WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  TN/RL/GEN/178 
10 March 2011 
 (11-1223) 
Negotiating Group on Rules Original:   English 
  
 
FISHERIES SUBSIDIES – ARTICLES III, V AND X 
 
Communication from the Republic of Korea
 
  
 The following communication dated 9 March 2011, is  being circulated at the request of the 
delegation of the Republic of Korea.  
_______________ 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. With this contribution, the Republic of Korea ("Korea") submits its textual proposal for 
certain provisions of the Annex VIII of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  (the 
"SCM Agreement") to follow up with its prev ious textual proposal dated 22 September 2010
1 and 
conceptual paper dated 24 November 2009.2 
2. As the textual proposal of 22 September 2010 onl y addressed Articles I, II and IV of the 
Chair's Text of November 20073, Korea subsequently submitted supplemental documents to the 
textual proposal relating to other issues in the Ch air's Text.  More specifically, on 4 February 2011 
and 3 March 2011, Korea submitted supplemental c ontributions to complement its September 2010 
textual proposal:  the former addresses the fisher ies management system ("FMS") and the illegal, 
unreported or unregulated ("IUU") fishing4 and the latter concerns the special & differential treatment 
of developing country Members.5 
3. The present contribution is an attempt of Korea to put its conceptual proposals of 4 February 
and 3 March 2011 into a textual form.  As such, th is textual proposal should be read with these 
previous submissions.  This textual proposal addresses Articles III (Special & Differential Treatment of Developing Country Members) and V (Fisheries Management) of the Chair's Text.  In addition, 
this proposal includes a suggestion for a new provision to address IUU fishing. 
                                                     
 
1 Fisheries Subsidies Annex – Articles I, II and IV , Communication from the Republic of Korea, 
TN/RL/GEN/168 (22 Sept. 2010). 
2 Framework of the Discipline of Fisheries Subsidies , Communication from the Republic of Korea, 
TN/RL/W/245 (24 Nov. 2009). 
3 See Fisheries Subsidies Annex – Articles I, II and IV , Communication from the Republic of Korea, 
TN/RL/GEN/168 (22 Sept. 2010), at para. 1. 
4 Fisheries Subsidies Annex – Articles I, II and IV , Communication from the Republic of Korea, 
TN/RL/GEN/168/Suppl.1 (4 Feb. 2011). 
5 Fisheries Subsidies Annex – Articles I, II and IV , Communication from the Republic of Korea, 
TN/RL/GEN/168/Suppl.2 (3 Mar. 2011). TN/RL/GEN/178 
Page 2  
 
  4. This contribution is to facilitate the nego tiations among the Negotiating Group on Rules by 
sharing Korea's views on these issues with other Me mbers.  Korea reserves the right to modify or 
change its position contained in this contributi on depending on the development in the current 
negotiations and modifications of other provisions in the Annex. 
II. BASIC OBJECTIVES OF THE KOREA'S TEXTUAL PROPOSAL 
5. Korea seeks to achieve following obj ectives in this textual proposal: 
• Adjusting the S&D Treatment Provision Depe nding on the Level of Small-Scale De 
Minimis Carve-Out :  To the extent the sensitivities and interest of developing 
Members can be addressed by the small-scale de minimis  exemption, Korea proposes 
proportional changes to the current S&D provisions. 
• Elaborating the FMS Provisions to Pr ovide More Incentives for Effective 
Implementation :  Korea attempts to elaborate elements of the FMS and restructure the 
FMS provisions so as to provide Members w ith appropriate and practical incentives 
to put an effective FMS in place; 
• Addressing the IUU Fishing Problem in an Effective and Practical Manner :  Given 
the significant magnitude of the IUU fishing, Korea proposes a provision that can effectively deter the IUU fishing and address the problem in a more practical manner. 
III. EXPLANATIONS ON THE KEY ELEMENTS OF KOREA'S TEXTUAL PROPOSAL 
6. In order to achieve the above objectives, Kore a has made the following specific changes to 
the Chair's Text.  First, Korea has amended S&D tr eatment provisions in Article III of the Chair's 
Text assuming that the same or a similar level of co mfort zone is provided to the developing Members 
through the prospective de minimis  provision in General Exceptions as proposed by some Members 
including Korea.  Korea has also amended Article V of the Chair's Text to elaborate elements of the 
FMS and divide them into two cate gories (i.e. mandatory elements and additional elements).  Finally, 
Korea has inserted a new draft article for the IUU fishing as a stand-alone provision. 
1. Adjustment of the S&D Treatment Provision (Article III of the Chair's Text)
6 
Interaction between the De Minimis  Provision and the S&D Treatment 
7. Consideration of two factors has prompted Ko rea to propose an adjustment of the S&D 
treatment provision in Article III of the Chair's Text.  One is the urgent necessity for a critical mass of 
major fishing powers to pledge themselves to "sus tainable fishing activities" through an effective 
FMS and the other is apparently increasing c onsensus among Members on the introduction of the 
small-scale de minimis  exemption in the General Exceptions provis ion.  Korea is of the view that the 
two issues are closely intertwined and, preferab ly, should be discussed together under a holistic 
approach.  Careful coordination of  the two provisions may provide a viable alternative that merits 
consideration by the Members. 
                                                      
