RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/TF/M/14 
10 July 2006 
 (06-3319) 
Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation  
  
 
 
SUMMARY MINUTES OF THE MEETING 
 
Held in the Centre William Rappard
 
on 6-7 June 2006  
 
Chairman:  Mr. Tony Miller (Hong Kong, China) 
 
 
1. The Chairman  said that the  main purpose of the meeting was to provide delegations with 
another opportunity to advance the Group's agenda - both in terms of offering new input and reacting 
to the contributions previously received. Members w ould also again be invited to issue the customary 
invitation to relevant internati onal organizations to attend the ne xt formal meeting.      
2. The agenda was adopted . 
A. CONTRIBUTIONS ON THE AGREED AGENDA OF THE NEGOTIATING GROUP  
3. The Chairman  said that  under this item,  delegations were invited to contribute on the agreed 
agenda.  Work on its various elements had contin ued since the last session, resulting in a number of 
additional contributions. The qualifi cation "additional" was used as they were not new in that their 
content limited itself to consolidating and refini ng earlier suggestions, distilling main elements and 
identifying common ground.  
4. Most of those papers reached the Negotiating Group (NG) at a rather late stage, leaving 
delegations with little time to prepare.  This was why he would like to provide for informal reaction 
time, allowing Members to freely raise questions and obtain clarification at the unofficial level when discussing those contributions for the first time.   The NG had already adopted this approach at its 
May meeting with encouraging results.   
5. This informal exchange would then be followe d by a formal one, providing Members with an 
opportunity to present statements they wished to make for the record, both with respect to new 
submissions and to proposals previously received. To avoid repetition and to allow for a focus on each 
paper without having to engage in a complex set of jumps from formal to informal mode, he wished to 
maintain the structure successfully applied at the May meeting where presentations of proposals were 
considered formal despite taking place under the info rmal "chapeau."  The initial reactions to those 
papers would remain informal and therefore off th e record.  In other words, the NG would consider 
the introduction of new proposals to fall under the fo rmal category of contributions for the purposes 
of record taking, while reactions to the pape rs would stay informal in all respects.  
6. Within the presentation of newly submitted pape rs he suggested to equally continue the 
previously adopted thematic approach, grouping  submissions by similar topic as listed in the 
compilation document, now available in its seventh re vision.  Special room would then be given for 
cross-cutting proposals, especially the ones on the ke y pillars of special and differential treatment TN/TF/M/14 
Page 2  
 
  (S&DT) and technical assistance and capacity build ing (TA&CB).  Time would also be accorded to 
input from the participating international organizations.  
7. The meeting moved into informal mode
, with the exception of the following introductions of 
new submissions. 
8. The representative of Japan  introduced document TN/TF/W/114, explaining that his 
delegation wished to present text-based proposals on the areas of publication and availability of 
information, prior publication and consultation, appeal procedures and pre-arrival processing in 
cooperation with co-sponsoring Members.  These pr oposals were developed on the basis of the 
proposals made by Japan at the last meeting, presenting key elements of each measure.  The new submission also incorporated the points raised on ea ch proposal at previous meetings.  Furthermore, 
in order to avoid a discussion on the definition of wo rdings, the latest document endeavoured to adopt 
formulations adopted in existing WTO Agreements to the extent possible.   
9. Japan wished to touch upon the need to reconfirm the application of national treatment, most- 
favoured-nation (MFN) treatment, and general and secu rity exceptions provided for in Articles I, III, 
XX, XXI of GATT 1994, even if those concepts we re not included in the proposals.  Japan also 
wished to mention that some of the elements in  the proposals did not add any new obligation to the 
current system of GATT 1994. 
10. Japan recognized that S&DT and TA&CB were cross-cutting issues and should be discussed 
intensively, based on proposals such as TN/TF/W/81,  W/82, and W/95.  Thus, the provisions on those 
issues in those proposals were only preliminary ones. 
11. With respect to the proposal on publication and availability of information, Japan wished to 
note that the enhancement of transparency w ould allow traders to obtain accurate and timely 
information on trade procedures, reducing their cost  and time, which would lead to increased business 
opportunities, especially for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that had so far missed the 
opportunity. 
12. As for paragraph 1.1, the wording made refe rence to paragraph 8 of the Pre-shipment 
Inspection Agreement and to other articles.  With resp ect to the scope of publication in that paragraph, 
Japan wished to reconfirm that the information stipul ated related to information of general application 
as mentioned in the first sentence. 
13. Paragraph 1.2 made a reference mainly to Article 2.7 of the Pre-shipment Inspection 
Agreement which used the term "in a convenient manner".  Regarding paragraph 1.3, Japan would 
further elaborate the definition of "outline of ma jor trade-related procedures", reflecting the discussion 
taking place in the Negotiating Group.  As for paragr aph 1.4, Japan intended to include a provision 
that made clear that a Member might provide the information in paragraph 1.1 in its local language, 
making reference to paragraph 11, Annex B, of the SPS Agreement.  The proposal also included a 
provision on confidential information, making re ference to paragraph 1 of GATT Article X. 
14. Regarding enquiry points, reference was made  to Article 10.1 of the TBT Agreement and 
paragraph 3 in Annex B of the SPS Agreement, wh ich stipulated the establishment of an enquiry 
point.  With respect to a Single National Focal Po int, Japan fully recognized Members' comments on 
Japan's previous proposal TN/TF/W/96.  In devel oping the new proposal, Japan had avoided using the 
wording "Single National Focal Point" and had deci ded to use the phrase "should, whenever practical" 
instead of "shall". A square bracket was include d in the paragraph to further hear Members' 
comments. Japan hoped that Members shared its view  on publication and availability of information 
and looked forward to having a constructive discussion on the proposal.   TN/TF/M/14 
 Page 3 
 
 
  15. The representative of Japan  introduced TN/TF/W/115 on prior publication and consultation  
which was presented in cooperation with other Member s.  Like other proposals, it was developed on 
the basis of a previous submission (TN/TF/W/102), in corporating the points made in its discussion at 
previous meetings, as appropriate.  Ensuring pred ictability was very important.  If laws and 
regulations were suddenly re vised or if a revision was not publishe d before its implementation, traders 
would not have enough time to comply with the re vised regulations appropriately.  This made doing 
business more difficult, especially for SMEs.  Furthermor e, it made it difficult for traders to adjust to 
the revised laws and regulations which also made it difficult for a government to secure compliance. 
16. With respect to the textual part of the proposal , paragraph 1 on prior consultation incorporated 
all elements stipulated in TN/TF/W/102, while the scope of consultation was extending to the area of 
general application, except judicial decisions, which should be published under the proposal on 
publication.  Paragraph 2 on prior publication made  reference mainly to Article 2.12 of the TBT 
Agreement.   
17. Paragraph 4 was added to address the restrain ts accruing due to differing legislative and 
administrative situations among Members, which was stipulated in proposal TN/TF/W/102.  Japan 
hoped that Members shared its view on publicati on and availability of information and looked 
forward to having a constructive discussion.  
18. The representative of Turkey  introduced submission TN/TF/W/120 on advance rulings. 
Turkey had previously put forward a paper on the matter (TN/TF/W/45) which expressed its support 
to the advance ruling concept.  The new proposal aimed at providing main elements, which, in 
Turkey's  opinion, should be included in the final commitment.   
19. Those main elements were defined in detail in or der to help studies for a textual elaboration.  
Most elements proposed were in parallel to those previously proposed by Canada, the United States 
and Australia in their respective definitions:  a dvance ruling on tariff and advance ruling on origin. 
20. A ruling system had already been laid down in the Agreement on Rules of Origin.  The 
inclusion of advance rulings on origin here woul d provide discipline and recognize it as being a trade 
facilitation tool.  As for advance ru lings on tariff, that seemed to be a compromise among the previous 
proposals and the discussions.  Tariff classifi cation was the most popular field traders sought 
interpretative solutions for their regular operations from customs administrations. 
21. Contrary to the previously tabled proposals, the current paper advocated the view that the tool 
would be an efficient solution in valuation becau se it was not possible to make a value assessment for 
a trade case in order for it to be valid for a speci fic period.  Each assessment could only be performed 
in a case-specific manner.  Nevertheless, this did not actually mean that requesting an official decision 
from customs administrations in other fields of legi slation was impossible.  In Turkey's case, it was 
clearly regulated by law that traders or their representatives could lodge applications in customs 
administrations to obtain a decision regarding implementation of customs provisions on any subject, including valuation.  However, an advance ruling w as a specially designed version of a decision to be 
adopted and bound in a time-bound manner. 
22. Advance rulings should be open to the public to  give an idea about customs implementation 
in similar cases.  However, confidential inform ation and data secrecy claimed by applicants for 
advance rulings should be kept undisclosed.   
23. An advance ruling should be subject to a revision option for legitimate objectives.  In 
Turkey's case, the customs law provided the opportunity  to traders to use thei r advance rulings issued 
before a revision for six more months in order not to distort the impact of the contracts which had TN/TF/M/14 
Page 4  
 
