WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION   
WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
14 June 2011  
 
(11-2904) 
Trade Policy Review Body  
SYMPOSIUM 
 
THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE ROLE OF THE WTO 
 
Background Note by the Secretariat1 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. This Note builds on the trade policy monito ring reports presented to the TPRB by the 
Director-General at regular intervals covering the period since October 2008.
2  It provides background 
information for a discussion in the TPRB on the Fina ncial and Economic Crisis  and the Role of the 
WTO.  As proposed by the Chairman of the General Council at its meeting on 29 July 20103, the aim 
is to provide an opportunity to Members to be better informed about research conducted by other 
international organizations on the issue and to a llow Members to exchange information and discuss 
their experiences.  The discussion is intended to have a broad scope, covering the possible trade 
effects of the measures taken by Members in respons e to the financial and ec onomic crisis in both the 
goods and services areas, while avoiding any over lap with the work already conducted by the 
Committee on Trade in Financial Services.4 
2. Previous monitoring reports have focused on bor der restrictions – tariffs, non-tariff barriers, 
trade remedy measures and export restrictions – that WTO Members and Observer Governments 
introduced in response to the financ ial and economic crisis.  One reason for this focus, beyond the fact 
that these measures are central to the functioning of the multilateral trading system, was concern that 
the economic and social effects of the crisis could place WTO Members under pressure to increase 
trade restrictions to a degree that would worsen th e contraction of trade and output and, because trade 
restrictions are a tax on consumption and pr oduction, that could undermine reflationary 
macroeconomic policies that were put in place to support economic recovery. 
3. The monitoring reports also noted that many governments, in particular but not only those in 
industrialized countries, introduced exceptional fiscal support measures to counteract the effects of the 
global crisis.  The majority of those measures were introduced during the early  stages of the crisis.  
Recently the Secretariat has encountered fewer new measures of that kind and many of the original 
assistance measures have now expired.  Nonetheless,  while they were active the measures raised 
concerns about their effects on trade and competition.   
                                                      
1 This Note has no legal effect on the rights and oblig ations of Members, nor any legal implication with 
respect to the conformity of any meas ure noted in the report with any WTO Agreement or any provision thereof.  
The inclusion of a measure in this Note implies no judgement by the WTO Secretariat on whether or not such 
measure, or its intent, is protectionist in nature. The Note is without prejudice to Members' negotiating positions 
in the Doha Round.   
2 The reports are contained in WTO documents JOB(09)/2 (26 January 2009), WT/TPR/OV/W/1 
(20 April 2009), WT/TPR/OV/W/2 (15 July 2009), WT/TPR/OV12-00 and WT/TPR/OV/12-01 
(18 November 2009), WT/TPR/OV/W/3 (14 June 2010), and WT/TPR/OV/13 (24 November 2010). 
3 WT/GC/M/127 (6 September 2010). 
4 S/FIN/M/64 (27 September 2010).   WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 2  
 
  II. SUMMARY 
4. The monetary and fiscal stimulus programmes that were put in place by a number of WTO 
Members from late-2008, particularly the coordi nated programme of G-20 countries, succeeded in 
reversing the contraction of global trade and outpu t that resulted from the financial crisis.  Trade 
volume had recovered to its pre-cr isis levels in developing countr ies by mid-2010 and globally by 
end-2010.  Trade led the recovery of growth in  global output and of jobs in emerging economies, 
although unemployment remains a major preoccupation worldwide. 
5. The reflationary effect of fiscal stimulus on economic activity helped take pressure off 
governments to react to the effects of the crisis through trade restriction to protect domestic output and jobs.  This helps to explain why there was relatively limited resort by WTO Members to new 
border trade restrictions over the past two and one- half years, when some outside commentators were 
predicting a widespread descent into protectionism. 
6. The fiscal stimulus programme was exceptional and intended to be temporary.  Most of its 
component measures were implemented early on in th e crisis and many have now expired.  Current 
budget constraints in developed countries are severel y restricting the extent to which those measures 
can be perpetuated or reintroduced.  Some of the measures (particularly certain production and 
consumption subsidies and governme nt procurement practices) surely did cause trade distortion or 
restriction while they were active by protecting do mestic producers from foreign competition, but in 
most cases (in particular where the assistance is being recouped by governments) their most significant trade effects are likely to expire with the measures themselves. 
7. Lack of information about most of these measures (which are subject to fewer WTO 
disciplines and notification requirements than are borde r restrictions and are more difficult to monitor) 
makes it hard to calculate their trade effects.  A recent study by the IMF gives a basis for drawing a 
tentative conclusion.  The study estimated that bo rder measures (tariffs etc.) and behind-the-border 
measures (subsidies and bail-outs) each accounted fo r about half of a total, annual, trade distortion 
effect of between 0.25% and 0.75% of worl d trade (US$35 billion to $110 billion a year).
5 
8. The IMF study is valuable in offering estimates of the size of the trade impact of new fiscal 
assistance relative to new border measures taken in the context of the crisis.  One implication of its 
results, however, is that the additional restric tion and distortion of trade flows caused by these 
measures is minor when compared with the effects of the stock of trade restricting and distorting 
measures that existed prior to the crisis and that continues to impede trade flows today. 
III. THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 
A. CRISIS  
9. In 2007, a number of major financial ins titutions began incurring heavy losses on their 
exposure to sub-prime mortgages in the United Stat es.  The situation worsened in 2008 as uncertainty 
grew about the extent of these losses and underm ined confidence in banks and other financial 
institutions more generally.  Lehman Brothers  investment bank failed in September 2008, and 
monetary authorities in industrialized countries ste pped in to provide financial support on a massive 
scale to prevent financial panic and the collap se of the core of the global banking system.6   
                                                      
5 Christian Henn and Brad McDona ld, "Crisis protectionism: The obse rved trade impact", 22 December 
2010, viewed at http://www.voxeu. org/index. php?q=node/5960.   
6 For a detailed account of the financial crisis, see "Policy Response to the Crisis", Bank for 
International Settlements, 79th Annual Report, Chapter VI, 29 June 2009, reproduced for the WTO Committee 
on Trade in Financial Services in WTO document JOB/SERV/12 of 24 June 2010.  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 3 
 
 
  10. The financial crisis occurred at a time when economic growth in the major industrialized 
economies was already slowing down.  The crisis  turned the slowdown into a sharp economic 
contraction as credit dried up, equity values plunged,  and housing markets weakened further, leading 
consumers to cut consumption and firms to slash in vestment spending.  The result was a sudden drop 
in aggregate demand in industrialized countries, whic h caused trade and output to contract on a global 
scale.  At the depth of the crisis, the United Stat es economy was shrinking at an annual rate of 7% and 
job losses were averaging 750,000 per month. 
11. The impact of falling export demand on developing countries was increased by sharp falls in 
commodity prices, declines in international remitta nces, and by international investors repatriating 
capital, causing a decline of net private capital fl ows to developing countries.  Trade finance for 
exports from many developing countries contracted. 
12. By the third quarter of 2008, GDP growth had become negative and unemployment had 
spiked higher in most major economies (Chart 1) .  The volume of world trade, which had grown 
annually by nearly 8% on average between 2000 a nd 2007, increased by only 3% in 2008 and then 
fell by a record 12% in 2009.7  Developed countries' merchandise exports fell by almost 14% and 
developing countries' exports by 8%. 
B. STABILIZATI ON AND STIMULUS  
13. A coordinated policy response to the financia l and economic crises was agreed to by G-20 
countries at their first Summit in November 2008 in Washington D.C.  Central banks had already cut 
interest rates aggressively, in many cases to levels near zero, and large bank rescue packages were put 
in place.  These measures prevented the collapse of th e financial system but they were insufficient to 
reverse the contraction of economic activity in the short-term.  The G-20 therefore agreed on the need 
for fiscal stimulus for 2008-2009 to boost aggregate demand. 
14. According to the OECD, the financial rescue me asures represented a disproportionately high 
share of the recovery packages in most countri es, relative to the size of the fiscal stimulus.8  O n e  
example was the United Kingdom where the fina ncial rescue package (purchases of assets, 
guarantees, etc.) that was announced represented 28. 6% of GDP against 1.3% of GDP for fiscal 
expenditure related to the crisis;  comparable fi gures for Germany were 19.8% against 2.8%, and for 
France 19% against 1.1%.   
15. Nonetheless, the fiscal stimulus programmes were in many cases very large.  The IMF 
recommended a global fiscal stimulus target of 2%  of aggregate GDP each year for 2009 and 2010.  
The OECD estimated the total size of the fiscal stimulus packages announced by OECD countries at 
around 3.5% of GDP (Table 1).9  In the case of the United States, Blinder and Zandi estimated that "In 
all, close to US$1 trillion, roughly 7 per cent of GDP, will be spent on fiscal stimulus" under the American Recovery and Reinv estment Act of 2009 and several, subsequent, smaller stimulus 
measures such as the Cash-for-Clunkers tax incentive for automobile purchases.
10 
                                                      
7 IMF, "World Economic Outlook April 2011", Washington D.C. 
8 OECD Trade Policy Studies, "Trade and Economic Effects of Responses to the Economic Crisis", 
Paris 2010, page 54. 
9 OECD, "Policy Responses to the Economic Crisis:  Investing in Innovation for Long-Term Growth", 
Paris, June 2009.   
10 Alan S. Blinder and Mark Zandi, "Stimulus Worked", IMF Finance and Development, December 
2010, pages 14 to 17. WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 4  
 
  02468101214
-8.0-6.0-4.0-2.00.02.04.06.0
Q1 2007
Q2 2007Q3 2007Q4 2007Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2008Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2009Q1 2010Q2 2010Q3 2010Q4 2010Q1 2011
% of labour force% change over previous quarterChart 1
GDP growth and unemployment rates of se lected G20 economies, Q1 2007 - Q1 2011
(Annualized percentage change over previous  quarter and percentage of labour force)
United States
0246810121416
-10.0-8.0-6.0-4.0-2.00.02.04.06.0
Q1 2007
Q2 2007
Q3 2007Q4 2007Q1 2008Q2 2008
Q3 2008
Q4 2008Q1 2009Q2 2009
Q3 2009
Q4 2009Q1 2010Q2 2010
Q3 2010
Q4 2010Q1 2011
% of labour force% change over previous quarterEuropean Union (27)
0246
-22.0-18.0-14.0-10.0-6.0-2.02.06.010.014.0
Q1 2007
Q2 2007Q3 2007Q4 2007Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2008Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2009Q1 2010Q2 2010Q3 2010Q4 2010Q1 2011
% of labour force% change over previous quarter-2-1012345678910111213
-18.0-16.0-14.0-12.0-10.0-8.0-6.0-4.0-2.00.02.04.06.08.010.012.0
Q1 2007
Q2 2007
Q3 2007Q4 2007Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008
Q4 2008
Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2009Q1 2010
Q2 2010
Q3 2010Q4 2010Q1 2011
% of labour force% change over previous quarter
0123456789
-22.0-18.0-14.0-10.0-6.0-2.02.06.010.014.0
Q1 2007
Q2 2007
Q3 2007
Q4 2007Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008
Q4 2008
Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2009
Q1 2010
Q2 2010Q3 2010Q4 2010
Q1 2011
% of labour force% change over previous quarter
01234
-2.00.02.04.06.08.010.012.014.016.018.020.022.0
Q1 2007
Q2 2007
Q3 2007Q4 2007Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008
Q4 2008
Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2009Q1 2010
Q2 2010
Q3 2010Q4 2010Q1 2011
% of labour force% change over previous quarterJapan Brazil
Russian Federation China a,b
  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 5 
 
 
  0.01.02.03.04.0
-2.00.02.04.06.08.010.012.014.016.018.020.022.0
Q1 2007
Q2 2007Q3 2007Q4 2007Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2008Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2009Q1 2010Q2 2010Q3 2010Q4 2010Q1 2011
% of labour force% change over previous quarterChart 1 (continued)
India b
Source :  Organisation for Econom ic Cooperat ion an d Development (OECD)  and National Statistics.1216202428
-8.0-6.0-4.0-2.00.02.04.06.08.0
Q1 2007
Q2 2007Q3 2007Q4 2007Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2008Q1 2009Q2 2009
Q3 2009
Q4 2009Q1 2010Q2 2010Q3 2010Q4 2010Q1 2011
% of labour force% change over previous quarterSouth Africa
GDP (LHS) Unemployment rate (RHS)
a    GDP growth estimated based on year-on-year changes reported by China's National Bureau of Statistics.
b    Unemployment data not available.
 
Table 1 
Behind-the-border measures indirectly affecting trade   
(By implementing country) 
Implementing 
country Amount of 
the fiscal 
package (% 
GDP)a Measure (September 2008-August 2009) 
Demand Supply 
Government 
spending Private 
consumption Capital (private) Direct 
subsidies (or 
tax cuts) to 
producers Credit 
facilitation Domestic FDI 
  (■ economy wide;  ◨ sector specific;  ■◨ both economy wide and sector specific) 
Australia 0.9 ■ ■  ■ ◨ ◨ 
Canada  ■ ■  ■ ◨ ◨ 
Japan 2.3 ■ ■◨  ■◨ ■◨ ■ 
Korea, Rep. of 1.1 ■ ■◨  ■ ■◨ ■ 
Mexico 4.7  ◨  ■ ■  
New Zealand 3.7 ■ ■     
Norway 0.6 ■  ◨  ■ ■ 
United States  5.5 ■ ■◨ ◨ ■ ◨ ◨ 
E u r o p e a n  U n i o n         
Belgium 0.6   ■  ◨ ■ 
France 1.3 ■ ■◨ ■  ■◨ ■◨ 
Germany 1.6 ■ ■◨ ■ ■ ■◨ ■ 
Hungary 4.0      ■ 
Table 1 (cont'd) WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 6  
 
  Implementing 
country Amount of 
the fiscal 
package (% 
GDP)a Measure (September 2008-August 2009) 
Demand Supply 
Government 
spending Private 
consumption Capital (private) Direct 
subsidies (or 
tax cuts) to 
producers Credit 
facilitation Domestic FDI 
Italy  0.3 ■ ■◨   ■◨ ■ 
Netherlands 1.0 ■ ◨ ■  ■◨ ■ 
Portugal 1.3 ■ ◨   ■◨ ■ 
Spain 8.1 ■ ■◨   ■◨ ■◨ 
United Kingdom 0.9 ■ ■◨   ■ ■ 
Non-OECD 
countries        
Brazil 0.2 ■ ■◨ ■ ■ ◨ ◨ 
China 6.9 ■ ■◨ ■ ■ ◨ ■ 
India 0.3 ■ ■◨  ■ ■ ■ 
Russia 1.1 ■ ◨   ■◨ ◨ 
South Africa 3.8 ■ ■  ■   
Application  Economy-
wide only   Economy-
wide only   
Examples of 
measures included in 
the category    Infrastructure 
for transports;  
schools; 
hospitals; grants to local governments   Tax or 
regulatory 
measures to 
support investment in physical 
private 
infrastructure;  rules governing the 
depreciation 
of capital;  industrial structure 
adjustments;  
special loans for 
deployment 
of efficient innovations Foreign entry 
incentives;  
facilitation of 
the operation of MNEs;  FDI-specific 
taxation 
measures Direct state 
aid payments;  
reductions of 
sales taxes;  subsidized loans; 
speeding up 
the payment of governments 
bills State 
guarantees for 
credit;  
roll-over of loans;  subsidized 
interest 
payments;  subsidized guarantees;  
adjustment of 
venture capital schemes;  
export credit 
guarantees  
a Source:   ILO (2009).  The amounts are taken for a horizon of two years.  They exclude rescue packages for the financial sector.  
Source:  OECD (2010), Trade and Economic Effects of Re sponses to the Economic Crisis , Paris.   
16. Advanced G-20 countries injected more fiscal expansion into their economies in 2009 than 
emerging G-20 countries when measured in terms of the change in their overall fiscal balance as a share of GDP compared with 2007.  However, sev eral emerging G-20 countries did implement large 
fiscal stimulus programmes;  in China, Korea, Russia, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and 
South Africa, crisis-related discretionary fiscal measu res were reported by the IMF to have led to a 
deterioration in their fiscal balances of more than 3% of GDP (Table 2).
11 
17. The fiscal stimulus measures varied in composition among G-20 countries (Chart 2).  
Increased public spending through public consum ption, transfers and investment accounted for 
two-thirds or more of the stimulus in all but four of the G-20 countries;  Brazil, India, Indonesia and 
the United Kingdom relied instead primarily on tax cuts and other revenue measures. 
                                                      
11 IMF Staff Position Note, SPN/09/25, "The State of Public Finances Cross-Country Fiscal Monitor:  
November 2009", 3 November 2009, Annex Table 2.  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 7 
 
 
  Table 2 
Fiscal balance, 2007-14  
(Per cent of PPP-weighted GDP) 
 2007 (pre-crisis) 2009 2010 2014 
World -0.5 -6.7 -5.6 -2.8 
Advanced economies -1.2 -8.9 -8.1 -4.7 
Emerging economies  0.7 -4.0 -2.8 -0.7 
Low-income economies -0.2 -3.8 -2.0 -1.4 
G-20 countries -1.0 -7.9 -6.9 -3.7 
Advanced G-20 countries  -1.9 -9.7 -8.7 -5.3 
Emerging G-20 countries 0.3 -5.1 -4.1 -1.3 
Memo item:  excluding financial support 
G-20 countries -1.0 -7.0 -6.7 -3.7 
Advanced G-20 countries  -1.9 -8.2 -8.4 -3.7 
Emerging G-20 countries 0.3 -5.1 -4.1 -1.3 
Source:  IMF staff estimates based on the Octobe r 2009 WEO and July 2010 WEO Update.   
C. RECOVERY  
18. From a macroeconomic perspective, the fina ncial and budgetary assistance programmes have 
been credited with avoiding a much deeper and more long-lasting global economic recession than in 
fact occurred. 
19. World output stabilized in the second quarter of 2009 and the economic situation began to 
improve in the third quarter with growth resuming in most countries.  Since then, the world economy has regained strength, with developing count ries as a group performing better than developed 
countries where growth has been sluggish.
12   
20. World trade recovered more strongly than out put, and exports of developing countries grew 
faster than those of developed countries.  The fast est growth in both trade and output was recorded by 
developing countries in Asia.  Exports and im ports of developing economies rose above their 
pre-crisis highs by July 2010 and world trade volume was back to its pre-crisis peak by end-2010, although developed countries as a group did not rega in that level until the first quarter of 2011 
(Chart 3).  Commodity prices resumed an upward trend from mid-2009, with fuels and metals 
experiencing particularly strong increases.   
21. The faster export growth of developing economies was supported by particularly strong 
growth of South-South trade.  Intra-trade of developing economies, excluding fuels and mining products, was up 38% year-on-year in the first half of 2010.   
22. Available data on trade in commercial services also show exports of  developing economies 
recovering faster than those of developed economies.   In the first half of 2010 the dollar value of 
services exports in the European Union was up by 5%  year-on-year, in the United States by 10%, in 
Brazil by 16%, and in China by 41%. 
 
                                                      
12 IMF, "World Economic Outlook April 201", Washington D.C. WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 8  
 
  0% 25% 50% 75% 100%United StatesUnited KingdomTurkeySouth AfricaSaudi ArabiaRussiaMexicoKoreaJapanItaly 1/IndonesiaIndiaGermanyFranceChinaCanadaBrazilAustraliaArgentinaShare of total stimulus planned in 2009Chart 2
G-20 Countries:  Composition of Fiscal Stimulus Measures
1/     Includes expansionary stimulus measures only.
Source:   IMF, Novemb er 2009 Fiscal Monitor.Public consumption and transfers
Public consumption and transfers Tax cuts on capital Tax cuts on consumptionTax cuts on labour Investment
 
  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 9 
 
 
  05101520253035
Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10 Jan-11050100150200250
Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10 Jan-11020406080
Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10 Jan-11
050100150200250
Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10 Jan-11020406080100120140160
Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10 Jan-11
0510152025
Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10 Jan-11
01020304050
Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10 Jan-11Chart 3
Monthly merchandise exports and imports of se lected economies, January 2007 - March 2011
United States Japan(US$ billion)
European Union (27) extra-trade China (April)
Brazil (April) India
Russian Federation
024681012
Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10 Jan-11South Africa
Exports Imports
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics;  GTIS;  GTA database;  national statistics.
 
 WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 10  
 
  23. The slow pace of job creation in most developed countries has left unemployment at very 
high levels.  Overall, the ILO has projected that une mployment will not return to its 2008 level before 
2015 in high income economies, whereas in emergi ng economies that level was regained already in 
2010.
13  Unemployment globally is estimated at 210 million, an increase of 30 million over pre-crisis 
levels.  Past experience shows that prolonged peri ods of job losses and unemployment are one of the 
main catalysts for more restrictive trade policymak ing, pointing to the need for continued vigilance 
from WTO Members to resist protectionist pressures. 
IV. THE CRISIS AND TRADE AND TRADE-RELATED POLICIES  
24. The coordinated macroeconomic policy response to the crisis is credited with having 
prevented a deep and prolonged global economic recession.  It he lped to take pressure off 
governments to respond to the contraction of economic  activity and the loss of jobs through the use of 
measures to restrict trade, and to avoid the danger that a proliferation of those measures could have 
worsened the economic situation for all, provoked  retaliatory action by others and diminished 
prospects of an early recovery. 
A. GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE :  TYPOLOGY  
25. All of the measures put in place by WTO Members in response to the financial and economic 
crises affected trade in some way.  At one end of the spectrum are macro-economic measures such as 
loosening monetary policy and ge neral tax reductions that boosted aggregate demand, including for 
imported goods and services, and therefore helped  expand world trade without prejudicing existing 
conditions of competition in world markets.  At the other end of the spectrum are measures (border 
restrictions and subsidies) that were targeted to  assist selected domestic industries at the direct 
expense of competing producers abroad.  
26. The reports presented to the TPRB to help it m onitor the trade policy impact of the crisis 
grouped government measures into three main categori es:  border restrictions (tariffs and NTBs, trade 
remedies, and export restrictions), governme nt support measures (subsidies) and government 
procurement.   
27. Economic theory provides a frame of reference to analyse the economic effects of different 
generic categories of trade and trade-related measures (Box 1).   
Box 1:  Economic effects of measures taken in response to the crisis 
The OECD has undertaken an analysis of a range of measures taken in response to the crisis to try to 
enhance understanding of the potential relative impacts of such measures and, in so doing, to assist governments in the task of designing appropriate exit strategies that are also supportive of trade and growth. 
Stylized policy simulations have been carried out using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), a 
multi-sector computable general-equilibrium model of world trade and production, to ask a series of "what 
if?" questions, the answers to which provide information relative to the status quo in terms of the economic 
structure and the policies existing before the "policy shocks" are applied.
 
Box 1 (cont'd) 
                                                      
13 ILO Annual World of Work Report , 1 October 2010.  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 11 
 
 
  The policy measures simulated range from border measures (increases in tariffs) to demand-side stimulus 
measures (a reduction in a generic consumption tax) to sector-specific subsidies (to the automobile industry).  
A representative set of countries and regions is include d in the experiments:  the EU25, the United States, 
Japan and China.  Recognizing that the purpose of the measures was generally not related to trade, the experiments generate impacts on both GDP and exports of the country or region taking the measure and on 
its trading partners.  The model produces "multipliers" wh ich can be interpreted as th e effect on the variable 
of interest (own or partner's GDP or exports) of a single dollar or euro of stimulus spending.  In other words, the simulations do not reflect the actual size of the stimulus packages in any country, nor do they predict 
actual impacts. 
This analysis indicates that border protection is unambiguously the most damaging type of measure in terms 
of trade but also potentially in terms of effects on GD P.  Both are affected nega tively in the country taking 
the measure and in partner countries – confirming the well-known Lerner symmetry that protecting against 
imports means that, ultimately, exports are taxed.  No behind-the-border measure is, dollar for dollar, as 
destructive of trade and GDP as import protection.  Indeed, positive impacts on GDP or trade are observed 
for some domestic measures, but there are significant di fferences among measures in terms of their impacts 
on the country applying the measure and on others. 
A generic consumption subsidy — for example, an across-the-board reduction in a consumption tax – proves 
to be supportive of GDP and exports in both the country taking the measure and in partner countries, 
provided the stimulus does not leak into savings.  Impacts are very much diluted when the consumption stimulus is made specific to a particular sector, alth ough they remain positive, even for partner countries.  
When a demand-side measure is restricted to domestically produced goods, positive effects on the economy 
taking the measure disappear and the impacts on partner countries are negative both for GDP and exports.  Increasing demand by increasing government expenditure scores badly from the trade point of view, 
probably because most government expe nditure has rather low trade intensity. 
As many governments have intervened in the automobile  industry, that sector was chosen for the supply-side 
experiments.  The strongest across-the-board positive effects occur when indust ry-specific assistance is 
given in the form of a direct subsidy to labour.  Own and partner GDP and own and partner exports all 
respond positively.  A direct capital subsidy under otherwise the same conditions performs much less 
strongly and is negative for a partner's GDP and own exports. 
Sector-specific measures are also pr oblematic in ways that are not amenable to quantification but that 
suggest their use should be carefully circumscribed.  One is that they tend to create rents that are either 
capitalized into the value of fixed assets or otherwise ca ptured, leading to the creation of vested interests and 
an intensification of rent-protecting behaviour.  Second ly, there is a risk that they may trigger retaliation.  
The risk is even greater when prov isions discriminating against foreign goods and firms are included, or 
when there is suspicion that such pressure is being brought to bear informally. These effects will compound 
the welfare losses shown in the simulations to result fr om maintaining resources in inefficient sectors with 
detrimental effects on longer-term growth and trade. 
These findings suggest that there is a logical sequence, supportive of recovery in both income and trade, in 
which governments should begin to unwind crisis-related measures, when it is judged timely to do so.  Protectionist measures at the border should be immediately unwound.  Doing so carries no risk to the 
recovery.  On the contrary, lowering protection could provide an important and needed stimulus, through 
trade.  Reductions in border protection could be undertaken unilaterally, but would have an even greater positive impact if taken on a comprehensive multilateral basis.  Next, provisions in behind-the-border 
measures that discriminate between do mestic and foreign goods or firms should be removed.  Sector-specific 
measures should then be tackled, especially those th at support capital rather than labour, although some 
kinds of labour market policies can also be damaging to GDP in the long-term.  Specific consumption 
subsidies should then be examined with a view to rem oval. Generic consumption measures should be the last 
to be unwound. While these measures have relatively po sitive impacts, particularly in the short term, they 
may be detrimental to growth prosp ects in the longer term as consumption taxes such as VAT are generally 
less distorting and more efficient in the long run than  corporate or personal in come taxes.  As fiscal 
consolidation begins, governments will have to be mindful of the need to return to patterns of taxation that 
are supportive of gr owth and recovery. 
Source: OECD (2010), Trade and Economic Effects of Responses to the Economic Crisis , Trade Policy 
 Studies, Paris.
 WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 12  
 
  28. The usual caveats apply about the need to take  into account the simplifying assumptions on 
which the theory rests.  In addition, the excepti onal financial and economic circumstances in which 
the measures were applied mean that particular car e is needed when analysing the trade effects of 
individual measures in isolation from the broa d macro-economic effects of the programmes 
themselves.  If rescue packages to specific firms or industries had not been provided, would 
competing overseas suppliers have been able to step in and take over market share or would they have 
perished too given the globalized nature of many of  the industries concerned, widespread international 
cross-ownership arrangements, and the integr ation of production chains across borders? 
29. Theory suggests that border restrictions cause th e most damage to trade and potentially also to 
GDP.  The reason is that they alter market prices and therefore affect both producers and consumers 
of the goods concerned.  A tariff raises the dom estic price of an imported good and reduces 
competition in the domestic market.  Domestic producer s are able to raise their prices above the world 
price, which creates an incentive for domestic out put to expand beyond its social optimum level and 
forces consumers to reduce their demand below their preferred level.  Welfare losses occur in both the 
production and consumption of the good in question.   Non-tariff measures (such as import quotas) 
have similar effects, but are considered more damaging than tariffs because their effect on prices is 
less predictable and transparent and because domest ic producers collect the windfall profits from the 
wedge between world and domestic prices, whereas tariff revenue is collected by the government.  
30. Fiscal assistance to production can distort trad e, depending on precisely how the assistance is 
structured.  Support targeted at specific industries or sectors that expands their production at the 
expense of imports evidently damages trade, a lthough generally-speaking this is less welfare-
distorting overall than equivalent border restricti ons since domestic consumers will not necessarily be 
adversely affected.  The length of time that the assistance is provided matters when assessing its trade effects;  temporary assistance that is conclusively withdrawn within a relatively short period of time, 
leaving producers subject once again to market for ces, is less damaging than assistance that keeps 
uncompetitive producers in business permanently. 
31. Fiscal assistance to consumption is supportive of  trade flows as long as it is implemented in a 
trade-neutral way, for example through a consump tion subsidy or a cut in consumption tax on both 
domestically produced and imported goods.  The more the assistance is targeted at the consumption of 
domestically produced goods (e.g. through "buy -local" conditions attached to government 
procurement), the lower is the welfare benefit to th e country taking the measures  and the greater is the 
negative impact on its tradi ng partners' exports and GDP. 
32. It is important to bear in mind that economic or  legal considerations can  constrain the choice 
of assistance measures governments are able to  adopt.  The use of budgetary assistance presupposes a 
fiscal situation that is solid enough to allow a gove rnment to finance such assistance, a position that 
many countries, particularly develo ping countries, do not enjoy.  On the other hand, the use of border 
restrictions is subject to WTO disciplines, for example a Member's tariff bindings, which impose 
greater constraints on those Members that have a ccepted higher levels of WTO obligations than on 
others. 
B. BORDER RESTRICTIONS  
33. Regular monitoring by the WTO showed some increase in the imposition of new border trade 
restrictions from end-2008.  New restrictions were imposed more extensively than in the pre-crisis  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 13 
 
 
  period, and more quickly than they have subsequen tly been reduced or removed.  However, there was 
no significant recourse to protectionism.   Studies by the World Bank and IMF confirmed this.14 
34. Table 3 shows the number of new border restrict ions by type taken during the crisis and 
documented in monitoring reports to the TPRB.  Th e majority took the form of initiations of trade 
remedy investigations, in particular anti-dumping investigations, and increases in tariffs and NTBs.  
Table 3 
Border restrictions (number of new measures)  
Type of restrictive measure October 2008 – October 2009 November 2009 – mid-October 2010 
Trade remedy 184 122 
Import (incl. tariffs, licensing) 105 62 
Export 20 25 
Total 309 209 
Source : WTO Secretariat. 
35. The incidence of new trade restrictions dec lined as the crisis bottomed-out and recovery 
began to set in, but restrictions accumulated to c over a growing fraction of total imports.  Between 
October 2008 and October 2009, new import restri ctions covered around 1% of world imports.15  By 
October 2010, the coverage of these and subsequent r estrictions had grown to 2.2% of world imports 
(Table 4).  Only around 15% of the measures intr oduced by G-20 economies since the outbreak of the 
crisis were removed despite many Members havi ng entered into a phase of economic recovery.   
Table 4 
Share of world trade covered by import-restricting measures  
October 2008 to October 2009 November 2009 to mi d-October 2010 Mid-October 2010 to April 2011 
1.01 1.20 0.53 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.   
36. The restrictions affected a relatively wide  range of product groups , most importantly 
machinery and mechanical appliances, iron and st eel, organic chemicals, electrical machinery and 
equipment, cereals, transport equipment and plastic  products.  These, along with textiles and clothing 
and agricultural products, were already relatively heav ily protected in many markets before the crisis 
and were particularly vulnerable to further protectionist pressures resulting from job losses and 
unemployment.  The new restrictions further hampered structural adjustment at home and denied export opportunities abroad. 
37. Some Members adopted trade facilitating measur es, in particular through the reduction of 
import tariffs (although some reduc tions were implemented on a temporary basis only) or the 
streamlining of customs procedures.  A number of  trade remedy actions were ended, involving the 
termination of investigations w ithout the imposition of duties or the removal of existing duties.   
                                                      
14 Hiau Looi Kee, Cristina Neagu and Alesandro Nicita, "Is Protectionism on the Rise?  Assessing 
National Trade Policies during the Crisis of 2008", World Bank, April 2010, Policy Research Working Paper 
5274 – the authors concluded that "while the rise in tariffs and anti-dumping duties in these countries may have jointly caused global trade to drop by as much as $43 billion during the crisis period, it explains less than 2 per 
cent of the collapse in world trade".  Rob Gregory, Christian Henn, Brad McDonald and Mika Saito, "Trade and 
the Crisis:  protect or Recover", IMF Staff Position No te, 16 April 2010, SPN/10/07 – the authors found that 
"The aggregate impact of new restrictions is modest, at  about 0.25 per cent of globa l trade, as most countries 
have resisted a widespread resort to protectionism". 
15 The methodology used for these estimates is described in WT/TPR/OV/13 of 24 November 2010.  
The estimates represent the trade coverage of the meas ures;  they do not indicate the size of the reduction in 
trade caused by the measures which, other than in the case of prohibitively high restrictions, is considerably less. WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 14  
 
  C. F
ISCAL SUPPORT DURING THE CRISIS  
38. The WTO monitoring reports recorded measu res taken by Members through their fiscal 
stimulus programmes and noted that these could have a trade restricting or distorting effect (Annex 1).  
Excluding financial bail-out packages, budgetary  assistance programmes were implemented or 
announced by many Members, both developed and developing.   
39. The following sections describe the budgetary  assistance programmes for production and 
consumption that were notified in the monitoring reports and provide some more detailed information 
on the assistance programmes of the European Unio n, the United States and China taken from their 
recent TPR reports, the only TPRs to date  that have looked at this topic. 
40. By far the most significant share of budgetary assistance provided in response to the crisis 
took the form of support for banks a nd other financial institutions.  This  was the subject of a dedicated 
discussion in the Committee on Trade in Fi nancial Services held in June 2010.16    
1. Budgetary assistance for production  
41. Many Members introduced assistance to support the revenue and balance sheets of their 
domestic firms.  Data availability  on production assistance varies widely across Members.  Some 
governments identify and publish the value of budge tary assistance granted in the form of actual 
outlays, sometimes providing details on the specific fo rm they take (e.g., direct grants, equity 
injections or subsidies).  Less frequently, some governments make available estimates of tax rebates 
and exemptions, and in a few cases industr y aggregations of budgetary assistance. 
42. Insofar as these measures helped maintain purchase s by firms from their suppliers at home 
and abroad, they represented a contribution to su pport global aggregate demand and helped turn 
around the contraction of trade in goods and services. 
43. However, production assistance allows the benefi ciary firms to increase their output, which 
must be sold in either domestic or export market s.  Just like border restrictions, production assistance 
can prolong the operations of uncompetitive firms,  which denies market share to other producers 
including competing foreign suppliers.   
44. Reportedly in some cases, production assistance  was tied to conditions that created an 
additional distortionary effect on trade flows, such as conditions on a firm or industry's investment (e.g. to avoid de-investing domestically) or its policies or practices for sourcing parts or labour.  Most 
conditions of this type were attach ed informally and were of a political  rather than contractual nature, 
so that it is difficult to verify their exis tence and track how they were implemented. 
45. The production assistance that was provided took various forms and, insofar as the Secretariat 
was made aware of its existence, it was recorded in  reports to the TPRB (Table 5).  The reporting of 
measures by Members peaked in the period immedi ately following the outbreak of the crisis and 
declined as economic recovery set in, with a la rge number of the cases that were subsequently 
reported involving the prolongation of exis ting measures rather than new actions. 
                                                      
16 WTO document S/FIN/M/64, 27 September 2010.  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 15 
 
 
  Table 5 
Budgetary assistance for production October 2008 to October 2010 
Country/ 
Member Number of 
reported 
measures Type of measures Targeted activities 
Armenia 1 Financial support. Agriculture. 
Australia 3 Stimulus package, special funding. General, infrastructure, motor vehicle production. 
Bangladesh 1 Stimulus package.  Agriculture, electricity generation, others. 
Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela 1 Government aid. Import substitution, exports. 
Brazil 7 Official credit, state investment. General, agriculture, motor vehicle production, 
capital goods exports. 
Canada 8 Stimulus package, government guarantees, official 
credit, state investment, pricing. General, forestry, motor vehicle production, paper 
production, air transport, electricity generation. 
China 9 Direct grants, official credit, insurance and 
guarantees; tax concessions; state investment. SMEs, exports, agriculture, bio-industries, film 
making, air transport and other industries. 
Costa Rica 1 Stimulus programme. SMEs and other. 
Croatia 1 Reduced government subsidies. Agriculture. 
Egypt 1 Stimulus programme.  Manufacturing, exports. 
EU and its member states 128
a State aid including direct grants, official credit, 
insurance and guarantees, tax concessions, state 
investment. General, SMEs, agriculture, forestry, food processing, 
green products, motor vehicle production, steel and 
aluminium production, shipbuilding, air transport, 
exports. 
Hong Kong, China 2 Official guarantees, marketing. SMEs, exports. 
India 4 Stimulus package, sectoral aid. General, leather and textiles, air transport, exports. 
Indonesia 1 Official credit. Exporters. 
Israel 1 Subsidies and tax concessions. High-tech industries. 
Jamaica 1 Official credit. SMEs. 
Japan 4 Stimulus package, sectoral aid, official credit. General, forestry, air transport. 
Jordan 1 Tax concessions. General. 
Kazakhstan 1 Cost reimbursements. Exports. 
Korea, Rep. of 3 Stimulus package, restructuring aid, official credit 
and guarantees. General, SMEs, shipping. 
Malaysia 4 Stimulus package, official credit. General, micro and SMEs. 
Mexico 2 Stimulus package, official credit. General, tourism, motor vehicle production. 
Mozambique 1 Official credit. Agriculture. 
New Zealand 2 Stimulus package, official insurance. General, exports. 
Nigeria 1 Stimulus package. General. 
Norway 2 Stimulus package, sectoral aid, official guarantees.  General, various sectors, exports 
Pakistan 1 Official credit. Traders. 
Peru 2 Stimulus package, official credit and insurance. General, SMEs, exports. 
Philippines 1 Official financing.  SMEs, exports. 
Russian 
Federation 6 Government aid, subsidies, official credit and 
guarantees SMEs, motor vehicle production, exports. 
Singapore 2 Stimulus package, official insurance. General, exports. 
South Africa 3 Sectoral aid. Textiles and clothing, and others. 
Switzerland 2 Government aid.  Agriculture, SMEs, exports. 
Chinese Taipei 1 Stimulus package including official credit and 
insurance. General, exports. 
Tanzania 1 Government aid. Agriculture. 
Thailand 2 Stimulus package.   General, SMEs, various sectors. 
Turkey 3 Stimulus package including official credit and 
guarantees. General, SMEs. 
United States 7 Stimulus package, direct grants, official credit and 
guarantees, tax concessions, state investment.  General, motor vehicle production, SMEs. 
Uruguay 1 Sectoral aid. Textiles and clothing. 
Table 5 (cont'd) WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 16  
 
  Country/ 
Member Number of 
reported 
measures Type of measures Targeted activities 
Uzbekistan  Stimulus package including official credit and tax 
concessions. General, exports. 
a  Includes EU-wide programmes plus measures documented for th e following individual members (number of measures between 
parentheses):  Austria (6), Belgium (4), Bu lgaria (2), Cyprus (1), C zech Republic (2), Denmark (2),  Estonia (1), Finland (3), 
France (13), Germany (17), Greece (4), Hungary  (5), Ireland (2), Italy (6), Latvia (6),  Lithuania (2), Luxembourg (4), Malta (1 ), 
Netherlands (6), Poland (8), Portugal (1), Romania (3), Slovak Republic (7), Slovenia (4), Spain (5), Sweden (3), and United Kingdom (7). 
Source:  Annex 1. 
46. In half of the Members for which inform ation on production assistance was collected, the 
target of some or all of the assistance was given as  "General" so that it is not possible to know which 
sectors or industries benefitted.  About one-quarter of  the Members listed "agriculture and/or forestry" 
and "motor vehicle production" as beneficiaries.  Support for "SMEs" and for "Exports" was relatively 
common; in both cases it seems often to have taken the form of official credit and various types of 
guarantees to offset the near drying-up of credit facilities from the financial system.  A few Members 
listed services sectors as beneficiaries ("air transport, entertainment, shipping and tourism"). 
47. Some studies suggest that governments took the opportunity of steering their budgetary 
assistance towards key environmental projects, including climate change.  A report by HSBC estimated that more than US$430 billion out of total budgetary stimulus of US$2.8 trillion was 
directed at environmental investment projects, with  China alone responsible for half of that total.
17  
Much of this assistance was targeted at new infr astructure projects, in particular railways, power 
grids, and waterworks.  In most Members, these are mainly or wholly state-owned sectors of the economy that are not open to foreign involvement or competition and the goods and services that they produce are not easily tradable.  However, many of  the goods and services inputs used to build the 
infrastructure are tradable, and the effects of this assistance on trade flows are therefore not negligible 
– they depended in particular on the government procurement laws and practices of the countries 
concerned (see below). 
2. Budgetary assistance for consumption  
48. Compared with other forms of government s upport, budgetary assistance for consumption has 
the advantage of not distorting domestic prices and of  being trade-expanding provided that consumers 
remain free to choose internationally the goods and servi ces that they buy.  That is most likely to be 
the result from assistance provided in the form of tax cuts, which as noted in Chart 2 constituted one 
of the main components of G20 fiscal stimulus in Argentina, Brazil, India, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom. 
49. When the assistance is provided in the form of  private consumption subsidies, pressure may 
be placed on governments to restrict the freedom of  consumers to purchase internationally not only by 
domestic producers, who will hope to benefit most  from the boost to consumption, but also by 
taxpayers who are reluctant to see their financia l contribution leak out of the domestic economy 
through imported goods and services and boost economic activity abroad  rather than at home.  One 
way of defusing this pressure is to ensure that budgetary assistance for consumption is well-
coordinated among trading partners, in terms of timing at least.   
50. That appears to have been the case of budge tary assistance to boost the consumption of 
automobiles during the crisis, which on the basis of  measures covered in previous monitoring reports 
                                                      
