Note: Advance written questions by WTO Members and the replies provided by the United States  
are reproduced in document WT/TPR/M/200/Add.1 and will be available online at:  
http://www.wto.org/english/tr atop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm.  WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/TPR/M/200 
4 August 2008 
 (08-3681) 
Trade Policy Review Body 
9 and 11 June 2008  
 
  
 
TRADE POLICY REVIEW 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
Minutes of Meeting
 
 
Chairperson:  H.E. Mr. Yonov Frederick Agah (Nigeria) 
 
  
Page  
 
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 3 
 
II. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE REPRES ENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES 4 
 
III. STATEMENT BY THE DISCUSSANT 8 
 IV. STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS 12 
 
V. REPLIES BY THE REPRESENTATI VE OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
 ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 41 
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 49  
 
 WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 3 
 
 
 I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 
1. The Chairperson welcomed members of the Trad e Policy Review Body to the ninth Review 
of the United States.  He greeted the delegation of the United States led by H.E. Ambassador 
Peter Allgeier, Permanent Representative to the WT O, and the discussant, H.E. Ambassador Claudia 
Uribe (Colombia).  The discussant had made availa ble, in document WT/TPR/D/175, the main issues 
she intended to raise. 
2. The Chairperson recalled the purpose of the Trad e Policy Reviews and the main elements of 
the procedures of the meeting.  The Report by  the United States was contained in document 
WT/TPR/G/200, and that of the Secretariat in document WT/TPR/S/200.  The U.S. delegation had 
provided, before the beginning of the first session of  the review meeting, written answers to questions 
submitted at least two weeks before the review me eting.  Questions posed subsequently should be 
answered, to the extent possible, be fore the start of the second session of the meeting.  Questions left 
unanswered at the end of the second session should be  answered in writing no later than one month 
after the meeting.  For this review, the following delegations had submitted written questions at least 
two weeks in advance of the meeting:  Mexico;  Switzerland;  Singapore;  Chinese Taipei;  Costa 
Rica;  Argentina;  Chile;  Australia;  Japan;  Braz il;  Canada;  Norway;  Hong Kong, China;  China;  
the Republic of Korea;  New Zealand;  European  Communities;  and Colombia.  Copies of these 
questions and of the answers provided by the delega tion of the United States were available in the 
meeting room. 
3. The following delegations had submitted written questions after the two-week deadline:  
Indonesia;  India;  Pakistan;  and Thailand.  These questions had also been transmitted to the 
delegation of the United States, and copies were av ailable in the meeting room;  related answers 
should be available on Wednesday morning. 
4. The Chairperson had considered w ith keen interest the reports prepared for the meeting.   
Both reports pointed out that the United States remained firmly committed to the WTO as the 
embodiment of an open, transparent, and rules-based multilateral trading system.  The U.S. 
Government report noted that the United States cons idered transparency as a key component of robust 
world trade, while the Secretariat report observed that precisely the transparency and openness of the 
U.S. trade regime had been the main contributing fact ors to the efficiency that characterized the U.S. 
economy.  It was hence of the utmost importance to know that in the current period of economic 
uncertainty the United States, as the world's single largest trader, remained committed to continued 
trade liberalization.  In this regard, particularly in  view of the sharp increases in food and fuel prices 
since the last U.S. Review in 2006, he noted the st atement in the Secretariat report that liberalization 
should include the agricultural and energy markets. WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 4  
 
 
 II. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE REPRESEN TATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES 
5. The representative of the United States  reiterated the continuing high value that the U.S. 
Government attached to the Trade Policy Review pr ocess.  His delegation was working diligently to 
answer the more than 800 questions it had recei ved.  The United States had provided preliminary 
responses to the vast majority of questions submitted up to two weeks before the meeting.  It had also 
included responses for Members that had missed the two-week deadline by one or two days, and to 
questions submitted after the deadline but that overl apped in substance with questions received on a 
timely basis.  It was continuing to work hard on all the remaining questions  
(1) OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.  ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
6. For the first time in recent memory, internationa l trade had become a topic of U.S. kitchen 
table conversation.  The United States agreed with the WTO Secretariat’s conclusion that reducing the 
U.S. current account deficit require d expanding U.S. exports, "which  would be facilitated by a more 
liberal trading system and stronger demand growth outside the United States." 
7. Over the review period (2006-07), the U.S. econo my had performed well.  It had grown at an 
average annual rate of 2.5% over the two years.  Employment had increased by 3.9 million.  The 
unemployment rate had moderated from 5.1% in 2005 to 4.6 % in 2007 and real labour compensation 
in the business sector had increased  by 2.8%.  Concerning U.S. trade, real goods and services exports 
had expanded by over 17% and real imports, by 8% .  In nominal terms, the goods and services trade 
deficit had risen from US$715 billion in 2005 to US$764 billion in 2006 and then fallen to US$708 
billion in 2007.  These nominal figures reflected in part  an increase of two thirds in the price of U.S. 
crude oil imports in the period under review.  
8. He acknowledged that many Members would be interested in economic developments over 
the most recent months, given recent and still-de veloping circumstances in the U.S. and global 
economies.  A decline in U.S. demand for housin g in recent quarters had resulted in excess U.S. 
inventories of unsold homes, falling housing prices,  and declining levels of investment in new 
residential construction.  This had led to loss of  homes for some U.S. purchasers, asset depreciation 
and solvency concerns for some lenders, and had substantially tightened credit conditions in U.S. 
financial markets.  Against this background, the most recent data on the U.S. economy for the first 
quarter of 2008 showed continued GDP expansion, although at the modest annualized rate of 0.9%. 
9. The full range of public policy responses, incl uding monetary and fiscal policy actions, was 
being used to help resolve the economic challenges created by the current market corrections in the 
United States.  Time was required for the housing mark et to return to equilibrium, for counter-cyclical 
public policy actions, such as current personal income tax rebates, to have their full impact, and for 
credit markets to absorb fully and adjust to the challenges.  There was a good possibility that growth, 
which had been widely expected to be weak or ev en negative in the first half of 2008, would improve 
in the second half.  For the year overall, however, growth was likely to be weak.  The United States 
was confident that, with one of the world’s most  flexible and adaptive economies, it was productively 
addressing the current difficulties and that the econom y would move back to healthy expansion.  
10. Global U.S. trade imbalances had been a source of concern in previous U.S. Trade Policy 
Reviews.  With slower growth in U.S. demand, stronger growth outside the United States, and the 
increased price competitiveness of U.S. exports, the U.S. imbalance had begun to shrink.  In nominal dollar terms, the goods and services trade deficit ha d fallen from a peak 6.2% of GDP in the fourth 
quarter of 2005 to 5% of GDP in the third quarter  of 2007.  Under the impact of rapidly rising 
petroleum import prices, the deficit had remained at sl ightly more than 5% in the first quarter of 2008.  
In real terms the change had been more dramatic .  During 2006 to 2008 (first quarter to first quarter) 
U.S. exports had increased by 16%, roughly seven tim es faster than its imports (at 2.3%).  Strong WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 5 
 
 
 export growth had been a stabilizing element for the U.S. economy as other sources of growth had 
weakened.  Export expansion had accounted for more than 40% of U.S. economic growth over the last 
two years. 
11. Even as the United States underwent a tem porary period of growth-dampening economic 
adjustment, it remained firm in its belief in the va lue of open markets, freer trade, and the rules-based 
international trading system as organized under the WTO.  Open markets were obviously helping 
facilitate U.S. economic adjustment by accommodati ng strong U.S. export growth at a time when 
domestic demand growth was exceptionally subdued. 
12. More fundamentally and in the longer term , however, the United States believed that 
movement toward freer, competitive markets and expanded trade under the rules based system had 
aided the U.S. economy to employ resources mo re efficiently, enhance productivity, and boost labour 
compensation more rapidly, while suppo rting employment and economic growth. 
(2) RECENT TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS  
(i) Openness of the U.S. market 
13. The United States continued to expand access to its already very open market.  The current 
U.S. simple average tariff was 3.5% on a legally  bound basis under the WTO.  When GSP and other 
preferences were taken into account, the U.S. trade we ighted average applied tariff was just 1.3%.  In 
2007 nearly 70% of all U.S. imports (including unde r preference programmes) had entered the United 
States duty free.  U.S. services markets were open to  foreign providers and regulatory processes were 
transparent and accessible to the public. 
14. Because of its open markets, U.S. goods a nd services imports had been US$2.35 trillion in 
2007 (about US$4 million per minute).  The United Stat es had been the destination for nearly 23% of 
world goods exports in 2006 (excludi ng intra-EU25 trade).  It remained the world’s largest importer 
and a major engine of global economic growth.  Ex ports now supported one in six U.S. manufacturing 
jobs.  Imports had kept inflati on at bay, had increased choices for consumers, and had made producers 
more competitive because of cheaper inputs and capital equipment. 
15. The United States continued to be the world’s la rgest host for foreign direct investment;  FDI 
in the United States was roughly US$1.5 trillion.  The authorities were committed to keeping the 
United States an attractive destination for foreign investment, both to avoid disruptions in trade and 
capital flows and to preserve the significant and tangible benefits that investment brought. 
(ii) Importance of multilateralism 
16. The multilateral trading system remained at the heart of U.S. trade policy, as had been the 
case for more than 60 years.  Recently, in test imony before Congress, Ambassador Schwab had said 
that, “The business of the WTO is the global trading sy stem itself, and its operation is at the center of 
U.S. trade policy.”  The United States viewed the rules-based multilateral system as the essential 
foundation of an increasingly integrated and comp etitive global economy, and it strongly supported 
further efforts to reduce and eliminate restrictions on the flow of international trade.  The ultimate 
success of the Doha Development Agenda was vital to  the U.S. vision of a more prosperous economic 
future.  A successful Doha Round outcome was the top U.S. trade negotiating priority.  
17. At the beginning of 2008, President Bush had confirmed that the United States was 
committed to concluding a strong Doha Round in 20 08, and would provide the leadership necessary 
to achieve this objective.  He had stated that a successful Doha agreement must reduce and eliminate 
tariffs and other barriers, as well as market-disto rting subsidies for agricultural goods.  In his WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 6  
 
 
 statement of 1 May, the President had focused on worldwide food shortages and had again invoked 
the importance of successful Doha Round ne gotiations towards achieving a solution. 
18. The United States planned to continue to work  with its trading partners to achieve a 
successful agreement that generated meaningful new trade flows and new economic opportunities for 
citizens around the world – in agriculture, industr ial goods, and in services.  The United States also 
attached great importance to trade facilitation a nd subsidies disciplines, particularly fisheries 
subsidies, which could result in a win for trade, development, and the environment. 
(iii) Expanding bilateral and regional initiatives 
19. The United States was also pursuing an active ag enda of regional and bilateral initiatives in a 
manner that was supportive of the multilateral tr ading system.  These initiatives looked to the 
multilateral system as the foundation upon which to build.  U.S. agre ements included high standards 
and sought ambitious and comprehensive outcomes;   in conformity with its obligations, the 
United States notified them to the WTO. 
20. The United States was a party to FTAs with 14 countries, and several others were in various 
stages of negotiation and implementation.  The U. S. experience was that these agreements had not 
undercut its ability to participate fully in multilatera l negotiations, nor diminish ed its enthusiasm for 
multilateral liberalization.  One of the criteria th e United States had used in selecting its free-trade 
agreement negotiating partners was a clear, consistent, commitment to WTO-based trade 
liberalization.  U.S. partners included some of the strongest supporters of MFN-based liberalization.   
(iv) U.S. initiatives to foster development 
21. Another important aspect of U.S. trade polic y was to create opportunities for its developing 
country partners.  Integral to the U.S. goal of  accelerating growth and economic reform in the 
developing world and most importantly in its poorest regions were the four U.S. preference 
programmes (the Generalized System of Preferen ces, the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA), the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the Andean Trade Preference Act) through which 
eligible products entered the United States duty-fr ee from 131 beneficiary developing countries.  U.S. 
imports from many beneficiary countries under thes e programmes had grown significantly, and the 
Administration was using the means at its disposal  to increase trade under preference programmes and 
ensure that their benefits extended to lesser- and least-developed beneficiaries. 
22. The United States also recognized that market ac cess could be of little value if beneficiaries 
were not able to take advantage of it;  it was committed to assisting developing countries build up 
their capacity by providing aid for trade.  The Un ited States reaffirmed the commitment made at Hong 
Kong, China to more than double its contributions to global Aid for Trade, from US$1.3 billion in 
2005 to US$2.7 billion in grants by 2010.  It planne d to continue to support the WTO’s catalytic role 
in aid for trade as well as the Enhanced Integrated  Framework, which aimed to help the least trade-
active countries participate in the global trading system. 
23. The United States believed that trade capacity  building (TCB) - Aid for Trade - was an 
important complement to trade liberalization and that trade was a key element of any sustainable 
national development plan.  The Government was ready to use all of its available tools to support Aid 
for Trade, reflecting its view that  trade played a central role in efforts to reduce poverty and spur 
growth. 
24. The United States had more than doubled its annual TCB spending since 2001, resulting in 
aggregate outlays of approximately US$7 billion in  grants.  USAID and the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC) were the two largest U.S. pr oviders of TCB, which had also benefited from WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 7 
 
 
 changes in the way that U.S. assistance was delivered, by supporting partner country ownership, 
promoting best practices to improve aid eff ectiveness, and leveraging private resources. 
(v) Implementing dispute settlement decisions 
25. The U.S. Government continued to support the ru le of law in international trade.  While the 
United States expected compliance in disputes wher e it prevailed, it also recognized its responsibility 
to implement adverse DSB recomme ndations;  it had acted on its res ponsibilities.  Compliance issues 
in accordance with a rules-based in ternational trading system would continue to be a high priority.  
(3) LOOKING FORWARD  
26. The United States would continue to play a strong leadership role and do all it could to 
achieve an ambitious and mutually beneficial outco me to the Doha negotiations.  The United States 
was willing to make bold proposals and take politi cal risks, provided others did the same.  But 
breakthroughs were urgently needed where th e greatest impetus to growth and the greatest 
development gains would come.  The United States  remained strongly comm itted to open markets, 
and was convinced that the Doha negotiations were th e most powerful tool to get there.  But it was a 
step all Members had to take together. WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 8  
 
 
 III. STATEMENT BY THE DISCUSSANT 
27. The discussant  considered the U.S. economy as the most dynamic, open, productive, and 
competitive in the world, therefore the challenges fo r the United States were different from those of a 
majority of WTO Members.  
28. The United States had undergone more Trade Policy Reviews than any other Member.  The 
current review was taking place at a time of high  food and oil prices and financial sector problems 
caused the crisis in the U.S. construction and mortga ge guarantee markets.  It was also a time when 
the future of the Doha Round was being decided.  
(1) MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
29. At the macroeconomic level, in recent mont hs the United States had faced considerable 
economic difficulties.  Although its macroeconomic performance ha d been robust during the review 
period, there had been a gradual slowdown in grow th, from 3.4% in 2005 to 2.2% in 2007, resulting 
mainly from the 21% contraction in housing constr uction;  there had also been a reduction in 
unemployment and inflation.  
30. The mortgage crisis had led to a strong response from the authorities on the economic 
monetary and fiscal fronts.  The expansionary mone tary policy undertaken by the Federal Reserve and 
the fiscal stimulus applied appeared to have removed the fears of a deep recession in the current year 
and the crisis in the housing market seemed to ha ve bottomed out.  In 2008 growth was expected to 
slow to around 1.5%, unemployment to rise to 5.7%, inflation to be slightly lower at 2.3%, and the current account deficit to be some 5.5% of GDP.  
31. Since 1991, the United States had been accumula ting an increasing deficit in the current 
account of the balance of payments.  Such an extend ed period of mounting deficits of this magnitude 
had no precedent in the modern era among larger industrialized countries.  According to historical data, the United States had not recorded deficits greater than 5% of GDP since 1817.  The current 
account deficit was a reflection of an economy in wh ich investment exceeded savings.  The consensus 
among analysts was that this deficit was unsustainable .  The debate was whether the correction of this 
imbalance would be gradual or abrupt.  The answ er to this question was crucial to all economies 
whose main trading partner was the United States.  It would therefore be very enlightening to hear the view of the United States on the prospects for reduc ing the current account deficit of the balance of 
payments.  
32. The U.S. economy had had a very low unemploymen t rate in recent decades.  However, this 
had been accompanied by very high trade deficits.  An analysis of this situation showed that, at least 
in the case of United States, unemployment was not attributable to international trade. 
33. The dollar had depreciated in nominal and real  terms during the period under review.  This 
had been predicted by Members in the previous Revi ews.  The magnitude of the deficit in the current 
account was not compatible with a strong dollar;  the adjustment had to start with a depreciation of the 
dollar, which had allowed an improvement in the balance of goods and services.  The United States 
reported its net foreign debt as equivalent to 19 .2% of GDP, which made it the country with the 
highest debt in the world.  But as the dollar depreci ated the value of that debt was also falling.  
(2) T
RADE POLICY REGIME  
34. The United States had traditionally favoured multilateral trade negotiations;  it strongly 
supported the Doha Round negotiatio ns, and had strongly resisted protectionist pressures despite the 
internal situation.  U.S. trade policy as well as the framework within whic h it conducted international WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 9 
 
 
 trade negotiations was unique.  On the one hand, the Administration received a negotiating mandate 
from Congress (which had expired in July 2007), and on the other, the Administration maintained a 
complex process of consultations at different levels.  As a consequence, the negotiations were carried 
out with direct public involvement or through Congress.   Public participation explained the creation of 
programmes that sought to minimize the impact of  economic openness, such as the Trade Adjustment 
Program, which assisted workers and farmers affected by trade, as a compleme nt to the initiative to 
improve competitiveness.  Members had raised several  questions on the operation of the programme, 
its budget, and use. 
35. Trade capacity building was another essential co mponent of U.S. trade policy. It supported 
better integration of developing countries into the multilateral trading system by aiding them in the 
development and implementation of trade polic ies, in accession processes, and to benefit from 
preferential access programmes to the U.S. market.  Between 2001 and 2007, the United States had 
spent US$7.1 billion on this. 
36. The United States was careful in fulfilling its obl igations to the WTO and likewise was very 
attentive to other Members' fulfilment of th eir commitments.  The United States had presented 
proposals for transparency, for exampl e the opening of panel hearings to the public.  However, there 
were some notification delays, especially in agriculture. 
37. The United States had been the main user of the dispute settlement system, acting as a 
plaintiff in 88 cases and as a defendant in 99.  Wh ile compliance with DSB resolutions and decisions 
had been good, implementation of some DSB reco mmendations were still pending, such as the cases 
dealing with Article 211 of the Omnibus Act of 199 8;  some aspects of anti-dumping investigations 
on certain steel hot rolled products originating from Japan; and section 110 (5) of the Copyright Law. 
38. The United States was an important player in ai d for trade;  this aid was provided through 
USAID and the Millennium Challenge Corporation.  The value of aid had been US$1.4 billion in 
fiscal year 2007.  The United States ha d the ability to increase such aid.  
(3) TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
39. In 2007 the average MFN applied tariff had been 4.8%, among the lowest in the world.  The 
MFN rate applied to agriculture had fallen from 9.7%  in 2004 to 8.9% in 2007;  the average rate for 
non-agricultural products remained unc hanged at 4%.  These tariff rates were among the lowest in the 
world and reflected the degree of openness of the U. S. economy.  However, 10.7% of tariff lines were 
not ad valorem , mainly agricultural products, garments, foot wear, watches, and precision instruments.  
This was a subject of concern to many WTO member s.  Also, certain agricultural products were 
protected by high out-of-quota tariffs.  Nearly 2% of agricultural lines were subject to quotas.  
40. The Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) was an esse ntial instrument of trade policy for the 
United States.  In late 2007, 232 anti-dumping m easures affecting imports from 39 trading partners 
were in force.  About 40% of these had provided pr otection for over ten years.  The use of "zeroing" 
when calculating the margin of dumping had been th e subject of several disputes under the DSB, and 
on each occasion, the DSB had found the practice to be contrary to the ADA.  Although the Byrd 
Amendment had been revoked in 2005, anti-du mping and countervailing duties assessed before 
October 2007 were still being distributed to U.S. producers who had supported the request.  
Disbursements had been US$225 million in 2005 and US$380.6 million in 2006. WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 10  
 
