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PRESS/TPRB/190
16 April 2002
(02-2069)
TRADE AND INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION HAS SERVED AS CATALYST
FOR MEXICO'S DEVELOPMENT BUT FURTHER REFORMS ARE ESSENTIAL
Mexico has become a prime example of trade and foreign investment as catalysts for
economic modernization and growth.  Using intern ational engagements as anchors to move away
from past inward-looking policies, policymakers have induced a virtuous circle of deregulation,
structural change, growing productivity, and higher per capita income that has made Mexico
increasingly attractive as a trading partner and foreign investment destination.  Mexico's liberalization
strategy has, however, opened a significant gap between its treatment of preferential partners and
other WTO Members, according to a WTO Secretariat report on the trade policies and practices ofMexico.
The WTO Secretariat report, along with the policy statement by the Government of Mexico,
will serve as a basis for the third Trade Policy Review (TPR) of Mexico by the Trade Policy Review
Body of the WTO on 15 and 16 April 2002.
The report says that certain activities remain relatively inefficient, both sheltered from
competition and handicapped by trade or investment barriers.  Important reforms have been pending
for years, notably in the hydrocarbons and electricity sectors.  Moving forward the reform agenda is
thus essential to maintain the impetus in Mexico's  restructuring efforts and to resume growth, which
has slowed down since end 2000 in the wake of falling U.S. demand.
Despite the recent slowdown, Mexico's overall economic performance over the last five years
has been positive.  Between 1997 and 2000, GDP expanded at an annual average rate of 5.2%;
Mexican trade in goods grew at an annual averag e rate of 17.1%, the fastest among WTO's twenty
largest single Members, with imports slightly outpacing exports.  This has gone hand in hand withconsiderably increased investment:  between 1997 and 2000, private investment grew at a annual
average rate of 10.6%.  During that period, Mexico attracted some US$44 billion in foreign direct
investment.PRESS/TPRB/190
Page 2
MOREUnderpinning this good performance were sound macroeconomic policies, marked by a stable
exchange rate, and falling inflation and unemployment.  Fiscal deficits were moderate but a better
outcome might have been desirable in view of the economy's strong performance.  A compromise
fiscal package adopted by the Congress for 2002 is expected to increase tax revenue, but by less than
originally sought by the Government.  Mexico's fiscal position thus remains exposed to fluctuations in
petroleum revenues, and to significant contingent liabilities.
The majority of Mexico's trade takes place under preferential rules, with the NAFTA
remaining of paramount economic significance.  In particular, Mexico's principal trade partner is by
far the United States, which in 2000 supplied some 73% of Mexico's imports and attracted about 89%
of its exports.  That year, Canada was the second largest destination for Mexican products, accounting
for some 2% of exports.  Outside NAFTA, no individual country absorbed more than 1% of totalMexican exports.
The report adds that Mexico considers the multil ateral trading system as the main instrument
for the liberalization of world trade.  Its support for this system has been recently very visible, forexample through Mexico's strong backing for the launch of the Doha Development Agenda and itsoffer to host the WTO's Fifth Ministerial Conference.
Mexico's trade policy remains closely associated with the promotion of foreign investment,
rules for which have been part of both its multilateral and preferential initiatives.  With the exception
of the agreement with Israel, all of Mexico's FTAs contain investment provisions that grant investors
additional protection.  Since 1997, Mexico has also undertaken important unilateral steps to open up
to foreign investment various service activities, notably financial services and telecommunications.
However, a limited number of areas remain off-limits to all private capital, are either entirely reservedfor Mexican capital, or require majority Mexican capital, or are subject to prior approval for foreigninvestment to exceed 49% of total capital.
Since its previous Review in 1997, the report says, Mexico has implemented MFN tariff
increases that raised the simple average applied rate by some three percentage points, to 16.5% in
2001.  As a result, and in contrast with the situation prevailing in 1997, Mexico's tariff structure for
2001 showed clear tariff escalation.
The number of different tariff-quota schemes adds complexity to Mexico's import regime.
Mexico applies tariff quotas on several agricultural products, with most quotas reserved for specific
countries.  The basis for customs valuation varies according to the origin of imports:  f.o.b. for
imports from NAFTA partners, and c.i.f. for other imports.  And Mexico is an active user of
contingency measures, mainly anti-dumping.
