WT/DS343/R 
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ANNEX A 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF THE FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION  
OF THE PARTIES 
 
CONTENTS PAGE 
Annex A-1 Executive Summary of the First Written Submission of the United 
States A-2 
Annex A-2  Executive Summary of the Fi rst Written Submission of Thailand A-9 
 WT/DS343/R 
Page A-2  
 
  ANNEX A-1 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF  
THE UNITED STATES 
 
(11 May 2007) 
1. Introduction  
1. This dispute centers on certain action taken by  US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to 
address a serious and growing revenue collection prob lem.  In 2003 and 2004, CBP determined that 
importers were defaulti ng on hundreds of millions of dollars of antidumping and countervailing duties 
lawfully owed to the United States.  The duties in question were unsecured by cash deposits, sufficient 
bonds, or other guarantees:  thus, when an importer defaulted, CBP could not recover the duties owed 
from the sureties that ordinarily protect CBP from default risk.  To address the problem, CBP began to develop a new directive for increasing security requirements on merchandise with higher risk of default.  Its own analysis indicated that importers of agricu lture/aquaculture merchandise in particular were the 
source of the bulk of the defaults.  
2. During the same period, the US Department of  Commerce (USDOC) and the US International 
Trade Commission (USITC) were considering a petition to impose antidumping duties on another 
agriculture/aquaculture product:  certain shrimp from China, Thailand, India, Vietnam, Brazil, and 
Ecuador.  Imports of the merchandise subject to th e petition were in 2003 valued at in excess of $2.5 
billion – itself an unprecedented figure for agriculture/a quaculture merchandise subject to an antidumping 
order.   
3. If the defaults it experienced with respect to ot her agriculture/aquaculture importers occurred for 
shrimp, CBP realized that its revenue  collection problem could rapidly grow into a crisis.  Therefore, after 
considerable analysis and considera tion, it decided to apply the new directive to shrimp.  The directive 
provides for an importer-specific risk assessment as the basis for additional bond amounts.  Importantly, 
this means that CBP has tailored the process to ensure  that, if a company subject to the directive does not 
itself pose a collection risk, it need not provide add itional bond amounts.  Even with this mechanism in 
place, Thailand asserts that the directive is impermissible under various provisions of the WTO Agreements.  In effect, Thailand ask this Panel to  find that the United States may not collect duties 
lawfully owed to it.   
4. Thailand's complaint focuses on the question of what the WTO Agreements permit a revenue 
collection authority to do when faced with a co llection problem involving antidumping duties.  As 
discussed below, in its effort to apply the disciplines contained in the Agreement on Implementation of 
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs a nd Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement) to the action 
in question, Thailand mischaracterizes both the obligat ions that Agreement contains and key facts about 
the directive, its content and how it operates.  If accepted, Thailand's arguments would suggest that 
ordinary revenue collection strategies may not be a pplied to importers subject to antidumping duties, and 
in so doing would seriously compromise the ability of Members' customs authorities to collect duties 
lawfully owed the Member.  These arguments do not accord with the text of the Agreement, which 
expressly permits authorities to require "reasona ble security" to collect antidumping duties.  
2. Factual Background 
5. CBP is the US agency responsible for collection of customs duties.  Under the US system, goods 
are permitted to enter the customs territory of th e United States without having paid duties or other 
liabilities imposed by law.  In this manner, the Un ited States expedites the entry of goods and does not 
make the importer wait on the final determination of duties owed or other liabilities under the law.  
However, since the goods will have been long since released from CBP's custody and are not available for  WT/DS343/R 
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  return to satisfy any obligations of the importer when they are legally determined to be due, it is necessary 
for CBP to have some security against payment of amounts lawfully owed.  Consequently, CBP requires 
single transaction bonds or continuous bonds for entries of merchandise as a matter of course.  As a rule, 
all entries must be accompanied by evidence that a bond is posted with CBP to cover any potential duties, taxes, and charges that may accrue.  Pursuant to CBP 's regulatory authority, a port director may require 
additional bond amounts or other additional security in or der to ensure that the acceptance of an entry will 
be adequately protected against any duties or other liabilities imposed by law.  
6. CBP establishes the minimum amount of the bond that the importer must obtain from a surety.  
The United States is the third party beneficiary to the contract between the surety and the bond principal, 
but is not itself a party to the contract.  CBP does not set the fees charged by the sureties for the bonds 
they provide. 
7. It is not uncommon for Members to require secur ity in this manner, pending final assessment of 
customs liability.  Under India's customs law, for exam ple, when final duty liability cannot be determined 
upon entry, customs officers may assess provisional duti es if the importer "furnishes such security as the 
proper officer deems fit for the payment of the defi ciency, if any, between the duty finally assessed and 
the duty provisionally assessed."  Security requirements such as these ensure th at customs authorities are 
able to collect duties lawfu lly owed upon final assessment. 
8. Surety systems are contemplated by, among other provisions, Article 13 of the Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VII of the General Agre ement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Customs Valuation 
Agreement), which provides that Members shall allow importers to withdraw goods from customs 
pending final determination of custom s value if the importer "provides sufficient guarantee in the form of 
a surety, a deposit or some other appropriate instru ment, covering the ultimate payment of customs duties 
for which the goods may be liable."  In addition to Ar ticle 13 of the Customs Valuation Agreement, surety 
systems are explicitly provided for in the Kyoto C onvention on the Simplification and Harmonization of 
Customs Procedures.  The Convention, like the Cu stoms Valuation Agreement, encourages the early 
release of merchandise, and permits the adoption of su rety systems to ensure compliance with regulatory 
undertakings, as well as to ensure collection of any additional  import duties and taxes that might become 
chargeable.  Thus, the Convention explicitly contem plates that, as a necessary consequence of the early 
release of merchandise, it might become necessary to  impose bond requirements to ensure the collection 
of assessed duties beyond the estimated duties for wh ich an importer might be liable based on information 
at the time of entry.  
9. The bond requirements imposed by the United Stat es do not entail any payments to the United 
States Government.  Rather, importers must provide  evidence that they have obtained either single 
transaction bonds or continuous entry bonds (or cash or an authorized obligation of the United States in 
lieu of surety on a bond) for the entry or entries in question.  These bonds are obtained from private surety 
companies, which charge the importers based on the risk involved with the transaction.  
10. With respect to merchandise subject to an antidumping or countervailing duty order, the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement provides Members with the fl exibility to adopt a variety of systems to deal 
with the assessment of antidumping duties.  The Unite d States has adopted a retrospective system of duty 
assessment.  In the US system, an antidumping duty liab ility attaches at the time of entry, but duties are 
not actually assessed at that time.  Once a year (dur ing the anniversary month of the order) interested 
parties may request a review to determine the amou nt of duties owed on each entry made during the 
previous year.  Between the time that the good is entered and the time that duties are finally assessed 
following this review, importers of merchandise s ubject to antidumping or countervailing duties are 
required to provide (1) a cash deposit in the amount  of the antidumping or countervailing duty rate 
determined in the investigation; and (2) like importe rs of all goods, a bond to secure against duties, taxes 
or charges that may accrue.  Under its 1991 Bond Gu idelines, CBP provides that the amount of this bond 
should be equal to 10 per cent of the duties, taxes, and fees paid by the importer in the previous 12 WT/DS343/R 
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  months, or a minimum of $50,000.  In general, an  importer may obtain eith er a bond covering a single 
entry (a single entry bond) or a continuous bond (a bond that provide security for all entries filed by the 
bond principal during the period of time covered by  the bond, usually one year) to satisfy this 
requirement. 
11. In 2003, CBP undertook a review of its overall duty collection program to identify areas in which 
it was experiencing collection difficulties, so as to addr ess significant problems.  As part of that process, 
CBP determined that, over the past few years, de faults on antidumping dut y supplemental bills had 
increased substantially from previous years.  While historically, annual uncollected duties from importers 
had been relatively low (rarely exceeding $10 milli on a year), outstanding antidumping liability for 2004 
alone reached an unprecedented $225 million.  As of  the end of fiscal year 2006, total uncollected 
antidumping duties amounted to $629 million. 
12. Facing a serious and growing noncollection probl em, CBP reconsidered its general continuous 
bond formula, which provides that the minimum continuous bond may be in an amount equal to the greater of $50,000 or ten per cent of the amount of the pr evious year's duties, taxes and fees.  On 9 July 
2004, CBP published on its website a Memorandum announcing an enhanced customs bond amount for 
those continuous bonds that secure the promise to pay all duties finally determined to be due on certain 
merchandise subject to antidumping or countervailing duties (July 2004 Amendment).  The formula set 
forth in the July 2004 Amendment is the USDOC rate  in the antidumping or c ountervailing duty order, or 
the cash deposit rate at the time of entry, multiplie d by the value of subject merchandise that the importer 
entered during the previous year.  The formula in effect ensured that, should the antidumping duty rate 
actually assessed for an importer increase from that de termined during the investigation, CBP would be at 
least partially secured for the difference.  The additi onal bond directive does no t apply to single entry 
bonds. 
13. CBP also determined that the principal entities re sponsible for uncollected duties were importers 
of agriculture/aquaculture merchandise subject to anti dumping duties, and in par ticular importers using 
continuous entry bonds.  Based on CBP's analysis, the noncollection problem with respect to this 
merchandise appeared to be attributable to the fact  that importers of agriculture/aquaculture merchandise 
tended to be undercapitalized, and that by the time final liability was assessed (typically one or more years 
after the goods had entered), the companies were no longe r in operation.  This was coupled with the fact 
that antidumping duties finally assessed on the mercha ndise often significantly exceeded both the cash 
deposit rate and the ordinary bond amount typically  required for all merchandise under the 1991 Bond 
Guidelines.  CBP was thus unable to collect the unsecured portion of the du ties assessed, resulting in a 
shortfall in CBP collections amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.  
14. On 1 February 2005, following a determination that certain shrimp  from Thailand, India, and four 
other countries were being dumped in the United States, and a finding by the USITC that the US domestic industry was materially injured by imports of frozen warmwater shrimp, USDOC issued its final 
determination imposing definitive duties on frozen warm water shrimp.  The shrimp order was the first 
order imposed on agriculture/aquaculture merchandi se after issuance of the July 2004 Amendment.  
Significantly, compared to previous agriculture/a quaculture cases, the overall value of shrimp imports 
subject to the order was enormous – in calendar year  2003, imports of subject shrimp reached $2.5 billion. 
 Given the volumes involved, even a modest in crease in the antidumping rate upon assessment could 
result in substantial revenue losses if unsecured.  T hus, viewing the shrimp order as an appropriate case 
for application of the additional bond directive, CBP began applying the directive to shrimp importers.  
15. On 10 August 2005, CBP published a clarification to the July 2004 Amendment (the 
"Clarification"), in an effort to improve both im porters' and customs officers' understanding of how the 
additional bond directive would be applied and to improve transparency in the process by which CBP 
identified covered cases and special categories of merchandise.  WT/DS343/R 
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  16. In a further effort to minimize burdens on importers resulting from the additional bond amount, 
on 24 October 2006, CBP published a Notice in the Federal Register amending its procedure for 
determining bond amounts for covered categories of merchandise.  The October 2006 Notice "represents 
the comprehensive and exclusive statement of the policy and processes expressed in" the July 2004 
Amendment, the 2005 Bond Formulas, and the August 200 5 Clarification.  As described in the October 
2006 Notice, importers are offered the opportunity to submit inform ation on their financial condition 
