06-3101  JOB(06)/200/Rev.1        26 June 2006  
 
Negotiating Group on Market Access  
 
 
TOWARDS NAMA MODALITIES 
 
Revision  
 Introduction
 
 
 I present this document for submission to th e Trade Negotiations Committee in response to 
the request of Members for proposed language of  full modalities for the No n-Agricultural Market 
Access (NAMA) negotiations.  I regret  that I am unable to fulfil that mandate, as a result of the failure 
of the Negotiating Group to find consensus on many important issues, and that the present report is, at 
best, a step in the direction of full modalities.  This explains the title of my document.   This also explains why I decided to preserve the structure of my April 28, 2006 report to the TNC for this document.  I believe that this form at remains an effective mechanism to display the 
mandate of the negotiations, the results of the ne gotiations thus far and the principal issues and 
options on questions that remain unresolved.  To recall this format: 
 - the first column
 contains Annex B of the Genera l Council decision of 1 August 2004 
(commonly referred to as the "NAMA Framewor k"), as amended or supplemented by the 
relevant paragraphs of the Hong Kong Minist erial Declaration.  The additions from the 
Ministerial Declaration have been indicated in bold;   
 - the second column
 shows possible modalities language.  In some cases the issue has 
matured and the language is agreed.   In ot her cases it was a simple transposition of the 
language in the July Framework.  In yet othe r instances, it is language that I felt I could 
risk proposing on my own responsibility (i dentified in italics).  Rest assured, those 
instances are a few: I took such initiative only in  those cases where I felt that the points of 
divergence were not that entrenched a nd could be bridged at this time; and 
 - the third column
 is the Chair’s commentary on the issues.  I have not given an exhaustive 
narrative of the position of Members.  Instead, I have briefly presented the issues and, in 
some instances, taken the liberty of provid ing some guidance for future discussions.  In 
others instances, I felt I could not provide  guidance because Members were unable to 
create that opportunity for me.   
 
 Where this document diverges from my April report is in the inclusion of an Annex.  In this 
Annex, I have reproduced the vari ous textual proposals submitted to the Negotiating Group on issues 
on which we do not yet have consensus and where the di vergence is too great for me to bridge at this 
time.   While this will certainly give Members a comprehensive picture of where we stand on all 
NAMA issues, it will not make their lives any easier .  On some issues, as you will discover, the 
Annex represents a complex menu of options which Members will not have an easy time navigating.  
 
 There is another important dimension to the NAMA negotiations and to the interpretation of 
both the agreed modalities and the possible options fo r resolving outstanding issues presented in this 
document.  This is what I have referred to as th e “brackets” on the entire NAMA negotiations – that 
is, the agriculture negotiations.  The simple fact is  that progress in the NAMA negotiations have, at all 
times, been both constrained by and conditional upon progress in the ag riculture negotiations.  This is 
true both in respect of the overall negotiations and in  respect of specific issues, including the level of 
ambition in the formula, the overall degree of flexibilities, and the treatment of preference erosion, small, vulnerable economies and recently acceded Members.   JOB(06)/200/Rev.1 
Page 2  
 
   
 Over the past few weeks, I have been tr ying to obtain agreement on the “architecture” for 
resolving each of the issues.  My intent was to pr epare a final stage in the negotiations, which would 
be concentrated only on the numbers – the level of ambition.  I cannot claim much success.  We were 
able to confirm the architectur e of the treatment of paragraph 6 countries and to agree on the 
substance of the issues related to least-developed count ries.  On other issues, I can claim only partial 
success. In respect of small, vulnerable economies and recently acceded Members, we have tentatively agreed only partial elements of the fina l solution.  On the remaining issues, I can offer no 
more than possible approaches to fi nding an eventual solution.   
 
 I have faithfully adhered to the principle of  the bottom-up approach, and this document is a 
reflection of the degree of convergence between Members on the issues.       
   JOB(06)/200/Rev.1
 Page 3July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
 
 
 
1. This Framework contains the initial elements for future work on modalities by the Negotiating Group 
on Market Access.  Additional negotiations are 
required to reach agreement on the specifics of some of these elements.  These re late to the formula, the 
issues concerning the treatment of unbound tariffs in 
indent two of paragraph 5, the flexibilities for developing-country participants, the issue of 
participation in the sectorial tariff component and the 
preferences.  In order to finalize the modalities, the Negotiating Group is instructed to address these issues 
expeditiously in a manner consistent with the mandate 
of paragraph 16 of the Doha  Ministerial Declaration 
and the overall balance therein. 
 
2. We reaffirm that nego tiations on market access for 
non-agricultural products shall aim to reduce or as 
appropriate eliminate tariffs, including the reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff 
escalation, as well as non-tariff barriers, in particular 
on products of export interest to developing countries.  We also reaffirm the importance of special and 
differential treatment and less than full reciprocity in 
reduction commitments as integral parts of the modalities. 
 
3. We acknowledge the substantial work undertaken by the Negotiating Group on Market 
Access and the progress towards achieving an 
agreement on negotiating modalities.  We take note of the constructive dialogue on the Chair's Draft 
Elements of Modalities (TN/MA/W/35/Rev.1) and 
confirm our intention to use this document as a reference for the future work of the Negotiating 
Group.  We instruct the Negotiating Group to continue   
Preamble
 
 
We recall paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration in which we agreed "to negotiations 
which shall aim, by modalities to be agreed, to reduce 
or as appropriate elimin ate tariffs, including the 
reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs, 
and tariff escalation, as well as non-tariff barriers, in 
particular on products of export interest to developing countries.  Product coverage shall be comprehensive 
and without a priori  exclusions.  The negotiations 
shall take fully into acco unt the special needs and 
interests of developing and least-developed country 
participants, including through less than full 
reciprocity in reduction commitments, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article XXVIII bis of 
GATT 1994 and the provisions cited in paragraph 50 
of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. To this end, the 
modalities to be agreed will include appropriate 
studies and capacity-building measures to assist least-developed countries to participate effectively in the 
negotiations."  
 Further to the Doha mandate, and building on the 
results reached in Annex B of the General Council 
Decision of 1 August 2004 (NAMA Framework) and paragraphs 13 to 24 of the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration, we establish the  modalities for the 
NAMA negotiations as set out below.      
  JOB(06)/200/Rev.1 
Page 4 July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
its work, as mandated by paragraph 16 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration with its corresponding 
references to the relevant provisions of 
Article XXVIII bis of GATT 1994 and to the 
provisions cited in paragraph 50 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration, on the basis set out below.    
 
 4. 
We recognize that a formula approach is key to 
reducing tariffs, and reducing or eliminating tariff 
peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation.  We agree that 
the Negotiating Group should continue its work on a non-linear formula applied on a line-by-line basis 
which shall take fully into account the special needs 
and interests of developing and least-developed country participants, including through less than full 
reciprocity in reduction commitments. 
 
14. We adopt a Swiss Formula with coefficients at 
levels which shall inter alia :  
 
− Reduce or as appropriate eliminate tariffs, 
including the reduction or elimination of tariff 
peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation, in 
particular on products of export interest to 
developing countries;  and 
− Take fully into account the special needs and 
interests of developing countries, including 
through less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments. 
 
