WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/DS393/1 
G/L/887 
G/ADP/D78/1 
19 May 2009 
 
 (09-2434) 
 Original:   Spanish 
 
 
 
CHILE – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF 
WHEAT FLOUR FROM ARGENTINA 
 
Request for Consultations by Argentina  
 
  The following communication, dated 14 May 2009,  from the delegation of Argentina to the 
delegation of Chile and to the Chairman of the Di spute Settlement Body, is circulated in accordance 
with Article 4.4 of the DSU. 
 
_______________ 
 
  My authorities have instructed me to request  consultations with the Government of Chile 
pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes , paragraph 1 of Article XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994  
("GATT 1994") and Article 17 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994  ("Anti-Dumping Agreement" or "AD") with respect to the 
anti-dumping measures taken by the Republic of Chile on imports of wheat flour from Argentina, as well as any amendments thereto or extensions thereof
1 and any related measure;  and also with respect 
to certain provisions of Law No. 18.5252 whose text was consolidated , coordinated and rationalized 
by Decree having Force of Law No. 31 of 20053, and the Supreme Decree of the Ministry of Finance 
No. 575.4 
 Background
 
 
 On 11 April 2008, the Asociación de Molineros del Centro A.G.  submitted a request for the 
initiation of an investigation in to alleged dumping and the appli cation of a provisional anti-dumping 
measure on imports of wheat flour from Argen tina.  On 18 April 2008, in Session No. 3025, the 
National Commission responsible for investigating di stortions in the price of imported goods ("the 
Commission") decided to initiate an investigation into possible dumping of imports of wheat flour 
from Argentina. 
  On 3 July 2008, the Minister of Finance, by order of the President, through Exempt Decree No. 737
6, and taking into account Record No. 3037 of the Commission, decided to impose a 
                                                      
1 Including any further determinations made pursuant to court order or remand. 
2 Published in the Official Journal of 30 June 1986. 
3 Published in the Boletín Oficial de la República de Chile  (Official Gazette of the Republic of Chile) 
of 22 April 2005. 
4 Published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Chile of 20 August 1993. 
5 Record of Session No. 302, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Chile on 
25 April 2008. 
6 Published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Chile of 7 July 2008. WT/DS393/1 
G/L/887 G/ADP/D78/1 
Page 2 
  
  provisional anti-dumping duty of 30.3 per cent on impor ts of wheat flour from Argentina, classified 
under tariff heading 1101.0000 of the Customs Tariff.  
 Finally, on 2 January 2009, the Minister of Finance, by order of the President, through 
Exempt Decree No. 1
8, and taking into account Record No. 3079 of the Commission, decided to 
conclude the investigation with the imposition of  a definitive anti-dumping duty of 30.3 per cent on 
imports of wheat flour from Argentina, classified under tariff heading 1101.0000 of the Customs Tariff. 
 
Legal background
 
 
1. Investigation conducted, determinations made and duties imposed 
 Argentina considers that the investigati on conducted by the Chilean authorities, the 
determinations made and the duties imposed violat e Chile's obligations under the provisions of 
GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  In  particular, Argentina considers that the 
anti-dumping measures on wheat flour from Argentina are inconsistent with, at the least, Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13 and 18 of the Anti-Dumping Ag reement and Annex II thereto;  Article XVI of the 
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization  ("WTO Agreement");  and 
Article VI of the GATT 1994, for the reasons set out below: 
 
 Article 1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement: 
 
• because the anti-dumping measures were not applied under the circumstances 
provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 a nd pursuant to an investigation initiated 
and conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
 
 Article 2  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;  in particular but not exclusively: 
 
• Article 2.1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not 
determine the existence of dumping by co mparing the export price of wheat flour 
exported to Chile with the normal value of  the like product destined for internal 
consumption in Argentina; 
 
