WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
22 May 2007 
 
 (07-2084) 
Committee on Trade and Development  
  
DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE DOHA ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Note by the Secretariat
 
 
Revision  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... .1 
II. DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
NEGOTIATIONS ................................................................................................................... ..2 
A. AGRICULTURE .............................................................................................................................2  
B. NON-AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS .....................................................................................6  
C. SERVICES ............................................................................................................................... ....11  
D. TRADE FACILITATION ...............................................................................................................14  
E. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT ................................................................................17  
F. IMPLEMENTATION -RELATED ISSUES AND CONCERNS ..............................................................19  
G. RULES ............................................................................................................................... .........22  
H. TRADE -RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ..........................................26  
I. TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT ......................................................................................................27  
J. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING .................................................................................29  
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................................31  
 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. At the 54
th Session of the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) on 5 October 2005, 
Members undertook a review of the developmental asp ects of the Doha Round of negotiations based 
on a background paper prepared by the Secretaria t (WT/COMTD/W/143).  Discussions continued at 
the 55th Session on 28 November 2005 and the 58th Session on 6 July 2006 based on revised versions 
of the background paper (WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 and Rev.2 respectively).  The usefulness of 
periodic updates to the paper has been widely recognized by Members.   
2. The present document addresses the developmen tal aspects in all the subject areas under 
negotiation in the Round.  In addition to providing a br ief summary of the status of the negotiations in 
each area1, the paper attempts to highlight the broad pa rameters of the development dimension, to 
identify specific issues of interest to developing countries and to describe the potential gains which 
                                                      
1 Relative to an earlier version, the present document takes into account developments in the 
negotiations up to the end of March 2007 approximately (in some instances, more recent developments have 
also been reflected). WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
Page 2  
 
  could accrue to developing countri es from the conclusion of the negotiations.  This revised document 
has been prepared under the Secretariat's own resp onsibility and by no means claims to provide an 
exhaustive coverage of all the de velopmental aspects raised in th e course of the negotiations.  Nor 
should the paper be seen as an attempt to prioritize issues, subjects or concerns raised by individual 
Members or groups of Members.  Finally, this pa per does not prejudice the right of any Member to 
raise other concerns or views related to paragra ph 51 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration or the 
presentation below concerning the areas currently  under negotiation in th e Doha Development 
Agenda. 
II. DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
NEGOTIATIONS 
A. A
GRICULTURE  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
3. Agriculture plays an important role in the de velopment of many WTO Members.  For a large 
number of developing and least-developed countries (LDCs), agriculture makes a significant contribution to their economies, including its direct  contribution to gross domestic production, export 
revenue and employment as well as to rural develo pment and livelihood security.  However, many of 
the world's agricultural producers are currently di sadvantaged in the world trading environment 
because of high tariff barriers and competition from pr oducers that receive high levels of domestic or 
export-related support.  Therefore, a reduction in protection and support can lead to important gains 
for developing country agricultural producers.  Th e development aspects related to agriculture can 
thus be found in each of the three pillars of th e agriculture negotiations – market access, domestic 
support and export competition. 
(a) Market access 
4. The market access pillar is arguably the most co mplex and intricate pillar of the agriculture 
negotiations.  Some Members see a link between mark et access and flexibilities, in particular that an 
increase in flexibilities (defensive inte rests) leads to a curtailing of ma rket access (offensive interests).  
In this regard, the 1 August 2004 General Council D ecision (WT/L/579) is a delicate balance of the 
offensive and defensive interests of all Members.  Despite its complex natu re, the market access pillar 
has, arguably, the greatest potential to deliver real economic benefits to Members.  As tariff barriers 
are reduced and tariff rate quotas expanded in bot h developed and developing countries, increased 
market access opportunities will allow Members to  improve welfare by expanding export volumes 
and revenues and through better access to their ma rkets for imports, while taking account of the 
sensitivities and development goals  in developing countries.  
5. A significant reduction in tariffs and the expansi on of tariff quotas, particularly in developed 
country markets, is being sought by many developing countries in order to assist with the achievement 
of their development and other trade-related objectiv es.  In addition, some Members also view the 
reduction of tariff escalation and the implementati on of the long-standing commitment to the fullest 
liberalization of trade in tropical products as being key elements of the development dimension of the 
Doha Round.  At the same time, many developing countries are concerned about the likely impact of tariff reductions on rural livelihood,  and consequently on their food security concerns, in particular 
should domestic support levels remain  high in some other countries.  Accordingly, they argue for a 
flexibility in the reduction of tariffs, especially  for "Special Products" and through the Special 
Safeguard Mechanism.  Preference-receiving de veloping and least-developed countries are also 
concerned that tariff reductions by preference-gran ting countries will result in significant preference 
erosion, especially since preferential access arrangement s play a vital role in terms of their ability to 
export and earn foreign exchange, thereby contri buting to the development of their economies.  
However, there are also concerns that the levels  of flexibility sought by some negotiating groups  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
 Page 3 
 
 
  would reduce the welfare gains that could ari se from improved opportunities for trade between 
developing countries. 
(b) Domestic support 
6. Achieving reductions in the high levels of domest ic support is a key issue for most developing 
countries, since such policies distort the agricultu ral trading environment and contribute to lower 
world prices, including the decline of commodity pr ices.  This has a negative impact on producers not 
receiving subsidies, particularly those in developi ng countries, many of which are keen to see large 
reductions in trade-distorting support.   
7. Reform of domestic support is linked to the market access pillar.  Some developing and 
least-developed countries argue that it would indeed be  counter to development aims to expect them 
to further reduce their tariffs while other countries c ontinue to maintain significant levels of spending 
on Amber and Blue Box subsidies.  They are con cerned that further market openings could mean 
increased competition for their domestic producers from subsidised production in other countries.   
(c) Export competition 
8. Some delegations have stated th at export subsidies, of all kinds, are the most egregious form 
of trade-distorting support.  The use of export subs idies ensures that there are more agricultural goods 
on world markets, resulting in lower world pr ices than would otherwise be the case.  For 
non-subsidising countries this means artificially high levels of competition in both the domestic 
market and abroad.  Thus, the removal of this form of artificial competition and price suppression 
would help to improve the ability of Members th at do not use such programmes, particularly 
developing and least-developed Members, to compete.  
9. Most developing countries argue for the elimin ation of all forms of export subsidies, 
including in the form of export credits, non-genuine food aid or trade-distorting practices of exporting state trading enterprises (STEs).  However, there are also some concerns that the elimination of all 
forms of export subsidies may increase the cost of imported food products for some net-food importing developing countries.   
2. Status of the Negotiations 
10. At the Sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong,  Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to 
the mandate on agriculture.  They agreed, inter alia , to a three-band system for reductions in domestic 
support, with higher linear cuts in higher bands, and to ensure the para llel elimination of all forms of 
export subsidies and disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect by the end of 2013.  In 
addition, a safe box for bona fide food aid will be provided to ensure there is no unintended 
impediment to dealing with emergency situations.  On market access, four bands were adopted for 
structuring tariff cuts, with relevant thresholds, including those applicable for developing countries, to be agreed.  The Ministerial Declaration also stated that developing countries would have the flexibility to self-designate an appropriate numb er of tariff lines as Special Products guided by 
indicators based on the criteria of food security, liv elihood security and rural development and have 
the right to recourse to a Special Safeguard Mech anism based on import quantity and price triggers. 
11. As the Chairman noted in his report of 27 July 2006 to the General Council (TN/AG/23), a 
wide number of proposals had been received since the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference from various delegations including many from developing country groups like the African Group, the 
least-developed group of countries, the G-20, the G-33 and the group of small, vulnerable economies 
(SVEs).  In addition proposals were made by groups  which include some developing countries such as 
the Cairns Group and the G-10.  Unfortunately, th e differences between Members meant that it was 
not possible to establish modalities and the Chairman's Draft Possible Modalities document WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
Page 4  
 
  (TN/AG/W/3) clearly shows that a lot more work  and compromises will be needed before modalities 
can be finalised.  However, he also pointed out  that progress had been made since the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Conference.  Even in areas where di fferences are most acute, the issues and the 
background to Members' positions are now clearer.  Progress can be made provided Members show the necessary flexibility. 
12. On 30 April 2007, the Chairman issued a communication outlining his thoughts on a number 
of negotiating issues.  Since not all the issues in the agriculture framework were covered in this 
communication, he planned to issue a second instalment in due course. 
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
13. Issues of interest to developing countries are included in all the three pillars of the 
negotiations.  The specific issues of interest to de veloping countries cover every aspect of market 
access.  Given the different situations in different developing countries their views are often different 
on specific issues.  The various positions include, inter alia : 
(a) Market access 
• Improved market access to developed countries;  
• Improved market access to other developing co untries (South-South trade) but with less 
than full reciprocity in the negotiations, in cluding by having to undertake lesser tariff 
reductions and/or tariff quota expansion commit ments relative to those to be undertaken 
by developed countries; 
• Fullest liberalization of trade in tropical agricultural products and for products of 
particular importance to the diversifica tion of production from the growing of illicit 
narcotic crops;  
• Addressing problems relating to preference erosion; 
• Addressing the issues of tariff escalation and the issue of tariff simplification; 
• Improving the administration of tariff rate quotas; 
• Lifetime of the existing special agricultural safeguard (SSG); 
• Appropriate special and differential treatment (S&D) for developing countries, including 
the flexibility to designate an appropriate number of products as 'Special Products' (SP) 
guided by indicators based on the criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural 
development needs, and the establishment of a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM).   
(b) Domestic support  
• Substantial reductions in trade-distor ting support in developed countries; 
• Enhanced Blue Box criteria to ensure that this  category of support is less distorting than 
Amber Box support; 
• Review and clarification of the Green Box criteria to ensure that such measures have no, 
or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects on production while ensuring that 
programmes of developing countries that meet this fundamental requirement are 
effectively covered;  
• Capping of product-specific aggregate measur ements of support, in accordance with a 
methodology to be agreed;    WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
 Page 5 
 
 
  • Appropriate special and differential treat ment, including lesser reductions in 
trade-distorting support and the flexibility to provide certain types of investment and input subsidies. 
(c) Export competition 
• Elimination of all forms of export subsidies; 
• Developing appropriate rules in respect of  short-term export credits, export credit 
insurance or guarantee programmes (export credits, etc. with repayment terms of more 
than 180 days are to be eliminated), expor ting STEs, with special consideration for the 
monopoly status for STEs in developing count ries, and on food aid, whilst ensuring that 
these disciplines have appropriate provisions fo r differential treatment of least-developed 
and net food-importing developing countries; 
• Appropriate special and differential treatmen t, including longer time frames to eliminate 
all forms of their export subsidies (to tho se developing countries that have reduction 
commitments in this area), extension of th e provisions contained in Article 9.4 which 
provides an exemption from reduction commitments for certain types of export marketing and transport costs. 
14. In addition to the issues of interest to developing countries highlighted above, S&D will 
include lower reduction rates and longer implementation periods for developing countries while LDCs 
will not have to undertake reduction commitments and will have full access to all S&D provisions.  
The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration also prov ided that developed countries and developing 
countries in a position to do so will provide duty- and quota-free market access for at least 97 per cent 
of products originating from LDCs.
2   
15. Given the importance of cotton for a number of  developing countries, especially LDCs, cotton 
now has its own specificity in the agriculture negotiations through the Sub-Committee on Cotton.  
While being supported by a wide range of developing countries, the issue is being most actively 
pursued by the four proponents of the Sectoral Initiative on Cotton:  Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and 
Mali.  The Hong Kong Ministerial Conference agreed  that all forms of export subsidies for cotton 
would be eliminated by developed countries in  2006, and that developed countries would give 
duty-free and quota-free access for cotton exports from LDCs from the commencement of the implementation period.  Members also agreed to the objective of reducing trade distorting domestic 
subsidies for cotton production more ambitiously th an under whatever general formula is agreed in 
the negotiations and that it shoul d be implemented over a shorter period of time than generally 
applicable.  Since the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference the Sub-Committee on Cotton has continued its work with additional proposals from the proponents, including TN/AG/SCC/GEN/6 of 16 June 2006.  These proposals are reflected in the Draft Possible Modalities Document 
(TN/AG/W/3).   
16. A number of recently acceded Members (RAMs) are concerned about the possible negative 
impact on their agricultural sectors of further significant market access commitments.  These 
Members argue that due to the significant comm itments they undertook during their accession process 
their levels of border protection are already at very low levels, especially compared to the tariff levels 
of other, more advanced countries.   
17. Other issues of concern to various groups of  developing countries include monitoring and 
surveillance mechanisms to en sure implementation of Members' commitments, low prices for 
                                                     