15. We reaffirm the importance of special and differential treatm ent and less than full reciprocity 
in reduction commitments , including paragraph 8 
of the NAMA Framework, as integral parts of the modalities.  We instruct the Negotiating Group to 
finalize its details as soon as possible.   
Formula
 
 
We agree that the following  Swiss Formula shall apply 
on a line-by-line basis:   
Formula  
 
Architecture of the formula  
 There is no consensus on the structure of the formula.  
 
There continue to be two Swiss formula options on the table - one is the simple Swiss formula with two 
coefficients (one for developed and one for developing 
country Members) and the other is the ABI formula. 
 
On the basis of the discussions of the Negotiating Group and my consultations with Members, I believe 
that there is broader and stronger support for the 
simple Swiss formula with two coefficients and that the discussions should focus on this structure as the more 
likely to attract a consensus. It should be noted, 
however, that some of this  support depends on the 
level of the coefficients and whether they will deliver 
on Members' interpretations of the Doha mandate 
and/or paragraph 24 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. Putting this in different terms, the key 
questions are: (1) the interpretation of “less than full 
reciprocity in reduction commitments”; (2) the extent to which “real market access” must also be achieved; 
and (3) the comparability of any outcome in NAMA to 
the ambition achieved in Agriculture.     
   JOB(06)/200/Rev.1
 Page 5July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
  Formula coefficients  
 
There is no consensus on the coefficients for the tariff-
reduction formula.  I do not believe that the discussions in the Negotiating Group provide a basis 
on which to establish the coefficients, or even to 
propose a range of numbers within which to focus the discussion  
 
 
 5. We further agree on the following elements 
regarding the formula: 
 
 
− Product coverage shall be comprehensive without 
a priori exclusions.  
 
18. We take note of the level of common 
understanding reached on the issue of product 
coverage and direct the Negotiating Group to 
resolve  differences on the limited  issues that remain  as quickly as possible. 
  
Elements regarding the formula
 
 
We further agree on the following elements regarding 
the formula: 
 
 
(a)  Product coverage shall be comprehensive   
without a priori exclusions as reflected in 
document [...].  
Elements regarding the formula  
  
 
  
Product Coverage
 
 
There is no consensus on product coverage.  There is 
a wide view that the ideal outcome would be an agreed list with no deviati ons.  However, in light of 
the impasse in the Negotiating Group, I tabled a 
proposal for an agreed list (JOB(06)/126/Rev.1) that would include a footnote recording the deviation of 
two Members without altering the rights of other 
Members.    
Most Members are in favour of an agreed list and 
were uncomfortable with the proposed footnote.   Notwithstanding their relu ctance, some Members have 
expressed a willingness to accept my proposal.  
Others have insisted on an agreed list with no footnotes or have indicated that they would add their 
own deviations to the footnote, exacerbating the 
problem.    
It would be unfortunate if we were not able to achieve 
full agreement on the products covered in the NAMA 
negotiations.  This is essential for the tabling of   
  JOB(06)/200/Rev.1 
Page 6 July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
  schedules and also enhances transparency for traders.   
It may also avoid disputes in the area of classification 
and resolve the ambiguities from the Uruguay Round.   
 In short, my first best solution is to have an agreed list 
with no deviations.  My second-best solution is to have 
an agreed list with full transparency of any deviation 
 
 
 
− tariff reductions or elimination shall commence 
from the bound rates after full implementation of 
current concessions;  however, for unbound tariff 
lines, we adopt a non-linear mark-up approach 
to establish base rate s for commencing tariff 
reductions.   
  
 
(b)  Tariff reductions or elimination shall commence 
from the bound rates after full implementation of 
current concessions; however, for unbound tariff 
lines, we adopt a constant non-linear mark-up of […] percentage points to the MFN applied rate in 
the base year to establish base rates for 
commencing tariff reductions.  
 Unbound Tariffs
 
 
Treatment  
 
There is consensus on the architecture of the treatment 
of unbound tariffs, which is a constant, non-linear mark-up.   
 
Mark-up
 
 
There is no consensus on th e level of the mark-up, but 
it is clear that the range is between 5 and 30 
percentage points.  While Members have their 
preferences, and there continue to be sensitivities over low and high, unbound rates, a great deal of flexibility 
has been signalled.  This  flexibility was even more 
apparent after the simulations of the effects of various formula approaches were issued, as these 
demonstrated that the effect of the mark- up is 
relatively small once the formula is applied.    
  
− the base year for MFN applied tariff rates shall be 
2001 (applicable rates on 14 November); 
  
 (c)  The base year for MFN applied tariff rates shall be 
2001 (applicable rates on 14 November); 
  
 
 
 Base year
 
 
There is consensus on this issue.  
   JOB(06)/200/Rev.1
 Page 7July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
 
 
 
 
− credit shall be given for autonomous liberalization 
by developing Members provided that the tariff 
lines were bound on an MFN basis in the WTO since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round; 
  
 
 
 (d)  
  
Credit for bound autonomous liberalization by 
developing countries  
 
There is no consensus on this issue. Few developing 
Members have bound autonomous tariff reductions 
since the Uruguay Round.  While some Members have noted the importance of this issue, they have also 
acknowledged that it is a difficult concept to 
operationalize.  Perhaps as a result, until very recently, no proposal had been tabled and no 
discussion had been held on  this subject.  However, a 
proposal was tabled just before the preparation of this document.  The proposal suggests that an unspecified 
number of additional points should be added to the 
coefficient in the formula for those lines which were bound autonomously.  There has been no discussion of 
this proposal, which does not provide specifics on how 
to assess the value of the liberalization for the purpose 
of adjusting the coefficient.   
 
  
− all non- ad valorem  duties shall be converted to ad 
valorem  equivalents on the basis of  the 
methodology outlin ed in document 
JOB(05)166/Rev.1 and bound in ad valorem  
terms; 
  
 
(e) all non- ad valorem  duties shall be converted to 
ad valorem  equivalents on the basis of  the 
methodology outlined in document 
JOB(05)/166/Rev.1 and bound in ad valorem  
terms;  
 Ad valorem  equivalents
 
 
A useful multilateral verification process of AVE 
submissions is ongoing and will need to be concluded soon after the establishment of modalities.  
 
 
 
− negotiations shall commence on the basis of the 
HS96 or HS2002 nomenclature, with the results of 
the negotiations to be finalized in HS2002 
nomenclature; 
   
 (f)  negotiations shall commence on the basis of the 
HS96 or HS2002 nomenclature, with the results of 
the negotiations to be finalized in HS2002 nomenclature to the extent possible . 
 Nomenclature
 
 
Members have the option of submitting schedules in 
HS96 or HS2002. However, in the fo rmer case, the 
question of finalizing the results in HS2002 will present a challenge to Memb ers and/or the Secretariat 
due to time constraints.  My proposal would be to 
make the finalization of results in HS2002 a “best 
efforts” provision.     
  JOB(06)/200/Rev.1 
Page 8 July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
 
 
 
-    the reference period for import data shall be 1999- 2001.  
 
