WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/RL/W/242 
7 October 2009 
 (09-4807) 
Negotiating Group on Rules Original:   English 
  
 
FISHERIES SUBSIDIES 
 
Communication from Barbados
 
  
 The following communication, dated 5 October 2009, is being circulated at the request of the 
Delegation of Barbados.    
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Statement Delivered by Barbados on Behalf of the Small Vulnerable Economies under Item 15.c of 
the Chair's List of Questions on Fisheries Subsidies  
 
 We wish to respond to the question by promo ting what we think is an effective, innovative 
and specific suggestion for treatment for a number of developing countries which have little impact on 
over fishing and over capacity.  Members are well aw are of the SVEs commitment to this process and 
our aim of crafting solutions that meet the dual pur pose of the mandate:  curbing those subsidies that 
cause over fishing and over capacity and ensuring that developing countries are able to support their 
fisheries and attain developmen tal gains from this sector.   
 
 The SVEs have been guided by this Mi nisterial mandate on the Fisheries subsidies 
negotiations as well as the Doha a nd Hong Kong mandates on SVEs which instruct all of us to find 
appropriate solutions to the concer ns of SVEs in all areas of the negotiations, including fisheries. 
  For many years we have consistently presente d our concerns through verbal statements in 
the NG;  through the tabling of a number of prop osals;  and through constant communication with 
interested members and the Chair.  We would, in particular, draw members' attention to document 
TN/RL/W/226/Rev.5 dated 22 September 2008 and co-sponsored by  Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Honduras, Jamaica, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, 
St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, and Tonga which sets out the rationale behind our positions.  
We don't want to use valuable time by reitera ting these views but rather we wanted to bring 
something new to the table and ensure that we as SVEs craft and suggest solutions to meet our 
problems.   
 
 The SVEs continue to be willing to engage w ith the structure of the Chair's text and to 
develop appropriate solutions that can be incorporated  into this structure.  When the text was tabled 
we made it clear that although we appreciated the Ch air's attempts to develop effective S&DT we, like 
the majority of developing countries, were not of the view that it would provide us with the kind of 
flexibility and policy space that we required.  In add ition, for SVEs in particular, we felt that the text 
unduly restricted small members who have very little impact on over fishing and over capacity.  The mandate does not call for a full-scale prohibition on subsidies;  on the contrary it is very clearly 
drafted to focus on those subsidies that lead to over fishing and over capacity.  Although we recognise 
that it may not always be easy to determine a causal  relationship, or lack th ereof, between a subsidy 
and over fishing and over capacity, the small size of  our fleets, our limited financial capacity to TN/RL/W/242 
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  subsidize, our small market share in global marine  capture fisheries production and our small share of 
total world trade, for us, illustrates how unlikely it is that we are the cause.  For us a sense of fairness 
must prevail.   
 
 The sustainability of the marine  resources is important to us.  Some of our SVEs are wholly 
or largely dependent on fisheries and tourism and the sustainability of  natural resources is 
indispensable.  We believe that those countries th at have had a history of providing unnecessary 
subsidies and which have proven ove r capacity in their fleets should bare the greatest burden in these 
disciplines.    
 The reality is that at this stage in our development, some of the SVEs are not in a position to 
offer subsidies for operating costs and boat buildi ng and maintenance, especially in light of the 
uncertain economic climate we are in.  On the other hand some of us had to provide assistance to our 
fisher folk for operating costs subsidies during the re cent increase in the price of fuel.  Therefore, we 
need the flexibility to be able to either continue to provide the very small subsidies that we do under 
the areas covered by Article 1.1 a and 1.1 c and to  maintain the policy space to provide them in the 
future if our governments determine that  there is a developmental need to.   
 
 The Chair's text as it exists does not take into  account the size of our vessels, many of which 
are not under 10 metres.  In addition the text does not  take into account the need to allow our fisher 
folk to follow highly migratory and straddling stock into the EEZs of our neighbours if there is a 
mutual agreement between the countries involved.  Therefore we are recommending an addition to 
the Chair's text as Article III.2 (b2) ii which seek s to provide the same treatment for SVEs as is 
currently provided for boats under 10 metres in the Chair's text of Article III.2 (b 2).  In other 
words, developing countries with a share of wo rld NAMA trade of not more than 0.1 per cent, 
will be exempt from the prohibition of Article 1.1 a and Article 1.1.c subsidies. 
 
 It is important to point out that we are not  suggesting a rolling back of other aspects of the 
text as we note that there will be an opportunity at later sessions to discuss those matters under Articles 4 to 8.   
  From where have we taken these NAMA figures?  It would be recalled that in the NAMA 
negotiations there is an understanding that deve loping countries with under 0.1 per cent of NAMA 
trade would benefit from additional flexibilities.  Th e same exists in the agriculture negotiations 
where there is a criterion of NAMA trade;  agri culture trade and world merchandise trade.  For 
purposes of consistency we have chosen NAMA trad e especially as fish is understood to be a NAMA 
product in the context of the WTO.  We have lo oked at more fisheries specific criteria but we 
recognised that to negotiate a new listing of countri es based on data to which there is no agreement, 
would be difficult and possibly counter productive.  However, it is important to note that when one 
looks at the fisheries data one would find that virt ually all of those countries have a global fisheries 
capture production of less than 0.5 per cent and in total the countries with a share of NAMA trade less 
than 0.1 per cent have a cumulative total of less than  3 per cent (2.956).  In addition 28 out of these 
Members have a share of global fisheries catch less than 0.1 per cent each, which we consider 
miniscule.   
  Although we consider the NAMA data to be appropriate, easily verifiable and effective 
criteria, we are open to hearing suggestions from members on alternative or additional criteria.  I 
should point out at this stage, that the list of c ountries we have included as falling within the criteria, 
is taken from TN/MA/S/18 and it should be noted that two ot her members which are classified as 
RAMS- Cape Verde and Tonga- also have a share of NAMA trade under 0.1 per cent.  In addition, 
there may be additional countries that had elected not to use the SVEs NAMA solution that would fall 
within the criteria we are using.   
  TN/RL/W/242 
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   This brings us to the issue as to whether the list of beneficiaries would be static or dynamic 
and we are open to discuss this further.  It should be pointed out that the treatment of the list in 
NAMA is static but we are open to  suggestions on this matter.   
 
