G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
11 May 2021 
(21-4024) Page: 1/74 
Committee on Agriculture    
 
 
COMPILATION OF POINTS RAISED  BY MEMBERS  UNDER  THE MONITORING  
OF THE DECEMBER 2015  MINISTERIAL DECISION ON EXPOR T COMPETITION1 
Addendum  
This addendum refers to and must be read in conjunction with document G/AG/W/ 211. It contains 
Annexes I, II and III as defined therein.  
 
 
_______________  
 
 
 
1 This document has been prepared under the Secretariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice to 
the positions of Members or to their rights and obligations under the  WTO.  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  TABLE OF CONTENTS  
SUMMARY TABLE  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  5 
ANNEX I  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........................  8 
1   COA MEETING 7 -8 JUNE 2016  ................................ ................................ .....................  8 
1.1   EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 8 
1.2   TURKEY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  8 
2   COA MEETING 14 -15 SEPTEMBER 2016  ................................ ................................ ....... 9 
2.1   PAKISTAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................  9 
3   COA MEETINGS 9 NOVEMBER 2016  ................................ ................................ .............  9 
3.1   INDIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................  9 
4   COA MEETINGS 27 MARCH 2017  ................................ ................................ ................  10 
4.1   CANADA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 10 
4.2   SWITZERLAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 10 
5   COA MEETINGS 7 JUNE 2017  ................................ ................................ .....................  11 
5.1   CANADA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 11 
5.2   EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......11 
6   COA MEETING 17 -18 OCTOBER 2017  ................................ ................................ .........  11 
6.1   NEW ZEALAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 11 
6.2   RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ 12 
7   COA MEETING 20 -21 FEBRUARY 2018  ................................ ................................ ....... 12 
7.1   ARGENTINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 12 
7.2   PAKISTAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 13 
7.3   RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ 13 
8   COA MEETING 11 -12 JUNE 2018 ................................ ................................ ................  14 
8.1   EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......14 
8.2   INDIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................... 15 
8.3   LIECHTENSTEIN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 15 
8.4   NORWAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 16 
8.5   PAKISTAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 16 
8.6   RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ 22 
8.7   SWITZERLAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 24 
9   COA MEETING 25 -26 SEPTEMBER 2018  ................................ ................................ ..... 25 
9.1   INDIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................... 25 
9.2   TURKEY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 26 
9.3   ZIMBABWE  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 27 
10   COA MEETING 26 -27 NOVEMBER 2018  ................................ ................................ .... 27 
10.1   INDIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 27 
10.2   PAKISTAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 28 
10.3   ZIMBABWE  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 29 
11   COA MEETING 26 -27 FEBRUARY 2019  ................................ ................................ ..... 30 G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  11.1   PAKISTAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 30 
11.2   SWITZERLAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 31 
11.3   ZIMBABWE  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 31 
12   COA MEETING 25 JUNE 2019  ................................ ................................ ...................  32 
12.1   EGYPT  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................... 32 
12.2   INDIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 32 
12.3   RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ .............................. 33 
12.4   ZIMBABWE  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 34 
13   COA MEETING 30 OCTOBER 2019  ................................ ................................ ............  34 
13.1   CANADA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 34 
13.2   INDIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 34 
13.3   SWITZERLAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 36 
13.4   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  ................................ ................................ ..................... 36 
14   COA MEETING 18 JUNE 2020  ................................ ................................ ...................  41 
14.1   AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 41 
14.2   NEW ZEALAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 41 
15   COA MEETI NG 28 JULY 2020  ................................ ................................ ...................  42 
15.1   EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....42 
15.2   INDIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 44 
16   COA MEETING 22 SEPTEMBER 2020  ................................ ................................ ........  47 
16.1   AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 47 
16.2   INDIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 48 
16.3   NEW ZEALAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 48 
17   COA MEETING 30 NOVEMBER 2020  ................................ ................................ .........  49 
17.1   AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 49 
17.2   INDIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 52 
17.3   RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ .............................. 53 
ANNEX II  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......................  54 
1   COA MEETING 9 MARCH 2016 ................................ ................................ ....................  54 
1.1   ISRAEL  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 54 
1.2   RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ 54 
1.3   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  ................................ ................................ ...................... 54 
2   COA MEETING 7 -8 JUNE 2016  ................................ ................................ ...................  55 
2.1   CANADA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 55 
3   COA MEETING 9 NOVEMBER 2016  ................................ ................................ .............  55 
3.1   NORWAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 55 
4   COA MEETING 27 M ARCH 2017  ................................ ................................ ..................  56 
4.1   SWITZERLAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 56 
5   COA MEETING 7 JUNE 2017  ................................ ................................ .......................  57 
5.1   EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......57 G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  5.2   SWITZERLAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 57 
6   COA MEETING 20 FEBRUARY 2018  ................................ ................................ ............  58 
6.1   NORWAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 58 
6.2   SWITZERLAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 58 
7   COA MEETING 11 -12 JUNE 2018 ................................ ................................ ................  59 
7.1   CANADA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 59 
8   COA MEETING 25 -26 SEPTEMBER 2018  ................................ ................................ ..... 60 
8.1   PANAMA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 60 
9   COA MEETING 26 -27 NOVEMBER 2018  ................................ ................................ ...... 60 
9.1   MAURITIUS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 60 
9.2   PANAMA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 61 
10   COA MEETING 26 -27 FEBRUARY 2019  ................................ ................................ ..... 61 
10.1   ISRAEL  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 61 
10.2   PANAMA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 62 
11   COA MEETING 25 JUNE 2019  ................................ ................................ ...................  62 
11.1   BRAZIL  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 62 
11.2   CANADA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 63 
11.3   MEXICO  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 63 
11.4   NORWAY ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 64 
11.5   TURKEY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 64 
12   COA MEETING 30 OCTOBER 2019  ................................ ................................ ............  66 
12.1   KOREA, REPUBLIC OF  ................................ ................................ ................................ 66 
12.2   MEXICO  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 67 
12.3   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  ................................ ................................ ..................... 68 
13   COA MEETING 28 JULY 2020  ................................ ................................ ...................  69 
13.1   BRAZIL  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 69 
13.2   CANADA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 70 
13.3   MOROCCO  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 71 
13.4   TURKEY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 71 
14   COA MEETING 22 SEPTEMBER 2020  ................................ ................................ ........  72 
14.1   AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 72 
15   COA MEETING 30 NOVEMBER 2020  ................................ ................................ .........  72 
15.1   BRAZIL  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................... 72 
ANNEX III  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  74 
 
  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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SUMMARY  TABLE  
ID Answer by  Question by  CoA 
Meeting 
Date  CoA 
Meeting 
Number  Section  Reference 
link within 
document  
86064  Argentina  European  Union  21.02.2018  86 I. Article  18.6 7.1.1   
95041  Australia  Canada  22.09.2020  95 I. Article 18.6  16.1.2    
94048  Australia  European Union  18.06.2020  94 I. Article 18.6  14.1.1    
95008  Australia  India 22.09.2020  95 I. Article 18.6  16.1.1    
95021  Australia  India 22.09.2020  95 II. Individual 
Notifications  14.1.1    
96021  Australia  India 30.11.2020  96 I. Article 18.6  17.1.1    
93162  Brazil  Australia  28.07.2020  93 II. Individual 
Notifications  13.1.1    
91201  Brazil  European Union  25.06.2019  91 II. Individual 
Notifications  11.1.1    
96071  Brazil  European Union  30.11.2020  96 II. Individual 
Notifications  15.1.1    
84016  Canada  Australia  07.06.2017  84 I. Article 18.6  5.1.1   
93223  Canada  Australia  28.07.2020  93 II. Individual 
Notifications  13.2.1    
80078  Canada  European Union  07.06.2016  80 II. Individual 
Notifications  2.1.1   
93197  Canada  European Union  28.07.2020  93 II. Individual 
Notifications  13.2.3    
83067  Canada  Indonesia  28.03.2017  83 I. Article 18.6  4.1.1   
87143  Canada  New Zealand  11.06.2018  87 II. Individual 
Notifications  7.1.1   
91204  Canada  New Zealand  25.06.2019  91 II. Individual 
Notifications  11.2.1    
92075  Canada  New Zealand  30.10.2019  92 I. Article 18.6  13.1.1    
93199  Canada  New Zealand  28.07.2020  93 II. Individual 
Notifications  13.2.2    
91138  Egypt  United States of 
America  25.06.2019  91 I. Article 18.6  12.1.1    
84037  European Union  Australia  07.06.2017  84 I. Article 18.6  5.2.1   
87067  European  Union  Australia  11.06.2018  87 I. Article 18.6  8.1.1   
93226  European Union  Brazil  28.07.2020  93 I. Article 18.6  15.1.1    
84011  European Union  Canada  07.06.2017  84 II. Individual 
Notifications  5.1.1   
84109  European Union  Guatemala  07.06.2017  84 I. Article 18.6  1.1.2   
93243  European Union  India 28.07.2020  93 I. Article 18.6  15.1.2    
80013  European Union  Japan  07.06.2016  80 I. Article 18.6  1.1.1   
88122  India Australia  25.09.2018  88 I. Article 18.6  9.1.3   
91006  India Australia  25.06.2019  91 I. Article 18.6  12.2.1    
92095  India Australia  30.10.2019  92 I. Article 18.6  13.2.3    
93065  India Australia  28.07.2020  93 I. Article 18.6  15.2.3    
95051  India Austr alia 22.09.2020  95 I. Article 18.6  16.2.1    
96022  India Australia  30.11.2020  96 I. Article 18.6  17.1.2    
92048  India Canada  30.10.2019  92 I. Article 18.6  13.2.2    
82032  India European Union  09.11.2016  82 I. Article 18.6  3.1.1   
87001  India European Union  11.06.2018  87 I. Article 18.6  8.2.1   
88040  India European Union  25.09.2018  88 I. Article 18.6  9.1.2   
92007  India European Union  30.10.2019  92 I. Article 18.6  13.2.1    
93001  India European Union  28.07.2020  93 I. Article 18.6  15.2.4    
96053  India European Union  30.11.2020  96 I. Article 18.6  17.2.1    
88037  India New Zealand  25.09.2018  88 I. Article 18.6  9.1.1   
89059  India New Zealand  26.11.2018  89 I. Article 18.6  10.1.1    
96055  India New Zealand  30.11.2020  96 I. Article 18.6  17.2.2    
93007  India United States of 
America  28.07.2020  93 I. Article 18.6  15.2.1    
93010  India United States of 
America  28.07.2020  93 I. Article 18.6  15.2.2    
90127  Israel  Australia  26.02.2019  90 II. Individual 
Notifications  10.1.1    
79044  Israel  European Union  09.03.2016  79 II. Individual 
Notifications  1.1.1   G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  ID Answer by  Question by  CoA 
Meeting 
Date  CoA 
Meeting 
Number  Section  Reference 
link within 
document  
92039  Korea, Republic of  European Union  30.10.2019  92 II. Individual 
Notifications  12.1.2    
92122  Korea, Republic of  Ukraine  30.10.2019  92 II. Individual 
Notifications  12.1.1    
87091  Liechtenstein  European Union  11.06.2018  87 I. Article 18.6  8.3.1   
89002  Mauritius  Canada  26.11.2018  89 II. Individual 
Notifications  9.1.1   
92123  Mexico  Brazil  30.10.2019  92 II. Individual 
Notifications  12.2.1    
91198  Mexico  United States of 
America  25.06.2019  91 II. Individual 
Notifications  11.3.1    
93163  Morocco  Australia  28.07.2020  93 II. Individual 
Notifications  13.3.1    
95061  New Zealand  Canada  22.09.2020  95 I. Article 18.6  16.3.1    
85046  New Zealand  European Union  17.10.2017  85 I. Article 18.6  6.1.1   
94050  New Zealand  European Union  18.06.2020  94 I. Article 18.6  14.2.1    
82047  Norway European Union  09.11.2016  82 II. Individual 
Notifications  3.1.1   
86079  Norway  European Union  21.02.2018  86 II. Individual 
Notifications  6.1.1   
91205  Norway  European Union  25.06.2019  91 II. Individual 
Notifications  11.4.1    
87096  Norway  New Zealand  11.06.2018  87 I. Article 18.6  8.4.1   
86007  Pakistan  Australia  21.02.2018  86 I. Article 18.6  7.2.1   
87081  Pakistan  Australia  11.06.2018  87 I. Article 18.6  8.5.2   
89061  Pakistan  Australia  26.11.2018  89 I. Article 18.6  10.2.2    
87163  Pakistan  Brazil  11.06.2018  87 I. Article 18.6  8.5.3   
81028  Pakistan  European Union  14.09.2016  81 I. Article 18.6  2.1.1   
89091  Pakistan  Russian  Federation  26.11.2018  89 I. Article 18.6  10.2.3    
87164  Pakistan  Thailand  11.06.2018  87 I. Article 18.6  8.5.4   
87021  Pakistan  United States of 
America  11.06.2018  87 I. Article 18.6  8.5.1   
89030  Pakistan  United States of 
America  26.11.2018  89 I. Article 18.6  10.2.1    
90045  Pakistan  United States of 
America  26.02.2019  90 I. Article 18.6  11.1.1    
88115  Panama  United States of 
America  25.09.2018  88 II. Individual 
Notifications  8.1.1   
89043  Panama  United States of 
America  26.11.2018  89 II. Individual 
Notifications  9.2.1   
90078  Panama  United States of 
America  26.02.2019  90 II. Individual 
Notifications  10.2.1    
86010  Russian Federation  Australia  21.02.2018  86 I. Article 18.6  7.3.1   
79050  Russian  Federation  European Union  09.03.2016  79 II. Individual 
Notifications  1.2.1   
85036  Russian Federation  European Union  17.10.2017  85 I. Article 18.6  6.2.1   
91021  Russian Federation  European Union  25.06.2019  91 I. Article 18.6  12.3.1    
96060  Russian Federation  European Union  30.11.2020  96 I. Article 18.6  17.3.1    
87098  Russian Federation  Ukraine  11.06.2018  87 I. Article 18.6  8.6.1   
84010  Switzerland  Australia  07.06.2017  84 II. Individual 
Notifications  5.2.1   
83028  Switzerland  European Union  28.03.2017  83 II. Individual 
Notifications  4.1.2   
83029  Switzerland  European Union  28.03.2017  83 II. Individual 
Notifications  4.1.1   
86080  Switzerland  European Union  21.02.2018  86 II. Individual 
Notifications  6.2.1   
87100  Switzerland  European Union  11.06.2018  87 I. Article 18.6  8.7.1   
90020  Switzerland  European Union  26.02.2019  90 I. Article 18.6  11.2.1    
92018  Switzerland  European Union  30.10.2019  92 I. Article 18.6  13.3.1    
83057  Switzerland  New Zealand  28.03.2017  83 I. Article 18.6  4.2.1   
91206  Turkey  Australia  25.06.2019  91 II. Individual 
Notifications  11.5.1    
93165  Turkey  Australia  28.07.2020  93 II. Individual 
Notifications  13.4.1    
93164  Turkey  Brazil  28.07.2020  93 II. Individual 
Notifications  13.4.2    G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  ID Answer by  Question by  CoA 
Meeting 
Date  CoA 
Meeting 
Number  Section  Reference 
link within 
document  
91107  Turkey  Canada  25.06.2019  91 II. Individual 
Notifications  11.5.2    
88059  Turkey  European Union  25.09.2018  88 I. Article 18.6  9.2.1   
91207  Turkey  European Union  25.06.2019  91 II. Individual 
Notifications  11.5.3    
80012  Turkey  Japan  07.06.2016  80 I. Article 18.6  1.2.1   
91097  Turkey  Thailand  25.06.2019  91 II. Individual 
Notifications  11.5.4    
92125  United States of 
America  Australia  30.10.2019  92 II. Individual 
Notifications  12.3.1    
92085  United States of 
America  China  30.10.2019  92 II. Individual 
Notifications  12.3.2    
79028  United States of 
America  European Union  09.03.2016  79 II. Individual 
Notifications  1.3.1   
92072  United States of 
America  India 30.10.2019  92 I. Article 18.6  13.4.1    
88076  Zimbabwe  United States of 
America  25.09.2018  88 I. Article 18.6  9.3.1   
89033  Zimbabwe  United States of 
America  26.11.2018  89 I. Article 18.6  10.3.1    
90046  Zimbabwe  United States of 
America  26.02.2019  90 I. Article 18.6  11.3.1    
91163  Zimbabwe  United States of 
America  25.06.2019  91 I. Article 18.6  12.4.1    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX I  
MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMITMENTS: ARTICLE 18.6  
1  COA MEETING 7 -8 JUNE 2016  
1.1  EUROPEAN UNION  
1.1.1   Question by Japan (AG -IMS ID 80013 ) 
With regard to the elimination of export subsidies, coul d the European Union confirm if 
there are any products to which the footnotes 3 or 4 of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on 
Export Competition are applied and for which the elimination of export subsidy are 
postponed?  
  
If there are such products, could th e European Union describe the detailed tariff lines 
(CN number) and the latest budgetary outlay of export subsidy on each tariff line?  
 
Footnote 3 of the Nairobi Decision applies to the 1,374,400 tonnes of export subsidy quantity 
commitment for the EU sugar: see the most recent notification G/AG/N/EU/29 . The European Union 
pays no subsidy on these quantities,  but they count against the quantity commitment.  
  
As set out in the relevant EU notifications, the European Union has not granted any export subsidies 
on the products referred to in footnote 4 since 2011/12 for pig meat, 2009/10 for dairy and 2012/13 
for processed products.  
  
Follow -up: Argentina noted interest in this issue.  
1.1.2   Question by Guatemala (AG -IMS ID  84109 ) 
In relation to the Export Subsidies Commitment agreed in MC10 Nairobi Ministerial, how 
is the EU implementation process for those commitments?  
 
EU legislation on export subsidies is already and explicitly limited by the EU's international 
commitments, which include the Nairobi outcome (see Article 196(1) of Regulation (EU) 
No 1308/2013). The  EU set the last export subsidy rate to zero in July 2013 and no export subsidies 
have been granted to EU exports since then.  
 
In terms of incorporation of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition into the Schedules 
of Commitments of the 18 W TO Members which were entitled to use export subsidies prior to Nairobi, 
including the EU, the scheduling process is ongoing in Geneva. The European Union is actively 
participating in this process with the view to finalising it as soon as possible and well  in advance of 
MC11, as part of a wider process of updating the EU Schedule.  
1.2  TURKEY  
1.2.1   Question by Japan (AG -IMS ID  80012 ) 
In the last session (79th CoA), Turkey replied to the question from the European Union 
(AG-IMS ID 79027) that "Turkey's export subsidies and domestic support notifications 
are being prepared". Could Turkey update the situation?  
  
With regard to the elimination of export subsidies, could Turkey confirm if there are any 
products to which footnotes 5 of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition 
are applied and of which the elimination of export subsidy are po stponed?  
  
If there are such products, could Turkey describe the detailed tariff lines (12 -digit level) 
and the latest budgetary outlay of export subsidy on each tariff line?  
 
As one of the developing countries with export subsidy entitlements, Turkey has the right to benefit 
from the longer time -frame extended through the footnote 5 of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  Export Competition to eliminate export subsidy entitlements, for some products or groups of 
products. The list of these products can be f ound in the Turkey's notifications G/AG/N/TUR/9 , 
G/AG/N/TUR/11 and G/AG/N/TUR/13 . However, Turkey has yet to identify the products that will 
benefit from this flexibility.  
  
The latest budgetary outlay of export subsidies for these products will provided within the export 
subsidy notifications of Turkey, which will be submitted soon to the Secretariat.  
2  COA MEETING 14 -15 SEPTEMBER 2016  
2.1  PAKISTAN  
2.1.1   Question by the European Union (AG -IMS ID 81028 ) 
Pakistan has introduced a subsidy for export of sugar – EPD circular Letter No 9 of 2016 
(State Bank of Pakistan) – whereby a subsidy of 13  PKR/kg (=112  EUR/t) is guaranteed 
by the State in case the selling price of the sugar is at least 450 USD/t and the cane 
producer has been paid a minimum price of 180 PKR/40 kg.  
 
a. How would Pakistan explain this policy development in light of the Bali 
Ministerial commitment to exercise utmost restraint with regard to any recourse 
to all forms of export subsidies?  
b. When does Pakistan intend to notify this measure to the WTO?  
c. How does Pakistan see the conformity of this measure with Article 9:4 of the 
Agreement on Agr iculture?  
Pakistan appreciates the European Union's question and takes this opportunity to inform that the 
programme indicated in the question is no longer operational. It expired on 31 March 2016. It was 
a one -time measure to address market failure and la ck of infrastructure. Marketing and freight cost 
was offered to those exporters that purchased from poor farmers. This measure will be notified after 
receiving all the claims, last date for submitting claims is 31 October 2016. Pakistan fully supports 
all WTO Ministerial Decisions including the Bali Ministerial Decision.  
3  COA MEETINGS 9 NOVEMBER 2016  
3.1  INDIA  
3.1.1   Question by the European Union  (AG-IMS ID 82032 ) 
According to press reports, Maharashtra State has proposed to put in place an export 
subsidy programme for onions.  
 
a. Could India confirm this and provide more information about this programme 
(duration, total amount and subsidy rate per tonne, number of producers 
concerned, etc.).  
b. Could India confirm that such subsidies are planned to reduce the costs of 
marketing and transport of onions?  
c. Will India submit any notification relating to this program me, and when?  
d. Since export of onions in Maharashtra state is subject to state trading through 
the Maharashtra Agricultural Marketing Board, how would India see its policies 
complying with Article 20 of the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition?  
e. It is also  EU understanding that India is working on a market price support 
programme for onions. If confirmed, could India give any indication about the 
state of preparations of such a programme?  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  The information is being collected and will be shared in due course.  
 
4  COA MEETINGS 27 MARCH 2017  
4.1  CANADA  
4.1.1   Question by Indonesia  (AG-IMS ID 83067 ) 
The Government of Canada over the last five years (2013 -2018) has been implementing 
Agri-Marketing programme with the provision of grants amounting to CAD 341 million. 
The Agri -Marketing Program helps farmers and food processors compete in markets at 
home and abro ad. It supports the agriculture industry by creating and maintaining access 
to markets and taking advantage of market opportunities.  
  
a. What are the requirements to be fulfilled by farmers to access this programme?  
b. How is the calculation of the government's budget managed to provide relief to 
farmers on this programme?  
c. There is information that the project expenditure which can be subsid ized 
through this programme in the form of the contracted services, travel, capital 
and other expenditures. Indonesia is concerned that this policy will affect 
commitment to implement Nairobi Ministerial Decision related to export 
competition.  
a. Farmers are  not eligible under this programme. The programme provides matching 
contributions to national not -for-profit agricultural organizations aimed at helping these 
organizations develop and implement  long-term strategies, as well as national assurance 
systems s uch as those relating to traceability, food safety and biosecurity, to help the 
agricultural sectors prosper (e.g., canola). Moreover, a small portion of the funds are 
earmarked to assist small and medium sized enterprises (SMES) to promote Canadian 
agricu lture and agri -food products.  
b. As noted, these funds are not available to farmers.  
c. The Agri -Marketing Program does not affect Canada's implementation of the Nairobi 
Decision on export competition.  
Follow -up: Indonesia urged all Members to respect their export subsidy commitments and to 
demonstrate transparency in their domestic policies.  
4.2  SWITZERLAND  
4.2.1   Question by New Zealand  (AG-IMS ID 83057 ) 
New Zealand thanks Switzerland for its continued transparency in the Committee on 
Agriculture on its export subsidies on processed agricultural products, including its 
foreshadowing in 2015 of the recen tly notified increase in outlays of CHF  26 million 
in 2015 as compared to 2013 and 2014. New Zealand recalls its concerns about this 
increase of nearly 30% given the trade distorting effects of export subsidies and 
Ministers ' commitments in the Bali Declar ation on Export Competition, reaffirmed at MC10 
in the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition, to exercise utmost restraint with regard to 
any recourse to all forms of export subsidies. At the 78th meeting of the Committee on 
Agriculture, in response to Ne w Zealand 's question (AG -IMS ID 78025) Switzerland 
reported that the Swiss Government intends to respect the export competition 
commitments that it made in Bali and that for 2016 it had submitted to Parliament a 
reduced budget which allocates CHF 68 millio n for contributions to exports of processed 
agricultural products. Can Switzerland provide the Committee with an update on its 
budget for 2016 and 2017 and outlays for 2016?  
 G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 11 - 
 
  The annual budgets for 2016 and 2017 were fixed by Parliament at SwF 94.6 million . The exact 
outlays will be communicated through Switzerland 's notification. These budget amounts are 
substantially below the entitlements in the schedule of Switzerland -Liechtenstein.  
 
5  COA MEETINGS 7 JUNE 2017  
5.1  CANADA  
5.1.1   Question by Australia (AG-IMS ID 84016 ) 
Has Canada provided export subsidies for butter exports after the 21 Decembe r 2015 
Ministerial Decision on Export Competition? If so, what were the amounts and to which 
export markets?  
 
This information will be included in Canada's 2015 -2016 export subsidy notification which will be 
submitted in due course. In the interests of tra nsparency, Canada can note that it experienced a 
shortage of butter on its domestic market and therefore, did not provide export subsidies for butter 
in the 2015 -2016 dairy year.  
5.2  EUROPEAN UNION  
5.2.1   Question by Australia (AG-IMS ID 84037 ) 
 
The expiry of the European Union 's existing sugar programme, including sugar productio n 
quotas, and elimination of scheduled export subsidy entitlements for sugar on 
30 September 2017 is a significant event for the global sugar industry, but one that also 
presents potential challenges. What arrangements has the European Union put in place t o 
address the risks of production and market volatility after that date? Given that sugar 
production in the European Union will continue to be in receipt of subsidization, what 
arrangements has the European Union put in place to ensure that any EU sugar ex ports 
will comply with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition?  
 
