RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/AG/R/19 
13 May 2005  
 (05-1944) 
Committee on Agriculture 
Special Session   
 
 
SUMMARY REPORT ON THE THIRTIETH MEETING  
OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, SPECIAL SESSION  
HELD ON 17 MARCH AND 19 APRIL 2005 
 
Note by the Secretariat1 
 
 
1. The Special Session of the Committee on Agricu lture, which was established by the General 
Council (WT/GC/M/53), is pursuing negotiations under paragraphs 13, 14 and other relevant 
provisions of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  The thirtieth formal meeting was held on 17 March 
and 19 April 2005 under the chairmanship of Ambassador Tim Groser. 
2. The Chairman, with the agreement of Members, opened the meeting on Thursday, 17 March 
2005 (instead of Friday, 18 March as stated in the convening airgram).  The agenda as contained in WTO/AIR/2512 of 17 February 2005 was adopted.   After a few delegations took the floor, the 
Chairman suspended the meeting.  On 19 Apri l 2005, the meeting was resumed and concluded 
without any interventions by delegations.   
I
TEM A (I):  STATEMENT BY CHAIR  
3. The Chairman referred to his comments made at the preceding informal meeting of the 
Committee on Agriculture, Special Session and noted th at he had no additional statement to make.   
ITEM A (II):  STATEMENTS BY PARTICIPANTS  
4. The representative of Brazil noted the Chair's efforts to advance the work throughout the 
March "Agriculture Week" and assured of Brazil's co -operation with a view to reaching an agreement 
on issues discussed during the week.   
5. With respect to the time devoted to negotiations , the representative of Mauritius noted that the 
next "Agriculture Week" in April would span over se ven days of which all could be usefully utilized.  
Commenting on the process and the Chair's "system of locks" for conducting consultations, Mauritius 
considered that negotiations were reaching a point at which it would be  desirable that checklists used 
in consultations with smaller groups  of Members be circulated to the wider Membership for the sake 
of transparency.  This had been the practice in  the past and had been done for the December 
"Agriculture Week". 
6. A number of delegates requested that their statements made at the informal Special Session be 
included in the summary record of  the formal Special Session.  The Chairman reminded delegates of 
the standard practice that any delegation wishing to  have their informal statements included in the 
summary report of the formal Special Session, would need to submit, electronically, to the Secretariat, 
their statement as soon as possible.   
                                                      
1 This document has been prepared under the Secret ariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice 
to the positions of Members or to their rights or obligations under the WTO. TN/AG/R/19 
Page 2  
 
 7. Statements from the following delegations were forwarded to the Secretariat and are attached 
to this report:  Argentina (paragraph 49; and differential export taxes), Bolivia (paragraph 49); 
Bulgaria (paragraph 49); Chile (paragraph 49); Ch ina (implementation of commitments in export 
competition; recently-acceded Members; and export  taxes); Colombia (sectoral initiatives; and 
conversion of specific tariffs to ad valorem  tariffs for the purposes of the tiered reduction formula);  
Croatia (on behalf of the recently-acceded Memb ers – paragraph 47);  Cu ba (differential export 
taxes);  Switzerland (on behalf of the G10 – tariff si mplification; and special agricultural safeguard);  
Brazil (on behalf of the G20 – implementation of commitments in export competition; tariff 
escalation; tariff simplification; special agricu ltural safeguard; LDCs; recently-acceded Members; 
monitoring and surveillance; paragraph 49; and th e Blue Box); India (sectoral initiatives); Kenya 
(paragraph 49);  Mauritius (on behalf of the ACP – implementation of expor t competition elements; 
tariff escalation; tariff simplification; special ag ricultural safeguard; LDCs; cotton; recently-acceded 
Members; and, monitoring and surveillance);  Moldova (recently-acceded Members); South Africa 
(paragraph 49); Switzerland (geographical indicati ons); Chinese Taipei (recently-acceded Members); 
and Zambia (on behalf of the LDCs – paragraphs 45 and 46). 
I
TEM B: OTHER BUSINESS  
8. There was no discussion under this agenda item.  TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 3 
 
 
 Statements made in the Informal Special Session  
Statement by Argentina  
 
 
Paragraph 49  
  Mr. Chairman, allow me to recall the statement made at the November Special Session by the 
representative of Brazil on behalf of the G-20:  "I n that respect, Mr. Chairman, the inclusion of 
paragraph 49 in the December Session discussions causes great concern for the G-20.  To put issues 
that are characterized in the Framework as 'of in terest but not agreed' on the same level as the 
negotiating pillars could be unde rstood as an implicit reinterpretation of the Framework." 
  We consider it unnecessary to refer to paragra ph 49 issues, since it has been decided within 
the Framework Agreement that such issues are not agreed and therefore need not be considered.  
Furthermore, bearing in mind the limited time available and the considerable amount of work left to 
do, it is not appropriate to spend time discussing the th ree issues that are not agreed simply to satisfy 
the wishes of a small number of Members.   The question that arises is this:  if these Me mbers have now taken such a keen interest in 
paragraph 49 issues, why did their Ministers accept such strongly worded language as "not agreed"?  
The answer is because they did not dare oppose paragraph 49.  The reasoning behind this obvious 
behaviour during a diplomatic negotia tion is that they did not wish to forfeit the "successes" achieved 
in other parts of the Framework Agreement, notably  in the area of Market Access.  Therefore, with 
these successes assured, they are now coming back for more.   As I am sure you are aware, Mr. Chairman, behaviour of this kind is inconsistent with 
diplomatic practice and the principles of international law, such as the principle of bona fide.  
Negotiating in good faith is essential for fostering conf idence, which is in turn necessary in order to 
work flexibly and reach agreements.  Some Member s have accepted a greater degree of flexibility as 
regards Market Access, and this must be respected across the whole of the Agreement.  What is more, 
as the Latin expression goes, "pacta sunt servanda";  in  other words, agreements must be observed.  If 
all the Members were to act in the way that so me are acting over paragra ph 49, we would no longer 
have a Framework Agreement.  In spite of this , Argentina has faithfully respected the Framework 
Agreement, even in those areas in which its wishes are not reflected. 
  Moreover, if an expression as clear as "not agreed" can mean something different to one 
delegation, what should we expect from other Fram ework Agreement issues that are agreed or are 
being negotiated? 
  In our country, the sectors concerned will ask themselves:  why does something that is "not 
agreed" suddenly need to be negotiated?  Can we change other parts of the Framework Agreement in 
our favour?  What sort of agreement is the Framew ork Agreement?  Does it apply to all Members, or 
only to some of them? 
 
 Today's discussion on issues not agreed has marked the WTO out from other international organizations, where the rule is that agreements ar e to be respected.  This will not survive political 
scrutiny.  
 Finally, Mr. Chairman, the substance of any one of the paragraph 49 issues is sufficiently 
controversial to have blocked any consensus on a Framework Agreement in July 2004, or at any other 
time.  As far as this matter is concerned, nothing has changed since the night when you prepared the 
text that allowed us to reach an agreement. TN/AG/R/19 
Page 4  
 
 Differential export taxes (paragraph 49) 
 
 
 I will repeat the statement we delivered on be half of a group of developing countries at the 
informal Heads of Delegation meeting on 30 July 2004 contained in JOB(04)/110: 
 
 Export taxes and differential export taxes are e ssential policy instruments and nine out of ten 
Members applying these instruments are developing countries.   There are at least three main reasons why this is so: 
 
 - First, because export duties constitute an im portant and reliable source of revenue.  It 
is also an instrument which can easily be invoked and administered; 
  - Second, to reduce dependence on the export of commodities which are subject to 
volatile price fluctuations that have a di rect impact on the income and livelihood of 
farmers and rural population.  Also, it helps to promote downstream processing 
industries in a context of tariff escalation applied by major importing countries;  and 
  - Third, for food security reasons, to prev ent shortages of primary products and to 
address unfair redistribution of rents in cases of exchange rate distortions. 
 
 Within the rules of the WTO, export taxes a nd differential export taxes are legitimate policy 
instruments.   This clear fact was recently reaffirmed by a Panel in a ruling which established that such 
instruments do not imply financial contributions or revenue forgone by governments.  They cannot be 
considered as subsidies as defi ned under Article 1.1(a) of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement nor, consequently, as any form of export subsidies.   Considering that any change in the WTO rules on such a sensitive question would have required an explicit mandate by our Ministers in Doha and that such mandate does not exist, our 
delegations are not in a position to accept any inclus ion of the question of differential export taxes in 
the negotiating process.   Summing up, our delegations maintain that e xport taxes and differen tial export taxes must 
continue to be legitimate policy instruments, as any attempt to dilute the present rules would be 
detrimental to developing countries and incompatible with the Doha Mandate. 
  
