WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  G/ADP/14 
9 November 2005 
 (05-5260) 
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices  
  
 
CHAIR'S REPORT TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS 
ON TRANSITIONAL REVIEW OF CHINA 
 
 1. The Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices undertook the fourth Transitional Review of 
China pursuant to Paragraph 18 of the Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China 
(WT/L/432) at its meeting of 31 October-1 November 2005.   
 2. There is no information specified for subm ission to the Committee under Annex 1A to the 
Protocol.  Members submitted questions and comment s in the context of the Transitional Review 
relating to China's implementation of the Agr eement on Implementation of Article VI of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the Anti-dumping Agreement).  These can be found in 
documents G/ADP/W/446 (submitted by the Un ited States), G/ADP/W/447 (submitted by Japan), 
G/ADP/W/448 (submitted by the European Commun ities), and G/ADP/W/449 (submitted by the 
United States).    
3. The statements made at the meeting of  31 October-1 November 2005, at which the 
Transitional Review was item E of the agenda, are reflected in the minutes of the meeting, which will be circulated as document G/ADP/M/29.  The releva nt paragraphs of the minutes, which reflect the 
statements made and the discussion at the meeting, are annexed. G/ADP/14 
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 Excerpt from the minutes of the regular meeting of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices 
held 31 October-1 November 2005, to be  circulated as document G/ADP/M/29 
 K. TRANSITIONAL REVIEW UNDER PARAGRAPH 18 OF THE PROTOCOL OF 
ACCESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 
 1. The Chair
 recalled that Paragraph 18 of the Protocol of Accession of the People's Republic of 
China to the World Trade Organization provides that  all subsidiary bodies, including this Committee, 
"which have a mandate covering China's commitme nts under the WTO Agreement or [the] Protocol 
shall, within one year after accession, review, as appropriate to their mandate, the implementation by 
China of the WTO Agreement and of the related provi sions of [the] Protocol."  China is to provide 
relevant information in advance of the review, in cluding information specified in Annex 1A to the 
Protocol.  China can also raise issues relating to any reservations under Section 17 or to any other specific commitments made by other Members in th e Protocol, in subsidiary bodies which have a 
relevant mandate.  The Committee must report the r esults of the review promptly to the Council for 
Trade in Goods.  The review is to take place after accession in each year for eight years, with a final 
review in year 10 or at an earlier date decided by the General Council. 
2. The Chair further recalled that there are no procedures set out for the conduct of the 
Transitional Review in the Protocol, except that Chin a is to provide relevant information in advance 
of the review.  No information is specified  for submission to the Committee on Anti-dumping 
Practices under Annex 1A. 
3. The Chair noted that the delegations of the United States, Japan, and the European 
Communities had submitted questions and comments in the context of the Transitional Review, which 
were circulated in documents G/ADP/W/ 446, W/447, and W/448, respectively.   
4. In response to the Chair's invitation for any statem ents of a general nature , the delegate of the 
United States
1 noted that this was the fourth annual re view of China's implementation of its anti-
dumping regime under the Transitional Review Mech anism of China's protocol of accession, the goal 
of which is to provide Members an opportunity to examine and report on China's efforts to meet its obligations under the ADA.  In the previous thr ee reviews the US had voiced concerns about China's 
conduct of its anti-dumping actions but also ha d noted incremental improvements in China's 
compliance efforts.  Unfortunately, since the previous review, China's efforts to meet its obligations 
appeared to have shown little improvement.  China in sisted that its anti-dumping laws and regulations 
embraced the fundamental principles of transparency and fair procedures that formed the core of the 
Anti-dumping Agreement and in large part this appear ed to be the case.  In practice, though, China's 
conduct with regard to the anti-dumping measures th at it had imposed fell short of these fundamental 
principles.   
5. One needed only to turn to the statements made by the United States during the previous 
year's Transitional Review in the Committee and note how the circumstances described then were 
largely unchanged.  The previous year, the Unite d States had raised serious concerns about the 
availability of information from China's administering authority, the Ministry of Commerce ("MOFCOM") and its injury arm in particular, the I nvestigation Bureau for Industry Injury ("IBII").  