related to the risk of non-collection for that importer and CBP determines bond amounts based on that 
information, the importer's compliance history and other relevant information available to CBP.  CBP will evaluate this information promptly and provide an  importer-specific bond suffi ciency assessment for the 
importer concerned.  In the absence of this in formation, CBP calculates the bond amount using the 
formulas.  This procedure allows importers to obtai n an individualized determination, rather than a 
determination based upon the formulas.   
17. Since CBP issued the October 2006 Notice, by using the process outlined therein, several 
importers currently subject to the additional bond formulas have requested and received individualized 
bond amounts substantially lower than those CBP in itially required under the ad ditional bond formulas.  
3. The Bond Directive Constitutes "Reasonable Secu rity" Permitted by the Ad Note to GATT 
Article VI:2 and 3 
18. Under the Ad Note, a Member may require that an importer provide "reasonable security" for the 
payment of antidumping or countervailing duties.  As is evident from the cl ause that precedes it, the "final 
determination of the facts" in the Ad Note refers to  the determination of the facts with respect to the 
"payment of anti-dumping or countervailing duty."  In the context of a retrospective duty assessment 
system, the "determination of the facts" referenced in  the Ad Note is the determination that in Article 
9.3.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is referred to as  the "determination of the final liability for payment 
of anti-dumping duties." 
19. Importantly, the Ad Note does not specify a par ticular amount of security that a Member may 
require pending determination of the final liability for payment of anti-dumping duties, but rather provides 
that the amount required must be "reasonable."  U nder Thailand's line of reasoning, no amount of bond 
that exceeds the margin of dumping established in  the investigation phase of a proceeding can be 
"reasonable" security.  This interpretation of the term  "reasonable" lacks a basis in the text, which, as 
noted, does not specify a particulr ceiling for the bond amount other than the requirement that it be 
"reasonable". 
20. This interpretation also does not accord with or dinary customs practice, which provides context 
through the Ad Note's prefatory reference to "man y other cases in customs administration."  A bond is 
security against the prospect of a future liability .  The additional bond amount is intended to secure 
against additional liability that may accrue upon assessment.   As with any insurance policy, to establish 
the amount of security required, one must consider both the amount of potential liability in the event of 
default and the likelihood of default.  With respect to the amount of potential liability, in excess of $2.5 
billion worth of shrimp imports had entered the Un ited States from countries subject to the antidumping 
order during calendar year 2003.  With respect to the risk of default, after facing hundreds of millions of 
dollars in uncollected antidumping and countervail ing duties, CBP determined that importers of 
agriculture/aquaculture merchandise subject to antid umping or countervailing duty liability faced an 
elevated risk of default, due in part to low capitali zation and high turnover rates in the industry as a whole. 
 Since issuing the directive, CBP published additi onal mechanisms so that any additional bond amount 
required is tailored to individua l importers' risk of default 
21. Thailand appears to conflate the re quirement of reasonable security contained in the Ad Note with 
Article 7 of the Antidumping Agreement regarding pr ovisional measures (i.e., measures taken prior to a 
final determination of dumping or s ubsidization).  The bond directive, however, is a security requirement WT/DS343/R 
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  imposed after the final determination of dum ping or subsidization, pending "determination of the final 
liability for payment of anti-dumping duties."  It is not a "provisional measure" within the meaning of 
Article 7.  
4. Additional Bond Directive Is Not a "Specific Action Against Dumping" 
22. As explained above, the additiona l bond directive serves to secure an otherwise unsecured debt 
owed to the US government in the form of assessed antidumping duties that exceed cash deposits.  It was 
issued after CBP identified a serious noncollection prob lem with respect to these duties.  As it would in 
any case in which there exists an un secured liability that presents a risk to the revenue, CBP issued the 
additional directive to provide fo r an increase in the amount of security on certain transactions and 
thereby address the noncollection concern. The sole reason the directive is designed to secure 
antidumping liability is because the vast majority of unsecured liabili ty that has resulted in noncollection 
happens to be antidumping duty liability.  Of the $589 million in uncollected duties outstanding since 
fiscal year 2003, $513 million (87 per cent) have b een antidumping duties.  The fact that the additional 
bond directive is based on noncollection risk, rath er than the constituent elements of dumping or 
subsidization, is evident in the text of th e directive itself and associated materials.   
23. Thailand cites four aspects of the directive that it claims "dissuade the practice of dumping" and 
therefore support the conclusion that, as applied to importers of shrimp from Thailand, it is action 
"against" dumping.  However, a review of Thaila nd's assertions demonstrates that the additional bond 
directive does not meet the second prong of the test set  forth by the Appellate Body under Article 18.1:  it 
is not an action taken "against" dumping or subsidiza tion.   First, Thailand claims that the directive 
reduced shipments from countries subject to it.  Ho wever, the record simply  does not support this 
assertion.  According to a study pr epared by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), after the 
petition was filed in late 2003, but before the bond directive was announced , the share of imports from 
Thailand decreased from 30 per cent of total US shrimp imports to 15 per cent.  After the bond directive 
was announced in July 2004, Thailand's share of shrimp  imports actually increased significantly, returning 
to approximately 30 percent.  Based on GAO's analysis , there is no evidence that the bond directive in fact 
adversely affected imports of merchandi se subject to the antidumping order.  
24. In order for Thailand to prevail on its claim that the directive is "action against dumping", it also 
must demonstrate that the directive is not "in acco rdance with the provisions of GATT 1994."  It has 
failed to do so.  As explained a bove, the additional bond amounts requi red under the directive constitute 
"reasonable security" within the meaning of the Ad No te to GATT Article VI and therefore the directive 
is "in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994." 
5. The Additional Bond Directive Is Not Inconsistent with GATT Article X:3(a) 
25. Thailand has failed to establish a breach of Article  X.  Even under Thailand's theory that GATT 
Article X applies, the evidence de monstrates that CBP administers the bond directive in a "uniform, 
impartial and reasonable" manner.  The directive co ntains various criteria for identifying importers of 
merchandise with elevated default risk, and CBP a pplies these criteria uniformly.  "Impartial" means 
"[n]ot partial; not favouring one party or side more than another; unprejudiced, unbiased; fair."  Treatment 
in an unbiased and fair manner is distinguishable from identical treatment.   Using the criteria described 
above, CBP determined that importers of shrimp we re particularly risky – the potential losses were 
significant, as was the likelihood of default.  Insofa r as CBP treated shrimp importers differently from 
others, it did so based on neutral, "impartial" criteria.  "Reasonable" means "[i]n accordance with reason; 
not irrational or absurd."  Here, CBP's reason for a pplying the additional bond directive to shrimp subject 
to the February 2005 orders is clear:  it faced $2 billion in imports of shrimp newly subject to an 
antidumping order, had experienced $225 million in defaults on similar merchandise when antidumping 
orders were imposed in the past, and believed that, due to low capitalization rate s in the industry and other 
factors, these imports posed a serious risk to the revenue. Thus, Thailand fails to demonstrate that the  WT/DS343/R 
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  additional bond directive represents unreasonable, par tial, or nonuniform administration of US customs 
laws, within the meaning of GATT Article X. 
6. The Additional Bond Directive Does not Breach GATT Article XI 
26. With respect to GATT Article XI, as was the case with the bond measure at issue in Dominican 
Republic – Cigarettes , the bond directive does not prevent importers from importing shrimp into the 
United States.  The directive does not mandate an in creased bond amount – as noted  previously, importers 
can obtain individual bond determinations and, de pending on their ability to pay and history of 
compliance with US customs laws and regulations , may not be required to obtain a higher bond.  
Furthermore, even those importers that have not demo nstrated an ability to pay or have not complied with 
US customs laws in the past are ab le to import even without particip ating in the process outlined in the 
directive or providing additional bond amounts.  
7. The Directive Is Not Inconsistent with GATT Article I or II 
27. The additional bond directive itself does not constit ute a "duty" (antidumping or otherwise).  
Likewise, the additional bond directive does not constitute an "other charge."  First, CBP does not charge 
for the bonds, nor does it even require that security take the form of the additional bond.  Second, 
Thailand's argument that such bonds are "other char ges" would mean that Members may not maintain 
bonds as a means to secure importers ' obligations unless the bonds are specifically included in a Member's 
schedule.  However, as noted above, customs bonds are specifically contemplated in various WTO 
provisions, including the Ad Note to Article VI and Ar ticle 13 of the Customs Valuation Agreement.  This 
context supports the conclusion that bonds are a tool that is generally available to the Members, and not 
simply to those Members which have scheduled th em.  For this reason as well, bonding requirements are 
not an "other charge". 
28. Thailand claims that the application of the bond directive to importers of shrimp subject to 
antidumping duties is inconsistent with Article I because it allegedly discriminates between products 
originating in Thailand and products originating in other countries.  Thailand claims that even the 
imposition of additional "evidentiary burdens" constitutes discrimination under Article I.  This assertion is 
incorrect, because the US action of increasing bond am ounts merely addressed the particular risks 
associated with these entries, risk s not present with respect to entries of other products from other 
countries.  The particular risks associated with th ese entries arose in connection with imposition of the 
antidumping duty order on shrimp, which as explaine d previously gave rise to significant unsecured 
liability on the entries at issue.  Importers of shri mp from other countries not subject to the antidumping 
order are not required to pay antidumping duties, a nd therefore no additional security is necessary with 
respect to their entries.  In th e absence of higher bond amounts, CBP faced the risk that existing bonds 
would not provide sufficient recourse if importers re fused to pay the difference between estimated duties 
and the higher duties which might ultimately be assesse d.  Thus, in imposing di fferent bond requirements 
on these entries, the United States did no more than respond to the special risks associated with these 
entries.   
8. The Additional Bond Directive Is Justified by GATT Article XX(d) 
29. As the United States has demonstr ated, the additional bond directive is not inconsistent with US 
WTO obligations.  Article XX of the GATT 1994 makes this even clearer.  
30. The additional bond directive is "necessary to secure compliance" with US antidumping and 
countervailing duty assessment laws, in particular  19 USC. 1673e(a)(1) governing the assessment of 
antidumping duties and general customs and regulations  requiring the payment of duties owed to the US 
Treasury.  The fact that the directive and its applica tion to shrimp secures compliance with this obligation 
and general customs laws and regula tions requiring payment of duties owed  to the US Treasury is evident WT/DS343/R 
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  on its face.  The directive is "necessary" to secure compliance with US laws and regulations.  Revenue 
collection is among the most fundamental responsib ilities of governments.  As explained above, the 
directive secures an otherwise unsecured liability in  the form of additional antidumping duties owed upon 
assessment that exceed cash deposits, and thus permits collection of revenue that in the past has been 
subject to unprecedented default.  
31. The additional bond directive also meets the requi rements of the chapeau to Article XX, as it has 
not been applied in a manner that would constitute a "d isguised restriction on international trade" or "a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination betw een countries where the same conditions prevail."   
9. Zeroing 
32. According to Thailand, the "zeroing" in which US DOC engaged in this investigation is the same 
as the "zeroing" in which USDOC engaged in Ecuador Shrimp .  The United States did not disagree with 
Ecuador's description of the "zeroing" in that dispute.  Further, the same type of "zeroing" occurred in the 
investigation of shrimp from Thailand.  The Unite d States recognizes that a measure using a similar 
calculation was the subject of the Softwood Lumber report, and the DSB ruled that the measure was 
inconsistent with Article 2.4.2, first sentence, because of that calculation. 
  WT/DS343/R 
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  ANNEX A-2 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF  
THAILAND 
 
