WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/AFT/W/8 
4 May 2006 
 (06-2155) 
Aid for Trade Task Force Original:   English 
  
 
COMMUNICATION FROM MAURITIUS ON BEHALF OF THE ACP GROUP 
  
 The following communication, dated 2 May 2006, is being circulated to the Aid for Trade 
Task Force at the request of the Delegati on of Mauritius on behalf of the ACP Group. 
_______________ 
 
ACP CONCEPT PAPER ON AID FOR TRADE 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Ministers agreed in paragraph 57 of the WT O Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration that "Aid 
for Trade  should aim to help developing countries, pa rticularly LDCs, to build the supply-side 
capacity and trade-related infrastructure that they need to assist them to implement and benefit from 
WTO Agreements and more broadly to expand their trade".  
2. This note addresses a number of operational issues concerning aid-for-trade (AfT)  and 
recommends some options for the architecture of  aid for trade in the context of the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA).   
3. Key issues include:   
• What type of support is needed and what should AfT cover?  
• Assessment of country-specific needs. 
• Nature of AfT financial support. 
• How additional financial resources can be mobilized. 
• Duration and sustainability of AfT funding. 
• Monitoring and governance of AfT. 
• Predictability of resources and the status of AfT in DDA "single undertaking". 
 
4. In the context of the operationalization of Aid fo r Trade, it is recognized that Aid for Trade is 
a subset of Aid for Development.  Both need to be demand driven.  In  addressing Aid for Trade, the 
ACP Group is not seeking to compromise in any way the provision of resources for demand driven development needs that may need to be addressed within the wider context of aid for development, 
and for which adequate and increased fu nding should be made available.   
II. WHAT TYPE OF SUPPORT IS NEEDED AND WHAT SHOULD AID FOR TRADE 
(AFT) COVER? 
5. While there is a general and long-term need  to assist low income and vulnerable developing 
countries to expand their trade from current relatively low absolute levels, there is also an important 
and immediate need  to assist them, particularly those alr eady actively engaged in and dependent on 
international trade (e.g., as measured by the share of  exports in GDP), to avoid or cope with potential 
economic losses, associated with their limited supply- side capacities to adjust rapidly and beneficially 
to policy-induced changes, ar ising from WTO Agreements.   WT/AFT/W/8 
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  6. To be relevant and effective, aid for trade in  the context of the DDA will need to build on the 
experience at both the national and multilateral leve ls in providing support for trade-related economic 
adjustments, technical assistance and supply-side capacity building.  The experience to date has 
identified a number of areas where existing support is inadequate and more is critically needed, 
particularly at the multilateral level.  These need s can be briefly summarized, in outline form, as 
follows. 
A. D
EALING WITH TRADE -RELATED ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTS :  ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE  
7. To help cover the adjustment costs, partic ularly the social and economic consequences 
(costs), arising from the implementation of WTO agreements and the associ ated changes in the 
international trade regime (e.g., DDA negotiated ch anges to multilateral trade rules and market access 
conditions);  in particular, those relating to:   
• Preference erosion.1 
• End of textiles and clothing quotas.2 
• Loss of tariff revenues.3 
• Rising food prices following reform of agricultural subsidies.4 
• Export earnings shortfalls.5 
• Social costs6 - loss of jobs/livelihood activities due to  contraction of import-competing sectors 
and/or export sectors faced with loss of trad e preferences, including end of textiles and 
clothing quotas.   
 
