WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  WT/TPR/M/235 
1 November 2010 
 (10-5754) 
Trade Policy Review Body 
29 September and 1 October 2010  
 
 
 
TRADE POLICY REVIEW 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
Record of the Meeting  
 
Chairperson:  H.E. Mr. Bozkurt Aran (Turkey) 
 
  Page 
 
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 3 
II. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE REPRESEN TATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES  5 
III. STATEMENT BY THE DISCUSSANT 9 
IV. STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS 13 V. REPLIES BY THE REPRESENTATI VE OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
 ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 66 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 75 
 
 
  
Note:   Advance written questions by WTO Member s and the replies provided by the United States 
are reproduced in document WT/TPR/M/235/Add.1 and will be available online at:  
http://www.wto.org/english/tr atop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm.    WT/TPR/M/235 
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  I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 
1. The tenth Trade Policy Review of the United States was held on 29 September and 1 October 
2010.  The Chairperson H.E. Mr. Bozkurt Aran (T urkey) welcomed the delegation of the United 
States, headed by H.E. Mr. Michael W. Punke , and the discussant, H.E. Mrs. Hiswani Harun 
(Malaysia).   
2. The Chairperson recalled the purpose of the Trad e Policy Reviews and the main elements of 
the procedures for the meeting.  The report by the United States was contained in document 
WT/TPR/G/235 and that of the WTO Secretariat in WT/TPR/S/235. 
3. Questions by the following delegations had been  submitted in writing at least two weeks in 
advance and had been transmitted to the delegation of  the United States:  India, Guatemala, Brazil, 
Mexico, China, El Salvador, Australia, the Republic  of Korea, New Zealand, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Ecuador, ASEAN, Singapore, Norway, Colombia, Cost a Rica, Peru, Japan, Argentina, Pakistan, the 
EU, Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong, China, Canada, Chile, the Dominican Republic, and 
Chinese Taipei.  
4. The following delegations submitted written questio ns after the two-week deadline:  Egypt, 
Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago.   
5. The Chairperson noted that the report by th e United States reminded us that WTO Members 
shared a common purpose:  to expand economic opportunities for the world's citizens by reducing trade barriers.  The United States economy was the la rgest in the world and its trade policies could 
create opportunities or impose restrictions that had a major impact on other countries.  As noted in the 
Secretariat report, the U.S. trade and investment regime was among the most open in the world, and 
had remained so throughout the period under re view despite one of the most severe economic 
recessions in U.S. history.  This openness  to trade was surely to be welcomed. 
6. Of course, as the Secretariat report also made clear, not everything was perfect and Members 
had posed many questions across all areas of th e report concerning issues such as the use of 
contingency measures, domestic preferences in go vernment procurement, and assistance to the 
agricultural and financial sectors.   
7. Like Members, he was particularly pleased that the United States had used the occasion of its 
tenth Trade Policy Review to reaffirm its commitment to the multilateral trading system.  In his view, the strong commitment shown by the United States and other Members to the principles of this 
Organization helped forestall a worldwide slid e into protectionism during challenging economic 
times.  In this regard, he welcome the statement by  the United States that the fundamental features of 
U.S. trade policy remained unchanged despite new challenges presented by a dynamic, global 
economy. 
8. In 2009, President Obama set a goal of doubling U. S. exports in the subsequent five years to 
support job creation in the United States.  As not ed in the report by the United States, the new 
National Export Initiative was part of the Administration's focus on spurring economic growth and 
putting Americans back to work.  Furthermore, the Administration intended to make enforcement of 
trade agreements a centrepiece of U.S. trade policy.  He noted that Members would be interested in 
learning more about the specific progra mmes encompassed by these two initiatives. WT/TPR/M/235 
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  9. The U.S. report stated that "the United States needs open markets around the world to 
withstand protectionist pressures at home and to sust ain the economic arguments at the core of [its] 
more than sixty-year old, bipartisan, open trade po licy".  He firmly believed that WTO Members were 
keenly aware of this reality.  By the same token, he believed that Members would like to gain a better 
sense of the extent to which the United States views as a policy priority the continued liberalization of 
its trade regime within the context of the DDA.   Increased openness in the United States would 
reaffirm the U.S. leadership role that had b een so crucial in advancing the objectives of the 
multilateral trading system, while concluding the DDA would also enhance market access security for 
U.S. and other exporters.  WT/TPR/M/235 
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  II. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE REPRESEN TATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES 
10. Because the United States continues to place a high value on the trade policy review process, 
my delegation has been working tirelessly to answer  the multitude of questions – more than 1,200 – 
that Members have put before us.  For Members that  gave us their questions two weeks ago, we have 
provided responses to all of your questions.  We have also included responses for those Members who 
missed the two-week deadline by one or two days and where we were able to do so.  We provided 
these responses to the Secretariat last night. We ar e continuing our hard work on all the remaining 
questions. 
11. U.S. trade policy and the U.S. Government’s tr ade policy priorities are no secret to this Body 
or to the world.  The United States has been repor ting U.S. trade policy priorities and activities to the 
American people for the past 55 years.  Each year, in accordance with U.S. law, the President's Trade 
Policy Agenda and the Annual Report of the President  of the United States on the Trade Agreements 
Program are submitted to the Congress and made ava ilable to the public.  The United States produces 
and publishes reports, studies, testimonies, deci sions, and regulatory and legislative notices on an 
ongoing basis to inform our citizens - and any other in terested party - about th e issues and rules that 
inform decision-making in the trade arena.  We ar e - by national practice and by law - a government 
founded on transparency, and we are becoming ev en more so.  The Obama Administration is 
committed to greater transparency in trade policy and we are using 21st century technology to fulfill 
this commitment.  This has improved the informati on available to the public about trade policy, while 
also inviting a broader range of stakeholder participation. 
12. Since the last U.S. Trade Policy Review, the world has faced the most severe recession in 
over half a century.  Despite this downturn, the United States market remains open for business.  The 
U.S. Government response to the recent crisis has be en informed by a keen aw areness of the mistakes 
of the 1930s, and a determination not to repeat th em.  We have maintained our firm commitment to 
international trade obligations and assiduously avoi ded trade restrictive reactions that, as we know 
from experience, would only have compounded the cr isis.  We recognize the constructive role the 
WTO has played in fostering a collective effort, across the memb ership, to avoid recourse to 
protectionism.  The past two years have thus rein forced my country’s conviction that the WTO is 
critical to advancing U.S. interests in a strong,  multilateral trading system, to restoring global 
economic and employment growth, a nd to expanding economic opportunity and the rule of law.  More 
broadly, we have worked with other major ec onomies through such groups as the G20 to stop the 
crisis as quickly as possible and to restart growth across the globe.  We took actions – fiscal, 
monetary, and financial – aimed at preventing a slid e into full-fledged depression.  Such a slide would 
have been a disastrous occurrence for the world – and for world trade.  In addition, we have taken a 
number of steps to attack the root causes of the cr isis including a landmark financial regulation bill 
passed this summer. 
13. In 2008, the WTO Secretariat concluded that reducing the U.S. current account deficit 
required expanding U.S. exports, "which would be facilitated by a more liberal trading system and 
stronger demand growth outside the United States."  We agreed with the Secretariat’s conclusion in 
2008, and we agree with it today.  President Obam a’s National Export Initiative, with its objective of 
doubling U.S. exports in the next fi ve years, is tangible evidence of my country’s conviction that trade 
– both imports and exports – continues to provide vital avenues for economic growth and recovery. 
14. As of 2008, exports supported over 10 million jobs in the United States, including more than 
one in four in the manufacturing sector.  Today, expo rts account for more than one in every 10 dollars 
of U.S. income.  Imports from U.S. trade partners have also helped to expand our purchasing power, 
to widen choices for American consumers, and to pr ovide valuable inputs into U.S. production.  As 
we all understand, trade need not be a zero-sum ga me.  If we all open our markets and play by the WT/TPR/M/235 
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  rules, trade gains to one country come, not at the expense of others, but in conjunction with the gains 
of others.  
15. I will turn now to the U.S. trade policy environment and review the key themes.  
Openness of the U.S. Market  
16. The World Bank confirms that the United Stat es is one of the most open economies in the 
world.  IMF data also show that 76 countries have  the United States as their first, second or third 
largest export market.  For 67 of these countries, the United States ranked either first or second.  According to the WTO, the current U.S. simple av erage tariff is 3.5% on a legally bound basis, and 
there is virtually no difference between the tariff rates we have bound at the WTO and the applied 
duties we charge at the border.  When the Generalized System of Preference (GSP) program and other 
tariff preference programs are taken into account, the U.S. trade-weighted average tariff is under 1.4% 
on an applied basis.  In 2009, 70% of all U.S. imports (including under preference programs) entered 
the United States duty free.  U.S. services markets are open to foreign providers and U.S. regulatory 
processes are transparent and accessible to both domestic and international stakeholders. 
17. Our commitment to open trade notwithstanding, U.S. and global trade contracted sharply 
beginning in mid-2008, with recovery beginning in the third quarter of 2009.  As a result of the 
extraordinary measures that were taken, nationally and internationally, to combat the downturn, U.S. 
real GDP rose 3.0%, on an annual basis, between  the second quarter of 2009 and the second quarter of 
2010.  Personal consumption increased  1.7%, and non-residential fixe d investment increased 5.3% 
(both on an annualized basis).  U.S. exports of goods and services increased 14.1% between the 
second quarter of 2009 and the second quarter of 2010,  while U.S. imports of goods and services rose 
17.2%. 
18. Sustainable economic growth implies a more balanced distribution of global demand than 
existed before the crisis.  During the crisis, the U.S. current account deficit moved from 6%, as a share 
of GDP, to under 3%.  Going forward, it is unlikel y that the U.S. will resume its outsized share of 
world demand, which will require concomitant adjustment from the large current account surplus 
countries. 
Support and Strengthen the Rules-Based Trading System 
19. In a time of global economic challenge, the United States reaffirms its commitment to the 
rules-based trading system anchored in the WTO.   And let there be no doubt – the United States 
continues to regard the Doha negotiations as a uni que opportunity not only to solidify the foundations 
of our multilateral system, but to lay the basis fo r future prosperity around the world by expanding 
market access in a way that will benefit all countri es – developed and develo ping alike.  President 
Obama has emphasized that the United States is "wor king toward an ambitious and balanced Doha 
agreement –not any agreement, but an agreement that will open up markets and increase exports 
around the world."  He sent a clear signal at the To ronto G-20 that what is on the table is not enough 
and that emerging markets, in particular, bear a special responsibility to provide greater market 
access, not just for the United States, but also fo r the world’s poorest countries.  The world has 
changed since 2001, and the market access on the ta ble in each of the core negotiating areas of 
agriculture, industrial goods, and services, needs to reflect contributions from all key players that are 
commensurate with their position of leadership in th e global economy.  We stand ready to do our part. 
Enforce U.S. Rights in the Rules-Based System 
20. As we continue to commit ourselves to amb itious and balanced results in Doha, the 
enforcement of U.S. rights in the rules-based system is also a tr ade policy priority for the Obama  WT/TPR/M/235 
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  Administration.  The American people expect th eir government to uphold the terms of negotiated 
agreements and, in 2009, the Obama Administratio n responded to their call for more vigilant trade 
enforcement.  Our efforts begin with frank negotia tions and continue with  additional tools where 
needed and appropriate.  For instance, this year we introduced two separate reports that will help us to 
identify and to address technical barriers to trade a nd sanitary and phytosanitary barriers.  As tariff 
barriers fall, non-tariff barriers are becoming some of  the most difficult challenges our exporters face. 
21. We continue to place great value on the existen ce of this institution’s rules and procedures for 
dispute settlement.  While we welcome rapid and pr agmatic resolution of trade disputes on the basis 
of dialogue and negotiation, the United States ha s not hesitated to pursue legal remedies when 
necessary.  The system is stronger and we are be tter trading partners as a result.  In asserting our 
rights, and in taking care to abide by our own oblig ations, we believe that we help strengthen the 
WTO’s institutional credibility. 
Bilateral and Regional Developments 
22. The United States continues to hold firmly to th e view that our commitment to the multilateral 
system is strongly complemented by the existen ce of sound, comprehensiv e bilateral and regional 
agreements.  Our agreements include high standa rds and strive for ambitious and comprehensive 
outcomes.  In conformity with our obligations, we  faithfully notify our Free Trade Agreements to the 
WTO and welcome a full discussion of their provisions.   Last year, we pledged to seek paths forward 
on approving and putting into effect three pe nding FTAs, and to build on important existing 
agreements to better achieve our goals of  creating more jobs and higher growth. 
23. I am pleased to report that we are making pr ogress on these objectives.  With respect to the 
United States-Korea FTA, President Obama announced in  June that he was launching an initiative to 
resolve outstanding issues by the November G20 summ it meeting in Seoul.  He also indicated his 
intent – if the outstanding issues have been re solved – to submit the legislation approving and 
implementing the Agreement to Congress in the months following the summit.  President Obama has also announced his commitment to move forward w ith the Colombia and Panama trade promotion 
agreements as soon as possible. 
24. With regard to new initiatives, the United States has begun negot iations of a regional, Asia-
Pacific trade agreement, known as the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership (TPP) Agre ement, with Australia, 
Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vi et Nam.  With this initial group of like-minded 
countries, the United States is negotiating a high-standard, 21
st century regional agreement. 
U.S. Initiatives to Foster Development 
25. The developmental dimensions of trade conti nue to gain importance in the United States’ 
overall approach to trade policy.  This Admini stration supports expandi ng trade opportunities to 
stimulate market-led growth in the poorer countries  of the world and to lift their national income 
levels.  Much can be done through the WTO.  Firs t and foremost we can do better in using the Doha 
negotiations to open those markets that present the greatest opportunities for new growth in the 
decades to come.  The United States also stands by our Hong Kong commitment to provide duty-free 
and quota-free market access to least-develope d countries as part of the implementation of a 
successful conclusion to the Doha Round.  In July , US Trade Representative Ron Kirk announced that 
the United States will contribute US$1.05 milli on to the WTO Global Trust Fund, building on 
previous such commitments.  This is only one part  of our much larger commitment to trade capacity 
building assistance, to which the United States has contributed US$12 billion since 1999.  In this 
connection, the United States will continue support for the Enhanced Integr ated Framework through 
bilateral trade capacity building assistance and on-th e-ground presence in LDCs.  We will work with WT/TPR/M/235 
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  developing countries to help prioritize trade in th eir development plans, particularly in critical 
undertakings such as food security. 
26. We also will champion the WTO’s important work on trade facilitation, which holds such 
promise for developing country members of th is body.  Simplifying and modernizing customs 
procedures enhances trading opportunities, improves th e investment climate, and helps better integrate 
developing countries, particularly least deve loped countries, into global supply networks. 
27. Integral to the U.S. goal of accelerating grow th and economic reform in the developing world 
and most importantly in its poorest regions are th e four U.S. preference programs - the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP), the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI), and the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA).  Through these programs, eligible 
products from 131 beneficiary develo ping countries enter the United States duty-free.  We will 
continue to work with the Congress and other st akeholders to implement and to improve these 
programs, and to better focus benefits on the poores t countries.  We also will continue to provide 
trade-related technical assistance for these programs.   In the world’s poorest countries, ranging from 
Haiti to Sub-saharan Africa, we will continue to make special efforts to link trade and economic 
opportunity for countries that have been ravaged by disaster or violence.  
Conclusion 
28. In conclusion, the United States is proud to say that in 2010 we remain among the most open 
and transparent economies in the world, even in the face of challenges and economic stresses brought 
to bear by global financial turmoil.  Through a ve ry rough two years since our last review, we have 
remained committed to the rules-based trading syst em.  We know without any doubt that the existence 
of this institution, its rules, and its collegial deliber ations have helped us, a nd all Members, to weather 
the storm. 
29. The knowledge of the good the WTO has accomplis hed in the recent past accounts in large 
measure for our determination to continue pushing for the best and most ambitious possible outcome 
in the Doha negotiation that has dominated the work of this institution for the past nine years.  We 
know that we can achieve tremendous benefits, fo r all Members, if we keep our focus on the 
fundamental truth of this Organization – market a ccess counts.  Open markets promote growth, raise 
living standards, and help individuals at all levels in all societies to realize dreams for themselves and 
for their families. 
30. If we lose sight of this truth, if we settle for less, if we fail to respond to our individual and 
collective responsibilities as Members of  this institution - we will do ourselves and future generations 
a significant disservice.  By contrast, if we work toge ther to arrive at a Doha outcome that reflects the 
global economy as it exists today, and as it will be over the next generation, we will have succeeded 
in achieving an enormous global benefit.  The Doha  negotiation is a once in a generation opportunity 
that we cannot afford to squander. 
31. We understand that the United States plays an importa nt leadership role in this Organization.  
And with leadership comes responsibility – includi ng to engage productively and honestly in the 
review that is taking place this week.   WT/TPR/M/235 
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  III. STATEMENT BY THE DISCUSSANT (H.E. MRS. HISWANI HARUN (MALAYSIA)) 
32. It is indeed an honour and a challenge to be  a discussant for the U.S. Trade Policy Review. 
An honour because this is a Review of the world’ s biggest economy, an economy whose policies and 
priorities would, like it or not, have varying degrees of impact on the rest of us. 
33. It is a challenge because this Review is ta king place at a time when the United States 
economy is experiencing one of the most critical a nd tumultuous time in its financial and economic 
history.  This contraction in external trade and reduced domestic consumption in the U.S. had 
dramatic consequences on the e xport dependent economies, incl uding the Asian economies like 
Malaysia, where the U.S. has been and still is th eir traditional major export market, and where as a 
result of the contraction saw their export earnings  plummeting to unprecedented low levels since the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. 
34. I will present my views and comments on a range  of issues, which I hope, would encourage 
and provoke a meaningful and lively discussion am ong you, and a better understanding of the policies 
and measures under review.  My intervention will t hus be structured under three broad topics:  the 
macroeconomic environment, trade policy regime and sectoral policies. 
Macroeconomic environment 
35. The period under review coincided with a new er a in U.S. politics with the election of a new 
President who is immediately confronted with the daunting task of bringing America back to 
economic and financial stability, and as stated in th e U.S. Government Report, has resolved to reject 
protectionism and continue to reaffirm the Ad ministration’s commitment to international trade 
obligations.  This is indeed heartening to note, a nd we laud the efforts of the U.S. Administration in 
keeping protectionist tendencies at bay, however, we  hope that despite the difficult times, the U.S. 
would continue to refrain from implementing inwa rd looking policies and other measures that could 
manifest into self-serving outcomes that would eventually do more harm than good to their trading partners and thus have a spiral e ffect on the global economy as a whole. 
36. It is also welcoming to note the Secretariat’ s observation that an economic recovery has been 
under way since the second half of 2009, where real GDP  increased at 2.1% and 5.6% in the last two 
quarters of 2009 and 3% in the first quarter of 2010.   
37. The National Bureau of Economic Research rece ntly issued a report that the recession had 
officially ended in June 2009, which, at 18 mont hs is the longest U.S. recession since the Great 
Depression. However, as we know, although there ar e flickers of light glimmering through the leaves, 
many would agree that the economy is still not out of  the woods yet, and recovery would be slow and 
painful. 
38. In fact, President Obama, while acknowledging th e latest report by the Bureau on the end date 
of the recession, remarked that: (I quote):  "E ven though economists may say that the recession 
officially ended last year, obviously for the millions  of people who are still out of work, people who 
have seen their home values decline,  people who are struggling to pay th eir bills day to day, it is still 
very real for them." 
39. News of the recovery, though slow, has genera ted much interest among U.S. trade partners 
whose economy and trade are very much interdependent and intertwined with the U.S. economy.  However, there are lingering downside risks which need to be addressed and as identified by the 
Secretariat, the recovery faces several challenges, which include:  the continued need for households 
to rebuild their wealth; the expected slow process of financial sector repa ir and deleveraging; and 
continued weakness in the labour market. The IMF,  in its World Economic Outlook report of 2010, WT/TPR/M/235 
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  also noted that despite the stimulus-led recove ry, private demand is still subdued and remains well 
below pre-crisis levels. 
40. On the fiscal front, although financial market strains have continued to ease, credit conditions 
remain on the tight side and it is speculated that with banks’ balance sheets  still not fully repaired 
from the crisis, and with losses mounting in certain sectors such as commercial real estate, financial 
conditions may remain a drag on growth, particul arly for small and medium-size enterprises that 
cannot access capital markets. 
41. This outlook frames the balancing act facing fiscal  policy – the need to support growth now 
and to secure fiscal stability over the medium te rm. Given the present weaknesses and risks in the 
labour and housing markets, it would be  interesting if the U.S. could shed some light on their plans to 
address these issues and whether this would involve support to the targeted sectors. However, given 
the size of the fiscal imbalances, a credible plan  for fiscal sustainability w ill need to accompany any 
such measures to limit the risk of rising long-term interest rates, which could further dampen growth. 
42. The Federal budget deficit is projected to be clo se to 11% of GDP in fiscal 2010.  At the same 
time, public debt is projected to reach almost 64% of GDP in 2010, while the Congressional Budget 
Office projects that the debt is "on a trajectory that poses significant economic risks and becomes 
unsustainable".  Thus, the medium term fiscal  outlook is daunting – indicating that significant 
additional adjustment would be needed to reduce th e budget deficit and bring public debt to a more 
sustainable path.  I believe Members would be inter ested to hear more of the Administration’s plans 
on addressing these concerns. 
43. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve has indicated pl ans on its exit strategy while signaling its 
commitment to withdrawing excess liquidity and normalizing monetary polic y gradually.  Given 
uncertainties in the economic outlook, high excess li quidity and remaining weaknesses in financial 
sector balance sheets, it would be useful to understa nd how the exit strategy would be implemented so 
as not to disrupt the fragility of the current financial and economic situation. 
44. The recent progress toward financial reform is welcome and it is hoped that it would 
contribute to restoring the financial sector to full health and address the gaps in regulation highlighted 
by the crisis.  The passage of the recent legislati on on financial reform showcased U.S.’s commitment 
to overhaul its own financial system. Considering th e relevance and importance of the legislation in 
relation to global economy and finance, can the U. S. therefore provide further insights on this, 
particularly on how the legislation would be able to contribute to current efforts in restoring the stability and credibility of the global financial order.  
Trade and Investment Policy regime 
45. The United States continue to maintain a larg ely transparent and open trading regime to 
support its growth and this is highly commendable considering the financial and economic difficulties 
that is facing the country presently. The average applie d MFN tariff for out of quota rates, at 4.8% is 
considered relatively low, however, as noted in the Se cretariat’s report, there is considerable variation 
within and between the HS Chapters and some tariff  peaks, particularly in agriculture, and this has 
raised concerns among some trading partners. 
46. An important policy instrument that was not part  of the U.S. 2011 Trade Policy Agenda is the 
trade promotion authority that expired in July 2007.  Considering the importance of this instrument in 
providing predictability to trade negotiations, it would be enlightening if we could be apprised of the 
Administration’s plans in getting the TP A to be considered in Congress.   WT/TPR/M/235 
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  47. Despite the absence of the TPA, the U.S. remains a strong supporter of the multilateral 
trading system.  According to the Government’s Report, the U.S. remains committed to the rules 
based system anchored by the WTO’s system of mu ltilateral trade rules and dispute settlement.  This 
is in consonant with the country’s active partic ipation in the DDA negotiations and this fact was 
further emphasized in one of the Obama Administration ’s most valuable export to Geneva recently, in 
the form of Ambassador Michael Punke.  The conti nued engagement and leadership of the U.S. is 
critical in steering the negotiations towards a su ccessful outcome. Thus, we hope, that the U.S. 
delegation under the leadership of Ambassador Punke, will continue to engage and contribute 
constructively to the current process here in Geneva. 
48. The United States’ active role in the multilateral trading system is also demonstrable in the 
number of dispute cases that it has participated in. The U.S. was a complainant in 94 DSU cases, and 
respondent in 109 cases, including 10 new cases. Ho wever, some concerns remain on the U.S. 
Administration’s implementation of the panel or Appellate Body rulings, therefore it would be 
meaningful for Members to hear of the difficulties faced by the U.S. and what their plans are to 
address these difficulties. 
49. Since the last Review, there have been a number  of new rulings or legislations implemented 
or in the process of undergoing Congressional approva l. Considering that many of these rulings or 
measures have a potential to directly impact the co mpetitiveness of U.S. trade partners, this Review 
provides a timely opportunity for Members to obtain clarification and understa nd how they would be 
impacted by them.  The new rulings/measures that ha ve generated much interest and some concerns 
include:  the 10+2 rule under the SAFE Port Act 2006;  new uniform rules of origin in customs 
legislation that relies primarily in tariff classi fication;  Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability 
Act being discussed in Congress;  government procur ement policies; certain provisions of the Buy 
American  Act; and the American Recovery a nd Reimbursement Act 2009;  and compatibility of 
measures adopted by states and sub-federal jurisdictions  to U.S. obligations under the WTO.  We look 
forward to the U.S. responses to questions posed by Members to these and other related issues that 
concern the trade and investment policies of the U.S. 
Sectoral Policies 
50. The United States is the world’s largest expor ter of agriculture products and one of the 
biggest importers and consumers.  Although agricu lture production contributed to slightly less than 
0.8% to U.S. GDP in 2009, and only 1.4% of the civi lian labour force, it remains an important part of 
the U.S. economy, and for some individual states, it is one of the main economic activities.  A number 
of questions have been raised by Members on the U. S. agriculture policies, in particular on specific 
programmes and payments made under the Farm Ac t 2008. I am sure these would be duly addressed 
by the U.S. delegation during the Review. 
51. An interesting point to note in relation to the current DDA negotiations on agriculture 
modalities is the spending levels for the AMS suppor t for 2007 which was quite low compared to the 
preceding years, thus providing flexibility fo r the U.S. to manage their farm support. 
52. At the same time, as was noted by the Secretar iat, the OECD considered the marketing loan 
benefits which made up most of the AMS support during times of high support levels as among the 
less efficient and trade distorting of support to agriculture producers. Therefore, it would be interesting to know if the U.S. intends to redu ce such support in line with the proposed draft 
modalities in agriculture. 
53. The services sector continues to be the major economic driver for the U.S. economy.  It 
accounted for 80% of total GDP and the U.S. remain s the world’s largest services importer.   The 
openness of the U.S. market has also largely contri buted to the stellar performance of this sector, WT/TPR/M/235 
Page 12  
 
  however, there are some issues that merit attention.   Concerns have been raised in the past, among 
others in maritime transport, in particular the cabotage policy in the Jones Act, MFN exemptions on 
marketing and sale of air transport services, certain  restrictions in the telecommunication services and 
other issues that could erode the competitiveness of ot her foreign players in the key services sectors. It 
would therefore be of benefit to Members in know ing how the U.S. plan to address some of these 
concerns and what their specific plans are to fu rther liberalise the services sector,  including  
accommodating the export interests of devel oping countries in this Round of negotiations. 
54. In conclusion, I think it is fair to say that the U.S. economy has gone through much 
turbulence in the last two years, with the recent fina ncial and economic crisis testing their resilience to 
the limits. However, we know that this great country  will pull through and be back on its feet, and 
hopefully emerge from these challenging times a much stronger nation.    WT/TPR/M/235 
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  IV. STATEMENTS BY MEMBERS 
INDIA 
 
