WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/RL/GEN/145 
22 March 2007 
 (07-1216) 
Negotiating Group on Rules Original:   English 
  
 
FISHERIES SUBSIDIES:  PROPOSED NEW DISCIPLINES 
 
Proposal from the United States
 
  
 
 The following communication, dated 21 March 2007, is being circulated at the request of the Delegation of the United States.  
_______________ 
 
 
Introduction 
 
1. Worldwide fishing capacity is substantially above sustainable levels, and many commercially 
significant fish populations face overexploitation or depletion.  A number of Members have 
experienced first-hand the social and economic conse quences that result when the level of exploitation 
tips over into overexploitation and leads to the coll apse of particular fisheries stocks.  The Rules 
Negotiating Group has therefore been given a manda te to clarify and improve the disciplines on 
subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishi ng.  Only an ambitious outcome pursuant to this 
mandate will deliver an outcome that is a win fo r trade, a win for development and a win for the 
environment. 
 2. As we have stated previously (TN/RL/W/196), the United States believes that a broad prohibition addressing all elements that contribute most directly to overcapacity and overfishing would be the most effective means to fulfil our mandate.  Both New Zealand (TN/RL/GEN/100 and 
TN/RL/GEN/141) and Brazil (TN/RL/GEN/79/Rev.3)  have offered legal text for framework 
proposals based on such an approach.  In contr ast, the alternative proposals from Japan, Korea and 
Chinese Taipei (TN/RL/GEN/114/Rev.1), the European Communities (TN/RL/GEN/134) and Norway (TN/RL/GEN/144) would fall short of that result. We note that much of the technical work in the Group over the last year, including the identification of appropriate exceptions and the discussions of Argentina's proposal for special and differential treatment for developing countries 
(TN/RL/GEN/138/Rev.1), has been premised on a broad prohibition as the backbone of new 
disciplines.    3. Now that negotiations have resumed, the Unite d States offers a framework proposal that we 
believe would achieve an ambitious, pragmatic result  sufficiently flexible to address the concerns we 
have heard from other Members.   While remaining sensitive to the unique challenges of fisheries, we 
have sought to draft text that is grounded in fam iliar WTO rules and concepts  to the maximum extent 
possible.  The proposed text is attached to this pape r.  For ease of review, we have also attached an 
annotated version of the text as an annex to this proposal.     
 
 TN/RL/GEN/145 
Page 2  
 
  Explanation of the Proposal 
 
4. A broad prohibition on subsidies to the harve sting of marine wild capture fisheries.   There 
is broad agreement that the focus of improved rul es should be on subsidies to the harvesting sector of 
marine wild capture fisheries.  For these purposes,  subsidies would be those included within the 
meaning of Article 1 of the existing Agreemen t on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), 
and that meet the criteria for specificity set out in the existing Article 2 of the ASCM.
1   
 5. Effective disciplines for programmes that  are not included in the prohibition.   The 
United States and others have contributed to identification of programmes that do not normally 
promote overcapacity and overfishing, and are theref ore appropriate exceptions to a prohibition.  The 
proposals by New Zealand (TN/RL/GEN/141) and Br azil (TN/RL/GEN/79/Rev. 3) show substantial 
convergence on the scope of these exceptions.  We  have drawn upon these proposals in developing 
our exceptions text.
2  In addition, we have expanded upon th e appropriate treatment of arrangements 
under which a Member acquires fishing rights for its di stant water fleet to fisheries resources in the 
exclusive economic zone of another country.  We r ecognize the sensitivity of this issue to developing 
countries and look forward to a further discussion. 
  
