RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/IP/M/19 
19 July 2008 
 
 (08-3500) 
Council for Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights Special Session  
 
  
MINUTES OF MEETING 
 
Held in the Centre William Rappard
 
on 29 April 2008  
 
Chairman:  Ambassador M anzoor Ahmad (Pakistan) 
  
Subjects discussed
 Page No . 
 
A. ADOPTION OF AGENDA ................................................................................................................2  
B. STOCKTAKING OF THE STATUS OF WORK ;  CHAIRMAN 'S THINKING REGARDING HIS 
REPORT TO THE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE ...................................................................2  
C. GENERAL STATEMENTS ...............................................................................................................3  
D. DISCUSSION OF THE ELEMENTS ENVISAGED IN THE CHAIRMAN 'S REPORT ................................17  
1. Participation .................................................................................................................. ..........17  
2. Consequences/legal effect s of registrations...........................................................................19  
3. Notifications.................................................................................................................. ...........28  
4. Registration ................................................................................................................... ..........29  
5. Other elements ................................................................................................................. .......30  
 TN/IP/M/19 
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  A. 
ADOPTION OF AGENDA  
1. The nineteenth Special Session agreed to adopt the agenda as set out in WTO/AIR/3174. 
B. STOCKTAKING OF THE STATUS OF WORK ;  CHAIRMAN 'S THINKING REGARDING HIS REPORT TO 
THE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE  
2. The Chairman  said that one of the reasons why he had not called a formal meeting of the 
Special Session was to allow Members time to pursue dialogue amongst themselves and explore 
solutions.  He had been keeping contact with the de legations concerned and, to ensure transparency 
and inclusiveness, he had held open-ended informal  meetings in June and December 2007.  More 
recently, he had engaged in consulta tions to enable him to submit a factual report setting out the status 
of the work to the TNC, including an open-ended consultation held for that purpose on 11 April 2008.  
The aim of this meeting was to take stock of  the negotiations in the Special Session on the 
establishment of a multilateral system of notifica tion and registration of geographical indications 
(GIs) for wines and spirits, including on the issues of  participation, consequences/legal effects of 
registrations, notification and registration and any other elements that delegations might wish to 
address. 
3. He said that, as had been indicated at the ope n-ended meeting on 11 April, he had in mind a 
report along the following lines: 
 - First, he would emphasize that the re port would be on his own responsibility and 
without prejudice to the position of any delegation and to the outcome of the negotiations.  As in previous reports, he would reproduce the Special Sessions' 
mandate as contained in paragraph 18 of the Doha Declaration and Article 23.4 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, and would also refer to the agreement on the Special Session's 
mandate in the Hong Kong Ministerial Declara tion.  He would then refer to the three 
formal proposals on the table in the same wa y as in previous reports, namely as set 
out in the side-by-side document, TN/I P/W/12, and note that more recently the 
European Communities had shared with pa rticipants new thinking, which it had 
presented as an effort to narrow the gap, a nd that the references to the position of the 
European Communities in his report wo uld be based on this new thinking. 
  - Second, he would indicate that the elements of a registration system that had been 
considered in the work could be put into three categories: 
 
  - In the first category, there were the two key issues of participation and 
 consequences/legal effects of regist rations, where there continued to be 
 fundamental differences, even if there had been some movement in the past 
 months.  In regard to these elemen ts, he would reproduce in the report the 
 position of participants as reflected in their proposals and in the discussions 
 in the Special Session. 
   - There was a second category of elemen ts on which a fair amount of detailed 
 work had been done, namely the areas of notification and registration.  While  recognizing that much of the work was not recent and further work was  clearly required, in particular becau se positions on these matters were linked 
 to the treatment of participation and consequences/legal effects, he believed 
 that it would be appropriate to set out his tentative appreciation of the points  of convergence and divergence. 
  TN/IP/M/19 
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    - The third category related to a num ber of other elements which depended 
 substantially on the key policy choic es to be made, in particular on the 
 questions of participation and con sequences/legal effects, and which had 
 hitherto thus been less fully discussed .  These included such matters as:  fees, 
 costs and administrative burdens, par ticularly as they could impact on 
 developing and least developed c ountry Members;  the duration of 
 registrations and procedures for th eir modification and withdrawal;  
 arrangements for review;  contact poi nts;  and special and differential 
 treatment.  On these points, he would not propose in the report to seek to  identify points of convergence and divergence, but rather to flag the need for 
 further discussion. 
  - His report would also indicate that no ag reement had yet been reached on the legal 
form of the eventual outcome and also  on the institutional arrangements for its 
management and servicing.  On the former  question, the suggestions on the table 
included a TRIPS Council decision and the addition of an annex to the TRIPS 
Agreement through an amendment to the Agreement.  On the latter question, 
delegations had not excluded the possibility of  inviting the WIPO secretariat to play a 
role. 
  - His report would factually indicate that different views had been expressed on 
whether the work of the Sp ecial Session should be addressed in the context of the 
modalities decision, and that some Members believed that further guidance on its work should be given, while some others  believed that the existing mandate was 
sufficiently clear and that no further guidance was necessary. 
 
