WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/TF/W/4 
12 January 2005 
 (05-0119) 
Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation  
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE X OF GATT 1994 – SCOPE AND APPLICATION  
 
Note by the Secretariat  
  
 
 
   
 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. As the last part of a series of updates of Secretariat papers on the three GATT provisions 
under discussion in the ongoing negotiations on trade facilitation, the present document revises a 
previous note on Article X.
1  Apart from some changes of an organizational nature, the paper also 
modifies the jurisprudence section, bringing it up to date  with the latest developments in this field.   
II. STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER 
2. The first section of the document takes a look at the Article's current text, followed by a brief 
review of its negotiating history.  It then draws atte ntion to Article X's covera ge, before turning to an 
analysis of the resulting obligations. A final s ection introduces the guidance obtained by dispute 
settlement rulings on the Article's interpre tation under both the GATT and the WTO.   
III. TEXT OF THE PROVISION  
1. Laws, regulations, judicial de cisions and administrative rulings  of general application, made 
effective by any contracting party2, pertaining to the classification or the valuation of products for 
customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements, restrictions or 
prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer of payments therefor, or  affecting their sale, 
distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing, inspection, exhibition, processing, mixing or other 
use, shall be published promptly in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become 
acquainted with them.  Agreements affecting international trade polic y which are in force between the 
government or a governmental agency of any cont racting party and the government or governmental 
agency of any other contracting party shall also be published.  The provisions  of this paragraph shall 
not require any contracting party  to disclose confidential information which would impede law 
enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the publ ic interest or would prejudice the legitimate 
commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private. 
                                                      
1 G/C/W/374, 14 May 2002. 
2 See also the Explanatory Notes 2 (a) and (b) of GATT 1994.   This document has been prepa red under the Secretariat's own 
responsibility and without prejudice to the positions of 
Members and to their rights and obligations under the WTO TN/TF/W/4 
Page 2  
 
  
2 No measure of general application taken by any contracting party effecting an advance in a 
rate of duty or other charge on imports under an es tablished and uniform practice, or imposing a new 
or more burdensome requirement, rest riction or prohibition on imports, or on the transfer of payments 
therefor, shall be enforced before such measure has been officially published. 
 
3. (a) Each contracting party shall adminis ter in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner 
all its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings of th e kind described in paragraph 1 of this Article. 
  (b) Each contracting party shall maintain, or  institute as soon as practicable, judicial, 
arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and 
correction of administrative action re lating to customs matters.  Such tribunals or procedures shall be 
independent of the agencies entrusted with admin istrative enforcement and th eir decisions shall be 
implemented by, and shall govern the practice of, such agencies unless an appeal is lodged with a court 
or tribunal of superior jurisdicti on within the time prescribed for appeals to be lodged by importers;  
Provided that the central administration of such agency  may take steps to obtain a review of the matter 
in another proceeding if there is good cause to believe that the decision is inconsistent with established 
principles of law or the actual facts.   (c)  The provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph shall not require the 
elimination or substitution of procedures in force in the territory of a contracting party on the date of 
this Agreement which in fact provide for an objective  and impartial review of administrative action even 
though such procedures are not fully or formally  independent of the agencies entrusted with 
administrative enforcement.  Any contracting party employing such procedures shall, upon request, 
furnish the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES  with full information thereon in or der that they may determine whether 
such procedures conform to the re quirements of this sub-paragraph.  
 