  been enacted under reliance upon the previous situation.   Turkey believed that such an option could be 
recognized in the final outcome as a favourable facilitation tool.   
24. The representative of Japan
 introduced a non-paper on other measures to enhance impartiality 
and non-discrimination, which had been prepared in cooperation with other Members.  It was the first 
document after the Hong Kong Ministerial Confer ence on uniform administration and integrity 
(section F of the compilation) which abstracted the el ements of a previous proposal in TN/TF/W/8, as 
well as other Members' proposals.  In developing the document, serious attention had been paid to the 
concerns and comments made by Members at previo us discussions on the matter, such as the need to 
avoid further administrative burden and not to interven e in strict internal policies.  Those issues were 
left as elements for further discussion.  However,  Japan stressed the need to address traders' 
complaints regarding inconsistent interpretation of  regulations among local customs officers as well 
as other issues. 
25.  Japan wished to touch upon only one part of  the proposal.  With respect to the "central 
function", Japan had avoided a form ulation referring to establishing a new body in the administration 
while addressing the need to ensure the uniform in terpretation of trade-rela ted regulations.  With 
regard to staff training, it was imperative to pr ovide enough training to officials of border agencies 
and to increase their expertise to ensure uniform a nd impartial application of trade regulations.  Most 
of Japan's technical assistance (TA) activities had  been provided for that purpose. 
26. In the current proposal, an attempt had been ma de to narrow down the elements and to submit 
the document as a non-paper in order to further hear Members' views.  Japan looked forward to having a constructive discussion and hoped that Members shared its view. 
27. The representative of th e European Communities
 introduced document TN/TF/W/107 on fees 
and charges, explaining that it was an attempt to  convert an earlier proposal (TN/TF/W/94) into the 
components of a text.  The EC hoped that those de legations who did have the chance of studying and 
reacting to the earlier proposal on fees and charges would see now in the legal draft much that was 
familiar.  There were few new things.  Article VIII of GATT recognized the desirability of reducing 
the incidence of fees but did not give any guidance on how to do it.  There was, however, a certain 
amount of panel jurisprudence available since th e GATT Article was drafte d.  The current EC 
proposal was an attempt to codify a common unde rstanding of what kind of fees and charges 
connected with import and export were  indeed allowable and legitimate. 
28. The text deliberately provided a fairly broad definition of fees and charges connected with 
importation and exportation because the EC wanted to include within the coverage of the commitment 
certain kinds of fees such as activity fees, and ac tivity licenses which had been an issue in a number 
of recent WTO accessions.  Secondly, the proposal cl arified Article VIII of the GATT by underlining 
that fees and charges must be levied only in co nnection with a service provided to the transaction in 
question and, therefore, might not be levied on an ad valorem  basis.  By definition, if a fee reflected a 
service, it would not reflect the value of the good.  The service would be the same in respect to the 
value of the consignment. 
29. The third commitment proposed was that fees a nd charges may not be levied unless they had 
been transparently published and made available to the trading community.  That sounded very 
obvious, but it was really to prevent the discre tionary imposition of fees and charges.  More 
comprehensive texts and proposals on transparen cy and prior notification had been proposed  in the 
past and, perhaps, as Members made further progr ess in assembling the various texts, those broader 
proposals on transparency might make the present specific proposal unnecessary.  That was to be 
seen.    TN/TF/M/14 
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  30. The representative of Switzerland  introduced document TN/TF/W/112, explaining that it was 
a third-generation document that followed up on communication TN/TF/W/92.  Studies had shown 
that the number of required documents, their comp lexity as well as the number of signatures, was a 
highly relevant fact that acted as an obstacle to trade.  The objective of the current proposal was to contribute to reducing these obstacles to trade. 
31. The content of the proposal was fairly similar to the one presented in TN/TF/W/92.  First, 
customs and other border agencies should require on ly the documents necessary to permit the control 
of the operation and to ensure that all requirements relating to the application of relevant laws were 
complied with.  A second point the sponsors of the proposal were making was that governments or border agencies should accept copies, especially when  the original was already held by another 
government authority, as well as in the case of it being a commercial supporting document.  That was 
more and more becoming a best practice in many countries. 
32. The sponsors of the document had taken on board comments made by Members who had 
some difficulties in accepting only copies as such wh en they were in the hands of other border 
agencies.  Therefore, the sponsors had now sugg ested that in cases where governments already had 
one original document, they should at least a ccept authenticated copies by  the agency holding the 
original. 
33. Best practice more and more allowed trader s not to present supporting documents.  Those 
supporting documents could be either  transport documents, such as sh ipping manifests, or commercial 
documents.  However, traders should hold this info rmation available during a certain period of time.  
In case of electronically launched and electronically  authenticated documents, the sponsors of the 
proposal wished to make clear that the original was the electronic document.  Hence, if documents 
were required at borders stations, only copies s hould be asked for. With regard to the use of 
commercially available information, Members were encouraged to use this information in relation 
with supporting documents.     
34. The representative of Korea
 introduced his delegation's non-paper on the issue of single 
window, saying that the main purpose of the paper was to propose text on the matter, based on the 
joint communication in TN/TF/W/100, as well as on the discussions held among Members so far.  
The basic attempt was to derive common denominators of the key elements as well as of further elements contained in TN/TF/W/100.  
35. The main elements of the proposal were very simple and threefold.  There was the basic 
commitment to establish a single entry point where documentation and data requirements for 
exportation and importation were su bmitted one time only, followed by the function of a Single 
Window, undertaking onward distribution.  It further involved coordination among relevant 
authorities in processing those documentation and data requirements. 
36. The second element involved a notification of th e contact information regarding the Single 
Window to Members through the WTO Secretariat.  This information might include addressees, 
contact points, means for submission, and the lik e, for enhancing the effectiveness of the Single 
Window.  The third element was encouragement of in formation technology, to the extent possible, 
which was not necessary, but which supported the Single Window.  S&DT and TA&CB were 
addressed in a very general manner due to their cro ss-cutting nature.  It could be dealt with in the 
context of other provisions.    
37. The representative of the European Communities
 introduced document TN/TF/W/108, 
explaining that it was a legal text version of a pr oposal made previously.  The proposal was extremely 
simple.  It proposed the elimination, over time, of  pre-shipment inspection as provided for in the PSI 
Agreement.  It also proposed some transitional measures pending the eventual phase-out of PSI.  The TN/TF/M/14 
Page 6  
 