 
2 Reference is made to the Decision on Measures in Favour of LDCs in Annex F of the Hong Kong 
Declaration on duty-free and quota-free market access for LDCs, which is treated in the section on "Special and 
Differential Treatment". WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
Page 6  
 
  commodities, the removal of tariff escalation, the el imination of tariff duties for commodity products 
under GSP schemes,  the elimination of non-tariff ba rriers and the particular problems facing SVEs. 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
18. A successful conclusion of the negotiations would lead to considerable gains for developing 
countries.  Further reform of the world agriculture trading system would lead Members closer towards 
the long-term objective they agreed to during th e Uruguay Round and which is encapsulated in the 
Doha Declaration, the 1 August 2004 Decision and th e Hong Kong Declaration, namely to establish a 
fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system.  
19. Substantial reductions of tariffs, along with a reduction of tariff peaks and tariff escalation, 
would result in increased market access opportunities.   Exports to developed countries would increase 
and South-South trade would be stimulated.  Th is would not only allow developing countries to 
export products where they have a comparative advant age, but would also allow for the diversification 
of production, including value-adde d processing, and export orientation.   Enhanced tariff quotas with 
an improved tariff quota administration regime would also result in improving market access opportunities.  Substantial reductions in trade-dist orting domestic support and the elimination of all 
forms of export subsidies would make world pri ces more realistic, reduce artificial competition and 
benefit exporters, especially in  developing countries.   
20. At the same time, appropriate special and diffe rential treatment, including the flexibility to 
designate a number of products as 'special' and the establishment of a Specia l Safeguard Mechanism, 
may alleviate some concerns that some developing countries have about the possible effect of tariff 
reductions on rural development, ru ral livelihood and food security.  Similarly, flexibility in the right 
to provide some agriculture support, as well as the flexibility to provide certain types of input and 
investment subsidies could help developing c ountries improve productivity, and consequently the 
earning capacity, of their agriculture sector.  At the same time, improved market access conditions on 
a more certain footing can help to increase infrastructure and investment, including foreign direct investment, and therefore increase and improve pr oduction and processing standards, employment and 
standards of living.   
B. N
ON-AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
21. Trade in non-agricultural products accounts for mo re than 90 per cent of world trade in goods 
and encompasses some key products of export interest to many developing countries.  Therefore, the 
NAMA negotiations offer the promise of impr oved and more secure market access conditions 
(through new tariff reductions and bindings) in both developed and developing country markets.  
Some major aspects of these are: 
• Improved access into developed country markets (North-South trade) :  The reduction or 
elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation that remained from the Uruguay Round on products originating in de veloping countries would open up valuable 
new market access opportunities in developed countries.   
• Improved opportunities in other developing country markets (South-South trade)
:  Since 
more than 40 per cent of their merchandise expor ts are directed towards other developing 
countries, there is in principle a substa ntial interest in improving market access 
conditions to each other. 
• Improved market access for LDCs :  LDCs consider that improved market access, in the 
form of preferential duty-free/quota-free access,  is key for their development goals.  At  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
 Page 7 
 
 
  the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference it was ag reed that developed Members shall, and 
those developing country Members in a positio n to do so should, provide duty-free and 
quota-free market access for at least 97 per cent of products originating from LDCs. 3   
22. Developing country Members in the NAMA ne gotiations have often called for flexibilities 
that would allow them to make lower tariff cuts or  exempt a number of tariff lines from new bindings 
or reduction commitments in order to take account  of special and differential treatment and the 
principle of less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments.  Some of the main considerations 
underlying these arguments are listed below.   
• Preserving "policy space" :  Many developing country Me mbers have argued for a degree 
of flexibility to set their import tariffs in order to pursue their developmental goals, including industrialization and the diversifica tion of their economies.  Others have noted 
that many developing countries have a large binding overhang (difference between the 
bound duties and the applied duties) and that tariff reductions will probably not cut into 
applied duties as a result of this Round.  The idea has also been moot ed that, since some 
developing countries lack the institutional capac ity to use trade remedies (i.e. safeguards, 
anti-dumping, etc.) they need to preserve hi gh bound duties as a substitute instrument.  
• Protecting infant industries
:  Some developing countries have argued for the need to 
retain tariffs to nurture infant industries because they lack public funds to provide 
subsidies or other types of incentives for this  purpose.  Members have discussed the risks 
of excessive protection over extended periods in terms of a potentially negative impact 
on development.  Others have noted that almost all Members have protected nascent 
industries at some stage of their development. 
• Maintaining unbound duties :  Some Members have made a case for keeping tariff lines 
unbound, particularly in sensitive sectors.  Ot hers have questioned why the establishment 
of new bound duties, as opposed to their level,  should be considered  detrimental to any 
industry.  They have also noted that all agricultural tariffs, which are normally considered to be more sensitive, were bound  during the Uruguay Round and that several 
developing countries and LDCs alrea dy have full binding coverage.   
• Non-reciprocal preference erosion
:  Many developing and l east-developed countries have 
argued that they depend on non-reciprocal pr eferences, which are granted by developed 
countries, for a significant share of their exports.  They consider that any further MFN 
liberalization should provide for a trade solu tion that takes this into account and should 
not lead to further marginalization and de -industrialization of their economies.  Other 
developing countries which benefit to a l esser degree from preferences emphasize the 
importance they attach to further MFN liber alization precisely in the markets of the 
preference giving countries and note that non -reciprocal preferences are autonomously 
granted outside the WTO system.  These Members are ready to consider safety-net solutions for the preference receiving count ries which could be affected by tariff 
reductions in the developed countries, but outside the NAMA negotiations (e.g. in the context of the Aid for Trade discussions).   
• Preventing the loss of tariff revenue
:  Dependence on import tariffs for government 
revenue has been cited by some developing countries as a reason for preserving tariffs at 
current levels.  While arguing that it is desira ble for a country to diversify its tax base 
over time, others have noted that, since bound and not applied duties are being negotiated, the risk of revenue loss for ma ny developing country Members is low.   
                                                     
 
3 Reference is made to the Decision on Measures in Favour of LDCs in Annex F of the Hong Kong 
Declaration on duty-free and quota-free market access for LDCs, which is treated in the section on "Special and 
Differential Treatment". WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
Page 8  
 
  2. Status of the Negotiations 
23. Following a process of intensive meetings and c onsultations, the Chairman of the Negotiating 
Group on Market Access (NGMA) put forward in July 2006, on his responsibility, a paper entitled "Towards NAMA Modalities."
4  In this document, he laid out possible modalities language taken 
from the NAMA Framework5 supplemented by the Hong Kong Mi nisterial Declaration, language 
subsequently agreed or language he  was proposing on his own responsibility (identified in italics).     
24. With regard to modalities for tariff reduction,  it was agreed at the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference to adopt a Swiss formula with coefficients  that satisfy the mandate in paragraph 16 of the 
Doha Declaration.  Ministers also reaffirmed the importance of special and differential treatment and 
less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments , including paragraph 8 of the NAMA Framework, 
as integral parts of the modalities.  In July 2006, there continued to be two Swiss formula options on 
the table:  a simple Swiss formula with two coe fficients (one for developed and a higher one for 
developing country Members) and the so-called ABI formula.   
25. The different flexibilities contained in the Fr amework and Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration 
(i.e. for LDCs, Members with a low binding c overage, SVEs, RAMs and developing countries 
applying the formula) have been the subject of nu merous substantive discussions.  The tension around 
this point arises from the trade-off between am bition and flexibilities (particularly paragraph 8 
flexibilities), as an increase in the latter (defensive interests) leads to a curtailing of market access 
(offensive interests).  One agreed issue worth hi ghlighting is that LDCs are exempted from tariff 
reductions and are only expected to increase their bindi ngs substantially, leaving it largely to them to 
decide on the level and coverage of the bindings.   
26. Unbound tariffs have also been an issue of concern to a number of developing countries.  At 
Hong Kong, Ministers agreed to adopt a non-linear  mark-up approach to establish base rates for 
commencing tariff reductions and the NAMA Chairman noted in his July 2006 report that this mark-up was in the range of 5 to 30 percentage poi nts.  It should be noted that twelve developing 
countries with a binding coverage below 35 per cent would be exempted from the application of the 
formula (the so-called "Paragraph-6" Members) and the application of the non-linear mark-up.  
Instead, they are expected to bi nd a certain percentage of non-agricultural tariff lines at an average 
level that does not exceed 28.5 per cent.  The Ch airman noted in his July 2006 report that the 
percentage of tariff lines to bound was in the range of 70 to 100 per cent.   
27. The flexibilities for the developing countries applying the formula are described in 
Paragraph 8 of the NAMA Framework.  This pa ragraph would allow these developing countries to 
choose between applying less than formula cuts of up  to [10] per cent of the tariff lines; or keeping 
tariff lines unbound or not applying formula cuts for up to [5] per cent of tariff lines.  The numbers in 
brackets are still under negotiation and both options would be conditioned on not exceeding a certain 
level of imports.   
28. Ministers at Hong Kong noted the concerns raised by SVEs and instructed the Negotiating 
Group to establish ways to provide flexibilities for these Members without creating a sub-category of 
WTO Members.  The Chairman noted in his July 2006 report that there appears to be broad support on the "trigger" to determine eligibility (i.e. Member s having a share of less than 0.1 per cent of world 
NAMA trade for a reference period of 1999 to 2001) , but positions remain divided on the possible 
treatment of these Members.  The basic options bein g considered revolve around a proposal to grant 
bigger numbers to SVEs under Para graph 8 and another one which would exempt SVEs from the 
application of the formula and would entail a Paragraph-6 type of treatment. 
                                                     
 
4 TN/MA/W/80. 
5 Annex B of the Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004 (WT/L/579).  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
 Page 9 
 
 
  29. A number of additional issues have been discu ssed in the NGMA, including the issue of 
recently acceded Members (RAMs).  The NAMA Fr amework recognized that these Members shall 
have recourse to special provisions for tariff reducti ons in order to take into account their extensive 
market access commitments undertaken as part of  their accession.  The Chairman noted in his 
July 2006 report that there is consensus to grant them additional flexibility in the form of "longer 
implementation periods".  Other flexibilities which ha ve been proposed by the RAMs include a higher 
coefficient in the formula, greater Paragraph 8 flexibilities and grace periods.   
30. The sectoral tariff component of the negotiations is being pursued actively in an informal 
Member-driven process.  Fourteen sectors have be en proposed for negotiation, some of which are 
being pursued by developing countries (e.g. fish  & fish products, gems & jewellery and raw 
materials). Ministers at Hong Kong instructed the Negotiating Group to review proposals with a view 
to identifying those which could ga rner sufficient participation to be realized. They agreed that 
participation should be on a non-mandatory basis.  Some developing country Members have indicated 
that such initiatives may be to the detriment of sma ll Members, as they would erode even further their 
preferential margins.  Other Members consider th e sectoral tariff component an essential component 
of the NAMA negotiations in order to achi eve commercially meaningful market access. 
31. Another issue which has been discussed intensiv ely is that of non-reciprocal preferences. 
Ministers at Hong Kong instructed the NGMA to intens ify work on the assessment of the scope of the 
problem with a view to finding possible solutions . Intense discussions have taken place on the issue 
based on a preliminary assessment by the Secretaria t, and currently the focus is on identifying the 
possible solutions. 
32. Addressing non-tariff barriers (NTBs) is important  for many developing countries and LDCs.6  
It has now become clearer that the majority of  notified NTBs will be taken up by the Members 
concerned either in regular WTO committees or in other negotiating groups.  The majority of these 
pertain to technical barriers to trade (TBT), tr ade facilitation, customs valuation and sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures.  Ministers at H ong Kong recognized the need for specific negotiating 
NTB proposals and encouraged participants to make  such submissions as quickly as possible.  There 
are currently eight draft vertical and horizontal pro posals, one of which is spearheaded by a group of 
developing countries.7  This is a very complex area of work in which many developing countries and 
LDCs have had difficulties in identifying  the NTBs affecting their exports.   
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
33. Summarizing from the preceding section, the specifi c issues of interest to developing country 
Members are listed below.  It is noted that not all developing countries share the same views on some 
of these issues and, in some of them , they have conflicting views.   
• Bring down tariff peaks, high tariffs and tari ff escalation in developed country markets 
(improve access in developed country markets); 
• Bring down tariff peaks, high tariffs and ta riff escalation in other developing country 
markets (improve South-South trade); 
• Duty-free and quota-free access for LDCs while ensuring that LDCs are only required to 
increase their level of bindings and not to apply the formula or to participate at sectorals; 
• Reduce or eliminate non-tariff barriers; 
                                                      
