JOB/AG/195  
 
12 May 2021  
(21-4069) Page: 1/17 
Committee on Agriculture  
Special Session  Original: English  
 
 
SUBMISSION BY BRAZIL  
ARTICLE 6.2 OF THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE (AOA) IN PERSPECTIVE  
The following submission, dated 11 May 2021, is being circulated at the request of the delegation of 
Brazil . 
 
_______________  
 
 
1  INTRODUCTION  
1.1.  In January 2020, a group of Members put forward JOB/AG/1771, proposing a "Framework for 
Negotiations on Domestic Support " (hereinafter referred to as the Framework). The proponents seek 
an agreement at the WTO to "cap and reduce the sum of current global agricultural trade - and 
production -distorting domestic support entitlements by at least half by 2030 " in a way that is fair, 
proportionate and reflective of development needs.  
1.2.  Co-sponsors also propose  that the negotiations for this agreement "shall take into consideration 
all forms of trade - and production -distorting domestic support under Article 6 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture " (AoA). The proponents have noted that the Framework does not prescribe any modality 
to this end, does not prejudge how various elements are included or assume that all forms of support 
must be treated equally. The modalities for reductions such as scope and coverage, reduction 
formulae, and definitions of terms are left for s eparate discussions and negotiations to be determined 
by Members .2 
1.3.  This document, which has been written by the Brazilian delegation as a contribution to the 
debate, aims to briefly analyse, from a historical perspective, Article 6.2, one of the "uncapped " 
categories of domestic support under Article 6. Article 6.2 expenditure is exempt from the Current 
Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (CTAMS) calculations, as well as from quantitative limits 
and from reduction commitments.  
1.4.  Statistical data are base d mainly on Canada' s Analytical Tool on Domestic Support, outlined in 
JOB/AG/190 , including the exchange rates, and on Members ' notifications .3 A limitation in this 
analysis, as can be seen in the referred document, is that many Members ' domestic support 
notifications are outdated. In this regard, through the Framework, co -sponsors stated that "the 
implementation of existing notification obligations  under Article 18 of the Agreement on Agriculture, 
thus strengthening transparency with respect to existing domestic support commitments, is 
imperative, and that utmost effort must be made to provide all outstanding DS:1 notifications ". 
 
1 In February 2021, a revised version including a new cosponsor was circulated.  
2 More information on the rationale for the approach taken in the Framework can be found in document 
RD/AG/81/Rev.1 . 
3 Notifications submitted by M embers as of 17 November 2020.  JOB/AG/195  
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  1.5.  This analysis does not take into full account certain aspects of Article 6.2, such as all concepts 
included in its definition and Q&A in the Committee of Agriculture in regular session (CoA). We 
encourage Members to explore these issues further with additional analysis and s ubmissions.  
The main conclusions of this analysis are as follows:  
 
• Among Members that are entitled to use Article 6.2, less than half of them have notified at least 
once the use of such programmes since 2001, and less than a quarter have notified it in the 
past five years;  
 
• Among Members notifying support under Article 6.2, five of them are responsible for around 
90% of expenditures annually;  
 
• Domestic support under Article 6.2 has exponentially grown during the 2000s. There have since 
been ebbs and flows, but the 2010 peak has not been surpassed;  
 
• In aggregate, Article 6.2 expenditure is currently more than a quarter of all trade -distorting 
domestic support (TDDS)4; 
 
• At the individual level, domestic support under Article 6.2 is relatively small com pared to each 
Member 's caps under Article 6 (both product -specific and non -product -specific "de minimis " 
and, when applicable, FBTAMS);  
 
• In some cases, it is the only form of subsidy provided under Article 6 of the AoA;  
 
• Despite the absence of uniform usag e among Members, the share of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East in global Article 6.2 notified use has remained relatively 
low since 2001;  
 
• Whilst the number of investment subsidies measures exceeds the number of agricultural inpu ts 
subsidies measures, expenditure is larger in agricultural inputs subsidies than in investment 
subsidies;  
 
• More than 30% of the programmes or measures notified under Article 6.2 since 1995 has a 
component of product -related specificity;  
 
• Since this analy sis relies on domestic  support notifications, Members are encouraged to ensure 
they meet their notification obligations in a timely, accurate and complete manner. This will 
help advance our collective understanding of the current situation with respect to domestic 
support, and help inform our ongoing negotiations.  
 