 
(g) the reference period for import data shall be  
1999-2001 
 
 (h) the implementation period for tariff reductions for   
developed-country Members shall be [..] years 
and for developing country Members [...] years, to be implemented [...].    
Reference period
 
 
There is consensus on this issue.  
Implementation period
 
 
I suggest that the question of implementation periods 
be addressed in a new paragraph which would include 
both the longer implementa tion periods for developing 
Members subject to formula cuts (currently addressed 
in paragraph 8), but also the implementation period 
for developed countries. Regarding the number of years proposed for implementation, Members’ 
positions are not yet certain enough for me to propose 
numbers at this stage.  My language also leaves open the question of how the tariff reductions will be 
implemented (e.g. staging etc.), as this has not yet 
been agreed by Members.      
 
 
  
 
6. We furthermore agree that, as an exception, participants with a binding coverage of non-
agricultural tariff lines of less than [35] percent would 
be exempt from making tariff reductions through the formula.  Instead, we exp ect them to bind [100] 
percent of non-agricultural tariff lines at an average 
level that does not exceed the overall average of bound tariffs for all developing countries after full 
implementation of current concessions. 
  
Flexibilities for developing Members with low 
binding coverage1  
 
We furthermore agree that, as an exception, 
participants with a binding coverage of non-
agricultural tariff lines of less than 35 percent would 
be exempt from making tariff reductions through the formula.  Instead, we expect them to bind [70-100] 
percent of non-agricultural tariff lines at an average 
level that does not exceed the overall average of bound tariffs for all developing countries after full 
implementation of current concessions, which is at 
28.5%.   
Flexibilities for developin g Members with low 
binding coverage  
 
There is consensus on the architecture of this exception.  The negotiation is  now focussed on the 
binding that such Members would be expected to 
make.  I would note that the proponents of this paragraph have indicated that their acceptance of the 
28.5% average binding level  was conditional upon an 
acceptable level of binding coverage.  While most other Members are willing to show some flexibility on 
the binding coverage, they have generally indicated 
that 70% is too low.  They recognize that other developing Members availing of paragraph 8 
flexibilities will have the possibility to maintain 5% of 
                                                      
1 Developing Members concerned are: Camero on; Congo, Côte d'Ivoire; Cuba; Ghana; Keny a; Macao, China; Mauritius; Nigeria; Sri La nka; Suriname; and Zimbabwe.   
   JOB(06)/200/Rev.1
 Page 9July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
tariff lines unbound and, as a result, they are willing 
to consider a 95% percentage binding coverage for 
these Members.  Others have shown greater flexibility. 
Some have suggested that, as  the target tariff average 
was fixed on the basis of the "overall average of 
bound tariff for all develop ing countries after full 
implementation of current concessions", the same rationale could be used to determine their binding 
coverage (i.e. 81% if all developing countries except 
LDCs are included; 93% if the paragraph 6 countries are removed.).  
 
 
 7.  We recognize that a sectorial tariff component, 
aiming at elimination or harmonization is another key 
element to achieving the objec tives of paragraph 16 of 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration with regard to the 
reduction or elimination of tariffs, in particular on products of export interest to developing countries.  
We recognize that participation by all participants will 
be important to that effect.  We therefore instruct the 
Negotiating Group to pursue its discussions on such a 
component, with a view to defining product coverage, 
participation, and adequate provisions of flexibility for developing-country participants. 
 
 
16. In furtherance of paragraph 7 of the NAMA 
Framework, we recognize that Members are 
pursuing sectoral initiatives.  To this end, we instruct the Negotiating Group to review proposals 
with a view to identifying those which could garner 
sufficient participation to be realized.  Participation should be on a non-mandatory basis. 
  
Sectoral negotiations
 
 
1. We reaffirm that the sectoral tariff reduction 
component is another key element to achieving the 
objectives of Paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration.  Participation in sectoral initiatives is on 
a non-mandatory basis.  Such initiatives shall aim to reduce, harmonize or as appropriate eliminate tariffs, 
including the reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, 
high tariffs and tariff escalation, over and above that which would be achieved by the formula modality, in 
particular on products of exp ort interest to developing 
countries.   
2. We recognise the progress made in a variety of 
sectors, where discussions among participants in the sectorals have focused on: defining the critical mass 
which may include the share of world trade and level 
of participation of competitive producers; the scope of product coverage; the implementation schedule; and 
special and differential treatment for developing-
country participants.  
3. At the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, 
Ministers instructed members to identify sectors which 
could garner sufficient participation.  Members have  
Sectoral negotiations
 
 
As there is wide agreement on the core issues, I have 
taken the initiative of proposing compromise language 
on sectoral negotiations.  I believe that, at the Hong 
Kong Ministerial, Minist ers resolved the most 
contentious issue on sectoral negotiations – the non-mandatory nature of participation in such initiatives.  
I believe that the other concerns which have been 
voiced concerning language proposed by ten Members and circulated as JOB(06)/125 can be bridged.  I have 
used this document as the basis for my proposed text.  
 I would note that a concern was raised that, given the 
lack of clarity on matters such as critical mass and the 
potential impact that sectorals could have on products of export interest to le ast-developed countries, 
sectorals should not be part of the modalities 
language.  However, it is diff icult for me to ignore the 
fact that Ministers have agreed that sectorals are a 
"key element" in the NAMA negotiations.  I believe 
that such concerns could be accommodated through dialogue between concerned Members and the 
proponents of sectoral initiatives, especially in the 
area of product coverage, implementation periods and 
special and differential measures.    
  JOB(06)/200/Rev.1 
Page 10 July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
started submitting specific textual proposals on the 
following sectors:  Autos and related parts, Bicycles 
and related parts, Chemicals, Electronics/Electrical 
products, Fish and fish products, Forest products, Pharmaceuticals and medical devices, Gems and 
Jewellery, Raw materials, Sports equipment, Hand 
Tools and Textiles, Clothing and Footwear.  
  
4. We instruct Members participating in the sectoral 
initiatives to intensify their work and finalise the details of each sector in order to be in a position to 
incorporate any outcomes of such negotiations on a 
conditional basis in the draft comprehensive schedules of participating members at the time of 
their submission. Work could continue thereafter, if 
necessary, to encourage broader participation in the sectoral initiatives referred to under paragraph 3 
above or in any additional sectoral initiatives aiming 
at greater-than-formula reduction or elimination of 
tariffs in particular on products of export interest to 
developing countries. 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
Harmonization  proposal on the Textiles and Clothing 
Sector  
 
A sectoral proposal on tariff harmonization in the textile and clothing sector has been submitted by 
Turkey.  Many Members, including the proponent, 
have acknowledged that it is a sectoral initiative which is different in nature from the other sectoral 
initiatives on which work is currently ongoing.  It 
proposes mandatory participation and leaves open the possibility of an outcome that is not over and above 
that which would be achieved by the formula. While 
this proposal enjoys the support of some Members, it is also firmly opposed by many others, who argue that 
it does not satisfy the requirements of the mandate  
   JOB(06)/200/Rev.1
 Page 11July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
from Ministers.  It is clear that the proponents will be 
challenged to garner sufficient support for this 
proposal. 
 
