Note: Advance written questions by WTO Members and the replies provided by the United States  
are reproduced in document WT/TPR/M/160/Add.1 and will be available online at:  
http://www.wto.org/english/tr atop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm.  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/TPR/M/160 
9 June 2006 
 (06-2787) 
Trade Policy Review Body 
22 and 24 March 2006  
 
  
 
TRADE POLICY REVIEW 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
Minutes of Meeting  
 
Chairperson:  H.E. Ms. Claudia Uribe (Colombia) 
 
    Page 
 
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 3 
 
II. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE REPRES ENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES 4 
 
III. STATEMENT BY THE DISCUSSANT 9 
 IV. STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS 13 
 
V. REPLIES BY THE REPRESENTATI VE OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
 ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 41 
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 49  
 WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 3 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 
1. The Chairperson welcomed members of the Trad e Policy Review Body to the eighth Review 
of the United States.  She greeted the delegation of the United States led by H.E. Ambassador 
Peter Allgeier, and the discussant, H.E. Ambassador  Amina Chawahir Mohamed (Kenya).  As usual, 
the discussant would speak in her personal capacity.  In accordance with established procedures, the 
discussant had made available, in advance, outlines of the themes she intended to raise (document 
WT/TPR/D/136). 
2. The Chairperson recalled the purpose of the Trad e Policy Reviews and the main elements of 
the procedures of the meeting.  The Report by the United States was contained in documents 
WT/TPR/G/160 and WT/TPR/G/160/Corr.1, and that of the Secretariat in document WT/TPR/S/160 and WT/TPR/S/160/Corr.1.  As indicated in document WT/TPR/6/Rev.1, the Member under review should submit written answers before the beginning of  the Review to questions submitted at least two 
weeks before the meeting.  Questions posed subse quently should be answered, to the extent possible 
before the start of the second session of the meeting.   Questions left unanswered at the end of the 
second session should be answered in writing no later th an one month after the meeting.  Questions by 
the following delegations had been submitted in writi ng at least two weeks in advance of the meeting 
and had been transmitted to the delegation of the United States:  Cuba;  Colombia;  Chile;  New 
Zealand;  Australia;  Chinese Taipei;  Guatemala;  Switzerland;  India;  and Argentina.  Copies of these questions and of the answers provided by the delegation of the United States were available in 
the meeting room. 
3. The Republic of Korea;  the European Commun ities;  Mexico;  Japan;  Turkey;  Brazil;  
Canada;  Peru;  Indonesia;  China;  Israel;  Hong Kong, China;  Thailand;  Ecuador;  South Africa;  
Costa Rica;  Norway;  the Philippines;  Singapore;   and Trinidad and T obago had submitted written 
questions after the two week deadline.  Copies of all advance questions, as well as the responses 
provided by the United States, are reproduced in document WT/TPR/M/160/Add.1. 
4. The Chairperson had examined both the U.S. and the Secretariat Reports and was pleased to 
note that the United States continued to be a drivin g force of world trade and to be fully committed to 
the multilateral trading system.  The United States' ac tive participation in the WTO and in the current 
negotiations was evident from the large number of proposals it had advanced, in agriculture, non-
agricultural market access services, and many others. 
5. Since its last Trade Policy Review, in January 2004, the United States had registered strong 
economic growth, no doubt partly as a result of the openness and transparency of its trade regime.  During the period under review, the United States had continued to introduce liberalization measures 
at MFN and preferential levels.  However, measures that constituted obstacles or that distorted trade 
persisted in a few areas.  Hence, she was pleased to observe that the United States had been willing to 
consider the reduction or elimination of many of these distortions in the context of the DDA.  This 
would strengthen the multilateral trading system a nd contribute to sustainable and balanced growth 
for the U.S. and world economies. WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 4 
 
 
II. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE REPRESEN TATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES 
6. The representative of the United States  stated that the United States continued to value highly 
the trade policy review process, which complete d and reinforced the transparency provisions 
elsewhere in the WTO Agreements and was vitally  important in promoting greater awareness with 
respect to trade policies and practices.  Judging from  the high participation in the current meeting, as 
well as the hundreds of questions received, it was obvious that other Members remained greatly 
interested in U.S. trade practices although it had b een reviewed more than any other Member.  The 
United States welcomed this interest as well as the opportunity to discuss its trade policies with other 
Members. 
7. His delegation was working diligently to answ er the six hundred or so questions Members 
had submitted, and on the agreed timeline set out du ring the 2005 TPR appraisal.  That meant that 
preliminary responses to the vast majority of qu estions had been provided for Members that had 
submitted them two weeks in advance of the meeti ng.  Responses for Members that had missed the 
two-week deadline by one or two days, and to ques tions that overlapped in substance with questions 
received on time, had also been provided.  The Un ited States was continuing to work hard on all the 
remaining questions, those received well after the two-week deadline, and its goal was to have 
responses to many of these by the next session. 
(1) MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
(i) Overview of the U.S. economic environment 
8. The representative of the United States noted  that the U.S. economy was based on 
competition, based on the belief that well functioning markets were critical to the effective allocation 
of national resources and to providing economic o pportunity and incentives to growth.  Central to 
U.S. efforts to support and strengthen healthy comp etition had been a consistent trade policy since 
1934 to lower and eliminate barriers and distortions to  U.S. international trade on a reciprocal basis.  
The advent of the rules-based multilateral system with GATT 1947 and its evol ution and expansion to 
the WTO had contributed importantly to stre ngthening competition and helping improve the 
performance of the U.S. and other Members' economi es.  Since the inception of the WTO in 1995, the 
U.S. real economy had achieved sustained, strong growth:  the U.S. economy had grown at an annual 
rate of nearly 3.3%, despite a recession and the la rge economic shocks of the Asian financial crisis 
and the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001.  This strong growth had been 
accompanied by a healthy expansion in employment, which had grown by more than 18 million, while the unemployment rate had dropped from 6.1% in 1995 to less than 5% in 2006. 
9. Strengthened productivity growth had been just as important.  Real output per hour worked in 
the private sector overall had grown at an average of  2.8% over the previous 11 years compared with 
1.8% in the preceding 11 years.  In manufacturi ng, productivity had grown by  4.4% annually since 
1994.  Improved productivity growth was central to stronger growth of incomes;  growth of private-
sector real hourly compensation had more than doubl ed from the 11 years preceding the WTO to the 
last 11 years, rising to nearly 2% annually.  Av erage per capita GDP in the United States had been 
more than a quarter higher in 2005 than in 1994. 
10. Improving productivity growth was due to factors,  such as investment  in infrastructure, 
equipment and education, and the development and adoption of new technologies.  The removal of 
trade impediments and barriers in the marketplace also permitted the expansion of production in 
sectors where workers could be most productively employed, and generated incentives to greater 
investment in relatively productive sectors. WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 5 
 
 
(ii) Challenges successfully met 
11. During the period under review, the United States had continued to deal with the economic 
challenges of the 2001 recession, the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in 2001, slow economic growth 
in a number of its major trading partners, and th e damage caused by hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 
2005.  From 2000 to 2003, the r ecession and other economic shocks ha d slowed GDP growth down to 
a three-year average annual rate of 1.7%, though growth had improved from year to year during the 
period.  The Government had reacted to recession at home and economic difficulties in the global economy with both fiscal and monetary policy to  support economic growth.  In 2004 the U.S. 
economy had grown at 4.2%, and in 2005 by 3.5%, despite the devastation of Katrina and Rita.  
Productivity growth had accelerated, up 3% a year for the private sector and 5.1% for manufacturing 
between 2003 and 2005.  Employment was up by over 4 million, and th e latest rate of unemployment 
was 4.8%. 
12. Considerable interest had been expressed in U.S. fiscal policy in recent years.  The U.S. fiscal 
policy had moved in an appropriate counter-cyclically  stimulative fashion to limit the scope of the 
2001 recession and its aftermath.  The current polic y focus of spending restraint and low, growth-
enhancing tax rates created a solid basis for future sustained growth of the U.S. economy.  At the peak of the previous business cycle in 2000 the federal budget had been in modest surplus.  In the face of 
the recessionary pressures beginning in 2001, counte rcyclical fiscal measures had been taken to 
support domestic demand and help re new strong growth.  The recession and measures to combat it, 
however, had moved the federal budget into a deficit, peaking at 3.6% of GDP in 2004.  With healthy 
growth restored, as well as the growth in federal government receipts, the budget deficit had declined 
to 2.6% of GDP in 2005 and was projected in the latest budget to fall further to 1.4% of GDP by 2009. 
(iii) The global nature of imbalances 
13. U.S. trade had recovered after a period of little gr owth early in the decade.  Real exports of 
goods and services had expanded by 7.6% a year and real imports by 8.4% a year between 2003 and 
2005.  As a share of GDP, exports had grown from 9.5% to 10.4% between 2003 and 2005 and 
imports increased from 14.1% to 16.2%.  As these fi gures indicated, an already large U.S. deficit in 
trade in goods and services had become considerab ly larger over the period of review, up from 
US$495 billion in 2003 to US$724 billion in 2005.  As a share of GDP, the deficit on the current 
account, the broadest measure of international trad e, had increased from 4.7% in 2003 to 6.4% in 
2005. 
14. Much concern had been expressed about the si ze of the current global imbalance.  The 
imbalance was “global” since, if the United St ates currently had an US$805 billion current account 
deficit, the rest of the world was running, by definition, collectively US$805 billion in current account 
surpluses.  While the U.S. real economy had performed  very well, despite growing trade deficits, the 
size of current imbalances raised questions to some  about their long run sustainability.  Open trade 
policy did not provide the tools to deal directly with aggregate trade imbalances, and the WTO was 
not a forum that dealt with the tools affecting such imbalances. 
15. From a U.S. perspective, three factors woul d be necessary to produce a healthy reduction of 
U.S. deficits and foreign country surpluses:  firs t, higher rates of U.S. saving;  second, stronger 
growth performance in a number of U.S. trade part ners and third, some countries had rates of saving 
well in excess of domestic investment opportuni ties, with much of the excess flowing to the 
United States as net capital inflows.   Nothing in the balance-of-payments accounting framework per 
se suggested the direction of causality between ne t capital inflows and current account deficits.  
However, improvements in funda mental conditions limiting attractive investment opportunities in WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 6 
 
 
countries where saving currently far surpassed inv estment would make an extremely valuable 
contribution to the long-term reduction in the size of current global trade payments imbalances. 
(2) RECENT TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS  
16. Since the U.S. Trade Policy Review in 2004 the Un ited States had worked to remove barriers 
and expand trade opportunities on all fronts, at the WT O as well as in bilateral and regional contexts.  
Many U.S. specific actions, accomplishments, and deci sions were described in detail in its Report, but 
he stressed that all of these pos itive events were taking place in a c onsistent and coherent environment 
in which the major policy directions had not change d since the previous review.  He highlighted six 
key themes of U.S. trade policy. 
(i) Openness of the U.S. market 
17. The United States continued to expand access to its already very open market.  The U.S. 
simple average tariff rate was 3.6% on a legally  bound basis under the WTO.  When GSP and other 
trade preferences were taken into account, the U.S. trade weighted average applied tariff was 1.4%.  
In 2005, nearly 70% of all U.S. imports had entered the United States duty free.  U.S. service markets were open to competition, and regulatory processes were transparent and accessible to the public, 
including the foreign public.  The United States had purchased roughly US$2 trillion in goods and 
services from the rest of the world in 2005 making it the world’s largest importer and a major engine of global economic growth. 
18. The United States continued to be the world’s largest host for foreign direct investment.  
Currently, foreign direct investment in the United States was roughly US$1.5 trillion.  This 
investment created jobs, boosted wages, and brough t in new research, technology, techniques, and 
skills.  U.S. affiliates of foreign companies employed  more than 5 million U.S. workers, equivalent to 
roughly 5% of private non-agricultural employment, a nd they often paid higher than average wages.  
The United States was committed to remaining an a ttractive destination for foreign investment, both 
to avoid disruptions in trade and capital flows and to  preserve the significant and tangible benefits that 
foreign investment brought. 
(ii) Importance of multilateralism 
19. The multilateral trading system had been the h eart of U.S. trade policy for more than 60 
years;  the United States was deeply committed to the WTO.  The WTO was the essential foundation 
of an increasingly integrated and competitiv e global economy of the 21st century, and the 
United States strongly supported further efforts to reduce and eliminate restrictions on the flow of 
international trade. 
20. The Secretariat Report described U.S. trade policy as being part of a broader security 
objective.  While it was true that security consid erations had played an important role in the 
multilateral system from the beginning, it would be more accurate to say that the U.S. commitment to the WTO was grounded in the first instance in its c onviction that the multilateral system provided the 
most powerful path to greater global growth, development, and prosperity. 
21. The United States was holding on to its ambitious  vision for multilateral trade liberalization, 
as evident from the boldness of its proposals in  the DDA – including on agriculture, NAMA, and 
services – and from the decision by Congress to extend Trade Promotion Authority until 1 July 2007.  
Under this legislation, the U.S. Government had to  notify Congress of its intent to sign an agreement 
at least 90 days before the projected signing date.  The law further required notification of Congress 
180 days prior to signature of the full range of proposals advanced in the negotiations that might WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 7 
 
 
require changes in U.S. trade statutes.  It was th erefore essential that the DDA be completed by the 
end of 2006.  Any closing Ministerial Conference to sign the DDA agreements needed to take place 
no later than June 2007. 
22. The DDA had the potential to convey great benef its and to be the greatest multilateral round 
thus far.  The United States welcomed the results of the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference, including 
on the important issues of development, but many  important political decisions still needed to be 
made.  A successful conclusion of the negotiations required real new market access opportunities in 
agriculture, industrial products, and services, areas wh ere very strong results were to be obtained to 
sell the package to Congress and to the U.S. public.  The United States also attached great importance 
to trade facilitation and subsidies disciplines, partic ularly fisheries subsidies, which could result in a 
win for trade, development, and the environment. 
(iii) Expanding bilateral and regional initiatives 
23. The United States was also pursuing an active ag enda of regional and bilateral initiatives in a 
manner that was supportive of the multilateral syst em.  These initiatives were based on the premise 
that deeper economic integration could convey great benefits, economic as well as political, and at the 
same time challenge the multilateral trading system  to keep pace with the interests and needs of 
Members.  Following Congressional approval, these agreements were notified to the WTO. 
24. In the interest of transparency , the United States had provided considerable information about 
its bilateral and regional initiatives in its Report.  Some negotiations were conducted with individual 
countries; others took place in the context of regiona l initiatives.  So far, free-trade agreements with 
eight countries had been achieved, while negotiations  with 21 other Members were at various stages 
of negotiation or implementation.  In this respect:  free trade agreements were currently in place with 
Australia, Chile, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Singapo re, and NAFTA partners Canada and Mexico;  
Congress had approved agreements with Bahrain, the CAFTA countries, and the Dominican Republic, 
which were beginning the process of implementa tion as U.S. partners completed their domestic 
procedures;  negotiations had been completed with  Oman, Peru, and Colombia;  negotiations with 
Ecuador, Panama, the five SACU countries, Thaila nd, and the United Arab Emirates were underway;  
and negotiations with Ko rea and Malaysia had b een recently launched. 
25. The Secretariat, in its report, had expressed th e view that the increasing number of U.S. free-
trade agreements could divert administrative res ources away from the multilateral trading system and 
impede progress in the multilateral negotiations.  Similar claims had been made before, as they 
occasionally appeared in the academic literature.  Ho wever, in the experience of the United States, 
this was not the case.  In fact, one of the criteri a the United States used in selecting its free-trade 
negotiating partners was a clear, consistent commitm ent to WTO-based trade liberalization, and U.S. 
partners included some of the strongest supporters of MFN-based liberalization.  U.S. free trade 
agreements were not among the obstacles facing the Doha Development Agenda. 
(iv) Autonomous initiatives to foster development 
26. A fourth important aspect of U.S. trade po licy was to use the U.S. market to create 
opportunities for developing country partners.  On  the demand side, the United States provided duty-
free access for most products from developing coun tries through preferential trade programmes such 
as the Generalized System of Preferences;  the A frican Growth and Opportunity Act; the Caribbean 
Basin Trade Partnership Act; and the Andean Tr ade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act.  The 
United States also recognized that market access was of little value if beneficiaries were not able to 
take advantage of it:  it was the largest single- country provider of trade-related development 
assistance, and had increased spending on trad e capacity building initiatives from US$920 million in WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 8 
 
 
2004 to US$1.3 billion in 2005.  The U.S. Government  planned to more than double that aid, to 
US$2.7 billion annually by 2010, subject to de veloping countries prioritizing trade in their 
development plans.  It was ready to use all av ailable tools, including the Millennium Challenge 
Account and USAID programmes, to support Aid for Trade,  as trade played a cent ral role in efforts to 
reduce poverty and spur growth. 
(v) Strengthening U.S. borders 
27. A fifth development, and a major accomplishment of recent years, was the successful 
implementation of border security measures in a manner that minimized disruptions and delays in lawful commerce.  The United States appreciated th e understanding shown by its  trading partners in 
this area.  Through the Container Security Initia tive and the Customs Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism it had been possible to use advance info rmation, technology, and close cooperation with 
stakeholders in the trade community to simultaneously  protect and facilitate trade.  This had been a 
major topic of discussion during the previous U.S. review, and the United States was pleased to report 
there had been very few situations where delays  or disruptions had not been resolved to the 
satisfaction of the affected parties.  The United States also welcome the continued feedback on its 
implementation of these essential measures and ways that they could be improved. 
(vi) Implementing dispute settlement decisions 
28. While the United States expected compliance in disputes where it prevailed, it also 
recognized its responsibility to implement adver se DSB recommendations.  For example, the United 
States had made administrative determinations in  response to DSB recommendations involving anti-
dumping and safeguard investigations.  In addition, where legislation was required to implement these 
findings, the Administration had worked closely with  Congress to secure the necessary legislation, as 
had been done for the 1916 Antidumping Act, the Fo reign Sales Corporation-Extraterritorial Income 
tax provisions, the Continued Dumping and S ubsidy Offset Act (also known as the Byrd 
Amendment), and the Upland Cotton User Marketing Certificate Program (known as Step-2), among others.  The United States would continue to work on outstanding compliance issues. 
(3) L
OOKING FORWARD  
29. In the past two years, the United States had actively pursued trade and economic policies to 
strengthen the global economy and provide a firmer basi s for growth.  It would continue to do so in 
the coming year, the crucial final year of the Doha  negotiations.  The time had come to make the 
difficult political decisions necessary to grasp a co mprehensive and meaningful outcome.  In case of 
failure, the world risked missing a landmark opp ortunity to boost global economic growth and 
alleviate poverty. 
30. The United States would continue to play a strong leadership role to achieve an ambitious and 
mutually beneficial outcome to th e Doha negotiations.  It was willing to make bold proposals and take 
political risks, provided others did the same.  But breakthroughs were urgently needed, especially in 
the areas of agriculture, services, and industrial good s, where the greatest impetus to growth and the 
greatest development gains would come.  The Unite d States remained strongly committed to open 
markets and free trade, and was convinced that the Doha negotiations were the most powerful tool to 
get there.  But it was a step that all Members must take together. WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 9 
 