• Article 2.2  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not 
reach a reasoned conclusion based on an unbiased and objective evaluation of the facts when they determined that domestic  sales of wheat flour in Argentina did not 
take place in the ordinary course of trade; 
 
• Article 2.2.1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities 
determined that domestic sales of wheat fl our on the Argentine domestic market were 
not in the ordinary course of trade and that these sales should be disregarded in determining the normal value, without have  previously determined that:  (a) these 
sales were made within an extended period of  time;  (b) in substantial quantities;  and 
(c) at prices which did not provide for the recovery of all costs within a reasonable 
period of time; 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
7 Session No. 303, held on 27 June 2008. 
8 Published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Chile of 7 January 2009. 
9 Session No. 307, held  on 29 December 2008.  WT/DS393/1 
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  • Article 2.2.2  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, be cause when constructing the normal 
value the Chilean authorities did not base their determination regarding the amounts for administrative, selling and general costs, and for profits, on actual data pertaining 
to production and sales in the ordinary c ourse of trade of the like product by the 
exporter or producer under investigation;  and even supposing that the investigating 
authority had considered that these amounts c ould not be determined on the basis of 
the ordinary course of trade, the normal value was not constructed according to the 
methods laid down in the list in this provision;  and 
 
• Article 2.4  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because a fair comparison between the 
export price and the normal value was not ma de;  this comparison was not made at 
the same level of trade and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same 
time.  The Chilean authorities did not make due allowance, in this case, on its merits, for differences which affect price comp arability, according to the indicative list 
mentioned in this provision. 
 
 Article VI  of the GATT 1994 and Article 3  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement;  in particular 
but not exclusively:  
• Article 3.1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, b ecause the Chilean authorities, when 
determining the threat of material in jury, did not base themselves on positive 
evidence or an objective examination of:  (a ) the volume of the dumped imports and 
their effect on prices in the domestic mark et for like products;  and (b) the consequent 
impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products; 
 
• Article 3.2  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not 
consider during the investigation that ther e had not been a significant increase in 
imports of wheat flour from Argentina, eith er in absolute terms or relative to 
production or domestic consumption in Chile;  they did not consider either that there 
had not been significant price undercutting by the imports or that the effect of such imports was not to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree; 
 
• Article 3.4  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not 
examine the impact of the imports of wheat flour from Argentina on the Chilean 
domestic industry, including an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and 
indices having a bearing on the state of th is industry, including those listed in 
Article 3.4 itself; 
 
• Article 3.1, Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and paragraph 1 of 
Article VI of the GATT , because the Chilean authorities did not demonstrate that, 
through the effects of the alleged dumping, the imports investigated had caused or threatened to cause injury to the Chilean domestic industry;  they did not base their 
determination of a causal relationship betw een the imports allegedly dumped and the 
injury to the domestic industry on positive ev idence or an objective examination of all 
relevant evidence;  they did not examin e known factors other than the allegedly 
dumped imports from Argentina which at th e same time could have injured the 
domestic industry, and because they attribut ed the injuries caused by these factors to 
the imports of wheat flour from Argentina; 
 WT/DS393/1 
G/L/887 G/ADP/D78/1 
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  • Article 3.7  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not 
base their determination of a threat of material injury on facts but merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility ;  they did not undertake any examination 
to show that this threat of material in jury was clearly foreseen and imminent;  and 
because when making the determination of threat of material injury, the Chilean 
authorities did not consider the factors listed in Article 3.7 or other known factors;  and 
 
• Article 3.8  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not 
take the special care prescribed when cons idering and deciding on the application of 
anti-dumping measures in cases where there is a threat of material injury. 
  Article 5  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in particular but not exclusively: 
 
• Article 5.2  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the application referred to in 
Article 5.1 of the AD did not include evidence of:  (a) dumping;  (b) injury within the 
meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement;  and (c) a causal link between th e dumped imports and the alleged injury;  
the application for initiation submitted was based on simple assertion, unsubstantiated 
by relevant evidence;  and, lastly, because the application did not contain all information reasonably available to the a pplicant in accordance with the indicative 
list in Article 5.2 itself; 
 