Response to Chile concerning differential export taxes 
 
 I would like to remind my Chilean colleague th at export taxes and differential export taxes are 
essential policy instruments and that nine out of every ten Members applying these instruments are 
developing countries.     Export taxes and differential export taxes are le gitimate policy instruments.  Those with an 
interest in eliminating such taxes are those who wish to force developing countries to continue as 
mere suppliers of raw materials, and it is they w ho apply tariff escalation, thus perpetuating the North-
South pattern of trade in which developing countries have no means of adding value to their products.   
  TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 5 
 
 
  Any attempt to undermine the legitimate and s overeign right of devel oping countries to apply 
export taxes and differential export taxes affects th e right of developing countries to develop their 
economies.     Supporting the elimination of export taxes and differential export taxes plays to the interests 
of those who wish to continue purchasing raw materials and selling manufactured goods.  TN/AG/R/19 
Page 6  
 
  
Statement by Bolivia
 
 
 
Paragraph 49 
 
 On the basis of the comments in the general statement by the G-20 on the interpretation of 
paragraph 49, and on the understanding that we are referring to an issue not agreed , we support the 
statement by Australia for the simple legal reason of competence - geographical indications should be 
negotiated under the TRIPS Agreement - as well as w ith a view to preserving the integrity of such 
indications, as stated by the delegation of the United States. 
     TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 7 
 
 
 Statement by Bulgaria  
  
Paragraph 49 
 
 Mr. Chairman,  
  One of the previous speakers, referring to the July Framework, expressed the view that, since 
in the Framework paragraph 49 issues were described as “not agreed”, it was contrary to international 
law and the principle of pacta sunt servanda  to bring up these issues in the further negotiations. I 
would like to disagree strongly with this view.  
  First, it should be pointed out that negotiations on the extensi on of the additional protection of 
geographical indications, as an outstanding implem entation issue, are manda ted by paragraphs 12 and 
18 of the Doha Declaration and are therefore integr al part of the Doha Development Agenda. It is 
such denial of the mandated character of negotiati ons on the extension of the additional protection of 
geographical indications that would not be in good faith and that would amount to behaviour not 
compatible with the principle of pacta sunt servanda.  Of course, the extension of the additional 
protection of geographical indications is not a ma tter to be dealt with in the negotiations on 
agriculture, but the negotiations on agriculture do  deal with market access issues and we are asking 
precisely for that: improved market access for so me agricultural products with geographical 
indications. The negotiations on agriculture are the appropriate place to negotiate such improved 
market access, which is something entirely different  from the intellectual property rights on the names 
of those products.   Regarding the July Framework, it should be born in mind that it was adopted on the 
understanding, that it deals with several issues, on which there was some agreement, leaving other 
issues for decision at a later stage, so that the so lutions on those issues can become part of the single 
understanding at the end of the negotiations and that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We 
were assured that these issues are not deleted from the Doha Development Agenda, but simply that work has advanced in some of the areas of the negotiations, on the understanding that it will have to 
advance on the other issues. Paragraph 49 issues are precisely such issues. The text of paragraph 49 
means that these issues must be taken up, in orde r to restore the balance of interests. The July 
Framework marks progress on some issues, of interest to some Members, but that progress must be balanced with progress, yet to come, on other issues, of interest to other Members.   For Bulgaria paragraph 49 is of particular importance because of geographical indications. As 
we have pointed out on other occasions, for us geogr aphical indications are also a matter of non-trade 
concerns. What we are asking for in the contex t of agricultural market access negotiations, is 
improved market access for some of our products with  geographical indications. This is a pure market 
access issue and it does not jeopardize the integrity  of the TRIPS Agreement, and does not put the 
balance in the TRIPS Agreement at risk.  It is a pur e market access issue and what we will be doing is 
to request from some participants in the nego tiations improved access for some specific agricultural 
products in their schedules. We intend to do that as part of the modalities and we will not accept 
reductions of tariffs or domestic support under various formulae, if, at the same time, such improved 
market access is not guaranteed. In particular, we  will not accept that such improved market access 
for products with geographical i ndications is negotiated separately, in the post-modalities stage, as 
something different, voluntary and additional to th e reductions to be undertaken under the modalities.  
 
   TN/AG/R/19 
Page 8  
 
 Statement by Chile
 
  
Paragraph 49 issues 
  As stated by Brazil on behalf of the G-20, this  stage of negotiations is not the right time in 
which to discuss Paragraph 49 issues.  For the mome nt, we must concentrate our efforts on the central 
issues relating to the three negotiating pillars.  However, Paragraph 49 issues will need to be 
addressed at a later stage, and each issue discussed on its own merits.  As you are aware, Chile has problems with some of these issues. 
 
 With regard to the specific issue of export taxes, Chile recognises the fact that these are 
permitted instruments applied by a number of Memb ers for various reasons.  However, in certain 
circumstances these instruments can have a distortiv e effect on international trade, giving rise to 
artificially competitive exports.  This is particularly  true when such taxes are applied differentially 
within the same production chain.  Our country has su ffered the direct consequences of this situation 
in specific productive sectors.   Consequently, our delegation favours greater e xport tax discipline.  Specifically, we believe 
that these instruments should initially be subject to bindings and later to gradual reductions including 
a harmonizing factor, as is the case with import tariffs.  TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 9 
 
 
 Statement by China  
 
 
Implementation of commitments in ex port competition - paragraphs 20-24 
  Mr. Chairman, China supports the statement made  by Egypt on behalf of the G-20 and would 
like to add the following points:    Mr. Chairman, among all the elements concer ning the implementation of commitments in 
export competition, the elimination of all forms of export subsidies by a credible end date as required 
by paragraph 17 of the July framework is the mo st important, which will determine the level of 
ambition of the Doha Mandate.  Therefore, the nego tiations should be focused  on deciding the end 
date at an earliest stage and ensuring its credibility.   The second important element is to set up th e schedules of phasing out all forms of export 
subsidies in a parallel and equivalent way.  We are of the view that there should be some detailed 
schedules on how to eliminate the export subsidies fo r the most heavily subsidized products.  One of 
the options for consideration could be the following: as the first instalment and in the first year, the 
final bound levels of budgetary ou tlays and quantities for those products as specified in Members' 
Schedules should be reduced by a significant percentage , and the rest be reduced on an annual basis.  
And the issue of whether the instalments would be  equal or not will necessarily depend on the length 
of the elimination period. 
  And the third important element is that a basic principle of standstill should be preserved, i.e., there should be no new export subsidy programs to be introduced.  
 
Recently-acceded Members (paragraph 47) 
 
 China welcomes the statement made by India on behalf of the G-20, and also would like to 
take this opportunity to reiterate its constant  positions on the issue of recently acceded Members, 
which were clearly demonstrated in its  communication presented in August 2003. 
 
 Mr. Chair, it is well known that as a recently  acceded member, China has made substantive 
commitments in all the three pillars.   In market access , China committed to reduce its tariff from the 
base level of 54 per cent to the final bound level of  15.6 per cent by 2004, 70 per cent lower than its 
base rate in the Uruguay round, which was much higher than the 24 per cent cut for developing 
countries during Uruguay round.  And the volume for each TRQ product that we committed is even 
far beyond the minimum market access requirement fo r developed Members, namely 5 per cent of the 
domestic consumption.  For example, the TRQ vol ume that we committed for wheat, cotton, sugar 
and wool in 2004 accounts for 9 per cent, 14 per cent, 20 per cent, 72 per cent of our average 
domestic consumption respectively in 2002-2004.  In  domestic support, we committed to an 8.5 per 
cent de minimis , rather than 10 per cent for other deve loping Members, meanwhile the development 
programs under Article 6.2 which would have been exempted from reduction commitment for 
developing Members is included in our AMS calcul ation.  In export competition, we committed to 
elimination of export subsidies upon accession.   Mr. Chair, implementation of the accession commitment has already posed huge challenge 
and pressure on China's agriculture and rural deve lopment, which required long-term and arduous 
efforts in economic restructuring.  Further commi tments would make it more difficult for China to 
address the particular concerns, such as food securi ty, rural employment, farmers' income, livelihood 
security of farmers, and poverty reduction, etc.    TN/AG/R/19 
Page 10  
 
  Before fundamental changes take place in the current agriculture  trade system where 
imbalance, unfairness, high distortion and high pr otection prevail, requirement of further reduction 
commitment by RAMs would exacerbate imbalance between RAMs and other Members, leading to deviation from Doha mandate of "establishing a fair trading system".  
 The constructive contributions to the multila teral trading system made by RAMs to 
agriculture trade liberalization must be sufficiently  taken into account and recognized in an objective 
manner.  The modalities to be established must st rike a balance among commitments made by RAMs 
during their accession process and commitment require d by Uruguay Round and to be required by 
Doha Round, thus providing RAMs sufficient flex ibility to effectively address their particular 
concerns across all three pillars. 
  In view of extensive commitment made by RAMs in market access, domestic support and 
export competition, specific flexibility provisions should cover all three pillars.    
 To be specific, the flexibility provisions in market access should include:  exemption from 
further reduction of certain products, lower level of reduction for other products, longer 
implementation period, and de ferred implementation.  In the domestic support pillar, de minimis 
support will be exempt from reduction.  In the expor t competition pillar, monopo ly status of exporting 
STEs in developing country Members should be preserved. 
 
 
Export taxes (paragraph 49)  
 
 China supports the statement made by Argentina on the issue of export tax.    
 China believes justifications given by Argentin a on this policy instrument are very clear, and 
objectives of having this kind of policy instrument  for the purpose of promoting development is 
consistent with the overall objectives of DDA.  We al so feel that reasons given by Argentina are quite 
convincing.  Therefore, we urge Members to cons ider seriously the demand for maintaining this kind 
of policy instrument.  China would also like to take  the opportunity to express our full support to the 
statement made by Brazil on behalf of G-20, concerning status of Para 49 and we'd like to see our 
discussion will focus more on those central issues rela ted to three pillars and we can make progress.  
In this regard, China is prepar ed to work with all the partic ipants to realize the DDA goals. 
  TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 11 
 
 
 Statement by Colombia  
 
 
 
Sectoral Initiatives (paragraph 49) 
 
 Mr. Chairman, we welcome the opportunity you ha ve given us to address paragraph 49 of the 
Working Framework.  Colombia, although well awar e that no agreement has been reached on the 
issues specified in this paragraph has, on sever al occasions in the course of these negotiations, 
expressed an interest in the adoption of sectoral  initiatives, in particular geared towards the 
multilateral liberalization of trade in flowers. 
  This proposal is based on the Doha Decl aration, which recognizes that free trade and 
agricultural market access are critically important for the economic growth of developing countries.  
In light of the foregoing, we consider it essential that tangible results be achieved in favour of 
developing countries. 
  The sectoral initiative we would like to propose for liberalizing trade in flowers is underpinned by the following aspects:   Overview of the world floriculture industry
 
 
Most flower cultivation, around 80 per cent, is  concentrated in developing countries.  
Estimated production by continent is as follows:1 
  Asia/Pacific 62 % 
 Europe 15 % 
 Central and South America 13 %  North America 7 %  Africa 2 %  Middle East 1 %  
 Although the Netherlands is the world's leading fl ower exporter, with a share of 70 per cent, a 
number of developing countries have captured a gr owing share of the market and currently account 
for over 25 per cent:
2 
  Colombia 12 % 
 Ecuador 5 % 
 Kenya 4 %  Israel 3 %  Zimbabwe 2 %   In developing countries such as Colombia, Ecua dor and Kenya, the floriculture industry has 
been characterized by rigorous growth over recent y ears, and has become one of the leading sectors in 
terms of foreign trade and income generation.  
                                                     
 
1 International Association of Horticultural Producers. 
2 Idem . TN/AG/R/19 
Page 12  
 
  The bulk of world imports (67 per cent)  enter developed countries, as follows:
3 
  Germany 16 %  United Kingdom 15 %  United States 11 % 
 Netherlands 8 % 
 France 7 %  Japan 3 %  Italy 3 %  Switzerland 3 % 
 Canada 1 % 
 
 
 Overview of the Colombian floriculture industry
 
 
 The Colombian floriculture industry is markedly  export-oriented, with more than 95 per cent 
of its production destined for international markets.   At domestic level, floriculture is the l eading non-traditional agricultural export sector, 
accounting for 4 per cent of agricultural GDP and 16 per cent of the GDP of the Bogotá-
Cundinamarca region, which is the most populated in the country. 
 