 
III. STATEMENT BY THE DISCUSSANT 
31. The discussant  noted that this review of the United States was taking place at a very critical 
juncture in the DDA negotiations, between the Hong Kong Ministerial and the April deadline for 
modalities in agriculture and NAMA.  It was co mmon knowledge that the United States was among 
the G6 countries involved in looking for common gr ound to move the negotiations forward.  She 
welcomes the full engagement of the United Stat es in the negotiations as well as the spirit of 
accommodation and inclusiveness that it had demons trated throughout her term as Chair of the 
General Council. 
32. As the United States was the most important pl ayer in international commerce, its activities 
were watched with a lot of interest by the WTO me mbership, as well as by the wider international 
community.  It was expected to lead and be the sta ndard bearer, a heavy responsibility but one that it 
had performed admirably well. 
33. The economy had remained strong and comp etitive even under extremely challenging 
circumstances since 2001.  It was very encouraging th at, despite all the constr aints, the United States 
had continued to drive global growth by mainta ining a largely open economy.  Its policies had 
underpinned its status as the world's largest single im porter and a key engine of  global growth directly 
benefiting its trading partners as well as U.S. pro ducers and consumers.  The extension of the Trade 
Promotion Authority had brought greater predicta bility to multilateral trading environment and 
underlined a firm commitment to the trade negotia tions.  However, in its leadership position the 
United States would need to pay attention to th e market access barriers and other distortions that 
persisted in a few but important areas of interest to its trading partners. 
(1) MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
34. She commended the United States for the strong performance of its economy during the 
period under review.  A number of important i ndicators had underpinned U.S. economic growth.  
Exports had grown faster than GDP in 2004 and in the first two quarters of 2005 making a positive 
contribution to overall growth.  Real exports of go ods and services had expanded by 7.6% a year in 
the same period.  The economy had been further s upported by strong private consumption, bolstered 
by an increase in disposable income, mortgage  refinancing, and lower unemployment.  Labour 
productivity continued to show solid growth with  private non-farm business productivity being in the 
lead after a slight hiccup in the first half of 2005.  The openness of the economy might have led to 
productivity gains remaining well above th e increases of the past two decades. 
35. The United States had continued to absorb imports  from the rest of the world;  real imports 
had increased by 8.4% in 2003-05, and thus had been  instrumental in maintaining the momentum of 
world economic growth.  It was remarkable that 70% of imports had entered the U.S. market duty free.  Further, the openness of the U.S. market enabled U.S. producers and consumers to access goods, 
services, and capital from around the world on the best terms and conditions.  This in turn added to 
the competitiveness of the U.S. economy.  It had be en reassuring to hear the commitment to maintain 
the United States as an attractive destina tion for goods, services, and investments. 
36. There were, however, some caveats to this  overall positive picture, as noted in the 
Secretariat’s report.  The first was the issue of the twin deficits.  Al though the deficit in the last fiscal 
year had been slightly lower than expected, it was large in absolute terms and had contributed to a 
further accumulation of debt.  Negative public sector savings were accompanied by a negative 
personal savings rate, and reflected in the deficit in  the current account of the balance of payments.  
The United States had been successful to date in financing this deficit, but concerns had been 
expressed with respect to the sustainability of th is situation including by the President of the WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 10 
 
 
New York Federal Reserve.  It was also note worthy  that the U.S. debt was increasing to record 
levels.  A "hard" landing, resulting in a substantial decline of the do llar and higher interest rates would 
be in no one's interest and would have negative repercussions for the world economy. 
37. A second point of concern with respect to the macroeconomic situation was the effect of a 
possible slowdown of the U.S. economy following the change in monetary policy stance taken by the 
Federal Reserve.  Lower growth in the United Stat es might result in lower imports, which could have 
a negative impact on growth in the rest of the world. 
(2) TRADE POLICY REGIME  
38. Both the Secretariat and Government reports highl ighted that the trade and investment regime 
of the United States is one of the world's most open and transparent.  The United States remained 
steadfast in its support of the rules-based multilate ral trading system.  Its active involvement and 
leadership in the DDA negotiations clearly bore witness to this. 
39. The United States considered multilateral, regiona l, and bilateral initiatives to be mutually 
reinforcing, and had been negotiating preferentia l trade agreements with a growing number of 
partners.  From 2001 to late 2005, the number of FTAs concluded had increased five fold, from three 
to 15, with 12 more under active negotiation.  She queried whether, from a gl obal perspective, there 
was not a downside risk in pursuing this strategy, and whether it could be argued that energies and 
resources were being diverted away from multilateral e fforts.  For developing countries, especially the 
weakest, the DDA was about integration into the multila teral trading system;  many of these countries 
were not in a free-trade agreement relationship with the United States, and might feel left out, especially in light of the challenges in the round.   There was the additional risk that this could 
translate into a complex system of preferential tariff s and rules of origin that could distort trade and 
investment flows. 
40. The extension of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) until mid 2007, was welcomed by 
WTO Members.  The extension had enhanced predictability regarding the adoption by the 
United States of any future agreement reached under the DDA and provided an impetus for Members 
to redouble efforts in meeting the deadlines ag reed to at the Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting. 
41. The United States had a number of unilateral preferential schemes for developing countries, 
such as the AGOA, and CBI, ATPA.  Although ther e had been some concern about the perceived 
discriminatory nature of such preferential regimes, their impact on countries that felt marginalized by 
the multilateral trading system could not be ig nored.  In the case of AG OA, for instance, the 
contribution to growth in some African countries such as Lesotho, Madagascar or Mauritius was 
clear, from employment creation to an increase in foreign direct investment. 
42. Security considerations were an essential component of U.S. trade and investment policy; 
they were central to the implementation of investme nt provisions and had le d to the promulgation of 
regulations affecting U.S. import procedures.  Re gulations introduced since the last review had 
included the electronic transmission to the U.S. authorities of information on U.S.-bound cargo prior 
to departure;  registration of food manufacturing and handling facilities;  and advance notice of all 
food shipments destined for the United States.  At  the same time, the Un ited States had adopted 
several trade facilitation measures in recent year s, including the Automated Commercial Environment 
and the government/business initiative known as C-TPAT.   She asked the United States to share its 
experience in balancing security concerns with th e principles of open trade and investment during the 
past few years.  She wondered whether, based on th is experience, the United States envisaged changes 
to its trade and investment policy.  Also, she asked about U.S. efforts to ensure that customs-related WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 11 
 
 
programmes like C-TPAT and the Container Security  Initiative applied to as many WTO Members as 
possible, to prevent any discrimination. 
43. The average MFN tariff had been reduced slightly to 4.9% during the period under review.  
However, much higher tariffs continued to apply to  some agricultural products, and to textiles and 
clothing.  Although the share of non- ad valorem  tariffs had continued to decline, non- ad valorem  
duties continue to afford significantly higher protection than ad valorem  duties, especially to 
agricultural products. 
44. Although the pace seemed to have slowed dow n, the United States continued to use anti-
dumping actions actively.  She invited the United Stat es to ensure that these measures, which could be 
highly trade-disruptive, were applied in strict a ccordance with commitments and obligations.  It was 
important to stress that during the period under re view, the United States had issued legislation to 
abide by DSB rulings in two prominent anti-dumping cases:  the Antidumping Act of 1916 had been repealed, as had the Byrd Amendment.  Members had noted with some concern, however, that, in the 
case of the Byrd Amendment AD duties would continue to be distributed to the domestic industry 
until 1 October 2007, creating further trade distortions ;  she enquired about the choice of a date that 
seemed so relatively far in the future. 
45. The Secretariat report noted that the United St ates had terminated measures under its "Global 
Steel Safeguard" ahead of schedule and that, during the period under review, no new "global" 
safeguard measures had been applied.  U.S. restraint in this area was laudable. 
46. The Secretariat report regarded federal and st ate financial assistance in the form of tax 
exemptions, financial outlays, and credit programmes as another potential source of market distortions 
that raised some concern.  It was understood that such support, although not targeted at exports, could 
significantly affect trade because the United St ates was among the world's largest producers, 
exporters, and importers.  She was interested in th e U.S. authorities' views on the circumstances that 
warranted the granting of government assistance.  She wondered whether this could affect global trade 
and impair efficiency in an economy otherwise largely free of policy-induced distortions. 
47. The United States continued to apply Buy Ameri can provisions for federal-level procurement 
not covered by international agre ements.  Set-asides and special provisions as well as targets were set 
for small businesses and other categories of domestic suppliers.  In general, with the exception of 
treatment granted to LDCs, the U.S. approach to procurement was based on reciprocity;  this had 
become more explicit in recent years as seen in the procurement provisions contained in the FTAs 
signed by the United States.  It would be interes ting for Members to know to what extent LDCs and 
FTA partners had taken advantag e of these preferential provisions. 
48. Regarding intellectual property rights, the Unite d States had played a constructive and well 
appreciated role both in 2003 and December 2005 in  supporting the decision on the Implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Hea lth and the subsequent 
amendment.  However, concern had been expressed by Members that measures affecting developing 
countries could be adopted as a result of Special 301 or section 337 investig ation.  Developing 
countries could consequently lose preferential access  to the U.S. market, or, through section 337, 
might find access for some of their products to th e United States barred.  She asked whether such 
measures had been adopted since 2004.  She also soug ht clarification on steps taken to improve patent 
quality, noting that an initiative by the United Stat es Patent and Trademark Office to look into the 
issue would be welcome. 
49. U.S. implementation of panel a nd Appellate Body rulings was of systemic importance to the 
WTO.  Concerns about the failure by the United States to implement several rulings had been voiced WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 12 
 
 
in previous U.S. reviews.  During the peri od under review, a complianc e panel had found that 
legislation repealing the U.S. tax code's extrate rritorial income provisions had failed to implement 
fully previous WTO rulings.  At the same time, as noted in the Report by the United States, the 
United States had announced in 2005 that it was undertaking a number of measures to comply with the WTO ruling on upland cotton, including the adop tion of a "risk-based" fee structure for certain 
export credit guarantee programmes.  More recently, th e President had signed legislation to eliminate 
the so-called Step 2 export subsidies for upland cotton and the Byrd amendment. 
(3) S
ECTORAL POLICIES  
50. The Secretariat report highlighted that overall government support to agriculture was well 
below the OECD average.  However, there had been  an increase in the share in total government 
payments of counter-cyclical and loan programme pa yments since the enactment  of the Farm Bill.  
Additionally, government payments for 2005 were predicted to have reached the high levels 
registered in 1999-01, driven largely by increases  in counter-cyclical and emergency payments.  
Members might be interested to learn more about the reasons for the recent increase in government 
payments to farmers, and whether this signalled a shift away from the declining trend since 2000.  
Also, the availability of government-subsidized crop insurance programmes had not prevented the 
disbursement of large sums under ad hoc disaster legi slation;  in this respect, she asked for the U.S. 
authorities' view of the interaction betwee n emergency assistance and crop insurance. 
51. The U.S. telecommunications market was largely op en to foreign participation.  It was clear 
that this openness had brought tangible benefits fo r U.S. consumers, who benefited from prices below 
the OECD average in a variety of services. 
52. Although steps towards harmonization had been ta ken in the insurance industry, the market 
remained fragmented and each State had its own regulators responsible for supervision.  She 
welcomed any comments from the United States on this issue. 
53. The situation on maritime transport had not changed since the last review of the 
United States.  Restrictions under the Jones Act a nd other legislation were still in place, and there 
were limited waivers to the Act.  She encouraged  the United States to reconsider these restrictions, 
and invited it to include maritime services in the proposed offer on services. 
54. Ownership limitations in air transport persisted.   Given the frail situation of several U.S. 
airlines that were or had been under Chapter 11 protection during the period under review, it was 
probably time to reassess the convenience of these tight limitations, especially since there was a high level of interest by foreign investors. 
55. She stressed the importance of active U.S. lead ership in the multilateral trading system and 
commended the U.S. Government for its further liber alization efforts since the last U.S. review. WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 13 
 
 
IV. STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS 
56. Members welcomed the delegation of the United States led by Ambassador Allgeier, and 
commended the United States for its support of the multilateral trading system.  Several Members 
acknowledged the leadership role played by the United States in the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) negotiations. 
57. The representative of Cuba  noted that the trade, economic, and financial embargo imposed by 
the United States against Cuba was part of a br oader policy against the Cuban regime.  Cuba 
considered that the embargo a nd other unilateral measures were a multilateral issue because, among 
other things, they violated international law, including the MFN and national treatment principles, 
which were part of the juridical obligations of WT O Members.  Cuba considered that the measures 
applied by the United States were more a blockade th an an embargo, since they had extraterritorial 
effects.  In 2004, the greater impact of the bloc kade on Cuba had been through the application of 
extraterritorial regulations, with an effect est imated at US$380 million.  Among other restrictions, 
Cuba could not use the U.S. dollar in its forei gn transactions, had no access to credit, and could not 
engage in operations with multilate ral or regional financial institu tions.  Ships and airplanes from 
third countries could not touchdown U.S. territory if they had previously been in Cuba.  U.S. company 
subsidiaries in third countries could not buy goods th at contained any Cuban input or product.  Third-
country companies could not export to the Unite d States products with Cuban inputs, nor sell goods 
and services to Cuba in which U.S. technology was embedded, or that contained U.S. inputs 
accounting for more than 10% of their value.  Entrepreneurs from third countries were prohibited 
from having business or investment relations with C uba on the grounds that this was related with 
property in which the United States had ownership claims. 
58. The 1992 Torricelli Act had prohibited Cuban impor ts through U.S. company subsidiaries in 
third countries;  these had totalled US$718 million in 1991, of which 91% was foodstuff and medicines.  In 1996, the Helms-Burton Act, am ong other things, had enhanced measures with an 
extraterritorial effect;  imposing sanctions against actual and potential foreign investors in  Cuba.  As 
a result, entrepreneurs of the Canadian firm She rrit had been barred access to the United States, and 
the hotel chain Jamaica Super Clubs had cancelled its  operations in Cuba.  In May 2004, the Federal 
Reserve had imposed a US$100 million fine on the Sw iss bank UBS AG, for allegedly violating U.S. 
sanctions against Cuba, Libya, Iran, and Yugoslavi a.  Eleven of the 77 companies, banks, and ONGs 
fined in 2004 for actions considered in violation of the blockade were third-country companies or 
subsidiaries of U.S. companies in third countri es, such as Mexico, Canada, Panama, Italy, 
United Kingdom, Uruguay, the Bahama s, and Anguilla.  Another seven companies, including Iberia, 
Alitalia, Air Jamaica, and Daewoo, had been fine d allegedly because their U.S. subsidiaries had 
violated certain provisions regarding the blockade. 
59. Cuba had reiterated its request to the United Stat es to bring its trade into conformity with its 
international obligations, and repeal  all laws and arbitrary and discriminatory provisions such as the 
Torricelli and Helms-Burton Act, and Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropr iations Act of 1998. 
60. The representative of Korea
 noted that the robust U.S. economy remained a key engine of 
world economic growth, and that the openness of the U.S. market for goods, services, and capital 
continued to provide a model for all WTO Member s.  However, Korea was concerned about the 
sustainability of the growing U.S. fiscal and curre nt account imbalances and the risks of increased 
volatility in the global capital market and of rising  protectionism.  Korea regarded those issues as 
global and systemic and therefore looked forward to a systemic policy coordination among leading 
economies for a soft landing and adjustment.  WT/TPR/M/160 
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61. The United States was a major economic and trad ing partner for Korea.  The launch of FTA 
negotiations between Korea and the United States  was an important policy decision by the two 
governments, and Korea hoped that the negotiations would be concluded soon and contribute to the 
achievement of the ideals and goals of the WTO. 
62. Korea noted with significant concern some indica tions of rising protectionist sentiment in the 
United States, in particular in Congress.  While this was closely related to the imbalances in the fiscal, 
financial, and trade accounts, as well as to savings  and spending in the United States and elsewhere, 
protectionism would not provide a solution to the pr oblems and challenges.  Korea requested the U.S. 
Government to continue to resist  any call for trade protectionism. 
63. Korea welcomed the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, which repealed the Byrd Amendment.  
This would be a significant step toward resolvin g the prolonged dispute.  Nonetheless, Korea was 
concerned that through a transitional clause, the By rd Amendment disbursements would remain for a 
certain period.  As long as the disbursements conti nued, the United States could not be considered to 
have fully implemented the rulings and recommenda tions of the Dispute Settlement Body.  Korea 
called upon the U.S. Government to step up its efforts to comply promptly with the DSB rulings. 
64. Korea welcomed the decline in the number of U.S. anti-dumping investigations and measures 
for three consecutive years since 2001.  The United Stat es itself was the fourth most frequent target of 
global anti-dumping actions, according to statistics publis hed by the Secretariat.  This clearly showed 
why WTO Members work together to establish a mo re predictable and transparent trade remedy 
system that would benefit the entire membership.  Korea hoped that the United States would play a 
more proactive role in the DDA Rules negotiations toward the clarification and improvement of WTO 
rules to further enhance fairness of trade.  
65. Korea echoed the point made by the discussant on the need to balance security concerns and 
free trade;  it also considered that further, subs tantial liberalization in maritime transport services 
would benefit all economies, consider ing its key role in the conduct of  world trade.  Korea hoped that, 
given its leading role in pursuit of trade libera lization both in goods and services in the ongoing DDA 
negotiations, the United States would offer subs tantial market access commitments on maritime 
transport services commensurate with its general op enness in the international maritime transport 
market. 
66. The representative of Colombia  noted that the United States  had registered solid economic 
growth during the period under review. Colombia tr usted that the United States would not introduce 
trade restrictive measures to reduce its fiscal and cu rrent account deficits.  Colombia valued the U.S. 
policy of promoting market opening and the rule of law despite its trade deficit.  Colombia was also 
pleased to note that the U.S. Government gave prio rity to multilateral trade negotiations, including the 
conclusion of the DDA in 2006.  Colombia shared  the United States' view of advancing special 
negotiations with its closer trading partners, including the Free Trade Area of the Americas.  
Colombia trusted that the United States would con tinue to liberalize its trade and would make this 
compatible with other policies, such as those in the areas of security, agriculture, employment, health, 
and consumer and environmental protection. 
67. At the multilateral level, Colombia agreed with  the United States that market access for goods 
and services was the central element of the current round of negotiations.  Agricultural goods were an 
essential part of the package, and U.S. concessions  on market access as well as a significant reduction 
in domestic support were essential.  Colombia hop ed that the negotiations would follow the route 
designed in Doha, so as to reduce the disparities between the disciplines ruling market access for 
agricultural and industrial products.  Colombia also called for the application of SPS and TBT WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 15 
 