2  ARTICLE 6.2  
2.1  DEFINITION  
2.1.  Under the AoA, Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) is defined as the annual level of 
support provided for agricultural production, with the only exception of the support provided under 
programmes that meet the criteria of Annex 2 to the Agreement.  
2.2.  Nonetheless, domestic support reduction commitments apply to "all of [its] domestic support 
measures in favour of agricultural producers with the exception of domestic measures which are not 
subject to reduction in terms of the criteria set out in this Article  [Article 6] and in Annex  2 to this 
Agreement ". In what regards to "the criteria set out in this Article ", in order to achieve consensus 
in the AoA negotiations during the Uruguay Round, Members agreed that there would be three forms 
of domestic expenditur es that exclusively developing Members would not be obliged to include in 
their CTAMS calculations (Table DS:1), but that would also not be part of Annex 2 of the AoA either. 
 
4 TDDS is inclusive of all support provided under Article 6 of the AoA.  JOB/AG/195  
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  These three forms include investment or input subsidies that are part of developm ent programmes, 
and crop diversification subsidies that are part of programmes to substitute illicit narcotic crops.  
2.3.  Article 6.2 of the AoA states that:  
In accordance with the Mid -Term Review Agreement that government measures of assistance, 
whether dire ct or indirect, to encourage agricultural and rural development are an integral part 
of the development programmes of developing countries,  
(a) investment subsidies which are generally available to agriculture in developing country 
Members and  
(b) agricultural in put subsidies generally available to low -income or resource -poor 
producers in developing country Members  
shall be exempt from domestic support reduction commitments that would otherwise be 
applicable to such measures,  
(c) as shall domestic support to produce rs in developing country Members to encourage 
diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops.   
Domestic support meeting the criteria of this paragraph shall not be required to be included in 
a Member 's calculation of its Current Total AMS.  
 
2.2  CONCERNS ABOUT THE CURRENT DEFINITION  
2.4.  The discussion about Article 6.2 has been well summarized in JOB/AG/160 , which states that 
despite the legitimat e objective of allowing developing country Members "to provide some forms of 
product specific and non -product specific support, without any reduction commitment, to enable 
them to pursue legitimate development goals ", "when applied in excess or without pro per 
qualification, those subsidies may also be a source of distortions to trade and production of 
agricultural goods. These concerns are particularly acute in the case of input subsidies5, whereas 
support for diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops has been less controversial ". This 
assessment becomes more relevant when one observes that "Members classify most of their 
Article  6.2 support as input subsidies, less as investment subsidies and still less as support to 
encourage diversific ation from growing illicit narcotic crops "6, as it will be discussed ahead in this 
document.  
2.5.  Another source of possible concern, as pointed out in JOB/AG/160 , is the meaning or the scope 
of some pivotal terms of Article 6.2: which kind of restriction would render the programme not 
"generally available? What kind of producer is "low -income or resource -poor"? Should support go 
directly to producers and not suppliers of inputs (e.g. electrical utilities, or fertilizer suppliers)? The 
document also points to a possible set of enhanced transparency obligations, such as more complete 
programme descriptions; more complete breakdowns of expenditure – i.e. prog ramme by 
programme; more information to show how criteria are met, in order to guarantee that solely the 
support meeting the criteria of paragraph 6.2 is excluded from the Member's calculation of its 
CTAMS. To that list, one may add the fulfilment of the c urrent obligation of submitting a DS:2 
notification for any new support measure or modifications to an existing measure as in G/AG/2 . 
 