  
 
 8. We agree that developing-country 
participants shall have longer implementation periods 
for tariff reductions.   
 
In addition, they shall be given the following flexibility: 
 
 
(a) applying less than formula cuts to up to [10] 
percent of the tariff lines provided that the cuts are no less than half the formula cuts and that 
these tariff lines do not exceed [10] percent of 
the total value of a Member's imports; or 
 
 
(b) keeping, as an exception,  tariff lines unbound, or 
not applying formula cuts for up to [5] percent of 
tariff lines provided they do not exceed [5] 
percent of the total value of a Member's imports. 
 
 
We furthermore agree that this flexibility could not be used to exclude entire HS Chapters. 
  
Flexibilities for developing  Members subject to the 
formula  
 
 
 
  
 
Developing-country participants shall be given the following flexibility: 
 
 
(a)  applying less than formula cuts to up to [10] 
percent of the national tariff lines provided that the cuts are no less than half the formula cuts and 
that these tariff lines do not exceed [10] percent 
of the total value of a Member's non-agricultural imports; or 
 
(b)  keeping, as an exceptio n, tariff lines unbound, or 
not applying formula cuts for up to [5] percent of 
national tariff lines provided they do not exceed 
[5] percent of the total value of a Member's non-agricultural imports. 
 
We furthermore agree that this flexibility could not be used to exclude entire HS Chapters. 
  
Flexibilities for developing Members subject to the 
formula  
 
Implementation Period  
 
(See section on implementation period above.)  
 
Architecture
 
 
There is consensus on the architecture of paragraph 8 
flexibilities.  
 
Numbers  
 
There is no consensus on the percentage of tariff lines 
that will be covered by these flexibilities.  However, while some Members continue to believe that the 
current numbers in 8(a) and 8(b) are the minimum or 
maximum of what should be offered, my sense is that, with very limited exceptions, Members could agree to 
the numbers already in th e brackets provided the 
coefficients in the formula are satisfactory.  My advice, therefore, would be to treat these numbers as a 
working hypothesis and fo cus discussions on the 
coefficients in the formula.  
Alternative to the use of paragraph 8 flexibilities
 
 There is no consensus on the proposal submitted by 
Mexico which suggested adding 5 points to the 
coefficient for any developing Member that did not 
exercise its right to use paragraph 8 flexibilities.   
  JOB(06)/200/Rev.1 
Page 12 July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
Some Members have supported this proposal, 
although some indicated reservations about the 
number of additional points to be added to the 
coefficient.  Others have expressed opposition to the proposal, arguing that it would establish a precedent 
for an “a-la-carte” application of the formula.  
 
  
21. We note the concerns raised by small, 
vulnerable economies, and instruct the Negotiating Group to establish ways to provide flexibilities for 
these Members without creating a sub-category of 
WTO Members.  
Small, Vulnerable Economies
 
 
The criteria  
 With the exception of developed countries, Members 
having a share of less than [0.1%] of world NAMA 
trade for a reference period of 1999 to 2001, or best available data, as contained in document TN/MA/S/18 
may use the following modality for tariff reduction:  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
It is understood that this does not create a sub-
category of WTO Members . 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
Small, Vulnerable Economies
 
 
The criteria  
 There is consensus on the use of this criterion to 
determine eligibility for additional flexibilities as a 
small, vulnerable economy.   
While recognizing that this benchmark establishes 
only that an economy is sma ll, in terms of its NAMA 
trade, Members have acknowledged the difficulties of 
articulating additional criteria to establish that economies are also vulner able and can accept the 
single criterion. 
 The proponents have proposed additional criteria 
related to agricultural trade and total goods (both 
NAMA and agriculture) trade.  Many Members oppose the use of such criteria, arguing that this would create 
a new sub-category of Members.  I would note, in this 
regard, that it is important for many Members that the treatment of small, vulnerable economies in these 
negotiations does not create a precedent for future 
negotiations.  
Finally, it was noted that this criterion should be 
understood as only a “trigger” for eligibility – that is, the criterion alone should not define the group of 
countries that will have access to these flexibilities.  
Members will recall that the proponents do not 
include all countries with trade below this threshold.  
   JOB(06)/200/Rev.1
 Page 13July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
 
The treatment  
 
  
 
  
The treatment
 
 
There is no consensus on the treatment of small, 
vulnerable economies.  
 
There are two basic options on the table:  a paragraph  6-type solution or a paragraph 8-type solution.  The 
first option
 has two variations, one put forward by the 
SVEs proponents and the second by Norway.  The SVE proponents have suggested a banded approach while 
Norway's proposal is more similar in structure to 
paragraph 6, with a single target tariff average  and 
minimum cuts on individual tariff lines.  The second 
option  is to use a paragraph 8-type solution, which 
would envisage increasing the flexibilities in paragraph 8.  There are different permutations of this 
option including adding percentage points to the 
existing numbers in paragraph 8; removing the trade 
limitation, combining sub-paragraph (a) and (b), and 
by extending the implementation period.  
Unfortunately, I am unable to provide much guidance 
on this issue.  I would note that one factor which has made this discussion difficult is the diverse tariff 
profiles of the SVE proponents. Beyond this, I can only 
repeat my view that a satisfactory contribution from these Members can be achieved using either the 
paragraph 8 or paragraph 6 approach.  The central 
question, therefore, is how great a contribution is required of these Members. 
 
  
 
  
  
  JOB(06)/200/Rev.1 
Page 14 July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
 
 
 
  
9. We agree that least-developed country 
participants shall not be required to apply the formula nor participate in the sectorial approach, however, as 
part of their contribution to this round of negotiations, 
they are expected to substantially increase their level of binding commitments. 
  
Least-Developed Countries (LDCs)
 
 
Flexibilities for LDCs  
 
We recall the decision of July 2004 General Council 
to exempt LDCs from participating in the formula for tariff reduction and the sectoral approach.  However, 
as part of their contribution to this Round of 
negotiations, LDCs are expected to substantially increase their level of tariff binding commitments.   
We therefore reaffirm th at individual LDCs will 
determine the extent and level of tariff binding
 
commitments in accordance with their individual 
development objectives. 
  
Least-Developed Countries (LDCs)  
 
Flexibilities for LDCs  
 
There is consensus on this language.  
 
 
 
 
10. Furthermore, in recognition of the need to enhance the integration of least-developed countries 
into the multilateral trading system and support the 
diversification of their production and export base, we call upon developed-country participants and other 
participants who so decide, to grant on an autonomous 
basis duty-free and quota-f ree market access for non-
agricultural products originating from least-developed 
countries by the year […]. 
 
 Market Access for LDCs
 
 
We reaffirm the need to he lp LDCs secure beneficial 
and meaningful integration into the multilateral 
trading system.  In this regard, we recall the Decision 
on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries  
contained in decision 36 of Annex F of the Hong 
Kong Ministerial Declara tion (the "Decision"), and 
reaffirm our commitment to fully implement the 
Decision as agreed.  
 
We reaffirm our commitment to ensuring that preferential rules of origin applicable to imports from 
LDCs will be transp arent, simple and contribute to 
facilitating market access in respect of non-
agricultural products. 
 