6 See the LDC Group's proposal on rules of origin (TN/CTD/W/30 – TN/MA/W/74 – TN/AG/GEN/20) 
and the Secretariat note on non-tariff measures on products of export interest to LDCs (WT/COMTD/LDC/W/39 and Add.1/Rev.2). 
7 Proposal entitled "Draft Text on Procedures for Re solution of Non-Tariff Barriers" by the NAMA-11 
group of developing countries. WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
Page 10  
 
  • Preserve "policy space"; 
• Provide adequate protection for infant industries;  
• Preserve unbound duties; 
• Address non-reciprocal preferences; 
• Prevent tariff revenue losses. 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
34. In recognition of benefits that accrue from appropriately designed trade liberalization 
measures, many developing country Members have  been reducing their import tariffs autonomously 
over the years.  Several of them have also libera lized in the context of customs unions and regional 
trade agreements.  The importance of developing count ries in international trade has been growing.  
Trade in manufactures – which is a subset of th e non-agricultural products accounting for more than 
70 per cent of world merchandise exports – provi des a good example: the share of developing 
countries in world exports of manufactures rose from 16.6 per cent in 1990 to 28.1 per cent in 2004.
8   
35. Overall, the gains from NAMA liberalization have  been estimated by several institutions to 
range from US$54.2 billion to US$ 276.8 billion.9  Most of these estimates are long-term, in the sense 
that they assess the impact following full adjustment.  Evidence regarding short-term effects is scarce.  
These estimates need to be considered in light of the following:  first, the estimates are based on 
scenarios which may diverge substantially from any final agreement reached.  Second, the models 
typically do not take proper account of factors such as growth effects, preferences, or supply-side constraints.  For example, in order to feel th e full benefits of results in the NAMA negotiations, 
alleviation of supply-side constraints is a necessary condition.  Moreover, it is  important to note that 
the estimates of gains from opening up to trade do not take into account any consideration of 
adjustment costs associated w ith increased trade competition. 
36. The gains that could accrue to individual devel oping countries would also differ depending on 
each country's comparative advantage as well as on  the extent to which it will liberalize itself. 
However, in general terms, both No rth-South and South-South trade ar e expected to expand as a result 
of the NAMA negotiations, with the corresponding effect on economic efficiency and growth.  
Additionally, removing or reducing tariff escalati on will give developing countries the opportunity to 
diversify their export base and to produce and e xport products with a highe r domestic value-added 
component. 
37. Another outcome of the NAMA negotiations is e xpected to be an improvement in the binding 
coverage levels which, along with a possible re duction in binding overhang, could enhance the 
predictability and transparency of the trading enviro nment.  This could be further reinforced by the 
requirement that bindings should only take the form of ad valorem  duties.  Problems in the area of 
non-tariff barriers are also expected to be addressed  in the context of the NAMA negotiations and in 
other negotiating groups.  Since the results of th e different NTB negotiations will be applied on an 
MFN basis, the benefits will accrue to the en tire Membership.  Granting duty-free and quota-free 
market access to LDCs, whether by developed c ountry Members or other developing Members, would 
offer this group of countries additional market access.  
                                                     
 
8 Source:  WTO Secretariat.  The term manufactures  refers to SITC sections 5, 6, 7, 8 minus 
division 68 and group 891.  It excludes fish & fish products, as well as fuel and mining products. 
9 Piermartini, R. and Teh R.  (2005). "Demystifying Modelling Methods for Trade Policy", WTO 
Discussion Paper No. 10.  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
 Page 11 
 
 
  C. SERVICES  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
38. Services production is the dominant economic activity  in virtually all countries of the world, 
regardless of their level of development.  The services sector represented 68 per cent of world gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2004.10  Despite many country-specific factors such as natural resource 
endowments, the share of services tends to be positively related to the level of income or 
development.  This is due to a variety of factors,  including a propensity of individuals to spend more 
on services as their incomes grow and of the services content of production to increase with growing 
sophistication in industrial production.  For exampl e, in 2004, services were estimated to account for 
49 per cent of GDP in low income economies, 53 per cent in middle income economies, and 
72 per cent in high income economies.11 
39. Many traditional services, including distribu tion, construction, or social services are 
particularly labour-intensive.  Services thus tend to be an even more important source of employment 
– and employment creation – than the above figures suggest.  By the same token, given the sector's 
dominant role in total employment, productivity ga ins are essential for overall economic expansion 
and welfare.  Removing barriers to access and competition among services and service suppliers can 
lead to lower prices, better quality and a wider choice  for consumers.  Given their infrastructural role, 
services such as telecommunications, financial ser vices (including banking and insurance), business 
services, construction and transport are crucial in  shaping overall economic performance.  Logistics 
(packaging, storage, transport, inventories, admi nistration and management) are also an important 
component of the production and distribution chai n, and logistics costs may indeed constitute a 
particularly heavy burden for developing countri es, especially small economies, island economies, 
and landlocked economies.  In sum, there is a co mmon interest across countries at all levels of 
development in ensuring that their services infrastru cture underpins, rather than inhibits, internal 
economic performance and access to external markets.   The quality, availability and price of core 
producer services are key determinants of co mpetitiveness, and ultimately of growth and 
development.  
2. Status of the Negotiations 
40. The services negotiations are taking place on two broad fronts:  market access and 
rule-making (Emergency Safeguard Measures, Gove rnment Procurement, Subsidies and Domestic 
Regulation).  The market access segment consists of negotiations on new or improved commitments 
for inclusion in Members' schedules of specific commitments under the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS), and the re-negotiation of curre nt MFN exemptions as mandated by the Annex on 
Article II Exemptions.  Appropriate flexibility is to be provided to individual developing countries, 
which may open fewer sectors and liberalize fewer types of transactions in line with their 
development situation.   
41. The GATS does not recommend or prescribe temp lates for undertaking commitments.  Each 
Member is free to structure its commitments in line with its national policy objectives and constraints.  
However, in accordance with GATS Article XIX, Members have adopted specific instruments to 
guide the negotiations.  Among these are the 'Gui delines and Procedures for the Negotiations on 
Trade in Services', which, inter alia , recall that the negotiations aim to achieve progressively higher 
levels of liberalization and increase the participat ion of developing countries in services trade;  
reaffirm that the process of liberalization sha ll take place with due respect for national policy 
objectives, the level of development and the size of economies of individual Members;  require 
Members to give special attention to sectors and m odes of supply of export interest to developing 
                                                      
10 World Bank (2006), World Development Indicators.  
11 Ibid. WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
Page 12  
 
  countries;  and recognize the right of Members to re gulate and to introduce new regulations.  Special 
provision has also been made for LDC participation in the negotiations, affirming the need for greater 
flexibility in terms of the depth and coverage of LDC commitments, calling for particular attention on 
the part of other Members in opening up sectors of interest to LDCs, and emphasizing the importance of assisting LDCs to participate more effectively in international trade in services. 
42. The Negotiating Guidelines, which govern the negotiations on market access, establish the 
request-and-offer approach as the main negotiating method.  However, the request-and-offer process 
has only produced limited results so far:  by the end of March 2007, only 70 Members (counting the 
EC as one) had submitted offers, in cluding 30 revised offers.   
43. At Hong Kong, Ministers urged all Members to  participate actively in the negotiations 
towards achieving a progressively higher level of liber alization of trade in services, with appropriate 
flexibility for individual developing countries as provided for in Article XIX of the GATS.  LDCs are not expected to undertake new commitments.  Mini sters expressed their determination to intensify the 
negotiations in accordance with agr eed principles and the objectives, approaches and timelines set out 
in Annex C of the Ministerial Declaration with a view to expanding the sectoral and modal coverage 
of commitments and increasing their quality.  (How ever, the timelines foreseen in the Annex were 
later made redundant by the suspension of all negotiati ons in late July 2006.)  In terms of approaches, 
Ministers agreed, inter alia,  that in addition to bilateral ne gotiations, the request-offer procedure 
should also be pursued on a plurilateral basis.  They also agreed to give due consideration to proposals 
on the trade-related concerns of small economies,  to develop methods for the full and effective 
implementation of the LDC Modalities, and to provid e targeted technical assistance with a view to 
enabling developing and least-developed countries to participate effectively in the negotiations.   
44. Discussions – both formal and informal – have also been conducted on the implementation of 
the LDC modalities, on the basis of a communication submitted by Zambia on behalf of the LDC Group – "A mechanism to operationalize Article IV:3 of the GATS" (TN/S/W/59).  At the meeting of 
the Special Session of the Council for Trade in Se rvices held on 14 July 2006, the EC delegation 
presented a paper co-sponsored  by the US, Japan and Canada.  The new proposal provides that all 
Members notify, by September 2006, how they woul d grant "special priority" to LDCs in the 
negotiations, pursuant to Article IV:3 of the GATS.   It also provides that a review of these 
notifications be conducted and that the Chairman of the Council for Trade in Services in Special 
Session compile a "list of best practices" in this re gard.  Intensive discussions on this issue have been 
held since the resumption of the negotiations in Febr uary 2007, although significant gaps remain to be 
bridged. 
45. At the same meeting, the African Group presented a room document regarding S&D 
proposals.  The document calls for the Council fo r Trade in Services to undertake, before the 
conclusion of the Doha Round, an evaluation of th e extent to which the envisaged services package 
contributes to the full and effective implementation of Article IV of the GATS.  It also proposes, 
inter alia , a regular review of the implementation of Article IV by Members.  While the document 
was generally well received at an informal m eeting in March 2007, demandeurs and some other 
Members differed on certain aspects.  The African Group is expected to submit further proposals on 
S&D treatment. 
46. The rule-making negotiations, which already started in 1995, are based on the mandates 
contained in Article VI:4 (Domestic Regulati on), Article X (Emergency Safeguard Measures), 
Article XIII (Government Procurement), and Artic le XV (Subsidies).  Pursuant to the Doha 
Declaration, they were integrated into the broa der agenda of the new round of negotiations.  The 
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration reaffirmed the mandate in Article VI:4 to develop disciplines on 
domestic regulation, and called upon Members to develop text for adoption.  Following the informal 
resumption of the negotiations in late 2006, the Chairman conducted several rounds of informal  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
 Page 13 
 