The report notes that in part to offset the anti-export bias resulting from trade barriers on
imports, Mexico promotes exports through various duty and tax concessions, one of which has been
notified to the WTO as an export subsidy.  Under these schemes, unless otherwise specified by an
FTA, imported inputs incorporated into export goods are not subject to tariffs;  in addition, Mexico
promotes exports through various administrative tax facilitation schemes.
Mexico also operates numerous programmes in support of selected activities.  In general,
support is provided through financing facilities, mostly channelled through development banks orpublic trust funds, or in the form of tax concessions.  Certain tax concessions are contingent on
meeting national-content requirements, or are granted only if no domestic substitute is available.
In 2001, Mexico requested and obtained an extension for the elimination of its WTO-inconsistent
TRIMs in the automotive sector.PRESS/TPRB/190
Page 3
MORERegarding the sectorial policies, the report notes that Mexico's manufacturing sector has
confirmed its crucial role as a key catalyst for economic growth, its expansion having been closely
tied to its ability to compete in foreign market s.  In agriculture, while many activities have
modernized and benefited from increased access to foreign markets, notably in the United States,
others remain small-scale and mainly oriented to self-consumption.  The energy sector remains
largely under state control, as constitutional provisions restrict private participation in strategic areassuch as the exploitation of hydrocarbons and the supply of electricity to the public.  In the services
sector, important changes have been made to the legal and institutional framework, often secured or
otherwise linked to Mexico's multilateral and preferential liberalization initiatives.  However,
competition policy concerns have arisen in recent years in the telecommunications market, and in
domestic transport, which remains largely closed to foreign participation.
Note to Editors
Trade Policy Reviews are an exercise, mandated in the WTO agreements, in which member
countries’ trade and related policies are examined and evaluated at regular intervals. Significant
developments which may have an impact on the global trading system are also monitored. For each
review, two documents are prepared: a policy stat ement by the government of the member under
review, and a detailed report written independently by the WTO Secretariat. These two documents are
then discussed by the WTO’s full membership in the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB). Thesedocuments and the proceedings of the TPRB’s meet ings are published shortly afterwards. Since 1995,
when the WTO came into force, services and trade- related aspects of intellectual property rights have
also been covered.
For this review, the WTO’s Secretariat report, together with a policy statement prepared by
the Government of Mexico, will be discussed by the Trade Policy Review Body on 15 and 16 April2002. The Secretariat report covers the development of all aspects of Mexico trade policies since the
previous review, including domestic laws and regulations, the institutional framework, trade policies
by measure, and developments in selected  sectors.
Attached to this press release are the Summary Observations of the Secretariat report and
parts of the government policy statement. The Secretariat and the government reports are availableunder the country name in the full list of trade policy reviews at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm . These two documents and the minutes of the
TPRB’s discussion and the Chairman’s summing up, will be published in hardback in due course and
will be available from the Secretariat, Centre William Rappard, 154 rue de Lausanne,
1211 Geneva 21.PRESS/TPRB/190
Page 4
MORESince December 1989, the following reports have been completed: Argentina (1992 and
1999), Australia (1989, 1994 and 1998) , Austria (1992), Bahrain (2000 ) Bangladesh (1992 and 2000),
Benin (1997), Bolivia (1993 and 1999), Botswa na (1998), Brazil (1992, 1996 and 2000), Brunei
Darussalam (2001), Burkina Faso (1998), Cameroon (1995 and 2001), Canada (1990, 1992, 1994,
1996, 1998 and 2000), Chile (1991 and 1997), Colombia (1990 and 1996), Costa Rica (1995 and
2001), Côte d’Ivoire (1995), Cyprus (1997), th e Czech Republic (1996 and 2001), the Dominican
Republic (1996), Egypt (1992 and 1999), El Salvador (1996), the European Communities (1991,
1993, 1995, 1997 and 2000), Fiji (1997), Finland (1992), Gabon (2001), Ghana (1992 and 2001),
