RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/AG/R/17 
11 March 2005 
 (05-1067) 
Committee on Agriculture 
Special Session  
 
  
SUMMARY REPORT ON THE TWENTY-EIGHTH MEETING  
OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE SPECIAL SESSION  
HELD ON 17 DECEMBER 2004 
 
Note by the Secretariat
1 
  
1. The Special Session of the Committee on Ag riculture, which was established by the 
General Council (WT/GC/M/53), is pursuing negotiations under paragr aphs 13, 14 and other relevant 
provisions of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  The twenty-eighth formal meeting was held on 
17 December 2004 under the chairmanship of Am bassador Tim Groser of New Zealand.   
2. The agenda as contained in WTO/AIR/2468 was adopted. 
I
TEM A (i):  STATEMENT BY CHAIR  
3. A summary of the Chairman's statement is attached. 
4. On the adequacy of the process, which the Ch airman had addressed in his statement, the 
representative of Bulgaria referred to the statement of  his delegation at the previous formal meeting of 
the Special Session.  He emphasized the need for mo re transparency in the process and proposed that 
substantive information be provi ded in written form on the views expressed and proposals made by 
delegations in the course of the consultations in Rooms F and D, especially since those issues were 
very technical and information had to be passed onto capitals.  Regarding the speed of progress, 
Bulgaria stated that agriculture might, in comparis on to other areas, be moving too quickly.  Bulgaria 
wished that the schedule of meetings be discu ssed prior to their formal announcement because 
elsewhere too few meetings were scheduled to ade quately cover the subject matter and, therefore, 
Members needed to look at this in a wholesome way. 
5. The Chairman noted that he would reflect on the statement and views of Bulgaria. 
ITEM A (ii):  STATEMENTS BY PARTICIPANTS  
6. On behalf of the ACP group of countries, Trinidad and Tobago shared the view that the 
present work structure had allowed them to make c oncrete first steps towards initial problem solving, 
while laying the foundation for future collaboration and co-operation with ot her delegations.  While 
balance was needed within the ma rket access pillar, for the ACP, wh at was equally important, was the 
need to create a greater sense of balance in gl obal agricultural trade by redressing the imbalance 
inherent in the current Agreement on Agriculture.  Me mbers had to ensure that reform in agricultural 
trade did not promote unbridled liberalization in deve loping countries inconsistent with the spirit in 
which the Round was launched and in contravention of principles espoused in the Framework.  This 
                                                      
1 This document has been prepared under the Secret ariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice 
to the positions of Members or to their rights or obligations under the WTO. TN/AG/R/17 
Page 2  
 
would require balance and ambition with flexibility , and modulating efforts to secure substantial 
improvement in market access with meaningful S&D. 
7. For the ACP the SSM should provide all Members with the requisite policy space and 
flexibility for policy interventions  needed to safeguard their food security, livelihood security and 
rural development needs.  More specifically, the SSM  had to also insulate the markets of developing 
countries from the negative effects of import surg es and declining international prices.  It was 
essential that the SSM be automatically activated and,  in addition, the trigger mechanism had to be 
price and volume-based.  Trinidad and Tobago also noted that the SSM had to be available to all 
agricultural products and that applicable remedi es had to include additional duties and quantitative 
restrictions.  Such an approach might also be n ecessary in order to:  (i) prevent or remedy serious 
injury;  and (ii) allow the domestic industry to ad just.  The representative of Trinidad and Tobago 
further noted that the methodology for the calculation of  the trigger levels had to be simple, and, in 
the case of a price mechanism, the reference pri ce for calculating the trigger level should not be 
biased in favour of producing low values.  The AC P favoured the application of the safeguard over an 
appropriate period to be negotiated, and with regard to transp arency, requiring Members to include 
intended trigger prices and volumes in their country schedules could be explored. 
8. Regarding Special Products, Trinidad and Tobago noted that paragraph 41 meant that 
developing countries had to be able to self-designate an appropriate  number of products, without 
tariff reductions or increases in tariff quotas, while  having access to the SSM.  On the tiered formula, 
the representative of Trinidad and Tobago said that it had to take account of different tariff structures 
and that the ACP group of countries could not accept a Swiss Formula on any tier, given that the 
concept of harmonization was neither contained in the Framework nor in the Doha mandate.  For the 
ACP Group that would constitute not only paying twice, but also at compound interest. 
9.  On domestic support Trinidad and Tobago noted that  clear criteria were needed to ensure that 
the Blue Box was a tool to move from more to mi nimally trade-distorting measures.  It was also 
crucial that the reference periods selected  be indicative of existing realities.   
10. Mauritius noted that there was a need for bot h transparency and efficiency.  Regarding 
transparency, political ownership of the process was necessary, but the format used for the 
Framework had been collectively revised and the ne w format consisted of going from informal open-
ended Special Sessions to Room D, to Room F and b ack to Room D.  There was an educative part in 
transparency, and the educative part of the Ro oms D and F process was extremely important for 
developing countries to understand and really be in a position to assess the difficulties of other 
Members and also to understand where they had to  provide inputs.  On the issue of access to 
information, Mauritius wished to put on record its  appreciation that documents discussed in Room F 
were distributed to all Members.  Mauritius believed that this was an important step in ensuring better 
transparency, in particular for small delegations , as were certain requests that had been made on 
circulation of information.  
11. Regarding tariff reduction formulae, Turkey str essed that all market access related issues lied 
at the heart of the process and were interlinked with the improvements in other pillars of the 
negotiations.  The delicate positions of developing  countries in that area required adoption of a 
formula which would result in proportionate and ba lanced outcomes and many Members, developing 
and developed, had pointed out that a Uruguay Rou nd-type linear formula was the most appropriate 
method to deal with the issue.  The representative of Turkey also noted that Special Products and the 
Special Safeguard Mechanism were an essential part  of S&D and he was looking for further technical 
elaborations on both.  Turkey's expectation was that similar type of fruitful Room D discussions 
would also take place on the other S&D issues.  On the issue of product-specific AMS caps and the 
Blue Box, Turkey noted that there was no common understanding and those issues needed further 
technical examination and Turkey looked forward to technical work from the Secretariat in that area.  
Overall, Turkey believed that the negotiations were  moving in the right direction with the 3-stage  TN/AG/R/17 
 Page 3 
 
