WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/MA/W/67 
TN/AG/GEN/14 13 March 2006 
 
 
(06-1101) 
Negotiating Group on Market Access Committee on Agriculture Special Session Original:   Spanish 
 
 
 
MARKET ACCESS FOR NON-AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
 
Communication from Argentina
 
 
 
 The following communication, dated 9 March 2006, is being circulated at the request of the 
delegation of Argentina.  
_______________ 
 
 
IMPLEMENTING PARAGRAPH 24 OF 
THE HONG KONG MINISTERIAL DECLARATION 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration establishe s in paragraph 24 that negotiators are to 
ensure a comparably high level of ambition in mark et access for Agriculture and NAMA, and that this 
ambition is to be achieved in a balanced and prop ortionate manner consistent with the principle of 
special and differential treatment.
1 
2. The purpose of such a provision is to avoid th e adoption of extreme opposite stances in the 
crucial area of access to goods markets, in view of  the adverse effects that this would have on the 
negotiating process. 
3. It is with this in mind that the present paper addresses the question of how the consistency of 
the Agriculture and NAMA proposals with pa ragraph 24 can effectively be gauged. 
4. To this end – i.e. in order to consider whethe r the proposals are consistent with a comparably 
high level of ambition in market access for Ag riculture and NAMA, we propose that work should 
focus on four central elements:  (1)  cutting fo rmulas;  (2) flexibilities and sensitive products;  
(3) maximum tariffs and the relationship betw een bound and applied tariffs;  and (4) tariff 
simplification. 
                                                      
1 To make comparison easier, this paper leaves out the components of special and differential treatment 
and less than full reciprocity for the developing countries.  These will have to be incorporated in the negotiating 
process in due course. TN/MA/W/67 
TN/AG/GEN/14 Page 2 
 
 
  II. THE FOUR ELEMENTS 
1. Cutting formulas 
5. As can be seen both from the Hong Kong Mini sterial Declaration and from the appended 
reports of the Chairs of the Agriculture and NAM A negotiating groups, these two areas have different 
methodologies for reduction formulas. 
6. In Agriculture, four bands are envisaged for the cuts, though the ceilings and floors of the 
bands and the cut percentages to apply within each one have yet to  be defined.  In NAMA, on the 
other hand, the plan is to work on the basis of a "Swiss formula with coefficients", which will be so 
defined as to observe the principle of special and di fferential treatment and less than full reciprocity 
commitments for the developing countries. 
7. The fact that there are different methodologies makes the "comparison" required by 
paragraph 24 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declarati on difficult.  It is therefore necessary to work on 
an empirical basis, verifying that the ex-post outcomes of applying linear cuts or coefficients, as the 
case may be, lead to relative equivalence ("co mparability") in the impact of the cuts. 
8. Taking as an example the European Union's proposals on NAMA and Agriculture, it can be 
seen that empirical analysis reveals obvious disparity , with  very ambitious positions for NAMA and  
very defensive ones for Agriculture. 
9. Applying the Swiss formula coefficient 10 propo sed by the EU in NAMA would mean that a 
35 per cent tariff (which is close to the developing countries' average Uruguay Round bindings)
2 
would drop to 7.78 per cent, equivalent to a linear cut of 77.8 per cent. 
10. In Agriculture, on the other hand, the Europ ean Union's proposal for the same 35 per cent 
tariff would give a new tariff of 19.25 per cent on the basis of its proposed 45 per cent linear cut.  This 
linear cut is equivalent to what would be obtaine d by applying a Swiss formula with a coefficient of 
42.78. 
11. The disparity between these two situations is plain, as the Swiss formula coefficient 10 that 
the EU proposes for NAMA would have to be multiplie d by more than 4 in order to reach the Swiss 
formula equivalent referred to in the previous pa ragraph.  Such an outcome is clearly not what 
Ministers had in mind as a comparably high level of ambition in these two negotiating areas.   
12. An empirical analysis, with the respective equi valents between linear cuts and Swiss formula 
coefficients, can be carried out for the bands and tiers of some of the proposals so far tabled in 
NAMA and Agriculture.  In this way, it is possi ble to gauge the "comparability" required by 
paragraph 24 of the Hong Kong Declaration. 
13. For this purpose the present paper sets out, in Annexes 1.a and 1.b, correspondence tables for 
linear cuts and Swiss formula coefficients. 
14. Annex 1.a shows the tariffs and Swiss formula coefficients in NAMA that result from 
applying the linear cuts proposed in Agriculture  by the European Union, the G20 and the 
United States. 
                                                      