As could be seen from the questions filed by the United States for this Transitional Review, these 
problems persisted.  The MOFCOM public readin g room still contained only a limited number of 
documents pertaining to a few of China's ongoing injury  investigations.  Interested parties, including 
responding parties and officials of the US Government, continued to be frustrated in their attempts to 
                                                     
 
1 The statement by the United States was ci rculated in document G/ADP/W/449.    G/ADP/14 
 Page 3 
 
 
 obtain adequate non-confidential versions of docum ents, such as Chinese industry responses to IBII 
questionnaires.   
6. As the number of anti-dumping measures bei ng imposed by China grew, there were a 
growing number of complaints by responding pa rties about the quality of the non-confidential 
summaries China had made available.  Article 6. 5 of the Anti-dumping Agreement required that non-
confidential summaries of confidential documents be in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable 
understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence.  As the United States had 
pointed out the previous year, without access to confidential information submitted to MOFCOM, it 
was essential to responding parties to have comprehensive and informative non-confidential 
summaries in order to be able to mount an effec tive defence.  The US government had received ever 
more frequent complaints that non-confidential summa ries, when they were finally made available, 
contained insufficient factual information to permit development of effective arguments.   
7. Furthermore, the United States continued to be concerned that, in a growing number of cases, 
critical arguments or evidence put forward by inter ested parties had not been addressed adequately in 
either preliminary or final determinations.  This  had been a problem the previous year and still 
remained a problem, especially prevalent in inju ry determinations.  Similarly, many of the 
conclusions reached by MOFCOM did not appear to be supported by adequate evidence.  In many 
instances, either no evidence was cited at all, or the evidence cited was not available to anyone except 
the administering authority.  As the United States ha d stated the previous year, conclusory statements 
without evidentiary support did not constitute positive evidence.  In particular, details of the factual 
basis and reasoning supporting the investigating authority's decisions, as well as petitioners' 
allegations and briefs, had to  be made available to all interested parties.   
8. The United States again urged China to apply fair procedures to all parties to an investigation 
as envisioned by the Anti-dumping Agreement.  For inv estigations and reviews, this included, but was 
not limited to, timely access to administrators and fa vourable consideration of hearing requests, as 
embodied in Article 6.2 of the ADA.  The United States was concerned about continuing delays by 
MOFCOM in responding to requests to hold hear ings submitted by interested parties, as well as 
continued use of private meetings rather than hear ings open to all interested parties, as a principal 
means to obtain the views of parties.  The United St ates continued to urge that interested parties not 
present at such private meetings be quickly inform ed of matters discussed at such meetings in 
accordance with Article 6.3 of the ADA.   
9. As China's anti-dumping regime grew out of its  infancy, new concerns were surfacing with 
regard to how China's customs authorities were collecting anti-dumping duties.  Until that point, 
virtually all attention appeared to have been focused  on the investigative proces s.  However, even the 
most objective and transparent investigation could be undermined by poor interaction between the 
administering authority and the customs authorities who assessed the anti-dumping duties at the border.  In a growing number of cases, the US Government had received reports from responding 
parties of Chinese customs authorities either assessing anti-dumping duties on merchandise not 
subject to the measure, or imposing seemingly unreas onable burdens of proof be fore allowing entry of 
non-subject merchandise.  This situation was exacerbat ed by the apparent lack of uniform procedures 
for importers to resolve disputes when faced with such circumstances.  The United States urged China 
to put in place such procedures, as well as to refine the process by which MOFCOM informed 
Chinese customs officials, at China's ports, as to the precise merchandise subject to each anti-dumping 
measure and the anti-dumping duty rates applicable  to each importer.  The United States called to 
China's attention in this regard Article 5.9 of the ADA which provides that anti-dumping proceedings 
shall not hinder customs clearance.   