6. To avoid loopholes, and to retain Members'  rights under the existing ASCM, exceptions to the 
prohibition should remain actionable.  As Member s have recognized, however, the current rules on 
serious prejudice (Article 6 of the ASCM) have not b een fully effective in the fisheries context.  New 
rules should include some appropriate customizatio n of the serious prejudice criteria to make those 
rules more operational.  We have proposed two such  customized criteria.  In addition to the current 
Article 6.3, serious prejudice would arise if a Member could show that the effect of the subsidy is either:  (i) to increase the capacity of the subsidizin g Member to produce the like product; or (ii) to 
increase the subsidizing Member's relative share of the like product as compared to non-subsidized 
production over a representative period (c f. ASCM article 6.4).  We look forward to further discussion 
of this issue in the Group.
3 
 
7. Some elements of flexib ility for small programmes.   Additionally, Members may have small 
programmes that, by virtue of the small benefits conferred, do not contribute to overcapacity or 
overfishing, but might nevertheless be inconsistent wi th a prohibition.  In our view, this consideration 
should not prevent adoption of a high level of ambiti on for the core discipline.  Therefore, Members 
should consider flexibility to address such programmes, bearing in mind that developing such a 
                                                      
1 Aquaculture would be treated along the lines su ggested in the Brazil and New Zealand proposals, i.e., 
subsidies to aquaculture would remain under the exis ting ASCM disciplines because these disciplines are 
generally adequate to address them; however, subsidies to associated wild capture activities ( e.g., the harvesting 
of juveniles to raise in pens or farms, or the harvesting of wild stocks to use as feed) would be covered by the prohibition.  Similarly, subsidies to non-marine (inl and) fisheries activities would not be included in the 
prohibition, as in Brazil’s proposal (TN/RL/GEN/79/Rev.3) ; however, species that spend part of their life cycle 
in the marine environment would be considered "marine" for purposes of the prohibition.   
 2 We have also clarified that there should be an  exception for government assistance to establish 
"rights-based" management systems, such as individual or group limite d access privileges or other exclusive 
quotas.  As explained in the United States’ earlier paper (TN/RL/GEN/41), such systems are a promising 
approach to addressing the fundamental  problem of the "race for fish," because  they allow fishermen to fish at 
their own pace instead of racing to harvest the fish before someone else does.  Several Members already have 
such systems in place and others (including th e United States) are actively developing them. 
 3 We are also interested in exploring further the possibility of additional new disciplines on subsidies to 
on-shore processing, in light of suggestions that overcapacity in the processing sector may have some link to 
overcapacity in the harvesting sector.  One possibility wo uld be to consider a "dark amber" category for such 
subsidies, modelled on the expired ASCM Article 6.1; however, we have not proposed text for such a provision 
at this time.  We note that  proposals have been made to the Group concerning reinstatement of Article 6.1 as 
part of the general subsidies disciplines .  TN/RL/GEN/145 
 Page 3 
 
 
  provision raises technical issues that will need to be  addressed and that such flexibility must not create 
a loophole that could undermine the core discipline.   Any exception for small programmes should be 
subject to the serious prejudice and notification require ments.  We have not proposed text for such a 
provision, but are interested in exploring it with the Group.  Further technical work also needs to be done on artisanal subsidies. 
 