 
  consultations and finally submitted,  in April 2007, a room document containing a draft negotiating 
text for the Article VI:4 disciplines.  The Hong Kong Declaration also called upon Members to 
intensify their approaches to conclude the nego tiations on rule-making unde r GATS Articles X, XIII 
and XV, in accordance with their respective mandat es and timelines.  While a number of issues have 
been raised and discussed in the Working Party on GATS Rules since then, overall, there was no 
notable change in long-held positions.   
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
47. A broad range of developi ng countries have expressed their negotiating objectives and 
expectations in written submissions since the start of the services negotiati ons.  Over 40 per cent of 
the 150 proposals that have been tabled since November 2000 involve one developing country or 
more (this number excludes most proposals on so-called horizontal issues, but covers basically all 
proposals on sectors and modes of supply).  In total,  more than 30 developing country Members have 
voiced interest in at least one sector or mode of  supply under negotiation.  Relevant sectors include 
professional services, computer and related services, telecommunication services, audiovisual services, construction and related engineering services, distribution services, energy services, 
environmental services, financial services;  tourism services and transport services (including 
logistics).  
48. Movements of natural persons (u nder Mode 4) and, more recently, the cross-border supply of 
services (under Modes 1 and 2), have also attracted  attention.  Proposals on Mode 4, which plays a 
focal role for many developing countries, have incl uded a call for the harmonization of categories of 
service suppliers used in scheduling commitments, more commitments on lower-skilled workers, the 
reduction of barriers involving such matters as natio nality, residency and work permit requirements, 
tax treatment, wage parity requirements, and the dur ation of stay.  The emergence of "off-shoring" 
activities in recent years has turned  the spotlight on cross-border trade.  A number of developing 
countries have recently called for ambitious comm itments under both Modes 1 and 2 across a wide 
range of sectors, including business services, research and development services, computer services, 
management consulting services, call-centre services, and transfer of financial information and data.   
49. Developing-country Members are actively taki ng part in the plurilateral request-offer 
mechanism agreed to at Hong Kong.  Apart from bei ng recipients of many requests, some of them 
have also co-sponsored plurilateral requests for mark et access in areas of speci fic interest, such as the 
movement of natural persons, cro ss border supply of services, computer related services, construction 
and related engineering services, and the removal of  MFN exemptions.  At the meeting of the Special 
Session of the Council for Trade in Services held in May 2006, the delegation of Zambia submitted on 
behalf of the LDC Group a communication presenting their collective request in Mode 4 (JOB(06)/155).  The LDC Group requests Members to make commitments in four categories of 
natural persons, with each category applying to a number  of specified sectors of export interest to this 
group.  
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
50. Several studies have estimated, with a wide vari ety of research techniques, the income effects 
attributable to a reduction in services protection.  In  general, these gains have been found to dwarf the 
benefits expected to flow from further trade liberali zation in goods.  This is due to several factors.  
First, barriers in many services markets are highe r than existing barriers in goods trade, barring 
particular exceptions such as in the case of agricultu re.  Second, these barriers normally consist of less 
transparent and efficient measures – quotas and ot her non-revenue generating interventions – than 
tariffs in merchandise trade.  Third, as explained ab ove, the costs of services protection, in particular 
of infrastructure-related services, are spread across,  and impose deadweight losses on, a wide array of 
downstream user industries.   WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
Page 14  
 
  51. Developing countries stand to gain considerably from liberalization of trade in services, both 
on the part of their trading partners and in terms of their own policy regimes.  Bearing in mind the 
nature of potential economy-wide gains from low-co st, high quality services, benefits to countries 
from their own liberalization can be considerable.  While there are obvious long-term gains associated 
with services liberalization, there are also adjustment costs involve d which may need to be addressed 
with assistance and capacity-building programmes.  Obviously much depends on domestic regulatory 
or institutional reforms to underpin  the viability and credibility of the new environment.  For example, 
the absence of clear and predictable market conditions may prompt potential investors to demand risk premiums that are not politically or socially acceptable.   If increased entry into financial sectors is not 
accompanied by adequate prudential supervision,  instability may ensue.  And the absence of 
well-designed universal service requirements may resu lt in new, unsustainable burdens being imposed 
on vulnerable groups or regions.  The pace, conten t and sequencing of liberalization programmes are 
thus key to avoiding unnecessary frictions and en suring the efficiency and viability of the new 
regimes.   
52. Even though governments can – and indeed do – initiate reforms of services sectors 
unilaterally, multilateral commitments under the GA TS can be an important catalyst for such 
liberalization and reform efforts.  On the one ha nd, services negotiations can help to improve export 
access in areas of developing country interest, such as the movement of natural persons, cross-border 
supply of services, or in specific sectors.  The GATS can also be used to secu re access to markets that 
are already open, and where developing countries ar e acquiring a comparative advantage, such as the 
cross-border trade of electronically delivered servi ces.  On the other hand, specific commitments can 
spur and promote investment in the unilaterally liberalized sectors, by making access to the market 
predictable, secure, and discrimination-free.  More over, specific commitments can be shaped to take 
into account eventual adjustment processes and to allow for the development of necessary regulatory 
frameworks. 
D. T
RADE FACILITATION  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
53. Development aspects have always been at th e heart of WTO work on facilitating trade, 
reflecting the wide-spread recognition of Trade Faci litation as a fundamental element of a country's 
trade and growth policy.  Having brought down tari ff barriers to historically low levels, Members 
decided to address the remaining obstacles to trade.   Negotiations on Trade Facilitation are widely 
seen as a necessary complement to broader liberalizat ion efforts – essential to reap the full benefits of 
freer trade.   
54. The importance of development aspects is also  reflected in the negotiating mandate, listing 
the enhancement of technical assistance and capac ity-building (TA&CB) as a specific goal of the 
negotiating exercise.  Also to be taken into acc ount is special and differe ntial treatment for the 
developing country Members with the extent and the timing of entering into commitments being 
compatible with their implementation capacities.  It  is recognized that the S&D principle would have 
to extend beyond the granting of traditional transi tion periods.  The mandate makes clear that 
developing and least-developed Members would not  be obliged to undertake investments in 
infrastructure projects beyond their means.  Far-reaching flexibility is further granted to LDCs, which will only be required to undertake commitments to the extent consistent with their individual 
development, financial and trade needs or thei r administrative and institutional capabilities.  
Development-related aspects are also reflected in the mandate's call for the identification of trade 
facilitation needs and priorities as an integral part of  the negotiations.  Each of those aspects has been 
reflected in various contributions by the Memb ership, advancing their understanding and outlining 
possible ways for their practical implementation.   WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
 Page 15 
 
 
  2. Status of the Negotiations 
55. Based on the modalities set out in Annex D of the July Package and supported by the 
additional guidance obtained at the Ministeria l Conference in Hong Kong, negotiations have 
proceeded on the basis of Members' contributions, both in written and verbal form.  More than 
140 submissions, many by developing countries, ha ve been tabled on all issues under negotiation, 
underlining their commitment to advancing the facilita tion of trade.  Written contributions have also 
been made by LDCs, often teaming up with  partners from the developed world. 
56. Through a series of discussions on all elements of the mandate, Members arrived at refining 
their input from initial ("first generation") pr oposals over consolidated ("second generation") 
suggestions to contributions in text form ("third ge neration").  They were all compiled in a regularly 
updated document (TN/TF/W/43 with its respective revisions12) which came to be the basis of the 
Negotiating Group's further discussions13.   
57. Based on the Hong Kong Ministerial recommendation14 to deepen and intensify the 
negotiations on the issue of special and differential treatment,  Members made particular efforts to 
advance this pillar of their work with encouraging results.  Valuable  advances were also achieved at 
the crucial technical assistance front which had also b een highlighted in the Ministerial Declaration as 
an area requiring "special attention"15.  Members submitted substantive proposals on the subject which 
were the subject of intensive discussion in the Ne gotiating Group.  Two proposals were presented in 
text form.  The first originates from a group of developed a nd developing countries16 and proposes a 
staged, needs-oriented implementation mechanism of trade facilitation commitments, including key 
elements for technical assistance (TN/TF/W/137 and subsequent add itions).  A textual proposal was 
also submitted by the Core Group of developing countries,17(TN/TF/W/142), equally presenting ideas 
on an implementation mechanism for S&D and TA&CB support.  Both submissions represent work in 
progress with additional ideas on the subject also ha ving been presented by ot her delegations (albeit 
not yet in written form). 
58. Work also advanced on the important needs assessment area.  A corresponding programme, 
which includes both regional and national activities in a ll parts of the world, is a joint undertaking by 
the WTO Secretariat and relevant international or ganizations (in particular the World Bank, WCO, 
UNCTAD, OECD and IMF) with the support of donors  from the government side.  It is carried out on 
the basis of a self-assessment guide specifi cally developed for that end (TN/TF/W/14318).   
                                                      
12 The most recent revision is TN/TF/W/43/Rev.10. 
13 At the General Council meeting of 27-28 July 2006, the Chairman reported on the state of play in the 
trade facilitation talks, submitting compilation TN/TF/W/ 43/Rev.9 as the document "on which negotiations are 
proceeding" (TN/TF/4).  The compilation was referred to as  "a reflection of work in progress that represents a 
significant advance, but not agreement".  Reference was also made to it being "without prejudice to the right of 
Members to put forward new contributions".  The report e qually made clear that the proposals required further 
refinement and negotiation.  
14 Annex E of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, paragraph 7. 
15 Annex E of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, paragraph 6. 
16 Armenia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, EC, Georgia, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mexico , Moldova, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, 
Switzerland and Uruguay. 
17 Bangladesh, Botswana, Cuba, Egypt, India, In donesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Rwanda, Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
18 The tool was developed by the World Bank in cooperation with the WTO Secretariat and other 
Annex D organizations. Professor David Widdowson of the Centre for Customs & Excise Studies of the 
University of Canberra was commissioned by the World Bank to prepare the main draft.     WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
Page 16  
 
  3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
59. Apart from TA&CB, much attention has been give n to the needs and priorities of developing 
countries, to cost implications and questions of  S&D.  Reference was further made to linkages 
between Annex D's elements and the need for a bala nced result.  There was also focus on measures to 
improve and clarify the relevant regulatory frame work with a view to expediting and enhancing 
developing country trade.  For landlocked count ries (as well as non-landlocked Members of the 
developing world), transit matters ar e of particular interest in that regard.  Regional approaches to 
trade facilitation were brought up as an area of  interest by a number of small economies
19 
(TN/TF/W/129/Rev.1), especially with respect to implementing requirements and the provision of 
TA&CB.  Issues such as economies of scale, maximi zation of resources and targeted support were 
stressed as important considerations for the trade facilitation discussions.  
60. In the TA&CB area, calls have been made for support both during the negotiations and after 
their conclusion, with a number of concrete measures proposed for each phase.  Such support is 
recognized as vital for developing and least-develope d countries to fully participate in and benefit 
from the negotiating process.  Assistance was request ed to be precise, effective and operational, 
reflecting the trade facilitation needs and priorities of the developing world.  Reference was also made 
to enhancing cooperation and coor dination amongst the various aid providers to increase efficiency 
and avoid duplication of work.  The identification of trade facilitation needs and priorities is another 
issue close to the heart of developing Members, wi th requests being made for their advancement and 
support.  Work is also requested to continue and intensify on the process of addressing concerns on 
the cost implications side.   
61. Special and differential treatment is another key pillar of the negotiations and an essential 
requirement for their success.  As in the case of TA &CB, calls have been made for S&D provisions to 
be precise, effective and operational.  Requests were further made to allow for the necessary 
flexibility in implementing the negotiations' results.   
62. Issues raised by developing countries with r espect to improving and clarifying the existing 
regulatory framework cover all rele vant GATT Articles.  Proposals range from enhanced transparency 
and non-discrimination initiatives over various me asures regarding import/export-related fees and 
formalities to matters addressing goods in transit.  The landlocked countries have been especially 
active in pursuing some of these issues.  Common  underlying objectives of  those suggestions are 
increased trading opportunities that take account of th e particular needs of the developing world.   
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries  
63. Lowering trade-related transaction costs can resu lt in a significant improvement in a country's 
ability to compete effectively in the global economy.  This has been widely recognized by developing 
countries and LDCs, which also ac knowledge  the importance of trad e facilitation for the attainment 
of their development objectives.  While pointing at the need for TA&CB to respond to possible costs 
of implementing certain measures, developing an d least-developed Members have drawn particular 
attention to the benefits they foresee in terms of increasing the competitiveness of their small and 
medium-scale enterpris es.  This applies in particular to th e case of landlocked developing countries 
and LDCs, for which steps to facilitate transit tr affic along with facilitating their own cross-border 
trade can produce a marked reduction in their im port costs and an improvement in their export 
competitiveness on world markets.  National experi ence papers presented by delegations in the 
Negotiating Group, as well as numerous studies that ha ve been conducted by re levant international 
organizations that are collaborating with WTO Members in this area, point to a range of benefits that 
can be realized by taking measures to facilita te trade, including improving revenue collection, 
                                                      
