WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
1 March 2011 
 (11-1003) 
Committee on Sanitary a nd Phytosanitary Measures  
  
 
 
SPECIFIC TRADE CONCERNS 
 
Note by the Secretariat
1 
 
Addendum  
  
ISSUES CONSIDERED IN 2010 
 
 
 This part of document G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11 c ontains summary information regarding all 
issues which were raised in the SPS Committee for the first time during 2010, and issues which were 
previously raised but on which further discussions  or activities occurred during 2010.  This includes 
issues for which there was no substantive discu ssion in the Committee during 2010, but where 
Members reported that a previously raised issue ha d been resolved, or where substantive action on the 
issue occurred in another WTO body during 2010 (e.g ., establishment of a dispute resolution panel on 
the issue).   A total of 33 specific trade concerns were brought to the attention of the Committee during 2010, of which 22 were new issues.  Figure 1 shows a ll trade concerns raised or for which a resolution 
or other action was reported in 2010, by subject.  Ov erall, nine issues (27 per cent) relate to food 
safety, seven issues (21 per cent) relate to plant health and four issues (12 per cent) relate to other concerns.  The remaining 13 issues (40 per cent) rela te to animal health and zoonoses;  this category 
includes issues such as tr ansmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSEs) that are also relevant for 
food safety.  Figure 2 indicates that TSEs account for 31 per cent of animal health concerns raised in 
2010, while issues related to foot and mouth diseas e account for 15 per cent, avian influenza for 31 
per cent, and the remaining 23 per cent concern other animal health issues. 
                                                     
 
1 This document has been prepared under the Secret ariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice 
to the positions of Members or to their rights or obligations under the WTO. G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page ii  
 
  FIGURE 1 - TRADE CONCERNS BY SUBJECT – 2010 
02468101214
Total 13 9 7 4
New 9733Animal Health Food Safety Plant Health Other
 
 
FIGURE 2 - TRADE CONCERNS RELATED TO ANIMAL HEALTH & ZOONOSES – 2010 
 
TSE
31%
FMD
15%AI
31%OAH
23%
TSE
FMD
AI
OAH
  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page iii 
 
 
  FIGURE 3 - PARTICIPATION OF MEMBERS - 2010 
 
1510
171823
100
18
0 5 10 15 20 25Members Maintaining
the Measure in
QuestionSupporting MembersMembers Raising the
IssueNumber of Members
Developed Countries Developing Countries Least-Developed Countries 
 Of the 33 trade concerns discussed in 2010, in 10 cases a developed country Member has 
raised the issue, compared to 23 cases for de veloping country members.  On some occasions, 
developing and developed country Members have raised  or supported the same issue.  No cases were 
raised by a least-developed country Member in 2010.  Developed country Members have supported 
another Member raising the issue in 15 cases an d developing country Members have supported 
another Member in 18 cases.  No cases were supporte d by a least-developed country Member in 2010.   
 In 17 cases, the measure at i ssue was maintained by a developing country Member, and in 18 
cases it was maintained by a developed country Memb er.  Some specific trade concerns are with 
regard to measures maintained by  more than one Member, including combinations of developed and 
developing countries.  For the first time, a trad e concern regarding measures maintained by a least-
developed country Member was raised. 
 Four trade concerns raised in 2010 were put on th e agenda solely to report that they had been 
resolved, and in one case, the Committee was informed  that a partial solution had been found.  One of 
the resolved issues related to TSEs, one to AI, and two to plant health protection.  The partially 
resolved issue related to TSEs.  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page iv  
 
  Table 1 – Issues Raised for the First Time in 2010 
Specific 
trade 
concern number  Member(s) Maintaining the 
Measure Title Status
2
291 Chinese Taipei  BSE measures NR 
292 United States  Prohibition of ornamental plants larger 
than 18 inches  NR 
293 France, European Union3 Risks arising from carambola fruit fly 
in French Guyana  NR 
294 Malaysia  Import restrictions on plant and plant 
products  NR 
295 European Union  Artificial colour warning labels  NR 
296 China  SPS notification practices NR 
297 Canada  Registration requirements for pet food 
export enterprises in China NR 
298 Colombia  Import restrictions on Brazilian beef NR 
299 United States  US 2009 Food Safety Enhancement 
Act  NR 
300 European Union  EC Regulation No. 1099/2009 NR 
301 United States  US risk analysis for the entry of queen 
bees NR 
302 Turkey  Restrictions on products derived from 
biotechnology NR 
303 Senegal  Import restrictions on poultry meat NR 
304 Canada  Proposed MRL for 1-methylcyclo-
propene in bananas NR 
305 Indonesia  Import restrictions on beef and 
recognition of the principle of 
regionalization NR 
306 European Union  Maximum residue levels of pesticides NR 
307 Japan  Prohibition of certain food additives NR 
308 Brazil  Restrictions on bovines and bubalines 
for reproduction NR 
                                                      
2 NR= Not Reported, P = Partially resolved, R= Resolved 
3 On 1 December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community  (done at Lisbon, 13 December 2 007) entered into force.  On 29 
November 2009, the WTO received a Verbal Note (WT/L/7 79) from the Council of th e European Union and the 
Commission of the European Communities stating that, by virtue of the Treaty of Lisbon , as of 
1 December 2009, the European Union replaces and succeeds the European Community.  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page v 
 
 
  Specific 
trade 
concern number  Member(s) Maintaining the 
Measure Title Status
2
309 Brazil  Labeling of products of animal origin 
(G/SPS/N/BRA/654) NR 
310 Brazil  Measures on canned sardines 
(G/SPS/N/BRA/666) NR 
311 Albania, Croatia  Restrictions on poultry and poultry 
products  NR 
312 Mexico  Restrictions on beef exports due to 
BSE-related concerns NR 
 
Table 2 – Other Items Considered During 2011 
Specific 
trade 
concern number  Member(s) Maintaining the 
Measure Title Status
4
81 European Union  Wood packing material R 
185 India  Restrictions due to avian influenza NR 
193 Certain Members  General import restrictions due to BSE PR 
257 United States  Import restrictions on cooked poultry 
products from China R 
267 Japan  Pesticide maximum residue level 
(MRL) enforcement system NR 
270 Mexico  Import restrictions on rice R 
277 Canada, Mexico, United States  NAPPO draft standard for ships and 
cargoes from areas infested with Asian gypsy moth NR 
283 Japan  Pesticide maximum residue levels 
(MRLs)  NR 
284 United States  Rule on importation of wooden 
handicrafts from China NR 
288 Ukraine  Import measures on animals and 
animal products R 
290 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  Suspension of inspection and delivery 
of plant and animal health certificates 
for imports NR 
                                                      
4 NR= Not Reported, P = Partially resolved, R= Resolved G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page vi  
 
  Table of contents
 
 
Page  
ALBANIA ........................................................................................................................ .......................1  
CONCERNS RELATED TO ME ASURES MAINTAINED BY ALBANIA ..................................................1  
Animal health.................................................................................................................. ................1  
311. Restrictions on poultry and poultry products – Maintained by Albania and 
Croatia ........................................................................................................................ .........1  
BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (VENEZUELA) .....................................................1  
CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURES MAINTAINED BY VENEZUELA .............................................1  
Other concerns................................................................................................................. ...............1  
290. Suspension of inspection and delivery of pl ant and animal health certificates for 
imports – Maintained by Venezuela ....................................................................................1  
BRAZIL ......................................................................................................................... .........................3  
CONCERNS RELATED TO ME ASURES MAINTAINED BY BRAZIL .....................................................3  
Food safety.................................................................................................................... ...................3  
309. Labeling of products of animal  origin (G/SPS/N/BRA/654)...............................................3  
Animal health.................................................................................................................. ................3  
308. Restrictions on bovines and bubalines for reproduction......................................................3  
Other concerns................................................................................................................. ...............4  
310. Measures on canned sardines (G/SPS/N/BRA/666)............................................................4  
CANADA ......................................................................................................................... .......................5  
CONCERNS RELATED TO ME ASURES MAINTAINED BY CANADA ...................................................5  
Food safety.................................................................................................................... ...................5  
297. Registration requirement for pet food export enterprises in China......................................5  
304. Proposed MRL for 1-methylcyclopropene in bananas ........................................................5  
Plant health................................................................................................................... ...................6  
277. NAPPO draft standard for ships and car goes from areas infested with Asian 
gypsy moth – Maintained by Canada, Mexico and the United States .................................6  
CHINA .......................................................................................................................... ........................11  
CONCERNS RELATED TO ME ASURES MAINTAINED BY CHINA ....................................................11  
Other concerns................................................................................................................. .............11  
296. SPS notification practices ..................................................................................................11  
COLOMBIA....................................................................................................................... ..................11  
CONCERNS RELATED TO ME ASURES MAINTAINED BY COLOMBIA .............................................11  
Animal health.................................................................................................................. ..............11 
298. Import restrictions on brazilian beef..................................................................................11   G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page vii 
 
 
  CROATIA........................................................................................................................ .....................12  
CONCERNS RELATED TO ME ASURES MAINTAINED BY CROATIA ................................................12  
Animal health.................................................................................................................. ..............12  
311. Restrictions on poultry and poultry products  - Maintained by Croatia and 
Albania (See item 311, page 1)..........................................................................................12  
EUROPEAN UNION................................................................................................................. ..........12  
CONCERNS RELATED TO MEAS URES MAINTAINED BY THE EUROPEAN UNION .........................12  
Food safety.................................................................................................................... .................12  
295. Artificial colour warning labels .........................................................................................12  
306. Maximum residue levels  of pesticides...............................................................................14  
Animal health.................................................................................................................. ..............15  
300. EC Regulation No. 1099/2009...........................................................................................15  
Plant health................................................................................................................... .................16  
81. Wood packing material......................................................................................................16  
293. Risks arising from carambola fruit fly in French Guyana – Maintained by France ..........17  
INDIA.......................................................................................................................... ..........................18  
CONCERNS RELATED TO ME ASURES MAINTAINED BY INDIA ......................................................18  
Animal health.................................................................................................................. ..............18  
185. Restrictions due to avian influenza....................................................................................18  
INDONESIA...................................................................................................................... ...................27  
CONCERNS RELATED TO ME ASURES MAINTAINED BY INDONESIA .............................................27  
Animal health.................................................................................................................. ..............27  
305. Import restrictions on beef and recognition of the principle of regionalization ................27  
JAPAN .......................................................................................................................... ........................28  
CONCERNS RELATED TO ME ASURES MAINTAINED BY JAPAN .....................................................28  
Food safety.................................................................................................................... .................28  
267. Pesticide maximum residue level (MRL) enforcement system .........................................28  
283. Pesticide maximum resi due levels (MRLs).......................................................................30  
307. Prohibition of certain food additives .................................................................................32  
MALAYSIA....................................................................................................................... ...................33  
CONCERNS RELATED TO ME ASURES MAINTAINED BY MALAYSIA .............................................33  
Plant health................................................................................................................... .................33  
294. Import restrictions on plant and plant products .................................................................33  
MEXICO......................................................................................................................... ......................33  
CONCERNS RELATED TO ME ASURES MAINTAINED BY MEXICO .................................................33  
Animal health.................................................................................................................. ..............33  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page viii  
 
  312.
 Restrictions on beef exports due  to BSE-related concerns ................................................33  
Plant health................................................................................................................... .................34  
270. Import restrictions on rice..................................................................................................34  
277. NAPPO draft standard for ships and car goes from areas infested with Asian 
gypsy moth - Maintained by Mexico, Canada and the United States (See 
item 277, page 6) .............................................................................................................. .35 
SENEGAL ........................................................................................................................ ....................35  
CONCERNS RELATED TO ME ASURES MAINTAINED BY SENEGAL ................................................35  
Animal health.................................................................................................................. ..............35  
303. Import restrictions on poultry meat ...................................................................................35  
SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND 
MATSU (CHINESE TAIPEI)......................................................................................................... ....36  
CONCERNS RELATED TO ME ASURES MAINTAINED BY CHINESE TAIPEI ....................................36  
Animal health.................................................................................................................. ..............36  
291. BSE measures ................................................................................................................... .36 
TURKEY ......................................................................................................................... .....................36  
CONCERNS RELATED TO ME ASURES MAINTAINED BY TURKEY .................................................36  
Other concerns................................................................................................................. .............36  
302. Restrictions on products de rived from biotechnology.......................................................36  
UKRAINE........................................................................................................................ .....................38  
CONCERNS RELATED TO ME ASURES MAINTAINED BY UKRAINE ................................................38  
Food safety.................................................................................................................... .................38  
288. Import measures on animals and animal products.............................................................38  
UNITED STATES.................................................................................................................. ..............39  
CONCERNS RELATED TO ME ASURES MAINTAINED BY UNITED STATES .....................................39  
Food safety.................................................................................................................... .................39  
299. US 2009 Food Safety Enhancement Act ...........................................................................39  
Animal health.................................................................................................................. ..............40  
257. Import restrictions on cooked poultry products from China..............................................40  
301. US risk analysis for th e entry of qu een bees......................................................................43  
Plant health................................................................................................................... .................43  
277. NAPPO draft standard for ships and car goes from areas infested with Asian 
gypsy moth - Maintained by the United States, Canada and Mexico (See 
item 277, page 6) .............................................................................................................. .43 
284. Rule on importation of wooden handicrafts from China ...................................................43  
292. Prohibition of ornamental plants larger than 18 inches .....................................................45   G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page ix 
 
 
  CERTAIN ME MBERS ................................................................................................................ .......46  
CONCERNS RELATED TO ME ASURES MAINTAINED BY CERTAIN MEMBERS ..............................46  
Animal health.................................................................................................................. ..............46  
193. General import restrictions due to BSE .............................................................................46     G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
   Page 1  
 
  ALBANIA 
CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURES MAINTAINED BY ALBANIA Animal health 311. Restrictions on poultry and poultry pro ducts – Maintained by Albania and Croatia 
Raised by: Chile 
Supported by: United States 
Dates raised: October 2010 (G /SPS/R/61, paras. 155-161) 
Relevant document(s): Raised orally 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
1. In October 2010, Chile reported that Albani a restricted imports of poultry products from 
Chile allegedly because of avian influenza.  Howe ver, no avian influenza had been found in Chile 
since 2002.  If Albania's concern was with regard to  the A1/ H1N1 virus, Chile noted that there was 
no scientific evidence that this virus was spread by  poultry products.  Chile therefore requested that 
Albania remove these emergency measures. 
2. The United States supported Chile's request a nd urged all Members to remove any trade 
restrictions that had been imposed due to H1N1. 
3. Albania indicated that this information would be transmitted to the authorities, who would 
reply to Chile shortly. 
4. Chile indicated that Croatia had also imposed  restrictions on poultry products from Chile 
allegedly because of avian influenza.  As there ha d been no avian influenza in Chile since 2002, there 
was no scientific basis for these restrictions.  Furthe rmore, Croatia had not notified those measures to 
the WTO.  Chile requested Croatia to remove those measures without delay. 
5. Croatia responded that the measures had been introduced in 2009 on the basis of an OIE 
warning about an emerging disease situation in Chile .  However, the emergency measure had expired 
after six months, and had been fo rmally abolished in August.  Th is would be notified to the WTO 
shortly. 
6. Chile expressed concern that Members should not introduce restrictions in reaction to 
information provided to the OIE for purposes of tran sparency, rather Members should be encouraged 
to be more transparent about their measures. 
BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (VENEZUELA) 
CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURE S MAINTAINED BY VENEZUELA 
Other concerns 290. Suspension of inspection and delivery of plan t and animal health certificates for imports 
– Maintained by Venezuela G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 2  
 
  Raised by: Colombia 
Supported by:  
Dates raised: October 2009 (G/SPS/R/56, pa ra. 202), March 2010 (G/SPS/R/58, paras. 
41-43), June 2010 (G/SPS/R/59, paras.  48-51), October 2010 (G/SPS/R/61, 
paras. 29-30) 
Relevant document(s): G/SPS/GEN/983. 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as resolved:   
 
7. In October 2009, Colombia informed the Comm ittee of Venezuela recent decision to stop 
issuing SPS certificates for certain goods coming fro m Colombia.  In response, Venezuela requested 
that Colombia present the details of their concer n and assured the Committee that they would deal 
with this matter on a bilateral basis.   
8. In March 2010, Colombia presented G/SPS/GEN/ 983, which detailed its concern about the 
suspension of inspections and the delivery of pl ant and animal health certificates for Colombian 
products into Venezuela.  Colombia considered that the measures adopted by Venezuela were in 
flagrant violation of the basic provisions of the SPS Agreement, in particular Article 2, Annex C and 
Article 13 (Implementation), and would cause severe economic losses to Colombia. 
9. Venezuela responded that the information presented in G/SPS/GEN/983 was not based on 
official documents or an actual certification refusal , but rather on information from the press.  The 
request for approval related to me dication Lendormin should not be c onsidered an SPS matter, but as 
an import licensing issue outside the scope of th e SPS Agreement.  Venezuela suggested that the 
issues raised by Colombia be discussed bilaterally. 
10. Ecuador,  the Plurinational State of Bolivia (B olivia) and Cuba encouraged both countries to 
try to solve their differences bilaterally. 
11. In June 2010, Colombia reitera ted the concerns presented in G/SPS/GEN/983.  Colombia 
considered the measures adopted by  Venezuela to represent undue obst acles to trade as these were not 
based on scientific evidence of a health risk.  In  response to Venezuela's comments at the March 2010 
meeting that Colombia was relying only on pr ess reports, Colombia had submitted additional 
documentation showing instructions banning the delivery of licenses and permits.  Colombia wished 
to receive an explanation as to why those instructions had been issued. 
12. Venezuela repeated its suggestion that the issu es raised by Colombia be discussed bilaterally. 
13. Cuba and Bolivia again encouraged both count ries to solve their di fferences bilaterally. 
14. In October 2010, Colombia reported that the issu e of sanitary restrictions had been discussed 
in a meeting between the Presidents of Venezuela and Colombia as part of the normalization of trade relations between the two countries.  Colombia ho ped that expeditious progress would be made, so 
that a resolution might be reported to the Committee in March 2011. 
15. Venezuela confirmed that bilateral contacts ha d been established between the two countries 
and that reports would be provided on the progress made in resolving this issue.  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 3 
 
