WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
22 November 2005 
 
 (05-5476) 
Committee on Trade and Development  
  
DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE DOHA ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Note by the Secretariat
 
 
Revision  
 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... .1 
II. DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
NEGOTIATIONS ................................................................................................................... ..2 
A. AGRICULTURE .............................................................................................................................2  
B. NON-AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS .....................................................................................7  
C. SERVICES ............................................................................................................................... ....11  
D. TRADE FACILITATION ...............................................................................................................13  
E. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT ................................................................................15  
F. IMPLEMENTATION -RELATED ISSUES AND CONCERNS ..............................................................17  
G. RULES ............................................................................................................................... .........19  
H. TRADE -RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ..........................................22  
I. TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT ......................................................................................................24  
J. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING .................................................................................26  
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................................29  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. At the 54th Session of the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) on 5 October 2005, 
Members undertook a review of the developmental asp ects of the Doha Round of negotiations based 
on a background paper prepared by the Secretaria t (WT/COMTD/W/143).  It was agreed at the 
meeting that the paper would be revised based on comments made by Members so as to more fully 
reflect the interests and concerns of developing countries in the current Round.  
2. The present document addresses the developmen tal aspects in all the subject areas under 
negotiations in the Round.  In addition to providing a brief summary of the status of the negotiations 
in each area, the paper attempts to highlight the br oad parameters of the de velopment dimension, to 
identify specific issues of interest to developing countries and to describe the potential gains which 
could accrue to developing countri es from the conclusion of the negotiations.  This revised document 
has been prepared under the Secretariat's own resp onsibility and by no means claims to provide an 
exhaustive coverage of all the de velopmental aspects raised in th e course of the negotiations.  Nor 
should the paper be seen as an attempt to prioritize issues, subjects or concerns raised by individual 
Members or groups of Members.  Finally, this pa per does not prejudice the right of any Member to 
raise other concerns or views related to paragr aph 51 or the presentation below concerning the areas 
currently under negotiation in the Doha Development Agenda. WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
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 II. DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
NEGOTIATIONS 
A. A
GRICULTURE  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
3. Agriculture has the potential to play an important role in the continuing development of many 
WTO Members.  For a large number of developing and least-developed countries, agriculture makes a 
significant contribution to their economies, including its direct contribution to gross domestic production, export revenue and employment as well as to  rural development and livelihood security.  
However, many of the world's ag ricultural producers are currently di sadvantaged in the world trading 
environment because of high tariff barriers and competition from producers that receive high levels of 
domestic or export-related assistance.  Therefore, a reduction in trade barriers and subsidy levels, both 
domestic and export, can lead to important im provements for developing country agricultural 
producers.  The development aspects related to agricu lture can be found in each of the three pillars of 
the agriculture negotiations – market access, domestic support and export competition. 
(a) Market access 
4. The market access pillar is arguably the most co mplex and intricate pillar of the agriculture 
negotiations, with the 1 August 2004 Decision (WT/L/ 579) being a delicate balance of offensive and 
defensive interests of all Members.  Despite its co mplex nature, the market access pillar has, arguably, 
the greatest potential to deliver real economic benefits  to Members.  As tariff barriers are reduced and 
tariff rate quotas expanded in both developed a nd developing countries, increased market access 
opportunities will allow Members to expand export volumes and revenues.  
5. A significant reduction in tariffs and the expansi on of tariff quotas, particularly in developed 
country markets, is being sought by developing countries in order to assist with the achievement of their development and other trade-related objectives.   In addition, some Members also view the 
reduction of tariff escalation and the implementation of the long-standing commitments to the fullest 
liberalization of trade in tropical products as being key elements of the development dimension of the 
Doha Round.  At the same time, many developing countries are concerned about the likely impact of 
tariff reductions on rural livelihood, and consequently on their fold security concerns.  Accordingly, 
they argue for a flexibility in the reduction of ta riffs, especially for "special products". Preference 
receiving developing and least-developed countries  are also concerned that tariff reductions by 
preference-granting countries will resu lt in significant preference eros ion, especially since preferential 
access arrangements play a vital role in terms of  their ability to export, and earn foreign exchange, 
which contributes to the development of their economies.   
(b) Domestic support 
6. Reduction in the high levels of domestic support is a key issue to most developing countries, 
since such policies distort the agricultural trading environment and contribute to lower world prices 
including the decline of commodity prices.  This  has a negative impact on non-subsidising producers, 
particularly those in developing countries, many of  which would therefore like to see large reductions 
in trade-distorting support in developed countries.   
7. Reform of domestic support is linked to the market access pillar.  Some developing and 
least-developed countries argue that it would indeed be  counter to development aims to expect them 
to further reduce their tariffs while countries are still able to maintain signifi cant levels of spending on 
Amber and Blue Box subsidies.  Further market openings would simply mean increased competition 
for their domestic producers against highly subsidised products.    WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
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 (c) Export competition 
8. Export subsidies, of all kinds, are generally c onsidered to be the most egregious form of 
trade-distorting policy.  The use of export subsidi es ensures that there are more agricultural goods on 
world markets, resulting in lower world prices than would otherwise be the case.  For non-subsidising 
countries this means artificially high levels of co mpetition in both the domestic market and abroad  
and reduced export revenue.  In some cases, exports may be completely displaced in third markets by 
'cheaper' subsidised products.  Thus the removal of this form of artificial competition and price 
suppression would help to improve the ability of  Members that do not use such programmes, 
particularly developing and least-developed Members,  to compete in a fair and market-orientated 
agricultural trading system.  
9. Most developing countries argue for the elimin ation of all forms of export subsidies, 
including in the form of export credits, non-genuine food aid or trade-distorting practices of exporting state trading enterprises.  The parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies may, however, 
increase the cost of imported food products for some net-food importing countries.   
2. Status of the Negotiations 
10. The agriculture negotiations are governed by paragraph 13 of the Doha Declaration which 
states that the negotiations are "aimed at:  substan tial improvements in market access;  reductions of, 
with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsid ies; and substantial reduc tions in trade-distorting 
domestic support".  Ministers also agreed that "s pecial and differential treatment for developing 
countries shall be an integral part of all elements  of the negotiations and shall be embodied in the 
Schedules of concessions and commitments and as a ppropriate in the rules and disciplines to be 
negotiated, so as to be operationally effective and to enable developing countries to effectively take 
account of their development needs, including  food security and rural development".   
11. Paragraph 13 of the Doha Declaration has been given further precision by Members in 
Annex A of the General Council Decision of 1 Augu st 2004.  For example, in the area of market 
access, the Decision states that tariff reductions will be made through a tiered formula that takes into 
account Member's different tariff structures and that  progressivity in tariff reductions will be achieved 
through deeper cuts in higher ta riffs with flexibilities for sensitive pr oducts.  Similarly, it states that 
developing country Members "must be able to pursu e agricultural policies that are supportive of their 
development goals, poverty reduction strategies, food security a nd livelihood concerns".  Although 
not fully developed, special and differential treatment  provisions are also set out in Annex A.  Such 
provisions include, inter alia , lower reduction commitments, longer implementation periods, 
designating an appropriate number of  products as Special Products, and the use of a Special Safeguard 
Mechanism.   
12. The 1 August 2004 Decision also states that preference erosion will be addressed in the 
negotiations, as well as that the full implementati on of the long-standing commitment to achieve the 
fullest liberalization of trade in tropical, agri cultural products and for products of particular 
importance to the diversification of production fr om the growing of illicit narcotic crops will be 
effectively addressed.  Clearly, an intricate, delicat e and challenging balance needs to be found in the 
negotiations so that all developing countries are able  to pursue agricultural policies that are supportive 
of their development goals, poverty reduction stra tegies, food security and livelihood concerns.    
13. Prior to July 2005, Members had been involved in a series of consultations to develop a "first 
approximation of draft modalities".  The objective of the first approximation was to give further 
precision to the 1 August 2004 Decision so that Members could later agree on full modalities.  
Members had focused their work on a number of "g ateway" issues where clarity was required before 
other issues, including development related issues, could be further developed.  For example, on WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
Page 4  
 
 agricultural market access it was necessary to have so me idea of the basic structure of the approach to 
be taken to reduce tariffs before a special safegua rd mechanism for developing countries can be fully 
defined.  The inability of Members to achieve a sufficient degree of convergence on the "gateway" 
issues, coupled with a very limited period of tim e before the Sixth Ministerial Conference, led 
Members to agree on a change of focus in thei r discussions.  Members committed themselves to a 
"bottom-up" negotiating approach.  Rather than di scuss specific issues in isolation, the "bottom-up" 
approach looks at the issues in a more comprehe nsive and complete manner and includes a discussion 
of the numbers (i.e. levels of ambition) for the re ductions in support and protection.  A number of new 
proposals in various formats, from both developed and developing countries, have been submitted to 
the negotiations since September 2005.  These propo sals outline the modalities and level of ambition 
different Members, and groups of Members, are seeking to achieve.  Not only will the final modalities 
package define the level of ambition from the ne gotiations, it will also determine the commitments 
that Members will be willing to undertake, which in turn will define the development potential of the 
agriculture negotiations.  
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
14. Issues of interest to developing countries suffuse all the three pillars of the negotiations.  Even 
though the emphasis that different groups of develo ping countries and the le ast-developed countries 
attach to the different issues varies,  these remain central to their ov erall ambitions for the Round.  The 
specific issues of interests to developing countries include, inter alia : 
(a) Market access 
• Increased market access in developed c ountries, by pushing for tariff reductions, 
especially on products of export inte rest to developing countries;  
• Expanding their trading opportunities in other developing countries (South-South trade);  
• Fullest liberalization of trade in tropical agricultural products and for products of 
particular importance to the diversifica tion of production from the growing of illicit 
narcotic crops;  
• Less than full reciprocity in the negotiations , including by having to undertake lesser 
tariff reductions and/or tariff quota expansi on commitments relative to those to be 
undertaken by developed countries;  
• Addressing problems relating to preference erosion; 
• Addressing the issues of tariff escalation and the issue of tariff simplification; 
• Expanding and improving the administration of tariff rate quotas; 
• Lifetime of the existing special agricultural safeguard (SSG); 
• Appropriate special and differential treatme nt for developing countries, including the 
flexibility to  designate a number of products  as 'Special Products' (SP) based on criteria 
of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs, and the establishment 
of a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM).   
(b) Domestic support  
• Substantial reductions in trade-distor ting support in developed countries; 
• Blue Box criteria/ceiling; 
• Review and clarification of the Green Box criteria to ensure that such measures have no, 
or at most minimal trade-distorting effects on production;   WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
 Page 5 
 