 In 2003, exports of Colombian flowers to talled US$681 million, representing 23 per cent of 
the country's total agricultural exports  and 5 per cent of its overall exports. 
  Between 1977 and 2003, the number of workers directly employed by the floriculture 
industry rose from 25,000 to 94,271, with 65 per cen t of jobs held by women.  The sector also 
generates 80,130 indirect jobs.   Current situation regarding tariffs and tariff quotas for flowers in the major international 
markets and producer countries  
 
 In the US market, bound tariffs range from 4.8 to 6.4 per cent, although flowers enjoy duty-
free entry under bilateral agreements or unilate ral trade preferences, such as the Andean Trade 
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 
(CEBERA) and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) (with the exception of roses).   
 In the European Union, bound tariff levels can reach 12 per cent, but flowers also enjoy duty-
free access under bilateral agreements or under unilateral trade preferences under the GSP. 
  Another major market, Japan, has bound its ta riff rates at zero per cent for flowers and at 
3 per cent for foliage.  
 It should be noted that the above situation benefits flower-exporting countries such as 
Colombia, Ecuador, Kenya, Israel and Zimbabwe.  
                                                     
 
3 Idem . 
  TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 13 
 
 
  Conclusion  
 
 Considering that: 
  Flowers are subject to relatively low WTO bound tariffs in the main markets; 
 
 Most trade is eligible for duty-free treatm ent under preferential arrangements under the GSP 
and trade agreements, and this sectoral initiative does not therefore represent a fiscal sacrifice for 
importing countries in real terms;  
 Although a mechanism such as the GSP has fa cilitated trade in flowers, it provides no 
absolute guarantee with regard to future market conditions;   The bulk of production originates in developing countries, where agriculture is a key source of employment and revenue; 
 
 We propose that, as a result of the Doha R ound, countries establish a multilateral agreement 
whereby parties to the sectoral in itiative bind tariffs at zero and eliminate all tariff quotas for trade in 
flowers under subheadings 0602, 0603 and 0604.   We invite flower-exporting and -importing countri es to join this sectoral initiative with a view 
to determining the modalities to be agreed. 
  
Conversion of specific tariffs to ad valorem  tariffs for the purposes of the tiered reduction 
formula 
  
 Colombia emphasizes the importance of transparen cy and inclusiveness in this process.  We 
agree that whilst there is need to move forward at this stage of the negotiations, much care and 
attention must be given to what exactly is being d one, for, as we say in Colombia, "rushing leads to 
nothing but tiredness".  In regard to this issue, we would like to see specific tariffs converted to 
ad valorem rates for the purposes of the tiered reduction form ula, the critical part of the exercise being 
to determine the tariff line unit price or value th at the countries will have to use to make that 
calculation.  Colombia agrees that the calculation does not have to be totally exact, but, as we have 
said on so many occasions, it does have to reflect r eality as closely as possible; in other words the 
estimated ad valorem  equivalent will have to be as representativ e as possible of the effective level of 
protection of specific tariffs.  Care should therefor e be taken to avoid arriving at a result which, 
through carelessness or oversight, would prevent us from finding the ad valorem  level closest to a 
Member's tariff protection. 
 
 On the basis of the information we have re ceived from a number of Members regarding the 
progress of the simulation exercise, I would like to comment on two technical issues that have aroused 
our concern: 
 
  Filters and 40/20
 
 
  In Colombia's view, the 40 per cent diffe rence between the IDB unit value and the 
COMTRADE unit value is considerable, which explains the limited number of potentially 
problematic tariff lines.  Such is the case when a pplying this filter to the United States, where only 
4 per cent of tariff lines with specific tariffs could give rise to potential problems;  for the European 
Communities the figure is 16 per cent and for Sw itzerland 28 per cent.  We have analysed the 
situation and concluded, as have other Members, that it clearly results from using the COMTRADE 
import unit value as the point of comparison, given the weight of imports of those countries.  We must TN/AG/R/19 
Page 14  
 
 therefore work with other figures, for example 20/10  or 20/15.  We would like to see the results 
obtained by using such figures. 
   Using CIF as a basis
 
 
  In its consultations, Colombia has repeatedly emphasized that this scenario poses a problem, 
and it deplores the fact that the issue has not been  discussed in a transparent manner.  Colombia has 
insisted that countries using an FOB-based custom s valuation system should work on that basis for 
both Integrated Data Base and filter data, and, in  the case of COMTRADE da ta, they should work 
with the export unit value. 
 
  In Colombia's opinion, if a Member uses the FOB value as a basis for applying its specific 
tariffs, then it is unacceptable to calculate the ad valorem  tariff equivalent on a CIF basis, as this 
would produce a higher unit value and, consequently , the country would appl y a smaller reduction in 
the tiered formula.  The difference between the FO B unit value and the CIF unit value will be greater 
for products with a lower unit value, such as co mmodities, where transport costs will weigh more 
heavily than for products with a higher unit value. 
   We have been given various informal explana tions as to why the CIF unit value is used as the 
basis in this exercise, none of which we agree with.  
 
  Firstly, we are told that very few Members a pply tariffs on an FOB basis, yet, few as these 
Members may be (three), they play a critical part in the negotiations, the organization, and international trade in agricultural products , which renders this situation unacceptable. 
   We are also told that this scenario is better  for us, as the filters will cover a greater number of 
tariff lines, yet this idea is absurd if one considers that what is important is the unit value that the 
Member will use in its calculations and the r esults in terms of the level of tariff reduction 
corresponding to each tariff line.  Colombia cannot  accept that a Member should benefit from the 
decision to work in CIF terms and artificially increase  the unit value of 96 per cent of tariff lines with 
specific tariffs, hence effectively applyi ng a lower level of tariff reduction.   
 
  Finally, we have been told that the objec tive is to ensure equal conditions for all Members 
who apply specific tariffs.  This is also unaccep table because the issue here is about having as 
accurate an idea as possible of the level of protection in ad valorem  terms applied by each Member 
over an earlier period of time, without any need for making comparisons.  However, even if we give 
this reason some consideration, we fail to understand why the Members carrying out this exercise 
have agreed to work on the same upward basis, i.e.  in CIF terms, instead of on a downward basis, 
which is what should happen, that is, by agreeing to  work in FOB terms, since we know that those 
using CIF-based valuation do not apply the specific tariff to transport. 
 
 In light of the above, we wish to reiterate the request we have made on so many previous 
occasions, that is, that, at the very least, those Members using an FOB customs valuation system 
should use the IDB unit values in FOB terms and make comparisons with the COMTRADE export 
unit value.  We hope that Colombia's request will be  addressed in this ongoing exercise, so that we 
can join a future consensus on the me thodology to be used in calculating ad valorem tariff 
equivalents.  TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 15 
 
 
 Statement by Croatia on behalf of recently-acceded Members  
(Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Jordan, Moldova And Oman)  
 
 
Recently-acceded Members (paragraph 47)  
 I have the honour to speak today on behalf of six Recently Acceded Members, namely, 
Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Jordan, Moldova a nd Oman.  Our group would like to commend you Mr. 
Chairman, and the Secretariat for the hard work and efforts you are putting in the process.  The 
tangible progress that this group constantly mana ges to achieve in these negotiations could be 
attributed to your skilful and competent guidance.  We are particularly pleased that the model for conducting these negotiations proved to be efficient and helped Members to clarify their positions.  It 
is up to the Members to make the best use of avai lable tools and mechanisms and enable us to reach 
our common goal. 
  The beginning of the common efforts of countries from our group resulted in the text of Paragraph 9 of the Doha declaration, where the gr oundwork for the future treatment of our countries 
has been laid down.  Ever since Doha our group has tried to maintain a proactive approach.  We 
constantly reminded Members of our specific positi on and our concerns within these negotiations by 
drafting negotiating proposals, crafting compromis es, and negotiating directly with our trading 
partners.  Consequently, we succeeded in incorpora ting the kind of language in the Paragraph 47 of 
the July Framework that should be a guarantee for su itable treatment of our countries in the final draft 
of modalities.  To that end, our strong interest is to ensure that concerns of RAMs are considered on 
an equal footing with all other elements of the modalities. 
 
 Since July we have been engaged primarily in listening to other Members and waiting for the 
proposals and initiatives that would bring our group further, for we realise that our question will be 
dealt with at the subsequent stages of the negotiatio ns, after some other questions will be resolved.  
We trust that such sequencing of issues reflects th e specific nature of these negotiations and does not 
imply that any other issue could be regarded as more  important.  As the result of such approach, our 
voice was not permanently present in all the areas of the negotiation, and in all the meetings, but let 
me assure you that we remain engaged and ready to contribute our share in all stages and all areas of 
negotiations.  At this point, let me reiterate the need to avoid future overlapping of important WTO 
meetings, as it is the case this week with Agri culture and NAMA, in order to enable smaller 
delegations to come well-prepared and to full y participate at the meetings.  Our countries' 
performance at the meetings suffers immensely under  such tight scheduling, and this issue will be 
even more important as the negotiating pr ocess progresses to more decisive stages.  
 
