RESTRICTED  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/DSB/M/269 
23 July 2009 
 (09-3621) 
Dispute Settlement Body 
11 June 2009  
 
 
   
MINUTES OF MEETING 
 
Held in the Centre William Rappard
 
on 11 June 2009  
 
Chairman:  Mr. John Gero (Canada) 
  
 Prior to the adoption of the Agenda
, the representative of the United States  said that in 
relation to the item proposed for the Agenda of th e present meeting, the United States wished to note 
that a corrigendum had been issued to the Appellate Body Report in document 
WT/DS294/AB/RW/Corr.1.  Accordingly, the United States proposed that the corrigendum be taken 
up together with the Appellate Body Report to which it pertained. 
 
 It was so agreed . 
 
1. United States – Laws, regulations and methodology for calculating dumping margins 
("Zeroing"):  Recourse to Article 21.5 of  the DSU by the European Communities 
(a) Report of the Appellate Body (WT/DS294/AB/R W and Corr.1) and Report of the Panel 
(WT/DS294/RW) 
1. The Chairman  drew attention to the communication from the Appellate Body contained in 
document WT/DS294/31 transmitting the Appellate Body Report on:  "United States – Laws, 
Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Du mping Margins ("Zeroing"):  Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities", which had been circulated on 14 May 2009 
in document WT/DS294/AB/RW, in accordance with Article 17.5 of the DSU.  He reminded 
delegations that the Appellate Body Report and the Panel Report pertaining to this dispute had been 
circulated as unrestricted documents.  As Members were aware, Article 17.14 of the DSU required that:  "An Appellate Body Repor t shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the 
parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body Report 
within 30 days following its circulation to Memb ers.  The adoption procedure was without prejudice 
to the right of Members to express their views on an Appellate Body report".  
2. The representative of the European Communities
 said that the EC thanked the members of the 
Panel and of the Appellate Body as well as the WTO S ecretariat for the time and the efforts dedicated 
to resolving the present dispute.  After many deci ded and ongoing disputes against the United States 
on "zeroing", the EC could safely say that the issue of "zeroing" was not a new one to WTO 
Members.  Indeed, the practice of "zeroing" had first been condemned in 2001 in a WTO dispute 
against the EC ("Bed Linen" case).  The Appellate  Body had since maintained a consistent and 
coherent line on this issue and had confirmed, on several occasions, that "zeroing" ran foul of 
fundamental obligations of the Anti-Dumping Agreem ent.  Nonetheless, the United States had yet to WT/DSB/M/269 
Page 2  
 