IV. NEGOTIATING HISTORY 
3. Article X was partly based on Articles 4 and 6 of the 1923 International Convention Relating to 
the Simplification of Customs Formalities .3  Most of its provisions can already be found in the Geneva 
Draft of the Havana Charter, whose Article 37 concurs with Article X, except for the requirement for 
governments to supply the organization with copies of their laws and regulations.4  The Geneva text was 
altered at the Havana Conference.  It was decided to  change the provision prohibiting the enforcement of 
certain measures of gene ral application prior to their official publication,  by replacing the words "made  
public"  with the term "published" .  The Havana Reports note that Members agreed that the provision 
"did not require the prior public issue of an offici al document, but that the effect could also be 
accomplished by an official announcement made in the legislature of the country concerned" .5  
Furthermore, the Havana Confer ence added the obligation that "suitable facilities shall be afforded for 
traders directly affected by any of those matters [the respective laws and regulations]  to consult with the 
appropriate governmental authorities" .6 
4. None of these alterations were carried into the GATT, whose Article X remained unchanged.  
                                                      
3 E/PC/T/C.II/W.41, E/PC/T /C.II/54/Rev.1, p. 29. 
4 This obligation, contained in paragraph 1 of th e Geneva Draft Charter, was not carried into the 
GATT. 
5 Havana Reports, U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/8, p. 79, para. 52.  
6 Havana Reports, U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/8, p. 79 para. 52.   TN/TF/W/4 
 Page 3 
 
 
 V. COVERAGE 
A. GENERAL  
5. Article X's paramount objective is to allow for a certain transparency in the publication and 
administration of trade regulations.  A report of the Technical Sub-Committee to the Drafting 
Committee drawing up the Havana Charter notes:  "It was agreed that, as far as possible, prompt and 
adequate publicity should be given to change in laws and regulations af fecting foreign trade" .7   
B. PARAGRAPH 1 
6. Paragraph 1 requires each contracting party to promptly publis h its laws, regulations, judicial 
decisions and administrative rulings of general appli cation that affect imports and exports.  Agreements 
affecting international trade policy sh all be published as well.  The publication must be of such form " as 
to enable governments and traders to  become acquainted with them" .  To address concerns about 
possible negative side-effects arisi ng from this notification requirement , it is stated that paragraph 1 
"shall not require any contracting pa rty to disclose confidential information which would impede law 
enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the publ ic interest or would prejudice the legitimate 
commercial  interests of particular enterprises, public or private."   
7. While the Geneva Draft provision requiring gov ernments to communicate copies of their 
respective laws to the ITO was not carried into th e GATT, Members agreed in 1964 to recommend such 
conduct.8  The notification requirements were reaffirmed  and strengthened in the Tokyo Round.  A 1979 
Understanding stat ed that parties "… undertake, to the maximum ex tent possible, to notify the 
CONTRACTING  PARTIES of their adoption of trade measures af fecting the operation of the General 
Agreement…" .9  The Understanding calls for an endea vour to notify measures prior to their 
implementation, but provides for the opportunity to notify ex post facto , where advance notification has 
not been possible.  The following years saw a furt her strengthening as well  as an expansion of 
notification and publication requirements, both in te rms of general decisions10 and specific provisions 
contained in the GATT.  The 1994 Ministerial Decision on Notificati on Procedures incorporated the 
1979 Understanding and further provided for a central Secr etariat registry of notif ications and review of 
procedures by the Council for Trade in Goods.   
C. PARAGRAPH 2 
8. According to this paragraph, no party is allowe d to enforce certain measures prior to their 
official publication.  The measures covered by this  obligation include those:   
(i) effecting an advance in a duty rate or other ch arge on imports under an  established and uniform 
practice, or 
(ii) imposing a new or more burdensome requirement , restriction or prohibition on imports, or on 
the transfer of payments therefore.   
                                                      
7 U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/54/Rev.1 p. 28. 
8 Recommendation on Cooperation in the Field of  Trade Information an d Trade Promotion:  
"Contracting parties should forward promptly to the secretariat copies of the laws, regulations, decisions, rulings and agreements of the kind described in paragraph 1 of Article X if the General Agreement, together 
with such other information they consider relevant to the objectives of this Recommendation;"   The 
recommendation even went beyond the Geneva proposal in noting that "should use their best endeavors to assist 
in the identification of market oppor tunities, including the exchange of mar ket research studies ... and to provide 
any other assistance deemed appropriate which woul d further the objectives of the services".  BISD 125/50, 1964. 
9 L/4907, adopted on 28 November 1979, BISD 26S/210, para. 3. 
10 See for example the decision s of 12 April 1989 on the "Functioning of the GATT System"  and on the 
creation of a Trade Policy Review Mechanism.   TN/TF/W/4 
Page 4  
 