55. The recession caused a greater decline in the U.S. GDP than any downturn since World War 
II.  It has also been the longest in terms of time taken to revert to the pre -recession level.  The demand 
for goods and services declined post-recession.  U.S. merchandise exports and import of goods 
declined by 19% and 26% respectively in 2009.  In this context, we have noted the remarks of the 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, expressing concern on the fiscal position of the U.S. 
and its high levels of public debt.  Unemployment has remained high, close to almost 10%.  Many have predicted a "jobless recovery" again throu gh 2010, as had happened following the 1990-91 and 
2001 recessions.  The U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research has declared on 20
th September 
that the Great Recession was officially over as of Ju ne 2009.  However, thoug h the signs of recovery 
are there, the increase in consumer spending is quite sl ow.  It may be relevant to recall here what the 
White House Economic Adviser Larry Summers said yesterday that the economy was "not fulfilling 
the promise" that it had shown in the spring because of the headwinds.  Some also hope that emerging 
from a deep recession will make the U.S. economy leaner, more productive and stronger, offsetting 
the headwinds.  There are indeed  some healthy signs as far as U.S. trade data is concerned. 
56. Earlier this month, the U.S. announced total July exports of US$153.3 billion which brings 
down its current account deficit from U$S42.8 billi on, down from US$49.8 billion in June 2010.  
These are indeed positive trends as far as prosp ects of reviving global trade are concerned. 
57. When the U.S., which is the largest economy and trading nation in the world, faced an 
economic and financial crisis, its impact, especially on many developing countries, was profound.  
Therefore, it is important for the health of the global economy and trade that the U.S. continues to 
take steps to restore growth and stimulates demand for goods and services, whic h will in turn provide 
an impetus for global recovery.  As many expert s have commented, the growth in the emerging 
markets will also provide a stimulus for the import of goods and services which are produced and 
exported by the U.S. companies.  Thus, the initiatives that the U.S. takes must be to keep the markets 
open and avoid protectionism of any kind. 
58. In the context of the Doha Round negotiations  the U.S. has a special responsibility to 
discharge, and a leadership role to play in deliv ering on the development dimension of the Round.  
We hope and expect that this will take place wit hout seeking to selectively re-open some issues and 
re-negotiating the mandate. 
59. India and the U.S. are strategic partners and our multifaceted bilateral relationship is rapidly 
expanding and deepening.  Commerce Minister Shar ma was in the U.S. last week and held wide 
ranging talks with USTR R. Kirk.  We also l ook forward to welcome President Obama during his 
state visit to India in November.  Trade has emerged as a key element of our ties and has grown by over 570% during the last two decades.  India’s mercha ndise exports to the U.S. grew by 41.8% in the 
period January-July 2010 as compared to the same period last year.  U.S. exports of merchandise to 
India also grew by 20.3% during the same period.  It is important to mention that most of the U.S. exports to India are of capital equipment and attract  an average tariff of well below 5%.  The exports 
of such items also help create jobs in the U.S. 
60. My delegation has posed several questions to th e U.S. delegation.  I do not wish to go over 
these questions in detail. However, I wish to point out that we have noted with deep concern that 
some of the tariff and non-tariff barriers to India’s exports to the U.S. market.  These include high 
tariffs on textiles, food products, footwear, leathe r goods and automotive components.  Tariffs for 
some footwear products are as high as 58%.  In th e automotive sector, while the tariff for passenger 
cars is around 2.5%, for pickups trucks it is as high as 25%. WT/TPR/M/235 
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  61. The U.S. has a relatively low level of implementa tion and use of international standards set by 
international standardization bodies.  Many Indian  exporters to the U.S. market face regulatory 
barriers as products are increasingly being required to conform to multiple technical regulations. 
62. Indian exports face a number of additional cust oms impediments, such as import user fees and 
excessive invoicing requirements on importers, which add to costs in a similar way to tariffs.  In 
addition, Indian exporter are watching with concern the ultimate outcome of the Foreign 
Manufacturers Liability Bill, which in its present shap e, raises some concerns with regards to its 
compatibility with the WTO/GATT Agreement, notably Article XI.  It will add an additional layer of 
administrative burden and will create new barriers to trade as the legislation would expand the reach of personal jurisdiction to persons  normally exempt because they do not meet the minimum contact 
requirements under U.S. law as well as the proposed  Bill’s compatibility with  the Hague Convention 
on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudici al Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters. 
63. In the agricultural area, a number of sanitary  and phytosanitary issues remain a source of 
difficulty.  For example, the U.S. requires that Pest  Risk Analysis be carried out for new agricultural 
products before their import conditions are estab lished.  The time taken between applying and 
inclusion on the list of approved products can be long, as has been the case for pomegranates and 
grapes from India.  Even in the case of mango exports from India, the pest eradication protocol which 
took 17 years to finalise, still is so burdensome a nd expensive that it has not resulted in any tangible 
gains for the exporters. 
64. The recent developments in the U.S. concerni ng visa free enhancement for H1B and L1 visas 
and a ban on outsourcing projects financed by a particul ar state, are matters of concern to my country.  
Some of these appears to be adversely impacting Indian companies disproportionately and are thereby 
trade restrictive. 
65. Finally, I would like to mention two areas of concern, more from a general systemic 
perspective than from a purely India specific one.  Th e first one relates to the inordinately long delays 
in some cases in bringing the U.S. measures in compliance with  the dispute settlement process 
findings.  The cotton case and a number of cases relating to antidumping are examples of such delays.  
The U.S. which is the undisputed leader of the global  trading arena, needs to set the bar high for the 
other nations to emulate.  The second concern relates to the emergence of a host of TRIPS plus initiatives, be that bilateral and plurilateral FTAs or  through structures like ACTA, IMPACT, etc.  All 
these developments contribute collectively to u ndermining not only the TRIPS Agreement but the 
multilateral trading system as well.  The non-transpar ent nature of the functioning of some of the 
latter structures only add to these concerns. 
GUATEMALA 
66. I have divided my statement into two parts, the first concerns the bilateral relationship 
between Guatemala and the United States, while the second concerns the role played by the 
United States in the WTO's multilateral trading system. 
67. With respect to the bilateral relationship betw een my country and the United States, I would 
like to point out that the United States is a tradi ng partner of critical importance for Guatemala, since 
it takes 41% of Guatemala's exports and provides 36% of its total imports.  Guatemala's main exports 
to the United States are textiles, fruit and preparatio ns, coffee, sugar, vegeta bles and precious metals.  
At the same time, Guatemala imports from the United States mainly machinery and equipment, mining products and chemical products. 
68. The entry into force of th e Free Trade Agreement between Central America, the 
Dominican Republic and the United States, known as RD-CAFTA, has reinforced the trend for trade  WT/TPR/M/235 
 Page 15 
 
 
  to increase and RD-CAFTA is emerging as an im portant contribution to the development of 
Guatemala and the region as a whole. 
69. In fact, since the Agreement ente red into force in 2006 there h as been a significant increase in 
a number of Guatemalan exports, in addition to th ose mentioned above.  These include natural rubber 
and the like, fertilizers, pesticides and insecticides. 
70. Moreover, as the cornerstone of bilateral relations  in the area of trade and investment between 
the United States and Guatemala, RD-CAFTA has given consumers access to a greater variety of better quality and more competitively priced goods and services. 
71. RD-CAFTA has also played a dynamic role in  the growth of FDI in Guatemala, thereby 
acting as an important source of job creation.  The sectors that have attracted most the United States 
investment are manufacturing, agro-industry, tourism, and financial services.  Special mention should 
be made of the successful opening and operation of call centres in Guatemala.  These centres reflect the geographical proximity of the United States, our cultural affinity and Guatemala's efforts to train 
bilingual professionals, all of which is unde rpinning a promising expansion in the sector. 
72. Having mentioned all these positive aspects, I w ill now refer to the problems affecting our 
trade relations with the United States.  Although re latively few, these are of great importance and are 
having a considerable impact on our country.  An example is the labour complaint recently initiated 
under RD-CAFTA.  In this connection,  it should be pointed out that Guatemala is directing its efforts 
towards making the bilateral relationship with the United States a mutually profitable one and keeping 
afloat the benefits of the Agreement.  We feel confident that the United States shares this vision. 
73. I shall now turn to the role of the United States in the multilateral trading system.  As 
mentioned in the Secretariat Report, the trade and investment regimes of the United States are among 
the most open in the world.  Despite the seriousne ss of the global financia l crisis and its domestic 
economic situation, the United States has vigorousl y rejected protectionist pressures and largely 
resisted the temptation to put up barriers to trade. 
74. This attitude of the United States, in addition to demonstrating a strong commitment to the 
multilateral trading system, opened the way for other Members to avoid a "slide into protectionism".  
There can be no doubt at all that these actions are to be commended. 
75. Nevertheless, the world economic situation, in particular, the persistence of high levels of 
unemployment, may continue to create protectionist pressures between Members.  The predicted end of the stimulus measures that governments have a dopted could aggravate these pressures and direct 
them towards objectives inconsistent with those of this Organization. 
76. Accordingly, we cannot disregard the fact th at protectionist tendencies still prowl around our 
Organization, and even though Member s have discussed and recognized th e all-important role of trade 
policy in the recovery and the rebalancing of the ec onomy, we need something more than mere words.  
We need an effective antidote to counteract these trends. 
77. In other words, there is an urgent need to make progress in those sectors of the Doha Round 
negotiations, such as agriculture, that will do most to stimulate growth and promote development. 
78. My delegation recognizes that agriculture is a critical component of the United States' 
economic and trade policy.  We also recognize that in this sector the United States has applied both an 
offensive and a defensive strategy.  However, wi thin the range of its defensive interests, the 
United States provides support for agricultura l production with subsidies and price- or 
production-related aid.  The scale of this aid is cons iderable and has repercussions in world markets. WT/TPR/M/235 
Page 16  
 
  79. In view of this and because of its importance to this Organization, the United States must 
continue to emphasize and contribute, with c oncrete actions, to the maintenance of open and 
transparent trade and investment regimes. 
80. Even though the conclusion of the Doha Round is a step that we must all take together, there 
can be no doubt that it is for the United States, as one our Organization's main trading partners, to 
exert firm leadership by formulating bold proposals and assuming political risks. 
MEXICO 
 
81. The last review of the trade policy of the Un ited States was in 2007 and at that time there 
were already signs of a deterioration in its econom y, but not even the most pessimistic could have 
predicted the magnitude and scope of the incipient recession which was to spread contagion 
throughout the global economy.  This is why in the present review an assessment of the 
macroeconomic situation of the United States is more relevant than ever. 
82. Between early 2008 and the middle of 2009, the United States experienced one of the sharpest 
falls in its GDP ever recorded.  This had serious  repercussions on the labour market and household 
wealth, and led to the economic situation being pe rceived as the most dangerous since the 1930s.  The 
repercussions on world trade were unprecedented.  We  know that in 2009 it fell 12.2% in volume and 
22.6% in value.  In the United States, imports fe ll by 26% in value as compared with 2008.  The 
decline was most pronounced in products such as  motor vehicles and other consumer durables, 
products in which Mexico has a competitive advant age.  In 2009, Mexican exports to the United 
States fell by 21%.  This was the main reason for the fall in Mexico's GDP to its lowest levels since 
the 1930s.  The global economic slowdown and its consequences for global employment created 
powerful incentives for the introduction of trade-restri ctive measures.  However, thanks to the timely 
intervention of the G-20 leaders, the existence of a dispute settlement mechanism, a key component of 
the multilateral trading system, and the strict superv ision of various international organizations, it was 
possible to ward off the introduction of far-reaching restrictive measures. 
83. The United States Government has taken a wide range of measures to confront one of its 
worst economic crises.  The tools of monetary and fiscal policy were effective in restoring growth, which was again observed in the second half of 2009 a nd at the beginning of this year.  No doubt, the 
measures taken by the current Administration were s ound and helped to prevent an economic crisis of 
larger proportions.  The action taken to stabilize the financial sector, particularly the banking sector, 
was vital for the purpose of avoiding even more serious effects on the real economy. 
84. We also applaud the fact that the steps taken to support and rescue the financial system were 
accompanied by comprehensive regulatory reforms proposed by President Obama and approved by 
the United States legislature, which will strengthen the supervision and increase the transparency of 
the country's financial institutions.  Moreover, th e agreement recently reached  by the central bank 
governors in Basel will help to rein force the global financial system. 
85. For Mexico, the behaviour of the United States  economy is of fundamental importance, since 
to a large extent it also determines the performan ce of the Mexican economy.  There is a strong 
historical interrelationship between the economy of  the United States and that of my own country, 
which became even stronger with the entry into force of the NAFTA in 1994.  For example, bilateral 
trade between the two countries is around US$380,000 m illion, which is equivale nt to approximately 
40% of Mexico's GDP.  The United States receive s about 80% of Mexican exports while, for the 
United States, Mexico is its second largest export market after Canada. 
86.
 To cite only a few figures, since NAFTA ente red into force, Mexican exports to the 
United States have approximately quadrupled, with an  average annual rate of growth of 17%, making  WT/TPR/M/235 
 Page 17 
 
 
  Mexico the United States' third largest supplie r country, after only China and Canada.  The 
United States is our principal foreign investor and Mexico is increasingly becoming a large investor in 
the United States market. 
87. Due to the close trade relations between Mexico  and the United States, we occasionally have 
some serious disputes.  One high-profile dispute wh ich, unfortunately, has soured trade relations, is 
the failure by the United States to fulfil its comm itments to open up its road transport market under 
NAFTA. 
88. In 1995, road transport between our two countries should have been freed of restrictions.  It 
was not, for reasons connected with domestic politi cs in the United States, and in 2001 we won a 
dispute settlement panel in NAFTA, although it s hould be noted that the United States is also 
violating its WTO commitments, just as it has viol ated its NAFTA commitments.  A pilot road 
transport programme was established.  Unfortunately , this pilot programme was suspended due to the 
suspension of funds by the United States Congress.  Th is led my country to take reprisal measures 
which we would like to withdraw as soon as possibl e.  But of course we will only do that when the 
United States allows free entry for road transport into  its country.  Some 70% of our bilateral trade is 
carried by road, and while what is happening is subs tantially increasing the cost of our mutual trade, 
what we are both losing is a comparative advantage for our region vis-à-vis  the rest of the world. 
89. Where the use of anti-dumping measures is concerned, there is also an issue of extreme 
importance for Mexico, namely, the use of "zeroing" by  the United States.  In its report on stainless 
steel from Mexico of 20 May 2008, the Appellate Bo dy concluded that the United States had acted in 
a manner inconsistent with paragr aph 2 of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and paragraph 3 of Article 9 
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement by applying simple "zeroing" in the five periodic reviews that 
formed the subject of that dispute.  The United St ates has yet to comply with the Appellate Body's 
recommendations.  Mexico therefore requested the establishment of a compliance panel, which was established on 22 September. 
90. I would like to reiterate that "zeroing" is a practice that unduly increases dumping margins 
and continues to be a source of se rious and costly disputes between the United States and its trading 
partners.  A measure of the economic harm that this pr actice is doing is the millions of dollars that we 
participants in these dispute settlement panels are payi ng our lawyers, that is to say, the money we are 
paying for their assistance in pursuing these disputes  shows the seriousness of practices of this kind 
for producers such as ourselves when we are subjected  to them.  I would therefore like to call on the 
United States to comply with the relevant recomme ndations adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body 
and, aware that this is an issue being negotiated in the Doha Round, in any event, we would like to 
encourage them to abolish the practice. 
91. Another dispute with the United States revolves around the establishment of country of origin 
labelling requirements (COOL), protectionist an d unjustified requirements that violate several 
provisions of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.  I do not propose to 
give details of the serious harm that this practic e is doing to Mexican expor ts, but it has damaged the 
integrated production chain that existed between the two countries.  The Government of Mexico 
would like to encourage the United States to review the regulations a nd adhere to the provisions of the 
GATT and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to  Trade, since the COOL requirements do not 
promote any legitimate interest and are eminently pr otectionist in nature in favour of the livestock 
producers of the United States. 
92. Of course, the tuna question cannot be left out either.  This dispute with the United States 
goes back more than 20 years and during that time the tuna caught by the Mexican fishing fleet has 
faced various restrictions which are currently being maintained by a label erroneously called 
"dolphin-safe" that is currently restricting effec tive access to the United States market through the use WT/TPR/M/235 
Page 18  
 
  of clearly discriminatory measures.  Mexico consid ers these measures to be inconsistent with the 
GATT and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.  The United States should amend the regulations on "dolphin-safe" labels and allow ef fective access to tuna that complies with the 
international guidelines agreed by the United States itself for the protection of dolphins. 
93. A further concern and one already mentioned by  the Ambassador of India is the recent 
Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of  2010, which would create unnecessary barriers to 
trade. 
94. Mexico, like the United States, is committed to ensuring product safety and consumer 
protection.  However, the proposed requirement for foreign manufacturers to designate an agent 
registered in the United States to receive notificati ons on behalf of the enterprise as a precondition for 
the importation of its products coul d infringe the international commitm ents of the United States.  It 
would be expensive to implement and would adve rsely affect producers, importers and exporters, 
especially in sectors with integrated production ch ains, not to mention numerous other problems.  
Accordingly, Mexico urges the Government of the United States to ensure that these measures are not 
instituted, given its commitments within the WTO. 
95. We cannot let slip this opportunity to appeal to  the United States to exercise its leadership in 
the Doha Round.  None of the par ticipants is going to receive everyt hing it wants and we are all going 
to pay more than we expected when the Round en ds.  The various studies of the outcome of the 
Round show that the United States would make ga ins, greater or smaller depending on the 
assumptions.  What is clear is that it will not  lose under any of the scenarios posited in these 
econometric and other studies.  In fact, many countri es, including Mexico, will gain much less than 
the United States in absolute and relative terms, an d in per capita terms we will also gain much less 
than the United States.  All the studies agree that the world as a whole would make important gains in 
trade and levels of income, which would certainly  have a positive impact on the global economy, the 
multilateral trading system and, of course, the North American economy. 
BRAZIL 
96. Our biennial review of the trade policies of the U.S. takes place in a scenario that is rather 
different from that prevailing in the ninth review in 2008.  At that time, it was the month of June, 
despite the fact that food and energy prices were  attaining historic high levels, that financial 
speculation was rampant, few could anticipate, in that scenario of economic expansion and thriving 
trade that the financial and econom ic crisis was just around the corn er. The deepest crisis since the 
1930s put to test the resilience of the multilateral ru les based trading system. Its effects are still felt, 
particularly in employment levels. 
97. As a major trading partner to most WTO Member countries, the United States necessarily 
influenced international response to the crisis and pl ayed a leading role in th e search for solutions for 
this unprecedented challenge. We acknowledge the leadership displayed by the G-20 Summits in 
coordinating international action and steering a set  of reforms in the international financial 
architecture. The U.S. played a key role in the r ecognition that a larger a nd more legitimate group, 
comprising a wider range of views, would tackle this complex crisis more successfully.  U.S. 
responsibilities are, of course, commensurate with its importance and its measures, are therefore, well 
scrutinized in light of their impact on the Membership. 
98. It is difficult to disagree with the opening statem ent of the Secretariat’s Report that "the U.S. 
trade and investment regimes are among the most  open in the world and that it remained so 
throughout the period under review", but we cannot fail to note that relevant and numerous exceptions 
exist, and that they have adverse e ffects on many Members, including Brazil.  WT/TPR/M/235 
 Page 19 
 
 
  99. In our view, the most notorious of those excep tions is not a minor one.  Agriculture accounts 
for only 0.8% of U.S. GDP and it employs just 1.4%  of its labor force. Ne vertheless, this sector 
displays a considerable arsenal of trade-restric tive and distorting measures: TRQs for products like 
sugar, tariff peaks (tobacco is at 350%), generous  domestic support entitlement s, and export subsidies 
– briefly reintroduced during the crisis, and then with drawn. On top of that, the U.S. retains non-tariff 
barriers in contravention of the SPS Agreement, su ch as the performance of "economic tests" in a 
process that should be limited to sanitary or ph itosanitary - not economic - implications. Brazilian 
pork and beef exporters have been pa rticularly affected by those pro cedures, and the cumulative effect 
of those measures is not to be dismissed lightly. 
100. In relation to domestic support, the Secretaria t’s Report recalls that the U.S., the largest 
agricultural exporter, concentrates a large share of th at support in some key agricultural products:  the 
so-called "program crops". T hese include corn, co tton, soybeans, rice, and wheat. It is comforting 
that international and domestic prices for those products were sufficiently high during the last two 
years to dispense with the disbursement of subsidi es. However, when prices drop, those subsidies will 
be in place again precisely at the moment when th ey will provoke the largest distortions and most 
damage to producers elsewhere. 
101. The Secretariat reports that U.S. border measures such as tariffs and quantitative restrictions 
have remained broadly unchanged in the period  under review, confirming, on the one hand, the 
overall stability of its trade regime. On the other hand,  it is also an indication that tariffs are not the 
main instrument for border protection. 
102. Nonetheless, as far as tariffs are concerned, the Secretariat Report indicates that, while the 
simple average applied MFN tariff was 4.8%, the hi ghest tariffs for industrial goods in the U.S. are 
concentrated on sectors of priority export interest  for developing countries. Millions of workers in 
poor countries are employed by manufacturers of f ootwear, textile and clothing and, of course, 
agriculture. The level of protection in these key sect ors for exporters in developing countries is still 
very high: tariffs for footwear, for instance, are as high as 60%, a level which is much higher than 
tariff peaks in many developing countries. 
103. Additionally, the inadequate recourse to "other  duties and charges" in the amount 14.27 cents 
per liter imposed on ethanol as fuel not only generates an ad valorem  of over 40% - much above the 
bound tariff of 2.5% - but also stands in the wa y of liberalizing an environmental good of export 
interest not only to Brazil but to all developing countries producing sugarcane. 
104. In addition, while tariffs were kept at the sa me level, there was a significant increase in the 
use of trade remedies in 2008/09 (10% more  antidumping measures and 200% more countervailing 
measures). The investigations opened resulted in th e imposition of provisional measures or definitive 
antidumping rights in the overwhelming majority of the cases. As to countervailing measures, all investigations resulted in the imposition of additional duties. 
105. The American Recovery and Reinvestment  Act of 2009 (ARRA) was a source of great 
interest and concern among the Members. Although  understood as an essential mechanism to sustain 
economic activity in a time of cr isis, it was feared that its provisions would introduce significant trade 
distortions and would have protectionist impacts,  particularly its "Buy American" provisions.  
106. Likewise, U.S. government support to the fina ncial sector in the context of the global 
economic crisis was essential to restore its liquidi ty and stability. Nevertheless, such widespread 
granting of subsidies in services was likely to have  implications on the competitiveness of the sector 
on a global scale. It is surprising that, despite th e volume of assistance provided, the United States did 
not make any WTO notification concerning any new, or any changes to, existi ng laws, regulations or WT/TPR/M/235 
Page 20  
 
  administrative guidelines that significantly affect tr ade in services, as required by Article III.3 of the 
GATS. 
107. Still in the area of services, we note with appreci ation that U.S. policymakers have set out to 
develop a comprehensive process of financial regulat ory reform that was initiated within the G-20 
Summit. It was precisely the prudent regulation of the domestic financial system that spared Brazil the 
worst effects of the financial crisis. We believe th at adequate worldwide re gulation of the financial 
system is essential in an area prone to market failures.  
108. Section (v) of the Secretariat's Report highli ghts the activism of the U.S. on trade-related 
intellectual property rights, in particular in the ar ea of enforcement.  Multilaterally, the U.S. is the 
country that has brought the highest number of in tellectual property cases, totaling 15, to the dispute 
settlement body of the WTO. Unilaterally, it continu es to use its domestic legislation, especially the 
Special 301 Section, to exert pressure on a selected number of countries. Plurilaterally, it is one of the 
leading countries seeking WTO plus enforcement arrangements. 
109. We would hope, however, that this commitment to the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights would also extend to one important domain of acute interest to developing countries. In the 
TRIPS Council, for quite a while now, the U.S. delega tion still did not join the consensus to admit the 
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) as observer. 
110. Brazil shares the statements contained in the U.S. government submission to this TPR on the 
role played by the WTO rules-based system and its dispute settlement mechanism.  In this respect, it 
is worth recalling that last August Brazil and the Un ited States jointly notifie d the Dispute Settlement 
Body that they had concluded a "Framework for a Mutually Agreed Solutio n" to the long-standing 
Cotton  dispute. This is a welcome development. The Framework  does not constitute in itself a 
solution to the dispute. It sets out the basis for a pr ocess of consultations that, we hope, will lead to the 
full implementation of the WTO rulings. 
111. Such implementation, however, is taking an unreasonable amount of time. Unfortunately, this 
is not limited to the cotton dispute with Brazil. Th e United States has been slow and maybe reluctant 
to implement some WTO Dispute Settlement rulings. The United States is the respondent in six out of 
seven disputes that are currently listed by the Secret ariat as without full compliance to date. That list, 
by the way, does not include the cotton dispute,  where compliance is still lacking.  Lack of 
compliance with dispute settlement rulings - not only by the U.S., but by any Member - undermines 
the security and predictability that are fundamental pi llars of this Organization. A better record by the 
U.S. in this respect would confer credibility a nd legitimacy to the multilateral trading system. 
112. Turning to the DDA, Brazil ta kes note of the stated U.S. commitment to the Doha Round. 
Nevertheless, our attention is drawn to the statem ents in the Government Report and by Ambassador 
Punke this morning that link the conclusion of the Round to further concessions from developing 
countries of its own selection. While all WTO Members are well familiar with a process of "give and take", they also know that trade-offs that took pl ace over nine years of negotiations cannot be simply 
erased or ignored. As a key major partner in these negotiations, the United States must provide 
responsible leadership, one that acknowledges that  requests for further unilateral and selective 
concessions from developing countries will simply en sure the continuation of the current deadlock. 
113. Brazil sees the U.S. as a fundamental trade partne r.  Nevertheless, our bilateral exchanges are 
considerably below their potential and have been severel y affected by the crisis. In 2009, in relation to 
the previous year, U.S. total imports declined  26%, while imports from Brazil declined 43%. The 
20 main products imported from Brazil declined on av erage 41.3%. While the impact of the economic 
crisis continues to be felt, this performance al so reflects the prevalence of high barriers against 
Brazil’s main export products. In fact, a study conducted a few years ago showed that the average  WT/TPR/M/235 
 Page 21 
 
