WT/DS334/R 
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  ANNEX A 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF THE FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS 
BY THE PARTIES AND WRITTEN SUBM ISSIONS BY THE THIRD PARTIES 
 
Contents Page 
Annex A-1 Executive summary of the first written submission by the 
United States (27 September 2006) A-2 
Annex A-2 Executive summary of the first written submission by Turkey 
(18 October 2006) A-10 
Annex A-3 Third party written submis sion by China (18 October 2006) A-18 
Annex A-4 Third party written submis sion by Egypt (18 October 2006) A-22 
Annex A-5 Third party written submission by the European Communities 
(18 October 2006) A-28 WT/DS334/R 
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  ANNEX A-1 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION 
BY THE UNITED STATES 
(27 September 2006) 
 
 1. Simply put, this dispute is about market access.  During the Uruguay Round, Turkey committed itself to permit imports of rice at a bound ra te of 45 percent.  Instead, Turkey has instituted 
a non-transparent, discretionary import licensing system to restrict and, at tim es, eliminate imports of 
rice.  Specifically, since 2003, Turkey has applie d a tariff-rate quota ("TRQ") for rice and has required 
licenses in order to import rice both at the in-quot a and over-quota rates.  With respect to the over-
quota rate, Turkey's Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs ("MARA") simply fails to issue 
licenses in accordance with a series of unpublished "Letters of A cceptance", in which the Minister of 
Agriculture agrees to "delay" the start date for the issuance of import licenses, or "Certificates of 
Control".  Importers who have applied for licenses ofte n wait for months or even years for a 
response to their applications, and if they do receive a response, their license applications are 
denied with little reason (e.g., spelling errors) or denied with no reason provided at all.  One 
importer went to court in October 2004 seeking a court order for the government to grant him 
an import license after his application forms were returned and ultimately denied: as of 
December 2005, his rice was still
 sitting in a warehouse while the litigation remained pending.    
 
2. With respect to the in-quota quantities, Tu rkey has made the receipt of licenses from the 
Turkish Foreign Trade Undersecretariat ("FTU") co ntingent upon the purchase of large quantities of 
domestic rice.  The amount of rice that importers are required to purchase in order to import under the TRQ is contingent on three factors: (1) the type of  rice to be imported (paddy, brown, or milled); (2) 
the source of the purchased domestic rice (the Turk ish Grain Board ("TMO"), on the one hand, or 
Turkish producers or producer associations on th e other); and (3) if purchased from Turkish paddy 
rice producers or producer associations, the region wh ere the rice originates.  As a result of this 
complicated system, the ratio of imported-to-purchased domestic rice varies greatly, depending on the interaction among the three variables, and in most cases, an importer has to purchase a larger
 quantity 
of domestic rice than the quantity of rice it wishes to import.  
 
3. Because Turkey fails to issue licenses at  the over-quota rate and Turkey closes the TRQ 
during the annual Turkish rice harvest, there is a co mplete ban on imports of  rice during the August-
October time period.  Turkey relaxes and strengthens these import licensing measures at will, often with no advance written notice to importers, and fre quently in contravention of what has been 
published in Turkey's Official Gazette.  In taki ng these measures, Turkey has acted inconsistently 
with several provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994  ("GATT 1994"), the 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures  ("Import Licensing Agreement"), the Agreement on 
Agriculture  ("Agriculture Agreement"), and  the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures  
("TRIMs Agreement").  
4. The United States has sought to avoid disput e settlement on this issue and instead reach a 
mutually acceptable solution with Turkey.  However, US attempts to resolve this issue have thus far 
been unsuccessful.  Therefore, on November 2, 20 05, the United States requested consultations with 
the Government of Turkey pursuant to Articles 1 and 4 of the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes  ("DSU"), Article XXII:1 of the GATT 1994, 
Article 6 of the Import Licensing Agreement, Articl e 8 of the TRIMs Agreement, and Article 19 of 
the Agriculture Agreement regarding Turkey's import  restrictions on US rice.  Pursuant to this 
request, the United States and Turkey held cons ultations on December 1, 2005.  These consultations 
failed to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution to this dispute.  On Febr uary 6, 2006, the United 
States requested the establishment of a panel pursuant to Article 6 of the DSU, Article 6 of the Import  WT/DS334/R 
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  Licensing Agreement, Article 8 of the TRIMs Ag reement, and Article 19 of the Agriculture 
Agreement.  The Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB" ) established the Panel on March 17 with standard 
terms of reference.  Despite th e ongoing Panel proceedings, the Unite d States remains willing to reach 
a solution to this matter with Turkey.    
5. In its first written submission, the United States advanced claims regarding (1) Turkey's 
denial of licenses to import rice at the over-quota rates (or Turkey's WTO bound rate of duty); (2) Turkey's TRQ regime, coupled with a domestic pur chase requirement, which regulates in-quota trade; 
(3) Turkey's overall import licensing regime, that is, the denial of import licenses and the TRQ, acting in conjunction to restrict rice imports and distort the Turkish rice market; as well as other claims 
related to Turkey's import regime or  restrictions on imports of rice. 
 
US Claims Relating to Turkey's Denial of Import Licenses  
 
6. Turkey's denial of licenses to import rice at or below the bound rate of duty is inconsistent 
with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 because it prohibits or restricts imports at the over-quota rate, 
and when the TRQ is closed, it acts as a complete ban on rice imports.  Turkey's denial of import licenses also constitutes discretionary import licensi ng: under Turkish law, MARA is supposed to 
grant import licenses automatically but in fact it do es not issue any licenses at all.  In addition, the 
Certificate of Control is an import license for purposes of Article XI:1, because MARA requires importers to complete an application for a Certificat e, and that application must be granted in order 
for the importation to take place.  The Certificate of Control would in any event be a prohibition or 
restriction on importation that is made effective by an "other measure" because, as the panel in India –
Autos found, Article XI:1 conveys "an intention to cover any type of measures restricting the entry of 
goods into the territory of a Member, other than t hose specifically excluded, namely, duties, taxes or 
other charges".  Turkey's failure to issue Certificates  of Control not only restricts the entry of rice into 
Turkey: in fact, it prohibits  entry other than the in-quota quantity of the TRQ. 
 7. The range of measures that Members may not in stitute or maintain under Article XI:1 is quite 
broad.  The provision encompasses all prohibitions  or restrictions on importation other than those 
enumerated, regardless of whether a Member utilizes  a quota, an import or export licensing regime, 
"or other measures" to effect the prohibition or restriction.  Several panels have characterized the 
scope of this provision as "broad" and "comprehensive".  
 8. Turkey's denial of import licenses except fo r the in-quota quantity under the TRQ constitutes 
a "prohibition" on importation for purposes of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.  A "prohibition" exists 
when it is legally impermissible to trade or bring in a particular good from another country.  Turkey's 
ban on the importation of rice outside its TRQ regi me is effected through MARA's denial of 
Certificates of Control to importers.  An importer who wants to import rice outside the TRQ regime is 
required to obtain a Certificate of Control from MARA as a condition of importation.  However, 
through a series of unpublished Letters of Acceptance, the Minister of Agriculture decided, starting in 
September 2003, that MARA would "delay" the issuance of Certificates of Control.    
9. The wording of the Letters demonstrates th at Turkey imposes a "prohibition" on imports of 
rice within the meaning of Article XI:1 as it is cl ear on their face that the Minister of Agriculture 
instructs officials in his Ministry not to issue th e Certificate of Control document to importers, and 
without such documents, importation cannot occur (u nless Turkey has re-opened its distortive TRQ).  
Specifically, in each Letter, the General Director ate recommends that there be a "delay" in the 
issuance of such Certificates over a certain period of  time, and the Minister of Agriculture signs the 
Letter to indicate his acceptance of the recommendation.   When the time period covered by a Letter is 
about to expire, the General Directorate issues a new Letter in which it recommends a further "delay" 
in the start date for issuing Certificates.  Without  a Certificate of Control, an importer cannot import 
rice into Turkey, unless Tu rkey has re-opened its TRQ and the importer purchases domestic rice.  In WT/DS334/R 
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  sum, Turkey, through its decision not to issue Certif icates of Control, effectively prohibits all imports 
of rice at its WTO bound rate (the minimum market access to which it has committed).  It is only when Turkey decides to re-open its distortive TRQ that imports may occur at all.  During the times 
when that TRQ is closed – generally from August through October, a period which tracks the Turkish 
rice harvest – there is no mechanism to import rice into  Turkey at all, a total ban on imports of rice.  
Minister Tuzmen confirmed that Certificates of Control were not being granted in a letter to 
Ambassador Portman when he stated that  "the control certificate will be issued as of April 1, 2006 ".  
 10. This situation is not unlike that in Turkey – Textiles , in which the panel found that India had 
made out a prima facie  case that Article XI:1 had been breached  by showing that Turkey's measures, 
"on their face", imposed quantitative restrictions on imports.  Similarly, in the instant dispute, the 
wording of the Letters of Acceptance is clear: the Mini ster of Agriculture gave a series of orders that 
no Certificates of Control shall be granted.  Without such Certificates, no importation can occur.  And that is exactly how MARA officials interprete d those documents, as evidenced by a May 1, 2006 
letter from a Provincial Agriculture Directorate to a Turkish importer of US rice.  The Directorate 
denied the importer's April 25, 2006 request for a Certificate of Control to import medium grain 
milled rice from the United States "since it is not possibl e to prepare a control certificate according to 
our laws and regulations".  11. Turkey's ban on the issuance of Certificates of Control, which ensured that importation of rice 
could not take place outside the TRQ regime, also  constitutes a "restriction ... on importation" 
contrary to Article XI:1.  The ordinary meaning of the word "restriction" is a "limitation on action, a 
limiting condition or regulation".  The India – Autos  panel, citing with approval this definition of 
"restriction" and recalling the broad reach of Article XI:1, stated that "any form of limitation  imposed 
on, or in relation to importation constitutes a r estriction on importation within the meaning of 
Article XI:1".  Turkey's failure to grant Certifi cates of Control to importers clearly places a limitation 
on imports.  Turkey's decision not to issue Certifi cates of Control also demonstrates that it maintains 
discretionary, or non-automatic, import licensing, th rough which it makes effective restrictions on 
importation.  In India – Quantitative Restrictions , the panel found that two aspects of India's import 
licensing system constituted discretionary import li censing, because licenses we re granted in some, 
but not in all cases, and as a result, found Article XI:1 breaches in both instances.  Here, Turkey fails 
to grant Certificates of Control 100 per cent of  the time, demonstrating that Turkey utilizes its 
discretion to impose restrictions on importation.  
 12. Because Turkey's denial of import licenses outside the TRQ is a WTO-inconsistent quantitative import restriction and also constitutes discretionary import licensing, Turkey also has 
breached Article 4.2 of the Agriculture Agreem ent.  Other panels have found, in similar 
circumstances, that where a measu re with respect to agricultural products is inconsistent with 
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, it is necessarily in consistent with Article 4.2, which provides in 
footnote 1 that, inter alia , "quantitative import restrictions" and "discretionary import licensing" are 
measures that Members may not maintain, resort to, or revert to.  In this dispute, the United States has 
demonstrated that Turkey's denial of import licenses constitutes a prohibition and restriction on importation and that, as a result, Turkey has acted inc onsistently with Article XI:1.  Similarly, Turkey 
is acting inconsistently with Artic le 4.2 of the Agriculture Agreement.  In the Uruguay Round, Turkey 
committed to permit imports of rice automatically at a rate no greater than 45 per cent ad valorem .  As 
previously described, MARA has refused to grant import licenses to importers.  This total ban on 
imports outside the TRQ constitutes a quantitative impor t restriction.  Further, Turkey's denial of 
import licenses also amounts to discretionary import licensing, because MARA does not grant 
licenses automatically.  That is, the denial of licen ses demonstrates that Turkey has the discretion to 
grant or not to grant them, and without these licen ses, importation cannot occur.  These are measures 
set out in footnote 1 to Article 4.2 as measures "of th e kind" that Turkey may not maintain, resort to, 
or revert to.     
  WT/DS334/R 
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  13. Additionally, Turkey's import licensing regime for imports outside the TRQ is non-
transparent.  For example, Turkey does not sp ecify a time frame within which import license 
applications will be appr oved or rejected and does not provide  applicants with the reasons for 
rejection.  Further, Turkey has failed to notify its import licensing regime for rice to the WTO, despite 
a US request that it do so.  Its regime therefor e is inconsistent with additional WTO provisions, 
including Articles 1.4(a) and (b) and 3.5(e) and (f) of the Import Licensing Agreement and 
Articles X:1 and X:2 of the GATT 1994.  
US Claims Relating to Turkey's TRQ Regime Requiring Domestic Purchase  
 14. Turkey's imposition of a domestic purchase requirement under its TRQ regime on importers 
of rice into Turkey is inconsistent with Artic le III:4 of the GATT 1994 because the measure treats 
imported rice less favorably than domestic rice and adversely affects the conditions of competition for 
imported rice in the Turkish market.   There are three elements that must be satisfied to establish that 
a measure is in breach of Article III:4: (1) the imported and domestic products must be "like" 
products; (2) the measure is a law, regulation, or re quirement "affecting their internal sale, offering for 
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or u se"; and (3) the imported products are treated less 
favorably than domestic products.    15. The first prong of the Article III:4 test is  whether the domestic and imported products are 
"like" products.  In general, "like" products are produc ts that have the same or similar properties.  In 
examining whether products are "like" for pur poses of Article III, several panels have found 
significant the fact that a measure distinguishes betw een a domestic and an imported product solely on 
the basis of origin.  Moreover, one panel, noting th at the statute at issue made a distinction between 
foreign and imported articles solely on the basis of or igin, found that "there is no need to demonstrate 
the existence of actually traded like products in orde r to establish a violation of Article III:4".  In this 
instance, Turkey's measures, on their face, make dist inctions with respect to rice based on whether the 
origin of rice is foreign or domestic.  The Letters  of Acceptance bar the importation of foreign rice 
into Turkey, plainly stating that Certificates of Cont rol will not be issued in order to protect producers 
of domestic rice.  The domestic purchase requirement ensures that importers of foreign rice procure domestic rice as a condition upon importation.  It is clear from the face of these measures that Turkey  
considers that foreign and domestic rice compete with each other; therefore, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that at least some  imported rice is "like" Turkish rice.   
 16. Even if Turkey's measures did not distingui sh between foreign and imported rice on the basis 
of origin, US and Turkish rice also constitute "l ike" products with respect to a more detailed 
examination.  The Appellate Body, which has found  a "relatively broad product scope" for finding 
that products are "like" for purposes of Article III: 4, narrowed down the non-exhaustive list of factors 
that might be considered in such an examination to  four: tariff classification; the "properties, nature 
and quality" of a product; a product's end-uses; and consumer preferences.  Under this test, US and 
Turkish rice are "like" products for purposes of Ar ticle III:4.  Both products are classified under 
HS 1006.  Turkey and the United States both produce the same two varieties of rice: medium-grain and long-grain.  Their end use is the same: paddy  rice and brown rice is destined for milling, and 
milled rice is destined for human consumption.  Furt her, US Calrose rice is directly competitive with 
the Turkish Osmancik variety: in March 2005, they were selling in retail outle ts in Ankara at roughly 
the same price.   17. The second element that must be demonstrated to prove that a Member has failed to observe 
its Article III:4 obligations is that a measure (1) is a law, regulation, or requirement (2) "affecting 
[the] internal sale, offering for sal e, purchase, ... or use" of the like products at issue.  The TRQ 
regime is comprised of several legal instruments,  including decrees and notifications, that were 
promulgated by FTU and published in Turkey's Offici al Gazette.  It is unclear to the United States 
whether Turkey's individual instruments should be characterized as "laws" or "regulations" but it is WT/DS334/R 
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  clear that all of these instruments are legally bi nding under Turkish law.  Regarding whether the 
domestic purchase requirement could be characterized as a "requirement", the India – Autos panel 
found that the term "requirement" encompassed obl igations which "an enterprise voluntarily accepts 
in order to obtain an advantage from the government".  In US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC) , the panel 
found that a measure containing conditions that a pe rson must satisfy to obtain an advantage from the 
government is a "requirement" for purposes of Article III:4.  Here, Turkey imposes a "requirement" 
that importers purchase domestic rice as a condition of  importation if they want to pay a reduced rate 
of duty to import rice.  Thus, the domestic purch ase requirement under the TRQ satisfies the "law, 
regulation or requirement" standard.    
18. The domestic purchase requirement also clearly affects the internal sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, and use of the like products.  The use of the word "affecting" in Article III:4 implies that a 
measure would not have to deal directly with the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase or use of a 
product, but encompasses a much broader range of potential interaction with those elements.  The 
Appellate Body has noted that the term "affecting"  should be interpreted as having a "broad scope of 
application". In the instant dispute, there can be  no doubt that the domestic purchase requirement is 
"affecting" the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, and use of rice.  It provides the only way  to 
import rice into Turkey.  Turkey does not produce sufficient quantities of rice to meet its domestic 
needs so it must import, and imports comprise a substantial portion of the Turkish rice market.  
Without documentary proof from TMO that an impor ter has purchased a specific quantity of domestic 
rice, FTU will not grant that importer an import license to bring foreign rice into Turkey.  Therefore, 
the domestic purchase requirement directly affects th e internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, and 
use of rice in Turkey.  Because domestic producers, unlike their foreign competitors, are not required 
to procure large quantities of rice from their competito rs in order to sell rice in Turkey and, unlike 
their foreign competitors, are not limited in regard  to whom they may sell their rice, the domestic 
purchase requirement has a seriously adverse ef fect on the conditions of competition between 
imported and domestic rice.  Furthermore, only domestic rice can satisfy the purchase requirement – 
imported rice is excluded from eligibility.  19. The third element that must be demonstrated to prove that a Member has failed to observe its 
Article III:4 obligations is that a measure accords im ported products less favorable treatment than like 
domestic products.  Previous panels  have found that measures are inc onsistent with Article III:4 if 
they impose requirements on foreign products that  are not imposed on domestic products; create an 
incentive to purchase and use domestic products or a disincentive to utilize imported products; or 
"adversely affect ... the equality of competitive oppor tunities of imported products in relation to like 
domestic products".  Significantly, the Appellate Body in US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC)  noted that a 
measure could still be inconsistent with Article III:4 even if unfavorable treatment did not arise in 
every instance.  On its face and by design, Turk ey's TRQ regime treats imported rice less favorably 
than domestic rice in every instance .  Imported rice cannot be sold in the domestic market under any 
circumstance unless the importer first purchases, at in flated prices, domestic rice.  Domestic rice 
producers are not subject to the same requirement in  order to bring their product to market, which 
provides them a tremendous advantage in the ma rket.  Further, because the domestic purchase 
requirement makes procuring imported rice more costly – oftentimes requiring an importer to 
purchase three or four times the quantity of domestic  rice as the quantity of foreign rice an importer 
wants to import – the domestic purchase requireme nt creates a disincentive to purchase and import 
foreign rice.  Consequently, by making the sourcing of imported rice less desirable, the domestic purchase requirement alters the decision-making calculus of domestic entities when making purchasing decisions regarding rice.  And by making  imported rice ineligible to satisfy the purchase 
requirement, the conditions of competition are alte red in favor of domestic rice.  For these reasons, 
Turkey's domestic purchase requirement accords less  favorable treatment to imported rice and hence, 
Turkey has acted inconsistently with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.     WT/DS334/R 
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  20. To the extent Turkey's domestic purchase requi rement is not viewed as a "law, regulation or 
requirement" within the meaning of Article III, th is requirement breaches Article XI:1 of the GATT 
1994, because it is a "restriction ... on importation" w ithin the meaning of Article XI:1.  The domestic 
purchase requirement clearly falls within the scope of the phrase "whether made effective through 
quotas, import or export licences or other measure s" because FTU will not issue an import license 
under the TRQ without proof of domestic purchase and the term "other measures" is broad enough to 
encompass a domestic purchase requirement.  As noted by the India – Autos  panel, "any form of 
limitation  imposed on, or in relation to importation c onstitutes a restriction on importation within the 
meaning of Article XI:1".  In this case, the domestic purchase requirement, on its face, imposes a substantial restriction on imports of rice.  Impor tation under the TRQ cannot be realized unless an 
importer purchases large quantities of domestic rice and presents proof of such purchases to FTU.  
The TRQ regime constitutes discretionary import licensing because receiving a license to import under the TRQ is non-automatic.  Rather, importa tion under the TRQ is conditioned on domestic 
purchase.  Further, the Turkish regulations have not  always specified the amount of rice that would 
need to be procured in order to receive a por tion of the quota, which has rendered importers 
completely unable to ship at times, or at best, has left them in a state of considerable uncertainty as to 
how much domestic rice they would need to procure in order to bring their shipments of foreign rice into the country.  21. Another aspect of the domestic purchase require ment – the eligibility criteria – accords less 
favorable treatment to US rice and thus, is incons istent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.  Turkish 
regulations restrict the issuance of import licenses under the TRQ to certain categories of persons, 
namely (1) domestic producers who have a permit to grow paddy rice; (2) domestic producers who 
purchase paddy rice from Turkish producer associations of which they are members; or (3) those who 
procure rice from TMO, which will undoubtedly be do mestic producers as well.  As a result of these 
criteria, only domestic rice producers, principally those with milling capacity, will be eligible to 
import rice.  This state of affairs negatively a ffects competitive conditions for imported rice in the 
Turkish marketplace.  The Turkish millers primarily want to import paddy rice to send to their milling 
facilities, increase their milling capacity, and keep  out imported milled rice which competes with 
Turkish milled rice and reduces the domestic price.  Whereas domestic producers can sell their rice to 
anyone along the production chain, from the paddy producer to the ultimate consumer, US producers 
do not have that choice.  They are not permitted to sell rice directly to consumers.  Instead, they are 
forced to market their rice through their Turkish competitors. 
 22. To the extent that the eligibility criteria to  purchase rice are not viewed as a "law, regulation 
or requirement" within the mean ing of Article III, these criteria breach Article XI:1 of the GATT 
1994, because they constitute a "restriction ... on impor tation" within the meaning of Article XI:1.  
The eligibility criteria for importing under the TRQ fa ll within the ambit of the phrase "whether made 
effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures" because FTU will not issue an import license under the TRQ to a person who has not met the eligibility criteria, and the term "other 
measures" is broad enough in scope  to encompass eligibility criteri a.  The eligibility criteria for 
purchasing domestic rice under the TRQ act as a re striction on importation because they limit the 
range of entities that may import rice into Turkey to  certain categories of persons described above.  
As a result of these criteria, only domestic rice produ cers, principally those with milling capacity, will 
be eligible to import rice.  Consum ers would not have a permit to grow  paddy rice or be members of a 
Turkish rice producer association, and because cons umers do not have milling capacity, they would 
never be interested in purchasing domestic paddy rice from TMO.      
23. In addition, Turkey is in breach of Article  2.1 and Paragraph 1(a) of the Annex 1 of the 
TRIMs Agreement because it has instituted a dome stic purchase requirement, which importers must 
fulfill in order to obtain the advantage of importing rice at duty rates below the bound rates.  To prove 
that a measure is inconsistent with Article 2.1, the United States must demonstrate that the domestic 
purchase requirement is a measure with the characteristics set forth in paragraph 1(a) of the Annex, WT/DS334/R 
Page A-8  
 
  namely that such a measure (1) is mandatory  or enforceable under domestic law or under 
administrative rulings, or compliance with the meas ure is necessary to obtain an advantage; and (2) 
requires the purchase or use by a company of domest ic products (e.g., based on the type, volume, or 
value of products).  Turkey's domestic purchase requirement satisfies both of these elements, and hence, is within the ambit of paragraph 1(a).  Tu rkey requires importers to purchase domestic rice in 
certain specified quantities, and fulfilling (a nd documenting to FTU) the domestic purchase 
requirement is necessary to obtain an advantage, namely importing rice under the lower rates of duty 
under the TRQ regime.   24. Turkey's domestic purchase requirement also is inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the 
Agriculture Agreement because it constitutes a measure listed in footnote 1 to Ar ticle 4.2 of the kind 
which should have been converted into ordinary  customs duties – namely, discretionary import 
licensing and non-tariff measures maintained through state-trading enterprises.  FTU will only grant a 
license to import rice under the TRQ to those importe rs who procure large quantities of domestic rice 
from TMO, Turkish producers, or Turkish producer  associations and who present to FTU proof of 
such purchase.  As the issuance of licenses is not  automatic but contingent on domestic purchase, 
Turkey's maintenance of a domestic purchase requirement to import under the TRQ constitutes 
discretionary import licensing.  The domestic purchase requirement is also a non-tariff measure maintained through a state-trading enterprise because TMO administers the domestic purchase 
requirement aspect of the TRQ.  An importer may only import rice under the TRQ if it purchases rice domestically, including from TMO, which sells rice at prices it announces.  In addition, the importer 
must obtain proof of such purchase from TMO, which must be presented to FTU.  If an importer does 
not present that documentation, FTU will not grant a license to import under the TRQ.  Lastly, TMO is permitted to import 50,000 metric tons of milled rice in order to help stabilize the domestic market 
in the event that prices increase.  
25. Turkey also has acted inconsistently with Article 3.5(h) of the Import Licensing Agreement 
because it administers the TRQ in such a way that  the full amount of the quotas cannot be reached.  
Specifically, Turkey sets the domestic purchase require ment so high that the entire Turkish domestic 
production of rice would be purchased by importers be fore the in-quota amount was reached.  Further, 
the high cost of domestic purchase makes importing under the TRQ much more expensive to the importer, who is likely a miller, than simply pr ocuring rice domestically, and hence discourages the 
full utilization of the TRQ.  
 26. Turkey first opened the TRQ in April 2004, making it retroactive to September 1, 2003, and 
has closed and re-opened the TRQ several times sin ce then.  Turkey most recently opened the TRQ on 
November 1, 2005, while MARA was continuing to de ny import licenses at the over-quota rates.  This 
most recent opening is likewise inconsistent with th e provisions of the covered agreements previously 
discussed. 
 