5 Payments based on input use, a coupled form of support policy, is deemed by the OECD to be, along 
with market price support, one of the most trade and production distorting support polices  (Agricultural Policy 
Monitoring and Evaluation 2020, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/928181a8 -en). The OECD  
has highlighted that "there is also evidence that coupled support can exacerbate environmental impacts by 
incentivizing farmers to expand production and intensify the use of environmentally damaging inputs. It can 
also undermine efforts to adapt to climat e change by locking farmers into producing certain crops even where 
conditions are becoming increasingly less suitable " (Agriculture Policy Brief. Food systems and the triple 
challenge, OECD  (January 2021) . 
6 BRINK, Lars & ORDEN, David. "Taking Stock and L ooking Forward on Domestic Support under the 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture". St. Paul, Minnesota: University of Minnesota, Department of Applied 
Economics, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (April 2020).  JOB/AG/195  
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  2.3  USERS  
2.6.  With few except ions7, potentially every self -declaring developing Member at the WTO8 has the 
right to adopt and notify measures under the Article 6.2 of the AoA as long as the classification 
criteria are met. Under those circumstances, those measures may be exempt from  the calculation 
of its CTAMS.  
2.7.  Fifty ( 50) developing Members have notified measures under this category at least once since 
2001 (see Table 1), and 27 Members – including 12 LDCs - have notified such measures in the last 
five years.  
Table 1: M embers that have notified 6.2 support since 2001  
Kingdom of Bahrain  Bangladesh  Barbados  Botswana  Brazil  
Burundi  Chad Chile Colombia  Costa Rica  
Cuba Dominican Republic  Ecuador  Egypt  El Salvador  
Guatemala  Honduras  India Indonesia  Jordan  
Republic of Korea  Lao People's 
Democratic Republic  Lesotho  Madagascar  Malawi  
Malaysia  Mali Mauritius  Mexico  Mongolia  
Morocco  Namibia  Nepal  Oman  Panama  
Paraguay  Peru Philippines  Qatar  Senegal  
Seychelles  Sri Lanka  Thailand  Togo Tunisia  
Turkey  United Arab 
Emirates  Uruguay  Viet Nam  Zambia  
2.8.  Expenditure under Article 6.2 is heavily concentrated in a few Members. For instance, in 20169, 
five Members accounted for 94% of the domestic support notified under Article 6.2 (see Graph 1). 
According to Canada' s Analytical Tool on Domestic Support, one major Member (A) accounted for 
73.9% in 2016, while the other top four Members accounted for 8.9% (B), 5.9% (C), 2.7% (D), and 
2.4% (E).  
Graph 1: D omestic support expenditures under Article 6.2 in 2016  
 
 
7 For example, as part of its Prot ocol of Accession, China could provide support through government 
measures of the forms described in Article 6.2, but the amount of such support would be included in China' s 
calculation of its Aggregate Measurement of Support ("AMS "). A similar provision w as maintained in 
Kazakhstan' s Protocol of Accession regarding support provided under Article 6.2.  
8 According to cosponsors of JOB/AG/138 , "124 Members are eligible to provide support under 
Article  6.2". 
9 2016 is the most recent year to which all five Members who have been noti fying the highest annual 
expenditure under Article 6.2 circulated a DS:1 notification to the WTO.  
JOB/AG/195  
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  2.9.  Article 6.2 support is also the main support category noti fied by several WTO Members. For 
example, in 2016 Article 6.2 expenditure represented the only expenditure under Article 6 notified 
by twelve10 developing Members and the most important type of support for some major developing 
Members. Article 6.2 account ed for 80.3% of the biggest user 's Article 6 expenditure on domestic 
support (A), while for other major users it accounted for 94.6% (B), 93.3% (C), 29.1% (D), and 
25.5% (E) (see Graph 2 and Annex 1).  
Graph 2: T op five users of Article 6.2 support as a sha re of trade -distorting domestic 
support (TDDS) in 2016  
 