After 30 September 2017 when the production quota system is abolished, EU sugar will not benefit 
from any support measures contingent upon export performance. EU sugar exports will thus continue 
to comply with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition.  
6  COA MEETING 17 -18 OCTOBER 2017   
6.1  NEW ZEALAND  
6.1.1   Question by the European Union (AG -IMS ID 85046 ) 
New Zealand in its reply to the EU question for the 84th meeting of the Committee on 
Agriculture argues that since Zespri is a private organization, provisions of the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures are not relevant for Zespri  operations. 
However, paragraph 20 of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition rules  
that "Members shall ensure that agricultural exporting state trading enterprises do not 
operate in a manner that circumvents any other disciplines contained in this annex". 
Paragraph 6 of the same Ministerial Decision rules that export subsidy entitlement s shall 
be immediately eliminated. Following to that, agricultural exporting STEs shall not operate 
in a manner that circumvents the commitment to eliminate export subsidies. According to 
Annex 1(g) of the ASCM exemption of indirect taxes on exported produ cts, in excess of 
those levied on domestic like products, fall under the illustrative list of export subsidies. 
Therefore, following the adoption of the Nairobi Decision, Zespri shall not grant export 
subsidies in the form of providing its nursery stock fr ee-of-charge to growers outside New 
Zealand whereas planting fees and royalties are charged on the domestic like products. 
Could New Zealand confirm if Zespri provides its nursery stock free -of-charge to growers 
outside New Zealand?  
 
As New Zealand has pre viously clarified to the Committee on Agriculture, Zespri is a private 
company. Zespri's decisions relating to the provision of nursery -stock to overseas growers is a G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  commercial decision and in no way involves the New Zealand Government. The New Zealand 
Government has no equity shares in Zespri. When it was established in 2000, Zespri Group Limited 
shares were distributed to kiwifruit growers and ownership remains private. Further, Zespri does not 
receive any form of support from the Government, other than having access to contestable Crown 
funding for research and development that is available to all companies and industries. As with any 
New Zealand company, the New Zealand Government expects Zespri to operate in a manner 
consistent with the law in all juri sdictions in which it operates, including competition law and any 
laws relevant to the provision of nursery stock.  
  
Follow -up: The European Union noted its particular interest in the status of STEs, i.e. whether an 
enterprise needed to be government -owne d to be STE.  
6.2  RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
6.2.1   Question by the European Union (AG -IMS ID 85036 ) 
The European  Union has learned from various sources that the Russian Federation intends 
to apply a discount of 10.3% on railway tariffs for exported grains originating in Voronezh, 
Orel, Tambov, Orenburg, Saratov, Novosibirsk and Omsk regions. The total value of the 
discount would be around 3 billion RUB (43.4  m EUR) according to the estimations of the 
Russian Ministry of Agriculture and it concerns wheat, rye, oats, barley, corn, rice, 
buckwheat, beans, peas, beans and other grains. The measure would be effective from 
1 October 2017 until 30 June 2018. How would the Russian Federation see this measure 
complying with Article 9(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture and with the Nairobi 
Ministerial Decision on Export Competition?  
 
This measure has certainly no thing to do with export subsidy and is not intended to somehow 
prioritize or favour export over domestic consumption. Moreover, its scope and purpose are of limited 
geographical and product coverage and, therefore, will have modest effect upon the agricult ural 
sector. It is being developed as a temporary instrument and is aimed at securing against yields 
losses in regions with inadequate logistics and transportation shortages. The EU's list as provided in 
its inquiry illustrates it as well, indicating only few regions under consideration for receiving special 
transportation conditions. This instrument is applied both to domestic and foreign transporters of 
cereals and is not of discriminatory nature.  
7  COA MEETING 20-21 FEBRUARY 2018   
7.1  ARGENTINA  
7.1.1   Question by the European Union (AG -IMS ID 86064 ) 
Media reports state that Argentina aims at achieving an annual US D 7 billion meat exports 
and to that end Argentina has increased export refunds for pig meat by 
0.5 – 2.3 percentage points, depending on the product. For shoulders and legs (with 
bones) this represents a subsidy rate of around 5.8% o f the market value. Could Argentina 
confirm the above information and if affirmative, explain how these measures comply with 
the Nairobi commitments on export subsidies?  
 
To answer the EU's question on export refunds for pig meat products, with Decree 853/ 2017 
published on 23  October  2017, Argentina modified the rates in force under the export refund system 
for the sector. This update took account of the indirect internal taxes in the value of the product 
cumulated through the different phases of the produc tion process. Argentina recalls that for each 
product, Argentina calculated the value of indirect taxes levied during its production and distribution. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that a number of tax limitations have meant that in many 
cases, the rates have had to be established below the value that would have resulted from the 
calculations made, and hence, for certain products amounts refunded had to be less than the 
amounts paid as indirect taxes. As Argentina pointed out at the 85th session of the Committee on 
Agriculture last October, Decree 853/2017 is entirely consistent with both the Decision on Export 
Competition adopted at the Nairobi Ministerial Conference as well as the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures and the Agreem ent on Agriculture. In no event does the value of the G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  indirect taxes refunded exceed the amount of the taxes levied in respect of the production and 
distribution of like products when sold for domestic consumption.  
 
7.2  PAKISTAN  
7.2.1   Question by Australia  (AG-IMS ID 86007 ) 
Pakistan 's Ministry of Commerce on 14 September 2017 announced a 0.5 MMT sug ar 
freight support subsidy to its sugar millers where the sugar was conditional on export. 
This quantity was subsequently increased to 1.5 MMT by Pakistan 's Ministry of Commerce 
and Textile on 7 December 2017 (links below). Australia seeks to better unders tand the 
basis for Pakistan 's domestic subsidies for sugar. Can Pakistan please provide the 
following information:  
 
a. How are these subsidies consistent with WTO agreements?  
b. How much of this subsidy has already been outlayed?  
c. What is the value of the amou nt that has been outlayed?  
d. Who has received this support?  
e. When will this subsidy be removed? 
http://www.sbp.org.pk/epd/2017/FECL23.htm  (accessed 7 February 2018)  
a. Government of Pakistan is providi ng freight support to the sugar producers under 
article  9.4 read with 9.1 (d) and (e) of Agreement of Agriculture (AoA ) as allowed under 
Nairobi Decision,  being a Net Food Importing Country.  
b. No amount has been outlayed till now.  
c. No amount has been outlay ed till now.  
d. Sugar producers are eligible to avail this support.  
e. It is a temporary measure to address the grievances of poor sugar cane growers to enable 
sugar millers to clear outstanding dues of cane farmers. However, freight support will be 
stopped af ter crushing season 2017 -18.  
7.3  RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
7.3.1   Question by Australia  (AG-IMS ID  86010 ) 
Australia notes decree No. 1595 issued by the Russian Government on the rules for 
provi ding grain transportation subsidies on 20 December 2017. Australia further notes 
reports that the Russian Government has said that this measure was introduced in order 
to stimulate grain exports from a number of Russian regions.  
  
Can the Russian Federatio n respond to the following questions:  
  
a. Can the Russian Federation confirm if the purpose of the measure is to stimulate 
grain exports?  
b. Could the Russian Federation explain how the measure is consistent with  
Article  9(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture and with the Nairobi  Ministerial 
Decision on Export Competition?  
c. What is the value of the amount that has been outlayed?  
d. Who has received this support?  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  e. When will this subsidy be removed?  
The measure at issue contributes to proportional distribu tion of grain resources among the regions 
of the Russian Federation and has a positive effect on prices within the framework of seasonal 
production. The measure has been developed as a temporary instrument and is assumed to be 
effective until July 2018. Th e main recipient of this subsidy is the Joint Stock Company "Russian  
Railways". The Government Resolution No. 1595 does not determine agricultural producers as the 
recipients of this subsidy. The amount of support provided through the Government Resolution  
No. 1595 will be submitted by the Russian Federation in domestic support notification for 
corresponding reporting periods. The measure does not constitute an export subsidy due to the fact 
that it is not contingent upon export performance and provides equ al terms for grain shipments 
regardless of the course of such shipments.  
8  COA MEETING  11-12 JUNE 2018  
8.1  EUROPEAN UNION  
8.1.1   Question by Australia  (AG-IMS ID 87067 ) 
 
Australia welcomes the withdrawal of EU sugar production quotas in 2017, but notes 
ongoing substantial domestic support provided under the EU Voluntary Coupled 
Support  (VCS) and Basic Payments Scheme (BPS). According to the European 
Commission, "EU  sugar production to increase significantly for 2017/18,  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/eu -sugar -production -increase -significantly -2017 -
18_en ," EU sugar production is forecast to rise 23% to 21 million tonnes in 2017/18.  
 
Further, the EC DG AGRI Dashboard:  
 
Sugar,  https ://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/dashboards_en , states that sugar imports are 
forecast to fall from 3.04 million tonnes in 2016/17 to 1.77 million tonnes in 2017/18. 
Sugar exports in the corresponding period however, are forecast to rise from 2.93 million 
tonne s in 2016/17 to 4.85 million tonnes in 2017/18.  
 
a. Can the EU explain whether the increased EU sugar production and exports are 
sustainable in the medium to long term, or is the increased production driven by 
current and expected future levels of domestic su pport?  
b. Given the high levels of domestic support provided under the VCS and the BPS, 
what steps has the EU put in place to prevent subsidised domestic sugar 
production being exported and having a negative impact on the global sugar 
market?  
c. Given the elimin ation of export subsidies under the Nairobi Ministerial Decision, 
can the EU provide reassurance its domestic support programmes are not 
circumventing the requirement to eliminate all export subsidies?  
d. Can the EU provide assurance that the domestic support  provided to the EU sugar 
industry is not cross -subsidising EU sugar exports?  
a. The EU would recall that the change to EU sugar policy decided in 2008, including the 
abolition of sugar quotas, was partly due to the outcome of the WTO panel brought against 
the EU sugar quota system by Australia along with two other Members. EU  notes with 
interests that Australia now has concerns about the logical consequence of the abolition 
of EU sugar quotas – i.e. an increase in production.  
The abolition of EU sugar quotas has led to a significant restructuring of the EU sugar 
industry, which has indeed been challenging for many actors (farmers, processors etc.) 
within the EU, but these changes have led to a significant increase in the compet iveness 
of the EU sugar production, as seen in the volume of 2017 production. The increase of 
production results from both a certain increase in area sown as well as exceptional yields 
in 2017 due to favourable weather conditions. Thus, the increase of pro duction and exports G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  has been driven by two elements, on one hand the new competitive environment 
generated by the end of the production quotas - whereby operators respond to market 
forces, and favourable weather conditions on the other hand. However,  this development 
cannot be explained by any EU domestic support which remained unchanged. As the 
EU sugar industry is in a transition to adapt to its new pot -quota environment, it is 
foreseeable that the EU  sugar production will adjust in the future as a respon se to market 
signals, supply/demand balance, and international market developments.  
b. The Basic Payment Scheme is a decoupled Green Box payment, and has no influence on 
the level of EU sugar production. Voluntary Coupled Support (VCS) may only be granted 
by a member State to a sector or type of farming that is undergoing difficulties (e.g. a risk 
of a decline or abandonment of production). Further, it is a 'production limiting scheme' in 
accordance with Blue Box criteria, and also subject to strict budgetary limits. It has no 
negative impact on intra - or extra -EU trade. It is particularly worth noting that the increase 
in area sown with sugar beet is concentrated in EU member States which do not apply 
VCS for sugar. On the contrary, the area under sugar beet i n EU member States applying 
VCS decreased in comparison to previous years when the measure was not in force. 
Therefore,  any increase on EU export capacity is not the result of domestic support but 
the natural consequence of removing the previous production  and export limitations.  
c. and d. The definition of "export subsidies" are "subsidies contingent on export 
performance" (Article 1(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture). The panel judgment in 
dispute DS266 on the previous EU sugar scheme was based on the fact the sugar produced 
under the "C quota" indeed was required to be exported, thus creating such an export 
contingency.  
All EU sugar production quotas have now been abolished. There is no export requirement 
of any kind in the current EU sugar regime. There ar e no subsidies contingent on export 
performance. The EU sugar regime fully respects all WTO  obligations on export 
competition.  
8.2  INDIA  
8.2.1   Question by the European Union  (AG-IMS ID 87001 ) 
Press reports suggest that India intends to offer an export incentive for chickpeas in the 
form of a "Merchandise Export from India Scheme" which implies "duty credit scrip" 
at 7% of realized FOB value of covered exports.  
 
How would India see this initiative complying with paragraphs 1 and 10 of the Nairobi 
Ministerial Decision on Export Competition which state, respectively, that Members should 
exercise utmost r estraint with regard to any recourse to all forms of export subsidies and 
that Members should seek not to raise their export subsidies beyond the average level of 
the past five years on a product basis.  
The objective of MEIS is to offset infrastructural in efficiencies and associated costs. As per 
Article  9 (d-e) of AoA, India is entitled to provide subsidies to offset infrastructural inefficiencies 
related to marketing and transportation, handling, upgrading etc.  
8.3  LIECHTENSTEIN  
8.3.1   Question by the European Union  (AG-IMS ID 87091 ) 
In document G/AG/W/125/Rev.8/Add.1 Switzerland -Liechtenstein mentions that  its 
parliament has approved "accompanying measures, including new support for dairy and 
cereal products that is not linked to exports, and a simplified authorization procedure for 
inward processing traffic in the basic dairy and cereal products that curre ntly benefits 
from export contributions".  
 
a. Could Switzerland -Liechtenstein explain the functioning of the new support 
measures for dairy and cereal products?  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 16 - 
 
  b. Could Switzerland -Liechtenstein explain the changes made in respect of inward 
processing?  
In Decem ber 2017, the Swiss Parliament approved a package of measures for implementing 
the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition. The package is scheduled to be implemented on 
1 January  2019. It contains the following elements:  
 
• A revision of the so ‑called "Choc olate law": the legal basis for the granting of export 
subsidies is abolished;  
• Accompanying measures, namely a simplification of the procedure for approval of the 
inward processing trade and coupled payments for certain staple agricultural products, 
including milk and cereals.  
The new payments for cereals and for marketed milk will be distributed directly to agricultural 
producers, according to the production quantity in the case of marketed milk and to the area under 
cultivation in the case of cereals. The disbursement of such payments will be independent from 
exports of the process ed products. As regards the procedure for approval of the inward processing 
trade, a notification to the subsectors concerned will replace the consultations provided for under 
the current system. This procedural simplification will apply to basic dairy and  cereal agricultural 
products which currently qualify for export contributions.   
8.4  NORWAY  
8.4.1   Question by New Zealand  (AG-IMS ID 87096 ) 
New Zealand notes that contrary to the MC10 Export Competition Decision, Norway's 
notified export subsidy outlays for butter in 2016 are 1154% of those in the previous five 
years. They are also 250% of outlays in 2015.  
 
a. Footnote 4 of the MC10 Export Competition Decision requires that there shall be 
no export subsidies applied to new markets and that product shall not be 
destined for least developed countries. Which markets did the export subsidised 
butter go to in 2015 and 2016?  
b. What steps is Norway taking to bring its export subsidy outlays for butter back 
within the previous five-year average required by paragraph 10 of the Decision?  
a. Norway used export subsidies for butter for exports to the European Union, Egypt and  
Morocco in  2015 and to the European Union and Morocco in 2016.  
b. Norway accepted at the Ministerial Conference in Nairobi in December 2015 stronger 
export subsidy commitments for butter, thus reducing the subsidized export quantity by 
approximately 80%, co mpared to the level set in the Uruguay round.  
Norway remains fully committed to the outcome of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision and will phase 
out all export subsidies by the end of 2020 according to its revised and certified schedule of 
commitments. Acco rding to preliminary figures, there were no subsidized exports of butter in 2017.  
8.5  PAKISTAN  
8.5.1   Question by  the United States of America  (AG-IMS ID 87021 ) 
 
The United States understands the Government of Pakistan (GOP) has authorized an 
export subsidy of up to USD159 per metric tonne to facilitate exports of up to 2.0 million 
metric tonnes of wheat th at will be in effect through 30 June 2018. The United States 
calculates the result in public expenditures will be up to USD320 million if the full amount 
is exported at the full subsidy. Further, the United States notes that Pakistan's domestic 
wheat price s are significantly higher than prevailing international prices.  
 G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 17 - 
 
  a. Please provide an update to this Committee on the quantity of wheat exports 
that have been exported under this scheme.  
b. Noting that Pakistan has not notified any export subsidies in its most recent 
export subsidy notifications (which covers only up through 2006/07), please 
explain the reason Pakistan has apparently increased its use of export subsidies 
despite the standstill and phase -out commitments undertaken by all 
WTO  Members in Nairo bi. 
c. Please provide the legislation and/or cabinet decision for making this export 
subsidy available.  
a. The total quantity of wheat exported so far is 1 .625 million tonnes.  
b. Government of Pakistan is providing freight support (inland and sea route) to the wheat 
exporters for the purpose of stock clearance to ensure that subsistence farmers are not 
discouraged and to overcome the challenges posed by climatic change stresses on food 
security. It is a temporary/time bound measure i.e up to 30 June 2018. The su pport 
provided is in full compliance of Article 9.4 read with 9.1  (d) & (e) of Agreement of 
Agriculture (AoA).  
c. The request has been made to the concerned authorities and the copy of notification will 
be made available in course of time.  
8.5.2   Question by  Austral ia (AG-IMS ID 87081 ) 
 
Further to Australia's previous questions to Pakistan on sugar during the February 2018 
meeting (AG -IMS ID 86007), Australia has reviewed Pakistan's previous answers and 
further analysed Pakistan's sugar freight support, and has a number of follow -up 
questions.  
 
Based on Pakistan Government circulars, "a cash freight support  of Rs 10.7/kg may be 
given to the sugar millers on export of sugar subject to the condition that the said amount 
of freight support will be given on a sliding scale between the international price of 
USD 376/MT (as on 08.09.2017) and USD 499/MT (the inter national sugar price which 
equals the cost of production as calculated by the MoIP)".  
 
a. Why has Pakistan based its freight support for sugar on a sliding scale between 
the international price and the cost of sugar production in Pakistan?  
b. Why does the subsid y amount provided for freight appear to vary in accordance 
with the international price for sugar?  
c. Can Pakistan confirm that the freight support is designed to bridge the gap 
between the world price and the cost of production in Pakistan?  
d. If this is not th e case, can Pakistan please clarify how the freight support is 
calculated?  
Australia notes that Pakistan has previously justified the sugar export subsidies as freight 
support under Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and the application of 
Article 9.4 was extended under the Nairobi Decision. While Australia does not dispute the 
extension of the application of Article 9.4 under the Nairobi Decision, the export subsidies 
need to meet the requirements of Article 9.1 (d) and (e).  
e. Can Pakistan exp lain how the cash freight support of up to RS 10.7/kg 
(determined on a sliding scaling) is linked to the cost of marketing exports of 
agricultural products, the costs of international transport and freight, and 
internal transport and freight charges as out lined in Article 9.1 (d) and (e)?  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 18 - 
 
  f. Can Pakistan explain how subsidies which vary due to changes in the 
international sugar price can be categorised as freight support under 
Article  9.1 (d) and (e)?  
In Pakistan's reply to Australia's previous question, it stated that the freight support will 
be stopped after the 2017/18 crushing season, but Australia notes that forecasts predict 
an ongoing structural surplus of sugar in Pakistan in future years. Australia also notes 
there has been media reports  in March 2018 that Pakistan's Cabinet agreed to amend its 
domestic sugar subsidy programme.  
 
g. Can Pakistan confirm media reports that reforms are planned to its domestic 
sugar subsidy programme? If so, can Pakistan provide more details?  
h. In the absence of d omestic reforms that remove the incentive to overproduce 
and eliminate the structural sugar surplus, how does Pakistan intend to dispose 
of the surpluses in the future without export subsidies?  
Australia understands that at least over half of the two milli on tonnes of Pakistani sugar 
eligible for freight support has been exported.  
 
i. Can Pakistan confirm the volume of sugar that has been exported with freight 
support, and provide a dollar amount of how much freight support has been 
provided to date?  
j. Can Pakis tan confirm the date when the freight support shall official cease?  
a. As already replied to previous questions from the delegation of Australia on the issue, 
Pakistan provides the freight support to sugar producers on a limited quantity, not to 
promote the e xport of sugar but in order to address the grievances of poor sugar cane 
farmers, to enable sugar millers to clear outstanding dues of cane farmers. It is worth 
mentioning that about 90% of cane farmers in Pakistan are subsistence farmers, having 
land hold ing less than five acres. The sliding sale is basically a barometer to ensure a 
certain cut of limit of the freight support, in addition to the quantitative and time limit, 
and to ensure that this freight support does not distort the overall market, in 
circumstances, when international prices of sugar tend to increase. This freight support 
was available till the crushing season of 2017 -18. 
b. Same as explained in reply to question (a) above.  
c. The freight support provided by Pakistan is not meant to promote the export of sugar. Its 
sole purpose is rather to facilitate the payment of outstanding dues of poor farmers.  
d. The freight support is calculated in accordance with the provisions of Article 9.4 read 
with 9.1 (d) & (e) of Agreement of Agriculture (A oA). 
e. Same as explained in reply to question (d) above.  
f. Pakistan has no domestic sugar subsidy programme. However, Pakistan is only providing 
freight support to sugar producers with the sole purpose to enable payment, to poor sugar 
cane growers. Further, Fe deral government has expressed its commitments not to provide 
any kind of export subsidy to sugar and to further reform this sector. However, elections 
are scheduled to be held on 25 July 2018. The reform process will depend on the newly 
elected government . 
g. Same as explained in reply to question (f) above.  
h. Same as explained in reply to question (f) above.  
i. The relevant information is being collected and would be shared, as and when available  
j. This freight support was available till the crushing season of 2017 -18. G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  8.5.3   Question by  Brazil  (AG-IMS ID 87163 ) 
 
Brazil would like to co -sponsor the following que stion from Australia  (AG-IMS ID 87081):  
 
Further to Australia's previous questions to Pakistan on sugar during the February 2018 
meeting (AG -IMS ID 86007), Australia has reviewed Pakistan's previous answers and 
further analysed Pakistan's sugar freight support, and has a number of follow -up 
questions.  
 
Based on Pakistan Government circulars, "a cash freight support of Rs 10.7/kg may be 
given to the sugar millers on export of sugar subject to the condition that the said amount 
of freight support w ill be given on a sliding scale between the international price of 
USD 376/MT (as on 08.09.2017) and USD 499/MT (the international sugar price which 
equals the cost of production as calculated by the MoIP)".  
 
a. Why has Pakistan based its freight support for sugar on a sliding scale between 
the international price and the cost of sugar production in Pakistan?  
b. Why does the subsidy amount provided for freight appear to vary in accordance 
with the international price for sugar?  
c. Can Pakistan confirm that the freig ht support is designed to bridge the gap 
between the world price and the cost of production in Pakistan?  
d. If this is not the case, can Pakistan please clarify how the freight support is 
calculated?  
Australia notes that Pakistan has previously justified the sugar export subsidies as freight 
support under Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and the application of 
Article 9.4 was extended under the Nairobi Decision. While Australia does not dispute the 
extension of the application of Article 9.4 u nder the Nairobi Decision, the export subsidies 
need to meet the requirements of Article 9.1 (d) and (e).  
e. Can Pakistan explain how the cash freight support of up to RS 10.7/kg 
(determined on a sliding scaling) is linked to the cost of marketing exports of 
agricultural products, the costs of international transport and freight, and 
internal transport and freight charges as outlined in Article 9.1 (d) and (e)?  
f. Can Pakistan explain how subsidies which vary due to changes in the 
international sugar price can be  categorised as freight support under Article 
9.1 (d) and (e)?  
In Pakistan's reply to Australia's previous question, it stated that the freight support will 
be stopped after the 2017/18 crushing season, but Australia notes that forecasts predict 
an ongoing  structural surplus of sugar in Pakistan in future years. Australia also notes 
there has been media reports in March 2018 that Pakistan's Cabinet agreed to amend its 
domestic sugar subsidy programme.  
 
g. Can Pakistan confirm media reports that reforms are planned to its domestic 
sugar subsidy programme? If so, can Pakistan provide more details?  
h. In the absence of domestic reforms that remove the incentive to overproduce 
and eliminate the structural sugar surplus, how does Pakistan intend to dispose 
of the su rpluses in the future without export subsidies?  
Australia understands that at least over half of the two million tonnes of Pakistani sugar 
eligible for freight support has been exported.  
 
i. Can Pakistan confirm the volume of sugar that has been exported with  freight 
support, and provide a dollar amount of how much freight support has been 
provided to date?  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 20 - 
 
  j. Can Pakistan confirm the date when the freight support shall official cease?  
a. As already replied to previous questions from the delegation of Australia on t he issue, 
Pakistan provides the freight support to sugar producers on a limited quantity, not to 
promote the export of sugar but in order to address the grievances of poor sugar cane 
farmers, to enable sugar millers to clear outstanding dues of cane farmer s. It is worth 
mentioning that about 90% of cane farmers in Pakistan are subsistence farmers, having 
land holding less than five acres. The sliding sale is basically a barometer to ensure a 
certain cut of limit of the freight support, in addition to the qu antitative and time limit, 
and to ensure that this freight support does not distort the overall market, in 
circumstances, when international prices of sugar tend to increase. This freight support 
was available till the crushing season of 2017 -18. 
b. Same as e xplained in reply to question (a) above.  
c. The freight support provided by Pakistan is not meant to promote the export of sugar. Its 
sole purpose is rather to facilitate the payment of outstanding dues of poor farmers.  
d. The freight support is calculated in ac cordance with the provisions of Article 9.4 read 
with 9.1 (d) & (e) of Agreement of Agriculture (AoA).  
e. Same as explained in reply to question (d) above.  
f. Pakistan has no domestic sugar subsidy programme. However, Pakistan is only providing 
freight support t o sugar producers with the sole purpose to enable payment, to poor sugar 
cane growers. Further, Federal Government has expressed its commitments not to provide 
any kind of export subsidy to sugar and to further reform this sector. However, elections 
are sc heduled to be held on 25 July 2018. The reform process will depend on the newly 
elected government.  
g. Same as explained in reply to question (f) above.  
h. Same as explained in reply to question (f) above.  
i. The relevant information is being collected and would be  shared, as and when available  
j. This freight support was available till the crushing season of 2017 -18. 
8.5.4   Question by  Thailand  (AG-IMS ID 87164 ) 
 
Thailand  would like to co -sponsor the following question from Australia  
(AG-IMS ID 87081): 
 
Further to Australia's previous questions to Pakistan on sugar during the February 2018 
meeting (AG -IMS ID 86007), Australia has reviewed Pakistan's previous answers and 
further analysed Pakistan's sugar freight support, and has a number of follow -up 
questions.  
 