We also reaffirm our commitment to progressively achieve compliance with th e Decision referred to 
above, taking into account  the impact on other 
developing countries at similar levels of development. 
 Market Access for LDCs
 
 
There is consensus on th is language, subject to 
confirmation from capitals  by some Members.   
   JOB(06)/200/Rev.1
 Page 15July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
We reaffirm that developing country Members shall 
be permitted to phase in their commitments and enjoy 
appropriate flexibility in coverage. 
 Accordingly, by the time Members submit their 
comprehensive draft schedules of concessions, 
developed-country Members shall, and developing-country Members declaring th emselves in a position to 
do so should: 
  - inform the WTO of the products that are currently 
covered under duty free and quota free market 
access for LDCs;  
 
- notify the internal procedures by which they will 
implement the Decision; and 
 
- provide an indication of the possible time frame 
within which they intend to fully implement the 
Decision as agreed.   
 
 
 
 
11. We recognize that newly acceded Members shall have recourse to special provisions for tariff 
reductions in order to take  into account their extensive 
market access commitments undertaken as part of their accession and that stag ed tariff reductions are 
still being implemented in many cases.  We instruct 
the Negotiating Group to further elaborate on such provisions. 
  
Recently Acceded Members (RAMs)
 
 
In recognition of their extensive market access commitments undertaken as part of their accession 
and that staged tariff reductions are still being 
implemented in many case s, the Recently Acceded 
Members shall have an additional implementation 
period of […] years, in respect of […]. 
  
 
In recognition of their extensive market access commitments undertaken as part of their accession 
and their current economic circumstances, Armenia, 
Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova shall not be required 
to undertake tariff reductions.   
Recently Acceded Members (RAMs)
 
 
Who is a RAM?  
 
An informal understanding was reached that for the 
purposes of complying with paragraph 58 of the Hong Kong Declaration concer ning RAMs, the relevant 
negotiating bodies should consider the situation of all 
those Members who have acceded to the WTO since its establishment, with the exception of those who have 
since become members of the European Union and 
those who are LDCs.  In addition, any further countries which acceded before the conclusion of the 
negotiations under the DDA should also be 
considered.  It is also understood that if Bulgaria 
becomes a member of the European Union before the  
  JOB(06)/200/Rev.1 
Page 16 July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
 
 conclusion of the Round, it would not be considered a 
RAM for the purposes of paragraph 58 of the Hong 
Kong Declaration.   
 On that basis, the potential list of RAMs for the 
purposes of paragraph 58 of the Hong Kong 
Declaration would be as follows: Ecuador, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Panama, Kyrgyz Republic, Jordan, 
Georgia, Albania, Oman, Croatia, Moldova, China, 
Chinese Taipei, Armenia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Saudi Arabia.  
 
Treatment of RAMs
 
 
There is consensus that additional flexibility in the 
form of longer implementation periods should be extended to all recently a cceded Members.  However, 
Members have differing views on how such longer 
implementation periods should apply. Some have 
argued that the extension should apply to all tariff 
lines while others would restrict the extension to tariff lines on which accession commitments have not yet 
been fully implemented.   
 There is also consensus that the small, low-income 
economies in transition (Armenia, Moldova and 
Kyrgyz Republic) should be given special consideration.   
 
There is a widely held view among Members that, in addition to these flexibilities, RAMs should also make 
use of other flexibilities for which they are eligible (for 
example, there may be a number of RAMs who may be eligible to use the flexib ilities for developing countries 
that apply the formula, or for small, vulnerable 
economies).   
  
   JOB(06)/200/Rev.1
 Page 17July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
A proposal was submitted by China providing options 
for additional flexibilities that might be accorded to 
RAMs, including a higher coefficient, greater 
paragraph 8 flexibilities and grace periods for the implementation of the formula.  Croatia supported this 
proposal, but proposed that the grace period and 
implementation period be increased and that they should have access to paragraph 8 flexibilities.  Little 
support was expressed for these proposals.  
 
  
 
12. We agree that pending agreement on core modalities for tariffs, the possibilities of 
supplementary modalities such as zero-for-zero sector 
elimination, sectorial harmonization, and request & 
offer, should be kept open.  
Supplementary Modalities
 
 
We agree that Members may use the request & offer approach as a supplementary modality following 
establishment of the core modalities.  
   
Supplementary Modalities
 
 
Supplementary modalities will be used once the 
formula has been agreed to.  In my view, the only 
supplementary modality which is feasible from a 
practical point of view, once the core modality is 
agreed to, is the request & offer modality.  I would 
note that sectoral negotiations provide a vehicle for zero-for-zero tariff elimination and tariff 
harmonization, and that the doors remain open to new 
proposals on sectoral agreements.  I do not know what other type of supplementary negotiation is available, 
so am not sure of the relevance of the term "such as" 
in the July Framework language.   In other words, the language in the July Framework strikes me as being 
outdated.  I have proposed some new language in the 
middle column to take account of the evolution of the negotiations  
 
 
  
13. In addition, we ask developed-country participants 
and other participants who so decide to consider the elimination of low duties.  
Elimination of low duties
 
 
In addition, we ask devel oped-country participants 
and other participants who so decide to consider the elimination of low duties.   
Elimination of low duties
 
 
Presumably, the question of elimination of low duties 
will be taken up after agreement on the formula and at the discretion of Members. Therefore, I believe that 
the language can be transferred from the July 
Framework to the middle column.  
  JOB(06)/200/Rev.1 
Page 18 July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
 
 
 
14. We recognize that NTBs are an integral and equally important part of these negotiations and 
instruct participants to intensify their work on NTBs.  
In particular, we encourage all participants to make notifications on NTBs by 31 October 2004 and to 
proceed with identification, examination, 
categorization, and ultimately negotiations on NTBs.  We take note that the modalities for addressing NTBs 
in these negotiations could include request/offer, 
horizontal, or ver tical approaches; and should fully 
take into account the pr inciple of special and 
differential treatment for developing and least-
developed country participants.  
 
22. We note that the Negotiating Group has made 
progress in the identification, categorization and 
e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  n o t i f i e d  N T B s .   W e  a l s o  t a k e  n o t e  that Members are developing bilateral, vertical and 
horizontal approaches to the NTB negotiations, 
and that some of the NTBs are being addressed in other fora including other Negotiating Groups.  We 
recognize the need for specific negotiating 
proposals and encourage participants to make such submissions as quickly as possible. 
  
Non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
 
 
We reaffirm that negotiations on  NTBs are an integral 
and equally important element to achieving the 
objectives of paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration.  The NTB initiatives shall aim to reduce or eliminate, as appropriate, non-tariff barriers, in 
particular on products of export interest to developing 
countries and to  enhance market access opportunities 
achieved through the tariff formula modality and 
sectoral initiatives.  
 Progress has been made in the identification, 
examination and categorization of non-tariff barriers.   
Discussions have focused on defining the nature of the barrier, the scope of products affected and 
potential solutions. Some Members have also already 
submitted specific requests and  specific negotiating 
proposals, including on horizontal issues such as 
export taxes, export restrictions, remanufactured goods and a future mechanism for resolving NTBs, as 
well as on vertical initiatives on automobiles, 
electronic products, textiles, clothing and footwear and wood products.  
 
Members have expressed different views regarding these proposals and negotiations are now required to 
obtain results in line with the mandate.  
 
