RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/TPR/G/124
4 November 2003
(03-5679)
Trade Policy Review Body Original:  Spanish
TRADE POLICY REVIEW
CHILE
Report by the Government
Pursuant to the Agreement Establishing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
(Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization), the policy statement by the Chilean Government is attached.
Note: This report is subject to restricted circulation and press embargo until the end of the meeting
of the Trade Policy Review Body on Chile.Chile WT/TPR/G/124
Page 3
CONTENTS
Page
I. MACROECONOMIC EN VIRONMENT ..................................................................................4
II. TRADE POLICY................................................................................................................ ........7WT/TPR/G/124 Trade Policy Review
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I. MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
1. Chile's macroeconomic policy rests on three pillars:  (i) a monetary policy directed at
achieving inflation targets;  (ii) exchange flexibility;  (iii) a prudent tax policy design, based on the
structural surplus rule.
2. Thanks to these policies and to the transparency  of its institutions, an open trade regime and
sound banking systems, Chile has been able to maintain its stability and a reasonable economicgrowth rate in spite of the difficult external situation of the past few years.
External situation
3. The international situation as it applies to Chile can be described in terms of four main trends:
(i) the low growth rate affecting its main trading partners;  (ii) the fall in the price of its main exportproducts;  (iii) the high price of oil;  (iv) the significant decrease in capital flows towards the
emerging economies.
4. Indeed, the period from 1997 to 2003 was characterized by a series of shocks, both real and
financial which, generally speaking, were distinctly negative.  Also noteworthy during this period was
the growing integration of international financial markets, which meant that the impact of certain
events, which at one point appeared to be regional, rapidly spread to the rest of the world, affecting
other economies to an ever greater extent.  Meanwhile, in the United States, the driving force of the
world economy during much of the 1990's, the technology share price bubble burst in March 2000,
exerting a negative impact on world economic activit y.  And just when the international situation
seemed to be recovering, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 took place, dealing a serious blow
to investor and consumer confidence.  This was followed by a series of accounting scandals in major
US corporations, with their inevitable impact on share prices and investment decisions.
5. More recently, starting in the second half of 2002, markets began to focus on the political and
economic situation in Brazil, which was in a pre-election period.  As a result of all this international
upheaval, international financial markets were highly volatile.  Added to this was the uncertainty with
respect to the impending war in Iraq, which caused oil prices to rise, a trend which lasted until the first
quarter of 2003.
6. The prices of Chile's main export products fell sharply with the slackening of world economic
activity.  Copper deserves a special mention, not only because it is Chile's main export, but also
because it suffered additionally from a significant decline during the second half of the 1990's.
7. The deteriorating international situation turned ou t to be a determining factor in the decline of
the country's leading macroeconomic indicators.  The table below shows the main indicators,comparing the period 1990-1996 with the period 1997-2002.Chile WT/TPR/G/124
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Period Average GDP
growth (%)Average growth
in domestic
spending (%)Average
annual
inflation (%)Rate of
investment (%
of GDP)Average
employment rate
(%)Current
account deficit
(% of GDP)
1990-96 7.8 9.1 14.7 22.8 7.3 -2.6
1997-02 3.1 2.5 4.1 24.2 8.2 -2.1
Source: Central Bank of Chile
8. In spite of the fact that it is located in a region that suffered considerably from the negative
international environment, Chile maintained growth rates similar to those recorded at the world level,
and higher than those recorded in the rest of the region.  In fact, Latin America grew at an average
rate of only 1.8 per cent per year during the period 1997-2002.
Monetary and exchange policies
9. With the deterioration in the terms of trade and the evolution of domestic spending, by 1998
there was a threat that the growth in expenditure would drive the current account deficit of the
balance-of-payments to dangerous levels which would be impossible to finance soundly.  A tight
monetary policy helped to adjust expenditure in 1998, and this was followed by repeated decreases in
the monetary policy rate which helps the economy to recover in the past few years.  However, the
lower growth rate and increased uncertainty abroad caused the investment rate to drop fromapproximately 26 per cent between 1995 and 1998 to 23 per cent in the years that followed.