Based on Pakistan Government circulars, "a cash freight support of Rs 10.7/kg may be 
given to the sugar millers on export of sugar subject to the condition that the said amount 
of freight support will be given on a sliding scale between the in ternational price of 
USD 376/MT (as on 08.09.2017) and USD 499/MT (the international sugar price which 
equals the cost of production as calculated by the MoIP)".  
 
a. Why has Pakistan based its freight support for sugar on a sliding scale between 
the international price and the cost of sugar production in Pakistan?  
b. Why does the subsidy amount provided for freight appear to vary in accordance 
with the international price for sugar?  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 21 - 
 
  c. Can Pakistan confirm that the freight support is designed to bridge the gap 
between the world price and the cost of production in Pakistan?  
d. If this is not the case, can Pakistan please clarify how the freight support is 
calculated?  
Australia notes that Pakistan has previously justified the sugar export subsidies as freight 
support under Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and the application of 
Article 9.4 was extended under the Nairobi Decision. While Australia does not dispute the 
extension of the application of Article 9.4 under the Nairobi Decision, the export  subsidies 
need to meet the requirements of Article 9.1 (d) and (e).  
e. Can Pakistan explain how the cash freight support of up to RS 10.7/kg 
(determined on a sliding scaling) is linked to the cost of marketing exports of 
agricultural products, the costs of i nternational transport and freight, and 
internal transport and freight charges as outlined in Article 9.1 (d) and (e)?  
f. Can Pakistan explain how subsidies which vary due to changes in the 
international sugar price can be categorised as freight support under  Article 9.1 
(d) and (e)?  
In Pakistan's reply to Australia's previous question, it stated that the freight support will 
be stopped after the 2017/18 crushing season, but Australia notes that forecasts predict 
an ongoing structural surplus of sugar in Pakis tan in future years. Australia also notes 
there has been media reports in March 2018 that Pakistan's Cabinet agreed to amend its 
domestic sugar subsidy programme.  
g. Can Pakistan confirm media reports that reforms are planned to its domestic 
sugar subsidy pro gramme? If so, can Pakistan provide more details?  
h. In the absence of domestic reforms that remove the incentive to overproduce 
and eliminate the structural sugar surplus, how does Pakistan intend to dispose 
of the surpluses in the future without export subs idies?  
Australia understands that at least over half of the two million tonnes of Pakistani sugar 
eligible for freight support has been exported.  
i. Can Pakistan confirm the volume of sugar that has been exported with freight 
support, and provide a dollar amo unt of how much freight support has been 
provided to date?  
j. Can Pakistan confirm the date when the freight support shall official cease?  
a. As already replied to previous questions from the delegation of Australia on the issue, 
Pakistan provides the freight support to sugar producers on a limited quantity, not to 
promote the export of sugar but in order to address the grievances of poor sugar cane 
farmers, to enable sugar millers to clear outstanding dues of cane farmers. It is worth 
mentioning that about 90% of cane farmers in Pakistan are subsistence farmers, having 
land holding less than five a cres. The sliding sale is basically a barometer to ensure a 
certain cut of limit of the freight support, in addition to the quantitative and time limit, 
and to ensure that this freight support does not distort the overall market, in 
circumstances, when international prices of sugar tend to increase. Thi s freight support 
was available till the crushing season of 2017 -18. 
b. Same as explained in reply to question (a) above.  
c. The freight support provided by Pakistan is not meant to promote the export of sugar. Its 
sole purpose is rather to facilitate the paymen t of outstanding dues of poor farmers.  
d. The freight support is calculated in accordance with the provisions of Article 9.4 read 
with 9.1 (d) & (e) of Agreement of Agriculture (AoA).  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 22 - 
 
  e. Same as explained in reply to question (d) above.  
f. Pakistan has no domestic sugar subsidy programme. However, Pakistan is only providing 
freight support to sugar producers with the sole purpose to enable payment, to poor sugar 
cane growers. Further, Federal Government has expressed its commitments not to provide 
any kind of export  subsidy to sugar and to further reform this sector. However, elections 
are scheduled to be held on 25 July 2018. The reform process will depend on the newly 
elected government.  
g. Same as explained in reply to question (f) above.  
h. Same as explained in reply t o question (f) above.  
i. The relevant information is being collected and would be shared, as and when available  
j. This freight support was available till the crushing season of 2017 -18. 
8.6  RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
8.6.1   Question by Ukraine  (AG-IMS ID 87098 ) 
 
In response to a number of concerns expressed by some interested Members at the 
85th and 86th CoA meetings regarding the Russian Federation's grain transportation 
subsidies implementing according to the Government Resolution No.  1595, the 
Russian  Federation stated that these measures are not export subsidies.  
 
a. Please inform how these measur es will be notified to the WTO? In case of 
attributing them to domestic support as the Russian Federation answered to 
some Members' question at the 86th CoA meeting, please, specify how will the 
information be presented in a Table DS:1 notification?  
b. Could the Russian Federation please provide the relevant data regarding the 
amount of shipped grain particularly wheat, barley and corn, and their final 
destination (to which ports)?  
c. Does the Russian Federation have intentions to continue such policy in future?  
a. This subsidy is calculated based on the amount of losses (leaving revenues of the carrier) 
from carriage of grain under the feed -in (reduced) tariff, which means that the amount of 
state support is linked to the volume of transported grain. In this  regard the total quantity 
of transportation by railway transport on the specified route at the present moment is 
about 212,000 tonnes and granted state support amounts to 246 million rubles 
accordingly. Reference information: In order to adjust the grain limits in the specified 
regions (according to Decree No. 1595) the Russian Federation government issued Decree 
No. 502 ( 25 April 2018). In the Novosibirsk region limits increased to 200,000 tonnes and 
Omsk Region up to 250,000 tonnes.  
b. Granting this state s upport is aimed at reducing costs for shippers in the process of 
carriage of grain by railway transport, leading to the increase of the relevant routes of 
customer deliveries within the Russian Federation, and it is not linked to foreign trade 
operations i n any way. In this regard, there is no aim to identify the grain that goes further 
for export. However, the  Russian Federation  assures Members that on the stage of 
development of this state support mechanism the Russian Federation took into 
consideration i ts commitments not to grant export subsidies, based on the financing linked 
(directly or indirectly) with the agriculture export.  
c. Decree No. 1595 is a domestic instrument, the implementation of which is due to the 
objective grounds, namely the territory of  the country and the uneven distribution 
(centralization) of population (demand). Therefore, the application of this measure does 
not aim at changing trade conditions on the international grain market.  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 23 - 
 
  d. According to Decree No. 1595 this subsidy is provided for 2017/2018. The possibility of 
the extension the duration of this support will be considered depending on the results of 
its efficiency and domestic market conditions.  
e. Grain farmers are not specified by Decree No. 1595 as the recipients and (or) direct 
beneficiaries of this subsidy and that is mainly a systematic measure for the domestic 
agricultural market. Therefore, the implementation of this Decree does not have any 
substantial effect on the agricultural production. Firstly, the Far East includes are as of 
rapid development, within which a number of major infrastructure projects are 
implemented, including the transportation systems of rail and road cargo transportation. 
Furthermore, throughout areas of rapid development a processing infrastructure is b eing 
created, including the food industry, which provides deep processing of agricultural 
products (raw materials) realized both in the regions of the Far East and in the central 
part of the country. Thus, subsidizing the cargo transportation of agricultur al products in 
this direction is a part of the systemic measures related to the development of the Far 
East territory as a strategically prioritized region for Russian economic development. 
Secondly, Russian Export Center is chosen as an agent because it i s the key institution 
that provides logistics support on the territory of the Russian Federation, which includes 
the implementation of: basic consultations on the choice of the optimal scheme of delivery 
of the goods to the end user; preliminary calculatio n of the costs of delivery; consulting 
on the filling of shipping documents; assistance in picking a new (optimal) routes that 
meet the needs of specific shippers.  
f. No, the  Russian Federation  does not confirm this information. Meanwhile, Members should 
pay attention that the objectives of this state support are defined by Decree 1104.  
g. 49.3 million roubles (about USD  820 000) from the Federal Budget were outlaid for the 
purpose of Decree No. 1104 in 2017.  
h. In accordance with Decree No. 1104 part of the costs r elated to the transport of 
agricultural products (food) with the use of inland transport is compensated, contributing 
to the freight flows reduction on roadways of federal and regional level, through the use 
of rail and road transportation no less than thi rd environmental class. For the receipt of 
this subsidy, organization should file the package of documents that certificate legal 
status, financial sustainability, implementation of transportation in accordance with the 
established forms. Reference informa tion. In Particular:  
• a statement on establishing an agreement in free form (hereinafter referred to as 
"Statement");  
• an extract from the Unified State Register of Legal Entities (Unified State Register of 
Sole Proprietors);  
• a certificate signed by the head  of the Russian organization or a sole proprietor (an 
authorized person with the submission of documents confirming the authority of that 
person), confirming the compliance of the Russian organization with the conditions 
stipulated in paragraph 4 of these Rules;  
• a certificate of the tax authority confirming the absence from the Russian organization 
as of the date not earlier than 15 calendar days before the day of submission to the 
Center of the documents specified in this clause of the unfulfilled obligati on to pay 
taxes, fees, insurance fees, penalties, fines and interest due payment in accordance 
with the legislation of the Russian Federation on taxes and fees;  
• Calculation of the subsidy amount in accordance with Appendix No. 3;  
• the following documents ce rtified by the head and chief accountant (if any) of the 
Russian sole proprietor (an authorized person with the submission of documents 
confirming the authorities of that person) confirming incurred costs of the Russian 
organization and their compliance wi th the purposes specified in paragraph 1 of this 
Regulation: the contract signed between the Russian organization and the carrier 
delivering services of goods transportation the certificate of the executed works (the G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 24 - 
 
  rendered services) or other documents c onfirming realization of transportation of 
production; account for the payment of work (services) associated with the 
implementation of the carrier transportation of products; payment order for payment 
of works (services) related to the transportation of p roducts;  
• documents confirming the carrier's performance activity for the goods transportation, 
submitted to the carrier who performed part of the transportation, including: an extract 
from the Unified State Register of Legal Entities stating the date of re gistration, 
confirming the carriage of goods as a primary activity for at least three years, certified 
by the head or chief accountant of the Russian organization or by a sole proprietor (an 
authorized person submitting documents confirming the authority o f that person) or 
by the tax authority; a notarized copy of the supply agreement concluded between the 
Russian organization and the carrier who has performed part of the transportation by 
road; a copy of the vehicle passport used for goods transportation, indicating the 
ecological class, certified by the head of the carrier (an authorized person with the 
submission of documents confirming the authority of that person); copies of 
documents confirming the presence or ownership of at least ten units of large -capacity 
trucks (copies of certificates of registration of vehicles and (or) lease contracts certified 
by the head of the carrier (authorized person with a submission of documents 
confirming the authorities of this person); copies of documents confirming me mbership 
in the Union of Transport Workers of Russia, or the non -profit organization Russian 
Automobile Union, or the Russian Association of Freight Forwarders and Logistics 
Organizations, or the Association of International Road Carriers, or in self -regulatory 
organizations of road carriers that meet the requirements established by the Federal 
Law" About self -regulatory organizations ";  
• other certified documents confirming compliance of the Russian organization with the 
conditions provided for in Paragraph  4 of these Rules.  
i. While drafting Decree No. 1104 the  Russian Federation  took into consideration the Nairobi 
Decision on export competition which does not allow direct export support based on the 
financing, linked (directly or indirectly) with the agricult ure export.  
8.7  SWITZERLAND  
8.7.1   Question by the European Union  (AG-IMS ID 87100 ) 
 
In document G/AG/W/125/Rev.8/Add.1 Switzerland -Liechtenstein mentions that its 
parliam ent has approved "accompanying measures, including new support for dairy and 
cereal products that is not linked to exports, and a simplified authorization procedure for 
inward processing traffic in the basic dairy and cereal products that currently benefits 
from export contributions ". 
 
a. Could Switzerland -Liechtenstein explain the functioning of the new support 
measures for dairy and cereal products?  
b. Could Switzerland -Liechtenstein explain the changes made in respect of inward 
processing?  
In December 2017, the Swiss Parliament approved a package of measures for implementing the 
Nairobi Decision on Export Competition. The package is scheduled to be implemented on 
1 January  2019. It contains the following elements:  
 
• A revision of the so -called " Chocolate law": the legal basis for the granting of export 
subsidies is abolished;  
• Accompanying measures, namely a simplification of the procedure for approval of the 
inward processing trade and coupled payments for certain staple agricultural products, 
including milk and cereals.  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 25 - 
 
  The new payments for cereals and for marketed milk will be distributed  directly to agricultural 
producers, according to the production quantity in the case of marketed milk and to the area under 
cultivation in the case of cereals.  The disbursement of such payments will be independent from 
exports of the processed products. As regards  the procedure for approval of the inward processing 
trade, a notification to the subsectors concerned will replace the consultations provided for unde r 
the current system. This procedural simplification will apply to basic dairy and cereal agricultural 
products which currently qualify for export contributions.  
 
9  COA MEETING  25-26 SEPTEMBER 2018  
9.1  INDIA  
9.1.1   Question by New Zealand (AG-IMS ID 88037 ) 
New Zealand understands that the State Government of Gujarat is implementing a 
provision of up to USD  44 million to support the Gujarat Milk Marketing Federation to 
export 60,000 tonnes of skim milk powder. This funding will subsidise the export of Indian 
skim milk powder and significantly impact international trade of skim milk powder.  
  
a. What is the scope and nature of the state of Gujarat's recently announced 
support skim milk powder export; including for example the eligibility for 
receiving payments, the criteria for making payments and how this scheme will 
be implemented?  
b. What is India's position on how the state of Gujarat's provision of skim milk 
powder export subsidies is consistent with the elimination of export subsidies 
through the MC10 Export Competition Ministerial Decision?  
The State Government in Gujarat has decided to provide financial a ssistance to the state dairy 
cooperative federation up to a maximum of INR 50 per kg for a total quantity of 60,000 tonnes.  The 
measure is an attempt by the State Government to support the farmers in defraying the costs of 
marketing including handling, dom estic and international freight which are allowed for developing 
countries under the WTO's AoA.  
 
9.1.2   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 88040 ) 
The Gujarat Government announced in the month of July 2018 the equivalent of 
USD 43.5 million in export support for Gujarat Milk Marketing Federation (Amul) to export 
60,000 tonnes of Skim milk powder over the following  six months to clear their 
110,000  tonnes of stocks. This subsidy (Rupee  50/kg) is equivalent to around 
USD 725/tonne (at th e time of the announcement), or more than 35% of the value of the 
product (measured either in percentage of world market price for Skim milk powder or 
internal Indian market prices for skim milk powder ).  
  
a. Can India please confirm that this support has be en decided on and granted by 
the Gujarat Government?   
b. Can India indicate how much of the intended 60,000 tonnes have been exported 
up to and including 31 August 2018?   
c. How does India intend to notify this export subsidy to WTO considering in 
particular that India has no scheduled entitlements for export subsidies?   
d. How does India see this export subsidy to be in line with the Bali and Nairobi 
Ministerial Decisions, which require WTO Members to show the utmost restraint 
in applying export subsi dies?  
The State Government of Gujarat has decided to provide financial assistance to the state dairy 
cooperative federation up to a maximum of INR 50 per kg for a total quantity of 60,000 tonnes. 
About 800 tonnes have been exported up to 31 August 2018. T he measure is an attempt by the G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 26 - 
 
  State Government to support the farmers in defraying the costs of marketing including handling, 
domestic and international freight which are allowed for developing countries under the WTO's AoA. 
India will be submitting its Article 9.4 Export Subsidy notification in due course.  
  
Follow -up: The European Union looked forward to India's notification of these subsidies. Australia 
and the United States supported the question.  
9.1.3   Question by Australia (AG-IMS ID 88122 ) 
 
Australia would like to co -sponsor the following question (AG -IMS ID 88037) from 
New Zealand:  
New Zeala nd understands that the State Government of Gujarat is implementing a 
provision of up to USD 44 million to support the Gujarat Milk Marketing Federation to 
export 60,000 tonnes of skim milk powder. This funding will subsidise the export of Indian 
skim milk  powder and significantly impact international trade of skim milk powder.  
a. What is the scope and nature of the state of Gujarat 's recently announced 
support skim milk powder export; including for example the eligibility for 
receiving payments, the criteria for making payments and how this scheme will 
be implemented?  
b. What is India 's position on how the state of Gujarat 's provision of skim milk 
powder export subsidies is consistent with the elimination of export subsidies 
through the MC10 Export Compe tition Ministerial Decision?  
The State Government in Gujarat has decided to provide financial assistance to the state dairy 
cooperative federation up to a maximum of INR 50 per kg for a total quantity of 60,000 tonnes.  The 
measure is an attempt by the State Government to support the farmers in defraying the costs of 
marketing including handling, domestic and international freight which are allowed for developing 
countries under the WTO's AoA.  
 
9.2  TURKEY  
9.2.1   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 88059 ) 
Following a decision by Money Credit Coordination Board in the Official Gazette No  30389 
on 12  April  2018, Turkey published a list of products receiving export subsidies and the 
'export return amount'. The products listed were poultry meat, eggs, honey, flowers, 
vegetables and dried vegetables.   
  
a. Can Turkey please detail the quantities that have received export subsidies for each 
product group up to and including 31 August 2018?   
b. Can Turkey please inform WTO Members about the amounts of Turkish Lira committed 
up to and included 31 August 2018?   
c. When and how does Turkey intend to notify these expor t subsidies to WTO considering 
in particular that, in accordance with the Nairobi decision on Export Competition, 
Turkey shall eliminate export subsidies by the end of 2018?   
d. Several concerned products (such as fruits or stoned fruits or sausages) seem not  to 
be covered by Turkey's entitlements. How does Turkey envisage to notify these export 
subsidies?   
e. Can Turkey explain how it sees this measure to be in line with the Bali and Nairobi 
Ministerial Decisions, which require WTO Members to show the utmost res traint in 
applying export subsidies?   G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 27 - 
 
  f. When does Turkey intend to forward its revised scheduled for implementing the 
Nairobi Ministerial Decision which obliges developing countries to eliminate export 
subsidy commitments by the end of 2018?  
a. Turkey has submitted DS and ES notifications for the period of 2001 -2009. The  
notifications for the years 2010 -2013 have already been completed and will be submitted 
shortly. Turkey is still working on notifications for 2014 onwards and plans to submit them 
soon.,  
b. Turkey is currently providing export subsidies for agricultural products in line with the 
commitments of Turkey originated in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. In accordance 
with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition, Turkey's revised schedu le was 
circulated through the document G/MA/TAR/RS/588 dated 18 June 2019.  
Moreover, pursuant to Article 25.2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, Turkey submitted new and full notifications for current export subsidies, 
through the d ocument G/SCM/N/315/TUR/Suppl.1 - G/SCM/N/343/TUR dated 16 
September 2019.  
c. Refer to the response to (b).  
d. Refer to the response to (b).  
e. Refer to the response to (b).  
Follow -up: New Zealand and Ukraine stressed the importance of implementing Bali and Nairobi  
Ministerial Decisions and meeting WTO commitments. New Zealand encouraged Turkey to respond 
to the annual questionnaire on Export Competition. The United States noted interest in this question.  
9.3  ZIMBABWE  
9.3.1   Question by the United States of America (AG-IMS ID 88076 ) 
The United States understands the Government of Zimbabwe's Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
(which is the central bank) is providing tobacco growers a performance export bonus as 
an incentive to grow the country's production and increase exports. For the 
2018  marketing season, the central bank, has increased the export incentive from 5% 
to 12% and  up to 17.5% for top exporters.  
  
a. Please explain these agriculture support measures implemented by Zimbabwe's 
central bank during the marketing periods 2017 and 2018.  
b. What is the legal basis under the Agreement on Agriculture and the Nairobi 
Decision that  allows for this kind of agriculture support measure?  
10  COA MEETING  26-27 NOVEMBER 2018  
10.1  INDIA  
10.1.1   Question by New Zealand (AG-IMS ID 89059 ) 
 
At the Committee on Agriculture in September 2018, India noted the export subsidies of  
INR 50 per KG for 60,000 tonnes of SMP provided for skim milk producers in Gujarat were 
to assist with marketing and transport costs. India also announced the inclusion of milk 
powder in the Merchandise Export from India Scheme (MEIS) with an ad valorem s ubsidy 
of 20%  
  
a. Did the costs of marketing and transport recently increase?  
b. What is the relationship between the costs of marketing and transport and the 
subsidies provided?  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 28 - 
 
  c. What is the duration of the two programmes?  
d. The Export Competition Ministerial Dec ision of December 2015 commits all 
Members not to raise export subsidies above the previous five-year average on 
a product basis. India last notified export subsidies in 2012, for the marketing 
years 2004 -2005 to 2009 -2010 (G/AG/N/IND/9). Do India 's new ex port 
subsidies for skim milk producers in Gujarat and the inclusion of milk powder in 
the MEIS mean that export subsidies for these products now exceed the previous 
five-year average?  
e. India has not provided information on export subsidies to the annual 
examination process established by the Ministerial Decision since its adoption. 
When will India respond to the Secretariat questionnaire to provide information 
on these new programmes and any other programmes?  
a. to c. In view of the inadequate infrastructural d evelopment and costs arising out of 
infrastructural inefficiencies, the State Government in Gujarat decided to provide financial 
assistance to the state dairy cooperative federation up to a maximum of Rs.  50 per kg to 
meet the marketing and transport costs . The duration of this programme is six months. 
The details regarding MEIS programme are available at the website 
http://www.dgft.nic.in/ . 
d. to e. India would update its Art 9.4 Export Subsidy notifications in due cour se. It is not 
mandatory for developing countries to reply to export competition questionnaire till  2020.  
10.2  PAKISTAN  
10.2.1   Question by the United States of America (AG-IMS ID 89030 ) 
As a follow -up to AG -IMS ID 88072:  
  
The United States understands that Pakistan announced a subsidy for wheat exports 
earlier this year and that the current programme expired on 30  June  2018, the conclusion 
of the 2017/18 fiscal year. Please provide an update on the wheat export subsidy 
programme, including the quantity of wheat exported under this programme during 2018.  
Does Pakistan plan to provide more subs idies to support wheat exports?  If so, please 
provide additional information, including the expected tenure of the programme.  
  
Pakistan had provided freight and marketing support for export of 2.1 million MT of wheat to mitigate 
the livelihood concerns a nd financial constraints of resource poor farmers.  
  
Pakistan believes that being a net food importing developing country it can provide freight and 
marketing support in terms of Article 9.4, 9.1 d) and e) of the AOA and the Nairobi Decision, 
whenever deem ed necessary.  
  
Follow -up: The European Union underlined the importance of respecting the Nairobi Ministerial 
Decision on elimination of export subsidies, including paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Decision, which 
asked Members not to apply export subsidies in a  manner that circumvents the requirement to 
reduce and eliminate export subsidies and not to raise export subsidies beyond the average level of 
the past five years on a product basis. Canada, as an exporter of wheat, flagged interest in the issue, 
particul arly the use of export subsidies for wheat.  
10.2.2   Question by Australia (AG-IMS ID 89061 ) 
Australia notes that Pakistan's Economic Coordination Committee of Cabinet approved 
on 2 October the proposal from the Commerce Division to export one million tonnes of 
surplus sugar. In order for the mills to be eligible to export their excess sugar, Pakistan's 
central bank has stated that the mills must clear cane arrears and s tart crushing.  
  
a. Will Pakistan provide any funding to assist the mills to clear cane arrears during 
this crushing season?  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 29 - 
 
  Is Pakistan proposing to provide any freight or financial support to sugar exporters during 
this crushing season?  
 
At present, there i s no proposal to grant freight and marketing support on export of sugar.  
  