 Our extensive market access and domestic support commitments made during the accession 
to the WTO are being widely accepted and recognised, but at the same time there is a considerable 
amount of work still to be done in order to turn this abstract perception in concrete and specific 
provisions that will effectively address our problems a nd concerns.  We believe that such concerns are 
legitimate and they were repeated and ela borated many times during these negotiations.  
 
 The months ahead of us are being widely pe rceived as crucial in the run-up to Hong Kong 
Ministerial.  The deadline for our first milestone along this way is rapidly approaching and we should 
all concentrate on our work on the first approximation of modalities.  In our view, this is the stage 
where the particular interests of Members mu st fully get into the overall picture.   
 TN/AG/R/19 
Page 16  
 
  We all are aware that further reduction in dom estic support and tariff protection are necessary, 
but at the same time we consider that the process to adjust to the international competition requires 
additional flexibility. To adequately address the c oncerns and specific situation of recently acceded 
countries, the modalities in the ar ea of market access should include specific flexibility provisions
 that 
would: 
 
 1. provide for a grace period of at least 4 years after the entry into force of this round 
results;  
 2. exempt low tariffs from further reduction commitments;  3. provide for lower tariff reductions than  those applicable to developed Members; 
 4. provide for a longer period for implementation of the new commitments.  
 
 Additionally, any provision to be agreed fo r a special safeguard instrument, be it SSM or 
SSG, or both, should accordingly be applicable to RAMs.  The new reduction commitments should 
not affect the transitional period for the implementation of the commitments made in accession's negotiations.   In the area of domestic support the grace period for implementation of new commitments 
would be crucial.  We would al so require longer implementation periods in this area, as well as the 
exemption of RAMs from the obligation to reduce de minimis  support. 
  The exercise of AVE conversion is the n ecessary precondition for the successful progressing 
of negotiation in all three pillars.  We strongl y support a rapid conclusi on on the methodology and 
reiterate our readiness to work along the elements to  be agreed.  However, we believe that this 
exercise and its results should not preclude countries from binding their concessions in non ad 
valorem  terms at the end of the round.  
  This group consists of members that have cho sen to liberalize their agricultural markets and 
expose them to a fierce competition from mainly la rger, well subsidized producers coming from more 
developed economies.  The vulnerability of our coun tries when it comes to our domestic agriculture 
policies, and the exceptional political, social and en vironmental importance of the agriculture for our 
countries could not be overstated.  Economies in our  countries are faced with similar structural 
problems, while most painful adjustments are bein g made in the agricultural sector.  Small private 
producers dominate our agricultural production, and many of them face difficulties caused by 
transition of the economy to a market-based econom ic system.  Rapid liberalisation process, which 
came as the result of our accession to the WTO, has cr eated additional structural and social difficulties 
to our farmers that were not easy to digest at once.   Such ambitious undertaking in the liberalisation of 
domestic agricultural markets would pose serious problems even for members on a much more advanced stage of development.  We have trie d to make best use out of our accession processes by 
initiating broad market reform policies in our agricu ltural sectors.  The aim of those reforms is to 
increase efficiency and competitiveness of our produc tion methods and products.  It is a long-term 
process which will hopefully bring fruits at a later stage.   Our countries represent very small percentage of  the total global trade of agriculture products. 
Our level of development and the level of our co mmitments, alongside with our vulnerability in the 
agriculture sector, qualify our countries for special treatment in respect to market access and domestic 
support.  The need for such treatment is written down in the documents th at serve as our working 
basis. I would strongly suggest that we keep tho se arguments in mind when we embark on drafting the 
specific provisions for our countries.   TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 17 
 
 
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, if we are to claim th e political ownership on the result of this round, 
we have to ensure that negotiating process is tr ansparent and inclusive, taking into account all 
concerns of the members. We believe that our par ticular concerns should be addressed in this round if 
we want to achieve balanced result and not deepen further already existing inequalities. 
 TN/AG/R/19 
Page 18  
 
 Statement by Cuba
 
 
 Differential export taxes (paragraph 49) 
  My delegation fully supports the statemen ts by Brazil on behalf of the G-20, which 
substantially set out Cuba's position with regard to the issues specif ied in paragraph 49 of Annex A to 
the July Package.   Over the last five years, discussions on the issu es covered by this para graph have shown that 
Members' positions are opposing and irreconcilable and would significantly complicate the objectives 
approved in the Doha Declaration and, more recently, in the July Package. 
  In this connection, our delegation endorses th e statement by the distinguished Argentine 
delegate, in particular with regard to the possib ility of developing countries applying differential taxes 
to their exports as a legitimate instrument for pur suing their development objectives and to help to 
overcome the present constraints of tariff escalation.   We should like to emphasize that we view as positive the flexibility shown by the Chilean delegation, which, while voicing its specific concerns regarding diffe rential export taxes, raised the 
possibility of future negotiations.  In this resp ect, our delegation endorses the comments by both the 
G-20 and other delegations regarding the absence of any agreement on commencing negotiations on 
these issues;  we therefore wish to make it quite clear  that such interests will have to be addressed in 
another negotiating round, not in the present one.   The Cuban delegation takes note of the stat ements by the US delegate and calls upon 
Members to focus upon the current process of strengthening disciplines on export restrictions pursuant 
to paragraph 50 of Annex A to the July Package with the same intensity as the US delegation 
addressed the issue of eliminating export taxes and, in particular, putting an end to the discretionary 
and discriminatory nature of their application.   Cuba also echoes the concerns expressed by Kenya and India on sectoral initiatives, in that 
these could further marginalize the most vulnerable countries, in particular LDCs. 
   TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 19 
 
 
 Statement by the G-10  
 
 
Tariff Simplification (paragraph 37) 
  With regard to the issue of tariff simplifi cation, G10 understands th at the consultations on 
AVEs have proceeded on the basis that such disc ussion does not reopen the content of the agreed 
Framework. In this regard, we would like to r ecall that paragraph 29 of the Framework clearly 
stipulates that tariff reductions will be made from bound rates.  For us, it means that the final tariff 
commitments will be expressed in the sam e form as the current bound tariffs. 
 
 Some Members have stated that all tariffs should be bound in ad valorem because they were 
more transparent and predictable.  We would like to state again that we do not agree with this.  First, 
specific duties are more transp arent and predictable than ad valorem tariffs because they are not 
depending on price changes.  Second, they are si mpler because they do not require an application of 
cumbersome customs valuation procedures.  
  Having said that, we acknowledge the concerns  of some Members with regard to highly 
complicated technical duties in our schedules.  We are willing to hear from these Members about what 
their problems are so that we can look more closely at them in view of simplification.  
 
Special Agricultural Safeguard (paragraph 38) 
 
 The Special Safeguard Clause (SSG) is an inte gral part of the agricultural reform process 
enshrined in the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA Article 5.9).  Furthermore, without a SSG 
tariffication would not have been accepted for virtually all agricultural products.  
  The significance of the SSG increases with each step in the liberalization process.  According 
to Article 5 of the AoA it must be ma intained throughout the reform process. 
  SSG represents a kind of "safet y valve" and provides a certain level of comfort to importing 
countries when opening up their markets.  With out the SSG these countries would face big difficulties 
making further concessions.   In their present form both the quantitative and the price-based SSG do not provide more than 
a temporary, limited reprieve from sudden import su rges.  The SSG may help to avoid recourse to 
other trade remedies such as the general safeguard clause of Article XIX of GATT and the kind of 
trade disruptions which these measures imply.   In its present form the SSG is only open to Members which have tariffied their NTBs and 
QRs as a result of the Uruguay Round Negotiation.  Ho wever, based on its experiences the G-10 is of 
the view that a limited extension of the right to invoke the SSG could be envisaged for countries 
making significant concessions in the present negotia tion.  An extension to developing countries 
undertaking major market access concessions should ther efore be explored.  In addition, the Special 
Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) could be another sim ilar instrument for developing countries.  The 
coverage and content of the SSM is still under negotiation.  G-10 is ready for an exchange of views 
and experiences which could also provide valuable  inputs for possible improvements to the SSG and 
for designing the SSM. 
  G-10 supports a solution with both options  for developing countries and expects the 
concerned countries will support the maintenance of the rights of present SSG beneficiaries.  TN/AG/R/19 
Page 20  
 
  In any case, the abolition of the present SSG  would require a consensus decision.  
Anticipating that our group will have to make some of the biggest concessions in the present 
negotiation on market access, the G-10 legitimatel y expects that the SSG will be maintained 
throughout the entire reform process.  
 We are not, at this point in time, proposing any modifications to the present formulation of 
SSG.  However, we would be very happy to develop some of our earlier proposals in order to suggest 
a couple of improvements and simplif ications if this is the wish of other Members, especially the 
proponents of the SSM, or of the Chair.  The G- 10 believes its experiences with the SSG would allow 
for a fruitful dialogue with all interested partners a nd stands ready to do so at an appropriate moment. 
  TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 21 
 
 
 Statement by the G-20  
 
 
Implementation of commitments in export competition – paragraphs 20-24 
 
Before entering into the discussion on implemen ting of commitments and rules on the export 
competition pillar, the G-20 will make a general observation.  
  Quoting the introductory phrase of Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture:   
"Recognizing that the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in 
support and protection resulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing process, …" .  
 The use of the words "ongoing process" implies that the reform process would not stop ("non 
pause clause").  Nevertheless, in fact as regards developed members th is reform process stopped as 
from 1 January 2001, when their Uruguay Round im plementation period ended.  This means that no 
further commitments have been undertaken by deve loped members since that date, despite that the 
commitment to an ongoing reform process .  Thus the implementation of  commitments by developed 
Members including export competition must make up for the absence of commitments by those members during the four years from 2001 up to 2004.   As regards export competition: 
 