2.10.   There is no uniform use among developing countries of the most different regions. Africa, for 
example, has 46 Members and represents 37% of all developing Members, but only two African 
countries11 appeared among the top 10 greatest users of this box in any year during the past decade.  
2.11.   Despite the absence of uniform usage among Members, a regional analysis demonstrates that 
Asia is at the forefront of expenditures, being responsible for a t least 85% of expenditures in every 
year since 2001, except for 2002 and 2019 (see Graph 3). Expenditures in Latin America and the 
Caribbean as well as in Africa and the Middle East have remained relatively low throughout the entire 
period.  
Graph 3: S hare of notified 6.2 support per region12 
 
 
10 Botswana, Chile, Egypt, Guatemala, Malawi, Mali, Oman, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Seychelles 
and Sri Lanka.  
11 One at 7th place in 2017 and another at  10th place in  2015.  
12 Notifications from the 28 member States of the EU -28 are counted as one for the whole 2001 -2019 
period, even in cases where the member State was not part of the bloc for some of the years of the series.  
JOB/AG/195  
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  2.4  ARTICLE 6.2 NOTIFIED USE SINCE 2001  
2.12.   Article 6.2 domestic support increased from US D 9.6 billion in 2001 to a maximum of 
USD 39.3 billion in 2010 (see Graph 3 above). Since then, it has stabilized closer to the 
USD 30 billion -dollar mark. In 2018, Members notified US D 28.8 billion, a number that would 
probably increase as more developing Members update their domestic support notifications.  
2.13.   Most changes in total expenditure can be explained by changes in expenditure of the biggest 
user of support (A) under Article 6.2 (see Graph 4). This Member increased its notified expenditure 
from US D 8.3 billion in 2001 to a maximum of US D 31.6 billion in 2010, and then decreased it back 
until it reached US D 24.2 billion in 2018.  
Graph 4: A rticle 6.2 support since 2001  – Aggregate and biggest user's  notified 
expenditure  
 
2.14.   The number of Members notifying Article 6.2 expenditure should also be taken into account, 
especially since the number of DS:1 notifications dropped after 2014. This may indicate that notified 
support is underestimating the actual support provided in the last five years.  
2.5  ARTICLE 6.2 SUPPORT VIS-À-VIS ARTICLE 6 AND VOP  
2.15.   Even if support in absolute terms has stabilized, Article 6.2 support as a percentage of all 
support provided under Article 6 has recently shown an upward trend (see Graph 5). In 2001, it 
represen ted 9.1% - USD 9.6 billion out of US D 105.9 billion. In 201613, support under Article 6 
reached US D 121.7 billion, and Article 6.2 support accounted for US D 30.9 billion and 25.4% of the 
total.  
 
13 2016 is also the l ast year for which there are data available for the top 10 world greatest users of 
trade - and production - distorting domestic support.  
JOB/AG/195  
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  Graph 5: A rticle 6.2 support as a share of TDDS since 200114 
 
2.16.   Interestingly, support under Article 6.2 as a percentage of the value of production (VoP) is 
not significant for most users. According to Brink and Orden15, as to support provided under this box 
in 2014 -2016, "for many Members16 the amount exempted corresponds to only a few percent of VoP 
in agriculture ". In fact, Article 6.2 support as a percentage of VoP has been on the decline for most 
(Members A, D, E and F) of the major users (see Graph 6).  
Graph 6: A rticle 6.2 major users' expenditure as a percentage (%) of their VOP  
 
2.17.   The reasons behind these changes are multiple: increasing VoP; reduction in Article 6.2 
expenditure in absolute terms; and/or increas e in Article 6.2 does not catch up with the growth in 
the VoP, resulting in a reduction in the indicator (see Annex 2).  
2.18.   As the VoP grows, "de minimis " entitlements can better accommodate the expenditure that 
is usually notified under Article 6.2. According to Brink and Orden, for those whose Article 6.2 support 
 