(30 March 2007) 
1. Measures at Issue 
1. This complaint concerns two measures applied by th e United States that affect imports of certain 
frozen warmwater shrimp from Thailand.  First, in February 2005, the United States imposed definitive 
anti-dumping duties on imports of certain frozen warm water shrimp from Thailand (the "Anti-Dumping 
Measure") and five other countries.1   Second, in conjunction with the imposition of these anti-dumping 
duties, the United States changed its normal practices regarding the provision of security for the payment 
of duties and began to apply significantly enhanced b onding requirements to imports of subject shrimp.  
The main measure at issue in th is dispute is the application of this Enhanced Bond Requirement2 to 
imports of subject shrimp from Thailand. 
2. Legal Argument  
(a) The USDOC's use of zeroing was contrary to Ar ticle 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement  
2. The US Department of Commerce ("USDOC") has ad mitted that it used zeroing in calculating the 
dumping margins of Thai shrimp exporters on the basi s of average-to-average comparisons in the final 
determination3 of dumping and the Anti-Dumping Measure. 
3. This methodology was found to be  inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement by the Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber V4 and by the recent panel in US – Shrimp 
(Ecuador ).5  For the same reasons as articulated by the Appellate Body and the panel in those cases, 
therefore, the use of this same zeroing methodology by the USDOC in this case  was inconsistent with 
Article 2.4.2 of the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the Ge neral Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994 (the "Anti-Dumping Agreement"). 
                                                      