Members are instructed to finalize their NTB  work in 
2006 before the conclusion of the tariff negotiations 
in order to multilateralize the outcomes  through inter 
alia incorporating them where appropriate into Part 
III of schedules.  We recall that these non-tariff 
barrier negotiations can include request/offer, horizontal and vertical approaches and they should 
also take fully into account the principle of special  
Non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
 
 
As there is wide agreement on the core issues, I have 
taken the initiative of proposing compromise language 
on NTBs.  This text merges two textual proposals on 
the table - one from the US/EC and the other from the NAMA-11 group of developing Members, which based 
itself on the US/EC text.   
 Important details remain to be sorted out in respect of 
all the proposals, but in respect of some proposals the 
unresolved issues are more fundamental than for others.  In particular, many Members oppose the 
proposals to negotiate disciplines in respect of export 
taxes or export restrictions, arguing that these issues fall outside the explicit mandate and the balance of 
issues struck in Doha.  Others note that there is no 
agreed definition of a non-tariff barrier to guide the 
discussions.  While no decisions on specific NTB 
proposals are required at this time, I make these points only to underline that, while we may be able to 
agree on modalities language on the process, a 
consensus on the substan ce of some NTB proposals 
remains, at best, uncertain. 
 
 
  
   JOB(06)/200/Rev.1
 Page 19July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
and differential treatment for developing and least-
developed country participants. 
 
 
 
 
 
15. We recognize that appropriate studies and 
capacity building measures shall be an integral part of 
the modalities to be agreed.  We also recognize the 
work that has already been undertaken in these areas 
and ask participants to continue to identify such issues 
to improve participation in the negotiations. 
  
Appropriate Studies and Capacity Building 
Measures  
 
We commit ourselves to exploring and enhancing effective delivery mechanis ms to assist LDCs, and 
Members in the early stages  of development, through 
trade capacity-building measures to assist them in addressing challenges that may arise from increased 
competition as a result of MFN tariff reduction and 
inherent supply side capacity constraints.  These mechanisms shall be designed to enable LDCs, and 
Members in the early stages of development,  to take 
advantage of increased market access opportunities 
and shall assist them to meet technical 
standards/requirements and to address product and market diversification as well as to overcome other 
non-tariff measures.
 
  
Appropriate Studies and Capacity Building 
Measures  
 
This language has very wide support.  Some Members 
expressed concerns about the fact that the scope of the 
paragraph may have been expanded through the 
inclusion of the phrase "Members in the early stages of development".  In their view this paragraph was 
only meant for LDCs.  However, others noted that the 
language in the July Framework did not specify that such measures were for LDCs uniquely.  In any event, 
no Member disputes that such assistance should be 
provided to LDCs, nor that the broader Aid-for-Trade 
initiative should include similar assistance for other 
developing Members.    
  
 
16. We recognize the challenges that may be faced by non-reciprocal preference beneficiary 
Members and those Members that are at present highly 
dependent on tariff revenue as a result of these negotiations on non-agricultural products.  We instruct 
the Negotiating Group to take into consideration, in 
the course of its work, the particular needs that may arise for the Members concerned. 
 
20. As a supplement to paragraph 16 of the NAMA Framework, we recognize the challenges 
that may be faced by non-reciprocal preference 
beneficiary Members as a consequence of the MFN  
Non-reciprocal preferences
 
 
  
Non-reciprocal preferences  
 
Assessment of the scope of the problem  
 
Pursuant to Ministers’ instructions at Hong Kong, the 
Negotiating Group continues to assess the scope of the preference erosion problem.  This assessment was 
greatly assisted by a Secretariat analysis of the key 
products, key countries and key markets concerned.  While no final conclusions have been reached, 
Members agreed that this was a useful analysis, which 
should be pursued and which could provide the basis for a discussion of possible solutions. 
 
  
  JOB(06)/200/Rev.1 
Page 20 July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
liberalization that will result from these 
negotiations.  We instruct the Negotiating Group to 
intensify work on the assessment of the scope of the 
problem with a view to finding possible solutions.  Possible solutions  
 
There is no consensus on possible solutions.  The 
Negotiating Group will need to turn to this question after Members are satisfied that the scope of the 
problem has been sufficiently defined. Having said 
this, Members have expressed views – indeed, strong views – on possible solutions.   
 
All Members support targeted Aid-for-Trade to address the underlying challenges faced by preference 
receiving countries – the diversification of their 
exports and strengthening of their competitiveness.  Many Members are at least open to a discussion of a 
trade solution, in addition to Aid-for-Trade, but only 
in respect of longer implementation periods.  There is little support for a correction coefficient, the other 
measure suggested by the proponents of this issue.  
However, some Members are opposed to any trade 
measures to respond to the preference problem, as this 
would be at the expense of their own access to major markets.    
 
There has also been some discussion of whether special consideration should be given to Members 
who are not beneficiaries of preferences and who may 
be most affected as a result of a trade solution, such as a longer implementation period for tariff reduction on 
the key products.  A proposal was presented by Sri 
Lanka suggesting immediate access to preferential regimes for such affected Members. Support for this 
proposal was mixed but some Members have signalled 
their possible support for special consideration for these countries through shorter implementation 
periods.   
 I would also underline that the resolution of this issue 
is, even more than others,  intimately linked to a  
   JOB(06)/200/Rev.1
 Page 21July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
satisfactory approach being taken in the agricultural 
negotiations on the same questions.  
 
Tariff Revenue Dependency  
No textual proposal has been submitted on the issue of 
tariff revenue dependency.  It is my sense, therefore, 
that the proponents are satisfied that this issue is being resolved through other parts of the modalities. 
 
 
  
17. We furthermore encourage the Negotiating 
Group to work closely with the Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session with a view to 
addressing the issue of non-agricultural environmental 
goods covered in paragraph 31 (iii) of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration. 
  
Non-agricultural environmental goods
 
 
  
Non-agricultural environmental goods  
 
There is no consensus on this subject, beyond the 
existing mandate.    
A proposal was put forward by a group of Members 
concerning the treatment of environmental goods in 
the context of the NAMA negotiations.  These 
Members proposed tariff elimination on those products.  However, this  proposal was met with 
opposition.  An alternative textual proposal was 
submitted by another group of countries proposing that the work of the CTESS must be completed before 
any discussion of the treatment of such goods can be 
taken up in the NAMA negotiations.     
Many Members also believe that participation in any 
initiative in respect of environmental goods should be non-mandatory, while others feel that there is a 
mandate in 31 (iii) to do something more on these 
products than on those treated under the formula or the sectoral negotiations.   
 
As there is no progress on this issue to record at this time, my suggestion would be to transfer the July 
Framework language to the modalities paper.   
 
  
  JOB(06)/200/Rev.1 
Page 22 July Framework, modified or supplemented by the 
Hong Kong Ministerial De claration (in bold),  
as appropriate Modalities Chairman's remarks 
 
 
 
24. We recognize that it is important to 
advance the development ob jectives of this Round 
through enhanced market access for developing 
countries in both Agricult ure and NAMA.  To that 
end, we instruct our ne gotiators to ensure that 
there is a comparably high level of ambition in 
market access for Agricu lture and NAMA.  This 
ambition is to be achieved in a balanced and 
proportionate manner consistent with the principle 
of special and diff erential treatment. 
  