                                                      
1 IMF estimates indicate that the potential aggregat e export revenue loss for LDCs arising from a 
40 per cent cut in the MFN tariffs of Quad countries would be around US$530 million per year and around US$914 million for middle-income developing countries.  Countries dependent on trade preferences in sugar, 
bananas, beef and textiles and clothing would be the hard est hit.  For example, see:  IMF, Financing of Losses 
from Preference Erosion, Note on Issues raised by Developing Countries in the Doha Round. Communication to the WTO from the International Monetary Fund, WT/TF/COH/14, 14 February 2003;  and, K. Alexandraki and 
H.P. Lankes, Estimating the Impact of Preference Erosion on Middle-Income Countries, IMF Working Paper, 
2004. 
2 The system of quotas that had regulated imports of textiles and clothing into developed countries for 
30 years, and from which some developing countries had benefited, was formally ended on 1 January 2005. 
3 IMF estimates indicate that low-income countries would be able to offset, with alternative sources of 
revenue, on average no more than 30 per cent of reductions  in their trade tax revenues. For example, see:  
T. Baunsgaard and M. Keen, Tax Revenue and (or?) Trade Liberalization, IMF Working Paper, 2005. 
4 World Bank estimates indicate that the magnitude of the likely losses of net food importing 
developing countries is between US$300 to US$1.2 billi on per year depending on the final DDA agreement.  
For example, see:  D. Mitchell and M. Hoppe, From Marrakesh to Doha:  Effects of Removing Food Subsidies on the Poor, chapter 29 in R. Newfarmer, ed., Trade, Doha and Development:  A Window into the Issues, World 
Bank, 2005. 
5 Many LDCs and low-income countries rely on a few commodities (e.g., tropical beverages and raw 
materials) whose real prices have experienced not only the sharpest l ong-term declines of all agricultural 
commodities but also the highest variability from trend levels .  A loss of trade preferences combined with a shift 
to a more competitive multilateral trading environment is  likely to further increase the dependence of these 
countries on those commodities for their export earnings as they find it more difficult to compete and diversify 
into other products.  Already, whereas more advanced and better off developing countries have been able to 
reduce the share of tropical beverages and raw materials in their agricultural exports (from 55 per cent in the 
early 1960s to around 30 per cent in 1999-2001), during the same period LDCs have actually increased their 
dependence of these products (from 59 per cent of their agri cultural export earnings to 72 per cent).  See FAO, 
The State of Agricultural Commodity Market 2004. 
6 See for example, Santiago Fernán dez de Cordoba et al, "Adjustmen t costs and trade liberalization" 
UNCTAD, 2005, and OECD, Trade and Structural Adjustment, OECD, Paris, 2004.    WT/AFT/W/8 
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8. While on the one hand, the impact of implem enting WTO agreements may mean a reduction 
in both export (foreign exchange) earnings and fi scal revenues for countries dependent on preferences 
for their exports and tariffs as a revenue base, at the same time, on the other hand, such countries may 
be obliged to increase public expenditures (e.g., on social safety net programmes, retraining of 
workers, provision of technical and financial assistance in support of alternative livelihood and/or 
export activities, etc.) to deal with the economic and so cial costs of trade adjustment.  In this context, 
external support (fiscal/budget support)  would be crucial to sustain a country's foreign exchange 
reserves and allow it to spend more on dealing with the social and economic costs of trade 
adjustments without increasing unsustainably govern ment borrowings and thereby contributing to 
macroeconomic instability. 
B. COMPLIANCE WITH COMMITMENTS , RULES AND STANDARDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
TRADING SYSTEM (ITS) 
9. Institutional and technical support to facilitate  the implementation of the DDA agreements, 
and to adapt to and comply with the standards and re gulations of the ITS and thereby be better able to 
take advantage of trading opportunities.   
10. Costs include those relating to:   
• putting in place domestic regulatory mechanis ms and institutional frameworks to support 
services liberalization.7  
• putting in place standard setting institutions, certification agencies, testing laboratories.8  
• complying with TRIPS, etc. 
                                                      