However, Pakistan believes that being a net food importing developing country it can provide freight 
and marketing support in terms of art 9.4, 9.1 (d &e) of AOA and the Nairobi de cision of  2015.   
Follow -up: Australia welcomed Pakistan's confirmation that no freight assistance contingent on 
exports had been provided at this stage. Australia noted its interest in closely monitoring the global 
sugar market and reviewing Members' measu res negatively affecting global sugar prices. Australia 
also noted that it may follow up on Pakistan's previous responses in relation to minimum support 
prices on sugar. The European Union echoed Australia's concern and asked Members to respect the 
Nairobi  Ministerial Decision. Brazil and Colombia noted concern as regards Members' support policies 
to sugar and their impact on the international sugar market. Costa Rica, Guatemala,  and Thailand 
flagged interest in the topic.  
10.2.3   Question by the Russian Federatio n (AG-IMS ID 89091 ) 
The Russian Federation notes that Pakistan has been applying export subs idies on sugar 
for the last four years. In 2017 the Government of Pakistan announced an increase of 
export subsidies and export quotas. The volume of export quota for sugar grew 
significantly: from 500 thousand tonnes to 2 million tonnes. Pakistani exporte rs enjoy 
sugar subsidies of 97 USD per tonne. Therefore, the total amount of subsidies could equal 
to 194 million USD in 2017.  
a. a. Could Pakistan specify the amount of export subsidies for sugar it provided 
over the last four years?  
b. Could Pakistan clarify the mechanism of choosing the destinations for export of 
sugar under this programme?  
c. Could Pakistan describe the criteria for producers to be eligible to receive the 
abovementioned export subsidies?  
a. Pakistan had provided freight and  marketing support in the past under article 9.4, 9.1  d) 
and e) of the AoA and the Nairobi Decision of 2015 to sugar cane producers on a limited 
quantity. The main aim of this measure was to mitigate market failures and infrastructural 
inefficiencies to en able sugar millers to clear outstanding dues of cane farmers.  
Details of previous years' measures have already been provided in previous CoA  meetings 
and will be provided in Pakistan's final reply.  
b. There was no binding on exporters for choosing the destina tions for export of sugar.  
c. The criteria for freight and marketing support was the cut -off date for export which was 
the end of the crushing season.  
10.3  ZIMBABWE  
10.3.1   Question by the United States of America (AG-IMS ID 89033 ) 
As a follow up to AG -IMS ID 88076, the United States would like to reiterate the follow ing 
question, for which Zimbabwe has not provided a written answer:  
  
The United States understands the Government of Zimbabwe's central bank, the Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe, is providing tobacco growers a performance export bonus as an 
incentive to grow the  country's production and increase exports.  For the 2018 marketing 
season, the central bank, has increased the export incentive from 5% to 12% and up 
to 17.5 % for top exporters.  
  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 30 - 
 
  a. Please explain these agriculture support measures implemented by Zimbabwe' s 
central bank during the marketing periods 2017 and 2018.  
b. What is the legal basis under the Agreement on Agriculture and the Nairobi 
Decision that allows for this kind of agriculture support measure?  
Zimbabwe undertook to provide a response at a later sta ge.  
  
Follow -up: The European Union reiterated the importance of all Members respecting the Nairobi 
Ministerial Decision on Export competition.  
11  COA MEETING  26-27 FEBRUARY 2019  
11.1  PAKISTAN  
11.1.1   Question by the United States of America (AG-IMS ID 90045 ) 
In response to AG -IMS ID 88072, Pakistan clai med it is only providing freight and 
marketing support for exports.  According to Agreement on Agriculture Article 9.1(d), this 
would include items such as: handling, upgrading and other processing, and international 
transport and freight, as well as favour able internal transport and freight charges. Note 
that a) the support price in Pakistan is Rs  1300 per 40 kg, or about USD265 per MT at 
August  2018 exchange rates, and b) that Pakistan authorized the export subsidy price of 
up to USD159 per metric tonne.  By USDA estimates, if all other costs were covered and 
wheat was sold at that price FOB, Pakistan would still be one of the highest price origins 
in the world.  
  
a. Please provide additional information and data that would clarify that the 
subsidy is only bein g provided for the internal transport and freight charges on 
export shipments.  
According to the Nairobi Ministerial Decision, "Members shall seek not to raise 
their export subsidies beyond the average level of the past five years on a 
product basis". Pakis tan announced a subsidy for wheat exports early in 2018, 
which expired on 30 June 2018. Pakistan reportedly announced additional 
funding for subsidizing wheat exports in November 2018.  
b. Please provide an update on the wheat export subsidy programmes, includ ing 
the quantity of wheat exported under these programmes during 2018.   
c. Please provide any details on how this measure differs from the previous 
measure governing the programme that expired in June.  
d. Does Pakistan plan to provide increased levels or extend its current support 
levels for wheat exports going forward?  
a. Export of wheat is not a regular phenomenon of Pakistan. Even Pakistan imported wheat 
during 2013, 2014 and 2015. Infrastructural gaps and deficiencies along with large 
distances between farms and ports contribute to high inland transportation costs in 
Pakistan. Therefore, in order to offset the effects of these infrastructural inefficiencies and 
to meet quality standards for exports, the support was provided to cover inland transport 
charges, marketing costs, incidental charges, cleaning/grading charges, pre -shipment 
inspection charges, fumigation, packaging charges and international freight costs.  
b. The details of wheat support programme up to June 2018 have already been shared 
previously. About 2.5 Million Tonnes of wheat was exported till June 2018.  
c. The modalities of current programme are under process and no quantum has been 
exported so far.  
d. No such plan is under consideration at the moment.  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  Follow -up: The EU and the Russian Federation hi ghlighted the importance of all WTO Members 
respecting the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on eliminating export subsidies, including those with 
access to Article 9.4. Australia and Canada, as wheat exporters, noted interest in the use of export 
subsidies on wheat. Australia repeated its view that such subsidies needed to link to the actual costs 
of internal transport and freight. Australia reminded Pakistan, despite Pakistan's previous statement 
that it could provide freight and marketing support when necessa ry under Article 9 .4, the Nairobi 
Decision stated that developing Members could continue to benefit from the provisions of Article  9.4 
until 2023 and Members shall not seek to raise the subsides beyond the average level of the past 
five years on a product basis. Australia sought Pakistan's confirmation on whether the subsidies 
announced last year on wheat exports did not exceed the average of the period 2012 -2017.  
11.2  SWITZERLAND  
11.2.1   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 90020 ) 
a. Can Switzerland confirm that following the new "Loi chocolatière" in operation 
as of 1  January 2019, an amount equal to previous export subsidies will reach 
chocolate producers via farmers and private funds?  
b. Can Switzerland explain how the new law complies with the Nairobi Export 
Competition Decision and its new certified schedule?  
a. The law in question ("Federal Law of 1 3 December  1974 on the import and export of 
processed agricultural products") was completely revised following the entry into force of 
the Nairobi Ministerial Decision and is now called the "Federal Law on the import of 
processed agricultural products" (SR  632.111.72). It now only covers regulations 
concerning imports of processed agricultural products. All export subsidies were therefore 
eliminated as of 1  January  2019. In parallel, Switzerland has introduced support measures 
in the form of direct payments  to milk and cereal producers that are not linked to exports. 
Switzerland has also simplified the authorization procedure for inward processing for basic 
dairy and cereal products that previously benefitted from export contributions.  
b. The new law is in conf ormity with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on export competition. 
The support measures are also in conformity with the Ministerial Decision, since they 
involve support under the AMS commitment of Schedule LIX Switzerland -Liechtenstein. 
The simplification  of inward processing arrangements for basic dairy and cereal products 
provides processing companies with administratively simplified access to imported 
products.  
Follow -up: Ukraine highlighted the importance of Members' transparent implementation of the 
Nairobi Ministerial Decision on export competition. Russian Federation acknowledged Switzerland's 
announcement that it would end its export subsidies by 1  January  2019 and noted its concern with 
new export subsidy measures directed to agricultural producers . 
11.3  ZIMBABWE  
11.3.1   Question by the United States of America (AG-IMS ID 90046 ) 
As a follow up to AG -IMS ID 89033 and AG -IMS ID 88076, the United States would like to 
reiterate the following question, for which Zimbabwe has not provided a written answer:  
 
The United States understands the Government of Zimbabwe's Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
(which is the cent ral bank) is providing tobacco growers a performance export bonus as 
an incentive to grow the country's production and increase exports.  For the 2018 
marketing season, the central bank, has increased the export incentive from 5% to 12% 
and up to 17.5% for top exporters.  
 
a. Please explain these agriculture support measures implemented by Zimbabwe's 
central bank during the marketing periods 2017 and 2018.  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  b. What is the legal basis under the Agreement on Agriculture and the Nairobi 
Decision that allows for this kind of agriculture support measure?  
12  COA MEETING  25 JUNE 2019  
12.1  EGYPT  
12.1.1   Question by the United States of America (AG-IMS ID 91138 ) 
 
The United States has seen press reports that the Government of Egypt (GOE) is 
impleme nting export subsidy programmes, administered by the Egyptian Export 
Development Fund (ESF), to promote several economic sectors, including agriculture.  
  
a. Please explain how the export subsidy measure is implemented and provide 
eligibility criteria for agr icultural products.  
b. Please provide the total value of export subsidy by agricultural product group 
and by destinations.  
c. Please provide the legislation and/or decision(s) for making this export subsidy 
available.  
d. When will the GOE provide all overdue Table ES:1 notifications, including 
Supporting Table ES:2, and respond to the export competition questionnaire?  
12.2  INDIA  
12.2.1   Question by Australia (AG-IMS ID 91006 ) 
 
Australia refers to the Transport and Marketing Assistance (TMA) for Specified Agriculture 
Products scheme announced by the Government of India 's Press Information Bureau on 
5 March 2019. This scheme 's objective is to  "provide assistance for the international 
component of freight and marketing of agricultural produce ", which pursuant to Article  9, 
paragraph 1(d) of the Agreement on Agriculture is an export subsidy.  
 
Australia notes that pur suant to paragraph 7 of the 2015 Nairobi Ministerial Decision on 
Export Competition, India as a Developing Member: "shall  continue to benefit from the 
provisions of Article  9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture until the end of 2023 ". 
 
That said, India is al so obliged by the subsequent paragraphs of the Nairobi Decision, 
which note:  
 
"9. Members shall not apply export subsidies in a manner that circumvents the 
requirement to reduce and eliminate all export subsidies;  
 
10. Members shall seek not to raise their  export subsidies beyond the average level of the 
past five years on a product basis; and  
 
11. Members shall ensure that any export subsidies have at most minimal trade distorting 
effects and do not displace or impede the exports of another Member. To that  effect, 
Members using export subsidies shall give due consideration to the effects of any such 
export subsidies on other Members, and shall consult, upon request, with any other 
Member having a substantial interest as an exporter with respect to any matte r related to 
the export subsidies in question. The Member applying such export subsidies shall 
provide, upon request, such a Member with necessary information. " 
 
Noting these relevant paragraphs of the Nairobi Decision, can India provide the following 
information with respect to the TMA:   
 G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 33 - 
 
  a. Please advise how this new export subsidy scheme is consistent with the entire 
Nairobi Decision, notably paragraph 9 's obligation to reduce export subsidies 
(rather than increase them)?  
b. Can India please prov ide information on the average level of export subsidies 
provided for those products covered by the TMA for the past five years?  
c. Can India provide advice on what steps and assessment it undertook in the 
development of the TMA to ensure it is consistent wit h paragraph 11 of the 
Nairobi Decision  and has, at most, a minimal trade distorting effect on other 
Members?  
a. to c. As per the Nairobi Ministerial decision, developing Members shall continue to benefit 
from the provisions of Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture until the end of 2023.  
The "Transport and Marketing Assistance " (TMA) is a new scheme introduced in March 2019. This 
scheme aims to provide assistance for the international component of freight and marketing of 
agricultural produce and complies with the Nairobi decision.  Further details about the scheme can 
be accesse d at 
 
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=189200 . 
 
12.3  RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
12.3.1   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 91021 ) 
 
According to the submitted ES1 notifications, the Russian Federation provides no export 
subsidies to agricultural products.  
 
However, it was recently announced that 406 billion rubbles worth of subsidies will be 
spent under the Agribusiness Product Exports project, to boost the export potential of the 
Russian Far East.  
 
a. Can the Russia n Federation  provide more information about this programme?  
b. When did the programme start and when will it be notified under the 
ES1 notification? How does it comply with the Nairobi decision on Export 
Competition?  
a. In accordance  with national project "International Cooperation and Exports" and related 
federal project  "Exports of Agro -Industrial Products" 406.8 million rubles has been 
allocated to achieve agricultural exports to US D 45 billion by 2024. Within the framework 
of the "Exports of Agro -Industrial Products" project the following basic goals have been 
defined:  
• increasing volume of agricultural production, including increased high value -added 
products share;  
• improvement of logistics infrastructure ; 
• elimination tariff and non -tariff barriers in foreign markets;  
• promotion of agricultural products to foreign markets.  
For further information, please, visit the website:  http://futurerussia.gov.ru . 
  
b. The Russian  Federation  remains committed not to granting export subsidies that is in 
conformity with its WTO obligations.  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  12.4  ZIMBABWE  
12.4.1   Question by the United States of America (AG-IMS ID 91163 ) 
 
The Un ited States requests a response from Zimbabwe for AG -IMS ID 90046, 
AG-IMS ID 89033, and AG-IMS ID 88076.  
  
13  COA MEETING  30 OCTOBER  2019   
13.1  CANADA  
13.1.1   Question by New Zealand (AG-IMS ID 92075 ) 
New Zealand refers to Canada 's responses to Australia 's question at the June 2019 
Commi ttee on Agriculture (AG -IMS ID 91002). The Canadian Government is providing a 
series of compensation packages to farmers and producers in supply -managed sectors 
(dairy, poultry and egg sectors) that are impacted by recent trade agreements, 
including  CPTPP and CETA.  
  
In its response Canada stated it is working to determine how best to implement its 
commitment to the relevant sectors in a fair and effective way. Media reporting in 
August  2019 states that Canada will pay CAD 345 million directly to dairy farm ers in the 
first year based on the size of their production quotas.  
  
a. Can Canada confirm that this trade and production -distorting support will be 
notified as AMS?  
b.  Export subsidies for products given a grace period under the Nairobi Decision 
must be elimi nated by 1 January 2020. What steps is Canada taking to ensure 
that production -linked compensation does not circumvent the intent of these 
commitments by leading to increased exports of subsidised product?  
a. This program will be notified as appropriate in Canada 's 2019 Domestic Support 
notification.  
b. Canada 's policies and programs are fully in compliance with Canada 's international trade 
obligations. Canada has implemented the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition and in 
keeping with its term s and conditions will eliminate its remaining export subsidies by the 
end of 2020. These payments provided to eligible dairy producers are not contingent upon 
export and are not linked to export subsidies . 
13.2  INDIA  
13.2.1   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 92007 ) 
The Indian Government announced on 28 August 2019 that it would introduce an export 
subsidy of USD146.1 per tonne. A budget of 62.68 billion rupees was approved for the 
export of up to 6 million tonnes during the 2019/20 marketing year. The announcement 
also stated that this subsidy did not violate WTO rules.  
 
a. If the export subsidy is not t o violate WTO rules, India is considered to conform 
to Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Can India please indicate how it 
has calculated and arrived at this level of subsidies including the transport cost 
in question as well as other the other e lements taken into consideration.  
b. Can India explain how it sees the increasing subsidy level and increasing 
quantity of sugar exports to be subsidised to be in line with Nairobi Ministerial 
Decision paragraphs 9, 10 and 11. In particular how does India see  the 
2019/20  export programme as respecting paragraph 10:"Members shall seek G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 35 - 
 
  not to raise their export subsidies beyond the average level of the past five years 
on a product basis".  
c. Can India indicate the quantity of sugar exported during the 2018/19 marke ting 
year (total and with subsidies) and the total amount spent on subsidy for these 
exports (by both national and provincial authorities).  
a. and b. The export subsidy to be provided to the sugar mills have been calculated by taking 
into account the expenses  incurred by them on marketing costs (including handling, 
upgrading and other processing costs) and costs of international and internal transport 
and freight charges and is therefore consistent with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision.  
c. India will provide an a nswer to this question in due course.  
13.2.2   Question by Canada (AG-IMS ID 92048 ) 
On 28 August 2019,  India 's Cabinet approved the use of export subsidies Rp 62.68 billion 
(USD 877 million) to encourage the export of 60 Lakh metric tonnes (6 million MT) of 
sugar in the marketing year 2019/2020 starting on 1 October 2019. The Government of 
India will provi de a subsidy Rp 10,448 per tonne (US D 146) of sugar for its export.  
  
The announcement notes that this export subsidy is being provided under Article 9.1  (d) 
and (e) of the Agreement on Agriculture. Canada notes that paragraph 11 of the Nairobi 
Ministerial Decision on Export Competition charges Members "to ensure that any export 
subsidies have at most minimal trade distorting effects and do not displace or impede the 
exports of another Member. "  
  
a. India is the world 's second largest sugar producer. Could India clarify how it 
ensures that its subsidized sugar exports are not displacing or impeding the 
sugar exports of another Member?  
b. Could India indicate how  much sugar has been exported using these export 
subsidies?  
a. The scheme is intended to provide support for expenses on marketing costs including 
handling, upgrading and other processing costs, costs of international and internal 
transport and freight charg es on export of sugar for the sugar season 2019 -20, which is 
compliant with Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  
b. Till now, no exports have been made under the scheme.  
13.2.3   Question by Australia (AG-IMS ID 92095 ) 
 
Australia refers to its question to India at 91th CoA, AG -IMS ID 91006, in which Australia 
requested India provide information on its new Transport and Marketing 
Assistanc e (TMA) scheme. India 's response did not provide a level of detail for any 
Member to understand how the TMA is fully consistent with all constituent parts of the 
Nairobi Decision, including paragraphs  9, 10 or 11 of the Decision. Australia therefore 
requests India provide specific details on:  
a. The average level of export subsidies provided for those products covered by the 
TMA for the past five years?  
b. What steps and assessment India has undertaken in the development of the TMA 
to ensure it is consistent with paragraph 11 of the Nairobi Decisions and has at 
most, a minimal trade distorting effect on other Members?  
a. and b. As per Para 8 of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on export compet ition, developing members 
shall continue to benefit from the provisions of Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture until the 
end of 2023. Article 9.4 of the AoA allows developing members to provide export subsidies under 
Article 9.1 (d) & (e).  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 36 - 
 
  The "Transport and Marketing Assistance " (TMA) is a new scheme introduced in March 2019. It aims 
to provide assistance for the international component of freight and marketing of agricultural 
produce and is compliant with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision.  
 
Further  details about the scheme can be accessed at a weblink that will be provided in our written 
response ( http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=189200 ). 
 
13.3  SWITZERLAND  
13.3.1   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 92018 ) 
 
Could Switzerland explain the function and status o f the private trust "TSM Treuhand 
GmbH" - for the milk sector - and FSPC (French: Fédération suisse des producteurs de 
céréales, German: Schweizerischer Getreideproduzentenverband – SGPV) – for the 
cereals sector – in the context of the compensation of the  price difference of incorporated 
products, and explain under which conditions such compensation is granted?  
 
The EU notes that on the TSM website it is stated in German: "Im Rahmen eines 
Leistungsauftrages des Bundesamtes für Landwirtschaft erfüllt die TS M öffentlich -
rechtliche Aufgaben im Bereich der Milchpreisstützung". [In EN In the context of a 
performance report issued by the Federal Office of Agriculture, the TSG complies with 
public law tasks relating to milk price support].  
 
This appears to imply t hat payments made by these organisations are financed by virtue 
of government action. Can Switzerland confirm the accuracy of the TSM website and that 
the compensation for incorporated products is based on this public law task.  
 
On the basis of Article 43 of the Law on Agriculture (RS 910.1), a service contract between the Swiss 
Confederation and TSM Fiduciaire Sàrl regulates tasks to be performed in the dairy sector. These 
public law tasks are the subject of exhaustive regulation in Article 12 o f the Ordinance on milk price 
support (RS 916.350.2) and are compensated by the Confederation. The Swiss Federation of Cereal 
Producers (FSPC) is an association within the meaning of Article 60 et seq. of the Civil Code. Only 
producer organizations and gro ups whose members produce cereals, oilseeds or protein crops can 
be FSPC members. The FSPC is not tasked in any way with implementation of the Law on Agriculture 
(RS 910.1) and is not associated in any way with implementation of the provisions of Article  55 
thereof concerning the additional payment for cereals. The conditions for granting the additional 
payment for cereals are established in the Ordinance on contributions for particular crops 
(RS 910.17). As already indicated in previous replies to question s on this subject, Switzerland 
abolished the legal bases for the compensation of price differences for incorporated primary 
materials for export with the reform that entered into force on 1  January  2019. This reform is in 
conformity with the Nairobi Decisi on. Nor are there any service contracts between the Confederation 
and private companies in this sphere. Hence there are no payments on exports financed by virtue 
of government action.  
 
13.4  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
13.4.1   Question by India (AG-IMS ID 92072 ) 
a. Market Facilitation Program (MFP) of the United States "provides assistance to 
farmers and ranchers wi th commodities directly impacted by unjustified foreign 
retaliatory tariffs, resulting in the loss of traditional export markets ". With 
reference to question AG-IMS ID 91063 raised in June 2019 CoA meeting, the 
United States responded that "Market Facilita tion Program is currently in the 
rulemaking process ". 
i. India requests the United States to provide an update on the status of the 
programme.  
ii. Further, the United States is requested to state the total as well as 
component -wise amount of compensation announced so far under the 
programme.  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 37 - 
 
  iii. India would appreciate if the United States can clarify the basis for deciding 
the product -wise payments where there is no impact on trade as a result of 
diversion of trade to other markets with no signifi cant trade injury incurred.  
iv. Could the United States please provide information on the average level of 
subsidies provided for the products covered under the MFP since the 
programme started?  
v. India requests the United States to elucidate the provisions of th e Agreement 
on Agriculture under which the programme is intended to be notified?  
b. The Budget Summary of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), 
FY 2019, under the heading of International Markets for U.S. Agricultural 
Exports, states that "The Budget includes $433 million to reduce trade barriers 
that disadvantage U.S. agricultural exports and to open new markets for U.S. 
farm products. " 
(Source:  https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/usda -fy19-
budget summary.pdf ).  
In this regard, the United States is requested to  
 
i. Elaborate, how the sum of $433 million would be channelized for increasing 
agricultural exports?  
ii. Please advise the provision s of AoA and the Nairobi Ministerial Decision, 
under which such a support has been provided.  
c. "The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) is issuing a new regulation to 
implement the Agricultural Trade Promotion Program (ATP). The ATP provides 
assistance to U.S . agricultural industries to conduct activities that promote 
U.S. agricultural commodities in foreign markets for commodities impacted by 
tariffs, including activities that address existing or potential non -tariff barriers 
to trade. "  
(Source:  https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/08/30/2018 -
18870/agricultural -trade -promotion -program ) 
 
i. India would like to request the Unit ed States to explain how the money 
disbursed under the ATP intends to increase agricultural exports by 
addressing the non -tariff barriers to trade?  
ii. The programme mentions about some activities to be conducted with 
assistance from the government, what is th e nature of these activities?  
iii. What constitute  "potential "non-tariff barriers and how would the 
United  States assess the impact of the  "potential " non-tariff barriers? Are 
there any identified guiding parameters?  
iv. Please advise the provisions of the AoA, under which this scheme would be 
notified?  Further, India would like to understand how this new scheme is 
consistent with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision of 2015?  
d. The USDA 's Trade Aid Package includes "Food Purchase and Distribution 
Program " to parti ally offset lost export sales of affected commodities under 
which the USDA has targeted an initial 29 commodities for purchases and 
distribution through domestic nutrition assistance programs. " (refer 
to https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45310.html ). In this respect, 
India would request the United States to provide information on the following:  
i. The prices at which the commodities would be procured?  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 38 - 
 
  ii. How does the United State s intend to dispose the procured stocks? Would 
there be an international aid component in the disposal of the stocks?  
e. In July/August, 2018, the United States announced US D 12 billion package 
comprising direct payment under 'Market Facilitation Programme ' (MFP), Food 
Purchase and Distribution Programme (FPDP) and Trade Promotion 
Programme  (TPP) to assist farmers suffering from damage due to unjustified 
trade retaliation by foreign nations.  Further, in May 2019, the US announced 
USD 16 billion package to  supp ort for farmers impacted by unjustified retaliation 
and trade disruption. In this context:  
i. The US is requested to provide the reasoning for authorizing the second relief 
package in May 2019 for agriculture, immediately following a similar 
programme in 2018 . 
ii. Given the fact that a member with total AMS commitments is obligated to 
make the domestic support notification no later than 90 days following the 
end of the calendar year, when will the US submit its domestic notification 
covering July/August 2018 relie f package?  
f. f. With regards to the Trade Mitigation Programmes for 2018 and 2019, the 
United States is requested to provide the following:  
i. What was the budgeted and actual expenditure for Market Facilitation 
Programmes (MFP), Food Purchase and Distribution Programme (FPDP) and 
the Agricultural Trade Promotion Programme (ATP) under both the relief 
packages?  
ii. What is the specific eligibility criterion for MFP under 2018 relief package?   
iii. Kindly list all the products that were procured under the FPDP and how the 
procured quantity was disposed under both relief packages?  
g. g. India reiterates its Question with AG -IMS ID 91603 regarding the May 2019 
relief package.  Reports suggest that the US Department of Agriculture plans to 
provide aid of USD16 billion to compensate farmers for lower prices and lost 
sales stemming from ongoing trade disputes:  
(https://www.usda.gov/media/press -releases/2019/05/23/usda -announces -
support -farmers -impacted -unjustified -retaliation -and). Amongst the various 
programs, the Market Facilitation p rogramme provides for payments to the 
farmers ' respective commodities depending on the severity of the trade 
disruption and the period of adjustment to new trade partners.  
i. How will these disruptions and period of adjustment be calculated?  
ii. How have the elig ibility criteria and initial payment  rates of the commodities 
been determined under  the programme?  Was the criterion for MFP in 2019 
different from the previous MFP?  
a.  
i. Sign-up for the 2019 Market Facilitate Program (MFP) began on July 29, 2019. More 
informa tion about the program can be found at:  https://www.usda.gov/media/press -
releases/2019/07/25/usda -announces -details -support -package-farmers  
ii. As of Monday, 30 September 2019, a total of USD5.2 billion in MFP payments had been 
made to producers.  
iii. USDA defined economic losses due to the trade actions in terms of gross trade 
damages. Gross trade damages were defined as the total amount o f expected export G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 39 - 
 