  text was fairly self-explanatory, which is why he  merely wanted to say a few words about its 
contribution to the objectives of the negotiating mandate. 
38. The aim of the negotiations was to simplify and streamline import and export procedures.  In 
the 45-50 countries in the world who used PSI, it repr esented a very high cost for traders who had to 
pass through it, and for governments which used PSI instead using their own customs administrations.  
PSI was a from of contracting out of customs functions.  Typically, PSI companies charged one 
percent of the transaction value for the service they provided.  The cost to countries of using PSI was 
typically 2 or 3 times higher than the cost of runnin g a customs administration.  It was therefore very 
costly for traders and very costly  for governments which could hardly afford to put so much public 
money into contracting PSI companies.  
39. PSI existed in situations where customs did not function properly due to major problems of 
governance or corruption.  It had always b een seen as a temporary arrangement pending the 
establishment of properly functioning customs admini stration.  It was never envisaged as something 
permanent.  What had been observed, however, was that PSI regimes were becoming a fairly 
permanent fixture in many countries.  That was not  helpful.  And that was why a commitment was 
proposed to eliminate PSI over time.  Doing so presu pposed that in parallel with the phase out of PSI, 
development aid and TA would be provided to countries who needed that kind of support to 
progressively build up the competence of their cust oms administrations.  After a period of X years, 
the customs could take over the functions of the PSI companies. 
40. If anybody wanted to understand more about the way that PSI worked and the high costs it 
implied for governments and traders, there was an  excellent paper which analysed how PSI systems 
operated
1.   
41. The representative of the European Communities  introduced document TN/TF/W/110, 
explaining that it proposed legal text for an ear lier suggestion to prohibit the mandatory use of 
customs brokers.  The EC recognized the very good work done by customs brokers and that many traders, especially small ones, relied upon them to clear import requirements.  It was a question of 
commercial freedom to use customs brokers.  However, a number of companies who had in-house 
capacity to carry out the import clearance procedur e were prohibited from doing so because they were 
obliged in certain countries to use customs broke rs.  That could represent high costs for those 
companies, particularly when the number of custom s brokers was limited and they had an effective 
monopoly over the work. 
42. The EC was therefore proposing to end any manda tory requirement to use customs brokers.  
It was a commitment and transition, which would be subject to time and the EC was not suggesting to 
do it  overnight.  The EC also proposed that, wh ere customs brokers during that transitional period 
were mandatory, their licensing should be done in  a non-discriminatory manner.  One might argue 
that this was already covered by existing GATT prov isions, but it was perhaps not crystal clear, which 
was why it had been added to the proposal.  
43. The representative of Japan
 introduced document TN/TF/W/117 on pre-arrival processing 
which had been prepared in cooperation with othe r Members.  Like other proposals, it had been 
developed on the basis of a previous proposal (TN/TF/W/98) while also incorporating the feedback received at previous meetings.   
44. Pre-arrival processing further expedited the release of goods through documentary 
examination prior to the arrival of goods.  The prop osal was without prejudice to authorities' right to 
                                                     
 
1 Patrick Low, "Preshipment Inspection Services", World Bank Discussion Paper No. 278  (1995).  TN/TF/M/14 
 Page 7 
 
 
  conduct further examination, where necessary, and to maintain appropriate borde r control with the use 
of risk management.  
45. The proposal was structured to enhance the obj ective of GATT Article X.  Japan wished to 
reaffirm its willingness to figure out appropriate S& DT and TA&CB, which would be dealt with in 
the context of the horizontal S&D paper which Japan co-sponsored and which would be discussed 
later on in the meeting.  Japan was ready to furt her elaborate the S&D and TA&CB provisions of the 
proposal in line with the horizontal proposal on S&DT and TA&CB. 
46. Paragraph 1 incorporated the first bullet of the basic concept set out in TN/TF/W/98.  It also 
incorporated the provisions on international standa rds and practices in paragraph 2.  Paragraph 3 
incorporated the provision of W/98's second bullet to reconfirm Members' right to ensure appropriate 
border control with the use of risk management .  There had been constructive discussions on the 
matter and Japan hoped for other Members to share the view set out in the proposal.  
47. The representative of the European Communities  introduced submission TN/TF/W/109, 
explaining that it represented a familiar concept in  the form of a text-based version of an earlier 
proposal on the issue of authorized traders.  It proposed a basic commitment that Members would 
introduce in their customs regimes simplified procedures for authorized traders who had a good track 
record of compliance.  It was a concept which was increasingly used around the world and was a very 
useful way to fulfil negotiating objectives to reduce the incidence  of fees and formalities for traders. 
48. It was also beneficial for qualifying companies as they were subject to fewer inspections and 
it saved time and money.  It also freed up reso urces of customs to concentrate on higher risk 
consignments and was of benefit to governments as well.  The second proposed  commitment was that 
when applying or introducing authorized traders systems, the eligibility criteria for companies were 
fair.  Companies of all shapes and sizes, whether multinationals or SMEs, s hould have the same right 
to apply for authorized trader status.  The EC woul d not want to see a proliferate in Members' systems 
which effectively excluded all but the very largest companies.  
49. Finally, the proposal picked up a number of provisions on transparency about the rules for 
authorized traders.  To the extent that there was a more cross-cutting horizontal provision on 
transparency, one could dispense w ith those specific provisions on transparency and notification in 
the present  proposal. 
50. The representative of Korea  introduced a non-paper on the release of goods, saying that the 
main purpose of the communication was to propose te xt on the issue of release time of goods, based 
on proposal TN/TF/W/101 and comments received on it. It marked the result of the process from an 
"elements" paper to developing a text proposal.    
51. The elements in the present proposal were al most identical to the ones contained in the 
"elements" paper.  The first was a commitment to  calculate and publish the average time for the 
release of goods on a periodic basis, based on inte rnational common standards such as the WCO Time 
Release Study.  The second was a continuous end eavour to reduce the average release time.  
52. The third element was that in case of a signi ficant delay in the release of goods, Members 
shall provide traders with reasons for the delay, except in the case of pursuance of legitimate policy 
objectives.  With respect to S&DT and TA&CB, that  would be discussed in more detail as one of the 
cross-cutting issues.     
53. The representative of New Zealand  introduced submission TN/TF/W/111 on tariff 
classification.  For New Zealand, this was a very important part of the NG's work because tariff 
classification ultimately was an integral part of the movement of goods across borders.  Given that TN/TF/M/14 
Page 8  
 
  that was the case, classification could be used as a regulator to expedite the movement of goods 
depending on the quality of  classification procedures. 
54. The proposal sought to introduce a minimum standard for the way in which tariff 
classification took place.  The minimum standard was a requirement to apply criteria for the tariff classification of goods.  Those classifications were neither arbitrary or unjustifiable and did not 
constitute a restriction on international trade.  The language here should be fami liar to Members for its 
use elsewhere in other WTO instruments.   
55. The proposal also suggested that the classifi cations pursuant to the WCO HS Convention 
could be presumed to comply with their requireme nts.  This was not an onerous requirement, as all 
WTO Members applied the WCO Harmonized System.  Although they did that, the proposal was 
necessary on the grounds that the HS was only a guide.   The HS had been applied differently in the 
final determination of classifications.  The propo sal essentially proposed for Members to retain the 
flexibility to make their own dete rminations, largely because even the HS experts did not always 
agree.  When classifying a product, a Member should apply criteria that, as a minimum, were not arbitrary or unjustifiable, or constituted disguised restrictions on trade. 
56. Members would all agree that this was im portant and that existing standards were 
questionable.  As all WTO Members applied the HS , there was potentially so me need for S&DT and 
TA, certainly for developing-country  Members and, especially, for LDCs.  There might be need for 
transitional periods to allow for the amendment of re levant rules and to allow for capacity constraints 
to be addressed through training of customs offi cials on how to apply the HS Convention.   
57. The representative of the European Communities
 introduced proposal TN/TF/W/113, 
outlining that it was a revision in legal language of a previous proposal from th e EC and others  aimed 
at clarifying and improving GATT Article V on Freedom  of Transit.  Without prejudice to the final 
format of the negotiations, the sponsors had chosen the legal form of a new article V.  The proposals 
in the previous paper had received a fairly good rece ption.  The EC hoped for that to be equally the 
case now that those ideas had been put in legal form.  The proposal recommended five forms of 
clarification to Article V and three improve ments, in line with the negotiating mandate. 
58. The first clarification was that goods moved via fixed infrastructures, such as oil or gas 
pipelines or electricity grids, were covered by the provisions of GATT Article V.  That was an 
important clarification because there had been so me question in current accession negotiations as to 
whether Article V covered the movement of energy.  It was important to put beyond all doubt the fact 
that it did.    
59. The second clarification was to confirm that goods  transiting a country before returning to the 
country of origin were also goods in transit with in the meaning of Article V.  That had been 
questioned, but the historians would know that th at was a provision of the Havana Charter which 
inadvertently did not get any taking-up in the original GATT Article V. 
60. The third clarification was that subject to certa in limits and qualifications, it was the trader, 
the company who determined the route most convenient for transit.  That was what the draft of Article 
V of the Havana Charter had intended.  The EC certa inly recognized that the right of the trader to 
choose the transit route most convenient was not an absolute right and was subject to the right of 
governments to limit that right and that choice  for environmental, health, safety or other 
infrastructural reasons.  The proposal tried to strike the correct balance between the right of the trader 
to choose the route and the right or the responsib ility of Members to curtail that right in given 
circumstances.   TN/TF/M/14 
 Page 9 
 