• Article 5.3  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not 
examine the accuracy and ade quacy of the evidence provided in the application to 
determine whether there was sufficient ev idence to justify the initiation of an 
investigation; 
 
• Article 5.3  and Article 5.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean 
authorities, when determining that the appli cation had been made by or on behalf of 
the domestic industry, did not examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence 
provided, and did not base themselves on an examination of the level of support for or opposition to the application expressed by domestic producers of the like product;  and 
 
• Article 5.8  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not 
satisfy themselves that there was not suffi cient evidence of either dumping or of 
injury to justify pro ceeding with the case and, therefore,  did not reject the application 
submitted pursuant to Article 5.1 of the AD, promptly terminating the investigation. 
 
 Article 6 and Annex II  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in particular but not exclusively: 
 
• Article 6.1, Article 6.1.3 and Article 6.2  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because 
the Chilean authorities failed to give all in terested parties notice of the information 
required and ample opportunity to present in writing all relevant evidence;  they did not provide the full text of the applicati on for initiation of an investigation to known 
exporters;  and did not give all interested parties full opportunity for the defence of 
their interests; 
  WT/DS393/1 
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  • Article 6.6  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not 
satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of th e information supplied by the applicants 
before basing their findings on it; 
 
• Article 6.8 and Annex II  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean 
authorities made preliminary and final determinations on the basis of the facts available without giving all exporters or producers of wheat flour in Argentina an opportunity to submit the necessary inform ation or provide it within a reasonable 
period;  and because, when interpreting paragraph 8 of Article 6 of the AD , the 
provisions of Annex II to the aforementi oned Agreement were not observed;  and 
 
• Article 6.10  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not 
determine the individual margin of dumpi ng for each known exporter of wheat flour 
investigated;  as the number of exporters and producers was not so large as to make such a determination impracticable, the authorities should not have limited their 
examination to certain interested parties. 
 
 Article 7  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in particular but not exclusively: 
 
• Article 7.1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, b ecause when applying the provisional 
measure on imports of wheat flour from Argentina:  (i) this was not done pursuant to an investigation initiated in accordance with  the provisions of Article 5, no notice was 
given to all interested parties and they  were not given adequate opportunities to 
submit information and make comments;  ( ii) a reasoned preliminary determination 
was not made, on the basis of positive evidence and an objective and unbiased evaluation of all relevant evidence, of dumping and consequent injury to a domestic industry;  and (iii) it was incorrectly judge d that the provisional measure applied for 
this purpose was necessary to prevent injury  being caused during the investigation;  
and 
 
• Article 7.5  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not 
follow the relevant provisions of Article 9, as required by this provision. 
  Article 9  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in particular but not exclusively: 
 
• Article 9.2  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, b ecause the Chilean authorities imposed 
an anti-dumping duty on imports of wheat flour from Argentina without collecting this duty in the appropriate amount;  and they named the country supplying the product, Argentina, even though it was not impracticable to name the supplier or suppliers involved;  and 
 
• Article 9.3  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement,  because the Chilean authorities 
exceeded the margin of dumping by not observing the provisions of Article 2. 
  Article 12  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, in particular but not exclusively: 
 
• Article 12.1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the Chilean authorities did not 
satisfy themselves of the existence of suffici ent evidence to justify the initiation of an 
anti-dumping investigation, pursuant to Article  5 of the AD;  and because they did not 
notify all interested parties; WT/DS393/1 
G/L/887 G/ADP/D78/1 
Page 6 
  
   
• Article 12.1.1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the public notices of 
initiation of the investigation did not contai n, nor otherwise make available through a 
separate report, adequate information according to the list in Article 12.1.1 itself; 
 
• Article 12.2  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the public notices of the 
preliminary and final determin ations did not set forth, or otherwise make available 
through a separate report, in sufficient detail, the findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law by the Chilean authorities;  and 
 
• Article 12.2.1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the public notices of the 
imposition of provisional measures did not set  forth, or otherwise make available 
through a separate report, sufficiently de tailed explanations for the preliminary 
determinations on dumping and injury;  and because these notices or reports did not contain the information prescribed in the list in Article 12.2.1. 
 