US Claims Relating to Turkey's Import Licensing Regime As a Whole  
 
27. Moreover, Turkey's overall import licensing regime – the TRQ, licenses for which are 
contingent on domestic purchase, acting in conjunctio n with the denial of any licenses to import at the 
over-quota rates – is inconsistent with Article XI:1  of the GATT 1994.  Each component of Turkey's 
import licensing system – the TRQ regime and the de nial of Certificates of Control outside that 
regime – is inconsistent with Article XI:1 ope rating independently, as previously described.  In 
addition, the two components also give rise to a breach of Article XI:1 acting in conjunction.  
Turkey's denial of Certificates of Control outside the TRQ is what forces importers to utilize the TRQ:  
no economically rational importer would import under the TRQ given the choice, because the 
domestic purchase requirement is so large and ther efore importing under the TRQ is so costly.  As a 
consequence of the interaction between the two co mponents, however, all importation of rice into 
Turkey takes place through the TRQ, which is a discretionary import licensing system:  FTU only  WT/DS334/R 
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  grants import licenses if importers agree to purchase large quantities of domestic rice from TMO, 
domestic producers, or domestic producer associatio ns.  Turkey's import licensing regime for rice 
constitutes a serious market access restriction under Article XI:1, but it also frequently amounts to a 
prohibition on imports.  Turkey has completely ba nned imports of rice outside the TRQ by denying 
the issuance of import licenses.  Consequently, wh en Turkey temporarily closes the TRQ each year 
during the Turkish rice harvest, there is a total ba n on imports of rice into Turkey.  This "seasonal 
ban" was in place during the domestic rice harvest in 2003, 2004, and 2005 .  Moreover, Turkey 
ensures that the full amount of the quotas cannot  be reached by setting the domestic purchase 
requirement so high that the entire Turkish domestic production of rice would be purchased by importers before the in-quo ta amount was reached.  
 
28. Turkey's import licensing regime also constitu tes a breach of Article 4.2 of the Agriculture 
Agreement.  The United States al ready has established that both aspects of Turkey's import licensing 
regime are inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agriculture Agreement: the domestic purchase 
requirements under the TRQ constitute discretiona ry import licensing and non-tariff measures 
maintained through state-trading enterprises, which ar e measures set forth in footnote 1 to Article 4.2; 
and Turkey's denial of Certificates of Contro l outside the TRQ constitutes a quantitative import 
restriction and discretionary import licensing, which also are measures set forth in footnote 1.  Furthermore, the United States previously demonstr ated that Turkey's import licensing regime as a 
whole is inconsistent with GATT Article XI:1's ban regarding prohibitions or restrictions on 
importation.  Because Article 4.2 of the Agriculture Agreement prohibits Members from employing 
quantitative import restrictions and discretionary import licensing in place of ordinary customs duties, 
the two measures operating in conjunction are necessarily in breach of Article 4.2.   
 29. Turkey's import licensing regime is also inconsis tent with Articles 3.5(a), 5.1, 5.2(a), (b), (c), 
(d), (e), (g), and (h), 5.3, and 5.4 of the Impor t Licensing Agreement because Turkey has not provided 
information concerning the issuance of Certificates of Control at the over-quota rates of duty and the 
number of Certificates that had been granted over the last year, nor has it notified its non-automatic import licensing regime for rice to the WTO Import Licensing Committee.    30. For the reasons set out above, the United Stat es respectfully requests the Panel to find that 
Turkey's import licensing regime for rice, incl uding the most recent opening of the TRQ, is 
inconsistent with Articles III:4, X:1, X:2, and XI :1 of the GATT 1994; Article 4.2 of the Agriculture 
Agreement; Articles 1.4(a) and (b), 3.5(a), (e), (f), and (h ), 5.1, 5.2(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (g), and (h), 
5.3, and 5.4 of the Import Licensing Agreement; and Ar ticle 2.1 and paragraph 1( a) of Annex 1 of the 
TRIMs Agreement, and recommend that Turkey bri ng its measures into conformity with its WTO 
obligations.  
 WT/DS334/R 
Page A-10  
 
  ANNEX A-2 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE  
FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION BY TURKEY 
(18 October 2006) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
1. This dispute relates to a number of laws a nd procedures regulating the importation of rice into 
Turkey.  In particular, the United States claims th at Turkey's regime for rice importation results in a 
restriction of market access which is inconsiste nt with a number of provisions under the GATT 1994, 
the Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on Im port Licensing Procedures, and the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures.  Turkey categor ically rejects all the allegations made by the 
United States and maintains that it is in full compliance with its obligations under the WTO. 
 
2. As a result of the Uruguay Round negotiati ons, Turkey committed to reduce its MFN bound 
rate of duty applicable to rice imports to 45% ad valorem .  However, the applied rates of duty 
currently levied on rice imports are, respectively, 34%, 36% and 45% ad valorem  for paddy, brown 
and white rice.  In addition, Turkey has offered, between 2004 and 2005, preferential rates for imports 
of rice within predetermined tariff rate quotas (TRQ s).  These annual TRQs have been opened by 
Decree.  The TRQ system was administered on the basis of automatic import licensing procedures and 
certain legal requirements which we re applied in a non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent 
fashion.  The TRQ regime is no longer in force.  3. With respect to both MFN trade and (in the past) TRQ trade, rice importation occurs on the 
basis of compliance, by traders,  with the traditional and legitimate customs formalities and legal 
requirements that Turkey, like all other WTO Members,  applies to trade.  Essentially, all that it is 
required for rice to be customs-cleared is that the a pplicable MFN rate of duty has been paid and that 
the specific consignment complies with the relevant Turkish requirements on, inter alia , food safety, 
fitness for use, and standards or specifications pr ovided in technical regulations or implementing 
recognized international standards.  In order to facilitate the process of customs clearance, traders 
must submit at importation a document, known as Ce rtificate of Control, which contains all the 
information required for customs purposes.  This do cument must be approved by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Affairs.  Contrary to what is claimed by the United States, the Certificate of 
Control is not an import license and it is not meant to serve the traditional purposes of import licenses, both de jure  and de facto . No import license has ever been a pplied in relation to MFN trade. 
 
4. With respect to rice imports within the TRQ, in order to benefit from the preferential tariff 
rates available within the quotas, traders were required to comply, in addition to the legal 
requirements applicable to all rice importation (i.e., payment of applicable duties and compliance with 
the general customs formalities, including the submi ssion of approved Certificates of Control), with 
legal requirements peculiar only to TRQ importation.  In particular, they had to apply for an import 
license which was automatically issued if all legal requirements had been duly fulfilled.  These legal 
requirements included a domestic purchase requirement.  Turkey's automatic import licensing procedures for imports of rice within the TRQ were always administered in a non-discriminatory, transparent, predictable, and non-trade-distortiv e fashion which provided a considerable tariff 
advantage and enhanced conditions of competition to  imported rice.  In any event, Turkey's TRQ 
regime and its related import licensing procedures are no longer in force. 
 5. Turkey has systematically sought to avoi d dispute settlement on this issue and reach a 
mutually acceptable solution with the United States.   These efforts have been made both during the 
relevant WTO committees' meetings and during the di spute settlement consultations.  Turkey remains  WT/DS334/R 
 Page A-11 
 
 
  willing to address the United States' specific trade c oncerns, but is not willing to forego its legitimate 
WTO rights.  6. In its first written submission, Turkey has addr essed all factual and legal issues advanced by 
the United States in its claims.  Turkey respectfully requested the Panel to find that its measures, both 
in relation to MFN and TRQ trade, are not incons istent with its WTO obligations and the covered 
agreements. With respect to TRQ tr ade, Turkey also respectfully requ ested the Panel not to make, in 
any event, any finding or recommendation as the related measures are no longer in force.  
Factual Background 
 
7. Under the Harmonized System, rice is classified under tariff item 1006.  Within item 1006, rice is classified according to th e three stages of its production process: rice in the husk, otherwise 
known as paddy or rough rice (HS 1006.10); husked rice, otherwise known as brown rice (HS 1006.20); and semi-milled or wholly-milled rice,  otherwise known as white rice (HS 1006.30).  
Paddy, or rough, rice is rice as it is harvested from the field.  It consists of kernels of rice having a 
portion or portions of the protective husk (or hull) remaining.  Paddy rice can be milled into either 
brown rice or, if the milling process continues, white rice.  Brown rice consists of kernels of rice 
where the husk has been removed, but the brown laye r remains.  Milled, or white, rice consists of 
kernels of rice where the husk and at least the outer  bran layers have been removed.  Turkey's bound 
MFN rate for rice is 45% ad valorem .  Currently, however, the applied rates for imports of paddy, 
brown and white rice are, respectively, 34%, 36% and 45% ad valorem .  In addition, Turkey has also 
been offering preferential rates for imports with in predetermined tariff rate quotas opened by Decree 
between 2004 and 2005. 
 
8. The importation into Turkey of certain go ods such as processed foodstuffs, agricultural, 
animal and veterinary products is subject to the levying of the app licable rates of duties and to the 
common types of customs control and certification that all countries and WTO Members conduct when foreign products cross their borders.  In Tu rkey, these control requirements, and the related 
authority for enforcement, are currently conferred, by the relevant legislation, to the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA).  It is MARA which holds the competence to certify compliance of the imported goods with the applicable  requirements. While most of these requirements 
are for trade monitoring and information purposes only, others aim at ensuring that imported products 
meet the legitimate standards for the protection of human health and safety, animal or plant life or 
health, and the environment.  9. In particular, MARA determines the " fitness and compatibility " of certain products with 
respect to human health and safety and in relati on other concerns.  Rice falls within the list of 
products which are covered by the control requirement s applicable at time of importation.  In essence, 
this means that rice importers must present a duly completed " Certificate of Control ", which has been 
checked and approved by MARA, to Turkish Custom s as a condition for importation.  No quantitative 
restriction is foreseen under Turkish law and this re quirement is applicable to all covered products, 
independently from their country of origin and the tariff rate that they benefit from when imported 
into Turkey.  The Certificate of Control is not, nor  should it be interpreted as, an import license or an 
instrument of allocation of imports to origins or traders.  10. The Certificate of Control is an official document through which the importer submits certain 
information to MARA in relation to the particular pr oduct that it wishes to import into Turkey.  It is a 
reference document needed to process the custom s clearance of any particular consignment of 
produce and, most importantly, to verify the product safety and fitness for use of the imported items with respect to human consumption.  The Control Certificate allows customs authorities to verify, on a single document, all required customs information,  including the product's compliance with relevant 
standards and technical regulations.  The application form to be used as a Certificate of Control is WT/DS334/R 
Page A-12  
 
  readily available free of charge to all importers a nd does not need to be issued by MARA.  After the 
importer duly fills in the form and MARA approves it, it becomes an official certificate (i.e., the 
Certificate of Control), and can be submitted to th e competent customs authorities at point of entry 
into the customs territory of Turkey.   
11. Inter alia , the Certificate of Control contains inform ation on: the tariff heading applicable to 
the product being imported, the description of the product or products which will be in the 
consignment, information on the importer (i.e., bus iness title, address, telephone, etc.), the importer's 
tax registration number, information on the expor ter (i.e., business title, address, telephone, etc.), the 
intended use of the commodity, the purpose of importa tion of the commodity (to be specified for live 
aquatic products), the quantity of the product bein g imported, the batch number of the commodity 
(only for agricultural veterinary drugs and related active substances) , the country of origin of the 
commodity, the country in which the commodity is to be loaded for transportation to Turkey, the 
customs point of entry of the commodity into Tu rkey, information on the firm which will use the 
imported commodity (i.e., business title, address, tele phone, etc.), and the applicable information 
indicating compliance of the imported commodity with  the relevant Turkish technical regulations or 
specifications implementing recognized internationa l standards (i.e., EC, WHO or FAO Codex) for 
the specific imported commodity.  MARA may requi re additional documents and certificates to be 
provided when importation is sought.  Some of th ese documents are require d for all products being 
imported (the pro-forma  invoice and other documents such as the nutritional specifications which may 
be requested by law), while others only for certa in types of products.  These latter documents may 
differ in relation to the type of product and the re levant legislation in force.  However, they all 
establish specific information oblig ations and requirements to ensure that human health and safety, 
and animal or plant life or health are protected.  12. When all required information has been dul y provided and attached to the Certificate of 
Control, MARA approves it and it becomes a valid document for purposes of customs control.  In 
essence, it is only when the commodity to be imported is found to be " proper " (i.e., in line with all 
Turkish requirements for marketability, product safety and fitness for use) that MARA will approve a 
Certificate of Control.  MARA will then have exha usted its customs certification mandate and it will 
simply retain later powers of market surveillance.  Certificates of Control have always been systematically and regularly approved on a non-discri minatory basis both in relation to rice imports 
occurring at the "over-quota" MFN or applied rate level and, most importantly for purposes of the 
allegations by the United States, within the "in-qu ota" volumes established each year since 2004.  In 
particular, from 2003 to date, Turkey has approved a to tal of 2,223 Certificates of Control, allowing a 
total importation of 2,264,857 tonnes of foreign rice (paddy, brown and milled). Of this total volume, 
497,469 tonnes of rice equivalent have been allocat ed under the TRQ system since January 2004. 
 
13. This clear and undisputable factual evidence is the single most powerful proof that the Certificate of Control used by Turkey is an instru ment of customs control that has not discriminated 
between exporting countries, that it has not been used  differently on the basis of whether it related to 
TRQ or MFN rice import applications, and that both de jure  and de facto  it is not intended to act as an 
import license.  It is not an import license, but an administrative form that, when duly filled and 
approved by MARA, can be shown at point of en try into Turkey, therefore fulfilling its customs 
purposes.  14. Turkish law does provide for the use of impor t licenses.  These were required for imports of 
rice within the TRQ, and were separate and distinct forms from the Certificates of Control in that they 
did not serve a customs purpose, but rather aimed at allocating the available quota among traders and 
guaranteeing predictability of the market supply.   These dedicated import license forms had the 
distinctive traits that import licenses have in all countries where they are utilized: the issue number; 
the quota period; the authority responsible for issue; the last day of validity; the quantity expressed in  WT/DS334/R 
 Page A-13 
 
 
  quota unit; and the security (as applicable).  All these information requirements are not present on 
Certificates of Control.  15. The tariff rate quota (TRQ) system, introduced  in April 2004, created a preferential access 
regime for importation of rice into Turkey.  The TR Q was not introduced as an instrument to protect 
or distort trade, but rather as a tool to achieve the necessary supply of rice to Turkey and to stabilize 
the domestic market.  Very simply, the TRQ provided a tariff advantage to import rice up to predetermined quantities.  Any interested importer of  foreign rice could apply if there was compliance 
with the requirements and conditions set out by releva nt Turkish legislation.  In particular, to take 
advantage of this system, any interested importer needed to take the following steps: apply for an 
import license to the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade (UFT), indicate compliance with the domestic 
purchase requirement, receive approval by UFT, f ill-out the Certificate of Control and receive 
approval from MARA, lodge the required security to guarantee actual importation, pay the applicable 
customs duties at point of entry, and place the imported rice on the Turkish market.  
16. The TRQ has systematically been allocated on a " first-come-first-served " basis and has never 
discriminated on the basis of country of origin of  the rice or nationality/affiliation of the importer 
applying for a license.  The requirements for the application and evaluation procedures of the import 
licenses have always been clear, transparent and easy to implement for all importers. Similarly, the 
administrative procedures for licensing have always  been simple and user-friendly. All documents 
required for application have always been published in  the relevant legislation.  When all application 
requirements were met, the import licenses have sy stematically been issu ed with an average 
administrative delay of 5 days. In addition to the import licenses obtained for purposes of quota allocation, of course, importers also had to comply with all other customs obligations and 
requirements, in particular the presentation and approval by MARA of the required Certificates of 
Control.  The tariff quota system was never meant to act as and never had any restrictive or 
discriminatory effects on trade and rice imports. Ra ther, the system was voluntary and conferred an 
advantage to the importers meeting the requirement s stipulated in the legislation, including the 
domestic purchase requirement. Importers have always been free to make use of the system or not.  Evidence clearly indicates that the high volumes of in-quota imports and the high numbers of licences and Certificates of Control which have been issued  and approved (respectively) are testimony to the 
attractiveness and appeal that the tariff advantag e has had in the business determinations made by 
importers. 
 
On the US Claims Relating to Turkey's Alleged Denial of Import Licences 
 
Certificates of Control are not Import Licences within  the Meaning of Article 1.1 of the Agreement on 
Import Licensing Procedures  
17. Turkey does not operate (and never did) an import licensing system in relation to the importation of rice at the MFN or applied rates of duty (hereinafter, the MFN trade).  On the other 
hand, an import licensing system has been operated for purposes of administering the allocation of the 
rice quotas which have been opened between 2004 and 2006 at preferentia l rates of duty (hereinafter, 
the TRQ trade).  There is a clear and distinctive difference between the administrative forms to be 
used in connection with the customs procedures (i.e ., the Certificates of Control required to facilitate 
customs clearance of rice imports in relation to bot h MFN and TRQ trade) and those needed to apply 
for a license in order to be allocated part of the quota and benefit from the ta riff advantage (i.e., the 
import licenses which are required for importation of rice in relation to TRQ trade). 
 
18. GATT Article XI:1 does not define the concept of " import license ".  Neither is this concept 
defined by the Agreement on Agriculture when, in footnote 1 to Article 4.2 thereof, it refers to 
"discretionary import licenses " as being quantitative restrictions.  According to the panel report in 
EC – Bananas , "the notion of 'import licensing' is limite d to procedures requiring the submission of WT/DS334/R 
Page A-14  
 
  an application or other documentation (other than that required for customs purposes
) to the relevant 
administrative body ".  Turkey's Certificates of Control have not been adopted, and are not required by 
Turkey, in order to comply with the " administrative procedures used  for the operation of import 
licensing regimes"  in the meaning of Article 1 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.  In 
fact, there is no import licensing regime applicable to imports of rice into Turkey under MFN trade.  
There is an import licensing regime only in relation to rice imports under TRQ trade. 
 19. Turkey's Certificates of Control amount to ad ministrative forms that are required exclusively 
for " customs purposes ".  If all informative data is duly provided by the importers, and MARA 
determines compliance with all relevant specificat ions, standards and tec hnical regulations (i.e., 
human health and safety, animal or plant life or health, environmental prot ection, fitness for use, 
product safety, public policies, etc.), the Certificates  of Control are automatically approved.  At that 
point, importers may use them as official documents for " customs purposes ", when seeking customs 
clearance at point of entry into Turkey.  With respect to MFN trade, there is no 'administrative 
procedure' or 'licensing requirement' provided by law other than the mere approval by MARA of 
Certificates of Control for " customs purposes ". 
 20. It appears clear that Turkey's Certificates of Control are not " administrative procedures used 
for the operation of import licensing regimes ", but are " required for customs purposes " within the 
meaning of Article 1.1 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.  Therefore, the claim by the United States that the Certificate of Control is an import license must be rejected. 
 
The Lack of Approval of Certain Individual Certificates of Control does not Amount to a Prohibition 
or Restriction of Rice Imports within th e Meaning of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 
 
21. Having established that the Certificate of Cont rol is not an import license within the meaning 
of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Tu rkey considers that the Certificate of Control 
cannot be considered an import license under GATT Ar ticle XI:1.  The United States fails to indicate 
in its pleading on what grounds Turkey's Certificate of Control (and the alleged denial thereof) can or 
should be considered an " other measure " for purposes of the application of GATT Article XI.  
Because of the de jure  and de facto  operation of the Certificate of Control, it is clear that no 
"prohibition " or " restriction " of rice importation through any " other measure ", falling within the 
meaning of GATT Article XI:1, has occurred through th e alleged 'denial of Certificates of Control to 
import rice'.  22. The United States has failed to show that Turkey 's alleged 'denial of Certificates of Control to 
import rice' constitute an " other measure " within the meaning of GATT Article XI:1 and a de jure  
and/or de facto  "prohibition " or " restriction " of the type that GATT Article XI considers a 
quantitative measure that should not be " instituted or maintained ".  As there is no " restriction " or 
"prohibition ", the nature of the " measure " is of no relevance.  For this reason, the claim by the United 
States under GATT Article XI must be rejected.  
The Lack of Approval of Certain Individual Cer tificates of Control does not Constitute a Measure 
within the Meaning of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture  
23. Having indicated that the Certificates of Control are not import licenses within the meaning of 
the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, that th ere is clearly no 'denial' of Certificates of 
Control, and that there is no de jure  or de facto  import prohibition or restriction within the meaning of 
GATT Article XI:1, Turkey maintains that there cannot be " discretionary import licensing " and/or 
"quantitative import restrictions " within the meaning of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture 
and footnote 1 thereof. Having conclusively dem onstrated that there is no violation of GATT 
Article XI, Turkey believes that no further scr utiny should be conducted under the Agreement on  WT/DS334/R 
 Page A-15 
 
 
  Agriculture.  For this reason, the claim by the United States under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture must be rejected.  
The Publication and Administration of Turkey's Tr ade Regulations Complies with the Relevant 
Obligations under Article X of the GATT 1994 
 
24. Turkey considers that its trade regulations  are in full compliance with the transparency 
obligations under Article X of the GATT, as all releva nt laws, regulations and administrative rulings 
with respect to Turkey's import regime for products, and in particular for rice, were always promptly 
published. All requirements connected to the Certif icates of Control, including the accompanying 
documentation that must be provided for customs pur poses, have systematically been published as 
indicated in the factual background.  Incidentally, Turkey believes that the documents referred to by 
the United States as 'Letters of Acceptance', do not  fall within the letter and the scope of GATT 
Article X in that they are mere instruments of internal communication among Turkish administrators 
and public officials. 
 