 
process.  For the rest of the process, it was crucial to  maintain the inclusive and transparent nature of 
negotiations at the different stages. 
12. Indonesia noted that a lot of progress had been made in agriculture in 2004 and expressed its 
thanks to the Chairman.  Since September there ha d been three technical sessions to put flesh on the 
various issues in the Framework and a good momentum had been established with capital to restart in 
2005.  Regarding the Room D discussions on the Speci al Safeguard Mechanism, they had been rich 
and touched upon the core issues but it was clear th at positions were still far apart.  Indonesia was 
surprised by how limited some Members view w as of the Special Safeguard Mechanism since S&D 
tools were there for developing countries to be ab le to address their development needs.  Indonesia, 
echoed by the Philippines, stressed that inclusiven ess and transparency had to continue and supported 
Egypt's suggestion that a visual/audio link be estab lished between Rooms D and E.  The objective for 
2005 was ambitious and work had to be organized in  the most effective way.  Indonesia believed that 
Rooms D and F discussions had to be on issues that  Members were ready to discuss at a technical 
level and stressed the importance of taking up all core technical issues in all three pillars in Room D.  
13. On transparency and efficiency, Kenya supported the proposal made earlier by Egypt for a 
video/audio link to be set up between Rooms D and E.   The representative of Kenya also stressed that 
flexibilities for developing countries had to be looked at in tandem with all other issues and not at the 
end.  Regarding the process, Kenya noted the need  to ensure:  (i) that the Membership moved 
together;  and (ii) political ownership of the process.   
14. Jamaica shared the Chai r's view that there was a considerable amount of technical and other 
work left to be done if Members were to achieve modalities by Hong Kong.  In that light, it could be 
necessary to have seminars to bring some negotiators  up to speed on the implications of some of the 
technical elements contained in the Framework.  In th at context of technical work, and that of the lack 
of grasp of some Members, including Jamaica, th e question of transparency became over-riding and 
Jamaica supported fully the request made by Bulgar ia on keeping better track of the proceedings in 
Rooms D and F. 
15. The representative of Chile took the floor to note for the record that, with regard to market 
access, the record of the meeting would look bette r if at least one government said it wanted to 
liberalize trade, and he was speaking on behalf of that government. 
16. The representative of Argentina thanked the Ch airman for his statement which he supported 
fully.  Argentina believed that the negotiations were moving, and this was crucial in order to solve the 
problems Members had before them with the objective of reaching a basis for an agreement in July.  
Argentina also agreed with the Chairman that the negotiation process had to take place and be 
resolved in Geneva and, for that to occur, participa tion and transparency were crucial.  It was in that 
light that Argentina wished to echo delegations which supported Bulgaria's request for reports on 
Room F discussions to the plenary. 
17. The Representative of Bulgaria drew atten tion to the importance which his delegation 
attached to non-trade concerns in the context of  market access negotiations.  For some countries, 
including his own, geographical indications for th eir specific products were a matter of non-trade 
concerns and it was essential that the possibilit y of negotiating improved market access for such 
products be guaranteed in the modalities. 
18. The representative of the European Communiti es noted that, while he did not necessarily 
agree on all the details, the Chairman's summary of the state of play and way forward was overall a 
good one.  The European Communities gave the Chai rman its full support for the work and the way 
that he had been conducting the work so far and w ould continue to help him to move the process 
forward.  Of course progress would have to be ac ross the board because if Members moved ahead on 
agriculture, they would have to move ahead elsewhere as well.  TN/AG/R/17 
Page 4  
 
19. Statements made in the informal Special Session by the following delegations were forwarded 
to the Secretariat and are attached to this summary at the request of the Members concerned:  Brazil, 
El Salvador, Jamaica and Kenya.  The statement ma de by Mauritius at the informal Special Session 
on 16 November 2004 is also attached.  The Chairm an asked that any delegation that wanted its 
statement from the informal Special Session include d in the report on the formal meeting should sent 
it to the Secretariat as soon as possible and it w ould be included as an attachment to the summary 
report. 
20. Statements made at this formal Special Sessi on by the following delegations were forwarded 
to the Secretariat and are attached to this summary at the request of the Members concerned:  Croatia 
and Moldova. 
I
TEM B:  OTHER BUSINESS  
REPORT ON CONSULTATIONS ON COTTON  
21. The Chairman noted that consultations on cotton were held on 8 December to discuss 
procedure and the date of the first meeting of the Sub-Committee on Cotton.  From the discussion at the consultations there appeared to be a gene ral understanding that the meetings of the Sub-
Committee would be held around the same time as  the Special Sessions of the Committee on 
Agriculture.  Therefore, the Chairman proposed th at the first meeting of the Sub-Committee take 
place on 16 February 2005.  
R
EPORT  ON CONSULTATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT ISSUES  
22. The Chairman stated that he had held c onsultations, on 9 December, on the development 
issues referred to the Special Session of the Co mmittee on Agriculture by the General Council.  The 
Chairman noted that the approach  used was that of the Committee on Trade and Development's Chair 
and that more consultations were needed , at the next appropriate opportunity. 
CHAIRMAN 'S REPORT TO THE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE  
23. The Chairman stated that, on his responsibility as Chairman, he would be reporting to the 
Trade Negotiations Committee on this meeting. 
DATE OF THE NEXT SPECIAL SESSION  
24. As noted at the last Special Session, the Ch airman informed the Committee that the next 
Agriculture week would begin on Monday 7 Februa ry 2005.  The formal Special Session of the 
Committee on Agriculture would take place on 11 February 2005. 
  TN/AG/R/17 
 Page 5 
 