1 Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order:  
Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand , 70 Fed. Reg. 5145 (February 1, 2005), Exhibit THA-14. At the 
same time, the United States also imposed anti-dumping measures on imports of shrimp from Brazil, China, Ecuador, India and Vietnam.  Frozen warmwater shrimp from Thailand and these other countries subject to anti-
dumping duties is referred to in this Executive Summary as "subject shrimp". 
2 The "Enhanced Bond Requirement" refers to the application by the United States Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection ("CBP") to subject shrimp from Thailand of the following amendments and clarifications to 
Customs Directive 99-3510-004 of 23 July 1991: the "Amendment to Bond Directive 99-3510-004 for Certain Merchandise Subject to Antidumping/Countervailing Cases" dated 9 July 2004 (the "9 July 2004 Amendment"); the 
CBP document titled "Current Bond Formulas" dated 25 January 2005 (the "25 January 2005 Amendment"); the 
CBP document titled "Clarification to July 9, 2004 Amended Monetary Guidelines for Setting Bond Amounts for Special Categories of Merchandise Subject to Antidumping and/or Countervailing Duty Cases" dated 10 August 
2005 (the "10 August 2005 Clarification"); and the CBP Federal Register notice USCBP-2006-0119 titled 
"Monetary Guidelines for Setting Bond Amounts for Importations Subject to Enhanced Bonding Requirements" dated 24 October 2006 (the "24 October 2006 Notice"). It also includes any amendments, extensions, and related or 
implementing measures. 
3 Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Antidumping Duty Investigation of Certain Frozen and Canned 
Warmwater Shrimp From Thailand To James J. Jochum From Barbara E. Tillman, 23 December  2004, Exhibit 
THA- 16. Also Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, Postponement of Final 
Determination, and Negative Final Determination of Critical Circumstances:  Certain Frozen and Canned Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand , 69 Fed. Reg. 76918 (December 23, 2004), Exhibit THA-15. 
4 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber V , para. 101. 
5 Panel Report, US – Shrimp (Ecuador) , para. 7.41. WT/DS343/R 
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  (b) The application of the Enhanced Bond Requi rement to subject shrimp from Thailand is 
inconsistent with Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
4. The application of the Enhanced Bond Requi rement to subject shrimp from Thailand is 
inconsistent with Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it (1) constitutes "specific action 
against dumping" and (2) is not otherwise permitted under the Anti-Dumping Agreement or Article VI of 
the GATT 1994. 
(ii) The Enhanced Bond Requirement is  specific action against dumping 
 The Enhanced Bond Requirement is "specific action" against dumping  
 