 
 • Capping of product-specific aggregate measur ements of support, in accordance with a 
methodology to be agreed;   
• Flexibility to pursue agricultural policies that  are supportive of their development goals, 
poverty reduction strategies, food secu rity and livelihood concerns; 
• Flexibility in, or exemption from, any reducti on in de minimis support (building upon the 
decision that developing countries that a llocate almost all de minimis support for 
subsistence and resource-poor farmers will be exempt from reduction commitments); 
• Appropriate special and differential treatment,  including the right to use some level of 
agriculture support either now or in the futu re; flexibility to provide certain types of 
investment subsidies and to target subsidi es to low-income or resource-poor farmers. 
(c) Export competition 
• Elimination of all forms of export subsidies; 
• Developing appropriate rules in respect of  short-term export credits, export credit 
insurance or guarantee programmes (export credits, etc. with repayment terms of more than 180 days are to be eliminated), exporting state trading enterprises, with special 
consideration for the monopoly status for certa in STEs in developing countries, and on 
food aid, whilst ensuring that these disci plines have appropriate provisions for 
differential treatment of least-developed and net food-importing developing countries; 
• Appropriate special and differential treatmen t, including longer time frames to eliminate 
all forms of their export subsidies (to tho se developing countries that have reduction 
commitments in this area), extension of th e provisions contained in Article 9.4 which 
provides an exemption from reduction commitments for certain types of export 
marketing and transport costs. 
15. In addition to the issues of interest to developing countries highlighted above, special and 
differential treatment will have to include lower re duction rates and longer implementation periods for 
developing countries.  Furthermore, the 1 August 2004 Decision states that least-developed countries 
(LDCs) will not have to undertake reduction commitm ents and that they will have full access to all 
special and differential treatment provisions.  It al so states that developed Members, and developing 
country Members in a position to do so, should provide duty-free and quota-free market access for 
products originating from least-developed countries. 
16. Given the importance of cotton for a number of  developing countries, especially LDCs, cotton 
has now its own specificity in the agriculture negotiations.  Members have agreed to address it 
ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically within the agriculture negotiations.  A Sub-Committee on 
Cotton has been established and is tasked with ad dressing "all trade-distorting policies affecting the 
sector" in all three pillars of the agriculture nego tiations.  The work progra mme of the Sub-Committee 
is also to take account of the need for "cohere nce between trade and development aspects of the 
cotton issue".  The main interest of the proponents is to seek the elimination of all export subsidies 
and subsidies which distort international cotton markets and to obtain bound duty-free and quota-free 
access for cotton and its by-products for LDC cotton producers and net exporters. 
17. A number of recently acceded Members (RAMs), are concerned about the possible negative 
impact on their agricultural sectors of further signi ficant market access commitments in particular.  
These Members argue that due to the significant commitments they undertook during their accession 
process their levels of border protection are already at very low levels, especially compared to the 
tariff levels of other more advanced countries.   WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
Page 6  
 
 18. Because of the perceived shortcomings of the mechanisms put into place at the end of 
Uruguay Round to monitor the implementation of Members' commitments, some developing countries have put forward a proposal for improved monitoring and surveillance mechanisms.  They 
support greater transparency in the implementation of new obligations through improved monitoring 
mechanisms as well as ensuring full compliance of new provisions through better surveillance.   
19. A number of developing countries have voiced concern about the continuing decline of 
commodity prices.  Key aspects of their proposal tabled in June 2005 include the removal of tariff escalation, the elimination of tariff duties for comm odity products under GSP schemes;  the temporary 
protection of preferential margins where MFN reductions may affect these preference margins;  enhanced duty- and quota-free access for products from least-developed countries into developed and 
advanced developing country markets;  the elimina tion of non-tariff barriers;  more rapid reductions 
on trade-distorting domestic support and elimination of  export subsidies;  and the establishment of a 
transitional compensation mechanism with a view  to compensating exporting countries for the 
subsidy-related losses in their export earnings, durin g the period which subsidies are being reduced or 
eliminated  
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
20. A successful conclusion of the negotiations would lead to considerable gains for developing 
countries. Further reform of the world agriculture trading system, would lead Members closer towards 
the long-term objective they all agreed to during the Uruguay Round and which is encapsulated in the 
Doha Declaration and the 1 August 2004 Decision, namely to establish a fair and market-orientated 
agricultural trading system.  
21. Substantial reductions of tariffs, along with a reduction of tariff peaks and tariff escalation, 
would result in increased market access opportunities.   Exports to developed countries would increase 
and South-South trade would be stimulated.  Th is would not only allow developing countries to 
export products where they have a comparative advant age, but would also allow for the diversification 
of production, including value-adde d processing, and export orientation.   Enhanced tariff quotas with 
an improved tariff quota administration regime would also result in further market access 
opportunities. 
22. Substantial reductions in trade-distorti ng domestic support presently provided many 
industrialized countries and the elimination of all forms of export subsidies would make world prices 
more realistic and would allow exporters, espec ially in developing countries to trade in an 
environment free from artificial competition and artificially low prices.  This would undoubtedly 
improve developing and least-developed countries' sh are in world trade in products in which they 
have a comparative advantage.   
23. At the same time, appropriate special and diffe rential treatment, including the flexibility to  
designate a number of products as 'special' and the establishment of a Specia l Safeguard Mechanism, 
would go a long way in alleviating concerns that many developing countries have about the possible 
effect of tariff reductions on their rural developmen t, rural livelihood and food security.  Similarly, 
flexibility in the right to provide some agriculture  support, as well as the flexibility to provide certain 
types of investment subsidies, and to target these subsidies to low-income or resource-poor farmers, 
would help developing countries in their effort to increase the productivity, and consequently the earning capacity, of their agriculture sector.  Cl early, increased trade and thereby increased export 
revenue and foreign exchange earnings are all impo rtant aspects in the realization of development 
objectives, especially objectives related to rural devel opment and the alleviation of rural poverty.  At 
the same time, improved market access conditions on a more certain footing can help to increase infrastructure and investment, including foreign direct investment, and therefore increase and improve production and processing standards, employ ment and standards of living.    WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
 Page 7 
 
 
 B. NON-AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
24. The NAMA negotiations offer the promise of improved and more secure market access 
conditions through new tariff reducti ons and bindings in both deve loped and developing country 
markets.  Major aspects of these new opportunities are listed below. 
• Improved access into deve loped country markets :  The reduction or elimination of tariff 
peaks, high tariffs, tariff escalation on pro ducts originating in developing countries 
would open up new valuable market acc ess opportunities in developed countries.   
• Improved opportunities in South-South trade :  Developing countries also have a 
substantial interest in improving their acces s opportunities into other developing country 
markets.  South-South trade constitutes approximately 40 per cent of the exports of developing countries and these flows are growing at a faster rate than trade with 
developed countries.  Some Members consider that there are better ways of improving 
South-South trade opportunities outside of th e NAMA negotiations, such as Free-Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) and GSTP negotiations.  Howe ver, other consider that this approach 
would be discriminatory, including potentially among developing countries.   
• Improved market access for LDCs
:  LDCs consider improved market access in the form 
of preferential duty-free/quota-free access impor tant for their development goals.  LDCs 
aim to secure and improve this type of access into developed countries markets as well as 
those of other large developing countries.   
25. Developing country Members in the NAMA ne gotiations have often called for flexibilities 
that would allow them to make lower tariff cuts, exempt a number of tariff lines from new bindings or 
reduction commitments, or maintain the status quo .  This would be in line with the principle of less 
than full reciprocity for developing countries in ne gotiations.  Some of the main considerations 
underlying these arguments are listed below.   
• Preserving "policy space" :  Many developing country Me mbers have argued for a degree 
of flexibility in order to pursue their devel opmental goals, including industrialization and 
the diversification of their economies.  While recognizing merit in these arguments, at least with respect to a few products or sector s, others have noted that many developing 
countries have a large binding overhang (d ifference between the bound duties and the 
applied duties) and will probably not cut into  applied duties as a result of this Round.  
The idea has also been mooted that since some developing countries lack the institutional 
capacity to use trade remedies (i.e. safeguards, anti- dumping, etc.) they need to preserve      
high bound duties as a substitute instrument.  
• Protecting infant industries
:  Some developing countries have argued that they need to 
retain tariffs to nurture infant industries b ecause they lack the public funds to provide 
subsidies or other types of incentives for this  purpose.  Members have discussed the risks 
of excessive protection over extended periods in terms of a potentially negative impact 
on development.  Some have noted that almost all countries have protected nascent industries at some stage of their development. 
• Maintaining unbound duties
:  Some Members have made a case for keeping tariff lines 
unbound, particularly in sensitive sectors.  Others have questioned why a binding, as 
opposed to the level of a binding, should be considered detrimental to any industry, and 
have noted that all agricultural tariffs normally considered more sensitive are bound and 
that several developing countries and LDCs  already have full binding coverage.   WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
Page 8  
 
 • Non-reciprocal preference erosion
:  Many developing and l east-developed countries have 
argued that they depend on non-reciprocal preferences for a significant share of their 
exports.  They consider that further MFN lib eralization should take this into account and 
avoid their further marginalization.  Othe r developing countries which benefit less from 
preferences emphasize the importance they att ach to further MFN liberalization precisely 
in the markets of the preference giving count ries and note that non-reciprocal preferences 
are autonomously granted outside the WTO system.  These Members are  ready to consider safety-net solutions for preference receiving countries, but outside the WTO framework.  They do not want MFN liberalization to be compromised for preserving preference margins as this solution would, amount to S&D for developed countries. 
• Preventing the loss of tariff revenue
:  Dependence on tariffs for government revenue has 
been cited by some developing countries as a reason for preserving tariffs at current 
levels.  While arguing that it is desirable for a country to diversify its tax base over time, 
others have noted that since bound and not app lied duties are being negotiated, the risk of 
revenue loss may be lower for many developing countries.   
2. Status of the Negotiations 
26. Paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial Declarati on provides that the negotiations shall aim, by 
modalities to be agreed, to reduce or as appropria te eliminate tariffs, including the reduction or 
elimination of tariff peaks, high ta riffs, and tariff escalation, as well as non-tariff barriers, in particular 
on products of export interest to developing countri es.  It also provides that the negotiations would 
take fully into account the special needs and inte rests of developing and LDC participants, including 
through less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of Article XXVIII bis of GATT 1994 and the provisions cited in paragraph 50.  The 
modalities to be agreed are also to include a ppropriate studies and capacity-building measures to 
assist LDCs to participate effectively in the negotiations. 
27. The Negotiating Group on Market Access (NGMA)  has been working towards the objective 
of achieving full modalities for the Hong Kong Minister ial.  Since the start of the year, the discussions 
on the non-linear formula have been intensive.  Mo re recently, discussions have focused on a Swiss or 
Swiss-type formula.  Various proposals have been submitted.  Different views have been expressed on 
how to measure less than full reciprocity in reduc tion commitments, with some indicating that this 
means lower percentage cuts for developing than de veloped Members while for others this principle 
should be evident in the end result irrespective of the means to achieve it.  Not unexpectedly, given 
the fast approaching Hong Kong Ministerial, Me mbers have begun to engage in a discussion of 
numbers for the coefficients for the formula. 
28. Flexibilities have been the subject of substan tive discussions.  Some Members have indicated 
that flexibilities are a stand alone component a nd have expressed concerns about the conditions 
attached to the use of flexibilities.  Some ot her Members see a link between the formula and the 
flexibilities.  LDCs are expected to  increase their bindings substantially , leaving it largely to them to 
decide on the level and coverage of the bindings.  Discussions have taken place more recently on the 
question of duty-free and quota-free market access for LDCs.   
29. Unbound tariffs have also been an issue of con cern to a number of developing countries.  The 
question of how these should be treated has been  discussed thoroughly on the basis of several 
proposals.  In this context, the August 2004 Decision already recognises that LDCs shall not be required to apply the formula nor to participate in the sectoral approach, but as a contribution to the 
Round they are expected to substantially increase their level of binding commitments. 
  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
 Page 9 
 