8. Notifications and transparency.   We share the views of others that transparency and 
notification procedures in the fisheries sector need  to be strengthened while remaining workable and 
not unduly burdensome.  We have sought to make the notifications more useful in light of the 
objectives of new fisheries disciplines (requiring information concerning the fisheries benefiting from 
the subsidy, as well as information concerning how  any conditions specified for the applicable 
exceptions have been or will be met).  To furthe r promote transparency, we also propose that each 
Member establish an inquiry point to respond to reasonable enquiries from other Members and 
interested parties in other Members concerning its fisheries management system, including measures in place to address fishing capacity and fishing effort and the biological status of managed stocks.  
This kind of mechanism has worked well in th e Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ( see TBT 
Agreement, Article 10.1).  It would be one way of  ensuring that Members receive relevant fisheries 
management-related information of particular inte rest, while avoiding the burden of requiring lengthy 
submissions of information in the notifications that may or may not be useful.  In addition, we have 
been carefully considering proposin g additional incentives to notify, but note that there are some 
practical considerations to be accounted for in im plementing such an approach.  We therefore have 
not made a proposal on this issue, but would like to explore it further. 
 9. Special and differential treatment.   Special and differential treatment should address the 
practical problems developing countries may f ace in implementing stronger rules while not 
undermining the objectives of the negotiations.  Furthe r work needs to be done in this area to assure 
this balance.  We continue to be inte rested in developing Argentina's proposal 
(TN/RL/GEN/138/Rev.1), and we have already had some valuable discussions concerning how to 
make the sustainability and fisheries management crit eria referred to in the proposal workable within 
the structure of WTO rules.  We also believe that  some aspects concerning the limits of special and 
differential treatment need to be more explicitly sp elled out.  For example, given that fishing vessels 
are a mobile capital asset with a useful life of thirty  years or more, we have questions about how such 
vessels would be treated once the capacity of the fi shery builds up to the level to exploit maximum 
sustainable yield.    10. Other provisions.   Our proposal also contains provisi ons on anti-circumvention (similar to 
that proposed by Brazil), review, fisheries expertis e and transitional arrangements.  The provisions on 
review and expertise reflect some minor revisions to  our initial proposal (TN/ RL/GEN/127) in light of 
the discussion in the Group.  Concerning transition periods, Members might also consider provision for negotiating individualized country phase-out sch edules for specified programmes.  This could 
provide an additional element of flexibility to the transition to stronger rules, as well as a further 
element of transparency.  While we have not provided explicit text, we are interested in exploring this 
concept further.   TN/RL/GEN/145 
Page 4  
 
   
Attachment 
 
ANNEX [VIII] TO THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES 
 
Preamble  
[to be developed] 
 
Article 1 - Prohibition  
 
 Except as otherwise provided in this Annex, a subsidy
1 that confers a benefit on enterprises 
engaged in the harvesting of marine wild  capture fisheries shall be prohibited.2 
 Article 2 - Exceptions to the Prohibition   
1. Nothing in Article 1 of this Annex shall prevent government assistance for:   
  (a)   vessel decommissioning programmes, provided that:  
  (i)  the vessels subject to such programmes are scrapped or otherwise 
permanently and effectively prevented fr om being used for fishing anywhere 
in the world; 
   (ii)  the fish harvesting rights asso ciated with such vessels are permanently 
revoked and may not be reassigned; 
   (iii)  the owners of such vessels are required to relinquish any claim associated 
with such vessels that could qualify su ch owners for any present or future 
harvesting rights in any fishery; and 
 
  (iv)  there are in place fisheries management control measures designed to prevent 
over-fishing in the targeted fishery, such as limited entry systems, catch 
quotas, limits on fishing effort or allocation of exclusive quotas to vessels, individuals and/or groups. 
 
 (b)   assistance and user-specific allocations to individuals and groups under limited access 
privileges and other exclusive quota programmes;  
  (c)   research to inform fisheries management decision makers, including data collection, 
surveys, data analysis and stock monitoring, sampling and assessment; 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
1 "Subsidy" as used in this Annex is a subsidy within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (A SCM).  A subsidy subject to this Annex must be 
specific within the meaning of Article 2 of the ASCM.    
 2 "Harvesting" includes the on-vessel processing of fish and transport of fish from one vessel to another 
or from a vessel to shore.    
  TN/RL/GEN/145 
 Page 5 
 
 
   (d)   measures that enhance marine res ources rather than capacity to harvest those 
resources, such as fisheries stock enhancement, marine conservation and marine protection, including marine environment restoration, hatcheries for breeding, artificial reefs and by-catch mitigation devices; 
 
 (e)   the construction and maintenance of infrastructure for fishing communities, such as 
the provision of housing, roadways and water and sanitary waste systems; 
    (f) unemployment relief, early retirement, worker retraining or re-education, life 
insurance, support for the temporary suspension of fishing activities and alternative 
employment assistance for fishermen; 
  (g) the replacement of fishing capacity foll owing a natural disaster where fleet capacity 
has been reduced, provided that capacity is not restored beyond its pre-disaster state;  and 
 