 
 (4) TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
(i) Agriculture 
41. Agriculture was a critical economic and trad e policy issue for the United States.  The 
United States applied both an offens ive and defensive strategy in this sector.  It was seeking market 
access for products where it had a leading role in wo rld trade, such as corn, in which it had a 61% 
world market share in 2005,  soybean, with a 44% share, cotton with 40%, and wheat with 25%.  As 
part of its defensive strategy, the United States gr anted support for agricultural production in the form 
of subsidies and high import tariffs.  The average out-of-quota tariff for 195 tariff lines subject to quotas was 42%, and direct payments to producers during 2003-07 were esti mated at US$16.3 trillion 
between.  Although, on average, this amount represente d less than 6% of the value of total production, 
it had exceeded 50% of the value of production for some products, such as rice and cotton.  
42. Despite all this fiscal effort, agricultural expor ts represented no more than 9% of total U.S. 
exports of goods and, for 2005 and 2006, the top ten import and export  produc ts did not include any 
agricultural product.  Incentives to produce biofuels ha d altered the U.S. supply of grains and oilseeds, 
substantially raising the prices of major commodities. 
43. The U.S. Congress retained a pattern of suppor t that had begun during the Great Depression 
and did not correspond to the current situation.  While the Executive had objected to the Farm Bill, passed the previous month, Congress had approved it with a substantial majority.  This was very bad 
news for the WTO, for the global agricultural reform begun in the Uruguay Round, and for the Doha Round.  The many questions from Members in this area confirmed that without movement by the 
United States there was little chance of success. 
(ii) Services 
44. Some 70% of U.S. economic output corresponde d to the production of services.  During the 
period under review there had been a surplu s of U.S. services exports over its imports. 
(a) Air transport 
45. Ownership and control limitations in air transpor t were still of concern.  Restrictions were 
maintained, despite the liberalization of the sect or.  The opening of these companies to foreign 
investors could contribute to the efficiency of th e sector, especially to increase competition and meet 
the challenges imposed by high fuel prices. 
(b) Maritime transport 46. In the previous Review, some Members had ca lled on the United States to review the Jones 
Act and submit an offer in the context of current negotiations on services.  According to the 
Secretariat there had been no major changes in polic y or legislation on maritime transport since 2006.  
The Jones Act reserved cargo services between points in the United States to vessels built and 
registered in the country, belonging to a U.S. comp any with at least 75% of its staff comprising U.S. 
citizens.  Domestic passenger services were subject to similar requirements.  
47. It would be interesting to hear the U.S. de legation's views on the prospects for maritime 
transport, as the United States had not included mariti me transport services in its DDA services offer, 
just as it did not participate in the WTO Negotiati ons on Maritime Transport Services, Suspended in 
June 1996.  WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 11 
 
 
 (c) Insurance 
48. The main weakness in insurance was the lack of  a licence that enabled companies to operate 
throughout the territory.  
(d) Mode 4 
49. Many members were concerned by the require ments and procedures for obtaining licences or 
permits for the provision of professional services, as well as by the procedures for the temporary admission of individuals to the United States in order to deliver services.  These included licensing requirements for each State, requirements for reside nce, nationality and studies in the United States, 
as well as barriers and quotas in the granting of visas. 
(5) T
ASKS TO FULFIL  
50. The United States still had tasks to fulfill, including:  pending notifications, especially with 
respect to domestic support in agriculture;  and adopting and implementing SPS measures in a way 
that facilitated trade.  Many Members believed that quarantine requirements, risk assessment 
processes, special procedures for imports of dair y products and sugar, the assessment of some 
products before they were imported for the first ti me, and the lack of implementation of bilateral 
protocols were obstacles to trade, especially due to th e delays in the proceedings by health authorities. 
51. Other pending tasks included:  the "Buy Ameri can" legislation in government procurement, 
which was still regarded as discriminatory;  the tax on chicken, which was established as transitional 
and after several decades persisted;  the impl ementation of the DSB recommendations on gambling 
and betting, where the United States had chosen to initiate proceedings to amend its list of 
commitments in this agreement, instead of amending its legislation.  
52. Several Members had expressed through their ques tions, but also with their participation in 
various WTO bodies, their concern at the measures take n against terrorism in the port of embarkation, 
which covered inspection at the port 48 hours in ad vance, compliance with rules requiring reporting 
additional information, and the intention to im plement scanning of all containers bound for the 
United States before 1 July 2012.  
53. The United States had made many contributions to the WTO, but it could contribute much 
more, as could other Members. WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 12  
 
 
 IV. STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS 
54. Members welcomed the delegation of the United States led by Ambassador Allgeier, and 
commended the United States for its support of the multilateral trading system. 
55. The representative of Mexico  noted that, after a prolonged period of expansion, the growth 
prospects of the U.S. economy had deteriorated in  2007.  GDP growth had declined significantly as a 
result mainly of the negative effects of the slowdow n in the housing market and the turbulence in the 
credit market.  In part due to the exchange rate  adjustment, which had taken place as a result of a 
current account deficit equivalent to 5.3% of GDP, there had been some inflationary pressures, also 
fed by rising international oil and food prices. 
56. The Secretariat Report had stressed that, a lthough the fiscal deficit had declined steadily 
between 2004 and 2007, reachi ng 1.2% of GDP in 2007, it was likely to increase as a result of the 
economic slowdown and fiscal meas ures taken to confront it. 
57. The U.S. economy faced great challenges at the macro level.  U.S. economic policy makers, 
needed to take measures to restore economic growth and curb inflationary pressures.  Mexico trusted 
that appropriate measures would be taken to r estore growth and economic stability, which would 
undoubtedly lead to greater certainty in internatio nal markets.  This was of paramount importance, 
because the performance of the Mexican economy depe nded largely on the behaviour of the U.S. 
economy.  Hence, faced with the recent slowdown in the U.S. economy, the Mexican government had 
taken important steps to mitigate that effect.  
58. The United States was Mexico's largest trading partner.  In 2006, the United States had 
received 84.7% of Mexico's exports and Mexico's  imports from the United States had accounted for 
53.4% of the total.  Mexico was the United States' second largest export market.  
59. From the entry into force of NAFTA, Mexican exports to the United States had increased 
more than four fold, with average annual growth of 15%.  In 2007, these exports had reached US$211 billion, which placed Mexico as the United Stat es' third-largest supplier, after Canada and 
China. 
60. On 1 January 2008 all tariffs maintained betwee n the two countries had been eliminated.  All 
agricultural and industrial tariff lines had a zero  tariff without exception.  Very few regional 
agreements had reached such a level of liberalizati on.  In the 14 years afte r its entry into force, 
NAFTA had succeeded in tripling the trilateral trad e between Mexico, the United States, and Canada, 
which would reach US$1 trillion in 2008.  This ag reement had given consumers access to a wider 
range of goods and services, bette r quality, and more competitive prices, had promoted investment in 
North America, and had created millions of jobs in the three countries.  
61. The United States was Mexico's largest foreign i nvestor.  U.S. direct investment in Mexico, 
had risen from less than US$3 billion on average in the years prior to 1994 to an annual average of 
more than US$10 billion after the entry into force of NAFTA.  
62. Trade problems with the United States were rela tively few, but very important.  While many 
stemmed from issues that were not negotiated bilate rally, some had to do with the lack of compliance 
with their obligations under the NAFTA, but with  multilateral implications.  For example, the 
problem of road transport, had emerged from non- compliance by the United States of the commitment 
to openness in NAFTA;  at the  multilateral level,  the only U.S. MFN exception in the GATS on this 
issue was against Mexico.  This seriously limited the overall competitiveness of the two countries.  
Mexico asked the United States whether it intended to remove this exception from its list under the 
Doha Round.  WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 13 
 
 
 63. As part of the Doha Round, both Mexico  and the United States sought strengthened 
multilateral rules, as well as better access for their ag ricultural and industrial products to international 
markets, and their service providers.  However, the recent Farm Bill contained provisions that Mexico 
believed were in violation of obligations assu med in the WTO, in the design of the support 
programmes and the size of the agricultural subsidie s.  The inclusion of a new programme of income 
guarantees for farmers, linked to the current producti on of certain crops, could be regarded as amber 
box and had the potential to exceed the commitments involved in the DDA.  Such provisions and the substantial increase in the amount of support we re extremely worrying for the future of the 
negotiations in agriculture and for the su ccessful conclusion of the Doha Round.  
64. Mexico remained convinced that the inefficien t production of biofuels was one of the main 
factors that had contributed to the food crisis.  Subsidized ethanol production in the United States had pressed global demand for grains, particularly maize, which had led to a sharp increase in international prices since January 2007, the interna tional price of maize had increased approximately 
48%;  some 75% of the increase in maize production in 2007 had been to produce ethanol.  The 
volume of corn used in the United States to produ ce ethanol represented about 30% of the total used 
at international level.  When all the costs of en ergy to produce ethanol were taken into account, its 
contribution to reducing the CO2 in the atmosphere was very small.  
65. The increase in agricultural product prices and its implications for developing countries, 
especially its poorest, could be aggravated by the su bsidies to be granted through the new agricultural 
legislation of the United States.  
66. Mexico believed that WTO Members had to take steps to effectively and substantially reduce 
domestic support that distort world trade, mainly that used by developed countries.  Therefore, 
Mexico urged the United States to maintain an ag ricultural policy in line with its WTO commitments 
and consistent with its position in the negotiation process in order to achieve a successful outcome of 
the Doha Round.  
67. The Appellate Body Report on the case of Definitive Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless 
Steel from Mexico, had found that the United St ates had acted in a manner inconsistent with 
paragraph 2 of Article VI of  GATT 1994 and paragraph 3 of Ar ticle 9 of the ADA by applying 
zeroing in five administrative reviews.  Zeroing remained a source of friction between the United 
States and its trading partners, as well as a risk factor for the successful conclusion of the Doha 
Round.  For these reasons, Mexico called on the Un ited States to abide by all the recommendations 
made by the DSB in this area and eliminate zeroing in all its forms, both in its investigations of 
alleged dumping and all subsequent reviews.  
68. The United States had made commitments in 11 services sectors and approximately 70% of 
the service industries under the GATS.  However, it had set various horizontal  limitations regarding 
the entry and temporary stay of persons, land acquis ition, grants and tax measures.  Mexico urged the 
U.S. delegation to substantially improve its service offerings, particularly in sectors and modes of 
supply of interest to developing countries.  
69. With regard to sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, the Secretariat had indicated that 
since the last Trade Policy Review of the United St ates there had been no significant changes to the 
institutional framework governing the implementation of such measures at the federal level.  The 
report had noted that, in accordance with federal law,  states in the United States were authorized to 
establish SPS measures if they were compatible with federal rules and regulations, as well as the obligations of the United States under the WTO.  In this regard, the Mexican authorities were 
interested in knowing how state regulations were subj ect to U.S. obligations under the WTO.  Several 
questions had been raised related to the absence of  deadlines set for the publication and entry into 
force of regulations with respect to plants, animals,  and derived products expor ted for the first time to WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 14  
 
 
 the United States, as well as to the administra tive procedures carried out by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and Customs and Border Protection at ports of entry for foodstuffs.   
70. Mexico urged the United States to exercise gr eater leadership and show the flexibilities 
needed to successfully conclude these ne gotiations before the end of 2008.  
71. The representative of Switzerland  was pleased to note that over the past two years, bilateral 
economic ties had been further strengthened.  Trad e had increased substantially:  the United States 
was Switzerland's second largest export market and a significant source of imports.  The United States 
was also Switzerland's most important destination for foreign investment, with US$105 billion and more than 300,000 high value jobs created by Sw iss companies;  furthermore, Switzerland was the 
most important foreign investor in U.S. manufacturing.  Also, Switzerland was among the ten most 
important destinations for U.S. foreign direct investment.  
72. A Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum had b een established in 2006, and during its first 
two years, had focused on issues linked with trad e and security, intellectual property, e-commerce, 
private data protection and trade in specific products. 
73. During the period under review, the United Stat es had continued to top world competitive 
rankings and benefited from labour productivity growth.  Exports ha d performed very well with a 
depreciating dollar and imports had remained at a high level, stim ulating economic activity around the 
world.  Switzerland was very concerned, however, by  the current economic situation triggered by the 
subprime, securitization and credit crises.  U. S. consumption and investment had weakened 
significantly, with falling house prices, tight credit,  a weakening labour market, and high oil and food 
prices.  The large savings-investment gap reflected in the significant current account deficit required 
major adjustments.  The U.S. economy and the dolla r had become very dependent on capital imports 
and policy changes of foreign investors.  The big challenge for policy-makers would be to contain 
inflationary pressures while stimulating growth and addressing major disequilibria.  
74. Switzerland commended the openness and transparency of the U.S. trade regime and the 
policy oriented toward further liberalization at th e bilateral, plurilateral,  and multilateral levels.  
Switzerland pursued the same aims;  however, it also had some concerns. 
75. Although Switzerland attributed the highest pr iority to security, trade-related measures 
needed to be internationally consistent and compa tible.  Bureaucracy should not be a tool to pursue 
more security.  Switzerland faced growing difficulty with the new unilateral security measures, namely the 100% cargo scanning initiative.  The Swiss business community expected a significant 
impact on trade with losses of competitiveness on th e U.S. market due to higher costs and longer 
delivery delays.  Switzerland pleaded for risk-bas ed controls to minimize additional costs and 
maximize the resulting benefits, close internationa l cooperation, and mutual  recognition of national 
regimes for the clearance of economic operators.  This was why the trade facilitation negotiations 
were so important to Switzerland. 
76. Switzerland saw room for improvement in several areas of the regulatory field such as 
technical norms or insurance services.  Responsibility at the state or city level implied a large variety 
of regimes, and significantly affected efficiency fo r firms.  The Transatlantic Dialogue and the Swiss-
U.S. Forum should engage in developing common regimes.  
77. Substantial progress was also needed to accelerat e the rulemaking process for meat exports to 
the U.S. and to simplify the requirements for foreig n firms so that small and medium-sized businesses 
were not prevented from entering the U.S. market.  With regard to the WTO plurilateral Agreement 
on Government Procurement, Switzerland encouraged  the United States to further liberalize markets 
at the State and city level. WT/TPR/M/200 
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 78. Switzerland shared the U.S. view that IPR pr otection was of utmost importance to foster 
private research, development, and innovation.  Switzerland also supported, together with the 
United States, the elimination of trade barrier s for environmental goods and services through the 
WTO. 
79. Switzerland and the United States shared a strong interest in the successful conclusion of the 
Doha negotiations and looked forw ard to further intensive cooperation to promote a more open world 
trading system and a rigorous implementation of its rules. 
80. The representative of Thailand speaking on behalf of ASEAN , noted that ASEAN and the 
United States enjoyed a long-standing strategic and ec onomic partnership.  Since the last U.S. TPR in 
March 2006, ASEAN and the United States had celebrated several milestones, including the signing of the U.S.-ASEAN TIFA in August 2006, the 30th anniversary of ASEAN-U.S. relations in 2007, 
and the appointment of the first U.S. ambassador to ASEAN in April 2008.  
81. The United States was among ASEAN’s most important trading partners, and ASEAN was 
the United States’ fifth largest trading partner.  In 2007, two-way trade had totalled approximately 
US$170 billion.  Some ASEAN Members had also concluded or were ne gotiating FTAs with the 
United States.  ASEAN looked forward to further strengthening trade and investment ties with the 
United States, and to bridging differences to push the DDA to a mutually beneficial conclusion.  
ASEAN shared the U.S. belief that concluding an ambitious round would "help lift millions of people 
in developing countries out of poverty."  ASEAN also  appreciated the United States’ statement that its 
“maintenance of an open, competitive market at  home, compliance with WTO obligations, and 
leadership in the multilateral trading system” were fundamental features of its trade policy, and urged 
the United States to continue fostering these traits. 
82. To that end, certain features of U.S. trade policy could be improved.  On agriculture, the 
Secretariat Report had noted that high out-quota tari ffs remained a main form of protection for U.S. 
agricultural products.  In addition, certain commod ities received high-level subsidies, with the export 
subsidization aspect of some payment programme s having recently been successfully challenged 
under WTO rules.  The United States was one of th e world’s leading agricultural producers:  ASEAN 
therefore urged it to prevent supported output from  distorting trade.  While the DDA outcome should 
effectively reduce U.S. trade-distorting subsidi es, ASEAN was concerned that the new Farm Bill 
increased subsidy thresholds for 15 commodities.   On the positive side, ASEAN welcomed the 
updated U.S. notifications to the Agriculture Comm ittee since its last Review, and looked forward to 
its updated tariff quota notification.  
83. Noting that tariff peaks and tariff escalation were  mainly present in products of export interest 
to developing countries, such as agriculture goods, textiles, and foot wear, ASEAN urged the 
United States to undertake and secure substantial tari ff reductions across the board in both agriculture 
and NAMA negotiations.  Such measures would provi de greater economic benefits and meaningful 
market access for all developing countries, which would in turn help propel the Development Round 
negotiations forward. 
84. The Secretariat Report had observed that con tingency measures remained a key trade policy 
instrument for the United States.  ASEAN noted th at AD investigations by the United States had 
increased from seven initiations in 2 006 to 29 in 2007, with measu res lasting for an average of 
11 years, and regretted that the United States was one of the major users.  Frequent recourse to such 
measures created uncertainty for foreign exporte rs, stifled competition, and retarded market 
adjustments.  ASEAN observed that several Memb ers continued to question AD/CVD investigation 
methods used by the United States.  Some of th ese methods had been found inconsistent with WTO 
rules.  ASEAN commended U.S. implementation of some DSB recommendations and rulings for 
certain disputes, and hoped it would continue efforts to bring itself into full compliance for all trade WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 16  
 