 
-  Annual installments  of elimination commitments:  Departing from the levels bound at the 
end of the implementation period of the Uruguay Round, we note that the installments must be on an annual basis, but whether installmen ts are equal or not will necessarily depend on the 
length of the elimination period.  Regarding this schedule of elimination, a number of 
approaches can be envisaged. The elimination sh ould be frontloaded as this is the most 
devastating and distorting form of support.  
 - Parallel and equivalent commitments :  What would constitute "equivalent and parallel 
commitments" has yet to be defined and their m eaning is not obvious given that there are two 
types of commitments that Members have to implement in this pillar:  those based on 
schedules and those which are rules-based.  With respect to the elimination of all forms of 
export subsidies, including with respect to non-conforming practices, a central role will be 
provided by the final bound levels of the Ur uguay Round in the schedules of commitments of 
export subsidies.  In this regard Members must  respect the basic principle of standstill based 
on respecting existing obligations.  The shorter the timeframe we agree on for the elimination 
of all forms of export subsidies, the easier it will be to deal with the complex issue of 
equivalence and parallelism.  
 - Special and differential treatment in paragraphs 22 to 24:  At this stage, the G-20 
reiterates the importance of l onger timeframes for the eliminat ion of all forms of export 
subsidies, as well as the importance of the seque ncing for the elimination of export subsidies 
of Article 9.4. of the Agreement, as provided for in paragraph 23, together with the specific 
S&D provisions for Net Food-Importing Devel oping  and Least-Developed Countries. 
 Comment on the process
 
 
 The negotiation in this pillar will be facilita ted if those Members responsible for the high 
levels of subsidization of exports  in all forms, abide by their commitments and other obligations, as 
well as not increase their levels or re-introduce su ch measures. We should prevent a situation where 
the re-introduction of a measure or the increase of its  level, in any form by any Members, results in a TN/AG/R/19 
Page 22  
 
 deterioration of the trading environment, leading also to a deterioration of the negotiating 
environment. Thus, G-20 urges the main users of  these measures, in any form, to preserve this 
standstill and consequently act in a consistent way with their commitments to this Round.  
 
 
Tariff escalation (paragraph 36) 
 
 The G-20 would like to take this opportunity to make initial comments on the issue of tariff 
escalation.  As we noted in our general statemen t on the market access pillar in December of 2004, 
this issue is of critical importance to developing countries.  
 
 Trends in global agricultural trade show that  there is greater growth in trade in processed 
agricultural products than in trade in primary products.  However, the share of developing countries' exports in processed products decreased from 53 pe r cent for the period 1981-1990 to 48 per cent for 
the period 1991-2000.  This means that the relativ ely higher tariffs faced by developing countries in 
export markets in products further along the proc essing chain have a devastating effect on the 
developmental objectives of our agricultural sectors.  In this regard, the G-20 would like to see the 
elimination of tariff escalation, especially in develo ped country markets, where it is most acute.  The 
mandate in paragraph 36 provides a starting point for this objective.   Tariff escalation protects domestic industries.  Th is in turn is related to the distribution of 
processed food industries and their concentration in developed countries in particular.  Tariff 
escalation therefore acts to maintain the depende nce of developing countries on a single or few 
primary agricultural commodities by impeding the de velopment of value-added industries in these 
products.   
 In addition, tariff escalation has a negative effect on investment flows, by creating difficulties 
for developing countries to attract investment, give n the barriers their value-added products face in the 
major markets of developed countries.    Further, in terms of income generation, the export of raw products to developed countries, and 
the subsequent re-import of the processed products  undermine the gains which could be made by the 
developing countries, which are much more reliant on agricultural trade than their developed country 
partners.  The developmental im plication of this is clear.  
  Products subject to tariff escalation are often al so subject to other forms of protection.  For 
example, where these relatively higher tari ffs exist, these are usually expressed in non- ad valorem  
terms, such as compound or technical rates. 
  The position of the G-20 remains that the tariff reduction formula must be the main focus of 
the market access pillar.  Pending the final r esolution of the discussions on the AVE conversion 
methodology, only then will we be able to start discu ssions in earnest on the formula.  It is at this 
stage that we will be able to assess the extent to which tariff escala tion will need to be further and 
specifically addressed, in order to ensure that th e mandate of substantial improvements in market 
access for all products is achieved.    Chair, there is no doubt that this issue has the potential to be a very technical one.  For 
example we will need to be able to assess the ma gnitude of the problem, so as to allow us to 
collectively develop an appropriate toolbox.  Give n its importance to developing countries, it must 
receive due attention as soon as possible.  We therefore need to move forward with urgency in the discussions on the market access pillar, starting w ith the prompt resolution of the AVE issue. 
  
  TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 23 
 
 
 Tariff simplification (paragraph 37)  
 
 Paragraph 37 of the Framework Agreement on ta riff simplification is a stand-alone provision 
within the market access pillar.  It  bears no relationship whatsoever w ith the issue of the conversion of 
non-ad valorem  duties into ad valorem equivalents.   
 
 There are tariffs in the schedules of  concessions which are not expressed in ad valorem terms. 
They represent the imposition of proportionately hi gher duties to products, particularly from 
developing countries.  This restricts their capacity to participate in the international trade and their 
ability to develop.  The non- ad valorem duties have a double protecting effect: by their high level  and 
the way they are expressed, which entails an additional layer of protection compared to ad valorem 
duties which is not obvious.   Moreover, these duties apply differently dependi ng on the price of products.  This raises the 
question if such duties really are consistent w ith the central provisions of non-discrimination of 
Article I of GATT 94. 
  The restrictive character of non- ad valorem duties is increased when they are mixed duties or 
have some other more complex forms.  Such duti es, not only discriminate against lower priced goods, 
but also reduce the capacity of exporters to assess the level  of the protection due to the way the tariff 
is expressed. 
 
 All forms of non- ad valorem tariffs raise questions on their transparency and predictability for 
economic agents, while adding another layer of invisible protection.  In brief non- ad valorem s lead to 
a situation where asymmetry of information prevails.   
 In contrast, it should also be noted that tariffs of value-added products tend to be expressed in 
non-ad valorem forms in some protected markets.  This raises a further question on the role of non- ad 
valorem duties in tariff escalation.  These layers of invisible protection mentioned above seem to 
concentrate on processed products in some markets.   Developing countries rely predominantly on ad valorem duties, with a totally transparent 
tariff structure, whereas developed countries use laye rs of different forms, thereby masking the real 
level of protection.    Summing up, Mr. Chairman, at this stage and as a way of leveling the playing field among some developed and the developing coun tries, full simplification of all non- ad valorem tariffs should 
be achieved in this Round, as part  of the package in this pillar. 
 
 
Special agricultural safeguard (paragraph 38) 
 
 One of the most important and effective provi sions in the Agreement on Agriculture is the 
abolition of any protective measure which is not a tariff (paragraph 2 of Article 4).  An illustrative 
footnote describes those measures – other than ordi nary customs duties - such as variable levies, 
quantitative restrictions, etc.    The importance of this Article of the Agreem ent on Agriculture derives from the fact that 
without this rule the tariff concessions of WTO members would be meaningless, since any tariff 
binding in the schedules could be circumvented.  Th erefore, there would be no way to continue the 
reform process in agriculture with a tariff reducti on formula approach if there are Members which can 
circumvent the tariff bindings by using prohibited measures.   TN/AG/R/19 
Page 24  
 
  However, Article 4.2 has a transitional exception:   The Special Safeguard of Article 5 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture (SSG).   Mr. Chairman, we are not dealing here with a "safeguard" in the sense of the Safeguard 
Agreement, but nothing less than an evasion of: 
 
 - The prohibition of other measures than ta riffs in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture; and 
 - The prohibition to apply tariffs in excess of bound duties.  
This also explains why this measure is of transitional nature. 
  At this stage the G-20 does not consider it ne cessary to detail all the uncertainties of the 
Special Safeguard of Article 5 since the Uruguay Round, such as its application on insignificant imports, which are documented in the reports of th e Regular Committee of Agriculture and also in 
OECD studies
1.  
  As regards the moment of its elimination, Article 5.9 says that:  
"The provisions of this Article shall remain  in force for the duration of the reform 
process as determined under Article 20". 
Accordingly, the issue we are negotiating is not if, but when  this elimination will take place.  This is 
also necessary to prevent that market access impr ovements resulting from this Round are not impaired 
by this distorting measure.   In summary, Mr. Chairman, this is a tran sitional instrument that from its commercial 
perspective and from its systemic implication fo r the WTO is no longer justified for developed 
Members.  For these reasons the date  of elimination of the Special Safeguard of Article 5 must be 
agreed in these negotiations.  Our proposal remain s that it should be eliminated by developed 
Members at the beginning of the implementation pe riod.  The SSG has already fulfilled its role, 
namely to allow for a smooth transition fro m quantitative restrictions into tariffs.  
 
 
Least-developed countries (paragraphs 45-46) 
 
 The G-20 would like to make a short statement on this issue.  We would like to take note of 
the statement made by Zambia on behalf of the LDC group, and express our support in their efforts, 
and will work with them in achieving their objec tives, which are of common interest to us.  
  The preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO noted the developmental 
objectives for all developing countries, and in partic ular, those of the LDCs.  Our work within the 
Agricultural negotiations must form part of their integration into the multilateral trading system.   
 Paragraphs 45 and 46 of the Framework Ag reement refer to LDCs, and the special 
consideration which will need to be given to them during the negotiatio ns of the modalities.  
However, as noted, this provides a weak start to  address the problems faced by these countries.  
  It is well established that LDCs as a rule have lower tariffs than developed countries and they 
do not have the means to provide financial support to  their farmers.  As a consequence, the special 
and differential treatment provisions under the Agre ement have been of little use to these countries.  
                                                     
 
1 The URAA: An Evaluation of its Implementation in OECD Countries, OECD, 2001, pages 27-33.  TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 25 
 
 
  Thus, the needs of the LDCs must be taken into account when designing the modalities.  This 
means, for example, while they will benefit from so me of the S&D mechanisms negotiated such as SP 
and the SSM, we must ensure that they make meani ngful gains in each of the three pillars.  Moreover, 
where export competition and domestic support measur es have a negative effect both on the domestic 
production in LDCs and their ability to compete in th e global agricultural export markets, this must be 
taken into account.  There is no doubt that develope d Members have a particular responsibility in this 
regard.  Many other paragraphs refer to issues whic h have significant implications for LDCs, such as 
tariff escalation, which we have already addressed during this session, to name but one.  All these 
elements together must contribute toward s providing genuine gains to the LDCs.  
 