17 Nick Robins, Robert Clover and Charanjit Singh, "A Climate for Recovery.  The Colour of Stimulus 
goes Green", report by HSBC Global Research, 25 February 2009, available at http://www.research.hsbc.com.  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 17 
 
 
  seems to have been the single largest, industry-speci fic assistance programme that was put in place by 
Members.  Measures introduced to support the automob ile industry in response to the effects of the 
crisis were covered in some de tail a previous monitoring report.18  The most widespread measure was 
"scrapping" programmes that involved government s ubsidies and/or tax rebates to consumers for the 
purchase of new (and more environmentally friendly) cars to replace old models.  The programmes 
were introduced by most Members, developed a nd developing, that have significant automobile 
production capacity.  In 2009, they were valued at  some Euros 6.5 billion in  Europe, Yen 370 billion 
in Japan (Euros 2.8 billion), and US$3 billion in the United States.19  Overall, the OECD estimated 
that the programmes helped automobile production to  add 1.7 percentage points to real GDP growth 
in the third-quarter of 2009 in the United States, and positive although somewhat  smaller additions in 
the Euro area.20  With few exceptions (e.g. Russia), the programmes did not re quire consumers to 
choose domestic over new imported cars in order to qualify for the subsidy.  However, the OECD 
suggested that the programmes could have nega tive long-run effects on trade, by distorting 
competition in favour of incumbent firms, distorti ng the incentives for overall industry restructuring, 
and shifting demand away from high-margin luxury cars toward low-margin sedans.21  
51. Increased government consumption played a larg e part in the stimulus programmes of many 
countries, and in most cases dwarfed the amount of assistance provided through private consumption 
subsidies and tax cuts.  As noted earlier, increas ed public spending through consumption, transfers 
and investment was estimated by the IMF to have accounted for two-thirds or more of the planned 
fiscal stimulus in 2009 in all but four of the G20 countries.   
52. Beyond the total amounts involved, there is little detail available about the increase in 
government spending in response to the crisis.  In normal times, government sp ending appears to have 
a low import-intensity compared with the import conten t of aggregate consumption.  In part, this is 
because it is dominated by services such as health, e ducation and social services that are not trade 
intensive.   
53. In addition, many countries have reserved it as  a means to favour domestic producers so as to 
boost domestic economic activity.  Government proc urement is carved out of the general MFN, 
national treatment and market access disciplines of the GATT and the GATS, so that only the 41 
signatories of the Government Procurement Agreement from among WTO Members have 
commitments to allow each other's suppliers to compete in their domestic markets. 22  Even then, the 
commitments cover only procurement contracts above a certain threshold, not all areas of government 
procurement are open to foreign competition and a ma rgin of preference is applied in favour of 
domestic producers when competing for contracts. 
54. When announcing new fiscal stimulus packages in response to the crisis, some Members 
included "buy national" rules on how funding was to be spent to reduce the l eakage into imports and 
concentrate the stimulus effects on domestic firms and job creation:  the United States applied a "Buy American" provision its main stimulus programme (the ARRA) subject to its WTO and other trade 
obligations, China reinforced its "Buy Chinese" regulations, Russia decreed new preferences to 
domestic suppliers in the form of a 15% price a dvantage across a wide range of goods, and Chinese 
Taipei, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Paraguay and Ukra ine were reported to have introduced similar 
                                                      
18 WT/TPR/OV/W/3 (14 June 2010). 
19 Financial Times, "Automotive industry sputters back to life", 4 May 2010;  OECD Economic 
Outlook, No. 86, Chapter 2, "The Automobile Industry in and beyond the Crisis", November 2009, Paris. 
20 OECD, Ibid. 
21 OECD, Ibid. 
22 Canada; the European Union, with its 27 member States; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; Israel; Japan; 
Korea; Liechtenstein; the Kingdom of the Netherlands with respect to Aruba; Norway; Singapore; Switzerland; 
Chinese Taipei and the United States. WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 18  
 
  provisions in their government procurement.
23  "Buy national" rules act in the same way as traditional 
import restrictions and produce the same effects:  higher prices and lower choice of goods and services purchased through the stimulus programme (lower value-for-money), along with the less 
efficient allocation of resources and reduced comp etitiveness of the domestic economy.  They can 
(and in some cases did) create pressure for retaliation from other countries.   
3. Budgetary assistance in the European Union
24 
55. The authority to decide on budgetary assistance ("state aid" in EU pa rlance) rests with the 
European Commission.  The Commi ssion's assessment of aid is generally a "balancing of the positive 
effects of aid (in terms of contributing to the achievement of a well-defined objective of common interest) and its negative effects (namely the resulting distortion of competition and trade)".
25  The 
principles of the balancing test have been incor porated into "horizontal guidelines" for specific 
categories of state aid, including research, innovation, environmenta l protection, regional 
development, small and medium-sized enterprises,  training, employment, and risk capital.  The 
horizontal guidelines, which cover all sectors, de fine the conditions under which member States can 
grant particular types of aid. 
56. In general, EU member States must notify the Commission, and obtain its authorization, 
before granting state aid.  State aid eligible un der the General Block Exemption Regulation, which 
entered into force in August 2009, is not subject to prior notification and scrutiny.26  Neither is de 
minimis support (€200,000 or less per company over a period of 3 years).27  Nearly €11 billion was 
awarded on the basis of block exemptions in 2009.28  Individual aid awarded under an aid scheme 
does not need to be notified, provided that the Commission has approved the terms and conditions of 
the particular scheme.  State aid granted in the absence of Commission approval is automatically 
classified as "unlawful aid".  The Commission must order member States to recover unlawful aid that 
is found to be incompatible with the EU common market.   
(a) Overall assistance 
57. Assistance granted at the EU level is mostly for agriculture and "structural actions".  The EU's 
structural actions, which comprise the Structural  Funds and the Cohesion Fund, seek to "strengthen 
the economic and social cohesion [of the EU], in pa rticular by reducing disparities between the levels 
of development of the various regions and th e backwardness of the least favoured regions".29 
58. According to the latest EU subsidies notifi cation, outlays under the European Regional 
Development Fund, Cohesion Fund, and the Instrume nt for Pre-accession Assistance totalled close to 
€37 billion in 2008, the latest year available, co mpared with around €29 billion in 2006.  The EU 
notification did not specify the allocation of these funds by member State or sector.  The European 
Regional Development Fund accounts for approximately  80% of this assistance.  As one of the 
Structural Funds, the European Regional Developmen t Fund is mainly used to co-finance investment 
                                                      
23 OECD, "Trade and Economic Effects of Responses to  the Economic Crisis", 2010, Paris, page 62-63. 
24 The following section is based on the forthcoming Trade Policy Review.   
25 European Commission (2008), Vademecum:  Community law on State aid, 30 September.  Viewed 
at:  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/st udies_reports/vademecum_o n_rules_09_2008_en.pdf. 
26 Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid 
compatible with the common market in application of  Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block 
exemption Regulation), OJ L 214, 9 August 2008. 
27 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 
and 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid, OJ L 379, 28 December 2006. 
28 This figure refers to aid granted to industry and services. 
29 WTO document G/SCM/N/186/EEC, 23 December 2009.  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 19 
 
 
  for the creation or maintenance of jobs, infrastru cture, and the development of local business 
initiatives and the activities of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
59. The remainder of this section provides an overvi ew of assistance granted by member States 
during the period under review, as measured by state aid data published by the European Commission.  These data do not cover all assistance granted by member States;  in particular, they do not reflect the 
total size of fiscal stimulus packages adopted by some member States during the economic crisis, and 
therefore underestimate assistance provided by me mber States during the period under review.  For 
example, labour market support granted directly to workers under some of these stimulus packages is not subject to state aid control by  the Commission, and is therefore not included in the data presented 
in this section of the Report.  Similarly, de mand support measures like car scrapping schemes, to the 
extent that they do not discriminate with regard to  the origin of the product, are not counted as state 
aid. 
60. State aid provided by member States totalled a pproximately €427 billion in  2009, or 3.6% of 
EU-27 GDP.
30  On average, member States granted appr oximately €268 billion per year between 2007 
and 2009, roughly three-and-a-half times the average for 2004-06.  This reflects the sharp increase in 
state aid provided by member States in response to  the financial and econom ic crisis (Chart 4). 
0.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.54.0
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009Chart 4
Overall level of aid provided by Member States, 1992-2009
% of GDP
Note:
Source:Total aid excludes railways.
Data for Austria, Sweden, and Finland are included from 1995 onwards, for EU-10 Member States from 2000, 
for Bulgaria and Romania from 2002.
European Commission online information, Scoreboard:  Data on State Aid Expenditure.  Viewed at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/expenditure.html.EU-27
 
                                                      
30 This figure excludes aid to the railway sector  and aid for compensation for "services of general 
economic interest" due to lack of data.  Services of general economic interest are defined in EU competition law 
as "economic activities that public authorities identify as  being of particular importance to citizens and that 
would not be supplied (or would be supplied under different conditions) if there were no public intervention."  
The sources of data on state aid are:  European Commission document SEC(2010) 1462, Facts and figures on 
State aid in the Member States Accompanying the Report from the Commission (State Aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2010 Update), 1 December 2010;  and European Commissi on online information, "State Aid control:  Studies 
and reports".  Viewed at:  http://ec.europa.eu/comp etition/state_aid/studies_reports/expenditure.html. WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 20  
 
  61. The United Kingdom granted the largest amount of state aid in 2009 (€124 billion), followed 
by Germany (€116.8 billion), France (€42.3 billion), Belgium (€34.3 billion), and Greece 
(€14.3 billion).  Relative to economic size, state ai d was highest in Belgium (10.2% of national GDP), 
followed by the United Kingdom (7.9%), Ireland (7.7%) , Greece (6%), and Latvia (5.8%).  For seven 
member States, the share of state aid in national GDP was less than 1%. 
62. Excluding aid granted in response to the financ ial and economic crisis, average annual state 
aid decreased from €76.1 billion in 2004-06 to €70. 1 billion in 2007-09.  Twelve member States 
reduced their average st ate aid levels between 2004-06 and 20 07-09.  Relative to economic size, 
Bulgaria recorded the highest level of non-crisis  aid in the EU (2.1% of national GDP) in 2009, 
followed by Malta (2%), Hungary (1.5%), and Finla nd (1.2%).  Non-crisis state aid was 0.4% of 
national GDP or less in Estonia, Luxembourg,  Italy, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
63. The bulk of non-crisis state aid provided by member States was directed at manufacturing, 
followed by agriculture.  The share of manufacturing in total state aid increased significantly between 
2004-06 and 2007-09, while the share of transport decreased.  Other sectors' shares remained 
relatively stable (Chart 5). 
01020304050607080
Manufacturing
sectorsFinancial
servicesOther services Agriculture Fisheries Coal Other non-
manufacturing
sectorsTransport (excl.
railways)Chart 5
Non-crisis aid provided by Member States, 2004-09
% of total aid
Source:
European Commission online information, "Scoreboard:  Data on State Aid Expenditure".  Viewed at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/expenditure.html.Average 2004-06
Average 2007-09
 
64. Excluding crisis-related measures, grants a nd tax exemptions were the most common 
instruments to provide state aid, accounting for appr oximately 95% of the total in 2009.  Soft loans, 
guarantees, and equity participation acc ounted for slightly less than 7% of total aid.  Austria, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Luxembourg, and Slovenia used gran ts for the bulk of state aid.  France, Germany, 
Ireland, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, and th e United Kingdom used tax exemptions for at least 
50% of state aid.  Including aid in response to th e financial and economic cr isis, around half of total 
state aid in 2009 was in the form of equity participation, followed by guarantees (36% of total aid), and grants (10%).  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 21 
 
 
  (b) Assistance in response to the financial and economic crisis 
65. Following the onset of the financial crisis  in 2008, the Commission issued several 
communications providing guidance on the design and implementation of state aid in support of banks.
31  The communications cover public guarantees, recapitalization measures, impaired asset 
relief, and "restructuring aid.32 
66. Between October 2008 and October 2010, the Co mmission authorized state aid measures for 
the financial sector in 22 member States on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU.33  The "maximum volume" of this state aid totalled nearly €4,590 billion, or 
some 40% of EU-27 GDP.34  Of this, around three-quarters was in the form of guarantees, including 
the blanket guarantees covering all bank debts adopt ed by Denmark and Ireland.  According to the 
Commission, member States relied principally on guarantee measures, because they had a "stabilising 
effect for the financial sector without weighing he avily on the public finances as opposed to more 
interventionist instruments such as recapitali sations or the cleaning of impaired assets".35  Denmark, 
France, Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom a ccounted for nearly 70% of approved state aid 
for the financial sector. 
67. In addition, member States pr ovided support for the real economy, mostly under the European 
Economic Recovery Plan, which was adopted in D ecember 2008 to ensure a coordinated EU response 
to the crisis.36  The Plan called on member States to devote 1.2% of GDP to counter the effects of the 
crisis and adopt short-term measu res in support of employment, infrastructure, construction, and 
business.  As part of the Plan, the EU adopted  in early 2009 a "temporary framework" allowing 
member States to provide state aid in response to "the exceptional difficulties of companies to obtain 
finance".37  As in the case of bank support, the tempor ary framework is based on the consideration 
that the severity of the crisis justifies, for a limited period, state aid measures on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. 
                                                      
31 See Communication from the Commission – The application of State aid rules to measures taken in 
relation to financial institutions in the context of the curr ent global financial crisis, OJ C 270, 25 October 2008;  
Communication from the Commission – The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial 
crisis:  limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition, OJ 
C 10, 15 January 2009;  Communication from the Commission on the treatment of impaired assets in the 
Community banking sector, OJ C 72, 26 March 2009;  and Communication from the Commission on the return 
to viability and the assessment of the restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the 
State aid rules, OJ C 195, 19 August 2009. 
32 European Commission (2009), DG Competition's re view of guarantee and recapitalisation schemes 
in the financial sector in the current crisis, 7 Au gust.  Viewed at:  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
state_aid/legislation/review_of_schemes_en.pdf. 
33 European Commission document COM(2010) 701, State Aid Scoreboard:  Report on State aid 
granted by the EU Member States, Autumn 2010 Upda te, 1 December 2010. 
34 The maximum volume is the upper limit of support approved by the Commission;  it does not 
represent the amounts handed to financial institutions. 
35 European Commission document SEC(2010) 1462, Facts and figures on State aid in the Member 
States Accompanying the Report from the Commission (State Aid Scoreboard, Autumn 2010 Update), 1 December 2010. 
36 European Commission document COM(2008) 800 final, Communication from the Commission to 
the European Council:  A European Economic Recovery Plan, 26 November 2008. 
37 Communication from the Commission — Temporary Community framework for State aid measures 
to support access to finance in the current financial and economic crisis, OJ C 83, 7 April 2009;  and European 
Commission press release IP/08/1993, "State aid:  Commi ssion adopts temporary framework for Member States 
to tackle effects of credit squeeze on real  economy", 17 December 2008.  Viewed at:  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases Action.do?reference=IP/08/1993. WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 22  
 
  68. The temporary framework opened up new po ssibilities for member States to provide 
assistance to firms in the form of:  grants of up to €500,000 per firm for investments or working 
capital over a period of three or four years, dependi ng on when the firm receives the grant;  subsidized 
loans and loan guarantees;  and aid for the production of "green" products.  In addition, the temporary 
framework set out temporarily adapted existing state aid instruments on annual risk capital aid for 
small and medium-sized enterprises, and short-te rm export insurance.  Aid under the temporary 
framework can only be granted to firms that were not in difficulty, as defined under EU state aid rules, on 1 July 2008.  Grants under the temporary framework are not available to firms in the fisheries sector and are capped at €15,000 fo r firms producing primary agricultural products.
38  State 
aid measures adopted under the temporary framewo rk are subject to ex ante notification and 
authorization by the Commission. 
69. Member States could adopt measures under the te mporary framework until the end of 2010.  
In December 2010, the Commission agreed to  extend certain measures under the temporary 
framework until end 2011.  According to the Commissi on, "a limited prolongati on of certain measures 
currently set out in the temporary framework, acco mpanied by the introduction of stricter conditions 
on the prolonged measures, constitutes a central elemen t of a gradual return to normal State aid rules, 
while limiting their impact on competition."39 
70. The prolonged temporary framework maintains the possibility to provide subsidized 
guarantees and loans, including for green products .  It reduces the maximum subsidy for guarantees, 
and prohibits subsidized loans to finance large firms'  working capital.  Firms in difficulty, as defined 
under EU state aid rules, are not eligible for state aid measures adopted under the prolonged 
temporary framework.  The Commission decided to make permanent the upper limit on annual risk 
capital aid introduced as part of the original temporary framework. 
71. The prolonged temporary framework discontinu es the provision that allowed member States 
to grant up to €500,000 per company for investments or working capital.  The Commission considers that, although the provision in the temporary framewo rk was useful as a "short-term instrument when 
the uncertainty of the economic outlook was at the highest, it has also given rise to disparities in the 
internal market".
40  According to the Commission, around 7% of funds allocated by member States 
and approved by the Commission under this provision we re actually paid out, and nearly 80% of aid 
disbursed was concentrated in one member State (Germany). 
72. Between mid-December 2008 and October 201 0, the Commission approved 73 schemes 
under the temporary framework and 4 ad hoc aid measures, totalling a maximum volume of aid of 
€82.5 billion (0.7% of EU-27 GDP).  Schemes for ai d up to €500,000 per comp any were implemented 
in 23 member States, subsidized guarantee schemes in 14, subsidised loan schemes in 7, reduced 
interest loan schemes for the production of green pr oducts in 5, and risk capital schemes in 5.  In 
addition, Latvia, Romania, and Sweden received a pproval for 5 ad hoc aid measures, mostly to car 
manufacturers.  Twelve member States put in place schemes providing up to €15,000 for agricultural 
producers. 
                                                      
38 Communication from the Commission amending the Temporary Community Framework for State 
aid measures to support access to finance in the current financial and economic crisis, OJ C 261, 31 October 
2009. 
39 Communication of the Commission — Temporary Union framework for State aid measures to 
support access to finance in the current financial and economic cr isis, OJ C6, 11 January 2011. 
40 Communication of the Commission — Temporary Union framework for State aid measures to 
support access to finance in the current financial and economic cr isis, OJ C6, 11 January 2011.  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 23 
 