25. Finally, the obligation under GATT Article X:2 does not appear to be pertinent to the case at 
issue in that the 'Letters of Acceptance' are not " measures of general application " that need to be 
published ahead of enforcement.  Again, as indicated by the Appellate Body in EC Poultry , the 
transparency obligation of Article X relates to the publication  and administration  of 'laws, 
regulations, judicial decisions and administrative ruli ngs of general application', rather than to the 
substantive content  of such measures.  The 'Letters of Accep tance' are never enforced and, in fact, 
cannot be legally enforced by any party (i.e., th e importers, the administration, or the courts). 
Therefore, the related claim by the United States must be rejected.  
Articles 1.4 and 3.5 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures do not Apply 
 
26. Along the same lines, Turkey reaffirms that the Certificates of Control are not import licenses within the meaning of the Agreement on Import Licen sing Procedures.  Therefore, the claim by the 
United States that Turkey has acted  inconsistently with the obligations of transparency and due-
process of Articles 1.4(a) and 1.4(b) of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures must be rejected for the inapplicability, in the case at issu e, of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. 
 
On the US Claims Relating to Turkey's Tari ff Rate Quotas Regime Requiring Domestic 
Purchase 
 
The Domestic Purchase Requirement within Turkey' s TRQ Regime is not Inconsistent with 
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 in That it does not A ccord Imported Rice Treatment Less Favourable 
Than Domestic Rice 
 
27. Turkey believes that its domestic  purchase requirement (DPR) does not ' affect the internal 
sale, offering for sale, purchase (…) or use ' of imported rice.  In relevant part, the key issue with 
respect to the operation of Turkey's DPR and the allegations made by the United States under GATT 
Article III:4 appear to rest on the circumstance that the DPR would ' affect the internal sale, offering 
for sale, purchase (…) or use ' of imported rice by "adversely modifying the conditions of competition 
between domestic and imported products".  The United States has failed to prove this allegation. 
 28. In particular, it is wrong and misleading to st ate that the fulfilment of the DPR by importers 
"provides the only way to import rice into Turkey ".  In fact, as widely known and as effectively 
evidenced by the trade-flows, any importer is free to import whatever quantity of rice into Turkey 
from whatever country at the MFN or applied rate  of duty.  The regime of importation which was 
applied within the TRQ was meant to provide an adva ntage to importers of foreign rice to adequately 
supply the Turkish rice market.  In fact, it is well known that Turkey is a net importer of rice and that WT/DS334/R 
Page A-16  
 
  imports are essential to stabilize the market (both in terms of price and quantities available).  Turkey 
maintains that the opening itself of its TRQ was a trade policy that, while being necessary to stabilize 
the domestic market, resulted in the modification of the conditions of competition between domestic 
and imported products in favour of imported products . 
 
29. The success rate in terms of applications  for import licenses and volumes of imported rice 
within the TRQ clearly indicates that, despite the allegations of the United States, a considerable 
degree of appeal and competitive advantage was retained by the TRQ system, albeit " affected by the 
DPR system ", in the eyes and business determinations of importers of foreign rice, independently of 
the country of origin.  Had this element of compe titive advantage not been there, the importers could 
still have imported rice at the MFN or applied rate of duty.  In relation to the eligibility criteria, 
Turkish regulations never restricted the issuan ce of import licenses for rice imports under the TRQ 
system only to domestic rice producers.  In fact, one of the categories eligible to receive import licenses were " those who make purchase of paddy rice or rice from Turkish Grain Board " (TMO).  
The United States maintains in its submission that  this category would 'undoubtedly be domestic 
producers as well', but fails to argue or prove the validity of this assertion.  The United States has also 
failed to prove that, '(t)his state of affairs negativ ely affects competitive conditions of imported rice in 
the Turkish marketplace'.  For all these reasons, the claims by the United States that Turkey has acted 
inconsistently with GATT Artic le III:4 must be rejected. 
 
Turkey has not Acted Inconsistently  with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 Because its Domestic 
Purchase Requirement and the Eligibility Criteria do not Constitute Restrictions on Imports Other 
Than in the Form of Duties, Taxes or Other Charges 
 
30. The TRQ regime, and its DPR system, only restricted imports in relation to the TRQ trade volumes (i.e., those imported at preferential rates) an d in a strict non-discriminatory fashion, but never 
altered or removed the ability of importers to impor t unlimited quantities or rice from any origin at the 
applied or MFN bound rate.  Therefore, it never resulted  in a substantial restriction on imports of rice.  
Furthermore, the import licensing regime used to ad minister the TRQ regime was an automatic import 
licensing system and, therefore, not falling within  the scope of GATT Article XI.  There was never 
any de jure  restriction of rice importation into Turkey  since nothing in the relevant laws and 
regulations ever diminished the ability to impor t at the applied or MFN bound rates of duty.  
Furthermore, the TRQ regime acted to confer an advantage to importers of rice at preferential rates 
which available data show to have been largely u sed by importers, independently of the country of 
origin and despite the eligibility criteria of the DP R.  Therefore, the claim that Turkey has acted 
inconsistently with GATT Article XI:1 in relation to the domestic purchase requirement and eligibility 
criteria of its TRQ regime must be rejected. 
 
Other Claims 
 
31. Turkey indicated that no violation Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures can be argued given that no violation of GATT Article III:4 was maintained when the TRQ 
system was in force.  The DPR instituted by Turkey under the TRQ regime did not amount to a 
measure in violation of GATT Article III:4 since it did not accord treatment less favourable to 
imported products nor did it adversely affect th e conditions of competition to the detriment of 
imported products.  32. Turkey also showed that its TRQ regime was not based on discretionary import licensing and 
it is not correct to state that non-tariff measures we re maintained through state trading enterprises in a 
way which made the DPR inconsistent with Artic le 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  In 
particular, Turkey's import licensing system for pur poses of allocating the TRQ to traders has never 
been a tool of discretionary import licensing.  On  the contrary, this system has always been an 
automatic import licensing system where approval of import licenses would be granted in all cases,  WT/DS334/R 
 Page A-17 
 
 
  provided that all application requirements were met by importers.  Furthermore, Turkey recalls that 
the TMO was only one of the possible providers of  domestic rice under the three categories of the 
DPR (i.e., paddy producers having permission to plan t paddy rice, their cooperatives and unions or the 
TMO).  Therefore, the United States failed to prove  how the TMO could be in a position to operate 
non-tariff measures on imports of TRQ rice. 
 
33. For these reasons, all the related claims by the United States that Turkey has acted inconsistently with its WTO obligations under the covered agreements must be rejected. 
 
US Claims Relating to Turkey's Import Licensing Regime as a Whole 
 
34. Turkey indicated that there is no de jure  or de facto  'denial' of approval of Certificates of 
Control in breach of GATT Article XI. The Certificates of Control are not 'import licenses' but administrative forms relevant for " customs purposes ", which are aimed at ensuring compliance with 
legitimate objectives.  Turkey has also provided re levant data and trade statistics clearly indicating 
that MFN trade in rice has effectively occurred thro ughout the operation of the TRQ regime.  There is 
no legal or operational link between the legislativ e framework that provides for the TRQ regime and 
the one regulating MFN trade would aim at seriously restricting market access.  There is no prohibition or restriction connected with either the Certificates of Control or Turkey's TRQ regime.  
There are no discretionary import licensing procedures.  There are no seasonal bans.  Therefore, none of these instruments has ever acted, either individua lly or in combination with one another, to deter 
full utilization of the quotas opened within the TRQ re gime or to prohibit or restrict MFN trade.  
Turkey also maintained that its system of rice im portation as a whole was never inconsistent with the 
Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.  35. Finally, Turkey emphasized that the legisl ative framework providing for the TRQ regime, 
including the domestic purchase requirement, is no longe r in force. The legal validity of all relevant 
legislation expired before the commencement of the Panel proceedings.  Turkey has not renewed 
these measures, neither extending them nor adopting new legislative instruments.  Turkey submitted 
that certain Panels and the A ppellate Body have found it " inconsistent " to make recommendations on 
measures which were no longer in force.  In particular, in Dominican Republic – Cigarettes,  the Panel 
did not find it appropriate to recommend to the Disp ute Settlement Body that it make any request to 
the Dominican Republic regarding this measure si nce it was no longer in force.  For these reasons, 
Turkey respectfully requested the Panel to either  refrain from making findings on the measures related 
to Turkey's TRQ regime as no longer in force, or, should the Panel consider making these findings necessary for purposes of securing a positive solution to  the dispute, not to make any recommendation 
to the Dispute Settlement Body. 
 
Conclusion 
 
36. For all the reasons set out above, Turkey respect fully requested the Panel to reject all claims 
made by the United States and find that Turkey's relevant laws, regulations and procedures, both in 
relation to MFN and TRQ rice imports, are not inconsistent with Articles III:4, X:1, X:2, and XI:1 of 
the GATT 1994; Article 4.2 of the Agriculture Agreemen t; Articles 1.4(a) and (b), 3.5(a), (e), (f), and 
(h), 5.1, 5.2(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (g), and (h), 5.3, and 5.4 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; and Article 2.1 and paragraph 1(a) of Annex 1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures.  WT/DS334/R 
Page A-18  
 
  ANNEX A-3 
 
THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION BY CHINA 
(18 October 2006) 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. The People's Republic of China (hereafter "China ") makes this third party submission because 
of its systemic interests in the correct  interpretation and application of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994  (the "GATT 1994") , and the  Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures  (the "TRIMs Agreement") in relation to the present dispute. 
2. In this written submission, firstly we will discu ss the proper interpretation of Article XI:1 and 
Article III:4 of GATT 1994. Then, we will address the question of application of the TRIMs 
Agreement and the measures at issue . 
II. ARTICLE XI:1 OF GATT 1994  
3. The US alleges that, Certificates of Control is  an import license, and since September 2003, 
the competent authority of Turkey has not issued Cert ificates of Control for rice to be imported at the 
bound tariff rates, thereby effectively preventing any out-of-quota imports.
1  However, Turkey 
disputes this fact and by claiming that it serves th e purpose of customs, argues that Certificates of 
Control is not an import license, and has been approved all the time.2 
4. On this point, China is of the view that, th e essence of the issue under GATT Article XI:1 is 
that whether the Certificate of Control prohibits or restricts trade of rice in practice. Even assuming, 
arguendo , that the Certificate of Control is not an impor t license, if it prohibits or restricts the import 
of rice, it may still constitute an "other measure" which is inconsistent with GATT Article XI:1.  
5. As to the interpretation of the term "restricti on" in GATT Article XI:1, the panel of the case 
India-QRs  held that the scope of the term "restriction" in Article XI:1 was also broad, as seen in its 
ordinary meaning, which was "a limitation on action, a limiting condition or regulation".3 Another 
panel endorsed this finding and noted that, "[o]n a plai n reading, it is clear that a 'restriction' need not 
be a blanket prohibition or a precise numerical limit."4 
6. To give a clearer interpretation of restriction or limitation, China considers that the following 
elaboration of the panel in India – Quantitative Restrictions is illuminating: 
"[After examining several GATT panel reports, the panel stated that] These reports 
are consistent with the ordinary mean ing noted above, as discretionary or non-
automatic licensing systems by their very nature operate as limitations on action since certain imports may not be permitted. Thus, in  light of the terms of Article XI:1 and 
these adopted panel reports, we conclude that  a discretionary or non-automatic import 
licensing requirement is a restriction prohibited by Article XI:1." 
7. Although this statement was made towards import lic ense, the rationale is applicable to "other 
measures" under GATT Article XI:1. In other words, if  an "other measure" subject to the discretion of 
                                                     
 
1 The US first written submission, paras. 59-73. 
2 Turkey's first written submission, paras. 47-69. 
3 Panel Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions , para. 5.128. 
4 Panel Report, India – Autos , para. 7.270.  WT/DS334/R 
 Page A-19 
 
 
  a government agency and may block certain imports , such measure should be deemed to operate as 
limitations on imports and is not permitted by Article XI:1. Specific to this case, if the Certificates of Control has effect of prohibition or limitation on  importation of rise, such Certificate probably 
constitutes restrictions on imports and violates Article XI:1. 
III. ARTICLE III OF GATT 1994 
8. With respect to domestic purchase requirement , the US claims that it violates GATT 
Article III:4, whereas Turkey denies such claim. Specifically, Turkey argues that with the benefit of 
lower tariff rate, the domestic purchase requirement actually altered the conditions of competition in 
favour of imported product, and theref ore was consistent with Article III:4.
5 
9. However, in China's view, such line of reasoni ng seems questionable. Article III deals with 
the comparison of treatments between the produc ts imported and national products, and has no 
relation to the level of tariff. If domestic purchase requirement alters the competition conditions to the detriment of imported products and thus violates Arti cle III:4, the violation could not be redressed or 
offset by the benefit of lower tariff rate. Accord ingly, Turkey can not invoke the beneficial tariff 
under the TRQ as the excuse from violation of Article III:4, if such violation is found by the panel.  
IV. THE APPLICATION OF TRIMS AGREEMENT 
10. The US claims that Turkey is in breach of Ar ticle 2.1 and Paragraph 1( a) of the Annex 1 of 
the TRIMs Agreement. On this point, the United St ates argues that the TRIMs Agreement does not 
define what is a "trade-related investment measu re" that would breach Article III:4, and Turkey's 
domestic purchase requirement satisfies both of the two elements contained in paragraph 1(a) of 
Annex 1 of the TRIMs Agreement; thus, the measure at issue is inconsistent with Article 2.1 and 
Paragraph 1(a) of Annex 1 of the TRIMs Agreement. 
6 
11. Turkey argues that the subject measure is cons istent with GATT Article III:4, and therefore 
does not violate Article 2.1 of the  TRIMs Agreement.7 It seems that Turkey ignores the fact that the 
US fails to define what is a "trade-related i nvestment measure" and prove Turkey's measure 
constitutes a TRIM8. China wishes to raise its observation in this regard.  
12. Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement provides: 
1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no 
Member shall apply any TRIM that is incons istent with the provisions of Article III 
or Article XI of GATT 1994. 
2. An illustrative list of TRIMs that ar e inconsistent with the obligation of 
national treatment provided for in paragr aph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 and the 
obligation of general elimination of quantita tive restrictions provided for in paragraph 
1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 is containe d in the Annex to this Agreement.  
13. Concerning the claim made under Article 2 of  the TRIMs Agreement,  the panel in 
Indonesia – Autos  spelt out that "[b]y its terms, Article 2.1 requires two elements to be shown to 
                                                      
5 Turkey's first written submission, paras. 95-99. 
6 The US first written submission, paras. 110-112. 
7 Turkey's first written submission, paras. 110-113. 
8 TRIM is the abbreviation of "trade-related investment measure", note added by China. WT/DS334/R 
Page A-20  
 
  establish a violation thereof: first, the existence of  a TRIM; second, that TRIM is inconsistent with 
Article III or Article XI of GATT. "
9 
14. China wishes to stress that th e TRIMs Agreement is a fully fledged treaty with autonomous 
legal existence, and it must have its own applica tion scope. In fact, Article 1 of the TRIMs Agreement 
which is entitled " Coverage ," expressly provides: 
This Agreement applies to investment measures related to trade in goods only 
(referred to in this Agreement as "TRIMs"). 
15. Although the TRIMs Agreement does not define what a TRIM is, this term could be 
interpreted properly according to the prin ciple set forth in Article 3.2 of the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dispute  (the "DSU"). In no case it is proper to bring a 
measure out of the coverage of TRIMs Agreement under the jurisdiction of it. 
16. Furthermore, the chapeau of paragraph 1 of Annex 1 of the TRIMs Agreement states that: 
TRIMs  that are inconsistent with the obliga tion of national treatment provide for in 
paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994  include those […](Emphasis added.) 
17. This provision, corresponding with the provision of Article 1, clearly shows that, before the 
examination of paragraph 1(a) of  Annex 1 of the TRIMs Agreement, a measure must firstly be found 
to be a TRIM.  
18. According to above-mentioned principles, the United States, as the complaining party, should 
establish prima facie  cases for the two elements before the Panel proceeds to consider its claim under 
Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement, but it failed to do so.  
19. If the reasoning put forward by the United States prevailed, a measure could jump over 
Article 1 and the chapeau of paragr aph 1 of Annex 1, be considered directly under Paragraph 1(a) of 
Annex 1 of the TRIMs Agreement. In such case, Ar ticle 1 and the chapeau of  paragraph 1 of Annex 
1of the TRIMs Agreement would be tu rned superfluous and meaningless.  
V. THE MEASURES AT ISSUE  
20. China notices that claims made by the United States are divided into three groups, namely, 
Turkey's denial of import licenses, Turkey's TRQ regime requiring domestic purchase, and Turkey's 
import licensing regime as a whole. The United States did not define "Turkey's import licensing 
regime as a whole". According to the context of the US's first written submission, this term seems to 
refer to the joint operation of Turkey's TRQ regi me and Certificate of Control system, which have 
already been challenged separately.  
21. Although Turkey does not disagree with the identification and categorization of subject 
measures, China is concerned about such kind of approach of challenging a regime "as a whole". 
Generally speaking, the scope of the measures challe nged under the title of "regime as a whole" tends 
to be vague and can not meet the requirement of sp ecificity in Article 6.2 of the DSU. As to the 
present dispute, the "as a whole" claim did not appear in the US's panel's request and should not be included in the panel's terms of reference.  
                                                     
 
9 Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos , para. 14.64.  WT/DS334/R 
 Page A-21 
 
 
  VI. CONCLUSION 
22. In the light of the relevant WTO/GATT jurisprude nce and the analytical approach with regard 
to the measures in question set forth above, China hopes the viewpoints and various issues raised in 
this submission may assist the Panel in its decision. WT/DS334/R 
Page A-22  
 
  ANNEX A-4 
 
THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION BY EGYPT 
(18 October 2006) 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. The Arab Republic of Egypt (hereinafter, "Egypt ") welcomes this opportunity to provide the 
Panel with its views on the legal claims raised by the United States of America (hereinafter, the "United States") with respect to the measures set up by Turkey to regulate imports of rice. 
2. Egypt has decided to intervene as a third party in this dispute since it is an important producer 
of rice and has, traditionally, been amongst the main  exporters of rice to Turkey. Also, Egypt has a 
systemic interest in the correct interpretation of the WTO Agreements and, in particular, the General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade 1994 (hereinafter, the "GATT 1994"), the Agreement on Agriculture 
and the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures (hereinafter, the "Import Licensing Agreement"). 
3. Egypt has essentially limited this submission to questions related to the proper interpretation 
of Articles III:4 and XI:1 of GATT 1994 and Artic le 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  Its 
conclusions are as follows: 
 – prohibitions or restrictions on the im portation of rice are inconsistent with 
Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994; 
 
 – restrictions on imports of rice are not permitted under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture; and,  
 
– domestic purchase requirements affecting im ports of rice are inconsistent with 
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. 
4. Egypt recognizes that many of the issues raised in  this dispute are solely or primarily factual 
in nature. 
5. Given the short period between the deadline for the first written submission of Turkey and the 
deadline for the third party submission, Egypt has been unable to incorporate in this submission a 
response to all the arguments brought by Turkey. Co nsequently, Egypt reserves it right to address new 
arguments and further develop the arguments set out hereinbelow at the third party session of the first 
substantive meeting of the Panel. It will also be av ailable to answer any ques tions the Panel may have 
on this occasion.  
II. IMPORT PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS OF RICE ARE INCONSISTENT 
WITH ARTICLE XI:1 OF THE GATT 1994  
1. Any General Denial of Certificates of Control for Imports of Rice is to be Considered as 
a Prohibition or Restriction under Article XI:1  
6. The United States claims that Turkey's denial to issue Certificates of Control to importers 
actually restricts or prohibits the importation of ri ce at the over-quota rate and is thus, inconsistent 
with Article XI:I of the GATT 1994. The United Stated  argues that the Certificate of Control is an 
"import license" or an "other measure" within the m eaning of Article XI:1 because Turkey's Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (hereinafter, "MARA ") requires importers to submit an application  WT/DS334/R 
 Page A-23 
 
 
  for a Certificate and that application must be granted in order for the importation to take place1. It is 
further contended that the Certificates would, in  any event, be a prohibition or restriction on 
importation for the purposes of Article XI:1. 
7. In response to the claims raised by the United St ates, Turkey contends that the Certificates of 
Control are not import licenses within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the Import Licensing Agreement 
since they are required exclusively for customs purposes and the lack of approval of certain individual 
Certificates cannot be considered to amount to a pr ohibition or restriction on rice imports within the 
meaning of Article XI:12. 
8. Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 provides: 
"No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether 
made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be 
instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of 
the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party."  
9. In Dominican Republic – Impor t and Sale of Cigarettes , the Panel stated that "Article XI:1 of 
the GATT covers prohibitions and re strictions, other than duties, taxes or other charges, on the 
importation or the expor tation of products"
3. Previously, in India – Quantitative Restrictions, the 
Panel had found that "[T]he text of Article XI:1 is  very broad in scope, providing for a general ban on 
import or export restrictions or pr ohibitions 'other than duties, taxes or other charges'." Referring to 
the findings of Japan – Semi-conductors , the Panel then noted that "the wording of Article XI:1 is 
comprehensive: it applies 'to all measures institute d or maintained by a [Member] prohibiting or 
restricting the importation, exportation, or sale for e xport of products other than measures that take the 
form of duties, taxes or other charges. The scope of the term 'restriction' is also broad, as seen in its 
ordinary meaning, which is 'a limitation on action, a limiting condition or regulation'"4. In India – 
Autos , the Panel confirmed that the expression "other me asures" in Article XI implies a "broad scope" 
as to the types of measures that are covered. It is the "nature of the measure as a restriction in relation 
to importation which is the key factor to consider  in determining whether a measure may properly fall 
within the scope of Article XI:1"5. 
10. Considering the above-mentioned precedents, Egypt submits that regardless of the form that a 
quantitative import restriction or prohibition takes, it is  inconsistent with Article XI:1. If, as claimed 
by the United States, the Certificates of Control actua lly restricted or prevented the importation of rice 
into Turkey they should be considered as measu res falling within the scope of Article XI:1.  
11. The fact that the Certificates of Control ma y be administrative forms that are required 
exclusively for customs purposes, within the me aning of Article 1.1 of the Import Licensing 
Agreement, does not confirm the consistency of th e Turkish rice import regime with Article XI:1. 
Certificates of Control, if not considered as impor t licenses, must be considered as measures covered 
by Article X1:1, since they are not  duties, taxes or other charges. 
12. As indicated by Turkey, the essential element with  respect to the consistency of its system of 
Certificates of Control with Article XI:1 is whether it resulted in a quantitative restriction6.  In order 
                                                      