Meanwhile, private consumption experienced a slow recovery.  As a result, the rate of growth of
domestic demand decreased to an average of 2.5 per cent during the period 1997-2002.
10. The policy framework that prevailed until 1996 was not entirely in line with the new
international situation.  The introduction of the inflation target scheme at the beginning of the 1990'sand the subsequent establishment of a floating exchange rate regime in September 1999 provided the
flexibility needed to avoid a major crisis in the fa ce of the international financial imbalances of the
past few years.  Unlike what happened in a number of countries that floated their currencies, including
Chile in the past, by carefully preparing the flotat ion Chile was able to avoid any destabilization and
contribute to establishing the credibility of the Central Bank, in spite of the fairly sharp fluctuations inthe price of oil, the global slowdown and a depr eciation in the exchange rate.  The new policy
framework enabled Chile to stabilize inflation expectations at 3 per cent.  At the same time, financial
integration was deepened, monetary and financial policy was fine-tuned and the operations of the
Central Bank were extensively modernized.
11. As could be expected, the new domestic and external situation during the period 1997-2003
meant substantial changes in the key relative prices in the Chilean economy.  Particularly as from
1999, which saw the introduction of exchange rate flexibility, the real exchange rate served as amechanism to absorb external shocks:  real depreciation boosted the tradeable goods sectors of the
economy and compensated in part for labour market rigidities.WT/TPR/G/124 Trade Policy Review
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12. Following the tight monetary policy applied in the wake of the Russian financial crisis, the
monetary policy interest rate was repeatedly lowered, decreasing from a UF ( Unidad de Fomento  -
Chilean monetary unit) plus 8.5 per cent1 at the end of 1998 to 2.75 per cent as of January 2003 – the
second of these values was defined in pesos following the nominalization of monetary policy in the
middle of 2001.  Moreover, during 2001 and 2002, there were Central Bank interventions in the
exchange market that were announced beforehand and involved limited amounts.  The purpose ofthese interventions was to avoid over-reaction by the local exchange rate and the adverse economic
effects that this could entail.
13. The last 6 years have also seen significant progress in the liberalization of the capital account
of the balance-of-payments.  This fits in with the efforts to avoid movements in the real exchange rate
beyond what is considered reasonable for a small economy open to international trade.  Among themost important measures taken is the elimination of non-interest-bearing reserve requirements for
capital inflows and the elimination of the one-year residence requirement for certain forms of capital.
These regulations, which helped to maintain domesti c interest rates at a higher level than foreign
interest rates, were imposed to ensure that the ex change rate was not affected during a restrictive
policy cycle.  However, the development of hedgin g instruments together with the increased maturity
of the Chilean financial system and the credibility of its macroeconomic policies made it possible to
eliminate these restrictions definitively in April 2001.
14. The Central Bank was successful in its effort to ensure currency stability and normal domestic
and foreign payment operations.  The 1990's began with an inflation rate of 26 per cent, which was
gradually brought down to one digit in 1995, subsequently reaching a level comparable to that of the
industrialized countries and becoming considerably less volatile.  This performance is the direct result
of the monetary policy applied during that period.  Indeed, during those years the Central Bank soughtresolutely to reduce annual inflation to the point where it could be contained in the 2 to 4 per cent
range, centered around 3 per cent.  Using the monetary policy interest rate as its main tool, it was able
to maintain inflation within the target range, smoot hing the economic cycle resulting from rigidities in
the economy, but at the same time working according to  the principle that monetary policy is neutral
in the long term, so that it does not substantially affect actual economic growth trends.
15. In practice, the price stability objective has meant permanently containing the inflation rate -
now comparable to the rate prevailing in the indust rialized countries – within a target range of 2 to
4 per cent, centring on 3 per cent.  Thus, for the first time in its recent history, Chile achieved
permanent price stability:  indeed, it should be remembered that on many occasions, Chile tried to
control its inflation without success or with on ly fleeting success, leading to serious external
imbalances and more inflation.  In contrast, the adoption over the past few years of an inflation target
system coupled with floating exchange rates has b een successful in keeping inflation under control.
The Central Bank has also managed, in spite of the major external shocks, to implement a monetary
and financial policy that has ensured normal domestic and foreign payments operations.  This has
been possible thanks to the modernization efforts, which were needed to ensure that in spite of the
adverse international financial situation, its financial system was capable of providing liquidity when
the economy needed it.