2 The report by the Chairman of  the Uruguay Round Market Acce ss Group determined that the 
developing countries were in line with reduction objectives if they bound their respective tariffs at a rate equal 
to or less than 35 per cent ad valorem.   TN/MA/W/67 
 TN/AG/GEN/14 
 Page 3 
 
 
  15. Annex 1.b shows the tariffs and linear cuts that  would result in Agriculture from applying the 
Swiss formula with the coefficients proposed by  the EU and the US in NAMA.  There is no G20 
proposal as such for NAMA, but the G20 proposal fo r Agriculture is half way between the different 
proposals in terms of impact, so we have also included the impact of a hypothetical Swiss formula 
with the various coefficients that derive for each tariff level from the linear cuts of the G20 proposal.  
We have called this hypothetical proposal "Hypothe sis #24" and we note that, as was to be expected, 
the outcome of applying a Swiss formula with such coefficients produces perfect "comparability" 
(i.e. equivalence) in the cuts for each tari ff level, both in NAMA and in Agriculture. 
16. Annex 1.c summarizes the disparity that the EU, US and Japan (G10) proposals would 
produce in the ambition of the tariff-cutting formulas.  It shows, for example, that to apply the cutting 
formula proposed by the EU would take the EU av erage and maximum agricultural tariffs to levels 
substantially higher than would be produced by a pplying the EU NAMA proposal to Agriculture.  The 
final agricultural tariffs would have averages of 12.02 per cent (applying the EU cut for Agriculture) 
and 4.82 per cent (applying the EU Swiss formula coefficient for NAMA).  Similarly, the maximum 
tariffs would be 100 per cent and 9.6 per cent respectively. 
17. Lastly, Annex 1.d gives a clear picture of the "comparability" of the proposals by showing the 
linear cuts of the various positions:  those pertai ning to NAMA put forward by the US, the EU and the 
G10, with a Swiss formula coefficient of 10;  and those pertaining to Agriculture put forward by the 
same countries and the G20.  This table also s hows the differences between the cuts for NAMA and 
Agriculture in some of the proposals and their dive rgence in terms of the objective of a comparably 
high level of ambition in market access for both are as, to be achieved in a balanced and proportionate 
manner. 
2. Flexibilities and sensitive products 
18. According to paragraph 8 of Annex B (NAMA)  of the Work Programme approved by the 
General Council on 1 August 2004, developing countries would be free not to apply cuts to, or not to 
bind, up to 5 per cent of all tariff lines, not exceedi ng 5 per cent of the total value of their respective 
imports.  Alternatively, they could apply a tariff cut of up to 50 per cent of the agreed overall 
reduction provided that this covers no more than  10 per cent of total tariff lines and does not exceed 
10 per cent of the total value of their imports.3 
19. As to the matter of sensitive products in Agri culture, total tariff lines and the value of the 
trade that may be affected have as yet to be defined. 
20. In Agriculture, the exclusion from overall reduction commitments of a few tariff lines that 
cover products of high commercial importance can seriously restrict trade for a large proportion of exports from developing countries. 
21. As an illustration, it is worth mentioning that  the EU proposed designating 8 per cent of tariff 
lines as sensitive.  If one were to assume that these lines correspond to the highest bound rates 
(expressed as ad valorem  equivalents), this would cover 11.55 pe r cent of its total agricultural imports 
(see Annex 2.a). 
22. To this 11.55 per cent of trade must be added the number of lines and the value of the trade 
arising from the additional flexibility proposed by th e EU for products up to a tariff level of 30 per 
cent.  Inclusion of a "pivot" in this range, whereby some tariffs would undergo a cut of only 20 per 
                                                     