1 First written submission of the United States, paras. 59-63. 
2 First written submission of Turkey, paras. 47-69. 
3 Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes,  para. 7.248. 
4 India – Quantitative Restrictions , para. 5.128. 
5 India – Autos , para. 7.261.  
6 First written submission of Turkey, para. 62. WT/DS334/R 
Page A-24  
 
  to determine this element, Egypt submits that all th e elements before the Pane l should be considered.  
The fact that the unpublished Letters of Acceptance issued by the Turkish Minister of Agriculture to 
MARA to delay the issuance of Certificates of Control may not be considered as "laws, regulations, judicial decisions or administrative rulings" is ir relevant in determining whether the system of 
Certificates of Control is consistent with Article XI:1.  In Korea – Various Measures on Beef, in order 
to establish that the Korean beef import regime  imposed restrictions within the meaning of 
Article XI:1, the Panel considered the lack and dela ys of the tendering authority in calling for tenders 
and its discharge practices
7.  Consequently, to determine whether the alleged denial of Certificates of 
Control constitutes a prohibition or restriction under Article XI:1, the Letters of Acceptance issued by 
the Minister of Agriculture should be considered, amongst other elements. 
2. The Joint Operation of a TRQ Regime and a General Import Regime Restricting or 
Preventing Imports of Rice into Turkey  is Inconsistent with Article XI:1 
13. The United States argues that the eligibility criteria to purchase rice under the TRQ are in 
breach of Article XI:1 because they limit the range of entities that may import rice into Turkey and, 
therefore constitute a restriction on importation within the meaning of that Article8. Also, the United 
States claims that the TRQ system, operating in conjunction with the failure of MARA to grant 
Certificates of Control is inconsistent with Article XI:19. 
14. In response to these arguments, Turkey contends that since the TRQ regime, and its domestic 
purchase requirement obligation, only cover imports  made under the TRQ regime, and the latter does 
not prevent importers from importing rice outside the TRQ, the TRQ eligibility criteria do not restrict the importation of rice into Turkey
10. For the same reason, Turkey argues that the TRQ regime, in 
conjunction with the general import regime, i.e., c oncerning imports outside the TRQ, is consistent 
with Article XI:111. 
15. Egypt considers that in order to determin e whether or not the TRQ eligibility criteria 
constitute a restriction to the importation of rice under Article XI:1, the Panel must examine the 
general import regime together with the TRQ. I ndeed, both the general import regime and the TRQ 
regime actually govern the importation of rice into Turkey. 
16. The joint examination of both the TRQ and genera l regime is particularly pertinent if the 
Panel was to concur with the United States in finding  that the denial to issue Certificates of Control 
outside the TRQ regime has forced importers to import under the TRQ regime. If this was the case, 
the Panel should determine whether the TRQ eligibility criteria has restricted or prevented imports of 
rice into Turkey within the meaning of Article XI :1. In line with the conclusions of the Panel in 
India – Quantitative Restrictions12, if it is found that the TRQ regime is a discretionary or non-
automatic import licensing regime, it should be considered as a restriction prohibited by Article XI:1.  
Also, if it is established that no imports of rice were possible during the periods where access to the TRQ was suspended, the resulting ban should be co nsidered as a prohibition within the meaning of 
Article XI:1.   
                                                     
 
7 Korea – Various Measures on Beef , para. 767. 
8 First written submission of the United States, paras. 106-109. 
9 First written submission of the United States, paras. 120-124. 
10 First written submission of Turkey, paras. 104-109. 
11 First written submission of Turkey, paras. 124-128. 
12 India – Quantitative Restrictions , paras. 5.130-131.  WT/DS334/R 
 Page A-25 
 
 
  III. RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS ARE NOT 
PERMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 4.2 OF THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE 
17. The United States claims that Turkey's denial to issue Certificates of Control to importers of 
rice is inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agre ement on Agriculture since it constitutes a measure of 
the kind required to be converted into ordinary customs duties13. Also, the United States argues that 
the domestic purchase requirement provided for under the TRQ regime, considered independently or 
with the denial of Certificates of Control under the general import regime, are breaching Article 4.214. 
18. Turkey considers that it has complied with Article  4.2 since its Certificates of Control are not 
import licenses, their issuance has not been denied , and there is no prohibition or restriction on 
imports of rice within the meaning of Article XI:1 of the GATT 199415. With respect to its TRQ 
regime, Turkey contends that it is also consistent with Article 4.2 since it rests on an automatic import 
licensing system16. 
19. Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture prev ents Members from maintaining, resorting to 
or reverting "to any measures of the kind which have  been required to be converted into ordinary 
customs duties, except as otherwise provided for in Article 4.2". Footnote 1 to Article 4.2 provides 
that the measures covered include, amongst others: "quantitative import restrictions", "discretionary 
import licensing" and "similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties".  
20. In Chile – Price Band System , the Appellate Body found that "A rticle 4.2 was drafted in the 
present perfect tense to ensure that  measures that were required to be converted as a result of the 
Uruguay Round -- but were not converted -- could not be  maintained, by virtue of that Article, from 
the date of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement on 1 January 1995"17. The Appellate Body also 
considered that the reference to the residual category of "similar border measures other than 
ordinary  customs duties", indicates that "the drafters of the Agreement did not seek to identify all 
'measures which have been required to be converted' during the Uruguay Round negotiations"18.  
21. In the light of the interpretation of Article 4.2 given by the Appellate Body in Chile – Price 
Band System , Egypt considers that all measures that s hould have been converted into ordinary 
customs duties are inconsistent with this Artic le. These measures include "discretionary import 
licensing" regimes but also all measures generally pr eventing or restricting importation of agricultural 
products. Consequently, if the Panel was to find that  the denial of Certificates of Control and the TRQ 
regime, either independently or in conjunction, proh ibit or restrict imports of rice into Turkey, it 
should establish a violation of Article 4.2 has occurred.  Whether or not the Certificates of Control and 
the TRQ regime are a "discretionary import licensi ng systems" or "quantitative import restrictions" 
within the meaning of Article 4.2 ,should not limit th e Panel in its analysis of the consistency of the 
measures at issue.   
22. It should also be noted that panels have found that restrictions on agricultural products that 
were found to be inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 constituted violations of 
Article 4.2. In Korea – Various Measures on Beef , the Panel, after having reached the conclusion that 
the measures considered were inconsistent with Ar ticle XI, came to the conclusion that the same 
measures were necessarily inconsistent with Artic le 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and its 
                                                      
13 First written submission of the United States, paras. 74-78. 
14 Paras. 113-115 and 125. 
15 First written submission of Turkey, para. 71. 
16 Para. 115. 
17 Chile – Price Band System, para. 207. 
18 Para 210. WT/DS334/R 
Page A-26  
 
  footnote referring to non-tariff measures maintained through state-trading
19. Similarly, in India – 
Quantitative Restrictions , the Panel, after having found that the measures at issue were violating 
Article XI:1, considered that these measures violated Article 4.220. 
IV. DOMESTIC PURCHASE REQUIREMENTS AFFECTING ALL IMPORTS OF RICE 
ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ART ICLE III:4 OF THE GATT 1994 
23. The United States alleges that the domestic  purchase requirement imposed under the TRQ 
regime is inconsistent with Ar ticle III:4 of the GATT 1994. In suppor t of its allegation, the United 
States considers that imported a nd domestic products are "like produc ts"; that the measures governing 
the TRQ regimes are to be considered as laws, regul ations or requirements "affecting their internal 
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation or use"; and that imported rice is treated less 
favourably than domestic rice and that the conditio ns for imported rice in the Turkish market are 
being affected21. 
24. Turkey expresses the opinion that the domestic  purchase requirement of its TRQ regime does 
not affect the "internal sale, offering for sale, purch ase, transportation or use" of imported rice, neither 
does it adversely modify "the conditions of co mpetition between domestic and imported products". 
Therefore, Turkey claims that it has not  acted inconsistently with Article III:422. 
25. Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 provides: 
"The products of the territory of any contr acting party imported into the territory of 
any other contracting party shall be accord ed treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin  in respect of all laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application 
of differential internal transportation ch arges which are based exclusively on the 
economic operation of the means of tran sport and not on the nationality of the 
product." 
26. In the event that the denial of the Certificates  of Control by MARA is established and it is 
found that importers had no other op tion than to import rice under the TRQ regime, the consistency of 
this regime with Article III:4 must be consider ed. Indeed, Egypt submits that a violation of 
Article III:4 can only be established if importers were  deprived of their right to import without any 
conditions, regarding the origin of the imported rice or the imported volumes in particular, at the 
MFN or applied rates. 
27. Since neither the United States nor Turkey di spute that the imported and domestic products 
are "like" products and that the measures governi ng the TRQ regime are "laws, regulations or 
requirements" within the meaning of Article III:4,  one must examine whether these measures affect 
the "internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transp ortation, distribution or use" of imported rice and 
whether imported products are treated le ss favourably then domestic products. 
28. In Canada – Autos, the Panel noted that the word "aff ecting" in Article III:4 "has been 
interpreted to cover not only laws  and regulations which directly govern the conditions of sale or 
purchase but also any laws or regulations which mi ght adversely modify the conditions of competition 
                                                      
19 Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 768. 
20 India – Quantitative Restrictions, paras. 5.238-242. 
21 First written submission of the United States, paras. 86-87. 
22 First written submission of Turkey, paras. 88-99.  WT/DS334/R 
 Page A-27 
 
 
  between domestic a nd imported products"23. In the framework of the US – FSC Article 21.5 
proceedings , the Appellate Body interpreted "affecting" as having a "broad scope of application". 
Further, in India – Autos , the Panel considered that the term "affecting" "goes beyond laws and 
regulations which directly govern  the conditions of sale or purchase to cover also any laws or 
regulations which might adversely modify the conditions of competition between domestic and 
imported products.24 In the case at hand, Egypt considers that the TRQ regime criteria, and more 
particularly the domestic purchase requirement, should be considered as affecting the internal sale, 
offering for sale purchase and use of imported rice, since importers must comply with these criteria 
when importing rice under the TRQ.  
29. The text of the first sentence of Article III:4, in  addition to past panel reports, clearly provides 
that imported products shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than the like domestic products 
once they have been cleared through customs. This is  in line with the broader objective of Article III 
"to provide equal conditions of competition"25. The words "treatment no less favourable" call for 
"effective equality of opportunities for imported pr oducts in respect of the application of laws, 
regulations or requirements affecting the sale, offe ring for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution 
or use of products"26. In India – Autos , having noted that the measures at issue requirement generated 
"an incentive to purchase and use domestic products  and hence creates a disincentive to use like 
imported products", the Panel cons idered that they were modifying the conditions of competition in 
favour of the domestic products27.  
30. If the TRQ regime was the only option available to  importers to import rice into Turkey, it is 
submitted that the domestic purchase requirement adversely modified the conditions of competition 
between imported and domestic rice to the benefit of  the latter. Regardless of the eventual unit cost of 
rice imported under the TRQ regime compared to domestic rice, the obligation for importers to 
purchase domestic rice as a pre-condition for the im portation of rice accords less favourable treatment 
to imported rice since domestic producers were not s ubject to a similar requirement and should, thus, 
be considered contrary to Article III:4. 
V. CONCLUSION 
31. Egypt thanks the Panel for providing it with an opportunity to comment on the issues at stake 
in these legal proceedings and hopes that's  its comments will prove to be useful. 
 
                                                      
23 Canada – Autos , para. 10.80. 
24 India – Autos , para. 7.196. 
25 US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC) , para.210. 
26 US – Section 337 , para. 5.11. 
27 India – Autos , paras. 7. 201-202. WT/DS334/R 
Page A-28  
 
  ANNEX A-5 
 
THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
(18 October 2006) 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. The European Communities (hereafter "the EC")  makes this third party submission because of 
its systemic interest in the correct inte rpretation of Articles III:4, XI:1 of the GATT 1994 , Article 4.2. 
of the Agreement on Agriculture , Article 2.1 and Paragraph 1(a) of the Annex 1 of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures  (TRIMs Agreement), the Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures and Articles 3.3 and 11 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding  (DSU). 
2. Many of the issues in dispute involve questions of fact on which the EC does not comment. It 
appears that on most if not all aspects of facts US  and Turkey have directly opposing views. This 
submission will therefore address only a limited number of issues of legal interpretation which are of 
particular interest to the EC. The EC reserves its right to comment on other matters in its oral statement. 
3. The EC notes that the US first submission a ppears to include some ambiguities on how the 
alleged Turkish system should be examined under the different relevant agreements. In particular, the 
US first separates the alleged denial of import licenses from the allegations concerning the Turkish 
tariff rate quota ('TRQ') on rice but then in the third part it examines these two issues in conjunction. 
However, the US does not clarify whether the separate analysis of the two parts of the alleged system 
is its primary position and whether the third part i.e.  analysis of the parts of the alleged system in 
conjunction is an alternative position.  
4. Section II of this written submission addr esses considerations on whether the US first 
submission alleges an "as such" finding of the Turkis h measures or rather a series of "as applied" 
measures. Section III in turn examines the definitio n of an import licence.  Sections IV and V then 
examine some issues relating to th e borderline between Article XI GATT  and Article 4.2. of the 
Agreement on Agriculture and Article III:4 of the GATT  respectively. Finally, Section VI contains 
some considerations due to the fact that the Tu rkish TRQ regime has ceased to exist. Section VII 
summarises the main conclusions. 
II. DOES THE US MAKE AN "AS SUCH" OR AN "AS APPLIED" CLAIM? 
5. The EC considers that the way in which the clai ms are put forward by the United States raises 
systemic issues that the Panel should consider with particular care.  
6. In the introduction to its first written submissi on, the United States states that "Turkey has 
instituted a non-transparent, discretionary import licensi ng system to restrict an d, at times, eliminate 
imports of rice".
1 Although not stated explicitly, the refere nce to a "system" could be understood to 
refer to an "as such" claim instead of an "as appl ied" claim. In other words, the US appears to 
consider that the Turkish system concerning imports of rice violates the relevant agreements and not just its application in specific instances.  
                                                     
 
1 First written submission of the United States, para. 1.  WT/DS334/R 
 Page A-29 
 
 
  7. Subsequently in its first written submission the United States describes the alleged denial of 
import licenses inter alia  as "an unofficial ban".2 It appears that in particular with respect to the 
alleged denial of import licenses the US case relies on internal documents of the Turkish administration and reference is also made to oral inst ructions given to Turkish officials. In the view of 
the EC these arguments appear to make rather an "as applied" claim than an "a s such" claim. In other 
words, the US appears to be attacking th e way the system is applied in practice. 
8. The European Communities would also like to draw the attention of the Panel to the fact that 
the United States is claiming that the alleged practice  of denial i.e. the omission  to grant the 
Certificates of Control is a measure  that falls within the category of a prohibited measure inter alia  
under Article XI:1 of the GATT  and Article 4.2. of the Agreement on Agriculture .  
9. The EC respectfully submits that before viol ation of these provisions can be established on 
the basis of the alleged practice not to grant impor t licenses i.e. an alleged omission, the US has the 
burden of making a prima facie case by asserting relevant fact, adducing probative evidence in 
support of such assertions of fact, and making and developing releva nt legal argument.  
10. The EC considers that a useful starting point is the definitions provided by the Appellate 
Body in US – Zeroing (EC) . In this case the Appellate Body clarified that any act or omission 
attributable to a WTO Member can be a measure of that Member for the purposes of dispute settlement proceedings, within the meaning of Article  3.3 of the DSU. This includes not only acts 
applying a law in a specific situation, but also act s setting forth rules or norms that are intended to 
have general and prospective application, irresp ective of how or whether they are applied in a 
particular instance.
3 This is so even if such rules or norms  are not expressed in the form of a written 
instrument.4 
11. The Appellate Body has repeatedly emphasised th e seriousness of "as such" claims, since they 
seek to prevent Members ex ante  from engaging in certain conduct. Thus, the implications of such 
claims are obviously more far-reaching than "as app lied" claims since "as such" claims potentially 
cover all instances of application of the measure and not only the ones identified by the complaint. 
Consequently, a panel must not lightly assume the existence of a "rule or norm" constituting a 
measure of general and prospective application. If a panel were to do so, it would act inconsistently 
with its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU to make an objective assessment of the matter before 
it.5 
12. When an "as such" challenge is brought against a measure that is expressed in the form of a 
written document, such as a law or regulation, there would, in most cases, be no uncertainty as to the 
existence or content of the measure that has been  challenged. The situatio n is different, however, 
when a challenge is brought against an alleged rule  or norm that is said not to be expressed in the 
form of a written document. In such cases, the very existence of the challenged rule or norm may be 
uncertain. Accordingly, particular rigour is require d on the part of a panel to support a conclusion as 
to the existence of a rule or norm. A panel must carefully examine all concrete evidence regarding the 
existence of the purported rule or norm in order to  determine whether or not it can be challenged as 
such.6 
                                                      
2 First written submission of the United States, para. 14. 
3 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC) , paras. 187-188. 
4 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC) , paras. 190-193. 
5 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC) , paras. 189 and 196. 
6 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC) , paras. 197-198. WT/DS334/R 
Page A-30  
 
  13. There is thus a distinction between the existence  of a measure and the content  of a measure.
7 
An enquiry into whether or not a measure exists  should include all the evidence: Obvious matters to 
consider are the author, nomenclature, date of a doption, procedure of adoption, place of adoption, 
method of record and method of pub lication of the alleged measure. 
14. Without prejudice to the question as to whether ther e is a violation of th e relevant agreements, 
the EC is not necessarily convinced that the alle gations of the United States in its first written 
submission could lead to an "as such" finding. This  is particularly the case with the US argumentation 
concerning or relating to the alleged "denial of or failure to grant import licenses" (US claims A, B, C, 
and part of K and L). The foundation of these cl aims is an alleged practice of the Turkish 
administration not to issue the Certificates of Control.  This practice is allegedl y proven by the "Letters 
of Acceptance", which apparently are not publicly available documents but rather internal documents 
of the Turkish administration. Reference is also made to oral instructions given to officials.8 It would 
seem to the EC that on the basis of the facts before  the Panel, there may rather be a series of "as 
applied" measures (or a practice), which the US is  inviting the Panel to construe as a measure and 
condemn in "as such" terms. 
III. THE DEFINITION OF AN IMPORT LICENSE  
15. Article XI:1 of the GATT  does not define what is an import license. Neither does the 
Agreement on Agriculture  define this notion. The EC considers that Turkey rightly draws the attention 
of the Panel to Article 1.1 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures , where import licensing 
is defined as  
administrative procedures1 used for the operation of import licensing regimes 
requiring the submission of an application or other documentation (other than that 
required for customs purposes) to the relevant administrative body as a prior condition for importation into the customs territory of the importing Member. 
_______________ 
1 Those procedures referred to as "licensing"  as well as other similar administrative 
procedures.  
16. Although the definition is given for the purposes of  that agreement, the EC considers that it 
provides useful context for the interpretation of the same notion under the GATT  and the Agreement 
on Agriculture . This definition makes an important distin ction between administrative procedures for 
the operation of import licensing regimes and those of exclusively customs purposes. As the footnote 
to Article 1.1 of the Agreement on Import Licensing  demonstrates, the formal name or title of the 
procedure and/or document is not determinative. It  is the purpose of the procedure that one has to 
examine in order to ascertain whether it amounts to an import licensing regime or not. 
17. In order to definitely escape being consid ered an import licensing regime a given 
administrative procedure required to be followed prio r to importation should be confined to "customs 
purposes". This in turn requires an analysis of what "customs purposes" means. Without trying to 
define the concept in an exhaustive way, the EC considers that it would a priori  be difficult to 
                                                      
7 Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC) , para. 203:  "… the Panel did not, in its analysis, clearly 
distinguish between the issue of ascertaining the existence  of the challenged measure, which is especially 
important when unwritten measures are at issue, and the separate examination  of its consistency with the 
relevant provisions of the covered agreements." 
8 First written submission of the United States, para. 36.  WT/DS334/R 
 Page A-31 
 
 
  consider a procedure that involves e.g. product saf ety checks or SPS measures within the notion of 
"customs purposes". 
18. The EC draws the attention of the Panel to the f act that the US is also claiming violation of 
the Agreement on Import Licensing.  It is arguable that the Agreement on Import Licensing  relates 
more specifically to the matte r before this Panel than the GATT  and the Agreement on Agriculture . 
Therefore in accordance with th e Appellate Body report in EC – Bananas9 the EC invites the Panel to 
consider whether the alleged violations of the Agreement on Import Licensing  should be considered 
first before the alleged viola tions of Article 4.2. of the Agreement on Agriculture  and the GATT . 
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARTICLE XI OF GATT AND ARTICLE 4.2. OF 
THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE 
19. Referring to findings of previous panels, the Un ited States submits that where a measure with 
respect to agricultural products is in consistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT , it is necessarily 
inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture .10 This argument is advanced under all 
three main sections of the US written submission i.e. in relation to the alleged denial of import 
licenses, the claims relating to Turkey's tariff ra te quota requiring domestic purchase and the two parts 
of the alleged system read in conjunction.  
20. The EC agrees with the US that there is a general systemic link between the two provisions. 
However, the EC would like to point out that, apart from the footnote in Article 4.2 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture  in which reference is made to quantita tive import restrictions, no automatic link has 
been made in the text of these provisions. The EC therefore considers that caution should be exercised 
in concluding that the violation of Article XI:1 of the GATT  would necessarily and in all 
circumstances lead to the violation of Article 4.2. of the Agreement on Agriculture . 
21. If the Panel were to conclude that the Turkish Certificate of Control is an import license and 
that the matter would consequent ly be examined first under the Agreement on Import Licensing , there 
is a further systemic question on the order of an alysis of the Turkish measures under the relevant 
agreements. It is arguable that the Agreement on Agriculture  should be considered more specific in 
relation to the GATT  in a situation where the import of a part icular agricultural product is at stake. 
Consequently, in accordance with the Appellate Body report in EC – Bananas III11 it is arguable that 
the alleged violation of Article 4.2. of the Agreement on Agriculture  should be considered first before 
the alleged violations of the GATT . 
V. ARTICLE III:4 VS. ARTICLE XI:1 OF THE GATT 
22. In respect of the Turkish TRQ system the US considers that it violates Article III:4 of the 
GATT . In the alternative, the US submits that the system violates Article XI:1 of the GATT . 
23. Article XI:1 of the GATT  states that  
No prohibitions or restrictions other than du ties, taxes or other charges, whether made 
effective through quotas, import or expor t licences or other measures, shall be 
instituted or maintained by any c ontracting party on the importation  of any product of 
the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of 
any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party. [emphasis added] 
                                                      