 
  73. France and Germany maintained the largest  number of measures under the temporary 
framework, with seven aid schemes each.  They were  followed by Hungary, Italy, Latvia, and the 
United Kingdom.  Cyprus did not adopt an y measure under the temporary framework. 
74. The Commission estimates that the maxi mum volume of measures approved under the 
temporary framework totalled €81.3 billion in 2009,  or almost 0.7% of EU-27 GDP.  The amount of 
aid granted by member States was slightly below 3% of the maximum volume approved. 
75. Assistance provided under the temporary framework was not sector specific.  Thus, there are 
no data on the volume of aid under the temporary framework disaggregated by economic sector.  Nonetheless, some parts of member States' fiscal stimulus packages targeted particular economic 
sectors.  According to one estimate, one-third of all measures introduced by member States under the 
European Economic Recovery Plan were sector specif ic.  The automobile sector, along with tourism 
and construction received the largest share of sectoral support (Box 2).
41 
Box 2:  Support for the EU automobile industry during the 2008-09 economic crisis  
In autumn 2008, tighter credit conditions and falling business and consumer confidence sparked by the 
financial crisis led to a collapse in demand and a severe drop in output and capacity utilization throughout 
the EU.  The ensuing economic crisis severely affect ed the automobile industry.  Car sales in the EU 
decreased by between 25% and 45% in nine member States between September 2008 and January 2009.  Production decreased in all five main vehicle- producing countries (Germany, France, Spain, 
United Kingdom, and Italy), with particularly sharp reductions in Italy (-23% between 2007 and 2008) and 
France (-16% during the same period). 
Several EU member States responded to these conditions  by granting significant support for the automobile 
industry.  Some measures sought to  ease car companies' access to finan ce and encourage the industry to 
adapt to environmental legislation.  For exampl e, the "Pacte Automobile" announced by France in 
February 2009 includes subsidized loans to Renault and PSA Peugeot-Citroen to finance clean vehicles 
(€6.5 billion), loans to these companies' internal banks (€2 billion), guarantees and funds for suppliers, and 
measures to support employment.  In the United Kingdom, the Automotive Assistance Programme includes €2.5 billion in loans and guarantees to the automotive sector.  Other countries that introduced supply-side 
measures were Germany, Romania, and Sweden.  Most supply-side measures were granted under non-sector 
specific schemes approved by the Commission on the basis of the Temporary Framework. 
In addition, several member States also set up sector -specific demand support.  At least 12 member States 
(Austria, Denmark, France, German y, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom) introduced temporary "scrapping schemes" that provided consumer subsidies for replacing old, energy-inefficient vehicles.  The amount of the subsidies provided under these 
programmes varied widely among countries.  Their total cost in 2009-10 ranged from €10 million in 
Luxembourg to €5.8 billion in Germany. 
Following the introduction of scrapping schemes, new car registrations increased in the EU in early 2009, 
with substantial increases in Austri a, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Slova kia, and the United Kingdom.  In 
addition, production in sectors related to the automobile  industry registered increases during the first eight 
months of 2009, particularly in Germany.  There is some evidence that scrapping schemes had cross-border 
spillover effects.  For example, German imports of cars increased significantly during the first half of 2009, 
particularly from France, It aly, Romania, and Slovakia. 
Box 2 (cont'd) 
 
                                                      
41 European Commission (2010), Product Market Review 2009:  Microeconomic consequences of the 
crisis and implications for recovery, European Economy  11/2009. WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 24  
 
  The European Commission indicates that  the extent of aid received by th e automotive sector appears to be 
linked to the perceived importance of this sector in the economy at large.  The sector's size in terms of value 
added, although relatively small for the EU as a whole (1.5% of EU GDP), is significant for some member States, including the Czech Republic and Germany, where it is almost 4% of national GDP.  In many car 
producing countries, including Hungary, Slovakia, and Spain, a large share of output is exported. 
There were concerns about possible conditions attached to some supply-side measures.  For example, during 
the Pacte Automobile's signing ceremony, the Presid ent of France stated that Renault and PSA had 
undertaken a very important commitment not to close any of their sites for the duration of their loans, and to 
make every effort to avoid layoffs.  Following discu ssions with the Commission on these loans,, the French 
authorities formally undertook to en sure that the loan agreements would not contain any conditions 
concerning "either the location of [the car manufactur ers'] activities or the requirement to prioritize France-
based suppliers".  According to the Commission, a simila r issue was raised in the context of state aid that 
Germany intended to grant to another car manufacturer, Adam Opel GmbH, under an approved temporary 
framework scheme related to the sale by General Motors of its Opel/Vauxhall European operations to an 
investor.  General Motors eventually reversed its decision to sell Opel. 
Source:   WTO Secretariat. 
76. In its assessment of support measures introdu ced under the European Economic Recovery 
Plan, the Commission concluded that they did not u nduly distort competition, and that they helped to 
achieve long-standing EU objectives like enhanci ng research, development and innovation, extending 
ICT, improving transport links, and using energy more efficiently.  Nonetheless, the Commission indicates that these measures could hinder much needed  adjustment and restructuring in the targeted 
sectors and concludes that it is necessary to plan  the credible withdrawal of these measures once 
growth becomes durably anchored so as to avoid longer lasting market distortions. 
77. The EU announced, on 1 December 2010, a deci sion to gradually phase out those temporary 
actions taken in the context of the global fi nancial crisis, while agreeing to prolong until 
31 December 2011 its state aid crisis framework subject  to stricter conditions.  The stated aim is to 
gradually return to a normal market functioni ng.  The EU's Temporary Framework to support 
business access to finance maintains those measures th at address on-going market failures.  But firms 
in difficulty are from now on excluded from the scope  of the Temporary Framework to ensure an 
appropriate restructuring of the economy.  As on 1 January 2011, every bank requiring state support 
in the form of capital or impaired asset measures have to submit a restructuring plan.   
4. Budgetary assistance in the United States 
78. The Secretariat report for the most recent Trade Policy Review of the United Sates, conducted 
in September 2010, covered government assistance measures in the section "Subsidies and other 
government assistance".
42  This part of the Note is based on information covered in that section. 
79. In the United States, government assistance to bus inesses is granted at the federal level, as 
well as by state and local governments.  The main  instruments of support are tax benefits, direct 
payments, and credit programmes.  Tax benefits ha ve traditionally been the main form of federal 
government support to business. 
80. Annual tax benefits for business averaged around US$98 billion between fiscal years 2007 
and 2009, compared with around US$86 b illion between fiscal years 2004 and 2006.43  The largest tax 
benefits result from the deferral of income fro m controlled foreign corporations (CFCs), an 
accelerated depreciation allowance, deductions for U. S. production activities, and credits for research 
                                                      
42 WTO document WT/TPR/S/235/Rev.1 (29 October 2010). 
43 U.S. Government Printing Office, "Budget of the Government of the United States", various years  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 25 
 
 
  activities.  Under the American Recovery and Rein vestment Act of 2009, tax benefits to businesses 
are projected at around US$74 billion between 2009 and 2011.44 
81. The latest U.S. subsidies notification to the WTO, submitted in May 2010, contains 
information on assistance to businesses disaggregated by sector.45  The notification contains data up to 
fiscal year 2008. 
82. The U.S. notification lists programmes providi ng subsidies at the federal and sub-federal 
levels.  Since the previous Review of the United States, the amounts notified have increased sharply 
under three categories:  other energy and fuels;  metals, minerals, and extraction;  and others 
(Table 6).  This reflects, in part, relatively larg e increases in the value of subsidies for the production 
of ethanol, biodiesel, oil, gas, and non-fuel minerals. 
Table 6 
Federal programmes notified to the WTO, fiscal years 2005-08a 
Sector Main forms of support Total amount 2005-06
(annual average, 
US$ million) Total 
amount 2007 
(US$ million) Total 
amount 2008 
(US$ million) 
Energy development, storage 
and transportation Grants, cooperative 
agreements 2,085.1 1,519.8 1,786.2 
Other energy and fuels Tax concessions 6,780.0 8,850.0 9,828.0 
Fisheriesb Grants, loans 77.0 75.1 75.8 
Lumber and timber Income tax concessions 455.0 500.0 530.0 
Medical Income tax concessions and 
sale of isotopes 244.4 275.6 304.8 
Metals, minerals, and 
extraction Income tax concessions, 
guarantees 257.5 410.0 950.0 
Textiles Grants 2.9 0 1.7 
Timepieces and jewellery Import duty exemptions, 
direct payments 4.3 4.3 3.6 
Others Income tax concessions 2,204.6 5,170 3,690 
a Excludes subsidy programmes to agriculture. 
b Excludes loans. 
Source: WTO documents G/SCM/N/123/US A, 15 November 2007, G/SCM/ N/155/USA, 20 May 2009, and 
 G/SCM/N/186/USA, 18 May 2010. 
83. The United States adopted several fiscal stim ulus packages to stabilize consumption and 
investment, and help the U.S. economy recover from the financial and economic  crisis.  The largest 
was the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), whose cost is estimated at US$787 billion for fiscal years 2009-19.  Roughly one thir d of ARRA funds is in the form of tax cuts 
to individuals and business tax incentives;  aid to st ates represent another one fifth, and social safety 
spending about 11%.  The other one-third of A RRA encompasses direct government investment 
spending, including spending on infrastructure, hea lth information technology, research on renewable 
energy, and tax credits for particular types of  private investment, such as advanced energy 
manufacturing. 
84. The automotive and energy sectors, have been among the largest recipients of government 
support during the review period;  assistance to these two sectors is discussed in the next sub-section. 
                                                      
44 Joint Committee on Taxation (2009a).  Enacted in February 2009, the bill also allocates 
US$230 billion for tax rebates that benefits individuals, e.g. a new payroll tax credit, extension of first-time 
homebuyer credit, expanded education credit, and a deduction of sales taxes from car purchases. 
45 WTO document G/SCM/N/186/USA, 18 May 2010.  The document notes that the notification is 
transparency-oriented, and carries no le gal weight as to the actual identification or measurement of a subsidy, its 
status as an actionable subsidy, or its trade effects. WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 26  
 
  (a) Assistance to the U.S. automotive industry 
85. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) established the Automotive Industry Financing 
Program (AIFP) in December 2008 to "prevent a significant disruption of the American automotive 
industry, which would pose a systemic risk to financ ial market stability and have a negative effect on 
the economy of the United States".
46  Under this program the Treasury has provided about 
US$85 billion of Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds to help support automakers, 
automotive suppliers, consumers, and automobile finance companies.47 
86. A sizeable amount of AIFP funding has been allocated to support the restructuring of two 
large automotive producers:  Chrysler Group LLC (Chrysler) and General Motors Company (GM) 
(Table 7).48  Assistance to these two companies has been  provided in the form of loans and equity 
investments.49  In addition, the AIFP provided funding to ensure that auto suppliers receive 
compensation for their services and products, to pr ovide consumers with confidence that warranties 
would be honoured, and to support the automotive fi nance companies affiliated with GM and Chrysler 
(Chrysler Financial and GMAC Inc.), which provi de consumer financing for vehicle purchases and 
dealer financing for inventory build-up.  The 20 11 President's Budget projects that the federal 
Government will not recoup approximately 30% of the total value of support granted under the 
AIFP.50 
Table 7 
Assistance for the automobile industry 
Firm Form of support Value of support 
(US$ million) Observations 
Chrysler Loans to Chrysler for general 
business purposes 12,500 US$7.1 billion will be repaid as a term loan, including US$5.1 billion to 
be repaid within 8 years and US$2 billion to be repaid within 2.5 years.  Treasury also received a 9.85% equity share in new Chrysler. 
 Supplier Support Programme 123 All funds have been repaid and the programme has been terminated. 
 Warranty Commitment 
Programme 28 All funds have been repaid and the programme has been terminated. 
General 
Motors Loans to GM for general 
business purposes 49,500 Treasury converted most of its loans to old GM to US$2.1 billion in 
preferred stock, 61% of common equity in new GM;  a US$7.1 billion 
loan assumed by new GM was repaid in full. 
 Supplier Support Programme 29 All funds have been repaid and the programme has been terminated. 
 Warranty Commitment 
Programme 361 All funds have been repaid and the programme has been terminated. 
 Loan to participate in GMAC 
rights offering 884 Treasury exchanged this loan for a portion of GM's equity in GMAC.  As 
a result, Treasury received a 35.4% common equity interest in GMAC. The GM loan was terminated. 
Chrysler Financial Loan funded through Chrysler 
LB Receivables Trust 1,500 Loan repaid in full plus  US$7.4 million in interest. 
GMAC Preferred stock with exercised 
warrants 16,300 Treasury converted some of its preferred stock to common stock, 
increasing its common equity interest in GMAC to 56.3%. 
Source:  GAO (2009c)  Troubled Asset Relief Program:  Continued Stewar dship Needed as Treasury Develops Strategies 
 for Monitoring and Divesting Financia l Interests in Chrysler and GM , GAO-10-151, November.  Viewed at:  
 http://www.gao.gov;  and data pr ovided by the U.S. authorities. 
                                                      
46 Department of the Treasury online information, "Road to Stability:  Automotive Industry Financing 
Program", 9 April 2010.  Viewed at:  http://www.financialstability.gov/ roadtostability/aut oprogram.html. 
47 GAO (2009), Biofuels:  Potential Effects and Cha llenges of Required Increases in Production and 
Use, GAO-09-446, August.  Vi ewed at:  http://www.gao.gov. 
48 In June 2009, substantially all of Chrysler's assets were sold to a newly formed entity, 
Chrysler Group LLC or "new Chrysler";  and in July 2009 , substantially all of GM's assets were sold to a newly 
formed entity, General Motors Company or "new GM". 
49 For details, see US Department of the Treasury online information, "Road to Stability:  Automotive 
Industry Financing Program".  Viewed at:  http://www.f inancialstability.gov/roadtostability /autoprogram.html. 
50 Table 4-8 in Analytical Perspec tives, Budget of the Un ited States Government, Fiscal Year 2011.  
Viewed at:  http://www.gpoacce ss.gov/usbudget/fy11/index.html.  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 27 
 
 
  87. Under its June 2010 credit agreement with the Treasury, Chrysler must manufacture in the 
United States at least 40% of its yearly U.S. sales vol ume or ensure that its U.S. production volume is 
at least 90% of its 2008  U.S. production volume.51  The July 2010 agreem ent between the Treasury 
and GM states that GM "agrees to use its commercia lly reasonable best efforts to ensure that the 
volume of manufacturing conducted in the United States is consistent with at least 90% of the level 
envisioned in [its] Business Plan, absent a materi al adverse change in its business or operating 
environment which would make the co mmitment outlined herein non-economic".52 
88. Another initiative involving assistance to the auto mobile industry is the Consumer Assistance 
to Recycle and Save (CARS) Act of 2009.  Re ferred to as the "cash-for-clunkers" programme, it 
provided credits to consumers who traded in old,  fuel-inefficient vehicles when buying or leasing 
new, more fuel-efficient vehicles.  According to  the U.S. authorities, the CARS Act appropriated 
US$1 billion for this programme;  an additional US $2 billion was subsequently redirected to the 
programme from the Innovative Technology Loan Gu arantee Program at the U.S. Department of 
Energy.  The law applied equally to the purch ase of domestic and foreign vehicles.  Nearly 
680,000 vehicles valued at US$2.8 billion were pur chased under the CARS programme, which ended 
in August 2009.53 
(b) Assistance to the energy sector 
89. ARRA expands or creates energy incentives for businesses and utilities that produce or use 
renewable energy.  These incentives generally take the form of tax credits  for the production of 
electricity from wind, refined coal, geothermal, biomass, solar, and combined heat and power systems.  ARRA allocated US$2.3 billion for clean energy manufacturing tax credits, and an 
estimated US$16 billion for renewable energy ge neration payments in lieu of tax credits. 
90. Federal policy comprises various tax credits a nd a biofuel charge on ethanol imports.  Some 
of these tax credits expired at the end of 2009 and have not been renewe d.  In addition, the 
United States maintains a renewable fuel standard, a mandate that requires an increase in biofuel use 
from 9 billion gallons in 2008 to 36 billion gallons in 2022 (Table 8). 
Table 8 
Renewable and alternative fuel incentives, 2010 
Fuel type Amount of tax credit Expiry 
Biodiesel US$1 per gallon, plus  US$0.10 per gallon for small 
agri-biodiesel producers 31 December 2009 
Renewable diesel US$1 pe r gallon 31 December 2009 
Alcohol fuel (not ethanol, other than from 
natural gas or coal US$0.60 per gallon 31 December 2010 
Ethanol US$0.45 per gallon, plus 
US$0.10 per gallon for small producers 
(for the first 15 million gallons of ethanol produced each year) 31 December 2010 
Cellulosic biofuel US$1.01 per gallon (for alcohol, 
US$1.01 per gallon less the amount of the alcohol fuel mixture 
credit and small ethanol producer's credit in effect at the time 
of production) 31 December 2012 
Table 8 (cont'd)
                                                      
51 Section 5.17, "$7,142,000,000 First Lien Cr edit Agreement Among New Carco Acquisition LLC 
(to be renamed Chrysler Group LLC) as the Borrower, and The Lenders Parties Hereto From Time to Time",  
10 June 2009.  Viewed at:  http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/autoprogram.html. 
52 Section 5.27, "$7,072,488,605 Secured Credit Agreement Among General Motors Company, as the 
Borrower, the Guarantors and the United States Departme nt of the Treasury, as the Lender", 10 July 2009. 
53 National Highway Traffic Safety Administratio n online information, "Transaction Data and 
Reports".  Viewed at:  ht tp://www.cars.gov/carsreport. WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 28  
 
  Fuel type Amount of tax credit Expiry 
Alternative fuels (liquefied petroleum gas;  
compressed or liquefied natural gas;  liquefied hydrogen;  any liquid fuel derived from coal 
through the Fischer-Tropsch process;  
compressed or liquefied gas derived from biomass;  and liquid fuel  derived from biomass) US$0.50 per gallon 31 December 2009 
(30 September 2014 for liquefied hydrogen)
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation (2009b), Estimated Budget Effects of the Re venue Provisions Contained in the 
 Conference Agreement for H.R. 1, The "American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009" , JCX 19-09, 
 12 February.  Viewed at:  http ://www.jct.gov/pub lications.html. 
91. The largest of the biofuel tax expenditures is the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit 
(VEETC), which provides a US$0.45 per gallon excise tax credit to blenders of ethanol and gasoline.  
Prior to the enactment of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, the tax credit was US$0.51 per gallon.  The cost of the VEETC in forgone tax revenue totalled US$4 billion in fiscal year 2008, 
compared with US$2.7 billion in fiscal year 2006.
54  The cost is expected to increase to almost 
US$7 billion in 2015.  The Food, Conservation, a nd Energy Act of 2008 also extended through 2010 a 
charge of US$0.54 per gallon on imports of ethanol from MFN sources (ethanol used for fuel under 
subheading HS 9901.0050).  In addition, imports of ethanol are subject to an ad valorem MFN tariff 
rate of 1.9% or 2.5% (under subheading HS 2207.2000 or 2207.1060). 
92. ARRA amended the Department of Energy 's Innovative Technology Loan Guarantee 
Programme to include the deployment of eligible renewable energy, electric power transmission, and 
leading-edge biofuels projects whose cons truction starts before 30 September 2011.55  Guarantees 
cannot exceed 80% of project costs.  The programme received US$4 billion to cover the 
Government's expected costs of the loan guarantees.   Applicants for loan guarantees must determine 
whether the Buy American requirements of the ARRA apply to their proposed projects. 
5. Budgetary assistance in China 
93. The Secretariat report for the latest Trade Po licy Review of China, conducted in May 2010, 
included information related to government assistan ce mainly under the heading "Direct expenditures, 
industrial policies, and pr ice 'guidance' measures ".56   
94. The report noted that total government expenditure amounted to Y 6,259.3 billion in 2008, 
accounting for 20.8% of GDP.  Of the total, expe nditure for general public services was the biggest 
outlay, although expenditure for industry, commer ce, and banking grew the fastest (Table 9).   
Table 9 
Selected government transfers, 2007-08 
(Y billion and per cent) 
 
2007a 2008 Growth rate 
(%) 
Total government expenditure 4,978.14   6,259.27   25.7 
Expenditure for general public services 851.4 (17.1%) 979.6 (15.7%) 15.1 
Expenditure for education 712.2 (14.3%) 901.0 (14.4%) 26.5 
Expenditure for science and technology 178.3  (3.6%) 212.9 (3.4%) 19.4 
Expenditure for social safety  net and employment effort 544.7  (10.9%) 680.4 (10.9%) 24.9 
Table 9 (cont'd) 
                                                      
54 GAO (2009), Sovereign Wealth Funds:  Laws Limiting Foreign Investment Affect Certain U.S. 
Assets and Agencies Have Various Enforcement Processes, GAO-09-608, May, Washington, D.C.  This study 
contains a useful description of analytical work on the economic impact of U.S. biofuel policy. 
55 Section 406. 
56 WTO document WT/TPR/S/230 (26 April 2010).  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 29 
 
 
   