 Article 18  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement: 
 
• Article 18.1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, be cause the Chilean authorities took 
specific action against the alleged dumping of imports of wheat flour from Argentina in a manner inconsistent with GATT 1994 a nd with the Anti-Dumping Agreement;  
and 
 
• Article 18.3  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, because the provisions of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement were not applied to  this investigation, which was initiated 
pursuant to an application made after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement for Chile. 
 
2. Chilean legislation applicable  to anti-dumping procedures 
 In addition to the investigation and the speci fic measures outlined above , Argentina wishes to 
extend its consultations in respect of the following provisions of Law No. 18.525
10, whose text was 
revised, coordinated and consolidated by th e Decree having Force of Law No. 31 of 200511, ("Law 
No. 18.525"), and the Supreme Decree of the Ministry of Finance No. 575, published in the Official Bulletin of the Republic of Chile of 20 August 19 93 ("Decree No. 575").  These provisions appear to 
be inconsistent with Chile's obligations pursu ant to the Anti-Dumping Agreement, GATT 1994 and 
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization  ("WTO Agreement"). 
 
(i) The competence of the Chilean authorities for the imposition of anti-dumping duties 
 It appears that the following conclusions can be drawn from Articles 8 and 9 of Law 
No. 18.525 and Articles 1 and 16 of Decree No. 575:  (a) regarding the application of anti-dumping 
measures, Chilean legislation does not lay down an y time-limits for the final decision, leaving the 
interested parties during an investigation in a situ ation of uncertainty regarding it;  and (b) in their 
final decision on the application of anti-dumping measures, the Chilean authorities do not appear to be obliged to base their conclusions on the factual or legal background.  
                                                     
 
10 Published in the Official Journal of 30 June 1986. 
11 Published in the Official Bulletin of the Republic of Chile of 22 April 2005.  WT/DS393/1 
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   In particular, but not exclusively, these pr ovisions appear to be inconsistent with: 
 
• Article 1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members to apply 
anti-dumping measures only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of 
GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations  initiated and conducted in accordance 
with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; 
 
• Article 6.14  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members to proceed 
expeditiously in reaching preliminary or fi nal determinations, whether affirmative or 
negative, and to apply provisional or fina l measures in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; 
 
• Article 5.10  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which provides that investigations 
shall be concluded within one year, and in no case more than 18 months, after their 
initiation; 
 
• Article 18.1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members not to take 
specific action against dumping of exports from another Member except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement; 
 
• Article 18.3  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which states that the provisions of the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement shall apply to investig ations initiated on or after the date of 
entry into force for a Memb er of the WTO Agreement; 
 
• Article 18.4  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires each Member to take 
all necessary steps, of a general or particul ar character, to ensure, no later than the 
date of entry into force of the WTO Agre ement for it, the conformity of its laws, 
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement;  and 
 
• Paragraph 4 of Article XVI  of the WTO Agreement, which requires each Member 
to ensure the conformity of its laws, regul ations and administrative procedures with 
its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements. 
 