 
 remedy disputes, particularly on zeroing and By rd Amendment disbursements.  ASEAN also hoped 
that the United States would bring itself into full compliance in other disputes, such as those 
concerning its TRIPS obligations, particularly as the United States actively promoted increased IPR 
protection and enforcement. 
85. Turning to services, in the context of the current round of negotiations, while the United 
States constantly called upon emerging developing  Members in particular ASEAN to make their 
contribution through ambitious market access comm itments, the U.S. services regime was far from 
perfect, being particularly restrictive in certain se ctors, notably Mode 4, maritime transport, and 
logistics services, areas where U.S. leadership could be  decisive to the success of the Round.  Overall, 
the United States needed to provide leadership by  undertaking liberalizing commitments in sectors 
and modes of interest to developing countries.  ASEAN subscribed to the principle of progressive 
liberalization in accordance with Article 19 of th e GATS.  Certain ASEAN Members also remained 
convinced about the importance of and need for an emergency safeguard mechanism.  Having a set of 
meaningful disciplines on domestic regulations to ensure the quality of negotiated specific 
commitments before the conclusion of the Round also had high importance. 
86. The United States remained the world's largest single importer and a key engine of global 
growth.  As a result, its policies affected ev ery member of the WTO.  Continued openness, 
transparency, and improvements to U.S. trade polic ies and measures would further strengthen both the 
multilateral trading system and U.S. economic growth.   
87. The representative of Chinese Taipei , noted that the world economy was facing serious 
difficulties:  the food crisis, sharply increasing oil prices, and the threat of inflation.  Every country 
was encountering its own specific problems.  As the largest trading economy in the world, the 
United States was having to bear the pressures not only of these macroeconomic difficulties, but also 
of domestic financial crises, such as tighter liquidi ty in the debt markets and the impact of the 
continuing slowdown, as well as the challenge posed by the sub-prime mortgage crisis.  However, 
Chinese Taipei was impressed by U.S.  performance in such circumstanc es, largely due to its relatively 
stable and generally open trade regime, and its po licy of trade liberalization.  This was also 
contributing to the growth of its numerous partners  and helping to keep the global economy turning 
over.  The United States was Chinese Taipei's third largest trading partner, and Chinese Taipei ranked 
as the United States' ninth largest trading partner. 
88. The United States had shown a strong sense of leadership and commitment in the WTO.  
Nevertheless, a few aspects of U.S. trade policy re mained a source of some concern or worthy of 
comment.  Firstly, Chinese Taipei hoped the Preside nt’s Trade Promotion Authority, could be 
successfully renewed in the near future.  Secondly, the incidence of U.S. anti-dumping investigations 
had decreased from 2004 to 2006, an d no safeguard measures or investigations had been initiated 
during the period under review.  This was a very po sitive sign, which would help the flow of normal 
trade for foreign exporters.  Thirdly, Chinese Taip ei sought better access to information on the current 
U.S. administrative and legislative regime, particularly in areas such as custom procedures, trade 
remedy measures, trade-related intellectual propert y rights, financial services and agricultural policy 
trade remedy measures.   
89. The representative of Costa Rica  stated that the United States was Costa Rica' largest trading 
partner, absorbing 35% of its exports.  It was also its main supplier, with 38% of total imports.  Trade 
between the two countries had totalled just over US $8.5 billion in 2007.  Costa Rica's exports had 
totalled U$3.5 billion in the same year and imports from the United States had reached US$5 billion.  
The entry into force of the CAFTA-DR would stre ngthen this trend of trade growth and contribute 
greatly to the development of Costa Rica and the entire region.  WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 17 
 
 
 90. Costa Rica shared with the Un ited States a strong support for a multilateral trading system 
based on rules, and an interest in reaching an am bitious outcome in the Doha Round so as to reduce 
trade barriers and create new opportunities for all WT O Members on an MFN basis.  In this regard, 
Costa Rica welcomed the commitment expressed in the U.S. Government Report, to exercise its 
leadership to build the co nsensus necessary to enable a successful  conclusion of these negotiations in 
2008.  
91. However, Costa Rica was concerned about th e recent decision by the U.S. Congress to 
approve a new Farm Bill, which contradicted the objectives and mandate of the Doha Round.  The 
introduction of this new legislation, at a time when  farmers were benefiting from high world prices for 
their products, missed a rare opportunity to restructure and reform this sector.  
92. Costa Rica also noted the changes in cust oms procedures by the United States aimed at 
incorporating additional security considerations.  Co sta Rica urged the United States to continue along 
risk-based approach path and thereby avoid creati ng potential barriers to trade and investments.  
93. The representative of Argentina  highlighted that the openness of the U.S. economy had 
contributed to the efficiency that characterized this  economy.  Argentina trusted that this efficiency, 
and greater trade openness would serve to promote clarity to the economic uncertainty that prevailed in early 2008.  The U.S. economy was flexible, a nd Argentina was convinced that this would help 
overcome the negative effects of the slowdown in th e housing market and the turbulence of financial 
markets as well as new challenges posed by energy prices and food.  
94. The United States had a prominent place in the Doha Round negotiations.  Argentina shared 
many of the goals of the United States and was confident that the negotiations could be brought 
forward if each Member exercised its responsibilities.  
95. A significant portion of U.S. imports entered Argent ina's territory free of tariffs.  Despite this, 
since the last Trade Policy Review, trade liberali zation measures taken by the United States had been 
mostly a matter of preferences.  Argentina was confident that the current Round confident would 
serve to multilateralize these openings.  
96. Trade relations between Argentina and the Un ited States had experienced an impressive 
evolution since the economic crisis that Argen tina had suffered.  Betw een 2002 and 2007 Argentina's 
exports to the United States had increased from US $2.87 billion to US$4.06 billion, and imports from 
US$1.79 billion to US$5.34 billion.  This development s howed that when tariffs were set at levels that 
allowed both trade and growth, as was the case with many industrial products from developing 
countries, it was not the reduction of those tariffs which created new trade flows and access real markets, but a situation of economic growth  underpinned by a strong production basis.  
97. Argentina had begun, thanks to economic growth, to diversify its exports to the U.S. market 
since the 2002 crisis.  Despite this, manufacturi ng exports of agricultural origin and commodities 
continued to represent a significant portion of Arge ntina's commercial interests in the U.S. market. 
98. Argentina shared with the United States the appr oach of promoting the use of internationally 
accepted standards and scientific evidence for the app lication of sanitary and phytosanitary measures.  
Argentina hope that the United States would c ontinue to pursue these objectives on sectoral trade 
objectives.  Moreover, Argentina was convinced that  the current environment, characterized by high 
agricultural prices, should present a favourable econo mic climate to introduce significant changes in 
agricultural policies aimed at greater orientation towards the market in this sector.  Argentina 
regretted in this regard, that the recently appr oved Farm Bill not only fa iled to properly provide 
market signals, but ignored completely the situation of the Doha Round negotiations.  WT/TPR/M/200 
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 99. The representative of Chile  noted that despite U.S. commit ment to the multilateral trading 
system, some measures applied by the United States we re of concern.  In particular, recent legislation 
had dramatically increased subsidies to agriculture, at a time when discussions were being held in the 
WTO to reduce subsidies.  The United had post poned indefinitely the adoption of legislation 
implementing the trade agreement negotiated with Co lombia, a developing country that needed that 
agreement urgently.  Chile was also concerned by  the intensive use of anti-dumping measures, which 
had increased during 2007;  according to the Secret ariat report, applied duties were as high as 280%, 
and significantly affected domestic prices.  This, in  a context where predatory dumping simply could 
not take place in a modern economy.  Chile was al so concerned about the maintenance of payments 
made under the Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Byr d Amendment), although it had been found to be 
contrary to WTO rules by the Appellate Body.  
100. The ties between the United States and Chile were long-standing and went beyond the purely 
commercial.  The United States was the main inv estor in Chile.  The business relationship between 
the United States and Chile was strong and vibrant and was based on a free trade agreement, which had entered into force on 1 January 2004.  Since then, bilateral trade had grown by 155%, from 
US$6.282 billion in 2003 to US$16.065 billion in 2007.   U.S. exports had risen steadily and were 
currently at a level comparable with that of impor ts.  As of January 2008, 7,675 tariff lines had been 
liberalized, representing 98.4% of Chile's export bask et.  By 2015, 100% of trade in goods from both 
countries would be completely liberalized.  Th e U.S.-Chile FTA was a modern, comprehensive 
agreement, which had proved to be mutually beneficial. 
101. Chile was concerned about the possible conseque nces for bilateral trade regulations of the 
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorist Standard (CFA TS) adopted by the Department of Homeland 
Security.  It was particularly concerned about the transparency in drafting the regulation, which had not been notified to the WTO;  the lack of scien tific basis for the measure;  and some procedural 
aspects, including the 60-day term given for the provisions to become applicable while the WTO 
recommended 180 days.  Chile was also concerned a bout the approval of an amendment to Marketing 
Order 925 with respect to table grapes:  such legislation would create unfair access conditions for 
products of Chile and harm U.S. consumers.  In th is connection, Chile asked whether there were plans 
to notify the norm under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.  
102. The representative of Australia
 noted that the United States and Australia had a strong record 
of promoting free trade.  They shared a dynamic trade relationship and the common goal of supporting global trade liberalization as a key driver  for world economic growth and development.  
The United States was Australia's largest single-country  economic partner.  In 2007, the United States 
was Australia's third-largest two-way trading partner.   It was Australia's third-largest export market, 
its largest services trading partner and the major s ource of Australia’s foreign direct investment.  
Australia was the ninth largest direct investor in  the United States.  This close relationship was 
reinforced by the Australia-United States Free Trad e Agreement (AUSFTA), now in its fourth year.  
Australia and the United States continued to work  to expand the trade and economic relationship. 
103. As a major agricultural exporter, Australia w as disappointed at farm support measures in the 
U.S. 2008 Farm Bill.  The Bill reinforced rather th an reformed Government support for agriculture.  
The Bill increased a number of subsidies and levies that would directly affect Australian exports, and 
further underlined the need to conclude the Doha Round in 2008. 
104. Australia welcomed the steps taken by the Un ited States to implement rulings of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body.  In this regard, Austra lia placed particular importance on the leadership 
shown by major players, such as the United States, in  contributing to the integrity and predictability of 
the multilateral trading system, and encouraged the Un ited States to continue to work towards full and 
prompt compliance in all relevant cases.  Aust ralia was encouraged by the strength of the 
United States’ wider bilateral and regional free-tr ade agenda.  Australia hoped this would provide WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 19 
 
 
 added impetus to the United States’ efforts to reduce trade barriers in the multilateral context.  It was 
vital during this period of increased economic uncertainty that all nations sustained their commitment to trade liberalization.  A successful outcome to the Doha Round – one that delivered improvements 
in market access across agriculture, industrial produc ts and services – would provide a major boost for 
the world economy, strengthen the multilateral trading system, and make an important contribution to 
improving global food security.  Further progress was needed urgently and Australia looked forward 
to continuing to work closely with the United St ates and other WTO Members in their efforts to 
conclude the Round in 2008. 
105. The representative of Japan
 stated that despite new challe nges, such as housing and credit 
markets, the U.S. economy had been robust, a nd that it had been supported by an open and 
competitive trade system advocated by the U.S. Gove rnment.  In light of the current soaring resource 
prices, it had become even more important to ach ieve further effective allocation of resources by 
improving predictability and transparency.  From this point of view, the United States, as a leader of the world economy and trade, was expected to ma ke a significant contribution to promoting the 
multilateral trading system in the right direction. 
106. Japan highly appreciated the United States’ co mmitment to the multilateral trading system 
and its continued contribution to its  strengthening.  In particular, Japan expected the United States to 
continue to exercise leadership in order to br ing the DDA to a successful conclusion by the end of 
2008. 
107. In the past two years, the United States had b een engaged in FTA negotiations with a number 
of countries.  Japan expected these negotiations an d agreements to both support and expand trade 
liberalization in the multilateral trading syst em, as stated in the Government Report. 
108. Security considerations had continued to driv e significant changes in customs procedures, 
such as the 24 hours rule and 100% container scanning under the SAFE Port Act 2006.  Although 
Japan shared U.S. concerns on secu rity-related issues and renewed its commitment to cooperate with 
the United States in this respect, security concerns should not disp roportionately compromise trade.  
The United States had mentioned in its Government Report that one of the fundamental features of 
U.S. trade policy was compliance with WTO obligat ions.  While the United States had made progress 
in implementing several WTO rulings calling for changes to U.S. legislation,  Japan had concerns about the delay in the implementation of certain DSB recommendations and rulings.  The United 
States was the most frequent user of the WTO disp ute settlement system and had helped to enhance 
the predictability and reliability of the system, in terms of implementation of most of the DSB recommendations and rulings, and the positive roles played in the DSU negotiations.  Effective 
functioning of the DS system was vital for the ma intenance of the WTO system.  This gave more 
reasons for Japan's concern over a few cases in whic h U.S. implementation had been delayed.  Japan 
also had concerns over the Jones Act. 
109. Japan appreciated the commitment and efforts by the U.S. administration to address the issues 
of harmonization in its patent system, including the "first to invent" rather than "first to file" system.  Japan noted the answer provided by the United States  to its questions.  Japan was not challenging its 
consistency with the TRIPS Agreement, but was ra ther requesting harmonization for the sake of better 
protection of universal patent rights. 
110. The representative of Brazil
 noted that whilst the WTO Secretariat credited the United States 
with a generally open and non-discriminatory trad e policy, there remained many market access 
barriers and various trade distorting measures in signi ficant areas, especially for developing countries, 
such as in agriculture, textiles, steel, and footwear .  The persistence of those barriers and practices 
generated significant losses for exporte rs in the developing world. WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 20  
 
 
 111. The 2008 U.S. TPR was taking place at a critical moment for the global economy.  The 
depreciation of the dollar, inflationary pressures, and rising international prices of agriculture and 
energy commodities posed challenges to all.  As th e world’s single largest economy and trader, the 
United States was a major factor in these challenges and had to play a leading role in the search for 
solutions.  The United States was also one of Brazil’ s main trade partners, accounting for almost 20% 
of Brazilian exports.  Thus, restrictive trade measure s in the United States caused  concern in Brazil.  
Sectors that relied on protection and subsidies see med to dominate the U.S. trade agenda.  The 
increasing preference for bilateralism and the political rhetoric in favour of protectionism in trade and 
foreign investments were worrisome.  Brazil looked forward to concrete signs of continued U.S. 
commitment to the multilateral trading system. 
112. The 2008 Farm Bill reinforced the longstanding relia nce of U.S. agriculture on subsidies.  The 
G-20 had outlined that the Farm Bill would lead to  larger outlays through increased thresholds for 
subsidies payments for 15 commodities, in contra diction to the Doha Round Mandate and the recent 
DSB decisions on cotton.  The new Bill created a coupled income insurance programme that was 
likely to generate generous payments well beyond  the subsidies' ceiling under consideration in the 
Doha Round.  The Bill ran counter the long-term pro cess of reform in agriculture and accentuated the 
unfair competition brought about by subsidies.  Recent World Bank studies had highlighted that 
agricultural trade reform would provide a major contribution to the reduction of inequality and 
poverty in the United States, as well as in developing countries.  
113. The United States had been slow or reluctant to implement several WTO Dispute Settlement 
rulings, such as on cotton subsidies.  The lack of compliance with dispute settlement rulings 
undermined the predictability of the rules-based multi lateral trading system.  Brazil had received with 
satisfaction the recent DSB decision on cotton and hoped that it would stimulate the United States to improve on its record of compliance. 
114. Whilst average MFN tariffs were low, many significant tariff peaks remained, especially in 
agriculture.  Brazil's top 20 export products faced an  average tariff of 23% in the U.S. market, while 
the top 20 U.S. export products faced an average ta riff of only 11.6% in Brazil.  Specific duties and 
fees added an extra burden on imports of sugar, or ange juice, and ethanol.  U.S. ethanol producers 
were protected by a policy that  combined a domestic subsidy (a US$0.51 per gallon volumetric 
ethanol excise tax credit for ethanol blenders) and border protection (a US$0.54 per gallon tariff on 
top of a 2.5% ad valorem duty).  Brazil considered that the United States should correct this 
discriminatory treatment in favor of domestic et hanol.  Brazil also remained concerned about the 
categorization of direct payments as Green Bo x and counter-cyclical pa yments as non-product-
specific AMS.  
115. Low tariffs were often nullified by the use of  trade remedies.  Well over 200 anti-dumping 
measures were in force, more than half affecting ir on and steel products.  Some of those measures had 
been considered illegal under WTO rules, including the use of “zeroing”, but the procedures for AD 
investigations remained largely unchanged. 
116. The U.S. trade regime still presented significant barriers and distortive practices, particularly 
harmful to developing country exporters.  Addressi ng these would be to the benefit of the multilateral 
trading system and to the U.S. economy itself.   Brazil continued to follow with interest internal 
developments with regard to trade policy in the United States and hoped that the U.S. Government 
would continue to give priority to the multilatera l trading system and would decisively pursue the 
implementation of the Doha Mandate , in order to conclude the Round in 2008 with an ambitious pro-
development outcome. 
117. 
The representative of Canada  stated that Canada and the United States enjoyed a strong trade 
and investment partnership, facilitated by a rules- based trading system offered by the WTO and the WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 21 
 
 
 NAFTA.  The two countries shared the largest bila teral flow of goods, services, people, and capital 
between any two nations in the world, moving cl ose to C$2 billion worth of goods and services and 
approximately 186,000 people across the border each da y.  Canada and the United States were each 
other's largest customers and biggest suppliers on a single nation basis.  In 2007, Canada had exported 
US$364 billion in goods and services to the United States and imported US$296 billion in return.  By integrating both economies, they had increased the productivity of North American producers, 
facilitated their participation in gl obal supply chains, and created an e nvironment that allowed them to 
be more competitive. 
118. Canada and the United States also had a long hi story of two-way investment.  In 2007, U.S. 
direct investment in Canada had been US$288 billion;   this represented nearly 58% of total FDI in 
Canada and made the United States the top foreign investor.  Canadian direct investment in the 
United States had been US$225 billion, accounting for 44% of Canadian foreign direct investment abroad. 
119. As one of the world’s most dynamic and prospe rous economies, the United States remained a 
major engine for global growth and had demonstr ated its commitment to trade liberalization by 
playing a key role in the WTO and through its ambitious bilateral and regional trade agenda.  
However, U.S support to engage in the global economy appeared to be waning:  legislative and other 
actions had the potential to undermine past gains.  A demonstrable commitment to continued trade 
liberalization was more important now, than ever befo re, in order to help create the conditions needed 
for a successful global marketplace.  Canada urged th e United States to hold steadfast in its support of 
trade liberalization in the coming years.  
120. Three key areas of importance were border security, food and product safety, and agriculture.  
On border security, despite ongoing efforts to bu ild a more open, integrated, economy, North 
American industry had had to face new challenges in  recent years in doing business across the border.  
Measures included an increased number of inspectio ns and more onerous re porting burdens.  Canada 
shared the U.S. desire to enhan ce security that had fuelled the implementation of these measures and 
was confident that through continued engagement with its trading partners, the United States could 
maintain a high-level of border security while avoiding unnecessary impediments to the flow of 
goods, services, and people. 
121. In the area of food and consumer product safety, Canada and the United States shared a 
common interest to protect their citizens from potentially hazardous goods.  With over US$32 billion 
of agricultural goods having crossed their border in 2007, their food systems were highly integrated.  
Given the level of inter-dependenc y of their systems, Canada had been closely monitoring recently 
proposed measures in the United States that could si gnificantly raise costs for both their industries.  
Canada looked forward to continuing to work w ith the United States on a coordinated approach to 
address food and product safety concerns based  on level of risk and sound science.  
122. In agriculture, there remained a small number of high-profile issues that continued to pose 
serious concern for Canada.  For example, Canada  was very concerned and disappointed with the 
2008 Farm Bill, which lacked any meaningful refo rm and represented a missed opportunity for the 
United States to show real leadership in agri cultural reform.  Amongst Ca nada’s concerns were 
mandatory country-of-origin labelling; provisions on  sugar; additional importation requirements for 
softwood lumber; and the increased lo an rates, target prices, and other trade-distorting support, which 
ran counter to the agreed objectives in the WTO D oha negotiations.  The amendments to mandatory 
country-of-origin labelling represented only an incr emental improvement to the provisions in the 
previous bill, and the legislation still contained fi sheries, agriculture and agri-food product labelling 
requirements that were arbitrary and flawed, and wh ich ignored the reality of an integrated North 
American market. WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 22  
 