  sales lost to the retaliatory partner due to the additional tariffs. Gross trade damage 
contributes to the economic cost to the producer to adjust to the disrupted markets, 
manage surplus commodities, and expand and develop new markets, c onsistent with 
the design of the MFP.  
iv. The program is still being implemented and final data are not yet available. As of 30 
September 2019, total MFP payments were $5.2 billion.  
v. The United States will notify these programs to the Committee on Agriculture a t the 
appropriate time.  
b.  
i. With regard to the cited report, this was a budget proposal made by the Administration 
and was never enacted by Congress.  
ii. These programs are currently being implemented, and the United States will report 
these measures per the prov isions of the Agreement on Agriculture and the Nairobi 
Ministerial Decision on Export Competition in due course.  
c.  
i. The funding provided through the ATP is intended to help U.S. agricultural exporters 
identify and access new markets. It is further intended t o mitigate the adverse effects 
of other countries' tariff and non –tariff barriers by providing cost -share assistance to 
eligible U.S. organizations for activities such as consumer advertising, public relations, 
point-of-sale demonstrations, participation i n trade fairs and exhibits, market 
research, technical assistance, etc.  
ii. The U.S. Government and/or its staff do not generally participate in ATP activities. 
Participants use their own personnel and members or hire additional staff and/or 
contractors to und ertake a variety of activities that include everything from market 
research to technical assistance and promotional events. After conclusion of an 
activity, participants seek reimbursement for eligible expenditures. Overall, the ATP 
program provides cost –share assistance to reimburse program participants for eligible 
expenditures they make in furtherance of approved activities under an ATP agreement.  
iii. A potential non -tariff barrier is any proposed or impending non -tariff issue that a 
program participant beli eves will threaten access to a market for U.S. agricultural 
commodities. If an ATP participant identifies a potential barrier, they may propose 
activities (such as technical assistance, trade servicing, etc.) designed to mitigate or 
lessen the impact of th e threatened barrier.  
iv. These programs are currently being implemented and the United States will report 
these measures per the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture and the Nairobi 
Ministerial Decision on Export Competition in due course.  
d.  
i. Commodities purchased under the Food Purchase and Distribution Program are 
purchased at market prices using a competitive bid process.  
ii. There are no procured stocks under this program. Food purchased through FPDP is 
directly distributed by the Food and Nutrition Servic e of USDA to food banks, schools, 
and other outlets serving low -income individuals in the United States. None of the food 
purchased under this program is distributed through international aid programs.  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 40 - 
 
  e.  
i. The 2019 program provides producers with financial as sistance to absorb some of the 
additional costs resulting from having to delay or reorient marketing for the 2019 crop 
due to continued trade actions of foreign governments.  
ii. The United States will notify these programs to the Committee on Agriculture as pa rt 
of its regular notification for the 2018/2019 marketing year.  
f.  
i. USDA was authorized to provide up to USD12 billion in assistance under the 
2018 programs. In 2019, USDA was authorized to provide up to $16 billion. Total 
actual expenditures for the three 2018 programs are approximately $10 billion as of 
30 September 2019: $8.6 billion for MFP, $1.1 billion for FPDP, and $200 million 
for ATP. The 201 9 programs have just begun to be implemented. As of 
30 September  2019, payments under MFP total $5.2 billion. No purchases have yet 
been made under FPDP. On July 19, 2019, $100 million in cost -share assistance was 
awarded under ATP.  
ii. Eligibility criteria fo r MFP under the 2018 program can be found 
at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR -2019-title7-vol10/xml/CFR -2019-
title7-vol10 -part1409.xml . 
iii. The following products were announced for the 2018 FPDP: apples, apricots, beef, 
blueberries, cranberries, dairy, figs, grapefruit, grapes, hazelnuts, kidney beans, 
lemons/limes, lentils, macadamia nuts, navy beans, fresh oranges, orange juice, 
peanut butt er, pears, peas, pecans, pistachios, plums/prunes, pork, potatoes, rice, 
strawberries, sweet corn, and walnuts. Actual purchases as of 30 September 2019 
included apples, beef, blueberries, cranberries, dairy figs, grapefruit, grapes, 
hazelnuts, kidney bean s, lentils, navy beans, fresh oranges, orange juice, peanut 
butter, pears, peas, pecans, pistachios, plums/prunes, pork, potatoes, rice, 
strawberries, sweet corn, and walnuts. The following products were announced for 
the 2019 FPDP: pork, dairy, beef, poul try, lamb, citrus (oranges, orange juice, 
grapefruit, lemons, and limes), apples, strawberries, blueberries, apricots, 
plums/prunes, pears, figs, sweet corn, raisins, potatoes, onions, and processed foods 
(including tomato sauces, canned tomatoes, pasta, p repared cereals, soups/broths, 
and other processed foods. No purchases have yet been made under the 2019 FPDP.  
g.  
i. Please refer to the 2019 USDA Trade Damage Estimation Report for an explanation of 
the methodology used to measure gross trade damages caused by  ongoing retaliatory 
tariffs. The trade mitigation programs do not compensate farmers for lower prices.  
ii. Please see the response to question (g)(i) above. For eligibility criteria for the 2019 
MFP, please see  https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/07/29/2019 -
15700/trade -mitigation -program#sectno -citation -%E2%80%891409.1 . G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  14  COA MEETING  18 JUNE 2020  
14.1  AUSTR ALIA  
14.1.1   Question by the European Union (AG -IMS ID 94048 ) 
 
Australia has implemented a programme  called the International Freight Assistance 
Mechanism (IFAM). According to the relevant Australian Government factsheet v3.0 on 
the IFAM ( https://www.austrade.gov.au/ArticleDocuments/10562/covid -19-relief -and-
recovery -fund.pdf.aspx ) the IFAM is an AUD  110 million "scheme designed to assist 
Australian agricultural and fisheries producers to export their premium produce to priority 
market s". The factsheet states: "by meeting a portion of the airfreight costs, the 
government is helping ensure Australian exporters can recover and adapt quickly when 
the COVID -19 crisis begins to abate". According to the factsheet, eligible products include:  
• seafood (including lobsters);  
• premium red meat (including beef, lamb and pork);  
• dairy (such as fresh milk and yoghurt);  
• horticulture (such as premium fruits and packaged salad or vegetables  
 
This appears therefore to be an aid provided to reduce the costs o f marketing exports of 
agricultural products, namely the costs of international transport and freight. As such, it 
appears to be an export subsidy as defined in Article 9.1(d) of the Agreement on 
Agriculture which covers "the provision of subsidies to redu ce the costs of marketing 
exports of agricultural products (other than widely available export promotion and 
advisory services) including handling, upgrading and other processing costs, and the 
costs of international transport and freight". For developed W TO Members such as 
Australia, paragraph 6 of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision of 19  December  2015 
(WTO  document WT/MIN(13)/40) provides for the elimination of export subsidies as of 
the date of adoption of that Decision.  
 
a. Can Australia explain how the IFAM  respects its WTO obligations on agricultural 
export subsidies as set out in the Nairobi Ministerial Decision and the Agreement 
on Agriculture?  
b. Will Australia immediately terminate any prohibited agricultural export 
subsidies?  
Australia thanks the European Union for its question and kindly refers the EU to the response to 
Canada 's question AG-IMS ID 94034. IFAM is consistent with Australia 's WTO obligations.  
 
14.2  NEW ZEALAND  
14.2.1   Question by the European Union (AG -IMS ID 94050 ) 
 
New Zealand has introduced the International Airfreight Capacity scheme (IAFC), by 
which it supports the export of New Zealand's product by air to export destinations.  
 
a. Can New Zealand explain more in detail how much the New Zealand Government 
is spending on this programme, and the basis on which the subsidy level has 
been calculated?  
b. Can New Zealand explain whether and how this support scheme complies with 
the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on export competition.  
The COVID -19 pandemic has presented us all with an extraordinary and unprecedented set of 
circumstances. As an island nation in t he South Pacific, New Zealand was particularly vulnerable 
when the cessation of passenger flights due to COVID -19 related travel restrictions caused 
international air freight capacity to collapse almost overnight. Prior to COVID -19, globally, around 
half o f air freight was carried on passenger planes; for New Zealand, this figure was closer to 80%. 
Like a number of other governments, the New Zealand Government has had to step in temporarily, G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 42 - 
 
  in the absence of a functioning market, to assist airlines sufferi ng as a result of the COVID -19 crisis. 
For us, 'Green Lanes ' and other emergency measures adopted by other Members are not an option; 
we need planes for connectivity with the rest of the world. The International Air freight Capacity 
Scheme has been a neces sary and fundamental part of our broader, temporary, emergency response 
to the COVID -19 pandemic. We have not provided subsidies to exporters of agriculture products, 
reduced or waived fees and charges, or provided incentive payments. The International Air  freight 
Capacity Scheme is market -led. It was established through a Request for Proposal process that was 
open to carriers from all nations, whether or not they previously serviced the New Zealand market. 
Businesses continue to purchase air freight capaci ty from carriers, via their freight forwarders, as 
they always have done. New Zealand has taken its international trade obligations into account in 
developing the scheme. Further, through this scheme (and our recent tariff eliminations on 
COVID -19 related goods), New Zealand has given effect to:  
• our pledge, along with ten other Members via a Joint Ministerial Statement (link) to maintain 
trade flows and supply chain connectivity; and  
• our commitment, along with 41 other WTO Members [WT/GC/212], to ensure t hat any COVID -
19 related measures are "targeted, proportionate, transparent and temporary ", do not "create 
unnecessary barriers to trade or disruption to global supply chains ", are "consistent with WTO 
rules" and will be lifted "as soon as possible ".  
a. The New Zealand Government has made up to NZD  330 million available to the 
International Air Freight Capacity Scheme. No products receive subsidies. Businesses 
purchase the air freight capacity from airlines, via their freight forwarders, as they did 
prior to COVID -19.  
b. New Zealand has taken its international trade obligations into account in developing this 
scheme. We have not provided subsidies to exporters of agriculture products, reduced or 
waived fees and charges, or provided incentive payments. Import ers and exporters of 
critical products, such as essential medical supplies and food, are purchasing air freight 
capacity from airlines, via their freight forwarders, as they did prior to COVID -19. More 
generally, we note that New Zealand 's scheduled export  subsidy entitlements were 
eliminated in 2000, long before the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on export competition. 
Further, New Zealand is an active contributor to the annual Cairns Group Export 
Competition Review, which seeks to ensure full implementation  by all WTO Members of 
the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on export competition.  
15  COA MEETING  28 JULY 2020   
15.1  EUROPEAN UNION  
15.1.1   Question by Brazil (AG-IMS ID 93226 ) 
The French Government has announced that for SMEs and  mid-tier companies, and for the 
entire duration of the  COVID -19 pandemic, Bpifrance Assurance Export can now cover its 
insurees (credit in stitutions) for up to 90% of issued and  declared guarantee 
commitments (export guarantee insurance)  or pre -financing that has been set up 
(pre-financing  guarantee) compared to 80% previously. For other  businesses, insurees 
may be covered for up to 70% as a gainst  50% in the past.  
 
Since Bpifrance Assurance Export was mentioned on France's  last answer to the Export 
Competition questionnaire (G/AG/W/125/Rev.11/Add.2), could France/the EU clarify if:  
a. These new conditions apply to agricultural products  exports;  
b. The program is still self -financing and covers its  long-term operating costs and 
losses.  
As mentioned in the EU ad hoc report document G /AG/GEN/159, all new or modified export credit 
schemes that EU member States have implemented in connection with the Covid -19 pandemic, are 
required to fully respect the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition including tenor length G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 43 - 
 
  and self -financ ing. This was also mentioned by the EU during the EU intervention in the special 
COVID -19 CoA meeting on 18 June.  
15.1.2   Question by India (AG-IMS ID 93243 ) 
 
Pursuant to the European Union's ad hoc Report on measures taken during the COVID -19 
pandemic (G/AG/GEN/159), India notes that the Netherlands instituted the 
'compensation for damages caused by COV ID-19 outbreak to horticulture, floriculture and 
potato sectors' amounting to EUR 650 million.  
  
With regards to this, India requests the European Union to provide the following 
information:  
 
What is the nature of these payments and how will they be notifi ed under the AoA?  
 
Please provide the details regarding eligibility for receiving these payments, the method 
of calculation of damages for farmers and traders and the ceiling limit for damages (if 
any)?  
 
India notes that a few European Union members such as Belgium, Denmark, France, and 
the Netherlands have instituted export financing schemes. The European Union, in their 
ad hoc report in document G/AG/GEN/159, states that these schemes are general and 
non-agriculture specific.   
 
The document further mentions that 'all agriculture -specific or agricultural part of general 
schemes are required to respect the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition.  
 
With regards to these schemes, India requests the  European Union to respond to the 
following:  
 
a. Please provide details regarding the export financing measures being adopted 
by these EU  members.  
b. What is the estimated expenditure/outlay for these measures?  
c. What are the eligibility requirements under these e xport financing schemes?  
d. How will these schemes be notified under the Agreement on Agriculture?  
e. How is it proposed to comply with the statement included in the above document 
regarding respecting the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition. 
Have  any further guidelines been issued in this context?  
Ad NL support programmes  
 
These measures will be included in the EU notification for marketing 2019/20.  
 
These measures will be notified as Amber Box.  
 
The NL scheme concerning the compensation for damages caused by COVID -19 outbreak to 
horticulture, floriculture and potato sectors, was adopted by the Commission on the basis of 
Article  107(2)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU which stipulates that the member States 
are en titled to grant compensation for damages suffered as a consequence of an exceptional 
occurrence. The nature of the scheme is therefore compensation for damages suffered as a 
consequence of the COVID -19 outbreak. A copy of the Commission decision is availab le here:  
 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_57217  
  
Ad Export credit schemes  
 
The EU export credit schemes has been included in G/ AG/GEN/159 and its update forwarded to the 
Regular CoA meeting 28 July.  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 44 - 
 
   
As mentioned in the EU ad hoc report document G/ AG/GEN/159, all the new export credit schemes 
or changes to existing schemes that EU member States imple mented in connection with the 
COVID -19 pandemic, are required to fully respect the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export 
Competition including tenor length and self -financing. This was also mentioned by the EU explicitly 
during the special COVID -19 CoA me eting on 18 June.  
 
Data on the actual use of the schemes in question will be included once it becomes available, under 
the standard procedure of the yearly Questionnaire on Export Competition.   
 
15.2  INDIA  
15.2.1   Question by the United States of America (AG-IMS ID 93007 ) 
India stated in AG -IMS ID 89045 that the Interest Equalisation Scheme on Pre and Post 
Shipment Rupee Export Credit (IES) "is in the nature of working capital support, which is 
WTO compatible" . The United States notes that Reserve Bank of India's (RBI) notices 
refer to IES as being an export credit program and not a working capital support pro gram. 
However, the United States also notes in RBI notices 
DBR.Dir.BC.No  62/04.02.001/2015 -16 dated 4  December  2015 and 
DCBR.CO.SCB.Cir.No  1/13.05.000/2015 -16 dated 11 February 2016 explain a procedure 
for Indian banks to pass on the benefit of IES by redu cing the interest rate charged to the 
eligible exporters upfront. The notices also describe how banks submit claims to RBI for 
reimbursement.  
 
a. Please explain in detail why India does not believe IES is an interest rate support 
programme as covered under paragraph 13 (a) direct financing support of the 
Nairobi Decision.  
b. Please explain how RBI's premiums are charged and how RBI's financial 
contribution/claims are recovered under the IES.  
Per DBR.Dir.BC.No 09/04.02.001/2018 -19 dated 29 November 2018 an d 
DBR.Dir.BC.No  22/04.02.001/2018 -19 dated 11 January 2019, the United States notes 
that India's IES rate of interest equalization has increased from 3 % to 5% for Micro, Small 
& Medium Enterprises (MSME), and that since 2019 the scheme has expanded to allo w 
large merchant/corporate exporters to participate at an interest equalization rate of 3%.  
 
c. Please explain the reasoning for increasing the export financing support and 
allowing large merchants to participate in the IES.  
The United States understands that since inception in 2015 to July 2018, the RBI has spent 
INR 4,829 crore (US D 679 million) on the export support scheme for all eligible 
manufacture and agricultural products. The notice instructs RBI to keep records and s end 
a monthly report to India's Dept. of Commerce and Directorate of General of Foreign 
Trade  (DGFT) indicating reimbursements made, on both a commodity and bank basis.  
 
d. Please provide the total agricultural product -specific export support spent under 
the scheme and the total value of agricultural products benefited up to the 
present day.  
We thank the United States for their question.  
Our response is as follows:  
Under the Reserve Bank of India's Master Circular, titled - 'Rupee / Foreign Currency Export Cre dit 
and Customer Service to Exporters' issued  vide DBR.No.DIR.BC.14/ 04.02.002/2015 -16 dated  
1 July 2015, the terms Pre -shipment and post -shipment export credit have been defined to mean 
credit that is provided by the bank to an eligible exporter for finan cing expenses which are in the 
nature of working capital expenses. As the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition, pursuant to G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 45 - 
 
  footnote 7 to Para. 13, permits working capital financing to suppliers, the Interest Equalization 
Scheme is compatible with the Na irobi Decision.   
The Reserve Bank of India does not make any financial contribution under the Interest Equalization 
Scheme. Under the scheme, banks are required to pass on the benefit of interest equalisation, as 
applicable, to the eligible exporters upfro nt and submit the claims to the Reserve Bank of India for 
reimbursement. These claims are duly certified by an external auditor.  The reimbursement of the 
interest equalisation claim is made as and when funds are received from the Government of India.  
The G overnment of India,  vide notification no. 01/94/180/37/AM16/PC4/1215 dated 
2 November  2018, decided to increase the interest equalization rate from 3 to 5% for exports by 
MSME manufacturers, with effect from November 2018. More detailed information regardi ng this 
may be seen from the Reserve Bank of India's circular number DBR.Dir.BC.No.09 
/04.02.001/2018 -19 dated 29 November 2018.  
The Government of India, through notification no. 01/94/180/330/AM19/PC4 dated 
10 January  2019, decided to include merchant exp orters under the ongoing Interest Equalisation 
Scheme for Pre and Post Shipment Rupee Export Credit with effect from 2nd January 2019. 
Information in this regard can be accessed in Circular no. DBR.Dir.BC.No.22 /04.02.001/2018 -19 
dated 11 January 2019.  
15.2.2   Question by the United States of America (AG-IMS ID 93010 ) 
Noting the introduction of the Trans port and Marketing Assistance (TMA) scheme by India 
in March 2019, India has stated in response to AG -IMS ID 92095 that the measure 
complies with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition regarding Article 9.4 
export subsidies. The measure cov ers a wide variety of products and lists eligible export 
destinations including West Africa, South America, ASEAN, Oceana, and several other 
regions.  
 
a. Given the broad scope of this measure, how does India analyze this programme 
in the context of paragraph 10 of the Ministerial Decision on Export Competition, 
regarding not raising the level of export subsidy use, and paragraph 11 of the 
Decision, regarding having at most minimal trade distorting effects and not 
displacing or impeding the exports of  another Member?  
b. Can exporters benefit from the IES for agricultural products through at least 
March 2020 and from TMA (or other export subsidy measures) for the same 
agricultural products?  
c. If products do benefit concurrently from these measures, please de scribe what 
steps are taken by India to ensure that the export does not benefit from the 
measures in excess of what is permitted under Article 9.4.  
As per Para 8 of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition, developing  Members continue 
to bene fit from the provisions of Article 9.4 of the Agreement on  Agriculture until the end of 2023.  
Article 9.4 of the AoA allows developing members to provide export subsidies under  Article 9.1 (d) 
& (e).  
The "Transport and Marketing Assistance " (TMA), introduc ed in March 2019, aims to  provide 
assistance for the international component of freight and marketing of agricultural produce and 
complies with the Nairobi decision.  
Details about the product coverage under the TMA scheme can be accessed 
at https://dgft.gov.in/CP/ . 
Details about the product coverage under the Interest Equalization Scheme can be accessed at:  
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/257IE85A5E419354C4226B855C5C7E949DF9F.P
DF. G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 46 - 
 
  15.2.3   Question by Australia (AG-IMS ID 93065 ) 
Australia refers to its questions to India at 91th CoA (AG -IMS ID 91006) and 92th CoA 
(AG-IMS ID 92095) with respect to its Transport and Marketing Assistance (TMA) scheme. 
Australia acknowledg es that as per Paragraph 8 of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on 
Export Competition, developing country Members shall continue to benefit from the 
provisions of Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture until the end of 2023. Article 9.4 
of the AoA allo ws developing country Members to provide export subsidies under 
Article  9.1 (d) & (e). However, Paragraphs 9 through 11 establish clear obligations on 
India with respect to the implementation of export subsidies. Australia therefore requests 
India provide specific details on:  
 
a. The average level of export subsidies provided for those products covered by the 
TMA for the past five years?  
b. What steps and assessment India have undertaken in the development of the 
TMA to ensure it is consistent with paragraph 11 of the Nairobi Decision and has 
at most, a minimal trade distorting effect on other Members?  
If it is the case that India does not believe Paragraphs 9 through 11 apply to it, Australia 
would further request India:  
c. Explain under what grounds i t has made the decision to not apply the 
commitments and provisions of Paragraphs 9 through 11 of the Nairobi Decision 
in the development of the TMA scheme?  
The Nairobi Decision on Export Competition allows developing countries to provide export subsidies 
under Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture until the end of year 2023.  
 
Article 9.4 of the AoA allows developing members to provide export subsidies under Article 9.1 (d) 
& (e).  
 
The "Transport and Marketing Assistance" (TMA),  introduced in March 20 19 aims to provide 
assistance for the international component of freight and marketing of agricultural produce and is 
compliant with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision.  
 
15.2.4   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 93001 ) 
Follow -up question to AG -IMS ID 92007:  
  
a. Can India indicate for the five years 2011 to 2015 prior to the Nairobi Ministerial 
meetin g the following:  
• Total export of sugar from India per year;  
• Quantity of this which had received export subsidy (federal or state) and the 
amount spend on these subsidies annually 2011 to 2015.  
b. Can India explain how it sees the increasing subsidy level and increasing 
quantity of sugar exports to be subsidised to be in line with Nairobi Ministerial 
Decision paragraphs 9, 10 and 11? In particular how does India see the 2019/20 
export programme as respecting paragraph 10:  "Members shall seek not to raise 
their export subsidies beyond the average level of the past five years on a 
product basis "? 
We thank the European Union for their question.  
 
India's export data regarding sugar can be accessed from the web -link: https://commerce -
app.gov.in/eidb . 
 G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 47 - 
 
  Other requisite information will be submitted in India's ES:1 notification, which will be submitted in 
due course.  
16  COA MEETING  22 SEPTEMBER 2020  
16.1  AUSTRALIA  
16.1.1   Question by India (AG-IMS ID 95008 ) 
 
On 3 July 2020, the Australian Government committed an additional AUD  241.9 million to 
continue the International Freight Assistance Mechanism (IFAM), helping keep 
international freight routes and flights operating until the end of the year. This funding is 
in addition to the AUD  110 million announced in April  2020 to establish the IFAM under 
the AUD  1 billion Relief and Recovery Fund to support regions, communities and industry 
sectors disproportionately affected by COVID -19. 
 
According to the Australian Government's factsheet, eligible products include:  
• seafo od (including lobsters);  
• premium red meat (including beef, lamb and pork);  
• dairy (such as fresh milk and yoghurt);   
• horticulture (such as premium fruits and packaged salad or vegetables.  
 
The IFAM appears to be an aid provided to reduce the costs of market ing exports of 
agricultural products, namely the costs of international transport and freight. As such, it 
appears to be an export subsidy as defined in Article 9.1(d) of the Agreement on 
Agriculture which covers "the provision of subsidies to reduce the c osts of marketing 
exports of agricultural products (other than widely available export promotion and 
advisory services) including handling, upgrading and other processing costs, and the 
costs of international transport and freight". For developed WTO Membe rs such as 
Australia, paragraph  6 of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision of 19  December  2015 
(WTO  document WT/MIN (13)/40) provides for the elimination of export subsidies as of 
the date of adoption of that Decision.  
 
a. Can Australia explain how the IFAM respec ts its WTO obligations on agricultural 
export subsidies as set out in the Nairobi Ministerial Decision and the Agreement 
on Agriculture?  
b. Can Australia provide more precision on how these funds are distributed, noting 
specifically how freight rates are dete rmined for agricultural exporters and 
whether any of the funds can be received by exporters directly?  
IFAM is a temporary, targeted and proportionate emergency measure to try to keep open a critical 
number of pre -COVID -19 international airfreight supply ch ains into and out of Australia. Australia is 
continually and judiciously monitoring the market for airfreight, which is heavily reliant on 
international passenger flight activity including on individual routes, and will cease IFAM assistance 
on specific ro utes once the market re -adjusts.  
 