 
measures that were in conformity with the objectiv es of the multilateral trading system, and not as a 
means for domestic market protection. 
68. Colombia hoped that the appropriate U.S. aut horities dealing with the movement of natural 
persons would be involved in the negotiations on services, since obstacles in this area could harm 
trade in services.  Colombia also hoped that invest ment measures would be applied in such a manner 
as to permit free investment flows. 
69. Colombia underlined the constructive position of the United e with respect to the WTO 
Agreements, and hoped that this w ould be reflected in new market access proposals.  Colombia and 
the United States were important trading partners:  40% of Colombian exports had been directed in 
2005 to the U.S. market, with a growth rate of  19.3% between 2004 and 2005.  FTA negotiations 
between Colombia and the United States had just b een concluded.  The FTA would include unilateral 
preferences that had been granted to Colombia by the United States in the past and had allowed 
Colombia to increase its exports of goods and ser vices.  Enjoying preferential access to the U.S. 
market indefinitely under the FTA would allow Colomb ia to the achieve of one of its main objectives: 
creating employment as a complement to a policy of eradication and substitution of illicit crops. 
70. The representative of Chile  stated that the United States accounted for 16.2% of Chilean 
exports and 15.8% of its imports .  An FTA, had entered into fo rce on 1 January 2004, and had 
resulted in a 29% increase in bilateral trade.  The number and variety of products traded had also 
increased, benefiting from the elimination of tariffs .  Between 2004 and 2005, the value of exports of 
over 300 Chilean products had increased by more than 200%. 
71. In the Doha Round, Chile and the United St ates shared similar positions on a number of 
negotiating issues, including NAMA, services, fish s ubsidies, and trade facilitation.  However, in 
some areas their positions differed.  This was particularly the case with respect to the negotiations on anti-dumping, where Chile hoped that the United States would show sufficient flexibility.  Due to its 
weight in world trade as the largest importer and one of the main producers of goods and suppliers of 
services, the United States was a key participant in the negotiations.  For this reason, active U.S. 
leadership was necessary in orde r to achieve a balanced and ambitious result in the Round. 
72. The need to maintain the solid  and transparent system of rules provided by the WTO was as 
important as the negotiations.  To this end, it was im portant for Members to abide by the DSB rulings.  
In this respect, Chile, as a plaintiff in the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 
(CDSOA) dispute, expressed its satisfaction for th e derogation of this law in February 2006. 
73. The representative of Argentina
 noted that the importance of the U.S. economy at an 
international level and its role of engine of world growth was evidenced by its solid economic growth, 
which had not been lower than 3.3% since its last review in 2004.  This performance had been made 
possible by the increased openness of the U.S. trade regime.  This policy combination continued to 
place the United States as a key supplier of goods and services to the world economy. 
74. Despite this overall positive assessment, in contr ast with Argentina's healthy fiscal and trade 
surpluses, the U.S. current account deficit had cont inued to widen, which was worrisome.  This had 
already been a matter of concern in 2004, and Arge ntina appreciated the presentation of the corrective 
measures the U.S. Administration intended to pursue. 
75. Argentina and the United States had longstandi ng trade relations.  Between 2004 and 2005 
U.S. imports from Argentina had grown by 23.2% and Argentinian imports from the United States by 
20%.  The United States was Argentina's third expor t market and import source.  In 2005, bilateral 
trade had reached US$8.3 billion. WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 16 
 
 
76. Argentina and the United States shared a secur ity concern;  both countries had suffered 
terrorists attacks in their cities.  Argentina coopera ted in the fight against terrorism, but considered 
that security measures should not, as far as possible,  impede trade.  Argentina was concerned that 
access to the U.S. market had become more diffi cult since 11 September 2001 as a result of customs 
measures such as the C-TPAT.  Argentina had no info rmation with respect to the regulations for the 
implementation of this programme, nor with respect  to exporter access to C-TPAT, since, until now, 
access had taken place through U.S. im porters of Argentinian products. 
77. The United States had notified 375 support programmes and Argentina sought more 
information on the scope of these programmes and th e products benefiting from them.  Argentina also 
sought information on the Trade Adjustment Assistance programme. 
78. According to the Secretariat report some 2% of U.S. imports were subject to tariff quotas;  
this affected Argentinian exports of bovine meat and certain dairy products.  Argentina was concerned 
by the unjustified delays in the approval procedur es for certain agricultural products, as well as in the 
recognition of certain areas as pest-free by the U.S. authorities.  
79. Argentina stressed the importance of abiding by the decisions of the DSB, and requested that 
the U.S. Government implement the DSB recommendations. 
80. The representative noted that the United States w as fully engaged with the multilateral trading 
system and the current negotiations.  In the DDA,  Argentina and the United States held shared 
positions in seeking the opening of agricultural markets and urgent elimination of fishing subsidies, as 
well as in the respect of intellectual property rights. 
81. The United States had continued to engage in FTA s.  While this was a legitimate approach, 
Argentina hoped that the United States would concen trate its main efforts and exert its leadership 
towards the conclusion of the Doha Round. 
82. The representative of New Zealand  applauded the decision taken by the U.S. House of 
Representatives in June 2005 to strongly support con tinued U.S. participation in the WTO, and the 
priority placed on the successful completion of the Doha Development Agenda  before the end of 
2006. 
83. In relation to market access in goods, New Zeala nd agreed with the Secretariat report that an 
assessment of the economic impact of the new regulations to incorporate security considerations into U.S. import procedures would be valuable, to ascerta in their actual costs and benefits.  New Zealand 
drew attention to the high tariff protection th at remained in agricultural food products.  The 
Secretariat report also noted that, while domestic support was lower than the 1986-88 average, it was 
above the levels of the mid 1990s, and production and trade-distorting forms of support were still 
significant.  New Zealand highlighted its concern about the operation of counter-cyclical payments 
such as the Milk Income Loss Contract programmes and the potential for these programmes to impact 
on the international dairy market. 
84. The representative of China
 noted that China and the United States enjoyed an important and 
far-reaching trade partnership.  Bilateral trade vol ume had risen from less than US$2.5 billion in 1979 
to US$211.63 billion in 2005, according to China’s statistics, which represented a more than 80-fold 
increase.  In the last four years, China-U.S. trade had been growing f aster than bilateral trade between 
the United States and its all other major trading partne rs.  Compared with 26 years ago, the nature of 
bilateral economic and trade cooperation between China and the United States had changed 
fundamentally, from trade alone to cover almost a ll areas in the economy.  The United States was one 
of the main sources of FDI to China and a major provider of goods and services.  There was strong WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 17 
 
 
complementarity and potential for further cooperatio n between China and the United States in natural 
resources, human resources, capital, and technology.  The stable, healthy and diversified development 
of economic and trade relations between China and the United States was in line with the long-term 
interests of the two countries. 
85. While China had full confidence in further deve loping bilateral economic and trade relations, 
it had some concerns about U.S. trade policies.   China had submitted written questions to the 
United States on various issues, including the “twin de ficits” of trade and finance, the fulfilment of 
transparency obligations, the fair implementation of anti-dumping measures, and foreign investment 
restrictions in the services sector. 
86. As the most frequent user of the dispute se ttlement mechanism, the United States showed a 
strong desire for compliance by other Members when  DSB rulings were in its favour, but failed to 
meet the DSB “prompt compliance” requirement when ru lings were against its interests.  For instance, 
three years had passed since, in January 2003, the Appellate Body's final ruling on the Byrd 
Amendment, and the United States had just started to take steps to comply.  Moreover, the United 
States would not actually fulfil its obligations until  2007.  Additionally, Members were still waiting 
for the United States to honour its obligations to comply with many other DSB rulings and recommendations, including the one regarding Sectio n 211 of the U.S. Omnibus Appropriations Act 
of 1998. 
87. In recent years, the United States had taken many trade measures based on national security, 
some of which had significantly affected internati onal trade and foreign direct investment flows.  
Recently the United States had exerted pressure and imposed restrictions on inward FDI on account of 
national security, preventing foreign companies fro m seeking mergers and acquisitions within the 
United States.  China was highly concerned that the U.S. interpretation and application of WTO 
national security clauses had seriously undermined the credibility of the multilateral trade regime. 
88. U.S. export control policies and measures, such as restrictions on the export of high-tech 
products to China, had deprived many U.S. high-t ech enterprises of the opportunity to do business 
with China.  Among China's suppliers of high-tech  products, the United States' ranking dropped from 
second in 2001 to sixth in 2005, with its share of  China’s total high-tech imports decreasing from 
16.5% to 8.1%.  This had not only harmed the inter est of U.S. exporters, but had also worsened the 
trade deficit between the United States and China.  China was also concerned about the enforcement 
of the Bioterrorist Act, as well as customs measu res applied by the United States.  China urged the 
United States to assess the effect of these measures on normal trade and to improve its practices. 
89. The United States was a major user of anti-dumping measures and a number of its practices 
regarding anti-dumping investigations and measure s were not consistent with WTO anti-dumping 
rules.  For instance, the DSB had made a clea r ruling on the U.S. practice of “zeroing” in anti-
dumping investigations, which had greatly harmed th e interest of other Members.  China urged the 
United States to observe this ruling and make immediate policy changes.  Additionally, the 
United States had extended the time span of many  anti-dumping measures with its “sunset reviews”, 
which went against the purpose of sunset review provisions in the Agreement. 
90. The rules of origin in certain U.S. unilate ral preferential arrangeme nts required developing 
Members to import raw materials from the United St ates to produce goods for export.  This U.S.-
content requirement was inconsistent with the U.S.  position of eliminating local content in the TRIMs 
negotiations and was also causing trade diversion.  For instance, beneficiaries could not import yarn 
from countries other than the United States to ma nufacture textile products in order to enjoy 
preferential treatment. WT/TPR/M/160 
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91. After the Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting, Members still faced enormous challenges to 
conclude the Doha negotiations within the expected  timeframe.  China hoped that the United States 
would assume greater responsibility and would continue to play the leading role in the Round.  The 
representative invited the United States to take fu rther steps with respect to domestic support in 
agriculture, thereby contributing to the progress of the Doha negotiations. 
92. The representative of Australia  stated that his country and the United States had a strong 
record of promoting free trade.  They shared a dynamic trade relationship and the common goal of 
supporting global trade liberalization as a key driver  for world economic growth and development.  
The United States was one of Australia's largest trading partners:  it wa s among its top merchandise 
trading partners, its largest services trading partner and the major source of Australia's FDI.  Australia 
was the ninth largest investor in the United States in 2004. 
93. This close relationship was reinforced by th e Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 
(AUSFTA), which had entered into force on 1 Jan uary 2005.  The AUSFTA was a comprehensive 
agreement in line with the requirement of the WTO rules on FTAs.  Moreover, the FTA achieved 
"WTO plus" standards by including provisions on investment, competition policy, consumer 
protection, government procurement, intellectual property, and e-commerce;  it set a high standard for 
WTO Members to follow. 
94. While many of Australia's concerns regarding U.S. trade barriers had been addressed through 
their FTA, Australia encouraged the United States to  be ambitious in reforming domestic support of 
agriculture.  Deliberations in 2006 on the direction of the 2007 U.S. Farm bill presented a significant opportunity for the U.S. Administration, and fo r the wider WTO Membership, to secure a more 
reform-oriented U.S. agricultural policy.  Australia looked to the United States to show leadership in 
this regard. 
95. The United States had made positive contribution to the Doha Round nego tiations with its 
offer on agriculture.  Australia was pleased that th e United States had shown flexibility and initiative, 
but political commitment by the United States and othe r WTO Members would be needed to ensure a 
successful outcome to the Round in 2006, before the expiry of the TPA in mid 2007. 
96. Australia also welcomed the United States' step s to implement DSB rulings.  Australia placed 
particular importance on the leadership of major play ers, such as the United States, in contributing to 
the integrity and predictability of the multilateral tr ading system, and encouraged the United States to 
continue to work towards full and pr ompt compliance in all relevant cases. 
97. Australia was encouraged by the strength of th e U.S. wider bilateral and regional free-trade 
agenda, and hoped this would provi de added impetus to U.S. efforts to reduce trade barriers 
multilaterally.  Sustained commitment to trade lib eralization by the United States was crucial to 
ensuring that the benefits of free trade were felt by  all. Australia looked forward to working with the 
United States and other Members in pursuit of this objective. 
98. The representative of the European Communities
 highlighted the strong EU-U.S. relations, 
noting that it was by far the largest economic relati onship between any two continents in history.  
Together they accounted for almost 40% of world trade.  In 2003 total EU-U.S. two-way investment 
had amounted to around €1.5 trillion, and in 2005 e xports of EU goods to the United States had 
amounted to €250 billion, while imports from the Un ited States had amounted to around €163 billion.  
While disputes or differences between the EC and the United States tended to attract the headlines, the 
vast bulk of trade and investment between them flowed fully unimpeded.  The EU-U.S. partnership 
had been strengthened over a long period, recently  the Transatlantic Economic Initiative had been WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 19 
 
 
launched within which they coopera ted on regulatory issues, barriers to investment and procurement, 
and issues related to intellectual property. 
99. The EC welcomed the United States' stated  commitment to the WTO and the ongoing DDA 
negotiations, which fully corresponded to the EU's own orientation.  This clear message from the U.S. 
authorities was very important, especially because the United States had continued to conclude and 
pursue new regional trade agreements and, in several  other spheres of international policy, had shown 
a less unambiguous interest in multilateral appro aches.  The EC understood the important driving 
forces behind the trend to go the bilateral route in parallel with the multilateral one.  More broadly and 
beyond the issue of RTAs, the EC fully appreciated  the difficulties and challenges the United States 
was facing when trying to make long-term trade policy choices, given strong sectoral interests and 
short-term domestic concerns.  But priorities were clear:  the WTO and DDA came first. 
100. The representative of the EC welcomed the inclusion of a substantial discussion on 
sustainable development in the documentation provide d, including environmental and social issues.  
The EC believed that there was much potential for a mutually reinforcing relationship between further 
trade liberalization and the promotion of decent work and a sustainable environment, both at home 
and abroad.  
101. The representative noted that problematic issues  in the United States related to regulatory 
domain, rather than market access.  Current sub -federal legislation on public procurement restricted 
the ability of EU and other companies to do business with specific countries if they wished to bid for 
contracts in various U.S. States and cities.  By  contrast, U.S. companies had good access to 
procurement opportunities in the EU Member States.  There was a need to redress the balance, away 
from this kind of extraterritorial policy, which wa s out of keeping with the business environment.  
There was also a general problem of transparency at the sub-federal level. 
102. The EC welcomed the recent U.S. actions towards compliance with WTO rulings and 
recommendations in the FSC, 1916 Anti-Dumping and Byrd Amendment disputes.  However, the EC 
regretted that the repeal of the WTO-illegal measu res had been subject to transitional periods and 
grandfathering provisions, thus keeping them in ope ration for a number of years.  The EC hoped that 
these first steps would soon be followed by further actions towards full compliance with WTO rules.  
In general, U.S. compliance with WTO panels t ook more time, and was less automatic, than was 
envisaged by the dispute settlement system, a nd this was a source of systemic concern. 
103. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures were hindering trade in food products, but the EC 
welcomed the recently expressed will to shorten th e list of unresolved issues.  On the question of 
access to medicines, the EC inv ited the United States to adopt soon the necessary legislative 
provisions to implement this decision.  The Unite d States and the EC had made important progress 
with respect to geographical indications through th eir Wine Agreement, which had now entered into 
force.  However, on this basis, it was necessary to  follow up at WTO level, since the issue was much 
broader than only wines and spirits.  On security concerns, the EU was fully committed to continue 
working with the United States in the fight agains t terrorism, but the EC recognized that a careful 
balance needed to be struck between security  concerns and unnecessary and costly burdens to 
legitimate and honest trade. 
104. The EC was aware of the joint EU-U.S. responsib ility in the WTO, and of the need to work 
jointly on outstanding trade irritants and on bringing  the DDA to a successful conclusion.  The EU 
had an ambitious agenda, based on the Single Undert aking, and expected subs tantial results not only 
on the three pillars of market access (agricultural, in dustrial, and services) but also on rules, including 
trade facilitation, anti-dumping, subsidies, RTAs a nd GIs;  all this coupled with a substantial 
development package.  The EC hoped that the United States shared this ambition.  It would require WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 20 
 
 
political will and courage, but would be to the benefit of all.  The EC urged to United States to reform 
domestic support in agriculture, to grant furthe r market access concessions for LDCs than those 
agreed in the Hong Kong Ministerial, to go furt her on the cotton issue, and to address the issue of 
special and differential treatment and preference erosion in the DDA.  These objectives were crucial to a pro-development outcome of the DDA. 
105. The representative of Chinese Taipei
 congratulated the United States on it steady economic 
growth since its last Trade policy review in 2004.  As the world's single largest importer and a key engine of global economic growth, the continue d expansion of the U.S. economy would greatly 
benefit its trading partners.  The expanded openness of U.S. markets to international competition had 
served U.S. long-run economic interests very well , and Chinese Taipei hoped that any calls for 
protectionism would not influence U.S. trade policy. 
106. Chinese Taipei was the United States' eighth largest  trading partner, and the United States was 
Chinese Taipei's third largest trading partner.  In 2005, the value of bilateral trade had reached 
US$49 billion, or 14.5% of Chinese Taipei's fore ign trade.  However, there were still many 
opportunities for the expansion of two-way trade and investment. 
107. Chinese Taipei congratulated the United States  on its leadership role in the multilateral 
trading system and for its adherence to the aims of  the DDA.  Chinese Taipei shared the view that a 
successful completion of the Round would secure a healthy economic future for Members.  It was 
committed to working closely with the United States and other Members towards achieving an 
ambitious outcome by end 2006. 
108. Chinese Taipei shared the U.S.  view that regional and bilateral agreements acted as an 
incubator or catalyst for multilateral liberalization.  However,  for these to contribute to multilateral 
liberalization, it would be better to conclude them with Members like Chinese Taipei that could bring 
significant economic benefits.  Chinese Taipei a ppreciated the continued U.S. support for the DSB 
and welcomed the recent legislation on the Continue d Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act and the Step 
2 Cotton Program, in response to DSB recommendations.  Chinese Taipei trusted that the 
Administration would continue to work clo sely with Congress to resolve the remaining 
implementation issues in the DSB. 
109. While Chinese Taipei generally admired the U. S. trade regime and its commitment to the 
WTO, a few aspects of U.S. trade policy remained a source of some concern.  Chinese Taipei was 
encouraged by the decreasing trend in anti-dumpi ng investigations initiated by the United States in 
recent years, but was uncertain whether this woul d be carried over into a similar decrease in the 
number of measures in place.  Chinese Taipei also noted the increasingly important role of technical 
regulations, standards, and SPS measures, and while it fully endorsed the use and administration of 
these measures in a reasonable and objective manner with regard to foreig n exporters, it emphasized 
the need of enhancing cooperation between govern ments for addressing safety, quality, and health 
matters. 
110. The representative of Japan
 noted that as suggested by both  reports, the United States had 
achieved solid economic growth and ha d been a driving force of the expansion of world trade.  Japan 
highly valued that the United States had assumed the responsibility of sustaining world economic growth when many other Members had not been ab le to do so.  Japan hoped that the United States 
would succeed in reducing “the twin deficits”,  in  order to maintain such growth.  He had noted 
carefully the U.S. statement about savings-investment gaps around the world. 
111. Japan appreciated U.S. leadership in maintaining and strengthening a free-trade regime in a 
multilateral context.  Japan expected the United Stat es, together with the other major players, to WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 21 
 