Paragraph 24   
Paragraph 24  
 
A proposal (TN/MA/W/67) has been made in respect of operationalizing` this paragraph.  While there was 
some support for this proposal, and most Members 
thought it a useful contribution to the negotiations, many of the Members who have taken the floor during 
discussions on this issue were of the view that 
individual Members will judge for themselves whether the requirements of this paragraph have been met. 
 
_______________ 
 
 
  JOB(06)/200/Rev.1 
 Page 23 
 
 
  ANNEX  
Specific textual proposals on issues in which broad divergences remain  
 
  
I. FORMULA  
A. ARCHITECTURE  
 
Option 1 :  A Simple Swiss formula with two coefficients, one for developing and the other 
for developed Members:  
00
1 b)or (a  b)or (a 
ttt+×=  
 
where , 
   t
1= Final bound tariff 
t0=  Base rate  
a =  Coefficient for developed  Members b =  Coefficient for developing Members subject to the formula.  
 
  
or 
 
 
 
Option 2 :  ABI formula  
 
00
1ttBttBt
aa
+×××=  
 
 
where , 
 t
1  is the final rate, to be bound in ad valorem  terms 
t0  is the bound base rate 
ta   is the average of the current  bound rates 
B   is a coefficient, its value(s) to be determined by the participants 
 JOB(06)/200/Rev.1 
Page 24  
 
  B. C
OEFFICIENTS  
Option 1 : Proposal by Pakistan (TN/MA/W/60)  
These coefficients should be based on an objective criterion; taking the overall average of the bound tariff 
lines for developed and developing countries as their respective coefficients.  These averages have been 
worked out to be 5.48% for developed countries, and 29.12% for developing countries2.  For the sake of 
simplicity these could be taken as 6 and 30. 
 
 
Option 2 : Proposal by Canada; Hong Kong, China; New Zealand, Switzerland, 
Chinese Taipei and the United States (Room document of 8 June 2006)  
The coefficient for developed countries (A) shall be at most five less than the developing country 
coefficient (B).  For example, the de veloped country coefficient (A) would be [10 or less] provided that the 
coefficient for the developing countries applying the formula is within five points of the developed country 
coefficient. 
 
 
 
                                                      
 2 The calculation was based on the data taken from document TN/MA/S/4/Rev.1/Corr.1. The 
developed countries mean, Australia, Canada, EC, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the 
US, and those developing countries that will apply the formula (i.e. excluding countri es under Paragraph 6 & 9).  JOB(06)/200/Rev.1 
 Page 25 
 
 
   
II. ELEMENTS REGARDING THE FORMULA 
A. CREDIT FOR BOUND AUTONOMOUS LIBERALIZATION MEASURES BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
-   Proposal by the NAMA-11  (Room document of 16 June 2006)  
(d)   Noting that some developing countries have bound3 their tariffs on an MFN basis in the WTO 
since the conclusion of Uruguay  Round, credit shall be given for such autonomous liberalization 
provided that the tariff lines were bound before commencement of the Doha Round.  Credit will 
be effected by allowing the relevant developing  country Member to use a coefficient [ ] points 
higher than the applicable coef ficient to that Member in the agreed formula, for undertaking 
further reduction of these autonomously bound tariff lines. 
 
 
III. SECTORALS 
A. HARMONIZATION  PROPOSAL ON THE TEXTILES AND CLOTHING SECTOR  
-   Proposal by Turkey  (Presentation of 23 June 2006)  
  Insert the following paragraph after the proposed sectoral language: 
 
"5. Without prejudice to the modalities referred above and taking into account the specific concerns of 
developing countries on the textiles and clothing sector s and the specific needs of the industries arisen 
thereof, a sectoral initiative to harmonize tariffs in textiles and clothing sectors has been proposed.  We 
instruct the Negotiating Group to continue its work to en sure liberalization in the textile and clothing sectors, 
on a line by line basis, outside of the scope of the formula approach.  We recognize that participation by all competitive producers will be important to that effect." 
 
 
IV. PARAGRAPH 8 FLEXIBILITIES 
A. PARAGRAPH 8 NUMBERS  
-  Proposal by NAMA-11  (JOB(06)/194 ) 
  The numbers between brack ets in paragraph 8 shall be considered the bare minimum.  Greater 
flexibilities in terms of higher number of tariff lines  and larger trade covera ge may be required by 
developing country Members to address their specific situations.  Such requests will be given due 
consideration and accommoda ted appropriately.  
 
B. ALTERNATIVE TO THE USE OF PARAGRAPH 8 FLEXIBILITIES  
 -  Proposal by Mexico  (Room document of 21 April 2006 ) 
  Developing country Members that do not use the flexibilities provided for in paragraph 8 of Annex B 
of the July framework, will be allowed 5 additional points in the coefficient in the application of the 
tariff reduction formula. 
                                                      
3 India (WT/Let/374), Korea (W T/Let/302), Pakistan (WT/Let/4 24), Sri Lanka (WT/Let/398) JOB(06)/200/Rev.1 
Page 26  
 
  V. SMALL, VULNERABLE ECONOMIES 
A. P
ARAGRAPH 6-TYPE SOLUTION  
Option 1 :  Proposal by the SVE group  (Room document of 15 June 2006)  
The treatment proposed for small, vulnerable economies would be that these countries would not be subject 
to formula cuts, but would bind 100% of their non-agricultural tariff lines at average levels reflected in the 
following bands: 
Current Bound 
Average % Average % Cut Expected Final Bound 
Average % 
≤  37 [….] [….] 
38 – 47 [….] [….] 
48 – 57 [….] [….] 
≥  58  [….] [….] 
1. Tariff reduction for SVEs shall be on the basis of  lower tariff cuts for those in the lower bands and 
higher cuts for those in the higher bands  
2. In meeting this requirement, beneficiaries would make minimum reductions of [  ] percent on a 
maximum of [  ] percent of individual tariff lines 
3. In the specific case of Fiji with less than 50% bindi ng coverage, Fiji shall be allowed to keep [5%] 
of their lines unbound while binding the remaining [95%] at an average of [  ]. 
4. The implementation of the tariff reduction commitments should be staged over a longer period than 
other developing countries in order to ensure a smooth liberalisation process and not jeopardise the industrial and social develo pment prospects of the small, vulnerable economies. 
 
Option 2 :  Proposal by Norway  (Room document of 6 June 2006)  
Such Members will bind [100%] of their non-agricultura l tariffs.  The average bound tariff level of such a 
Member will not exceed [X] percent after the implem entation period.  In meeting this requirement, 
beneficiaries would make minimum reductions of [Y] percent on individual tariff lines.  
 
B. PARAGRAPH 8-TYPE SOLUTION  
Option 3 :  Proposal by Costa Rica and Uruguay  (Room document of 30 May 2006)  
Developing countries that have been identified by the above mentioned criteria to be small and vulnerable 
economies will benefit from a unique [X] additional percen tage points to the figure currently in brackets in 
Paragraph 8(a) or Paragraph 8(b)4. 
 