 
  BRAZIL 
CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURES MAINTAINED BY BRAZIL Food safety 309. Labeling of products of an imal origin (G/SPS/N/BRA/654) 
Raised by: European Union 
Supported by:  
Dates raised: October 2010 (G/SPS/R/61, paras. 41-42) 
Relevant document(s): G/SPS/N/BRA/654 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
16. In October 2010, the European Union stated th at it welcomed the postponement until January 
2011 of the entry into force of Brazil's labeling provisions, but noted that the new labeling requirements were not based on science, and could aff ect a wide range of products exported to Brazil.  
The European Union sought clarification from Braz il on the sanitary risks the labeling requirements 
were intended to address. 
17. Brazil stated that the draft legislation on labeling requirements fo r imported products of 
animal origin reflected requirements that had been  in place since 1998.  Due to the high number of 
comments received on the draft legislation, Br azil had extended the deadline for comments until 
November 2010.  The draft legislation was supposed to  enter into force in January 2011.  Brazil hoped 
that further bilateral technical exchanges of info rmation would successfully address the EU concerns. 
Animal health 308. Restrictions on bovines and bubalines for reproduction 
Raised by: Colombia 
Supported by:  
Dates raised: October 2010 (G/SPS/R/61, paras. 22-23) 
Relevant document(s): Raised orally. 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
18. In October 2010, Colombia expressed concern that the entry into force of Brazil's new 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA) standard 46 would nullify the 2003 
Memorandum of Understanding re garding bovines and bubalines and semen of bubalines from 
Colombia.  Brazil's recognition of the FMD-free st atus of Colombia was not forthcoming.  The 
Brazilian authorities had requested more informa tion following the 2003 and 2006 recognition of the 
FMD-free status of Colombia.  This information ha d been sent and discussed in bilateral meetings in 
2007.  In 2008, MAPA had indicated a need for a ne w verification visit, but had failed to carry out 
this visit.  In bilateral meetings held in the margins of the SPS Committee meeting, Brazil had G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 4  
 
  proposed a new quarantine procedure which Colombia  hoped would lead to the resolution of this 
problem. 
19. Brazil indicated that the bilateral meeting had b een a useful opportunity to clarify some issues 
and resume discussions.  Brazilian sanitary authoriti es had concluded that the new quarantine station 
on the Island of Cananea in the state of Sao Paol o, which had recently started its operations, could 
provide additional guarantees as rega rded the sanitary controls for Co lombia's exports to Brazil.  If 
Colombia's exports of live cattle and buffalos were s ubject to certain procedures at that station, it 
would facilitate the solution of the matter.  Braz il's requirements were due to the existence in 
Colombia of a certain strain of the vesicular stom atitis virus which affected bovines.  This virus was 
exotic to Brazil, and of major concern in the Mercosur region. 
Other concerns 310. Measures on canned sardines (G/SPS/N/BRA/666) 
Raised by: Morocco 
Supported by: European Union 
Dates raised: October 2010 (G/SPS/R/61, paras. 43-46) 
Relevant document(s): G/SPS/N/BRA/666 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
20. In October 2010, Morocco stressed the importanc e of the fish sector for Morocco's economy, 
and in particular canned sardines which represente d 94 per cent of their canned fish.  Although 
Brazil's notification did not identify health concer ns, in Morocco's view the notified measure was 
more restrictive of trade than necessary.  The no tified measure was also in contradiction with the 
Codex principle of identification of sardine speci es, and Codex should be referred to when adopting 
measures.  Brazil's notified measure could seriously  restrict canned sardine exports from Morocco and 
constituted unfair competition at the global level.  Morocco also considered that the measure was in 
contradiction with Articles 3.5 and 12.4 of th e SPS Agreement and sought reactions from other 
Members, especially from the European Union as a major importer of canned sardines. 
21. The European Union supported the concerns of  Morocco, and noted that Brazil's deadline for 
comments was 40 days and not the recommended 60 days .  Brazil's requirements were not in line with 
the relevant Codex standards and the European Un ion urged Brazil to align its measures with the 
relevant international standards. 
22. Brazil reported that the draft legislation had b een also notified to the TBT Committee.  All 
comments received would be duly taken into account  and Brazil was willing to hold any technical 
meetings considered necessary by Morocco.  Braz il did not understand how a measure that would be 
less trade restrictive than one based on an internationa l measure could be considered to be a barrier to 
trade.  While Brazil's list of species that could be  used for canned sardines was shorter than the Codex 
list, according to Article 5 of the draft legi slation the Brazilian list was not exhaustive. 
23. Peru recalled that there had been a previous  case between Peru and the European Union on 
the denomination of sardines which had also involved Codex standards. 
  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 5 
 
 
  CANADA 
CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURES MAINTAINED BY CANADA Food safety 297. Registration requirement for pet food export enterprises in China 
Raised by: China 
Supported by:  
Dates raised: June 2010 (G/SPS/R/59, paras.17-18) 
Relevant document(s): Raised orally. 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
24. In June 2010, China referred to Canada's registration requirement for pet food export 
enterprises in China.  In April 2008, China had sen t a letter to Canada inviting a field inspection of 
Chinese pet food companies who intended to export to  Canada.  After receiving no reply, in April 
2009 China sent a second letter requ esting facilitation of the inspecti on process.  Canada had replied 
to that letter stating that only those companies th at had already corresponded with Canadian importers 
could be inspected due to limited financial res ources.  Although China had indicated that it was 
willing to bear the costs, Canada had still refused to accept China's request.  China invited Canada to 
reconsider its request. 
25. Canada reported that industries in both countries we re interested in pet food exports, and that 
a new inspection plan was initiated earlier in the m onth.  A list of 60 facilities were on the original 
list, and Canada had elected to start with 19 facilitie s that already held valid import permits.  Canada 
was prepared to send several teams to simultaneously  visit different facilities, and would continue its 
technical dialogue with China. 
304. Proposed MRL for 1-methylcyclopropene in bananas 
Raised by: Ecuador 
Supported by: Colombia, Costa Rica 
Dates raised: March 2010 (G/SPS/R/58, paras. 49-51) 
Relevant document(s): G/SPS/N/CAN/413 and Corr.1 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
26. In March 2010, Ecuador expressed concerns w ith Canada's notification of 22 December 2009 
regarding 1-methylcyclopropene in or on bananas.   This product was used to prevent premature 
ripening of fruit due to ethylene exposure.  This product was not registered with Ecuador's agricultural 
quality assurance agency AGROCALIDAD and Code x had not established an MRL for it.  
Consultations with the private sector had shown th at exporting companies affiliated with the banana 
exporters' association of Ecuador did not use this  product.  Nevertheless, Ecuador was concerned G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 6  
 
  about the notified regulation, which proposed an extremely low MRL and could thus become a trade 
barrier.  Therefore, Ecuador requested an explana tion of the scientific basis for the proposed MRL. 
27. Colombia and Costa Rica shared Ecuador's c oncern, while Venezuela expressed a systemic 
interest in the issue. 
28. Canada acknowledged Ecuador's concern and noted that Canada  followed the transparency 
obligations to avoid unnecessary barriers to trade.  The comment period on the notification had ended 
on 2 March 2010, and Canada had not received any co mments, nor any requests for an extension of 
the deadline for comments.  If Canada received a request for such an extension from Ecuador, the 
deadline would be extended. 
Plant health 
277. NAPPO draft standard for ships and cargoes from areas infested with Asian gypsy moth 
– Maintained by Canada, Mexico and the United States 
Raised by: China 
Supported by: Indonesia, Japan, Korea 
Dates raised: October 2008 (G/SPS/R/53, pa ras. 112-120), February 2009 (G/SPS/R/54, 
paras. 128-135), June 2009 (G/SPS/R/ 55, paras. 136-140), October 2009 
(G/SPS/R/56, paras. 151-156), June 2010 (G/SPS/R/59, paras. 54-56) 
Relevant document(s): G/SPS/GEN/880 and G/SPS/N/CAN/281/Rev.1 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
29. In October 2008, China raised concerns relati ng to a draft regional standard of the North 
American Plant Protection Organization (NAPPO) entitled "Guidelines for Regulating the Movement 
of Ships and Cargoes Aboard those Ships from Areas Infested with the Asian Gypsy Moth".  This 
standard would require NAPPO members (Canada, Mexico and the United States) to impose strict 
phytosanitary measures on ships and cargoes incl uding from China, Japan, Korea, Mongolia and 
Russia.  More detailed information was presented in G/SPS/GEN/880. 
30. China had the following concerns regardi ng the draft standard:  (1) if passed and 
implemented, it would have serious impacts on inte rnational trade;  (2) it was inconsistent with 
Articles 2.2 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement;  and (3) it had ambiguities regarding the technical 
application of the measure in different NAPPO count ries and in different climatic conditions.  China 
urged NAPPO members to delay the implementati on of the standard until it was recognized by 
relevant organizations including the IPPC. 
31. Indonesia, Japan and Korea indicated that they sh ared the concerns raised by China regarding 
the draft NAPPO standard. 
32. The United States reported that the NAPPO standard pertaining to inspection and certification 
requirements related to the Asian Gypsy Moth ( AGM) was still in a draft form, and more changes 
could be made based on comments submitted by c oncerned countries.  China had declined an 
invitation to participate in a meeting held in Oct ober 2008 to allow trading partners to present their 
concerns regarding the standard.  A harmonized  standard among the three NAPPO members would 
allow ships to enter any port in a NAPPO country after being approved by the first port of call.   G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 7 
 
 
  Finally, the United States invited Members with concerns to engage in discussions with NAPPO 
members regarding this issue. 
33. Canada supported the United States and stated that previous incursions of AGM had caused 
serious and costly problems for Canada.  Mexico  supported the interventions made by the United 
States and Canada. 
34. China stated that technical comments had alr eady been sent to the NAPPO secretariat and 
hoped that further meetings coul d be held between NAPPO members and the concerned countries. 
35. The European Communities reported that it had not taken new measures on AGM, but it 
remained vigilant to any potential risk.  There we re parallels between this issue and ISPM 15 on wood 
packaging material that had previously been exte nsively discussed in the Co mmittee.  The European 
Communities hoped that similar solutions to the AGM problem could be found. 
36. Norway expressed interest in this issue and its impact on Norway's exports. 
37. Mali asked if there were quarantine measures ag ainst AGM and whether the pest existed in 
the NAPPO countries.  The United States clarified th at this pest was not present in NAPPO countries 
and that it was very invasive.  Based on this in formation, Mali agreed that NAPPO countries should 
take the necessary measures to prevent th e entry of AGM into their countries. 
38. In February 2009, China reported that it had maintained good communications with officials 
from NAPPO countries.  The draft standard had been revised and was undergoing a second comment soliciting process.  Technical expert groups from NA PPO had been sent to China, Japan and Korea 
for exchange of information, including on risk assessment.  China welcomed the open and transparent 
working procedures of the NAPPO countries.  China requested NAPPO countries not to adopt the 
standard until comments and concerns were take n into account.  In addition, China recalled the 
provision in Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement SPS measures must be based on scientific evidence. 
39. China also reported that the occurrence of AGM had been significantly reduced in its 
territory, and joint surve illance with the United States in some  Chinese ports showed that no AGM 
was detected.  China further recalled the SPS Agre ement provision for the least trade-restrictive 
measure to be applied.  China acknowledged th e legitimate objective pursued by NAPPO, but any 
SPS measure must comply with the relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement. 
40. Japan supported the statement by China, and al so appreciated NAPPO's  transparent and open 
procedures.  Japan underlined that the proposed sta ndard could result in a huge impact on the trade 
between Japan and NAPPO countries.  Japan was undertaking consultations  with its relevant 
stakeholders before submitting its comments to NAPPO, and requested that the draft standard on 
AGM not be adopted until its comments were duly considered. 
41. Indonesia reported that it had similar concerns  on the draft NAPPO standard on AGM, which 
was a pest listed in its regulation for quarantin e measures.  Indonesia supported the objectives of 
RSPM 33, but further studies were needed on the po ssibility of the insects to  survive long distance 
journeys from Indonesia to North America in cargoes.   Lastly, Indonesia stated that it followed the 
recommendations and treatments provided in ISPM 15  in all of its shipping from Indonesia to North 
American countries. 
42. Korea shared the concerns raised by China a nd Japan, and expressed regret that the draft 
standard on AGM did not consider the low prevalence of this pest in Korea.  Korea argued that the 
draft standard might pose an excessive restriction on trade, and did not consider other less-restrictive G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 8  
 
  treatments that were available.  Korea highlighted the need for scientific justification, which it had 
recently conveyed to NAPPO. 
43. Canada underlined that the NAPPO measure on AGM aimed at controlling a real risk to 
North American forests, which had been affected by AGM in the past resulting in a multi-million US 
dollar process for eradication.  NAPPO members we re aware of the trade impact and the costs 
associated with control measures, and it was in NAPPO  members' interest to keep shipping costs low 
for both imports and exports.  The draft regional st andard had been develope d to be no more trade 
restrictive than necessary to effectively address th e risks associated with AGM.  Regular meetings 
with trading partners had been held, including vis its from NAPPO members' experts to China, Japan 
and Korea.  The results from these consultations would be taken into account in the elaboration of the 
regional standard. 
44. The United States affirmed that AGM was a highly invasive pest, not present in North 
America, and which had been found  on a number of occasions in port areas in North America.  The 
NAPPO Pest Risk Assessment Panel had conducted a risk assessment which concluded that NAPPO 
members should adopt specific phytosanitary measur es to prevent the introduction of AGM in North 
America.  This risk assessment was available upon request, and was the basis for the draft NAPPO 
standard for AGM.  The draft standard had not been adopted by the NAPPO Executive Committee at 
its October 2008 annual meeting, due to the number of public comments which were still being 
reviewed.  In February 2009, a NAPPO delegati on had held a constructive meeting with Chinese 
regulatory officials to discuss the draft standa rd.  Similar cooperative initiatives were being 
undertaken with Japan and Korea.  The United Stat es assured its trading partners that the applied 
phytosanitary measures would be consis tent with WTO rights and obligations. 
45. Mexico corroborated the statements by the United States and Canada, and indicated that 
Mexico attached high importance to the topic.  Me xico looked forward to continuing to work with 
concerned trading partners to mitigate any potential risk of introduction of AGM into North America. 
46. Chile inquired whether phytosanitary standard s developed by regiona l organizations were 
considered international standards or regi onal standards according to the SPS Agreement. 
47. The Secretariat clarified that the SPS Agreem ent makes clear reference to international 
standards for plant health as being the ones develo ped under the auspices of the secretariat of the 
IPPC in cooperation with regiona l organizations operating within the framework of the IPPC.  
Therefore, standards developed by regional organiza tions alone were not likely to be considered by 
the SPS Agreement as an international standard.  If WTO Members applied or incorporated those 
regional standards into their domestic legislati on, however, then the SPS Agreement would apply. 
48. In June 2009, China observed that the draft regional standard deve loped by NAPPO on AGM 
had a tremendous potential to impact trade between China and countries in North America.  The draft 
standard pertained to all ports in China, wherea s the AGM had historically been found only in the 
north-eastern part of China.  The occurrence of th e AGM in China had been reduced significantly, and 
a joint survey conducted by China and the USDA in 2008 identified no occurrence of AGM in China.  
China welcomed the open and transparent working pr ocedure of the NAPPO countries, and noted that 
it had sent written comments on the revised draft sta ndard at the end of February 2009.  China 
stressed the need for scientific justification for the proposed measure, and requested that different 
geographic and climatic characteris tics be taken into account.  Chin a invited NAPPO and its member 
countries to participate in a workshop in July that would highlight the preventive and control 
measures it had taken.  China was concerned with the operability of the current draft standards, 
especially with regard to certification and insp ection requirements, noting the impossibility of 
checking ships and cargo at night, as many ships de parted before dawn.  Moreover, as numerous non- G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 9 
 
 
  plant related cargo such as cars and steel also had to  be inspected, it would lead to an increase in 
costs, thus creating a barrier to trade. 
49. Japan supported the statement by China, and stress ed that the proposed standard could have a 
huge impact on international trade.  Japan had submitted its comments at the end of April and 
requested that the revised draft standard not be adopted until its comments were duly considered.  
Korea and Indonesia shared the concerns raised by China and Japan and also requested that Member's 
concerns be taken into account. 
50. Canada underlined that the NAPPO standard aimed at controlling a real risk to North 
American forests, which had been affected by AGM in the past with multi-million dollar costs for 
eradication.  Since March 2009, six ships had b een found with AGM egg masses on board.  NAPPO 
members were aware of the trade impact and the cost s associated with control measures, and it was in 
their own interest to keep shipping costs low for both imports and exports.  The draft regional standard had been developed to be no more trade restrictive than necessary to effectively address the 
risks associated with AGM.  Comme nts of all stakeholders would be taken into account when the 
standard was finalized in August 2009.  Once the regional standard had been adopted, Canada, the 
United States and Mexico would work in a coordina ted approach to consider  direct impacts of the 
standard on trade. 
51. The United States affirmed that AGM was a highly invasive pest, not present in North 
America, and which had been found  on a number of occasions in port areas in North America.  The 
regional standard was based on a risk assessment  which was available upon request.  The United 
States had been working diligently along with Mexico and Canada to solicit scientific and technical 
inputs from concerned countries.  NAPPO experts trav eled to China, Japan and Korea in February 
2009 to consult directly with regulatory officials, leading to constructive inputs.  In June 2009, the NAPPO forestry panel reviewed the comments receive d and a revised draft of the standard would be 
made available in August 2009.  The United States assu red its trading partners that the phytosanitary 
measures applied would be cons istent with WTO obligations. 
52. Mexico supported the statements by the Unite d States and Canada, and expressed its interest 
in  continuing to work with concerned trading partners. 
53. In October 2009, China noted that this was the f ourth time that it was raising this concern in 
an SPS Committee meeting.  The "Guidelines for Re gulating the Movement of Ships and Cargo from 
Areas Infested with the Asian Gypsy Moth" ha d been approved by the North American Plant 
Protection Organization (NAPPO) on 10 August 2009  with immediate eff ect.  The Guidelines 
identified risk management options for the moveme nt of ships and cargo from areas infected with 
Asian Gypsy Moth, such as inspection, systemic appro aches, pest-free areas, certification, rejection of 
the shipment, refusal of entry etc.  The guidelines did not mention specific countries but stated that the 
pest was "present in temperate As ia, has been reported east of the Ural Mountains, but no definitive 
distribution information in eastern Europe is avai lable."  China reiterated its serious concerns 
regarding this standard, and the hope that the memb er countries of NAPPO would take these concerns 
and comments into consideration when developing  specific implementation actions, in order to 
minimize the adverse impact of their SPS measures on international trade. 
54. Korea supported China's intervention and noted th at this standard was adopted without any 
critical reflection of concerned parties' comments, a lthough this standard coul d have a negative impact 
on international trade.  Korea therefore asked NAPPO  member countries to implement the standard in 
a manner which would minimize the negative impact  on trade in accordance with the SPS Agreement 
and the relevant international st andard.  These measures should reflect the role and responsibility of 
the exporting and importing country in a balanced manner. G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 10  
 