 - In the report he would say that he would not describe the range of views that had been 
expressed on issues of linkage between work in the Special Session and work elsewhere, both on non-TRIPS and TRIPS ma tters, including in regard to the 
coverage of the GI register and to the relationship between th e TRIPS Agreement and 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).   This was because these issues related 
to matters which went beyond the mandate of the Special Session, including its 
limitation to geographical indications for wines and spirits. 
  - Following this general introduction, the report would set out in narrative form the 
positions on the four elements of the mu ltilateral system, namely participation, 
notification, registration and consequences /legal effects.  On participation and 
consequences/legal effects, he would set out  the various proposals as they had been 
made.  On notification and registration, he would seek to identify - in narrative form - 
points of convergence and divergence. 
 4. He proposed to take up in turn each of the four elements, namely participation, 
consequences/legal effects of regi strations, notification and regist ration, and then to offer an 
opportunity for delegations to address any other specifi c elements.  Before doing that, he offered the 
floor for general statements. 
C. 
GENERAL STATEMENTS  
5. All delegations  taking the floor expressed their appreciation that the Chairman had convened 
the Special Session after a long interruption. 
6. The representative of th e European Communities  said that his delegation, representing many 
WTO Members on this key issue at a key point in time , wished to underline its expectations in this TN/IP/M/19 
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  area.  As regards the significance of GIs for the European Communities, he said that they were 
traditional products that reflected the regional divers ity of the EC food production and were part of 
the EC heritage.  The TRIPS Agreement provided GIs with a status of an "intellectual property right" 
alongside patents, trademarks or copyrights.  Th e Agreement aimed at protecting producers of GI 
goods against unfair competition from companies outsi de their region that misused the geographical 
names to unfairly benefit from their reputation or to mislead consumers.  Thus, GIs had a real 
economic impact and provided millions  of jobs worldwide.  In Eur ope and elsewhere, including in 
developing countries, such products  improved farmers' income, allo wed agricultural diversification 
and supported the rural economy.  The GI Frie nds Group presently included more than 40 WTO 
Members and similar concerns were being shared by many more Members. 
7. In the Doha negotiations, his delegation was ready to make very significant concessions on 
Agriculture by eliminating export subsidies, cons iderably reducing domestic trade distorting support 
and agreeing to unprecedented tariff cuts.  In other words, while the EC accepted it would have to 
face increased competition, its farmers must have  the opportunity to compete where they were 
competitive, namely in the high quality processed f ood sector related to the area where they were 
produced.  The TRIPS Agreement was already providi ng some protection to GIs in general, but the 
system still had some important shortcomings that  should be tackled to effectively allow a level 
playing field.  He underscored that the EC and its 27 member States would not accept an unbalanced 
outcome on largely liberalized agricultural with out providing their farm ers with a chance to 
effectively and in a fair way compete by buildin g on the reputation and quality of their products.  
Improved GI protection was essential for that.  Th is is why an agreement on further Agriculture 
liberalization and improved GI protection had to be ach ieved at the same time, that is at the time of 
modalities. 
8. He further said that on GIs, both register and extension, the potential for progress in the 
negotiations at the technical level had been exha usted for quite some time.  Without any political 
guidance at this point in time, discussions were going round in circles.  Movement had hitherto come 
only from the EC lowering its level of ambition.  The EC had come however to the limit of what 
could be done on its side.  GIs could only progress w ith a political decision at the time of modalities. 
9. As regards the register, Members had agreed to set it up some 13 years ago.  There would be 
no justice in moving ahead in one part of the built-in  agenda, Agriculture, and not in the other, the GI 
register.  Over the years the EC had indicated various and meaningful flexibilities to address the 
concerns expressed by other Members.  First, th e EC had accepted that the system proposed would 
have no retroactive effects:  no names would have to  be given up as a result of a deal.  Contrary to 
what the opponents often claimed, the EC proposals were forward-looking and did not aim at correcting history.  Second, the EC had substantially  reduced the initially proposed legal effects.  It 
would no longer be necessary to take action in th e WTO within a given time-frame, and any Member 
would be able to take decisions according to its own national system and at any time.  This would 
effectively eliminate any costs and burden of the register.  The EC had also expressed readiness to 
discuss concerns on coverage, particip ation, or S&D.  Against this background it was regrettable that 
opponents had not moved at all from their initial pos ition.  Their negotiators were in fact not 
negotiating at all and insisted that their proposal was the only way to achieve  an agreement in this 
area.  After 13 years of unsuccessful discussions, there would simply be no way to move forward unless the matter was taken up at higher level a nd Ministers provided guidance in this area. 
10. He further indicated that the EC would be essentially seeking guidance for two issues at the 
time of modalities:  the effects of the register wh ich Members would be bound by these effects.  At 
least on these two issues, Ministers should provide sufficient guidance at modalities so that a legal draft of the register could be produced.  Taking account of the flexibilities it had offered, the EC 
considered that such guidance should deal with th e points he would elaborate.  First, on Members' 
coverage, i.e., participation, whatever effects of the register, they should apply to basically all  TN/IP/M/19 
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  Members.  The DDA, including the mandate for a GI register, was a multilateral negotiation not a 
plurilateral one.  There was already a plurilateral re gister in WIPO, so there was no point in having 
another voluntary register in the WTO.  Second, th e legal effects of registrations should effectively 
"facilitate the protection of geographical indications" as indicated in the mandate.  This meant that 
effects must be legally meaningful and not be just  illusory.  He recalled that in order to maintain 
momentum the EC had over the years drastically re duced its level of ambition.  It was merely 
proposing that the information in the register be taken into account as rebuttable presumptions on 
three grounds only, namely those relating to the GI definition, to GI genericness and to GI 
homonymy.  This would be far from being automa tic TRIPS protection since these grounds could be 
invoked at the national level at any time.  This woul d ensure that the EC approach would be forward 
looking in avoiding future problems with GI protection, and not aiming at solving problems which 
arose in the past.  Compared to the prevailing TRIP S exceptions, the effects of the register appeared 
very limited.  Other issues related to the regist er could be negotiated after modalities if sufficient 
guidance on legal effects was provided. 
11. As regards the Chairman's report, the representa tive of the EC said that the report was long 
overdue.  This negotiation had b een launched in 1996 but, while other Chairs had been able to 
produce very detailed papers in areas with mo re recent mandates, this negotiating group had 
accumulated a substantial delay and should start cat ching up.  The EC therefore hoped that the report 
would instil a new dynamic.  His delegation assumed that the GI report would come out around the same time as the papers in the area of Agri culture and NAMA.  The Chairman's report should 
facilitate the work of the negotiating group towards con sensus.  Therefore, the EC considered that the 
report on the GI register should include an explan ation of the progress made and describe the current 
state of play, as well as provide language in all areas of the register indicating possible progress in 
concrete terms.  On the key issues of participati on and legal effects, the report should provide clear 
language and options.  Concerning participation, his delegation would suggest some better drafting 
regarding its own option.  The report could also clarify that all WTO Members should be able to 
notify GIs if they so wished.  On other areas of the register such as notification and registration, 
positions were much closer.  His delegation would therefore prefer that the paper provided legal 
language showing convergence and le ft pending issues between brackets .  As was being done by other 
Chairs, this was a useful way to help  partners move towards consensus. 
12. He further reiterated that GIs were of para mount importance to the EC both for economic and 
political reasons.  The EC did not want to see that world agricultural liberalization further erode the 
rights of its farmers to protect the names of their products.  After all these years of negotiations, it had 
accepted not to look into past situa tions and had lowered its expectati ons to the bare minimum.  It 
hoped that its efforts to understand others' concerns while remaining committed to this important topic 
would be rewarded.  It was ready to cooperate w ith the Chairman as well as with WTO Members with 
a view to finding a solution to this issue in th e modalities process in order to help avoid a "train 
crash". 
13. The representative of Canada
 said that his government cons idered this negotiating group's 
work to establish a GI registry for wines and spirits as an important component of the Doha Round.  It 
was its view, endorsed by Canadian industry, that a GI register for wines and spirits would be a 
valuable tool that would provide benefits for all pr oducers.  To this end, he reaffirmed that Canada 
remained committed to achieving a positive conclusion to the negotiations on a GI register for wines 
and spirits as mandated by TRIPS Article 23.4 and pa ragraph 18 of the Doha Declaration.  Canada 
viewed it as unfortunate that progress in these negotia tions remained elusive.  Moreover, it had been 
disappointed that some Members had been unwilling to  engage in technical discussions, particularly 
with regard to the joint proposal (TN/IP/W/10).  Canada and other co-sponsors were certainly willing 
and able to address how the joint proposal satisfied th e requirements set out by Ministers.  They were 
also prepared to discuss how it would provide producers of wines and spirits with tangible benefits. TN/IP/M/19 
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  14. He said that the joint proposal enjoyed the broadest support among WTO developed and 
developing country Members, for good reasons:  it was the only proposal that fell within the mandate;  
it allowed for voluntary participation;  costs and ad ministrative burdens would be limited;  and it did 
not create legal effects for non-participating Memb ers.  Moreover, the joint proposal was a middle 
ground:  as was indicated in the recent informal c onsultations, there were viewpoints on a potential GI 
register for wines and spirits that fell on both sides of the joint proposal.  This development should be 
captured in the Chairman's report. 
15. With regard to the EC proposals, Canada had a number of concerns that he would also further 
develop later at this meeting:  the proposals e nvisaged fundamental legal changes, and Canada's 
experience had caused it to be very wary of the c onsequences of such changes;  their coverage was 
unclear;  on participation they were unclear on who w ould be expected to participate, and would have 
repercussions on both participants  and non-participants;  they could mean significant costs to 
governments, IP offices, users of the IP system, and non-users as well, and these costs were unclear. 
16. Canada had carefully considered the possible elements of a Chairman's report, which had 
been shared with delegations through informal consultations.  It had previously indicated its 
preference for a factual report with  a simple and straightforward account  of the negotiations to date.  
While such a report would not reveal any discernable progress unless there were developments from this meeting's discussions, to do otherwise would be an inaccurate portrayal of the negotiations. 
17. The representative of Chinese Taipei
 made four points concerning the factual report.  Firstly, 
participation in the wines and spirits register s hould be voluntary, not only because Article 23.4 of the 
TRIPS Agreement clearly stated that the register wa s for "those Members participating in the system", 
but also because from a development perspectiv e mandatory participation would result in an 
unwanted administrative burden for many developi ng Members who had limited resources and very 
little interest in the wines and spirits register.  Sec ondly, on the issue of legal effect or consequences, 
it was made clear in the mandate that the regist er would be established in order to "facilitate" 
protection, not to "increase" it.  According to th e proposals of both the EC and Hong Kong, China, a 
notified GI from one Member would have a legal effect of presumption in another Member's domestic 
legal system.  This legal effect would go beyond the principle of territoriality, and would actually 
increase protection for the GI in the wines and spir its sector.  Therefore, his delegation considered 
such legal presumption to be unreasonable and beyond the scope of the negotiating mandate.  In 
contrast to those two proposals, the joint proposal, sensibly in his delegation's view, provided for voluntary participation and a procedural requirement  that really could facilitate protection for GIs 
while at the same time respecting the principle of territoriality. 
18. Thirdly, regarding the horizontal process, he said that, in light of the continuing diversity of 
positions among Members and complexity of the t echnical issues, his delegation had serious doubts 
about the wisdom of asking Ministers to take any firm political position during the horizontal 
negotiating process itself.  At this stage, Ministers could only be expected to decide between the three 
proposals in their entirety, rather than to pick -and-choose different parts from each of them.  If 
Ministers were asked to make a political decision, th en his delegation firmly believed that they should 
choose the joint proposal. 
19. On the subject of the so-called "linkage" betw een the wines and spirits register negotiations 
and the implementation issues of GI extension a nd TRIPS/CBD that some delegations had proposed 
for inclusion in the report, he said that, since th ere was a clear mandate on wines and spirits in the 
Special Session of the TRIPS Council, and DG Lamy  was due, quite separately, to produce a report 
on other issues, his delegation believed it would be ess ential that the Chairman's report be kept clearly 
focused on wines and spirits alone.  TN/IP/M/19 
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  20. The representative of Chile  reiterated his country's support for the joint proposal.  His 
delegation was increasingly convinced that the proposal was actually an excellent basis for 
negotiation, because it was the only one on the tabl e which strictly complied with the mandate of 
Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement and of paragr aph 18 of the Doha Declaration.  Article 23.4 
instructed that the negotiations dealt with four el ements:  first, the register should facilitate the 
protection of GIs;  second, it related to wines and sp irits;  third, it should be multilateral;  and, fourth, 
it should be applicable to those Members participat ing in the system.  The joint proposal precisely 
proposed a register that contained these four elemen ts:  it would be limited to wines and spirits, be 
really voluntary in terms of participation, effectiv ely facilitate and not increase the protection of GIs, 
and be multilateral in the sense that it would be ne gotiated by all Members of the WTO and be open 
to all those wishing to participate in the system.  In addition to its conformity with the mandate, the 
joint proposal had the following features:  it would not  have any have legal effects for those Members 
who had decided not to participate in the system;  it respected the existing balance between rights and 
obligations of Members, which meant that Members would be able to avail themselves of Article 24 
exceptions;  it would not imply substantive co sts neither for right holders, consumers and 
governments nor for the registration office and the WTO Secretariat;  it resp ected the principle of 
territoriality on which the entire system of intell ectual property was based and whereby a decision to 
protect a given GI and disputes regarding that GI continued to be within the competence of the country where protection was being sought;  it preserv ed the right that Members had under Article 1.1 
to determine the appropriate met hod of implementing the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement within 
their own legal system and practice.  While achie ving all these objectives, the joint proposal would 
not impose an excessive burden on Members nor woul d it substantially change Members' IP system.  
It was precisely for all these reasons that the joint proposal had won so much support. 
21. He recalled that his delegation had been taking part in good faith in informal consultations 
with the proponents of a register of GIs for all ty pes of products.  While recognizing that there had 
some recent movement from the EC, who had presented new ideas, their initial proposal 
(TN/IP/W/11) was the only official text on the table.   As regards the new ideas, the EC continued to 
go beyond the mandate and propose a system with ma ndatory participation and obligations for all 
Members, to be applied to all products and with a re versal of the burden of proof.  His delegation was 
of the view that the joint proposal would be the best basis for an agreement:  it struck a balance 
between the various options, which ranged from a pr oposal for a mandatory register of GIs for all 
products to the position that the register should not have any legal effects for participating Members 
and that, in this regard, the joint proposal was going too far as well.  For his delegation, the joint 
proposal fully complied with the mandate and actua lly facilitated protection of GIs for wines and 
spirits for those Members who decided to particip ate.  He said that the Chairman's report should 
therefore reflect this situation.  It should be a factual report reflecting the fact that, on the one hand, 
there was a proposal with wide support and, on th e other hand, other proposals with support from a 
minority. 
22. The representative of Australia
 said that all the delegations present recognized the context in 
which the Special Session was meeting.  Like the Ch airs of other negotiating groups within the Single 
Undertaking, the Chairman was charged with prep aring a report for the TNC on the state of this 
group's negotiations that would assist Members th rough a so-called "horizontal process" to reach 
agreement on modalities in Agriculture in NAMA, and that in turn would allow Members to conclude 
the Single Undertaking negotiations by the end of the year.  Australia certainly recognized that the 
Single Undertaking mandate did include the negotiation of a system of notification and registration of 
GIs for wines and spirits to facilita te the protection of these GIs in pa rticipating Members.  Australia 
remained committed to that mandate.  However, to have any chance of achieving both modalities in 
the coming weeks and the overall deal by the end of th is year, delegations must  move beyond general, 
rhetorical statements about the importance of one issu e or another and its linkages to other areas in the 
Round.  Delegations must deal seriously with the detail and substance of the proposals on the table.  
In that regard this meeting was very timely. TN/IP/M/19 
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  23. The Chairman's report for the TNC should accurate ly and fairly reflect the substance of the 
proposals and Members' positions in this negotiation.  In that connection, Australia acknowledged the 
indication given by the Chairman that he intended to  do so.  For that purpose, it was necessary for all 
Members to have the opportunity to formally and subs tantively exchange their views on the proposals.  
At the beginning of this meeting reference had again been made in  broad and vague terms to "new 
thinking" or "new ideas" submitted by one Member  on the register negotiation, including some 
assertions as to how those proposals or ideas might work.  His delegation looked forward to seeing those ideas submitted and elaborated in writing so th at all Members could have a proper substantive 
exchange and understand more fully the implicati ons of these ideas for their legal systems and for 
their commercial interests.  This was a pre-requisite for any real negotiations.  Members could not and 
should not think that they could bypass this substa ntive "technical" work" and put to Ministers some 
vague "political" proposals that had never been tabl ed or considered in this Group, let alone by 
experts in capitals.  Any substantive technical work in these negotiations must also give proper 
consideration to the joint proposal. 
24. His delegation had come to this meeting, prep ared to elaborate on how the joint proposal 
would add real value and facilitate the protection of wines and spirits GIs without overreaching 
legally or placing unreasonable burdens on Members.   The joint proposal had never been given the 
attention it deserved.  Indeed, it had been a source of  disappointment - or even of frustration - to his 
delegation to hear from some Members that the Joint Proposal Group "refused" to engage on GI 
issues, when it had a proposal on the table, w ith broad support from developed and developing 
country Members, had added value,  and most importantly, met the negotiating mandate.  Instead of 
any engagement to discuss the substance of the join t proposal, all that had been heard in the various 
exchanges had been snide and dismissive referenc es to "mere databases" or to a "Google proposal", 
which sounded much more like a refusal to engage.  One delegation had said that the Special Session 
had come to the end of useful technical discussions , but had referred to matte rs that had never been 
formally tabled in writing.  His delegation was a little puzzled by such comments and reiterated its 
readiness to discuss the substa nce of the joint proposal. 
25. The representative of Morocco
 said that, as indicated in the statement made by his delegation 
at the Ministerial Conference at Doha, the extensi on of the level of protection of Article 23 of the 
TRIPS Agreement to GIs for all products, namely to agricultural, fishery, and handicraft products was 
of great importance to Morocco.  The Law of 17- 97 on the protection of industrial property as 
modified and completed provided for a procedure for the protection of appellations of origin and GIs 
for all products and services which could be identified by their geographical origin in accordance with 
the definition contained in Article 22.1 of the TRI PS Agreement.  He reiterated that the establishment 
of a multilateral system of notification and registra tion of GIs should be broa d in scope and not be 
limited to wines and spirits.  Morocco's position was in line with the proposal for the extension of the 
protection of Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement to  the GIs of all products contained in document 
W/T/GC/WW/587-TN/C/W/48 of 19 February 2008, which Morocco had co-sponsored.  It was high 
time to abolish the artificial distinction which had b een drawn up hitherto between the issue of GIs for 
wines and spirits and GIs for other products, whic h also included the question of the multilateral 
register that was being negotiated. 
26. Concerning the practical modalities of the multilate ral system of notification and registration 
of GIs, his delegation said that it should be simple, flexible, not too costly and permit the protection of 
prior right holders' rights acquired in good faith.  Appropriate measures should also be taken within 
the S&D framework so as to take into considera tion the situation of deve loping countries in general 
and the situation of LDCs in particular. 
27. The representative of China  said that, with regard to the issue of coverage, his country 
supported an extension of the protection under Artic le 23 to cover GIs for all products and would 
prefer that the proposed GI register covered all products.  China did not see any legitimate reason why  TN/IP/M/19 
 Page 9 
 