16.1.2   Question by Canada (AG-IMS ID 95041 ) 
 
International Freight Assistance Mechanism  
 
On 3 July, the Australian Government annou nced an additional AUD  241.9  million to 
subsidize the transportation cost of exporting of high -value agricultural goods via the 
International Freight Assistance Mechanism (IFAM). In total, IFAM is expected to provide 
up to AUD  351.9  million to reduce the t ransportation costs for the export of Australian 
agricultural goods.  
 
Canada appreciates Australia transparency in regards to IFAM. That being said, in 
Canada 's view, the IFAM does seem to operate as an export subsidy program.  
 G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 48 - 
 
  a. Could Australia indicate if it intends to report this transportation support as an 
export subsidy?  
b. Please indicate how IFAM is in conformity with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision 
and Australia 's export subsidy commitments?  
c. Could Australia explain the rationale to more tha n triple the budget of the IFAM?  
IFAM is a temporary, targeted and proportionate emergency measure to try to keep open a critical 
number of pre -COVID -19 international airfreight supply chains into and out of Australia. Australia is 
continually and judiciou sly monitoring the market for airfreight, which is heavily reliant on 
international passenger flight activity including on individual routes, and will cease IFAM assistance 
on specific routes once the market re -adjusts.  
 
16.2  INDIA  
16.2.1   Question by Australia  (AG-IMS ID 95051 ) 
 
Australia would like to follow -up with India on question AG-IMS ID 93065, submitted for 
the 93rd Committee on Agriculture, with respect to India 's Transport and Marketing 
Assistance (TMA) Scheme.   
 
India did not respond to any of Australia 's clear question s in AG-IMS ID 93065 with 
respect to the TMA and how it is consistent with the Nairobi Decision.   
 
Australia kindly requests India provide answers to the following questions:  
 
a. What was the average level of export subsidies provided for those products 
cover ed by the TMA for the past five years?  
b. What steps and assessments has India undertaken in the development of the 
TMA to ensure it is consistent with paragraph 11 of the Nairobi Decision and has 
at most, a minimal trade distorting effect on other Members?  
c. Does India believe Paragraphs 9 through 11 are not applicable to India?  
i. If so, why not?  
The Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition allows developing countries to provide export 
subsidies under Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture until th e end of year 2023.  
 
Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture clearly states that during the implementation period, 
developing country Members shall not be required to undertake commitments in respect of the 
export subsidies listed in subparagraphs (d) and (e) of paragraph 9.1  of the Agreement on 
Agriculture.  
 
India has previously clarified that the Transport and Marketing Assistance scheme aims to provide 
assistance for the international component of freight and for the marketing of agricultural produce , 
and therefore, it is compliant with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision.  
16.3  NEW ZEALAND  
16.3.1   Question by Canada (AG-IMS ID 95061 ) 
 
New Zealand seems to indicate in its answers to question AG -IMS ID 94038, that their 
NZD 330 million International Air Freight Scheme did not provide support for the export 
of New Zealand agricultural products. Canada 's understanding of the programme is that 
it allows airlines and air freight companies to offer rat es that would currently not be 
commercially viable if this subsidy was not offered by New Zealand Government.  
 G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 49 - 
 
  a. Could New Zealand explain how this transportation subsidy does not subsidize 
New Zealand 's exports of agricultural products compared to other WTO  Members 
who have not implemented a similar scheme?  
b. Could New Zealand indicate if it intends to report this support as an export 
subsidy?  
c. Please indicate how the program is in conformity with the Nairobi Decision and 
New Zealand 's export subsidy commitment s? 
a. New Zealand 's temporary International Air Freight Capacity scheme is necessary to 
maintain vital air links during COVID -19. 1,700 km of ocean separates New  Zealand from 
the nearest landmass.  The only way to reach New  Zealand other than by a long sea voy age 
is by air.  Given this geographical context, New  Zealand, in company with some 17 other 
WTO Members, has implemented  temporary  air connectivity support.   
New Zealand would draw Canada 's attention to the useful report from the OAG Aviation 
Worldwide Limi ted, 'Strapped for cash: how airlines can survive the winter season ' of 
2 September 2020, which lists the top 10 airlines by level of state support.  The list is 
headed by Lufthansa Group, followed by Air France -KLM. Air New  Zealand is not in that 
top 10 list. Given passenger aircrafts also carry freight, similar questions could arise with 
respect to any airline in receipt of any kind of government support.  
b. New Zealand has, and will continue to have, a strong record of comprehensive and timely 
notification s. As the IAFC is a temporary programme to maintain air connectivity, it does 
not require notifying under the AoA Agreement.  We will, however, submit it to the 
WTO's COVID -19 services tracker for transparency purposes.  
c. New Zealand has a persistent interest  in, and very much welcomes discussions about, 
compliance with the Nairobi Decision.  Accordingly, we look forward to all WTO Members 
eliminating relevant subsidies.  
17  COA MEETING  30 NOVEMBER 2020  
17.1  AUSTRALIA  
17.1.1   Question by India (AG-IMS ID 96021 ) 
The Australian Government has introduced a package of reforms for the Australian 
agricultural sector in Oct ober 2020, as part of the Economic Recovery Plan from the 
COVID -19 recession and to rebuild the economy. The Busting Congestion for Agricultural 
Exporters package is worth over AUD328.4 million over four years from 2020 -21. In this 
regard, Australia is req uested to provide the following details:  
 
a. Can Australia explain how the Busting Congestion for Agricultural Exporters 
package is compatible with Australia's WTO obligations on agricultural export 
subsidies as set out in the Nairobi Ministerial Decision and  the Agreement on 
Agriculture?  
b. How are the funds available under the scheme distributed?  
c. Are exporters eligible to receive funds under the package directly?  
d. Could Australia elaborate upon the product coverage and eligibility criteria for 
receiving support under this programme?  
e. Could Australia please advise how it will ensure that these measures do not 
negatively impact the global markets?  
f. When and how does Australia propose to notify its export subsidies to the 
Committee on Agriculture?  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  g. How is the Australian Government ensuring that this four -year package is 
"Temporary, Transparent, Targeted and Proportionate " to mitigate the adverse 
impact of COVID -19? 
Australia thanks India for its question and interest in this important package to support Australia's 
efficient and productive agricultural sector. Australia was pleased to have sent India information on 
this package in early October and appreciates the opportunity to further discuss this package and 
its objectives with India and other Members.  
  
With respect to the questions:  
  
a. All measures under the Busting Congestion for Agricultural Exporters package will be fully 
consistent with Australia's commitments at the WTO and will be notified in due course, 
consistent with Australia's notifi cation obligations. No funding will be provided to producers 
– funding will be used to achieve the objectives of the package and to fund the increased 
staffing and operational requirements of the relevant Government agencies. The primary 
objective of the p ackage is to reduce the burden on agricultural producers with respect to 
bureaucratic procedures and out -dated export regulatory systems.   
For example, for some Australian agricultural producers, current regulatory requirements mean up 
to 20 forms need to be completed in order to export, meanwhile in 2017 -18 on average 550 paper 
export certificates were manually handled by government and exporters to send goods overseas.  
  
To address this, the package will create a more efficient, effective and sustainable export regulatory 
system, improving data and technology supported regulation post -COVID -19; and taking systems 
online and providing a single portal for exporters to engage with government to make export rules 
clearer and easier to navigate.   
  
b. Funding will  be provided to governmental agencies to implement the aforementioned 
enhancements in Australia's export regulatory systems. Expenditures under the package 
will be notified to the WTO as appropriate and in due course under Australia's Domestic 
Support noti fication obligations.  
c. No, agricultural producers and/or exporters will not receive funds under the package.  
d. The package will be implemented across Australia's agricultural sector. Each different 
commodity sector currently has a number of regulatory require ments. Hence, some of the 
measures under the package will address specific commodities, but only so far as to 
harmonise and modernise those systems consistent with the overall objective of the 
package. For example:  
i. Seafood (not covered by AoA) and live ani mal export regulations will be enhanced 
under a AUD  14.3 million funding package over a 3 -5 year period;  
ii. Meat industry regulations will be enhanced under a AUD 10.9 million funding package 
over a 3 -5 year period; and  
iii. Plant industry regulations will be harm onised and streamlined under at AUD 10 million 
funding package over a 3 -5 year period.  
e. The measures under this package will not impact negatively on global markets. These 
measures will improve Australia's agricultural producers' abilities to navigate Austr alia's 
regulatory systems, which subsequently will more efficiently respond to global demand 
and their customers' orders. The quantum of Australian product exported is fully subject 
to market conditions and competitiveness. These measures ensure that Austr alia 
maintains its rigorous, effective and reliable regulatory systems, but does so in a modern 
and streamlined manner.  
f. The package will be implemented over four years, starting in financial year 2020 -21. 
Expenditures under the package will be notified to the WTO in Australia's 2020 -21 
DS:1 notification onwards.  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  g. The measure is not a "Temporary, Transparent, Targeted and Proportionate" to mitigate 
the adverse impact of COVID -19. The measure's objective is to modernise and streamline 
Australia's regulatory sy stems for the future. This will be an important part of the 
Australia's economic recovery from COVID -19, but is not a COVID -19 specific measure.  
17.1.2   Question by India (AG-IMS ID 96022 ) 
India thanks Australia for its response to AG -IMS ID 95008 on additional 
AUD 241.9  million to continue the International Freight Assistance Mechanism (IFAM), for 
inter national freight routes and flights operating until the end of the year. In 
October  2020, the Australian Government committed a further AUD  317.1 million to 
extend IFAM until the middle of 2021.  
 
As has earlier been mentioned in question AG-IMS ID 95008, t he IFAM appears to be an 
aid provided to reduce the costs of marketing exports of agricultural products, namely, 
the costs of international transport and freight. As such, it appears to be an export subsidy 
as defined in Article 9.1(d) of the Agreement on Agriculture which covers "the provision 
of subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of agricultural products (other than 
widely available export promotion and advisory services) including handling, upgrading 
and other processing costs, and the co sts of international transport and freight". In 
addition, Australia is the first WTO Member among the 16 Members with export subsidy 
entitlements in their schedules of commitments to take the step of modifying their 
schedules. Australia has informed the WT O Membership that the IFAM is a temporary 
measure. India requests Australia to answer the following questions with respect to this 
measure:  
 
a. Can Australia explain how the IFAM and its subsequent extension meets its 
WTO  obligations on agricultural export subsidies as set out in the Agreement on 
Agriculture and the Nairobi Ministerial Decision?  
b. Has the extension of the IFAM scheme in October 2020 broadened the product 
coverage under the scheme?  
c. Could Australia please advise how it will e nsure that these measures do not 
negatively impact global agricultural markets?  
d. Can Australia explain how these funds are distributed, noting specifically how 
freight rates are determined for agricultural exporters and whether any funds 
can be received by exporters directly?  
e. Australia in its response to Question AG-IMS ID 95008 stated that it will cease 
IFAM assistance on specific routes once the markets re -adjust. Can Australia 
explain the mechanism being used to analyse the market situation? What 
threshol ds have been identified by Australia in this regard?  
Australia thanks India for its questions regarding the International Freight Assistance Mechanism 
(IFAM). IFAM is a temporary, targeted and proportionate emergency measure to try to keep open a 
critical number of pre -COVID -19 international airfreight supply chains into and out of Australia. 
Australia is continually and judiciously monitoring the market for airfreight, which is heavily reliant 
on international passenger flight activity including on individ ual routes, and will cease 
IFAM assistance on specific routes once the market re -adjusts. IFAM is not specific to agricultural 
products, but rather applies for time -sensitive products that are reliant on airfreight.  The extension 
of the IFAM scheme in Octo ber 2020 did not broaden the product coverage under the scheme.    
IFAM does not pay any funds to agricultural producers or exporters. IFAM provides support to the 
aviation and freight forwarding industry to keep Australia 's critical air links with the worl d open while 
Australian export -focused businesses review their pre -COVID -19 business models and adjust to the 
'new normal ', which will likely comprise of significantly increased costs to export or import. Under 
IFAM, airfreight costs for importers and expo rters are always more than pre -COVID airfreight rates 
with Australian businesses required to pay the majority of the increased cost of their freight.   G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  Australian authorities are monitoring in -bound and out -bound flight numbers (passenger and freight) 
on all routes. A number of routes have already returned to a level that has seen IFAM removed from 
those routes and businesses using those routes are either adjusting to the increased costs or are re -
adjusting their business models and considerations of their e xport capacity.  
17.2  INDIA  
17.2.1   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 96053 ) 
Several press reports  suggest that the dairy company owning the Amul brand will be 
granted export subsidies for skimmed milk powder. A report from Dairy Industry 
Newsletter of 3 November states:  
 
"Gujarat Co -op Milk Marketing Federation (GCMMF), who own the Amul brand, 
were or dered to purchase milk from private producers unable to sell it due to 
India 's COVID -19 lockdown. In return their 18 member unions are being 
offered US D 680/t in export subsidies by the government. During lockdown 
Amul procured 35,000  - 40,000 litres of additional milk every day, which has 
led to excess SMP stocks estimated at 90,000t. The export subsidy will be 
provided by the State Government from November, continuing for six months 
to April 2021. Amul managing director RS Sodhi said th ey planned to export 
50,000  t of milk powder this year, up from 12,000  t last year ". 
a. Can India confirm that Amul is being paid a subsidy of US D 680 per tonne of SMP 
that is exported?  
b. Can India indicate the quantity subsidized? Is there a maximum quantity f or this 
subsidy? Or will all 90,000 tonnes referred to in the press be exported with this 
subsidy?  
c. How has the level of subsidy has been calculated? Which elements or criteria 
were used?  
d. According to the press report this export subsidy is granted due to a n internal 
support measure for the dairy sector in India. The subsidy would thus not appear 
to fall within the exceptions for developing countries in Article 9:4 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture. How is this export subsidy justified in relation to 
India 's commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture?  
e. Point 1 of the Nairobi Ministerial decision (WT/MIN(15), WT/L/980) reads: 
"Members  reaffirm  their  commitment, pursuant to the 2013  Bali Ministerial 
Declaration on Export Competition, to exercise utmost restrai nt with regard to 
any recourse to all forms of export subsidies and all export measures with 
equivalent effect. " How does this export subsidy respect this provision?    
India likes to thank the EU for the question, and our response is:  
 
The information is b eing collected, and a response will be provided in due course.  
17.2.2   Question by New Zealand (AG-IMS ID 96055 ) 
 
New Zealand understands that the State Government of Gujarat will be providing up to 
50 rupees/KG in subsidies to export 50,000 tonnes of skim milk powder over the period 
of 01/11/2020 – 30/04/2021. New Zealand is concerned that this will provide an export 
subsidy to Indian skim milk producers and significantly impact the world supply of skim 
milk powder.  
 
a. At Bali and Nairobi, as part of the historic outcome supported by all Members, 
India committed to exercising utmost restraint with regar d to all forms of export 
subsidies.  Can India indicate how the provision of these new export subsidies 
fits with their commitment to utmost restraint?   G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 53 - 
 
  b. The Nairobi Decision commits all Members not to raise export subsidies above 
the previous five -year aver age on a product basis. Do India 's new export 
subsidies for milk in Gujarat mean that export subsidies for skim milk powder 
now exceed the previous five -year average of export subsidies provided to milk 
powder in India?   
c. The Nairobi Decision requires Membe rs to ensure that export subsidies have at 
most minimal trade distorting effects and do not displace or impede the exports 
of another Member. What measures has India taken to ensure that its export 
subsidies for milk powder do not have a trade distorting e ffect?   
India thanks New Zealand for the question, and our response is:  
 
The information is being collected and a response will be provided in due course.  
17.3  RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
17.3.1   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 96060 ) 
Decree 1665 of 12 October 2020 was adopted, amending Decree No 1816 from 
25 December 2019 "On state support of organizations in order to compensate for part of 
the costs associated with certification of products of the agro -industrial complex in 
foreign markets". According to this decree, agricultural producers who export directly or 
via intermediaries can receive state support to part of the certification costs for exported 
agricultural products.  
 
a. Can the Russian Federation explain how much money is budgeted for this 
measure and the eligibility criteria?  
b. How does this measure, which grants support to the export of agricultural 
products, respect Russia's export subsidy commitments?  
c. Point 1 of the Nairobi Ministerial decision (WT/MIN(15), WT/L/980) reads: 
"Members reaffirm their commitment, pursuant to the 2013 Bali Ministerial 
Declaration on Export Competition1, to e xercise utmost restraint with regard to 
any recourse to all forms of export subsidies and all export measures with 
equivalent effect." How does this export subsidy respect this provision?  
Please refer to the Russian Federation's reply to question AG -IMS ID  95037.  
 
 G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX II  
POINTS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH INDIVIDUAL NOTIFICATIONS  
1  COA MEETING  9 MARCH 2016  
1.1  ISRAEL  
1.1.1   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 79044 ) 
Israel has considerably increased export subsidies in 2014, compared to 2013. How would 
Israel explain this policy development in light of the Bali Ministerial commitment to 
exercise utmost restraint with regard to any recourse to all forms of export subsidies?  
 
This policy tool has always been carefully used by Israel and only to provide lim ited relief to Israeli 
exporters in specific situations. As required by the Bali Ministerial Declaration the level of export 
subsidies for all products is still significantly below Israel's export subsidy commitments and no new 
export subsidies have been i ntroduced in recent years. Changes in the composition of the exported 
products during 2014 with increased export of other fruit (mostly dates) caused the increase in 
subsidies in this category (which is still only 40% of Israel's commitment in this categor y). In line 
with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision all export subsidies will be totally removed by the end of 2022.  
 
Follow -up: The European Union took note of Israel's commitments to implement the Nairobi 
Ministerial decision.  
1.2  RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
1.2.1   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 79050 ) 
The notified amounts of Russia n Federation 's food ai d in notification G/AG/N/RUS/7 
differ for certain products and destinations from the information found in Secretariat 
background document G/AG/W/125/Rev.3/Add.3 (dated 27 July 2015). For example, in 
G/AG/W/125/Rev.3/Add.3 the Russian Federation notifies th e use of in -kind food aid to 
certain countries in 2014. There are no indications of such food aid in G/AG/N/RUS/7.  
 
What are the reasons behind these discrepancies?  
 
a. The answers to the questionnaire circulated by the Secretariate were provided at the end 
of 2014. After providing the answers, the information on food aid provided by the Russian 
Federation was aggregated and finalized.  
b. The actual information on food aid in NF:1 for 2014 is provided in financial equivalent by 
the Russian Federation, with all the data aggregated.  
c. The discrepancies detected by the European Union are connected to the time of 
information processing and to the fact, that the Russian Federation provided financial 
equivalent to the food aid amount in Table NF:1.  
1.3   UNITED STATES OF A MERICA  
1.3.1   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 79028 ) 
The European Union notices that for certain products, such as beans, emergency food 
product meal replacements, potatoes, rice, soy fortified cornmeal, wheat and wheat soy 
blends, the United States notifies larger amounts of in -kind food aid to least developed 
and net food -importing developing countries for fiscal year 2013 than what has prev iously 
been notified to all destinations (see G/AG/W/125/Rev.3/Add.3, dated 27  July 2015).  
 
What are the reasons behind these discrepancies?  
 G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 55 - 
 
  The discrepancies between G/AG/W/125/Rev.3/Add.3 and G/AG/N/USA/105 are due to a switch to 
a new data system throu gh which the United States reports its data. The United States will provide 
updated figures to the Secretariat for formal distribution in a revised version of G/AG/N/USA/105.  
 
Please see the attached table for revised figures.  
 
Food Aid Commodity Table: 2 013 Tonnage  
Commodity  Overall 2013 Contributions  LDC and NFIDC Contributions  
Beans  17,320  11,740  
Bulgur  19,070  19,070  
Corn 15,920  15,920  
Cornmeal  33,080  33,080  
Corn-Soy Blend  90,880  87,220  
Lentils  27,070  25,520  
Nonfat Dry Milk  - - 
Peas 105,100  101,960  
Potatoes  1,620  800 
Rice 93,630  82,180  
Salmon  100 0 
Sorghum  301,090  296,690  
Soy Flour  - - 
Soy Fortified Bulger  12,660  12,660  
Soy Fortified Cornmeal  770 770 
Soy Protein Products  - - 
Soybean Meal  51,600  33,600  
Soybeans  - - 
Vegetable Oils  109,962  99,372  
Wheat  540,030  492,650  
Wheat Flour  25,440  24,980  
Wheat -Soy Blend  3,890  3,890  
Emergency Food Product Meal 
Replacement  3,080  3,080  
COMMODITY TOTALS  1,452,312  1,345,182  
 
 
2  COA MEETING  7-8 JUNE 2016   
2.1  CANADA   
2.1.1   Question by the European Union (AG -IMS ID 80078 ) 
 
Canada notified the use of export subsidies  for the product category "butter" in its 
notification covering the 2012/13 and 2013/14 marketing years. For the 
2014/15  marketing year, Canada does not notify export subsidies for butter. The 
European Union welcomes such a policy shift and asks Canada to confirm that, in line with 
the Bali commitments, no export subsidies to butter would be reintroduced before the 
date of elimination of export subsidies for dairy products at the end of 2020.  
 
Canada is currently experiencing a shortage of butter on its market. It remains possible that Canada 
may use export subsidies for butter before the end of 2020, within the limits established by the 
WTO Nairobi Ministerial Decision.  
 
3  COA MEETING  9 NOVEMBER 2016   
3.1  NORWAY  
3.1.1   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 82047 ) 
The European Union notes that Norway still provided substantial export subsidies to 
cheese i n 2015. During the meeting of the Committee in June 2015 Norway indicated that 
a proposal had been presented to the Norwegian Parliament on the abolition of export 
subsidies for cheese. Could Norway please provide an update on this issue.  
 G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 56 - 
 
  We thank the Eur opean Union for their continued interest in the phasing out of Norwegian export 
subsidies. At the CoA in June 2015 we informed the committee that the Government had submitted 
a white paper on globalisation and trade to the Parliament in which the Governmen t proposed to 
phase out all export subsidies (not limited to cheese) by the end of 2019.  
 
The white paper was debated in Parliament in January 2016, i.e. after the Nairobi ministerial 
conference, and the Parliament decided that the phasing out of export s ubsidies, should be made in 
accordance with the timeframe of the Nairobi ministerial decision.  
 
4  COA MEETING  27 MARCH 2017  
4.1  SWITZERLAND  
4.1.1   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 83029 ) 
According to press reports, the new Swiss Chocolate Law voted by Parliament in 
December 2016 maintains the level of export subsidies for chocolate producers using 
Swiss produced milk and cereals. Following the Nairobi Decision, cereals can no longer 
benefi t from any export subsidies in the form of primary products. Also "eggs," "oils and 
fats" and "sugar" cannot benefit from any export subsidies in the form of primary 
products. However,  the content of these primary products affects the amount of export 
subsidies granted to processed products, according to the export subsidy notification. 
How would Switzerland see this as complying with Article 11 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture which sta tes that the per -unit subsidy paid on an incorporated agricultural 
primary product shall not exceed the per -unit export subsidy that would be payable on 
exports of the primary product as such?  
 
In December 2016, the Swiss Parliament set the budget for 2017  at 94.6 million Swiss Francs for 
export refunds under the Federal Law of 13 December 1974 on the importation and the exportation 
of processed agricultural products (the so -called "Chocolate law ") for certain processed agricultural 
products. This is the sa me amount as was allocated for the year 2016. Apart from this yearly budget 
decision, no revision of the "Chocolate Law " was undertaken in December 2016.  
 
The Swiss Schedule of Concessions contains a list of certain basic agricultural products eligible for  
export refunds when exported incorporated in processed agricultural products. In conformity with 
Para. 6 Footnote 4 of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on export competition, which establishes an 
exception to the general and immediate prohibition of expor t subsidies, Switzerland continues to 
grant export refunds for certain processed agricultural products. Switzerland applies a price 
compensation scheme to compensate for the difference of raw material prices between the domestic 
and foreign markets faced b y the domestic food industry as a result of the use of locally produced 
agricultural raw materials. According to the current Swiss legislation, only certain processed 
agricultural products containing selected basic dairy products and selected certain cerea l products 
are eligible for price compensation.  
 
According to Article 11 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, WTO Members are not prohibited from 
granting subsidies, in accordance with Part IV of Section II of their Schedules of Concessions, on 
processed p roducts in the event that the primary products contained in such processed products are 
not subsidized in the same manner.  
 
Switzerland can confirm that applied per -unit subsidy rates granted for basic agricultural products 
incorporated in processed produ cts do not exceed the price differences between domestic and foreign 
markets. Therefore, these applied per -unit subsidy rates do not exceed the per - unit export subsidy 
that would be payable on exports of the primary product as such. Economically the Swiss  export 
refunds do not have the effect of a subsidy to the processing industry but only compensate the 
market price differences of certain raw materials.  
 