9 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III , paras. 202-204. 
10 First written submission of the United States, claims B, I and L. 
11 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III , paras. 202-204. WT/DS334/R 
Page A-32  
 
  24. Article III:4 of the GATT  in turn states that 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
 into the territory of 
any other contracting party shall be accord ed treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin  in respect of all laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use.  The provisions of this  paragraph shall not prevent the application 
of differential internal transportation ch arges which are based exclusively on the 
economic operation of the means of tran sport and not on the nationality of the 
product. [emphasis added] 
25. In principle these two provisions regulate two distinct situations i.e. prohibitions or 
restrictions on importation i.e. "border measures" (Article XI:I) on the one hand and, prohibition of 
discrimination once the product has been imported into  the territory of a WT O member country i.e. 
"internal measures" (Article III:4) on the other hand . Therefore, in principle Article III only applies to 
internal measures, not border measures and, vice versa , Article XI:1 only applies to border measures 
but not internal measures. 
26. However, it is not always easy to distinguish an  internal measure from a border measure.  The 
Ad Note to Article III aims at clarifying this borderline: 
Any internal tax or other internal charge, or  any law, regulation or requirement of the 
kind referred to in paragraph 1 which app lies to an imported product and to the like 
domestic product and is collected or enfor ced in the case of the imported product at 
the time or point of importation, is neverthel ess to be regarded as an internal tax or 
other internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in 
paragraph 1, and is accordingly subject  to the provisions of Article III. 
27. Consequently, a prohibition or a restriction of th e import of a given product that fails e.g. to 
meet an intended public health or consumer prot ection requirement which also applies to domestic 
products is to be examined under Ar ticle III, not under Article XI.  
28. However, in certain circumstan ces the same measures can be found to fall within the scope of 
both Article III:4 and XI and, therefore, they may be  examined as both border measures and  internal 
measures at the same time depending on which aspects of the measures are emphasised. This is illustrated by the Panel ruling in India – Autos , where the Panel considered that India had acted 
inconsistently with Article III:4 by imposing an  obligation on automotive manufacturers to use a 
certain proportion of local parts and components in the manufacture of cars and by imposing an 
obligation to offset the amount of their purchases of previously imported kits and components, already 
on the Indian market, by exports of equivalent valu e. However, the Panel also found a violation of 
Article XI:1 due to India imposing an obliga tion on automotive manufacturers to balance their 
importation of kits and components wi th exports of equivalent value.
12 Consequently, where a border 
measure inconsistent with Article XI:1 is used  to favour domestic production, it may also violate 
Article III of the GATT . 
29. The EC would also like to point out that an illustrative list of trade-related investment 
measures (TRIMs) that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in 
paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT  and the obligation of genera l elimination of quantitative 
restrictions provided for in pa ragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT  is contained in the Annex to the TRIMs 
Agreement .  
                                                      
12 Panel Report, India – Autos , para. 8.1.  WT/DS334/R 
 Page A-33 
 
 
  30. The EC considers that a priori  the domestic purchase requirement of the TRQ system would 
seem to fall within the scope of Pa ragraph 1(a) of Annex 1 of the TRIMs Agreement . 
VI. THE ABOLITION OF TURKEY'S TRQ REGIME  
31. In its defence Turkey states that the legislativ e framework providing for the TRQ regime is no 
longer in force. Consequently Turkey has made a request that the Panel refrain from making findings 
on the measures related to Turkey's TRQ regime as no longer in force. Or, should the Panel consider 
making findings necessary for purposes of securing a positiv e solution to the dispute, not to make any 
recommendation to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 
32. In these circumstances the EC does not consider  it necessary to examine more in detail the 
expired Turkish TRQ regime. The EC only notes that  should the Panel consider it necessary to make 
findings on the TRQ regime to secure a positive solu tion to the dispute, the EC agrees with the 
Turkish alternative position that there would not be  a need to make any recommendation to the DSB. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
33. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the European Communities invites the Panel to: 
• carefully examine the existence of a "rule or norm" constituting a measure of general 
and prospective application 
 
• consider the order of analysis of the releva nt agreements in the light of the Appellate 
Body Report in EC – Bananas III  
 
• consider that where a border measure is used to favour domestic production, it 
violates also Article III of the GATT 
 
• refrain from making any recommendations to the DSB on the Turkish TRQ regime. 
 34. The European Communities hopes that the preceding observations will prove useful in the 
deliberations of the Panel and reserves its right to  make further observations in the oral hearing. 
  WT/DS334/R 
 Page B-1 
 
 
  ANNEX B 
 
ORAL STATEMENTS BY THE PARTIES AND THIRD PARTIES 
AT THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MEETING 
 
Contents Page 
Annex B-1 Executive summary of the opening oral statement by the 
United States at the first substantive meeting (17 November 2006) B-2 
Annex B-2 Closing oral statement by th e United States at the first substantive 
meeting (9 November 2006) B-7 
Annex B-3 Opening and closing oral statements by Turkey at the first 
substantive meeting (8-9 November 2006) B-9 
Annex B-4 Oral statement by Australia at the third party session 
(9 November 2006) B-19 
Annex B-5 Oral statement by China at the third party session 
(9 November 2006) B-23 
Annex B-6 Oral statement by Egypt at the third party session 
(9 November 2006) B-25 
Annex B-7 Oral statement by the European Communities at the third party 
session (9 November 2006) B-27 
Annex B-8 Oral statement by Korea at the third party session 
(9 November 2006) B-29 
Annex B-9 Oral statement by Thailand at the third party session 
(9 November 2006) B-31 WT/DS334/R 
Page B-2  
 
  ANNEX B-1 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE OPENING ORAL STATEMENT  
BY THE UNITED STATES AT THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MEETING 
(17 November 2006) 
 
 1. In its first submission, the United States made out a prima facie  case that Turkey has breached 
several provisions of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agre ements, including with respect to barriers to 
importation as well as to discrimination against im ported rice.  For example, the United States 
demonstrated that Turkey has maintained a WTO- inconsistent domestic purchase requirement (DPR) 
as part of its tariff rate quota (TRQ) system.  To import rice under the TRQ and obtain a lower rate of duty, an importer must purchase substantial quantiti es of rice from the Turkish Grain Board (TMO) or 
Turkish producers and producer associations in or der to obtain an import permit from Turkey's 
Foreign Trade Undersecretariat (FTU).  And only domestic rice qualifies an importer to obtain this 
advantage – imported rice does not receive this advantage.  Turkey's domestic purchase requirement 
treats imported rice less favorably than domestic rice, thereby breaching Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.  2. Although the DPR makes it very expensive to import rice, importers ha ve no alternative but 
to import rice under the TRQ because Turkey's Mini stry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA)  
fails to grant licenses to import rice at the over-quota rates of duty.  Through the unpublished "Letters 
of Acceptance," Turkey's Minister of Agriculture  repeatedly accepts recommendations from his staff 
to "delay" the start date of the period in which su ch licenses, or "Certificates of Control," will be 
granted, thereby ensuring that rice trade occurs unde r the TRQ.  When even the TRQ is closed during 
Turkey's annual rice harvest, no rice importation can o ccur.  Turkey's denial of Certificates of Control 
outside the TRQ regime is a prohibition or restric tion on importation that breaches Article XI:1 of the 
GATT 1994.  3. Turkey has denied the US claims but has essentially ignored the extensive factual evidence 
presented by the United States and, despite all eviden ce to the contrary, has asserted that Turkey's rice 
regime actually provides an advantage  to foreign rice producers over Turkish rice producers.  Turkey 
has failed to rebut the prima facie  case made by the United States. 
 
Definition of Import License  
 
4. First, Turkey claims that the Certificate of Control is not an import license and hence is not 
subject to the provisions of the Import Licensi ng Agreement and other provisions, because the 
Certificate "amount[s] to administrative fo rms that are required exclusively for ' customs purposes '."  
In its first submission, Turkey sets forth its propo sed criteria for when a doc ument is exclusively for 
customs purposes (and hence should not be considered  an import license).  Turkey then asserts that, 
since the Certificates of Control may be used fo r customs purposes, they are not licenses but rather 
official documents for customs purposes.  
 
5. This argument is unpersuasive.  The fact th at a document is necessary to clear customs does 
not mean it is not an import license.  Indeed, impor t licenses will be used for customs purposes – that 
is the very nature of an import license since importa tion cannot occur without it.  The real question is 
what else is the document used for.  Here, the Cer tificate of Control is used to control importation – 
not just in the customs sense, but in the sense of a r estriction or ban on importation.  The Certificate of 
Control is not even a customs document in the mo st basic sense – it is very revealing that the 
Certificate of Control is approved by MARA, not by Turkish Customs.   WT/DS334/R 
 Page B-3 
 
 
  6. Second, the Certificate of Control is an impor t license even under Turkey's standard.  In its 
submission, Turkey acknowledges that the impor t permit required by FTU for importation under the 
TRQ is an import license.  Yet a side-by-side comparison of the elements required by MARA for the Certificate of Control and those required by FTU fo r the import permit reveal a remarkable degree of 
similarity.  Accordingly, under Turkey's own lo gic, there would be no reason to exclude the 
Certificate of Control from Import Licensing Agreem ent disciplines on the basis that it contains 
customs-related information.  7. Third, a Member cannot shield a measure  from coverage under the Import Licensing 
Agreement or other provisions by including customs- related information in th e license application and 
then claiming it is no longer an import license.  The footnote to the definition of "import licensing" in 
the Import Licensing Agreement makes clear that, regardless of how a Member characterizes particular administrative procedures, such procedur es are still considered "import licensing" if they 
satisfy the criteria in Article 1 of the Import Licensing Agreement.   
8. The addition of customs-related information in  the Certificate of Control does not change the 
fact that the Certificate is part of Turkey's requi rement for the submission of an application or other 
documentation as a prior condition for importation, and approval constitutes formal permission from 
MARA (not Customs) to import rice into Turkey.  In  other words, the Certificate is an import license 
within the definition in Article I of the Import Licensing Agreement.   Over-Quota Imports and the Issuance of Certificates of Control  
 
9, In its first submission, the United States made a prima facie case that Turkey's denial of 
import licenses outside the TRQ is in breach of  Article XI of the GATT 1994 because Turkey 
prohibits or restricts imports at the over-quota rate through the use of import licenses or other 
measures.  In making its case, the United States presented a large amount of documentary evidence 
demonstrating that Turkey does not issue Certificates of Control, which are necessary to  import rice outside the TRQ.  The United States presented examples of "Letters of Acceptance" signed by Turkey's Minister of Agriculture.  Through these doc uments, the Minister directs MARA officials not 
to grant Certificates to protect the domestic rice  industry.   The United States presented examples of 
correspondence between Turkish importers and MARA, including several letters from MARA 
rejecting importer requests for Certificates.  In on e letter, dated May 1, 2006, a Turkish government 
official admitted
 that the government did not have authorit y under Turkish law to grant Certificates.  
And the United States presented Minister Tuzmen's  March 24, 2006 letter to USTR Portman, which 
was issued just after the DSB established the panel in this dispute and which promised that Turkey 
would issue Certificates "as of April 1, 2006."  Apparently, MARA was not in agreement with the 
contents of Minister Tuzmen's letter, as evidenced  by the May 1 rejection letter referenced above.  
The rejection letter was completely consistent with  the guidance provided in the unpublished Letter of 
Acceptance that was operative at the time.   10. As the United States has met its burden to make out a prima facie  case that Turkey is in 
breach of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, it is now up to Turkey to rebut the US case.  Turkey has not 
done so.  Turkey has not contested the authenticity of any
 of the documents submitted by the United 
States.  Moreover, Turkey has not provided any  documentary evidence to rebut their contents.  
Instead, Turkey merely asserts, without any substantia tion, that contrary to the express terms of the 
Letters of Acceptance, it has been granting Control Ce rtificates at the over-quota rates of duty.  In the 
US – Wool Shirts and Blouses dispute, the Appellate Body noted it was "difficult, indeed, to see how 
any system of judicial settlement could work if it incorporated the proposition that the mere assertion 
of a claim might amount to proof."    11. Instead of attempting to rebut the US argumen ts directly, Turkey attempts to dismiss the 
Letters of Acceptance as "informal internal docum ents," documents that ar e "never enforced" and WT/DS334/R 
Page B-4  
 
  cannot be enforced by the courts, "unreliable evid ence of the real intenti on and trade policies of 
Turkey in relation to rice importation", and "inadmis sible evidence" that cannot be reviewed by this 
panel.  In addition, Turkey dismisses the rejecti on letters sent to importers  by MARA and the court 
documents as nothing more than "a natural compone nt of the interaction between any WTO Member's 
administration and its business community."  Wh ile the United States certainly understands why 
Turkey would like the Panel to ignore these documents , the fact is they are evidence that cannot be 
ignored.  And whether they are leaked or internal or enforced by the courts is irrelevant.  The simple 
fact is they show that Turkey decided not to issue Certificates of Control, thus demonstrating that the 
Certificates are discretionary import licenses (and therefore an import restriction as such) and that Turkey is using them in practice to restrict imports.  
 
12. Turkey's arguments that the Letters of Acceptance are confidential, unenforceable and 
disregarded by the judiciary are contradicted by the fact that Turkey tried to use these documents in 
Turkish court to justify its denial of Control Cer tificates to an importer and, in fact, relied upon the 
documents in court as its sole source of legal author ity for the denial.  It is difficult to understand how 
the Letters are an unreliable source of the intenti ons of Turkish trade policy when counsel for MARA 
argued before the court that MARA did not have au thority under Turkish law to grant Certificates to 
the importer under the terms of those Letters, and that  the Letters were adopted in order to protect 
domestic rice producers against foreign competition.   13. In lieu of documentary evidence, Turkey h as produced a chart which purports to show that 
Turkey is granting Certificates of Control outside the TRQ, but which raises additional questions.  US 
export data and Turkish data on Control Certificates with respect to US rice imports vary 
significantly.  For example, Turkey claims th at through September 21, 2006, MARA has granted 
Certificates covering the importation of over 400,000 t ons of US rice, whereas US trade data puts the 
volume of US rice exports to Turkey in 2006 at ju st under 18,000 tons through October 26.  Further, 
even under Turkey's own chart, at least 96 per cen t of rice approved in 2004 and 90 per cent of rice 
approved in 2005 was for entry under the TRQ, for which domestic purchase is required.  As it is 
much more expensive to import under the TRQ, it is  clear that such an overwhelming majority of 
importers would only "choose" to import rice under the TRQ if there were severe restrictions or a ban 
on importing at the over-quota rates.  
14. Turkey also claims that the Letters of Accep tance are not being enforced, as evidenced by the 
fact that MARA is granting Certificates of Cont rol to importers who purchase domestic rice under the 
TRQ regime.  If Turkey is requiring the Certifi cates to import under the TRQ regime, the United 
States thanks Turkey for that clarification.  However,  that information is irrelevant to the question of 
whether Turkey is granting the Certificates, and therefore blocking importation, outside the TRQ.  
The Letters only purport to suspend the granting of Cer tificates to importers who want to import at the 
over-quota rates without domestic purchase.  They do  not address whether the Certificates are granted 
under the TRQ regime.  In addition, this clarifica tion only deepens our concern with respect to the 
WTO-inconsistency of the DPR because, if what Turk ey says is correct, an importer that wants to 
import rice under the TRQ will have to approach four
 different Turkish government agencies – TMO, 
FTU, MARA, and Turkish Customs – and obtain two  different import licenses in order to effectuate 
the importation.   
 15. With respect to the ban on the issuance of Cont rol Certificates at the over-quota rates, even if 
Turkey could substantiate that it is  not enforcing the Letters of Accepta nce, that is not a bar to this 
panel making a finding of WTO-in consistency concerning them.  A measure may still be found WTO-
inconsistent even if it is not bei ng enforced, as was the case in the US – 1916 Act dispute.  
Furthermore, even if Turkey were issuing some
 Certificates, that would not alter the fact that they 
constitute discretionary import licensing and an impor t restriction contrary to Article XI:1 of the 
GATT 1994 and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.   WT/DS334/R 
 Page B-5 
 
 
  Domestic Purchase Requirement  
 
16. With respect to the DPR, Turkey contests th at (1) the DPR is a measure "affecting [the] . . . 
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportati on, distribution or use" of domestic and imported 
rice, and (2) that the DPR treats imported rice less favor ably than domestic rice.  Turkey's rationale is 
that importers can freely import rice outside the TRQ and that the TRQ modifies conditions of 
competition so that imported products are actually treated more  favorably than domestic products.  
Turkey has failed to rebut the US prima facie  case on both issues.    
 17. With respect to the first issue, the DPR directly
 affects the conditions of competition between 
domestic and imported rice.  Only domestic rice satisfies the purchase requirement in order to import 
rice into Turkey under the TRQ.  Thus, domestic  rice has an advantage in the marketplace that 
imported rice does not have, and is more attractive as a result.  Turkey claims that the United States has not satisfied the "affecting" standard because importers can import rice into Turkey outside the 
TRQ where domestic purchase is not required.  Ev en if that were true, it does not erase the 
discrimination against imported rice. 
 18. In this respect, a Member's requiring the sourcing of domestic goods as a condition to receive 
a benefit has long been recognized as inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.  In 1958, the 
GATT panel in Italian Discrimination Against Im ported Agriculture Machinery found an Italian law 
that conditioned the receipt of special credit terms for farmers on the purchase of domestic 
agricultural machinery to be in breach of Article III:4.  And the India – Autos panel found an 
Article III:4 breach where India's local content requi rement for automobile manufacturers created an 
incentive to purchase and use Indian-origin parts a nd components and, thus, a disincentive to use like 
imported parts and components.    
19. On the issue of whether the DPR treats im ported rice less favorably than domestic rice, 
Turkey argues that the TRQ system actually provide s foreign rice producers with an advantage over 
Turkish rice producers in selling their rice in Turkey.   However, Turkey completely ignores the costs 
stemming from the DPR in its analysis.  The large cost from domestic purchase more than offsets any 
alleged cost savings resulting from the preferential ra tes of duty realized by importers under the TRQ.  
It hardly matters that one ton of US rice will allegedly be a few dollars cheaper than one ton of 
Turkish rice if one fails to account for the fact that, in order to import that one ton of US rice into 
Turkey, the importer needs to purchase two tons of Tu rkish rice at a cost of several hundred additional 
dollars.      
Restrictions on Who May Import Rice Under the TRQ Regime  
 
20. Turkey claims that anyone can import rice under the TRQ.  While it is true on the face of the 
regulation that this is a theoretical possibility, Letter of Acceptance 1795 confirmed that Turkey only 
permits entities that purchase paddy rice to impor t rice under the TRQ.  Practically speaking, only 
millers or those with milling capacity would purch ase paddy rice.  Consumers, wholesalers, retailers, 
and other distributors are unlikely to have milling ca pacity and, thus, would not be able to "take 
advantage" of being able to import under the TR Q.  Even if TMO would allow entities to purchase 
milled rice in order to satisfy the DPR, the TRQ re gime would still exclude much, if not all, of the 
non-milling community from importing rice under the TRQ,  as restaurants and retailers that might be 
interested in importing milled rice would be dissuad ed by the high purchase and storage costs.  For 
these reasons, the eligibility criteria for domestic pur chase under the TRQ also are inconsistent with 
Article XI of the GATT 1994. 
 WT/DS334/R 
Page B-6  
 
  Measures That Have Allegedly Expired  
 
21. Lastly, Turkey argues that the measures co mprising its TRQ regime are no longer in force 
and, thus, the panel should refrain from making findings with respect to that regime or, if it does make 
such findings, should not make any recommendations  to the DSB regarding those measures.  The 
United States disagrees that the Panel should re frain from making findings and recommendations and 
further disagrees that the measure is no longer in force.    22. The text of the DSU, as clarified by past pane l and Appellate Body reports, makes clear that if 
a measure exists at the time of consultations a nd panel establishment, it has not expired for purposes 
of WTO dispute settlement.  In this dispute, the DSB established this panel with standard terms of 
reference to examine the matter raised by the United States on March 17, 2006.  The TRQ regime 
allegedly "expired" more than four months later.  Therefore, the TRQ regime had not "expired" at the 
time of consultations and panel establishment, and th e Panel is charged by the terms of reference and 
Article 3.3 of the DSU to issue findings with resp ect to the consistency of the measures comprising 
Turkey's TRQ regime with the relevant provi sions of the covered agreements and make 
recommendations in order to resolve the dispute.    23. The reports cited by Turkey respect the dis tinction between measures that expire prior to 
consultations and panel establishment and measures that expire after panel establishment.  In US –
Certain EC Products  and Chile – Price Band System , the panels declined to make findings on 
measures that expired prior to panel establishment.  With respect to Dominican Republic – Import and 
Sale of  Cigarettes , Turkey states that the panel did not find it necessary to make finding with respect 
to a measure that expired during the course of panel proceedings, but failed to note that the Appellate 
Body disagreed
 with the panel and recommended that the Dominican Republic bring its measure into 
conformity with its WTO obligations to the extent that it had not already done so.  
 
24. Further, it is not clear to the United States th at the TRQ regime ceased to exist on July 31, as 
Turkey claims, given the number of unpublished documen ts that Turkey issues with respect to the rice 
trade.  Moreover, Turkey claimed that the TRQ re gime "expired" in 2003, 2004, and 2005 and yet the 
measure resurfaced a few months later.  Therefore,  the United States believes that it is critical for 
achieving a definitive resolution of this matter that, if  the Panel were to make adverse findings in this 
dispute, it also issue recommendations that Turkey bring its measures into conformity with its WTO 
obligations.   WT/DS334/R 
 Page B-7 
 
 
  ANNEX B-2 
 
CLOSING ORAL STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES  
AT THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MEETING 
(9 November 2006) 
 
 1. Thank you, Madam Chair, members of the Panel, and members of the Secretariat.  We would like to thank you for your attention and work on this dispute, as demonstrated over the past two days.  
As we conclude this first panel me eting, I do not intend to re-state the arguments we made yesterday, 
but would like to highlight a few additional point s that we observed over the past two days.   
 2. First, the United States believ es that the discussion has further clarified that the Certificate of 
Control is not a document for customs purposes.  An  importer makes its application for a Certificate 
of Control to Turkey's Ministry of Agriculture (MARA), not Turkish Customs.  Second, an importer 
needs to apply for a Certificate from MARA, and receive approval, well before the shipment is 
presented to Turkish Customs.  Turkey clarified th at this was the case in paragraph 6 of its oral 
statement when it stated that "[o]nce approved, the Certificate of Control is a guarantee for the 
importer that all elements and requirements need ed to clear customs are present and will allow 
importation ... The importer will then feel confident to conclude all necessary business engagements 
for purposes of importation ."  In other words, the Certificate of Control is a document that the 
importer needs to ensure it can obtain before it finalizes any contracts for the importation of rice.  
Third, when an importer has not received MARA's a pproval of a Certificate of Control, the shipment 
will not be cleared through Customs.  This is appare nt from the experience of Torunlar, a Turkish rice 
importer which signed rice purchasing contracts prior to receiving MARA's approval of a Control Certificate, and had to file suit in Turkish court to force MARA to issue the Certificate so it could 
move the rice out of bonded warehouses. 
 3. Turkey has argued that anyone can import rice under the TRQ but, until yesterday, ignored the fact that, as a practical matter, only millers or packers would have the ability or desire to purchase 
paddy rice.  At yesterday's panel meeting, Turkey conceded that it was unaware of any restaurants or 
retailers that would want to purchase paddy rice.  We agree with Turkey's assessment.  Given that 
purchasing paddy rice is a condition for importing under the TRQ, it follows that no restaurant or 
retailer would utilize the TRQ.  Narrowing the eligibility criterion from purchasing rice to purchasing 
paddy rice  was thus used by Turkey to limit the class of persons or firms that w ould be able to import, 
thereby demonstrating an additional restriction on  importation for purposes of Article XI:1.   
 