5. The Enhanced Bond Requirement is "specific ac tion" against dumping within the meaning of 
Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement because it is inextricably linked to a determination of 
dumping as defined in Article VI:1 of th e GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement.6  
6. The Enhanced Bond Requirement is  "action that may be taken only when the constituent elements 
of 'dumping' are present".7 This is because the application of the Enhanced Bond Requirement is limited 
to merchandise upon which USDOC has issued an anti-dum ping order.  The  CBP has stated that "[a]ny 
increase in bond liability will become effective when  the Department of Commerce (DOC) issues its 
Order on the case".8  The Enhanced Bond Requirement is based on "specific guidelines for bonds 
covering certain merchandise subject to antidumping/countervailing duty cases ",9 and applies only to 
"covered cases" within "special categories" of merc handise.  The 24 October 2006 Notice confirms that 
relevant "Special Category me rchandise … is merchandise subject to AD/CVD ".10 In fact, the formulae for 
calculating the amount of the Enhanced Bond Require ment all require the u se of a USDOC-determined 
anti-dumping duty rate as the multiplier.11 
7. A recent decision of the US Court of International Trade ("USCIT") that enjoined the application 
of the Enhanced Bond Requirement found that "the admi nistrative record indicates that the plaintiffs are 
likely to succeed in showing that the bond formulas were applied to these plaintiffs for the sole reason that 
these plaintiffs were importers of shri mp subject to antidumping duty orders",12 and that "Customs did not 
consider each individual importer's financial conditio n or ability to pay prospective antidumping duties, 
but rather appeared to base the application of th e formulas on one critical factor – that the importer 
engages in the importation of subject shrimp."13  
8. That the Enhanced Bond Requirement has been app lied only to imports of subject shrimp further 
illustrates that it constitutes "specific action" against dumping.14  This is confirmed by the CBP's stated 
                                                      
6 Appellate Body Report, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) , para. 242. 
7 Appellate Body Report, US – 1916 Act , para. 122. 
8 9 July 2004 Amendment. Exhibit THA-2. 
9 10 August 2005 Clarification. Exhibit THA-4, p. 2. 
10 24 October 2006 Notice, Exhibit THA-5, p. 62276. 
11 Either the final determination dumping rate, the most recent administrative review dumping rate, the 
preliminary determination dumping rate, or the applicable deposit rate. 
12 National Fisheries Institute, Inc., et al., v. Unit ed States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection , Court 
No. 05-00683, Slip Op. 06-166, 13 November 2006, (Stanceu J.) (" NFI v. U.S ."). Exhibit THA-9, p 58. 
13 Ibid., p. 60.  See also Government Accountability Office, Customs' Revised Bonding Policy Reduces Risk 
of Uncollected Duties, but Concerns about uneven Implementation and Effects Remain, GAO-07-50 (Washington 
D.C.: October 2006), (the "GAO Re port"), Exhibit THA-10, p. 5. 
14 10 August 2005 Clarification, Exhibit THA-4, p. 3.  WT/DS343/R 
 Page A-11 
 
 
  policy that it would alter the enhanced bond amount if importers stopped or limited imports of subject 
shrimp.15 
9. In addition, the CBP's stated policy reasons for introducing the Enhanced Bond Requirement 
confirm the clear connection to dumping.  These in clude "[d]ifficulties in collecting the antidumping 
duties" and "the impact of these collections on the amount of disbursements pursuant to the Continued 
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act",16 (i.e. disbursements previously found to  be inconsistent with Article 
18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement).17 
10. Finally, the Enhanced Bond Requirement constitu tes "specific action" against dumping because it 
does not address circumstances other than dumping such as:  (i) problems of default (because it has not 
been applied in situations where there is a history of  default, such as crawfish); (ii) problems of surety 
bankruptcies;  or (iii) problems that arise in new shipper situations (which have been addressed separately 
through legislative action). 
The Enhanced Bond Requirement is specific action "against" dumping  
11. The application of the Enhanced Bond Requirement to subject shrimp acts "against dumping" as 
it has an adverse bearing on, and has the effect of dissuading, the practice of dumping. 
12. First, the Enhanced Bond Requirement dissuades imports into the United States of subject shrimp. 
 Thus, the 10 August 2005 Clarification lists as a fact or that may result in altering the amount of the 
enhanced bond "whether the importer can show that it has switched to a new source of imports or a shift 
in the pattern of imports".18  The USCIT found that "only those eight importers who promised not to 
import subject shrimp, or to limit such imports, we re able to negotiate a lower minimum bond amount 
than the bond formulas required".19 
13. The GAO Report found that the Enhanced Bond Re quirement would tend to "cause importers to 
change business practices" and to "reduce impor ts from countries subject to AD/CV duties".20  The CBP 
itself confirmed that "NFI importers have increased  their sourcing from countries not affected by the 
antidumping order, from 21 per cent to 32 per cent".21 
14. The adverse bearing of the Enhanced Bond Require ment is also demonstrated by the significant 
shift in trading patterns of Thai shrimp exports: while  100 per cent of exports were made on a CIF basis in 
2003, over 50 per cent of exports were made on a DDP basis in 2006.22  This shift to DDP exports "makes 
the foreign-based supplier the U.S. importer of reco rd and shifts the burdens of the higher bonds to 
them".23 
15. Second, the Enhanced Bond Requirement results in enhanced bonds significantly greater than 
those required of other goods solely because those goods are subject to anti-dumping measures. 
16. The adverse effects of the Enhanced Bond Requi rement include costs associated with the 
enhanced bonds, such as the fees charged by sure ties of 10 per cent of the value of the bonds.24  These 
                                                      