 (h) the improvement of vessel and crew safety
3, provided that:  
   (i) there is no increase to fishing capacity, such as the volume of fish hold or 
engine power of a vessel subject to such programme; and 
 
  (ii) the improvement is undertaken to  comply with international or domestic 
standards. 
 2. This Annex does not cove r government-to-government payments to obtain access for a 
Member's distant water fishing fleet to fisheri es resources within the exclusive economic zone of 
another country.  The further transfer of those access rights to the Member's fishing fleet is covered by 
this Annex but is not prohibited under Article 1, provided that: 
  (i)  the Member's fishing fleet pays compen sation comparable to the cost the fleet would 
otherwise have to pay for access to the fisheries resources; 
 
 (ii)  the terms and conditions of access, in cluding the compensation paid by the fishing 
fleet, are published; and 
  (iii)   the access arrangeme nt provides for a science-based assessment and monitoring of 
the status of the fisheries resources in qu estion and for compliance with applicable 
fishery management systems.   
 
3.  Government funding of services directly related to fisheries management, including data 
collection and analysis for fisheries science, ma nagement and enforcement, the protection and 
restoration of marine habitats, the developmen t and implementation of fisheries management 
measures, and the monitoring and enforcement of fi shery regulations are not covered by this Annex.
4 
  
                                                     
 
3 Programme or activities aimed primarily at vessel modernization or repair do not fall within this sub-
paragraph.  The construction of vessels is not permitted under this sub-paragraph. 
4 Fisheries management includes the establishment and administration of management systems 
(including allocating and monitoring fishing licences, permits, quota, vessel numbers and catch returns); 
adjusting management settings within an existing management system; and developing amendments or additions 
to the existing management system. TN/RL/GEN/145 
Page 6  
 
  Article 3 - Serious Prejudice 
  
 In addition to the circumstances provided for in Article 6.3 of the ASCM, serious prejudice may arise in the case of subsidies that qualify for th e exceptions in Article 2.1 [and Article 4] of this 
Annex, where the effect of the subsidy is: 
 
 (a)  an increase in the subsidizing Member's capacity to produce the like product;  or   (b)  an increase in the subsidizing Memb er's relative share of production of the like 
product, as compared to non-subsidized  production over a representative period 
sufficient to demonstrate clear trends in production. 
 
Article 4 – Small Programmes 
 
 [to be developed]  
Article 5 – Developing Country Members 
 
Article 6 – Anti-Circumvention 
 
 For purposes of this Annex, a prohibited subsidy is attributable to the Member conferring the 
subsidy, regardless of the flag of the vessel harvesting the fish or the application of rules of origin to 
such fish.  
Article 7 – Notifications and Enquiry Point 
 
1. Members asserting that a subsidy covered by this Annex qualifies for an exception pursuant 
to Articles 2.1-2.2 [,4 and 5] shall include in  its notification under Article 25 of the ASCM 
information concerning the fisheries benefiting fro m the subsidy, including whether the subsidy is 
widely available to many fisheries or targeted to specific fisheries, allowing for an assessment of how 
any conditions set forth in Articles 2.1-2.2 [,4 and 5] for that exception have been or are expected to 
be fulfilled.   
 
2. Each Member shall maintain an enquiry poi nt to answer all reasonable enquiries from other 
Members and interested parties in other Member s concerning its fisheries management system, 
including measures in place to address fishing capacity  and fishing effort and the biological status of 
managed stocks. 
 
Article 8 – Review  
 
 The Committee on Subsidies and Countervaili ng Measures shall review the implementation 
and operation of this Annex every __ years, taking into account the objectives thereof. In this regard, 
the Committee shall, as appropriate, request in formation from persons and organizations with 
expertise in fisheries management, conservati on and stock assessment, such as the United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization and regi onal fisheries management organizations. 
 
Article 9 – Transitional Arrangements  
 1. Subsidy programmes that have been established within the territory of any Member before the 
date of entry into force of this Annex and that are inconsistent with the provisions of this Annex shall 
be: 
(a) notified to the Committee not later than __ da ys after the date of entry into force of 
this Annex; and  TN/RL/GEN/145 
 Page 7 
 
 
   
(b) brought into conformity with the provisions  of this Annex within __ years of the date 
of entry into force of this Annex.   
 