  55. Japan supported the views of China and Korea, and intended to consult with NAPPO and its 
member countries on the implementation of this standa rd to ensure that the measure was economically 
and technically feasible and not more trade restrictive than necessary. 
56. Canada noted that the NAPPO measure on AGM wa s being put in place to control the risk to 
North America's forests.  NAPPO representatives ha d been diligent in ensuring that all concerned 
stakeholders, including the shipping industry, had b een consulted.  The standard would be phased in 
with full implementation taking place in March 2012.  The measure had taken all possible SPS 
measures into consideration and had been developed to be no more trade restrictive than necessary to 
manage the risk.  Furthermore, all NAPPO member countries were working with affected Members to 
come up with appropriate implementation plans and a number of Members had already participated in 
these meetings.  The risk of introduction of AGM was acute;  in 2009 Canadian authorities had 
detected egg masses on ten ships traveling from the region, and each egg mass contained thousands of 
eggs. 
57. Chile questioned whether this issue belonged unde r the agenda item related to the monitoring 
of the use of international standards.  Was it a ppropriate for the SPS Committee to raise this matter 
with NAPPO since it was not one of the three sisters?   Chile suggested that this types of issue could 
be addressed under specific trade concerns. 
58. IPPC indicated that although regional plant pr otection organizations were recognized in the 
IPPC convention and often the regi onal organizations depos ited regional standards with the IPPC, this 
did not make these an international standard.  Th e IPPC work programme in cluded consideration of 
the need for an international standard on the moveme nt of pests via ship containers and vessels.  In 
such situations, the IPPC might use a regional st andard as the basis for the development of an 
international standard. 
59. In June 2010, China raised concerns on Cana da's notification, circulated on 7 May 2010, 
concerning its plant protection policy for marine vessels which may carry  AGM.  China and other Members had previously expressed concerns about the application of the NAPPO regional standard 
on AGM.  While China recognized Canada's rights to develop phytosanitary measures, China was 
concerned about the negative effect of the measure on exports and its scientific  justification.  China 
requested (i) that Canada provide a risk assessment report of AGM from Chinese-consigned marine vessels prior to implementing the draft regulation;  a nd (ii) that the different climatic conditions of 
China's ports be considered in determining the ri sk of AGM.  Finally, China suggested that required 
documentation for marine vessels should be limited to marine vessels that visited ports in regulated 
areas during the egg laying season of AGM within 1to 2 years to minimize unnecessary trade 
obstacles. 
60. Korea referred to the comments it had sent on Canada's notification.  Korea expressed 
concerns about the measure's proposed adoption date  of 1 June 2010 and asked that the measure be 
implemented with minimum trade impacts. 
61. Canada reported that it had held  a constructive bilateral meeting with China prior to the 
Committee meeting.  Canada reiterated that the NA PPO measure was being put in place to protect 
North American forests and pre-empt the high cost s of eradication.  In 2009, egg masses of AGM 
were found on ships from Asia.  The standard w as approved on 10 August 2009, had entered into 
force in 2010 and would be phased in by March 2012.  Canada emphasized that all stakeholders had 
been consulted during that process, that it continued to take into account the concerns of its trading 
partners, and that a technical working group had b een established to address concerns and risks in a 
collaborative manner.  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 11 
 
 
  CHINA 
CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURES MAINTAINED BY CHINA Other concerns 296. SPS notification practices 
Raised by: European Union 
Supported by:  
Dates raised: June 2010 (G/SPS/R/59, paras. 15-16) 
Relevant document(s): Raised orally. 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
62. In June 2010, the European Union expr essed concerns over China's SPS notification 
practices.  On 1 June 2009, China's new Food Safety  Law had entered into force.  This legislation 
involved many new national food safety measures, cr eating a framework food safety legislation with 
the objective of assuring high levels of health prot ection.  While the European Union welcomed the 
objectives of the legislation, it was concerned that the rapid development of these measures meant that 
trading partners were not informed of the new legi slation before adoption or  did not have adequate 
time to comment prior to enforcement.  Trading pa rtners had been notified only after the adoption of 
the new Food Safety Law even though the legislati on included, for example, new measures on dairy 
products, additives, contaminants, veterinary medi cines, and commodities such as honey.  China had 
submitted almost 100 SPS notifications on food additiv es within a few days, providing only a 15-day 
deadline for comments.  None of the notifications in cluded references to the original text.  China had 
not agreed to requests to extend the period for comments, even to the normally recommended 60-day 
period, despite the time required for reviewing such  a large volume of technical standards.  The 
European Union requested that China clarify its procedure and indicate how it would ensure its SPS 
notification practices gave reasonable time frames fo r trading partners to comment and for China to 
take these comments into serious consideration. 
63. China explained that the notification of a larg e number of national standards in a short time 
period was the result of the adoption of a new F ood Safety Law.  Codex and other international 
standards had been fully considered in the deve lopment of the new measures, and as a result China 
believed that trade effects should be minimal.  Members were welcome to continue to make 
comments, and China would take into account th e comments received even after the end of the 
comment period before the publication of standards, and in future modifications.  China was starting 
to include hyperlinks in the notifications, as reco mmended, but in all cases the Enquiry Point could 
provide full texts upon request.  China would info rm its standard-setting agencies about the EU 
comments for future improvements in the process. 
COLOMBIA 
CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURES MAINTAINED BY COLOMBIA 
Animal health 298. Import restrictions on Brazilian beef G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 12  
 
  Raised by: Brazil 
Supported by:  
Dates raised: June 2010 (G/SPS/R/59, paras. 19-20) 
Relevant document(s): Raised orally. 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
64. In June 2010, Brazil expressed concerns rega rding the lack of reaction by Colombian 
authorities to a Brazilian proposal for a sanitary certif icate for the export of beef to Colombia.  In 
2006, Brazil had presented a certificate to export m eat products to Colombia, however, in February 
2007 Colombia had indicated that this proposal did not fulfill its requirements.  In 2007, Brazil had 
presented a new version of the certificate but de spite various diplomatic contacts and bilateral 
meetings, Brazil still had not received a response from Colombia regarding its risk analysis. 
65. Colombia reported that in November 2006, the Brazilian embassy in Colombia had requested 
a template for the official export certification of  edible beef products.  In November 2006, the 
Colombian Agricultural Institute (ICA) had requested  the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA) 
to provide a clarification regarding which produ cts would be covered by the proposed health 
certificate.  Colombia had not yet received an answer  to this communication.  In February 2008, ICA 
had began the process of risk analysis for the im portation of bovine and buffalo products by sending a 
questionnaire to MAPA, and in June 2008 had un dertaken a verification visit regarding MAPA 
measures for bovine disease control.  ICA had sent the report of the visit to Brazil in November 2008, 
but had not received any response to the report.  Su ch a response was necessary in order to continue 
the process solicited by Brazil. 
CROATIA 
CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURES MAINTAINED BY CROATIA Animal health 
311. Restrictions on poultry and poultry products  - Maintained by Croatia and Albania (See 
item 311, page 1)  
EUROPEAN UNION CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURES MAIN TAINED BY THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Food safety 295. Artificial colour warning labels  
Raised by: United States 
Supported by: Mexico, New Zealand 
Dates raised: March 2010 (G/SPS/R/58, par as.28-30), June 2010 (G/SPS/R/59, paras. 45-
47), October 2010 (G/SPS/R/61, paras. 39-40) 
Relevant document(s): G/SPS/N/EEC/291 and Add.1 
Solution:   G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 13 
 
 
  Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
66. In March 2010, the United States raised con cerns about EU Regulation (EC) 1333/2008 on 
food additives.  Article 24 of the Regulation re quired warning statements on food products that 
contained one or more of six colour additives:   Sunset Yellow (E110), Quinoline Yellow (E104), 
Carmoisine (E122), Allura Red (E129), Tartrazine  (E102), and Ponceau 4R (E124).  The United 
States was particularly concerned with the scientif ic basis of the regulation, its potential negative 
impact on international trade, and the transparency of  its adoption.  Most of these six colour additives 
were widely used by the food industry in products  such as confectionaries and beverages.  When the 
regulation was notified to the WTO Secretariat (G /SPS/N/EEC/291), it did not contain the provision 
on warning statements, and the United States was not aware of an addendum to the original 
notification.  Statistics from the University of S outhhampton and the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA) did not substantiate a link between the indi vidual colours and possible behavioural effects in 
infants.  The United States was also concerned th at the European Union planned to implement the 
measure in July 2010. 
67. New Zealand and Mexico supported the concerns raised by the United States, noting that the 
measure did not seem to be based on scientific evidence. 
68. The European Union stressed that the issue of  colorants was a complex and delicate matter, 
especially in confectionary and beverages consumed by children and infants.  The identified additives 
raised concerns related to health problems in ch ildren, such as hyperactivity, attention loss, and 
deficit-disorder.  The study by the University of  Southhampton raised con cerns and media interest, 
which led shops and retailers to phase out the sale of products containing those food additives.  The 
new EU regulatory regime on additives and colo rants was not an import ban but only introduced 
certain specific labeling provisions.  An opinion  from EFSA concluded that although the changes 
noticed in child behaviour were small, they were st atistically significant.  The European Union also 
clarified that an addendum to the original notif ication had been submitted to the WTO Secretariat 
(G/SPS/N/EEC/291/Add.1).  The new measure allowe d for an 18-month transitional period before 
entering into force.  The measure was not discrimin atory, since it is applied equally to European 
producers and imports from third countries. 
69. In June 2010, the United States reiterated concerns about EC Regulation 1333/2008 on food 
additives.  The United States was particularly c oncerned that even though EFSA was unable to 
substantiate a link, the European Union planned to  implement the measure in July 2010.  The United 
States had recently petitioned the European Union to delay implementation a nd would shortly provide 
the European Union with more than 580 studies to warrant a thorough scientific review of relevant 
evidence. 
70. New Zealand and Mexico supported the concerns raised by the United States. 
71. The European Union clarified that the labeli ng requirement had been adopted in December 
2008 and included a transitional period of 18 months  for implementation, which would expire on 20 
July 2010, allowing industry time to comply.  This measure had been notified by the European Union 
as a draft on 10 August 2006 (G/SPS/N/EEC/291) and as an addendum with the final text on 2 July 
2009 (G/SPS/N/EEC/291/Add.1).  A 2007 study by th e University of Southampton had concluded 
that exposure to some mixtures of colorants resulted in increased hyperactivity in 3-year old and 8- to 
9-year old children.  The new EU regulatory regime  on artificial colorants was not an import ban but 
only introduced certain specific labeling provisi ons.  An opinion from EFSA had concluded that 
although the changes noticed in child behaviour were sm all, they were statistically significant.  Until G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 14  
 
  new elements demonstrated the absence of those e ffects, the European Union's position would remain 
unchanged.  The European Union encouraged the Un ited States to share any additional scientific data 
as it became available. 
72. In October 2010, the United States reiterated its concerns about EC Regulation 1333/2008 on 
food additives.  The United States was concerned th at even though EFSA was unable to substantiate a 
link, the European Union implemen ted the measure in July 2010, disregarding available pertinent 
information from relevant intern ational organizations, such as th e Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee 
on Food Additives.  The United States requested info rmation from the European Union on any further 
expansion of the list of additives to be subjected to the warning labels. 
73. The European Union clarified that the new EU regulatory regime on artificial colorants used 
in food products was not an import ban but only introduced certain specific labeling provisions.  The 
labeling requirements had entered into force in July 2010 and had not had any noticeable effect on 
trade.  A transitional period of 18 months for implementation had been provided, allowing industry 
time to comply.  The European Union would cont inue the evaluation, through EFSA, of all food 
additives to avoid any unnecessary trade disruption.  The European Union pointed out that at its 
March 2010 session, the Codex Committee on Food Add itives had postponed the decision to adopt 
new provisions for one of the Southampton colours,  Ponceau 4R, in soybean-based beverages due to 
safety concerns.  Until new elements  demonstrated the absence of a dverse effects of the Southampton 
colorants, the EU position would remain unchanged. 
306. Maximum residue levels of pesticides 
Raised by: India 
Supported by: Brazil, Pakistan, Thailand 
Dates raised: October 2010 (G/SPS/R/61, paras. 17-19) 
Relevant document(s): G/SPS/N/EEC/196/Add. 2, G/SPS/N/EEC/196/Add.10, G/SPS/N/EEC/382, 
EU Revised Plant Protection Re gulation 1107/2009, EC Regulation 
396/2005. 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as resolved:   
 
74. In October 2010, India referred to three EU no tifications on the adoption of MRLs for certain 
pesticides (G/SPS/N/EEC/196/Add.2, G/SPS/N/EEC/196/Add.10 and G/SPS/N/EEC/382) within the framework of the EU Revised Plant Protection Regulation 1107/2009.  EC Regulation 396/2005 
established the legislative framework for MRLs of pesticides in or on food and feed of plant and 
animal origin, which was notified by the Europ ean Commission in April 2005.  India was concerned 
that the MRLs for a number of chemicals were set at the "limit of detection" (LOD).  This was the residue limit which could be detected using analyti cal methods/testing procedures available in Europe.  
Different climatic conditions in India required a diffe rent use of pesticides in agricultural production.  
No scientific evidence had been provided to justify the setting of the MRL at the LOD, especially for 
imported products.  For some subs tances, the MRLs in EU cereals was much higher than the approved 
level of the same substance in rice.  The setting of  MRLs at the LOD had impacted India's exports of 
agricultural products to the European Union, and In dia requested the European Union to provide the 
validated testing methods it used to arrive at  the LOD as well as the scientific basis and risk 
assessment for the MRLs.  India considered that  the EU MRLs resulted in the violation of 
Articles 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 5.1 and 5.4 of the SPS Agreement.  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 15 
 
 
  75. Thailand shared India's concerns, observing that  in the recent EU notifications the proposed 
MRLs for some chemicals were much lower than th e levels set by Codex.  Brazil and Pakistan also 
shared India's concerns about the EU procedure for establishing MRLs. 
76. The European Union explained that the new le gislation on pesticide residues was in place 
since 1 September 2008.  MRLs had undergone a co mmon EU consumer intake assessment carried 
out by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)  to make sure that all classes of consumers, 
including vulnerable ones such as babies and children,  were sufficiently protected.  The validated 
analytical methods used by the European Union co uld be found on the website of the EU Reference 
Laboratories for Residues of Pesticides.  The model used for estimating the dietary intake of 27 EU 
consumer groups was available on the EFSA website .  The risk assessment methodology used for 
setting the MRLs came from the framework establishe d by the Codex, as described by a 2002 Joint 
FAO/WHO Meeting on Pesticide Residues' (JMPR) re port.  An LOD was set when there was a safety 
concern for consumers from the use of a pesticide at  high levels or when there was no authorized use 
on a specific crop within the European Union or th ird countries.  The proposed revisions of the EU 
MRLs had been notified to the WTO in 2003, 2005 and 2007, and all WTO Members and 
stakeholders had also been informed about all th e individual values that were proposed.  The MRLs 
were fixed and published in the Offi cial Journal if no reaction to the notifications had been received.  
Nevertheless, applicants in and out side the European Union could a pply to have import tolerances set 
for higher MRLs in specific cases.  Although the European Union was aware of the different geo-
climatic conditions in India, data on the sa fety of imported products was still necessary. 
Animal health 
300. EC Regulation No. 1099/2009 
Raised by: India 
Supported by: China, Viet Nam 
Dates raised: June 2010 (G/SPS/R/59, paras.  24-27), October 2010 (G/SPS/R/61, paras. 
31-33) 
Relevant document(s): Raised orally. 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as resolved:   
 
77. India raised concerns about EC Regula tion No. 1099/2009, dated 24 September 2009, 
regarding the humane treatment of an imals at the time of slaughter, which was to enter into force on 
1 January 2013.  Under Article 12 of  the regulation, the import of meat from third countries must be 
supplemented by a health certificate indicating th at requirements at least equivalent to those 
established in Chapters II and III of the regulation ha d been met.  According to India, this specific 
regulation had not been notified by the European Union despite being a trade-restricting measure.  
India sought clarification on the justification for th is regulation and for animal welfare requirements 
that may not fall under the SPS Agreement.  India al so inquired about:  (i) how equivalence may be 
assessed, including details of the certification process;   and (ii) how EU experts would ensure that 
animals were slaughtered in humane conditions a nd received clearance from the European Union. 
78. China supported the concerns raised by India a nd noted that it would continue to follow the 
issue. G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 16  
 
  79. The European Union reported that the regulation would enter into force on 1 January 2013 
and was based on two publicly available scientific op inions which had been forwarded to the Indian 
authorities.  The European Union clarified that regu lations regarding animal welfare conditions at the 
time of stunning and slaughter had been in place since 1993, and that regul ation No. 1099/2009 re-
addressed the issues, but did not impose new require ments.  The European Union believed that the 
measures were not more restrictive than necessary a nd that the regulation recognized the principle of 
equivalence.  The system had proven to be eff ective over a 15-year time period and other countries 
had developed similar legislation, based on the OIE C ode and consistent with in ternational standards.  
Nevertheless, the European Union would ensure continued cooperation among experts to address any 
concerns before the legislation entered into force in 2013. 
80. The OIE clarified that if the measures were to control animal health, including ante- and post-
mortem inspections, then they were  relevant to SPS.  Although animal  welfare was not an SPS-related 
issue, OIE members had adopted a resolution in 20 04 for OIE to undertake further work on animal 
welfare issues, and OIE members had the opportunity  to comment on those standards, particularly 
through the Animal Welfare Working Group. 
81. In October 2010, India again expressed concer n that the EU regulation contained animal 
welfare requirements that would be trade restrictiv e, and as the slaughter of animals was a sanitary 
issue, this measure should be notified to the WT O.  Although the regulation was based on OIE 
standards, only those OIE standards that had the ob jective to control animal health, including ante- 
and post- mortem inspections, fell within the sc ope of the SPS Agreement.  The new regulation 
introduced animal welfare requirements beyond those that had been in place since 1993, and therefore 
the European Union should notify the regulation to the WTO and give Members time to submit 
comments.  India asked:  (1) how trade issues would be linked with animal welfare issues;  (2) how 
equivalence of measures would be assessed;  (3) wh ether the provisions of Article 12 of the EU 
regulation were in line with any WTO agreements;  and (4) whether Article 5 of the regulation would 
require that all establishments exporting meat r eceive a prior clearance from the European Union. 
82. Viet Nam noted that it shared India's concerns , in particular relating to fishery products. 
83. The European Union indicated that the re gulation was based on scientific findings, in 
particular two scientific opinions by the European  Food Safety Authority in 2004 and 2006.  These 
scientific opinions were publicly available and had b een provided to India.  As a major importer of 
meat products, and as a result of consumer prefer ences, the European Union required that certain 
animal welfare conditions be met at the time of slaughter.  The measures contained in Article 12 of 
Regulation 1099/2009 were not more trade restrictiv e than those currently enforced.  There was no 
obligation for countries to apply the same or identical  measures, but measures that were equivalent in 
achieving the same aims were acceptable.  The prin ciple of equivalence had existed and been applied 
since 1993.  The regulation took into account the international animal welfare standards on the 
slaughter of animals developed by the OIE.  It wa s the role of the EU Food and Veterinary Office to 
evaluate the equivalence of measures implemented in  countries exporting to the European Union.  The 
European Union welcomed collaboration between experts on animal welfare, as in the ongoing 
bilateral agreement with India, to exchange  technical knowledge and achieve a common 
understanding on equivalency. 
Plant health 
81. Wood packing material 
Raised by: Canada 
Supported by: Chile, Japan, Korea, United States  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 17 
 
 
  Dates raised: November 2000 (G/SPS/R/20, paras. 33-35), March 2010 (G/SPS/R/58, 
paras. 52-53) 
Relevant document(s): G/SPS/N/EEC/93 
Solution: Adoption of IPPC standard (ISPM 15) 
Status: Resolved 
Date reported as 
resolved: March 2010 
 