 
 123. Given the generally close compatibility of U.S.-Canadian interests and their strong working 
relationships, it was important for the region’s fu ture prosperity and competitiveness that they 
continued to face these challenges together.  Cana da looked to the United States to continue its 
leadership efforts to achieve global economic and trade liberalization, in spite of the increasing 
scepticism of trade and increasing support for protectionism at home.  There was too much at stake to 
shift directions now.  Canada also encouraged th e United States to continue playing an important 
leadership role in working to wards a successful and ambitious outcome to the WTO Doha 
negotiations. 
124. The representative of Norway  noted that the United States continued to be hugely influential 
in the global economy.  The magnitude of trade and investment flows in and out of the United States 
had a significant impact on all WTO Members. 
125. The United States had been a motor of interna tional trade negotiations and a key player in 
both launching and in ensuring the successful outcome  of previous rounds of  negotiations.  Norway 
was pleased that the United States would continue to  show leadership as work continued to bring the 
Doha Round negotiations forward, as c onfirmed by Ambassador Allgeier. 
126. The United States had a very open economy, with low tariffs and generally few restrictions on 
trade in goods and services or on foreign investme nt.  The importance of this to the world economy 
could not be overstated.  Th e housing downturn and associated credit turmoil of early 2008 had 
triggered an aggressive monetary policy response, wh ich could prove to be a challenge in a landscape 
of rising inflationary pressures, in the United States and globally.  The efforts by the United States to 
deal with this situation were followed with great  interest by other countries due to the impact 
economic developments in the United States would have on the rest of the world.  The latest 
assessments were cautiously optimis tic.  The effects of the macroeconomic policy response together 
with the easing of monetary policy were expected to r esult in a turn for the better in the second half of 
2008.   
127. Certain aspects of U.S. trade policy continued to give some reason for concern.  While 
Norway commended U.S. policy regarding FDI, it ha d some concerns related to the implementation 
of the Foreign Investment and National Security  Act of 2007 (FINSA).  It was important that 
measures to protect national security were transp arent and that the processes of review under the 
FINSA be sufficiently predictable, in practice.  No rway was concerned that the present legislation and 
the regulations proposed by the Treasury did not fully meet these expectations.   
128. The United States was an important market for Norwegian exports of fish and fish products.  
A longstanding obstacle for Norwegian imports into th e U.S. market continued to be the anti-dumping 
and countervailing measures imposed on whole, fresh  Norwegian salmon.  The measures had been 
first introduced in 1991 and, in Norway's view, there was no basis for the application of the measures.  
U.S. practice relating to "sunset re views" appeared to result in a rather automatic "roll over" every 
five years.  The situation had changed since th e early 1990s when Norwegian salmon exports to the 
U.S. market were substantial:  Norway’s share of the market was now marginal.  Norway furthermore 
noted that the "domestic producers" of salmon in  the United States, comprised mainly a single, 
foreign-owned company, which was a major supplier of its own imported salm on to the United Stated, 
and had only very limited production in  the United States.  The result of the U.S. measures had been 
the substitution of Norwegian supplie rs of salmon by other foreign suppliers, to the detriment of 
Norwegian exporters as well as U.S. consum ers and the U.S. processing industry.  
129. Maritime transport was important for Norway, and constituted the backbone of world trade.  
This should be properly reflected by Members' commitments in their GATS schedules.  Norway 
appreciated that the U.S. market for international maritime transportation, with some exemptions, was 
open for foreign participants.  Norway therefore encouraged the United States to engage WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 23 
 
 
 constructively in the negotiations on maritime se rvices.  In particular Norway encouraged a 
favourable response to the plurilateral request in maritime transport forwarded to United States by 
some Members, including Norway. 
130. The representative of Hong Kong, China  noted that the United States and Hong Kong, China 
maintained close economic and trade relations.  In 2007, the United States had been Hong Kong, 
China's second largest trading partner, its second la rgest export market and its fifth largest source of 
imports.  Total trade in 2007 had amounted to US$65 b illion, an increase of 2.5% year on year.  Hong 
Kong, China applauded the United States' continue d efforts at trade liberalization;  many WTO 
Members looked to the United States to continue its leadership in trade liberalization and the 
maintenance of open markets.  Further reforms undertaken on a MFN basis would promote U.S. 
welfare and foster global market trade flows and strengthen the multilateral trading system. 
131. The United States had put a lot of effort and resources during the period under review into 
formulating security programmes.  Hong Kong, China supported initiatives to enhancing global 
security, and recognized the importance of strengt hening global security through international 
cooperation.  However, being a major business hub a nd one of the world's busiest container ports, 
Hong Kong, China was concerned that security initiatives should not impede legitimate trade or the smooth operation of the port, and asked that the implementation of any security measures not unduly 
affect the efficiency of the flow of go ods or impose punitive costs on doing business. 
132. The United States had bound almost all of its tari ff lines, and had maintained a low rate for 
average applied tariffs at 4.8% in 2007 - almost on a par with its average bound rate of 4.7%.  This 
had imparted a high degree of predictability to trad ers.  However, individual products, such as tuna, 
apparel, footwear and even brooms , were still subject to relatively high tariff rates of between 30% 
and 64%.  Hong Kong, China encouraged the United States to consider lowering the tariffs on these 
products. 
133. There had been a sharp increase in the number of anti-dumping investigations initiated by the 
United States, up from 13 in 2005 to 29 in 2007;  and countervailing investigations had increased 
from two in 2005 to five in 2 007.  Hong Kong, China believed that imposition of these defence 
measures, or even the initiation of investigations alone, was prone to be trade harassing and likely to 
have trade distorting effects.  Hong Kong, China' s position on the highly selective U.S. practice of 
zeroing had been well-rehearsed in meetings of th e Negotiating Group on Rules and needed no further 
elaboration.  Hong Kong, China therefore appealed to the United States to ex ercise the utmost caution 
and restraint in considering and taking such action. 
134. The United States' average MFN applied tariff in  agriculture (8.9% in 2007) was more than 
double the rate of protection afforded to the non- agricultural sector.  The U.S. Department of 
Agriculture had also found that so me elements of farm programme payments might be inconsistent 
with market signals.  In the current environm ent of high commodity prices, Hong Kong, China 
encouraged the United States to in troduce policy changes, and working closely with other key players 
in the DDA agricultural negotiations to achieve s ubstantial reductions in these trade-distorting and 
unfair subsidies and tariffs.  In this sense, H ong Kong, China noted with great concern the recent 
passage of the Farm Bill, which was a missed opportuni ty for much needed reforms.  In itself, this 
constituted a very strong argument for a revised Ag reement on Agriculture within the context of a 
successful DDA outcome, so as to override its trade distorting provisions. 
135. Both the United States and Hong Kong, China were staunch supporters  of the multilateral 
trading system;  they shared the same goal of purs uing continuous liberalization for trade in services, 
as a component of the eventual successful conclu sion of the Round.  U.S. market access barriers 
persisted in a few, but nevertheless, important areas.   One of these was maritime services, for which 
the United States had yet to make an offer.  Hong Kong, China was of the view that the Jones Act WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 24  
 
 
 remained a serious access barrier to the U.S. ma rket and a major derogation from the fundamental 
principles of the WTO Agreements.  It looked forwar d to a review by the United States as to whether 
the legislation covered by the exemption still serve d the objectives originally intended, and whether 
the conditions for the retention of the measures s till prevailed.  Hong Kong, China encouraged the 
United States in its next services offer to narrow the gap between the commitments it had undertaken 
under the GATS and its more liberal de facto  regime.  
136. The representative of China  welcomed the opportunity to collectively evaluate the trade 
policy and practices of the United States and their impact on the functioning of the multilateral trading 
system.  As the world’s largest economy and the biggest beneficiary for decades from the multilateral 
trading system, the U.S. economy had remained robust during the past two years, with average growth 
of nearly 3%;  the federal fiscal deficit had contract ed steadily to some 1.2% of GDP in 2007;  U.S. 
imports and exports had c ontinued to expand faster than GDP on average.  While these achievements 
were commendable, some problems had aroused extensive concerns among Members. 
137. The United States had experienced an economic slowdown since late 2007, mainly due to the 
sub-prime crisis, with more profound and wide-ra nging spill-over effects rippling cross multiple 
sectors.  The continuous downward adjustment on in terest rates and the expansionary fiscal policy by 
the U.S. Federal Reserve had led to continued depr eciation of the dollar, aggravated the inflation 
pressure worldwide, and further added fuel to the ra pid increase of the crude oil and food prices.  This 
had put developing countries that were highly dependent on imports of these commodities under 
heavier inflationary pressure, and they had suffere d great economic losses.  As a major currency for 
international settlement, the dollar’ s continued depreciation seriously affected the exports of other 
countries, especially those vulnerable and export-or iented developing countries, undermining their 
ability to further develop and to address their social  problems.  As a major currency for international 
reserve, the dramatic depreciation of the dollar had led to shrinking national reserves and reduced 
social welfare in many countries.  In this connectio n, China hoped that the Un ited States, as a driving 
engine of the world’s economy, would take quick and targeted actions to stabilize the U.S. dollar.   
138. The rising sentiment of protectionism in the Un ited States also caused increasing concerns.  
U.S. economic fatigue had led to a significant retrogression in the domestic attitude towards 
multilateral trade liberalization, to rising voices for the protection of domestic industries, and to slower further trade reform.  The failure of th e U.S. Congress to renew Trade Promotion Authority 
and the adoption of new Farm Bill, which maintained  enormous agricultural subsidies, had sent very 
negative signals with respect to U.S. leadership  and its political will to contribute in the Doha 
negotiations.  Members were also concerned about the continuous abu se by the United States of trade 
remedy measures.  At end 2007, 224 definitive anti-dumping measures had been in effect, and the 
average duration had been some 11 years;  the oldest dated back to 1973.  China remained 
disappointed at the multiple delays of and reluctan ce the United States to comply with the rulings of 
the DSB.  This was an obvious contradiction to its st atus as the biggest beneficiary of and most active 
cheerleader for multilateral trade liberalization.  Chin a was very concerned that, if this tendency to 
protectionism grew unchecked, it could become a th reat to global trade and the multilateral trading 
system.  
139. The bilateral trade relations between China and the United States had continued to accelerate, 
with trade volumes of US$263 billion and US$302 billion in 2006 and 2007, increasing by 24.1% and 15% respectively.  The United States and China were  each others' second largest trading partner, and 
their trade structures were highly complementary.  Therefore, maintaining healthy trade relations and 
deepening mutual cooperation would promote econom ic development and welfare in both countries, 
and contribute to the economic growth of the worl d as a whole.  In this respect, China had some 
concerns. WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 25 
 
 
 140. China had noted a growing tendency of protectionism  in U.S. trade with China.  In 2007, the 
U.S. Congress had introduced 52 bills on trade with  China, most of which requested the U.S. 
Administration to strengthen pressure on China, either  through restrictions or influence over bilateral 
trade.  China was especially concerned that such  bills were more and more manipulated by non-
economic factors, which was an unhealthy sign.  
141. There had also been a sharp increase in the numbe r of trade remedies against China.  In 2007 
alone, the United States had initiated seven joint anti-dumping/countervailing investigations, five 
independent anti-dumping investigations, and 17 Sec tion 337 investigations, the highest number in 
recent years.  The United States had shown a strong arbitrariness in the investigations and rulings, 
including extending the scope of investigations at will and had conducted unfai r treatment of Chinese 
firms.  For instance, in joint anti-dumping/counte rvailing investigations, the United States had used 
the data from Chinese enterprises in the countervailing in vestigation, but had used the data of a third 
country in the anti-dumping investigation.  In a nother case, while refusing to recognize China as a 
“market economy” and imposing an ti-dumping duties based on discriminative calculations, the United 
States had taken countervailing measures simultaneousl y, resulting in double counting, which was not 
in line with relevant WTO rules. Moreover, in  anti-dumping investigations, the United States had 
acted arbitrarily in selecting surrogate countri es, refusing to recognize Chinese market-oriented 
industries and adopting zeroing methodology in the re views.  All these actions had seriously damaged 
the rights of Chinese industries and brought  uncertainty to bilateral trade. 
142. While requesting China to further open its market, the United States still maintained 
restrictions and controls on the export of high-t ech products for civilian use.  The comparative 
advantages of China and the United States determined that their trades were mutually complementary:  
China’s comparative export advantage lay in labour -intensive products, while the United States had 
strong advantages in exporting technology-intensiv e products and high value-added services.  
Restrictions on the export of civilian high-tech pr oducts undermined balanc ed development of the 
bilateral trade relations.  
143. The overall tariff level was relatively low, but tariff peaks, tariff escalation and high out-of-
quota tariffs were impediments to trade.  High tariff  rates had remained in se veral sectors, especially 
in those of export interest to developing countries.   The long-existing tariff escalation had restricted 
imports of semi-manufactured or manufactured goods with high added value.  Tariff quotas and 
quantitative restrictions on some agricultural prod ucts was aimed at protecting the interests of 
domestic industries.  The exceptionally high ta riff rates on out-of-quota imports also constituted 
barriers to foreign products.  
144. Agriculture was another core issue of concern to China.  The United Stated provided large 
subsidies to its agriculture, distorting domestic pr oduction and international trade, forcing many 
developing Members out of competition, and leavi ng the livelihood and food security of billions of 
developing country subsistence farmers at threat.  Since 2005, the United States had been subsidizing 
corn-based biofuel, which had driven up prices of food and had become a major factor in the current 
world food crisis.  This had also caused great suffe ring to many developing Members, especially those 
vulnerable economies depending heavily on imported food.  With the DDA negotiations now entering 
a crucial stage, Members looked to the United States to play a leadership role and make substantial 
reductions in agricultural subsidies.  The prices of agricultural products were soaring worldwide, 
providing the best opportunity for the United States to reduce its subsidies without much pain.  However, the U.S. Congress had just passed a new Fa rm Bill, maintaining agriculture subsidies at a 
high level and increasing direct payment to 15 prod ucts.  These actions had ignored the voices of 
many developing Members and defied the rulings  of the DSB, which caste a shadow over the 
successful conclusion of DDA negotiations.  WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 26  
 
 
 145. With regard to non-tariff barriers to trade, there was a tendency to abuse border measures and 
TBT/SPS measures by the United States.  As the Secr etariat Report pointed out, the U.S. customs had 
newly added a number of extreme requireme nts, including 100% scanning and "10+2 port 
documents" requirements for "national security reas ons".  Although China understood the need for 
national security, these excessive measures had incr eased the time and the economic cost for 
importers, and constituted barriers to free trade.  Furthermore, a number of TBT/SPS measures 
applied without sound rationale were inconsistent with intern ational standards, and were de facto  
obstacles undermining imports.  In particular, Artic le 733 of the Agricultural Allocation Bill for the 
Fiscal Year 2008, passed at the end of 2007, stipulat ed that the appropriation under this bill should not 
be used to "design or implement" policies on the import of cooked poultry from China.  While 
bilaterally, the United States had stated several time s that there were no "technical problems" in the 
import of Chinese cooked poultry prod ucts and that this issue would be solved as soon as possible, 
domestically it had kept using administrative measur es to regulate trade, which were not consistent 
with WTO rules.  China urged the United States to terminate these measures as soon as possible.  
146. China had noted that the United Stated had tig htened its control on cross-sector foreign 
investment.  The United States had modified its la ws on foreign investment and national security, 
granting the Authority the power of investigation with little restraint, whic h had added uncertainties 
for foreign investors.  Sectors such as banking, in surance, power generation and distribution, natural 
gas, and communication were more strictly regulated at the state level.  Government interventions on 
foreign investment had been exercised with ex cessive examination and s upervision procedures. 
147. Concerning transparency, China had noted that there was much room for improvement.  As a 
founding Member of GATT and WTO, the United Stat es had designed several trade-related policies 
without sufficient consultations with interested par ties or notification to the WTO.  The Secretariat 
had noted that the United Stated fell short of fulf illing its notification obligations on preferential rules 
of origin, agricultural tariff quotas, and government procurement statistics.  Furthermore, too many 
state regulations and rules made the U.S. le gal framework complex and opaque, and created de facto  
barriers for foreign investors, especially in services and TBT/SPS.  
148. With regard to services, though access to the U.S. market was broad in general, the 
United States seemed to be reluctant to open sev eral key sectors such as banking, insurance, and 
telecommunications.  Equity caps, restrictions in types of services or business scope, excessive qualification requirements, and exceptions in MFN treat ment were still maintained at the state level.  
The United States was particularly conservative on Mode 4 and on sectors such as maritime 
transportation and launching of civilian satellites, and maintained several discriminatory measures 
inconsistent with WTO rules.  
149. The healthy development of the multilateral tr ading system required a more open, fair, and 
transparent policy framework.  Promoting the DDA nego tiations would serve the best interests of all 
Members, especially given current uncertainties.  The DDA was now at a crucial stage.  Whether the 
deadlock could be broken and a conclusion reached  before the end of 2008 depended very much on 
the outcome of the agriculture negotiations, particul arly on the reduction of agricultural subsidies.  
China urged the United States, as the greatest bene ficiary for decades of the multilateral trading 
system, to play a leading role and make a new and meaningful offer to substantially reduce its 
domestic support in agriculture to break the ice.   Only when the United States and other major 
developed Members exercised due leadership coul d a successful conclusion of DDA be achieved. 
150. The representative of Korea
 noted that the United States is was major political, economic, and 
trading partner for Korea.  Korea expected the bilateral FTA, concluded in 2007, to bring the 
partnership to a new height of mutual benefits and prosperity.  As one of the United States’ important 
trading partners, Korea had a deep interest in the U.S. trade regime. WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 27 
 