Guatemala (2002), Guinea (1999), Hong Kong (1990, 1994 and 1998), Hungary (1991 and 1998),
Iceland (1994 and 2000), India (1993 and 1998), Indonesia (1991, 1994 and 1998), Israel (1994 and
1999), Jamaica (1998), Japan (1990, 1992, 1995,1998 and 2000), Kenya (1993 and 2000), Korea,
Rep. of (1992, 1996 and 2001), Lesotho (1998), Macao (1994 and 2001), Madagascar (2001),
Malaysia (1993, 1997 and 2001), Malawi (2002), Mali (1998), Mauritius (1995 and 2001), Mexico
(1993, 1997 and 2002), Morocco (1989 and 1996), Mozambique (2001), New Zealand (1990 and
1996), Namibia (1998), Nicaragua (1999), Nigeria (1991 and 1998), Norway (1991, 1996 and 2000),
OECS (2001), Pakistan (1995 and 2002), Papua New Guinea (1999), Paraguay (1997), Peru (1994
and 2000), the Philippines (1993 and 1999), Poland (1993 and 2000), Romania (1992 and 1999),
Senegal (1994), Singapore (1992, 1996 and 2000), Slovak Republic (1995 and 2001), the SolomonIslands (1998), South Africa (1993 and 1998), Sri Lanka (1995), Swaziland (1998), Sweden (1990
and 1994), Switzerland (1991, 1996 and 2000 (jointly with Liechtenstein)), Tanzania (2000), Thailand
(1991, 1995 and 1999), Togo (1999), Trinidad and T obago (1998), Tunisia (1994), Turkey (1994 and
1998), the United States (1989, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1999 a nd 2001), Uganda (1995 and 2001), Uruguay
(1992 and 1998), Venezuela (1996), Za mbia (1996) and Zimbabwe (1994).PRESS/TPRB/190
Page 5
MORETRADE POLICY REVIEW BODY
MEXICO
Report by the Secretariat – Summary Observations
Since its previous Trade Policy Review in 1997, Mexico has become a prime example of
trade and foreign investment as catalysts for economic modernization and growth.  Using
international engagements as anchors to move aw ay from past inward-looking policies, policymakers
have induced a virtuous circle of deregulation, structural change, growing productivity, and higher per
capita income that has been making Mexico increasingly attractive as a trading partner and foreign
investment destination.  This process has been driven mainly by an aggressive policy of reciprocal
liberalization, buttressed by unilateral initiatives and multilateral commitments.  As a result, the lion'sshare of Mexican trade is now governed by the preferential rules of free-trade agreements (FTAs).
Mexico's liberalization strategy has opened a significant gap between the treatment offered to
MFN and FTA partners, which in areas like tariffs has widened since 1997.  This raises the possibility
of net trade distortion.  Moreover, despite the broad coverage of Mexico's FTAs, trade barriers still
hinder the access of Mexican consumers to some of the world's most competitive products.  Certainactivities remain relatively inefficient, both sheltered from competition and handicapped by trade or
investment barriers.  Moving forward the reform agenda is thus essential to maintain the impetus in
Mexico's restructuring efforts.  This in turn is a precondition for Mexico to resume and sustain the fast
rate of economic growth required to bring its livin g standards nearer to those of its closest trading
partners.
Mexico's economy performed very well between 1997 and 2000, when GDP expanded at an
annual average rate of 5.2%;  Mexican trade in goods grew at an annual average rate of 17.1%, the
fastest among WTO's twenty largest single Members, with imports slightly outpacing exports.  This
has gone hand in hand with considerably increased investment:  between 1997 and 2000, private
investment grew at a annual average rate of 1 0.6%.  During that period, Mexico attracted some
US$44 billion in foreign direct investment.
Underpinning this good performance were sound macroeconomic policies, marked by a stable
exchange rate, and falling inflation and unemployment.  Fiscal deficits were moderate but a betteroutcome might have been desirable in view of the economy's strong performance.  A compromise
fiscal package adopted by the Congress for 2002 is expected to increase tax revenue, but by less than
originally sought by the Government.  Mexico's fiscal position thus remains exposed to fluctuations inpetroleum revenues, and to significant contingent liabilities.
The majority of Mexico's trade now takes place under preferential rules, with the NAFTA
remaining of paramount economic significance.  In particular, Mexico's principal trade partner is byfar the United States, which in 2000 supplied some 73% of Mexico's imports and attracted about 89%
of its exports.  That year, Canada was the second largest destination for Mexican products, accounting
for some 2% of exports.  Outside NAFTA, no individual country absorbed more than 1% of totalMexican exports.