 
maintain its leadership in the remainder of the Round.   In this regard, Japan w as interested in the U.S. 
approach regarding its agricultural domestic s upport reform and the possible introduction of new 
disciplines.  Japan also hoped that the United States would take stronger initiatives in the Rules 
Negotiations in order to bring the DDA to a successful conclusion. 
112. One of the main objectives of the DDA was to el iminate trade distortions and thereby increase 
trade opportunities especially for developing countries.   Japan would like to work with the United 
States in this field, including on "Aid for Trade". 
113. The United States was seeking many regional an d bilateral initiatives described by some, as 
an “FTA rush”.  Japan could support the current trend as long as FTAs were implemented in a manner 
that enhanced trade liberalization, not deviati ng from the main objectives of the WTO.  In this 
context, Japan sought the U.S. view on the future prospect of its FTA undertakings as TPA was nearing expiry.  Japan was also in terested in the U.S. view on the possible proliferation of FTAs by 
other WTO Members after the expiry of the TPA. 
114. Noting that the improvement of the dispute se ttlement mechanism in the WTO was one of the 
greatest achievements of the Uruguay Round, and that both the United Sates and Japan had benefited 
from it, the representative reiterated Japan's appreciati on that the United States had made it clear that 
one of the fundamental features of its trade polic y was compliance with its WTO obligations.  Japan 
therefore expected that U.S. laws or measures inju rious to trade liberalization, such as certain anti-
dumping measures and the Jones Act, would be dea lt with promptly.  Japan further hoped that any 
measure the United States would introduce or main tain in order to enhance security, such as the 
“Bioterrorism Act” and new immigration contro l procedures, would be operated in a manner 
consistent with the WTO Agreement.  While Japan  shared U.S. concerns regarding security-related 
issues and renewed its commitment to cooperate in  this respect, security concerns should not 
disproportionately affect trade. 
115. The representative of Guatemala
 stated that the United States was an important trading 
partner for his country.  As mentioned in the Secret ariat, since its last Trade Policy Review in early 
2004, the United States had achieved solid economic growth aided by the openness and transparency 
of its trade regime achieved through trade liberali zation at the multilateral, regional, and bilateral 
levels.  In previous yeas, Guatemala had enjoyed unilateral preferential access to the U.S. market, 
which had helped Guatemala's economic and social  development.  More recently, FTA negotiations 
had been concluded between the countries of Ce ntral America, the Domi nican Republic, and the 
United Sates.  This agreement was essential in or der to accede to the U.S. market in a more 
predictable and certain manner. 
116. Guatemala shared the U.S. view that FTA s were a tool that supported multilateral 
liberalization, promoted investment, job creation,  and cooperation mechanisms, and improved trade 
relations.  In the last few years the United States ha d posted a surplus in its service balance;  this had 
opened possibilities for small economies to enter the U.S. market, especially trading those services in 
which they were most competitive. 
117. The United States played an important role in the current agricultural negotiations:  
Guatemala trusted that the United States would give priority to market access and the elimination of 
subsidies and distortionary support measures.  Th e United States had a great responsibility in the 
achievement of successful round of negotiations , especially in obtaining important results on 
development issues. 
118. The representative of Israel  stated his country's appreciation for the active role the 
United States had been playing in the multilateral tr ading system.  The United States was Israel's most WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 22 
 
 
significant trading partner.  With respect to intell ectual property rights, Israel was interested in the 
U.S. criteria used for placing countries on Sec tion 301 of the 1974 Trade Act lists.  He wondered 
whether WTO Members who abided by the provis ions of the TRIPS Agreement appeared on the 
"301 lists".  He enquired about the type of protec tion granted under U.S. copyright law to producers 
of sound recordings in respect of the public pe rformance and broadcasts of their sound recordings. 
119. He noted that, as tariff duties had been re duced significantly over the years, standards 
requirements had become a significant barrier to the free flow of goods around the world.  He asked for the United States' view on concluding mutual re cognition agreements (MRA's) in order to alleviate 
the problems created by Members' different sta ndards requirements;  he wondered whether the 
United States was willing to conclude MRA's in la boratory testing as an interim solution in sectors 
such as IT equipment and drugs. 
120. The representative of Switzerland
 stated that the United States was a very important economic 
partner for his country, with an increasing share in Swiss merchandise trade.  In 2005, the 
United States had been Switzerland's second largest export market, with 10.9% of overall exports and 
its most important non-European supplier with 5.1% of overall imports.  Switzerland was the 
United States' eighth most important buyer and supplier of services, with US$17.6 billion.  The 
backbone of both countries' economi c relationship was investment.  With FDI stocks amounting to 
more than SFr. 80 billion in each direction, the United States was Switzerland's first FDI partner, 
holding 40.3% of all FDI in Switzerland. 
121. The present economic environment offered a mixe d picture.  On the one hand, the economic 
recovery in the United States was now more broad-based  than at its last review in 2004, as growth in 
other regions of the world was also picking up.  On the other hand, macroe conomic imbalances were 
more pronounced.  The twin deficits continued to  be a major concern.  The U.S. current account 
deficit was at a record high while there were no signs of a major fiscal consolidation beyond some 
cyclical effects.  In light of continued relatively high oil process, a very low domestic savings rate and 
gradually increased interest rates, there was uncerta inty about the future development of some key 
economic parameters.  Careful macr oeconomic management would be essential in order to reduce the 
present disequilibria.  The large amount of forei gn savings absorbed annually by the U.S. economy 
was of serious concern.  The current period of  worldwide economic growth offered favourable 
conditions to address these imbalances  and this opportunity should be  seized.  This was particularly 
important as a major adjustment shock in the Un ited States could have serious repercussion on its 
trading partners and on the stability of the world economy. 
122. The United States had continued to pursue a stra tegy of competitive liberalization, seeking to 
liberalize trade multilaterally, regionally, and bilate rally, with a number of partners around the globe.  
Like the United States, Switzerland viewed preferential trade agreements as useful complements to multilateral liberalization.  In Switzerland's view, pr eferential trade agreements should be limited to 
trade and economic issues, offering WTO-plus type arrangements and they should not be a substitute 
for the multilateral trading system.  The United States had made progress on IPR protection through 
specific agreements and MOUs.  Switzerland shared  the view that IPR protection was of utmost 
importance for fostering innovation and inducing comp anies to put new products on the market, in 
particular in industries such as pharmaceuticals. 
123. Despite the general openness of the U.S. mark et, the United States still maintained a wide 
range of barriers to trade and investment. Markin g requirements and customs procedures for watches, 
some SPS measures, textiles labelling and technical barriers to trade constituted significant 
impediments for Swiss businesses.  On investment, although Switzerland was satisfied that no acquisition had been blocked under the Exon-Florio amendment, it was somewhat concerned that the lack of definition of "national security" and the wide  discretion in the interp retation of this concept WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 23 
 
 
could undermined and otherwise sound and liberal  U.S. FDI policy.  Beyond removing remaining 
barriers to trade, the United States could also enha nce access to public procurement by increasing the 
coverage of the GPA to additional entities at the stat e and city levels.  With regard to services, there 
remained much scope for further liberalization and commitments, particularly in transportation and 
asset management. 
124. The representative of India  noted that U.S. policies and practices, carried considerable 
influence globally.  For a large number of WTO Me mbers, including India, the United States was the 
largest export market and for many countries, it was the largest source of imports.  In these 
circumstances, it was heartening that the United St ates had continued to show solid economic growth 
even though the trade deficit was often a matter of  domestic concern.  India would like to see the 
United States maintaining and strengthening its tr aditionally open and transparent trade regime. 
125. The United States accounted for about 17% of India’s exports and a bout 7% of imports.  
India’s exports of services were an increasingly important component of trade;  approximately a quarter of India's exports of services of US$50 billion had been destined to the U.S. market in 2005.  
The United States ranked first and accounted for ab out 25% of the total FDI approvals accorded by 
India since it had begun its liberalization programme in 1991. 
126. The long India-U.S. history of economic and trade cooperation had been institutionalized 
through the India-U.S. Commercial Dialogue and the U.S.-India CEO Forum.  The establishment of the U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum, announced in July 2005, was a watershed event.  This was part of 
the overall economic dialogue, and there had been  wide ranging discussions on tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, agriculture, investment, services, intellect ual property, and the overall progress of the Doha 
Round.  During the visit of the U.S. President to India in March 2006, the two leaders had reaffirmed 
their shared commitment to completing the WTO Doha  Development Agenda before the end of 2006 
and had agreed to work together  to help achieve this outcome. 
127. Textiles and clothing constituted a major export sector for India in the U.S. market.  This 
sector was of crucial importance in the economy of developing countries, including India.  Although 
the United States had removed all quota restrictions, there were still relatively high tariffs on textiles 
and clothing as well as on leather, which was another pr oduct of export interest for India.  India urged 
the United States to take early action for the remova l of tariff peaks and high tariffs on products of 
export interest to developing countries. 
128. India was concerned at some recent protectioni st trends in the United States particularly 
regarding cross-border supply of services and move ment of natural persons.  While the Indian 
software industry had been a major beneficiary of access to the U.S. market, there were some 
outstanding issues relating to delays and other restri ctions in the grant and applicability of H1B visas.  
Social security taxes were levied on software prof essionals even though they were unable to derive 
social security benefits because of the limited dur ation of their stay.  India had suggested either 
exemption from social security or refund of cont ributions upon return of professionals, and hoped for 
a favourable response on this issue.  India also ur ged the United States to examine the time taken for 
granting approval to various banks th at had applied to begin operations in the United States:  some 
Indian banks had been waiting as long as 18 months for approval. 
129. The IPR regime in the United States was of major interest to India.  In two cases relating to 
copyrights and trade marks, on which the DSB had gi ven its verdict, compliance by the United States 
was awaited.  He asked about the proposed action by  the United States in this regard.  Improvement of 
the patent system to avoid the grant of broad and bad patents was under debate in the United States;  
India was interested in any further information on this issue.  India urged the United States show 
greater understanding for the concerns of India and other developing countries regarding the need for WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 24 
 
 
patent applicants in the United States to disclose the source of the genetic material and associated 
traditional knowledge used in an invention. 
130. The representative of Mexico  noted that the United States was Mexico's main trading partner, 
and Mexico was the United States third largest tradi ng partner.  Bilateral trade had risen from some 
US$88 billion in 1993, before NAFTA, to US$280 billion in 2005.  The United States was the 
destination of 87% of Mexican expor ts and the source of 55% of it s imports.  Additionally, Mexico 
was one of the main recipients of U.S. FDI, w ith US$66.1 billion, while Mexican FDI in the United 
States was some US$8 billion. 
131. Both Mexico and the United States were inter ested in a successful conclusion of the DDA;  
their FTA did not affect in the least their engagement in the WTO.  Mexico believed that the 
negotiations could be concluded by end 2006, a nd did not think it useful to suggest seeking an 
extension of the TPA.  Mexico appealed to U.S.  leadership so that the Round may be concluded 
successfully by that deadline. 
132. The trade relationship between Mexico and the United States was mainly covered by the 
NAFTA.  Thus, Mexico would not be the main bene ficiary of the Round;  in fact, it would be the 
main country affected by an erosion of preferences.   Despite this, Mexico had a systemic interest in 
having a strong multilateral trading system.  Moreover,  despite the important share of trade covered 
by the NAFTA, some issues had to be dealt with  at the multilateral level for example, U.S. 
agricultural subsidies and the access of Mexican suga r to the United States.  In the context of the 
GATS, Mexico was the only country exempted from MFN treatment with respect to road 
transportation.  Mexico considered it essential that  the United States eliminate this exemption in the 
current negotiations on services. 
133. Mexico was concerned with the position taken by a number of U.S. Congress members on 
market access for natural persons providing service te mporarily.  Mexico expected this topic to be 
covered in the current development round.  Also , the WTO dispute settlement mechanism was in 
many cases the only forum to deal with controversies among the parties. 
134. Mexico acknowledged the efforts made by the Un ited States to solve some of their bilateral 
problems.  The agreement reached with respect to  cement, which had ended a 16-year old dispute, 
was an example that, even difficult problems could be solved with political will.  Mexico also 
acknowledged the U.S. progress to repeal the Byrd Amendment.  Although some problematic aspects 
would remain in place for two more years, this was an important step in the right direction. 
135. The representative of Turkey  stated that, as the world's largest import market and a key 
supplier of goods and services, the United States play ed a vital role for the overall wellbeing of the 
global economy and the multilateral trading system.  In this context, the fiscal deficit, the low savings 
rate and the widening current account deficit needed to be taken into consideration with respect to 
their possible negative effects on the domestic and external economic environments,  Turkey underlined that the widening current account defi cit, which had reached 6% of GDP in 2005, put 
pressure on the administrations of other countries.  Well-designed monetary policies and incentives to 
increase domestic savings could have a positive effe ct on rebalancing the current account deficit. 
136. Since its last Review, the United States had con tinued to liberalize trade at various levels.  
The openness of the U.S. economy was of key impor tance for the global economy.  Any change in 
U.S. policies directly influenced the world econom y, especially the developing countries.  Turkey 
held the view that the United States had a responsib ility to closely monitor the impact of its actions on 
global economic growth.  Turkey noted with satisfa ction U.S. efforts to advance market openness in WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 25 
 
 
different platforms.  Turkey was, however, concer ned that security considerations could hamper the 
openness of the U.S. market. 
137. Turkey supported the U.S. view that bila teral, regional and mu ltilateral liberalization 
reinforced each other and served the broader objec tive of removing trade barriers globally, as long as 
each level of liberalization was based on multilateral rules.  As a staunch supporter of the multilateral 
trading system, Turkey was grateful for U.S. efforts since the launching of the DDA;  the United States had helped overcome the obstacles in  the negotiating process and to revive negotiations 
at critical junctures.  U.S. l eadership was ever more  necessary following the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference where a commitment to conclude negotia tions by the end of 2006 had been confirmed by 
Members. 
138. U.S. trade policy reflected an excellent coor dination effort among stakeholders, including the 
private sector.  The Trade and Investment Framework Agreement of 1999 had been the main mechanism for continued dialogue between Turkey a nd the United States on various bilateral trade 
and investment issues.  Bilateral trade flows had reached US$10 billion in 2005;  exports to the 
United States had accounted for 6.7% of Turkey's tota l exports in the same year.  Turkey considered 
that the current level of bilateral relations in trade and investment could still be deepened and, to this 
end, stood ready to take further steps. 
139. The representative of Brazil
 noted that the United States was Brazil’s main trade partner, 
accounting for almost 20% of Brazil's exports.  Thus , restrictive trade measures in the United States 
were a reason for concern in Brazil.  Whilst the WTO Secretariat credited the United States with a 
generally open and non-discriminatory trade policy, there remained many market access barriers and 
various trade distorting measures in significant ar eas, especially for developing countries, such as 
agriculture, textiles, steel, and footwear.  The pe rsistence of those barriers and practices generated 
significant losses for exporters in the developing world. 
140. The United States had been slow and, at times,  somewhat reluctant to implement several 
WTO dispute settlement rulings, both from panels and from the Appellate Body.  It had been slow, for 
instance, in modifying the Byrd Amendment, and ha d shown reluctance to comply with rulings in a 
number of outstanding cases, such as on cotton subsid ies.  This lack of compliance with rulings 
undermined the predictability that constituted one of  the pillars of the rules-based multilateral trading 
system. 
141. Whilst average MFN tariffs were low, many significant tariff peaks remained, especially in 
agriculture, where the average tari ff was more than twice as high as on other products.  Brazil's top 20 
export products faced an average tariff of 23% in the U.S. market.  In comparison, the top 20 U.S. 
export products faced an average tariff of only 11.6% in Brazil.  The U.S. rate for out-of-quota 
tobacco, for instance, was 350%.  Specific duties and fees added an extra burden to imports of sugar, 
orange juice and ethanol.  For industrial goods, tariffs  were high on footwear and textiles.  Moreover, 
tariff escalation remained a major concern for de veloping countries, as fully processed cocoa and 
coffee faces higher tariffs than those products in raw form. 
142. Low tariffs were often nullified by the use of trade remedies:  almost 300 anti-dumping 
measures were in force, more than half affecting ir on and steel products.  Some of those measures had 
been found inconsistent with WTO rules, such as “zeroing”, but the procedures for AD investigations 
remained largely unchanged.  Likewise, the proc edures for investigations on subsidies relied on 
debatable criteria, as ac knowledged by some dispute settlement panels.  The procedures for sunset 
reviews, for instance, explained the extraordin ary long duration of some AD and CVD duties. WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 26 
 