 
 151. After an extended period of economic expansion, the United States was confronting an 
economic slowdown, as a result of the negative effects of the credit crunch and the subprime mortgage crisis.  Since a robust and stable U.S.  economy was crucial for sustainable global economic 
growth, Korea hoped these economic challenges w ould be addressed with appropriate policy 
adjustments.  However, Korea was concerned that  there was a rising protectionist sentiment in the 
United States.  The Secretariat report questioned th e sustainability of the current account deficit, 
which was likely to increase protectionist sentiment.  The Secretariat Report was very pertinent in pointing out that raising savings rates would be th e right policy response for the U.S. Government to 
address the deficit, while maintaining its traditi onal openness, which allowe d U.S. consumers access 
to goods, services, and capital from abroad at the be st conditions.  Korea hoped the U.S. Government 
would follow this path and resist any call for protectionism.  
152. The DDA had entered a critical stage.  Korea ve ry much appreciated the U.S. delegation’s 
great efforts since the launching of the DDA, but called  for even greater efforts and leadership to help 
conclude the final leg of the DDA successfully.  In this regard, it was reassuring to hear the U.S. 
Government’s firm commitment to the successful conclusion of the DDA.   
153. Korea was concerned about the increase in anti-dum ping investigations initiated in 2007, after 
a decrease in 2005 and 2006.  Korea requested the Un ited States to take a more prudent approach in 
initiating anti-dumping investigations, by not utilizing them as a systemic trade barrier.  In particular, 
Korea was deeply concerned about the continued use of the "zeroing" methodology, despite consistent 
rulings against the practice by the DSB.  Korea urge d the United States to stop its zeroing practice in 
all anti-dumping proceedings.  While Korea we lcomed the stated commitment by the U.S. 
government to comply with the DSB rulings, it would appreciate early implementation of this commitment.  It was especially important for a major player like the United States set the example in order to maintain the integrity and predictability of the WTO.  
154. Security considerations had continued to play an important role in the formulation of U.S. 
trade and investment policies.  Wh ile Korea recognized U.S. security related concerns, it called for an 
appropriate balance so that security measures did not become unnecessary barriers to trade.  Korea 
was particularly interested in the future implem entation of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, which 
required all containers to be scanned, prior to  being loaded on a U.S.-bond vessel from mid 2012.  
Given the enormous impact this requirement would have on trade, Korea was interested to know how 
the U.S. Government intended to proceed with implementation. 
155. According to the Secretariat report, the In teragency Working Group on Import Safety had 
recommended several TBT- and SPS-related measures to enhance the safety of imports into the United States.  While Korea fully understood the importance of protecting public safety, it was concerned that these measures could act as a market a ccess barrier since they would be applied only to 
imported goods.  Therefore, Korea wished to know when and how the U.S. Government intended to 
implement these recommendations, and, if implemented, how it would ensure their consistency with WTO obligations.  
156. There was no doubt that the openness of the U.S. market had greatly benefited the 
United States and the global economy.  Korea hoped that the United States would continue to maintain and strengthen its traditionally open and tr ansparent trade and economic policy, and that the 
TPR exercise would help the U.S. delegation see its  important responsibility as a global leader and 
renew its commitment to take the necessary leader ship role to successfully conclude the DDA. 
157. The representative of New Zealand
 stated that as the world’s largest economy and trading 
nation, the United States played a critical leadersh ip role in the WTO through its strong contribution 
both to setting and maintaining open and transparent tr ade rules and to achieving further global trade 
liberalization.  As a country that firmly supported the multilateral trading system and the benefits it WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 28  
 
 
 brought, New Zealand appreciated the principal role  the United States had played since the inception 
of the GATT some 60 years ago.  The United States made a very significant contribution across all areas in the WTO, as well as in other forums such as APEC.  New Zealand recognized and shared the 
U.S.. Administration’s commitment to successfu lly concluding the Doha Round to achieve the 
ambitious outcome needed by all WTO Members,  and acknowledged the active leadership of USTR 
Schwab and her staff in their efforts to make b est use of the current window of opportunity to 
conclude the Round in 2008.  In these uncertain econom ic times, this was all the more important.   
158. Current higher food prices offered challenges a nd opportunities.  New Zealand agreed with 
the observation in the Secretariat’s Report that th e current environment of high commodity prices 
offered a favourable juncture for the United Stat es to introduce policy changes aimed at further 
improving the market orientation of its own agri culture sector to the benefit of consumers and 
taxpayers.  Responding in this way to the market would unleash further efficiencies and gains for 
farmers that were already evident in other sectors of the U.S. economy.  
159. Since the last Trade Policy Review, there had been cooperation be tween New Zealand’s 
Customs Service and U.S. Customs and Border Pr otection, which had led to the signature of a 
container security arrangement in July 2007 to f acilitate New Zealand's expor ts through U.S. ports. 
160. The United States was a huge and, in most s ectors, open services ma rket.  New Zealand’s 
single most important services export interest in the WTO context was education services.  New Zealand had been working closely with the United States in the Doha Round services negotiations to 
secure expanded education services commitments from other WTO Members, as demandeurs in the education services plurilateral negotiating group.  Ne w Zealand had valued the U.S. close cooperation 
in that context. 
161. Active U.S. participation and leadership in th e WTO remained vital to  the health of the 
organization.  For this reason, many Members looke d to the United States to set the benchmark in 
terms of the openness, transparency, and competitiv eness of its own economy and trade regime and in 
leading the way on further trade liberalization.  Ne w Zealand encouraged the Un ited States to this end 
through this review process. 
162. The representative of the European Communities
 stated that the United States was the second 
largest trader in the world after the EU, and a str ong supporter of the multilatera l trading system.  This 
prime position left the United States with the huge  responsibility to excel at its WTO commitments 
and obligations, and to contribute actively to the good functioning of an open and dynamic trading 
system.  The United States remain ed critical to global economic gr owth and development, and it was 
therefore in all WTO Members' interest, and in the United States' own interest, that its trade regime 
remained open, transparent, and consistent with WTO rules. 
163. The United States was the EC's bi ggest trading and investment partner.  Trade flows across 
the Atlantic were around €1.7 billion a day.  In 2 006, EC-U.S. two-way trade flows had amounted to 
€444 billion, while the stock of EC direct investment in the United States had reached 
US$1.11 trillion, accounting for almost half the total stock of FDI in the United States.  In 2006, total 
two-way investment amounted to €1.9 trillion, whereby each side had about equal shares.  This strong 
and growing bilateral trade relati onship was creating new trade opportunities and jobs on both sides of 
the Atlantic. 
164. With such huge trade it could not come as a surprise that there were some problems.  
However, these differences, which tended to attract mo st headlines, affected, in reality, only some 2% 
of EC-U.S. trade.  Many had been tackled in  the WTO or through bilateral channels.  The 
Transatlantic Economic Council had been established to bring both economies closer and to identify 
key areas where greater convergence was required.  Th is had offered a useful platform for regular WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 29 
 
 
 cooperation in investment, financial instruments and capital markets, innovation and technological 
development, intellectual property,  and several regulatory issues covering areas like import safety and 
regulatory impact assessment.  The EC looked forw ard to further constructiv e engagement with the 
United States under this framework.  Bilateral re lations were complementary to the WTO, which 
remained the main focus to develop trade.  In this regard, the EC t ook note of the United States' stated 
commitment to the WTO and the ongoing DDA negotiations. 
165. The United States was actively embarked on an intense regional and bilateral agenda.  The 
EC hoped that efforts in the pursuit of bilateral objectives would not divert attention away from the 
multilateral sphere, and the United States would conti nue to put the multilateral trading system first, 
as it had reiterated.  The EC, like others, remain ed concerned that it was seeing less commitment to 
multilateralism than in the past, and strongly encour aged the United States to address this issue during 
the review. 
166. The Government Report included reference to environmental and social aspects, as an 
important component of trade policy objectives.  Th e EC believed that there was much potential for a 
mutually reinforcing relationship between furthe r trade liberalization on the one side, and the 
promotion of decent work and sustainable environment on the other, both at home and abroad.  
167. While recognizing the U.S. commitment to expa nding trade liberalization by reducing barriers 
to trade and creating new market opportunities, the EC was concerned/disappointed by signs of growing protectionism in a number of areas.  This worrying tendency testified that U.S. trade policy 
remained captured by special interest groups at the expense of broader policy objectives that could 
benefit the vast majority of U.S. citizens.  In  other instances, while th e United States pursued the 
unquestioned right to protect national security, it did so  in a way that unjustifiably restricted trade and 
investment.  The expiration of the 2002 Farm B ill had presented a significant opportunity for the 
United States, and for the wider WTO membership , to secure a more reformed-oriented U.S. 
agricultural policy.  Unfortunately, this opportuni ty had been missed, and the 2008 Farm Bill had 
followed the same trade-distorting direction as its pr edecessor.  Some preliminary analysis revealed 
that the new provisions had even aggravated the trad e-distorting character of the former Farm Bill, in 
particular, in sectors such as cereals, cotton, suga r, and dairy products.  The EC requested further 
information on the intended objectives and foreseen consequences on world trade of the enactment of 
the 2008 Farm Bill, and the grounds on which the Un ited States justified it.  The EC wondered what 
signal the United States was giving with this Farm Bill. 
168. The enactment of the SAFE Port Act in  October 2006 had introduced new import 
requirements for security purposes, and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 required image scanning a nd radiation detection monitoring  for all containers on U.S.-
bound vessels.  For the EC, these measures, while not increasing security, would increase transaction 
costs and introduce huge burdens on exporters a nd Customs services worldwide.  These measures 
affected the smooth circulation of trade flows, and their compliance with WTO rules was also in 
question.  While the EC remained committed to work ing closely with the United States in order to 
counter terrorism and protect its citizens, it was c oncerned that some of the import measures applied 
on security grounds could be used as a disguised form of protectionism.  Even more importantly, the EC was not convinced that these measures could e ffectively serve their intended purposes.  Measures 
to respond to legitimate security concerns shoul d be taken in a way that avoided unnecessary and 
costly burdens to trade and investment.  The EC  looked forward to hearing how the United States 
intended to ensure that the implementation of its le gislation did not unnecessarily restrict trade flows, 
and complied with WTO rules on import restrictions a nd freedom of transit.  In this respect, the EC 
wished to know whether affected exporters ha d had the opportunity to comment on the 100% 
scanning legislation;  if this had been the case, wh ether their comments had been taken on board;  and 
if so which comments and how they had been taken on board. WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 30  
 
 
 169. The EC flagged its concerns regarding the long-st anding restrictions to foreign investment in 
two key economic areas,  air transport and public procurement.  Foreign ownership and control of 
U.S. airlines was prevented by equity caps.  In  the procurement market, restrictions to foreign 
participation and favourable treatme nt of domestic companies still existed, in particular due to the 
non-participation of some States in the Government Pr ocurement Agreement.  In this context, the EC 
urged the United States to address these enduring re strictions, as no improvements had been reported 
in these areas since its last Trade Policy Review.  Th e EC asked about any U.S. plans to improve this 
situation, and whether it could expect some ch anges in these important sectors in the future. 
170. The EC welcomed U.S. actions to impr ove its compliance with WTO rulings and 
recommendations.  However, further efforts were need ed in order to ensure prompt compliance with 
all DSB rulings and recommendations which were essential for ensuring effective resolution of 
disputes to the benefit of the Members.  The disput e on zeroing had led to an avalanche of recourse to 
the WTO forced by the unwillingness of the United St ates to accept rulings of the Dispute Settlement 
Body.  The EC was concerned that this sent a signal of defiance to internationa l rules.  The EC looked 
forward to learning more about U.S. trade policies and measures in the course of this TPR, and to 
working with the United States to  successfully conclude the DDA. 
171. The representative of Colombia  noted that, after a prolonged period of growth, the U.S. 
economy was going through a difficult juncture as a r esult of the negative effe cts of the slowdown in 
the housing market and the turbulence in the fina ncial sector.  This undoubtedly concerned the 
international community due to the effect it might have on the global economy.  The U.S. 
Government had acted quickly by promoting inter est rates reductions, providing liquidity to the 
financial system, and making tax refunds.  These actions appeared to have paid off, to the extent that 
they had limited the decline in economic activity.  Colombia hoped that this effort would promptly return the United States to the path of growth.  On e of the remarkable events of recent period was the 
major depreciation of the dollar, which had begun to have an impact on the current account.  The 
trade deficit as a percentage of GDP had fallen from over 6% in 2005 and 2006 to around 5.3% in 
2007;  this trend would provide greater stability in the exchange rate in the long term.  
172. Colombia acknowledged U.S. participation in fa vour of the Doha Round, but drew attention 
to the absence of special "fast track" powers, whic h had expired in July 2007.  Colombia was equally 
concerned by the recent approval by Congress of the new law that increased domestic trade-distortionary agricultural support.  Colombia a ppreciated the U.S. Government's commitment in 
favour of the Round and the reform of agriculture;  it s contribution would be vital to complete it in 
2008. 
173. The United States had one of the lowest levels of tariff protection among WTO Members, 
4.8% on average.  However, some agricultural products, in particular those subject to quotas, continued to have high out-of-quota protection:  42% on average, which affected not only trade but 
U.S. consumer welfare.  With respect to the Customs regime, in developing the Cargo Security 
initiative, Customs was considering establishing a da tabase managed by the private sector to improve 
risk assessment of international cargo.  It was of Memb ers' interest to verify that such a step did not 
generate overruns for importers.  Moreover, the obligation to scan all containers destined for the 
United States at foreign seaports, by July 2012 would have a strong impact on trade, and result in lower earnings and higher transportation costs for importers.  I was important to seek alternatives to reduce their impact.  This issue was being consid ered in the Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation, 
aimed at reducing and/or eliminating cost overruns for users.  
174. In matters relating to SPS measures, the Secretar iat report indicated that approval processes 
for plants, animals, and derived products imported to the United States for the first time, normally 
lasted two to three years.  However, such procedures could take much longer and therefore 
unreasonably delay trade flows.  WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 31 
 
 
 175. The United States was Colombia's largest trad ing partner;   the United States was the 
destination of 40% of Colombia's exports and the source of nearly 30 % of its imports.  Two-way trade 
exceeded US$18 billion, with growth rates exceeding 12% recently.  The trade balance had increased 
in favour of Colombia, thanks to the high participa tion of fuel in Colombia's exports.  Since 1991 the 
United States had been granting Colombia and the A ndean countries tariff preferences, as part of the 
shared strategy for crop substitution and fight agai nst illicit drugs.  These preferences were in force 
until December 2008.  Colombia reite rated its appreciation of this important instrument, which had 
undoubtedly helped to generate new export opportunities.  
176. In 2007 Colombia and the United States had c oncluded negotiations leading to a free-trade 
treaty, which was awaiting U.S. Congressional ratification.  Colombia hoped that the treaty, which replaced the system of unilateral preferences and ga ve more certainty to the operators of the two 
nations, would be ratified soon.  
177. The United States was also the largest foreign i nvestor in Colombia.  In 2007, U.S. FDI in 
Colombia amounted to US$1.3 billion and accounted fo r 27% of total foreign investment.  Colombia 
noted a significant complementarity between the two economies and therefore significant potential for 
mutual growth.  
178. The representative of Indonesia
 stated that the United St ates was the second largest export 
destination of Indonesian products as well as the sec ond largest source of Indonesia’s import.  Total 
trade between Indonesia and the United States in 2003-07 had increased by 12.96% on average, total 
trade had reached US$16. 4 billion in 2007.  
179. Indonesia emphasized that the continued robus tness of the United States economy remained 
an important issue for Indonesia as well as for the global economy.  It was of great importance that 
the United States continued to apply an open and transparent trade regime.  Furthermore, the 
United States should refrain from taking protectioni st measures, and instead adopt liberalization 
procedures supportive of pro-competitive policies.  The United States was a very important trading 
partner and played a very active role in the multi lateral trading system, particularly in the Doha 
Development Agenda.  
180. The Secretariat Report had noted that anti-dumping measures remained a key trade policy 
instrument for the United States.  At the end of 2007, the United States had maintained some 232 anti-dumping measures, affecting imports from 39 trading partners.  During 2005-07, it had initiated some 
33 investigations, and applied 19 provisional measures, but imposed only 11 final duties.  Most 
importantly, it had applied anti-dumping duties of up to 280%.  Similarly, during the review period, 
the United States had maintained 31 countervailing duty orders involving 13 trading partners.  While 
Indonesia recognized the importance of anti-dumping and countervailing actions to combat unfair trade, it was of the view that these measures should not  be used as instruments of protection, as they 
frequently were. 
181. During the period under review, the United St ates had notified a new approval process for 
first-time imports of fruit and vegetables subject to  designated sanitary and phytosanitary measures.  
This was expected to accelerate import approval time, which could be as long as three years.  Indonesia sought clarification and elaboration from the United States concerning the stages of SPS measures as the basis for approval, in particular why the approval process took three years.  Indonesia 
also wished to know what regulations would be u sed for the approval process for first-time imports of 
other agricultural products. 
182. In February 2008, the U.S. National Fisheries Institute (NFI) had informed Indonesia of a new 
USDA inspection programme on fishery products from countries that had experienced Avian Influenza virus (H5N1), since it was suspected that  certain crab meat produc ts imported from those WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 32  
 
 
 countries contained HN51.  In this context, Indonesi a was advised to issue a certificate of H5NI-virus-
free for "crab meat breaded" from Indonesia.  Howe ver, as the Avian Influenza virus only affected 
poultry, Indonesia believed that the use of this kind of certificate for fishery products would be misleading.  Indonesia also referred to a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register  
(Vol. 73 No.1) of 2 January 2008, concerning Secur ity Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements.  
Indonesia was fully aware of the proposal for submis sion of certain data elements (called 10 + 2), not 
later than 24 hours before a cargo was laden aboard a vessel destined for the United Sates.  Indonesia 
requested more information on this, as well as on the Vessel Stowage Plan and Container Status Message, which could result in increased storage and loading expenditures for Indonesia’s vessels.  
Indonesia hoped that those procedural systems, which seemed very complex, would not constitute 
unnecessary barriers to trade. 
183. The representative of India
 noted that the Trade Policy Review of the United States was an 
important exercise.  The over US$13 trillion U.S. economy was the world’s largest economy and had 
played a very significant role in the expansion of  global trade in the last half century.  It was 
important that the United States continued to play a leadership role in further expansion of global 
trade.  The United States was Indi a’s second largest trading partner and an important destination for 
Indian investment.  Indian FDI in the United States had been around US$2 billion in 2007.  There had been 46 outbound investment deals in IT subsectors accounting for 48% of the total.  The United States was also an important FDI and technology  transfer source.  In terms of FDI inflows into 
India, the United States had ranke d second in 2007, with FDI valued at US$856 million.  The India-
US Trade Policy Forum, established in 2005, was play ing a very useful role in expanding bilateral 
trade and investment relations. 
184. A major issue of concern to India was the tariff range for India’s top ten merchandise exports 
to the United States.  The United States continue d to maintain high tariffs also on food products, 
footwear, leather goods, and automo tive products.  In textiles, tariffs peaks were of 32% for some 
clothing, 25% for fabrics, and 13.2 % for yarns.  In  addition, specific duties applied for a wide range 
of textile and footwear pr oducts.  Tariffs for some footwear produc ts were as high as 48% of the f.o.b. 
value.  The complexity, multiplicity of regulator y requirements and long time taken in processing 
them in the United States was another issue of c oncern to Indian exporters, especially smaller and 
medium-sized exporters.  The multiple technical re gulations regarding consumer protection including 
health, safety and environmental protection represented an important structural constraint to market 
access.  Indian exports also faced a number of cu stoms impediments, such as import user fees and 
excessive invoicing requirements on importers, which a dded to costs in a similar way to tariffs.  A 
more integrated, transparent, and streamlined re gulatory environment and efficient processing would 
significantly assist domestic consumers and importe rs as well as exporters to the United States. 
185. In agri-food exports, a number of SPS issues remained a source of difficulty.  Applications for 
inclusion on the list of approved pr oducts could take a long time.  The exporting agency had to pay a 
substantial amount for APHIS inspectors certifying each shipment. 
186. The main U.S. trade barriers in public procuremen t were contained in a wide array of clauses 
in federal, state, and local legislation and regul ations allowing preference to domestic suppliers or 
products, or excluding foreign bidders or products  altogether.  Although the Buy American Act 
applied in principle to the procurement of goods , it had also inspired similar provisions in the 
procurement of services. 
187. The Foreign Investment and National Security Ac t and subsequent legisl ation, which placed 
controls on foreign investment in (or ownership o f) businesses, also acted as investment barriers.  The 
lack of a definition of national security, and uncerta inty as to which transactions are notifiable were 
causes for concern.  U.S. restrictions on foreign in vestment were particularly evident in shipping, 
energy, and communications:  foreign-owned firms faced substantial access barriers in the U.S. WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 33 
 