 
 30. The sectorial tariff component of the negotiations  is being pursued actively in an informal 
Member-driven process.  Some Members consid er this an essential component of the NAMA 
negotiations in order to achieve commercially mean ingful market access.  Four of the ten ongoing 
sectoral initiatives have been initiated by developing  country Members.  However, other developing 
country Members have indicated that such initia tives are to the detriment of small developing 
Members, as they would erode preferential margins.   
31. Intense discussions have taken place on the erosion of non-reciprocal preferences.  A number 
of studies which show that the effects of preferen ce erosion is circumscribed to a limited number of 
countries and a limited number of pr oducts have also been discussed .  While some Members see the 
preservation of such preferences at the heart of their development needs, others see MFN 
liberalization central to their own development n eeds.  The NGMA has had a preliminary exchange 
on tariff revenue dependency.  Howe ver, it would appear that more information is necessary from the 
Members concerned in order to move the discussions forward. 
32. A number of additional issues have been discu ssed in the NGMA, including the subject of 
recently acceded Members.  Some recently acceded  low income economies in transition have 
indicated that given their significant contribution at the time of their WTO accession and their low 
levels of development, they shoul d not be required to make any tariff cuts.  The NGMA has also been 
working on the subject of product coverage.  On Ad valorem  Equivalents (AVEs), Members agreed to 
use the guidelines contained in JOB(05)/166/Rev.1 for the conversion of non ad valorem  duties to 
AVEs.   
33. Addressing non-tariff barriers (N TBs) would appear to be important for many developing 
countries.  It has now become cl earer that the majority of notif ied NTBs will be taken up by the 
Members concerned either in regular WTO committe es or in other negotiating groups.  The majority 
of NTBs notified pertain to technical barriers to trade (TBT), trade facilitation, customs valuation and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures.  It should be recalled that many of the regular WTO bodies have ongoing technical assistance and capacity building projects to assist developing countries 
and LDCs to assume the obligations laid out in the various NTB Agreements, such as the TBT and 
SPS Agreements.  There are also ongoing vertical NT B discussions, mostly spearheaded by developed 
country Members and it is also expected that some NT Bs will be addressed bilaterally.  This is a very 
complex area of work and many developing and LD Cs have had difficulties in identifying the NTBs 
affecting their exports.  The NGMA has spent a cons iderable amount of time identifying, categorizing 
and examining the notified NTBS, and in so me instances discussed the NTBs proposed for 
negotiation in the NGMA.  Members are expected in the current process to come up with specific 
proposals on how they would like to solve the NTBs they are facing. 
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
34. Summarizing from the preceding section, the specifi c issues of interest to developing country 
Members are listed below.  It is noted, however, that not all developing countries share the same 
views on several of the issues listed below.   
• Bring down tariff peaks, high tariffs and tari ff escalation in developed country markets 
(improve access in developed country markets); 
• Bring down tariff peaks, high tariffs and tari ff escalation into other developing country 
markets (improve South-South trade); 
• Duty-free and quota-free access for LDCs while ensuring that LDCs are only required to 
increase their level of bindings and not to apply the formula or to participate at sectorials; 
• Reduce or eliminate non-tariff barriers; WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
Page 10  
 
 • Preserve "policy space"; 
• Provide adequate protection for infant industries;  
• Preserve unbound duties (keep certain lines unbound); 
• Address non-reciprocal preference erosion; 
• Prevent tariff revenue losses. 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
35. In recognition of benefits that accrue from appropriately designed trade liberalization 
measures, many developing count ry Members have been reduci ng tariffs autonomously over the 
years.  Trade in the manufacturing sector covers 85 to 90 per cent of world merchandise trade.  
Moreover, the share of developing countries in world exports of manufactured goods rose from 
16.6 per cent in 1990 to 28.1 per cent in 2004 (the figure for manufactured goods excludes fish and fish products and petroleum). 
36. Overall, the gains from NAMA liberalization have  been estimated by several institutions to 
range from US$54.2 billion to US$ 276.8 billion (Piermartini, R. and Teh, R. 2005).  Most of those 
estimates are long term, in the sense that they assess th e impact following full adjustment.  Evidence 
regarding short-term effects is scarce.  These estimates need to be considered in light of the following: 
first, the estimates are based on scenarios which ma y diverge substantially from any final agreement 
reached.  Second, the models typically do not take proper account of factors such as growth effects, preferences, or supply-side constraints.  For example, in order to feel the full benefits of results in the 
NAMA negotiations, alleviation of supply-side constr aints is a necessary condition.  Moreover, it is 
important to note that the estimates of gains from opening up to trade do not incorporate any 
consideration of adjustment costs associ ated with increased trade competition. 
37. The gains that could accrue to individual developing countries differ depending on each 
country's comparative advantage as well as on the extent  to which it will liberalize itself.  However, in 
general terms, both North/South and South/South trade are expected to expand as a result of the 
NAMA negotiations, with the corresponding effect on economic efficiency and growth.  Additionally, 
another impact of removing or reducing tariff esca lation will be to give developing countries the 
opportunity to diversify their export base and to pr oduce and export products with a higher domestic 
value-added component. 
38. Another outcome of the NAMA negotiations is expected to be an improvement in binding 
levels, which would enhance the predictability a nd transparency of the trading environment.  
Reducing binding overhangs which are currently prevalent in tariff structures of many Members 
would render the trading environment more stable  and potentially also improve the investment 
environment.  This could be further reinforced by  the requirement that bindings should only take the 
form of ad valorem  duties. 
39. Problems in the area of non-tariff barriers are also  expected to be addressed in the context of 
the NAMA negotiations or in other negotiating gr oups.  Since the results of the different NTB 
negotiations will be applied on an MFN basis, th e benefits will accrue to the entire Membership, 
irrespective of whether or not a particular Member engaged in the discussions.  This alone could lead 
to a considerable alleviation of the NTBs face d by developing countries and will facilitate their 
exports to developed country markets as well as to the markets of their developing trading partners.  
  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
 Page 11 
 
 
 40. Granting duty-free and quota-free market acce ss to LDCs, whether by developed country 
Members or other developing Members, would offer this group of countries additional market access, 
and along with this, the opportunity to integrate furthe r into the trading system and to diversify their 
export base. 
C. SERVICES  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
41. Services production is the dominant economic activity  in virtually all countries of the world, 
regardless of their level of development.  The services sector represented 68 per cent of world gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2002 (World Bank 2004).  Despite many country-specific factors such as natural resource endowments, the sh are of services tends to be pos itively related to the level of 
income or development.  This is because individua ls tend to spend more on services at higher levels 
of income, and the services content of production in creases with growing sophistication in industrial 
production For example, in 2002, services were estimat ed to account for 44 per cent of GDP in LDCs, 
57 per cent in middle income economies, and 71 per cent in high income economies (World Bank 2004). 
42. Many traditional services, including distribu tion, construction, or social services are 
particularly labour-intensive.  Services thus tend to be an even more important source of employment 
– and employment creation – than the above figures suggest.  By the same token, given the sector's 
dominant role in total employment, productivity ga ins are essential for overall economic expansion 
and welfare.  Removing barriers to access and competition among services and service suppliers can lead to lower prices, better quality and a wider choice  for consumers.  Given their infrastructural role, 
services such as telecommunications, financial ser vices (including banking and insurance), business 
services, construction and transport are crucial in  shaping overall economic performance.  Logistics 
(packaging, storage, transport, inventories, admi nistration and management) are also an important 
component of total production costs.  The impact of  costly or inadequate services infrastructure is 
comparable to a tax on production and exports.  Moreover, access to global production and trade 
networks requires efficient and timely delivery of pr oducts.  In sum, there is a common interest across 
countries at all levels of development in ensuring that their services infrastructure underpins, rather 
than inhibits, internal economic integration and acc ess to external markets.  The quality, availability 
and price of core producer services are key determin ants of competitiveness, and ultimately of growth 
and development.  
2. Status of the Negotiations 
43. The services negotiations are taking place on two broad fronts:  market access and 
rule-making (Emergency Safeguard Measures, Gove rnment Procurement, Subsidies and Domestic 
Regulation).  The market access segment consists of negotiations on new or improved commitments 
for inclusion in Members' schedules of specific commitments under GATS, and the re-negotiation of 
current MFN exemptions as mandated by the Annex on Article II Exemptions.  Appropriate flexibility 
is to be provided to individua l developing countries, which ma y open fewer sectors and liberalize 
fewer types of transactions in line w ith their development situation.   
44. The GATS does not recommend or prescribe, temp lates for undertaking commitments.  Each 
Member is free to structure its commitments in line with its national policy objectives and constraints.  
However, in accordance with GATS Article XIX, Members have adopted specific instruments to 
guide the negotiations. Among these are the 'Guidelin es and Procedures for the Negotiations on Trade 
in Services', which, inter alia , recall that the negotiations aim to achieve progressively higher levels of 
liberalization and increase the participation of develo ping countries in services trade;  reaffirm that the 
process of liberalization shall take place with due respect for national policy objectives, the level of WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
Page 12  
 