 We have discussed these ideas in a number of b ilateral meetings in advance of this session 
and one of the suggestions raised by members was whether the SVEs should look more closely at an 
Article 27.4 solution.  We have taken this on bo ard and examined this but given that we are not 
seeking a time bound exemption based on annual decisi ons with additional criteria and notification 
responsibilities, we believe that the solution we ha ve recommended is the more appropriate one.  As 
SVEs we will endeavour to accep t the transparency and notification requirements for developing 
countries that would be contained in an eventual agreed text but we do not envisage being subjected to 
any additional transparency and notification require ments, time bound exemptions or phasing out of 
programmes given that those are not envisaged for Article 2 subsidies for developed and developing 
countries, for example.    
 We have been really encouraged by memb ers' willingness to engage on our ideas when we 
met them bilaterally and we hope that you will r ecognise that the SVEs are being constructive and 
taking the initiative to present a solu tion that meets our needs and prior ities.  We believe this solution 
causes minimal dislocation to the text; it does not take anything away from any other member;  it 
respects the checks and balances in the text which wo uld include Article 4, Article 1.2 and Article 6.6 
which recognises that if a subsidy is thought to be  causing over fishing and overcapacity, a member 
can bring this to the attention of the relevant committee.   
  It is important that members understand that  this solution will not be relevant for all 
developing countries therefore we have to work to find additional solutions on  S&DT that meet the 
needs of other developing countries because one size is not going to fit all.   
 
 We present these ideas, Chair, for you to cons ider as you revise your Fisheries text, and to 
members for their positive consideration.  A copy of  this statement and the statistics referred to is 
available in the room.   
 
  TN/RL/W/242 
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  I. List of non-LDC WTO Developing Co untry Members with Share of World NAMA 
Trade of less that 0.1%  
 
Non-LDC WTO Developing Country 
Members with Share of World NAMA 
trade less than 0.1% (See Note 1 below) Share of World NAMA 
trade (Average of period 
1999-2004) Share of global total catch 
(marine wild capture fishing 
only), Average of period 2004 – 
2006) (See Note 2 below) 
 
Albania  0.017 0.003 
Antigua and Barbuda  0.004 0.003 
Armenia (landlocked) 0.013 n/a* 
Barbados  0.011 0.003 
Belize  0.004 0.005 
Bolivia (landlocked) 0.028 n/a 
Botswana (landlocked) 0.056 n/a 
Brunei Darussalam 0.053 0.003 
Cameroon  0.032 0.077 
Cuba  0.052 0.034 
Dominica  0.001 0.001 
Dominican Rep. 0.063 0.013 
Ecuador  0.098 0.474 
El Salvador  0.044 0.048 
Fiji  0.012 0.050 
FYR Macedonia (landlocked) 0.027 n/a 
Gabon  0.032 0.041 
Georgia  0.012 0.003 
Ghana  0.047 0.370 
Grenada  0.002 0.002 
Guatemala  0.072 0.015 
Guyana  0.008 0.064 
Honduras  0.032 0.018 
Jamaica  0.040 0.015 
Jordan  0.071 0.000 
Kenya  0.041 0.009 
Kyrgyzstan (landlocked) 0.010 n/a 
Macao, China 0.050 0.002 
Mauritius  0.034 0.011 
Moldova (landlocked ) 0.013 n/a 
Mongolia (landlocked) 0.012 n/a 
Namibia  0.028 0.645 
Nicaragua  0.018 0.032 
Panama  0.035 0.258 
Papua New Guinea  0.030 0.307 
Paraguay (landlocked) 0.023 n/a 
Saint Kitts and Nevis  0.002 0.001 
Saint Lucia  0.003 0.002 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  0.002 0.007 
Sri Lanka  0.095 0.242 
Suriname  0.009 0.036 
Swaziland (Landlocked) 0.015 n/a 
Trinidad and Tobago  0.088 0.013 
Uruguay  0.037 0.149 
Zimbabwe (landlocked) 0.030 n/a  TN/RL/W/242 
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  (1) Data compiled from WTO document TN/MA/ S/18, as referenced in Paragraph 13 of 
TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3, December 8. 2008.  The above list is also contained in Annex I, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4, 
8 December 2008.  
(2) Statistics relating to global fisheries catch for the average period 2004-2006 have been directly 
obtained from the FAO upon the request of the SVEs.  Statistics in relation to share of global fisheries 
capture for the 10 Memb ers referenced as "landlocked" was no t available primarily due to these 
Members being landlocked countries, with li ttle marine wild capture fishing activity.  
 * Data Not Available  
 
  
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