                                                     
1 The Unidad de Fomento  (UF) is one of the readjustment systems authorized by the Central Bank of
Chile under Article 35.9 of its Constitutional Organic Law.  The UF is readjusted as from the 10th day of each
month until the 9th day of the following month, on a daily basis, in accordance with the variation in the
consumer price index, as determined by the National Institute of Statistics, during the calendar month
immediately preceeding the period for which the unit in question is being calculated.Chile WT/TPR/G/124
Page 7
Fiscal policy
16. The chief fiscal policy innovation was the introduction of the so-called structural surplus rule,
which stipulates that the calculation of the annual budget should produce a surplus of 1 per cent of
GDP, assuming a level of activity at  a normal rate of utilization of factors.  In addition, given the
importance of copper to tax revenue, consideration is given to future copper price estimates.  Thevarious inputs used in these calculations are supplied by independent experts and processed according
to a standard methodology by the Ministry of Finance.  The goal is to provide greater transparency
and certainty in the implementation of fiscal policy, a matter to which Chile attaches the utmost
importance in view of the prevailing uncertainty in the world, and particularly in the region.
Outlook
17. The different elements described in this section constitute some of the most important factors
in placing the Chilean economy back on the road to  growth.  Controlled inflation, the structural
surplus rule, and efficient monetary and financial policies form an essential part of the framework
within which private operators, investors and the go vernment can conduct their activities in the best
possible conditions and without added obstacles, to ensure faster growth in the future.
18. According to the most recent Central Bank Monetary Policy Report available when this report
was being prepared (September 2003), the evoluti on and outlook of the main economic variables were
as follows:
2002 (p) 2003 (f) 2004 (f)
GDP 2.1 3.0-3.5 4.0-5.0
Domestic income 3.1 3.1 5.1
Domestic demand 2.2 3.2 5.6Exports of goods and services 0.5 5.7 6.4
Imports of goods and services 0.5 6.3 9.9
Current account (% of GDP) -0.8 -0.5 -0.7Price of copper* 70.8 77.5 80.4
Inflation 3.1% 3.5%
(p) Preliminary
(f) Projected
* Cents per pound on the London Metal Exchange, average
Source: Central Bank of Chile
II. TRADE POLICY
19. Chile has a relatively small economy, highly dependant on foreign trade.  Consequently, over
the past few years, and with the support of the majority of the population, Chile's trade policy has
given priority to improving and ensuring access for its goods and services to the most important
markets and to stimulating domestic and foreign investment.
20. Continuing and developing the strategy adopted at the beginning of the 1990's, Chile has
pursued its objectives through a "multidimensional" trade policy.  This has involved the consolidationWT/TPR/G/124 Trade Policy Review
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of its unilateral policy of openness as well as the negotiation of new bilateral free trade agreements,
the fine-tuning of existing agreements, and active participation in regional and multilateral forums and
negotiations.
21. As described in the previous section, Chile's trade policy in the six-year period from 1998 to
2003 was developed in a difficult global economic environment.  In this new context, different from
what the country had experienced during most of the 1990's, trade policy took on an even moreimportant role.  Chile opted for an outward orientation as a key tool for achieving sustainable
economic recovery, both through its unilateral policy of openness and through trade negotiations at
various levels.
22. This is why there are various new elements to be highlighted in Chile's trade policy with
respect to the previous report (1997).  We shall begin by discussing the developments that took placeat the national level before going on to examine recent bilateral, regional and multilateral
developments.
23. Chile has maintained its policy of applying a uniform overall tariff to all imports, almost
without exception.  From 1999 to 2003, Chile's applied MFN tariff was unilaterally phased down
from 11 per cent to 6 per cent.  This low and uniform applied tariff has not only helped to allocateresources more efficiently, but it has also been f undamental in enabling Chile to negotiate bilaterally
with different partners.  Without this distinctive element of Chile's trade policy, the risk of
incoherence among the different agreements and of ending up with a highly differentiated tariff
structure would have been too great.  It should be  pointed out that the principle of refraining from
treating the different productive sectors in a differentiated manner is not confined to trade policy only,
but is an extremely important element of Chile's economic policy in general.