 
  U.S. tariff on Brazil’s top 20 exports to the world wa s 44%. This is four times larger than the average 
Brazilian tariff on the top 20 U.S. exports to the world. 
CHINA 
114. The U.S. and China are important trading part ners to each other, and we maintain close 
bilateral trade and investment ties.  Therefore, China attaches great importance to this Review and 
believe that it will provide an important opportunity to encourage a meaningful exchange of views 
and enhance our mutual understanding.   This morning, we received the U.S. replies to some of our 
questions, which we appreciate a lot and will study them carefully.  Meanwhile, we would like to 
listen to the U.S. views on the following poin ts of concern to Members including China. 
115. During the review period, the U.S. Government’s  priority was to fight the financial crisis, 
avoid recession and revive the economy.  We are pleased to see that since the second half of 2009, the 
U.S. economy had started to reb ound, and especially this year, the increased domestic private 
investment and strong export growth contributed to  a sustained economic recovery.  As it indicates in 
its statement, to restore the economic growth, the U. S. needs first of all the rebalance of the economy, 
which means less consumption on credit, less government deficit, more savings, more private 
investment, and more export. 
116. However, another fundamental issue, which cannot  be ignored, is its expansionary monetary 
policy.  As the Secretariat’s Report notes, the U.S. dollar has almost witnessed a continuous depreciation over the past eight years.  At the sa me time, the U.S. government’s budget deficit kept 
growing, and the share of the federal public debt in GDP is projected to reach as high as 64%, much 
higher than the international warning level.  Such an outcome, to a great extent, is a result of a long-
standing expansionary monetary policy implemented by the U.S. Administra tion, especially the so-
called "quantitative easing" after the crisis.  Give n the increasingly deepened globalization and the 
unique role of the U.S. dollar in the international monetary system, as well as the significant impact of 
the U.S. policy on the global financial markets a nd the world economy, we are very much concerned 
about how the U.S. would take practical and responsible measures to prevent the dollar glut and 
maintain the stability of the currency.  China alread y raised this point in the previous Review but 
failed to get a proper answer.  We hope to get a more specific and more direct answer from the U.S. this time. 
117. China has taken note of and welcomes the U.S. commitment to promoting the multilateral 
trading system.  The U.S. has been one of the most  active Members and has played an important role 
in the WTO.  At the same time, it has remained one of the biggest beneficiaries of the multilateral 
trading system.  However, many Members have taken note that, in the Doha Round negotiations, 
particularly over the past two years, the U.S. seems to have stepped back from its due leadership role.  
Examples include:  i) the U.S. highlights more on its own export interests than showing the political will to conclude the Round in orde r to maintain credibility and relevance of the Organization.  While 
ignoring the Doha development ma ndate by pushing the major developing countries to further open 
their markets, it failed to indicate how it might improve its own offer on issues of concern to 
developing countries;  ii) contrary to its repeated st atement no to re-open what is already on the table, 
its recent requests, both through multilateral and bilatera l channels, could only lead to the unravel of 
the whole thing.  We believe that the right way for th e U.S. to play its leadership role is to adopt a 
more pragmatic and realistic approach on the Doha R ound.  iii) On top of that there is an incremental 
setback of free trade vis-à-vis  trade protectionism in the U.S., particularly during and after the 
financial crisis;  iv) last but not least, as the Secretariat’s Report points out, quite a few WTO DSB 
rulings remain on the table for years for the U.S. to  implement.  As the discussant has pointed out, we 
need some clarification on this issue. WT/TPR/M/235 
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  118. China hope that the U.S. can, as it reaffirmed in the Government's statement, give its top 
priority to the multilateral system, ensure subs tantive involvement in and contribution to the 
negotiations, and ensure openness of economy, transp arency of the system and compliance with the 
international obligations. 
119. The Secretariat's Report mentions that the U.S. is vigorously promoting export and 
strengthening supervision on its trad ing partners’ fulfillment of the mu ltilateral obligations in a bid to 
achieve its economic recovery and re-balance.  Un fortunately while urging its trading partners to 
further open markets, the U.S. has adopted more rest rictive and protectionist practices in its domestic 
market.  For example, it provides huge subsidies to  the domestic industries;  its economic stimulus 
packages include bail-out and other measures which are not consistence with WTO rules, such as 
"Buy American", or "Hire American";  it impl ements a good variety of discriminatory non-tariff 
measures at a deeper level and with a wider range;   it implements strict export restrictions and 
controls under the excuse of "national security";  it limits market access with tariff peaks and tariff 
escalations with significant negative implications on exports from developing countries;  it turns down 
investment projects through strict and non-transpar ent investment review and border measures on the 
grounds of "national security";  These practices al l go against the commitment to opposing trade 
protectionism made by the U.S. at various intern ational fora, contradict with its own preaching of 
free-trade spirit and have negatively affected the inte rnational trade.  We would like to hear from the 
U.S. on what actions it will take to respond to Members’ concerns on its rising protectionism. 
120. The U.S. is China’s second largest trading partner.   In the past three decades, our bilateral 
trade has been growing rapidly from less than US$2.5 billion in 1979 to US$298 billion in 2009, 
showing an increase of nearly 120 times.  Accordin g to Chinese statistics, th e bilateral trade over the 
past five years saw an average a nnual increase of 9%.  China is the fastest growing export market for 
the U.S. and statistics from the U.S. show that si nce 2000, compared to the 29% growth rate of its 
export with the rest of the world, its exports to China grew by 330%. 
121. Given our strong trade relationship and incr easing interdependence, China attaches great 
importance to the U.S.' commitment to and efforts in  maintaining an open trading system and an open 
market.  Specifically, we have concerns on the fo llowing aspects.  First, the huge financial assistance 
and subsidies.  After the crisis, the U.S. launc hed a series of subsidization programs for the 
automotive, financial, steel and other industries.  Despite the special background of the crisis, the 
negative impacts of these measures on the U.S. indu stries and the international trade are causes of 
great concern to the rest of the world.  We would urge the U.S. government to restrain from 
intervening businesses and influencing the economy by the means of subsidization. 
122. Second, service trade and investment.  As for service trade, although the U.S. committed a 
higher level of openness, the actual degree of openness is greatly reduced in important services sectors such as banking, insurance, and construction due to the qualification requirements and many 
other domestic regulatory limitations and MFN excepti ons.  The U.S. is still very conservative in the 
flow of natural persons maritime transport and other areas. 
123. Third, the abuse of trade remedies.  In recent years, the U.S. trade remedy measures increased 
substantially in terms of both the numbers and the range of subjects, which has aroused strong 
concern from many of its trading partners.  The Secret ariat’s Report mentioned that more than half of 
the about 50 U.S. trade remedy cases in 2009 were directed at China.  Within only 10 days from 
2 November to 12 November 2009, the U.S. Department of Commerce brought as many as 20 trade 
remedy cases against China.  The high filing rate  of trade remedy measures against one Member is 
rarely seen in the history of international trade pract ice.  The irony is that while adopting trade remedy 
measures against other Members, the U.S. consid erably increased subsidies and procurement support 
to its own domestic industries.  WT/TPR/M/235 
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  124. On top of that, in September 2009, against objective facts and with the absence of statutory 
conditions, the U.S. imposed special safeguard  measures on Chinese tires despite the strong 
opposition of its domestic industries and consumers.  While throwi ng hundreds of thousands of 
Chinese tires workers into unemployment and injuri ng consumers’ interests, recent evidence has 
shown that it failed to help the U.S. industries in the U.S. 
125. Fourth, discriminative measures in the agricultura l sector.  The WTO has recently ruled that 
the U.S. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 viol ated relevant WTO rules on MFN, elimination of 
quantitative restrictions, and animal and plant quaran tine.  However, Section 743 of the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2010 still cont ained a number of additional restrictive measures against exports 
of Chinese products to the U.S., and clearly indicates  that the U.S. Administration does not take the 
application for the import of Chinese poultry products  into consideration at first place.  Such a 
practice that seriously departs from the WTO rules should be changed as soon as possible. 
126. Fifth, restrictive standards and inspection and quarantine measures.  Although the U.S. 
maintains an overall level of lower and open tariffs , there are a large number of non-tariff measures in 
practices, and the number is growing, which seriously affects market access.  The U.S. sets stringent 
entry criteria through the TBT, SPS and other m easures, and especially discriminates products from 
developing countries. 
127. China and the U.S. have established a multi- level dialogue and comm unication mechanism, 
and the China U.S. Joint Commission on Commerce a nd Trade (JCCT) is also forthcoming.  China is 
willing to communicate and exchange with the U.S.  on issues of mutual concern through dialogues 
and cooperation.  Meanwhile, we always give a t op priority to the multilate ral channels, China hopes 
to continue cooperation with the U.S. in the multila teral framework, including the trade policy review 
mechanism. 
EL SALVADOR 
128. The United States continues to be my country's  principal extra-regional trading partner and 
our trade relations are developing very smoothly within the framework of the DR-CAFTA, which 
entered into force for both countries in 2006, El Salv ador being the first Central American country to 
ratify the Agreement.  Following the entry into force of the FTA, Salvadoran exports increased by 
10% up to 2008 and have subsequently increased further. 
129. This Agreement is a valuable trade instrument for El Salvador which has used it to achieve 
beneficial results reflected in ne w and genuine opportunities for trade and investment that are helping 
to improve the living conditions of our citizens. 
130. El Salvador's main exports to the United Stat es include coffee (café oro), cane sugar, made-up 
textile products, vegetables, grain alcohol, pape r products, crustaceans, and manufactured plastics 
products.  El Salvador's imports from the United Stat es consist mainly of fuels, fats and oils, flour, 
maize (corn), paper, some vegetabl es, and travel goods, among others. 
131. We also consider it important to note the links  that bind El Salvador and the United States 
outside the bounds of trade, since over one million Sa lvadorans live in the United States, which is the 
equivalent of about 15% of El Salvador's population. 
132. In this context, it is important to not e the recent signing of the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the two countries on collabora tion in the Building Remittance Investment for 
Development Growth and Entrepreneurship (BRIDG E) Initiative, a topic which, as it happens, will 
today form the subject of an initial exchange of  ideas between the President of the Republic of 
El Salvador and President Obama during the Sa lvadoran President's visit to Washington. WT/TPR/M/235 
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  133. This is an unprecedented cooperation initiative th at will allow the remittances of Salvadoran 
workers to be concentrated in an investment th at enables the country's municipalities to grow and 
develop, especially those with high levels of migrat ion.  The agreement stresses that the anticipated 
flow of remittances and other flows could support financing with the potential for being used for 
productive and economically viable investment that  will have a positive and lasting impact on the 
country's development. 
134. The difficulties encountered by the United States economy in connection with the financial 
and economic crisis, as reflected in a sharp fall in tr ade and, in particular, in a decrease of 35% in 
merchandise imports between the third quarter  of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009 and the 
suspension of the investment plans of United States businesses, have had a serious effect on 
El Salvador.  In 2009, Salvadoran exports to th e United States fell by up to 19%.  Likewise, the 
remittances of Salvadoran workers and United States FDI in El Salvador declined substantially during 
this period. 
135. In this context, El Salvador is very depende nt on the recovery strategy implemented by the 
Administration of President Obama and trusts that  it will help to stabilize the United States economy 
and thus make it possible to emerge from this difficult situation that is affecting all the countries in the 
world and especially the smallest. 
136. Nonetheless, my country considers that in the c ontext of the crisis and even though, according 
to the Secretariat Report, the United States has la rgely resisted pressures to respond to the global 
economic recession by tightening restrictions on import s and the restraint shown by the United States 
has helped forestall a worldwide slide into prot ectionism, the effects on world trade of the rescue 
measures adopted in various goods and serv ices sectors still need to be analysed. 
137. We note that there has been hardly any cha nge in border measures, such as tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions, since the United States' la st Review which, according to the Secretariat 
Report, illustrates the overall stability of its trade regime. 
138. However, El Salvador views with concern the fact that the measures to increase import safety 
include new advance information requirements for cargo arriving in the United States by vessel under 
the so-called "10+2" rule.  Regarding the requireme nt to scan 100% of containers prior to loading 
them on US-bound vessels, we note with satisfacti on that the Secretary of Homeland Security has 
indicated that this security initiative is currently unw orkable at many ports and that its implementation 
will be delaye d beyond 2012. 
139. We observe that, according to the Secretariat Re port, intellectual property is critical to the 
United States' economy, forming the basis of its eco nomic competitiveness and, in its opinion, being 
the only sector in which it has a trade su rplus with every nation in the world. 
140. Despite the fact that since the United States' last TPR there have been no major changes in its 
legislation, we wish to draw attention to the conten ts of the PRO-IP Act, wh ich is intended to improve 
enforcement of intellectual property rights by  increasing penalties and improving resources for 
investigation. 
141. One of the chief benefits of this Act is th e creation of the post of Intellectual Property 
Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC) in the Executive Office of the President.  The Office of the 
President will formulate the Administration's strate gic plan and work with the agencies responsible 
for intellectual property enforcement to effec tively and efficiently implement that plan. 
142. The IPEC established an interagency working group to support this effort and has received 
significant feedback and input from relevant Un ited States agencies, the public, and industry.  WT/TPR/M/235 
 Page 25 
 
 
  143. With respect to the negotiations in this area, El  Salvador has interests similar to those of the 
United States and appreciates the active participation of its delegation in the deliberations of the 
Council for TRIPS. 
144. The view that intellectual property benefits  and promotes a favourable environment for 
development and fosters strengthening in areas such as innovation and protection of Members' 
intangible assets has prompted major initiatives, such as negotiations for the establishment of a 
multilateral system for notifying and registering ge ographical indications for wines and spirits, a 
system that does not impose excessive burdens on Members and a proposal that El Salvador is 
supporting. 
145. Within the framework of the Doha Round, both El Salvador and the United States are seeking 
to strengthen the multilateral rules, as well as to obt ain better access to international markets for their 
agricultural and industrial products and their service pr oviders.  For its part, El Salvador is pressing 
for the flexibilities needed by the developing countries, especially the small and vulnerable 
economies. 
146. In relation to agricultural trade, even thou gh, overall, support for agriculture in the 
United States, as a percentage of the value of prod uction, remains low compared with other countries, 
according to the Secretariat Report, the large size of the agriculture sector means that the absolute 
amount of support is considerable, varies from one year to another depending on prices, and can affect 
world markets.  Accordingly, we urge the United States to fulfil its commitments to reduce domestic 
support in order to avoid distorting the markets. 
147. In the area of trade in services, although the United States has made extensive commitments 
in 11 services sectors under the GATS, its horizont al commitments establish various limitations 
regarding the entry and temporary stay of persons, la nd acquisition, grants and tax measures.  We note 
that, at State level, among other things, equity caps, restrictions in types of services or business scope, and excessive qualification requirements are still be ing maintained.  In addition to this, where 
domestic regulations are concerned, in many sectors the responsibility resides with the States or 
municipalities, which implies a wide variety of regimes. 
148. El Salvador, like other Members, views with great concern the security legislation recently 
signed by President Obama, which amends the cost of issuing H1-B and L1 visas, both of which are 
categories for businessmen.  There is some doubt as to the compatibility of this legislation with the 
commitments made by the United States under the GATS. 
149. El Salvador therefore urges the United States de legation to substantially improve its service 
offerings, particularly in sectors and modes of supply of interest to developing countries. 
150. The leadership of the United States in all the negotiating areas will be decisive for the success 
of the Doha Round and the achievement of the development dimension of the Doha Round 
Programme, through the opening up of those sector s and modes of service delivery that promote the 
integration of the developing countries, especially  the small and vulnerab le economies, into the 
multilateral trading system.  We are convinced that with the necessary leadership on the part of the 
United States we shall be able to make importa nt progress towards the successful conclusion of the 
Doha Round negotiations.  
AUSTRALIA 
151. Australia and the United States share an extensiv e range of interests on the trade front.  The 
United States remains one of Aust ralia’s largest economic partners.  In 2009, the United States was 
our third largest two-way trading pa rtner in goods and services, with trade valued at US$50.1 billion.  WT/TPR/M/235 
Page 26  
 
  The United States is also our most import investment partner, with two way investment reaching 
US$918 billion in 2009. 
152. The Australia-United States Free Trade Agreem ent (AUSFTA) – now in its sixth year – has 
cemented this robust bilateral re lationship and provides a framework to further expand our trade and 
economic relationship in the future. 
153. We cannot ignore the negative impact the gl obal economic crisis has had on global trade 
including in our own bilateral relationship where tr ade in 2009 decreased by 9.1% over the previous 
year.  We note re-emerging concerns of another slowdown in U.S. economic recovery, and welcome 
recent comments from U.S. Federal Reserve Chair, Ben Bernanke, that the central bank will do what 
is necessary to prevent the economy slipping into a cycle of falling wages and prices.  We are pleased 
Mr. Bernanke’s outlook for 2011 predicts modest growth. 
154. We would also like to welcome the U.S. Preside nt’s recognition of the important role trade 
has to play in the recovery.  The President’s ambitio us goal and doubling U.S. exports in the next five 
years is designed to support 2 million jobs in the United States.  In this respect, we particularly 
welcome President Obama’s 2010 State of the Un ion address which recognized a successful outcome 
to the Doha Round would provide a major boos t to trade and drive economic growth and 
development.  This is consistent with the G-20 Leaders’ commitment at successive G-20 summits to 
fight protectionism and to support efforts to brin g the WTO Doha Round to a balanced and ambitious 
conclusion as soon as possible. 
155. We also welcome the Administration’s renewe d commitment to its bilateral and regional 
trade agenda.  The United States is seeking to e nhance its robust economic engagement in the Asia 
Pacific region, notably through the Trans-Pacific Partnership, in which Australia is also an 
enthusiastic participant, and through APEC wher e we look forward to working closely with the 
United States particularly in 2011 when they will host the APEC Summit. 
156. We have raised a number of concerns in relati on to the United States’ policy instruments in a 
variety of areas including agriculture, services and co mpetition policy.  We have for example asked 
questions on financial regulatory reform legislati on, the operation of US SPS and trade remedy laws, 
import controls in the natural gas sector, plans for th e U.S. Government to dispose of its equity stake 
in companies such as Chrysler and GM and acces s for foreign professionals to the U.S. services 
market.  We have also asked several questions about U.S. agriculture programs.  As a major 
agricultural exporter, we continue to be concer ned by tariff and non-tariff barriers that the U.S. 
imposes on a range of agricultural products, as well as subsidies provided to the sector.  Such 
measures distort global agricultural trade a nd impose significant costs on U.S. consumers. 
157. Australia notes the recent congressional hearings  in advance of the 2012 Farm Bill.  We 
encourage Congress to embrace this opportunity to re form U.S. agricultural support programs, make 
them less trade and production distorting, and ensure U.S. policies are consistent with its international 
trade obligations and support the ongoing reform of  global agricultural trade.  We would welcome 
continued efforts by the U.S. to ensure that regul ations and guidelines are not more trade restrictive 
than necessary to achieve their underlying objectives. 
PAKISTAN 
158. The U.S. being the largest trading nation and the la rgest import market is of key interest to all 
WTO Members.  Its data of economic growth an d degree of openness impact all other economies no 
matter how big or small they are.  WT/TPR/M/235 
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  159. During the period under review, the global economy experienced severe strains similar to that 
of the economic depression of 1930s.  The economic crisis originated in the financial markets in 
developed countries ultimately impacted markets and j obs in the developing world that had no role in 
initiating the crisis.  The WTO played a proactive role  to curb the protectionist sentiment – usually the 
first option in similar situations.  The impact of the financial or economic cr isis, nevertheless, had a 
serious impact on economic and trade policies of many  countries.  It is perceived by some that DDA 
negotiations may remain at the back burner until fu ll sustainable recovery process begins.  The other 
point of view is that an early conclusion of th e current round can give big boost to the recovery 
efforts. 
160. The U.S. appears to have put more nego tiating capital on bilateral and regional trade 
agreements during 2009-10, especially amongst the developed and emerging economies in Asia and 
Pacific region.  These initiatives would primarily facilitate trade amongst the relatively more developed countries, leaving a large number of developing and small econom ies being left out.  
Besides, we all know that RTAs never addressed to co re agricultural issues like domestic support, etc.  
Accordingly, there is a concern that while the tariff peaks in the products of export interest of lesser 
developed countries would create further tariff barri ers, these countries because of their geographical 
size and GDPs cannot generate enough domestic demand to plan their economic growth.  The 
salvation for them is development oriented, ambiti ous and equitable early conclusion of the Doha 
Round. 
161. We believe that the United States is conscious of these facts and is anxious to provide the 
desired leadership to move forward in the Round.  We also welcome the U.S. commitment to the rule-
based multilateral trading system and its belief in reducing trade barriers.  For this purpose, 
Ambassador Michael Punke’s role at Geneva is crucial. 
162. Through GSP, the U.S. is providing preferen tial market access to the developing and least 
developed countries.  The scheme is being review ed by the U.S. and we believe that products 
attracting high tariffs, especially textiles and garments , leather products, etc. would be included in the 
new scheme to provide necessary market access to smaller countries. 
163. In the case of services, we hope  that the U.S. will not only push its offensive interest but may 
also make necessary commitments for its defensive sectors such as Mode 4 and remove or soften its 
MFN exemption in this area. 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
164. The United States has been for many years and still remains Korea’s major economic and 
strategic partner.  One of the latest milestone deve lopments in Korea-U.S. relations is that we are 
working closely together to move forward on the Ko rea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, which has yet to 
be ratified.  Indeed, we believe not only that th e Korea-U.S. FTA will bring our bilateral economic 
relationship to new heights, but also that it could serve as a good model for removing the tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and services, which is one of the fundamental objectives of the 
WTO. 
165. As one of the United States’ important trading pa rtners, Korea has keen interest in the U.S. 
trade regime.  With this in mind, we have subm itted several written questions concerning the various 
aspects of U.S. trade and economic policies.  We would appreciate it if the U.S. delegation could 
provide answers to these questions later.  Now,  I would like to make some comments on the U.S. 
economic and trade policies on which we would like to see further improvement. WT/TPR/M/235 
Page 28  
 
  166. As the Secretariat Report rightly points out in th e first lines of its first page, the United States’ 
trade and investment regimes are among the most ope n in the world.  Its average bound tariff rate is 
only 3.5% and about 70% of all imports to the country were duty-free in 2009. 
167. However, in the face of the growing economic uncertainty in the aftermath of the global 
financial and economic crisis, there still appears to be a persistent protectionist sentiment in some 
quarters of the United States.  We take due note that President Obama announced the launching of the 
National Export Initiative which is aimed not only at  doubling U.S. exports in five years to create 
2 million jobs, but also at strengthening trade enforcement. 
168. Although the NEI does not intend to advocate protec tionism there seems to be concerns that 
the initiative might conflict with the U.S.’s traditiona lly open trade policy.  In this regard, we would 
highly appreciate it if the U.S. delegation could provide as much information on the NEI Trade Law 
Enforcement Package as possible. 
169. As an advocate for the G-20 standstill on protec tionism, Korea certainly hopes and believes 
that the U.S. Government will resist any call for pr otectionism in its trade policy and remain a firm 
supporter of free and open trade. 
170. Turning to some of the issues that are of par ticular interest of Korea, my delegation would 
appreciate the U.S.’s clarification on the pending Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability bill.  
Indeed, if enacted, it may have the effect of incr easing the cost for Korean manufacturers, especially 
auto parts makers, of doing business with the United States. 
171. Korea also shares the concern over the excessive duration of some anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures initiated by th e U.S. government.  According to the Secretariat Report, a total 
of 254 anti-dumping duty orders were in effect as of  December 2009.  Of these, 28% had already been 
in place for 10 to 20 years, and 15% ha d been imposed for more than 20 years. 
172. In addition, out of the 41 countervailing duty orde rs in effect as of December 2009, five had 
been lasting for 23 years, including the one agains t Korea stainless steel cooking ware.  The Korean 
Government finds that duty orders of such duration could be considered out of place given the U.S.’s 
strenuous efforts to enhance the competitiveness of its domestic industries. 
173. We are now at a critical juncture in the DDA negotiations.  Members will have to redouble 
their efforts to break the logjam through what we call a "cocktail approach".  We hope and trust that 
the U.S. will continue to play its leadership role in  helping the DDA negotiations to move forward.  In 
this regard, I would like to take this opportunity to  remind this house that Korea, as Chair of the G-20 
Seoul Summit to be held in November 2010, will al so work closely with the U.S. Government and 
other G-20 countries to ensure that this Summit will make meaningful contributions to the early and 
successful conclusion of the DDA negotiations. 
NEW ZEALAND 
174. The United States is New Zealand’s third largest trading partner and we take a close interest 
in its trade policy.  We therefore welcome the opportunity which this Review presents for the WTO 
Membership to engage in dialogue with the United States about its trade policy. 
175. This is an extremely important Review becau se the United States, as the world’s largest 
economy and trading nation, plays a critical leadership  role in this Organization.  It makes a critical 
contribution both to setting and main taining open and transparent trade rules and to achieving further 
global trade liberalization.  WT/TPR/M/235 
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  176. As a country that firmly supports the multilateral trading system and the benefits it brings to 
all participants, New Zealand appreciates the leading role the U.S. has played. 
177. We recognize and share the Administration’s co mmitment to concluding an ambitious and 
balanced Doha Round.  We welcome the leadership  of U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Kirk 
and Ambassador Punke.  We look fo rward to working with them, and with the wider U.S. team to 
successfully concluding the Doha Round at the earliest possible opportunity.  In these uncertain 
economic times, this commitmen t is all the more important. 
178. As we have heard a number of times this mo rning, the U.S. economy was hit hard by the 
global economic crisis and U.S. trade fell steeply.  We appreciate the U.S. commitment in the G-20 
and APEC contexts to refrain from raising new tr ade and investment barriers or implementing WTO 
inconsistent measures to stimulate exports.  We  support this commitment and the ongoing vigilance 
required to resist pressures for protectionism. 
179. We have followed with interest the National Export Initiative and the President’s goal to 
double exports in five years.  Key to achieving the President’s goal will be further liberalization of 
trade and investment.  In this context, we welcom e the U.S. Administration’s decision to enter into 
negotiations with New Zealand and other countries for the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement.  This 
is an opportunity to work with the United States to negotiate a high quality and comprehensive trade 
agreement in a regional context. 
180. Active U.S. participation and leadership in the WTO remains vital to the future well-being of 
this Organization, and to prospects for bringing th e Doha Round to a successful conclusion.  For this 
reason, we look to the U.S. to set the benchm ark in terms of the openness, transparency and 
competitiveness of its economy and regulatory regime.  We look to the U.S. to continue to lead the 
way on further trade liberalization. 
SWITZERLAND 
181. The U.S. is a very important economic part ner for Switzerland;  it ranks second for Swiss 
exports and is the most significant non-European su pplier.  Our trade relationship is reinforced by 
very substantial foreign investment from both countri es.  Switzerland is one of the largest, if not the 
largest, foreign investor in U.S. manufacturing an d has strengthened significantly its presence there 
over the past two years.  U.S. investments in Swit zerland are also considerable and growing.  Specific 
issues are being dealt with under the Swiss-U.S. Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum established 
in 2006. 
182. In our Declaration at the last U.S. TPR on 2008, we said "We are very concerned by today’s 
economic situation triggered by the subprime, securitization and credit crises".  Since then, the worst 
case scenario has happened.  The U.S. and the wo rld economy have faced the worst economic crisis 
since the 1930s.  Despite a sudden steep fall in world trade, overall demand and employment around 
the world, markets have remained open.  In many respects, the mistakes of the 1930s were not 
repeated. 
183. The huge U.S. domestic stimulus package c ontained nevertheless some inward-oriented 
measures.  Examples are to be found in the car industry under the Trouble Assent Relief program or 
the domestic production requirement for iron, steel and manufactures used for public works financed by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.  And another example is the local content requirements at sub-federal level.  Not all is criticis m:  referring to the cars, I would like to point out 
that the cash for clunkers car buying stimulus pr ogram applied both to domestically-produced and 
foreign-made cars equally. WT/TPR/M/235 
Page 30  
 
  184. For the near future, let me highlight three con cerns we have in relation to the U.S. trade 
policy.  First, rising protectionism:  U.S. GDP growth has slowed down recently;  the impact of the fiscal packages is fading.  Job creation has remained stalled so far.  The rod to sustainable economic 
growth could still be long;  we run the risk of ri sing protectionist pressures in terms of anti-dumping, 
countervailing duties and non-tariff barr iers.  We urge the United States to resist these and keep its 
market open;  in turn, the U.S. will bene fit from open markets for its growing exports. 
185. Second, rising border controls:  we note that th e release time for imports in the U.S. is among 
the shortest in the world;  however, preparatory steps are very comprehensive with the 10+2 Rule 
fully enforced this year and the 100% scanning which proves very costly and not feasible.  
Switzerland pleads for risk-based strategies and is interested in a mutual recognition agreement 
between C-TPAT and our authorized economic operator regime. 
186. Third, rising requirements or delays blocking trade:  in the meat sector, Switzerland has been 
waiting for years for a ruling by the Animal and Pl ant Health Inspection Service to restart Swiss 
exports of some specialty meat.  Despite the fact that Switzerland and the U.S. are in the same risk 
category for BSE, no action is being taken for a reopen ing of the U.S. market for Swiss meat exports.  
In addition, the Food Safety Inspection Service require ments have become so strict and costly to abide 
to, in particular for inspections that small businesses  cannot even dream of exporting to the U.S.  In 
the area of maintenance of aircrafts, also, there is  more than a two-year delay in the certification of 
new firms as new security measures await to be publis hed by the Transportation Safety Agency.  We 
urge the U.S. to maintain these markets accessible to competitive foreign firms. 
187. The Secretariat Report also refers to the in terest of Customs and Border Protection to 
establish uniform non-preferential rules of origin.  We  would urge the U.S. to focus foremost on the 
finalization of the negotiations on the harmonizati on of the rules of origin initiated in 1995 and 
mandated by the Agreement on Rules of Origin.  A ll efforts should be focused on that endeavor.  
Referring to the ongoing negotiations on the revision of the government procurement agreement, they 
are in their final phase.  Switzerland appreciates the U.S. involvement and strongly pleads for U.S. 
leadership toward a rapid conclusion with substan tial results.  It is time to successfully conclude a 
negotiation which started in the early 2000. 
188. Finally, I would like to stress our appreciation th at the U.S. trade and investment regimes still 
guarantee one of the most open markets in the worl d regardless of the concerns mentioned earlier.  
We share the U.S. view on an ambitious and bala nced conclusion of the Doha Round and invite the 
U.S. as well as the other major trading powers including the emerging ones to assume leadership 
corresponding to their share in the world trade and to enter into the final phase of the negotiations. 
189. A strong rules-based system, as provided by the WTO is crucial particularly for small 
countries like Switzerland.  We are therefore commit ted to help adjust and strengthen the WTO rules 
and their implementation. 
ECUADOR 
190. Undoubtedly, the most obvious difference between the present trade policy review and that of 
2008 has been the explosion of the international fina ncial crisis.  This crisis, which has had a global 
impact and arose from a sharp downturn in the housing market and associated banking and credit crisis, plunged the United States economy into severe and protracted recession, as evidenced by the 
contraction in its GDP in five of the nine quarter s covered by this review and by an unemployment 
rate which in October 2009 peaked at 10.1%, 5 per centage points above than the level recorded in 
December 2007.  WT/TPR/M/235 
 Page 31 
 