6 If this provision is added to the Korea's Textual Proposal of 22 September 2010, it will become 
Article IV of the proposal.  TN/RL/GEN/178 
 Page 3 
 
 
  8. The FAO statistics submitted as Attachment 1 of Korea's supplemental document of 
3 March 2011 evidence the urgency of pledging sust ainable fishing activities among a critical mass of 
major fishing powers, regardless of their status as developed or developing Members.  The statistics indicate that among the top 30 fishing countries whic h account for 86.5 per cent of the global total 
catch, at least 20 of them are developing Members.   Apparently, these statistics remind us that the 
objectives of the Annex can be achieved only th rough cooperation from major fishing powers.  
Provided that the conservation of sustainable fish st ocks is the fundamental objective of the Annex, an 
argument therefore can be made that an adjust ment may be necessary concerning the S&D treatment 
in the Chair's Text.
7 
9. In light of this, Korea proposes an approach in  which a critical mass of major fishing powers8, 
whether they are developed or developing Members, recognizes "common responsibility" and 
promises to assume adequate obligations in order to  achieve the objectives of the Annex.  It is 
essential that a critical mass of these major fi shing powers promise to introduce and commit 
themselves to an effective FMS implementation obligation.9 
10. At the same time, any prospective adjustment  in this regard, however, should not undermine 
the S&D treatment as one of the fundamental prin ciples of the Annex, nor should it deprive the 
developing Members (including those with signifi cant fishing power) of the legitimate expectation 
based on the level of current S&D treatment of the Chair's Text.  The legitimate concerns and 
development needs of these developing Members should continue to be adequately addressed. 
11. In Korea's view, the small-scale de minimis  provision to be introduced in the general 
exceptions category should be able to address these concerns of developing Members.  If Members 
agree to provide the developing Members (including  those regarded as major fishing powers) with a 
bigger number (i.e. X+Y) than the one for the de veloped Members (i.e. X) with respect to the 
de minimis  carve-out, a significant portion of the concerns and political sensitivities of the developing 
Members (including those regarded as major fishing powers) should be addressed by the de minimis  
provision.  At the same time, Members could consid er providing a more comfort zone (i.e. X+Y+Z) 
for the SVEs taking into account their peculiar econom ic vulnerability.  Obviously, these numbers can 
be discussed and determined so as to protect the legitimate political sensitivities of developing Members, thereby ensuring cooperation of all Members that is essential to preserving global 
sustainable fisheries.  In return, the developing Members belonging to the critical mass of major fishing powers are required to implement an enhan ced FMS (i.e. FMS with mandatory elements and 
certain additional elements). 
 
                                                     
 
 7 Korea considers that the S&D treatment for develo ping Members is one of the fundamental features 
of the new Fisheries Subsidies Annex.  But at the same time, the S&D treatment should not be devised in a way 
that somehow undermines sustainable fishing activities.  In fact, the ultimate depletion of fish stocks would render the S&D treatment  moot and meaningless in the long run. 
8 A critical mass of major fishing powers should in clude all major fishing co untries whose collective 
catch constitutes an absolute majority (e.g. [90] per cent) of the global marine wild capture in total.  Members 
can continue to discuss to agree on a specific number of  the absolute majority and a reasonable threshold to 
determine which Members should be regarded as belonging to the critical mass. 
9 As to the developing Members that are not regarded as major fishing powers, e.g.  SVEs, some of the 
FMS requirements could be adjusted or lowered in certain circumstances with a longer implementation period, 
as indicated in Attachment 2 of Korea's submission of 3 March 2011. TN/RL/GEN/178 
Page 4  
 