4.1.2   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 83028 ) 
a. Switzerland has increased the amount of export subsidies granted to processed 
products by 36% in 2015 compared to 2014. How would Switzerland see  the 
increase as complying with the Bali Ministerial Declaration on Export Competition G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 57 - 
 
  according to which Members committed to exercise utmost restraint with regard 
to any recourse to all forms of export subsidies and undertake to ensure to the 
maximum ext ent possible that the level of export subsidies will remain 
significantly below the Members' export subsidy commitments?  
b. Could Switzerland confirm that no export subsidies for cattle for breeding and 
horses were granted after 19 December 2015?  
a. The Swiss Pa rliament increased the export subsidy budget for processed agricultural 
products for 2015. This decision was made in the context of the unexpected appreciation 
of the Swiss Franc and the corresponding impairment of competitiveness of Swiss 
exporters follow ing the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate of the Euro against 
the Swiss Franc by the Swiss National Bank in January 2015. The notified amount of export 
subsidies is substantially below the entitlements in the schedule of Switzerland -
Liechtenstei n. 
b. The implementation of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition requires an 
amendment of a cantonal piece of legislation. The cantonal government of Jura started 
right after the Nairobi decision with the necessary legal adjustments, but the  budget 
outline for 2016 had already been fixed. Therefore , export subsidies were provided for a 
few horses on a cantonal level by the canton of Jura only.  
5  COA MEETING  7 JUNE 2017  
5.1  EUROPEAN UNION  
5.1.1   Question by Canada (AG-IMS ID 84011 ) 
Canada notes that in the European Union's Table ES:1 and Table ES:2 Notification 
(G/AG/N /EU/38), the European Union notified the subsidized quantity of exports for 
sugar based on export licences issued.  
  
a. Can the European Union confirm when actual exportation of such sugar 
occurred?  
b.  Was any sugar exported following the adoption of the 19 De cember  2015 
Ministerial Decision on Export Competition?  
a. The actual export of the sugar concerned took place during the validity period of the export 
licence. According to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1239 of 
18 May 2016 a licence is valid from its actual day of issue until the end of the third month 
following the month of the day of issue.  
b. b. Yes, the European Union exports up to 1.35 million tonnes of out -of-quota sugar each 
marketing year. Exports of EU out -of-quota sugar fall under the provisions of footnote  3 
of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition.  
5.2  SWITZERLAND  
5.2.1   Question by Australia (AG-IMS ID 84010 ) 
Australia thanks Switzerland for its notification for export subsidy commitments for 2015 
which includes CHF 95.6 million in subsidized exports within a ceiling of CHF 114.9 million.  
 
a. What further progress has Switzerland made on the commitment made at the 
10th Ministerial Conference in Nairobi to eliminate export subsidy entitlements?  
b. How will the commitment be implemented?  
c. What legislative changes, or other action by Parliament, will t his involve?  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 58 - 
 
  d. What steps has Switzerland taken to ensure that it complies with the standstill 
commitment of the Ministerial Decision in the interim?  
In May this year, the government approved a reform package to completely eliminate all remaining 
export refunds and subm itted it to Parliament. The reform package includes accompanying 
measures, namely facilitation of inward processing and additional direct payments to milk and wheat 
producers. Together with this legislative reform, the government also submitted to Parliame nt the 
Nairobi decision and the required amendments of the schedules of commitments for approval. After 
successful completion of the parliamentary process and the optional referendum, the legislative 
reform is expected to enter into force in January 2019. Within the same time frame, the government 
will be authorized to notify the amended schedules of concessions. For the time being, Switzerland 
continues to grant export refunds for certain processed agricultural products in conformity with the 
Nairobi Minis terial Decision on export competition. Since 2015, the annual export refund 
expenditures have remained on the same level. The government does not foresee any budget 
increase in the remaining period until the abolition of the export refunds.  
 
6  COA MEETING  20 FEBRUARY 2018  
6.1  NORWAY  
6.1.1   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 86079 ) 
The European Union n otes that Norway has significantly increased the use of export 
subsidies for swine meat and butter between 2015 and 2016. Does Norway consider this 
increased use of export subsidies for swine meat and butter to be in line with the 
commitment, pursuant to t he 2013 Bali Ministerial Declaration on Export Competition, to 
"exercise utmost restraint with regard to any recourse to all forms of export subsidies 
and all export measures with equivalent effect "? 
 
According to paragraph 10 of the Nairobi Ministerial De cision on Export Competition 
"members shall seek not to raise their export subsidies beyond the average level of the 
past five years on a product basis ". According to the information notified, Norway has 
failed to achieve this objective for butter in 2016.  What are the reasons behind the 
increased use of export subsidies for butter?  
 
Based on the Uruguay round schedule, Norway had the right to use export subsidies for eleven 
products. In line with the 2013 Bali Ministerial Declaration on export subsidies No rway reduced the 
use of export subsidies and used export subsidies for only four products in 2015.  
 
At the Ministerial in Nairobi in December 2015, Norway agreed to stronger commitments for swine 
meat, butter, cheese and processed agricultural products. Th e export quantities for these products 
were fixed based on the average export in the period 2003 – 2005. For swine meat, Norway had to 
reduce the subsidized export quantity by 50 % and for butter by approximately 80 %, compared to 
the level set in the Urugu ay round negotiations. Still some exports of butter had to take place 
in 2016.  
 
Norway remains fully committed to the outcome of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision. Norway has 
notified a revised export subsidy schedule 28th November 2017.  
 
6.2  SWITZERLAND  
6.2.1   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 86080 ) 
The EU notes that Switzerland is in breach of the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition  
by granting export subsidies to cattle for breeding and horses in 2016. The EU also notes 
that Switzerland is in breach of Article 11 of the Agreement on Agriculture by granting 
export subsidies to certain ingredients of processed agricultural products, s uch as eggs, 
flour, oils/fats and sugar which cannot benefit from any export subsidies in the primary 
form.  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 59 - 
 
  The EU nevertheless also notes that the Swiss authorities have recently adopted a 
proposal on the abolition of agricultural export subsidies by 2019 . The proposal refers to 
certain compensatory measures taken by the private sector and subject to private law, 
i.e. without direct participation of the authorities. Could Switzerland clarify if such private 
law measures imply any support to exported produc ts financed by virtue of government 
action, such as a mandatory levy on agricultural products from which the exported 
products would be derived?  
 
Switzerland takes this opportunity to inform Members that it has no longer provided export subsidies 
for horse s since 2017. As regards the EU's comment on export subsidies for certain processed 
agricultural products, Switzerland does not grant any export subsidies for eggs, oils or sugar 
contained in processed products. Turning to the question on export subsidies for certain dairy 
products and staple grains used in processed agricultural products, Switzerland considers these 
subsidies to be in conformity with Article 11 of the Agreement on Agriculture, and refers to question 
No. 83029 and to its reply to that quest ion at the meeting of the Committee on Agriculture of 
28 March  2017. In December  2017 the Swiss Parliament approved a package of measures which 
included the abolition of export subsidies. The package also includes accompanying measures, 
namely the simplifi cation of the procedure for approval of processing trade and coupled payments 
for certain staple agricultural products, including milk and cereals. The package contains no state 
measures in support of export activities. The package is scheduled to be imple mented 
on 1 January  2019.  
 
7  COA MEETING  11-12 JUNE  2018   
7.1  CANADA  
7.1.1   Question by New Zealand (AG -IMS ID 87143 ) 
Canada submitted its ES:1 notification (G/AG/N/CAN/118) in March 2018. In the table 
"Export Subsidies: Budgetary Outlays and Quantity Reduction Commitments" and 
accompanying footnote 4, Canada states that: "Canada's Uruguay Round export subsidy  
commitment for dairy products are reported on a dairy year basis which runs 
from  1 August to 31 July.  
 
Under the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition (WT/MIN/(15)45 
and WT/L/908), the new export subsidy volume limits took effect from 1 Janu ary 2016. 
Therefore there is an overlap between the dairy year and the calendar year so that a 
portion of Canada's 2015 -2016 dairy year fell under the Uruguay Round commitment 
(from 1 August 2015 to 31 December 2015), and a portion under the new Nairobi 
commitment (from 1 January 2016 to 31 July 2016). Canada calculated a Partial Nairobi 
cap to cover the first 7 months of the 2016 calendar year."  
 
a. How has Canada calculated its "Partial Nairobi cap" for the 7 months of the 2016 
calendar year?  
b. Can Canada please explain how the outlays (i.e. value of subsidised exports) and 
quantity are calculated?  
a. As described in the second paragraph of footnote 4 un der Canada's 2015 -2016 Export 
Subsidy notification (G/AG/N/CAN/118), to calculate the export subsidy limit for 
1 January  2016 to 31 July 2016, which is a partial dairy year, Canada first determined the 
percentage proportion of the Uruguay Round export subs idy volume commitment that was 
actually used from 1 August to 31 December 2015. Based on this information, Canada 
applied the leftover percentage proportion to the new dairy year volume cap making this 
the new cap which would be in effect for the partial d airy year. = {1 - (% of UR export 
subsidy volume commitment used)}* Nairobi Cap . Canada also notes that all of Canada's 
subsidized dairy exports for the 2015 -2016 dairy year are under the partial Nairobi 
commitment levels.  
b. The outlays ( USD value) and volu me (in tonnes) amounts of Canada's subsidized exports 
are provided by the Canadian Dairy Commission and represent the amount of actual G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  subsidized exports provided under milk class 5(d). Outlays, in particular, are calculated 
based on the price and the expo rt permits (quantity) for subsidized dairy products issued 
by the Canadian Dairy Commission. The Uruguay Round outlay commitments did not 
change as a result of the Nairobi Decision on export subsidies in respect of products 
covered by footnote 4 of the Nai robi Decision until their elimination. The annual 
commitment levels on a quantity basis were calculated based on the criteria of the average 
of quantity levels of the 2003 -2005 base period as per footnote 4 of the Nairobi Decision 
on export subsidies.  
8  COA MEETING  25-26 SEPTEMBER 2018  
8.1  PANAMA  
8.1.1   Question by the United States of America (AG-IMS ID 88115 ) 
 
The United States notes that in G/AG/N/PAN/44 Panama notifies that no export subsidies 
were provided from 2004 through 2017. However, the measure Certificados de Fomento 
a la Agroexportación (CEFA), in accordance to Panamanian law (Annex 1 law No.  82 
31 December  2009), was started in calendar year 2010, and provides agricultural 
producers with an export subsidy for marketing costs incurred in concepts of handling, 
packaging and inland and ocean freight costs.  
 
Please explain the basis for not notif ying this measure in Supporting Table ES:2.  
 
In its list of export subsidy commitments in Section II and III of Part IV of its Schedule, Panama set 
out an elimination commitment for an export subsidy programme entitled Certificado de Abono 
Tributario (Tax Allowance Certificate, CAT), with a completion date of 31  December  2002. The nature 
of this subsidy was described in the report by the Working Party on the Accession of the Republic of 
Panama to the World Trade Organization (WT/SPEC/33/Rev.2). Furthermore,  given that Panama has 
no export products with a share of total world agricultural exports exceeding 5%, it is not, according 
to Committee on Agriculture document G/AG/2 of 30  June 1995, required to make a notification 
corresponding to Table ES:2. Regardin g Law No.  82 of 31  December  2009, which establishes the 
Agricultural Exports Promotion Certificate (CeFA) referred to by the United States, we should point 
out that the guide to notification requirements and formats contained in the Committee on 
Agricultur e document of 30  June 1995 (G/AG/2) establishes that Members using export subsidies 
under Article 9.1(d) and (e) of the Agreement on Agriculture are exempt in terms of Supporting 
Table ES:2. Nevertheless, Panama is aware that according to the Ministerial D ecision of 
19 December  2015 on export competition (WT/MIN(15)/45), developing countries like Panama shall 
continue to benefit from the provisions of Article 9.1(d) and (e) of the Agreement on Agriculture 
until the end of 2023, and therefore Panama will, in  due course, take legislative action to eliminate 
the CeFA. To reassure the participating Members of the Committee on Agriculture, please note that 
Panama has 14 international trade agreements with its main trading partners that account for around 
75% of P anama's total exports, of which over 90% are agricultural products, to which no export 
subsidies apply. It should be noted that the CeFA is valid "de jure". However, we emphasize that it 
has not been applied "de facto"  to Panama's exports under the specifi c commitments undertaken 
with its trading partners in existing international trade agreements.  
 
9  COA MEETING  26-27 NOVEMBER 2018  
9.1  MAURITIUS  
9.1.1   Question by Canada (AG-IMS ID 89002 ) 
In Supporting Table ES:2 of G/AG/N/MUS/10, Canada notes that Mauritius reported 
export s ubsidies under Article 9.4. Could Mauritius please expand on how it plans to 
implement the Nairobi decision regarding Article 9.4 for least developed countries and net 
food-importing by the end of 2030?  
 
The Export subsidy being provided by Mauritius is W TO compatible though time -bound. 
Consultations will be held in due course as provided in the Nairobi Ministerial Declaration with 
relevant stakeholders to take stock of the situation and on how the support could be phased out.  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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9.2  PANAMA  
9.2.1   Question by the Unite d States of America (AG-IMS ID 89043 ) 
Panama has not provided a written response to the questions posed by the United States 
in AG -IMG ID 88115. Thus, the United States repeats them here:  
 
The United States notes that in G/AG/N/PAN/44 Panama notifies that no export subsidies 
were provided from 2004 through 2017. However, the measure Certificados de Fomento 
a la Agroexportación (CEFA), in accordance to Panamanian law (Annex 1 law No.  82 
31 December 2009), was started in calendar year 2010, and provides agricultural 
producers with an export subsidy for marketing costs incurred in concep ts of handling, 
packaging and inland and ocean freight costs. Please explain the basis for not notifying 
this measure in Supporting Table ES:2.  
 
In its list of export subsidy commitments in Section II and III of Part IV of its Schedule, Panama set 
out an elimination commitment for an export subsidy programme entitled Certificado de Abono 
Tributario (Tax Allowance Certificate, CAT), with a completion date of 31  December  2002. The nature 
of this subsidy was described in the report by the Working Party on the  Accession of the Republic of 
Panama to the World Trade Organization (WT/SPEC/33/Rev.2). Furthermore, given that Panama has 
no export products with a share of total world agricultural exports exceeding 5%, it is not, according 
to Committee on Agriculture d ocument G/AG/2 of 30  June 1995, required to make a notification 
corresponding to Table ES:2. Regarding Law No.  82 of 31  December  2009, which establishes the 
Agricultural Exports Promotion Certificate (CeFA) referred to by the United States, we should point  
out that the guide to notification requirements and formats contained in the Committee on 
Agriculture document of 30  June 1995 (G/AG/2) establishes that Members using export subsidies 
under Article 9.1(d) and (e) of the Agreement on Agriculture are exempt  in terms of Supporting 
Table ES:2. Nevertheless, Panama is aware that according to the Ministerial Decision of 
19 December  2015 on export competition (WT/MIN(15)/45), developing countries like Panama shall 
continue to benefit from the provisions of Articl e 9.1(d) and (e) of the Agreement on Agriculture 
until the end of 2023, and therefore Panama will, in due course, take legislative action to eliminate 
the CeFA. To reassure the participating Members of the Committee on Agriculture, please note that 
Panama has 14 international trade agreements with its main trading partners that account for around 
75% of Panama's total exports, of which over 90% are agricultural products, to which no export 
subsidies apply. It should be noted that the CeFA is valid "de jure" . However, we emphasize that it 
has not been applied "de facto"  to Panama's exports under the specific commitments undertaken 
with its trading partners in existing international trade agreements . 
 
10  COA MEETING  26-27 FEBRUARY 2019  
10.1  ISRAEL  
10.1.1   Question by Australi a (AG-IMS ID 90127 ) 
In G/AG/N/ISR/67, Israel notified export subsidies for fruits (other than  citrus fruits), 
and fresh vegetables.  Noting the Nairobi Decision, under which Members agreed to not 
raise their export subsidies beyond the average level of the past five years on a product 
basis, can Israel provide Members with information on:  
 
Why its exports subsidies for fruits other than citrus fruits in 2017 were around 65% 
higher than the average level of the past five years for that specific product?  
 
Exports subsidies for fruits other than citrus were higher in 2017 due to the fact that some subs idies 
for fruits exported in previous years were only technically granted in 2017. Israel is in the process 
of eliminating export subsidies, and it is expected that these subsidies will diminish altogether 
before  2022.  
 G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  10.2  PANAMA  
10.2.1   Question by the United State s of America (AG-IMS ID 90078 ) 
As a follow up to AG -IMS ID 89043 and AG -IMS ID 88115, the United States would like to 
reiterate the following question, for which Panama has not provided a written answer:  
 
The United States notes that in G/AG/N/PAN/44 Panama notifies that no export subsidies 
were provided from 2004 through 2017. However, the mea sure Certificados de Fomento 
a la Agroexportación (CEFA), in accordance to Panamanian law (Annex 1 law No. 82 
31 December 2009), was started in calendar year 2010, and provides agricultural 
producers with an export subsidy for marketing costs incurred in c oncepts of handling, 
packaging and inland and ocean freight costs.   
 
Please explain the basis for not notifying this measure in Supporting Table ES:2.  
 
In its list of export subsidy commitments in Section II and III of Part IV of its Schedule, Panama set 
out an elimination commitment for an export subsidy programme entitled Certificado de Abono 
Tributario (Tax Allowance Certificate, CAT), with a completio n date of 31  December  2002. The nature 
of this subsidy was described in the report by the Working Party on the Accession of the Republic of 
Panama to the World Trade Organization (WT/SPEC/33/Rev.2). Furthermore, given that Panama has 
no export products wit h a share of total world agricultural exports exceeding 5%, it is not, according 
to Committee on Agriculture document G/AG/2 of 30  June 1995, required to make a notification 
corresponding to Table ES:2.  
  
Regarding Law No.  82 of 31  December  2009, which es tablishes the Agricultural Exports Promotion 
Certificate (CeFA) referred to by the United States, Panama should point out that the guide to 
notification requirements and formats contained in the Committee on Agriculture document of 
30 June 1995 (G/AG/2) es tablishes that Members using export subsidies under Article 9.1(d) and  (e) 
of the Agreement on Agriculture are exempt in terms of Supporting Table ES:2. Nevertheless, 
Panama is aware that, according to the Ministerial Decision of 19  December  2015 on export  
competition (WT/MIN(15)/45), developing countries like Panama shall continue to benefit from the 
provisions of Article 9.1(d) and (e) of the Agreement on Agriculture until the end of 2023, and 
therefore Panama will, in due course, take legislative action to eliminate the CeFA.  
  
To reassure the participating Members of the Committee on Agriculture, please note that Panama 
has 14 international trade agreements with its main trading partners that account for around 75% 
of Panama's total exports, of which ov er 90% are agricultural products, to which no export subsidies 
apply. It should be noted that the CeFA is valid "de jure". However, Panama emphasizes that it has 
not been applied "de facto"  to Panama's exports under the specific commitments undertaken with  
its trading partners in existing international trade agreements.  
 
11  COA MEETING  25 JUNE 2019   
11.1  BRAZIL  
11.1.1   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 91201 ) 
Over three years after Nairobi, Brazil did not provide its updated schedule. Currently, 16 
product -specific export subsidy reduction commitments still appear in Brazils ' schedule.  
 
When will Brazil comply with the commitments undertaken in this respect in Nairobi?  
 
First of all, it is important to mention that Brazil is upholding the objectives and purpose of the 
Nairobi Decision, for Brazil has not provided export subsidies since i t consolidated its rights during 
the Uruguay Round. Regarding the procedural steps to update its schedule of concessions, the 
measure requires Congressional approval. It was not possible to complete this process under the 
previous administration and Brazil ian regulation requires the process to be restarted under the new 
administration. The Brazilian Government remains committed to the Nairobi Decision and hopes to 
obtain approval from Congress later this year.  
 G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  11.2  CANADA  
11.2.1   Question by New Zealand (AG-IMS ID 91204 ) 
New Zealand notes that Canada has, for the first time since 2011 (G/AG/N/CAN/92), 
subsidi sed its exports of butter in marketing year 1 August 2017 to 31 July 2018.  
  
a. Can Canada provide an explanation of the domestic policy changes that led to it 
utilising its scheduled commitment to subsidise butter?  
b. Does Canada expect this practice to becom e a trend in the time remaining before 
export subsidies on butter must be eliminated?  
c. Does Canada intend to notify export subsidies for butter in its ES:1 notification 
for marketing year 1 August 2018 to 31 July 2019?  
a. The Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC) administers the exports of dairy products, 
including butter, under milk class 5(d) in a ccordance with the 2015 Nairobi Ministerial 
Decision. Specific circumstances resulted in the CDC exporting 50 tonnes of butter in the 
2017-2018 dairy year. More information is available in the CDC's 2017 -2018 Annual Report 
which is available at:  http://www.cdc -
ccl.gc.ca/CDC/userfiles/file/CDC_AR_2018_%20FINAL%20WEB%20en(1).pdf  
b. Decisions to use milk class 5(d) are made on a case -by-case basis. This relatively s mall 
amount of butter should not constitute a trend; however, if exports under milk class 5(d) 
are made prior to the end of 2020 they will be administered in accordance with the Nairobi 
Ministerial Decision. c. Canada will continue to comply with all of it s international trade 
obligations, including those related to notifications.  
11.3  MEXICO  
11.3.1   Question by the United States of America (AG-IMS ID 91198 ) 
 
The United States notes that Mexico implemented three temporary incentive programmes 
for the export of 1.0 million metric tonnes of white corn due to oversupply in key Mexican 
regions. The intended incentive has a budget of approximately USD $15.4 million (see 
titles of notices).  
  
Titles of the Notices: A) Notice to announce the incentive to address specific marketing 
problems of white corn growing in the 2017 spring -summer crop cycle, unde r the 
Commercialization Support Program. B) Notice to announce the incentives to address 
specific marketing problems of corn growing in the 2017 spring -summer crop cycle, for 
the states of Guanajuato, Jalisco and Michoacan, for livestock consumption, under  the 
Commercialization Support Program. C) Notice to announce the incentive to address 
specific marketing problems of the surplus volume of white corn from the 2016/17 
fall-winter crop cycle for the state of Sinaloa, under the Commercialization Support 
Program.  
  
Under the Nairobi Decision developing country Members can benefit from the provisions 
of Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture until the end of 2023.  
  
a. Please explain whether Mexico considers these programmes Article 9.4 export 
subsidies.  
b. If so, please submit a Supporting Table ES:2 for calendar year 2017.  
We thank the United States for its question. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development  (SADER) is currently carrying out the appropriate internal consultations to provide 
clarificati on on this matter and obtain detailed information to enable us to make a correction to 
our 2017 export subsidies notification.  
 G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 64 - 
 
  11.4  NORWAY  
11.4.1   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 91205 ) 
The European Union notes that Norway 's export subsidies for processed agricultural 
products increased by 18% between 2017 and 2018. Considering that Norway will not be 
allowed to use export subsidies for those products after 2020, is Norway planning any 
alternative measures to promote Norwegian exports of processed agricultural products 
post 2020?  
 
Norway thanks the EU for the question related to export subsidies for  processed agricultural products 
(PAP).  
  
Even though Norway's export subsidies for PAPs correctly has increased by 18%, the total volume 
of exported PAPs receiving such subsidies are also low (approximately 3,6% of the total PAPs 
exported).  
  
The phasing out of export subsidies will indeed be a challenge to those parts of the PAP - industry 
that are affected. The Norwegian Government is in a process of reviewing the current scheme for 
inward processing, mainly by simplifying it. The industry may  use this scheme for continued exports 
based on imported raw materials.   
 
11.5  TURKEY  
11.5.1   Question by Australia (AG-IMS ID 91206 ) 
Australia acknowledges Turkey has submitted export subsidy commitment – 
ES:1 notificatio ns for 2005 through to 2009. While we appreciate the notifications, 
Australia would like to express its concern with Turkey's remaining overdue notifications 
on export subsidy commitments. With those for 2010 onwards remaining overdue.  
 
a. Australia welcomes  Turkey's advice on when it will submit its outstanding 
notifications.  
b. Noting that Turkey is limited by the Nairobi Decision to providing export 
subsidies beyond 2018 only for those products for which it was providing export 
subsidies in its 1998 2000 rep orting period, can Turkey: Confirm what, if any, 
export subsidies it has provided since the end of 2018?  
a. Turkey has submitted Table ES:1, ES:1 -Supporting Table and Table ES:2 notifications for 
the period of 2001 -2009. We are still working on the notificat ions for the following years 
and we hope to complete them very soon.  
b. In accordance with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition, Turkey's revised 
schedule was circulated through the document G/MA/TAR/RS/588 dated 18  June 2019. 
Turkey is curr ently providing export subsidies for agricultural products in line with the 
commitments of Turkey originated in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Pursuant to 
Article  25.2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Turkey will 
submit new and  full notifications for current export subsidies soon.  
11.5.2   Question by Canada (AG-IMS ID 91107 ) 
Questions apply to G/AG/N/TUR/26 to G/AG/N/TUR/30  
  
Canada appreciates Turkey providing more recent export subsidy notifications to this 
Committee. Since the last year notified refers to programmes that were in force 10 years 
ago, Canada is concerned with  the fact that the current situation of Turkey 's export 
subsidy measures remains hard to assess, including their compliance with export subsidy 
elimination commitments contained in the 2015 Nairobi Decision on Export Competition. 
Canada notes that Turkey h as notified export subsidies for apples (TURX021) for the G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 65 - 
 
  years  2005, 2006 and 2009, but that apples were omitted from the 2007 and 2008 
notifications.  
  
a. Could Turkey explain why apples were omitted from the 2007 and 2008 
notifications? Were budgetary out lays and quantities for those years nil?  
b. If so, will Turkey provide revised notifications that would show that no export 
subsidies were provided for apples during that period (a nil)?  
c. Were apples excluded from Turkey 's export subsidy programmes during th ose 
years? If so, how and why?  
d. When will Turkey provide more recent export subsidy notifications, so that other 
Members may be able to understand how Turkey complies with the 2015 Nairobi 
Decision on Export Competition?  
a. Due to budgetary constraints, Turk ey did not provide any export subsidies for apples in 
2007 and 2008.  
b. Products which are not involved in export subsidy programme of Turkey are not shown in 
notifications.  
c. Please refer to the response for question a.  
d. Please refer to the response to AG -IMS ID 91206.  
11.5.3   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 91207 ) 
 
Turkey has recently submitted their due notifications up to 2009. Over three years afte r 
Nairobi, Turkey still did not provide its updated schedule. Notifications 2010 -1018 are 
also outstanding.  
 