 
  191. The responses to the crisis took various fo rms, but the fiscal support and stimulus 
programmes in favour of domestic suppliers of goods and services in certain sectors which, as the 
Secretariat Report points out, amounted to hundreds of billions of US dollars deserve special mention.  
Without prejudice to the reasons for their adoptio n, Ecuador considers that the Membership as a 
whole, as with the measures that other Members were forced to adopt as a consequence of the 
international financial crisis, should analyse the e ffects of these measures within the context of the 
WTO Agreements. 
192. Although there are encouraging signs that th e United States economy is recovering, the 
structural reforms need strengthening to prevent a repe tition of the crisis.  In this respect, in addition 
to approving the Government's intention to rebalance the economy by increasing the share of 
non-residential investment and exports in total out put, we welcome the recent approval of legislation 
to establish stricter regulation of the financial system at the same time as we invite the Government of the United States to consider the existing initia tives for a new global financial architecture. 
193. With respect to its tariff structure, Ecuador notes that the United States, except for two lines 
devoted to crude oil, has bound all its tariff lines.  In the agricultural sector, however, tariff rates vary 
significantly, ranging as high as 350%.  Moreover, of the 1,595 tariff lines that cover this sector, 696 
have non- ad valorem  duties. 
194. With respect to the domestic support that the United States grants to agriculture, although as a 
percentage of the value of production it remains lo w compared with other OECD countries and some 
non-OECD countries, the size of the agricultural sector  means that the absolute amount of support is 
considerable, which could create severe distortion in world markets.  Consequently, considering also 
the importance of the agricultural sector for develo ping countries, we suggest that the United States 
should review the amount and nature of the domestic support it provides in this sector. 
195. We note with concern that the United States has still to comply with the recommendations 
and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body in th ree separate cases, a situation that is eroding the 
credibility of the system.  Aware that the United States closely follows the fulfilment of Members' 
obligations in this Organizati on's various committees, we again call on it to comply with these 
recommendations as soon as possible. 
196. Despite the sharp decrease in exports to th e United States market in 2009 as compared with 
2008, trade relations between Ecuador and the United St ates continue to be robust.  One factor that 
has contributed to the growth of trade between the two countries has been  the enactment by the 
United States of the Andean Trade Preference Act.  Ecuador appreciates the granting of this unilateral 
preferential treatment to compensate for the efforts made  to combat the traffic in narcotic drugs, but at 
the same time considers that it should be granted an d remain in force for more than a one-year period, 
thereby affording the economic agents of both coun tries greater certainty.  At the same time, we 
would like to express the concern felt by Ecuadoran  fresh product producers and traders regarding the 
time taken by the zoosanitary and phytosanitary in spection services to complete the formalities for 
authorizing and grading fruit and vegetable imports from Ecuador.  We trust that it will be possible to 
solve this problem on the basis of a dialogue between the relevant authorities on each side. 
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM, ON BEHALF OF ASEAN 
197. ASEAN and the United States have long enjoyed a strategic and economic partnership that 
has continued to be strengthened over the years.  Ju st last week, our ASEAN leaders got together with 
President Obama for the Second ASEAN-U.S. Leader s Meeting in New York, where we reaffirmed 
our common resolve to continue strengthening our comprehensive relations, including through the 
ASEAN-U.S. Trade and Investment Framework Agre ement, with a view to enhancing prosperity, 
security and stability in the region. WT/TPR/M/235 
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  198. Despite being in the midst of recovering from the global recession, we are also pleased with 
the sustained increase in two-way trade between  ASEAN and the United States, which totaled 
US$84 billion in the first half of 2010, representing a 28% increase from 2009.  In addition to this, the 
stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in A SEAN totaled US$153 billion in 2008, whilst stock of 
ASEAN foreign direct investment in the United St ates totaled US$13.5 billion, further testament to 
the importance of our economic relations. 
199. A number of us have also engaged in bilate ral FTAs with the United States, whilst Brunei 
Darussalam, Singapore and Viet Nam together with  Australia, Chile, New Zealand and Peru have 
entered into negotiations with the U.S. on the re gional Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement.  We 
continue to view our regional and bilateral economic partnershi ps as building blocks towards a 
strengthened multilateral trading system, which will complement the successful outcome of the Doha 
Development Agenda in due course. 
200. I shall now turn to specific trade policy inst ruments of the United States.  We note the 
Secretariat’s assessment that U.S.’s trade and i nvestment regimes are amongst the most open in the 
world, and have commendably remained so in spite  of the global economic recession, helping avoid a 
worldwide slide into protectionism.  Border meas ures and quantitative restrictions have remained 
unchanged since the last review, however we still view  that certain features of the U.S. trade policy 
could be improved. 
201. ASEAN noted that whilst the simple average applied MFN tariff has remained at the pre-
recession rate of 4.8%, tariff peaks continue to ex ist in products of export interest to developing 
countries, such as agriculture goods, textiles, and foot wear and as such would like to urge the United 
States to undertake substantial tariff reductions across the board in both agriculture and NAMA 
negotiations.  Doing so would provide  greater economic benefi ts and meaningful market access for all 
developing countries and would serve to be a positive contribution in this Development Round. 
202. ASEAN would also like to reiterate previous concerns on the United States Farm Act, where 
we would like to urge the United States to avoi d any form of support that could distort trade, 
particularly given that the United States is one of the world’s leading agricultural producers, and 
hence has the potential to effect world prices and international trade. 
203. We also note with concern, the Secretariat’s observations that the 20 Anti-Dumping 
investigation initiations in 2009 re main lower that during the peak of 2007, however, the share of 
investigations that result in final anti-dumping or ders have increased from 224 to 246 orders, affecting 
imports from 40 countries.  We regr et the frequent recourse of the United States to such measures as it 
creates uncertainty for foreign exporters and stifle s competition.  Some of us in ASEAN also have 
specific concerns pertaining to the United States use of zeroing methodology in calculating dumping margins and the arbitrary selection of respondent s, which we hope the United States will look into. 
204. Moving on to services in the Doha Developmen t Round negotiations, while the United States 
has been constantly calling upon de veloping Members, in particular ASEAN, to undertake ambitious 
commitments to liberalize services sectors, the U.S. continues to maintain restrictions in certain 
sectors where U.S. leadership is a key driver of  the success of the Round, such as telecommunications 
services, maritime transport services, logistics and Mode 4.  We hope to see the United States undertake liberalizing commitments in these sectors. 
205. Let me turn briefly to the participation of the U.S. in the WTO.  The United States has 
continued to play a strong leadership role in  the multilateral trading system and has actively 
participated in all areas of the DDA negotiations , seeking strong outcomes to the Round.  We 
continue to view the U.S. as a wo rld leading economy that can assume a great role in ensuring that the 
Round is a success and one that is mutually advantag eous to all nations.  A SEAN would in particular  WT/TPR/M/235 
 Page 33 
 
 
  like to thank Ambassador Punke and his delega tion for their tireless efforts and constructive 
engagement with delegations including  individual ASEAN Members in Geneva. 
206. We would also like to express our appreciation to the United States for its contributions on 
Trade Capacity Building programs and WTO’s trade-related technical assistance, allowing the developing and least developed coun tries including those in ASEAN to integrate more effectively into 
the international trading system a nd benefit further from global trade. 
SINGAPORE 
207. Singapore and the United States share strong b ilateral economic relations underpinned by a 
common belief in free trade and open markets.  This bond was strengthened by the successful signing 
of the U.S. Singapore Free Trade Agreement in 2003 , the first free trade agreement between the U.S. 
and an Asian nation.  With our ec onomic links enhanced by the Agreement, the United States, in 2009 
became Singapore’s third largest trading partner with  a total bilateral trade of about US$48 billion.  
Although, between 2008 and 2009, the global economic crisis had caused our total trade to fall by 
nearly 23%, Singapore nonetheless climbed in th e U.S.’ export and import rankings.  In 2009, 
Singapore was the U.S.’ 11
th largest export destination and 23rd largest import source, as compared to 
being 12th and 28th respectively just one year before.  This  made Singapore the U.S.’s fifth largest 
trading partner in Asia last year, after China, Japan, South Korea and Chinese Taipei. 
208. The United States is also Singapore’s largest foreign investor, with an overall FDI stock 
estimated at US$38 billion in 2008, mainly in financ ial and insurance services.   U.S. companies based 
in Singapore include both multinational corpora tions and small and medium sized enterprises, 
representing a diverse range of industries, spa nning sectors such as biomedical science, infocomm-
technology, education and oil and gas.  Similarly,  Singapore’s investments into the United States are 
substantial, valued at more than US$10 milli on in 2008.  This placed the U.S. as the 11th most popular 
country worldwide for Singapore’s outward investment s, which have mainly been in the financial 
services and manufacturing sectors. 
209. In addition to strong two-way trade and invest ment linkages, Singapore’s economic relations 
with the Unites States are multi-faceted and wide rang ing.  Our scientists and institutions have formed 
partnerships for cutting-edge R&D collaborations.  Both our economies participate actively in the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperati on fora.  And our current collaboration on the Trans Pacific 
Partnership Agreement along with Chile, New Zeala nd, Brunei, Peru, Viet Nam and Australia, is 
aimed at further deepening economic integration in  the Asia-Pacific, through a high-quality free trade 
agreement that reinforces the WTO’s globa l of enhancing trade liberalization. 
210. It is thus clear that Singapore greatly values our partnership with the United States, not only at 
the bilateral level but also as a fellow proponent of free trade.  As an anchor of the global free market 
economy, the U.S. plays a critical role in setting the stage towards liberalized trade and investment in 
the world.  As a major influencing power, their actions also set the tone for others to follow. 
211. It is hence essential for the United States to ensure that its trade practices reflect its trade 
principles, and we are concerned that this has not been  the case in all areas of its trade policy thus far.  
The recent economic crisis, for example, has given rise to an emerging pattern of domestic preference 
measures and assistance schemes in the United States.  This is worrying.  It  is disadvantageous to 
foreign firms, damaging to the U.S.’ own export goals, and instigates similar actions in other 
economies, all of which stifle global economic activity and slow down potential recovery.  Our 
concerns with such measures and bills are reflecte d in some of the questions we had earlier submitted 
to the U.S., as we would like to better understand wh at they entail and what their impact on businesses 
might be. WT/TPR/M/235 
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  212. While it could be argued that many of these measures have been implemented in accordance 
with the U.S.’ international commitments, including those of the WTO, upholding and enhancing the 
global trading regime necessitates a commitment not only to the letter but to the spirit of the WTO’s 
laws, premised on the principles of openness and tr ansparency.  As the world still grapples with 
current economic uncertainty, the U.S.’ commitment to the free market system assumes even greater 
relevance that in times of strong growth.  The U.S.’ leadership by example is key to achieving an ideal 
global trading environment.  Not only is it important to our traders and investors that the United States 
overcome the pressures of shielding domestic workers and industries, it is also crucial to the global 
trading engine as a whole that the U.S. rise up agai nst protectionist policies to maintain the open and 
transparent trade and investment regime that we all uphold. 
213. Before ending, I would also like to acknowledge  the efforts of Ambassador Punke and his 
team in the DDA negotiations.  We share the goal of seeing a good outcome.  We hope to see 
discussions progress and look forward to the U. S.’ leadership role in the negotiations. 
NORWAY 
214. Let me first refer to our bilateral trade relati onship with the United States.  The United States 
is the second largest export market for Norwegian goods  following the European Union.  In addition, 
it is the third most important source of imports to Norway.  The value of goods exported to the U.S. 
decreased by about 12% from 2008 to 2009, while im ports from the U.S. decreased by 2%.  In other 
words, U.S. exports to Norway were not seri ously affected by the global financial crisis. 
215. The economy of the United States is of such  a magnitude that the trading relationship 
Members have with the United States is extremely important to each Member as well as to the world 
economy.  It is therefore with great interest we ha ve studied the reports on the trade policy and trading 
environment of the United States, and we have al so submitted written questions.  Allow me to make 
some general remarks and raise a couple of points of particular concern. 
216. The United States has been an engine of intern ational trade negotiations for over 60 years.  
The U.S. has always been a key player in both launching and in ensuring the successful outcome of 
previous rounds of negotiations.  We are confident that the U.S. w ill show leadership in the crucial 
time ahead and do its part as we strive to fi nally bring the DDA to a successful conclusion. 
217. As stated in the Secretariat Report, the trad e and investment regimes of the U.S. are among 
the most open in the world, and have remained so  throughout the period under review.  We agree with 
this general assessment and would like to underline the importance of this fact to the general well-
being of the global economy. 
218. Furthermore, as noted in the reports, the U.S. h as in general resisted the pressure to respond to 
the global economic recession by tightening restric tions on imports.  We agree that the restraint 
demonstrated by the United States has been a key fact or in our collective effort to avoid sliding into 
the destructive spiral of protectionism. 
219. While the general assessment is mainly positive,  we remain concerned about certain aspects 
of the trade policy of the U.S.  Firstly, the U.S. is  a frequent user of trade remedies.  Anti-dumping 
and countervailing measures were imposed on fresh , whole Norwegian salmon in 1991.  The main 
result of these measures was the substitution of Norweg ian suppliers of salmon to the U.S. market by 
other suppliers. 
220. In our view, there has never been and still no basis for the application of an anti-dumping and 
countervailing measure on fresh, whole Norwegian salmon.  U.S. practic e relating to "Sunset reviews" 
appears to be a purely mechanical procedure wher e all current AD-measures are rolled over every five  WT/TPR/M/235 
 Page 35 
 
 
  years.  The AD measure from 1991 imposed on Norwegia n salmon is not only to the detriment to the 
Norwegian exporters, but also to the American consumers and the American processing industry. 
221. The situation today is clearly very differen t compared to 1991 when the measures were 
introduced, but also compared to the last sunset re view in 2005.  For the upcoming sunset review we 
expect a transparent approach where the U.S. tak es into consideration the new situation and finally 
remove the AD measure that has stayed in place for 19 years. 
222. Secondly, I would like to highlight the importance of maritime transport to world trade and 
the world economy.  Access to a global network of reliable, efficient and cost effective maritime 
transport services is beneficial to all WTO Member s.  Maritime transport constitutes an essential 
vehicle for commercial interconnection in the worl d economy.  Norway believes that better access to 
and supply of maritime transport services on open a nd equal market conditions is crucial to the 
economic development.  We be lieve improved offers and binding commitments in the WTO are 
important for fair competition and economic growth. 
223. We will therefore use this occasion to encourage th e U.S. to contribute to the entry into force 
of the MFN article by the end of the negotiation Round as foreseen by the Council of Trade in 1996.  
In our view, maritime transport would also be an obvious part of a deal on environmental services in 
the Doha Round.  
COLOMBIA 
224. In recent years the world has endured the wors t economic crisis since the Great Depression of 
1929.  In the United States, the magnitude of the crisis has been reflected in 9.3% unemployment affecting almost 15 million people, the highest leve l since 1982, a 2.4% fall in GDP in 2009, declines 
in exports and imports of 9.6% and 13.9%, respec tively, and an increase in debt, which rose from 
36% of GDP in 2007 to 53% in 2009. 
225. The crisis also affect ed the twin deficits that were causing economic analysts so much 
concern.  The current account deficit shrank, falli ng from 6% in 2006 to 2.7% in 2009.  Meanwhile, 
the fiscal deficit, which had been reduced to 1.2% in 2007, increased to 10% in 2009, due to the fiscal 
stimulus packages applied. 
226. At present, there is talk of economic recovery , the worst concerns seem to have evaporated 
and the fear of a return to protectionism also s eems to have receded.  A significant role in achieving 
this result has been played by the ability of th e Government of the United States to respond to the 
crisis by adopting anticyclical measures, particul arly an expansionary monetary policy and fiscal 
stimulus packages.  We welcome the fact that th e United States has resisted protectionist pressures 
despite its domestic economic situa tion and that, as the Secretariat Report observes, has helped "to 
forestall a worldwide slide into protectionism". 
227. During the period under review, the United States ma intained one of the lowest tariff levels 
among WTO Members, a simple average applied MFN tariff of 4.8%, which indicates an economy 
with a high degree of openness.  Moreover, and desp ite the global crisis, the United States was the 
world's second largest importer in 2009, with 12.2% of world imports. 
228. However, since low tariffs can be offset by the excessive use of corrective measures, we are 
concerned about the increase in thei r use.  The Secretariat Report notes that the United States has in 
force 246 anti-dumping duty orders affecting imports  from 40 trading partners.  Likewise, initiations 
of countervailing duty investigations almost trip led and final orders rose from 31 in 2007 to 41 in 
2009.  Moreover, despite "zeroing" having repeatedly  been declared incompat ible with WTO rules, 
anti-dumping investigation proceedings continue to adopt this practice. WT/TPR/M/235 
Page 36  
 
  229. Another concern is the increase in practices that  affect the competitiveness of other Members 
of the WTO such as the implementation of SPS me asures that go far beyond agreed international 
standards;  the increase in agricu ltural subsidies contained in the 2008 farm bill, at a time when the 
question of how they might be reduced was being discussed;  and the "Buy American" programme that continues to be implemented despite its discriminatory elements. 
230. Colombia values the commitment of the United States to the multilateral trading system and 
its constant efforts to strengthen it.  We encourag e the United States to continue exercising leadership 
in order to bring the Round to a rapid and success ful conclusion, while encouraging all the other 
Members, especially the larger ones, to renew thei r commitment to the completion of the negotiations.  
In making this appeal we trust that the effort s currently being made will bear excellent fruit. 
231. At bilateral level, we note that the United States is  our principal trading part ner.  It is the main 
destination for our exports with 40%  of the total, our main investor with 27% of FDI and the largest 
source of tourism to Colombia with 23.3% of the total. 
232. Bilateral trade exceeds US$22,000 million, with  a balance in favour of Colombia.  Our 
exports include, in particular, fuel, coffee, flowers,  bananas and made-up clothing.  For its part, the 
United States is our chief supplier of machinery and equipment, chemicals and cereals. 
233. Since 1991 the United States has enabled Colomb ia and the Andean countries to benefit from 
an important tariff preference programme as part of the joint anti-drug trafficking and crop substitution strategy.  We continue to be grateful for this important instrume nt that has helped to 
generate new export opportunities. 
234. In 2007, Colombia and the United States conc luded the negotiation of an FTA for the purpose 
of strengthening trade relations and investment.  The Congress of the United States has not yet ratified 
the Agreement.  Given the importance of the Agreem ent for bilateral relations we trust it will be 
ratified shortly. 
235. The current United States TPR is being conducted at a time when we appear to be emerging 
from the crisis.  In his State of the Union address in  January of this year, President Obama said:  "… 
we need to export more of our goods.  Because the more products we make and sell to other countries, 
the more jobs we support right here in America.  So tonight, we set a new goal:  we all double our 
exports over the next five years, an increase that will support two million jobs in America". 
236. We interpret this statement as an express acknowle dgement of the role that international trade 
can play in overcoming the economic crisis and as a commitment to a more open international market. 
COSTA RICA 
 
237. Costa Rica is participating with great interest  in this review of the trade policy of the 
United States, its principal trading partner and the source of most of its FDI inflow.  Although there 
was a fall in bilateral trade in 2009 due to the econom ic crisis, the first half of 2010 marked the onset 
of a recovery.  The figures for 2009 indicate that over one third of Costa Rican exports went to the 
United States, and 45% of imports came from that co untry, as did a little over half of FDI.  Costa Rica 
exports to the United States market products as diverse as medical instruments, computer parts and other information technology products, bananas, pi neapples, coffee, tyres and textile products, among 
much else.  For their part, United States exporters  supply the Costa Rican market with products such 
as integrated electronic circuits, petroleum products , maize (corn), soya beans, paper and board and 
computer equipment, to mention only a few.  WT/TPR/M/235 
 Page 37 
 
 
  238. The relations between our countries have grown even stronger since the beginning of 2009, 
when the Free Trade Agreement between Centra l America, the Dominican Republic and the 
United States (RD-CAFTA) entered into force in  Costa Rica.  Costa Rica applauds the firm 
commitment of the United States to a rule-based tr ading system and agrees with the statement made 
by the United States in its report concerning the importance of the WTO as a defence against 
protectionism, thanks to the application of its rules and its monitoring, transparency and trade analysis 
work, including trade policy review exercises. 
239. Like the United States, Costa Rica assigns high priority to the successful conclusion of the 
Doha Round negotiations and shares the inte rest in achieving ambitious results. 
240. The Secretariat Report stresses the role of th e United States in forestalling a slide into 
protectionism in response to the global economic cr isis.  It is remarkable that, despite the severe 
recession suffered by its economy, the United States is currently maintaining a trade regime as open 
as before the crisis, which has certainly helped to dissuade other countries from resorting to trade 
measures for purely protectionist reasons. 
241. Within the context of its strategy for emerging from recession and triggering economic 
recovery, the United States has announced the im plementation of an important initiative for 
promoting its exports and creating new jobs.  Costa Rica would like to know more details of the 
measures to be taken as part of this initiative and endorses the call made in the Secretariat Report 
concerning the importance of having this export promotion strategy complemented by continued 
reduction in remaining restrictions on market access and other trade-distorting measures. 
PERU 
 
242. With a GDP of US$14,000 million in 2009 an d a population of around 300 million, the 
United States is the largest economy in the world and the largest consumer market and provider of 
FDI.  Accordingly, the United States trade policy revi ew is of special interest since in this way we can 
analyse and consider the progress it has made since its last review. 
243. In its Report the Secretariat st resses the stability and openness of  the United States' trade and 
investment regimes and the fact that, despite its economy being in sharp recession it has largely 
resisted protectionist pressures, which would have  had a major global impact.  Nevertheless, the 
Report also notes that during the review period th ere was a pronounced declin e in United States trade, 
with goods exports down by 19% in 2009 as compared with the previous year and imports down by 
26% during the same period. 
244. The global economic crisis and the severe rece ssion have had significant repercussions, in 
particular on the labour market, with the unemp loyment rate reaching a high point of 10.1%.  
Nevertheless, the second half of 2009 saw the beginning of an economic recovery, reflected in a 3% 
increase in real GDP in the first quarter of 2010, which we hope will be sustained. 
245. As part of its policy for promoting a sustained economic recovery, the United States 
authorities have committed themselves to increasing dom estic savings and exports, reducing the fiscal 
deficit and improving the regulation of the financ ial sector.  Peru recognizes and appreciates these 
efforts by the United States to overcome the recessi on and support the recovery  and rebalancing of its 
economy.  It is important to note the food safet y and security measures incorporated in the new 
agricultural legislation.  We consider that th e United States should continue with its open and 
transparent trade and investment re gimes and their support for productivity, in order to achieve better 
results with its exports.  We agree with the Secr etariat as regards the need  for United States export 
policy and promotion to be complemented by reduc tion in restrictions on market access and other WT/TPR/M/235 
Page 38  
 