Option 4 :  Proposal by the NAMA-11  (JOB(06)/194/Add.1)  
i. Once the number in brackets of paragraph 8 (a) and (b) has been agreed for developing countries, 
additional flexibility beyond that shall be identified fo r SVEs; further relaxation of the trade limitation, 
in particular, is an avenue worth exploring, consid ering the economic situation of SVEs, with a longer 
implementation period; or 
ii. The SVEs could be permitted access to paragrap hs 8 (a) and (b) cumula tively, with a longer 
implementation period. 
                                                      
4 The additional [X] percentage points will depend on  the share of NAMA trade to be agreed in the 
selection criteria. These [X] percentage points would be higher if the threshold of NAMA trade is lower, and 
vice versa.   JOB(06)/200/Rev.1 
 Page 27 
 
 
  VI. RECENTLY ACCEDED MEMBERS 
Option 1 : Proposal by China (Room document of 12 June 2006) 
                    Croatia proposed some changes whic h have been incorporated below 
1. The coefficient for the Swiss form ula applicable to Recently Acceded Me mbers shall be 1.5 times of that 
for developing-country participants. 
 
2. In addition, the Recently Acceded  Members shall be given the flexib ility of applying less than formula 
cuts to up to 15 percent of tariff lines provided that  the cuts are no less than half the formula cuts; or 
 
 the Recently Acceded Member s may choose exemption from formula cuts  for up to 10 percent of tariff 
lines. 
 
3. The Recently Acceded Members sha ll have an implementation period [3-5] years longer than that for 
developing-country participants. 
 
4. The Recently Acceded Members shall have a gr ace period for [3-5] years before the start of 
implementation of DDA commitments. 
 
 
Option 2 : Proposal by the NAMA-11  (JOB(06)/194)  
NAMA 11 recognises the diversity in the tariff profiles of the RAMs as well as their specific situations. 
Accordingly, it would be appropriate that RAMs that de clare themselves to be ak in to developed countries 
should adopt the modalities applicable to developed countries. Other RAMs should adopt the modalities applicable to developing countries or LDCs, as the ca se may be, with all the attendant flexibilities and special 
and differential provisions. The NAMA 11 also proposes that the RAMs be allowed a longer implementation 
period.    
The particular situation of some recently-acceded low income economies in  transition shall be considered 
separately, to allow them adequate and appropriate flexibilities.  
 JOB(06)/200/Rev.1 
Page 28  
 
   
VII. NON-RECIPROCAL PREFERENCES 
A. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS  
Option 1 : Proposal by the African Group  (TN/MA/W/49)  
The African group proposes the application of a correcti on co-efficient to an approach that will be agreed by 
Members, to improve the preference margins for these products.  Longer staging periods would be required for this option.  For products which are not zero rated,  preference-giving countries would use the same rates 
of reduction points to ensure the non-recipro cal margin of prefer ence is maintained. 
Option 2:  Proposal by the NAMA-11  (JOB(06)/194)  
In this regard, the NAMA 11 proposes a two-pronged solution: 
i)  A longer implementation period for the reductions affecting such tariff lines . This implementation period 
for those developed country Members who provide preferences shall not be longer than the implementation period set for developing country Members. 
ii)  Additional technical and financial assistance, including through the Aid for Trade initiative , to help 
address supply constraints, promote diversification of markets, export basket and sources of imports and mitigate the costs of adjustment and restructuring.  
Developed countries who have been granting long standing preferences shall explore ways to achieve the 
fuller utilization of existing schemes, including, for example through the simplification of rules of origin.  
The developed countries shall ensure that adequate step s will be taken to remedy the disproportionate adverse 
effects on non-beneficiaries by any m easures agreed in this regard.  
 
Option 3:  Proposal by Colombia  (TN/MA/W/76)  
If the trade solution for non-reciprocal  preference beneficiaries is long er implementation periods in the 
Members granting such preferences, the developing Memb ers affected by that trade solution shall have X 
additional years for implementing the formula cuts in the same tariff lines. 
 
The affected developing Members in question are those th at export under these tariff lines at least X per cent 
to the market of the Member gran ting the non-recipro cal preferences. 
 
Option 4:  Proposal by Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama and Uruguay  
(JOB(06)/207)  
It has been recognized that there will be a very limited number of countries with a very limited number of 
products that will face the challenges  of MFN liberalization.  The solution shall be targeted and directed 
towards specific countries  with specific needs. 
We propose the following treatment for such countries facing the challenge of preference erosion in an MFN 
liberalization: 
(a)  Targeted and coordinated Aid for Trade, following paragraph 57 of the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration should be the central part of the solution; and/or 
(b)  Expanded MFN Market Access for products which are of vital export  importance to preference-receiving 
Members;  and/or 
(c) Targeted technical assistance programmes an d other appropriate measures, provided by the 
preference-granting Member, to assi st preference-receiving Members to  diversify their export base; 
and/or 
(d) Additional financial assistance and capacity building to address supply constraints promote diversification 
and assist in adjustme nt and restructuring.  JOB(06)/200/Rev.1 
 Page 29 
 
 
   
B. TREATMENT  OF MEMBERS MOSTLY AFFECTED BY A TRADE SOLUTION  
- Proposal by Sri Lanka (Room document of 16 June 2006)  
As it has proposed by some Members5, a longer implementation period for the reductions, affecting tariff 
lines sensitive to preference erosion, becomes a part  of modalities; steps should be taken to remedy its 
adverse effects, at a disproportionate level, on some non-beneficiaries of preferences.  The Secretariat paper 
identifies, in the case of the United States, small gr oup f countries with such disproportionate impact6. 
To minimize the adverse impact on non-beneficiaries whose exports under “tariff lines sensitive to the 
preference erosion”, to the particular developed country market, cover Y% of total exports should be 
provided preferential access7 to that market, from the beginning of the implementation period.  
 
 
VIII.  NON-AGRICULTURAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS 
Option 1 :  Proposal by Canada, the EC, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland and the 
United States (Room document of 14 June 2006)  
Further to paragraph 31(iii) of the Doha Minister ial Declaration we agree to eliminate tariffs on 
environmental goods as soon as possible, but no later than 2008 for developed countries and those developing 
countries declaring themselves in a position to do so.  For other developing countries, tariffs should be 
eliminated by X years thereafter. Further flexibilities for developing countries may include exclusions for a 
limited number of products (e.g., similar to a “complementary” or “development” list). " 
Option 2 :  Proposal by the NAMA-11 (Room document of 16 June 2006)  
The Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session (CTE-SS) is addressing the mandate contained 
in paragraph 31 of the Doha Declaration with a view  to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and 
environment.  Without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations, this could be achieved by means, inter 
alia, of the CTE-SS agreeing on approa ches to the reduction or, as approp riate, elimination of tariffs and 
no-tariff barriers to consensually defined environmental goods and services.  
While encouraging the Negotiating Group on NAMA to work closely with the CTE-SS on relevant issues, 
Ministers note that treating environmental goods in the NGMA before the CTE-SS has fulfilled its mandate 
would amount to prejudging the outcome of  negotiations under paragraph 31 iii.  
 
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5 ACP and NAMA-11. 
6 These include Bangladesh, Cambodia and Sri Lanka.  The share of exports of the 22 most sensitive 
products form the ACP list to the United States consists of over 48.2% for Sri Lanka, 52.9% for Bangladesh and 59.4% for Cambodia.  
7 Most favourable non-reciprocal pr eference extended to ACP member with similar rules of origin.