 D. P
ARAGRAPH 3  
9. Paragraph 3 calls on Members to administer a ll their laws, regulations, decisions as well as 
rulings of the kind listed in paragraph 1, in a "uniform, impartial and reasonable manner".  It further 
requires every Member to maintain or institute j udicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or 
procedures "as soon as practicable" , for the purpose of, inter alia , prompt review and correction of 
administrative action relating to customs matters.  Certain guarantees are made with respect to their 
independence.  The provision obliges those tribunals or  procedures to be independent of the agencies 
in charge of the administrative enforcement.  Furthermore, their decisions shall normally be 
implemented by those administrative enforcement ag encies, except for the case of an appeal by an 
importer with a court or tri bunal of superior jurisdiction.11  This is important as it ensures that it is not 
the same entity that makes both the decision and takes care of its implementation.   
10. An exception is made for procedures, which "in fact" provide for an objective and impartial 
review of administrative action, even though they are not fully independent  of the administrative 
enforcement agencies, if they  have already been in force "on the date of the Agreement ".12  Any party 
wishing to employ such procedures is, however, required to notify them to the other parties upon 
request.   
VI. BASIC OBLIGATIONS 
11. In essence, Article X requires a party to:  
(i) publish its trade-related laws, re gulations, rulings and agreements  in a prompt and accessible 
manner (paragraph 1); 
(ii) abstain from enforcing measures of general applic ation prior to their publ ication (paragraph 2);  
and 
(iii) administer the above- mentioned laws, regulations, rulings and agreements in  a uniform, impartial  
and reasonable manner.  In this context, parties are required to in stitute or maintain tribunals or 
procedures for the, inter alia , prompt review and correction of administrative action relating to 
customs matters (Paragraph 3).   
VII. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION  
12. Article X has been applied by GATT and WTO pa nels as well as by the Appellate Body on 
various occasions.  The following section outlines th eir main findings on the interpretation of key 
provisions of this Article.13   
A. G ENERAL  
13. The Appellate Body in EC - Poultry  described the scope of Ar ticle X as follows:   
                                                      
11 This exception requires "that the central administration of such agency may take steps to obtain a 
review of the matter in another proceeding if there is good cause to believe that the decision is inconsistent with 
established principles of law or the actual  facts".  
12 According to Article XXVI:1, "The date of the Agreement shall be 30 October 1947". 
13 The note limits itself to an outline of the panels' findings that are relevant for an interpretation of key 
provisions of GATT Articles V, VIII and X.  It does not intend to be a comprehensive analysis of all findings 
related to those Articles that have been made by GATT/WTO dispute settlement panels.  TN/TF/W/4 
 Page 5 
 
 
 "Article X relates to the publication  and administration  of 'laws, regulations, judicial 
decisions and administrative rulings of general application', rather than to the 
substantive content  of such measures".14   
 