  distorting measures, such as tariff peaks, support fo r agriculture, and remaining barriers to services 
trade and investment in the United States. 
246. I must stress the importance for Peru of the bila teral relationship, since the United States it is 
its foremost trading partner and second in the field of investment.  At present, the framework for our 
bilateral trade relations is the Trade Promotion Ag reement that was signed in April 2006 and entered 
into force in February 2009.  Moreover, Peru has been collaborating with the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership with a view to establishing a Regional Tr ade Agreement with the Un ited States, Australia, 
New Zealand, Singapore, Chile, Brunei and Vietnam designed for the realities of the 21
st century.  
Likewise, the United States and Peru both belong to APEC. 
247. In the area of bilateral trade, in 2009, impor ts from the United States amounted to more than 
US$4,300 million, the United States being our foremost supplier.  In the same year, Peruvian exports 
to the United States accounted for 17% of the total, reaching a value of US$4,600 million.  Peru's total 
exports to the United States have been steadily in creasing and during the period 1994-2008 recorded 
an annual average of 15%.  Peru's non-traditional expor ts are predicted to grow at an annual rate of 
23% during the period 2009-2014, which is of specia l importance for my country.  At the same time, 
the United States is the second most important source of FDI in Peru in sectors as diverse as industry, 
mining, financial services and energy, with an investment stock estimated at more than US$2,700 million in 2009. 
JAPAN 
248. Let me start with economic policy and the economic  environment.  Just three months after the 
previous TPR of the U.S. in June 2008, Lehman Brothers went bankrupt with an unprecedented level 
of debt. Its influence was felt far beyond the U.S. economy, and triggered a severe economic 
stagnation and difficulties throughout the world.  
249. We greatly appreciate the various efforts the U. S. has devoted to economic recovery under the 
Obama Administration since its inauguration in January 2009, and commend its efforts for maintaining its market openness and competitiveness. 
250. The economic measures that have been taken are producing positive effects. The real GDP 
growth rate has been positive since the third qua rter of 2009, while so me downtrend tendencies, 
including high unemployment, remain.  Economic recove ry is slow but under way. There is no doubt 
that the recovery of the U.S. economy is important  for all WTO Members; so is the U.S. trade and 
investment policy. 
251. President Obama set a goal to double exports ove r the next five years, and announced the 
National Export Initiative to help to achieve this  goal. Japan recognizes that the U.S. government 
expresses a stronger interest in trade than before, esp ecially for the increase of exports which lead to 
jobs creation. 
252. Japan believes it is important that the U.S.  continues to place the development of the 
multilateral trade system at the core of its economi c policy, and that the FTAs signed, concluded, or 
currently being negotiated by the U.S. will comple ment and reinforce the multilateral trade system. 
Japan expects continuous contribution by th e U.S. towards the conclusion of the DDA. 
253. With regard to specific trade and investment po licies, I would like to make a few comments.  
Firstly, with regard to the "Buy American" provisi ons in the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 and other legislation, Japan request s that their application and implementation be 
consistent with the commitments of the U.S. unde r the Agreement on Government Procurement, and 
that the U.S. ensure that they do  not contravene international comm itments to resist protectionism.   WT/TPR/M/235 
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  254. Secondly, let me briefly touch upon dispute settle ment. The U.S. is one of the most frequent 
users of the WTO dispute settlement system. We a ppreciate that the U.S. has resolved many cases 
through a mutually agreed solution or the implem entation of adverse rulings and recommendations by 
the DSB.  
255. However, there also remain certain cases wher e the U.S. has yet to achieve full compliance 
long after the expiry of the implementation period, or the so-called "reasonable period of time".  Such 
cases include DS217, DS322 and DS184. Japan urges the U.S. to take immediate and concrete actions 
to fully comply with the DSB’s recommendations and resolve these long-standing disputes without further delay.  
256. Thirdly, as to the patent system, the U.S. is the only country which has adopted the first-to-
invent system. It has the problem of a lack of stab ility and predictability, and the cost of preparing and 
retaining documents proving the date of the inventio n. Japan believes that the patent system should 
provide transparency and stability of rights with fe wer burdens placed on inventors. Therefore, Japan 
continues to urge the U.S. to switch from its current first-to-invent system to the first-to-file system.  
257. Fourthly, with regard to anti-dumping, Japan requests the prompt revocation of unduly long 
U.S. measures.  Fifthly, with regard to maritime tr ansport, Japan would like to raise several issues. In 
response to the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, there is a movement to establish new legislation which would 
expand the application of the Jones Act. Japan requests that any such legislation be in conformity with 
basic WTO principles, and again strongly requests the repeal of the Jones Act.  As for the 24-hour 
rule, "10+2 rule" and 100% contai ner scanning requirement, Japan urg es the U.S. to improve these 
measures so that they will not undermine the smooth flow of goods.  Japan also hopes that payment to 
domestically flagged vessels under the Mariti me Security Program will be repealed. 
258. Sixthly, Japan expects the U.S. to give caref ul consideration to the Foreign Manufacturers 
Legal Accountability Act of 2010, in order to ensure its consistency w ith international agreements and 
to avoid introducing measures in a trade-restrictive manner. 
259. Finally, I would like to express our fervent hope that the U.S. will continue to exercise its 
strong leadership towards enhancing the world free trade system.  
ARGENTINA 
260. It would be impossible for an American country  to ignore the importance of the United States, 
not only in the regional context but also in worl d trade, both for the trade flows in which it 
participates and for its role as the main player in  the world trading system that this Organization 
embodies. 
261. A quick reading of the data in the Secretar iat Report only confirms the importance of the 
United States for the world economy and trading system, with almost 3,000 million dollars of 
merchandise trade in 2009 and imports that represen t - according to the United States Report - around 
19% of the world total and 14.5% of exports. 
262. The commitment of the United States to the ru le-based trading system, as demonstrated by its 
role as main user of the WTO's Dispute Settleme nt Body, has made and continues to make an 
important contribution to the strengthening of the system.  However, this commitment needs to be reaffirmed through the definitive implementation of  certain rulings with which the United States has 
still to comply. 
263. The commercial and economic re lationship between our countries has always been very 
close;  the composition of trade has been similar during recent years and, in particular, during the WT/TPR/M/235 
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  period covered by this review, with a clear pred ominance of manufactured products and fuel among 
exports in both directions. 
264. From the beginning of the new century bilate ral trade between the two countries increased 
steadily up to the third quarter of 2008, when the effects of the global crisis began to impact on trade flows.  Bilateral trade then slumped by 30% th e following year, although it had improved by January 
of this year and a timid recovery of the order of 6% of the bilateral trade flow is now being observed 
relative to the previous year.  Nevertheless, we cons ider that there is a strong potential for growth in 
bilateral trade. 
265. However, the relations between Argentina a nd the United States do not end with the trade 
figures.  Within the framework of the Doha R ound negotiations, as well as in the institutional 
development of the WTO, we have taken the same view on a number of issues while there have also 
been a few disagreements. 
266. With respect to the issues on which we agree, we both want to see an ambitious and balanced 
outcome of the negotiations.  We take the same vi ew on specific aspects of the negotiations such as 
multilateral registration for wines and spirits, on the negotiation of effective disciplines that make it 
possible to end the degradation of marine resour ces by prohibiting subsidies that create excessive 
fishing capacity, and on the use of the instruments contained in the WTO rules for protecting domestic 
industry and on unfair competition. 
267. Nevertheless, despite all these shared views, we  are concerned about the idea, expressed again 
today by the United States, that some developing co untries should contribute more in this Round, in 
terms of market access, than other Members.  This is of particular concern when the United States has 
been granting and in some cases con tinues to grant subsidies to its agriculture, its financial institutions 
and its automobile industry.  In this context, we find it illogical to argue that other developing 
Members which are unable to provide subsidies shoul d contribute more than others in this Round. 
268. We note that both the Secretariat Report and th at of the United States include the conclusion 
of President Obama's Council of Economic Advisers concerning the need to give the United States a 
new balance, less dependent on domestic expend iture and consumption as engines of economic 
activity and wish President Obama's Government every success in this respect. 
TURKEY 
269. At the outset, we would like to start by pointing out that the U.S. played a crucial and positive 
role in the recovery of the world economy from one of its deepest crisis.  At the pinnacle of the crisis, 
its prompt reaction through stimulus packages has b een one of the main elements in preventing the 
crisis from going any deeper. 
270. While there have been some examples of pr otectionism like government procurement or 
concerns over the potential trade distorting effects of  certain measures in these packages, in general, 
we believe they were limited in scope.  They must  remain so and those packages should not become a 
general practice, undermining what we have achieved so far in the WTO. 
271. Being the biggest economy and one of the most prosperous and dynamic market of the world, 
the U.S. will continue to be an engine of grow th for the world economy in the future.  Obviously, 
certain structural challenges like low domestic savin g rate or fiscal imbalances will remain the source 
of attention.  In this respect, we are looking forw ard to the outcome of several studies initiated by the 
U.S. government in order to address such structural problems.  WT/TPR/M/235 
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  272. We also certainly hope that the U.S., as one of  the key players, will show leadership with 
regard to the Doha Round as well.  As one of the ma in stakeholders of the multilateral trading system, 
we expect unnerving commitment from the U.S. to finalize the Doha Round, taking into account its 
development mandate. 
273. Our cooperation with the U.S. is broad and ge tting stronger each day in a number of different 
fields.  More than 1,000 American companies are among the top major investors in Turkey in various 
sectors from energy to banking with a total investment of US$6 billion. 
274. Our trade relations with the U.S. are also growing very fast.  We have also learnt that Turkey 
is also among the targeted "new tier" countries in th e U.S.’s new strategy of doubling the exports in 
five years.  We are looking forward to further im proving our commercial relations.  In the meanwhile, 
we also hope that the new export plant will be carri ed out in line with the U.S. commitments under the 
WTO, and the new export strategy will not lead to any increase in the U.S.’s current level of already 
high domestic support and export subsidies in agriculture. 
275. As pointed out in both Reports, the U.S. has one  of the most open trad e regime in the world 
with some restrictions in certain sectors.  One such  striking example is in the services sector.  Despite 
its overall openness, it seems that participation by the foreign companies have been restricted in 
certain fields through various domestic regulations .  We hope that the U.S. will address and show 
necessary flexibility in domestic regulation talks of the DDA. 
276. We have very much appreciated the commitmen t clearly expressed in the U.S. Government 
Report to the rules based trading system.  We share the U.S.’s belief in the primacy of the multilateral 
trading system and we are ready to work with th e U.S. towards further strengthening of the WTO.  
Nevertheless, we are also concerned that the U.S.  has not yet complied with a few decisions of the 
dispute and appellate bodies under this house.  Complia nce with such decisions is the first step to 
improve and strengthen the rules based trading system and there must be no exception for any Member and for any issue including the use of zeroing method. 
277. Another point we would like to raise about the U.S. trade regime is the duration of the 
safeguard and anti-dumping remedies.  In the U.S. practice, there are remedies applied for a long time, 
one example being 36 years.  While we fully unders tand the importance of the establishing a fair trade 
environment, in our opinion, such long durations are not remedial, but punitive. 
278. We are also concerned with continuously in creasing security measures at the borders.  These 
must be handled in a cost effective and efficient manner.  We have posed several questions on this 
topic, which, we believe, help us better understand such implementations. 
279. Last but not least, we read with interest that th e U.S. is not planning to conclude new bilateral 
FTAs other than the Trans Pacific Partnership.  This is in stark contrast with the general trend in the 
world.  We hope that this will be an opportuni ty to conclude the DDA and to strengthen the WTO. 
EUROPEAN UNION 
280. We note with some surprise that the Secretaria t has not given any coverage to the fisheries 
sector. We would like to understand the reasons for this omission, which deprives Members of 
valuable information, the U.S. being one of the world's major fishing nations and traders of fish 
products. So an explanation would be in order.  
281. As several other speakers have observed, the U.S. is the second largest participant in the 
trading system. The policies it adopts influence th e shape of the world economy and global trade. 
With this influence comes responsibility: the respons ibility of the U.S. to meet the highest standards WT/TPR/M/235 
Page 42  
 
  of transparency;  to comply rigorously with WTO commitments and obligations; and to contribute to 
strengthening multilateralism.  
282. Over the decades the U.S. has b een at the forefront of those who have recognized the value of 
an open, rules-based international trading order.  Indeed the U.S. played the prime role in its 
construction. Recently, however, we see some signs  that this commitment and willingness to lead by 
example may be dwindling. This is of great concern.  This review provides an opportunity for the U.S. 
to reassure its partners that maintaining open mark ets, expanding trade, and remaining faithful to 
WTO rules remain at the top of its agenda, and that  it will stand firm in the face of protectionist 
pressures. 
283. For the EU the stakes are especially high becau se our economies are the most interlinked in 
the world. We are by far each other's largest expor t markets absorbing some 20% of our respective 
exports in goods and a bout 30% in services. Even though the economic crisis caused a double-digit 
drop in 2009, still over 600 billion Euros worth of goods and services crossed the Atlantic. Our 
investment relations also dwarf any other. The EU holds over one trillion Euros of FDI in the U.S. - a third of our total stock abroad. At the same, the EU is also host to over 1 trillion Euros of investment 
coming from the U.S. The overall "transatlantic work force" is estimated at 12 to 14 million people.  
284. Now, disagreements between us often fill the headlines. But the numbers I have cited are a 
more realistic reflection of our positive commercial relations, just as they reflect our long record of 
cooperation in the WTO and a bilateral relati onship firmly grounded on WTO principles.  
285. Even though our level of economic  integration is advanced, the transatlantic market still holds 
a lot of potential.  As an example, in June 201 0 the U.S. and EU concluded the Open-Skies aviation 
agreement. This deal alone carries an estimated  potential to deliver overall 12 billion Euros of 
economic benefits and create  possibly 80.000 new jobs.  
286. The EU, like others, hopes to continue to find in the U.S. a constructive and responsible 
partner, so as to reap opportunities for mutual trade, growth and employment. On the multilateral 
front, to get to a Doha conclusion, whatever the u ltimate balance of concessions that will have to be 
made, this means that the U.S. will need to demons trate leadership in the same way as it has done in 
previous multilateral Rounds, including by making a furt her contribution of its ow n, by being realistic 
in what it seeks from others, and by giving fu ll recognition and value to the systemic and 
developmental benefits of the Round.   
287. The U.S.'s current economic difficulties were la id out in some detail this morning. The 
economy is still on the rebound from the most severe re cession since the Great Depression, and this 
has exposed structural challenges fo r sustainable growth in the future.  Against this background, the 
two reports underscore the new emphasis of U.S.  trade policy on export promotion and enforcement 
of partners' trade commitments. In a period when much growth in purchasing power is taking place 
outside its borders, particularly in the emerging econo mies, the U.S. naturally looks more to exports to 
contribute to its economic growth. It is a valid obj ective with which we take no issue. However, the 
particular strategy risks disappointing at home as we ll as abroad, unless the U.S. pays equal attention 
to keeping its own markets open and removing the re maining barriers for foreign suppliers. Given that 
almost a third of U.S. imports are manufactured inputs used in export production, openness to imports is just as much a prerequisite for American co mpetitiveness as export success. Big exporters are also 
big importers. In a period of high unemployment, blaming trade is so easily a kneejerk reaction, so upholding openness and valuing imports as well as expor ts requires political effort. But this precisely 
is what defines leadership, and what de livers prosperity in the long run.  
288. 
Having made these more general observations, le t me turn to some specific trade policy 
measures that worry us, particularly in so far as they  indicate wider tendencies.  I first note that the  WT/TPR/M/235 
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  trade and investment restrictions th at we highlighted during the last review remain major concern. For 
example, in 2008 we raised the issue of restrictions to foreign participation in the procurement market 
and preferential treatment accorded to domestic s uppliers. Since then, however, not only have these 
discriminatory policies not been rolled back, but mo re Buy American provisions were included in the 
stimulus package.  
289. Now, we recognise the need to provide incentives to economic opera tors, so they can generate 
growth and jobs, but international commitments need also to be fully respected, or a dangerous signal 
could be sent to other trading nations. We are, regrettably, already seeing Buy Local requirements 
spreading in other countries. Moreover, we fail to see how limiting competition could be in the interest of public customers or end consumers. We  wonder to what extent these arguments have been 
taken into consideration and how they may impact  the implementation of Buy American provisions. 
290. Turning to another potential source of friction, as the Secretariat's Report also notes, there has 
been an increase in legislative activity to impr ove product safety. The objective of consumer 
protection is of course laudable. However, as a Member of this Organisation the U.S. has the 
obligation to ensure that it is pursued by prop ortionate measures that do not unnecessarily restrict 
trade.  
291. The draft Foreign Manufacturers' Legal Account ability Act passed recently by the House 
Energy and Commerce Committee does not meet that t est. If adopted in the current version, the law 
would prohibit imports from those foreign manufacturer s who did not register an agent in the U.S. 
This would inflict a heavy administrative burden on foreign manufacturers as well as raise serious 
questions of WTO compatibility, notably with rega rd to Article XI of GATT. Moreover, the U.S. 
would clearly be shooting itself in the foot, by penalizing US based producers who rely on foreign-
made components. Could the U.S. share its views on the matter? Specifically, we invite the U.S. to 
confirm that its international oblig ations will be observed in the ongoing legislative process so as to 
avoid a negative impact on trade.  
292. Among the long-standing trade irritants, we are co mpelled to flag two particular concerns in 
the sanitary and phytosanitary area. First, the U.S.  maintains import restrictions on deboned beef and 
beef products on grounds of BSE risk that are not in line with international standards established by 
the International Organization for Animal Health  (OIE), and without providing any scientific 
justification for doing so. Imports from EU countries ha ve been denied although they are classified by 
the OIE as controlled or negligible BSE risk st atus - the same as the U.S. and some other WTO 
Members from whom beef and beef products ha ve nevertheless been accepted. Beyond the 
obligations under the SPS Agreement, such restricti ons reflect an inconsistency - a double standard if 
you wish - in the U.S. policy which insists strongly on  the respect of OIE rules in its export markets. 
So why not for imports? The U.S. Secretary of Agricu lture recently confirmed to us that the so called 
"BSE comprehensive rule" would be published in the US Federal Regi ster still in 2010, aligning the 
U.S. legislation with OIE. Could the U. S. provide an update on these intentions? 
293. Second, there is a backlog of applications for access to the U.S. market  for plants and plant 
products, some of them pending for several years a nd even decades while imports have remained de 
facto blocked. European exporters of plants and pl ant products have practically stopped developing in 
the U.S. as a consequence of the slow and unpr edictable procedures which defy the relevant 
international standard of the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). We would like to urge 
the U.S. to take steps to avoid undue delays in approving first time imports as well as to increase its 
transparency on import requirements, for instance by publishing a list of quarantine pests. More 
generally, we do note a considerable reticence on th e part of the U.S. to embrace international 
standards in several areas, which is obviously of concern. WT/TPR/M/235 
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  294. Last but not least, the U.S. has reiterated fi rmly - including today - its commitment to the 
integrity of existing trade rules. We hope that this will also encompass prompt actions to ensure 
implementation of all outstanding rulings and r ecommendations by the Dispute Settlement Body 
addressed to the U.S. Without entering into the cost  to trade of any individual case, not implementing 
DSU rulings puts the full credibility of the Dispute Settlement system at stake.  
295. To close, the EU looks forward to hearing further views on the U.S. trade policies and 
practices. We thank the U.S. for providing this mo rning replies to our advanced questions. We hope 
that the U.S. will take up in its policy delibera tions in Washington the feedback received from 
partners in good faith through this review.  
MALAYSIA 
296. At the outset, Malaysia would like to associat e itself with the statement delivered by 
Ambassador Janin Erih of Brunei Darussalem on behalf of ASEAN. 
297. The Secretariat Report depicts that the trade a nd investment regime of the United States as the 
most open in the world, and has remained so th roughout the period under review, despite the difficult 
times faced by all of us in this room given the recen t financial and economic cris is.  It is heartening to 
note the restraint demonstrated by the U.S. during this difficult period in its policies which has in a 
way help avert the world from slipping fu rther into the realm of protectionism. 
298. Malaysia recognizes the active role of the Unite d States in the multilateral trading system as 
well as the DDA negotiations.  This is reflected by  the various proposals and contributions made by 
the United States to advance negotiations in all areas.  In this light, Malaysia hopes that the U.S. will 
continue to assume a leadership role in moving forward the negotiations, as well as in finding creative 
solutions to deal with difficult issues in our concerte d efforts to achieve a successful conclusion of the 
Doha Round which is balanced and takes into account the concerns and interest of all WTO Members. 
299. On the bilateral front, the United States is a very  important trading partner and this is clearly 
reflected in our trade statistics. 
300. In 2009, the United States was Malaysia’s third largest trading partner.  During 2009, 
Malaysia and the United States recorded a total trade of US$31 billion, w ith Malaysia’s exports 
amounting to US$17 billion and imports US$13 billion.  However, this figure also reflects a 21.5% 
decline over the preceding year as Malaysia too was not spared from the effects of falling demands due to the severity of the ec onomic and financial crisis. 
301. Malaysia’s major export to the U.S. remains electrical and electronic products in which it 
accounted for 65.5% of total export.  Other main  exports include rubber, optical and scientific 
equipment and palm oil.  Imports were mainly on el ectrical and electronic, machinery, appliances and 
parts and chemicals and chemical products. 
302. With regards investment, for the period of 2005-09, the U.S. was the second largest foreign 
investor in Malaysia’s manufacturing sector, with  total investments amounting RM21.6 billion where 
investments were primarily in capital and tec hnological intensive and knowledge-based sectors.  
Many major U.S. companies have established presence in Malaysia for many years, not only 
providing capital investments, but also integral to wards the creation of the employment opportunities 
for Malaysians. 
303. To further strengthen bilateral trade relations , our Minister of International Trade and 
Industry recently led a trade and investment mission to Atlanta, Philadelphia and Washington D.C.  WT/TPR/M/235 
 Page 45 
 
 
  from 18-21 September 2010.  This efforts is to con tinuously engage and foster  collaboration with the 
U.S. on the trade and investment opportunities in both countries. 
HONG KONG, CHINA 
304. Hong Kong, China enjoys close economic and trade relations with the U.S.  Since 1985, it has 
been our second largest trading partner.  In 2009, the U.S. remained our second largest export market 
and fifth largest source of impor ts.  Despite a 16% drop from the preceding year due mainly to the 
global economic downturn, total trade between the two places amounted to around US$55 billion.  
And, as the economy starts to recover, we have  witnessed a strong rebound of almost 19% in our 
bilateral trade volume in the first seven months of  2010.  The U.S. also has substantial direct 
investments in Hong Kong, amounting to some US $32 billion, covering a wide range of economic 
sectors.  Meanwhile, the tens of thousands of  U.S. citizens who make Hong Kong their home 
represent one of the largest and liveliest expatriate communities in our city. 
305. Overall, we agree with the asse ssment that the U.S.’ open a nd transparent trade and economic 
policy is not only crucial to maintaining the flexib ility and efficiency of its economy, but is also 
instrumental in driving and supporting economic grow th on a global scale.  In this regard, we are 
encouraged to note the Secretariat’s observation that the U.S. has shown resistance to the 
exceptionally strong pressure to tighten restrictions  in imports brought by the unprecedented financial 
and economic crisis.  Such resistance has helped fo restall a worldwide slide into protectionism.  We 
would also subscribe to the Secr etariat’s conclusion that any further export promotion has to be 
complemented by a continued reduction in the U.S.’ remaining restrictions on market access and other 
trade distorting measures. 
306. On the DDA, like others we have high hopes and ex pectations of the leadership vested in the 
U.S. and other major players to support the multilate ral trading system through this Organization, and 
more specifically via the prompt and successful conclusion of the DDA negotiations.  As we near the final phase of the negotiations, the need for a cour ageous demonstration of leadership has become 
ever more pressing.  We believe that this can be manifested in a greater willingness to remove 
existing trade barriers, in a fuller engagement with  other trading partners in sorting out outstanding 
issues, in a stronger appreciation of negotiating part ners’ positions, as well as in greater flexibility in 
reaching a balanced and ambitious deal through collec tive give-and-take.  To this end, we take some 
reassurance from the statement in the Government Report that the U.S. will continue to play a 
leadership role and work with other WTO Members in the pursuit of a successful conclusion of the 
Doha Round.  Such leadership and co-operation are required to break the impasse and bring us all to 
the finish line, thereby sustaining the faith that we  have all placed in our mutual efforts in conducting 
these international trade negotiations. 
307. Turning to specific aspects of trade policy, in respect of tariffs, we appreciate that the U.S. 
has bound all its lines.  We also note that the U.S. ha s maintained a low averag e applied rate of 4.8% 
in 2009.  In the same year, however, tariff peaks as high as 60% were applied to certain non-
agricultural products, such as leather, rubber, foot wear and travel goods.  We look forward to the 
creation of additional market access opportunities in the U.S. through further tariff reductions. 
308. For textiles and clothing, in particular, we we lcome the U.S.’ elimination of all quantitative 
restraints on such imports in 2009.  We expect the U.S. to continue to exercise restraint from taking 
protectionist measures that could impede textiles a nd clothing trade flows between the U.S. and its 
trading partners. 
309. On technical regulations and standards, we ac knowledge that the U.S. enacted the Consumer 
Product Safety Improvement Act in 2008 in order to  enhance the safety of consumer products, in 
particular, children’s products.  We appreciate the objectives of the Act, but note that, in its initial WT/TPR/M/235 
Page 46  
 
  stage of implementation, the new requirements caused considerable practical difficulties for importers 
and manufacturers, domestic and foreign alike.  We would like to invite the U.S. Administration to 
take into account the scientific ev idence and the capacity of the industry when introducing new safety 
standards, so as to avoid creating any unnecessary techni cal barriers to trade.  We would also ask that 
a reasonable lead time be provided to allow smoot h compliance with any new requirements by foreign 
suppliers. 
310. As for contingency measures, the U.S.’ practice of "zeroing" in calculating dumping margins 
remained the issue of most concern among the disputed anti-dumping cases during the review period.  Hong Kong, China shares the view of many others that the use of "zeroing" is unfairly partial and 
inconsistent with WTO rules.  A series of unequivoc al WTO Appellate Body rulings have repeatedly 
affirmed this.  We would urge the U.S. to di scontinue such a practice in accordance with the 
established jurisprudence in the matter. 
311. In addition, we note that there has been a bi g increase in the number of new countervailing 
duties investigations, doubling from 7 in 2007 to 14 in 2009.  None of the countervailing duties 
investigations initiated in 2007 an d 2008, and only 5% of the an ti-dumping investigations initiated 
during the same period, have resulted in negative dete rminations.  We hope that the U.S. will exercise 
caution in considering whether to initiate trade reme dy investigations, as they, once initiated, have the 
effect of stifling trade. 
312. Furthermore, we note that some of the anti- dumping and countervailing duties orders have 
been in place for a prolonged period of time.  The Secretariat Report mentions that 15% of 254 anti-dumping orders have been in place for more than 20 y ears, with some for as long as 36 years.  We are 
not convinced that it is possible for a foreign expor ter to practice dumping to cause and sustain an 
injury to domestic industry for decades.  We woul d invite the U.S. to re-assess the economic case for 
their continuation critically during the next sunset review of these orders. 
313. Turning to agriculture, as the worl d’s largest exporter, with a considerable share of the global 
market, and as one of the largest importers of agri culture products, the U.S. has a prominent role to 
play in delivering an ambitious Doha deal w ith additional market access opportunities, and should 
take the lead in liberalization on this front.  We note that high tariff rates are still maintained for a number of agricultural products.  Price-based safeg uards are applied frequently, and domestic support 
remains high.  We look forward to the U.S. stepping up its efforts to liberalise this sector. 
314. As regards services, we note from the Government Report that the U.S. has indicated ways to 
advance the Doha negotiations thr ough improved packaging in the se rvices negotiations.  However, 
we remain concerned about the market access barri ers and other distorting measures persisting in 
some important services sectors, including financ ial services, transport, telecommunications, and 
maritime transport services.  We would for example, ask the U.S. critically to evaluate the Jones Act 
exemption, which has a bearing on its position in the negotiations for maritime transport services, and to assess whether the legislation covered by that  exemption still serves the objectives for which it was 
originally intended.  The MFN exemptions maintain ed by the U.S. in telecommunications and other 
services sectors are also of concern to us.  In air transport services, exemptions have been maintained 
on sales and marketing, and on operatio n and regulation of computer reservation system services.  As 
we have stated in our written questions, would urge  the U.S. seriously to consider removing all the 
MFN exemptions, in order to comply with a fundamental principle of the multilateral trading system. 
315. On customs procedures, we note that the U.S. was in the process of enhancing freight security 
during the review period, in particular through the planned implementation of 100% scanning of 
inbound seaborne containers worldwide by July 2012  pursuant to the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.  
While we understand the objectives behind this initiativ e, we would invite the U.S. Administration to 
conduct a pragmatic reassessment of the operati onal challenges of the 100% scanning requirement  WT/TPR/M/235 
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  and the timeline for its implementation.  It is impor tant that legitimate trade and the efficient operation 
of ports around the world should not be impeded in  the pursuit of overly cumbersome and intensive 
freight security measures. 
CANADA 
316. Canada has a long-standing and multi-dimensiona l relationship with the United States. Our 
countries share the most comprehensive trade relations hip, facilitated by a rules-based trading system 
centred on the WTO and the North American Fr ee Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Canada and the 
United States are each other's largest customers a nd biggest suppliers on a single nation basis and we 
share the largest bilateral flow of goods and services between any two nations in the world. Each day, 
approximately US$1.4 billion worth of goods and services and over 170,000 people cross our mutual 
border. In 2009 alone, Canada exported US$307 billi on in goods and services to the United States and 
imported US$286 billion in return. U.S. direct inv estment in Canada totale d US$274 billion in 2009, 
representing just over 50% of total foreign direct in vestment in Canada. In the same year, Canadian 
direct investment in the United States reached almost US$249 billion, accounting for some 44% of 
Canadian foreign direct investment abroad.  
317. By integrating our economies, we have in creased the productivity of North American 
producers, facilitated their participation in global supply chains, and created an environment that 
allows them to be more competitive. Actions that  threaten this relationship can undermine the cost 
structures of businesses on both sides of the border.  Barriers to imports from Canada can hurt U.S. 
companies that source inputs from Canada, and negatively impact exports from the United States with Canadian content. Over half of imports from Canada  are intermediate inputs feeding into U.S. supply 
chains. In short, actions that restrict trade harm U.S. competitiveness.  
318. The depth of the Canada-United States economi c relationship is testimony to the value of 
international trade rules – rules that have ensure d transparency and predictability to allow business 
relationships to flourish. For its part, and even in these difficult economic times, the United States has 
demonstrated its commitment to engage in the global economy by playing a key role in the WTO and 
continuing to pursue a bilateral and regional trade ag enda.  Moreover, as demonstrated by the reports 
that we are considering here today, the United Stat es remains generally very open to foreign trade and 
investment.  
319. However, we are concerned that support in the United States for open markets and for further 
trade liberalization has come under in creased pressure.  We applaud efforts of the U.S. Government to 
ensure continued openness and to pursue rules-based trade liberalization.  Given the risk - however 
minimal - of recurrence of the global economic downt urn, and the reality of growing economic inter-
connectedness, a strategic commitment to continued trade liberalization is more important now than ever before in order to help create the conditions th at workers, industries, a nd communities need to be 
successful in the global marketplace. Accordingl y, we urge the United States to continue to 
demonstrate its support for increased trade liberaliza tion in the coming years and to ensure that new 
restrictions are not put in place, even when these  restrictions are technically permitted under existing 
agreements.  As noted in the Secretariat Report,  to ensure that trade policy supports economic 
recovery and rebalancing more effectively, cont inued recognition of the contribution of open and 
transparent trade and investment regimes can make to productivity is a key ingredient of export 
success.   
320. In any bilateral trading relationship of this scope and magnitude, issues and disputes can be 
expected to arise. Let me turn to some specific ar eas of importance.  We are pleased to have reached a 
bilateral agreement with the United States with resp ect to government procurement in February 2010 
to address some of the concerns surrounding the Buy American restrictions attached to funding under 
their stimulus legislation.  We also look forw ard to exploring the possibility for deepening our WT/TPR/M/235 
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  procurement commitments and to continuing to wo rk closely together within the plurilateral 
negotiations under the Agreement on Government Pr ocurement to improve procurement disciplines 
and to expand market access more broadly. However,  we are concerned that there are pressures on the 
domestic front that could potentially create new proc urement barriers.  As we can all agree, no one 
wins when one introduces measures that restrict trade. Economic recovery depends on maintaining 
and expanding trade relationships.    
321. Maintaining the free flow of goods, services, and people across our border remains a shared 
challenge. Despite ongoing efforts to build a more , integrated economy to promote North American 
competitiveness, North American industry has had to face new challenges in recent years in doing 
business across the border. These ch allenges include more onerous reporting burdens, an increased 
number of inspections, and a number of other measures.   Canada shares the U.S. desire to enhance its 
security, at the border and beyond. We expect to see increasing collaboration between our two 
countries, which will result in greater physical secu rity and in greater economic security through 
facilitated trade and investment. We remain confid ent that through continued engagement with its 
North American and other trading partners, the Unite d States can meet the challenges of maintaining a 
high level of border security while avoiding unnecessar y impediments to the flow of goods, services 
and people. 
322. In spite of these new security measures, the bulk of Canada-U.S. agricultural trade flows 
relatively problem-free. We remain each other’s mo st-important customers for agriculture and agri-
food products, with annual bila teral trade valued at approximately $37 billion.   
323. Canada shares the U.S. objective of strengthening food safety systems and recognizes the 
need for collaboration on what has become an increasingly global food supply.  The Canadian and 
U.S. food industries are highly integrated, with significant volumes of commodities, ingredients and 
consumer-ready products movi ng back and forth across the border. Continued bilateral 
communication and collaboration are essential to obtain the positive food safety and food quality outcomes we consistently realize as well as to avoid creating unnecessary impediments to trade that 
would decrease our competitiveness vis-à-vis  third markets. 
324. Our relationship on agriculture is very positiv e, but there are issues of concern. Canada 
is challenging the Country-Of-Origin Labellin g (COOL) requirement that has negatively 
affected exports of Canadian livestock to the United States.    
325. We are also looking for strong leadership on the pa rt of the U.S. in the next Farm Bill to move 
away from the type of distorting farm income suppor t that insulates its producers from market signals. 
326. In the area of intellectual property, Canada and the United States share a common view 
regarding the important role that the protection of intellectual property plays in promoting an 
innovative, competitive and prosperous economy.  Considerable cooperation exists between the 
United States and Canada on a range  of international intellectual pr operty initiatives.  Canada looks 
forward to continued cooperation and an ongoing constructive dialogue with the United States 
regarding intellectual property issues. 
327. In closing, Canada would like to welcome th e strategic leadership the United States has 
traditionally demonstrated to achieve  global economic growth and trade liberalization.  We look to the 
United States to continue this leadership, in sp ite of other pressing priorities, and public skepticism 
regarding the benefits of trade. We also encourage the United States to continue to play an important 
leadership role in giving new momentum to the Doha Round negotiations.   WT/TPR/M/235 
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  CHILE 
328. This review covers a particularly turbulen t period in the recent economic history of the 
United States and the world as a whole.  The emer gency measures adopted by the Government of the 
United States have been successful in avoiding a do wnward spiral into depression.  However, they 
have also had harmful consequences for the budget which must be taken into consideration with a 
view to gradually reducing the fiscal deficit. 
329. We much appreciate the fact that against a background of recession the United States 
Government has successfully resisted the tempta tion to introduce protectionist measures that would 
have worsened the situation.  The leadership shown by the Un ited States, through the consensus 
achieved within the G-20, has made it possible to contain these pressure s and design surveillance 
mechanisms for evaluating the trade measures be ing applied, among which the WTO Monitoring 
Mechanism has proved its relevance. 
330. To the extent that the economy is showing signs of recovery, it is appropriate to set about 
withdrawing the exceptional support programmes introdu ced in the context of the crisis, as proposed 
by the G-20 and the OECD.  We find it encouragin g that in this context the United States trade and 
investment regime has continued to be one of the most open in the world, as indicated by the 
Secretariat in its Report. 
331. With respect to services, we agree with the United States about the importance of progressing 
with the liberalization of trade in services and the benefits that market opening brings for the economy 
in general.  However, our attitude is more mute d where the negotiations on domestic regulations are 
concerned.  In this area, we note that the cautious position taken by the United States is not consistent 
with its ambitions for market access.  The ai m of establishing strict disciplines for domestic 
regulations has to do with ensuring effective acces s to the markets that result from liberalization.  
Without these disciplines access commitments could easily be evaded or eroded by means of 
burdensome or unnecessary regulations. 
332. On the bilateral front, Chile continues to be fa vourably impressed by the results of the FTA in 
force since 2004.  By 2008 bilateral trade had mo re than doubled to reach US$19,000 million.  In 
2009 it fell by 31% as a consequence of the economic crisis. 
333. To conclude, I would like to express our thanks  for the demonstrations of solidarity and 
support by the Government of the United States in th e face of the earthquake that struck our country 
in February 2010, and now for the technical support for the rescue of the miners trapped 700 metres 
underground.  NASA and other United States agencies are cooperating in the rescue process. 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
 