  bring itself into full compliance.  The United St ates continued to use the "zeroing" methodology, 
thereby forcing other WTO Members into new and continued litigation.  The confirmation from the 
Appellate Body in this dispute that the United States had failed to implement the 2006 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB on the u se of "zeroing", and the recent appeal by the 
United States in the compliance dispute on "zer oing", initiated by Japan (DS322), might be an 
indication of the US approach and intentions.  The EC was, therefore, satisfied that the Appellate 
Body had not only reversed the errone ous findings of the Panel in this case, but also that the important 
clarification had been provided with respect to WTO compliance obligations in the context of a 
"retrospective" system of duty assessment, such as the one in the United States.  The EC welcomed 
the Appellate Body's finding that a panel establis hed under Article 21.5 of the DSU had the mandate 
to rule on the WTO-consistency of "measures taken to comply" with the DSB's rulings, and agreed 
with the Appellate Body that what qualified a m easure as a "measure taken to comply" was the 
existence of a "sufficiently close nexus, in terms of  nature, effects, and timing" with the relevant 
DSB's recommendations and rulings.  These findings were of systemic importance.  When this reasoning was applied to the use of the WTO-inconsistent "zeroing" methodology by the 
United States in this dispute, the necessary conclu sion was that any subsequent administrative review 
determination issued after the end of the reasonable period of time in which "zeroing" was used, or, if 
no such review was requested, an action after the e nd of the reasonable period of time by which anti-
dumping liability was assessed on the basis of cash de posit rates calculated with "zeroing", constituted 
a failure to comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings.  
3. The EC regretted that the Appellate Body had not provided explicit guidance with respect to 
the US implementation obligations when government  actions to liquidate duties were delayed as a 
result of domestic judicial proceedings.  But in view  of the clear language of the Appellate Body that 
"compliance with the DSB's recommendations and ruli ngs implied not only cessation of zeroing in the 
assessment of duties, but also in consequent measure s that, in the ordinary course of the imposition of 
anti-dumping duties, derived mechanically from th e assessment of duties" (para. 310), it seemed 
obvious that such actions to liquidate duties could not be excluded from the US obligation to comply.  
The EC acknowledged that the application of the "clo se nexus" test could be difficult in practice.  It 
could not, however, agree with the reasoning pr ovided in the separate opinion concerning its 
application to certain US measures, namely, admini strative reviews in Cases 1 and 6, and welcomed 
the fact that the majority of the Appellate Body division hearing this appeal did not share the views of the dissenting member. 
4. The EC welcomed the Appellate Body's reversal  of the Panel's findings concerning the blatant 
arithmetic error in Case 11, although the Appellate Bo dy had not been able to complete its analysis 
because of an alleged lack of undisputed facts on the r ecord.  In fact, the EC believed that all relevant 
documentation relating to the error had been put befo re the Panel.  Without this error, which the 
United States had not denied making, the result of the calculation of the dumping margin for the 
company concerned would have been de minimis  and the measure would have been revoked.  Since 
the facts were undisputed, the EC expected that the United States would now do the right thing and revoke the measure immediately.  Failure to do this would constitute a serious systemic failure on the part of the United States, by maintaining a protec tive measure, which only existed because of its own 
mistake.  To conclude, whilst the EC did not agree with each and every aspect of the Report, it welcomed the finding in principle that the United States should have immediately complied by the 
end of the reasonable period of time at the latest by eliminating "zeroing" from any further actions or 
inactions;  and in any event the EC unconditionall y accepted the Appellate Body Report, consistent 
with its DSU obligations.  The EC also noted that  the reasonable period of time for implementation in 
this dispute had expired on 9 April 2007, and that  anything other than immediate compliance with the 
DSB's recommendations and rulings, to be adopted at the present meeting, would not be acceptable 
for the EC.  In this regard, the findings of the Pane l and the Appellate Body in this dispute concerning 
specific cases were clear and the United States was required to comply with them without delay by 
recalculating dumping margins without "zeroing" and collecting duties at non- zeroed rates.  In the  WT/DSB/M/269 
 Page 3 
 
 
  end, it was purely a mathematical exercise, which could be accomplished by changing one line of 
computer code. 
5. The representative of the United States  said that his country wished to thank the Panel, the 
Appellate Body, and the Secretariat assisting them  for their work in this proceeding.  The 
United States recognized that there had been a number of disputes addressing the use of "zeroing" in 
anti-dumping duty investigations and "zeroing" in anti-dumping duty assessment proceedings.  For 
reasons that the United States had previously discussed , the United States continued to believe that the 
reasoning relied upon by the Appellate Body in  its Reports in these disputes was in error.1  
Nonetheless, the United States had taken steps to comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings and, as it had stated in prior DSB meeti ngs, the United States intended to comply with the 
recommendations and rulings in these disputes.  Howe ver, the Reports being considered for adoption 
at the present meeting were not really about "zeroi ng".  Rather, these Reports were about key issues 
involving the question of the scope of compliance proceedings and what a Member was expected to 
do after the end of the reasonable period of time with respect to collecting duties on entries of goods 
made prior to the end of the reasonable period of time.  The compliance Panel had taken an approach 
that took into account some of the difficulties inhere nt in asking a Member to reach back in time and 
change duty determinations that had been made prior to the end of the reasonable period of time, 
indeed in some cases prior to the existence of any DSB recommendations and rulings.  The Appellate 
Body had reversed the Panel, but had done so in  a way that raised a number of new problems, 
questions and uncertainties, including with respect  to compliance in disputes not about anti-dumping 
duties.  For example, the Appellate Body Report had raised a number of issues for disputes involving 
ordinary tariffs in breach of a Member's tariff bindi ngs.  The United States had raised these concerns 
during the appeal, but, unfortunately, they had rema ined unaddressed in the Appellate Body Report. 
6. In addition, the United States was disappointed th at, in several respects, the Appellate Body 
Report was not based on the recommendations and rulings  made by the DSB in the original dispute.  
This compliance proceeding was limited to the qu estion of whether the United States had complied 
with the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this particular dispute.  Here, the contested issues all 
related to findings "as applied" with respect to 31 specific, individually identified determinations – 15 
original investigations and 16 administrative review s.  The United States had taken all steps necessary 
to ensure that none of these 31 measures – with one  partial exception that the United States had never 
contested – were being applied to current im ports.  The Appellate Body had found that "the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB did not exte nd" to certain administrative reviews, because 
those recommendations and rulings concerne d only investigations and not reviews.
2  Nonetheless, the 
Appellate Body had found that these reviews fell within the jurisdiction of the compliance Panel.3  
The Appellate Body's finding was very troubling in light  of the fact that, as a factual matter, it had not 
been disputed that these reviews did not alter in any way the effect of the US measures taken to 
comply, which had been to re-do the investigati ons in accordance with the DSB's recommendations 
and rulings, and to revoke the anti-dumping duties on entries going forward.   
7. By extending the scope of the compliance Pane l's jurisdiction to cover measures like these, 
the Appellate Body Report had expa nded the scope of Article 21.5 of the DSU to cover measures that 
did not, in fact, have an identifiable link to the DSB's recommendations and ru lings in the original 
dispute.  In this regard, the United States noted the separate and dissenting opinion of one member of 
the Division that cautioned panels not to " overly broaden[] the scope  of proceedings under 
Article 21.5" to include "measures that share onl y a limited link to the DSB's recommendations and 
                                                      