15 See below, para. 12. 
16 9 July 2004 Amendment, Exhibit THA-2, p. 1. 
17 Appellate Body Report, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) , para. 318. 
18 10 August 2005 Clarification, Exhibit THA-4, para 3(g), p. 6. 
19 NFI v. U.S. , Exhibit THA-9, pp. 52-53. 
20 GAO Report, Exhibit THA-10, p. 32. 
21 Declaration of Bruce W. Ingalls to the USCIT in NFI v. U.S. , Exhibit THA-7, para. 17. 
22 Thai Shrimp Industry Survey, Department of Foreign Trade, Exhibit THA-12. 
23 GAO Report, Exhibit THA-10, p. 6. 
24 Exhibit THA-18. WT/DS343/R 
Page A-12  
 
  effects are compounded by the demands of sureties fo r 100 per cent collateral to secure the enhanced 
bonds
25 and the "stacking" of bonds due to regular three to five year delays before final liquidation, which 
results in the tying up of assets and cash that forces companies to forego business opportunities.26 
17. For all these reasons, the Enhanced Bond Requireme nt is "specific action" that acts "against" 
dumping within the scope of application of Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
(iii) The Enhanced Bond Requirement is not a permissible response to dumping 
18. Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement prohibits any "specific action against dumping" not 
taken "in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement".  The 
Appellate Body found that "the permissible respon ses to dumping" are limited to "provisional measures, 
price undertakings, and definitive anti-dumping duties".27  Thailand submits that the Enhanced Bond 
Requirement is not a permissible provisional measur e, price undertaking, or definitive anti-dumping duty 
within the meaning of Articles 7, 8, and 9 of th e Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article VI of the GATT 1994 
and Note 1 to paragraphs 2 and 3, Ad Article VI of the GATT 1994.28 
The Enhanced Bond Requirement is not a provisional measure  
19. The application of the Enhanced Bond Requireme nt to subject shrimp from Thailand does not 
take the form of a permitted provisional measure within the meaning of Note 1 to paragraphs 2 and 3, Ad 
Article VI of GATT 1994 or Article 7.1 of th e Anti-Dumping Agreement as it is applied after the 
definitive determination of dumping. It is also not a provisional measure taken in accordance with Articles 
7.2 and 7.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement or Note 1, Paragraphs 2 and 3 to Ad Article VI of the GATT 
1994, because it exceeds the amount of the provisional measures contemplated by those provisions.  Furthermore, it is not taken in accordance with Article 7.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as its 
application has not been limited to "as short a period as possible". 
The Enhanced Bond Requirement is not a price undertaking
 
20. The Enhanced Bond Requirement is evidently not a voluntary price undertaking in accordance 
with Article 8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
The Enhanced Bond Requirement is not an anti-dumping duty  
21. As the Enhanced Bond Requirement is a "bond" th at operates as a security for the payment of 
duties, it is of a fundamentally different character  to an anti-dumping "duty" taken in accordance with 
Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 9 of th e Anti-Dumping Agreement.  Even if it were 
considered to be an anti-dumping "duty", the measure is not applied in accordance with Articles 9.2, 9.3 
and 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as it w ould impose an obligation to provide duties additional  to 
the amount permitted in those provisions. 
                                                      
25 GAO Report, Exhibit THA-10, p. 6. NFI v. U.S. , Exhibit THA-9, at p. 38. 
26 GAO Report, Exhibit THA-10, pp. 6 and 35. NFI v. U.S. , Exhibit THA-9, p. 31. 
27 Appellate Body Report, US – 1916  Act , para. 137; Appellate Body Report, US – Offset Act (Byrd 
Amendment) , para. 265. 
28 Thailand has made separate claims that the Enha nced Bond Requirement is inconsistent with the 
provisions of Articles 7.1, 7.2, 7.4,  and 7.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,  Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, and 
Note 1 to paragraphs 2 and 3, Ad Article VI of GATT 1994, governing the application of provisional anti-dumping 
measures, and Articles 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 of the Anti-D umping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, 
governing the imposition and collection of anti-dumping duties.  The arguments supporting those claims are 
essentially those used in the context of Thailand's Article 18.1 claim.  Thailand notes, however, that these claims are 
subsidiary and alternative to Thailand's Article 18.1 claim.  WT/DS343/R 
 Page A-13 
 
