WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  G/SPS/GEN/641 
20 March 2006 
 (06-1225) 
Committee on Sanitary a nd Phytosanitary Measures Original:   English 
  
 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE EC CONTROL MEASURES 
FOR AVIAN INFLUENZA 
 
Communication from the European Communities
 
 
 
 The following communication, received on 13 Marc h 2006, is being circulated at the request 
of the Delegation of the European Communities.  
_______________ 
 
 
Background 
 Numerous WTO Members have recently adopted precautionary measures restricting trade 
from the European Communities on grounds of outbreaks of Avian Influenza (AI).  These restrictions 
reveal generally a lack of knowledge on how the European Communities deals with this disease, 
especially concerning the marketing conditions for live birds, meat and meat products, eggs and 
feathers, and animal feeding stuffs including processed poultry. 
 To overcome this situation, th is documents aims to explain th e latest legislation adopted by 
the European Communities for the prevention of AI, including cooperation with third countries, 
international institutions and research centres. 
 This document has been structured in the form of questions and answers, with the aim that the 
interested reader can go directly to the point(s) of  concern.  Special emphasis has been laid down to 
explain the use of vaccination as a control measure. G/SPS/GEN/641 
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  Table of content 
 
I.
 BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................................... ..4 
A. WHAT IS THE EC LEGISLATION ON AVIAN INFLUENZA ? .............................................................4  
B. WHAT HAS BEEN THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE AI OUTBREAKS CAUSED BY 
THE ASIAN STRAIN OF THE VIRUS ?..............................................................................................5  
C. EC MEASURES TO REACT TO THE THREAT OF HPAI ...................................................................5  
D. WHAT ARE THE MOST RECENT MEAS URES TAKEN AGAINST AI IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES ? ...........................................................................................................................5  
II. WHY A NEW DIRECTIVE ON  AVIAN INFLUENZA?.....................................................6  
A. WHICH MEASURES ARE APPLIED IN CASE  OF OUTBREAKS OF AVIAN INFLUENZA ?.....................6  
B. WHAT IS THE EC EXPERIENCE ON PREVENTIVE VACCINATION ?.................................................7  
C. WHAT IS THE DIVA  STRATEGY ?.................................................................................................7  
D. WHAT DOES THE NEW DIRECTIVE PROVIDE FOR VACCINATION ? ...............................................7  
1. What are the advantages of vaccinating birds against avian influenza?.........................8  
2. What must a member State do prior to carrying out a vaccination campaign?..............8  
E. WHAT SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL MEASUR ES HAVE TO BE CARRIED OUT ON 
VACCINATED BIRDS ? ...................................................................................................................8  
F. WHAT HAPPENS IF THERE IS AN OUTBREAK OF HPAI  IN A VACCINATED FLOCK ?......................9  
G. ARE THERE ANY REGIONALIZATION MEASURES IMPLEMENTED ? ...............................................9  
H. HOW CAN A TRADE PARTNER KNOW WHICH ARE THE INFECTED AND FREE ZONES ? ..................9  
I. CAN MEAT AND EGGS FROM VACCINATED BIRDS BE MARKETED ?............................................10  
J. WHAT ARE IMPLICATIONS OF VACCINATION IN THIRD COUNTRIES FOR EXPORTS TO 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ? ...............................................................................................10  
K. WHICH OTHER ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN ? ...........................................................................10  
L. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF "REFERENCE LABORATORIES "?.............................................................11  
M. HOW MANY METHODS OF DIAGNOSIS EXIST ?............................................................................11  
N. WHICH STANDARDS ARE APPLIED FOR DE POPULATION OF INFECTED FLOCKS ? .......................11  
O. WHICH STANDARDS ARE USED FOR CLEANSING AND DISINFECTION ?......................................11  
P. WHAT HAPPENS IF AI IS DETECTED DURING IMPORTATION ?....................................................11  
III. WHAT HAPPENS WITH PO ULTRY BY-PRODUCTS?..................................................11  
A. HOW SAFE IS FEEDING STUFF MADE FROM POULTRY MEAT WASTE IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES ? .........................................................................................................................12  
B. HOW SAFE ARE FEATHERS AND DOWN (FROM POULTRY ) FROM THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES ? .........................................................................................................................12  
C. HOW WOULD THE LAW CHANGE IF NEW SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS OCCUR ? ........................13  
D. CAN THE MEMBER STATES ADOPT OTHER MEASURES ? ............................................................13  
IV. HUMAN HEALTH AND INFLUENZA...............................................................................13   G/SPS/GEN/641 
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  A. HAS ANY SAFETY ADVICE BEEN ISSUED AT EC LEVEL FOR POULTRY WORKERS AND 
OTHER PEOPLE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH POULTRY ? ................................................................13  
B. WHAT IS THE PANDEMIC INFL UENZA PREPAREDNESS PLAN ?....................................................14  
C. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR DISEASE PREVENTION AND 
CONTROL (ECDC)  IN PREPARING FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA ? ...............................................14  
D. WHAT IS THE EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE SYSTEM ? ......................................................14  
E. HOW DOES THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COOPERATE WITH ALL ITS TRADE 
PARTNERS ?.............................................................................................................................. ..15 
F. PROMOTING NETWORKS :...........................................................................................................15  
G. USEFUL LINKS ...........................................................................................................................16  
 