2007a 2008 Growth rate 
(%) 
Expenditure for medical and health care 199.0  (4.0%) 275.7 (4.4%) 38.5 
Expenditure for environment protection 99.6  (2.0%) 145.1 (2.3%) 45.7 
Expenditure for urban and rural community affairs 324.5  (6.5%) 420.6 (6.7%) 29.6 
Expenditure for agriculture, forestry and wate r conservancy 340.5  (6.8%) 454.4 (7.3%) 33.5 
Expenditure for transportation 191.5 (3.8%) 235.4 (3.8%) 22.9 
Expenditure for industry, commerce and banking 425.7  (8.6%) 622.6 (9.9%) 46.3 
Extra-budgetary expenditures 611.2 .. .. .. .. 
General public services 61.2 .. .. .. .. 
Education 219.7 .. .. .. .. 
Social safety net and employment effort 25.6 .. .. .. .. 
Transport 97.6 .. .. .. .. 
Urban and rural community affairs 77.1 .. .. .. .. 
Other 130.1 .. .. .. .. 
.. Not available. 
a The classification of expenditure accounts was adjusted in  2007, and is not comparable with the previous years. 
Note: Figures in parenthesis show percenta ge of total budgetary expenditure, or per centage of total extra-budgetary expenditure . 
Source:  National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistica l Yearbook 2009. 
95. China's total budget expenditure increased further in 2009, to Y 7,587.4 billion, up 21.2% 
from 2008.  This increase mainly reflected the Y 4 trillion (13% of 2008 GDP) economic stimulus 
package announced in November 2008, covering the period up to 2010.  Y 1.18 trillion came from the 
Central Government, and the rest from, inter alia , local governments budgets, and investment carried 
out by SOEs together with investment arms affili ated with the governments, as well as bank loans.  In 
2009, Y 908 billion (76.9% of the Y 1.18 trillion fr om the Central Government budget) was already 
allocated for the package, which was intended to c over, among other things:  infrastructure investment 
including rail, road, and water (37.5%), reconstruc tion in post-earthquake areas (25%), construction of 
low-rent housing (10%), and rural infrast ructure construction (9.25%) (Table 10). 
Table 10 
Y 4 trillion Stimulus Package, November 2008 
Projects Estimated investment 
(Y billion) 
Important infrastructure projects, such as railways, road  networks, airports, and irri gation systems Y 1,500  (37.5%) 
Reconstruction of post-earthquake areas Y 1,000 (25%) 
Construction of low-rent housing and residence renewal Y 400 (10%) 
Rural infrastructure construction, including water, electri city grid, road networks, and natural gas Y 370 (9.25%) 
Innovation and structural adjustment programmes Y 370 (9.25%) 
Energy-saving, emission-reducing, and envi ronmental protection projects Y 210 (5.25%)  
Medical and health care, education, and cultural businesses development Y 150 (3.75%) 
Source : Central Government online info rmation.  Viewed at:  http:// www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-03/09/content_1254645.htm 
 (in Chinese) [09/03/09]. 
96. Industrial policies were important to "guide" th e allocation of resources.  In early 2009, the 
Government identified ten sectors (nine manufacturing) most affected by the reduced external demand 
due to the global crisis.57  To boost their development, sector-sp ecific policies were issued.  The major 
measures include:  lowering the taxes levied on en terprises, by, for example, adjusting VAT rebate 
                                                      
57 Nine manufacturing sectors (iron and steel, autom obile, shipbuilding, petrochemical industry, textiles 
and clothing, light industry, non-ferrous metal, equipment manufacturing, electronics and information industry);  
and one services sector (logistics). WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 30  
 
  rates;  providing preferential loans or other fina ncial assistance to enterprises in these industries to 
encourage, inter alia , innovation.  For example, Y 10 billion was allocated to the automobile industry 
in a three-year period to facilitate R&D activities.  The Government also aims to consolidate industry 
structures by encouraging mergers and acquisitio ns.  Through these measures, the Government 
intended to achieve 12% growth rate of its manuf acturing industry in 2009:  the value added of 
China's secondary industry (w hich comprises mainly manufacturing) grew by 9.5% in 2009. 
97. The Government also provided "guidance" regarding some prices of:  commodities and 
services deemed to be of great importance to the national economy and pe ople's livelihood (such as 
electricity and certain medicines);  scarce natura l resources (processed petr oleum products and natural 
gas);  operations of natural monopolies (water suppl y); important public utilities (public transport);  
public welfare services (education fees).  Accord ing to the authorities, these "guidance" prices 
accounted for 3% of all prices in the economy.
58   
98. Some products and services were subject to price "guidance"  at the central level, and some at 
the local level.  At the central level, the ND RC was in charge of price "guidance" in respect  of, for 
example, key reserve materials of the State59, natural gas, electric power, important transport (such as 
rail and civil aviation), and post and telecom services.60  At the local level, the Bureau of Commodity 
Pricing in each province was in charge of price "guidance" concerning, inter alia , health-related 
services, and passenger transport by road.61  In addition, minimum procurement prices for rice and 
wheat remained for main grain-producing areas (seven provinces for rice, and six provinces for wheat).  These prices were increased several times in  2008 and 2009, to reflect the increasing cost of 
grain farming.   
V. THE TRADE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE 
99. Assessing the trade impact of assistance measure s presents a particular challenge because of 
the lack of details notified to the WTO and the pa ucity of reliable information available elsewhere on 
the measures themselves and how th ey have been implemented. 
100. This was demonstrated in a recent econometric analysis by the IMF of new "protectionist" 
measures taken in the context of the crisis, incl uding behind-the-border measures such as subsidies 
and bail-outs.62  The IMF study concluded that border measu res (tariffs etc.) and behind-the-border 
measures each accounted for about half of a total, annual, estimated, trade distortion effect of about 
0.25% of world trade, or US$35 billion a year .  Developed countries' measures accounted for 
                                                      
58 Under the Price Law, there are government-set prices and government-guided prices.  Government-
set prices are fixed prices, and governm ent-guided prices are usually set as a basic level, and a range within 
which prices can fluctuate.  However, it is not clear to the Secretariat which commodities are subject to which 
type. 
59 For key reserves of the State, designated SOEs st ockpile these commodities as  required by the State, 
but their purchase is at market pr ices.  When the case when these SOEs  claim losses from the Ministry of 
Finance, they may refer to government guided prices.  These settlement prices extend only to products held by 
the State as its reserves.   
60 Key reserve materials of the State are grain, cotto n, sugar, silkworm cocoons, crude oil, processed 
oil, and chemical fertilizer.  Other products subject to pr ice controls at the central level are: state-monopolized 
tobacco, edible salt, civil explosive equipment, some fertilizers, some key medicines, educational materials,  
water-resource projects subordinated to the Central Government or constructed in more than one province, and 
military materials. 
61 Prices of freight transport by road, and waterway  transport are determined by the market.  Other 
prices controlled by local governments are: thermal power, water resources (apart from those subject to price 
controls by the Central Government), medical services , education, selling prices and rents of residential 
apartments and home s for the elderly. 
62 Christian Henn and Brad McDonald, "Crisis protectionism: The observed trade impact", 
22 December 2010, viewed at http://www.v oxeu.org/index. php?q=node/5960.    WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 31 
 
 
  two-thirds of the aggregate trade distortion, with nearly all of the rest attributable to upper middle-
income developing countries.  Developing countries su ffered two-fifths of the export loss, with the 
share split evenly between upper-middle and lower-mi ddle income countries.  There was little trade 
impact on low-income countries. 
101. The IMF study noted, however, that 0.25% is probably at the low end of the actual trade 
effect since they were unable to include in the study a relatively large number of behind-the-border 
measures due to lack of detailed information.  If all of these measures of which the IMF was aware 
had been included, they estimate an annual trade distortion effect of 0.75% of world trade ($110 
billion), with behind-the-border measures accoun ting for the largest share of that effect. 
102. Assessing the trade impact of assistance measures is a complex task in view of the different 
forms that assistance can take and of its potential to  result in different costs and benefits depending on 
the specifics of each situation.  Moreover, consid ering the impact of individual assistance measures in 
isolation results in shortcomings from an analyti cal perspective.  A meaningful analysis requires 
estimating the combined impact of all individual assistance measures affecting a firm, industry or 
sector.  This involves measuring their effects on the returns from investment and production, on the 
cost of inputs, and the value of any direct assistance granted to labour and capital.   
103. Exemplary work has been done in this area by Australia's Productivity Commission.  It 
estimates that Australia's manufacturing sector in 2008-09 received a combined value of government 
assistance of A$8.3 billion, equivalent to 4.6% of (unassisted) value added in the sector.63  This is 
broken up into the following components: 
 Price-related assistance, A$6.5 billion, made up of: 
 A$9.4 billion from the increased value of output resulting from existing and new 
tariffs levied on manufactured products; 
 minus  A$2.8 billion caused by the higher production costs resulting from tariffs 
levied on inputs;  and  
 Budgetary assistance, A$1.8 billion, made up of: 
 A$724 million in the form of direct budgetary outlays received by the sector; 
 plus A$1 billion from tax concessions granted to the sector. 
104. The Australian manufacturing sector received far more net assistance during the crisis from 
tariffs than from budgetary assistance, but the bulk of that assistance was of a longstanding nature and 
was not related to the crisis per se.  This illustra tes a general point that the assistance arising from 
existing tariffs and other price-re lated measures can be considerably higher than the value of 
exceptional assistance granted through direct outla ys, tax concessions or other budgetary measures 
even in countries like Australia, where the average MFN tariff applied in the manufacturing sector is 
relatively low (3.3%) and the fiscal position makes it possible to provide budgetary assistance.
64 
105. This kind of comprehensive analysis is complex and costly and it is rarely, if at all, carried out 
elsewhere.  As a result, combined estimates of assistance that could allow comparisons across 
countries are not available.  In their absence, it is  important to bear in mind while discussing the 
                                                      
63 Productivity Commission, Trade & Assistance Review  2008-09, Annual Report Series, Canberra, 
2010. 
64 See WTO document WT/TPR/S/244 (1 March 2011)  for details on Australia's trade policies. WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 32  
 
  assistance measures adopted during the crisis that me asures taken in isolation seldom say much about 
the impact of all government interventions on trade, a particular activity or the economy as a whole.   
106. An area in which much more could be done in  the WTO to increase the transparency of, and 
monitor the trade impact of, behind-the-border m easures is government procurement.  This is 
estimated to account for 15-20% of the GDP of Parties to the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA) in normal times, and as noted earlier increased government consumption played a 
particularly significant role in the budgetary assistance policies introduced by WTO Members in 
response to the crisis.  Although only a portion of the procurement activities of the 41 Parties to the 
GPA are scheduled and are therefore subject to GPA disciplines, the Office of the USTR has 
estimated that the aggregate value of market access commitments under the GPA was $1.6 trillion in 
2008.
65 
107. The GPA played an important role during the crisis in helping to keep open the procurement 
markets of GPA Parties and in reducing the potentia lly detrimental effects on trade of the measures 
that were adopted.  For example, the "Buy Amer ican" provisions of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 were deliberately frame d in a way that would respect the rights and 
obligations of GPA Parties, which limited the poten tially market-restricting effects of the legislation 
and reduced the likelihood of retaliatory action by  U.S. trade partners in their own procurement 
activities.  For transparency purposes, the impl ementation of the U.S. measures was discussed on 
several occasions in the WTO Comm ittee on Government Procurement. 
108. Statistical reports provided by the GPA Parti es, as required by the Agreement, provide 
valuable insights into the procurement activities of  relevant government ministries and other covered 
entities at both the central and (where appli cable) the sub-central levels of government.66  Currently, 
an effort is under way in the Committee on Govern ment Procurement to review and improve the 
content of these reports, for example by shari ng insights concerning methodological approaches and 
techniques.  An informal sub-body of the Committee has been established for this purpose. 67 
109. The speed with which statistical reports ar e processed has been substantially enhanced 
through the introduction of a new system whereby Parties' reports are quickly mounted on the WTO 
public website, in the format in which they are provided by delegations.  For accountability purposes, 
a one-page notification indicating the link at which each report can be found is issued by the Secretariat to all GPA delegations.
68  Within the Committee on Government Procurement, 
consideration is also being given to possibilities for electronic notification of statistics.  Over time, 
these initiatives are expected to enhan ce the usefulness of the Parties' statistical reports both for public 
policy purposes and as a market access information tool. 
                                                      
65 United States Office of the United States Trade Representative, "The WTO Government 
Procurement Agreement:  A Tremendous Opportunity for China", available at http://shenang.usembassy-
china.org.cn/wto-gpa.html. 
66 The Parties' statistical reports are available at the following link:  
http://www.wto.org/english/trat op_e/gproc_e/gpstat_e.htm. 
67 Report (2010) of the Committee on Government Procurement (GPA/106 of 9 December 2010), 
paragraph 10. 
68 Report (2010) of the Committee on Government Procurement (GPA/106 of 9 December 2010), 
paragraph 11.  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 33 
 
 
  REFERENCES 
Asmundson, I. et al., Trade and Trade Finance in  the 2008-09 Financial Crisis, IMF Working Paper, 
January 2011. 
Berg, A. et al., Global Shocks and their Impact  on Low-Income Countries: Lessons from the Global 
Financial Crisis, IMF Worki ng Paper, February 2011. 
Blinder, A.S. and Zandi, M., Stimulus Wo rked, Finance & Development, December 2010. 
Blöchliger, H., et al., "Sub-central Government s and the Economic Crisis: Impact and Policy 
Responses", OECD Economics Department  Working Papers , No. 752, 2010 
Bown, C. P., Developing Countries and Monitoring WTO Commitments in Response to the Global 
Economic Crisis, Policy Research Work ing Paper, World Bank, May 2010. 
Brunel, C. and Hufbauer, G.C., "Money for the Au to Industry:  Consistent with WTO Rules?", 
Peterson Institute for Intern ational Economics Policy Brief PB09-4, Washington D.C. 
Cali, M., The global financial crisis and trad e prospects in small states, Economic Paper, 
Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010. 
Dullien, S. et al. (editor), The financial and ec onomic crisis of 2008-2009 an d developing countries, 
UNCTAD, 2010. 
Gregory, R. et al., "Trade and the Crisis:  Prot ect or Recover", IMF Staff Position Note SPN/10/07, 
March 2010. 
Haddad, M. and Shepherd, B. (editors), Managi ng Openness: Trade and Outward-Oriented Growth 
after the Crisis, World Bank, 2011. 
Jansen, M. and Von Uexkull, E., Trade and employment in the global crisis, ILO, 2010. 
Jones, B. and Keen, M., Climate Policy an d the Recovery, IMF Staff Position Note, 
4 December 2009. 
Kee, H.L. et al., Is protectionism on the rise ? Assessing national trade policies during the crisis of 
2008, Policy Research Working Paper 5274, World Bank, April 2010. 
Keeley, B. and Love, P., From Crisis to Rec overy: The Causes, Course and Consequences of the 
Great Recession, OECD Insights, 2010. 
Lane, P.R. and Milesi-Ferretti, G.M., The Cro ss-Country Incidence of the Global Crisis, IMF 
Working Paper, July 2010. 
Langhorst, C. and Mildner, S., "Good for the economy  – bad for trade?  The effects of EU and US 
economic stimuli on international tr ade and competition", Centre for European Studies, June 2009, 
Brussels. 
Milberg, W. and Winkler, D., Restructuring of Gl obal Value Chains, Policy Research Working Paper, 
World Bank, May 2010. WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 34  
 
  OECD, "Impact of the crisis on international trade", in OECD, Measuring Globalisation: OECD 
Economic Globalisation Indicators 2010. 
OECD, "Responding to the Crisis while Protecting Long-term Growth", in OECD, Economic Policy 
Reforms 2010: Going for Growth, 2010. 
OECD, "Trade and Economic Effects of Responses to  the Economic Crisis – Preliminary Results", 
TAD/TC(2009)2/Rev.2, 27-29 October 2009, Paris. 
OECD, "Trade and Economic Effect s of Responses to the Economic  Crisis", OECD Trade Policy 
Studies, 2010, Paris. 
Tsangarides, C., Crisis and recovery: role of the exchange rate regime in emerging market countries, 
IMF Working Paper, October 2010. 
UNCTAD and JETRO, International trade afte r the economic crisis : challenges and new 
opportunities, 2010. 
UNCTAD Secretariat Task Force on Systemic Issues and Economic Co-operation, The global 
economic crisis: systemic failur es and multilateral remedies, 2009. 
Van Bergeijk, P.A.G., On the brink of deglobalizati on : an alternative perspective on the causes of the 
world trade collapse, 2010.  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 35 
 
 
  ANNEX 1 
Budgetary assistance for production1 
(October 2008 – October 2010) 
 
Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
Armenia Financial support measure for agricultural production. Press reports (26 August 2010). Non-verified information. 
Australia Ford Credit Australia wa s authorized to participate in 
the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) funding 
mechanism (up to $A 550 million (US$454.2 million) 
over 12 months). Permanent Delegation of 
Australia to the WTO 
(6 July 2009). Verified information. 
Australia Stimulus Package "Economic Security Strategy 
(ESS)" (1% of GDP). Permanent Delegation of 
Australia to the WTO 
(October 2008). Over 90% of one-off cash 
payments have been 
made. 
Verified information. 
Australia Programme of nation building investment (A$66 
billion (US$60 billion)) in infrastructure, including 
roads, metro rail, ports, universities and energy efficiency, under the Government's 2009-10 Budget. 
The A$42 billion (US$38.2 billion) Nation Building 
and Jobs Plan, announced in February 2009, included tax bonus payments for working Australians and 
investment in shovel-ready infrastructure projects. A 
further A$22 billion (US$20 billion), under the National Building for the Future infrastructure 
package was announced in the 2009-10 Budget.  Permanent Delegation of 
Australia to the WTO 
(12 May 2009). Verified information. 
Bangladesh Stimulus package (US$492 million) for a number of 
sectors such as agriculture, electricity generation, and 
social safety net programmes (financial year 
2008-09).  Permanent Delegation of 
Bangladesh to the WTO. Verified information. 
Bolivarian 
Republic of 
Venezuela Fondo Bicentenario (overall budget Bs 3 billion 
(US$699.3 million)) aiming at: (i) developing non-
traditional exports (Bs 1 billion (US$233.1 million)); and (ii) selective import substitution (Bs 2 billion 
(US$466.2 million)). Decreto No. 7.173 - Gaceta 
Oficial No. 39.349 
(19 January 2010) and WTO Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Verified information. 
Brazil Government credits (US$1.7 billion) fo r carmakers.  Permanent Delegation of Brazil 
to the WTO (7 February 2009). Verified information. 
Brazil Additional credit line (US$4 billion) for State 
Governments through the National Development 
Bank (BNDES). Permanent Delegation of Brazil 
to the WTO (17 April 2009). Verified information. 
Brazil Provisional Programme for Investment Support 
(interest rate of 4.5%) through the National 
Development Bank (BNDES PSI), to finance the 
production of capital goods destined for exports. Permanent Delegation of Brazil 
to the WTO (16 June 2009). Verified information. 
Brazil Additional credit line (US$4 billion) for State 
Governments through the National Development 
Bank (BNDES). WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Terminated on 
31 December2009. 
Verified information. 
Brazil Additional credit line (R$80 billion (US$47.4 billion)) 
through the National Development Bank (BNDES), 
allocated to maintain activ ities already scheduled. The 
credit line will not generate new commitments. WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Verified information. 
Cont'd 
                                                      