 
  (c) The Enhanced Bond Requirement is inconsiste nt with Article XI:1 of the  GATT 1994 
22. The Enhanced Bond Requirement is  inconsistent with Article XI :1 in that (1) it imposes a 
restriction on the importation of subject shrimp from Th ailand and (2) this restrict ion cannot be classified 
as a duty, tax or other charge. 
23. First, the Enhanced Bond Requirement constitutes a clear restriction on the importation of subject 
shrimp from Thailand.   By imposing considerable a dditional financial costs and procedural burdens on 
importers, the Enhanced Bond Requirement makes the importation of subject shrimp from Thailand more 
burdensome than the importation of goods not subj ect to anti-dumping duties and the importation of 
goods subject to other U.S. anti-dumping measures.  It is also clear that the Enhanced Bond Requirement has a limiting effect on shrimp imports from Thaila nd, confirmed by the evidence that importers have 
reduced the share of imports of shrimp subject to  anti-dumping duties and have increased the share of 
shrimp sourced from countries exempted from the Enhanced Bond Requirement.   Moreover, the 
Enhanced Bond Requirement has forced Thai exporters to considerably change their terms and channels 
of sale.   For these reasons, the Enhanced Bond Requi rement imposes a "restriction" within the meaning 
of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994.   
24. The Enhanced Bond Requirement clearly imposes a restriction on importation
 as it is applied at 
the border and imposed solely on importers of subject shrimp.   
25. Second, the obligation to provide a bond in an am ount determined pursuant to the Enhanced Bond 
Requirement cannot be characterised as a requirement to  pay a duty, tax or charge, as it does not involve a 
monetary imposition that yields public revenue. 
(d) Alternatively, the Enhanced Bond Requirement is inconsistent with Articles II:1(a) and II:1(b) of 
the GATT 1994 
26. Thailand also claims, in the altern ative, that if the Enhanced Bond Requirement is considered to 
constitute a duty or charge imposed on or in connectio n with importation, it is in consistent with Articles 
II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994. If considered a "duty", it would be in excess of the bound rates set forth in the United States' Schedule and ca nnot be characterised as anti-dumping duties that would otherwise be 
permitted under Article II:2(b) of the GATT 1994 and is  therefore cannot be reconciled with Article 
II:1(b). If the charges, costs, and fees incurred in connection with the Enhanced Bond Requirement are 
considered other "charge[s]", they are inconsistent  with the second sentence of Article II:1(b) of the 
GATT 1994, read in conjunction with the Understandi ng on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of the 
GATT 1994.  By applying the measure to subject sh rimp, the U.S. fails to accord to those imports 
treatment no less favourable than provided in its Schedule contrary to Article II:1(a). 
(e) The selective application of the Enhanced Bond Requirement is inconsistent with Article X:3(A) 
of the GATT 1994 
27. In applying the Enhanced Bond Requirement only to importers of subject shrimp, the United 
States has failed to administer its laws and regulations re lating to import bonds in a uniform, impartial and 
reasonable manner and therefore acts inconsiste ntly with Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994. 
(ii) The United States fails to administer its custom s laws and regulations relating to bonds in a 
"uniform" manner   
28. In its administration of customs laws and regul ations requiring importers to provide a bond in a 
sufficient amount in order to secure possible liabilities, the United States differentiates between importers 
solely on the basis of whether they import subject shrimp.   WT/DS343/R 
Page A-14  
 
  29. Importers of subject shrimp are being treated  differently from other importers.  They are 
(1) subject to unique evidentiary burdens from which importers of all other goods  subject to anti-dumping 
duties are exempt and (2) must post continuous bonds in higher amounts than importers of all other goods 
subject to anti-dumping duties.  Thus, the United States  fails to treat the narrow category of importers of 
goods subject to anti-dumping duties equally.  This special  and adverse treatment is  inconsistent with the 
"more demanding requirement of uniformity" identified by the panel in EC – Selected Customs Matters  
and constitutes a failure by the United States to admi nister these laws in a uniform manner within the 
meaning of Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994.  
(iii) The United States fails to administer its custom s laws and regulations relating to bonds in a 
"reasonable" manner 
30. The CBP should ensure that its bond amount assessments are reasonably related to the actual risk 
represented by imports of subject shrimp from Thailand.  The fact that an importer imports subject shrimp 
does not, by itself, provide any reliable indication of any elevated risk of non-payment. The problems the United States has experienced in collecting anti- dumping duties have been concentrated almost 
exclusively in non-market economy cases and, in par ticular, anti-dumping duties on imports of crawfish 
and to a lesser extent garlic.  They also arise from new shipper reviews and isolated surety bankruptcies.  
Circumstances that have not arisen or do not appl y in the context of imports of subject shrimp from 
Thailand. 
31. Moreover, the CBP should have taken further steps to ensure that its bond amount assessments 
are reasonably related to the actual risk represented by individual importers.  It is unreasonable for the 
CBP to impose the Enhanced Bond Requirement selectively on imports of one product without 
conducting an individual analysis of a variety of relevant factors such the importers’ individual 
compliance records and their capitalisation, using ex actly the same standards as the CBP would apply to 
other industries, such as the steel or chemicals i ndustries.  Indeed, Section 113.13 of the Customs 
Regulation
29 requires the CBP to consider the individual co mpliance record of the importer in determining 
whether the amount of a continuous bond is sufficien t.   These standards cannot reasonably be abandoned 
simply because an importer imports subject shrimp.  Thus, the United States fails to administer its 
customs laws and regulations relating to bonds in a "reasonable" manner because it fails to consider the 
individual circumstances of importers of subject  shrimp in its analysis of bond amounts.  
(iv) The United States fails to administer its custom s laws and regulations relating to bonds in an 
"impartial" manner   
32. The evidence establis hes (1) that the CBP has used the Enhanced Bond Requirement to try to 
limit imports of shrimp subject to anti-dumping duties, (2) that in applying the Enhanced Bond 
Requirement to subject shrimp the CBP "was motivated, at least in part, by domestic political pressure to 
take action directed against the shrimp importing industry"30 and (3) that the CBP applied the Enhanced 
Bond Requirement only to the measures against subj ect shrimp even though there was no history of 
marked defaults or other problems w ith respect to these imports and in face of considerable problems with 
respect to other products and other anti-dumping orde rs.  This evidence cannot be reconciled with the 
requirement of impartiality contained in Article X:3(a).  
(f) The Enhanced Bond Requirement is incons istent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 
33. While the United States applies the Enhanced B ond Requirement to imports of certain shrimp 
products from Thailand and the five other countries, it exempts like products from countries  other than 
Thailand and the five other countries (referred to as the "preferred countries") from this requirement.  
                                                      
29 "Customs Regulation" refers to Chapter 1 of Title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
30 NFI v. U.S. , p.57.  WT/DS343/R 
 Page A-15 
 