 
Statement by Ambassador Tim Groser  
 
Chairman, Special Session, Committee on Agriculture 
 
 
1. I would like to group my comments under five inter-related headings: 
• The Process 
• The Progress we are making – speed 
• The real Timetable 
• The Agenda for February 
 
The Process 
 2. I am well aware there are various concerns in  the Membership about the negotiating process, 
but I have concluded that there is a high level of consensus that the post-Framework negotiating 
process we have developed is the best available to  deal with the issue.  No one has mounted a 
plausible argument that there is so me clearly superior alternative. 
3. The process - my three locks - is okay.  Points of mild dissatisfaction centre around the 
following: if the open – ended technical discussions in the Room D process is to fulfil its real 
function, we need a higher degree of self-disciplin e amongst delegations not to repeat basic political 
statements that belong in the first lock:  the in formal Special Session.  Everyone understands that 
there is a place for these basic political positioning st atements:  political reality.  But the place for that 
is in the Special Session, not Room D.  That said, some of the Room D discussions are working well, while other discussions are working less well.  
4. The checklist approach I have used for these di scussions is accepted as the basic tool to 
discipline the discussion and I and the Secretariat are going to try and redouble our efforts to ensure that these checklists are as focussed  as possible, get out to the delegations in a timely manner to allow 
the process of domestic consultation/intra-group cons ultations enough time to make the best use of 
this opportunity. 
5. There is some dissatisfaction in the Membership th at, in the course of this week's discussions 
on the Blue Box and the Market Access Formula some  delegations are not being entirely faithful to 
the Framework in the sense that they may be espous ing positions that re-litigate issues settled in the 
Framework.  I cannot agree that there is any systematic  attempt to do this.  But it is a very sensitive 
matter since we make no progress if we do not accept th at the Framework is a balanced deal and the 
acquis of progress to date.  I would offer a deliber ately weak formulation of this concern:  could 
people please reflect very carefully on this legitima te concern and make particular efforts in this 
regard not to go back to square one.  It will succeed only in delaying progress. 
6. The third lock – the Room F – some feel that th ere are too many people in the room.  This is 
not quite the same thing as saying there are too many  delegations.  I have had quite a lot of support for 
the Egyptian suggestion – a salle d'ecoute.  I will look into this. 
7. Finally, some have made the point to me – a nd this had quite a lot of support – that it would 
help build confidence further in this  interactive process if the results of a really intensive and very 
technical discussion in the Room F process were to be fed back into the Room D for a further open-
ended discussion so that all delegations, even if  they have been well briefed by their group 
representatives participating in the Room F process,  could express their point of view on behalf of 
their own delegations.  I fully agree with that in pr inciple and I shall look for opportunities early next 
year to give practical expression to that objective. TN/AG/R/17 
Page 6  
 
8. In summary, I would repeat the fundamental point I have been making in the 10 months I 
have been the Chairman.  There is a balance to be struck between transparency  and efficiency of the 
Geneva process.  Transparency is essential – the day has long passed in this House where power 
brokers can impose a solution that is not understood a nd expect it to be endorsed.  But the aim is to 
negotiate texts, not make speeches, and this cannot be done with over 100 delegations in the room.  If 
the Geneva process is blocked, the process will be ta ken out of Geneva and yo u have the worst of all 
worlds.  
9. Behind every technical issue lies a political ques tion, but underlying every political issue are 
technical issues, which our Ministers cannot possibly be  expected to resolve.  Again, the day when an 
undifferentiated mess of technical and political issues  are thrown at our Ministers with the demand 
that we cannot resolve them, it is up to them – is hopelessly unrealistic and represents an abdication of 
the responsibilities of senior officials in democratic societies – a phrase that more and more describes 
in a fair way the reality of the majority of our me mbers, developed and devel oping.  We owe a duty of 
care to our Ministers not to throw every issue back at them.  So please resist the easy argument that 
we cannot move at official level, so we shall have to ask our Minist ers to solve these issues.  Our job 
is to do sufficient technical work to make the political  choices clear to our Ministers.  That is the basis 
on which I am proceeding. 
10. Next year we need a higher level of political i nput than we have had in the six months since 
the Framework was negotiated.  I know many Minist ers are ready to do this.  We deeply appreciate 
the strong personal commitment of Ministers who have expressed to others and me their strong 
personal commitment to this negotiation.  They are probably looking to us – the senior officials – for 
some guidance on what issues we want them to focus on.   This is not a simple matter.  I have no fixed 
views on the best way to integrate political inputs to our Geneva process but on all occasions, and I think on your behalf, I have stressed what I ha ve always said openly: the full modalities will be 
written in Geneva or they will not be written at all. 
11. Finally the WTO is about negotiating texts multila terally.  Political level discussions are fine 
but if they are not finally linke d to texts they become meaningless.  These texts are negotiated in 
Geneva or they are not negotiated at all.  Political  involvement is an input to this process, not a 
substitute.  This is the underlying reality and not  always fully comprehended, or comprehended too 
late – after failures in our negotiating process. 
Pace of Negotiations 
 12. First, on this matter, I am going to put entirely to the side the deeply controversial matter of 
any cross comparison with other non-agriculture areas of the negotiation.  I know it is an issue:  
ultimately every senior negotiator understands we are not working in an agriculture vacuum.  But our 
job is to make as much progress as we can within agriculture and all parties seem well aware that the deeper we enter into the post-Fra mework stage, the greater the amount of work that needs to be done 
becomes apparent.  I am pleased to say that even t hose countries with the deep est adjustment issues in 
agriculture fully subscribe to that view. 
13. I do not agree, from the perspective of the Chai r, that delegations with major difficulties in 
agriculture are not being constructive.  There is a w ealth of contrary evidence.  Delegations such as 
the G10 delegations have this week, for example, shown that they are deeply engaged on their least 
favourite topic – market access.  I deeply appreciate their efforts and hope the exporters do too.  Yet 
while I insist that the pace of this negotiation is not - I repeat not – being slowed down by deliberate 
procedural moves to delay progress, it is clear to me that we are moving too slowly, if the objective is 
to reach full modalities by Hong Kong. 
14. There are a number of other reasons for this – they include the difficulties of comprehending 
the technical discussions and the time it takes to coordinate group positions, as well as the intrinsic  TN/AG/R/17 
 Page 7 
 