14. Consequently, the Appellate Body held that, to the extent that the complainant's appeal relates 
to the substantive content of the respondent's rules themselves , and not to their publication or 
administration, such an appeal woul d fall outside the scope of Article X.15   
B. PARAGRAPH 1 
15. Interpretative guidance has been given wi th respect to the following terms:  
(i) "of general application" 
 16. In US – Underwear , the Appellate Body upheld the panel's interpretation  
"… that Article X:1 of GATT 1994, whic h … uses the language 'of general 
application', includes 'administrative rulings ' in its scope.  The mere fact that the 
restraint at issue was an administrative orde r does not prevent us from concluding that 
the restraint was a measure of general applic ation.  Nor does the fact that it was a 
country-specific measure exclude the possib ility of it being a measure of general 
application.  If, for instance, the restraint was addressed to a specific company or applied to a specific shipment, it would not  have qualified as a measure of general 
application.  However, to the extent that th e restraint affects an unidentified number of 
economic operators, including domestic a nd foreign producers, we find it to be a 
measure of general application".
16   
 17. In EC – Poultry , the Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding that the withholding of 
information regarding a specific shipment was not inc onsistent with Article X as  being outside its scope. 
It noted that:   
"… Article X does not deal with specific tran sactions, but rather with 'rules of general 
application'.  (…)  Although it is true … th at any measure of general application will 
always have to be applied in specific cases, nevertheless the specific treatment 
accorded to each individual shipment cannot be considered a 'measure of general application' within the meaning of Article X".
17   
 
18. The Appellate Body further agreed with the panel that:   
                                                      
14 Appellate Body Report,  European Communities – Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain 
Poultry Products, ("EC – Poultry") , WT/DS69/AB/R, adopted 23 July 1998, para. 115.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, 
("US – Underwear"), WT/DS24/R, adopted 25 February 1997, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS24/AB/R, para. 21.   
17 Appellate Body Report, EC – Poultry, WT/DS69/AB/R, paras. 111 and 113.  See also Panel Report, 
US – Underwear,  WT/DS24/R, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS24/AB/R, para. 7.65. 
Confirmed in  United States, Sunset Review of Anti-dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from Japan , Report of the Panel, WT/DS244/R para. 7.309. TN/TF/W/4 
Page 6  
 
 "conversely, licenses issued to a specific company or applied to a specific shipment 
cannot be considered to be a measure of 'general application' within the meaning of Article X".
18   
 
19. In the Japan – Film case, the panel referred to the panel Report on US – Underwear  when 
interpreting the term "of genera l application" as follows:   
"…inasmuch as the Article X:1 requirement applies to all administrative rulings of 
general application, it should also extend to administrative rulings in individual 
cases where such rulings establish or revise principles or criteria applicable in 
future cases".19  
 
(ii) "published promptly in su ch a manner as to enable governm ents and traders to become 
acquainted with them" 
 
20. In EEC – Dessert Apples the (GATT) panel found that publicati on in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities did fulfill Ar ticle X:1's requirement to promptly publish a measure in a manner 
as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with it.  The panel noted that no time-limit or delay between publication and entry into force was specified by this provision.  On the other hand, it 
held that Article X:1 would prohi bit the use of backdated quotas.
20  Identical findings were made in the 
EEC – Apples case.21   
21. In Canada – Alcoholic Drinks , the panel held that Article X:   
"… did not require contracting parties to ma ke information affecting trade available to 
domestic and foreign suppliers at the same time, not did it re quire contracting parties to 
publish trade regulations in advanc e of their entry into force".22   
 22. The sharing of information relating to price pol icy of governmental authorities with domestic 
brewers before that information wa s available to foreign authorities,  as well as the announcement of a 
new pricing policy in the legislature only five days before it entered into effect, were therefore not a 
violation of Article X.   
23. However, referring to paragr aph 1's requirement to promp tly publish all laws and the 
relationship of that requirement to the provisions of Article X:3 (a), the panel in the Argentina –Bovine 
Hides  case noted that:   
"While it is normal that the GATT 1994 shoul d require this sort of transparency 
between Members, it is significant that Article X:1 goes further and specifically references the importance of transparency to individual traders.  Thus, it can be seen that Article X:3(a) requires an examination of the real effect that a measure might have on traders operating in the commercial wo rld.  This, of course, does not require 
a showing of trade damage, as that is gene rally not a requirement with respect to 
                                                     