 
143. U.S. agriculture relied heavily on subsidies:  in the past five years, U.S. farmers had received 
almost US$10 billion in payments for soybeans, US$14 billion for cotton, and US$20 billion for corn.  
Current U.S. practices implied huge losses for farmers in the developing world. 
144. Many discrepancies persisted regarding regulations  at the state and federal levels on services.  
Much remained to be done in order to bring conver gence with different regula tions and thus guarantee 
fair access conditions for services providers in the national market. 
145. The U.S. trade regime still presented signifi cant barriers and distortionary practices, 
particularly harmful to developing country exporter s.  Addressing these would be to the benefit of the 
multilateral trading system and to the U.S. economy.   Brazil hoped that the U.S. Government would 
continue giving priority to the multilateral tr ading system and would decisively pursue the 
implementation of the Doha mandate, in order to co nclude the Round in 2006 with an ambitious pro-
development outcome. 
146. The representative of Brunei Darussalam on behalf of ASEAN , congratulated the 
United States on its solid economic growth;  ASEA N hoped that the United States would continue to 
pursue openness and transparency in its trading regime.  ASEAN noted that the United States 
considered that opening foreign markets to U.S.  products and services would enhance economic 
growth and prosperity.  A successful conclusion of  the DDA would bring benefits equivalent to an 
US$18 billion tax cut for U.S. consumers and manuf acturers while expanding the U.S. economy by 
US$95 billion.  
147. ASEAN was aware that multilateral trade nego tiations were a priority of the U.S. 
Administration in its quest to open markets and strengthen rules.  ASEAN joined others in calling for 
developed countries like the United States to do more , and to provide the leadership to ensure a 
successful conclusion of the DDA.  In agricultu re and industrial goods, meaningful market access 
concessions for products of export interest to de veloping countries through substantial across-the-
board tariff reductions would provi de greater economic benefits.  Elimination of market access 
barriers, notably subsidies, which persisted in a few but important area would benefit U.S. trading 
partners and help strengthen the global economy.  Other barriers, such as high out-of-quota tariffs, 
and other distorting measures should be addressed under the current negotiations. 
148. The average MFN tariff was just over 5%, but  the average tariff on agricultural products 
stood at 10%.  However, tobacco, peanuts, certain da iry products, sugar and cer tain footwear were in 
the 50-350% tariff range and most tariffs on textile s on clothing were in the 15-30% range.  Tariff 
escalation was also present in textiles and clothing, non-metallic minerals and basic metal industries.  
This was an area of concern, particularly in the ongoing negotiations, as the United States had 
proposed the elimination of all industrial tariffs by 2015, and substantial cuts in agricultural tariffs.  
Also of concern were the U.S. non- ad valorem  tariffs, which, despite thei r decrease since the last U.S. 
TPR in 2004, still amounted to 10.6% of its tariff lines. 
149. On trade facilitation, the regulations and re quirements of the Trade Act of 2002 and the 
Bioterrorism Act continued to be burdensome to e xporters of developing countries.  An assessment of 
the economic impact of the new regulations would be valuable to ascertain their actual costs and 
benefits.  On agriculture, he noted that domestic  support notifications were lagging;  ASEAN looked 
forward to receiving up-to-date notifications as soon as possible, since this would facilitate negotiations on agriculture.  ASEAN would welcome capacity-building aid from the United States in 
services, as well as enhanced market  access in sectors and modes of interest to developing countries.  
Some ASEAN countries continued to place impor tance on the establishment of an emergency 
safeguard mechanism in services.  ASEAN was inte rested in knowing how the United States intended 
to address the discretion granted to the President on investment issues by the Exon-Florio Amendment WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 27 
 
 
in the context of the ongoing negotiations in  the Working Party on GATS Rules on Emergency 
Safeguard Measures.  
150. ASEAN noted that the United States remained of the leading user of contingency trade 
remedies, and was worried that this contributed to  uncertainty for foreign exporters.  Also, trading 
partners had increasingly challenged U.S. rules a nd methods concerning AD and CVD investigations 
and methods, some of which had been found by th e DSB to be WTO inconsistent.  While ASEAN 
commended the United States for the implementation of DSB rulings for some disputes, it urged it to continue its efforts for all outstanding disputes, pa rticularly in the light of some ASEAN members 
concerns about full implementation of the Byrd Amendment. 
151. ASEAN was pleased to note the establishment of  the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) 
by the United States in 2002, with the objective of strengthening U.S. trade and investment ties with ASEAN.  ASEAN was collectively the United States' fi fth largest trading partner, and encouraged the 
United States to enhance efforts to promote trad e with the region.  Several ASEAN members had 
concluded or were currently nego tiating FTAs with the United States.  ASEAN was therefore please 
that the United States had stated its intention to work on regional and bilate ral initiatives to promote 
free trade, creating a climate of "competitive libera lization". ASEAN was also pleased that U.S. trade 
policies had attempted to take into account the concerns of developing countries and had expanded 
unilateral preferences.  The expanding U.S. prefer ential network could serve to draw its partners 
closer to the multilateral trading system. 
152. The representative of Hong Kong, China
 stressed the close ties between Hong Kong, China 
and the United States.  The United States had been Hong Kong, China's second largest trading partner 
and export market in 2005, and its fifth largest s ource of imports.  Total trade in goods had reached 
US$62 billion, representing a 5.8% increase over 2004;  trade in services had reached US$16 billion 
in the same year.  The United States also had subs tantial direct investment  in Hong Kong, China, 
amounting to some US$24 billion, covering a wide range of economic sectors. 
153. Hong Kong, China congratulated the United States on its solid and sustained economic 
growth and its remarkable improvement in produc tivity.  The United States' open and transparent 
trade and economic policy was a key factor in maintaining the economy's flexibility and efficiency, thereby fuelling global economic growth.  Hong Kong,  China applauded U.S. leadership in the DDA 
and in supporting the multilateral trading system;  a courageous demonstration of that leadership was 
needed as the final phase of the DDA started. 
154. Security measures had continued to play a prom inent role in the formulation of trade and 
investment policies in the United States.  Consid erable effort and resources had been devoted to 
programmes like the Automated Commercial Envir onment (ACE), Container Security Initiative 
(CSI), Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism  (C-TPAT), Bioterrorism Act, etc.  While Hong 
Kong, China recognized that such initiatives were ai med at enhancing global security, it hoped that 
they would not incur unnecessary restrictions, unr easonable costs, or other barriers to trade and 
investment flows.  Hong Kong, China also urged that the initiative be open equally to foreign and 
U.S. companies and that every effort be made to avoid creating discriminatory treatment between U.S. and non-U.S. companies.  To facilitate comp liance, detailed requireme nts and implementation 
arrangements had to be clearly and comprehens ively accessible to all interested parties. 
155. Hong Kong, China was pleased that the United States had fulfilled its commitments under the 
WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, but was concerned at the proliferation of various 
preferential arrangements in this sector, tied to non-liberal rules of origin.  Hong Kong, China 
remained to be convinced that the creation of industries in areas lacking any natural competitive 
advantage would be good for development.  H ong Kong, China hoped that the United States would WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 28 
 
 
resist pressure to impose new protectionist measur es to impede normal textiles trade flows between 
the United States and other economies. 
156. Hong Kong, China commended the United States for its high level of ambition and active 
participation in the NAMA negotiations under the DDA.  MFN tariffs in non-agricultural products 
were generally low, except for p eaks on a few selected products, such as footwear and textiles and 
clothing, which it expected would be bull dozed during the negotiations.  However, non- ad valorem  
tariffs had accounted for over 10% of U.S. tariff lines in 2004;  Hong Kong, China looked forward to seeing improvements in this area in the ongoing NAMA negotiations. 
157. AD action was being taken increasingly against U.S. products, while U.S. investigations, 
orders imposed, and trade coverage under both AD and safeguards rules, was steadily declining.  
There were many disputes regarding U.S. AD practices, including the "zeroing" methodology.  Hong 
Kong, China urged the United States to bring expedi tiously its AD measures into conformity with the 
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, and to eliminate all unfair, trade-distorting dumping-margin determination practices. 
158. Hong Kong, China appreciated U.S. efforts to  maintain an open and transparent services 
regime;  however, market access barriers and other distorting measures persisted in several areas of 
interest to Hong Kong, China including air, mar itime, and financial services.  Hong Kong, China 
invited the United States to revisit the economic ra tionale for such measures.  Hong Kong, China was 
disappointed that the United States had still not made any offer on maritime transport services in its revised services offer, despite its general openness in  the international maritime transport market.  
This lack of offers ran counter to its more ge neral pursuit of successful trade liberalization in the 
current round.  Hong Kong, China urged the United States to make commitments in this important 
area. 
159. The representative of Ecuador
 congratulated the United States for the improvement in its 
economic indicators despite the adverse circumstan ces it had faced.  A strong U.S economic was of 
great importance for the world economy, and in this respect Ecuador hoped the United States 
managed to correct its macroec onomic imbalances.  The United St ates was Ecuador's main trading 
partner:  in 2005, exports to the United States we re 50% of a total of US$9.6 billion, of which 
US$5.87 billion were in the petroleum sector.  The United States had also been the market for 11.4% 
of Ecuador's exports of traditional products, such as  bananas, coffee, cocoa, and some 13.3% of non-
traditional agricultural goods , and 16.6% of non-traditional industrial products. 
160. Some 39% of trade with the United States t ook place under the Andean Tariff Preferences and 
Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) preferences.  However,  trade flows had been affected by the use of 
non-tariff barriers in the United States, in par ticular SPS and TBT measures, quotas, AD measures, 
and licensing.  Since 2001, when ATPDEA entered in to effect, some 84% of exports had been subject 
to one or more non-tariff barriers.  The Secretaria t report mentioned that the United States had made 
several notifications under the TBT and SPS Agreem ents, but did not provide information on the 
extent to which those regulations were based on international rules and standards developed by 
international organizations, nor on how these meas ures were developed by the U.S. authorities.  
Information on this would be useful.  There was also  a lack of information on the effect of the U.S. 
security measures on the exports of SMEs and on their capacity to abide by the rules of the 
Bioterrorism Act. 
161. The United States was the source of some 20% of Ecuador's imports, mos tly industrial goods.  
It also accounted for some 40% of FDI in Ecuador , and was the source of 50% of the remittances 
entering Ecuador.  Ecuador and the United States we re on the verge of concluding an FTA to bind 
preferences granted under the ATPDEA and open access for new products, as well as to reinforce WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 29 
 
 
labour and environmental institutions to ensure  a balanced exchange, and grant access to the 
Ecuadorian market for U.S. products, under conditi ons that safeguarded Ecuador's sensitive products. 
162. Ecuador shared with the U.S. view on the importance of the multilateral trading system and 
was engaged in the successful conclusion of the DDA.  Ecuador supported negotiations to eliminate 
subsidies in agriculture, as it did not grant any su bsidies, domestic support, or export credit to its 
farmers, while the large amounts of subsidies gr anted by developed countries distorted trade and 
discouraged the competitive capacity of countri es like Ecuador.  That is why Ecuador sought 
complete liberalization of tropical agricultural pr oducts during the round, as well as the establishment 
of multilateral rules with respect to fishing subsidi es.  Ecuador was also interested in the protection 
granted by U.S. legislation to biodiversity and tradi tional knowledge, and w ould like to see these 
topics covered in future reviews. 
163. Ecuador hoped the United States would provid e technical assistance to build capacity in 
developing countries.  In particular, Ecuador trus ted the United States would support the inclusion of 
Latin American countries with high vulnerability in dices in the programme to support trade on which 
the WTO had embarked.  This would result in higher growth, productive diversification, and 
progressive liberalization for Ecuador. 
164. The representative of Costa Rica  noted that the United States had one of the world's most 
open and transparent trade and investment regimes;   this was of vital importance for the world 
economy.  Costa Rica was pleased that the United Stat es continued to maintain a policy of promoting 
market opening and the rule of law in the world, in  particular with respect to the multilateral trading 
system.  The United States absorbed 43% of Costa Rican exports, and accounted for 46% of Costa Rica's imports.  Bilateral trade was some US $7 billion out of US$17 billion.  Costa Rica trusted 
that the ratification of the CAFTA, in a near future  would allow an even larger trade with the United 
States. 
165. Costa Rica shared the U.S. objective of broader trade opening and higher growth and 
development levels through regiona l agreements such as CAFTA and through the DDA negotiations.  
Costa Rica appreciated U.S. leadersh ip in the DDA and its engagement to  conclude the ro und in 2006.  
Costa Rica also appreciated the U.S. views on de velopment issues especially with respect to long-
term objectives and sustainability.  The United St ates had made a valuable contribution to the 
negotiations and set ambitious market access goals.  Costa Rica hoped that these results would be 
achieved, but noted that in order for this to happen the United States would need to contribute 
significantly in areas such as domestic support and anti-dumping. 
166. The representative of Canada
 stated that the Canada/U.S. relationship was founded on 
common commitments:  to the rule of law, to the mutual benefits of trade agreements, and to the 
understanding that the unimpeded flow of goods, ser vices, investment, technology, and ideas enriched 
the prosperity of their two nations, and their citiz ens.  The Canada/U.S. trade relationship was the 
largest in the world, with US$1.6 billion worth of goods and services crossing their mutual border 
every day.  The many agencies and officials, on both si des of the border, worked closely to ensure that 
difficulties were minimized.  The generally close comp atibility of their interests often allowed the two 
countries to face challenges cooperatively.  For example, previous cases of BSE in North America had required the North American beef industry and gove rnment agencies in both countries to work closely 
together to manage risk and reassure trading part ners that North American beef remained safe. 
167. One of Canada's highest objectives was to improve security and law enforcement while 
ensuring the efficient movement of legitimate goods, services, and people across the U.S./Canada border.  Canada recognized the legitimacy of in creased security measures as a necessary response to 
terrorist activity, but called upon the United States  to ensure that these measures did not become WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 30 
 
 
unnecessary barriers to trade.  That leadership also  needed to transcend the influence of special 
interests in the formulation and application of trad e policy:  the pursuit of broad trade liberalization 
had become an increasingly complex and difficult t ask, but it was essential that the principal objective 
of trade liberalization continued to be vigorously pursued. 
168. In this context, Canada attached great importa nce to U.S. leadership in advancing the global 
trade policy agenda.  Canada would continue to  work with the United States to promote trade 
liberalization multilaterally, regionally, and bilaterally. 
169. Three broad areas of U.S. trade policy were of concern to Canada.  The first was the U.S. 
record in implementing WTO decisions.  A key example was the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (the Byrd Amendment), which ha d been found to be inconsistent with U.S. WTO 
obligations.  The reasonable period of time to bri ng this measure into compliance was long past.  
While Canada welcomed the recent law to repeal the Byrd Amendment, it was concerned that the 
effective date for this repeal woul d be almost four years after the end of the reasonable period of time 
for compliance set by the WTO.  This type of  prospective repeal did not bode well for the 
effectiveness of the Dispute Settlement Unders tanding and did not represent prompt compliance. 
170. Canada's second concern dealt with agriculture.  Canada-U.S. agriculture and agri-food trade 
was significant and mutually beneficial.  Neverthe less, Canada, like other WTO Members, had been 
negatively affected by the Farm Security and Ru ral Investment Act, otherwise known as the Farm 
Bill, particularly the increase in, and broadened cove rage of, trade-distorting domestic support and the 
mandatory country-of-origin labelling (COOL) require ments.  The increases to domestic support ran 
counter to the agreed objective in the WTO agricu lture negotiations to substantially reduce trade-
distorting domestic support.  The CO OL initiative sought to undo the benefits that trade liberalization 
had brought:  it mandated that certain agriculture and agri-food products be labelled on the basis of 
requirements that were fundamentally flawed a nd unworkable.  Existing labelling schemes already 
provided adequate consumer info rmation and there was no reasonable justification for the new 
mandatory programme. The mandatory COOL for fish and shellfish, which had entered into force on 
4 April 2005, had had an impact on the compe titiveness of North American fish and shellfish 
producers. 
171. Canada's third area of concern was softwood lumber.  This dispute had cost Canadian 
companies over US$5 billion in duties since early 2002, and its resolution was a major priority.  It had 
put significant strain on businesses, communities, workers and consumers in both countries, all 
intended beneficiaries of a rules-based internationa l trading system.  Canada preferred a long-term 
durable resolution in the best interests of all, in cluding U.S. consumer interests.  However, Canada 
would continue litigation over the under lying duty orders to promote its vital trade interests in this 
sector. 
172. Canada welcomed and praised the U.S. leadersh ip and efforts to achieve global economic and 
trade liberalization, and to bring the Doha Deve lopment Agenda to a successful conclusion in 2006. 
173. The representative of Norway
 stated that the United States had been an engine for 
international trade negotiations in the GATT and had always been a key player in both launching and 
in ensuring the successful outcome of previous  rounds.  Norway hoped the United States would 
continue to show leadership to bring the process of negotiations forward.  The United States was a 
very open economy, with low tariffs and generally few restrictions on trade in goods and services and 
on foreign investment.  The importance of this to  the world economy could not be overstated.  The 
Secretariat report had an optimistic outlook for the U.S. economy;  it referred to measures to curtail 
spending and reduce the fiscal deficit, to ensure long-term economic stability.  These efforts would be 
followed with great interest by other countries. WT/TPR/M/160 
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174. Certain aspects of U.S. trade policy, however, gave reason for concern.  The use of trade 
remedies was prevalent, and had been the subject of numerous challenges before DSB panels. Certain 
cases repeated themselves, indicating that a more rigorous implementation of WTO law was needed in 
respect of such measures.  The Un ited States was an important market for Norwegian exports of fish 
and fish products;  the main obstacle for furthe r increasing these exports was related to the anti-
dumping and countervailing measures imposed on fr esh, whole Norwegian salmon since 1991.  The 
main result of these measures had been the substitu tion of Norwegian salmon suppliers to the U.S. 
market by other suppliers.  In Norway's view, th ere was no basis for the application of AD and CV 
measures on these products:  the U.S. sunset review procedure appeared to a be purely mechanical, 
whereby all current AD measures were rolled ove r every five years.  The AD measure from 1991 
imposed on Norwegian salmon was not only detrimenta l to Norwegian exporters but also to U.S. 
consumers and the U.S. processing industry. 
175. On maritime transport, Norway appreciated that  the U.S. market for international maritime 
transport, with some exceptions, was open to fore ign participants, but faile d to see this situation 
reflected in the U.S. GATS offer.  Norway encour aged the United States to engage constructively in 
the GATS maritime services negotiations.  In part icular, Norway would like to see a favourable 
response to the plurilateral request for commitments on maritime transport that had been forwarded to 
the United States. 
176. Norway referred to the USTR annual review s in which Norway, and several other WTO 
Members, had been criticized for promoting comp etition from generic drugs as well as lower priced 
pharmaceuticals.  Norway could be placed on a "watch  list" in USTR's next Special 301 Report.  
However, changes had been proposed in Title XI  of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, 
and Modernization Act of 2003, to modify U.S. patent law to allow for more competition from 
generic drugs and lower priced pharmaceuticals.  While no regulation had been prepared and no 
imports under the Act had taken place, Norway was concerned about the lack of coherence between 
the criticism directed at Members and the national policy change taking place in the United States.  
177. The representative of Singapore  noted that his statement complemented the ASEAN 
statement.  In 2005, the United States was Singapore' s second largest trading partner (after Malaysia) 
with bilateral trade valued at S$77.8 billion.  Ther e were also extensive two-way investment flows.  
At end 2004, U.S. FDI into Singapore totalled US$56. 9 billion, representing 14.6% of total U.S. FDI 
into the Asia-Pacific region.  Meanwhile, with its  generally open and transparent investment regime, 
the United States continued to be an attractive i nvestment destination for Singapore's manufacturing, 
finance, and real estate companies.  Singapore hope d the United States would continue to remain 
receptive to foreign investment, includi ng in the infrastructural sectors. 
178. Singapore shared the United States' approach to advancing trade liberalization through 
negotiations at the multilateral, regional, and bila teral levels.  U.S. efforts in the WTO towards 
liberalization and its active  par ticipation and contributions in th e various negotiating bodies to move 
the DDA process along, had been useful to the ne gotiations.  Because of its large economic power, the 
United States' trade policies had a significant impact on all WTO Members.  Singapore commended the United States for its continued commitment to ma intaining an open, transparent, and effective 
rules-based multilateral trading system, and to  facilitate a successful completion of the DDA 
negotiations by end 2006. 
179. Against the United States' generally good trade record and contribution to the WTO system, 
there were a few areas where there could be improvements.  Singapore had earlier referred to foreign investment in infrastructural sectors, and had sen t a few queries on telecommunications to the U.S. 
delegation. WT/TPR/M/160 
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180. Singapore welcomed U.S. efforts to promot e economic cooperation and dialogue on trade 
facilitation, investment, transparency, and IPR in va rious regional fora, such as APEC and ASEAN.  
Within APEC, the United States had been highly su pportive of the development of model measures 
for RTA/FTA chapters as  well as e-commerce and technology choice principles.  The United States 
had also initiated and led a number of sectoral initiatives in APEC.  These initiatives would contribute 
to the broader goal of trade liberalization across the Asia-Pacific region.  Singapore welcomed the 
ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership, which sought to promote trade and investment facilitation and 
strengthen the investment climate in ASEAN.  Singapore hoped that it would help in the move 
towards the conclusion of a region-wide ASEAN-U. S. trade and investment framework agreement. 
181. On the bilateral front, the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) was now into its 
third year, and there had been a significant increase in bilateral trade and investment flows.  There had 
been regular dialogues on the implementation of the USSFTA and on how to further improve access 
to each other's markets.   Such ambitious and co mprehensive FTAs could help catalyze global trade 
liberalization efforts by serving as a template for future FTAs. 
182. The representative of Trinidad and Tobago  noted that the United States had continued to 
show its commitment to world economic growth a nd development and had demonstrated leadership 
and a willingness to work with other countries to achieve  that goal.  By maintaining an almost totally 
open and transparent trading system, the United States  had underlined its belief that this would deliver 
that objective.  However, the United States continued to maintain significant barriers to trade that had 
to be addressed, such as measures in the iron and steel industry. 
183. Despite the United States' strong economic pe rformance, the current account deficit had 
increased to almost 6% of GDP, its national debt had continued to accumulate , and its savings rate 
had declined.  This could have negative consequences for its tradi ng partners and on overall global 
economic stability. 
184. The United States was Trinidad and Tobago's ma in trading partner, providing a key export 
markets for oil, natural gas, methanol, petrochemi cals and other products, as well as services.  This 
trade relationship was cemented by the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act;  the establishment 
of a Free Trade Area of the Am ericas, would further enhance Trinidad and Tobago's economic 
growth. 
185. Trinidad and Tobago acknowledged the U.S. role  in the current trade negotiations and would 
continue to work with the United States and ot her WTO Members in order to achieve a successful 
outcome of the round, including agreements in agri culture, NAMA, services and rules.  Trinidad and 
Tobago continued to look forward to U.S. commitmen t to the WTO dispute settlement regime and to 
the measures it would undertake in this regard.  In  addition, Trinidad and Tobago would continue to 
work with the United States to ensu re that the concerns of devel oping countries, especially small 
vulnerable economies, were taken fully on board. 
186. The representative of Peru  encouraged the United States to engage in further reform in 
agriculture.  She was convinced that the United St ates had the political will to do so.  Peru also 
encouraged the United States to redouble its efforts to  abide by the recommendations of the DSB.  On 
security-related issues, Peru was concerned about th e coherence between secu rity measures and trade 
openness. 
187. The representative of Sri Lanka  noted that this Review of the United States was taking place 
at a very important juncture, as WTO Members were  geared towards or in the process of making 
important decisions to meet deadlines in key areas of the DDA.  Sri Lanka greatly valued the U.S. WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 33 
 