1 WT/DS294/16;  WT/DS294/18;  WT/DS322/16;  WT/DS344/11;  see also WT/DSB/M/211, 
paras. 37-40;  WT/DSB/M/225, paras. 73-76;  WT/DSB /M/250, paras. 47-55;  WT/DSB/M/265, paras. 76-79. 
2 Appellate Body Report, para. 250. 
3 Appellate Body Report, para. 252. WT/DSB/M/269 
Page 4  
 
  rulings, and to the measures that a Member takes to implement these rulings".
4  It was unfortunate that 
the majority of the Division had no t heeded this useful warning.   
8. Second, the Appellate Body expressly had not ma de any finding with respect to "zeroing" in 
administrative reviews "as such" in th e original proceeding in this di spute.  Nonetheless, the Appellate 
Body Report had stated – without any supporting r easoning – that the recommendations and rulings in 
this dispute meant that "the United States was required to ensure that the use of the zeroing 
methodology in the 31 Cases at issue in the original  proceedings ceased by the end of the reasonable 
period of time".5  The idea of "cases" as challenged meas ures was not involved in this dispute and 
there were no findings against "cases".  Rather, th e idea of "cases" appeared to be similar to the 
Appellate Body's approach in a subsequent "zeroing"  dispute.  In effect, the Appellate Body Report 
had replaced the DSB's recommendations and rulings in the original dispute with recommendations 
and rulings from a subsequent dispute.  The Appellate  Body Report raised serious systemic concerns 
by importing into this dispute – with all the poten tial consequences that resulted from a finding of 
non-compliance under Article 21.5 – findings derived from later rulings made in another dispute. 
9. There was another significant and very troublin g element of the Appellate Body's original, 
uncorrected Report.  That was its finding of the ex istence of a supposed determination to assess duties 
at the cash deposit rate in "Case 31".  Although the compliance Panel had found that "the European 
Communities did not identify any specific duty a ssessment determination after the end of the 
reasonable period of time"6, the Appellate Body's uncorrected  Report nonetheless had deduced the 
existence of such an assessment determination by th e United States.  The Appellate Body's reasoning, 
however, had relied on the assumption that the rele vant exporter did not request an administrative 
review in May 2007.  However, the uncontested fact s on the record demonstrated that the exporter in 
question had, in fact, requested a review.  Therefor e, this supposed determination – which had never 
been mentioned by the EC or anyone else during the Pa nel or Appellate proceedi ngs – had not, in fact, 
occurred.  The United States was grateful that when it had brought this error to the Appellate Body's 
attention, the Appellate Body had issued a co rrigendum removing the reference to this supposed 
determination.  To help Members understand the b ackground to this corrigendum, the United States 
referred Members to its request to the A ppellate Body that had been circulated7 pointing out this error 
and requesting its correction.  Nonetheless, the fact that this error had occurred in the first place was 
of profound concern to the United States, and should be to all Members.  Here, the Appellate Body 
had made factual findings, apparently on its ow n initiative, and based on its own assumptions about 
the relevant facts.  The Appellate Body was not an  investigating body and did not have authority to 
make factual findings.  Nor shoul d the Appellate Body be researching and developing supposed facts 
that no party had submitted or argue d.  This incident illustrated quite starkly some of the potential 
problems that arose when panels or the Appellate Bo dy took a more expansive view of their role than 
was provided for under the WTO Agreements.  Moreover, the corrigendum did not fully resolve the problem that had been created by the Report's initial assumptions regarding this supposed 
determination.  For example, the Appellate Body Report had initially relied on the existence of this 
supposed determination when it reversed the finding  of the compliance Panel that, with respect to 
Case 31, "the European Communities did not iden tify any specific duty assessment determination 
after the end of the reasonable period of time".
8  It would appear that the Appellate Body Report had 
acknowledged that no such determination had been  identified – and yet the Report nonetheless had 
retained the reversal of the compliance Panel's finding on this point.  The representative of the 
United States said he could go on but would stop here, having noted these very troubling aspects of 
the Report and the systemic concerns they raised. 
                                                      