10. The previous year, the United States had noted th at China did not appear to have notified all 
relevant legislation to the Committee and in particul ar had asked China to clarify which rules applied G/ADP/14 
Page 4  
 
 to its prosecution of anti-dumping actions.  The same  problem still persisted.  Key pieces of China's 
legislation still appeared not to have been notified to the Committee, leaving considerable uncertainty 
as to the rules being used by China to conduct its  anti-dumping actions.  Such lapses in notification 
only served to compound the concerns about implem entation.  The United States urged China to 
clarify in detail to the Committee the full set of ru les, regulations and laws that governed its anti-
dumping regime. 
11. In conclusion, the United States recognized the efforts China had made to develop a legal 
framework for its anti-dumping regime that took in to account the principles of transparency of the 
Anti-dumping Agreement.  With much of that frame work now in place, China needed to focus its 
efforts on conducting its anti-dumping actions in a ma nner consistent with th at framework, and in 
conformity with WTO rules.  The United States l ooked forward to seeing substantial improvements in 
the very near future and offered its assist ance to China in pursuit of that goal. 
12. The Chair
 noted that written questions from the United States had been circulated in 
document G/ADP/W/446, and offered the floor to China to respond.   
13. The delegate of China  noted that the Chair had requested China to respond first to questions 
posed by the United States, but indi cated that in its preparation of responses to all questions submitted 
by Members, China had categorized the questions , and therefore preferred to respond to all the 
questions that had been raised.   
14. Concerning the opening remarks of the US delegation, China did not share the view that 
China's implementation of the Anti-dumping Agreemen t, and the practices of the Chinese authorities, 
were inconsistent with the Agreement.  China ha d taken note of the comments made, but certainly did 
not agree with those points of view.  From the deta iled responses to the questions posed by Members, 
which China was about to present, the Committee woul d recognize that China had been abiding by the 
rules of the ADA sincerely and faithfully. 
15. Turning to the answers to all of the questions  raised by Members prior to the meeting, 
including the questions by the US delegation, the de legate of China noted first, that in terms of 
notification of the anti-dumping-related regulations of China, China had notified to the Committee, in 
document G/ADP/N/1/CHN/2/Suppl.3, the regulations  of the People's Republic of China on anti-
dumping which regulated the work of the genera l administration of customs on anti-dumping duty 
collection and, in document G/ADP/N/1/CHN/2/Suppl.1, the provisional rules on access to non-confidential information of anti-dumping inv estigations.  Concerning the administrative 
reconsideration law and the implementati on measures of MOFCOM on administrative 
reconsideration, these did not provide specific procedures for initiation and investigation of anti-
dumping cases but rather regulated the procedures of  administrative reconsideration on all kinds of 
administrative acts generally, and China considered that Article 16.5 of the Agreement did not apply 
to them.  Concerning the rules of the Supreme People' s Court on certain issues related to application 
of law in hearings of anti-dumping and administra tive cases, coordination was still ongoing with the 
judicial branch to prepare the English version for notification.   
16. The second issue was about information disclosure.   According to regulations of the People's 
Republic of China on anti-dumping, and provisions  on the anti-dumping investigation of industry 
injury, in any investigation of injury and causa lity, the authority disclosed the essential facts under 
consideration which formed the basis for the decisi on, as stated in Article 6.9 of the Anti-dumping 
Agreement, to interested parties or their attorney s in writing before the final determination.  The 
interested parties could submit comments in writing to  the authority within 10 days from the date of 
information disclosure and the authority accepted a nd gave full considerations to the comments 
submitted.  According to China's knowledge, not all investigating authorities of WTO Members 
disclosed information in strict consistency with Article 6.9 as China did.    G/ADP/14 
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 17. The third issue was confidentiality, in which re gard China referred Members to Article 22 of 
the regulation of the People's Republic of China on anti-dumping, which well safeguarded the business secrets in interested parties' submissions .  In practice, confidentiality applications from 
interested parties had been given serious considerat ion by the authority of China.  While protecting 
the confidential information of the interested partie s, according to China's relevant regulations and 
WTO rules, the investigating authority required the interested parties, incl uding both the domestic 
applicants and the responding parties, to provide  non-confidential summaries according to Article 6.5 
of the Anti-dumping Agreement.  After necessary ex amination, the authority sent these summaries to 
the anti-dumping non-confidential information unit w ithin 10 working days from the day they were 
received.  Therefore, the authority had alread y established a complete and competent injury 
information system with easy access to the non-confid ential summaries for the interested parties.   