2. No Member shall extend the scope of any su ch programme, nor shall such a programme be 
renewed upon its expiry. 
 
Article 10 - Consultations and Dispute Settlement  
 
 In a dispute under this Annex involving scientific or technical questions related to fisheries, a 
panel should seek advice from fisheries experts chosen by the panel in consultation with the parties to 
the dispute.  To this end, the panel may, when it deems it appropriate, establish an advisory technical 
fisheries experts group, or seek the assistance  of the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization or other relevant inte rnational organization in identifyi ng appropriate fisheries experts, 
at the request of either party to the dispute or on its own initiative. 
 TN/RL/GEN/145 
Page 8  
 
  Annex – Annotated Proposal 
   
ANNEX [VIII] TO THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES 
  Preamble  
 [to be developed] 
 
Article 1 - Prohibition   
 Except as otherwise provided in this Annex, a subsidy
1 that confers a benefit on enterprises 
engaged in the harvesting of marine wild  capture fisheries shall be prohibited.2 
 
Subsidies to aquaculture would not be covered by the Annex, because there appears to be consensus 
that the disciplines in the existing ASCM are curren tly adequate to address them.  However, to the 
extent that wild harvest activities o ccur in connection with aquaculture ( e.g., the harvesting of juvenile 
fish for farming, or the harvesting of wild fish  for use as feed stock), those activities would be 
included in the prohibition. 
 
The term "marine" is equivalent to the exclusio n of "inland fisheries," as in Brazil's proposal 
(TN/RL/GEN/79/Rev.3).  We understand that the term "marine" includes both anadromous ( e.g., 
salmon) and catadromous ( e.g., eels) species that spend a signifi cant part of their life cycle in 
saltwater. 
 
Article 2 - Exceptions to the Prohibition  
 
1. Nothing in Article 1 of this Annex shall prevent government assistance for:   
 
 (a)   vessel decommissioning programmes, provided that: 
   (i)  the vessels subject to such programmes are scrapped or otherwise 
permanently and effectively prevented fr om being used for fishing anywhere 
in the world; 
 
  (ii)  the fish harvesting rights asso ciated with such vessels are permanently 
revoked and may not be reassigned; 
   (iii)  the owners of such vessels are required to relinquish any claim associated 
with such vessels that could qualify su ch owners for any present or future 
harvesting rights in any fishery; and 
 
                                                     
 
1 "Subsidy" as used in this Annex is a subsidy within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (A SCM).  A subsidy subject to this Annex must be 
specific within the meaning of Article 2 of the ASCM.    
 2 "Harvesting" includes the on-vessel processing of fish and transport of fish from one vessel to another 
or from a vessel to shore.    
  TN/RL/GEN/145 
 Page 9 
 
 
    (iv)  there are in place fisheries management control measures designed to prevent 
over-fishing in the targeted fishery, such as limited entry systems, catch 
quotas, limits on fishing effort or allocation of exclusive quotas to vessels, individuals and/or groups. 
 
 (b)   assistance and user-specific allocations to individuals and groups under limited access 
privileges and other exclusive quota programmes;  
  (c)   research to inform fisheries management decision makers, including data collection, 
surveys, data analysis and stock monitoring, sampling and assessment; 
 
 (d)   measures that enhance marine res ources rather than capacity to harvest those 
resources, such as fisheries stock enhancement, marine conservation and marine protection, including marine environment restoration, hatcheries for breeding, artificial reefs and by-catch mitigation devices; 
 
 (e)   the construction and maintenance of infrastructure for fishing communities, such as 
the provision of housing, roadways and water and sanitary waste systems; 
  (f) unemployment relief, early retirement, worker retraining or re-education, life 
insurance, support for the temporary suspension of fishing activities and alternative 
employment assistance for fishermen; 
  (g) the replacement of fishing capacity foll owing a natural disaster where fleet capacity 
has been reduced, provided that capacity is not restored beyond its pre-disaster state;  and 
 