 
3 The percentages for the tariff lines and value of tr ade have not as yet been agreed.  Nor has it been 
decided whether these options can be applied together. TN/MA/W/67 
TN/AG/GEN/14 Page 4 
 
 
  cent (less than the 35 per cent average overall cu t), can mean the exception for sensitive products 
amounting to a significant level of trade.  It should be noted that the range in question includes 1,720 tariff lines covering more than 66 per cent of the European Union's agricultural imports. 
23. If a hypothetical "pivot" were to be applie d to 10 per cent of these 1,720 tariff lines
4, 6.96 per 
cent of the total value of EU agricultural imports  would be affected (see Annex 2.b).  This figure 
would increase to 11.94 per cent if the cut were applied to 15 per cent of the tariff lines, and to 14.80 per cent if it were applied to 20 per cent of them. 
24. In short, if the flexibility ("pivot") of the firs t band for tariff cuts were added to the sensitive 
products, the total could range from 15.80 per cent to  23.60 per cent of agricultural tariff lines and 
from 18.55 per cent to 26.35 per cent of the EU's to tal agricultural imports.  These percentages are 
well above the 5 per cent or 10 per cent of total tr ade under the options that would be available to 
developing countries in NAMA. 
25. It seems clear as a consequence of the fore going that "comparability" of outcome between 
Agriculture and NAMA must also involve obtaini ng approximate percentage values for the trade 
affected by the inclusion of sensitive products. 
26. "Comparability" not only of the number of tariff lines but also of the values of the total trade 
affected because of sensitive products  appears to be a prerequisite fo r balance between the Agriculture 
and the NAMA negotiations.  This prerequisite constitutes the second central element for 
ascertaining whether the objective of a comparably high level of ambition in market access for 
Agriculture and NAMA, as laid down in paragra ph 24 of the Hong Kong Declaration, has been 
achieved. 
3. Maximum tariffs and the relationship between bound tariffs and applied tariffs 
 
27. The wish of some Members to compute cuts in  NAMA on the basis of a pplied tariffs – apart 
from being contrary to the Doha mandate – ca nnot be justified from a negotiating standpoint. 
28. As regards trade in agriculture, in the absence of tariff quotas with reduced or zero tariffs, for 
many tariff lines there would be no imports in the de veloped countries.  This is not a fact to be 
overlooked given the significant number of products at HS8-digit level with AVE tariffs of more than 
30 per cent:  486 in the European Union, 126 in the United States and 195 in Japan (9 digits).  Of 
these, the tariff lines with rates of over 100 per cent amount to 15.2 per cent in the European Union, 
16.7 per cent in the United States and 68.2 per cent in Japan.  The maximum tariff in AVE terms is 
408 per cent in the European Union, 440 per cent in the United States and 1,738 per cent in Japan 
(Annex 3.a).  A similar situation exists in other European and Asian developed countries. 
29. The situation is different in NAMA, where many developing countries have a maximum 
bound tariff of 35 per cent ad valorem , which allows import flow as the trade statistics of these 
countries show.  This rate will be reduced even further as result  of the negotiations.
5  Any tariff 
reduction in NAMA, even if it does not reduce the applie d rate in all tariff lines, will afford security of 
market access. 
                                                      
4  The tariff line percentages of 10 per cent, 15 per cent and 20 per cent are defined in descending order 
from the 30 per cent maximum tariff in the first band. 
5  According to paragraph 6 of Annex B (NAMA) of the Work Programme approved by the General 
Council on 1 August 2004, developing participants that have bound a minimum percentage of their tariff lines, as yet to be defined, will have the option not to make cuts provided they generalize binding at the level of the 
average of bound tariffs for all developing countries.  TN/MA/W/67 
 TN/AG/GEN/14 
 Page 5 
 