 development and the size of economies of individual  Members;  require Members to give special 
attention to sectors and modes of supply of export in terest to developing countries;  and recognize the 
right of Members to regulate and to introduce new re gulations.  Special provision has also been made 
for the terms of LDC participati on in the negotiations, affirming the need for greater flexibility in 
terms of the depth and coverage of LDC commitments,  calling for particular attention on the part of 
other Members in opening up sectors of interest to LDCs, and emphasizing the importance of 
assisting LDCs to participate more effectively in international trade in services. 
45. The Negotiating Guidelines, which govern the negotiations on market access, establish the 
request-and-offer approach as the main negotiating method.  However, the request-and-offer process 
has only produced limited results so far:  by th e end of October 2005, only 69 Members (counting the 
EC as one) had submitted offers, in cluding 30 revised offers.  In  other words, 23 offers are 
outstanding, if LDCs are not counted.  If LDCs ar e factored in, 54 offers would remain to be 
submitted.  Members have expressed their concerns  with regard to both the number of Members 
which have yet to submit an offer and the m odest quality of offers submitted to date.   
46. The rule-making negotiations already started in  1995 are based on the mandates contained in 
Article VI:4 (Domestic Regulation), Article X (emergency safeguard measures), Article XIII 
(government procurement), and Article  XV (subsidies).  Pursuant to the Doha Declaration, they were 
integrated into the broader agenda of the new round of negotiations.  Overall, however, the rules 
negotiations have made little head way to date.  While discussions are ongoing on the basis of several 
proposals, major divergences between Members remain to be solved. 
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
47. A broad range of developi ng countries have expressed their negotiating objectives and 
expectations in written submissions since the st art of the services negotiations.  Interests among 
developing countries show considerable variation.  Over 40 per cent of the 150 proposals that have 
been tabled since November 2000 involve one de veloping country or more (this number excludes 
most proposals on so-called horizontal issues, but covers basically all proposals on sectors and modes 
of supply).  In total, more than 30 developing count ry Members have voiced interest in at least one 
sector or mode of supply under ne gotiation.  Relevant sectors include professional services, computer 
and related services, telecommunication services, a udiovisual services, construction and related 
engineering services, distribution services, energy services, environmental services, financial services; tourism services and transport services (including logistics).  In other words, the sectors addressed by individual developing countries extends across a ll major services covered by the Agreement.   
48. Movements of natural persons ( under mode 4) and, more recently, the cross-border supply of 
services (under modes 1 and 2), have also attracted  attention.  Proposals on mode 4, which play a 
focal role for many developing countries, have incl uded a call for the harmonization of categories of 
the type of service supplier used in scheduli ng commitments, more commitments on lower-skilled 
workers, the reduction of barriers involving such ma tters as nationality, r esidency and work permit 
requirements, tax treatment, wage parity requireme nts and the duration of stay.  The emergence of 
"off-shoring" activities in recent year s has turned the spotlight on cross-border trade.  A number of 
developing countries have recently called for am bitious commitments under both modes 1 and 2 
across a wide range of sectors, including business services, research and development services, computer services, management consulting services, call-centre services, and transfer of financial information and data.   
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
49. Several studies have estimated, with a wide vari ety of research techniques, the income effects 
attributable to a reduction in services protection.  In  general, these gains have been found to dwarf the  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
 Page 13 
 
 
 benefits expected to flow from further trade liberali zation in goods.  This is due to several factors.  
First, barriers in many services markets are highe r than existing barriers in goods trade, barring 
particular exceptions such as in the case of agricultu re.  Second, these barriers normally consist of less 
transparent and efficient measures – quotas and ot her non-revenue generating interventions – than 
tariffs in merchandise trade.  Third, as explained ab ove, the costs of services protection, in particular 
of infrastructure-related services, are spread across,  and impose deadweight losses on, a wide array of 
downstream user industries.   
50. Developing countries stand to gain considerably from liberalization of trade in services, both 
on the part of their trading partners and in terms of their own policy regimes.  Bearing in mind the 
nature of potential economy-wide gains from low-co st, high quality services, benefits to countries 
from their own liberalization can be considerable.  While there are obvious long-term gains associated 
with services liberalization, there also adjustment  costs that may be involved which need to be 
addressed with assistance and capacity-building pr ogrammes.  Moves towards a more competitive 
environment take time and may impose significant bu rdens in terms of redundancies, professional or 
even regional relocation, additional training requirements, etc. on affected companies and their staff.  
Obviously much depends on domestic reforms to underpin the viability and credibility of the new 
environment.  For example, the absence of clear  and predictable market conditions may prompt 
potential investors to demand risk premiums that are not politically or socially acceptable.  If 
increased entry into financial sectors is not a ccompanied by adequate prudential supervision, 
instability may ensue.  And the absence of well-d esigned universal service requirements may result in 
new, unsustainable burdens bei ng imposed on vulnerable groups or regions.  The pace, content and 
sequencing of liberalization programmes are thus key to avoiding unnecessary frictions and ensuring 
the efficiency and viability of the new regimes.   
D. TRADE FACILITATION  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
51. Development aspects have always been at th e heart of WTO work on facilitating trade, 
reflecting the wide-spread recognition of 'facilitation'  as a fundamental element of a country's trade 
and growth policy.  Having brought down tariff barrie rs to an all-time low, Members have decided to 
address the remaining obstacles to trade.  Negotia tions on Trade Facilitation are seen as a necessary 
complement to broader liberalization efforts to a llow the realization of their full potential.  The 
development dimension further surfaces in the negot iations' aim of enhancing technical assistance for 
Facilitation measures and harness private sector s upport.  UNCTAD estimates that trade facilitation 
could result in savings equivalent to 2-3 per cent of the value of the traded goods. 
52. The development aspects are reflected in the negotiating mandate, addressing them in three 
inter-connected ways.  First, by seeking to expe dite the movement, release and clearance of goods, 
including goods in transit, with the related a dditional goal of enhancing technical assistance and 
capacity-building support in this field.  Work on both aspects further has to take full account of S&D 
treatment for the developing membership with exte nt and the timing of entering into commitments 
being related to their implementa tion capacities.  Members recognize that the S&D principle should 
extend beyond the granting of trad itional transition peri ods with developing  and least-developed 
Members also not being obliged to undertake in vestments in infrastructure projects beyond their 
means.  Far-reaching flexibility is further granted to LDCs, which will only be  required to undertake 
commitments to the extent consistent with their i ndividual development, financial and trade needs or 
their administrative and institutional capabilities.  Development-related aspects are finally also 
addressed in the mandate's call for the identificatio n of trade facilitation needs and priorities as an 
integral part of the negotiations.  Each of those asp ects has been reflected in various contributions by 
the Membership, advancing th eir understanding and outlining possible ways ahead.    WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
Page 14  
 
 2. Status of the Negotiations 
53. Based on the modalities set out in Annex D of the General Council Decision of 
1 August 2004, and in line with the Work Plan adopt ed for their translation into day-to-day work, 
negotiations have proceeded on the basis of Member s' contributions, both in written and verbal form. 
More than 60 submissions, many by developing countri es, have been tabled on various aspects of the 
mandate, underlining their commitment to advancing the facilitation of trade.  Written contributions 
have also been made by least-developed countri es, often teaming up with  developed Members. 
54. Having completed a series of discussions on all elements of the mandate and the proposals 
submitted thereon, the Negotiating Group has worked  on capturing the progress made so far and 
setting out the road ahead, proposing a number of concrete recommendations in that regard.  
Benefiting from advances in unders tanding and building on elements of common ground, the draft 
reflects a generally expressed sense of satisfacti on with the inclusive and transparent manner of 
conducting the negotiations, and their progress made on s ubstance.  At the same time, there is clear 
recognition of there still being substantial work ah ead, especially with respect  to S&DT aspects, needs 
and priorities identification, concerns about cost implications and technical assistance and capacity-
building support.   
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
55. Issues identified by developing countries as areas of particular interest cover a wide field, 
including technical assistance and capacity building (TA& CB).  A lot of attention has also been given 
to the needs and priorities of developing countri es, cost implications and questions of S&D.  
Reference was further made to linkages between A nnex D's elements and the need for a balanced 
result.  At the same time, there was also focu s on measures to improve and clarify the relevant 
regulatory framework with a view to expediting and enhancing developing country trade.  For 
landlocked countries (as well as non- landlocked Members of the devel oping world), transit matters 
are of particular interest in that regard.  
56. In the TA&CB area, calls have been made for support both during the negotiations and after 
their conclusion, with a number of concrete measures proposed for each phase.  Such support is 
recognized as vital for developing and least-develope d countries to fully participate in and benefit 
from the negotiating process.  Assistance was request ed to be precise, effective and operational, 
reflecting the trade facilitation needs and priorities of the developing world.  Reference was also made 
to enhancing cooperation and coor dination amongst the various aid providers to increase efficiency 
and avoid duplication of work.  The identification of trade facilitation needs and priorities is another 
issue close to the heart of developing Members, with strong requests being made for their 
advancement and support.  Proposals were also made for a compilation of the identified results, with 
tools solicited to this end.  Work is also requ ested to continue and intensify on the process of 
addressing concerns on the cost implications side.   
57. Special and differential treatment is another key pillar of the negotiations and an essential 
requirement for their success.  Like in the case of TA&CB, calls have been made for S&D provisions 
to be precise, effective and operational and allow for the necessary flexibil ity in implementing the 
negotiations' results.  Issues raised by developing countries with respect to improving and clarifying 
the existing regulatory framework cover all releva nt GATT Articles.  Proposals range from enhanced 
transparency and non-discrimination initiatives ove r various measures regard ing import/export-related 
fees and formalities to matters addressing goods in transit.  The landlocked countries have been 
especially active in pursuing some of these is sues.  Common underlying objectives of those 
suggestions are increased trading opportunities that  take account of the particular needs of the 
developing world.    WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
 Page 15 
 
 
 4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries  
58. Lowering trade-related transaction costs can resu lt in a significant improvement in a country's 
ability to compete effectively in the global econo my.  There has been wide recognition of this 
expressed in the Negotiating Group on Trade Facilita tion by developing countries and LDCs, and of 
the importance of trade facilitation for the attainment  of their development objectives.  They have 
drawn particular attention to the benefits they  foresee in terms of increasing the competitiveness of 
their small and medium-scale enterprises.  This a pplies in particular to the case of landlocked 
developing countries and LDCs, for which steps to fac ilitate transit traffic along with facilitating their 
own cross-border trade can produce a marked reduc tion in their import costs and an improvement in 
their export competitiveness on world markets.  Na tional experience papers presented by delegations 
in the Negotiating Group, as well as numerous st udies that have been conducted by relevant 
international organizations that are collaborating with  WTO Members in this area, point to a range of 
benefits that can be realized by taking measures to facilitate trade, including improving revenue 
collection, improving border controls and security, lowering administrative costs, encouraging more 
trade and foreign investment, and enhancing the competitiveness of domestic business in its home 
market as well as on export markets.  Developing countries also stand to benefit greatly from the 
aspired increase in transparency and pr edictably of the trading environment. 
E. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
59. Special and differential treatment (S&D) is an  integral part of the WTO Agreements and 
reflects a recognition of the diverse nature of WT O's vast membership, asymmetry in their economic 
strengths and the need to ensure that economic gains from the trading system are well distributed 
among all Members.  These provisions are also designe d to facilitate the integr ation of developing and 
least-developed countries into the world economy, a nd to provide countries at different levels of 
development support and flexibility in their obligations  so as to be able to achieve economic growth.  
While developing countries acknowledge that the mu ltilateral trading system has attempted to address 
some of their concerns through appropriate S&D provi sions, many of them still feel that more needs 
to be done to enhance the effectiveness and opera tionalization of these provisions.  One of the main 
concerns expressed has been that S&D provisions ar e couched in best endeavour language and merely 
exhort Members to take certain steps, rather th an making this action mandatory and binding.   
60. The development dimension of S&D can be b est gauged from the submissions made by the 
proponents in the Special Session.  The African Gr oup, one of the main proponents on S&D, in its 
submission states that "special and differential treatment shall aim, to address and resolve the 
imbalances between deve loped country Members and developi ng and ... to suppor t developing and 
least developed country Members to undertake adjustments that are necessary for them to meaningfully benefit from the agreements ... and to  secure for them market access in the multilateral 
trading system that will facilitate their rapid economic development" (TN/CTD/W/3/Rev.2).  The 
African Group has submitted that their experience with implementing S&D provisions has shown that 
such provisions are best operationalized when they are in the form of binding obligations.  The LDCs, 
which have also played a central role in this  work, believe that developing country Members, 
particularly the LDCs, "experience peculiar problems, which constrain their beneficial participation in 
the multilateral trading system" (TN/CTD/W/4).  They  therefore feel that assuming the same types 
and levels of obligations as unde rtaken by other Members has prev ented them from addressing their 
development challenges and from participating meaningf ully in the international trading system.  The 
LDCs argue that S&D provisions should provide th em flexibility to take measures to assist their 
domestic industries, and that they should be obliged to undertake only such commitments or obligations that are consistent with their trade, development and financial needs.   WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
Page 16  
 