 Paragraph 42 of the Doha Ministerial Declarati on provides us with guidance as to the range of 
concerns which will need to be addressed in order for the LDCs to benefit, these include "meaningful 
market access, support for the diversification of th eir production and export b ase" in addition to the 
duty-free and quota-free access envisaged in paragraph 45.   
 Further it is important to note that Article  15 of the Agreement on Agriculture should be 
expanded to reflect that LDCs will be exempt from reduction commitments under all the pillars.  
  Finally, we cannot but note that paragraph 46 li nks the cotton issue with that of the LDCs, and 
in this respect we look forward to the advanc ement of the work being done in the cotton sub-
committee as contributing towards fulfilling this mandate.    Recently-acceded Members (paragraph 47)  
 The G-20 would like to take this opportunity to make a few general comments on the issue of the Recently Acceded Members.  We have expr essed the importance of this issue on different 
occasions.  The Doha Development Agenda and the Ju ly Framework have clearly indicated that the 
accession of the new Members will greatly strengthen the multilateral trading system; their particular 
concerns will be effectively addressed through specific flexibility provisions.  
  The Recently Acceded Members have already made commitments upon accession, including 
the binding of their tariff lines, and made substan tial reductions on that basis.  Many of their tariff 
lines are already bound at the applied levels. Some of them have very low tariffs.  Others also 
committed to the phasing out of all forms of export subsidies.  Other than the Green Box, they are only able to use de minimis  support.  These commitments already represent some effort for RAMs, 
and they are still in the process of implementing th em.  Therefore, the specific conditions of their 
accession should be taken into account with respect to further substantive commitments during this 
Round and their particular concerns should be effectively addressed through specific flexibility 
provisions.   The particular concerns of the RAMs should be addressed in light of two guiding principles: (1) the specific flexibility provisions for the RAMs should be integrated within discussions on all the 
pillars, by addressing issues such as coefficients fo r reduction;  bases for reduction as well as base 
periods; implementation periods a nd other onerous and discriminat ory obligations;  and (2) the 
specific flexibility provisions should resolve their particular concerns effectively. 
  Mr. Chairman, as we all know, generally speaki ng, it will be more reas onable to define the 
specific provisions after concluding the general provisions.  Therefore, the G-20 suggests that the 
related specific flexibility provisions for the RAMs c ould be addressed after the general principles for 
the three pillars have been defined.  TN/AG/R/19 
Page 26  
 
  The G-20 is prepared to consult with all RAMs  and other delegations with a view to making 
concrete and constructive proposals to  address their particular concerns. 
  
Monitoring and surveillance (paragraph 48)  
 
 One of the areas in which the current Agreem ent on Agriculture clearly requires improvement 
is related to the enhancement of  provisions on monitoring and surveillance of the implementation of 
commitments.   
 General criticisms can be leveled against th e Uruguay Agreement on Agriculture in terms of 
low levels of ambition and the provision of export subsidies in products which were not included in 
Members' schedules, to name but a few.  This s ituation has been exacerbated by conspicuously late 
notifications, insufficient information and some lack of compliance with the provisions of the 
Agreement.  Any outcome from the Doha R ound should therefore necessarily address these 
deficiencies as well as ensuring the same problems are not experienced in terms of assessing the 
implementation of the new disciplines agreed in the Round.    The G-20 sees enhancing the monitoring and surveillance mechanisms as a fundamental improvement to be introduced in this Round.  In line with paragraph 48 of the Framework agreement, 
Article 18 of the AoA should be amended "so as to effectively ensure full transparency, including 
through timely and complete notifications with re spect to the commitments in all three pillars". 
Special and Differential treatment will also be addressed in this regard.    The AoA has created a sui generis  regime for domestic support a nd for export subsidies.  In 
addition, providers of domestic support and expor t subsidies have been in sulated from actions under 
the WTO dispute settlement system and the lack of  development of disciplines as mandated in the 
Agreement.  This certainly did not act as an incentive for Members to follow the changes in 
agricultural policies by developed countries, given the difficulties in building a case.  This resulted in 
a lax situation in relation to agricultural policies a nd a measure of distrust in relation to the existing 
review mechanisms, which undermines the cred ibility of an Agreement such as on the one on 
Agriculture.  Peer review has also proved not to be a sufficiently strong inducement for Members to 
update their notifications.  Discussing "old" me asures could be seen as meaningless or futile.  
  An excellent example in this regard is that  of Article 6.5 or the Blue Box.  Blue Box 
payments are direct payments under production-lim iting programmes, but without any requirement to 
notify details of how the payments in question have in fact limited production.   It has become clear 
that in some cases, during the implementation of the UR, production in some sectors has in fact 
increased, despite being notified as having received Blue Box payments.  To make such an assessment, we would have needed notification of le vels of production for the products in question as 
the starting point.  This is a clear example of one  area in which monitoring and surveillance must be 
one part of the effective solution in order to ma ke sure that the Blue Box is indeed less trade-
distorting than Amber Box measures, as it was intend ed to be, being the "hal fway house" between the 
Amber and Green Boxes. 
  The objectives of the G-20 in the discussions under paragraph 48 include:   - Improving existing monitoring mechanisms with a view to contributing to Members' 
compliance to rules, disciplines, and co mmitments made both under the AoA and the 
outcome of this Round of negotiations;  
  TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 27 
 
 
  - Generating greater transparency and coll ective understanding of re levant trade-related 
agricultural policies and practices by Memb ers thereby increasing confidence in the 
Agreement, so enhancing its credibility; and 
  - Enhancing the effectiveness of the review process.  
 
 Some of the ideas which the group is considering at the moment include:   - Amending Article 18 of the AoA, creating a sub-committee within the Committee on 
Agriculture to examine regularly relevant tr ade-related agricultural policies, with an 
emphasis on domestic support and all forms of export subsidies; 
  - Regular reviews for Members with high le vels of domestic support or who use export 
competition measures, including those being eliminated.  Individual notifications 
would continue to be examined in the same format as currently undertaken;  and 
 
 - An annual review of the performance of tr ade in agricultural products, in the light of 
commitments undertaken in terms of tari ff reductions and TRQ expansion and rules 
regarding their administration.  This could lead to recommendations by the Committee on Agriculture on additional measu res to enhance growth in trade on 
agricultural products.  
 
 Paragraph 48 notes that consideration should be  given to developing countries in this respect. 
Developing country Members face particular challeng es with respect to institutional and financial 
capacity and other constraints.  The G-20 remain s committed to ensuring transparency through 
monitoring and surveillance, but the difficulties of developing Members in fulfilling this must be 
taken into account.  Therefore, some assistance fro m developed Members would be required to ensure 
the best outcome in this regard.    All of the above would contribute to making sure that in the case of non-compliance, a good basis exists to move to other options to ensure th at the credibility of the multilateral trading system is 
maintained.  Monitoring and surveillance provisions  are key to the observance of the substantive 
disciplines to be negotiated.  Consequently, wh at we achieve under paragraph 48 cannot be a 
substitute to what should be accomplished with resp ect to the development of  rules and disciplines, 
but a complement to.    While this is an important area of the nego tiations, discussions will obviously have to go hand 
in hand with discussions on substance in various other areas of discussions as they develop, and we 
will make more detailed comments on the con tinued discussions on paragraph 48 as well as under 
individual items as they arise, as we did with r espect to export prohibitions and restrictions.  
  
Paragraph 49 
  We would like to remind delegations of our stat ement at the November session last year.  At 
that time we said:  "The inclusion of paragra ph 49 in the December Session discussions causes great 
concern for the G-20.  To put issues that are char acterized in the Framework as "of interest but not 
agreed" on the same level as the negotiating pillars could be understood as an implicit reinterpretation 
of the framework.  This is something we should no t attempt to do now or at any time." (end of quote). 
  At this stage of the negotiations we face mo re urgent challenges on a variety of issues whose 
negotiation have been explicitly agreed on, and whic h are at the core of the Doha mandate and the 
July Framework. TN/AG/R/19 
Page 28  
 
  
 We need to preserve the negotiating process and the most critical resource in the negotiation, 
which is time. If only for this reason we should avoid devoting to these issues scarce negotiating 
resources here at the Special Session.  Blue Box  
  There is little doubt that the negotiations on Blue  Box, in particular the criteria under which 
this instrument is going to be implemented, are one of the most important outstanding issues for the 
discussion on modalities.  The path for an agre ement on modalities will necessarily pass through the 
Blue Box. 
   Chairman, you will recall (better than most of us, in fact), that the Blue Box was the outcome 
of the Blair House agreement which resulted in th e creation of a new category of trade distorting 
support exempt from reduction commitments predicated on the condition that it is subject to 
"production-limiting programmes".  
   Although Article 6.5 of the Agreement on Agriculture does not make any explicit reference to the fact that Blue Box payments are "less trade-di storting" than the AMS, nevertheless the assumption 
behind the exemption of such payments from reduction commitments was that control of the areas would curtail the trade and production distorting character of the policy.  
 
   Article 6.5 has also two additional features that made it so appealing for users:    - it shifted the goal-posts by changing the base for commitments;  and  - there was no upper limit.  
 
  The way the Blue Box was conceived, therefore allowed members to shift programmes already counted in their 1986-88 AMS base figures to the Blue Box without deducting them from the 
baseline. In other words, an additional cushion was created.  
   To make matters worse, due to the way the notification process was developed, no effective 
monitoring provision was created to ensure that the central element of Article 6.5 – production-
limiting programmes – was made effective.     In brief, the creation of the Blue Box h as allowed for higher levels of trade-distorting 
domestic support; made the 1986-1988 base levels less relevant; made reduction commitments easier 
to be complied with and, finally, weakened multila teral disciplines in terms of monitoring trade and 
production distorting effects.    In fact, AMS and Blue Box payments, seen in  conjunction, confirm that their total amount has 
in some cases approached the commitment levels agreed to in the Uruguay Round.  If the Blue Box 
had not been created, it would have been very di fficult for these Members to comply with their AMS 
commitments. 
  Although Blue Box payments are granted under production-limiting programmes, there are no 
requirements for details as to how these payments in fact limit production.  The need and importance 
of improved monitoring and surveillance provisions is cl ear and the G-20 will revert to this issue later. 
 