4 Appellate Body Report, para. 262. 
5 Appellate Body Report, para. 299 (emphasis added). 
6 Appellate Body Report, para. 342. 
7 WT/DS294/32. 
8 Appellate Body Report, para. 342.  WT/DSB/M/269 
 Page 5 
 
 
  10. The representative of Japan  said that his country thanked the Appellate Body and the Panel 
for their Reports in this compliance dispute.  As a third party, Japan had been actively participating in 
these compliance proceedings, both at the Panel and th e Appellate Body stages, to assist the Panel and 
the Appellate Body in making proper findings on co re issues in this "zeroing" dispute.  This 
compliance dispute was factually complex and raised  novel issues of law that had not been addressed 
or decided in previous disputes.  Complexity of discussions set out in the Report, not to mention the 
existence of rarely rendered separate opinion, appear ed to reflect the challenge that the Appellate 
Body and the Panel had faced in disposing of the issues presented in this co mpliance dispute.  Japan, 
on its part, did not agree, or was not  fully satisfied, with all of the fi ndings and their reasoning, or lack 
thereof, in the Report.  However, on balance, th e Appellate Body had reach ed proper conclusions on 
certain key issues in this dispute.  First, on th e issue of whether the subsequent reviews had a 
sufficient close nexus with the DSB's recommendations  and rulings so as to fall within the scope of 
the compliance proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU, the Appellate Body had properly rejected 
the Panel's erroneous finding that the review s that pre-dated the adoption of the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings did not fall with in the scope of compliance proceedings.9  T h e  
Appellate Body had explained "[s]ince compliance with the recommendations and rulings of DSB can 
be achieved before the recommenda tions and rulings of the DSB are adopted, a compliance panel may 
have to review events pre-dating the adoption of  those recommendations and rulings in order to 
resolve a disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of such 
measures".10  The Appellate Body had further held th at the Panel's erroneous finding appeared 
"premised on the notion that a panel's mandate under Article 21.5 is limited to"11 the measures taken 
with the intention to comply with recommendations  and rulings, but, "the relevant inquiry was not 
whether the subsequent reviews were  taken with [such] intention".12   
11. Second, on the same issue of the scope of the compliance proceedings under Article 21.5 of 
the DSU, the Appellate Body had examined the necessary link "in terms of natures or subject 
matter".13  In this analysis, the Appellate Body had fou nd the following facts to be relevant;  (i) these 
subsequent reviews at issue "were issued under the same respective anti-dumping duty order as the 
measures challenged in the original proceedings and, therefore, constituted connected stages … 
involving the imposition, assessment and collectio n of duties under the same anti-dumping order"14 
and (ii) "the issue of zeroing was the precise subject  of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, 
… and only aspect of" these subsequent reviews challenged by the EC in the compliance 
proceeding.15  Third, again on the same jurisdictional issue, the Appellate Body had concluded that 
there was "sufficient link, in terms of effects ,"16 where the subsequent reviews "generated assessment 
rates and cash deposit rates calculated with zeroing th at replaced those found to be WTO-inconsistent 
in the original proceedings with the effect of asse ssment rates and cash deposit rated that continued to 
reflect the zeroing methodology".17  Fourth, on the scope of the US compliance with DSB's 
recommendations and rulings in this dispute, the Pa nel and the Appellate Body had expressly rejected 
the US argument that the date of entry, or the lega l regime that existed at that date, was decisive in 
establishing the scope of compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings with respect to the 
administrative reviews at issue.  In this respect, Ja pan had noted the Panel's findings that under the US 
retrospective system, the anti-dumping duties "are not determined at the time of entry, but rather, are 
                                                      