(ii) The definition of dumping and the grounds for imposing anti-dumping duties 
 It appears that the following conclusions can be drawn from Article 8 of Law No. 18.525 and 
the second and third paragraphs of Article 1 of Decree No. 575:  (a) the definition of dumping 
provided in Chilean legislation is  not consistent with the provisi ons of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
and GATT 1994, and the grounds for imposing an an ti-dumping duty include an extremely broad and 
imprecise range of possibilities, going beyond the grounds for imposition of duties prescribed by 
GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
  In particular, but not exclusively, these pr ovisions appear to be inconsistent with: 
 
• Article 1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members to apply 
anti-dumping measures only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of 
GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations  initiated and conducted in accordance 
with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; WT/DS393/1 
G/L/887 G/ADP/D78/1 
Page 8 
  
   
• Article 2.1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which provides that a product is to be 
considered as being dumped, i.e. introduced  into the commerce of another country at 
less than its normal value, if the export  price of the product exported from one 
country to another is less than the comparable  price, in the ordinary course of trade, 
for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country; 
 
• Article 18.1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members not to take 
specific action against dumping of exports from another Member except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement; 
 
• Article 18.3  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which provides that the provisions of 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement shall apply to investigations initiated on or after the 
date of entry into force for the Me mber concerned of the WTO Agreement; 
 
• Article 18.4  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires each Member to take 
all necessary steps, of a general or particular  character, to ensure, not later than the 
date of entry into force of the WTO Agre ement for it, the conformity of its laws, 
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement;  and 
 
• Paragraph 4 of Article XVI  of the WTO Agreement, which requires each Member 
to ensure the conformity of its laws, regul ations and administrative procedures with 
its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements. 
 
(iii) Who may initiate anti-dumping procedures 
 It appears that the following conclusions can  be drawn from Article 10 of Decree No. 575:  
(a) investigations intended to determine the existe nce, degree and effect of the alleged dumping may 
be initiated at the request of parties other than those authorized by the Anti-Dumping Agreement and 
without their having the necessary level of support fr om domestic producers of the like product that 
would allow the authority to conclude that the appl ication is considered to have been made by the 
domestic industry or on its behalf;  and (b) that the requirements laid down in Article 10 of Decree 
No. 575 concerning the admissibility of applicati ons for initiation are not consistent with the 
requirements laid down in Article 5.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
  In particular, but not exclusively, this provision appears to be inconsistent with: 
 
• Article 1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members to apply 
anti-dumping measures only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of 
GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations  initiated and conducted in accordance 
with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; 
 
• Article 5.1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires that investigations to 
determine the existence, degree and effect of any alleged dumping shall be initiated 
upon a written application by or on behalf  of the domestic industry, except as 
provided for in paragraph 6 of Article 5; 
  WT/DS393/1 
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  • Article 5.2  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, wh ich requires that the application 
contain such information as is reasonably ava ilable to the applicant on the points in 
the indicative list mentioned in this provision; 
 
• Article 5.4  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, wh ich requires that the application 
should have the necessary degree of support from domestic producers of the like product to enable the authority to determine that it is considered to have been made 
by the domestic industry or on its behalf; 
 
• Article 18.1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members not to take 
specific action against dumping of exports from another Member except in 
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement; 
 
• Article 18.3 , which provides that the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
shall apply to investigations initiated on or after the date of entry into force for the 
Member concerned of the WTO Agreement; 
 
• Article 18.4  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires each Member to take 
all necessary steps, of a general or particular  character, to ensure, not later than the 
date of entry into force of the WTO Agre ement for it, the conformity of its laws, 
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement; 
 
• Paragraph 4 of Article XVI  of the WTO Agreement, which requires each Member 
to ensure the conformity of its laws, regul ations and administrative procedures with 
its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements. 
 
