WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/GC/W/489
31 January 2003
(03-0683)
General Council
10-11 February 2003Original:  Spanish
PROPOSAL TO REMOVE AND AVOID INCONSISTENCIES
IN THE TEXTS OF THE WTO AGREEMENTS
Communication from Chile
The following communication, dated 29 January 2003, has been received by the Chairman of
the General Council from the Permanent Mission of Chile.
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With reference to the proposal presented last year by Chile with a view to removing and
avoiding inconsistencies in the texts of the WTO Agreements (WT/GC/W/473), I should be grateful if
you would include an item on the agenda of the next meeting of the General Council for discussion of
the matter.  The enclosed document has been prepared for the purpose;  it draws on two examples and
proposes a practical approach for resolving existing inconsistencies, i.e. by means of decisions by theGeneral Council.  I should also be grateful if the document could be translated so that the Members
can analyse and properly discuss it in the General Council.  We shall, moreover, hold consultations
with a number of Members to obtain their vi ews on the new ideas put forward by Chile.WT/GC/W/489
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Language inconsistencies
Examples of Decisions Proposed
1. With reference to its proposal to remove and avoid inconsistencies in the texts of the WTO
Agreements (WT/GC/W/473), Chile has considered it appropriate to draw on two examples in order
to show how the Members could harmonize the meaning and scope of the different versions of the
texts resulting from the Uruguay Round.  Two types of inconsistency are used to illustrate its point.
In the first case, i.e. Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, one or two of the versions do not
incorporate all of the elements contained in one or two of the other versions, and hence the three
versions undoubtedly carry different meanings.  The second case concerns texts that have acquired
different meanings because of the translation of certain expressions.
A. Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards
The three versions state the following:1
Artículo 9
Países en desarrollo Miembros
1. No se aplicarán medidas de salvaguardia contra un producto originario de un país en
desarrollo Miembro cuando la parte que corresponda a éste en las importaciones realizadas por el
Miembro importador del producto considerado no exceda del 3 por ciento, a condición de que lospaíses en desarrollo Miembros con una participación en las importaciones menor del 3 por ciento no
representen en conjunto más del 9 por ciento de las importaciones totales del producto en cuestión.
Article 9
Developing Country Members
1. Safeguard measures shall not be applied against a product originating in a developing country
Member as long as its share of imports of the product concerned in the importing Member does not
exceed 3 per cent, provided that developing country Members with less than 3 per cent import sharecollectively account for not more than 9 per cent of total imports of the product concerned.
Article 9
Pays en développement Membres
1. Des mesures de sauvegarde ne seront pas appliquées à l'égard d'un produit originaire d'un
pays en développement Membre tant que la part de ce Membre dans les importations du produit
considéré du Membre importateur ne dépassera pas 3 pour cent, à condition que les pays en
développement Membres dont la part dans les importations est inférieure à 3 pour cent ne contribuent
pas collectivement pour plus de 9 pour cent aux importations totales du produit considéré.
2. A reading of the above provisions shows that the English- and French-language versions
specify a notion of time (" as long as " and " tant que ") that is absent from the Spanish version.  Such a
notion implies that safeguard measures do not apply to imports from developing countries up to
certain ceiling figures – but only to the extent that the imports remain within the specified limits.
3. In other words, once imports from a developing country exceed 3 per cent of total imports, or
once total imports from developing countries with less than 3 per cent import share exceed 9 per centof total imports, the safeguard measure will begin to apply.
                                                     
1 Footnote 2 has been omitted here because it b ears no relevance to the example or the proposed
decision.WT/GC/W/489
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4. The fact that the above notion is absent from the Spanish version implies that once the
exemption of a developing country has been established (because its imports did not exceed 3 per
cent), the safeguard measure will never apply to this country – not even if its import share increases
beyond the 3 per cent in question.  This considerably alters the meaning and scope of the provision.
5. Such a difference in meaning and scope is entirely due to the omission of that notion, since
the logic behind the English and French versions is unquestionably the correct one.
6. If the Members consider it appropriate, a decision should be adopted along the following
lines:
Draft Decision
Whereas the English and French versions of paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the Agreement on
Safeguards specify a notion of time which defines the application of the exemption provided in that
paragraph and the Spanish version does not include that notion,
Whereas such an omission is due to a simple error,
Whereas the negotiators' intent, as reflected in the English and French versions, was to limit
the scope of the exemption to imports from developing countries that do not exceed 3 per cent of total
imports and that collectively account for no more than 9 per cent of total imports,
The Members decide that the Spanish version of paragraph 1 of Article 9 should be read in
conjunction with the English and French versions of that same paragraph and that hence safeguard
measures shall not be applied against a product originating in a developing country Member as long
as its share of imports of the product concerned in the importing Member does not exceed 3 per cent,provided that developing country Members with less than 3 per cent import share collectively account
for not more than 9 per cent of total imports of the product concerned.
B. Article 18.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
The three versions read as follows:
Artículo 18
Comunicaciones con el grupo es pecial o el Órgano de Apelación
2. Las comunicaciones por escrito al grupo especial o al Órgano de Apelación se considerarán
confidenciales, pero se facilitarán a las partes en la diferencia.  Ninguna de las disposiciones delpresente Entendimiento impedirá a una parte en la diferencia hacer públicas sus posiciones.  Los
Miembros considerarán confidencial la inform ación facilitada al grupo especial o al Órgano de
Apelación por otro Miembro a la que éste haya atri buido tal carácter.  A petición de un Miembro, una
parte en la diferencia podrá también facilitar un resumen no confidencial de la información contenida
en sus comunicaciones escritas que pueda hacerse público.