  G/SPS/GEN/641 
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  I. BACKGROUND 
1. Poultry is listed in Annex I to the EC Treaty and one of the Community's tasks in the 
harmonized veterinary field is to improve the health  status of poultry, thereby facilitating trade and 
ensuring the development of this sector.  Furthermore, when defining and implementing Community policies and activities a high level of human health protection is to be ensured. 
2. Concerning Avian Influenza (AI), most AI viruses are of low pathogenicity and do not cause 
serious disease in birds, but due to rapid virus mutation and possible re-assortment of the genetic material between different strains, the level of risks for animal and public health posed by the 
different strains is to some extent unpredictable.  A consequence of the a bove is the existence of 
specific legislation aiming to control AI in the Eu ropean Communities.  This legislation takes into 
consideration the role of wild birds (ducks, geese a nd gulls in particular) that often carry these viruses 
without showing any symptoms and ar e considered to be the main "reservoir" of AI viruses in nature.  
From these birds, the low pathogenic viruses may spread to domestic poultry and some of these 
(notably those of the types H5 and H7), can muta te into highly pathogenic viruses causing the Highly 
Pathogenic AI (HPAI), a serious disease leading to epidemics in poultry and other birds.  The recent 
Asian strain of the AI virus is an example of an  HPAI virus which can al so spread and cause disease 
in humans. 
A. W
HAT IS THE EC LEGISLATION ON AVIAN INFLUENZA ? 
3. EC legislation to control AI is la id down in Council Directive 92/40/EEC1 although this 
Directive is being replaced by Council Direc tive 2005/94/EC of 20 December 2005 on Community 
measures for the control of AI and repealing Directive 92/40/EEC.2  There are other actions for 
preventive hygienic measures at farm level, disease awareness amongst farmers and cooperation 
between operators in the poultry sector with a view to ensure that the stri ctest biosecurity measures 
are applied to prevent disease spread.  According to this legislation: 
(a) all member States must have an AI contingency plan  in place to ensure that the most 
appropriate measures are immediately impl emented in the event of an outbreak; 
(b) all suspected cases of AI must be investigated and appropriate measures taken in case 
of confirmation of high pathogenic AI; 
(c) to limit the spread of the virus: 
– infected poultry must be killed in a humane  way and disposed of safely; 
– feeding stuffs, contaminated equipment and manure must be destroyed or treated 
in order to inactivate the virus; 
– the veterinary authorities are required to immediately implement movement 
restrictions on the affected holdings and on all farms in a radius of at least 10 km 
around these holdings (the so called surveillance zone);  and 
– if necessary, stamping-out measures can also be extended to poultry farms in the 
vicinity, or to holdings which have had high risk contact with infected farms. 
                                                      
1 Council Directive 92/40/EEC of 19 May 1992 introducing Comm unity measures for the control of AI (Official 
Journal L 167, 22 June 1992 p.:1). 
2 Official Journal L 10, 14 January 2006 pp.:16-65.  G/SPS/GEN/641 
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  B. WHAT HAS BEEN THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE AI OUTBREAKS CAUSED BY THE 
ASIAN STRAIN OF THE VIRUS ? 
4. Since 2003, the particularly virulent Asian strain of AI has caused the death or destruction of 
many million birds in South East Asia, and is still in ci rculation.  In Central China, that is inhabited by 
a large population of different species of wild bi rds including migratory birds, several different 
species were found infected.  At the end of July-beginning of August 2005, Russia and then 
Kazakhstan confirmed outbreaks in poultry farms of the Asian strain, while Mongolia detected this 
virus in wild birds.  In Russia, the first outbreaks were all reported in Siberia, but since mid-October 
outbreaks have also been reported in the European part of the country.  Since October, new cases of 
AI had been reported in Romania's Danube Delta region, a region where large numbers of migratory 
birds gather from different areas.  Other cases have been reported in West Anatolia (Turkey), Croatia, 
Ukraine (Crimea), Germany, Italy, Greece, Austria a nd more recently in France.  The situation with 
regard to AI is changing very rapidly and the European Communities regularly updates the situation on its website:  http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/healt h_consumer/dyna/influenza/index.cfm
 
C. EC MEASURES TO REACT TO THE THREAT OF HPAI 
5. The European Communities started intensive surv eillance of domestic and wild birds already 
in 2003.  An expert group reviewed the surve illance measures in place and recommended that all 
member States urgently review and intensify the surveillance programmes already planned for 
2005/06 by increasing sampling of migratory waterfowl along the flyways that could pose a risk of disease introduction.  In parallel, a fundamental revi ew of the existing legislation on avian flu was 
proposed. 
6. The expert group also recommended that memb er States introduce additional awareness 
programmes  encouraging farmers to improve biosecu rity measures, review and update the 
contingency plans  for AI already in place according to EC  legislation and ensure that existing 
measures and controls at EC external borders  are fully applied as regards both commercial 
consignments and personal imports by individual s, particularly regarding pet birds.  In the 
contingency plans, the need was highlighted to provide adequate protection for poultry workers at 
risk, as well as proper and reliabl e information on poultry products to consumers to prevent any lack 
of consumer confidence. 
D. WHAT ARE THE MOST RECENT MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST AI IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES ? 
7. The European Communities follows the norms of  the World Organization for Animal Health 
(OIE) and regularly reviews the situation in aff ected countries.  This is done by the Standing 
Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health  (SCOFCAH).  If appropriate, the European 
Communities establishes restrictions, which are upda ted in line with the latest epidemiological 
situation in the countries concerned.  Import bans  have been placed on live birds  and risky poultry 
products such as fresh poultry meat  and untreated feathers  from all countries or regions which 
detected and confirmed outbreaks of the disease within their borders.  As the Asian strain of the virus 
started to spread westwards from Asia in the sec ond half of 2005, the European Communities stepped 
up preventive, surveillance and control measures.  Tighter biosecurity measures (in continuous review 
as the situation evolves) were agreed.  These included: 
(a) keeping poultry indoors in identified high risk areas; 
(b) banning the collection of birds at markets, shows and cultural events; 
(c) allowing member States to vaccinate zoo birds; G/SPS/GEN/641 
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  (d) wild bird surveillance
3;  and 
(e) national testing programmes.4 
These measures have already proven successful in det ecting the virus in wild birds in several member 
States and in confining outbreaks in commercial flocks to a single incident. 
II. WHY A NEW DIRECTIVE ON AVIAN INFLUENZA? 
8. The new Council Directive 2005/94/EC of 20 December 2005 on Community measures for 
the control of Avian Influenza and repealing Directive 92/40/EEC5 is based on a proposal by the 
Commission that considered recent scientific knowledge on the risks of AI for animal  and 
public health , new laboratory tests and vaccines as well as the lessons learnt during previous 
outbreaks.  The Commission consulted: 
(a) the Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare; 
(b) the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA);  and 
(c) the changes in the Terrestrial Animal H ealth Code and Manual of Diagnostic Tests 
and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals of the OIE. 
9. Council Directive 2005/94/EC updates all EC AI measures, to ensure that the most 
appropriate surveillance and prevention measures ar e in place and that the health risks, economic 
costs, and negative impact on society in the event of  an outbreak are minimized.  A key aspect of the 
Directive is the new focus on the surveillance  and control of low pathogenic viruses , as a means of 
preventing a major AI outbreak. 
10. In fact there is evidence th at these HPAI strains originat e from the low pathogenic avian 
viruses through mutation  and moreover, wild birds often transmit the low pathogenic viruses to 
domestic flocks.  As low pathogenic viruses cannot be eradicated from wild birds , the infection of 
domestic poultry can be best controlled and eradi cated, therefore reducing the potential for a virus 
mutation into the highly pathogenic forms.  In view  of the above, particular  provisions have been 
included concerning early detection  of infection aiming at a quick reaction  and the adoption of 
appropriate and proportionate c ontrol and eradication measures  which include a system of active 
surveillance  following general guidelines  that may be adapted in the future at the light of further 
knowledge and developments in this field. 
A. WHICH MEASURES ARE APPLIED IN CASE  OF OUTBREAKS OF AVIAN INFLUENZA ? 
11. To prevent the spread of the disease, the affected poultry cannot be moved  from farms where 
low pathogenic AI has been detected.  Birds (from th e affected farms) can be slaughtered normally or, 
alternatively, culled and destroyed ("stamping out ").  The new AI Directive 2005/94/EC, also allows  
member States, under strictly controlled c onditions, to carry out preventive vaccination  and 
emergency vaccination  against AI.  National authorities must submit vaccination plans  to the 
Commission for approval. 
                                                      