 
  30. The same cannot be said of Agriculture.  The in cidence of high tariffs on trade can been seen 
in two significant examples, to be found in Annex 3.b.  In the European Union 33.6 per cent of 
agricultural imports are subject to AVE tariffs of 30 per cent or more.  Of these imports, 82.6 per cent are Intra-EU and the remaining 17.4 per cent are from third countries and enter almost exclusively 
through tariff quotas.  Extra-EU imports of goods wi th tariffs of 30 per cent or more amount to only 
5.8 per cent of the total value of EU agricultural impor ts.  Much the same is true of the United States, 
where goods with AVE tariffs of over 30 per cent account for only 1.2 per cent of the value of 
agricultural imports.  Here too, most imports en ter under tariff quotas.  The high overall tariff is in 
practice prohibitive. 
31. The "tariffication" of Agriculture during the Uruguay Round was based on extremely low 
international prices or artificially high internal pri ces and so resulted in very  high equivalent tariffs, 
which in practice do not allow trade.  Tariff quotas are used as a make-do solution.  They could be assimilated to a lower applied tariff, but with a qua ntitative restriction in addition.  The difference 
between bound tariffs and applied tariffs in NAMA,  on the other hand, is the outcome of an 
autonomous reduction in tariffs which would allow tr ade at bound rates, but which – for reasons of 
public policy – the developing countries have decided to reduce, maintaining the political leeway that 
a better level of binding would afford. 
32. Accordingly, a reduction in applied tariffs in Ag riculture, if it gave rise to further high tariffs, 
would have an insignificant trade effect – even less of an effect than might result from the certainty 
that would be afforded by the possibility of enteri ng a market at a reasonable tariff level in NAMA, 
even if it were – temporarily – higher than the applied rate.  In concrete terms, expectations of market 
access are much higher with a bound tariff of 30 per cen t and an applied tariff of 20 per cent, than 
with a bound and applied rate of 100 per cent.  Conse quently, to argue that a reduction of a prohibitive 
applied rate to another applied ra te which is also prohibitive in Agriculture must be offset by a 
reduction in applied rates in NAMA, is indefensible , particularly in the context of paragraph 24. 
33. Maximum tariffs are another importa nt element of a comparison of level of ambition.  On this 
matter proposals in the range of 100 per cent for Agriculture and 10 per cent for NAMA coexist. 
34. It need hardly be said that in such a context and in view of complying with paragraph 24, any 
tariff reduction in NAMA will require major compensation in terms of tariff quotas. 
4. Tariff simplification 
35. The report by the Chair of the NAMA group indicates that agreement was reached on binding 
the tariffs resulting from the negotiations in ad valorem  terms. 
36. For the purpose of comparing ambition, a simila r measure is needed for Agriculture, on the 
one hand because of the increased protection that could arise from the use of specific tariffs where there are price fluctuations, and on the other, for reasons of transparency regarding border protection 
measures. 
37. The binding of tariffs in ad valorem terms is an important preliminary to seeking a balance or 
comparing level of ambition, and is the fourth element  of the objective of complying with 
paragraph 24 of the Hong Kong Declaration. 
III. BALANCE 
38. The observations and comments in the previ ous section are of assistance in identifying 
elements and parameters for examining or analysin g proposals in order to ascertain whether they are TN/MA/W/67 
TN/AG/GEN/14 Page 6 
 