 
commitment to a strong multilateral trading system, and believed that the role of the United States 
was crucial to achieving these deadlines and developm ent targets, and to overall progress in the DDA. 
188. The United States was Sri Lanka's main trading pa rtner, with total trade of US$2.2 billion.  
The U.S. market absorbed nearly 35% of Sri Lanka 's exports of which 82% were apparel exports in 
2004.  A total of 68 U.S. investment programmes,  for over US$100 million we re in operation in Sri 
Lanka.  In July 2002 they had signed a trade and investment framework agre ement (TIFA) with the 
broad objective of furthering bilateral and trade rela tions.  This was a useful forum for a trade policy 
dialogue.  The Agreement on Investment and A voidance of Double Taxation between the two 
countries, which had come into effect in 2004, was a useful instrument for further promoting mutual 
trade and economic activities. 
189. A robust an solid U.S. economy was crucial for the world economy.  The continued strong 
expansion of the U.S. economy was an encouraging sign, but the ever-expanding U.S. current account 
deficit was a concern for all.  This deficit, wh ich had reached US$668 billion, or 5.7% of GDP, could 
create great uncertainty in financial markets, a nd this could hamper world economic growth, as 
stability in exchange rates and financial markets were necessary for the smooth conduct of trade 
between countries. 
190. The United States was the world's largest import market;  this reflected the United States' 
generally open and flexible trade policies geared at  promoting and facilitating international trade and 
sourcing its requirements from overseas suppliers.  However, Sri Lanka faced higher import duties 
than certain developed countries.  For example, acco rding to U.S. Bureau of the Census figures, in 
2004, U.S. imports from Sri Lanka, totalling US$1. 95 billion, had paid US$261.9 million in import 
duties, while imports from Australia, which had totalled US$7.5 billion had paid US$117 million in 
import duties, and those from Switzerland, which had totalled US$11.5 billion, had faced import 
duties of US$175.6 million. 
191. The apparel sector was the top foreign exch ange earner for Sri Lanka, and provided 
employment for over 350,000 people.  As reported in  the Secretariat report, the United States pursued 
trade liberalization at the  multilateral, regional, a nd bilateral levels.  Sri La nka considered multilateral 
liberalization the best option, since it provided a leve l playing field for all countries, big or small, and 
prevented possible trade and investment diversio n.  In recent years, however, some unilateral 
preferential schemes such as AGOA, and the CBE RA, had placed some small developing countries 
like Sri Lanka at great disadvantage with respec t to market access.  The U.S. trade policy of 
promoting development in one region or group th rough unilateral preferential arrangements should 
not be at the expense of the devel opment of another country or region. 
192. The United States had adopted many technical regul ations and standards to ensure food safety 
and quality.  Sri Lanka asked to what extent these fo llowed international standards;  in recent years, 
there had been many cases where developed count ries had misused SPS measures under the guise of 
food safety, and these measures had become a si gnificant barrier for world trade in food. 
193. Sri Lanka also requested more information ab out the U.S. duty drawback programme, and 
how it was implemented, in terms of product coverage, percentages of  duty drawback, etc.  Sri Lanka 
asked how the United States financed such schemes.  On services, Sri Lanka wondered whether in the 
current negotiations, the United States would treat mode  4 liberalization as an immigration or a trade 
issue.  Sri Lanka considered that mode 4 should be treated as a trade issue. 
194. The representative of Benin  noted that the U.S. economy had grown some 3.5% in 2005.  
Real exports of goods and services had increased by 15.7% in 2004 and 17.6% in 2005.  In the WTO, 
the United States supported the DDA and had engaged to conclude the round by end 2006.  Benin WT/TPR/M/160 
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appreciated the U.S. Government's efforts in the economic area, and encouraged it to maintain its 
engagement in a successful conclusion of the ro und, bearing in mind the need to promote the 
participation of developing count ries, in particular the poorest of them in international trade. 
195. Benin benefited from the AGOA, which was an important instrument to promote trade 
between African countries and the United States.  Beni n considered, however, that the participation of 
African countries, and other developing and least de veloped countries in international trade, would 
only become effective if the rules, principles, and mechanisms governing international trade were 
applied as they were designed.  In this respect, Be nin invited the United States to act to reduce the 
distortions to international trade, and asked the U. S. delegation which measure s had been envisaged to 
follow up the decisions on cotton adopted in the Hong Kong Ministerial.  An adequate response to the 
cotton issue would promote and encourage the par ticipation of African countries in international 
trade. 
196. The representative of Uruguay  highlighted the U.S. role in the current negotiations and its 
active participation in the Hong Kong Ministerial.  The success of the round, and its conclusion at the 
latest in December 2006, would depend to a larg e extent on the position and political vision of the 
United States, as well as its attachment to the principles of equity, non-discrimination, and special and 
differential treatment for developing countries. 
197. The U.S.' solid economic growth since its last  Review in 2004 had benefited its trading 
partners as it was the world's main import ma rket and a fundamental engine of growth. 
198. Uruguay shared the views of the United States on a number of areas, but differed in others, 
such as in agriculture, but hoped to narrow differe nces during the negotiations.  Uruguay considered 
that U.S. subsidy policies affected both producti on and market access for third countries.  These 
generated serious distortions that affected the intern ational trade of products of interest to Uruguay, 
such as rice.  Despite its small si ze, Uruguay was the seventh largest e xporter of rice in the world;  it 
exported over 80% of its production, so was exposed  directly to the effect of distortions in 
international markets.  According to Uruguay's est imates, U.S. domestic support policies for rice had 
a direct impact on production and st ock levels and distorted internati onal prices, with a negative effect 
on Uruguay's trade interests. 
199. Uruguay considered the DDA mandate on agriculture  to be ambitious, and adequate to find 
solutions to the serious deficiencies and limitations  that existed.  Uruguay was confident that the 
objectives reflected in the mandate would be achieve d.  Agricultural liberalization and reform was a 
necessary and irreversible fact, and the United St ates had a key role to play in this process. 
200. Uruguay's bilateral trade with the United States ha d increased substantially;  the United States 
had become the main market for Uruguay's exports especially since it had been opened to imports of 
bovine meat.  The share of bovine meat in Urugua y's total merchandise exports had increased from 
5.8% in 1998 to 22.4% in 2005, a US$603 million increase.  U.S.-Uruguay bilateral trade and 
investment commission had been reactivat ed, to further enhance trade relations. 
201. The United States continued to be the worl d's main import market and its economy had 
continued to contribute to world economic growth th rough the openness of its markets.  This openness 
was also one of the factors behind U.S. economic growth, since it allowed its producers and consumers the procurement of foreign goods, services and capital needed at the best conditions.  The 
Secretariat report noted that the United States assigne d the greatest priority to the multilateral trading 
system and the conclusion of the DDA before end 2006.  Uruguay fully shared these goals. WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 35 
 
 
202. The representative of Bulgaria  noted that, since its last Trade Policy Review in 2004, the U.S. 
economy had achieved solid growth and had remained among the world's most competitive.  Bulgaria 
commended the United States for its strong commitment  to the multilateral trading system and to the 
timely and successful conclusion of the current round , and for its active participation in the ongoing 
negotiations.  Bulgaria and the United States enjoye d strong relations.  Bilate ral cooperation had been 
institutionalized and was moving to a new era of part nership.  Bulgaria appreciated U.S. technical 
assistance and support for structural reforms and capacity building. 
203. Trade and economic relations had been growing steadily since the conclusion of the bilateral 
trade agreement in 1991, which granted MFN treat ment to Bulgaria, and a bilateral investment 
promotion treaty in 1992.  The United States was now Bulgaria's ninth largest trading partner and sixth largest investor.  Bulgaria would benefit fro m enhanced U.S. market access.  According to the 
conclusions of the WTO Secretariat report for th e 2003 TPR of Bulgaria, the benefits resulting from 
trade policies reform in Bulgaria and the signifi cant liberalization undertaken would be significantly 
reinforced by improved market access provided by Bulgaria’s MFN partners.  Her delegation was 
interested in hearing the intentions of the Un ited States with respect to this recommendation. 
204. The representative of Romania
 noted that the Trade Policy Review Mechanism allowed WTO 
Members the possibility to be informed, each second y ear, of the trade policies of the most important 
players in world trade, and to better evaluate thes e Members' actions in order to fully observe their 
WTO commitments.  Romania supported that principle. 
205. The reports by USTR and the Secretariat both ou tlined the weight of the United States in the 
world economy and world trade as well as its impact on other economies.  The United States was an important trading partner for Roma nia and one of the most importan t with which it did not have a 
free-trade agreement.  The long-standing positive bila teral political relations, and the dynamics in the 
last decades had led to a steady increase in trade vol umes.  On the one hand, there was better access 
under the GSP for traditional Romanian exports, su ch as textiles and products, and on the other, 
imports of high-tech products and technologies as we ll as services were needed  for the restructuring 
of the Romanian economy. 
206. Expanding trade could, sometimes, activate tr ade defence mechanisms.  Most of these cases 
had been solved in an amicable way.  U.S. rec ognition of Romania's market economy status had been 
important as it had allowed Romanian exporters to  be judged in accordance with their commercial 
behaviour.  Still, the Romanian authorities would like to see fewer trade defence measures taken or 
continued against Romanian exports. 
207. While most of the U.S.-Romania trade policy had been influenced by the process of taking 
over the acquis communautaire ;  since 1993, Romania had enjoyed and was grateful for the technical 
assistance and support of the U.S. authorities, for ex ample in intellectual property rights (especially 
copyright) and the enhancement of the capacity of authorities and customs offices to fight 
counterfeited goods and piracy. 
208. Romania recognized the U.S. role in the functi oning of the multilateral trading system.  It 
believed that the system would become even stronge r and more reliable if the U.S. authorities would 
implement all DSB recommendations in a more timely manner and, in the process of negotiation, if technical assistance was provided to developing countries to better formulate their development 
needs. 
209. The representative of Pakistan
 stated that, since the United States was the largest import 
market in the world, its growth rate and degree of openness impacted all other WTO Members, large 
and small.  Pakistan's exceptional GDP and export growth owed a lot to U.S. recent economic growth.  WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 36 
 
 
Pakistan was also pleased to note U.S. commitment to the rules-based multilateral trading system and 
its belief in reducing trade barriers.  There was no doubt that the United States continued to play a leadership role in moving the DDA forward. 
210. Nonetheless, the recent push by the United States for bilateral deals seemed to be diverting 
attention from its multilateral role, and could be c ontributing to the slow movement of the DDA.  
Many WTO Members were also concerned that the U.S. seemed to have no particular criteria for 
selecting its FTA partners;  it seemed that this was of ten on a political rather than an economic basis.  
Since the United States maintained high tariff peak s and tariff barriers on many products of export 
interest to developing countries, its FTAs resulted in trade diversion and also had an adverse impact 
on many countries but more so on low-income developing countries. 
211. Bilateral trade between the United States and Pakistan amounted to about US$5 billion.  
Pakistan's annual exports to the United States were a bout US$3.5 billion, almost a quarter of its total 
exports.  Trade relations with the United States c ould be enhanced:  besides stringent SPS measures, 
security concerns, and non-availability and delays for visas for its businessmen, Pakistan's exporters 
faced average tariffs of 10%, whereas the MFN av erage was 4.9%.  For Pakistan's most competitive 
exports, tariffs ranged from 11% to 19.7%.  The U.S.  preferential schemes lessened this impact for 
some developing countries, but were designed to pr otect and promote the U.S. textile industry.  
Moreover, through rules of origin, these schemes also  hurt south-south trade.  Pakistan hoped that 
during the current round, the United States would be  able to agree on an ambitious NAMA outcome 
to level the playing field for all. 
212. Through its farm subsidies, the United States was able to export several crops below cost.  
This adversely affected several developing countri es like Pakistan where the share of agriculture in 
GDP was high.  According to some estimates, the United States was exporting cotton at 47% below production cost, rice at 26% below, and wheat at 28% below cost.  This increased the poverty of farmers who depended upon these crops for their liveli hood.  Similarly, the value of exports covered 
by export credits, insurance, and guarantees amounted  to US$3.7 billion.  By  offering credits below 
market terms, an unfair competitive adva ntage was granted to U.S. farmers. 
213. In services, the United States maintained 18 MFN exemptions, which according to GATS 
rules should not exceed ten years.  Pakistan asked  about U.S. plans for phasing out these exemptions. 
214. The representative of Jamaica
 noted that her Government had been struck by the extent to 
which the TPR process promoted both transparency and contributed to awareness and knowledge of the trade policies and practices of WTO Members, particularly those reviewed as frequently as the 
United States.  Small delegations like Jamaica' s appreciated the utility and value of this. 
215. The United States was the single largest trad ing economy in the world, and the largest 
importer.  This reflected its generally open trade policies and practices and pointed to its critical and 
beneficial roles as a growth pole in the world ec onomy.  The Secretariat report described the United 
States quite rightly as a "key engine for global growth".  Against this background, Jamaica noted with 
satisfaction that U.S. economic growth had been, "strong and steady" since the last Review, propelled 
by productivity gains, private investment, and defen ce purchases.  While this was of interest to all 
Members, it was of great importance to Jamaica:  the United States was Jamaica's principal trading 
partner, accounting for more than 40% of Jamaica's merchandise trade, as well as being Jamaica' main trading partner in the area of services, and its primary source of direct investment.  Remittances had come to play an increasingly important economic role:  the United States was a key partner in this 
regard and Jamaica looked forward to the mutually be neficial expansion of opportunities in this area. WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 37 
 
 
216. As befitted its role as a major player in the global economy, the United States was an active 
participant and a leader in the Doha Round.  C ountries like Jamaica looked to the United States to 
respond to the concerns, interests and special circ umstance of small vulnerable economies.  Jamaica 
remained deeply appreciative of th e U.S.' role at the bilateral level, as well as its commitment and 
support for processes aimed at promoting growth and de velopment, and beneficial integration into the 
global economy.  The Caribbean Basin Economic  Recovery Act (CBERA) enhanced by the 
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) wa s a valuable instrument for Jamaica and many 
other countries in the sub-region.  Jamaica regrette d that no decision had been taken in the Council on 
Trade in Goods on this and other wa iver requests by the United States. 
217. While the performance of the United States ec onomy was mainly positive, Jamaica noted the 
fiscal imbalances and growing current account deficit.   The Federal Reserve had said that the current 
trajectory of the U.S. current account deficit was uns ustainable:  this was worrying, as the U.S. was 
vitally important to the health of the global ec onomy.  Jamaica hoped for responsive policy measures 
by the United States and other major trading partners. 
218. The representative of the Dominican Republic  noted that the United States was the 
Dominican Republic's main trading partner, accounting for over 60% of total trade.  Their trade relations had benefited from pref erential programmes such as the CBI, and CBERA.  The U.S. 
Congress had approved, in 2005, an FTA with the countries in Central America and the Dominican 
Republic (DR-CAFTA), for which approval was pending in only one of the signatories.  This 
agreement would consolidate and enhance trade rela tions as it encompassed also services.  It would 
allow the Dominican Republic to capture more FDI, from companies interested in the U.S. market. 
219. The Dominican Republic acknowledged the significant U.S. contributions to technical 
assistance, in the WTO and bilaterally, and welcom ed the announcement made in December 2005 that 
these contributions would be enhanced.  The United States had shown clear interest in the progress of 
the DDA and in concluding the negotiations in Dece mber 2006, taking into account that TPA expired 
in July 2007.  The Dominican Republic hoped that the United States would continue showing the 
flexibility needed for a successful conclusion.  This was necessary for developing countries in 
general, and for the small and vulnerable economies, LDCs, and new WTO Members, in particular, 
especially with respect to market  access modalities for agricultural a nd non-agricultural products.  At 
the same time, the Dominican Republic hoped for an improvement of market access conditions or 
mode 4 supply of services. 
220. The representative of Honduras
 congratulated the United States for its good economic 
performance and its contribution to world economic growth.  The United States was Honduras' main 
trading partner and major export destination.  Ho ndurans living in the Un ited States remitted some 
US$1.16 billion to their country every year;  this was one of the main foreign exchange sources for 
Honduras. 
221. Bilateral initiatives such as the CBTPA had bene fited Honduras.  Foreign trade was one of the 
key development tools for Honduras;  for this reas on, Honduras had joined other countries in Central 
America, in negotiations for an FTA with the Unit ed States to ensure a better flow of goods and 
services.  The CAFTA was expected to enter in to force in Honduras on 1 April.  Honduras was 
convinced that the CAFTA would result in increas ed investment flows, employment creation and 
higher growth.  The CAFTA was a development opportunity for Honduras. 
222. Regarding multilateral issues, Honduras we lcomed the understanding shown by the 
United States with respect to the group of sma ll economies and their quest for flexibility in the 
NAMA negotiations.  Honduras also thanked the United States for the technical cooperation it granted. WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 38 
 