 
18 Appellate Body Report, EC – Poultry, WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 113.  
19 Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer P hotographic Film and Paper, ("Japan – 
Film"),  WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 April 1998, para. 10.388. 
20 Panel Report, EEC – Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples ("EEC – Dessert Apples) , L/6304, 
adopted on 22 March 1988, BISD 35S/37, 88 –89, para. 4.20. 
21 Panel Report, EEC – Restrictions on Imports of Apples  ("EEC – Apples"),  L/6513, adopted on 
22 June 1989, BISD 36S/135, 166-167, paras. 5.20 – 5.23. 
22 Panel Report, Canada – Import, Distribution, and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial 
Marketing Agencies, ("Canada – Alcoholic Drinks"),  DS17/R, adopted on 18 February 1992, BISD 39S/27, 
85-86, para. 5.34.    TN/TF/W/4 
 Page 7 
 
 
 violations of the GATT 1994.  But it can involve an examination of whether there is 
a possible impact on the competitive situation due to alleged partiality, unreasonableness or lack of uniformity in the application of customs rules, regulations, decisions, etc".
23   
 
C. PARAGRAPH 2 
24. According to the Appellate Body in US – Underwear,  
"Article X:2 …. may be seen to embody a pr inciple of fundamental importance – that 
of promoting full disclosure of governmen tal acts affecting Members and private 
persons and enterprises, whether of domes tic or foreign nationality.  The relevant 
policy principle is widely known as the pr inciple of transparen cy and has obviously 
due process dimensions.  The essential impl ication is that Memb ers and other persons 
affected, or likely to be affected, by governmental measures imposing restraints, 
requirements and other burdens, should ha ve a reasonable opportunity to acquire 
authentic information about su ch measures and accordingly to protect and adjust their 
activities or alternatively to seek  modification of such measures".24   
 
25. The Appellate Body further addressed the i ssue of whether Article X:2 prohibits the 
retroactive application of transitional safeguard m easures under the ATC Agreements, observing that:   
"Article X:2 … does not speak to, and hence not resolve, the  issue of permissibility 
of giving retroactive effect to a safeguard restraint measure.  (….) Where no 
authority exists to give retroactive effect  to a restrictive governmental measure, that 
deficiency is not cured by publishing the measure sometime before its actual application".
25 
 
D. PARAGRAPH 3 
1. General 
26. In EC – Bananas III, the panel dismissed the argument that paragraph 3 applies only to internal 
measures.  It held that :   
"internal laws regulating border measures  constitute '…requirements … on imports….' 
in the meaning of Article X:1 [defining Article X:3(a)'s cove rage] and cannot be 
excluded from its scope".26   
 
27. According to the panel's ruling, Article X:3's sc ope would include licensing regulations for tariff 
quotas.27   
                                                      
23 Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished 
Leather ("Argentina – Bovine Hides"),  WT/DS155/R, adopted 16 February 2001, paras. 11.76 and 11.77. 
24 Appellate Body Report,  US – Underwear", WT/DS24/R, para. 21. 
25 Ibid., para. 22. 
26 Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas ("EC – Bananas III"),  WT/DS27/R/GTM, adopted 25 September 1997, as modified by the Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 7.206. 
27 Ibid., paras. 7.206 and 7.225. TN/TF/W/4 
Page 8  
 
 2. Subparagraph a 
(a) Scope 
28. In the US – Stainless Steel  case, the panel rejected Korea's claim that the United States had 
violated paragraph 3(a) by depar ting from its own established policy regarding the determination of 
local sales prices.  The panel reasoned that Article X:3(a)  
"was not in our view intended to function as  a mechanism to test the consistency of a 
Member's particular decisions  or rulings with the Member's own domestic law and 
practice; that is a function reserved for eac h Member's domestic j udicial system, and a 
function WTO panels would be particularly ill -suited to perform. (…)  In our view, the 
requirement of uniform admini stration of laws and regulations must be understood to 
mean uniformity of treatment in respect of persons similarly situated;  it cannot be 
understood to require identical results wher e relevant factors differ.  Nor do we 
consider that the requirement of reasonable  administration of laws and regulations is 
violated merely because, in the administration of those laws and regulations, different conclusions were reached based upon di fferences in the relevant facts".
28   
 