 
  61. The fourth clarification was on national treatment.  The sponsors wanted to confirm beyond 
all doubt that like products, travelling along the same routes in like conditions, would be transiting goods and subject to the same provisions.  It was a useful clarification because in a number of WTO accessions, there had been evidence of discriminator y treatment of transiting goods by comparison 
with domestic movements. 
62. The fifth and final clarification of Article V was on fees and charges.  The proposal contained 
parallel provisions to the ones set out in the subm ission on fees and charges and GATT Article VIII.  
That had been done because GATT Article VIII co vered importation and ex portation.  Article V 
covered transit, which was a completely different form of customs procedure.  There had to be 
disciplines on fees and charges for each kind of cust oms procedure.  If there was a more all embracing 
fees and charges commitment, which applied to transit equally, that would be fi ne with the sponsors.  
63. There were three specific improvements to Article V set out in the proposal which simply put 
into more legal language proposals that had been ma de on a number of occasions over the last years.  
The first was a commitment that transit procedures should be simplified, applying to transit the kind 
of simplification commitments which had been propo sed for classic importation and exportation.  One 
example was a commitment to have separate physi cal lines at the border for transiting traffic. 
64. The second improvement sought was a general commitment to promote regional transit 
arrangements.  This was one of the more important aspects of this proposal.  Transit was almost by definition a regional notion and real freedom of transit required cooperati on and common procedures 
between neighbouring countries.  Even if similar ru les existed and even if countries were bound to 
each other by regional transit arrangements, the impl ementation of those rules varied considerably and 
the provisions were not always a binding practice.  The present proposal aimed at encouraging more 
practical cooperation between neighbouring countri es to improve freedom of transit and reduce 
transaction costs for goods in transit within a transit region. 
65. The final improvement proposed was a mo re broad-based commitment on cooperation 
between authorities on each side of the border as re gards the management of transiting goods, as well 
as more cooperation between the customs and the priv ate sector in respect of the rules and procedures 
and the handling of goods in transit.  It parallele d proposals made in respect to GATT Article VIII.  
One should not be prescriptive in any way in this area , but rather set a broad objective that, in order to 
minimize traders' costs and delays, there woul d be a minimum degree of cooperation between 
Members engaged in transit management and between Members and the private sector.   
66. This was entirely within the objectives of the ne gotiations.  It was a revision of GATT Article 
V to take into account the many developments that  had occurred since GATT Article V had first been 
drafted.  It was recasting and putting into lega l form a proposal made by developed and developing 
Members over the last 5 years. 
67. The representative of Japan
 introduced proposal TN/TF/W/116 on appeal procedures, saying 
that it had been prepared in cooperation with other Members.   
68. The proposal was developed to clarify GATT Article X.  The provisions of paragraph 4 – 
opportunities to raise complaints – were introduced to enhance the objectives of Article X.  S&DT 
and TA&CB would be discussed later on.  Japan was w illing to review the relevant provisions in this 
proposal in line with the horizontal paper on the matter. 
69. With respect to paragraph 1 – right of app eal – the proposal incorporated the element 
contained in the first bullet of part B in TN/TF/ W/97, making reference to existing Articles such as 
Article 11.1 of the Customs Valuation Agreement.  In paragraph 2 – transparency – the proposal 
reconfirmed non-discrimination in the process of a ppeal procedures and ensured the availability of TN/TF/M/14 
Page 10  
 
  information on the procedures.  With respect to  the representation issue mentioned in TN/TF/W/97, 
the current proposal adopted the wording of indepe ndent legal counsel, making reference to Article 42 
of the TRIPs Agreement. 
70. With regard to paragraph 3, standard period,  TN/TF/W/97 had proposed to set it out at an 
administrative level.  In the present proposal, it was made clear that it was customs and other relevant 
border agencies that were required to set it out fo r the review.  Paragra ph 4 incorporated other 
elements regarding opportunities to raise complaints  contained in the previous proposal, in order to 
avoid additional administrative burden for Members w ith no mentioning of the physical component to 
be responsible for this task.  Enquiry points  could be a good candidate in that respect.   
71. The representative of Switzerland
 introduced a proposal on transit (TN/TF/W/119), 
explaining that it was a third gene ration textual proposal based on part IV – common features – of 
communication TN/TF/W/39 that were found to be co mmon to most or all bilateral, regional or 
international transit arrangements.  While there was a slight overlap with TN/TF/W/113, that had been 
mentioned in the paper, which borrowed elements fro m the other proposal. So there was an element of 
harmonization.  But the many transit-related issues  had been too broad to be incorporated in one 
single document.  The current proposal focused on the transit specific issues as opposed to the broader 
issues related to GATT Article V.  
72. Switzerland wished to recall that the proposed m easures all strived to strike the right balance 
between legitimate safety/security concerns (including  the illegal diversion of goods into the domestic 
market) and the faster and more efficient movement of goods in transit. 
73. The proponents wished to underscore the high economic relevance of efficient transit 
procedures for landlocked Members, whose economi c growth had lagged as a consequence of their 
geographical situation.  Thus, landlocked developing-country Members hoped that the transit issue 
received particularly positive consid eration by the Negotiating Group. 
74. With respect to the issue of special border cr ossing facilities for transit, traffic in transit 
should not be subject to any unnecessary delays or r estrictions and should be  granted expedited and 
simplified treatment at border crossing points, including sea, fluvial and air ports or inland terminals, 
as applicable.  As far as possible, physically separate transit lanes should be ma de available for traffic 
in transit. 
75. As for formalities adjusted to the specificities of the goods in transit, Members should adapt 
the treatment of goods in transit to the expected  degree and nature of the hazard, whether fiscal, 
sanitary or security related, that could be deri ved from the characteristics of goods in transit.  
Categories such as "normal goods", "dangerous goods", "perishable goods " and "sensitive goods" 
might be established at national le vel together with related proced ures and should be made publicly 
available. 
76. With respect to limited physical inspections of goods, international standards recommended 
that Members limit physical inspections of goods in transit to cases where circumstances might 
require them. Consignments secured by customs seal s should not as a general rule be subjected to 
customs examination.  No quality control and no veterinary, medicosanitary or phytosanitary 
inspection should be imposed on goods in transit, ex cept in cases where risks had been identified.  
This should not prevent customs from carrying out spot checks on the goods, based on risk management. 
77. As for common customs documentation and procedures, during transit, the overarching 
objective should be to limit administrative burden to the greatest extent possible.  The proposals 
suggested a number of possible measures to do this:  (a) by accepting commercially available  TN/TF/M/14 
 Page 11 
 