 
223. The representative of El Salvador  noted that a substantial share of its exports went to the 
United States.  During 2005, they had represented ove r 60% of total exports;  the main products were 
clothing, coffee, sugar, and paper.  Also in 2005, so me 40% of El Salvador's imports had originated in 
the United States.  The CAFTA, had entered into for ce in El Salvador on 1 March;  it was fully based 
on WTO principles, reflecting the balance of interest on both sides.  El Salvador expected benefits to 
include new trade and investment opportunities, lead ing to better living standards for its citizens. 
224. A few trade policy issues, however, affected mark et access horizontally and should be treated 
both multilaterally and bilaterally, such as SPS measur es and standards.  El Salvador recognized the 
United States' right, as a WTO Member, to establish th e regulations required to protect its legitimate 
interests.  However it was important to ensure that  SPS measures, standards, and related measures, did 
not result in erecting unnecessary obstacles to trade. 
225. El Salvador highlighted the economic growth achieved by the United States since its last 
Trade Policy Review, which had been supported by  flexible fiscal and monetary policies and 
accompanied by an increase in employment, labour productivity, and investment.  U.S. exports had 
expanded rapidly during the period under review, and this had been  an important factor supporting 
economic growth. 
226. The representative of Nigeria  noted the significant growth in the United States since its last 
TPR, aided by the openness and transparency of th e trade regime, including liberalization on both an 
MFN and preferential basis.  However, market acces s barriers and other distorting measures, such as 
subsidies, persisted in few but important areas.  Nigeria agreed with the Secretariat report that 
addressing these distortions would benefit U.S. consum ers and tax payers, and help in strengthening 
the global economy. 
227. Nigeria appreciated the efforts to assist count ries in sub-Saharan Africa gain access to the 
U.S. market through AGOA.  A number of key ec onomic benefits and incentives aimed at promoting 
economic reform and trade expansion, as well as stre ngthening U.S. trade relations with sub-Saharan 
African countries, had been provided in the scheme.   This could be complemented with capacity 
building, with a view to overcoming the supply- side constraints being experienced by Nigerian 
exporters.  The use of trade hubs had been of imme nse benefit, but a lot more needed to be done.  
Nigeria also called on Members to e xpeditiously conclude action on th e waiver for AGOA, in order to 
provide security and predictability to investors. 
228. Nigeria noted that the United States intended to  remain engaged in the discussions on the Aid 
for Trade Initiative aimed at help ing the least trade-active countries participate in the global trading 
system.  This and the continued commitment to th e integrated framework were highly commendable.  
In addition, the early implementation of measures announced by the United States to implement the 
ruling in the dispute with Brazil on U.S. subsidi es on upland cotton, should have a positive impact on 
the plight of West African cotton growers. 
229. Nigeria called on the United States to demonstrate credible leadership, by exercising the 
requisite flexibility to ensure that the outcome of the DDA negotiations was development-friendly.  
Nigeria also hoped that the increasing resort to FT As would not diminish U.S. commitment to the 
MTS. 
230. The representative of Jordan  stated that because of the trade policies of the United States, the 
bridges over the Jordan River could be consider ed an important channel of cooperation between 
neighbours in a region that needed stability and p eace.  The relationship between his country and the 
United States was an example for other countries in the region.  Exports of Jordanian goods to the 
United States had reached US$1 billion in 2005.  The entry into force of an FTA with the WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 39 
 
 
United States in 2001 had been an important turn ing point for Jordan.  FTAs were an important 
opportunity for developing countries. 
231. The representative of Jordan also highlighted th e role of the United States in the DDA;  as a 
developing country, Jordan depended on U.S. co mmitment toward a successful development round. 
232. The representative of Kenya  stated that, as one of the majo r economies, the performance of 
the United States had a direct impact on world eco nomic growth.  In this  connection, Kenya was 
encouraged that the U.S. economy had been strong and steady since its last review, largely due to 
steps taken to create a stable macroeconomic environment that was conducive to trade and 
investments.  The United States was a major exporter and importer of goods and services, and 
therefore trade was important for its contribution to  the GDP and to overall economic growth.  As an 
important player in international trade, the frequent  use of WTO trade remedy instruments particularly 
on products originating from developing countries rema ined a source of concern.  Kenya considered 
this as an attempt by the United States to prot ect domestic production that was uncompetitive.  The 
current account deficit seemed to be unsustainable;   this was also a concern since it could have a 
significant adverse effect on interest rates and gl obal capital markets.  Kenya urged the United States 
to take the necessary steps to address its current account deficit. 
233. The United States had increased the number of countries with which it had concluded FTAs.  
The potential impact of these on third countries was a major concern.  FTAs had also, in a way, 
undermined the objective of existing U.S. preferen tial schemes for the benefit of some developing 
countries.  Kenya considered this strategy as a seri ous distraction from the multilateral trading system, 
which the United States had indicated was th e core of its international relations. 
234. Kenya commended the United States for its conti nued contribution to trade-related technical 
assistance and capacity building programmes for de veloping countries in the WTO.  Kenya also 
commended the United States for its leadership role  in the DDA and in particular the successful 
conclusion of the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference wh ich gave a clear direction to specific areas of 
the negotiations. 
235. At the bilateral level, the United States had a long-standing partnership with Kenya.  Kenya 
was a beneficiary under the United States GSP and the AGOA.  The passing of AGOA 3 by the U.S. Congress in June 2004 had been an important landma rk in Kenya's continued partnership with the 
United States.  Kenya therefore urged Members to expedite the granting of a waiver to AGOA.  
Kenya was also grateful to have been selected to be among the threshold countries under the 
Millennium Challenge Account. 
236. On trade in services, and particularly the tour ism sector, the number of tourists visiting Kenya 
from the United States had grown steadily, despite the travel warning placed on Kenya by the U.S. 
Government as a result of the terrorist events in Kenya in 1998.  Kenya urged the United States to 
consider lifting of the travel warning since the c onditions that necessitated its existence no longer 
prevailed.  This would ensure that Kenya reaped  maximum benefits from the tourism sector.  Kenya 
looked forward to continued cooperation with the Un ited States particularly on development issues. 
237. The representative of Morocco
 noted her country's close economic and political relations with 
the United States.  An FTA between them had ente red into force on 1 January 2006, and had been 
notified to the WTO.  Morocco hoped that th is FTA, would open new o pportunities to support 
economic growth and create  new jobs, especially through the prom otion of exports, encouragement of 
investment, and improvement of the trade envi ronment, taking into account the development 
differences. WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 40 
 
 
238. The United States had made efforts since its last TPR to promote trade and growth.  Morocco 
hoped that the United States would make a positive contribution to the conclusion of the DDA, and 
respond positively to the concerns of developing c ountries, notably with respect to;  eliminating 
export subsidies in agriculture and substantially  reducing domestic support;  promoting new market 
access opportunities for developing and least-developed countries, mainly through the elimination of 
non-tariff barriers;  finding ways to address the erosion of preferences;  granting effective technical 
and financial assistance;  encouraging special and differential treatment;  and encouraging capacity 
development. 
239. The representative of Rwanda  commended the United States for its commitment to the rules-
based multilateral trading system, and its leading ro le in the WTO negotiations.  Rwanda remained 
confident that the United States' dedication woul d make the Doha Round a successful development 
one.  Rwanda was pleased that the United States was an active participant in the Aid for Trade 
initiative to assist developing countries to benef it from trade opportunities by addressing supply-side 
constraints and trade-related infrastructure.  His delegation particularly commended the United States 
for the AGOA, enacted in May 2000, which ha d provided Africa with trade opportunities and 
economic benefits.  It had been instrumental in assisting poor countries to raise their exports to the 
United States, thus reducing povert y.  In the case of Rwanda, the tr ade policy of the United States, 
particularly the AGOA initiative, had permitted genoc ide widows in remote areas of Rwanda to 
export weaved baskets to the United States.  Widows had formed cooperatives and their work 
provided income to sustain them as well as the genoc ide orphans they looked after.  In addition, 
gathering together on an income-generating activ ity provide healing and reconciliation effects. 
240. The representative of Nicaragua  stated that the United Stat es was Nicaragua's main trading 
partner, absorbing 36% of its exports, providing 25 % of its imports and account ing for 34% of FDI.  
The conclusion of the CAFTA-DR Agreement had b een an important event for Nicaragua, and the 
National Assembly had just approved the legal amendments required for its implementation in 
Nicaragua, opening the way for its entry into for ce on 1 April.  CAFTA rules encompassed most 
policy aspects of the trade relations between th e United States and Nicaragua; it did not cover 
domestic support. 
241. The last notification on domestic support by the United States did not include support granted 
under the Farm Act of 2002 programmes.  Support to producers had increased considerably, reaching 
18% of producers' gross income, and this could in fluence international markets.  Products receiving 
the highest level of support were sugar, milk, wheat, and other cereals.  The new programme for 
peanuts was a major source of concern for her Gove rnment and Nicaragua considered that it should be 
added to the list.  According to National Agricult ural Service data, the average price received by 
peanuts farmers for the 2005 crop was of US$349 per tonne.  They would receive an additional 
US$140 per tonne in the form of direct payments, an ti-cyclical payments and loan programmes;  this 
represented some 40% of a farmers' net income.  In addition, since 2002 the Government had assumed 
reception, storage and transportation costs previous ly paid by the processor, representing between 
US$46 and US$68 per tonne.  The new peanut programme had increased output by some 40% over 2002-05, while consumption had risen by just 6%.  As a consequence, stocks had increased by 113% 
during the period, with the risk that they could sold  in international markets at prices below 
production costs.  Nicaragua asked the United St ates for an objective assessment of the peanut 
programme. 
242. Nicaragua  valued U.S. efforts to move forw ard the DDA, and in particular, the ambitious 
proposals presented.  Trade was its growth engine  for Nicaragua, and it hoped that the DDA would 
improve substantially market access for its exports and reduce effectively the distortions currently 
created by agricultural policies in international markets. WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 41 
 
 
V. REPLIES BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
 ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 
243. The representative of the United States  thanked Members for their views.  The United States 
shared the interest of African, Andean, and Caribb ean beneficiaries of U.S. preference programmes in 
obtaining approval of the waiver requests under consideration by the Council for Trade in Goods. 
(1) ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT  
(i) Twin deficits 
244. The representative of the United States  noted that many delegations had mentioned the U.S. 
twin deficits, and the importance of reducing the current account deficit through further action on the 
federal budget deficit.  The United States shared conc erns about the long-run sustainability of growing 
U.S. and global current account imbalances, and r ecognized the need to reduce them, while preserving 
healthy U.S. and global growth.  Its fiscally stimul ative policies adopted in the early part of the 
decade had helped it and the global economy to avoi d more serious downturns in economic activity.  
Those same policies were increasing federal revenues,  resulting in a decrease in the budget deficit as a 
share of GDP to 2.6% in 2005, from 3.6% in 2003 and 2004.  The U.S. administration's current 
budget projects a deficit of 1.4% of GDP by 2009, reflecting spending restraint. 
245. Action on the U.S. budget was not enough to address global imbalances.  The U.S. budget 
deficit as a share of GDP fell by one percentage  point between 2003 and 2005.  The U.S. current 
account deficit did not drop correspondingly;  rather , it rose by 1.7 percentage points, to 6.4% of 
GDP.  In considering the U.S. trade and current acc ount deficits, the following points had to be kept 
in mind:  the budget deficit was one of many factors underlying the U.S. current account deficit.  As a 
result, there was not a one-to-one relationship be tween changes in the U.S. budget balance and the 
current account balance;  trade and payment imbalances were global.   Other countries ran 
US$805 billion in current account surpluses to match th e U.S. deficit of US$805 billion last year;  
government policies and economic developments in ma ny countries besides the United States had led 
to the imbalances;  and addressing global im balances required action by many countries. 
246. Many factors, including saving and investment  rates and relative rates of economic growth 
were related to the U.S. deficit increase.  These mi ght be part of a broade r evolution, requiring a 
global adjustment, since government policies such  as budget-cutting or encouragement of private 
saving were unlikely to correct the current account de ficit by themselves.  According to a simulation 
conducted by the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank the highest  factors in explaining the U.S. current account 
deficit were increased productivity growth, which had made the United States a magnet for foreign 
saving, and the slump in foreign domestic demand.  To address the global imbalances successfully, changes were needed in:  U.S. government budgetary and other policies to encourage higher domestic 
savings;  U.S. trading partners' policies and f undamental economic conditio ns to support stronger 
economic growth;  and, in countries where savings exceeded domestic investment, the fundamental 
conditions limiting the attractiveness of internal investment to encourage domestic demand, and 
where appropriate, domestic demand growth, and to  promote a better balance between savings and 
domestic investment. 
(ii) U.S. economic outlook 
247. At least one Member had expressed concerns about  the U.S. economic outlook in light of the 
current account deficit, and the impact of a U.S.  slowdown on other countries.  U.S. real GDP had 
been growing strongly (by 4.2% in 2004 and 3.5% in  2005), despite an annualized rate of growth of 
1.6% in the fourth quarter of 2005.  The slowdown in the fourth quarter reflected unusual factors, WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 42 
 
 
including the temporary loss of oil and gas productio n after hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  The widely 
respected Blue Chip Consensus proj ected an annualized rate of U.S. real GDP growth of 4.7% in the 
first quarter of 2006, followed by seven quarters of roughly 3%.  The United States was committed to 
maintaining policies supportive of growth and a healthy economy. 
(iii) Free-trade agreements 
248. The U.S. premise underlying FTAs was that deep er economic integration could convey great 
economic and political benefits, and that the mu ltilateral system was the foundation on which U.S. 
FTAs were built.  Statements by trading partne rs expressing the value of their FTAs with the 
United States, and their strong commitment to multila teral liberalization, were proof of this.  U.S. 
FTAs also challenged the multilateral trading system to keep pace with the interests and needs of 
Members. 
(iv) Investment 
249. In response to questions by several Members on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States (CFIUS), which implemented the Exon-Fl orio legislation, the representative stated that 
the purpose of CFIUS was to ensure that legitimate  national security interests were protected, while 
encouraging foreign direct investment in the Unite d States.  The United States continued to be the 
world's largest host of foreign direct investment , which was currently US$1.5 trillion.  The vast 
majority of transactions submitted to CFIUS procee ded without an investigation;  since 1988, only 
one transaction subject to Exon-Florio had been blocked by the President.  The United States remained committed to maintaining its attractivene ss as a location for FDI, recognizing its significant 
and tangible benefits. 
(v) Dispute settlement 
250. The United States recognized its responsibility to implement adverse DSB recommendations 
and rulings.  Its overall compliance record in WTO dispute settlement was very good;  it had 
complied with the vast majority of DSB recommend ations and rulings, in nearly all cases within a 
reasonable period of time.  For the handful of disputes for which compliance was still pending, the 
United States continued to make efforts. 
251. The discussant
 noted that Members had appreciated the role of the U.S. economy in driving 
global growth, and recognized the need for the Unit ed States to maintain an open and competitive 
market, and the dangers of protectionism.  The discussant commended the United States for the strong performance of its economy, and remaining the world's largest importer of goods, services, and 
capital, despite natural and other challenges. 
252. The representative of the European Union
 noted that the United States was an open and 
highly competitive market.  The U.S. trade regime was characterized by generally low tariffs and a 
limited number of trade impediments.  The grow th of GDP and labour productivity during the past 
decade had been outstanding and could set an exampl e for the EU.  The EU agreed that openness to 
domestic and foreign competition had paved the way to U.S. economic growth.  Nevertheless, the 
fiscal deficit, low savings rate, and widening curre nt account deficit were sources of concern.  A 
robust and stable U.S. economy was crucial for sustainable world economic growth.  The EU appreciated the recognition by the United States that there were a number of domestic measures necessary to fight the twin deficits.  Actions by th e United States alone were not sufficient to deal 
effectively with international imbalances.  Furt her worldwide market opening was necessary, and the 
successful conclusion of the DDA would be an im portant contributing factor in this regard. WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 43 
 
 
(2) TRADE POLICIES AND MEASURES  
253. The representative of the United States  stated that many delegations had raised issues related 
to the Doha negotiations.  The United States was co mmitted to an ambitious and mutually beneficial 
outcome this year.  It had tabled proposals that would bulldoze tariff peaks and high tariffs, in both 
agriculture and NAMA, as well as a proposal in the agriculture negotiations th at would require major 
cuts in, and reform of, domestic support.  Regarding services, the United States was working with other Members to achieve ambitious and mutually bene ficial results.  It was equally committed to all 
other areas of the negotiations.  The United States re cognized the importance of its leadership role in 
the negotiations, but negotiations were a collective effort, a nd success could only be achieved if all 
Members contributed.  The key to success would be to pursue a high level of ambition.  The U.S. 
proposals demonstrated that the United States wa s prepared to make far-reaching changes in its 
policies and practices.  However, the United States c ould only do this in the context of an ambitious 
package that produced substantial and meaningful new opportunities in markets for agricultural and 
non-agricultural products, and services. 
(i) Border security measures 
254. Many Member had raised the issue of security measures.  These measures were essential.  A 
terrorist event involving sea containers could have po tentially devastating effects.  The United States 
was committed to ensuring that these measures we re implemented in a manner that minimized 
disruptions to trade:  they had created little, if an y, friction with trading partners.  The United States 
appreciated WTO Members' participation in th e open and participatory process it had used in 
developing and implementing the measures.  It had sought to take their comments into account, and 
welcomed continued feedback from Members on ways to improve these measures. 
255. In response to the discussant's question regard ing cooperation with foreign governments in 
programmes to enhance security, the representative not ed that under the Container Security Initiative 
(CSI), U.S. Customs and Border Protection worked  with host customs administrations in establishing 
criteria to identify high-risk containers.  There were more than 40 ports in 25 countries at various 
stages of CSI implementation, including Thailand,  Sri Lanka, Argentina, Brazil, Oman, and South 
Africa.  Assistance in complying with CSI require ments was provided to developing countries, for 
example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection pr ovided training in risk-based targeting techniques 
and 3D image analysis.  The United States also le nt developing countries sophisticated, non-invasive 
X-ray and gamma ray machines, and radiation detecti on machines used to screen high-risk containers.  
This assistance avoided the sometimes lo ng delivery times for such machinery. 
(ii) Trade remedies 
256. The United States believed that effective trade remedies were a necessary and integral part of 
a strong, rules-based trading system.  In consider ing and applying such remedies, it was important to 
honour WTO rules.  The United States appreciated Members' interest in its  objectives for the WTO 
rules negotiations.  The United States had made a numb er of proposals to enhance the rules relating to 
transparency, due process, and enforcement in trad e remedy proceedings.  It was seeking to address a 
surge in unjustified requests for new shipper revi ews, and to deal with the problems caused by 
circumvention.  In addition, it sought to strengt hen disciplines on subsidies to address the underlying 
causes of trade distortions leading to the use of  remedies.  The United States attached great 
importance to the fishery subsidies negotiations. WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 44 
 