 2. Status of the Negotiations 
61. The section on S&D in the August 2004 D ecision mandated the Special Session to 
expeditiously complete the review of all the out standing Agreement-specific proposals and report to 
the General Council, with clear recommendations for a decision, by July 2005.  The Special Session 
was also instructed to address all other outstandi ng work, including on the cross-cutting issues.  The 
proposals that have been referred to other WT O bodies were also to be addressed with clear 
recommendations for a decision no later than July 2005.  Of the 88 Agreement-specific proposals submitted in the Special Session mainly by the LDCs and the African Group, Members had up to Cancún been able to agree in principle to 28 propo sals, which are yet to be adopted.  (Annex C of 
JOB(03)/150/Rev.2).  Thirty-eight proposals are under consideration in other WTO bodies.  The 
remaining proposals are under consideration in the Special Session. 
62. Members have agreed to focus their effort s on the five remaining LDC proposals and in 
recent weeks intensive work has been carried out on them.  These proposals, inter alia , are seeking 
bound duty-free and quota-free market access for all products originating from LDCs, flexibility in 
the TRIMs Agreement, simplification of the wa iver process for LDCs and improved coherence 
agreements with other internati onal organizations to ensure more targeted technical assistance and 
capacity-building programmes.   
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
63. Just as development issues suffuse all areas of th e negotiations, so do issues relating to S&D.  
Consequently, any comprehensive compilation of is sues of interest to developing countries would 
need to necessarily include the pro posals on S&D tabled by developing countries in the different areas 
being negotiated.  However, in the context of the proposals tabled in the Special Session, it can be 
said that the specific issues of interest to  developing countries, include the following: 
• Flexibility in the multilateral rules, which re flect their concerns and constraints;  
• Transitional arrangements linked to the achievement of certain pre-specified 
developmental objectives; 
• Simplifying existing procedures, including for enhanced flexibilities and extended 
transition periods, so as to provide a timely an d effective response to particular concerns; 
• Less than full reciprocity in the commitments undertaken by developing countries; 
• Enhanced and targeted technical assist ance and capacity-building programmes that 
would assist countries to implement WTO rules; 
• Measures that would provide stable and pred ictable market access for products of export 
interest to developing countries, esp ecially for the least-developed countries; 
• Making S&D provisions mandatory, in keeping with the concern expressed by many 
developing countries that most of these provi sions are not couched in binding language; 
• Improved coherence arrangements to ensure that flexibilities provided in the WTO rules 
are not diluted because of commitments mandated by other organizations. 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
64. While it is difficult to quantify the gains fro m the S&D work programme, mainly because of 
the lag between adopting and operationalizing any recommendation that may be adopted, it can be 
said that gains would accrue by making the provisi ons precise, effective and binding.  Clearly, in 
order to assist developing countries, especially the LDCs, the S&D provisions must respond to, and be 
reflective of, their concerns.  A number of devel oping country Members have said that commitments  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
 Page 17 
 
 
 and obligations undertaken by them in the WTO have  reduced their flexibility to adopt, what in their 
view, are pro-development policies and measures.  In this context, they have put forward a number of 
proposals which seek to enhance the existing flexib ility in the rules for them, and consequently 
provide them a certain degree of policy space.  They  have also sought simplification of cumbersome 
procedures and/or notification obligations, so that they can divert their resources to other 
developmental issues and areas.  Clearly, market access will be an important area where gains would 
accrue, even if the bulk of the development outcome  are to be found in the different areas being 
negotiated, such as in the agriculture, NAMA and services negotiations.  However, the actual gains 
will largely depend on how effectively th ese recommendation are operationalized.   
65. Developing country Members also consider trans itional time periods as an important element 
of S&D treatment; one that provides them with mo re time to conform with, or fulfil particular 
obligations.  However, many, if not all, of these  transition periods have expired and developing 
countries, especially the LDCs, are seeking a positive consideration of their requests for extension of 
these transition periods.  There are several recomme ndations on the need for technical assistance (TA) 
to be more targeted to the development needs of  developing and least-developed countries.  There are 
also a number of proposals that seek to improve coherence arrangements with other organizations in 
the delivery of such assistance.  An  effective S&D regime, as part of the final outcome of the Doha 
Round, will certainly strengthen the development di mension of the  negotiations.  However, to 
achieve this it will be important to ensure that S& D provisions are targeted, effective and binding and 
provide actual development gains to developing countries. 
F. IMPLEMENTATION -RELATED ISSUES AND CONCERNS  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
66. Concerns arising from the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements were raised by 
some developing countries shortly after the establishment of the WTO in 1995.  To them, the Uruguay Round Agreements were not balanced and did not contain provisions that would facilitate their 
integration into the multilateral trading system.  In fact, there was the view that some of the 
Agreements, particularly the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures and the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures restricted the policy measures that could be implemented 
by developing countries to attract foreign dir ect investment and to support their nascent domestic 
industries ("policy space").  Concerns were also e xpressed about a wide range of issues, including the 
back loading of commitments under the Agreem ent on Textiles and Clothing. There was the 
additional concern among small and economically-w eak developing countries that the cost of 
implementing the Uruguay Round Agreement, particul arly the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property and the Agreement on Cust oms Valuation was excessive as compared to 
benefits they had derived from the implementa tion of the Uruguay Round Agreements.  Some 
developing countries also complained about abu se of anti-dumping, safeguards and countervailing 
measures as well as standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
67. In response, a number of developed countries que ried whether all the proposals were genuine 
implementation issues in the sense of focusing on di fficulties encountered by developing countries in 
their implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements .  Rather, they believed some proposals were 
aimed at rewriting Agreements, thereby upsetting the balance which was struck during the Uruguay 
Round.  Nonetheless, they entered into a lengt hy process of consideration of the issues. 
2. Status of Work  
68. Work on implementation issues begun in earnest  in 2000 when WTO Members agreed to set 
up an Implementation Review Mechanism under th e auspices of the General Council, which 
culminated in the adoption of a Decision on Impl ementation-Related Issues and Concerns at the WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
Page 18  
 
 Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha.  Under this  Decision, Ministers agreed to take immediate 
action to address about 55 issues.  Regarding the outstanding implementation issues, they agreed 
under paragraph 12 of the Ministerial Declaration to  address them in two parallel tracks.  Where a 
specific negotiating mandate had been provided, the relevant issues were to be addressed under those 
mandates.  Where no such mandate had been provided,  the issues were to be addressed by relevant 
WTO bodies, which were expected to report to th e Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) by the end 
of 2002 for it to take appropriate action.  In th is latter track of work, the relevant WTO bodies 
reported wide divergences in Members’ positions on most of the issues preventing the TNC from taking any action on the issues at its meeting in December 2002. 
69. To break the impasse, Members requested the Di rector-General in May 2003 to consult on the 
issue of the extension of the protection of geogra phical indications provided for in Article 23 of the 
TRIPS Agreement to products other than wines a nd spirits, which was widely seen as the most 
controversial proposal.  It was felt that progress on this issue would have spill-over effects and allow 
progress to be made on the other issues.  It was fu rther agreed that the Director-General's deputies 
would consult on the remaining 23 issues.  Desp ite intensive consultati ons, very little progress was 
made on the outstanding issues prompting a number of Members to request that the issues be 
considered by the TNC itself in dedicated sessions.  There was no agreement on this proposal and the 
Director-General process was allowed to continue. 
70. The 1 August 2004 Decision of the General Council mandated the Director-General to 
continue with his consultative process on all outstanding implementation issues under 
paragraph 12(b).  Since that time, work has proceed ed on two tracks.  The first track concerns all 
outstanding implementation issues except GI extensi on, with consultations being carried out by the 
Chairpersons of concerned WTO bodies acting as th e Director-General's Friends, in line with the 
August 2004 Decision.  On the second track (GI ex tension), the Director-General requested his 
Deputy Director-General to conduct, on his behalf, a technical level process aimed at clarifying the issues related to GI extension, building on the work  already undertaken.  The Director-General, in 
reporting to the TNC and General Council in May 2 005, said that the picture was a mixed one, with 
more encouraging signs in some areas than in othe rs.  In some cases, ways in which Members could 
try to move forward had emerged which deserved to be further explored.  He, therefore, suggested 
that the work should continue on both tracks and that he would report again in July 2005.  In July, however, the Director-General reported that the ov erall situation had not evolved significantly, and  
suggested that his successor be requested to cont inue the consultative processes after the summer 
break.  The General Council took note of the report by the Director-General. 
71. At the meeting of the TNC of 13 October 2005, the Director-General informed delegations 
that, in line with the mandate given to the Direct or-General in the August 2004 Decision which was 
renewed by the General Council in July 2005, he was undertaking a consultative process on all 
outstanding implementation issues under paragraph 12( b) of the Doha Declaration, including on 
issues related to the extension of the protection of  geographical indications provided for in Article 23 
of the TRIPS Agreement to products other than win es and spirits.  He indicated that this process 
would be carried out in his capacity as Director-Gen eral and was without prejudice to the positions of 
Members.  He is being assisted by a number of the Chairpersons of concerned WTO bodies acting as 
his Friends and by two of his Deputy Directors-Ge neral, namely on the TRIMs issues and on GI 
extension and issues relating to TRIPS and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). 
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
72. Although raised under a number of agreements, the outstanding implementation issues can be 
broadly classified under four main headings:  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
 Page 19 
 