 (h) the improvement of vessel and crew safety
3, provided that:  
   (i) there is no increase to fishing capacity, such as the volume of fish hold or 
engine power of a vessel subject to such programme; and 
 
  (ii) the improvement is undertaken to  comply with international or domestic 
standards. 
 2. This Annex does not cove r government-to-government payments to obtain access for a  
Member's distant water fishing fleet to fisheri es resources within the exclusive economic zone of 
another country.  The further transfer of those access rights to the Member's fishing fleet is covered by 
this Annex but is not prohibited under Article 1, provided that: 
  (i)  the Member's fishing fleet pays compen sation comparable to the cost the fleet would 
otherwise have to pay for access to the fisheries resources; 
 
 (ii)  the terms and conditions of access, in cluding the compensation paid by the fishing 
fleet, are published; and 
  (iii)   the access arrangeme nt provides for a science-based assessment and monitoring of 
the status of the fisheries resources in qu estion and for compliance with applicable 
fishery management systems.   
 
                                                     
 
3 Programme or activities aimed primarily at vessel modernization or repair do not fall within this sub-
paragraph.  The construction of vessels is not permitted under this sub-paragraph. TN/RL/GEN/145 
Page 10  
 
  3.  Government funding of services directly related to fisheries management, including data 
collection and analysis for fisheries science, ma nagement and enforcement, the protection and 
restoration of marine habitats, the developmen t and implementation of fisheries management 
measures, and the monitoring and enforcement of fi shery regulations are not covered by this Annex.
4 
 
The text builds on proposals made by New Zealand (TN/RL/GEN/141) and Brazil 
(TN/RL/GEN/79/Rev.3).  
 
Article 3 - Serious Prejudice 
   In addition to the circumstances provided for in Article 6.3 of the ASCM, serious prejudice 
may arise in the case of subsidies that qualify for th e exceptions in Article 2.1 [and Article 4] of this 
Annex, where the effect of the subsidy is:   (a)  an increase in the subsidizing Member's capacity to produce the like product;  or 
 
 (b)  an increase in the subsidizing Memb er's relative share of production of the like 
product, as compared to non-subsidized  production over a representative period 
sufficient to demonstrate clear trends in production. 
 
The current rules on serious prejudice (Article 6.3 of  the ASCM) have not been fully effective in the 
fisheries context because they relate primarily to certa in types of trade effects in specific end markets, 
rather than to potential trade distortions occurring at the point of production (harvesting).  The 
proposed additional criteria are intended to address that concern.  They may most clearly be needed in 
the case of those exceptions that provide the greatest possibility of circumvention, either because large 
amounts of government funds are typically involved or because the conditions on the subsidies do not 
lend themselves to precise definition ( e.g., decommissioning subsidies, in frastructure, disaster relief, 
vessel and worker health and safety).   
 
For example, assume a Member under a decommissioning programme pays its fishermen to retire 
their vessels from a fishery that  produces crab (and those vessels are permanently removed in 
accordance with the conditions in Article 2.1(a)).  Those fishermen then use the funds to purchase 
vessels that produce groundfish.  If the effect of th e subsidy is to increase the Member's capacity to 
produce groundfish, there could be serious prejudi ce to another Member that also produces groundfish 
(the "like product"). 
 
Article 3(b) is analogous to the current  ASCM Article 6.4. 
 
Article 4 – Small Programmes  
To be developed.  The United States believes that there should be consideration of a provision giving 
flexibility to address programmes that provide a small benefit but that would otherwise be 
inconsistent with the prohibition, bearing in mind that developing such a provision raises technical 
issues that will need to be addr essed and that such flexibility must not create a loophole.   Any 
exception for small programmes would be subject to the serious prejudice provisions in existing 
Article 6.3 of the ASCM and Article 3 of this Anne x and to the notification provisions in Article 7. 
 