1 The inclusion of any measure in this table implies no judgement by the WTO Secretariat on whether 
such measure, or its intent, is protectionist in nature.  Moreover, nothing in the table implies a judgement on a 
measure's consistency with a WTO Agreement or its  relationship with the global financial crisis. WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 36  
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
Brazil Announcement of phase 2 of the Growth Acceleration 
Programme (PAC 2) (estimated investments 
US$520 million for the period 2011-14) encompassing a set of actions and investment goals 
aimed at creating the necessary conditions for long-
term economic growth and social development. WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Verified information. 
Brazil Financial support measure (R$100 billion 
(US$59.17 billion)) for agricultural production for the 
2010-11 season. Grain Market Report GMR 
No. 401 (24 June 2010). Non-verified information. 
Canada Stimulus package "Canada Economic Action Plan" 
(almost C$30 billion (US$27.9 billion) in 2009, but to 
surpass C$50 billion (US$46.5 billion) over the next two years, including stimulus  from other levels of 
government). Permanent Delegation of 
Canada to the WTO 
(27 January 2009). Verified information. 
Canada Additional measures for the automotive industry, 
including the Canadian Warranty Commitment 
Programme, to guarantee warranties from GM of 
Canada and Chrysler Canada  during the restructuring 
period, and expanded accounts receivable insurance for automotive parts suppliers. Permanent Delegation of 
Canada to the WTO 
(April 2009). Conclusion of the 
Programme on 16 
September 2009 (the 
accounts receivable 
insurance still in place). 
Verified information. 
Canada Government of Cana da and the Government of 
Ontario provided loans to General Motors of Canada 
Inc. and Chrysler Canada Inc. In April 2009 the 
Chrysler Canada loan was increased to 
Can$3.7 billion (US$3.4 billi on), and on 10 June a 2% 
ownership stake in the automaker was taken.  Both 
Governments also increased the GM loan to 
Can$10.6 billion (US$9.9 billi on) in April, and on 
10 July took on a 12% ownership stake.  Permanent Delegation of 
Canada to the WTO 
(April 2009). Loan agreements 
implemented. 
Verified information. 
Canada Under the Canadian Secured Credit Facility, the 
Government has committed to purchase up to 
Can$12 billion (US$11.2 billion) of newly issued term asset-back securities (ABS) backed by loans and leases on vehicles and equipment, and dealer floor 
plan loans through the Business Development Banks. Permanent Delegation of 
Canada to the WTO 
(8 May 2009). Funds available until 
31 March 2010.    
Verified information. 
Canada Government fundi ng (Can$1 billion (US$929.7 
million)) for Canadian pulp and paper producers that 
invest in improved energy efficiency and 
environmental performance.   Permanent Delegation of 
Canada to the WTO 
(18 June 2009). Verified information. 
Canada Government loan (C an$100 million (US$93 million), 
through "Canada Account" to Air Canada. Permanent Delegation of 
Canada to the WTO 
(29 July 2009). Verified information. 
Canada Investment in Forest Industry Transformation 
Programme (IFIT) (Can$100 million over four years 
(US$97.1million)), for projects that implement innovative technologies  for a more economically 
competitive and environmentally sustainable forest 
sector. Permanent Delegation of 
Canada to the WTO 
(20 October2010). Verified information.  
Canada Ontario's Feed-In Tariff Programme Backgrounder 
(FIT) for renewable energy generation was launched 
in September 2009. The programme is designed to 
encourage the generation of renewable energy with projects of 10 kW or less. The FIT includes domestic 
content requirements. Press reports (3 February 2010). Non-verified information. 
China Increase of short-term export credit insurance by 
China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation to 
US$84 billion in 2009. 
Increase of preferential export buyer' credit by the 
Import-Export Bank of China to US$10 billion in 2009. Permanent Delegation of China 
to the WTO. Verified information. 
China Support credit guarantee for SMEs (Y 1.6 billion 
(US$234.3 million)). Permanent Delegation of China 
to the WTO (October 2008). Verified information. 
Cont'd  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 37 
 
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
China From the beginning of 2009, adjusting and 
reinvigorating plans for 10 industries, including iron 
and steel, automotive, ship- building, petrochemicals, 
light manufacturing, tex tiles, non-ferrous metals, 
equipment manufacturing, electronics and 
information, and logistic. Permanent Delegation of China 
to the WTO (April 2009). Verified information. 
China Policies to promote th e accelerated development of 
bio-industries.  Permanent Delegation of China 
to the WTO (2 June 2009). Specific implementing 
measures to be defined. 
Verified information. 
China Establishment of the Financing Guarantee Special 
Funds for SMEs. Permanent Delegation of China 
to the WTO (7 August 2008). Verified information. 
China Measures to promote the domestic film industry such 
as preferential fiscal measures, and 2/3 of screening 
time reserved for local films (already applicable since 
2001), under the Guiding Opinions on Promotion of Prosperous Development of the Film Industry of 
21 January 2010. WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Verified information. 
China State aid through a capita l injection (Y 1.5 billion 
(US$224.6 million)) for China Southern Airlines. The 
funds appear to be the la st instalment of capital 
extended to the top three carriers. Permanent Delegation of China 
to the WTO (27 October 2010) 
and WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Verified information.  
China Direct payments (Y 15.1 billion for the year 2010 
(US$2.26 billion)) to grain farmers (wheat, corn, and 
rice), aiming at  increasing their income and 
stabilizing production. Permanent Delegation of China 
to the WTO (27 October 2010). Verified information.  
China Financial aid (Y 15.5 billion for the year 2010 
(US$2.32 billion)) to farmers for the purchase of 
agricultural machinery and tools, aiming at improving 
productivity and expanding domestic demand in rural areas. Permanent Delegation of China 
to the WTO (27 October 2010). Verified information.  
Costa Rica Economic and social stimulus programme (Plan 
Escudo) including measures (among others) aimed at 
strengthening the banking sy stem, facilitating credit 
for SMEs, and capitalization of State banks. Permanent Delegation of Costa 
Rica to the WTO. Verified information. 
Croatia Reduction of government subsidies (40%) for 
agriculture sector. Agence France Presse 
(8 March 2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010.  Non-verified information. 
Egypt Fiscal Package (LE 15 billion (US$2.7 billion)) to 
support the manufacturi ng and export activities 
(Export Development Fund (LE 3 billion 
(US$493 million)).  EC Commission – Fourth 
Report on Potentially Trade 
Restrictive Measures.  Non-verified information. 
EU Increase (from €25 billion to €50 billion 
(US$37-US$74 billion)) for the outstanding amount 
of loans to be granted under the EC medium-term 
assistance for balance- of-payments facility. Council Regulation 
No. 431/2009 of 18 May 2009 
(OJ L 128/1). Verified information. 
EU Amendment to the "Temporary Community 
Framework for State Aid measures to support access 
to finance in the current financial and economic 
crisis".  Communication from the 
Commission (2009/C 303/04) 
(15 December 2009)  and WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Effective until 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Cont'd WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 38  
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
EU Specific market support measure for dairy farmers 
(€300 million (US$420.48 million)). The measure is 
intended to grant a financial envelope in order to support dairy farmers that are severely affected by the 
collapse of world market and EU market prices and 
encounter liquidity problems in these circumstances. Members to communicate to the Commission without delay and no later than 31 March 2010 a description 
of the objective criteria used to determine the methods 
for granting support and the provision taken to avoid distortion of  markets. Commission Regulation 
No. 233/2009 
(15 December 2009) and  WTO Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Verified information. 
Austria Amendment (€10 billion (US$14.3 billion)) budget 
increase) to an aid scheme approved on 
20 March 2009. (Beneficiary: companies that were not in difficulty on 1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (18 June 2009). Verified information. 
Austria Temporary aid scheme granting compatible aid of up 
to €500,000 (US$740,000), in the form of direct 
grants, interest rate subsid ies, subsidised public loans 
and public guarantees. (Beneficiary: companies that 
were not in difficulty on 1 July 2008).   Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC delegation (20 March 2009). Aid can be granted until 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Austria Temporary modification of the existing risk capital 
investment scheme 'Eigenkapitalgarantien'. In 
particular, the measure allows an increase of the 
maximum investment tranches from €1.5 million 
(US$2.2 million) to €2.5 m illion (US$3.7 million) 
over each 12-month period until 31 December 2010. 
The minimum private participation for risk capital 
investments is temporarily reduced from 50% to 30%. (Beneficiary: businesses). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (25 March 2009). Verified information. 
Austria "Bürgschaftsrichtlinien": aid scheme (overall budget 
€15.3 million (US$21.44 milli on) and annual budget 
€5.1 million (US$7.15 million)), in the form of guarantee for restructuring firms in difficulty (all sectors). EU State Aid N 673/09 
(22 January 2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Effective from 
10 October 2009 to 
9 October 2012. 
Verified information. 
Austria Short-term export credit insurance scheme. The 
Commission authorized, under EU State aid rules, a 
measure adopted by Austria to limit the adverse impact of the current financial crisis on exporting 
firms. EU State Aid N 434/09 (OJ 
2010/C 25/02) and WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Effective until 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Austria Temporary state aid to help farmers (€1.2 million 
(US$1.7 million)) available until the end of 2010.   EU State Aid N 118/10 and  
WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Decision adopted on 
19 April 2010. 
Verified information. 
Belgium Temporary scheme providing aid in the form of 
subsidized guarantees for investment and working 
capital loans. The reduction of the guarantee fee can 
be applied during the period of up to two years for 
loan guarantees contracted no later than 31 December 2010. Where the duration of the underlying loan 
exceeds two years, the safe harbour premiums may be 
applied for the remaining period of the guarantee. The maximum duration of guarantees granted under the 
scheme is limited to five years. (Beneficiary: 
companies in Flanders that were not in difficulty on 1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (20 March 2009). Verified information. 
Belgium Arkimedes risk-capital programme, increase of annual 
investment tranches. Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (3 June 2009). Verified information. 
Belgium BELGACAP: "Assurance-crédit export de court 
terme". Aid scheme (overall budget €300 million 
(US$420.48 million)) for all sectors. EU State Aid N 532/09 
(6 November 2009) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Effective until 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Cont'd  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 39 
 
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
Belgium Limited amounts of aid (€2.73 million 
(US$3.83 million)) for prim ary producers hit by the 
financial crisis.  Aid will take the form of state guarantees on working capital loans. EU State Aid N 34/10 
(11 February 2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Effective until 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Bulgaria Temporary state aid to help farmers (€10.26 million 
(US$14.4 million)) available until the end of 2010.   EU State Aid N 108/10 and  
WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Decision adopted on 
19 April 2010. 
Verified information. 
Bulgaria Temporary aid scheme allowing direct grants of up to 
(€500,000 (US$700,800)) per company. (Beneficiary: 
companies  that were not in difficulty on 1 July 2008).  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EU 
Delegation (10 October 2010) and EU State Aid N 333/10. Decision adopted on 
10 September 2010. 
Verified information. 
Cyprus Rescue aid (€1.6 million (US$2.24 million)), in the 
form of state loan guarantee, for the agricultural 
sector. EU State Aid N 60/10 
(6 May 2010). Verified information. 
Czech 
Republic Temporary scheme allowing government, regional 
and local authorities to grant aid in the form of 
reduced interest rates on loans. The lower rates 
available for loans contracted no later than 31 December, but only on interest payments up to 
31 December 2012. After that date firms have to pay 
market rates. (Beneficiary: companies that were not in 
difficulty on 1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (6 May 2009). Verified information. 
Czech 
Republic Temporary scheme granting compatible aid of up to 
€500,000 (US$740,000) per company over the period 
2009-10. The aid can be granted in the form of direct grants, reimbursable grants, interest rate subsidies, 
subsidised public loans and public guarantees. 
(Beneficiary: companies that  were not in difficulty on 
1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (7 May 2009). Verified information. 
Denmark Temporary export lending facility (overall budget 
DKr 20 billion (US$3.7 billion)) that supplies Danish 
exporters and their customers with the required 
liquidity to continue tr ading. The facility is 
administered by Eksport Kredit Fonden pursuant to 
the Danish Act on Eksport Kredit Fonden. EU State Aid NN 4/10 
(10 March 2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Effective until 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Denmark Export credit insurance scheme (short-term), under 
which, the Danish state export-credit agency Eksport 
Kredit Fonden (EKF) can provide export-credit 
reinsurance to complement insurance cover available 
on the private market. Under the reinsurance agreement with the private credit insurer, EFK takes 
over the part of the risk related to those transactions 
for which private insurers ha ve withdrawn their cover. 
Both, the private insurers and the exporters retain part 
of the underlying risk. (Beneficiary: export firms). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EU 
Delegation (6 May 2009). EC 
State Aid N 554/09 (29 October 2009). Amendment and 
prolongation of the 
scheme until 
31 December 2010. 
Estonia Aid up to €500,000 (US$740,000) per company in the 
form of grant, loans and guarantees, until 
31 December 2010. Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (13 July 2009). Verified information. 
Finland Scheme granting aid of up to €500 000 (US$740,000) 
per company. (Beneficiary: companies that were not 
in difficulty on 1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (3 June 2009). Verified information. 
Finland Guarantee scheme providing relief in the form of 
subsidized guarantees for investment and working 
capital loans concluded by 31 December 2010. (Beneficiary: companies that  were not in difficulty on 
1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (9 June 2009). Verified information. 
Cont'd WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 40  
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
Finland Export credit insurance scheme: short-term export-
credit insurance coverage to  companies established in 
Finland. The maximum coverage would be 90% for both commercial and political risk, which means that 
the exporters would have to assume at least 10% of 
the underlying risk themselves. (Beneficiary: companies that were not in difficulty on 1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (22 June 2009). Verified information. 
France "Régime temporaire d'aides compatibles d'un montant 
limité".  This measure allows State, regional or local 
authorities and certain public bodies to grant aid of up 
to €500,000 (US$740,000) in 2009 and 2010 to businesses which find themselves in difficulty as a 
result of the economic crisis. Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (19 January 2009). Verified information. 
France "Régime temporaire de prêts bonifiés pour les 
entreprises fabriquant des produits verts".  This 
measure provides reduced-interest loans to business 
investing in the production of green products. 
Supports businesses faced with financing problems 
because of the credit squeeze while at the same time 
making it easier for them to invest in products with an 
environmental benefit. Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (3 February 2009). Verified information. 
France "Régime temporaire d'aides sous forme de taux 
d'intérêts bonifiés".  This measure allows State, 
regional or local authorities and certain public bodies 
to grant aid in the form of  reduced interest rates on 
loans.  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (4 February 2009). Verified information. 
France "Régime temporaire d'aides s ous forme de garanties".  
This scheme allows State authorities to grant aid, until 
31 December 2010, in the form of subsidized guarantees for investment and working capital loans.  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (27 February 2009). Verified information. 
France Loans to car industry. Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (28 February 2009). Verified information. 
France Modification of risk capital scheme. The temporary 
modification consists of raising the maximum 
investment tranches from €1.5 million to €2.5 million 
(US$2.2-US$3.7 million) over each 12-month period. This amendment is valid until the end of 2010. 
(Beneficiary: businesses). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (16 March 2009). Verified information. 
France Aid scheme (€25 million (US$37 million)) for 
provision of risk capital from 2009 until 
31 December 2010. (Beneficiary : SMEs (all sectors)). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (30 June 2009). Verified information. 
France Short-term export credit in surance. Coface, a public 
export credit agency, to provide short-term export-
credit insurance to companie s established in France, 
where such cover is unavaila ble in the private market. 
Only financially sound export transactions would be eligible for support under the measure. The 
Commission authorised the measure until 31 
December 2010.  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (5 October 2009).  
France "Assurance-crédit export de court terme (CAP 
export)", short-term export credit insurance (overall 
budget €1 billion (US$1.37 billion)). Coface, a public 
export credit agency, to provide short-term export-credit insurance to companie s established in France, 
where such cover is unavaila ble in the private market. 
Only financially sound export transactions would be 
eligible for support under the measure. The Commission authorized the measure until 31 
December 2010.  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EU 
Delegation (5 October 2009). EC State Aids N 384/09 and N 449/09. Verified information. 
Cont'd  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 41 
 
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
France "Aides aux investissements en faveur des enterprises 
de transformation et commercialisation du secteur 
agricole" (overall budget €225 million (US$309 million), annual budget €45 million 
(US$62 million)), until 31 December 2013. EC State Aid N 215/09 (OJ C 
275) (14 November 2009). Decision adopted on 
30 September 2009. 
Verified information. 
France Temporary aid scheme (€700 million 
(US$981.1 million)) for farmers. The scheme 
provides aid in the form of direct grants, interest rate subsidies, subsidized loans, as well as aid towards the 
payment of social security contributions. The scheme 
is in application of the amendment to the Commission's Temporary framework for State aid 
measures to support access to finance in the current 
financial and economic cris is, which introduced the 
possibility of granting limited amounts of aid to 
primary agricultural producers. EU State Aid N 609/09 (OJ 
C30) (6 January 2010) and  
WTO Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Decision adopted on 
2 December 2009 and is 
effective until 31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
France Aid scheme "aides à l'assistance technique dans le 
secteur des fruits et légumes" (overall budget 
€1 million (US$1.4 million)). EU State Aid No. XA 232/09 
(16 February 2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Effective until 
31 December 2013. 
Verified information. 
France Direct grant (overall budget €2.276 million 
(US$3.2 million)) for Eastern Airways, aiming at 
developing new air services, for the period 2010-13. EU State Aid N 709/09 
(25 March  2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Verified information.  
Germany Amendment to the scheme allowing aid of up to 
€500,000 (US$704,750) per company. Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (17 July 2009). Verified information. 
Germany Temporary reduced-interest loans scheme for green 
products. (Beneficiary: companies that were not in 
difficulty on 1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (4 August 2009). Verified information. 
Germany KfW-run loan component of German 
"Konjunkturprogramm" for larger companies.  Aid to 
undertakings affected by the current credit squeeze.  The programme will be administered by the 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW).  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation  Verified information. 
Germany Federal Framework Scheme for small amounts of 
capital aid up to €500,000 (US$740,000) per company 
until 2010. 
The scheme was amended on 4 June 2009. Risk-
capital injunctions in the form  of direct grants up to 
€500,000 (US$740,000). Private investment, 
particularly in the form of wholly or partially  
privately funded constructi ons, is explicitly excluded 
from the scheme. (Beneficiary: undertakings with 
normally a maximum turnover of €500 million 
(US$740 million), excluding companies that were in difficulty on 1 July 2008). 
Second amendment on 17 July 2009 calculating the 
aid element of public guarant ees on the basis of safe 
harbour premiums of the EC's Temporary Framework. Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation 
(30 December 2008). Verified information. 
Germany More flexible capital investments until 2010 for 
SMEs that are in early stages of development. 
Measure increases the maximum investment ranges from €1.5 million to €2.5 m illion (US$2.2 million to 
US$3.7 million). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (3 February 2009). Verified information. 
Germany Loans at low interest rates for companies 
encountering financial difficulties as a result of the 
economic and financial crisis.  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (19 February 
2009).
  Verified information. 
Cont'd WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 42  
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
Germany Subsidized State guarantees for companies in the form 
of investment and working capital loans.  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (27 February 2009). Verified information. 
Germany Tax refund aid scheme (€570 million 
(US$843.6 million) through re duction of energy costs 
of primary agricultural and forestry production, until 31 December 2009. Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (13 July 2009). Verified information. 
Germany Temporary reduced-interest loans scheme for green 
products. (Beneficiary: companies that were not in 
difficulty on 1 July 2008).  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation  Verified information. 
Germany Short-term export credit insurance. The German state 
export credit insurance scheme, managed by a 
Consortium consisting of Euler Hermes and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, provide short-term export-credit insurance to comp anies established in 
Germany, where such cover is unavailable in the 
private market for financially sound export transactions. To receive insurance under the scheme, a 
considerable proportion of the risk needs to be 
retained by the exporter, to ensure that only sound transactions are covered. This measure is authorised 
until 31 December 2010.  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation  Verified information. 
Germany Aid scheme (overall budget €360 million 
(US$532.8 million), a nnual budget €120 million 
(US$177.6 million)), from 1 July 2009 to 31 
December 2011. (Beneficiary: firms from the Hessen 
Region in difficulty from all sectors). EC State Aid N 458/09 (OJ 
2009/C 230/01) (14 August 
2009). Verified information. 
Germany Scheme to facilitate the refinancing of export credits 
(overall budget €1.5 billion (US$2.2 billion)) through 
KfW Frankfurt am Main, from 15 September 2009 
until 14 March 2010. EC State Aid N 456/09 (OJ 
2009/C 247/01) (15 September 2009). Verified information. 
Germany Temporary framework scheme (€100 million 
(US$140 million)) for farmers.  The scheme provides 
aid in the form of direct grants, interest rates 
subsidies, and subsidized loans, valid until 
31 December 2010, and with a maximum amount of €15,000 (US$21,024) per aid. The scheme is in 
application of the amendment to the Commission's 
Temporary framework for State aid measures to support access to finance in the current financial and 
economic crisis, which intr oduced the possibility of 
granting limited amounts of aid to primary agricultural producers.  EU State Aid N 597/09 
(10 February 2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Decision adopted on 
23 November 2009. 
Verified information. 
Germany Scheme to facilitate the refinancing of export credits 
(overall budget €1.5 billion (US$2.1 billion)) through 
KfW Frankfurt am Main, from 15 September 2009 until 14 March 2010. The Commission authorized the 
scheme, under EU State aid rules, to limit the adverse 
impact of the current financial and economic crisis on the supply of export credit. EU State Aid N 48/10 
(9 March 2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Prolongation of the 
scheme (with some 
technical modifications) on 9 March 2010 until 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Germany Aid package (€30.18 milli on (US$42.3 million)) to 
steel producer ArcelorMittal Eisenhüttenstadt GmbH's 
for a top gas recycling project (TGR). EU State Aid N 450/09 
(9 March 2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Verified information. 
Germany EU State aid (overall budget €45 million 
(US$63 million), and annual budget €22 million 
(US$30.8 million)) "Ände rung der Regelung für 
Innovationsbeihilfen an den Schiffbau" for shipbuilding sector. EU State Aid N 116/10 
(10 May 2010). Effective from 
1 May 2010 to 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Cont'd  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 43 
 