7 Improved regulatory systems – ranging from prudential regulation in financial services to pro-
competitive regulation in a variety of network-based services  – is critical for realizing the benefits of services 
liberalization in many sectors.  However, these may be costly to set up.  "For example, even a bare-bones 
telecommunication regulatory authority is likely to cost around $2 million each year, or 5 per cent of the 
government budget in a country like Dominica".  See, Aaditya Mattoo, "S ervices in a Development Round:  
Proposals for overcoming Inertia", chapter 13 in R. Newfarmer, ed., Trade, Doha and Development:  A Window into the Issues, World Bank, 2005.   
8 The number of standards with which products must  comply (in their design, size, weight, traceability, 
safety, energy and environmental performance, inter-oper ability, material and even process of production) to be 
traded internationally is quite large.  The Internati onal Organization for Standardization (ISO) has published 
around 14,900 international standards.  In addition to  the public expenditures required to provide national 
laboratories and skilled technicians for testing and cer tification, a significant portion of meeting the cost of 
standards has also to be borne by firms in developing countries.  The incremental production costs for firms in 
developing nations in conforming to standards imposed by major importing countries are estimated by the 
World Bank to be fixed costs of ap proximately $425,000 per firm, or abou t 4.7 per cent of value added on 
average, and variable production costs of between 0.06 and 0.13 per cent for every 1 per cent increase in 
investment to meet compliance requirements (see, Keith E. Maskus, Tsunehiro Otsuki and John S. Wilson, "The 
Cost of Compliance with Product Standards for Firms in Developing Countries:  An Econometric Study", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3590, May 2005).  However, there is considerable variation in costs 
across countries depending on country situations and the pr oduct.  For example, after repeated quality and safety 
detentions of Bangladesh shrimp exports entering the United States and a ban in 1997 on shrimp imports to the 
European Union, Bangladesh had to make major investments to upgrade fish processing facilities, product 
testing laboratories, and other areas.  The total cost is  estimated to have been around US$18 million, with the 
subsequent annual costs of maintaining the established fo od-safety controls at around US$2.4 million.  In the 
case of Nicaragua, because many Nicaraguan shrimp fact ories were relatively new and modern, more modest 
incremental investments were needed to comply with modified US fish safety regulations.  These were estimated to have cost US$560,000, with annual maintenance costs of about US$290,000.  (See Food Safety and 
Agricultural Health Standards:  Challenges and Opportunities for Developing Country Exports, World Bank 
Report No. 31207, January 2005).  The value of the agro-food exports of developing countries rejected at the border in rich countries for failure to meet SPS standard s is estimated to have been  $1.8 billion in 2000-01, a 
fraction of the potential trade discouraged by inability to meet standards.   WT/AFT/W/8 
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C. T
RADE -RELATED INFRASTRUCTURE  
• Physical infrastructure – (e.g., roads, ports , telecommunication, energy and electricity, 
transport systems, water supply and sanitation, etc.);  and  
• Trade support institutions – (e.g., customs, trade finance, marketing and distribution facilities, 
etc).   
 
11. Inadequacies in roads, railway networks, ports, power supply, telecommunications, water 
supply and irrigation facilities and tr ade-related institutions saddle expor ters in developing countries 
with higher costs for electricity, transport, te lecommunication, and other inputs than elsewhere, 
putting those exporters at a competitive disadvantage in reaching and supplying global markets.  The 
trade-related infrastructural needs of developing co untries are not only national.  In some cases (e.g., 
landlocked countries), the key trade-related infrastru ctural problems relate to cross-country and 
regional impediments to trade development, su ch as regional transport corridors, cross border 
transit/storage facilities, disease and pest control f acilities, etc.  While the physical infrastructure 
needs of developing countries are often multi-functional, infrastructural investments at the country and regional/sub regional levels s hould be properly sequenced in orde r to ensure that trade-related 
infrastructural bottlenecks are dealt with expeditiously.
9   
D. SUPPLY -SIDE CAPACITY BUILDING  
12. Particularly for countries facing the risk of ma rginalization in world trade despite enhanced 
market access, as well as those countries likely to experience cont raction of major national export 
sectors due to preference erosion and the end of MFA quotas.   
13. Targeted support would be needed at the enterp rise and producer levels (i) to enhance export-
production capabilities and competitiveness in commod ities, manufactures and services sectors with a 
strong national potential, including through divers ification (vertically and horizontally) into 
alternative and dynamic exports, as well as (ii) to facilitate entry into new markets (market 
diversification) and beneficial par ticipation in global supply chains.10   
14. Support would need to cover, inter alia , incentives for investments in new activities (e.g., 
through finance, credit subsidies, reduction of input costs in start-up phases, etc.), extension services 
and technology facilitation to boost productivity, export marketing facilitation (including export 
promotional activities, joint ventures with firms in  importing countries and logistics), formation of 
producers associations and cooperatives for informati on sharing on best practices for success in the 
particular sectors, for input procurement and for output marketing, etc.11 
                                                      