14 The number of notifications per year as in Graph 3.  
15 BRINK & ORDEN, op.cit.  
16 Authors identified two exceptions "where the Art icle 6.2 exemptions reached 7% or 8% of VoP in the 
early years of the 2010 decade ". 
JOB/AG/195  
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  is relatively high, those "exemptions thus free up significant room for potential AMS support  within 
their limits ".17 
2.19.   Data indicate that most Members implementing development programmes have notified 
expenditure levels that are relatively low in terms of their Amber Box18 entitlements (see Graph 7).  
Graph 7: A rticle 6.2 main users' expenditure (l atest notification19) versus Amber Box 
entitlements  (latest VOP available ) 
 
2.6  ARTICLE 6.2 SUB -CATEGORIES  
2.20.   Since 1995, a total of 1,715 measures have been notified in Supporting Table DS:2 
("Measures exempt from the reduction commitment - Special and Differential Treatment "). Of this 
total, 963 were investment subsidies (56%); 696 were agricultural input subsidies (41%); and 52 
were diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops subsidies (3%) (see Graphs 8 and 9).  
2.21.   Government support has been gran ted for the acquisition of both general forms of inputs, 
such as electricity or fuel, and specific ones, like seeds, fertilizers, or feed. In general, government 
support for investments has been less detailed than support for inputs, but it is oftentimes r elated 
to improvements in production sites. Diversification subsidies are much less frequent, and there was 
 
17 BRINK & ORDEN, op.cit.  
18 Amber Box entitlements is the summation of Final Bound Total Aggregate Measurement of Support 
entitlements and both product -specific (PS) and non -product -specific (NPS) "de minimis " entitlements . For 
additional Member -specific data on Article 6.2, Amber Bo x and Article 6, please refer to Annexes 3 and 4 
below.  
19 As of 17 November 2020.  
JOB/AG/195  
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  only one occasion in which a Member specified which type of production it was favouring to, 
appropriately, replace illicit narcotic crops.  
Graph 8: Article 6.2 notified measures since 1995  – per sub -category  
 
 
Graph 9: S hare of each sub -category in notified Article 6.2 support since 1995  – per 
number of programmes or measures  
 
 
2.22.   Even if the number of investment subsidies programmes surpasses the number of input 
subsidies programmes, between 2001 and 2019, total expenditure in the latter is more than eight 
times bigger than in the former (see Graph 10).  
JOB/AG/195  
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  Graph 10: E xpenditure notifi ed under Article 6.2 since 2001  – per sub -category   
 
2.23.   It is possible to identify a component of product -related specificity in 519 programmes or 
measures notified since 1995 (see Graph 11). Out of the 963 investment subsidies measures, 191 
(18.9%) had some sort of product -related specificity20 component included in the description 
provided in the notification. Out of the 696 agricultural input subsidies measures, 326 (46.9%) had 
some sort of product -related specificity component. Only 2 (3.6%) of the 56  diversification from 
growing illicit narcotic crops subsidies measures had some sort of product -related specificity 
component.  
Graph 11: N otified 6.2 support expenditure with a product -specific reference since 1995  
– per sub -category  
 
2.24.   The majority of pro duct-related specificity relates to "crops " (211 measures), followed by 
"livestock " (107 measures) support. There was a relevant number of measures related to 
"fruits/nuts/vegetables/horticulture " (67); "spices/teas " (41); "rice" (22); "coffee " (19); 
"dairy/milk " (15); and "cotton/silk " (11) (see Graph 12).  
 