  Articles III.2(a) and III.2(b)(2) 
12. To the extent a significant portion of political sensitivities of developing Members relating to 
artisanal/small-scale fisheries is covered by the prospective small-scale de minimis  provision, Korea 
has made proportional changes to the S&D provision of the Chair's Text.  Consequently, Korea has deleted Article III.2(a) and III.2(b)(2) of the Chair's Text mainly permitting subsidies for 
artisanal/small-scale fisheries, as we believe that these subsidies should be captured by the bigger 
number small-scale de minimis  carve-out for developing Members. 
Article III.2(b)(3) 
13. On the other hand, we have kept Article III.2(b )(3) of the Chair's Text as it is because in our 
view subsidy for vessel construction for EEZ fisher ies within the meaning of Article III.2(b)(3) 
probably will not overlap with the small-scale de minimis  provision. 
Article III.2(b)(1) 
14. Permission for infrastructure subsidies in Article  III.2(b)(1) of the Chair's Text has not been 
changed either since the importance of infrastruct ure establishment and maintenance for developing 
Members is well recognized among the Negotiating Gr oup.  At the same time, reflecting discussions 
in recent negotiation meetings among Members, Korea is  also of the view that infrastructure subsidies 
should be permitted to de veloped Members as well to the extent they are provided for the 
establishment and maintenance of general infrastructur e within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of 
the SCM Agreement. 
15. Permission for income support and price support in Article III.2(b)(1) may be deleted or 
adjusted depending on the level of additional number Y for the de minimis  exemption for developing 
Members.  In addition, considering special economic vulnerability of the SVEs, Members may 
consider permitting income support and price support to the SVEs despite an additional de minimis  
number (i.e. Y+Z) to be given to these Members. 
Articles III and IV 
16. Subsidies arising from further transfer of access rights in Article III.3 and technical 
assistance/capacity building in Article III.4 of the Ch air's Text serve separate and distinct purposes, 
and should remain as they are, regardless of the de minimis  provision. 
FMS Conditionality 
17. Finally and importantly, the de minimis  carve-out should be based on the common pledge 
among Members for an effective FMS.   Thus, the invocation of the de minimis  exemption and S&D 
treatment should be subject to the implementation of  the FMS obligation.  As explained below, Korea 
proposes an amendment to Article V of the Chai r's Text concerning the FMS, which includes a 
different scale of obligations for Members.  De veloping Members including SVEs should implement 
respective FMS requirements in order to invoke the de minimis  exemption and S&D treatment 
provisions.  As explained above, in our view it is particularly important for a critical mass of major 
fishing powers to pledge to have a re liable and verifiable FMS in operation.  TN/RL/GEN/178 
 Page 5 
 