 
 (a) Proposals intended to give longer transiti onal periods to developing countries to 
implement their obligations; 
(b) Proposals safeguarding the market access of developing countries and ensuring that 
they derive benefits under certain Agre ements, such as the TRIPS Agreement; 
(c) Proposals intended to exempt developing c ountries from complying with obligations, 
such as those under the TRIMs Agreement;  and 
(d) Proposals requesting that developing countri es be provided with effective technical 
assistance. 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
73. Proponents of the various implementation-rela ted proposals have argued that they would 
derive economic and development benefits from them.  For example, some of the proposals are 
intended to safeguard the market access of deve loping countries by requiring developed countries to 
take account of their interests when applying c ontingency protection measures.  Proponents believe 
that the proposals under the TRIMs Agreement would en able them to attract foreign direct investment 
into certain critical sectors of their economy.  They argue that the domestic content requirement 
would benefit local industries in terms of enhanci ng their competitiveness and facilitating the transfer 
of technology.  Some other Members argue that if the domestic industries are efficient, most foreign 
investors would source inputs from them rather than importing them from elsewhere. 
74. Proponents also believe that the proposals on the TRIPS Agreement would confer several 
benefits on them.  This would ensure that they  receive adequate remuneration for their genetic 
materials and related traditional knowledge used in inventions through equitable benefit-sharing 
schemes (in particular on the Convention on Biologica l Diversity), and also for products which enjoy 
GI protection.   Some of the proposals, if a dopted, could facilitate the transfer of technology, 
particularly to least-developed countries.  On the ot her hand, some Members feel the adoption of these 
proposals would not necessarily increase investment fl ows, as investors also take into account a 
number of other factors, including political st ability, macro-economic fundamentals and other 
economic-related matters.  There is also the exp ectation among proponents that the proposals relating 
to technical assistance would strengthen their hum an and institutional capacities and enable them to 
participate effectively in the activities of standard -setting bodies.  Proponents also feel that the 
proposal on Article XVIII of the GATT 1994 would assist them to implement programmes which would put their economies on the path of sustainable growth and development.  It may be noted that 
some of these issues have also  been raised in the Special Se ssion of the Committee on Trade and 
Development as part of the work programme on S&D. 
G. R
ULES  
1. Anti-Dumping and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Including Fisheries 
Subsidies  
(a) Parameters of the de velopment dimension 
75. Developing country exports have been the s ubject of some 45 per cent of all anti-dumping 
investigations since 1995.  Developing country Members also are the main users of anti-dumping, accounting for nearly 60 per cent of all anti-du mping investigations since 1995.  A number of 
developing country Members have sponsored or  co-sponsored proposals aimed at tightening 
anti-dumping rules, i.e., reflecting exporter interest s.  On the other hand, a number of developing 
country Members (including some that have co-s ponsored proposals aimed at tightening anti-dumping 
rules) have cautioned against making the rules too difficult for developing country investigating 
authorities to implement, thereby reflecting their interests as users.  Disciplines on subsidies are WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
Page 20  
 
 differentiated among developing c ountry Members based on their level of development and certain 
other factors.  This diversity of current treat ment is reflected in positions on various proposals 
concerning whether and how subsidy disciplines might  be strengthened, and on proposed changes to 
the special and differential treatment provisions of  the SCM Agreement.  Finally, in the area of 
fisheries subsidies, certain deve loping country Members favour very strict disciplines with few 
exceptions and limited special and differential (S&D ) treatment, while others seek broad exemptions 
from any new disciplines.   
(b) Status of the negotiations 
76. The work of the Negotiating Group on Rules has pr oceeded in three stages,  the first of which 
began in 2002 and which continued up to the Cancún Ministerial in September 2003.  It consisted of 
formal meetings at which formal submissions we re made by Members, identifying issues on which 
they wished to negotiate.  The second stage began after Cancún and established a process of informal 
plenary meetings, at which more detailed and speci fic "elaborated proposals" were discussed.  The 
third stage continues the formal and informal pl enary process, but has added, since early 2005, a 
series of bilateral and plurilatera l consultations convened by the Chairman of the Negotiating Group 
to discuss "third generation" precise proposals for specific changes to the text of the existing 
Agreement.  The Negotiating Group has also cr eated a Technical Group on issues related to 
anti-dumping questionnaires and verification, with a view to reducing the cost and increasing the 
predictability of investigations.   
(c) Specific issues of interest to developing countries 
77. Most of the proposals on anti-dumping have b een submitted by a group of Members known as 
the Friends of Anti-dumping Negotiations (FANs), wh ich includes a number of developing country 
Members.  Developing and developed Members have also submitted proposals individually on 
various aspects of anti-dumping and countervailing dut y measures.  The general orientation of the 
FANs' proposals is to make the rules on using anti- dumping measures stricter, both in respect of the 
substantive provisions (how dumping margins are calculated, and how injury and causation are 
established), and in respect of duty application and investigative procedures.  In addition, various 
Members are pursuing some of the implementati on and S&D issues pertaining to anti-dumping which 
were referred to the Negotiating Group.  On the ot her hand, certain proposals by developing country 
Members reflect concerns that anti-dumping rules are becoming more demanding and that many developing country administrators have difficulty implementing them because of their cost and/or 
complexity.  A final cluster of anti-dumping pro posals/issues with implications for developing 
countries concern transparency and due process in anti-dumping investigations.  On the one hand, 
certain developing country Members express conc erns over a lack of access to information in 
investigations to which their exporters are subject .  On the other, some developing country Members 
express concern over the increased costs and burdens of any new procedures or mechanisms.  Proponents on these issues, however, have stressed the importance that they  attach to a high and 
consistent standard of procedural  fairness and transparency on the part of any Member making use of 
the anti-dumping instrument.   
78. A relatively small number of proposals on horizontal subsidy disciplines under the SCM 
Agreement are under active discussion at present.  Mo st of these have to do with the rules on export 
subsidies, one has to do with the meaning of "withdr awal" of a subsidy, and one has to do with serious 
prejudice.  Only one of these proposals, on export credits, is sponsored by a developing country 
Member.  In other fora, including the Dedi cated Sessions of the Committee on Trade and 
Development, certain proposals have been tabled to exempt on a long-term basis certain developing 
countries from the SCM Agreement prohibition on e xport subsidies.  In addition, early in the 
negotiations, Members (developed as well as developi ng) tabled papers referring to S&D under the 
SCM Agreement.  Developing country proposals di ffer on the question of exemptions from horizontal  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
 Page 21 
 
 
 obligations under the Agreement, with some fa vouring the prolongation of such exemptions and 
others expressing concern about their implications for international competition.  Finally, certain 
papers tabled early in the negotiations propose enhanced immunity from countervailing measures for 
developing country exporters.   
79. The main proponents of new, sector-specific di sciplines on fisheries subsidies comprise a 
group called "Friends of Fish".  This group includ es a number of developing country Members.  For 
the developing country proponents, the main concer n is the artificial competitive advantage created by 
subsidies, which affect access to fish and contribut e to the depletion of the resource.  Most Members 
(developed as well as developing) have stressed the n eed for effective S&D as part of any fisheries 
subsidies package.  Of particular concern in this regard are small-scale, artisanal fisheries and any 
subsidies thereto, as well as payments that so me developing Members receive from foreign 
governments for access to the fisheri es in their waters.  Aquaculture is another area of considerable 
interest to many developing country Members, whic h seek to ensure that any new disciplines would 
not interfere with these activities.   
(d) Possible gains to developing countries 
80. An eventual clarification and improvement of any of the rules under negotiation will increase 
the predictability of the trading system to the be nefit of all Members.  Moreover, an appropriate 
balance of rights and obligations will permit de veloping countries to pursue their development 
objectives and at the same time guard against practices that have a negative impact on their trade.  
Another area where balance is crucial concerns trade-offs between the costs and administrative 
burdens of the contingency protection system and its capacity to ensure fairness and transparency.      
2. Regional Trade Agreements 
(a) Parameters of the de velopment dimension 
81. Negotiations on regional trade agreements (RTAs) aim to clarify and improve WTO 
disciplines and procedures governing these agreements , including in relation to their developmental 
aspects.  RTAs can foster economic growth and de velopment.  But such an outcome is dependent 
upon various factors, including net trade-creation,  an improved regulatory environment, enhanced 
investment flows and technology transfers.  These fact ors are also important in terms of the benefits 
that RTAs can bring to non-parties, as is the readin ess of members of RTAs to translate their mutual 
preferences into non-discriminatory trade liberalizat ion.  RTAs have become a significant element in 
the trade policy of virtually all WTO Members.  A key question is whether they are a building block to non-discrimination or a permanent feature of th e trading landscape.  Concern has been expressed 
that some RTAs reflect a defensive necessity aime d at maintaining access to larger markets, locking 
out competition from other MFN suppliers and locking in  investment.  If such trends are sustained and 
not counterbalanced by a successful outcome of the Doha Round, the contribution of an ever-growing 
number of overlapping RTAs to the economic pr ogress of both parties and non-parties could be 
negative. 
(b) Status of the negotiations 
82. The negotiations on RTA rules and procedures ha ve proceeded on parallel tracks, involving 
"systemic" and "transparency" issues.  In th e last two years, the Negotiating Group has made 
considerable progress in considering various elemen ts of the transparency question.  These include 
procedural questions such as the early announcement of RTAs and the timing of formal notifications.  Discussions have also focused on building a more tr ansparent and efficient RTA review process based 
on a factual presentation by the Secretariat and a streamlined process for subsequent notifications.  
Outstanding issues include how to deal with tho se RTAs on which the CRTA has not been able to WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
Page 22  
 
 report and the extent to which new transparency arrangements should apply to RTAs notified under 
the Enabling Clause.  Discussions on systemic issues
 have not made as much progress as those on 
transparency issues.  Submissions by participants have most notably focused on the clarification of 
certain GATT Article XXIV provisions, including th e "substantially all trade" requirement and the 
length of transition periods.  Proposals have also  addressed the question of flexibilities for developing 
countries. 
(c) Specific issues of interest to developing countries 
83. One of the issues of particular interest to so me developing countries is whether the proposed 
transparency mechanism should apply to Enabli ng Clause agreements.  One developing country 
submission calls for a reaffirmation of the right of developing countries to rely on the Enabling Clause 
to regulate South-South RTAs.  Some devel oping countries have opted to use the GATT 
Article XXIV provisions for South-South agreements .  Some developing count ries have also proposed 
additional flexibility in relation to the "substantially all" and "reasonable period of time" criteria, as 
well as on certain procedural aspects of the rules re garding notification, reporting, review and dispute 
settlement in this context.      
(d) Possible gains to developing countries 
84. It is generally accepted that a developmenta l rationale exists for allowing developing 
countries to engage in progressive asymmetric libera lization with selected partners.  However, if 
transition periods are too long or too many produc ts are excluded from coverage, potential gains from 
RTAs in terms of growth and de velopment will be foregone.  At th e same time it is important to 
ensure coherence both within the regional arrange ment, as well as with the broader goals of the 
multilateral trading system.  Another area of benefit relates to transparency, which serves the interests 
of all WTO Members, in particular those lacking information resources of their own.  If Members retain the right to accord more fa vourable trade conditions to some partners that are not extended to 
all Members, then equally they retain the obliga tion to keep other Members well informed of such 
preferences.  Since practically all WTO Members ar e engaged, or are engaging, in multiple RTAs, the 
need for adequate transparency has beco me systemic in a fundamental sense.   
H. T
RADE -RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
85. The negotiations regarding the establishment of  a multilateral system of notification and 
registration of geographical indications for wines an d spirits (hereinafter "multilateral system") form 
an integral part of the wider mandate of the Doha  Development Agenda.  In keeping with the mandate 
contained in Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement, paragraph 18 of the Doha Declaration states that 
"[w]ith a view to completing the work started in the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (Council for TRIPS) on the implementa tion of Article 23.4, we agree to negotiate the 
establishment of a multilateral system of notificatio n and registration of geographical indications for 
wines and spirits by the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference". 
2. Status of the Negotiations 
86. The negotiations are being conducted by the Special Session of the Council for TRIPS.  
Initially foreseen as an "early harvest" of the Do ha Round, the negotiations are presently being 
pursued in accordance with the 1 August 2004 Decisi on, which reaffirmed Members' commitment to 
progress in all of areas of the negotiations in line wi th the Doha mandates.  Since 2002, a considerable 
amount of work has been done, involving the tabling of  position papers and proposals by delegations.  
The various points and issues raised by delegatio ns up to May 2003 have been reflected in a  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
 Page 23 
 