                                                      
4 Fisheries management includes the establishment and administration of management systems 
(including allocating and monitoring fishing licences, permits, quota, vessel numbers and catch returns); 
adjusting management settings within an existing management system; and developing amendments or additions 
to the existing management system.  TN/RL/GEN/145 
 Page 11 
 
 
  Article 5 – Developing Country Members 
 
The United States is interested in  the further development of Arge ntina's proposal (TN/RL/GEN/138 
Rev.1), noting the need for further clarification of the limits of any proposed special and differential 
treatment. 
 
Article 6 – Anti-Circumvention 
 
 For purposes of this Annex, a prohibited subsidy is attributable to the Member conferring the 
subsidy, regardless of the flag of the vessel harvesting the fish or the application of rules of origin to 
such fish. 
 
Article 7 – Notifications and Enquiry Point 
 
1. Members asserting that a subsidy covered by this Annex qualifies for an exception pursuant 
to Articles 2.1-2.2 [,4 and 5] shall include in  its notification under Article 25 of the ASCM 
information concerning the fisheries benefiting fro m the subsidy, including whether the subsidy is 
widely available to many fisheries or targeted to specific fisheries, allowing for an assessment of how 
any conditions set forth in Articles 2.1-2.2 [,4 and 5] for that exception have been or are expected to 
be fulfilled.    
Any conditions placed upon subsidies pursuant to Ar ticles 4 [Small Programmes] and 5 [Special and 
Differential Treatment] would also be subject to th e notification requirements in Article 7.1; however, 
since we have not proposed text for those Articles,  we have left the references in brackets.  In 
addition, the United States recognizes the value of strengthening the notification requirements and is 
carefully considering proposing additional incentives to notify, noting that there are some practical 
considerations to be accounted for in  implementing such an approach.   
 
2. Each Member shall maintain an enquiry poi nt to answer all reasonable enquiries from other 
Members and interested parties in other Member s concerning its fisheries management system, 
including measures in place to address fishing capacity  and fishing effort and the biological status of 
managed stocks. 
 
Cf.  Article 10, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
  
Article 8 – Review  
  The Committee on Subsidies and Countervaili ng Measures shall review the implementation 
and operation of this Annex every __ years, taking into account the objectives thereof. In this regard, 
the Committee shall, as appropriate, request in formation from persons and organizations with 
expertise in fisheries management, conservati on and stock assessment, such as the United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization and regi onal fisheries management organizations. 
 Article 9 – Transitional Arrangements  
 
1. Subsidy programmes that have been established within the territory of any Member before the 
date of entry into force of this Annex and that are inconsistent with the provisions of this Annex shall 
be: 
 
(a) notified to the Committee not later than __ da ys after the date of entry into force of 
this Annex; and TN/RL/GEN/145 
Page 12  
 
  (b) brought into conformity with the provisions  of this Annex within __ years of the date 
of entry into force of this Annex.   
 
2. No Member shall extend the scope of any su ch programme, nor shall such a programme be 
renewed upon its expiry. 
 
Article 10 - Consultations and Dispute Settlement  
 
 In a dispute under this Annex involving scientific or technical questions related to fisheries, a 
panel should seek advice from fisheries experts chosen by the panel in consultation with the parties to 
the dispute.  To this end, the panel may, when it deems it appropriate, establish an advisory technical 
fisheries experts group, or seek the assistance  of the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization or other relevant inte rnational organization in identifyi ng appropriate fisheries experts, 
at the request of either party to the dispute or on its own initiative.  
It is assumed that the provisions of Articles XX II and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied 
by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), shall apply to consultations and settlement related to 
new rules covered by this annex.  Depending on th e final shape of those rules, the existing provision 
on expertise in Article 13 of the DSU may be adequa te, or Members may determine there is need for 
an explicit provision such as that proposed above.  In light of the Rules Group's technical discussions 
with the FAO, the United States' initial proposal is  modified to clarify that the FAO and other 
international organizations would not themselves, as organizations, pr ovide expert opinions but could 
instead be called upon to provide assistance in  identifying the appropriate experts.   
 
 
__________