4. The United States understands that Turkey inte nds to provide information that it has been 
granting Certificates of Control outside the TRQ.  In this regard, the United States notes that, under 
the terms of a bilateral agreement between the Eu ropean Union and Turkey, the European Union has 
an annual quota of 28,000 tons of milled rice.  Under the quota, importers  are permitted to import 
milled rice from the EU, primarily from Italy, on a duty free basis throughout the year without being subject to any of the prohibitions and restrictions that  the United States has raised in this dispute.  We 
realized that this was the case after discussing this matter with EU rice traders, who were unaware of 
the problems that exporters from the United States, Egypt, and other WTO Members were experiencing in shipping rice to Turkey.  The Un ited States is uncertain whether Turkey requires 
importers of EU rice to obtain Certificates of Cont rol since EU rice imports are "green-lighted" under 
the terms of the bilateral agreement.  If Turkey does require importers of EU rice to obtain such 
Certificates, this raises further questions a bout the data presented by Turkey in Annex 20. 
 5. According to Turkish import data, Turkey im ported approximately 25,000 and 32,000 tons of 
rice from the European Union in 2004 and 2005, resp ectively.  Yet according to Annex 20, Turkey 
only granted Certificates of Control for approximate ly 7,000 tons of out of quota rice in 2004 and WT/DS334/R 
Page B-8  
 
  approximately 24,000 tons of out of quota rice in 2005.  If Turkey is correct that Certificates of 
Control are only valid for one year – so Certifi cates obtained in prior years could not account for 
much of this apparent shortfall – this raises the question as to where EU rice  imports can be found in 
Turkey's chart and, if not, whether importers of EU rice need to obtain Control Certificates.  The United States looks forward to Turkey's clarification of this issue.  
 
6. The United States would conclude by sta ting that, for the reasons above as well as the 
arguments the United States has raised in its first s ubmission and at this week's meeting of the panel, 
Turkey has not produced evidence and argument to  rebut the evidence and argument of the United 
States.  As clarified by the Appellate Body in its report in US – Wool Shirts and Blouses , Turkey has 
therefore failed to rebut the US prima facie  case.     
 7. Madam Chair, this concludes our closing stat ement.  Again, we would like to thank you, the 
members of the Panel, and the Secretariat for your  efforts.  We look forward to answering your 
questions in writing and seeing you at the next meeting of the panel in January. 
  WT/DS334/R 
 Page B-9 
 
 
  ANNEX B-3 
 
OPENING AND CLOSING ORAL STATEMENTS 
BY TURKEY AT THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MEETING 
(8-9 November 2006) 
 
 Ms. Chairwoman, distinguished Members of the Panel,  1. Turkey would like to express its gratitude to  all three panellists for having accepted to serve 
on this Panel and to assist in the resolution of this dispute. 
 2. Turkey welcomes the opportunity to submit orally its views at this first meeting of the Panel.  
Turkey has already provided a comprehensive rebuttal to the claims made by the United States.  In 
this statement, Turkey wishes merely to outline its legal arguments, its submission on the facts and its 
conclusion that the regime for the importation of rice in to Turkey is fully compatible with WTO rules.  
 3. This oral statement addresses a number of f actual and legal considerations related to: the 
Certificates of Control; the expired Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ); the TRQ domestic purchase requirement; and a number of systemic and genera l considerations related to trade in rice. 
 
4. Turkey's Certificates of Control are not impor t licenses. They have never been applied as an 
import licensing instrument.  The Certificates of C ontrol have never functione d as import restrictions 
or prohibitions in relation to the importation of ri ce whether at the MFN rates, the applied rates of 
duty, or within the TRQ.  
5. The Certificate of Control is a reference doc ument needed to process the customs clearance of 
specific consignments of a variety of goods, includin g rice.  The Certificate of Control allows customs 
authorities to verify, on a single document, all re quired customs information, including the product's 
compliance with relevant standa rds and technical regulations. 
 6. The Certificate of Control acts as an element of  trade facilitation.  It provides legal certainty 
and commercial predictability to im porters engaged in rice importation.  In fact, once approved, the 
Certificate of Control is a guarantee for the importer that all elements and requirements needed to clear customs are present and will allow importation (provided, of course, that the consignment imported corresponds to the information supplied and passes the phytosanitary and food safety inspections).  The importer will then feel confid ent to conclude all necessary business engagements 
for purposes of importation. This element of legal certainty must be seen as a tool of trade facilitation.  
It provides administrative certainty for importers and avoids possible time consuming and costly 
procedures at border control.  7. GATT Article XI:1 does not define the concept of " import license ".  Neither is this concept 
defined by Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agricu lture or by any previous GATT or WTO panel or 
Appellate Body decision.  An element of inte rpretative guidance appears to be available under 
Article 1.1 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, where it is clearly indicated that the submission of an application or other documentation required for " customs purposes " falls outside of 
the definition of import licensing.  
8. The " customs purposes " of Certificates of Control are evident both de jure  and de facto .  In 
Turkey, as in all WTO Members, the process of import ation and customs clearance is more than just 
compliance with the obligation to pay the applicable  duty and other charges.  Customs clearance also 
includes the compliance with all administra tive requirements and the fulfilment of " customs 
purposes " such as, inter alia : the 'gathering of relevant administrative information by customs WT/DS334/R 
Page B-10  
 
  authorities'; the 'customs valuation determination'; the 'origin determination'; the 'monitoring of trade 
and collection of statistics'; the application and cer tification of 'quarantine, sanitation and fumigation 
requirements'; and the 'analysis, inspection and certification'.  9. If all the required information is provided by  the importers, and it is shown that the goods 
comply with all relevant specifications and techni cal regulations, the Certificates of Control are 
automatically approved.  Individual instances of ad ministrative delay, rejection, or even domestic 
litigation in relation to the approval (or non approva l) of a particular application for a specific 
Certificate of Control, cannot be used to claim or imply that Turkey adopted and/or applied this 
instrument as an intentional barrier to trade. 
 
10. The fact that Certificates of Control are used for both MFN and TRQ rice importation stands out as a clear testimony that they are exclusively for " customs purposes ".  In fact, contrary to what the 
United States argues, imports under the TRQ can onl y occur if an importer obtains both an import 
license and a Certificate of Control. 
 
11. Certificates of Control are not import licenses and, therefore, do not fall within the meaning and the scope of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.  12. With respect to the claimed violation of  GATT Article XI:1, Turkey believes that the 
Certificate of Control does not amount to a prohib ition or restriction made effective through, in 
relevant part, " import licences " or " other measures ".  Turkey has shown that the Certificate of Control 
is not an import license.    13. Nor are Certificates of Control "other measures".  The United States has failed to show on 
what grounds Turkey's Certificates of Cont rol can or even should be considered as " other measures " 
for purposes of the application of GATT Article XI.  The United States has not shown that there is 
either de jure  or de facto  a " prohibition " or " restriction " in relation to the alleged 'denial of 
Certificates of Control to import rice'.  As there is no " restriction " or " prohibition ", the nature of the 
"measure " is of no relevance.  Measures are only prohib ited if they are restrictions or prohibitions. 
 14. Furthermore, individual rejections in the appr oval of Certificates of Control have never been 
instances of restriction (both de jure  or de facto ) within the meaning of GATT Article XI:1.  The 
reasons for rejection of individual importers' applicat ions have always been pr ovided and, in general 
terms, were most often due to missing or wrong information supplie d by the importers such as the 
introduction of the wrong customs code classification,  the lack of indication of the chosen customs 
points of entry, or the wrong origin information. 
 
15. Turkey can provide the approval rates of the applications for Certificates of Control made by rice importers during the period 2003-2006 (for both MFN and TRQ trade volumes).  In 2003, 
96.73% of the importers' applicati ons were approved.  In 2004, th is approval rate was 94.37%, in 
2005 it was 98.45%, and in 2006 (to date) the approva l rate stands at 90.80% of the applications 
lodged.  These figures are clear evidence of the lack of any  de facto  restriction to rice imports 
obtained through the administration of the Certificates of Control system. 
 16. With respect to the de jure  scrutiny, the relevant Turkish law does not impose any 'denial' and 
does not aim at imposing directly or indirectly an y import prohibition and/or restriction.  The United 
States wrongly assumes that the so-called 'Letters  of Acceptance' are to be considered as " laws, 
regulations, judicial decisions or administrative rulings " of the kind that can prove an instance of de 
jure "prohibition " or " restriction ". 
 17. As for the de facto  scrutiny, Turkey has shown that, in relation to both MFN and TRQ trade, a 
high number of Certificates of Control were a pproved (i.e., 2,223 between 2003 and 2006, which  WT/DS334/R 
 Page B-11 
 
 
  amounts to 2,264,858 tonnes of paddy, brown a nd milled rice) and large amounts of rice were 
imported (i.e., 939,013 tonnes of milled rice equiva lent between 2003 and 2006).  This is convincing 
and irrefutable evidence that th ere has never been a general de facto  'denial of Certificates of Control 
to import rice '.  In addition, the claim by the United States that Turkey failed " to grant Certificates of 
Control to importers 'at all' for a period of over 2 ½ years and is still not granting them " is not 
correct.  Turkey has provided clear evidence to  the contrary. And, in any event, this de facto  scrutiny 
cannot be merely quantitative in nature (i.e., carried -out solely on the basis of the number of approved 
Certificates of Control).  In relation to the data pr ovided, an updated version of Annex 20 to Turkey's 
First Submission is provided today.  While the total figures do not change, the attention of the Panel is 
drawn to the 2005 'In Quota' and 'Out of Quota' data. 
 
18. Certificates of Control are automatically appr oved in all instances when importers show full 
compliance with legal requirements established for " customs purposes ".  Individual instances of non-
approval of particular rice importers' applicati ons must be seen as a natural component of the 
interaction between any WTO Member's administration and its business community and cannot be 
generalized into a general ' denial of Certificates of Control to import rice ' to show the existence of an 
"import restriction ". 
 19. The TRQ is no longer in force.  TRQs were opened in 2004 and 2005, not to protect or distort 
trade, but rather to achieve the necessary supply of rice into Turkey and to stabilize the domestic 
market.  Very simply, the TRQ provided a tariff advantage to imported rice up to predetermined 
quantities.  Any interested importer could apply for a TRQ licence which was granted if there was 
compliance with the requirements and conditions set out in relevant Turkish legislation. 
 20. The TRQ has systematically been allocated on a " first-come-first-served " basis and has never 
discriminated on the basis of country of origin of  the rice or nationality/affiliation of the importer 
applying for a license.  The requirements for the application and evaluation procedures of the import 
licenses have always been clear, transparent and easy to implement for all importers. Similarly, the 
administrative procedures for licensing have always  been simple and user-friendly. All documents 
required for application have always been published in  the relevant legislation.  When all application 
requirements were met, the import licenses have systematically been issued within 5 days.  
21. In addition to the import licenses obtained fo r purposes of in-quota allocation, of course, 
importers also had to comply with all other custom s obligations and requirements, in particular the 
presentation and approval of the required Certificates  of Control.  Turkey wishes to emphasize that 
there is a clear difference between the TRQ import licence and the Certificate of Control. The first instrument is used to facilitate the allocation of  the TRQ among importers, while the other is to 
facilitate customs clearance. 
 22. The tariff quota system was never meant to act as, and never had, any restrictive or 
discriminatory effects on trade and rice imports. Ra ther, the system was voluntary and conferred an 
advantage to the importers meeting the requirements stipulated in the legislation. Importers have 
always been free to make use of the system or not. 
 
23. Turkey has shown that the high volumes of in -quota imports and the high numbers of licences 
which have been issued are testimony to the attrac tiveness and appeal that the tariff advantage has had 
in the business determinations made by individual ri ce importers.  This in-quota advantage has always 
existed in parallel to the ability to import at the le ss advantageous MFN rates of duty.  Again, Turkey 
has shown that MFN trade has never been prohibited or restricted, both de jure  and de facto
. 
 24. The claim put forward by the United States alleges that the domestic purchase requirement and the eligibility criteria of Turkey's TRQ system ' affect the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase 
(…) or use ' of imported rice by " adversely modifying the conditions of competition between domestic WT/DS334/R 
Page B-12  
 
  and imported products " within the meaning of GATT Article III:4.  The arguments made by the 
United States are somewhat misleading a nd not supported by convincing evidence. 
 25. In particular, it is wrong and misleading to st ate that the fulfilment of the domestic purchase 
requirement by importers " provides the only way to import rice into Turkey ".  Turkey maintains that 
any importer has always been free to import whatev er quantity of rice into Turkey from whatever 
country at the MFN or applied rate of duty.  The regime of importation which was applied within the 
TRQ was meant to provide an advantage to importers  of foreign rice to adequately supply the Turkish 
rice market.  In fact, it is well known that Turkey is a net importer of rice and that imports are 
essential to stabilize the market (both in terms of price and quantities available). 
 
26. Turkey has shown that the opening of the TR Q always resulted in the modification of the 
conditions of competition between domestic and imported products in favour of imported products .  
With particular regard to Paragraph 52 of the Firs t Submission by the United States, Turkey maintains 
that the scenario set out is flaw ed by the use of the following two wrong assumptions: 1) The cost to 
the importer cannot be the FOB price, but rather the CIF price; 2) The figure of US$ 1,654 per tonne 
used by the United States does not represent a corre ct benchmark of comparison since it should refer 
to three metric tonnes of paddy rice (i.e., two of  domestic produce and one of imported rice).  In 
addition, the TMO price of US$ 650 per tonne cannot represent the actual market price since the share of total domestic production purchased by TMO amount s only to a mere 2.4%, which corresponds to 
a negligible volume and does not allow TMO to in fluence the domestic market price.  A simple 
review of the average price dynamics of the Turkis h rice market in 2005 shows something completely 
different from that claimed by the United States.  27. In particular, the calculations carried-out by Turkey indicate that, in the event that paddy rice 
from the United States was imported at the MFN rate of 34% ad valorem  (i.e., at the applied rate 
already set at a much lower level than the bound MFN rate of 45% ad valorem,  in order to attract 
imports), its cost amounted to US$ 495 per tonne.  If the same type of rice was imported from the 
United States at the preferential tariff rate of 20% ad valorem  (i.e., the rate offered for rice imports 
within the TRQ), it would have cost US$ 444 per t onne.  At the same time, the cost of purchase of 
domestic rice from local producers (based on the av erage domestic prices for the year 2005) would 
have been 640 New Turkish Liras, equivalent to  US$ 457 per tonne. Therefore, when an importer 
purchased 1 tonne of Turkish rice under the domes tic purchase requirement (on the basis of its 
coefficients) in order to be allowed, for purposes of  benefiting of the TRQ preferential rates, to import 
800 kg of paddy rice from the United States, the average cost per tonne would have equalled US$ 451.  The domestic purchase requirement, in substance, was altering the conditions of 
competition between domestic and imported products in favour of imported products .  What could 
have been bought domestically at US$ 457 per tonne had become, all of a sudden, cheaper to be 
purchased through the TRQ regime at a mere US$ 444 per tonne.  The competitive advantage for 
imported rice would have been US$ 13 per tonne.  28. As a further example to that set out in Tu rkey's First Submission, the data compiled in 
relation to milled rice imports during the years 20 04 and 2005 provide an even better and more 
compelling overview of the price dynamics.  In particular, in 2004, rice imports from the United 
States at the MFN rate of duty (i.e., 45%) would ha ve cost importers US$ 1,008 per tonne.  The cost 
of importation within the TRQ (i.e., at the 43% rate  of duty) would have been, in the absence of any 
domestic purchase requirements, US$ 994 per tonne.  Taking into consideration an average cost of 
domestic rice of US$ 822 per tonne, the application of the domestic purchase requirement (taking into 
consideration the applicable coefficients) would have resulted in an average cost of US$ 908 per 
tonne.  This figure is much lower than the average cost of rice imported from the United States at the 
MFN rate (i.e., US$ 1,008 per tonne) and, most importa ntly for this case, even  lower than the average 
cost of the TRQ imports, had they occurred without the application of the domestic purchase 
requirement (i.e., US$ 994 per tonne).  In 2004, as well as in 2005, it is clear that the shift in the  WT/DS334/R 
 Page B-13 
 
 
  conditions of competition was totally in favour of imported products  and to the detriment of 
domestically produced rice.  This is a further indica tion that an advantage to imported rice has always 
been conferred by the TRQ system and its domes tic purchase requirement.  The extent of the 
advantage changed due to a number of factors such as US$-Turkish Lira exchange rates, consumers' 
preferences and/or foreign countries' competitive po sitions vis-à-vis the various types of imported 
rice.  However, Turkey's objectiv e has always been that of market stabilization, never a "hidden 
agenda" to distort the market in favour of domestic rice.  29. In fact, Turkey had to pursue, at the same ti me, two legitimate objectives: the one of greater 
market supply (through the TRQ) and that of ma rket stabilization (through the domestic purchase 
requirement).  It is clear that a TRQ system without the domestic purchase requirement would have 
resulted in too great an advantage in favour of imported products.  This outcome would have also 
carried negative consequences in terms of the viability and affordability of Turkey's market 
intervention mechanisms and its ability to comply with WTO obligations in relation to its committed 
levels of Aggregate Measurement of Support. 
 
30. The domestic purchase requirement partly modera ted (or even magnified, as the data for 2004 
and 2005 milled rice imports indicate) the advantag eous effects, and not the adverse effects as 
claimed by the United States, that the TRQ had conferred to imported rice.  The TRQ did confer an advantage.  Its success, in terms of quota utilization,  is clear evidence of this.  The domestic purchase 
requirement did not take away this advantage.  The domestic purchase requirement must be seen as a 
fundamental of the TRQ system itself, just like the in-quota and the preferential rates of duty.  Turkey 
maintains that it was fully entitled to decide, in lin e with its economic policies, the characteristics of 
the TRQ.  For those importers that did not consid er TRQ trade advantageous, MFN always remained 
an option.  Turkey has shown that, contrary to what is claimed by the United States, TRQ and MFN 
rice importation always co-existed. 
 
31. The allegations that the dom estic purchase requirement and the eligibility criteria should, in 
the alternative, be considered a restriction on imports of rice within the meaning of GATT 
Article XI:1, are legally incorrect and not based on convincing factual evidence. There was never a 
de jure  restriction of rice importation into Turkey sin ce nothing in the relevant laws and regulations 
ever diminished the ability to import at the app lied or MFN bound rates of duty. The TRQ regime, 
and its domestic purchase requireme nt, never altered or removed th e ability of importers to import 
unlimited quantities of rice from any origin at the applied or MFN bound rates of duty. Furthermore, 
the TRQ regime acted to confer an advantage to importers of rice at preferential rates which available data show to have been largely u sed by importers, independently of the country of origin and despite 
the domestic purchase requirement. 
 
32. The United States alleged that certain requireme nts, referred as the eligibility criteria, would 
restrict the categories of importers/traders able to  purchase domestic rice for the purpose of importing 
under the TRQ.  Such requirements, according to  the United States, constitute an autonomous 
violation of GATT Articles III:4 and XI:1.  Turkey submits that the allega tion is wrong and largely 
based on the erroneous translation and interpretation of  Turkey's relevant legislation.  Turkey recalls 
that there is no eligibility requirement in order to be able to purchase domestic  rice.  On the contrary, 
any restriction of the categories of eligible pur chasers would defeat the purpose and objectives of the 
TRQ system in that it would diminish the chances th at the entire TRQ be allocated and that the market 
be adequately supplied and, consequently, stabilized .  Therefore, Turkey wishes to clarify that the 
relevant legislation simply provid es that domestic rice may only be purchased  from paddy producers 
having permission to plant paddy rice, their coope ratives and unions, or from the TMO (as indicated 
in Turkey's First Submission at Annex 9, Article 5 and Annex 16, Article 5). 
 33. Turkey also wishes to emphasize that, contrary  to the allegations of the United States, the 
TRQ regime was based on an automatic import licensing system and, therefore, does not fall within WT/DS334/R 
Page B-14  
 
  the scope of GATT Article XI. In addition, Turkey maintains that, in the context of an automatic 
import licensing regime, legal requirements such as th e eligibility criteria of the TRQ system must be 
deemed not to have trade-restrictive effects so long as any person, firm, or institution which fulfils 
them is equally eligible to apply for and to obtain an  import license.  This has always been the case in 
Turkey during the existence of the TRQ system. 
 
34. Turkey turns now to the claims made by the United States in relation to a number of general 
and systemic considerations related to trade in rice.   35. First, Turkey wishes to recall that, in orde r to establish the existence of a violation of the 
TRIMs Agreement, a measure must be inconsiste nt with the provisions of GATT Article III (or 
GATT Article XI). The United States has not established that the domestic purchase requirement is inconsistent with GATT Article III:4. Therefore, ev en if the domestic purchase requirement were to 
be considered an investment measure related to trade in goods within the meaning of the TRIMs 
Agreement, the United States has not established th at the domestic purchase requirement is, as such, 
inconsistent with Article 2. 1 of the TRIMs Agreement. 
 36. Second, Turkey rejects the claim that a le gal or operational link between the legislative 
framework for the TRQ regime and MFN trade could aim at seriously restricting market access or even at imposing a seasonal ban and therefore constitute, autonomously, a violation of GATT Article XI:1.  The United States bases its argumen t on the assumption that both the Certificate of 
Control requirement and the TRQ regime individua lly breached the obligations set forth in GATT 
Article XI. However, Turkey has already provided legal arguments and factual evidence showing that 
there is no de jure  or de facto  prohibition or restriction connected with either the Certificates of 
Control or Turkey's expired TRQ regime.  Turkey submits that none of these instruments has ever acted, either individually or in combination with one another, to deter full utilization of the quotas 
opened within the TRQ regime or to prohibit or restrict MFN trade. In fact, Turkey has shown that, 
rather than being "economically irrational", the TRQ system generated a s ubstantial advantage to 
importers of rice, even of rice of US origin and in spite of the domestic purchase requirement. 
 37. Third, Turkey considers that the United Stat es has failed to properly establish a violation of 
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. In pa rticular, Turkey has shown that the Certificates of 
Control are not 'import licenses' within the meaning of the Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures, and that there has never been any 'denial' of 'import licenses' or any de jure  or de facto  
import prohibition or restriction within the meani ng of GATT Article XI:1.  Turkey has also shown 
that its TRQ regime was not based on discretionary im port licensing and that it is not correct to claim 
that non-tariff measures were maintained through stat e trading enterprises.  Turkey therefore believes 
that the claim put forward by th e United States under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture 
should be rejected, both in relation to the individu al instruments and in their joint operation.  In 
addition, Turkey wishes to recall that it is well awar e of the objectives of Article 4.2 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture and of the special relation betwee n this article and GATT Article XI:1. However, 
Turkey does not consider that any automatic link be tween the two provisions has yet been established.  
A violation of GATT Article XI:1 does not constitute automatically a violation of Article 4.2 unless it 
is positively established that the measure at stake fall s within and is inconsistent with footnote 1 of 
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  38. Fourth, in relation to the alleged violations  of certain provisions of the Import Licensing 
Agreement, Turkey again notes that the United States has based its claims on the incorrect 
assumptions that (i) the Certificates of Control are, or function as, import licenses and that (ii) the 
TRQ regime is based on a non-automatic import licensing system. Turkey has shown that the Certificates of Control are not 'import licenses' a nd the TRQ licences were automatic while the TRQs 
were in force. These claims should be rejected entirely.   WT/DS334/R 
 Page B-15 
 
 
  39. Finally, Turkey wishes to draw the attention to  the fact that the legi slative framework for the 
TRQ regime, including the domestic purchase requireme nt, is no longer in force.  The measures under 
consideration were of short legal validity and have expired.  In this respect, Turkey notes that it has 
been previous Panels' and Appellate Body's practic e to either refrain from making findings or, when a 
finding was considered necessary for the positive r esolution of a dispute, to refrain from making 
recommendations on expired measures. On the basis of, inter alia , the consideration that Turkey has 
not renewed the measures in question and has no inte ntion to do so, Turkey considers that further 
examination of the TRQ regime is not necessary for the successful resolution of the dispute. Turkey 
recognizes this Panel's full discretion to decide on th e specific matter at stake.  However, should this 
Panel consider it necessary to make a finding, Turkey  respectfully requests the Panel not to make any 
recommendation. 
 40. In conclusion, the United States has not shown eith er in law or in fact that the regime for the 
import of rice into Turkey is incompatible with  Turkey's obligations under the WTO Agreements. 
 