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
Germany Aid scheme (€2,050 million (US$2,873 million)) for 
all sectors (Änderung der sog., Bundesregelung 
Kleinbeihilfen" im Bereich der Nachrangdarlehen). EU State Aid N 255/10 
(31 August 2010). Effective from 
1 September 2010 to 
31 December 2010.  
Verified information. 
Greece Scheme for subsidized guara ntees for investment and 
working capital loans concluded by 31 December 
2010. (Beneficiary: companies that were not in difficulty on 1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (3 June 2009). Verified information. 
Greece Scheme allowing aid in the form of reduced interest 
rates on loans concluded by 31 December 2010. 
(Beneficiary: companies that  were not in difficulty on 
1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (3 June 2009). Verified information. 
Greece Aid up to €500,000 (US$740,000) per company in the 
form of grants, until 31 December 2010. Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (16 July 2009). Verified information. 
Greece State aid to aluminium of Greece SA.  EU State Aid C 2/10 (ex NN 
62/09) (16 April 2010). Verified information.  
Hungary Temporary aid scheme for granting limited amount of 
compatible aid. The scheme enables the granting of  
aid of up to €500,000 (US$740,000) and reduced 
interest loans.  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (24 February 2009). Verified information. 
Hungary Temporary scheme allowing authorities to grant aid in 
the form of subsidized guarantees for investment and 
working capital. During the period of up to two years 
the guarantee fee for loan and leasing guarantees 
contracted no later than 31 December can be reduced by 25% compared with the market level fee. The 
guarantee coverage can amount to 90% of the 
underlying loan or leasing. Guarantees can only be given under the scheme to SMEs up to a total of €2.5 million (US$3.7 milli on) per beneficiary. 
(Beneficiary: companies that  were not in difficulty on 
1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (10 March 2009). Verified information. 
Hungary Application of rules relating to aid in the form of 
guarantees under the Temporary Framework. Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (1 July 2009). Verified information. 
Hungary Short-term export credit insurance scheme 
(€183 million (US$256.5 million)). EU State Aid N 187/10 
(5 July 2010). Effective from 
5 July 2010 to 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Hungary Amendment of the Temporary Framework Guarantee 
Scheme which determines the maximum amount of 
the investment loan that can be covered by a guarantee on the basis of the EU 27 average labour 
costs. Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EU Delegation. EU State Aid 
N 56/10 (6 August 2010). Verified information.  
Ireland Temporary measure allowing the State to grant aid of 
up to €500,000 (US$740,000) per firm in 2009 and 
2010. The aid can be granted in the form of direct 
grants, reimbursable grants, interest rate subsidies, 
and subsidized public loan s. (Beneficiary: companies 
that were not in difficulty on 1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (14 April 2009). Verified information. 
Ireland Amendment to the Framework Scheme - limited 
amounts of compatible aid, increasing its overall 
budget (from €100 million to €350 million (from US$140 million to US$490.6 million)) and the maximum number of beneficiaries (from 1,000 firms 
to 2,000 firms). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EU Delegation. EU State Aid N 473/09 (15 December 2009). Verified information.  
Cont'd WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 44  
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
Italy Adaptation of existing risk capital schemes to increase 
companies' financing by increasing the maximum 
investment tranches and redu ced private participation, 
until 31 December 2010. Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (20 May 2009). Verified information. 
Italy Scheme allowing up to €500,000 (US$740,000) per 
company in the form of debt write off, direct grant, 
interest subsidy until 31 December 2010. (Beneficiary: companies that  were not in difficulty on 
1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (28 May 2009). Verified information. 
Italy Guarantee scheme until 31 December 2010. 
(Beneficiary: companies that  were not in difficulty on 
1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (28 May 2009). Verified information. 
Italy Reduced interest rate until 31 December 2010. 
(Beneficiary: companies that  were not in difficulty on 
1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (29 May 2009). Verified information. 
Italy Temporary interest rate subsidies for "green" products 
(overall budget €300 million (US$420.5 million)). 
The Italian scheme, which was authorized by the Commission under the Temporary Community 
Framework for State Aid measures to support access 
to finance in the current financial crisis, provides for interest rate subsidies for the production of 
environmentally friendly (gr een) products related to 
an early adaptation to, or overachievement of, adopted but not yet in force EU environmental product 
standards. The beneficiaries will include in particular 
the car sector.  EU State Aid N 542/09 and  
WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Effective until 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Italy Export credits insurance (overall budget €31.5 million 
(US$44 million)) for Vinyls Italia S.p.A. (land transport and transport via pipelines, chemicals and 
pharmaceutical industry).  EU State Aid N 77/10 
(25 March 2010) and  WTO Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Effective from 
1 April 2010 to 1 October 2010. 
Verified information. 
Latvia Temporary measure aimed at supporting exporters by 
covering risks and serving as additional security for 
export transaction financing (where deferred payment 
does not exceed two years). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (19 March 2009). Measure to be terminated 
by 31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Latvia Guarantee for development of enterprise 
competitiveness. Amendment to the approved aid 
scheme to include "cooperative partnerships" which 
provide services to producers of agricultural products (purchase, supply, distribution, and transport), to the 
list of eligible beneficiarie s. Due to the extension of 
eligible beneficiaries, the Latvian authorities estimate an increase of the overall budget to LVL 40.6 million 
(US$79.6 million). EU State Aid N 506/2009 
(22 December 2009) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Effective until 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Latvia Scheme aimed to issue guarantees in order to 
minimize the general economic risk and social 
economic crisis. The scheme allows the granting of 
subsidized guarantees for initial investment and 
working capital loans concluded by 31 December 2009.  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (22 April 2009). Verified information. 
Latvia State guarantee (€89 million (US$124.7 million)) to 
steel manufacturer JSC Liep ājas Metalurgs (LM), 
authorised by the Commission under EU State aid rules. The aid is intended for the company 
modernization. EU State Aid N 670/2009 and  
WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Effective until 
15 December 2019. 
Verified information. 
Latvia Short-term export credit insurance scheme for 
temporarily non-marketable risks related to exports 
into EU markets and into individual OECD countries.  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EU Delegation. EU State Aid 
N 84/10 (10 June 2010). Effective from 
1 July 2010 to 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Cont'd  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 45 
 
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
Latvia Aid scheme (LVL 55.8 m illion (US$109.4 million)), 
in the form of direct grant for the agriculture sector (in 
compliance with the Rural Development Programme 2007-13). EU State Aid N 256/10 
(17 August 2010). Effective until 
31  December 2013. 
Verified information. 
Lithuania Scheme allowing aid of up to €500,000 (US$700,800) 
per firm to businesse s facing funding problems 
because of the current cr edit squeeze. (Beneficiary: 
companies  that were not in difficulty on 1 July 2008).  EU State Aid Nos. N 272/09, N 
523/2009, N 46/10 and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Amended on 
13  November 2009,  
extending its scope of application to include two measures (i) on 
diversification into non-
agricultural activities; and (ii) on support for 
business creation and 
development, which are integrated in the Rural 
Development Programme 
2007-13. Verified information. 
Lithuania Short-term export credit insurance (LTL 100 million 
(US$40.5 million)). The Commission authorized, 
under EU State aid rules, a measure adopted by Lithuania to limit the adverse impact of the current 
financial crisis on exporting firms. EU State Aid N 659/09 and  
WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Effective until 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Luxembourg Scheme providing export-credit insurance to 
complement insurance policies taken out with private 
insurance companies.  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (20 April 2009). Verified information. 
Luxembourg "Régime temporaire d'aides au redressement 
économique".  This scheme enables granting aid of up 
to €500,000 (US$740,000) to businesses likely to 
have a structural impact on the national or regional 
economy. Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (27 February 2009). Verified information. 
Luxembourg Temporary guarantee scheme enabling the 
Government to grant aid to businesses until 
31 December 2010 in the form of guarantees for 
investment and working capital. The reduction in the 
guarantee premium will apply for a maximum of two years. If the duration of the underlying loan exceeds 
two years, the safe harbour  premium can be applied 
for an additional maximum period of eight years. No further reduction can be applied to these guarantee 
premiums. The guarantees granted under this aid 
scheme will last for 10 years at most. (Beneficiary: companies that were not in difficulty on 1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (11 March 2009). Verified information. 
Luxembourg Temporary export-credit insurance scheme, under 
which the export-credit agency concerned, Ducroire 
Luxembourg, will provide e xport-credit insurance to 
complement insurance policies taken out with private 
insurance companies. Ducroire can provide credit up 
to a higher limit where evid ence exists that private 
insurers have excessively reduced or even refused 
credit. The budget earmarked for this measure 
amounts to €25 million (US$37 million). (Beneficiary: Insurance market). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (20 April 2009). Verified information. 
Malta Support measure for businesses, up to €500,000 
(US$740,000) per firm may be granted in 2009 and 
2010. (Beneficiary: businesses facing funding problems because of the current credit crunch). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (18 May 2009). Verified information. 
Netherlands Temporary scheme to help business to deal with the 
economic crisis. Authorities at national, regional and 
local level may grant aid of up to €500,000 
(US$740,000) per firm in 2009 and 2010 to businesses facing funding problems because of the 
current credit crunch.  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (1 April 2009). Verified information. 
Cont'd WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 46  
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
Netherlands Export credit insurance – reinsurance scheme. The 
State will provide a reinsu rance facility, which would 
top-up the cover offered by credit insurers in cases where the existing credit lim its have been reduced or 
new limits given by credit in surers are lower than the 
amount requested by the insured company. The maximum possible top-up amount provided by the Dutch State is 100% of the credit limit offered by the 
credit insurer. In particular, the measure requires 
market-oriented remuneration and is focussed specifically on addressing th e current unavailability of 
short-term export credit insurance cover in the private 
market. The Commission authorized the measure until 31 December 2010.  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EU Delegation (2 October 2009). 
EC State Aids N 409/09 and 
14/2010.  Verified information. 
Netherlands Amendments to the short-term export credit insurance 
(initially approved on 2 Oct ober 2009). The modified 
scope of the cover provided and the level of the premium charged are designed  to stimulate exports.  EU State Aid N 14/10 
(5 February  2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Verified information.  
Netherlands Temporary state aid to help farmers (€2.81 million 
(US$3.94 million)) available until the end of 2010.  
Aid will take the form of state guarantees on working capital loans. EU State Aid N 611/09 
(6 February 2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Decision adopted on 
22 December 2009. 
Verified information. 
Netherlands "Subsidieregeling innovatieve zeescheepsbouw". 
Direct grant (overall budget €60 million 
(US$84.1 million), annual budget €20 million (US$28 
million)) for the shipbuilding sector. EU State Aid N 692/09 
(9 February 2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Effective from 
1 January 2010 to 
31 December 2011. 
Verified information. 
Netherlands Aid scheme (€21 million for seven years 
(US$29.4 million)), in the form of loan, guarantee, 
and interest subsidy for rescuing and restructuring 
firms in difficulty. EU State Aid N 281/09 
(24 March 2010). Effective until 
1 February 2017. 
Verified information. 
Poland State aid to Polish farmers for the purchase of 
agricultural land under the form of subsidized interest 
payments on loans amounting to a maximum of Zl 400 million (US$139.4 million). Council Decision 2010/10/EC 
(20 November 2009)  and  
WTO Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Effective from 
1 January 2010 to 
31 December 2013. 
Verified information. 
Poland Temporary scheme for granting aid of up to €500,000 
(US$700,800) per firm. On 8 October 2009 the 
scheme was amended, allowing an increase of the 
overall aid at the disposal of an additional group of 
vulnerable companies, particularly in rural areas. WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010 Verified information. 
Poland Aid (Zl 11.7 million (US$4 million)) for Volkswagen 
Motor Polska Sp. Z o.o, under a block exemption 
regulation.   EU State Aid X 128/2010 
(16 April 2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Aid granted on 
28 December 2009.  
Verified information. 
Poland Aid (Zl 12.48 million (US$4.4 million)) for MTU 
Aero Engines Poslka Sp. Z o.o, under a block 
exemption regulation.  EU State Aid X 130/2010 
(16 April 2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Aid granted on 
29 December 2009.  
Verified information. 
Poland Soft loan (overall budget Zl 150 million 
(US$52.3 million)) for chemical and pharmaceutical 
industry (Zaklady Chemiczne "Police" SA). EU State Aid N 693/09 
(26 May 2010). Effective from 
1 June 2010 to 
30 November 2010. 
Verified information. 
Poland Soft loan (overall budget Zl 12.5 million 
(US$4.35 million)) for manufacturing industry 
(Fabryka Lozysk Tocznych Krasnik SA). EU State Aid N 104/10 
(2 June 2010). Effective from 
1 June 2010 to 
30 November 2010. 
Verified information. 
Poland Soft loan (Zl 8 million (US$2.8 million)) for 
manufacturing industry (Zaklady Sprzetu 
Precyzyjnego "Niewiadów" S.A.). EU State Aid N 126/10 
(25 June 2010). Effective from 
15 June 2010 to 
15 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Cont'd  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 47 
 
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
Poland Amendments to the Temporary Framework - Limited 
amounts of compatible aid (initially adopted on 
17 August 2009). (Beneficiaries: all firms from all sectors having an economic activity in Poland). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EU Delegation. EU State Aids 
N 22/10, N 50/10 and N 86/10. Effective from 
15 July 2010. 
Verified information. 
Portugal Soft loans for granting of aid of up to €500,000 
(US$740,000) for 2009 and 2010.  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (19 January 2009). Verified information.  
Romania Scheme allowing aid in the form of subsidized 
guarantees for investment and working capital loans 
concluded by 31 December 2010. (Beneficiary: companies  that were not in difficulty on 1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (5 June 2009). Verified information.  
Romania Guarantees for FORD Romania (overall budget 
€400 million (US$560.6 million)). The Commission 
authorized, under the EU State aid rules, a State guarantee for FORD Romania SA to access a loan 
from the European Investment Bank for the period 
2009-14. The loan will co-fin ance the development of 
a low CO2 engine and subs equent vehicle production 
at Ford's Craiova plant.  EU State Aids N 478/09 and 
N 680/09 and  WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Verified information.  
Romania Temporary aid scheme allowing direct grants of up to 
(€500,000 (US$700,800)) per company. (Beneficiary: 
companies  that were not in difficulty on 1 July 2008).  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EU 
Delegation. EU State Aid N 
547/09 (5 January 2010). Verified information.  
Slovak Rep. Temporary measure allowing the State to grant aid of 
up to €500,000 (US$740,000) per firm in 2009 and 
2010. The aid can be granted in the form of grants and 
remission of penalties for non-payment of taxes. (Beneficiary: companies that  were not in difficulty on 
1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (30 April 2009). Verified information. 
Slovak Rep. Aid (€14.3 million (US$20 m illion)) for Volkswagen 
Slovakia aiming at the tran sformation of an existing 
plant in Bratislava. The project involving eligible investments of €300 million (US$420.5 million) by 
Volkswagen Slovakia, is aimed at contributing to the 
development of the region's economy. EU State Aid N 674/2008 
(2 December 2009) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Verified information. 
Slovak Rep. Scheme for a temporary provision of small aid 
(€400 million (US$560.6 million)) in the primary 
agriculture production sector for the duration of the 
financial and economic crisis.   EU State Aid N 707/09 
(3 March 2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Effective until 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Slovak Rep. Temporary aid scheme allowing direct grants of up to 
(€500,000 (US$700,800)) per company, for the period 
2009-10. The scheme provides aid in the form of 
remission of debt. (Beneficiary: companies facing funding problems due to the current crisis).  EU State Aid N 711/09 
(2 February 2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Effective until 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Slovak Rep. Aid support (€3.32 milli on (US$4.65 million)) for 
farmers through direct grants. EU State Aid XA 7/10 and  
WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Effective from 
19 February 2010 to 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Slovak Rep. Aid scheme (€80.5 million (US$112.8 million)), in 
the form of temporary reducti on of the mineral oil tax,  
for the agricultural sector. EU State Aid N 111/10 
(28 April 2010). Effective from  
1 May 2010 to 
31 December 2012. 
Verified information. 
Slovak Rep. Aid scheme (overall budget €400 million 
(US$560.6 million)), for all sectors (except agricultural primary production and fishing industry). 
The scheme provides aid in the form of remission of 
debt.  EU State Aid N 711/09 
(2 February 2010). Effective until 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Cont'd WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 48  
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
Slovenia Scheme allowing aid of up to €500,000 (US$740,000) 
per company.  (Beneficiary: companies that were not 
in difficulty on 1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (12 June 2009). Verified information. 
Slovenia Scheme allowing aid in the form of subsidized 
guarantees for investment and working capital loans 
concluded by 31 December 2010.  (Beneficiary: companies  that were not in difficulty on 1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (12 June 2009). Verified information. 
Slovenia Short-term export credit insurance scheme 
(€50 million (US$71 million)). The scheme requires a 
higher remuneration than that offered by the private 
market and tackles the problem of the current insufficiency of short-term export credit insurance 
covered by the private mark et. (Beneficiary: insurance 
companies that insure clai ms of insurance holders 
registered in Slovenia, provided that these companies 
have concluded a whole- turnover contract with 
insurers). EU State Aid N 713/09 
(16 March 2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Effective until 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Slovenia Amendment to the Temporary Framework Scheme 
"Guarantees-Jamstvena Sc hema (NN 34/09)" (overall 
budget €1.2 billion (US$1.68 billion)). The 
amendment relates to the possibility to calculate 
maximum amount of the underlying investment loan 
covered by a guarantee also on the basis of the annual 
EU27 average labour costs. The original scheme intended to be provide in the form of guarantees to 
both investment and working capital loans including 
the reprogramming of short-term loans into medium-or long-term loans. Reprogramming of loans is 
allowed only for short-term loans. Loans intended for 
the buy-out of companies or shares therein or for the paying-off of existing loans not covered by the scheme are excluded. (Beneficiary: SMEs and large 
enterprises that exercise  an economic activity in 
Slovenia). EU State Aid N 105/10 
(16 April 2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Effective until 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Spain Temporary scheme allowing interest rate subsidies for 
the production of environmentally-friendly ("green") 
cars. Subsidized loans may be granted until 
31 December 2009 with a maximum term of two years. The reduction in the interest rate may not 
exceed 50% SMEs and 25% for large businesses, in 
relation to the reference rate, and must take into account the enterprise's risk profile when the loan is 
granted. (Beneficiary: companies (car and car 
component industry) that were not in difficulty on 1 July 2008. Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation  (29 March 2009). Verified information. 
Spain Scheme allowing direct grants of up to €500,000 
(US$740,000) per company.  (Beneficiary: companies  
that were not in difficulty on 1 July 2008). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (8 June 2009). Verified information. 
Spain Direct grant (about €3.7 million (US$5.2 million)) for 
food processing (Grupo Alimentario Naturiber SA). EU State Aid N 403/09 
(10 December 2009). Effective from 
10 December 2009 to 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Spain Aid scheme (direct grant) for investment in 
agricultural holdings (€8.3 million 
(US$11.6 million)). EU State Aid N 87/10 
(28 April 2010). Effective from 
30 June 2010 to 
31 December 2013. 
Verified information. 
Spain Guarantee scheme for businesses facing funding 
problems, for the year 2010. Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EU 
Delegation. EU State Aids 
N 68/10 and 157/10 (20 April 2010). Verified information.  
Cont'd  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 49 
 