19 The submission was sponsored by Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Papua 
New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevi s, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.   WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
 Page 17 
 
 
  improving border controls and security, lowering admi nistrative costs, encouraging more trade and 
foreign investment, and enhancing the competitiv eness of domestic business in its home market as 
well as on export markets.  Developing countries al so stand to benefit greatly from the aspired 
increase in transparency and predictabi lity of the trading environment. 
E. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
64. Special and differential treatment is an integr al part of the WTO Agreements and reflects a 
recognition of the diverse nature of WTO's vast membership, asymmetry in their economic strengths 
and the need to ensure that economic gains from the trading system are well distributed among all 
Members.  While acknowledging that the multilateral tr ading system has attempted to address some of 
their concerns through appropriate S&D provisions, most developing countries still feel that more 
needs to be done to enhance the effectiveness and operationalization of these provisions.  One of the 
main concerns expressed has been that S&D provisi ons are couched in best endeavour language and 
merely exhort Members to take certain steps, rather  than making this action mandatory and binding.   
65. The development dimension of S&D can be best  gauged from the different submissions made 
by the proponents in the CTD in Special Session.  The African Group, one of the main proponents on 
S&D, states that "special and differential treatment shall aim, to address and resolve the imbalances between developed country Memb ers and developing and ... to  support developing and least-
developed country Members to undertake adjustment s that are necessary for them to meaningfully 
benefit from the agreements ... and to secure for th em market access in the multilateral trading system 
that will facilitate their rapid economic developm ent" (TN/CTD/W/3/Rev.2).  The African Group has 
submitted that its experience with implementing S& D provisions has shown that such provisions are 
best operationalized when they are in the form of binding obligations.  The LDCs, which have also played a central role in this wo rk, believe that developing country Members, particularly the LDCs, 
"experience peculiar problems, which constrain thei r beneficial participation in the multilateral 
trading system" (TN/CTD/W/4).  They therefore feel that assuming the same types and levels of 
obligations as undertaken by other Members has pr evented them from addressing their development 
challenges and from participating meaningfully in th e international trading system.  The LDCs argue 
that S&D provisions should provide them flexib ility to take measures to assist their domestic 
industries, and that they should be obliged to undert ake only such commitments or obligations that are 
consistent with their trade, deve lopment and financial needs.   
2. Status of the Negotiations 
66. Of the 88 Agreement-specific proposals submitte d in the Special Session, mainly by the 
LDCs and the African Group, thirty-eight proposals had been referred to other negotiating groups and 
WTO bodies.  Of the remaining 50 proposals Members had, by Cancún, agreed in principle to 28 proposals.  These proposals, which are yet to be adopted, are contained in Annex C of JOB(03)/150/Rev.2.  At the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, Members adopted the five remaining 
LDC Agreement-specific proposals.  The adopted texts of the five proposals are contained in Annex F 
of the Hong Kong Declaration.   
67. The five LDC proposals adopted at Hong Kong include the decision that developed-country 
Members shall, and developing-country Members decl aring themselves in a position to do so should, 
provide duty-free and quota-free (DFQF) market access for at least 97 per cent of products originating 
from LDCs.  Members are to also ensure that prefer ential rules of origin applicable to imports from 
LDCs are transparent and simple, and contribute to facilitating this market access.
20  The other 
                                                      
20 Cross reference with footnotes 2 and 3 in the "A griculture" and "Non-Agricultural Market Access" 
sections respectively. WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
Page 18  
 
  adopted decisions in Annex F of the Hong Kong Declaration, inter alia , provide the LDCs flexibility 
in the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment M easures (TRIMs), simplification of the waiver 
process and improved coherence agreements with othe r international organizations to ensure more 
targeted technical assistance and capacity-building programmes. 
68. In addition, Ministers at Hong Kong instruct ed the Special Session as well as the bodies in 
which the Category II proposals are being addressed, to  complete the review of all the outstanding 
Agreement-specific proposals and report to the Ge neral Council with clear recommendations for a 
decision by December 2006.  The Special Session was also instructed to resume work on all other 
outstanding issues, including on the cross-cutting i ssues and report on a regular basis to the General 
Council.   
69. Since the resumption of the negotiations, work  in the Special Session has focused on the 
16 remaining Agreement-specific proposals with a view to making clear recommendations on all 
these proposals in the shortest time possible.  Th e text-based discussions have focused mainly on 
seven of the remaining proposals, of which on six pr oposals Members have been able to come up with 
revised texts.  On the remaining nine proposals,  significant divergences exist and, unless Members are 
able to put forward new ideas or alternate language, progress will be difficult. 
70. During discussions on the Agreement-specific propo sals, the LDCs have continued to stress 
the need for quick and effective implementation of th e DFQF market access decision.  In this context, 
the LDCs formally tabled two submissions in the Sp ecial Session, one on rules of origin and the other 
on market access.
21  A number of Members have indicated their intention to implement the decision.  
Of these, Japan has recently no tified the details of its revised GSP scheme to LDCs which has 
increased the coverage of DFQF market access for LDCs to 98 per cent.22   
71. On the outstanding issues, while a number of el ements have been raised as possibly forming 
part of the future work on the cross-cutting issues,  the Monitoring Mechanism is considered by most 
Members as an important step in the continuing re view of the effectiveness and operationalization of 
the S&D provisions.  Members have therefore agreed  that work on the outstanding issues begin with 
consideration of the possible elements of the Mech anism, including its possible scope and structure.  
To facilitate discussions, the Secretariat compiled a paper containing all the earlier proposals made on 
the Monitoring Mechanism. 
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
72. In the context of the proposals tabled in the Special Session, it can be said that the specific 
issues of interest to developing countries, include the following: 
• Flexibility in the multilateral rules, which re flect their concerns and constraints;  
• Transitional arrangements linked to the ach ievement of developmental objectives; 
• Simplifying existing procedures, including for enhanced flexibilities and extended 
transition periods, so as to provide a timely an d effective response to particular concerns; 
• Less than full reciprocity in the commitments undertaken by developing countries; 
• Enhanced and targeted technical assist ance and capacity-building programmes that 
would assist countries to implement WTO rules; 
• Measures that would provide additional and predictable market access for products of 
export interest to developing countries; 
                                                      
21 TN/CTD/W/30 and W/31 respectively. 
22 WT/COMTD/N/2/Add.14.  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
 Page 19 
 
 
  • Operationalization of the decision to provi de duty free and quota free market access to 
the least-developed countries; 
• Making S&D provisions mandatory, in keeping with the concern expressed by many 
developing countries that most of these provi sions are not couched in binding language; 
• Improved coherence arrangements to ensure that flexibilities provided in the WTO rules 
are not diluted because of commitments mandated by other organizations. 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
73. While it is difficult to quantify the gains fro m the S&D work programme, mainly because of 
the lag between adopting and operationalizing any recommendation, it can be said that gains would 
accrue by making the S&D provisions more precise, effective and binding.  Clearly, in order to assist developing countries, especially the LDCs, the S&D provisions must respond to, and be reflective of, 
their concerns.  A number of developing country Members have said that commitments and obligations undertaken by them in the WTO have redu ced their flexibility to adopt, what in their view, 
are pro-development policies and measures.  In this  context, they have put forward a number of 
proposals which seek to enhance the existing flexib ility in the rules for them, and consequently 
provide them a certain degree of policy space.  They  have also sought simplification of cumbersome 
procedures and/or notification obligations, so that they can divert their resources to other developmental issues and areas.     
74. Developing country Members also consider trans itional time periods as an important element 
of S&D treatment; one that provides them with mo re time to conform with, or fulfil particular 
obligations.  However, many, if not all, of these  transition periods have expired and developing 
countries, especially the LDCs, are seeking a positive consideration of their requests for extension of 
these transition periods.  There are several proposals on the need for technical assistance to be more 
predictable and targeted to the development n eeds of developing and least-developed countries.  
There are also a number of proposals that seek to improve coherence arrangements with other organizations in the delivery of such assistance.   
F. I
MPLEMENTATION -RELATED ISSUES AND CONCERNS  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
75. Concerns arising from the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements were raised by 
some developing countries shortly after the establishment of the WTO in 1995.  To them, the Uruguay 
Round Agreements were not balanced and did not contain provisions that would facilitate their 
integration into the multilateral trading system.  In fact, there was the view that some of the 
Agreements, particularly the Agreement on TRIMs and the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures restricted the policy measur es that could be implemented by developing 
countries to attract foreign direct investment a nd to support their nascent domestic industries.  
Concerns were also expressed about a wide ra nge of issues, including the back loading of 
commitments under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.  There was the additional concern 
among small and economically-weak developing countries that the cost of implementing the Uruguay Round Agreement, particularly the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) and the Agreement on Customs Valuati on was excessive as compared to benefits they 
had derived from the implementation of the Urugua y Round Agreements.  Some developing countries 
also complained about the abuse of anti-dumping,  safeguards and countervailing measures as well as 
standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures. WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
Page 20  
 
  2. Status of Work  
76. In December 2005, Ministers at Hong Kong re iterated the instruction in the August 2004 
Decision to the TNC, negotiating bodies and other WTO bodies concerned to redouble their efforts to 
find appropriate solutions to outstanding implemen tation-related issues.  Ministers requested the 
Director-General, without prejudice to the positions of  Members, to intensify his consultative process 
under paragraph 12(b).  Specific mention of the issue of the relationship between the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Di versity (CBD) was added alongside that of 
Geographical Indications (GIs) extension.  Ministers also instructed the Director-General to report to 
each regular meeting of the TNC and the General Council on the outstanding implementation issues.  
The General Council was to review progress and take any appropriate action no later than 
31 July 2006. 
77. At the July 2006 General Council meeting, th e Director-General reported that although 
numerous consultations on GI extension had been he ld, the positions of participants in the discussion 
remained essentially unchanged between those w ho supported GI extension and those opposed.  A 
key issue on which positions remained divided was  wh ether the current level of protection for GIs for 
products other than wines and spirits under Article  22 of the TRIPS Agreement was sufficient for 
protecting such GIs.  Other issues concerned the im plications of extension for other producers that 
had been using the terms in question in their own ma rket and in third country markets, and the extent 
to which extension of the exceptions provisions of Article 24 would meet concerns on this count.  As 
to action to be decided by the General Council, th e proponents of GI extension had advocated a clear 
General Council decision to engage in text-based ne gotiations aimed at providing for GI extension.  
Some other delegations had opposed moving to negotia tions and argued that the case for extension of 
additional protection had not been made.  Howeve r, these delegations had expressed preparedness to 
envisage further fact-based work on the issue. 
78. As regards the relationship between the TRI PS Agreement and the CBD, the consultations 
had included the examination of a non-exhaustive lis t of topics on the basis of consultations with 
delegations.  While positions in the detailed consultations on the basis of the topics in the list 
remained essentially unchanged, the consultations facilitated a more  clear-cut identification of the 
points of divergence and convergence and of the key po licy questions that remained to be decided.  
As to action to be decided by the General C ouncil, the proponents of a new TRIPS disclosure 
obligation advocated a clear General Council decision to engage in text-based negotiations aimed at 
providing for such an obligation.  Some other dele gations had opposed negotiations but had indicated 
preparedness to envisage further fact based wo rk on the issue aimed at seeing how the underlying 
commonly agreed objectives could be best reali zed.  With regard to the other outstanding 
implementation issues – which related to other TR IPS issues, balance of payments, market access, 
TRIMs, customs valuation, safeguards and TBT – the Director-General reported that the situation had 
not evolved and that the ball was essentially in the court of the proponents. 
79. Given the impasse in the Director-General's c onsultations on the outstanding implementation 
issues, as in the negotiations, the Chairman of the General Council said he  could only urge all 
delegations to seriously reflect on this situation.  For his part, he would continue his contacts with 
delegations and with the Director-General to consid er how to take the work forward in this area, 
although realistically Members should be under no illusion that these issues could make significant 
progress until the overall negotiati ng environment improved.    
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
80. Although raised under a number of agreements, the outstanding implementation issues can be 
broadly classified under four main headings:  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
 Page 21 
 