 
  information as part of transit declarations;  (b) by agreeing on common, simplified documents that 
were aligned with international standards among th e parties to a regional agreement;  and (c) by 
allowing the same set of document s to accompany the consignment from the country of departure to 
its destination. 
78. On the issue of international, regional or national customs guarantee system, without a 
customs guarantee system, transit procedures c ould immobilize important  amounts of money the 
exporter might not be able to afford and therefore, constitute a barrier to trade.  In order to avoid 
provisional taxation while securing revenue in ca se of inland diversion of goods, Members should 
operate bonded transport regimes that allowed th e transit of goods through the territory.   
79. With regard to the promotion of regional tran sit agreements or arrangements, it might seem 
strange to promote bilateral arrangements in a multila teral context, yet transit was foremost a regional 
issue with international consequences.  It was recommended that such agreements or arrangements 
went beyond customs matters which were relevant in th e context of transit, such as road and transport 
issues.  Switzerland was aware that this might go be yond the scope of Article V, but it was formulated 
as only a recommendation, and highly relevant in the context of transit.  Members should not enforce 
unilateral rules affecting traffic in transit which we re not in accordance with th e participants' bilateral 
or regional transit agreem ents or arrangements. 
80. As regards the issue of monitoring with a view  to enhancing efficiency, transparency and 
predictability of the transit agreement or arrangeme nt, experience had shown that it was not done with 
the signing of a regional arrangement.  Therefore,  continuous efforts were necessary to keep the 
arrangements going.  This was meant to be a reco mmendation not a mandatory requirement.  Finally, 
the paper also contained a reference to the use of inte rnational standards, in particular with regard to 
arrangements which were designed in th e bilateral or regional context.  
81. The representative of Paraguay  introduced a discussion (non)-paper on a possible 
implementation mechanism.  Various delegations  had presented contributi ons on S&DT and TA&CB 
as well as on other questions of a cross-cutting natu re which had led to extensive discussions.  The 
dynamic generated by the presentation of those docu ments further increased everybody's interest in 
the issues addressed therein.    
82. For many Members, appropriate negotiation of  S&DT was as important as the negotation on 
substance itself.  The focus of th e work was to clarify Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT.  In the 
discussions following the presentation of do cuments TN/TF/W/81 and TN/TF/W/82, some 
delegations had suggested that, given the exis ting complementarity between the ideas expressed 
therein, it would be appropriate for delegations w ho had worked on their preparation to get together 
and try to produce a joint document.  Other delegati ons, who had not been involved in the preparation 
of these communications, had expressed interest in participating in a process which would result in a single communication on the matter.  The demonstrated readiness of those delegations to work together with the openness of the co-sponsors of  the communications TN/TF/W/81 and TN/TF/W/82, 
as well as the thrust generated between this group of Members had enabled the constitution of a basic 
ingredient which made it possible to form a gr oup made up of Members of different categories, 
different latitudes and different situations. 
83. Under the coordination of Switzerland and Paragua y, this Group had worked on a mechanism 
for the implementation of a future Agreement on TF.   The first working sessions of this group had 
resulted in the present discussion paper. The docum ent established a basic structure composed of 
successive phases, which was only a skeleton, a stru cture on which the sponsors would like to build 
an implementation mechanism. TN/TF/M/14 
Page 12  
 
  84.  The presentation of the non-pape r sought to stimulate discussions in order to get feedback on 
the ongoing work on the matter and to try to generate  a standard which could implement S&DT in the 
future Agreement on TF.  The sponsors were aware that various relevant questions such as TA&CB 
did not appear duly treated in this first structure presented to Members for consideration.  This was 
not a coincidence but the result of the Group's interest  to further reflect on those questions in order to 
come up with concrete proposals which woul d be included in a general mechanism. 
85. The Group which had prepared the document was by no means a closed or exclusive one, but 
one which merely represented a union of people who had an interest in working on this important 
matter.  It was open to the participation of everyb ody wishing to take part.  Those who would like to 
attend the meetings of the group were invited to info rm Switzerland or Paraguay so that they could be 
included in the communication list. Switzerland woul d now add more technical detail to the paper 
presented.  
86. The representative of Switzerland
 (co)-introduced a discussion (non)-paper on the phases of a 
proposed implementation mechanism submitted in c ooperation with other co sponsoring Members.  
Encouraged by the fruitful discussions at recent me etings on issues pertaining to the implementation 
of TF commitments, and communications W/81 and W/ 82 in particular, those Members had decided 
to work on a joint contribution, starting from the structure proposed in Annex 2 of document W/81 while integrating elements from W/82 and other communications on the same subject. 
87. Members would notice that they had been acquainted with the essence of the proposed 
mechanism through the structure set out in W/81.  The proposed mechanism started with the signing 
of the Single Undertaking.  The steps between the signing and entry into force of the agreement would 
have to be fixed somewhere outside the TF agreement, be it a ministerial decision or a decision by the 
General Council.  The first phase was dealing w ith capacity self-assessment.  There had been 
numerous discussions in the Negotiating Group on the matter and there seemed to be converging 
views among Members that the capacity self-assess ment was an ongoing process which had already 
started in many countries.  The finalization of this assessment would take place once TF measures had 
been defined and agreed on.  Hence, it was vis-à-vis  the agreed TF measures that this assessment was 
taking place.   
88. It was, in essence, a self-assessment.  Up on request, donors, including international 
organizations, should be ready to assist countries in this exercise.  Switzerland was ready to provide 
this assistance upon request as already mentioned in W/63.  
89. The second step in this mechanism was the notification procedure.  With respect to that phase, 
the proposal contained both old and some new elem ents.  Like in W/81, it was proposed for Members 
to notify, as a result of the capacity self-assessme nt, those measures for which they required TA&CB 
and those elements for the implementation of whic h they required more time.  The new structure 
made clear that Members should not notify the stat us quo, i.e. those measu res they were already 
implementing as of the signing of the Single Undertaking.  The new paper also introduced a 
previously tabled idea suggesting that all Me mbers committed to a minimum number of core  
obligations that were comparatively easy to im plement and which did not require any TA.   
90. In addition, it was suggested to include in  the notification phase the possibility for all 
Members to engage in a multilateral dialogue with the notifying Members.  The objective of such a 
dialogue was to increase transparency and predicta bility and not to push Members to go beyond their 
implementation capacities.   
91. The third phase was the entry into force.   This phase was key.  Non-notified  obligations 
became applicable.  Equally important, Members started to take actions in order to achieve 
compliance with TF obligations in sink with the notifications.    TN/TF/M/14 
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  92. With respect to the phases of formulation, notification and implementation of the capacity-
building plans, there was nothing fundamentally new compared to W/81.  At the end of the implementation of the capacity building plan, there was the crucial question of whether the capacity 
had been required or not.  In case the answer was an  uncontested yes, the Member would notify that it 
had reached capacity.  Where the capacity had not be en required from any of the parties involved, one 
would have to think about the mechanism for solving these cases.  This would of course, at first hand,  
involve the parties involved. But then, at some stag e, the case would also have to be brought to the 
knowledge of all Members. 
93. Many of the sub-processes involved in the mech anism were still open, such as the mechanism 
dealing with the non-acquisition of capacity.  The sponsors were still pulling elements together.  
94. The Chairman
 asked whether there were any statements  a delegation wished to make for the 
record and, to that end, moved the meeting back to formal mode .  Any delegation wishing to make a 
formal statement with respect to the new or one of  the previously submitted contributions could do so 
now. 
95. The representative of Morocco, speaking on behalf of the African Group , said that the African 
Group would come up with detailed comments on th e discussion paper regarding the implementation 
mechanism after it had discussed the contribution w ithin the Group.  The African Group also would 
like to support the statement made by Malaysia on be half of the Core Group and  wished to reiterate 
some of its preoccupations that should be taken into  account in the process of the negotiations, mainly 
that this Group was moving towards the legal drafting stage.    
96. It was needless to recall what was clearly stated in Annex D of the July Framework, and 
Annex E of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration w ith regard to the parameters for the application 
of the principle of S&DT for developing a nd least-developed countries in trade facilitation. 
97. As already stated in its previous proposals,  for the African Group, S&DT went beyond longer 
transitional periods.  In the context of any new commitments on trade facilitation, S&D should 
provide policy space and flexibility for African count ries while determining when, how, and to what 
extent such new commitments on trade facilitation we re to be implemented.   S&DT should condition 
the implementation of such commitments to the provision of operational technical assistance and capacity building from donors and international orga nizations.  S&DT also should consider a GATS 
positive list approach by making certain obligations applicable only when the African countries had 
the capacity to do so. 
98. The African Group welcomed Members' comments in  this regard and wished to reiterate its 
full engagement for the success of the negotiations. 
99. The representative of Malaysia, speaking on behalf of the Core Group
, said that in line with 
the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration's call for text-based negotiations, the Core Group of developing countries expressed its willingness to review draft texts that had as their aim the clarification and improvement of Articles V, V III and X of the GATT 1994.  The Group wished to 
reiterate that, as called for in Annex D of the July Framework, the principle of S&DT for developing 
and least-developed countries should extend beyond th e granting of traditional transition periods for 
implementing new commitments, and that the extent  and the timing of entering into commitments 
should be related to the provisions of th e necessary TA&CB essential for enhancing the 
implementation capacities of developing  and least-developed Members.   
100. Annex D, paragraph 6, called for specific support and assistance in relation to helping 
developing and least-developed countries implement commitments resulting from the negotiations. 
Where such commitments would require support for infrastructure development on the part of some TN/TF/M/14 
Page 14  
 