3 Wild bird hunting and other relevant  organisations are now obliged to immediately notify national competent 
authorities of any abnormal mortality or si gnificant disease outbreaks in  wild birds.  EC experts also drew up guidelines on 
testing wild birds for avian influenza. 
4 In September 2005, member States backed a Commiss ion Decision to provide €884 000 from the EC budget for 
the period of July 2005  to January 2006, and the amount will be further reviewed in early 2006. 
5 OJ L 10, 14 January 2006, pp.:16 -65.  G/SPS/GEN/641 
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  B. WHAT IS THE EC EXPERIENCE ON PREVENTIVE VACCINATION ? 
12. Following a major outbreak of HPAI (but not  H5N1) in 1999-2000, a targeted preventive 
vaccination campaign using the DIVA strategy (see be low) was developed and applied with turkeys, 
laying hens and poultry in certain high risk areas (tra nsit of migratory birds) in the Po Valley region in 
Italy.  The campaign was broadly successful in containing low pathogenic AI viruses to prevent them 
from mutating into highly pathogenic strains. 
13. Since the major AI outbreak in the Netherla nds, Belgium and Germany in 2003, successful 
special vaccination programmes were implemented to  protect birds in zoos and approved centres in 
these countries.  Other member States have recen tly started applying vaccination campaigns for zoo 
birds in response to the heightened  risk of the H5N1 AI virus spr eading to birds in the European 
Communities.  Vaccination has also been authorised in  the Netherlands and in France in the context of 
the current H5N1 outbreaks, under strict conditions. 
C. WHAT IS THE DIVA  STRATEGY ? 
14. DIVA stands for Differentiating between Infected and Vaccinated Animals .  It is a specific 
vaccination strategy developed and applied in It aly since 2000, in regions where low pathogenic 
AI viruses frequently occur.  DIVA consists of clear measures to distinguish  between vaccinated birds 
and birds infected with AI that are indistinguishab le in terms of antibodies.  DIVA requires the use of 
appropriate vaccines and specific discriminatory tests  which enable differentiation between vaccine 
and infectious antibodies.  This is important: 
(a) to detect any AI outbreak in vaccinated birds;  and also 
(b) for trade purposes as it enables restrictions  on vaccinated poultry meat to be lifted 
once the flocks could be clearly shown to be free of infection. 
15. The DIVA strategy has been accepted internationally as a good way to monitor and provide 
assurances on the health of vaccinated poultry and their products. 
D. WHAT DOES THE NEW DIRECTIVE PROVIDE FOR VACCINATION ? 
16. The new AI Directive 2005/94/EC allows  member States to carry out preventive vaccination  
and emergency vaccination  against AI.  National authorities must submit vaccination plans  to the 
Commission for approval.  The decision to use vaccina tion can be a useful tool where domestic birds 
are exposed to the virus from wild birds. 
17. Preventive vaccination  of individual birds may be used in a targeted way, for example a 
Commission Decision6 allows member States to vaccinate special  categories of birds (e.g. zoo birds or 
rare species  of birds) or to be used in certain cat egories of poultry in specific areas where low 
pathogenic AI viruses frequently recur.  Preventive vaccination requires the adoption of particular 
surveillance  and controls  to prevent the possible persistence of disease in an endemic form in a 
poultry population. 
18. Emergency vaccination  may be used by member States when there is an outbreak of HPAI 
within or very close to their territory .  It is a short term  measure to contain an outbreak of AI in 
poultry or other captive birds or to stop it from sp reading from other areas where there is a confirmed 
outbreak.  Emergency vaccination cannot be app lied unless a risk assessment demonstrates a 
                                                      