 
 Secretariat compilation (TN/IP/W/7/Rev.1 and Corr .1).  These discussions were structured around 
four main categories of issues, namely:  the defi nition of the term "geographical indications" and 
eligibility of geographical indications for inclusion in the system;  the purpose of the notification and registration system;  what was meant by a "multilateral system of notification and registration"; and the issue of participation.  Within these discussions , several points and issues were raised on the costs 
and benefits of the system to all Members, in  particular developing countries, and to various 
stakeholders, including those in developing countri es.  While some developing country Members have 
lent broad support to the approach proposed by th e European Communities for a system whereby, in 
the absences of reservations, registrations of geographical indications would create legal effects that included presumptions, there are other developing c ountries that have sponsored or supported the 
approach of the "Joint Proposal" group of Member s, whereby participating Members would commit 
themselves to consult a database of registered geogr aphical indications when taking national decisions 
on the protection of geographical indications. 
87. There are two major stumbling blocks.  The first is the extent to which the registration of a 
geographical indication, within the multila teral system, should create legal effects  at the national 
level.  The second relates to participation, that is  to say the question of whether the legal effects under 
the system should apply to all WTO Members or to those opting to participate in the system.  In addition to these two key issues, there are other poi nts such as administrative and other burdens of a 
multilateral system, especially on developing and least-developed countr ies, and whether the 
proposals on the table would modify the balance of rights and obligations in the TRIPS Agreement and respect the principle of territoriality. 
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
88. Those developing countries that have been ac tive in the work of the Special Session have 
expressed diverging views about the merits of the proposals on the table for a multilateral system, including on the implications for their developm ent.  A significant number of developing countries 
have yet to take a position and are still studying the va rious proposals, including as they relate to their 
own development.  An issue on which a number of  developing countries have expressed particular 
interest is that of participation.  Some of them expressed the view that the system should be voluntary 
and not have legal effects for countries opting not to participate in it.  
89. Discussion of S&D treatment has been relatively lim ited so far.  The point has been made that 
the need for it would depend, to a significant exte nt, on the nature and complexity of the basic 
notification and registration system to be chosen – which still remains unclear.  Nonetheless, there has 
been some discussion of this issue, for example on the extent to which special and differential 
treatment in the payment of registration fees might be  envisaged for developing and LDC participants.  
It has also been suggested that  the participation of developing countries in the system could be 
facilitated through technical assistance.  A suggest ion has been made that a transition period for 
developing countries could be envisaged, so as to  give them enough time to create a sound database 
and to sort out domestic legal and practical issu es related to a better protection of geographical 
indications.  The point has also been made that al lowance would have to be made for the transition 
period of LDCs under the TRIPs Agreement. 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
90. The question of possible gains to developing c ountries has been the subject of some debate 
among the participants in the negotiations.  Some ho ld the view that a multilateral system's ability to 
alleviate the costs for all producers in seeking prot ection worldwide by allowing them to gain legal 
standing in third countries via a centralised pro cedure would help developing country producers in 
particular, who have less resources to invest in  asserting such protection internationally.  Others 
consider that the system would impose considerab le administrative burde n on developing countries, WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
Page 24  
 
 which would more than offset any benefits they mi ght obtain, especially as the mandate is limited to 
wines and spirits, of which most developing countries are not exporters. 
91. In paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
Ministers recognized that WTO Members with in sufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in maki ng effective use of compulsory licensing under 
the TRIPS Agreement.  Following their instruction to find an expeditious solution to this problem, the 
General Council on 30 August 2003 adopted the deci sion on "Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Pub lic Health", which contained three waivers to 
paragraphs (f) and (h) of Article 31 of the TRIPS Ag reement with respect to pharmaceutical products.  
Paragraph 11 of this Decision, which makes it clear th at this work is not part of the negotiations under 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration, instructs the Co uncil for TRIPS to prepare an amendment of the 
TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions, based, where appropriate, on the Decision.  It stipulates that the waivers remain in place until the date on wh ich the amendment takes effect for that Member.  
At present, consultations on the preparation of the amendment are actively underway among certain 
delegations.  The TRIPS Council is expected to reconve ne to consider this matter once more prior to 
the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. 
I. T
RADE AND ENVIRONMENT  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension 
92. The negotiations under paragraph 31 of the Doha  Declaration, which are undertaken with a 
view to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment, and the negotiation under 
paragraph 28 of the Doha Declaration on fisheries s ubsidies, represent the "environmental package" of 
the current negotiations and are an integral part  of the wider mandate of the Doha Development 
Agenda.  The mandate contained pa ragraph 31 mandate has three main  components:  paragraph 31(i) 
sets out the scope of work as far as the relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in multilateral e nvironmental agreements (MEAs) is concerned.  It states that the 
negotiations shall be limited in scope to the appli cability of such existing WTO rules as among parties 
to the  MEA in question, and that they shall not pr ejudice the WTO rights of any Member that is not a 
party to the MEA in question;  paragraph 31(ii)  mandates negotiations on procedures for regular 
information exchange between MEA Secretariats and the relevant WTO committees, and the criteria 
for the granting of observer status;  while para graph 31(iii) mandates negotiations aimed at the 
reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and 
services. 
2. Status of the Negotiations 
93. Since the commencement of the negotiations, the Committee on Trade and Environment in 
Special Session (CTESS) has held a large number of  formal and informal meetings, as well as two 
Information Exchange Sessions on Environmental Goods and Services.  U nder paragraphs 31(i) 
and (iii) in particular, a large number of pr oposals have been submitted by delegations 
(TN/TE/INF/4/Rev.7, dated 4 October 2005).  While paragraph 31(ii) has also been discussed, it has 
received somewhat less attention than other part s of the mandate.  Recently, the CTESS has given 
particular focus to paragraph 31(iii), including through proposals submitted and technical discussions 
held during the abovementioned in formation exchange sessions.   
94. With respect to paragraph 31(i), the C TESS first attempted to develop a common 
understanding of the negotiating mandate.  Various terms contained in the mandate were explored, 
such as "specific trade obligation" (STO) and "mu ltilateral environmental agreement" (MEA).  In 
parallel, discussions were held on proposals rela ting to certain governance principles aimed at 
ensuring mutual supportiveness of WTO-MEA regimes - as a potential outcome for negotiations.  A  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
 Page 25 
 
 
 process of national experience sharing was also initiated, in which Members, including some 
developing countries, discussed their national experiences in the negotiation and domestic 
implementation of STOs in MEAs.  With respect to  paragraph 31(ii), Member s have before them a 
number of ideas exploring how to enhance inform ation exchange and cooperation between the WTO 
and MEAs.  In the discussions, several delega tions have pointed to synergies between 
paragraphs 31(i) and (ii) of th e negotiating mandate.  Developing c ountries have participated actively 
in the negotiations under paragraphs  31(i) and (ii) with a number of them including Argentina, 
Korea, Malaysia, and China tabling submissions to clarify their positions on this aspect of the 
negotiations. With respect to negotiations on trade li beralization in environmental goods and services 
under paragraph 31(iii), the CTESS's work focused mainly on clarifying the concept of an 
environmental good, based on submissions of th e Members.  Submissions so far have proposed 
inter alia  the following approaches: an approach suppor ting the establishment of a mutually agreed 
list of environmental goods, and the environmental pr oject approach.  On the first, nine lists of 
environmental goods have been tabled by diffe rent Members.  Under the second approach 
("Environmental Project Approach"), environmen tal goods and services would be included in a 
project to be approved by a Designated National Authority (DNA);  if approved, the goods and 
services included would qualify for special concessions for the duration of the project.  Recently, an integrated approach suggesting multilateral identif ication of categories of goods that could be 
included in national environment projects has also been tabled.  The liberalization of such goods 
should take effect as of the time that the impor ting Member assigns to a given national project the 
goods required to meet the objective of that project.   
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
95. While positions and interests naturally vary am ong developing countries, some specific issues 
of interest to them can be discerned.  Many developi ng countries feel that liberalization in the trade of 
environmental goods should offer opportunities for th em to increase exports of goods in which they 
have a competitive advantage.  On their part, proponents of lists have generally underlined the 
importance they attach to achieving a "balanced lis t" of environmental goods, i.e. a list of products 
which takes into account areas of trade interest for developing countries.   
96. Some Members have observed that the exports of  most developing countries consist, by and 
large, of natural resource-based products.  He nce, the definition of environmental goods should 
necessarily cover such products.  At the same time , some concerns have been expressed regarding the 
existing asymmetries in production capacities, tradi ng volumes and tariff structures for environmental 
goods.  A number of developing countries have questi oned the benefits for them of liberalizing trade 
in environmental goods, commenting that most envi ronmental goods proposed t hus far have multiple 
uses or have been "high-tech" or "end-of-pipe" products that are pr imarily of interest to developed 
countries.  Other issues of interest to developing countries include the need to facilitate technology 
transfer to the developing and least-developed Me mbers, the use of technologies adapted to their 
needs, and how to ensure the negotiations take into  account the principles of special and differential 
treatment and less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments. 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
97. There has been little substantive debate among pa rticipants in the negotiations on the specific 
gains that can accrue to developing countries from the negotiations under paragr aphs 31(i) and (ii) on 
the relationship between MEAs and WTO rules.  As  regards paragraph 31(iii), some hold the view 
that liberalization of environmental goods and servi ces can be beneficial to trade, environment and 
development.  According to them, the negotiations  could result in increased trade due to a reduction 
or elimination of tariffs and non-ta riffs barriers.  They also feel that there would be development gains 
because liberalization would assist developing count ries in obtaining the tools needed to address key 
environmental priorities.  Others, however, question the possible environmental benefits of some of WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
Page 26  
 