  Members, developed-country Member s were to ensure support and assistance directly related to the 
nature and scope of the commitments in order to  allow implementation.  Where support and assistance 
for capacity building and necessary infrastructure w as not forthcoming, implementation then would 
not be required.   
101. At this juncture, the Core Group drew attention to the need to ensure the incorporation into 
any draft texts of such provisions that would re nder faithful the mandate of Annex D and other 
provisions therein relating to the need for assistan ce as regards needs assessment and evaluation of 
costs implications. 
102. In this light, the Core Group was currently preparing its consolidated comments on the 
various proposals that had so far been tabled with a view to identifying the proposals' faithfulness to 
the mandate and the limits of the scope of the tr ade facilitation negotiations and the need for specific 
text to capture the important provisions relating to S&D and technical and financial assistance as well as implementation assistance that went beyond the tr aditional concepts of longer implementation 
periods. 
103. The Core Group thanked the Chair and all Me mbers for their continued constructive and 
transparent efforts to fulfil the ma ndate while keeping a constructive environment in the negotiations.  
However, for the negotiations to reach the right c onclusions, it was necessary to create the appropriate 
linkages between any new commitments relating to Articles V, VIII and X of GATT 1994 and the 
provision of TA&CB to developing and least-developed Members.  In doing so, the development nature of the current Round could be truly preserved. 
104. The representative of Singapore, speaking on  behalf of the ASEAN Member countries
, said 
that ASEAN had circulated a room document to share its experience on the development of the 
ASEAN Single Window.  The room document also attached the full text of the "Agreement to Establish and Implement the ASEAN Single Window ".  The ASEAN Member countries believed that 
this could contribute to the NGTF's work in the area of single window.   
105. The document was circulated without prejudice to the individual ASEAN countries' position 
in the negotiations.  Singapore wished to invite  Members to study the full text of the "ASEAN 
Agreement".  Some points relating to the "ASEAN Ag reement" were flagged for Members' ease of 
reference. 
106. First, some brief background.  The "ASEAN Ag reement" was signed by Ministers responsible 
for trade in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 9 December 2005.  The "ASEAN Agreement" was intended to support the implementation of the ASEAN Free Trad e Area. It was also envisaged to be one of the 
mechanisms to realize the ASEAN Economic Community.  
107. The "ASEAN Agreement" in itself was not the ASEAN Single Window. It simply provided 
the guidance for the development of the ASEA N Single Window. The ASEAN Single Window, when 
it became operational, would be the envir onment where National Single Windows of ASEAN 
Member Countries would operate and integrate.  The development of the National Single Windows of 
the ASEAN countries was therefore critical for th e realization of the ASEAN Single Window.   
108. The National Single Window was a system which enabled: (i) a single submission of data and 
information; (ii) a single and synchronous processi ng of data and informa tion; and (iii) a single 
decision-making for customs release and clearance.  
109. The "ASEAN Agreement" stated that Member  countries would ensure that transactions, 
processes and decisions under their National Single Windows and the ASEAN Single Window were  TN/TF/M/14 
 Page 15 
 
 
  performed, carried out or made in a manner complying with the principles of:  (i) consistency;  (ii) 
simplicity;  (iii) transparency; and (iv) efficiency.  
110. Article 5 of the "ASEAN Agreement" contai ned a number of obligations for the ASEAN 
Member countries. Singapore wished to flag two of them.  First, Member Countries were to develop 
and implement their National Single Windows in a timely manner for the establishment of the 
ASEAN Single Window. In this regard, it was fores een that the original ASEAN-6 Members (i.e. 
Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,  Singapore and Thailand)  would operationalize 
their National Single Windows by 2008, at the latest.  The newer Members of ASEAN (i.e. Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam) would operationalize their National Single Windows 
no later than 2012. 
111. Second, Member countries were to make use of information and communication technology 
that were in line with relevant internationa lly accepted standards in the development and 
implementation of their National Single Windows. 
112. The "ASEAN Agreement" was not a static one. The Ministers responsible for ASEAN 
economic integration were to meet  whenever necess ary to review this Agreement for the purpose of 
considering further measures to improve the de velopment and/or implementation of the ASEAN 
Single Window.  The provisions of the "ASEAN Agre ement" might be modified through amendments 
to be mutually agreed upon in writing by all Member countries.  
113. Lastly but importantly, technical assistance a nd capacity building were integral to the 
development of the ASEAN Single Window. In this regard, the ASEAN Member countries 
acknowledged the technical assistance they had r eceived from the EC under the ASEAN-EC Program 
for Regional Integration Support. Further Technical  Assistance and Capacity Building might be 
needed by individual ASEAN Member countries, as a ppropriate, for the develo pment and operation of 
their National Single Windows.   
114. The representative of India
 wished to offer clarifications on issues raised in relation to India's 
proposal contained in document TN/TF/W/103 on Customs Cooperation.  
115. India had submitted a proposal on the specifi c elements for a multilateral cooperation 
mechanism for the exchange of information betw een Customs Administrations of Members, which 
was based on its proposal submitted in  document TN/TF/W/68.  In its document, India had set out the 
elements for commitment and methodology of exch ange and had introduced document TN/TF/W/103 
at the Group's meeting in May. Several comment s were made during the meeting on its proposal. 
India took this opportunity to respond and clarify some of the issues that had been raised.   
116. It was not the intention of the proponent to re quire Members to assume uncalled for burden in 
collecting, compiling or retaining such inform ation.  The proposal did not require Member 
administrations to modify the format of the impor t or export declarations, or documentation. It was 
also not proposed that the period of retention of su ch documents by the requested administrations be 
enhanced beyond their existing national requirement s.  The proposal did not require Members to 
reintroduce paper documentation where they had alread y introduced electronic formats.  Further, only 
that information was to be provided which was al ready available with the Members.  Finally, the 
proposal also did not require the exporting country to  carry out any verification of export information 
or documents but only required the information or  documents submitted by exporters and accepted by 
the Member administration to be true to be made  available to the requesting country.  The proposal 
was not expected to result in a huge number of requests since the requesting country had to carry out 
detailed internal verification processes before making such a request, which itself would place a 
limitation on the number of requests that were made.   TN/TF/M/14 
Page 16  
 