6 Commission Decision 2005/744/EC of 21 October 2005 layi ng down the requirements for the prevention of 
highly pathogenic avian influenza caused by influenza A virus of subtype H5N1 in susceptible  birds kept in zoos in the 
member States (Official Journal L 279, 22 October 2005 pp.:75-78).  G/SPS/GEN/641 
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  significant and immediate threat of AI spreading to the poultry and birds concerned, from another 
infected area. 
19. The use of vaccination will always be strictly  monitored and the EC rules require that 
vaccinated birds can be differentiated from infect ed birds (DIVA strategy - Differentiating between 
Infected and Vaccinated Animals) and that specific surveillance and control measures are in place.  
This is very important both for disease control
 and for trade purposes.   In effect, restrictions on trade 
(both for the internal trade and to expo rt) will be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
1. What are the advantages of vaccinating birds against avian influenza? 
(a) Vaccination reduces the risk  of birds becoming infected with the AI virus, and lowers 
the chances of the virus being introdu ced into a vaccinated holding, as a higher 
amount of the virus is needed before a vaccinated bird will become infected. 
(b) Vaccination also reduces the amount of the virus shed in the environment  by a bird if 
it does become infected with avian flu, th ereby helping to lower the risk of the 
disease spreading. 
(c) A properly vaccinated flock is less likely to have an outbreak of AI than a non-
vaccinated flock, and if an outbreak of the disease does occur it is slower to spread 
and easier to contain and eradicate in a vaccinated flock. 
(d) Moreover, vaccination reduces the mortality leve ls of infected birds, making it useful 
for protecting valuable birds such as zoo birds. 
2. What must a member State do prior to  carrying out a vaccination campaign? 
(a) Before vaccinating any birds against AI, a member State must submit a detailed 
vaccination plan , including details on surveillance measures, to the Commission. 
(b) The Commission then reviews this plan, together with the Standing Committee on 
Food Safety and Animal Health.  It may la y out further conditions, such as movement 
restrictions on live vaccinated birds , before authorising the vaccination campaign. 
(c) In the case of emergency vaccination, the member State may begin implementing the 
vaccination programme prior to authorisation from the Commission, provided that it 
issues a general ban on the movement of poultry and their product and other captive birds from the area of vaccination, and shows that vaccination will not have a negative effect on disease control. 
E. W
HAT SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL MEASURES HAVE TO BE CARRIED OUT ON VACCINATED 
BIRDS ? 
20. Member States applying a vaccination plan must  carry out intense surveillance on vaccinated 
poultry and captive birds, in line with the DIVA stra tegy to ensure that any outbreak of AI in the 
vaccinated birds is detected quickly, despite the f act that symptoms of the disease may be less obvious 
than in non-vaccinated birds.  Different measures ca n be taken to monitor for the virus in vaccinated 
flocks: 
(a) "Sentinel" birds  (non-vaccinated) placed in the flock with the vaccinated birds.  G/SPS/GEN/641 
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  (b) Regular testing (on swabs taken from vaccinate d birds) to ensure that they have not 
become infected with the AI virus. 
(c) Movement restrictions are placed on live v accinated birds and their hatching eggs, 
and these products cannot be traded or marketed.  
(d) The meat and products of vaccinated poultry can only be moved or traded if 
accompanied by a certificate to show that they have come from a healthy, virus-free 
bird. 
(e) Member States using vaccination as a prev entive measure must also carry out blood 
tests that allow the differentiation be tween vaccinated and infected birds. 
F. WHAT HAPPENS IF THERE IS AN OUTBREAK OF HPAI  IN A VACCINATED FLOCK ? 
21. If there is outbreak of HPAI in vaccinated  poultry, members States must apply the same 
eradication and control measures as are carried out when there is an outbreak in unvaccinated poultry: 
(a) all poultry on the infected holding must be culled; 
(b) their meat and products must be destroyed;  and 
(c) thorough cleansing and disinfection must be carried out on the holding. 
G. ARE THERE ANY REGIONALIZATION MEASURES IMPLEMENTED ? 
(a) YES, first, a 3 km radius protection zone  and 10 km radius surveillance zone  must be 
set up around the site where the disease was detected; 
(b) SECONDLY, wider risk areas are marked to act as a buffer zone  between the affected 
and non-affected part of the member State;  and 
(c) THIRD, in these restricted areas severe move ment restrictions, biosecurity measures 
and intense monitoring of holdings are implemented. 
H. HOW CAN A TRADE PARTNER KNOW WHICH ARE THE INFECTED AND FREE ZONES ? 
22. EC member States immediately inform the Commission and other member States of any 
presence (or suspected presence) of AI, any AI conf irmed in slaughterhouses, means of transport, 
border inspection posts and quarantine facilities for im ports and the results of any surveillance for AI 
virus carried out in mammals.  This inform ation appears rapidly in a dedicated Webpage.7  Next to 
this, the Commission, in the course of a week, adopts a decision that is made public in the Official 
Journal of the European Communities (see in Annex I,  20 decisions adopted to date in the last six 
months).  These decisions are also publicised in th e press and notified, where appropriate, to the OIE. 
23. From the above it follows that EC trading part ners are informed of the affected areas by 
following the Official Journal of the European Communities, visiting the web page of the 
Commission or asking directly to the EC SPS Enquiry Point.8  The follow up of the situation can be 
                                                      