84. In November 2000, Canada drew the Committee' s attention to the European Communities' 
proposed measures on solid wood packaging material, notified as G/SPS/N/EEC/93.  Canada recognized that wood packing material was widely consid ered to be at risk of containing plant pests.  
However, it was used for a very large volume of products moving in international trade, and the 
proposed EU measure would cover 69% of Canada's exports to the European Union.  Furthermore, 
the IPPC was working on a comprehensive standard fo r all countries and all pests, to be completed by 
July 2002, it would be best for all countries to focus their efforts on developing an international 
standard and refrain from taking unila teral actions in this regard.   
85. The United States considered that it would be impossible to implement the certification and 
marking requirements within the time-period set out in  the EU notification.  Korea stressed the need 
for the European Union to implement the least trade restrictive measure which would be effective, and 
in this respect to take into consideration the hist oric experience of trade without pest introduction, the 
processing of the packing materials, and the actual pest risks involved. 
86. The European Union replied that pine wood nema tode had been detected in packing materials 
in 1998 and 1999, despite the existing EU require ments on wood packing materials.  The EC 
Regulatory Committee for Plant Health was examin ing the comments which had been submitted on 
the EU notification.  The European Union was activel y contributing to the IPPC efforts to develop an 
international standard, however this  did not replace the need for an emergency measure to protect EU 
forests.  It was now obvious that the EU measur e would not be finalized and implemented on the 1 
January 2000 date as initially proposed, and that  bilateral and multilatera l consultations would 
continue. 
87. In March 2010, Canada announced the resolution of its concerns regarding EU phytosanitary 
requirements for non-manufactured solid wood packagi ng, first raised in November 2000.  At the 
time, Canada and others had been working on an in ternational standard for wood packaging material.  
In 2002, the IPPC had adopted ISPM 15 for th e regulation of wood packaging material in 
international trade.  Canada supported the IPPC  standard, and now agreed that there was no 
substantial difference between ISPM  15 and the EU phytosanitary requirement for wood packaging.  
Canada had no objection to the EU le gislation for solid wood packaging and wished to close this trade 
concern. 
88. The European Union recalled that this issue ha d been raised by several Members, who had 
requested a delay in the entry into force of the m easure.  The European Union considered that the 
resolution of this issue was also been a success in terms of the provision of special and differential 
treatment. 
293. Risks arising from carambola fruit fly in French Guyana – Maintained by France 
Raised by: Brazil 
Supported by:  
Dates raised: March 2010 (G/SPS/R/58, paras. 23-24) G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 18  
 
  Relevant document(s): Raised orally. 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
89. In March 2010, Brazil expressed concerns regard ing delays in eradicating the carambola fruit 
fly from the area close to the common border be tween French Guyana and Brazil.  The carambola 
fruit fly posed a real risk of spreading in the country and could negatively affect many producers.  A 
protocol of cooperation in the control and eradication of the carambola fruit fly was signed between 
Brazil and France in 2002.  However, France had susp ended the protocol in 2005 without providing a 
sufficient justification.  A meeting of experts from both parties with an independent expert was yet to 
be scheduled.  Brazil was mainly concerned that th e delay in the resolution of this problem might 
result in severe loses to its fruit producers. 
90. The European Union reported that the French authorities were awaiting a reply by Brazil to a 
letter dated 10 November 2009, so the situ ation could be dealt with accordingly. 
INDIA 
CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURES MAINTAINED BY INDIA Animal health 185. Restrictions due to avian influenza 
Raised by: European Union 
Supported by: Australia, Canada, China, United States 
Dates raised: March 2004 (G/SPS/R/33, paras. 18-20 ), June 2004 (G/SPS/R/34, paras. 
42-43), October 2004 (G/SPS/R/35, par as. 59-60), June 2007 (G/SPS/R/45, 
paras. 21-23 ), October 2007 (G/SPS/R/46, paras. 29-32 ), April 2008 
(G/SPS/R/49, paras. 33-38), June 2008 (G/SPS/R/51, paras. 31-35), October 
2008 (G/SPS/R/53, paras. 29-34 ), Fe bruary 2009 (G/SPS/R/54, paras. 17-
20), June 2009 (G/SPS/R/55, paras.  43-46), October 2009 (G/SPS/R/56, 
paras. 40-43), March 2010 (G/SPS/ R/58, paras. 37-40), June 2010 
(G/SPS/R/59, paras. 39-41 ), Octobe r 2010 (G/SPS/R/61, paras. 25-28) 
Relevant document(s): G/SPS/N/IND/13/Add.1, G/SPS/N/IND/14, G/SPS/N/IND/46/Add.3 and 
Add.4 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as resolved:   
 
91. The European Union raised concerns on meas ures applied by India on 3 March 2004, on 
imports of live birds, fresh poultry meat and meat products due to avian influenza.  These measures 
were not notified as required by the SPS Agreement.   In addition, India's restrictions were 
disproportionate to the health risks associated with imports from the European Union since the 
European Union was free of highly pathogenic avia n influenza.  India was requested to lift the 
restrictions on EU products.  The United States shared the concerns of the European Union.  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 19 
 
 
  92. India explained that restrictions on poultry im ports were temporary measures to address the 
emerging threat of introduction of highly pathogeni c avian influenza.  The measures were intended to 
protect farmers for whom poultry production was an essential source of income.  Delays in the 
reporting of outbreaks increased the risk of the viru s spreading into other countries.  In addition, 
infected poultry did not always exhibit clinical signs  of the disease.  Once intr oduced into the country, 
the disease would be impossible to control.  In dia was taking all measures necessary to gather 
information on efforts to contain the disease gl obally and welcomed information from exporting 
Members who were free of the disease. 
93. In June 2004, the European Union stated that India continued to apply import bans on a range 
of poultry products from several countries allegedly in response to highly pathenogenic avian 
influenza.  India was requested to review the cu rrent ban and lift all rest rictions on poultry products 
from the European Union.  India responded that the measures prohibiting poul try and poultry products 
had been implemented as temporary measures.   New outbreaks of highly pathenogenic avian 
influenza (HPAI) in WTO Members, but not within the territories of the Eur opean Union, had been 
reported as recently as 4 June 2004.  Since poultry production in India was typically a family-run 
business, Indian authorities were particularly con cerned about potential hu man development of the 
disease. 
94. In October 2004, the European Union stated that  India had issued two notifications, on 7 July 
and on 6 August 2004, informing Members of the re laxation of the ban for a range of products.  
However, the ban was disproportionate to the risk, had no scientific basis and should be confined to 
regions affected by the disease following OIE guidelines and recommendations.  India was requested 
to review its ban and bring its me asures into conformity with the SPS Agreement.  India stated that 
the ban was a temporary measure which was enfo rced due to the outbreak of avian influenza 
throughout the world.  The situati on had been under constant review since the imposition of the ban in 
February 2004.  The ban on imports of poultry w ith vaccination and specific pathogen-free eggs was 
lifted in July 2004.  A subsequent review by an expert group resulted in the continuation of the ban on 
imports of certain products such as live and raw poultry and pig meat.  Processed products from HPAI 
infected countries were allowed into India, however , and the situation continued to be monitored. 
95. In June 2007, the United States noted that India was banning poultry, swine and other 
products in response to the detection of low pathogeni c avian influenza in wild birds in some parts of 
the United States.  These restrictions far exceeded the standards developed by the OIE for the control 
of avian influenza.  India failed to apply the con cept of regionalization to the United States.  India 
applied its ban against US products although no in cident of highly pathogenic avian influenza had 
occurred in the United States;  applied its ban to prod ucts that had been treated or processed in such a 
manner that the avian influenza virus was killed;  and applied its ban to species and products from 
animals that were not known to transmit the virus.   Although India had recently notified a change to 
its measures to allow the entry of dry processed pet food, it continued to pr ohibit other heat-treated 
pet foods that posed no animal health risk. 
96. The European Union observed that it had sim ilar concerns regarding India's measures.  
Although it had been seeking to resolve the matter  bilaterally, problems continued to appear and 
reappear.  All Members were urged to apply the inte rnational standards, to ensure that the measures 
applied were proportionate to the risks.  India's me asure was applied even to products that had never 
been known to transmit avian influenza, including pork meat. 
97. India noted that high or low pathogenic strains of avian influenza had been reported in more 
than 60 countries, and the authorities were concerne d that the virus was spreading.  The virus had 
important human health implications , given its high fatality rate.  India had experienced an outbreak 
of highly pathogenic avian influenza in 2006 which ha d been successfully contained, and the country 
was now free of the disease.  India was trying to saf eguard animal and human health in its territory, G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 20  
 
  and protect its family-run poultry industry.  It th erefore banned imports of poultry from any country 
which had experienced an outbreak of avian influenz a, whether highly pathogenic or low pathogenic.  
The United States had reported an outbreak of lo w pathogenic avian influenza.  Countries free from 
avian influenza could export livestock to India, and pathogen-free eggs fo r vaccine production were 
permitted from any country, regardless of its avian infl uenza status.  Because many wild birds visited 
India, this was a vector of concern.  With regard  to pet food, India had revised its health protocol 
notified in June 2007, and w ould take into account the co mments made on this matter. 
98. In October 2007, the United States reiterated c oncerns regarding India's ban on imports of US 
poultry, swine and their products due to detections of low-pathogenic avian influenza (AI) in wild 
birds in the United States.  In June, the United St ates had noted that this prohibition went beyond the 
OIE guidelines and that India had not provided scientific  justification for this prohibition.  India had 
made two notifications related to AI (G/SPS/ N/IND/46/Add.3 and Add.4).  The Add.3 document 
extended AI-related import prohibition to include pig bristles.  Prohibiting the import of these products was not scientifically justified nor in co mpliance with the OIE guidelines based on the AI 
status of a country, region or zone.  The Unite d States requested that India remove all import 
restrictions on US-origin live pigs and porcine products.  India's Add.4 extended for a further six 
months the emergency measures it had put in place in  August 2006.  The United States urged India to 
put in place permanent measures for trade in poultr y products and AI, and to ensure that these 
measures were consistent with the provisions of the OIE Code chap ter on AI.  India's measures should 
distinguish between highly-pathogenic and low-pathoge nic strains of AI, and allow for the application 
of regionalization. 
99. The European Union noted that it had problem s similar to those mentioned by the United 
States.  India failed to recognize the difference be tween high and low pathogenic influenza as well as 
the AI-related differences between wild birds and domestic animals.  The European Union 
encouraged India to follow the recommendations from the OIE. 
100. India stressed the dangers related to AI and how widespread the virus ha d been.  In addition, 
AI was known to reoccur in countries where outbreaks had previously taken place.  India restricted 
imports from countries reporting AI.  The United St ates was currently positive for low pathogenic AI 
in poultry (LPNAIH5).  India's import restrictions due to outbreaks of AI in the United States were 
clarified in detail to the United States during the l ast trade policy forum meeting held in New Deli.  
India contested the claim that its regulations were  not based on science by observing that the presence 
of LPAI in poultry was a notifiable disease accordi ng to the OIE as per the list of diseases in Article 
2.1.3 of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code.  Furthermore, as noted by USDA's factsheet on AI, LPAI 
had a high potential to mutate into  highly pathogenic AI;  a view that India shared.  Nonetheless, India 
regularly reviewed its trade regulations in the light of new developments on AI.  Regarding the 
concerns with pork products, there were numerous scien tific reports that pigs could be easily infected 
by many human and AI viruses and, therefore, c ould provide an environment favourable for viral 
replication and genetic re-assortment.  The fast mu tating nature of the AI virus, along with the 
possibility that the virus could re-combine with ot her subtypes, made pig and pig products a risk.  
With regard to wild birds, consultations with expe rts had taken place and the Indian authorities were 
of the view that wild birds could not be ignored w ith respect to AI.  The US and EU concerns would 
be reported back to India's technical experts for review. 
101. The OIE clarified the recommendations of the OI E and how they should be put in practice.  
The listing of diseases such as high pathogenic avia n influenza (HPAI) and low pathogenic notifiable 
avian influenza (LPNAI) was first and foremost for disease reporting purposes and related to the 
question of transparency.  Findings of AI in wild birds and of LPNAI should not lead to import bans.  
There needed to be a distinction drawn between reporting and the imposition of measures.  There was 
no scientific basis for restrictions on pigs and pig pro ducts in relation to AI, whether it be high or low 
pathogenic strains, and this point was clear in the OIE Terrestrial Code.  OIE was concerned that the  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 21 
 
 
  imposition of measures that were not scientifically  based worsened the risk s for spread of disease 
because countries were discouraged from proper repor ting if they believed that the reporting would 
lead to unjustifiable measures.  It was of utmost importance that countries report their diseases. 
102. In April 2008, the European Union indicated that  India continued to ban certain EU animal 
products due to AI.  Although India had relaxe d the ban for some products earlier in 2008, it 
continued to ban many commodities.  India impo sed the ban in response to both high and low 
pathogenic strains of AI.  The OIE, however, did not recommend trade bans if AI was present only in 
wild birds, or if low pathogenic strains were f ound.  The obligation to notify cases of low pathogenic 
AI to the OIE should not be misused as a reas on to impose trade restrictions, as the OIE had 
previously clarified.  Furthermore, heat-treated products could be safely traded regardless of the AI 
status of the exporting country.  The European Unio n considered also that India's ban on pigmeat and 
pork products based on AI concerns was disproporti onate to the risk.  Although the European Union 
had requested information regarding what needed to  be done to regain free status, India had not 
provided any response.  As indicated previously, the European Union was of the view that India's measures were disproportionate to the risks and for some products were not based on scientific 
evidence.  In addition, HPAI had been found in India, and the European Union questioned whether 
Indian domestic products would be subj ect to the same treatment as imported goods. 
103. The United States shared the concern that Indi a's measures were introduced and maintained 
without sufficient scientific basis or a risk assessmen t.  The measures were unjustifiably restrictive 
and too broad in geographi c and commodity application.  Bilate ral exchanges had allowed progress on 
some areas, but not regarding the AI measures.  Despite requests, the United States had not yet 
received copies of India's risk assessment.  Furt hermore, these emergency import prohibitions had 
been extended again (G/SPS/N/IND/46/Add.5), after having been in place for almost two years.  The United States urged India to lift AI measures that were not based on science, and in particular to 
distinguish between high and low pathogenic strains, recognize disease-free zones, not apply measures to swine and pork products, and to reco gnize measures taken to inactivate the virus. 
104. Australia noted that it shared the concerns  of the European Communities and the United 
States, and urged India to base its meas ures on sound science and the OIE standards. 
105. Mali reported that since it did not know how to do  a risk assessment with regard to AI, it had 
closed its borders to poultry imports from countries which had the disease. 
106. India noted that AI continued to spread, and that it had serious human health implications 
with hundreds of persons already affected.  Indi a had previously had an outbreak, and despite its 
efforts to eradicate the disease, new outbreaks had o ccurred.  Therefore India was extremely cautious 
to safeguard animal and human health, especially as India had widespread, small family poultry businesses.  India was not permitting imports from aff ected countries.  India viewed low and high 
pathogenic strains of AI with equal concern, regard less of whether in poultry or wild birds.  LPAI 
presented a high potential risk, as the science showed that the virus was constantly evolving and there 
was a possibility of LPAI mutating into a highly  pathogenic strain.  With respect to the OIE 
guidelines, India had voted against the resolution in  the last annual session which proposed that LPAI 
was not a concern for international trade.  India was not the only country taking such measures, and 
Egypt had apparently imposed similar requirements.   Pigs were potential hosts of both the AI and 
human viruses, and could serve as vessels where th e viruses could mix, therefore India was also 
prohibiting swine and pork products from AI-affected countries.  India was visited by wild birds, 
therefore the risk of transmission of AI through th is means could not be ig nored.  India had recently 
reviewed and modified its measures on pathogen-f ree eggs, and pet food, and agreed to provide 
information to the European Union shortly.  Th e concerns raised by other Members would be 
communicated to technical experts in capital.  India assured all Members that it would abide by its WTO obligations. G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 22  
 
  107. The European Union clarified that in the case of  Egypt, the measures were applied to very 
different commodities.  Although both countries had measures related to AI, these could not be easily 
compared. 
108. In June 2008, the European Union reported that  India continued to apply a ban on the imports 
of poultry, swine, and their products, from areas th at had reported outbreaks of either low- or high-
pathogenic avian influenza in wild bird populations only.  In addition, India restricted the importation 
of products also from areas where LPAI had been  found, disregarding th e OIE standards which 
assured the complete elimination of risks and allo wed products to be safely traded.  The ban on 
imports of pigs and pigmeat was not justified accord ing to the OIE, nor had India provided scientific 
justification for the ban.  India's restrictions we re disproportionate and the European Union requested 
India to review its measures without delay. 
109. Canada supported the EU arguments, noting that according to the OIE, pigs did not represent 
a threat for transmitting avian influenza.  Furthe rmore, India should recognize the principle of 
regionalization when applying a ban based on avian infl uenza.  Canada requested that India follow the 
OIE's standards and remove the import restrictions currently in place. 
110. The United States supported the concerns raised , observing that India's measures had been 
introduced and maintained without scientific eviden ce or risk assessment.  India's argument that LPAI 
had the potential to mutate into the highly pathogeni c form, and that virus re-assortment could occur 
in swine, had been addressed by the OIE.  The Un ited States had requested a copy of India's risk 
assessment that supported its ban, but this had not  been provided.  China supported the concerns 
raised and requested India to revisit its measur e in order to comply with OIE recommendations. 
111. India reiterated that it did not allow the impor tation of poultry and pork products, including 
processed meats, from areas where outbreaks of avian influenza had been reported.  India was equally 
concerned about low and highly pathogenic avian in fluenza, as well as with avian influenza found in 
wild birds only.  A number of scientific studies ha d shown the possibility of low pathogenic forms of 
avian influenza mutating into highly pathogenic st rains.  A report from FAO had also shown that 
mutation was feasible.  An official US web site as serted that low pathogenic forms of avian influenza 
had the potential to mutate into HPAI.  At the OIE General Session in May 2007, India had voted 
against the resolution that stated that LPAI did not pose a risk to international trade.  India remained 
concerned that the low pathogenic viruses also po sed risks to human health.  Regarding pigs, 
scientific evidence showed that pigs could host the virus and were known to be a mixing vessel for 
some diseases, hence they could infect humans wi th avian influenza.  As new scientific evidence 
evolved, India had lifted its bans on some products, such as eggs and pet food.  Further reviews would 
be done in the future.  India took note of Member s' requests for copies of the risk assessment and for 
the recognition of regionalization, and those concer ns would be conveyed to experts in the capital. 
112. In October 2008, the European Union acknowle dged India's efforts to remove its import 
restrictions on processed pig meat.  However, India continued to apply a ban on live animals and on a 
wide range of products of animal origin.  This ba n had been based on the risk of entry into India of 
several diseases, in particular avian influenza.   These restrictions did not conform to the OIE 
standards.  India was also invited to acknowledge th at heat-treated meat and meat products could be 
safely traded regardless of the avian influenza stat us of the exporting country.  Moreover, India had 
not responded to the request for providing scientific justification and its risk assessment on pig meat 
and pig meat products.  The European Union urged India to review the import restrictions on live 
animals and different products of animal origin. 
113. The United States expressed concerns regarding India's extension of its emergency measures 
prohibiting a wide range of products because of avia n influenza.  These measures were not based on 
scientific evidence or on a risk assessment.  The Unit ed States renewed the request to India to provide  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 23 
 
