08-3824 JOB(08)/95  12 August 2008  
 
 
Committee on Agriculture 
Special Session   
REPORT TO THE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE 
BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
AGRICULTURE, AMBASSADOR CRAWFORD FALCONER 
 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. As foreshadowed at the meeting of the Trad e Negotiations Committee held on 30 July this 
report has been prepared in light of the work on agriculture that was undertaken during the period 21 
to 29 July.     
2. Overall, there was a credible basis for conclu sion on very many (and possibly one could have 
said “nearly all”) issues.  But even “nearly all” is not all.  And, as a matter of plain fact, there was 
decisive disagreement on certain matters while other very significant issues were not even dealt with.  
So there was no possibility to put a judgement  on the “other” matters to the final test. 
3. That said, had the “outstanding” matters been resolved (and that would have been no small 
matter), I do think the rest could have “fallen into  place”.  But such a judgement is a function of a 
very particular situation. That situation was one where, at the time, Members were conscious that 
there was a genuine endgame scenario.  Members were , accordingly, prepared to accept compromises 
that were not generally their preferred options. That was a mind-set that applied as of yesterday. As of 
today that remains at best moot. 
4. We were also in a position to have tabled preci se texts as a basis upon which we could have 
finalised the negotiations over agriculture modalities.   But the inescapable f act is that, with the 
impasse that occurred, we are mani festly not now, or at least we  are no longer, in circumstances 
where such precise texts could in and of themselves secu re such an outcome.  That is dictated by the 
fact that there are issues where substantive disagre ement remains and there are others where we did 
not get to substance at all. For the rest, it is not to say that all Members concerned have retreated from 
the substance of their positions.  On the contra ry, it is precisely because Members might yet be 
prepared to live with those positions that it would be counter-productive to oblige them now to react 
to precise text which alleges their agreement.   
5. Such precise texts are, of course, still on the hard  drive.  But that is where they do and must 
remain, at least for the time being.  That is b ecause, as is clear from the above, those texts only had a 
rationale for their existence in circumstances wher e Members were in genuine final decision-making 
mode, as they were at that time.  Regrettably, time has moved on. It is, of course, my fervent hope that 
a moment of genuine decision making will in fact recu r and, more to the point, will recur very soon.  
If so, those texts will, hopefully, still serve the purpose for which they were intended.  Unless and 
until that moment arrives, the existing texts rema in, as do the particular negotiating moves made by 
Members, which, of course, did not solidify into  actual agreement.  Outlined below is a brief 
summary account of where that has left us for the time being on the main issues. JOB(08)/95 
Page 2  
 
II. MARKET ACCESS 
A. 
TARIFF CUTS  
6. As regards the tariff cut in the top band of th e tiered formula, the output from the G7 and the 
Green Room discussion have been well reported regarding  a 70% cut. 
B. SENSITIVE PRODUCTS  
7. On Sensitive Products for developed country Me mbers, the output from the G7 and the Green 
Room discussion  based on the concept of “4 +2 ” for the number has been well reported. There 
remained some Members outside that G7 process for whom such an approach would have required at least some further discussion.  
8. On Sensitive Product treatment for developing coun try Members, a revised tripartite structure 
could have been a basis for an agreement in my view.  Under this structure, a developing country 
Member would be able to select a limited number of its Sensitive Products (between one-third and 
two-thirds of its Sensitive Product tariff lines) to take lesser reductions than required by the tiered 
formula.  The basic concept being that the greater  the deviation from the formula the fewer products 
and the shorter the implementation period.  At the sa me time they would also be able to opt for the 
full tariff cut with a longer implementation period an d/or the deviation and tariff quota creation option 
for any remaining tariff lines. 
9. On Paragraph 76, the output from the G7 and the Green Room discussion has been well 
reported. 
10. There was no new basis for resolution of th e disagreement on whether there could be new 
tariff quota creation. Certain bilateral discussions ma y have taken place, but nothing that came to a 
multilateral forum, even informally.   