7 http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/healt h_consumer/dyna/influenza/index.cfm   
See also page http://europa.eu.int/comm/health/ph_threats/com/Influenza/press_influenza_en.htm   
8 Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection. Directorate D,  Unit D/3 International Questions 
(multilateral).  European Community' SPS No tification Authority and Enquiry Point:  sps@cec.eu.int ; 
juan.perez-lanzac@cec.eu.int ;  Fax +32/2 299 80 90.  G/SPS/GEN/641 
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  easily done by visiting the pages of the Standi ng Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health 
(SCFCAH section Animal health) in the Commission Web.
9 
I. CAN MEAT AND EGGS FROM VACCINATED BIRDS BE MARKETED ? 
24. Under EC legislation, only products from healthy animals may be marketed.10  Fresh meat, 
meat products and table eggs  from vaccinated poultry can be traded.  Meat has to be accompanied by 
a certificate  verifying that they come from a virus-free poultry flock  (see paragraph 20). 
25. Vaccinated live poultry and birds, and their hatc hing eggs, cannot be traded within or from 
the European Communities, except under very limited circumstances .  Eggs originating from holdings 
where poultry suspected of being infected with AI must be handled according to Regulation 
(EC) 852/200411 and Regulation (EC) 853/200412 under certain conditions. 
26. The measures outlined in paragraphs 22 and 23 are in line with the OIE recommendations.  
Furthermore there are movement restrictions on live birds and hatching eggs in vaccinated zones.  As 
a consequence, third country trading partners can apply a regionalised approach to EC exports of 
poultry and eggs . 
J. WHAT ARE IMPLICATIONS OF VACCINATION IN THIRD COUNTRIES FOR EXPORTS TO THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ? 
27. In terms of EC imports from third countries, live birds and hatching eggs from countries 
which have vaccinated against HPAI are banned .  As general rule, fresh poultry meat is not authorized 
either from countries which have carried out vacci nation programmes against HPAI in the previous 
12 months . 
28. However, the principle applied by the Europ ean Communities is that third countries which 
have animal health and food safety standards equal or  equivalent to EC standards should be treated in 
a non-discriminatory fashion.  Therefore, in line w ith this principle, special rules permitting imports 
of fresh poultry meat from a vaccination country might be adopted on a case-by-case basis  on the 
condition that the third country in question can demons trate that the animal health rules applied in its 
territory in relation to vaccination are equivalent to  those applied by the Eu ropean Communities.  No 
third country where vaccination is applied has, to date, sought to export pou ltry or poultry products to 
the European Communities. 
K. WHICH OTHER ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN ? 
29. At Community level, the human health risks  posed by influenza viruses are primarily dealt 
with by other actions and lega l acts concerning in particular: 
(a) the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), established by 
Regulation (EC) No 851/200413; 
                                                      
9 See pages http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/animal/dis eases/controlmeasures /avian/index_en.htm  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/committees/index_en.htm   
10 Even if the meat is safe for humans. 
11 Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the hygiene of 
foodstuffs (Official Journal L 139, 30 April 2004 pp.:1-55).  
12 Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliame nt and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down 
specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin (Official Journal L 139, 30 April 2004 pp.:55-205).  
13 Regulation (EC) No 851/2004 of the European Parliament  and of the Council of 21 April 2004 establishing a 
European Centre for disease prev ention and control (Official Journa l L 142, 30 April 2004 p.:1 -11).   G/SPS/GEN/641 
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  (b) the recommendations issued by the Commission on Community Influenza pandemic 
preparedness and response planning; 
(c) the European Union Early Warning and Response System;  and 
(d) the establishment of the European  Influenza Surveillance Scheme. 
L. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF "REFERENCE LABORATORIES "? 
30. Any suspicion of AI infection which may arise from clinical or laboratory investigations or 
any other reason set in motion immediate official investigations by the EC Reference Laboratories.14  
As a result, immediate actions are foreseen as soon as the presence of infection is confirmed, including depopulation of the infected holdings and of those at risk of infection (see headings G and H). 
M. H
OW MANY METHODS OF DIAGNOSIS EXIST ? 
31. Only one.  The legislation in place establish es provisions to ensure harmonised procedures  
and methods for the diagnosis, including the functioning of a Community reference laboratory  as well 
as reference laboratories in member States . 
N. WHICH STANDARDS ARE APPLIED FOR DE POPULATION OF INFECTED FLOCKS ? 
32. Council Directive 93/119/EC15 sets out the minimum standards for the protection of animals 
at the time of slaughter or killing including for th e purpose of disease control.  Such rules apply fully 
to slaughter or killing. 
O. WHICH STANDARDS ARE USED FOR CLEANSING AND DISINFECTION ? 
33. Disinfectants must comply with Directive 98/8/EC.16 
P. WHAT HAPPENS IF AI IS DETECTED DURING IMPORTATION ? 
34. If AI is detected during importation  in a quarantine facility or centre, as provided for in 
Commission Decision 2000/666/EC17, this should be reported to the Commission.  This reporting in 
quarantine facilities excludes the procedure in Council Directive 82/894/EEC.18 
III. WHAT HAPPENS WITH POULTRY BY-PRODUCTS? 
35. The rules on the collection, transport, storag e, handling, processing and use or disposal of 
animal by-products including animals killed to er adicate epizootic diseases, to prevent them from 
                                                      