 
  Importers of shrimp products from th e preferred countries need only provide a bond in an amount that is 
approximately equal to 10 per cent of the duties and charges paid by the importer in the previous year (the "Basic Bond Requirement").  Importers of subject sh rimp, on the other hand, provide a bond calculated in 
accordance with the Enhanced Bond Requirement, which is  far higher than 10 per cent of the duties and 
charges paid by the importer in the previous year. 
34. Imports of subject shrimp from Thailand are "lik e" shrimp products originating in the preferred 
countries.  The factors commonly used in GATT/WTO practice to determine likeness, such as customs 
classification, end-use, and the physical properties of the product, all support a finding that shrimp 
products from these various sources s hould be treated as like products.
  However, the United States does 
not grant the advantage of allowing importation in accordance with the Basic Bond Requirement 
immediately and unconditionally to imports of subject  shrimp from Thailand even though this advantage 
is granted to imports of shrimp products from the pr eferred countries. This failure to treat like products 
equally cannot be reconciled with the United States ' obligations under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. 
(g) The Enhanced Bond Requirement cannot be ju stified under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 
35. Thailand presents a few comment s on Article XX of the GATT 1994 without prejudice to its right 
to develop further argumentation th at responds more directly to any defences of the United States.  
(i) The Enhanced Bond Requirement is not "necessary to  secure compliance" w ithin the meaning of 
Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 
36. Under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994, the United States bears the burden of proving that the 
Enhanced Bond Requirement is "necessary" to secure compliance with its laws and regulations.  The 
United States must establish that the less trade-rest rictive and less WTO-incons istent alternative measure 
of the Basic Bond Requirement would fail to achieve compliance with its laws and regulations imposing 
anti-dumping duties on imports of subject shrimp and that therefore the Enhanced Bond Requirement is 
"necessary". 
37. The fact that the United Stat es applies the Basic Bond Requirement to 98 per cent of anti-
dumping orders currently in place suggests that the United States cannot discharge this burden. The 
United States must establish that importers of subject shrimp from Thailand have special features that 
force the United States to resort to more stringent measures. 
38. There is no basis to assume that future assessmen t rates of anti-dumping duties are likely to be 
higher than cash deposit rates in cases involving imports  of subject shrimp from Thailand. As the USCIT 
ruled, "[t]he record does not identif y evidence that the initial cash deposit of plaintiffs will be insufficient 
to cover the final rates of liquidation".31 
39. Equally, there is no basis to assume that importers  of Thai subject shrimp are far more likely to 
default when presented with supplemental bills than importers of other products subject to anti-dumping 
duties.  The USCIT ruled that "[c]ustoms … did not articulate in the Amendment or the Clarification a reason why antidumping duties on shrimp imports are especially susceptible to under-collection, as 
opposed to duties on imports of other agricultural or  aquacultural products subject to antidumping duty 
orders, or as opposed to all pr oducts subject to such orders".
32 It also ruled that "no record exists 
demonstrating that significant numbers of shrimp exporters are defaulting or  have defaulted on any 
obligation to pay antidumping duties on their imports of shrimp".33 It remains unclear why it is 
                                                      
31 NFI v. US , Exhibit THA-9, p. 55. 
32 Ibid., p. 54. 
33 Ibid., p. 54. WT/DS343/R 
Page A-16  
 
  "necessary" to impose more stringent bonding requirements on a class of importers who are not 
susceptible to and have no marked history of default.   
40. U.S. problems with collecting anti-dumping du ties arise almost exclusively in non-market 
economy cases such as those involving crawfish and ga rlic.  The difficulties arise from the unique manner 
in which the United States determines dumping margin s in non-market economy cases as well as isolated 
surety bankruptcies and exemptions (now removed) from cash deposit requirement s for new shippers of 
products subject to anti-dumping duties.  None of th ese circumstances applies to Thailand.  The USCIT 
ruled that the record does not "iden tify evidence that importers of shrimp are particularly susceptible to 
bankruptcy, likely to go out of business, or operating as "sham" or "alter ego companies".
34  For all these 
reasons, the Enhanced Bond Requirement is not "neces sary" to secure compliance with the United States' 
laws and regulations. 
(ii) The Enhanced Bond Requirement does not meet the co nditions set out in the chapeau to Article 
XX(d) of the GATT 1994. 
41. The Enhanced Bond Requirement also does not  conform to the requirements of the chapeau  to 
Article XX because the manner in which it is app lied constitutes "arbitrary"  or "unjustifiable" 
discrimination and a "disguised restriction on intern ational trade". The lack of any nexus between the 
purported objective of the Enhanced Bond Requireme nt (to protect United States' revenue) and the 
manner in which it is actually applied (solely to subj ect shrimp) indicates that it constitutes a "disguised 
restriction on international trade" of  shrimp products.  Furthermore, th e application of the Enhanced Bond 
Requirement to importers of shrimp from six WTO Members while exempting importers of products from 
other countries that present equivalent or even great er risks to United States revenue clearly constitutes 
"arbitrary" and "unjustifiable" discrimination. 
42. For these reasons, Thailand does not consider th at the application of the Enhanced Bond 
Requirement to shrimp from Thailand can be justif ied under GATT Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994.  
Thailand will expand on this discussi on in subsequent submissions in the event that the United States 
does, indeed, seek to justify its measure under Article XX(d). 
3. Summary of Request for Finding s, rulings and recommendations  
43. Thailand considers that both measures at issue in  these proceedings are inconsistent with WTO 
law.  Thailand notes that had the United States not u sed zeroing to inflate artificially the margin of 
dumping, it may not have been able to impose dumping  duties on Thai shrimp.  Then, in turn, the United 
States would not have imposed the Enhanced Bond Requi rement on Thai shrimp exports.  Therefore, the 
concurrent application of these inc onsistent measures on im ports of subject shrimp from Thailand has, and 
continues to, adversely and unfairly affect trade in this important export commodity for Thailand. 
44. Thailand requests the Panel to find that: 
(a) The application of the Enhanced Bond Require ment to subject shrimp from Thailand is 
inconsistent with: 
(i) Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreem ent; or, subsidiarily, Articles 7 and 9 
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, and Note 1 to 
paragraphs 2 and 3, Ad Article VI of GATT 1994. 
(ii) Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994; or, alternatively, Article II:1(a) and the first and 
second sentences of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994.   
                                                      
34 Ibid., p. 55.  WT/DS343/R 
 Page A-17 
 
 
  (iii) Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994. 
(iv) Article I of the GATT 1994.   
(b) The Anti-Dumping Measure is inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement.   
45. If the Panel agrees with the claims under Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Thailand 
requests the Panel to nevertheless also address its  claims under Articles XI, II, X:3(a), and I of the 
GATT 1994.  Doing so would ensure th at the Appellate Body can, if neces sary, fully addre ss those claims 
or, at a minimum, complete any necessary analysis to rule on those claims. 
46. Thailand also requests that, pursuant to its authorit y under Article 19.1, the Panel suggest that the 
United States bring its measure into conformity by immediately releasing any bonds held by the CBP for 
imports of subject shrimp from Thailand pursuant to  the Enhanced Bond Requirement, so that those 
imports, like all other US imports subject to anti- dumping duties would be secured by the Basic Bond 
Requirement.