Article 18
Communications with the Panel or Appellate Body
2. Written submissions to the panel or the Appellate Body shall be treated as confidential, but
shall be made available to the parties to the disput e.  Nothing in this Understanding shall preclude a
party to a dispute from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public.  Members shall treat as
confidential information submitted by another Member to the panel or the Appellate Body which that
Member has designated as confidential.  A party to a dispute shall also, upon request of a Member,WT/GC/W/489
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provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its written submissions that could
be disclosed to the public.
Article 18
Communications avec le groupe spécial ou l'Organe d'appel
2. Les communications écrites présentées au groupe spécial ou à l'Organe d'appel seront traitées
comme confidentielles, mais elles seront tenues à la disposition des parties au différend.  Aucune
disposition du présent mémorandum d'accord n'empêchera une partie à un différend de communiquer
au public ses propres positions.  Les Membres traiteront comme confidentiels les renseignements qui
auront été communiqués par un autre Membre au groupe spécial ou à l'Organe d'appel et que ce
Membre aura désignés comme tels.  Une partie à un différend fournira aussi, si un Membre le
demande, un résumé non confidentiel des renseignements contenus dans ses exposés écrits qui
peuvent être communiqués au public.
7. Unlike in the preceding example, what we are dealing here is not the omission of a notion but
the use of different verb tenses that alter the meaning and scope of the provision.  The English andFrench versions use tenses which make the provision mandatory (" shall ... provide " and " fournira ")
and, in this case, where a Member so requests, a party to a dispute is required to provide a non-
confidential summary of the information contained in its written submissions that could be disclosed
to the public.
8. Conversely, the Spanish version uses the term " podrá ", which divests the last part of Article
18.2 of its mandatory character.  In this case, " podrá " would be translated into English as " should …
provide " and into French as _________.  If the objective was to establish a mandatory provision, the
term " deberá … facilitar " or "facilitará " should have been used.
9. It will be noted that paragraph 3 of Appendix 3 on Working Procedures takes up the ideas and
purpose of Article 18.2.  All three language versions use terms that give this provision a mandatory
character.  The relevant part of the Spanish version of paragraph 3 reads as follows:
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"Cuando una parte en la diferencia facilite una versión confidencial de sus comunicaciones
escritas al grupo especial, también facilitará, a petición de cualquier Miembro, un resumen no
confidencial de la información contenida en esas comunicaciones que pueda hacerse público."
10. In other words, the Spanish version of Article 18.2 of the DSU stands in contradiction not
only with the English and French versions but al so with the Spanish version of paragraph 3 of
Appendix 3 to the DSU.  This evidently reflects an error of translation.
11. If the Members consider it appropriate, a decision should be adopted along the following
lines:
Draft Decision
Whereas the English and French versions of the last sentence of Article 18.2 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) establish an
obligation and this is not the case of the Spanish version,
                                                     
2 The English version states:  "Where a party to a dispute submits a confidential version of its written
submissions to the panel, it shall also, upon request of a Member, provide a non-confidential summary of the
information contained in its submissions that could be disclosed to the public."
3  The French version states:  "Dans les cas où une partie à un différend communiquera au groupe
spécial une version confidentielle de ses exposés écrits, elle fournira aussi, si un Membre le demande, un résumé
non confidentiel des renseignements contenus dans ses exposés qui peuvent être communiqués au public."WT/GC/W/489
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Whereas the three versions of the last sentence of paragraph 3 of Appendix 3 to the DSU take
up the content of the last sentence of Article 18.2 of the DSU and all three establish an obligation,
Whereas the difference in verb tense in the Spanish version of the last sentence of Article 18.2
of the DSU is due to a simple translation error,
Whereas the negotiators' intent, as reflected in the English and French versions and in all
three language versions of the Working Procedures, was to oblige a party to a dispute to provide a
non-confidential version of the information contained in confidential submissions, where a Member
so requests,
The Members decide that the Spanish version of the last sentence of Article 18.2 of the DSU
should be read in conjunction with the English and French versions of that same provision and that
therefore, where a party to a dispute submits a confidential version of its written submissions to the
panel, it shall also, upon request of a Member, provide a non-confidential summary of the information
contained in its submissions that could be disclosed to the public.
Note: Such a decision does not prejudge the outcome of the negotiations to clarify and improve the
DSU.
12. The two aforementioned examples are designed to show how the Members could resolve the
differences and inconsistencies between the various versions of the texts of the WTO Agreements.
These are practical approaches based on understandings already reached on one version or another
(using decisions by panels and/or the Appellate B ody, for example), in the event of widely recognized
inconsistencies (such as that regarding Article 18.2 of the DSU), or in cases where the meaning and
scope of provisions is clear – or the meaning and scope of a provision is absurd or pointless comparedwith the meaning and scope of the other versions.
13. We understand that there are instances in which such a practical exercise may prove more
difficult, particularly because the more controversial nature of the provisions involved, on which
decisions such as those suggested in this document may be neither appropriate nor sufficient.  In such
cases, the Members will have to consider other approaches in order to resolve inconsistencies,
including by presenting practical proposals for textual amendments (Article X of the MarrakeshAgreement) or by resorting to authorized interpre tations (Article IX:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement).
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