 the goods proposed for liberalization.  These Member s feel that the developmental gains would be 
enhanced only if goods which have an unam biguous environmental use are liberalized.   
98. Some developing country Members have also ar gued for the retention of a certain level of 
policy space in determining which goods help them meet their nationally prioritized environmental 
objectives.  In this context, they have also stressed  that their national interest in these negotiations is 
mainly directed towards the building-up and de velopment of domestic production capacity and the 
provision of environmental goods and services.  This  in their view would further their objectives of 
sustainable development. 
J. D
ISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING  
1. Parameters of the Development Dimension  
99. The negotiations on dispute settlement aim to "agree on improvements and clarifications" of 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).  Unde r paragraph 47 of the Doha Declaration, these 
negotiations are not to be treated as part of a si ngle undertaking.  A number of developing country 
Members highlighted in the early stages of the nego tiations the need to have  effective access to the 
dispute settlement procedures.  In this context, it w as stressed that clarifications or improvements to 
the DSU should not lead to any reduction in the access of developing country Members to dispute 
settlement procedures.  Although a number of developing country Memb ers have been active users of 
the dispute settlement procedures, others, in par ticular African and LDC Members, have had much 
more limited participation to date.  These Members highlighted in their proposals the significant constraints, including resource constraints, they f ace in having recourse to the complex and expensive 
(if outside counsel is used) procedures of the DSU. 
100. A number of proposals presented by developing c ountries have, therefore, aimed at enhancing 
the ability of developing country Members to partic ipate effectively in dispute settlement proceedings 
and to ensure that specific developing country inter ests are adequately taken in to account at all stages 
of the proceedings.  This has been reflected in a variety of forms, including proposals for additional 
flexibility to be provided to developing countr y Members in respect of timeframes, or the 
enhancement of existing provisions for S&D.  A num ber of developing country Members have also 
put forward proposals intended to reinforce the ef fectiveness of procedures at the implementation 
phase, sometimes, but not exclusively, in the form of  S&D.  Proposals have also been made to assist 
developing countries overcome financial and res ource constraints, including through enhanced 
technical assistance.   
101. The interests of developing country Members in the DSU negotiations are, however, not 
limited to S&D, or indeed to developmental aspects  only.  The improvement and clarification of the 
dispute settlement mechanism has an institutional di mension that goes beyond th e particular interests 
of developed or developing countries. A stable, predictable and effective multilateral system to 
resolve trade disputes benefits the whole WTO membership.  Many proposals put forward by 
developing country Members therefore address system ic concerns and are not intended to secure any 
form of S&D.  Some of these proposals may reflec t concerns which are of special significance to 
developing country Members as users of the di spute settlement mechanism (for example, the 
enhancement of third party rights).  Others, however, also reflect more general systemic concerns not 
intrinsically tied to a developmental dimension.   
102. Since February 2004, the work of the Special  Session of the Dispute Settlement Body has 
been  based primarily on efforts by Members or groups of Members to develop areas of convergence, 
building on the work to date.  A number of the issu es in respect of which contributions have recently 
been put forward are of interest to developing country Members, without being development-related 
per se .  Indeed, a significant part of recent discussi ons has been based on informal contributions  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
 Page 27 
 
 
 presented jointly by a group of de veloped and developing  country Members.  Several delegations, 
including developing country proponents, have also indicated that they were working on issues relating specifically to developing country participat ion.  However, this wo rk is still ongoing and has 
not yet led to the presentation of revised or impr oved text.  Bearing this consideration in mind, 
specific issues of interest to developing country Members are identified below.  
2. Status of the Negotiations  
103. In the initial phases of the negotiations, a wide range of proposals was put forward, covering 
virtually every provision of the DSU, and reflecting very diverse levels of ambition.  Many of these 
proposals were submitted by developing countries or  groups of developing countries, including some 
Members that have not been active us ers of the dispute settlement system so far.  As part of recent 
Member-driven efforts to develop areas of converg ence based on work in the previous phases of the 
negotiations, a number of revised contributions, most ly informal, have been put forward by various 
Members or groups of Members, including developing  country Members.  Specifically, contributions 
have been put forward and discussed in respect  of remand, third-party rights, sequencing, 
post-retaliation, third-party ri ghts, additional guidance to WTO adjudicative bodies, panel 
composition, time-savings and transparency (open m eetings).  However, in this recent phase of the 
negotiations, no revised proposal relating specifically to S&D or developing country participation in 
dispute settlement has been put forward.  Rece ntly, several developing country proponents have 
indicated that they are working on issues relating to the participation of developing country Members 
in dispute settlement, with a view to presenti ng some revised text to the Special Session.  
3. Specific Issues of Interest to Developing Countries 
104. A number of developing country Members have  presented proposals, spanning all phases of 
the dispute settlement procedures.  These proposals re flect a range of concerns that include, but are 
not limited to developmental consid erations.  Given the systemic dimension of the clarification and 
improvement of the DSU, virtually all issues under discussion could be said to be of relevance to 
developing countries as Members of the WTO and potentia l users of the DSU.  Only issues in respect 
of which specific attention has been given to deve loping country interests are identified below.  For 
the sake of clarity, the i ssues are identified under four broad headings corresponding to the four main 
stages of dispute settlement proceedings under the DSU. 
(a) Consultations 
• Provide adequate time for consultations, especia lly for developing country respondents.   
• Ensuring adequate opportunity for non-dispu ting Members to join the consultations. 
• Improving the existing S&D provision relating to the attention to be given to developing 
country Members' particular interests during consultations.  
(b) Panel proceedings 
• Preserving adequate timeframes at all stages of the proceeding to allow developing 
country Members to prepare and present their arguments, especially as respondents.   
• Ensuring adequate representation of developi ng country nationals as panellists in cases 
involving developing country Members. 
• Strengthening of third-party rights.   
•
 Strengthening existing S&D provisions and ensuring that developmental aspects are 
adequately taken into account in the proceedings. WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
Page 28  
 
 • Some developing country Members have expressed strong views on issues of so-called 
"transparency", relating to the opening WTO dispute settlement procedures more widely 
to the public, raising concerns as to the poten tial implications of such opening.  Recent 
discussions have focused specifically on the proposed opening of panel meetings and 
Appellate Body hearings for the public to observe.   
(c) Appellate review 
• Strengthening of third-party rights.  
• Transparency (similar concerns as at the panel stage). 
(d) Implementation 
• Improving the effectiveness of remedies, in  particular where a developing country 
Member has prevailed against a developed country Member.   
• Enhancing the opportunities for effective co mpensation or retaliation in favour of 
developing country Members. 
• Ensuring that developing country Members are afforded sufficient time for the 
implementation of adverse rulings. 
• Enhancing the means for developing country  Members to overcome the financial and 
human resource challenges posed by participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, through enhanced technical assistance, the creation of a "fund" for developing country Members, or the award of litigation costs to developing country 
Members prevailing in a case. 
4. Possible Gains for Developing Countries 
105. The institution of a strengthened multilateral rules-based dispute settlement mechanism has 
been heralded as one of the major achievements of  the Uruguay Round, and the DSU is generally 
acknowledged to have served WTO Members well so far.  Indeed, more than 80 WTO Members (of 
which 65 are developing countries) have participated, either as party or as third-party, in at least one 
dispute to date.  Since the dispute settlement procedures are in essence an instrument for the 
protection of Members' substantive rights and obl igations under the WTO Agreements, it might be 
said that the immediate objective of improving and clarifying procedures under the DSU ultimately 
serves the long-term goal of enhancing the ability of WTO Members, in particular developing country 
Members, to fully benefit from the trade opport unities they have negotiated in the WTO.    
106. The main benefits of improvements and clarifica tions to the DSU, could be expected to come 
in the form of institutional strengthening of the multilateral trading system, and enhanced capacity for 
all Members to protect their interests in the WTO.  To the extent that developing country Members, 
especially smaller economies with limited political powe r to influence the behaviour of larger trading 
partners, may generally have more difficulty in  defending their interests effectively, such 
enhancements would especially benefit them.  In this perspective, any improvement that would 
enhance the effectiveness of the procedures and thus  facilitate a prompt and effective resolution of 
disputes, has the potential to benefit especially developing country users.  A number of such 
procedural improvements are under consideration, th at may not have any particular developmental 
dimension, but that would, if adopted, benefit developing country Members equally as users of the 
system (for example, the establishment of remand aut hority, the clarification of "sequencing" between 
compliance and retaliation procedures or the elabora tion of procedures to address "post-retaliation"). 
107. Interests depend, in part, on the particular positi on a Member finds itself in a given dispute:  
as complainants, Members are likely to want to obtain prompt and effective relief from dispute 
settlement, while as respondents, they will require gu arantees that they will be in a position to defend  WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.1 
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 their interests adequately and be allowed suffici ent time to implement any adverse rulings.  An 
important dimension of the DSU ne gotiations is thus that all Memb ers, developing countries included, 
have to negotiate in consideration of the fact that th ey may, in a given case, be either in the position of 
complainant or in the position of defendant.  These pressures can be exacerbated where developing 
country Members are concerned: as a complain ant, a developing country Member facing an 
inconsistent measure maintained by another Member may have more  limited capacity to withstand 
any adverse effects for a prolonged period, while, as a respondent, a developing country Member with 
significant resource constraints will be especially sens itive to the need for the procedures to afford it 
sufficient time and means to defend itself in the mo st adequate manner.  In these circumstances, an 
optimal outcome, including for developing country Memb ers, is likely to be the result of a balancing 
exercise between different interests, including in situations where legitima te developing country 
interests might exist on either side of the dispute. 
108. Proposals to address the resource constraints hi ghlighted by a number of developing country 
Members, in the form of enhanced  technical assistance or financial support, are of a slightly distinct 
nature, in that they do not directly affect procedur al steps in the dispute, but focus rather on ensuring 
that developing country Members have effective access to the pr ocedures in the first place.  
Improvements designed to address these resource constr aints could facilitate actual recourse to the 
procedures by developing country Members who might  otherwise feel unable to take advantage of 
them.  In cases where such improvements would benef it defendant developing country Members, they 
could enhance the ability of these Members to effectively defend their rights under the WTO 
agreements with respect to measures they themselves have taken.  
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
109. In an effort to assist Members with their discussion concerning paragraph 51 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration, this document identifies th e key developmental aspects raised in the various 
negotiating bodies.  While the issues raised in the pa per vary according to subject area, it is clear that 
developing countries have serious and pressing interests which they wish to see addressed in the 
Round.  These interests also change according to the subject area under discussion and reflect the very 
diverse interests of developing countries overall.  
110. Two conclusions stem from this document: first,  development finds itself into each and every 
item under negotiation, whether on the market access or in the rule-making part.  Second, a large 
number of proposals are already on the table aimed at addressing the development aspects of each 
subject.  It is hoped that this paper helps Memb ers in their discussions and negotiations towards a 
conclusion of the Doha Development Round. 
 
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