  According to paragraphs 13 and 14 of the "Framework", we will negotiate a change in 
existing criteria as well as additional criteria.  The G-20 therefore notes that from the outset Members have indicated they are ready to discuss criteria in order to make the Blue Box less trade-distorting 
than the Amber Box, as agreed in the Framework.  TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 29 
 
 
  On criteria, the G-20 would like to present the following ideas: 
 
• As regards Blue Box payments whic h are not aimed at limiting production: 
 
- No updating of base areas and yields: 
 This would reduce the incentive to fa rmers to increase planted areas on the 
expectation that a possible future upda ting would increase their revenue received 
from Government.  As a consequence, farmers would focus more on market 
signals; 
 - Payments should be independent  on what is being produced: 
 This proposed change is intended to allo w for a larger degree of flexibility for the 
farmers to move away from their original  crops and even to withdraw land from 
production; 
 - Accumulation of payments 
 If the Blue Box is a half-way to reform, commodities benefiting from it should not 
be allowed to receive Amber support; 
 - Setting criteria to determine target prices:  Target prices are currently fixed arbitrar ily, which creates an effectively permanent 
incentive for farmers to continue to pro duce a specific crop, insulating the farmer 
from market signals.  A good alternative coul d be loan rates fixed in relation to a 
5-year Olympic average, following market price fluctuations; 
 - Limits to price-gaps differentials:  Current AoA rules in terms of direct payments limit the compensation for farmers' 
income loss due to natural disasters to 70%.  It is proposed that a factor or 
reduction be introduced to bring down the level of income-loss compensation due to normal market risks; 
 - Product-specific caps:  This would be a means of preventing the shift of support among products or the 
concentration of large amounts of support in a few products.  
 
• As regards production-limiting programmes:  such Blue Box, as any category of 
trade-distorting support will need product-specific caps, in order to prevent shifts in support among products or the concentra tion of large amounts of support in a few 
products to ensure it is less-trade distorting than AMS measures;  
 
• Improvement in notification requirements:  All Blue Box users shall be obliged to 
notify their planted area and the production resulting thereof, as well as the number of 
heads. 
   In conclusion, we will welcome suggestions  by Members on the criteria which make Blue 
Box more useful for developing country Members as  well.  The current Article 6.5 Blue Box seems 
only to reflect the programmes of certain Members, and in addition, none of the ideas currently on the 
table reflect criteria which could be of practi cal use to developing country Members.   
  Chairman, we look forward to hearing the views on these preliminary ideas. TN/AG/R/19 
Page 30  
 
 Statement by India
 
 
 
Sectoral initiatives (paragraph 49) 
  We support the statement of Brazil on behalf of G-20 and of Argentina on paragraph 49 
issues.  We reiterate that these are issues of inte rest but not agreed in the framework.  We do not 
support discussions on sectoral initiatives because firstly  the agrarian economies of different countries 
are so different that there can be no complimentar ity and zero for zero solution.  Secondly the very 
concept of sectoral initiatives is antithetical to th e SP – SSM instruments and would circumvent the 
S&D provisions agreed in the framework.    TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 31 
 
 
 Statement by Kenya  
 
  
Paragraph 49  
 
 Kenya's reading of the Paragraph 49 of Annex A is that the issues included in this paragraph 
are of interest to some Members but they have not been agreed upon by the entire Membership for 
negotiation.  
 The first step would therefore be for Members to agree to negotiate on these issues and then 
move on to engage in negotiati ons on paragraph 49.  In particular, Kenya would not support any 
sectoral initiative within the agricultu re negotiations.  This is given th e fact that Kenya would not be 
able to compete in such a scenario with the majo r exporters.  Indeed sectoral initiatives would mean 
reduced market access for low income countries like Kenya. TN/AG/R/19 
Page 32  
 
 Statement by Mauritius on behalf of the ACP Group
 
 
 
Implementation of Export Competition measures (paragraphs 20-21)  
   Our comments on these paragraphs have to be  viewed along with the comments made by 
several members of the group on the NFIDC/LDC, food aid and STEs issues, wherein we called for 
effective S&D and flexibility.  We are taking this opportunity to reiterate that disciplines on food aid 
should be dealt with as a matter of priority.  Indeed, most of the recipients of this aid are found in the 
ACP group.  The Group would be ready to particip ate actively in work on this issue.  More 
specifically we would in respect of paragraphs 20 and 21 like to point out that: 
 
• implementation issues can be viewed with greater clarity once the other elements of the 
modalities on the various forms of expo rt competition have been finalized; 
 
• The phasing out of export competition measures should take into account the importance of 
long-standing preferences; 
 
• Paragraphs 20 and 21 have to be considered  along with the S&D dimension spelt out in 
paragraphs 22 to 25.   
  
Tariff escalation, tariff simplification, and speci al agricultural safeguards (paragraphs  36-38)
  
• Our approach on the Market Access cluster is  that there should be a balanced outcome 
ensuring that the interests of the ACP, wh ich comprises essentially weak and vulnerable 
countries, are adequately safeguarded.  In th is regard, the ACP wishes to underscore the 
importance it attaches to the part of the Framework Agreement entitled " Other Development 
Issues ".  Indeed, reference is made therein to  the need in the ongoing market access 
negotiations to give special attention to the specific trade and development related needs and 
concerns of developing countries, including their capacity constraints.  The key concerns of 
the ACP are in respect of the maintenance of domestic production and the limitation of preference erosion. 
 
• We do agree that work has to be done in resp ect of tariff escalation and in this regard, 
paragraph 8 of Rev.1 could be used as a basis for future work.  However, the ACP would like 
to point out that this exercise may result in an erosion of tariff preferences.  Accordingly the 
ACP consider that the issue of preference er osion should be viewed in a holistic manner. 
 
• Tariff simplification:  This issue which remain s under negotiation is a fairly complex one and 
we would appreciate if the Secretariat c ould facilitate our work and understanding by 
preparing some basic documents on the various types of tariffs used by Members. 
 
• The ACP would in this context point out that SPS and TBT measures which often are 
constraints to market access, in particular for weak and vulnerable countries, should be equally addressed to provide operati onally effective market access. 
   TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 33 
 
 
 Least-developed countries (paragraph 45) 
 
• The vast majority of LDCs are in the ACP group 
 
• We invite developed countries and developing countries in a position to do so to provide duty 
and quota free market access to products originating in LDCs. 
 
• The market access should be bound at the WTO to provide certainty and predictability. 
  
Cotton (paragraph 46) 
 
• The ACP Group would like to recall the decision achieved on cotton by the General Council 
in July 2004 and contained in paragrap hs 1(b) and 4, 5, and 6 of Annex A. 
 
• The Group stresses the importance of cotton for ma ny countries of this constituency which are 
cotton producers and for whom export earnings from cotton represent a large share of total 
export revenues. 
 
• These countries have been suffering from the depressed prices resulting from price trade 
distorting policies brought by domestic suppor t and export competition measures on cotton. 
 
• The ACP Group considers that the work in th e Sub-Committee on cotton has to be expedited 
so that effective measures are included in th e July 2005 first approximation of modalities. 
  
Recently-acceded Members (paragraph 47) 
 
• The ACP fully support the principle of flexibility for these countries 
 
• Moreover, the ACP believe that such flexib ility should be incorporated in the accession 
guidelines so as to facilitate th e accession of ACP countries and take into account their 
constraints in making concessions. 
 
 
Monitoring and Surveillance (paragraph 48) 
 
• Whilst we welcome the principle of reinfor ced rules on monitoring and surveillance, we 
would nonetheless point out that the difficulties of  the ACP to comply with the new set up for 
notifications has to be reckoned. Technical  assistance and capacity building should be 
provided in this regard. 
 TN/AG/R/19 
Page 34  
 
 Statement by Moldova
 
 
Recently-acceded Members (paragraph 47) 
 
 Firstly, on behalf of our delegation, I would like to confirm that we endorse the statement 
made by Croatia on behalf of the Recently Acceded Members of the WTO. 
  I would like secondly to highlight once again the f act that agriculture is crucial to our country.  
The economic development of Moldova, as an agricultu ral country, is dependent to a large extent on 
the results of this round of negotiations, particularly in the agricultural sector. 
 
 I would also like to underline that the Repub lic of Moldova already made concessions and 
commitments during its accession process which many ot her Members have yet to make in the course 
of this round.  As a result, the level of our border protection of agricultural goods is very low.  The 
simple average bound tariff for agricultural goods is  12.2 per cent and the applied tariff in 2004 was 
9 per cent.  In Moldova as in many small countries tariffs are the sole instrument of protection. 
  I would further like to emphasize that the Republic of Moldova neither applies tariff quotas nor grants export subsidies to its firms.  That is  why even a small volume of subsidized agricultural 
imports has very negative repercussions for our dom estic producers and forces our small firms out of 
the market. 
 
 Furthermore, we have a de minimis  AMS and the rates applied in  practice corresponded to our 
bound rates, which are already considerably lower than those of many developed country Members. 
  I would further like to make clear that the Republic of Moldova was considered during the 
accession process as a country in transition from a planned to a market economy, which does not 
really reflect its level of development.  It is for this reason that the Republic of Moldova was not able 
to benefit from the flexibility enjoyed by other co untries with more advanced economies and a higher 
standard of living than ours.   I would also like to mention that while we noted a rapid increase in imports of goods into our 
country in recent years, as a transition country we  are unable to apply special safeguard measures.  
We relinquished that right during our accession.   Unfortunately, the Agreement on Agriculture, including Article 20 on future reform, makes 
not even the slightest provision for the specific a nd difficult situations that the so-called transition 
countries may face.  In fact, according to the objectiv e indicators, several countries in our group could 
be classified as developing countries or even as  LDCs.  What is more, having completed their 
accession, the countries mentioned in paragraph 9 of  the Doha Ministerial Declaration made much 
higher commitments than those of the most developed countries.  T oday, for example, these countries 
(paragraph 9) are marketing their agricultural goods  according to normal WTO rules, without export 
subsidies or tariff quotas.  They should be credited for these unprecedented efforts. 
 