 
  (a) Proposals intended to give longer transiti onal periods to developing countries to 
implement their obligations; 
(b) Proposals safeguarding the market access of developing countries and ensuring that 
they derive benefits under certain agre ements, such as the TRIPS Agreement; 
(c) Proposals intended to exempt developing c ountries from complying with obligations, 
such as those under the TRIMs Agreement;  and 
(d) Proposals requesting that developing countri es be provided with effective technical 
assistance. 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
81. Proponents of the various implementation-rela ted proposals have argued that they would 
derive economic and development benefits from them.  For example, some of the proposals are 
intended to safeguard the market access of deve loping countries by requiring developed countries to 
take account of their interests when applying contingency protection measures.  Proponents have said that the proposals relating to technical assistance  would strengthen their human and institutional 
capacities and enable them to par ticipate effectively in the activities of standard-setting bodies.  To 
take another example, the proponents have said that the proposal on Article XVIII of the GATT 1994 
would assist them to implement programmes wh ich would put their economies on the path of 
sustainable growth and development.  
82. With regard to the proposals under the TRIMs Ag reement, the proponents have said that these 
would enable them to attract foreign direct investme nt into certain critical sectors of their economies.  
They argue that the domestic content requirement w ould benefit local industri es in terms of enhancing 
their competitiveness and facilitating the transfer of technology.  Some other Members argue that if 
the domestic industries are efficient, most foreign investors would source inputs from them rather than 
importing them from elsewhere. 
83. While useful clarificatory work on GI exte nsion has been undertaken, positions remain 
divided on the impact of extens ion on developing countries.  Developing countries figure both among 
the proponents and opponents of extension.  Deve loping country and other proponents maintain that 
extension would provide stronger and more easily asserted protection of GIs for products other than 
wines and spirits.  As a result, extension would fo ster development of local rural communities and the 
value added contingent on a GI would help cr eate new and better opportun ities for quality products, 
especially for smaller, developing country Member s.  In response, developing country and other 
opponents have said that it had not been shown that the existing level of protection required for such 
GIs was inadequate.  They have also argued that extension could not in itself make GIs for quality 
products a valuable marketing tool;  nor could GI protection guarantee market access.  The opponents 
have also raised concerns, inter alia , on the impact of any extension on producers not located in the 
area designated by a GI, as well as questions related to administrative costs and burdens.  The Secretariat circulated in May 2005 a factual compilation of the issues raised and views expressed on 
issues related to GI extension since the beginnin g of the Doha Work Programme (WT/GC/W/546 - 
TN/C/W/25).  This document gives a fuller picture of the debate that has taken place on the matter. 
84. Issues relating to the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD are being 
discussed in two contexts.  In addition to th e consultations undertaken on behalf of the 
Director-General in the context of outstanding im plementation issues, an intensive exploration of 
substantive concerns and suggesti ons is being carried out in the regular sessions of the Council for 
TRIPS, pursuant to paragraph 19 of the Doha Declaration and paragraph 44 of the Hong Kong 
Declaration.  The Secretariat circulated in Februa ry 2006 an updated summary note of issues raised 
and points made on the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD (IP/C/W/368/Rev.1) 
which gives more details on the positions of Member s on this subject in the TRIPS Council.  With WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
Page 22  
 
  regard to the consultations on outstanding impl ementation issues carried out on behalf of the 
Director-General, a group of developing countri es, with wide support from other developing 
countries, have reiterated their proposal on amending the TRIPS Agreement to include a disclosure 
requirement in patent applications aimed at a voiding erroneous patents and facilitating compliance 
with national access and benefit-sharing regimes.  Developing country proponents have said that a 
satisfactory outcome on the issue of the relations hip between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD is 
critical for the development dimension of the Doha Wo rk Programme.  Some others take the view that 
the case has not been made and that such a proposal  is neither necessary nor appropriate in achieving 
the shared objectives in this area,  which can be most effectively realized in other ways without 
involving the patent system.  In between these two positions, support has been expressed for a more 
limited patent disclosure requirement at the internati onal level, restricted to the origin or source of 
genetic material and related traditional knowledge and without substantive implications for 
patentability. 
G. R
ULES  
1. Anti-Dumping and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Including Fisheries 
Subsidies  
(a) Parameters of the de velopment dimension 
85. Developing country exports have been the s ubject of some 45 per cent of all anti-dumping 
investigations since 1995.  Developing country Members also are the main users of anti-dumping, accounting for nearly 60 per cent of all anti-du mping investigations since 1995.  A number of 
developing country Members have sponsored or  co-sponsored proposals aimed at tightening 
anti-dumping rules, i.e., reflecting exporter interest s.  On the other hand, a number of developing 
country Members (including some that have s ubmitted proposals aimed at tightening anti-dumping 
rules) have cautioned against making the rules too difficult for developing country investigating 
authorities to implement, thereby reflecting their interests as users.   
86. Disciplines on subsidies are differentiated among developing country Members based on their 
level of development and certain other factors.  Th is diversity of current treatment is reflected in 
positions on various proposals concerning whet her and how subsidy disciplines might be 
strengthened, and on proposed changes to the spec ial and differential treatment provisions of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM).  Finally, in the area of fisheries 
subsidies, certain developing country Members favour  very strict disciplines with few exceptions and 
limited special and differential treatment, while  others seek broad exemptions from any new 
disciplines.   
(b) Status of the negotiations 
87. Ministers at Hong Kong directed the Negotia ting Group on Rules (NGR) to intensify and 
accelerate the negotiating process in all areas of the ma ndate, on the basis of detailed textual proposals 
before the Group or on those yet to be submitted, an d to complete the process of analyzing proposals 
by participants on the Anti-Dumping (AD) and SCM Agreements as soon as possible.  The Chairman 
of the Negotiating Group was also mandated to prepare consolidated texts of the AD and SCM 
Agreements that would serve as the basis for the final stage of the negotiations.  Following the 
Ministerial Conference, and pursuant to the instructions from Ministers, the Negotiating Group intensified its work in respect of all areas of its mandate, in informal plenary sessions as well as in 
bilateral and plurilateral consultati ons convened by the Chairman.   
88. In his 27 July 2006 report to the TNC (TN/RL/19), the Chairman noted that Members 
individually, and the Negotiating Group collectively,  had done what was required to complete the 
analysis of textual proposals by the June target date  that he had set to put him in a position to table his  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
 Page 23 
 
 
  consolidated texts.  He observed that it had not proven possible to do so because of conditions 
elsewhere in the Round.  Since that report, the Negotiating Group has continued certain technical 
work, focusing in particular on fisheries subsidies and horizontal subsidy disciplines, including on new proposals that have been tabled in these areas. 
(c) Specific issues of interest to developing countries 
89. Most of the proposals on anti-dumping have b een submitted by a group of Members known as 
the Friends of Anti-dumping Negotiations (FANs), wh ich includes a number of developing country 
Members.  Developing and developed Members have also submitted proposals individually on 
various aspects of anti-dumping and countervailing dut y measures.  The general orientation of the 
FANs' proposals is to make the rules on using anti- dumping measures stricter, both in respect of the 
substantive provisions (how dumping margins are calculated, and how injury and causation are 
established), and in respect of duty application and investigative procedures.  In addition, various 
Members are pursuing some of the implementati on and S&D issues pertaining to anti-dumping which 
were referred to the Negotiating Group.  On the ot her hand, certain proposals by developing country 
Members reflect concerns that anti-dumping rules are becoming more demanding and that many 
developing country administrators have difficulty implementing them because of their cost and/or 
complexity.  A final cluster of anti-dumping pro posals/issues with implications for developing 
countries concern transparency and due process in anti-dumping investigations.  While certain developing country Members express concerns over a lack of access to information in investigations 
to which their exporters are subject, others expr ess concern over the increased costs and burdens of 
any new procedures or mechanisms.  Proponent s on these issues, however, have stressed the 
importance that they attach to a high and consistent  standard of procedural fairness and transparency 
on the part of any Member making use of the anti-dumping instrument.   
90. A relatively small number of proposals on horizontal subsidy disciplines under the SCM 
Agreement are under active discussion at present.  Th ese pertain to the rules on prohibited subsidies, 
the meaning of "withdrawal" of a subsidy, the rules on serious prejudice, subsidy calculation issues 
and countervailing measures.  Two proposals, on export credits and export competitiveness, are 
sponsored by developing country Members.  In ot her fora, including the Dedicated Sessions of the 
Committee on Trade and Development and the SCM Co mmittee, certain proposals have been tabled 
to prolong the exemption of certain developing  countries from the SCM Agreement prohibition on 
export subsidies.  In addition, early in the ne gotiations, developed and de veloping country Members 
tabled papers referring to S&D under the SCM Agre ement.  Developing country proposals differ on 
the question of exemptions from horizontal obligatio ns under the Agreement, with some favouring the 
prolongation of such exemptions and others expressing concern about their implications for 
international competition.  Finally, certain papers tabled early in the negotiations propose enhanced 
immunity from countervailing measures for developing country exporters.   
91. The main proponents of new, sector-specific di sciplines on fisheries subsidies comprise a 
group called "Friends of Fish".  This group includ es a number of developing country Members.  For 
the developing country proponents, the main concer n is the artificial competitive advantage created by 
subsidies, which affect access to fish and contribut e to the depletion of the resource.  Most Members 
(developed as well as developing) have stressed the n eed for effective S&D as part of any fisheries 
subsidies package.  Of particular concern in this regard are small-scale, artisanal fisheries and any subsidies thereto, as well as payments that so me developing Members receive from foreign 
governments for access to the fisheri es in their waters.  Aquaculture is another area of considerable 
interest to many developing country Members, whic h seek to ensure that any new disciplines would 
not interfere with these activities.  Certain developi ng country Members, including a group of small, 
vulnerable coastal states, have tabled specific pr oposals addressing the general framework of possible 
new disciplines as well as treatment of developi ng country Members within such a framework. WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
Page 24  
 