Since late 2000, in the wake of falling U.S.  demand, trade and GDP growth have slowed,
accompanied by a contraction in employment.  The policy options open to the authorities to address
these trends appear limited with respect to both monetary and fiscal policies.  Resuming and
sustaining growth thus depends importantly on a turnaround in the world economy, particularly in theUnited States, and carrying out a number of important reforms that have been pending for years,notably in the hydrocarbons and electricity sectors.PRESS/TPRB/190
Page 6
MORESince its previous Review, Mexico has made no fundamental changes to its trade policy
framework.  The Department of the Economy (formerly SECOFI) still has main responsibility for
formulating and implementing trade policy.  A new administration is largely pursuing earlier trade
policy objectives, which spell out formal links between industrial policy, economic deregulation and
export promotion.  A successor trade and investment programme for 2000-06 was to be released in
early 2002.  Significant improvements have been made since 1997 in terms of transparency, notablythrough various governmental bodies that disseminate key information, including through the internet.
Mexico considers the multilateral trading system as the main instrument for the liberalization
of world trade.  Its support for this system has been recently very visible, for example through
Mexico's strong backing for the launch of the Doha Development Agenda and its offer to host the
WTO's Fifth Ministerial Conference.  Mexico accepted new multilateral commitments within the
context of the Fourth and Fifth Protocols to the GATS, on basic telecommunications and financial
services, which entered into force in February 1998 and March 1999, respectively.
Awaiting the outcome of broader liberalization initiatives, Mexico's main avenue to open its
trade and investment regimes has been the negotiation of FTAs.  Mexico acknowledges that the
advantages implicit in FTAs are of a temporary nature, and hence no substitute for improving the
competitiveness of its economy.  As is the case for other Members following similar strategies, the
large and growing number of Mexico's preferential agreements can raise concerns about complexities
resulting from the application of differing regimes, and their effect on trade patterns.
Since 1997, Mexico has entered into new FTAs with Chile, the European Free Trade
Association, the European Union, Israel, Nicaragu a, and the Northern Triangle (El Salvador,
Guatemala, and  Honduras), raising to more than 30 the number of countries with which it has FTAs.
In late 2001, Mexico was considering the negotiation of FTAs, or was already doing so, with Japan
and Singapore, among others.
Mexico's trade policy remains closely associated with the promotion of foreign investment,
rules for which have been part of both its multilateral and preferential initiatives.  With the exception
of the agreement with Israel, all of Mexico's FTAs contain investment provisions that grant investors
additional protection.  Since 1997, Mexico has also undertaken important unilateral steps to open up
to foreign investment various service activities, notably financial services and telecommunications.
However, a limited number of areas remain off-limits to all private capital, are either entirely reserved
for Mexican capital, or require majority Mexican capital, or are subject to prior approval for foreigninvestment to exceed 49% of total capital.
Mexico has been involved in only a few disput es before the WTO.  Most complaints against
Mexico have related to Mexican anti-dumping practices;  a complaint was also lodged against
Mexican practices in telecommunication services.  With Mexico as complainant, all but one case has
also been related to anti-dumping.
Since its previous Review, Mexico has implemented MFN tariff increases that raised the
simple average applied rate by some three percentage points, to 16.5% in 2001.  As a result, and in
contrast with the situation prevailing in 1997, Mexico's tariff structure for 2001 showed clear tariff
escalation.  The increase in MFN rates, and reductions in preferential tariffs, has also widened the gap
between the treatment granted to imports from MFN and preferential sources.  Tariff protection foragricultural products is substantially higher than for other products, with applied MFN rates on a
small number of products slightly exceeding bound rates.  Mexico grants at least MFN treatment to all
its trading partners.PRESS/TPRB/190
Page 7
MOREThe number of different tariff-quota schemes adds complexity to Mexico's import regime.
Mexico applies tariff quotas on several agricultural products, with most quotas reserved for specific
countries.  In addition, other products may carry a reduced MFN tariff provided they have a quota
certificate;  this is aimed at guaranteeing supply when domestic production is insufficient.  Mexico
also maintains tariff quotas for certain imports from preferential partners, and for some agricultural
products imported under a special border tariff regime.