C. T
ARIFF SIMPLIFICATION  
11. There was no new basis for resolution of tariff simplification. 
D. IN-QUOTA TARIFFS  
12. On in-quota tariffs I believe we had a sound basi s for concluding, based on going to the lower 
of a threshold or a formula cut with a single tariff ra te for all the tariff lines covered by a quota.  The 
more detailed elements on starting point and phasing were also developed so that an agreement on all 
features was in the offing.  I believe that we ha d an equivalent basis for elements relating to 
developing country Members, although some very sp ecific elements would have needed finalisation. 
E. TARIFF QUOTA ADMINISTRATION  
13. As regards the tariff quota under fill mechanism,  I believe we had a basis for agreement on 
the outstanding issue of application to developing country Members. 
F. SPECIAL AGRICULTURAL SAFEGUARD  
14. As regards the SSG, the output from the G7 and the Green Room discussion has been well 
reported regarding reducing the maximum number of products eligible for the SSG and eliminating it 
after seven years.  Had that been finalised, it was li kely that the SSG would have been retained at a 
very low percentage of tariff lines for developi ng countries generally and at a somewhat higher 
percentage for SVEs. JOB(08)/95 
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G. SPECIAL PRODUCTS  
15. On Special Products, the output from the G7 a nd the Green Room discussion has been well 
reported regarding the percentage of tariff lines  that could be declared Sensitive Products, the 
percentage that would not take a tariff cut and the overall average cut for them. 
H. SPECIAL SAFEGUARD MECHANISM  
16. On the SSM, the output from the G7 and the Gree n Room discussion has been well reported.  
Within the G7 itself there simply proved to be unb ridgeable differences regarding the triggers for 
breaching the pre-Doha bound rate. The other key ques tions of how far you could go above that rate 
and how often you could do it could not be a source of any convergence in the absence of any common ground on the fundamental issue of what conditions would need to be met for you to even 
breach it in the first place.  
17. It is perhaps worth underlining that such diffe rences were not some purely “technical” matter. 
Of course, like all fundamental political differences , there are consequent technical differences, but 
the impasse was not technical. It was political. The fundamental issues were, on the one hand, 
whether you can breach pre-Doha bound rates and, if  so, on what terms and conditions and, on the 
other hand, how you can make a SSM mechanism genuinely operational fo r developing country 
Members if there is an a priori ceiling constraint of such a kind. These issues remained-as they have 
throughout the negotiations - subs tantive, and essentially political, divisions. SSM was always going 
to be one of the three or four potential deal-breaker items and so, alas, it proved to be. 
I. T
ROPICAL AND DIVERSIFICATION PRODUCTS  
18. The list of tropical and diversification products  had been essentially st abilised.  There could 
have been consensus around a formulation on treatme nt that had support among the key participants.  
The particularly sensitive matter of so-called “ overlap” between tropical products and preference 
erosion product lists would have been resolved on the basis of specific understandings developed over 
those few days. 
J. PREFERENCE EROSION  
19. That same understanding as far tropical a nd diversification products would have been 
reflected in preference erosion modalities.  Beyond the so-called “overlap” issue, there would have been a basis to have concluded on the treatment  of other nominated preference erosion products. 
K. L
EAST -DEVELOPED COUNTRY MEMBERS  
20. The treatment as regards least-developed country  Members would have been resolved (as 
sought by LDC’s themselves) on an essentially e quivalent basis to NAMA as and when NAMA was 
resolved. 
III. DOMESTIC SUPPORT 
21. The output from the G7 and the Green Room discussion has been well reported regarding  
developed country Members’ domestic  support commitments, in particular as relates to OTDS and, in 
the case of the United States, the base period for AMS.  These were essentially the mid-point and, 
where necessary, rounding-up to the nearest whole percentage the bracketed numbers for OTDS cuts 
and removing the brackets for the base period.  JOB(08)/95 
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22. Questions still remained as regards the “head room” for Blue Box product-specific 
commitments and the starting point for product-speci fic AMS commitments.  My sense was that those 
latter matters would, however, have been reso lved also in terms of an overall agreement. 