  (d) Possible gains to developing countries 
92. An eventual clarification and improvement of any of the rules under negotiation will increase 
the predictability of the trading system to the be nefit of all Members.  Moreover, an appropriate 
balance of rights and obligations will permit de veloping countries to pursue their development 
objectives and at the same time guard against practices that have a negative impact on their trade.  
Another area where balance is crucial concerns trade-offs between the costs and administrative 
burdens of the contingency protecti on system and its capacity to ensure fairness and transparency.   
2. Regional Trade Agreements 
(a) Parameters of the de velopment dimension 
93. In the WTO context, a regional trade agreemen t (RTA) constitutes a commitment to liberalize 
trade among a selective number of countries, hence on a preferential and discriminatory basis.  While 
RTAs can foster economic growth and development, such an outcome is not guaranteed.  It depends 
on various factors, most significantly the RTA's de sign and effective implementation.  Studies tend to 
show that ambitious RTAs among countries with open trade regimes tend to perform better than 
RTAs that are limited in scope, poorly implemente d and employed as an import substitution strategy, 
i.e. preferential liberalization behind high MFN tariffs.  The former type of RTA will minimize the 
risks of trade diversion and is likely to bring benefits in the form of an improved regulatory 
environment, enhanced investment flows and incre ased technology transfers.  Such benefits may be 
further enhanced provided that the RTA commitme nts are taken as a temporary step to further 
multilateral trade liberalization, thus benefiting over time third parties and the multilateral trading 
system as a whole.  RTAs based on an open tradi ng regime that envisage the gradual MFN extension 
of preferences are all the more important at a time when all WTO Members are engaged in an RTA 
race that inevitably amplifies the level of discriminat ion in international trade.  Clearly, the net losers 
of this race are those countries, mainly developing ones, that are left out of the preferential trading 
network being built around the major trading part ners.  Concerns are mounting over the defensive 
nature of many RTAs strategically designed at maintaining access to larger markets, locking out 
competition from other MFN suppliers and locking in i nvestment.  If such trends are sustained and not 
counterbalanced by a successful outcome of the Doha Round, the contribution of an ever-growing 
number of overlapping RTAs to the economic pr ogress of both parties and non-parties could be 
negative. 
(b) Status of the negotiations 
94. The aim of the negotiations in this area is to  clarify and improve WTO rules and procedures 
that apply to RTAs and to take into account RT As' development aspects.  The negotiations have 
proceeded on parallel tracks, considering "systemic"  and "procedural" issues.  With respect to the 
latter, the Negotiating Group on Rules has made very significant progress and a decision on a 
"Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agre ements" was adopted by the General Council on 
14 December 2006 (WT/L/671).  The mechanism clarif ies and streamlines the existing transparency 
provisions contained in all the current WTO provisions on RTAs.  Its main objectives are to ensure 
coherence in the treatment of transparency acro ss the relevant WTO provisions and to enhance the 
provision of RTA information by simplifying Memb ers' reporting obligations and complementing it 
with technical assistance for developing country Me mbers.  The  decision also seeks to untangle the 
current deadlock in the WTO Committee on RT As (CRTA) by shifting the focus of its 
modus operandi  from the present legalistic examination of agreements to a more open transparency 
exercise.  Recognizing the systemic importance of RTA transparency, the  decision also applies to 
RTAs notified under paragraph 2(c) of the Enab ling Clause, although it preserves the Committee on 
Trade and Development as the WTO body responsible for such RTAs.   WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
 Page 25 
 
 
  95. Discussions on systemic issues  have not made as much progress as those on transparency 
issues.  Submissions by participants have focused  on the clarification of certain GATT Article XXIV 
provisions, most notably the "substantially all trade" (SAT) requirement, the length of RTAs transition periods and the inclusion of S&D pr ovisions in Article XXIV of the GATT 1994.  
Participants have indicated that the scope of any future work in this area should be comprehensive 
(with specific reference to Chair Roadmaps) and not lead to a dilution of current provisions.  It has 
been reiterated that text-based proposals are at  this point essential to advance the process.  
(c) Specific issues of interest to developing countries 
96. In light of the growing number of RTAs, both South-South and North-South, the scope of the 
these negotiations is of particular interest to de veloping countries since any outcome will affect the 
nature of their WTO obligations with respect to RTAs.  In the area of RTA transparency, there was 
consensus among NGR participants that given the systemic importance of the issues, any such 
mechanism should apply to all RTAs.  Thus, the Tr ansparency Decision clarifies, streamlines and 
enhances the existing reporting obligations under th e relevant WTO provisions.  Of interest to 
developing countries, in particular those availi ng themselves of the flexibilities offered by the 
Enabling Clause, is the extent to which the new m echanism adds to existing transparency obligations 
and whether it adequately addresses their capac ity constraints (see sub-paragraph (d)). 
97. The negotiations on RTA systemic issues aim at clarifying existing rules and have to date 
focused mainly on elements pertinent to Article  XXIV of the GATT 1994.  This Article does not 
contain any flexibility for developing countries and it is the only legal cover available to developing 
countries entering into RTAs with developed countries.  In light of the increasing number of 
North-South agreements, some developing countries have shown an interest in modifying existing 
provisions by including S&D treatment.  As mentione d earlier, the systemic discussions have focused 
on the concept of SAT, length of transition peri ods and S&D.  The question of flexibility for 
developing countries has been acknowledged on rep eated occasions, though it has also been the 
opinion of most participants that this issue cannot  be adequately dealt with until a more concrete 
position on SAT and transition periods , among others, emerges.  It shoul d also be noted that of the 
submissions received, very few deal with the S&D question. 
(d) Possible gains to developing countries 
98. With respect to RTA transparency, the new Transparency Mechanism may have certain 
implications for developing countries and in par ticular for those availing themselves of the Enabling 
Clause.  The latter agreements will be subject to tr ansparency obligations on a par with RTAs notified 
under Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and Article V of the GATS, thus adding new elements to what 
is current practice, i.e. a "Factual Presentati on" of the RTA prepared by the Secretariat.
23  However, 
while strengthening the transparency obligations , the Transparency Mechanism acknowledges the 
constraints that some developing countries may face in gathering the required reporting information 
and it provides for flexibilities with respect to th e reporting timeframes and for technical assistance.  
Of great significance to developing countries is th e improved access to RTAs-related information that 
will result from the operation of the mechanism.  Si nce practically all Members are engaged, or are 
engaging, in multiple RTAs, the need for adequa te transparency has become systemic in a 
fundamental sense. 
99. As for RTA systemic issues, it is generally accep ted that a developmental rationale exists for 
allowing developing countries to engage in pr ogressive asymmetric liberalization with selected 
                                                      
23 Parties to RTAs notified under GATT Article XXI V and GATS Article V were previously required 
to submit a "Standard Format" which was essentially a su mmary of the agreement.  The Factual Presentations 
relieve Members of such responsibility thus benefiti ng all Members irrespectively of whether they are 
developed or developing country Members. WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
Page 26  
 
  partners.  However, if transition periods are t oo long or too many products are excluded from 
coverage, potential gains from RTAs  in terms of growth and devel opment will be foregone.  At the 
same time, it is important to ensure coherence bot h within the regional arrangement, as well as with 
the broader goals of the multilateral trading system.  Negotiations in this area can deliver important 
gains for developing countries by shaping the rules in  such a way as to reflect RTAs parameters that 
can better accommodate their developm ent needs and constraints.     
H. T
RADE -RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS24 
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
100. The negotiations regarding the establishment of  a multilateral system of notification and 
registration of geographical indications for wines an d spirits (hereinafter "multilateral system") form 
an integral part of the wider mandate of the D oha Development Agenda.  Article 23.4 of the TRIPS 
Agreement provides that "[i]n order to facilitate th e protection of geographical  indications for wines, 
negotiations shall be undertaken in the Counc il for TRIPS concerning the establishment of a 
multilateral system of notification and registration of  geographical indications for wines eligible for 
protection in those Members participating in the syst em".  Paragraph 18, first sentence, of the Doha 
Declaration states that "[w]ith a view to completing the work started in the Council for Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Council fo r TRIPS) on the implementation of Article 23.4, 
we agree to negotiate the establishment of a multila teral system of notification and registration of 
geographical indications for wines and spirits by the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference", 
thus extending the mandate of Ar ticle 23.4 to cover also spirits. 
2. Status of the Negotiations 
101. Since 2002, a considerable amount of work h as been done, involving the tabling of position 
papers and proposals by delegations.  There are three proposals on the table:  a proposal from Hong Kong, China (TN/IP/W/8);  a Joint Propo sal from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Sa lvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Chinese Taipei and the United States (TN/IP/W/10);  and a 
proposal from the EC (TN/IP/W/11).  They have been set out side by side in Secretariat document 
TN/IP/W/12.  Co-sponsors of the Joint Proposal consider that the EC proposal is beyond the mandate in Article 23.4 by requiring mandatory participa tion and by increasing the protection of geographical 
indications through the use of legal presumptions, a system of reservations and compulsory bilateral 
negotiations, and restrictions on the use of exceptio ns.  The EC and Switzerland, on the other hand, 
consider that the Joint Proposal, which proposes an  information database, would be insufficient to 
facilitate the protection of geographical indications for wines and spirits and therefore to meet the 
mandate.   
102. There are two major stumbling blocks.  The first is the extent to which the registration of a 
geographical indication, within the multilateral sy stem, should create legal effects at the national 
level.  The second is about whether participati on in the system should be voluntary or mandatory, 
including whether the legal effects under the system should apply to all WTO Members or only to 
those opting to participate in the system.  In a ddition to these two key issues, there are other points 
such as administrative and other burdens of a multilateral system, especially on developing and 
least-developed countries, and whether the proposals on the table would modify the balance of rights 
and obligations in the TRIPS Agreem ent and respect the principle of territoriality.  In his 26 July 2006 
report to the TNC (TN/IP/16), the Chairman of the Special Session remarked that the side-by-side 
document continued to represent a valid description of the state of the proposals in the Special 
                                                     
 
24 The work undertaken by the Council for TRIPS on the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement 
and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) pursuant to paragraph 19 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration is treated in the section on "Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns".     WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
 Page 27 
 
 
  Session.  He observed that progress towards esta blishing a common basis for the final negotiating 
phase would require delegations to be creative in findi ng new flexibility.  In the light of consultations 
held by the Chairman in December 2006 and in February 2007, a compilation of points raised and views expressed on the three proposals is being ci rculated as an addendum to the side-by-side 
document (TN/IP/W/12/Add.1). 
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
103. While some developing country Members have expr essed the view that the EC proposal is the 
only one that makes a genuine attempt at meeti ng the requirements of Article 23.4 of the TRIPS 
Agreement to facilitate the protection under that pr ovision (TN/IP/W/3), others have sponsored or 
supported the "Joint Proposal" as the only one that fully respects the mandate of Article 23.4.  A 
significant number of developing countries have  yet to take a position and are still studying the 
various proposals, including as they relate to their own development.  An issue on which a number of developing countries have expressed par ticular interest is that of partic ipation, taking the view that the 
system should be voluntary and not have legal eff ects for countries opting not to participate in it.  
Another issue of concern to developing countries re lates to the possible costs and other burdens that 
the system might entail, in particular for non-participating developing countries. 
104. Discussion of special and differential treatment h as been relatively limited so far.  The point 
has been made that the need for it would depend, to  a significant extent, on the nature and complexity 
of the basic notification and registration system  to be chosen – which still remains unclear.  
Nonetheless, there has been some di scussion of this issue.  The point has been widely made that the 
system should be efficient for developing countries, keeping in mind the burdens they are already 
bearing and the fact that the Doha Round is about development.  Other points made relate to:  the 
extent to which S&D in the payment of registrati on fees might be envisaged for developing countries 
and LDCs;  technical assistance to facilitate particip ation of developing countries in the system;  and 
transition periods for developing countries and, in th e case of LDCs, the need to take account of their 
overall transition period under the TRIPS Agreement. 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
105. The question of possible gains to developing c ountries has been the subject of some debate 
among the participants in the negotiations.  Some ho ld the view that a multilateral system's ability to 
alleviate the costs for all producers in seeking prot ection worldwide by allowing them to gain legal 
standing in third countries via a centralised pro cedure would help developing country producers in 
particular, who have less resources to invest in  asserting such protection internationally.  Others 
consider that a system that would impose consid erable administrative bur den on developing countries 
would not necessarily save costs for GI owners and would, in any event, entail burdens that would more than offset any benefits developing countri es might obtain, especially as the mandate is for 
wines and spirits, of which most developing countries are not exporters.  It is, therefore, important 
that the system be simple and voluntary in nature and not entail new obligations. 
I. T
RADE AND ENVIRONMENT  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
106. The negotiations under paragraph 31 of the Doha  Declaration, which are undertaken with a 
view to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment, and the negotiations under 
paragraph 28 on fisheries subsidies25, form the "environmental package" of the current negotiations.  
Paragraph 31 has three main components:  paragr aph 31(i) mandates negotia tions on the relationship 
between existing WTO rules and specific trade ob ligations set out in multilateral environmental 
                                                      