 
(iii) Government procurement 
257. Several Members had expressed an interest in procurement restrictions pursuant to the Buy 
American Act.  The United States had waived the a pplication of Buy American provisions for goods 
and services covered by the GPA.  The United States had played a leading role in the current revision 
and streamlining of the GPA, given its strong inter est in making GPA participation attractive to all 
WTO Members.  It had also worked to secure  commitments from new WTO Members to accede to 
the GPA.  The United States was an active participan t in negotiations to revise the text of the GPA, 
and to expand market access opportunities under this Agreement. 
258. The discussant  stated that the confirmation that the United States was committed to an open 
and transparent trade environment was welcome.  Members had referred to a perceived shift in the 
attitude of the U.S. Congress toward protectionism.   The United States would need to keep in mind 
concerns regarding the balance between security and trade, the negative impact of government 
assistance on trade, government procurement, and th e proliferation of FTAs, including the signal 
FTAs sent to Members that were not parties to th em.  The dual track of pursuing FTAs and the DDA 
had taken its toll on USTR resources.  The U.S. trade policy regime had made it possible for most 
Members to trade effectively and profitably with  the United States.  The technical assistance and 
capacity building efforts of the United States were highly appreciated. 
259. The representative of Australia  underscored the belief shared between Australia and the 
United States regarding the importance of open gl obal markets.  Australia welcomed the U.S. 
proposal to reform U.S. domestic support to agri culture, which was a real contribution to the 
multilateral trading system, and consistent with the need for global approaches to problems in 
agriculture trade.  It also reflect ed the U.S. commitment to change its support policies in agriculture.  
Australia urged the United States to keep focused on these types of changes.  Australia shared the 
U.S. commitment to improve market access in agriculture. 
260. The representative of China  shared the discussant's view on FTAs.  The United States was 
pursuing a number of FTAs at a time when the Doha negotiations were at a critical stage.  Although 
this might not pose any resource problems to the Un ited States, there were concerns that U.S. FTA 
partners might have to divert resources away from multilateral negotiations to service bilateral 
negotiations.  China hoped that the United States would concentrate on the multilateral negotiations, 
especially because of the tight deadlines under the TP A.  China understood the concerns underlying 
security measures.  However, sometimes these measur es were cumbersome and affected trade:  there 
had been cases where exports of fresh fruit from Chin a transported in air conditioned containers had 
had to be unloaded and exposed in the open air for five hours upon arrival at a U.S. port;  the cargo 
had then had to wait five to seven days to clear customs.  This had resulted in significant costs to 
traders.  The United States should consider how to strike a proper balance be tween security concerns 
and trade facilitation. 
261. Regarding intellectual property rights, Ch ina was concerned about the unilateral 
investigations under section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Ac t of 1930, which provided U.S. industries with a 
dual remedy and affected imports from other Members,  especially developing countries.  China also 
considered that the business exemption under section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act was 
inconsistent with U.S. obligations  under article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, as ruled by the DSB in 
2000.  China urged the United States to comply with WTO rulings and the relevant provisions of the Berne Convention. 
262. The representative of Cuba
 stressed that the blockade imposed by the United States against 
Cuba was a multilateral issue.  The blockade violated the national treatment and MFN principles, which were binding under WTO agreements.  It also violated the freedom to trade and to navigate.  WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 45 
 
 
The blockade was an essential part of U.S. po licy towards Cuba.  This policy also included 
aggressions, radio-electronic wars, political manipulati on of migrants, and terrorism.  Its objectives 
had been in place since April 1960.  According to a senior State Department official at the time, the 
objective of the blockade was to deny money and inputs to Cuba with a view to diminishing wages 
and to causing hunger, desperation, and the fall of  the Government.  The blockade had clear extra-
territorial effects and violated WT O rules.  Because of it, Cuba ha d no access to credit;  Cuban aircraft 
and boats, and boats from third c ountries calling on Cuban ports coul d not use port facilities in the 
United States;  companies from third countries could not export to the United States products 
containing Cuban raw materials, or export to Cuba  products containing U.S. technology, or products 
with U.S. content exceeded 10% of value.  Several U. S. measures with extra-territorial effect violated 
WTO principles and should therefore be repealed, including the Torricelli Act of 1992, which prevented exports to Cuba by U.S. subsidiaries in  third countries, and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, 
which provided for additional extra-territorial measures. 
263. Of the 77 companies and NGOs fined in 2004 fo r allegedly violating the blockade, 11 were 
foreign companies or U.S. subsidiaries established in  third countries.  Seven companies were fined 
heavily because of alleged violations of the blockade  by their U.S. subsidiaries.  Cuba called on the 
United States to bring its trade policy in conformity  with WTO obligations by repealing all laws and 
regulations with extra-territorial effect. 
264. The representative of the European Union
 shared the U.S. view that FTAs were 
complementary to the multilateral trading system.  However, there were important differences 
between the EU and U.S. approaches to FTAs.  The EU believed it was important to focus on the 
successful conclusion of the DDA, and to use FTA s to "top up" multilateral liberalization.  The 
United States had taken a different route, driving forward several FTAs in parallel to the DDA.  The 
EU questioned this strategy, because it shifted polit ical attention by dome stic constituencies away 
from the DDA, rather than becau se of concerns about negotiating capacity.  The appetite for 
liberalization was limited among domestic constituencies.  The EU hoped that the United States 
would not consume this scarce resource in conc luding FTAs, and at the expense of multilateral 
liberalization.  The EU understood the U.S. focus on opening agricultural markets in the context of the 
DDA.  However, openness in non-agricultural a nd services markets across countries was highly 
unbalanced, and the EU considered these i ssues at least as important as agriculture. 
265. The EU was pleased that the United States had a relatively open maritime regime, and that it 
recognized the need for further work in the energy  sector.  The EU encouraged the United States to 
take further steps to liberalize its services market, and hoped that that the plurilateral request would 
provide a good opportunity towards increased openn ess.  The EU was concerned about the proposed 
extension of the Exon-Florio legislation to other sect ors.  This risked undermining the U.S. policy of 
openness to foreign investment.  The representative noted the lack of transparency and remaining 
barriers in government procurement at the sub-federa l level, which posed particular problems to small 
and medium-sized enterprises.  The United States should remedy this situation. 
266. The representative of Japan  stated that Japan was encouraged  by the bright prospects of the 
U.S. economy, the U.S. commitment to the conclusion  of the DDA, and U.S. efforts to seek the right 
balance between security and trade.  Some writte n responses provided by the United States were not 
fully satisfactory, including those on the Jones Act,  and Japan wished to readdress these issues.  It 
wished to continue expert-level consultations with the United States on maritime transport security.  
Other responses by the United States had dealt only partially with Japan's concerns, including those 
on the Byrd Amendment and other areas of non-compliance.  Japan looked forward to resolving outstanding issues in a constructive and expeditious manner. WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 46 
 
 
267. The representative of India  hoped that the United States would give due consideration to 
issues raised by India in connection with the U.S. pa tent regime, particularly the granting of broad and 
bad patents, and the disclosure of the source of ge netic material and traditional knowledge by patent 
applicants. 
268. The representative of the United States  noted that the domestic environment for advancing 
trade liberalization was difficult, but the United States was committed to achieving this.  Regarding 
FTAs, the United States disagreed that regional or bilateral negotiations had distracted countries from 
the WTO negotiations, while recognizing that ne gotiating with the United States was a labour-
intensive effort.  There were certain syne rgies between FTAs and multilateral negotiations. 
269. The United States was trying to make security measures as trade friendly as possible, and it 
welcomed suggestions on how to do this better.  Regarding th e problems encountered by Chinese 
fresh fruit at the U.S. border, th e Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade would soon be working 
to establish food and vegetable pre-clearance progra mmes.  The United States was willing to continue 
working with China and other partners on this issu e.  However, problems as the one noted by China 
had not been an overwhelming impediment to Chinese imports into the United States, which last year 
amounted to US$240 billion. 
270. On intellectual property, the representative noted that, although a 1989 GATT dispute 
settlement panel had found some of  the procedures in section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 to be 
inconsistent with national treatment, the United States had amended its re gime through the Uruguay 
Round implementing legislation, bringing it into conformity with national treatment.  The United 
States had worked intensively on the Irish music ca se, but had not succeeded in bringing its regime 
completely into compliance with the WTO.  The Un ited States had applied a three year arrangement 
providing compensation, but the agreement had not b een extended.  Issues related to the Convention 
on Biodiversity were under discussion at the WTO a nd were controversial.  Many U.S. companies 
were involved in bio-prospecting and were sensitive to countries' concerns regarding disclosure of 
resources and sharing of benefits.  A number of interesting steps taken by private companies had 
brought great benefits to the countries invol ved, while allowing the work of finding new 
pharmaceutical products to advance.  The United States would continue to participate actively in these 
discussions. 
271. The United States had an open regime for intern ational maritime transport services and, as a 
result, enjoyed some of the world's most competitive sh ipping rates.  Offers tabled in the context of 
the Doha negotiations were from a relatively small group of countries and did not match the U.S. level 
of liberalization.  As a result, it was difficult fo r the United States to undertake new commitments in 
maritime transport.  There was a lot of political anxiety regarding security, which had flowed over into foreign investment discussions.  However, fore ign investment was very important to the U.S. 
economy.  The Administration recognized this and would therefore resist proposals to restrict 
investment.  The United States was ready to cont inue discussions on security, DSB compliance, and 
some of the services issues raised by Japan. 
(3) S
ECTORAL POLICIES AND MEASURES  
272. The representative of the United States  noted that the recent increase in domestic support for 
agriculture had been necessary, particularly b ecause of the devastating hurricane season.  The 
hurricanes in 2005 had severely disrupted transpor tation and commodity markets, resulting in very 
low prices.  In addition to Louisiana, hurricanes had caused extensive damage to  agriculture in Florida 
and other southern states, and high energy pri ces had caused economic distress.  Nonetheless, the 
United States remained within its WTO-allowe d limits on domestic support.  Regarding the 
interaction between crop insurance and emerge ncy assistance, crop insurance was not always WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 47 
 
 
available or sufficient in cases of extreme disast ers like those in 2005.  There were provisions 
stipulating that the combination of crop insuran ce and disaster payments could not exceed 100% of a 
loss. 
273. The United States attached great importance to services and had made it clear that a strong 
outcome was essential for a successful conclusion of the DDA.  The U.S. offer in the Doha 
negotiations improved an already robust set of  commitments by offering new or enhanced 
commitments in a number of sectors.  The United States recognized Members' interests in mode 4.  
U.S. temporary entry commitments were among th e most generous among WTO Members.  Only a 
handful of developed Members had offered comp arable commitments.  The United States was 
concerned that some developing countries were looking at this issue primarily in terms of potential 
remittances.  The GATS dealt only with temporary movement of personnel, and was not meant to 
promote permanent migration of labour, the prim ary source of remittances.  The U.S. insurance 
market was open and highly competitive.  U.S. Stat es welcomed foreign insurance suppliers and had 
worked through the National Association of Insura nce Commissioners to facilitate the licensing of 
companies to operate in more than one state, and to ensure consistent supervision.  On air transport, 
the U.S. Department of Transportation had proposed to define "actual control" of U.S. airlines in a 
way that would significantly enhance airlines' ac cess to foreign capital and permit greater foreign 
involvement in the management of the commercial side of U.S. carrier operations.  The comment 
period on the proposed rule had closed and the Department was reviewing the comments. 
274. The discussant  encouraged the United States to continue to pay attention to travel advisories 
resulting from terrorist activities. 
275. The representative of China  noted that many developing countries' requests on mode 4 asked 
for improvements in U.S. visa procedures and th e facilitation of movement of foreign service 
providers.  The United States had not made an offer in this area.  A recent report by the American 
Chamber of Commerce in China indicated that the U.S. visa policy continued to place U.S. companies 
at a disadvantage, that one in six respondents had lost significant sales or business relationships 
because of visa-related issues, and that many manufactu rers feared that customers, particularly capital 
equipment purchasers, were developing a preference for EU suppliers because of the difficulties in 
obtaining visas to travel to the United States.  Ch ina urged the United States to improve its policies 
relating to the movement of natu ral persons and visa procedures. 
276. The representative of the European Union  noted that the recent upswing in domestic support 
to agriculture had not only been due to an increase in emergency payments, but also to other forms of 
domestic support.  The EU would like to see the U.S. notification on domestic support.  In contrast to 
developments in the United States, trade-distorting domestic support ha d fallen consistently in the EU 
following the CAP reform, and was well below WTO limits.  The EU was disappointed with the U.S. 
negotiating position, which disregarded progress made  by the EU and established an unfortunate link 
to market access in agriculture, instead of reci procating the steps taken by the EU and presenting 
comparable proposals covering all aspects of domestic support policies in agriculture. 
277. The EU agreed that there was a misunderstanding on mode 4 in some developing countries.  
Neither labour mobility nor migration were covered by the GATS.  However, the U.S. horizontal 
carve-out of all mode 4 commitments weakened the services negotiations' potential.  The EU 
understood developing countries' interests in genuine mode 4 commitments.  The EU, in spite of the 
sensitivity of the issue, had tabled substantial co mmitments in this area.  The EU hoped that the 
United States would review its stance and would undertake mode 4 commitments. 
278. The EU welcomed the emphasis by the Unite d States on sustainable economic growth and 
sustainable development, particularly in its econo mic, development, and e nvironmental strategies.  WT/TPR/M/160 
Page 48 
 
 
The EU hoped that the United States would follow- up on employment-related matters and core labour 
standards. 
279. The representative of Kenya  endorsed the point made by th e discussant regarding the U.S. 
policy on travel advisories, particularly on countries affected by terrorist attacks. 
280. The representative of Mexico  noted that the distinction between migration and the temporary 
movement of natural persons was clear to Mexico .  There were requests on mode 4, including by 
Mexico, that were clearly related to the GATS, and not to remittances. 
281. The representative of the United States  recognized that travel advi sories were a very sensitive 
issue, particularly for countries that were heavily dependent on tourism.  The United States wished to 
ensure the safety of its citizens but also to apply its  policy in a fair manner.  The visa issue raised by 
China was of concern to the U.S. business co mmunity, and was receiving significant attention 
domestically.  More broadly, one of the most diffi cult issues for the United States in the services area 
was mode 4:  it was aware of the importance count ries attached to this issue.  The congressional 
environment to deal with it was very difficult, but the United States would continue its efforts in this 
area.  The United States would work with all its tr ading partners to obtain very strong outcomes in 
agriculture, services, and all other areas covered by the round. WT/TPR/M/160 
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 
282. This eighth Trade Policy Review of the United States has provided an opportunity to discuss 
changes in U.S. trade policies and practices since Ja nuary 2004, revisit issues considered in earlier 
reviews, and enhance our understanding of the current state of the U.S. trade and investment regime.  
Our discussions have greatly benefited from the whol e-hearted engagement of the U.S. delegation led 
by Ambassador Allgeier, from the informed cont ributions by the discussant, Ambassador Mohamed, 
and from the insightful comments made by a large number of WTO Members. 
283. At the outset, I would like to highlight the unequivocal recognition by Members that the U.S. 
trade regime is one of the world's most liberal and transparent.  But no trade policy regime is perfect 
and Members took advantage of this review to enga ge the United States in a frank exchange of views 
about possible improvements to its trade regime.  The discussions took place in a constructive atmosphere, and were greatly aided by the efforts made by the U.S. delegation to provide timely 
answers to questions that had been submitted two weeks before the meeting, and to other advance 
questions posed by Members.  I thank Ambassador A llgeier and his delegation for their hard work in 
this respect, and for the U.S. attachment to the TPRM and its effective operation. 
284. The interest shown by Members in the policies of the United States is evidence of its major 
role in the multilateral trading system, and of its  economic importance as the world's largest importer 
and one of its engines of growth.  In this rega rd, Members were complimentary of the strong U.S. 
growth record but expressed concerns about the si ze and sustainability of present imbalances.  The 
United States acknowledged that an open trade policy do es not provide the tools to deal directly with 
aggregate trade imbalances;  instead, addressing such imbalances would be aided by higher rates of U.S. savings, and stronger growth and more attrac tive investment conditions in foreign markets. 
285. The United States was commended for its leadership  in the multilateral trading system and the 
DDA, and was invited to continue exercising this leadership to facilitate the conclusion of the 
negotiations.  Members welcomed the steps taken by  the United States to comply with WTO rulings, 
but noted that in some cases implementation of rulings was pending or had been delayed.  The 
United States was also asked to submit lagging WTO notifications.  The importance granted by the United States to its participation in regional tr ade agreements was stressed, with some Members 
considering such participation sup portive of multilateral efforts but ot hers raising concerns about its 
possible distortionary effects.  A number of devel oping countries recognized the benefits they derived 
from U.S. unilateral preferences but it was also noted  that this should not be at the expense of non-
beneficiaries. 
286. The U.S. trade regime was acknowledged as bei ng generally open, but concerns remain in 
areas such as tariff peaks, non- ad valorem  duties, and the administration of tariff quotas.  These 
measures seem to affect in particular textil es and clothing and agricultural products.  Several 
Members also described certain technical regula tions and SPS measures as significant impediments to 
trade.  Members also raised the issue of restric tions on government procurement including at the sub-
federal level. 
287. Members expressed concern about the continued active use of anti-dumping measures, and 
the additional bond requirements introduced in 2004.   While Members noted that investigation 
initiations have declined, the United States was urged to exercise restraint in initiating new 
investigations.  Members also voiced some worry about government support to agriculture, noting that 
trade distorting forms of support are still significant and might have risen recently.  The United States was invited to seize the opportunity for reform provided by the expiry of the 2002 Farm Act next year.  The United States was also urged to notify up-to-d ate information on domestic support, including for 
programmes under the 2002 Farm Act. WT/TPR/M/160 
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288. Members noted that security considerations c ontinue to play a prominent role in the 
formulation of U.S. trade and investment policy.  Thus, they urged the United States to ensure that security-related initiatives are non-discriminatory and as least trade-restrictive as possible. 
289. Regarding services, comments were mainly made with respect to telecommunications, 
maritime and air transport, financial services, as well as professional services and movement of 
natural persons.  On maritime transport, some Me mbers asked the United States to review the Jones 
Act, and to table an offer in the context of the ongoing service negotiations. 
290. In closing, I would like to thank again the U.S.  delegation for the oral and written responses 
provided during the meeting;  we all look forwar d to receiving answers on out standing questions.  The 
wide interest shown by Members in this review reflects the vital importance of the United States to 
the multilateral trading system.  It also demonstrat es the value of the TRPM  even for Members that, 
like the United States, maintain largely open and tr ansparent trade and investment regimes.  This 
review has highlighted a number of possible improvements to the U.S. regime, many of which could be brought about as part of the DDA negotiations.  In this regard, I am heartened by the statement by 
the United States that its long run economic interest s have been very well served by openness.  I am 
also encouraged by the stated willingness of the United States to take political risks to achieve a 
mutually beneficial outcome to the DDA, something I would urge all Members to do. 
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