 
  a copy of their avian influenza risk assessment.  Fi nally, India was requested to modify its measure to 
address the concerns expressed by several Members in the Committee. 
114. In response to the US request, India proposed that a technical discussion between India and 
other technical experts be held.  The United States i nvited India to bring its technical experts to the 
next meeting of the SPS Committee and again requ ested a copy of India's risk assessment. 
115. India suggested that instead of waiting for the next meeting the experts could meet before 
then, perhaps through a video conference, which c ould allow a resolution before the next meeting. 
116. India reported that the import restriction of avian influenza related products had been 
discussed in the OIE, in the SPS Committee, and in  various bilateral meetings with countries 
including the European Union and the United States.  India treated high pathogenic and low 
pathogenic types of the virus in both poultry or wild  birds with equal concern.  Also, India did not 
import pig meat from countries with avian influenza outbreaks.  India had been reviewing the policy of avian influenza and its trade implications every six months.  This had led to the removal of import 
restrictions on different processed pig products fro m avian influenza positive countries.  India would 
continue to review its restrictions and keep only t hose which affected human and animal health.  India 
suggested that the discussion should stay among e xperts from India and other concerned partners. 
117. The OIE stated that countries should notify the presence of avian influenza in domestic and 
wild birds.  However, notification of the early det ection of avian influenza in wild birds was requested 
for purposes of transparency and shou ld not lead to trade restrictions.  Also, the representative urged 
OIE Members to send their scientific evidence to OIE, to be considered when making necessary 
amendments to the standards established in the OIE codes. 
118. In February 2009, the United States expressed  disappointment that India continued to 
maintain its emergency measures prohibiting a wide  range of products because of avian influenza 
without scientific evidence or a risk assessment.  Appropriate measu res for avian influenza did not 
include trade restrictions on swine or swine pr oducts, trade measures related to notifiable avian 
influenza in wild birds, or prohibitions on heat -treated products.  In addition, Members should 
distinguish between highly pathogenic and low pat hogenic avian influenza.  The US representative 
reminded the Committee that India had proposed a mee ting at a technical level to discuss the issue at 
the October 2008 Committee meeting and that th e United States welcomed their suggestion.  
However, the United States on numerous occasions had asked for a copy of India's scientific 
justification as a basis for such technical discussions , but had not received the documents to date.  The 
United States again urged India to present its risk assessment so that a technical discussion could be 
scheduled.   
119. The European Communities welcomed the recent lifting by India of some avian influenza-
related restrictions, but supported the US concerns that the remaining restrictions were unjustified and 
went against the OIE Code, in particular the lack of distinction between outbreaks of highly 
pathogenic and low pathogenic avian influenza.  
120. India explained that since many countries repor ted avian influenza, and because of the human 
health implications, it was natural that Members were extremely cautious to safeguard animal and 
human health.  This was particularly true in Indi a, since its poultry industry was largely family-run.  
Many Members had adopted avian influenza meas ures, including import bans.  India had banned 
imports of poultry and swine products from countri es reporting both low and highly pathogenic avian 
influenza, since one strain of the virus could mutate into the other.  An FAO publication 
acknowledged that mutation to virulence had be en demonstrated, and the USDA website also 
admitted this.  At the OIE General Session, India had voted against the resolution stating that low 
pathogenic avian influenza was not a trade concern.  India believed that trade interests should not take G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 24  
 
  precedence over human health concerns, but accepted that science was evolving and had provisions 
for reviewing its avian influenza measures.  As a result, trade restrictions on certain products from 
avian influenza-positive countries had been lifted.  I ndia had recently reviewed the restrictions on pig 
meat and found there was minimal risk, especially when processed.  India had thus decided to lift restrictions on pig products and on processed poultry products.  The reviews would continue.  India 
had taken note of the US concerns, had had bi lateral meetings with the United States and the 
European Communities, and would convey their concerns to appropriate authorities.   
121. OIE indicated that avian influenza was a major challenge for trade in poultry products.  The 
relevant standards were in place and the OIE did not receive many comments from OIE members;  the 
standard seemed to be well accepted.  Currently the OIE was looking at conditions for trade in pet 
food and various by-products such as feather meal .  Members should  review the avian influenza 
standards and raise any concerns at the OIE.  The OIE clarified that there were a number of publications on avian influenza, some by the OIE, so me by FAO, some joint.  For international trade, 
the relevant standard was that in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code. 
122. In June 2009, the European Comm unities stated that it appreciated the bilateral meetings with 
India but remained concerned that India's measures we re not consistent with OIE standards.  Despite 
having raised the concern previously, India conti nued to make no distinction between low and high 
pathogenic influenza, and had still not shared its scientific justification for the measures.  The 
European Communities regretted that India did not adhere to the principle of regionalization, and 
furthermore that India banned imports of live pigs citing avian influenza fears but had no such ban on 
the domestic market.  The European Communities called upon India to base its import requirements 
on the relevant international standards.  
123. The United States shared the concern raised by the European Communities and noted that 
India prohibited the import of a large number of items , in disregard of the relevant OIE Chapter.  The 
United States requested that the bans on swine be lifte d and that scientific justification be provided for 
all measures.  In addition, the United States request ed India to provide a copy of its risk assessment 
for the measures relating to avian influenza.   
124. India stated that the ban on pork products was ta ken to prevent an outbreak of avian influenza.  
The measures were based not only on OIE guidelines,  but on relevant scientific literature.  Technical 
experts re-evaluated the scientific information ev ery six months, and now imports were banned only 
from those countries reporting H5 and H7 strains of  low pathogenic influenza.  India was concerned 
that the low pathogenic virus could mutate into the high pathogenic virus, which had a greater impact 
on animal and human health.  Trade concerns shoul d not interfere with the protection of human and 
animal health.  All restrictions regarding pork an d poultry products except live pigs had been lifted 
from areas reporting avian influenza, because the avia n influenza virus could mutate in the pigs, as 
both human and avian influenza viruses had establishe d stable virus lineages in pigs.  India applied 
the same measures to domestic products as to im ports.  India thanked the European Communities for 
fruitful bilateral discussions on 22 June 2009, and expressed its commitment to dialogues with all 
interested Members.    
125. OIE drew attention to the informal dispute resolution procedure of the OIE as a means to 
resolve technical differences relating to provisions of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code.  
126. In October 2009, the European Communities stated that India still did not base its 
requirements on OIE standards, and still maintained a ban on live pigs, pig semen and products such 
as feathers for reasons of avian influenza.  Furt hermore, India did not recognize the regionalization 
principle, applied strictly in the European Comm unities where affected zones were placed under strict 
biosecurity measures, and instead India required total country freedom from avian influenza.  
Although India had announced that unprocessed meat  would no longer be bl ocked for reasons of  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 25 
 
 
  avian influenza, India's requirements stated that only heat-treated pig meat could be imported, a 
measure not in line with international standards.   The European Communities requested India to 
provide scientific evidence justifying its strict measur es;  to bring its import requirements in line with 
international standards;  and to recognize the re gionalization principle as applied in the European 
Communities.  
127. The United States stated that India's ban and av ian influenza import requirements were not in 
line with the OIE standards.  India continued to pr ohibit the import of pigs and a wide range of avian 
species and avian products without a risk asse ssment that supported the measures.  India had 
maintained an emergency measure in one form or another since 2002 and its emergency notifications 
since 2004 had essentially blocked all imports.  Sufficie nt time had passed for India to complete an 
import risk assessment and to adopt  OIE-consistent measures.  The United States requested India to 
provide its risk assessment and to modify its measures to address the concerns expressed by a number of Members.   
128. India stated that the notification issued in 28 August 2009 prohibited the import of poultry 
and poultry products and live pigs from count ries reporting both highly pathogenic and low 
pathogenic avian influenza.  India's technical experts had observed that symptoms of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza were noticeable and the infection could be controlled, but low pathogenic 
avian influenza might pass unnoticed and the contro l of the infection could become difficult.  
Additionally, there was no data available confirmi ng that low pathogenic avian influenza could not 
mutate into highly pathogenic avian influenza.  Imports were currently allowed based on the avian 
influenza status of the exporting country.  The I ndian authorities had commissioned  a lab-based study 
of domestic pigs to confirm the ch ances of genetic re-assortment of the virus in live pigs that could 
produce new influenza viruses.  As notified, I ndia permitted the import of poultry products from 
countries reporting avian influenza subject to a co nformity assessment.  Comments received from 
trading partners on this notifi cation were under examination.  
129. The OIE stated that there were some differences  at a scientific and technical level in relation 
to this matter, and reminded Members of the OIE' s informal mechanism to resolve differences at a 
scientific and technical level. 
130. In March 2010, the United States stated that India was alone among the world's leading 
trading partners in imposing severe import requirements related to avia n influenza (AI), that were not 
in line with those established by the OIE.  I ndia continued to mainta in emergency measures 
prohibiting a wide range of pig and avian products .  Furthermore, India has not provided timely 
emergency notifications to the WTO Secretariat, as it had extended its AI  emergency measures on 28 
August 2009, but not yet notified it.  The United States had for several years repeatedly requested a copy of India's risk assessment for AI, but this was never provided. 
131. The European Union supported the US concerns  regarding India's ban on import of a number 
of products and live animals that, according to the OI E, should not be restricted.  The European Union 
highlighted the importance of the use of the SPS notification system by India.  The European Union 
also repeatedly requested India' s risk assessment for its AI measure, but had not obtained it.  
Moreover, India did not recognize the regionalizati on principle, as applied in the European Union 
whenever an outbreak of AI occurred. 
132. The OIE encouraged WTO Members to implemen t the OIE standards on AI, since they were 
based on science and had been democratically appr oved.  The OIE standards on AI had not been 
changed recently. 
133. India reported that as notified, it imposed an  import ban on live pigs, poultry and other 
poultry products from countries reporting either the H5 or H7 strains of AI.  There was no import ban G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 26  
 
  on live pigs, poultry or poultry products from countries reporting AI in wild birds, other than poultry.  
The ban was imposed on countries with both Low Pathogenic AI (LPAI) and High Pathogenic AI (HPAI), as the LPAI virus might mutate into HPAI vi rus.  India conducted a detailed risk analysis for 
the importation of animal and animal products, by a committee of experts, based on the existing global situation of AI, available sc ientific literature and the OIE st andards.  The justification for 
imposing the ban on live pigs was due to the fact  that pigs were known to act as mixing vessels for 
human, animal and other influenza viruses.  The ba n on pigs would be review ed after the completion 
of some technical studies. 
134. In June 2010, the European Union reiterated the concerns regarding India's restrictions due to 
avian influenza and the lack of notification by India on the issue.  India had announced via its website 
that it would review its import c onditions related to avian influen za every six months however, that 
information had not been notified to the WTO.  The European Union recalled that on several 
occasions India had been requested to provide scientif ic justification for imposing import restrictions 
above the OIE standard on avian influenza.  Du ring its May 2010 General Assembly, the OIE had 
confirmed that its avian influenza standard was we ll supported by scientific evidence, and it had also 
been clarified that there was no risk related to trad e in fresh meat with regard to low pathogenic avian 
influenza.  The European Union also requested I ndia to recognize the regionalisation principle of the 
SPS Agreement, which was strictly applied in th e European Union when an outbreak of avian 
influenza occurred.  The European Union requested that India fulfil its transparency obligations, and 
either bring import requirements fully in line with international standards, or share the scientific 
evidence invoked to justify its measures. 
135. The United States supported the concerns raised by the European Union, stating that India 
stood alone with respect to the scope of its avian in fluenza-related bans, which were not in line with 
OIE standards.  The United States expressed disappointment that these bans continued as emergency measures, thereby prohibiting the imports of live pi gs and a wide range of avian species and avian 
products without a risk assessment.  The United States noted that, on numerous occasions, India had 
not provided a timely notification of its avian infl uenza-related import restrictions.  For example the 
last notification was on 31 March 2009, extending  the ban for six months.  However, the ban 
continued to be applied despite the lack of a ne w notification.  The United States and the European 
Union had repeatedly asked India to provide its risk assessments to suppor t the imposition of import 
requirements beyond OIE recommendations.  The United States urged India to provide its risk assessment and modify its measures to address the concerns repeatedly expressed by several 
Members. 
136. India replied that the situation had rema ined unchanged although, based on changed 
conditions, India had allowed some re strictions to be temporarily lifted.  The Indian Department of 
Animal Husbandry had reviewed its sanitary co nditions and removed avian influenza-related 
restrictions for the import of pork products (raw and processed pork).  India reported that presently 
there was no ban on the import of pork products (raw and processed pork) from avian influenza-
positive countries.  However, the import of live pigs  continued to be prohibited from avian influenza-
positive countries.  Furthermore, the import of processed poultry and poultry meat products were 
allowed from avian influenza-positive countries subj ect to conformity assessment for both low and 
high pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI and HPAI).  India cited scientific evidence that LPAI had the 
potential to mutate into HPAI, particularly in wild aquatic birds. 
137. In October 2010, the United States indicated that India stood alone among the world's leading 
trading partners with respect to the scope of the ba ns it imposed and the severity of its avian influenza 
(AI)-related import requirements.  India's bans and import requirements were not in keeping with the 
OIE established standards.  India continued to ma intain the AI bans as emergency measures, and 
prohibited the import of live pigs and a wide range of avian species and products without providing a 
scientific justification for exceeding the international standards.  Despite repeated requests, India had  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 27 
 
 
  not provided its risk assessment until the Octobe r 2010 SPS Committee meeting.  Moreover, India had 
failed repeatedly to notify its AI-related import rest rictions in a timely manner.  In March 2010, India 
had announced a new extension of its emergency m easures, and also that products from countries 
reporting any notifiable AI in domesticated or wild  birds would be banned.  Those new measures had 
not been notified to the WTO. 
138. The European Union shared the US concerns about the emergency measures taken by India 
and the lack of transparency.  India had failed to provide an opportunity for WTO Members to comment before measures were put in place.  I ndia had not made public the outcome of the last 
review of its import conditions on  AI, although it had reported to the SPS Committee that this took 
place every six months.  The European Union called on India to share its risk assessment or other 
scientific justification for its import measures, a nd to recognise the principle of regionalization as 
foreseen under the SPS Agreement. 
139. India recalled that it had continuously explaine d the reasons for its measures, and changes to 
these.  At the last Committee meeting, India had re ported on the lifting of the ban on imports of pork 
products, although imports of live pig was still prohibited from AI positive countries.  Processed 
poultry and poultry meat products were allowed from AI positive countries subject to certain 
conformity assessment requirements, thereby facilitati ng trade while continuing to protect human and 
animal health.  I<><>ndia remained concerned that  low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) had the 
potential to mutate into highly pathogenic strain s.  India noted that Article 10.4.1 of the OIE 
Terrestrial Animal Health Code prohibited trad e in poultry and its pr oducts from LPAI positive 
countries.  India had provided its risk assessment on av ian influenza directly to the United States, and 
was willing to share it with other Members upon request. 
140. The OIE expressed an interest in receiving India' s risk assessment.  She stressed that the OIE 
standards did not justify trade restrictions on the b asis of reports of LPAI in wild birds.  AI was 
widespread in wild birds and the OI E requested that this be notified so  as to provide valuable data, but 
did not recommend any trade restrictions on this basis. 
INDONESIA CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURE S MAINTAINED BY INDONESIA 
Animal health 305. Import restrictions on beef and recognition of the principle of regionalization 
Raised by: Brazil 
Supported by:  
Dates raised: October 2010 (G/SPS/R/61, paras. 15-16) 
Relevant document(s): Raised orally .  Indonesia's Regulation 82/200. 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
141. In October 2010, Brazil expressed concerns ove r Indonesia's Regulation 82/200, which did 
not seem to comply with Article 6 of the SPS Agreem ent.  Indonesia had notified revisions to the law 
which would have permitted recognition of disease- free regions, and the authorities had engaged in 
bilateral discussions regarding im ports of meat from Brazil.  In August 2010, however, the Indonesian G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 28  
 
  courts had annulled that aspect of the legislation.  Brazil expected the Indonesian authorities to take 
all necessary measures to revise the law, and to notify this to the WTO.  Brazil already had OIE recognition of its FMD-free status. 
142. Indonesia observed that the country had about  7,000 islands, and it had taken Indonesia 
almost 100 years to eradicate FMD.  The Governme nt had sought to develop regulations that were 
consistent with international standards, but these had been challenged in the constitutional court.  
Imports from regions where FMD had not been comp letely eradicated were therefore prohibited. 
JAPAN 
CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURES MAINTAINED BY JAPAN Food safety 
267. Pesticide maximum residue level (MRL) enforcement system 
Raised by: United States 
Supported by: China, Ecuador, New Zealand 
Dates raised: June 2008 (G/SPS/R/51, paras.  15-17), October 2008 (G/SPS/R/53, paras. 
15-18), February 2009 (G/SPS/R/54,  paras. 33-34), October 2009 
(G/SPS/R/56, paras. 50-52 ), March 201 0 (G/SPS/R/58, paras. 31-32), June 
2010 (G/SPS/R/59, paras. 37-38) 
Relevant document(s): Raised orally 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
143. In June 2008, the United States noted that in May 2006, Japan's Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Welfare (MHLW) imposed a testing and sanctions  policy that involved increased testing (30 per 
cent country-wide) after the occurrence of one MRL violation.  If a second violation involving the same pesticide and commodity occurred within on e year of the first, a 100 per cent test-and-hold 
policy was enforced on all exports of that commodi ty from that country.  The United States believed 
that the sanctions under inspection and control prog rammes should be limited to  the violating supplier 
as long as there was no indication that a country-wide problem existed.  The United States considered 
that this would be the least trade restrictive measure  and the most appropriate policy.  This was also 
the policy applied by the United States itself. 
144. China supported the concerns raised by th e United States and invited Japan to provide 
scientific justification for its measure, in order to comply with the SPS Agreement. 
145. Japan stated that the MRLs fo r agricultural chemicals in food were developed based on 
scientific assessments, and took into account the MRLs  established by Codex and by other countries.  
Before adopting a new MRL, Japan notified its pr oposal to the WTO and considered any comments 
from Members, as appropriate.  The MRLs app lied equally to domestic and imported products.  
Whenever non-compliance with an MRL was f ound in imported products, Japan strengthened 
inspections of agricultural chemical residues.  The degree, frequency, or extent of enhanced 
inspection was determined by the circumstances.  Each violation was handled on a case-by-case basis, 
but always conducted in a rational and reasonable manner, for instance, by limiting the enhanced 
inspections to the violating exporter only.  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 29 
 