9 See for example, OECD, "Role of Infrastructure in Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction –  
Lessons Learned from PRSPs of 33 countries" (October 2004), and World Bank, "Infrastructure and the World 
Bank:  A Progress Report" (September 2005). 
10 The two key pillars of supply-side capacity are efficiency in production and efficiency in marketing 
and distribution (i.e. the whole logistical chain – including adapting, conditioning, packaging, labelling, 
transporting, etc. – of getting goods from the point of production to the point of sale).  The enhancement of 
efficiencies in both these pillars requires both public a nd private investments:  public investments in institutions 
and infrastructures and the creation of a business en vironment in which private productive initiatives can 
flourish, and the means for private individuals to in vest in productive activities, accumulate know-how and 
financial capital.  The producer or enterprise is the ultimate locus of effi ciency enhancements.   
11 For further discussion, see for example, OECD, "Supporting Private Sector and Trade Development: 
Lessons Learned from Experiences", prepar ed by Chimère Diop (January 2004).   WT/AFT/W/8 
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III. ASSESSMENT OF COUNTRY-SPECIFIC NEEDS 
15. Given the wide variation in country situations  with respect to export-production (supply-side) 
capabilities, and trade-related infrastructure (i.e . administrative, institutional and physical 
infrastructure), a country-specific approach to needs assessment  will be necessary in order to 
identify both the priority needs of individual c ountries and the additional assistance required in each 
case.  Accordingly, the process for the identification of country-specific needs should involve (i) a 
diagnostic study  at the national level (undertaken by th e country with the assistance of WTO and 
other relevant agencies) and (ii) an inter-agency technical review  (see also section VII below) of the 
country's trade-related needs and gaps in its trad e-related assistance.  The whole process, however, 
should be country demand driven. 
IV. NATURE OF AFT FINANCIAL SUPPORT 
16. In order to avoid an increase in the debt burde n of developing countries, particularly LDCs 
and other vulnerable developing countries, aid -for-trade financial s upport should be provided 
primarily in the form of grants.  However, for cer tain physical infrastructure development which may 
be particularly high cost such as major roads, por ts, power supply systems and so on, these could be 
co-financed with long-term concessional loans fro m other multilateral financial institutions (e.g., 
regional development banks and the World Bank).  Su ch loans should be on  terms no less favourable 
than those of IDA or IFAD.  
17. While needs are likely to vary from country to co untry, as well as their costs, a target for the 
grant element should be up to $100 million per country.12  Support to a country in excess of the grant 
element could take the form of concessional loans and/or additional discretionary bilateral grant 
support.13 
V. MOBILIZING ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
18. As the experience of implementing Uruguay Ro und commitments on trade-related technical 
assistance and capacity building, as well as that relati ng to the Integrated Framework (IF), has shown, 
reliance on "best endeavour" commitments, ad hoc  donor conferences and the possibility of loans 
from the international financial institutions has not guaranteed secure, predictable and additional 
funding being forthcoming beyond those of the mult ilateral trade capacity building (TCB) trust funds.  
Accordingly, there may be a need to "multilaterali ze" in some fashion, fo r example through existing 
multilateral TCB Trust Funds (such as the IF), all or  part (say, up to two-thirds) of the additional 
resources (multi-year pledges) bilateral donors indi cated in Hong Kong they are prepared to commit 
to aid for trade.14  For example, if only 20 per cent of those resources were multilateralized, this 
                                                      
12 Estimates based on existing programmes of technical assistance for trade development and World 
Bank lending (which reflects borrowing capacity rather  than the full spectrum of needs) for trade capacity 
building and supply-side issues, suggest requirements – not including infrastructure and adjustment costs – of 
$45-$95 million per country over 10 years.  See, IMF/World Bank, "Doha Development Agenda and Aid for Trade", September 2005.  
13 The funding practices of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) provide a useful model in this 
regard.  In addition to GEF grant funds, sources of co-finance for GEF projects in clude (i) an implementing 
agency's own co-finance, (ii) a recipi ent Government's co-finance and (iii) contributions mobilized for a project 
from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector and beneficiaries. 
14 In Hong Kong, Japan announced spending on trade, production and distribution infrastructure of 
$10 billion over three years, the US announced Aid-for-Trad e grants of $2.7 billion a year by 2010, and the EU 
and its member States announced trade-related spending of €2 billion per year (up by 600 million) by 2010.  
Calculations on which G-7 Finance Ministers based their statement of support in early-December 2005 involved 
doubling Aid-for-Trade by 2010 to $12 billion a year, wi th an additional $2 billion a year for "trade policy, 
regulation and development" (policy formulation, implementing trade agreements, export promotion, and 
standards) and an additional $4 billion a year  for supply-side capacity and infrastructure. WT/AFT/W/8 
Page 6  
 