14 See more about the Reference Laboratories on our web page 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/anima l/diseases/laboratories/index_en.htm   
15 Council Directive 93/119/EC of 22 December 1993 on the protection of animals at the time of slaughter or 
killing (Official Journal L 340, 31 December 1993 pp.:21-34). 
16 Directive 98/8/EC of the European Parliament and of th e Council of 16 February 1998 concerning the placing of 
biocidal products on the market (Offici al Journal L 123, 24 April 1998 pp.:0001). 
17 Commission Decision 2000/666/EC of 16 October 2000 laying down the anima l health requirements and the 
veterinary certification for the import of birds, other than poultry and the conditio ns for quarantine (Official Journal L 278,  
31 October 2000 pp.: 26-34). 
18 Council Directive 82/894/EEC of 21 December 1982 on th e notification of animal  diseases within the 
(Community Official Journal L 378, 31 December 1982 pp.:58-62). G/SPS/GEN/641 
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  presenting a risk to animal and public health  are set by Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002
19, which 
provide for a general framework for the disposal  of animal by-products not intended for human 
consumption and animals killed in relation to diseas e outbreaks.  Nevertheless, the new legislation 
provides for the adoption, by the committee procedure,  of specific, additional or different measures 
where necessary to enhance further AI control measures. 
A. HOW SAFE IS FEEDING STUFF MADE FROM POULTRY MEAT WASTE IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES ? 
36. Article 2.7.12.21 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal  Health Code (TAHC) provides that products 
of poultry origin intended for use in animal feeding , regardless of the AI status of the country, zone or 
compartment of origin, may circulate on presentation of an international veterinary certificate  
attesting that:  these commodities come from birds which have been kept in an AI free country , zone  
or compartment  since they were hatched or for the past 21 days; or these commodities have been 
processed to ensure the destruction of AI viru s and the necessary precautions were taken to avoid 
contact of the commodity with any source of AI viru s.  In the European Co mmunities, pursuant to the 
Community legislation explained before, very inte nsive surveillance programmes for AI are in place 
to ensure that the most appropriate actions are immediately taken in poultry farms should the disease 
occur, and strict control conditions operate fo r the production of meat and bone meal from poultry 
meat waste and feather meal hydrolyzed for feed use. 
See also paragraph 37 below. B. H
OW SAFE ARE FEATHERS AND DOWN (FROM POULTRY ) FROM THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES ? 
37. Article 2.7.12.22 of the TAHC provides that rega rdless of the AI status of the country, zone 
or compartment of origin, these products may circul ate on presentation of an international veterinary 
certificate attesting that: these commodities come from birds which have been kept in an AI free country, zone or compartment since they were hatched or for the past 21 days; or these commodities have been processed to ensure the destruction of AI virus and the necessary precautions were taken to 
avoid contact of the commodity with any source of AI virus. 
38. In the European Communities, meat and bone meal from poultry meat waste as well as 
hydrolyzed  feather meal are clearly identified and compul sory declarations set by law.
20  A n y  
establishment producing these or any ot her feedstuff must be registered.21  Moreover, the technical 
conditions for production of both commodities are set also  by law.  In conclusion, existing legislation 
enables any EC member States to produce an intern ational veterinary certificate providing sufficient 
guaranties about: 
(a) the identity of the commodities; 
(b) its origin (country, region and industrial plant in which has been produced); 
                                                      
19 Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002 of the European Parliament  and of the Council of 3 October 2002 laying down 
health rules concerning animal by-products not intended for human consumption (Official  Journal L 273, 10 October 2002 
pp.:1-95) and Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down 
specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin (Official Journal L 139, 30 April 2004 pp.:55-205). 
20 Council Directive 96/25/EC of 29 April 1996 on the circul ation and use of feed mate rials, amending Directives 
70/524/EEC, 74/63/EEC, 82/471/EEC and 93/ 74/EEC and repealing Directive 77/101/EEC  (Official Journal L 125, 
23 May 1996 pp.:35-58 ). 
21 Article 9 of Regulation No 183/2005 of the European Pa rliament and of the Council of 12 January 2005 laying 
down requirements for feed hygiene (Officia l Journal L 35, 8 February 2005 pp.:1-22).   G/SPS/GEN/641 
 Page 13 
 
 
  (c) the processing conditions they have experien ced to ensure the destruction of the AI 
virus;  and 
(d) that necessary precautions have been taken to avoid contact of both commodities with 
any source of AI virus. 
C. HOW WOULD THE LAW CHANGE IF NEW SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS OCCUR ? 
39. The new Council Directive allows further ame ndments to be made when necessary without 
delay in order to take account of  developments in scientific and technical knowledge.  Considering the 
unpredictability of influenza viruses, it ensures a swift procedure for a rapid adoption at Community 
level of additional or more specific measures to co ntrol any infection of poultry and other animal 
species whenever such measures are necessary. 
D. CAN THE MEMBER STATES ADOPT OTHER MEASURES ? 
40. Yes, they can.  The Directive sets out the mi nimum control measures to be applied in the 
event of an outbreak of AI in poultry or other captive birds.  However, member States are free to take 
more stringent administrative and sanitary actions in the field covered by this Directive.  In addition, 
this Directive should provide for member States' au thorities to apply measures proportionate to the 
health risk posed by different disease situations. 
IV. HUMAN HEALTH AND INFLUENZA 
41. Influenza pandemic is the term used for a se rious human influenza epidemic, more severe 
than the normal seasonal outbreaks.  They are cau sed by a new virus emerging against which humans 
have reduced or no immunity, resulting in tran smission and multiple outbreaks across the globe.  
Although pandemics are rare, scientists monitoring the evolution of influenza viruses consider that a 
virus capable of generating an influenza pandemi c may arise in the coming years, and the World 
Health Organisation has issued similar warnings.  The European Commission and EC member States 
are working continually on pandemic influenza pl anning and response measures in case of such an 
eventuality. 
A. HAS ANY SAFETY ADVICE BEEN ISSUED AT EC LEVEL FOR POULTRY WORKERS AND OTHER 
PEOPLE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH POULTRY ? 
42. Member States have issued national guidelin es for poultry workers and other people who 
come into close contact with poultr y infected with AI viruses.  In general, the use of good hygiene 
practices (e.g. washing hands properly after contact  with birds) and protective clothing and masks 
form the basis of recommendations. 
43. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) has published guidelines 
for risk groups, such as cullers and people working and living on poultry farms in regions affected by 
the Asian strain.22  These guidelines can be viewed as a pre-em ptive document, to be employed where 
there is an outbreak caused by this strain in th e European Communities.  The guidelines are based on 
6 principles: 
(a) controlling the infection in birds; 
(b) minimizing the number of people possibly exposed to the virus; 
                                                      
22 The web address of the ECDC is http://www.ecdc.eu.int/   
See also  http://www.ecdc.eu.int/press/press_ releases/PDF/060216_press_release.pdf   G/SPS/GEN/641 
Page 14  
 