 
political difficulties in such issues as Blue Box crite ria and market access.  Of course I understand the 
difficulties in accelerating our work but finally this is a case whe re failure is not an option .  How 
we accelerate our effective work is not at all cl ear to me, but if we are serious about achieving 
agreement on full modalities by Hong Kong, we are goi ng to have to come up with an answer.  A 
reality check is inevitable sometime in Spring 2005 or shortly thereafter. 
The Real Timetable 
 
15. We have – wisely in my firm view – avoided the trap of repeating past errors:  negotiating an 
artificial road map with artificial timelines that reflect wishful thinking, not the realities of a 
negotiation where the path ahead is anything but clear.  Instead, we seem to have settled quite 
naturally on a working hypothesis that the objec tive is to reach agreement on full modalities by Hong 
Kong.  That we may fail is obvious; but to settle for anything less ambitious as representatives of the 
G20, the EU, the Cairns Group and many others have stressed to me informally, is to ensure we fall 
far short.  There is no support, however, for another 'framework'.  We are aiming for full modalities. 
16. A number of delegations have said to me that in  practice that means we have to have the first 
approximation of modalities laid out by the summer break 2005.  That would leave a few months 
between September and Hong Kong to  crunch modalities.  I do not have a clear view of what might 
constitute a 'first approximation' of full modalities by July.  You will recall that my first approximation of the Framework was the 10-page st atement I made in my personal capacity on 
30 June 2004 to the TNC.  This was a reflection by me of where I thought the main points of convergence on a framework lay.  It was perhaps about 60 per cent right, 20 per cent wrong and 
another 20 per cent was missing but we put it into the Final Agreed Framework. 
17. But even if my first approximation of the Fr amework was only, say, 60 per cent correct, it 
helped, nonetheless.  It is consistent with Carlo Tr ojan's helpful concept of a process of 'progressive 
approximation'.  Inevitably, it is not quite right on your first attempt.  You then adjust it to deepen 
convergence until finally you have a document that is acceptable to the Membership as a whole.  It is 
by definition, a text-based concept.  It depends, for its success, upon the read iness of the membership 
not to get obsessed over to accept the first text as 'the' basis, 'a' basis, a 'star ting point' for negotiation. 
But I cannot invent such a statement or a text by the Summer Break next year.  My statement at the 
corresponding period leading to the adoption of the Fr amework reflected my best efforts to synthesis 
points of convergence amongst you, the Membership.  
18. Now, if it is possible for me, as the Chair, to develop a first approximation by July, this leads 
on to a very interesting question:  what are full modalities?  Full modalities ar e a means to an end.  
The end is a formula to allow all Members to do two things.  To avoid controversy I shall use my own 
country as an example.  First, to instruct technicians in New Zealand to draw up schedules of commitments on the three pillars – export compet ition, internal support and market access that 
express what NZ will do to put into concrete terms its obligations to translate the Framework into 
proposed policy changes by New Zealand.  The sec ond purpose of Full Modalities is to allow the 
New Zealanders to inspect the sch edules of trading partners to see what they are going to do about 
their own export competition measures, their own inte rnal subsidies, their own market access barriers 
to allow New Zealand to make an assessment of  the opportunities the Doha Round offers.    
19. It must also be very clear by Hong Kong that the adoption of full modalities must give 
developing countries confidence that, if they agree on full modalities, fundamental development 
objectives will flow as a consequence.  The developm ent return from the Doha Development Agenda 
is integral to any feasible Modalities we ask our Ministers to adopt.  Full modalities is a coin, but like all coins, has two sides:  the defensive and offensiv e, or export, side.  This allows all Members the 
basis for making a first assessment of political , commercial and developmental balance.  TN/AG/R/17 
Page 8  
 
20. But if we achieve our ambitious objective – agreement on full modalities by Hong Kong – 
this is not the end of the agriculture negotiations, but the conclusion of a key – almost certainly the 
decisive – step in the process of a multilateral agri culture negotiation.  First, assume a perfectly clear 
set of Full Modalities that make it abundantly clear to New Zealand for example what precisely New Zealand is expected to do in all three pilla rs.  However, do not reject the possibility that 
New Zealand or any other Member may want  to explore the possibility of negotiating deeper 
commitments than the minimum commitments prescribed by the Agreed Framework.  This could 
become very important in terms of sectoral initiativ es, for example, where the New Zealanders may, 
for example be interested in explor ing a deeper than minimum deal in some areas.  It may not just be 
in market access.  It may involve complex negotia ting possibilities that involve deeper than minimum 
commitments implied by the tiered formulae in cuts in trade distorting support. 
21. This will take some time, beyond the phase in which we have agreed on Full Modalities.  Let 
me complicate this further.  One cannot exclude th e possibility that some delegations will make a 
mess of translating their commitments in one or all three pillars and, it is likely that the first examination of schedules will lead to tears.  And what  is becoming clear to me is that the experience 
of the Uruguay Round – and the unhappiness this gene rated – is only thinly buried below the surface 
of the Doha Round negotiations.  A nu mber of leading delegations have expressed to me the view that 
the process of what I would call 'final verification' of schedules must not be so compressed as to allow 
yet more unlevel playing fields to be constructe d.  The Uruguay Round left no time to resolve these 
deeply controversial inequities.  This cannot  be repeated, according to many delegations. 
22. There is then a quite separate but vital post- Modalities phase of the agriculture negotiations:  
the rectifications of the legal texts.  I am assumi ng that Full Modalities will include what I would call 
'quasi-legal' texts.  For example, the text I have di stributed to all delegations on export credits is the 
beginning of such a text.  But professional lawyer s – not agriculture negotiators – will enter this 
negotiation and they will need to rectify legal inc onsistencies.  They will need to consider the 
coherence of negotiated texts on, say, export compe tition with the SCM code.  Some changes may be 
required.  This, both in my and others' opini on, can take place simultaneously with the post-
Framework examination of the 3 schedules.    
23. Now, colleagues, the simple conclusion I draw  from this analysis comes down to one simple 
conclusion:  the agriculture negotiations will pr obably not end with agreement on Full Modalities.  
That is bound to be the most important single part of our negotiations but it will not signal the end of 
participation of agriculture negotiators and their legal teams in the Doha Development Agenda.  And 
while we do not know how long this further process may take, it simply adds to the weight of the 
argument that we must endeavour to complete Full Modalities by Hong Kong, if we are to have any 
chance of finishing the global negotiations in 2006. 
24. Thus, there is no plan here to endorse, but I thought, as we close proceedings for 2004, it 
might be better that you know what is in my head as a working hypothesis for 2005.  TN/AG/R/17 
 Page 9 
 