 
  a GI register was being negotiated for wines and sp irits only, but not for rice, tea, coffee or other 
products.  It believed that GIs of  all products should be protected on an equal footing so that all 
Members could benefit from the GI register and a proper balance be achieved among products and 
among Members.  Secondly, with regard to par ticipation, China would only be interested in 
participating in a GI register that covered all pr oducts, and not one limited to wines and spirits.  It 
could not afford a register which only protected the interests of some Members while leaving the 
interests of others unguaranteed, which was certainly not fair.  As to the nature of the system, the 
question of whether or not the GI register should have a binding lega l effect on participating Members 
should be carefully considered, based on the different  situations of Members' domestic legislation and 
current level of protection.  In this regard, the pr inciple of territoriality sh ould be fully respected. 
Fourthly, the special needs and situations of deve loping countries, particularly LDCs, had not been 
fully addressed in the main proposals on the table.  A GI register could be costly and burdensome and 
special and differential treatment must be appr opriately considered and fully addressed in any 
solution. 
28. On the relationship between the TRIPS Ag reement and CBD, which was a fundamental 
component of the development dime nsion, and had been discussed for years, it had not been included 
in the Special Session of the Council for TRIPS.  In  this regard, China reiterated that the issues of 
CBD was an integral part of the DDA Single Undert aking and must be fully discussed and resolved. 
29. Speaking on behalf of the ASEAN Group , the representative of Singapore  said that the group 
had been closely following the work of this Speci al Session given its importance and the implications 
of its outcome, especially on non-wine producing Memb ers.  In this regard, the group supported the 
voluntary elements of the joint proposal.  From th e group's view point the eventual multilateral system 
of notification and registration to facilitate the prot ection of GIs for wines and spirits should subscribe 
to the following principles:  participation should be  voluntary;  it should preserve the existing balance 
between Members' rights and obligations;  it shou ld have no legal effects for Members who had 
decided not to participate in the system;  it shoul d not involve substantial costs, particularly for 
Members who had decided against participating in the system;  it should respect the principle of 
territoriality on which intellectual property rights we re premised;  it should be  consistent with TRIPS 
Article 1.1, which permitted Me mbers to determine the most a ppropriate method of implementing 
TRIPS provisions within their own legal system and practice.  Whatever system the Special Session eventually would agree to, it should not prejudice th e interests of non-wine producing Members.  The 
group was seeking a system that was simple, straig htforward and efficient. More importantly, the 
system should maintain the principle that protecti on of GIs would be granted in accordance with the 
domestic law of each WTO Member, consistent w ith the existing obligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement.  In other words, it should not pre-empt decisions made regarding the protection of GIs at 
the national level. 
30. Short of seeing the Chairman's ideas of a re port in written form, the ASEAN Group shared the 
reservation expressed by previous delegations on th e Chairman's intention to reflect the EC's new 
thinking in that report.  She noted that the EC had only introduced their new ideas once and had not 
formally submitted them.  Finally, since the DG's last report to the TNC on the work in the TRIPS Special Session, little had changed.  Divergen ces on the proposals on the table still remained. 
Therefore, in the Group's view, a factual report that  would set out the differing positions in a general 
manner would suffice for the Chairman's report to th e TNC.  It would also support recommendations 
to have further consultations on this issue. 
31. The representative of El Salvador
 recalled that her country had co-sponsored the joint 
proposal to promote a multilateral system which mu st not involve any increase or curtailment of the 
rights and obligations that already existed for WTO Members under the TRIPS Agreement.  Her 
delegation said that, in conformity with the manda te of Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement and 
paragraph 18 of the Doha Declaration, the Special  Session should start the negotiations.  She further TN/IP/M/19 
Page 10  
 
  highlighted the objectives and advantages of the join t proposal for developing country Members.  Its 
objective was to facilitate the protection of GIs for wines and spirits.  Voluntary participation 
guaranteed that the system suggested would produce effects for Members participating in this system 
whilst preserving the existing balance between the rights and obligations of Members and without 
imposing administrative burdens on those Members who had decided to participate in this system.  As 
to legal effects, this register would produce eff ects on participating Members with the advantage that 
they would not have to modify the substantive right s and obligations currently contained in the TRIPS 
Agreement.  Regarding the registration aspect, the system provided for in the joint proposal would 
offer a new tool to registration offices so that Me mbers could fulfil their obligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement.  As had often been explained, the sy stem would offer information to national offices 
when they took administrative decisions.  In confor mity with TRIPS Articles 1.1, 22 to 24, such 
decisions would continue to be taken at the na tional level without affecting the rights hitherto 
acquired by individuals or Members, or the right to  take any action in conformity with the national 
legislation, and they would have a stronger legal underpinning.  Finally, she said that, as participation 
would be voluntary, the system under the joint proposal would therefore meet the need for providing 
for S&D measures for developing country and least developed country Members. 
32. The representative of Honduras
 expressed support for the Chairman's intention to draw up a 
factual report on the state of play of these negotia tions.  Her delegation considered that document 
TN/IP/W/12/Add.1 and Corr.1, which contained a co mpilation of the three proposals on the table and 
the different points of view expressed by the dele gates, as well as the di scussions which had taken 
place since the compilation would be a good basis for the Chairman's report.  With regard to the issue 
of participation, her delegation said that the mandate established in Article 23.4 of the TRIPS 
Agreement was clear enough.  Firstly, it defined wh at was sought with these negotiations, that is, to 
facilitate the protection of GIs for wines and spirits.  Secondly, it also explicitly referred to "Members 
participating in the system", which implied the possibility for Members not to participate in the 
system.  In the light of the above, her delegation was of the view that participation in the system of 
notification and registration must be voluntary.  It also lent support to the comments made by the 
delegation of Chinese Taipei. 
33. The representative of Hong Kong, China  reiterated that her delega tion had a strong systematic 
interest in fulfilling the negotiating mandate under Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement and 
paragraph 18 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration for the establishment of a multilateral system of 
notification and registration of GIs in order to facilitate the protection of GIs for wines and spirits.  
Hong Kong, China therefore presented a proposal in April 2003 providing a middle ground with a 
view to facilitating the negotiations and meeting the mandate.  Under the Hong Kong, China proposal 
contained in document TN/IP/W/8, Members were free to participate and notify GIs for wines and 
spirits protected in their territories.  The obligation to give effect to a registration under the system 
would only be binding upon those Members choosing to participate in the system.  The multilateral 
system under Hong, China's proposal, which was cons istent with the mandate, was a voluntary system 
with no legal effects in non-participating Member s.  The legal effects or consequences of a 
registration, would in a way be mo re limited than the ones in the EC's proposal, but be more extensive 
than the ones in the joint proposal . She further said that, notwithstanding the Chairman's efforts, 
Members were still having diverging views on the in terpretation of the mandate, and the negotiations 
on the establishment of the GI register for wines and spirits were stalled for some time.  As 
highlighted by the Chairman, two key issues, name ly participation and legal effects/consequences, 
were yet to be resolved.  Certainly more work had to be done before th e negotiations could be 
concluded. 
34. Hong Kong, China supported the Chairman's prep aration of the factual report as proposed and 
outlined.  TN/IP/M/19 
 Page 11 
 
 
  35. The representative of Jordan  said his delegation was looking forward to a positive result on 
setting rules for a multilateral registration of GIs for wines and spirits as long as it would take the 
following main elements into consideration:  pa rticipation should be voluntary without any legal 
effect;  it should be the least costly and burdensome;   it would not go beyond the mandate and;  would 
preserve the existing balance. 
36. As for the horizontal process, his delegation agr eed with those delegations who had indicated 
that the Chairman's report should be factual.  It al so supported most of the elements mentioned by the 
Chairman in his introductory remarks. 
37. The representative of Japan  agreed to a factual report, i.e ., a report accurately reflecting the 
discussions. The narrative form would be appropria te.  Actually narrative reports on the TRIPS 
Special Sessions had already been made, such as those in documents TN/IP/14 and TN/IP/17.  Japan 
could therefore go along with the same appro ach, which was accepted by other Members. 
38. As regards the register, he said that further technical discussions were necessary.  As a 
general comment, he recalled that the Special Sess ion's mandate was to establish a multilateral system 
for notification and registration of GIs for wines and sp irits in order to facilitate the protection of such 
GIs.  In that regard, the joint proposal would be  less burdensome, simpler, more flexible, and more 
Member-friendly.  Such a system could facilitate th e protection of GIs for wines and spirits and be 
acceptable to more Members. 
39. The representative of New Zealand  said that his country understood the importance of having 
results on GIs in the wider context of the round.  As  was pointed out by some delegations, the Special 
Session's mandate for a register to facilitate protect ion of GIs for wines and spirits in participating 
Members had been set out for quite some time.  He agreed with the EC's statement that the time for 
fulfilment of this mandate was currently as part of the Single Undertaking, and said that New Zealand 
would also want these negotiations to come to a clo se.  However, his delegation had heard previously 
and again at this meeting, a demand for decisions  in the upcoming horizontal process that were not 
directed at a fulfilment, but at an amendment of the mandate.  Seeking an amendment of the mandate 
at this late stage in the negotiations was not, in hi s delegation's view, a path to closure.  New Zealand 
remained committed to a result regarding GIs, and w ould continue to seek a result consistent with the 
mandate, i.e., a register facilitating protection of GIS for wines and spirits in participating Members.  
There was only one proposal on the table that his country had co-sponsored and that met the mandate, 
namely the joint proposal. 
40. While expressing readiness to address the techni cal questions raised in recent informal 
meetings, he said that such technical questions coul d not be resolved in the horizontal process, but 
only in the TRIPS Special Session's meetings. 
41. The representative of Turkey  said that what had to be fixed was the unfair treatment in the 
TRIPS Agreement of a whole set of GIs other than those for wines and spirits.  For Turkey, extending 
the protection to all products would restore the ba lance under the Agreement.  This was the starting 
point and an important principle because many de veloping countries did not have wines and spirits, 
but other valuable GI products, in many instan ces non-agricultural ones.  The GI universe was not 
limited to wines and spirits only.  Unless there wa s a protection of GIs for all products in the TRIPS 
Agreement, the owners of such GIs would not be able to reap the fruits of thei r investment in their IP 
rights due to the low level protection of GIs in the TRIPS Agreement.  It should be kept in mind that in many of the cases related to the developing co untries, all this was about small businesses, which 
were extremely vulnerable to unfair competition from the usurpation of their GIs by other parties.  
This was the major problem to be fixed. TN/IP/M/19 
Page 12  
 
  42. With regard to the registration and notificati on system, Turkey supported the establishment of 
such a system.  The system, if established, would ch ange the territorial principle currently applicable 
and would create an international registration which w as needed.  It was clear from Article 23.4 of the 
TRIPS Agreement that the protection requirement  under that Article could be ensured only by 
attaching legal consequences to the registration.  W ith regard to participation, Turkey believed that 
the participation should be binding upon all WTO Me mbers, with some flexible provisions for LDCs 
and maybe for developing countries too. 
43. As for the report, she said that, since there w as no agreement on the whole, Turkey could not 
support the view that the joint proposal could be th e basis for future discussions.  Furthermore, the 
report should clearly state the facts regarding the discussions in the Special Session and contain some 
guidance from a higher level. 
44. The representative of Guatemala
, recalling that his country had co-sponsored the joint 
proposal, highlighted certain points.  First of all, there was no dispute that the mandate in Article 23.4 
of the TRIPS Agreement provided for the establishment of a multilateral system for notification and registration of geographical indications for wine s and spirits.  However, there remained major 
differences, particularly with regard  to the legal effects of registration and to participation.  Currently, 
there were three proposals on the table, each reflect ing different views.  The joint proposal and the 
proposal of the European Communities had been re garded as extreme positions while the Hong Kong, 
China proposal had been perceived as a compromise between the first two.  This was a mischaracterization of the situation.  Article 23.4 clearly provided for the facilitation of the protection 
of GIs;  it did not contain any provision providin g for an increase of the level of protection.  The 
mandate also clearly referred to those Members pa rticipating in the system, which meant that the 
system was not intended for the whole WTO Member ship.  The mandate was limited to wines and 
spirits.  All these elements were precisely the basis of the joint proposal.  Guatemala considered that 
the joint proposal already met the mandate set in Arti cle 23.4,  that it should be the starting point for 
the discussions, and that this was the only way to move forward. 
45. With regard to the process of the Doha Round,  like previous delegations, Guatemala was of 
the view that this was not ripe fo r discussion in the horizontal process. 
46. The representative of Korea
 said that his country could go along with the Chairman's idea of 
making a factual report on the GI multilateral registra tion issue, and welcome the indication that the 
report would be without prejudice to Members' positi ons and to the outcome of the negotiations.  It 
was Korea's understanding that the report would be  submitted to the TNC, not to the horizontal 
process meetings, be it at senior official level or at ministerial level.  Given the wide gaps among the 
proposals on the table, it was Korea's view th at discussions on GIs would only complicate the 
horizontal process and, eventually, delay the whol e negotiating process.  It would constructively 
engage in the future negotiations on the establishmen t of the GI multilateral system which was simple, 
not too burdensome and acceptable to a wider Membership. 
47. The representative of Switzerland  said that this meeting would shed more clarity, particularly 
with regard to further negotiations at the horizontal  process level in view of the upcoming ministerial 
meeting at a crucial time of the Doha Round wh ere delegations were beginning to see linkages and 
trade-offs between the various areas of negotiations .  She underscored the crucial importance that 
Switzerland attached to tangible results on GIs, pa rticularly on the extension of the protection of 
Article 23 of TRIPS to GIs for all products as part  of the outcome for the Doha negotiations;  this 
involved decisions to be taken on the register, which was one of the integral elements.  For 
Switzerland, this was a clear trade-off for concessions that it was being asked to make in the agricultural sector to give to Swiss products and GI qu ality products  with  hi gh added value, be it in 
the agricultural, handicrafts or industrial sector s, access to niche markets where there could be 
efficient protection of their identification signs so th at they could  make the most out of the reputation  TN/IP/M/19 
 Page 13 
 