 
 communication services market, including, restri ctions to investment, lengthy proceedings, 
conditionality of market access, and reciprocity-based procedures.  Market acce ss barriers also existed 
for digital terrestrial television services.  Indian Broadcasters were required to enter into 
disadvantageous commercial arrangements with U.S. broadcasters and content distributors. 
188. In its report, the United States had reaffirmed its firm commitment to the WTO and affirmed 
that it shared a common purpose with its WTO pa rtners in expanding economic opportunities for the 
world’s citizens by reducing trade barriers.  Howeve r, the new Farm Bill was of concern.  The Bill 
extended many existing federal subsidies, which we re difficult to justify when commodity prices had 
registered a sharp increase and there were no indications  of their sliding downwards in the near future.  
This raised questions as to whether the United Stat es could move meaningfully in the direction of 
reform of trade in agriculture.  The diversi on of around a third of corn production to ethanol 
production with the help of subsidies and high tari ff barriers was an indication of how distortions 
could lead to misallocation of resources.  The im pact of this diversion on global food prices was 
substantial.  India hoped the United States would re view its policy of support to corn-based ethanol.  
Similarly, in services, which were of crucial importa nce to the U.S. economy, the U.S. interest in an 
ambitious outcome would be better served if it coul d respond positively to the requests of developing 
countries in sectors and modes of export interest to them. 
189. The representative of Pakistan  stated that, while bilateral relations between Pakistan and the 
United States had been influenced mainly by gl obal and regional geopolitics, trade and investment 
initiatives remained under considerat ion.  The United States was by far the single largest export 
market for Pakistani products, accounting for nearly one quarter of total exports.  Bilateral trade with 
the United States in 2007 had been US$5.613 billion,  with exports worth US$3.57 billion and imports 
worth US$2.035 billion.  Pakistan was confident that  its textile sector was well-placed to compete for 
its share in the U.S. market, given the level playing field in U.S. import tariffs vis-à-vis  the tariffs 
applied to Pakistan's competitors.  Better access to th is market would be of great benefit to Pakistan. 
190. Besides non-tariff barriers, like stringent SPS measures, security concerns, and long delays 
for visas for its business professional, Pakistan's exporters faced serious tariff barriers.  Whereas the average applied MFN tariff in the United States was 4. 9%, Pakistan's exporters paid an average rate of 
10%.  For its relatively more competitive exports, the rates ranged from 11% to 19.7%.  Through its 
farm subsidies, the United States was able to expor t several crops below their cost of production.  
Apart from export assistance, domestic producers benefited from federal and sub-federal tax 
exemptions, financial outlays, and credit programme s below market terms.  Such unfair competitive 
advantage offered to U.S. farmers adversely affect ed many developing countries, like Pakistan, where 
the share of GDP of agriculture was rather high. 
191. In the case of services, Pakistan hoped that the United States would not only push its interest 
but also make the necessary commitments in Mode 4.  Pakistan also urged the United States to relax 
the capping on its H-1B visa programme, which allo wed U.S. employers to employ foreign guest 
workers for a limited duration. 
192. Pakistan commended the United States' commitm ent to the rules-based multilateral trading 
system and its stated belief in reducing trade barriers.  The United States continued to play a leadership role in moving the process forward.  N onetheless, the push for bilateral and regional deals 
by the U.S. administration during the last few year s seemed to be diverting its attention from its 
multilateral role.  Such emphasis on regional trade e xpansion might be contributing to somewhat slow 
the pace of movement of the DDA.  Besides, there was concern about the transparency and criteria by 
which the U.S. administration selected its FTA partne rs, which often seemed to be driven by political 
considerations rather than by economic needs and realities.  Since the United States maintained high 
tariff peaks and tariff barriers on many products of export interest to developing countries, its FTAs 
resulted in trade diversion and also had adverse impact on other WTO Members, in particular, the WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 34  
 
 
 low-income developing countries like Pakistan.  T hough the U.S. preferential market access schemes 
lessened this impact for some developing countries,  the schemes were designed in a way that they 
protected and promoted the U.S. textile industry mo re than they helped the developing countries they 
were intended to promote.  Through their rules of origin provisions these schemes also hurt South -
South trade.  Pakistan hoped that during the current Round, the United States would agree on an 
ambitious NAMA outcome so as to provide a level playing field for rest of the Membership. 
193. The representative of Singapore  noted that Singapore fully associated itself with the ASEAN 
statement.  Singapore shared deep, long-standing an d broad-ranging ties with the United States.  The 
United States was Singapore's third largest trading pa rtner, with total trade amounting to more than 
SG$88.1 billion in 2007.  Meanwhile, Singapore was the United States’ fifth largest trading partner in 
Asia and eleventh largest export destination.  The key milestone in bilateral ties had been the signing 
of the U.S.-Singapore FTA (USSFTA) in 2003,  whic h had institutionalized economic ties, catalyzing 
further growth in bilateral trade and investme nt.  The USSFTA had been hailed as a ‘landmark 
agreement’ for its WTO-plus and NAFTA-plus commi tments, including the protection of intellectual 
property, the inclusion of e-commerce and ICT se rvices, advanced rules of origin and customs 
cooperation.  Since its entry into force in 2004, b ilateral trade had grown by 36%, and U.S. FDI in 
Singapore had increased by more than 10.5%.  
194. Singapore companies had also made successful inro ads into the U.S. market in IT, aerospace, 
ports, shipping etc.  Similarly, U.S. compani es had long had a presence in Singapore and investments 
in non-traditional sectors had been growing.  On a broader level, the USSFTA had been the United 
States’ first FTA with an Asian country, and the conclusion of the FTA between the United States and 
Korea had created another important trans-pacific link.  The Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
proposal at APEC, and the signing of the ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership Plan of Action and the US-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Arrange ment (TIFA) in 2006 were useful avenues 
through which ASEAN-U.S. ties had been further institutionalized.  
195. Singapore was heartened by the United Stat es’ unwavering commitment to an open, 
transparent, rules-based multilateral trading system as reflected in its active and constructive efforts 
on the Doha Development Agenda.  It welcomed th e United States’ recognition that, in the face of 
possible economic slowdown, strong export growth w ould play an important role in supporting its 
economy and it needed to maintain an open trad e policy.  Singapore also commended the U.S. 
Administration for its strong support for trade liberalization and free trade in the face of increasing trade scepticism in the current politically ch arged atmosphere of an election year.  
196. Since its last Review in 2006, the United States has taken further steps to liberalize its trade 
regime, although mostly on a preferential basis.  It s efforts in trade capacity building were laudable.  
There were some areas of U.S. trade policy where there was scope for improvement.  In this regard, 
Singapore shared the Secretariat’s assessment that in the face of economic uncertainty, U.S. welfare 
would be best promoted by continuing to redu ce barriers to market access and other distorting 
measures.  Incorporating additional security consider ations into U.S. trade and investment policies 
should also be pursued on a sound and rational basis.  As ASEAN had highlighted, U.S. efforts in continuing to maintain an open and transparent regi me would send an important  signal to others as the 
United States was the world's largest single economy and trader. 
197. The representative of Sri Lanka
 noted that the United States was Sri Lanka’s biggest export 
market, absorbing almost one third of its exports .  Two-way trade exceeded US$2 billion per annum.  
Though exports had declined overall over the past year, individual sectors of importance, as well as 
new and emerging sectors had increased, indicating the importance of the U.S. market in Sri Lanka’s future challenge of diversification.  Exports had al so been assisted in certain  sectors through the GSP 
scheme. WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 35 
 
 
 198. Sri Lanka had entered into several bilateral tr eaties with the United States to improve trade 
and economic relations, including the Avoidance of Double Taxation Treaty, the Investment 
Promotion and Protection Agreement, the US-Sri La nka Air transport Agreement with the provision 
of open skies, and the TIFA. 
199. Sri Lanka had been the first country in Sout h Asia to implement the Container Security 
Initiative.  Sri Lanka fully co-operated with the U.S. Customs and Boarder Protection Authority and 
considered the measures helpful in streamlining po rt operations and strengthening the risk assessment 
capability of the Colombo Port. 
200. Apparel products remained Sr i Lanka's biggest export sector, accounting for almost 80% of 
its exports to the United States, and about 55-60% of  Sri Lanka’s total appare l exports.  However, Sri 
Lanka noted with regret the decline in imports for th e first time in almost 20 years, in part due to Sri 
Lanka facing one of the highest average tariffs  during 2007, at 12.63%.  The sector had been 
identified by the USITC as one of the few sectors in an overall low tariff regime, to be subject to high 
import barriers.  While Sri Lanka continued to st ruggle to be competitive against these high tariffs, 
many of its competitors from ot her regions had duty-free access.  In  this regard, Sri Lanka did not 
urge special treatment, but asked the United States to  take the opportunity of the current Round to 
ensure a level playing field for small countries like Sri Lanka, which struggled to improve its exports 
in an MFN environment. 
201. U.S. investment in Sri Lanka covered a wide number of sectors, and continued to assist Sri 
Lanka in developing its industries in diverse i ndustrial and service sectors.  The United States 
remained Sri Lanka’s biggest investor, with 72 U.S. companies operating in the country, with 
cumulative realized investment of US$385 million at the end of 2006. 
202. Sri Lanka welcomed the U.S. reiteration to complete the Doha Development Round as a 
means to generate economic growth through meani ngful new trade flows in agriculture, industrial 
goods and services.  Sri Lanka also appreciated th e United States’ placing importance on trade and 
capacity building measures in its trade policy.  Sri Lanka had benefited directly from capacity 
building measures in the area of intellectual propert y and in international trade law and economics.  
Sri Lanka thanked the United States for its joint in itiative with the EC on the proposal for labelling 
textile, apparel, footwear, and travel goods.  This  was important to maintain transparency and 
uniformity on labelling requirements in the multilatera l trading system, and particularly important for 
Sri Lanka as a textile exporter. 
203. While appreciating U.S. transparency on its b ilateral and regional agreements, Sri Lanka 
considered the importance of maintaining a level playing field for countries (particularly small 
economies, trading on an MFN basis), that were  losing competitiveness through increased free trade 
arrangements implemented by the United States.  Countries like Sri Lanka benefited under the U.S. 
GSP scheme, but further improvements were needed, particularly in addressing the stringent rules of 
origin criteria. 
204. Intellectual property (IP) was important for all co untries, and the U.S. IP regime sought to 
ensure all IP rights.  In this regard, Sri Lanka re quested the United States to consider the IP concerns 
of developing countries, particularly in the area s of TRIPS-CBD and GI extension.  Sri Lanka was 
also concerned about the proposal in the area of custom s valuation to use "last sa le", rather than "first 
sale" for purposes of valuation, which could affect meaningful market access otherwise to be obtained 
through this Round of negotiations. 
205. Sri Lanka appreciated the U.S. openness in services, particularly in the area of professional 
services, but urged consideration of more meanin gful access in Mode 4 for developing country 
professionals.  Sri Lanka strongly believed that the United States would continue to provide its WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 36  
 
 
 leadership to make a better international trad ing and economic order and to conclude the DDA 
negotiations successfully at an early stage. 
206. The representative of Benin  stated that, during the period under review, two different sub-
periods could be identified for the U.S. economy:  a relatively long phase of expansion, when GDP 
had grown by some 3% per year;  and a second phase, starting in the last months of 2007, 
characterized by slower GDP growth, the consequence of the housing market downturn and 
turbulence in credit markets.  The U.S. Government had applied monetary policy measures to maintain the situation under control, put a rein  on inflation, and manage the budget deficit.  
207. The United States had made openness and transpar ency the two major driving forces of its 
economic and commercial activities.  This had tran slated, in different sectors, in market access 
initiatives and commitments.  However, at the mu ltilateral level, the duty-and quota-free market 
access commitments made by the Un ited States in favour of least-developed countries, had been slow 
to be put in place.  On agricultural subsidies,  the United States would convey a positive message in 
the DDA negotiations by substantially reducing the dom estic support granted to its farmers, mainly in 
cotton, which was a vital sector for several least-developed countries.   
208. Benin appreciated the support granted by th e United States in its economic and social 
development efforts. 
209. The representative of El Salvador
 said that bilateral relations were excellent.  The 
United States was El Salvador's main extra-regiona l trading partner, its main export market, and an 
important supplier of goods.  The FTA concluded in 2006, which was in line with WTO principles, 
sought to strengthen El Salvador's trade and institu tional capacity.  El Salvador's exports to North 
America had increased by 33.3% since the FTA's en try into force.  Small and medium-sized 
enterprises had been the main benefi ciaries.  The FTA had helped broaden El Salvador's exports.  U.S. 
overall support to agriculture amounted  to 11% of gross farm receipts, five percentage points less than 
in 2004.  This decrease largely reflected higher co mmodity prices.  Some products, including sugar 
and milk, received high levels of support.  El Salvador was concer ned that certain aspects of the 
2008 Farm Bill could depart from U.S. multilateral co mmitments and could have a negative effect on 
the DDA.  El Salvador and the United States shared numerous negotiating objectives in the WTO, particularly in the area of intellectual property.  She encouraged the United States to continue sending 
clear signals to conclude the negotiations successfully. 
210. The representative of Nigeria
 commended the United States for its engagement in the 
negotiations and asked how the United States woul d implement any commitments arising from the 
DDA in the absence of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA).  The U.S. economy had slowed down, 
mainly because of the sub-prime mortgage crisis a nd the subsequent credit crunch.  This had had a 
negative impact on the world economy, and had in creased protectionist tendencies, which could 
adversely affect the DDA.  He asked what the United States would do to play a leading role in 
concluding the DDA successfully.  The United States had taken steps to implement DSB decisions, 
but the implementation of a few remained outstandi ng.  The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset 
Act of 2000 had been repealed in 2005, but an ti-dumping and countervailing duties assessed before 
October 2007 continued to be distributed to U.S. pr oducers.  He asked when this would stop.  The 
United States considered that a comprehensive multilateral agreement offered the best chance to 
expand trade and development opportunities, and that bilateral and regional trade liberalization could 
also provide significant benefits.  Bilateral a nd regional commitments should not diminish U.S. 
multilateral commitments. 
211. The representative of Barbados  welcomed the commitments made by the United States at the 
High Level Conference on World Food Security to address food security in developing countries.  Recent challenges in the housing and credit markets app eared to have triggered a decline in the U.S. WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 37 
 
 
 growth rate.  The United States had adopted m onetary and fiscal measures to address economic 
difficulties.  A strong and stable U.S. economy w as vital.  Recent volatility had affected small, 
inherently open and fragile economies like Barbados .  The United States was Barbados' main trading 
partner, accounting for around 30% of imports in 2006.   Merchandise imports from the United States 
totalled US$602 million, and exports to the United States US$43 million.  Technical cooperation was 
also part of the strong bilateral relationship.  The United States had been instrumental in promoting economic development and export diversification opportunities in the Caribbean through CBERA, 
which was enhanced by the CBTPA.  She regrette d the uncertainty about the future of these 
programmes.  She appreciated the U.S. commitme nt to aid for trade, and its engagement and 
leadership in the DDA and the multilateral trading system.  Barbados relied on the United States and 
other key players to facilitate the integration of de veloping countries, particularly small, vulnerable 
economies into the multilateral trading system.  The role of the United States would be crucial in 
fulfilling the development dimension of the DDA.  Barbados remained committed to achieving this 
objective through constructive engagement. 
212. The representative of Guatemala
 noted that the United States was Guatemala's main trading 
partner, accounting for some 25% of Guatemala's e xports in 2007.  Therefore, he was concerned 
about the U.S. economic slowdown.  The two count ries had an FTA.  Although the United States had 
made progress in some areas, some trade practices  had not yet been addressed:  it had not fully 
complied with some WTO transparency obligations, pa rticularly in agriculture.  He was concerned 
about high levels of domes tic support to sugar, and about the impact of biofuel policies on world 
commodity markets and the food crisis.  The new Fa rm Bill sent a negative message to the WTO.  
The successful conclusion of the DDA should remain the top priority in the U.S. trade agenda.  
Although the United States had undertaken broad commitments in the context of the GATS, 
horizontal commitments entailed limitations on entr y and temporary stay.  He was concerned about 
the Jones Act, and anti-trust legislation exceptions affecting transport prices.  Lack of openness in 
maritime transport resulted in high prices, wh ich undermined export competitiveness.  Although the 
United States had implemented most DSB decisions, some had not yet been implemented.  This weakened the WTO dispute settlement system. 
213. The representative of Cuba
 stated that, in practice, U.S. trade policy differed from the 
description contained in the report submitted by the Un ited States for this Review.  According to the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), U.S. sanc tions to Cuba were the most comprehensive 
among the 20 sanctions programmes applied by the Un ited States.  Due to the embargo, Cuba was 
unable to trade with the United States.  Cuban food  imports from the United States were allowed, but 
were subject to a complex licensing system.  Cuba c ould not use the U.S. dollar in its international 
transactions, had no access to credit, and could not conduct transactions with international financial 
institutions.  The embargo affected third countries' trade relations with Cuba and the United States.  
Between May 2006 and May 2007, at least 30 c ountries had been affected by the embargo's 
extraterritorial application.  Cuba was the onl y WTO Member that did not receive MFN treatment 
from the United States.  The U.S. embargo against Cuba was inconsistent with WTO agreements.  
The United States had never abided by the GATT Ministerial Declaration of 29 November 1982, which stated that contracting parties would ab stain from adopting GATT-inconsistent measures for 
non-economic reasons.  The cost of the U.S. embar go had been estimated at US$1.35 billion between 
the second quarter of 2006 and the first quarter of 2 007.  During the past 50 years, the cost had been 
estimated at around US$90 billion.  The tightening of the embargo had affected Cubans' health. 
214. The U.S. Administration had reinforced measures against Cuba by adopting the provisions 
contained in the second report by the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba.  One of the goals 
was to tighten the embargo to deny resources to, and exercise greater economic and financial pressure 
on Cuba.  This would be achieved through a more  rigorous application of the Helms-Burton and 
Torricelli Acts (which had been repudiated by many  Members in past U.S. Reviews), several other 
Acts, and regulations by the Department of  the Treasury and the Commerce Department. WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 38  
 