  (c) using personal protective equipment (e.g. gl oves, masks) when directly involved in 
work with potentially infected animals; 
(d) using antiviral drugs in a proper and controlled manner, following a local risk 
assessment; 
(e) recommending seasonal influenza vaccination for people involved in culling infected 
poultry flocks, especially if seasonal influenza is circulating; and 
(f) surveying for infection among those potentially exposed. 
B. W
HAT IS THE PANDEMIC INFL UENZA PREPAREDNESS PLAN ? 
44. The EC preparedness plan identifies the ke y components needed to face up to pandemic 
influenza:  the preparation and testing of national preparedness plans;  surveillance and networking of 
national reference laboratories to identify the pande mic strain quickly;  early notification of cases, 
outbreak assistance and coordination of responses of member States;  and the adequate and timely 
supply of vaccines and anti-viral drugs.  The plan revised WHO definitions of pandemic phases taking 
account of the opening of the European Centre fo r Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC).  In 
particular, it sets out a proposed EC response for each phase of an influenza pandemic as defined by 
the WHO and clarifies the responsibilities of th e EC member States, the Commission and the 
EC agencies in an influenza pandemic. 
45. The influenza viruses are continuously cha nging, and every year the seasonal human 
influenza virus is different so vaccines have to be developed to respond to the new strains.  The strain 
of virus that could cause a pandemic is unknown.  From this it follows that it is not yet possible to create a vaccine against an unidentified virus.  The Commission is focussing on ensuring that if a 
pandemic does occur, vaccine production capacities w ill be maximized so that doses can be made 
available in the shortest possible time and to as many people as possible. 
C. W
HAT IS THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR DISEASE PREVENTION AND CONTROL 
(ECDC)  IN PREPARING FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA ? 
46. The key responsibilities of the ECDC are to id entify, assess and communicate current and 
emerging human health threats, including those caused  by influenza viruses.  It should analyze and 
assess, in real time, the human health risk related to latest developments on influenza.  On the basis of 
its assessments, the ECDC should provide relevant and up-to-date scientific information, and timely 
advice, for effective outbreak management.  Anothe r important function allocated to the new agency 
is the technical operation and round-the-clock moni toring of the early warning and response system 
(EWRS), which is important for an effective and coordinated EC response to an outbreak. 
D. WHAT IS THE EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE SYSTEM ? 
47. The Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) is a telematic system linking the 
designated authorities in member States and the Commission.  The system allows for immediate 
exchange of views on risk assessment  and risk management  crucial for timely public health action.  
Member States inform as soon as possible through the EW RS of any data they have of a public health 
threat that could have international consequen ces.  The EWRS has already proven useful during a 
number of public health emergencies, including the Severe Acute respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
outbreak in 2003.  G/SPS/GEN/641 
 Page 15 
 
 
  E. HOW DOES THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COOPERATE WITH ALL ITS TRADE PARTNERS ? 
48. The Commission has been working with member States and the WHO to help member States 
draw up and improve their own national preparedness plans  so EC' member States now have 
pandemic preparedness plans in place.  These were  studied and assessed by the Commission, ECDC 
and WHO, and two workshops were held in March and October 2005 with member States, to address 
weaknesses and close gaps in the national plans.  Work by the Commission and member States to 
keep improving and updating national plans as necessary is ongoing.23 
49. Pandemic simulation exercise :  on 23-24 November, the Commission, member States, WHO, 
ECDC and the pharmaceutical industry took part in a command-post exercise on pandemic influenza.  
The exercise aimed to test communications, in formation exchange a nd coordination between 
member States, EC bodies and international organisations in a public health emergency.  It also tested 
the inter-operability of national pande mic preparedness plans, and provi ded an opportunity to put into 
practice plans that had, up until then, only been on paper. 
50. The international community has pledged a total amount of $1.9 billion dollars to fight AI and 
prepare for a possible human influenza pandemic.   To this the European Commission pledged 
€80 million ($100 m) in aid grants from the Comm ission's External Relations budget and the 
European Development Fund and committed €20 million in research funds for AI from the EC 6th 
Research Framework Programme, for a total pledge of €100 million ($122 mil lion).  Taken together 
with the €114 million ($140 m) undertaken by the EC member States, the European Communities has 
in total pledged around €214 million ($260 m). 
51. Of the €80 million pledged by the European Commission to third countries, €30 million is 
destined for Asia, €5 million for Central Asia, €5 mi llion for the EC's Eastern European neighbouring 
countries, €10 million for North Africa and the Middle East, and €30 million is earmarked for the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries, subject to approval by the ACP countries.  Separately, the 
European Commission is preparing to bring forw ard urgently €4 million in pre-accession aid to 
Turkey, foreseen for 2007, to tackle AI.  Aid is also being provided under existing bilateral 
arrangements between the European Communities and its partners. 
F. PROMOTING NETWORKS : 
52. The Commission has also placed great emphasis on promoting various networks to bring key 
players together in addressing the threat of influe nza.  Networks of veterinary and human health 
laboratories are already in place in the European Communities, as is an EC-funded network known as 
the European Influenza Surveillance Scheme (EISS), which monitors seasonal influenza outbreaks 
each winter.  The Commission is now working to establish improved co-operation between EISS, the 
ECDC and the Community Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza , as well as other European and 
international organisations dealing with animal and human health, to ensure better preparation in case 
of a pandemic.  This led, in September 2005, to  the adoption of a Technical Guidance Document on 
procedures for communicating influenza A/H5 events in humans to member States, the ECDC and the 
Commission. 
                                                      
23 See more in http://europa.eu.int/comm/health/ph_threats/com/Influenza/influenza_en.htm   G/SPS/GEN/641 
Page 16  
 
  G. U
SEFUL LINKS  
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control:  http://www.ecdc.eu.int   
WHO page on influenza:  http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/en /  
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE):  http://www.oie.int  
UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO):  http://www.fao.org  
EC Website:  http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_c onsumer/dyna/influenza/index.cfm  
 
  G/SPS/GEN/641 
 Page 17 
 
 
  Annex I 
List of Commission decisions, related to AI 
(adopted since October 2005) 
 