23. As regards developing country Members a nd RAMs OTDS scheduling and Blue Box 
entitlements, I believe we had developed a basis for agreement. 
IV. EXPORT COMPETITION 
24. On export competition, I believe that, in the c ontext of a total overall package, there was a 
specific and balanced outcome on the outstanding elements on food aid, export credits, STE’s and phase out of export subsidies that was ripe and ready to go. 
V. EXPORT RESTRICTIONS  
25. On temporary export restrictions there was, I be lieve, a fine-tuned text that would have been 
acceptable to Members. 
VI. COTTON 
26. There was no new basis for an outcome on cotton.  Although there was a renewed 
commitment to seriously engage in negotiations by a ll the Ministers that represent those countries that 
have been most heavily involved in this issue, it was, regrettably, not addressed in a substantive way 
by the time that negotiations had broken down overall. 
VII. CONCLUSION   
27. Where to now? I see no alternative to picking ourselves up, dusting ourselves off, and trying 
again. Sure, there are plenty who would see that as  a tall order. They are right. But it seems self-
evident to me that even a small ch ance of success is sufficient to warrant the effort, given what is at 
stake. Moreover, I do detect a genuine willingness to t est to the uttermost whether there is indeed still 
scope to make this work for all Members. 
28. Of course, this cannot be done naively. Indeed it has to be done in full awareness of the 
enormity of the task facing us. Above all, any such effort has to be invested with realism as regards 
what has happened and why. It will not succeed if it is approached in some kind of sunny pollyanna-
ish belief that we had an unexpected minor technical  hitch but, with a bit of sleep and rest, normal 
service will be resumed as soon as possible. Nor can it be done if there is a denial of reality, therefore precluding us from tackling the real problems confronting us. 
29. As noted above, we did make real progress in th e last week of July in wrapping up where the 
intensive work since the previous July had brought us . Yes, we were on the verge of finally resolving 
a score of things that, one year previously (Post- Potsdam), few if any obser vers would have believed 
at all conceivable, let alone inside twelve mont hs. That progress can be acknowledged and, hopefully, 
kept on life support for a little bit longer. But that is not the main message. Th e main message is that 
we did not go on to finish the job. That is where our real efforts must now lie. 
30. Clearly, we need to revisit the SSM as part of that effort. But in doing so we must recognize 
that it was not, for any of the participants involved (and those participants include Members that were 
not in the G7, it should be added), a purely techni cal breakdown. It was a political divide.  In fact 
there was progress made on it politically, and techni cally, during that week. But it was simply not 
sufficient to bridge a political divide that had been enduring since at least Hong Kong. So illusion 
number one to guard against is th at it can be resolved essentially technically. The technicalities will 
need to be addressed but will only wo rk with the same level of political  investment that was evident in 
many other issues where technical and political are inseparable.  JOB(08)/95 
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31. But our task does not begin and end with SSM.  I need only mention Cotton - one of the other 
three or four potential deal-breakers, which was no t at all seriously addressed before things broke 
down with SSM. There is tariff quota creation.  There is tariff simplification. Yes, one might well take 
the view that these can fall into place.  But we also  have to actually make that happen. And, while one 
might well rightly have held the view that key el ements elsewhere were essentially on the brink of 
resolution, not all of those affected were in the r oom, and that would have needed further effort to 
ensure finalisation. 
32. The precise technique for addressing these matters needs some further reflection. But two 
general elements seem to be clear.  First, if we want to fix this in something less than a three year time 
horizon (which I hope we want to do), it has to be done in the very near term. Each day that passes 
takes us further and further away from the prepared ness to compromise that was certainly evident in 
that last week of July for much of the time.  Second, the only way we have ever fixed seemingly 
intractable problems in this House has been through intens ive work at senior officials’ level: hard 
grind and no waiting for divine interventions from Olympus. That was the post-Potsdam lesson, and a 
lesson that we learnt well. I do not see things as in  any way different this time around. If you feel the 
same way, your Chair will be ready to continue that effort with you over coming weeks. I do not 
believe we have anything to lose by at least making the effort.   
 
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