9 Appellate Body Report, paras. 222 – 227. 
10 Appellate Body Report, para. 224. 
11 Appellate Body Report, para. 223. 
12 Appellate Body Report, para. 226. 
13 Appellate Body Report, para. 230. 
14 Appellate Body Report, para. 230. 
15 Appellate Body Report, para. 230. 
16 Appellate Body Report, para. 231. 
17 Appellate Body Report, para. 231. WT/DSB/M/269 
Page 6  
 
  determined at a later date"
18 and that the legal regime that existed at the time of entry "is, at most, a 
provisional one as concerns the final anti-dumping duty liability incurred by the imports".19  T h e  
Appellate Body had also rightly reversed the Pa nel's erroneous finding that "the United States' 
obligation to implement the recommendations of th e DSB does not extend to the actual collection and 
liquidation of duties, and to the issuance of assessme nt or liquidation instructions, when these actions 
result from administrative reviews determinations ma de before the end of the reasonable period of 
time".20   
12. Japan considered that these conclusions reach ed by the Appellate Body were proper and 
would serve to provide useful guidance for the Un ited States in its effort to implement the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings.  However, Japan also had some concerns about the Report and wished 
to make two points.  First, even though the Appe llate Body had reversed  the Panel's erroneous 
findings that the US compliance with the DS B's recommendations and rulings did not cover 
liquidation actions after the end of the reasonabl e period of time based on the reviews determined 
before that date21, the Appellate Body had declined to rule  on the issue of whether US compliance 
would extend to such actions "that have been  delayed as a result of judicial proceedings".22  Although 
Japan agreed with the Appellate Body's reversal  of the Panel's finding, it failed to see how the 
Appellate Body could have reache d this conclusion without addressing the issue of judicial review, 
especially because the Panel's concern about conseque nce of the delay in liquidation as a result of 
judicial review was one of the main  rationales behind the Panel's findings23 that the Appellate Body 
had reversed.  Second, Japan wished to recall that the Appellate Body had pr eviously found in other 
disputes that the Panel's duty to provide a "basi c rationale" under Article 12.7 of the DSU required 
panels to "set for the explanations and reasons su fficiently to disclose the essential, or fundamental, 
justification for those findings and recommendations".24  The Appellate Body had reasoned that this 
was so because:  (i) the implem enting member "is entitled to know the reasons for [the adverse] 
finding as a matter of due process";  (ii) the Panel' s explanation and reasons "assists such member to 
understand the nature of its obliga tions and to make informed deci sions about … what must be done 
in order to implement the eventual rulings and recommendations made by the DSB";  and (iii) the 
Panel's explanation and reasons w ould serve "the objective … of providing security and predictability 
in the multilateral trading system and of clarifying the existing provisions of the covered agreement" 
as contemplated under Article 3.2 of the DSU.25  Japan considered that the same rationales equally 
applied to Appellate Body reports.  Japan, once agai n, thanked the Appellate Body, the Panel and the 
Secretariat for their efforts devoted to this complia nce dispute.  Japan had no objection to the adoption 
of the Reports by the DSB at the present meeting.   
13. Finally, Japan wished to briefly touch on the US  request for the correction of errors in the 
Report and the subsequent corrigendum26 issued by the Appellate Body  and wished to offer a few 
observations.  First, as a general matter, an A ppellate Body report, once adopted by the DSB, 
provided the basis for future implementations and gui dance as to what should be done to comply with 
the DSB's recommendations and rulings.  Thus, in principle, factual inaccuracies or findings based on 
such unwarranted facts should not be tolerated a nd must be eliminated to the maximum extent 
possible.  Otherwise, the report might lose its credibility and could create confusion and possibly 
become a source of disagreement between the parties at  the later stage, rather than serve to resolve 
                                                      