24. Secondly, alongside the tariff reduction, a safeguard regime was established in 1999 by Law
No. 19.612.  This regime is not only fully consistent with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, but in
fact goes beyond that Agreement in several respects.  For example, the maximum duration of a
safeguard measure is limited to one year, renewable only once for a maximum of one year.
25. Thirdly, the process of adapting various schemes for the promotion of production to the
requirements of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures – for example, thesimplified refund of exporters and the deferred payment of tariffs on capital goods – was continued.
In the same spirit, the so-called draft "miscell aneous (omnibus) law on WTO compliance", submitted
to Congress at the end of 1999 and now ready to be passed, introduces amendments to Chile's
regulations in areas such as customs valuation, border measures to combat the import of pirated
goods, the protection of various categories of intellectual property and the development of technicalregulations.
26. Finally, Chile's policy of openness has not been limited to goods alone.  In the area of
investment and services, Chile also has an open regime which does not discriminate between nationals
and foreigners, and which often goes beyond its GATS commitments.
Bilateral initiatives
27. As already stated, sufficient unilateral liberalization is a prerequisite for an effective trade
policy.  However, unilaterally opening up is not enough in itself to achieve all of the trade policy
objectives pursued, in that it does not provide access to other markets.  The best way to attain that
objective, in the case of a small and open economy like Chile, is through multilateral negotiations.Chile WT/TPR/G/124
Page 9
However, that alternative is not always available.  Similarly, because of the actual nature of any
interaction among large numbers of participants with varying interests, negotiations tend to be slow
and their results do not always match our expectations and needs.  A small country like Chile has a
limited capacity to exert any influence in the resolu tion of these problems.  Consequently, bilateral
initiatives are useful as a supplementary way of achieving substantial results more rapidly than would
be possible at the multilateral level.  Bilateral negotiations provide a particularly effective alternativewhen they are conducted, as in the case of Chile, with the country's main markets.
28. During the period from 1998 to 2003, Chile negotiated new trade agreements or strengthened
existing agreements with all of Latin America.  It also negotiated free trade agreements with some of
its main trading partners outside the region.  Thus, at the time of submission of this report, an
agreement with the European Union was alre ady in force and the Congress was examining
agreements with the United States, Korea and the European Free Trade Association.
29. In the near future, more than 75 per cent of Chile's foreign trade will be conducted free of
tariffs, implying a potential preferential market for producers installed in Chile of some 1,200 million
persons.  It should be added that some 50 agreements for the reciprocal promotion and protection of
investments have been concluded, as well as 37 air transport agreements and 13 double taxationagreements.
30. This bilateral opening up is consistent with a development strategy based on an economy
open to the world, competitive in terms of products and equitable in its performance.  It has helped to
reduce the external vulnerability of the economy, to consolidate and extend access for its goods and
services to the leading world export markets, to make the country more attractive for foreign
investment, to diversify exports, and to develop clear and stable rules for trade in goods and services
and for investment.
31. As a result of the bilateral treaties concluded with the world's two leading powers, Chilean
products will no longer face tariff escalation and/or ta riff peaks, they will be produced with cheaper
and more modern inputs, and they will be transported to their destinations at lower transport and
insurance costs.  All of these factors will boost the value added of Chile's exports.
32. It should further be pointed out that although the countries with which it has negotiated trade
agreements vary considerably, Chile has tried to maintain a certain coherence in its negotiations,
which means that each new agreement negotiated must be consistent with those that already exist.
Above all, the trade agreements recently concluded by Chile either do not provide for the exclusion of
any products, or they do so for a very limited number of products.  They also contain disciplines in the
area of services and investment as well as in other areas such as intellectual property, governmentprocurement, trade defense mechanisms, transparency, and bilateral dispute settlement mechanisms.