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
Sweden State guarantees in favour of Volvo car maker: 
guarantees that would enable it to access loans from 
the European Investment Bank (EIB).  The loans would co-finance the development of environment-
friendly cars. Volvo would pay an adequate 
remuneration for the guarant ee and provide sufficient 
securities in case the guarantee would be drawn. Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation, and EC State Aid N 
80/09 (OJ 2009 C 172/01) 
(5 June 2009). Verified information. 
Sweden Short-term export credit insurance scheme. The 
Commission authorized under EU State aid rules, a 
measure adopted by Sweden to limit the adverse 
impact of the current financial crisis on exporting firms. EU State Aid N 605/09 
(25 November 2009) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Effective until 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Sweden State guarantee (€400 million (US$560.6 million)) for 
SAAB Automobile AB to access a loan from the 
European Investment Bank, for the period 2010-19. SAAB is ask to pay an adequate remuneration for the 
guarantee and provide sufficient securities in the case 
the guarantee would be drawn.  EU State Aid N 541/09 
(8 February 2010) and  WTO 
Document WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Verified information.  
United 
Kingdom Short-term provision of small amounts of compatible 
aid (De minimis) scheme.  Measure enables aid of up 
to €500,000 (US$740,000) to be granted in 2009 and 
2010 to businesses in difficulty as a consequence of the economic crisis. Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC 
Delegation (4 February 2009). Verified information. 
United 
Kingdom Temporary measures to grant loan guarantees and 
interest rate subsidies.  Businesses producing green 
products will benefit. (Scheme will initially concern car industry £2.3 billion (US $3.8 billion), but will be 
open to all sectors). Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation /27 February 2009). Verified information. 
United 
Kingdom Scheme aimed at relieving firms that encountered 
financial difficulties as a result of the current credit 
crunch. The measure allows national, regional and local authorities to grant ai d in the form of reduced 
interest rates on loans of any duration concluded by 
31 December 2010.  Public information available on 
the European Commission's 
website transmitted by the EC Delegation (15 May 2009). Verified information. 
United 
Kingdom Aid scheme (tax advantage) for SMEs in all sectors 
(annual budget £210 million (US$343.6 million)), 
valid until 6 April 2018. EC State Aid NN 32/09 
(OJ 2009/C 235/01) 
(13 July 2009). Verified information. 
United 
Kingdom Rescue aid (overall budget £5 million 
(US$8.2 million)) for moto r vehicles manufacturing 
LDV Ltd., from 18 May 2009 to 12 June 2009.  EC State Aid NN 41/09 
(ex N 313/09) (OJ 2009/C 
212/03) (7 August 2009). Verified information. 
United 
Kingdom "Welsh Assembly Governme nt Rescue and Restruring 
Scheme Aid for SMEs" through the provision of risk 
capital, debt write-off, and soft loan, from 1 September 2009 to 31 December 2013.  EC State Aid N 421/09  
(OJ 2009/C 230/01) 
(19 August 2009). Verified information. 
United 
Kingdom Extension of the short-term provision of small 
amounts (£20 million (US$31.7 million)) to primary 
agricultural producers. EU State Aid N 71/10 
(28 April 2010). Effective until 
31 December 2010. 
Verified information. 
Hong Kong, 
China Enhancement of a number of support schemes for 
SMEs (Special Loan Guar antee Scheme, SME Loan 
Guarantee Scheme, and SME Export Marketing Fund). Permanent Delegation of Hong 
Kong, China to the WTO 
(15 June 2009). Verified information. 
Hong Kong, 
China Extension of the Special Loan Guarantee Scheme to 
assist local enterprises until 31 December 2010. WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Verified information.  
India Government support (incentives) for exports of 
leather and textiles sectors (US$67 million). EC Commission – Fourth 
Report on Potentially Trade 
Restrictive Measures 
(1 April 2009). Non-verified information. 
Cont'd WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 50  
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
India Broad stimulus package including: fiscal measures 
and changes in FDI regulations (allowing for larger 
shares of foreign ownership in areas such as industrial parks, air transport services, petroleum and natural 
gas, and mineral and ores ) to counter recessionary 
trends. Permanent Delegation of India 
to the WTO (7 December 2008). Verified information. 
India Government support (financial aid package) for the 
National Aviation Company of India Ltd. (Air India).  
Rs 8 billion (US$180.6 million) approved on 
18 February 2010. WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Verified information.  
India Extension of the stimulus package for exporters 
covering sectors such as textiles and apparel, 
engineering, electronics, agro-food, and agro-
chemicals,  from 31 March 2010. WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Verified information.  
Indonesia Government loan (US$2.52 billion) for trade 
financing (importers or exporters), through the 
Indonesian Eximbank trade financing agency. Permanent Delegation of 
Indonesia to the WTO 
(1 September 2009). Eximbank formally 
launched on 1 September 
2009. 
Israel Government support measures to boost high-tech 
industries (tax breaks and subsidies). Financial Times (22 July 2010). Non-verified information. 
Jamaica Support loans to small businesses and micro-
enterprises (US$350 million). Permanent Delegation of 
Jamaica to the WTO. Verified information. 
Japan Government support through the Forestry Agency for 
lumber (¥50,000/m3 (US$554/m3), and for floor 
space to wood suppliers (¥135,000/m2 
(US$1,495/m2) utilized in the construction of gymnasiums at public schools. Press reports (1 April 2009). Non-verified information. 
Japan First Supplementary Budget (2009), new Stimulus 
Package (¥15.4 trillion (US$172.3 billion)) (3% GDP) 
to ease credit squeeze; provide safety net for unemployed, and stimulate consumer demand. Permanent Delegation of Japan 
to the WTO (1 February 2010). Projects worth ¥2.93 
trillion (US$32.8 billion) 
suspended on 16 October 2009. Second 
Supplementary Budget 
(2009) being executed. 
Japan New stimulus package (US$60 billion) approved by 
the Cabinet on 8 October 2010. Permanent Delegation of Japan 
to the WTO (20 October 2010). Verified information. 
Japan Reported increase of state-funded credit to Japan 
Airlines (from ¥100 billion to ¥200 billion 
(US$1.1 billion to US$2.2 billion)). BBC News (4 January 2010).  Non-verified information. 
Jordan Monetary and fiscal measures (such as tax reduction 
on accommodation services) to minimize the impact 
of the global crisis on the economy. Permanent Delegation of Jordan 
to the WTO (March 2009).  
Kazakhstan Reimbursement to local  producers of 50% of certain 
export costs such as certification, participation on 
foreign exhibitions, and promotion, since February 2010. Press reports (February 2010) 
and  WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Non-verified information. 
 
Korea, Rep. 
of Stimulus package of US$14. 1 billion in total, which 
constitutes approximately 2.4% of Korea's GDP. The 
total amount of the package may be increased. Permanent Delegation of Korea 
to the WTO (December 2008). Verified information. 
Korea, Rep. 
of Shipping fund to purchase  vessels from shipping 
companies as part of the government's efforts to 
facilitate restructuring of the shipping industry. The 
fund has been established through contributions from private investors and financ ial institutions as well as 
from the Restructuring Fund managed by the Korea 
Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO).  Permanent Delegation of Korea 
to the WTO (23 April 2009). W 191.2 billion 
(US$161 million) used as 
of 28 August 2009. 
Verified information. 
Cont'd  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 51 
 
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
Korea, Rep. 
of Korean Hidden Champion Programme of the Export-
Import Bank of Korea (KEXIM) providing tailored 
loans and guarantees at market rates according to the risk profile of the borrower, for selected SMEs  with 
high technologies and growth  potential (45 identified 
as of May 2010). The total amount of  the programme is not fixed, but KEXIM set a target of W 20 trillion (US$16.6 billion) for the next 10 years. The 
programme is not aimed at specific sectors. WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Verified information.  
Malaysia Stimulus Package (RM 7 billion (U S$2.1 billion)). Permanent Delegation of 
Malaysia to the WTO 
(14 November 2008). Verified information. 
Malaysia "Micro Enterprise Fund" (RM 200 million (US$58.6 
million)) launched by the Ce ntral Bank of Malaysia, 
to broaden the access to financing for micro enterprises with viable businesses.  Permanent Delegation of 
Malaysia to the WTO 
(14 November 2008). RM 54 million 
(US$15.8 million) was 
granted to 2,554 micro enterprises at the end of 
August 2009. 
Verified information. 
Malaysia "SME Assistance Guarantee Scheme" (RM 2 billion 
(US$585.7 million)), established by the Central Bank 
of Malaysia, to ensure th at viable SMEs adversely 
impacted by the crisis, continue to have adequate 
access to financing. Permanent Delegation of 
Malaysia to the WTO 
(February 2009). RM 1.1 billion 
(US$322.2 million) was 
granted to 5,466 SMEs at the end of August 2009. 
Verified information. 
Malaysia Second Stimulus Package (RM 60 billion 
(US$17.6 billion)), including measures to attract FDI. Permanent Delegation of 
Malaysia to the WTO (10 
March 2009). Verified information. 
Mexico Stimulus package (US$2.1 billion), including 
measures for the tourism sector. Les Echos (7 May 2009). Non-verified information. 
Mexico Support measures (US$800 million) for the car 
industry (including car parts suppliers), through low 
interests.  EC Commission – Fourth 
Report on Potentially Trade 
Restrictive Measures.  Non-verified information. 
Mozambique Scheme for the provis ion of reduced interest loans 
(US$25 million) for small farmers. Grain Market Report GMR 
No. 404 (23 September 2010). Non-verified information. 
New Zealand Temporary change in the mandate of the New Zealand 
Export Credit Office (NZECO), in order to provide 
short-term trade credit insura nce at market rates, on a 
temporary basis (Small Business Relief Package to 
Small and Medium Sized Businesses). Permanent Delegation of New 
Zealand to the WTO (4 
February 2009). The scheme was extended 
(by NZ$100 million 
(US$74.4 million)) on 24 
June 2009. 
Verified information. 
New Zealand Stimulus packag e (NZ$500 million (US$372 million)) 
for publicly-funded projects (housing, transport, and 
education). Permanent Delegation of New 
Zealand to the WTO 
(11 February 2009). The 2009 budget 
increased infrastructure 
funding to NZ$7.5 billion (US$5.6 billion) over the 
next five years. 
Verified information. 
Nigeria Stimulus Package (US$2 billion), financed by its oil 
windfall fund. BBC News  Non-verified information. 
Norway Export Guarantee Scheme (NKr 50 billion 
(US$8.7 billion)) through the Guarantee Institute for 
Export Credits.   Verified information. 
Norway Revised National Budget increasing the spending of 
oil revenues by a further NKr 9.5 billion 
(US$1.7 billion) (to a total of NKr 130 billion (US$23.1 billion)) during the 2009 fiscal year, 
equivalent to around 3% of non-oil GDP. Additional 
funds will be provided to areas such as investment in the agriculture sector, municipalities, and credit 
facilitation. Permanent Delegation of 
Norway to the WTO  Verified information. 
Pakistan In order to facilitate trade the State Bank of Pakistan 
allows advance payment (up to 100%) of Import 
Letters of Credit. WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Effective 
31 January 2010. 
Verified information. 
Cont'd WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 52  
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
Peru Stimulus package ("Plan de Estímulo Económico" and 
"Programa de Seguro de Crédito a la Exportación para 
Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas (SEPYMEX)"). Permanent Delegation of Peru 
to the WTO (30 January 2009). Modified on 15 May 2009 
(to guarantee up to 50% 
of credits granted to SMEs). 
Verified information. 
Peru Measures to facilitate the financing of  micro and 
SMEs, through "factoring". Permanent Delegation of Peru 
to the WTO (11 October 2010). Verified information.  
Philippines Export Support Fund (PhP 200 million 
(US$4.2 million)) to finan ce export development and 
promotion, as well as capacity building for SMEs 
exporters.  Permanent Delegation of 
Philippines to the WTO 
(30 May 2009). Verified information. 
Russian 
Federation Financial support measures for the car industry:  loans 
to leasing companies (Rub 43 billion, 
(US$1.47 billion)); provision of State guarantees, 
Rub 130 billion (US$4.46 billi on) (see also Annex 2). Permanent Delegation of the 
Russian Federation 
(6 November 2008). Funds fully allocated. 
Measure expired. 
Verified information. 
Russian 
Federation Special anti-crisis packag e for SMEs, including small 
scale agricultural enterprises (US$1.2 billion for 
2009). Permanent Delegation of the 
Russian Federation 
(6 November 2008). Funds fully allocated. 
Measure expired. 
Verified information. 
Russian 
Federation "Plan of Industry S upport" (Rub 195 billion 
(US$6.33 billion)) for 2010 (mainly through the 
provision of State guarantees on credits). Measures 
include support to companies, purchase of vehicles for the public sector, and support to housing and utilities 
sector. WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Verified information. 
Russian 
Federation Increase of annual federal funding (from Rub 6 billion 
to Rub 9 billion (US$194.8 million to 
US$292.2 million)) for exports of industrial products, 
as a partial compensation of payment of interest on 
credits given by Russian financial institutions for the period 2005-10. WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Verified information.  
Russian 
Federation Prolongation of subsidies granted in 2009 to producers 
of agricultural machinery and automotive industry. Permanent Delegation of the 
Russian Federation 
(20 October 2010). Verified information. 
Russian 
Federation Government support (Rub 2 billion (US$64.9 million)) 
for exporting SMEs. Permanent Delegation of the 
Russian Federation 
(20 October 2010). Verified information. 
Singapore Stimulus Package (US$13.7 billion). The package 
covers areas such as saving jobs; stimulating bank 
lending; and enhancing business cash flow and 
competitiveness. Permanent Delegation of 
Singapore to the WTO (Various 
dates). Implemented. No further 
updates to the scheme. 
Verified information. 
Singapore Export Coverage Sche me (ECS) intended to cover 
insolvency and protracted defaults of end buyers 
(coverage up to 90%). Originally scheduled to be effective from 1 March 2009 to 28 February 2010. WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Extension of the ECS 
until 31 January 2011. 
Verified information. 
South Africa Rescue plan (Customized Sector Programme) for the 
textile and clothing sector.  The Programme includes 
tariff increases, safeguard investigations, and public procurement measures (Annex 2). Press reports (21 May 2009). Non-verified information. 
South Africa Customized Sector Programme for the textile and 
clothing industry, as part of the "Framework for 
South Africa's Response to the International Economic Crisis". Permanent Delegation of South 
Africa to the WTO 
(21 May 2009). Verified information. 
South Africa Second Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) for 
12 "focus sector" such as textiles and clothing, plastics, 
pharmaceutical and chemicals, automotive, and tourism.  Press reports (18 February 
2010) and  WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 14 June 2010. Non-verified information. 
Cont'd  WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
 Page 53 
 
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
Switzerland Three new schemes established through "OSEC 
Business Network Switzerland" to promote SMEs' 
exports (Cleantech, Medtech, Architecture/Engineering/De sign). The initial financial 
endowment is part of the third economic stabilization 
package.  Permanent Delegation of 
Switzerland to the WTO 
(18 October 2010). 
Verified information. 
Switzerland Geneva Cantonal aid to milk producer (Sw F 1/litre 
(US$1.04/litre) instead of Sw f 0.6/litre 
(US$0.63/litre)). Permanent Delegation of 
Switzerland to the WTO 
(18 October 2010). Verified information. 
Chinese 
Taipei "New Zheng He Plan" stimulus package 
(NT$8.53 billion (US$262.3 million)) including export 
credit, re-lending facility , and export insurance. Permanent Delegation of 
Chinese Taipei to the WTO 
(25 December 2008). Verified information. 
Tanzania Increase of the budget allocated for the agriculture 
sector (T Sh 903.8 billion (US$604.5 million)) in order 
to support the development of high quality seeds, and 
the purchase of farm inputs. Grain Market Report GMR No. 
401 (24 June 2010). Non-verified information. 
Thailand "Abhisit" Stimulus Package (B 116.7 billion 
(US$3.5 billion)).  Financial support for SMEs, and 
measures to stimulate tourism. Permanent Delegation of 
Thailand to the WTO 
(March 2009). Verified information. 
Thailand "Strong Thailand", second "Abhisit" Stimulus Package 
(B 1.56 trillion (US$46.6 billion) for 2010-12. 
Measures include development in water management, 
transportation and logistic s, education and public 
health, and tourism. Permanent Delegation of 
Thailand to the WTO 
(7 April 2009). The second Abhisit was 
approved on 7 April 2009, 
and launched in 
September 2009.  
Verified information. 
Turkey General stimulus package such as financial support 
(with zero interest rates) through Small and Medium 
Sized Industry Development Organization and Trade Credit Facility (US$650 million) for SMEs. Permanent Delegation of 
Turkey to the WTO 
(17 March 2009). The fund was fully 
utilized. 
Verified information. 
Turkey Loan guarantee suppor t mechanism (TL 1 billion 
(US$670.1 million)) for SMEs, guaranteeing 65% of 
the loans. Permanent Delegation of 
Turkey to the WTO 
(15 July 2009). Verified information. 
Turkey General incentive scheme for large scale investments in 
certain sectors for reducing regional differences in 
development. Permanent Delegation of 
Turkey to the WTO 
(16 July 2009). Verified information. 
United 
States The US Auto Industry Financing Programme aimed at 
stabilizing the US automotive industry through loans to 
General Motors and Chrysler.  Under this programme, US Treasury agreed to loan General Motors (GM) 
US$13.4 billion (delivered in three instalments) and to 
loan Chrysler US$4 billion.   The US Treasury is 
evaluating the restructuring submissions received 
17 February 2009, under the terms of the loans to GM 
and Chrysler.   
 
On 29 December 2008, US Treasury announced that it 
would purchase US$5 billion in senior preferred equity 
with an 8% dividend from GMAC LLC as part of a broader programme to assist the domestic automotive 
industry in becoming financially viable.  Additionally, 
on 16 January 2009, the US Treasury agreed to lend up to US$1 billion to General Motors so that GM could 
participate in a rights offering at GMAC in support of 
GMAC's reorganization as a bank holding company. GM drew US$884 million under this commitment.  
 On 16 January 2009, US Treasury announced a 
US$1.5 billion five-year loan to a special purpose entity created by Chrysler Financial to finance retail automotive purchases.   Permanent Delegation of the 
United States to the WTO 
(19 December 2008). Restructured Chrysler 
emerged from bankruptcy 
on 10 June 2009 under a new ownership structure 
(which includes partial 
ownership by FIAT).  
 
GMAC subjected to the 
"Stress Test".  
 
Chrysler Financial fully 
repaid the US$1.5 billion 
loan on 14 July 2009. 
Verified information. 
Cont'd WT/TPR/OV/W/4 
Page 54  
 
  Country/ 
Member Measure Source/Date Status 
United 
States New additional loan to Ge neral Motors Corporation 
(US$2 billion) to provide working capital for the 
company (prior to its bankruptcy filling).    
GM filed bankruptcy proceed ings on 1 June 2009, and 
has been offered additional US$30.1 billion debtor-in-possession loan by the US Treasury. The loan is intended to benefit all of GM's continuing 
operations without regard to geographic location.  
The new entity, General Motors Company emerged 
from bankruptcy on 10 July 2009 after the completion 
of the sale of certain GM a ssets to the "New GM". The 
Government converted its loans to 60.8% of the equity 
in the New GM, loans in th e amount of US$7.1 billion, 
and US$2.1 billion in preferred stock.  Permanent Delegation of the 
United States to the WTO 
(April-July 2009). Verified information. 
United 
States American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA) providing aid for US$787 billion (5.5% 
GDP).  Permanent Delegation of the 
United States to the WTO 
(17 February 2009). Verified information. 
United 
States Auto Supplier Support Pr ogramme (US$5 billion) 
available to all critical suppliers. The programme 
provides the same benefits to foreign and local 
suppliers, through financial protection on receivables 
from any domestic auto companies.  Permanent Delegation of the 
United States to the WTO 
(19 March 2009). US Treasury continued to 
implement the 
programme. The amount 
of the commitment was 
reduced to US$3.5 billion as of 8 July 2009.  
Verified information. 
United 
States Grant (US$2.4 billion) for the development of new 
generation electrical vehicle (48 new advanced battery 
and electric drive projects), under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment  Act. Projects were not 
restricted to US entities.  Permanent Delegation of the 
United States to the WTO 
(5 August 2009). Verified information. 
United 
States Jobs for Main Street Act (H.R. 2847), which includes 
"Buy American" provisions (see Annex 2). WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Effective 18 March 2010.  
Verified information. 
United 
States Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 including temporary 
tax credits and expansion of loan programmes for 
SMEs. Permanent Delegation of the 
United States to the WTO 
(20 October 2010). Effective 
27 September 2010. 
Verified information. 
Uruguay Renewal of State aid (Ur$25 million (US$1.2 million)) 
for textile and apparel sub-sectors. El País digital (12 May 2010) 
and  WTO Document 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 of 
14 June 2010. Non-verified information. 
Uzbekistan Stimulus package "Anti Crisis Action Programme 
2009-2012", including support of the banking system, 
to export companies and incentives for exports 
through: preferential credit and tax rebates. Permanent Delegation of 
Uzbekistan to the UN Office in 
Geneva (January 2009). Verified information. 
 
 
__________