  would imply approximately a $3 billion increase in the resources of existing multilateral TCB Trust 
Funds.  
VI. DURATION AND SUSTAINABILITY OF AFT FUNDING 
19. As it is unlikely that the supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure needs of all 
developing countries, in particular LDCs, c ould be adequately addressed through a one-off 
intervention, it is necessary to envisage funding of multi-year projects.  Accordingly, procedures will 
need to be agreed for the periodic replenishment of AfT funding.   
20. In this connection, it is proposed that AfT f unding pledges be deliverable within a time-bound 
schedule coinciding with an agreed transitional pe riod (e.g., the implementation period of WTO and 
DDA commitments by developing countries and LDCs).   For example, AfT funding cycles could run 
for three years with the first starting 1 January 2007 and ending 1 January 2010.  Thereafter, 
replenishments could take place every 3 years until at least the end of the implementation period for LDCs.  The target for AfT resources channelled through existing multilateral TCB Trust Funds should 
be at least $3 billion for the first three years.
15 
VII. MONITORING AND GOVERNANCE OF AFT  
21. In addition to multilateral channe ls, it is likely that AfT will al so be supplied through bilateral 
channels.  However, as far as the WTO is concer ned, the General Council and its subsidiary bodies 
(e.g., the Committee on Trade and Development)  should have the overall responsibility for 
monitoring the flow of AfT and ensuring its cohe rence with WTO objectives for AfT.  The Joint 
WTO/OECD Database on TRTA/CB would be a useful  overall monitoring tool.  However, there may 
be a need for an ad hoc  working party to oversee the collection and processing of information 
notified. 
22. The governance of multilateral mechanisms for providing AfT, such as the multilateral TCB 
Trust Funds, should be based on an agreed administ rative framework as well as  on agreed principles 
for the management and allocation of funds.  As noted earlier, the needs of each eligible member 
should be demand-driven and determined on the basi s of a country-specific diagnostic study presented 
by its government and reviewed technically (with a focus on gaps in trade-related assistance) by an 
inter-agency advisory group.  Funds should be al located with priority to LDCs and other more 
vulnerable WTO Members (e.g., SVEs) with a high risk  of being adversely and seriously affected by 
adjustment costs and further trade marginalization.  As a general principle, additional criteria for AfT 
allocation, if necessary, should be limited only to th ose that would ensure the use of the funds for the 
purpose for which they were given.   
                                                      