 
Statements made in the Informal Special Session  
 
 
Statement by Brazil on behalf of the G-20  
 
 Mr. Chairman, 
 1. As we approach the end of the year, I would li ke to take this opportunity to present some 
comments and considerations on our work in the last months and on what lays ahead of us next year 
until Hong Kong.  Last week, we had a TNC meeting where we were able to  have an overview of 
evaluations presented by Members concerning the state of play.  Our Chief negotiator, 
Ambassador Clodoaldo Hugueney, was in Geneva for a couple of days and we took advantage of his 
presence to promote an exchange of views with our G-20 colleagues. 
2. It is, therefore, on behalf of the G-20 that I take the floor, with the objective of presenting 
some points for the consideration of the Special Session. 
3. The technical consultations of the third agri culture week after the Framework Agreement 
have started Monday morning.  Again, the G-20 has pr epared itself to the best possible extent (during 
the brief 3 weeks time we had since our November Special Session).  The G-20 worked hard to present comments and/or statements regarding the i ssues you proposed in the agenda, always with a 
view to promoting good and sound debate and to contributing positively to the discussions. 
4. Concerning the agenda and the working method you chose, we acknowledge your flexibility 
to adapt the course of action.  We do hope that your  "system of locks" will work efficiently to allow 
for a panoramic view of countries positions and – wh at is more important – to allow for consensus 
building. 
5. As several developing countries have indicated – and the G-20 has repeatedly tried to convey 
to you and to the membership – delegations need to have a clear understanding of what is at stake in 
these negotiations.  Technical issues must be well un derstood by all for they are the necessary tools to 
enable political decisions we all will have to take  in due time.  In that sense, we welcome the 
preparation of the technical documents announced by  the Secretariat, as well as the organization of 
Seminars. 
6. The G-20 is committed to expedite the work without losing inclusiveness in the process and 
without risking to leave delegations behind.  We  have a challenging schedule ahead of us and the 
G-20 is again prepared to contribute technically an d politically to set the stage for the objective of 
achieving full modalities by the Hong Kong Ministerial. 
Mr. Chairman, 
7. The objective is ambitious but we are prepared to spare no efforts to bring the Round to a 
successful conclusion.  To that end, it is importa nt to have in mind that there is a hierarchy of 
technical issues that derives from the Framework.  Let me run through some of them in each of the 
negotiating pillars. 
(Domestic Support) 
8. In domestic support we have to determine base pe riods and final numbers that are capable of 
standing technical and political scrutiny, so as to fulfill the mandate objective of "substantial cuts in 
domestic support".  Furthermore, we should ensure that disciplines will be in place so as to guarantee that the process of migration of the more distortin g forms of support into less distorting forms (the 
Blue Box) or into no or minimally trade-distorti ng support (the Green Box) will not degenerate in a TN/AG/R/17 
Page 10  
 
mere reclassification of subsidies.  If that were to  happen, it would imply no real change in the way 
agricultural policies are carried out at present. 
(Market Access) 
9. In market access, we support that a pragmatic approach be taken in the conversion of AVEs 
so as to set the stage for the core modality, namely, the tariff reduction formula.  In particular, the 
conversion process should be guided by a very simple  set of instructions in which the validation 
process will take place at the multilateral level, taki ng into account benchmarks for the evolution of 
the conversion.  Furthermore, the process is to be  concluded prior to designing the formula so as to 
avoid a situation of "asymmetry of information" , in which developing countries would have their 
tariff structures fully exposed, while devel oped countries would conceal theirs behind non- ad valorem  
duties. 
(Export Competition) 
10. In export competition, we find ourselves well positioned to move as soon as there is enough 
political critical mass to take a decision on the rate by which direct export subsidies will be 
eliminated.  We favour a very short period that w ould have the additional advantage of assisting to 
resolve the question of parallelism.  Good work has been developed in relation to export credits and 
food aid so as to make us confident that this pillar can be disposed of rather expeditiously.   TN/AG/R/17 
 Page 11 
 
 
Statement by El Salvador  
  
Thank you, Mr Chairman. 
 