  117. Several Members had raised the issue of confid entiality and some suggestions had been made 
in this regard. It was recognized that there was a need for confidentiality since this affected the 
commercial interests of each country.  The proposal already envisaged that the information would not 
be revealed to any third party except in the context of judicial proceedings.  However, if Members had 
specific concerns that required higher levels of conf identiality than what had been provided for, India 
would propose that these issues could be covered in  the agreement itself through specific provisions.  
However, enforcing the level of confidentiality that  prevailed in the requested country would prove 
difficult to address in an agreement and its implem entation would also be impossible because of the 
diversity of the confidentiality requirements in diff erent countries.  The issue of confidentiality could 
be resolved through negotiations and the aforesai d formulation was expected to contribute towards 
this end.  
118. Another issue that had been raised related to existing mutual bilatera l agreement versus new 
multilateral arrangements.  It was India's view that  the two would be complimentary to each other and 
that a multilateral agreement would not supersed e the bilateral agreement that was specifically 
negotiated to address the concerns of two individual countries entering into such an Agreement.  On 
the subject of including a sunset clause, India' s understanding was that this was to allow the 
mechanism to lapse after a certain period of time.   Cooperation for Customs compliance was one of 
the aims mandated under the Trade Facilitation nego tiations.  It was well recognized that a proper 
balance should be maintained between Trade Fac ilitation and Customs compliance so as to achieve 
the legitimate policy objectives.  In fact, trade facilitation could not be achieved without having 
adequate compliance measures and safeguards in place.   It would not be a ppropriate to have any 
sunset clause for cooperation on Customs complia nce matters.  Furthermor e, proposing a sunset 
clause only for one part of the mandate related to tr ade facilitation appeared to be inconsistent if a 
similar clause could not apply to other parts of the mandate. 
119. There had also been some comments that th e proposal on the exchange of information 
implied that Customs authorities did not have the s ophistication to effectively apply their procedures. 
It should be appreciated that effective control was required for trade facilitation.  If certain measures 
had to be undertaken to facilitate imports of goods  into a country, it was e qually necessary to ensure 
that the compliance mechanism was in  place to take care of the enhanced level of facilitation for such 
imports.  Exchange of informati on could benefit both developing a nd developed countries for various 
purposes (such as addressing revenue, security, envir onmental concerns).  Since the proposal was 
limited to certain specific information and suppor ting documents requested after due verification of 
their essentiality by the requesting country, it should not  raise serious concerns of confidentiality and 
additional burden to the requested Members. 
120. The Chairman
 turned to the contributions from the pa rticipating international organisations. 
Work had continued in all of them in support of the negotiations, especially on the important area of 
cost implications, where several projects had b een initiated in that regard.  New information 
particularly came from the World Bank, who were engaged in intense studies on the subject in 
collaboration with other international partners.  Wh ile this work appeared to be still going on, the 
World Bank could inform Members about the work carried out so far.  
121. The representative of the World Bank  reported on the World Bank's activities in support of 
the TF negotiations.  At the Februa ry meeting of the NG, the World Bank announced that it was about 
to embark on a detailed study designed to provide Members with indicative information on the costs 
and implementation difficulties that developing countr ies and LDCs were likely to face in terms of 
implementation of a new Agreement on TF.  With th e full participation of the IMF and the WCO and 
with generous funding support provided by both th e EC and DFID, the World Bank was in the middle 
of conducting seven in-country gap assessments and costing studies.  TN/TF/M/14 
 Page 17 
 
 
  122. To date, the World Bank had completed studi es in Rwanda, Paraguay and Sri Lanka and 
would undertake studies in Senegal and Egypt later th is month.  Further studies were planned for the 
Philippines and Fiji in July.  The World Bank expected  to provide an interim report to Members at the 
meeting scheduled for 24-26 July and a full report of the World Bank's conclusions immediately after 
the summer recess.  The content of the nationa l studies was confidential and the World Bank  
therefore could not provide detailed costing of the TA requirements of the individual countries 
concerned.  However, several preliminary conclusi ons had already emerged which were worth sharing 
with Members and very pertinent to the di scussions currently taking place in the NG. 
123. While needs and implementation capacities varied  from one country to the next, there had 
been a lot of commonality in the TA needs identif ied to date.  This might ultimately provide an 
opportunity for economies of scale in the preparation and delivery of TA and CB assistance.  For 
example, if 50 countries needed help to develop administrative procedures and legislative amendments to allow for risk management systems to  be further developed, it would seem sensible to 
develop one package that could then be tailored to the specific needs of individual countries.  
124. The majority of proposals currently on the ta ble were considered sensible and positive by 
customs officials.  Many officials regarded a new agreement as providing much needed political 
support and motivation for their efforts toward reform  currently undertaken. They also stressed that 
the vast majority of measures under negotiation were  not totally new but were already part of a 
generally accepted suite of good practice reforms al ready included in various  WCO instruments. 
125. Each of the countries studied so far had comme nced a reform and modernization programme 
compatible to the work discussed in the WTO.  None  of them were starting from scratch.  Indeed, two 
of the three countries had already received signifi cant donor support for their customs modernization 
efforts from a variety of donors and were therefore technically well equipped to deal with quite a few 
of the proposed new commitments.  One example was advance rulings.  In two of the countries, 
customs already issued advance rulings, but only on an  informal basis.  It would not be difficult to 
establish formal mechanisms.  
126. All three were likely to comply with many of the new measures already.  For example, all 
three countries already employed some form of risk management, all had established good appeal 
mechanisms, all accepted security or bonds that allo wed goods to be released prior to final settlement 
of outstanding matters, all had websites that containe d most of the information required in at least one 
WTO language, and all employed IT systems to f acilitate parts of their import and export process. 
127. While there was certainly some need for well targeted technical assistance in key areas, the 
most significant costs identified to date were associated with just a small number of extremely 
difficult to implement measures, namely:  (i) de veloping and implementing genuine electronic single 
window systems, and (ii) construction and refurbis hment of buildings, if one-stop border stations 
between countries sharing common land borders were  to be agreed upon as a commitment.  If these 
made it to the final list of measures, then th ey were likely to incur significant costs.  
128. What was also interesting to note was that in  all three countries officials and private sector 
representatives interviewed by the study team commented  that many of the most difficult barriers to 
implementation of the proposals were domestic in na ture and that TA, regard less of its quantity or 
quality, would not necessarily help.  Other issues such as a lack of po litical will to reform, a lack of 
inter-agency cooperation and a lack of sophistica tion and compliance amongst the private sector were 
often regarded as more significant barriers to impl ementation of the measures under negotiation.  It 
was not simply a matter of technical assistance. TN/TF/M/14 
Page 18  
 