(iv) Provisional measures 
1. It appears that the following conclusions can  be drawn from Article 22 of Decree No. 575:  
(a) if the Commission determines that there is no du mping in the price of the goods investigated or 
there is no injury or threat of material injury to  the domestic industry, the Commission is not obliged 
to request the President of the Republic that the provisional measures imposed be revoked;  (b) there 
is no provision whatsoever obliging the President , at the Commission's request, to revoke the 
provisional measures in the circumstances referred to in the preceding sentence;  (c) there is no 
provision whatsoever obliging the President, under the circumstances described in sentence (a) in this 
paragraph, to revoke the provisional measures immediately.   In particular, but not exclusively, this provision appears to be inconsistent with: 
 
• Article 1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members to apply 
anti-dumping measures only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance 
with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; 
 
• Article 7.1(ii) , which provides that provisional measures may be applied only if a 
preliminary affirmative determination has been made of dumping and consequent 
injury to the domestic industry; 
 WT/DS393/1 
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  • Article 18.1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members not to take 
specific action against dumping of exports from another Member except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement; 
 
• Article 18.3 , which provides that the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
shall apply to investigations initiated on or after the date of entry into force for the 
Member concerned of the WTO Agreement; 
 
• Article 18.4  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires each Member to take 
all necessary steps, of a general or particular  character, to ensure, not later than the 
date of entry into force of the WTO Agre ement for it, the conformity of its laws, 
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement; 
 
• Paragraph 4 of Article XVI  of the WTO Agreement, which requires each Member 
to ensure the conformity of its laws, regul ations and administrative procedures with 
its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements. 
 2. It appears that the following conclusions can  be drawn from Articles 16, 19 and 20 of Decree 
No. 575:  (a) the Chilean implementing authority is empowered to impose provisional measures even 
before the expiry of 60 days following the date of initiation of the investigation;  and (b) provisional 
duties may be applied for a period exceeding that laid down in Article 7.4 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement inasmuch as the provisional measures may be applied up until the date on which the final 
decision is taken and the investigating authority is not limited to any period of time during which it 
has to take this decision.   In particular, but not exclusively, these pr ovisions appear to be inconsistent with: 
 
• Article 1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members to apply 
anti-dumping measures only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance 
with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; 
 
• Article 7.3  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which determines that provisional 
measures shall not be applied sooner than 60 days from the date of initiation of the 
investigation; 
 
• Article 7.4  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires that provisional 
measures shall be applied for as short a period as possible, not exceeding four months or, on decision of the comp etent authority and upon request  by exporters representing 
a significant percentage of the trade involv ed, for a period not exceeding six months.  
When the authorities, in the course of an investigation, examine whether a duty lower 
than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury, these periods may be six and nine months respectively; 
 
• Article 18.1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members not to take 
specific action against dumping of exports from another Member except in 
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement;  WT/DS393/1 
 G/L/887 
 G/ADP/D78/1 
 Page 11 
  
   
• Article 18.3 , which provides that the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
shall apply to investigations initiated on or after the date of entry into force for the 
Member concerned of the WTO Agreement; 
 
• Article 18.4  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires each Member to take 
all necessary steps, of a general or particular  character, to ensure, not later than the 
date of entry into force of the WTO Agre ement for it, the conformity of its laws, 
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement; 
 
• Paragraph 4 of Article XVI  of the WTO Agreement, which requires each Member 
to ensure the conformity of its laws, regul ations and administrative procedures with 
its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements. 
 3. It appears from Articles 19 and 21 of Decree No. 575 that the Chilean implementing authority 
would be empowered to impose provisional duties w ithout having initiated an investigation pursuant 
to the provisions of Article 5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and without havi ng given all interested 
parties adequate opportunities to subm it information and make comments. 
  In particular, but not exclusively, these pr ovisions appear to be inconsistent with: 
 
• Article 1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members to apply 
anti-dumping measures only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations  initiated and conducted in accordance 
with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; 
 
• Article 7.1(i)  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which provides that provisional 
measures may be applied only if an inves tigation has been initiated in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 5 and inter ested parties have been given adequate 
opportunities to submit information and make comments; 
 
• Article 18.1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members not to take 
specific action against dumping of exports from another Member except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement; 
 
• Article 18.3 , which provides that the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
shall apply to investigations initiated on or after the date of entry into force for the 
Member concerned of the WTO Agreement; 
 