 
  146. In October 2008, the United States again rai sed its concerns about Japan's enforcement 
system for MRLs.  In particular, there was no re ason for Japan to employ country-wide sanctions 
where there was no indication of a country-wide prob lem.  In cases of individual company violations, 
sanctions should be applied at the individual company level. 
147. New Zealand noted that its exports had been subj ect to testing by Japan.  New Zealand asked 
for further clarification regarding the reasons be hind testing products, especially asparagus products 
as these were normally frozen. 
148. China shared the US concerns regarding Japan's testing regime. 
149. Japan responded that in order to enforce thei r MRLs, Japan conducted monitoring inspections 
of agricultural chemical residues in imported food.  These controls were strengthened if imported 
products did not comply with the established MRLs .  Multiple violations had been detected on 
imported products from the United States, giving rise to increased monitoring. 
150. In February 2009, the United States indicated that Japan's MRL enforcement policy imposed 
on US specialty products continued to be of great c oncern.  This policy imposed industry-wide testing 
for pesticides after one MRL violation by a singl e party.  If a second violation involving the same 
pesticide and commodity occurred within one year , a 100 per cent test-and-hold policy of all exports 
from that country was enforced. 
151. Japan indicated that the MRLs had been deve loped based on scientific assessments, taking 
into account Codex standards, and that they were  applied both to domestic and imported products.  
When there were instances of non-compliance, insp ections were strengthened, taking into account 
various factors, on a case-by-case basis.  Japan had confirmed that the US regulation on pesticide 
residues was equivalent to Japan's.  Where US MRLs  were equal to or stricter than Japan's, the 
enhanced inspections were limited to the specifi c exporter.  In cases where the US MRL was higher 
than Japan's, Japan needed to ensure that US exporters as a whol e complied with Japan's MRL.  Such 
evidence should be provided by the US Government itself, or in some other way.  In fact, Japan's inspection records showed that multiple violations had been detected by the enhanced inspections 
after an initial violation.  This suggested that  responsibility of the exporter alone did not always 
ensure compliance with Japan's MR Ls.  Japan needed a mechanism to  ensure that exporters complied 
with Japan's MRLs, e.g. a compliance programme established by industry or information on their 
compliance history.  If the United States provided such  information, it would enable Japan to consider 
limiting the enhanced inspection to the specific exporter.  Japan hoped to continue technical 
discussions with the United States. 
152. In October 2009, China recalled that after th e implementation of Japan's positive list system 
for chemical residues, China and many other WTO Members had expressed concerns regarding the issue of "uniform standards".  Japan had indicated that the standard would be revised on the basis of 
scientific evaluations and MRLs would be established for more chemical residues.  In recent years, 
almost all notices that China receiv ed from Japan regarding products that exceeded pesticide limits 
were caused by the "uniform standards".  These had se verely affected China's trade with Japan.  Also, 
after the implementation of Japan's positive list system, a series of regulatory measures such as 
intensified inspection, quarantin e and supervision, had been undertaken.  China urged Japan to 
develop science-based residue limits for the items  of concern as soon as possible, to alleviate 
unnecessary restrictions to international trade. 
153. Ecuador supported China's concern regarding MRLs applied by Japan.  Ecuador's cacao 
exports had faced difficulties of market access, a nd although various meeti ngs had taken place, no 
solution had been provided.  Ec uador requested Japan to modify  its MRLs in accordance with 
international standards. G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 30  
 
  154. Japan stated that the uniform standard was based on the evaluations by the FAO/WHO Joint 
Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) and/or on the tolerance exposure amounts that the US 
Food and Drug Administration adopted for food additives. 
155. In March 2010, China reiterated the concerns regarding Japan's MRLs and its enforcement 
system, which should be based on scientific evidence and applied in a least-trade restrictive manner.  
According to China, out of approximately 50 thou sand MRLs in Japan, more than 40 thousand were 
"temporary" standards, which were neither based  on scientific evidence nor risk assessments as 
required by the SPS Agreement.  Less than 50 per cent of the "temporary" standards had been reviewed by the end of 2009, although they had been  applied for almost five years, creating serious 
obstacles to China's food exports to Japan.  Moreover, Japan's "uniform standard" of 0.01 ppm MRL 
for several products was not based on scientific evidence.  MRLs should be set according to the 
different levels of exposure through different f ood products, toxicology evaluations and acceptable 
daily intake (ADI) levels consiste ntly with international practice.  In addition, Japan's enforcement 
system of MRLs was neither reasonable nor transp arent, as sometimes Japan inspected 100 per cent of 
China's food exports, known as "order inspections".  By way of examples, Japan set a 2 ppm MRL for 
pyrimethanil in scallion, while for sh allots Japan applied the "uniform standard" of 0.01 ppm.  Japan 
also applied the 0.01 ppm "uniform standard" for ch lorpyrifos in matsutake, while the Codex standard 
for chlorpyrifos in edible fungi was 0.05 ppm .  China also asserted that Japan applied a less 
favourable treatment to imported food  products than to Japanese products. 
156. Japan responded that the "uniform limits" had been established after holding consultations 
and receiving opinions from health experts based on:  (i) acceptable exposure levels determined by the 
evaluations conducted by the Joint FAO/WHO E xpert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA), and 
evaluations on indirect additives by the United St ates Department of Agriculture (USDA);  (ii) 
acceptable dairy intake for pesticides and veterinary drugs evaluated by JECFA;  and (iii) the default 
level of 0.01 ppm established by the European Union.   According to the Japanese system, the Ministry 
of Health, Labour and Welfare conducted an evalua tion before allowing pesticide residues in food 
products.  This evaluation was based on individual p esticide residue data for each commodity.  Any 
exporter could apply to the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare to request the evaluation of 
specific data on MRLs. 
157. In June 2010, China reiterated its concerns re garding Japan's MRLs and their enforcement 
system.  China welcomed the SPS cooperation arrange ment recently signed between Japan and China 
and the first round of technical consultations which had taken place under the new arrangement.  
Nevertheless, China wished to reiterate its concer ns regarding the temporary standards under Japan's 
Positive List scheme, the lack of scientific basis for those standards, and a lagging review process. 
158. Japan responded that its Positive List system had been established in 2006 after consulting 
existing MRLs from Codex, Australia, Canada, Ne w Zealand, the European Union and the United 
States, based on a scientific evaluation.  Japan stated  that its standard-setting process was in line with 
the SPS Agreement, and that it had notified its draft MRLs to the WTO, providing Members an 
opportunity to submit comments. 
283. Pesticide maximum residue levels (MRLs)  
Raised by: Brazil 
Supported by: China, Ecuador 
Dates raised: June 2009 (G/SPS/R/55, paras.  36-38), October 2009 (G/SPS/R/56, paras. 
50-52), October 2010 (G/SPS/R/61, paras. 37-38) 
Relevant document(s): Raised orally. 
Solution:   G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 31 
 
 
  Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
159. In June 2009, Brazil noted that Japan imposed stricter pesticide residue limits than Codex, 
because it required industry-wide testing for one MRL violation and a 100 per cent test-and-hold 
policy in case a second violation involving the same  pesticide and commodity took place within one 
year.  Brazil had difficulty in exporting green coffee beans to Japan, as Japan's MRL was 30 times lower than that of Codex.  In a bilateral meeti ng, Japan had stated that the revision of these MRLs 
would take place within two years.  Brazil had request ed an interim transitiona l mechanism as trade in 
coffee was worth over US$300 million per year.  Brazil exported coffee to over 100 countries and 
requested Japan to modify their procedures in lin e with international standards, or provide a 
transitional period while the Japanese authorities d ecided on the revision of the requirement without 
any negative impact on Brazilian coffee exports. 
160. China supported Brazil's concern, and requested th at Japan's temporary standards be based on 
scientific justification and a risk analysis.  Th ese measures had been applied for a period of three 
years, adversely affecting Chinese food exports to Japan.  Furthermore, Japan's uniform standard of 
0.01 ppm for several pesticides was arbitrary and without  scientific justification.  China requested that 
Japan brings its requirements into line with the relevant internationa l standards.  China's exporters 
indicated that imported products were subjected  to a greater number of random inspections.  
Furthermore, inspections were carried out only on certain imported products, even though the same 
pesticides were also used domestically in Japan.  China urged Japan to apply its measures uniformly 
without any discrimination. 
161. Japan clarified that the MRLs were based on scientific assessment, and Codex and other 
international standards were taken into account wh en enforcing the measures.  Japan had notified the 
WTO before establishing these MRLs and had recei ved comments.  The SPS Agreement was taken 
into consideration, and the measures were applie d equally to imported a nd domestic products.  The 
frequency of inspections was increased based on findi ngs of violations.  Japan confirmed that the 
Codex MRLs would be the basis of the current re vision, which would occur by December at the 
earliest.  Japan expressed its commitment to c ontinuing bilateral discussions with Brazil. 
162. In October 2009, China recalled that after th e implementation of Japan's positive list system 
for chemical residues, China and many other  Memb ers had expressed concerns regarding the issue of 
"uniform standards".  Japan had indicated that the st andard would be revised on the basis of scientific 
evaluations and MRLs would be established for more chemical residues.  In recent years, almost all 
notices that China received from Japan regarding produc ts that exceeded pesticide limits were caused 
by the "uniform standards".  These had severely aff ected China's trade with Japan.  Also, after the 
implementation of Japan's positive list system, a se ries of regulatory measures such as intensified 
inspection, quarantine and supervision, had been undertaken.  China urged Japan to develop science-
based residue limits for the items of concern as s oon as possible, to alleviate unnecessary restrictions 
to international trade. 
163. Ecuador supported China's concern regarding MRLs applied by Japan.  Ecuador's cacao 
exports had faced difficulties of market access, a nd although various meeti ngs had taken place, no 
solution had been found.  Ecuador requested Japan to modify its MRLs in accordance with 
international standards. 
164. Japan stated that the uniform standard was based on the evaluations by the FAO/WHO Joint 
Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) and/or on the tolerance exposure amounts that the US 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) adopted for food additives. G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 32  
 
  165. In October 2010, Ecuador rais ed concerns over Japan's 2006 Food Health Act establishing 
new MRLs for food products of plant and animal or igin, intended for human consumption.  Products 
with concentrations of residues above those limits could not be imported, processed, used or stored for 
sale in Japan.  The Food Health Act established a list of 158 chemicals and their corresponding MRL 
for food, and substances.  The establishment of such  stringent limits had meant that shipments of 
Ecuadorian cocoa in which 24D was present had been  rejected by Japan, causing significant costs to 
Ecuador cocoa exporters and producers.  Despite constructive bilateral discussions, no solution had 
been found, and Ecuador requested more informatio n on the process used by Japan to set its MRLs 
measures and asked for swift notification by Japan of anomalies or lack of compliance with cocoa 
exports regulations. 
166. Japan stated that based on the Japanese Positive List System, th e Ministry oh Health, Labour 
and Welfare (MHLW) established individual MRLs in food commodities through safety evaluations and residue studies.  Japan adopted Codex MRLs as Japanese MRLs where the necessary 
requirements were met.  If Ecuador wanted Japan  to establish MRLs for specific pesticides, an 
application had to be submitted to the MHLW.  In addition, Japan would consider relevant 
applications for modifications and revise current MRLs as appropriate. 
307. Prohibition of certain food additives 
Raised by: India 
Supported by:  
Dates raised: October 2010 (G/SPS/R/61, paras. 20-21) 
Relevant document(s): G/SPS/N/JPN/255. 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
167. In October 2010, India expressed concerns ove r Japan's proposed withdrawal of 80 food 
additives in May 2011, which had been notified to  the WTO in July 2010 (G/SPS/N/JPN/255).  The 
decision to prohibit the use of these additives was a pparently based on a survey and the analysis of 
public comments.  The survey cons idered the sale, manufacturing, import, processing, use, storage 
and display of such substances in Japan's market .  India was concerned that the requirements of 
Article 2 of the SPS Agreement had not been full y considered, as the survey did not provide any 
indications that the additives were hazardous to  human health, nor had a risk assessment been 
undertaken by the Japanese authorities, and internati onal standards had not been followed.  Of the 80 
food additives to be withdrawn, at least 33 substances were allo wed in other countries, including 
Korea and the United States, in line with Codex or country specific standards.  India urged Japan to 
follow the provisions of the SPS Agreement before d eciding to prohibit the use of the food additives, 
and suggested that Codex could be requested to  examine the risks associated with those food 
additives. 
168. Japan recalled that according to the revision of the Japanese Food Sanitation Law in 1995, 
natural additives became subject to prior approval by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.  
Therefore, whether natural or synthetic, no addi tive could be used unless it was approved by the 
Ministry.  The concept of "existing food additives"  was established in 1995 an d referred to substances 
that were derived from natural origin and that ha d been used before 1995 without prior approval.  
However, their safety had not been verified or  examined based on a safety assessment, and Japan 
would be systematically verifying the safety of exis ting food additives.  Japan considered that it was 
justifiable to eliminate those substances for which th ere was no actual use or distribution in Japan, and  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 33 
 
 
  hence would not lead to any restriction of trade.  Japan had previously directly contacted embassies 
and trade groups in response to requests received on this issue.  In 2009, Japan had carried out a 
survey on 125 substances and, based on the surv ey results, had prohibited these 80 additives since 
they were no longer in use in the domestic mark et.  Should Members nevertheless have further 
comments on this notification, these should be submitted by 17 November 2010 at the latest. 
MALAYSIA CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURE S MAINTAINED BY MALAYSIA 
Plant health 294. Import restrictions on plant and plant products  
Raised by: Brazil 
Supported by: Japan 
Dates raised: March 2010 (G/SPS/R/58, paras. 25-27) 
Relevant document(s): Raised orally. 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
169. In March 2010, Brazil expressed concerns related to Malaysia's import restrictions on  plants 
and plants products due to a regula tion on South American leaf blight disease.  Brazil considered that 
the regulation did not have a scientific justification.   Malaysia's import restrictions were apparently 
based on a provision in the constitutive text of th e Asia and Pacific Plant Protection Commission 
(APPPC) on South American leaf blight disease.  Howe ver, other parties to the APPPC did not apply 
this provision to Brazil.  A representative of FAO con ducted a pest risk analysis to verify whether the 
South American leaf blight disease represented a risk  to Malaysia, but no risk had been identified.  
Therefore, Brazil requested that Malaysia allow the importation of plants and plants products from 
Brazil. 
170. Japan observed that the trade restriction was al so a concern for Japan.  Japan recognized the 
efforts of the APPPC to amend its regulation so  as to be consistent with the SPS Agreement. 
171. Malaysia indicated that they had not receive any information from Brazil in advance of the 
meeting and, thus, could not consult with technical officials.  Malaysia invited Brazil to send its 
concern in writing so a response could be provided. 
MEXICO 
CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURE S MAINTAINED BY MEXICO 
Animal health 
312. Restrictions on beef exports due to BSE-related concerns 
Raised by: Nicaragua 
Supported by:  
Dates raised: October 2010 (G /SPS/R/61, paras. 162-164) G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 34  
 
  Relevant document(s): Raised orally  
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
172. In October 2010, Nicaragua raised concerns rega rding Mexican restrictions on its beef exports 
because of BSE-related concerns.  Nicaragua had requested Mexico to recognize its status as a 
"controlled risk" country, in line with its submissi on to the OIE.  In addition, Mexico failed to 
approve Nicaraguan slaughterhouses, despite the fact that these had been approved by other countries. 
173. The representative of the OIE stressed that accord ing to the OIE standard, de-boned beef was 
a safe commodity with regard to BSE, irrespective of the BSE status of a country. 
174. Mexico indicated that they were willing to work  bilaterally with the government of Nicaragua 
to resolve these difficulties. 
Plant health 
270. Import restrictions on rice 
Raised by: Pakistan 
Supported by:  
Dates raised: June 2008 (G/SPS/R/51, par as. 23-24), October 2008 (G/SPS/R/53, para. 
42), June 2009 (G/SPS/R/55, Para.54) , March 2010 (G/SPS/R/58, Paras. 
54-55) 
Relevant document(s): G/SPS/N/MEX/184/Add.1. 
Solution: Agreement reached. 
Status: Resolved 
Date reported as 
resolved: 21 January 2010 
 
175. In June 2008, Pakistan noted that since 200 5, Mexico banned the importation of Pakistani 
rice.  Both countries had engaged in bilateral cons ultations since 2006, but with marginal progress to 
date.  Pakistan was willing to ap ply mitigation treatments on its rice, if necessary, but no further 
information had been provided by  the Mexican authorities.  Pakist an considered that Mexico was 
failing to respect its obligations under Articles 4 and 5 of the SPS Agreement.  Pakistan urged Mexico 
to eliminate the import restrictions imposed on Pakist ani rice, and stressed that Pakistan was ready to 
respond to any request from Mexico. 
176. Mexico observed that it did not agree with the c oncerns raised by Pakistan related to Articles 
4 and 5.  Mexico was currently conducting a pest ri sk analysis in accordance with IPPC's standards, 
before allowing the importation of rice from Pakistan .  In this pest risk analysis, Mexico was 
assessing all the potential pests, and not only the gorgojo khapra (Trogoderma granarium).  In 
addition, in every meeting of the Mexico-Pakista n Commission, Mexico had informed Pakistan about 
the latest developments of the risk analysis.  A memorandum of understa nding between both countries 
acknowledged the need to complete a risk assessment  before allowing imports of rice from Pakistan.  
The results of the pest risk analysis would be conveyed to Pakistan as soon as it was concluded.  
Mexico reiterated its willingness to bilaterally  work with Pakistan on this matter.  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 35 
 
 
  177. In October 2008, Mexico reported that the concern raised by Pakistan regarding restriction of 
rice imports was resolved, however, Mexico had not yet completed its assessment of plant health risks.  Pakistan thanked the Govern ment of Mexico for the efforts undertaken to carry out the required 
pest risk assessment.  Pakistan al so requested a time-line from Mexico  for each step of the pest risk 
assessment process on plant health. 
178. In June 2009, Pakistan reported that an agre ement had been reached with Mexico on this 
issue, and all that was now required was that th e final agreed procedures be published.  Mexico 
confirmed that only some regulatory aspects had yet to be concluded with regard to the importation of 
rice from Pakistan. 
179. In March 2010, Mexico indicated that on 21 January 2010 Mexico had removed the absolute 
restrictions on rice imports due to the Khapra beetle and replaced it with partial restrictions.  This had 
been notified as G/SPS/N/MEX/184/Add.1.  Pakistan and other countries that complied with the new 
phytosanitary requirements should be able to export rice to Mexico. 
180. Pakistan was grateful to Mexico for resolving th e issue and hoped that this would lead to an 
increase in economic cooperation and trade between the two countries. 
277. NAPPO draft standard for ships and cargoes from areas infested with Asian gypsy moth 
- Maintained by Mexico, Canada and the United States (See item 277, Page 6)  
SENEGAL CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURES MAINTAINED BY SENEGAL Animal health 303. Import restrictions on poultry meat 
Raised by: Brazil 
Supported by:  
Dates raised: June 2010 (G/SPS/R/59, paras. 34-36) 
Relevant document(s): Raised orally. 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
181. In June 2010, Brazil raised con cerns regarding Senegal's import r estriction on poultry meat, in 
place since 2005.  Brazil, while recognizing Senegal's right to protect itself against diseases, recalled the OIE guideline that a Member could establish m easures if avian influenza was detected.  Brazil 
stated that its products fulfilled all international re quirements and that avian influenza had not been 
reported in its territory.  Brazil had provided Sene gal with all the information needed for a risk 
analysis, and had asked in March and May 2010 fo r scientific justification of Senegal's import 
restrictions.  Brazil concluded that it was looking fo rward to receiving technical feedback to allow the 
export of Brazilian poultry meat to Senegal. 
182. Senegal stated that the Senegalese authorities had only received Brazil's request a few days 
prior to the Committee meeting, and that a reply would be provided to Brazil as soon as possible. G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 36  
 