  129. Another conclusion the World Bank had reached was that while customs administrations were 
generally well advanced on much of the agenda , the same could not be said for other border 
management agencies that often did not employ m odern approaches to risk  management etc.   
130. Two more studies would be conducted later this  month and two more over the summer.  An 
Interim Report on results would be distributed to Me mbers at the NGTF in late July and a final report 
including detailed costing information immediatel y after the summer.  While costs would only be 
calculated for the seven participating countries, the information was likely to be useful for all LDCs 
and developing countries as well as for the donor community.   
131. In addition, the studies were also used to develop a comprehensive self-assessment tool, 
which would also be ready after the summer and w ould be refined as more clarification was given 
within the context of the negotiations.  
132. Certainly, TA&CB support was needed in all three countries, but at the same time, the 
countries were not starting from scratch and much had already been achieved.  With the exception of 
the small number of technically difficult tasks th e World Bank had mentioned, many measures had 
already been implemented or were scheduled for implementation under existing plans, regardless of 
the outcome of the negotiations. The level of resource s needed to meet a series of minimum standards, 
based on the measures already on the table, might be  somewhat less than initia lly envisaged by some 
Members. 
133. The World Bank further wished to respond to a comment made on the Bretton Woods' views 
on pre-shipment inspection (PSI).  While it might have  been the policy of those institutions in the past 
to include the use of PSI in certain loan conditiona lities, that was no longer the case.  Both the World 
Bank and the IMF were interested in sustainable ca pacity building.  And there had barely been a 
transfer of knowledge from PSI companies to cust oms officials.  They would therefore typically 
prefer to see the funds going to PSI companies cha nnelled instead in building capacity of countries to 
more effectively manage their own customs depart ments and responsibilities.  Likewise, for countries 
already using PSI, the Bank typically recommended th e development of a medi um- to long-term exit 
strategy so that they could take over those respons ibilities at some time in the future.  There were a 
few situations such as the case of a country suffering from a civil war, making it impossible to guarantee the security of its borders, or emergency situations, where the Bank might support PSI.  But 
generally, there was a change of policy in that re gard.  More information on the Bank's views on PSI 
could be obtained from the Customs Moderniza tion Handbook which had been presented to the NG 
some time ago.  
134. The representative of UNCTAD
 reported on the work UNCTAD had been doing with the 
WTO.  UNCTAD had been organizing regional work shops, one in Panama a nd two coming up in Sri 
Lanka and Fiji.  Those workshops  were done in collaboration with  the WCO, with UNCTAD bringing 
in Geneva delegates for information about the negotiations.  UNCTAD had also organized activities 
jointly with the WTO.  In particular, UNCTAD was participating in the seven joint workshops 
organized by the WTO.  Three of them had alread y been held, in Egypt, Senegal and in Singapore, 
and four were coming up in Zambia, Barbados, Eastern Europe, and Paraguay.  UNCTAD would 
bring someone from its Secretariat and at least three delegates from Geneva to contribute to the development of these workshops.  UNCTAD had al so been involved in the organization of 
brainstorming sessions.  Two of them had been held l ast year, with one more foreseen in July for the 
African Group. 
135. UNCTAD had worked on more sp ecific activities with other sister organizations and the 
WTO such as on national workshops in Honduras a nd Cuba and an upcoming regional workshop in 
Moldova for Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova.  Finally, UNCTAD was also contributing  TN/TF/M/14 
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  to support groups in Latin America.  UNCTAD had further continued work initiated by the World 
Bank regarding a national negotiati ng group set up in the country. 
136. UNCTAD had also prepared a number of technical notes.  Seventeen of them were available 
on UNCTAD's website and the website of the GFP, both in English and Spanish.  They covered a 
number of issues currently discussed.  Finally, from 16 to 18 October, there would be an Expert 
Meeting on Information and Communication Technol ogy Solutions to facilitate trade at border 
crossings at UNCTAD in Geneva.    
137. The Chairman  said that the contributions had offe red food for thought both in bringing 
forward new items as well as in offering comments a nd questions on them.  It had been a very useful 
engagement of minds on almost all issues under nego tiation.  While the NG now had some bricks for 
the building it was constructing,  the remaining bric ks relating to other issues had to come off the 
conveyor belt as fast as Members could possibly deliver them. 
138. In that context, Members had to impose a little  discipline on themselves.  He was conscious 
of remarks made by a number of delegations with r espect to the timeliness with which proposals were 
put forward and the way in which the proposals related to one another.  The first one was easy to deal 
with.  Bearing in mind that the third-generati on texts which were coming forward would require 
scrutiny from delegations not just in Geneva but also from their principals in capital and their 
principal's lawyers – with the scrutiny getting closer the closer Members were getting to a final text -  
it was a demand of courtesy to one another to bring forward such text early.   
139. He would therefore propose that for the next set  of textual papers which would be coming 
forward to an informal meeting in early July, Member s ensured that they were available by the end of 
June.  That should allow time for consideration and for translation.  He was not imposing a bar to all 
new submissions.  Far from it. Clearly there would always be circumstances which delayed some papers.  What he was thinking about was to provide a sensible queuing mechanism.  Contributions which reached the Secretariat before the end of June  would deserve a priority treatment.  Those which 
arrived later would have to be dealt with later.  He hoped to have Members understanding on that 
arrangement.   
140. With respect to the second point, the discussions  on S&DT and the other horizontal issues had 
been very valuable.  He was conscious about thei r importance to many Members.  Members therefore 
owed it to themselves to give a bit more time to that subject when meeting next time.  He might therefore vary the order of the agenda to ensure that the maximum amount of time possible was given 
to that item 
141. On the point raised by a delegation about the di fficulty of relating different elements one to 
the other, in particular the difficulty many smalle r delegations had in focusing their capitals on the 
scope of what was under discussion and how the elements  related to one another, he was conscious of 
the way in which the very comprehensive compilation prepared by the Secretariat was becoming more and more unwieldy as Members rolled forward.  With  Members' indulgence, he was therefore going 
to give some serious consideration to how the NG might provide itself with a more user-friendly 
document in respect of all third-generation proposal s which were coming forward.  Having said that, 
he wished to stress that this should no t be seen in any way as threatening.   
142. As he had already mentioned before, there was not  going to be a text drafted by the Chair.  
Rather, Members were drafting it. It was a bottom- up approach.  Members were providing the bricks 
for the building the NG was constructing.  He was st ill fascinated by the way in which Members, who, 
not so long ago, would have avoided the word "A greement" had occasionally let that word slip from 
their mouths.  That was interesting as a pheno menon, but he made no valued judgment on it.  
Whatever the form Members came to discuss those th ird-generation proposals at the next meeting, it TN/TF/M/14 
Page 20  
 
  remained something that Members were buildi ng and something which was without prejudice to 
either the final form or the substance of those proposals.     
143. He encouraged Members to continue to work toge ther.  He was particularly struck by the way 
in which those topics which had been the subject of the most intense interaction among delegations 
had attracted the most focused scrutiny and the most productive discussion in the meetings.  He 
therefore encouraged those who had been working on parallel lines to try and talk to one another and 
build some convergence.   
144. The representative of Cuba
 thanked the Chair for properly hearing the concerns expressed and 
his readiness to give due attention to them.  Cuba  had two suggestions.   The discussions during the 
present meeting had made it evident that the most appropriate way to carry forward S&DT issues was 
a cross-cutting manner.  In many cases, the propon ents, at least recently, also moved towards this 
result.  She therefore invited colleagues who had made  proposals to take account of this fact in order 
to give other delegations more time to discuss this important matter.   
145. The other suggestion had to do with the compila tion document.  Cuba appreciated and highly 
valued the work done by the Secretariat in updating th is document.  Cuba woul d be very grateful if 
one could include the questions and comments made by other delegations on the compiled proposals.   
146. In any case, Cuba did not think that it  would be the spirit of any delegation not to carry 
forward the mandate set by the Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation.  It was an area in which 
everybody could arrive at positive results.  
147. The Chairman  said that there was already a document which provided for much of what Cuba 
had suggested in compiling Members' questions and answers on the proposals.  
148. He asked Members to bear with him while he considered precisely how to move forward for 
the next series of discussions and thanked a ll delegations for their contributions.    
149. The Negotiating Group took note  of the statements made. 
B. AD HOC ATTENDANCE OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS , INCLUDING THE 
IMF,  OECD,  UNCTAD,  WCO  AND THE WORLD BANK, AT THE NEXT MEETING OF THE 
NEGOTIATING GROUP  
150. The Chairman  suggested inviting relevant internati onal organizations, including the IMF, 
OECD, UNCTAD, WCO and the World Bank to attend the next meeting of the NG on an ad hoc basis, as provided for in the Work Plan. 
151. It was so agreed
. 
C. OTHER BUSINESS  
152. The Chairman  raised the issue of the Group's next meeting, recalling Members' agreement to 
meet in informal mode on 10 and 11 July. 
153. The meeting was adjourned . 
__________