1. 2005/726/EC:  Commission Decision of 17 Oc tober 2005 amending Decision 2005/464/EC 
on the implementation of survey programmes  for AI in poultry and wild birds to be carried 
out in the MS (Official Journal L 273, 19 October 2005 pp.:21 - 24) 
2. 2005/731/EC:  Commission Decision of 17 October 2005 laying down additional 
requirements for the surveillance of AI in wild birds  (Official Journal L 274, 
20 October 2005 pp.:93 - 94) 
3. 2005/732/EC:  Commission Decision of 17 October 2005 approving the programmes for the 
implementation of Member States' surveys for avian influenza in poultry and wild birds  
during 2005 and laying down re porting and eligibility rules for the Community financial 
contribution to the implementation costs of those programmes  (Official Journal L 274, 20 October 2005 pp.:95 - 101) 
4. 2005/734/EC:  Commission Decision of 19 October 2005 laying down biosecurity measures  
to reduce the risk of transmission of highly pa thogenic avian influenza caused by Influenza 
virus A subtype H5N1 from birds living in the wild to poultry and other captive birds and 
providing for an early detection system  in areas at particular risk  (Official Journal L 274, 
20 October 2005 pp.:105 - 107) 
5. 2005/744/EC: Commission Decision of 21 Octobe r 2005 laying down the requirements for 
the prevention of highly pathogenic avian influenza caused by influenza A virus of subtype 
H5N1 in susceptible birds kept in zoos  in the MS (Official Journal L 279, 22 October 2005 
pp.:75 - 78) 
6. 2005/745/EC:  Commission Decision of 21 Oc tober 2005 amending Decision 2005/734/EC 
laying down biosecurity measures to reduce the risk of transmission of highly pathogenic 
avian influenza caused by influenza A virus of subtype H5N1 from birds living in the wild to 
poultry and other captive birds and providing for an early detection system  in areas at 
particular risk (Official Journal L 279, 22 October 2005 pp.:79 -80) 
7. 2005/759/EC:  Commission Decision of 27 Oc tober 2005 concerning certain protection 
measures in relation to highly pathogenic avian influenza in certain third countries and the 
movement from third countries of birds accompanying their owners  (Official Journal 
L 285, 28 October 2005 pp.:52 – 59) 
8. 2005/855/EC:  Commission Decision of 30 N ovember 2005 amending Decision 2005/734/EC 
laying down biosecurity measures to reduce the risk of transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza caused by Influenza virus A subt ype H5N1 from birds living in the wild to 
poultry and other captive birds and providing for an early detection system  in areas at 
particular risk (Official Journal L 316, 2 December 2005 pp.:21- 22) 
9. 2005/862/EC:  Commission Decision of 30 November 2005 amending Decisions 
2005/759/EC and 2005/760/EC relating to measures to combat avian influenza in birds 
other than poultry  (Official Journal L 317, 3 December 2005 pp.:19 - 22) 
10. 2005/926/EC:  Commission Decision of 21 December 2005 on introducing supplementary 
measures to control infections with low pathogenic avian influenza in Italy  and repealing 
Decision 2004/666/EC (Official Journa l L 337, 22 December 2005 PP.:60 - 70) G/SPS/GEN/641 
Page 18  
 
  11. 2006/052/EC:  Commission Decision of 30 January 2006 amending Decision 2005/731/EC 
laying down additional requirements for the surveillance  of avian influenza in wild birds  
(Official Journal L 27, 1 February 2006 pp.:17- 18) 
12. 2006/086/EC:  Commission Decision of 10 February 2006 concerning certain interim 
protection measures in relation to suspected cas es of highly pathogenic avian influenza in 
wild birds in Greece  (Official Journal L 40, 11 February 2006 pp.:26-31) 
13. 2006/090/EC:  Commission Decision of 13 February 2006 concerning certain interim 
protection measures in relation to suspected cas es of highly pathogenic avian influenza in 
wild birds in Italy  (Official Journal L 42, 14 February 2006 pp.:46-51) 
14. 2006/094/EC:  Commission Decision of 14 February 2006 concerning certain interim 
protection measures in relation to suspected cas es of highly pathogenic avian influenza in 
wild birds in Austria  (Official Journal L 44, 15 February 2006 pp.:25-30) 
15. 2006/104/EC:  Commission Decision of 15 February 2006 concerning certain interim 
protection measures in relation to suspected cas es of highly pathogenic avian influenza in 
wild birds in Germany  (Official Journal L 46, 16 February 2006 pp.:53-58) 
16. 2006/105/EC:  Commission Decision of 15 February 2006 concerning certain interim 
protection measures in relation to suspected cas es of highly pathogenic avian influenza in 
wild birds in Hungary  (Official Journal L 46, 16 February 2006 pp.:59-64) 
17. 2006/115/EC:  Commission Decision of 17 February 2006 concerning certain protection 
measures in relation to highly pathogenic avian influenza in wild bird s in the Community and 
repealing Decisions 2006/86/EC, 2006/90/EC , 2006/91/EC, 2006/94/EC, 2006/104/EC and 
2006/105/EC (Official Journal L 48, 18 February 2006 pp.:28 - 34) 
18. 2006/135/EC:  Commission Decision of 22 February 2006 concerning certain protection 
measures in relation to highly pathogenic avian influenza in poultry in the Community (Official Journal L 52, 23 February 2006 pp.:41 - 53) 
19. 2006/147/EC:  Commission Decision of 24 Fe bruary 2006 on introducing preventive 
vaccination against highly pathogenic avian in fluenza H5N1 and related provisions for 
movements in the Netherlands  (Official Journal L 55, 25 February 2006 pp.:47 - 50) 
20. 2006/148/EC:  Commission Decision of 24 Fe bruary 2006 on introducing preventive 
vaccination against highly pathogenic avian in fluenza H5N1 and related provisions for 
movements in France  (Official Journal L 55, 25 February 2006 pp.:51 - 57) 
 
 
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