  183. ECOWAS reported that at a meeting in Cape Verde, ECOWAS members had held high level 
discussions on the issue.  ECOWAS hoped that  the issue would be resolved amicably. 
SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU 
(CHINESE TAIPEI) 
CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURES MA INTAINED BY CHINESE TAIPEI 
Animal health 
291. BSE measures 
Raised by: Canada 
Supported by:  
Dates raised: March 2010 (G/SPS/R/58, paras. 19-20) 
Relevant document(s): Raised orally. 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
184. In March 2010, Canada expressed concerns over Chinese Taipei's BSE measures.  In 
May 2007, the OIE had recognized Canada as a "c ontrolled BSE risk" country, and in July 2007 
Chinese Taipei resumed partial trade with Canada  by allowing access for boneless beef from animals 
under 30 months of age.  However, despite numer ous technical discussions, an inspection visit to 
Canada, the completion of a risk assessment, and a formal arrangement on conditions for bone-in beef 
from animals under 30 months, no further market access had been granted by Chinese Taipei.  In 
January 2010, Chinese Taipei appr oved an amendment to its food sanitation act banning the import of 
offal and certain other bovine products from countries affected by BSE.  Canada was concerned about 
the recent amendments to Chinese Taipei's legislati on, and requested that all necessary steps be taken 
to ensure that the import conditions of Chinese Taip ei were consistent with the recommendations and 
guidelines provided by the OIE. 
185. Chinese Taipei explained that the recent 16th a nd 17th cases of BSE in Canada necessitated a 
new risk assessment of bone-in beef.  Pending co mpletion of the new risk assessment, the current 
regulations on imports of bone-in beef from Cana da would remain in force.  Chinese Taipei 
maintained that its BSE regulation w as consistent with the SPS Agreement. 
TURKEY 
CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURE S MAINTAINED BY TURKEY 
Other concerns 
302. Restrictions on products  derived from biotechnology 
Raised by: United States 
Supported by: Argentina, Canada 
Dates raised: June 2010 (G/SPS/R/59, paras.  30-33), October 2010 (G/SPS/R/61, paras. 
34-36) 
Relevant document(s):  G/SPS/N/TUR/8  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 37 
 
 
  Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
186. In June 2010, the United States raised concerns about the development of Turkey's regulatory 
system for agricultural biotechnology (G/SPS/N/TUR/8) .  In the eight months since Turkey had begun 
implementing new biotech measures, Turkey ha d announced both a Bio safety Law and several 
implementation measures.  However, only two of those implementation measures had been notified to the WTO and one of those was notified as "effectiv e immediately" with no comment period.  The 
United States was concerned that compliance re quirements were not shared publicly, and that 
regulations prohibiting the presence of biotechnology in  products for infants and children did not refer 
to a risk assessment, hence leading to a lack of predictability in the approval process.  The United 
States asked for clarification on the status of cu rrent approvals, the approvals process, and how the 
process would change after the Biosafety Law was enforced on 26 September 2010. 
187. Canada stated that it would continue to mon itor the implementation of Turkey's Biosafety 
Law and its impacts on Canadian exports of geneti cally and non-genetically modified commodities.  
Canada hoped that the new law would take into acco unt scientific assessments and would not be more 
trade restrictive than necessary. 
188. Argentina supported the concerns raised by the United States, noting that the Turkish 
standards were not consistent with the SPS Agreem ent or Codex standards, and were unfavourable to 
modern biotechnology pro ducts.  Argentina expressed deep concern about the measures and hoped 
that they would be revised based on the SPS Agreement and Codex standards. 
189. Turkey stated that in 2009 and 2010 it had notified its legislation related to biosafety issues 
whose objectives were to:  (i) establish and implement a biosafety system for human, animal and plant 
health;  (ii) ensure the conservation of the envir onment and biodiversity and their sustainability;  and 
(iii) establish science-based regulations and monitori ng principles and procedures.  Previous Turkish 
legislation and the Cartagena Protocol had been  used as reference documents, as well as EU accession 
documents.  Turkey had endeavoured to address the c oncerns raised by the United States, Canada and 
Argentina regarding its notifications, including issues caused by mistranslation.  Turkey indicated that 
it would draft and notify secondary regulations to the WTO, to clarify misunderstandings. 
190. In October 2010, the United States welcomed Tu rkey's notification of the implementation of 
its new biotech measures, however the developmen t and implementation of the law had not been 
transparent nor timely.  The United States appreciated the valuable trade in agricultural products with 
Turkey and wished to re-establis h market access for the previously approved products without delay.  
The United States remained concerned that the syst em prohibited the presence of biotech products in 
products for infants and children, as well as the cu ltivation of biotechnology without reference to a 
risk assessment or scientific ev idence.  The United States sought clarifications on the process and 
criteria used to evaluate approval decisions, and encouraged Turkey to establish written procedures 
outlining those processes and criteria, as well as to confirm that they were based on science. 
191. Argentina expressed concern that the Turkish st andards were not consistent with the SPS 
Agreement or Codex standards, a nd were unfavourable to modern biotechnology products.  Canada 
stated that the new law had to take into acc ount scientific assessments and not be more trade 
restrictive than necessary.  Canada also urged Turk ey to consider delaying the implementation of the 
regulation for six months until at least 26 February 2011. G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 38  
 
  192. Turkey recalled that in 2009 and 2010 it had notifie d its legislation related to biosafety issues 
whose objectives were to establish a biosafety protection system for human, animal and plant health against risks emerging from GMOs and GMO-based products.  There were around 12,000 protected species in Turkey, 3,700 of those being only endemi c to Turkey.  More than 700 agricultural products 
could be naturally grown in Turkey, therefore it was critical for Turkey to protect its rich biodiversity 
from the risks arising from biotech products.  Turkey had endeavoured to address the concerns raised 
by various Members regarding its notifications, and would notify sec ondary regulations to the WTO, 
to clarify misunderstandings.  Turkey welcomed th e opinions of its trading partners to improve its 
legislation.  Turkey further asserted that the impl ementation of its legislation was science-based and 
fully complied with WTO and other international rules, as well as with the Cartagena Biosafety 
Protocol.  In addition, Turkey stated that no par ticular trade restriction had been reported during the 
preparation and adoption of the legi slation or after its enforcement. 
UKRAINE 
CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURES MAINTAINED BY UKRAINE Food safety 
288. Import measures on animals and animal products 
Raised by: European Union 
Supported by: Canada, Iceland, Norway, United States 
Dates raised: October 2009 (G/SPS/R/56, par as. 18-20), March 2010 (G/SPS/R/58, paras. 
46-48) 
Relevant document(s): G/SPS/N/UKR/3/Rev.1/Corr.1 
Solution: Withdrawal of measure 
Status: Resolved 
Date reported as 
resolved: 7 January 2010 
 
193. In October 2009, the European Communities rai sed concerns with regards to the imposition 
of an inspection requirement on a ll establishments wanting to continue exporting a wide range of 
animal and animal products to Ukraine.  There was no justification for the sudden introduction of such 
comprehensive inspections.  The European Comm unities questioned the scope, range of products 
covered and how the inspections woul d be carried out.  Assurance was needed that trade would not be 
unjustifiably and unnecessarily disrupted.  The meas ure would take effect on 14 January 2010, and 
Ukraine should clarify that if it had not completed inspections by 14 January this would not result in 
the rejection of goods, as had been stated in bilatera l meetings with the Ukraine Veterinary Services.  
The European Communities requested  the postponement of the entr y into force of the measure. 
194. Canada, Iceland, Norway and the United States expressed similar concerns with respect to 
Ukraine's new import conditions on animal products.  They indicated that their respective authorities 
had submitted comments to Ukraine regarding the new measure. 
195. Ukraine stated that the measure was intended to protect health and safety within it's territory.  
Ukraine would take note of the concerns raised and the comments that had been received during the 
comment period for the original notification.  Notification G/SPS/N/UKR/3/Rev.1/Corr.1 had been 
distributed to WTO Members with a deadline for comments of 30 November 2009.  Ukraine authorities had been in contact with the concerned Members and remained willing  to further rectify  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 39 
 
 
  and revise the text of the measure so that it provi ded more legal certainty and comfort for trading 
partners. 
196. In March 2010, the European Union highlighted the importance of the notification circulated 
on 7 January 2010, that Ukraine was withdrawing earlier notified measures on animals and animal 
products due to BSE and other pri on infections.  The European Union welcomed the withdrawal of 
the measure, which would have implied the sudde n imposition of an inspection requirement for all 
export establishments.  The draft measure had cove red a wide range of animals and animal products 
and would have caused unnecessary trade disruptions .  Along with other trading partners, the 
European Union had expressed concerns on these dr aft measures in the SPS Committee and had also 
held bilateral discussions with Ukraine.  The Eur opean Union considered this a good example of the 
importance of the transparency obligations and the SPS notification system.  The European Union was 
willing to continue working closely with Ukraine on further developments of its import system, which 
should continue operating in a transparent manner with a view to avoiding trade disruptions. 
197. Canada and Norway also appreciated the d ecision to withdraw the notified measure and 
thanked the Ukraine for its responsiveness.  Canada had also raised concerns about this matter and 
submitted detailed written comments.  This was a good example of an effective use of the WTO 
notification process to avoid trade problems. 
198. Ukraine explained that inspections were part of normal procedures.  Ukraine had taken into 
account the concerns expressed at the previous SPS Committee meeting and bilaterally.  It was 
important to ensure that measures were based on science and on OIE standards.  Ukraine would 
continue to cooperate w ith its trading partners. 
UNITED STATES CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURES MAINTAINED BY UNITED STATES Food safety 299. US 2009 Food Safety Enhancement Act  
Raised by: China 
Supported by: India 
Dates raised: June 2010 (G/SPS/R/59, paras. 21-23) 
Relevant document(s): Raised orally. 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
199. In June 2010, China expressed concerns relate d to the US 2009 Food Safety Enhancement 
Act.  The US Congress had proposed several new measures, including required registration for export 
food companies, follow-up inspections, compulsory certification for high risk imported products and 
the expansion of FDA authority.  China asked th e United States to notify these new measures and to 
provide the opportunity for Members to make comments before the adoption of the legislation. 
200. India expressed the need to understand the pr oposed legislation.  Indian industry had 
questions regarding the duration of the registrati on process, whether it was modeled on international 
standards, whether foreign government and sector asso ciations would be notified before or after a G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 40  
 
  food facility was inspected, and how the fast-track process for registration would work.  Once it had a 
better understanding of this process, India would seek further clarification. 
201. The United States clarified that the US Congr ess was in the process of considering this 
legislation and it was not clear when the bill would b ecome law, if at all.  Accordingly, because the 
Food Safety Enhancement Act was not a SPS measur e, the United States did not believe it was 
appropriate to comment on it at this time.  However, if this bill or any other food safety legislation did 
become law, the United States would alert its trading partners, and would notify the WTO accordingly. 
Animal health 
257. Import restrictions on cooked poultry products from China 
Raised by: China 
Supported by:  
Dates raised: October 2007 (G/SPS/R/46, par as. 11-12), April 2008 (G/SPS/R/49, paras. 
39-40), June 2008 (G/SPS/R/51, paras.  29-30), October 2008 (G/SPS/R/53, 
paras. 35-36 ), February 2009 (G/ SPS/R/54, paras. 15-16), October 2009 
(G/SPS/R/56, paras. 37-39), March 2010 (G/SPS/R/58, paras. 33-34 ), June 
2010 (G/SPS/R/59, paras. 42-43 ) 
Relevant document(s): Raised orally 
Solution: DSU consultations requested on 17 April 2009;  request for establishment 
of a panel on 23 June 2009.  Panel composed on 23 September 2009 (WT/DS392) 
Status: Panel report adopted 
Date reported as resolved: 25 October 2010 
 
202. In October 2007, China stated that the OIE ha d explicitly pointed out in the Avian Influenza 
Guideline that restrictive measures associated with  avian influenza should not be applied to cooked 
poultry meat that had been subjected to heat treat ment to destroy the viru s.  Nonetheless the United 
States prohibited the importation of such cooked poultry meat processed from poultry originated in 
China.  Although the United States admitted that there was no technical problem for the importation of such cooked poultry meat and it was only a matter of legal procedure, the US Congress had passed 
in August the Agriculture Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2008, of which Section 731 prohibited 
the importation of such products from China.  China questioned the scientific justification behind such 
a decision, how this section took into considerati on the SPS principle of minimizing negative effects 
on trade and the principle of risk assessment.  China hoped that the United States would abolish 
Section 731 and lift the ban as soon as possible. 
203. The United States noted that the Agriculture A ppropriations bill had not yet passed Congress, 
and was subject to potentially su bstantial change before it was signed into law by the President. 
204. In April 2008, China indicated  that despite numerous bilate ral meetings, including on the 
recognition of equivalence, China's cooked poultr y products were still denied access to the US 
market.  The United States had admitted that there were no technical problems with the importation of 
cooked poultry from China, yet imports remained re stricted due to legal problems.  The Agriculture 
Appropriations bill, which contained a specific provi sion to not allow imports from China, had been 
signed into law.  This prohibition was contrary to  Articles 2.2 and 2.3 of the SPS Agreement, as the  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 41 
 
 
  law was discriminatory and not science-based.  This  development set a bad precedent, showing that 
SPS measures could be easily overturned by legislation that paid no attention to scientific factors. 
205. The United States explained that the Agricultu re Appropriations bill prohibited the use of 
federal funds by USDA to continue work on this ru le.  China's concerns would be brought to the 
attention of the appropriate authorities in Washington , with the aim to resolve this problem as soon as 
possible. 
206. In June 2008, China reported that its con cerns on the US ban on imported Chinese cooked 
poultry dated back to 2004.  China had been inform ed that all technical issues, including recognition 
of the equivalence of its sanitary system, had been resolved during bilateral consultations.  However, 
the US Agriculture Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Y ear 2008, Section 7333, stipulated that the funds 
made available by that bill could not be used to  establish or implement a rule allowing Chinese 
poultry products to be imported into the United States .  This legislation disregarded the fact that the 
USDA had undertaken a risk assessment which c oncluded that Chinese cooked poultry did not pose 
risks to health.  China consider ed the law to be discriminatory, and not based on science.  China 
requested an update of the situation, and an indication of when Chinese cooked poultry products 
would be allowed into the US market. 
207. The United States indicated that they placed great importance on the fact that its SPS 
measures were based on science.  China's concerns w ould continue to be raised with the appropriate 
authorities within the United States with the hope th at this situation could be resolved as soon as 
possible. 
208. In October 2008, China reiterated its concerns  regarding US import restrictions on cooked 
poultry products from China, even though there we re no technical problems with these products.  
However, the US Agriculture Appropriations Bill banned the use of federa l funds to allow poultry 
products to be imported from China. 
209. The United States affirmed that it would con tinue to raise China's concerns with the 
appropriate authorities in Washington and hoped to resolve the issue as soon as possible. 
210. In February 2009, China reitera ted concerns about the US Agri cultural Appropriations Bill for 
fiscal year 2008, which had seriously affected Chin a's exports of cooked pou ltry products.  Although 
all technical problems had been resolved after nume rous bilateral consultations, the United States still 
maintained an import ban because the Bill's Section 733 indicated that no funds made available by the 
Bill could be used to establish or implement a ru le allowing poultry produc ts to be imported from 
China.  China was seriously concerned about this  discriminatory legislation, which was in obvious 
violation of US international obligations.  China hoped to resolve this problem in a science-based and 
pragmatic manner and asked the United States for an  update.  The United States indicated that US 
authorities placed great importance on ensuring that measures were based on science.  China's concerns would be brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities in Washington with the aim 
of resolving the issue as soon as possible. 
211. In October 2009, China stated the United States had modified the relevant clauses of the 
Omnibus Appropriations Act 2009, and the newly adopted Agriculture Appropriation Act of 2010, 
allowed imports of processed poultry or poultry produc ts from China only if certain criteria were met.  
The criteria included audits of inspection system s and onsite reviews of slaughter and processing 
facilities, laboratories and other control operations;  a significantly increased level of port of entry re-
inspection;  and the creation of an information-sh aring programme with other countries.  While China 
noted the progress on the issue, the new measures were discriminatory as they specified conditions 
applicable only to China. G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 42  
 
  212. China further stated that the planned auditing and inspection requirements were excessively 
stringent and the certifying procedure was complicated.  Additionally,  the new provision ignored the agreement reached in 2007 between the United St ates and China on relevant technical issues 
concerning the import of poultry and poultry products from China, and the achievements China had made on developing disease-free areas in accordance w ith  OIE standards.  China requested the 
United States to fulfill its WTO obligations and to  take active steps to eliminate discriminatory 
measures and normalize bilateral poultry trade. 
213. United States stated that the Agriculture Appropriations legislation approved in 2009 
permitted USDA to make a determination with resp ect to China's application to export poultry 
products to the United States, provided that the Secr etary of Agriculture made certain commitments to 
Congress.  Such commitments set forth what would or dinarily occur under the standard procedure that 
would apply to an application to export poultry products from any country.  USDA would undertake certain transparency and notification obligations w ith respect to Congress, but it would not have any 
effect on the substantive treatment of China' s application or of any imports from China. 
214. In March 2010, China reiterated that Secti on 743 of the US Agriculture Appropriations Act 
(AAA) of 2010 set discriminatory requirements on China's processed poultry products.  China had 
raised similar concerns about Sections 733 and 72 7 of the US Appropriations Acts of 2008 and 2009, 
respectively.  Section 743 was discriminatory in na ture, and required a significantly increased level of 
port of entry re-inspection, the creation of an in formation-sharing programme with other countries, 
audits of inspection systems and on-site reviews of slaughtering and processing facilities.  These 
Chinese-specific requirements were not in conf ormity with Articles 2.2 and 2.3 of the SPS 
Agreement.  Although the United States asserted th at Section 743 only established commitments on 
the Secretary of Agriculture by the US Congress,  the new requirements would create substantial 
obligations for China when exporting poultry products to the United States.  At the end of 2007, the 
USDA had concluded the equivalence recognition process for Chinese poultry inspection and control 
systems.  However, the only remaining task, which was the finalization of the US legislation process, 
had never been concluded.  China was dismayed  by recent US comments that the equivalence 
recognition process for Chinese poultry would need to be restarted. 
215. The United States responded that the Agri culture, Rural Development, Food and Drug 
Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriatio ns Act 2010 permitted the USDA to use funds to 
establish and implement equivalence rules for Ch inese poultry.  The USDA Food Safety Inspection 
Service (FSIS) was moving forward with the e quivalence process for China and had requested 
information regarding China's new food safety law on poultry inspection systems, as well as any other 
changes to China's laws and regulations related to these systems.  This type of request was made to 
any country that had significantly changed its food sa fety system during an equivalence determination 
process. 
216. In June 2010, China reiterated that Section 7 43 of the US Agriculture Appropriations Act 
(AAA) of 2010 set discriminatory requirements on China's processed poultry products.  China had 
previously raised this concern at the October 20 09 and March 2010 meetings.  At the March meeting, 
the United States had reported that additional info rmation was being sought regarding China's new 
Food Safety Law.  China stated that it had in f act finalized a recognition of equivalence with the 
United States at the end of 2007, and therefore Chines e cooked poultry products were able to meet US 
SPS requirements before the adoption and implemen tation of the new Food Safety Law.  China 
argued that the Food Safety Law could not be used  to impede the ongoing consultation process, and 
again urged the United States to eliminate discriminatory restrictions on Chinese cooked poultry products. 
217. The United States noted that it did not maintain  a funding restriction on USDA's ability to 
move forward with rulemaking related to China's equivalence for poultry.  USDA had reached out to  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 43 
 