334. For decades the United States h as been the principal trading partner of the Dominican 
Republic which for four years, together with the United States and the countries of Central America, 
has formed part of the RD-CAFTA Free Trade Ag reement.  We note with satisfaction that the 
United States trade and investment regimes are amo ng the most open in the world and have remained 
unchanged throughout the review period, despite the sev ere impact of the global financial crisis on the 
economy and trade of the United States.  In 2009, w ith a 35% reduction in its imports in the second 
quarter, the biggest fall in that year, its current ex ternal deficit contracted substantially.  The United 
States Administration is right to propose stimulat ing its economy and re-establishing its external 
balance by promoting exports and increasing dom estic savings, which will make a very positive 
contribution to reducing the severe and sensitive gl obal macroeconomic imbalance, one of the causes 
of the crisis. WT/TPR/M/235 
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  335. We note that in order to confront this gr ave crisis the United States has implemented 
compensatory multimillion stimulus programmes, particularly in the financial services and automobile and infrastructure sectors, including measures specifi cally for the benefit of domestic suppliers of 
goods and services, from which foreign suppliers ar e excluded.  We understand the need for the 
Government of the United States to provide these support programmes in order to avoid worse evils, 
but we suggest caution and care to ensure that they  are implemented in compliance with the rules of 
this Organization and disturb international markets to the least possible extent. 
336. We note with satisfaction that the average applie d tariff in the United States is 4.8%, the same 
as applied at the end of 2007 when the recession bega n.  However, despite the stability of the trade 
regime, the large number of special trade measure s being applied by the United States is a cause for 
concern.  These anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures are adversely affecting several 
Members of the WTO.  We therefore suggest that th e United States authorities review the situation, to 
enable trade to flow more smoothly and avoid creating barriers to trade. 
337. Where the agricultural sector is concerned, accord ing to the Secretariat Report, in the 2008 
Farm Act maintained most of the policies in th e 2002 Act with only a few changes, while some new 
programmes were introduced.  It is also indicated th at a substantial part of the support is linked to 
prices and/or production and that producers of cereal s, oilseeds and cotton are effectively insulated 
from market prices.  Moreover, the absolute amount of support for the agricultural sector is 
considerable and can affect world markets.  We co nsider it to be of the utmost importance for the 
United States authorities to examine these programme s and take steps to reduce this support which is 
distorting markets and having an adverse effect on the ability of countries, particularly the smaller 
ones, to compete.  Furthermore, this would contri bute decisively to the progress of the Doha Round 
negotiations.  We also note that more than 10% of  tariff lines, mostly for agricultural products, are 
subject to non- ad valorem  tariffs and that due to the considerab le fluctuations in the prices of basic 
products in recent years the ad valorem  equivalents have also change d substantially, which is making 
it very difficult to maintain a certain predictab ility in the trade in these products.  We therefore 
suggest that the United States authorities m odify these tariffs and convert them into ad valorem  ones, 
which would also contribute to commercial stabilit y in the agricultural sector and, given the huge 
importance of the United States for world trade, gi ve a boost to the agricultural negotiations in the 
Doha Round and thus reaffirm its  international leadership.  It should be recalled that the main 
objective of the Round is to promote development through trade. 
338. At the same time, in relation to the settlement of disputes, it should be pointed out that the 
United States has not yet complied with the reco mmendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement 
Body concerning article 110 of the United States Copyright Act, some aspects of the US anti-dumping investigation of certain hot-rolled steel produc ts from Japan, and article 211 of the Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998.  Compliance with the ru lings in some of these cases has been pending for 
more than seven years.  We must stress how important it is for the United States, one of the leading 
Members of this Organization, to comply with th e recommendations and rulings of the DSB, since in 
this way it reinforces the credibility of the multilateral trading system. 
339. Our delegation has sent questions to the delega tion of the United States, in particular in 
relation to aid for exports, the ta xes on alcoholic beverages, support for the agricultural sector and 
certain trade provisions applied by the Common wealth of Puerto Rico, which we consider 
incompatible with WTO rules. 
SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU  
340.
 I believe that all of us are pleased to have ha d reaffirmation from the United States, in its own 
report and again in today’s remarks, of its firm commitment to the multilateral trading system and to 
its leadership role in maintaining an open trad e policy.  We recognize that during the most severe  WT/TPR/M/235 
 Page 51 
 
 
  financial and economic crisis of recent times, the U. S. still resisted the pressure in general to introduce 
protectionist measures and maintained its commitment  to multilateralism at this critical point in time. 
341. My delegation appreciated the de termination of the U.S. over the last few years and the action 
it has taken. I believe it has successfully conveyed a st rong message to the rest of the world that it will 
continue to play its role in building a better ru les-based trading system. We are therefore now looking 
forward to the U.S. adopting a concrete schedule of actions that will help shape the conclusion of the 
Doha negotiations. We also hope that the U.S. government will pursue efforts to support the trade 
agenda as a priority in its economic program. 
342. Turning to the trade policy review exerci se that we are now engaged in, like other 
delegations, we would like to see more clarity a nd certainty in the implementation aspects of U.S. 
trade policies, in terms of its domestic regul ations and administrative regime, as well as its 
compliance with the multilateral trading systems. We have submitted several written questions on a 
number of different aspects in advance, such as competition policy, investment arrangement and 
sector policies, and we are grateful to the U.S. de legation for their responses received today. We will 
examine them carefully and may come back to them again in the second session of this review. 
343. The U.S. is our third largest trading partner, with bilateral trade in goods to US$36.3 billion 
from January to August 2010, up by 41.6% compari ng with the same period last year. We both have 
an important long-term cooperative relationship on in vestment and trade and share the same objective 
of reaching a balanced and ambitious outcome  for the Doha agenda. We look forward to 
strengthening this economic cooperation with the U.S.  even further in the future, through bilateral 
dialogue and multilateral negotiations.   
PANAMÁ 
344. Historically, the Republic of Panama and the United States have maintained close economic 
and trade relations.  The United States is the l eading market for Panamanian merchandise exports, 
around US$304 million in 2009, and the main source of  our imports, approximately US$4,400 million 
in 2009.  It is the fifth largest contributor to  FDI in Panama with around US$154.7 million, and the 
figures for trade in services, the backbone of th e Panamanian economy, although more difficult to 
measure, are also very substantial and the sector shows great promise for future growth. 
345. Since the 1980s, the United States has offe red Panama and the countries of the 
Central American region an important tariff preference programme.  Thanks to these preferences the region has had the opportunity to increase its trade with the United States.  For Panama this has 
proved a valuable tool for developing our exports to the U.S. market and has also helped to generate 
new export capacity. 
346. Panama, like the United States, attaches great im portance to trade agreements as a means of 
boosting trade in goods and services and investment flows and strengthening trade relations and the 
quality of trade between partner countries, with mutu al benefits and responsib ilities.  In 2007, Panama 
and the United States completed the negotiation of a Trade Promotion Agreement that will replace the 
current unilateral tariff preference system.  Panama has ratified this Agreement and believes that at a 
time when the Congress of the United States is r ecommencing the preference programme review 
cycle it will also shortly examine and ratify the Agre ement for the benefit of trade relations between 
the two countries, thereby eliminating the inherent  uncertainty generated by the periodic reviews of 
the current system of preferences. 
347. Panama congratulates the United States on the progress made with its trade policy since its 
last review and the enormous efforts it has ma de to revitalize its economy following the recent 
financial crisis, as well as on assigning great importance to international trade as a means of emerging WT/TPR/M/235 
Page 52  
 
  from the crisis.  This morning Ambassador Punke  stressed how important it is for a favourable 
outcome of the Doha negotiations for all the Members of the WTO to show the necessary vision in accordance with their capabilities and the benefits  they receive from the multilateral system.  
Similarly, both in the WTO and in its bilatera l and regional relations, the United States now has 
various opportunities to demonstrate both ambition and leadership in the liberalization process. 
VIET NAM 
348. During the past 15 years, Viet Nam and the United States have enjoyed vibrant relationship in 
many fields, particularly in trade and economic s.  In 2009, the two-way trade totaled nearly 
US$15 billion, increased almost 15 times compared to that of 2001, the year before the Bilateral Trade Agreement came into force. 
349. The United States has been the biggest importer of Viet Nam in recent years.  Viet Nam’s 
exports of goods to the United States in 2009 reached US$11.5 billion, accounting one fifth of the total exports.  In the first five months of 20 10, bilateral amounted to US$7.75 billion, of which 
Viet Nam exported about US$6.09 billion. 
350. Also in 2009, the United States became the largest  foreign investor in Viet Nam with the total 
registered capital of US$9.8 billion. 
351. Signed in 2007, the Viet Nam-United States Trade and Investment Framework Agreement 
(TIFA) serves as a mechanism for bilateral trade and investment dialogue.  The TIFA Council has 
helped to resolve many obstacles in trade and i nvestment relations, and has contributed to the 
expansion of trade and investment relations between the two countries. 
352. We are pleased to note that the United States is an important partner of Viet Nam in 
negotiating the Trans Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP). Viet Nam highly 
appreciates the flexibility and understanding of the Un ited States which would help us to participate 
more effectively in the TPP. 
353. Besides the bilateral trade and investment  ties which have witnessed remarkable 
improvements, we would also like to take this oppor tunity to express our deep concern regarding the 
application of trade remedy measures by the United States.  The Secretariat’s Report already brought 
up many aspects of the United States’ anti-du mping and countervailing duty investigations, 
procedures and findings which are subject of some WTO disputes during the review period. 
354. We would like to draw your attention on thr ee recent issues concerning Viet Nam.  Firstly, 
the anti-dumping duty order on frozen warm water shrimp from Viet Nam.  The use of zeroing methodology in calculating dumping margins in annual reviews, the arbitrary selection of respondents 
and the Viet Nam wide rate application have cause significant damage to Vietnamese shrimp 
producers, exporters and especially to poor shrimp farmers. 
355. Secondly, the joint anti-dumping and countervaili ng investigations against polyethylene retail 
carrier bags from Viet Nam.  We view that ther e was double counting in this case. On one hand, the 
United States continues to consider Viet Nam as a non-market economy to impose anti-dumping 
duties.  On the other hand, the U.S. applied counter vailing duties.  In addition, the U.S. does not take 
any step to modify its NME anti-dumping methodology to avoid the double application of remedies for the same alleged unfair trading behavior.  We see the application of both measures by the United 
States is inconsistent with U.S. obligati ons under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures and constitute an unfair treatment to Vietnamese firms.  WT/TPR/M/235 
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  356. Thirdly, we are concerned with the preliminar y decision recently made by the United States at 
the sixth administrative review of catfish imported from Viet Nam between August 1 2008 and 31 July 2009.  In the previous Review, a majority  of Vietnamese catfish exporters was given the 
lowest tariff of 0.25%, some were even recognized  as not dumping exercise.  However, in the recent 
Review, the United States suddenly shifted to the Philippines as the surrogate country to calculate 
dumping margins instead of Bangladesh as usual.  Th is led to the rise in the dumping margins of over 
130%, up from zero last year, and as a result, the ta riffs increase and Vietnamese firms shall have to 
bear the retroactive duties. 
357. We acknowledge the important role of the Unite d States in international trade.  We also 
appreciate the development of the bilateral ties.  At the same time, we do hope the United States 
review its anti-dumping and countervailing investig ations before making decisions, so that the 
decisions will not have adverse effects on ot her Members and hurt their domestic industries. 
358. In closing, Viet Nam would like to see a mo re active role of the United States in the 
multilateral trading system, contributing to early conc lusion of the Doha Round.  We look forward to 
further promoting healthy and stable re lations between the two countries.  
BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA 
 