1. The negotiating framework adopted on 1 August 20 04 sets out parameters for defining a tariff 
reduction formula which meets the objectives outlined in  the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  Worthy 
of special mention are the following elements: 
- A tiered tariff formula, whereby deeper cuts are achieved in higher tariffs and the 
sensitivity of certain products is acknowledged; 
- All Members, other than least-developed countries, will make a contribution and 
operationally effective special and differential provisions for developing countries will be 
an integral part of the elements of this formula.  
 2. On this basis, the following is an initial and non- exhaustive list of the elements which we feel 
could be taken into considerati on in order to make special and differential treatment measures for 
developing countries operational by means of the tariff reduction formula: 
- Proportionately smaller reducti ons for developing countries; 
- Longer implementation periods for tariff reduction commitments. 
 3. We also wish to highlight the significance of the following points in relation to the market 
access pillar: 
(a) Calculation of non- ad valorem  tariffs:  a transparent non- ad valorem  tariff conversion 
methodology which adequately reflects current levels of protection for these products is 
crucial to discussions on the tariff reduction formula.  
(b) We consider that the concept of special pr oducts for developing countries, as established in 
paragraph 41 of the negotiating framework, is  a key tool for ensuring that developing 
countries enjoy appropriate flexibilities under the market access pillar and, in this respect, 
must be dealt with independently from the ta riff reduction formula.  As provided for in 
paragraph 41, developing c ountries will have the flexibility to designate a number of 
special products on the basis of the criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural 
development.  This concept c ould be developed in accordance with the following criteria: 
- Special products shall not be subject to tariff reductions; 
- no additional tariff quota commitments shall be undertaken for special products;  
 and  
- developing countries should have access to  the special safeguard mechanism 
 provided for in paragraph 42 of the agreed framework. 
El Salvador stands ready to take part in furthe r discussions on the tariff reduction formula, as well as 
on other issues falling under the market access pillar. TN/AG/R/17 
Page 12  
 
Statement by Jamaica
 
  
Chairman, 
 
1. Jamaica supports the statement made by Kenya on behalf of the G-33 and also by Indonesia 
as well. 
2. We believe many useful points were also made by Switzerland, on behalf of the G-10. 
3. Mr. Chairman, paragraph 39 sets out elements that should inform the provision of special and 
differential treatment.  Paragraph 40 states clearly that lesser tariff reductions will be required of 
developing countries.  This is the understanding the fra mework gives to "proportionality".  In regard 
to the formula we think it is vital that the principle of lesser tariff reductions for developing countries be operationalized. 
4. How should we approach the fulfilment of the requirement for lesser tariff reduction on the 
part of developing countries.  As the Framewor k now stands, it requires in paragraph 29, second 
indent, that each member, other than LDCs, will make  a contribution.  We support the exemption of 
the LDCs from tariff reductions.  At the same time  we think that this is a useful benchmark for 
determining the level of tariff re duction that should be required of small, developing economies with 
vulnerable, small scale agricultural sectors and producers. 
5. Mr. Chairman, many developing countries, like my own, have flat tariff schedules.  Our view 
is that a very minimal linear cut will be sufficient contribution in such circumstances, and would fully 
conform to the proportionality principle. 
6. We will deal more fully with paragraphs 43 and 44 on trade in tropical products and on 
preferences at the February Special Session.  We  believe that there should be a linkage between 
sensitive products and preferences, and we note, in  this context, the linkage made between sensitive 
products and the taking into account of preference erosion that has been made by the G-10. 
7. Mr. Chairman, let me point out why a balanced  outcome requires that developing countries 
who will suffer some measure of preference erosion on  the export side be given the full benefit of the 
lesser tariff production provided for in paragrap h 40.  These countries, many of them small 
developing countries cannot be forced into drastic adjustment on both the import and export side.  This would be the case if they have to apply wh at has been described as a weighty and ambitious 
formula to their tariff schedules, while facing, simultaneously, significant preference erosion in 
respect of their limited range of exports.  Th is would be an unacceptable outcome for us. 
8. Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by reiterating support for the statement by Indonesia, on 
behalf of the G-33 in regard to Special Products.   
9. In respect to the Special Safeguard Mechanis m (SSM), we fully support Kenya on the stand 
alone character of the proposed mechanism. 
10. In our view, the SSM should apply to all agricu ltural products.  It should not be a transitional 
tool but instead be an integral part of the outcome  of this Round of negotiati ons, and thus should be a 
standing mechanism.  TN/AG/R/17 
 Page 13 
 
 
11. In respect of remedial action, both duties and quantitative restrictions should be available for 
use.  Particularly in the case of small economies, it may be necessary to utilize quantitative restrictions in some instances, given that the small size of the market and the vulnerability of domestic 
producers may require remedial action that is effective within a short time frame in order to prevent a total devastation of the affected sector. 
Thank you. TN/AG/R/17 
Page 14  
 
Statement by Kenya on behalf of the G-33
 
  
1. The July Framework incorporates certain principles for determining the tariff reduction 
formula, such as,  
• A tiered approach with progressivity in tariff reductions achieved through deeper cuts in 
higher tariffs; 
• Flexibility to take into account the sen sitive nature of some products;  
• Taking into account the different tariff stru ctures between devel oped and developing 
countries;  and  
• Proportionality of commitments by requiring deve loping Members to undertake lesser tariff 
reduction commitments than th eir developed counterparts; 
• Operationally effective special and differential treatment for developing countries as a cross-
cutting issue. 
 