 
  that they had created and avoid usurpation of that reputation.  Given the detailed discussions that had 
taken place for many years on GIs, her delegation r estated the imperative n eed to include in the 
horizontal modalities process the issues of extension and register for the group to make progress and 
reach an outcome.  Time was pressing for the GI issues – register and extension - and the TRIPS/CBD issue to make real progress for an overall result in  the Doha round.  If not, Members would simply be 
going round in circles in the negotiations.  All th e issues were intimately linked together as several 
delegations had said, particular ly in previous consultations. 
48. Modalities for the register should contain two elements. First, par ticipation should be 
extended to all Members of the WTO to achieve a real "multilateral" register as mandated under 
Article 23.4 of the TRIPS agreement.  Second, they should address legal effects.   In this regard, the 
creation of a rebuttable presumption regarding certain elements, e.g., the GI definition or genericness 
would be the best way to achieve results.  The prin ciple of territoriality should be fully respected by 
allowing that decisions be taken at national level. 
49. She underscored the importance of the report fo r her delegation and the new life it would add 
to these negotiations as indicated by the EC.  To preserve parallelism with other negotiations, it was 
equally important that the report be more than a simp le factual report.  It would be extremely useful 
for Ministers to be able to take stock of negotiations. 
50. She further asked the Chairman to include oral proposals made at the Special Session 
meetings which, in her delegation's view, went some  way to meeting the concerns she had mentioned. 
51. The representative of  Mexico
 said that her delegation shared the views expressed by other 
delegations that the report should be factual and reflect the discus sions.  Mexico supported a proposal 
which did comply with the mandate contained in Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement, namely to 
facilitate the protection of GIs and not increase it.  The only proposal that did fulfil this mandate was 
the joint proposal, co-sponsored by Mexico.  In the light of this, her delegation was convinced that it was not necessary to ask Ministers to repeat th e mandate contained in the TRIPS Agreement. 
52. The representative of  Argentina
 expressed her delegation's support for the joint proposal, 
which it had co-sponsored.  The proposal did comply  with the mandate contained in Article 23.4 of 
the TRIPS Agreement, and with para graph 18 of the Doha Declaration.   It had won great support from 
Members.  It proposed the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration of GIs for wines and spirits which would facilitate the protection of GIs of wines and sprits and would 
therefore preserve the territoriality principle of inte llectual property rights for GIs.  Participation in the 
system would be strictly voluntary as spelt out in Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
53. Her delegation considered that, if the EC in sisted on having a substantive decision on the 
register, there would not be an agreement on modaliti es.  As regards the Chairman's factual report,  
her delegation considered that the report, as he ha d indicated, must be factual and must set out the 
status of the work of the negotiations relating to  the register and contain as an annex the proposals 
submitted by the different Members.  As the report was not a negotiating text, it must not contain any 
brackets. 
54. The representative of  Ecuador
 agreed with the Chairman's i ndication that the report must be 
factual and reflect the status of the negotiations at  this stage on the basis of the mandate set out in 
Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement, in paragraph 18 of the Doha Declaration, and in paragraph 29 
of the Hong Kong Declaration.  He understood that  the Chairman would reflect the three existing 
proposals and the fact that it had received s upport from a large number of Members, including 
Ecuador.  Her country supported the comments made by  the representative of Chile, namely:  that the 
scope must be limited to wines and spirits;  that pa rticipation must be voluntary;  that, as spelt out in 
Article 23.4, it should facilitate and not increase the protection of GIs;  and that there must be a TN/IP/M/19 
Page 14  
 
  multilateral discussion to define all these aspects.  On the Chairman's intention to reflect the 
proposals, he said that the EC's new thinking, whic h might be more flexible, should be first presented 
as some delegations might not be aware of such new thinking. 
55. On the issue of linkages between TRIPS issues, his delegation was of the view that if there 
were any  results reached in GIs, register and extens ion, there should also be a  result for the issue of 
TRIPS/CBD. 
56. The representative of India
 said that, while India supported the idea of having a factual report, 
indicating Members' positions, convergences and di vergences, it had reservations about adding texts 
with options and square brackets.  On the GI regi ster, India recognized that there were three proposals 
currently on the table.  It wa s still studying the legal effect s proposed, including the rebuttable 
presumption contained in the EC proposal.  The imp lications of the proposal were still not clear to 
India.  It was also assessing the administrative burde n the register would impose on its IP authorities, 
and the benefits for India, which had minimal interest s in wines and spirits.  On the issue of coverage, 
it was aware that discussions were taking place with  DDG Yerxa's consultations on GI extension.  
Therefore discussions in this Special Session shoul d be without prejudice to the ultimate outcome and 
scope.  The issue of scope should therefore be ta ken up for ministerial guidance along with other 
TRIPS elements, namely GI extension  and TRIPS/CBD. 
57. On linkages with other IP issues, India reitera ted the need for parallelism in terms of process 
between GIs and TRIPS/CBD that it had demanded over the last year.  All IP issues should be 
considered together for ministerial guidance.  Fo r India, the linkages were well established and the 
linkage made with an outcome on TRIPS/CBD had been presented by several Members in the last 
green room meetings as an essential element of the Single Undertaking. 
58. The representative of the United States  said that his delegation fully appreciated that the 
establishment of a registration system was part of the Single Undertaking and was fully committed to fulfilling the mandate.  The mandate was very clear a nd needed no further modification.  It was clear 
that there were significant gaps on important aspects of the registration system, but there were 
detailed text-based proposals on the table for consid eration, which put this negotiating group in a 
good position to continue working towards a resolu tion of the differences between this meeting and 
the conclusion of the DDA. 
59. With respect to the Chairman's report, his dele gation appreciated and understood the value of 
a report from the Chairman to the TNC on the status  of the negotiations.  A factual report from the 
Chairman describing the key dynamics in the negotia tions and highlighting in narrative form the key 
points of convergence and divergence would be u seful and appropriate.  His delegation thought it 
could be useful to set out excerpts of proposals ta bled by Members in order to help illustrate the 
points of divergence and convergence on specific topics such as the legal consequences of the system 
and the question of whether participation would be  voluntary or all WTO Members would be required 
to participate in the system.  His delegation believed that it would not be appropriate or useful for the 
Chairman to present reformulated, bracketed or new text s at this stage.  In that regard he said that no 
support had been expressed for such a possibility.  Members seemed to recognize that additional work 
of the negotiators was needed before this could be considered further. 
60. With respect to the horizontal modalities exercise, it was his delegation's firm view that it 
should focus on Agriculture, NAMA, and Services.  While it understood the temptation to add other issues to the scope of what had to be worked out th rough the horizontal process, it feared that doing so 
would seriously undercut the Round's chances of su ccess.  The registration system and the issue of 
GIs more generally should not be a point for nego tiation in the development of a horizontal modalities 
package for the DDA.  Nevertheless, his delegati on was fully prepared to continue to engage 
energetically in additional work of the Special Se ssion during the remainder of the DDA negotiations  TN/IP/M/19 
 Page 15 
 
 
  in order to achieve the objective of the mandate .  As one of the numerous sponsors of the joint 
proposal, his delegation continued to support that proposal as the optimal means for fulfilling the mandate for this negotiation.  It considered that the joint proposal represented the appropriate basis for 
continued work of the Special Session, and the best  prospects for a rapid conclusion of the work.  
While his delegation appreciated the recent efforts by the EC to informally present some new ideas to 
a group of Members, it considered that these ne w ideas still went beyond the mandate to facilitate 
protection and still conceived of a mandatory system instead of a voluntary system envisaged in Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement.  The Special Session would clearly have much work to do in 
the negotiations.  He said that the United States wa s committed to working hard and constructively 
with the Chairman and with the other Members to  achieve this negotiating group's mandate.  It was 
vital that the group keep the focus on its mandate a nd avoid any attempts to expand or reinterpret this 
mandate.  In that regard, it would be wholly inappr opriate to see the mandate "to facilitate protection" 
be somehow reinterpreted as a mandate to expand Me mbers' rights and obligations.  Moreover, this 
was not a mandate to achieve or try to implemen t mutual recognition in the field of intellectual 
property rights among all the WTO Members, which his delegation feared as being what the EC 
proposal was seeking to accomplish through the registra tion system.  Unless his delegation could be 
persuaded that this was not the case, it would con tinue to have great difficulty in achieving the 
negotiating group's objective. 
61. The representative of Brazil
 reiterated his delegati on's position with respect to the substantive 
aspects of the register, namely that it should be  voluntary, produce no legal effects, avoid undue 
burden and cost, especially to developing countries, be limited to wines and spirits only, and fully 
preserve the exceptions under Article 24 of the TRIPS Agreement.  With respect to the joint proposal, 
some elements still needed further clarification as the proposal did not provide any certainty regarding 
the legal effects, in different na tional jurisdictions or in the WTO dispute settlement system, of the 
obligation to consult the register.  In view of this , Brazil did not share the view that the joint proposal 
was a minimum common denominator and it should therefore not be indicated as such in the 
Chairman's report.  Although Brazil had not put forw ard a written submission on this matter it had 
expressed its position orally on many occasions. 
62. As some elements of the proposals on the GI register went beyond the mandate, they could 
only be appropriately considered in the broa der context of discussions on GI extension and 
TRIPS/CBD.  Brazil would therefore support a referen ce in the Chairman's report to the relationship 
that existed in the Doha Development Round between:  (i) the elements of the register that went 
beyond the mandate of the TRIPS Special Session;  (ii)  GI extension;  and (iii) TRIPS/CBD.  Like 
other Members, Brazil believed that considerati on of these three issues in a broader context could 
overcome a deadlock which, if left unresolved, coul d become an obstacle to pr ogress in the horizontal 
modalities for the core negotiations of the Round. 
63. The representative of Colombia  said that, in order to achieve a successful outcome, Members' 
positions on the different proposals would have to move  towards each other more than before.  While 
her delegation believed that such convergence was st ill possible, it was clear that the negotiations had 
to take place according to the mandate, i.e., to nego tiate the establishment of a multilateral system on 
notification and registration of GIs for wines a nd spirits so as to facilitate their protection. 
64. With regard to technical issues, the system to be adopted would have to be simple and 
voluntary in nature, and should facilitate the protect ion of GIs for wines and spirits. It should not 
impose obligations or any administrative or ta x burdens on the industria l property authorities of 
Members.  While she welcomed the EU's flexib ilities regarding its proposal, her delegation did not 
yet have sufficient knowledge of these flexibiliti es that would allow her to see whether these 
eliminated the costs and burdens for developing co untries.  In any case, it was necessary to envisage 
situations where Members could lodge reservations  or oppositions. TN/IP/M/19 
Page 16  
 