41. As a result of the discussions entertained duri ng the oral hearing, it has become clear that a 
greater amount of evidence is needed to adequate ly understand the various issues at stake. Turkey 
believes that the further documents which it will su bmit will clearly show to the Panel and the United 
States that there has been no distortion of rice impor ts through the Certificates of Control or through 
the operation of the domestic purchase requirement in the TRQ.  
42. Turkey has shown that Certificates of C ontrol have been approved regularly by MARA 
during the whole 2003-2006 period (i.e., the period during which the United States claims that no Certificates of Control were approved because of the "Letters of Acceptance").  These Certificates have been approved for both in-quota and over-quota volumes of trade and even to the benefit of the 
individual trader (Torunlar) who took legal action ag ainst MARA and referred to by the United States 
in its Submission at paragraphs 28 to 31. 
 43. Turkey also believes that the oral hearing h as been able to address misunderstandings on the 
duration of validity of approved Certificates of C ontrol as well as the possibility for the multiple use 
of a single Certificate of Control up to the full amount for which it was approved.  The law clearly shows that the length of validity of an approved Cer tificate of Control for rice imports is, and always 
has been, 12 months from the date of approval.  The law also shows that, for rice importation, 
multiple uses of a single approved Certificate of Control are allowed.  44. This fundamental misundersta nding of Turkish law underlies much of the claim by the United 
States.  If a Certificate of Control is valid for 12 months from the date of approval, the issue before 
this Panel is not a question of when the Certificates  of Control were approved. As they can be used 
anytime within the 12 month period, at any one time there is an abundance of Certificates of Control 
available to importers. So the core claim made by the United States, that only a limited number of Certificates of Control was approved in any one period and that the Certificates of Control were import licenses, is not relevant. The real issue is how many valid Certificates of Control were in 
circulation at any one time as, if there were plenty available, they could not have acted as an import 
restraint. 
 45. In any event, the United States has not proved to Turkey or to this Panel that there were 
periods where applications for approval of Certif icates of Control were not approved.  The United 
States has merely referred to three specific cases wh ere Certificates of Control were not approved.  
This is not evidence of a systematic denial of a pprovals let alone evidence of an import prohibition or 
even of an import restriction.  In f act, the United States has not even made a prima facie  case. 
 46. Turkey, on the other hand, has already show n and will further clarify that the volumes for 
which Certificates of Control were approved far ex ceeded actual trade.  This means that traders WT/DS334/R 
Page B-16  
 
  maintained in their possession valid Certificates of Co ntrol for larger volumes that they needed for use 
at anytime during the 12 month period of their validity.  47. The Certificates of Control are not import licenses.  They are documents used for trade facilitation and customs purposes.  To the extent that  they are agricultural products, they are approved 
by MARA.  The information provided on the Certific ate of Control is customary information which is 
required by MARA to fulfil its domestic obligatio ns.  However, MARA does work closely with 
customs authorities for purposes of administering the process of inspection and customs clearance at 
point of entry.  
48. The scope of the information requested by MA RA for approval of the Certificate of Control 
does not change an administrative document used for customs purposes into an import license, as the 
United States argues.  If we were to follow the lin e of argument put forward by the United States, any 
document used in relation to importation would be an import license.  This is patently not the case.  
For example:  SPS certificates are not import licenses;  Certificates of origin are not import licenses; 
Certificates of compliance with technical regulations  are not import licenses.  The bringing together of 
all these individual 'non-import-licenses' into a sing le document does not suddenly turn that single 
document into an import license.  The United States has not shown which element of the Certificate of Control turns this administrative doc ument into an import license.  It has merely asserted that it is an 
import license.  The United States has not made a prima facie  case and it certainly has not brought 
any proof before this Panel. 
 
49. The fact that there are similarities in the in formation required on both Certificates of Control 
and TRQ Import Licenses is not proof that the Cer tificate of Control is an import license.  An 
examination of Exhibit 51 of the United States, wh ich lists the similarities, shows nothing sinister.  
The similarities cited include: a requirement that th e customs classification code must be provided, 
that the product must be described, that the impor ter must be named, that the importer's tax number 
must be provided, that the quantity is to be filled in, that the country of origin must be cited, that an 
indication of where the product was loaded is needed, and finally that the point of entry into Turkey 
must be indicated.  The requesting of this type of  information in relation to two different documents 
for two different purposes is perfectly normal.  It even shows that the documents were separate and 
served different purposes.  If they served the same  purpose, why repeat all information on both? 
 
50. The United States relies heavily, and ultima tely only, on the so-called "Letters of 
Acceptance".  Turkey accepts that "Letters of Acceptance" were wr itten and were in circulation.  
However, these letters were internal communi cations aimed at developing policies.  These 
administrative communications never resulted in the adoption of laws or regulations.  They were 
never used to systematically deny the approval of a pplications for Certificates of Control.  And even 
if, hypothetically, they had been used to limit the approval of Certificates of Control, which Turkey 
vehemently denies, this is not evidence that there was a measure prohibiting or restricting imports.  The same traders had other certificates of control for volumes greater than th ey needed usable over a 
12 month period.  
51. The record shows that, despite the "Letters  of Acceptance", Certificates of Control were 
approved.  And not only that, Certificates of Cont rol were approved for Torunlar, the domestic litigant 
relied upon by the United States to show that the Letters  did operate as a general restriction.  They did 
not operate as a general restricti on.  They did not operate as a sy stematic scheme of import prohibition 
or restriction, whatever the text of this intern al administrative communication actually states.  The 
import statistics clearly confirm this and this will be specifically addressed in Turkey's next 
submission.  52. The fact that these "Letters of Acceptance"  have been used in open court proceedings by 
MARA in their defence in relation to an individual re jection of an application for a specific Certificate  WT/DS334/R 
 Page B-17 
 
 
  of Control cannot be considered as evidence of a systemic denial of approval of Certificates of 
Control or, more importantly, for the purposes of the case by the United States in WTO law, a 
systemic prohibition or restricti on on imports under GATT Article XI. 
 53. In the course of the oral hearing, the United States has tried to suggest that import licenses for 
the TRQ were only being issued, in fact, to a limit ed number of specific traders.  The United States 
has shown no evidence of this, nor has it shown th at the alleged limited group of importers that 
benefited from the TRQ had any specific characteris tics.  Turkey does not understand the purpose of 
these suggestions.  If, however, the United States is  trying to hint at, or suggest, some sort of 
discrimination on the basis of nationality, Turkey strongly rejects this allegation. 
 
54. As Turkey has stated, a substantial number  of traders benefited from the TRQ and were 
allocated part of the quota.  Furthermore, Turkey notes that this allegation is not an allegation in 
relation to the GATT.  It is an allegation in rela tion to services, namely distribution services, and the 
United States has not pleaded the GAT S in this case.  Again, the ex act details will be provided in 
further submissions. 
 55. The United States has shown figures according to which the cost of import of a single tonne of rice within the TRQ amounts to US$ 1,654.  This calculation beggars belief.  The fact is that the 
amount of US$ 1,654 must be divided by three since the importer now holds three tonnes of rice.  In addition, Turkey asks the Panel to review in some detail the prices that the United States has 
submitted to you.  For example, in its First Submi ssion, the United States claims that the FOB price 
for paddy rice is US$ 295 per tonne.  In its oral stat ement, the United States claimed that the CIF price 
for paddy rice is US$ 260 per tonne.  Turkey has not had time to fully examine this issue, but the figures obviously seem to be, at best, inconsistent and,  at worst, randomly chosen.  As a general point, 
Turkey observes that the United States is only us ing extreme examples and does not build its case on 
general trade statistics, policies or laws. 
 56. The United States has argued that the deadlines and the re-openings of the TRQ are in and of 
themselves breaches of GATT Article XI.  Turkey fail s to understand this argument.  Time limits are 
an inherent part of the management of any TRQ.  If time limits are a breach of GATT Article XI, then all TRQs administered by all WTO Members would be incompatible with WTO law. 
 
57. In addition, the very fact that the deadlines of the TRQ were re-opene d or extended cannot be 
a breach of GATT Article XI.  Turkey is under the oblig ation to ensure full utilization of TRQs, if and 
when it chooses to open them.  In any event, the United States has not shown how the extension of the TRQ could have inhibited full utilization.  It is a mere  assertion not backed up by fact or by law.  This 
leads to the issue of the domestic purchase requirement. 
 58. The United States again misunderstands the do mestic purchase requirements for eligibility to 
benefit from the TRQ.  Turkish law provides that an applicant for a TRQ import license must show 
that it has purchased a specific quantity of domestic ri ce.  Any operator, domestic or foreign, that has 
a tax registration number, is entitled to purchase domestic rice from three categories of domestic 
sellers.  These are the paddy producers, the unions and cooperatives of paddy producers, and the 
TMO.  If the operator chooses to purchase from the TMO, the quantity is different from the quantity 
required if the purchase is from the other two categories.  These quantities are clearly set out in the law in a transparent fashion.  
59. Once an operator has purchased the required qua ntity of domestic rice, that operator becomes 
eligible to apply for an import license under the TR Q.  Contrary to what has been alleged by the 
United States, there are no eligibility criteria in re lation to who can be an operator for the purposes of 
purchasing domestic rice.  And thus  benefit from the TRQ advantages. 
 WT/DS334/R 
Page B-18  
 
  60. Turkey would now like to ask the United States what concerns it has arising from the fact that 
restaurants and individual consumers are not acting as operators for the purposes of importation of 
rice into Turkey (who, by the way, were perfectly  entitled to purchase domestic rice and, therefore, 
import within the TRQ).  The approach being take n by the United States, and the arguments being 
used in relation to individual consumers and restau rants, raise questions for Turkey as to the ultimate 
objective of the United States in making this complaint.  Is the complaint designed to cut out a normal 
and regular part of the value chain in relation to the production, processing and sale of rice?  The 
United States seems to think that the fact that operators are mainly tr aders and millers is evidence of a 
breach of WTO law.  This is patently not the case.  
61. Or is the objective of the United States to get the benefit of the TRQ's lower duty rates 
without the burden of the domestic purchase require ment?  The TRQ is, as Turkey has emphasised, a 
market stabilization mechanism and the domestic purchase requirement is an integral part of it.  The TRQ was a concession which Turkey granted in addition to its bound commitments under its GATT 
Article II Country Schedule.  Turkey has shown that, despite the domestic purchase requirement, the 
advantage conferred by the TRQ was considerable. It  has been quantified in Turkey's pleadings.  In 
fact, evidence shows that traders chose to import th rough the TRQ system rather than at the MFN or 
applied rates while both remained available.  62. There is a wide range of other issues that have  been raised during this hearing.  Turkey will 
address them in its subsequent pleadings.  Turkey  looks forward to the written questions from the 
Panel and thanks the Panel for its contribution to th e clarification of the law and the facts underlying 
this case.    WT/DS334/R 
 Page B-19 
 
 
  ANNEX B-4 
 
ORAL STATEMENT BY AUSTRALIA 
AT THE THIRD PARTY SESSION 
(9 November 2006) 
 
 
Introduction  
 
1. In this statement, Australia will canvass a number of issues of legal interpretation. 
2. First, the Panel should address the arguments rela ting to the correct order of analysis before 
considering whether, for reasons of judicial econo my, it is no longer necessary to address some or all 
of the claims raised. 
3. Second, Australia submits that Turkey's alle ged denial of Certificates of Control, if 
established, is inconsistent with the prohibitio n on non-tariff measures in Article 4.2 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture . 
4. Third, Australia will make submissions on the term 'import licence' used in the Agreement on 
Import Licensing Procedures  (Import Licensing Agreement ) and Article XI:1 of GATT 1994. 
5. Fourth, if Turkey's Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) is no longer in existence and there are no 
continuing measures being applied, the Panel shoul d consider whether it is necessary to make a 
finding in respect of the claims relating to the TRQ in order to resolve the dispute. Should the Panel 
decide to make findings on the TRQ, Australia argues that the domestic purchasing requirement is 
inconsistent with Artic le III:4 of GATT 1994. 
6. Fifth, if the Panel finds that Turkey has adopted a practice of denying Certificates of Control 
altogether, this would constitute a 'measure of general application' for the purposes of Article X:2 of 
GATT 1994 and a failure to publish this measure would be inconsistent with Article X:2. 
7. Sixth, in relation to Turkey's arguments about the admissibility of certa in evidence, Australia 
notes that all evidence is admissible, but it is for the Panel to determine the weight it is to be given. 
Order of Analysis 
 
8. The Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III  found that the Panel should have applied Article 1.3 
of the Import Licensing Agreement  before considering Article X:3(a) of GATT 1994 since the Import 
Licensing Agreement  deals specifically, and in detail, with the administration of import licensing 
procedures. The Appellate Body noted that if the Pa nel had adopted this order of analysis, there would 
have been no need for it to address the al leged inconsistency with Article X:3(a).1 
9. Australia agrees that, as a general principle, provisions of a more specific agreement should 
be considered before provisions of a more general agreement where, as in EC – Bananas III , the 
provisions are, "for all practical purposes, interchang eable", being identical in coverage and effect. It 
is for the Panel to determine whether these criteria are met and, if they are, whether to exercise 
judicial economy with respect to claims made unde r the more general agreem ent. Where claims are 
based on provisions which are not identical in covera ge and effect, each claim should, in principle, be 
considered.  
                                                      
1 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III , paras. 202-204. WT/DS334/R 
Page B-20  
 
  Inconsistency of Turkish measure with Article 4.2 of the  Agreement on Agriculture  
 
10. Australia submits that Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture  and Article XI of 
GATT 1994 are not identical in coverage and effect , so claims made pursuant to these provisions 
should be analysed separately. 
11. Australia agrees with the EC that, apart from the footnote to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture , there is no automatic link between the texts of Article 4.2 and Article XI of GATT 1994.
2  
12. Having expressed this caution, Australia consider s that under a separate analysis pursuant to 
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture , it would be open to the Panel to find that Turkey's 
alleged denial of the Certificates of Control, if est ablished by the facts, prevents or restricts imports 
outside the TRQ. 
13. Australia agrees with the US3 that if Turkey has refused to gr ant Certificates of Control, that 
would constitute a quantitative import restriction or discretionary import licensing, or fall within the 
broad category of 'similar border measures other than  ordinary customs duties' in footnote 1 to 
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture . The measure is therefore 'of the kind' that Turkey may 
not maintain, resort to, or revert to, and is inc onsistent with the prohibition on non-tariff measures in 
Article 4.2. 
Article XI:1 of GATT 1994 – import licence/other measure 
 
14. Australia considers that the Panel should clarif y the term 'import licence' under Article XI:1 
of GATT 1994, considering its ordinary meaning and in the context of the Import Licensing 
Agreement .  
15. Neither Article 1.1 of the Import Licensing Agreement  nor GATT 1994 defines the term 
'import licence'. However, Article 1.1 of the  Import Licensing Agreement identifies the scope of the 
Agreement as being concerned with the administrati ve procedures that are used to implement import 
licensing. The phrase 'prior condition for importation'  in Article 1.1 provides guidance on the meaning 
of the term 'import licence'. It indicates that the term covers the control of imports. 
16. The footnote to Article 1.1 also provides guida nce in considering the meaning of 'import 
licence'. As stated by the Panel in EC – Bananas III , the footnote "further defines 'administrative 
procedures' to include 'those procedures referred to as "licensing" as well as other similar procedures'. 
Accordingly, irrespective of whether the term ' licensing' is used … administrative procedures are 
covered by the Licensing Agreement provided that  they have a purpose similar to licensing."4  
17. Turkey's submission5 that its Certificates of Control deal  solely with customs matters - and so 
are not import licences – gives too great a scope to the carve out for 'customs purposes' and restricts the meaning of 'import licences' beyond that intended by either Article XI of GATT 1994 or the Import Licensing Agreement . Australia considers that it would be difficult to consider a procedure that 
involves product safety checks or SPS measures within the concept of 'customs purposes' under 
Article 1.1 of the Import Licensing Agreement  or GATT 1994. The fact that there are elements of a 
regime which are required for customs purposes does not  mean, in and of itself, that the regime falls 
outside the term 'import licence'. The structure a nd operation of the regime in practice need to be 
examined to determine if it has a 'purpose similar to licensing'.  
                                                     
 
2 Third Party Written Submission by the European Communities, 18 October 2006, para. 20. 
3 First Submission of the United States, 20 September 2006, paras. 76-78. 
4 Panel Report, EC – Bananas III , para. 7.147. 
5 First Submission by Turkey, 11 October 2006, paras. 47-54.  WT/DS334/R 
 Page B-21 
 
 
  18. Australia further contends that if the Panel fi nds that the Certificate of Control is not an 
'import licence', as referred to in the WTO Agreements , the Panel should consider whether either the 
Certificate of Control or Turkey's alleged denial of  the Certificates is an 'other measure' within the 
meaning of Article XI of GATT 1994. Such a findi ng will depend on the Panel's view as to whether 
the evidence supports the US submissi on that Turkey has, through use of its Certificates of Control, 
either acted to prohibit or restrict the entry of rice into Turkey. 
Domestic support under Turkey's TRQ 
 
19. Turkey argues that it is not necessary to examine the expired Turkish TRQ regime.6 
20. Australia notes that the Panel has authority to  make findings on measures which are properly 
within its terms of reference, even wh ere those measures have ceased to exist.7 However, it is 
established jurisprudence that a panel only needs  to address those claims which must be addressed to 
resolve the matter in issue in the dispute.8 
21. Where a measure has been withdrawn, it may often be unnecessary to make a finding on the 
measure's consistency with the WTO Agreements , and panels in the past  have generally found it 
inappropriate to make recommendations  on measures which no longer exist.9 If the TRQ regime has 
indeed expired, the Panel should consider whether,  based on the particular facts of the case, it is 
necessary to make findings or recommendations on the measure in order to resolve the dispute. 
22. If the Panel concludes that elements of the TR Q continue to exist or otherwise decides to 
make findings on the TRQ, Australia submits th at Turkey's imposition of a domestic purchasing 
requirement under its TRQ regime is  inconsistent with Article III:4 of GATT 1994. The only issue 
between the parties in this regard is whether im ported rice is accorded less favourable treatment than 
domestic rice. 
23. Australia notes that WT O jurisprudence supports the view that the imposition of an 
'additional requirement' or an 'extra hurdle' on imported products, when compared to like domestic 
products, constitutes less favourable treatment.10 In Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports , the 
Panel considered that these 'extra hurdles' need not be one rous in commercial and/or practical terms to 
be inconsistent with Article III:4 of GATT 1994.11 
24. Under Turkey's TRQ regime, imported rice cannot  be sold in the domestic market unless that 
importer first purchases a specified quantity of domes tic rice. Domestic rice producers are not subject 
to any such additional requirement. Australia argues th at this is an 'extra hurdle' which alters the 
conditions of competition in favour  of domestic rice, and constitutes less favourable treatment for 
imported products.  
                                                      
6 First Submission by Turkey, 11 October 2006, paras. 137-139;  Third Party Written Submission by 
the European Communities, 18 October 2006, para. 32. 
7 Panel Report, India – Autos, para. 7.26;  Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos , para. 14.9. 
8 Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses , page 19; Appellate Body Report, US – Lead 
and Bismuth II , para. 71. 
9 For example, Appellate Body Report, US – Certain EC Products , para. 81; Panel Report, Chile – 
Price Band System , para. 7.112. 
10 Panel Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports , para. 6.185. 
11 Panel Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports , para. 6.190.  WT/DS334/R 
Page B-22  
 
  Interpretation of "measures of general application" under Article X:2 of GATT 1994 
 
25. Turkey argues that Article X:2 of GATT 1994 does not apply to the dispute as the Letters of 
Acceptance are not 'measures of general application'  and, because they cannot be enforced, they are 
not subject to the publication requirement under Article X:2.
12 
26. As the US submission makes clear, the measure at issue is Turkey's alleged blanket denial of 
Certificates of Control.13 In Australia's view, this is the 'mea sure of general application' which is 
allegedly being enforced, and which, if found to exist, constitutes a 'restriction or prohibition on 
imports' under Article X:2.  
27. If the Panel finds that Turkey has in fact adopted a practice of denying Certificates of Control 
altogether, Australia argues this could constitute a 'm easure of general application' for the purposes of 
Article X:2, whether or not the Letters of Acceptan ce themselves can be enforced. Turkey's failure to 
publish its denial of the Certificates, whether th rough publication of the Letters of Acceptance or 
some other instrument, would be inconsistent with Article X:2. 
Evidentiary Status of the Letters of Acceptance 
 
28. Turkey submits that the Letters of Acceptanc e are inadmissible or partial and unreliable 
evidence of Turkey's intention and trade policies.14 
29. The Dispute Settlement Understanding  contains no rules on the admissibility of evidence. As 
clarified in the Panel report in EC – Bed Linen , WTO panels "are generally free to admit and evaluate 
evidence of every kind and to ascribe to it the weight that they see fit."15 
30. Australia therefore contends that the Letters of Acceptance are admissible and it is for the 
Panel to determine the weight to  be accorded to such evidence. 
Conclusion 
 
31. In conclusion, Australia thanks the Panel for its  consideration of the points we have raised. 
                                                      
12 First Submission by Turkey, 11 October 2006, para. 84. 
13 First Submission of the United States,  20 September 2006, paras. 79-80. 
14 First Submission by Turkey, 11 October 2006, para. 81. 
15 Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen , para. 6.34.  WT/DS334/R 
 Page B-23 
 