2. The Special Products and the Special Safegua rd Mechanism for developing countries are 
stand-alone provisions, which have  additionally been provided for among others for addressing their 
food security, livelihood security and rural development needs. 
3. G-33 would like to engage constructively in op erationalising and making effective the special 
and differential treatment for developing countries acro ss all aspects of the market access pillar, which 
has been explicitly provided for in the Framework. 
4. The tariff reduction formula recognizes the differe nt tariff structures of various Members.  
The tariff structures in most developing countries are more or less 'flat' which implies that the 
majority of their tariff lines will be subject to one particular rate of reducti on determined by the band 
or the tier in which these tariff lin es fall.  The levels of tariffs across developing countries, however, 
vary.  Those developing countries with already low tariffs have little capacity to undertake further 
significant cuts without disrupting their rural economies. 
5. There are many developing countries, which opted for ceiling bindings during the Uruguay 
Round.  Tariffs are the only instruments available to these countries for protecting their farmers.  It is important that the method of tariff reduction an d the numbers negotiated are such that these 
developing Members are not called upon to pay an i nordinately high, and iniquitous, price in these 
negotiations.  This would ensure that, the special  and differential treatment given to them in 
recognition of the condition of their agricultural sectors,  which enabled them to join in the Agriculture 
Agreement during the Uruguay Round would not be comp letely nullified in this round.  This is of 
great significance as the agriculture sectors of all such countries are underdeveloped and consist in 
large part of low income or resource poor farmers.  Agricultural development in these countries is not 
primarily related to international markets.  Lack or  infirmities of institutions and lack of adequate and 
comparable infrastructure have a much greater bearing on development of their agriculture sectors, which are not expected to change substantially in th e short or even in the medium term.  We need to 
take into account such situations also in de termining the thresholds for different bands. 
6. Developing countries in general do not apply ta riff rate quotas (TRQs).  It is not even 
desirable to add unnecessary complexity to their trade policies through TRQs regimes.  TRQ was an 
instrument used during the Uruguay Round to main tain current or the minimum access commitments 
mainly in developed countries when they changed over to tariff only regimes.  Sensitive products 
intended to take into account the sensitive nature of such products, which entail some expansion of 
TRQs will, therefore, be an instrument primarily  for managing sensitivities in developed countries.  
For most developing countries, it may not be an appropriate instrument for addressing their  TN/AG/R/17 
 Page 15 
 
 
sensitivities.  G-33 believes that the effective mean s of addressing their concerns is mainly through 
negotiating an appropriate rate of ta riff reduction and the Special Products.  
7. The principle of proportionality of tariff re duction commitments between developed and 
developing countries provided for in paragraph 40 of the "July Framework"2 is the essential basis for 
ensuring an operationally effective special and differe ntial instrument for developing countries.  It 
essentially means that the tariff reductions co mmitted to by developing countries will be 
proportionally less than those of developed countries.  In that regard, the G-33 would not want to see 
tariff reduction on non-sensitive products in develo ped countries as the only basis for calculating the 
proportionality of the commitments to be undertaken by developing countries.    
8. Finally, the G-33 is of the view that the calculation of ad valorem  equivalents will influence 
the number and thresholds of tariff bands.  In this regard, it is important to ensure that work on the 
calculation of AVE be done carefully.  In conclusion , Kenya would like to have Harbinson's text on a 
basis text on a basis for further work on tariff escalation. 
                                                      
2 Document WT/L/579 of 2 August 2004: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 04 . 
 TN/AG/R/17 
Page 16  
 
Statement by Mauritius
 
(Statement made at the informal Special Session on 16 November 2004)  
 
 Process  
 
Thank you Chair.  1. I will focus my intervention on the issues of Procedure and Process. 
2. A few months back, in a different capacity, I dr ew the attention of the Committee to a number 
of elements which would be necessary for the pr ocess to move ahead smoothly and conclusively, 
namely the need for inclusiveness, political owners hip and participation.  These points were well 
taken by you Chair, and by other Members and we managed to get a Framework Agreement.  Efforts 
were made by the big players but also by the smal l ones.  The G90 meeting of July in Mauritius, it 
would be recalled was a landmark in that respect. 
3. We were successful because we had been ab le to involve each and everyone and every 
sensitivity. 
4. In October, there was a slow start, this was in fact a warming-up exercise. 
5. The past two days, were extremely useful.  The Room D procedure has proved to be the best 
way to involve one and all.  At the end of the day, no one feels ambushed and we all learn from listening to each other. 
6. The process that we have initiated shows encour aging signs, we are on the right track and a 
good atmosphere has prevailed during these past two days.  
7. Chair, at the risk of repeating myself, it would reemphasise that process is critical, it should 
ensure political ownership and include as a ke y element an open-ended system where each and 
everyone is heard. 
TRQ Administration   
 
8. Mauritius made the following points: 
9. Paragraph 35 incorporates a good S&D element, in pa rticular the last part thereof.  This part 
provides an interesting negotiating hook for developi ng countries to ensure that they fully benefit 
from the market access opportunities afforded under the tariff rate quotas. 
10. When looking at the S&D element, as our colleague from Kenya has made the point earlier, 
S&D should not be seen from a narrow angle, it should be seen from the broad perspective.  The objective being to ensure full benefits to the DCs.  Th e other issue that we have also to look at, at a 
point in time, is that whatever means of allocation that we may have to put in place should not be detrimental to the DCs. 
11. In this regard, paragraph 6 of Attachment One of Rev 1 has an interesting language on S&D.  
Indeed, the S&D element has been given due atte ntion in the context of the Harbinson process, 
accordingly, there are certain elements of this Attachment whic h have to be kept. 
12. We agree with the other intervenants that pa ragraph 2 of Attachment One needs a significant 
overhaul.  TN/AG/R/17 
 Page 17 
 
 
Tropical Products 
 
13. Mauritius raised the following points with a view to facilitate technical work on the 
controversial issue of tropical products: 
(i) Whether it would not be more appropriate to  refer to "exporting interests" rather than 
"offensive interest", as suggested by the pr oponents of paragraph 43, indeed paragraph 44 
also refers to exporting interests; 
(ii) Whether the reference to M.F.N as proposed by Costa Rica and the others, applies only to 
developing countries exporters or also to developed countries exporters of tropical goods; 
(iii) The relevance for Secretariat to underta ke a study on tropical products may lead to 
controversy as there is no agreed list, in fact it would put the Secretariat in an embarrassing 
situation where it would have to take sides;  however, to enable work to proceed, Members 
could agree that the Secretariat works on the Mont real list with the strict proviso that it be 
without prejudice to the interests of Members;   regarding market shares, the movement in 
market shares from 1995 to 2003 should also be analyzed; 
(iv) What is the incidence of the GSP system in facilitating trade of tropical products; 
(v) While noting that according to some of the proponents of paragraph 43, they already 
accounted for 60 per cent of world share in tr opical products, it was pointed out that it should 
be ensured that this figure does not become 100 per cent, as this would imply that many small 
island developing states would be wiped out in the process; 
(vi) Referring to the point made by Peru that  implementation of para 43 was essential for 
rendering  S&D provision operational, Mauritiu s pointed out to the potential conflicts 
between paragraphs 43 and 44 and on the need  to find the convergence between these two 
paragraphs.   
14. It was indicated that Mauritius would circulat e its statement as a note to facilitate technical 
work. TN/AG/R/17 
Page 18  
 