 
  2. Elaboration of the FMS Provision (Article V of the Chair's Text)10 
18. Korea believes that it is the FMS that can actua lly conserve the fish stocks.  There may be 
problems and obstacles for the administration and oper ation of the FMS at a reliable level, but it 
seems to be the only mechanism designed to conserve the fish stocks. 
19. At the same time, it is also true that th e FMS includes various elements of technical 
complexities and that some Members would have diff iculty in fulfilling the relevant requirements in a 
short time frame.  Thus, Members may consider adopting a bifurcated approach to the FMS, where mandatory elements  for an FMS and additional elements  for an FMS are separately listed.  
Attachment 2 of Korea's 4 February 2011 Supplemental Document includes lists for mandatory 
elements  and additional elements .  The lists provided by Korea are merely indicative and Members 
can determine which elements should be included in  which category through discussions.  In light of 
this concept, Korea has broken down Article V of  the Chair's Text into these two categories. 
20. Mindful of the importance of the mobilization of a critical mass for the cause of sustainable 
fishing activities, Korea's textual proposal suggests that major fishing powers including developing 
Members assume the obligation to have an FMS in  place where all mandatory elements and additional 
elements contained in Korea's supplementa l document are adequately incorporated.
11  We note that 
technical assistance and capacity building under Article  III.4 would be particularly meaningful in this 
respect.  In addition, in our view a transition peri od for major fishing powers should be contemplated 
concerning the implementation of the additional el ements.  In the attached textual proposal, we 
propose different transition periods for majo r fishing powers depending on their status. 
21. On the other hand, developing Members othe r than major fishing powers are required to 
implement the mandatory elements of the FMS.  Korea's textual proposal also includes a transition 
period for these members to reflect the reality.  SVEs  are also expected to implement the mandatory 
elements of the FMS, but some of the requireme nt should be lessened or lowered in certain 
circumstances and a longer transition period seems to be necessary b ecause of the peculiar 
vulnerability of these Members.  Korea's textual proposal relating to Article V reflects these 
considerations. 
3. Regulation of the IUU Fishing 
22. In the course of the present negotiations, many Members have confirmed that the IUU fishing 
is one of the significant reasons of global overcap acity and over-fishing.  As such, introducing a 
mechanism to effectively regulate the IUU fishing shou ld remain to be one of the essential tasks of the 
current negotiations. 
23. Although the current Chair's Text stipulates a subsidy for the IUU fishing as one of the 
prohibited categories, in Korea's view probably there is no such subsidy conceptually.  In fact, it is 
hard to imagine that a Member would subsidize the IUU fishing because, by definition, the IUU 
fishing connotes fishing activities occurring in contravention of the laws and regulation.  Therefore, prohibiting "subsidies for the IUU fishing" would be unable to squarely address the IUU fishing 
problem. 
                                                     
 
10 If this provision is added to the Korea's Textual Proposal of 22 September 2010, it will remain as 
Article V. 
11 Given the importance of a common pledge for "sustainable fishing activities," a critical mass of 
major fishing powers including developing Members will have to implement, ultimately, mandatory elements 
and additional elements as illustrated in Korea's supplemental document of 4 February 2011.  At the same time, 
it is also true that the specific situations of developing  Member major fishing powers are different from those of 
developed Members.  So, with respect to the additional el ements, an adequate transition period to be determined 
should be ensured for these Members. TN/RL/GEN/178 
Page 6  
 
  24. More than anything else, the problem of the current approach seems that it is virtually 
impossible for a Member to identify "subsidies" for the IUU fishing in advance, if any, and repeal 
them in a timely fashion when the present Annex com es into force.  As indicated above, a subsidy for 
the IUU fishing has nothing to do with the governmental programme;  rather, such a subsidy only comes into existence when a recipient of a governmental support somehow engages in the IUU 
fishing afterwards.  Consequently, an otherwise permissible governmental measure or policy could 
become a prohibited subsidy simply because some (o r even one) of the recipients are subsequently 
engaged in the IUU fishing by violating applicable laws and regulations, the consequence of which is 
complete withdrawal of the governmental programme  in its entirety under the scheme of the Chair's 
Text. 
25. If Members are not able to confirm which prog rammes of theirs would be implicated from 
this provision in advance with a reliable degree of  certainty, they would be unable to implement the 
obligation under the Annex in good faith.  It is doubtful whether a legal norm that cannot expect 
Members' good faith implementation could survive in the long run. 
26. In our view, the IUU fishing is fundamentally  a law enforcement issue that can be more 
properly addressed in the FMS context.  Based on  this realization, Korea proposes a stand-alone 
provision to address the IUU fishing.  The new ar ticle proposed by Korea imposes an obligation on 
Members to enforce their laws and regulations to  monitor and sanction the IUU fishing taking place 
within their jurisdictions.  Under this idea, non-fulf ilment of such obligation by the Member will then 
be subject to the regulation of the Annex.  Stated differently, with respect to the IUU fishing Members 
will violate the Annex when they let it continue or  when they let the fishworkers engaged in such 
fishing activities receive the governmental assistance  even if they (Members) knew or should have 
known the situations. 
27. The magnitude and destructive nature of the IUU fishing certainly requires an immediate 
response.  In our view, a separate provision imposing an affirmative obligation to detect and punish 
the IUU fishing within the Members' jurisdictions w ill be able to establish an effective and practical 
mechanism to deal with this problem.  
Attached:   Proposed Amendment to the Chair's Text. TN/RL/GEN/178 
 Page 7 
 
 
  [Attachment] 
 