 
 215. Under section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations  Act of 1998, the U.S. Government had 
maintained measures to perpetrate the theft of two internationally recognized Cuban trade marks 
(Havana Club and Cohiba), denyi ng their Cuban holders or successors , which included foreign firms, 
the enjoyment and recognition in the United States of their trade mark rights.  This violated the TRIPS 
Agreement.  In 2002, the DSB ruled that the Un ited States had to modify section 211 because it was 
inconsistent with national treatment and MFN.  Howe ver, this ruling had not yet been implemented.  
He called on the United States to repeal unc onditionally the provisions relating to the Cuban 
economic, trade, and financial embargo. 
216. The representative of Turkey  stated that the United States was the largest import market and a 
key supplier of goods and services.  As such, it pl ayed a vital role in the global economy.  Although 
U.S. economic performance had remained strong dur ing most of the period under review, with 
average annual growth of 3% between 2005 and 2007, it  had weakened in the fourth quarter of 2007.  
The decline in U.S. demand for housing created seve ral challenges.  Growth in 2008 was expected to 
remain slow, although the risk of a recession might be avoided.  The fiscal deficit was likely to 
increase and inflation was expected to decline.  The competitiveness and efficiency of the U.S. 
economy would mitigate the economic slowdown, if s upported by meaningful policy responses.  U.S. 
trade had continued to expand, with exports increasi ng by almost 15% in 2006 and imports by about 
11%.  The current account deficit had fallen from some 6% of GDP in 2005 and 2006 to around 5.3% 
in 2007.  He urged the United States to ensure that its adjustment policies did not have adverse effects 
on world trade. 
217. The United States had continued to liberalize its trade regime.  At the multilateral level, the 
top priority was the successful conclusion of the DDA as a means of generating economic growth 
through market opening and increased trade flows.  The United States needed to  show leadership to 
ensure a successful conclusion:  the need for a ba lanced, fair, and beneficial global trade deal was 
urgent.  The 2008 Farm Bill contradicted the obj ectives of the DDA mandate by increasing subsidies 
beyond existing U.S. commitments.  Reform of U.S. agricultural subsidies was needed to attain the 
successful outcome of the negotiations.  He welcomed  U.S. efforts to advance market openness.  GSP 
was one of the long-standing means to access the U.S. market, but would expire at end 2008.  The SAFE Port Act created additional co sts to traders:  it required CBP to conduct a pilot programme to 
scan all U.S.-bound containers at foreign sea ports.  An evaluation report by CBP was pending.  He 
sought information on the experience with the implem entation of the SAFE Port Act and its impact on 
trade.  Turkey was pursuing a strategy to expand b ilateral trade, which totalle d US$11 billion in 2006.  
U.S. FDI in Turkey, and the number of U.S. firm s there, had been rising;  the capital of U.S. 
companies operating in Turkey totalling US$9.2 billion. 
218. The representative of Kuwait
 stated that his country shared excellent economic and political 
relations with the United States.  The United States was Kuwait's main tradi ng partner, and the value 
of trade had increased in recent years.  He appreciated the U.S. contribution to the DDA. 
219. The representative of Uruguay  stated that the success of th e DDA depended largely on the 
position, leadership, and political vision of the Unite d States, and its adherence to the mandate of the 
Round.  The 2008 Farm Bill was contrary to Member s' efforts and the DDA mandate:  it distorted 
international trade in products of particular inte rest to Uruguay, including rice, and exacerbated the 
problem of spiralling food prices.  The solution to  the food crisis was to increase trade and reduce 
intervention.  He urged the United States to play  an active role in reforming and liberalizing 
agriculture.  The United States was one of Uruguay's ma in trading partners, with  annual bilateral trade 
flows totalling US$1 billion during the past three y ears.  Uruguay's exports to the United States 
totalled US$493 million in 2007, and imports US$623 milli on.  In the context of the bilateral Trade 
and Investment Framework Agreement signed in Ja nuary 2007, both countries had made progress in 
areas like SPS and scientific and technological coopera tion.  The United States was the main producer 
of industrial goods and the world's main importer.  The U.S. economy had continued to contribute to WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 39 
 
 
 global economic growth, despite its recent slow down.  U.S. openness allowed producers and 
consumers to obtain goods, services, and capital unde r the best conditions, which partly explained 
U.S. economic growth.  The United States attached the highest priority to the multilateral trading 
system and to the successful conclusion of the DDA before 2009, an objective shared with Uruguay. 
220. The representative of Ecuador  noted the U.S. economy's solid growth of around 3% between 
2005 and 2007.  However, growth had slowed down due to the decline in housing demand.  This 
situation could lead to a recession, whose effects would be felt throughout the world.  Ecuador was 
sure that the United States would take appropriate  measures to redress the economic situation.  U.S. 
exports totalled US$1.04 trillion in 2006, a 15% increase over 2005, and imports US$1.92 trillion 
(11% increase).  The services trade surplus increased in 2005 and 2006,  reaching US$96.6 billion.  As 
members of "Friends of Fish", Ecuador and the United States supported the e limination of subsidies 
that lead to fishing overcapacity and overexploita tion.  Ecuador and the United States also supported 
the establishment of a multilateral registry for wi nes and spirits.  The United States was Ecuador's 
most important trading partner.  Between 2003 an d 2007, Ecuador's exports to the United States 
increased by 140%, and imports by 100%.  This w as possible partly due to U.S. preferences under 
ATPDEA.  Ecuador was interested in concluding a bilateral agreement covering trade, cooperation, 
and political dialogue.  He was c oncerned about the effects on market access of border security 
measures, particularly for perishable goods, and urge d the United States to bala nce internal security 
and Members' trading interests.  The new Farm Bill raised doubts about the U.S. commitment to 
reducing trade-distorting domestic support, and cr eated uncertainty about the Doha negotiating 
process.  He urged the United States to take into  account Ecuador's market access requirements in 
tropical and alternative products. 
221. The representative of Burkina Faso  stated that his country had had excellent relations with the 
United States during the past five decades.  Th e United States was among Burkina Faso's most 
important partners.  Burkina Faso was a be neficiary of AGOA and the Millenium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC).  The United States had provided aid to the cotton sector of African countries, 
including those sponsoring the WTO cotton initiative.  The 2008 Farm Bill reinforced subsidies to the 
U.S. cotton sector:  the United States should end massi ve and trade-distorting subsidies to its cotton 
producers.  The United States and developing count ries were committed to the successful conclusion 
of the DDA in 2008.  Economic growth generated as a result of a successful agreement would help to 
reduce poverty. 
222. The representative of Mali  stated that the United States had been one of the first countries to 
recognize Mali's independence in 1960.  Political, economic, and cultural relations between the two 
countries were dynamic.  He appreciated U.S. ec onomic and trade cooperati on, which had yielded 
encouraging results, notably in agriculture.  Mark et access was meaningless if supply-side constraints 
were not addressed.  He appreciated U.S. developm ent programmes benefiting Mali.  Under the MCC, 
the United States was providing US$451 million in aid to strengthen infrastru cture.  In December 
2006, Mali had obtained an "AGOA visa", which allowe d exports of nine product categories to the 
United States.  While exports had taken place under one  of these categories (specialty textiles) in 
2007, those under the remaining eight categories were ne gligible, due to the rigid conditions applied.  
He appreciated the significant efforts deployed in the context of the Integrated Framework (IF) by 
USAID.  However, Mali was seeking greater  coordination between USAID and Mali's IF 
Coordinating Unit.  He called on the United States to renew its commitment to making aid-for-trade 
operational.  The expectation of a rapid and ambitio us conclusion to the Doha Round, including the 
cotton issue, was great.  Mali was committed to c ontributing to a stronger, and more coherent and 
equitable multilateral trading system.  For this reas on, Mali had identified trade as a priority in its 
strategic framework for growth and poverty reducti on 2007-11.  Mali appreciated the readiness of the 
United States to discuss the cotton issue, but was disappointed that there had been no proposals since 
the Cotton Four had submitted theirs in March a nd June 2006.  Although the new Farm Bill had 
worsened the prospect of cotton subsidy reform, th e ambitious, prompt, and specific treatment of the WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 40  
 
 
 cotton issue, as agreed to in the 2004 July Package and the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting, 
could redress the situation.  He encouraged the United States to continue showing leadership in 
multilateral trade negotiations. 
223. The representative of Zambia  stated that the continued commitment of the United States to 
the multilateral trading system was important to he r country.  The United States continued to support 
Zambia's capacity-building efforts to enable its effective participation in the multilateral trading 
system.  She urged the United States to continue de monstrating leadership to ensure the effective 
integration of LDCs into the multilateral tradi ng system by steering Members to the successful 
conclusion of the Round. 
224. The representative of Senegal  stated that his country had ha d excellent relations with the 
United States during the past 50 years.  Trade a nd economic relations were strong, and took place in 
the context of AGOA.  Senegal was also eligible fo r aid under the MCC.  The U.S. engagement in 
support of Senegal's development e fforts was appreciated.  Senegal commended the U.S. efforts to 
address its economic problems and its commitment to the WTO, and invited the United States to exercise leadership to en sure the successful conclusion of the negotiations. 
225. The representative of Haiti
 stated that the new Farm Bill was a blow to the Doha Round, and 
that WTO Members were greatly concerned about it s seeming lack of consistency with WTO rules.  
Haiti and the United States shared friendly relations  and solid cooperation ties;  bilateral trading 
relations went back a long time.  The latest mani festation of U.S. solidarity towards Haiti was in the 
form of food aid valued at US$25 million granted by USAID.  The HOPE II Act reflected the will of the United States to reduce poverty.  In the contex t of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, several Haitian 
products entered the United States duty free. WT/TPR/M/200 
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 V. REPLIES BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
 ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 
226. The representative of the United States  stated that U.S. FTAs operated smoothly and 
benefited the parties involved.  They did no t replace multilateral trade liberalization, but 
complemented it.  The pursuit of FTAs by the Un ited States did not detract from multilateral trade 
liberalization. 
(1) ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT  
227. The U.S. economy was undergoing difficult ad justments, and the Government had adopted 
measures to ensure its return to healthy growth as soon as possible.  In early June 2008, the Chairman 
of the Federal Reserve had provide d an encouraging assessment of the U.S. economy, although he had 
recognized the potential risks to growth from the housing market contraction and higher energy prices. 
228. The trade deficit had decreased from 6.1% of GDP  in the fourth quarter of 2005 to 4.9% in 
the first quarter of 2008.  This reflected the sl owdown in U.S. demand growth and rising domestic 
demand in some key U.S. trading partners.  The increase in productivity had improved the 
competitiveness of U.S. exports.  The U.S. trade imba lance was part of a global trade imbalance.  The 
U.S current account deficit was matched by surpluses elsewhere.  A single country could not ensure 
the gradual and sustainable reduction of these imbalances while maintaining healthy economic 
growth.  Several countries with current account imba lances needed to take action.  Trade policy was 
not the tool to deal with trade and current account imbalances. 
229. Three factors were most likely to contribute to  the sustained reduction of trade and current 
account imbalances without threatening sustained gl obal economic growth.  Higher rates of saving in 
the United States would help to narrow the saving an d investment gap.  The reduction in U.S. budget 
deficits was a step in the right direction.  Altho ugh the budget deficit was expected to rise in 2008, the 
United States was committed to lowering the deficit in the medium-term.  U.S. household savings out 
of disposable income remained low, as American s dealt with the effects of a sharp reduction in 
growth, and rises in energy and commodity prices.   Nevertheless, the re duction in U.S. property 
values, a principal component of household net worth in the United States, might presage a gradual increase of household saving out of current income. 
230. The increase in the U.S. deficit during the last decade had coincided with periods of enhanced 
growth in the United States and reduced growth rates abroad.  Stronger domestic demand growth 
abroad in recent years had been another step to wards the correction of global trade and current 
account imbalances. 
231. Several countries had savings rates that exceed ed domestic investment, with much of the 
excess capital flowing to the United States.  A country ’s net capital inflows had to match its current 
account deficit.  Efforts to achieve a more attrac tive domestic investment environment, or greater 
reliance on domestic demand growth as a source of economic expansion were appropriate steps for 
countries with chronically large current account surp luses.  In some cases these efforts were hindered 
by exchange rate policies that had resulted in persis tently undervalued real effective exchange rates. 
232. U.S. monetary and fiscal policies in recent months had been focused on supporting economic 
activity.  The success of these actions was important to the United States and the global economy.  
The exchange value of the U.S. dollar was determ ined by the market.  Wh ile the U.S. external 
imbalance had shrunk, those of other countries had increased.  For example, China’s current account 
surplus had risen from 7.1% of GDP in 2005 to 11% in 2007.  As a share of global GDP, China’s current account surplus was larger than the U.S. deficit.  The United States was aware of the benefits WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 42  
 
 
 derived from raising domestic savi ng rates gradually.  However, countries with saving rates that 
exceeded domestic investment also had responsibilities.  There was greater scope for domestic demand expansion to sustain GDP growth and contri bute to the reduction of global trade and current 
account imbalances. 
233. The United States had a good overall complianc e record with DSB rulings and would 
continue efforts to implement them where compliance was pending. 
(2) T
RADE POLICIES AND MEASURES  
234. The U.S. President had reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to doing its part to conclude 
successfully in 2008 a Doha agreement that gene rated new trade flows and economic opportunities 
around the world in agriculture, industrial goods, a nd services.  The United States remained firmly 
committed to achieving ambitious results in the DDA.  However, all Members had to contribute 
towards this goal. 
235. The United States needed a new Farm Bill.  W ithout new legislation the United States would 
have had to revert to legislation from the 1940s .  The Administration would implement the new 
legislation in accordance with WTO obligations.  Th e 2008 Farm Bill was not the U.S. Doha offer.  
The United States would change its legislation to  reflect a successful DDA outcome.  The tiered 
formula approach in agriculture would subject higher tariffs to deeper cuts th an lower tariffs.  The 
modalities for tariff simplification in agriculture  remained under negotiation.  However, the 
United States had signalled its willingness to achieve an  ambitious result in this area.  On NAMA, the 
United States had made clear that, in the context of a balanced deal, it could accept a formula that 
would minimize tariff escalation and eliminate tariff peaks.  Non- ad valorem  bound duties would be 
converted to ad valorem  equivalents and bound in ad valorem terms as part of a successful conclusion 
to the NAMA negotiations.  Questions raised by  Members on services should be addressed in the 
services negotiations. 
236. U.S. measures related to border security were essen tial to deal with terrorist threats.  They 
could be developed and refined to minimize delays at the border.  For example, advance scanning and 
data reporting could allow safety and commercial c oncerns to be addressed earlier, bringing more 
certainty and seamlessness to  international trade.  The authoriti es continued to collect and assess data 
on safety measures, and would continue to consult w ith stakeholders to ensure that such measures 
achieved their goals without impeding legitimate tr ade.  The expansion of scanning beyond the three 
pilot programmes would be done in a reasone d, responsible, and risk-based manner. 
237. Effective trade remedies were an integral part of a strong rules-based trading system enjoying 
broad support among Members.  U.S. trade remedy m easures affected only 0.3% of total U.S. imports 
between 1985 and 2005.  U.S. trade remedy measures covered one or two products in a majority of 
countries subject to such measures.  It was not uncommon among Members for anti-dumping (AD) 
and countervailing duty (CVD) orders to concentrate on the steel sector, which had been heavily subsidized without commercial justification, lead ing to over-capacity.  Also, since January 2007, 
49 U.S. measures had been terminated as a result of sunset reviews. 
238. U.S. SPS measures were based on science and subject  to a transparent rulemaking process.  It 
was not possible to ensure a thorough review of th e original submission and scientific evidence, and 
to respond to comments from stakeholders on proposed measures within a predetermined and 
inflexible timeframe.  However, the United States ha d streamlined some procedures.  For example, in 
2007 it introduced a notice-based process for conducting pest risk analysis of new imports of fruits 
and vegetables.  The United States worked closely w ith relevant State authorities to ensure that SPS 
measures proposed and adopted at the State leve l were science-based and in accordance with WTO 
rules. WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 43 
 
 
 (3) SECTORAL POLICIES  
239. The United States pursued policies to ensure safe, abundant, and affordable supplies of energy 
and food.  It shared Members' concerns about ri sing food prices and was taking steps to help those 
most acutely affected at home and abroad.  The in creased conversion of corn, soybean oil, and other 
commodities into biofuel had partly contributed to rising prices for these commodities.  However, 
other factors had been contributing far more, incl uding higher global oil and gas prices, leading to 
increased production, storage, and transport cost s;  increased global demand for food, as living 
standards and diets improved;  bad weather, whic h had resulted in poor harvests during the past two 
years;  increased demand for U.S. agricultural exports;  export restrictions in some exporting 
countries;  and reductions in global agriculture re search and development.  The United States was 
investing significantly in research and devel opment for next generati on biofuels, which would 
promote food security and energy diversification.  It  was also collaborating with international partners 
on biofuel sustainability issues. 
240. The United States maintained an extremely open regime for international maritime transport 
services.  Around 97% of U.S. international shipping trade was carried by foreign flag vessels, and 
U.S. ports were open to ships from nearly all c ountries.  The U.S. maritime industry received a 
relatively low level of government support, which was primarily related to national defence.  Foreign 
ownership limitations on U.S. airlines were a complex issue that the United States approached with an 
open mind.  The U.S. Secretary of Transportation had decided to end rulemaking on "actual control" 
in late 2006.  However, in or der to amend laws, it would be essential to explain to the U.S. 
Government the potential benefits of expanding  investment opportunities in U.S. airlines and 
enhancing their ability to serve a global market. 
241. The discussant  noted that some Members were con cerned about the U.S. current account 
deficit and measures under consideration to reduce it.  FTAs were part of U.S. trade policy and 
complemented efforts to liberalize trade at the mu ltilateral level;  they should be more inclusive and 
compatible with WTO principles.  The main c oncern expressed by Members had been the absence of 
trade negotiating authority following the expiry of TPA.  Members were also concerned about trade 
remedy measures, in particular their duration, which in some cases exceeded ten years.  The application of U.S. anti-dumping legislation was und ermining the advantages of generally low tariffs.  
From 2012, all containers would have  to be scanned prior to being loaded on a U.S.-bound vessel;  the 
United States should seek to ensure that security me asures did not adversely affect trade.  It should 
also seek to reduce the duration of the approval pro cess for first-time imports of plants, animals, and 
related products.  The Buy American Act continued to grant preferences to U.S. suppliers at the 
expense of foreign suppliers.  One Member had indi cated that the United States should adopt the first-
to-file system of patent applications.  Exports from one WTO Member to the United States did not 
receive MFN treatment. 
242. Around 80% of Members' statements had referred to agriculture, in particular the 2008 Farm 
Bill, domestic support, and tariff peaks.  She took no te of the U.S. statement that the 2008 Farm Bill 
was not the U.S. Doha offer.  The United States should consider Members' concerns about biofuel 
subsidies, one of the factors leading to co mmodity price increases.  The United States should 
implement DSB rulings on cotton and take into acc ount calls from some African Members to make 
progress in the cotton negotiations.  Members were  concerned about high border protection and SPS 
requirements applied on sugar imports. 
243. The United States maintained an open regime fo r services trade.  However, Members were 
concerned about cabotage restrictions in maritime transport, and limits app lied on foreign ownership 
of U.S. airlines.  One Member had highlighted U.S.  road transport restrictions.  The United States 
should consider ways to facilitate the entry of pr ofessionals.  Licences to provide insurance services 
should cover the entire U.S. territory.  WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 44  
 