 
  consistent with the Ministers' instruction in paragraph 24 of the Hong Kong Declaration that a 
comparably high level of ambition is to be achie ved in market access for Agriculture and NAMA. 
39. Meeting the requirements pertaining to each of the four elements identified in the previous 
section is the basis on which to secure a balanced  outcome to the Round.  This will prevent the 
implementation of proposals that lack the bala nce or comparison required by paragraph 24 from 
compounding the current imbalance in the treatment of agricultural and non-agricultural products and 
jeopardizing the objectives set forth in the Doha Round mandate. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
40. The aim of the multilateral negotiations in the WT O is to achieve liberalization of trade and 
eliminate discriminatory treatment in internationa l relations.  Paragraph 24 contributes to achieving 
this goal by requiring negotiators to ensure that there is a comparatively high level of ambition in 
market access for Agricult ure and NAMA.  It is therefore undoubtedly a constructive means towards 
attainment of the objective of agreeing on negotiating modalities in these two sectors by 30 April 2006 at the latest.  
   TN/MA/W/67
 TN/AG/GEN/14
 Page 7Annex 1.a 
 
Impact of Linear Cuts in Agriculture Proposals  
and Swiss Formula Equivalents for NAMA  
 
Linear cut proposed for 
developed countries (%) Resulting tariff 
(%) Equivalent coefficients using the 
simple Swiss formula* 
EU G20 US EU G20 US EU G20 US Initial 
tariff 
(%) 
Minimum Average     Minimum Average     Minimum Average     
5 20 35 45 55 4.00 3.25 2.75 2.25 20.00 9.29 6.11 4.09
10 20 35 45 55 8.00 6.50 5.50 4.50 40.00 18.57 12.22 8.18
15 20 35 45 55 12.00 9.75 8.25 6.75 60.00 27.86 18.33 12.27
20 20 35 45 55 16.00 13.00 11.00 9.00 80.00 37.14 24.44 16.36
25 20 35 55 65 20.00 16.25 11.25 8.75 100.00 46.43 20.45 13.46
30 20 35 55 65 24.00 19.50 13.50 10.50 120.00 55.71 24.55 16.15
35   45 55 65   19.25 15.75 12.25   42.78 28.64 18.85
40   45 55 65   22.00 18.00 14.00   48.89 32.73 21.54
45   45 55 65   24.75 20.25 15.75   55.00 36.82 24.23
50   45 55 65   27.50 22.50 17.50   61.11 40.91 26.92
55   45 65 75   30.25 19.25 13.75   67.22 29.62 18.33
60   45 65 75   33.00 21.00 15.00   73.33 32.31 20.00
65   50 65 75   32.50 22.75 16.25   65.00 35.00 21.67
70   50 65 75   35.00 24.50 17.50   70.00 37.69 23.33
75   50 65 75   37.50 26.25 18.75   75.00 40.38 25.00 
  TN/MA/W/67 
TN/AG/GEN/14 
Page 8 Linear cut proposed for 
developed countries (%) Resulting tariff 
(%) Equivalent coefficients using the 
simple Swiss formula* 
EU G20 US EU G20 US EU G20 US Initial 
tariff 
(%) 
Minimum Average     Minimum Average     Minimum Average     
80   50 75 85   40.00 20.00 12.00   80.00 26.67 14.12
85   50 75 85   42.50 21.25 12.75   85.00 28.33 15.00
90   50 75 85   45.00 22.50 13.50   90.00 30.00 15.88
95   60 75 85   38.00 23.75 14.25   63.33 31.67 16.76
100   60 75 85   40.00 25.00 15.00   66.67 33.33 17.65
 (*) a = ((1- %Reduction )*Initial tariff)/ % Reduction  TN/MA/W/67 
 TN/AG/GEN/14 
 Page 9 
 
 
  Annex 1.b 
 
Impact of Using the Swiss Formula in NAMA Proposals and  
Equivalents in Terms of Linear Cuts in Agriculture  
 