359. Today's exercise is very important, since we are analyzing the trade policy, and its effects, of 
a Member of vital importance for the multilateral trad ing system, namely, the United States, at a very 
special time for the international economic sy stem, marked by the most serious economic and 
financial crisis that the world has experienced in th e last 100 years and one that originated mainly in 
the Member under review and whose effects s ubsequently spread around the whole world. 
360. The commercial and economic policy implemente d by the United States to confront and 
overcome the most recent crisis, c onsisting mainly of the much criticized economic aid packages, put 
together to rescue a deregulated financial sector  and other key sectors of the economy such as the 
automobile industry, has certainly had an impact  on the trade balances of many Members of this 
Organization, especially on those of the developi ng countries, which lack the economic resources to 
respond as the United States has done, although our peopl es are victims of the crisis which we have 
all, asymmetrically, had to endure and which will c ontinue to have real effects for many years. 
361. It should be pointed out that the fiscal stimul us package adopted by the United States in 2009 
and the other trade measures taken to confront the cr isis have made it harder to obtain access to that 
important market.  The quantitative restrictions, the import control measures and the other measures 
with distorting effects that have given its domestic industry an advantage are worth mentioning in this 
respect. 
362. At the same time, we have concerns about the increase in border measures and technical 
barriers to trade introduced by the United States, in particular, concerns of an environmental, sanitary 
and phytosanitary nature, which are blurring the mu ltilateral trade disciplines in force and, using up 
all the available infrastructure, and which our countries are finding it almost impossible to implement. 
363. These measures and/or technical barriers are adversely affecting many products from other 
countries, especially developing countries, putting them at a serious disadvantage with regard to 
access to the United States market by the use of these subtle mechanisms of evasion, while we are 
constantly being required to open up our markets, through the elimination of tariffs, which, as has 
been said here in this room, is not the mechanism used by the United States to lock the doors to its 
market, which is true since it is in fact these barriers we have mentioned. WT/TPR/M/235 
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  364. Neither should we omit to mention those trad e measures implemented by the United States 
that are motivated by aspects other than trade, be ing purely political in nature, and are supported by 
unilateral reports and criteria that interfere in th e internal affairs of sovereign countries.  These 
measures are eroding multilateralism, infringing the principles of the WTO and adversely affecting 
the countries concerned. 
365. We therefore share the concerns that have b een expressed, and those that will expressed in 
later statements, by those Members that have seen th eir trade relations with such an important market 
as that of the United States and with the rest of the world adversely affected for purely political 
reasons. 
366. No less harmful to the image of the WTO and th e multilateral system has been the fact that its 
dispute settlement mechanism, one of the pillars of the Organization, is being constantly jeopardized 
by the repeated and prolonge d failure of the United States to comply in certain cases. 
367. At the bilateral level, we are present here today not only because of the size of the 
United States economy and the potential that this re presents in terms of trad e, but also because the 
United States is the principal destination for our exports and our leading importer.  United States 
imports reached an historical maximum in 2008, while Venezuelan non-petroleum exports to the 
United States market reached a minimum in 2009, falli ng to a third of what we exported the previous 
year. 
368. Finally, with reference to the current D oha Round negotiations, we would remind the 
United States that we also want an ambitious outco me, but ambitious in term s of a coherent response 
to the development objectives defined in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, a response that does not 
work to the detriment of the poorest and most vul nerable, that does not merely make the wealthy 
wealthier and the poor poorer. 
369. We would therefore like to seize this valuable  opportunity to be the spokesman for those 
actors and circles, which on many occasions have drawn attention to the leading role that the United States should play in bringing the Round to a conclusion, and which at the same time have 
expressed concern about the interest of the United St ates in raising the level of ambition with regard 
to the results to be achieved.  We would therefore like to ask the United States whether it is ready to 
sit down to negotiate with a view to achieving an outcome in keeping with the mandate that really 
takes into account the needs of the developing c ountries and the imbalances between the Members of 
this Organization. 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
370. Trinidad and Tobago and the United States share a long-standing mutually beneficial, multi-
dimensional economic relationship, which in recen t times have focused on increasing our bilateral 
investment activities and strengthening our trading partne rship.  It is with this interest in mind, that 
my delegation submitted a few questions seeking cl arification on the economic environment of the 
United States and its trade policies and practices.  My delegation looks forward to reviewing the 
responses of the United States and believes that the information received could be beneficial in 
deepening even further the cordial economic relationship which our two economies enjoy. 
371. The United States is the main trading partner not only for Trinidad and Tobago, but also for 
the Caribbean Community, and it is in this vein th at my delegation notes with  satisfaction the renewal 
of the Caribbean Basis Economic Recovery Act and helping the beneficiary States of the Caribbean 
Community to expand and diversify their exports to this vitally important market.  WT/TPR/M/235 
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  372. The economies of CARICOM member states have  been hit hard by the ongoing global 
financial and economic crisis.  As  a major trading partner, contraction of the demand in the United 
States in the autumn of 2008 had an immediate negative effect on all our key exports sectors, with consequential loss of output and jobs.  Though the degree of exposure experienced by Trinidad and 
Tobago was perhaps less than other CARICOM states , both tourist arrivals and remittances declined 
precipitately in late 2008 and 2009, resulting in sever e pressure on the fiscal operations of virtually all 
CARICOM member states, including Trinidad and Tobago. 
373. Lacking the surpluses necessary to finance economi c stimulus packages, Trinidad and Tobago 
along with its partners in the Caribbean Comm unity has had to review and reprioritize its 
development programs, while at the same time reigning in recurrent expenditure.  Although 
maintaining control of the fiscal budget remains priority number 1, Trinidad and Tobago has 
witnessed an increase in unemployment fro m 4.5% in 2008 to 7.5% in 2010. 
374. The foregoing clearly establishes the extent to which our two economies are linked.  That is 
why we consider that the best economic stimulus plan for Trinidad and Tobago and indeed for the 
Caribbean Community in general is the resumption of robust and sustainable economic growth with 
concomitant job creation in the U.S. economy.  We  wish the U.S. every su ccess in that objective. 
HONDURAS 
375. According to the Secretariat Report, during the period under review, the economy of the 
United States experienced a severe and protracted recession following a sharp downturn in the housing market and associated banking and credit crisis.  The second half of 2009 marked the 
beginning of an economic recovery and GDP increased by more than 2% and more than 5% in the last 
two quarters of 2009, respectively, and by 3% in th e first quarter of 2010, th is growth being supported 
by private investment and consumption, as well as by increased exports. 
376. We note with satisfaction, in the same Report,  that the trading and investment regime is 
among the most open in the world.  Trade and invest ment policy is being used to support the recovery 
of the economy and trade policy, in part icular, is aimed at promoting exports. 
377. I will now, if I may, draw up a balance sheet of the trade relations between Honduras and the 
United States.  In 2009, our exports to the United States fell to about US$1,200 million as compared 
with the US$1,226 million recorded in 2008 and cons isted of such products as clothing, fresh fruit, 
cigars, coffee, tilapia, and sugar, among others. 
378. At the same time, imports from the United States into Honduras al so decreased, from 
US$3,028 million in 2008 to US$2,150 million in 2009.  Imports included fuel, maize (corn), 
telephones, medicinal products, goods transport vehi cles, wheat, manufactured wood products, data 
processing equipment, tourism vehicles and spare pa rts, and paper and board.  In 2010 we are seeing, 
with some optimism, an increase in trade in both di rections, a trend which we expect to continue to 
strengthen. 
379. Honduras is maintaining in force an FTA with  the United States, the objectives of which 
include stimulating the growth and diversification of trade in the region and substantially increasing 
investment opportunities.  This Agreement has ma de our trade relations more predictable while 
allowing us greater access to the largest ma rkets in the world on preferential terms. 
ZAMBIA 
380. My delegation is pleased to note that the s ituation in the United States is beginning to 
stabilize following the recent global financial crisis.  As highlighted in the two Reports submitted by WT/TPR/M/235 
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  the WTO Secretariat and the Government of the Unite d States, despite the notable decline in growth 
of 2.4% overall in 2009, the U.S. economy has had promising economic recovery with 3.5% nominal 
growth between the second quarter of 2009 and the first quarter of 2010.  With 2.5% increase in 
consumption and 3.4% increase in residential fixed investment as well as growth in trade averaging 
17%.  This recovery is important to LDCs in vi ew of the trade and economic cooperation that our 
economies have continued to enjoy with the U.S. Ma ny LDCs are dependent on export trade with the 
U.S. and receive a considerable amount of aid from the U.S. 
381. Zambia also commends the Unite d States for the initiatives undertaken to promote growth and 
development, particularly thr ough the African Growth Opportunities Act.  We note from the 
Government Report that 95% of the U.S.’s imports from the 38 AGOA eligible Sub-saharan countries 
entered that market duty free in 2009.  Zambia’s exports to the United Stat es have exhibited and 
average growth rate of 5% between 2005 and 2009.  This and other initiatives maintained in favor of 
developing countries and especially those catering fo r the needs of the least developed among them 
remain important towards integration in the global system and for attracting FDI. 
382. Although the AGAO presents many opportuni ties for Zambia’s trade growth and 
development, a number of challenges continue to  limit full utilization of this scheme.  Zambian 
companies have faced challenges in meeting so me of the technical, sanitary and phytosanitary 
requirements demanded by the U.S. authorities.  These are challenges faced by many Sub-saharan 
countries. 
383. Therefore support towards productive sector capacity building and addressing barriers to trade 
including the simplification of rules of origin are important for the effective utilization of the 
preferential market access.  To this end, we ar e happy to note that the United States has shown 
commitment in assisting Zambia to enhance competitiveness of its export sector not only to enhance utilization of the AGOA but also to diversify its export  products and markets.  Allow me to take this 
opportunity to thank the United States for the various  technical assistance programs financed through 
the USAID.  Key among these in recent years have  included the Market Access Trade and Enabling 
Policies Programme (MATEP) and Production Finan ce and Technology (PROFIT).  Value chains 
developed through these two programs include horticu lture/floriculture, honey, groundnuts, beans, 
coffee, paprika/chili, maize/seed, handicrafts, cott on/textiles, and livestock and wood products.  These 
programmes have assisted Zambian exporters in a ddressing quality standards, agro processing, market 
access, packaging, human capacity building, low cost finance and export promotion.  The programmes also worked towards addressing cha llenges posed by HIV and AIDS, mainstreaming 
these issues into business and trade operations.  This technical assistance contributed to stimulating 
export growth exceeding US$800 million. 
384. As regards the negotiations under the DDA, while we take note of the statement made by the 
delegation of the U.S. on its commitments to impl ement duty free and quota free treatment for LDCs, 
the real situation on the ground sends a different message.  The U.S. is yet to provide duty free and 
quota free market access for the product coverage in the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration.  We 
therefore wish to know when the U.S. intends to implement the Hong Kong Decision on duty-free quota-free market access.  Other ar eas of concern where we would like to see movement is on the 
trade aspects of the mandate on cotton and the services waiver for LDCs. 
385. Last but not least, I wish to state that the outcome of the Doha negotiations to deliver on 
development must be accompanied technical assistan ce and capacity building support.  To this end, 
we welcome the initiatives undertaken by the U.S. in providing support to developing and least 
developed countries and its increased contribution to  the Global Trust Fund, whole contributions from 
the U.S. reached US$10 million since the launch of  the DDA, as highlighted in paragraph 14 of the 
Government Report.  In particular, we welcome th e contribution of the U.S. through its bilateral 
channel (including USAID and the Millennium Challenge  Corporation) and the direct contribution to  WT/TPR/M/235 
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  the EIF Trust Fund, which has in the recent past been  adjusted upwards.  We are hopeful that the U.S. 
will continue to play an active role through its  bilateral channels as well as through enhanced 
contribution to the Trust Fund over the coming years.  This support is particularly important for the 
effective integration of LDCs and other low income countries into the global trading system. 
BARBADOS 
 386. We would first like to congratulate the U.S. for its leadership role in bringing relative stability 
back to the global financial system and in ensuring  that important enhancements were made in the 
financial regulatory framework, not only in the U.S., but through several global bodies in the global financial system and in a manner more inclusive of developing countries. 
387. Since its last Review in 2008, the global economic recession has been the dominant backdrop 
against which the United States and key global partne rs were required to ta ke unprecedented measures 
towards preserving international economic stability.   
388. Nevertheless, as the Secretariat Report records,  the overall stability and openness of the U.S. 
trade and investment regime during the review period,  did not prevent a steep fall in U.S. trade.  We 
note the various anti-recession measures taken by the United States during the period under review, 
the new measures related to address security and safet y concerns and the adoption of the 2008 Farm 
Act legislation. 
389. As the world grapples with a delicate global economic recovery process, we are encouraged 
that U.S. trade policy for 2010 seeks to advance a r obust American role in the global trading system 
and also for economic recovery and well being. For small, open economies like Barbados, given the 
high degree of vulnerability to external shocks and the important contribution of trade to our 
economies, a swift and sustainable restor ation of the global economy is critical. 
390. In addition to its multilateral engagement, the Un ited States is an active bilateral player and 
has a number of preferential trade agreements with  strategic partners.  The U.S. remains Barbados’ 
main trading partner, and in 2009 accounted for 44% of Barbados’ im ports.  This economic 
relationship is but one critical component of our st rong bilateral relations where technical cooperation 
is also pursued in a number of key areas.   
391. The United States is also the Caribbean region’s  leading trading partner, where relations are 
primarily governed through the Caribbean Basin Ec onomic Recovery Act (CBERA), enhanced by the 
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA).  This program seeks to promote the economic 
development and export diversifi cation opportunities of the countries comprising the region, and has 
played an important role in facilitating our pa rticipation in the global economy. We therefore 
welcomed the Council of Goods decision to approv e the waiver request on this program in March 
2009, which provides a more predictable and stable environment for investment and trade to take 
place. 
392. At the international level, Barbados r ecognises the importance of trade policy and 
development assistance as a means of supporting and reinforcing other U.S. foreign policy and 
international economic policy goals. We particul arly appreciate the continued and significant 
contribution of the U.S. in the Aid for Trade fram ework, which we are convinced, represents a key 
mechanism for stimulating econom ic growth and development. 
393. There can be no doubt of the high level of engagement and leadership of the United States in 
the Doha negotiations and the overa ll multilateral trading system. Barbados is therefore heartened by 
the stated U.S. commitment to the WTO and the conclusion of the Doha Round.  Moreover, we 
depend on key players such as the United States to  continue to actively address the concerns and WT/TPR/M/235 
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  interests of developing countries, particularly small,  vulnerable economies, in order to facilitate their 
further integration into the global trading system.  
394. While all Members have a relevant role to pl ay in the conclusion of the Doha negotiations, 
Barbados looks to the United States and other key partners in playing the leading role towards the 
fulfillment of this Round’s co re development objectives.   
CUBA 
395. I have read the Report of the United States very carefully and listened with close attention to 
the presentation made by Ambassador Punke and I ha ve noted with concern certain inconsistencies 
between words and deeds.  I much appreciate th e statements made by preceding delegations who 
expressed similar concerns, that is to say, regardin g the inconsistencies to which I referred and the 
effects on their economies of the trade measures and practices of the United States, and this is the 
basic direction that I would like to take in my statement, with regard to the effects of the 
United States' policy of blockading my country. 
396. When Mr Obama became President the press reported that the blockade of my country had 
been relaxed.  Something very far from the truth.  Be assured that the ec onomic, trade and financial 
blockade imposed on my country by the United Stat es is still intact.  None of the legislation has 
changed since the previous United States review, that is, since June 2008.  A dozen laws and 
regulations remain intact, in particular the Forei gn Assistance Act of 1961, the Tariff Classification 
Act of 1962, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton or Cuba Liberty Act of  1996.  What is more, very recently, on 
2 September, the President of the United States exte nded the Trading with the Enemy Act in order to 
maintain the blockade of my country.  This Ac t grants the President powers in time of war to 
investigate, regulate or prohibit transactions, transfers, etc. through the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Treasury Department of the United St ates, while maintaining the President's authority 
to impose the remaining legislation c ontributing to the blockade of Cuba. 
397. Cuba and the United States are not at war.  No r is there a situation of serious international 
tension between the two countries.  It would be ridi culous to regard Cuba as a threat to the national 
security of the United States.  Numerous statements by public figures and reports by military institutions and agencies have confirmed that  Cuba does not pose a military threat to the 
United States.  Consequently, none of the measur es taken under this Act are justified nor do there 
exist any of the situations envisaged in Article XXI of the GATT 1947 relating to security exceptions, 
an argument that has been out fo rward to justify the blockade. 
398. Other examples also testify to the continuation of the blockade of my country, namely, the 
siege of institutions and sanctions against instituti ons, enterprises and even individuals, in an attempt 
to discourage foreign companies from investing in our country.  Thus, the blockade is not only affecting my country but also having an extraterritorial effect on third countries. 
399. Moreover, within the context of the blocka de and political hostility, during 2009 a new 
dangerous and potentially harmful situation arose in connection with the intentions of certain 
plaintiffs in cases against the Cuban State to appropriate as a means of compensation trademarks and patents protected by United States legislation.  This  is in addition to the long-running dispute in the 
Dispute Settlement Body relating to Section 2.11, wh ich has already lasted eight years and to which 
other delegations have already referred. 
400. As Cuba has maintained in numerous internati onal forums and here in our own Organization, 
the blockade against Cuba imposed by the Governme nt of the United States is an act of economic 
warfare that cannot be justified by anything in inte rnational law or the rules of this Organization.   WT/TPR/M/235 
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  Cuba asks the Government of the United States to  revoke unconditionally a ll of the legislation 
currently in force enacted  with a view to maintaining the blockade, while reiterating that it reserves 
the right, as a WTO Member, to raise the issue in the relevant WTO bodies at any time it sees fit. 
URUGUAY 
 401. Uruguay would like to stress the role of the Un ited States in the negotiations in progress and 
its great responsibility for the conclusion of the Ro und, at a crucial moment for the international 
economy.  The success of this Round and its prom pt completion will largely depend on the position, 
leadership, and political vision of the United States,  and its adherence to the mandate of the Round, 
which makes development and agricultural reform its priority objectives. 
402. As stated in the Government Report, as one of its trade policy goals the United States is 
seeking to encourage economic growth by increasi ng exports, an objective shared by Uruguay and 
one that makes it even more important to bring the Doha Round to a conclusion with ambitious and 
balanced results in order to gene rate economic growth through new a nd substantial trade flows.  In 
this respect, we would stress the importance of the completion of the Doha Round continuing to be 
one of the foremost priorities of the United States, as reflected in the above-mentioned Report. 
403. Uruguay takes similar positions to the Un ited States on certain issues such as the 
strengthening of the multilateral trading system  based on a system of rules governing trade and 
dispute settlement within the WTO in order to promote growth and global economic development, 
while disagreeing profoundly on others, such as agri cultural subsidies, given that the domestic support 
policy of the United States is having adverse e ffects on both third-country production and market 
access.  As pointed out by the Secretariat in its Report, this is generating serious distortions with 
regard to a substantial part of domestic support that linked with prices and/or production or certain 
price support programmes. 
404. Although the Report recognizes that support for ag riculture in the United States remains low 
as compared with other OECD countries, the larg e size of the agricultural sector means that the 
absolute amount of support is cons iderable, varies from one year to  another depending on prices and 
can have an adverse effect on world markets.  Ur uguay considers that the agricultural mandate agreed 
in Doha is ambitious and at the same time appropr iate for remedying the serious shortcomings and 
limitations of current global agricultural trade.  Convinced that the reform and liberalization of 
agriculture constitute the appropriate response to this  situation, we urge the United States to play a 
fundamental role, as befits it in this process and in particular in this crucial period in which we find 
ourselves. 
405. In the last three years bilateral trade reached a total of US$900 million, making the 
United States one of Uruguay's principal trad ing partners.  The trade deficit in 2009 was 
US$381 million due to both a 17% decline in exports  and a 12% increase in imports relative to the 
previous year.  It should be mentioned that during 2008 there was a huge fall in exports (56%) as 
compared with 2007, while imports increased by 27% relative to the same year.  These movements 
are almost exclusively attributable to the almost 70% drop in sales of frozen bovine meat, historically 
the main export item.  During 2009 sales of this pr oduct again declined by 20%, which contributed to 
a 17% slump in exports in 2009 as compared with 2008. 
406. To expand the economic and commercial opportun ities for trade between the two countries, 
on 27 January 2007 in Montevideo, Uruguay and th e United States signed the Trade and Investment 
Framework Agreement (TIFA).  Under this Framew ork Agreement progress has been made in several 
areas additional to the Bilateral Investment Pr omotion and Protection Agreement including, for 
example, that relating to sanitary  and phytosanitary matters, where fu rther progress is expected, as 
well as in the area of innovation and scientific and technological cooperation. WT/TPR/M/235 
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  407. According to the Government Report, the Unite d States is assigning top priority to the 
multilateral trading system and to the conclusion of the Doha Development Programme.  Uruguay 
fully shares these objectives, convinced that refo rm of the agricultural sector will benefit 
United States farmers also. 
MOROCCO 
408. Morocco and the United States have very close ec onomic ties.  There has been a very notable 
increase in trade between the two countries.  Mo rocco welcomes the conclusion of the free trade 
agreement with the United States and reiterates its support for the work done by the WTO to ensure 
that it meets the criteria of the WTO and contribu tes to the latter's objective of ensuring closer 
economic integration between Members. 
409. Morocco welcomes the meeting of the Joint Co mmittee with the United States organized in 
2009, which has enabled concerns to be met and th e functioning of the free trade agreement between 
Morocco and the United States to be improved. 
410. Morocco expects this agreement to open up mo re new outlets, thus making it possible to 
sustain economic growth and create jobs, above all by promoting exports, encouraging investment and 
improving the business environment, given the different levels of de velopment.  Morocco considers 
that the agreement meets these criteria since it has set  itself a highly ambitious goal with respect to the 
further integration of the two economies. 
411. Since its last trade policy review, the United States has endeavoured to promote trade and 
growth.  Morocco expects it to respond positively to the concerns of the developing countries, 
particularly by promoting new market access opportunities for developing and least developed 
countries, mainly through the elimination of non-tari ff barriers;  finding ways to address the erosion 
of preferences;  granting effective technical and financial assistance;  encouraging special and differential treatment;  and encouraging capacity building. 
412. Morocco congratulates the United States on the pr ogress made in its trade policy and thanks it 
for maintaining openness and pursuing liberalization. 
SRI LANKA 
413. Undoubtedly, the U.S. being the world’s largest economy and the largest importer, and 
bilaterally Sri Lanka’s one of the most important tr ading partners, we attach great importance for this 
TPR meeting.  Until very recently, the U.S. h as been the number one export destination for Sri 
Lankan products.  Though Sri Lanka exports to the U.S. have registered a negative growth of 18% in 
2009 from US$1.9 billion in 2008 to US$1.5 billion in  2009 the U.S. still remains Sri Lanka’s second 
largest export destination.  In particular, the U.S. has consistently remained the most important market 
for Sri Lanka’s export of apparel products.  Overall,  Sri Lanka’s exports in this sector to the U.S. 
accounts for almost 60% of its apparel exports to th e world.  The U.S. also continues to be an 
important supplier in a number of key sectors, notab ly electrical machinery an d equipment, machinery 
and mechanical appliances, and medical instruments.  
414. We are pleased that the U.S. economy has gradually rebound from the crisis without resorting 
to proteccionist measures.  This recovery and h ealthy performance on the economy is important to 
create opportunities for small countries.  Recently the U.S. has contributed to a number of development projects, particularly following the end of the conflict in Sri Lanka in those areas which 
were affected by the conflict.  WT/TPR/M/235 
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  415. In recognition of our steady-bilateral trade relations, both countries signed a Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in 2002, ai med at further enhancing the existing trade and 
economic relations between the two countries.  Th e TIFA Joint Council has provided a forum for a 
trade policy dialogue, spanning across a wide range of bilateral trade and investment issues and 
shared interest and cooperation at the WTO to advance the DDA as well as a number of bilateral trade 
issues. 
416. As a developing country, Sri Lanka has been ab le to enjoy some benefits under the U.S. GSP 
Scheme for a number of product sectors.  However, a several delegations stated this Scheme currently 
excludes Sri Lanka’s most important exports, namely te xtiles and apparel.  It must therefore be noted 
that the majority of Sri Lanka’s trade in on an MFN basis, which has obviously led to it facing a 
number of high tariffs and tariff peaks on its key exports. 
417. Sri Lanka takes note of the fact that the U.S. trade and development policy in seeking to assist 
vulnerable countries across the globe particularly t hose in least development regions like Sub-saharan 
Africa to increase their trade, and has a number of programmes which facilitate preferential and duty 
free access for the exports of nearly 131 countries.  However, we would urge the U.S. to recognize the 
negative impact of such arrangement on the sim ilarly situated vulnerable economies like Sri Lanka 
which depends heavily on one or two product categori es and the U.S. market.  Sri Lanka further notes 
as per the statement made by Ambassador Punke a nd I quote "we will continue to work with the 
Congress and other stakeholders to implement a nd improve these programmes and to better focus 
benefit to the poorest countries".  Sri Lanka unde rstands and welcome helping poor vulnerable 
countries but such arrangements should not be at  the expense of poor and vulnerable economies 
located elsewhere.  We would therefore wish to suggest that the U.S. consider granting similar 
concessions or appropriate assistance to already affect ed countries as well.  Granting such benefits in 
terms of better and more facilitated access to Sri Lankan exports, particularly  the Sri Lankan apparel 
industry at this hour of need woul d be of particular importance to our economy and such benefits can 
help accelerate the country’s post-development effo rts and generate more job opportunities for its 
rural youth, especially those who are in the north and east, the two regions worst affected by nearly 
30 years of terrorism. 
418. We recognize the U.S. government increase ple dges to Doha Trust Fund for capacity building 
of developing countries.  Finally, we also note the emphasis the U.S. places on regional and bilateral 
initiatives, as a supplementary process to the multilate ral trading system.  While recognizing the U.S.’ 
wish to improve trade through such processes, Sr i Lanka would recall that for small economies like 
Sri Lanka, the multilateral trading system remain th e main, and sometimes only feasible, playing field 
to participate in global trade.  Therefore, while noting with encouragement, the reiteration of the U.S.’ 
commitment to strong rule-based multilateral trad ing system and the conclusion of the Doha 
Development Round, we urge the U.S.  to continue its leadership role in this Round and giving priority 
to its development content. 
BOLIVIA 
419. In the Reports of the Government of the United States and the Secretariat, reference is made 
to the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), a programme aimed at combating drug trafficking by promoting sustainable economic alternatives to co ca crop production in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador 
and Peru.  As many of you will re call, Bolivia was one of the countri es to benefit from the preferences 
granted since 2000, originally under the APTA a nd later the ATPDEA, for its fight against drug 
trafficking and the good results it achieved during that period. 
420. 
However, former President George Bush decide d to exclude Bolivia from this programme as 
from 15 December 2008, by an arbitrary, politica lly motivated and unjustified decision which 
signified in practice a form of discrimination between  beneficiary countries.  On certain occasions we WT/TPR/M/235 
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  have expressed the hope that the Administration of President Obama would carry out a fair review of 
compliance with the eligibility criteria by ATPDEA  beneficiary countries but clearly this has not 
happened and instead of being corrected  the situation has been confirmed. 
421. We note with concern that in the reports refe rred to above it is mentioned that Bolivia was 
excluded from the Programme because allegedly it fa iled to comply with the eligibility criteria 
concerning counter-narcotics cooperation, a statement which is incorrect as it gives an erroneous idea 
of the reasons why Bolivia was excluded from the Pr ogramme, since everyone knows that Bolivia has 
fought against the drug traffic responsibly and with commitment and to a large extent is continuing its 
efforts using its own resources, as shown by offici al United Nations reports which also show that 
there was no good reason for the United States to su spend the benefits being received by Bolivia. 
422. Solely by way of illustration, we would like to  share with you some figures from the World 
Drug Report (2009) and the Bolivian Coca Cultivati on Survey (2009) published in June 2010, both 
prepared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 
423. The UNODC's 2009 Coca Cultivation Survey for Bolivi a states:  "this year's survey revealed 
that 30,900 ha. were under coca leaf cultivation in  Bolivia in 2009, an increase by 1% compared to 
last year's estimate of 30,600 ha".  Accordi ng to the same document, "Bolivia reported the 
rationalization/eradication of 6,341 ha. of co ca crops in 2009, 16% more than in 2008". 
424. Among the three main coca leaf producing count ries, Bolivia has rema ined the smallest 
producer since at least 1999;  however, larger pr oducers still receive the benefits of ATPDEA.  These 
facts and figures endorsed by United Nations bodies,  like their implicit validation of our anti-drug 
strategy, show that Bolivia's notable efforts to co mbat drugs surpass many of the results obtained in 
respect of coca leaf cultivation, eradication and sei zure when ATPDEA preferences were available.  
Moreover, they are as good as or better than some of  the results achieved by the other countries in the 
region which still enjoy these prefer ences and face similar situations. 
425. Under the ATPDEA approximately 19,300 jobs we re created whereas, according to Bolivian 
private sector estimates, in 2009, after exclusion from the ATPDEA, roughly 30% of jobs in the 
textile and textile product sector were lost, while  job losses amounted to 15% in the camelidae and 
camelidae manufactures sector and 38% in the leather manufacturing sector, all figures that are making it hard for Bolivia, the country with the lo west development index ra nking in South America, 
to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and pove rty reduction targets.  We therefore wish to 
make it clear that the suspension of the ATPDEA was a heavy blow, in particular for thousands of 
Bolivian workers directly affected by the suspen sion of the programme which has caused social 
problems in the cities and export sectors, since the United States is the third most important 
destination for Bolivian exports. 
426. Clearly, the Government of President Bush used the ATPDEA tariff preferences as a means 
of exerting political pressure on the people of Boli via and their Government.  President Bush's 
decision was unjust and unfair, affecting numerous fam ilies of Bolivian workers.  We regret that the 
Administration of President Obama has opted for the same course of action to the detriment of the 
Bolivian people.  The Government of Bolivia theref ore wishes to express its concern with regard to 
the political use being made of the trade preferences system. 
427. Another aspect of the trade practices of the Unite d States in the Andean region that is causing 
us concern is the conclusion of bilateral agreements  and the erosion of integration processes such as 
that of the Andean Community (CAN) due to th e signing of FTAs.  The Andean Community is 
considered one of the most important integration processes in South America, with a 
multidimensional institutional structure that includes not only economic but also political, social and 
cultural aspects.  Community regulations used to be  approved by consensus but in recent years there  WT/TPR/M/235 
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  has been a series of disagreements due to the need of various Members to adapt the Andean 
regulations in the interests of the United States.   This has caused problems between Members which 
have also given rise to a series of compla ints in the Andean Court of Justice. 
428. The conclusion of FTAs between the United St ates and two Andean countries constituted an 
infringement of Decision 598, which allows countri es of the Andean Community to negotiate with 
third countries provided that the Community regul ations are not affected and the Commission is 
informed of the commitments entered into with th ird parties, and also led to an amendment of 
Decision 486 on the Common Industrial Property Regime which established a "differential" instead of 
a "common" regulatory regime, as was the Andean practice prior to the FTAs, an amendment which 
should have been made by consensus in  accordance with the Andean regulations. 
429. However, what is worse is that these cha nges were made without consulting the other 
Members, thereby adversely affecting Bolivia's commercial interests and encouraging, among other 
things, the departure of one of the members of this integration bloc. 
430. These two examples clearly show how the actions of one of the most important players in 
multilateral trade can have a negative effect on deve loping countries and obviousl y we hope that this 
statement will prompt it to analyse and modify its  trade policies, especially in the Latin American 
region. 
HAITI 
431. After the decrease in GDP for four successive quarters between mid 2008 and mid 2009, the 
U.S. economy has formally come out the recession duri ng the third quarter with growth rate of 2.8%.  
Between January 2008 and N ovember 2009 the U.S. registered a loss of some 7 million jobs, the two-
thirds which were lost in the second quarter of 2009,  while the country had almost come out of the 
recession.  At the end of 2008, unemployment w as 7.2% but it went over 10% in November 2009. 
Consumption and reducing unemployment are the two major problems that the Obama’s 
Administration has to resolve.  In spite of th e difficulties encountered, American exports of goods 
increased by around 12% in 2007-08 totaling about US $1.3 billion and the exports of merchandises 
have progressed about 7% in 2007-08  totaling US$2.7 billion. Contrary to trade in goods that usually 
has a deficit, trade in services has a surplus in the United States. 
432. Bilaterally the U.S. is an essential trade part ner for Haiti.  It receives around 90% of Haitian 
exports by value, the main Haitian exports are manufactured goods around 76% of the total value of 
the export value of goods.  Imports are mainly dom inated by food products and manufactured goods 
and the significance is constantly increasing.   Ha itian products benefit of fa vourable conditions in the 
American market and this provides opportunities to  private investors.  The advantages that Haiti 
benefits from are related to tariffs and these incl ude customs exemptions, and duty exemptions.   
433. Haiti participates in many programmes established by the U.S. Government, the U.S. GSP, 
the Programme 807 TS, the Initiative for the Caribbean  Basin, the 807 A, and the HOPE Act.  This 
latter Act offers several new advantages to the Ha itian textile sector in addition to those received 
under the IBC II.   This authorizes Haitian compani es to no longer pay customs duties to export their 
goods to the U.S. when they are manufactured in Haiti of at least 50% of the value, or if the goods are 
manufactured at least 50% of their value in countries that are partners of the U.S. or who benefit from 
preferential programmes in the U.S, under a FTA , regional preferences partner countries, CAFTA, 
AGOA, etc. 
434. According to exports the HOPE Act should enable  to generate some 100,000 direct jobs in 
Haitian textiles industry.  To this number it shoul d be added indirect employment that will be WT/TPR/M/235 
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  generated in the building of new free zones and those due to the increase of economic activities in 
general. 
435. With regards to diplomatic relations, the U.S.  maintains very good relations with Haiti, and 
they play a considerable role in promoting democr acy in the country.  The main donors are led by the 
U.S. with the most significant aid programme a nd financial assistant provided to Haiti following the 
earthquake in January 2010;  the Haitian pe ople will never forget that contribution. 
NIGERIA 
436. Nigeria is pleased to participate in this 10th trade policy review of United States.  My 
delegation notes from the Secretariat’s report the po sitive growth rates in the exports of insurance 
services in 2008 and 2009, despite the severe financia l crisis that was triggered by a protracted 
downturn in the housing market; and a sharp increas e in delinquencies of sub-prime mortgages that 
led to the sudden drop in the price of the securitie s backed by those mortgages.  The sub-prime 
mortgage crisis, it is noted, was the result of a macroeconomic environment with a prolonged period 
of low interest rates, high liquidity and low vola tility, which led the U.S. financial institutions to 
under-estimate risks and risk management practices in many financial institutions.  Nigeria has noted 
the policy actions taken by the United States to ta ckle the problem of open markets, Central Bank 
assistance measures, guarantees of ba nks liabilities, bank recapitalization through equity investments 
by private investors and government, as well as assi stance to individual financial institutions. Nigeria 
would like to know the steps United States is taking to  improve the financial sector regulations and to 
ensure that such unprecedented ev ents in the financial sector are minimised in the future. 
437. On the basis of the Secretariat Report, Nige ria wishes to also obser ve that stability and 
openness of the United States trade and investment regime, during the period under review, did not 