The basis for customs valuation varies according to the origin of imports:  f.o.b. for imports
from NAFTA partners, and c.i.f. for other imports.  All of Mexico's FTAs contain specific rules of
origin.  Non-preferential rules of origin apply to  products subject to anti-dumping and countervailing
duties to prevent circumvention of such duties;  the procedures to apply these rules vary by product
and originating country.
Mexico maintains import permits for sensitive products for reasons of national security,
public health, and protection of domestic industries.  In 2001, imports from MFN sources subject topermit included petrochemicals;  vehicles;  and used tyres, machines, clothing, and office machines.
For used vehicles and machines, permits are issued only when the foreign product has no domestically
produced substitute.  Since 1998, Mexico has used an import licensing mechanism to collect statistics
on the price of specific goods from certain countries before the importation takes place.
Mexico is an active user of contingency measures, mainly anti-dumping.  As at March 2001,
there were 90 anti-dumping duties applied on a wide range of products, mainly of Chinese origin.
Particularly since 2001, the number of anti-dumping cases initiated has dropped significantly, thus
lessening earlier concerns that these measures could become major trade barriers in Mexico.
In part to offset the anti-export bias resulting from trade barriers on imports, Mexico promotes
exports through various duty and tax concessions, one of which has been notified to the WTO as anexport subsidy.  Under these schemes, unless otherwise specified by an FTA, imported inputs
incorporated into export goods are not subject to  tariffs;  in addition, Mexico promotes exports
through various administrative tax facilitation schemes.  More than 90% of Mexican exports are
undertaken by firms benefiting from such schemes.  Since Mexico's previous Review, substantial
changes have been made to restrict their use for exports covered by the NAFTA.  Under the FTAsnegotiated with the EFTA countries and the European Union, Mexico should amend in 2003 its
promotion programmes covering exports to those regions.
Mexico also operates numerous programmes in support of selected activities.  In general,
support is provided through financing facilities, mostly channelled through development banks or
public trust funds, or in the form of tax concessi ons.  Certain tax concessions are contingent on
meeting national-content requirements, or are granted only if no domestic substitute is available.
In 2001, Mexico requested and obtained an extension for the elimination of its WTO-inconsistent
TRIMs in the automotive sector.
Mexico has not signed the Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement and it uses
public procurement to support domestic activities, particularly through price preference margins and
local-content requirements.
From 1 January 2000, the TRIPS Agreement applies fully to Mexico, which had taken steps
in advance to implement most of the Agreement's provisions.  Mexico's efforts to improve IPR
protection appear to have paid off in the form of considerable technology transfers.  Mexico also has
an active and growing trade in IPR-intensive goods such as information technology products,
pharmaceuticals, beverages, and "cultural goods".PRESS/TPRB/190
Page 8
MOREIn agriculture, while many activities in Mexico have modernized and benefited from
increased access to foreign markets, notably in the United States, others remain small-scale and
mainly oriented to self-consumption.  Overall, labour productivity in the sector is well behind the
national average.  Largely to increase the participation of the private sector in the commercialization
of agricultural products, Mexico has introduced important institutional changes since 1997, including
the elimination of the state firm previously responsible for milk imports.  Mexico maintains variousprogrammes designed to provide direct income support to farmers and to promote their productivity
and competitiveness.  Indicators of assistance to agriculture have increased substantially since 1997,
mainly as a result of low international prices.
The energy sector remains largely under state control, as constitutional provisions restrict
private participation in strategic areas such as the exploitation of hydrocarbons and the supply of
electricity to the public.  The capital-intensive nature of petroleum and electricity projects means that
these two industries alone draw close to 57% of public  sector investment.  In view of Mexico's fiscal
constraints and to bring in the investment required to meet rapidly rising domestic demand, the
Government is seeking to increase private participation in the energy sector while retaining its control
of the state-owned companies that dominate the sector.  Addressing the long-standing structural
problems of the electricity and hydrocarbons industries is of vital economic importance but has faced
strong resistance from entrenched interest groups.