20 Product -related specificity was assessed whenever there was a textual reference to a group of 
products or to a product in the description of the notified measures or whenev er there was a material 
indication that the support had been provided only to a group of products or to a product, such as the provision 
of agricultural input subsidies for the specific acquisition of seeds or of feed. Product -related specificity was 
also assessed both in very broad categories, such as "crops” and "livestock ", and in narrower categories, 
depending on description of the notified measures.  
JOB/AG/195  
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  Graph 12: "Product -specific" versus "Generally available" programmes or measures  – 
since  1995  
 
 
3   FINAL REMARKS  
3.1.  This document aims to contribute to Members ' discussions by offering a comprehensive view 
(on the basis of DS:1 notifications) on the usage of domestic support under the Article 6.2.  
3.2.  Such discussion is needed, because, although figures cannot be analysed without paying full 
attention to the developm ent component of Article 6.2, data suggest that this kind of support both 
in absolute terms and as a share of all support provided under Article 6 has been higher in recent 
years in comparison with the beginning of this century.  Expenditure in agricultural  inputs subsidies, 
which surpass in value expenditure in investment subsidies, has been amassing a large portion of 
domestic support in general.  In terms of the future of domestic support negotiations as determined 
by Article 20 of the AoA, excluding more than a quarter of notified TDDS from future rules and 
modalities would render the outcome outdated from its outset.  
3.3.  In addition, data indicate that most Article 6.2 users – which account for less than half of the 
Members who are entitled to use it and only  a quarter if only the previous five years are taken into 
account - have notified low levels of expenditure both relative to their Amber Box entitlements and 
their value of production. Even major users - five of the Members that notified domestic support 
under Article 6.2 are responsible for around 90% of expenditures annually - are seeing a reduction 
in the relative importance of Article 6.2 compared to both their Amber Box entitlements and their 
VoP, which comes coupled with changes in their domestic poli cies and the growth in their "de 
minimis " space. Therefore, if reform is achieved through a "cap-and-reduce " approach that considers 
all policy space derived from Article 6, the inclusion of Article 6.2 would not unduly limit the policy 
space available to developing Members. Agricultural programmes that will allow "farmers to have 
the opportunity to (i) engage and benefit from the economic development, (ii) have decent work in 
a level playing field, and (iii) be able to obtain and control resources to maint ain livelihood21" will 
still be available for Members to pursue the Sustainable Development Goals.  
 
21 FAO. Policy space for sustainable agriculture in the World Trade Organization Agreement on 
Agriculture  2020.  
JOB/AG/195  
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  3.4.  In terms of negotiation modalities, any discipline that only takes into account Amber Box 
entitlements will misestimate significantly the weight of certain M embers in assessing their distortion 
potentials in production and world trade. Hence, the exclusion of Article 6.2 seems detrimental to 
modalities that seek to ascribe obligations that correspond to Members ' role in the current distortion 
of the internatio nal agricultural trading system and would be harmful to the interests of the majority 
of WTO Members. Moreover, several Members have expressed the need to clarify some concepts 
and/or to establish additional transparency dispositions to limit the potential  distortive impact of this 
type of subsidies on international trade and production. Taking into account mainly data 
communicated by Members through notifications, this document shows some areas in which further 
and better information is needed for better a ssessments within the ongoing negotiations.  
3.5.  Regardless of the approach that would be applied to the reduction of Article 6 entitlements and 
the manner in which Article 6.2 will be considered in the negotiations, the result should be consistent 
with the pri nciple of proportionality in the reductions, in line with the guidelines proposed by the 
"Framework for Negotiations on Domestic Support ". The use of a proportional approach ensures that 
the greater a Member's participation in the global trade distorting potential22, the greater its 
contribution to the reduction efforts should be. The successful implementation of this principle has 
the greatest potential to generate a "level playing field " in the international agricultural system. 
Along with the other elements in the  Framework, it would prevent leakages or excessive burdens in 
terms of the reforms that would be required.  
3.6.  Moving forward, Members will have to discuss how to properly assess when domestic support 
classified under Article 6.2 is truly benefiting low -incom e or resource -poor farmers, who produce for 
subsistence, for local markets or in the context of social programmes, being, in this sense, players 
in combating hunger and food insecurity at a national level.  
3.7.  This assessment is of the utmost importance, for Members to be able to craft rules that tend 
to meet Members ' individual development needs, providing them with a policy space that, albeit 
under some sort of limitation, does not impair Members ' agricultural programmes for low -income or 
resource -poor farme rs. At the same time, this policy space cannot be a tool for Members to disguise 
support  provided under import substitution programmes or for highly exported agricultural products 
as Article 6.2 support.  
3.8.  The WTO is the competent fora for Members to define the rules for domestic support that will 
allow low -income or resource -poor farmers to play, in a dignified way, their role in agricultural value 
chains, contributing for improved availability of and access to food. These rules will need to address 
not only  policy space, but they will also need to correct and prevent trade restrictions and distortions 
in world agricultural markets, as stated in SDG 2.  
_______________  
 