18 Panel Report, para. 8.173. 
19 Panel Report, para. 8.176. 
20 Appellate Body Report, para.311, reversing the findings in para. 8.199 of the Panel Report. 
21 Appellate Body Report, para. 311.  See also para.6 supra. 
22 Appellate Body Report, para. 314. 
23 Panel Report, para. 8.191. 
24 Appellate Body Report, "Mexico – Corn Syrup" (21.5), para. 106. 
25 Appellate Body Report, "Mexico – Corn Syrup" (21.5), para. 107. 
26 WT/DS294/AB/RW/Corr.1.  WT/DSB/M/269 
 Page 7 
 
 
  disputes.  To this end, all people involved in  disputes settlement procedures, not just WTO 
adjudicators and the Secretariat, but also the parti es to disputes, must be diligent and be responsible 
for the high quality of reports.  Second, according to the accounts set out in the communications 
exchanged between the participants on this subject, it  appeared to Japan that neither participants had 
addressed nor argued the existence or non-existence of  specific assessment determination in question, 
presumably because their respective claims, defens es, arguments or litigation strategies did not 
require them to do so.  And in the absence of partic ipants' active engagements in this particular factual 
matter, the Appellate Body had appeared to ha ve drawn from evidence on the record available 
inference, which had turned out to be inaccurate.  Putting aside the issue of whether the Appellate 
Body could assume the role of trier of fact, under th is particular circumstance , Japan did not consider 
that the inference the Appellate Body had drawn w ould amount to wilful disregard or distortion of 
evidence27 before it.  In any event, Japan found the situation quite case-specific and an isolated 
incident.  Third, in Japan's view, the corrigendum  issued by the Appellate Body on 5 June 2009 had 
made necessary corrections that eliminated factual inaccuracy that the United States had raised and to 
that extent appeared to address the concerns expr essed by the United States.  Japan understood that 
the clerical correction made by the Appellate Bo dy was not satisfactory for the United States.  
However, the solution offered by the United States, i.e. to elim inate all related discussions and 
findings in the relevant paragraphs, was not the on ly "logical consequences of the corrections", in 
Japan's view.  Given the EC's "omission" arguments  advanced throughout the proceedings, i.e. that 
the United States should have stopped collecting duties based on "zeroing" as of the end of the reasonable period of time
28, and the overall findings and conclusions elsewhere in the Report read in 
context29, it appeared to Japan that the corrected version of the relevant part of the Report made sense 
and should offer a reasonable solution to the problem .  Japan was ready to engage in the discussion 
with other interested delegations as to how to prevent this issue from happening in the future. 
14. The representative of Norway  said that her country welcomed the adoption of the Appellate 
Body Report in this long-standing dispute.  The Appellate Body had, once again, confirmed the 
illegality of the "zeroing" methodology.  It had made it clear that use of "zeroing" during 
administrative reviews after the expiration of the compliance period – regardless of the date of importation – was indeed not consistent with the WT O rules.  In its third-party submission, Norway 
had addressed two issues in particular, the first of wh ich being the preliminary issue of what measures 
were within the Panel's jurisdiction, as "measures taken to comply".  Norway had argued that the 
temporal element was not decisive in this context, but that the relevant criterion was the "nexus-
based" test.  Norway welcomed the confirmation of  this interpretation by the Appellate Body.  
Norway had addressed the establishment of the "all ot hers" rate.  Norway had argued that Article 9.4 
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement did not leave the inv estigating authorities in a "free for all" situation 
so as to impose the margin they saw fit.  The Appellate Body had confirmed this, stating that the absence of guidance in Article 9.4 did not imply the ab sence of any obligation in this respect, and that 
the investigating authorities' discretion to appl y duties to non-investigated importers was not 
unbounded.  Norway saw this as an important clarif ication of the interpretation of investigating 
authorities' obligations according to Article 9.4.  There had been many "zeroing" disputes in the 
WTO, with most of them concerning the practice of the United States.  To bring itself into conformity with the WTO Agreements, the United States would ha ve to change its practice and discontinue the 
use of "zeroing".  It was Norway's hope that this issue be finally settled, and that speedy 
implementation would take place.  With regard to the request by the United States to issue a 
corrigendum, Norway had concerns about the use of su ch a procedure.  With the exception of errors 
of a clerical nature, such a procedure should be ab stained from.  It was essen tial for the effectiveness 
                                                     