  65. Regarding the Chairman's report, she said that the time was not ripe to have anything more 
than a factual report.  With respect to links to other areas under discussion in the WTO, her delegation 
considered that the issue of TRIPS/CBD was part and parcel of the Single Undertaking. 
66. The representative of Costa Rica
 said that the Chairman's report should be a factual portrayal 
of the discussions in this negotiating group.  Contra ry to certain other delegations, his delegation did 
not believe that it was necessary to request guidance from the Ministers on this issue, as the existing 
mandate was already clear.  Costa Rica, like other co untries that were neither producers nor exporters 
of wines and spirits, had no economic interest in this  issue, but a systemic interest in complying with 
the mandate contained in Article 23.4 of the TR IPS Agreement and in paragraph 18 of the Doha 
Declaration.  Therefore, to fulf il this mandate the protection of Ar ticle 23 should be facilitated and not 
increased, participation in the registration system had to be voluntary and it should not have legal 
effects on Members who had decided not  to participate in that system.  It should not entail heavy costs 
for Members participating in the system, nor for the body administering the system.  The system 
should respect the principle of territoriality, which was a fundamental element of the TRIPS Agreement, and had to be exclusively limited to GIs for wines and spirits.  Costa Rica continued to 
support the joint proposal, which was the only proposal complying with the mandate. 
67. The representative of Venezuela
 said that, while his delegation had not sponsored any of the 
proposals on the table, it supported the approach of a voluntary system of registration and notification 
for GIs for wines and spirits without legal effects.  It should take into account the asymmetry between developed and developing countries and should be clear with respect to its economic impact and its 
legal consequences.  He said that in taking into account these considerations the Chairman's report 
should be balanced and remain strictly factual. 
68. The representative of Kuwait
 said that his delegation would like to put on the record that, as 
Kuwait did not import or export alcohol for religious reasons, it was of the view that participation in 
the registration system for GIs should be voluntary and without any legal effect. 
69. The representative of the European Communities , in responding to the points raised, said that 
he spoke on behalf of 27 Members who did not want to change the way they did business.  Canada's 
claim that the joint proposal had stronger support th an the EC proposal was incorrect if one counted 
the EC's 27 Members together with the other Member s that had spoken in favour of a meaningful GI 
register.  In case the Chairman was intending to indicate the number of Members supporting each proposal, his delegation would prefer that the EC  proposal be referred to as "the EC and its 
27 member States" or some similar language. 
70. Furthermore, his delegation rejected Canada's claim that the joint proposal met the mandate, 
as it did not facilitate the protection of GIs, but only created the illusion of such facilitation.  He also rejected the claim that the EC proposal had extrate rritorial effects, unless it was believed that all WTO 
agreements had extraterritorial effects.  While an y international agreement by definition impacted on 
the legal regime of its signatories, this was not a contradiction to the principle of territoriality.  
Likewise, the EC proposal did not affect this principl e.  National jurisdictions were not affected by the 
EC proposal as national courts or administrative bodies would continue to take decisions on the 
protection of GIs under domestic legislation. 
71. In response to the criticism concerning costs and burdens of a GI register by Canada and 
Chile, he said that the register would follow the norm al procedure of notifications in the WTO.  The 
WTO Secretariat would just have to compile the legal acts creating GIs and put them on a website in 
an organized manner.  National authorities would c onsult the register, which would facilitate their 
work, and they would not need to deal with the i ssue of GI definitions unless a party claimed it before 
them.  He also rejected the criticism that the EC  had not submitted its formal proposal in a revised 
paper.  His delegation had undertaken all efforts to explain its proposal at length in different settings  TN/IP/M/19 
 Page 17 
 
 
  and had submitted a non-paper to this end.  He regretted that  other Members had not engaged in 
meaningful negotiations on this proposal. 
72. Finally, he reiterated his delegation's wish that the Chairman's report be a fully fledged report 
with legal texts and bracketed options to make clear the state of play on this important subject at the 
time of modalities. 
D. DISCUSSION OF THE ELEMENTS ENVISAGED IN THE CHAIRMAN 'S REPORT  
1. Participation 
73. The Chairman  said that he would now invite comments on the specific elements envisaged for 
his report, the first of which was participation.  Under this element, it was his plan to set out, in 
narrative form, the three proposals that  had been made on this point. 
74. The representative of Australia  requested a clarification regarding the three proposals. With 
respect to the non-paper mentioned by the EC dele gation he was not aware of any Job document, or 
any other document with a number or a reference and would therefore like more clarity with respect to 
which three proposals were being referred to. 
75. The Chairman  said that he would take account of the EC's new thinking as it had been 
mentioned by the EC's delegation at this meeting.  The EC had proposed that there be a register with 
participating and non-participating Members, a nd that participating Members should be those 
Members above a certain share in world trade. 
76. The representative of th e European Communities  said that, with respect to the specific 
element on participation, his delegation would like to clarify that its views would be best reflected by 
language as follows:  "In accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement, the 
system is multilateral, that is, applicable to a ll WTO Members.  Participating Members are Members 
above a certain share in world trade." 
77. Furthermore, his delegation would prefer that  the language should reflect that there was 
common ground that any WTO Member would be entitle d to submit notifications, and then clarify 
that it was on the legal effects or consequences of such notifications in WTO Members' that 
differences still existed. 
78. The Chairman  said that, as he had set out in his introductory comments, he did not intend to 
have options in his report, but rather would reflect Members' positions in a narrative form. 
79. The representative of the European Communities  said that, while his delegation regretted this 
change of approach because it thought that legal language would provide more clarity, it would of 
course defer to the Chairman's decision on the format of his report. 
80. The representative of Australia  said that, in order to avoid confusion arising from references 
to a paper that not all delegations had seen, she w ould like to set out the Members' three positions on 
participation which were straightforward and easy to characterize.  On the one hand, the joint proposal 
was voluntary, which her delegation continued to consider as a requirement of the mandate in 
Article 23.4 of TRIPS.  This position was not onl y supported by the 17 co-sponsors of the joint 
proposal, but also by many other delegations.  On the other hand, the EC proposal, in both its original 
version of 2005, which was available as a written  document (TN/IP/W/11), and in its new thinking 
that had been outlined in general te rms at this meeting, provided for a system in which participation 
for the vast majority of Members was not voluntary but mandatory.  Finally, the Hong Kong, China TN/IP/M/19 
Page 18  
 
  proposal was a hybrid in which participation was initi ally voluntary, consistent with the mandate, but 
with a clause envisaging review after a period of time. 
81. The representative of Switzerland
 requested a clarification with respect to Members' positions 
that had only been mentioned orally.  She asked whether the report would take into account what had 
been said at formal meetings of the TRIPS Counc il in the past and what was being said at this 
meeting. 
82. The representative of Turkey  said that, as the Chairman's report would be factual, it would 
only be logical to include the EC's new a pproach as any other papers or points made. 
83. The Chairman  said that he would take into account both what had been said at past meetings 
as well as what was said in this meeting. 
84. The representative of New Zealand  said that his delegation would have difficulties with the 
Chairman's characterization of the EC proposal as a register with participa ting and non-participating 
Members, as the EC proposal, even under its new id eas, required all Members to participate in the 
system by consulting the register when making deci sions on GIs.  As the vast majority of Members 
would also have to take action to implement the legal presumptions of the EC proposal, his delegation 
did not accept that a distinction was made between participating and non-pa rticipating Members in 
that proposal.  It was difficult for the Chairman to  be forced into a position of having to paraphrase 
the EC proposal for them. Therefore, as the EC it self was in the best position to characterize its 
proposal accurately, his delegation would s uggest that the EC submit it in writing. 
85. The representative of Chile  said that only three formal proposals were on the table, namely 
the Hong Kong, China proposal (TN/IP/W/8), the joint proposal (TN/IP/W/10) and the EC proposal 
(TN/IP/W/11).  In addition, there were three ot her informal proposals:  one by the EC, one from 
Brazil and another one from Switzerland.  The Br azilian one had been made orally, and the most 
recent one from the EU had been orally changed at th is meeting.  His delega tion would like to know 
how the Chairman's report intended to incorporate this mixture of proposals that had been mentioned. 
86. The representative of Switzerland  said that her delegation would like to remind Members of 
its position regarding participation so that it could be  clearly reflected in the Chairman's report. As 
Switzerland's approach to particip ation and legal effects was relate d to its request relating to GI 
extension, it did not want to develop a registra tion system that was overly specific to wines and 
spirits, but rather a flexible system that woul d be extended to all products in the long term. 
87. In order to go beyond what existed in WIPO and the Lisbon system on participation, it was 
absolutely vital for her delegation that meaning be given to the term "multilateral" in Article 23.4 of 
the TRIPS Agreement.  It was a logical consequence of that mandate that all Members would have to 
take into account registrations in the multilateral regi ster whereas they would be free whether or not to 
notify their national geographical indications.  In this  context, her delegation did not believe that the 
EC's use of a percentage of world trade as a criter ion for participation was appropriate in the context 
of intellectual property, particularly as it woul d not allow Members to fulfil the mandate of 
establishing a "multilateral" system.  In that respect, her delegation was reassured by the clarifications 
at this meeting that all Memb ers would be participating. 
88. It should not be forgotten that the mandate w as to facilitate, without increasing, the protection 
of GIs that all Members were already obliged to ma ke available nationally under Articles 22 to 24 of 
the TRIPS Agreement.  Such protection was, of cour se, subject to any applicable transitional periods 
which would continue to be applicable in the case of the register.  Her delegation remained open to 
discuss the incorporation of further measures rela ting to special and differential treatment if 
necessary.  TN/IP/M/19 
 Page 19 
 
 
  2. Consequences/legal effects of registrations 
89. The representative of the European Communities  said that his delegation would appreciate if 
it were made clear in the Chairman's report that  the joint proposal envisaged a database which 
included the obligation to consult, and not just the provision to consult, as had been indicated in some 
meetings. 
90. The representative of New Zealand  said that, regarding the consequences of registrations, 
there was a wide range of views among Members rangi ng from, at one end of the spectrum,  the view 
that the register should have no legal effects to, at the other end of the spectrum, a proposal which would have draconian legal effects that would not  facilitate but substantially increase protection.  
Such legal effects were draconian because they  would reverse a fundamental principle of 
New Zealand law, namely the burden of proof, and would give legal status to an IPR from any 
Member that registered a GI on such a register, wh ich was clearly inconsistent with the principle of 
territoriality.  Such a register would be unprecedented as it went further than the Madrid Protocol in relation to trademarks or the Patent Cooperation Tr eaty.  Both treaties reduced the costs of seeking 
protection in all countries, but the examination pr ocess was still undertaken in each country under its 
domestic law. 
91. Turning to the joint proposal , he rejected the EC's description of it as an illusion of 
facilitation.  The joint proposal fell between the tw o positions on the spectrum in that it provided for 
consequences of registration that facilitated protec tion in accordance with the mandate.  If adopted, it 
would provide real and substantive benefits to GI right holders.  In New Zealand, for instance, wines 
and spirits GIs were protected principally by th e common law tort of "passing off", and legislative 
requirements in the Trade Marks Act and Fair Tradi ng Act.  According to expert advice received by 
his delegation, if the joint proposal were to be im plemented in New Zealand, GI rights holders could 
use a registration under a joint proposal-type regist er to establish their case in a court action, as it 
would help right holders to show that it had a reputation in the particular name. 
92. In relation to trademarks, under the New Zealand Trade Marks Act an examiner had to satisfy 
himself that there were no grounds preventing the regi stration of the trademark, e.g., if the trademarks 
were non-distinctive.  Implementation of the join t proposal in New Zealand would involve including 
in the trademark examination process a requirement fo r the examiner to consult the register, to assess 
whether the trademark application contained a regist ered GI, and then to consider its eligibility for 
trademark registration with that information in mind .  If the trademark did consist of or contained a 
wine or spirit GI appearing on the international re gister, that would be highly relevant in assessing 
whether it was non-distinctive and therefore not regi strable.  Furthermore, the examination record 
obtainable under New Zealand's legislation on access to official information would show if the 
requirement to consult the register had not been complied with and this w ould constitute grounds for 
review of the decision to register the trademark.  Contrary to the views that the joint proposal had no 
legal effect was an illusion or would make no diff erence, the joint proposal would therefore clearly 
facilitate the protection of GIs in New Zealand by  making consolidated information on geographical 
terms available to examiners.  It would have a r eal effect in New Zealand as it would help prevent 
geographical indications from bei ng inappropriately registered as trademarks by specifically requiring 
consultation of the database in the examination pro cess.  A joint proposal-style register could also 
avoid the need for GI right holders to spend time and money lodging an opposition to an accepted 
application on the basis of non-distinctiveness.  Ther efore, it would also be of real benefit to GI 
right holders. 
93. The representative of Australia
 said that the issue of legal effects or consequences of 
registration was obviously a fundamental area of disagreement in these negotiations and merited 
spending some time on it.  She believed that the reasons why this area had been so difficult for 
Members was that, unlike in some other negotiations  in the WTO, this issue was not dealing with TN/IP/M/19 
Page 20  
 