25 See the Section on "Rules". WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
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  agreements (MEAs).  It states that the negotiations shall be limited in scope to the applicability of 
such existing WTO rules as among parties to the MEA in question, and that they shall not prejudice 
the WTO rights of any Member that is not a party to the MEA in question;  paragraph 31(ii) mandates 
negotiations on procedures for regular informati on exchange between MEA Secretariats and the 
relevant WTO committees, and the criteria for the granting of observer status;  paragraph 31(iii) 
mandates negotiations aimed at the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to environmental goods and services. 
2. Status of the Negotiations 
107. Since the commencement of the negotiations, the Committee on Trade and Environment in 
Special Session (CTESS) has held several formal a nd informal meetings, with a significant number of 
proposals submitted by both deve loped and developing  country Members on all three items of 
paragraph 31 (TN/TE/INF/4/Rev.11).   
108. Recent discussions under Paragraph 31(i) focused on a proposal for an outcome that 
suggested to build on the sharing of national e xperience in the negotiation and implementation of 
specific trade obligations in MEAs, which was undertaken in CTESS.  The other proposal on the table 
suggested, inter alia , the establishment of core principles to  govern the relationship between MEAs 
and WTO rules, and that WTO committees and panels be called upon to "defer" to the expertise of MEAs on relevant environmental matters. 
109. Under paragraph 31(ii), Members continued to explore avenues for enhancing information 
exchange and cooperation between the WTO and MEA secr etariats.  In this rega rd, concrete elements 
were discussed to improve or complement existi ng practices and cooperation mechanisms.  Various 
suggestions were also put forward regarding crite ria for the granting of observer status to MEA 
secretariats in relevant WTO Committees.  Some delegations have pointed  to synergies between 
paragraphs 31(i) and (ii) of the ma ndate.  It is important also to note that developing countries have 
participated actively in the discussions under paragra phs 31(i) and (ii) with a number of them tabling 
submissions to clarify their positions in this area of the negotiations. 
110. With respect to paragraph 31(iii), discussions in the CTESS have focused mainly on 
clarifying the concept of "environmental good".  In this context, different approaches to the negotiations have been discussed on the basis of submissions put forward by Members (TN/TE/W/63).  One approach proposes that the Committee establish a multilateral list of 
environmental goods for liberalization.  Under this  approach, nine Members have proposed products 
for inclusion in the multilateral list.  Other a pproaches have also been considered, including, 
inter alia , the "environmental project approach",  which proposes to grant concessions to 
environmental goods and services required in the c ontext of environmental projects approved by a 
Designated National Authority (DNA), for the duration of the project;  and the "integrated approach", 
which suggests that the CTESS identify categories of projects and environmental goods that could 
benefit from tariff reduction or elimination for the period of implementation of the project in which 
they are used. 
111. Members in the CTESS have engaged in techni cal work to further examine the products, 
systems or projects that could potentially fall with in the scope of the mandate.  As part of this 
exercise, Members have exchanged views on the en vironmental and developmental credentials and 
potential benefits of a broad range  of products put forward under diffe rent categories.  A number of 
questions were raised in this context, including with  respect to product coverage and how to deal with 
multiple use products.  Proposals have also b een made on modalities for environmental goods 
negotiations addressing issues such as special and differential treatment and the elimination of 
non-tariff barriers.  Most recently, a group of dele gations, including eight Members that had earlier  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
 Page 29 
 
 
  tabled lists of environmental goods, have proposed  to the CTESS a "Potential Convergence Set" of 
products as a basis for negotiation and further work among Members.     
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
112. While positions and interests naturally vary am ong developing countries, some specific issues 
of interest to them can be discerned.  Many deve loping countries feel that  trade liberalization of 
environmental goods should offer opportunities for th em to increase exports of goods in which they 
have a competitive advantage.  On their part, proponents of lists have generally underlined the 
importance they attach to achieving a "balanced lis t" of environmental goods, i.e. a list of products 
which takes into account areas of trade interest fo r all Members, including developing countries.   
113. Some Members have observed that the export inte rests of developing countries lie mainly in 
natural resource-based products.  Hence, the defi nition of environmental goods should cover such 
products.  Furthermore, some concerns have been expressed regarding the existing asymmetries in production capacities, trading volumes and tariff st ructures for environmental goods.  A number of 
developing countries have questioned the benefits for them of liberalizing trade in environmental 
goods, commenting that most environmental goods propo sed thus far have multiple uses or consist of 
"high-tech" or "end-of-pipe" products of interest primarily to developed countries.  Other issues of 
concern to developing countries include the need to  facilitate technology transfer to the developing 
and least-developed Members and the manner in whic h non-tariff barriers as well as the principle of 
special and differential treatment will be  taken into account in the negotiations. 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
114. There has been little substantive debate among pa rticipants in the negotiations on the specific 
gains that may accrue to developing countries from th e negotiations under paragr aphs 31(i) and (ii) on 
the relationship between MEAs and the WTO.  Many  developing countries have ratified many of the 
multilateral environmental agreements considered re levant in the present negotiations.  The mandate 
under paragraphs 31(i) and (ii) a ffords an opportunity to create positive synergies between the trade 
and environment regimes, including through more e fficient  institutional cooperation.  As regards 
paragraph 31(iii), some hold the view that liberali zation of environmental goods  and services can be 
beneficial to trade, environment and development.  According to them, the negotiations could result in 
increased trade due to a reduction or elimination of ta riffs and non-tariff barriers.  They also feel that 
the negotiations could potentially assist developi ng countries in obtaining the resources and tools 
needed to address key environmental priorities.  Others, however, question the possible environmental 
benefits of some of the goods proposed for libera lization.  These Members feel that the development 
gains would be enhanced only if goods whic h have an unambiguous environmental use are 
liberalized.   
115. Some developing country Members have also ar gued for the retention of a certain level of 
policy space in determining which goods may he lp them meet their nationally prioritized 
environmental objectives.  In this context, they have also stressed that their national interests in these 
negotiations are mainly directed towards the bui lding-up and development of domestic production 
capacity in the provision of environmental goods and services.  This, in their view, would further 
contribute to their objective of achieving sustainable development. 
J. D
ISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension  
116. According to paragraph 30 of the Doha Minist erial Declaration, the negotiations on dispute 
settlement aim to "agree on improvements and clarif ications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU).  Under paragraph 47 of the Doha Declaratio n, these negotiations are not to be treated as part WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
Page 30  
 
  of a single undertaking.  A number of developing country Members highlighted in the early stages of 
the negotiations the need to have effective access to the dispute settlement procedures.  In this 
context, it was stressed that clarifications or  improvements to the DSU should not lead to any 
reduction in the access of developing country Member s to dispute settlement procedures.  Although a 
number of developing country Members have been active users of the dispute settlement procedures, 
others, in particular African and LDC Members, have  had much more limited participation to date.  
These Members highlighted in their proposals the significant constraints, including resource 
constraints, they face in having recourse to the co mplex and expensive (if outside counsel is used) 
procedures of the DSU. 
117. The interests of developing country Members in the DSU negotiations are, however, not 
limited to S&D, or indeed to developmental aspects  only.  The improvement and clarification of the 
dispute settlement mechanism has an institutional di mension that goes beyond th e particular interests 
of developed or developing countries.  A stable, predictable and effective multilateral system to 
resolve trade disputes benefits the whole WTO membership.  Many proposals put forward by 
developing country Members therefore address system ic concerns and are not intended to secure any 
particular form of S&D.  Some of these propo sals may reflect concerns which are of special 
significance to developing country Members as u sers of the dispute settlement mechanism (for 
example, the enhancement of third party rights).  Others, however, reflect more general systemic 
concerns not intrinsically tied to  a developmental dimension.   
2. Status of the Negotiations 
118. Since the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, th e work of the Special Session has been based 
on a Member-driven, "bottom-up" approach to de velop areas of convergence based on work in the 
previous phases of the negotiations.  The Chairman  has since January 2007 been conducting a series 
of substantive consultations on DSU review, taking up revised drafting proposals discussed recently 
in the DSB Special Session.  The substantive cons ultations have been taking place in an informal, 
smaller group setting.  Participati on in that group remains open to an y interested delegation.  Key 
developing country delegations ha ve been invited regularly.   
119. The issues addressed at the thr ee substantive consultations he ld until the end of March 2007 
addressed revised drafting proposals on:  (i) remand;  (ii) enhanced third part y rights in consultations 
and at the panel and appeal stage;  (iii) the pr otection of strictly confidential information;  
(iv) transparency, including amicus curiae briefs;  (v) general provisions in the revised proposal of the 
Like-Minded Group of developing countries;  (v i) sequencing;  and (vii) post-retaliation.  
The substantive consultations are scheduled to co ntinue after the end of March and take up any 
revised drafting proposals on outstanding issues, such as special and differential treatment, and improving flexibility and Member control.  Further, for the sake of transparen cy and inclusiveness, an 
informal meeting of the DSB Special Session has been  held after each set of substantive consultations 
to allow the Chairman to report b ack to the Membership at large. 
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
120. Given the systemic dimension of the clarifica tion and improvement of the DSU, virtually all 
issues under discussion could be said to be of relevance to developing countries as Members of the WTO and potential users of the DSU.  The most directly pertinent recent development concerning 
developing country issues has been the submission by the so-called Like-Minded Group, composed of 
Cuba, Egypt, India, Malaysia and Pakistan, of a revised drafting proposal  on S&D (JOB(06)/222 and 
Corr.1 and Add.1).  The S&D propo sals in the LMG paper can be cat egorized, following the different 
stages of dispute settlement, as:  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
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  (a) developing country interests in consultations; 
(b) extended timeframes in consultati ons and panel proceedings;   
(c) litigation costs; 
(d) developing country interests in reasonable period of time (RPT) arbitrations;  and 
(e) cross-retaliation. 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
121. A strengthened multilateral rules-based dispute settlement mechanism h as been heralded as 
one of the major achievements of the Uruguay Round.   The DSU is generally acknowledged to have 
served WTO Members well so far.  Indeed, more than 80 WTO Members (including 65 developing countries) have participated, either as party or as third- party, in at least one dispute to date.  Since the 
dispute settlement procedures are in essence an instrument for the protection of Members' substantive 
rights and obligations under the WTO Agreements, it might be said that the immediate objective of 
improving and clarifying procedures under the DSU u ltimately serves the long-term goal of enhancing 
the ability of WTO Members, in particular devel oping country Members, to fully benefit from the 
trade opportunities they have negotiated in the WTO.    
122. The main benefits of improvements and clarifica tions to the DSU could be expected to come 
in the form of institutional strengthening of the mu ltilateral trading system and enhanced capacity for 
all Members to protect their interests in the WTO.  To the extent that developing country Members, 
especially smaller economies with limited political powe r to influence the behaviour of larger trading 
partners, may generally have more difficulty in  defending their interests effectively, such 
enhancements would especially benefit them.  A number of procedural improvements are under 
consideration, that may not have any particular developmental dimension, but that would also, if 
successfully negotiated, benefit developing country Me mbers as users of the system (for example, the 
establishment of remand authority, the clarifi cation of "sequencing" between compliance and 
retaliation procedures or the ela boration of procedures to address "post-retaliation" situations). 
123. Other proposals under consideration address the resource constraints highlighted by a number 
of developing country Members, in the form of e nhanced technical assistance or financial support.  
While they do not directly affect procedural st eps in the dispute, they focus on ensuring that 
developing country Members have effective access to  the procedures in the first place and the means 
to successfully go through a procedure.  Improvements designed to address these resource constraints could facilitate recourse to the procedures by deve loping country Members and enhance their ability 
to effectively defend their rights under the WT O agreements, as complainants or defendants. 
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
124. In an effort to assist Members with their discussion concerning paragraph 51 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration, this document identifies th e key developmental aspects raised in the various 
negotiating bodies.  While the issues raised in the pa per vary according to subject area, it is clear that 
developing countries have serious and pressing interests which they wish to see addressed in the 
Round.  These interests also change according to the subject area under discussion and reflect the very 
diverse interests of developing countries overall.  
125. Two conclusions stem from this document:  first, development issues suffuse all areas being 
negotiated, including in the market access and rule -making aspects of the negotiations.  Second, a 
large number of proposals already on the table ar e aimed at addressing the development aspects of 
each subject.  The possible gains to developing count ries would largely depend on the outcome of the WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.3 
Page 32  
 
  ongoing negotiations and manner in which the vari ous proposals are operationalized after being 
adopted.  It is hoped that this paper helps Memb ers in their discussions and negotiations towards a 
successful conclusion of the Doha Development Round. 
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