 
27 See Appellate Body Report, "US – Carbon Steel", para.142.  See also Appellate Body Report, "EC – 
Hormones III", para. 133. 
28 See, e.g. Panel Report, para. 8.214.  See also Appellate Body Report, para. 280, citing Panel Report, 
footnote 629 to para. 8.85. 
29 See, e.g. Appellate Body Report, para. 299. WT/DSB/M/269 
Page 8  
 
  of, and confidence in the system that the Appella te Body Report was endorsed by all Members as 
final. 
15. The representative of Hong Kong, China
 said that her delegation th anked the Appellate Body, 
the Panel and the Secretariat for their hard work on this case.  Hong Kong, China was pleased that the 
Appellate Body had drawn up a bright line test on the compliance obligations for the WTO Members 
using a retrospective anti-dumping system.  Unde r the Appellate Body's rulings, the responding 
Member was required to cease using WTO-inconsis tent practice by the end of the reasonable period 
of time, regardless of the date of importation of goods or the date of determination of duty.  Hong Kong, China had noted with concern that " zeroing" was still actively in use, despite its 
confirmed inconsistency with the An ti-Dumping Agreement.  That in turn had led to a growing list of 
disputes about the practice itself and the related im plementation actions.  Hopefully, the simple and 
clear test set out by the Appellate Body could now help stop the interminable debates and reduce 
future attempts to delay compliance.  Hong Kong , China also appreciated the Appellate Body's 
clarifications on the "scope of compliance proceedings" and "measures taken to comply" under Article 21.5 of the DSU.  Hong Kong, China welc omed the Appellate Body's judgements, which 
would no doubt prompt an effective implementati on of this case, as well as other pending disputes, 
and looked forward to a complete removal of "zeroi ng" in all its different manifestations, whether 
used in the original investigations or in review s.  Hong Kong, China strongly believed that this was 
the only way to fully implement the DSB's ruli ngs and recommendations in various disputes.  
Hong Kong, China supported the adoption of the A ppellate Body Report and the Panel Report, as 
modified by the Appellate Body Report, and urged the United States to implement the DSB's rulings 
and recommendations forthwith. 
16. The representative of Korea
 said that, as a third party to this dispute, his country welcomed 
the findings of the Reports in this dispute.  Korea noted that the Appellate Body had properly 
addressed issues raised in this compliance dispute w ith the "close nexus" criteria, and hoped that this 
ruling would contribute to further clarifying the im plementation scope and obligation, especially with 
regard to "zeroing" in the context of the US anti-dumping proceedings.  However, Korea remained 
concerned about the ongoing "zeroing" practice by the United States, which had been repeatedly 
found inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreemen t as well as other covered agreements.  This 
situation could lead Members to a continuous circle of disputes, undermining the Members' 
expectation of security and predictability of the mu ltilateral trading system.  Korea expected that the 
United States would take prompt measures to fully implement the DSB's rulings and 
recommendations without delay and w ould continue to remain vigilant in monitoring the situation in 
the future. 
17. The representative of Mexico  said that his delegation had listened carefully to the US 
comments on the Appellate Body Report.  Members were entitled to express their views on the report, 
however, they also had an obliga tion to unconditionally accept those repor ts.  He recalled that prompt 
compliance with the DSB's recommendations and ruli ngs was essential for the effective settlement of 
disputes.  Thus, the best way for the United States  to bring its measures into conformity with the 
WTO rules would be to eliminate the so-called "zer oing" practice.  By doing so, the United States 
would not only settle this dispute, but would put an end to other disputes, which involved the same 
practice. 
18. The DSB took note  of the statements, and adopted  the Appellate Body Report contained in 
WT/DS294/AB/RW and Corr.1, and the Panel Report contained in WT/DS294/RW, as modified by 
the Appellate Body Report.   
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