 
Article III 
 
Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Country Members 
 
[Note:  The proposed change below is conditi oned upon the introduction of the small-scale de 
minimis  exemption which addresses the sensitivities and development needs of the developing 
Members at the same or a similar level envi sioned by Article III of the Chair's Text] 
 
III.1 The prohibition of Article 3.1(c) and Article  I shall not apply to least-developed country 
("LDC") Members.  III.2 For developing country Members other than LDC Members, subject to the provisions of 
Article V : 
  (a)
 Subsidies referred to in Article I.1 sha ll not be prohibited where they relate 
exclusively to marine wild capture fishin g performed on an inshore basis (i.e., within 
the territorial waters of the Member) with non -mechanized net -retrieval, provided that 
(1) the activities are carried out on their own behalf by fishworkers, on an individual 
basis which may include family memb ers, or organized in associations;  (2) the catch 
is consumed principally by the fishworker s and their families and the activities do not 
go beyond a small profit trade;  and (3) there is no major employer -employee 
relationship in the activities carried ou t.  Fisheries management measures aimed at 
ensuring sustainability, such as the measures referred to in Article V, should be 
implemented in respect of the fisheries in question, adapte d as necessary to the 
particular situation, including by making use of i ndigenous fisheries management 
institutions and measures.  
  (b)
 In addition, subject to the provisions of Article V:  
 
  (a) (1)  Subsidies referred to in Articles I. 1(d), I.1(e) and I.1(f) shall not be 
prohibited. 
 
[Note:  Subsidies referred to in Articles I.1(e) and I.1(f) may be adjusted 
depending on the level of the de minimis exemption.] 
 
  (2)  Subsidies referred to in Article I.1(a)  and I.1(c) shall not be prohibited 
provided that they are used exclusively for marine wild capture fishing 
employing decke d vessels not greater than 10 meters or 34 feet in length 
overall, or undecked vessels of any length.  
 TN/RL/GEN/178 
Page 8  
 
    (b) (3)
 For fishing and service vessels of such Members  other than the vessels 
referred to in paragraph (b)(2) , subsidies referred to in Article I.1(a) shall not 
be prohibited provided that (i) the vessels are used exclusively for marine wild capture fishing activities of such  Members in respect of particular, 
identified target stocks within their Exclusive Economic Zones ("EEZ");  (ii) 
those stocks have been subject to pr ior scientific status assessment conducted 
in accordance with relevant internationa l standards, aimed at ensuring that the 
resulting capacity does not exceed a sustainable level;  and (iii) that assessment has been subject to peer review in the relevant body of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization ("FAO").
12 
 
III.3 Subsidies referred to in Article I.1(g) shall not be prohibited where the fishery in question is 
within the EEZ of a developing country Member, pr ovided that the agreement pursuant to which the 
rights have been acquired is made  public, and contains provisions d esigned to prevent overfishing in 
the area covered by the agreement based on intern ationally-recognized best practices for fisheries 
management and conservation as reflected in the re levant provisions of international instruments 
aimed at ensuring the sustainable use and conservation of marine species, such as, inter alia , the 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions  of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks ("Fish Stocks Agreement "), the Code of Conduct on 
Responsible Fisheries of the Food and Agriculture Organization ("Code of Conduct "), the Agreement 
to Promote Compliance with International C onservation and Management Measures by Fishing 
Vessels on the High Seas ("Compliance Agreement "), and technical guidelines and plans of action 
(including criteria and precautionary reference points) for the implementation of these instruments, or other related or successor instruments.  These provi sions shall include requirements and support for 
science-based stock assessment before fishing is und ertaken pursuant to the agreement and for regular 
assessments thereafter, for management and control measures, for vessel registries, for reporting of 
effort, catches and discards to the national authorities of the host Member and to relevant international 
organizations, and for such othe r measures as may be appropriate. 
 III.4 Members shall give due regard to the needs of developing country Members
13 in complying 
with the requirements of this Annex, including the conditions and criteria set forth in this Article and 
in Article V, and shall establish mechanisms for, a nd facilitate, the provision of technical assistance in 
this regard, bilaterally and/ or through the appropriate international organizations. 
  