  numbers on which one could split the difference, but rather with legal systems on which this 
difference-splitting would not be possible. 
94. In her view, Members had basically two appro aches to choose.  On the one hand, there was 
the simple information-based joint proposal, wher e terms on the register would be considered by 
national authorities and form part of the body of  information taken into  account under national law 
when making decisions about the protection of GIs and trademarks.  This would add value to the 
current system and facilitate the protection of  GIs for wines and spirits irrespective of how 
participating Members protected GIs, whether thr ough trademark systems, sui generis systems, or 
consumer protection legislation. 
95. On the other hand, there were the EC and H ong Kong, China proposals, whose legal effects 
were based on legal presumptions whereby the multilateral registrati on of a term by one Member 
would have legal implications for its eligibility for protection in another Member.  She emphasized 
that there were actually two approaches, not thr ee, as the Hong Kong, China and EC proposals were 
both based on legal presumptions, which her delega tion found difficult for various reasons that she 
would set out later. 
96. Commenting on the EC's request to the Chairman  that the joint proposal be paraphrased as 
including an obligation to consult, she agreed with previous speakers that had pointed out the 
Chairman's difficulty in paraphrasing what were quite  contentious and controve rsial issues in different 
proposals.  For this reason, her de legation believed that the best appr oach would be to maintain the 
language used by delegati ons who had made the proposals.  Havi ng said this, she did want to share 
Australia's understanding of the joint proposal that its legal effect would be to place on authorities an 
obligation to consult the database of GIs when making decisions about the protection of GIs and 
trademarks under national laws.  Implementation of the joint proposal in Australia would include 
writing into the rules of its authorities the requirement to consult the terms on the register and take them into account where relevant under national law. 
97. Her delegation considered that the joint proposal  did add value to the status quo and facilitate 
the protection of wines and spirits GIs consistent w ith the mandate in two important ways.  Firstly, it 
could prevent the improper registration of trademarks  that contain foreign GIs by alerting trademark 
examiners to the existence of the foreign GI, th ereby facilitating compliance with Article 23.2 of 
TRIPS.  This was an issue of real importance to a dvocates of increased protection for GIs, particularly 
EC member States who had raised serious concerns in the past about trademarks being granted over 
terms that contained European geographical indicat ions.  According to these delegations, one of the 
problems had been that these terms had not been well known to the trademark officers of countries 
like Australia.  It was for this reason that the databa se proposed in the joint proposal would provide all 
of this information in one place at a click.  This database had been referred to as a mere database or as 
the "Google" proposal in certain consultations, but Members needed to recognize that it was precisely this kind of information that trademark examiners had recourse to in examining applications for 
trademarks or certification marks in various systems.  Currently trademark examiners were using 
dictionaries or atlases to determine whether a te rm used in or as a trademark was actually a 
geographical name.  Thus, having in one place the GIs claimed by all WTO Members who chose to participate in the system would be a significant improvement of the status quo. 
98. Secondly, the joint proposal would facilitate the protection of GIs for wines and spirits in that 
it would provide useful information to the trademark examiner in considering whether or not to grant 
a certification mark to a GI, e.g., who owned the ma rk, who controlled the mark, what were the rules 
governing the use of the GI in its country of origin .  This added value to the current system without 
overreaching legally or creating unreasonabl e burdens on governments and industry.  TN/IP/M/19 
 Page 21 
 
 
  99. With respect to the legal presumptions contained in the EC proposal and their implications for 
the principle of territoriality, she said that to her delegation, the EC's new thinking did not seem to be 
very different from their 2005 proposal.  For the bene fit of those Members who had not participated in 
the informal consultations, she sa id that the main difference betw een the EC's 2005 proposal and the 
proposal elaborated at this meeting was the rem oval of the cumbersome state-to-state multilateral 
reservations and negotiations mechanism.  While he r delegation welcomed this reduction of excessive 
and inappropriate government involvement in asserting and defending GI rights  under the register by 
no longer subjecting determinations of a GI stat us to political negotiations, she had also seen the 
reservation system as a function of the legal presum ptions:  one could not be removed without the 
other, or the system would in fact get worse.  Whereas previously a Member could object to a 
notification and consequently did not have to pr ovide the legal presumption in its law, now all 
participating Members, which she understood to m ean the vast majority of Members, would be 
required to implement the presumption that a foreign GI was a GI in their respective markets.  While 
it might be possible to rebut this presumption somewhere and somehow, this remained to be 
elaborated. 
100. There were a number of problems with this approach.  Firstly, her delegation believed that the 
Hong Kong, China and EC proposals were inconsistent with the important principle of territoriality, 
and the EC's claim that from this point of view a ll WTO Agreements would have to be deemed extra-
territorial was incorrect.  Under the legal presumptio n envisaged by the EC's new thinking, all terms 
on the register would enter Australia with a presumpti on in their favour that they satisfied certain facts 
under Australian law, and that was extraterritorial.  Th e fact that a GI in Europe was relevant to its 
status in Australia without Australia having being ab le to examine that term and verify its entitlement 
to protection under its law was extraterritorial.  In the area of intellectual property no one was 
presumed to have this kind of monopoly, but had actually to seek one, and she saw no reason why GIs 
should be any different.  Her de legation could not accept a system where the intellectual property 
status of a term in Europe had le gal implications for its status in Australia, whether those implications 
were substantive and absolute, or procedural.  For those familiar with the adversarial system of the 
common law it was clear that the question who bore the burden of proof was a significant one. 
101. Finally, her delegation wanted to raise a se cond concern regarding the legal presumptions 
which was a policy concern of interest to the broader Membership.  The presumption in the EC 
proposal was that all registered terms would be pres umed not to be generic in all markets.  This 
proposal limited the exception for generic terms in Article  24.6 of the TRIPS Agreement.  A number 
of Members, and not just co-sponsors of the joint pro posal, had stated that the register should not alter 
the balance of rights and obligations and should not affect the Article 24 exceptions, but the EC 
proposal did.  Article  24.6 provided that Members di d not have to protect terms that were customary 
in common usage in their markets.  The EC proposal would constrain Members' implementation of this exception by dictating who, in a court of la w, would have the burden of proving what.  As a 
matter of public policy, it was questionable why the burden should be on users of generic terms, i.e., 
terms in the public domain, to justify their conti nued uses, rather than on the IP owner seeking the 
monopoly.  Commercially, such a limitation on Article 24. 6 posed particular risks in export markets.  
Although the EC had said in its general statements that its proposal was only forward-looking and not 
retrospective, this could not be ensured.  The EC proposal would give GI right holders presumptive 
rights in all markets without giving other legitimat e users any certainty that they would have an 
opportunity to rebut the presumption.  Increasing the protection without increasing the exceptions 
upset the balance of rights and obligations in th e TRIPS Agreement and was unnecessary to fulfil the 
mandate given to Members.  Her delegation remained  open to questions on the joint proposal and was 
prepared to discuss it in more detail. 
102. The representative of the United States  said that his delegation wanted to take the opportunity 
at this formal meeting to set out what the impact of the EC proposal would be on the US legal system, 
and how the joint proposal would be implemented in the United States.  As had been pointed out TN/IP/M/19 
Page 22  
 
  previously, the reversal of the burden of proof envisaged by the EC proposal would be a fundamental 
change, not just in the protection of GIs in the US, but also in intellectual property protection more generally.  The burden of proof in the US system was upon the person or entity that was seeking the intellectual property right.  That person or entity ha d to affirmatively demonstrate that it deserved this 
right whether it was a GI certification mark or a trad emark.  The EC proposal did quite the reverse.  It 
presumed that, because this term was on a list in  another country, the bur den of proof was on 
everybody else to show that it should not be protect ed.  This effect of reversing the burden of proof 
was not just incidental to the United States system, but concerned basically the system as it existed 
within TRIPS and for intellectual property protect ion more generally.  For those who already had 
rights, this reversal put a burden on them to defend the rights they thought they already had, e.g., a 
trademark holder would have to defend his trademark against the presumption that a GI in Europe, or 
some other country, that was on the register should enjoy protection in the US.  The EC claim that the exceptions spelt out in Article 24 would apply did not change the fundamental fact of who had to 
prove what under the EC proposal. 
103. Regarding the joint proposal, the US would oper ate in very much the same way as Australia 
had just set out:  it would be embedded in the pr ocedures of the patent office that a trademark 
examiner had a responsibility to consult the register .  If the trademark examiner had not done that 
properly, this would be a basis for a complaint and a challenge of the decision.  Having that information on the register would allow the examiner to complete or verify certain information that 
had to be checked during the examining procedure.  Examples for such information would be questions like: Was the term primarily geograp hic? Was it remote or obscure?  Was there a 
goods-place association, such that the US consumers were likely to believe that the goods came from 
the place indicated as its origin?  Did the applican t for this protection exert control in its home 
market?  With regard to such questions that th e examiner had to go through in order to make a 
determination, the register of the joint proposal would actually provide real value, certainly more 
value than a situation without such a register, a nd would therefore fully meet the mandate.  He hoped 
that other Members would also recognize the value of the joint proposal. 
104. The representative of Chinese Taipei
 said that, firstly, the fact that the EC had only mentioned 
their new ideas in consultations and had not shared them in writing presented a procedural problem, as 
Members who had not participated in the Chairm an's small group consulta tions had not seen the 
proposal and could therefore not seek instructions from their capitals in that regard. 
105. Secondly, although the EC's new ideas disti nguished between "participating" and "non-
participating" Members, non-par ticipating Members were still ob liged to consult the multilateral 
register.  Therefore, the system envisaged unde r the EC's new ideas was still mandatory and not 
voluntary.  It also agreed with Australia rega rding the forward-looking effect of the proposal.  
Furthermore, his delegation believed that the lega l effects of the EC and Hong Kong, China proposals 
undermined the principle of territoriality. 
106. Thirdly, Chinese Taipei shared the belief of  other Members that the joint proposal did 
facilitate the protection of GIs for wines and spirits.  His delegation had also done some research as to 
how it would be implemented internally.  Currently , as Chinese Taipei protected GIs as certification 
marks, when examining the applications for such  marks examiners would consult a database that 
contained not only prior trademarks, but also term s that were not allowed to be registered as 
trademarks, such as WIPO no tifications under Article 6 ter of the Paris Convention, names and logos 
of government authorities, and the names of agricu ltural products.  Currently, examiners were not 
required to provide a written record of their use of this database in the examination of a trademark 
application. 
107. If the joint proposal became a multilateral obliga tion, the internal examination guidelines 
would need to be amended to include the require ment for examiners to consult the WTO multilateral  TN/IP/M/19 
 Page 23 
 
 
  database when examining applications for certific ation marks for wines and spirits, and keep the 
records on file irrespective of the results.  The impl ementation of such procedures could be ensured by 
a checklist.  This showed that having a joint pro posal style register did make a difference and did 
facilitate the protection of GIs for wines and spirits. 
108. The representative of Canada  agreed with Australia that, it would be wise to use the 
proposals' actual language in the report.  Secondly, he  agreed with others that the joint proposal had 
real effects for participating Members. 
109. In view of its own direct experience with the EC in negotiating the bilateral wines and spirits 
agreement, his delegation had reas ons to be concerned about the c onsequences of the fundamental 
legal changes envisaged by the EC proposal.  In that proposal, the EC was asking Members to accept 
all GIs notified to the system as being valid GIs ac cording to the definition in Article. 22.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement.  However, in the negotiation of the bilateral agreement the EC had provided a list 
of approximately 10,000 names, supposedly wines and spirits GIs, and it had been difficult and time-consuming for Canada to analyse each of these name s and determine whether they were eligible for 
protection.  After analysis, only approximately  1,500 names had qualified for consideration for 
protection, the rest had failed because they had either  not been for a wine or a spirit, they were not 
GIs, or they had not been protected in their own country.  The EC was asking other Members to accept in good faith that anything notified to the sy stem would constitute a wi ne and spirit GI unless 
proven otherwise, that any GI notified to the syst em could not be considered generic, unless it was 
proven to be generic in those other Members.  Th is turned Article  24.6 of the TRIPS Agreement on 
its head and ignored the fundamental territorial as pect of this provision, which deferred to the 
perception of customary use of a term in the countr y where the GI was being used rather than where a 
product was being produced.  For these reasons, his delegation believed that all Members should be 
concerned about the consequences of the EC proposal. 
110. Finally, while the issue of costs and burdens might well be covered in a different part of the 
Chairman's report, he wanted to point out that the EC proposal envisaged costs not only for 
governments, IP users and IP offices, but also fo r people who never before  would have thought of 
having to incur costs in the IP system, such as producers of generic goods. This was another 
consequence of the EC proposal that  Members should be concerned about. 
111. The representative of Hong Kong, China
 said that the legal effect of a registration was an 
important element of the register.  While not wanti ng to repeat the details of her delegation's proposal 
on legal effects of registrations, she said that th e operation of the rebuttable presumptions, which only 
affected the burden of proof on the three issues  identified in the proposal, did not have an 
extraterritorial effect as the system did not deal w ith competing claims for GIs.  Such claims, as well 
the applicability of the exceptions under Article  24 of the TRIPS Agreement, would continue to be 
dealt with under the national laws.  Members inte rested in the differences between the Hong Kong, 
China and the EC proposal on legal effects could re fer to paragraph 149 of the minutes in TN/IP/M/14 
for her delegation's intervention on that point. 
112. Finally, to clarify the legal effects on non- participating Members under the Hong Kong, 
China proposal, she said that the obligation to give le gal effect to registrations under the system would 
only be binding on Members choosing to participate in the system.  In other words, there would be no 
legal effects in the non-participating Members. 
113. The representative of Argentina  said that, in her view, the Chairman's report would not have 
to distinguish between participa ting and non-participating Members.  Her delegation considered that 
the proposals must appear textually as they had b een presented, and that the Chairman should not 
paraphrase the joint proposal.  Finally, she said that the extraterritoriality of the legal presumptions in the EC proposal was not acceptable. TN/IP/M/19 
Page 24  
 