• Article 18.4  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires each Member to take 
all necessary steps, of a general or particular  character, to ensure, not later than the 
date of entry into force of the WTO Agre ement for it, the conformity of its laws, 
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement; 
 
• Paragraph 4 of Article XVI  of the WTO Agreement, which requires each Member 
to ensure the conformity of its laws, regul ations and administrative procedures with 
its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements. WT/DS393/1 
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Page 12 
  
   
(v) Absence of a judicial review mechanism 
 An examination of Law No. 18.525 and Decree No. 575 leads to the conclusion that there are 
no provisions for internal mechanisms to review  administrative measures relating to administrative 
determinations or examinations in respect of  anti-dumping through a judicial, arbitral or 
administrative body that is independent of the au thority making the determination or conducting the 
examination.  
 The absence of an independent review pr ocedure, in the sense described, could be 
inconsistent, in particular, but not exclusively, with the following rules:  
• Article 1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members to apply 
anti-dumping measures only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations  initiated and conducted in accordance 
with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; 
 
• Article 13  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires each Member, whose 
national legislation contains provision s on anti-dumping measures, to maintain 
judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia , 
of the prompt review of administrative ac tions relating to final determinations and 
reviews of determinations within the meani ng of Article 11;  it being understood that 
such tribunals or procedures shall be inde pendent of the authorities responsible for 
the determination or review in question; 
 
• Article 18.1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members not to take 
specific action against dumping of exports from another Member except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement; 
 
• Article 18.3 , which provides that the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
shall apply to investigations initiated on or after the date of entry into force for the 
Member concerned of the WTO Agreement; 
 
• Article 18.4  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires each Member to take 
all necessary steps, of a general or particular  character, to ensure, not later than the 
date of entry into force of the WTO Agre ement for it, the conformity of its laws, 
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement; 
 
• Paragraph 4 of Article XVI  of the WTO Agreement, which requires each Member 
to ensure the conformity of its laws, regul ations and administrative procedures with 
its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements. 
 
(vi) Failure to adapt Chile's anti-dumping regulations  subsequent to the entry into force of the 
WTO Agreements 
 From the analysis of the inconsistencies in Chile's regulations described above and the fact 
that Decree No. 575 of 1993 precedes the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement for Chile, 
the following may be concluded:  (a) that Chile di d not adopt the necessary measures to ensure that its  WT/DS393/1 
 G/L/887 
 G/ADP/D78/1 
 Page 13 
  
  anti-dumping regulations are consistent with the provisions of GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement;  and, consequently, (b) that the provisi ons of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as a whole, 
do not apply to the investigations and reviews of existing measures. 
 
 In particular, but not exclusively, th ese provisions appear inconsistent with: 
 
• Article 1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members to apply 
anti-dumping measures only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations  initiated and conducted in accordance 
with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement; 
 
• Article 18.1  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires Members not to take 
specific action against dumping of exports from another Member except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement; 
 
• Article 18.3 , which provides that the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
shall apply to investigations initiated on or after the date of entry into force for the 
Member concerned of the WTO Agreement; 
 
• Article 18.4  of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which requires each Member to take 
all necessary steps, of a general or particular  character, to ensure, not later than the 
date of entry into force of the WTO Agre ement for it, the conformity of its laws, 
regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement; 
 
• Paragraph 4 of Article XVI  of the WTO Agreement, which requires each Member 
to ensure the conformity of its laws, regul ations and administrative procedures with 
its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements. 
 
 Chile's measures identified in this request also appear to nullify or impair benefits accruing to 
Argentina directly or indirec tly under the cited Agreements. 
  For each of the measures referred to above, this request also covers any amendments, 
replacements, extensions, implementing measures or other related measures. 
  The Government of Argentina reserves its right  to raise additional factual claims and legal 
matters during the course of consultations.  We l ook forward to receiving your reply to the present 
request and to fixing a mutually conve nient date and place for consultations. 
 
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