 
  ANNEX B-5 
 
ORAL STATEMENT BY CHINA 
AT THE THIRD PARTY SESSION 
(9 November 2006) 
 
 1. Madam Chair, distinguished members of the Pa nel, thank you for providing China with the 
opportunity to make a statement at this meeting. In this statement, I w ill focus on three issues. 
I. ARTICLE XI:1 OF GATT 1994 
2. From the first submissions of the US and Turk ey, it's apparent that they have different 
viewpoints concerning whether Turkey's Certificates of Control is an import license. On this point, China is of the view that, even assu ming that the Certificate of Control is not an import license, if it 
prohibits or restricts the import of rice in practice,  it may still constitute an "other measure" which is 
inconsistent with GATT Article XI:1. Based on the in terpretations developed by the panel of the case 
India – Quantitative Restrictions ,
1 if an "other measure" subject to the discretion of a government 
agency and may block certain imports, such measur e should be deemed to operate as limitations on 
imports and is not permitted by Article XI:1. 
II. ARTICLE III OF GATT 1994 
3. With respect to domestic purchase requirement , the US claims that it violates GATT 
Article III:4, whereas Turkey denies such claim. Specifically, Turkey argues that with the benefit of 
lower tariff rate, the domestic purchase requirement actually altered the conditions of competition in 
favour of imported product, and theref ore was consistent with Article III:4.2 However, in China's 
view, such line of reasoning seems questionable. Ar ticle III deals with the comparison of treatments 
between the products imported and na tional products, and has no relati on to the level of tariff. If 
domestic purchase requirement alters the competition conditions to the detriment of imported 
products and thus violates Article III:4, the violation c ould not be redressed or offset by the benefit of 
lower tariff rate. 
III. THE APPLICATION OF TRIMS AGREEMENT 
4. The US claims that Turkey is in breach of Ar ticle 2.1 and Paragraph 1( a) of the Annex 1 of 
the TRIMs Agreement. Turkey argues that the subject measure is consistent with GATT Article III:4, 
and therefore does not violate Article 2.1 of the  TRIMs Agreement.3 It seems that Turkey ignores the 
fact that the US fails to define what a "trade-rela ted investment measure" is and to prove Turkey's 
measure constitutes a TRIM4.  
5. China wishes to raise its obser vation in this regard. The TRIM s Agreement is a fully fledged 
treaty with autonomous legal existence, and it mu st have its own appli cation scope. Although the 
TRIMs Agreement does not define what a TRIM is, this term could be inte rpreted properly according 
                                                      
1 Panel Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions , para. 5.129. 
2 Turkey's first written submission, paras. 95-99. 
3 Turkey's first written submission, paras. 110-113. 
4 TRIM is the abbreviation of "trade-related investment measure", note added by China. WT/DS334/R 
Page B-24  
 
  to the principle set forth in Article 3.2 of the DSU. In no case it is proper to bring a measure out of the 
coverage of TRIMs Agreement under the jurisdiction of it. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
6. This concludes my presentation. I thank you for your patience.  WT/DS334/R 
 Page B-25 
 
 
  ANNEX B-6 
 
ORAL STATEMENT BY EGYPT 
AT THE THIRD PARTY SESSION 
(9 November 2006) 
 
 Mrs. Chairperson, members of the Panel,   1. I am pleased to appear before you today to pr esent the views of the Arab Republic of Egypt as 
a third party to this proceeding. 
2. As an important producer and exporter of rice,  Egypt has a substantial interest in this 
proceeding. Also, as stated in its third party subm ission, Egypt is particularly concerned with the 
interpretation of Article III:4 and XI:1 of the GA TT 1994 and of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture.   
3. In today's statement, Egypt will elaborate on some of the elements raised in its third party 
submission and discuss certain of the issues raised  by other third parties to this proceeding.  
Measures at issue 
 
4. In its third party submission, the People's Re public of China submits that the measures 
challenged by the United States (US) under the title of "regime as a whole" are too broad to meet the 
specificity requirement of Article 6.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU).  
5. Egypt notes that in its request for the establishm ent of a panel, the US, after having identified 
the measures at issue and having referred separately to the denial of, or failure to grant import licenses 
and domestic purchase requirements, submits claims concerning Turkey's domestic purchase 
requirements, in conjunction with its  denial of, or failure to grant import licenses. Also, in its first 
written submission, under claims K, L and M, the US re fers to the denial of Certificates of Control 
and the domestic purchase requirements imposed unde r Turkey's TRQ regime. Under claim L, in 
particular, the US indicates that Turkey's import licensing regime comprises the TRQ requiring domestic purchase for under-quota imports and the deni al of import licenses for any imports at the 
rate of duty set out in Turkey's domestic schedule. 
Measures within the meaning of Article XI:1 
 
6. The US, in its first submission, primarily considers that Certificates of Control are import 
licenses within the meaning of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 even though it also states that they 
may be considered as "other measures" under this Article. Arguing that Certificates of Control are 
exclusively used for customs purposes, Turkey cont ends that they cannot be considered as import 
licences within the meaning of Article 1.1 of  the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. 
7. Since Article XI:1 does not define the notion of import license, Egypt considers that Turkey is 
right to refer to the definition set forth in Article 1.1 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures when examining if Certificates of C ontrol should be considered as import licenses under 
Article XI:1. Egypt is of the opinion that one of the central questions that must be addressed with 
respect to this issue is whether or not Certificat es of Control amount to administrative forms that are 
required exclusively for customs purposes. In line w ith the considerations invoked by the European 
Communities (EC) in its third party submission, E gypt believes that the requirements that must be WT/DS334/R 
Page B-26  
 
  satisfied by importers in order to obtain Certificat es of Control cannot be considered as exclusively 
for customs purposes. 
8. In the event that Certificates of Control wh ere found not to be import licenses within the 
meaning of Article XI:1, Egypt considers that it shoul d be examined whether they can be classified as 
"other measures". Egypt wishes to recall that, in previous dispute settlement proceedings concerning 
Article XI:1, panels have considered that its r each is very wide and that the expression "other 
measures" implies a broad scope as to the types of measures that are covered.  
"As such" or "as applied" claim  
 
9. The EC, in its third party submission, raises the question of whether the US has raised an "as 
such" or an "as applied" claim. In light of the findings of the Appellate Body in US – Zeroing (EC) , 
the EC considers that "on the basis of the facts before the Panel, ther e may be a series of "as applied" 
measures (or a practice), which the US is inviting th e Panel to construe as a measure and condemn in 
"as such" terms. 
10. Egypt wishes to indicate that the distincti on between "as such" and "as applied" claims 
referred to by the EC in its third party submissi on all concern the Agreement on Implementation of 
Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreem ent). While the findings of the Appellate Body 
and panels rendered within the framework of pr oceedings concerning the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
in relation to "as such" and "as applied" cases may be considered by the Panel in this proceeding, 
Egypt submits that the wording and nature of th e provisions referred to by the US in the present 
proceeding should be borne in mind. 
11. Egypt respectfully submits that if the Panel wa s to determine whether the US claims concern 
measures within the meaning of Article 3.3 of the DSU, it should examine how they are classified under the Articles referred to in support of their clai ms by the US. For example, with respect to US 
claim A, the Panel should determine whether the Ce rtificates of Control are import licenses or other 
measures within the meaning of Article XI:1. 
Expiry of the TRQ regime 
 
12. In its first submission, Turkey indicates that the legislative framework providing for the TRQ 
regime expired and requested the Panel to refrain from making findings  on the measures related to its 
TRQ regime or, should the Panel consider it necessar y to make findings necessary for the purpose of a 
positive solution to the dispute, not to make any recommendation to the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB). In its third party submission, the EC stat es that it does not consider it necessary to examine 
more in detail the TRQ regime. 
13. Considering the claims raised by the US with r espect to the joint operation of the TRQ regime 
and the general import regime, Egypt considers it impor tant for the Panel to take into consideration 
the TRQ regime for its findings to secure a positive solution to the dispute.  However, if the TRQ 
regime is no longer in force, Egypt also consid ers that no recommendation should be made to the 
DSB with respect to it. 
14. Mrs. Chairperson, members of the Panel, this  concludes the third party statement of Egypt. 
Thank you for your attention. 
  WT/DS334/R 
 Page B-27 
 
 
  ANNEX B-7 
 
ORAL STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
AT THE THIRD PARTY SESSION 
(9 November 2006) 
 
 Ms. Chairperson, distinguished members of the Panel,  1. The European Communities thanks the Panel for this opportunity to present its views today. 
2. In its written submission, the EC invited the Pa nel to conclude on four points of law:  
• carefully examine the existence of a "rule or norm" constituting a measure of general 
and prospective application 
 
• consider the order of analysis of the releva nt agreements in the light of the Appellate 
Body Report in EC – Bananas III  
 
• consider that where an import restriction that falls foul of Article XI has a 
simultaneous element of favouring the internal  sale of domestic, rather than imported, 
products, it violates also Article III of the GATT 
 
• refrain from making any recommendations to the DSB on the Turkish TRQ regime. 
 3. In this third party session, we will not devel op these arguments much further. However, for 
the sake of clarity, we will highlight again our main points. 
4. This is a very fact intensive case where the par ties appear to disagree on many of the facts at 
stake. The EC does not wish to add to this comp lication by building any theories based on assumptions 
of facts. What seems to be clear is that Turk ey's TRQ regime has ceased to exist. Under these 
circumstances, the EC does not consider it necessar y to examine more in detail the expired Turkish 
TRQ regime.  
5. The measures still in force, that is, the allege d import licensing system brings forward a very 
important systemic issue in the light of the argume nts presented by the United States.  The US in its 
first written submission refers to th e Turkish measures as "an unofficial  ban". It appears also that the 
US case relies at least partially on internal documen ts of the Turkish admini stration and reference is 
also made to oral instructions given to Turkish o fficials. Egypt in its third party submission considers 
it irrelevant that the unpublished Letters of Acce ptance may not be "laws, regulations, judicial 
decisions or administrative rulings" within the meani ng of Article XI:1 of the GATT. The EC is of the 
view that the issue is more subtle than as expr essed by Egypt as it is important to establish whether a 
measure exists in the first place. In this respect th e fact that a given document has not been published 
is relevant. 
6. As the EC has made clear in its written submissi on, this is a familiar systemic issue on which 
the Panel should be particularly vigilant: Is it truly so  that there is a system or a regime that is in place 
or could it be that the system as it stands has possibly been applied in a certain way in certain 
instances? This subtle but fundamentally importa nt question may make a significant difference.  
7. There is also another systemic issue before the Panel, namely the order of analysis of 
overlapping pleas in law under different provisions of different relevant ag reements. The Appellate 
Body has considered this question in EC – Bananas III , where it stated that the agreement more 
specific to the matter at stake should be examined first.  WT/DS334/R 
Page B-28  
 
  8. It is of course often a question of judgement as  to which agreement might be more specific in 
each case as that may depend on the emphasis of argument and the context of the measure. However, it would seem to the EC that due to the importance of the US argument on import licensing, the arguments relating to the import licensing agreement s hould be considered first. It would also seem 
correct to follow with the analysis under Artic le 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture as the case 
concerns a specific agricultural product. It is only afte r these agreements that th e more general rules of 
the GATT should be examined although one coul d also put forward an argument that the 
TRIMs Agreement should be examined before the provi sions of the GATT.  In view of the very close 
link between the latter agreements this choice is pe rhaps more a matter of presentation than genuine 
specificity.  
9. In this respect the EC would like to note that  the third party intervention of China does not 
appear to take account of the systemic link betw een Articles III:4 and XI:1 of the GATT on the one 
hand and the TRIMs Agreement on the other hand. A lthough it is true that the TRIMs Agreement does 
not define exhaustively the notion of a trade relate d investment measure, it is clear that through the 
annex to the TRIMs Agreement certa in specific TRIMs are considered ipso jure  inconsistent with 
these provisions of the GATT. The EC also consider s that as illustrated by the General Interpretative 
Note to Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, and underlined by the Appellate Body in Brazil – 
Desiccated Coconut , the authors of the WTO regime intended to put an end to the fragmentation that 
had characterised the previous system.  
10. Finally, should the Panel consider it necessary to examine in detail the TRQ system, the EC 
would like to point to the possibility that both Artic le III:4 and Article XI of the GATT might need to 
be examined at the same time. Some arguments presented in the written submissions suggest that 
depending on the emphasis of argument, the same measures might be considered both as border measures and internal measures. 
Ms. Chairperson, distinguished members of the Panel, 
 
11. In view of the disagreement on the facts of the case between the parties, the EC does not wish 
to make further observations on the matter before us today. However, since the Turkish TRQ system 
has been abolished, we feel that in any event th ere would not be a need to issue recommendations to 
the DSB on that side of the alleged Turkish measures.  
  WT/DS334/R 
 Page B-29 
 
 
  ANNEX B-8 
 
ORAL STATEMENT BY KOREA 
AT THE THIRD PARTY SESSION 
(9 November 2006) 
 
 Madame Chair and members of the Panel,    Thank for inviting Korea to present its views on this case.  Korea would like to comment on 
the following four issues: 
  (i) whether there has been either a prohibition or a restriction on the import of rice in 
Turkey during the period of September 2003 to July 2006;  
 
 (ii) if the import of rice was either prohibited or restricted by the operation of a system of 
certificates of control, whether such  certificates constitute import licenses; 
  (iii) whether imported rice has been less  favourably treated by the requirement of 
domestic rice purchases; and 
 
 (iv) whether the requirement of domestic rice purchases constitutes a trade related 
investment measure. 
  First, before deciding whether the certificate of control is discretionary import license or not, Korea believes that the panel should decide whether importation of rice has been really prohibited or 
restricted. As Turkey pointed out, if there is no " restriction " or " prohibition ", the nature of the 
"measure " is of no relevance.
1  If the statistics provided by Turkey in its annexes 8 and 20 are true, the 
US may be wrong in arguing that Turkey institutes or maintains a prohibition on imports through its failure to issue Certificates of Control
2, and that Turkey did not grant them at all for a period of over 
2 1/2 years.3  However, it seems imperative that the panel critically analyze this statistical information 
in order to decide whether the out-quota import of rice has been at least restricted or hampered by the 
way of managing the certificates of control.  With respect to annex 8 which shows that out-quota 
imports amounted to 71,181 tons between Janua ry 2004 and August 2006, this annex does not 
demonstrate the out-quota imports were made each year, since the data in the Annex only shows the 
total imports throughout the above period, not a year by year picture.  Korea believes that Turkey should be requested to provide yearly data on out-quota imports in order to prove their claim that out-
quota import has never been restricted. With rega rd to annex 20, the disproportionate number of 
certificates for out-quota imports should be explained by Turkey in order to avoid the suspicion that the issuance of out-quota certificates have been deliber ately controlled.  Since Turkey argued that the 
Certificates are issued automatically within a matter  of days, it needs to be confirmed that similar 
approval rates and processing times have been a pplied equally on both in-quota and out-quota 
certificate applications.  Korea notices that the proportion of out-quota certificates to in-quota 
certificates in 2006 is much higher than it is for the years 2004 and 2005.  An explanation for this 
should be sought so as to avoid the assumption that Tu rkey loosened its grip on out-quota certificates 
only after having been challenged in the WTO.  With  all those critical queries, the panel should decide 
whether out-quota imports have been de fact o restricted, if not totally prohibited. 
 
                                                     
 
1 Turkey submission para. 69. 
2 US submission para. 58 
3 US submission para. 71 WT/DS334/R 
Page B-30  
 
   Second, on the question of whether certificates of control could be import licenses, Korea is 
of the view that a licensing requirement should be distinguished from a license itself.  As the US 
rightly defined, a license is a formal, usually prin ted or written, permission from an authority to do 
something.
4  Korea believes that all licenses, as long as they carry the word "license", must have 
explicit permission of acts to be licensed.  On the bottom of the certificate of control form submitted 
by Turkey as annex 4, it is written that the [i]mpor tation of the related Comm odity has been found to 
be proper, provided that said commodity is found to  be proper and satisfactory in terms of human 
health and safety, etc.  It is also mentioned that [t]he present Certificate of Control has been issued … 
for presentation to the relevant customs office.  Ko rea is sceptical that such an expression could be 
interpreted as a formal permission of importation.  It seems more appropriate to view the certificate as 
one of the licensing requirements, rather than a license itself.  It should also be noted that an import 
license is issued separat ely in the in-quota importation of rice in Turkey after reviewing the 
certificates, whereas no license is granted in the case  of an out-quota importation which also requests 
the certificates.  The mere absence of a license does not convert a li cense requirement into a license 
itself. However, Korea recognizes th e possibility that rice importation in Turkey could be effectively 
restricted by manipulation of the Certificates of control.  If the panel found that the importation has 
been so restricted by Turkey, the way of managing th e Certificates has to be condemned as a violation 
of Article XI:1 of GATT.    Third, when it comes to the issue of less fa vorable treatment caused by the domestic purchase 
requirement, Korea simply does not understand Turkey's logic that the import price of rice per ton 
was lower due to the domestic purchase requirement th an it otherwise would have been in the absence 
of such a requirement.  No matter how much the co st of buying domestic rice was lowered by virtue 
of the so called domestic purchase requirement, it can not be denied that importers had to resource additional funds to purchase domestic rice, and fore ign rice could be imported more if such funds 
were not forced to be used to buy domestic rice.  The main focus in this issue is not the price of 
domestic rice but the additional obligation imposed on the importers.  
  Fourth, Korea believes that the measure at issu e has to be a trade related investment measure 
in order for the TRIMs Agreement to be applied.  Even though there is no legal definition for trade 
related investment measures, it seems clear that th e measure ought to have at least two elements, one 
is trade and the other is an investment element. The domestic purchase requirement at hand clearly 
possesses a trade aspect because the requirement is imposed on the importation of foreign rice.  
However, there does not appear to be an investment  element.  As mentioned in the preamble of the 
TRIMs Agreement, WTO members desire to facilitate investment across international frontiers and to 
take into account the financial needs of developing country members.  In this regard, the financial 
movement across the border can be understood as an essential element of any investment measure.  If 
there is no investment aspect in the domestic purchase requirement of Turkey, it can not be an 
investment measure, therefore the TRIM s Agreement could not be applied. 
 Madame Chair   These are the comments that Korea wishes to be c onsidered in your deliberation of the case at 
hand.  
 Thank you very much. 
                                                     
 
4 US submission para. 60  WT/DS334/R 
 Page B-31 
 
 
  ANNEX B-9 
 
ORAL STATEMENT BY THAILAND 
AT THE THIRD PARTY SESSION  
(9 November 2006) 
 
 1. Madame Chair and Members of the Panel:  Tha iland appreciates the opportunity to participate 
in this proceeding and to present its views on this matter to the Panel today.   
2. Thailand reserved its right to participate as a third party in this proceeding under Article 10.2 
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding  due to our systemic interest as one of the top global 
exporters of rice.   
3. In general, Thailand recognizes the concerns set forth by the United States in its first written 
submission regarding the inconsiste ncy of Turkey's rice tariff rate quota (TRQ) regime and domestic 
purchase requirement with its obligations under the GATT 1994 , the Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures , the Agreement on Agriculture , and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures  
(TRIMs).
1   
4. We view in particular that Turkey's domestic  purchase requirement is inconsistent with its 
obligations under Article III of the GATT 1994  and the TRIMs Agreement.  However, we will not 
make specific comments on these concerns today. 
5. Instead, Thailand would like to raise an issue not discussed by the parties and other third 
parties to date, that is, the inconsistency of Tu rkey's rice TRQ regime with its obligations under 
Article II of the GATT 1994  with respect to its Schedule of Concessions.  Specifically, Article II:1(a) 
requires all WTO Members to accord to the commerce of other Members "treatment no less favourable" than that provided for in the relevant part  of their annexed Schedules.  In this proceeding, 
Turkey does not dispute that it has bound its MFN duty on rice imports at 45 per cent ad valorem  in 
its Schedule, without an y quantitative limitations.
2  However, according to the factual evidence 
submitted by the United States, the treatment actua lly accorded by Turkey under its TRQ regime is 
"less favourable" than that provided for in its Schedule.  In fact, Turkey does not provide the treatment it has provided in its Schedule to all Member s.  Rather, Turkey restricts rice imports so that 
they may enter only in limited and unpredictable qua ntities (albeit at a tariff rate lower than 45 per 
cent), under a non-automatic import licensing regime, and only when coupled with the purchase of 
domestic rice quantitatively greater than the intended import amount.
3  Thailand therefore considers 
Turkey's TRQ regime to be incons istent with its obligations under GATT  Article II, in addition to its 
domestic purchase requirement being inconsistent with GATT  Article III and the TRIMs Agreement. 
6. In its defense, Turkey states that the measu res relating to its TRQ regime, including the 
legislative framework and the domestic pur chase requirement, are no longer in force.4  As a result, 
Turkey has requested the Panel to refrain from maki ng findings on these measures, or alternatively, if 
the Panel considers making such findings necessary,  to not make recommendations to the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB).5  In support of its request, Turkey re fers to the Appellate Body Report in 
United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities , which states 
                                                      
1 First Written Submission of the United States, 20 September 2006.   
2 First Written Submission of Turkey, 11 October 2006. 
3 First Written Submission of the United States, paras. 41, 45 and 49. 
4 First Written Submission of Turkey, para. 136. 
5 Ibid. para. 139. WT/DS334/R 
Page B-32  
 
  that the Panel erred in making recommendations to the DSB on a measure that the Panel had found to 
"no longer exist."
6   
7. Thailand considers that the Panel must examin e the measures challenged by the United States 
in its request for the establishment of this Panel.  There is consistent WTO jurisprudence stating that 
the relevant time to assess whether a measure is w ithin a panel's terms of reference is the time at 
which the panel is established, wh ich in this case is 17 March 2006.7   
8. While Thailand welcomes Turkey's statement that the TRQ regime and coupled domestic 
purchase requirement are no longer in force, Thaila nd notes that the relevant measures may be re-
introduced at any time in the future.  As the United States has shown, Turkey has in the past instituted 
seasonal import bans,8 and more recently, opened or applie d the TRQ regime with the domestic 
purchase requirement intermittently throughout a span of one year.9  Therefore, to preclude the 
possibility that Turkey may re-instig ate these measures, Thailand is of the view that this Panel should 
make findings with respect to the inconsistency of  Turkey's rice TRQ regime and domestic purchase 
requirement with its WTO obligations.  The Panel in European Communities – Measures Affecting the 
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products  considered that making a finding to prevent a WTO-
inconsistent measure from being re-introduced would help secure a positive solution to the dispute.10 
9. Thailand hopes that these views will assist the Pa nel in considering the issues that have been 
brought before it.  Again, we thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today. 
 
 
                                                      
6 Ibid. para. 138. 
7 Panel Report, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector , WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R and 
Corr.1, adopted 5 April 2002, para. 7.26, and Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of 
Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items , WT/DS56/R, adopted 22 April 1998, paras. 6.7 and 6.11.    
8 First Written Submission of the United States, paras. 14 and 15. 
9 Ibid. para. 38. 
10 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products , WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, and WT/DS293/R , circulated 29 September 2006, para. 7.1311.