prevent a steep fall in the country’s trade, more so as imports of goods decreased by almost 35% during the third quarter of 2008 and second quarter of 2009.  Imports of consumer durables and 
capital goods were particularly affected, as consumers delayed purchases of durables amid a sharp reduction in wealth, resulting from the downturn in  the housing and equity markets as well as the 
growing uncertainty in financial markets.  In the ci rcumstance, it would be interesting to hear how the 
keeping away from household consumption will be the main basis for economic growth and 
development.   
438. Nigeria and the U.S., in spite of various pr evailing challenges, have continued to enjoy 
improved bilateral relations, includi ng cooperation on important foreign policy goals in areas such as 
international and regional peacekee ping and security; investing in people; economic growth; food 
security and agriculture; science and technology; c limate change and environment sustainability; and 
the enthronement of the core values of democratic governance.  
439. Indeed, Nigeria is the United States’ largest trad ing partner in Sub-saharan Africa.  The U.S. 
is also the largest foreign investor in Nigeria, even though those investments are mainly confined to 
the oil and gas sector of our economy.  An estima ted one million Nigerians and Nigerian-Americans 
live, study and work in the U.S., while over  25,000 Americans live and work in Nigeria. 
440. The two countries have also signed a Bi-Nationa l Commission (BNC) agreement, the first of 
its kind with Africa under the Obama Administration.  To further strengthen the trade and investment 
partnership between the two countries, Nigeria and U. S. trade officials have been meeting regularly 
under the U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Investment Fr amework Agreement (TIFA) Council, which was 
established in 2000.  The Council is responsible fo r monitoring trade and investment relations and 
identifying opportunities for expanding and diversif ying trade, including other important issues and 
challenges that the two countries may need to address.   Trade officials from Nigeria and the U.S. also 
use TIFA Council meetings to explore common obj ectives such as cooperation in the WTO, trade  WT/TPR/M/235 
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  capacity building and technical assistance, intell ectual property protection and enforcement, and 
infrastructure issues.  It is noteworthy that th e TIFA work plan has provided Nigeria with the 
opportunity to improve the climate for trade and i nvestment flows between the two countries, as well 
as helped the country to use trade to a dvance its economic development objectives. 
441. Nigeria would like to acknowledge that the Unite d States is a very important member of the 
WTO; and plays a leading role in the Doha Deve lopment Agenda (DDA) negotiations.  We commend 
the tremendous efforts of Ambassa dor Punke, and his team, particularly as the Americans say “he hit 
the ground running” when he recently joined us he re in Geneva.  However, in view of the active 
participation of the United States in regional and b ilateral trade agreements within the period under 
review, it would be useful to hear what steps the United States is taking to address concerns relating to 
market access and other trade distorting measures in the agriculture negotiations under the Doha 
Work Programme (DWP). 
442. In conclusion, Nigeria would like to commend the U.S. for its significant technical assistance 
and capacity building support, aimed at assisting developing country Members and LDCs to take 
advantage of the opportunities offered by the multilatera l trading system.  As a demonstration of its 
commitment to assist developing countries, integrate better into the global economy, the U.S. has, as 
of 2009, provided assistance to the tune of over US$9.4 billion since the launch of the DDA 
negotiations.  Nigeria wishes to further commend the U.S. for its continued support to Sub-saharan African countries through initiatives like the AGOA,  which have generally assisted in providing 
opportunities for export diversification and economic development in our countries.   WT/TPR/M/235 
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  V. REPLIES BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 
443. I would like to start by expressing our appreciation for all the thought and effort that has gone 
into this review.  The broad participation, as we ll as probing questions a nd thoughtful observations, 
demonstrate the importance that Members attach to  the Trade Policy Review process and to the role 
of the United States in the multilateral trading system .  We also were pleased  to hear many Members 
emphasize the importance of bringi ng the Doha Round to a successful conclusion.  We strongly share 
this view and I will return to this issue later in my statement. 
444. We very much appreciate the recognition expr essed for the openness of the U.S. trade and 
investment regime and for our commitment to maintaining this openness in the face of an 
unprecedented economic crisis.  We also listened with  satisfaction to the comments of our free trade 
agreement partners on how well thes e agreements have been functi oning and would point out that 
these preferential partners are also strong advocat es of multilateral liberalization.  We also are 
gratified by the kind words offered by our African , Andean and Caribbean partners for our preference 
programs and we appreciate the support heard from bene ficiaries of our contributions in aid-for-trade. 
445. We have listened carefully and taken good notes on all the comments and questions that 
Members delivered on the first day of the Review.  You can rest assured that I and my colleagues will 
pass on what we have heard to those in Washi ngton responsible for the issues that have been 
discussed.  Most, if not all, of the issues that we re raised Wednesday are addressed in the questions 
and answers that were distributed that day.  With th at in mind, the rest of my statement will focus on a 
number of key points. 
446. The United States remains committed to maintaining open markets and an open and 
welcoming environment for investment.    In this connection, we would note that our response to the 
global economic crisis has been part of a joint e ffort, led by the G-20.  Together we have been 
working to stimulate demand and build confiden ce on the part of consumers, businesses, and 
investors. 
447. Rebalancing our economy has been an important and ongoing part of this effort.  The Obama 
Administration has enacted significant measures in four areas.  The Administration is seeking to 
increase private personal saving, reduce the cost to the federal government of health care, reduce the 
federal fiscal deficit, and increase U.S. exports.   
448. With respect to reducing the fiscal deficit, th e U.S. Government will be taking many steps 
over the coming years. The President’s FY 2011 budget lays out a number of savings that are 
estimated to reduce the deficit to roughly 4% of GDP by 2014.  Some of the improvement in the 
budget will come as a natural result of an im proving economy which will both reduce automatic 
stabilizer spending and increase revenues.  Savings  will also result as temporary stimulus measures 
wind down.  In addition, the President has called for a non-security discretionary spending freeze, for allowing some temporary tax cuts to expire, an d for making sure that health care reform puts 
substantial downward pressure on health care costs a nd the deficit in the medium and long term.  
Furthermore, the President has established a bipar tisan deficit commission to examine how to reduce 
the deficit further, with a goal of bringing the de ficit under 3% of GDP and t hus stabilizing the debt to 
GDP ratio over time. 
449. We appreciate the recognition that has been expr essed in this meeting for the steps that the 
Obama Administration has taken with respect to  financial reform.  Th e Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which was signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 
2010, establishes new authorities and supervisory direc tion with regard to the U.S. financial markets 
including banking, securities, insurance, derivativ es, executive compensation, consumer protection  WT/TPR/M/235 
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  and corporate governance.   The legislation is co mplex and requires approximately 250 rulemakings 
and 70 studies.  Over the next 6 to 18 months, regulators will undertake an intense period of rulemaking.  This process will include opportunity fo r public comment and all interested parties are 
invited to make submissions.   
450. I would like to briefly comment on China’s criticism of U.S. Federal Reserve action, 
specifically with regard to U.S. macroeconomic po licy and the dollar. With respect to our exchange 
rate, the United States pursues a policy in which the exchange value of the U.S. dollar is wholly 
determined by the market.  The Federal Reserve’s monetary policy is both appropriate, and in line 
with its mandate.  This is not the forum to discu ss monetary policy, and I will not comment further on 
that of the Federal Reserve.  Regarding U.S. fi scal policy, it has been appropriately focused on 
supporting economic growth in an unprecedented peri od and aimed at restoring the United States to 
healthy growth. The success of these actions is importa nt not only to U.S. citizens but also to the 
health of the global economy as many of the Me mbers mentioned on Wednesday.  Let me conclude 
discussion of this topic by noting that g
reater exchange rate flexibility in China would give China 
greater scope to determine its own monetary policy. 
451. A number of Members have raised questions with respect to actions we have taken to address 
the economic crisis as they relate to the financial services and automotive sectors.  In looking at these 
actions – and as acknowledged by many of the comme nts on Wednesday – it is important to consider 
the economic context in which they were taken and the likely consequences ha d we failed to act.  
There can be no doubt that the financial crisis woul d have been far worse and recovery much further 
off into the distance – and not ju st for us but for the global economy –had we failed to take these 
steps.   In taking these steps profound adjustments were  required on the part of the industries at issue.  
This involvement, other than the government’s role as regulator, is temporary and it is already phasing 
out as spelled out further in our answers to Member s questions.  Hence, while  we listened with keen 
interest to China’s comments about the dangers of in dustrial policy that is not what is at issue here. 
452. With respect to the questions that have been  raised concerning government procurement we 
would note two things.  Fi rst, we have been very careful in wo rking with Congress to ensure that such 
measures are consistent with our international oblig ations.  Second, we would hope that this renewed 
interest in government procurement will be re flected in broader interest among Members in 
participation in the Agreemen t on Government Procurement. 
453. A number of Members have asked questions  or made comments on the National Export 
Initiative.  We’ve responded in detail to those ques tions but I would like to emphasize that the NEI is 
an outward rather than inward looking policy and th at there is full recognition of the importance of the 
import side of the equation.   Th is recognition is reflected in the recent unilateral tariff suspensions 
that were enacted through the U.S. Manufacturing Enhancement Act of 2010.  Some of Wednesday’s 
comments appeared to imply that export promotion is  a sort of zero-sum game – if the United States 
does well, other Members may lose.  We disagree w ith such an implication, and would assert that 
there is no inherent conflict in play, provided that we are all striving to keep our markets as open as 
possible, and looking for opportunities to continually increase that openness. 
454. Turning to the DDA, we were very interested in the range of perspectives that we heard 
Wednesday and it will come as no surprise to anyone that we strongly agree with those who emphasized the need to ensure that the negotiations result in meaningful new opportunities for trade.   
Much has been made of the potential for the DDA to  be a stimulus package that does not tax national 
treasuries.  But this will only happen to the extent th at we get beyond simply consolidating the status 
quo.  We take to heart the calls of other Member s for the United States to show leadership.  The 
United States has and will continue to play this role.  However, I think we all agree that this need for 
leadership extends to all key players and I suspect  few are nostalgic for the days when one or two 
Members could lead alone.  Today responsibility is shared.  The DDA is a unique opportunity to make WT/TPR/M/235 
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  the WTO reflect the realities of the 21
st century, ensuring access to the fastest growing parts of the 
global economy.  We are clearly not there yet but the United States is fully and firmly committed to 
working with its negotiatin g partners to reach a successful conclusion. 
455. A number of Members raised issues with respect  to dispute settlement.  We would note that 
the United States has come into comp liance, fully and promptly, in the vast majority of its disputes.  
As for the remaining few instances where our effort s to do so have not yet been entirely successful, 
the United States has been working actively towards compliance in furtherance of the purpose of the 
dispute settlement system.  The U.S. Administration will continue to work with the U.S. Congress and 
other interested parties to fully implement the r ecommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement 
Body in those disputes.   
456. A number of Members have raised the zeroing disp utes.  I would note that our concerns about 
the Appellate Body’s findings are well known, so there is no need for me to address that issue today.  
We are keenly aware that the issue of our comp liance in the various zeroing disputes has created a 
difficult dynamic in the WTO.  I can assure you that  the United States takes its WTO obligations very 
seriously, and we have stated publicly that we inte nd to comply with the WTO rulings in all of the 
zeroing disputes.  We are very actively engaged in a serious effort with our domestic stakeholders and 
our Congress to find an acceptable solution.   
457. Turning now to trade policy by measure and sector, a number of Members have raised issues 
regarding tariff peaks and our agricultural progr ams.  We have addressed these issues in specific 
written responses.  And obviously, the DDA provides th e forum to address these issues.  We continue 
to support an outcome that would reduce or elim inate tariff peaks and the continuing reform of 
agriculture, along with opening up services markets,  as part of a balanced and ambitious Doha 
package. 
458. A number of Members have expressed concern a bout the increase over the past few years in 
contingency measures, which we would note has no t been limited to one or two Members but has 
been a general trend.  It is well known that th e incidence of petitions for trade remedies tracks 
economic cycles for reasons having nothing to do with protectionism but rather economics.   
Consistent with this pattern, petitions did increase as economies weakened but it is notable that 
notwithstanding the depth of this pa rticular downturn, the level of increase has more or less tracked 
the trend line of previous downturns.  We would also  emphasize that care must be taken not to equate 
use of trade remedies with abuse. 
459. Several Members have raised concerns rega rding the proposed Foreign Manufacturers Legal 
Accountability Act.  This legislation reflects a desire  to ensure consumers in the United States can be 
confident that the products they buy are safe and th at there are procedures available under U.S. law to 
address effectively any product liability issues tho se products may engender.  The United States 
believes these goals can be accomplished without im posing undue burdens on foreign manufacturers.  
I must note, of course, that this legislation h as not been enacted by both chambers of the U.S. 
Congress.  It has been useful for us to hear Member s’ views on this issue, and we will take these back 
to our capital. 
460. Several Members also raised questions or co mmented on customs measures related to border 
security, such as advance information requirements or  100% scanning.  The United States is confident 
that we can develop and refine these measures in  a manner that achieves our security objectives 
without impeding legitimate trade.  We are commi tted to working with our domestic and foreign 
partners, and with trade and indus try, to implement these measures in a logical and practical manner 
that minimizes trade disruptions and integrates smoothly into the global supply chain.  WT/TPR/M/235 
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  461. A number of Members raised the issue of regulatory approvals for SPS purposes.  The 
development of scientific, risk-based measures to protect human, plant, and animal health are 
complex and frequently involve detailed technical analysis and cooperation with technical experts 
among our trading partners.  As such, the time it takes to make a determin ation will vary depending 
on the facts of each case.  The United States,  however, remains committed to applying as 
effective and efficient a process as possible.  For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS ) has modified its Quarantine 56 regulation to 
provide a more flexible approach to import approv als of certain fruits and vegetables from pest-free 
status in foreign areas.   We continue to work  with WTO Members to identify trade and technical 
needs, and to assist Members in understanding our processes – with the overriding goal of ensuring a 
transparent and rules-based trading system.   
DISCUSSANT 
462. At the outset, I would like to highlight that what came up very clearly and succinctly from the 
statements and interventions expressed and questions  put forth by Members on this review was the 
critical role of the United States in the global economy and how much the policies and measures it 
adopted could impact the economy of most of the Members here. 
463. A large number of Members also cited the Un ited States as among their top trading partners, 
reinforcing the fact that any changes in policy or any hiccups affecting the U.S. economy would have 
consequences on their economic sustainability.  It is therefore not surprising that a large number of 
questions raised from the floor were focused on th e health of the U.S. economy and its plans and 
priorities to address current fiscal imbalances and bring the economy back to its feet. 
464. There is also unequivocal recognition by Members that the U.S. trade regime is one of the 
world’s most liberal and open, however some Memb ers also indicated their concerns on worrying 
trends towards inward looking policies that may harm the fragility of the current economic 
environment. Thus, reassurances from the U.S. were  sought on its steadfastness and its commitment 
to play by the rules of the multilateral system. 
465. The U.S. was commended for its active role in  the multilateral trading system and the DDA 
negotiations, and a strong message that came through from the membership is th e critical need for the 
U.S. not to abandon the multilateral ship but rather  to demonstrate leadership and commitment and 
continue to work with the rest of the membership  in striving for a successful conclusion of the Round. 
466. We have just heard a very comprehensive and lengthy response and explanation from the U.S. 
delegation, through Ambassador Punke, to the questi ons and issues raised during this review.  I am 
certain they would be scrutinized  back in the capitals and hopefully  help Members better understand 
their implications on trade and how they would eventu ally deal with them. Along the same vein too, I 
hope the U.S. delegation would also take back to  Washington the key messages, concerns, hopes and 
aspirations expressed by Members from this review. 
467. In concluding, I would like to say, that as a fi rst time discussant, this TPR has been a very 
educative and inspiring exercise for me, not just because of the voluminous documents, questions and 
reports that come with it, but the sense of openne ss and earnestness that Members attach to this 
review, which, to me is a clear testament of the successful working of the trade policy review as an 
important instrument of transparency advocated in our multilateral system. 
MEXICO 
468. I have taken the floor simply to thank the Un ited States for the replies to all the questions 
raised by the Mexican delegation.  We are studying and analyzing these replies with great interest in WT/TPR/M/235 
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  our capital and are grateful for the effort made by the delegation of the United States to provide very 
detailed answers to each of our questions. 
CHINA 
469. We find the discussion under the Review process on the 29
th very useful. It fully demonstrates 
the importance Members attach to the U.S. as the biggest trading power and the most active Member, 
which has great influence not only on all other Members, but also on the multilateral trading system.  
470. Though different questions and interventions have been made by different Members in 
different languages, one could easily draw some  common lines, which clearly show the common 
expectations of the Members from the U.S.  Such expectations are reflected on the following aspects:  
471. First, the U.S. leadership in the DDA negotiati ons.  With over nine years already passed and 
all eyes on the U.S. now, the need for the U.S. to de monstrate its responsible leadership is even more 
pressing as the discussant has indicated.  It is widely sh ared that such leadership must be manifested 
with a stronger political will, stronger appreciation of  existing results and a mo re realistic approach on 
its offensive and defensive interests.  
472. Second, combat rising protectionism in the U.S. market.  While we commend the U.S. for its 
generally low tariffs, many Members have shed light  on various barriers impeding imports into the 
U.S. market.  Examples given include abusive use of trade remedies, enormous trade-distorting support for agriculture, "Buy American" or "Hire Amer ican" provisions in its stimulus packages, tariff 
peaks on some products and pervasive non-tariff barri ers. Many of those barriers target products of 
great importance to the survival of impoverished producers in developing countries such as textiles 
and clothing, footwear, leather, corn and cotton. 
473. Third, enforcement of WTO dispute rulings.  Ma ny Members have rightly pointed out that the 
U.S. remain slow in fully complying with WTO disput e rulings. As indicated by Brazil, the U.S. is the 
respondent in six out of seven disputes which are currently listed by the Secretariat as without full 
compliance to date. 
474. Fourth, pursuit of TRIPS-plus Agreement.  So me Members expressed great concerns over the 
ACTA negotiations with the U.S. participation. We are firmly against this practice which is outside 
WIPO and outside WTO to seek TRIPs plus enforcement. 
475. Finally, a few words on the responses we have  received from the U.S. on our questions. We 
would like to express our sincere appreciation to the U.S. for their written answers, most of which we 
believe are clear.  However, for some questions of  great concerns to China, the answers remain 
unclear. We would like to take this opportunity to draw the U.S. attention to those questions and seek 
clearer and more relevant answers.  
476. China notes the U.S. assurance that its polic ies and measures to implement the Export 
Promotion Initiative will be consistent with the WTO rules including the Agreement on Subsidy and 
Countervailing Measures. We welcome this commitme nt. We hope this is not only at the policy-
making level, but also fully comply during the implementation practices.  
477. My delegation has posed the question on the defi nition of "national security" in respect of 
U.S. administration’s transaction review process, and we are grateful of the written response given by 
the U.S. delegation.  However, we are still concerne d that opacity of the U.S. review procedure and 
vagueness of the definition of "national security" will be used to discriminate against foreign 
companies, including the Chinese companies.   WT/TPR/M/235 
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  478. On China’s question regarding whether the U.S.  adopt different standards on investments by 
foreign enterprises of different nature, for example, state-owned and private, the U.S. did not provide 
a clear answer. We would like to have a direct answer  to this question from the U.S., that is, to what 
extent will the U.S. Administration consider th e ownership of the acquiring corporation in its 
"national security" review.  
479. On China’s questions on the U.S. monetary po licy, the U.S. simply answered that "The 
Federal Reserve is an independent agency we do not comment on its monetary policy decisions" or 
"cannot speculate on potential policies".  Our qu estions are not about the "independence" of the 
Federal Reserve but about what policy direction th e Fed would go in the future. We hope that the 
USTR, as have done by many other Members could c oordinate with the Fed to provide a meaningful 
answer.  
480. On area of services, I would like to have one general remark on maritime transport. Many 
Members expressed on Wednesday that maritime is a service sector of great importance. It accounts for over 10% of the service export worldwide. More than 90% of the global trade is realized through maritime transportation thus this sector is truly the life line of world trade. The U.S. has been a very 
active actor in pushing forward the service trade ne gotiations in Doha Round, and tabled a whole lot 
of requests on sectors of export interest to the U.S.  While in the maritime transport sector, financial 
services, telecommunications and Mode 4, which are of great importance to many developing 
countries, the U.S. has not made any meaningful offer yet.  We hope the U.S. could lead by example and push forward the negotiation on service.  
481. I would also like to take this opportunity to reiterate our concerns in TBT and SPS 
respectively. The first one is the Consumer Produc t Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA). As also been 
pointed out by other Members on Wednesday, this Ac t set more stringent technical requirements than 
necessary for certain consumer products, which go far beyond the current capacity of the industry and 
some of them lack convincing scientific basis.  The second one is the repeatedly delay of the pest risk 
analysis (PRA) procedure for Chinese apples.  Af ter 12 years’ intensive bilateral work, Chinese 
apples are still outside the U.S. market.  I have to say that compare with Indian mangoes, Chinese 
apples have not been treated too badly.  There are still five years to catch up with the Indian long 
waiting record. We would urge the U.S. to respect our  concerns, take concrete steps to eliminate those 
unnecessary market access barriers.  
482. We thank the U.S. for their response to our qu estion regarding Section 743 of the Agriculture, 
Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies. But the explanation of the 
U.S. does not well address our concern. This is  a discriminatory measure against China and will 
seriously impede China’s poultry products export to the U.S.  In its respon se, the U.S. argues that 
these measures apply to all countries and not particul arly targeting China. However, the Chapeau of 
Section 743 explicitly states that "none of the funds made available by this Ac t may be used to poultry 
imports from China". This is apparently a discrimin ation which goes against the basic WTO principle. 
We would urge the U.S. to take immediate acti on to eliminate such discriminatory requirements. 
483. Finally, I would like to highlight China’s speci al concerns on the currency bill passed by the 
U.S. Congress.  It is a wrong signal to the world. As one of my American friends wrote to me his comments, I quote "I was very sad to see the House pass the bill today regarding exchange rates. A 
countervailing duty against China would clearly be WT O illegal. I hope that China will continue to 
speak out in favor of following WTO rules and avoi ding protectionism."  End of quote. I would urge 
the U.S. Administration to deal with this issue with  great caution and try its best to maintain Sino-U.S. 
trade relations, which would be conducive to the lo ng term U.S. economic growth and job creation.  
484. 
In addition to that, we are looking forward to receiving the U.S. replies on our subsequent 
questions 4 which we submitted after the 2-week d eadline. I should say, on a per capita basis, the WT/TPR/M/235 
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  number of questions from China is rather negligible  and we therefore expect a timely response from 
the U.S. delegation.  
485. To conclude, we once again thank the U.S. for their efforts in answering all these questions. 
We hope the U.S. will take good note of Members' concerns and suggestions, and take the necessary 
measures and policy actions to address them.  
JAPAN 
486. Japan appreciates the hard work of  the United States in replying to all of the written questions 
which we understand amounted to 1, 200, probably the record on a per capita basis. The TPR meetings 
play a very important role in maintaining the transparency of each Member’s trade and economic 
policy. We are generally happy to note that the performance of both answering and questioning sides 
has improved.  Japan also appreciates remarks a nd comments made today by Ambassador Punke in 
response to Member’s observations. 
487. Regarding the answers to our questions provi ded the day before yesterday, Japan is 
submitting several follow-up questions so that we can understand with more clarity the U.S. intentions 
to implement measures in some areas, incl uding the implementation of the Anti-Dumping 
Investigation and the subsidies the U.S. granted for shipyards. We expect that we will be able to 
receive its answers in due course.  
488. Finally, I would like to express our fervent hope that the U.S. will continue to refrain from 
implementing protectionist measures in the course of its economic recovery  and will continue to 
exercise a strong leadership towards enhancing the world trade system by doubling its efforts for the 
successful conclusion of the Doha Round Negotiations.  
EUROPEAN UNION 
489. Before I turn to some follow up questions whic h came from Brussels, let me also make a 
couple concluding observations of mo re general nature, and the main  message that we – and I hope 
the U.S. – will take away. 
490. The more than 40 statements on Wednesday tes tify not only to the weight of the U.S. in 
global trade and its importance as a trading partner, bu t also to the genuine desire of Members of this 
Organization for the United States' to continue acti ng as a leader in the multilateral trading system.  
The U.S. is rightly proud to remain, despite the r ecent turmoil, one of the most open and transparent 
economies in the world. However, Members noted th at in some instances protectionist pressures have 
nevertheless got their way with the result that new re strictions were put in place. Moreover, the test of 
leadership lies not only in maintaining the status quo, but in showing the way forward in opening new 
opportunities for mutual trade. In this regard, the renewed reassurances the U.S.  gave in the course of 
this review – on its commitment to strengthening the multilateral trade rules and its willingness to do 
its part to bring the Doha Round to a successful cl ose – are important indeed, and without doubt will 
be watched vigilantly. 
491. Members taking the floor in this Review did not only share a similar view on the general 
stance of U.S. trade policy. We also noted a hi gh degree of commonality in their specific concerns 
that, I think it is fair to say, was unprecedented. This should give the U.S. a good indication where 
improvements can be made and of priorities for action. 
492. I noted that we also have a few additional sp ecific questions to clarify rules governing tariff 
classification, tax concessions, approval procedures for plant imports, data and rules on government  WT/TPR/M/235 
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  procurement, and state measures for protection of  geographical indications. We will submit these in 
full in writing today given the technical detail involve d. I would just make some brief remarks now.   
493. We are pleased to receive confirmation from the U.S. with regard to BSE-related import 
restrictions that steps are underway to amend U.S. ru les in the near future in line with OIE standards. 
We look forward seeing effective progress towards the alignment of U.S. legislation to WTO/OIE 
standards.   
494. With respect to the procedures to approve new imports of plants which we and other noted 
can take unreasonably long, we appreciate the U.S. ou tlining the efforts to date in order to expedite 
the review process. However, further steps appear to  be needed to consistently avoid undue delays. 
The EU looks forward to discussing with the U.S.  the most effective ways of achieving this. 
495. Regarding the proposed Foreign Manufacturer s Legal Accountability Act pending in the 
Congress, we welcome the U.S. agreeing with us that the objectives of protecting consumers and ensuring that products they buy are safe can be accomplished without imposing undue burden on 
foreign manufacturers. We reiterate our expectation th at all necessary efforts will be made to ensure 
that the rules eventually put on th e books will follow this approach. 
496. Finally, against the background of a trend towa rds proliferation of Buy American provisions 
transparency on government procurement is something th at we need to insist more. As a signatory to 
the GPA the U.S. has specific oblig ations in this regard. We are therefore somewhat disappointed that 
the U.S. has so far failed to provide data on the volume of the above thres hold procurement covered 
by the U.S. GPA commitments for sub-central a nd other entities although this is required under the 
GPA. We would like the U.S. to clarify that, if it cu rrently does not have such data, steps will be taken 
to collect it. 
497. In closing, knowing very well the workload that  comes with the TPR, we sincerely appreciate 
the good effort which the U.S. has put in to live up  to its transparency obligations. The discussion this 
week has been useful to all of us to get better understanding of the trade policies and directions the 
U.S. is taking and leaves us all with some food for thought.  
UNITED STATES 
498. Thank you for the additional comments. Some of the speakers have acknowledged that my 
statement earlier this morning and some of the written responses had addressed many of the questions, 
and so I won’t attempt to respond to every additional question that was raised today.  But there are a 
couple of questions where I think that some additional clarification may be helpful.   
499. China raised a specific question about apples.   The United States has been working with 
China to prepare a list of quarantine significant pest s that are associated with Chinese apples, which is 
a pre-requisite to developing a risk analysis and subsequent risk mitigation import measures.  This 
process is science-based and done on the transparent exchange of technical information.  Given the 
complexity and extensive number of pests and quara ntines significances involved in this process it has 
been underway for several years.  We continue to e ngage in this process with a view to developing 
risk mitigation measures that provide the U.S. with  its appropriate level of  protection and will allow 
the importation of Chinese apples. 
500. I do want to address the poultry issue.  I think the most important aspect of this dispute is that 
the measure only applied in the fiscal year 2009.  The measure was replaced in fiscal year 2010 with 
language permitting the use of the funds under certain conditions, and those conditi ons have been met.  
As a result, there is no current funding restric tion affecting the Department of Agriculture’s 
considerations of poultry from China.   WT/TPR/M/235 
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  501. I want to further address the currency issue rai sed by China.  Yesterday’s law clearly shows 
lawmakers had serious concerns about this issue.  The President shares those concerns and has said 
repeatedly that China needs to a llow a significant sustained appreciation over time.  China also raised 
the issue of WTO consistency.  It is the Administ ration’s position that any legislation be consistent 
with international obligations. Overall I would say that we will also work very hard to respond 
promptly to the further written ques tions there were submitted today.  WT/TPR/M/235 
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  VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON 
502. This is the tenth Trade Policy Review of the United States and I would like to thank Deputy 
USTR Ambassador Michael Punke and his delegati on for their constructive engagement in this 
meeting.  I would also like to thank Ambassador  Hiswani Harun of Malaysia for her excellent 
intervention as the discussant.  The Review was based on reports by the WTO Secretariat and the 
United States Government, both of which we re appreciated by the delegates.   
503. The period since the last Trade Policy Review  of the United States in June 2008 has been 
dominated by financial crisis and, in 2009, econom ic recession on a global scale and a sharp and deep 
contraction of international trade.  Prompt action by the United States through financial and 
macroeconomic policies to restore li quidity to its financial system and to boost domes tic demand have 
made an important contribution to global economic recovery.  De legations welcomed this, and 
remarked on the enormous importance of their trade and investment with the United States for their 
own economic growth and development prospects.   Those prospects depend on the United States 
continuing to play its historical leadership role  in fostering a strong, multilateral trading system, 
inter alia  by maintaining and, if necessary, reinforci ng its resistance to protectionist pressures that 
could derail global economic recovery and by he lping to bring the Doha Round to a successful 
conclusion, particularly its development dime nsion.  Delegations were encouraged by 
President Obama's confirmation of the importance that the United States attaches to trade – both imports and exports – as vital avenues for ec onomic growth and recovery and to completing 
negotiations under the DDA. 
504. Delegations welcomed the fact that the United St ates remains one of the most transparent and 
open economies in the world.  Import tariffs are low,  and a significant proportion of imports enter the 
United States duty free under zero-level MFN tariffs or preference programmes.  Nonetheless, it was 
also noted that significant tariff peaks remain in cer tain sectors, such as footwear, leather, textiles and 
clothing, and in agriculture where there is also a considerable number of non- ad valorem  duties.   
505. Some concerns were expressed about the restri ctive effects of non-tariff measures applied by 
the United States on imports.  Among those widely mentioned were certain TBT and SPS measures 
that some delegations felt are unduly trade restric tive.  Several delegations encouraged the United 
States to make greater use of intern ational standards in this regard. 
506. A number of delegations commented on the impor tance for trade of policymakers maintaining 
a balance between, on the one hand, the understandable need to ensure physical security at national 
borders and, on the other hand, the implementation of measures to facilitate cross-border trade in 
goods and services.  In that context, concerns we re voiced about the significant increase in trade 
transaction costs that could result from more inte nsive border checks as well as measures such as the 
10+2 advance information requirement and 100% c ontainer scanning requirement.  It was felt that 
more extensive reliance on risk-based strategies  as well as closer cooperation between customs 
authorities have important roles to play in creating the necessary balance. 
507. Several delegations drew attention to the tr ade-restrictive impact on their exports of 
anti-dumping and countervailing measures imposed by the United States.  It was noted that the imposition of new trade remedy measures increased in the period under review, although the number 
of measures in force is not above the levels experi enced in recent years.  Nonetheless, concerns were 
expressed about procedural aspects of these measures,  such as the continued use of the "zeroing" 
methodology, as well as the length of time some i ndividual measures have been kept in place – over 
thirty years in certain cases – which some felt ma de them appear punitive rather than remedial in 
nature.  We heard this morning a carefully cr afted response on this point by Ambassador Punke, 
which I found very encouraging. WT/TPR/M/235 
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  508. Several delegations expressed thei r continued concerns about trad e restrictive and distorting 
measures applied to support agricultural production in  the United States, even though it was noted that 
this support is relatively low compared with some other OECD countries.  In addition to tariff rate 
quotas and tariff peaks on certain imported products , the 2008 Farm Bill continues to provide 
domestic support that is related to prices and, in many cases, to production as well, which will lead to 
subsidies rising again automatically as world prices fall from their current high levels. 
509. On services, delegations repeated concerns they  had raised in previous Trade Policy Reviews 
of the United States concerning maritime transport re strictions under the Jones Act, foreign ownership 
restrictions in air transport, and visa restrictions affecting the supply of Mode 4 services.  Some delegations expressed concerns about the potential im pact of the extensive support provided by the 
U.S. to its financial services sector on comp etitiveness conditions for the sector globally. 
510. Delegations welcomed the strong and prompt response by the United States to boost domestic 
demand following the financial crisis.  While the ex traordinary nature of this response was fully 
recognized, a number of delegations commented on th e extent to which certain of its components 
favour domestic suppliers of goods and services, su ch as the "Buy American" requirements attached 
to government procurement programmes, and simila r measures at the sub-fe deral level.  Several 
expressed the hope that these measures will be only te mporary and that they will not signal a change 
in direction of U.S. trade policy beyond the period needed to implement crisis measures. 
511. Delegations voiced concerns about the potential impact on trade flows of some aspects of the 
draft Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act.  It was noted by the U.S. delegation that this 
Act is currently pending before Congress and that  the Administration believes that the goal of 
consumer safety can be achieved without impos ing undue burdens on foreign manufacturers. 
512. It was noted that the WTO dispute settlement syst em is vital to maintaining the integrity and 
strength of the rules-based trading system, and th at the United States has participated actively and 
extensively in dispute settlement proceedings as bot h complainant and respondent.  Many delegations 
expressed concerns that in some of these cases full im plementation of panel or Appellate Body rulings 
by the United States remains pending. 
513. Delegations welcomed the United States' con tinuation of its preference programmes to 
support export growth and diversification in develo ping and least- developed countries, such as the 
GSP, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, a nd the Caribbean Basin Initiative.  Nonetheless, it 
was noted that product exclusions and difficulties in meeting rules of origin in these programmes 
limited, for some, their potential beneficial impact on  exports to the U.S. market.  Many welcomed the 
United States' contributions of trade-related deve lopment assistance and capacity building, including 
through the WTO Global Trust Fund and the Enhanced Integrated Framework. 
514. The large number of questions tabled during this Trade Policy Review indicates clearly the 
importance of the United States as a trading partner for most WTO Members.  The U.S. delegation is to be commended for giving comprehensive replies to  so many questions with such short notice and 
Members look forward to receiving the final responses before the end of October. 
515. In closing, I would like to thank all delegations for this successful review of the trade policies 
of the United States. 
__________