  114. The representative of Chile
 said that the discussion seemed rather confusing.  While all 
delegations had the formal EC proposal (TN/IP/W/11)  only, the discussion seemed to relate rather to 
"new ideas" and amendments thereof.  Both the EC formal proposal and the new ideas would have 
strong legal effects on all WTO Members.  Both were  problematic.  First of all, because of what had 
already been said relating to legal presumptions and also because this was related to participation.  
Although the EC had said that there would be two cate gories of Members, i.e., those participating in 
the system and those who decide not to participat e in the system, it was still proposing that the legal 
effects would be applicable to all WTO Members, including those who had deci ded not to participate 
in the system.  This was a flagrant contradiction.  He further asked the EC to clarify what they meant 
by proposing that participating Members be those "above a certain share in world trade".  It was 
important that the Special Session look at that in view of the horizontal process and how Ministers 
would appraise the EC approach.  In comparison, th e joint proposal had value for two main reasons.  
First of all, it had an intrinsic value.  It woul d be a very reliable centra lized database which would 
include GIs notified by WTO participating Member s.  The governments of many Members would  
certainly be assured that the GIs were recognized as such in their countries of origin.  This was an 
important aspect to bear in mind, particularly for those countries who wanted to protect foreign GIs.  
This database proposed would be unprecedented:  it would be a kind of single window accessible to 
all with a click.  Secondly, the value of this data base was that the WTO Member s that wanted to take 
part in the system would be obliged to consult th at database.  Members would be obliged to consult 
the database when they take decisions relating to the protection of GIs and of trademarks for wines 
and spirits in conformity with their domestic legisl ation.  It was equally important that for those 
Members who did not wish to take part in the sy stem there would not be any legal consequences. 
115. The representative of the European Communities  said that his delegation did not want to 
disrupt the checks and balances between rights and ob ligations under the TRIPS Agreement, nor want 
retroactive effects.  As a  result of its proposal on le gal effects, it did not wa nt Members to give up the 
use of an existing name, the grandfathered use exce ption, the prior trademark use exception, or the 
genericness exception.  It had not proposed that genericness claims be appreciated according to the 
country of origin instead of the country where prot ection was sought.  He expressed surprise that other 
delegations kept commenting on what they only thought the EC wanted or that they did not know what the EC really wanted in spite of the fact that  they had been present at the informal consultations 
held last November where his delegation had shared  a non-paper on new ideas.  In light of this, he 
reiterated what the EC was seeking.  The registra tion or notification of a GI would entail a legal 
presumption.  Would this mean that all Members would have to examine in detail whether or not the 
GI was or not a problem in their own territories?  The answer was negative:  challenges could be made at any time in the country where protection wa s sought after the notificati on  had been made.  In 
that regard there would not be  any extraterritorial effect. 
116. As regards the joint proposal, he had heard th at the added value of the proposed database 
would be to allow for trademark examiners to have  a place where they could see if there was a GI, if 
the name was actually a GI, and so on.  He said that in an Internet era, where such information would 
already be available, there would not be any added value.  He pointed out that the obligation to prohibit the registration of a trademark consisting of  or containing a GI was currently part of TRIPS 
obligations.  In that regard the joint proposal w ould not add any value.  Under the EC proposal, when 
a GI had been notified to the register, it would be considered valid unless proven otherwise according 
to the legislation of the country where the challenge was being made.  As an example, he said that the 
EC would accept that a notified GI c ould be generic in Australia but no t in Canada.  On the issue of 
the reversal of the burden of proof, he took the following example based on the EC experience in the 
WTO:  if a WTO Member's GI legislation was not challenged or unsuccessfully challenged, it must be considered as valid.  The same applied to GIs:  unless proven otherwise at any time and according to 
the legislation of each of the WTO Members, a notified GI would be considered valid.  A GI right 
owner would not have to prove that  his GI was not generic, it would be the challenger of the GI which 
would have to prove that the GI was generic.  The legal effect proposed under the joint proposal did  TN/IP/M/19 
 Page 25 
 
 
  not have any added value in an Internet world where anyone could consult any database to know 
whether there was an existing GI or not.  In contrast, only the EC proposal fulfilled the mandate because it actually facilitated the protection of GIs.   He could not see how the protection of a GI, 
which was a legal judgment, would be  facilitated under the joint proposal. 
117. The representative of Canada
 said the point he wanted to make about Canada's experience 
was that the EC and their member States had propo sed a list of some 10,000 names, out of which 
many had been eliminated because they were not GIs, they were not for wines or spirits, not registered 
nor protected in their home country, and so on.  The point of concern based on the Canadian 
experience was that the notification of so many GIs with the addition of a rebuttable presumption, i.e., a reversal of the burden of proof, would create a da unting situation for users and others dealing with 
the proposed system. 
118. The representative of Japan
 said that after the explanations given by the EC he understood the 
need for further technical discussions.  He aske d whether the notified GI would be granted an 
automatic rebuttable presumption, in other words wh ether a Member would have to presume that a 
foreign GI would have some legal e ffect on its own territory and that that Member would have to bear 
the burden of the rebuttal of that presumption.  Th is would be a significant legal effect which was 
difficult to be accepted by many Members.  As mentioned by other co-sponsors, the joint proposal did not propose a database which would simply collect in formation but a system with legal consequences, 
which would add value. 
119. The representative of New Zealand
 said that the point about the 10,000 GIs in the context of 
the bilateral agreement between Canada and the EC went to the heart of the concerns and issues 
discussed.  As Canada had already clarified, it was a fact that the EC had sought protection for around 
about 10,000 terms and it would seem that in fact the work in thinning down that list was not done by 
the EC, but by the Canadians.  To some extent, this  was precisely the situation which raised concerns.  
This would involve outsourcing of work and respon sibilities to others, which was a problem for his 
country.  He was not sure whether or not the objectiv e of this exercise was to come up with a system 
where all Members were required to go through 10,000 terms in each of their administrations and 
work down to some more appropriate list.  On th e issue of legal effects under the EC's new ideas and 
its assurances about the generic exception, he said th at there was no list of generic terms in the EC 
and therefore asked how the EC could give assurances. 
120. The representative of Australia  referred to the statement by the EC that it was not seeking to 
change the checks and balances in the GI provision s in the TRIPS Agreement, that it was not seeking 
retroactive effects and that it was not seeking to und ermine or change in any way the prior use or 
generic exceptions.  While welcoming these clarificat ions, her delegation would be keen to see these 
reflected in writing in a proposal.  These points were inconsistent with the EC proposals, both in their 
2005 version and in their new thinking version. 
121. Regarding the generic exception, the EC had said that it was not interested in changing the 
checks and balances.  However, under its proposal it increased the protection of GIs because all terms 
entered on the multilateral register, entered all other Members' markets with the presumption that they 
met the definition of a GI under those other Members'  laws.  That would increase the protection of 
GIs without providing any certainty that in the export market context Australian producers would have the opportunity to rebut the presumption.  So, in certain export markets it might be that the terms 
would be simply protected. 
122. The other point that was raised regarded terr itoriality.  The EC had indicated that their 
proposal would not require other Members to review all the terms.  That was precisely the problem.  Under the Madrid system (trademarks) in WIPO , which was consistent with the principle of 
territoriality, all trademarks were notified, sent to  all trademark offices in the other Members, who TN/IP/M/19 
Page 26  
 
  would then have the opportunity to review them and reject them.  She noted however that this feature 
of the Madrid system was not one which could be proposed in these negotiations because there was 
not yet enough harmonization of laws on GIs to enable that kind of system and because that would go well beyond the mandate. 
123. In terms of added value, in reply to the co mment made that a database as proposed by the 
joint proposal would not bring any added value, she sa id that this would be an unfair characterization.  
The argument was made that the database would not be  anything more than the Internet.  While the 
Internet could provide a whole range of different info rmation,  much of it would not be relevant to the 
task at hand.  If Members had in one place a conso lidated database of terms formally notified to the 
WTO by a government, how could it be argued to be the same as entering a GI into Google?  This 
was simply not fair nor correct. 
124. The point was also made that there would not be added value because the requirement not to 
allow trademarks to contain or consist of GIs was already in the TRIPS Agreem ent.  In that regard, 
she said there was a mandate to facilitate the existing level of protection for GIs under TRIPS 
Article 23.  So, the joint proposal did facilitate protection by facilitating the compliance with TRIPS 
Article 23. 
125. Finally on the burden of proof, she asked for clarifications.  Her understanding was rather 
than the IP owner having to seek and assert its own ri ght and bear the burden of proving that its terms 
were distinctive or met the definition, that burde n would be shifted to the others to defend their 
existing uses.  She further added that discussions would be facilitated if there were a written text. 
126. The representative of th e European Communities
 said that if Canada had signed an agreement 
with the EC it must mean that it had seen some valu e in it and therefore whether the EC had more GIs 
and Canada had less GIs did not seem relevant.  What  was interesting was that the EC simply offered 
both systems, trademark and GI protection.  Producer s could use both or either one.  In contrast some 
Members favoured one system only. 
127. In reply to the concern expressed by Japan that GIs notified by a Member would be 
automatically protected in all other Members, he sai d that the EC did not want a one-stop-shop.  If the 
EC notified the GI "Côte du Rhône" to the register, it would not automatically get protection everywhere.  For example, a Côte du Rhône producer would still have to go to Ruratania's 
administration and register the GI as "Côte du Rhône ".  The only thing that the register brought the 
producer was that Ruratania's administration would have to consult the register and any third party in Ruratania could challenge the registered name on the ground that in Ruratania the term Côte du 
Rhône had become generic or there was a prior use or  a prior trademark.  What the challenger had to 
do would be to provide the evidence.  What was impor tant for the GI owner was that, contrary to the 
current situation in many countries, Ruratania's administration could not ask him to prove that the GI was not generic.  Each Member would examine whether or not the GI was deemed protectable 
according to its national law, which had by definitio n to be compatible with the TRIPS Agreement.  
What the EC had put forward was that those claimi ng that an exception applied to them had to prove 
it.  While the 2005 proposal suggested that GIs no tified and not challenged on ground of genericness 
would not be challengeable any longer, the new EC  thinking would not imply any additional work nor 
any need for changes in IP systems th at were presently functioning well. 
128. In response to the question by New Zealand regard ing a list of generic names, he said that the 
fact that a name was generic or not generic in th e EC had not, and should not  have, any consequences 
in  New Zealand.  Otherwise the effect of notif ication would be extraterritorial, which would be 
totally unfair and against the EC approach.  In th at regard, the EC position was very consistent.  TN/IP/M/19 
 Page 27 
 