Statements made in th e Formal Special Session  
 
 
Statement by Croatia on behalf of Albani a, Croatia, Georgia, Jordan, Moldova and Oman  
 
 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
 1. Speaking today on behalf of the six recently acceded members, namely Albania, Croatia, 
Georgia, Jordan, Moldova and Oman, I would lik e to thank you for providing us with the 
organizational fax well in advance of our meeting.  Such a carefully prepared set of questions enabled 
members to create constructive and positive atmosphere  that provoked interesting exchanges of views.  
We would like to thank you also for very interesting introductory remarks. 
2. We were encouraged by the spirit of engage ment displayed by all the members during the 
process embarked upon after the July package.  Ev en though we managed to achieve some progress 
during our discussions, we still feel that we have si gnificant amount of work ahead of us.  Numerous 
differences which were evident in th is week's discussions demonstrated  clearly how hard it is to single 
out technical issues from the universe of issues in the agriculture negotiations.  Under your skilful 
guidance Mr. Chairman we managed to stay focused most of the time in our technical discussions regardless of the complexity of issues at stake and political linkages that exist between them. 
3. Nevertheless, we believe it is clear by now that we should intensify our work in the next 
couple of months with an aim to reach the ag reement on modalities by the Hong Kong Conference.  
We agree with you that some first sketches of a future agreement should be established by the middle 
of next year, and I can assure you that you'll have our full support in this process.  If we do not want 
to lose the momentum and the good spirit we created so far within negotiati ng group, we believe we 
should move rapidly and start to engage in more in-depth discussi ons during next meetings.  Those 
discussions should include core matters  of interest to all the members, and we invite you to draft an 
outline for the future discussions that would incorporate such issues.  
4. Members of our group believe that all issues  should be treated on the equal footing and 
negotiated simultaneously.  This a pproach would provide this negotiating group with more space and 
room for compromises.  On the other hand, insi sting on separate discussions on certain issues where 
there is extreme divergence of positions could result in lots of dead ends.  
5. On the Room F process Mr. Chairman, our group be lieves that the principle of transparency 
should be preserved in these negotiations.  We unde rstand your intention to scrutinize the work done 
in first two readings on certain issues even further,  but at the same time we believe we have to find 
out the way to ensure that interests of all Members are reflected in the process.  In this regard we 
welcome the idea of video conference, but we shoul d perhaps think about some other approaches as 
well. 
6. We commend your efforts to establish some kind of seminar infrastructure for the delegates 
from Geneva, which would provide them with ne cessary background information on the negotiating 
topics under consideration of Special session.  Me mbers of our group could well appreciate such 
efforts, since nearly all of our countries have sma ll delegations in Geneva, which are often not in the 
position to participate in all the important meetings.  In that regard, steps that would result in better 
understanding of the entire process are more than we lcome, and we encourage you to proceed with the 
necessary preparations.  TN/AG/R/17 
 Page 19 
 
 
Mr. Chairman,  7. RAM's have been carefully listening the discussions  held so far during this week.  We have 
refrained from participating at this stage, because we thought that our position and our sensitivities have been communicated to members during our prev ious discussions.  RAM's have been requiring 
flexibilities in the areas of MA and DS, and asked fo r the possibility to use the mechanism of SSM.  
We would be persistently pursuing these goals in our  next meetings in a more active manner in order 
to contribute to the balanced and equitabl e result at the end of the negotiating process. 
Thank you Mr. Chairman. TN/AG/R/17 
Page 20  
 
 
Statement by the Republic of Moldova
 
  
Thank you, Mr Chairman.     
1. First of all, on behalf of our delegation, I s hould like to point out that agriculture is a key 
feature of our country's life.  The economic develo pment of Moldova, as an agrarian country, largely 
depends on the results of this negotiating r ound, particularly in the agricultural sector. 
2. For the Republic of Moldova, therefore, the lib eralization of market access for agricultural 
products through the reduction or elimination of tariff  peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation, as well 
as through the elimination of non-tariff barriers, is th e most important pillar in  this negotiating round. 
3. Secondly, we share the view of the various  delegations that the conversion of non ad valorem  
duties into ad valorem  duties is a highly important requirement at this stage of the negotiations.  For 
that reason, the methodology should be simple and transparent.   
4. Regarding the formula and special products, we note that proposals are to be made during the 
forthcoming meetings of the Committee. 
5. At the same time, our delegation hopes that due account is taken, when establishing the 
formula and as provided in the Doha Declaration, of the existing level of border protection implemented by Members, particularly recent new WTO Members, as a result of contributions already made to the multilateral trading system during their accession. 
6. We also feel that the formula should take account  of the needs of all Members, particularly 
the low-income countries in trans ition and the developing countries. 
7. Consequently, we endorse the proposals by many of the Members who have stressed in the 
recent negotiations that the low-income transiti on countries and the develo ping countries should 
contribute less than the developed countries.  This will serve to eliminate the existing imbalance in 
respect of agricultural market access fo r developing and developed countries. 
8. I would add that this is very important becau se tariffs are currently the only instrument of 
border protection available to Moldova.   
9. With regard to special safeguard measures unde r Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture, 
the European Union has stated that it is in favour  of a discussion of the special safeguard mechanism 
for developing countries.  I would point out that th is is a subject of great importance to Moldova. 
Thank you, Mr Chairman. 
 
 
__________