 
22 Without prejudice to Members ' positions, the "trade-distorting potential " as defined by Costa Rica in 
RD/AG/76  is a good example of a quantitative approach to this concept.  JOB/AG/195  
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  ANNEX 1  
DOMESTIC SUPPORT BY MAIN USERS OF ARTICLE 6.2 SUP PORT1 
For the graphs below, IISD and IFPRI classified Green Box as support notified falling under Annex 2 
of the AoA; AMS ceiling as FBTAMS limits; Article 6.2 as support notified under Article 6.2 of the 
AoA; "de minimis " as support notified below PS and NPS "de minimis " levels; and Amber Box (AMS) 
as only CTAMS.  
Member A  
 
Member B  
 
Member E  
 
_______________  
 
1 Source: IISD and IFPRI calculations, based on WTO notifications. In: Glauber et alii. "What National 
Farm Policy Trends Could Mean for Efforts to Update WTO Rules on Domestic Support ". Winnipeg: IISD, 
April 2020. The study does not include a corresponding table for Members C and D.  
JOB/AG/195  
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  ANNEX 2  
ARTICLE 6.2 EXPENDITURE VERSUS VOP  
 
 
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_______________  
JOB/AG/195  
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  ANNEX 3  
ARTICLE 6.2 VERSUS AMBER BOX SUPPORT1 
Member  Article 6.2 
expenditures 
(largest amount 
notified)/Amber Box 
expenditures (latest 
notification2) Article 6.2 
expenditures (latest 
notification3)/ 
Amber Box 
expenditures (latest 
notification3) Article 6.2 
expenditures 
(largest amount 
notified)/Amber Box 
entitlements4 (based 
on latest VoP 
available5) Article 6.2 
expenditures (latest 
notification3)/ 
Amber Box 
entitlements4 (based 
on latest VoP 
available5) 
A 323.8%  247.8%  38.6%  29.6%  
B 1,189.4%  1,189.4%  11.2%  11.2%  
C 1,410.0%  1,410.0%  29.1%  29.1%  
D 54.1%  41.1% 6.1% 4.6% 
E 163.5%  9.4%  6.2%  0.4%  
F6 315.7%  160.3%  5.2%  2.6%  
G 199.5%  143.6%  6.2%  4.4%  
H 4,469.2%  2,515.4%  12.3%  6.9%  
I 4,560.0%  4,560.0%  7.6%  7.6%  
J - - 40.4%  20.9%  
K 77.6%  21.7%  10.4%  2.9%  
L - - 5.4%  3.1%  
M - - 768.5%  768.5%  
N 888.9%  888.9%  7.4%  7.4%  
O*7 - - 4.3%  4.3%  
P * - - 3.1%  3.1%  
Q 237.0%  237.0%  12.8%  12.8%  
R 1136.4%  536.4%  4.0%  1.9%  
S* - - 14.4%  2.4%  
T* - - 40.8%  14.9%  
U - - 1.2%  0.8%  
V - - 13.0%  9.5%  
W 171.4%  135.7%  1.1%  0.8%  
X 57.7%  17.9%  1.6%  0.5%  
Y - - 3.3%  2.8%  
Z* - - # # 
AA - - 19.8%  14.9%  
AB* - - 1.3%  0.7%  
AC* - - 3.8%  2.1%  
AD - - 2.8%  0.6%  
AE 269.0%  6.9%  24.5%  0.6%  
AF - - 87.5%  5.7%  
AG* 1.6%  1.6%  1.8%  1.8%  
AH 8.5%  0.3%  0.5%  0.0%  
AI* 17.8%  17.8%  0.3%  0.3%  
AJ - - 2.5%  0.1%  
AK - - 31.8%  13,50%  
AL - - 7.4%  3.7%  
AM - - 117.6%  29.4%  
AN 7.7%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  
AO - - 58.8%  0.0%  
AP - - # # 
AQ - - 0.2%  0.0%  
AR - - # # 
AS - - 3.2%  0.0%  
AT - - # # 
AU - - # # 
AV - - 0.2%  0.0%  
AW - - 0.4%  0.0%  
AX - - 0.0%  0.0%  
_______________  
 