15 The Global Environment Facility (GEF) provides grants to developing countries for projects that 
benefit the global environment and promote sustainable livelihoods in local communities. 
The GEF is funded by donor countries who commit money every four years through a process called 
the "GEF Replenishment".  In 1994, 34 countries pledge d $2 billion to fund the first GEF Replenishment.  At 
the second GEF Replenishment in 1998, 36 nations committed $2.75 billion.  In 2002, 32 donor countries 
pledged $3 billion to the third GEF Replenishment, whic h is funding operations between 2002 and June 2006. 
The 32 donor nations that pledged contributions to the third GEF Replenishment are:  Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Czech  Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, 
Pakistan, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain,  Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.  
Since its inception in 1991, the GEF has provided $5.7 billion in grants and has leveraged an additional 
$18.8 billion in co-financing from partners, including international organizations, the private sector, 
nongovernmental organizations, and developing-country governments for projects in developing countries and 
countries with economies in transition.    WT/AFT/W/8 
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23. As regards the administrative framework of the multilateral mechanisms for providing AfT, 
the model of the IF appears to be a good one with respect to the governance structure, the involvement 
of relevant agencies and the management of the fund.16  Alternatively, it might be more effective to 
consolidate the existing multilateral TCB Trust Funds under an umbrella multilateral trust fund 
framework, with scaled up resources as indicated in section D above, that would address (e.g., 
through separate "windows") the four categories of  trade-related assistance needs identified in 
section II above.  In this scenario, the resource mob ilization, allocation and governance architecture of 
such a consolidated framework for multilateral TC B trust funds could be modelled on that of the 
Global Environment Facility.17 However, the practice of the IF could be followed with UNDP 
retained as Trustee.   
VIII.  PREDICTABILITY OF AFT RESOURCES AND THE STATUS OF AFT IN DDA 
"SINGLE UNDERTAKING" OUTCOME  
24. In view of paragraph 57 of the Hong Kong Mini sterial Declaration, an agreement on AfT will 
be part of the outcome of the Round.  This will be consistent with giving substance to the specific 
commitments, and the understanding contained in pa ragraphs 2 and 41, of the Doha Declaration on 
the important role of "sustainably financed tec hnical assistance and capacity building programmes" to 
the development dimension of the DDA.  However, the extent to which commitments on AfT will be 
meaningful and binding (i.e. more than of a "best  endeavour" nature) will depend largely on the 
details and the precision in any agreement on AfT as to what will be done, by whom, how and when.   
25. In this context, it would be desirable to secure agreement on clear multi-year commitments, 
for example, through pledges to be made prior to the conclusion of the negotiations and that would be 
referred to in the final WTO ministerial declaratio n on the DDA.  In addition, it would be desirable 
that the pledges provide for a substantial "down pa yment" or "front-loading" of overall pledged aid-
for-trade resources (e.g., at least one-third) in the fi rst year of the implementation period (e.g., through 
transfers to multilateral TCB trust funds, say be fore the end of 2007).  This would avoid the 
uncertainty associated with a "back-loading" of commitments on funds as implicit in some of the 
promises made to date, including in Hong Kong.   
                                                      
16 In particular, UNDP is the Trustee of IF funds,  rather than one of the Bretton Woods financial 
institutions, which avoids the introduction of those institutions' conditionalities in this context.  
17 The GEF is the designated financial mechanism  for four international conventions (i.e. on Biological 
Diversity, Climate Change, Persistent organic Pollutants and Desertification) which helps developing countries fund projects and programmes to meet the objectives of the conventions and address global environmental and 
sustainable development issues.  See, the Instrument for the Establishmen t of the Restructured Global 
Environment Facility which was adopted in 1994 and describes the governance, operational, financial and 
administrative oversight procedures for the GEF.   
 WT/AFT/W/8 
Page 8  
 
  ANNEX 
 
AID-FOR-TRADE  
CONCEPTUAL FINANCING ARCHITECTURE 
  
I. SOURCES OF AFT RESOURCES 
A. A
FT GRANT RESOURCES  
 
 
 
 
B. AFT CONCESSIONAL LOANS  
 
 Developing 
recipient 
countries Bilateral Donor 
Pledges 
International financial institutions 
(e.g., WB, IMF, RDBs) 
Developing 
recipient countries Bilateral creditors Existing multilateral TCB trust funds (e.g., IF, JITAP, STDF, WTO-GTF)  WT/AFT/W/8 
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II. ALLOCATION OF AFT RESOURCES 
A. G RANT RESOURCES  
 
 
 
 
    
 
     
 
    
 
 B. C
ONCESSIONAL AFT LOANS  
 
  
 
  
 
__________ Country requests for AfT funding 
 
(supported with facts, analyses  of needs and minimum efforts 
commitments in terms of existing national programmes or duly 
formulated and costed plans requiring additional funding) 
Verification of Needs 
Review Multilateral agencies Advisory Group 
(MAG) 
 
(e.g., UNCTAD, WTO, WB, IMF) 
Decision on Allocation 
to country  Financing Steering Group (FSG)  
(comprising grant providers – i.e., the 
multilateral TCB-TFs and bilateral donors – 
and members of MAG) 
Country Operational Programme 
 
(including detailed implementation work plans, disbursement schedules, 
monitoring & review, etc) developed 
and executed in collaboration with one 
or more implementing agencies Implementing agencies 
 
(members of MAG plus other competent specialized int'l agen cies - e.g., UNIDO, 
ITU, FAO, etc.) Countr y 
International financial institutions (WB,  IMF and RDBs) and bilateral creditors 
will, as far as possible, consider favourab ly the granting of concessional loans to 
AfT grant recipients to co-finance need ed projects for which grant resources are 
insufficient.