 In view of the foregoing, we believe that in the present negotiations, the Recently Acceded 
Members should contribute less than the other WTO Members with the exception of LDCs.  This will 
be a means of redressing the current imbalance between the rights and commitments of Recently 
Acceded Members and those of the original WTO Members. 
 
 Finally, Mr. Chairman, our delegation wishes to  reiterate Moldova's intention to participate 
constructively in this round of negotiations in or der to achieve tangible results on the Doha Work  TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 35 
 
 
 Programme as a whole, including the provision of  paragraph 47 of Anne x 1 of the Framework 
Agreement of 1 August 2004. TN/AG/R/19 
Page 36  
 
 Statement by South Africa
 
 
 
Paragraph 49:  Geographical indications 
 
 Chair, firstly we support the statement made on behalf of the G-20 on paragraph 49.  We had 
no intention to take the floor on this issue, but in  light of comments being made on GIs in particular, 
feel compelled to say something – for a moment I wasn't sure which meeting I was in!   Surely  Chair, this negotiation is compli cated enough without bogging it down with what is 
already being discussed in other fora in the hou se.  In this respect we support the statement by 
Australia and the US.  Relating GIs to market acce ss negotiations renders what is already the most 
difficult part of our negotiation almost impossible.  Let alone linking it to other pillars, we are gravely concerned by this notion.  
 We do not see a particularly ambitious appr oach in the area of market access by the 
demandeurs of GIs – who are also the demandeurs of sensitive products, retention of the SSG, and 
these are the same users of high levels of suppor t and protection – and a new form of protection is 
being proposed.   As New Zealand, we would prefer to spend our time on the core issues of market access – the 
tariff reduction formula.  As noted by our Kenyan colleague, we have yet to agree to negotiate the 
paragraph 49 issues in this forum.   TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 37 
 
 
 Statement by Switzerland  
  
Geographical indications (paragraph 49) 
 
 Mr. Chairman, 
  In these negotiations, we aim at improving mark et access and at creating a fair multilateral 
framework.  It is in this perspective that Switzer land, in alliance with a large number of other WTO 
Members, is committed to the proposal of 'GI-ext ension' which embodies a more effective protection 
of geographical indications for the products of all WTO Members.  Switzerland is firmly convinced 
that a more effective protection of geographical i ndications is a key element supporting market access 
efforts made by Members.  Switzerland thus rema ins fully committed to the extension of the GI-
protection as provided by Article 23 TRIPS Agreemen t to all products, including all agricultural 
products.  Granting this more effective level of prot ection to all products – and not just to wines and 
spirits - is a corollary to improving market access and therefore a necessary component of the Doha 
Single Undertaking.  This improvement of the WT O protection for geographical indications requires 
an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement. .   The need for a useful marketing tool to compete with bulk products on the global market is the same for producers of all GI-products.  Let us just think of Darjeeling tea from India, Ceylon tea 
from Sri Lanka, Antigua coffee from Guatemala, Bl ue Mountain coffee from Jamaica, Basmati rice 
from India and Pakistan, Jasmine Rice from Thailand.   All WTO Members have much to gain from 
'GI-extension', least-developed, developing and devel oped alike.  GI-extension is one of the elements 
which helps ensure a fair overall balance in the resu lts of the Doha Round and it is fully in line with 
the Doha Development Agenda.  
 
 The 'GI-extension' proposal strikes the right balance:  It will, on the one hand, create a level playing field and equal opportunities for the use of  geographical indications for all WTO Members for 
all their genuine products having a specific geographi cal origin to which a specific quality, reputation 
or other characteristic is linked.  On the other ha nd, the GI-extension proposal takes into account the 
concerns of certain WTO Members relating to the u se of certain GIs by immigrants for their products 
not having the relevant origin:  the exceptions from protection as provided today by Article 24 TRIPS 
Agreement in relation to the additional protection mu st also apply to 'GI-extension'.  This is the 
balance that was struck for wines and spirits at th e end of the Uruguay Round.  The regime for wines 
and spirits has worked well and there is no r eason why it should not do so for other products. 
 
 We are aware that an intervention on GI-extensi on would be best placed in the context of the 
TRIPS Agreement.  However, because of the refusal of certain Members to negotiate there and due to 
the mention of the issues of GIs in paragraph 49 of Annex A of the July Decision, we make this 
intervention in the COASS.   This is the reason why Switzerland submits at  this stage the following proposals concerning 
trade aspects within the negotiations on ag riculture with regard to GI-products: 
  - the envisaged end date for the phasing out of all forms of export competition including our 
export subsidies shall coincide with 'GI-extension'; 
 
 - the AMS product-specific cap will not apply to products identified with a GI and where 
incorrect use in other countries takes place b ecause the level of protection of Article 23 
TRIPS Agreement is not granted to this GI;  and 
 TN/AG/R/19 
Page 38  
 
  - lesser cuts in Amber Box and/or Blue B ox support related to GI production has to be 
envisaged. 
 
 In conclusion, I recall that Switzerland submits these proposals concerning a number of 
alternative measures for GI-products  within the negotiations on agriculture in case that it should not 
be possible to negotiate the extension of the protec tion to all products in the current Round.  Without 
an appropriate protection of GIs for all producers, there can be no "level-playing field" in our joint market access efforts.     TN/AG/R/19 
 Page 39 
 
 
 Statement by the Separate Customs Territo ry of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu  
 Recently-acceded Members (paragraph 47)  
 Mr. Chairman,  
 My delegation welcomes the statement made by  Brazil on behalf of G-20 on the issue of 
"Recently-Acceded Members (RAMs)," and we share the concerns raised by Croatia on behalf of six RAMs.  Mr. Chairman, it is a relevant fact that the commitments made by "Recently-Acceded 
Members (RAMs)" in the course of their accession to the WTO have been significantly bigger than 
those required of Members in the Uruguay Round.  For example, the RAMs were requested to 
eliminate their export subsidies, make deep reductio ns in tariffs and the AMS, to apply large TRQ 
volumes to the tariffication of sensitive products, and were only allowed a lower de minimis  
percentage and shorter implementa tion periods – all of which go fa r beyond the requirements for the 
other Members.  
 
 Moreover, even during the current DDA nego tiations, these RAMs are still in the process of 
implementing the concessions and commitments that  they were required to make on attaining 
Membership.  Thus in order to achieve a fair  and equitable sharing of responsibilities among 
Members in the multilateral trading system, and to ensure a smooth reform program for RAMs to 
sustain the continuous development of their agri culture sector, it is our strong belief that RAMs 
should be provided with adequate  and specific flexibility in the design of future modalities as 
stipulated in Paragraph 47 of the Framework Agreem ent, particularly in the Market Access pillar. 
  Mr. Chairman, the very considerable commitments already made by RAMs, including ourselves, should be recognized for the exceptional contribution they have made to the multilateral 
trading system.  In order to smoothly and successfully  continue the trade refo rms that will eventually 
benefit all WTO Members, the inclusion of some special treatment for RAMs within any future 
agreed modalities, needs be pursued.   The possible ideas for consideration are: lower reduction levels for tariffs and domestic support measures;  longer implementa tion periods and grace periods and, even more importantly;  the 
exemption from further commitments on tariff re duction and TRQ expansion of those selected 
sensitive products on which the extent of RAMs' lib eralization commitments go far beyond the level 
required in the Uruguay Round. At the same time, we  would like to see a greater number of sensitive 
or special products designated, in orde r to safeguard our non-trade concerns.  
 
 In addition, appropriate policy measures for adaptive adjustments should be provided to the 
RAMs.  To be specific, Mr. Chairman, RAMs shoul d be allowed to extend the adoption of Special 
Safeguard Measures (SSG) or the Special Safe guard Mechanism (SSM) to the above-mentioned 
products.    And last, but not the least, the de minimis  levels based on their accession commitments need 
to be maintained.  
  My delegation looks forward to working closely with you and other Members to come up with an agreeable solution to this issue in our future negotiations for the agricultural modalities. TN/AG/R/19 
Page 40  
 
 Statement by Zambia on behalf of the Least-Developed Country Grouping
 
 
 
Least-developed countries (paragraphs 45-46) 
  The LDCs refer to paragraph 45 of the July  Framework which envisages primarily the two 
elements hereafter in their favour:   On one hand, the full access to all the provi sions relating to the special and differential 
treatment, and the exemption of  reduction commitments; and 
 
 On the other, the duty-free and quota-free ma rket access for their originating products. 
  Further, the group refers to paragraph 46 on Cotton.  
 With regard to special and differential treatment , we would like to state that full access shall 
mean that each and every S&D treatment provisi on will be designed in a manner that will be 
operationally effective for all LDCs.   With regard to duty-free and quota-free access, it is our expectation that the Doha Round shall 
expand duty-free and quota-free market access opportun ities and make them stable, predictable and 
operationally effective under the WTO framework.  Ma rket entry barriers must also be addressed to 
allow full utilization of the market access.   With regard to paragraph 46 on cotton, the LDC Group would like once more to reiterate the 
need to work on the issue of cotton as a matter of priority, as the General Council decided during its 
July 2004 session. 
  According to paragraph 1 (b) of the July packag e, and paragraphs 4, 5 and 46, of its Annex A, 
all trade distorting policies affecting the cotton sector in all pillars of the agriculture negotiations shall 
be addressed ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically.  
 Cotton prices are depressed in a long term way by  trade policies that are inconsistent with the 
Agreement on Agriculture and Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
  In the period 1995 to 2001, cotton prices had been depressed by 52 per cent and currently they quite reached this sharp declined level. 
 
 For LDCs, cotton is important for improving inco mes particularly for the small scale farmers. 
  In this regard, the LDCs call upon WTO Member s to work towards submitting, by July 2005, 
for the first approximations, elements of moda lities on each pillar of the negotiations on cotton. 
 
 
__________