29. Different form requirements among EU member St ates for import license applications , as well 
as differences with respect to the requirement of  pro-forma invoices within these countries, were 
considered minimal  and not in themselves a breach of Article X:3 by a GATT panel in the EEC – 
Dessert Apples  case.29   
30. Similarly, in EC – Bananas III,  the Appellate Body stated that Article X:3(a) would not 
preclude the imposition of one system of import lice nsing procedures on a product originating in certain 
Members and a different syst em on the same product originating in other Members.30  According to the 
Appellate Body,  
"The text of Article X:3(a) clearly indi cates that the requirements of 'uniformity, 
impartiality and reasonableness' do not appl y to the laws, regulations, decisions and 
rulings themselves , but rather to the administration  of those laws, regulations, 
decisions and rulings.  The context of Article X:3(a) within Article X, which is entitled 'Publication and Administration of Trade Re gulations', and a reading of the other 
paragraphs of Article X, make it clear that Article X applies to the administration of laws, regulations, deci sions and rulings.  To the extent that the laws, regulations, 
decision and rulings themselves are discriminatory, they can be examined for their 
consistency with the relevant provisions of the GATT 1994".
31  
 
31. This was reaffirmed in a later panel ruling on the matter ( US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel 
Sunset Review) , holding that:   
"It is well-established that only the admi nistration of laws a nd regulations can be 
challenged under Article X:3(a) , not the laws and regulations themselves.  Substantive 
                                                      
28 Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless 
Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea ("US – Stainless Steel"),  WT/DS179/R, adopted 1 February 2001, paras. 6.50 – 
6.51.  
29 Panel Report, EEC – Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples , L/6491, paras. 6.3 – 6.6 and 12.30. 
30 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution 
of Bananas, ("EC – Bananas"),  WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, paras. 200 – 201. 
31 Ibid., para. 200.  TN/TF/W/4 
 Page 9 
 
 
 contents of laws and regulations can be ch allenged under relevant provisions of the 
covered agreements".32   
 
32. In Argentina – Bovine Hides , the panel rejected the respondent's  claim that Arti cle X:3(a) would 
only apply to situations of discrimination between WTO Members .33  The panel reasoned that Article 
X:3(a) 
"Nowhere …. refer(s) to Me mbers or products originating in or destined for certain 
Members' territories (…)".34   
 33. Referring to paragraphs 1 and 3(b) of the same Article, and highlighti ng their focus on private 
traders as main beneficiaries of the obligations es tablished in those provisions, the panel found that 
Article X could not be reduced to apply onl y to incidents of di scrimination between Members .
35   
34. The panel further rejected Argentina's argument th at a violation of paragraph 3(a) could only be 
found in the  administration of a regulation, not in its substance .  It held that:   
"If the substance of a rule could not be chal lenged, even if the rule was administrative 
in nature, it is unclear what could ever be challenged under Article X".36   
 35. According to the panel, resolutions of an admini strative nature were "properly subject to review 
under Article X:3(a)".  Read in conjuncti on with the Appellate Body's finding in the EC – Poultry  case 
that "Article X relates to the publication  and administration  of 'laws, regulations, judicial decisions and 
administrative rulings of general application', rather than to the substantive content  of such measures"
37, 
this suggests that, while Article X's focus is on th e administration of the above-mentioned regulations, a 
Member can nevertheless challenge th e substance of a rule, if that rule is administrative in nature.   
  "In a uniform, impar tial and reasonable manner" 
 
36. In US – Hot-Rolled Steel , the panel held that, for a Member's measure to violate paragraph 3(a), 
it would have to have a significant impact on the ove rall administration of that  Member's law as opposed 
to a mere impact on the outcome in the individual cas e in question.  The panel was of the view that: 
 "While it is not inconceivable that a Member's actions in a single instance might be evidence of  
lack of uniform, impartial, and reasonable admi nistration of its laws, regulations, decisions and 
rulings, we consider that the actions in question would have to have a significant impact on the 
overall administration of the law, and not simply on the outcome in the singl e case in question.  
Moreover, we consider it unlikely that such a c onclusion could be reached where actions in the 
single case in question were, themselves, consiste nt with more specific obligations under other 
WTO Agreements".38  
 