                                                     
 
12 If the Member in question is not a member of the FAO, the peer review shall take place in another 
recognized and competent in ternational organization. 
13 In particular, due regard shall be taken of the special circumstances of certain developing country 
Members whose respective share of world NAMA trade is  less than 0.1 % and whose respective percentage 
share of the global marine wild capture fishing is less than [a number to be determined] %.   TN/RL/GEN/178 
 Page 9 
 
 
  Article V 
 
Fisheries Management14 
 
[Note:  As with Article III, the proposed change  below is conditioned upon the introduction of 
the small-scale de minimis  exemption which sufficiently addresses the sensitivities and 
development needs of the developing Members.]  
 
V.1 Any Member granting or maintaining an y subsidy as referred to in Article II or 
Article III.2(b)  shall operate a fisheries management system regulating marine wild capture fishing 
within its jurisdiction, designed to prevent overfish ing.  Such management system shall be based on 
internationally-recognized best pr actices for fisheries management and conservation as reflected in the 
relevant provisions of international instruments aimed at ensuring the sustainable use and conservation of marine species, such as, inter alia , the Fish Stocks Agreement , the Code of Conduct , 
the Compliance Agreement , technical guidelines and plans of action (including criteria and 
precautionary reference points) for the implementa tion of these instruments, or other related or 
successor instruments.  V.2
 The fisheries management  system in paragraph 1 shall include the following as mandatory 
elements:  regular science -based stock assessment, as well as capacity and effort management 
measures, including harvesting licences or fees;  vessel registries;  establishment and allocation of 
fishing rights, or all ocation of exclusive quotas to vessels, i ndividuals and/or groups, and related 
enforcement mechanisms;  species -specific quotas, seasons and othe r stock management measures ;  
vessel monitoring which could include electronic tracking and on -board observers;   systems for 
reporting in a timely and reliable manner to th e competent national authorities and relevant 
international organizations data on effort, catch  and discards in sufficient detail to allow sound 
analysis;  and research and other measures related  to conservation and stock maintenance and 
replenishment.  
 
(a) regular scientific assessments of fish stocks including precautionary reference points or their 
proxies;  
 
(b) mechanisms for the regular collection of and readily available public access to data on catches  
(including discards), fishing effort and fish si ze compositions in sufficient detail to allow 
sound analysis of trends in fishing intensity and stock health;  
 
(c) regular assessments of the capacity of the Memb er's fishing fleets and a plan for managing  
capacity consistent with the FAO International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing 
Capacity;  
 
(d) measures regulating fishing effort that are d esigned to maintain populations of harvested 
species at levels no lower than necessary to  produce a total allowable catch, taking into 
account ecosystem interactions where applicable;  
 
(e) requirements that all vessels have licenses and be registered in a national registry and, where 
applicable, international registry, that  are readily available to the public;  
 
(f) judicial and administrative measures to ensure  compliance with the a pplicable management 
system including an inspection scheme at port and sea;  
                                                      
14 Developing country Members shall be free to implement and operate these management 
requirements on a regional rather than a national basis provided that all of the requirements are fulfilled in 
respect of and by each Member in the region. TN/RL/GEN/178 
Page 10  
 
   
(g) measures to detect, prevent and eliminate IUU fishing activities;
 
 
(h) in the case of shared, straddling, highly migratory and discrete high seas stocks, measures  
requiring cooperation with other parties and c ooperating non-parties in the fishery and the 
relevant regional fisheries management organization.  
 except that the fisheries management system main tained and operated by cer tain developing country 
Members15 shall only include subparagraphs [ e.g., (x,)(y),(z)] above as mandatory elements, and 
provided that developing country Members shall have  [four] years and the said certain developing 
country Members shall have [six] years from the date of entry into force of this Annex to incorporate 
above elements into their fisheries management systems.  
 
[Note:  These elements and the number of year s in the brackets are illustrative and can be 
adjusted or changed through discussions among Members.] 
 