18. Fourth, with regard to the situation when not all information requested was provided by 
interested parties, China understood that responding  companies might not be in the position to answer 
all questions in a questionnaire, and therefore took this situation into consideration when making 
determinations.  The partial questionnaire repli es would be partially accepted on the condition that 
they were partially qualified.  The Chinese author ity would disregard a questionnaire reply and use 
the facts available only on occasions when the interest ed parties provided false information or did not 
provide necessary information within a reasonable period of time, or significantly impeded the 
investigation.  In these situations , the Chinese authority would inform the relevant interested parties 
and provide a written explanation as to why their replies were excluded.  Even with the best 
information available, the Chinese authority woul d determine the case in strict accordance with the 
relevant regulations of China and the WTO rules, including the Agreement's Annexes. 
19. Concerning the questions on the injury investig ation, when examining the causal link between 
dumped imports and material injury in anti-dumping cases, the Chinese investigating authority analysed factors other than dumped imports that might injure the domestic industry, according to China's relevant regulations and WTO rules.  Th ese other factors included domestic market demand 
of the like product, changes in the patterns of consumption, management of domestic businesses, 
effects of trade policy, the competition environmen t, development of new technology, exports of 
domestic like products, the volumes and pr ices of imports from other countries, force majeure , etc.  
All the analysis and conclusions were demons trated in detail in the determinations.   
20. In an injury investigation, the authority firs t examined whether an industry was injured and 
then considered whether it was injured by dumpe d imports or by any other possible reasons.  
Comments on causality or other topics from interested  parties were fully considered.  According to 
the relevant WTO requirements, China understood that  an affirmative finding of causal link could be 
made when dumped imports were just one of the reas ons which led to injury.  If industry injury was 
caused only by other factors than the dumped imports, a negative finding would be made.  As for the technical aspects, the practices of the Chinese authority  were strictly consistent with the WTO rules, 
and while some other Members held different opini ons, many issues were still being discussed in the 
rules negotiations.  China was curious to know the views and practices on the above issues of the 
Member that posed the question.   
21. The second aspect in terms of injury investiga tion was on the public notices.  Public notices 
of both preliminary and final determinations issu ed by the investigating authority incorporated 
detailed information on findings of industry injury including procedures of investigation, facts and 
regulations on which the findings were based, and e xplanations of the final conclusions.  The public 
notices including all the information disclosure made by the Chinese authority were very detailed and 
accurate.  This had been well acknowledged by WTO Members.  However, China had also received 
reports from its interested parties that some WT O Members' public notices only consisted of three 
pages of information.   G/ADP/14 
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 22. The third aspect in injury investigations was the consideration of market share.  Pursuant to 
Chinese regulations and WTO rules, the Chinese injury investigating au thority analysed all relevant 
factors that reflected the impact of dumping on the industry, including market share, when evaluating 
the impact of the imported products' increasing volum e.  In addition to the market share, when 
determining whether a domestic injury was injured, the authority also analysed apparent consumption 
as well as other factors of importe d products and domestic lik e products in the domestic market.  With 
regard to price suppression and price depression, Ch ina had some confusion over the question posed 
by the Member.  However, pursuant to Article 3.2 of the Agreement, the Chinese investigating 
authority held the view that price suppression referred to prices of the imported products preventing domestic price increases which otherwise should have  occurred to a significant degree, and that price 
depression referred to prices of imports resulting in a significant decline in the price of the domestic 
like products. 