33. The effects of these bilateral agreements go beyond merely improving the conditions of
reciprocal trade.  For example, the growing im portance in the Chilean economy of an increasingly
open trade regime has led to a change in Chile's productive structure.  To a certain extent, this change
can already be felt today, for example in the use of agricultural land, where the area devoted to fruit,vegetables, vines and forest plantations has considerably increased at the expense of annual crops and
grassland.  This shift in production should speed up in the coming years.  We hope that the change
will be fully reflected in the next trade policy review in 2009, once the trade agreements with our
main partners have entered more advanced stages of implementation.WT/TPR/G/124 Trade Policy Review
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34. At the same time, these agreements may have macroeconomic effects in that they reduce the
volatility of growth.  External volatility will decrease with the diversification of exports and with the
stabilization of capital flows resulting from increased  certainty for investors in taking their investment
decisions.  At the domestic level, these bilateral agreements will reinforce the policy of openness and
the development strategy based on exports and the attraction of foreign direct investment.
Bilateral initiatives in Asia
35. For years, Chile has been expanding its trade in the Asia Pacific region.  For example, Japan
is Chile's second trading partner, while China and Korea are among Chile's five or six main
destination markets.
36. The free trade agreement concluded with South Korea in February 2003 is the first
trans-Pacific agreement of its kind, and places Chile in a privileged position to strengthen its
economic ties with Pacific Asia and act as  a bridge between Asia and South America.
37. Chile intends to continue expanding its commercial presence in Pacific Asia.  It is currently in
the initial stages of negotiating a free trade agreement with New Zealand and Singapore, and it is
holding discussions with Japanese agencies and with business associations to facilitate reciprocalaccess of exports.
Bilateral initiatives in America
38. During the first half of the 1990's, Chile developed a network of economic complementarity
agreements with many of the Latin American countries, following the LAIA format.  These are
agreements negotiated under the Enabling Clause, which regulate only trade in goods and contain
limited disciplines.  Things had already begun to change with the negotiation of agreements withCanada and Mexico, and the situation continued to evolve with the negotiation of an agreement
between Chile and four Central American countries:  Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Guatemala and El
Salvador.  This agreement has common disciplines, but market access was negotiated bilaterally.  To
date, the agreement has entered into force with Costa Rica and El Salvador.
39. Chile's most important trade initiative on the American continent since the last trade policy
review is unquestionably the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, which it finished
negotiating at the end of 2002.  At the time of presentation of this report, the Agreement is being
examined by the Chilean Congress.
40. The United States is Chile's main trading partner and its main foreign investor.  The free trade
agreement will make it easier to increase the value added of Chilean exports, and it is expected to helpboast investment and deepen our capital market.  It also establishes clear and transparent rules for
settling trade disputes.
41. This Free Trade Agreement also shows that a developing country can reach a mutually
satisfactory and comprehensive agreement with a developed country, an agreement which does not
merely focus on market access, but also attaches importance to institutional matters that contribute totransparency and improved conditions of competition which, over time, will benefit all countries that
trade with Chile.Chile WT/TPR/G/124
Page 11
Bilateral initiatives in Europe
42. Chile has consolidated its relations with most of Europe.  Thus, 1 February 2003 saw the
entry into force of the free trade agreement betw een Chile and the European Union, an agreement
which covers not only trade issues, but political and cooperation areas as well.  In the political area,
the agreement seeks to promote, disseminate and defend democratic values, while in the area ofcooperation, it seeks to contribute to the application of the objectives and principles of the Agreement,
including, in particular, the following areas:  science, technology and information society;  culture,
education and audiovisual media;  and social cooperation.
43. In the economic and trade area, the Agreement seeks progressive and reciprocal liberalization
of market access for goods, services and government procurement.  At the same time, it establishesdisciplines to stimulate the development of trade in areas such as intellectual property, technical
standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, competition policy and customs procedures.  It also
introduces a dispute settlement mechanism.
44. Alongside this deepening of its relations with the European Union, in March 2003 Chile
signed a free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which, at the timethis report was being prepared, was before the Chilean Legislature.  The Agreement with EFTA is as
comprehensive as the agreement with the EU.  It regulates trade in goods and services, government
procurement, and various trade disciplines, including the reciprocal elimination of anti-dumping
duties and a dispute settlement mechanism to resolve any disagreements between the parties.
Regional initiatives
45. Alongside the bilateral agreements, Chile has continued to participate actively in regional
bodies.  These include, in particular, the Free Tr ade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC).