Swiss formula coefficient 
for developed countries Resulting tariff (%) Equivalent linear cut 
(%) Initial 
tariff 
(%) EU/US Hypothesis 
# 24 EU/US Hypothesis 
# 24 EU/US Hypothesis 
# 24 
5 10 6.11 3.33 2.75 33.3 45.0
10 10 12.22 5.00 5.50 50.0 45.0
15 10 18.33 6.00 8.25 60.0 45.0
20 10 24.44 6.67 11.00 66.7 45.0
25 10 20.45 7.14 11.25 71.4 55.0
30 10 24.55 7.50 13.50 75.0 55.0
35 10 28.64 7.78 15.75 77.8 55.0
40 10 32.73 8.00 18.00 80.0 55.0
45 10 36.82 8.18 20.25 81.8 55.0
50 10 40.91 8.33 22.50 83.3 55.0
55 10 29.62 8.46 19.25 84.6 65.0
60 10 32.31 8.57 21.00 85.7 65.0
65 10 35.00 8.67 22.75 86.7 65.0
70 10 37.69 8.75 24.50 87.5 65.0
75 10 40.38 8.82 26.25 88.2 65.0
80 10 26.67 8.89 20.00 88.9 75.0
85 10 28.33 8.95 21.25 89.5 75.0
90 10 30.00 9.00 22.50 90.0 75.0
95 10 31.67 9.05 23.75 90.5 75.0
100 10 33.33 9.09 25.00 90.9 75.0
 TN/MA/W/67 
TN/AG/GEN/14 Page 10 
 
 
  Annex 1.c 
 
Impact on Agricultural Tariffs of Agriculture and NAMA Proposals
 
by the European Union, the United States and Japan (G10)1 
 
European Union* 
 
 Current tariff 
(%) Resulting tariff 
(%) 
  With Agriculture 
proposal With NAMA 
proposal2 
Average tariff 22.49  12.02  4.82 
Maximum tariff  407.82  100.00  9.76 
Number of lines = 2,205    
 *The average 35 per cent reduction was used for the first tariff band (0%-30%).  
 
United States 
 
 Current tariff 
(%) Resulting tariff 
(%) 
  With Agriculture 
proposal With NAMA 
proposal2 
Average tariff  10.93  3.40 3.01 
Maximum tariff  439.87  65.98  9.78 
Number of lines = 1,741    
 
Japan 
 
 Current tariff 
(%) Resulting tariff 
(%) 
  With Agriculture 
proposal With NAMA 
proposal2 
Average tariff  172.67  23.33  4.52 
Maximum tariff  1738.68  956.27  9.94 
Number of lines = 1,590    
 
Note : 
1. In ad valorem  equivalents;  taking all bound agricultural lines with ad valorem  and non- ad valorem  
tariffs.  The AVE calculations provided to the WTO by  each country in 2005 were used for lines with 
non-ad valorem  tariffs. 
2. A Swiss formula with a coeffi cient of A=10, as supported by the above countries in the NAMA 
negotiations, was applied to th e current agricultural tariffs. 
Source :  WTO  TN/MA/W/67 
 TN/AG/GEN/14 
 Page 11 
 
 
  Annex 1.d 
 
Linear Cuts of NAMA and Agriculture Proposals  
in Percentage Terms  
 
NAMA proposals Agriculture proposals 
US, EU and G10 US G20 EU G10 Initial 
tariff 
(%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
5 33.3 55 45 35 27 
10 50.0 55 45 35 27 
15 60.0 55 45 35 27 
20 66.7 55 45 35 27 
25 71.4 65 55 35 31 
30 75.0 65 55 35 31 
35 77.8 65 55 45 31 
40 80.0 65 55 45 31 
45 81.8 65 55 45 31 
50 83.3 65 55 45 31 
55 84.6 75 65 45 37 
60 85.7 75 65 45 37 
65 86.7 75 65 50 37 
70 87.5 75 65 50 37 
75 88.2 75 65 50 45 
80 88.9 85 75 50 45 
85 89.5 85 75 50 45 
90 90.0 85 75 50 45 
95 90.5 85 75 60 45 
100 90.9 85 75 60 45 
 TN/MA/W/67 
TN/AG/GEN/14 Page 12 
 