The manufacturing sector has confirmed its crucial role as a key catalyst for economic
growth, its expansion having been closely tied to its ability to compete in foreign markets.  It has also
benefited from strong government support through special trade and investment regimes.  The close
interlocking of the Mexican manufacturing sector with production chains in the United States has
brought about considerable benefits;  it has, thoug h, exposed the sector to U.S. cyclical downturns, as
evidenced by the significant contraction of manufacturing activity since late 2000.
In the services sector, important changes have been made to the legal and institutional
framework, often secured or otherwise linked to Mexico's multilateral and preferential liberalization
initiatives.  The degree of state involvement has continued to decline in recent years.  Increased
competition and growing foreign participation have gone hand-in-hand with major adjustments to the
market structure of key activities, notably financial and telecommunications services.  However,
competition policy concerns have arisen in recent years in the telecommunications market, and in
domestic transport, which remains largely closed to foreign participation.PRESS/TPRB/190
Page 9
MORETRADE POLICY REVIEW BODY
MEXICO
Report by the Government of Mexico -- Part II and III
An open trade policy as one of the central elements of Mexico's development strategy
Mexico embarked upon the process of economic liberalization more than 15 years ago, with
its accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986, and has been increasing
its presence on international markets ever since.
The trade and investment liberalization strategy has had a significant impact on the country's
economic growth, which has been strengthened by permanent and reliable access to foreign marketsand improvements to the regulatory framework of the national economy.
International trade negotiations are a key element of this strategy, since they provide greater
security of access to the most important world markets for Mexican products, generate long-term
investment, promote national productivity and the use of new technologies, and boost export volume
by further diversifying the target markets for Mexican products.
The real significance of Mexico's trade liberalization lies in the fact that it is a catalyst for
national development, given that it helps to bring new regions and firms into the fold of international
trade.  It will thus continue to encourage the creation of more and better jobs and balanced regional
development.
Mexico is intent on involving more firms in export activities, since experience shows that this
is a successful way to boost sales, create better-paid employment and modernize domestic industry.  It
also opens up possibilities of accessing new markets and quality inputs and creating strategic alliances
which promote access to new technologies for the production industry.  The 21,477 exporters in
Mexico in 1993 had increased by 70 per cent to 36,422 by 2000.  However, if the goals of
diversifying and boosting the country’s penetration in international markets are to be achieved, thisfigure must reach 70,000 by the end of this term of government.
In the early 1980s, Mexican exports depended almost exclusively on petroleum.
Hydrocarbons, the foreign sales of which represented the main source of government revenue, were
Mexico's main export product and accounted for 70 per cent of the country's total exports in 1982.
The pattern of exports has, however, radically changed.  In 2001, 89 per cent of Mexican exports weremanufactured goods.  Nevertheless, our exports must continue to encompass new products and
sectors.
Higher domestic value added per unit exported needs to be incorporated if the benefits of the
penetration of Mexican products on international markets are to be maximized.  The supply of inputs
to export firms is one way of promoting the international integration of domestic firms.
Mexico and the multilateral trading system
Mexico considers the WTO the main mechanism for both trade liberalization and the
establishment of a framework based on world trading rules. Mexico's trade liberalization and
participation in the multilateral trading system have played a very important role in boosting its
exports, spurring the economy and stimulating employment.PRESS/TPRB/190
Page 10
Mexico's accession to the GATT was motivated by the desire to create an environment
conducive to economic activity by taking advantage of, firstly, the opening up of world markets with
the lowering of trade barriers;  secondly, the certainty which stems from foreign trade operations
governed by the clear and transparent rules and discip lines of the multilateral trading system;  thirdly,
the fact that the rules and disciplines established by the WTO prevent the adoption of unilateral trade
measures; and finally, the possibility of having recourse to a trade dispute settlement mechanism.  Theconclusion of the Uruguay Round and establishment of the WTO made the benefits of participating in
the multilateral trading system even more obvious.
In this context, with a view to furthering its economic opening, creating greater opportunities
for developing countries and strengthening the multilateral trading system, Mexico supported further
trade liberalization in the form of the launch of a new round of multilateral negotiations at the Fourth
WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001.  The agenda of this Round is
sufficiently wide-ranging to cover the interests of all participants, in particular developing countries.It is against this backdrop that Mexico will ho st the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in 2003.
END