V.3 In addition, Members other than LDC Member s or developing country Members, and certain 
designated Members16 shall implement following additiona l elements through their fisheries 
management systems;  
 
(a) establishment of long-term management objectiv es with specific management actions through 
the creation of a fisheries management plan or other management frameworks;  
 
(b) mechanisms to ensure regular collection of and readily available public access to data on 
biological samples such as stomach contents , otoliths, gonads, as well as data on bycatch and 
discards to allow a more intensive analysis of  trends in the stock and ecosystem health;  
 
(c) research and other relevant activities relate d to stock conservation, maintenance and 
replenishment;  
 
(d) allocation of exclusive quotas to vessels, individuals and/or groups;  
 
(e) measures to deter destructive fishing practices, including high seas driftnet fishing;  
 
(f) measures to minimize waste, discards, catch by lost or abandoned gear, bycatch, and negative 
impact on associated or dependent species, in particular endangered species, which include 
restrictions on the use of fishing gear or mesh size and establishment of closed seasons and/or 
areas;  
 
(g) enhancement of transparency in the course of operating a fisheries management system and in  
related decision-making process;  
 
                                                      
15 For the purpose of this Annex, the term certain developing country Members shall mean developing 
country Members whose resp ective share of the world NAMA trade is less than 0.1 per cent and whose 
respective percentage share of the global marine wild capture fishing is less than [a number to be 
determined] per cent.  
16 For the purpose of this Annex, the term certain  designated Members sha ll mean Members that are 
listed in the FAO statistics for marine wild capture fish ing as countries collectivel y accounting for [90] per cent  
of the global catch in terms of weight.  This number shall represent a critical mass of global fishing powers for 
the purpose of maintaining sustainable fishing activities.  The Members belonging to this category shall be 
updated by the available FAO statistics on a regular basis.  [Note:  The Number in the bracket will be 
determined through discussions among Members.]   TN/RL/GEN/178 
 Page 11 
 
 
  (h) vessel monitoring system, on-board observers and catch tracking system;  
 
(i) transhipment control at sea;  
 
(j) measures to strengthen enforcement of domestic la ws and regulations to prevent or eliminate 
overcapacity and over-fishing.  
 within [two] years in the case of Members other than LDC Members or developing country Members 
and [four] years in the case of certain designated Members that are developing Members, from the 
date of entry into force of this Annex.  
 
[Note:  These elements and the number of year s in the brackets are illustrative and can be 
adjusted or changed through discussions among Members.] 
 
V.4 In operating fisheries management systems,  To this end, the Member shall adopt and 
implement pertine nt domestic legislation and administrative or judicial enforcement mechanisms.  I it 
is desirable that such fisheries management systems be based on limited access privileges.17  
Information as to the nature and operation of these systems, including the results of the stock assessments performed, shall be notified to the relevant  body of the FAO, where it shall be subject to 
peer review prior to the granting of the subsidy.
18  References for such legislation and mechanism, 
including for any modifications thereto, sha ll be notified to the Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures ("the Committee") pursuan t to the provisions of Article VI.4. 
 V.5
 V.2 Each Member shall maintain an enquiry point  to answer all reasonable enquiries from other 
Members and from interested parties in other Members concerning its fisheries management system, including measures in place to address fishing capacity  and fishing effort, and the biological status of 
the fisheries in question.  Each Member shall no tify to the Committee contact information for this 
enquiry point.   
Article [X]
 
 
Regulation of the Illegal, Unreported or Unregulated Fishing  
 
X.1 Members shall have effective legal and ad ministrative procedures to detect, prevent and 
eliminate illegal, unreported or unregulated fish ing.  Such procedures shall include criminal 
prosecution and administrative penalties, as the case may be, without prejudice to related 
constitutional or legal requirements in general.  
 X.2 Members shall ensure that fishermen engaged in  the illegal, unreported or unregulated fishing 
forfeit any benefit conferred on them by a governme ntal program and lose the eligibility for similar 
governmental programs for a designated period of time.  
 
                                                      
17 Limited access privileges could incl ude, as appropriate to a given fishery, community-based rights 
systems, spatial or territorial rights systems, or individual quota systems, including individual transferable 
quotas. 
18 If the Member in question is not a member of the FAO, the notification for peer review shall be to 
another relevant international organization.  The specific information to be notified shall be determined by the 
relevant body of the FAO or such other organization. TN/RL/GEN/178 
Page 12  
 
  X.3 Members that know or should have known th at illegal, unreported or unregulated fishing 
takes place within their jurisdiction relating to a governmental program but fail to enforce relevant 
laws and regulations shall be c onsidered to have conferred proh ibited subsidies or caused adverse 
effect, as the case may be, within the meaning of the relevant provisions of this Annex.  
 
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