23. Concerning the question of the general administ ration of customs, and the implementation of 
anti-dumping measures, according to Chinese anti-dumping regulations, MOFCOM, as the investigating authority, would propose imposition of an anti-dumping duty to the State Council Tariff 
Commission, ("SCTC"), based on the dumping and injury determination.  The SCTC would make a 
decision on the basis of such a proposal.  MOFCOM  would publish these dete rminations and Customs 
would implement accordingly, from the effective date  set forth in the public notice.  In the process of 
implementation, Customs would also give a public notice about the procedure to collect anti-dumping 
duties.  Concerning the scope and tariff line of the product subject to the anti-dumping measure, MOFCOM, as the investigating authority, would contact Customs immediately after initiating an anti-
dumping case in order to make sure that the scope  of the subject product and the tariff line were 
accurate.  MOFCOM and Customs would consult wi th each other in case any problem emerged about 
implementation of the measures.  MOFCOM also would consult the SCTC about any questions on 
classification and identification of the subject products ' tariff lines.  In the process of implementation, 
the importer and exporter could claim to Customs through the local customs office, or to MOFCOM 
directly, if there were a dispute about implemen tation of anti-dumping measures, and Customs and 
MOFCOM would contact each other to solve the problem.   
24. Concerning "all other" rates, MOFCOM calculated such rates, and specific data, upon the best 
information available in an anti-dumping case.   
25. Concerning initiation of investiga tions or reviews, the Chinese authority carefully examined 
the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provide d in the applications lodged by the domestic 
industry, in full compliance with the provisions of  the anti-dumping legislations and the Agreement, 
when initiating investigations and reviews of anti- dumping cases.  A case or a review would only be 
initiated when a petition being considered cont ained positive evidence and clear reasons.  The 
authority would not take the data into consideration during the initiation if they were not related to the 
case or to the subject product directly. 
26. Concerning administrative reconsideration and j udicial review of anti-dumping investigations, 
there was one case of administrative reconsideration on an anti-dumping investigation, and the administrative reconsideration decision as well as the customs data and other relevant evidence were 
delivered to the interested parties.  To date, th ere had been no judicial review of any anti-dumping 
measures.  
27. The Chair
 thanked the delegate of China, and opened  the floor for any additional or follow-up 
questions, or other comments.  
28. The delegate of the European Communities  thanked China for its attempt to reply to the EC’s 
questions, noting that he used the term “attempt” deli berately.  First, the EC had seen a similar series 
of events already in the previous TRM and the EC  was most unhappy about the way its questions had  G/ADP/14 
 Page 7 
 
 
 been replied to.  The EC had posed very clear a nd precise questions, other Members had done so as 
well, and, although there was a little bit of overlap , the questions which had been posed by three 
Members were quite different.  But what the EC had received was not a reply to its precise and clear questions but a sort of wholesale attempt to dispo se of these different questions altogether in one 
general reply.  The EC clearly thought that this was not appropriate.  This was the first point as far as 
the form of these replies was concerned.  Moving to the second point, the content of the replies, 
listening to the delegate of Chin a could give the impression that China was one of the best possible 
anti-dumping worlds.  Unfortunately, the reality seemed to be somewhat different.  The EC delegate’s 
instructions indicated that there was, for exam ple, a case where no disclosure had been given on 
injury and causal link, contrary to what the Ch inese delegate had said, which was that disclosure 
normally would cover causal link and injury.  His inst ructions also indicated that there were indeed 
problems with confidentiality.  The EC knew of on e example where a respondent had been required to 
put in the non-confidential summary the minimum price for the purposes of an undertaking.  This was tantamount to allowing the domestic industry to set up a cartel, because once it knew the price at which the respondent could deliver to China, the indu stry could easily undercut that price, and on this 
basis drive the respondent out of the Chinese market. 
29. Third, China had mentioned that it would resp ect the provisions of questionnaire replies.  
However, the EC question was wider, expressing co ncerns about information requests which seemed 
to be far-reaching.  Indeed, the problematic information requests not  only appeared in questionnaires 
but also during on-the-spot investigations.  There again, EC exporters had been confronted, in some cases, with excessive information requests, and t hus far no reply had been provided to the EC’s 
questions concerning these information requests. 
30. Finally, the EC took issue with one point made by China concerning the examination of 
"other factors".  From listening to the reply, it did not seem to be in line with the standard required under the Agreement, that the various causes of injury must be separated and distinguished. 