1 As in JOB/AG/190 , support figures have been rounded up to the nearest entire number.  
2 If a Member 's latest notification for Amber Box support is zero, tab le cell is filled with the symbol "-".  
3 As of 17 November 2020.  
4 For FBTAMS, as per 2019 exchange rates, except for Member F (2018).  
5 If a Member 's VoP is not available according to JOB/AG/190 , table cell is filled with the symbol "#". 
6 As in JOB/AG/190 , Member F's FBTAMS and notified su pport was multiplied by the deflator for each 
year notified before converting into nominal USD. This modification was made in order to reflect how this 
Member notifies its agriculture domestic support to the WTO.  
7 The * sign indicates that this Member is a Least -Developed Country (LDC).  JOB/AG/195  
- 17 - 
  ANNEX 4  
ARTICLE 6.2 USERS ' SHARE IN GLOBAL1 AMBER BOX AND ARTICLE 6 SUPPORT IN 20162 
 Amber Box entitlements3 Amber Box expenditure  Article 6 expenditure  
A 9.4%  0.7%  23.4%  
B 3.6%  0.2%  2.4%  
C 1.0%  0.2%  1.6%  
D 1.8%  2.6%  2.3%  
E 4.5%  2.7%  2.4%  
F 1.4%  0.7%  1.0%  
G 0.8%  0.0%  0.2%  
H 0.5%  0.0%  0.3%  
J 0.1%  0.0%  0.2%  
M 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  
N 0.1%  0.0%  0.1%  
P* 0.2%  0.0%  0.1%  
Q 0.1%  0.0%  0.1%  
R 0.4%  0.0%  0.1%  
S* 0.1%  0.0%  0.0%  
U 0.7%  0.0%  0.0%  
W 0.1%  0.0%  0.0%  
X 0.4%  0.0%  0.0%  
AF 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  
AI* 0.2%  0.0%  0.0%  
AJ 0.2%  0.0%  0.0%  
AN 0.1%  0.1%  0.0%  
AO 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  
AP 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  
AT 0.2%  0.0%  0.0%  
AW 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  
 
 
__________  
 
1 "Global " refers to all Members with available data as of November 2020, not only those who have 
notified Article 6.2 support.  
2 Only 63 Members presented their DS:1 notification f or 2016, according to JOB/AG/190 . Among those 
63, 26 notified Article 6.2 support. Amber Box and Article 6 expenditure may change due to other Memb ers' 
incoming notifications.  
3 As in RD/AG/74 . If one take into account only the 101 Members analysed in JOB/AG/190 , five 
Members ' shares would be slightly different: 9.6% for A; 4.6%, for E; 3.7% for B; 1.1% for C; and 0.8% for U.