When will Turkey comply with its obligations under the Nairobi Decision on Export 
Competition?  
 
Please refer to the response to AG -IMS ID 91206.  
 
11.5.4   Question by Thailand (AG-IMS ID 91097 ) 
 
Thailand would like to thank Turkey for submitting th e export subsidy notifications 
(G/AG/N/TUR/26, G/AG/N/TUR/27, G/AG/N/TUR/28, G/AG/N/TUR/29 
and G/AG/N/TUR/30).  
 
According to the 10th Ministerial Decision in 2015 (Nairobi Ministerial Decision), 
developing country members shall eliminate their export subsi dy entitlements by the end 
of 2018 or by the end of 2022 for products that it has notified export subsidies in one of 
its three latest export subsidy notifications examined by the Committee on Agriculture 
before the date of adoption of Nairobi Ministerial Decision.  
 
In this regard, could Turkey please:  
 
a. Clarify whther it is still currently providing export subsidies? and if so please 
elaborate its plan to reduce export subsidies commitment to meet Nairobi 
Ministerial Decision.  
b. Provide information as to when the subsequent notifications will be provided.  
c. Elaborate on Direct Export Subsidies and provide examples of such programmes 
implemented by Turkey.  
a. Please refer to the response to AG -IMS ID 91206.  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 66 - 
 
  b. Please refer to the response to AG -IMS ID 91206.  
c. The po licy objective of this export subsidy Programme is to develop Turkey's export 
potential in agricultural products. The subsidies are provided to producer/exporters or 
exporters in the form of deduction of their debts to the public corporations from their 
subsidy entitlement which is calculated on the basis of fixed amount per unit. Subsidy 
system is designed by taking into consideration the annual volume and value commitments 
of Turkey, originated in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.  
12  COA MEETING  30 OCTOBER 2019  
12.1  KOREA, REPUBLIC OF  
12.1.1   Question by Ukraine (AG-IMS ID 92122 ) 
G/AG/N/KOR/65; G/A G/N/KOR/66; G/AG/N/KOR/67; G/AG/N/KOR/68  
  
Ukraine appreciates the opportunity to review the Republic of Korea 's export subsidy 
notifications for the years 2014 –2017. The data demonstrate a significant increase in 
monetary support for vegetable (51 % incre ase from 2014 to 2017) and an exceptional 
increase in monetary support for processed food (747 % increase from 2014 to 2017). The 
combined monetary and volume impact for each of these products is also noteworthy: in 
the case of processed food, the volume in crease of 843 % in fact reduces the per unit 
subsidy; however, the volume increase for vegetables of 3.8 % translates to a significantly 
high per unit subsidy. The Republic of Korea claims the export subsidy support under the 
provisions of Article 9.4 of the  Agreement on Agriculture. Ukraine kindly ask the Republic 
of Korea to provide the following information:  
a. What are the main reasons for the sharp increases in export subsidy support for 
vegetables and processed food?  
b. Please identify specifically, which v egetables benefit from this export subsidy 
support?  
c. Please specify the nature of the cost reduction measures applied and any 
differences or specifics for vegetables and processed food.  
d. Could the Republic of Korea inform how this policy meets requirements  of 
paragraphs 9 and 10 of the 2015 Nairobi Decision stipulating the obligation "not 
to raise their export subsidies beyond the average level of the past five years on 
a product basis "?  
a. The Republic of Korea continuously decreases the proportion of export subsidy to total 
transport cost  (25% in 2008 to 9 % in 2018) as an effort to comply with its WTO obligation. 
The support for vegetables and processed food has increased due to successful 
diversification of export markets including Middle East and Eur opean countries, which led 
to increase in long -distance air cargo volumes as well as export subsidy.  
b. 35 products including bell pepper, strawberry, mushroom are receiving Article 9.4 support. 
Detailed list is as follows :  
- 2014 : bell pepper, strawberry( fresh), enokitake, pleurotus  eryngii , cabbage, chinese 
cabbage, cherry tomato, onion, tomato, muskmelon, takuan, other mushrooms, 
strawberry(frozen), chili pepper, other vegetables, pearl oyster mushroom, radish, 
watermelon, sweet potato, korean zucchini, potato, red pepper powder, garlic, cucumber, 
beefsteak plant, eggplant, bracken, carrot, seasoned beefsteak plant, green onion, 
spinach, common mushroom, garden asparagus, lettuce . 
- 2015 : bell pepper, strawberry(fresh), enokitake, pleurotus eryngii, cabb age, chinese 
cabbage, cherry tomato, onion, tomato, muskmelon, takuan, other mushrooms, 
strawberry(frozen), chili pepper, other vegetables, pearl oyster mushroom, radish, G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 67 - 
 
  watermelon, sweet potato, korean zucchini, potato, garlic, cucumber, beefsteak plant,  
eggplant, bracken, carrot, green onion, spinach, common mushroom, garden asparagus, 
siraegi, vegetable seeds, kabocha, lettuce . 
- 2016 : bell pepper, strawberry(fresh), enokitake, pleurotus eryngii, cabbage, chinese 
cabbage, cherry tomato, onion, tomato, muskmelon, takuan, other mushrooms, 
strawberry(frozen), chili pepper, other vegetables, pearl oyster mushroom, radish, 
watermelon, sweet potato, korean zucchini, potato, garlic, cucumber, beefsteak plant, 
eggplant carrot, green onion, spinach, common mushr oom, garden asparagus, siraegi, 
vegetable seeds, kabocha, lettuce . 
- 2017 : bell pepper, strawberry(fresh), enokitake, pleurotus eryngii, cabbage, chinese 
cabbage, cherry tomato, onion, tomato, muskmelon, other mushrooms, 
strawberry(frozen), chili pepper, other vegetables, pearl oyster mushroom, radish, 
watermelon, sweet potato, korean zucchini, potato, garlic, cucumber, beefsteak plant, 
eggplant carrot, green onion, spinach, common mushroom, garden asparagus, vegetable 
seeds, kabocha, lettuce, oriental mel on, bean . 
c. 9% of the transport and freight costs are calculated and supported by the government. 
While 9% subsidy rate remains unchanged, amount of support varies depending on 
distance and whether products are sea -shipped or air -carried. As for vegetables, air carrier 
is frequently used in order to maintain their freshness when exported to distant countries 
while processed foods are mostly sea -shipped.  
d. As the Republic of Korea mentioned in its previous answer, diversification of export 
markets and rise in e xport volume led to increase in export support. The Republic of Korea 
plans to continuously drop export subsidy rates to fully implement the WTO agreement 
including 2015 Na irobi decision.  
 
12.1.2   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 92039 ) 
Republic of Korea ES:1 Notifications G/AG/N/KOR/65 to 68 - Developing Country  
 
The E uropean Union  would like to thank the Republic of Korea for its efforts to bring its 
notifications up to date.  
 
The E uropean Union  has however noted that the Republic of Korea has notified its export 
subsidy commitments for 2014 -2017 in Supporting Table ES:2, using the Article  9.4 
exemption reserved for developing countries.  
 
Taking into account that the Republic of Korea according to the World Bank has a GNI per 
capita at US D 30,600 (2018 figures), and as such is classified as a "high income" country 
(USD 12,376 or more), the EU would ask whether the Republic of Korea could clarify this 
notification and identify the development needs that are met by using this Article.  
 
The Republic of Korea can avail itself of Article 9.4 support until the end of 2023, accor ding to the 
Nairobi ministerial decision on export support.  
 
12.2  MEXICO  
12.2.1   Question by Brazil (AG-IMS ID 92123 ) 
Mexico's latest ES:1 notifications (G/AG/N/MEX/39/Rev.1 and G/AG/N/MEX/44/Rev.1) 
reveal the granting of export subsidies to maize (corn) on back -to-back years, from 2017 
to 2018.  
 
Could Mexico provide further information on the programmes or p olicies that allowed for 
the payment of such export subsidies to Mexican farmers, especially if such programmes 
or policies are still in place?  
 G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
- 68 - 
 
  The export subsidies mentioned by Brazil were provided under the Marketing Incentives Component 
of the Marketin g Support Programme run by the Agency for Agricultural Market Development and 
Marketing Services (ASERCA).  
  
Table 1 shows the subsidy amounts provided in 2017 and 2018 and the share those amounts 
represented of certain variables of interest.  
  
Table 1. Me xico: Maize (corn) export subsidies, 2017 ‑2018  
  2017  2018  
Maize (corn) export subsidies (MXN  million)  356.0  339.0  
As percentage of Marketing Incentives Component  7.5%  6.5%  
As percentage of Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (SADER) budget 
expenditure  0.5%  0.4%  
As percentage of gross value of maize (corn) production  0.3%  0.3%  
Source:  Prepared with Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development data . 
  
The incentive is now part of a new programme under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, the Programme for Social and Sustainable Agricultural Markets (AMSYS), which seeks 
to promote the appropriate marketing of surplus harvests of eligible crops, such as maize (corn), 
and does not include export ‑related supp ort components.  
  
It should be noted that, in line with the new commitments undertaken in the area by Mexico as a 
result of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision, no export subsidies were provided for any product in fiscal 
year 2019. While provision is made for  marketing support for maize (corn), that support is focused 
on internal transportation to supply the domestic industry.  
 
12.3  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
12.3.1   Question by Australia (AG-IMS ID 92125 ) 
Australia thanks the United States for its ES:3 notification for FY  2016 -17 
(G/AG/N/USA /127) reporting total food aid to all destinations.  Australia fully supports 
the provision of assistance to address humanitarian emergencies and improve food 
security in regions that have poor access to sufficient nutrition. However, Australia notes 
the vo lumes of physical food aid notified by the United States for specific products are 
significant, for example: 850 thousand tonnes of wheat and flour; 375 thousand tonnes 
of course grains; 111 thousand tonnes of rice and 140 thousand tonnes of vegetable 
oil. Australia would therefore kindly welcome the United States ' advice on:  
 
a. whether it is considering moving to untied food assistance consistent with 
paragraph 23(c) of the Nairobi Decision?  
b. How it ensures the physical food aid does not cause adverse effects on recipient 
Members ' agricultural industries, nor on their region 's production and 
commercial markets of either like -products, or substitute products?  
a. U.S. food assistance is not tied directly or indirectly to commercial exports of agricultural 
products or other goods and services. Additionally, please note in the U.S. export 
competition questionnaire that, since fiscal year 2016, the value and volume of physical 
food aid notified by the United States have been decreasing year over year. Also, ever  
since fiscal year 2016 the total value of food assistance through cash transfers, vouchers, 
or locally and regionally procured food has substantially increased and exceeded the total 
value of U.S. in -kind food aid.  
b. The U.S. Government works with recipien t governments and implementing organizations 
to analyze the markets and choose agricultural products that will not disrupt local 
production, prices, local markets, or commercial trade. Prior to the approval of a proposed 
U.S. food aid program in a recipien t country, the U.S. Government must make a positive 
"Bellmon Determination." The local and regional market analysis of the Bellmon 
Determination takes into consideration quantitative and qualitative market data, timing of G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  harvests or a close substitute of the commodity in the country, suitability of commodity, 
and potential policy issues.  
12.3.2   Question by China (AG-IMS ID 92085 ) 
China welcomes the ES:3 notification of the United States (G/AG/N/USA/127) dated 
1 August 2019, concerning food aid (Table ES:3) in the context of export subsidy 
commitments for the fiscal year from 01 -10-2016 to 30 -09-2017. I t is noted that 
20,000  tonnes of oilcakes were provided as international food aid. Please clarify whether 
the oilcakes were provided as emergency food aid or non -emergency food aid? In addition, 
please provide the needs assessment for such aid.  
 
The notified 20,000 tonnes  consisted of soybean meal provided as non -emergency developmental 
food aid. As notified in the U.S. 2019 export competition questionnaire, U.S. food assistance for non -
emergency development/capacity building is provided by privat e voluntary organizations, 
cooperatives, governments of developing countries and their agencies, universities, the World Food 
Programme, and other international organizations. The U.S. Government works with the 
implementing organizations and the recipient governments to analyse the markets and choose 
agricultural products that will not disrupt local production, prices, local markets, or commercial trade.  
 
13  COA MEETING  28 JULY 2020  
13.1  BRAZIL  
13.1.1   Question by Australia (AG-IMS ID 93162 ) 
Australia welcomes Brazil's submission of its ES:3 for calendar year 2018, in which it 
notified 14,478.7  tonnes of rice pr ovided as food aid. Australia fully supports the provision 
of assistance to address humanitarian emergencies and to support food security in 
locations that have poor access to sufficient nutrition. With respect to this food aid, can 
Brazil advise:  
  
a. Which Member/country was the recipient of that food aid?  
 
b. If Brazil is considering moving to only cash -based food aid?  
 
c. How it ensures the physical food aid does not cause adverse effects on recipient 
Members' agricultural industries, nor on their regio n's production and commercial 
markets of either like -products, or substitute products?  
 
a. The food aid destination was the Gaza Strip. Donation was made through WFP/UNRWA.  
b. Law no. 12.429, of 20 June 2011, authorizes the government to offer international foo d 
aid of certain food products to the countries listed therein. Such aid shall be offered in 
kind, and made effective through the World Food Programme. Brazil understands that both 
its legislation and its international practice regarding food aid comply wi th the Agreement 
on Agriculture and the Nairobi Decision. c. Brazilian law allows for the provision of 
humanitarian cooperation in order to support countries or populations undergoing armed 
conflict, natural disaster, public calamity, food and nutritional insecurity or other situations 
of emergency or vulnerability, including serious threat to life, health and human or 
humanitarian rights of the recipient population. In Brazil, international food aid for 
humanitarian cooperation purposes are the result of c lose collaboration between the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), and the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA) through its National Food 
Supply Company (CONAB). ABC coordinates the donations, w hich may include food, 
medicines, and other items of need. The aforementioned actions are based on the 
principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence, in accordance with 
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 46/182 and 58/114 and w ith article 4 of the 
Federal Constitution of Brazil, which determines that Brazilian international relations are 
governed by the principles of the prevalence of human rights and cooperation among 
peoples for the progress of humanity, among others. In line with Brazil`s foreign policy, G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  ABC's cooperation and aid policies are demand -driven. For the donation to be carried out, 
Brazil must receive an official request for assistance, via Brazilian diplomatic posts abroad, 
or through the embassies of other countri es in Brazil. The received demands are analyzed 
and are only addressed, among other criteria, if they do not jeopardize the national food 
supply. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs defines the quantities and respective recipients of 
food, in coordination with  the World Food Programme (WFP). Brazil 's demand -driven policy 
is in line with the transition currently taking place within the United Nations to Country 
Strategic Plans. They represent the recognition that effective programs require integrated 
interventio n strategies, specific to each country and directed by the local government. 
That is, the programs must be adapted to the local context.  
13.2   CANADA  
13.2.1   Question by Australia (AG-IMS ID 93223 ) 
Australia thanks Canada for the submission of its ES:1 for 2018. Australia welcomes this  
good example of a fulsome notification, with clear information on the ongoing 
implementation of the Nairobi Decision outcomes by Canada, including confirmation that 
the remaining export subsidies in Canada 's schedule will be eliminated by the end of this 
year.  
 
With respect to the notification, Australia notes that Canada provided producer financed 
subsidies for butter, cheese and other dairy products.  
 
a. Can Canada provide further information on these measures, including the 
funding organisation, any operat ional details of these subsidies?  
The Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC) administers the subsidized exports of dairy products, 
including butter, cheese and other dairy products, in accordance with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision, 
under a specified milk class  price, 5(d).  
 
While the CDC administers these exports, they are not funded by the Government of Canada. The 
funding organizations are the dairy producers of Canada, as represented by provincial milk 
marketing boards operating in each province.  
 
13.2.2   Question b y New Zealand (AG-IMS ID 93199 ) 
Canada 's ES:1 notification for Marketing Year 1 (August 2016 -31 July 2017) confirmed no 
outlays on butter, despite Canada having a scheduled commitment of 905  tonnes. 
Canada 's ES:1 notification for Marketing Year 2018 confirms the reintroduction of a 
subsidy on 151 tonnes of its scheduled commitment for butter. New Zealand also notes 
that Canada continues to subsidise exports of cheese.  
 
a. How is Canada ensuring that export subsidies on butter and cheese (as well as 
skim milk powder and products using dairy ingredients) will be effectively 
eliminated by 31 December 20 20, as per the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on 
Export Competition?  
The Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC) administers the exports of dairy products, including butter, 
under milk class 5(d) in accordance with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision through its permit ting 
system. Permits will not be issued under milk class 5(d) for any exports taking place 
after 31 December 2020.   
 
13.2.3   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 93197 ) 
The European Union notes that Canada 's export subsidies for butter increased 
in 2018/2019 compared to the year before and that both the outlays and quantity of 
subsidised exports exceeded the average level of the past five years.  
  
• How does Canada consider this to respect the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on export 
competition?  G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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Canada 's modified export subsidy schedule was submitted to the WTO on 11 December 2017. This 
export subsidy schedule established Canada 's export subsidies quantity commitment level in 
accordance with the Nairobi decision. In Canada 's export subsidy notification for 2018/2019, levels 
for all products were within these export subsidies quantity commitme nt. Consequently, Canada is 
respecting the Nairobi Ministerial decision. Canada will eliminate all remaining export subsidies by 
the end of 2020 . 
 
13.3  MOROCCO  
13.3.1   Question by Australia (AG-IMS ID 93163 ) 
Australia welcomes Morocco's submission of its ES  :1 notification for 2014, 2016 
and 2017. Noting Morocco's export subsidies are provided subject to Article 9.4 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture, can Morocco provide responses to the following questions:  
  
a. Can Morocco provide details on the cost -reduction measures provided for 
vegetables, fruits , flowers and ornamental plants, olive oil and hatching eggs and 
day-old chicks?  
b. Can Morocco provide details on how these export subsidies meet Morocco's 
commitments under Nairobi Ministerial Decision, particularly paragraphs 9, 10 
and 11?  
13.4  TURKEY  
13.4.1   Question by Australia (AG-IMS ID 93165 ) 
Australia welcomes Turkey's submission of its ES:1 notifications for 2010 through to 201 3. 
This is an important demonstration of Turkey's commitment to transparency.  With respect 
to Turkey's remaining overdue ES notifications:  
a. Can Turkey advise when it expects to submit its outstanding notifications 
(for 2014 onwards).  
Further, with respect to Schedule XXXVII – Turkey – Part IV – Section II – Export 
Subsidies (document G/MA/TAR/RS/588), which outlines Turkey's export subsidy 
reduction commitments, the Schedule indicates Turkey will cease to provide export 
subsidies as of 1 January 2019 for a range of agricultural products, including 
beef (0201,  0202), sheep meat (0204), milk (0401.30) and tomatoes  (0702).  
b. Can Turkey confirm that no export subsidies have been provided for those 
commodities consistent with the Nairobi Decision?  
a. Turkey has submi tted its export subsidy notifications for the period of 2010 -2013. Turkey 
is working on the notifications for the following years and hopes to complete them very 
soon. Turkey eliminated its export subsidy entitlements as of 1 January 2019 for 
25 products o r groups of products (including 0201 -0202; meat of bovine animals, fresh or 
chilled; frozen, 0204; meat of sheep, 0401.30; milk, 0702; tomatoes) which are not 
included in one of its three latest export subsidy notifications examined by the Committee 
on Agr iculture before the date of adoption of Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export 
Competition.  
b. Currently, Turkey implements the export subsidy program in compliance with its revised 
schedule (document symbol; G/MA/TAR/RS/588) circulated in 18 June 2019 and N airobi 
Ministerial Decision on Export Competition.  
 G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  13.4.2   Question by Brazil (AG-IMS ID 93164 ) 
(Question comprises also G/AG/N/TUR/40)  
 
Taking into due account that Turkey 's notifications relates to calendar years 2010 to  2013, 
hence before MC10, and that, according to the notifications, none of its export subsidy 
reduction commitments have been disre garded, it is worth noticing that there is a 
considerable array of agricultural products that were entitled to subsidies.  
 
Could Turkey provide information on the reforms it has implemented on its agricultural 
policy related to export subsidies comply with  the Nairobi Decision?  
 
In accordance with the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition, Turkey's revised schedule 
(document symbol; G/MA/TAR/RS/588) circulated in 18 June 2019. Currently, Turkey implements 
the export subsidy program in complianc e with this revised schedule. Within this context, subsidy 
payments for "Honey" and "Preserved poultry meat products" have already been suspended as of 
1 January 2019, as they are not included in the latest export subsidy notifications of Turkey 
examined b y the Committee on Agriculture before the date of adoption of Nairobi Ministerial Decision 
on Export Competition.  
 
14  COA MEETING  22 SEPTEMBER 2020  
14.1  AUSTRALIA  
14.1.1   Question by India (AG-IMS ID 95021 ) 
In its ES:2 notification, document G/AG/N/AUS/127 for the calendar year 2018, Australia  
mentioned that it has moved to reporting on a Calendar Year basis from Fiscal Year with 
respect to export subsidy notification requirements.   
 
Can Australia explain the reason behind such change in the reporting year?  
 
Australia thanks India for its quest ion with respect to Australia 's ES:2 notification reporting period.  
 
Prior to formalising the elimination of Australia 's scheduled agricultural export subsidy entitlements 
in 2017 as a result of the Nairobi Decision, Australia 's ES:2 notifications provided  total exports on a 
calendar year basis for pears, and a financial year basis for butter and butter oil, cheese, skim milk 
powder and other milk products, pursuant to the entitlements under Australia 's schedule. In addition, 
Australia 's ES:2 notification r eport additional products on a calendar year basis for which Australia 
was a significant exporter or exceeded 5% of total world exports.  
 
In 2019, and following the elimination of Australia 's scheduled export subsidy entitlements, effective 
22 May 2017, Au stralia made the decision to provide data on a standard and consistent reporting 
year basis. Australia chose to do so on a calendar year basis as the relevant export data is made 
available quicker to officials preparing the notification, than it would be o n a financial year basis.  
 
As noted in the footnote of G/AG/N/AUS/127, Australia 's ES:2 notification for 2017 included export 
data for both CY2017 and CY2018 to ensure there were no gaps in data as a result of changing the 
reporting period.  
 
15  COA MEETING  30 NOVEMBER  2020  
15.1  BRAZIL  
15.1.1   Question by the European Union (AG-IMS ID 96071 ) 
The EU notes that Brazil's ES:1 notification for 2019 continues to include export subsidy 
commitments both for amounts and quantities.   
 G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  According to paragraph 7 of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision WT/MIN(15)/45 - WT/L/980, 
developing countries should have eliminated their export subsidy commitments by the 
end of 2018. Brazil was one of the co -sponsors of the proposal which led to that decision.  
 
a. Will Brazil submit a correction to the ES:1 to reflect the Nairobi Ministerial 
decision?  
b. Will Brazil submit a modification to its schedule to eliminate its export subsidy 
commitments?   
Although Brazil has not yet circulated an updated version of Part IV, Section II of its Schedule of 
Concessions, Brazil has never used its rights to provide export subsidies for agr icultural products, 
hence Brazil is in fulfillment of its obligations pursuant to the 2015 Ministerial Conference.  
 
The evaluation of the Nairobi Decision by the National Congress, a constitutional requirement, was 
hampered by the outbreak of the COVID -19 pandemic, but the issue remains a priority for the 
Brazilian Government. We aim at providing an updated version of Brazil 's schedule of concession in 
the near future.  
 
 
 
 
 G/AG/W/211/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX II I 
List of relevant  documents  
G/AG/W/153  
31 May 2016  Annual export competition review  - Submission from the Cairns Group to the 
80th meeting of the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) in June 2016  
G/AG/W/155  
10 August 2016  Compilation of responses to questions raised during the annual dedicated 
discussions on ex port competition on 7 June 2016  - Note by the Secretariat  
G/AG/W/164  
02 June 2017  Annual export competition review  - Submission from the Cairns Group and the 
Russian Federation to the 84th meeting of the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) 
in June 2017  
G/AG/W/166  
24 July 2017  Compilation of responses to questions raised during the annual dedicated 
discussions on export competition on 7 June 2017  - Note by the Secretariat  
G/AG/W/180  
07 June 2018 Annual export competition review  - Submission from the Cairns Group to the 
87th meeting of the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) in June 2018  
G/AG/W/182  
18 July 2018  Compilation of responses to questions raised during the annual dedicated 
discussions on export competition on 11 -12 June 2018  - Note by the Secretariat  
G/AG/W/180/Add. 1  
21 September 2018  Annual export competition review  - Submission from the Cairns Group to the 
87th meeting of the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) in June 2018 – Addendum  
G/AG/W/201  
20 June 2019  Annual export competition review  - Submission from the Cairns Group to the 
91st meeting of the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) in June 2019  
G/AG/W/201/Corr. 1  
21 June 2019  Annual export competition review  - Submission from the Cairns Group to the 
91st meeting of the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) in June 2019 - Corrigendum  
RD/AG/80  
22 September 2020  Observations on agricultural State Trading Enterprises, from 
G/AG/W/125/Rev.12/Add.4  – Communication from Canada  
 
 
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