 
 244. The representative of China  said that China's questions on U. S. monetary and exchange rate 
policies were not about the role of the market in de termining the exchange value of the U.S. dollar.  
Nor had China asked the USTR to comment on the au tonomy or the operation of the Federal Reserve.  
It was a long-standing practice in the TPRM that a Me mber's lead agency would coordinate with and 
seek responses from all relevant authorities, includi ng those in charge of monetary policy.  The 
continuous depreciation of the U.S. dollar, the key reserve and settlement currency, would affect 
Members' trade and economies.  The agreement establishing the TPRM provided that "the assessment carried out under the review takes place, to the exte nt relevant, against the background of the wider 
economic and development needs, policies and objectiv es of the Member concerned, as well as of its 
external environment".  During China's Review, the United States had as ked questions on China's 
exchange rate regime, and had stated that it was "particularly interested in learning more about 
China’s exchange rate regime".  The WTO was an appropriate forum to discuss Members' monetary 
policies.  He therefore urged the United States to respond to China. 
245. In response to questions on the U.S. role in  the Doha negotiations, the United States seemed 
to have concentrated solely on market access and new trade flows, without mentioning the reduction 
of trade-distorting support.  At this critical ph ase in the Doha negotiations, Members were waiting for 
a new and meaningful offer on trade-distorting support from the United States.  A development 
Round had to result in real cuts on farm subsidi es, and address issues like cotton, duty-free and quota-
free market access for LDCs, small and vulnerable ec onomies, special and differential treatment, and 
rules, particularly on "zeroing". 
246. The public version of the upcoming CFIUS re port should contain enough information to 
reassure Members that CFIUS conducted its reviews fairly and transparently, with minimum adverse 
effect on foreign investment.  The Committee on Re gional Trade Agreements (CRTA) was the forum 
to examine RTAs.  However, this did not preclude  questions on RTAs in the TPRM.  China sought a 
general picture of the exclusions in U.S. FTAs.   He urged the United States to provide updated 
information on its implementation of duty-free and quota-free access for LDCs, and to take the lead in 
materializing this commitment. 
247. He requested data on the Secure Freight Initiativ e pilot programmes.  He welcomed the U.S. 
statement that the United States would lower its  bound tariffs in the context of multilateral 
negotiations.  This would be key to demonstrating leadership.  U.S. tariff peaks were as high as 160-
350%, 2.5 to 5.4 times more than China's highest tariff in agriculture.  He wanted to know the 
justification for granting preferential tax treatment  to small domestic producers of wine and beer. 
248. In its AD investigations against China, th e United States calculated the alleged dumping 
margin using surrogate country data.  This was sufficient to remedy price distortions caused by 
alleged subsidies.  He asked why the United Stat es conducted joint AD/CVD investigations without 
changing the methodology for the AD investigation.   He sought confirmation that joint AD/CVD 
investigations did not involve double counting and duplicate remedy problems.  In its CVD 
investigations against China, the United States us ed an interest rate benchmark calculated by 
averaging interest rates from se lected countries.  It had also used the land price in Bangkok as the 
benchmark for a remote and poor province in China,  instead of an average land price around the land 
under investigation in the OTR Tires case.  He as ked about the criteria used by the United States to 
select a benchmark in investigations against China.  He also sought clarification regarding the criteria 
for accepting new allegations after an investiga tion had been initiated, and asked whether the 
United States conducted consultations  with the Member concerned regarding the inclusion of such 
allegations in an investigation. 
249. China asked about the science underlying the pr ovision in the Agriculture Appropriations 
Bill, which did not allow appropriations to be u sed to implement rules allowing imports of cooked 
poultry from China.  He sought information regard ing the possible extension of this provision beyond WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 45 
 
 
 the end of the fiscal year, and asked about measures to  ensure that this conformed to WTO rules.  On 
SPS, risk assessment was being abused by  the United States and constituted a de facto  barrier to 
international trade.  He urged the United States to  conclude the risk assessments on apples, which had 
been ongoing for ten years, in a timely and scientific manner. 
250. China disagreed with the U.S. explanation on  the possible linkage between biofuel policies 
and rising food prices, and sought information on how  the United States had reached the conclusion 
that the contribution of higher demand from deve loping countries, high oil prices, and adverse 
weather conditions outweighed that of U.S. biofue l policies.  The U.S. claim that increasing demand 
from developing economies was among the principal factors underlying food price increases was 
morally unacceptable and scientifically ungrounded.  According to the USDA, for the 2006/07 crop season, U.S. per capita consumption of beef was 8 times more than in China;  for corn, it was 7 times 
more, for chicken 6 times, for vegetable oil 2.2 times , and for wheat 1.3 times.  China had been a net 
food exporter for a long time.  A USDA report entitled Global Food Consumption and Impacts on 
Trade Patterns  noted:  "for an individual commodity there is not always a direct link between 
consumption and trade growth…The most notewor thy example is China, where rapid economic 
growth has not yet created a major demand for meat and livestock products.  Rather, domestic 
livestock production has accelerated in China in the past two decades".  Therefore, China was 
contributing to resolving the food crisis, not exacerbating it.  Various  newspapers had reported that 
U.S. daily average per capita calorie consumpti on was 3,770, compared with 2,700 in China and 
2,440 in India. 
251. The issue of rising food prices was complex and needed a comprehensive and thorough 
analysis before conclusions could be  drawn.  A recent UNCTAD report, Addressing the Global Food 
Crisis , listed biofuels and food security among the five  major causes of the food crisis.  The report 
pointed out that the use of maize for ethanol production was expected to almost double between 2005/06 and 2007/08.  It forecast that in 2009 al most 38% of total U.S. domestic maize use, 
equivalent to 100 million tons, would be devoted to biofuel production. 
252. As a strong demandeur in the services negotiations, the United States should take the lead in 
offering commercially meaningful market access in services to other Members.  He urged the United States to submit its notification under Article III of the GATS promptly. 
253. The representative of India
 noted that the U.S. response to India's question on the reduction of 
barriers to market access and other distorting measures was an attempt to change the mandate of the 
Round.  The Doha Ministerial Declaration stated  that Members "shall continue to make positive 
efforts designed to ensure that developing count ries, and especially the least-developed among them, 
secure a share in the growth of world trade commensurate with the needs of their economic 
development".  The Hong Kong Ministerial had recognized the importance of enhancing market 
access for developing countries in agriculture and NAM A.  An ambitious result in market access for 
agriculture and NAMA should be achieved in a bala nced and proportionate ma nner consistent with 
the principle of special and differential treatment. 
254. The branch licensing process for foreign banks amount ed to a denial of market access.  Indian 
banks had sometimes waited years for their applicati ons to be processed.  This was in sharp contrast 
to demands by the United States and its banks for prompt and transparent regulatory procedures in 
developing countries.  India was not satisfied with the U.S. response to its question on the tariff quota 
for tobacco. 
255. India had been blamed for increases in global fo od prices.  According to FAO, India's daily 
per capita calorie intake was 2,440, compared with  3,770 for the United States.  According to the 
USDA, the United States was the largest per cap ita consumer among major economies of beef, the 
most energy intensive food source.  Per capita consumption of corn was almost 60 times less in India WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 46  
 
 
 than in the United States.  The statement that high er demand for food in India due to improvements in 
the purchasing power of its middle class was causi ng global food prices to increase was wrong.  Food 
prices were nearly static until 2006.  In 2007-08 there had been a sudden spark.  India had been 
experiencing a boom during the past decade.  The fa ctors accounting for rising food prices were the 
diversion of arable land in the United States into ethanol production, trade-distortive subsidies, and 
the U.S. dollar decline.  Acco rding to the USDA, the linkage between changes in food consumption 
patterns and changes in world agricultural trade w as complex and involved more than income growth 
and dietary change.  In developing countries, diet  upgrading had not necessarily translated into higher 
import shares of livestock relative to grains and other bulk commodities.  The USDA concluded that a 
country's stage of development, distribution of income, and geography and culture were important 
factors underlying changes in food consumption and imports. 
256. The representative of Japan  welcomed the statement that the United States would consider the 
trade effects of the 100% scanning requirement.  Sh e requested additional information on the results 
of the 100% scanning pilot projects, and on future st eps regarding this requirement.  The Declaration 
of the High-Level Conference on World Food Security had reaffirmed the need to minimize the use of 
restrictive measures that could increase the volatility of  international prices.  The U.S. President had 
urged countries applying export restrictions on food to  lift them.  She appreciated this statement and 
sought confirmation that the United States would not in stitute new restrictions on exports of food and 
agricultural goods.  Japan appreciated the U.S. co mmitment to the multilateral trading system;  it was 
a firm supporter of the TPRM. 
257. The representative of the European Communities  noted that the United States had reiterated 
its commitment to the multilateral trading system .  However, the EC was concerned about U.S. 
backtracking on its engagement in the global tradin g system, which needed the support of its largest 
Members.  The 2008 Farm Bill was a missed opport unity to pursue domestic reform, including the 
reduction of trade-distorting subsidies and the elimina tion of export subsidies, and to show leadership 
in world agricultural reform.  The 2008 Farm Bill contradicted the DDA mandate and negotiations.  
He sought confirmation that the United States ha d not conducted any impact assessment or cost 
evaluation of 100% scanning prior to adopting the relevant  legislation.  He asked about the benefits of 
100% scanning and the reasons that had led the Unite d States to adopt legislation prior to the 
availability of results from the pilot programme .  He urged the United States to improve the 
transparency of U.S. agencies' recognition of e quivalence and conformity assessment methods.  The 
United States should implement adverse DSB rulings promptly. 
258. The representative of the United States  noted that there was broad support in Congress for an 
ambitious result from the Doha negotiations.  C ongress would have strong incentives to approve a 
strong outcome that achieved new trade flows and opened markets in agriculture, NAMA, and 
services.  On intellectual property rights, the effect of switching from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file 
patent application system was not likely to be sign ificant.  The vast majority (99.9%) of patent 
applications filed in the United States raised no di spute on the priority of the invention, and when 
such disputes arose, the inventor filing first usually  prevailed.  With respect to cotton, the United 
States intended to honour fully the commitments made in Hong Kong, and would continue its 
dialogue with the Cotton Four. 
259. Subsidies were part of the market access e quation in the negotiations.  The United States 
stood ready to make the hard choices necessary to  bring the Round to a successful conclusion.  
However, other Members had to do likewise.  Th e United States had informed Members about the 
steps taken towards the implementation of duty-free a nd quota-free market access for LDCs;  it would 
implement this initiative as part of the implemen tation of the Round.  The United States was willing 
to accept a result in NAMA that would obliterate tari ff peaks, and would like to hear about Members' 
interests in this area.  The United States had noted  that, in addition to the conversion of certain 
commodities to biofuels, other factors were contribu ting to the rise in food prices.  The United States WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 47 
 
 
 was providing resources to address the problem of rising food prices.  The U.S. record on notifications 
was very good;  it assigned high priority  to submitting pending notifications. 
260. There was no set time frame for the consideration of licence applications for foreign bank 
branches.  The United States was not trying to revisi t the special and differential treatment provisions 
agreed to as part of the Doha mandate.  Members would not always agree on what these provisions meant.  U.S. tariff quotas on tobacco were b ased on historical negotiations under multilateral 
auspices, and could be discussed under the DDA. 
261. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security was expected to report on the 100% scanning 
pilot programme to Congress shortly.  A large amount of information would be made available to the 
public then.  The United States shared Japan's concer ns regarding export restri ctions, which were not 
a response to the food price crisis. 
262. There was no evidence suggesting that th e United States had backtracked from its 
engagement in the WTO.  The United States had played  a leadership role in the negotiations.  It was 
also engaged in accession negotiations , and had provided assistance to acceding countries.  It was one 
of the most active participants in dispute settlem ent.  The United States had not been distracted by 
FTAs. 
263. The expected increase in the budget deficit duri ng the current fiscal year arose from a one-
time, counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus.  A budget surplus was forecast for 2012 and 2013.  U.S. household saving rates were very low.  Declines in housing prices would have a significant impact on 
the asset sheets of U.S. households, and households  were expected to increase saving out of current 
income to re-establish family wealth positions.  In  addition, the U.S. res ponses described three saving 
programmes and legislative changes to remove saving disincentives.  Saving incentive programmes 
were a double-edged sword, which might increase saving for some households and reduce it for 
others.  The United States was running a defi cit totalling US$740 billion, and there were 
US$740 billion in surpluses in the rest of the world.  The United States was not strictly in control of 
its external deficit, as it did not control capital flows.   A large net capital inflow into the United States 
implied a current account deficit, which raised the question of policies in the surplus countries.  The 
ultimate goal was to reduce the current global imbala nces while sustaining healthy economic growth.  
This could be achieved if all countries with s ubstantial imbalances took appropriate measures. 
264. In selecting an exchange rate regime, the underl ying motivation was to select a regime that 
facilitated balance-of-payments adjust ments.  The United States had a flexible exchange rate regime, 
where supply and demand for dollars arising from international transactions  were equated through 
fluctuations in the value of the dolla r.  This was not a managed policy. 
265. The representative of Canada
 asked whether the United Stat es could indicate when it would 
issue implementing regulations for the economic adjustment assistance programme for users of 
upland cotton under the 2008 Farm Bill, and whether there would be a pre-publication and comment 
period. 
266. The representative of China  welcomed the statement that th e United States did not neglect the 
importance of farm subsidies, and recognized that the United States was one of the first Members to 
accept the Chair's range on subsidy cuts.  Howeve r, Members had different views on the Chair's 
range, with some believing that the range would not affect U.S. applied subsidies, especially in the 
light of the recent commodity pr ice hike.  On biofuels, China was seeking to assess the problem 
objectively and share its information with a view to  identifying the roots of the problem and finding 
solutions. WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 48  
 
 
 267. The representative of the United States  stated that the implementing regulations for the 2008 
Farm Bill were being prepared and would be s ubject to normal rulemaking procedures allowing for 
public comment.  Compared with other issues in th e agriculture text that were important to the 
United States, the Chair's ranges gave Members a sense  of the possible outcome in subsidies.  The top 
of the Chair's range would require a reduction in U.S. support for 8 of the past 12 years.  The WTO 
offered the possibility for progress with respect to the status quo. 
268. The discussant  noted that this Review would help U.S. authorities to explain the need for 
reform to their constituents.  The U.S. TPR was very  important to all Members, as the United States 
was the largest economy in the world.  To conclu de the Round successfully, all Members needed to 
show flexibility. 
269. The representative of the United States  indicated that he would report back on this Review to 
help his authorities understand the concerns of WTO Members. WT/TPR/M/200 
Page 49 
 
 
 VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 
270. This ninth Trade Policy Review of the United States has allowed us to hold a frank discussion 
on U.S. trade policies and practices, focusing on changes since the last U.S. review in March 2006.  
The discussions have benefited from the full engageme nt of the U.S. delegation, led by Ambassador 
Allgeier, from the constructive contributions by  the discussant, Ambassador Uribe, and from the 
comments by Members. 
271. Members noted that the United States is the world's largest economy and trader, and 
recognized the efficiency that characterizes it.  Ho wever, they were concerned about the slowdown of 
U.S. economic activity.  The United States indicated that exports had helped mitigate the slowdown, 
and that the stimulus package adopted in 2008 wo uld keep the economy growing for the next few 
quarters, with growth accelerating towards the end of 2008. 
272. Members welcomed the United States' reaffirm ation that the multilateral trading system 
remains at the core of its trade policy.  Conti nued U.S. leadership was seen as key to ensuring a 
successful outcome to the DDA negotiations, with th e U.S. delegation stressing the broad support in 
the U.S. Congress for an ambitious result from the ne gotiations.  While noting that, in general, the 
United States has complied with WTO notification obligations and DSB rulings, Members stressed 
that some notifications were lagging and the full im plementation of certain rulings remained pending.  
Members also referred to various aspects of U.S. preferential trade initiatives, and expressed appreciation for its contribution to aid-for-trade. 
273. Members recognized the overall openness of the U. S. trade regime, but were concerned about 
tariff peaks and other specific trade-related measures.   They considered certain technical regulations 
and SPS measures to be unduly trade restrictive.  Memb ers also noted the persistence of some market 
access restrictions in government procurement.  The United States replied to a large number of 
questions posed by Members concerning its IPR regime. 
274. The use of anti-dumping measures by the United Stat es gave rise to concern, especially with 
respect to the increase in investigation initiations in  2007, the lengthy duration of measures, continued 
disbursements under the repealed Byrd Amendment, and methodological aspects of investigations including "zeroing". 
275. Members also expressed concern at the recently  adopted 2008 Farm B ill, considering it a 
missed opportunity to improve the market orientatio n of the U.S. agricultural sector.  They noted the 
new Bill's potential for increasing trade-distorting s upport, and questioned its compatibility with the 
goals of the DDA.  The U.S. authorities noted that the implementing regulations for the 2008 Farm Bill are yet to be issued and that any new U.S.  commitments made in the DDA context will be the 
subject of further implementing legislation.  Seve ral Members urged the United States to reconsider 
its assistance to biofuels in the context of risi ng food prices.  The United States replied that its 
increased conversion of cereals into biofuels is only one of several factors contributing to higher 
prices for such commodities. 
276. Border measures and security were another major theme of this Review.  While Members 
expressed understanding of U.S. efforts to enhance security, many indicated that measures, like the 
100% scanning requirement, impose additional costs on international trade.  Therefore, they 
encouraged the United States to ensu re that security-related initiatives ar e as least trade-restrictive as 
possible.  Some Members also noted that recent le gislative reforms to the review process of the 
national security implications of FDI may create uncertainty for foreign investors. WT/TPR/M/200 
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 277. On services, Members noted in particular thei r concern with respect to the Jones Act in 
maritime transport, foreign ownershi p caps in air transport, the lack of a unified insurance market, and 
restrictions on mode 4 services supply. 
278. I would like to conclude by noting that this  Review has taken place at a particularly 
challenging time for the multilateral trading syst em and the world economy.  Members recognized 
that the United States maintains a largely open tr ade regime but also expressed concern about a 
number of specific measures and policies.  In this regard, it is my understanding that Members were 
reassured by the United States stating that it remains fi rm in its belief in the value of open markets and 
the WTO, and that a successful DDA outcome is its top trade negotiating priority.  The latter is of 
utmost importance because strengthening the multilatera l trading system would be to the benefit of 
the U.S. and world economies alike. 
279. In closing I would like to thank once again the U.S. delegation for the oral and written 
responses provided during the meeting;  we all l ook forward to receiving answers to the remaining 
questions within one month. 
280. This concludes the ninth Trade Policy Review of the United States.  However, before I 
adjourn the meeting, I wish, on a personal note, to  mention that Mr. David Walters, in charge of 
economic affairs in USTR, has been part of the U.S. effo rt in each of its nine reviews.  This is his last 
Review.  Thank you Mr. Walters for all your work  – we all wish you well.  I also thank the 
interpreters for their hard work. 
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