 
  China several times in recent months to move forward with China's e quivalence application, 
specifically asking for an updated application and mo re information regarding its new Food Safety 
Law.  USDA was committed to ensure that its re gulatory policies were based on science and met its 
international obligations.  The United States urged Ch ina to work with the USDA on its application of 
equivalence and to provide the request ed information as soon as possible. 
301. US Risk Analysis for the Entry of Queen Bees 
Raised by: Argentina 
Supported by:  
Dates raised: June 2010 (G/SPS/R/59, paras. 28-29) 
Relevant document(s): Raised orally. 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
218. In June 20010, Argentina raised concerns about US risk analysis for the importation of queen 
bees from Argentina into the North American ma rket.  Argentina had conducted research and 
provided information to the US Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS).  There had 
been a constructive exchange and Argentina hoped to  soon report the satisfactory conclusion of the 
risk assessment. 
219. The United States reported that due to the importance of beekeeping in modern US 
agriculture, there was a high level of protection ag ainst foreign bee pests and diseases.  On 7 June 
2010, USDA had started a national bee pest and disease survey to determine the prevalence of 
parasites and disease-causing microorganisms that  could contribute to the observed decline of 
American honey bee colonies.  Two laws, the Honey Bee Act and the Plant Protection Act, direct the 
USDA to enforce sanitary regulations to protect honey bee colonies, and the United States had published science-based risk assessment procedures for approving imports of bees.  With respect to 
Argentina's request for a risk  assessment, the United States had provided the findings of an 
assessment to the Argentine authoriti es in 2004, identifying three pests of concern in Argentine bees:  
Africanized honey bee, Braula schmitzi (bee louse), and Varroa destructor (mite).  In September 
2009, the United States had informed Argentina that the risk assessment was being revised to reflect 
changes in bee health and risks worldwide.  Information collected  from the national survey launched 
in June 2010 would inform further the ri sk assessment of Argentine queen bees. 
Plant health 
277. NAPPO draft standard for ships and cargoes from areas infested with Asian gypsy moth 
- Maintained by the United States, Canada and Mexico (See item 277, Page 6)  
284. Rule on importation of wooden handicrafts from China 
Raised by: China 
Supported by:  
Dates raised: June 2009 (G/SPS/R/55, paras.  39-40), October 2009 (G/SPS/R/56, paras. 
47-49), March 2010 (G/SPS/R/58, par as. 44-45), June 2010 (G/SPS/R/59, 
paras. 52-53 ) 
Relevant document(s): G/SPS/N/USA/1921 G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 44  
 
  Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
220. In June 2009, China expressed gratitude to the United States for a bilateral meeting regarding 
the new notification that all wooden handicrafts w ould have to be subject to heat treatment and 
fumigation.  China requested that the requirement be limited only to those products for which there 
was an identified risk, and that the measure co mply with Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement. 
221. The United States recalled that between 2002 a nd 2005, during routine inspections at US 
ports of entry, significant pests were found 418 tim es including in artificial Christmas trees, wooden 
home products and wood handicraft items, despite certification by China.  The United States 
continued to allow wood products from China s ubject to a new bark-removal condition.  Upon 
completion of the risk assessment in 2008, the Un ited States shared its findings with China and 
initiated several bilateral technical meetings to e xplain its position to ensure that all interested 
stakeholders were well informed.  The new rule for importation was circulated to all Members on 
27 April 2009, and the comment period closed on 8 June 2009. The United States thanked Members 
for providing comments and assured that these would be  reviewed before a final determination on the 
matter. 
222. In October 2009, China reiterated concerns re garding US regulations on wooden handicrafts 
from China.  The draft regulation broadened the scope  of regulated products to all wooden handicrafts 
from China, which had to be subjected to fumiga tion or heat treatment and accompanied by a plant 
quarantine certificate.  Risks, however, were only associated with wooden hand icrafts with bark with 
diameter over one centimetre.  The US heat treatment  requirement went far beyond the IPPC standard.  
China requested that the United States base its meas ures on the relevant international standards, in 
particular ISPM 32, and to eliminate the certificate requirement for low risk wooden handicrafts in the 
final measure. 
223. The United States stated that in April 2009, the USDA proposed to allow the importation of 
wooden handicrafts from China under certain conditions .  The proposal would allow trade to resume 
in a broad range of Chinese-origin wooden handicraf ts while continuing to protect the United States 
against the introduction of plant pests, such as wo od boring beetles.  The United States had taken 
measures in response to finding pests on wood handic raft products, including artificial Christmas 
trees, trellis towers, other home and garden wood d écor, and wood handicraft items  The intercepted 
pests were closely related to the Asian longhorned b eetle, which had previously been introduced into 
the United States in shipments of wood packing ma terial from China.  The comment period on the 
proposed rule had closed on 8 June 2009, and all comments would be considered prior to making 
determination to issue a final rule. 
224. The IPPC stated that ISPM 15 concerned wood packaging material and that in 2008 the 
Commission on Phytosanitary Measures (CPM) had recogni zed that handicrafts were also an issue.  
The topic "Wood products and handicrafts made from raw wood" had been included on the IPPC 
work programme.  A specialized technical panel woul d draft a specification for this new standard in 
2010. 
225. In March 2010, China reiterated concerns regarding US restrict ions on wooden handicrafts 
from China (G/SPS/N/USA/1921).  The notified dr aft regulation would apply to all wooden 
handicrafts from China although the risks which had triggered the import ban were only associated 
with wooden handicrafts with a diameter over one centimetre.  China hoped that the United States 
would limit the scope of the measure to products presenting real risks.  According to the draft  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 45 
 
 
  regulation, all wooden handicrafts from China would be subject to fumigation or heat treatment and 
require plant quarantine certificates, which would unnecessarily raise costs for the Chinese handicraft 
industry and plant quarantine authorities.  China ha d made these points in its written comments on the 
US notification and invited the United States to ta ke the comments into account when finalizing the 
regulation.  To date, China had received no repl y from the United States.  China was willing to 
continue cooperating and hoped that the United Stat es would take concrete steps to address China's 
concern. 
226. The United States explained that a proposed ru le to reauthorize the importation of wooden 
handicrafts form China subject to specific requireme nts had been published in April 2009 and notified 
as G/SPS/N/USA/1921.  The proposal would allow trade in a broad range of handicrafts to resume 
while continuing to protect the United States agains t the introduction of plant pests such as wood 
boring beetles.  The comment period on this notifi cation had closed on 8 June 2009, and the United 
States had received eight comments, including comme nts from China.  The USDA's Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service would promulgate an ad ditional proposed rule that would address China's 
concerns, and subsequently a final rule , after evaluation of public comments. 
227. In June 2010, China reiterated the concerns re garding US restrictions on wooden handicrafts 
from China (G/SPS/N/USA/1921).  The notified dr aft regulation would apply to all wooden 
handicrafts from China and would unnecessarily rai se costs for the Chinese handicraft industry and 
plant quarantine authorities.  China had made thes e points in its written comments on the notification 
and hoped they would be taken into acc ount when finalizing the regulation. 
228. The United States explained that the emerge ncy action of April 2005 only prevented the 
import of wood handicrafts with attached bark.  Chinese-origin wood handicrafts remained enterable 
with the bark removed and properly treated.  Howe ver, to address China's market access concern, the 
United States had published a proposed rule to r eauthorize the importation of Chinese-origin wood 
handicrafts subject to specific requirements.  The proposal, notified on 27 April 2009 as G/SPS/N/USA/1921, would allow resumed trade in a br oad range of handicrafts while continuing to 
protect the United States against the introduction of plant pests such as wood boring beetles.  The 
USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Servi ce would promulgate an additional proposed rule 
addressing China's concerns, and subsequently a fi nal rule, after evaluation of public comments. 
292. Prohibition of Ornamental Plants Larger than 18 inches  
Raised by: Costa Rica 
Supported by:  
Dates raised: March 2010 (G/SPS/R/58, paras. 21-22) 
Relevant document(s): Raised orally. 
Solution:  
Status: Not reported 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
229. In March 2010, Costa Rica referred  to the US restrictions on the importation of ornamental 
plants larger than 18 inches, based on the US Code  of Federal Regulation, section 37, part 319, title 7 
(7 CFR § 319.37).  Costa Rica reported that in early 2000, it had conducted a risk assessment to 
support its request for the United States to lift its restrictions.  Based on a US request, Costa Rica had 
established and operated a Clean Stock Program, ai med at reducing the number of interceptions of 
exports of ornamental plants to the United States.  The Clean Stock Program for Dracaena marginata 
started to operate in 2005, and it involved authorities from Costa Rica and the United States.  The G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 46  
 
  Program concluded its work in December 2008.  Howe ver, more than one year after the conclusion of 
the Program, the United States had not yet initiated a process to modify its regulation restricting the importation of ornamental plants larger than 18 in ches.  A working plan had been elaborated by the 
regulatory agencies of both countries.  Neverthe less, Costa Rica was concerned that despite the 
agreement on the technical issues of the Plan, th e United States was taking too long to revise its 
restrictions. 
230. The United States reported that the authorities of both countries had been working 
cooperatively on issues related to the impor tation of tropical foliage, particularly dracaena spp..   The 
ongoing work addressed the development of greater surveillance and inspection protocols to reduce 
the high number of interceptions.  The US Depart ment of Agriculture (USDA) was working with 
Costa Rica on a work plan and a proposed ru le to allow the safe entry of oversized dracaena spp.   To 
complete the science-based review process, the US DA was awaiting a response on the draft work plan 
by Costa Rica, so as to expand the current Clean Stock Program. 
CERTAIN MEMBERS 
CONCERNS RELATED TO MEASURES MAINTAINED BY CERTAIN MEMBERS 
Animal health 
193. General import restrictions due to BSE 
Raised by: European Union 
Supported by: Canada, Switzerland, United States, Uruguay 
Dates raised: June 2004 (G/SPS/R/34, paras.  37-38), October 2004 (G/SPS/R/35, paras. 
85-86), June 2005 (G/SPS/R/37/Rev.1,  paras. 75-76), February 2007 
(G/SPS/R/44, para. 29), October 2008 (G/SPS/R/53, paras. 24-28), February 2009 (G/SPS/R/54, paras. 11-12), June 2009 (G/SPS/55, para. 
47), October 2009 (G/SPS/R/56, para . 46), March 2010 (G/SPS/R/56, 
paras. 35-36 ), June 2010 (G/SPS/R/59, para. 44 ) 
Relevant document(s): Raised orally 
Solution: Partial solution notified 
Status: Partially resolved 
Date reported as 
resolved:   
 
231. In June 2004, the European Union raised con cerns about unjustified im port restrictions on EU 
exports due to concerns about BSE.  To satisfy consumer demands, the European Union had adopted 
comprehensive measures to address risks relating to  BSE.  These measures applied both to products 
intended for consumption within the European Union, and to those destined for export.  The system of 
geographical assessment used in the European Un ion had successfully identified countries in which 
the disease was still present.  The Eu ropean Union called on other countries to replace import bans, 
which exceeded OIE recommendations and yet did not fully address potential internal risks, with 
specific import requirements in accordance with OI E standards.  Many products, such as semen, 
embryos and dairy products could be traded with predefined guarantees.  Members were urged to take 
into consideration OIE recommendations for intern ational trade and to stop discriminating among 
Members with similar BSE conditions.  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
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  232. Canada recalled that at its last meeting the OIE had reconfirmed that some products, such as 
semen, embryos, hides, and milk, did not contribute to  the transmission of BSE.  Hence the imports of 
these types of products did not provide a poten tial pathway for introduction of the disease. 
233. In October 2004, the European Union informed  the Committee that several WTO Members 
had reviewed their bans on EU beef and small bovine ruminant products and replaced them with 
specific requirements in accordance with OIE sta ndards.  The European Union urged all those 
Members who had not yet done so to align their re gulations in accordance with OIE standards.  The 
United States noted that some Members were reviewing their import restrictions on US beef and also urged all those Members who had not done so to align their regulations in accordance with OIE 
standards. 
234. In June 2005, the European Union reported that the number of countries that had lifted their 
respective bans on EU bovines a nd bovine products in accordance with OIE standards had been 
regularly growing, including also non-Members of the WTO.  According to the revised BSE chapter of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code, many bovine derived products, in cluding de-boned skeletal 
muscle and blood products, could be safely traded  regardless of the BSE status of the exporting 
country.  The European Union invited the remaini ng WTO Members to replace their import bans with 
specific import requirements in accordance with OIE standards. 
235. In February 2007, the United States expressed concern that US ruminant and non-ruminant 
products continued to face BSE-related restricti ons.  Although there had been some progress and a 
number of Members had removed measures, US pr oducts continued to face overly restrictive 
measures which exceeded the OIE standards.  The United States had undertaken extensive 
surveillance and put in place interlocking safeguards, nonetheless many restrictions remained in place.  
The United States asked Members to review th e evidence now available and to revise their 
requirements accordingly. 
236. In October 2008, the European Union recalled the concerns previously raised by Canada 
regarding Korea's restriction on beef imports.  Th e European Union also had concerns regarding 
restrictions maintained by other WTO Members on beef exported from the European Union, even 
though these beef products were considered safe and in compliance with the BSE chapter of the OIE 
Terrestrial Animal Health Code. 
237. Canada shared the EU concerns and asked Members to base their measures on the BSE 
chapter provisions of OIE Terrestrial Animal Heal th Code.  In May 2007, Canada was officially 
recognized by the OIE as controlled-risk for BSE and this was reconfirmed in May 2008.  Canada was 
grateful to the increasing number of WTO Members that restored full or partial access for beef and 
cattle.  Canada urged other Members to resume full trade in beef and cattle based on the OIE 
designation. 
238. Uruguay supported the concerns of the European Union and Canada.  With regard to animal 
health regulations applied to trade, Uruguay stat ed that all WTO Members should conform to the OIE 
designation and to the standards of the three sisters in general. 
239. Switzerland supported the EU concer n on restrictions due to BSE 
240. The representative of the OIE urged Members to abide by the standards enacted by the OIE. 
241. In February 2009, the European Union drew atte ntion to the OIE standard for BSE, which did 
not recommend trade restrictions on de-boned beef from animals aged less than 30 months.  The 
European Union met this standard, but its exports  were still facing trade restrictions.  National 
restrictions maintained despite the OIE Code underm ined this standard that had been adopted after G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
Page 48  
 
  long negotiations, thus damaging the credibility of the OIE.  The OIE was planning to update the 
Code, because there was compelli ng evidence that the age require ment was not necessary, but the 
European Union questioned whether this was worthw hile if Members did not apply the standard in 
any case.  Trade in beef was important, and BSE issues were among the concerns most frequently raised in the SPS Committee.  The European Union a ppealed to Members to make greater efforts to 
base their measures on the relevant OIE standards.   Jordan was now accepting the OIE Code, as did 
the European Communities, and othe rs should follow this example. 
242. The OIE explained that the BSE standards had b een democratically adopted by OIE members, 
and were in fact very conservative.  The OIE was considering removing the age requirement, and 
relaxing the restrictions on gelatin.  There was still a wide margin of safety built into the standards, 
and it was worrying that there was a lack of w illingness on the part of Members to apply them. 
243. In June 2009, the European Union again drew a ttention to restrictions on bovine meat and 
related products still imposed by many Members.  Th e European Union requested that unjustified and 
discriminatory restrictions be removed.  The OIE C ode stated that no bans were necessary even if a 
country reported cases of BSE.  EU measures to control BSE were exemplary and went far beyond 
OIE requirements, and the European Union urged Members to establish fair, non-discriminatory and 
transparent rules for the import of bovine products. 
244. In October 2009, the European Union recalled that  they had repeatedly raised concerns about 
unjustified restrictions by some WTO Members on  imports of bovine, ovine  and related products 
allegedly in response to transmissible spongiform encephalopathy.  Any measures should be based on 
the relevant international standards. While some were aligning their processes to OIE 
recommendations, other Members still required unn ecessary certification, applied burdensome and 
lengthy procedures and discriminated between countri es without scientific  basis.  EU measures to 
eradicate and control BSE were comprehensive a nd offered every guarantee that EU exports were 
safe.  Finally, the European Union urged Members to fully take into consideration the latest OIE BSE 
guidelines and to establish fair, non-disc riminatory and transparent rules. 
245. In March 2010, the European Union reported that certain WTO Members still maintained 
unjustified import restrictions argua bly to protect against Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies 
(TSE).  The European Union urged Members to lift any unnecessary, disproportionate, or 
discriminatory restrictions which negatively aff ected EU exports.  The OIE recommendations on 
BSE, which were reviewed in May 2009, included th e possibility to import meat or even live animals 
from countries having a "negligible", "controlled", or "undetermined" BSE risk status, as long as the 
OIE rules on surveillance and control were followed.  In addition, for certain products under specific 
conditions, such as de-boned skeletal muscle meat, mi lk and milk products, semen and embryos, there 
should be no BSE import requirements regardless of th e BSE status or the age of the cattle population 
of the exporting country, zone or compartment. 
246. Switzerland  supported the concerns raised by the European Union, stating that WTO 
Members should base their measures on the OIE recommendations and available data on BSE. 
247. In June 2010, the European Union reported that certain WTO Members still maintained 
unjustified import restrictions to protect against TSEs. The European Union urged Members to lift any 
unnecessary, disproportionate, or discriminatory restri ctions which negatively affected EU exports.  
The European Union recalled that OIE had issued BSE standards based on scientific risk assessments 
and defined the conditions under which commodities c ould be safely traded.  In May 2010, additional 
wording was inserted in Article 11.6 of the OIE Te rrestrial Animal Health Code to clarify that, 
providing the commodities had been imported in accor dance with those conditions, the status of the 
importing countries would not be affected.  The European Union recalled that according to OIE 
recommendations, it is possible to import meat or even live animals from countries having a  G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.11/Add.1 
 Page 49 
 
 
  "negligible", "controlled", or "undetermined" BSE risk status, as long as OIE rules on surveillance and 
control were followed.  In addition, for certain  products under specific c onditions, such as de-boned 
skeletal muscle meat, milk and milk products, semen and embryos, there should be no BSE import 
requirements regardless of the BSE status or the age of the cattle population of the exporting country, zone or compartment.  The European Union stat ed that some Members had recently announced new 
measures which, without any scientific justificati on, deviated from OIE standards.  The European 
Union urged Members to align themselves with the OIE process and to process applications from the 
European Union. 
248. In October 2010, the European Union noted that restrictions of imports  due to BSE remained 
of great concern and urged Members to lift any unnecessary, disproportionate and discriminatory 
restrictions.  A number of WTO Members continued to impose unjustified import restrictions, such as 
allowing imports only from countries that had a ne gligible risk status according to the OIE 
classification or where no cases of BSE had been no tified at all.  There had been, however, some 
positive developments.  The Philippines had announced  the lifting of import restrictions on beef from 
most of EU member States, and Egypt was now allowing imports of de-boned beef from animals 
younger than 48 months.  The European Union urge d Members to quickly align their requirements 
with the OIE standards, and to establish fair, non-di scriminatory, transparent and scientifically sound 
import requirements. 
__________