 
  129. The representative of the United States  associated his delegation with the views expressed by 
the delegations of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Japan.  He welcomed the clarifications made 
by the representative of the European Communities as his delegation's reading of the EC proposals 
was that they delivered practically all of what he was saying they did not want.  He further explained 
the concerns his delegation was having with regard to the EC proposal.  It included the presumption 
that one Member's determination regarding a GI woul d have a certain legal standing in the territory of 
other Members.  That would be unworkable in the US  legal system and clearly at odds with the most 
basic principles underlying the TRIPS Agreement and IPR protection more generally.  Members were 
mandated to establish a multilateral system of notifica tion and registration of GIs for wines and spirits 
in order to facilitate the protection of those GIs.  That mandate provided neith er for the expansion of 
the GI protection nor the encroachment upon other IP  rights.  They were not in any manner mandated 
through this negotiation to weaken or potentially negate other rights that were currently existing 
within the territories of WTO Members.  The EC proposal would place existing right holders in an automatically defensive position and subject to the loss of their rights simply by virtue of a name 
being placed on a list based on a dete rmination of its IP status made in another territory.  These right 
holders would then be required through mechanisms th at were still extremely unclear to his delegation 
to take affirmative action to defend their existing rights or to invoke one of the TRIPS exceptions.  
Under the EC proposal as just explained, a notif ied term would be presumed to meet the TRIPS 
definition.  By virtue of this short circuiti ng or circumvention of domestic examination and 
procedures, the validity of any conflicting use in  the receiving country would automatically and 
immediately be called into question, notably before the courts.  While the continued availability of the 
exceptions spelt out in Article 24 of TRIPS was impo rtant to note, this did not at all overcome this 
fundamental problem of short circuiting of dome stic decision-making through these presumptions and 
the reversal of the burden of proof.  This change was a fundamental shift.  As regard the exceptions 
under Article 24, he said that they were not even sacrosanct because the EC proposal put forward that 
a notified GI would be presumed to be non generic, and that would be a limitation. 
130. He further said that the trademark system was based on consumer perception.  If it was found 
that consumers were deceived by the use of a mark  on a particular good, that mark would be invalid.  
The fact that a notified term was presumed to meet  the TRIPS GI definition in the receiving Member's 
territory meant that any conflicting uses would im mediately be deemed geographically deceptive by 
operation of law.  That was the way this would wo rk.  In other words, under the EC proposal the act 
of notification would be deemed to artificially create knowledge of percepti ons of consumers in the 
receiving Member or, in other words, to presume that  the consumers in the US identified a particular 
GI with a particular good.  The EC was asking his country to create this consumer perception by statute or regulation rather than to infer it from act ual consumer's experience.  To put it mildly, this 
was a radical shift in the concepts and in the lega l foundations of the trademark field.  It would 
significantly impact the operation of national trad emark systems in a profound and far-reaching and 
quite unpredictable way.  Under the EC's revi sed concepts where the presumption would be 
rebuttable, there were significant questions as to whet her, at what cost to existing right holders, and 
through what procedures that presumption could be rebutted even within the US system.  Thus, it appeared that this process of rebutting presumptions would, to a very significant degree, be played out 
in US courts, would unleash domestic litiga tion on a scale undetermined, and could be quite 
significant.  This extremely burdensome process woul d also have to be repeated in every Member's 
territory in which existing right holders sought to ma intain those rights.  It was fundamentally unfair 
and unreasonable that in order to facilitate protection of GIs the rights of other right holders should be 
placed in legal jeopardy.  There must be a better and fairer way, which his delegation thought it had 
already found. 
131. The representative of the European Communities
 said, in response to the comment made by 
the US representative that the EC were trying to dict ate to the US consumer what he had to recognize 
as a GI or not, that this was only relevant when it  came to the issue of genericness.  This was totally 
irrelevant in respect of GI definition, which was about the quality and characteristics or reputation, but TN/IP/M/19 
Page 28  
 
  not necessarily reputation only.  Genericness by de finition had to be s ubjective and consumer-
oriented.  So the EC proposal would not have any impact on the GI definition.  The issue was who has 
to prove what.  If in the US the GI holder did not have to prove that his GI was not generic, but it was the one who claimed that the GI was generic who had to prove his claim, then the EC proposal did not 
change anything.  On the point made that the EC wa nted to impose a system, he said that it would be 
the US rules and system that would apply and that th ere would not be any extraterritoriality.  In the 
light of a statement made by some joint propo sal delegations that Members' trademark or GI 
authorities would be obliged to consult the register , he asked where would the difference be with the 
EC proposal. 
132. The representative of Australia
 asked that, if the EC was just  seeking to ensure that those 
claiming an exception make it out, why then was it se eking in its revised proposal a legal presumption 
as to three points and not only one, including that the terms met the definition of a GI in a market. 
133. On the comment made by the EC in response to the US that consumer perception was only 
relevant in the context of the genericness exception,  she asked whether the EC  considered that the 
definition of a GI in Article 22.1 was objective a nd universal or, as Australia did, that it was  
subjective and territorial. 
3. Notifications 
134. The Chairman  recalled that earlier discussions in the Special Session, reflected in documents 
TN/IP/W/12/Add.1 and Corr.1, indicated a fair measure of common ground on certain aspects, but also significant remaining differences on some othe rs.  In his report he would intend to draw upon 
that, subject to any new thinking, with a view to  describing points of convergence and divergence.  
The description should only be regarded as tentative,  since much of the discussion was not all that 
recent and because positions on these matters were linked to the treatment of participation and 
consequences/legal effects. 
135. The representative of th e European Communities
 said that his delegation would like to have 
this part as well as the other parts in legal language with brackets as the best way to show the progress 
and the state of play.  This was particularly the case in these two issues of notification and registration 
because the level of convergence was high. 
136. Concerning the GI to be notified, he thought that all Members agreed that only GIs that met 
the definition of Article 22.1 in the territory of the notifying country or had not fallen into disuse 
could be notified. 
137. On other elements that might be notified, th e divergence was not so much on whether or not 
an element could be notified but whether they "shall"  or "may" be notified.  He suggested that the 
Chairman reflect this in his report. 
138. The representative of Canada  said that, as indicated by ot her delegations, the appropriate 
approach for the Chairman was to not include draf t legal language but, as he had suggested, to make a 
factual report. 
139. The representative of Argentina  said the report should be factual and not contain any text 
between square brackets.  Texts should only quote the proposals as they had been made. 
140. The Chairman  said that his report would be factual, but if there was some progress made 
regarding certain points this could be captured, not in the same way as for th e modalities texts, but so 
as to show that there was some agreement on certa in points while on others differences remained.  TN/IP/M/19 
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  141. The representative of El Salvador  reiterated what her delegation had said at previous meetings 
of the Special Session and in informal consultations , namely that her country as a developing one was 
currently adjusting its national offices to the new ob ligations that it was havi ng and would have.  It 
believed that the negotiations in th is group had not been fully explored.  This was not the appropriate 
time to have negotiations on a legal text.  She woul d urge the Chairman to reflect in his report the 
position of small countries. 
142. The representative of the United States  welcomed the narrative approach the Chairman 
intended to take for his report, in particular the fact that he would give, as he had indicated, his 
"tentative" appreciation of  the state of play.  Hi s delegation strongly felt th at it would be essential for 
the Special Session to engage in additional discussions  on the notification of the system, in particular 
because there had not been discussions for quite some time.  In the light of the additional discussions 
that were being held, the issues of notification and re gistration were clearly interrelated.  He therefore 
supported the request made by Canada that the re port set out the notification elements in narrative 
form. 
143. The representative of the European Communities  encouraged the Chai rman to produce a full 
legal text with brackets, which would not be an exaggerated demand after 13 years of intense 
discussions. 
4. Registration 
144. The Chairman  said that there appeared to be significant common ground among Members on 
certain elements, although as previ ously said it would need to be ma de clear that final positions on 
this, as on other matters, would depend on the treat ment of participation and consequences/legal 
effects. 
145. The representative of the European Communities  said that registration was an area where 
there was important convergence among Members.  This  should therefore be reflected in the report.  
The draft paper submitted by the Chairman to a sm all group of Members did not contain any brackets. 
His delegation had at that time made a point that one element, on which there had been some degree 
of convergence and which was also contained in th e joint proposal, was missing, namely that the 
registration should be made in the three WTO langua ges.  Elements of registration were evidently 
subject to a final agreement coveri ng other issues, in particular the key issues of legal effects and 
participation, which in his dele gation's view should be tackled by Ministers because of fundamental 
differences. 
146. The representative of the United States  said that his delegation shared the view expressed by 
Australia regarding the EC's new thinking that the removal of opposition was actually potentially 
worse because a name put on a list by a Member by vi rtue of its domestic legi slation would have legal 
effects in all other Members.  On registration he said that more discussion would be required to 
discuss the suggestion made that some sort of exam ination of each notification should be undertaken 
prior to notifications being formally entered into th e database.  Compared to other elements in this 
negotiation, registration would perhaps be more straightforward;  however, it was important to 
consider all the elements together.  It would ther efore be inappropriate to present new text at this 
stage. 
147. The representative of New Zealand  said that the new thinking from the EC had never been 
formally circulated.  It had been discussed, and the Chairman had alluded to it.  In fact some of the 
Members here had given more details of the new th inking than the EC had.  Members had not seen 
the most substantive set of issues, namely legal effect and participation.  While seeing value in 
drawing some aspects of notification and registration together, he said that other aspects of these issues related straight back to legal effects a nd participation.  These were as much about the TN/IP/M/19 
Page 30  
 
  mechanics for delivering once the key issues were settled.  He asked how the Chairman could be 
asked to put forward texts with square brackets when  an important proposal by the EC had not even 
been formally tabled. 
148. The representative of Argentina
 said that there should not be any negotiating texts in the 
Chairman's factual report. 
5. Other elements 
149. The Chairman  said that he would not propose to deal in substance with such other matters as: 
fees, costs and administrative burdens, particularly  as they impact on devel oping and least developed 
country Members;  the duration of registrations;  procedures for their modification and withdrawals; 
arrangements for review;  contact points;  and speci al and differential treatment.  Rather, he would 
flag in his report the need for further discussion on these matters.  This was because these elements 
depended substantially on the key policy choices to be  made on the questions of participation and 
consequences/legal effects in particular and had thus been less fully discussed hitherto. 
150. The delegation of Canada  said that, while his delegation was fairly clear on what the costs 
would be under the joint proposal, it was not clear wh at the EC's new ideas would mean particularly 
regarding costs to governments, both participati ng and non-participating, costs for IP offices,  
including those which were self-financing, and costs to IP  users.  On this last aspect, he noted that the 
EC proposal might have benefits for GI holders who sought for protection, but he had concerns 
regarding the costs that would be incurred by tho se users in a third country who were faced with the 
task of proving genericness and prior uses, rather than having the entity asking for protection for its 
GIs to incur the costs.  In Canada many of these u sers were small or medium enterprises.  The issue of 
costs should be looked at quite carefully. 
151. The representative of the European Communities  said that on these issues there should also be 
scope for finding some language which captured the progress made, similar to the other issues.  He therefore suggested that on these issues as well th ere should be legal drafting with brackets as the 
Chairman saw fit.  On contact points, that was quite obvious.  On other issues, this might be less 
obvious.  There were however some areas which could be identified.  While agreeing that the report 
would be a factual one, his delegati on believed that there was a way to portray facts so as to underline 
the degree of convergence, if there was any.  If there was no convergence, then the report could 
indicate that there should be further discussions. 
152. On the issue of the costs, he said that the time limit for opposition in the WTO that the EC 
had eliminated as a sign of flexibility would in fact eliminate any burden to the authorities or agencies 
in all WTO Members, developing or developed c ountries, which would not be required to examine 
claims within a given time frame.  There would no  longer be any costs to the domestic agencies.  
Actually the system would facilitate their work in the same way that they would have an atlas where 
to search for geographical names:  they would be ab le to look at a list of GIs when any party made a 
claim, which would diminish some  of the administrative work. 
153. The representative of Chile
 said that of all the topics highlig hted by the Chairman the most 
problematic was costs, particularly for developing countries.  This was a point made by almost all 
delegations that had taken the floor.  It would be  useful to highlight th e issue of costs in the 
Chairman's report.  Registration systems such as these were difficult to administer and the fact that the 
EU had withdrawn its proposal relating to the 18- months opposition would not suffice to allow the EC 
to claim that it was removing burdens on authoriti es.  There would be burdens on governments and 
new responsibilities for them.  The question of to whic h extent the burden should be left to the private 
entities using the system required a careful examina tion.  Having had some experience in this area 
with thousands of GIs notified, Chile knew that this had to do with consumers, producers and  TN/IP/M/19 
 Page 31 
 
 
  governments.  He did not think that picking up the EC proposal on S&D and adding a few square 
brackets would be sufficient. 
154. The representative of Brazil  said that the EC new thinking did away with the opposition 
procedure that appeared in the earlier proposal, but di d not do away with the legal effects.  There were 
still legal effects of rebuttable presumptions and they were extra-territorial in nature.   This was not 
necessarily a flexibility from the pers pective of a developing country.  To the extent that there was 
some form of legal effect, his delegation was of the view that an opposition procedure was essential.  
What was burdensome in the previous proposal by  the EC was not the opposition procedure as such, 
but the obligation to hold bilatera l consultations for each opposition that was not clear.  If a country 
could simply oppose, and have its opposition recorded in  the register so that the registered GI would 
not have any effect for that country, this would be good from the perspective of a developing country.  
The system would not be burdensome. 
155. The Chairman  said that he had taken good note of all statements.  As for the timing of the 
circulation of the report, he said that he would have to fine tune it with what would be decided in the 
wider context of the overall process.  He reiterated that his report would be exclusively on his own 
responsibility and without prejudice to the position of  any delegations and to the outcome of the 
negotiations. 
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