                                                      
32 Panel Report, United States – Sunset Review of Anti-dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon 
Steel Flat Products from Japan , WT/DS244/R, adopted 9 January 2004, para. 7.289. 
33 Argentina had argued that paragraph 3(a) was only applicable to cases of discriminatory treatment 
regarding, for example, exports to two or more Members. For details see Panel Report, Argentina – Bovine 
Hides, WT/DS155/R. 
34 Ibid., para. 11.68. 
35 Ibid., paras. 11.67 – 11.68. 
36 Ibid., para. 11.71. 
37 Appellate Body Report, EC –Poultry, WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 115.  
38 Panel Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel , WT/DS184/R, adopted on 23 August 2001, para. 7.268. 
Affirming reference to this ruling was also made in Unites States – Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan , Panel Report, WT/DS244/R of 14 August 2003. TN/TF/W/4 
Page 10  
 
 37. According to the panel in Argentina – Bovine Hides , the test of whether there has been a 
violation of a Member's obligation to  administer its laws in a uniform , impartial and reasonable manner,  
"… generally will not be whether there has been discriminatory tr eatment in favor of 
exports to one Member relative to another.   Indeed, the focus is on the treatment 
accorded by government authorities  to the traders in question".
39   
 
38. With respect to the meaning of the term " uniform" , the panel noted that: 
"…this provision should not be read as a broad anti-discrimina tion provision.  We do 
not think this provision should be interprete d to require all products being treated 
equal.  That would be reading far too much  into this paragraph which focussed on the 
day to day application of Customs laws , rules and regulations.  There are many 
variations in products which might require differential tr eatment and we do not think 
this provision should be read as a gene ral invitation for a panel to make such 
distinctions".40   
 
39. On the interpretation of "impartial" , the panel observed that: 
"Whenever a party with a contrary comme rcial interest, but no relevant legal 
interest41, is allowed to participate in an export transaction such as this, there is an 
inherent danger that the Customs laws, re gulations and rules will be applied in a 
partial manner so as to permit persons with  adverse commercial interests to obtain 
confidential information to which they have no right". 
 
40. As regards "reasonable" , the panel held that: 
"… it is unreasonable to allow ADICMA [A ssociation of Industrial Producers of 
Leather, Leather Manufactures and Relate d Products] representatives into the 
Customs clearance process in light of the access to information that it affords.( … ) 
We do not see why ADICMA must have access to such information, which by its 
nature is confidential and which is made  available to it as a participant in the 
Customs clearance process for the purposes of proper classification, in order to combat fraud and mistakes with respect to assessment of export duties and awarding of export 'refunds'".
42 
41. It reasoned that: 
"… a process aimed at assuring the pr oper classification of products, ... which 
inherently contains the possibility of reveali ng confidential business information, is an 
unreasonable manner of administering the la ws, regulations and rules identified in 
Article X:1 and therefore inconsistent with Article X:3(a)".43   
 
__________ 
                                                      
39 Panel Report, Argentina – Bovine Hides,  WT/DS155/R, para. 11.76. 
40 Ibid.,  paras. 11.81 – 11.84. 
41 In a footnote, the panel stated:  "Again, we note th at there is, arguably, a 'l egal interest' created by 
RG 2235 [the Argentinian resolution allowing ADICMA re presentatives to be present when customs authorities 
inspect bovine hides and skins before export] itself. However, that is the measure in question and should not be 
seen to self-generate a legal relationship that would not otherwise exist".   
42 Panel Report, Argentina – Bovine Hides,  WT/DS155/R, para. 11.91.  The quotation does not include 
footnotes. 
43 Ibid.,  para. 11.94.