 
  Annex 2.a 
 
Imports of Sensitive Agricultural Products, EU-15
1 
2003 
 
  ECU 
(thousands) Share of total 
agriculture 
(%) 
Extra-EU 5,844,856 9.09 
Intra-EU 20,803,350 12.50 
Total 26,648,206 11.55 
Note: 1.  Taking 8 per cent of agricultural tariff lines with the highest bound 
rates expressed as ad valorem  equivalents, i.e., 176 lines. 
Source :  WTO and Eurostat (2004)  
  
   TN/MA/W/67
 TN/AG/GEN/14
 Page 13Annex 2.b 
 
EU Flexibilities1,2 
 
A.  Tariff lines 
       
  10% of lines with 
the highest tariffs 15% of lines with 
the highest tariffs 20% of lines with 
the highest tariffs 
Number of tariff lines 172 258 344 
Share of total agricultural lines (%) 7.80 11.70 15.60 
       
B.  EU-15 imports, 2003      
       
  10% of lines with 
the highest tariffs 15% of lines with 
the highest tariffs 20% of lines with 
the highest tariffs 
  ECU 
(thousands) Share of 
total 
agriculture 
(%) ECU 
(thousands) Share of 
total 
agriculture 
(%) ECU 
(thousands) Share of 
total 
agriculture 
(%) 
Extra-EU 2,034,846 3.16 4,129,760 6.42 5,313,801 8.26
Intra-EU 14,022,347 8.42 23,426,201 14.07 28,840,174 17.33
Total 16,057,193 6.96 27,555,960 11.94 34,153,976 14.80
 
Note : 
1. Flexibility resulting from the EU proposal for products in the 0%-30% tariff band. 
2. Taking agricultural lines with ad valorem  and non- ad valorem tariffs.  The AVE calculations provided to the WTO by the EU in 2005 
were used for lines with non- ad valorem  tariffs. 
Source :  WTO and Eurostat (2004)      TN/MA/W/67 
TN/AG/GEN/14 Page 14 
 
 
  Annex 3.a 
 
Bound Agricultural Tariffs
 
 
  EU1US1 Japan2
Number of lines 2,205 1,741 1,590
 30% or above 486 126 195
 100% or above 74 21 133
    
Share per tier (%)    
 30% or above / total lines 22.04 7.24 12.26
 100% or above / lines at or above 30% 15.23 16.67 68.21
    
Maximum tariff (%) 407.82 439.9 1738
    
1. HS 8-digit lines    
2. HS 9-digit lines    
Note:  The AVE calculations provided to the WTO by each  country in 2005 were used for headings with 
non-ad valorem  tariffs. 
Source :  WTO    
  TN/MA/W/67 
 TN/AG/GEN/14 
 Page 15 
 
 
  Annex 3.b 
 
EU and US:  Agricultural Imports  and Tariffs Above 30 Per Cent  
 
 Agricultural imports 
  Intra-EU Extra-EU Total 
EU-151    
Total agricultural products    
 ECU (thousands) 166,461,342 64,312,669 230,774,011
    
Agricultural products with tariffs > 30%    
 ECU (thousands) 64,116,258 13,507,996 77,624,254
 Percentage share 82.60 17.40 100.00 
 Share of total intra- and extra-EU agric. prod. (%) 38.52 21.00 33.64 
 Share of total agricultural imports (%) 27.78 5.85 33.64 
    
US2    
Total agricultural products    
 US$ (thousands)   52,426,453
    
Agricultural products with tariffs > 30%    
 US$ (thousands)   616,639
 Share of total agricultural products (%)     1.2 
    
1. 2003    
2. 2005    
Note:  The AVE calculations provided to the WTO by each country in  2005 were used for headings with 
non-ad valorem  tariffs. 
Source :  Eurostat (2004), USITC and OMC    
 
__________