Yes, the implementation of Article 8 requires to inform the party of the consequences of not
providing a summary or making unwarranted confidentiality claims as it can only be done by
correspondence.  Advice is given to the parties on confidentiality requirements in the application andthe questionnaires.
Q11. A-D Agreement Article 5.8 and SCM Agreement Article 11.9 require the immediate
termination of cases where the dumping ma rgin or the amount of the subsidy are de minimis,  or
where the volume of dumped imports is negligible.  Do Articles 39 and 60 of the EgyptianRegulations, which state that the Investigatin g Authority shall prepare a report  recommending
the termination of an investigation under thes e circumstances, conform to the requirements of
A-D Agreement Article 5.8 and SCM Agreement Article 11.9?G/ADP/Q1/EGY/5
G/SCM/Q1/EGY/5
Page 17
Reply
The Egyptian Regulations 38 and 60 conform with the requirements of A-D Agreement
Article 5.8 and SCM Agreement Article 11.9.  The United States reference to Regulation Article 39 isa mistake.  The termination can only be actioned lawfully by the Minister upon recommendation of
the Advisory Committee to which the Investigating Authority reports.  (See Regulation Articles 2,3
and 10.)  Articles 38 and 60 give the procedures stating what the Investigating Authority must do in
these circumstances.  This meets the WTO requirements for an immediate termination.
Q12. There appears to be an inconsistency between Article 2 of the Egyptian Law, which
specifies that respondents in anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases shall submit theinformation sought from them “within at most thirty days from the date of the request”
(emphasis added) and Articles 23 of the Egyptian Regulations, which specifies a period of37 days for responding to questionnaires.  Which provision is controlling?  To the extent
Article 2 of the Egyptian Law is controlling, is it consistent with A-D Agreement Article 6.1.1
and SCM Agreement Article 12.1.1, which specify that exporters and foreign producers beprovided at least 30 days from date of receipt to reply to questionnaires?
Reply
The reference in the United States question is not understood.  Article 2 refers to the provision
of information by official or non-governmental bodies both before and after initiation.  There is no
relationship between this and requests for information made to overseas parties.  Regulation
Article 23 states that the parties have 37 days to reply to the questionnaire.  The WTO requirement of
30 days counted from the date of receipt, in practice 37 days (see A-D Agreement Article 6.1.1 plus
footnote 15).
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