46. In the framework of the APEC, Chile continues to contribute – as established in its Individual
Action Plan – to the achievement of the Bogor goals by 2010.  Chile will be serving as Coordinator of
APEC in 2004, and in that capacity, it hopes that the work conducted by APEC will serve as an inputin the different areas of negotiation within the WTO.
47. Similarly, Chile has participated actively in the negotiation of the FTAA, and will continue to
do so.  It aims to achieve a balanced and broad agreement that is consistent with the rules and
disciplines of the WTO, that takes account of the differences in size and level of development of the
participating economies, and that results in a single commitment benefitting all participants.
48. For Chile, the FTAA represents an opportunity to negotiate on important subjects such as
services, investment and government procur ement with its MERCOSUR and Andean Community
neighbours – with which, at this point, it has only tariff agreements under the LAIA – which represent
important destinations for its investments and supply of services.  Chile would also like to have a
good common institutional framework for the settlement of any trade disputes.
Participation in the World Trade Organization
49. Since its last trade policy review in 1997, Chile has unwaveringly maintained its commitment
to the multilateral trading system as represented by the WTO.  Thus, it actively supported efforts to
launch a new round of negotiations in the Ministerial Conferences in Seattle (1999) and Doha (2001).WT/TPR/G/124 Trade Policy Review
Page 12
Chile welcomed the launching of the Doha Development Round, which represents an opportunity to
settle serious problems in our trade relations which have proven impossible to solve in the context of
bilateral or regional agreements.  This has been the case, in particular, for agricultural subsidies and
the abuse of anti-dumping measures.  Likewise, the Doha Development Round has provided Chile
with a potential to considerably improve access for its exports to important markets with which it has
no preferential trade arrangements, particularly in Asia.
50. In line with these objectives, Chile has submitted various negotiating proposals and has
participated actively in formal and informal coalit ions with other Members which share its interests.
These coalitions include, in particular, the Cairns Group and, more recently, the G21 in agriculture,
and the Friends of the Anti-Dumping Negotiations (FANs).  We have also been active in other areas
of the Doha Development Round such as market access for non-agricultural products and the reformof the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
51. The importance that Chile attributes to the WT O is not limited to the gains to be achieved
through negotiation.  For Chile, the WTO also derives its importance from the ongoing work of its
different technical bodies, above all the Dispute Settlement Body.  This is the mechanism that
ultimately ensures that multilateral trade rules are respected and that countries of extremely variedpolitical and economic weight can solve their problems on the basis of commonly agreed rules, on an
equal footing, and with the full opportunity to present their arguments, rather than being subjected to
the decisions of the most powerful.  Chile has in fact been active in using the DSB as complainant,
respondent and third party.
Conclusion
52. During the period from 1998 to 2003, Chile pursued and consolidated the strategy it had
adopted at the beginning of the 1990's through a "multidimensional" trade policy.  This policy was
developed in a difficult global and regional economic environment.  In this new context, different
from what the country had experienced during most of the 1990's, trade policy took on an even more
important role.  Chile opted for an outward orientation as a key tool for achieving sustainable
economic recovery, both through its unilateral policy of openness and through trade negotiations atvarious levels.  The choice was a successful one, which helped Chile to maintain its levels of stability
and to continue along the path to growth.
53. Chile's participation in the WTO – not only in its regular work, but particularly in the
negotiations of the Doha Development Round - is an essential component of its trade strategy for the
coming years.  Chile hopes that ambitious results in the current round will provide a substantialimpetus to its domestic economy, create more jobs and generate exports with a higher value added.
54. For all of these reasons, Chile deeply regrets the recent failure of the Cancún Ministerial
Conference.  It maintained its constructive and flexible position throughout the preparatory process
for Cancún and during the Ministerial Conference itself.  It had high expectations which have now at
least been postponed.  Chile hopes that the Cancún failure does not lead to a loss of interest in theWTO by its more influential Members.  This would be negative for all Members of the Organization,
but above all for the most vulnerable Members.  We remain committed to the Doha Development
Round, and are ready to contribute, individually or together with other Members, to ensuring that
negotiations can be resumed as soon as possible on a solid basis.
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