31. The delegate of Japan
 thanked China for the detailed explanation, and appreciated the steady 
improvement in the anti-dumping rules and practice of the People's Republic of China.  Members' 
common objective of the Transitional Review Mech anism was to share understanding of the efforts 
made by China heading to the complete compliance with the Anti-dumping Agreement.  To make this 
discussion more clear and effective, Japan had submitted written questions, as the EC had done.  
Japan's questions were in response to the statemen t by China the previous year that Members should 
make comments based on solid evidence and facts of  individual cases, as referred to in the meeting 
minutes, G/ADP/M/27, paragraph 81.  Japan requested that China also circulate its response in some 
written form.  
32. The delegate of the United States  agreed with Japan that it would be very helpful indeed if 
China's answers were circulated in written form. 
33. The delegate of China  stated that in his view the responses provided by his delegation during 
the meeting had fully clarified and explained the qu estions raised by Members.  Chinese investigating 
authorities investigated and made determinations on anti-dumping, inju ry to the industry and causality 
pursuant to a comprehensive and objective analysis  of the facts in a manner that was strictly 
consistent with China's re levant regulations a nd WTO rules.  The relevant legislation of China and the 
authorities' practices secured sufficient and transpar ent access in different stages of the investigation 
process for interested parties to convey their comment s to and seek explanations from the authorities.   
34. Anti-dumping procedures and practices were very complicated issues and it was not difficult 
for anyone just to pick out a specific aspect of  procedure and practice and elaborate on the argument 
that these did not live up to the requirements of th e Agreement.  In the morning session, Members had 
heard about a specific case raised by the Japanese de legation, with a request for explanation from the G/ADP/14 
Page 8  
 
 US delegation, also on a consistency issue.  It s eemed that no definite answer had been provided.  
Therefore, from China's point of view, the approach  of criticising another Member was not the right 
approach within the Committee.  All Members faced the challenge of improving their practices with regard to anti-dumping to reflect the spirit of th e Agreement.  China therefore did not accept the 
points particularly raised in the opening statemen t of the US delegation because, for example, on the 
point that public hearings were replaced by privat e meetings, the fact was that in China's practice, 
public hearings were held as long as interested part ies so requested.  Some of the specific private 
meetings in reality had been held at the request of the US Embassy in China.  China wanted to 
exchange views with Members on anti-dumping prac tices and procedures, which was helpful not only 
for China but also for all Members.  In this  respect, however, China did not accept a criticising 
approach. 
35. The delegate of Japan
 stated that he did not want to criticise China, and asked China to repeat 
its response with regard to Japan's first question, concerning initiation of investigations or reviews.  
36. The delegate of China  noted a point which had been very clear, that in all the Transitional 
Review Mechanism, the Chinese delegation was not in a position to provide written responses.  This 
was a known position.   
37. The answer to the first question of the Japanese delegation, on the initiation of investigations 
or reviews of anti-dumping investigations, was th at Chinese authorities carefully examined the 
accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in th e applications lodged by the domestic industries, 
in full compliance with the provisions of domestic anti-dumping legislation and the Anti-dumping Agreement, when initiating investigations or re views of anti-dumping cases.  A case or a review 
would only be initiated when a petition being cons idered contained positive evidence and clear 
reasons, whereas if the data were not related to th e case or the subject product directly, the authority 
would not take them into consideration during the initiation of the case or review. 
38. The delegate of Japan
 thanked China for the response and reiterated its request for a written 
reply to Japan's written questions concerning three specific cases.  
39. The Chair  thanked all delegations for their partic ipation in the exchange, and especially 
thanked the delegation of China for its preparation and for the information a nd answers provided.  She 
equally thanked those Members that had undertaken to submit written questions and to participate in 
the discussion.   
40. Concerning the required report to the Council for Trade in Goods concerning this Transitional 
Review, the Chair noted that there were no guidelin es for the report contained in the Protocol, and 
recalled that previously the Committee Chair, acting on his or her own responsibility, had prepared a 
brief, factual report, with references to the doc uments concerned, and a ttaching the portion of the 
minutes of the meeting which related to the Tran sitional Review.  She suggested proceeding on the 
same basis for the 2005 report.   
41. The Committee so  decided. 
__________